A 516167 U _-- fiSf0  0.55 TRAIN LENGTHS HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SEVENTY-FIFTH CONGRESS THIRD SESSION ON S 69 TO AMEND AN ACT ENTITLED "AN ACT TO REGULATE COMMERCE ", APPROVED FEBRUARY 4, 1887, AS AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTED, BY LIMITING FREIGHT OR OTHER TRAINS TO SEVENTY CARS JANUARY 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28 FEBRUARY 1, 2, 3. 4, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18 MARCH 1, 2, 3, 4, 17, 18 Printed for the use of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFI WASRINUTON:1938  TRAIN LENGTHS HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SEVtNTY-FIFTH CONGRESS THIRD SESSION ON S.69 TO AMEND AN ACT ENTITLED "AN ACT TO REGULATE COMMERCE", APPROVED FEBRUARY 4, 1887, AS AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTED, BY LIMITING FREIGHT OR OTHER TRAINS TO SEVENTY CARS JANUARY 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28 FEBRUARY 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18 MARCH 1, 2, 3, 4, 17, 18 Printed for the use of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 47891 WASHINGTON : 1988 COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCN CLARENCE F. LEA, California, Chairman ROBERT CROSSER. Ohio ALFRED L. BUEWINKLE, North Carolina VIRGIL CHAPMAN, Kentucky PAUL H. MALONEY, Louisiana WILLIAM P. COLE, Ja., Maryland SAMUEL B. PETTENGILL, Indiana EDWARD A. KELLY, Illinois GEORGE G. SADOWSKI, Michigan JOHN A. MARTIN, Colorado EDWARD C. EICHER, Iowa THOMAS J, O'BRIEN, Illinois HERRON PEARSON, Tennessee JERRY J. O'CONNELL, Montana GEORGE B. KELLY, New York LYLE H. BOREN, Oklahoma MARTIN J. KENNEDY, New York JAMES L. QUINN, Pennsylvania EDWARD L. O'NEILL, New Jersey CARL E. MAPES, Michigan CHARLES A. WOLVEItTON, New Jersey JAMES WOLFENDEN, Pennsylvania PEHR G. HOLMES, Massachusetts B. CARROLL REECE, Tennessee JAMES W. WADSWORTH, New York CHARLES A. HALLECK, Indiana GARDNER R. WITHROW, Wisconsin ELTON J. LAYTON, Clerk F. P. RANDOLPH, Assistant Clerk H CONTENTS Statements of- Page Corbett, John T---------------------------------------- 2,29, 1026 Johnson, W. D-------------------------- 40, 55, 85, 177, 347, 1050, 1059 Rice, Hubert L----------------------------------------------- 156 Hunt, John Sylvester-------------------------------------- 159 Kelly, Harry H------------------------------------------- 164 Towell, J. T------------------------------------------------- 167 Farquharson, J. A------------------------- 197, 225, 280, 331, 349, 1078 Schaiffter, C. 1I----------------------------------------------- 257 Carter, W. A___--------------------------------------------- 313 Ezelle, C. V.---------------------------_.--------------------315 Hughes, H. U------------------------------------------------ 321 Beach, E.mmnett T1----------------- - ---------------------- 323 Sullivan, E. J------------------------------------------------ 325 Wilhelm, Charles Thomas---------__-----------------------330 Lovell, Arthur J----------------------------------------- 347, 1105 Fort, J. Carter---------------------------------- 360, 385, 413, 1016 Booth, Henley C------------------------------------- 421, 443,523 Sullivan, J. J------------------------------------------------- 537, 57t, 599 Brown, R. W_---------------------------------------628, 630 IDay, William H---------------------------------------------- 655 Keeler, John B------------------------------------------------ -662Sti p C.T--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 68Se a ,Ch s A - - - - - - - - --- - --- - - - - - - - - - 67 Stripp, C.h ---------------------------------------------- 668 SetChasaiJ A_-------------- ------ ------------------------674 Wrighithn A.D----------------------------------------------773 Caber lainB-J.-------------------------------------------67 GrifithGerg M - _------------------------------------------ 703 Barbtder, lvi B---------------------------------------------7204 Hohcleric, C. --------------------------------------------- 720 Elickn, C.r S------------------------------------------------ 727 Dean, Allen ------------------------------------------------- 734 Williams, Samuel H-----------------------------------------__ 736 Macleay, Donald--------------------------------------------- 737 Guerke, P. F----------------------------------------------- 738 Newton, Cleveland A----------------------------------------- 739 Culbertson, Win. S------------------------------------------- 740 Botsford, Samuel B-----------------------------------------__ 741 Renshaw, Fred M-------------------------------------------- 742 IHabermann, Rudolph---------------------------------__ ------744 Seat, Charles R----------------------------------------------- 746 Smythe, M. A---------------------------------------------- 748 Davy, J. R------------------------------------------------ 750 Brown, Andrew H-------------------------------------------- 753 Underwood, J.J J--------------------------------------------- 758 Williams, Neal E..B--.--- -------------------------------------- 760 Bryan, J. E-------------------------------------------------- 763 Conaway, Chas. H------------------------------------------- 767 Neekamp, C. .J---..-------------------------------- ----771 Goodyear, C.J J-------------------------- _----------------- 791 Vogtle, Alvin W----------------------------------------------- 79q, Callahan, Donald A------------------------------------------- 805 rScott, John B------------------------------------------------ 806 Estes, F. F-------------------------------------------------- 808 Brenckman, Fred-------------------------------------------- 809 Brown, R. W----------------------------------------------- 827 Hood, J. M------------------------ -------------------- 845. Parmelee, J. H-------------------------------------- 84,857, 1111. III IV CONTENTS Statements of-Continued. Page. Symes, JamesM M......---- ....--. . ..-- 888 Metzman, Gustav. - .......- ...--...---------------...--- 895 Rill, J. C-----------.---------------------------------------905 Mahoney, J. J---------------------------------------------917 O'Brien, Wm. J--------------------------------------------926 Van Horn, C. W-------------------.--.. ----------------------935 Dorety, F. G--.-------------------------------------------947 Beale, F. D...-----------------------------------------------976 Mason, Burton---------------------------------------------991 Cunningham, P. 8_.:..-------------....__-_-------------------- 1000 Bergen, E. Von_--------------------- ----------..---------1009 Communications from- Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce------------------------------666 Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co---------------------- 673 Bay City Chamber of Commerce-------------------------------682 Saginaw Board of Commerce----------------------------------683 Blue Ridge Glass Corporation. ..--------------------------------- 684 Appalachian Traffic Club-------------------------------------685 General Timber Service, Inc----------------------------------688 Hon. Ira Walton Drew .. ..--------------------------------------690 American Cotton Cooperative Association--.-----........-.-...---------691 American Paper and Pulp Association---.. ----....---_--... _ __ _..- 691 National Association of Manufacturers---.--........... _ _ _ .-........--.---..- 694 Buffalo Chamber of Commerce_. ----------------------------------- 743 Wisconsin Manufacturers Association--.----------------.....-.-...-.....--- 752 Manitowoc Chamber of Commerce----------------------------- 752 Hon. Norman R. Hamilton---.--------------------------------779 General Steel Castings Corporation-----------------------------781 Indiana State Chamber of Commerce..----------------------------782 Hon. Francis D. Culkin.--------------------------------------784 Albany Chamber of Commerce-------.------------------------- 784 Newark Chamber of Commerce--------------------------------787 Toledo Chamber of Commerce--------_......-.--..--.--..----. 788 Watertown Chamber of Commerce.-----------------------------789 National Cooperative Council---------------------------------819 United States Livestock Association----------------------------- 1013 Briefs: Nevada Train Limit Case------------------------------------475 TRAIN LENGTHS TUESDAY, JANUARY 11, 1938 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CoMMrEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a. m., in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence Lea (chairman) presiding. The CHAnRMAN. The committee will please come to order. We are met this morning for a hearing on S. 69, known and com- monly referred to as the train-length bill. A number of similar measures have been introduced in the House, the first of which was by Mr. Griswold, of Indiana, introduced on the 5th of January 1937. Mr. Griswold introduced a similar bill in a former Congress, on which hearings were partially held in 1935. There was a similar bill introduced by Mr. O'Connell, of Montana, and one by Mr. Withrow, a member of the committee, and by Mr. Scrugham, of Nevada. We do not have a very large attendance of the members of the committee as yet, but it will be the policy of the committee so far as possible to begin the hearings promptly, and we hope that that will lead to a better attendance of the committee. (The bill above referred to, S. 69, is as follows:) [S. 69, 75th Cong., 1st seas.] AN ACT To amend an Act entitled "An Act to regulate commerce," approved February 4, 1887, as amended and supplemented, by limiting freight or other trains to seventy cars Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Act entitled "An Act to regulate commerce," approved February 4, 1887, as amended and supplemented, be fur- ther amended by the addition thereto of a new section designated as "Section 26a," reading as follows: "SEC. 26a. After July 1, 1938, it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter to run, or permit to be run, over its line or road, or any portion thereof, any train consisting of more than seventy freight or other cars, exclusive of caboose : Provided, That this Act shall not apply in cases of engine failures between terminals or to other mechanical failure on the line of road: Provided further, That in claiming an exception for such an emergency the burden shall be upon the railroad to show that it has acted in the exercise of diligence and good faith." Passed the Senate July 22 (calendar day, July 26), 1937. Attest: EDwIN A. HALSEY, Secretary 1 TRAIN LENGTHS STATEMENT OF JOHN T. CORBETT, ASSISTANT GRAND CHIEF ENGINEER, N A T I O N A L LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS, WASHINGTON, D. C. The CHAIRMAN. The first witness will be Mr. John T. Corbett, for the proponents of the bill. Mr. CoRBETr. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appear in favor of the provisions of bill No. S. 69, which are that- After July 1, 1938, it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter to run, or permit to be run, over its line or road, or any portion thereof, any train consisting of more than seventy freight or other cars, exclusive of caboose : Provided, that this Act shall not apply in cases of engine failures between terminals or to any other mechanical failure on the line or road: Provided further, that in claiming an exception for such an emergency the burden shall be upon the railroad to show that it has acted in the exercise of diligence and good faith. It is the sincere wish of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers that this bill may receive the favorable consideration of your com- mittee and that it may be passed by the House of Representatives with a vote as nearly unanimous as it received in the Senate of the United States. Full appreciation has been given to the fact that the provisions of this bill would not provide for as beneficial safety conditions as would the provisions of H. R. 147, introduced by Congressman Gris- wold, or H. R. 4891, introduced by Congressman O'Connell, as those bills provide for lengths of either 70 cars, or one-half mile, whichever would be the lesser, as the length of freight trains and they have the additional restriction of 14 cars for passenger trains. The provi- sions of these last mentioned bills received the approval of the train service brotherhoods during the Seventy-second Congress-they were introduced in the Seventy-third Congress-in the Seventy-fourth Congress and, as mentioned, are before the present Congress. How- ever, as bill S. 69 has been passed by the Senate, almost unanimously, we are agreeable to accepting its compromise provisions but retain our belief that the half-mile restriction provided in the other bills should be considered as the more desirable because of their greater safety features. We are appearing as experienced men who have spent our lives in the handling of trains of all kinds and lengths and, as the result of our own personal experiences, from the statements made to us by thousands of others who have spent their lives in the handling of trains-and from the records of the accidents caused by the slack action of these excessively long trains-we have become convinced that the safety of our fellow workers, the safety of the traveling public and the best interests of that public, of the railroads them- selves, and of our train-service employees will be best served by a Federal act that shall provide for train lengths at least as restrictive as are provided for in bill S. 69. During the last several weeks the magazines of the country have carried advertisements that appeared over the name of the American Association of Railroads. I have taken it upon myself to secure a copy of the Saturday Evening Post of December 18, 1937, and a copy of the same magazine dated January 8, 1938, for each member TRAIN LENGTHS 3 of the committee and it seems proper to take a few minutes to give consideration to the expressions contained in these and similar adver- tisements that have been mentioned. The headline of the advertise- ment of January 8, 1938-"It's your future as well as ours." The locomotive engineers desire to offer the suggestion that the remark shall be changed and that we may be permitted to say, "It is our future as well as yours." We believe that there has been too much of a tendency to p lace dollar values ahead of the values of the wel- fare and safety of the railroad workers. We believe that the future of both the railroads and their employees may be best served by a better recognition of the appeals that have been made-and that continue to be made by the railroad workers for safer and improved working conditions. At the lower right-hand corner of the advertisement there appears the present slogan of the Association of American Railroads, "Safety first-Friendliness, too." We believe that the arrangement of the advertisement is poorly constructed. We believe that their most wonderful slogan should be the most prominent part of their article and we shall hope that those railroads that have become associated in this organization may be fully consistent and that they may realize that their slogan "Safety first" means more t-o their employees in train service than they realize and that the endeavors to secure some restriction in the lengths of trains has been presented because of the injuries and deaths of many thousands of train service employees because of the accidents caused by these long trains. The second advertisement appears in the magazine of December 18, 1937. We have given it considerable attention. It appears over the name of the Association of American Railroads. It begins with a sort of scarehead, "Do you want to go back"? Then, in the first paragraph there appears some reference to a period 70 years ago. We have wondered why they have selected such a time. We have wondered if the Association of American Railroads, themselves, would care to return to that period in the history of some of those railroads that are at present a part of that association and erase some of those historical smells that were created by the railroad financiers of that time. There was no Association of American Railroads 70 years ago, in 1867, but there was an active railroad labor organization named the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. It was organized some years before 1867 because the locomotive engineers of that time became convinced that it was only through cooperative action that they could hope to secure any relief from the unpleasant and dangerous working conditions that the railroad managements of that time endeavored to compel their employees to accept. We believe that the American Association of Railroads must realize that there is no "going back." The railroad employees have secured the passage of many laws that provide for better safety conditions and we believe that the American railroads appreciate the fact that those remedial laws have returned the railroads enough benefits to show proper returns on their original costs. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers has been a pioneer in the presentation of proposals for safety. We shall hope that the Aj. TRAIN LENGTHS American railroads may continue to move forward-but with safety at all times. The Association of American Railroads should appreciate the fact that there can be no going backward in the manner in which they provide service. The American public has long been awake to conditions connected with the transportation service and we believe it proper to assume that-if and when-the American railroads lead themselves to believe that they may go backward in service in order to go forward in the making of payments to their security holders-- the American public-and the Americain Government may decide that the transportation systems shall be taken over by the Government and be operated for the benefit of that American public that has always been called on to pay the bills. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers has not considered it as advisable to indorse Government ownership of railroads. However, they have observed that the socialization of our different branches of education, the grade schools, our high schools, and our State uni- versities provide the best of facilities for the education of our chil- dren-they have observed that our fire departments, our police de- partments, our Federal Bureau of Investigation together with our Post Office Department with hundreds of other public departments have presented proof that it may be possible that the socialization of all transportation systems might be desirable as a matter of public convenience and necessity. Our organization shall hope that the American railroads may accept the request of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers that there may be a cooperative effort to pro- vide the best transportation service that the American public may want-always with safety. We believe that the passage of bill S. 69 should be considered as absolutely necessary as the first move in that direction. We shall expect that you may find it convenient to cooperate in a con- tinuation of the demands of the railroad employees-"Go ahead and we are with you." The second paragraph deals with some reference to wages. The unit of measurement on the railroads is the ton-mile in freight serv- ice and the passenger-mile in passenger service. It is true that the daily rate of pay for a locomotive engineer today appears as more than was paid 40 years ago. However, on the ton-mile piece-rate scale, the locomotive engineer was receiving less per ton-mile in 1937 than he did in 1897. That same paragraph makes reference to improved safety condi- tions. That statement is true but we believe it proper to make fur- ther reference to how those safety measures were secured, later on in this statement. There is a reference in the third paragraph to the, "modern tracks with heavy rails." There have been some such improvements. Then, there has come to my attention the report made by an inspector of the Bureau of Locomotive Inspection who had been assigned to make an investigation of a locomotive that had been reported as "hard riding." That inspector expressed the opinion that the locomotive was in good mechanical condition, but that, in his opinion, the trouble was caused by the poor condition of the tracks the locomotive was as- signed to run over. This is mentioned so that the members of this committee may understand that all tracks are not "modern." Neither TRAIN LENGTHS 5 are they equipped with heavy rails. It might be added that this rail- road can be reached in but a few hours' ride from the Capitol. The advertisement follows with the fossilized expression that we have heard from the railroads for all the years that the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers has dealt with them. We must challenge their claims on every count they have mentioned. We resent the ap- parent accusation that our endeavors to secure safer working condi- tions should be considered as any movement to retard safety, service, efficiency or, if proper attention is given to the improved conditions and service, its economy. Some weeks ago I received letters informing me that there were attempts being made by the railroad officers in different districts to have certain employees send letters to the Congress in opposition to the provisions of bill S. 69. We have interpreted the last line of this advertisement as a sort of public appeal for a spread of that "letter writing." We must take a special exception to the claim that "accidents to employees have been reduced by nearly three-fourths." It is true that during the depression, when trains were being run with lowered tonnage, there was a slight dropping off in the number of accidents to the employees but with the increase in business there was a noticeable increase in such accidents and proper evidence to sustain these state- ments will be supplied. The railroad brotherhoods could not hope to finance any adver- tising campaign in competition with the Association of American Railroads and I have considered it as necessary to provide these remarks as a rebuttal to such advertising. Our present endeavor to secure assistance from Congress in our efforts to secure safer and better working conditions is not something without many precedents. Because of the peculiar attitude of many railroads of placing dollar values ahead of the values placed on the safety and health of their employees there have been numerous occa- sions on which the railroad employees have found it necessary to appeal to Congress for the consideration of their unsafe and un- pleasant working conditions and it has been with real satisfaction that we have witnessed the intelligence and humanity of each of those Congresses to which we have made appeals, by their recognition of our conditions and their passage of proper legislative measures for our relief. We shall most earnestly hope that this committee and the present Congress may be added to the list of those that have pro- vided such relief by passage of bill S. 69. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers fully appreciates the fact that there are safer working conditions provided for railroad employees than were in effect in the early sixties when our organiza- tion was first started, but the records of our organization during these many years shows that there were but few of these measures passed without opposition from the railroads. The railroads not only did their utmost to oppose passage of these laws, but they endeavored by every means of court procedure to prevent proper administration of many of these laws after they had been passed by the Congress or by the legislatures of the different States. When those working on trains were losing their fingers, their arms, and, in far too many instances, their lives because of the danger- ous use of the old link and pin couplers there was no proper recogni- TRAIN LENGTHS tion of those conditions by the railroads and it was only through a Federal act that compelled the railroads to adopt the so-called auto- matic coupler that the railroad employees were relieved of the dan- gers of the old couplers. That legislation was opposed by the rail- roads. Their representatives at that time expressed the prediction that the cost would be so high that the railroads would all become bankrupt. It is a peculiar twist in the evolution of railroading that compels us to now stop and take notice of the fact that it is through the use of these same automatic couplers that the railroads have been able to haul the excessively long and heavy trains that they desire to continue operating. There arose the same opposition from the railroads when their employees requested the installation of air brakes as a part of the equipment on locomotives and cars and, again, it was only through the passage of a Federal act that the present air-brake equipment was ordered as a requirement for the equipment of locomotives and cars. The records of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers shows that there was continued opposition by the railroads to the proposal to have locomotives equipped with electric headlights. There was continued opposition, including court action through the United States Supreme Court, in opposition to the proposal that those railroad employees who were employed on locomotives in cold weather, in the northern districts, should be provided the protection of vestibule cabs or some proper protective cab curtains. There has been continued opposition from the railroads to the pro- posal that the larger locomotives should be equipped with power reverse apparatus and mechanical stokers and it has necessitated the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars and continued hear- ings to finally secure these beneficial equipments for locomotives. There was opposition to the proposal that the Interstate Com- merce Commission should be properly authorized to make inspections of locomotives and that the Commission might be authorized to order defective locomotives out of service until the necessary repairs might be made. I feel fully justified in expressing the belief that each and every one of these improvements has resulted in big financial returns to the railroads that formerly opposed them and we believe that the pass- age of bill S. 69 will result in equally good returns to these same rail- roads. There never has been a more expert group of craftsmen than those I have the honor to represent. There never has been a group of workers that have rendered better service to their employers than has been given by railroad employees, especially those who have been engaged in the operation of trains. They have, one and all, accepted the responsibilities of a work that has always been considered as haz- ardous, and they have always delivered the goods in the highest man- ner of efficiency possible. These men, with their century of ac- complishments behind them, resent the accusation that they have any desire or intention of stopping rail progress. I am authorized to speak for but one organization but I can assure the Association of American Railroads that the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers stand ready to assist the railroads of the country in providing better service than is being provided or than can be provided under the mistaken idea that only the greatest UVRAIN LENGTHS 7 length of trains will provide for returns to those who have invested in the securities of the railroads. Our experiences and the remarks made to us by many former patrons of the railroads leads us to believe that the railroads have made errors in holding cars of merchandise at terminals for long periods of time in order to permit the maximum tonnage that the largest locomotives can haul to accumulate. We believe that the shorter, and faster, trains will relieve terminal congestion and will deliver merchandise to its destination far more rapidly than is being done through the use of extra-long and slowly moving trains. I believe I am fully justified in making the statement that there is not a single railroad in this country that has not lost the greater part of their local freight business. It is quite probable that the greater portion of this business has been transferred to the trucking carriers. It is the local freight that provides the greatest income per hundred pounds. We believe that much of this business might be returned to the railroads through the use of the shorter and faster trains and, possibly, with the extension of the "door to door" service. The trucks have not found it necessary to adopt equipment that will handle several thousand of tons at a time. During the last several years the Interstate Commerce Commis- sion has received petitions from the railroads for permission to abandon tracks. It is noticeable that there was none of these peti- tions that gave as its reason for asking for the abandonment that it couldn't continue because it couldn't make use of large enough locomotives. There were numerous cases in which there was the expression "truck competition" and, again, these trucks are not equipped for handling thousands of tons or the equivalent of more than 70 cars, at a time. The new passenger equipment that has been placed in operation by many of the railroads and that is lighter and permits of faster operation than some of the older equipment should serve as a revela- tion to railroad managements as to what can be done through the use of smaller and faster trains-run more often-but that run- instead of waiting for another car to make up some maximum tonnage allotment. We believe that the American public will show a far better ap- preciation of faster-moving freight trains than they have of the former practice of leaving cars for many hours at terminals to complete the tonnage allotments of any locomotive. The locomotive engineers will cooperate with the railroad man- agements in any efforts that may be proposed so that this better service may be provided. We shall hope for a cooperation that will permit us to move forward with safety. We are sincere in our beliefs that the enactment of bill S. 69 should be accepted as the first step in our proposed program. We do not feel that the limitation of 70 cars will eliminate all train accidents but we do believe that such a limitation must result in a large reduction of those accidents that are being caused by slack action and we believe that where accidents do occur in trains of 70 cars or less such accidents will not be as severe as have been experienced by train-service employees who have been injured at the rear end of excessively long trains. 8 TRAIN LENGTHS There is one safety feature of this legislation that has not been given proper consideration. In the handling of trains the em- ployees endeavor to express their desire for some movement of that portion of the train that is coupled to the locomotive through the use of signals. In the daylight these signals are given by hand. At night they are given by movements of signal lanterns. The distances at which these signals may be properly interpreted must vary according to the condition of the atmosphere and the location of tracks and their adjacent buildings, cars, or other objects. After nearly 40 years of service on locomotives, from my own experiences, from remarks made by trainmen I have worked with, and from remarks made by other locomotive engineers, I believe I am fully justified in making the statement that it is very seldom that signals can be properly interpreted at a distance of 70 cars. The practice is, generally, to station members of the train crew at different places in the train and to have one employee relay the signal for movements to the next one nearer the locomotive. The trainmen are expected to watch their trains, both on their own track and on other adjacent tracks so that they may give a proper signal to the loco- motive engineer in case there is something wrong noticed. There have been numerous, costly, accidents and wrecks because, on account of the length of the train, those at the rear end could not give a proper signal to the locomotive engineer. If there is any question in connection with the above statements on the interpretation of signals I shall be pleased to join with any members of the committee-with members of those representing the carriers-or with any other group that may desire to make the test of such conditions. If, and when, such tests are conducted full oppor- tunities should be had to make them in different atmospheric condi- tions, at some different times of the day, at night, and under condi- tions as generally experienced on the railroads which must include fast-moving trains, both in the daytime and at night. Some scien- tific decision as to the average distance of proper visibility should be of value. As we have heard of some rather peculiar statements as having been advanced by those who have expressed some slight opposition to the provisions of bill S. 69 and as there were some of those expressed by the opposition while the bill was before the Senate for considera- tion it seems proper to take up the one reason that seemed to be the main topic of the opposition. I refer to those remarks concern- ing the conditions that might be presented if the railroads discon- tinued the use of their extremely long trains. It was stated that the change must create more highway-crossing hazards. Certain advertisements that have appeared in the campaign that has been adopted by the Association of American Railroads would lead us to believe that they may present such statements before this committee. Such a statement, from its very nature, and expressed by concerns that are endeavoring to secure a greater volume of busi- ness, appears as most nonsensical. If that protest of the carriers should be credited with any reason- ableness-there must follow the assumption that the best way to eliminate crossing accidents, or hazards, would be to give the rail- roads as little business as possible so that they could move as few trains as possible. We consider such a position as untenable. TRAIN LENGTHS 9 There can be no class of citizens that feel more objection to cross- ing accidents than the locomotive engineers do, for they are the ones that are called upon to give a recital of the things that may have caused the accident, and it is they who are called on to clear away the wreckage, remove the injured and see that they are provided assistance. Again, because of the large number of deaths that have been experienced by the locomotive engineers, themselves, through derailments of their locomotives, they have the greatest interest in the crossing-accident hazard. I happen to be one of those unfortunate locomotive engineers who has crashed an automobile at a highway crossing. Because it prob- ably reveals the reason for many similar accidents it seems proper to have this statement contain what was reported at the coroner's inq nest. It was an exceptionally fine, sunshiny, Sunday afternoon and the accident happened at the edge of a small village in northern Illinois. There was a clear view for the motorist for a long distance. There had been two separate whistle signals given, one for the approach to the station and a second for the crossing. The bell had been continuously ringing for about a half mile. There were the regular crossing warnings and the injured driver of the car stated that he bad been back and forth over than crossing many hundreds of times and over a period of many years and that he knew about when the regular trains were due at the station. He was quite honest in his statement that he was not paying a bit of attention to where he was, or what he was doing-and that lie never noticed any of the many warnings that had been provided for his protection. That crossing had but one freight train each way and two pas- senger trains each way during the 24-hour daily period. The recital is made to show that it is possible that few trains are less protection than many are. It is the opinion of most locomotive engineers that there is but one real protection for railroad crossings and that is grade separation. It is their general belief that, until such time as there has been grade separation, there should be laws enacted that would demand that all operators of vehicles shall come to a full stop at least 40 feet from railroad crossings and that they should proceed across those crossings on their own responsibility and only after they have shifted the gears of motor vehicles into low gear. As the Federal requirements demand that there shall be air brakes on both freight and passenger cars, it seems proper to have the rec- ords contain some brief record concerning such equipment. Each locomotive is equipped with at least one air compressor and the air taken from the atmosphere by the compressor passes from the compressor into a large storage drum called the main reservoir. Air from this reservoir passes though a controlling valve and through piping to a flexible connection at the rear of the locomotive to the front end of the locomotive tender and then through a continua- tion of the piping to the rear end of the tender where, again, a flexible. connection between the tender and first car introduces this air to the piping throughout the train. These pipes are referred to as "the main line." Under the locomotive, under the tender, and under each car, there are additional pipe connections that lead to the different operating- 10 TRAIN LENGTHS valves and other apparatus operated from this central air reservoir. Under each of the cars there is what is referred to as a "triple valve," an auxiliary reservoir for the storage of the air that may be needed to apply the brakes on that car, and a brake cylinder-into which the air must pass to apply the brakes. Attention must be called to the fact that brakes on all cars operate automatically if any accident suddenly lowers the pressure in the train line-such as the bursting of one of the flexible air hoses, a break in the train line, and these breaks may be caused by any of the cars becoming uncoupled. Any such sudden reduction will result in an emergency application of the brakes throughout the train. The triple valve referred to as being under each car received its name because of its three principal functions; first, it permits air that has come through the train line to pass to the auxiliary reservoir, later, when there is to be an application of the brakes, the triple pis- ton moves and closes the port through which the air from the train line had passed through to the auxiliary reservoir and, in that same movement, a small slide valve attached to the triple piston permits the stored air in the auxiliary reservoir to pass from that reservoir to the brake cylinder, where it exerts sufficient pressure on the brake piston to move the levers that apply the brakes. Finally, when there is need to release the brakes, the movement of the slide valve in the triple valve permits the compressed air that had applied the brakes to escape into the atmosphere. These are the three principal func- tions of the triple valve. It is quite probable that there have been many hundreds of thousands of experiments to secure a perfect type of triple valve and many of these experiments have resulted in improvements. However, up to the present time there is none that would prevent the slack action of the long trains from causing a severe jar at the rear end of such trains. The reduction of air pressure in the train line may be made from any place in that train line that has been coupled up and has been provided with pressure. Such reduction may be either intentionally, by some member of the train crew or the locomotive engineer, or through any accident that causes a break in the line or by the un- coupling of cars in the train and when such an accident occurs back of the locomotive there is no way that an emergency automatic ap- plication of the brakes throughout the train may be avoided. It is generally because of these sudden emergency actions of the brakes that the accidents caused by slack action in the train are brought about. Accidents that cause the injured employee to remain off duty for a period of 3 days or more are reported to the Interstate Commerce Commission. If the employee is able to return to service inside of the 3-day period or if his injury does not make it necessary to remain away from service such injuries are not recorded by the Interstate Commerce Commission. When there have been injuries serious enough to demand reports to the Interstate Commerce Commission the cause of the injuries is generally investigated by some examiner of that Commission. My attention has been called to a recent accident on the Central Railroad of New Jersey. As it illustrates quite fully the fact that there are emergency actions of the brakes when there is a break in TRAIN LENGTHS 11 two of the trains I shall appreciate inserting the report made by the Interstate Commerce Commission at this point. I have secured sufficient copies of this to provide the members of the committee with one each. Mr. Chairman, should this report be read into the record or may it be inserted as it is? The CHAIMAN. It may be inserted without reading. Mr. CORBEr. Thank you. (The statement referred to is as follows:) REPORT OF THE CHIEF INSPECTOR, BUREAU oF LoCoMoTVE INSPEOrIoN, TO THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISsION, WASHINGTON, OF THE AcCIDENT ON THE CENTRAL RAILROAD CO. OF NEw JERsEY, BLooMsBURY, N. J., NovmBER 19, 1937 JANUARY 6, 1938. To the Commission: On November 19, 1937, about 4:23 p. m., while passing through Bloomsbuty, N. J., at a speed of approximately 35 miles per hour, an emergency application of the air brakes occurred on Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey west-bound freight train Jax. The resulting sudden stop caused the serious injury of one employee who was riding in the caboose. DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT Freight train Jax, hauled by locomotive 874, departed from Jersey City ter- minal at 12:10 p. In., November 19. A stop was made at Bound Brook, N. J., where the locomotive was uncoupled from the train and 14 cars picked up. Leaving Bound Brook the train consisted of 95 cars, 2,604 tons. While passing through Bloomsbury, N. J., the locomotive became uncoupled from the head car and separation of the brake-pipe hose caused an emergency application of the brakes. Due to the sudden stop Flagman J. Halbeisen and Conductor J. Lechner, who were riding in the caboose, were thrown violently against the walls of the caboose. Flagman Halbeisen was cut og the forehead and seriously injured; Conductor Lechner was bruised on the right shoulder but did not lose any time as a result of the injury. Immediately after the train and locomotive stopped the knuckle of the coupler on the rear end of the tender was found open ; the uncoupling lever was in down position and the lock lifter in up position. The locomotive was then recoupled and the train proceeded to its destination without further incident. EXAMINATION OF COUPLER Upon arrival of the train at Bethlehem, Pa., the master mechanic and general car foreman inspected the coupler and draft gear and reported the entire assemblage to be in good condition. The knuckle, lifter, and lock were removed and new parts applied ; the removed parts were shipped to the superintendent of motive power and rolling equipment at Reading, Pa., and the locomotive was returned to service. Inspection by the Federal inspector was made at Jersey City, N. J., where the coupler had been removed from the tender. The parts that had been pre- viously removed and shipped to Reading were sent to Jersey City for this inspection. The coupler was a top-operated type D, date placed in service unknown. The anticreep shoulder of the original type lock lifter was found to be worn approximately three thirty-seconds inch below standard dimen- sions. After all parts were assembled pressure was applied on the bottom of the knuckle lock to test the anticreep feature of the lifter, this resulted in the lock and lifter raising which permitted the knuckle to open. DISCUSSION A considerable number of personal injuries have occurred from trains parting caused by type D couplers becoming uncoupled In service. Circular No. D. V.-899, dated March 8, 1937, was issued by the mechanical division, Asso- lation of American Railroads, to all member roads which contained recommenda- tions on method of checking top-operated type D couples for ineffective anticreep 12 TRAIN LENGTHS condition and method of correcting the condition ; the contents of this circular are quoted below: "The committee on couplers and draft gears presented a supplement to the annual report in 1936 relating to type D couplers opening in service. "In this supplementary report (circular No. D. V.-869--A) reference was made to a practice some inspectors were following to determine whether the lock-lift anticreep feature was effective. It was the opinion of the committee that this practice was not well adapted to develop the information desired. Attention was also called to the method some roads were following in building up metal on the anticreep lug in the coupler head. "RECOMMENDED METHOD FOn CHECKING TOP-OPERATED TYPE D COUPLERS FOR INEFFECTIVE ANTICREEP CONDITION "Attempt to lift the lock by pressing downward on a small bar inserted through the front face of the coupler and underneath the lock. If the lock does not respond to these efforts, the anticreep feature may be considered to func- tion satisfactorily. If the lock can be lifted by this means suficiently to release the knuckle the anticreep feature does not function properly and should be corrected. "R5COMMENDED METHOD FOR CORRECTING INEFFECTIVE ANTICREEP CONDITION IN TYPE D COUPLERS "When it is indicated that, the anticreep feature should be improved it is recommended that a No..3 type D lock lifter conforming to the design shown in figure 1 be applied. If the coupler is fitted with No. 2 type top-lock lifter, this lifter may be reclaimed by 'building up on the anticreep ledge to conform with the gage shown as figure 2. If the coupler is fitted with No. 1 type of lock lifter, it must be replaced with a new No. 3 lifter or a reclaimed No. 2 lifter. "When a No. 3 or a reclaimed No. 2 top lock lifter has been applied to a. coupler, the anticreep feature should again be tested and the coupler should be fully checked for complete operation." Type D couplers were superseded as standard by type E couplers by action of the mechanical division in 1931 and the current code of rulers for inter- change of traffic applicable to freight-train cars prohibits the acceptances of cars in interchange if equipped with type D couplers cast after August 1, 1936. This rule has the effect of prohibiting the application of new couplers having type D heads; it' does not require discontinuance of use of serviceable type D couplers cast before the date given, nor prohibit repairs or replacement parts being applied to existing couplers. The interchange rules do not apply to locomotives; however, it is obvious that the standards of equipment and condition of couplers on locomotives should be at least equal to those applicable to cars. RECOMMENDATION Investigation of this accident and others similar thereto leads to the con- clusion that many of the carriers' officers and employees whose duties embrace supervision of, inspection, and repair of couplers have not been made aware of the recommendations of the mechanical division, Association of American Railroads, with respect to testing of top-lock lifters of type D couplers nor of the method of making necessary repairs to insure that the couplers will not uncouple in service. It is therefore recommended that appropriate action be taken by the car- riers to fully inform all officers and employees concerned of the hazards incident to disengagement of couplers in service and the procedure to be followed in making inspections and the application of repairs to type D couplers. Respectfully submitted. JOHN M. HALL, Chief Inspector. Mr. CoRBETT. Your attention is called to the fact that there were 95 cars in this train-and that a train of such a length has not been considered as any unusually long train. You. will note that this acci- dent happened on November 19, 1937, and that the report on the investigation is dated January 6, 1938. These dates are mentioned so that you may note that accidents happen at the present time. You TRAIN LENGTHS 13 will note that the emergency action of the brakes throughout the train was caused by an accidental uncoupling of the car at the rear end of they locomotive and, finally, that both employees who were in the caboose at the rear end of the train were injured; but, apparently because one of them was not injured bad enough to remain away from service, the report lists it as but one injury. It is quite possible that the representatives of the carriers may en- deavor to interpret the fact that there are not more accidents as sonie indication that their management has been successful in creating a condition that makes it unnecessary to have any limitation of train lengths, or that these proposed restrictions will prove exceptionally costly. From the best information I have been able to secure there would be no effect on some 80 percent of the freight trains that are being run, as this percentage of those trains are of lengths of less than 70 cars. That leaves about 20 percent that the adjustments might be required on. However, we know that all of the trains on any rail- road are not of lengths in excess of 70 cars, and we know that the trains of less than 70 cars are not confined to any one railroad. The average length of freight trains is about 46 cars. This will permit of so arranging their trains that the excess from one train may be added to some of lengths below 70, and there may be no great incon- venience or added expense. From statements made at previous hearings we have noticed that there were certain fears expressed for more sidings, additional roundhouses, and other equipment. It is just the opposite that must take place. It was the purchase of some of these larger locomotives that made larger roundhouses necessary, that made longer turn- tables necessary, and that demanded longer sidings. There was the additional need of greater storage space in the terminals. These are all available. We proposed to demonstrate that cars that are being moved more rapidly between loadings and unloading must give better service and will result in increased business to the rail- roads and the public. The car that is unloaded quicker after each loading must permit of oftener loadings or what would be termed a "better turn-over" if it was applied to a business establishment. Those cars that are held in terminals for long periods of time in order to have the maximum tonnage of the larger locomotives accu- mulate are so much dead investment, both in the cost of the equip- ment and the cost of the load, and the railroads receive no more freight income from the car that is not delivered for a month than they do for the one that is delivered at its destination in a few days. Then, there was the claim that the few extra trains that might be needed if there is a limiation in the train length must create so many additional meeting points that trains could never reach their destina- tion. The statement appears as ridiculous as many of the others that were listened to. First, because there will be no meeting points in districts where there are double tracks. It is most unreasonable to think that each and every train that moves over any single track during a 24-hour period shall meet with each and every train that operates in an opposite direction during that same 24-hour period. Such a condition could not occur. I have compiled a list of the prices of railroad securities that provides information concerning the prices of railroad stocks over 47891-38-2 14 TRAIN LENGTHS a period of some 40 years, and it seems proper to state that these stocks were considered as of more value before the long trains were run than they are today. It would seem that these extra long trains have not increased the values of railroad securities. There is but one item left-it is that this may be considered as a movement to provide employment. If such a statement is advanced, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers will be interested in learning why the American Railroads should not be expected to give some consideration to their employees. In 1920 there were approximately two and a quarter millions of employees on the American railroads. Technological improvements and some different arrangements had reduced this to about half that number at the end of the next dozen years. We believe that the increases in business that the Democratic administration has. pro- vided since 1933 should be at least partly enjoyed by the railroad employees through their additional employment to the same extent that industrial employees have benefited. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers is sincere in their ex- pression of the belief that there has been no one piece of legislation, to provide for the safety of the railroads, for the safety of the travel- ink public and that public's merchandise, and for the safety of the railroad employees, introduced in many years that is of more real value than bill S. 69. We shall hope that its provisions may receive your unanimous favorable consideration. I thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions. Mr. WoLVERTON. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WOLvERTON. I would like to ask a question, Mr. Chairman, with your permission. Mr. Corbett, I understand that the basic reason that you advance for this legislation is to promote safety. Mr. CORBETr. Partly that; yes, sir; and that is the greatest feature that I believe it presents. We hold this, Congressman-that at the rear end of a 125- or 150- car train, it is absolutely impossible to have a train stop through an emergency application of the brakes without an injury to anyone riding at the rear end of that train. Mr. WOLvERTON. Has there been a tendency during recent years to increase the length of freight trains? Mr. Coimrr. I would question the use of the word "recent." There has been a sort of hallucination in the minds of many of those who arrange for the administration of railroad service that it is only through the longer kinds of trains that they may secure some return for the investors. In other words--I have mentioned it in my state- ment so that you can get it possibly more easily-back 40 years ago and on a division of the railroad that I am quite familiar with, the locomotive engine that was on at that time would haul 700 tons. The locomotive engineer that was moving that 700 tons over a distance of 100 miles would have handled what we term "70,000 ton-miles." For moving that train that locomotite engineer received about $4. Now, it may have been 10 cents, more or less. I do not have the data right in my mind, but it is about that. I was railroading at that time, and that is my best present recollection. TRAIN LENGTHS 15 Today, over that same piece of track, the present locomotive engi- neer and the locomotive that he operates will pull about 3,000 tons. Now, there are many instances where that would be increased a bigger proportion than that; but I am going to take that one instance for just a moment. That man's pay previous to this last wage increase was $8.05 for moving that 3,000 tons 100 miles. The 3,000 tons would represent 300,000 ton-miles. He receives about twice as much money for mov- ing four times as much freight as he did 40 years ago. I would not say that that is something that has come up recently. Naturally the locomotive that was in service 40 years ago was larger than the one that was in service 80 years ago, and there has been a continuous endeavor to increase those sizes, and I might say this- that the use of the larger locomotives present safety conditions in a degree to what I have mentioned and possibly what others may men- tion. There are many instances where tunnels were cut for former- and smaller-sized locomotives. Larger locomotives were provided, and today, in some of those tunnels, I am informed that these ex- cessively long trains moving provide a condition where the men on those locomotives are nearly suffocated in going through those tun- nels, and again it is not necessery to go any great distance from the Capitol to witness those particular conditions. We believe that if the tonnage on that kind of a train was reduced so that those engines could move through there with the proper amount of speed, the boys working on them would be benefited. Mr. WOLVERTON. The statement you have made is very interesting and very helpful in some respects, but it does not answer the question which I asked, and that is: Has there been a tendency in recent years Mr. CORBrrr. Oh, yes, sir. Mr. WOLVERTON (continuing). To increase the length of trains? Mr. CORBETr. Yes. In recent years, and a continuous effort in that direction, and we are fearful of what it may lead to. Mr. WOLvERTON. Has there, during the same period of time in which there has been a tendency to increase the length of the trains, been a corresponding increase in the number of accidents? Mr. CORBETr. I believe that in my statement I gave a recital of the fact that accidents had decreased during the time in the depression when the train lengths, because of a lowered amount of tonnage be- ing offered the railroads, had been shortened. I believe that at the present time the accident reports will show that the increased business of the railroads has resulted in an increase in the number of accidents, and I believe that one of those who will fol- low me will give as nearly a full recital of those accidents as you may ask for.. Mr. WOLVERTON. I think you can readily understand, if this legisla- tion is based upon a safety basis, that the facts which I have asked for and which you have stated will be given have a very direct bearing upon the question as to what action should be taken with reference to this legislation. Mr. CoRBETr. Well, Congressman, I have full confidence in the be- lief that you will be fully convinced that the accident reports that will bq submitted here will be sufficient evidence that accidents are in- creasing as train lengths have increased. 16 T1AIN LENGTHS Mr. WoLvEETON. Will it be possible to give information as to whether the rate of accidents is greater on long trains than on short trains? Mr. CoRBEnr. The rate of accidents insofar as rear-end shocks are concerned is greater on the long trains than on the short trains. Mr. WOLvERToN. Is it your intention to produce the facts that will justify that statement? Mr. Conr. Yes, sir. Mr. WOLvERroN. I have in my mind, Mr. Corbett, the statement you mrde in the early portion of your statement that from the record of accidents connected with these long trains, you were of the opinion that this legislation should be passed in the interest of the workers and the traveling public; but your statement did not contain the record of accidents or any facts to justify the statement. I assume from what you say that record will be given by the speakers who will follow you. Mr. CoRBErr. From the point of view of the locomotive engineer, the potential hazard that is before him as he passes a long train on double track is, especially to those who have had accidents of the kind, fearful. In other words, when a locomotive engineer going east reaches a point where he is passing a similarly long train coming west, he is always fearful that some emergency in that train line may cause an emergency application of the brakes in the opposite freight train, with the result that there is going to be a bump and throw some of the cars in front of him. That is not witnessed as much in the shorter trains as it is in the longer ones. Mr. BULwINKLE. I would like to ask a question. Mr. WOLvERTON. I have another question I would like to ask. I am endeavoring to make plain at this early part of the hearings the importance I think the factual side of it takes when you face the request for the legislation upon a safety basis. I assume that having made the request for the legislation upon that basis you will be able to sustain it with the facts. I merely want to indicate that I am interested in that side of the discussion. Mr. CORnBETr. That evidence will be submitted. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Corbett, how much slack is there between cars? Mr. CORBETr. That must depend upon the draft equipment. It must depend upon, partly upon the amount of load that is in the car and the condition of the equipment itself. It has been my privilege to visit on an exceptionally long train and in talking with the engineer who was handling that train, he told me that it was a trade in itself to just start such a train and he just expressed his method that there were some 32 telegraph poles to the mile on his railroad and with one of those exceptionally long heavy trains, he generally figured that he had not started the caboose to move until he had passed more than the distance between two of the telegraph poles. Now, I do not know exactly that any tests have ever been made and I am telling you what I have been told. I have never worked on trains as long as that. I have worked on trains of 125 car lengths, but I am speaking now-of trains of half of that length more. TRIN LENGTHS 17 Mr. BULwINKLE. Would it average about 10 inches to the car? Mr. CoRBmr. I beg your pardon. Mr. BULwINKLE. Would it average about 10 inches to the car? Mr. CoRBETT. I doubt if it would be that much. I might say that it would be approximately from 8 to 12 inches. Now, the gear-we refer to the apparatus that is under the body of the car that pulls, accepts the power from one end and pulls it at the other end, as the draft gear. That includes all of the appara- tus at both ends of the car. Mr. BULWINKLE. Well, you were speaking just now of the shoclj in the caboose when you stopped one of these long trains. Mr. CORBETr. Yes. That is caused because as the train is pulled out this way [indicating] and especially on level or down-grade if they are working steam, the tendency is that the caboose will be stretched out as much as that draft gear will permit it to be. Now, when an emergency application of the brakes near the front end of the train takes place there is a sudden stoppage here [indicat- ing], and the tendency is that the other cars jam into this part of the train. And, the worst jam is at the rear end, although I will say this: I have seen those kind of accidents and apparently it was the weakest spot in the train that let go. It might be a flat car or an empty stock car or something in the middle of the train that would telescope. Does that answer your question? Mr. BULwINKLE. Yes. Mr. PEARsoN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pearson. Mr. PEARsoN. Mr. Corbett, I would like to ask whether or not any investigation was made by the proponents of this bill prior to its introduction for the purpose of determining what would be the suit- able length of train and how an arbitrary length of 70 cars was arrived at. Mr. CORBEr. Insofar as the interpretation of signals is concerned, I believe that the tests that have been made state that less than 60 cars is about the average distance that signals can be interpreted per- fectly. Now, you understand, that a man 60 car lengths away will raise his hand this way, and it signifies that the man in charge of the locomotive shall move ahead. He gives a signal this way [indicating] and it means that the man in charge of the locomotive shall come back. He may hold his hand out this way [indicating] and the engineer interprets that the movement is to be made slowly. He may start it back and the train- man will move his hand three or four times this way [indicating], and it signifies the number of car lengths that they want that train to move. Now, at the rear or when you get to the rear end of up to exceed 50 cars, it becomes difficult to interpret those signals properly and when you get 60 cars away, it is practically impossible to interpret them properly. Mr. PEARsON. Now, if that be true, what is the advantage of having trains limited to 70 cars if as a matter of fact it is not safe to operate one of 60? You cannot see the signals. Mr. Cozmrr. You will recall that in my statement I mentioned the fact that the two bills that were introduced by Congressman Gris- 18 TRAIN LENGTHS wold and Congressman O'Connell-and I would understand that the one introduced by Congressman O'Connell has been copied from the one which had been previously introduced, owing to the fact that at that time, that that legislation was first introduced in the Congress, Congressman O'Connell was not a Member of the Congress. So, I would refer to that older one and it was the purpose of the trainmen at that time, and still is, that a half a mile represents a better restriction than does the 70 ears. Now, it was not at our suggestion that the Senate of the United States gave their favorable consideration to the compromise, and we would be very glad if this committee would give their favorable consideration to the provisions that are in Congressman Griswold's bill and Congressman O'Connell's bill, if in your judgment you believe that better. Mr. PEARsoN. Those bills provide for a different train length? Mr. CORBETT. Yes, sir; a shorter train length. Mr. PEARSON. Now, in connection with your statement, I am just wondering as you proceed, whether or not the question of tonnage which a train carries had as much to do with the safety of it, or the lack of it, as did the mere length, and I would like to ask just what the practice of the railroads is in handling empty cars in transporta- tion or returning them from one railroad to another; that is, whether or not those empties are handled in a train with partially loaded cars and empty cars, or whether they are handled in a train entirely made up of empty cars. Just how are they handled? Mr. CORBET. Well, Congressman, it would be my opinion that the answer to your question could be more perfectly given by one of the witnesses who may appear for the railroads. I would prefer that you present that question to them, and it would be preferable to do that insofar as their statement would be con- cerned. Mr. PEARSON. Very well. Mr. CORBETT. I will say this, that a locomotive engineer does not have the privilege of knowing much about the train that he is pull- ing. He may know that he has 100 cars, and he may be told that those cars represent 75 loads and 25 empties; but the make-up of the train as it has been switched, its arrangement, the arrangement of the cars, and those things, he is not acquainted with. Mr. PEARsON. Well, Mr. Corbett, just speaking from your personal experience as a locomotive engineer, would you say that it is as dan- gerous to handle a train of 125 cars made up of empties as it would be to handle a train of the same length, all carrying their capacity tonnage, each car carrying its capacity tonnage; would that have any effect on the consideration? Mr. CoRBEmr. It might depend, I think, possibly it would depend, somewhat on the grade and somewhat on the speed and the conditions surrounding the movement of the train. A heavy train on an up- grade, probably even with an emergency application of the brakes, would make no jar at the rear end of that train that would be in any ways injurious, because the grade itself and the weight of those cars would have a tendency to retard that movement. Mr. PEARSON. Take up the slack? Mr. Coutr. Yes. Now, then, it is possible that the brake action on a light car at the rear end of the train and on level ground might TRAIN LENGTHS 19 retard the forward movement of that car more. I really do not know whether there have been full tests made. Our general run of trains that we are expected to haul are mixed. It is very seldom that we have 125 empties, and it would be difficult to say just what the actual jarring effect at the rear of that kind of a train would be. Mr. WITHRow. I would like to ask the gentleman a question. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Withrow. Mr. WITHROW. Mr. Corbett, in regard to emergency applications of the air-I am particularly interested in emergency applications that have to be made from the rear end of the train. Now, as a locomotive engineer you are familiar with the air-brake equipment on the engine, on the modern engines, are you not? Mr. CORBETr. Fairly well. Mr. WrrHRow. And likewise you are familiar with the brake equipment upon the rear end of the train, in the caboose, the valve that is used to set the air brakes. Mr. CORBETT. Yes. Mr. WITHRow. I am going to give you an example I think will illustrate the emergency application of the brake from the rear end of a train and it is not an unusual condition. It is quite usual. We will say on a 100-car train, the train crew in the caboose of the train sees something wrong, probably 30 cars up on the train. It might be a brake rigging dragging; it might be a hot box; it might be any one of a number of other things. The trainmen attempt to get a signal to the head end of the train. They are not successful in getting the stop signal to the head end of the train. Now, why is it more dangerous for them to set the brakes from the rear end of the train than it is to have the engineer set the brakes at the head end, in the normal way? I wish you would explain that to the committee. Mr. CoRBErr. I would understand that from your question that one represents an emergency application of the brakes, that is the one from the rear end. Mr. Wrrnxow. Yes. Mr. CoRBETr. The one made by the locomotive engineer would be made with a brake valve. Mr. Wrrnmow. Yes. Mr. CORRETT. And the instructions given to locomotive engineers are that his first reduction in air will be made by what is known as a service application. I am mentioning the two kinds of applications so that this may be before you. Mr. WrrHRow. Just a moment, before you go into that. This emergency application from the rear end of the train is not the application you have in mind but rather an application made through the crude valve on the caboose. Mr. CORBErr. I appreciate that. Mr. WITHRow. And they use the gage. Mr. CORBET. Yes. Mr. WITHROw. But I wish that you would explain the difference between the equipment at the head end and the crude equipment they have in the caboose. Mr. CoRBETr. The equipment on the locomotive at the head end- the engineer has a gage that he can look at and he can make his 20 TRAIN LENGTHS reduction almost to the pound. The practice on the locomotive would be to make a movement of the brake lever and to make a reduction of about 7, 8, or 9 pounds, possibly, depending on what previous applications on that train taught him was the best reduction. When that kind of a reduction is made these triple valves that I have told you of, that are throughout the train, permit the air to become adjusted gradually. When the emergency application is made at the rear end-and I might say for the benefit of the Congressman, that the locomotive engineer often is called upon to make the same kind of an emergency application. That is a general reduction of that air throughout the train line. In fact, it is possibly all opened, wide open, and at the rear end of the train there is either a hose at the rear end of the caboose with a valve to it or in the caboose there is a valve that is known as the conductor's valve, and the air may be drawn out of that. The valve at the rear end does not permit of as gradual a reduction, neither do they permit of the same adjustment of the air pressure reduction. That is, the air pressure in these different parts of the train cannot be as efficiently reduced as can be done from the loco- motive. The result is that there is an emergency application at the rear end as generally with most triple valves-in fact, I believe it would be proper to state that 90 percent of the triple valves in these long trains all work slightly different during an emergency application, and there would be a 20-percent increase in pressure exerted in the brake cylin- der from an emergency application than is made by the ordinary service application. Now, then, when the application is made at the rear end, we will assume that the caboose stops now. It may be but a fraction of a second when the next car takes it and that moves on this way. It is from car to car rather than a gradual stopping down through the train, as is done when a proper application is made from the head end, and, while I am on that subject, I believe that it might be proper to have the record contain the statement that the locomotive engineers take these long trains over the road and back many hun- dreds of times without making a full service application of the brakes while the train is in motion. They do that by handling the air on the locomotive alone and bunching that slack and coming up to a watering place where they take water, or coal sheds, something like that, without making a full application until they get about to the point they wish to stop. Then they make their full application and the train is stopped in that way [indicating], and when they get ready to start the brakes are released after that kind of an application more readily. Mr. WITHROw. And that sort of an application makes the slack action in the train more vicious and dangerous? Mr. CoRarr. That is correct. Mr. Wrriuow. In addition to the contrast between valve equipment in the caboose and the modernized equipment in the engine, the fact is that applying the brakes from the rear of the train instead of the normal application by the engineer is dangerous and very likely to result in serious consequences. Then, in addition to that, there is this: That if, at the same time you apply the brakes from the rear end of the train through an emergency application on the caboose. you still have the. huge bumps located on the engine, bumping of? VAIN LENGTHS 21 the brakes on the head end of the train, you therefore do not have any braking power on the head end of the train, with the result that there is a tendency for the train to buckle and you have created a rough and dangerous condition. Mr. CORBETr. That is correct. Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Chairman. Mr. LEA. Mr. Halleck. Mr. HALLEOK. I am wondering if the matter of slack action about which you talk would prevail in those conditions under which a loco- motive is back of the train and pushing. Mr. CORBETr. There is slack action naturally at all times and in the condition that you state, where the locomotive is at the rear end of the train, that slack would all be bunched in. Now, then, if an emergency application was made then by the locomotive at the front end of the train, the locomotive would probably stop first, and if it were a fast train it would snap off the other end. Mr. HALLECK. Possibly I did not make myself clear, but I had reference to a train with a locomotive at the front and rear, as fre- quently is seen. Mr. CORBETT. Well, now, Congressman, that is one of the safety features that railroad employees have been trying to get away from, and I will cite you the reason. We will assume that you have a train of 100 or 125, or 150 cars, and you have a locomotive at the front, and you have a locomotive at the rear end, and they are moving, and one at the rear end working as hard as it can pushing a portion of that train. The other is working to pull it, and an automobile attempts to win out at the crossing. Now, if the loco- motive engineer on the front engine suddenly makes up his mind that it is going to be necessary to set the brakes, and sets them in the emergency, he does that, the force of a big locomotive at the rear of the train will telescope some place in that train, and it has been injurious to the men in the caboose, and I think universally the rail- road employees and most of the railroads are endeavoring to do away with that kind of work. The practice at the present time is that if it is necessary to have a helper, that helper shall be at the head end of the train rather than at the rear. Mr. HALLECK. Of course, then, as I understand it, the slack action that causes the injury about which you spoke in your original state- ment would not prevail if you had the locomotive at the back end, but certain other dangerous situations might be set up. Mr. CoRnBr. That is right. Mr. HALLECK. But in any even, under the operation of this bill if it should become a law, 70 cars would be the limit whether there were two locomotives or one. that is, whether they are both on the front or the back. Mr. CORBETT. That is right. Mr. BOuRN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman, I might make one observation. I did not gather any connection from the evidence thus far presented be- tween the movement of the shippers' goods and any sort of schedules in freight-train operations. Mr. CORBET. How is that? 22 T RAIN LENGTHS Mr. BOREN. I could not gather any thought as to the schedule of freight trains, their position and movement, and the movement of ,the shippers' goods from the statement you have made thus far. It indicates that cars might be indefinitely left over, left in the terminals, etc. Is there not some schedule in operation. Mr. CoRBrr. No; not that I know of. Mr. BOREN. For example, passenger trains move on schedule and it may be that the train will be half full of passengers or maybe it will be filled and extra cars will be put on to take care of the pas- sengers, meeting the demands of the schedule traffic. Does not that same thing apply in an equal measure to freight-train operation? Mr. Corrr. No. You understand that a large portion of the freight trains are what we know as extra trains. They are run as business is offered to the railroad for movement and we will assume that at Baltimore, now, it is quite probable that there will be one merchandise train out of there late this evening ; but if there is not sufficient merchandise offered for a second train, they will endeavor to hold that tonnage until the tonnage of a locomotive can accumulate. In a city as large as Baltimore that might not be as noticeable; but as in smaller terminals, in places when business is not built up by what is produced in that particular terminal, and it is necessary to wait and secure freight that comes in from different outside places, it has not been the practice to run trains on schedule as passenger trains are run. I mean freight trains. Mr. BOREN. Then I want to make this observation, if I may : There seems to be in your statement no indication of the sort that there is any . correlation between the speed of trains and the number of accidents either on the train or at the railroad crossing. I am inter- ested in that viewpoint, if that is your viewpoint. Mr. CORBETr. I have no data, and I do not know that any would be easily available that would permit one to check back on the speed at which all trains that have caused accidents-and I refer to crossing accidents-might have been traveling. Mr. BoRnx. Then I want to make one further observation, and that is, speaking as an individual-my opinion on this bill will be largely guided by facts and figures as to the number of people injured that are train employees, on trains if the train is of a length greater than the number of 70 cars as compared to the number injured on trains of less than 70 cars, and, also, of course, that same information con- cerning the safety of the public at railroad crossings. I am interested also in what effect the shortening of the trains will have on employment. Unless we can see actual facts and figures individually, I do not see any basis for making a distinction on the the philosophy of whether or not one particular car might move 10 inches or 5 inches, or what not. The result is what I am interested in, and I cannot find any actual figures and facts at this stage of your statement. You say, of course, this is coming later on. But I make that observation for the later witnesses. Mr. Coiwrr. Well, it was thought advisable to divide up this testi- mony, and I have every reason to believe that those representing the rear end of the train will present full data that should be most con- vincing, for the reasons that we are appealing for some relief from the accidents that are being caused by long trains, and it is an TRAIN LENGTHS 23 appeal. It is not just a request. It is the most sincere appeal that we know how to make. Again, I do not want to present any statement to the effect that a restriction of train lengths to 70 cars is going to entirely eliminate these kinds of accidents, but the more restrictive you can make this kind of an act, it is my belief, the more safe you are going to make it. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. I would like to ask one question. Referring to your comparison between the former 700-ton and the more recent 3,000-ton train, have you any figures as to the relative speed of those trains in miles per hour in moving over the division and the relative time that it takes them to cover the division? Mr. CoRBETT. Congressman, it is my understanding, and I have data on that, that at the time I mentioned, some 40 years ago, the train speed was at an average of about 10 miles per hour. It might be a fraction more or less. But it was about 10 miles per hour, and it is my present understanding that the average speed of freight trains has been increased to about 15 or 16 miles per hour. It may be slightly more than that. It so happens that on the division that I myself worked on, going back more than 35 years ago, we hauled beer trains that were loaded at Milwaukee and were being sent possibly to Colorado-we hauled them to the Southwest-and the movements of the trains over that par- ticular territory and with that kind of merchandise were just about as fast as the wheels could be made to revolve, and the practice has continued as being in effect at the present time. I know that it is 158 miles and that it was not unusual to make that 158 miles in about 6 or 7 hours with that kind of a train. Mr. MARTIN. What are they making it in now?. Mr. CORBErr. About the same time. They moved that kind of merchandise, and generally all merchandise that is offered them of that nature, perishable goods, just as fast as they could run the cars, and I think probably if you will check on the Pennsylvania Railroad out of Potomac Yards you will find that the freight trains over that railroad and I presume all other adjacent railroads, move equally fast. They attain speeds of 50 miles an hour and maintain that speed. Mr. MARTIN. The principal delay, then, is in accumulating the maxi- mum tonnage at the terminal rather than in the length of time required to move the train over the division? Mr. CoRBETT. That is partly correct. Heavy trains cannot be han- dled as easily as the shorter ones may be moved. Mr. MAPES. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mapes. Mr. MAPEs. Mr. Corbett, are you & freight or passenger engineer? Mr. CoRBEr. Well, Congressman, I have worked on both, both as an engineer and a fireman, and my last work was on a freight in preference to a passenger. Mr. MAPES. When was your last work as an actual engineer? Mr. CoRBETr. I believe it was the day before New Years of 1933. Mr. MAPES. Where was your run ? Mr. CoRnEr. I beg your pardon. Mr. MAPEs. Where was your run? 24 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. CORBrrr. From the coal fields in central Illinois to Beloit, Wis. Mr. MAPEs. Over what road? Mr. CoBrrr. Over the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific. Mr. MAPES. How many miles is that ? Mr. CORBEr. It was about eighty-some miles. We ran over two different railroads to make that, and I would have to. add them up. It is less than 100 miles. Mr. MAPES. In your experience what percentage of freight trains that you hauled were over 70 cars in length, would you say? Mr. CoRBEr. Well, I think probably that percentage of trains that I have worked on the last few years that I was in service would run more than that, but not any of them longer than 100 cars. Mr. MAPEs. You mean, then- Mr. CoRBETr (interposing). Now, I can explain for that, Congress- man. Mr. MAPES. You mean that the majority was over 70 cars in length? Mr. CORBEZr. I think so; yes, sir. Mr. MAPES. Were those through trains or trains just on your line!t Mr. Cornwrr. They were not through trains. They were trains that traveled through from about three different terminals, and it was necessary to set out and pick up cars at those terminals. Mr. MAPES. You hauled very few that were over 100 cars? Mr. CORBEr. Very few ; yes sir. Mr. MAPES. How frequently did you have accidents? Mr. CORBET. How frequently? Mr. MAPEs. Did you have accidents on your line? Mr. CORBETr. I recall but the one occasion in which I crashed an automobile at the crossing. I mentioned my position in connection with that as that of an unfortunate locomotive engineer. I am one of the fortunate locomotive engineers in that I have railroaded nearly 40 years with no mark against my record. I would like to make this statement while I am on that accident question. I have had on many occasions accidents to vehicles and motorcycles, automobiles that ran against the side of the locomotive I was on, that ran against the side of the train that I was pulling; and in one instance I was the engineer on what is known as a gas-electric passenger train, and a motorcycle crashed into the side of that train. Mr. MAPES. Would you say that there has been a tendency to in- crease the length of trains since you were in the actual service? Mr. CoRBEn. Oh, yes, sir; surely. Thirty-five years ago- Mr. MAPEs. I mean since you left the service in 1932. Mr. Corrr. Yes, sir. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kenney. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. Under this bill Congress gives its sanc- tion, approval, to a train of 70 cars. Mr. CouBErr. Yes, sir; that would be exclusive of the caboose and locomotive. Mr. KEN NET of New Jersey. And there would be no power vested anywhere to compel the railroad to use less than the 70 cars on any train. Mr. CoRnETr. No, sir. TR1AIN LENGTHS 25 Mr. KENEY of New Jersey. Well, now, you expressed some doubt as to whether a 70-car train was reasonably safe. Did you express your own opinion or that of the men? Mr. CormErr. I think both. I have attended many meetings, what we might term a lodge meeting, where there would be 20, 25, or 30 engineers. I have attended many meetings that we refer to as union meetings, where a group of these lodges would meet together. I have heard that question of train length discussed, and it is my opinion, from my own experiences and from those of the men mentioned, that even a shorter length than 70 cars might be desired; would be desired. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. I understood you to say in answer to a question that you did not regard a train of more than 60 cars reason- ably safe. Mr. CoRBETr. I expressed this statement, and I believe that you misunderstood the question that was asked. It was in connection with the interpretation of signals, and I expressed the doubt that signals could be properly interpreted at a greater distance than 60 cars. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. Well, would you or would you not now say that a train of 70 cars was reasonably safe for operation? Mr. CoRBETr. We would feel inclined to give it a trial; it would be preferable to what we have---unless there be data that might accumu- late over a time to prove as to what its results may be. My own opinion is that it would be fairly safe. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. You feel that a train of that length would be safe to operate under all conditions, in all places, having in mind especially mountainous regions? Mr. CORBETT. I would not make that assertion; no, sir. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. Well you have asked us to pass a bill in the present form. Do you not ask us to give approval to a 70-car train in doing that? Mr. CORBETT. Yes, sir. Mr. KENNET of New Jersey. With no power anywhere to compel the railroads to make a train less than 70 cars. Mr. CoRBETT. Yes, sir. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. And you want us to do that, despite the fact that you say in certain instances that would be an unsafe operation? Mr. CORBEr. Our men felt that the length of a half a mile was preferable. This length will probably provide for something more than a half a mile. It has been given the approval and endorsement of our organizations in a sort of expression of willingness to give it a trial. If after 10 years we find that this has not worked out as we hope it will, if you are here at that time, you may expect we shall come back again with the data that may have accumulated in the meantime and to present a new appeal to you at that time. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. Well, now, I was wondering whether this might not take place: That if we fix an arbitrary number of cars, that there will then be a tendency on the part of the railroads to increase the number of cars on those trains where they now operate less than 70 cars. Mr. CoRBrT. I think that that is quite probable. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. And if the railroads do that in those regions where they should not do it, they would, of course, rely upon 26 TRAIN LENGTHS our sanction here that they might run these 70-car trains, so I was wondering whether we ought not to be very careful not to sanction something which, after all, might not be safe or reasonably safe. Mr. ConBErr. Well, if this committee and the Congress will grant a length of less than 70 cars, you may be assured that the railroad employees will appreciate it fully. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Do you not think that there ought to be some other safeguards-for instance, under 70 cars-in those cases where it will be unsafe to operate with 70 cars? Mr. CoRBrr. The present bill seems to contain the best provisions that we can hope to secure. We have compromised on what is before you, and it is about all that we could hope for at this time. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. That is all. Mr. MAPES. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask one other question. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mapes. Mr. MAPEs. If I understood you correctly, Mr. Corbett, in your prepared statement you said something to the effect that more than 80 percent of the trains were less than 70 cars in length. Mr. CoRnBirr. That is my understanding; yes, sir. Mr. MAPES. Of course, that statement is quite different from your own personal experience, where you say that a majority of the trains which you hauled were over 70 cars in length. Mr. CoRBETr. The trains that I worked on were largely merchan- dise and empties going in one direction. Then we were hauling cement, coal, and heavy material of that kind in an opposite direction, and that movement presented a condition where it was not difficult to easily handle more than 70 cars over that territory with the loco- motives that we had. Now, they would not handle that in loads over all of the territory. There were places in that territory that during the trip we would not have more than 70 cars. Mr. MAPES. The reason I asked about that is because of the em- phasis which has been put on the expense which this legislation would cause the roads, and it seems to me that it is desirable, so far as we can, to find out just how much of a change this legislation would cause in the practice of the railroads. Mr. CORBErr. Well, I have a great deal of respect for the ability of the railroads to compile figures, and it has often bothered me, and still does; to get any proper balancing of their statements and our be- liefs. We do not feel that they are making statements that represent what they will do if this bill is passed. Mr. MAPES. You mean by that that the estimated expense of it is quite excessive? Mr. CORBETT. Yes, sir. Mr. CROSSER. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Crosser. Mr. CRossEn. Mr. Corbett, you stated in your testimony a few mo- ments ago that when you were last in the service you were operating a freight train by preference. I am curious to know why you should have a preference to operate a freight train rather than a passenger train. Mr. Coiwzrr. The train that I was operating ran out of my home terminal. TRAIN LENGTHS 27 Mr. CRossER. I see. Mr. CORBETr. And the passengers, that is, the trains that I might take or my seniority might buy for me, would necessitate my leaving home and being away from home the greater portion of the time. Mr. CROSSER. That was just a matter of personal convenience? Mr. CORBETr. Yes, sir. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kennedy. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. Corbett, am I to understand that you were speaking for all of the railroad employees? Mr. CORBETr. No, sir; I am speaking only for the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. There are others here representing other or- ganizations. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. How many men would you say that you were rep resenting ? Mr. CORBETr. About 65,000 who are the locomotive engineers. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. How many employees did you say there are on the railroads? Mr. CORBETT. About 1,000,000. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Was the statement that you read to- day, adopted or approved by your entire association? Mr.. CORBETrI. It has received the approval of the convention, and we have what is known as the national legislative board. Mr. Alvaney Johnston, the grand chief engineer of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, is the chairman of that national legislative board. Mr. George B. Laughlin, who preceded me in this position and is now first assistant grand chief engineer, is the second member of it, and I myself am the third member, and the secretary of that board. The convention that met in 1933, and the convention that met again in 1936 gave that board full authority over legislative and political matters. That board has met and has given consideration to the pro- visions of this bill and has expressed its endorsement of it. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Is there any difference of opinion among railroad employees as to the advisability of this bill in its present form? Mr. CORBETT. I am going to make this statement as to the possible difference: There is no difference of opinion, but all of the employees will not admit that. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Well, let us try to restate it. Your position, as I understand it, is that you are speaking for the 65,000 members of your organization, and only that organization Mr. CORBETT. That is correct. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. In your prepared statement you said something about there was no such thing as a freight schedule? Mr. CORBETr. No; I did not say that. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Well, my understanding of your re- mark was that freight was accumulated and sent along at will, when- ever the railroad collected enough. Is that the impression you wish to create? Mr. CORBErr. Partially; yes, sir. I tried to explain it to the other Congressmen. There are many terminals at which they wait for trains to come in from different places rather than where they pro- duced that tonnage in that particular terminal. 00 jdV TRAIN LENGTHS Now, it may be that there is a crew at station M on Saturday after- noon at 2 o'clock, and that crew has had its rest. In other words, if they were in service less than 16 hours they have had 8 hours' rest time, or in service 16 hours or more they have had 10 hours' rest time, and they are available for duty and a locomotive is available. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I do not want to interrupt you, but that is not the point I want to make. For instance, in the city of New York every day we receive thousands of carloads of freight--vege- tables, meat, and other perishable articles. Now, is it not a fact that those articles are all shipped subject to schedule? Mr. CoRBETn. No, sir. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Do you mean to say that poultry, meat, and vegetables are not shipped at a definite time to reach New York at a definite time? Mr. CORBETr. They are loaded, and at the time they are loaded the shipper is probably told, and in the case of poultry that it is going to be moved by express, and on a passenger train, and I will agree that that movement is going to be 100 percent on schedule. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Corbett, would it be convenient for you to return in the morning? Mr. CORBETr. I beg your pardon. The CHAIRMAN. Would it be convenient for you to return in the morning and testify? Mr. CORBETr. Surely. The CHAIRMAN. Will that be agreeable to you, Mr. Kennedy? Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kennedy can complete his examination in the morning. The committee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. (Thereupon, at 12:01 p. m., the committee adjourned to meet the following morning, Wednesday, January 12, 1938.) TRAIN LENGTHS WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 12, 1938 HousE of REPRSiNTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FoREiGN CoMMERCE, Wasa8ington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. M., in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence Lea. (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order. When we adjourned yesterday morning Mr. Kennedy was in the course of examination of the witness, so, Mr. Kennedy, you may proceed. STATEMENT OF JOHN T. CORBETT, ASSISTANT GRAND CHIEF ENGINEER, N A T IO N A L LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS, WASHINGTON, . C.-Resumed Mr. CORBETT. Mr. Chairman, at the time of the adjournment yester- day I had started a reply to a question from Congressman Kennedy, "Do you mean to say that poultry, meat, and vegetables are not shipped at a definite time to reach New York at a definite time?" And I had partly made answer that they are loaded, and at the time they are loaded the shipper is probably told, and in the case of poultry, meat, and vegetables, that it is to be moved by express and on a passenger train. I will agree that the movement will be 100 percent on schedule. Now, I would like to add to that: It is my understanding that practically all railroads mlaintain certain advertised scheduled freight trains and that they endeavor to provide service on such trains for perishable merchandise such as your question referred to. It is the dead freight that my statement was intended to cover. If there happens to be a surplus of tonnage left in a certain terminal after the scheduled or other freight trains have departed with their maximum tonnage, this surplus is permitted to accumulate until there is again a maximum tonnage that the power in that particular dis- trict would haul. If that amounted to 125 or 150 cars, it is quite probable that it aught be permitted to accumulate for some several hours. The idea that I had in mind was that if movements were made as often as not to exceed 70 cars had accumulated, this service would be more prompt and probably of a better nature than that provided with the present practice of permitting the dead tonnage to accumulate 47891-,38=-3 29 3V TRAIN' LENGTHS until the present maximum tonnage of the largest locomotive accu- mulates. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Do you have any actual figures to sustain that statement; thatis, as to the accumulation of cars and the time elapsing between their arrival and their being sent out of the railroad yards? Mr. CoxErrr. No, sir. I have not gone into it that far. All cars have a waybill to cover the merchandise that is loaded in them and it would be only by making an extensive examination of those way- bills that one might know definitely and exactly how much delay had been occasioned at different terminals or on any specific car. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Up to the present time, so far as you know, there is no actual figures to indicate? Mr. CORBETT. Not that I am familiar with ; no, sir. - Mr. KENNEDY of New York. My question yesterday was directed to such produce as fruit, live poultry, fresh vegetables. I under- stand that in the city of New York during 1936 there came 81,000 carloads of perishable foodstuffs. Those figures are accurate. Would you say that it required a very definite schedule to move 81,000 cars of perishable foodstuffs on the part of the railroads? Mr. CoRBErr. I am trying to visualize how many trains 81,000 cars would make, and it would be necessary probably to take sufficient time and check those cars against the railroads that they entered New York on, then make a comparison of that 81,000 cars with the total number of cars of merchandise and dead freight, as we call it, such as coal and that type of tonnage, that had entered the city and check as to the exact time that those cars were in transit from their place of delivery. I am not coming before this committee with the statement that 'the American railroads are not providing the best transportation system that the world has ever known; butI am of the opinion that, good as it is at present, there is an opportunity for improvement, and I am sincere in my belief that the restrictions of train lengths to 70 cars is going to provide one method, at least, that that betterment may be attained. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Have you any fear of the additional costs that would be added to foodstuffs as the result of the readjust- ment or the setting of a 70-car length? Do you think it would add anything to the costs of the foodstuffs to the people of my city? Mr. CoRBirr. No, sir. If the people of your city will refer to the statements that were made by shippers in the food distribution and in certain districts that provide the material, we will term it, food material of the New Yorkers and for the wholesalers who ship out of New York, your fruit people, when they had relied on the usual trains only for the handling of their fruit shipments knew how to handle the New York markets. When you divided up your receipts and permitted trucks to go into the fruit districts and buy up the culls and deliver them on the New York market, and a large percentage of your fruit and perish- ables are delivered in that manner, you practically destroyed any exact way of determining the conditions of the New York markets in- sofar as perishable foodstuffs are concerned, and while you may have in some instances provided something for the New York markets from these trucks that were quoted as.lower in price, you destroyed TRAIN LENGTHS 31 the grading that had been done at the place of production and left on the New York market a sort of destroyed condition compared with what it had been; and I doubt very much of the New York market, or any other market, that is making use of the bootlegging truck service could exactly give a recital as to the costs of these different commodities. It is quite probable that the perishable goods arriving at New York come in mixed trains-and by mixed train I mean they have a few of these trains that may handle that merchandise as solid fruit trains-with the exception, possibly, of some that may come from the southern markets. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Well, my present impression from your statement is that you believe there is a definite schedule estab- lished for perishable foods. Is not that so? Mr. CoRBETr All railroads have scheduled freight trains. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. You are not familiar with the number of cars that are now run in a train of perishable foods, are you? Do you have any knowledge of that? Mr. CORBETV. I do not; no, sir. And in my own experience I do not know that I have ever been told that we were pulling an entire train of perishables. Most of the trains have been mixed. There have been perishables and possibly livestock, and whatever was being offered for transit was mixed in the train. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Are you acquainted with the geography of the city of New York; the geography so far as the railroads are concerned? Mr. CoRBErr. Not fully ; no, sir. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. You know we have a rather peculiar problem, having 7,000,000 people within a very limited area on Man- hattan Island, only about a mile wide, and I was wondering whether or not it would be possible to crowd these extra trains in that small area; if that might create any problems as to the delivery of the food- stuffs. Mr. COIRBErr. Well, it is difficult to understand your reasons for the fear that you express. Suppose there are 140 cars at the Potomac yards in Washington, and that all of those 140 cars are perishable and that they are to be moved to New York as quickly as possible. Can you visualize any real dif- ference as to why those 140 cars could not be divided and each loco- motive haul 70 cars? And when they arrive in New York you have exactly the same problem, whether they arrived in one train or whether they arrived in two trains, insofar as the filling in of the trackage in the city of New York is concerned. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Well, I was under the impression that all of these cars were not all accumulated in the same minute and they were not all delivered at the railroad yards at the same time. Mr. CORBETT. I am sure you are right. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Is it usually the case that they pick up cars here and there and elsewhere on the road? Mr. CoRBEn. I believe that, insofar as the pick-up is concerned, you are slightly mistaken, and for this reason: In order to provide the service that your class I railroads are providing, they endeavor to switch their cars into trains that will move from one terminal to possibly a place a hundred miles distant with as little change as pos- 32 TRAIN LENGTHS sible, and that the service that would be provided for the intermediate points would be provided through a slower-moving and a different schedule, possibly by an extra tram. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Even though it might be a perishable product? Mr. CORBETr. I think so; yes, sir. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Well, I am trying to picture what the stockyards at Chicago and the butcher shops in New York would do. I am wondering whether they send those on en masse or whether they pick them up a few here and a few there. I do not know whether it is possible to get all of the meat and all of the fish and all of the eggs at one point. Mr. CoRBErr. Possibly I can help you. I have had some experience with meat from the time it is loaded out in Montana until it was eaten in a New York restaurant. I do not mean it was the same animal. But I worked in Montana for nearly a year, and it was the practice for one loading crew to spot cars adjacent to what they term a round-up. There might be several thousand head of stock that would be brought together out some 4 or 5 miles from the railroad. They were worked in in bunches of about 125, and they were loaded as quickly as possible, and that stock was moved with the speed of the passenger trains from there to the markets of Chicago. There was no delay, and if there was a delay either in transit or in terminals there was an explanation demanded for it. Those trains, generally speaking, were moved to either the plants at New York, or at St. Paul, or at Chicago, and the meat is again put into refrigerator cars and moved fully as rapidly. I believe that if you will refer to Pennsylvania trains, Baltimore & Ohio trains, New York Central trains or any of those, you will find that the locomotive engineer on those iast trains over those territories and on the Pennsylvania Railroad out of the city of Washington, here, to New York, are expected to endeavor to keep up a speed in the neighborhood of 50 miles an hour, which is probably as fast as the passenger trains run. Mr. KENNEDY of- New York. Fifty miles an hour? Mr. CoRBErr. Yes, sir. Many of those trains move that fast. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Can you give some assurance that if this bill passes it would not add prohibitive costs to the foodstuffs bought by the people in my city?$ Mr. CoRBErr. I see no reason why it should add anything to the food costs. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Is it your opinion that the service will be equally as good and that our markets will be served as well as they are now being served? Mr. CoRmirr. Surely. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I just have one other question. Is it your understanding that this bill is primarily intended to make for safety for the men? Mr. CoRBETr. Yes; that is its principal idea, and it was proposed and prepared because of the thousands upon thousands of accidents that the railroad employees at the rear end of those exceptionally long trains have experienced. It has cost the Brotherhood of Rail- road Trainmen and the Order of Railway Conductors many hundreds of thousands of dollars for benefits to those injured in those acci- TRAIN LENGTHS 33 dents, which those accidents have rendered in a condition so that they could not continue working, and these men are going to come before you and serve as the "terrible examples," if you please, of what they are up against, what they have been up against, and what they are appealing to you to prevent in the future. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Are there not certain inherent hazards in the occupation that we can never eliminate, whether the maximum is 5 cars or 50 cars or 25? Mr. CORBETr. Yes; I think that your assumption is correct. It would be correct in connection with any moving object. But, to go back to what has happened on the highways: There was not the recital of highway accidents with slow-moving, horse-drawn vehicles that there is at present with your heavy, dangerous trucks and busses and vehicles of that kind. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Well, why do you associate the acci- dents of the busses with the trains? No matter what we do about the trains, you could not stop the bus accidents. Mr. CORBETr. But your bus accidents, when they attain a high speed-and that is their principal objective, apparently, to give fast, quick, local service-shows a large number of accidents as the weight of those busses and thespeed of those busses has increased. We do not feel that a train that is recognized as a fast train has any more inherent dangers than possibly one with half such speed. In other words, I doubt if the passenger-train service that almost universally travels at speeds of better than 60 miles an hour, shows any more mechanical causes for accidents than are shown by the present freight trains that have an average speed of 16 miles per hour. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I was not clear on that point. What- ever we do here would not have any effect on the bus accidents. Mr. CORBETr. I am only making a comparison. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. For what purpose? It is not clear in my mind as to why you associate bus accidents with the operation of trains. Mr. CoRBErr. That the heavy, fast-moving bus provides for, with the number of them on the highways, more accidents, more fatalities, if you please, than the smaller and differently handled private automobile. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I do not care to carry this any further, but I still cannot see what effect the 70-car bill would have on bus accidents. There is no apparent association. Mr. CoRBEr. The bus is heavier. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Yes; but what has the bus got to do with the 70-car bill? How can we be charged with doing anything in the situation of the busses? It does not come within the considera- tion of this bill. Mr. CORBET. Well, has it dawned upon you that your 150-car train is a much heavier and differently constructed train from the short 70-car train? Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Oh, certainly it has dawned upon me. It is rather elementary, but you still have not answered my question as to what effect the 70-car-train bill will have on automobile accidents. Mr. CORBETr. It will not have any. I am making a comparison be- tween the big long train that causes accidents and the big heavy 34 TRXAIN LENGTHS busses that cause accidents, because of its weight and its speed. That is all. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Well, I must confess I cannot get it. Mr. CORBETT. I am sorry. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I do not know what you are driving at. That is all. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. I want to ask one question. You mentioned the 150- car train. What is the maximum car-length train? Is there a maximum? Mr. CORBETr. I doubt, Congressman Martin, if there is any maxi- mum. There has been mention made to me of trains that were more than 200 cars in length. I believe that on one or two occasions I was told of trains that were up in the neighborhood of 225 or 250 cars. Mr. MARTIN. What length of train would that make? Mr. CORBETr. I would have to stop and figure it out. Mr. MARTIN. What is the average length of the modern, standard car, coupler and all? Mr. CORBETT. The trains that are hauled, the cars of the trains of that length, are largely those that are hauled as empty cars, such as ore cars, gondolas, and that type of cars, back up for loading purposes. I believe that the average run of a freight car would be around 42 to 45 feet and cars of that average length of ore cars would run possibly 10 feet less than that. Mr. ETCHER. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eicher. Mr. ETCHER. Mr. Corbett, could you summarize briefly the basic considerations that caused the judgment of the sponsors of this bill to crystalize on exactly 70 cars as the maximum, regardless of the varying conditions of terrain as between the Great Plains, for exam- ple, and our great mountains? Mr. CORBETRT. Now, if I understand you correctly, you have asked if I can answer what prompted the decision of 70 cars. Mr. ETCHER. That is right. Mr. CORBET. No, sir; I cannot. It was the opinion of the broth- erhood that a shorter restriction than that should be applied and I believe that it was Senator McCarran, possibly prompted by the fact that his State legislature had passed a law for the restriction of train lengths that is about the same as the provision of this, S. 69. Does that answer your question? That was proposed, you understand, by Senator McCarran. Mr. EICHER. Yes; if that is all you can say, but I have quite a query in my mind as to why this maximum 70-car train figure should be adopted for the country as a whole, as a matter of inflexible law. Mr. CORBETr. It is not an inflexible law, only insofar as the maximum length of the train is concerned. There is no intention, and I am sure that the wording of the bill does not make such a provision, that train lengths could not be less than 70 cars. But the bill does provide a maximum length beyond which the railroad managements would not lawfully be permitted to run a train except in an emergency or the case of a mechanical break- down, or something of that sort. TRAIN LENGTHS 35 Mr. EIcizE. Of course, I have never been a practical operating railroad man, although I have had a good deal of experience in other phases of it; but I just cannot see why under some conditions of terrain 35 cars in length might be just as unsafe for purposes of practical operation as 100 cars might be under other conditions. Mr. CoiumEr. Well, the idea that is presented here is that--and I am in agreement with your proposal that there should be 35-car lengths, and if you can succeed in getting that for us, we will accept it and thank you for it; but the idea is that this is a compromise, and I cannot tell what prompted the compromise in Senator McCar- ran's office, or by whom it was made; but his bill was introduced, I believe, on his personal intiative, and it was given more favorable consideration than the more restrictive bills that had been introduced by some two or three other Senators and those other bills provided for train lengths of one-half mile or not to exceed 70 cars, which- ever would be the lesser, and for a restriction of passenger-train lengths to 14 cars. Mr. WITHROW. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Withrow. Mr. WITHROw. I would like to ask you a question which will probably clarify that. Aside from the limitation of trains, the lengths of trains, because of excessive slack action that makes for the terrible jolt that is received on the rear end, the limitation of trains on that ground, do you not feel as though this 70-car provision was based upon the fact that it is impossible to distinguish signals more than 70 car lengths away from the engine? Mr. CORBETT. Not only that, but it is almost impossible to inter- pret signals correctly. Mr. WITHEOw. Yes. Mr. CoRBETrr. One hundred percent of the time even at distances of 70 cars. Mr. XVITHRow. And that a great many people are under the impres- sion that the only signals given are the signals to start and go and the signal to stop. Mr. CoRBETr. That is correct. Mr. WITHRow. When, as a matter of fact, there are a great many other signals. Now, as a matter of fact, on foggy days, it is not possible to see what is going on along the train, and a great many things might go wrong, and would it not be unsafe to run any train that you could not see the entire length of ? Mr. CoRBETr. I would say so ; yes, sir. Mr. WITHxow. Then, as a matter of fact, it is not only the safety of the employees but it is the safety of the public who are traveling on passenger trains that are intermingled with this high-speed freight traffic which is endangered. The men who operate freight trains must know what is going on on those trains so that they do not injure the passenger trains that are operating on double tracks or over inter- locking plants. Mr. CoRBEr. I believe that your assumption is 100 percent right. Mr. Wrniow. Well, do you not feel as though the railroad com- panies have built up a psychology of safety first in this country and created that psychology I 36 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. CoRBrrT. I think that the railroads should be commended for having done that, and I believe that they have done more in the advancement of safety than probably any other line of industry or any other kind of service. Mr. WITHROW. Well, the public feels as though they are absolutely safe when they get on a passenger train nowadays, do they not? Mr. CoRBEnr. I believe they do. Mr. WITHRoW. As a matter of fact, they do not realize the hazards that passenger trains are being subjected to. Mr. CORBETr. Well, if they do realize it, they have confidence enough in the precedents that have been built up through the safe passenger service to accept the service with very little hesitation. It might be proper to put into the records that there is a railroad which enters the city of Washington that celebrated its one hundredth anniversary more than a year ago and that had never had an accident to a passenger in 100 years of service. Mr. WITHRow. Well, I will put it this way to you: Do you believe that the trains are operated as safely as the people who travel on the passenger trains think they are? Mr. CORBETT. I think that they are operated just as safely, insofar as passenger service is concerned, as it would be possible to provide service with the exceptions of the possible hazards that are presented by the long freight trains on adjacent tracks. Does that answer your question? Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Halleck. Mr. HALLECK. As a matter of fact, the records of the railroads in respect to the safety of people riding on passenger trains is almost perfect, is it not? Mr. CORBEr. I think so. Mr. HALLECK. Therefore it would seem to me to follow that the long trains have not set up much of a hazard to people riding on passenger trains. Mr. CosBEr. Well, there may be a question about that. Mr. HALLECK. Did I understand you to say that you would welcome and be glad to have a bill that would limit freight trains to 35. cars? Mr. CORBETT. I. did not ask for that. I said that there are condi- tions when I believe that a train length of 35 cars represents a hazard and that would be in foggy or stormy weather. Mr. HALLECK. As a matter of fact, under certain atmospheric con- ditions you could not see a hand signal two cars away? Mr. CoRBETr. That is true. Mr. HALLECK. I am wondering if you know of any situation where the operation of a freight train of more than 70 cars would be eco- nomical and would be within reasonable limits of safety. Mr. CORBETr. I think it would not be anywhere. Mr. HALLECK. That is the operation of more than 70-car trains? Mr. CoRBEr. No; you worded it, as I understand, of just 70 cars. Mr. HALLECK. No; I did not intend to. Mr. Comrr. Will you read the question again? Mr. Haax. I will state it again. Can you conceive of any situation, having regard to the terrain, the straightness of the track, the fact that the cars are empty, or TRAIN LENGTHS 37 other things that would be favorable; a situation under which the operation of a freight train of more than 70 cars would be economical and within reasonable limits of safety? Mr. CORBErI. No; I cannot. Mr. HALLECK. You think that is the absolute limit under any con- ditions ? Mr. CoRBErr. That is my personal opinion; yes, sir. Mr. HALLECK. And that under some circumstances even 70 cars would be too long a train? Mr. CORBETT. That is correct. Mr. HALLECK. Is the impact resulting from the application of the emergency brakes-the emergency stop-greater or less, according to the speed of the train? Mr. CoRBErr. I am in hopes that I could give you this as correctly as possible and the only data that could answer your question would be whatever might be learned from the scientific instruments that are used to test slack action, and I have no definite information as to, well, we will call it scientific data, that those instruments have revealed at different speeds of trains. Mr. HALLECK. Well, do you know what the experience of the men who ride in the cabooses is as to these emergency stops going, say, 5 miles an hour or 50 miles an hour, as to which is most serious? Mr. CoRBET. I would not want to express that as definite, and I would prefer that when the representatives of the train service, who have experienced those shocks, millions of times a year, I would prefer that you might put that question to them and that it might be answered by them. Mr. HALLECK. Having regard to the matter of highway crossing accidents, do you think we would have more or less accidents as we increased the number of trains operating over the crossings? Mr. Coinrr. I am going to make the expression that an increase in trains, together with the continued increase with the number of automobiles, trucks, and busses, must make a continued increase in the crossing hazards. Mr. HALLECK. Do you have any idea as to the number of people who are injured in crossing accidents as compared with the number who are injured in the cabooses by reason of these emergency stops on the long trains? Mr.-Conanmr. No; I have not. Mr. HALLECx. As I undestood your direct statement you recom- mended the construction of grade separations as the ultimate solu- tion of the matter of highway accidents, crossing accidents. Mr. CoRBETr. I believe that at all of the meetings of locomotive engineers that I have attended, they have referred to what we had considered dangerous crossings, and they have expressed from their experiences where there had been grade separations, the hope that it might be extended to cover many other crossings, because there is no real chance for a continuation of fatal accidents on crossings where the grades have been separated. Mr. HALLWJK. Just one further question and then I am through. Mr. Kennedy inquired about the possible or probable effect upon the consumer of foodstuffs in New York City. I represent an agricultural district and I recently have had many letters from organizations of farmers in opposition to this bill. I 38 TRAIN LENGTH S am wondering what your view is as to whether or not, if the bill should pass and if it should follow that the operating expenses of the railroads are increased and that should be reflected in an increase in freight rates, whether or not the farmers of Indiana would have to stand that increase or whether it would have to be borne by the consumers of New York City. Mr. Conrr. Well, first, because my understanding of the effect of this bill is that its effects are only on about 20 percent of the freight trains that are run, and because I can see no reason for any additional costs, I would be of the opinion that there should be no place, no individual, or no group of individuals, that would be called upon to pay more. It might be of interest to you to know that we have a number of letters that tell us that representatives of railroads are going out and asking these men to write these letters and they are not only doing that, but they are going to men in the shops and in different kinds of pursuits other than train service and almost making demands that they shall write you, and the other Congressmen, in opposition to this bill. That probably explains the reason for at least some of the letters that you have received. This is not something that your ordinary farmer has sat down and read out of the papers. It is something that he was, as Congressman Withrow referred to a minute ago, the railroads have endeavored to build up a sort of psychological effect upon the people to believe that this represents something that is really reprehensible and that it is going to raise the dickens with freight rates and everything else. That is just so much bunk in the eyes of the railroad employees who are engaged in the handling of trains. We believe that it has no basis in fact. And we challenge the opposition to present proper evidence to sustain their position. Mr. HALLECK. It seems to me that is a very important point. Mr. CoRBmirr. I think so myself. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Chairman. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Corbett, coming down to the safety part of this proposition, I want to ask a few questions. How many accidents or injuries to the crews of the trains, of the freight trains consisting of 70 cars or more, have you had in the United States in the last year? Mr. CoRwrr. In how long? Mr. BuLWINKLE. During the year 1937. Mr. CoBETr. Well, Congressman Bulwinkle, we have compiled as complete a list as possible and we have gone back over a longer period than just 1 year. Our records are quite complete. It covers the accidents I believe on trains of less than 70 cars and on trains of more than 70 cars, and the exact dates of each of those accidents will be reported to you by one of the others who will follow me. We have divided up our statements. Mr. BULwINKLE. Well, I would like, in answer to my question, Mr. Corbett-I do not care whether it is taken up later or answered by you-but, do you know of your own knowledge how many of these accidents happened last year? TRAIN LENGTHS 39 Mr. CoRBErr. In exactly the year. Do you mean just the year 1937? Mr. BULWINKLE. Yes. Mr. CoRBETr. You want we to confine it to just 1937? Mr. BULWINKLE. Yes. Mr. CoRBETr. I have not the figures for that time, but I have this, Congressman, if you will let me answer, please. Mr. BULwINKLE. Yes. Mr. CoRlrr. I have assisted in the compilation. We have gone to the Interstate Commerce Commission records, and I believe that either Mr. Johnson or Mr. Farquahrson, who will follow me, will give you a recital of every one of those accidents. Mr. BULwINKLE. Well, in order to get it from the rest of them, I am going to ask you the rest of my questions and see whether you can answer them of your own knowledge, or we will wait for them. How many wrecks on freight trains have been caused during the year 1937 by the operation of freight trains consisting of more than 70 cars. Mr. CoRBETT. That I have not brought with me. Have you those written out? Mr. BULwINKL. I am just going to ask the questions so that you and the other gentlemen can get them. Then how many wrecks of passenger trains have been caused by the operation of freight trains consisting of mo.re than 70 cars during the year 1937. Mr. CoRBEr. I have none of that, exactly. Mr. BUIINKLE. And the other question is: How many grade- crossing accidents have been caused by the operation of freight trains consisting of more than 70 cars during the last year? If any of the other gentlemen can answer those questions, I would like to take them up by years or by periods. Mr. CoRErr. We will be glad to try to do that, sir. The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, Mr. Corbett, you referred to the fact that about 28 percent of the trains would be affected by this legislation. Mr. CoRBErr. About 20. The CHAIRMAN. About 20? Mr..CoRBEnr. That is my understanding. The CHAIRMAN. And, do you have any statistics or are any avail- able which show what percentage of freight would be moved on the trains in excess of 70 cars as compared with the trains under that length ? Mr. CoRBETr. I do not have that myself. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Boren, you had a question? Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe I have a question. I just want to say that we still want the facts and figures. You chal- lenged the opposition awhile ago. I want to challenge both the pro- ponents and the opponents of this bill to give us facts and figures. Personally I am not interested in the theory of the thing at all. I want to know what the facts and figures will show. Thus far I do not think that we have had any. I am referring back to your statement, Mr. Corbett, that you challenged the oppos- tion to show the facts and figures on this bill showing that it would increase freight rates, and so on, but I challenge both sides to show 40 TRAIN LENGTHS to me what the real facts are concerning freight rates; concerning employment; concerning safety; and the other factors. Mr. O'BRIEN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O'Brien. Mr. O'BRIEN. Mr. Corbett, I understood you to say a few moments ago that the passage of this bill would create no additional expense. Is that true ? Mr. CORBETT. It is my belief, and I am basing that belief upon the fact that there are a larger percentage of trains that have less than 70 cars than there are with more than 70 cars, and on the belief that they can transfer some of the cars that are now hauled in the extra long trains to the shorter trains, and it may result in a larger per- centage of trains that will be about 70-car lengths in length. Does that answer your question? The CHAIRMAN. I believe that is all. Thank you, Mr. Corbett. Mr. CORBETT. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson is the next witness. STATEMENT OF W. D. JOHNSON, VICE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, ORDER OF RAILWAY CON- DUCTORS, WASHINGTON, D. C. Mr. JoHNsON. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is W. D. Johnson. I am vice president and national legislative representative of the Order of Railway Conductors. I reside in Washington, D. C., and maintain an office at No. 10 Independence Avenue. The Order of Railway Conductors has for many years been on record as favoring and sponsoring legislation to limit the length of trains in interstate commerce. Therefore, I appear as a duly author- ized representative of the Order of Railway Conductors in support of the bill now under consideration. I might say further, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, that this question has been handled in our grand division sessions and action taken thereon for the past 20 years. Senate bill 69, now before you, places a limitation on the car length of trains which may be operated upon railroads by common carriers engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, and is right- fully termed "a safety measure." This bill passed the Senate July 26, 1937, amended to read as follows: A BILL To amend an Act entitled "An Act to regulate commerce," approved February 4, 1887, as amended and supplemented, by limiting freight or other trains to seventy cars Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Act entitled "An Act to Regulate Commerce," approved February 4, 1887, as amended and supple- mented, be further amended by the addition thereto of a new section, desig- nated as "Section 26a," reading as follows: "SEc. 20a. After July 1, 1938, it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter to run, or permit to be run, over its line or road, or any portion thereof, any train consisting of more than seventy freight or other cars, exclusive of caboose: Provided, That this Act shall not apply in cases of engine failures between terminals or to other mechanical failure on the line or road: Provided further, That in claiming for an exception for such an emergency the burden shall be upon the railroad to show that it has acted in the exercise of diligence and good faith." TRAIN LENGTHS 41l The emergency provision of the bill provides: That this Act shall not apply in cases of engine failures between terminals or to other mechanical failure on the line or road: Provided, That in claiming for an exception for such an emergency the burden shall be upon the railroad to show that it has acted in the exercise of diligence and good faith. This provision is broad enough to take care of any emergency that may arise in train operation between terminals. The primary object of the proponents of S. 69 is to promote safety and to secure at least reasonable comfort for train-service employees while in the performance of their duties, and at the same time provide safety to the public. We maintain that train-service employees are constantly working under more hazardous conditions as the length of trains is increased. Statistical data has been introduced at previous hearings on train- length legislation dealing with the amount of shock sustained and registered by dynamometer cars and other mechanical devices em- ployed in making tests in train operations. Tests of various kinds by and through mechanical devices to determine shocks and draw-bar pull are essential at intervals. How- ever, we contend the result of such tests is an unfair method by which to determine the amount of shock or suffering employees may endure, because flesh, bone, and brain cannot endure the pressure which a mechanical instrument incapable of feeling, speaking, or suffering is able to withstand, especially a device particularly de- signed for the purpose of registering and resisting shocks. We will introduce statistics at this hearing covering specific cases of accidents to train-service employees, due to excessive rear-end shocks on long trains. These records will show date, location,.names of railroads, names of employees, extent of injury and time lost by injured employees, and we contend that statistics of this character should be the factor for determining the necessity for the enactment of the legislation now before you. The operating rules on all railroads provide for the proper inspec- tion of trains while en route, and train crews are required, under the rules, to inspect their trains at all stops and keep a close lookout at all times while the train is in motion. Such inspections, however, are impossible under long-train conditions, and, in our judgment, many accidents that have occurred would have been avoided had proper inspection of the train been made. I might go a little further, Mr. Chairman, and say that many of such accidents, according to the reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission, are shown to be due to drawbars coming down in the middle of the train while the train is in motion; the breaking of an arch bar; the breaking off of a flange; the dragging of a brake beam, causing derailment which many times involves an expense of thou- sands and sometimes runs into hundreds of thousands of dollars. I think we have had a couple of accidents just recently on the Chesa- peake & Ohio Railroad and the Norfolk & Western that involved more than a million dollars, and I contend, based upon my experience-as a train-service employee, that had the crew had an opportunity to prop- erly inspect those trains, perhaps the defects would have been caught and the cars set out or some repairs made that would have avoided those accidents. 42 TRAIN LENGTHS However, the railroads, in their testimony, refer to the large volume of increased expense, which is an assumption, in connection with the operation of this particular piece of legislation, and they fail to take into consideration that there is a possibility that many accidents would have been and will be avoided if the crew is afforded an oppor- tunity to properly look after their trains while in their charge. In- creased costs of this kind cannot be predetermined. The rules further require that enginemen must receive a "proceed" signal before train is started and certain other signals while the train is in motion. Such requirements under the rules cannot be fulfilled under ordinary circumstances in present-day long-train operation. It is true that the railroads have expended large sums of money to improve the roadbed, equipment, and the method of train operation, with the result that a wonderful improvement has been made and the efficiency in operation increased. However, regardless of the won- derful improvements which have been made, the element of danger in long-train operation still exists and train-service employees are injured daily. Mr.BOREN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. That question as to derailment is still sticking in my mind. I would like to know the number of trains of more than 70 car lengths that have been derailed over any particular length of time and the number of trains of less than 70 car lengths that have been derailed over any particular length of time. Mr. JOHNsoN. Congressman Boren, there is no doubt but what we could work up such data from a few of the men who are employed on certain divisions of the various railroads. That would give us a basis upon which we could strike a fair estimate as to the accidents of that kind. While, on the other hand, taking the accident reports rendered to the Interstate Commerce Commission by the carriers, we could check and find the number of accidents and segregate the two classes as set forth in your question. Mr. BOREN. The point of my question is this: I cannot see any bear- ing on derailment in this bill-unless it can be shown it has something to do with the length of the train, whether it is more or less than 70 cars. Mr. JoHNsON. Well, Mr. Congressman, in reply to that, there is not always a derailment involved in things of this kind. Mr. BoREN. I am referring back to your own statement where you cited a derailment. Mr. JOHNSON. We could, of course, after an accident has hap- pened and an investi'gation is made to place the responsibility for the accident and it is determined that the accident was caused by a bursted wheel, a broken-down truck, dropping of arch bar, or from any other causes, but the investigation would fail to determine just when the defect in that particular car occurred. Mr. Bortn. Well, I know, but- Mr. JOHNsoN. If you will let me go just a little further, please. Mr. BozuN. Yes. Mr. JOHNsON. But, I do know, from experience, and I think it can be testified to by other men who have had a comparable experience to mine-and I do not think that the railroads would take issue with this statement--that in many instances when trains take siding to TRAIN LENGTHS 43 meet an opposing train, the crew, in looking over the train, have found some of these defects, while the train was standing on the sidetrack, which allowed them to get rid of that car, which avoided an accident; and to carry it further, had that train not taken siding and continued on its straightaway movement, the accident might have happened from the defective equipment. Mr. BOREN. Still, I see no implication of 70 cars or 80 cars or 30 cars or 20 cars, other than your general statement that that affects your employees and would indirectly affect you; but I want some facts and figures showing that the derailment has something to do with the 70-car length. Mr. JOHNSON. Well, Mr. Congressman, I am going to give you the benefit of some reports a little later on that are not based on aver- ages. They are not based on assumptions. They are not based on car-miles. They are not based on freight-train miles. They are based upon actual facts. Mr. BOREN. That is what I want. Mr. JOHNSON. These facts were obtained from the man who paid the price. I hope we have not reached the point where we are going to give consideration to life and limb based upon averages, because I dare say there is not a man in this room who would allow that rule of reasoning to be applied to him individually. And we are not here begging for this legislation on averages. We are basing our plea on the rights of the train-service employees to be afforded pro- tection from the dangers that exist. Mr. BOREN. I do not want you to gather the impression from my statement that I have any thought necessarily of calling for averages. I cannot, for instance, see, and so far you have not cited, one in- stance-not one. Mr. JOHNSON. Maybe we will, before we get through. Mr. BOREN. I hope so. Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Chairman. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Chairman, just at this point, may I ask this question before the witness gets away? Mr. WOLVERTON. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BULwINKLE. What did you mean when you stated just now that the accidents could have been avoided if the train crew had had time to properly look after their train? Mr. JoHNSON. I mean by that, Mr. Congressman, this: You take a long train, to give you an idea and answer the question asked awhile ago, as to what the length of a train of 203 cars would be, based on an average of 46 feet per car, which is agreed to by the opponents of this legislation as a fair average for the length of freight equip- ment, a train of 203 cars would be just 1,222 feet short of 2 miles long, exclusive of the caboose and engine, which would add thereto approximately 160 feet more. The average man outside of the railroad industry has no real knowledge as to how long a train really is. You speak in cars-140, 150, or 160 cars. But when you measure the cars, as I will show you a little further along in my report, you will see the real length of the train. Mr. BULwINKLE. Then, I understand you to say that a crew cannot properly look after a train of over 70 cars. 44 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. JoHNsON. Not look after it and handle it safely; no; regard- less of any testimony to the contrary. Of course, if they allow the crew plenty of time, but they do not get that time any more. If they would allow stops of an hour and a half or 2 hours to properly inspect the train; but may I suggest how long would it take you to walk from here to the Willard Hotel, which is over a mile. Then you will have some idea as to how long it will take to walk the length of a 150-car train and stop and inspect the running gear, the draft rigging, and the various other appliances in connection with the equipment; we are not allowed that much time. One man may leave the caboose and get 30 or 35 cars down the train and cross over and then go back. Likewise, the man on the head end of the train can walk back a certain distance and cross over and goes back, but many times the middle of the train, where many of the accidents do happen, never gets the proper inspection. I do not blame a trainman for wanting to get back to the engine or caboose before the train starts, because it is a dangerous thing to ride out on top of these long trains with so many accidents happening. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WOLvERTON. Is it the practice of the Interstate Commerce Con- mission to make investigations of accidents that have happened while trains were in operation? Mr. JOHNSON. Not all accidents, Congressman; no. They do when loss of life is involved or personal injuries, and in many instances where there is an excessive damage to the equipment. Mr. WoLVERToN. What is the amount so far as money damages is concerned that forms a basis for cases where they make an inves- tigation? Mr. JOHNsON. I do not feel safe in saying-there is no set amount of damage that would cause the Interstate Commerce Commission to make an investigation of an accident. They use their judgment, to some extent, in matters of that kind. If it is an extraordinary or unusual accident, even though no lives have been lost or any serious personal injury resulted, they make a thorough investigation in order to determine the responsibility for the accident, which may result in steps being taken to eliminate a like occurrence at some future time. Mr. WOLVERTON. I asked the question because I have a recollection that sometime in the hearings before this committee I gathered the impression that investigations were made in case of accidents which covered a certain amount of damage. I do not remember whether it was $50 or some other amount. Mr. JOHNsoN. I think that you are basing that on requirements of reports from the carriers 'covering accident when more than $150 damage is involved. Mr. WOLVERTON. That may be the amount. Mr. JOHNsoN. Yes. Mr. WOLVERTON. When investigations are made does the Interstate Commerce Commission determine the cause and the responsibility for the accident? Mr. JOHNSON. They do, yes; and render a report based upon their findings through a very close and careful investigation. TRAIN LENGTHS 45 Mr. WOLvERTON. In how many instances has the Interstate Com- imerce Commission found by such investigations that the cause of the accident was directly attributable to the length of the train? Mr. JOHNsON. I do not know, Mr. Congressman, whether we could find a report that would bring out that particular answer; but you will find, however, that the Interstate Commerce Commission's re- ports show that the accident was caused by a defective drawbar or truck, which resulted in an emergency application of the air, which caused a severe shock on the rear end of that train which resulted in John Doe or Bill Smith being injured. Mr. WOLVERTON. In the statement given my Mr. Corbett, he stated as a conclusion that accidents happen to such an extent, as a result of the length of the train that this legislation is necessary. Have you come to the same conclusion? Mr. JOHNsoN. Yes. Mr. WOLVERTON. I assume both of you base your conclusions on the facts as you know them to exist. Has the Interstate Commerce Coin- mission come to any such conclusion on the basis of the facts it has? In other words, has the Interstate Commerce Commission at any time in reports of individual accidents, or from a study of all accidents, recommended legislation of this kind as a preventive of accidents? Mr. JOHNSON. They have not, and I do not think that they have that right under the law to make a reconunendation of that kind. They have, however, Mr. Congressman, ordered tests to be made; the one on the Oregon Short Line will be referred to later on, to determine the amount of shock on excessive long trains. Mr. WOLVERTON. What is in my mind is this: Up to the present time the committee has not been given any facts. We have had the benefit of the conclusions which you and Mr. Corbett have come to as a result of your experience, or your study of the subject. But no facts have been presented by either of you to sustain your conclusions, It would seem to me that if the accidents are as frequent as you folks would indicate, and which is the basis of your request for this legislation, it would seem to me that the Interstate Commerce Com- mission would also have come to some conclusion in the matter and that it would have been a subject of recommendation. If such is the case, it would be very helpful to me if I could see the recommenda- tions, if any, they may have made. If they have not done so, it is equally important to understand or know the reason. The absence of any such recommendation would indicate a different opinion than that which is being expressed by you and by the speaker who pre- ceded you. Mr. JOHNsON. Mr. Congressman, in reply to that, I am satisfied that the members, perhaps not all of the Interstate Commerce Com- nission, realize from the many reports which have been rendered to the Safety Division of the Interstate Commerce Commission, by the railroads, that there is a hazard in connection with long-train oper- ation. I think any man who will take the reports and carefully read them would be convinced that there is a hazard. There is something there that should be eliminated. But I am just wondering if they--under the law, which is a Federal law, requiring a certain set-up to do a certain thing which is made applicable for all of the people-could, 47891--38--4 46 TRAIN LENGTHS within their jurisdiction, come out and take a positive stand in a matter of this kind. I repeat, they have ordered tests to be made in many ways in con- nection with train operations to develop certain facts. Mr. WOLVERTON. If the Interstate Commerce Commission has authority to order tests to be made, what would be the value of making a test, if they do not have the power to make a report or offer recommendation based on the test? Mr. JOHNSON. I think, Mr. Congressman, that I could furnish you that information just a little later on with respect to a report printed in connection with some of the tests which have been made. Mr. WoLvERToN. I think it is apparent from the questions that have been asked by the members of the committee that there is a great desire upon their part to have the facts in the case that have led you and the others who have appeared as witnesses to the con- clusions which you have reached. While I do not wish to suggest to the proponents of this bill the method they should pursue in pre- senting the case for the bill, I would think from the experience so far gained that it might seem wise if the factual side.. was placed before the committee first to justify the conclusions which would afterward be drawn by the speakers from those facts. Mr. JOHNSON. I believe, Congressman Wolverton, that we will be able, before we conclude our testimony, to furnish you and the other members of the committee all of the information that you may desire; even though statements have been prepared by some of the opponents of the bill that we have endeavored to deceive- I want to assure you that we have no desire whatsoever to deceive. We want to place before the committee all of the facts in connection with this particular legislation, with the hope that we will be able to convince you of its justification. Mr. WOLVERTON. I can assure you that no one on this committee has any thought that you or any other witness who appears in behalf of this bill will deceive or attempt to. We all have confidence in your integrity and honesty. Mr. JoHNsON. I just say that inference has been made by some outside of the committee. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kennedy. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. In reference to your statement in connection with the examination of the train to prevent accidents, is that not a situation that could be overcome by adding one or two more men to the train? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, in answer to that, Mr. Congressman, we conceived that idea some 20, 25, or 30 years ago, and you should have heard the howl that went up from the railroads then; they proclaimed it ridiculous, and their plea was, "what are you going to do? Put on one or two more men on the train to be killed"? That was their argument then and still is. That is a matter of record. So that would not work out. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Why wouldn't it work? Mr. JOHNSON. Because we take the position that 70 cars should be the maximum number of cars that train-service employees should be forced to ride behind, and the mere adding of one more man will not eliminate the hazard that we are talking about. TRAIN LENGTHS 47 Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I understood your argument to be directed against the long train because it is supposed to be physically impossible for a man to cover that territory and get back. Now, if there was an additional man or two additional men, what- ever the case might be, so that you would only be called upon to inspect one-third of a train or one-fourth of a train, would it not then be possible to do the job in a shorter space of time and in that way also be insured that the cars were in perfect working order and eliminate all the hazards you are talking about? Mr. JoHNsON. No. What we are talking about could not be elim- inated, I do not care if you put a man on every car. You have not eliminated the hazard of the shock on the rear end of that train. I am talking about that specifically and let us not get confused about that. I did not say that the proper inspection of the train would eliminate the hazard we are talking about. I said the proper inspection of the train would eliminate, in my mind, many of the accidents that occur, such as wrecks, which would be a saving to the railroads and absorb some of this $237,000,000, graduated down to about $80,000,000, that it is going to cost them. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Then your argument is largely, re- gardless of how many men you might have on the train, that there still will be a necessity to reduce the number of cars to approximately 70? Mr. JOHNSON. To eliminate the hazard of rear-end shock; yes, sir. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Do you happen to know offhand how many service accidents have occurred on trains of less than 70 cars within the last year or last 2 years, or for any given period of time? Mr. JOHNsON. I have a report here, that I am going to give later on, that shows that information for about 310 accidents. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. What I have in mind and what I am trying to have settled is the question as to whether or not the condi- tions you have described in the 100-car trains is greater than the num- ber of accidents on the smaller trains, 50 or 60 or 40 cars. Mr. JoHNsON. According to the report that I have here, there are more accidents on the long trains, and as yog analyze the report cover- ing the claims paid on trains of less than 70 cars, you will find the greater percentage of those claims involve trains between 60 and 69 cars. Therefore, as the length of the train increases, the hazard in- creases. And I will say this: There may have been a few less accidents, but if there was a decrease, Mr. Congressman, the severity of the acci- dents which have occurred more than offset the decrease. I am going to give you the benefit of some of these things a little later on. The railroads know all about this. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. I have a list here which shows that in 24 years about 52,792 claims were paid by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen's Association on accidents. Now, how many trainmen are there employed ? I am trying to get at what this represents. Mr. JOHNSON. You mean how many trainmen are in service? 48 rTRA14N LENGTIi$9 Mr. BOREN. How many people are insured; that would come under the claims that are made here. That is what I am getting at. Mr. JOHNsON. That report is from the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. Therefore, I would like for you to ask Mr. Farquharson, when he gets on the stand, to answer that question, because I do not know. I can only speak for the Order of Railroad Conductors; I do have reports here covering the claims that we have paid. However, these reports do not reflect the total number of injuries, because they only cover the accidents occurring to members of our organization, and all of the members of our organization do not belong to our accident-insurance department. But I might say that they do re- flect, according to my best judgment, about one-sixth of the total number of accidents occurring to train-service employees. Mr. BOREN. Will you then indicate in your statement how many people are covered by your reports, as well as how many accidents there have been and the specific period of time? Mr. JOHNsON. I am going to furnish you a copy of the reports. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. I have here Senate hearings, Seventy-fourth Con- gress, first session, S. 27 and S. 344, in which you were a witness before the committee. Now, I notice in this report, in these hearings, beginning on page 9 and ending on page 33, there is an itemized statement of 216 claims for disabilities, accidents, and the numbers of cars in each train in- volved is given. Then, beginning on page 53 and ending on page 59, there is a list of 532 accidents with the number of cars in each train involved. Then, beginning on page 59 and ending on page 104, there is a list of 530 accidents giving the number of cars per train; then, there is a supplementary report beginning on page 104 and ending on page 111 of the same character, giving 78 additional cases. The report begins on page 59 and ends on page 104, which has 530 cases, and the supplementary report has 78 additional cases. Are you going to make a comparable showing at this time in sup- port of the pending bill or are you just going to rest on what is in the Senate hearings? Mr. JOHNsON. We are going to bring additional information in, Mr. Congressman, setting forth additional claims that have been paid, and it is my intention to furnish each member of the committee with a copy of these reports, which we have prepared, and, I repeat, they are based on actual happenings, not on percentages, or car-miles, or freight-train-miles, or ton-miles. The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed. Mr. JOHNSON. The. speed of freight trains has been increased to the extent that on many, if not all railroads, freight trains are op- erated at a higher rate of speed than was made by a passenger train a few years ago, and in some instances they exceed the speed made by passenger trains at the present time. This fact alone demands tlat every precaution should be taken to safeguard the lives and limbs of train-service employees and we contend that no greater con- tribution can be made to safeguard them than by reducing the length of the trains. TRAIN LENGTHS 49 Notwithstanding the wonderful improvements which have been made in a general way in train operation, the method of transmit- ting signals between train-service employees is practically the same today as it was in the early days of railroading-we may say from the very inception of the railroad industry. In other words, when trains consisted of 8, 10, and 15 cars of about one-half the length of present-day equipment, the same signals were used then as are being used today; that is, a red flag, torpedoes and fuses by day, and red flag, white and red lights, torpedoes and fuses by night. Signals of this character could be clearly seen and properly interpreted on the short trains. However, such is not the case on the extremely long trains of today. Much of the freight equipment in use today is approximately twice he length of the equipment in use 30 years ago and in addi- tion to the increase in length, the number of cars handled in a train has increased many times, with the result that it is utterly impossi- ble to properly interpret day and night hand signals on trains of greater length than provided for in the bill now before you. The rays of the white and red lights have their limitations-also the human eye at its best has its limitations-from the standpoint of distant visibility, and we contend that it is utterly impossible to properly interpret lamp signals or the movements of the human body for a greater distance than 70 cars, and only then on very rare occa- sions and under most favorable weather conditions. Therefore, in view of these facts, the rule with respect to enginemen being required to get a signal from the rear end of the train before starting, or while the train is in motion is not possible of fulfillment on the ex- cessively long trains. But regardless of the facts set forth, the rules covering train inspection en route and proper signaling are still in effect. The requirements and observance of these two rules are absolutely necessary to insure safe train operation. I have had approximately 38 years' experience in railroading, 32 years of which was in active service as a brakeman, switchman, yard- master, and conductor in freight and passenger service, during which time I was actually in charge of trains of greater length than pro- vided for in the bill now before you. Therefore, I feel that I am in a position to testify with respect to the conditions under which train-service employees are required to work. I know something about operating a train in a fog and other inclement weather condi- tions and the strain under which men work riding on the rear end of long trains. I also have some knowledge with respect to the distance day and night hand signals can be properly and safely interpreted. At previous hearings, the opponents stated that signals can be properly interpreted on trains in excess of 70 cars in fair weather conditions and it is reasonable to assume like statements will be made at this hearing. As one of the representatives of the train-service employees and as one who has had actual experience in train service, I must challenge the statements already made in this connection and any similar statements that may be made during this hearing. A careful investigation of this question by your committee will convince you that I am fully justified in making such a challenge. On page 196 of the hearings before a subcommittee of the Commit- tee on Interstate Commerce, United States Senate, Seventy-fourth 50 TRAIN LENGTHS Congress first session, on S. 27 and S. 344, bills to limit the car length of trains, you will find the following statement made by Mr. J. W. Smith, vice president and general manager of the Boston & Maine and Maine Central Railroads, which is in connection with the transmission of signals from one end of the train to the other and visual tests that were conducted in Kansas and Illinois and re- ferred to by Mr. Rafferty and Mr. Abrams, appearing as witnesses in support of these bills: What I want to bring out is that there is no safety to employees involved, or to the public, in the signal question that has been raised. There may be a matter of some delay involved, but that is a managerial question, and I have always found when the delay is serious it is corrected by the officers of the railroad. I am indeed surprised to know that an operating official would make such a statement, because I have been led to believe throughout my entire railroad experience that a proper interpretation and ob- servance of all signals under all conditions are two of the most important things in connection with train operation. However, statements such as Mr. Smith made should convince your committee that the railroads do condone to a certain extent the disregard for certain operating rules under certain conditions. . Such train operations in utter disregard of these two important rules results in the fact that in many, many instances trains of excessive length are being operated today from the standpoint of chance and trusting to luck with a consequent hazard to train-service employees and the traveling public. These hazards can be and should be removed as provided for in the bill now before your com- mittee for consideration. In the study of this bill by your committee most serious consider- ation should be given to weather conditions both day and night. For example, a crew is called to leave terminal A at 7 a. m. It is an ideal day so far as visibility is concerned. They start with 50 cars in their train. On leaving the terminal they receive instructions to pick up cars en route. While en route the weather conditions change to the extent of reducing the visibility from 25 to 75 percent, and under certain conditions, such as fogs and storms, the visibility is practically wiped out. In the meantime the length of the train has been materially increased through the process of picking up cars, but regardless of the increased length of the train and the decreased visibility, the crew is required to complete the trip, do all the work they have instructions to do, with the same degree of safety and efficiency as though they had continued with the 50 cars they had in the train leaving terminal A and the weather conditions had re- mained ideal. Just look out the window, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, and you will see that this is one of the days just men- tioned, and we have them all over the country,. and they operate long trains throughout the entire country. In the event the crew fails to carry out instructions with respect to doing the work assigned to them, or they violate a rule which results in personal injury or damage to property regardless of weather conditions or length of train, they are disciplined accord- inzly. I have known of train-service employees being disciplined for failure to make schedule time or consuming too much time in doing their work under such adverse weather conditions. However, I feel TRAIN LENGTHS 51 confident a careful investigation will fail to reveal where trains have been reduced in length due to decreased visibility. The only reduc- tions made in train length or tonnage are in extreme cold weather, clue to the fact that an engine will not handle maximum tonnage in cold weather and make schedule time. In the early days of railroading the principal hazards in connection with train operation were the link-and-pin couplings and the going over the top of the trains to operate the hand brakes to assist in con- trolling the speed of the train. The advent of the automatic coupler and air brake through legislative enactment eliminated these hazards to a very considerable extent. However, the railroads at that time took the same position with respect to legislation as they are taking today. Their plea at that time was that the enactment of such legis- lation would inflict a financial burden upon them that they could not meet. Therefore they would be forced into bankruptcy if the legis- lation was enacted. But, regardless of the objections raised by the railroads, the legislation was finally enacted and we now have 100- percent automatic couplers and air brakes. The railroads are still operating and many of them have not been forced into bankruptcy, and those who have passed through or are now in receivership cannot charge same to the laws that have been enacted for the safety of the employees and the public. I will venture the statement that a care- ful check of the results derived from automatic couplers, air brakes, safety appliances, clearance, headlights, and other safety legislation will reflect a saving to the railroads instead of a cost. Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WOLVERTON. May I inquire at this point whether your organi- zation supported the railroads in their plea for increased rates in the case recently before the Interstate Commerce Commission? Mr. JOHNSON. We did not intercede in those hearings that I know of, Mr. Congressman, nor did we oppose the request for an increase. Mr. WOLVERTON. I was under the impression that all of the brother- hoods did so. Mr. JOHNSON. It is possible they did through the chief executives' association. I can find out very easily and let you know. Mr. WOLVERTON. The thought that comes to my mind is this: If the brotherhoods supported the railroads in their requests for increased rates, it was probably based upon the knowledge of the brotherhoods that there was need of increased rates for revenue purposes by the railroads. I intended to follow that question by asking if such support was given, then what would be the attitude of the brother- hoods toward legislation of this character in the event that the petition for increased rates was refused? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, we would not change our position with respect to this legislation, Mr. Congressman, because we take the position that the enactment of this legislation is not going. to cost these rail- roads anything like the amount they have estimated, which is a mere assumption. You cannot predetermine increased costs of this kind. Mr. WOLVERTON. Evidently you are aware of the fact that argu- ment has been made throughout the country against this legislation upon the basis of creating greatly increased cost of operation. This probably has done as much as anything to create opposition upon the 52 TRAIN LENGTIIS part of the grangers and other organizations throughout the coun- try. Under the circumstances, if it is a fact that it will not increase the cost of operation, then I think you will agree with me that it is very important to present to this committee an answer to the argu- ment that it will increase cost of operation. I assume that you will give the facts at a later time to support your position. Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Congressman, of course, when we go back, and perhaps I can read into the record some of the testimony of long ago. The railroads are not singing a new song. This song was written away back in 1890. And we contend that the same plea was made then that is being made now, and through the public they were successful in getting certain statements to be made in opposition to legislation at that time and they have continued to do so to the present time. Now, we have the right to take the position-that it is a mere assumption on the part of the railroads, and we contend that this legislation will not cost the railroads anything like the amount of money that they have stated at the previous hearings, and I am sat- isfied they will say here. They do not apply the cost to the individual railroads. Mr. WOLVERTON. If you were a member of this committee, would you ask both sides to present facts to justify the respective conclu- sions they reach? Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Congressman, I would want to have all of the enlightenment possible. Mr. WOLVERTON. That is the position of this committee. Mr. JOHNsON. I appreciate that, and I am trying to answer to the very best of my ability, but I say that the estimated cost in connec- tion with this legislation is a mere assumption as to the amount. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. Chairman- The CH AIRMAN. Mr. Kennedy. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I wish to ask you, Mr. Johnson, one question, if I may. You quoted from page 198 of the hearings before the Senate com- mittee, from the testimony of Mr. Smith in answer to questions by Senator Lonergan. I presume you have a copy of the hearings there. Now, in fairness to Mr. Smith, would you have any objection to reading the third paragraph on page 197? The impression I got from your statement was one of absolute indifference on the part of Mr. Smith in his answer to the safety feature of this bill. Mr. JoHNSON. You want me to read the third paragraphI Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Yes. Mr. JOHNSON. Beginning with the word "Gentlemen" Mr. KENNEDY of New York. No; the third paragraph. The para- graph below that. The CHARMAN. Mr. Kennedy, the committee has a bill on the floor today which will be taken up in the early part of the session so per- haps it would be desirable to adiourn at this time. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. This will only take the witness about 1 minute, and is in keeping with his statement, and I think that in fairness it might be well for him to read it. The CHAiRxAN. Very well. TRAIN LENGTHS 53 Mr. JoHNsON. In reply to the request, I will read: In the first place, the proponents claim that long-train operation has greatly increased the number of accidents caused by sudden stops, starts, jerks, or slack surges in train, etc. Our records prove conclusively that there has been a sharp reduction in this type of accident; in fact, but one-third as many of these accidents occurred in 1933 as compared with 1923. If the danger to trainmen riding in the caboose of long trains is in any proportion as great as claimed by the proponents, how, then, could the railroads during the past 10 years, when the operation of long trains has become so prevalent, show such a decided improvement in their accident record? It could not be done, which is conclusive proof that the hazard of danger has not increased as the proponents would have you believe. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand adjourned until tomor- row morning at 10 o'clock. (Thereupon, at 11:50 a. m., the committee adjourned as above in- dicated, to meet the following morning, Thursday, January 13, 1938, at 10 a. m.)  TRAIN LENGTHS THURSDAY, JANUARY 13, 1938 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITEE ON INTRSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Washington, D. C. The comnittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m. in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence F. Lea (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order. Mr. Johnson, you may proceed. STATEMENT OF W. D. JOHNSON, VICE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, ORDER OF RAILWAY CON- DUCTORS, WASHINGTON, D. C.-Resumed Mr. JOnNsoN. I will pick up with my statement, Mr. Chairman, where I left office yesterday. That takes us up to the middle of page 6. In my judgment, the automatic-coupler and air-brake laws have proved to be the two out- standing safety laws so far as train-service employees are concerned. However, their enactment opened the way for longer trains, which has resulted in the hazardous and unsafe conditions which we are now endeavoring to portray to you. The enactment of the automatic- coupler and air-brake legislation was fully justified; likewise the enactment of the bill now before you is justified and should become a Jaw during the present session of Congress. I am sure the opponents of this bill will raise the same financial objections at this hearing as they raised in the past. However, we trust this committee will, in their consideration of this bill, set aside all objections that may be raised from the standpoint of increased operating costs and place human rights above property rights. Many of the increased operating costs which were submitted by the rail- roads at previous hearings-namely, switching, enlargement of yards and roundhouses, lengthening of sidetracks, and various other operat- ing facilities-is a mere assumption, and I am sure will not be re- flected to the amount claimed if this bill is enacted. To the contrary, we believe the operation of a train-limit law will reflect a saving, the same as other safety laws which have been enacted. I am sure, with few exceptions, the members of this committee are not familiar with practical train operation, and no doubt you do not understand the real facts in connection with long-train operating, and perhaps you have not considered train length to the extent of fully realizing the length of a freight train of 140 and 150 cars. For your 55 56 TRAIN LENGTHS information and ready reference, will say that it is 1A miles from the Peace Monument to a point on Constitution Avenue opposite the Washington Monument; therefore, a train of 150 average cars would place the caboose or rear end of the train at the Peace Monument and the engine at the Washington Monument.. I am wondering just how many people can with the naked eye distinguish an object the size of a man that distance, let alone discern the movements of certain mem- bers of the body. We have many days during which you cannot see the Monument. The same weather conditions prevail in other parts of the country where long trains are operated, and the trainmen are required to work under such conditions. I might say, Mr. Chairman, the question was asked yesterday as to the length of a train of 203 cars, based'upon 46 feet over-all; a train of 203 average cars would place the rear end just about where we are now, and the engine would be approximately 2,000 feet beyond the Washington Monument. Or a train of 160 cars, the rear end of the train would be about where we are at the present time, and the engine would be at the Washington Monument. Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question? The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wadsworth. Mr. WADSWORTH. Are signals ordinarily given from the caboose, we will say, to the engine without relaying? Mr. JOHNSON. What do you -mean by "without relaying"? You mean start at the caboose and then be picked up by some one along near the center of the train and then passed on? Mr. WADSWORTH. Yes. Mr. JoHNSON. At times, Congressman, yes, under certain condi- tions. When the train is standing still and the crew is out on the ground the head man usually works his way back toward the rear end of the train; the man on the rear end who is not protecting the rear end by flagging under the rules, might have worked up toward the head end of the train, and in that way any signals from the rear end would be picked up by the man who was more in the center of the train and he, in turn, would transmit them to the engine crew. But, I say it'is utterly impossible, Congressman; and actual tests, regardless of weather or location, will demonstrate that you cannot properly interpret signals for a distance greater than 70 cars. Mr. WADSWORTH. I am one of those members of the committee who has had no practical experience in the operation of trains Mr. JoHNsoN. Well, you are fortunate. Mr. WADSwoRITH. And my questions may seem unnecessary to you, but how many men are there on a train other than the engine crew? Mr. JOHNSON. The standard crew consists of five men-an engineer and fireman, conductor and two brakemen, or the rear man is identi- fied as the flagman. On some of our local freight trains puller crews. switchers, mine-run crews, or other trains that are required to do a great deal of switching en route, consist of six men, which would be in addition to the engine crew, the conductor, and three brakemen, one of whom would be confined to the rear end of the train in order to protect the train when standing. Mr. LEA. Is there any established rule fixing the number of em- ployees on the train, depending on the number of cars? TRAIN LENGTHS 57 Mr. JOHNSON. California has a full-crew law which requires addi- tional men on all trains of over 50 cars. The CHAIRMAN. But outside of the legal requirements, what is the practice in reference to that? Mr. JoHNsON. What is the practice? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mr. JOHNSON. We have nothing under the contractual rule or agreement with the railroads except there are agreements on certain railroads that provide for a certain number of men to be assigned to certain locals, or switcher crews, during certain seasons of the year to take care of heavy traffic, during a specified time. We had that on the property where I hold my rights. But it was a contractual agree- ment. We have a full-crew law in the State of Texas, which reads that a crew on a passenger train will consist of not less than four men, and names them-engineer, fireman, conductor, and one brakeman; and on a freight train will consist of not less than five men, and names them-engineer, fireman, conductor, and two brakemen; and on light engine movements, not less than three men, and names them-engi- neer, fireman, and conductor. The CHAIRMAN. With trains moving a long distance, what is the rule in reference to inspection en route ? Mr. JOHNsON. When the train stops for any length of time that will permit the crew to get out, it is their duty to inspect the train with particular attention to the trucks, wheels, brake beams, journal boxes, drawbars, drawbar hangers, and other parts of the running gear of the car. If it is possible for them to do so, they are required to go over the entire train in that manner, which, as I outlined yes- terday, a man from the rear might go to a point where he meets the man from the head end and then they cross over and he returns on the opposite side of the train, which he inspects, to the rear end or caboose, and likewise the head man would cross over and return to the head end on the opposite side from which he came down. The CHAIRMAN. Does the personnel in the stations en route take part in that inspection? Mr. JOHNsON. On the majority of railroads, and perhaps all, they require the station employees, trackmen, and other employees, whose duties require them to come in close proximity to the track, where they have a chance to observe or make what we term "a running inspection of the train" to do so, and pay particular attention to the train as it pulls by, and if in the passing they detect some defect, they are supposed to give the crew a signal accordingly. If they are unable to do that, then they go into the office and notify the operator at the station, tower, or cabin ahead, requesting him to notify or stop the train or inform them, in some way that there is a defective car in the train. Likewise, Mr. Chairman, train crews are required to so station themselves when, meeting or passing freight and passenger trains that they can observe the train that they are meeting or passing and make a running inspection of it, and if they detect hot boxes, or brake beams dragging, or ajy other defects on that train, it is their duty to notify the train crew through a system of fixed signals which are understandable from one crew to the other. TRAIN LENGTHS There is only one place, Mr. Chairman, that a man can make such an inspection and that is on the rear end of the caboose, and I will ask you to visualize a man standing or in any way anchored on the rear end of one of these cabooses, with a train of 150 cars, to carry out the instructions of the company in that respect and have one of these rear end shocks take place while he is out there. That is a hazard that should not exist. Human beings should not be required. to subject themselves to a condition of that kind. The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed. Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRAAN. Mr. Wolverton. Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Mr. WOLVERTON. How many accidents happened during the past year under the conditions that you have just related? Mr. JonxsoN. Do you mean, Mr. Congressman, men being injured while on the rear end of the caboose making that inspection? Mr. WOLvERTON. I am not confining it to that. I say, how many accidents have happened during the past year as a result of the con- ditions you have just related? Mr. JOHNsoN. I cannot give you an exact number. However, Mr.. Farquahrson, who will follow me, has made a very careful check of the accident reports made to the Interstate Commerce Commission by the various railroads, which I am sure will give you the informa- tion you desire. Mr. WOLVERTON. You have stated in very graphic language the necessity, as it seems to you, for legislation of this character and you have pointed out to the committee the conditions which, in your opinion, are likely to produce accidents. I am not willing to assume that you would make that statement to the committee without some basis for it; I am therefore asking what knowledge you have of the number of accidents during the past year that have resulted from the conditions you have related. Mr. JOHNSON. I will answer that, Mr. Congressman, by saying that the statement that I will submit to you and other members of the committee a little later on will show you the number of accidents that have happened in keeping with the statement that I have made. Mr. WOLVERTON. Were there many such accidents last year? Mr. JOHNSON. I think somewhere in the neighborhood of 1,400. Mr. WOLVERTON. Were they all of the character you mentioned? Mr. JOHNsON. Involving rear end shocks on long trains. Mr. WOLVERTON. Were they all on trains of more than 70 cars? Mr. JoHNSON. Not all on 70 car trains. Mr. WOLvERTON. How many accidents happened on trains of more than 70 cars? Mr. JOHNSON. I think perhaps Mr. Farquahrson in his testimony will be able to give you that break-down. Mr. WOLvERTON. Do you not know? Mr. JOHNSON. No; I do not have the exact report on that, because as stated by Mr. Corbett- Mr. WOLVERToN. Do you have any idea? Mr. JoHNsON. Pardon me for just a moment, please. Mr. WOLVERTON. Yes. Mr. JoHNsON. As stated by Mr. Corbett, we divided up the man- ner in which we would make our submission in this case and we TRAIN LENGTHS 59 relied on some to gather certain information and others to gather other information. However, if you insist that I furnish you that, I will be glad. to do so. Mr. WOLVERTON. I do not want to put you to any inconvenience. Mr. JOHNSON. It is not going to be any inconvenience, but we have that information for you. Mr. WOLVERTON. The thought that has occurred to me, Mr. John- son, is this, and the same thought occurred to me when Mr. Corbett was testifying: Both of you in very strong language have indicated to the committee the necessity of this legislation from the standpoint of safety that should be provided for the workers, and naturally that strikes a sympathetic chord in the heart and mind of every member of the committee. I assume in making that statement you have facts that will justify your conclusions. I am therefore trying to find out from you, as a representative of the trainmen's organization, what facts you have on which you base your conclusions. Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I know from this report that I have here, which, however, does not provide for all of the accidents, and none subsequent to January 1, 1937-however, I have a few additional cases covering claims paid subsequent to January 1, 1937. I do have some witnesses here who will be introduced a little later on who will testify as to the injuries which they sustained in long- train operation, and I know of no better way, Mr. Congressman, to develop the facts than to get them from the men who actually faced the hazards and sustained injuries therefrom. Mr. WOLVERTON. I do not know of any other better way to get the facts than to ask those who are representing the men. Mr. JOHNSON. All right; and we are going to try to give them tq you. So far as I am concerned, I am going to give you seven-hun dred-and-some-odd cases. Mr. WOLVERTON. Are they all cases that happened in 1937? Mr. JoHNsoN. Not 1937; no. Mr. WOLVERTON. In what year did they happen? Mr. JOHNSON. Up to the close of December 1, 1936. Mr. WOLVERTON. Over how long a period? Mr. JOHNsON. From August 1929. Mr. WOLVERTON. Do the, cases relate to trains of more than 70 cars? Mr. JOHNSON. Four hundred and seventeen of those cases involve trains of 70 cars or more; 310 of them involve trains of less than 70 cars. They give you the number of cars, the date, and in some instances the location, the number of engines on the train, the cause of the accident, the extent of the personal injury, and the time lost by the injured employee. As I said yesterday, these reports do not reflect the total number of accidents because they are confined to members of the accident insurance department of our organization, and all of our members do not belong to the accident-insurance department. Therefore, they do not reflect the total number but what we have are based upon true statements made by the man who actually suf- fered the injury. They are not based on percentages, ton-miles, or. car-miles. MIA TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. WotvErroN. Of the factual information you have before you how many cases happened in the past year? Mr. JOHNSON. Last year? Mr. WOLVERTON. Yes. Mr. JOHNsoN. Approximately 1,400. Mr. WpLVERoN. On trains of more than 70 cars? Mr. JOHNSON. Approximately 1,400. Mr. WOLVERToN. On trains of more than 70 cars? Mr. JOHNSON. Not all of them on trains of more than 70 cars. Mr. WOLVERTON. Does the Interstate Commerce Commission have a report of those cases? Mr. JoHNsON. The Interstate Commerce Commission receives a report from the carriers covering accidents of that kind when there is more than $150 involyed in damages. Mr. WOLVERTON. Are the cases to which you refer the direct result of the length of the train? Mr. JOHNSON. The injuries are chargeable to excessive shock sus- tained on the rear end of the train. We do not say, Mr. Congressman, that you cannot get a shock on a short train. We do not take that position. Mr. WOLVERTON. As I understood, Mr. Johnson, in your remarks this morning, and also the graphic manner in which you illustrated it yesterday, that frequently these accidents happen as the result of the inability of the person at the head of the train to see the signals that are given from the rear end of the train; is that right? Mr. JOHNSON. No; I do not think that I made such a statement as that, Mr. Congressman. Mr. WOLVERTON. I was under the impression that you had asked the committee to visualize how impossible it would be on a train of over 100 cars in length, for a person at one end giving the signals and the person at theother end getting those signals, to do so. Mr. JOHNSON. That is true. That is the interpretation of sig- nals. If a man fails to see a signal and no effort is made to stop the train, nothing may happen; on the other hand there may be an accident. Mr. WOLNERTON. Mr. Johnson, what I am trying to get at is, how many accidents actually happened as a result of a 70-car-length train or longer, because that is really the subject that is before this committee to determine with respect to this legislation. Mr. JOHNSON. Well, Mr. Congressman, the only answer that I can give to you on that would be that we will take the total number of accidents which occurred in a given time, a thousand, twelve hundred or whatever it may be. You can break that down and set up the number of trains in brackets of 10 cars or 20 cars, and so on. We do not say that accidents do not happen on shorter trains. I have some reports here where there were only 12 or 14 cars in the train, but we do claim that as the length of the train is increased, naturally the hazard increases and the shock is more severe on a long train than it is on a shorter train. Mr. WoLvERTON. What are the elements that most frequently cause accidents on trains, relating particularly to their length? Mr. JoHNsON. There are more from the emergency application of the air. However, on some railroads, what we might term as "saggy railroads," however, on those roads they do not pull the excessively TRAIN LENGTHS 61 long trains as a rule. Occasionally they do. But with one of our large locomotives, we will take a train with 75 80, or 90 cars going down through one of these dips. The head end starts up the grade. There is a certain compression on the large engines when not working steam that will bunch the train. The head end starts up the hill and about that time the rear end comes down the hill and, naturally the slack bunches and there is a greater impact on the rear end of that train than the average man who is not familiar with train opera- tions can realize. Mr. WOLvERTON. That is my difficulty. I do not have the accurate knowledge you have and that is the reason I am asking what may seem to you to be unnecessary questions. Mr. JOHNSON. That is all right, Congressnian. I am going to do my best to give it to you the best way I can, give you all the infor- mation I can. Mr. WOLvERToN. I realize that from your wide experience both as an operating employee on the railroad, as well as from the present position you occupy, that you have a fund of information that I do not have and that is what I am seeking to get. Mr. JOHNSON. We are going to try to give you that. Mr. WOLVERTON. It would take a very short time for you to men- tion how many cases of the kind you have knowledge of have resulted in accidents. Mr. JOHNSON. Well, Congressman, I did not make a break-down of these reports to the extent of answering that question, and it would be quite a task to say that this man was injured on account of the bunching of the train due to the physical characteristics of the property; or that man was injured due to a drawbar dropping down, causing an emergency application of the air; or this man was in- jured due to the train buckling as a result of a bursted air hose or excessive leakage in the train line which caused some weak triple valve in the train to function to the extent of an emergency and caused a bunching of the train or things of that kind. But, we tried to break it down and show that there were several hundred cases involving rear-end shock which resulted in personal injuries over a given period of time, segregating into two groups one of less than 70 cars and one of over 70 cars. Mr. WOLVERTON. Is there any other element that produces acci- dents other than the emergency application of brakes? Mr. JOHNSON. Of course, the bunching of the train as just out- lined, the emergency application, which may be caused from several elements, viz people on the highway crossings, trespassers on the right-of-way, stock on the right-of-way, improper signaling, and defective equipment. Mr. WOLVERTON. Could all those elements that you have just men- tioned happen as readily with a short train as with a long one? Mr. JOHNSON. They may happen; yes, with the short train, but in about 9 chances out of every 10, the result of the application of the air on the short train would not produce the severe impact on the rear end that occurs on the long trains. Here is the idea, Mr. Congressman: Take a train of 150 cars, and we will take the AB brake, which they claim is the latest improved brake that we have on freight equipment, and if I understand it 47891-38---5 62 TRAIN LENGTHS correctly, it has two oustanding functions. The first is positive serv- ice. What we mean by that is when a service application is made it is positive in its application. The second is that it has a positive emergency application after service is made. But, it has its limita- tions, and there is an element of time from the time that the brakes set on the head car until the brakes set on the last car to the extent of its breaking ability, and that has been demonstrated through tests to be 60 cars. You are running with 150 cars, and a service applica- tion is made, or an emergency application is made; the brakes apply, we will say back to the seventieth car of that train; you still have 80 cars behind that. This happens: When the head end starts to stop, with the train stretched, the rear end runs up, and with the 90 and 100 feet of slack behind the last operating brake, you are bound to get a very severe impact which results in injury to those on rear end. The operation of the automatic brakes may develop beyond the sixtieth or seventieth car through the assistance of train line leakage, but not to the extent of entirely eliminating the shock on the rear end in all cases. The slack behind 70 cars is uncontrollable in most every case. Mr. WOLVERTON. How many of those accidents happened as a re- sult of that during the past year? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, Mr. Congressman, all of them that have hap- pened are not chargeable to an emergency application of the air brake. However, the emergency application of the air brakes are included in this category. Mr. WoLvERTON. I am fearful that we are taking up too much time in my endeavor to get the facts. Mr. JOHNSON. Oh, that is all right. I will give you the benefit of this, which happens many times. Take a train of 60 cars. There may be a weak triple valve in the train somewhere-what we call a dyna- miter, a kicker, or a sensitive triple valve. It is sensitive due to the fact that there may be a leak in the packing leather in the triple valve or a weak graduating spring in the brake operation which will cause the weak triple valve when service application is made to kick in to the emergency, which may result in causing other sensitive brakes to apply in the emergency. Such braking will cause a bunching of the train, and in many instances the impact is so severe that someone on the rear end pays the price- Mr. WoLvErroN (interposing). Let me conclude my statement. I think we are both probably taking too much time on this. Mr. JOHNsON. All right, sir. Mr. WOLVERTON. Do I understand that this factual information that you are submitting will be possible of being broken down by the committee or by some of the witnesses and that it will show not only the cause of these accidents, but also their relation to the length of the trains? Mr. JOHNSON. So far as these 807 cases that I have here are con- cerned; yes, sir. They have already been separated. I have the statement m one set-up on less than 70 cars and in another of over 70 cars. Mr. BuLwxNaxE. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Johnson, I just want to ask one or two ques- tions. TRAIN LENGTHS 63 These lists of accidents have not been classified as to whether the accident was caused by an air hose bursting or a drawhead pulling out or something like that, have they? Mr. JOHNSoN. Yes, sir. Mr. BULWINKLE. You have classified them? Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir; we have shown the cause and in many in- stances the damage to the equipment. Mr. BULwINKLE. Will it tell us how many accidents happened in all of these trains, between 70 and 100 cars and between 100 and 130 cars? Mr. JOHNSON. I have that broken down; yes, sir. Mr. BULWINKLE. You have that broken down? Mr. JoHNsON. Yes, sir. Mr. BULWINKLE. For instance, showing the condition in a train movement of 130 cars? Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Mr. BULwINKLE. All right. When you come to it, there will be plenty of time. Mr. WrInow. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Withrow. Mr. WITHRow. You heard the question asked by the chairman of the committee relative to so-called running inspections; I feel that probably some of the members of the committee might have received the impression that everytime a freight train passed by or went through a station, or met another train, that the train was given an inspection. Now, as a matter of fact, when a freight train goes through a sta- tion, whoever may be employed there, comes out and looks at the train as it goes by, the train is going 35, 40, maybe 45 miles an hour. Mr. JOHNSON. Or 60. Mr. WITHROW. That is not an inspection. The train is going clanking by. On the other hand, when freight trains meet on the road, on double track, we will say, trainmen are required to stand on the rear platform of the train, the train that he is standing on is going probably 45 miles an hour, and the train that meets him on double track is probably going 45 miles an hour, so that is not an inspection. Mr. JOHNSON. Well, no ; it is mighty hard, Mr. Congressman, to make an inspection under such conditions. Mr. WrIHROw. Railroad officials do not regard that as an inspec- tion? Mr. JOHNSON. No. I know that it is required by the railroads whether it produces results or not; perhaps there are times when the train crew or the operator is able to detect a hot box. Mr. WITHROW. Yes; if there is a lot of smoke coming up from the box. Mr. JOHNSON. That cannot be seen from the head end or the rear end of the train. Mr. WITHROW. But it is not an adequate inspection? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, no; but there is no doubt in my mind but what some defects have been detected through that system of inspection. A4 TRAIN LENGTHS But reggrdless of the results, it is a very hazardous requirement of the train-service employees. The CHAIRMAN. My question was inspired by my own observation in traveling. Frequently, when the train stops before stations, where they stay some time, I have seen the people going along looking for hot boxes and testing the wheels. Mr. JOHNSON. That is true. The CHAIRMAN. An examination which is more or less casual, and I really wanted to learn how consistently that policy is followed, par- ticularly with regard to these long trains where, of course, it is a bigger job than it is with the short trains. Mr. JOHNSON. Well, if it is possible for the crew to do that, they do it not only to protect the company against loss due to a wreck but they do it to protect themselves. The trainmen find many defects that would have caused a wreck which perhaps might have resulted in his personal injury or the injury of one of his fellow workers; but such is practical railroading, and is followed literally when it is possible to do so. Of course, there is an element of time in this connection which is a deciding factor. Now, on some railroads, I will say, Mr. Chairman, for you benefit, they do require the trains to stop at intervals of 35, 40. or 50 miles and allow the crew time for inspection of the train. However, that does not prevail on all railroads. Mr. MAPEs. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mapes. Mr. MArEs. A few minutes ago, Mr. Johnson, in answer to a ques- tion, you gave the number of accidents that occurred during your period of service, on trains of less than 70 cars and on trains of more than 70 cars. In terms of percentages, can you give the number of accidents that occurred on trains of over 70 cars and on those of less than 70 cars, the percentages to the total number of trains? Mr. JOHNSON. In the break-down of this report, I have called the attention of the committee to the increased number of accidents on trains of more than 70 cars. The percentage can be very easily worked out so far as these two reports are concerned. However, I am not inclined, Mr. Mapes, to deal in percentages, because percent- ages of that kind and statistics dealing with questions of this kind can be used so many different ways. They can be used to build up or they can be used to break down, but you have before you a statement of the claims, which I think is a very clear analysis of the real facts in connection therewith, which will, if properly studied by the mem- bers of this committee, furnish you some information that will be very valuable to you, and upon which you can consider the merits of this bill, with a great deal of serious thought in connection with the rights of the men who are making the claim for this legislation. Mr. MAPEs. From your answer I am not sure that I have made myself clear to you. To answer what I had in mind, it would be necessary to know the total number of accidents on the railroads in trains that had more than 70 cars and the total number of accidents on trains that had less than 70 cars, as well as the total number of all trains. Have you the data to enable you to do that? ThAIN LENGTHS 65 Mr. JoHNSoN. No, and I think, Congressman, speaking for myself, it would be impossible to do that in a reasonable length of time. However, I am satisfied that the railroads can give you that infor- mation, and perhaps they may have that in their prepared state- ments, which will be presented later; the only way that I could get that information and make that compilation would be to write a letter to all of the conductors or to write a letter to all of the railroad companies. Take the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, for instance: The only way I could get information of that kind would be to write the car accountant or the superintendent of transportation on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad and ask him to furnish it for the month of December 1937, which would be somewhat of a job, and that would be followed on all of the railroads throughout the United States. Mr. MAPES. I can see that you would not have that information. Do the roads have it? Mr. JoHNsON. I am satisfied that the roads can give it to you. They might give a break-down on one or two roads, which wojild be a basis upon which you could make your assumptions as to the ap- plication on other roads where they do operate excessively long trains. There are some few roads that this legislation would not be a burden to, if you might term it as being burdensome, because their percentage of trains in excess of 70 cars is very low. Mr. MAPES. My question was prompted perhaps by a letter which I received this morning, which purports to give the total number of trains on roads operating in Michigan, so apparently somebody has that information. Mr. JoHNSON. Of course, you take the entire car movement throughout the entire United States for a given time, and you will get an average of about 48 cars per train. A lot of those trains may be from five cars on up, but that would be the average. You take then the number of trains that handle cars in. excess of the maximiun provided for in this law, and on the basis of an average of 48 cars per train it might be worked out to reflect but 1 train out of every 4 that is operated, handles cars in excess of 70 as provided for in the bill, but those are percentages. They reflect one way and then the other. But what we are talking about is the long trains, the train in excess of 70 cars. Mr MAPES. I recall at the hearings a few years ago on a similar bill, the testimony was that there were two States which limited the length of trains to 70 cars. Has any additional State legislation been passed along that line since those hearings? Mr. JOHNSON. We have a workable State law fixing the maximum as 70 cars in the State of Arizona. A like law was passed in the State of Nevada. However, it was carried into the courts and is not operative today. We also had a law passed in the State of Lou- isiana which met with like procedure to the end that it is not effective today. Mr. MAPES. What do you mean? Mr. JOHNSON. It was crried into the courts, and the railroads were granted an injunction, and the law was never put into effect in the State of Louisiana. Mr. MAPES. Do you mean that it was declared unconstitutional? 66 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. JOHNSON. The railroads, if I understand it correctly, applied for a restraining order, which was granted. We withheld further action waiting the outcome of the litigation involving the Nevada law, which was declared unconstitutional. Therefore, we took no further action with respect to the Louisiana law, feeling that the only way this matter can be properly handled is through a Federal law, and that is why we are here today. Mr. MAPES. On what grounds did they ask for an injunction? Mr. JOHNSON. Just the same old argument that have been used for many years-that such a law inflicted an expense upon the rail- roads which could not be justified in train operations; and restricted them in their earning power through the operation of shorter trains. Mr. MAPES. Did the roads claim in asking for the injunction that the law was unconstitutional? Mr. JOHNsON. That is right; and it denied them of their rights under the Constitution as to the operation of trains, also that it was discriminatory, to the end that it did not apply to certain railroads of a certain length. I could get you the full report on that. I think I have'it in the office. We were advised of the fact that the railroads were going to contest the constitutionality of the law and take it into the courts. That, we naturally expected. Mr. MArES. Did the Nevada courts render an opinion on the con- stitutionality of the law? Mr. JOHNsoN. They did. I would be glad to furnish you with that. I think that I have a copy of the decision in my office. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson, is it not correct that the courts de- cided that State legislatures were without authority because it would be a burden upon interstate commerce? Is not that the substance of the decision? Mr. JOHNSON. I think that you are correct, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. So that we might have an understanding about the statistics- Mr. FORT. Mr. Chairman, could I say that we will develop those cases quite fully before the committee and the court held in that case that the law had no relation to safety and instead of promoting safety would operate contrarily to safety, and that was one of the grounds why the law was set aside. The CHAIRMAN. But the constitutional ground was on the theory that it would be a burden upon interstate commerce under the facts developed? Mr. FORT. Well the constitutional grounds, lack of due relation to safety, and also their lack of any right to regulate because there was no relation to safety. The CHAIRMAN. I see. Mr. FORT. But, as I say, we will develop that very fully. Mr. JOHNSON. I think that you will find that covered in the hear- ings on S. 2625, Seventy-third Congress, second session, and you will also find it in connection with the hearings on S. 27 and S. 344, Seventy-fifth Congress. The CHAIRMAN. There is a final decision in that case now, is there? Mr. JOHNSON. I beg your pardon? The CHAIRMAN. There is a final decision; no appeal pending at the present time? Mr. JOHNSON. In the Nevada case? AIN TLENGTHS 67 The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mr. JOHNSON. So far as I know there is not. The CHAIRMAN. Can we have an understanding about these sta- tistics to be presented, and understand that the statistics which are going to be presented as you proceed, that the source of your statistics, and of the railroads is the same, through the Interstate Commerce Commission ? Mr. JOHNSON. Not mine; no, sir. Mine were not taken from the Interstate Commerce Commission's statistics. They were taken from the records of our organizations and the source is the claims paid by our accident-insurance department. The CHAIRMAN. I was wondering if the two sides here could agree on the authenticity of the statistics presented. Mr. JOHNSON. I do not know about the railroads agreeing with what I have here, because they have not had access to them. How- ever, I might say that the records of our accident-insurance depart- ment at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, are available and open for inspection to anyone desiring to investigate them, and we have some witnesses here who have been paid claims as outlined in these reports. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BuLWINKLE. I want to make an observation to the chairman, if you gentlemen please, and that is this, that these statistics should have been given in the first instance in order that they could be printed and available for the use of the committee. If there is a mass of statistics that will come along here at the last that we have no opportunity to examine you gentlemen on in regard to them, that will not be satisfactory. It seems to me that they should be received as early as possible. Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I have about 30 copies, and I will be glad to give them to you this morning. They are in pamphlet form. The CHAIRMAN. Is it not your intention that these statistics should be presented by Mr. Farquahrson and he will follow you? Mr. JOHNSON. When I complete my submission and what few wit- nesses I have, then Mr. Farquahrson will follow me; and whatever he has will be in printed form and copies will be given to you, Mr. Congressman. Mr. BULwINKLE. As soon as you are ready to give them to us I will be glad to have them. Mr. WOLvERTON. Would it be in order for the clerk to distribute them now, Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mr. JOHNSON. This [referring to pamphlet] is on trains of 70 cars or more. We will make a little comment on that later on. (To the clerk.) If you will, give each member of the committee a copy, please Mr. BULWINKLE. Those are not the same as were put in to the Senate hearings. Mr. JOHNsON. I beo- your pardon. Mr. BULWINKLE. Tey are just the same as those that were put into the hearings the last time? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, with some additions; yes. And is more com- plete. 68 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Johnson one question before he resumes. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. What is the present trend in the way of increasing the power and capacity of locomotives-the motive power? That is, is that resting or is the increase continuing such as we have had in the last 20 or 25 years? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, from my observation and based upon some of the statements made by the representatives of the carriers, new equip- ment and new motive power is increased in size. The power has been increased; and, according to their statement, if this law is enacted, they will be restricted from purchasing larger power to be used in freight service. Mr. MARTIN. You said yesterday that about 40 years ago a loco- motive handled about 700 tons and now about 3,000 tons. What is the maximum tonnage that the heaviest power can handle now? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, of course, that would depend as to the rail- road involved. In some parts of the country one of the large engines could pull cars just as long as they would stay together, a train 2 or 3 miles long if you could just keep them coupled together. That is down in the southern part of the country or in the level sec- tions of the country, while on other railroads the power that they have will not permit a train, of a greater length than 70 or 75 cars. In some instances and on some divisions a lesser number. I have a report from the Virginian Railroad covering a train that was handled not so awful long ago which consisted of 175 loads of coal, 20,393 tons. Reduced down to pounds, he had over 40,000,000 pounds. On that railroad I dare say 40 years ago, if they were doing business at that time, that tonnage would have made up some 10 or 12 trains. Mr. MAPEs. Was one engine pulling that train? Mr. JOHNSON. One engine. Mr. MAPES. How far? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I do not know ; perhaps 100 miles or more. Mr. MARTIN. Do you know how long it required? Mr. JOHNSON. I beg your pardon. Mr. MARTIN. Do you know how long it took them? Mr. JOHNSON. That may be developed by some of the witnesses, Mr. Martin. I do not have that. But I do know that train was over a mile and a half long. I might give you this fact: That train had a meeting point at a certain station ? the train that they were to meet was required to take siding; they discovered that they had no air on the rear end, due to the fact that an air valve had been left open on a car about 15 cars from the caboose. The man who got on the caboose saw what had happened. There was no air on the caboose gage. The train was of such length he could not get a signal to the head end. He knew he had to meet this train beyond that Fpoint. So he dropped off a note to the operator or agent to notify the dispatcher, to try and get them stopped, which the dispatcher endeavored to do, but when the train was finally stopped they were 2.miles beyond the point where they were supposed to meet the train; but fortunately the opposing train beat them there and got in on the sidetrack. The train in question was going down a six-tenths of 1 percent grade. TRAIN LENGTHS 69 Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. That reference seems to go back to the importance of being able to see the signals as a safety proposition in operating trains of excessive lengtfi; and in that connection I would like to have just a little further explanation of exactly how important you feel that it is from the standpoint of safety and number of accidents in recent years that trains be of less length in order that signals may be more accurately seen. You have not given us facts. Of course, there is one instance= and only one particular instance, that I remem- ber you have given since you have been on the stand. Mr. JOHNsoN. Well, we could, Mr. Congressman, give you many cases of where it was impossible to get signals to the head end of the train and where messages have been dropped off. Mr. BOREN. Well, now Mr. JoHNsON. Pardon me. Mr. BOREN. I would like to pursue that just this far. First, though, I might come right down to the basis of why you want this legislation. You are not asking for this legislation on the grounds of employment, are you? Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir. Mr. BOREN. And you are not of the opinion that the employment feature should necessarily enter into the determination of whether or not this legislation should be passed. Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct. Mr. BOREN. Now, you are not Mr. JoHNsON. It may, however; I will be fair with you and say that I am of the opinion that it will require perhaps some additional train and engine service employees. Mr. BOREN. Well, I am going to make a decision on this bill, and I want to get it down as accurately as I can as to what grounds that decision can be based on. So, we will strike employment out of this decision. Now then, you are asking for it entirely on safety grounds. Then from the signal standpoint alone, how many accidents have occurred, we will say, in the last 3 years because excessively long trains have made it impossible for the employees to pass signals from one end of the train to the other. Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I do not know, Mr. Congressman, as I have a break-down of that particular feature; but regardless of that fact, we have made the statement, we have invited tests to be made to prove the statements that we have made that you cannot properly interpret signals on a train of greater length than 70 cars; and we do know, and I am satisfied, that no operating official of any railroad will take issue with the statement that the strict observance of signals is the most important thing in connection with railroading. Mr. BoREN. But if you are asking for this bill on the basis of safety-that is, to protect the men against loss of life and limb-and then if you are going to base your request for this bill on that ground, you should show-I mean, on the ground of signaling, you should show that failure of being able to signal from one end of the train to the other has resulted specifically in instances of loss of life or limb to employees. And I would like specifically to have you show, dur- ing the last 2 years or 5 years or 10 years how many men have been 70 TRAIN LENGTHS killed or injured due to the fact that signals could not be passed from one end of the train to the other with efficiency. Mr. JoHNsoN. Well, of course, Mr. Congressman, a very careful analysis of all of the cases might develop the fact that train-service employees who were involved in certain accidents did not try to convey a signal to the head end of the train, and they refrained from applying the brakes from the rear in some of the accidents which have occurred. I am quite sure many crews have been placed in the same position as the Virginian crew and were forced to drop off a note, as I have outlined, requesting assistance in order to stop the train. Mr. BOREN. Surely you can delete from all of the number of acci- dents you have had whether or not you have got particular accidents that were caused by the inability to pass signals from the one end of the train to the other. In your opinion, how many such accidents, or from your informa- tion, what particular specific accidents, did occur from that cause? Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Congressman, the large number of injuries sus- tained are chargeable to the excessive shock on the rear end of a train. Mr. BoREn. Then we will delete that Mr. JOHNSON. No; we will not; we will just lay the things up on top of the table. Mr. BOREN. That is what I want, and I am doubting if you have done that. Mr. JOHNSON. I will ask you, whether the man gives the signal or not, is it fair to ask a man to work under conditions when he knows absolutely that if he gave a signal it could not be seen? Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Chairman, with Mr. Boren's permission. Mr. JOHNSON. That is the thing that you are asking about. Would you ask a man to work under those conditions? The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boren, do you yield? Mr. BOREN. I will yield to Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WOLvERTON. Mr. Boren has yielded, so that I may bring to your attention this circumstance: I have before me a report of the Interstate Commerce Commission relating to train accidents result- ing from improper giving of hand signals during the year 1936, and on the point that Mr. ]Doren is now directing his questions to. I observe in the report the following: Failure of trainmen to be in a position to pass signals; total acci- dents occurring during 1936 as a result of that: No one killed; no one injured; no accidents. And that, due to misunderstanding of signals, the report shows that two were injured during the whole year of 1936, and the two cases which the Interstate Commerce Commission reports were as follows: On May 15, 1936, the Kansas City Terminal Railway Co.-this man was a yard fireman. A Kansas City Terminal engine was backing light to Mill Street and collided with Rock Island engine 1919, with 15 cars. This collision was the result of violation of yard rule by both crews. It was a yard rule. The other case was New York Central, at Chicago, Ill. A yard flagman was injured. The engineman evidently misunderstood a "back" signal for "come head" signal,'and there were 17 cars in that particular train. TROAIN LENGTHS 71 That is right along the line that Mr. Boren is asking questions at this time. I had the report of the Interstate Commerce Commission and observed the figures I have just given. Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; we are familiar with that, Mr. Congressman, and that involved the failure of certain yard-service employees. They only had 14 or 15 cars. We have a good many accidents along that line where we have a man failure and which results in an accident. But the point we are trying to make, Mr. Congressman, is from the standpoint that the railroads have reached the time in the length of their trains that they have separated the rear end from the head end, so far as communicating hand signals are concerned. We do have the brake valve on the rear end of the caboose which we can use, but after you study and get testimony as to the results which many times occur from the application of that air brake you are not going to take hold of it unless there is an absolute emergency. Mr. BOREN. But the statistics here show for a year that you had no accidents because of inability to transfer signals from one end of the train to the other, and how do you justify then requesting the legis- lation based upon trains being too long to pass signals? Mr. JOHNSON. Because. Mr. Congressman, the reports rendered to the Interstate Commerce Commission by the carrigrs cover certain accidents where more than $150 damages was involved. That report to the Interstate Commerce Commission mnight reflect an altogether different story if we had all of the facts in connection with the investigation made. I do not say that the railroads have made false reports, but that is just a report. Mr. BOREN. Have you any report that would give us better evidence than that we have to hand? Mr. JOHNsON. I have not made a break-down, Mr. Congressman, in that particular connection, but if we cannot see the justice for legislation of this kind to provide for this particular group of indus- trial workers a better condition, one that will preserve their life and limb, regardless of how the accident may have happened, you are not dealing fairly with them. We have hundreds and thousands of cases, if you want to go back and dig them all up, where men have been injured in long-train operations, and wee say that reducing the length of the train will result in eliminating a lot of future accidents and deaths. Mr. BOREN. Now, you understand this about my questions. I am simply of this opinion. If I can be shown that there is a need for this bill, I am going to vote for it. Mr. JOHNSON. I hope you will. Mr. BOREN. But we have talked so much about signals, and I want to be certain whether or not this element of signals should be used as a justification for the legislation. And so far, while there has been a lot of talk of signals, there has been no evidence that would justify the legislation. Mr. JOHNSON. Well, from the standpoint of practical railroading, Mr. Congressman, and the requirements of the railroads through the operating rules to transmit signals under certain conditions, which is absolutely impossible of fulfillment on these long trains, should, I think, prompt any man to say that there is a condition in the railroad industry which should be corrected. 72 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. BoREN. I want to make this observation, Mr. Chairman-I do not think it is too far afield: They tell me that on the statute books of Texas there is a law to the effect that camel caravans cannot move down the main streets of a city, and, in fact, I checked it up to be sure that that legislation at one time was enacted. Now, if there never is a camel caravan moving down the main street of a city in Texas, if there never is an accident caused by the failure to pass signals from one end of the train to the other, it seems to me that to pasN legislation on this ground would be as hard to justify as the passage of a law in Texas to the effect that camel caravans should not go down the main street. Mr. JOHNSON. You will have to ask some of these Texans about that; but I do not think that this question could be placed in that ridiculous category, Mr. Congressman, and, in view of the fact that you have mentioned that, let us go back 2 years ago. I recall when one of the elevators dropped in this building. I think there was a young lady in that elevator. There was no injury in that accident, but there was an order which came from the man who- has charge of the elevators in the Capitol buildings to leave nothing undone to eliminate the recurrence of that accident. I am wondering if any- one at that time, those who use the elevators daily, said, "Now, let us not do that. That is the first time it has ever happened in this new building. Let us wait a while. Let us wait until somebody is in- jured or it happens again, then it may justify the expense in making this survey and correcting any evil that may exist." But they did not do that, and rightfully so. They said, "We are not going to dis- turb the minds of the people who use these elevators. We are going to eliminate that defect to the end that in the future when people get in these elevators to be transported up or down, they will not have in their minds fears as to the recurrence of that particular accident. That is fundamental. It is human. And we have the same thing in long-train operation. We have thousands of cases. There are men here ready to testify who have been thrown upon the human scrap heap. You can pass a thousand laws and it will do them no good. Why? Because they a're through. They have paid the price for long-train operations. But, they are only asking you to give con- sideration to their former fellow workers in order that they may be relieved of this hazard the same as was done in the elevator case. Mr. BoREN. Just one further question, Mr. Chairman, and that is with reference to the information you have given here of acci- dents on account of shock from the collision effect when long trains are stopped or started? Now, this information interests me and interests me deeply, and I want to say that the line of questioning I have been following has been to eliminate any of these grounds that are not substantial to dis- cover upon what specific substantial grounds you are asking this legis- lation, and it strikes me that the arguments you have presented up to date are the number of accidents caused by collision effect in stopping and starting long trains, and that you are basing your entire request for this bill upon that. Are you willing to go that far? Is that your honest judgment? Mr. JOHNsoN. We are basing our argument, Mr. Congressman, upon the standpoint of safety and human rights. TAIN LENGTHS 73 Mr. BoREN. Well, I know ; but, if you are going to have several ele- ments, one of which is safety, and one or two or three others, I would like to see whether those should be eliminated. One is signaling. I want to write No. 1 down and, if it is my judgment it is not a sound basis, strike it off, and see how many sound bases you have left. But it is confusing. You give us facts about this collision effect, and yet place most of your argument on signaling, but no facts to substantiate that. Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Congressman, can we, by the widest stretch of imagination or rule of reason, take the position that it is fair to ask any industrial worker-I do not care what industry he may be engaged in--to work blindly? Deprive him of the right or the possibility of human coinmunication ; start a man out on a train of 175 cars on a dark night when lie cannot see; he cannot see two car lengths in front of hin, clamoring along at the rate of 40 or 50 miles an hour, carried in one of these cabooses. knowing full well that John Doe, his fellow worker, went out on the same kind of a train the day before and he had a rear-end shock which resulted in his personal injury, due to a bursted air hose or a broken-down car, and that man has 175 cars that are comparable to the ones John Doe had. Can you tell me that there is not dread and fear in the mind of that man, knowing full well that he has air hoses oil his train; be has the same kind of couplers on his train that are subject to defects, the same as occurred the day before. Is it right to ask a man-is it right to ask a hunan being-to work under such conditions? Mr. BOREN. That is a good argument and is based entirely on the collision effect; but now I still do not find anything about signaling in it. The point I am still making is this: I have ridden on a roller coaster. It looks awfully dangerous to me. But several times I have ridden on it. But if the fact is that thousands and thousands of people over many years have ridden on them and no one has ever been killed, de- spite what they might look like, I can get on one with a reasonable degree of assurance.. Mr. JoHNsoN. But you do not have to ride on a roller coaster to make a living. Mr. BOREN. I still do not see why he is concerned, if the facts show that nothing ever comes of his fears. Mr. JOHNsON. Now, Mr. Congressman, from a practical stand- point-and if you do not think this is so and if you are willing, per- haps we can get a permit from one of these railroads and let you ride on one of these long trains. There are times when a man on the rear end of the train feels that he should communicate with the head end of the train; but he is deprived of that. It is impossible for him to do it with one of these long trains. And he sits back there and trusts to luck. And you take the position that such a condition should not be considered. Mr. Bymwnnas. Mr. Chairman- The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BuLwiKa. Mr. Johnson, I just want a little information on these bulletins you gave us. Mr. JOHNsON. Yes, sir. 74 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. BULWINKLE. This one reads on the inside, on page 2, "Acci- dent Insurance Department. Approximate number members in freight service." Mr. JOHNSON. Yes Mr. BULWINKLE. And the. same thing on No. 2. In it is a sup- plemental statement for the year 1936. Are those numbers the number of men who are insured with you, or are they the men who had accidents? Mr. JoHNSON. They are the number of men who carry protection in our accident insurance department, which does not reflect the total membership of our organization. Mr. BuLwINKLE. So, basing it on that No. 2. for the year 1936, there were 53 accidents of trains of 70 or more car lengths that you paid claims on? Mr. JOHNsON. That is right. Mr. BuitwINnLE. Now, are there any others that you did not pay claims on? Mr. JOHNSON. There were many other conductors, Congressman Bulwinkle, who were injured in the same kind of accidents that we have no record of, due to the fact that they were not members of the accident insurance department. Mr. BULWINKLE. Now, where are we to get that information from? Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Farquahrson has here a check of the reports rendered to the Interstate Commerce Commission and that involves something like about 1,400 train-service employees during the year or about 19 months, which he will submit at a later date. I want to make it plain to you, this report here does not reflect the total member of injuries because all of the conductors are not mem- bers of the accident insurance department of ou organization and perhaps only about one-sixth or one-seventh of the total number of accidents involving rear-end shocks which happened to conductors during that period of time is indicated. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. I would like to make a request here that at this point Mr. Wolverton insert some very pertinent information which he has at hand on this subject relative to all trains in operation in the Nation, and the number of accidents in a year's time that oc- curred in all trains of the Nation as a result of this collision effect in connection with the questions I just asked on this shock injury. The CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say, Mr. Wolverton has that? Mr. BOREN. I would like to have him insert it at this point in the hearings. Mr. WOLVERTON. I have before me, Mr. Chairman, the same re- port of the Interstate Commerce Commission to which I previously referred and during the questioning of Mr. Johnson by Mr. Boren, I have examined the report again to see what information it con- tained on the particular point now being considered, and I find Mr. JOHNSON. Congressman, will you read just a little louder? Mr. WOLvERTON. I find on code No. 7009, under the title, "Sudden application of brakes or hose bursting, departing, or otherwise de- fective," none were killed; 29 injured, and that under code No. TRAIN LENGTHS 75 7010, "Sudden application of brakes, defective air-brake equip- ment," none killed and 37 injured. That covers a report from all railroads and all trains, passenger and freight, operating throughout the Nation during the year 1936. The CHAIRMAN. Your statement includes all that you thought was pertinent for this purpose? Mr. WOLVERTON. There is considerable more, but it would take too much time to read it into the record. It is all in accident bulle- tin 105 of the Commission. Mr. JOHNSON. Have you 7008 and 7007? Mr. WoLvERTON. Yes. Mr. JOHNSON. What does that say? Mr. WOLVERTON (reading) : Sudden stopping, lurch, or jerking of locomotive, car, or train, not elsewhere provided for, 13 killed, 812 injured. Is that what you refer to? Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. What is the date of that report? Mr. WOLVERTON. That which I have referred to applies to trains of all sizes, passenger and freight. Mr. JOHNSON. What is the number of that bulletin? Mr. WOLVERTON. Accident bulletin No. 105. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman, could I add a few words to what Mr. Wolverton has just said? The CHAIRMAN. I think that the witness wants to reply. Mr. JOHNsoN. Pardon me right there. Turn over to page 54, if you will, Mr. Congressman, in that report, and I think you will find there were 20 killed as a result of "sudden stopping, starting, lurch, or jerk of locomotive, car, or train, not otherwise provided for." That is sudden stopping, sudden application of brakes, air hose being defective, parting, or otherwise; sudden application of brakes or defective air. Mr. WOLVERTON. What is the code number? Mr. JOHNSON. 7007. Mr. WOLVERTON. The one I have does not indicate those figures. Mr. JOHNSON. Well, we have here accident bulletin No. 105 for the calendar year 1936. Mr. WOLVERTON. It speaks for itself, whatever it is. Mr. JOHNSON. Page 54, code No. 7006, down to and including 7010. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman, .I would like to repeat my request. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wolverton. Mr. BOREN. That to Mr. Wolverton's phraseology there be added "all passenger and freight trains." I would like to add to that "of all lengths." The CHAIRMAN. Very well. I take it that that conforms to the facts so that if there is no objection that request is granted. Mr. WoLvERTON. I have no personal information as to the cor- rectness of the Interstate Commerce Commission's reports. I assume, however, they are reasonably authentic. I am merely referring to that portion of the report which seems to be appropriate to the questions being asked by Mr. Boren. Possibly I should not have taken it upon myself to bring that information forward, but should have permitted Mr. Johnson to do so. The CHAIRMAN. Well, the information is good, and I presume be- fore we are through we will have a representative of the Interstate Commerce Commission here to explain their statistical information. 76 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. JoHNsON. I think their reports, Mr. Chairman, can be relied upon, because they are compiled from the information and statistics that are furnished them by the carriers. The CHAIRMAN. Very well, you may proceed. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Boren's questions recall to my mind the state- ment made to me by an engineer who runs on about 100 miles of mountain district. He said that frequently he hauled freight trains which were of such length he never saw the way car at any time over the division. Is it the practice of enginemen to keep an eye out, as the saying is, for the tail end of the train and advantageous and desirable in train movements that the head end can see the tail end? Mr. JOHNSON. That is the requirement under the operating rules, Congressman, and should be done from the standpoint of practical railroading. Mr. MARTIN. Is there anything in train rules referring to it? Mr. JOhNsON. I beg your pardon? Mr. MARTIN. Is there anything in train rules referring to that practice? Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. The men on the head end of the train are sup- posed to look back and observe the train as far back as they can see, particularly so when going around curves, the engineer has an oppor- tunity on curves to the right to look back and observe the train and see if anything is dragging, hot boxes, dust flying, or anything wrong with the train. Likewise, on curves to the left the fireman on the left side is re- quired under the rules to do the same thing. I think one of the main things in the report rendered by the Interstate Commerce Commis- sion dealing with stokers on engines was that it is absolutely neces- sary to have a stoker on the engine in order that the fireman could be in the cab of the engine at all times to look out on his side of the train and to observe the signals and other things in connection with his duties and the movement of the train. Mr. MARTIN. In connection with my statement that the engineer said he never saw the way car, I meant that he said that the train was of such a length on the mountain districts that it could not be seen from the engine. Mr. JOHNSON. That is absolutely true. Mr. MARTIN. That he never reached a point on his division where it could be seen, where the engine could be seen from the way car. Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wadsworth. Mr. WADSWORTH. Have any steps been taken to develop methods of signaling from the head end to the rear end of trains? Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; there have been, Congressman. They have tried to develop a telephone system, certain arms or mechanical devices on the caboose; whistle signaling, and other devices of that kind, but regardless of what you may have, they are mechanical devices and subject to failure, the same as man, but we find more mechanical failures than man failures. There is nothing that will ever take the place of the hand-communication signals from the rear end of the train day or night. TRAIN LENGTHS 7 Mr. WADSWORTH. Well, that same observation might have been said back in the days of the Napoleonic wars when the semaphore was adopted and people said that that was the last word in mechan- ical signals. Mr. JoHNsON. That is true. Mr. WADSWORTH. Yet wonderful strides have been made in the field of the radio and the telephone. Mr. JOHNSON. That is true. Mr. WADSWORTH. Have they experimented in the field of radio or telephone in the signaling on trains? Mr. JOHNSON. They have. Mr. WADSWORTH. With any degree of success? Mr. JoHNsoN. Well, I do not think so. They do have in some yards, however, a telephone communication from the rear end to the head end, which is used by carmen in connection with terminal in- spection and terminal air tests. After the brake pressure reaches 70 pounds a service application is made and the man at the head end of the train walks back until he meets the man from the rear end to ob- serve if the pistons in the brake cylinders have traveled out, which indicates that the brake has set. When they meet signal is given to the engineer, and he releases the brakes. They then return one to the rear and the other to the head end, observing if the brakes release. When the man gets to the rear end he telephones the man on the head end that everything is all right. The man at the head end gives the train a clearance and they go. I do not know about such communi- cations while the train is en route; I am afraid sometimes, if you had a set-up like that and there was one of these sudden stops, it would suffer like everything else. However, they may eventually develop it. I would not say that they will not. You know we are advancing pretty rapidly. Mr. WADSWORTH. In the field of communication? Mr. JoTNSoN. That is true. But the whistle-signal device, if I understand it correctly, if there is any interference whatsoever in the train-line pressure to a cer- tain point, the whistle in the caboose will sound. Mr. WADSWORTH. Does that give an instant of warning against this slack action? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, it gives a little warning, Mr. Congressman, but sometimes these shocks are so severe, even though one may get warning, he is knocked clear out of the caboose. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Johnson, I just recall an amusing incident that happened one night when I was functioning in a humble way on the head end. It was not very amusing at the time. We lost the tail end of the train, and it was not discovered until we made the next stop about 20 miles away, and I got bawled out from the right-hand side for being asleep on the job. I do not suppose that that can happen any more, because the service is very different now. So I do not want anybody to lean too heavily on what I know about train movements. Mr. JOHNSON. Well, there are certain railroads, or certain divisions of certain railroads, which I will venture the statement that a great 47891--38--6 78 TRAIN LENGTHS portion of the time the head end of the train cannot see the rear end or the rear end cannot see the head end. I saw one of the Chesapeake & Ohio trains pull by in Virginia one time. The standard down there, you know, is 160 cars, and with- out any exaggeration whatsoever, when the caboose passed the cross- ing where we were waiting to get over, ITwill venture the statement that that train was on not less than five curvatures of the track. The engine was behind a hill. You could not see over 25 or 30 cars ahead of the caboose. Of course, that does not prevail on all rail- roads. But the characteristics of many of the railroads are such that a great portion of some of the divisions are on curves and you can- not possibly see full length of train. You know, the Aouthern Rail- road has one piece of track between Appalachia, Va., and St. Charles--I believe it is 21 miles-and there is 19 miles of the 21 on curves. Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Chairman. The CHARMAN. Mr. Halleck. Mr. HALLECK. Is it possible for a man riding in the caboose to be injured-thrown down and injured-by reason of an emergency stop without regard to the slack action in the train? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, that might happen, Congressman, based upon practical experience to this extent, that the brakes act like they do on an automobile. Sometimes the brakes on some cars act quicker than others. You may have a short train, but as a rule on a long train the breaking power does not get back on the rear end until after all of the damage is done. But we will say on a short train, an emergency application of the brakes is made. You might have a caboose with a very sensitive triple valve; it might beat some of the others on and be so severe that if a man was not braced, he might lose his balance and fall, but such cases are rare. Mr. HALLECK. Now, I have been interested in reading the state- ments which you have submitted. I notice that some of them referred to slack action. Mr. JOHNSON. That is true. Mr. HALLECK. And then others make no reference to that at all. They refer rather to a quick stop by the engineer at water tanks, or the careless handling of the throttle. Mr. JOHNSON. That is true. Mr. HALxc. Are we to understand that those cases where no reference is made to slack action did not involve slack action, but sudden stopping, or some other matter? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, the emergency stop brings about the bunch- ing of the slack, and it is that sudden impact that causes the injury. Now, slack running out is like I said awhile ago, on what we term saggy railroads. A man might have a train of 60 or 80 cars. He is running down into one of these sags, or dips, as we call them. The head end starts up the incline out of the dip, the rear end is coming over and going down into the sag. Naturally, the train bunches, and it may be interesting to know that those bunchings have been so severe at times that they resulted in knocking cars off center. It has caused cars to buckle. Then, as they go on up and the engine tips over the top of the hill and starts down the other side, it snatches TRAIN LENGTHS 79 the slack out of the train, which causes many injuries. Such ik termed slack action. Mr. HALLECK. I particularly referred to the statement in these cases, because to my mind they are very definitely indicative of what is going on on the railroads. Mr. JOHNSON. That is true. Mr. HALLECK. Quotation marks are used. Do these quote the claimant's explanation of what caused the accident? Mr. JoHsoN. It does, Mr. Congressman, and that information is furnished on printed forms. Mr. HALLECK. I understand. So that is a quotation from the claimant himself and contains his version or explanation of why the accident happened? Mr. JouNsoN. That is true. Mr. HALLECK. Now, are we to draw any distinction between those cases that apparently do refer to slack action and those which simply make reference to a sudden emergency stop? Mr. JOHNsoN. Well, of course, there is distinction there when you speak of the bunching of the train due to an emergency application of the air, while on the other hand the man was jerked down in the caboose due to the snatching out of the slack. Mr. HALLECK. Of course, with respect to those cases that involve stopping of the train, that would necessarily involve a forward move- ment. Slack action, as I understand it, could only refer to what you might call gathering, that is, the train running up or the cars run- ning up from the back. Mr. JoHNsON. Or snatching out, sometimes. Mr. HALLECK. There would not, of course, be. a snatching out in a stopping movement. Mr. JoHNsON. Well, that does happen, Mr. Congressman. Mr. HALLECK. Well, now, let me ask you this, for my information. Cases are referred to here and quoted from accidents on less than 70 cars and more than 70 cars. Mr. JOHNSON. That is right. Mr. HALLECK. And in both of those lists there are some references to slack action, and then others make no reference to that, but to some other situation. Are we to understand that slack action was an active contributing cause to the injury in every one of these cases, or do you mean when you designate it as shock that that might come from the sudden stop- ping of the train, the application of the brakes without regard to slack action that might become accentuated in the longer trains as against the shorter trains? Mr. JoHNsoN. Well, the direct cause of the accident was the slack on that train. It all depends upon the slack on those long trains. Mr. HALLECK. Well, now, I notice there is reference to slack action in one case here on a train of 12 cars. Mr. JOHNSoN. That is possible. Mr. HALLECK. Is it possible to have slack action in that kind of a train? Mr. JOHNsON. Yes: in this way. We will say, for instance, that you have one large engine pulling 12 cars. Some engines will re- spond to the steam in the cylinders more proinptly than others. The engineer might give just a little more steam or start a little more 1080 TRAIN LIENGTHS quickly than he figured on and snatch the slack out of the train. Those 12 cars might all be bunched. He reaches up and starts the train, jerking the rear end; there is 12 or 14 feet of slack in 12 cars, sufficient to jerk a man down. That would be termed "slack action due to quick starting of train." Likewise, you might have the train stretched to its full capacity and you wanted to back up. The bunching of the train might have been severe enough to cause the employee to be thrown against something in the caboose, causing the injury. However, I think that you will find cases of that kind somewhat scarce in that report. But I would like to ask each member of the committee, with all fair- ness, that you give careful consideration to that report, because we be- lieve it is absolutely reliable. It paints the true picture of the thing that really happens, and this thing that we are talking about, and the thing which we are trying so hard to eliminate. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Mr. Halleck ? Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Excuse me. Mr. HALLECK. Yes; I am through. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kennedy. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. From this report, can you tell whether or not the claimants set forth here have had more than one accident during this period? Mr. JOHN sON. You may find, Mr. Congressman, where we have paid one claimant two or three claims. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I have applied just mental arithmetic to this, and it appears that there are about five claims in one, accord- ing to this report, of 1936, or four claims over a period of 6 or 7 months, or something of that sort. I happened to notice one case that maybe you might tell me something about. It is claim No. 8750, page 3. Mr. JOHNSON. I beg your pardon. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. On page 3. Mr. JoHNSoN. In the pamphlet State of Claims Paid by Accident Insurance Department of the Order of Railway Conductors of Amer- ica on Account of Shock on Trains of 70 Cars or More. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Yes. Mr. JOHNSoN. That is right in the body of it- Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Claim No. 8750. Mr. JOHNsON (reading): Claim 8750-F. L. Veasey, of Wilmington, Delaware, freight conductor, P. R. R. Company, Maryland Division. Injured October 3, 1929, "When approaching Principio, Maryland, with clear signal at a speed of about 35 miles per hour, signal was tripped by trackmen, engineer applying brake into emergency, throw- ing me violently against rear of cab ; 93 cars, 2 engines." Contusion to back, head, and neck. Disabled 1 week, 4 days, $39.20. That means that the insurance department paid him $29.20 Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Are there many accidents of that sort that would not be affected by this proposal? Mr. JoHNSoN. Yes; there are a few of them. I think that you will find the statement made by Mr. Smith, general manager of the Boston & Maine Railroad in the hearing before the Senate com- TRAIN LENGTHS 81 mittee, where he explained an accident that happened on his railroad in which train-service employees were injured, stating practically the same thing, that the engineman had a clear signal. In other words, a train going 35 miles per hour, and gets a clear block. Of course on some railroads we have automatic blocks, and when the block is clear we go ahead. There are places where we have other blocking devices. But it seems in this case of Mr. Veasey and the case that was outlined by Mr. Smith that the engineman had a clear block and he was going on through, and then they took it away from him. In other words, they displayed a stop signal in his face. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. The point to my question is that that accident is as apt to happen with a train of 2 cars as with 72. Mr. JOHNSON. Oh, that is true, Congressman. If they take a block away from a man and display a stop signal, there is only one thing to do, and that is to stop. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Is there not a substantial number of these train accidents as set forth caused by certain circumstances similar to that occurrence? Mr. JOHNSON. No; I would not say that; and I think as you read through it, Mr. Congressman, you will find that my statement is correct. Mr. KELLY of New York. Mr. Chairman. The ChAIRMAN. Mr. Kelly. Mr. KELLY of New York. Mr. Johnson, you stressed the necessity and importance in hand signals being seen as substantiating your request for this legislation and Congressman Wadsworth asked about any efforts to develop some sort of mechanical signals, and you said nothing as yet had been developed which you believed could replace the hand signals and it occurred to me that regardless of the length of the train, there must be long periods of time when weather condi- tions make it impossible for any signal to be seen regardless of the length of the train. For example, in heavy snows, fogs, or storms, snow storms. Just how much of that would occur, and how substantial a part of the whole matter and problem of visibility of hand signals, from the trainmen to the engineer, would that be? Mr. JoHNsON. Well, you take as an illustration here in this im- mediate territory. We know during the fall, winter, and early spring months we have much fog. Sometimes it is so dense that visibility is broken down until you cannot see but a very short distance. You take in other parts of the country. Take the territory where I worked, down in southeast Texas, and in the Galveston territory. I have seen times down there, days after days, when the early morning fog was so dense you could not see a car length. We had to work by communicating the signals from mouth to ear. In other words, we would go to the head end of the train and tell the engineer to. move what in his judgment was about four car lengths and stop and not to move again until lie was told to move. Of course the fog clears up later on in the day. There are times down there at night when a condition of that kind prevails, but regardless of those conditions, there never has been a reduction made in the train lengths to take care of a condition of that 82 TRAIN LENGTHS kind. They say, though, if it was on 10 cars it would be just the same. That is true. But when a man has 70 or 100 or 110 cars un- der conditions of that kind and is required to communicate signals by mouth to ear, it could be much easier done with a shorter train than with a long train, and the men in charge of that train would feel a great deal safer than they do. Those conditions are hard to deal with. The CHAIRMAN. It will be necessary to take a recess. Mr. WOLVERTON. May I ask just a question to clear a situation which has been brought to my attention? The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Mr. WOLVERTON. It will enable Mr. Farquharson, who is to follow Mr. Johnson, to give more accurate information. In the report, Accident Bulletin No. 105 of the Interstate Com- merce Commission, to which I have previously referred and from which I have quoted, I find that there is some break-down of figures which I previously gave, as occurring in the reports. Under the code No. 7007, to which the witness directed my attention and which refers to "sudden stopping, starting, lurch, or jerk of locomotive, car, or train, not elsewhere provided for," I find that the figure that I gave at that time from this report relat'ed to all types of trains, passenger and freight, and also to accidents that happened in yard service as well as along the road. I assume that the cases to which Mr. Farquharson or Mr. Johnson directed our attention are cases in the freight service on the road. I find that the Interstate Com- merce Commission in its report has made a break-down in that so that it shows that of the 13 total killed only 3 were actually in road service on freight trains; but the report does not indicate the length of the train. It may be possible by further examination to ascertain whether those three deaths occurred on trains of greater than 70 cars in length or less. I find under code No. 7008 under the title "Sudden application of brakes, air-hose bursting, parting, or other- wise defective," that there were no employees in the freight service on road service killed. But, the number of injured was 11, which is a part of the total I previously read. Under code No. 7009, "Sudden application of brakes, air-hose bursting, parting, or otherwise defective," I find none were killed and 27 injured of the total which I previously gave. And under code No. 7010, "Sudden application of brakes, other defective air-brake equipment," none were killed and 27 were injured. I call the attention of the committee and the proponents of the bill to those facts and ask that if possible the committee be informed as to how many of the three killed, and those injured, actually occurred in road service on trains of greater than 70 cars in length. Mr. JOHNsON. I will get that for you. The CHAIRMAN. It will be necessary to adjourn at this time, and you may make reply at the next meeting of the committee. It seems to be the desire to hold a short executive meeting of the committee, soI will ask the audience to vacate the room as promptly as possible. Should it be deemed advisable to hold an afternoon session of the committee, we will let you know in a few minutes later. However, such a session will have to have the approval of the House also. TRAIN LENGTHS 83 If it seems to be practical to hold an afternoon session we will let you know within a few minutes. Mr. JoHNSON. We will wait outside. (Thereupon, the committee proceeded to the consideration of other business, as above indicated, after which, at 12: 05 p. M., it adjourned to meet the following morning, Friday, January 14, 1938.)  TRAIN LENGTHS FRIDAY, JANUARY 14, 1938 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, - COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Washington, . C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. M., in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence Lea (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will lease come to order. Mr. Johnson, will you resume your statement? I may say in this connection that shortly I will have to leave the committee, and Mr. Crosser or Mr. Bulwinkle will preside in my absence. I am sorry to be away, but is necessary this morning. STATEMENT OF W. D. JOHNSON, VICE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, ORDER OF RAILWAY CON- DUCTORS, WASHINGTON, D. C.-Resumed Mr. JOHNSoN. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I will begin where I left off in my statement yesterday. In my judgment train-service employees are forced to work under conditions both day and night that do not prevail in any other in- dustries-that is, they are required to work blindly, especially at nighttime. The size of the equipment they work with, speed, and the elements are against them. Therefore the trainmen on the rear end of a freight train are forced to wor under a mental strain while the train is in motion. They do not know at what time something may happen to cause a bunching of the train which will result in the personal injuries we are talking about. These accidents happen on all railroads that operate long freight trains. Thousands of train- service employees have been injured on account of rear-end shocks. Therefore when a train-service employee is called for service, he knows full well that lie will be subjected to the same dangerous con- ditions that resulted in the injury to his fellow workers. The injury may come in the first. mile and it may not come until the last mile, or the final stop in the final terminal. Therefore, these employees are forced to work under a strain throughout the entire trip. Further- more, when a trainman is once injured, it creates within him a fear that cannot be eliminated. In other words, he becomes gun-shy. Such a condition and feeling is not conducive of safe and efficient train operation. In other words, a feeling of dread and fear dis- tracts the mind from other matters of vital importance during the tour of duty which may result in additional accidents. No man can render his best service when required to work under abnormal con- 85 86 TRAIN LENGTHS ditions. I contend that no one is better qualified to testify to a haz- ardous condition than the one who is required to work under such conditions. Long-train operations do create a hazardous condition and the trainmen who are required to operate them are ready and willing to so testify. I stated in the early part of my statement that I would introduce, to be made a part of the record, certain reports covering specific injuries to train-service employees due to excessive rear-end shocks on long freight trains. Therefore I desire at this time to introduce two reports with re- quest that they be made a part of the record and be identified as exhibits 1 and 2. These reports were prepared and sworn to by Mr. W. A. Wilson, manager of the accident-insurance department of the Order of Railway Conductors, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, which is main- tained for the exclusive benefits of members of the Order of Rail- way Conductors. I willstate, Mr. Chairman, exhibits 1 and 2 are the two statements that were presented to each member of the committee yesterday, showing the claims paid by our accident-insurance department on trains of 70 cars or more, and on trains of less than 70 cars. (The exhibits referred to are as follows:) STATEMENT OF CLAIMS PAID aY AcCIDENT-INSURANCE DEPARTMENT OF THE ORDER OF RAILWAY CONDUCTORS OF AMERICA, ACOUNT SHoCK ON TRAINs OF 70 CARs OR MoEr, PAID BrrwEEN AUGUST 1929 AND JANUARY 1, 1936--364 CLAIMS, $55,077.79 Approximate number members in freight service Aug. 1, 1929-----------------4,791 Jan. 1, 1933-------------------5, 665 Jan. 1, 1930----------------- 4,839 Jan. 1, 1934----------------- 5,230 July 1, 1930-----------------4, 881 Jan. 1, 1935-----------------4,733 Jan. 1, 1931----------------- 4, 786 July 1, 1935-----------------4, 00 Jan. 1, 1932-------------------5.265 Jan. 1, 196----------------- 4,495 CLAIM No. 8584.-F. B. Jenkins, Ridgely, W. Va., freight flagman and conduc- tor, Western Maryland Railroad. Injured July 26, 1929. "I was standing on rear of caboose and when train stopped to set off car, it stopped so hard caboose jumped up and cut off and bounced back 10 or 15 feet, injuring both by arms; 94 cars, 1 engine." "Contusion and abrasion of left elbow-contusion of shoulder, right. General shaking up." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. CLAIM No. 8542.---W. A. Cogbill, Soldier Summit, Utah, freight conductor, D. & R. G. W. Railroad Company. Injured July 5, 1929. "Getting off caboose to throw switch, slack ran in, was thrown off in front of caboose. About 75 cars, 1 engine." "Crushing of fibrous tissues distal to left calcaneous and other left tarsals. Swelling, laceration, pain hematoma." Disabled 7 weeks, $175.00. CLAIM No. 8344.-L. R. Wilkinson, Columbus. Ohio, freight conductor, Nor- folk & Western Railroad. Injured April 15, 1929. "Train parted behind 10th car from head end while running about 17 mi. per hour. At this time I was standing on rear platform of caboose and was thrown against end of cab, receiving wound on head and two sprained knees ; 128 cars, 1 engine." "Vulnus laceration and contusion of scalp. Stremma and contusion both knees. Trau- matic arthritis of both knees." Disabled 18 weeks 1 day, $453.57. CLAIM No. 8493.-J. F. Liscom, Beardstown, Ill., freight conductor, C. B. & Q. Railway. Injured June 15, 1929. "Air hose blew off, setting brakes suddenly and throwing me against stove in way car, bruising left ring finger ; 104 cars, 1 engine." "Badly bruised condition of left ring finger with great amount of swelling, a ring worn being nearly imbedded in swollen tissues and hindering circulation to a dangerous degree." Disabled 6 weeks 5 days, $167.86. CLAIM No. 8632.-W. G. Falls, Salisbury, N. C., freight conductor, Southern Railway. Injured Aug. 14, 1929. "Automatic signal was clear when front of engine passed it-yard engine crew at Salisbury, N. C., threw switch, causing train control to catch and apply brakes. Moving about 10 mi. per hour, making TRAIN LENGTHS 87 sudden stop as I was catching rear steps to caboose; 83 cars, 1 engine." "Swelling and discoloration of sternum." Disabled 2 weeks 5 days, $67.86. CLAIM No. 8410.-G. W. Keller, Centralia, Ill., freight conductor, C. B. & Q. Railroad Company. Injured May 23, 1929. "Was making a stop for water and was thrown from way ear platform by a hard stop; 71 cars, 1 engine." "Right wrist-fracture of lower end of radius and fracture of styloid process of ulna. Left wrist-fracture of lower end of radius. Numerous bruises about body." Disabled 15 weeks 5 days. $392.86. CLAIM No. 8686.-A. Troon, Indianapolis, Ind., freight conductor, Big Four Railroad. Injured Sept. 7, 1929. "Section men were working on track, flagged us and in starting to move train cut and threw air in emergency; 9 cars, 1 engine." "Strain of muscles of back. Bruise and abrasion 1st and 2nd right fingers." Disabled 1 week 2 days, $32.14. CLAIM No. 8643.-J. J. Monahan, Champaign, Ill., freight conductor, Illinois Central. Injured Aug. 17, 1929. "Engine shut off with such force, at time slack of train was bunching in sag, caused caboose to come almost to sudden stop. At the same time the impact caused me to be thrown over top of chair against the corner of ice box and then onto floor, causing injury to ribs and left side ; 80 cars, 1 engine." "Sprained muscles between shoulder blades over 5th Dorsal vertebrae and around to below right axilla. Intercostal muscles slightly torn here and greatly bruised. Severe pain extending from 5th Dorsal vertebrae to a point under right Axilla, very difficult breathing." Disabled, 1 week 2 days, $32.14. CLAIM No. 8680.-J. T. Coultas, Springfield, Ill., freight conductor, Wabash Railroad. Injured Sept. 8, 1929. "Train came to sudden stop, throwing me against desk of caboose ; 90 cars, 1 engine." "Contusion to right side of chest, fracturing 8th and 9th ribs on right side." Disabled 4 days, $14.29. CLAIM No. 8672.-J. E. Shelley, Hornell, N. Y., freight conductor, Erie Rail- road. Injured Aug. 30, 1929. "Sudden application of brakes; 100 ears, 1 engine." "Contusion of shoulder, hip, and thigh and abrasion due to being thrown in the cab in an emergency stop of the train. Also a contusion of the mastoid region, right side of head." Dsiabled 4 weeks, $100.00. CLAIM No. 8707.-W. M. Cassell, Springfield, Ill., freight conductor, Wabash Railroad Company. Injured Sept. 7, 1929. "Rough stop of train, struck frame of door; 86 cars, 2 engines." "Bruised left side, severe pain left side." Dis- abled 3 weeks, $45.00. CLAIM No. 8709.-H. O. Hartman, Harvey, Ill., freight flagman, I. C. Railroad Company. Injured Sept. 18, 1929. "Engineer made hard stop at coal station. Threw me against door, down on floor of cab; 80 cars, 1 engine." "Sprain of left knee." Disabled 5 days, $17.86. CLAIM No. 8722.-F. P. Outcelt, La Crosse, Wis., freight conductor, C. B. & Q. Injured Sept. 24, 1929. "Train made a hard stop, throwing me on floor striking my head and shoulders ; 127 cars, 1 engine." "Contusion on occiput, headache and dizziness." Disabled 3 weeks, $75.00. CLAIM No. 8714.-H. J. Bates, St. Louis, Mo., freight conductor, Missouri Pacific Railroad. Injured Sept. 8, 1929. "Leaving Jefferson City discovered no air on rear of train ; ordered operator at A. O. Tower to put positive block against engineman at Osage. Engineer made stop with no air on 40 rear cars, causing severe shock, injuring me in caboose; 105 cars, 1 engine." "Contusion of left elbow followed by bursitis and ulnar nerve involvement." Disabled 3 weeks 4 days, $89.29. CLAIM No. 8750.-F. L. Veasey, Wilmington, Del., freight conductor, P. R. R. Company, Maryland division. Injured Oct. 3, 1929. "When approaching Principio, Md., with clear signal at a speed of about 35 mi. per hr. signal was tripped by trackman, engineer applying brake into emergency throwing me violently against rear of cab; 93 cars, 2 engines." "Contusion to back, head, and neck." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $39.29. CLAIM No. 8761.-W. J. Henretty, Superior, Wis., freight conductor, G. N. Railway. Injured Sept. 9, 1929. "Slack ran in on train, knocking me to floor, and as I passed caboose stove hit lower ashpan door catch, bruising my second toe, left foot, causing infection ; 175 cars, 1 engine." "Severely swollen left foot, second toe area infected." Disabled 4 days, $14.29. CLAIM No. 8724.-F. M. Smith, Columbus, Ohio, freight conductor, N. W. Railway. Injured Sept. 20, 1929. "Delano, Ohio, on N. W. Railway double header ; lead engine broke off, knocking caboose and one car off center ; 141 cars, 2 engines." "Torn acromial, clavicular ligament, right shoulder." Disabled 4 Weeks 4 days, $114.29. 88 TRAIN LENGTHS CLAIM No. 8755.-T. Smith, Pasco, Wash., freight brakeman, Northern Pacific. Injured Oct. 4, 1929. "Engineer set air descending grade, set straight air, then released, slack ran, causing jar on rear end ; 89 cars, 1 engine." "Fell over back of chair in caboose. Fracture of 3 ribs, left chest." Disabled 3 weeks 3 days, $85.71. CLAIM No. 8688.-H. M. Lynch, Hornell, N. Y., freight conductor, Erie Rail- road. Injured Sept. 6, 1929. "Derailment, causing extreme rough stop; 110 cars, 1 engine." "Contusion of chest wall and separation cartillagious attach- ment of 5th and 6th ribs at breast bone." Disabled 8 weeks 5 days, $217.86. CLAIM No. 8829-J. B. Cooper, W. Fairview, Pa., freight conductor, P. R. R. Injured Nov. 1, 1929. "Thrown against front end of cabin, with my face striking- nose and forehead ; the cause of accident emergency application of air; 101 cars, 1 engine." "Severe contusion over base of nose, frontal area. Hepistaxis. Severe pain over occipital region, X-ray negative for recent fracture." Disabled 3 weeks 3 days, $85.71. CLAIM No. 8847.-I. Muckel, W. Fairview, Pa., freight brakeman, P. R. R. Co. Injured Oct. 30, 1929. "Train parted, throwing me against end of cabin ; 110 cars, 2 engines." "Laceration of head." Disabled 3 weeks, $75.00. CLAIM No. 8839.-T. Murphy, Ravenna, Ky., freight conductor, L. & N. Rail- road. Injured Nov. 3, 1929. "Train stopped suddenly, throwing me against table and stove in caboose; 75 cars, 1 engine." "Contusion of abdomen and left side." Disabled 6 weeks 1 day, $128.57. CLAIM No. 8828.-C. P. Cooke, McComb, Miss., freight conductor, Illinois Central. Injured Oct. 28, 1929. "Train parted account coupling slipped by in 100-car train, 1 engine." "Severe laceration to left ear; contusions to head, neck, and chest." Disabled 7 weeks 3 days, $185.71. Claim No. 8872.--J. W. Moran, Bellevue, Ohio, freight conductor, N. Y. C. & St. L. Injured Nov. 14, 1929. "Owing to emergency application of air brake. I was knocked down in caboose and struck end of cab, injuring left arm and side ; 83 cars, 1 engine." "Sprain of left shoulder." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days, $107.14. CLAIM No. 8924.-L. F. Cook, Oelwein, Iowa, freight conductor, C. G. W. Railway. Injured Dec. 6, 1929. "I was on rear platform of caboose, train of 73 ears, 1 engine, 15 mi. per hr., engine broke off, main line Olwein Yard, pulling out, going East. Leg struck grab iron, head struck end of caboose." "Contusion of muscles of left thigh, contusion of head.' Disabled 1 week 6 days, $46.43. CLAIM No. 8940.-J. H. Clark, Springfield, Ill., freight conductor, Wabash. Injured Dec. 10, 1929. "Train of 83 cars, 1 engine, broke in two near head end at slow speed." "Contusions and abrasions of right knee, accompanied by pain, tenderness, and swelling, also redness." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. CLAIM No. 8734.-H. H. McQuitty, New Franklin, M., freight brakeman, M. K. T. Injured Sept. 27, 1929. "Air set on train ; train buckled together; cars were derailed ; 151 cars, 1 engine." "Bruises' of face and sacral region." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. CLAIM No. 8941.-S. W. Lindsey, Memphis, Tenn., freight conductor, Illinois Central. Injured Dec. 10, 1929. "At Halls, Tenn., train parted between 59th and 60th from rear end account of carrier iron dropped down nut lost off bolt and slack run up, threw me against coal box; 120 ears, 1 engine." "Severe bruises about right shoulder and cut left temple." Disabled 1 week 5 days, $42.86. CLAIM No. 8524.-J. E. Harmon, Frankfort, Ind., freight conductor, Nickel Plate. Injured July 6. 1929. "Air released and jerked off caboose. Was on steps of caboose to hand agent bills; 79 cars, 1 engine." "Transverse cutting wound over the left knee joint about 8 or 9 inches long, cutting wound parallel to first about 3 inches below knee and about 4 inches long. The -uadriceptor extensor tendon partially severed over the patella ; patella capsula ruptured and patella fractured longitudinally in three fragments. Fracture of middle phalynx and distal phalynx third right hand." Disabled 25 weeks 3 days, $635.71. CLAIM No. 8947.-S. Grossman, Galesburg, Ill., freight conductor, C. B. & Q. Injured Dec. 12, 1929. "Train made a quick stop; I was on rear end of way car and bumped myself on iron rail of door; 78 cars, 1 engine." "Contusion with laceration of tissues upper % posterior aspect left forearm, over ulna." Dis- abled 1 week, 6 days, $46.43. CLAIM No. 8979.-M. J. Bolley, Hornell, N. Y., freight conductor, Erie Rail- toad Injured Dec. 22, 1929. "Making about 25 miles per when draw ,head came out and making emergency stop, injuring me and two of my brakemen ; 114 cars, 1 engine." "Pain in back muscles." Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $34.28. TRAIN LENGTHS 89 CLAIM No. 8990.-J. B. Kuecher, Springfield, Ill., freight conductor, Wabash Railroad. Injured Dec. 4, 1929. "The braking power on rear end of train did not hold and slack ran up and banked against head end. I got hold of desk and pulled it away from side of caboose causing a sprained ligament in left arm; 87 cars, 2 engines." "Patient was jerked loose from his desk in the caboose by failure of air to work on back end of train, causing an injury to elbow, with which he continued to work until it swelled so much that he had to stop and get relief, when it was found that the ligaments were torn loose." Disabled 3 weeks 4 days, $89.29. CLAIM No. 8974.-George Martin, Bellevue, Ohio, freight conductor, N. Y. C. & St. L. Injured Dec. 20, 1929. "Sudden stop of train threw me against window sill of caboose ; 74 cars, 1 engine." "Fracture of right arm." Disabled 4 weeks 1 day, $103.57. CLAIM No. 8989.-E. M. Hill, Terre Haute, Ind., freight brakeman, Pennsyl- vania Railroad. Injured Dec. 28, 1929. "Train was moving about 8 mi. an hour. High and low draw bar caused train to part. Brake went into emergency and I was thrown against table in caboose; 87 cars, 1 engine." "Fracture of 6th rib left side." Disabled 4 weeks 1 day, $103.57. CLAIM No. 9078.--W. Tolan, Hornell, N. Y., freight conductor, Erie Railroad Co. Injured Dec. 25, 1929. "This accident was caused by 4th and 5th cars derailing, when pulling in Hornell yard causing train to make sudden stop knocking me down in caboose ; 102 cars, 1 engine." "Contusions of left chest wall and left shoulder." )isabled 4 weeks, $100 00. CLAIM No. 8928.-A. I). DeMaine, Pine Bluff, Ark., freight brakeman, St. L. S. Wn. Railroad. Injured Dec. 8, 1929. "Thrown against end of caboose by sudden jerk of train; 75 cars, 1 engine." "Right wrist sprained and ulna frac- tured." Disabled 8 weeks 1 day, $203.57. CLAIM No. 8956.-G. W. French, Youngstown, Ohio, freight conductor, N. Y. C. Injured Dec. 9, 1929. "Was moving south with train at Ashtabula, Ohio, on Franklin division N. Y. C. Railway. Head car was derailed by coupler breaking and dropping under wheels. Emergency application causing sudden stop caused caboose and rear car to be thrown out of train and across adjoining Pennsylvania Compaiy main tracks. Pusher engine 85 was behind caboose, cab and rear car were destroyed; 82 cars, 2 engines." "Strain of muscles of back and neck. Bruise of right hip and thigh." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71. CLAIM No. 9060.--N. F. Peck, Greenville, Pa., freight conductor, Bessemer & Lake Erie Railroad. Injured Jan. 7, 1930. "In cupola of caboose on left side with head out of window watching train on curve when head car of train slipped by causing train to part : 75 cars, 2 engines." "Contusion right side of neck, shoulder, and arm." Disabled 2 weeks 6 days, $71.43. CLAIM No. 909.-H. B. Rcbinson, Memuhis, Tenn., freight conductor, Y. & M. V. Railroad. Injured Jan. 20, 1930. "Train broke in two, demolishing sev- eral cars including one I was standing on, throwing me clear of wreckage; 100 cars, 1 engine." "Strained ligaments, also bruises." Disabled 1 week 6 days, $46.43. CLAIM No. 9120.-A. W. Wilson, Columbus. Ohio, freight conductor, N. & W. Injured Jan. 29, 1930. "Caused by emergency stop of train account of signal dropping to red position in front of train ; 124 cars, 1 engine." "Sacro iliac sprain, contusion of right hip. Small inguinal hernia on right side." Disabled 1 week 5 days, $42.86. CLAIM No. 9018.-G. W. McBride, Russell, Ky., freight brakeman, C. & 0. Railway. Injured Jan. 2, 1930. "Air hose bursted causing sudden stop; 127 cars, 1 engine." "Fractured ribs, right." Disabled 7 weeks 3 days, $185.71. CLAIM No. 9131.-J. L. Vannatta, Temple, Texas, freight conductor, Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe. Injured Jan. 31, 190. "I was standing on rear end of caboose, moving about 8 to 10 miles per hour up hill. Passing Kopperell Sta- tion, a knuckle broke 6 cars from head end of a double-header with 83 cars, throwing me against end of caboose against inside grab iron or railing: 83 cars, 2 engines." "Bruise to left side. Marked pain and tenderness on palpation of muscles just above illiac crest. Marked pain on tip-of illiac crest. Some swell- ing. Slight abrasion of elbow. X-ray negative for fracture." Disabled 2 weeks 6 days, $71.43. CLAIM No. 9136.-J. S. Diamond, Portola, Calif., freight brakeman, Western Pacific. Injured Jan. 25, 1930. "Pulling in yards at Portola made sudden stop throwing me the length of eaboose, striking my back in such a way that was unable to work for the length of time showed in report ; 74 cars, I engine." "Contusionsof head and slight laceration of kidney and concussion." Disabled 5 weeks, $125.00. 90 TRAIN LENGTHS CLAIM No. 9103.-W. B. Hudgins, Gainesville, Texas, freight conductor, Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe. Injured Jan. 24, 1930. "Was standing in caboose going about 7 miles per hour when draw bar pulled out on head end of 70-car train; knocked me thru screen door and to floor, hitting on left side ; 70 cars, 1 engine." "9th, 10th, and 11th ribs on left side." Disabled 6 weeks 3 days, $160.71. CLAIM No. 9214.-G. A. Arnett, Port Huron, Mich., freight conductor, Grand Trunk Western. Injured March 0, 19,0. "Engineer put brakes in emergency on account of hitting automobile on crossing, causing me to be thrown against corner of stove in caboose ; 74 cars, 1 engine." "Long, deep laceration of the scalp on left side of head requiring seven stitches." Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $57.14. CLAIM No. 9235.-J. B. Brantley, Paragould, Ark., freight conductor, Missouri Pacific. Injured March 21, 1930. "Pulled out D. H. running about 6 miles per hour and throwed me against stove in caboose, bruising my back. Brakes set in emergency to keep from hitting switch engine ; 78 cars, 1 engine." "Injury to back by being thrown against stove in application of emergency. Soreness of muscles and pain on moving." Disabled 3 days, $10.71. CLAIM No. 9246.-H. Brandt, Beardstown, Ill., freight conductor, C. B. & Q. Injured March 26, 1930. "Was on rear end of caboose pulling into yard when slack of train ran up catching myself with left hand; 92 cars, 1 engine." "Sprain of left hand and wrist, swelling, discoloration, and pain present." Disabled 3 days, $10.71. CLAIM No. 1244.-F. N. Barker, Parsons, Kan., freight conductor, M. K. & T. Railway. Injured March 26, 1930. "Was thrown from cupola of caboose to floor by emergency stop of train at slow speed ; 91 cars, 1 engine." "Contusion of muscles of left hip and back." Disabled 2 weeks 5 days, $67,86. CLAIM No. 9238.---L. T. Kaigler, New Orleans, La., freight flagman, T. & N. O. Railroad. Ivjured March 19, 1930. "While pulling through siding running about 5 or 6 mi. per hour after setting up switch and boarding caboose, air hose bursted, throwing me against rear grab iron on caboose; 97 cars, 1 engine." "Contusion of right side of back." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days. $64.28. CLAIM No. 9314.-J. Donahue, Columbus, Ohio, freight brakeman, Hocking Valley Railway. Injured April 19,1930. "Knocked against cupboard when rough stop was made; 101 cars, 1 engine." "Strained ligaments in the left upper arm." Disabled 3 days, $10.71. CLAIM No. 9329.-B. B. Ballard, Corbin, Ky., freight conductor, L. & N. Rail- road. Injured April 25, 1930. "Engineer made rough stop of train. Threw me against cupola window; hook on window cut head over right eye. Sprained neck and shoulders ; 100 cars, 1 engine." "Cut over right eye ; neck and shoulders sprained." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $21.42. CLAIM No. 9337.-J. A. Hughes, Trenton, Mo., freight brakeman, C. R. I. & P. Injured April 29, 1930. "Slack ran up in train while crossing over from one side of cupola to other side, knocked me off my balance, causing me to fall partly out of cupola; caught left leg on lower landing of cupola step, causing side strain of left knee; 75 cars. 1 engine." "Sprain of left knee. Swelling and stiffness." Disabled 1 week. $25.00. CLAIM No. 9365.-H. B. Robinson, Memphis, Tenn., freight conductor, Y. & M. V. Injured May 9, 1930. "Bursted air hose caused brakes to go on in emer- gency, threw me up against end of caboose ; 90 cars, 1 engine." "Injury to left shoulder." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. CLAIM No. 9412.-E. M. Shirk, Harrisburg, Pa., freight conductor, P. R. R. In- jured May 29, 1930. "Was knocked down in cab by sudden stop of train while moving in yards at Holidaysburg and struck hand against door knob; 113 cars, 1 engine." "Contusion of middle finger of left hand and dorsal surface of left hand." Disabled 4 days, $8.57. CLAIM No. 9315.-J. C. Cascie, Hinton, W. Va., freight conductor, Chesapeake & Ohio. Injured April 18, 1930. "Train stopped suddenly. I was thrown from rear platform of caboose to ground ; 150 cars, 1 engine." "Severe sprain of muscles of back, lower lumbar, and sacral regions. Laceration of last phalanx of right ring finger." Disabled 7 weeks 3 days, $185.71. CLAIM No. 9173.-H. L. Nolan, Pennington Gap, Va., freight conductor, L. & N. Railroad. Injured Feb. 21, 1930. "Rough or sudden stop of train knocking me loose from my hold in cupola and against opposite side, injuring me; 95 cars, 1 engine." "Left inguinal hernia." Disabled 16 weeks 5 days, $417.86. CLAIM No. 9324.-O. J. Post. Duluth, Minn., freight conductor, Northern Pacific Railway. Injured April 28, 1930. "When engineer set air to stop, the air brakes went into emergency and threw me against front end of caboose ; 81 cars, 1 engine." "Fracture of left radium and ulna." Disabled 7 weeks, $175.00. TRAIN LENGTHS 91 CLAIM No. 9426.-J. G. Sanderson, Kansas City, Mo., freight conductor, Frisco Railway Company. Injured June 2, 1930. "Knocked down by sudden stop of train, hitting stove in caboose ; 126 cars, 2 engines." "Contusion over back of left arm ; contusion and sprain left wrist, contusion right arm." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. CLAIM No. 9432.-E. J. Steger, Lufkin, Texas, freight conductor T. N. O. Rail- road. Injured May 30, 1930. "Rough stop of train and was thrown out of chair against door facing in caboose ; 76 cars, 1 engine." "Lacerated wound joint over right eye." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57. CLAIM No. 8399.-C. G. Ballard, Salamanca, N. Y., freight conductor, Erie Railroad. Injured May 12, 1929. "Train was suddenly stopped as I had my re- port ready to throw off, sudden slack knocked me against ice box, knocked un- conscious ; 102 cars, 2 dead engines, 1 engine handling train." "Fractured left hip with limitation motion. Walks with difficulty. Examined by me at request of family." Disabled 52 weeks, $1,300.00. CLAIM No. 9400.-W. R. Coley, Texarkana, Ark., freight conductor, Missouri Pacific Railway. Injured May 24, 1930. "Was knocked down in caboose account engineer making sudden stop, striking on lower spine ; 83 cars, 1 engine." "Con- tusion to back and right knee." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71. CLAIM No. 9418.-W. G. Larimore, Des Moines, Iowa, freight conductor, C. R. I. & P. Injured May 31, 1930. "Train made a sudden stop ; I struck left knee on hand rail and fell to the ground ; 71 cars, 1 engine." "Bruised left knee. X- ray findings: has the appearance of a piece of bone torn off the tibia posteriorly at the knee joint and is about the size of a small bean." Disabled 4 weeks, $100.00. CLAIM No. 9564.-G. F. Wetzel, Bellevue, Ohio, freight flagman, N. Y. C. & St. L. Injured July 8, 1930. "Application of brakes and release of same together with motion of tank car of acid immediately ahead of caboose ; caused me to be thrown against ladder on platform of caboose, striking just over my heart; 73 cars, I engine." "Pain in left chest, increased on movement and walking." Dis- abled 2 weeks 4 days, $64.29. CLAIM No. 9584.--C. W. Wilson, Kansas City, Kan., freight conductor, St. L. & S. F. Injured July 24, 1930. "Was knocked down in caboose caused by a sudden stop, while making a stop in K. C. yard. Threw me against the end of cab, hitting my head and ear; 140 cars, 1 engine." "Contusion and laceration of skin over left mastoid region and of ext. ear, and ext. auditory meatus. Contusion with bone injury of right tuber ischii." Disabled 2 weeks 4 days, $38.57. CLAIM No. 9647.-J. Crichlow. Bonham, Texas, freight conductor, T. & P. Rail- way. Injured July 10, 1930. "Sudden stop of train which threw me against door facing ; 103 cars, 1 engine." "Lacerated wound of right cheek and sprain of right wrist." Disabled 2 weeks 3 days, $60.71. CLAIM No. 9684.-C. B. McMullen, Parsons, Kan., freight brakeman, M. K. & T. Railway. Injured Aug. 31, 1930. "Knuckle broke on first car behind engine; air went into emergency, threw me through cupola window ; 100 cars, 1 engine." "Contusion and laceration to left ear, caused by ear being cut by broken glass from cupola window." Disabled 1 week, $15.00. CLAIM No. 9590.-S. Grossman, Galesburg, Ill., freight conductor, C. B. & Q. Injured July 26, 1930. "I was standing on rear platform on way car. Engineer made a very hard stop and knocked me over against the way car and hurt my head and shoulder ; 89 cars, 1 engine." "Dislocated right shoulder." Disabled 6 weeks 2 days, $157.14. CLAIM No. 9664.-1. C. Coates, Cheyenne, Wyo., freight conductor, Union Pacific railroad. Injured Aug. 20, 1930. "Was thrown against cupola account sudden stop ; 80 cars, 1 engine." "Crack of seventh rib about 2 inches from spine." Disabled 1 week, $15.00. CLAIM No. 9685.-R. A. Rust, Waterloo, Iowa, freight conductor, I. C. Rail- road. Injured Aug. 29, 1930. "By a sudden lurch of train, throwing me against end of caboose ; 80 cars, 1 engine." "Severe sprain of back and contused wound to back of head." Disabled 1 week 6 days, $46.43. CLAIM No. 9735.-J. E. Ballinger, Asheville, N. C., freight conductor, Southern Railway. Injured Sept. 10, 1930. "Rough stop at Hickory in caboose, thrown against door of caboose, skin broken on elbow; 70 cars, 1 engine." "Abrasion size of dime at point of left elbow, infected." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57. CLAIM No. 8848.-E. Shute, Beardstown, Ill., freight brakeman, C. B. & Q. Injured July 17, 1929. "Was on No. 75, and slack ran up on train, knocking me on stove; 92 cars, 1 engine." "Hemorrhage in pelvis; later abscess of pelvis was drained. Echymosis." Disabled 49 weeks 3 days, $1,235.71. 92 TRAIN LENGTHS CLAIM No. 9726.-W. Wright, Melville, Sask., freight conductor, Canadian National. Injured Sept. 9, 1930. "Ar hose bursted on the 13th car from engine, bringing train to a sudden stop, throwing me down in caboose ; 124 cars, 1 engine." "Tenth rib, left side, severely bruised, also side hurt. Almost unable to walk after injury." Disabled 2 weeks 3 days, $60.71. CLAIM No. 9748.-F. A. Gemperling, Harrisburg, Pa., freight conductor, P. R. R. Injured Sept. 19, 1930. "Sudden application of air brake on train. Was knocked down in cabin on left arm; 122 cars, 1 engine." "Sprain of left wrist." Disabled 1 week 5 days, $42.86. CLAIM No. 9581.-E. E. Butz, Conneaut, Ohio, freight conductor, Nickel Plate. Injured July 23, 1930. "Air went into emergency caused by kicker, threw me up again water tank in caboose." "Double fracture of Zygomatic arch, fracture of skull, left knee and thigh badly bruised and sprained." Dis- able 10 weeks 3 days, $260.71; 96 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 9693.-fR. J. Brown, Covington, Ky., freight conductor, L. & N. Railway. Injured Sept. 2, 1930. "Emergency application of brakes to keep from hitting a wagon load of hay on road crossing which throwed me in caboose and injured me as stated." "Severe strained knee, left." Disabled 6 weeks 4 days, $164.29; 98 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 9767.-R. B. Dunn, Biggar, Sask., freight conductor, Canadian National. Injured Sept. 9, 1930. "Air was set in emergency and I was thrown against window, causing above injuries." "A cut on right side of face just in front of right ear ; an artery appeared to be severed. The wound had been stitched before I saw it." Disabled 1 week 2 days, $32.14; 77 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 97C6.-J. W. Bartlett, Sayre, Pa., freight conductor, Lehigh Valley Railroad. Injured Sept. 25, 1930. "Was standing in caboose writing report in rack, when emergency stop cane, throwing mne out door of caboose, striking on railing of caboose and falling down across drawhead between first car ahead of caboose. Door was open in caboose at the time emergency stop came." "Laceration of face, severe contusion of chest and abdomen." Disabled 4 weeks 5 days, $117.86; 112 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 9799.-C. C. Fleming, Roanoke, Va., freight conductor, Virginian Railroad. Injured Oct. 5, 1930. "Slack ran out of train, jerking body against desk in caboose." "Ribs on right side jammed." Disabled 3 weeks, $75.00; 147 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 9845.-E. Riley, Parsons, Kans., freight conductor, M. K. & T. Injured Oct. 26, 1930. "Was in caboose and running slowly when engineer set brakes in emergency and threw me head on against desk and injuring head." "Laceration of scalp and multiple minor contusions and muscle strains." Dis- abled 1 week 2 days, $32.14; 98 cars, 1.engine. CLAIM No. ',805.-C. N. Buckalew, Hot Springs, Ark., freight conductor, Mis- souri Pacific Railway. Injured Oct. 8, 1930. "I was sitting at desk in caboose making out reports when train came to a sudden stop, throwing me against desk, bruising my left side." "Contusion over cartilage left 7th and 8th ribs." Dis- abled 2 weeks 2 days, $107.14; 77 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 9870.-E. J. Davis, Greenfield, Mass., freight flagman, Boston & Maine. Injured Oct. 31, 1930. "Train moving up grade about 15 miles per hour, train parted account high and low draw bar between 14th and 15th head car causing severe shock on rear end of train." "Contused wound of chest and right hip." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $21.42; 113 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 8893.-G. F. Cook, Harrisburg, Pa., freight conductor, P. R. R. Injured Nov. 21, 1929. "Going west with Eng. 6891 with 135 empty cars. An- tomatic control failed at Duncannon, Pa. Shopping 52 cars and cabin. There were 30 cars off center, 22 train lines broken, journal box on cab broken, 2 hinges broken off, east door window broken out, stove also broken. I was sit- ting in skylight or dome and sudden stop threw me on my right foot up against front of dome." "Fractured right ankle." Disabled 52 weeks, $1,300.00; 135 cars, I engine. CLAIM No. 988.-J. A. Garris, Albion, Pa., freight conductor B. & L. E. Rail- way. Injured Nov. 14, 1930. "Slack ran in throwing me against conductor's valve, cutting face badly ; 100 cars, 2 engines." "Contused wound right side of nose, ecchymosis." Disabled 6 days, $21.43. CLAIM No. 9920.-C. T. Riley, Ludlow, Ky., freight conductor, Southern Rail- way. Injured No. 9, 1930. "Rough stop caused me to be knocked out of cupola to floor, injuring elbow." "Piece of cartilage on left elbow knocked loose." Disabled 1 week 5 days, $25.71; 85 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 9860.-C. J. Keating, Conneaut, Ohio, freight conductor, N. Y. C. & St. L. Injured Oct. 30, 1930. "Cars buckling up in east-bound train in TRAIN LENGTHS 93 face of west-bound train. Air used in emergency, wrecking caboose." "Severe contusion lumbar muscles." Disabled 4 weeks 4 days, $114.29; 91 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 9923.-J. F. Harriger, Bellevue, Ohio, freight conductor, N. Y. C. & St. L. Injured Nov. 15, 1930. "Went to stop at Sheffield and when engi- neer put air on very suddenly, caused me to be jammed against end of ca- boose." "Accidental injury to left chest ; thrown against grab iron of caboose when air brakes were suddenly applied. Symptoms, pain in left side of chest on breathing, coughing, or exertion." Disabled 3 weeks 4 days, $89.29; 110 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 8967.-J. R. Alexander, Dupo, Ill., freight conductor, Missouri Pacific. Injured Dec. 16, 1929. "I was jerked from my feet in caboose and struck wash basin stand with my back." "Fracture of left transverse process 2d lumbar spine. Multiple abrasions of back." Disabled 52 weeks, $1,300.00; 117 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 9953-F. M. Stoner, Bellevue, Ohio, switchman, N. Y. C. & St. L. Injured Nov. 30, 1930. "While riding on caboose the engineer put the air brake on in emergency, causing me to be thrown over the end of caboose." "Muscular sprain to posterior chest and back (Lumbar region). Also abrasion and muscular sprain to right knee with symptoms such as unable to stoop, walk correctly, pain on breathing, and movements of back and chest." Disabled 4 weeks, $100.00; 90 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 9994.-W. M. Baker, Sapulpa, Okla., freight brakeman, St. L. & S. F. Injured Dec. 12, 1930. "Emergency stop made, door slammed shut on arm and threw my body against stove." "Cut on right arm near wrist joint. Both hips bruised." Disabled 2 weeks, $30.00; 112 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 9982.-H. R. Salzgeber, Bensenville, Ill., freight brakeman, C. M. St. P. & P. Railway. Injured Dec. 9, 1930. "Air hose blew off of coupling 11 cars from engine, causing caboose and rear car to double up with helper engine behind caboose being thrown off of platform." "Contusion 2 inches in diameter, discolored black and blue on anterior surface of left leg, with slight swelling and limitation of motion at knee due to a mild sprain. Slight limi- tation of motion in left arm with soreness in left biceps muscle." Disabled'3 days, $6.42; 104 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 9837.-,S. L. Cain, Poplar Bluff, Mo., freight conductor, Missouri Pacific Railroad. Injured Oct. 20, 1930. "Train parted and knocked me down in caboose." "Contusion and brasion right thigh and leg, right sciatic nerve." Disabled 8 weeks 5 days, $217.86; 96 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 9972.-P. J. Hahn, Columbus, Ohio, freight and passenger con- ductor, C. & O. Railway Company. Injured Nov. 14, 1930. "Thrown against the corner of a locker when the train made an emergency stop." "Contusion over the right shoulder with severe wrench." Disabled 6 weeks, $150.00; 110 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10067.-L. M. White, Indianapolis, Ind., freight conductor, B. & o. Railroad. Injured Jan. 5, 1931. "Had 117 cars, 2 engines, broke off from train causing sudden stop, knocked me to side of cupola of caboose, iniuring my right wrist." "Lacerated and contused wound over ulner styloid and sprain of right wrist." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $39.29; 117 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 10062.-J. E. Spates, Dunsmiir, Calif., freight conductor, Southern Pacific. Injured Dec. 21, 1930. "Train pulling in on siding, I did not hear cur train starting, jerked me up against the ladder on end of caboose." "Contusion of left chest anterior-pain (fracture of 5th and 6th ribs)." Disabled 3 weeks 4 days, $89.29; 71 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 9540.-0. I. Hall, Meadville, Pa., freight conductor, Erie Railroad Company. Injured July 12, 1930. "I was riding in cupola of caboose behind a train consisting of ninety-six cars when front drivers of engine went off treck and the engineman applied the air brakes in emergency, the sudden stop threw me forward against the window sill of cupola injuring my rieht le" a dA- scribed." "Vertical stellate fracture of the head of the tibia, right." Disabled 27 weeks 2 days, $682.14; 96 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10093.-0. E. Dana, Dubuque, Iowa, freight conductor, C. M. St. P. & P. Railway. Injured Jan. 11, 1931. "Making emergency stop at slow rate of speed, finding stock on track, throwing me against seat in cupola and then throwing me to the floor." "Bruise and abrasions rirht lee below knee. with injury to right arm." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days, $10714. 87 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10140.-J. Weldon, Duluth, Minn., freight conductor, Northern Pacific Railroad. Injured Jan. 8. 1931. "In making train stop for depot at 47891-38--7 94 TRAIN LENGTHS Wyoming, air brakes went into emergency and knocked me down in caboose." "Contusion thorax multiple bruises right foot." Disabled 2 weeks 0 days, $71.43; 70 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 9885.-E. R. Flett, Elmira, N. Y., freight conductor, Erie Railroad Company. Injured Nov. 2, 1930. "Train line broke, stopping very suddenly, throwing me the length of caboose. Right leg against cupola supports." "Marked swelling of right knee, no redness, no real tenderness, knee feels like a bag of small bones. Hurt patient and gave considerable pain if he walked any distance." Disabled 12 weeks 2 days, $307.14; 121 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10141.-E. T. Gilliland, Selma, Ala., freight conductor, C. & O. Injured Jan. 12, 1931. "Pulling in yard at Clifton Forge when engineer applied his air, slack ran into train, knocked me down, struck shoulder against corner of cupola of caboose." Clavicle separated. from end attachment." Disabled 5 weeks 1 day, $128.57; 111 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10204.-C. R. Mathis, Kingsville, Texas, freight conductor, Mis- souri Pacific Railway. Injured Feb. 19, :931. "Sudden stop of caboose behind 105-car vegetable train." "Left elbow and hip bruised and left shoulder sprained." Disabled 6 days, $12.86; 105 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10219.-W. C. Hancock, Jackson, Tenn., freight conductor, I. C. Railroad. Injured Feb. 23, 1931. "Train was running very slow, about five miles per hour ; train consisted of 80 cars and had a derailment up on the head end, 16 cars from engine, causing a very heavy shock on the rear end, throwing me against end of caboose." "Severe contusion of left shoulder." Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $57.14; 80 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 9993.-F. J. Paulsen, Los Angeles, Calif., freight conductor, South- ern Pacific Railway. Injured Nov. 25, 1930. "Air hose, blew off, causing train to go into emergency, throwing me against the cupola, causing my injury." "Con- tusion and sprain left knee; contusions left pelvis, forehead, and right leg." Disabled 12 weeks 1 day, $303.57; 87 cars, 3 engines. CLAIM No. 10146.-A. Gangraw, Durand, Mich., freight brakeman, Grand Trunk Western. Injured Jan. 25, 1931. "On starting train was thrown against brake wheel on rear of caboose." "Fracture 10th rib." Disabled 6 weeks 2 days, $1'57.14; 80 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10252.-D. D. Barton, Biggar, Sask., freight conductor, C. N. R. In- jured March 10, 1931. "Sudden stop at Winter Wye, 91 cars, threw me thru cupola window, cutting face with glass." "Laceration beneath lower lid of right eye; laceration was jagged." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57; 91 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10286.-A. E. Burke, Champaign, Ill., freight conductor, I. C. R. R. Injured March 22, 1931. "In starting train I was jerked against open door of caboose, striking my knee on edge of door, bruising it and causing to swell badly." "Contusion of left knee with prepatellar bursitis." Disabled 4 days, $14.29; 75 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10299.-J. D. Neighbors, Birmingham, Ala., freight conductor, Southern Railway. Injured Feb. 6, 1931. "Was sitting in cupola of cab. Had 84 cars in train, angle cock broke off 31 cars from cab, 53 cars from engine, threw brakes on in emergency and jammed me against corner of cupola. "Con- tusion right lower chest. Old injury to left iliac crest which was wired at time of old injury, now has drainage which is due to old wire." Disabled 6 weeks 4 days, $164.29; 84 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 9976.-A. E. Shattuck, Van Buren, Ark., freight conductor, Mis- souri Pacific Railway. Injured Dec. 4, 1930. "Train broken in two and air brake shock. Thrown against platform railing." "Compound fractures 3rd, 4th, and 5th fingers left hand." Disabled 21 weeks 1 day, $528.57; 74 cars 2 engines. CLAIM No. 10331.-L. L. Lefier, Ft. Scott, Kan., freight conductor, St. L. S. F. Railway. Injured April 8, 1931. "I was stepping from rear car of train to platform of caboose when train came to a sudden stop, throwing over railing of platform, striking end of caboose with head, injuring right eye." "Lacerated wound of upper right eyelid with bruises of the forehead and eyeball." Disabled 1 week 2 days, $32.14; 74 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10346.-G. F. Reynolds, Big Spring, Texas, freight conductor, T. & P. Railway. Injured April 10, 1931. "Pulling out of siding, 73 cars in train, and engine was derailed, emergency application of brakes causing sudden stop ; I was knocked down in caboose, being thrown against middle partition of caboose, causing injuries as stated above." "Contusion over left cheek and left temporal region of head: contusion right side of chest and deep muscular con- tusion over left thigh." Disabled 1 -week. $25.00 ; 73 cars 1 engine. TRAIN LENGTHS 95 CLAIM No. 10344.-J. F. O'Connor, Bellevue, Ohio, freight conductor, Nickel Plate Railroad. Injured April 9, 1:31. "Standing on rear end of caboose, a sudden application of the air brake threw me against the grab iron on rear end of caboose." "Muscular sprain to left chest in mid-axilliary line (level of the 9th rib)." Disabled 2 weeks 4 days, $04.29: 70 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10325.-V. E. Allen, Belen, N. Mex., freight conductor, A. T. & S. F. Railway. Injured April 4, 1931. "Air went into emergency causing emer- gency stop and threw me against partition post in caboose." "Left shoulder contused injury at joint, no fractures, sprain." Disabled 4 weeks 3 days, $110.71; 110 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10390.-G. M. Molaison, New Orleans, La., freight conductor, Southern Pacific Railroad Company. Injured April 10, 1931. "Air hose busted on eighth car behind engine stopping train instantly, slamming me against rear end of caboose, forehead striking hand rail and left knee striking body of caboose." "Lacerated wounds of forehead and knee-brush burn of left patella." Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $57.14; 77 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10438.-M. J. Hehir, Hornell, N. Y., freight conductor, Erie Rail- road Company. Injured May 9, 1931. "Stopping at River Jet. to pick up car, did not expect them to stop until we were into clear which they should have done. Was not looking for this sudden stop throwing me against cupola of caboose." "Contusion of right chest wall." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71; 120 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10364.-H. Meechan, LaFayette, Ind., freight conductor, C. I. & L. Railway. Injured April 17, 1931. "Engineer made application of air brakes went into emergency. I was on rear platform of caboose and was thrown against end of grab iron causing injury." "Severe consusion of hips, hemotoma over right ileum." Disabled 5 weeks 1 day, $128.57; 71 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10514.-W. G. Lumbard, Arkansas City, Kan., freight conductor, A. T. & S. F. Railway. Injured May 30, 1931. "Sprained back caused by slack running out going over hog back and throwing me against window sill in cupola." "Sprained back due to fall backward when train was moving, discolor- ation across back." Disabled 1 week, $25.00: 87 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 10535.-D. E. Young, Binghamton, N. Y., freight conductor, Dela- ware & Hudson Corp. Injured June 3, 1931. "With train of 101 cars-two engines on lead-on descending grade, slowed to ten miles per hour. Released air, started working steam. Lead Eng. 954 broke rear knuckle causing eng. to break off putting brakes in emergency, forehead struck front of window frame and I was thrown the length of caboose." "Sprain of back with abrasion forehead and contusion of body." Disabled 4 days, $14.29; 101 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 10547.-J. S. Hyde, New Haven. Conn., freight conductor, New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad. Injured June 19, 1931. "Running west on freight N. H. 5 with 90 cars in train, engine made running release at Coscob, Conn. We got a very severe yank on rear of train which caught me off guard as I was passing from one side of caboose to the other throwing me against coal box." "Fracture of 11th rib left side chest." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days, $107.14; 90 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 10607.-J. S. Brown, Brownwood, Texas, freight conductor, G. C. & S. F. Injured July 14, 1931. "Slack action in train." "Bruised left knee cap. Fractured rib on right side." Disabled 1 week 6 days, $46.43; 94 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 10632.-D. H. Starkey, Columbus, Ohio, freight flagman, Norfolk & Western Railroad. Injured July 25, 1931. "Engineer made hard stop on red signal throwing me from center of 'caboose to west end of cab on my head and shoulder." "Sprained left shoulder and stiff neck." Disabled 4 days, $8.57 90 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10545.-J. B. Gould, Fort Scott, Kan., freight conductor, St. L. S. F. Railroad Company. Injured June 13, 1931. "3 fractured bones viz. - Tip of radius of left forearm, metacarpals of third & little finger of left hand, left shoulder bruised and slight injury to right middle finger. Automatic air brakes went into emergency on train of one hundred forty-four (144) cars,. causing me to fall on left hand and side." "Fracture styloid process of radius,. fracture 4th & 5th metacarpals. X-ray taken." Disabled 7 weeks 1 day, $178.57;: 144 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10624.-H. F. Lehman, Toledo, Ohio, freight conductor, N. Y. C:. Injured July 21, 1931. "14th car from caboose off track, brakes went into emer- gency, throwing me into table & stove." "Possible fracture left upper jaw, thru neck of condyle." Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $32.14; 87 cars, 1 engine. 96 TRAIN LENGTHS CLAIM No. 10612.-J. S. Diamond, Portola, Calif., freight brakeman, Western Pacific Railroad. Injured July 17, 1931. "While train, was running air hose blew off, causing train to go in emergency, pulling out draw bar in middle of train, and smashing second car ahead of caboose of center of both trucks, throw- ing me to floor of caboose out of cupalo." "Fractured ribs and contusions chest." Disabled 4 weeks 1 day, $103.57; 127 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 10592.-C. A. DeVany, Palestine, Texas, freight conductor, Inter- national Great Northern Railway. Injured April 19, 1931. "Sudden stop of train." "Sprain of right ankle and strain of left, swelling and pain." Disabled 4 weeks 3 days, $110.71; 73 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 10736.-A. M. Reynolds, Pine Bluff, Ark., freight conductor, St. L. & S. W. Railway. Injured Aug. 21, 1931. "Was knocked down, thrown over n chair against a seat in caboose, while on duty as freight conductor." "Bruised chest, due to fall." Disabled 2 weeks 4 days, $64.29; 71 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10727.-A. D. Moore, Portsmouth, Ohio, freight conductor, N. & W. Railroad Company. Injured Aug. 22, 1931. "Engineer made emergency stop to prevent blocking crossing. Was so violent every light was knocked out and I was thrown against front door of cab, striking left shoulder, rebounding my back struck bunk bruised & sprained." "Contusion of left shoulder and strain of right lumbar muscles." Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $57.14; 112 ears, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 9753.-D. G. Carroll, Columbus, Ohio, freight flagman, Pennsyl- vania Railway. Injured Sept. 21, 1930. "116 cars 2 engines descending heavy grade. Air brakes had been applied, speed of train reduced. Brakes were released while train still in motion head end run away from rear end--the sudden shock to rear end threw me against air pipe dislocating shoulder." "Dislocation of right shoulder, complication-Sub-Acrominel bursitis." Dis- abled 52 weeks, $1,300.00; 116 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 10764.-A. W. Lindsay, Wilmington, Del., freight conductor, Penn- sylvania Railroad. Injured Aug. 17, 1931. "Sudden stop of train." "Contusion & sprain of neck and shoulders." Disabled 5 weeks 3 days, $135.71: 73 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10787.-P. B. Baker, Herington, Kan., freight brakenan, C. R. I. & P. Railway. Injured Sept. 5, 1931. "Side and back injured when thrown from caboose, striking against brake wheel. Rough stop in yard." "Severe contusion in right infrascapular region." Disabled 5 days, $17.86: 92 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10765.-J. P. Nisewarner, South Cumberland, Md., freight con- ductor, D. & 0. Railroad. Injured Aug. 29, 1931. "Was thrown from top of running train caused by air being applied in emergency." "Superficial lacera- tion of left hip and left scalp. Fractured 8th rib left side." Disabled 5 weeks 2 days, $79.28; 127 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10781.-J. Keating, Trenton, Mo., freight conductor, C. R. I. & P. Railway. Injured Sept. 13, 1931. "Was going through terminal yard when train stopped suddenly throwing me against desk breaking one rib." "Fracture of left 8th rib mammary line. Contusion with swelling, pain when taking a long breath or cough." Disabled 4 weeks, $60.00; 122 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10756.-J. K Bailey, Montgomery, Ala., freight conductor, L. & N. Injured Sept. 5, 1931. "Pulling in Boyles yard, engineer made emergency appli- cation, to keep from running through switch. I was standing on rear of caboose on west side, my left side striking hand hold on caboose, bending hand hold." "Severe bruise and strain of left hip and back with some injury to kidney." Disabled 4 weeks 5 days, $117.86; 85 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10810.-H. C. Lusher, Huntington, W. Va., freight conductor, C. & O. Railroad. Injured Sept. 17, 1931. "Air hose busted on head of train caused weight to be thrown against right elbow." "Acute traumatic bursitis right elbow." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days, $107.14; 162 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 9978.-F. Smith, Portsmouth, Ohio, freight conductor, Norfolk & Western. Injured Dec. 5, 1930. "Was making about 15 miles per hour and pipe pulled out of main reservoir on Engine and brakes went in emergency causing train to stop suddenly and threw me against end of caboose." "Fracture of inner condyle of left leg." Disabled 43 weeks 3 days, $1,085.71; 155 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10873.-F. B. Jenkins, Ridgely, W. Va., freight flagman, Western Maryland Railway. Injured Oct. 11, 1931. "Making about 25 miles per hour I engineer went to put on brakes to slow up for street crossing; brakes went on in emergency, broke 3 knuckles; made awful hard stop, bumped my face against side of caboose window and jammed leg against cupboard, hurting hip." "Con- TRAIN LENGTHS 97 tusion right cheek and cuts about right eye. Traumatic Arthritis right hip and knee." Disabled 3 weeks, $75.00; 114 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10867.-E. H. Williams, Bellevue, Ohio, freight conductor, N. Y. C. St. L. Railroad. Injured Oct. 7, 1931. "The air was applied into emergency account of double red block at the west end of Wickliffe siding caused by yard engine working between two blocks with open switch."' "Muscular sprain to neck and shoulders due to sudden jolt of caboose car in which party was riding." Disabled 3 weeks 4 days, $89.29; 100 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10916.-B. R. T. Smith, Columbia, S. C., freight flagman, Southern Railroad. Injured Oct. 25, 1931. "Sudden stop of train, thrown against stove in cab." "Lacerated wound of scalp, Anterior parietal region, moderate concus- sion of brain." Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $57.14; 75 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10942.-W. F. Lewis, Chicago, Ill., yard conductor, I. C. Injured Nov. 1, 1931. "Engineer made rough stop of train by air brakes." "Sprained left knee and contusion of inner condyle of the femur with swelling." Disabled 2 days, $7.14; 88 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10902.-M. H. Jones, Princeton, W. Va., freight conductor, Vir- ginian Railway. Injured Oct. 14, 1931. "Broken collar bone & right shoulder badly sprained, brake applied emergency, knocked down in cab." "Fracture of right clavicle, Right shoulder also badly bruised." Disabled 5 weeks 6 days, $146.43; 110 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10957.-C. H. Jacoby, Chillicothe, Mo., freight conductor, A. T. S. F. Railroad. Injured Nov. 7, 1931. "A sudden stop cause broken rail." "Sprain of right Sarco Iliac joint, left shoulder girdle and left hip joint and trauma to, left side of neck, also sprain of left knee." Disabled 1 week 6 days, $46.43; 141 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10967.-R. A. Roberts, Birmingham, Ala., freight flagman, South- ern Railroad Company. Injured Nov. 9, 1931. "Was running about 20 miles per hour draw head pulled out derailed car about 25 cars from engine throwing me against stove." "Severe contusion left Gluteal muscles." Disabled 2 weeks, $50.00; 87 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10892.-J. S. Diamond, Portola, Calif., freight brakeman, Western Pacific. Injured Oct. 16, 1931. "Train broke in two throwing me to ground causing me to land on right shoulder." "Dislocated clavicle at sternum." Disabled 6 weeks 3 days, $160.71; 74 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10993.-H. C. Dwight, Bellevue, Ohio, freight flagman, N. Y. C. St. L. Railroad. Injured Nov. 12, 1931. "Train pulling along slowly then with a sudden increase of speed throwing me off balance I struck elbow on window sill." "Acute bursitis over olecranon of left arm. Swelling occurred next morning following injury." Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $57.14; 83 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10961.-F. J. Pape, Sioux City, Iowa, freight brakeman, C. M. St. P. & P. Railway. Injured Nov. 11, 1931. "In order to prevent striking an automobile the Engineer had to apply the air brake in emergency, thereby shocking the train to the extent, that I was thrown to the caboose floor on my back. The shcck was so violent that it broke the truck sills and put the caboose off center. Also damaging two cars in the train." "Wrench of back, bruise & abrasions right arm and left leg." Disabled 4 days, $14.29; 74 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11015.-C. N. Buekalew, Little Rock, Ark., freight conductor, Mis- souri Pacific Railway. Injured Nov. 22, 1931. "Was standing on rear platform of caboose to catch orders when air hose bursted causing train to come to sudden stop throwing me against grab iron on rear of caboose." "Contusion to left chest, sixth to eighth ribs." Disabledi 1 week 5 days, $42.86; 77 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11031.-J. B. Hamill, Birmingham, Ala., freight conductor, South- ern Railway (A. G. S.). Injured Nov. 24, 1931. "Standing on rear of caboose entering Birmingham, Ala., yards in order to give stop signal when into clear. Train stopped suddenly due to an undesired emergency or excessive reduction in air-throwing me against side of caboose." "Concussion brain. Laceration of left cheek one inch in front of left ear. Bruise left upper extremity and shoulder, etc. Contusion palmar surface of hand." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71; 70 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11006.-F. T. Calhoun, New Cumberland, Pa., freight conductor, Pennsylvania Railroad. Injured Nov. 20, 1931. "My train of 97 empty cars was moving about 15 miles per hour train parted between first & second car wreck- ing train. I was on rear bumper of caboose, was thrown violently with my back against cabin car." "Contusion left side chest." Disabled 3 weeks 4 days, $53.57; 97 cars, 1 engine. 98 TRAIN LENGTHS CLAIM No. 10999.-R. M. Panman, Dauphin, Man., freight conductor, C. N. Railroad. Injured Nov. 12, 1931. "Avoiding hitting road drag and four-horse team on public road crossing, air brakes applied in emergency." "Left elbow left knee bruised and skinned." Disabled 5 days, $17.86; 81 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11115.-C. C. Bowen, Poplar Bluff, Mo., freight conductor, Mis- souri Pacific Railroad. Injured Dec. 17, 1931. "Train parted 10th car from engine, sudden stop of rear end threw me against door, head striking door and shoulder struck wash stand." "Fractured skull with concussion to brain. Contusion of right shoulder." Disabled 3 weeks 3 days, $85.71; 117 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11007.-I. W. Crookshanks, Hinton, W. Va., freight conductor, C. & O. Injured Nov. 17, 1931. "While pulling through Hinton yards at speed of 8 or 10 mi. per hour, air hose bursted on car of 150-car train, causing a sudden stop." "Contusion of back, shoulders and leg." Disabled 11 weeks 6 days, $177.86; 150 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11268.-E. M. Boyles, Minot, N. D., freight brakeman, Great Northern Railway. Injured Feb. 3, 1932. "Thrown against caboose stove from standing position account sudden and unexpected bunching of train." "Bruises knee." Disabled 5 days, $17.86; 82 ears, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11277.-B. F. Shannon, East Syracuse, N. Y., freight conductor, New York Central. Injured Feb. 3, 1932. "Standing on lower steps of caboose, engineer made emergency stop with the air brakes, throwing me from caboose to next track, striking on rail." "Bruises of hip, leg and face." Disabled 2 weeks 6 days, $42.86; 78 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11199.-A. C. Charette, Greenfield, Mass., freight conductor, Bos- ton & Maine Railroad. Injured Jan. 15, 1932. "Train parted, causing a sudden jolt and threw patient against desk. Strain of left knee. Fracture of rib." Disabled 6 weeks 2 days, $157.14; 138 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 11280.-G. H. Blunt, Auburn, Wash., freight conductor, Northern Pacific. Injured Feb. 4, 1932. "Section crew on main line with gas car, stalled in snow. Foreman came running around curve with red flag waving his arms and engineer made an emergency application of air brakes, throwing me against the wall of cupola of caboose." "Contusion and strain of right cervical region and laceration of. scalp." Disabled 3 weeks 3 days, $85.71; 74 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11340.-R. C. Saunders, El Reno, Okla., freight conductor, C., R. I. & P. Railway. "Rough stop on freight train. Knocked unconscious, 1/31/32." "Bruised and lacerated head, leg, and arm." Disabled 2 days, $7.14; 96 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 11093.-J. E. Hailey, Illmo, Mo., freight conductor, St. L. S. W. Railway Company. Injured Dec. 18, 1931. "Speed of train had been reduced to 5 or 6 mi. per hr. by use of independent brake and when coming to stop by use of automatic air brakes, went into emergency, throwing me against parti- tion in caboose with sufficient force to break leg." "Fracture of tibia and fibula-right." Disabled 10 weeks 5 days, $267.86; 97 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11321.-J. Haffey, Jackson, Miss., freight conductor, I. C. Rail- road. Injured Feb. 12, 1932. "Pulling grade 15 miles per hr. with 101 empty refgrs., engine and 2 cars broke off and slack in train demolished caboose." "Contusions and lacerations in general." Disabled 2 weeks 3 days, $60.71; 101 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10270.-E. T. Gilliland, Selma, Va., freight conductor, C. & O. Railway. Injured March 12, 1931. "Emergency application of air brakes, throwing me against end of caboose, 12 mi. per hr." "Laceration about scalp. exterior sprains and bruises of muscles of neck." Disabled 52 weeks, $1,300.00; 120 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11274.-H. C. Warner, Salamanca, N. Y., freight conductor, B. & O- Injured Feb. 3, 1932. "Had started out rear door of caboose when train stopped suddenly, throwing me against door casing." "Fractured ribs left side near sternum." Disabled 6 weeks 2 days, $157.14; 87 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11357.-H. G. Baxter, Durand, Mich., freight brakeman, Grand Trunk Western. Injured Feb. 20, 1932. "Train started up to a speed of 8- 10 mi. per hr. and then came to a sudden stop. I was sweeping caboose and was knocked down to floor on my back." "Sprained and bruised spine." Dis- abled 2 weeks 5 days, $67.86; 77 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11412.-A. B. Flanagan, Roanoke, Va., freight conductor, N. & W. Injured Jan. 6, 1932. "Engine pulled off from 99-car train, wrecking four or five cars, and throwing me against opopsite side of cupola." "Contusion of back TRAIN LENGTHS 99 and chest with fracture of ribs." Disabled 8 weeks 3 days, $210.71; 99 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11432.-J. W. Gaddy, Clifton Forge, Va., freight conductor, C. & O. Railway. Injured March 18, 1932. "Slack ran in train knocking me against end of caboose, knee striking grab iron." "Contusion of knee." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57; 135 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10333.-S. W. Vanstone, El Paso, Texas, freight conductor, S. P. Co. Injured April 5, 1931. "Was standing in caboose. Emergency appli- cation of air brakes threw me against store." "Spinal injury followed by partial paralysis." Disabled 52 weeks, $1,300.00; 71 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11401.-E. J. Davis, Greenfield, Mass., freight flagman, Boston & Maine. Injured March 12, 1932. "Engineer used emergency causing a severe shock on rear, throwing me against door." "Contused wound of chest." Dis- abled 2 weeks 4 days, $38.57; 79 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11436.-J. E. Batch, Ogden, Utah, freight brakeman Southern Pacific. Injured March 24, 1932. "Air hose broke about 6 or 7th car from head end, derailing the 42-48-44th cars from rear, causing emergency stop on rear end throwing me to floor of caboose, spraining my wrist, arm, and shoulder." Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $57.14; 119 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11457.-N. A. Perry, Ft. Wayne, Ind., freight flagman, N. Y. C. St. L. Injured March 20, 1932. "Rough stop of train, thrown against corner of cupola of caboose." "Fractured ribs, right side." Disabled 3 weeks 4 days, $89.29; 91 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11492.-F. U. Storms, East Syracuse, N. Y., freight brakeman, N. Y. C. Injured April 9, 1932. "Caboose demolished by pusher engine account sudden stop caused by burst air hose." "Laceration of forehead, neck, and leg, contusion of back." Disabled 8 weeks 3 days, $126.42; 130 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 11404.-E. A. Johnson, Hinton, W. Va., freight conductor, Chesa- peake & Ohio Railway. Injured March 6, 1932. "Emergency stop of train throwing me against arm rest of seat." "Laceration and severe contusion of left thigh and hip." Disabled 9 weeks 2 days, $232.14; 106 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11495.-. A. Cobb, Meridian, Miss., freight flagman, N. O. & N. E. division Southern Railway. Injured April 9, 1932. "Knocked down against stove in caboose when sudden severe stop was made." "Fracture of ribs and contusion of soft parts." Disabled 4 weeks 3 days, $110.71; 75 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 11525.-W. A. Giblin, Springfield, Ill., freight conductor, C. & I. M. Railway. Injured March 27, 1932. "Severe application of air threw me against desk." "Injury ribs and right side of abdomen." Disabled 7 weeks 3 days, $185.71; 72 cars, I engine. CLAIM No. 11531.-J. E. Clark, Brookfield, Mo., freight conductor, C. B. & Q. Railroad. Injured April 22, 1932. "Pulled draw bar out 2nd car from engine, stopping at station. Thrown against end rail on way car." "Fractured rib." Disabled. 5 weeks, $125.00: 91 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11541.-C. C. Barker, Raceland, Ky., freight conductor, Chesapeake & Ohio. Injured April 28, 1932. "Angle cock blew off 6th car from engine caus- ing emergency stop. I was seated in cupola and was thrown against arm rest." "Fractured ribs, contusion of kidney." Disabled 3 weeks, $75.00; 160 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11553.-W. E. Burnham, Toledo, Ohio, freight brakeman, M. C. Railroadompany & N. Y. C. Railroad. Injured May 5, 1932. "I was standing on rear platform coming into Warner yards when the slack of train ran up, throwing me against end of caboose, knocking me.down." "Fracture of femur; lacerations of forehead, face; injury to knee." Disabled 4 weeks 4 days, $68.57; 107 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11564.-fR. C. Saunders, El Reno, Okla., freight conductor, C. R. I. & P. Railway. Injured April 10, 1932. "Rough stop account train parted at slow speed." "Crushing injury to right chest, fracture of 6th, 7th & 8th ribs- bruises of body." Disabled 12 weeks 6 days, $321.43; 77 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11630 -W. H. Sehobey, Huntington, Ind., freight conductor; Erie Railroad. Injured May 28, 1932. "Train gave sudden jerk when I was on top, throwing me to the eround." "Sprain to back and contusion to right shoulder." Disabled 6 weeks. $90.00; 91 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11637.-W. J. Page, McComb, Miss., freight brakeman, I. C. Rail- road. Injured May 27, 1932. "Train parted and caused air to go on in emer- gency, knocking me from cupola." "Fracture of scapula and contusion of side." Disabled 4 weeks 4 days, $114.29; 76 ears, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11727.-G. H. Little, Houston, Texas, freight conductor, T. & N. O. Railroad. Injured June 27, 1932. "Pulling into yards, preparing to make final 100 TRAIN LENGTHS stop, air hose blew completely off from nipple, causing brakes to go into emer- gency and making violent stop. I was- writing at my desk in caboose and was thrown against stationery case, hitting left side of my head." "Contusion and laceration of face and fracture of supre orbital plate." Disabled 3 weeks, $75.00; 100 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11772.-J. P. O'Brien, Galesburg, Ill., freight conductor, Burlington Railroad. Injured July 10, 1932. "Was in way car when sudden stop was made throwing me down." "Contusion and abrasion of left patella." Disabled 1 week, $25.00; 92 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11651.-J. P. Mooney, Conneaut, Ohio, freight conductor, N. Y. C. & St. L. Railroad. Injured June 6, 1932. "Train parted 10 cars from engine causing me to be thrown." "Intercostal sprain right chest wall, axillary line." Disabled 7 weeks 1 day, $178.57; 110 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11751.-F. W. Jenks, Richmond, Va., freight conductor, C. & 0. Railway. Injured June 30, 1932. "Collision of train and light engine." "Head injury and shoulder bruised." Disabled 6 days, $21.43; 113 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11805.-M. G. Huff, Lafalette, La., freight conductor, Southern Pa- cific Railway, T. & N. O. Dist. Injured July 11, 1932. "While drifting into Echo yards, train parted 6 cars from engine ; was knocked out of my chair at desk and thrown against end of caboose." "Sprain of ankle, general contusions and bruises of body." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $39.29; 88 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11779.-J. E. Batch, Ogden, Utah, freight brakeman, Southern Pacific Railway. Injured July 13, 1932. "Sudden stop." "Fracture of right big toe." Disabled 3 weeks 1 day, $78.57; 125 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11815.-H. F. Sipe, Tracy, Calif., freight brakeman, Southern Pacific Railway. Injured July 10, 1932. "Knocked off caboose step account of rough stop." "Sprained right ankle and leg." Disabled 3 weeks, $45.00; 119 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11426.-H. J. Filkins, Mechanieville, N. Y., freight conductor, Boston & Maine. Injured March 21, 1932. "Broken defective coupler caused emergency application of the air brakes." "Fractured ribs, bruised back, torn cartilage." Disabled 20 weeks 1 day, $503.57; 126 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 11828.-E. 0. Giffin, Bridgeport, Ohio, freight flagman, B. & 0. Railroad Co. Injured July 24, 1932. "Bad air brake stop with 88 cars, which threw me in and against the door of caboose." "Dislocation of cartilage of left knee." Disabled 3 weeks 2 days, $82.14; 88 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11832.-V. E. Allen, Belen, N. M., freight brakeman, A. T. & S. F. Injured July 26, 1932. "Knocked off top of box car account sudden application of engine brakes, causing severe run in on rear of train." "Traumantic injury to shoulder." Disabled 3 weeks 6 days, $96.43; 110 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11725.-C. Graham, Columbus, Ohio, freight conductor, C. & 0. Injured June 21, 1932. "Emergency stop of train when towerman took crossing away from us at Big 4 Crossing, Delaware." "Fracture of left fibula." Disabled 10 weeks 1 day, $253.57; 160 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11921.-C. C. Reinscheld, Columbus, Ohio, freight flagman, Penn- sylvania Railroad. Injured Aug. 20, 1932. "Was going west with 125 empty hoppers when engine broke eccentric strap and engineer went into emergency with air." "Contusion and sprain of back ; contusions of body." Disabled 4 days, $14.29; 126 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11881.-W. N. Phillips, Putnam, Conn., freight conductor, N. Y. N. H. & H. Railroad. Injured Aug. 13, 1932. "Sudden stop of train." "Sprain of right ankle." Disabled 3 weeks 3 days, $85.71; 121 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11994.-F. N. Gelbaugh, Sunbury, Pa., freight conductor, Pennsyl- vania Railroad. Injured Aug. 31, 1932. "Rough stop of train, throwing me against side wall of cabin car." "Infected wound over right eye." Disabled 2 weeks, $30.00; 104 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 10784.-H. B. Robinson, Memphis, Tenn., freight conductor, Y. M. V. Railroad. Injured Sept. 9, 1931. "Train broke in two coming to sudden stop." "Injury to spine and head." Paid 52 weeks, $1,300.00; 90 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11544.-C. T. Washburn, Indianapolis, Ind., freight conductor, Pennsylvania Railroad. Injured April 28, 1932. "Train broke in two throwing me against table with brakeman on top of me." "Fractured ribs, severe con- tusion of abdomen." Disabled 20 weeks 5 days, $517.86; 101 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11988.-R. M. Mercier, McComb, Miss., freight conductor, I. C. Railroad. Injured Sept. 6, 1932. "Air hose bursted and threw me against wall of caboose account sudden stop of train." "Contusion and laceration to face, neck, and shoulder, and right knee." Disabled 2 weeks 6 days, $71.43; 109 cars, 1 engine. TRAIN LENGTHS 101 CLAIM No. 12018.-J. F. Sahloff, Albany, N. Y., freight flagman, N. Y. C. Injured Sept. 10, 1932. "Train made a bad stop account of hitting truck at crossing, throwing me backward the length of caboose." "Injuries to hip, back, and leg." Disabled 1 week 5 days, $25.71; 70 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 11985-J. Haffey, Jackson, Miss., freight conductor, I. C. Rail- road. Injured Sept. S, 1932. "Air hose burst ; slack ran up knocking me down." "Contused-laceration to head, shoulder, and hand." Disabled 4 weeks 4 days, $114.29; 127 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11055.-W. Nicholson, Salt Lake City, Utah, freight conductor, D. R. G. W. Injured Dec. 2, 1931. "Train broke in two, and I was thrown against the corner of desk in caboose." "Injury to left elbow and hip." Dis- abled 45 weeks 3 days, $1,135.71; 84 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12219.-J. C. Mercer, Portsmouth, Ohio, freight conductor, N. & W. Railway Company. Injured Nov. 16, 1932. "Was sitting on rear of enb and train made sudden stop." "Cut over eye, contusion of forehead, and sprain of neck." Disabled 2 days, $7.14; 84 cars. 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12121.-W. S. Rhodes, Meadville, Pa., freight conductor, Erie Rail- way. Injured Oct. 12, 1932. "Slack in train ran together and threw me on caboose floor." "Fracture of left wrist." Disabled 8 weeks 1 day, $84.85; 135 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 12226.-H. R. Hershey, Denison, Texas, freight conductor, M. K. T. Injured Nov. 15, 1932. "As I was getting down from cupola engineer set air on 75 cars, throwing me against corner of washstand, injuring back." "Bruise and sprain of back." Disabled 3 weeks 6 days, $96.43; 75 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12288.-S. Hartzel, Alliance, Ohio, freight conductor, Pennsyl- vania Railroad. Injured Dec. 2, 1932. "Sudden stop in Conway Yards." "Sprain of left lower lumbar muscle." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $23.57; 82 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12225.-H. L. Hackley, Monroe, La., freight conductor, Missouri Pacific Railway. Injured Nov. 17, 1932. "Train running about 20 mi. per hr., train Itarted, second car from engine, causing brakes to go into emergency, stopping train suddenly, knocking me down in caboose." "Sprain of right wrist and elbow." Disabled 1 week, $25.00; 82 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11726.-A. A. Haggard, Herington, Kan., freight brakeman, C. R. I. & P. Injured June 29, 1932. "Train broke in two, throwing me against front of cupola." "Sprained back, wrenched knee, with probable injury to semilunar cartilage." Disabled 25 weeks 6 days, $943.43; 120 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11104.-L. F. Kash, Latonia, Ky., freight conductor, L. & N. In- jured Dec. 20, 1931. "Was standing upon rear platform of caboose when brakes went into emergency, throwing me to ground." "Fracture of pelvis." Disabled 52 weeks, $1,300.00; 100 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11819.-J. J. Corvin, Roseville, Calif., freight conductor, Southern Pacific Company. Injured July 21, 1932. "1 was in caboose and was thrown vio- lently to the floor by sudden stop of train." "Contusion and ruptured ligaments of shoulder and arm." Disabled 23 weeks 2 days, $582.14; 101 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12284.-W. C. French, Denver, Colo., freight brakeman, Santa Fe. Injured Dec. 3, 1932. "Pulling into Pueblo yard, engineer made emergency stop to avoid striking cars on lead. I was on top of caboose." "Jammed right arm into shoulder-right shoulder sprain." Disabled 4 weeks 4 days, $114.29; 74 cars, I engine. CLAIM No. 12059.-S. Pearson, Fitchburg, Mass., frieght conductor, Boston '& Maine. Injured Sept. 27, 1932. "Proceeding up grade, about 25 mi. per hr., broke apart between the 11th and 12th head cars, emergency stop throwing me up against end of caboose." "Contusion and strain of back, hip and thigh." Disabled 15 weeks, $225.00; 122 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 12358.-J. J. Madigan, Carbondale, Pa., freight and passenger con- ductor, Erie Railroad. Injured Dec. 16, 1932. "Pulling in yard when rear end of train got into clear, I was putting the bolt on rear door of baggage car when engineer got signal at head end from yardmaster to stop. He applied air, throwing me to head end of car to floor." "Severe strain and contusion of muscles of neck, back, hips, and legs." Disabled 3 weeks, $75.00; 102 ears, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12348.-3. L. Barker, Dupo, Ill., freight conductor, Missouri Pacife Railroad. Injured Dec. 16, 1932. "Going out rear door of caboose to drop a fuse against overdue following train, slack ran out of my own train, jerking me off balance. In catching for support, I caught door casing just as caboose door was slammed shut by jerk of train." "Fracture of distal end of third finger, right hand." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days, $107.14; 78 cars, 1 engine. 102 TRAIN LENGTHS CLAIM No. 11363.-P. H. Smith, Portland, Me., freight conductor, Boston & Maine. Injured Nov. 29, 1931. "Hauling into yard, had on train 89 cars, pony trucks under engine, took track 5 and driving wheels took track 6. Engineman applied emergency brake as engine was leaning over badly, causing sudden stop and throwing me around car." "Injury to right shoulder and head." Dis- abled 15 weeks, $375.00; 89 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12136.-J. E. Powell, Martinsburg, W. Va., freight flagman, B. & O. Railroad. Injured Oct. 17, 1932. "Train parted causing me to fall against end of caboose." "Fractured ribs, bruised elbow and hip." Disabled 15 weeks, $375.00; 123 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12444.-J. E. Graves, Covington, Ky., freight conductor, L. & N. Railroad. Injured Jan. 7, 1933. "Sudden stop of freight train." "Severe cuts and bruises of head." Disabled 4 weeks 3 days, $66.42; 99 cars, I engine. CLAIM No. 12580-J. E. Utter, Mayfield, Pa., freight conductor, N. Y. O. & W. Injured Feb. 11, 1933. "Pony wheels on engine jumped tracks, engineer made quick application of air, causing train to stop suddenly." "Skin brush of left cheek punctured wound upper lid of left eye." Disabled 1 week 2 days, $19.28; 83 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12579.-H. E. Hatten, Portsmouth, Ohio, freight conductor, N. W. Railroad. Injured Feb. 11, 1933. "Hard stop of train ; slid forward in seat shoving feet back against body." "Injury to knee." Disabled 4 days, $14.29; 148 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12518.-P. J. Keefe, Rutland, Vt., freight conductor, Rutland Railroad. Injured Jan. 27, 1933. "Emergency stop of train, throwing me against door of van." "Acute Sacro Iliac strain." Disabled 4 weeks 4 days, $114.29; 82 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 11215.-J. D. Moore, Gold Bar, Wash., freight brakeman, Great Northern. Injured Jan. 16, 1932. "Was setting at table in cab making out reports. Pulled draw bar about 12 cars from head end causing instant stop of cab, throwing me against table." "Fractured ribs and general injuries." Dis- abled 52 weeks, $1,300.00; 100 cars, 5 engines (Elec. Motors). CLAIM No. 12517.-J. S. Diamond, Portola, Calif., freight brakeman, Western Pacific. Injured Jan. 12, 1933. "After turning markers on rear of caboose, train came to sudden stop, throwing me off rear end of caboose." "Contusion right side over groin." Disabled 5 weeks 5 days, $142.86; 74 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12621.-G. W. Jones, Harvey, Ill., freight conductor, I. C. Injured Feb. 20, 1933. "Engine broke off from train causing brakes to set in emergency throwing over desk to front end of caboose." "Bruises and contusions left abdomen and left thigh." Disabled 2 days, $7.14; 94 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12614.--F. W. Allain, Chicago, Ill., freight brakeman, Illinois Cen- tral Railroad. Injured Feb. 20, 1933. "Train parted while moving about 15 miles -per hour, rear end running into head end. Train parted account of high and low draw bar.'' "Scalp wound, right parietal bone, lacerated right elbow and forearm, contusion muscles right side." Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $53.57; 94 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12651.-R. P. Christian, New Haven. Conn., freight conductor, N. Y. N. H. & H. Railway. Injured Feb. 2, 1933. "Train made a sudden stop and was thrown to the other end of caboose and struck on my heel." "Con- tusion left foot." Disabled 1 week, $25.00; 87 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12689.-J. S. Padon, Mineola, Texas., freight conductor, Texas & Pacific. Injured March 12, 1933. "Sudden stop of train threw me off caboose." "Contusion and sprain to left shoulder and left side chest-brush burned left wrist." Disabled 3 weeks 1 day, $78.57; 87 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12705-L. W. Gills, Richmond, Va., freight conductor, R.' F. & P. Railroad. Injured March 17, 1933. "Train slack being jerked out and thrown against table in cab." "Right leg bruishes between knee and hip." Disabled I week 6 days, $46.43; 72 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12542.-J. G. Kelley, Conneaut, Ohio, freight conductor, N. Y. C. St. L. Injured Feb. 6, 1933. "Emergency application of air threw me against door of caboose." "Dislocated shoulder, right." Disabled 8 weeks 2 days, $207.14; 81 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12785.-W. Rehbock, Savanna, Ill., freight conductor, C. N. St. P. P. Injured April 8, 1933. "Thrown from seat in caboose to the floor, bruised ligaments about right knee." Disabled 1 week, $25.00; 70 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 12751.-P. J. Clark, Pittston, Pa., freight conductor, Lehigh Valley Railroad. Injured April 1, 1933. "87 mty. cars 2 engines on head end broke in two, account of couplers slipped over putting brakes into emergency." "Right leg injured.", Disabled 3 weeks 2 days, $82.14; 87 cars, 2 engines. TRAIN LENGTHS 103 CLAIM No. 12829.-C. C. Patterson, Osawatomie, Kans., freight conductor, Missouri Pacific Railway. Injured April 30, 1933. "Was knocked down in ca- boose making stop for water." "Sprain of left hand. contusions of ligaments." Disabled 4 days, $8.57; 70 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12819.-G. W. Miller, El Reno, Okla., freight conductor, C. R. I. & P. Railway. Injured April 25, 1933. "Passing through car, severe appliance of air threw me out of door to platform striking brake wheel." "Bruised chest and side, fracturing two ribs." Disabled 3 weeks, $31.26; 82 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12850.-E. C. Buckminster, Dupo, Ill., freight conductor, Missouri Pacific Railway. Injured May 5, 1933. "Engineer applied air in emergency, knocking me down on floor of caboose." "Injured back, right elbow and right shoulder." Disabled 1 week, 3 days, $35.71; 107 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12822.-G. Ostrander, Port Jervis, N. Y., freight conductor, Erie Railroad Company. Injured April 28, 1933. "Train was running about 30 miles per hour, when draw head slipped by between four and five cars from Eng., throwing me on stove and burning face and left arm and cutting head open near left eye." Disabled 3 weeks, 3 days, $85.71; 110 cars; 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12837.-W. A. Wheeler, Los Angeles, Calif., freight brakeman, Southern Pacific Railway. Injured April 30, 1933. "Standing on top of caboose when train stopped suddenly causing me to be thrown in air, landing on my face." "Nose broken, head and face badly bruised." Disabled 6 weeks. 2 days, $157.14; 99 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12923.-P. Barnes, Hartford, Conn., freight conductor, N. Y., N. H. & H. Injured May 7, 1933. "Engineer was applying brakes, throwing me across cupola and hit iron bar on south side of cupola on right side of body. Right side hurt and bruised including ribs and muscles of ribs." Disabled 1 week, 2 days, $32.14; 97 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12915.-F. C. Murphy, Garrett, Ind., freight conductor, Baltimore & Ohio. Injured May 26, 1933. "Air hose burst on 7th car from engine, causing an emergency stop of train which threw me against rear of caboose. Was jerked loose from hold which caused finger to be torn." "Right side of body bruised and straired." Disabled 3 weeks, 6 days, $96.43; 99 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12984.--W. T. Taylor, Salt Lake City, Utah, freight conductor, Western Pacific Railroad. Injured June 17, 1933. "Branch pipe broke off, causing an emergency stop, breaking knuckle in train." "Thrown and struck left hand, shoulder badly bruised and sprained." Disabled 2 weeks, $50.00: 70 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 12971.-F. W. Jackson, Parksville, Ky., freight flagman, L. & N. Railroad Company. Injured June 14, 1933. "Engineer applied brakes knocking me against end of caboose and injuring me." "Sprained right knee and com- plications." Disabled 1 week, 6 days, $27.86; 82 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 13008.-W. E. Cofer, Mineola, Texas, freight conductor, Texas & Pacific Railway. Injured June 24, 1933. "Heading out of sidetrack with 80 cars engr. applied air in emergency knocking me down against end of caboose." "Left shoulder injured account knocked down against end of caboose." Dis- abled 3 weeks, 1 day, $78.57; 80 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12952.-C. Workman, Cuba, Mo., freight conductor, Missouri Pa- cific. Injured June 7, 1933. "Train of 174 cars broke in two making a rough stop, throwing me out of cupola." "Three broken ribs." Disabled 6 weeks, 1 day, $153.57; 174 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13071.-C. D. Stinnett, Mineola, Texas, freight brakeman, Texas & Pacific Railway Company. Injured June 24, 1933. "Was standing on rear end of caboose when engineer made emergency application of air, throwing me against grab iron." Ribs broken loose from breastbone, left side." Disabled O weeks, $125.00; 80 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13036.-W. J. May, Sparks, Nev., freight conductor, Southern Pacific Company. Injured June 22, 1933. "Entering rear door of caboose on rear of freight train and when about to sit down at desk air hose blew off coupler on head end of train resulting in severe slack action. I was thrown head on against the partition under cupola and rendered completely unconscious by the impact." "Wound in forehead, upper lip cut, nose bruised, right thumb sprained." Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $32.14; 74 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12961.-R. C. Groves, Decatur, Ill., freight conductor, Wabash. Injured June 11, 1933. "Knocked down in caboose when engine broke off from tral nof 113 cars, speed 15 to 20 miles per hour." "Broken left collar bone." Disabled 8 weeks, $200.00; 113 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13066.-W. S. Rhodes, Meadville, Pa., freight conductor, Erie Rail- Way Company. Injured July 9. 1933. "A lamp was torn from caboose wall and 1.04 TRAIN LENGTHS fell on my arm when the brake pipe on third head car broke and stopped train suddenly." "Cut in left forearm." Disabled 2 weeks 4 days, $64.29; 121 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13089.-J. R. May, Ashland, Ky., freight conductor, C. & O. In- jured July 12, 1933. "Was conductor on test train-a test of new equipment brakes was made in emergency, stopping with such force shoving me forward in the cupola of caboose, injuring my left leg." "Left knee and hip stoved." Dis- abled 1 week, $15.00; 160 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13095-L. L. Lyne, Herington, Kan., freight conduretor, C. R. I. & P. Railway. Injured July 19, 1933. "Sitting in cupola and knocked out onto flour when air hose bursted." "Sprained ankle, wrist and knee, hip, neck, and body bruises." Disabled 2 weeks 6 days, $11.43; 126 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13083.-P. O'Shea, Hornell, N. Y., freight flagman, Erie Railroad. Injured July 11, 1933. "Went to rear end of caboose to inspect markers, as I stepped out on platform and in line with brake wheel engine took slack out of train, jerking me against brake wheel causing bad bruise in chest." Disabled 3 weeks, $45.00; 116 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13117.-F. T. McKennett, Minot, N. Dak., freight conductor, Great Northern Railroad Company. Injured July 24, 1933. "Slipping on wet floor of caboose and slack in train of 92 cars running out going through sag in track reaching for drink of water." "Bad strain in lower portion of back." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71; 92 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13241.-J. E. Batch, Ogden, Utah, freight brakeman, Southern Pacific Railroad. Injured Sept. 4, 1933. "While stopping at Lakeside to set out car hard run in on rear of train, knocking me to floor hitting back and side on steps to cupola." "Bruises of left side and back." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $39.29; 126 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 12756.-E. F. Rettig, Garrett, Ind., freight conductor, B. & 0. Railroad. Injured April 1, 1933. "Train parted between 5th and 6th cars from engine. Was thrown against table in caboose and back under sink. Sink jolted from wall & striking me on back of neck and head." "Sprained back and chest. 6th rib left side fractured and 8th rib on right side fractured and back of neck & back injured." Disabled 23 weeks 3 days, $585.71; 113 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 13010.-J. Dapprich, Dearborn, Mich., freight conductor, M. C. Railroad. Injured June 10, 1933. "Was thrown on back of head and shoulder, injuring my spine and shoulder while sitting at my desk, and train was started, tipping me over backward, landing on my head and shoulder." Disabled 13 weeks 2 days, $221.34; 100 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13201.-C. L. Montgomery, Rawlins, Wyo., freight conductor, Union Pacific Railway. Injured Aug. 25, 1933. "Standing on caboose platform, made a rough stop, throwing me against ladder on end of caboose, fracturing left arm." "Fracture of bone, left arm." Disabled 4 weeks 4 days, $114.29; 88 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13270.-D. F. Boyer, Indianapolis, Ind., freight conductor, 13-4 Railroad. Injured Sept. 14, 1933. "In starting the train rough, my hand was jerked loose from back rest of cupola in caboose, forcing my hand through glass window in cupola." "Knuckle to finger on right hand cut and back of hand pierced with small slivers of glass." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71; 88 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13821.-T. F. Martin, Council Bluffs, Iowa, freight conductor, Illinois Central. Injured Sept. 15, 1933. "Train stopped suddenly, throwing patient against end of caboose. Sprained back, laceration external lateral ligament, right ankle, contusion external surface, distal end right femur." Disabled 1 week 2 days, $32.14; 82 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13267.-H. E. Thayer, Columbus, Ohio, freight conductor, N. Y. C. Railroad. Injured Sept. 15, 1933. "Was sitting in cupola and some train rider stepped on operating parting train, causing air to go into emergency, this was done while was in motion at a speed of about 5 miles per hour." "Right ankle stove." Disabled 3 weeks 3 days, $85.71; 100 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13252-P. M. Rowe, Everett, Wash., freight conductor, Great Northern. Injured Sept. 2, 1933. "Train moving 10 to 12 miles per hour lp 1% grade when air hose came uncoupled between 2nd and 3rd eng., causing sudden stop, throwing me against edge of table with left side. 3 engines coupled on head end, 2 coupled 50 cars back." "Broken rib left side and badly bruised." Disabled 4 weeks, $100.00; 100 cars, 5 engines. CLAIM No. 13303.-C. H. Streator, Grand Island, Neb., freight conductor, Union Pacific. Injured Sept. 18, 1933. "Engineer applied emergency air throw- TRAIN LENGTHS 105 ijg me in caboose, wrenched neck & back, injured muscles in calf of right leg.' Disabled 3 days, $10.71; 81 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 1331.-H. L. Thomas, Havre, Mont., freight conductor, Great Northern. Injured Sept. 25, 1933. "Knocked down in caboose when train parted near head end, causing violent stop on rear end." "Face cut, and shoulder bruised." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57; 100 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13226.-C. L. Carmichael, Des Moines, Iowa, freight conductor, C. G. W. Injured Sept. 1, 1933. "Train was heading in on siding and engine trucks derailed ; engineer applied air brakes in emergency. I was at desk in caboose and the impact threw me against end of caboose." "Broken ribs and back hurt." Disabled 5 weeks 4 days, $139.29; 84 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13338.-E. J. Varnadoe, Glenns Ferry, Idaho, freight conductor, Union Pacific Company 0. S. L. Railway. Injured Sept. 25, 1933. "Sitting at desk in caboose emergency application of air throwing me against desk." "Broken rib sprained shoulder and back." Disabled 4 weeks 3 days, $110.71; 75 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13393.-R. E. Norton, Pasco, Wash., freight brakeman, Northern Pacific. Injured Oct. 12, 1933. "Thrown against cupola window account of train derailment." "Cut under left eye." Disabled 1 week, $25.00; 83 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13211.-L. F. Kash, Latonia, Ky., freight conductor, L. & N. Injured Aug. 28, 1933. "Bursted air hose, train stopping suddenly threw me against cupola of caboose." "Strain of left hip and knee." Disabled 9 weeks 1 day, $228.57; 100 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 13428.-G. A. Trost, Cumberland, Md., freight conductor, B. & 0. Railroad Company. Injured Oct, 27, 1933. "Engineer made emergency stop knocking me against door of caboose causing badly bruised side." Disabled 6 days, $21.43; 84 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13437.-D. E. Young, Binghamton, N. Y., freight conductor, Dela- ware & Hudson Corp. Injured Oct. 28, 1933. "Standing in caboose putting on coat, coming into Oneonta, 2 engines on lead 88 mixed loads and mtys. in train, engineer slowed train and released brakes. Slack running out threw me to floor and to the end of caboose. Landing on left arm and shoulder." "Sprained muscles and ligaments left shoulder, left arm, and neck." Disabled 2 weeks 4 days, $64.29; 88 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 13290.-E. T. Griffith, Bellefontaine, Ohio, freight brakeman, C. C. C. & T. L. Railway. Injured Aug. 14, 1933. "Was knocked down in caboose when train came to sudden stop." "Traumatic condition of 3rd and 4th vertebrae." Disabled 13 weeks, $325.00; 115 cars, 1 engine. .CLAIM No. 13447.-F. J. Ilofmeier, Covington, Ky., freight conductor, C. & 0. Railroad. Injured Nov. 5, 1933. "Bursted air hose on 2nd car from engine threw me hard against back end of caboose." "1 rib broken and back sprained." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days, $64.28; 133 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13501.-F. E. Vedder, Los Angeles, Calif., freight conductor, Southern Pacific Railroad. Injured Nov. 20, 1933. "Injury resulted from a broken train line." "Minor cuts and bruises together with severe shock to left shoulder." Disabled 3 weeks, $75.00; 71 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13297.-0. . Croonquist; Biggar, Sask., Canada, freight conductor, Canadian National Railway. Injured Sept. 19, 1933. "Engineer applied air in emergency, impact of blow threw me, and knee struck bunk or steel bed spring, causing injury to knee." "Knee injured." Disabled 11 weeks 3 days, $285.71; 101 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13540.-T. C. Noerr, Punxsutawney, Pa., freight brakeman. Balti- more & Ohio Railway. Injured Nov. 30, 1933. "Went out on rear platform of caboose, when air went on in emergency threw me to floor of cab causing the disability." "Sprained back bruised hip left side laceration on left arm." Dis- abled 2 weeks 1 day, $32.14; 96 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13553.-J. E. Frawley, Pueblo, Colo., freight conductor, D. & R. G. W. Railway. Injured Dec. 1, 1933. "Was sitting at desk making out reports- and train parted between 1st and 2nd car from engine causing sudden stop." "Bruised shoulder." Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $34.28; 74 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13558.-R. A. McBurney, Cranbrook, B. C., freight conductor,. C. P. R. Injured Dec. 3, 1933. "Knocked against coal box table when an emergency stop of train was made to avoid hitting stock on the track." "Badly' bruised left arm." Disabled 2 weeks 5 days, $67.86; 78 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13580.-C. L. Bush, Portsmouth, Ohio, freight brakeman, N. & W. Railway. Injured Dec. 14, 1933. "Engineer made an emergency stop 106 TRAIN LENGTHS pulling in yard, to avoid a collision with hand or push car." "Injuries to head, neck, and back." Disabled 1 week 6 days, $27.86; 97 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13413.-F. F. Lyons, Lyons, Colo., freight brakeman, D. & R. G. W. Railroad. Injured Oct. 23, 1933. "Big Maley, Eng., starting train when slack had run up, the sudden jerk of the caboose threw me against side of cupola down on floor." "Sprained right ankle and torn ligaments right leg." Disabled 11 weeks 3 days, $171.42; 89 cars, 1 engine. . CLAIM No. 13647.-J. T. Richardson, Meridian, Miss., freight conductor, M. & 0. Railway. Injured Dee. 20, 1933. "Pulling out of yard when 'engineer stopped to line up switch and when he started train, jerked me off of back end of cab, throwing me on my head, striking rail with head, shoulder, and leg." "Bruises and abrasions." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71; 73 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13671.-B. W. McVay, Brownsville, Pa., freight conductor, Mo- nongahela Railroad. Injured Jan. 6, 1934. "Sudden stop of train caused by car next to engine coming uncoupled and I was thrown out of cockpit of caboose to floor." "Contusion of head and back." Disabled 2 weeks, $30.00; 110 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13704.-E. Bowers, Illmo, Mo., freight conductor, St. L. S. W. Railroad. Injured Jan. 15, 1934. "We had two engines, a double-header, and front engine broke off, knocking me against front end of caboose and desk." "Bruises to left side of chest and left arm." Disabled 2 weeks, $30.00; 84 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 13711.-G. A. Zetty, South Brownsville, Pa., freight flagman, Monongahela Railway. Injured Jan. 6, 1934. "Engine broke off from train, causing sudden stop." "Brush burn of left eye, contusion and sprain of neck and back." Disabled 2 weeks, $30,00; 110 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13661.-A. H. Hargadine, Havre, Mont., freight conductor. Great Northern Railway. Injured Jan. 1, 1934. "Up in cupola when train broke in two, running 15 miles per hour up hill, defetive knuckle causing train to break in two, causing injury." "Severe wrench and sprain with swelling of right leg and foot." Disabled 5 weeks 6 days. $146.43; 79 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13538.-W. H. Saunders, McKees Rocks, Pa., freight flagman, P. & L. E. Railroad. Injured Nov. 28, 1933. "I was thrown out of cupola of caboose while making a sudden stop." "Contusion of body, fracture of rib, marked bronchial irritation." Disabled 9 weeks 1 day, $228.57; 116 cars. 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13816.-P. B. Shepard, Lincoln, Nebr., freight conductor. C. B. & Q. Injured Feb. 17, 1934. "I was on rear platform of caboose and train made hard stop and I was thrown against end of car." "Contusion of left shoulder and thigh." Disabled 2 weeks 6 days, $71.43; 77 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13864.-F. Hanlin, Osawatomie, Kans., freight conductor, Mis- souri Pacific. Injured March 1, 1934. "Draw bars slipped by between engine and head car, causing train to stop suddenly." "Bruised muscles and contu- sion of scalp; sprained right ankle." Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $57.14; 76 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13633.-G. R. Mount, Harrisburg, Pa., freight conductor, Penn- sylvania Railroad. Injured Dec. 27, 1933. "Air brakes applied in emergency, causing broken train lines on the 47th and 67th cars." "Dislocated shoulder, contusion of spine, and laceration of head and ear." Disabled 12 weeks 1 day, $182.14; 95 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13973.-W. B. Latshaw, Alliance, Ohio, freight conductor, Pennsyl- vania Railroad. Injured April 7, 1934. "Air hose between engine and 1st car bursted, knocking me against desk in cabin car." "Severe contusion of chest with possible fractured ribs." Disabled 1 week, $25.00:72 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13871.--A. B. Flanagan, Roanoke, Va., freight conductor, Norfolk & Western Railway Company. Injured March 4, 1934. "Train parted second car from engine, causing emergency stop with 88 cars. Was thrown from rear of cab to the front end." "Fractured elbow in left arm with contusions to side." Disabled 6 weeks 5 days, $167.86; 88 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13911.-G. I. Phillips, Big Spring, Texas, freight conductor, Texas & Pacific: Injured March 21, 1934. "Engineer making stop and start of train threw me out back door of cabin." "Sprained ankle." Disabled 4 weeks, $100.00; 80 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13934.-E. A. Johnson, Hinton, W. Va., freight conductor, C. & 0. Railway. Injured March 26, 1934. "Train ran into a slide causing an emer- gency stop, knocking me from cupola of caboose." "Sprain and bruise right knee." Disabled 4 weeks 3 days, $110.71; 121 cars, 1 engine. TRAIN LENGTHS 107 CLAIM No. 13964.-H. C. Warner, Salamanca, N. Y., freight conductor, B. & O. Railway. Injured April 11, 1934. "Train broke in two." "Laceration over right eye." Disabled 1 week 5 days, $42.86; 89 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13983.-W. L. Smith, Des Moines, Iowa, freight brakeman, C. G. W. Railway. Injured April 17, 1934. "Getting down from cupola slack ran in throwing me against seat on opposite side." "Fractured 2 ribs on left side with severe contusions same area." Disabled 3 weeks 3 days, $85.71; 77 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14004.-M. Barrett, Chicago, Ill., freight brakeman, C. & N. W. Railway. Injured April 23, 1934. "Thrown to floor of way car by severe run in of slack caused by train control setting brakes." "Injury to dorsal region." Disabled 2 weeks 5 days, $67.86. 80 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14040.-W. B. Maness, Corbin, Ky., freight flagman, L. & N. Injured April 14, 1934. "Rough stop while train in motion, knocked over end of bunk in caboose." "Severe bruise to right hip, side and back." Disabled 3 weeks 5 days, $55.71; 90 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13896.-J. McCarrick, Columbus, Ohio, freight conductor, Pennsyl- vania Railroad. Injured March 17, 1934. "Train running at speed of 15 mi. per hr. rounding a curve, ran on to a stop block signal engineer put air in emergency causing sudden stop, throwing me from east end of cabin to west end." "Con- tusion and fracture left hand." Disabled 8 weeks 2 days, $207.14; 125 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14082.-A. G. Lillman, Dupo, Ill., freight conductor, Missouri Pacific Railway. Injured May 4, 1934. "Trespasser cut train in two with foot pin lifter, when trained slowed down to enter yards and when engineer started engine, train parted 18th car from engine." "Contusion to back, lumbar region." Disabled 2 weeks 4 days, $64.29; 70 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14008.-T. W. Weldon, Columbus, Ohio, freight conductor, C. & 0. Railroad. Injured April 26, 1934. "Bursted air hose 15 cars back of engine." "Severe contusion of right leg." Disabled 9 weeks 4 days, $239.29; 160 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14110.-C. T. Sloope, Memphis, Tenn., freight conductor, I. C. Railroati. Injured June 5, 1934. "Train separated near head end of train, knocking me down against stove in caboose." "Lacerations of right side of face, contusion of chest and legs." Disabled 2 weeks 3 days, $60.71; 85 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14140.-G. F. Reynolds, Big Spring, Texas, freight conductor, Texas & Pacific Railroad. Injured June 19, 1934. "Sudden start of train." "Strain of the chest lower fibers of the Pectoralis major muscle." Disabled 2 lays, $7.14; 80 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14095.-S. Gates, El Paso, Texas, freight conductor, S. P. Rail- road. Injured May 22, 1934. "Making 40 M.P.H., air hose blew off of 5th car from head end, broke knuckle in 60th car from head end. Train stopped in 300 feet. Threw me against end of caboose." "Injury to ribs and left chest." Disabled 5 weeks 1 day, $128.57; 104 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14138-J. L. Comer, Hagerstown, Md., freight flagman, W. M. Railroad. Injured June 21, 1934. "Vent valve came open, causing air to go down into eniergency, throwing conductor and myself against locker and caus- ing injury to both of us." "Lacerations left knee-contusion top of head." Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $32.14; 99 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13866.-A. Leverington, St. Louis, Mo., freight conductor, Mis- souri Pacific Railroad. Injured March 3, 1934. "Train parted and was thrown from cupola to floor of caboose." "Contusion to shoulder and cervical region. Slight fracture of skull in fronto-parietal region." Disabled 18 weeks 3 days, $276.42; 150 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 14169-W. E. Fleck, Russell, Ky., freight conductor, C. & O. Railway. Injured June 30, 1934. "Train pipe on head broke off, causing emergency stop." "Strained muscles in calf of leg and ankle." Disabled 1 Week 5 days, $42.86 ; 160 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14208.-W. W. Thomason, Williamson, W. Va., freight conduc- tor, N. & W. Railway. Injured July 7, 1934. "Train stopped suddenly, throw- ing me against side of gondola." "Contusion of left side over lower ribs, abra- sion of left thigh, leg, and forearm." Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $53.57; 90 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14198.-V. B. Young, Ft. Madison, Iowa, freight conductor, A. T. S. F. Railroad. Injured July 7, 1934. "Sudden stop threw me off rear end way car." Contusion right hip and painful swollen right knee." Disabled 3 weeks 2 days, $82.14; 114 cars, 1 engine. 108 TRAIN LENGTHS CLAIM No. 14052.-W. E. Dunn, Portsmouth, Ohio, freight conductor, N. & W. Railway. Injured May 19, 1934. "Caused by air hose bursting on a 93-car train at a speed of about 10 mi. per hr." "Fracture of head of right radius and torn ligaments about right elbow. Bone injury diagnosed by X-ray." Disabled 11 weeks, $275.00; 93 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14104.-H. H. Dickerson, Roanoke, Va., freight conductor, N. & W. Railway. Injured May 30, 1934. "Thrown against stove when train was stop- ping. at a water tank." "Fractured left clavicle, severe contusion with hema- toma formation and discoloration about left shoulder. Contusion with discolora- tion dorsal surface, right arm, midway between elbow and shoulder ; fracture of olecranon process, left elbow. Low-grade concussion of brain." Disabled 11 weeks 2 days, $282.14; 82 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14246.-H. Kemp, Pueblo, Colo., freight conductor, D. & R. G. W. Railroad. Injured July 28, 1934. "Sitting at desk in caboose-slack ran heavy. Knocked against side of caboose." "Lacerations above left eye, general body contusions." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71; 106 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 14238.-W. N. Phillips, Putnam, Conn., freight conductor, N. Y. & N. H. & H. Railway. Injured July 28, 1934. "Emergency stop of train." "Bruises and contusions over right 7th and 8th ribs." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days, $107.14; 104 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14306.-J. Z. See, Portsmouth, Ohio, freight brakeman, N. & W. Railway. Injured Aug. 23, 1934. "Emergency stop, bursted air hose. I was riding in cupola of caboose and head struck roof of cupola forcing my head and neck down in shoulders." "Contusion of head, strained neck." Disabled 1 week 6 days, $46.43; 150 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14342.-J. C. Reynolds, Mandan, N. D., freight conductor, N. P. Road. Injured Sept. 8, 1934. "When stopping at coal dock at Glen Ullen to take coal, engineer just started- to set automatic air when air went into emergency, knocking me from caboose platform to ground." "Bruise right upper arm and right chest, also right forearm." Disabled 1 week, $25.00; 94 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14248.-G. H. Replogle, Toledo, Ohio, passenger and freight con- ductor, N. Y. C. Injured July 31, 1934. "Emergency stop. Contusion ldft knee with comminuted fracture left patella." Disabled 8 weeks, $120.00; 93 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14295.-R. Cyrus, Portsmouth, Ohio, freight conductor, N. & W. Railway. Injured Aug. 23, 1934. "Emergency stop, caused by bursted air hose." "Contusion right shoulder joint and of chest wall." Disabled 5 weeks 4 days, $139.29; 150 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14349.-C. B. Lawrence, Mineola, Texas, freight conductor, Texas & Pacific Railway. Injured Sept. 14, 1934. "Engineer applied brakes in emer- gency account switch engine not in clear, throwing me against cupola stand of caboose." "Severe contusion left shoulder and over clavicle." Disabled 2 weeks 3 days, $60.71; 83 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14362.-M. L. DeLaVergne, Port Huron, Mich., freight brakeman, Grand Trunk Western. Injured Sept. 24, 1934. "Riding on back end of caboose, speed 15 mi. per hr. when slack ran out of train throwing me off on the ground." "Sprained coccyx." Disabled 4 weeks, $100.00; 85 ears, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13862.-W. Grimshaw, Columbus, Ohio, freight brakeman, Norfolk & Western Railway Company. Injured Feb. 21, 1934. "Air pipe on engine came loose, causing air on train to go in emergency throwing me forward against end of cupola on cab." "Fractured left ankle." Disabled 36 weeks, $900.00; 150 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14373.-George Showalter, Savanna, Ill., freight conductor, C. U. St. P. & P. Railway. Injured Sept. 28, 1934. "Getting down out of cupola of caboose, train gave a little jerk and I stepped crooked on my right ankle." "Sprained right ankle, contusion of joint." Disabled 4 weeks 5 days, $117.86; 120 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14427.-M. Currie, Souris, Man., freight conductor, C. P. Railway. Injured Oct. 19, 1934. "Engine broke away from train throwing train into emergency." "Contusion muscles posterior surface right leg." Disabled 1 week, $25.00; 88 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 14469.-W. L. McCann, Wellington, Kan., freight brakeman, A. T. & S. F. Railway. Injured Nov. 2, 1934. "Vent valve on engine opened up after air was set and released and train speed reduced down to about 10 mi. per br. this caused air to go into emergency and sudden stop made. There were 81 loaded cars in train." "Contusion right chest." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days, $107.14; 81 cars, 1 engine. TRAIN LENGTHS 109 CLAIM No. 14435.-R. E. McKinney, Appalachia, Va., freight conductor, South- ern Railway. Injured Oct. 20, 1934. "Train parted & ran together, pitched me about 14 ft. to front end of cab, unconscious about 30 minutes." "Laceration over left eye, contusions of left foot and side." Disabled 7 weeks 2 days, $182.14; 110 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14562.-I. C. Walthall, Salem, Va., freight brakeman, Virginian Railway. Injured Dec. 4, 1934. "Train parted and threw me up against parti- tion on cab." "Contused left hip and lumbar region." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57; 123 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14555.-W. H. H. Cromwell, Los Angeles, Calif., freight conductor, Southern Pacific Company. Injured Dec. 2, 1934. "Started train as I was getting up out of chair at desk, throwing me across arm of chair, bruising 2 lower ribs." "Contusion right side of chest." Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $53.57; 117 ears, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14421.-J. B. Cooper, West Fairview, Pa., freight conductor, Penn- sylvania Railroad. Injured Oct. 16, 1934. "Some one cut train 20 cars from engine and we had 126 cars and train running together, shoe me against end of cabin." "Contusions and sprains of right foot and ankle." Disabled 9 weeks 3 days, $235.71; 126 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14484.-R. P. Christian, New Haven, Conn., freight conductor, N. Y. N. H. & H. Railroad Company. Injured Nov. 6, 1934. "A truck of mail was blown by the wind in front of engine while passing thru Hartford Station and engineer applied brake in emergency to avoid hitting a water plug with mail truck." "Bruised breast bone and right rib broken." Disabled 5 weeks 3 days, $135.71; 86 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14543.-U. N. Hoskins, Oroville, Calif, freight conductor, Western Pacific Railroad. Injured Nov. 27, 1934. "Engineer made emergency stop." "Contusion of left rib cage area." Disabled 3 weeks 2 days, $82.14; 74 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 14567.-H. M. Fentress, Ft. Worth, Texas, freight conductor, T. & P. Railroad. Injured Nov. 30, 1934. I was sitting at desk in caboose making switch list and checking waybills when engineer made a sudden stop of train, knocking me over against cupola wall." "Contusion of right shoulder and left temple." Disabled 4 weeks 1 day, $103.57; 85 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14616-C. Wildman, Champaign, Ill., freight conductor, Illinois Central Railroad. Injured Dec. 22, 1934. "By a severe jerk in starting train at a positive block, turning chair in which I was sitting over and resulting in contusion of neck, left shoulder, and elbow." Disabled 3 days, $10.71; 97 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 13678.-H. A. Seiders, Harrisburg, Pa., freight conductor, Read- ing Company. Injured Jan. 6, 1934. "While making up my forms engine parted from train, throwing me against front end of cabin, striking neck and head." "Fracture of 7th cervical vertebrae (transverse processes right and left)." Disabled 52 weeks, $1,300.00; 105 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14632.-T. W. Campbell, Springfield, Mo., freight conductor, St. L. & S. F. Railroad. Injured Dec. 18, 1934. "Making out reports in cab when engineer made an emergency stop to avoid hitting engine on main line, knock- ing me unconscious and telescoping 3 and 4 cars ahead of cab, spreading stove fire over floor and bad ordering 19 cars." "Contusion right shoulder joint and right elbow ; laceration of nose ; abrasion of right side of head." Disabled 4 weeks 4 days, $68.57; 88 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14486.-W. L. Merritt, Huntington, W. Va., freight conductor, C. & O. Railway. Injured Nov. 9, 1934. "Extra 2316 East with 1 Ld. and 157 mtys. Making an emergency stop at mile post 497, Bauboursville, W. Va. I was riding in cupola of caboose." "Fracture of left ankle." Disabled 10 weeks 3 days, $260.71; 158 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14657.-L. L. Sheidler, Alliance, Ohio, freight conductor, P. R. R. Injured Jan. 4, 1935. "Pulling slack out of train, thrown against guard rail in caboose." "Severe contusion right thigh, lateral side, with injury to super- ficial blood vessels." Disabled 3 weeks, $75.00; 92 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14424.-W. A. Jordon, Jefferson City, Mo., freight conductor, M. P. Railroad. Injured Oct. 19, 1934. "Train broke in two about 6 cars from engine, speed about 20 mi. per hr." "Contusion of lumbar region ; sprain of lumbar muscles; contusion to left hip." Disabled 15 weeks 1 day, $378.57; 96 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14684.-D. D. Barton, Biggar, Sask., freight conductor, C. N. Railroad. Injured Jan. 16, 1935. "At M. P. 24 on the Unity Sub. on No. 403- 47891-38 8 110 TRAIN LENGTHS C. N. R. R. R. draw bar came down and put air in emergency. 49 mtys., 23 loads, 1 coach." "Severe contusion of right hip and right arm." Disabled 2 weeks, $50.00; 73 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14631.-John Wilson. St. Louis, Mo., freight brakeman, Missouri Pacific. Injured Dec. 26, 1934. "Heading in at Jeff. City, Mo., and sudden stop of train throwed me into stove on caboose, causing contusion to back, chest, and arthritis of lower thoracic and lumbar spine." Disabled 7 weeks, $105.00; 74 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14735.-T. M. Schmoeger, Denver, Colo., freight conductor, D. & S. L. Railway. Injured Jan. 23, 1935. "Train broke in two at Mi. post 131 and slack running up caused sudden stop and throwed me up against other articles in cab." "Sprain of back, hip, and right shoulder. General bruising." Disabled 2 weeks 4 days, $64.29; 71 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 14347.--H. F. Faust, Los Angeles, Calif., freight brakeman, South- ern Pacific Company. Injured Aug. 25, 1934. "Freight train broke in two ; rear end crashed into the head portion, -causing a very sudden and severe stop, throwing me into the front end of caboose, knocking me unconscious." "Frac- tured skull (right frontal) and contusion right side." Disabled 24 weeks 2 days, $607.14; 111 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14967.-F. H. Haggett, South Portland, Me., freight conductor, Main Central Railroad. Injured April 11, 1935. "Air hose blew off leading engine at Belgrade, Me., and threw me out of monitor of caboose." "Contusion of ribs left chest wall." Disabled 1 week 5 days, $42.86; 102 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 14914.-L. G. Lockhart, Pine Bluff, Ark., freight conductor, St. L. S. W. Injured April 17, 1935. "Engineer made an emergency stop, going about 6 mi. per hr. I was knocked down and fell off caboose, injuring left chest and hip." Disabled 1 week 5 days, $42.86; 70 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14919.-F. Chumbley, New Franklin, Mo., freight brakeman, M., K. & T. Injured April 17, 1935. "Train stopped in emergency ; I was on rear end of platform and was thrown against guard rail on platform." Injury to both knees; bruised and sprained." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71; 115 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14749.-F. B. Connor, Carbondale, Pa., freight conductor, N. Y., 0. & W. Railroad. Injured Feb. 1, 1935. "At Carbondale, Pa., sudden stop of train threw me against side of caboose." "Sprained muscles of right shoulder and right chest." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71; 81 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14223.-W. Stoody, Ft. Wayne, Ind., freight conductor, Pennsyl- vania Railroad. Injured July 11, 1934. "Was shoving train in yards at Cole- hour, South Chicago, jerked off train by sudden application of air brakes." "Laceration of scalp, compound linear fracture right parietal region and right occipital region." Disabled 33 weeks, $495.00; 78 cars, I engine. CLAIM No. 14778.-T. E. O'Connor, Roseville, Calif., freight conductor, Southern Pacific Company. Injured Feb. 8, 1935. "Clamp on air hose at nipple blew off, train came to sudden stop, causing injury in caboose to four of train crew. Had 8 Lds. 115 Mtys." "Contusion of left chest." Disabled 4 weeks 3 days, $110.71; 123 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14723.-W. H. Saunders, McKees Rocks, Pa., freight flagman, P. & L. E. Railroad. Injured Jan. 8, 1935. "Emergency application of brakes throwing me against table in caboose." "Fracture of right 11th and 12th ribs, followed by disabling pain." Disabled 8 weeks 1 day, $203.57; 100 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14861.-J. R. Wood, Klamath Falls, Ore., freight brakeman, Southern Pacific Company. Injured March 17, 1935. "Pulling out of Klamath Falls yard, engine hit car on main street crossing and engineer used the emer- gency causing me to be throwed against the stove, causing the following injury: badly sprained right ankle, extensive contusions and ecchymosis right femur." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57; 75 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14955.-O. J. Harris, Columbus, Ohio, freight conductor, C. & 0. Injured May 6, 1935. "Train pulled apart, air thrown on, causing a severe jolt and patient was thrown against caboose door. Contusion or wrenching of right shoulder and base of neck." Disabled 2 weeks 4 days, $64.29; 100 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15008.-A. E. Boatwright, Memphis, Tenn., freight conductor, Y. & M. V. Railroad. Injured May 22, 1935. "Train was stopped suddenly to keep from hitting motor car and knocked me over ice box." "Contusion and bruise of left chest and arm." Disabled 3 days, $10.71. 94 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14992.-S. J. Craig, Paducah, Ky., freight flagman, Illinois Central Railroad. Injured May 23, 1935. "Emergency application of air brakes on TRAIN LENGTHS 111 long freight train. Was thrown against caboose wall." "Lacerated scalp, con- tused body muscle, and abrasion left hip." Disabled 3 weeks 2 days, $82.14; 76 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14911.-J. F. Burton, Terre Haute, Ind., freight conductor, C. C. C. St. L. Injured April 17, 1935. "Stop made with straight air on engine, knocking me to cabin floor and against lockers." "Contusion and abrasion of right elbow ; contusion right hip ; possible hernia, right inguinal, incomplete." Disabled 9 weeks 4 days, $239.29; 93 ears, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15001.-F. C. Behr, Buffalo, N. Y., freight conductor, N. Y. C. H. Railroad, Lines East. Injured May 22, 1935. "On account of a bursted air hose on the 27th car back of engine. Thrown against stove breaking off door of same and landing on floor of caboose." "Lumbo-sacral sprain and sprained left shoulder." Disabled 3 weeks, $75.00; 128 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14946.-W. 1. Merritt (Division 136), Huntington, W. Va., freight conductor, C. & O. Railway. Injured May 2, 1935. "Emergency train stop Big Sandy Jct." "Fractured ribs on right side." Disabled 6 weeks 6 days, $171.43 ; 158 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14782.-L. Johnson (Division 298), Herington, Kans., freight con- ductor, C. R. I. & P. Injured Feb. 12, 1935. "Rough stop of train; sitting in cupola." "Fracture of tibia left leg." Disabled 20 weeks 6 days, $521.43; 80 cars. 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15087.-E. Riley (Division 161), Parsons. Kans., freight conductor, M. K. T. Injured June 24, 1935. "Was standing on rear of caboose and engineer made sudden stop throwing me against end of caboose." "Contusions of head and over sacrum." Disabled 1 week, $25.00; 105 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14506.-V. H. Stewart (Division 172), Tyrone, Pa., freight con- ductor, P. R. R. Injured Nov. 16, 1934. "Draw head broke off on tank of dead engine causing air to go on emergency on train throwing me from monkey box to floor of cabin." "Severe contusion over back of neck and left shoulder." Disabled 34 weeks, $510.00; 96 cars, 2 dead engines; two engines. CLAIM No. 15106.-J. H. Dray (Division 402), Massillon, Ohio, freight con- ductor, W. L. E. Injured June 8, 1935. "Just east of Sherrodsville engineer made application of air and threw me down in caboose." "Contusion of back, right side in lower part." Disabled 3 weeks, $75.00; 123 loads, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 15097.-R. O. Masker (Division 136), Huntington, W. Va., freight conductor, Chesapeake & Ohio. Injured June 30, 1935. "I was sitting ou bunk of caboose behind desk, when engineer started to use automatic air and the entire train went in emergency throwing me in under desk. Rear brakeman was knocked off caboose." "Wrench left knee." Disabled 3 weeks, $75.00; 152 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15079.-C. C. Grass (Division 136), Huntington, W. Va., freight brakeman, Chesapeake & Ohio. Injured June 30, 1935. "I was standing on rear end of caboose, engineer stopping the train, air went into emergency mak- ing a sudden stop, knocking me to the ground." "Contusion of chest and abdomen." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days, $107.14; 154 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15108.-W. E. Loy (Division 518), Gerber, Calif., freight con- ductor, Southern Pacific Company. Injured June 25, 1935. "Near Eukron, Calif., siding or M. P. 374 train line broke causing aid brakes to go into emer- gency, knocking truck out from under caboose." "Contusion of scalp and con- cussion of brain." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $39.29; 82 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15132.-A. L. Harris (Division 481), Bellefontaine, Ohio, freight conductor, C. C. C. St. L. Injured July 8, 1935. "Busted air hose; was thrown against grab iron in caboose, at Fostoria, Ohio." "Bruise over lower lumbar vertebrae with scratch marks over the area." Disabled 2 weeks 6 days, $42.86; 100 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15152.-L. W. Gregory (Division 139), Knoxville, Tenn., freight conductor, Southern Railway Company. Injured July 25, 1935. "Standing on rear of train-reaching for order, sudden stop by engineer of train, threw me against grab iron on cab." "Contusion of right chest extending into right back near scapula." Disabled 1 week 5 days, $42.86; 71 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM' No. 15167.--P. V. Tingle (Division 119), Ft. Wayne, Ind., freight brakeman, N. Y. C. St. L. Railroad. Injured July 27, 1935. "Slack running out of train." "Sacro iliac strain or sprain." At Sidney, Ind, Disabled 4 weeks 5 days, $117.86; 79 ears, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15213.-J. C. Staples (Division 552), Ft. Madison. Iowa, freight brakeman, A. T. & S. F. Railway. Injured Aug. 21, 1935. "Air hose blew off six cars back of engine, train consisted of 96 cars including nine baggage ears on rear end, train making very rough stop, 4 miles out of terminal." "Contusions, 112 TRAIN LENGTHS abrasions both legs, and laceration right leg." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $17.14; 96 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15248.-H. Albright, (Division 351), Columbus, Ohio, freight brake- man, Norfolk & Western. Injured Aug. 15, 1935. "Renick, Ohio. Engineer made rough stop and was knocked against door of caboose." "Traumatic pleurisy." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $23.57; 95 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15281.-L. Hunsinger (Division 351), Columbus, Ohio, freight con- ductor, Norfolk & Western. Injured Sept. 11, 1935. "I was standing on rear end of caboose when passing local at Hayesvlle air hose bursted on 27 car from engine, I was knocked down." "Contusion of back, left side." Disabled 5 days, $10.71; 150 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15124.-P. B. Baker (Division 298), Herington, Kan., freight brakeman, C. R. I. & P. Railway. Injured July 10, 1935. "At Lost Springs. Kan., air brakes were used in emergency, stopping for red signal at railroad crossing protected by automatic interlocking plant. Thrown against lantern rack in for- ward end of caboose." "Fracture left transverse process, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th lumbar, left side." Disabled 11 weeks 5 days, $292.86; 79 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15240.-A. Leverington (Division 3), St. Louis, Mo., freight con- ductor, Missouri Pacific Railroad. Injured Aug. 31, 1935. "At Osage, Mo., train parted four cars from engine, caused by low drawbar." "Contusion to left knee." Disabled 5 weeks 3 days, $81.42; 151 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15301.-J. B. Orvis (Division 432), Bakersfield, Calif., freight conductor, A. T. S. F. Railway Company. Injured Sept. 25, 1935. "Knocked down in caboose by undesired emergency of train brakes at Kramer, Calif." "Contusion of face and nose, laceration of lip, sprained right wrist." Disabled 2 days, $7.14; 72 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15330.-W. H. Boyer (Division 486), Covington, Ky., freight con- ductor, C. & O. Railway. Injury Oct. 13, 1935. "Was pulling into yard at Stevens, Ky., when air went into emergency." "Sprained and bruised back, bruised head." Disabled 5 days, $17.86; 160 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No 15309.-G. H. Corrigan (Division 498), Spokane. Wash., freight conductor, Great Northern Railway. Injured Sept. 25. 1935. "At Leonia in Mon- tana just east of the Idaho line, when stopping to enter passing track, air went into emergency and caused very sudden stop account 130 cars in train and threw me against desk in caboose." "Fractured ribs, right side, also bruised right side." Disabled 4 weeks 6 days, $50.61; 130 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15393.-H. J. Lovern (Division 210), Roanoke. Va., freight con- ductor, Norfolk & Western Railway Company. Injured Nov. 5, 1935. "The air hose burst on 12th car from head end of train. Air went in emergency, and pusher engine 102 tore cab up and wrecked cab and rear car, throwing me out of the cupola onto the floor. Accident occurred near Shawsville. Va." "Severe contusion of left ear, with lacerated wound about one-half inch long on posterior border of ear. There is also a superficial laceration about 1 inch long in mas- told region, just behind ear. Contusion of left shoulder ; there appears to be a fracture over inner border of scapula. Contusion and hematoma formation with superficial abrasion of skin just above crest of left ilium ; tenderness in right gluteal region." Disabled 2 weeks 3 days, $60.71; 135 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 15410.-J. L. Morgan (Division 367). McComb, Miss., freight con- ductor, Illinois Central Railroad. Injured Nov. 1, 1935. "Train parted and knocked me against desk in caboose. At Anding, Miss." "Contusion to chest and laceration to left forearm." Disabled 2 weeks 3 days, $60.71; 90 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15434.-E4 H. Roe (Division 119), Ft. Wayne, Ind., freight con- ductor, Nickle Plate Railroad Company. Injured Nov. 21, 1935. "Air hose head casting blew off when train was moving causing severe shock on rear of train, causing me to fall in caboose." "Contusion of thigh ; strained muscles of neck." Disabled 1 week 2 days, $19.28; 115 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15140.-H. C. Tone (Division 134), Bellevue, Ohio, freight con- ductor, N. Y. C. & St. IL. Railroad. Injured July 16. 1935. "Was knocked out of cupola of caboose to floor." "Fractured tibia and fibula (left)." Disabled 20 weeks 2 days, $507.14; 75 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15419.-H. C. Johnson (Division 503), Los Angeles, Calif., freight conductor, Southern Pacific Railroad Company. Injured Nov. 5, 1935. "De- scending grade at Fingal, 98 miles east of Los Angeles on S. P. Railroad, 84 cars, severe run in of slack knocked out of seat in cupola of caboose, fell strik- ing back on cupola steps." "Injury to right side, abrasion of skin, and deep discoloration located anterior to the spine and over the first floating rib, accom- panied by severe pain intensified by breathing. Right leg received an injury to the muscle, skin and bone which was located one inch to the inner side of the TRAIN LENGTHS 113 tibia about the middle part. These tissues badly crushed which was likely to cause abscess." Disabled 3 weeks 4 days, $89.29; 84 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15474.-W. R. Miller (Division 449), Harrisburg, Pa., freight con- ductor, Reading Railroad. Injured Dec. 7, 1935. "Air set and released--the jerk threw me against coal box in cabin." "Laceration of ear and hand (right)." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57; 76 cars, 1 engine. AFFDAVIT STATE OF IOWA, County of Linn, ss: I, W. A. Wilson, being first duly sworn, depose and say: I live in Cedar Rapids, Linn County, Iowa, where I have lived since July 1928, and during all of which time I have been an employee in the office of the General Secretary & Treasurer of the Order of Railway Conductors of America, in Cedar Rapids, Linn County, Iowa, and I am now so employed; I was Manager of the Accident Insurance Department of the Order of Railway Conductors of America from July 1928 to May 1932, and I have been such Manager from September 1934 to and including the present time; as such Manager all the records and files of said Department are kept under my personal supervision and control, and I am familiar with said records ; I have personally examined said records for the purpose of ascertaining and tabulating the number of claims filed with said Accident Insurance Department, growing out of the operation of freight trains of 70 cars or more in length, in which the claimants based their claims on acci- dents resulting from what is commonly known in railroad parlance as "freight train shocks" or "slack action" ; the foregoing tabulation was made by me after a personal checking of each of the claims hereinbefore referred to and the analysis of said claims, as hereinbefore set forth, is a true, accurate, and correct analysis of the statements filed in each of said claims as shown by the files, including the amounts paid by the said Accident Insurance Department between August 1929 and January 1936 to the members thereof on account of said accidents. Done at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, this 3rd day of September A. D. 1936. W. A. WILSON. Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for Linn County, Iowa, on this 3rd day of September A. D. 1936. [sEAL] BERNADINE MCGINNIS, Notary Public. STATEMLNT OF CLAIMs PAID Y ACCIDENT INsURANcE DEPARTMENT OF THE OnDER OF RAILwAY CONDUCTORS OF AMERICA, ACCOUNT SHOCK ON TRAINS OF SEVENTY CARS OF MoRE, PAID BETwEEN JANUARY 1, 1936, AND DECEMBER 31, 1936--53 CLAIMs, $9,347.07 . Approximate number members in freight service January 1, 1936 ---------------------------------------------4,495 December 31. 1936---------- ------------------------------- 4,504 CLAIM No. 15413.-A. B. Koontz, Division 26, Toledo, Ohio. Freight conductor, New York Central. Injured Nov. 9, 1935. "At Mina, Ohio, account very hard and sudden stop from a speed of 15 or 20 miles per hour, throwing me against desk in caboose." "Contusion and injury chest with fracture 7th rib, left." Disabled 7 weeks, $105.00; 118 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15492.-A. L. Allen,. Division 554, Princeton, W. Va. Freight conductor, Virginian Railway Co. Injured December 14, 1935. "Had train of 87 cars with 4 Eng., 2 Eng. on head end & 2 in train 41 cars from head end of train. Low draw head in 2d car pulled off wrecking 40th, 41st cars and pusher Eng. causing sudden stop on rear. 1 miles east of Cirtsville, W. Va." "Con- tusion of chest. head, abdomen & rt. thigh. Lacerations of face." Disabled 2 weeks 4 days, $64.29; 87 cars, 4 engines. CLAIM No. 15486-R. C. Ekstrand, Division 327, Chicago, Ill. Freight con- (luctor, Ill. Central R. R. Injured Dec. 10, 1935. "Heading in Champaign, Ill. Air hose blew off of 18th car from Eng. with 100 cars going about 4 or 5 mi. per hour, knocked me out for a few moments." "1st and 2nd degree burns of right hand. Traumatic synovitis of right knee." Disabled 3 weeks 2 days, $82.14; 100 cars, 1 engine. 114 TRAIN LENGTHS CLAIM No. 15498.-J. W. Durkin, Division 325, Grand Junction, Colo. Freight conductor, Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Injured Dec. 16, 1935. "Thrown against cupola step in caboose account sudden stop at Thompson, Utah." "Severely bruised baek." Disabled 2 weeks 5 days, $67.86; 75 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14987.-H. W. Breyley, Division 134, Belevue, Ohio. Freight con- ductor, N. Y. C. St. L. R. R. Injured May 18, 1935. "Stopping to set off hot box train got down to about 4 miles hr., air went into emergency and threw me out of cupola of cab and struck grab iron." "Fracture 12th Dorsal vertebra & 12th rib." Disabled 32 weeks 6 days, $821.43; 100 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15506.-W. A. Shell, Division 134, Bellevue, Ohio. Freight conduc- tor, N. K. P. R. R. Injured Dec. 13, 1935. "West 25th Cleveland 7Tx 97 mty. 10 miles per hr., 5th head car draw bar slipped under the 6th head car causing accident." "Sprained ankle. Bruise over oscalcis." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days, $107.14; 104 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15511.-J. F. Castle, Division 49, Moberly, Mo. Freight brakeman, Wabash Ry. Injured Dec. 16, 1935. "Train running on level track near Hunt- ington, Mo., when knuckle slipped on car and train broke in two. The sudden stop and impact threw me to floor of the caboose." "Sprain of right shoulder." Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $53.57; 82 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14698.-A. E. Gadd, Division 554, Princeton, W. Va. Freight brakeman, Virginian Ry. Co. Injured Jan. 16, 1935. "Emergency stop of train. Thrown in caboose. One mile east of Princeton." "Fracture left knee, badly sprained right ankle." Disabled 52 weeks, $1,300.00; 150 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15449.-W. E. Francis, Division 554, Princeton, W. Va. Freight conductor, Virginian Ry. Co. Injured Nov. 25, 1935. "99 mty. cars, wrecked 3 rear cars ahead of pusher, sudden stop caught me against desk in my caboose." "Fracture of 7th & 8th ribs, right side." Disabled 6 weeks 6 days, $171.43; 99 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15629.-J. R. Rawlings, Division 132, Salida, Colo. Freight con- ductor, Denver & Ro Grande Western. Injured Jan. 28, 1036. "M. P. 285--5 mi, west of Tennessee Pass. Had 3 Engs. ascending 3%% grade, 72 cars 3,260 tons. Helper Engs. slipped and broke train in two and threw me to floor of caboose, striking on my face." "Fractured bridge of nose, contused wound of nose. Severe nasal hemorrhage." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $21.42; 72 cars, 3 engines. CLAIM No. 15658.-J. H. Morgan, Division 441, Alamosa, Colo. Freight con- ductor, Denver & Rio Grande Western R. R. Co. Injured Feb. 1, 1936. "I was sitting in caboose on locker, checking way bills against my switch list, when slack action ou 95 car train run out, breaking draw bar off of 4th car ahead of caboose, 3 cars passed over draw bar but catching front end caboose and throw- ing caboose off track into ditch." "Wrenched back and bruised both hips." Dis- abled 2 weeks 2 days, $57.14; 95 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15688.-G. P. Gourley, Division 175, Memphis, Tenn. Freight con- ductor, I. C. R. R. Injured Feb. 7, 1936. "Emergency stop. I was thrown from cupola of caboose. Hit my right side on door of oil room, which was standing open." "Contusion of chest (Rt. side)." Disabled 3 weeks 6 days, $96.43; 80 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15712.-S. S. Robinson, Division 330, Emporia, Kan. Freight con- ductor, Santa Fe Ry. Co. Injured Feb. 20, 1936. "Vat valve came open on engine causing air to go in emergency, throwing me to floor, coining into Em- poria yards, I was in way car." "Sprain of right wrist, abrasion of left wrist. traumatic pleurisy right chest, contusion right leg with ecehymosis." Disabled 2 weeks 1 days, $32.14; 82 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15727.-M. J. Hehir, Division 225, Hornell, N. Y. Freight conduc- tor, Erie R. R. Co. Injured Feb. 26, 1936. "At Fillmore, N. Y. Broke in two 10 cars from engine, breaking knuckle 91 cars from engine, also derailing 1 car 5 cars from caboose. We made an awful stop." "Contusion sprain of back. Contusion of left leg." Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $53.57; 126 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15559.-C. F. Baker, Division 100, West Jefferson, Ohio. Freight conductor, Pan Handle Div. P. R. R. Injured Jan. 7, 1936. "Engineer applying air brakes on 90 car train, broke knuckle in draw bar of car on head end of train, making an emergency stop on rear of train while taking siding at Tyndall, 0." "Fracture of rib, rt. side and contusion of muscles of chest and neck." Disabled 13 weeks 4 days, $339.28: 90 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 15691.-M. G. Seibert, Division 678, Hagerstown, Md. Freight flagman, W M. R. R. Injured Feb. 9, 1936. "I was flagman on Ex. 914 coming around Bokes, Pa., on a hard pull with 16 loads 61 empty in train. Train parted between 8th & 9th cars in train causing very hard emergency stop, threw TRAIN LENGTHS 115 me against cupboard spraining my left ankle." "Severe sprain & contusion left ankle with possible tearing of soft parts of joint structure. X-ray negative for fracture or dislocation." Disabled 5 weeks, $125.00; 77 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15720.-T. E. Ward, Division 486, Covington, Ky. Freight conduc- tor, C. & O. R. R. Injured Feb. 15, 1936. "Engineer made emergency stop throwing me against caboose door. At Edgington, Ky." "Bruised left side of chest." Disabled 3 week 2 days, $49.28; 129 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15742.-0. L. Sumners, Division 120, Huntington, Ind. Freight conductor, Erie R. R. Injured Feb. 26, 1936. "About 2 miles east of Foraker, 0. Train moving about 25 miles per hr. when the draw bars between the head and 2nd car in train slipped by each other causing emergency air application." "Contusion to right shoulder." Disabled 3 weeks 3 days, $51.42; 143 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15747.-L. A. Clinton, Division 442, Barrackville, W. Va. Freight flagman, B. & O. Injured March 2, 1936. "Black Oak, Md. Eng. 7142 ran into a broken rail, throwing engine off the track and emergency stop." "Laceration of nose, contusion face, abrasion forehead." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71; 73 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15729.-C. R. Mathis, Division 593, Kingsville, Tex. Freight con- ductor, St. L., B. & M. Ry. Injured Feb. 17, 1936. "Train broke in two heading into yard at Harlingen, causing sudden stop of caboose, knocking me uncon- scious." "Contusion of both sides of face, particular on right. Fracture of Zigomadic bone, fracture of right metacarpule bone of right thumb just distal to proximal end." Disabled 5 weeks, $75.00; 73 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15784.-F. L. Meador, Division 261, Victoria, Va. Freight con- ductor, Vgn. Ry. Injured March 11, 1936. "Train parted. I was sitting in cupola, the shock threw all my weight on right foot. The shock buckled 3 cars out of train, 10 off center & 3 trucks off rail. M. P. 216." "Contusion and sprain of little toe right foot." Disabled 1 week, $15.00; 168 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15801.-W. P. Patton, Division 554, Mullens, W. Va. Freight conductor, Vgn. fly. Injured March 20, 1936. "Ingleside, W. Va. 145 cars out of Roanoke, Va., on entry 101 west, slip by between the forty-eighth & forty- ninth car knocking eleven cars off the center, knocking both sets of trucks out from under the cab." "Fracture of 5, 6, & 7th ribs right side." Disabled 1 week 6 days, $46.43; 145 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15815.-fR. W. Harrison, Division 283, Marceline, Mo. Freight conductor, A., T. & S. F. R. It. Injured March 23, 1936. "Air hose coupling blew off of air hose on A. T. 244271 at Standish, Mo." "Contusion of left arm and sacroiliac sprain." Disabled 2 weeks 1 days, $32.14; 102 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15546.-M. J. Bolley, Division 225, Hornell, N. Y. Freight con- ductor, Erie R. R. Injured Dec. 12, 1935. "125 cars coming in to Salamanca yard about 10 miles per hour, drawhead came out, sudden stop on rear end, crash came suddenly without warning throwing me against the west end of caboose." "Fractured rib-traumatic pleurisy." Disabled 14 weeks 2 days. $214.28; 125 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15481.-W. S. Shaw, Division 66, South Portland, Me. Freight flagman, Boston & Maine R. R. Injured Nov. 30, 1935. "Thrown to the floor of the caboose by the sudden stopping of the train, emergency application of the brakes." "Back strain. Arthritis of spine." Disabled 18 weeks 3 days, $276.42; 100 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15851.-Chas. Love, Division 136, Russell, Ky. Freight conduc- tor, C. & O. Injured April 17, 1936. "My engineer applied brakes in emergency and threw me forward and jerked me back in the cupola seat, and hit my back against arm rest and sprained my ankle and bruised my back." "Sprained ankle, contusion, back, sacro-iliac, medial aspect of leg 3" above ankle." Dis- abled 1 week 2 days, $32.14; 160 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15872.-G. C. Heritage, Division 264, Raleigh, N. C. Freight conductor, S. A. L. fly. Injured April 22, 1936. "Knocked down in caboose car when there was a very rough stop made." "Sprained muscles of left shoulder and bruise on left side." Disabled 1 week and 2 days, $32.14; 79 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15879.-E. D. Tilley, Division 396, Mineola, Texas. Freight con- ductor, T. & P. R. R. Injured April 29, 1936. "Was at Conductor's desk making out clerical reports, slack ran In causing to turn me over in chair, fell against protector to stove." "Bruise of right side over last 4 or 5 ribs posteriorly-abrasions." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $39.29; 91 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15703.-P. P. Falvey, Division 198, Springfield, Mass. Freight conductor, Boston & Maine R. R. Injured Feb. 17, 1936. "While sitting at 116 TRAIN LENGTHS desk in caboose, emergency stop, thrown forward against desk." "Two broken ribs and one fractured. Pneumonia following injury." Disabled 15 weeks 6 days, $396.43; 91 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15895.-A. W. Mills. Division 278, Columbus, Ohio. Freight con- ductor, Penna. R. R. Co. Injured May 10, 1936. "Sudden jerk of train causing glass to be broke in rear door of cabin P. R. 477589 and falling on left arm at Burgettstown, Pa." "Laceration of left arm at elbow 3 " long, 5 clips to close." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57; 89 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 15838.-C. G. Heckling, Division 14, Cleveland, Ohio. Freight conductor, Erie R. R. Co. Injured April 3, 1936. "At Mantua, O., train broke in two, thrown against stove in caboose." "Radiographs of chest show frac- tures of left ninth, tenth, and eleventh ribs." Disabled 6 weeks 2 days, $94.28; 87 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15118.-H. F. Everts, Division 557, Mason City, Iowa. Freight conductor, C. M. St. P. & P. Injured June 29, 1935. "Knocked down and thrown in caboose caused by train breaking in two." "Sprain left knee joint." Disabled 48 weeks 1 day, $1,203.57; 82 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15884.-W. T. James, Division 619, Lansford, Pa. Freight conduc- tor, L. & N. E. R. R. Injured May 5, 1936. "Sudden application of air throw- ing me against desk in the caboose." "Contusion of chest and legs." Disabled 3 weeks, $45.00; 102 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15966.-S. J. Griffith, Division 177, Canton, Ohio. Freight con- ductor, P. R. R. Injured June 18, 1936. "Air went into emergency caused by a kicker in train. I was making out a wheel report 362 and was shifted back against a table." "Contusion of right side." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $21.42; 87 cars, I engines. CLAIM No. 15991.-J. E. Hailey, Division 332, Illmo, Mo. Freight conductor, Cotton Belt R. R. Injured June 24, 1936. "Extra 705 making ten or twelve miles per hour with 100 mtys. set brakes in emergency to avoid striking derailed motor weed cutter. Train stopped with great violence, train being uncoupled in two places by the stop." "Right cheek lacerated, fracture of 2nd rib left, bruise to chest and shouder." Disabled 2 weeks, $50.00; 100 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15862.-H. Kent, Division 36, Pueblo, Colo. Freight conductor, D. & R. G. W. R. R. Injured April 20, 1936. "Train broke in two, thrown down and against the side of caboose." "Contusion and ligament strain right knee, indirect inguinal hernia, left." Disabled 13 weeks 2 days, $332.14; 91 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15969.-R. O. Masker, Division 136, Russell, Ky. Freight con- ductor, C. & O. Railway. Injured June 14, 1936. "Air hose bursted pulling in Peach Creek Yard, 27 cars from engine." "Fractured rib, head injury and bruised arm." Disabled 6 weeks 1 day, $153.57; 160 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15192.-W. N. Rion, Division 486, Latonia, Ky. Freight conduc- tor, L. & N. Injured Aug. 9, 1935. "Sudden stop of train by engineer apply- ing brakes in emergency." "Fracture right femur lower % involving knee joint." Disabled 52 weeks, $1,300.00; 100 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16023.-W. Leitch, Division 94, Carlin, Nevada. Freight brake- man, S. P. Railway. Injured July 10, 1936. "Severe slack action. Brake pipe on engine 3718 broke causing an emergency stop." "Sprain right ankle." Dis- abled 3 weeks 4 days, $89.29; 122 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14963.-J. W. Stalling, Division 134, Bellevue, Ohio. Freight conductor, N. Y. C. & St. L. R. R. Injured Aug. 4, 1936. "Was thrown against table bolted to side of caboose when engineer made a very rough stop at water tank, Mentor, Ohio." "Muscular sprain of right lower chest." Disabled 2 weeks 3 days, $60.71; 111 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16081.-T. Peterson, Division 260, Pasco, Wash. Freight con- ductor, Northern Pacific Railroad. Injured July 28, 1936. "In the act of leaving the cupola of caboose the train stopped suddenly breaking my hold and throwing me from the cupola and against the brakeman's knee. Brakeman was also in the act of descending from the cupola. Was approaching Satus 'Station." "Fracture 9th and 10th ribs, right." Disabled 4 weeks 5 days, $117.86; 82 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16097.-A. H. Rollins, Division 3, Maplewood, Mo. Freight con- ductor, Mo. P. R. R. Injured Aug. 14, 1936. "Air hose bursted on 19th car from engine on 153-car causing emergency stop of train, throwing me into partition of caboose. "Abrasion of scalp." Disabled 2 weeks 4 days, $64.29; 153 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16099.--G. A. Trost, Division 263, Cumberland, Md., Freight con- ductor, B. & 0. R. R. Injured Aug. 11, 1936. "Going Into Glenwood engineer made TRAIN LENGTHS 117 a rough stop causing G. A. Trost to be knocked down striking side against coal box in cab." "Contusion to chest wall." Disabled 1 week, $25.00; 87 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16149.-R. M. Sovine, Division 686, Russell, Ky. Freight brake- man,. C. & 0. R. R. Injured Aug. 24, 1936. "Jerked off back of end of caboose when train started at Russell yard." "Bruise, contusion of left buttock." Dis- abled 1 week 1 day, $28.57; 160 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 161118.-C. Workman, Division 3, Cuba, Mo. Freight conductor, Mo. Pacific. Injured Sept. 14, 1936. "Engines derailed and air set in emerg- gency, at a speed of about ten or twelve miles per hour causing a very sudden stop on rear end." "Contusions to neck, contusions to back, contusion to left shoulder." Disabled 3 weeks 2 days, $82.14; 149 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 16167.-0. E. Ornburn, Division 49, Moberly, Mo. Freight conduc- tor, Wabash R. R. Injured Aug. 23, 1936. "Was thrown across caboose account of improper handling of throttle of engine." "Contusion and infection (abscess) on top of left middle finger." Disabled 4 weeks, $100.00; 80 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16345.--W. F. Walls, Division 486, Ludlow, Ky. Freight flagman, Southern Ry. Co. Injured Nov. 29, 1936. "Engineer applied brakes on 84 cars. Knocked me out of cupola of caboose." "Laceration and contusion over left supraorbital arch." Disabled 1 week, 3 days, $35.71; 84 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16351.-E. L. Jarrell, Division 218, Savannah, Ga. Freight con- ductor, S. A. L. Ry. Injured Dec. 1, 1936. "Running about five miles per hour, 101 cars, double-heading, air hose came uncoupled between the engines." "Con- tusion right posterior chest, right knee, and upper articulation of right fibula." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71; 101 cars; 2 engines. CLAIM No. 16181.-0. R. Wright, Division 272, Havre, Montana. Freight con- ductor, Great Northern Ry. Injured Sept. 14, 1936. "Heading into Havre yard; sudden stop. Thrown on caboose floor." "Fracture of left hip." Disabled 13 weeks, $325.00; 110 ears, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16305.-T. J. Henretta, Division 554, Roanoke, Va. Freight con- ductor, Virginian Ry. Injured Nov. 13, 1936. "Train of 149 empty cars broke in two, account of the coupler of the fourth car from engine breaking in the key- way and the severe slack action threw my weight against my right angle. I was up in cupola at the time of break in two." "Sprain of right ankle." Dis- abled 3 weeks 3 days, $85.71; 149 cars, 1 three-unit electric engine. CLAIM No. 16359.-E. L. Walsh, Division 206, Decatur, Ill. Freight conductor, Wabash R. R. Injured Dec. 2, 1936. "Train running about 20 miles per hour when air hose burst, stopping train immediately, throwing me down in caboose." "Both wrists sprained, both hands bruised, left knee bruised, bruise over left eye, left calf of leg bruised." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $39.29; 100 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 16294.-F. J. Erbskorn, Division 26, Toledo, Ohio.. Freight conduc- tor, N. Y. C. Injured Nov. 4, 1936. "Engine derailed; sudden stop of train." "Contusion and back sprain." Disabled 5 weeks 4 days, $139.29; 80 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16346.-R. L. Weeks, Division 104, Middletown, N. Y. Freight con- ductor, Ontario & Western. Injured Nov. 21, 1936. "Sudden stop of train which threw me against knob of caboose door." "Contusion left side pf chest." Dis- abled 3 weeks 6 days, $96.43; 70 cars,, 1 engine. I hereby certify that the foregoing tabulation was made by me after a per- sonal checking of each of the claims and is a true, accurate, and correct analysis of the statements filed in each of said claims as shown by the files, including the amounts paid by the Accident Insurance Department during the year 1936 to members thereof on account of said accidents. Done at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, this 11th day of January A. D. 1937. W. A. WILSON, Manager, Accident Insurance Department. Subscribed and sworn to before me; a Notary Public in and for Linn County, Iowa, on this 11th day of January A. D. 1937. [sEAL] BERNADINE MCGiNNIs, Notary PubUc. 118 TRAIN LENGTHS STATEMENT OF CLAIMS PAID BY ACCIDENT INSURANCE DEPARTMENT OF THE Onur OF RAILWAY CONDUcTORS OF AMERICA, ACCOUNT SHOCK ON TRAINS OF LEsS THAN SEVENTY CARS, PAID BrwEEN AUoUsT, 1929, AND JANUARY 1, 1936-- 272 CLAIMS, $30,731.59 Approximate number members in freight service August 1, 1929--------------4, 791 January 1, 1933---------------.5,665 January 1, 1930-------------4, 839 January 1, 1934-----.--_---__ 5,230 July 1, 1930-.-----------------4, 881 January 1, 1935_---------------4,733 January 1, 1931--.----------- 4, 786 July 1, 1935-----------------4, 600 January 1, 1932-------------5,265 January 1, 1936--------------4, 495 CLAIMS No. 8581.-H. F. Wimsatt, Roodhouse, Ill., Freight Conductor, Chi- cago & Alton. Injured July 23, 1929. "Flagman cut off caboose in one yard. I was on rear Car, preparatory to go to adjacent yard with train, jerked of in starting train. Fifty-four cars, one engine." "Injury to side of face, laceration. Sprain of ligaments of right hand and wrist. Also traumatic injury to thigh and hip, right." Disabled 4 weeks 4 days, $114.29. CLAIM No. 8668.-V. R. Singleton, Danville, Ky., Freight Conductor, C. N. O. T. P. Railway. Injured September 2, 1929. "Was stopping at Somer- set to set out car and engineer released brake just before stopped and jerked me against door. Forty-four cars, one engine." "Deltoid Bursitis from fall against caboose door." Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $57.14. CLAIM No. 8677.-W. Smith, Springfield, Mo., Freight Conductor, St. L. S. F. Injured August 27, 1929. "Knocked from top of caboose by stack running out. Was on top giving stop signal account of hot box, train had come to full stop, just as I took hold of grab iron to climb down, caboose lunged forward, jerking me off, caught in ladder, throwing entire weight on left knee. Thirty-five cars, one engine." "Bruise and sprain left leg." Disabled 4 days, $8.57. CLAIM No. 8692.-W. D. Logan, Bristol, Va., Freight Flagman, Southern Rail- road. Injured September 10, 1929. "Slack ran up in train. I had started to get down out of cupola of caboose when engineer stopped engine, knocking me down, by head striking something and I struck the floor. Thirty-four cars, one engine." "Lacerated wound over left eye, skin abrasion and contusions; strained muscles of shoulder and back." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57. CLAIM No. 8654.-W. Nichols, Brookfield, Mo., Freight Conductor, C. B. & Q. Injured August 23, 1929. "Knocked down in way car, rough stop. Fifty-three cars, one engine." "Severely wrenched right shoulder." Disabled 6 weeks, $150.00. CLAIM No. 8703.-L. S. Minier, Detroit, Mich., Freight Brakeman, Grand Trunk. Injured September 12, 1929. "Thrown length of caboose by rough stop of train, sixty-six cars, one engine." "Severe laceration over left frontal and temporal area-6 to 7 inches long through aponeurosis, exposing bony vault of skull-dizziness, fainting, headaches, severe hemorrhage." Disabled 2 weeks, $50.06. CLAIM No. 8706.-F. W. Bakeman, Huron, S. D,, Freight Conductor, C. & N. W. Railway. Injured August 9, 1929. "Slack bunched on head end, but not on entire train, so did not have any warning in caboose. When slack ran out, I was thrown against desk, injuring my back. Sixty-two cars, one engine." "Contusion chest muscles left chest in back. Was seen by Dr. Workman of Tracy and left chest strapped. X-rays taken showed no fracture." Disabled 2 days, $7.14. CLAIM No. 8723.-A. C. Pearson, Peru, Ind., Freight Conductor, Wabash Railroad. Injured August 29, 1929. "Caused by air going into emergency, throwing me out of chair in caboose against corner of desk. Forty-six cars, one engine." "Severe contusion right shoulder-Ecehymosis and much crepitus in joint." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days, $107.14. CLAIM No. 8756.-J. H. Waddell. Alexandria, La., Freight Conductor, Missouri Pacific. Injured September 29, 1929. "Was in caboose when train started and jerked and threw me against door. I put out my right arm and it went through glass door, cutting arm. Sixty-two cars, one engine." "Lacerated wounds of right forearm near wrist." Disabled 6 days, $21.43. CLAIM No. 8650.-C. C. Moyer, Elmira, N. Y., Freight Conductor, Pennsyl- vania Railroad. Injured August 21, 1929. "On August 21. arriving at Hone- heads, N. Y., engineman came to a red block and applied the air brake in emergency, causing a sudden stop to train by which I received the above injury. TRAIN LENGTHS 119 Sixty-three cars, one engine." "Small laceration over left eye, severe contusion of left chest between nipple line and sternum. Much pain in left chest." Disabled 11 weeks 2 days, $282.14. CLAIM No. 8796.-D. S. Dean. Brookfleld, Mo., Freight Conductor, C. B. & Q. Railroad. Injured October 1, 1929. "Stopping at Meadville, jerked from the platform of way car, cutting finger and bruising elbow ; rough stop of train. Sixty-two cars, 1 engine." "Contusion and laceration right arm, with infection in laceration." Disabled 7 weeks 1 day. $178.57. CLAIM No. 8836.-J. R. Reed, Ravenna. Ky., Freight Conductor, L. & N. Rail- road. Injured October 30, 1929. "Rough stop, throwing me into cupola at Hazard Terminal. Sixty-five cars, one engine." "Cut extending down into the cartilage of left ear, bruise on side of head, back of ear." Disabled 4 days, $14.29. CLAIM No. 8896.-J. S. Roller, Danville, Ky., Freight Flagman, C. N. O. T. P. Railroad. Injured November 23, 1929. "When brakes applied leaving Danville, Ky., yard, was knocked down in caboose. Fifty-two cars, one engine." "Sprain of left sacro iliac joint." Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $53.57. CLAIM No. 8915.-A. C. Myers, Parsons. Kan., Freight Conductor, M. K. & T. Railroad. Injured November 27, 1929. "Slack ran in on train at South Mound. Kan., fell on corner of coal box. Fifty-two cars, one engine." "Contusion of ribs of lower right chest." Disabled 1 week 2 days, $32.14. CLAIM No. 8816-E. H. Lee, Newark, Ohio, Freight Conductor, C. B. & Q., Ohio division. Injured September 8, 1929. "Sudden stop of train threw me on my back and right side; emergency application of air on fifty-four car train, one engine." "Contusion over right eye; contusion right hip and elbow and traumatic indirect inguinal hernia." Disabled 14 weeks 1 day, $353.57. CLAIM No. 8780.-J. H. I3ousman, Louisville, Ky., Freight Conductor, L. & N. Injured October 14, 1929. "Unsually rough emergency air brake stop. Engineer in attempting to reduce speed to get '19' orders, air brake went on in emergency, making unusually rough stop, knocking me down in caboose. Sixty cars, one en- gine." "Fracture of the lower end of the left radius." Disabled 9 weeks 5 days. $242.86. CLAIM No. 8936.-T. F. Fowler, Lafayette, Ind., Freight Conductor, C. I. & L. Injured December 8, 1929. "Standing in back door of caboose when severe stop was made which knocked the crowbar down, which fell on my foot. Thirty-eight cars, one engine." "Fracture of right great toe ; crushed soft parts of same and bruising foot." Disabled 3 weeks 1 day, $47.14. CLAIM No. 8999.-C. M. Phillips, Bellevue, Ohio, Freight Conductor, N. Y. C. & St. L. Railroad, Nickel Plate Road. Injured December 15, 1929. "Arriving at Bellevue Yard, I was on rear platform of caboose in the act of stepping down to first step to get off when engineer made an emergency air brake stop, throwing nee against grab iron railing on caboose. Fifty cars, one engine." "Sprained muscles of shoulder and back." Disabled 1 week 5 days, $42.86. CLAIM No. 8976.-J. F. Ramsey, Danville, Va., Freight Conductor, Southern Railway Company. Injured December 12, 1929. "Engineer applied air brake, causing train to stop abruptly. Sixty-five cars, one engine." "Fracture of the tenth and eleventh ribs at the posterior angle on the left side." Disabled 4 weeks 6 days, $121.43. CLAIM No. 9030.-J. R. Ragland, Louisville, Ky., Freight Conductor, Southern Railway. Injured ecember 31, 1929. "Engineer took slack on train, throwing me in coal box." "Lacerated wound at proximal end of first phalanx." Disabled 1 week, 6 days, $46.43; 16 cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 9000.-H. A. Sirls, Nashville, Tenn., Freight Conductor, N. C. & St. L. Railroad. Injured December 20, 1929. "Thrown against caboose when stopping for water. Thirty-five cars, one engine." "Traumatic Bursitis of right elbow with abrasion of skin." Disabled 3 weeks 2 days, $82.14. CLAIM No. 9052.-P. Perry, Marshalltown, Iowa, Freight Conductor, M. St. L. Injured January 9, 1930. "Drawbar pulled out fourth car from engine, heading into yard at Marshalltown, and owing to slow speed of train, stop was much more severe than it would have been had train been moving twenty-five or thirty miles an hour. Thrown violently on the floor of caboose. Forty-four cars, one engine." "Bruise and abrasion left knee." Disabled 2 weeks 4 days, $64.29. CLAIM No. 9042.-G. Swanner, Lebanon Junction, Ky., Freight Conductor, L. & N. Railroad. Injured January 7, 1930. "We were pulling through north yard south of Center street, Corbin Terminal. Switch engine pulled in front of 120 TRAIN LENGTHS us. Engineer had to throw the brake in the emergency to keep from hitting them. Fifty-six cars, one engine." "Right shoulder, neck and head bruised and strained." Disabled 6 weeks, $150.00. CLAIM No. 9130.-G. Slamal, Marshalltown, Ia., Freight Conductor, M. & St. L. Railway Company. Injured February 2, 1930. "Engineer was making stop to head in on siding, stop was very hard and I was thrown against the stove in way car. Forty-three cars, one engine." "Fractured rib in left side." Disabled 4 weeks 3 days, $110.71. CLAIM No. 9134.-T. J. Hogan, Grand Rapids, Mich., Freight Brakeman, Pere Marquette Railroad. Injured January 30, 1930. "Was on rear platform of caboose when stopped to take water at Plymouth, Mich. After stopping train, engineer moved train ahead to spot engine at water plug. In jerking train ahead, I was jerked off platform. Thirty-seven cars, one engine." "Sprain of left wrist with abrasions and swelling"; disabled, 1 week 2 days, $19.28. CLAIM No. 9177.-J. J. Porter, Brookfield, Mo., Freight Brakeman, C. B. & Q. Injured February 24, 1930. "Thrown against rear railing of way car when train started. Fifty-seven cars, one engine." "Contusion left thigh ; disabled 6 days. $21.43. CLAIM No. 9182.-W. F. McGrail, Ravenna, Neb., Freight Conductor, C. B. & Q. Injured February 25, 1930. "Engineer made bard stop, throwing me against front of cupola. Sixty-eight cars, one engine." "Lacerated wound over and at side of left eye"; disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57. CLAIM No. 9196.-E. J. Cook, St. Paul Park, Minn., Freight Conductor, C. B. & Q. Injured February 25, 1930. "Engineers made hard stop, throwing me down and slid length of caboose on left knee. Sixty-two cars, one enginer." "Knee was wrenched, bruised, swollen"; disabled 5 days, $17.86. CLAIM No. 9133.-J. H. Masters, Scranton, Pa., Freight Conductor, D. L. & W. Injured February 4, 1930. "Train parted five cars from head end on D. L. & W. 39496 caused by low draw bar. Sixty-six cars, one engine." "Con- tusion of left knee and ankle with pain, tenderness, and limitation of move- ment"; disabled 5 weeks 4 days, $139.29. CLAIM No. 9223.-G. E. Bland, Denison, Texas, Freight Brakeman, M. K. & T. Injured March 13, 1930. "Engine lurched forward, causing the door on car to slide and catch my head. Forty-three cars, one engine." "Cut one inch long left side of head behind ear. Severe bruise and abrasion right cheek" disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71. CLAIM No. 9219.-F. L. Gibbs. Beardstown. Ill.. Freight Conductor, C. B. & Q. Injured March 14, 1930. "Knocked down in way car caused by slack running up while stoppiug for switch leaving Beardstown ya -A. Forty-five cars, one engine." "Bruises, contusion, and sprain of back in lumbar and sacral region :" disabled 4 weeks 2 days, $107.14. CLAIM No. 9260.-A. B. Long, Connellsville, Pa., Freight Conductor, B. & O. Injured March 26, 1930. "Sudden stop of train on account of fire truck of Uniontown, Pa., hitting train. Sixty-three cars, one engine." "Laceration of forehead :" disabled 1 week, $25.00. CLAIM No. 9300.-C. Shearstown, Conneaut, Ohio, Freight Conductor, N. Y. C. & St. L. Railroad. Injured March 26, 1930. "By being thrown against corner of sink in caboose when air was applied by engineer to stop to take siding for passenger train. Sixty-eight cars, one engine." "Intercostal sprain (left)." Disabled 3 weeks 1 day, $47.14. CLAIM No. 9293.-J. N. Johnston, Los Angeles, Calif., Freight Conductor, Southern Pacific. Injured April 8, 1930. "Head partly out of cupola window to identify passing train while moving slowly. Slack action and hard stop, my head struck window casing. Fifty-nine cars, one engine." "Bruise outer angle right eye and flesh around it." Disabled 6 days, $21.43. CLAIM No. 9308.-W. W. McNeill, Raleigh, N. C., Freight Conductor, N. S. Railway. Injured April 19. 1930. "Slack ran up in train and threw me against corner of wash stand. Fifty-eight cars, two engines." "Fractured ribs, pain on respiration, cough, etc." Disabled 3 weeks 2 days. $82.14. CLAIM No. 9312.-F. A. Spang, San Antonio, Texas, Freight Conductor, I. G. N. Railroad (Missouri Pacific Lines). Injured April 22, 1930. "Knocked from center of caboose to end of caboose by sudden and violent stop of train of sixty-four cars with double-header." "Laceration of scalp, bruises, and contusion of extremities." Disabled 2 weeks 5 days, $67.86. Sixty-four cars, two engines. CLAIM No. 9252-J. J. Morgan, Decatur, Ill.. Freight and Passenger Con- ductor, Wabash Railroad. Injured March 25, 1930. "Knocked down in caboose TRAIN LENGTHS 121 at Taylorville, Ill., by severe application of air. Thirty-five cars, one engine." "Colles fracture left wrist." Disabled 8 weeks 3 days, $87.83. CLAIM No. 9388.-W. P. Gannon, Everett, Wash., Freight Conductor, G. N. Railway. Injured May 21, 1930. "Making emergency stop for a switch, was thrown in caboose, hitting head on corner of door jamb. Forty-five cars, one engine." "Lacerated wound of scalp, cerebral concussion, contusion of right arm." Disabled 2 weeks, $50.00. CLAIM No. 9342.-A. T. Williams, Rochester, N. Y., Freight Flagman, B. R. & P. Injured May 1, 1930. "Engineer made emergency application of air. I was sitting in rear end of caboose and was thrown about eight feet and struck on floor of caboose. Fifty-five cars, one engine." "Contusion to back, left side and sprained left knee." Disabled 6 weeks 3 days, $160.71. CLAIM No. 9409.--A. H. Yeck, Rio Linda, Calif., Freight Brakeman, Southern Pacific. Injured May 24, 1930. "Upset in chair sitting in caboose by sudden jerk of train, ran splinters in finger, causing infection in finger and arm. Fifty-six cars, one engine." "Infected lacerated wound of right fifth finger." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71. CLAIM No. 9285.-C. O. Davis, East St. Louis, Ill., Freight Conductor, C. B. & Q. Injured April 3, 1930. "Pulling into East St. Louis and a hard sudden stop of train threw me from standing position to floor, striking on right elbow and side and sliding along caboose floor. Forty-seven cars, one engine." "A fall on right elbow with contusions and skin lacreation over olecranon. Infection followed, extensive fluctuation, pus formation, necessitating free incisions and drains." Disabled 9 weeks 5 days, $242.86. CLAIM No. 9422.-H. E. Dorsey, San Bernardino, Calif., Freight Conductor, A. T. & S. F. Injured May 30, 1930. "Broke knuckle four cars from head end ; knocked me against coal box. Fifty-five cars, one engine." "Sprained back ; bruises and contusions." Disabled 3 weeks, $75.00. CLAIM No. 9424.-H. F. Faust, Los Angeles, Calif., Freight Brakeman, South- ern Pacific. Injured May 1, 1930. "Sudden stop of train, throwing me against eupola of caboose with such force injuring my side, causing me to lose my hold, and to keep from falling, strained myself in such a way as to cause injury, necessary for operation. Fifty-eight cars, one engine." "Left inguinal hernia and hemorrhoids." Disabled 6 weeks 2 days, $157.14. CLAIM No. 9451.-A. F. Hughes, Eldon, Iowa, Freight Conductor, C. R. I. & P. Injured June 6, 1930. "Sudden jerk of train, throwing me to top of cupola, cutting my head. Sixty-eight cars, one engine." "Incised wound of scalp." Disabled 3 days, $6.42. CLAIM No. 9489.-A. L. Rinker, Peru, Ind., Freight Conductor, Wabash Railway. Injured June 23, 1930. "Was knocked down in cab by sudden stop- ping of train, throwing me against edge of bunk, striking my hip and back. Fifty-seven cars, one engine." "Contusion of back ; right lumbo-sacral strain." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71. CLAIM No. 9483.-A. Tingle, Covington, Ky., Freight Conductor, L. & N. Railroad. Injured June 23, 1930. "Engineer was making stop at DeCoursey, Ky., receiving yards, and for some unknown reason the air brakes dynamited after they had started to apply in service application, throwing me about ten feet against the front end of caboose and my hand was shoved through the glass in caboose door. Had experienced no air trouble on the trip prior to this. Thirty-six ears, one engine." "Gash three inches long, very deep on thick part of hand, little and ring finger badly cut." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $39.29. CLAIM No. 9528.-G. W. Huff. Jefferson City, Mo., Freight Brakeman, Mis- souri Pacific. Injured July 9, 1930. "When heading in yard at Sedalia, air went into emergency, throwing me against oil cellar, fracturing sixth rib on right side. Fifty-seven cars, one engine." "Fracture of sixth rib, right." Dis- abled 2 weeks 6 days, $71.43. CLAIM No. 9532.-F. S. Berg, Montevideo, Minn., Freight Conductor, C. M. St. P. & P. Injured July 9, 1930. "Was going to rear door of caboose, when air brakes went into undesired emergency, throwing me to floor, striking on right hand and forearm. Sixty-two cars, one engine." "Fracture through lower end of right radius into wrist joint, as shown in X-ray picture." Disabled 3 weeks, $75.00. CLAIM No. 9504.-T. H. Marshall, Eldorado, Ark., Conductor, traveling switch engine, Missouri Pacific Railroad. Injured June 24, 1980. "A sudden jerk of train threw me down against wash stand in caboose. Twenty-four cars, one engine." "Traumatic injury to chest ; fracture of ninth rib on right side." Disabled 8 weeks 5 days, $217.86. 122 TRAIN LE:NGTHS CLAIM No. 9637.-F. E. Vedder, Los Angeles, Calif., Freight Conductor, South- ern Pacific Railroad. Injured August 9, 1930. "I was getting up out of a chair as train stopped at Lang for water, hard stop, turned my ankle. Fifty- six cars, two engines." "Sprain left ankle." Disabled 2 weeks 2 days. £57.14. CLAIM No. 9678.-J. C. Simpkins, Asheville, N. C., Freight Conductor, Southern Railway. Injured August 26, 1930. "Sudden stop in train knocked me against hand hold on end of caboose and injured back. Fifty-seven cars, one engine." "Severe contusion right lumbar region of back." Disabled 1 week 2 days, $32.14. CLAIM No. 9667.-W. C. Stevens, Raleigh, N. C., Freight Conductor, S. A. L. Railway. Injured August 14, 1930. "Was getting out of cupola of caboose car when slack ran out of train, striking my left side against arm rest. Fifty-one cars, one engine." "Green stick fracture of tenth rib of left side in axillary line." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57. CLAIM No. 9669.-W. 11. Erwin, Tracy, Calif., Freight Brakeman, S. P. Co. Injured August 22, 1930. "Train was stopping for water and after air had been applied, caboose made a sudden lurch and I was thrown against front of cupola and injured. Sixty-two cars, one engine." "Contusion to left chest; contusion to right thumb nail." Disabled 2 weeks 5 days, $67.86. CLAIM No. 9736.-C. D. Carr, Brookfield, Mo., Freight Conductor, C., B. & Q. Injured September 12, 1930. "Was on rear of way car when slack bunched in train and knocked me against grab iron, bruising and spraining right shoulder. Fifty-four cars, one engine." "Sprained and bruised shoulder." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. CLAIM No. 9745.-W. B. Whitaker, Asheville, N. C., Freight Conductor, Southern Railway. Injured September 13, 1930. "Stopping at coal chute, slack jammed in train, throwing me against west end of cab, as I started to open door. Fifty-four cars, one engine." "Swollen area inner side of knee and just above knee with slight discoloration." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $39.29. CLAIM No. 9628.-W. E. Butler, Montgomery, Ala., Freight Conductor, L. & N. Injured August 10, 1930. "Slack in long train ran in, knocking me down against stove in caboose, while approaching station, displaying signal at "19" train order position, was going out for the order. Sixty-four cars, one engine." "Contused lacerated wound of lower lip, left upper front tooth knocked out, with fracture of the superior maxills. Severe bruise of left shoulder and arm." Disabled 7 weeks 4 days, $189.29. CLAIM No. 9659.--E. D. Choate, Taylor, Texas, Freight Conductor, I. & G. N. Injured August 8, 1930. "Was knocked off my feet by violent start of train back- ward. In falling struck step of caboose cupola, bruising right side. Fifty cars, one engine." "Contusion of right side at lower border of ribs." Disabled 1 week, $15.00. CLAIM No. 9816.-J. S. Murphy, Sheffield, Ala., Freight Conductor, Northern Alabama Railway. Injured October 16, 1930. "Slack ran out of train, jerking me against wall of caboose. Twelve cars, one engine." "Bady sprained back-pain on motion, especially in right sacro illiac syncondrosis." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. CLAIM No. 9761.-C. J. O'Connor, Roodhouse, Ills., Freight Conductor, Chicago & Alton. Injured September 20, 1930. "Engineer made an emergency stop, throw- ing me through the screen door, and out on the platform of caboose against the iron railing on back end of carboose. Forty cars, one engine." "Traumatic injury of right inguinal region, resulting in phlebitis. Also injury to left chest in region of nipple." Disabled 6 weeks 4 days, $164.29. CLAIM No. 9791.-G. W. Redd, Frankfort, Ind., Freight Conductor, N. Y. C. & St. L. Injured October 4, 1930. "Thrown over back of caboose as train started suddenly. Twenty-nine cars, one engine." "Injury to right shoulder. Acromial clavicular joint injured. Probable cracked rib, right side. Sprained shoulder muscles and back." Disabled 8 weeks 1 day, $203.57. CLAIM No. 9868.-J. A. Cotter, Brookfield, Mo., Freight Conductor, C. B. & Q. Injured November 2, 1930. "Was sitting at desk when engineer ran through switch, making a sudden stop, causing body to go forward, shoving chest into breast at lower part of ribs. Sixty-four cars, one engine." "Fractured seventh right rib." Disabled 4 week 4 days, $114.29. CLAIM No. 9939.-J. E. Sackett, Roseville, Calif., Freight Conductor, Southern Pacific Company. Injured November 6, 1930. "While replacing drawer to con- ductor's desk, caboose car S. P. 730, slack of train, extra 4131 west, ran in, throwing me against wall, pinching little finger between wall and drawer. Sixty-nine cars, one engine." "Fracture of little finger, left hand." Disabled 3 weeks, $75.00. CLAIM No. 10019.-C. F. Botham, Galesburg, Ill., Freight Conductor, C. R &. Q. Railroad. Injured December 14, 1930. "Train made a hard stop and knocked TRAIN LENGTHS 123 me against east door lock in way car at Monmouth, Ill., while stopping to set out cars on Extra East 5311." "Injury to sciatic nerve characterized by neuralgic pain, tenderness and numbness along the course of the nerve." Disabled 4 days, $14.29. Fifty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 1022.-W. M. Johnson, Villa Grove, Ill., Freight Brakeman, C. & E. I. Railway. Injured November 13, 1930. "Knocked down in caboose and sprained and fractured bone in left wrist." "Slight fracture left scaphoid bone." Disabled 9 weeks 6 days, $246.43. Fifty-three cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 9856.-M. F. Marshall, Coffeyville, Kan., Freight Conductor, Mis- souri Pacific. Injured October 28, 1930. "Stopping train at Dexter, Kan., air applied on head end of train caused a jar on rear end, threw me against door facing, causing above injuries." "Contusion on back and on legs." Disabled 13 weeks, $325.00. Forty-three cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10103.-W. E. Harrison, Waterloo, Iowa., Freight Conductor, Illi- nois Central Railroad. Injured January 14, 1931. "Engineer was stopping train to head in on siding. The air brakes applied on train and caboose, when suddenly the train lurched ahead. This action snapped my head back as far as it could go, causing such pain in head and soreness in neck, I could not work." "Muscle strain of the muscles of the neck, back and shoulders." Disabled 1 week, $25.00, Forty-nine cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10134.-C. E. Shank, Red Oak, Iowa, Freight Conductor, Burling- ton. Injured January 22, 1931. "Sudden application of the air and thrown against knob of way car door." "Contusion right side chest under axilla." Disabled 3 days, $10.71. Twenty-nine cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10056.-C. O. Williams, Columbia, S. C., Freight Flagman, Southern Railway. Injured December 26, 1930. "In cupola train 53-December 20, 1930, Charlotte, N. C., to Columbia, S. C., when stopping at St. L. railroad crossing at Chester, S. C., I was thrown against front of cupola, knocking out front. window, getting glass in left eye, hurting left side, then falling about six feet to floor, wrenching left foot and ankle." "Contusion left side over lower ribs and left side of abdomen. Injury to left foot through the tarsus. This fpot has been injured before and there has been limitation of flexion since February 22, 1930." Disabled 6 weeks, 5 days, $167.86. Fifty-eight cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10228.-George Slamal, Marshalltown, Iowa, Freight Conductor, M. & St. L. Injured February 24, 1931. "Train line under fifteenth car ahead of way car broke off and train stopped at once, throwing me against corner of cupola." "Bruise of muscles, right shoulder." Disabled 2 weeks, 4 days, $64.29. Sixty-eight cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10185.-L. E. Ayers, Superior, Wis., Freight Brakeman, Great Northern Railway. Injured February 16, 1931. "Emergency stop of train throw- ing me from cupola to floor of caboose." "Deep contusion of right shoulder, involving scapular and pectoral region, with some contusion to brachial plexus. Sprained right ankle, slight." Disabled 4 weeks, 1 day, $103.57. Sixty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10266.-T. J. Jones, Norlina, N. C., Freight Conductor, Seaboard Air Line Railway. Injured March 12, 1931. "Brakeman pulled emergency air brake to stop rolling train, just as I got up to go to rear of train, throwing me against cupola partition." "Was thrown against lock in cab, thought nose broken. Went to Stuart Circle Hospital, Richmond, and was seen by Dr. W. L. Mason on March 13." Disabled 6 days, $21.43. Sixty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10285.-J. J. Gorman, Ft. Dodge, Iowa, Freight Conductor, Illi- nois Central. Injured March 7, 1931. "While pulling into Ft. Dodge yard, Yardmaster stepped out in front of engine and threw wrong switch, heading us in on top of another train. Engineer set emergency brakes, stopping at once, and throwing me over the desk chair." "Contusion to chest and strain of back muscles." Disabled 1 week, 1 day, $28.57. Forty-four cars, two engines. CLAIM No. 10298.-E. L. Morse, Waterloo, Iowa, Freight Conductor, Illinois Central. Injured March 27, 1931. "Was walking toward back door of caboose and in stopping at water tank at Scales Mount, train stopped so suddenly it knocked me backwards about twelve feet and I lost balance and fell on my back and right arm under me." "Severe sprain to right wrist." Disabled 5 days, $17.86. Thirty-two cars, one engine. Claim No. 10267.-William Cullen, Rochester, N. Y., Freight Conductor, N. Y. C. Injured March 2, 1931. "Caused by slack running together and engi- neer using steam, suddenly throwing me against door jamb, injuring left side." 124 TRAIN LENGTHS "Left side--contusion." Disabled 1 week 5 days, $42.86. Twenty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10288.-S. P. Gooding, Kansas City, Mo., Freight Conductor, Chicago Great Western. Injured March 24, 1931. "Was on steps of rear end of caboose. Engineer made sudden stop, throwing me against hand hold, badly jamming my shoulder, causing me to be unable to use arm." "Contusion of right shoulder," disabled 1 week, $25.00. Sixty-six cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10301.-J. E. Sackett, Roseville, Calif., Freight Conductor, South- ern Pacific Company. Injured March 22, 1931. "Standing on steps of rear platform of S. P. caboose, car 695, Ex. 4144 West, train parted second car be- hind the engine, throwing me against the end of cab and grab irons." "Abrasion and contusion left thigh, contusion chest"; disabled 1 week 4 days, $39.29. Sixty- eight cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10193.-J. Monroe, Silvis, Ill., Freight Brakeman, C. R. I. & P. Railroad. Injured February 12, 1931. "Was knocked down and struck .corner of stand in caboose, caused by hard stop made by Ex. 2639 at 10: 30 p. m. at Morris, Ill." "Fracture of tenth rib and severe bruises of muscles and tissues extending from one and one-half to two inches from spine around to nipple line"; disabled 9 weeks 2 days, $232.14. Sixty-nine cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10277.-J. W. Foster, Portsmouth, Va., Freight Conductor, S. A. L. Railway. Injured March 17, 1931. "While heading in yard at shops, defective switch derailed five cars and when brakes went on in emergency, I was thrown against grab iron on rear of cab, bruising my back and ribs." "Injury to ribs"; disabled 4 days, $5.95. Forty-nine cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10310.-B. J. Coleman, Columbia, S. C., Freight Conductor, South- ern Railway Company. Injured March 15, 1931. "Extra 4611 stopped at water tank, Ridgesprings, S. C., engineer stopped the engine to water tank with independent brake, slack ran up and threw me over and I slipped and struck nail which was out about one-half an inch." "Old wart proximal portion of palm of left hand--struck wart with nail, knocking it off level with skin. Re- turned very rapidly with much overgrowth and apparently pigmented. Suspected sarcoma" ; disabled 2 weeks 3 days, $60.71. Sixty-three cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10327.-C. O. Davis, East St. Louis, Ill., Freight Conductor, C. B. & Q. Injured April 4, 1931. "Was thrown down by sudden jerk of train after had been set and released and swung around stove and struck edge of corner of bunk before striking floor, knocking wind out of me and bruising chest, fractured ribs." "Bruise of right side of chest axillary line. Fractured ninth rib in same location. Pain on inspiration-pain and soreness on moving." Disabled 3 weeks 1 day, $78.57. Fifty-five cars one engine. CLAIM No. 10112.-D. L. Harris, Roodhouse, Ill., Freight Conductor, C. & A. Railroad Company. Injured October 15, 1931. "Emergency stop by engineer and thrown against caboose." "Severe traumatic injury right arm involving or resulting in a neuritis internal cutaneous nerve. X-ray picture also showed some periostitis." Disabled 15 weeks 5 days, $392.86. Fifty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10340.-W. B. Nelson, Asheville, N. C., Freight Flagman, Southern Railway Company. Injured April 10, 1931. "Slack run up in train, throwing me against stove in caboose, injuring my left shoulder." "Bruising of and blueing of the muscles of the upper arm." Disabled 6 weeks 2 days, $157.14. Forty-eight cars, two engines. CLAIM No. ±u436.-J. A. Tyler, Marshall, Texas, Freight Conductor, T. & P. Injured April 6, 1931. "Train of fifty bad order cars draw bars slipped by ac- count low draw-heads caused train to stop in emergency." "Severe contusion and laceration of scalp (left side), also contusion left shoulder and neck, some discoloration and swelling." Disabled 4 days, $14.29. Fifty-four cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10455.-J. G. Pochel, Bloomington, Ill., Freight Conductor, C. & A. Railroad. Injured May 17, 1931. "Rough stopping of train at water tank, Raniker, Ill." "Train stopped suddenly and he fell with full weight against right shoulder (right shoulder, capsular ligament torn loose from neck of humerus acromin process.)" Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $57.14. Sixty-four cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10563.-N. Nelson, Chicago, Ill., Freight Conductor, Illinois Central Railway. Injured June 27, 1931. "Coming into home signal, tower man came on ground and gave signal to stop. Engineer applied emergency brakes, causing train to come to a sudden stop, throwing me against the stove in caboose." "Sprain of the left wrist, no evidence of broken bones, except styloid process of ulna." Disabled 1 week 6 days. $46.43. Twenty-seven cars, one engine. TRAIN LENGTHS 125 CLAIM No. 10539.-F. H. Jones, Seymour, Ind., Freight Flagman, Baltimore & Ohio. Injured June 9, 1931. "In starting train, was thrown against railing of caboose, striking growth in back, causing infection to set in, resulting in surgical removal." . "Thrown against railing of caboose, striking growth in back, causing infection, resulting in surgical removal." Disabled 7 weeks, $175.00. Sixty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10577.-D. W. McIntyre. Yuma, Ariz., Mixed Freight Conductor, Southern Pacific Company. Injured June 30, 1931. "Making an emergency stop of train to avoid striking cattle on bridge, throwing me against door stop on door frame of baggage car." "Train stopped suddenly, throwing him against side of baggage car and causing tenderness and pain in right lower chest." Disabled 4 weeks 6 days, $121.43. Twenty-eight cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10674.-G. F. Thompson, Slater, Mo., Freight Conductor, the Alton Railroad Company. Injured August 3, 1931. "Making sudden stop of train, the slack in train running together made such a severe compact that it threw me from the cupola of the caboose to the floor of the caboose, which is about four feet in height, alighting on my head and shoulders, thus wrenching my back, this leaving me so sore that I was compelled to lose four days." "Wrenched muscles of upper back." Disabled 4 days, $14.29. Fifty cars, two engines. CLAIM No. 10708.-F. C. Ashley, Van Buren, Ark., Freight Conductor, Mis- souri Pacific Railroad. Injured August 16, 1931. "Was standing in front end of open door in caboose. Engineer applied air to keep from running through a switch. It threw me out of front door, and I hit my back on brake wheel, and threw' me down on platform." "Four-inch cut left forearm, bruise over right back, pain in back and arm." Disabled 1 week 2 days, $32.14. Fifty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10739.-H. L. Johnson, Centralia, Ill., Freight Brakeman, C. B. & Q. Railroad. Injured August 17, 1931. "Making hard stop of train, striking my right elbow. Infection set in. Abrasion about size of cent on outer aspect of right elbow. Infected and surrounded by area of lymphangitis when first seen." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57. Fifty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10653.-W. L. Grooms, Springville, Utah, Freight Conductor, D. & R. G. W. Railroad Company. Injured July 24, 1931. "Air hose blew off, causing sudden stop of train, throwing me against the corner of the desk and on the floor of caboose and up against the partition under the cupola of ca- hoose. Lameness in both knees, contusion swelling Echymosis and contusion ever left lower costal region." Disabled 3 weeks 5 days, $92.86. Twenty-six cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10744.-C. R. Stewart, Palestine, Texas, Freight Conductor, I. G. N. Railroad. Injured August 15, 1931. "Sudden stop of train threw me down and I struck my side on a table desk on side of caboose, injuring my side and ribs ; impossible for me to breathe or move without severe pain." "Contusion of left side of chest-probable fracture of rib." Disabled 4 weeks 4 days, $114.29. Sixty-eight cars, two engines. CLAIM No. 10755.-D. F. Wallace, Slater, Mo., Freight Conductor, the Alton Railroad. Injured September 1, 1931. "Was taking siding and had started to rear end of caboose, when engineer discovered he was about to run through switch (had double-header), and applied the emergency air brakes, throwing me upon cupola flooring and partition; striking right shoulder, arm and back of hand." "Acromis-clavicular articulation, right shoulder partially dislocated." Disabled 3 weeks 4 days, $89.29. Thirty-six cars, two engines. CLAIM No. 10782.-E. B. Morrison, Hagerstown, Md., Local Freight Con- ductor, Western Maryland Railway Company. Injured September 9, 1931. "Was pulling into Hagerstown yard. Yardmaster headed train in on wrong track. Had two shop cars ahead of engine. Cars were sighted and emergency stop made. I was on the caboose and was thrown against jamb of door." "Left elbow over olecranon process-severe contusion-redness-swelling-pain. An acute traumatic bursitis." Disabled 4 days, $14.29. Thirty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10807.-J. E. Ballinger, Asheville, N. C., Freight Conductor, Southern Railway. Injured September 19, 1931. "Thrown against grab-iron, at back of caboose, striking thigh ; cause, sudden stop." "Distinct ridge of ecchymosis across outer side right thigh with considerable bruising." Disabled 2 Weeks 2 days, $57.14. Fifty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10832.-H. A. Morgan, Knoxville, Tenn., Freight Flagman, South- ern Railway. Injured September 17, 1931. "Engineer stopping 60-car train at Rot Springs, N. C., made rough stop, throwing me against front door of ca- 47891-38 --9 126 TRAIN LENGTHS boose. My left hand went through glass in door, cutting it in seven or eiglt places. One deep cut on wrist. Had five or six small glass cuts in palm of left hand and wrist." Disabled 4 days, $14.29, Sixty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10813.-C. E. Mensch, Tamaqua, Pa., Freight Conductor, Reading Railway. Injured September 16, 1931. "Was in caboose standing near water stand when a sudden application of air brakes moved me ahead and againat stand, striking leg just below hip." "Contusion of external surface of left thigh, Echymosis of entire left leg." Disabled 4 weeks 4 days, $114.29. Fify- five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10716.-B. D. Comstock, Sodus Point, N. Y., Freight Conductor, Pennsylvania Railroad Company. Injured August 23, 1931. "Engineer made sudden stop at water tank at Orleans, N. Y." "Contusion of right side chest. Radiograph report states costal cartilage injury on right side. Seventh and eighth ribs marked tenderness and pain on taking deep breath." Disabled 6 weeks 1 day, $92.14. Forty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10895.-E. A. Murdock, Macon, Ga., Freight Conductor, C. of Ga. Railway. Injured October 20, 1931. "Brakes applied for slow speed board, brakes went emergency on car next to engine, causing drawhead to break in this car. After brakes released, engine broke loose from train, causing an emer- gency stop, knocked me out of cupola to floor of caboose." "Bruises of left shoulder, strained muscle left side neck." Disabled 6 days, $46.43. Fifty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10888.-B. I. Slater, Yuma, Ariz., Freight Conductor, Southern Pacific Company. Injured October 16, 1931. "While pulling into Phoenix re- ceiving yard, engineer stopping train with independent air, causing train to run in and rough stop on rear, knocking me up against east end of cab, either strik- ing door knob or window sill, while I was sitting at desk closing up my reports for the trip." "Separated costal cartilage, pain and tenderness in left side of chest." Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $57.14. Sixty-nine cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10930.-E. A. Martin, Pen Argyl, Pa., Freight Flagman, L. N. E. Railroad. Injured October 15, 1931. "Sudden stop of sixty-five car train, throw- ing me against stove and closet, landing on floor of caboose." "Sprain of left wrist and laceration of left elbow." Disabled 2 weeks, $50.00. Sixty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10881.-IH. H. Journey, Ft. Worth, Texas, Freight Conductor, Texas & Pacific. Injured September 23, 1931. "I was sitting at desk making out switch list (caboose). Train went through dip, jerked slack out of train, causing me to fall sideways, causing me to fall to floor, hitting my right eye on side of bunk." "Cerebral concussion." Disabled 1 week 6 days, $46.43. Sixty- one cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10908.-E. L. Carrithers, Ft. Scott, Kan., Freight Conductor, Mis- souri Pacific Railway Company. Injured October 24, 1931. "Was thrown out of door of caboose due to rough stop of train, and left hand caught in door jamb as door slammed shut." "Crushing injuries of middle and ring fingers left hand." Disabled 4 weeks 3 days, $110.71. Forty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10945.-J. S. Padon, Mineola, Texas, Freight Conductor, Texas & Pacific. Injured October 31, 1931. "Had fifty-five cars, one engine, moving 35 miles per hour. Engine stripped rods and pins on both sides. Emergency stop made by engineer. Rear end shock knocked me down in caboose, resulting in severe bruises to base of spine." "Severe contusion back in lower sacral region". Disabled 3 weeks, $75.00. Fifty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11012.-T. E. Walker, Trenton, Mo., Freight Brakeman, C. R. I. & P. Railroad. Injured November 20, 1931. "As I was going out the rear end of caboose at Streppy mines to pick up ten cars, the train stopped suddenly, throwing me against the grab iron." "Contusion of the left thigh, anterior stir- face, swelling, discoloration and pain." Disabled 6 days, $21.43. Thirty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10992.-J. F. Conway, St. Louis, Mo., Freight Conductor, Missouri Pacific Railway. Injured November 20, 1931. "Sudden stop, knocking me down in caboose. On investigating found train had parted." "Pain and swelling right wrist, sprain of right wrist." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57. Thirty-nine-cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10913.-George Cline, Louisville, Ky., Freight Conductor, Southern Railway. Injured October 22, 1931. "Train was heading in yards, sudden stop on head throwing me against cupola in caboose, fracturing right cheek bone, bad bruises under right eye." "Fracture of right upper maxilla." Disabled 6 weeks 1 day, $153.57. Forty-eight cars, one engine. TRAIN LENGTHS 127 CLAIM No. 10981.-S. Strode, Ft. Worth, Texas, Freight Conductor, M. K. & T. Injured November 11, 1931. "I was standing in cab and slack rolled in unexpected and knocked me down." "Severe bruising on right hip." Disabled 6 days, $21.43. fifty-nine cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10947.-J. C. Titsworth, Gladstohe, Mich., Freight Conductor, Minn., St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway. Injured October 30, 1931. "Train making very sudden stop, was thrown against in cupola of caboose, striking left shoulder and left side." "Left shoulder bruised and rib fractured." Disabled 5 weeks 3 days, $135.71. Fifty-eight cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11092.-D. E. Sweeney, Princeton, Ky., Freight Conductor, Illinois Central Railroad. Injured December 15, 1931. "Engineer made emergency stop at absolute block, knocking me against oil locker, back striking marker bracket, right arm striking side of locker." "Contusion of right side of chest and right elbow." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. Thirty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11037.-J. M. Rothrock, Bradford, Pa., Freight Flagman, B. R. & P. Railway. Injured December 1, 1931. "Switch tender had switches set for wrong track, making it necessary. to make an emergency stop, throwing me through caboose door." "Sprain and contusion left wrist." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days, $107.14. Fifty-nine cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11069.-G. Swanner, Lebanon Junction, Ky., Freight Conductor, L. & N. Railroad. Injured December 9, 1931. "Sitting on bunk making out re- ports. Engine derailed, brakes were applied in emergency, stopping train sud- denly, throwing me against end of caboose, causing injuries." "Both hands, head and left knee bruised." Disabled 5 weeks 3 days, $135.71. Sixty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11120.-J. J. Troy, Marion, Iowa, Freight Brakeman, Milwaukee. Injured December 25, 1931. "Rough stop of train. Bruise of left shoulder and arm." Disabled 3 weeks 6 days, $96.43. Sixty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11193.-C. C. Wallick, Laramie, Wyo., Freight Conductor, Union Pacific. Injured January 17, 1932. "Heading into passing track, and a train in ahead of us, bad snow storm, and engineer applied brakes in emergency, threw me up against corner of cupola and down on my face." "Laceration of left cheek." Disabled 3 days, $10.71. Sixty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11082.-J. L. O'Brien, Helper, Utah, Freight Conductor, D. & R. G. W. Railroad. Injured December 11, 1931. "Was sitting at my desk making out reports, train moving about ten miles per hour, car was derailed on icv crossing, making sudden stop. Thrown against desk." "Fracture of ribs left side ; contusion over upper abdomen and chest." Disabled 6 weeks 2 days, $157.14. Forty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11229.-J. P. Catterlin, Lafayette, Ind., Freight Conductor, C. I. & L. Railway. Injured Jan. 27, 1932. "Applying brakes and then releasing brakes, slack ran back, throwing me down in caboose." "Injury to tenth rib (right), strained muscles chest and back." Disabled 2 weeks 5 days, $67.86. Fifty-three cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11313.-C. L. Sims, Sanderson, Texas, Freight Brakeman, T. & N. O. Railroad, S. P. Lines. Injured Feb. 14, 1932. "Leaving Ryan, Tex., down grade and running seven or eight miles per hour. Engine brakes applied in emergency, knocking' me backward over the rail on caboose platform." "Severe sprain - with accompanying bruise right shoulder and left wrist." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. Sixty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11396.-A. D. Moore, Portsmouth, Ohio, Freight Conductor, N. & W. Railroad. Injured March 6, 1932. "In making stop for coal and water account of heavy loads on head end, caused train to lurch forward suddenly, throwing me against brake wheel on rear of cab, bruising back and fracturing ribs." Disabled 2 weeks, $50.00. Sixty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10326.-A. H. Carroll, McMechen, W. Va., Freight Conductor, B. & O. Railroad. Injured April 4, 1931. "Emergency stop with fifty-seven cars and two engines, account of automobile coming over the hill close to track flagged by a man with torch. Badly sprained and wrenched back." Disabled 52 Weeks, $780.00. Fifty-seven cars, two engines. CLAIM No. 11403.-J. J. Hunter, Osawatomie, Kan., Freight Conductor, Missouri Pacific Railroad. Injured March 10, 1932. "Caused by emergency stop, throwing me against desk in caboose." "Simple fracture of rib." Disabled 4 weeks 1 day, $103.57. Sixty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11448.-M. Addison, McComb, Miss., Freight Flagman, Illinois Central Railroad. Injured March 18, 1932. "Was going to rear of caboose platform to drop fusee off. Engineer released brakes, causing sudden jerk, throwing me against ladder on rear end of caboose." "Contusion to chest wall." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. Sixty cars, one engine. 128 TRAIN LENGTHS CLAIM No. 11446.-F. Dunlavy, Wichita Falls, Texas, Freight Conductor, F. W. & D. C. Railway. Injured March 27, 1932. "I was on back platform of caboose, sudden and rough stop was made, jerking me around and resulting in sprain of right shoulder." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. Sixty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11452.-W. O. Davis, Mojave, Calif., Freight Brakeman, Southern Pacific Company. Injured March 25, 1932. "Jerked from rear platform of caboose by sudden application and release of air brakes." "Abrasions of right leg and left elbow and sprained shoulders." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. Six cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11505.-J. A. Ervin, Ashville, N. C., Freight Conductor, Southern Railway. Injured April 10, 1932. "Jerked down while train was running and caught on right hand." "Sprain and strain of right wrist and fingers." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $39.29. Twenty-four cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11493.-E. D. Tilley, Mineola, Texas, Freight Conductor, T. & P. Railroad. Injured March 30, 1932. "Caught on rear of caboose as air was applied, causing train to dynamite, throwing me up against hand hold on caboose." "Severe contusion right side of chest." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. Fifty-eight cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11014.-B. I, Slater, Yuma, Ariz., Freight Conductor, Southern Pacific. Injured Nov. 23, 1931. "Stopping at Hyder, Ariz., to take water and oil, caboose was getting close to station and I got up from chair at desk in end of cab when engineer made emergency application with air, knocking nie down." "Fracture of left radius." Disabled 23 weeks 1 day, $578.57. Fifty- one ears, one engine. CLAIM No. 11508.-T. Parker, Tucson, Ariz., Freight Conductor, Southern Pacific. Injured March 24, 1932. "After stopping at Wymola Station to meet train, head brakeman opened passing track switch, engineer started train, head brakeman then went ahead and threw spur switch, engineer saw he was heading into spur track, applied the air in emergency." "Bruise of right lumbar region." Disabled 6 weeks, $90.00. Sixty-six cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11529.-G. H. Roberts, Columbus, Ga., Freight Flagman, C. of Ga. Railway. Injured April 22, 1932. "Engine parted from train, causing emergency stop." "Injuries to muscles of back and chest." Disabled 4 weeks, $100.00. Sixty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11608.-W. G. Falls, Salisbury, N. C., Freight Flagman, South- ern Railway. Injured May 18, 1932. "Jerked backward over guard rail of caboose rear platform by rough start of train." "Strain of muscles of back." Disabled 4 days, $14.29. Twenty-six cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11472.-F. L. Fiale, Roodhouse, Ill., Freight Flagman, Alton Rail- road. Injured April 1, 1932. "Slack ran out of train when engineer released air, jerking me off of rear end of caboose over the end railing, down on the track. Train running about 20 or 25 miles per hour." "Fracture of scapula and ribs" Disabled 8 weeks 5 days, $117.86. Thirty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11704.-R. B. Sorrells, Atlanta, Ga., Freight Conductor, Southern Railway. Injured June 19, 1932. "In stopping train at water tank, engineer made a hard stop, causing me to fall backward." "Contusion of left wrist." Disabled 2 weeks 3 days, $60.71. Forty-eight cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11697.-T. J. Boyle, Centralia. Ill., Freight Conductor, Illinois Central Railway. Injured June 21, 1932. "Was knocked down in caboose due to a bad stop at station." "Contusion to occiput, contusion of back, elbow, right ankle, hip, and neck." Disabled 5 days, $17.86. Thirty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11780.-M. F. Burnham, Perry, Iowa, Freight Conductor, C., M, St. P. & P. Injured July 15, 1932. "Emergency stop, knocking me down in cab." "Contusion and abrasion of right leg." Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $57.14. Sixty-nine cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11784.-W. R. E. Kelly, Stockton, Calif., Freight Brakeman, Western Pacific. Injured July 15, 1932. "Emergency application of air, throwing me against rear end of caboose." "Injury to right thigh and right chest with fracture of tenth rib." Disabled 1 week 6 days, $46.43. Sixty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11816.-H. G. Weise, Pinekneyville, Ill., Freight Brakeman, I111- nois Central Railway. Injured July 19, 1932. "Went to look out of side door in caboose when slack rolled up in train, throwing me forward against bed board brace on the bunker." "Contusions over insertion of patella. Disabled 5 days, $17.86. Forty-nine cars, one engine. TRAIN LENGTHS 129 CLAIM No. 11757.--F. P. Outeelt, La Crosse, Wis., Freight Brakeman, C. B. & Q. Railroad Company. Injured July 5, 1932. "Derailment of engine and eight cars on train I was working on. I was standing on rear platform in a position to catch order and the sudden stop threw me against the iron grab-iron, causing fracture of lower left ribs." Disabled 6 weeks 1 day, $153.57. Fifty-four cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 11865.-J. E. Goodin, Morristown, Tenn., Freight Conductor, Southern Railway. Injured Aug. 5, 1932. "Sudden stop of train; was on rear and grab iron caboose rammed into my left side." "Fracture rib; contusion of chest." Disabled 6 weeks 1 day, $153.57. Forty-six cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 10821.-W. T. Masterson, Gladstone, Mich., Freight Conductor, Soo Line. Injured Sept. 21, 1931. "Thrown off top of train when brakes went into emergency." "Crushing injury to right knee, resulting in fracture with marked displacement; oblique fracture of fibula." Disabled 52 weeks, $1,300.00. Forty-three cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12016.-T. F. Carrier, Milwaukee, Wis., Freight Conductor, C. M. & St. P. & P. Railway. Injured Aug. 28, 1932. "Was thrown forward in caboose by a sudden stop, landing on right knee." "Contusions of knee joint, synovitis of right knee." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. Forty-two cars, two engines. CLAIM No. 11979.-S. N. Borah, Louisville, Ky., Freight Conductor, Southern Railway. Injured Sept. 6, 1932. "Engineer applied the air in emergency, throw- ing me against the wash basin in caboose with such force as to break my ribs." "Broken ribs left side." Disabled 4 weeks 6 days, $121.43. Twenty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12054.-H. H. Jackson, Cleveland, Ohio, Freight Brakeman, C. C. C. St. L. Railway. Injured Sept. 24, 1932. "Rough stop of train-knocked down in caboose." "Severe contusions and sprain of back." Disabled 1 week 3 days; $35.71. Forty-nine cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12137.-P. F. Shields, Belle Plaine, Iowa, Freight Conductor, C. & N. W. Railway. Injured Oct. 4, 1932. "There were two engines on train, Iie head engine broke the head of drawbar on second engine on head end, causing the air to set on train, knocking me against desk." "Fracture of tenth and eleventh ribs. Disabled 3 weeks 4 days, $37.22. Sixty-three cars, two engines. CLAIM No. 12075.-E. T. Griffith, Bellefontaine, Ohio, Freight Brakeman, C. C. C. & St. L. Railway. Injured Sept. 27, 1932. "Heading into Turner yard, vas knocked down in caboose, striking table." "Bruised left chest." Disabled 1 weeks 4 days, $114.29. Forty-six cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12107.-C. Payne, Trenton, Mo., Freight Conductor, C. R. I. & P. Injured Oct. 10, 1932. "I was seated at desk in caboose doing clerical work when approaching signal at Tower No. 2, signal went red and engineer made emer- gency application of air, throwing me against desk." "Simple fracture of rib." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days, $107.14. Fifty-eight cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12217.-C. A. Jackson, Oroville, Calif., Freight Conductor, Western Pacific. Injured Nov. 11, 1932. "Was stopping train to do local work at.Scotts, Calif., when engineer made a bad stop, throwing me against the corner of desk, bruising my right side and back." "Contused abrasion right anterior thorax." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71. Forty-three cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12062.-W. A. Scanlon. Brookfield, Mo., Freight Conductor, C. B. & Q. Railroad. Injured Sept. 23, 1932. "Train bunched, knocking me over stove." "Severely sprained right ankle with torn ligaments." Disabled 10 weeks 4 days, $264.29. Forty-one cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12255.-J. Turner, Frankfort, Ind., Freight Conductor, N. Y. C. & St. L. Railroad. Injured Nov. 16, 1932. "Emergency application of air, knock- ing me against cupola band hold." "Severe bruising injuries to back and side." Disabled 1 week $25. Sixty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12078.-W. R. E. Kelly, Stockton, Calif., Freight Brakeman, Western Pacific. Injured Sept. 30, 1932. "Was standing on rear end of caboose and thrown off by violent jerk starting train." "Fracture of the internal Inalleolus of left leg." Disabled 11 weeks. $275. Thirty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12310.-B. F. Covin, Mineola, Texas, Freight Brakeman, Texas & Pacific Railway Company. Injured Nov. 25, 1932. "While switching cut of ears at Grand Saline, Texas, hanging on end of Missouri Pacific coal car with left arm, slack ran up and threw me against end of car." "Deep bruises of muscles of left side up under arm." Disabled 2 weeks, $50. Fifteen or eighteen cars, one engine. 130 TRAIN LENGTHS CLAIM No. 12363.-J. W. Newland, Lebanon Junction, Ky., Freight Con- ductor, L. & N. Injured Dec. 19, 1932. "Knocked down while heading in passing track at East Burnstadt." "Bruised and mashed left side." Disabled 1 week 2 days, $32.14. Sixty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12427.-W. M. O'Hearn, Slater, Mo., Freight Brakeman, Alton Railroad. Injured Jan. 3, 1933. "I was walking toward rear end of caboose when train gave a lurch when air brakes were released and I was thrown against door knob of rear door." "Injury to cartilage union of floating rib, right side." Disabled 2 weeks 3 days. $60.71. Thirty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12252.-C. L. Jack, Salt Lake City, Utah, Freight Brakeman, D. & R. G. W. Railway. Injured Nov. 16, 1932. "Cut of 64 cars, was riding on rear end of coal car, moving about 20 miles per hour; sudden stop threw me against end of coal car, top of which was even with my chest, 19 cars off center, three or four draw bars, four off track." "Contusion of chest and liver." Disabled 9 weeks, 1 day, $228.57. Sixty-four cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12314.-C. N. Condra, Washington, Ind., Freight Flagman, B. &. O. S. V. Injured Dec. 7, 1932. "Thrown against caboose table as result of emergency stop made by engineer while heading in at Flora, Ill." "Two frac- tured ribs, bruises and contusions of body." Disabled 6 weeks, $150.00. Fifty- eight cars, two engines. CLAIM No. 12412.-J. Turner, Frankfort, Ind., Freight Conductor, N. Y. C. & St. L. Injured Dec. 22, 1932. "On inbound train engineer made emergency application of air, knocking me against cupola." "Fractured sixth and seventh ribs, left side." Disabled 3 weeks, 4 days, $89.29. Thirty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12380.-R. F. Russell, Oil City, Pa., Freight Brakeman, P. R. R. Injured Dec. 10, 1932. "Emergency application of train brakes. Was thrown against desk of cabin car." "Left side of back sprained and bruised." Disabled 5 weeks, 2 days, $79.28.. Sixty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12509.-C. A. Sorrells, El Paso, Texas, Freight Conductor, S. P. Railroad. Injured Jan. 18, 1933. "Emergency application of air brakes from engine, was thrown against inside end of cab, striking head against cab." "Con- tusion of skull and right eye and concussion of brain." Disabled 2 weeks, 5 days, $67.86. Sixty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12553.-J. B. Corbin, Dupo, Ill., Freight Conductor, Missouri Pacific. Injured Feb. 5, 1933. "While train was drifting to switch, I was at table closing reports, train broke in two about ten cars behind engine, and the emergency set of air threw me against table." "Sprain of recti muscles and bruises to right chest." Disabled 1 week, 5 days, $42.86. Sixty- nine cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12717.-W. G. Granger, Chippewa Falls, Wis., Freight Conductor, Soo Line Railway Company. Injured March 17, 1933. "In making the stop for water, I was thrown against desk in caboose. Cut and bruised left hand." Disabled 6 days, $21.43. Fifty-one cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12663.-J. W. Wood, Trenton, Mo., Freight Brakeman, Rock Island. Injured March 2, 1933. "Sudden jar of train knocked me out of cupola." "Injury to back of head and neck." Disabled 6 weeks, 2 days, $157.14. Sixty-four cars. one engine. CLAIM No. 1277.-J. D. Honeyman. San Antonio, Texas, Freight Conductor, I. G. N. Injured March 9, 1933. "Making stop at water tank was knocked down in caboose." "Dislocated right shoulder and thumb on left hand lac- erated." Disabled 4 weeks, $100.00. Fifty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12764.-R. D. Peebles, Little Rock, Ark., Freight Brakeman, Rock Island. Injured April 1, 1933. "Car derailed about 10 or 12 cars from engine- set air in emergency and I was knocked off front end of caboose to the ground." "Left hip bruised, contusions left hip and left knee." Disabled 2 weeks, 1 day, £5357. Fifty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12768.-J. S. Daniels, Monroe, La., Freight Conductor, Y. M. V. Railway. Injured April 6, 1933. "Was knocked down in caboose when made rough sudden stop." "Sprain of left shoulder and back." Disabled 3 days, $10.71. Thirty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12429.-P. A. Schofield, West Chicago. Ill., Freight Conductor, 0. & N. W. Railway Company. Injured Jan. 2, 1933. "Was thrown against end of caboose account of sudden stop of train." "Fracture first rib (left), contusion left shoulder." Disabled 16 weeks, 2 days, $407.14. Fifty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12664.--R. L. Brown, Philadelphia, Pa., Freight Conductor, Read- ing Company. Injured Feb. 28, 1933. "Backing ears off at Tabor Junction, Philadelphia. Had 26 cars and was going to set off 25 and 26 cars on stop signal. TRAIN LENGTHS 131 yngineer made a straight air stop, throwing me from the 25th car to the ground." "Contusion of knee and dislocation of minor left semi-lunar carti- lage." Disabled 7 weeks, 3 days, $185.71. Thirty-three cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12814.-C. LaFleur, Cranbrook, B. C., freight conductor, Canadian Pacific Railway. Injured April 20, 1933. "Derailment shot out of seat' In caboose and struck iron pipe." "Bruises over right collar bone and right thigh." Disabled 1 week, 2 days, $32.14. Fifty-three cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12324.-H. E. Green, Minerva, Ohio, freight conductor, N. Y. C. Railroad. Injured Dec. 13, 1932. "Engineer made emergency application of air." "Fracture of ribs, left." Disabled 19 weeks, 4 days, $489.29. Fifty-two cars, two engines. CLAIM No. 12800.-T. R. Clegg, Princeton, Ind., freight brakeman, Southern Railway. Injured April 14, 1933. "Jerked backward against door of caboose when train was stopped by yard engine in yard making up train." "Contusion and sprain of muscles over right eighth rib." Disabled 2 weeks, 3 days, $36.42. Forty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12838.-F. E. Scarlott, Minerva, Ohio, freight conductor, N. Y. C. Railroad, Injured May 1, 1933. "Rough handling of train in starting, throwing me against stove and on floor of caboose." "Traumatic injury of left side." Disabled 6 days, $21.43. Seventeen cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12869. G. A. Mower, Montpelier, Ohio, freight conductor, Wabash Railroad. Injured May 11, 1933. "Sudden stop of engine threw me against stove in the caboose." "Cut on right forehead, third and fourth fingers cut, body brusises." Disabled 5 days, $17.86. Sixty-eight cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13001.-J. F. O'Herin, Pasco, Wash., freight conductor, Northern Pacific Railway. Injured June 18, 1933. "Was standing in body of caboose when, on account of to avoid running through a switch, emergency application of air applied, causing sudden and violent jar, which threw me against parti- tion of and to floor of caboose." "Lacerated and sprained arm and bruised right leg." Disabled 2 weeks 3 days, $60.71. Fifty-six cars, two engines. CLAIM No. 12948.-A. L. Rinker. Peru, Ind., freight conductor, Wabash Railway. Injured June 5, 1933. "Was sitting at desk making out reports, slack ran back on train with such force that it knocked me over on the floor, falling with all my weight on my left hand." "Fracture of left wrist, also sprain." Disabled 5 weeks 2 days, $132.14. Sixty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13047.-M. M. Arnold, Canton, Ohio, freight conductor, W. L. E. Railroad. Injured June 27, 1933. "Put air on emergency, engine struck auto, knocked me off chair, striking ice box in caboose." "Contusion and sprain of right chest." Disabled 6 days $12.86. Thirty-four cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13097.--0. L. Cagle, Birmingham, Ala., freight flagman, A. G. S. Railroad. Injured July 18, 1933. "Train stopping in emergency, knocking me from cupola onto the floor." "Dislocated thumb, right hip and knee bruised." Disabled 6 days, $21.43. Sixty-three cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13075.--W. A. Dale, Little Rock, Ark., freight conductor, C. R. I. & P. Injured July 8, 1933. "Was thrown against desk when taking slack to start train." "Left side bruised on lower ribs." Disabled I week 1 day, $28.57. Fifty-one cars, -One engine. CLAIM No. 13009.--C. H. Cook, Needles, Calif., freight conductor, A. T. & 8. F. Injured June 26, 1933. "Train parted at slow rate of speed, causing Undesired emergency. Chest badly bruised and right knee cut on left hand." "Injured wrist." Disabled 6 days, $21.43. Sixty-eight cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13011.-A. Lingenfield, South Connellsville, Pa., freight flagman, 13. & 0. Injured July 9, 1933. "When engineer applied air, slack ran in hard and caused me to lose my hold and get knocked down on table." "Contusion and sprain of back and right hip." Disabled 3 weeks 3 days, $51.42. Forty-four cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13085.-J. W. McCann, South Louisville, Ry., freight conductor, Southern Railway. Injured July 17, 1933. "Slack of train jerked me against corner of cupola, slack being so strong it broke my hold. I had 25 loads and 22 empties, 1,414 tons, made up in raggedy shape, loads and empties mixed in on rear, 14 empties and 2 loads on head end, rest scattered." "Broken eighth and ninth ribs, right side." Disabled 4 weeks, $100.00. Forty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13150.-O. M. Housley, Trenton, Mo., freight conductor, C. R. 1. & P Railway. Injured August 7, 1933. "Engineer applied air to bring train to restricted movement around curve ; train bunched, knocking my head against cross beam in top of cupola, and strain of muscles in neck." "Cut gah In top 132 TRAIN LENGTHS of head about two inches long to bone." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $39.29. Sixty- four cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13227.-W. E. Francis, Princeton, W. Va., freight conductor, Vir- ginian Railroad. Injured August 26, 1933. "Had 63 empties and engineer put brakes on heavy application, made rough stop, knocking me down in cab over top of stove on rear of train." "Sprained back and side hurt." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71. Sixty-three cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13193.-H. E. Ridge, Hagerstown, Md., freight flagman, Western Maryland Railway. Injured August 20, 1933. "Was sitting on seat left side of caboose when train stopped suddenly, throwing me against partition of caboose, striking left shoulder." "Badly strained muscles." Disabled 1 week 2 days, $19.28. Sixty-three cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13237.-J. F. Richardson, Cheyenne, Wyo., freight brakeman, Colorado & Southern. Injured Sept. 2, 1933. "Engineer got a short flag and applied air in emergency stop, throwing me against cupola of caboose." "Bruises on right hip." Disabled 5 days, $17.86. Fifty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13197.-D. Gorman, Bradford, Pa., freight conductor, Erie Railroad Company. Injured August 22,.1933. "Was pulling from Buffalo yard, standing on rear end of caboose to hand off train list to operator at tower when three cars were derailed near head end of train, setting train brakes in the emergency, throwing me against grab irons on rear end of caboose." "Left side of body bruised and ribs crushed." Disabled 5 weeks 4 days, $139.29. Sixty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13285-J. O. Rhymes, Temple, Texas, freight conductor, G. C. & S. F. Railway Company. Injured Sept. 16, 1933. "While train moving at a slow rate of speed, I presume engineer made an emergency application of air brakes, knocking me down in the caboose, striking head on top of water barrel, causing bad scalp injury, also bruising shoulder against the barrel." "Scalp injury and bruised shoulder." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57. Fifty-one cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13279.-J. O. Hargis, Smyrna, Ga., freight conductor, N. C. & St. L. Railway. Injured Sept. 9, 1933. "Slack in train ran out, causing a violent jerk, throwing me against an iron rod on platform of caboose." "Hemotoma of left arm ; swelling and discoloration." Disabled 3 days, $7.14. Thirty-nine cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13217.-O. J. Feather, Smithfield, Pa., mixed conductor, B. & O. Injured Aug. 25, 1933. "Getting on car. As I grabbed car, engine rammed cars, jerking feet off step." "Sprained shoulder." Disabled 2 weeks 5 days, $67.86. Fifty-three cars, two engines. CLAIM No. 13172.-R. E. McKinney, Appalachia, Va., freight conductor, South- ern Railway. Injured Aug. 3, 1933. "Standing in caboose behind 35 cars, engi- neer made emergency stop and as I came down on my feet my left foot slipped." "Both knees sprained." Disabled 10 weeks 4 days, $264.29. Thirty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13361.-J. M. Gwinn, San Antonio, Texas, freight conductor. Mis- souri Pacific Railway. Injured Oct. 8, 1933. "Train made stop on main line at Pearsall, Texas ; I braced myself, then got up out of my seat and was picking up lantern, when I heard slack coming. Train started backing up; throwing me to floor of caboose." "Dislocated finger, contusions, and sprained shoulder." Dis- abled 3 weeks, $49.98. Twenty-nine ears, one engine. CLAIM. No. 13377.-William Littlehale, San Bernardino, Calif., freight con- ductor, A. T. & S. F. Railway, Coast Lines. Injured Oct. 6, 1933. "Sudden stop. Thrown violently against railing front end caboose." "Contusions of right chest and leg." Disabled 3 weeks 4 days, $89.29. rifty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13469.-J. McAfee, St. Joseph, Mich., freight conductor, Pere Marquette Railroad. Injured Nov. 6, 1933. "Coming into Waverly with 7 loads, 56 empties, to stop there, when unusual quick stop threw me backwards over caboose stove ; fell on right open hand and shoulder." "Sprained right hand and wrist, and shoulder." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71. Sixty-three cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13185.-B. F. Snow, Lufkin, Texas, freight conductor, T. & N. O. Railway. Injured Aug. 19, 1933. "Sudden stop of train of 62 cars; was in caboose. Impact threw me down." "Right arm broken." Disabled 12 weeks 2 days, $307.14. Sixty-two cars, one enine. CLAIM No. 13541.--R. A. Howell. Mansfield, Ohio, freight conductor, Penn- sylvania Company. Injured Nov.. 22, 1932. "Sudden stop of freight train. causing to strike right side against table." "Contusion of right side." Disabled 1 week 2 days, $19.28. Sixty-three cars, one engine. TRAIN LENGTHS 133- CLAIM No. 13718.-J. S. Sanders, McComb, Miss., freight flagman, Illinois Central Railroad. Injured Jan. 23, 1934. "On rear end of caboose and sudden stop, my elbow struck ladder of caboose." "Contusion to right elbow." Dis- abled 1 week 2 days, $32414. Twenty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13774.-A. L. Osborn, Ft. Wayne, Ind., freight conductor, N. Y. C. & St. L. Injured Feb. 9, 1934. "Thrown against caboose window when emer- gency stop was made." "Laceration of forehead." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57. Sixty-four cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13842.-H. Kennard, Wichita Falls, Texas, freight brakeman, W. F. & S. Railroad Company. Injured Feb. 17, 1934. "Thrown against stove in caboose caused by sudden stop." "Bruised and contused tissue of left side." Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $53.57. Twenty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13797.-W. W. Levens, Oelwein, Iowa, freight conductor, Chicago Great Western Railroad. Injured Feb. 6, 1934. "In caboose, thrown. Hard stop of train." "Septic infection following lacerated wound from elbow joint." Disabled 2 weeks 6 days, $71.43. Sixty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13858.-J. 0. Retheford, Salem, Ill., freight conductor, C. E. I. Railroad. Injured March 3, 1934. "Was sitting in caboose writing up bills when knocked out of chair while spotting at water tank." "Bruised right hip." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71. Forty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13861.-C. W. Witt, North Fond du Lac, Wis., freight brakeman, Soo Line Railway Company. Injured Feb. 28, 1934. "While opening rear door of caboose air was released and slack ran out on train, causing me to be thrown and catching fingers in door." "Contused and bruised third right finger." Disabled 5 days, $17.86. Sixty-one cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13890.--W. Johnson, Charlottesville, Va., freight conductor, C. & 0. Injured March 5, 1934. "Jerk in train hit rib against cupola platform." "Fracture of left eighth rib in anterior axillary line." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. Fifty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13886.-L. II. Dingman, Pueblo, Colo., freight brakeman, A. T. & S. F. Railway. Injured March 10, 1934. "Knocked off end cars setting brake on rear car in train coming in yard ; emergency stop made to keep from running through switch." "Contusion of right thigh, resulting in discoloration, swell- ing and muscle spasm." Disabled 1 week 2 days, $32.14. Sixty-six cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13915.-J. C. Watson, Meadville, Pa., freight conductor, Erie Railroad. Injured March 20, 1934. "Sudden Stop of train; was thrown against side of caboose." "Contusion of muscles of back." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $39.29. Sixty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13666.-C. R. Simpson, Kenora, Ont., freight conductor, Canadian Pacific Railway Company. Injured Dec. 28, 1933. "Was in act of looking out cupola window when approaching Eagle River; the protection signal was dis- played on account of sub-zero weather, the visibility was poor. Engineer Codd made a very rough stop, throwing me against the cupola window frame with great force." "Torn ligaments of right shoulder and muscles bruised." Dis- abled 13 weeks 1 day, $328.57. Sixty-four cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13928.-J. Monahan, El Paso, Texas, freight conductor, T. & P. Railway. Injured March 27, 1934. "I was in the caboose sitting at desk with 60 cars. Engineer put the brakes on in emergency to spot car at plat- form to unload local, breaking two window glasses out of cupola and one frame." "Contusion of left hand and elbow." Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $57.14. Sixty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13924.-H. R. Cramer, Crewe, Va., freight brakeman, N. & W. Injured March 24, 1934. "Was on top of cab when sudden stop of train knocked me down against cupola." "Simple complete fracture of the right eighth rib." Disabled 3 weeks, $45.00. Sixty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13925.-C. M. Dye, Peru, Ind., freight flagman, C. & O. Railway. Injured March 30, 1934. "We were on 2'94 approaching Miami, Ohio, at a speed of 30 to 35 miles per hour. Engine struck a broken rail, causing a derailment of engine tank and nine cars, the quick stop throwing me against deck of cupola. Then when the rear of train hit the derailed cars I was thrown head-first against the front door of caboose." "Fractured left seventh rib and contusion of left chest." Disabled 3 weeks 2 days, $82.14. Thirty-six cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14010.-J. W. Hamilton, Dupo, Ill., freight conductor, Missouri Pacific Railway. Injured April 30, 1934. "Knocked to floor of caboose when engineer made an emergency application of air brake to avoid striking a cut of loaded cars ahead of engine." "Fracture of nasal bones, abrasion of fore- 134 TRAIN LENGTHS head, both arms, and right knee." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57. Sixty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13958.-G. A. Foley. Toledo, Ohio, freight brakeman, Pere Mar- quette Railway. Injured April 13, 1934. "While riding on ladder of box car, sudden stop jerked both feet off rung of ladder, allowing legs to hit stirrup on car." "Contusion on medial side of left knee over upper end of tibia, rupturing a varicose vein beneath the skin, followed by marked acchymosis." Disabled 4 weeks, $100.00. Thirty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 12937.-G. H. Kent, Denison, Texas, freight conductor, M. K. & T. Injured May 29, 1933. "Was thrown off cab step by sudden stop; left arm caught inside grab iron." "Fracture of both bones of left arm, middle and lower third." Disabled 52 weeks, $1,300.00. Twenty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14005.-L. B. Brubaker. Harrisburg, Pa., freight figman. Reading Company. Injured April 24, 1934. "Rough start of train, throwing me backward into wash bowl in cabin." "Fractured ribs, lacerationof elbow, contused shoul- der." Disabled 7 weeks, $105.00. Sixty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14106.-G. C. Heritage, Raleigh, N. C., freight conductor, Seaboard Air Line Railway. Injured June 3, 1934. "Knocked down in caboose car caused by unusual hard and rough stop." "Bruised hip." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. Fifty- eight cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14102.-C. Ash, Hamlet, N. C., freight flagman, S. A. L. Railway Company. Injured June 7, 1934. "Had gone to rear of train while running to throw off fusee account other train following close. Train came to sudden stop. slamming screen door of caboose. mashing finger." "Contused wound left third finger." Disabled 4 days, $14.29. Sixty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14088.-J. W. McCann. Louisville, Ky., freight conductor, Southern Railway. Injured May 28, 1934. "While making a stop west of Hooper the air released on caboose, letting it run against train; then the train jerked violently, throwing me up against corner of closet as I started to go out door to drop a fusee off." "Broken rib and bruised back." Disabled 2 week 6 days, $71.43. Forty- six cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14159.-J. H. Foreman, Denison, Texas, freight conductor, M. K. & T. Railway. Injured June 28, 1934. "Knocked down in caboose when air went into emergency." "Bruised right shoulder, and both arms." Disabled 6 days, $21.43. Fifty-six cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14164.-E. D. O'Bryant, Amarillo, Texas, freight conductor, F. W. D. C. Railway. Injured June 9, 1934. "Had head out of cupola window when breakes were applied, which threw my face against window." "Injured nose and face." Disabled 2 weeks 5 days, $67.86. Fifty-seven cars, one engine. QLAIM No. 14061.-A. J. Litton. Danville, Ky., freight conductor, Southern Railway. Injured May 16, 1934. "Sudden jerk of train, throwing body against cupola." "Strained back, neck and shoulder." Disabled 8 weeks 3 days, $210.71. Fifty-eight cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14243.-W .M. Johnson, Villa Grove, Ill., freight brakeman, C. & R I. Railway. Injured July 26, 1934. "Thrown down in caboose by rough stop of train." "Wrenched and sprained ligaments of right wrist." Disabled 6 days, $21.43. Fifty-three cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14183.-A. E. Thompson, Louisville, Ky., freight conductor, L. & N. Railroad Company. Injured July 3, 1934. "Brakes went into emergency and I was thrown." "Fracture left clavicle, laceration of the left elbow, contusion of the left thigh." Disabled 4 week 5 days, $70.71. Sixty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14215.-G. H. Nicholson, Kingsville, Texas, freight conductor. St. L. B & M. Injured July 18, 1934. "Knuckles slipped by between water car next to engine and head car in train, causing air to go in emergency, knocking me down in caboose, causing cut and bruises upper and lower back, also shoulders and left elbow bruised." Disabled 2 week 1 day, $53.57. Sixty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14234.-M. Handlin, Fitchburg, Mass., freight conductor, Boston & Maine Railroad. Injured July 20, 1934. ."Engine caught the guard rail, causing it to leave the track. Sudden stop throwing me to the floor, my leg was caught between desk and the box." "Contusions calf left leg ; contusions left hip." Disabled 3 week 4 days, $5.57. Sixty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14200.-P. O. Cannady, Evansville, Ind., freight conductor, L. & N. Railroad. Injured July 13, 1934. "Train parted, setting brakes in emergency. Braced myself for shock with right foot, turned right foot over, spraining ankle. Was on floor of caboose at the time." "Sprained right ankle." Disabled 4 weeks 5 days, $117.86. Sixty cars, two engines. CLAIM No. 14205.-G. E. Walton, Pratt, Ken., freight conductor, C. R. I. & P. Railway. Injured July 8, 1964. "Rough air stop, knocked me down." "Sacro- TRAIN LENGTHS 135 iliac strain." Disabled 7 weeks 5 days, $192.86. Forty-three cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14304.-G. E. Brown, St. Thomas, Ont., freight conductor, Wabash Railway Company. Injured Aug. 27, 1934. "Sudden application of the brakes, throwing me against stove in caboose." "Several cuts and bruises on both legs, bruise on the right side; right elbow bruised, causing inflammation." Disabled 1 week 5 days, $42.86. Forty-one cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14154.-F. A. Boykin, Atlanta, Ga., freight conductor, Southern Railway Company. Injured June 26, 1934. "Right knee sprained. Fracture upper end fibula. Descending from cupola, slack in train caused me to fall." Disabled 12 weeks one day, $182.14. Nineteen cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14038.-C. Reid, London, Ont., freight conductor, C. P. Railroad. Injured May 8, 1934. "Stopping in siding air went on, threw me over a chair, breaking my arm." "Fracture radius and ulna at left side." Disabled 20 weeks 2 days, $507.14. Sixty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14338.-C. J. Nixon, Alamosa, Colo., freight conductor, Denver & Rio Grande Western. Injured Sept. 2, 1934. "Slack ran in on 60-car train on 4 per cent grade, throwing me against ice box in caboose." "Contusion of right chest, no fracture, Bursitis left elbow." Disabled 3 weeks 5 days, $92.86. Sixty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14255.-J. B. Wellons, Macon, Ga., freight flagman, Southern Rail- way. Injured July 24, 1934. "Train slowed up for slow order at McRae, Ga. When resumed, speed jerked me over chair, struck my leg on top round of chair." "Hematoma of leg, with acute periositis." Disabled 8 weeks 4 days, $128.57. Fifty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14460.-John Schnoor, Muskogee, Okla., freight brakeman, Midland Valley. Injured Nov. 1, 1934. "Pulling out of siding, was standing on caboose platform preparing to line main line switch when engineer for some cause ap- plied air into emergency, throwing me against railing on caboose." "Bruised both thighs." Disabled 1 week 5 days, $42.86. Thirty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14487.-J. W. Sewell, Monroe, N. C., freight conductor, Seaboard Air Line. Injured Oct. 30, 1934. "Knocked out of cupola of caboose account emergency stop." "Wrenched back, sprained and bruised hight hip." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. Sixty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 13526.-W. G. Granger, Chippewa Falls, Wis., freight conductor, Soo line. Injured Nov. 23, 1933. "Rough .stop of train resulted in my being thrown to floor of caboose." "Compression fracture first lumbar vertebra." Disabled 52 weeks, $1,300.00. Forty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14499.-0. Crcelius, Princeton, Ind., freight conductor, South- ern Railway. Injured Nov. 12, 1934. "Making final stop in Princeton yards, slack ran out of train, jerking me out rear caboose door against railing around caboose platform." "Fracture left fourth and fifth ribs." Disabled 4 days, $14.29. Thirty-four cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14430.-F. D. O'Bryant, Amarillo, Texas, freight conductor, F. W. & D. C. Railway. Injured Oct. 14, 1934. "Emergency stop as I was sitting at desk in caboose." "Bruised and contused wound of entire chest wall." Disabled 6 weeks 2 days, $157.14. Sixty-one cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14436.-J. H. Morgan, Alamosa, Colo., freight conductor, broke off train, throwing air into emergency. Thrown into corner of desk." "Bruised contused leg." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57. Fifty cars, three engines. CLAIM No. 14471.--J. C. Roberts, Ottumwa, Iowa, freight brakeman, C. M. St. P. & P. Railway. Injured Nov. 3, 1934. "Making stop at coal shed-air going into emergency." "Fracture of fifth and sixth ribs left side, scalp wound." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days, $64.28. Fifty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14464.-E. Brown, Oroville, Calif., freight conductor, Western Pacific Railroad. Injured Oct. 31, 1934. "Standing in caboose when emergency stop was made, twisting my right leg." "Rupture of some fibers of calf muscles of right leg." Disabled 4 weeks 3 days, $110.71. Twenty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14536.-R. B. Ranes, Raleigh, N. C., freight flagman, Seaboard Air Line Railway Company. Injured Oct. 30, 1934. "Brakes were applied in emergency, and I was knocked from rear end of caboose." "Bruised left side just above hip and small of back." Disabled 3 weeks 6 days, $96.43. Sixty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No, 13664.-H. V. Morris (Division 227), Lincoln Neb., freight con- ductor, C. B. & Q. Railroad. Injured Jan. 3, 1934. "Had walked out on back platform of way car and hard stop threw me down on platform, resulting in fracture upper inner border left tibia." Disabled 52 weeks, $1,300.00. Fifty- one cars, one engine. 136 TRAIN LENGTHS CLAIM No. 14012.-C. O. Bushong, (Division 222), Chillicothe, Ill., freight conductor, A. T. & S. F. Railway. Injured May 4, 1934. "Knocked off top of box car ; engineer set air in emergency to avoid hitting water crane that would not clear engine." "Comminuted fracture left tibia." Disabled 35 weeks 1 day, $878.57. Fifty-six cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14470.-A. McColl, (Division 80), Outremont, Que., freight con- ductor, Canadian Pacific Railway. Injured Oct. 22, 1934. "Thrown against door frame of van when train started at St. Therese, P. Q. Train consisted of thirty-one cars." "Infected abrasion of left wrist and multiple secondary infections ; abscess formation." Disabled 10 weeks 3 days, $156.42. Thirty- one cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14661.-S. Adams, (Division 88), Dallas, Texas, freight conductor, Texas & New Orleans Railroad. Injured Jan. 3, 1935. "Quick stop made by train in yard threw me against corner of desk." "Fracture fifth and sixth ribs on right side." Disabled 2 weeks 6 days, $7143. Fifty-three cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14550.--N. T. Saunders, (Division 675), Biggar, Sask., freight conductor, Canadian National Railways. Injured Nov. 28, 1934. "After start- ing train at Winter coal dock broke in two near head end of train, causing brakes to go into emergency." "Concussion of brain, severe sprain of left wrist and traumatic synovitis left wrist ; contusion left thigh." Disabled 8 Weeks 6 days, $221.43. Sixty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14750.-W. R. Eck, (Division 449), Harrisburg, Pa., freight con- ductor, Reading Company. Injured Feb. 2, 1935. "In making stop at Lebanon, stop was very quick, throwing me off caboose to the ground." "Contusions over crest of right scapula, right humerus, right chest wall below the axilla." Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $32.14. Fifty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14768.-W. T. Hoy, (Division 613), Owosso, Mich., freight con- ductor, Ann Arbor Railroad. Injured Feb. 1, 1935. "While making stop at Alma, Mich., was knocked down in cab." "Sprain of right knee with resulting inflammation of deep tissues." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $21.42. Fifty-four cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14561.-W. H. Sommers, (Division 574), Roseville, Calif., freight brakeman, Southern Pacific Company. Injured Nov. 26, 1934. "Car of steel shifting, derailing car, parting train line, causing violent stop, throwing me down against step leading to cupola." "Dislocation of left shoulder." Disabled 16 weeks 2 days, $407.14. Sixty-nine cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14839.-T. J. Scanlon, (Division 156), Carbondale, Pa., freight conductor, N. Y. O. & W. Railway. Injured Jan. 28, 1935. "Train parted, sudden stop, throwing me against locker door in caboose." "Fractured rib, right side." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71. Sixty-nine cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14842.-J. D. Garloch, (Division 281), Benwood, W. Va., freight conductor, Baltimore & Ohio. Injured March 12, 1935. "While making stop at Elm Grove, was knocked to floor of caboose on account of sudden stop." "Left knee badly bruised, contused and sprained." Disabled 5 weeks 5 days, $142.86. Forty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14797.-W. A. Wolfington, (Division 560), Corbin, Ky., freigbt conductor, L. & N..Railroad. Injured Feb. 15, 1935. "Jerked down in caboose by slack action." "Fracture of greater tuberosity of left humerus." Disabled 10 weeks 1 day, $253.57. Fifty-one ears, one engine. CLAIM No. 14859.-. A. Patton, (Division 263), Meyersdale, Pa., freight flagman, B. & O. Railroad. Injured March 23, 1935. "Train parted, sudden jar. throwing me against the door of caboose, striking head and twisting body." "Contusion of forehead and face; sacro iliac sprain." Disabled 6 weeks 2 days $157.14. Fifty-eight cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14934.-R. B. Ranes, (Division 451), Raleigh, N. C., freight trainman, Seaboard Railway. Injured April 13, 1935. "Was pulling in Cayce Yard with engines 1134 and 411 coupled. Air hose became disconnected be- tween engines, causing air brakes to go into emergency. I was thrown from cupola to end of cab." "Injured right elbow, hip and knee, also neck." Dis- abled 1 week 3 days, $35.71. Forty-nine cars, two engines. CLAIM No. 14892.-E. O'Leary, (Division 88), Ennis, Texas, freight con- ductor, Southern Pacific. Injured April 2, 1935. "Knocked down in caboose at Denny, Tex., caused by the train on which I was the conductor coming to a sudden stop." "Right wrist sprained and right shoulder wrenched and twisted." Disabled 5 weeks 2 days, $132.14. Sixty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14903.-J. L. O'Brien, (Division 325), Helper, Utah, freight con- ductor, D. & R. G. W. Railroad. Injured April 8, 1935. "Injury occurred at TRAIN LENGTHS 137 Miounds, Utah. Stepped out of caboose on to rear platform after telling rear bakeman to cut caboose off to pick up ten empties ahead of caboose ; before bakeman got the cab cut off, train moved ahead with a violent start, jerking me over rear railing, striking between tracks." "Fracture of right seventh left radius; contusion of face; foreign body in eye." Disabled 5 weeks 6 days, $146.43. Eighteen cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14958.-T. Sommerville, (Division 176), Corning, N. Y., freight conductor, Erie Railroad. Injured April 27, 1935. "Engineer applied the air to avoid hitting a man and team on crossing, and threw me in the caboose." "Contusion and abrasions of body and general shock." Disabled 3 weeks 5 days, $92.86. Sixty-six vars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14968.-J. W. Wiley, (Division 678), Hagerstown, Md., freight brakeman, Western Maryland Railway Company. Injured May 10, 1935. "Get- ting on gondola car, slack ran in train and swung me around against car, twist- ing and bruising shoulder and arm (left) and muscle sprain." Disabled 2 weeks, $30.00. Forty-three cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14917.-J. V. Welsh, (Division 194), Brookfield, Mo., freight con- ductor, C. B. & Q. Railroad. Injured April 19, 1935. "Derailment of head end of train caused sudden stop, which threw me against stove in way car." "Con- tusion left side ; laceration right ear ; contusion of scalp." Disabled 6 weeks 3 days, $96.42. Forty-three ears, one engine. CLAIM No. 15002.-J. M. Kittell, (Division 327), Chicago, Ill., freight con- ductor, Illinois Central Railroad. Injured May 24, 1935. "Head end received a. quick stop signal, causing engineer to make emergency application of air, throwing me against side of car." "Laceration over right eye, contusion of left wrist, sprain of neck." Disabled 4 days, $14.29. Sixty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 15006.-N. McNeely (Division 57), Ft. Worth, Texas, freight con- ductor, Texas & Pacific Railway Company. Injured May 23, 1935. "Slack ran in against engine, striking my left hip on hand railing on end of caboose." "Contusion and possible abeess formation of left thigh." Disabled 1 week 2 days, $32.14. Fifty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 15058.-R. B. Rawls (Division 57), Ft. Worth, Texas, freight conductor, Texas & Pacific Railway Company. Injured June 3, 1935. "Train was stopping in Lancaster Yards-I was standing on rear end of caboose. Train stopped very suddenly and threw me against corner of caboose." "Bruise of right side of chest, crushing laceration distal end of fourth finger left hand, bruise of left knee." Disabled 3 week, $75.00. Sixty-one cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 15080.-J. E. Hailey (Division -332), Illmo. Mo., freight con- ductor, St. L. S. W. Railway Company. Injured June 24, 1935. "Entering Ilmo Yard, brakes were applied and when speed of train had been reduced to six or eight miles per hour, brakes were suddenly released, throwing me from chair to floor against rear door." "Injury to left shoulder, causing a bursitis." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. Fifty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 14927.-G. E. Gatewood (Division 442), McMechen, W. Va., freight conductor, B. & 0. Railroad Company. Injured April 25, 1935. "I was in caboose car when engineer made emergency stop, throwing me down in caboose and causing injury as stated by doctor." "Neck badly sprained, ribs fractured on right side, face and head bruised, injury through abdomen with lots of pain." Disabled 12 weeks 5 days, $190.71. Fifty-four cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 15137.-K. G. Ragan (Division 482), Cedartown, Ga., freight conductor, C. of Ga. Railway Company. Injured July 17, 1935. "Train No. 90 heading in Cedartown Yard at 3: 50 a. m. July 17, engine ran over derail switch, applied air brakes in emergency ; knocked me off of top of box car to ground." "Abrasions and contusions of body." Disabled 1 week 5 days, $42.86. Forty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 15211,-J. Keating (Division 42), Trenton, Mo., freight con- ductor, C. R. I. & P. Railway. Injured Aug. 22, 1935. "Going into Kansas City, Mo., moving about eight miles per hour, sudden stop. Was in caboose with feet braced (was in cupola)." "Strain of right knee." Disabled 3 weeks, $45.00. Sixty-seven cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 15220.-H. A. Rogers (Division 422), Cape Girardeau, Mo., freight conductor, St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad. Injured Aug. 14, 1935. "Was on top of caboose passing signals when train was stopped suddenly, throw- ing me to the ground hitting on my head and falling over on my left shoulder, missed rail about six inches. Caused by engineer setting straight air and with sixty cars, cal oose stopped first." "Contusions of the back and left side of face. Sub-scleral hemorrhage in the left eye. Pain in the chest and back." Disabled 4 weeks, $100.00. Sixty cars, one engine. 138 TRAIN LENGTHS CLAIM No. 15245.-J. A. Snyder (Division 44), Phippsburg, Colo., freight conductor and brakeman, D. & S. L. Railroad. Injured Sept. 3, 1935. "Was on rear of caboose heading in on siding. Stock chute gate did not clear engine, and engineer made emergency stop, throwing me from rear to front of caboose." "Contusion of left leg." Disabled 2 weeks, $50.00. Sixty-four cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 15112.-R. J. Henderson (Division 16), London, Ontario, freight conductor, C. P. Railway. Injured June 30, 1935. "Running at about 25 miles an hour, I was standing at rear of van, when slack was bunched up against engine, knocking me down." "Fracture of tibia, left ankle." Disabled 13 weeks 1 day, $328.57. Sixty-one ears, one engine. CLAIM No. 15221.-L. N. Thatch (Division 661), Qretna, La., freight con- ductor, Texas & Pacific, handling Missouri Pacific train. Injured Aug. 22, 1935. "Burkie, La., standing on rear platform of caboose, train making stop made sudden stop. I threw my right hand up to brace myself, struck end of thumb against one end of caboose." "Fracture of the terminal phalanx of right thumb with severe contusion." Disabled 7 weeks 5 days, $192.86. Fifty cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 15271.-C. G. Murray (Division 441), Durango, Colo., freight con- ductor, D. & R. G. W. Railway. Injured Sept. 6, 1935. "Slack ran in on 65-car train throwing me against back of seat in caboose. Accident occurred between Durango and Carbon Junction, Colo." "Fractured seventh rib, left side." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days, 107.14. Sixty-five cars, two engines. CLAIM No. 15307.-H. H. Boring (Division 163), Oil City, Pa., freight brake- man, Pennsylvania Railroad. Injured Sept. 27, 19.35. "1 was in cabin with 62 empty coal cars ; train parted between third and fourth cars, causing train to come to an instant stop. I was jammed against edge of desk." "Contusion of lower left ribs." Disabled 1 week 6 days, $27.86. Sixty-two cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 15337.-W. P. Sims (Division 149), Jackson, Tenn., freight conduc- tor, M. 0. Railway. Injured Oct. 4, 1935. "Was climbing in cupola of caboose when slack in train ran up, caused by slow-down, and threw me against arm rest in cupola." "Fractured ribs." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71. Fifty-one cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 15286.-M. P. Connolly (Division 80), Montreal, P. Q., freight conductor, Canadian Pacific Railway. Injured Sept. 17, 1935. "On arriving at St. Martin Junction with double-header and 24 cars, as I got up to go to rear of caboose, both engines took slack so hard it threw me down." "Contusion of knee joint." Disabled 8 weeks, $200.00 Twenty-four cars, two engines. CLAIM No. 15391.-L. K. Lane (Division 432), Bakersfield, Calif., freight con- ductor, Santa Fe Railroad. Injured Nov. 3, 1935. "Engineer made emergency application to avoid hitting a stalled auto, knocked me down in caboose. Bakers- field Yard." "Bursitis of the left knee." Disabled 3 days, $10.71. Sixty-six cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 15416.-B. W. Noble (Division 576), Cleveland, Ohio, freight con- ductor, C. C. C. & St. L. Injured Nov. 13, 1935. "Whilst pulling in at Huff Tower, I was ready to alight at telegraph office when a sudden jerk on the train threw me to the ground. Wellington, Ohio." "Bruises and sprain of mus- cles of back, left arm, and left heel." Disabled 1 week, $25.00. Forty-eight cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 15422.-A. Swarner (Division 357), Garrett, Pa., freight conductor, B. & O. Railroad. Injured Oct. 18, 1935. "While making rough stop in receiving yard at Cumberland, Md., had my left hand caught between door and door sill." "Laceration of left hand across exterior tendons." Disabled 4 weeks 3 days, $66.42. Sixty-three cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 15428.-E. B. Harrison (Division 428), Jacksonville, Fla., freight conductor, Seaboard Air Line Railway. Injured Nov. 16, 1935. "As I went to catch caboose leaving Williston, Fla., 8:15 p. in., slack was jerked out of train, causing me to fall to ground." "Contusion with ecehymosis into soft tissues left buttock." Disabled 2 weeks, $50.00. Twenty-five cars, one engine. CLAIM No. 1523.-J. M. Reel (Division 84), Perry, Iowa, freight conductor, C. M. St. P. & P. Railway. Injured Sept. 9, 1935. "Train entering Perry yard and passing through yard limit territory-undesired emergency action of air brakes. Thrown in caboose." "Fracture of right clavicle and contusion right chest." Disabled 12 weeks 6 days, $321.43. Forty-nine cars, one engine. AFrnAviT, STATE OF IOWA, County of Linn, s: I, W. A. Wilson, being first duly sworn, depose and shy : I live in Cedar Rapids, Linn County, Iowa, where I have lived since July 1928, and during TRAIN LENGTHS 139 all of which time I have been an employee in the office of the general secretary and treasurer of the Order of Railway Conductors of America, in Cedar Rapids, Linn County, Iowa, and I am now so employed ; I was manager of the accident insurance department of the Order of Railway Conductors of America from July 1928 to May 1932, and I have been such manager from September 1934 to and including the present time ; as such manager all the records and files of said department are kept under my personal supervision and control, and I am familiar with said records ; I have personally examined said records for the purpose of ascertaining and tabulating the number of claims filed with said acci- dent insurance department, growing out of the operation of freight trains of less than 70 cars length, in which the claimants based their claims on accidents resulting from what is commonly known in railroad parlance as "freight train shocks" or "slack action"; the foregoing tabulation was made by me after a personal checking of each of the claims hereinbefore referred to and the analysis of said claims, as hereinbefore set forth, is a true, accurate, and correct analysis of the statements filed in each of said claims as shown by the files, including the amounts paid by the said accident insurance department between August 1929 and January 1936 to the members thereof on account of said accidents. Done at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, this 3d day of September, A. D. 1936. W. A. WLsoN. Subscribed and sworn to before me, a notary public in and for Linn County, Iowa, on this 3d day of September, A. D. 1936. [sEAL] BERNADINE MCGINNIS, Notary Public. STATEMENT OF CLAIMs PAID BY AcCIDENT INSURANCE DEPARTMENT OF THE OunEr OF RAILWAY CoNDUCToRs OF AMERICA, ACCOUNT SHoCK ON TRAINS OF LESS. THAN SEVENTY CARS, PAID BETWEEN JANUARY 1, 1936, AND DECEMBER 31, 1936-- 38 CLAIMs, $4,626.43 Approimate number members in freight service January 1, 1936 ___-_- ___---- - ..___--__--- _-- 4,495 December 31, 1936---_---__-_.-----------------------------------------4,504 CLAIM No. 15480.-W. H. Saxton, Division 134, Bellevue, Ohio. Freight con- ductor, N. Y. C. & St. L. R. R. Injured Dec. 5, 1935. "Engine struck an auto at Girl Ave., Lakewood, O., killing a woman. Engineer set air in emergency a nd threw me against a partition." "Fracture of 10th rib." Disabled 5 weeks 2 days, $132.14; 60 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15555.-C. L. Pate, Division 613, Owosso, Mich. Freight conduc- tor, Ann Arbor R. R. Injured Dec. 29, 1935. "Making emergency stop to avoid striking oil truck on highway crossing-at Superior St., Alma, Mich." "Contu- sion of muscles." Disabled 3 days, $10.71; 66 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15554.-J. J. O'Keefe, Division 199, Smith's Falls, Ont. Freight brakeman, C. P. R. Injured Dec. 24, 1935. "When stopping at Bedell, engineer applied brake in emergency, taking mc off my balance in van, knocking me cown over chair." "Left hand and arm sprained." Disabled 2 weeks, $30.00; 53 cars. 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15540.-A. C. Salter, Division 673, Chicago, Ill. Freight brake- man, C. G. W. Ry. Injured Dec. 29, 1935. "Was thrown against desk when brakes went into emergency acct. train ahead. At Menominee, IlL" "Fracture 7" & 8" ribs, left side front." Disabled 3 weeks 2 days, $82.14; 65 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15567.-G. C. Lawrence, Division 485, Marietta, Ga. Freight brakeman, L. & N. R. R. Injured Jan. 5, 1936. "Slack jerked out of train throwing me against fusee box and door lock of caboose." "Contusion of R. side of lower ribs." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $39.29. 39 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15521.-W. W. Wayland, Division 450, Washington, D. C. Freight conductor, Sou. R. R. Co. Injured Dec. 13, 1935. "Draw head dropped down second ear from engine, train pulling heavy grade, slack stretched, air ,going in emergency. Near Orange, Va." "Fracture, complete, spine of left scapula." Disabled 6 weeks 3 days, $107.16; 62 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15626.-W. D. Haworth. Division 57, Baird, Texas. Freight con- ductor, T. & P. Injured Jan. 23, 1936. "I lined switch of passing track for main track after train had pulled out of passing track, and had gotten on step of caboose when train stopped, slack running in suddenly, throwing me against 140 TRAIN LENGTHS grab iron of rear end of caboose. Dothan, Texas." "Fractured rib, left side' Disabled 1 week 5 days, $25.71; 18 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15615.-R. M. Boozer, Division 318, Gramling, S. C. Freight con- ductor, Southern Ry. Injured Jan. 25, 1936. "I was standing on rear of caboose and engineer made a very sudden stop, throwing me against rod on end of caboose striking left leg against rod. At Flat Rock, N. C." "Contusion of muscles of left thigh with formation of haematoma, wrenching of left knee." Disabled 3 weeks 4 days, $89.29; 27 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15637.-J. Neill, Division 194, Brookfield. Mo. Freight brakeman, C. B. & Q. R. R. Injured Jan. 13, 1936. "Was in way car when slack ran in on train knocking me down over back of way car desk striking left side and small of back. Accident happened at Hamilton, Mo." "Back strain at 1st and 2nd lumbar, causing pain and limited motion." Disabled 6 weeks 5 days, $167.86; 48 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15600.-0. A. Sheldon, Division 272, Havre, Mont. Freight con- ductor, Great Northern Ry. Injured Jan. 14, 1936. "Heading in siding at Paisley air hose bursted on head car throwing me up against the writing desk right arm striking desk between elbow and shoulder, desk also striking chest, rear brakeman was thrown against me." "Severe bruising of right upper arm, shoulder and right side of chest, followed by pleurisy of right chest." Disabled 3 weeks 5 days, $9Z86; 21 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15721.-C. K. Anderson, Division 395, Salt Lake City, Utah. Freight brakeman, L. A. & S. L. R. R. Injured Feb. 15, 1936. "Riding in caboose train of 62 made an emergency stop throwing me through the front door of caboose, at 7th West St., Salt Lake City." "Laceration of left temple region, with serious hemorrhage and some brain concussion." Disabled 2 weeks 4 days, $38.57; 62 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 15686.-J. N. White, Division 67, Waterloo, Iowa. Freight con- ductor, I. C. R. R. Injured Feb. 13, 1936. "Was getting down on steps of for- ward end of caboose to give stop signal and engr. applied brakes into emergency throwing me from caboose onto platform." "Severe contusion muscles right thigh." Disabled 3 days, $10.71; 12 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15758.-J. H. Foreman, Division 53, Denison, Tex. Freight con- ductor, M. K. T. Injured Feb. 21, 1936. "Slack of train run out causing me to be jerked in to corner of wash stand in caboose." "Bruising left buttock and abscess formation." Disabled 5 weeks 2 days, $132.14; 52 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15819.-G. E. Porterfield, Division 504, Monroe, N. C. Freight brakeman, S. A. L. Injured Mar. 17, 1936. "Train parted and run together, knocking me from seat in cab, falling back on arm rest." "Bruise left lumbar muscle, large blue spot and 'Charly Horse' pain, unable to walk straight or turn self in bed." Disabled 2 weeks 3 days, $60.71; 64 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15813.-D. H. Dye, Division 303, Jeffersonville, Ind. Freight brake- man, Penn. R. R. Injured Mar. 17, 1936. "3 miles south of Indianapolis, Indiana, train 38 cars, broken rail, derailed 6 cars ahead of 13 rear cars. Injured in cabin car by derailment." "Bruised muscles and fractured 9th rib." Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $32.14; 38 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15836.-J. H. Bone, Division 611, Kamloops, B. C. Freight brake- man, Canadian National Ry. Injured Apr. 6, 1936. "Heading in yard at Kan- loops Jet., engine derailed, brakes set in emergency. Thrown against ladder oil platform of caboose." "Contusion left arm, swelling & ecchymosis in flexor surface of left elbow." Disabled 1 week 2 days, $32.14; 59 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 14953.-J. W. Dodds, Division 581, Winnemucca, Nev. Freight conductor, Western Pacific R. R. Injured May 5, 1935. "Slack running out of the train when making stop at water plug.' "Contusion on left cheek bone. contused tendons of right knee, synovitis." Disabled 52 weeks, $1,300.00; 60 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15900.-J. R. Shepard, Division 60, Franklin, Mo. Freight con- ductor, M. K. & T. Injured May 12, 1936. "Was using auto car for cab and was knocked down by slack running in." "Sprain of left shoulder." Disabled 1 week 2 days, $32.14; 54 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15873.-G. Scott, Division 228, Ft. Smith, Ark. Mixed train con- ductor, Ft. Smith & Western Ry. Injured April 24, 1936. "Sudden stop of train. Coach door slammed to catching right hand." "Multiple contused wounds of back of right hand." Disabled 3 weeks 4 days, $89.29; 31 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15952.-D. M. Tate, Division 318, Asheville, N. C. Freight con- ductor, Southern Ry. Co. Injured May 23, 1936. "Was pulling out of sidig and engineer applied brakes to slow train down and brakes went in emergency, TRAIN LENGTHS 141 throwing me against wash basin in caboose. Edge of basin struck leg." "Rup- tured blood vessel in rt. leg." Disabled 4 days, $14.29; 32 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15911.-W. W. Inman, Division 26, Toledo, Ohio. Freight con- ductor, W. & L. E. R. R. Injured May 16, 1936. "West end of Brewster Yard on No. 99. We ran into an open switch, engineer made emergency application of air. Put out all lights. In trying to get to back door of caboose fell over sack of railroad mail and to left knee and side, striking the locker." "Contusion left knee joint." Disabled 7 weeks 3 days, $185.71; 60 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16002.-J. R. Rawlings, Division 132, Salida, Colo. Freight con- ductor, D. & R. G. R. R. Injured June 27, 1936. "Leaving Malta, Colo., down grade with 60 cars, engineer pulled train about twenty car lengths and applied engine brake and bunched slack suddenly and threw me against grab iron on rear of caboose." "Severe contusion outer aspect right thigh, abrasion right elbow." Disabled 2 weeks 5 days, $40.71; 60 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16022.-F. W. Kellaher, Division 588, Mobridge, S. D. Freight brakeman, C. M. St. P. & P. R. R. Injured July 3, 1936. "Was alone in caboose, walking to rear platform to see the Order Board and check a train which was due. Train made a sudden stop. I fell on floor of caboose-very hard fall." "Median rupture." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $39.29; 65 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16013.-L. P. Toombs, Division 339, Flora, Ill. Freight conductor, B. & O. Railway. Injured June 11, 1936. "Slack run in on engine, throwing me against arm of seat in cupola of caboose." "Fracture of two lower ribs on left side" Disabled 1 week, $25.00; 31 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15965.-J. R. Finegan, Division 57, Fort Worth, Texas. Freight conductor, C. R. I. & Gulf R. R. Injured June 4, 1936. "Stopping at water tank thrown against platform rail on caboose account caboose stopping very suddenly." "Bruise on right side of chest and ribs." Disabled 7 weeks 4 days, $189.29; 30 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16080.-A. M. Caldwell, Division 81, Beardstown, Ill. Freight conductor, C. B. & Q. R. R. Injured Aug. 2, 1936. "Train jerked forward as I was sitting down to desk, striking stomach against same." "Bruise and con- tusion in lower abdominal area." Disabled 2 weeks 3 days, $60.71; 48 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16090.-G. P. Gourley, Division 175, Memphis, Tenn. Freight conductor, I. C. R. R. Injured Aug. 7, 1936. "Train heading in yard Paducah, Ky. Sudden stop knocked me down." "Lacerated left leg." Disabled 3 weeks 5 days, $92.86; 44 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15596.-S. Stallings, Division 515, Wichita Falls, Texas. Freight brakeman, M. K. T. R. R. Injured July 18, 1936. "Blew off air hose while train was moving and was knocked down. "Traumatic neuritis of the nerves of the neck and shoulder, right." Disabled 32 weeks 5 days, $817.86; 56 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16144.-L. W. Gills, Division 152, Richmond, Va. Freight con- ductor, R. F. & P. R. R. Injured Aug. 22, 1936. "North Anna River, 23 miles north of Richmond Irregular handling of train while running in excess of 45 miles per hour. Thrown on stove and fell on floor." "Deep bruise on leg." Disabled 1 week 5 days, $42.86; 62 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16151.-S. J. Angle Division 661, Algiers, La. Freight conductor, T. & P. R. R. Injured Aug. 30, 1936. "Sudden stop upset chair in caboose and threw me against corner of stove" "Severe contusion of chest and right side- posterior laterally." Disabled 1 week 5 days, $25.71; 47 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16183.-C. W. Gould, Division 570, Oroville, Calif. Freight con- duetor, Western Pacific R. R. Injured Sept. 16, 1936. "Getting off caboose to line main track switch slack of train ran in knocking foot off step of caboose and left hand off grab-iron. Holding on with right hand was thrown around against rear of cab striking cutting lever." "Contusion of right lower ribs, fracture of eighth rib, right side, auxillary line." Disabled 3 weeks, $45.00; 45 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16259.-W. A. Purkey, Division 103, Indianapolis, Ind. Freight conductor, Big 4 R. R. Injured Oct. 16, 1936. "Was standing on bottom step of caboose waiting for train to stop. Was braced for sudden stop but when the train stopped I was thrown against upright grab-iron on end of caboose causing injury." "Incomplete fracture of two ribs, left side of chest." Dis- abled 1 week 5-days, $42.86; 41 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16200.-W. S. Burnham, Division 209, Kemmerer, Wyo. Freight conductor, U. P. Ry. Injured Oct. 1, 1936. "Backing train in siding, straight 47891-3--10 142 TRAIN LENGTHb air applied on Eng. jerking slack out of train throwing me striking side and chest against grab iron onend of caboose." "Contusion of chest and pleurisy. Probably contusion was sole cause." Disabled 5 weeks, $125.00; 12 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16256.-W. S. Hood, Division 185, Selma, Ala. Freight con- ductor, Southern Ry. Co. Injured Oct. 16, 1936. "Was getting up in cupola of caboose, slack ran up in train throwing me against cupola box striking just below right hip joint." "Severe contusion of right hip." Disabled 3 weeks 3 days, $85.71; 35 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16249.-H. H. Fitzsimmons, Division 542, Lethbridge, Alta. Mixed train conductor, Can. Pac. Ry. Injured Oct. 12, 1936. "When coming out of caboose door was thrown against brake wheel of caboose account of violent stop of train at Wrentham, Alberta. Engine spotting for water barrels." "Fractured ribs." Disabled 3 days, $6.42; 30 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16140.-H. C. Brundick, Division 418, Princeton, Inl. Freight conductor, Southern Ry. Co. Injured Aug. 14, 1936. "Slack ran up in train throwing me against corner of table in caboose." "Injury to right scrotum, epididymis and testicle. Abscess of right testicle." Disabled 9 weeks, $225.00; 27 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16362.-H. C. Brundick, Division 418, Princeton, Ind. Freight conductor, Southern Ry. Injured Dec. 1, 1936. "Making stop of train of 52 cars, severe run-out threw me against corner of locker in caboose." "Contusions right chest." Disabled 5 days, $17.86; 52 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 163&3.-W. Byrne, Division 303, Louisville, Ky. Freight con- ductor, Southern Ky. Iniured Dec. 3, 1936. "Was getting up in cupola of caboose and jerked against iron rod left side." "Eighth rib left broken." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $39.29; 16 cars, 1 engine. I hereby certify that the foregoing tabulation was. made by me after a per- sonal checking of each of the claims and is a true, accurate and correct analysis of the statements filed in each of said claims as shown by the files, including the amounts paid by the Accident Insurance Department during the year 1936 to members thereof on account of said accidents. Done at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, this 11th day of January, A. D. 1937. W. A. WILsON, Manager, Accident Insurance Department. Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for Linn County, Iowa, on this 11th day of January, A. D. 1937. [sEAL] BERNADINE MCGINMs, Notary Public. Exhibit 1 covers 417 accident claims account of shock on trains of 70 cars or more from August 1929 to December 31, 1936, for which our accident department paid $64,424.86. Exhibit 2 covers 310 accident claims on account of shock on trains of less than 70 cars from August 1929, to December 31, 1936, for which our accident department paid $35,358.02. In your examination of those reports, Mr. Chairman, you will find that there is on the back of each one of the reports or statements a supplemental report covering the additional accidents that were paid from January 1, 1936, through December 31, 1936. These reports cover only claims paid to members of the Order of Railway Conductors who are members of the accident insurance de- partment. Therefore, they do not reflect the total number of train-. service employees who were injured on account of rear-end shocks from August 1929 to December 31, 1936, nor do they reflect the total number of injuries to members of our order, because all 'members of the Order of Railway Conductors are not members of our accident insurance department. However, the report of claims paid as set forth in these two reports are correct and can be relied upon as being true statements. Mr. WITEROW. Mr. Chairman. Mr. BULWNLE. Mr. Withrow. TRAIN LENGTHS -xb43 Mr. WfluRow. I wonder if I could ask a question right there. Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Mr. WITHROW. How severely does the individual have to be injured before benefits are paid? Mr. JOHNSON. He is paid for 1 day or more for loss of time. If his injury is of such nature that he is forced to lay off of his assignment, we pay him for all time lost up to a maximum of 52 weeks, or $1,300 for the 52 weeks. Mr. MAPES. What percentage of conductors belong to' the associa- tion, Mr. Johnson? Mr. JOHNSON. Both freight and passenger, I would judge about one-fifth of them, Congressman. Mr. MAPES. About one-fifth belong to the association? Mr. JOHNSON. About one-fifth of the total number of conductors actually employed in train and yard service. It is not compulsory for a member to belong to our accident insurance department, nor is it compulsory for a member to belong to our insurance department. Mr. MAPEs. Would it be fair to conclude then that the claims paid by the accident insurance department cover only one-fifth of the con- ductors who were injured? Mr. JOHNSON. I made the statement yesterday, I thought perhaps these statements would not reflect more than about one-sixth or one- seventh of the total number that were actually injured. Mr. MAPES. Of the total number of conductors? Mr. JOHNSON. I beg your pardon. Mr. MAPEs. Of the total number of conductors? Mr. JOHNSON. No; I think the total number of train-service em- ployees that are injured. Mr. MAPES. I understand that only one-fifth of the conductors be- long to the accident association? Mr. JOHNSON. Just about. Mr. MAPEs. Then the accidents to conductors who belong to the association would be not more than one-fifth of the total number, would they not? Mr. JOHNSON. We could break that down in percentages, Con- gressman, by checking the accident reports rendered by the carriers to the Interstate Commerce Commission involving conductors. Mr. MAPEs. It seems to me that if only one-fifth of the conductors belong to the association, there would be about five times as many accidents among all conductors as your reports indicate. Mr. JOHNSON. I do not think I would be far wrong in making the statement, that it would not reflect more than about one-fifth of the total injuries received. Mr. MAPES. To conductors? Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. This department was set up for the benefit of the members, as it provides a protection for the loss of time and other purposes at a reduced cost. It is not commercialized, it is only made available to the members of our organization. Each individual claim is identified by a number and shows the name of injured employee, place of residence-some cases place of accident--class of service, name of railroad, date of injury, cause of accident, extent of injury number of cars and engines in train, time lost, and the amount of the claim. 144 TRAIN LENGTH The information used in making an analysis of the individual claims was obtained through certain reports which each claimant is required under the laws of our accident insurance department to file as proof of his claim. These reports are captioned "Notice of injury" and "Weekly indemnity claim, final report." I desire at this time to file blank copies of these claim reports to be made a part of the record. They will be identified as exhibits 3 and 4. In filing these notices of injury, they furnish information to the department ~as set forth in the analysis of their claim. When final request is made or report is rendered, it carries additional informa- tion and requires that certain statements be made by an attending physician, and the final report requires three witnesses to certify as to the correctness of the information furnished. I desire that these be made a part of the record, Mr. Chairman. (The exhibits 3 and 4 above referred to are as follows:) ACCIDENT INSURANCE DEPARTMENT ORDER OF RAILWAY CONDUCTORS OF AMERICA NOTICE OF INJURY (Date)-------------------------193_-. I am holder of a Certificate in the Accident Insurance Department and received a personal injury as hereinafter described and you will consider this as notice of such injury. At the proper time I shall file a claim on a form furnished by you for the Weekly Indemnity due me by the terms and condi- tions of my certificate of membership. Division No-------------- Age-------------- Certificate No----------- 1. Amount of Insurance, Principal sum, $-----------Weekly Indemnity $---=------------------- 2. Date of injury ------------------------------------------------ 3. Is there any visible indication of injury?--------------------------- 4. State fully the nature and extent of injury 5. State precisely how and where the injury occurred ----------------- 6. Name and address of attending physician-------------------------- 7. By whom were you employed?-------------------Occupation-------- 8. Had you any other insurance against accident at the time that you re- ceived this injury? If so, state how much per week, and in what Com- pany or Association ------------------------------------------ 9. Give names and addresses of eye-witnesses to this accidental injury, if any 10. Have you ever made any claim for weekly indemnity in this Association before? Is so, when?- - ------------------------------------- Claimant Address ----------------------------- NoTE.-FiIe with certificates for use as may be required. See Art. 16. Claim No----------- ACCIDENT INSURANCE DEPARTMENT ORDER OF RAILWAY CONDUOTORS OF AMERICA NonCE or Iwrun ------------ ---Div. No--- -- Certificate No- - TRAIN LENGTHS 145 Date of Injury----------------------_-------------_ _--- -9- Date Filed with Dept----------------------------------------193. Any member of this Department, in good standing, meeting with an acci- dent, as defined in these laws, as a result of which accident he desires to make a claim for a weekly indemnity against this Department, must call and be examined by a regular physician or surgeon and thereafter notify the General Secretary and Treasurer (in writing, which notice shall be in the office of said General Secretary and Treasurer within ten days of the event causing the injury) and which said notice shall give full particulars concerning the acci- dent and the resulting injury and the name and address of the attending physician and surgeon. (See Article 16). ACCIDENT INSURANCE DEPARTMONT ORDER OF RAILWAY CONDUCTORs OF AMERICA FINAL PROOF OF INJURY AND CLAIM FOR INDEMNITY (Date)-------------------------, 193- Name of member----------------------- Age----------- Div. No-----------Date of certificate No. of certificate_ -.--Amount of insurance, principal sum $------- Amount of weekly indemnity $------_ . I received a personal bodily injury as hereinafter described, and for the purpose of claiming the weekly indemnity to which I may be entitled by the terms and conditions of my certificate of membership, I answer the following questions: 1. Date of injury------------------Date resumed work 2. Are you regularly employed?------------If so, in what capacity? - - (Passenger, freight, or yard service) 3. Have you been or will you be paid by your employer for work performed : (a) On date of injury? --- .. (b) On date you resumed work? 4. On what date did you quit work on account of this injury?-. 5. What was the nature of injury? _ 6. State precisely how the accident occurred - - State number of cars in train at time of accident---------. State number of engines handling train-------- 7. When did you first consult a physician? 8. Give physician's name and address 9. How long were you confined to your bed?------------------In the house?---------------- 10. How long were you confined to a hospital? Attach complete copy of all hospital records. 11. What was your occupation at time of this injury? 12. State whether in passenger, freight, mixed, or yard service- 13. Name company engaged with at time of injury 14. Give names and addresses of eye-witnesses to accident, if any 15. From what date to what date were you totally disabled in consequence of said injury?- 16. For what length of time do you claim indemnity?- weeks and----___-----_---days. . 17. Are you now, or were you just prior to the receipt of injury, or during its continuance, sufering from any bodily diseases or infirmities? If so, give full particulars- -----...... ------------ flpaclr------------------------------------------------------------- 18. Had you any other insurance against accidents at the time you were injured? If so, how much per week, and in what companies or associations?, -------------------------_--------- 19. Have you ever made any claim for weekly indemnity on this department before? If so, when? ----------------------------------------- 146 TRAIN LENGTHS 20. We, the undersigned, certify that Brother------------------sustained the injury reported herein, and that he lost the time claimed. - -----------------Div. No--. -----------------Div. No- ------------Div. No-- ------------------Sec. Div. No.- (Must have signature of division secretary) Signature -----------------------------, Claimant. Address -_-- ATTENDING PHYSICIAN S SRPORT Name of member- ... -- 1. When were you first consulted or called?-------------------------- 2. When, in your opinion, was injury received? - 3. Describe the injury, with symptoms, specifically --------------------- 4. Did you find any visible contusion or wound?---------- If so, describe 5. What operation, if any, did you perform? ------------------ 6. Your diagnosis ------------------------------------------ 7. Did the injury immediately, continuously, and totally disable and prevent member from following his occupation?---------------------------- . How long was member confined to his bed?---------In his house?--- 9. How long was he confined to a hospital? --------------------------- (If claimant has not attached all hospital records, please do so.) 10. Are the copies of the hospital records attached full and complete?- 11. Was member able to resume work when discharged by you?----------- 12. What other injury, disease, or cause, if any, has contributed to prevent recovery of member from the injury he describes in his statement?.----------- 13. From what date and to what date do you consider him to have been disabled and prevented from attending to any and all kinds of business pertain- ing to his occupation?- --------------------------------------------- 14.. How do you understand the accident to have occurred? -------------- -,-------------M. D. Attending Physician. Graduate of----------------, Class---- Post Office Address. - 19_ Benefit No AOCIDENT INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, ORDER OF RAILWAY CONDUCTORS OF AMflICA Claim No WEEKLY INDEMNITY CLAIM (Final report) - ----------------------------------------Div. No- .--- Certificate No Date of injury-------.----------- Date resumed work- ----- Rate per week $-.-------- Total time claimed- weeks----days Total amount due $----- Date claim filed-----------------------------------------,19.--- Trustees: This is to certify that this accident insurance certificate was in full force and effect on date of injury. -- - ---------------------------------------------------------- G. S. & T. Approved- Rejected-------- --___--..._ -- .. -_----- __---- _--- _.--, 19-- TRAIN LENGTHS 147 Appealed to Board of Directors Paid--- ---------------------------------------------------------------- Check No ---...--. --------------------------------------------- Bank---.---------..--------------------- --------------------- For the information of the committee, I wish to say that the acci- dent insurance department of the Order of Railway Conductors was organized in 1916. Since that time to and including November 30, 1937, we have paid a total of 15,926 weekly indemnity claims, amount- ing to $2,004,863.16, and 400 death and dismemberment claims, amounting to $937,786.93. I want to make it plain to the committee, Mr. Chairman, that the total number Qf accidents and the total number of death claims are not all chargeable to rear-end shock. In other words, it sets forth the total number of claims that were paid, which involves may acci- dents, many injuries, that are not chargeable to the thing which we are now talking about. A careful study of the claims paid in exhibits 1 and 2 should con- vince this committee that the statements I have made with respect to the hazards in connection with long-train operations are absolutely correct. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Johnson, if you will pardon me just a minute. Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Mr. BULWINKLE. We have covered these rear-end shocks, and as lo what your two exhibits claim. Now, what have you got as to the injuries to passenger-train em- ployees on account of 70 freight car trains? Mr. JOHNSON. Passengers? Mr. BULwINKLE. Yes, sir. The statement was made here the other day of four distinct causes; of freight trains with over 70 cars. One was the accidents to the crew on these 70-car trains. One was the risk to the freight trains, themselves, by the 70-car trains. The third was the risk or accidents to passenger trains caused by the 70-car freight trains, and the fourth was highway grade crossings causing accidents. causing-or were accidents caused to passengers by the 70-car trains? Mr. EiCHER. You mean by the more than 70-car. Mr. BULWINKLE. Yes. And, I asked the question of Mr. Corbett, I think it was. Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any record, and I do not know as anyone else has any record of a 70-car passenger train. Mr. BUILwINKLE. Freight trains. I asked the direct question of Mr. Corbett the other day, and I asked the others to be prepared to, answer. Mr. Corbett made the statement that you were basing this on acci- dents from four separate and distinct causes, four separate and dis- tinct classes of trains; one was to the crews themselves, who were on the trains having 70 cars or more. The other was that the-that on account of the 70-car freight trains there were many wrecks caused to the trains, themselves. The other question that I asked was how many wrecks of passenger trains have been caused by the operation of freight trains consisting of more than 70 cars, and then there was another statement made by Mr. Corbett which was on accidents on 148 TRAIN LENGTHS highway grade crossings, that accidents were caused there by trains having 70 bars or more. Mr. MARTIN. That would be because of derailing of a long freight train while meeting a passenger train. Mr. BULwiNLE. And causing wrecks to the passenger train. Mr. JOHNsON. I have no complete record. However, that can be obtained to a certain degree from the reports rendered to the Inter- state Commerce Commission. I do have in mind, however, at this particular time an accident that recently happened on the Baltimore & Ohio, where a passenger train collided with the derailment of a freight train. However, the cause of that derailment was chargeable to a broken drawbar. There is danger of freight trains buckling on double track while meeting passenger trains or while being passed by a passenger train. The railroad companies recognize that there is great danger or hazard in connection with this particular feature due to the fact that many if not all of the railroads operating double tracks issue instruc- tions to the enginemen and trainmen to avoid the use of the air brake while passing passenger trains or freight trains except in case of emergency. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Johnson Mr. JoHNsON (continuing). I do not have an accurate record, Mr. Congressman, covering the question that you have raised. However, that can be secured, and it is possible that Mr. Farquahrson, who has made a check of the 28,000 accident reports, filed by the railroads with the Interstate Commerce Commission during the year 1937, will furnish you the information desired. Mr. BULWINKLE. Let me ask you this question. I will ask it briefly so that you may answer yes or no. Mr. JOHNsON. All right. Mr. BULWINKLE. And that will be a means of hurrying this thing up. Mr. JOHNSON. All right, sir. Mr. BULwINKLE. Have you made any, have you paid any claims; has this insurance division paid any claims to conductors or to men- bers of your association to passenger-train employees who were in- jured by a wreck caused by a train consisting of more than 70 freight cars? Mr. JOHNSON. Do I get you right-paid the crew of the passenger train? Mr. BUwiNKLE. Yes, sir. Mr. JOHNsON. I would have to check that report, Mr. Congress- man, to ascertain that, and I will gladly do so. Mr. BULwINKLE. All right, go ahead. Mr. JOHNSON. Now, on your question Mr. BULwINKLE. As to highway grade crossings. Mr. JOHNSON. As to highway grade crossings? Mr. BULWINWLE. Yes. Mr. JOHNsON. Well, the accidents on highway grade crossings, Mr. Congressman, makes no difference whether there is 1 car or 150 cars, in train so far as individual accidents are concerned. Mr. ETCHER. Now on that point, Mr. Johnson, just a moment. Yesterday I received a letter from the Association of Motor Clubs in my State requesting me to urge the Interstate Commerce Commis- TRAIN LENGTHS 149 sion to investigate the feasibility of requiring red reflectors on the sides of all freight cars for protection to motorists traveling at night. This is the first time that that proposition has been brougift to my mind, but I am wondering if you folks have any statistics that would develop the facts as to how many highway crossing accidents do happen at night by reason of automobiles running into the sides of freight cars. Now, would not the length of the train be quite an imporiant factor in connection with the number of accidents of that kind that might happen in a year's time? Mr. JOHNSON. That is true, Mr. Congressman, and there is no doubt in my mind but what a lot of accidents have happened on the highway crossings due to the fact that the motorist has tried to beat the train to the crossing, realizing that some of the trains are very long, and in order to avoid the delay, they take that chance. But, so far as accidents are concerned, it would not make any differ- ence how many cars were in the train after this fellow gets hit and he or others in the car pay the price. Mr. EICHER. That is true enough; but apparently the idea of these motor clubs is that a lot of accidents happen to motorists in trying to cross unprotected passenger crossings- Mr. JOHNsTON. That is true. Mr. EICHER. Who, in the nighttime by reason of conditions of poor visibility, run into the side of a freight car that is crossing that highway crossing, which might be avoided if there were red reflectors on the sides of the cars. Mr. WITHRow. Would not there be the same danger regardless of whether there were 70 cars or 150 cars? Mr. JOHNSON. I imag ine that the same people who suggested that we have red reflectors on the sides of cars are opposing the passage of this measure; are they not? Mr. EIcHER. I do not know about that. Mr. BULwINKLE. A train would then look like a traveling Christ- mas tree. Mr. JOHNSON. Well, if the motorist happens to get there, it does not make any difference whether it is the first car, the tenth car, or the twentieth car, if he is not going to stop, and the train is still moving over the crossing, he is going to pay the price. We may have more to say regarding highway crossings a little later on, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BULwINKLE. All right; go ahead. Mr. JOHNsON. Furthermore, a careful study of the injuries sus- tained should further convince this committee that train-service em- Ployees are subjected to hazards that do not prevail in other indus- tries, and proper provisions have not been made to protect them from these hazards. No industry for the sake of making money should be allowed to subject their employees to such conditions. In breaking down these accident reports, we find in exhibit 1 that there are 11 groups of trains, as follows: Eighty-six trains of 70 to 79 cars, 86 trains of 80 to 89 cars, 61 trains of 90 to 99 cars, 53 trains of 100 to 109 cars, 40 trains of 110 to 119 cars, 36 trains of 120 to 129 cars, 8 trains of 130 to 139 cars, 10 trains of 140 to 149 cars, 16 trains of 150 to 159 cars, 11 trains of 160 to 169.cars, and 2 trains of 170 to 179 cars. 150 TRAIN LENGTHS In considering these 11 groups, you will find that out of the 409 trains, 233 of the accidents occurred in the first three groups; that is, from 70 to 99 cars. That is due, Mr. Chairman, in my judgment, to the fact that more trains of that length are operated. There are 176 trains in the remaining 8 groups, ranging from 100 to 179 cars. I will ask you to note there were 8 claims included in the statement covering claims paid on trains of more than 70 cars-Nos. 9726, 9767, 10252, 10999, 13297, 13558, 14427, 14684-paid in the Dominion of Canada, hence they are not included in the tabulation set forth above, and should not be considered by the committee. In breaking down exhibit 2 we find there were 10 trains of 10 to 19 cars, 19 trains of 20 to 29 cars, 36 trains of 30 to 39 cars, 50 trains of 40 to 49 cars, 75 trains of 50 to 59 cars, and 109 trains of 60 to 69 cars. I will also ask you to note there were 11 claims in this group, Nos. 12814, 13666, 14304, 14308, 14470, 14550, 15061, 15112, 15286, 15554, 15836, 16249, that were also paid in the Dominion of Canada; hence, they are not included in the tabulation set forth above. I wish to call special attention to the fact that 184, or 61.5 percent of the 299 accidents accounted for in exhibit 2 were on trains consist- ing of 50 to 69 cars, which is further proof that the hazards increase as the length of the trains are increased. Fifty-two weeks is the maximum weekly indemnity benefit pro- vided for in our accident insurance policies. A check of exhibits 1 and 2 reveals that 16 of the claims recorded were paid the maximum of 52 weeks. They are identified as Nos. 8399, 8893, 8967, 9753, 10270, 10333, 10784, 11104, 11215, 13678, 10326, 10821, 12937, 13526, 13664, and 14493. I have endeavored to check these claims in order to ascertain the total time lost. The information furnished me through my check shows that the claimants lost from 1 to 10 months in excess of the 52 weeks maximum; also that two of the claimants were totally dis- abled and did not-return to the service. Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Chairman. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Halleck. Mr. HALLECK. With reference to these 70-car trains, could you say to the committee that if trains of greater length than 70 cars, and on which there were accidents, had been of 70 cars or less, assuming that the stops would have been made, emergency stops, as they are reported in the accidents, that the people on those trains would not have been hurt? Mr. JOHNsoN. No; I could not. No one could make that state- ment, Congressman. However, I do not believe even if there had been an injury that it -would have been with the severity that it was in the cases referred to because tests will show that the brakes are operative back to approximately 60 or 70 cars. It is beyond that point the slack is uncontrollable, which causes the shock on the rear end of the train. Mr. HALLECK. Well now, just a minute. As I read the report on the trains having less than 70 cars, there were many accidents there apparently that were in a measure at least caused by slack action? Mr. JOHNSON. Tht is true. TRAIN LENGTHS 151 Mr. HALLECK. Well, then there can be slack action on trains of less than 70 cars. Mr. JOHNSON. I think I stated that yesterday. There can be slack action if there are but two or three cars if it is developed. Mr. EICHER. What is that last statement? Mr. JOHNSON. I say there is slack action on two, three, or four cars, a certain amount of slack action, if it is developed. Mr. EICHER. And if the brakes go into emergency for some reason or other instead of service applications, is that correct? Mr. JOHNsoN. That is correct, Congressman. If you have five cars in the train, there is about 5 or 6 feet of slack in those cars, and if you set the brakes in the emergency on the engine and the train is stretched, naturally you are going to get the impact from those five or six cars. It is there. There is not other way for it to be absorbed. Mr. HALLECK. Is it not true, too, Mr. Johnson, that a longer train puts a greater pulling stress on the draw-bars, and therefore probably stretches them out further than they would be on a shorter train? Mr. JOHNSON. When a locomotive is pulling a train, naturally on heavy grades, there is a draw-bar pull that develops all of the slack that is possible to be developed in the cars. Conversely, when the head end of the train stops and the rear end runs up, the weight of the cars will naturally compress the springs to the very limit. I am sure the opponents of this bill will introduce a great volume of statistics and other testimony in an endeavor to break down and make the statements of the proponents look ridiculous. Such statistics will be prepared from certain reports rendered and in no way reflect the physical or mental strain under which train-service employees are re- quired to work in long train operations which should be the factor to determine the need for this legislation. Furthermore, the majority' of such statistics are prepared by men who have very little knowledge as to practical train operation. However, regardless of what they may introduce, a general inquiry or investigation among train-service employees throughout the entire United States will produce evidence to confirm all statements which we may make, and we welcome such an inquiry or investigation to determine these facts. I repeat, the increased length of trains has created a hazardous con- dition that should not exist. The vast number of train-service em- ployees from one end of the country to the other can see no redress from the hazards which now confront them in long train operation except through the enactment of legislation. The bill now before you will, in a large degree, afford the train-service employees the relief they are seeking and to which they are justly entitled. The Congress has full power to enact such legislation. Therefore, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, as one of the representatives of the train-service employees and speaking from the standpoint of experience, I most earnestly request you to render a favorable report on this bill and use your influence to bring about its en'9 during the present session. s set forth in exhibit 1, on trains of 70 or more cars, are o any individual railroad nor to any individual territory. 60 of the outstanding railroads of this country. There- at this time to ask to have inserted ip the record a tabu 152 TRAIN LENGTHS lation that I have made setting forth the names of the railroads involved, and the number of accidents occurring on each railroad dur- ing the period shown in the exhibit- Mr. BULwINnl (interposing). Without objection, it will be in- serted. (The tabulation referred to is as follows:) The following tabulation shows the number of accidents on each railroad in- volved in the 417 accident claims paid by the accident insurance department of the Order of Railway Conductors account of shock on trains of 70 cars or more between August 1929 and December 31, 1936 (exhibit 1). Number of accidents Western Maryland-..---.--------------------------------------4 Denver, Rio Grande & Western------------------- -----__------9 Norfolk & Western----------.....---------------------------------------20 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy ------------------------------------- 10 Southern Railway----- _--..------.---------------------------------10 Big Four --------------------- -------------------------------2 Illinois Central--------.------ ...-------------------------- 21 Wabash------__------------------------------------- S Erie---------------------------------------------.-.---- ----18 Missouri Pacific ------------------------ ----------------------23 Pennsylvania-..--.-.. -------------------------------------24 Great Northern--------.. ----------------------------------------- 9 Northern Pacific- ......-----.-- --------------------------------------7 Louisville & Nashville---_..------------------------------------11 New York, Chicago & St. Louis-.---------..-----------------------------------------19 Chicago & Great Western---------------------------------------3 Missouri, Kansas & Texas-----------------_-------------------- 7 St. Louis Southwestern----------------------------------------- New York Central------------_---------------------------------11 Bessemer & Lake Eric---------------------------------------.---- Yazoo & Mississippi Valley----...-_------------------------------------4 Chesapeake & Ohio----------------------------------- 27 Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe---_------------------------------------3 Western Pacific------------------------__-- --------____--------_----6 Grand Trunk & Western--.--------------------------------------4 Texas New Orleans---..------------_------------------------------3 Hocking Valley----------.------------------------------------- 1 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific -----------------------------------11 St. Louis & San Francisco_-..---------------------------------------6 Texas Pacific--. ------------------------------------------- 10 Union Pacific--._---------------------------------- ----_--__---4 Lehigh Valley--... ---------------------------------------- .----- 2 Virginian---..-... -__...----------------- -----------------------_ 9 Boston & Maine- ------------------..-------------------------3 Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul.----------.---------------------------6 Baltimore & Ohio.-----.---------- .------------------------------12 Southern Pacific ------ --_---------------------------------------21 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.---------------------------------------11 Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville----------------------------------1 Delaware & Hudson------------- __------------------------- 2 New York, New Haven & Hartford------------------------------------6 International Great Northern------------ --- _-----------1 New Orleans & North Eastern-------------------------------------1 Chicago, Illinois & Midland--------.-------------------------------1 Michigan Central ----------------------------------------- --------2 New York, Ontario & Western_-------------------------------------3 Rutland---------------------------------------------------_-_--1 Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac-------------------------------1 Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis._-------_----__-_ __--__ 3 Mobile & Ohio---------------- --------------------------------1 Monongahela------------------_------------------------------ 2 Pittsburgh & Lake Erie -------------------------------------------2 Chicago & North Western---...----------------------------------------1 Reading-----------------.- -------.----- --- 2 TRAIN LENGTHS 153 Number of aacident& Denver & Salt Lake---..---.-.----------------------------------------I Maine Central--------------------------------------------------1 Wheeling & Lake Erie------- .-_-.---------------------------------------1 St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico-------------------------- 1 Seaboard Air Line--------------...----------------------------------2 Lehigh & New England-------------------------------------------1 Total--....------.---.-------------------------------------409 Canadian accidents------------- -------------------------------- Total------------------------.------------------.---- .--.417 Mr. JOHNSON. I also desire, at this time, Mr. Chairman and mem- bers of the committee, to submit to be made a part of the record, Interstate Commerce Commission investigation report No. 2224, cov- ering an accident on the Union Pacific Railroad, Brigham, Utah, November 18, 1937, and your special attention is called to that part of the first paragraph, page 5, in which there is a recital of the esti- mated speed of the train, between 8 and 15 miles per hour, the train parted between the ninth and tenth cars. The emergency application of brakes which followed the break-in-two resulted in a severe run-in of the rear portion of the train, and caused the derailment of tank car U. T. L. X. 11665, the sixty-third car in the train. The second paragraph on page 7: Conductor Estes was badly injured in the accident and was not available for questioning. That further presents.our reasons for making this appeal to Con- gress to restrict the length of freight trains. It presents conclusive evidence that when there is a break-in-two there is a severe shock on the rear end of long trains. Mr. MAPES. How long was that train, Mr. Johnson? Does the report show? Mr. JoHNSON. It shows, yes; 83 cars-23 loads and 60 empties. (The report referred to is as follows:) Inv-2224 REPORT OF THE DIREcTon, BUREAU of SAFETY, To THE INTERSTATEi COMMERCE CoM- MISSION, WASHINGTON, oF THE ACCIDENT ON THE UNION PAcIG RAILROAD, BRIGHAM, UTAH, NOvEMBER 18, 1937. [Investigation No. 2224] SUMMARY Railroad : Union Pacific ; date : November 18, 1937; location : Brigham, Utah ; kind of accident: derailment; train involved: freight ; train number : Extra 5311 west; engine number : 5311; consist: 83 cars and caboose ; speed: 8-15 m. p. h.; track: tangent; 0.72 percent descending grade; weather: slightly foggy; time: 8:20 a. m.; casualties: 2 injured ; cause : break-in-two followed by run-in of rear portion. DECEMBER 15 1937. To the Commission:- On November 18, 1937, there was a derailment of a freight train on the Union Pacific Railroad, as a result of a break-in-two and a run-in, at Brigham, Utah, which resulted in the injury of two employees. LOCATION AND METHOD of OPERATION Thl6 accident occurred on the sixth subdivision of the Utah division, which extends between Ogden, Utah, and McCammon, Idaho, a distance of 111.2 Miles. This is a single-track line over which trains are operated by timetable, 154 TRAIN LENGTHS train orders, and an automatic block-signal system. The accident occurred at a point approximately 1,250 feet west of the station at Brigham, where the track extends approximately north and south ; however, timetable directions, west and east, are used in this report. A siding lies on the south side and parallel to the main track, the east switch being 4,264 feet east of the station and the west switch 4,081 feet west of the station at Brigham. A trailing-point cross-over for west-bound trains from the siding to the main track is located opposite the station. Approaching the scene of the accident from the east switch on the siding, the track is tangent for a distance of 3,430 feet, followed by a 5* curve to the left 686 feet in length and then 200 feet of tangent track to the cross-over. From the cross-over westward the main track is tangent 1,250 feet to the point of accident and for about 6,000 feet beyond. The grade for west-bound trains is 0.70 percent ascending for a distance of 2,100 feet, then there is a vertical curve 200 feet in length, followed by 700 feet of 0.77 percent ascending grade, and a vertical curve 800 feet in length, then level track a distance of 500 feet to the cross-over. Continuing westward on the main track from the cross-over, the track is level for a distance of 200 feet, followed by a vertical curve 800 feet in length, and 2,500 feet of 0.72 percent descending grade. The accident occurred on this grade at a point approximately 270 feet from its eastern end. This latter grade is followed by a vertical curve 400 feet in length and 500 feet of 0.60 percent descending grade. The track is laid with 90-pound rails in 33-foot lengths on 18 ties to the rail length. It is single-spiked and fully tie-plated and ballasted with gravel to a depth of 8 inches under the ties. The maximum authorized speed for freight trains is 30 miles per hour. It was slightly foggy at the time of the accident, which occurred at 8: 20 a. m. DESCRIPTION Extra 5311, a west-bound freight train, consisting of 83 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 5311, was in charge of Conductor Estes and Engineman Haslam. This train arrived at Brigham at 8 a. m. and headed into the siding at the east switch to meet No. 42. After the departure of the latter train, extra 5311 headed out upon the main track through the cross-over opposite the station. When the rear of the train was a short distance west of the sta- tion, and while running at a speed estimated to have been between 8 and 15 miles per hour, the train parted between the ninth and tenth cars. The emer- gency application of brakes which followed the break-in-two resulted in a severe run-in of the rear portion of the train, and caused the derailment of tank car U. T. L. X. 11665, the sixty-third car in the train. The forward and rear portions of the train stopped about one car length apart. The rear truck of U. T. L. X. 11665 was derailed to the right and the rear end of the car was forced upward and mounted the platform of the sixty-fourth car, P. X. 76213. The fifty-eighth car sustained a broken train line and a broken oil box, and on the tenth car, D. & R. G. W. 18196, the coupler was broken through the keyway at the back' end of shank on west end of car. The caboose was partially knocked off center. The employees injured were the conductor and rear brakeman. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE Engineman Haslam stated that his train consisted of 23 loaded and 60 empty cars, 2,662 tons. A terminal test of the brakes was made at Salt Lake City, 57.4 miles east of Brigham, and this showed a 5-pound leakage which is not excessive. Main-reservoir pressure of 130 pounds and train-line pressure of 70 pounds were maintained without difficulty. The feed valve on the locomotive operated properly. No difficulty was experienced in starting the train at Salt Lake City and nothing unusual occurred between Salt Lake City and Ogden. The train brakes were not used until making the stop at Ogden, where they operated properly. At this point the engine was cut off but the make-up of the train was not disturbed. Nothing unusual occurred between Ogden and Brigham, a distance of 21.1 miles. In making the stop at the east switch to head into the siding at Brigham for the purpose of meeting No. 42 he used the train brakes. Due to slippery rail and the ascending grade of abot 0.75 percent, the engine slipped some in entering the siding but although the slipping was not excessive he thought there was something sticking or dragging in the train. After the departure of No. 42 he had to take slack several times to start the train and the TRAIN LENGTHS 155 engine stalled three times due to the slippery rail and the ascending grade. After the train moved 6 or 8 car lengths it proceeded without difficulty as the grade begins to descend near the station. The train proceeded at a speed of about 3 miles per hour and as the engine and forward part of the train were on the descending grade lie kept the slack hunched by using the driver brakes. As the caboose neared the cross-over he eased off on the driver brakes in order to stretch the train a little and to adjust the slack. The rear end passed over the cross-over at a speed of about 6 miles per hour and he received a proceed signal from the rear, given with a yellow fusee. He whistled a proceed signal, hooked up the reverse lever to about 25 percent cut-off, and worked the throttle lightly. After moving 12 to 15 car lengths he thought he had all slack out of the train a nd about then the brakes were applied in emergency. Although he thought the application had been made on the rear end, he lapped his brake valve and whistled a "broke-in-two" signal. The hea d brakeman went toward the rear and then returned to the engine with the information that there was a broken train line and a broken drawbar shank on the tenth car. Engineman Haslam then went to the rear and found a major drawbar on car I. & R. G. W. 181l6 with the shank broken next to the yoke rivets and through the keyway. This break disclosed a flaw on the top and another flaw on the right-hand bottom corner ; there were also rusty sand holes resembling an ant bed. Including the sand holes he estimated that more than 50 percent of the break was old. The carrier iron was down about 1 inch below normal on the right side; one bolt was missing, and the other bolts were old and rusty. On going further to the rear he found three damaged tank cars in a group, the sixty-second, sixty- third, and sixty-fourth cars. The rear truck of the sixty-third car was de- railed ; this car and the sixty-fourth were telescoped, with the rear end of the former mounted on the platform of the latter, and the drawbar of the former car had punctured the tank of the latter car. Later he examined the fifty-eighth ar and found a bad connection at the angle-cock nipple and a broken oil box at the left No. 1 wheel. After the bad order cars were disposed of, the train proceeded to Pocatello, Idaho, without experiencing further trouble, the brakes performing properly and there was no excessive slack. Engineman Haslanm said this was the first break-in-two he had experienced in over 3 years. Fireman Paul and Head Brakeman Kandt corroborated the statement of Engineman Haslam relative to the movement of the train from the siding to the main track; they said the slack'was taken out of the train in an easy manner and they observed no jerking of the train. The head brakeman was of the opinion that the drawbar in the tenth car received more strain at the time of pulling out of the siding than at the time the train broke in two. Rear Brakeman Moody corroborated the statement of Engineman Haslam concerning events up to the time of passing over the cross-over. He estimated the speed at 8 miles per hour when he closed the cross-over switches and said that after he boarded the caboose he gave a proceed signal with a yellow fusee at which time the speed was between 10 and 15 miles per hour. The brakes were applied in emergency and when the train stopped the caboose was about 300 feet west of the station. Conductor Estes was badly injured in the accident and was not available for questioning. Acting General Car Foreman Kreger stated that he was in charge of the wrecking outfit which arrived at Brigham at 1 p. m. He made an inspection of the damaged cars and it was his opinion that the breaking of the coupler shank on D. & R. G. W. car 18196, the tenth car in the train, was the initial cause of the accident. He said this was a major coupler with a 5 inch by 5 inch shank, cast in 1911, and that it was the smallest size permitted in freight car service. He said the broken coupler revealed about 10 pereent old break in the top part of the shank and some sand holes in the bottom portion. He cor- roborated the statement of the engineman concerning the positions of the sixty- third and sixty-fourth cars and added that the rear drawbar of the sixty-second car was on top of the tank platform of the forward end of the sixty-third car. He found nothing about these three cars that would have caused or contributed to the accident. He stated that he had not been experiencing a great deal of trouble with free slack in draft gears, and that repairs were made on system and foreign cars whenever 1 inches or more free slack was found. Car Inspectors Nielson and Patterson stated that they made class A inspec- Lion of D. & R. G. W. 18196 about 6 p. m, November- 17, and said they took no exceptions. After the accident they examined the broken shank, and, in their opinion, the fracture showed about 5 percent old break at the top and said it would be impossible to see this defect unless the coupler was removed from the car. 156 TRAIN LENGTHS OBSERVATIONS OF THE COMMISSION'S INSPECTORS All equipment involved in the accident had been moved before the arrival of the Commission's inspectors. The inspection of the track disclosed nothing that would have contributed to the cause of the accident. The fifty-eighth, sixty-second, sixty-third and sixty-fourth cars were inspected at Ogden and nothing was found that would have caused or contributed to the accident. D. & R. G. W. 18196 was inspected at Salt Lake City and was found to have an old- type major coupler with a 5-inch by 5-inch shank broken off through the key- way. An old flaw, or partial fracture, of about 10 percent of the cross section, and numerous sand holes in the casting, were revealed. These would mate- rially reduce the strength of the shank and were of such nature and so located that they could not reasonably be expected to be found by ordinary inspection with the coupler in place in the car. This car is a steel gondola built in 1901 and was rebuilt in December 1926. It is 37 feet 6 inches in length, had a capacity of 80,000 pounds, and weighs 33,300 pounds. It is equipped with twin-spring draft gears. DISCUSSION The evidence is to the effect that the train was moved in a normal manner from Salt Lake City to the point of accident. There was no excessive slack action and no rough handling. There was no warning of any defect prior to the break-in-two and the resultant emergency application of the brakes. The train broke in two between the ninth and tenth cars and the evidence is to the effect that the telescoping of the three tank cars, and the derailment of one of them, was caused by the sudden run-in which resulted when the brakes were applied in emergency. Not only was the coupler which failed the minimum in size permitted by A. A. R rules, but it was defective due to an old partial fracture and sand holes in the casting. Couplers with 5-inch by 5-inch shanks, on cars built new after November 1, 1920, or rebuilt after July 1, 1928, are not permitted by A. A. R. rules. This size of coupler is therefore obsolete, and the results of this accident point to the need of eliminating such couplers from service on all cars as quickly as possible. CONCLUSION This accident was caused by a break-in-two of the train due to the failure of a coupler shank. Respectfully submitted. W. J. PArrEasoN, Director. Mr. JoHNsoN. On page 7 of my submission, Mr. Chairman, I state, I contend that no one is better qualified to testify to a hazardous condition than the one who is required to work under such conditions. Long train operations do create a hazardous condition, and the train- men who are required to operate them are ready and willing to so testify. Therefore at this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce four witnesses who have paid the price that we are talking about, in order that they may read into the record statements covering their experience and injuries. Mr. BULWINKLE. Very well. Mr. Jonsow. With your permission, I would like to call at this time Mr. Hubert L. Rice. STATEMENT OF HUBERT L. RICE, LOGANSPORT, IND. Mr. Rc. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee: My name is Hubert L. Rice. I am 53 years of age and I reside at 715 Bringhurst Street, Logansport, Ind. I have a wife who is dependent on me for her support. fit VAIN LENGTHS 157 I was employed by the Pennsylvania Railroad Co. as a freight conductor. I entered the train service on July 1, 1909. In my experience as a conductor, I have operated trains up to and including 130 cars. On January 4, 1936, I was injured while on the rear end of a train of 93 cars in Hawthorne Yards, Indianapolis, Ind. This accident occurred about 6 p. m. It was dark and the temperature was about zero. In this accident, I sustained fractures of the second, third, and fourth lumbar vertebrae, commonly known as a broken back. This accident was caused by switch on running track being left open, a caboose and six cars setting to clear in this track and caboose occupied by trainmen who were preparing to go out on run. When engineer saw he was entering this track he made an emergency application of the automatic air brake to prevent hitting this caboose. In making this application he got the desired result on the head end of the train, but did not get it on the rear end of the train, which caused the teriffic impact of the rear end of the train. As a result of this injury from this accident, I have been declared by two responsible physi- cians to be permanently disabled from railroading. As to the damage to equipment, I am not in a position to say what damage was done to train, excepting caboose. The doors of the caboose were torn off, both platforms were torn up, lockers were torn loose, and the stove was torn loose from the floor. I was then taken to the hospital and did not see any other cars in this train. For my injuries sustained, I made a settlement-with the railroad company in the amount of $14,000, but I was compelled to employ the services of an attorney to secure this settlement, of which the attorney got one-fourth, leaving me $10,500 for my part of the settlement. In making this settlement, I had to offer my resignation and sign a release, releasing the company from any further financial obligation in connec- tion with my injury. At this time my monthly earnings averaged about $200 per month, but now I. am able to earn nothing. Prior to this accident, my physical condition had been good excepting two attacks of sciatic rheumatism for which I was off and took treatment. My individual experience as a conductor on long trains is that train service men on the rear end are compelled to work under a severe strain, because due to the sudden lurches and jerks that they have to be braced at all times to protect themselves from injuries. In my opinion, based on experience, hand signals by day or night cannot be clearly and safely intercepted for more than 60 or 65 car lengths under favorable conditions. The Pennsylvania Railroad requires -train employees on rear of trains to make running inspection of all trains met and passed,. which requires them to go to rear platform of caboose to make this inspection, which places them in a hazardous position, should the airbrakes of train go into emergency. As the results of my injury, I suffer pain and do not have good use of myself, which has resulted in my falling and receiving a broken arm. In my opinion and from my experience, the airbrakes cannot be successfully operated on a train of more than 70 cars with safety. Gentlemen of this committee, as you can readily see from my present physical condition, there is no law, you could enact to limit the length of trains that would ever do ;me, personally, any good However, the failure of the Congress to enact such legislation in the 47891-381--1 158 TRAIN LENGTHS past forced me and many others to pay the price and be thrown on the human scrap heap. But for the sake of my former fellow workers and their families, I plead with you gentlemen to support Senate bill 69. I thank you. Mr. BULwINWLE. Mr. Rice, would you mind if I asked you a question or two? Mr. RICE. No, sir. Mr. BULwINKLE. I did not catch it if you said how fast this train was going at the time you stopped. Mr. RICE. Mr. Congressman, I did not hear you. Mr. BULwINKLE. How fast was your train going at the time of this accident? Mr. RICE. I would say between 15 and 20 miles per hour. Mr. BmwINxxLE. What was the length of that train, in cars? Mr. RICE. Ninety-three cars. Mr. BULWINKLE. Anyone else have any questions? Mr. WrrHnow. I would like to ask Mr. Rice a question. At the time you were in the yards, when this accident happened- you were in the yards, were you not? Mr. RICE. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHRow. Of course, you had no way of knowing that the engineer was going to set the emergency or that the emergency appli- cation was going to be made? Mr. RIcn. No, sir. Mr. WrrHuow. But even had you known the emergency application was going to be made, there would have been no possible way in which you could have sufficiently braced yourself in the caboose to have withstood the terrific shock ? Mr. RICE. Not in that accident; no. Mr. Wrrmnow. There was no way in which you could possibly pro- tect yourself from the slack action jolt. Mr. RICE. None, because the doors were torn off and anything that I could have had hold of, would have been torn loose. Mr. WITRow. You would have been injured, notwithstanding that? Mr. RICE. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHROw. And that is not unusual for stops of that kind to be made on the railroads? Mr. RICE. Not with long trains. Mr. Eicnnn. Mr. Chairman- Mr. BItIwINKLE. Mr. Eicher. Mr. Eicnet. Were you the only one in the caboose at that time? Mr. RICE. I beg your pardon. Mr. EICHER. Were you the only one in the caboose at the time of the accident? Mr. RICE. No sir; my flagman. Mr. EionEm. What happened to him? Mr. RICE. He was standing to the rear, toward-well, the front end of the caboose, the way the train was going, and the wall caught him. He was injured to a certain extent, but did not receive any broken bones. Mr. Excam. That is all. Mr. BULWINxLE. All right, that is all. Thank you. Mr. RICE. Thank you. TRAIN LENGTHS 159 Mr. JOHNsON. Now, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to call Mr. John Sylvester Hunt. Mr. BULWINKLE. All right. STATEMENT OF JOHN SYLVESTER HUNT, COLUMBUS, OHIO Mr. HUrNr. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is John Sylvester Hunt. I reside at 895 Beech Street, Columbus, Ohio. I am appearing in support of Senate bill 69, which is now before f ou for consideration. I have been employed on the Hocking Valley Railroad, now a part of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad, since February 6, 1906, in the capacity of brakeman and conductor. I was promoted to the position of conductor in 1915 and I am still carried on the roster as such. During my active service period, I was involved in several acci- dents, which resulted in excessive rear-end shocks. I suffered injuries fron all of these accidents, however, I will only make special mention of the injuries sustained in my last accident. On February 28, 1936, I was in charge as conductor of extra 3006, east-bound from Walbridge, Ohio, to Columbus, Ohio. I was called to leave Walbridge at 9: 30 p. m. with 153 empty coal cars. I re- ceived a message en route to pick up one load and two empties at Upper Sandusky. After picking up these cars, I had a total of 156 cars in the train. At Marion, Ohio. about 2:50 a. in., the train parted due to a. defective drawbar which resulted in an emergency application of the air. I was knocked down in the caboose and was unconscious for about 15 minutes. My rear brakeman, or flagman, H. F. Chilcott, was also injured. After I regained consciousness, I got Mr. Chilcott out of the cupola of the caboose and laid him down on one of the bunks in the body of the caboose. The shock extinguished all the lights in the caboose and the markers on the outside of the caboose. After lighting the markers on the caboose and displaying some protection signals, I went to the telegraph office, which was about 12 or 14 cars from the caboose and called for an ambulance to take Flagman Chil- cott to the hospital and I requested the operator to arrange to have the train protected from thb rear by holding all trains at MD cabin and order an engine out to pull the caboose back to Dryus Street so allbulance could get Flagman Chilcott and take him to the hospital. In the meantime, the engine crew and head brakeman on the train brought our engine back through the siding and they found me at the telegraph office and by that time I had begun to feel the effects of my injuries. They placed me on the engine and took me back to the caboose, which I found to be a total wreck, doors torn off, stove broken, coal box misplaced, and coal scattered over the caboose. When the accident happened, I was thrown from locker box against the ice box in the center of the caboose. When I regained conscious- ness, I was on the floor of the caboose and one of the caboose doors was on top o fine. My injuries consisted of a very badly sprained knee and back. There was a fracture of the eleventh vertebrae. I was given first aid at Marion, Ohio, by Dr. Rue and was then taken to Columbus on train No. 36. I was in Grant Hospital 8 days. Z was then allowed to go home, but I was required to report to Dr. 160 TRAIN LENGTHS Baldwin's office for treatment twice a week for over 9 months. I was not satisfied with the treatment I was getting and I requested to be sent to another doctor. I was then sent to Dr. Harris and he made an examination and refused to tell me what he found, but he told Dr. Baldwin after a talk between them. I was taken back to Dr. Baldwin's office and a needle was inserted into my back with no result. After about 11 months, the doctor and claim agent thought I could perform the duties of a conductor. After making one trip, I had to lay off and again report to Dr. Baldwin. He tapped my knee three tunes, extracting about 2 ounces of fluid the first time and about 10 drops the second, however, no fluid was extracted the third time. After being off about 3 weeks more, I was given a place as brake- man on a passenger train 3 days a week. After making these days, it was necessary for me to take hot towel baths to reduce the swelling in my knee and I was forced to stay off of my feet. I worked as a pas- senger brakeman for about 3 months and during the entire time I was in misery and suffered real pain as a result of my injuries. I felt satisfied that I would never fully recover from my injuries and requested the claim agent to make a settlement. He offered me $2,500, which I refused to accept, because I knew that my working da ys were over and I was entitled to a better settlement of my claim. A fer further consideration, my wife and I decided to settle for $4,000 cash and a promise that my pension would be granted. I know that I am totally disabled, from performing any manual labor as my back and knee pain me at all times. In fact I have never been free from pain since my accident. Before my accident, I was a man who liked all kinds of sport. I loved to hunt, fish, and dance, however, I can never again enjoy these pleasures as I formerly did, and as others do. I am now wearing a waist belt and AC bandages on my knee. It is absolutely necessary that I wear these bandages and belt at all times. It is hard to think of a man being cast upon the human scrap heap at the age of 59. I can no longer earn as I once did, thereby providing for my wife the real comforts of life which we enjoyed prior to my in jury. Brakeman Chilcott, to wham I have referred in this statement, died as the result of his injuries. He lived approximately 7 weeks from the date of his injury, however he did not regain full consciousness. He was a man of approximately 63 years of age, but he was in ex- cellent health at the time he was injured. The Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad offered Mrs. Chilcott approximately $2,000 in settlement of her claim. Of course, this offer was refused and Mrs. Chilcott entered suit, which resulted in a judgment in her favor in the amount of $14,000, but my understanding is that the Chesapeake & Ohio intends to appeal to the higher court. During my railroad career, I have seen the length of trains gradu- ally increased,which I know has increased the hazards in connection therewith. Furthermore, through experience, I know, regardless of any statements that may be made to the contrary, that th6 present automatic airbrakes will not render efficient braking service on trains of more than 60 or 70 cars. I also know that day and night hand signals cannot be properly and safely interpreted on trains of greater length than 70 cars. TRAIN LENGTHS 161 I further know that train-service employees, particularly those riding on the rear of the train, are required under the rules to do certain things with respect to observing trains that are met and passed, which jeopardize their lives and limb every trip that is made. No doubt my personal appearance will cause some members of the committee to doubt my present physical condition, but regard- less of what your thoughts or opinions may be, I have paid the price in long-train operation. I would like to be back as I was prior to February 28, 1936, the date of my injury, but such will never be. I am forced to write "finis" after 32 years of service on the railroad, which is the result of property rights being placed ahead of human rights. The enactment of Senate bill 69 will mean nothing to me other than the satisfaction of knowing that my former fellow workers will not be further required to endure the strains, hardships, and injuries connected with the handling of trains of more than 70 cars in length. I earnestly plead with each member of this committee to give this all-important piece of legislation your full support. I thank you. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the witness a question. Mr. BanwINxm. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. You stated that after the impact you were uncon- scious about 15 minutes. Then you stated what you did thereafter, concluding with the protection of the rear end of the train. How long was it from the time of the impact until the rear end of the train was protected against following trains? Mr. HUNT. Fifteen minutes or longer. Mr. MARTIN. You said you were unconscious 15 minutes and then you went to the station agent, got him to get a flag out, or some- thing. How long, altogether, elapsed before the protection of the rear end of the train was effective? Mr. HUNT. Oh, I would say 30 minutes. Mr. MARTIN. Thirty minutes. Mr. HUNT. Yes. Mr. MARTIN. And it was at night? Mr. HINT. Yes, sir. That is what I mean by that, that is, I ar- ranged with the operator at M. A. to phone M. D. to protect the rear of the train. Mr. MARTIN. If there had been a following train within 30 min- lites of you at the time the accident happened, then there would have been nothing to protect it? Mr. HUNT. Yes; we have automatic blocks over there. Mr. MARTIN. You have the automatic block signals? Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. How far was it back from that block ? Mr. HUNT. Oh, about 70 car lengths. Mr. MARTIN. Did I understand you to say you have been in five accidents? Mr. HUNT. I have been in several. Mr. MARTIN. How many did you attribute to the train lengths; any other besides this? Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir; all of them were over 70 cars. 162 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. MARTIN. What was the train length when you began railroad- ing, the average train length? Mr. HUNT. From 40 to 50 cars. Mr. MARTIN. I remember the time when a train of 35 empty stock cars on the Santa Fe was a "drag-out." That was in the nineties. They called a train of 35 empties a drag-out, which was the maximum length of train they hauled in those days. Mr. BULwINKLE. Are you through, Mr. Martin? Mr. MARTIN. Yes. Mr. BULwINKLE. What was the speed of your train? Mr. HUNT. Between 18 and 20 miles an hour. Mr. BULWINKLE. All right. Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Chairman Mr. BULwINKTZ. Mr. Halleck. Mr. HALLECK. At what point in the train did it come in two? Mr. HUNT. Behind the tank, behind the engine. Mr. HALLECK. Behind the engine? Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHEow. Were there any cars derailed? Mr. HUNT. I cannot give you that, only hearsay. There were cars derailed, but I did not see them. Mr. WITHRow. When the lights were put out in the caboose and also the lights on the outside of the caboose, known as the mal kers Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHRow. That indicate red toward the rear end to prc tect you. Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir. Mr. Wrnow. They were out? Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir. Mr. WITnow. And the train, the rear end of the train, was un- protected for a proximately 30 minutes? Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir. Just let me explain that now. Mr. WITHROw. Yes. Mr. HUNT. The accident happened at 2: 50. I regained con scious- ness at 3: 05. At that time I looked at my watch. During that time all of the lights on the caboose were out. After I regained con- sciousness the first thing I did was to get the markers lit, put red to the rear. Then I threw off a fusee. I walked from there over to the telgraph office. te.r fTfRow. For at least 15 minutes the rear of the train was a dark object on the track? Mr. HUNT. That is all. Mr. WITHRow. No protection at all for 15 minutes and then there was not sufficient protection for at least 15 additional minutes, with the exception of what you term automatic block signals? , Mr. HUNT. Yes. Mr. WITHROW. They have frequent failures of the automatic block signals on railroads, do they not? Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHRow. To such an extent that the rules require that you shall not regard the automatic blocks as sufficient protection. Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHnow. Is not that so? Mr. HUNT. That is right. TRAIN LENGTHS 163 Mr. WIrnow. Now, if your train had made a normal stop at t he same point, for the length of time you speak of, even though there were red lights on the rear end of the train to protect it, and no cne had been injured, if you had remained in the caboose for 30 minutes without protecting the rear end and the officials of the railroad had found it out, that you left the train unprotected for 30 minutes, yc u would have been discharged, would you not? Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir. Mr. MAPES. May I ask a question? Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Mapes. Mr. MAPES. What in your judgment would have been the effect upon you if the same kind of accident you were in had happened on a train of 70 cars? I understand this train had 153 cars. Mr. HUNT. One hundred and fifty-six. Mr. MAPES. One hundred and fifty-six? Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir. Well, it would not have been nearly as bad on a 70-car as it was on a 156-car train. In other words, there is about 86 feet of slack that would not have been there. Mr. MAPES. Was there any defect in the cars, or any carelessness involved in the accident, or was your injury due entirely to the extra slack in the long train? Mr. HUNT. A defective drawbar on the head end. Mr. MAPEs. If there had been a defective drawbar on a train of 70 cars, would there have been a different slack action? Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir. Mr. MAPES. As a result of the length of the train? Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir. There would be lots of difference in the slack. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman Mr. BULwINKmE. Are you through, Mr. Mapes? Mr. MAPEs. Yes. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. Is there any rule or regulation on that system requir- ing the head end of the train to keep the tail end under observation, to keep an eye back for the tail end of the train? Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. Would it be practical for that to be done on a train of that length? Mr. HUkT. Not at all times, sir. Mr. MARTIN. That is all. Mr. BULWINKLE. All right. That is all, sir. Thank you. Mr. HUNT. Thank you. Mr. BULWINKLE. Who is your next witness? Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like at this point to read into the record a report of the Interstate Commerce Commis- sion on the accident just referred to, based on the reports made by the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Co., covering the accident. No. 1360, February 28, 1936. M. A. Cabin, extra 3006, 156 cars. Emergency application of air caused by. breaking in two- Mr. 3ULWINKLE. How long will it take you to read that, Mr. Johnson? Mr. JoHNsoN. There are just about two or three lines. Mr. BULwINrxE. Go ahead. 164 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. JOHxnso (reading) : Severe slack action threw Conductor J. S. Hunt down in caboose, causing him to suffer severe contusions right side and hip. Off probably 30 days. Brake- man H. F. Chileott thrown down in caboose and suffered body bruises, face lacerations and fractured shoulder blades. Off probably 90 days. J. S. Hunt states he is totally disabled, and Chilcott died as a result of his injuries. I would now like to call-Mr. Chairman-Mr. Harry H. Kelly. STATEMENT OF HARRY H. KELLY, COLUMBUS, OHIO Mr. KELLY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: My name is Harry H. Kelly. I reside at 54 North Gift Street, Columbus, Ohio. I am appearing in support of the bill now before you for con- sideration, Senate 69. My age is 55 years. I am married and my wife is dependent upon me for support. I first entered the railroad service as a brakeman on the Hocking Valley Raillroad on May 18, 1904. On May 9, 1910, I was promoted to the position of conductor. The Hocking Valley Railroad is now a part of and is operated by the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad. I was in service as a brakeman and conductor for a total of 32 years. On September 9, 1935, I was conductor on extra 3017, east-bound from Walbridge to Columbus, Ohio, with 160 empty coal cars in train. On approaching Powell, Ohio, about 5:20 a. m. at a speed of approximately 25 or 30 miles per hour, an emergency stop of the train was made, which was caused by a key in the drawbar of E. J. & E. car 10973 working out of place, which allowed the drawbar to come out, which resulted in a separation of the air hose causing the brakes to be thrown into emergency, which resulted in a very severe shock on the rear end of the train. The car causing the accident was 64 cars behind the engine. At the time of the accident Flagman J. T. Towell and I were riding in the cupalo of the caboose. We had no warning prior to the emergency stop. The sudden impact threw me forward against the front end of the cupalo breaking boards out of the front end of the cupalo. I was rendered unconscious and remained so for 15 or 20 minutes. I was severely injured in my back and right ankle. which has resulted in me being declared totally and permanently disabled, from doing any manual labor. When I arrived at Columbus I was taken to Grant Hospital and stayed there for 1 week. I was then released from the hospital and told to report to the company doctor at his office twice a week. This I did for 5 or 6 weeks. After about two trips to the doctor's office I was asked by the doctor how I was feeling and I informed him that I was suffering from my back injuries and the doctor's reply to me was that he was not concerned about my back injuries, but e was concerned about my ankle injuries. After about 6 weeks' treatment, the company doctor informed me that I was privileged to try to return to service. I then called on the claim agent, which we were required to do in mattets of this kind before returning to service after an injury, and']! furiished the claim agent a statement covering my physical condition after being released by the company doctor, which was turned over to the gen- TRAIN LENGTHS 165 eral claim agent by the assistant claim agent to whom I made the report. About 10 days after rendering my report to the claim agent, he notified me that he had been authorized to allow me $285 as a settlement for my injuries and that was all that he could do for me. I knew that I was not physically fit to return to service either as a brokeman or conductor in any class of service. Therefore, I de- clined to accept the offer made by the claim department as a settle- ment. After some exchange of correspondence and further han- dlingI was convinced that the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad would not allow me any kind of a settlement in keeping with the amount justly due me for the injuries which I sustained. Therefore, I employed a lawyer and filed suit against the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad and I was awarded a judgment in the amount of $5,000. However, after the judgment was rendered, an agreement was reached outside of further court handling to the end that I settled for $4,000. Of course, in reaching this settlement, I was required to sever my connection with the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad and sign a release relieving them of any further obligations to me in any way whatsoever. Prior to my injury, my monthly earnings averaged about $225 per month, but since my injury my earnings have been stopped and my present physical condition is such that I cannot perform any kind of manual labor, and I am forced to wear a steel brace around by body at all times except when I lay down. This steel brace weighs about 5 pounds and is not a very comfortable thing to have around your body, particularly so during the hot weather. The injury to which I have referred in this statement was the second one I received in long-train operation. The first one was in 1924, which was also due to an excessive rear-end shock on a long train. During the 32 years I was engaged in active railroad service as a brakeman and conductor, I saw the length of trains increased on the Hocking Valley Railroad from about 40 cars to 160 cars regardless of loads or empties. In my judgment, based on experience, trains of more than 70 cars are excessive because signals cannot be properly and safely interpreted on trains of a greater length and only on trains of 60 and 70 cars under clear and most favorable weather conditions. While I ivas in service, I know that trainmen were required to place themselves under the rules7 in hazardous positions in order to make a running inspection of trains which were met and passed en route. The only place the rules can be properly complied with in this con- nection is on the rear end of the caboose and I am convinced that every man will readily realize, regardless of whether he is an experienced railroad man or not, that the riding on the rear platform of a caboose while the train is in motion is a very dangerous practice. The testi- mony which has already been given and further testimony and acci- dent reports rendered in this connection will fully justify the state- ment I have made. Furthermore, I know from experience that the automatic airbrake will not properly function on trains of a greater length than 70 cars. This statement can be very easily borne out by practical brake tests. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen-of the committee, I am not making this plea with the hope that it will bring any benefits to me, be- cause my railroad career has ended. In other words, I am through. 166 TRAIN LENGTHS I have paid the price not only in human suffering, but also in a financial loss to me and my wife. Therefore, allow me to plead with you to enact this piece of legislation in order that other men engaged in train service will not be forced to pay the price that I have paid. I thank you. Mr. REECE Mr. Chairman Mr. BUmwiNE. Mr. Reese. Mr. RnEz. Did this gentleman become ineligible for retirement? Mr. JOHNSON. I beg your pardon. Mr. REECE. Did this gentleman become ineligible for retirement? Mr. JOHNsoN. Under the terms of the amended Railroad Retire- ment Act you mean? Mr. REECE. Yes; or any other. Mr. JOHNSON. He has his application before the Railroad Retire- ment Board under the disability provisions of the law. We are in- vestigating that and we are led to believe that this application will be certified by the Board to the Treasury Department for payment. Mr. MAPES. Mr. Chairman Mr. BTULWINKLE. Mr. Mapes. Mr. MAPES. It occurred since August 29, 1935? Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Mr. MAPES. The effective date of the Railroad Retirement Act? Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. He had an employment relation to carrier on August 29, 1935. Mr. MAPES. I would like to ask Mr. Johnson a question for my own general information. Mr. JOHNsoN. Yes, sir. Mr. MAPEs. To what extent do these long trains do a local business, pick up and deliver local freight? Mr. JOHNSON. I do not quite understand your question. Mr. MAPES. To what extent do these long trains handle local freight, stop at the small towns? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, of course, we have the through freight trains., the symbol trains, manifest trains, on all railroads that are straight- away trains. They do not stop. Then we have what we call our set-out and pick-up trains, which do the intermediate work, and we have our local freight trains. Many of them, however, Mr. Con- gressman, handle some pretty long trains. Mr. MAPES. These so-called set-out trains that you speak of, are they long trains, as a rule, or not? Mr. JOHNSON. Some of them are very long. Take our mine runs, and switcher runs; they handle 160 or 170 empty coal cars to be placed at the mines for loading, and in other industrial sections for other purposes. Mr. MAPES. Do these long trains that are loaded with freight stop to handle local freight? Mr. JoHNsON. No. They are symbol trains. They are high-class trains. They run just like passenger trains. They stop occasionally to take coal or water, and that is about all. Mr. MAPES. Is it the rule or the exception, that the long trains stop at the local stations to pick up or deliver freight? Mr. JonsoN. Well, Congressman Mapes, the trains who do the local work, the number of cars in those trains fluctuate. Mr. MAPES. I am trying to find out in a general sort of way whether TRAIN LENGTHS 167 these long trains pick up and deliver freight at the small local stations. Mr. JOHNsoN. Some of them do, yes; that are assigned for that particular purpose. Mr. MAPEs. Do they do so once a month, or every day ? Is it common practice for them to do so or not? Mr. JoHNsoN. We have daily local service, daily set-out and pick-up service on the majority of the roads, particularly on the main lines. This service is daily. Mr. BULwINKLE. In other words, Mr. Johnson, a train of over 100 cars, we will say, or through trains, do not do the pick-up work or local service; is that correct? Mr. JOHNSON. They are limited to a certain extent; yes, Con- gressman. Mr. BmwINKUL. Very few of them do a local pick-up service. Mr. JOHNsON. That is, the symbol trains, or high-class trains? Mr. BULwINiLE. All right. Is that all? Mr. KELLY. Yes, Sir. Mr. BUrwINKLE. Thank you very much. Call your next witness. Mr. JOHNsON. I have one more witness, Congressman. I will now call Mr. J. T. Towell. Mr. BrnwINKLE. I think it would be perfectly satisfactory with the committee, Mr. Johnson, if he wants to sit there. Mr. JoHNsON. And, if I read his statement. Mr. BULWINKLE. Yes; and the committee can ask any questions afterwards. I think you may read it for him, if he would rather have you do that, and then we can ask him questions afterwards. STATEMENT OF J. T. TOWELL, FRANKFORT, OHIO Mr. TowELL. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: My name is J. T. Towell. I reside at Frankfort, Ohio. This statement is rendered in support of Senate bill 69. I am 59 years of age. I have one sister and one brother who are partially dependent upon me for support. I entered the railroad service in 1895 on the C. H. & D. Railroad, which is now operated by the Baltimore & Ohio, in the capacity of a laborer. I was later promoted to the position of yard clerk. From 1900 to 1903, I worked as yard brakeman and yard conductor. About 1906, I was promoted to the position of yardmaster on the Big Four Railroad and served in that capacity until about 1911, at which time I went back into the yard as a yard conductor and con- tinued in that capacity until about 1914, at which time I left rail- road service and took up another profession. In September 1917, I entered the service of the Hocking Valley Railroad, which is now a part of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad, as a brakeman. I was lated promoted to the position of conductor. On September 9, 1935, I was flagman on extra 3017, east-bound, from Walbridge to Columbus, Ohio, consisting of 160 empty coal cars. I was the flagman to whom Mr. Harry H. Kelley, who just preceded me, referred in his statement. In my judgment, Mr. Kelly has furnished your committee a very complete outline covering the accident which resulted in our personal injuries. 168 TRAIN LENGTHS In this accident I was knocked unconscious in the cupola of the caboose. I was injured to the extent of a compound fracture of right leg at knee and ankle, also a back injury. As a result of these injuries, I have been in a very nervous state and I am still under the care of a doctor. At the time of the accident, a company doctor was located about 2 miles away, who was called and administered temporary relief. I was later sent to Grant Hospital in an ambulance, which was about 20 miles from the scene of the accident. I was confined to the hos- pital 5 months and 10 days. After leaving the Grant Hospital, I had X-rays made of the in- jured parts of my body, which resulted) in a report being made to me that I was totally and permanently disabled from performing any manual labor. Upon receipt of report covering my physical con- dition, I employed an attorney and filed suit against the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad in Federal Court at Cleveland, Ohio, and I was awarded a judgment of $12,500. The railroad company appealed the case, but before the case came to trial on the appeal, I reached a settlement with the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad in the amount of $10,500, but in so doing, I was required to sever my connections in every way with the company and furthermore sign a release, reliev- ing the company of further financial or other obligations to me i any way whatsoever. During my period of railroad service, I saw the length of trains increase from year to year from approximately 40 cars, 40 years ago, to 160 and more at the present time, and based on my experi- ence, I know that the hazards in connection with the operation of freight trains have been increased in proportion to the increase in length. I further know from experience that hand signals, both day and night, cannot be properly and safely interpreted on trains of a greater length than provided for in the bill now before you. I also know that the automatic airbrake will not properly function on trains of a greater length than 70 cars. I am rendering this statement in all sincerity, knowing full well that the enactment of the legislation now under consideration will in no way benefit me. However, I am deeply concerned regarding the future welfare of the men now engaged in train service, and to the end that none of them will be forced to suffer injuries such as I have. It is with these thoughts in mind that I am now earnestly re- questing the members of this committee to give this legislation their full support and influence. I thank you. Mr. BuLwinKX. Do any members have any questions? Mr. CRossER. I would like to ask a question. Mr. BtJLwINKLE. Mr. Crosser. Mr. CRossER. I would like to ask if this gentleman has an em- ployment relation, or did he have at the time of the accident? Mr. JOHNSON. He did, and now has an application pending with the Railroad Retirement Board. Mr. MARTIN. His got in by about 10 or 12 days. Mr. JOHNsON. That is true. Mr. BULwINKLE. Any other questions? Thank you, Mr. Towell. Mr. TowELL. Thank you. TRAIN IX-ENGTHS 169 Mr. BmLWINKLE. Mr. Johnson, have you anything else this morn- ing? Mr. JoHNsoN. Yes; I do have some more, Mr. Chairman. Of course, if you want to adjourn until Monday. Mr. BULWINKLE. No; go ahead. Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I have more, Mr. Chairman. In the face of the statements that have just been made by these witnesses, and the information furnished in the reports that have been submitted to you for consideration, we find on some of the railroads appearing on the bulletin boards and in bulletin books and as a part of the safety rules language that reads like this; Trainmen and others riding in caboose ears should brace themselves -at alt times against a possible shock resulting from a sudden start or stop. Mr. MARTIN. What is that you are reading from? Mr. JOHNSON. I am reading from a letter wherein was quoted a rule on the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad to train- service employees through the safety department of that railroad. Mr. MAPES. You mean that that is the rule of the Delaware, Lacka- wanna & Western? Mr. JOHNSON. That is the rule on practically all railroads, and instructs train-service employees to brace themselves in the caboose at all times while the train is in motion in order to guard against a personal injury and I am reading that to you for the purpose of asking you the question. How in the world can a human being anchor himself in a caboose to withstand the things that these men who just testified to are forced to endure? Mr. MAPES. What prompted my question was your statement that you were reading from a letter. As a matter of fact as I under- stand, it is a rule in the rule book of the company. Mr. JOHNSON. That is right. Mr. MAPES. Of the book of safety rules? Mr. JOHNsON. Safety rules which are printed, Mr. Congressman. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Johnson, are you able to tell us how long rules of that type or character have been in effect; how many years it dates back to the inception of that rule? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, speaking from my own personal experience, I can go back 25 years. I was in active service up to about the middle of 1930. Mr. WITHROW. Mr. Chairman Mr. I3ULWINKLE. Mr. Withrow. Mr. WInrnow. Mr. Johnson, is it possible for men to at all times brace themselves on the rear end of trains. For instance, how would a conductor brace himself doing his book work at the desk, and he has considerable work to do at the desk, listing cars, and so on. Mr. JOHNSON. It is an utter impossibility, and can anyone by any rule or reason justify the requirement of a man sitting in a caboose car over a 140-, 150-, or 200-mile division with himself braced in a rigid position at all times? And that, gentlemen, is what you have to do in order to avoid as much as possible the injuries that result from rear-end shocks. This is not an exaggerated statement. These are actual facts. A study of that report that I gave you will show that there is no designated point, no designated time, for those things to happen. 170 TRAIN LENGTHS They happen at all times and in all places, and I would like to read to you a statement that I have here in that connection. Here is a man who started out on a run on November 1, 1937, on the Great Northern Railroad uk in Washington. He had 116 cars consisting of 16 loads and 100 empties, and in 25 minutes from the time he left the initial terminal starting out on his trip, this very thing happened. He left Wenatchee, Wash., the initial terminal for Cascade going west, at 3: 50 a. m., November 1, 1937, on an extra west. [Reading]: We had 100 empty cars and 16 loads. The train was being pulled by three Units coupled together, each unit, electric motor, being a separate engine in itself. The engines were on the head end of the train. Twenty-five minutes after leaving Wenatchee, we arrived at Olds, Wash., and the train came to a sudden stop. The train had parted 75 cars ahead of the caboose, caused by heavy strain on the drawbars and slack action. The terrific impact of the sudden stop was terrible. I was making out my reports at the time of the accident and a brakeman was sitting down on the opposite side of the caboose. The sudden stop was of such a force that I was skidded to the other end of the caboose into a slanting desk and then hit the wall behind the desk and knocked unconscious. Neither I nor the brakeman knew what happened after that for 30 minutes, both of us being unconscious. The brakeman was off injured about a month, and I have not gone to work yet. My legs and back were very badly bruised and I had several ribs broken. I was in the hospital for 18 days and am now at home but have not yet been able to return to work. Many times these things happen, pulling into the final terminal and the last stop is being made. The man has been out on the road for 8 or 10 hours and covered perhaps 150 or 160 miles, reaching his home and these accidents occur. Even though he is braced, no human being can withstand those shocks and it is out of the ques- tion for the railroads to contend that a condition of that kind is safe. What difference does it make if there is only one life-and I de- test that word "only"--only one life lost? If we can prevent the loss of that life and we do not do it, I feel we are derelict in our duties, because if we were the one to pay the price we would expect everything to be done to prevent it and many of these people who are opposing this legislation, using the terms "only one" or "only a few," if they were called upon to pay the price, it would be an alto- gether different story. They would be appearing and making an altogether different plea. Here is something I received from a man on the Missouri Pacific Railroad. After much debate an effort on the part of the committees and individual employees, the past several years, together with many serious accidents and injuries to employees who are compelled to occupy the caboose on the rear end of trains, which are often 150 to 200 car lengths long, nothing has been done. and conditions still continue and still constitute a hazard. Our efforts in requesting consideration have been in vain. In our classes and safety meetings, we are admonished to comply with safety rules and be constantly on guard against shock. Mr. MARTIN. Let me ask you a question there. Mr. BULJwINKLE. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. How long has the matter of freight-train length been the subject of controversy between the employees and the companies; how many years? Mr. JOHNSON. Speaking for our organization, we have been very much interested in it for the last 25 years. TRAIN LENGTHS 171 I might state further, Mr. Congressman, going back about 35 years ago when we handled our negotiations with respect to the double-header rule we were able to incorporate into our working agreements a rule prohibiting many railroads from increasing ton- nage when more than one engine is used to handle the train. Mr. MARTIN. You had been able to do that? Mr. JOHNsoN. On some railroads, to the effect that they could not exceed the maximum tonnage of the heaviest engine. Mr. MARTIN. Has the matter of a train-length bill been the sub- ject of controversy constantly throughout this period you have named? Mr. JOHNSON. Absolutely. Mr. MARTIN. Has it been such during periods of comparatively full employment as compared with slack employment? What I mean by that is, has it been a subject of controversy during periods of comparatively full employment, as well as durin periods of slack employment? In other words, to show whether aditional em- ployment can be considered the major element in the controversy. Mr. JOHNSON. This legislation has never been handled on the theory of increased employment. Mr. MARTIN. Yes, but you understand that is what it is repre- sented to be in some quarters, that the main object of this legislation is to increase employment. Mr. JOHNSON. That is true, Mr. Congressman, and I am wonder- ing if we would be much out of line if it does result in putting a few thousand men back in the service, because we all know that the primary thought in the minds of the management of these rail- roads when they purchased the big motive power was to haul more cars, and eliminate jobs. So, I do not think it would be so much out of line if this legislation should happen to provide a few more jobs. Mr. MARTIN. I am getting letters every day now from granges, expressing apprehension that it will greatly increase the cost of rail- road operation, and the farmers will have to pay. Mr. JoHNsON. Well, I think perhaps a lot of that is based on this little green book that I have here [exhibiting pamphlet]. I do not know whether all of you got a copy of this or not. It is very seldom you can use the dynamite of the opponents of a piece of legislation to a good advantage; but if every member of the committee will get a copy of this pamphlet and read it, and read between the lines, I am convinced that your minds will be changed with respect to this legislation, and that you will support the bill. Mr. MARTIN. You might tell us a word about it right now. Mr. JOHNsON. This is one that was prepared by the Transporta- tion Association of America, 608 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, entitled "The Long and the Short.of It on Train-length Laws." A proper interpretation of that phrase is that it is about the longest thing on wild imaginary assumptions and about the shortest thing on a true statement as to human rights and human considera- tion as you will find anywhere. Nir. MARTIN. How was that used? Where was it disseminated? Mr. JoHNsON. In Chicago. Some people in Chicago in an office prepared it from statistics furnished them by the American Associa- tion of Railroads and from Senate hearings. Some one sat in an 172 TRAIN LENGTHS office in Chicago and said that it was not unsafe for these men who just testified and, who have paid the price, to work on long trains and endure shocks. Mr. MARTIN. What use did they make of this pamphlet ? Mr. JOHNSON. I do not know. I think they mailed it all over the country. They mailed me one, I guess by mistake. I received one. I have seen them other places. They state in the preface: The association, the Transportation Association of America, has been established to promote-aiming toward the improvement, protec- tion, and perpetuation of private enterprise. The association is nonpolitical and nonpartisan, and is distinctive as an organization of a composite membership Nation-wide in scope. It is opposed to Government ownership or operation of any form of transportation. The association likewise is opposed to the invasion of other fields of private enter- prise by government in competition with other citizens. In the field of trans- portation the association is concerned only from the standpoint of the public interest. It is not for the advancement of the interests of any one form of transportation as against another. No hostilities to railroad labor is implied by the association. It intends to propose labor measures. It is concerned only with the existence and the possibilities in a general lack of understanding so far as fundamental positions are concerned. It believes that all elements com- prising our working population should move forward toward better things together. And I will gamble anything in the world that this association was never known to sponsor a piece of legislation for the welfare of industrial workers of any kind or character; nor have they ever sup- ported any such legislation. But, it is only circulated for the purpose of poisoning the minds of the public in general and which is, I am sure, responsible for some of the letters that you have received outside of the railroad industry. Mr. SADOWsI. Mr. Chairman. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Sadowski. Mr. SADowsKI. Have any statistics been submitted by the pro- ponents thus far showing the number of accidents occurring on trains of 70 cars or more on a mileage basis and comparing them with accidents on a mileage basis on trains having less than 70 cars, miles traveled? Mr. JOHNSON. You will find that information, Mr. Congressman, in my exhibits 1 and 2 but not worked out on a mileage basis. Mr. SADOwSKI. Has anybody ever submitted ahy statistics showing that? Mr. JoHNsON. The statistics of the railroads, and other opponents, thus far produced are based on total car-miles or total train-miles. A break-down shows the number of injuries, and causualties to em- ployees, based on total train- or car-miles, such computation is un- fair, because, we are talking about trains of more than 70 cars, there- fore, mileage and car-miles on trains less than 70 cars are not in this picture and should not be considered. Thus far they have not taken the individual railroads and make a break-down to show the results on the individual railroads. Mr. SADOwSKI. Do you not have any figures available showing these comparisons; so that you could prepare something definite, for this committee? Mr. JoHNson. Mr. Congressman, you have made a pretty big request. We do not have access to the reports, and the only way we TRAIN LENGTHS 173, could get that would be to correspond with the men on the properties and ask them to furnish that information, which would take a long- tine; an unreasonable length of time. Mr. SADoWsKI. In sitting here listening to the testimony of the witnesses, it strikes me that it is a mighty important matter to have this information so as to have this committee arrive at a conclusion based on facts. It seems to me that facts ought to be submitted to this committee. We ought to know, on a mileage basis, on the number of miles traveled, how many accidents occur on trains having more than 70 cars, and then compare that with the number of acci- dents occurring on trains having less than 70 cars, on a mileage basis, whether on a 1,000-mile basis or 10,000-mile basis; but we ought to have something, some facts along those lines, it seems to me. Mr. CROSSER. Mr. Chairman. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Crosser. Mr. CRosSER. Mr. Johnson, you made a statement a few minutes ago about trains of 200 car lengths. What distance did that cover, about? Mr. JOHNSON. I gave some figures yesterday, I think it was, Con- gressman, on a train on the Virginian Railroad consisting of 203 cars. On the basis of what we consider the average length, 46 feet over all, that train was just about 1,222 feet short of 2 miles long. Mr. CRossER. Two miles Mr. JoHNsoN. Two miles. A train of 160 average cars is over a mile and a half long. Mr. EICHER. Mr. Chairman. Mr. BuvwmutE. Mr. Eicher. Mr. EICHER. Mr. Johnson, before we close, I would like to sub- mit an inquiry that you may not be able to answer today; but possibly later on you can supply some material on it. I suppose it may be taken for granted that the strong preponder- ance of opinion among the mass of operating employees of the rail- roads is to the effect that the policy of the management of the last 15 or more years pointing toward heavier steel and heavier motive power has been a mistake, both from the point of view of safety as you have been emphasizing, and also from the point of view of the best interests of the stockholders. I assume-that may be taken for granted. Now, have your organizations' made any historical study as to the comparative experience in railroad development along the lines I have just mentioned as between the United States and other coun- tries, like Canada and the European countries. I realize, of course, that there are different conditions prevailing in Canada and in Europe2 but it has occurred to me we might get some benefit from a historical narrative of the tailtoad development in those other countries as compated with the development in the United States. Mr. JOHNsON. In reply to that I will say, Mr. Congressman, it is my understanding that the Coordinator, Mr. Eastman, during his tcrin of office as Coordinator did, through his department, make stne study of the motive power used in foreign countries. How exten- sive I do not know. And, my understanding is that no reprt was rendered on the facts developed in that connection. I hme, however, 4789-38---12 174 TRAIN LENGTHS heard-I have nothing definite on it-that the foreign countries have not resorted to the excessive motive power as we have in the United States. It is possible that we might be able to assemble some worth-while statistics and facts in that connection and turn them over to the committee. I will be glad to do that if it is possible to do so. Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Wadsworth. Mr. WADSWORTH. Have you any information of a general charac- ter about the condition in Canada, which must resemble ours very closely ? Mr. JOHNsoN. They pull some long trains, Congressman, in Canada. Mr. WADSWORTH. Have any restrictions been placed upon them as yet? Mr. JOHNSON. No; but it is a live question up there, and has been for a long time. They have tried to bring about a reduction in train lengths through legislation. Mr. WADSWORTH. Does your organization extend into Canada? Mr. JOHNSON. We do. Mr. WADSWORTH. I thought so. Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir; we do. Mr. WADSWORTH. Do the other brotherhoods? Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir; the four transportation brotherhoods. We hold international seniority across the boundary line on some of the railroads. A little further on your question, if I may, Mr. Chairman. I think that a careful survey will develop the fact that the railroads took on a great deal of expense, which perhaps is not properly segre- gated, due to the increased power, through the reinforcement of bridges; the laying of heavier rails; more ties to the rail; increased ballast; enlarging of roundhouses; the lengthening of tracks; the elevation at water tanks; and in some instances, I understand, they have rebored some of the tunnels, in order to get these large engines through them. They have eliminated some of the curves and many other things that were required after the advent of the big motive power. All of which cost large sums of money. Furthermore, I think you will find that they white-leaded or dis- carded many engines capable of handling the very trains that we are talking about and making fast time, all in order to allow the big engines to come in, for no other purpose than to pull more cars. Mr. BuwiNn. Mr. Johnson, are you through with your testi- mony ? Mr. JonsoN. Well, I did have a little bit more, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BuLwiNnK. It is now 12 o'clock. Mr. JoHNsON. It will not take me very long. I did want to make a little further presentation. I do not mind telling you that I do not feel very well at the moment. Mr. BuLwn xLE. Yes; I saw that. Mr. JOHNsON. And if you are going to hold hearings tomorrow--- Mr. BULwINKim. No, sir; the committee will adjourn until Tuesday morning at 10 o'clock. Mr. JoHNsON. Tuesday at 10 o'clock? TRAIN LENGTHS 175 Mr. BULWINKLE. And my understanding is that Mr. Farquharson will go on then. Mr. JOHNsoN. I have just a little bit more that I wanted to put in, which will take only a few minutes. Mr. BuLwINnLE. If you are not feeling well, and you want to do so, you may put it in the record. Mr. JOHNsoN. Well, I will wait until Tuesday morning. If I de- cide to make a further statement, I would like to have that opportun- ity. Mr. BUwINILE. The committee will stand adjourned until Tues- day morning at 10 o'clock. (Thereupon, at 12: 02 p. m., the committee adjourned, to meet Tues- day, January 18, 1938, at 10 a. m.)  TRAIN LENGTHS TUESDAY, JANUARY 18, 1938 Houst or REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITEE ON INTERSTATE AND FoREIoN COMMEkLE, Washington, D. 0. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence F. Lea (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order. Mr. Johnson desires to complete his statement, so we will hear Mr. Johnson. STATEMENT OF W. D. JOHNSON, VICE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, ORDER OF RAILWAY CON- DUCTORS, WASHINGTON, D. C.-Resumed Mr. JoHNsoN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I will be but a short time completing my statement. I desire at this time to submit to be made a part of the hearing an additional statement prepared and sworn to by Mr. W. A. Wilson, manager, accident insurance department, covering a total of 49 claims paid to conductors by the accident insurance department of the Order of Railway Conductors, for injuries sustained on account of shock on trains of 70 cars or more during the period, January 1, 1937, to January 1, 1938, and it will be identifed as exhibit 1-A. This additional statement brings our claim payment account of shocks on trains of 70 cars or more up to date, to January 1, 1938. One of these claims, however, was said in the Dominion of Canada, and should not be taken into consideration. I will thank the clerk to pass each member of the committee a copy of this statement. (The statement referred to is as follows:) STATEMENT OF CLAIMS PAID BY AoNT INSURANCE DEPARTMENT OF THE ORM OF RAILwAY CONDUCTOS or AMnuc*&, AccouNT SHocK ON TRAINs OF 79 CARs OR MOR, PAID BETWEEN JANUARY 1, 1937, AND JANUARY 1, 1938-49 CLAIMS, $7,058.54 CLAIM No. 16389.-A. S. Hammond, Division 158, Scranton, Pa. Freight conductor, Delaware & Hudson Corporation. - Injured Dec. 8, 1938. "Sudden stop of train, put left foot against locker, as slack of train ran in caused sprain and bump. Also bumped leg with a mail sack being carried on train at same place accident occurred." "Sprain and contusion of left leg." Disabled 3 weeks I day, $7857; 81 cars, 1 engine. 177 178 TRAIN LENGTHS CLAIM No. 16396.-W. Grimshaw, Division 351, Columbus, Ohio. Freight conductor, Norfolk and Western Ry. Injured Dec. 21, 1936. "Train parted, caused sudden stop, in trying to save myself from falling, I held on to window frame in cab and was cut by sharp edge on window frame." "Laceration and contusion about size of dime, palm left hand." Disabled 1 week, $25.00; 99 ears, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 16220.-E. H. Williams, Division 134, Bellevue, Ohio. Freight conductor, N. Y., C. St. L. R. R. Injured Oct. 5, 1936. "Emergency stop of train." "Contusion over iliac region. Sprain of lumbar muscles and ligaments and sacro iliac joints." Disabled 13 weeks, 5 days, $342.86; 109 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16398.-W. N. Phillips, Division 237, Putnam, Ct. Freight con- ductor, N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Injured Dec. 19, 196. "Defective draw bar carrying iron, causing train to part, and an abrupt stop of train." "Contusion of foot with injury to metatarsal arch." Disabled 3 weeks 1 day, $78.57; 82 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16434.-C. E. Saylor, Division 163, Oil City, Pa. Freight con- ductor, Penna. R. It. Injured Dec. 26, 1936. "Had 121 cars in train, Oil City to Shire Oaks, Pa. While moving 17 miles per hr. at Shire Oaks, air hose bursted on 20th car from eng., threw air into emergency, making a crashing stop of train." "Bruise of left knee from heavy fall." Disabled 1 week, 5 days, $25.71; 121 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16470.-W. W. Levens, Division 673, Oelwein, Iowa. Freight conductor, Chicago Great Western. Injured Jan. 17, 197. "Train moving about 5 miles per hour, 75 cars, broken knuckle head car, throwing me against stove and on floor of caboose." "Contusion of Rt. Gluteal region and slight injury to Rt. trochanter of femur." Disabled 6 days, $21.43; 75 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16240.-C. W. Almas, Division 674, Edmonton, Alta. Freight brakeman. Canadian National Railways. Injured Jan. 12, 1937. "87 car train ; draw bars slipped by between first and second cars behind engine, slack ran in and I was thrown head first through front window of cupola, also storm sash." "Multiple cuts and bruises of face. Traumatic bursitis right knee." Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $57.14; 87 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16413.-A. F. Hughes, Division 437, Eldon, Iowa. Freight conductor, C. R. I. & P. Ry. Injured Dec. 28, 1936. "Thrown down backwards in caboose by emergency application of brakes." "Contusion of elbows, arms, and right hip." Disabled 6 weeks 1 day, $92.14; 100 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16486.-IH. P. McCommack, Division 554, Mullens, W. Va. Freight con- ductor, Virginian Railway Co. Injured Jan. 24, 1937. "Was riding in caboose of 4 loads and 110 mtys. when carrier iron came down on head car in train of 4 loads and 110 mtys., allowing an emergency stop." "Fracture 7th right rib. Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $57.14; 114 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16498. -R. N. Ayers, Division 46, Milwaukee, Wis. Freight conductor, C. M. St. P. & P. R. R. Injured Feb. 1, 1937. "An emergency stop of train, threw me against cupola partition in caboose, striking right shoulder against corner of same. Brakes were applied from rear end of train at Reeseville, Wis." "Severe contuion to right shoulder." Disabled 4 days, $14.29; 70 cars, 1 en- gine. CLAIM No. 16416.-J. C. Ridenour, Division 554, Princeton, W. Va. Freight conductor, Virginian Ry. Injured Nov. 29, 1936. "Sitting in cupola when by rough handling of train was jerked suddenly forward then backward causing pain in back and abdomen. Not thinking it serious, continued on run. On re- turn trip got jerked again, tried to keep working but had to lay off and consult a physician." "Hernia right inguinal acquired." Disabled 7 weeks 6 days, $196.43; 87 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16474.--E. J. Davis, Division 171, Greenfield, Mass. Freight conductor, Boston & Maine R. R. Injured Jan. 17, 1937. "Account of low train line pres- sure on rear of 133 car train, when brakes applied to cut motors off slack run in before brakes applied on rear causing severe shock in caboose or rear of train. I was braced but thrown against ice box in caboose, causing above injury." "Contused wound of chest." Disabled 3 weeks 1 day, $47.14; 133 cars, 3 electric motors, 1 steam engine. CLAIM 16457.-W. H. Haupert, Division 125, Peru, Ind. Freight conductor, Wabash R. R. Co. Injured Jan. 13, 1937. "Train was approaching R. R. Crossing at speed about 8 miles per hour, signal taken away, engineer brought train to a sudden stop. I was knocked against the coal box in caboose." "Fracture left 9th rib and contusion left lower chest." Disabled 4 weeks 5 days, $11786; 86 ears, 1 engine. TRAIN LENGTHS 179 CLAIM 16436.-M. J. Boyle, Division 65, Pittston, Pa. Freight conductor, Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. Injured Jan. 7, 1937. "Due to previous accident in which caboose was disabled, claimant was riding in automobile car with crew when train parted and he was thrown to floor of car and incurred injuries de- scribed above." "Fracture of olecranon of ulna (right), contusions of occipital region ; neck and breast bone." Disabled 8 weeks, $200.00; 89 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM 16613.-F. S. O'Bryant, Division 677, Birmingham, Ala. Freight con- ductor, Sou. Ry. Co. Injured Dec. 24, 1936. "Thrown against desk in caboose and ruptured both sides." "Bilateral inguinal hernia." Disabled 3 weeks 4 d ays, $89.29; 89 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16420.-J. S. Diamond, Division 570, Portola, Calif. Freight brake- man, Western Pacific R. R. Injured Dec. 26, 1936. "While train was running, knuckle pin between engines broke, brought train to sudden stop, throwing me against steps in caboose against stove to door of caboose, striking my right side against locker, landing on my left shoulder." "Multiple contusions and abra- sions. Sprain of right knee with pain on motion and swellings; strain of left shoulder and back." Disabled 14 weeks 5 days. $367.86; 74 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM 16636.-W. S. Masimore, Division 449, Harrisburg, Pa. Freight con- ductor, Reading Co. Injured March 20, 1937. "Sudden stop, slip over account low coupler 24 cars from engine." "Contusion of Lt. knee Jt. Stremm% of Lt. Knee Jt.: Contusion of Rt. Chest and Rt. Elbow Jt." Disabled 4 weeks, $60.00; 112 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16664.-C. Price, Division 456, Seattle, Wash. Freight conductor, Great Northern Ry. Injured March 13, 1937. "We had cars to set out at Gold Bar, Wis., was moving about 6 miles per hour, I was on rear platform of caboose when train stopped very suddenly throwing me from platform to ground in- juring my leg." "Bruised Rt. leg (upper outer thigh)." Disabled 1 week 4 days, $38.25; 124 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16661.-J. E. Graves, Division 486, Covington, Ky. Freight con- ductor, L. & N. R. R. Injured April 1, 1937. "Knocked, down in caboose when train made a sudden stop." "Dislocation left shoulder." Disabled 2 weeks 5 days, $39.29; 124 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 15885.-C. T. Wilhelm, Division 678, Hagerstown, Md. Mixed freight brakeman, Western Maryland R. R. Injured May 3, 1936. "While riding in cab behind 160 empty cars, engineer applied air in emergency account of man on track, causing my injury." "Complete dislocation left knee." Disabled 52 weeks, $780.00; 160 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16697.-F. J. Conlan, Division 177, Alliance, O. Freight flagman, Penn. R. R. Injured Apr. 8, 1937. "Train parted due to high and low draw bar and low place in track. I was sitting at desk in cabin working on "Wheel report" and was knocked to floor, striking some object and was unconscious for some time." "Laceration scalp occipital portion." Disabled 2 days, $4.28; 122 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16667.-W. A. Giblin, Division 206, Springfield, Ill. Freight con- ductor, Chicago, Ill., Midland R. R. Injured April 5, 1937. "Train parted and rear end ran into front part of train, throwing me against desk in caboose." "Bruise of right shoulder, right hip, and abdominal muscles." Disabled 4 weeks 1 day, $103.57; 76 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 1668.-E. Wesley, Division 486, Covington, Ky. Freight conductor, Chesapeake & Ohio. Injured Apr. 23, 1937. "I was standing on rear end of caboose while train was pulling into yard at Stevens, Ky. Engr. applied air to make stop and had undesired quick action that threw me against end of caboose, injuring my right leg and right side." "Bruised right side and thigh." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71; 160 cars 1 engine. CLAIM 16710.-C. S. Merrill, Division 122, Peaks Island, Me. Freight con- ductor, Boston & Maine R. R. Injured Apr. 23, 1937. "Train run into eight coal cars on passing siding around curve, brakes were set in emergency from engine, I was standing on rear of caboose and was thrown against caboose and rendered unconscious and thrown to ground into the tracks." "Multiple bruises-fractured ribs." Disabled 6 weeks 3 days, $160.71; 126 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16614.-W. P. Patton, Division 554, Mullens, W. Va. Freight con- ductor, Virginian R. R. Co. Injured Mar. 9, 1937. "Was sitting at desk making out reports pulling into yard, engineer ran into rear of another train, put brakes in emergency throwing me against desk with my right side." "Severe contusion over gall bladder and lower ribs. Possibly rupture of diaphragm. Fracture of ribs." Disabled 13 weeks 2 days, $332.14; 70 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16712.-C. A. King, Division 69, El Paso, Te. Freight conductor, T. N. O. Ry. Injured Apr. 22, 1937. "Pulling out of Madden, brakes went into 180 IRAIN LENGTHS emergency throwing me against hand railing on cab." "Bruised sternum." Disabled 1 week, $25.00; 70 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16727.-A. B. Watts, Division 177, Alliance, Ohio. Freight conductor, Penn. R. R. Injured May 3, 1937. "The engineer in starting train jerked the cabin car so violently it jerked Mr. Watts' head backward hard enough to knock his hat off and resulted in severe sprain of neck muscles." "Sprain of neck muscles at insertion at base of skull." Disabled 1 week, $25.00; 73 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16754.-W. C. Seibert, Division 678, Hagerstown, Md. Freight flagman, Western Md. R. R. Injured May 14, 1937. "While pulling train over hump went to cut caboose off, slack run in extra hard, knocked my body against safety chain and caught my foot between cut lever bracket and end sill of caboose." "Fracture distal phalanx left great toe with crushing of soft parts. Fracture, distal phalanx second toe, 1 foot." Disabled 6 weeks, $90.00; 99 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16797.-A. C. Cleary, Division 288, Superior, Wis. Freight con- ductor, Great Northern R. It. Injured June 11, 1967. "Slack run in and throwed me against stove striking edge of stove with my neck and head. Un- conscious 1 hour 20 min." Bruised and contused wounds left side of head especially back of left ear. Wrenched and contused left side of back. Contused and wrenched left side of neck. Neck swollen. Patient in some shock." Disabled 1 week 6 days, $46.43; 180 cars, I engine. CLAIM 16805.-M. C. Anderson, Division 211, Abbotsford, Wis. Freight con- ductor, Soo Line & Northwestern Ry. Injured June 10, 1937. "The engineer applied the emergency to 82 cars throwing me against the desk." "Fracture of L. 11th rib. Ecchymosis of abdominal wall." Disabled 2 weeks 4 days, $64.29; 82 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16855.-C. F. Crawford. Division 212, Slater, Mo. Freight brakeman. Alton Ry. Co. Injured July 1, 1937. "Heading in Slater yards with 70 cars triple valve broke causing air to go into emergency, throwing me against grab iron on rear end of caboose." "Bruise and contusion and hemorrhage in left groin." Disabled 3 weeks 5 days, $92.86; 70 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16635.-J. A. Kidd, Division 686, Russell, Ky. Freight conductor, C. & O. Injured March 18, 1987. "Standing in caboose, knocked down against stove and closet." "Supra-condylar fracture of humerus." Disabled 17 weeks and 4 days, $439.29; 103 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16863.-W. E. Butts, Division 295, Lorain, O. Freight conductor, B. & O. R. R. Injured July 13, 1937. "Was releasing hand brake 45 cars from the engine when the engineers tried to start the train and shoved slack back with a sudden jar which knocked me off the car between main tracks." "Contusion left shoulder, severe contusions over left chest 5th to 12th ribs. X-rays showed no definite fracture." Disabled 5 weeks 1 day, $128.57; 75 cars, 3 engines. CLAIM 1698.-F. L. Schull, Division 266, Big Spring, Tex. Freight com- ductor, Texas & Pacific R. R. Injured July 13, 1937. "I got up from desk and made rough stop and threw me on sharp edge of chair top." "Inguinal adenitis due to contusion." Disabled 3 weeks 6 days, $96.43; 93 ears, 1 engine. CLAIM 16906.-G. H. Kinnard, Division 617, Harrisburg, Pa. Freight flag- man, P. R. R. Injured Aug. 3, 1937. "Sudden stop, run in of train, throwing crew in cab, tearing door loose of which fell on me." "Severe contusion of right shoulder and chest fracture costal cartilage 7th & 8th ribs." Disabled 3 weeks 2 days, $49.28; 121 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16959.-A. B. Dunnavant, Division 351, Portsmouth, Ohio. Freight conductor, Norfolk and Western Ry. Injured July 28, 1937. "Knocked down in cab by emergency stop going in yards at Williamson." "Sprained back & badly bruised right hip." Disabled 4 weeks 6 days, $121.43; 100 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16960.-G. W. Jones, Division 327, Harvey, Ill. Freight conductor, Ill. Cent. R. R. Injured Aug. 26, 1967. "Engineer used brakes emergency, stand on rear platform of caboose throwed head against caboose knocking unconscious throwing off caboose on head." "Contusion top of head, contusion rt. side of jaw with cut lip and strained neck." Disabled 2 weeks 3 days, 460.71; 87 cars, 1 engine. OLAIM 16273.-E. E. Walters, Division 617, W. Fairview, Pa. Freight con- ductor, P. R. R. Injured Nov. 1, 196. "First motor breaking a knuckle and not able to get away and the train running into first motor causing me to be thrown against end of cabin and dislocating the vertebrae." "Concussion of brain; anterior luxation of 6th & 7th cerebral-vertebra; some displacement of TRAIN LENGTHS- 18. the 6th cervical vertebra on the 7th." Disabled 47 weeks 5 days, $1,192.86; 87 cars, 2 motors. CLAIM 16776.-A. B. Roberts, Division 42, Trenton. Mo. Freight conductor, Rock Island Ry. Injured May 14, 1937. "I was seated at desk writing report train came to a sudden stop throwing me violently against desk thereby causing' painful injuries to me internally in the region of stomach, chest and bowels." "Internal injuries, region of stomach and liver." Disabled 20 weeks 5 days, $517.86; 82 ears, 1 engine. CLAIM 17044.-E. L. Clarkin, Division 191, Forsyth, Mont. Freight conductor, N. P. Ry. Co. Injured Sept. 29, 1937. "Knocked down in caboose by rough stop of train." "Contusion back." Disabled 6 days, $21.43; 78 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 17025.-J. F. Fosmire, Division 171, Greenfield, Mass. Freight con- ductor Boston & Maine. Injured Sept. 23, 1937. "Thrown against side of desk by sudden stopping of train." "Probable fracture of rib, right chest." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days, $107.14; 78 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16954.-M. E. Moriarty, Division 288, Superior, Wis. Freight con- ductor, Great Northern Ry. Co. Injured Aug. 19, 1937. "While going west on Extra 2017 Sept. 19th about 7:35 p. m. train came to a sudden stop at Home signal at Saunders, I was thrown against table in caboose." "Fracture of 10th and 11th ribs, left side, posterior axillary line. Severe contusion over same area." Disabled 3 weeks 1 day, $47.14; 175 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 17092.-W. S. Stevenson, Division 599, Durand Mich. Freight con- ductor, Grand Trunk Western. Injured Oct. 22, 1937. "When air brakes were applied to reduce speed I was knocked off balance and hit left knee on corner of coal box in caboose. "Contusion left knee, injury to patella. Painful on motiow" Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $53.57; 93 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 17035.-T. W. King, Division 651, Indianapolis. Ind. Freight con- ductor, P. 0. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. Injured Sept. 25, 1937. "Sudden stop of train threw me against front end of cabin car." "Fracture of Rt. 12th rib, anterior to the axillary line, with possible fractures (shadows, wet plate x-ray) of 11th & 10th ribs in line with the fracture of 12th rib." Disabled 6 weeks 3 days, $160.71; 116 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM 17070.-0. E. Holz, Division 347, Dubuque, Iowa. Freight brakeman, C. M. St. P. & P. Ry. Injured Oct. 4, 1937. "Train of 88 ears sudden stop and putting caboose off center and being throwed against desk." "Contusion base front rt. chest." Disabled 4 weeks 3 days, $66.42; 88 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 17111.-F. W. Lyons, Division 330, Emporia, Kans. Freight conductor, A. T. & S. F. Injured Nov. 16, 1937. "Was in cupola of way car when train broke in two, throwing me against front of cupola and left hand through window." "Incised wound scalp 6 inches long, and lacerated wound left hand palmer aspect ulnar side, metacarpal region." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71; 123 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 17150.-R. H. Baker, Division 324, Williamson, W. Va. Freight con- ductor, N. & W. Ry. Co. Injured Nov. 24, 1937. "Was opening my desk door to get reports and just at that time slack ran up in train and threw me against corner of desk door." "Contusion of right side over ninth and tenth ribs." Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $53.57; 141 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 17119.-A. L. Davis, Division 396, Mineola, Tex. Freitght conductor, Texas & Pacific Ry. Injured Nov. 15, 1937. "Surging of train, thrown in caboose Cupola." "Severe contusion lower rt. ribs." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71; 73 cars 1 engine. CLAIM 17109.-W. H. Harlow, Division 351, Portsmouth, Ohio. Freight con- ductor, N. W. R. R Injured Nov. 9, 1937. "Main rod on left low pressure engine broke derailed engine] emergency stop." "Multiple contusions and frac- ture of 7th left rib." Disabled 5 weeks 2 days, $132.14; 161 cars, 1 engine. I hereby certify that the foregoing tabulation was made by me after a per- sonal checking of each of the claims and is a true, accurate, and correct analysis of the statements filed in each of said claims as shown by the files, including the amounts paid by the accident insurance department during the year 1937 to members thereof on account of said accidents. Done at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, this 15th day of January, A. D. 1938. (Signed), W. A. WISON, Manager, Accident Insurance Depattment. Subscribed and sworn to before me, a notary public in ad for Lin County,. Iowa, on this 15th day of January, A. D. 1938 (Signed) Lous Euxt, iVotary Public. 182 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. JOHNsoN. I would like to also submit to be made a part of the hearings an additional statement prepared and sworn to by Mr. W. A. Wilson, manager, accident insurance department, Order of Railway Conductors, covering a total of 36 claims paid by the depart- ment to conductors for injuries sustained account of shock on trains of less than 70 cars during the period January 1, 1937, to January 1, 1938, and it will be identified as exhibit 2-A. This additional statement brings our claims, payment account of shocks on trains of less than 70 cars up to date, to January 1, 1938. Two of these claims were paid in the Dominion of Canada, and should not be considered. I will thank the clerk to furnish each member of the committee a copy of the statement. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the statements will be inserted in the record. Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. (The statement referred to is as follows:) STATEMENT OF CLAIMS PAID BY ACCIDENT INSURANCE DEPARTMENT OF THE ORDER OF RAILWAY CONDUCTORS OF AMERICA, ACCOUNT SHOCK ON TRAINS OF LESS THAN SEVENTY CARS, PAID BETWEEN JANUARY 1, 1937, AND JANUARY 1, 1938-36 CLAIMS, $5,658.55 CLAIM No. 16339.-W. E. Flahaven, Division 236, Melrose, Minn. Freight conductor, Great Northern Ry. Co. Injured Nov. 13, 1936. "While sitting at table in caboose, train made a sudden stop throwing me against table." "Bruise of right chest, no evidence of rib fracture." Disabled 2 weeks, $50; 61 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16399.-F. M. Schlevoight, Division 105, Meridian, Miss. Freight flagman, N. O. & N. E. R. R. Injured Dec. 10, 1936. "Pulling out of yard at Meridian, Miss., engineer made emergency application of brakes, knocking me against caboose stove." "Burned back left hand." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71; 20 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16481.-W. A. Giblin, Division 206, Springfield, Ill. Freight con- ductor, C. I. M. Ry. Injured Jan. 23, 1937. "On platform attempting to pick up train order when the air was applied, slack threw me against the side of caboose." "Fractured 6th rib, left." Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $53.57; 64 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16514.-R. M. Sovine, Division 686, Russell, Ky. Freight brake- man, C. & O. Ry. Co. Injured Jan. 23, 1937, "Jerked against stove in caboose." "Burns second two fingers left, and left calf." Disabled 1 week 3 days, $35.71; 26 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16553.-J. R. Crain, Division 321, Springfield, Mo. Freight con- ductor, St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co. Injured Feb. 11, 1937. "Was catching caboose, had just caught caboose when slack in train ran out knocking me off caboose to the ground." "Contusion to right chest." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57; 27 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM 16533.-L. A. Couture, Division 80, Farnham, P. Q. Freight conductor, Canadian Pac. Ry. Injured Feb. 9, 1937. "While stopping train to spot second engine for water at Gould Station, Que., slack ran in and was thrown on my back on floor of van spraining left wrist." "Bruises and sprain of left wrist and arm with ecehymosis." Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $53.57; 49 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM 16453.-W. L. Beardsley, Division 2, Buffalo, N. Y. Freight con- ductor, Erie Railroad. Injured Jan. 15, 1937. "Air went into emergency throwing me against end of caboose." "Fractured ribs 9th and 10th left chest." Disabled 6 weeks 2 days, $157.14; 56 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16427.-G. H. Thompson, Division 509, Villa Grove, Ill. Freight flagman, C. & E. I. Injured Dec. 30, 1936. "Was stopping at Hillsboro, Ill.. to head in siding. Made a hard stop and with such force that it threw me against iron wash bowl, struck on my left side and was knocked down, struck on hips and shoulder." "Fractured 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th ribs posterior portion area." Disabled 9 weeks, $225; 65 cars, 1 engine. TRAIN LENGTHS 183 CLAIM No. 16576.-John Barry, Division 371, Livingston, Mont. Freight conductor, Northern Pacific Ry. Injured Feb. 21, 1937. "Was thrown against caboose door when heading into yard at Helena, Mont., account of rough starting of train after main track switch closed. I had a new Northern Pacific engine with two throttles. Weight of engine is 500 ton." "Contusion of right shoulder." Disabled 6 days, $21.43; 51 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16472.-A. B. Meek, Division 362, Coffeyville, Kans. Freight con- ductor, Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. Injured Jan. 14, 1937. "Train parted directly behind engine. Sudden stop threw me to floor of caboose, hitting some obstruction fracturing 3 ribs. See copy of my report attached." "Fractured ribs." Dis- abled 6 weeks 6 days, $171.43; 57 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16549.-E. H. Eastabrook, Division 340, Rhinelander, Wis. Freight brakeman, M. St. P. & S. St. M. Ry. Injured Feb. 12, 1937. "While making stop at Hawkins, Wis., train stopped suddenly throwing me against grab iron on caboose, injuring my chest." "Muscle strain and bruise, pectoralis major and minor, left." Disabled 2 weeks 6 days, $71.43; 44 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16475.-W. A. Hanlin, Division 453, Harvey, N. D. Freight conductor, M. St. P. & S. St. M. Ry. Injured Jan. 20, 1937. "While in caboose, sudden stop, threw me against an ice box." Severe bruise and echymosis right thigh." Disabled 7 weeks 1 da'y, $178.57; 30 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16589.-C. C. Rubush, Division 87, Stanford, Ill. Freight con- ductor, Alton R. R. Injured Feb. 27, 1937. "Rear end collision, knocked out of cupola. Hit rear end of C. E. I. Transfer at Nameoki, Ill." "Abrasions, lacerations, contusion." Disabled 2 weeks, $50; 24 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 1660.--G. H. Kent, Division 53, Denison, Tex. Freight con- ductor, M. K. T. of T. Injured Mar. 8, 1937. "Knocked down by emergency application of air brakes with train stretched going up hump." "Bruising hip and knee." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57; 50 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16629.-W. A. Timmons, Division 181, Chillicothe, Ohio. Freight conductor, B. & O. R. R. Injured Mar. 10, 1937. "Train I was running struck an automobile on crossing and engineer applied brakes in emergency making rough stop, throwing me against table in caboose." "Bruising sternum, left Sth rib and back." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57; 32 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 16626.-B. E. Olson, Division 340, Gladstone, Mich. Freight brakeman, Soo Line. Injured Mar. 14, 1937. "Pulling out of passing track at Pembine, Wisc., the 15th car from the engine left the rails, running on the ties for a half mile east of Pembine, Wisc., then this car became uncoupled and caused the air to go into emergency with a terrific stop, that threw me to the floor of the caboose, causing the injury to my knee." "Bruised over outer condyle right knee." Disabled 2 weeks 2 days, $57.14; 69 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 15869.-J. L. Goewey, Division 46, Milwaukee, Wis. Freight conductor, C. & N. W. Rfy. Injured Apr. 24, 1936. "Entering C. & N. W. Ry. Proviso Yard made sudden stop of train, because of no hand signal and was knocked to floor of way car." "Fractured neck left femure (ununited) ." Disabled 52 weeks, $1,300; 60 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16627.-J. H. Poppy, Division 133, Klamath Falls, Oreg. Mixed freight brakeman, Great Northern Ry. Injured Mar. 11, 1937. "Train stopped suddenly and throwed me against arm of seat." "Fracture of 9th and 10th ribs. Incomplete fracture of 7th and 8th ribs, left side." Disabled 5 weeks 5 days, 8142.86 :58 ears, I engine. CLAIM No. 16719.-J. A. Love, Division 447, Pittsburgh, Pa. Freight con- ductor, Pittsburgh & W. Va. Injured Apr. 26, 1937. "Was standing in rear door of caboose, there was a slide on track, the sudden stop threw me back- ward, falling across edge of bunk on back." "Contusion of the back. Spasm of left lumbar muscles." Disabled 1 week 5 days, $42.86; 17 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16796.-M. Barrett, Division 293, Chicago, Ill. Freight conductor C. & N. W. Ry. Injured June 6. 1937. "I was about to open rear door of way car when towerman took signal away from engineer, causing him to stop suddenly, throwing me backwards to the floor of way car." "Traumatic myosi- tis lumbar muscles, partial dislocation of coccyx." Disable 2 weeks 1 day, S-53.57; 32 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16728.-R. Beatty, Division 89, Louisville, Ky. Freight flagman, L. & N. R. R. Co. Injured Apr. 26, 1937. "I was on rear end of caboose, engineer run by switch, backed up to head In, slack run outand jerked my jaw against end of caboose" "Compound fracture of lower jaw." Disabled 4 weeks, $100; 40 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16666.-. H. Foreman, Division 53, Denison, Tex. Freight conductor, M. K. T. Ry. Co. Injured Mar. 26, 1937. "Bruised account of slack 184 TRAIN LENGTHS of train causing me to be thrown down on hard surface of window seat in caboose" "Perineal abscess." Disabled 7 weeks 2 days, $182.14; 65 cars, I engine. CLAIM No. 16742.-A. C. Wilson, Division 395, Salt Lake City, Utah. Freight conductor, D. & R. G. W. Injured May 6, 1937. "Stopped to head in yard at helper. Engineer started train, then applied engine brake causing a sudden stop throwng me against desk and on floor of caboose." "Contusion of left hip region." Disabled 5 days, $17.86: 42 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16558.-Thos. Pulford, Division 267, Vancouver, B. C. Mixed train conductor, Can. Nat. Ry. Injured Feb. 17, 1937. "Engine hit slide, sud- den stop upset me over chair, landing on left wrist." "Colles fracture of left wrist c out displacement." Disabled 15 weeks $375; 15 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16559.-C. F. Smith, Division 123, Macon, Ga. Freight conductor, Central of Georgia Ry. Injured Feb. 11, 1937. "Train hit broken rail, sudden application of air brakes, threw me from cupola of cab to floor." "Bruise left chest, abrasion and laceration middle third, anterior surface, both legs, sprain right shoulder." Disabled 15 weeks, $225; 51 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16839.-H. C. Witbeck, Division 681, Houston, Tex. Freight con- ductor, Mo. Pac. Ry. Injured June 28, 1937. "Was sitting at desk making out reports, head engine derailed pulling into yard, air going into emergency and account of slow movement of train, threw me very forcibly against desk." "Bruised abdomen and contents." Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $53.57; 53 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 16826.-F. F. Broaddus. Division 89, Louisville, Ky. Freight flag- man, L. & N. R. R. Injured June 21, 1937. "Train started and after going about 60 feet, brakes went in emergency throwing me on stove in caboose." "Bruised back, X-ray does not show fractured ribs." Disabled 4 weeks 2 days, $107.14; 37 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16867.-G. B. Palmer, Division 313, Tucson, Ariz. Freight con- ductor, Sou. Pacific Ry. Injured July 15, 1937. "X3309W called for 6:30 after getting on caboose moving 5 or 6 miles per hour engineer threw brakes into emergency throwing me over chair out the door to platform my head hitting end ladder on left side safety chain held me from falling between cars." "Lacer- ation left ear around rim and inside outer ear, bruise left knee, abrasion right forearm, flexor surface." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57; 66 cars, 1 engine. . CLAIM No. 16452.-F. Blair, Division 362, Nevada, Mo. Freight brakeman, Mo. Pac. R. B. Injured Jan. 1937. "Engine broke loose from train of 67 cars and I was in caboose, and the stop was so violent that I was thrown about 15 feet head foremost against a partition causing the injury." "Destructive process between 6th and 7th cervical vertebrae ; sprain and contusion of neck and left hip." Disabled 28 weeks 5 days, $717.85; 67 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16105.-F. J. Smith, Division 292, Willard, Ohio. Freight brake- man, A. C. Y. Ry. Injured July 16, 1936. "Slack of train ran out and I was thrown down in caboose." "Ununited fracture of femur with marked displace- ment of fragments-Hypertrophic osteoarthritis of spine." Disabled 52 weeks, $780; 60 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 16950.-G. O. Capwell, Division 69, El Paso, Tex. Freight con- ductor, T. & N. O. Ry. Injured Aug. 14, 1937. "Cars were all bunched on a grade toward the engine. Engineer made a rough start, I grabbed the ladder on rear of caboose to keep from being threw or jerked off, causing injury." "Strained condition of pectoralis minor and deltoid muscles of left side." Dis- abled 1 week 4 days, $39.29; 50 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 17054.-H. C. Decker, Division 260, Kennewick, Wash. Freight brakeman, No. Pac. Ry. Injured Oct. 3, 1937. "Passing through Cheney Sta- tion, I went out on the rear platform of caboose to catch a hoop containing train orders. The train gave a sudden lurch which threw me against the rear- end hand railing." "Muscular strain and contusion." Disabled 2 weeks 4 days, $64.29; 58 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 17128.-J. E. Ballinger, Division 318, Asheville, N. C. Freight conductor, Southern Railway. Injured Nov. 27, 1937. "Train No. 52 arriving Old Fort, N. C., at 10 a. m., November 27, 1937. I was in caboose, opened front door and started out. Engineer made very rough stop at water tank which would have thrown me between caboose and car had I not caught to door frame for support. Door slammed and caught my finger cutting off end as described above." "Traumatic amputation tip middle finger left tine." Disabled 2 weeks 1 day, $53.57; 40 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 17176.-J. W. Wilkerson, Division 44, Denver, Colo. Freight con- ductor Denver & Salt Lake. - Injured Dec. 15, 1937. "Engine broke off causing TRAIN LENOTHS 185 sudden stop." "Laceration of scalp, stiff neck and shoulders, and sprained right knee." Disabled I week 3 days, $35.71; 63 cars, 2 engines. CLAIM No. 17148.-C. C. Waters, Division 123, Macon, Ga. Freight conductor, C. of Ga. Ry. Injured Dec. 1, 1937. "Got down to put some coal in stove while train was running and was jerked down in caboose, my back striking corner of equipment box, bruising same." "Bruise of left side lumbar region of back." Disabled 1 week 1 day, $28.57; 50 cars, 1 engine. CLAIM No. 17100.-F. C. Young, Division 394, Haileyville, Okla. Freight brakeman, C. R. I. & P. Injured Oct. 25, 1937. "Knocked in caboose account rough stop." "Injured left wrist, swollen, pain on movement, sensitive to touch. A severe sprain." Disabled 2 weeks 4 days, $64.29; 57 cars, 1 engine. NoE.-Above claim No. 17100 should have appeared on page 3 between Claims No. 17054 and No. 17128. I hereby certify that the foregoing tabulation was made by me after a per- sonal checking of each of the claims and is a true, accurate, and correct analysis of the. statements filed in each of said claims as shown by the files, including the amounts paid by the accident insurance department during the year 1937 to members thereof on account of said accidents. Done at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, this 15th day of January, A. D. 1938. (Signed) W. A. WILsoN, Manager, Accident Insurance Department. Subscribed and sworn to before me, a notary public in and for Linn County, Iowa, on this 15th day of January 1938. (Signed) LoUIsE EUKEN, Notary Public. Mr. JoHNsoN. I will say, Mr. Chairman and members of the com- mittee, 21 of the 36 claims set forth in the statement cover accidents on trains of less than 70 cars consisted of 60 to 69 cars, which is further proof that the hazard increases as the length of the train increases. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, you heard the testi- mony given by the four witnesses Friday morning, the 14th. You saw their physical condition, which was the price they paid for long- train operations. Three of these witnesses were former train-service employees on the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad, which is one of the outstanding railroads that believes in and follows the practice of operating ong trains. In the hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Inter- state Commerce, United States Senate, Seventy-fourth Congress, first session, on S. 27 and S. 344, you will find on page 191 the following statement by Mr. J. W. Smith, who was speaking for the railroads: For example, we had a study made of one of the heavy tonnage divisions of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway and found that on their line between Rich- mond and Clifton Forge, a total of 231 miles, of which but 38 miles are double-tracked, it would be necessary to double track the remaining 193 miles ; and on the Logan subdivision, a total of 02 miles, of which 51 are double- tracked, it would be necessary to double track the remaining 11 miles in order to take care of the increasing trains that would have to be run if this bill were in effect. I would like to now read into the record a statement made by Mr. Jesse Jones, Chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which appeared in the Washington Star, January 4, 1938, and deals with the present financial condition of the Chesapeake & Ohio Rail- road. 186 TRAIN LENGTHS C. & O. Is BLAMED FOR ERIE'S PLIGHT JONES RAPS PARENT'S REFUSAL TO GUARANTEE NEEDED B. F. C. WAN CLEVELAND, Jan. 4.-Directors of the Erie Railroad, which defaulted interest on five bond issues yesterday, studied anew the carrier's financial problem today after Chairman Jesse H. Jones of the Reconstruction Finance Corp., laid the Erie's plight at the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.'s door. The C. & O. received last week approval from the Interstate Commerce Com- mission for taking direct financial control of the Nickel Plate (New York, Chicago & St. Louis) and the Erie, other units in the Van Sweringen system. C. & O. controlled the Erie indirectly through the Virginia Transportation Co. In a formal statement issued at Washington, Jones alluded to C. & O.'s "large ownership in the Erie" and criticized it for refusing to deposit approximately $2.500,000 with the R. F. C. to secure an Erie loan of $6,006,000. Erie directors had issued a few hours earlier the following, statement : "Officers reported inability of the company to meet conditions imposed by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Reconstruction Finance Corp. for the proposed loan of $6,006,000. Without the proposed loan from the R. F. C., the cash available to meet interest coupons due today, matured bills for materials and supplies, pay rolls, and other operating expenses is insufficient" Asserting C. & O. paid out $29,000,000 in cash dividends during 1937, plus $15,000,000 in 4-percent preferred stock, Jones added : "Probably if the directors of the C. & O. were as interested in protecting the Erie as they are the Alleghany Corp., which receives a large part of the C. & 0. dividends, their course might be different." I leave it with you gentlemen to pass on the question as to whether the Chesapeake & Ohio can stand a few millions of dollars increase in operating costs in order to eliminate the human price now being paid by train service employees on their property in the operation of their long trains from which they piled up the large surplus referred to by Chairman Jones, which was paid out in dividends. I might say a little further, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I have had a check made of a portion of the division re- ferred to by Mr. Smith, which I read into the record, and I found that the Chesapeake & Ohio operated over that particular territory on January 8, 1938, 12 trains ranging from 110 cars to 160 cars. The necessity of double-tracking this division as referred to by Mr. Smith is absolutely absurd. Before closing my statement Friday I made some reference to con- ditions on the Missouri Pacific Railroad, one of the roads which also like to operate these excessively long trains, and 'I find incorporated in a train order dated April 15, 1937, this language: Extra train 1910, east, has 177 cars. That train was in excess of 11/2 miles in length. Another train order dated May 9, 1937, reads in part as follows: Extra 1905, east, has 182 cars. Which was also considerably in excess of 1 miles in length. I also made reference to bulletins posted in bulletin books and appearing in the safety rule books on the various railroads caution- ing the men to brace themselves at all times while the train is in motion in order to avoid being injured in rear-end shock. I have before me now a statement covering a train handled on the Virginian Railroad on February 21, 1936, consisting of 164 empty coal cars. There was an emergency application made of the air, which resulted in 24 of those cars being knocked off center and 6 of them were buckled, and derailed, making a total of 30 cars that were TRAIN LENGTHS 187 shopped in that train, and I would like to ask how in the world human beings can anchor themselves in such a way as to avoid being injured in cases of that kind. The CHAIRMAN. Could you briefly indicate what you mean by "be- ing knocked off center?" Mr. JOHNsON. There are two sets of trucks, Mr. Chairman, un- der each car; forward and rear. Each end of the car rests on a truck and is held in place by a center plate and pin. The impact raised the body of that car up off of the truck and when it settled down again, the truck was misplaced, the body of the car was out of line on the truck which rendered the car unsafe to run until repaired. Iam sure that every member of this committee, as well as every Member of the House of Representatives, have received a good many letters from outside sources urging you to oppose this par- ticular piece of legislation, and I would like to read into the record a portion of a press report which I feel is largely responsible for these letters being prepared and mailed. There was a meeting of the Kiwanis Club held in Portsmouth, Ohio, on January 13, 1936. There appeared at that gathering a one Mr. J. F. McMullan, an official of the Norfolk & Western Rail- way who- urged the club to oppose a railway bill pending in Congress designed to limit freight trains to 70 cars and a caboose. The bill, he said, would benefit about 5 percent of the railway workers and would cost the shipper and the consumer in increased freight rates. He doesn't say what it would cost shipper and consumer in in- creased freight rates. Mr. McMullan said it costs the railroads about the same to haul a train of 140 cars as it does to haul 70 cars. Big engines, he said, were built to haul tonnage and not to cut fuel bills. I want you to pay particular attention to "to haul tonnage and not to cut fuel bills." INCREASE TitAFFIC HAZARD Limited trains of 70 cars would increase the railway traffic hazards, par- ticularly at grade crossings, Mr. MeMullan said, because it would require more trains to haul the tonnage handled under existing laws. The club voted unanimously to oppose the bill and copies of the resolution will be sent to Congressman James G. Polk. I also have here, Mr. Chairman, a copy of a press report covering other statements made by a representative of the Norfolk & West- ern Railway in the Florida Times-Union, November 19, 1937.. It lays special stress on the same points made by Mr. McMullan in his statement. It goes a little further, however, and says that if. this bill is enacted into law, naturally the railroads will have to ask for an increase in freight rates. Well, my understanding is that they have already asked for the increase in freight rates regardless of what may be the outcome of the particular bill. No doubt you have received letters from certain groups of em- ployes on the various railroads, which is due, I think,to the officials, on certain railroads, trying in a mild form to coerce certain em- ployees to work in opposition to legislation that is being sponsored .8 Ct TRAIN LENGTHS for the safety, of a certain group of employees. In other words, working both ends against the middle, and I would like to read into the Record one paragraph of the President's message No. 31, to all employees on the L. & N. Railroad, signed by Mr. J. B. Hill, presi- dent, dated October 1937. I am merely asking you to do your own thinking about limiting the length of trains. Should you reach the conclusion that this should not be done, or that it might adversely affect you or the class of employees to which you belong, then express yourself to the head of your organization and to your Representative in Congress that you do not desire such a bill passed. Mr. WiTHRow. Mr. Chairman- The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Withrow. Mr. WITHEOw. I wonder if I could ask a question? Have you received -letters from members of your organization or other train organizations protesting against the passage of this bill which would restrict freight trains to 70 cars in length? Mr. JOHNsON. No, sir; I have not; not one lettr Mr. WrrHow. The membership is as unanimously as possible be- hind this legislation? Mr. JOHNsON. The membership is supporting this legislation and I have received many letters to that effect. Mr. EICHER. Well, what classes of employees are being influenced by this mild coercion that you speak about? Mr. JOHNSON. I would say, Mr. Congressman, all classes outside of the train service and yard service employees. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Could you tell us in percentages how many employees are in favor of the bill and how many are opposed to the bill? Mr. JOHNSON. I would say, Mr. Congressman, that there are ap- proximately 225,000 employees now in the train and yard service. I mean by that engineers, firemen, conductors, and brakemen. There are, I suppose, a total of around 1,000,000 now employed in the railroad industry as a whole. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. That would indicate there are about 40 percent in favor of the bill as compared to 60 who might be opposed? Mr. JoHNsoN. I would say Mr. Congressman, in reply to that, that if the truth was really known, 95 percent, or greater, of the total number of railway employees would like to see this particular bill enacted into law. However, only the train, engine service, and yard service employees are actively engaged in promoting the bill. Mr. KENNEDY of=New York. Well, what -explanation is there for the fact that 60 percent are -inactive and disinterested? Are they not actively engaged in the industry, and should they not be favor- able to your organization's activities? Mr. JOHNSoN. They are, Mr. Congressman ; but they will not be directly affected by the operation of this bill, because their duties do not require them to take part in the active operation of the trains; but I repeat, we have not, as far as I know, received any letters from the other groups in opposition to this bill. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Well, is it not customary for all of the employees of the railroads to cooperate in the passage of legis- lation that will be helpful to other branches of the industry? TR &IN LENGTHS 189 Mr. JoHNsoN. That is true ; and I might go a little further and say that the train-length bill was placed before the Chief Execu- tives' Association, comprising the 21 standard railway labor organi- zations, and it was approved by that association, with the under- standing that the interested organizations would sponsor and handle it to a final conclusion. You cannot find anywhere where action has been taken by any of the 21 groups in opposition to this bill. The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps it would not be inappropriate to make an observation in reference to this question of how many are for or against a proposition. That is something that is involved in prac- tically every question that comes before the committee. Mr. JOHNSON. That is true. The CHAIRMAN. I think we should all recognize that the particular question is not who is for or who against, but rather that no one's suggestion is worth more than the reasons he gives in support of it. I have no doubt the committee will try to weigh the question here from that standpoint. Mr. JOHNsON. I feel confiident you will, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Halleck. Mr. HALLECK. These questions have raised some things in my mind, Mr. Johnson, I suppose largely arising out of the fact that certain of the local organizations in my district have sent me resolutions in opposition to this legislation. Mr. JOHNSON. May I ask that you repeat that statement? I did not quite hear it. Mr. HALLECK. Yes. I say that these questions which have just been suggested and asked here have raised a question in my mind, because I happen to be one of those members who has received some com- munications from railroad employees and their local organizations asking me to oppose this legislation. Will the representatives of the 21 standard railroad brotherhoods be here in the hearing to urge the passage of this legislation? Mr. JoHNsoN. Not all of them; no, sir. As I said a moment ago, this particular bill was approved by the association, but with the understanding that it would be handled to a conclusion by the or- ganizations interested, directly interested, in the bill; that is, the train- and engine-service employees. Mr. IIALLECK. Are we to understand from that that the asso- ciation is now urging the adoption of this legislation? Mr. JoHNsoN. The association is in full accord with this particular bill; yes, sir. Mr. HALLECK. Just one other thing- Mr. WITHRow. And just there. That has not all come about this year, but they have supported this legislation since its inception. That is so, is it not? Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Mr. WITHROW. Which has been for a period of years. Mr. JOHNsON. That is true. Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Johnson, I have been glancing through this list of claims paid as a result of the accidents arising in long trains, with particular reference to your testimony about inspections of trains. It has occurred to me that many of those accidents have 47891-38-13 190 TRAIN LENGTHS been caused by things that probably could not be located by inspection. Mr. JoHNSON. Some of them have been. Mr. HALLECK. I wonder if you could tell the committee how many of these accidents in the 417, I guess it is, listed might have been avoided by inspection? Mr. JOHNSON. I would not venture to make that statement just off hand, but I would be glad, Congressman, for your benefit, to go over that report and work something up and hand it to you and to the other members of the committee. Mr. HALLECK. I would like to have that. Of course, there are some things that might be detected by inspection. I suspect some of them could not be. But, I think that might be helpful in con- nection with your testimony as to the accident factor arising out of the inability to inspect. Mr. JOHNSON. I think you will find in searching the reports rendered by the Interstate Commerce Commission, setting forth facts developed through their investigation, that many defects were found that were not visible to the eye in ordinary inspection of the trains, such as broken knuckle pins, or a broken drawbar eye, where the knuckle pin goes through the eye of the coupler and the knuckle and holds the knuckle in place in the coupler. Mr. HALuECK. I suppose you could not tell about a hose, either, to look at it? Mr. JOHNSON. A hose may be defective through age or excessive strain due to pulling that perhaps has not developed a noticeable leak at the time the train left the terminal, but a little later on the pres- sure gets too great for the hose to resist and there is a blowout. That is the same as our automobile tires. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. May I ask Mr. Johnson a few ques- tions at this point? The OHAIRMAN. Mr. Kennedy. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Could you tell us whether or not in connection with that statement by Mr. Jesse Jones, Chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, whether your organization, or any of the allied organizations ever suggested to Mr. Jones that as a prerequisite to obtaining a loan from the Reconstruction Finance Cor- poration, that he ask the railroads to limit themselves to a 70-car limit? Mr. JOHNSON. No such request was ever made, to my knowledge. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Do you not think that it might be a proper request to make in view of the statement there? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I think it would be proper to ask anybody who could in any way bring about the thing that we are asking for. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Well, I am suggesting that in view of the fact you quoted Mr. Jones. Now, I have another question: Are there more trains operated on the railroads of more than 70 cars or less than 70 cars? Mr. JoHNsON. There are more trains under 70 cars, because the average number of cars per train at the present time is about 48. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I notice- Mr. JOHNSON. If you will pardon me. I mean 48 cars to the train. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I notice that in the reports that you submitted here that on trains of less than 70 cars the average claim is TRAIN LENGTHS 191 $151 and the average claim on trains of more than 70 cars only amounts to $144. Is there any way you can reconcile that difference? It would appear from the record that the accidents on the less than 70-car group are more severe than on the more than 70 cars. Mr. JOHNSoN. No; I would not say that, Mr. Congressman, be- cause the records will show that more claims are paid and the amounts are larger on trains of more than 70 cars than on trains of less than 70 cars. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Of course, I am just taking the figures that have been put before us, and it would appear that the less than 70-car group would be more severe than the upper group. Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Congressman, sometimes in dealing in percent- ages, the breakdown does not reflect the true picture or the real need for the thing that we are seeking. Mr. Chairman, I have here the pamphlet to which I referred Fri- day, titled "The Long and the Short of the Train Length Laws," prepared by the Transportation Association of America, 608 South Dearborn Street, Chicago-men occupying an office in Chicago, cir- cularizing the country with a statement setting forth that they are better qualified to pass on the safety of long-train operations than the men who appeared before you Friday and displayed their present physical condition. It is absurd, Mr. Chairman, and a statement of that kind should not be dignified by comment. However, as a representative of the Order of Railway Conductors, I want to place in the record my challenge as to the fairness, the truthfulness, of one or two state- ments that have been made in this pamphlet and with that I close. On page 2, I find the reasons given: Advocates of train-length laws have urged these laws for the fallacious reason that they might in some way promote safety. In reply to that, Mr. Chairman, I want to say that we have never tried in the slightest degree to deceive the public or anyone else in what we were endeavoring to do. We have been open and aboveboard. We have played the game fair. We contend that this bill is worthy of consideration based on safety. That can be verified by statements. We could bring hundreds of men here to testify who have paid the price, if we wanted to consume that much time of the committee. Therefore, I repeat, Mr. Chairman, we have no desire whatsoever to deceive or misrepresent a single thing in connection with this legislation. On page 10, I find a "sinister principle." The real principle involved is sinister. It is not as humanitarian as its sponsors proclaim. I repeat, Mr. Chairman, we have never at any time been dishonest or tried to be corrupt in the handling of this particular legislation. We have been open and aboveboard. One more: A step of this kind has an effect similar to sabotage. I want to reply to that, that we have no desire whatsoever to wreck or even retard the railroad industry. To the contrary, and regard- less of any statement that may have been made or may be made, we have a sincere desire to be helpful, and, to substantiate that state- 192 TRAIN LENGTHS ment, all I ask you to do is to go back for the past 45 years and review the legislation that has been enacted into Federal law due to the activities of the train-service organizations, and you will find that we builded the foundation upon which the railroads reached this high degree in transportation efficiency that they have already told about and they will tell about in this hearing. I will ask you what would happen to the railroads today if the Congress should repeal the safety-appliance law, the airbrake law, the automatic coupler law, the headlight law, the hours of service, and various other laws that have been enacted as a result of the ac- tivity of train- and engine-service employees. Take away from them the things which have been made possible through legislation and the railroads would absolutely go out of existence. They could not operate. Therefore, our activities, instead of being designed to injure or -retard the progress, have made possible a march forward to which the railroads look today with a feeling of pride. The enactment of the bill now before you is one more step forward and I feel no hesitancy in making the statement that if it is enacted into law, it will only be a question of time until the railroads will be able to appear before you and testify as to improved efficiency in train operation due to the enactment of the 70-car train-limit law. Mr. EICHER. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eicher. Mr. ETCHER. In connection with your remarks about the pamphlet entitled "The Long and Short of It," I just want to ask you whether you have had your attention called to a brochure entitled "Train Length" issued by the transportation and trade departments of the United States Chamber of Commerce, which came to my desk a few days ago and assumes to discuss both the safety and economic aspects of this bill? Mr. JOHNsoN. I have never seen one of those, but I know they get in the picture. They have always appeared in opposition to legisla- tion sponsored by the industrial workers, and I will ask you to check the record, and you will fail to find where the railroads, the United States Chamber of Commerce, or any other transportation society has ever sponsored or appeared in support of legislation dealing with the safety of the employees. They are only interested in one thing, and that is the financial side in order that the Chesapeake & Ohio and a few more railroads can continue to declare outstanding dividends while the employees in train service are not only paying a price in human suffering but in addition thereto they are paying a price in decreased earnings during the time of their injuries. The United States Chamber of Commerce has no concern for the human side of this question. Mr. MAPEs. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mapes. Mr. MAPES. Mr. Johnson, you have filed statements with the com- mittee, showing claims paid by the accident insurance department of the Order of Railway Conductors between January 1, 1937, and January 1, 1938, to conductors operating trains of 70 or more cars in length and the claims paid to conductors operating trains of less than 70 cars in length. TRAIN LENGTHS 193 As I count them there were 49 claims paid to conductors operat- ing trains of 70 cars or more during that year and 37 claims paid to conductors operating trains of less than 70 cars, showing that there were more claims paid to conductors operating trains of more than 70 cars than there were to conductors operating trains of less than 70 cars and this notwithstanding the statement of Mr. Corbett in his testimony which I have before me as follows: From the best information I have been able to secure this would be no effect on some 80 percent of the freight trains that are being run as this percentage of those trains are of length of less than 70 cars. That leaves about 20 percent that the adjustment might be required on. From that statement of Mr. Corbett and the records you have filed here today it would appear that there are more accidents on the long trains than on the short ones, even though the long trains constitute only about 20 percent of the total number of freight trains. Mr. JOHNSON. Based on the number of claims paid, I would say that was a pretty fair average. I think that the record will show about 1 train out of every 4 operated have more than 70 cars. Mr. MAPES. And the statement that you filed this morning of the accident insurance department shows more claims paid to conductors on long trains than on short trains? Mr. JOHNsoN. That is true; 21 of those 36, Mr. Congressman, covering claims paid on less than 70 cars were on trains between 50 and 69 cars. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. How many members in your union who would be subject to benefits under this insurance fund? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I suppose at the present time we have about 25,000 conductors' jobs; it might be a little higher than that. And, I would say 75 percent of those are in the freight service. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. So that would make what? About 15,000? Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; we have more than that in freight service. I could get you some more figures on that very easily if you think that would be helpful to you. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I was just looking at this report. According to your official reports, you paid out 85 claims for the entire year, and the average was $149, or a total amount paid out of twelve thousand and some-odd dollars. Does that represent an average year's payments or claims ? Mr. JOHNsoN. I would say that was a fair average based on the total number that we paid from August 1929 through December 1936. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Now, there is just one other question. I do not mean particularly in connection with the different kinds of accidents, but I am wondering if there is any way of allocating these accidents to railroads. Is there any way we can segregate the number of accidents that happen on the A railroad, the B railroad, or the C railroad, so that we can tell which was the greatest offender? Mr. JOHNSON. I had put into the record a break-down of that on the 417 claims set forth in exhibit 1. There were 60 railroads in- volved in that statement. Likewise I have here a breakdown of the two supplemental state- ments that I furnished this morning. I have not had that typed, however. I just got that statement yesterday. 194 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. MAPES. In looking over your list of accidents paid, I notice that the Great Northern had three very long trains. Mr. JOHNSON. That is true. Of course, you have got to take into consideration business. If there is a large volume of business, of course, there are more trains. On some railroads-I go back again to the Chesapeake & Ohio, the Norfolk & Western, the Virginian, the Pennsylvania, and the Great Northern, they run lots of these trains and the reports will show that many accidents happen on those rail- roads. There are some railroads, Mr. Congressman, that operate very few trains in excess of 70 cars, therefore, their percentage in this large volume of increased cost as proclaimed by the opponents of this legislation would be very small; but the outstanding offenders will be the ones that will absorb the greater portion of this increased cost and they can stand it. However, this legislation is not going to cost anything like the figure they have set forth. I think you can go back and check the records, and you will find that the costs that were estimated by the opponents of legislation that has been enacted in the past never did reach anything like the estimates that they claimed they would. They rearrange, the service to a large extent to overcome it. There will be many places where there will be a saving. I will make mention of that later on. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson, it will be necessary for the com- mittee to adjourn in about 3 or 4 minutes. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. Did I understand that approximately $1,000 a month is the average that organization pays out? Mr. JOHNSON. You mean only covering claims for rear-end injuries, or injuries on the rear end due to rear-end shock? Mr. BOREN. Well, I am asking this. I understand you have 15,000 members who pay in dues a dollar a month each, which would be $15,000 a month. I just want to know for my information if $1,000 a month is the average amount paid out from that $15,000 income, not that it has any bearing on the bill, but it interests me. Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I think that our monthly payments for claims chargeable to rear-end shock, is a little more than $1,000 a month. Mr. BOREN. I think that you are avoiding a direct answer to the question. Mr. JOHNsON. No, no ; Mr. Congressman. As I read into the record, we have paid more than 15,000 claims, indemnity claims, since the organization of our accident insurance department in 1916, and over 400 death claims, which amounts to approximately, over all, of $3,000,- 000 during that time. But, we are only speaking about injuries chargeable to rear-end shock. If we take it as a whole it will far exceed $1,000 a month cover- ing all accident claims of the department. Mr. BOREN. How far exceed it? Mr. JOHNSoN. Well, I would be glad to figure that out for you and take 1 year and give it to you. Mr. BOREN. I do not think it has any bearing on the bill, but for my personal information I would like to have it. Mr. JOHNSON. I will be glad to give it to you. I think you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. TRAIN LENGTHS 195 It will be necessary for the committee to adjourn shortly. You have concluded, have you, Mr. Johnson? Mr. JOHNSON. I have, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Tomorrow morning Mr. Farquharson, who is the representative of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, who has taken years of active interest in this problem, is going to present the case on behalf of the proponents. I understand Mr. Farquharson will present statistical information in support of the proponents' position. Now, the slow way in which we have progressed in the hearings sug- gests a consideration of what we shall do for the future. I find that it is desirable, so far as possible, to permit every man to present his case in his own way and to allow hint time enough to do that; but it is apparent that we cannot proceed to the end in that way. We have so many demands in opposition to this bill that it would be impossible to hear all of them under such a liberal procedure as we have followed up to date, in the length of time this committee can give to the subject during this session. I thought it very desirable to permit the men such as we have been listening to on behalf of the proponents to have very liberal time. We can, I think, more advan- tageously restrict the time as to witnesses who will follow Mr. Farquharson. Now, when it comes to the other side, there will be certain exponents of the opposition whom we would like also to have that liberal length of time; but when their time is consumed, or used, it is going to be necessary to restrict the hearings. One phase of the situation is that it is impossible to get the attend- ance of the committee membership here if we run the hearings too long. The question here is such that it should not require an indefinite con- tinuance of the hearings. So, all I am going to suggest at the present time is that both sides appreciate our position and that you try to conform your witnesses to the desires I have expressed. I think I am expressing the desire of the committee in trying to present this viewpoint to you. It is not a pleasure to restrict men when they are honest in present- ing their cases, but nevertheless, it is necessary here and if you will make it easier for us, we will appreciate it. So the committee will now stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomor- row morning. (Thereupon, at 11 a. m., the committee adjourned to meet the fol- lowing morning, Wednesday, January 19, 1938, at 10 a. m.)  TRAIN LENGTHS WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 19, 1938 HousE OF REPRESENTATIVEs, COMMITrEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence F. Lea (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order. Mr. Farquharson, you may proceed. STATEMENT OF J. A. FARQUHARSON, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, EDITOR AND MANAGER OF THE RAILROAD TRAINMEN, BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, WASH- INGTON, D. C. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is J. A. Farquharson, and I am national legislative repre- sentative of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and editor and manager of its official publication. My offices are located at 10 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, D. C. In presenting my testimony, I first want to call the attention of the committee to the fact that we are talking specifically about an uncontrolled slack action that exists on long trains and about the inability of trainmen to pass signals from the head end to the rear end, or rear end to the head end of the train, and the inability of trainmen to detect defects on these long trains and be able to stop them and correct the defect before an accident occurs, also the lack of opportunity there is for trainmen to inspect these long trains at intermediate points between terminals, because, gentlemen, we believe that we will be able to show you that we have laid our finger directly upon a cause of accident that can be eliminated to a very great degree by limiting the length of freight trains to not more than 70 cars. This is not a new question with the transportation brotherhoods. In about 1895 the railroads adopted an almost universal program of endeavoring to handle greater tonnage with fewer trains and at that time the locomotives were not so large and the policy of using two locomotives to propel a single train became quite prevalent. In 1903 the first negotiations with the railroads were conducted by what was then known as the Western Chairmen's Association. That was composed of chairmen of the Order of Railway Conductors and 197 198 TRAIN LENGTHS Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen on all of the roads lying west of and including the Illinois Central Railroad, and an agreement was reached at that time with the managements that double-heading on trains of over 30 cars would be discontinued. It is true that later those rules were modified and an agreement was reached that we could double-head trains with not more than the tonnage of the heaviest locomotive propelling the train was capable of handling. We did, however, during the negotiations in 1903, agree to the use of more than one engine being used to propel a train on certain grades which were termed as "helper territory," and that was the mountain territory. We added sufficient engines to the train to lift the ton- nage from the base over the mountain, over the top of the mountain. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Farquharson, in conversation with me, you expressed the view you thought you could make better progress by completing your statement before questions were asked. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I did, and I would appreciate that. The CHAIRMAN. It appears to me that plan would be the best way to proceed. In my enforced absence, Mr. Bulwinkle will preside, and we will go ahead with the meeting, as if I were here. Mr. FARQUHARsON. All right, Mr. Chairman. I had just stated that we had those helper territories, where we had permitted the use of the additional engines, but the hauling capacity of the locomotive increased so rapidly by the introduction of improved motive power that it continued to surpass the ability of the air brake to function properly on .the number of cars the locomotive was capable of handling, and in order that this commit- tee may have a clear picture of that, I ask you to bear with me until I give you a brief history of the development of the air brake up to the present moment. The railroads first considered the adoption of the power brake in the year 1870, and in that year appointed a committee to investigate the devices that were then known to exist. In 1871 the committee reported that a number of the power brake devices were being tested, and for several years the railroads appointed committees to report upon the development being made in power brake systems for freight trains. In 1880 the committee reported having investigated 22 power brakes during a period of 3 years, and while many of the devices were crude and undeveloped, the developing of a satisfactory power brake was feasible and was encouraged. In 1885 the com- mittee reported that a number of types of brake were in use but in order to decide upon the most efficient and satisfactory type,.compre- hensive tests would be required and they so recommended. In 1887 a series of tests were conducted on the Burlington Railroad, but on account of the excessive shock to the train caused by the emer- gency application of the brakes, the committee recommended at that time that the best type of brake was a brake operated by air but actuated by electricity. However, a so-called quick action triple valve was invented and the railroads accepted that type of brake. It is the same principle as the brake now in operation, except, of course, that it has been improved from time to time. In 1892 the committee, which at that time was composed of master car builders, set forth in considerable detail the conditions which a power brake should fulfill, and as there were none then available that would meet TRAIN LENGTHS 199 those requirements, it was suggested that a suitable test rack be constructed to enable further investigation to be carried on, which rack was constructed by the Pennsylvania Railroad Co. and put in operation at Altoona, Pa., and tests were made on triple valves submitted by different air brake manufacturers. From the record, none of these appear to have met the requirements and in 1895 the committee recommended for adoption a standard code of tests for triple valves, which was intended to outline to manufacturers the requirements of the railroads, and this code was adopted, and a standing committee was appointed for the purpose of subjecting to test any triple valve which might be submitted for test. Later these testing racks were transferred to Purdue University, where they are now located. In 1908 the testing rack was reconstructed to provide for testing equipment for 100 cars and a new code of requirements was drafted and adopted by the railroads in 1911. It appears from the record that only one triple valve was submitted for test after the 1911 code was presented to the manufacturers, which was the type K, triple, manufactured by the Westinghouse and New York Air Brake Com- panies. At this point the master car builders committee, which had carried on the work, were succeeded by what is now known as the Mechanical Division of the Association of American Railroads. In 1917 the rules of interchange between railroads were revised by the American Railroad Association to provide, in effect, that cars built on and after January 1, 1919, must be equipped with Ameri- can Railroad Association standard K triple valves. Each com- mittee carrying on this work has recommended certain changes in the brake to overcome the first complaint ever made against the air brake, and that is the excessive shock which is created under various conditions when the brakes are applied, with the result that there was and still is the danger of damage to property and personal injury to employees. A Rock Island Railroad official, testifying before the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its investigation of power brakes and ap- pliances for operating power brakes, said that, borne out by experi- ence on his road, the efficiency and adequacy of power brakes had not kept pace with the increasing capacity of locomotives, increased size of cars and increased tonnage per train. In 1921 tests were made on the Norfolk & Western Railroad of what is known as an automatic straight air brake, which tests proved that this brake was not any more effective and possibly not as effec- tive as was the K triple then in use. A report of its operation found in the Interstate Commerce Commission's report on case No. 13528 is as follows: In some of the 100-train tests heavy shocks were experienced, but it was the opinion of competent observers that these shocks were not more severe than are frequently encountered in daily service. The record in this case shows it is not an unusual occurrence for serious personal injury and material damage to equip- ment to result from shock due to emergency brake applications which occur in daily service. Finally, the Interstate Commerce Commission, of its own accord- On February 20, 1922, entered upon a proceeding of inquiry and investigation to determine whether and to what extent power brakes and appliances for operating power-brake systems now generally in use on the locomotives and cars of carriers by railroads subject to the Interstate Commerce Act are adequate and 2(( V TRAIN LENGTHS In accordance with the requirements of safety ; what approved appliances or devices are available for use, and what improvements in power brakes and appliances may or should be used, to the end that increased safety in train operation may be obtained. Consequently, on July 18, 1924, the Interstate Commerce Commis- sion, in its preliminary report and conclusions on case No. 13528, stated that improvements in the operation of power brakes was essential and must be effected, and specified several general requirements which, in the opinion of the Commission, were essential features of a suitable power brake, all of which were not present in the- present brake, aid the adoption of which improvements would require the replacement of the present freight-train brake with a much more expensive and complicated device. An agreement was reached between the American Railroad Associa- tion and the Interstate Commerce Commission providing that the American Railroad Association would make a thorough and unbiased investigation of power brakes and appliances for operating power- brake systems. The American Railroad Association placed the re- sponsibility of conducting this investigation upon the committee on safety appliances of the mechanical division of the association, and this committee agreed with the Bureau of Safety of the Interstate Commerce Commission upon the general scope and method of proce- dure of the investigation. A director of research was appointed by the American Railroad Association in December 1924, with instruc- tions to proceed to secure such appliances as were deemed improve- ments, even to the extent of entering into agreements to have such appliances made and after they were obtained to give them exhaustive tests on the testing racks at Purdue University, which racks were to be completely prepared and brought up to date for the purpose of testing these devices. In February 1925-and, gentlemen, I will bring you right up to 1936 on that, and the reason I have gone back to the beginning is to -show you the first complaint of severe shock still exists right today. In February 1925 the American Railroad Association placed an order for 150 sets of freight train air-brake equipments for trial pur- poses and these orders were placed with the Automatic Straight Air Brake Co., hereinbefore referred to as the A. S. A. brake, and with the Westinghouse Air Brake Co. The A. S. A. Co. delivered their brakes to Purdue University on April 1, 1926, and the Westinghouse Co. delivered a brake known as type FC-5, July 1, 1926, and later submitted a brake known as FC-3. There was also submitted another brake by the Westinghouse Co. known as FC-3A. These tests at Purdue University extended over the period of time from November 30, 1925, until January 24, 1929. As a result of extensive tests made of brakes at Purdue University, the committee recommended that the automatic straight air brake failed to show sufficient merit in the rack test to warrant the conduct of road tests and it was, therefore, discarded. However, it reconi- mended that service condition tests should be made with the Dresent standard K triple, the Westinghouse type FC-5 and Westinghouse FC-3. In May 1929 an agreement was signed by the Southern Pacific Co. in which it agreed to cooperate with the American Railroad Asso- ciation in the conduct of road tests. Road test means that they equip TRAIN LENGTHS 201 those cars and put them in actual operation and test them to deter- mine the efficiency of the brakes. The track selected is located on the Siskiyou Line of the Southern Pacific between Hornbrook, Calif., and Eugene, Ore., and contains the desired three grade conditions of level track, long moderate grade and heavy mountain grade. The tests on the level territory required the stopping of trains of from 50 to 150 cars to determine stopping distance and the action of slack during the brake operation. At times. all of the cars were loaded, other times all empty, and at other times loads and empties, mixed. The cars used were General American tank cars, each having a ca- pacity of 10,000 gallons, and they were filled with water to make the load and emptied to make them empty. The tests on the long moderate grades were made on trains rang- ing from 76 to 150 empty cars, and from 50 to 124 loaded cars. The tests on the very heavy grade, which is in excess of 3 percent,, were made up of trains from 50 to 85 cars (up to 3,500 tons train weight, and up to 55 tons per operative brake down the mountain.)h Mr. MAPES. What do you mean by excess of 3 percent? Mr. FARQUHARSON. One percent would be 52.8 feet and three times that to the mile. Mr. MAPES. To the mile? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. The limit placed on this grade by the Southern Pacific Railroad in its own operation required that trains do not exceed 56 loaded cars, or 50 tons per operative brake. I would like to point out there and explain to you what that opera- tion is. When we go over that mountain with trains where the cars each had, say, over 50 tons, and then on the top of the mountain we cut in empties in order that we will have greater braking power down the mountain, that is put more brake power in the train to equal the tonnage of the train. Dynamometer cars, all of steel construction, were placed through- out these trains at not more than 20 cars between any two instrument cars and the cabooses were to be all steel, so that each would be ca- pable of withstanding the severe shocks. These trains were also equipped with electrically controlled mechanisms to register the brake application. Special track equipment was provided so that all of the tests made would be predetermined. I possibly should state to you there that there were ramps built along the side of the rails and a short distance back of that ramp there were white stakes, put down so that the engineer would know what his speed was and the distance before he came to the ramp, and the ramp would set the air, and as the train would approach the point of contact, and the air would be applied some predetermined force. The cars were assembled at Eugene early in the year 1929, and by August 1, 1929, enough of the cars had been inspected and repaired to a point of perfection, so that the tests were begun on August 1 1929, and were completed March 31, 1931. It developed, as a result; of all ,these tests, that the brakes were capable of functioning on trains of 50 can, and that they did not.function safely on trains of 100 cars or more. This proves that since the beginning of the -us of power brakes the size of the locomotive itself, its increased hauling capacity, has far exceeded the ability of the power brake to safely' control the tonnage the modern locomotive is capable of handling. 202 TRAIN LENGTHIS At this point I would like to introduce photographs of wrecks that occurred on these test trains, and to advise the committee that there was nothing in the world that caused these wrecks but an application of the air brakes. These cars were perfect. They had been put into the shop; the brakes: were taken down; they were cleaned. The drawbars were known to be perfect. All draft rigging and brake beams were known to be perfect, the train was in perfect condition, and those wrecks you see there are the result of brake application and nothing else. Following these tests, Mr.C. C. Farmer, director of Engineering of the Westinghouse Air Brake Co., made the following statement: Within recent years changes in railroad requirements have necessitated the operation of faster, heavier, and longer freight trains than those for which the "K" triple valve was designed, and it became necessary for the railways to determine whether the longer and heavier modern trains could be safely and expeditiously controlled and stopped. To this end the American Railway Association made extensive rack and road tests under the direction of their ,director of research, Mr. H. A. Johnson. These tests were originally planned for trains of not more than 100 cars, but at the completion of the rack tests at Purdue University the American Railway Association decided to extend their investigation from 100 to 150 car train limits. It was known that the "K" equipment would be found unsatisfactory- This, you see, is the brake manufacturer's statement. for control of modern trains and, therefore, these valves could not serve the purpose of determining what brake functions were needed, and it followed that the American Railway Association must have new and special brake-control elements for this purpose. To meet requirements of the tests the Westing- house Air Brake Co. devised and furnished special brake devices which they believed necessary for the purpose. The earlier of these cars were designed on the basis of 100-car train limits and the later for 150-car train limits. These special brake devices were arranged for convenience of the investigation, and therefore were not in commercial form. In order that an adequate study and analysis might be made of the effect of propagation rates in service and emer- gency brake applications on train-slack control, we also devised and furnished electrically controlled mechanisms by the use of which the rate of brake appli- cation propagation could be changed as desired without reconstructing the brake devices. These experimental brakes and the research mechanisms permitted the American Railway Association to secure definite knowledge of the require- ments for safely controlling modern freight trains, without which the report of their director of research must have been generally limited, to the conclu- sion that the functioning of the "K" equipment was inadequate for modern freight train service. At this point I wish to pause in my statement to call attention of the committee to that part of Mr. Farmer's statement, in which lie said: "It was known the K equipment would be found unsatisfactory for control of modern trains." Gentlemen, for years before these tests were begun, the railroads were operating trains of more than 70 cars, and of 150. cars, or over, when the manufacturer of the brake knew, as did the railroads, that the brake could not. function properly on trains of that size. Hurrying along with this statement, we find that in the year 1936, Mr. J. C. Clifford, also associated, I believe, with the Westinghouse Air Brake Co., made the following statement in "Magazine of Wall Street," issue of April 24, 1937. _ Before I am through.with this testi- mony, I will read into the record many serious wrecks. that have Qccurred. TRAIN LENGTHS 203 Now, let us reflect on that statement in the second report. Those who have never done so might ponder a moment on the enormous force required to overcome the momentum of a modern fast freight-perhaps a hun- dred and fifty cars, each in itself weighing 25 tons and averaging 50 tons of freight, a 300-ton locomotive, and the whole mass hurtling along at more than *30 miles an hour. This is a picture that can leave no doubt as to the impor- tance, ruggedness, and durability of the brakes that stop the monster. It is to be noted, however, that it is a job for modern braking equipment, a point which is one of the most interesting aspects of the outlook of Westinghouse Air Brake. Freight trains have grown so much heavier and are operated at speeds so much greater than was the case a few years ago that they have outdistanced their brakes. The specific trouble is an unevenness of braking pressure, with the attendant danger that the train will buckle and throw cars across adjoin- ig tracks. So great has this danger been considered that orders have been given against braking long freights when parallel tracks are being used by pas- senger trains. Let us reflect upon the second paragraph of that statement. In the accident reports which I will submit in the course of the giving of my testimony I will call particular attention to cases where freight and passenger trains have collided with the wreckage of freight trains fouling adjacent tracks. Mr. Clifford's statement again proves that the railroads and the air brake companies knew that the brakes were not functioning properly upon the long trains. His statement was made in connection with the brake now known as the AB and which the railroads have adopted as a standard brake. However, we have witnesses here who will testify as to its performance and we say, with- out fear of successful contradiction, that the brake has not done what it is supposed to do and it is still in the experimental stage, and we are doubtful if any brake will ever be constructed that will fulfill the necessary requirements, and safely function on a train of over 70 cars, and brakes do not control all of the slack, and will show you cases where there was no brake application, where the slack simply rolled into the head end of the train and buckled the cars in front of passenger trains, and men were killed and many people injured. There is in every train a great deal of slack. All railroad equip- ment rides upon springs, and back of all of the coupler shanks are springs put in for the purpose of relieving the strain upon metal and also relieving shock, and it is interesting to note that a few years ago the coupler shank was 4 by 4 inches and was built to stand an approximate shock of 100,000 pounds; today the shank of the coupler is more than double that size and built to stand the shock of approx- imately 500,000 pounds. The center sills of the cars today are built to stand a side strain of 250,000 pounds. However, these couplers and these cars are crumbling under the shock of slack action and strain of draw-bar pull. Trains are moved always upon signal or order. The average length of the car is approximately 42 feet 6 inches, and, therefore, as the length of trains increased it was not long before it was impossible to interpret signals transmitted from one end of the train to the other end. In addition to that, it be- care impossible to detect defects on portions of the train, with the result that many accidents. occur today from. defects that were capable of being detected when the train was shorter and where sig- nals could be seen from one end of the train to the other and the train stopped and defects corrected. The railroads have, during the recess of Congress, conducted one of themost vigorous programs of spreading propaganda against the enactment of this legislation that has ever been carried on 204 TRAIN LENGTHS against any safety legislation the railroad brotherhoods have sought to have enacted. They have flooded the country with reports that railroad accidents have been so reduced that they would lead you to believe that they are so infrequent that there is no need for any legislation. We will admit that from the peak seasons of 1926 to 1929, as compared with the low depression years of 1930 and 1931, there was a substantial decrease in accidents, but with the pick-up of business in 1935 and 1936 let us see what the Interstate Com- merce Commission reports show in the increase in accidents: Now, there are a great many accidents that are chargeable to neg- ligence of the employees, and they start out their report this way: Negligence of employees shrank in relative importance from 34.65 percent in 1929 to 29.64 in 1936. Train accidents chargeable to condition of track or equipment increased from 54.77 percent of the total in 1929 to 58.41 in 1936. Train accidents at grade crossings in 1929 (not to be confused with train- service accidents) constituted 1.09 percent of the total and increased to 2.78 in 1936, but this was less than in 1935. Negligence or malicious acts of persons other than employees increased from 2.06 percent in 1929 to 2.67 in 1936. All other causes decreased from 7.43 percent in 1929 to 6.50 in 1936. Now, we come down to train accidents. We have here an exhibit which I will later submit which will show you just the result of this and what it costs. Because of the substantial increase in the number of train accidents in 1936 over 1935, some examples of the more prominent causes contributing to this increase are cited here. Train accidents due to defects in or failure of parts and appurtenances of locomotives and tenders other than boilers increased from 411 to 532, or 29.4 percent. Cases of defects in or failures of trucks increased from 687 in 1935 to 862 in 1936, or 25.5 percent. Train accidents due to defects in or failures of wheels and axles increased from 869 to 1,135, or 30.6 percent. Those due to defects in or failures of hand brakes, brake rigging, and appurte- nances increased from 207 to 257, or 24.2 percent. Defective couplers caused 153 train accidents in 1935 and 171 in 1936, an increase of 11.8 percent. De- fective draft rigging was responsible for 146 train accidents in 1935 and 167 in 1936, or 14.4 percent more. Defects in car bodies and other parts of equip- ment resulted in 132 train accidents in 1935 and 213 in 1936, an increase of 61.4 percent. In the causes listed under "Defects in or improper maintenance of way and structures," 308 train accidents were assigned to rails and joints in 1935, compared with 397 in 1936, or 28.9 percent more. Under "Defects in frogs and switches," 176 cases were reported in 1935 and 211 in 1936, an in- crease of 19.9 percent. Uneven superelevation, improper alinement, and im- proper surface of track caused 153 train accidents in 1935 and 229 in 1936, or 49.7 percent more. Landslides, boulders, and snow or ice on tracks were responsible for 106 train accidents in 1935 and 183 in 1936, an increase of 72.6 percent. The reduction in injuries, in the years 1922-36 has been more rapid than in fatalities for most of the period, but this tendency appears to have been checked recently. As previously noted, the percentage of increase for injuries from 1935 to 1936 was much greater than for fatalities. The total number of persons killed in train and train-service accidents in 1936 was higher than in any year since 1929. The number of employees killed in 1936 was higher than in any year since 1930. For passengers on trains the number killed was lower in 1936 than any other year in the period covered with the exception of 1932. At the previous hearings before this committee and at least twice before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commert, I introduced over 500 accidents occurring on long trains, together with a recapitu- lation of those reports broken down so that they could be more easily understood, and I wish at this time to introduce those. The railroads, in commenting upon those accidents, stated that we had gathered up only that number in the years 1928 to 1933; that TRAIN LENGTHS 205 was not altogether correct, as the record was made from a compila- tion of accident reports sent to my office by our members and it did include accidents occurring in the year 1928, but were principally for the time after 1930. I want to call your attention to, and you have before you the hear- ings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Com- merce, United States Senate, Seventy-fourth Congress, first session, on S. 27 and S. 344, and it may be that the accident compilation you have there are not numbered on the side. If you will reemmber, when these hearings were opened, you were given this report [indicating]. Mr. BULWINKLE. There are numbers on the side of that. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I want to call your attention to case No. 20, and I will read it here and explain it. Case No. 20 was one that occurred on September 19, 1929, at Pasco, Wash., train No. extra 1614, east, with 79 cars, made an emergency stop pulling into the Pasco yard, throwing brakeman Ralph C. Irwin to the floor of the caboose, and in falling he struck his arm on the caboose lamp and cut the arteries and tendons in the wrist and lost the use of his left hand. He is on one side from now on. In case No. 36, March 4, 1930, on Erie Railroad, at Freedom, Pa., train No. extra 3226, and engine 4414 with 99 cars. The slack ran out and broke a drawbar, damaging the equipment to the extent of $500. It injured brakeman C. A. King, and killed brakeman H. C. Grimes. Engine 4214 shoving on caboose of extra 3226, engine 4214 smashed into the caboose and crushed Grimes to death. Let us go to case 48. Mr. BULWINKLE. I am wondering, Mr. Farquharson, if you will pardon me, if it would not be better for you to finish your prepared statement and then tell us about the cases, because some members may want to ask some questions for information about these statistics. Mr. FARQUHARsON. I will be glad to do that. As I stated, the railroads had in hearings before the Senate com- mittee alleged that we had gone back from 1928 to 1933 and picked out these cases, and that was not a true picture, and I wanted to say to you now, gentlemen, that out of more than 700 cases that I had investigated, 1 selected those as drawing what I honestly believed to be a true.picture of the hazards. However, in order that there might be no misunderstanding about the frequency of those accidents, I have this year, with the assistance of one person working under my direct supervision, made a check of long train accidents for the year 1936, and through July 1937, from the Interstate Commerce Com- mission records, as reported to that Commission by the railroads, as required by law. There are a few for the months of August, Septem- ber, October and November; also one case in 1935. However, the balance do not run beyond the month of July, 1937. I have made a recapitulation of these reports in four forms, which I wish to submit at this time. Now, gentlemen, there are 1,407:of those accidegts we have drawn off, as reported by the railroads. There is nothing of our making in these reports. That is, the railroads' reports. Mr. MAPES. Over what period? 47891-38----14 206 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. FARQUHARSON. From January 1, 1936, principally, to July 31, 1937. There are some for August, September, October and November, scattered, and one for 1935 in this report. Mr. MATEs. All right. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Before we go into that, it might be well for the record thatwe read in what constitutes a train accident and what constitutes a train-service accident, .because those are the sort of accidents that are in those reports I made to you, and for the recapitu- lation. A train accident is a wreck to a train where the damage to the equipment or track, and clearing the wreck, cost $150 or more. A train-service accident is where a person who was injured in a train accident has lost 72 hours or 3 days or more time within 10 days following the time of the accident. Now, that is a train-service accident. In going over these 1,407 cases, if you %ill take the larger sheet that I have broken down, you will see that on the left-hand column, I gave the accident number, which will correspond with the number on the compilation of accidents reports you have, and in the next column I show the number of cars m the train. Then I show where there is an emergency application of the air, and then the cars, and/or engines damaged as reported with the cause of the emergency application of the air, whether it was a hose bursting and or train- line breaking. Now, the train line, may I explain to you, is the piping under the cars that carries the air from the hose through under that car to the one beyond.. The next one is couplers, or draft rigging; that caused a train to break in two and bringing about an emergency application of the air. The next one is defective air brakes. A defective air brake may be a weak triple spring; it may be dirt in the valve, and it becomes gummed and sluggish, or it may be a piece of dirt sitting in the valve. A grain of sand would do it. Anything that would unseat that valve. The next one is car bodies and sills. The next is wheels and/or axles. The next is trucks. The next is air applied from rear of train. The next inability to see signals. The next slack run in. The next is slack running out of the train. And, cost of damage. That is on the wreck as reported by the railroads. The next one, number of persons killed. Number of persons injured. Actual time lost. The next is probable time .lost, or the probable time that the rail- roads reported the injured person would lose, and the nature of injuries that they received. Now, when Mr. Johnson's witnesses were on .the witness stand, we read in this report where the railroads had reported a brakeman would probably lose 60 days, and a conductor would probably lose 30 days, but when the evidence was in here, it showed the brakeman TRAIN LENGTHS 207 died as a result of that injury, and the conductor was permanently injured, and testified before you. So that the time that is shown here in the probable time does not state the facts, and I will put on some witnesses here to show that they lost much more time. But, if you will just take the first recapitulation of this, of this form, you will find that those accidents number 1,407. On the back of that you are going to find 1,417, but when we were typing it, we went from, I think, 544 to 555. That was a mistake on our part, and that is the reason that there is 10 out. But the number of times the emergency application of air occurred was 1,325. And the number of cars or engines damaged was 3,021, and they were not always reported on the accident reports. The number of times damage to air hose or train line caused the emergency application of the air brake was 93. The number of times damage to coupler or draft rigging caused emergency application of the air was 380. The number of times defective air brakes were assigned as cause of emergency application of air was 71. The number of times damage to car bodies and/or sills caused eniergency application of air was 68. The number of times damage to wheels and/or axles caused emer- gency application of air was 107, and The number of times damaged trucks caused emergency applica- tion, caused a break in two, and emergency application of air, was 137. The number of times that damage was caused by applying the air from the rear end of the train was 19. The number of times that wrecks occurred on account of inability to see signals was eight. The number of times damage to property and/or injured persons occurred because of slack run in was 1,346. The number of times damage to property and/or injury to persons occurred because of slack run-out was 448. Total number of persons injured was 654. And among those were 287 conductors, 319 brakemen, 2 engineers, 9 firemen, 5 yard brakemen, 1 yard conductor, 11 livestock caretakers, 6 passengers, 1 yardmaster, 1 storekeeper. I want to explain that accident involving the storekeeper later. Mr. KENNEDY, of New York. Is that in your prepared statement? From what statement are you reading? Mr. FARQTHARSON. Did you not get one of those? Mr. KENNEDY, of New York. I thought that you were going to read the statement. Mr. FARQUHARSON. This is the first break-down. Now, this storekeeper was on a Great Northern train. They were delivering store supplies to section houses, and the like of that, and the train broke in two, and he was thrown over his desk and injured. That is how you find a storekeeper ridingon the train as an employee. Mr. BOREN. I want to ask a question, Mr. Farquharson. : am not sure I understood that statement. You said he was thrown over his desk? 208 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. FARQUHARSON. He was in his store car, and they were deliver- ing supplies. Mr. BOREN. Such as tools, implements, and so on. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. That is what he was doing. Mr. BOREN. And he was seated at his desk? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. It is shown in there. I can give you the case number. If you want the case number on -any of those.cases, you will find that we say in the middle one, for instance, "B." You will notice that. That means one brakeman. One "C" is one conductor. One "E," is one engineer. One fireman would be one "F" and so on. So, when you find that storekeeper, then look at the case number and right in the compilation you will find the history of the case. One baggage messenger. That is an error. That should be banana messenger. In shipping bananas there is a messenger who always rides with the car in order to keep it properly ventilated, and they ride on freight trains, so that that correction should be made. And then there is one nontrespasser. Now, a nontrespasser may be, say, a Pullman conductor deadheading or someone not engaged in train service. He might be a news messenger or somebody of that sort. That is what a nontrespasser is termed to be here. Then two railroad employees who were deadheading on a passen- ger train going to another point to work, and that passenger train collided with the wreck of the freight train. Three dining car employees. One carpenter. Now, the carpenter was a bridge carpenter, and they were movirg them from one place to another. These bridge carpenters are usually housed in old equipment, and when the outfit is being moved from one place to another it is placed on the rear end of these long trains. There was an emergency application of the air brakes and this man was thrown out of his bunk and injured. One express messenger. One section hand, and the section hand may seem odd to many of you to be in there, but. he was on a work train when the slack threw him off the train. One extra gang employee. I think the leg of the section man was broken, but we can find out very definitely. Now, the actual number of days time lost, as reported by the rail- roads by the persons injured was 5,829; they reported the probable number of days time lost by persons injured as 12,497; or a total of 18,308 actual and probable days by persons injured. And if you divide that by 365 you find that 654 men lost more than 50 years' work time in a period of approximately 18 months, and if you divide it by 313, the working days of the year, they lost more than 58 years' time from these injuries. Now, the number of persons killed were five-three engineers, one brakeman, one fireman-and one brakeman injured died subsequently from a second accident. The total cost of damage to equipment as reported by the rail- roacsa--and they did not report all of them; at least the amount was not shown on their reports-was $1,525,274. And then 68 times the conductor and brakeman were both knocked out and could not get out of the caboose, and the most important rule on a railroad is rule 99, and rule 99 says that whenever a train is stopped, the flagman must go back immediately a sufficient distance TRAIN LENGTHS 209 to insure full protection to that train, and both the men were knocked out in the caboose and unable to move. We will present some witnesses who went through that. Now, the question was asked by Mr. Bulwinkle, I believe, that he would like to know the number of cars in the train where men were injured, and if you have this paper-I did not desginate it by the number, because I thought you might want to mark that as an exhibit. Mr. BOREN. Let us understand that before you go any further. Mr. FARQUHARSON. All right. Mr. BULWINKLE. You are referring to the one that you call the number of wrecks in train lengths as indicated in the left column? Mr. BOREN. No; "number of persons injured according to train lengths." Mr. BULWINKLE. To "number of persons injured according to train lengths?" Mr. BOREN. Is that the one you have? Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is the one, as I understood your question. Mr. WOLvERTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask what date or period of time that covers? Mr. FARQUHARSON. That covers, that compilation that you have there, from January 1, 1936, to July 31, 1937. I think there might be 20 cases in September, October, and November. I am not so sure of that number, but I want to make this explanation to you now, so that you will know. The railroads are given 30 days after the close of the month in which the accident occurred to make a report, so when we went to the Commission to gather the information, there were some railroads that were prompt, and some not so prompt, and we were able only to get the complete statement up to July. There were a few stragglers beyond that, and we gathered that in. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. Would it be in order to ask here why it is that you left off all accidents on trains under 60 cars. Were they negligible, or are there any comparative estimates that might be helpful in reaching a conclusion as to the effect on the length of a train in connection with these accidents. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Congressman Wolverton asked that question the other day; there is not a check made by the I. C. C. segregating such accidents by the number of cars in the trains involved, and I would like to explain that here. You may be jerked off the top of a train if it only had one car, just the same as you would if it had 100 cars or more. The point that I tried to make when I first started my statement is, we are talking about an uncontrollable slack action. Now, if a man is jerked off a one-car train there is a possible man failure in starting or stopping that train; but when you get down to the point where the engineer cannot control that train by his air brakes, then that is un- controllable slack action. I saw a case there when a man was jerked off the engine; a switch- man standing on the footboard, and the engine started quickly, and he was jerked off the footboard. Mr. BOREN. In this connection though, Mr. Farquharson, are we to gather, that all of these 654 accidents were attributable to causes that belong solely or largely or only partially to the length of the train? 210 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. FARQUHARSON. I explained-I am sorry that you were not in when I first started, Congressman. Mr. BOREN. I regret that. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I will explain that again for you. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Boren, we had an agreement that we would not ask Mr. Farquharson any questions until he had finished his statement. I am not criticizing you at all. I just want to know what Mr. Farquharson wants to do. I want to live up to the Chairman's agreement. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I will not have any objections, Mr. Chairman. We are getting down to the time now where in the introduction of those exhibits if there is any doubt in the mind of the committee, that it would be to explain them. Mr. BULwINKLE. Why not complete your prepared statement, and then introduce your exhibits? Mr. FARQUHARSON. You mean stop introducing the exhibits and finish the statement? Mr. BULWINKLE. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. All right, I will do that. With all the investi- gations and tests that have been going on since 1871, railroad train- men have suffered while railroads have experimented with handling big trains and experimented with brakes to safely control them. Surely in these 67 years of experimenting, most everyone should have reached the conclusion that the time has arrived when railroad train- men should be relieved of this hazard, and trains reduced in size to a point where it is known the brake equipment will have opportunity to properly function. The principal opposition to the enactment of this legislation as set forth by the railroads is the item of cost, and they have alleged that it will cost at least $125,000,000 annually, but we contend that no one can predetermine that cost, if there be any- and I personally do not feel there is going to be any. I say that honestly to you gentlemen- except and until that point has been proven by actual demonstration of railroad operation under the terms of this legislation. When the Adamson 8-hour law was enacted-and there are some of you here now who were in the Congress at that time-the railroads carried on a very extensive campaign all over the country against it, and alleged that the cost of the 8-hour day would bankrupt them. Their spokesmen made speeches all over the country to the effect that if the 8-hour law was enacted, it would bankrupt them. However, President Wilson stated at that time that no one could foretell the cost of the 8-hour day, if any, which would have to be determined after it had gone into effect and had been tried out. The result was day and moved more freight more cheaply than they had ever done that the railroads made more money after the adoption of the 8-hour before. The 8-hour day did more to speed up train movement than anything that had happened up to that time. And, I would like to stop just there and say to you gentlemen that that law became effective in 1917, and in 1905 I had written an agreement putting in the 8-hour day on the El Paso and South- western, where I was employed as a conductor, and where I would hold my rights, and the day I left that job to work for the Brother- hoods, in May 1911, the general manager told me that that was the most profitable thing that he had ever done. TRAIN LENGTHS 211 Now, all of the allegations made by the railroads that they would have to create new terminals, build more sidetracks and more round- houses never came to pass; the opposite were followed--terminals were abandoned and longer divisions created. Some of the propaganda that I have here says they will have to build more roundhouses, and I will venture this statement, gentlemen, there has not been a roundhouse built in this country in 20 years, new. They use the same roundhouses they have had all of the time; the same roundhouses that handled over 62,000 locomotives in 1916, and, where have they got them now? There might have been a few built, but very few built. The same roundhouses are standing that always stood. Only this change may have been made. You might have raised the roof to get one of the big engines in, widen the stall to hold it. That is a change made. When the brotherhoods sought to force the railroads to equip their cars and engines with automatic couplers, automatic air brakes; to have the electric headlight law passed; also the ash pan law- the ash pan law may not sound very big there, but men used to have to get under the engine and hoe the cinders out of the ash pan, and if the engine moved, there was not a chance of them getting away, and we fought for years to get the ash pan law so that the fireman would not have to get under the engines any more; and to have stirrups, grab irons and running boards placed upon cars in such nunbers and in such manner as would make for safety-and you know, gentlemen, that we worked in this country, the trainmen, when the grab irons and stirrups were put on with a lag screw into a wooden board; and'many men were killed when climbing up the ladder when a screw pulled out and they fell to the ground. We had to fight to make them bolt the grab irons on to give us some security. And, we had to fight to get grab irons on the end of the cars when we were going between cars on our knees to couple air-hose and if the train moved and we had to junmp up, there was not anything to get our hands on. In each instance the railroads opposed us on the principle of cost and alleged that they would be practically driven into bankruptcy if laws were enacted to force the adoption of those things. In fact, in 1902, they testified that automatic couplers and brakes would cost approximately $90,000,000, and they would be unable to stand it, and nothing in the world has done more to move freight than the automatic coupler and the automatic air brake Their only trouble is they have been overtaxed. That is what we are talking about here now. They are overworking them, overloading them. They are placing too great a strain on it and with that they are kill- ing and crippling our men. We have no fault to find with the brakes, the air brake. Just don't overload it. When we asked for additional grab-irons to be placed upon the cars, also stirrups and running boards, Mr. Crawford of the Pennsylvania Railroad, in 1911, testified that it would cost the railroads $52,000,000. Gentlemen, cost has no place in the consideration of a safety measure; human lives and security against injury are too sacred to be denied because of alleged cost-and it is only an alleged cost. Now, let us consider cost for a moment. A railroad official wrote Senator McCarran-I am glad he is here-that if this law were enacted the damage to equipment would be so much lessened that 212 TRAIN LENGTHS it would be necessary to materially reduce the maintenance of equip- ment forces. It may be interesting to this committee to know that, according to statement No. M300 of the Interstate Commerce Commission, for the month of October 1937, there were 291,470 maintenance of equipment and stores employees in the middle of that month on a certain pay roll and 10,000 more on another pay roll; and at the same time and on the same date there were 10,538 through freight conductors; 7,074 local freight conductors; 27,177 road freight brakemen and flagmen in through freight service; 15,212 road freight engineers and motormen in through freight service; 7,494 road freight engineers and motormen in local way freight service; 17,825 through freight firemen; and 8,097 local freight firemen; or a total of 110,684 engineers, conductors, brakemen, and firemen on the rail- roads and 291,470 repairmen. Now, if that is not proof of the fact that these long trains are damaging equipment and it would be lessened if the train were shortened and relieved of that strain-and then, let us go back a few years. When we had a smaller train, let us see what it was. In the volume entitled "Railroad Statistics in the United States," published by the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1916, it is shown that the number of engineers, firemen, conductors, and road brakemen in the service, such as I have read off to you, was 211,870. and the number in the mechanical force was 273,000. Today we have 100,000 less in the transportation group and 20,000 more repairmen. Now, is there any economy in that? Who is paying the price? The man who is crippled on the rear end of the trains. So, if their statement is correct that they might expect to have to run more trains, according to this official's statement, the added cost will be practically offset by the saving in repair costs. Let us consider that just a little further: If the equipment will not be damaged to the same extent, then the life of the equipment will be greater, and the personal injury and death settlements will be lessened, and it is very probable, as we have repeatedly stated, that there will be no additional cost. According to the year book put out by the committee on public relations of the eastern railroads for 1936, there were 1,835,756 freight cars, with an average capacity of 48.3 tons per car; there were in 1935, 46,594 locomotives. It is interesting to note that the average tractive power of locomotives in 1916 was 33,188 pounds-that was the average tractive power-while in 1936 this had increased to 48,367 pounds, or an increase of 46 percent, and the brake remained practically the same. In other words, 46,594 locomotives had a total tractive power of 2,206,200,838 pounds, as against 61,332 locomotives-14,738 less- had a tractive power of 2,024,118,700 pounds or 82,082,138 less tractive power with 14,738 less locomotives than they had before the brake was the same. The average cars per train in 1922 was 38, while in 1929 it was 49, or an increase of 29 percent in 7 years. While the average cars per train decreased during the period of the depression, it is in- creasing again as. business picks up. The average tonnage per train increased between 1922 and 1929 19 percent. The average number of cars in a freight train today is approxi- mately 46. This bill permits the operation of a train of 70 cars, and that is more than a 50 percent increase above the general average. TRAIN LENGTHS 213 Let us consider for a moment the wisdom of purchasing this exces- sively larger power and throwing men out of employment. The average cost of a locomotive today is between 20 cents and 23 cents a pound, but I understand that the engine I am going to talk about was bought by the Northern Pacific at a cost of $150,000. I have before me a photograph of the Northern Pacific engine, No. 5100, that weighs 1,032,000 pounds. According to the list before me, the Northern Pacific has at least 11 of this type of engine and there are some engines larger than this one, and I want to read into the record here the message sent by the dispatcher at Glendive, Mont., addressed to the car foreman and the conductor of extra 5104 east, on September 10, 1937. Run extra east out Livingston at 9 a. in. tomorrow September 10 using engine 5104 caboose only and add bus car 1902 behind caboose for Laurel to check clearances, etc., on way to Laurel. Imagine that, gentlemen, buying an engine, sending her out on the road and then putting a car to see whether it is going to make the cuts and the tunnels, and the bridges. turn this engine at Laurel quickly as possible and arrange to consolidate Nos. 651 and 603 at Laurel tomorrow and give them 4.400 tons in loads as much as possible saving up loads if necessary to make No. 603's time Laurel to Livingston dispatcher will issue order not to exceed 10 miles per hour over bridge 68 and not exceed 20 miles per hour over bridges 63 and 74 on 5th sub copy all N 964. Can you imagine, gentlemen, buying that power with a track not able to handle it, with the cost thrown in, too; then the cost of strengthening the roadbed and the railroads are at the same time crying they have not got any business. Imagine buying something you do not need; buying something on the installment plan and heaping a debt upon the railroads and everybody else. And I can show you from the record in the hearings when held in the Senate where the Union Pacific rented some engines and paid 90 cents a mile. to the Union Pacific Trust Co. for the use of those engines because they would pull bigger trains and they put 47 locomotives in white lead at Pocatello, Idaho, and they are still in white lead, and after they used those engines until the rent paid for them, they bought them at $12,600 apiece. Now, who paid for that? Look at the men who were thrown out of employment. What about the merchant, the banker, the lawyer, the baker, the grocer, over at Pocatello? The pay roll was cut. What can they live on there? It is a railroad terminal, living on the railroad pay roll. And, gentlemen, this whole country is filled with them and we do not have to go further from this city than Bruns- wick, Md., to find a typical town of the towns I am talking about. Now, please note that the train was run with engine, caboose, and bus car for the purpose of checking the clearances, and so forth, on the way from Livingston to Laurel, that is to determine clearances in cuts, tunnels, bridges, and so forth, then to turn the engine as quickly as possible and consolidate two trains at Laurel, giving this engine 4,400 tons in this mountainous territory and then giving the conductor and engineer of the train it was hauling an order to reduce speed over bridge 68 to 10 miles an hour and 20 miles an hour over bridges 63 and 74 on the fifth subdivision, and there, gentlemen, is a clear case of running a locomotive of that size before the road was equipped 214 TRAIN LENGTHS to accommodate it, which means that we have been putting onto the railroads of this country big power that required the strengthening of bridges, increasing weight of the rail, and increasing the strength of the car, and with all that added cost it is a very serious question in the minds of many people whether or not the whole program has been profitable; and let us check just what the big power means: In 1927 there were 322,320 train, engine, and yard-service employees; in 1932 there were but 198,397, and in 1936, when business picked up to equal approximately 1926 business, there were 225,231; or, 123,923 less in 1932 than in 1927, and with business picking up as it did in 1936 there were 97,089 less than in 1927. And now, gentlemen, who paid for the heavier locomotive? Surely there can be no doubt in the mind of anyone that the em- ployees, who were thrown out of service without any consideration as to where they would go to find other employment, are the ones who actually paid for the heavier locomotive. The accident reports that have been submitted to this honorable body and the testimony of the witnesses you have so far heard and of those who will follow I believe prove conclusively that this legis- lation is sought on the basis of safety not only to the railroad em- ployees but to the traveling public as well, regardless of the propa- ganda spread by the railroads to the contrary. Mr. BUTWINKLE. Now, Mr. Farquharson, you can go ahead with the accident reports. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I would like to, now that we have gone into this, I would like to make another statement in connection with this cost. When we were before the Senate committee, Mr. Parmalee, Director of the Bureau of Railroad Economics, testified, and I want you to get this, and you will find it on page 248 of that hearing and through to page 274, of the hearings on S. 27 and S. 344, of which you have a copy before you. He testified that during a 12-year pe- riod, 1923 to 1934, the railroads had operated with, in round figures, about 14,000 less locomotives; that the capacity of the freight car had increased from 43 tons to 47 tons in 1934, and the length of the train had increased to 23 percent; and the net tons-now, get this- net tons out of which the railroads get their revenue, had increased only 4.4 percent. Now, who is going to pay for this if it is only 4.4 percent advantage that they get out of the net tons in the train, and are spending, as he boasted, $7,000,000,000? It just cannot be done, gentlemen. There is not enough revenue. But here is what we have done. The weakest point in any train is its weakest car and therefore in order to run these long trains, it is necessary to increase the weight and the strength of the cars hauled by these large locomotives, and today we are using a heavy truck, or were using a heavier car without enjoying a very much heavier cargo. In other words, we are pulling the equivalent of 5 tons load in a 10-ton truck, because the truck must be strong enough to stand the strain in these long trains. And then, don't be confused. He goes over to train-hours, the number of tons moved per hour, and to defend that issue, he says that they move 73 percent more; 73 percent more of what? 73 per- cent more of equipment less 4.4 percent of revenue freight. That is TRAIN LENGTHS 215 what happens. And, all of the time, gentlemen, trainmen have been suffering from the shock of slack on the hind end of the trains. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Farquharson Mr. FARQUHARSON. May I answer those questions? Mr. BOREN. If you have finished with your main statement, we will ask questions. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Will you pardon me for just a minute? I thought that you had received a compilation of the 1,407 cases and, Congressman, I beg your pardon. You asked a question? Mr. BULWINKLE. I think we have received those. Mr. FARQUHARSON. No; you got the 530. Mr. BULwiNKLE. The 530; yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Here is the compilation on the 1,407. And. when you get to this sheet here, let me explain again that those cases are all numbered and on these sheets on the left-hand column is the number, and all of that is tied across, so that you can make a check on that. Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Chairman Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Farquharson, will you inform us just what period of time this statement covers? Mr. FARQUHARSON. From January 1, 1936, principally, to the end of July 1937. You will find in there some accidents for August, Sep- tember, October, and one case for the year 1935. This gives the great majority, the great bulk. I have not counted those for August, Sep- tember, and October 1937. There are not very many, because they were not in the time I was going over them. Mr. BULwINKLE. Any other questions, gentlemen? Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Farquharson, I would like the analysis of these figures, the number of persons injured according to the length of the train or trains of more than 70 cars. Can you give me that infor- ]mation ? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. Mr. BOREN. Was there any comparison between these figures and the number on trains of less than 70 cars? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No, sir ; I did not check those, because the bill was dealing with trains limited to 70 cars and we drew those cases from the accident reports on trains of over 70 cars separately. How- ever, you will find on the very top there, that we drew ofd some 60 to 69 cars, and the reason we did that, Congressman, was you had asked the question why we wenti to 70 cars; why we put in 70 cars. We did not go to 70 cars voluntarily. We asked for 62 cars. We were not getting any place; 62 cars at 42 feet 6 inches long, gives us a half a mile, and that is what we were after. Now, the Arizona law that has been in effect since 1912 is 70 cars, and so we came to the 70 cars. There were a number of bills that were introduced in the various States that were asking for 70-car trains. Mr. WADSWORTH. May I make an inquiry, Mr. Chairman? Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Wadsworth. Mr. WAxswoRTH. Does the Arizona law apply to through trains? 216 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. FARQUHARSON. To through trains. It applies to any freight train; any freight trains operating within the State of Arizona. Mr. WADSWORTH. Then, the fruit trains starting in California with 140 cars have to split? Mr. FARQUHARSON. They split them at Yuma. Mr. WADSWORTH. They split them at Yuma? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes; and then, Mr. Wadsworth, they consoli- date them again at Lordsburg. That is where I worked myself. I know that territory. Mr. BOREN. I would like to follow that question a little further, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. In this analysis of 654 accidents, it is not clearly shown, Mr. Farquharson, what ones of these accidents are directly attributable to the length of the train, while they occurred in trains of more than 70 cars in length, except as your record shows here indi- vidual cases, we have no way of determining what number of these 654 were caused by the long train. Mr. FARQUHARSON. They were caused by slack action. Mr. BOREN. Not all of these 654 cases are slack action accidents, are they? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. BOREN. That answers my question. Then, on page 10 of your statement you say the total number of persons killed in train service accidents in 1936 and so forth. Mr. FARQUHARSON. What are you reading from? Mr. BOREN. Your general statement on page 10, the last paragraph. I want to ask you in that connection if this analysis covers that same period to show that these accidents were on trains of more than 70 car lengths or if that statement has any relation to 70 car lengths. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now, may I see that? Mr. BOREN. That is on page 10 of your statement. Mr. FARQUHARSON. You mean Mr. Farmer's statement? Mr. BoREN. You are quoting from the Interstate Commerce Coin- mission where you give the total number of train and train service accidents, and so on. Mr. FARQUHARSON. No; that includes all of the accidents. That is the general increase in all; yes, sir. Mr. BOREN. Does your analysis here show the number of persons killed as a result of the operation of trains of more than 70 car lengths over a given period of time? Mr. FARQUHARSON. There was a brakeman killed. There were three engineers that were killed, two passenger engineers and a freight engineer, when the trains they were pulling collided with the wreck of trains of overt 70 cars that were strewn across the track upon which they were moving. Mr. BOREN. But your accident reports here show that 12 people were killed or died as a result of these accidents. Mr. FARQUHARSON. You have got those 530 cases, have you not? Mr. BOREN. Yes. But, in connection with that number, referring to the 12 killed, is there any relation to the deaths of those 12 people and the 70-car train? TRAIN LENGTHS 217 Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. I will call your attention to it. That is what I had started to explain when Mr. Bulwinkle asked me to com- plete the written statement I had. Now, if you have before you this book of hearings on S. 27 and S. 344, which Mr. Layton left, I believe, with each of the members of the committee the day the hearings opened. The CLERK. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I want to call your attention to this. Mr. BOREN. What page is it? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Turn to page 16. And, I want to call your at- tention to the fact that the printer made an error and included some numbers in there that did not belong in there, and as proof of that gentlemen, I want to show you that here is the statement that i gave the printer to draw it off of, and why he put those additional numbers there ahead of case No. 36, I do not know. It was his mistake. It was not mine. Mr. BOREN. Referring to case No. 36. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now, you want case 36? Mr. BOREN. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now, that was the case of Grimes that was crushed to death in the car when an air hose near the head end of the train bursted they had a pusher on the hind end, and it came through the caboose and crushed Grimes to death. Mr. WOLVERTON. What claim number is that? Mr. CROssER. Page 65 of the hearings. Mr. BOREN. Then, if I may ask one other question, Mr. Chairman, in relation to the cost of this program. You referred to the estimated cost that the railroads will attempt to show. And, if you are in a position to do so, I would like for you to make a statement as to your opinion of the costs. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Congressman, I cannot lead myself to believe, and I am saying this not because I am supporting this bill; I want to give you the reason as I know train operations, and I do not know it as well as a great many other people. But, the average length of trains today is 46 cars, and what we have asked for is 70 cars. Now, the difference in there is 24, and that is more than 50 percent more cars than the average train they are now pulling. Now then, we have shown you here the added number in the mechanical forces that are required to repair these defective cars, and then there is another thing. We have not covered this, that a lot of these trains are pulled with two locomotives, and the two loco- motives can only pull their combined tonnage and no more than they can pull individually if the train were cut in two, and there- fore the added cost on that is simply the added train crew. Not another engine crew; just another train crew. Now then, deducting from that the wrecks that are caused by slack action, that would not occur on these smaller trains as they do, at least as frequently as they do on the longer trains, relieving them of the payment of personal-injury claims, the payment of death claims, the saving in damage to the contents of the cars that are ruined by this terrible slack action; I cannot see that it is going to cost anything. There may be a little cost; but even if there is, if we can save a human being, if we can save a life, if we can save 218 TRAIN LENGTHS these men from the injuries, does not society owe it to us? And let me just say this, Congressman, in further defense: In every State in the Union; in every factory; you have passed laws, legislation, to guard every moving piece of machinery so that the workmen will not get his hand crushed. In every State in the Union you have passed laws regulating the length, the width, the heights, the breadth, and the speed of trucks and automobiles which use the highways. And in every one where the highway was narrow, you have gone out and widened the highway. They have placed signals at important crossings to save life. Cost does not figure in that. Nobody figured what that was going to cost. People were trying to save lives, and I say, and say again, that if there is any cost here, that it has no place in an argument against this safety measure we are asking for. Mr. BOREN. Well, Mr. Farquharson, your proposal is to increase the number of trains approximately 20 percent ? Mr. FARQUHARsON. 20 percent? Mr. BOREN. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I do not think that it will. I seriously doubt that. I seriously doubt it. Mr. BOREN. I am just talking about taking the number of cars and cutting them down. But whatever may be the increase in num- ber of trains, approximately 20 per cent, it evidently will increase the speed of the trains; in relation to the number of men killed in train service, what is the public to expect from the increase in the number of deaths at grade crossings? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Congressman, I am rather glad you asked that question. I cannot figure how anybody could pass a law or do anything that would stop the follow from driving into the side of a car, side of a train. I do not see where the grade crossing ques- tion has any connection here, for this reason: That there are a great many of those grade-crossing accidents, where they have driven into the side of the car; where they have run over the flagman, flagging the crossing, and killed or injured him. They have run through gates, and hit the side of the cars, and you cannot regu- late that. We cannot regulate the minds of the people who are driving these 27 million automobiles that are registered in this coun- try at this time, and 3,800,000 trucks, we cannot do that. Mr. BOREN. We can act in the public interests here either to in- crease or prevent the increase of hazards. Mr. FARQUHARSON. You did that. All of you gentlemen sitting around here had that question before you, and when the great big relief bill came out, $4,800,000,000, you laid aside a certain amount of that for grade-crossing elimination, because all of the laws in the United States which had been passed about "Stop, Look and Listen" before you go ahead, had not stopped the fool from trying to beat a train across a railroad crossing and running into the side of it. And there has been expended and there is being spent millions of dollars in grade-crossing elimination. Now, on the basis that you acted, the Congress of the United States was that you knew that laws could not prevent that, so you started to eliminate the cause. That is what we are asking you to do here, eliminate the cause of those slack-action accidents by limiting the train lengths. We TRAIN LENGTHS 219 are asking you to do the very thing you did in the grade-crossing question. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. Chairman. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Kennedy. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. Farquharson, will you please tell us what organization you represent'? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I represent the Brotherhood of Railroad Train- men. They are the men in the train service and in the yard service that work upon the ground. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. About how many men would that be? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Today we have approximately 150,000 mem- bers. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Are you speaking for the group headed by Mr. Harrison? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Well, are you a member of that group? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No; that is the clerks' organization, railway clerks. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Is there any difference of opinion between your group and their group as to the merits of this bill? Mr. FARQUHARsON. Not that I know of. I have not heard of any from anyone. In fact, I was told the other day that they were in sympathy with us. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Well, do you know whether or not Mr. Harrison's group is going to appear in favor of or in opposition to this bill? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I do not know. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. With such a vital thing, would it not be possible to get an expression of opinion from them? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, this is a bill affecting the transportation group, and the transportation group are all back of it, the engineers, firemen, conductors and trainmen, the men who were actually doing the work; the men who are actually meeting this condition. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. All of the railroads of this country are subject to the same conditions as expressed in your prepared statement? Mr. FARQUHARSON. How do you mean? Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Does your criticism apply with equal force to all the railroads? Mr. FARQUHARSON.. Well, if you would separate the criticism, I mizht answer. There are 156 railroads. Mr. KENNNEDY of New York. For instance, have any of the rail- roads who on their own motion instituted any safety devices since 1871, or have they all been brought about by the activities of your organization? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Oh, no; I did not say that, Congressman. I said absolutely the contrary to that. I said the railroads had done that, not us. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Well, have the railroads indicated any miterest in the welfare of their employees since 1887? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Oh, yes. The railroads and us are getting along all right. 220 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Have the railroads had a selfish inter- est in operating the roads to reduce the cost of operation? Mr. IARQUHARsON. Now, do you refer to the introduction of this bigger power? Mr. KENNEDY of New York. No, I mean by eliminating all accidents to keep down the cost of accidents to employees. That is one of the big factors in every business organization. Mr. FARQUHARsON. Let me see. I want to answer you correctly, and may I state your question as I understand it? Mr. KENNEDY of New York, Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. You asked whether or not the railroads have done anything to help prevent accidents? Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Yes; to their own employees? Mr. FARQUHARsON. That is quite true. Yes; yes, the railroads have done lots of things, and we hold safety meetings with the rail. roads. We have safety committees in our organization. There is a safety committee elected, and that safety committee meets with the railroad officials, and they suggest changes in hazardous conditions, and so far as I know there is reasonable compliance with those suggestions. Mr. KENNEDY Of New York. Well, is there not generally a spirit of cooperation on the part of the railroads with the employees' or- ganizations for the elimination of all hazards? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I would say that there is; that those safety committees have accomplished a great deal. There are a lot of things about a railroad. Now, let me just explain to you. Someone may become careless about picking up shovels or crowbars or broken mate- rial that is lying between the tracks. We go in and ask that that be done, and of course they do it.- There may be bridges that are not covered, and we ask that they be covered. We may ask that sidewalks be put along a bridge so that we can get along there without being injured, because there are many times in the night when something happens, and you have to grab your red light and fusees, torpedoes, and get back and protect that train, and we have asked that sidewalks be put along the bridge, so that you just do not unload on the side and step off into somebody's gulch. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Has it not been the disposition on the part of the roads, and employees, to eliminate every known or ex- pected hazard? Mr. FARQUHARSON. There has been, I think, a reasonable compli- ance with the requests we have made on them, on many of the unsafe conditions that we have reported to them. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Is it not a fact that many accidents occur that cannot be foreseen and are purely unavoidable? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, yes. I thought I had shown that here in connection with bursted air hose, bursted train line3, or a valve might stick; things that we could not find until the accident occurred. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. That could not be found by an inspec- tion by anyone, regardless of how vigilant the road might be? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Oh, there is where you are wrong. There are defects that can be detected. If the train is not so long that we could not see around it, it could be protected. If it is not so long that we cannot give a signal and not so long that we cannot apply the air TRAIN LENGTHS 221 from the rear of the train without damaging it, if we do not get a signal to the head end, we can stop the train and correct the defect. Why, Congressman, I never burned a journal off in my life while I was running a train; never one. We had shorter trains and you could smell them. You could smell the waste burning. You could tell whether the brake was sticking or whether a wheel was sliding. You do that by the sense of smell, and we caught that, and stopped, and found out what the trouble was. If the brake was sticking or there was a defective triple valve, we cut the car out. That is, we cut out the brakes. There is a cut-out cock under the car and you can bleed the brake cylinder and go along without that brake being operative. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Is it your opinion that with the passage of this bill that all accidents will be completely eliminated? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No. No; you are always going to have acci- dents, but you will eliminate a lot of the accidents. You will elimi- nate a great many. and the public will be just as much the beneficiary in that as we will. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Then, I get from your answers that regardless of the size of the train, we will have accidents until the end of time? Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is true. You would, sir. You would have a lot of them. There is and always will be accidents. But you are not going to have, if we get this bill, an accident from an uncontrolled slack action to the same extent you get it now. We will always have brake wheels that brake of of the brake staff; brake chains that break; brake chains that coil so that you cannot set a brake and have to ride a runaway car down some grade. We will always have wheels that are poorly built, have a flaw in thei, and the flanges will break. We will always have broken rails. We will always have bent switch points. We will always have that. It is bound to go on, but the particular type of accident we are talking about here will be elim- inated. With 70 cars and below they will not be so frequent. And, there will be less slack. Now, can I give you this one example: There is about a foot of slack in every car, and if you have 170 cars, then you have got 170 feet of slack and when the head end stops, and the rear end goes 170 feet, you are going to have a terrible rear-end shock. It is a collision. And, we will prove that to you by Jhe witnesses, and if you have only 70 cars, and 70 feet of slack, you are not going to have as big a shock, because you are not going as far, and another thing, the brakes set quicker, because the brakes will not set as quickly on a 170-car, train as they will on a 70-car train. There is an element of time between the setting of each brake. The engine brake, then the next car, then the next, and the next, and on throughout the train. You throw in less time in there, and you will run in before the head end has stopped so suddenly. Now, I have shown you here that an emergency application on a 60-car train will injure somebody. I have shown you that. But, they are not at all in comparison with the train of over 70 cars, and I do not want you, Congressman, to get the idea we are talking about all kinds of accidents. We are not talking about that at all. We are talking about uncontrolled slack action, because of uneven brake 4789-38 15 222 TRAIN LENGTHS pressure and inability of the brakes to function because of the uneven brake-line pressure and the slack in the long train. Mr. CROSsER. Mr. Chairman. Mr. BULwINKIE. Mr. Crosser. Mr. CROSSER. I desire to ask a question. Am I right in my recollec- tion of Mr. Johnson's testimony, apropos of what Mr. Kennedy has just said to the effect that the 21 organizations of which lie spoke, had endorsed this bill? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. CRoSsER. That is what I thought. Mr. FARQUIHARSON. Now, let me say to you, that this bill was intro- duced by the 21 organizations when it was before your committee the last time, and if they have changed their minds on that, I do not know about it, do you, Mr. Corbett? Mr. ConiEtr. No. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Do you, Mr. Johnson? Mr. JOHNSON. No. Mr. FARQUHARSON. There has been no change in their attitude that I know of. Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. ChairmanI want to askone question. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Wadsworth. Mr. WADSWORTH. How long has the Arizona train-limit law been in effect? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Since 1912. Mr. WADSWORTH. Is there any possible way by which you could inform the committee as to the result in the prevention of slack run accidents as compared with similar mileage and similar tonnage in territory where no such law is in effect? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, I do not know how you would make a comparison. We had that up in the Nevada case, and they compared Nevada with Arizona. There is not as much railroad mileage in Nevada as there is in Arizona, as I remember. Mr. WADSWORTH. The mileage would not be the only factor. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Oh, no. Mr. WADSwoRTH. The number of trains and tonnage moved would, of course, have to be taken into consideration. Mr. FARQUHARSON. This, Congressman, I explained to the com- mittee, that the drawbar was now built to stand 500,000 pounds shock. Now, the strain on the drawbar between the engine and the first car is more than it is on a drawbar a number of cars back. Mr. WADSWORTH. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. That first coupler has got to pull everything back of it. Mr. WADSWORTH. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now then, as I showed you here on the strain on the coupler we had Mr. WADSWORTH. I understand fairly well the trend of your argu- ment, about that. That is the physical condition. Mr. FARQUHARSON. But, when you try to make the comparison of one road with another road, there is the physical characteristics of that road; the type of power they are using; the type of equipment they are using; and everything else. TRAIN LENGTHS 223 Mr. WADSWORTH. Well, in Arizona you have explained to us that the train from California with 140 cars is split. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes; at Yuma. Mr. WADSWORTH. At Yuma. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. Mr. WADswORTH. Have you any information as to what is the result of that with respect to the number of slack run accidents as compared with similar territory? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Then you would want a comparison. Mr. WADSWORTH. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Between California and Arizona? Mr. WADswORTH. I am not sure that California would be the most accurate comparison with Arizona. I do not know. I am asking you, have you in your possession a reasonably accurate comparison between the Arizona experience and that of similar territory, simi- lar mileage and similar tonnage? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, I think I could give you a comparison. I am not going to promise you that I can go back 20 years and get that, because I could not do it; but I think I can make a comparison of about a year between California and Arizona, if you would like that. Mr. WADSWORTH. Anything that is reasonably comparable. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I would like to do that, Congressman. Mr. WADSWORTH. After all, there is a 70-car train limit law in Arizona and it would be interesting to me, and I am quite sure it would to the committee, to ascertain its results. Mr. FARQUHARSON. In Arizona I checked for a year at one time, and I think we had three slack action cases, and as I remember, one of them was a man who went to get on a caboose when the engineer opened the throttle and the slack ran out and he missed the caboose or at least it came to him a little quick and threw him. Another time in pulling in, I believe, to Winslow yards, Winslow, Ariz., the fellow was putting away his lamps and for some reason the engineer had to make an emergency application of the air and threw this fellow down with a lamp in his hand and he was injured. Now, remember that in all of the slack action cases that have hap- pened and been reported in the year 1936, there were 222 passengers hurt and passenger trains have slack action, but the point I want to impress, Congressman, is that there are two kinds of accidents, controllable and uncontrollable. Mr. WADwORTH. Yes; you have outlined that to us. I am look- ing for the experience of Arizona as compared with other territory. Mr. BULWINKLE. Are you through, Mr. Wadsworth? Mr. WADSWORTH. Yes. Mr. BULwINKLE. It is now 12 o'clock. Mr. WITHROW. I would like to ask a question with regard to the Arizona law. I will only take a minute. Mr. BULWINKLE. Very well. Mr. WITHRow. Normally in the State of Arizona, due to its being so mountainous, you would have more trouble with slack action than you would normally in a State that was not as mountainous? Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is true. On the division I worked on-I can just give you this example-on the division I worked on, we will say, from Hachita to Douglas, crossed at the border of Arizona and 224 TRAIN LENGTHS New Mexico. Westbound we left Hachita and had 2 miles down hill, 5 miles up, 13 down, 5 up, just running over the foothills, as we approached the continental divide all of the way through, and, when I have had an opportunity to explain the slack action in a rolling country, I think that you will find that there is more to this than brake action alone. It does not all depend upon brakes, Congressman. Mr. BULWINKLE. All right. The committee will stand adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock with Mr. Farquharson on the stand. (Thereupon, at 12:05 p. m., the committee adjourned until 10 a. m., the following morning, Thursday, January 20, 1938.) TRAIN LENGTHS THURSDAY, JANUARY 20, 1938 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE oN INTERsTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Washington, P. 0. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence F. Lea (chairman) presiding. TuE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order. Mr. Farquharson, you may proceed. STATEMENT OF J. A. FARQUHARSON, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, EDITOR AND MANAGER OF THE RAILROAD TRAINMEN, BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, WASH. INGTON, D. C.-Resumed Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, yesterday I noticed .that after I had referred to the tests that were made in Oregon by the Association of American Railroads, and in con- junction with the Interstate Commerce Commission, that I did not go as fully into the results as I should have, and I have, very briefly, covered them here, and it can be found of record in the reports of the association when they reported on all of the facts after those tests. However, at that time I did read into the record the statement of Mr. C. C. Farmer, who testified, or stated that before the tests were started, they knew the brakes would not function. Now, at that time, I gave you, yesterday, photographs of the wrecks and explained that there were no defects in that tram; that they were the result of the application of'"the air. It was not a broken axle or bursted air hose or broken truck or pulled out drawbar. It was the result of the application of air, and I would like to just continue for a moment and give you my analysis of the results of those tests. Mr. MARTIN., Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. Before you start, have there been any tests made to show how much time elapsed between the application of the air in a 150-car train before it affects the way car? Mr. FARQUIARSCN. There has, Mr. Congressman, and it is in this report, and it is in the report of the Senate Committee, Senate Com- merce Committee, when they reported out their bill. There was a lapse of more than a minute on some between the set- ting of the first brake and the rear brake setting. It ran usually, if my 225 226 TRAIN LEiNGTHS memory serves me right--and I want the right to correct this state- ment if it is wrong--I think it was about 38 seconds of time between the setting of the first brake and the setting of the brakes on the rear of the train. So that gave the train a half a minute to freewheel, if I may express it that way into the head end of the train. Now, the tests, generally speaking, were typical of ordinary op- erating conditions. The first test was made with a train of 50 cars, and there was no trouble. The train was not broken in two, nor was there any severe shock from the slack run-in or slack run-out. There is possibly more than a foot of slack in the average car, and the longer this train, of course, the greater amount of slack and the greater the shock or lurch will be on the end of the slack. After the tests on 50 cars were completed, tests were taken on trains of 100 cars, and then the trouble began. There were severe slack rn-ins and run-outs; the trains frequently broke in two, and numbers of cars were bad-ordered. Then the number of cars on the train was increased to 150, and the results of these tests were still more severe and costly, and greater damage was done than on the 100-car trains. The instruments on the dynamometer car were capable of regis- tering a shock of 1,750,000 pounds, and many times the needle was unable to register the amount of the run-in as it was carried off of the recording chart; how much more it was we do not know, but it was great enough, as you will see from the photographs, to throw the cars, not inside the right-of-way, but outside the right-of-way, and nearly up to the pavement of the highway that parallels that rail- road. At the hearing before this committee, when the bill was up the last time in the Seventy-third Congress, we had a witness, a member of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, employed as a brakeman and conductor on the Southern Pacific out of Eugene, Greg., and he rode those trains for a time as an observer for the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and part of the time he worked on the train as a brakeman. He testified regarding six tests. From an attempted speed of 30 miles per hour, there were six bad-ordered cars in the stop. The next 35 miles per hour, with a stopping distance of 2,754 feet, with 10 bad-ordered cars. The next at equal speed, with a stopping dis- tance of 2,499 feet, with 12 bad-ordered cars. The next at 30 miles, stopping distance of 2,243 feet, 13 bad-ordered cars; the next at 30 miles, with a stopping distance of 2,275 feet, with 11 bad-ordered cars; and at 29.5 miles per hour, stopping distance 1,975 feet, with 9 bad-ordered cars, which will give you some idea of the tests on the 150-car train. There were also derailments in the 100-car trains, and frequently it showed that on the longer trains the brakes did not set behind the fiftieth car, and frequently at other times the brakes on 30 cars would set, but would not set on the next 30 cars, and then would set on the next 30 cars, which proved that it was not possible to keep an even brake pressure in the train line in a mile and a half of cars. It cannot be done, because that pipe is only about an inch and a half in diameter on the inside. TRAIN LENGTHS 227. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Farquharson, I did not hear the testimony yesterday in reference to this subject. Who conducted this experi- hient? Mr. FARQUHARsON. The tests were conducted by the American Rail- ]( )ad Association, together with the Interstate Commerce Commission. The mechanical division of the American Railroad Association was placed in charge of it and the Bureau of Safety of the Interstate Commerce Commission represented the Commission. For your information, Mr. Chairman, the tests began on August 1, 1929, and they were continued until the 31st of March 1931, and they began testing the devices that they were using, on the racks, at Purdue University, on November 30, 1926, and they continued until January 24, 1929. Now, there is 3 years and 2 months, that they conducted these tests of these devices before they moved them out on the road and equipped the cars and began to make practical road serv- ice tests. The CHAIRMAN. Since that time, have there been any changes or improvements made with a view of obviating the trouble demon- strated by those tests? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Since that time there has been put into use on some cars what they call an AB brake, and it is supposed to be an improvement over these others, and our witnesses who will follow will show that it does not function. The same slack action is coming in. The same injuries are being suffered by our men on the rear end of the trains. The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to interfere with your course of thought, Mr. Farquharson. Yesterday, you expressed a desire to proceed without interruption. Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is right. The CHAIRMAN. Have you completed your first statement now, or do you want to proceed further with that without questions? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I would like to just complete a little further statement on here. I have introduced the photographs, as I have just explained but at the hearing before, we were fortunate enough, before the Senate Committee, to have with us a representative of the Interstate Com- merce Commission, who was assigned by the Commission to ride those trains, and who helped compile the reports submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission, and he testified that the point of safety, in his opinion, for the air brake to function was between 50 and 100 cars-some place between 50 and 100 cars. Yesterday we introduced a compilation of accidents. There were 530 of them, and we did not break them down as we have broken down these 1,407 that we gave to you. Mr. BTUhWINKLE. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Farquharson, I was not here when you started your testimony. I regret that I could not leave the office. I want to ask a few questions before we start into these claims. You had, I think, 1,407 claims. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. BULWINKLf. What was the total of the cases that your organ- ization had of injuries to employees? Mr. FARQUHARSON. You mean 228 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. BULwInKz. For the same length of time? We have the summary of accidents reports, total number of ac- cidents in this compilation, 530. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. BULWINKLE. That is yours? Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is what I am starting now. Mr. BULWINKLE. All right. Now, what was the total number of accident reports to your organization during the period of time in this, during the period of time covered by this report? Mr. FARQUHARSON. There was possibly in the office at that time over 700, and they had been sent in to me by the general chairmen and by the local lodge offices, and from those I drew off these 530 in an effort to show as clearly as I could what I believed to be the true picture of slack action. Mr. BULwINKLE. All right. I am going to try to hurry this ip. Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is all right. Mr. BULwINKLE. I do not want to ask too many questions. I will just ask them briefly. Did the 700 claims in your office, did that constitute all of the claims in this period of time? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Oh, no, no. Mr. BUWINKLE. Well, how many did you have? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, all of the claims are not recorded in my office. Mr. BULWINKLE. I am talking about the claims that were reported to your office. Where did you get them from? Mr. FARQUIIARSON. I got those from letters and reports that my men sent to me of accidents. that they were in. Mr. BULWTNKLE. Well, did you get any other reports from em- ployees of the railroads that were sent to you that are not included in this? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. As I say, there were quite a number in there that caine in that we did not put in that compilation. Mr. BULwINKLE. Those just constitute the 700 reports you re- ceived. This is just those reports of accidents on trains of 70 cars or more in length? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. I do not know as I understand your ques- tion. You mean, did the 700 that were sent to me all cover trains of 70 cars or more? Mr. BULwINKLE. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. No. I think you will find in that report, as I remember; you will find an accident on the L. & N. Railroad-I cannot place my finger on it Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Farquharson, all I have to go by is what is contained in this report. You say accidents to trains of 70 cars or more? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. Mr. BULwINKL. That is the heading of it. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now, I think I can answer your question. Mr. BULwINxaE. All right, sir. Mr. FARQUHARSON. And a question that Mr. Wolverton asked of me. I could go back to the same source and from the Interstate Com- merce Commission reports on table No. 80 in Code Nos. 7007, 7008, TRAIN LENGTHS 229 7009, and 7010. and show you what the Interstate Commerce Com- mission reported as the number that were injured in slack actions. Mr. BUILwINKLE. Well, let us come back to your 700. Was that all of the reports that were furnished you from the train crews? Mr. FARQUIARSON. From my men? Mr. BULwINKLE. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARsoN. Yes, sir; and all of my men injured did not send reports in. Mr. BULwINKLE. All of your men did not send them in? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No. Mr. BULwINKLE. Well, lid you get any reports of accidents where the trains were of less than 70 cars? Mr. FARQUARsON. I have worked that out, and I think I can prove that conclusively to you in the 1,407 cases, and we might as well do that now as at any time, and clear it up. And, I think this will answer your question, Mr. Wolverton, at the same time. Now, in table No. 80, of the Interstate Commerce Connnission's Accident Bulletin for the year 1936, which will be found on page 55- and I am sorry; I have not got enough to give you each a copy, but we can give it to the reporter and lie can record it-there are listed certain accidents under code numbers. The first is 7007; the next 7008; the next'7009 and 7010. Mr. BULwINKLE. All right. Let me ask you just this question-I am a little confused about this: You were keeping track of the accidents, and have been doing it from your own reports, have you not? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I have been keeping track, Congressman, of the reports that were sent in to me by my men who were injured. Mr. BULwiNKLE. Well, I am asking you how many were injured on trains of less than 70 cars? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, I am trying to answer you. Mr. BULwINKLE. Well, I just (lid not want you to take it from the Interstate Commerce Comission's Reports. I am not asking you to do that. I am asking you from your reports. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Congressman, I do not know how I would go about getting that, because there are ordinarily about 300,000 of those accidents every year on the railroads of the United States, and the railroads reported in their manner, in their way, on the prescribed forms laid down by the Commission, to the Commission, and that is the only place in the world that they are available that I know of. There would be no other way I possibly could get them. Mr. BULwINKLE. You received only a few of that 30,000? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Just a very few, sir; just from the men who were injured and who knew that we were trying to compile this, and they sent them in. Some were interested; some sent them in very promptly. Others were somewhat indifferent, possibly did not know about it. Mr. BULwINKLE. All right, sir ; you may proceed. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now, Mr. Wolverton, and Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee: I am sorry Mr. Boren is not here, because he asked about the same question. On 7007, they classify it this way: "Sudden stopping, starting, birch, or jerk of locomotive, car or train, not otherwise provided for.' 230 TRAIN LENGTHS 7008, "Sudden application of brakes, improper handling of air.' 7009, "sudden application of brakes, air hose bursting, parting, or otherwise defective." 7010, "sudden application of brakes, or otherwise defective air- brake equipment." Mr. BULWINKLE. Let us get that 7009. How many accidents dlid they say were caused from that. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I think I can tell you. Thirty-one. Mr. BULwINKLE. For what period of time was that? Mr. FARQUHARSON. In 1930. Mr. BULWINKLE. That constituted all trains of all lengths? Mr. FARQUHARSON. And that constituted, Congressman, the nuin- her of accident reports I assume that were sent in to the Interstate Commerce Commission when the company alleged that to be the cause-the emegency application of the air-because the Conunis- sion would draw off on the information only from the reports of the company. Mr. BULWINKLE. Well, do the railroads make those reports. are they required to send the reports to the Interstate Commerce Coin- mission? Mr. FARQUIHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. BULWINKLE. They comply with it? Mr. FARQUHARSON. So far as I know; yes, sir; and they are sup- posed to send in those reports within 30 days from the close of the month in which the accident occurred. Now, they may be a little late at times, but so far as I know, they are making the reports. Mr. BULwINKLE. That's all. Mr. FARQUHARSON. However, I want to say that I am going to read into the record a statement by the Interstate Commerce Com- mission that there was a policy on the railroads to pay the men for the time lost so as not to report an injury. Mr. BULWINKLE. Is that frequent? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No; I would not say it was general, but I will read you the Commission's own conclusion on it. Mr. BULWINKLE. All right; just a minute before you do that; as to the number of these injuries, does that show the number of acci- dents in there? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No. Mr. BULwINKLE.. For instance, there might be two men injured in one accident. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, the tabulation starts out with the total number of persons killed or injured, and then it goes on, employees on duty in yard service, total killed or injured. Engineers and motormen; firemen and helpers; condnctors aid foremen and brakemen and helpers. Now, this yard service is switching in the terminals, and then, the hostlers. A hostler is an engineman who handles the engine in and about the roundhouses after the engineer delivers his engine to the pit track; then the hostler takes charge of it while they clean the fire, re-coal and fill with water and put it in over the turntable, in a stall in the roundhouse. That is the hostler. Then it goes over to road freight service, and that is what we ar" talking about in this case, and shows the number of engineers and1 TRAIN LENGTHS 231 inotormen injured; firemen and helpers; conductors and brakemen; and then it goes into the passenger service, and then it goes over to all other employees, and the employees not on duty; passengers in- jured; travelers not on trains and other nontrespassers, and then trespassers. That is the way they have broken it down. Now, in this report we find that under those four code numbers Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kenney. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. Mr. Farquharson, before you go on with that, may I ask if anywhere in the summary there is an analysis showing the actual number of accidents? Mr. FARQUHARSON. You mean in all sorts of accidents? Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. No; under that code number, 7007. Mr. FARQUHARSON. No, sir. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. For instance, there is nothing here to tell us at all how many actual accidents there were which resulted in injuries to the number of people that are stated here. Mr. FARQUHARSON. No; that is not broken down. Mr. BULWINKLE. Will you pardon me there, for a minute? Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. Yes; I have finished. Mr. BULWINKLE. Have you finished? Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. Yes. Mr. BULWINKLE. That is the reason I wanted to get this down to somie issues, as we say. The other day I asked Mr. Corbett, I think it was, the number of accidents or injuries to the crew caused by the operation of trains consisting of 70 cars or more. I want the total for the years 1936. 1935, and 1937, if we can get it, and aso 1934. That was one question. There is bound to be, according to Mr. Corbett's testimony, the other day, a starting point as to these injuries, in four classifications. One. as to crews in the freight trains themselves; one, as to any acci- dents or wrecks caused to other freight trains, and injuries to the crews on those. The other, the third question, was as to the passenger trains, wrecked passenger trains which were caused by wreckage of a train having more than 70 cars. The fourth was as to highway grade crossings. Now, have you got that broken down to show, so that we can tell during these years the total number of accidents caused by this? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I do not have for those years. Mr. BULwINKLE. Do you know where I could procure it? Mr. FARQUHARSON. It can be procured from the Interstate Com- merce Commission, except now, that the Commission has not broken down the accidents between long trains and short trains. They just show an accident of the type that it may be, regardless of how long or how short the train may have been. Mr. BrLwNKTLE. I realize that. That is the reason I am calling this to your attention on this item. I want to know, for one, as a. member of this committee, if trains consisting of 70 cars and more caused these accidents that happened, and how many of them there were: and how many were caused from trains of less than 70 cars, So that I can get the direct information. 232 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, I think I can answer you for the year 1936. Mr. BnLwINKLE. All right, sir; let us try it. Mr. FARQUHARSON. All right. And I feel quite positive that I can aswer you right down to the accident. Mr. BULwINKLE. I wish you would. Mr. FARQUHARSON. When you add up those columns of conductors injured in road freight service that we are talking about on this case, you will find that in the year 1936 there were 261 of them, and there was one killed, and that is on all trains, due to slack action. Mr. BULAVINKLE. All lengths? Mr. FARQUHARSON. All lengths, absolutely; and then in the brake.- men killed and injured, you will find two brakemen killed and 410 injured. Now, that makes a total of 674. Now then, in the reports that I have given you in the recapitulation there, you will find that there were 374 conductors and trainmen in- jured on long trains in the year 1936. Now then, subtracting that from 674, you will find that there were 300 injured on trains of less than 70 cars, and 374 injured on trains of 70 or more cars, and then if they run 25 percent of their trains of over 70 cars, and 75 percent are under 70 cars, then there was a ratio of four men to one hurt on the long trains, and there is the record from the Commission. Mr. BULwINKLE. Well, that may be correct and it may not. That is what is bothering me. For instance, on your chart entitled "Num- ber of persons injured according to trains lengths" you show, on trains of 100 to 105 cars there were 9.conductors and 20 brakemen hurt. But on trains from 70 to 75 there were 26 conductors hurt and 40 brakemen hurt. Now, we would have to break it further down as to the number of trains on any particular road so that we could get at it. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I do not know how you could do that. Mr. BULwINKLE. Well, I want to know. Mr. FARQUHARSON. If I knew-how to do it, and it could be done, I would not hesitate to do it; but I do not know how to do that, and I do not think there are any reports to the Interstate Commerce Commission from which any such a break-down could be made. Mr. BULWINKLE. Now, when his chart-comes to me, Mr. Farquhar- son, when you say as to the length of trains, here is one classification, 126 to 130 cars. There were 10 conductors and 8 brakemen injured, and in the classification of 170 cars to 174 cars, there was one conductor and one brakeman injured. I take it for granted there must be more trains of 130 to 135 cars in length than there are 170, being run. What I was going to do was find out about that. Mr. FARQUHARSON. What I was going to do, Congressman, I was going to start in on the list of 530 accidents, and then go on to the 1,407 and give you the break-down, and of course we have jumped from the 530 now into the last one, but if you will permit me to go on through and follow this thing, I think I can answer you. I will agree with you though, before we lekve here, that there are more trains of 70 cars run and more trains of less than 70 cars than TRAIN LENGTHS 233 there are trains of 130 or 190, as shown in there; by and large, all over the country. Mr. BULWINKLE. Just before wet get off that. Have the railroads issued any instructions, or has any railroad issued any instructions as to the length of trains on their system? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Not that I know of. Mr. BuLwINKL. None at all? Mr. FARQUHARSON. None that I know of. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Farquharson, I appreciate the difficulty of getting statistics that fit all of these various questions that the mem- bers of the committee may ask. I am wondering what would be a fair basis of comparison as applied to this bill as to trains of over 70 cars, and trains under 70. Would it be a fair basis, for instance, to compare the number of acci- dents that are involved in moving say 2,000 000 tons of freight 100 miles by the one type of train as compared with the other? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No. The CHAIRMAN. Why would not that be a fair basis? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, let us just consider it this way : You may have four trains and they may run over 150 miles of track, but of COUrse if you go on the ton-mile basis, you would take the weight of those trains and multiply them by the miles, and that would be your ton-mile basis. But, in the same terminal, I may have 20 crews that do not make 10 miles a day. They may go out and switch an industry with all of the danger while switching, that you stumble and fall under a car, or something of that sort, and I doubt if it could be broken down, because you are talking about ton-mileage, and you have got a lot of short local runs, and a lot of long through freight runs, and I do not know how you would break it down. What we are talking about here, all that we have to show this committee is that on these trains of over 70 cars, when the air went into emergency, these men that we report as killed, were killed, and these we have reported as injured, were injured, and I may say to you that about one-third of them-and I am sure that my analysis of it is right-suffered fractures of the vertebrae of their back, and if they get over that in their lifetime-well I would like to see one that did. They most always get injuries to their backs, either to the cervical, the dorsal, ur the lumbar vertebrae. That is where the fractures frequently occur, but numbers of them were injured by having their backs bruised. The CHAIRMAN. I take it that the percentage of hazard would be much higher in switching and short trains than on long routes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. In certain types of accidents. Now, I do not want to bore the committee, but I think I have got something here. Here is all of the accidents that happened as reported to the Interstate Commerce Commission by the Southern Pacific Sys- tem for the year 1934, and I am sorry Mr. Wadsworth is not here, because he asked a question that I think I can answer from this report. But, let me show you the type of accidents that they reported. The first case is a train of three cars. It hit an automobile. Here is a train of 65 cars and an emergency application of the air slammed a door on the brakeman's hand as he was walking out of the caboose. 234 TRAIN LENGTHS Here is one of three cars. The brakeman was uncoupling the air hose and the air pressure threw it around and struck him, injuring him. He lost some time. Here is one of 12 cars, where sand blew in the brakeman's eye, be- cause we burn oil as our fuel out there, and the oil clogs up the flues and ever so often the fireman sands the flues. He uses a scoop about the size of the old-fashioned groceryman's tea scoop, fills that with sand and holds it against the firebox door and the air and draft pull that through the flues and cuts the soot, out of the flues. The next one was a fireman. He was taking water, filling the engine tank, and he slipped and fell to the ground. They had 43 cars in that train. , Here is one with one car. The brakemaii was releasing a hand brake and it stuck. He was releasing it with a club, which is a pick-handle which you put in through the wheel to give you greater leverage, and that club shpped and flew around.-and hit him. And then there comes one with six cars, with a man getting off, and lie fell from the step. Another one with four cars, the same thing. Another one with 2 cars, and one with 78 cars, a trainman getting onto the train, and his foot slipped and lie fell. Another one with 33. A trainman getting off the train, and be slipped. The next one is a good one. Here is a train with six cars and the conductor was out on the highway flagging the crossing, and an automobile ran over him. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. Outside of that, were these others serious accidents? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No. That is the type of accident. That is the point I am trying to make here, that there are so many types of accidents, when you go to talk about the gross overall, but we are not talking about them. We cannot prevent all of those. We are speaking about slack action, accidents that occur on trains of T0 cars or over and there were 494 of those cases reported by the South- ern Pacific for the year 1934. So that the great majority of accidents that happen on trains are not slack action. They are, as I have stated here, such accidents as where an automobile runs into a train, or you hit an automobile, or a man is unloading freight and a box drops on his feet ; uncoupling air hose and the air pressure is so great the hose is knocked out of his hands and flies around and hits him; or a brake chain breaks, or a brake chain jams in the socket and the car runs away with him, or lie stumps his toe on a nail in the running board and falls to the ground. Now, I do not want to bore the committee; but that is the type of accident that is greatest on the railroad. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman-- Mr. CRossR (presiding). Mr. Martin. Mr. MART1W. In the early part of your testimony this morning, you spoke about a series of tests runnig over a period, I think, of some 3 years, conducted by the American Railroad Association and the Interstate Commerce Commission; tests on long trains. Mr. FARQUHARsON. Yes. TRAIN LENGTHS 235 Mr. MARTIN. In which, as I recollect, you said that the tests showed progressive increases in accidents with the progressive length of the tram. Was that correct? Mr. FARQUHARSON. In damage. Mr. MARTIN. In damage. Mr. FARQUHARsoN. That is right. Mr. MARTIN. What was the origin of this series of tests? Who caused the tests to be made? Mr. FARQUH ARSON. I covered that yesterday in my statement. Mr. MARTIN. Pardon me. I do not want you to go back over that. I could not be here. I had a bill for hearing before another commit- tee. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I will just give a brief statement on that. The Interstate Commerce Commission on its own accord, because of these accidents, because of the failure of brakes to function on long trains, ordered that this be done and said that there must be an improvement made. Mr. MARTIN. All right. That will be enough on that, if you cov- ered it yesterday. You said this morning that, or you mentioned the result of those tests, improvements, or attempted improvements, in the air-brake system. Did anything else result from it? Were there any findings made by the Commission? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No; the Commission did not make a definite finding on it, Mr. Congressman; but the air-brake people immediately set out to build a brake they thought an improvement. The admitted in their report that before these tests started they knew the present brakes would not function and that they would have to make a change to do it. That is all in the statement of yesterday. Now, Mr. Bulwinkle, you asked me a question and while it is before me I would like to answer it. In the testimony offered at one of the Senate hearings we had a witness, Mr. Anderson, who testified that it was quite prevalent on his railroad for the company to pay the men for the time lost rather than report the injury, and I would like to introduce his testimony as a. part of my statement. But, you will find in that that a man with a broken leg was wheeled down to the caboose and put on the caboose on a work train, and the conductor did the braking, and they never reported the man injured. And, another man was jerked from he top of a car who suffered -broken ankles, and with both ankles fractured he was wheeled down to the yard office and answered the telephone and drew his pay and that accident was not reported. If you get Anderson's testimony, you, will see that. And, the Interstate Commerce Commission said with regard to accidents-this is the accident bulletin of 1934, No. 103. Those hear- mgs were on in that year. The accident. recording rules require that injury to employees where the employee is incapacitated to perform ordinary duties for more than 3 days Within 10 days following an accident mst be included in the reports to the Interstate Commerce Commission. These minor injuries are not reportable. To make a good record for the railroad there is a tendency to make a special effort to get the injured person back to work within 3 days if possible, and this fact has undoubtedly tended to reduce the number of employee-injuries reported more rapidly than the actual accident frequency rates have fallen. 236 TRAIN LENGTHS That is their statement, the statement of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1934. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman Mr. CRoSSER. Mr. Kenney. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. Mr. Farquharson, referring to acci- dent bulletin No. 105. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. Page 54, and code No. 7007, "Sudden stopping, starting, lerch, or jerk of locomotive, car, or train, not elsewhere provided for," the number of injuries given there is 1,297. Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is true. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. Are you able to state how many of that number suffered from fractured vertebrae, broken legs, or other serious injuries? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No; but if you will turn back in the report here to the beginning-you will find out what they said; but on what I reported to you on the 1,407 accidents, it is there just as the railroads reported them. I did not change any of it. That is as they reported it. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. Chairman Mr. CROSSER. Mr. Kennedy. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. Farquharson, as to that testimony you just referred to before the Senate committee, would you mind telling me the name of the witness that gave the testimony about the broken leg? Mr. FARQUHARSON. That was Anderson, general chairman of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen on the Atlantic Coast Line Rail- road, Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Was that statement conceded at the hearings by the other side, or was there some question raised? Mr. FARQUHARSON. It was not denied. It was put in as evidence and there was no denial made of it. Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Chairman Mr. CROSSER. Have you finished, Mr. Kennedy? Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Yes. Mr. WoLvERTON. Mr. Farquharson Mr. FARQUHARsON. I was going to try to answer Mr. Kennedy. Mr. CROSSER. Mr. Kennedy says you have answered him. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I will get that and show you the number of bruises and fractures. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. What is that on? Mr. FARQUHARSON. On the question you just asked. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. In accident bulletin No. 105? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. I will have to pass that for the time being, but if you are willing to pass, I can dig it up and give it to you. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. If you will call my attention to it. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I will be glad to do that. Mr. CROssER. Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Farquharson, I am somewhat interested in the inquiries made yesterday by Senator Wadsworth with respect to the Arizona law. I think it is apparent that the committee has been en- deavoring to get information which is on a comparative basis would show the probability of increased accidents as a result of increasing TRAIN LENGTHS 237 the number of trains. As I understood you yesterday in answer to Senator Wadsworth's question, you said that the Arizona law had been in effect since 1912. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. WOLVERTON. Is that right? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. I think it is 1912. I may be wrong by a year. maybe off a year. Mr. WOLvERTON. Are statistics kept by any agency, State or Federal, as to the number and character of railroad train accidents in the State of Arizona with particular reference to the cause of the acci- dent and the length of the train? Mr. FARQUHARSON. The railroads, running through Arizona are the Southern Pacific and Santa Fe Railroad, and they, of course, run as you know, through various States, and they make reports to the Interstate Commerce Commission, and I have that for a year, and I will be glad to give it to you. Mr. WoLvmErToN. Could you give it at this point? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes; I will give it to you. Now, in the State of California-you want this slack action; is that what you want; is that what you asked me for? Mr. WOLVERTON. Well, the thought I have in mind, Mr. Farquhar- son, is this, that if a law of the character you are asking this Congress to enact has already been in existence in a State for 25 years, it would seem to m that would make available information that would be help- ful to this committee in determining the advantages that might be gained by legislation of this character. Now, I have no objection to your illustrating your point by slack action. bursting air hose, or emergency application of brakes or any other of the different elements that have been referred to in these hearings. All I am asking is that it be complete enough to give a true and full picture to the committee as to the effect of the law which was enacted in Arizona in 1912. Mr. FARQUHARSON. All right. I am answering you on the year 1934, that I have had worked up. I think I can answer your question also, Mr. Wadsworth. You yesterday made the statement that the train came in from California to Yuma with 140 cars. Mr. WADSWORTH. I used that as an illustration. Mr. FAR&UHARsON. As an illustration and went out of Yuma east, with 70 cars. So there would be more trains run in Arizona than there would be in California if they ar4 running out of there two to one, would there not? Now, in the State of California-and this mileage may not be just equal--but there were 28 slack accidents in that year, and in Arizona there was 1, and this is the kind of slack action it was: The man was getting on the train and while he was running and in the air with his hands like this (indicating) and his foot like this, to catch the stirrup, the slack ran out and he missed the stirrup and fell. Now, that is the Arizona case. And, there were 28 of them in California, where they ran trains over 70 cars in length, and this is compiled by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Mt.WADswoRTH. How many railroads are there in California? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Four: the Southern Pacific, the Union Pacific, the Santa Fe and the Western Pacific. 47891-38---16 238 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. KENNEY. Twenty-eight accidents? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No; on the Southern Pacific alone. This is the Southern Pacific in California, and the Southern Pacific in Arizona. Mr. KENNEY. You are talking about the 28 accidents on the Southern Pacific. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. WOLVERTON. Is that comparison based on the same number of train-miles? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Oh, no. Mr. WOLVERTON. It seems to me that if we are to get a true comparison- Mr. FARQUHARSON (interposing). There would be more. Mr. WOLVERTON (continuing). We must make it on the basis of the same number of train-miles rather than to say that in the State of California, which is much larger, and naturally has the greater num- ber of trains, and probably more accidents there because of that fact than in Arizona. It would be like saying that there were more ac- cidents in the State of New York than in the State of Delaware. It should be based on number of train-miles, and not merely the number of accidents in a particular State as compared with another State. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Wolverton, I do not want to make a state- ment that may be confusing to you, and I do not want you to draw any wrong conclusion from any statement that I made. We are talking about slack action, and that is the case before us now, and I have shown you that there was 1 in Arizona where they do not pull over 70 cars in a train, in the year 1934, on the Southern Pacific Railroad, and there were 28 in California, where they pull more than that number; where they pull as high as 150 in the San Joaquin Valley or the Imperial Valley or on the coast division in parts. Mr. WOLVERTON. You see, that makes it very important to see how much greater traffic was in the State of California than in Arizona. You cannot just take the total number and compare the two States. It would seem to me a better comparison, if you would base it on the number of train miles in the two States. Mr. FARQUHARSON. As I told you about train-miles, I will take you right over into the Imperial Valley, which we are talking about, the Southern Pacific, and during the fruit season we will have maybe 25 or 30 pick-up crews picking up melons in the valley at the packing houses where they are chilled, packed, and loaded in the trains, and. the hauling train pulls them out through Careto, or through Nyland into Yuma, and I have heard of, on the Southern Pacific, 27 pick-up crews and 7 hauling crews, and so the fellow that is on the pick-up job does not ever get 150 cars. He goes to those packing houses and switches them, places the empties for loading and picks up the loads and set them first out so that the other fellow can pick them up and go, because we move that stuff fast. So, when you go on train miles you have got 27 crews possibly working in an area of 30 miles, and you have got 7 crews working 120 miles, and I think that is about the mileage from the valley into Yuma. That is not it. I am wrong. It is, I believe, 139 from Indio to Yuma, but in the valley the switching work in a radius possibly of 30 miles in the Imperial Valley. TRAIN LENGTHS 239 Mr. WOLVERTON. Well, Mr. Farquharson, you can see that the greater number of trains that are run and the more train mileage there is, the greater the possibility of accidents. Now, unless the number of train-miles traveled in California was identical with that which was traveled in Arizona, it seems to me that your illustration would need something further to make a proper comparison. Mr. FAItQUHARSON. Well, I do not know how I can make it clearer. It is clear in my mind. It is clear in my mind, from the statistics. It is clear in my mind from the fact that I worked in Arizona. Mr. WOLVERTN. How many train-miles were traveled in Arizona that resulted in only one accident? Mr. FARQUTHARSON. That is the freight-train mileage in Arizona Oh, I could not tell you. Mr. WOLVERTON. How many train-miles were traveled in Arizona? Was it greater or less than in California? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, I do not know about that. I want to be very clear. Mr. WoLVERTON. This fact seems to me very important in deter- mining the value of the comparison that you have made. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Could I answer you? You asked me a ques- tion, and I would like to answer you there. Mr. WOLVERTON.. Certainly. Mr. FARQUHARSON. One of the biggest runs we have out there in the season is out of the Imperial Valley and the haul from there in Cali- fornia would be approximately 125 miles to the Arizona line. And, if I had a railroad timetable I could tell how far it is across Arizona. But here are the freight divisions. They run from Yuma to Phoenix or Yuma to Gila Bend on the Southern line and from Phoenix and Gila Bend into Tucson, and Tucson to Douglas. So, there are three freight divisions across there. Now, the fourth division goes over into New Mexico, and it is 164 miles from Tucson to Lordsburg in New Mexico;.that is just a few miles inside the Arizona-New Mexico line. So, in getting to your question, we would have to break it down, as I See it, to give you the true picture into the number of miles that particular tram ran in California and the number of miles it ran in Arizona, and as I have said to you now, the biggest business that we have got on the Southern Line out of the Imperial Valley, because there are two lines in California, one from Los Angeles out to Arizona, and one from San Francisco across Nevada, of the east and west lines, and the greatest business we have to haul out of ImperiarTalley Calif., is about 100 miles to the Arizona line, and I think there would be a greater mileage on those trains in Arizona than there is in Cali- forma. Now, what would have to be done, Mr. Congressman, to do what you have asked us to do, would be to take the Southern Pacific train sheets for the year and take every train moved by that company on those divisions, and all of the train sheets in the State of Arizona on the Southern Pacific, and break them down. And, I want to be sure about this. I think that the train sheets are for 24 hours, a 24- hour movement. . Mr. MASON. On the Southern Pacific hours are from midnight to idnight. 240 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. FARQUHARSON. All right, then. There is one train sheet on each dispatcher's desk, is there not, for each 24 hours? Mr. MAsoN. That is right. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now, that is what you would have to do. Mr. WOLVERTON. Either I have not made myself plain to you, be- cause of my lack of knowledge of railroading or you have not been able to make yourself plain to me. But, the fact remains that the more train-miles a train runs, or the greater the number of trains operated, the more likelihood there is of accident, because in each instance the accidents you refer to occur as the result of operating traims. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. WOLVERTON. And, therefore, when you draw a conclusion in one State where there was one casualty and in another State there were 28 casualties, it does not seem to me that comparison means any- thing unless we can have alongside of it the number of train-miles that were traveled in the respective States. In other words we should have the number of train-miles traveled in the State where 1 acci- dent occurred and on the other hand the number of train-miles that were traveled in the State where there were 28 accidents. If the same number of miles were traveled in each State and 1 accident happened in Arizona and 28 in California, that would be a comparison that would be helpful; but unless the two States are exactly on the same basis, it is improper to say that one shows a more favor- able condition than the other. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Or disproves it. Mr. WoLvERToN. Or disproves it. Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is correct. Mr. WOLVERTON. That is the reason I am asking for the information with respect to the number of train-miles traveled in each State you have used in your comparison. Now, may I ask a further question in that respect? How many accidents happened in Arizona, if any, of the kind you have just used as an illustration on trains of less than 70 cars as compared Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, I think I can get that very quickly. Mr. WOLvERTON. As compared, we will say with Colorado. .Mr. FARQUHARSON. Oh, now, I cannot tell you that. There are 48 States here, and 74 railroads, Mr. Wolverton, and I cannot give you that. Mr. WoLvERTON. You used California as an illustration. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Because Mr. Wadsworth asked that question. Mr. WoLvERTON. Yes. Would the same comparison hold true as between Arizona and Colorado? I have mentioned Colorado because it would seem to me that there is somewhat the same character of territory. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Oh, no; no, no. Mr. WOLVERTON. Well, I gathered from what you said yester- day Mr. FARQUHARSON (interposing). Now, pardon me. Let me just tell you that the biggest hills in this country and the steepest grades, outside of Siskiyou Mountains in California, are in Colorado, and I worked out there over an altitude of 10,854 feet, and on a better than 4 percent grade, and had the joy of being in a runaway and TRAIN LENGTHS 241 having 13 cars jump over the top of me on the 29th of September 1904. It is a different topography altogether. Mr. WOLVERTON. Then accidents of the character you describe would be more likely to occur in Colorado than in Arizona? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No, sir; no, sir. Mr. WoLvERToN. Would they be less likely to occur ? Mr. FARQUHARSON. there are quite a number in Colorado. Mr. WOLvERTON. I say, would they be less likely to occur? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I am going to answer you this way; as I honestly believe it, it makes no diference whether a train of 170 cars broke in two, killed a man in New York, Colorado, in New Mexico or in Old Mexico, if he was killed because of the slack action in a train of 170 cars, and it, would not make any difference in what State lie was killed. This train that lie might le killed on might originate in the State of New York and the accident might not occur until he got out into the State of Indiana. Mr. WOLVERTON. Yes; but my question with reference to different States is because you have used that as a basis. You selected California. Mr. FARQUHARSON. No: I did not. Mr. WOLVERTON. As against Arizona. Mr. FARQUHARSON. No, sir. I beg your pardon. Let us not get this wrong. Mr. Wadsworth asked me that specific question and I dug up that information. Mr. WOLVERTON. Very well. Mr. FARQUIHARSON. That is why I did that. Mr. WOLVERTON. Would it be just as easy to look up the record in Colorado? I am asking whether you can get that information. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I think I can give you that, too. We will take the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad operating through the State of Colorado, and in these 1,407 cases you will find them listed under the Denver, Rio Grande & Western. Mr. BULwINKLE. I want to ask you a question. Would New Mexico compare better with Colorado? Mr. FARQUHARSON. It might. Mr. MARTIN. Yes, it would. Mr. WQLVERTON. Does the Southern Pacific operate in New Mexico? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes; it operates through New Mexico. Now, you were speaking of topography of the country. That was your statement. In the northwest end of New Mexico we have the Raton Hills and Raton Mountains, and that is the steepest grade they have. Then they drop on down to the Gloritas and that is a little lighter grade. But there is not as much heavy grade in New Mexico as there is in Colorado, because you are going over the highest part of the Rockies on all of the roads running east and west through Colorado. Mr. WoLvERTON. May I ask a question? Mr. CRossR. Go ahead, Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WoLVERTON. Mr. Farquharson, you selected one type of acci- dent as a comparison. During the testimony that has been presented, there have been several types of accidents-bursting of air hose, emer- gency application of brakes, and several others. 242 TRAIN LENGTHS Do you have the figures with respect to those types of accidents so we could use them as a comparison or have you just the figures for the one type that you have used as an illustration? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now, I think that maybe you have misunder- stood the break-down that I mentioned there, and why I made that. If an air hose bursts, the air is applied in emergency. If a drawbar pulls out, and the air hose is parted, the air is applied in emergency. If the car body breaks down, breaking the train line, the air goes into emergency. If a car wheel leaves the track and breaks the air hose, the air goes into emergency, and the man on the hind end takes the shock. It does not make any difference to him whether the engineer ap- plies the brakes in emergency or whether the air hose broke, or whether a coupler broke, or the draft rigging breaks, or a drawbar breaks, derailing a car, or a truck gives way, or a flange breaks off a wheel, or an axle breaks, derailing the car. The result is the same. The emergency application of air follows and the man on the rear end gets the shock. Mr. WOLVERTON. Does the case you have used as an illustration cover all of the elements you have just referred to? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now, what case do you mean? Mr. WoLVERTON. You used as an illustration one accident which happened in Arizona and 28 which happened in California. Does the one case that you have selected as an illustration or basis for comparison, include all the other cases which you have just mentioned? Mr. FARQUHARsON. The other things did not happen in Arizona. Mr. WOLVERTON. So there was only one accident of any kind in the State of Arizona? Mr. FARQUHARSON. On what they said was a slack action case-and what it was-now, get this clear--the train was pulling out aid the brakeman attempted to catch the caboose, and here is what you do [illustrating and indicating]. When a train is moving and you ap- proach the side of the train, you do it comparable with the speed the train is running, because when you get on that train, when you leave the ground, you are in the air, and you figure on your foot catching the step, and that leaves your hand to catch the grab iron, and you get your balance. Now, just as he went to step on, the speed of the train changed because the slack run in, and he fell down. That is what happened. Mr. WOLVERTON. Well, the reason I am asking for this informa- tion is a hope to obtain a basis of comparison that is truly a com- parison and that will therefore be helpful. In the early part of the testimony by Mr. Corbett or Mr. Johnson, they gave consideration to misunderstanding of signals as a possible cause of accidents di- rectly attributable to the length of the train, and also of failure of trainmen to be in a position to pass signals, and then you and others have made reference to sudden stopping, starting, lurch, or jerk of trains; also by sudden application, of brakes, improper handling of air, and other means of sudden application of brakes, resulting in air hose bursting, parting, or otherwise becoming defective. So, what I am seeking to find out is this: Is the case which you have used as an illustration the only accident that has happened in any of those categories, to which I have referred? TRAIL LENGTHS 243 Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, now, I want to answer you if I can, Congressman Wolverton, and I think you know me well enough to know that I will "yes or no" you, whichever I think is right. Mr. WOLVERTON. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. But I just do not get your question. I cannot get it clear in my mind when you keep referring to this case, just specifically what that case is. Now, do you mean the one that is referred to in Arizona? Mr. WOLVERTON. That is the one that I am referring to in every question that I have asked. Mr. MAPEs. Mr. Chairman, may I ask just a question, Mr. Wolver- ton, to clear up a question in my mind? Mr. WoLvERToN. Yes. Mr. MAPES. Is the slack action the same no matter what is the cause of the accident, whether it is one or the other cause that you have enumerated? Mr. FARQUHARSON. It is all the same. Mr. MAPES. The slack action is the same in every case? Mr. FARQUHARSON. It is the emergency application of the air brakes. Mr. WOLVERTON. Then the one case you used as an illustration and which you stated was the result of slack action is the only one that happened under any of these several possible causes? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. Now, I do not know whether that was slack run in or run out when this fellow was getting on the train. I do not know that, but I want to make it clear to you, Congressman, that we are going to show you accidents where the brakes did not go into emergency when the accident occurred. The slack rolled in itself. The train went over a hill, and when the hind end came over and the slack rolled down against the head end, the train buckled out in front of a passenger train and killed three men, and I will give you more than one case of that kind. Mr. WOLVERTON. Did you testify in the Nevada case? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. WoLVERTON. Were facts presented in that case to the court showing the number and kind of accidents that had happened before the adoption of the law in Arizona? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I could not answer. I was only there for I day, or 2 days. I was only there for 2 days. I could not answer that. Mr. WOLVERTON. I had in mind that the most natural thing would be to have presented evidence to the court to show that the cutting of the train in half had actually resulted in less accidents; yet we have had some reference here to the fact here that the court found to the contrary, and that it did not produce safety. I am interested to know upon what basis the case was presented and that led the court to the conclusion I have just referred to. Mr. FARQUHARSON. As I tell you, sir, I was there for 2 days, and the testimony I gave was verifying certain accident reports that had been submitted as correct copies of the reports that the C. & O. Rail- road had reported to the Interstate Commerce Commission. They said that they did not know, and they then wired me to check it, and I checked it and went from here to Nevada to testify to that, and when I finished I left and came back home. 244 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. WOLVERTON. Do you know whether there are- any statistics available either in the Interstate Commerce Commission reports or in the Arizona State Utility commission reports, or in your own organization that would show just how many accidents happened through the different causes set forth in this Interstate Commerce Commission Report No. 105, and could there be a break-down that would enable us to match one against the other? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No, Mr. Copgressinan; I do not know. I do not think it is done. I have asked the Interstate Commerce Commis- sion, and they have a full force, and every railroad reports every accident to them, or is supposed to do it, and they have not done it, and I do not know how you would do it. Mr. WOLVERTON. Then from what source did you obtain your in- formation that there has been only one case in Arizona ? Mr. FARQUHARSON. By checking the Interstate Commerce Commis- sion records. They checked this information for me and gave it to me in 1934. Mr. WOLvERTON. Well then, the Interstate Commerce Commission does have the statistics that will enable us to obtain that information? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I wish you could have them break it down. On the Form T reports we had to go ahead and get the number of cars put on the reports. It is now on. I am trying to get the Form T reports and to get enough of them so that each of you will know the form of the report upon which the railroads report their accidents to the Commission. Mr. WOLVERTON. Would it be convenient for you to permit me to look at the report submitted to you by the Commission while some of the other members of the committee question yon? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes; I will be glad to hand it to you. May I dig this out, because there are several here. Mr. CROssER. Have you finished, Mr. Wolverton? Mr. WoLvERTON. For the time being. Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman. Mr. CROSSER. Mr. Wadsworth. Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Farquharson, referring again to the figures on Arizona and California. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. Mr. WAnsWORTH. As I understand, your figures show one accident in Arizona and 28 in California. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. WADSWORTH. Are they both confined to the Southern Pacific Railroad? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. WADSWORTH. How many of the accidents in California, 28 in number, occurred on trains of less than 70 cars, and how many on trains of over 70? Mr. FARQUHARsON. Those trains are all over 70 cars. Mr. WADSWORTH. All over 70? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now, wait a minute. I have not answered you altogether correct. The first one is 65; the next one 78; there is one with 58; the next one 93 cars; 87 cars; 99 cars; here is another one with 58; one with 104 cars; and one with 52 cars; 52 cars; and one with 85 cars; one with 62 cars; one with 72 cars;'one with 94 cars; one with 99 cars; one with 41 cars; one with 79 cars; one with 86 TRAIN LENGTHS 24t5 cars; one had 150 cars; one with 124 cars. Then there was one with 11W cars; one with 63 cars; one with 69 cars. I think that is all. Mr. WADSWORTH. That is all? Mr. CROSSER. Have you finished, Mr. Wadsworth? Mr. WADSWORTH. Yes. Mr. CRossER. Mr. Withrow, you had a question. Mr. WITHROW. How many railroads operate in Arizona? Mr. FARQUHARSON. The Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific. Mr. WrIHIROW. Regardless of any comparison of injuries in one State as against the injuries in another, relative to slack action, and I admit they might be very interesting, but I realize the difficulties you have in getting tables worked up. The fact still remains that due to the fact that trains of not more than 70 cars are permitted to be operated in Arizona, the slack action accidents and injuries on the Southern Pacific were almost entirely eliminated in 1934? Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is correct. Mr. WiHRow. Because only one accident occurred, and you cannot have less than one? Mr. FARQUHARSON. And, may I just say further, that when you are running trains of 70 cars through Arizona, and they are coming in from Indio and from the Imperial Valley with 140 and 150 cars, it siffply means that you are running more through trains in Arizona than you are on the Los Angeles division of the Southern Pacific and there are less accidents. Mr. WITHROw. And further you say that this legislation was written on the statute books of Arizona in 1912? Mr. FARQUHARsON. That is right. Mr. WITHROW. It has been effective there for 25 years? Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is right. Mr. WITHROW. Has it been effective all of the time, or was it repealed and reenacted? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No; as I remember, it has been in effect, and I am trusting to memory now, since the day of its enactment it has been attacked a great many times by the railroads. Mr. WITHRow. Has it not been your experience that where legis- lation has been in operation for 25 years, if that legislation is unjust and vicious, there is one of two things happens to it: In the first instance, either they disregard the legislation entirely or they repeal it. Neither has been the case in Arizona since 1912? Mr. FARQUHAR5ON. No, sir; it has been attacked in the courts out there. Mr. WITHROW. Yes; but it has not been repealed, and it has been effective all of the time and they do not operate trains of more than 70 cars? Mr. FARQUHARSON. And I am trusting to memory, and I cannot tell you the year, and I will try to check it up and answer you posi- tively ; but it is my recollection-I do not remember the year, but in Arizona we have a referendum, and a referendum vote was taken in Arizona to repeal that law, and the people sustained the law. Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wadsworth. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. These are on slack action? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. "- TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Slack action? All of them? Mr. FARQUHARsON. No; 466 other accidents are shown there of vari- ous types, and I am just- Mr. KENNEDY of New York. What has been the experience in Arizona on other types of accidents? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, I think that we could make a comparison there. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I mean briefly; are they the same there, or do you find them the same as in any other State ? Mr. FARQUHARsON. No, sir. That record will show they are less because of this reason, that the train is short enough so that we have an opportunity to smell a hot box, a sliding wheel or a sticking brake or to possibly see a brake beam dragging, and dust flying or fire flying, and stop the train and correct the defect before the wreck occurs. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. They are almost related? Mr. FARQUHARsON. Sir? Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Those accidents are related to slack action, are they not? I mean on some you have slack action because of the application of the air. Mr. FARQUHARsON. Now, wait a minute. I want to be clear. You mean that a hot box would be related to slack action? Mr. KENNEDY of New York. When the emergency is applied you get slack action. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. And what is the cause of the hot box? Mr. FARQUHARSON. A hot box is caused by the lubrication getting low or the brass breaking or the brass getting crooked on the journal and then you get a hot box just like in the engine in your automobile. It will run hot if you do not keep oil in it. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I would like to ask another question, if I may, Mr. Farquharson. On page 15 of your prepared statement, the first paragraph, almost at or near the end of the paragraph you say: "In 1927 there were 322,320 train, engine and yard service employees" and so forth. Then you go on referring to the business of 1927 as compared with 1936, and with business picking up as it did in 1936, there were 97,000 less engines than in 1927. Do you see that? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now, you are talking about employees. When you say engmes Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I am referring to your statement, your prepared statement. Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is employees. Mr. CRossER. You said engines, Mr. Kennedy. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. You say: "In 1927 there were 322,320 train, engine and yard service employees." Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. From the statement that you gave, it would appear there wet-e 654 accidents in a period of 18 months, or about 400 per year. Do you remember that? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes; of that particular time. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. That is what I am referring to. I am just referring to what you said. You said that in 1936 there were 97,000-odd fewer men employed than in 1927, and that business in 1927 is comparable to 1936. That is your opinion? TRAIN LENGTHS 2 247 Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. We can check those figures. Mr. KENNEDY. I am taking your figures. It would appear from your statement that the long train resulted in approximately 100,000 men in the railway service losing their jobs. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I did not say that now, did I? Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I mean if you adopt the figures; it seems that there are 100,000 men less. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I said this, that the displacement of men by the introduction of large power was about 97,000. Now, let us go on. I do not want you to get a wrong impression. I want to clear this all up in your mind. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Is it your thought that the passage of this bill, assuming the business to be the same, would reemploy 100,000 men in the railway train service? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Reemploy ? Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. No; no. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. If we cut down these big trains. Mr. FARQUHARSON. No; no; I never said that. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I did not say that you said it. Mr. FARQUHARSON. No. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. But if you are short that many men as a result of the present conditions of operations, and you went back to the former conditions, you theoretically would employ 100,000 men, would you not? Mr. FARQUIIARSON. I hope I did not leave that impression; no, sir. I did not, because now, let me explain to you. Let us not get this thing mixed up. The average length train today is about 47 cars, or 46 cars, and we have given them in this bill 24 more cars than that, per train, and I doubt if it will put more men to work. It would mean a better distribution of cars moved and trains run. Now, let us get this clear. On the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad, the Virginian Railroad, and the Great Northern Railroad, and in the iron ore district, where there is a fixed and regular movement, there will be more men put to work; but I say again, without fear of successful contradiction, upon the body of the whole in the United States that I do not believe that there will be any more men put to work on all of the railroads. There will be on certain railroads, and there ought to be. There is no man who ought to be required to ride behind 160 cars-20,000 tons of freight-going over a hill a mile and a half long where he cannot see. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I am not arguing that. I am not even suggesting it. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I know you are not. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I am just taking your figures; in the matter of simple arithmetic, if we brought this change about, would we give 100,000 more men work? Mr. FARQUHARsON. No. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Would we give any men work? Would we employ any additional men? Mr. FARQUHARsON. There might be some on some divisions. There would not be any more put to work in Arizona, because the law is already in effect there. There would not be any more put to work on 248 TRAIN LENGTHS possibly some divisions in California. There would not be any on the Siskiyou division of the Southern Pacific, because they limit their trains to 56 cars. That is all we can go through the tunnel with. The engine is so big and so close to the roof of the tunnel that we have to take the lights off of the back of the caboose and put them on the floor, because the gas is so thick in the tunnel that the lights go out. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Admitting that, it is possible that you could get more workers jobs? Mr. FARQUHARSON. On certain divisions and certain territories, Mr. Congressman, I think that is correct. I will say yes, in certain terri- tories, but, by and large, all over-and we are speaking now not of individual railroads, are we? We are speaking of all of them. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Yes; all railroads generally through- out the United States. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Will that necessarily create a great many more trains? Mr. FARQUHARSON. A great many more? Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. On certain divisions. I would say some more. Generally, I do not think so. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. You do not believe that it will make a substantial difference? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No. And, Congressman, may I say this to you? I wish it would, not for the employment feature so much, as getting the railroads to give a faster and more frequent service and recovering some of the stuff which went to the highway, because we were not giving the service. That is the answer to it. I wish we had the trains more frequent and we would get back a lot of this stuff that is going over the country on trucks and highways that we are all paying for, and they are not paying for the use of the highways. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I think you volunteered to make some statement about the perishable foods that were delivered in the city of New York. Have you had an opportunity to check that? . Mr. FARQUHARSON. I just broke that down roughly. As I under- stood your statement you said that there were 81,000 cars of perish- ables entering New York. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. That number is brought in by one railroad into the city of New York. Mr. FARQUHARsoN. I did not understand your statement and we could not break that down the way I had tried it, unless we had the total amount; but I want to say this, Congressman, I think you told me that it was the New York Central later when we were talking about it. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, the New York Central comes into New York in two divisions. The West Shore on the west side of the river and the New York Central proper on the other side; does it not? Mr.,KENNEDY of New York. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARsON. And if the New York Central or any other railroad shied away at 81,000 cars, I do not think that they would come up here and admit it to you. I think that they can handle 800,000 cars if they had to. TRAIN LENGTHS 249 Mr. KENNEDY of New York. In the city of New York? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. In our terminals? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now, let us check on what is going in there altogether, the number of cars. The railroads of this country are not afraid of business. We are prepared to handle it, handle any quantity. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. You are approaching this question from the wrong angle. I am trying to find out what effect this proposed bill will have upon the cost of food for the people of the city of New York. We have millions of people in New York City, and I am anxious to find out what effect this is going to have on them. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I do not see how it will have any. If the aver- age train is only 47 cars, and we can pull that in in 70, I do not see how it will have any effect. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. In making your statement have you considered the problem of the perishable foodstuff and the market hours, and so forth? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. And, I cannot see, honestly, as I know railroads, where that will make one bit of difference. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Would you want this committee to accept your statement as final, representing the trainmen, as their opinion, as their judgment, that you do not see what effect it would have. You really do not have any definite knowledge of the pro- posal? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Of the 70 cars? Mr. KENNEDY of. New York. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I said to you, sir, I think it would have no effect on the 70-car movement, on the movement at all. I think you will be getting quicker service. Honestly I do. I think there will be a faster train movement and more frequent train movement and quicker movement into the terminals, because you can take a 70-car train and distribute it around there, and when your next train come in, distribute those cars, because the way has been cleared. If they come in with 140. cars, I do not know whether you have got a track in New York that will hold 100 cars of perishables, if you had to put them in there. The chances are that you would have to split that train up -and put it in two sections. They can answer as to the length of their perishable tracks. I could not. I do not know. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman. Mr. CROSSER. Mr. Boren desires to ask a question. Mr. BOREN. You say that this 70-car train legislation has been in effect in Arizona for 25 years? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. Mr. BOREN. Have there been any constitutional questions, raised with relation to the trains that move oily in interstate commerce and not in intrastate commerce; and furthermore, if they have such a law in effect and have had for 25 years in Arizona, what efforts have been made and what possible chance is there for the States themselves to handle this problem? What efforts have been made in the other States to get this legislation, if a State can do it? Mr. FARQUHARSON. We passed it in your State last year, Oklahoma. We passed it in Congressman Maloney's State (Louisiana). 250 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. BOREN. Is it in force in Oklahoma? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No; it has been enjoined on the ground, I be- lieve, on the constitutionality of the State not having the right to pass that type of legislation. We passed it in California and the Governor vetoed it. I am not a lawyer, and I do not want to venture out into the field of arguing the constitutional law with you, because I do not know anything about it. Mr. BOREN. Has it ever been enjoined in Arizona or in any way made inoperative? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes; we have been taken through the courts and taken to the highest court, and the railroads are still complying with it, and they can tell you why they are. I cannot. As I say, I am not a lawyer, and I am not going to try to venture into any question of law, because I do not know anything about it. Mr. BOREN. With your experience, you have some practical ideas as to whether or not it is possible to approach it through the State governments. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I do not know. Mr. WOLvERTON. Mr. Chairman, I was just going to make this sug- gestion. I would like to ask a few more questions, but I do not want to do so until the others on the committee have had their opportunity; if you will bear that in mind, I will appreciate it. Mr. CROSSER. Are you through, Mr. Boren? Mr. BOREN. Yes. Mr. CROSsER. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. Do you think it might be beneficial or have a bene- ficial effect if the railroad freight service in competition with other types of transportation ; do you think it would be beneficial to stream- line their freight service, as well as their passenger service? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I am quite convinced of it, Congressman, and that if we will speed up this business, if we will establish a pick-up and delivery service-and I do not mean within the city limits. I mean; go out into the country and get this business and bring it in for line haul, that we will recover this business. There is not any agency of transportation in the world as reliable as railroads, and if we would do that, we will make the time; but I can truthfully say to you when I was in service-and I spent most of my time in service running a local freight train, because I liked that kind of work. There was a local each way, and we ran pretty nearly on time. The grocer- man would know within a couple of hours when- he could go to the station and get his shipment of goods. Then I saw the schedule changed. They said that the local would go up today and come back tomorrow. Then they said it will go up today and back day after tomorrow. Then we began to find the trucks coming in. Then we began to find the other agencies of transportation, and today the rail- roads are experimenting. And I want to say this for the railroad I hold my rights on, the Southern Pacific-and if I am wrong, there is a representative here of the Southern Pacific and he can change it. But we have done that; they are running freight trains on the San Francisco-Los Angeles branch, Los Angeles to San Francisco and back, on passenger schedules, and handling L. c. 1. freight. Are you not doing that, Mr. Mason? Mr. MASON. Yes; and with more than 70 cars, too. TR AIN LENGTHS 251 Mr. FARQUHARSON. No matter what you are running-wait a min- ute. I have the letters on what they are doing on these trains, and let me tell you, so that this comedy does not destroy- the seriousness of the question that is before you. The Southern Pacific started out and put 1. c. 1. freight on passenger trains in order to recover that business, and then put freight men on passenger trains loading and unloading 1. c.1., and from that grew the service that they have, and only last week I got a letter from the representatives of the men on the coast division that they are running these regular trains on passenger-train schedule every night, and there is not any engine, regardless of what my friend has said, that is going to pull more than 70 cars over the Santa Margarita Mountains at the speed of a passenger train. Mr. MARTIN. Going back to these new passenger trains-of course, I have just noticed this casually-I think that they started out with just one of these Diesel engines. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. Mr. MARTIN. Then 2, and now they are running these stream- lined passenger trains with 3 engines and 8 or 10 very light cars. They do not look much bigger than good-sized streetcars when you see them go streaking along over the prairies. Mr. CROSSER. Is that all, Mr. Martin? Mr. MARTIN. Just one more thought. I recall some years ago a statement by Henry Ford criticizing the great weight and size of freight equipment, engines and cars both. It was his theory that if they would sort of "flivver" these freight trains a little they would grealy improve the service and make it much cheaper. Mr. FARQUHIARsON. I think you are right, Congressman. More frequent service is the thing that we have got to have. Mr. BUI wINKLE. Mr. Chairman. Mr. CROSSER. Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Farquharson, I want to ask a question. How many States have passed laws limiting train lengths? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Arizona, California, Nevada, Louisiana, and Oklahoma. Mr. BULwINKLE. Just five out of the Union? Mr. FARQUHARsON. Yes; and in four of them they have been en- joined and in one the law is in operation. Mr. HLWINKLE. Just one other question. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. Chairman. Mr. MARTIN. They have been working on it in Colorado for about 20 years. Mr. CROSSER. Wait a minute. Mr. Bulwinkle has recognition. Mr. BULWINKLE. I want to know the number of cars specified in each of these acts. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir; 70. Mr. BULWINKLE. Seventy in all of them? Mr. FARQUHARsON. Yes, sir. Mr. BULWINKLE. I want to ask you another question. In this sheet you handed us entitled "Number of persons injured according to train lengths" as indicated in the left column, "Length of train," how many trains would you say are operated, freight trains of the Nation, which are from 70 to 75 cars? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I do not know. 252 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. BUiWINKLE. How many would you say are operated from 60 to 69? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Let me get that clear. You have asked the ques- tion, and I want to show you the difficulty about answering you. You may start out with 50 cars on a 100-mile division, and some time in the course of your trip you may have 80 cars, and then you may move on and set out and come into the terminal with only 40 cars, because you pick up and set out on those divisions. I do not know how that could be answered. Mr. BULwINKLE. Well, I want to find out, because I am trying to find out what the facts are. I notice on this a classification of 60 to 69 cars and I notice that there have been 24 wrecks, and from 70 to 75 cars there have been 144 wrecks. Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is what the reports said, not what I said. That is what the railroads reported to the Commission. Mr. BULWINKLE. I am trying to get some information myself. Mr. MArEs. Do you know whether or not the railroads keep a record of that? Mr. FORT. Mr. Crosser, may I ask Mr. Farquharson a question? Mr. CRossER. Yes. Mr. FORT. You do not include on that statement all accidents on trains of 60 to 69 cars, but just simply some of them which were sent through. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I do not know that I missed any of them on the 60 to 69 cars. Mr. FORT. Do you understand my question? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I know what your question is and I am not going to say that I missed any of them. If I did, I overlooked it. I am not sure I did. I went through it pretty carefully. Mr. CROSSER. Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BULWINKLE. Well, how can we get this information for a com- parison on these figures? Mr. FARQUHARSON. On the total number of trains run in the country? Mr. BULWINKLE. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I do not knoiv. I have told you that there is a train sheet for every 24 hours; that a man going over a division may have a 50-car train one hour and lie may have an 80-car train the next, and the accident may occur when he has 80, and there are 156 rail- roads, and there is a train sheet each 24-hour period. I do not know how to break it down. Mr. BuLwINKLE. Could you say without any actual information. but just as a guess, that there are more trains operating between 70 and 75 cars than between 60 and 69? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I think as you get to those bigger trains that they would be less frequent, because your average is only 47. Mr. BuLwINKLE. Well, then, I notice that as you step up from 70 to 75 cars your number of accidents increases. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Will you wait until I get that? I had hoped that I could go through and take these accident reports and take them up in turn, but we have jumped all over the testimony before I had a chance to properly present it to you. But, I will answer this. Now, this is the sheet you are referring to? TRAIN LENGTHS 253 Mr. BULWINKLE. No, sir ; this is the sheet. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now, your question, please. I have the sheet before me. Mr. BULWINKLE. I note that the number of accidents in trains of 60 to 69 cars in 24. There were 24 wrecks. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. Mr. BULwINKLE. What period of time is this? From January 1, 1936, to what time? Mr. FARQUHARSON. 1936 on through where I ended up in 1937. Mr. BULWINKLE. And then on trains of 70 to 75 cirs there were 144 wrecks? Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is right. Mr. BULwINKLE. Well, do you say that there are more trains run- ning from 70 to 75 cars in length than 60 to 69 cars in length? Mr. FARQUHARsON. I could not answer that. I do not know. I do not think anybody can tell you that, because, Mr. Bulwinkle, let me give you this statement and this is what the accident reports show. A man goes over the road and he will have 50 cars, as I have said, and no accident. He may pick up 21 cars and have 71, and there will be an accident. He is charged then with a train of 71 cars. At the very next station he may set out again, and only have 40 cars; but the number of cars in the train at the time of the accident is reported to the Interstate Commerce Commission and that may not be the number of cars the man handled across the division. And, when you say trains run, why, that is just what makes the difficulty. I could not answer that. Mr. BULWINKLE. Now, another thing I want to know. I wish you would tell me fully how these trains are inspected. There has been some discussion of that before the committee. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Inspected? Mr. BULWINKLE. Yes. Yesterday you said, I think, or Mr. John- son said, that if the train was not .so long there would be a better inspection of it. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now, as I remember your question, you said, How is the train inspected? Mr. BULWINKLE. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. All right. When we are in the terminal there are men known as car men and air men and they go over the train while it is standing on the track, and look at its drawbars, and its equipment. They are supposed to give it a very good inspection. The air men, when your train is ready for movement, will couple up the air hose. The air is pumped up and they go along the train and are supposed to see that there are not too many leaks in the train line and that the air pressure gage in the caboose has a pressure not less than 5 pounds less than there is on the engine. (The wit- nesses will testify about how much air there is in that caboose when they go out on these long trains-and then comes the signal to apply the air, and the engineer sets the airbrakes. They go along and see that the brakes are all set. They signal to release the brakes, and then they see that they are released, and you pull on out. Now, have I made that clear? Mr. BULYwINKLE Yes. Every train is inspected, or is supposed to be inspected. 47891-38- 17 254 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. FARQUHARSON. At the terminal. Mr. BULWINKLE. At the terminal. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. Mr. BULWINKLE. Now then, when it is necessary, after you leave the terminal, where is the next inspection, if any? Mr. FARQUHARSON. The first opportunity that you have. That is not definite. Mr. WITHIOW. You do not mean to say that there was an inspection Mr. CnossER. Wait a minute. Mr. BULWINKLE. That is all right. He is bringing out what I want to know. I am not objecting. Mr. WITHRoW. Do you mean to say that at the terminal every freight train is inspected that way? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No. Mr. Bulwinkle's question was, how are they inspected, and I told him how. I did not say they were or were not. Mr. BULWINKLE. I will ask you then this question: Is every train inspected? Mr. FARQUUARSON. I do not know. Mr. BULWINKLE. Is it supposed to be? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I cannot be there. I cannot answer that ques- tion. There are probably a thousand terminals in this country, and I do not know what is going on. I cannot answer that. Mr. BULWINKLE. When is the next inspection ? Mr. FARQUHARsON. You mean in ordinary train operation? Mr. BULWINKLE. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. The first opportunity that you had to go around your train. Mr. BULWINKLE. Who does that? Mr. FARQUHARsON. The train crew, if that opportunity presents itself. Mr. SADOWsKI. Mr. Chairman Mr. CRossER. Mr. Sadowski. Mr. SADOWSK. On yesterday you said that the locomotive tractive power had increased 26 percent in some instances. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. SADOWSKI. Do you recommend a decrease in the size of locomo- tives, a decrease in the tractive power? Mr. FARQUHARsON. Would I recommend a decrease in the size of locomtives? Mr. SADOWSKI. In the size of locofiotives; yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I do not care what the size of the locomotive is so long as the number of cars that it pulls are not so great as to en- danger the lives of the men. Mr. SADOWSKI. You made reference to these latge locomotives on yesterday and I was just wondering whether that in -itself was a vicious thing. Mt. WoLVERToN. Mr. Chairman Mr. CROssER. Mr. Wolverton desires to ask a question. Mr. FARQUniARSON. I do not care how big they are, if the train is limited so that we. can take care of ourselves. Mr. WOLvEITON. I hope you will consider my questions as a con pliment to you, because I consider you are probably the best informed man on these subjects that could come before the committee represent- TRAIN LENGTHS 255 ing the trainmen. For that reason, I am seeking to obtain from you all possible information. In your opinion does the operation of an increased number of trains increase the possibility of accidents? Mr. CROSsER. Mr. Wolverton, will you have a number of questions? It is about 12 o'clock. Mr. WOLvERTON. Maybe I can get one or two questions in and thereby give Mr. Farquharson an opportunity to look up the facts. I think it is important to do so. Mr. CRossER. Very well. Mr. FARQUHARSON. What is the question? Mr. WoLvERToN. Does an increase in the number of trains operated increase the possibility of accidents? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, Mr. Wolverton, I do not think anybody can positively answer that question. That would depend entirely upon the type of the train. Mr. WoLVERToN. Well, if a train is not operated it is not a hazard, and you will not have any accident. But if it is operated it immedi- ately creates an accident hazard. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Any moving body is liable to run into trouble. That is true. Mr. WOLVERToN. I do not think there is any difference of opinion as to that. I asked the question as a basis for further questions along the line that, if the number of trains operated increases the possibility of accidents, it would necessarily increase the possibility of accidents to other classes of railroad employees as well as trainmen. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Oh, no. How could a train out at an inter- mediate station between Philadelphia and Jersey City injure an employee up in Jersey City? Mr. WoLVERTON. Of course, I did not attempt to say anything, I hope, as foolish as that; but I concede my question may have seemed that way to you or you would not have made that answer. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I beg your pardon. Mr. WOLvERTON. The point I have in mind is this: As I have looked over Accident Bulletin No. 105, 1I find that trackwalkers, maintenance-of-way employees, and others have suffered accidents as a result of trains operating over the road. That is true, is it not? Mr. FARQUHARSON. You mean in looking over what accidents? Mr. WOLVERTON. Accident.Bulletin No. 105. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Oh, yes, but were they train accidents? Mr. WOLVERTON. Some may have been train accidents and some' may have been train-service accidents or just plain accidents; but the point is that trackwalkers, maintenance-of-way employees, and others who have to do, we will say, indirectly with the operating of or the moving of trains are likely to suffer accidents with every moving train. Is that not true? Mr. FARQUHARsON. Oh, that is remote. That is very remote. Mr. WOLVERTON. Well, it is not remote according to the figures I saw in Accident Bulletin No. 105, but if that is remote, let us consider it on another basis. Mr. FARQUHARSON. If I could see the table, I think I could answer you. Maybe I do not understand you. Mr. CROSSER. It is now 12 o'clock, Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WOLvERTON. I would like to ask one other question to enable Mr. Farquharson to get the facts. 256 TRAIN LENGTHS You have based an appeal on the humane standpoint for trainmen. What I am trying to ascertain is this: If we are to deal with it from a humane standpoint, and I assure you that appeals to me, we must take into consideration the possibility of accidents to others, including railroad employees and the traveling public, when the number of trains operated are increased, for instance, there is also possibility of increased accidents at grade crossings. Would not such accidents increase very considerably as the number of trains increased? Mr. FARQUHARsON. I will say this, Mr. Wolverton. I want to make this very clear to you. There is a certain type of careless driver, and of course the more times there is a train on a crossing, the more times that fellow would be exposed. Mr. WOLvERToN. May I continue this tomorrow, Mr. Chairman? Mr. CnossER. Yes. The committe will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, at which time Mr. Wolverton will continue his questions. (Thereupon, at 12:02 p. m., the committee adjourned to meet the following morning, Friday, January 21, 1938.) TRAIN LENGTHS FRIDAY, JANUARY 21, 1938 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMIITEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. M., in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence F. Lea (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order. Mr. Farquharson, you may proceed. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the commit- tee, I have a witness who desires to appear this morning. It is necessary that he leave town today to attend another meeting that had been arranged before he came here, and it will take him, I sup- pose, about 15 or not more than 20 minutes to submit his testimony, and I would appreciate it very much if the committee would permit me to put him on the stand at this time. The CHAIRMAN. That will be satisfactory. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I wish now to introduce Mr. Schaffter, a mem- ber of the Order of Railway Conductors. The CHAIRMAN. At this time, I might say also that witnesses speak- ing from written statements, if they desire to do so, may omit por- tions of their paper and let it appear in full in the record. STATEMENT OF C. R. SCHAFFTER, ORRVILLE, OHIO Mr. SCHAFFTER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: My name is C. R. Schaffter. I reside at 507 Garfield Avenue, Orr- Ville, Ohio. I entered railroad service as a fireman in 1907, was furloughed in the fall of that year and transferred as a brakeman on the Penn- sylvania Railroad in 1908. I was promoted to conductor in 1912 and have continually served in the capacity of conductor since that time. On the Cleveland division, where I am employed, providing suffi- cient freight and tonnage has accumulated, we handle trains of about 100 cars, 75 to 90 of which are loads, with a tonnage of about 5,500 tons. The longest and heaviest train that I have been in charge of re- cently contained 88 loads and 36 empties-124 cars--6,325 tons. The topography on our division is such that it requires two of the largest type locomotives in the service to draw these trains, and 257 4 258 TRAIN LENGTHS between Glenmont, Ohio, and Danville, Ohio, where we have 1.18 per- cent grades, it requires another engine of the same type, which is as- signed to helper service in that territory and is usually attached to the rear of the train behind the cabin car, to propel the trains over these heavy grades. A number of the cars in practically every train are equipped with the new type AB brakes, and, notwithstanding the merits and ad- vantages claimed for them, we are experiencing considerable trouble due to undesired quick action, and these emergency applications of the brakes often result in one or more couplers being broken, cars decentered, lading shifted or damaged, and members of the crew on the rear end being injured by the shock or impact. Regardless of the type of air brakes used, the excessive amount of slack in these long trains, which averages about a foot or more to each car, is a constant hazard to the safety of trainmen. I have been knocked down and have received injuries a number of times in the cabin car on the rear 'end of these long trains. On May 29, 1933, when descending a grade approaching Orrville, Ohio, with a 102-car train, drawn by two engines, the engineer applied the brakes to reduce the speed, and when he released them there was a severe stretch-out, which caused the coupler to break between the two engines. This caused an emergency application of the brakes, and, although I anticipated a rough stop and clung to an iron bar which is a part of the framework in the cabin car, my hold was broken and I was thrown through the open doorway against the iron banister which extends across the platform, badly bruising my left leg'between the knee and hip, and causing me to lose about 2 weeks' time. A short time later a coupler pulled out of the head end of a 100-car train at Brink Haven, Ohio, and I was bruised and cut by flying glass from window panes that were shattered by the impact, but Iwas able to return to work before the expiration of 72 hours. There is considerable clerical work to be done in the cabin cars of freight trains and the longer the train the more work there is of this nature. Conductors are required to prepare a report, showing the following information for each and every car in the train: Initial and number of car, "x" indicating a loaded car, and "-" indicating an empty car, point and date at which car was picked up, and point and date at which car was left, weight of empty car as stenciled on side of car, weight of lading as shown on way bill, the kind of lading, and the final destination. Another report similar to this must be pre- pared for the yardmaster at the end of the run. In addition to this, all delays must be shown on the time report, and all delays must be shown on a special report for the superintendent and trainmaster, as well as special reports covering accidents and defects in the equip- ment; also consists of the train stating number of loads, empties, and tonnage. Last week there was some comment during these hearings in regard to these reports that were required of a conductor, and I wish to introduce at this time as an exhibit a sample of the various types and forms that are required of a conductor on each trip. The first reports in this group are required only in case of an acci- dent, an accident to the equipment. And another an accident to an employee. That is, when personal in jury is involved. TRAIN LENGTHS 259 Gentlemen, if any of you wish to look at these reports I have them here. I have a consist blank of the train that is required. I have a copy of a delay report that is prepared in the usual manner; copy of the reports required in case of defective cars set out at any point en route. There [indicating] is a copy of the report prepared for the yard- master showing each and every car in the train, together with other information. There is a copy of the time report showing the time that the vari- ous members of the crew reported for work, the time we left, date, and so forth, with all of the delays that must be shown on the back [indicating]. Here is what is known as a wheel report for the benefit of the car record's office and the statistical bureau showing each and every car with a station abbreviation for each and every car, as to where the car was picked up and set off and the date, which must be shown on every car, tonnage, lading, final destination, and so forth, together with all information including the delays on the back of these reports [indicating]. The CHAIRMAN. Did you intend to have this printed in the record; was that your desire, or did you wish to have it made available for inspection of the members of the committeeI Mr. SCHAFErER. I do not believe it would be advisable to print those copies in the record. The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have given a brief summary and the clerk will keep these men so that any member who wants to will have an opportunity to examine them. Mr. SCHAFFTER. I believe that is sufficient. That will be sufficient. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. SCHAFFTER. That, with my description of the reports. It requires about 2 hours on each trip for a conductor to do this work, and I want to emphasize the fact that while so doing he is not in a position to properly and adequately protect himself against shocks and impacts, because he is holding a clipboard in one hand and in his arm, in this manner [indicating], and writing with the other. The flagman usually assists the conductor in preparing these re- ports, but assuming that one man does all of the writing, it requires about 2 2hours. It is practically impossible to observe defects. Mr. EICHER. That would be true, regardless of the length of the train? Mr. SCHAFrETR. No, sir; on a long train of 100 cars, it will require practically 2 hours. Mr. EiCHER. The longer the train, the longer time it takes? Mr. SCHAFFTER. The longer the train, the more clerical work, the more writing there is. Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Chairman Mr. WmrnRow. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Halleck. Mr. HALLJM K. You do not object to the doing of that clerical work, as such, do you? Mr. SCHAFFTER. No, sir ; we do not. 260 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. WrnHRow. That is, you do not mean to offer that as a reason as to why the train should be shorter rather than longer? Mr. SCHAFFTER. No, sir. That is not the point. Mr. WITHRow. Mr. Chairman- The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Withrow. Mr. WrnuHow. I think you should state right there that it would be impossible to do this work before you go out or when you arrive at your terminal; or must it be done while you are in transit? Mr. ScHArFTER. It must be done while in transit. It is scarcely possible to do this work at either terminal, because the train crews are given no preparatory time whatever. If a train crew is called for reporting at 6 a. m., the train is required or expected to leave as soon as possible after 6 a. m. The members of the crew are required to do the necessary work in connection with the departure of that train and that work consists principally of-releasing hand brakes that may bO set; doubling over the train in case one track will not hold the entire train; making couplings; giving signals, and being alert in general; looking for defects; or any other work that might be done. There may be a shop car, a bad order, it being necessary to set out the car, before the departure of the train, and in that case it is prac- tically impossible to do that work before leaving the initial terminal. Neither is it practical to do it when you arrive at the final terminal, because the moment the train is yarded, the time of that train crew ends. There would be no allowance made so far as compensation is concerned for preparing any reports, except at some points where the conductor is required to deliver report bills and so forth, such as at Canton, Ohio, he is allowed an additional 15 minutes for so doing. Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Halleck. Mr. HALLECK. I understand, Mr. Schaffter, that the fact that you sit at a table making out these reports adds to the hazard in riding in the caboose? Mr. SCHAFYTER. It does in this respect: It is the time that he is required to make those reports, and the fact that lie is not in a position to hold adds to the hazard, especially on a long train. Mr. HALLECK. Well, do you sit at some sort of a desk when you write these reports? Mr. SCHAFETER. Some cabin cars have a desk. Mr. HALLECK. What do you do in these cabooses when you are not sitting there writing out these reports? That is what I am getting at. What I want to know is how much that adds to the hazard? Mr. SCHAFFTER. We are absorbed in watching the train. The condi- tions of the train, as the train runs along, especially on curves, we keep a lookout for hot boxes. Mr. HALLECK. Yes. How many men ride in the caboose? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Two, the conductor and the flagman. Mr. HALLECK. Do they both watch for hot boxes? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes. sir. Mr. HALLECK. And they sit down when they are watching the train? Mr. SCHAFFTER. The cupola is arranged so that you can sit down and slide the windows open and watch the train from that point. Mr. HALLECK. Are you in any more danger sitting at a desk writing these reports, than you would be sitting up in the cupola? TRAIN LENGTHS 261 Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes, sir; we are. In the cupola, when there is a shock or an impact, we are prepared. There are grab-irons on the side of the cupola and we would be sitting in such a position that w& would not be thrown. Our feet would be stretched out and we would be braced, where in the case of the preparation of these reports we are either sitting on a desk or on one of the bunks near the desk, or near the wall at the end of the cabin car and we are very apt to be thrown, because we cannot immediately grab for some fixed object in the cabin car in order to adequately protect ourselves. Mr. HALLECK. Now, if you had the same sort of grab rails and other equipment alongside your writing desk that you have in the cupola, you would not be in any worse shape, would you? Mr. SCHAFrER. Yes; we would. Mr. HALLECK. Why would you be? Mr. SCAFrrER. We have that heavy clipboard on our arm and sometimes in our hand we have these bills, sometimes a bunch of bills 2 inches thick. Mr. HALLECK. You write on your arm? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes, sir. Mr. HALLECK. I thought you wrote on a desk. Mr. SCHAFJYTER. I use my arm. Very few of them use the desk, be- cause it is impossible to write on those cabin cars while the train is running. It is too rough. There is too much vibration and it is nec- essary to hold these clipboards in my arm. I never write on a desk while the train is in motion. Mr. HALLECK. That is all. Mr. WITHROw. Mr. Chairman- The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Withrow. Mr. WITHRow. This is the point you really want to make, is it not, that when you are riding in the body of the car you are con- centrating on the reports you are getting out. Mr. SCHAFFTER. Certainly. Mr. WITHROw. And you cannot do two things well at one and the same time. Mr. SCHAFFTER. No, sir. Mr. WITHROW. When you are up in the cupola you are sitting there partially braced all of the time? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes, sir. Mr. WITPROw. Now, it is not possible to brace yourself that way when you are sitting at a desk making out your reports? Mr. SCHAFFTER. That is correct, and furthermore Mr. HALLECK. Just a minute. Why can you not make out the reports sitting up in the cupola, then? Mr. SCHAFFER. That would not be possible. Mr. HALLECK. You could brace yourself just as well and be ready to grab hold of something? Mr. SCHAFFTER. The arrangement of the cupola is such-it is on the order of this table [indicating]. It is long with braces, and here is a grab-iron. That would be an arrangement that would be inconvenient. Mr. HALLECK. I suspect it would. That was a little facetious. Mr. SCHAFFTER. Furthermore, in regard to your suggestion, Con- gressman Withrow, when a trainman is sitting in the cupola of a cabin car he usually has a window open and in the event there is a 262 TRAIN LENGTHS sudden stop made he can hear a crash or an impact approaching the cabin car and he in that case can prepare himself, whereas when he is sitting down in the cabin car the door will be closed and there will be no windows open, and he cannot hear. There will be no warning. The impact comes while he is occupied in the prep- aration of these reports, he and the flagman, both of them being occupied. There is where the additional hazard occurs. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Schaffter, if you were looking out of the cupola on a turn and saw a car had a hot box, what would you do about it? Mr. SCRAFFTER. I would make an effort to stop the engine by dis- playing stop signals. The CHAIRMAN. Suppose the signals were not observed by the engineer, what would you do? Mr. SCHAFFTER. In that case we are required to use judgment. If the condition of the car was such, a hot box should develop, and it was sufficiently serious in my judgment to justify the immediate stopping of that train, I would, in that case, comply with the in- structions contained in the time table, which says that trainmen must not apply the air brakes from the rear of the train except in case of an emergency. In that case, me being the conductor on that train, I would determine whether or not it would be good judgment to stop the train. Another thing I would have to take into consideration would be the grade the train was on, whether it was going up grade or down grade. If I saw fit to stop that train, each cabin car is equipped with a valve at each end of the cabin car. I would reach up, take hold of that valve, and make a gradual reduction of the brake pipe pressure which would gradually apply the brakes on the train and bring it to a stop, and then I would proceed over or along the train and ascertain the condition of that car. If there was water along the right-of-way, in case we had had rains, I would use that to cool it, probably put packing and oil -and grease in the box, take it to the next station or in case it was not sufficiently hot to justify setting it out at the next station, I would continue the car on through and see what developed. The car might run to the terminal. It might not, depending upon, the condition of the journal; the condition of the babbitt, the brass in the bearing. The CHAIRMAN. Is there no method of audible transmission of danger signals from the rear to the front of the train? Mr. SCHAFFTER. No, sir. Mr. EICHER. Do you know whether or not any studies have been made as to the availability of radio for the transmission of such signals? Mr. SCHAFFTER. I understand there have been in some cases, a- though I am not familiar with what success they have met. Mr. CROSER. I am inclined to think that you were not altogether clear in your explanation as to why you could not be in the cupola at all times while making these reports. Why is it necessary for you to be down in the car? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Assuming that that cupola would be arranged in the same manner as the body of the cabin car down on the floor of the cabin car, the bunks are near the desk. We would find that we would have considerable more side-sway and vibration. The higher TRAIN LENGTHS 263 we get off the bearings of a car, the more side-sway and more vibra- tion there would be, and it would be practically impossible to do so. Furthermore, in case of a sudden impact, a shock on the rear end with the conductor or flagman or both of them at work in writing up that report, ii that cupola, not being prepared and holding, because we are holding the clipboards and writing, in case of a sudden impact there is a greater possibility of being thrown out of the cupola down into the cabin car. It would not be practicable. The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed with your statement. Mr. Wrrmow. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Withrow. Mr. WTHRow. In addition to that, is not this so, that trains run at all hours of the night and the day and, if you were required to make your reports out in the cupola it would necessitate your having a light in the cupola? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Certainly. Mr. WITHROw. As a matter of fact now on most cabooses you have a curtain that you drop down so as to prevent the light getting up into the cupola. The reason for that being that when there is a light in the cupola you cannot see the train, because of the glare. Mr. SCHAFFTER. That is correct. Mr. WINTHROW. It just would not be practical at all, would it? Mr. SCHAFFTER. That is correct. I did not think of the light facili- ties in my explanation, but that is correct, also. Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Halleck. Mr. HALLECK. As I understand, Mr. Schaffter, you have recently been riding cabooses on the back end of freight trains? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes, sir. Mr. HALLECK. Operating trains with as high as 100 or more cars? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes, sir. Mr. HALLECK. Could you give the committee any idea, in percent- age, as to the increase in shock experienced by you riding in the cupola on a 100-car train as compared with a 70-car train? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes, sir; I believe I can. In order to exemplify the relative shock. Mr. HALLECK. I do not want to deflect you from the statement you are making here, but I referred to percentage. Mr. SCHArFTER. Percentage of shock. Mr. HALLECK. Yes. Mr. SCHAFFTER. I can illustrate that to you very clearly. Mr. HALLECK. All right. Mr. SCHAFFTER. In order to exemplify that, I might say, by taking a short cut to this: The shock that occurs on the rear end of a 150-car train is 100 percent greater than it is on a 75-car train, in the event of an emergency application. Mr. HALLECK. Do I understand from that that it is your position that the increase in the severity of the shock with the longer train is in exact ratio with the increase in the number of cars? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Usually, excepting when there is an unusual dis- proportion in the distribution of the loaded cars in their relation to empty cars in the make-up of the train. What I mean by that is we may have a cut of possibly 10 loads of coal or iron ore on the head end of the train and we may have a cut of 25 empty cars. Then we may 264 TVAIN LENGTHS have a cut of cars loaded with timber, steel, brick, lumber, and so forth. And then we may have another cut of empties, then a cut of loads on the rear end. The unequal braking power or the ability of the brakes to retard the motion and the speed of those cars causes these run-ins and run- outs, intermittently all through the train, ranging from the head end to the rear end. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Schaffter-are you through, Mr. Halleck ? Mr. HALLECK. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Is there any regular practice as to where the loaded cars in a train shall be placed? Mr. SCHAFFER. Not as a rule. The CHAIRMAN. To what extent does that tend to affect the shock, that is, the location of the loaded cars and empty cars; what effect does that have on the shock? Mr. SCHAFFTr. Let us assume we have 25 loads of coal on the head end of a hundred-car train; the remaining 75 are empties on the rear end. The train is running along and the head end of the train passes over a hump and starts descending a grade. The moment that those loaded cars are over the apex of that grade they immediately start to increase their speed. The slack immediately begins to run out on that train and by the time that slack runs out of the rear car there is a severe jerk on the cabin car. That, you understand, is without any application of the brakes whatever. The CHAIRMAN. By that, you mean slack is taken up by the rear cars running forward? Mr. SCHAFFTER. The head cars pulling forward, causing a jerk, a run-out; the stretch-out. The CHAIRMAN. Coming up the hill the rear cars would be stretched out. Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Then when you started down, the jerk would be because of the rear cars rushing forward? Mr. SCHAFFTER. I do not get the question. The CHAIRMAN. If a train comes along and goes up over a hump, as it goes over the hill all cars are taut. There is no slack. Then, when they start down the hill the cars begin to travel at a faster speed than the front end of the train and without the application of the brakes there would be slack taken up, pushing forward. Is that not right? And, when you are going downhill, all of the cars being taut, as they go up the hill, but as they start down, the cars in the rear have a tendency to push forward and take up the slack on the other end. Mr. SCHAFFTER. That would be the case in that particular case, provided all of the slack was stretched out and the cars were taut as you say; but as a usual thing when a train goes over a small hump, there is usually a descending grade beyond which causes the slack to bunch. We have that. I have in mind Fredericksburg, Ohio. We come down a grade and then we strike a level piece of track, approxi- mately 30 car lengths of level track and then immediately we start to descend, and when that train comes down that grade those cars, the slack runs in. In other words, bunches. Then when we go on the level track and the head end runs down over, and if there are TRAIN LENGTHS 265 loads in the head end of the train they increase in speed and we get a jerk. The CHAIRMAN. That answers my question. I just wanted to know if I understood your statement right. Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Halleck. Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Schaffter, have you ever given any thought to the recommendation of changes in the interior of cabooses by which the men might be made more safe? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes; I have. Mr. HALLECK. Have there been improvements in the past? Mr. SCHAFFTER. There have been none, because we have the same type of cabin cars that we had approximately 12 years ago. Mr. HALLECK. Do you think it would be possible to alter or change the equipment and the interior of the cabooses as to accomplish in a large measure the safety that might be accomplished by the passage of legislation such as this? Mr. SCHAFFTER. No, sir; not so far as the shock is concerned. There is nothing that can be done in that respect. Mr. HALLECK. I am reminded that when riding airplanes, safety belts are required to be used. Would a man riding in the cupola of a caboose get any measure of protection by the use of such a belt as that? Mr. SCHAFFTER. No, sir. It is not feasible, in my estimation. Mr. EICHER. Could they fix them up like they do padded' cells? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Like what? Mr. EICHER. Padded cells. Mr. SCHAFFTER. Well, we pad them up occasionally. We slide the cushions up against those iron walls so that in the event we get a shock we will be thrown up against there rather than up against the iron wall. Mr. HALLECK. That helps some? Mr. ScHAFFTER. It certainly does in case we are thrown against that pad. The fear, dread, and apprehension incident to riding in the cabin car on the rear end of these long trains, knowing that an emergency application may occur at any time and at any point, such an emer- gency application is made either by the engineer to avoid striking vehicles-or other obstructions, in response to a stop signal that may be given by track men or bridge men who are making repairs on or about the tracks, because a side or main rod or some other vital part of the locomotive has broken or becomes defective, or an involuntary or accidental application of the brakes caused by any of many defects that may develop, such as broken wheels, journals, couplers, knuckles, broken air pipes, bursting of air hose, and so forth, creates a feeling such as a motorist would experience if he were in constant danger of a stone wall being thrown up in the path of his automobile. The management of the Pennsylvania Railroad in the territory over which I operate virtually admits that riding in a cabin car on the rear end of these long trains presents the greatest hazard in con- nection with the handling of freight trains. In support of my con- tention, I would refer you to a book containing 203 rules pertaining to safety in train and engine service. 266 TRAIN LENGTHS This is the safety book that I refer to [exhibiting book]. This book was compiled by the management of the Pennsylvania Railroad and is issued to engineers, firemen, and trainmen. Rule No. 1508 in this book reads as follows: Be prepared to avoid injury from sudden starting, stopping, lurch, or jerk of engine, car, or train, by facing the direction it is moving, by being braced and holding, or prepared to do so instantly, and by moving about only when necessary for the performance of duty. Mr. WOLvFrTON. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WOLVERTON. Does that apply only to trains of more than 70 cars, or to all trains? Mr. SCHAFFTER. All trains. Mr. WOLVERTON. So you contemplate the possibility of accident is likely to arise in trains of less than 70 cars, as well as in trains of over 70 cars. Mr. SCHAFFTER. That is the intention of the rule. Mr. WOLVERTON. Are there any special rules with regard to trains of more than 70 cars? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Nothing. It is expected that this will cover the entire movement of any train regardless of the number of cars. Mr. WOLVERTON. The rules are based upon experience as to the cause of accidents? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes. Mr. WOLVERTON. And experience shows that they are likely to hap- pen to trains under 70 cars as well as trains over 70 cars. . Mr. SCHAFrER. Probably I can explain this better by the following comment in connection with that: As a result of the increasing num- ber of men who are being injured in the handling of these long trains, the management prepared a supply of heavy fiberboard notices upon which is printed this rule No. 1508 together with other comment in large type, black and red letters. The car service department was supplied with these notices and the workmen in that department at- tached them with screws in a conspicuous place on the walls of the cabin cars. I have here several copies of this notice, of this bulletin, rather, together with the notice they gave at the time that those notices were attached to the walls of the cabin cars. I will read the bulletin that I refer to. THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD, CENTRAL REGION, EASTERN DIVISION Pittsburgh, Pa., November 16, 19i. SAFETY BULLETIN To all train service emnployees: Our records show that 47 percent of the personal injuries occurring to train service employees would and could have been avoided had the requirements of safety rule 1508 been complied with. Safety rule 1508-be prepared to avoid injury from sudden starting, stopping, lurch or jerk of engine, car or train, by facing direction itis moving, by being braced and holding, or prepared to do so instantly, and by moving about only when necessary for the performance of duty. Here is the comment at the bottom of the rule: I am urging you personally to see to it that you are familiar with the above safety rule and observe all of its requirements, to avoid injury. I insist that your fellow trainmen do likewise. TRAIN LENGTHS 267 That is signed D. K. Chase, superintendent. Mr. MARTIN. Let me ask a question there. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. Has this rule ever been involved in any claims in litigation in court over personal injuries? Mr. SCHAFTER. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. That is, has the company availed itself of this rule, claiming contributory negligence on the part of a trainman for fail- ure to observe it? Mr. SCHAFFTER. We have instances, many of them, where men are injured and the management contended that it could have been avoided, yet the injured employee insisted that he had complied with the rule and he did everything within his power to avoid injury, but that the shock came so suddenly it was not possible for him to do so. It was not anticipated, and he was not in a position at that time in the discharge of his duties to adequately protect himself, conse- quently he was thrown against some fixed object in the cabin car, probably thrown on the floor. Mr. MARTIN. Well, when the company knows you have to put in a great part of your time in the caboose making out reports, it knows very well you cannot comply with this rule. Mr. SCHAFFTER. They certainly ought to know that a man cannot be holding continually because if he did he would be of no value on that cabin car, because the rules require him on passing every oppos- ing train on an adjacent track to be out there to observe and to inspect that train as it passes. We have predetermined signals that we are required to give and do give to the crew of the opposing train when the cabins pass each other. Holding the nose this way [indi- cating] indicates a hot journal. Sliding of the hands [indicating] indicates brake sticking or wheels sliding. At night a lantern while in a man's hand, by holding the frame of the lantern this way [indi- cating] indicates a hot box. By holding it out-stretched means that wheels are sliding, brakes sticking, on the train. Mr. MARTIN. An engineer could not see you holding your nose 150 cars away, could he? Mr. SCHAFFTER. That is for the benefit, Mr. Congressman, of the crew on the rear end of the train. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Have you finished, Mr. Martin? Mr. MARTIN. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BULwINKLE. Has the Pennsylvania Railroad issued any orders limitina train lengths, the number of cars in a train? Mr. CHAFFTER. Not to my knowledge. Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Halleck. Mr. HALLECK. Do you want us to understand, Mr. Schafter, that the Pennsylvania Railroad would undertake to defend an action against it for injury resulting from shock by showing that, for in- stance, while you were writing out one of these reports, did not have hold of something to brace yourself and therefore were guilty of contributory negligence? That is, as I read that rule, it contemplates that you should be braced, or be ready to hold on, so far as it would be consistent with the performance of your duties in the caboose. 268 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. SCHAFTER. Irrespective of the rule, the law of self-preserva- tion prompts us to take all of the precautions that we possibly can to avoid an injury. Mr. HALLECK. Well, that is a statement, as I understand it, of the common law rule of negligence. You are supposed to do what a rea- sonable prudent person would do under like circumstances. Mr. WOLvERToN. I assume, however, that much of that has been vitiated by the compensation laws now applicable to railroad employees. Mr. HALLECK. Well, I think that is true too. The CHAIRMAN. At this time, I would like to say that this morning a memorial service is being held for Judge William Graham, who was an able and very eminent member of this committee for a num- ber of years. Some of the members here served with him. I also served with him as a member of the War Investigating Committee. So, Mr. Crosser and I feel that it is necessary for us to attend that service, and we regret our temporary absences. The hearing will proceed, with Mr. Bulwinkle presiding. Mr. BULwINKLE. You may proceed, Mr. Schaffter. Mr. SCHAFFTER. With reference to this bulletin containing the safety rule, together with the comment preceding and following it, as I have already stated in relating the circumstances which resulted in my injuries, I complied with the rule by holding and by being braced, not merely because the rule requires it, but as I said before, because the law of self-preservation impelled me to do so. The fact of the matter is that there is a limit to the amount of shock a man can endure without being injured, in spite of the rule and all of the precautions he may take to prevent it. In the entire book containing those 203 safety rules that I referred to, no other rule has been emphasized in this manner; nor has there, to my knowledge, ever been such a strenuous effort made to impress the employees with the provision and requirement of the safety rule. We know that the lading in cars handled by these long trains is being damaged by rough handling and that the equipment is being damaged. We know that these long trains are being delayed en route because many of the passing sidings are too short to permit them to get into clear for following and opposing superior trains. They are delayed by reason of broken knuckles and drawbars and by stalling on heavy grades and quite frequently it is necessary to tie up the crew en route for 8 hours' rest under the hours-of-service law or send another crew out to relieve them and continue the train to the terminal. With the advent of the long trains they established helper- engine service by attaching engines on the rear of trains behind the cabin car to assist them over territory where they were never used before, thereby creating an additional hazard as trainmen have been injured and killed by this method of operation. Mr. EICHER. Can you tell me, Mr. Schaffter, when this rule 1508 first appeared in the rule book? Mr. SCHAFFTER. We have that rule incorporated in a book dated November 1, 1912. However, that rule at that time Mr. EICHER. Same wording? Mr. SCHAFFPER. It does not appear in its present form. The rule that appeared in that book is similar to that rule and provides for TRAIN LENGTHS 26 9 guarding against shocks and impacts, and so forth, as stated in the rule. It has been amplified in that book. The date of that book is Mr. EICHER. The date of this book I hold in my hand is November 1, 1933. Mr. SCHAFFER. The date of this one here, the older one, is 1912. Probably I can find that old rule and read it. Mr. MARTIN. Do you recall at this point, the main difference in the two rules? Mr. ScAFTER. Pardon me. Mr. MARTIN. Do you recall at this point the main difference in the rules? Mr. SCHAFFTER. There is practically no difference. It says be prepared to avoid injury in starting or stopping. Mr. EICHER. Do you think that you could find that and put it into the record, the exact wording of the first safety rule? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes; I think I can give it to you. Mr. BULWINKLE. Let some one else find it, and go ahead with your statement. Mr. MARTIN. Do you recall when you first operated a 100-car train; do you recall when you first operated a 100-car train? How many years ago? Mr. SCHAFETER. Approximately with the introduction of the big power, the heavy locomotives on our division, our line of railroad. I presume about 12 years ago. Mr. MARTIN. When did you first handle a 150-car train? Mr. SCHAFFTER. We, as a rule, do not handle many trains of that length. The longest train I have been in charge of, as I stated in my statement there is a 124-car train, exclusive of cabin car. Mr. MARTIN. What was the maximum length of trains when you become a trainman, I think you said, in 1907 or 1908? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Very seldom more than 40 cars. Occasionally we hauled 50 cars, providing they were empties. But usually we were instructed not to haul more than 50. Mr. O'BRIEN. Did you have any accidents at that time? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Resulting from what? Mr. O'BRIEN. Hauling 30 or 40 cars. Mr. SCHAFFTER. Due to shock, or impact? Mr. O'BhIEN. The same as you have in the long trains? Mr. SCHAFFTEJI. Yes; we had some accidents. We had a few. Mr. MARTIN. What was the comparative capacity of cars then and now, tonnage? Mr. SCHAFFTER. The size of the cars has been increased somewhat. That is, the capacity of them. We have cars ranging from-occa- sionally, we have an 80,000 capacity car. Most of our cars are 100.000; from 110,000 to 140,000 capacity. Of course, on other roads, like the Virginian, where they have six-wheeled trucks, I think the capacity of those cars are 210,000 pounds. I am not cer- tain about that. Mr. MARTIN. That would be 105 tons. Mr. ScHAFFTm. 105 tons. Mr. MARTIN. You said at the outset that you were handling a 6,500-ton train. 47891-3-- 18 270 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. SCHAFFTER. No; I said that was the longest train I had been on. I said that the longest train I had been in charge of was 5,500 tons. Mr. MARTIN. 5,500 tons ? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Usually, leaving Columbus, the 100-car train will usually run from 4,900 to 5,500 tons. Mr. MARTIN. What was the maximum they were handling when you first began, about? Mr. SCHAFFTER. The tonnage, or the cars? Mr. MARTIN. The tonnage. Mr. SCHAFFTER. An eight-six engine at that time would only haul 1,500 tons and that required a pusher engine over the 1.18 grades that I alluded to in my statement. Mr. MARTIN. The 5,500-ton train now, I presume, would require a pusher? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Oh, yes, sir; it does on that grade and we usually get a double-header, when we do not have a pusher, we have a double- header over the entire division, and in addition to that, the two engines on the head end, we require a pusher to propel that train over the heavy grades we have on the division. Mr. MAPES. Is that the rule on your run, to have two engines? Mr. SCHAFFTER. It happens to be necessary in order to propel the train over the road. Mr. MAPEs. Even with the increased power that the engines now have? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes. The largest locomotives we use on our divi- sion are the I-1 type. The tractive effort of those engines is slightly over 90,000 pounds, with horse-power equivalent to approximately 2,700 or 2,800 horsepower. Mr. MAPES. These big trains require two and sometimes three of those engines to pull them? Mr. SCHAFFTER. When we have the 100-car train, we will have two engines. If we do not have two engines, assuming we are leaving Canton-I am on the Canton-Columbus run-if we have that 100-car train and there are not two engine crews available from our home division, then they attach a pusher behind the cabin. That pusher assists to Orrville, a distance of 26 miles. At Orrville the eastern division pusher engine will be. detached and the Cleveland division usually attaches an engine to the head end of the train. That is necessary in order to pull the train over the first grade after leaving Orrville. Then, when we arrive at Glenmont, we usually stop for water and there is a pusher engine located at that point. Pusher service is maintained at that point with a terminal at Mount Vernon, Ohio. That engine is assigned to assist trains between Glenmont and Danville over those heavy grades and there that pusher engine is attached to the rear of the cabin car and assists the train over the grade. Mr. MARTIN. Can two engines pull a 100-car train at the same rate of speed as two engines would pull 50 cars, as a result of their double tractive power? Mr. SCHAFFTER. They do not do that as a rule. They do not take the tonnage of the two engines and divide it. They reduce it. It was customary to reduce the tonnage of the one engine by 10 percent when the train is double-headed. TRAIN LENGTHS 271 Mr. MARTIN. I do not just understand that. You mean that the two engines haul 10 percent less in one train than they would haul separately ? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Assuming that a given tonnage or hauling capacity of one locomotive would be 2,500 tons. Two of them would nor- mally be 5,000 tons. It was customary on our division to take the tonnage of the one engine, that is, 2,500 tons, and then reduce the tonnage of the second engine by 10 percent, which cut 250 tons off of the 5,000 tons, consequently the tonnage of the two when com- bined in one train would be reduced to 4,750 tons. Mr. MARTIN. How about the speed of the train? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Well, it all depends upon the territory over which we are running. If it is level or there is considerable downgrade there would be no difference so far as speed is concerned, but it re- quires longer to reduce the speed of these trains. It requires more care in releasing the brakes, and that is exactly where the trouble arises. When an application of the brakes is made on those long trains and it is necessary to reduce the speed to such a point as is necessary and local conditions require, the engineer is afraid to release the brakes on these long trains, because if they do, there will be a stretch-out and the couplers will break, knuckles will break, damage will result on account of run-outs, and in that way and for that reason, the longer train requires more time to be hauled over the division. Many times when an engineer reduces the speed of a train he will come to a complete stop with a 100- or 125-ear train, whereas if he had a short train of 70 cars, he would not come to a stop. He would release the brakes before the train had stopped and continue on; but because of that long train and because the brakes will not function properly on that long train, and because of the danger of tearing that train to pieces, rather than release those brakes he comes to a complete stop. Then it requires longer for them to release the brakes. Then it requires time to start the train. There is more difficulty in starting these long trains than there is in shorter trains. Often the engineer is required to take the slack from three to four and five times be- fore they get them started, because the blocks do not properly release on long trains. They are still sticking on the rear end, because the pressure in the train line has not been built up. Mr. BULWINKLE. You may proceed, if there are no further questions. Mr. WITHROW. Mr. Chairman. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Withrow. Mr. WITHRow. Mr. Schaffter, would the limitation of trains to not more than 70 cars in length eliminate any of this pusher service? Mr. SCHAFTER. Certainly. Mr. WITHRow. How much could be eliminated or would be elimi- nated, if the railroads were not permitted to run trains of over 70 cars? Mr. SCHAFFTER. That varies according to the' physiography, the topography, of the rails in the various divisions. Now, on our division, if we had a 70-car train, particularly empty ears, it would not be required to have any pusher engine. Pusher engines would be out of the picture. You would eliminate the pusher. But, on the' train that is loaded up, or partly loaded, it would require a pusher. Where we have the 1.18 percent grade, but at no 272 TRAIN LENGTHS other point on our division, unless it should be an unusually heavy train, such as a train loaded entirely with coal and iron ore-ponder- ous loading; for instance, on the eastern division with 70-car trains, pusher service would be almost entirely eliminated. Mr. WInnRow. That would be a material saving to the railroad company, the elimination of a portion of pusher service at least, would it not? Mr. SCHAJFFTER. Yes; it would, in many respects. Mr. WIrow. That is all. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. O'Brien. Mr. O'BRIEN. How does your pay compare now with what you were getting when you would run the 50-car train? Mr. SCHAFThER. Prom 1912 on for a number of years, when we had the eight-six engine, before the introduction of the H-8, or H-10 engine, the eight-six engine would haul 1,500 tons of iron ore. I use iron ore as an example, from Cleveland to Orrville. I received at that time $3.63, if my memory serves me right, for acting as con- ductor on a 1,500-ton train of iron ore from the initial terminal in Cleveland to Orrville. Mr. HALLECK. How many hours did that take? Mr. SCHAFTrER. That varies considerably. Sometimes we would make it in 5 hours and other times we were longer, depending upon the delays and that delay was principally to running over a single-track railroad, and so forth, passenger trains; meeting orders with other trains and so forth. At that time a conductor received, I believe, $3.63 for that trip. He was paid for an 8-hour day, paid for a minimum day. Today a conductor in charge of one of those trains with two of those large engins from Cleveland to Orrville--and as a rule he does not sto at rrville-that is only a 62-mile run or a 56-mile run. They have cut out the short-haul. With the big engines, with the welded flues and stoker, they haul them farther and we do not get the mini- mum day's pay for the 56-mile run. It is based on 100 miles, and from Cleveland to Columbus is a distance of 162 miles, and he is paid mileage, and that conductor today in charge of a train with two of those large engines hauling 6,000 to 6,300 tons, over that particular portion of the railroad, and with his pay with the 44-cents a day in- creased, amounts to $7.08 per hundred miles. Mr. MARTIN. How many miles is that? Mr. SCHATrER. Assuming that he makes 100 miles or less, without any overtime. If he does not run over the 8 hours, be gets $7.06. Mr. HALLECK. What does he get if he goes over 100 miles? Mr. SCHAFFTER. His earnings are increased proportionately in accordance with the mileage involved. Mr. HALLECK. But by what proportion? Mr. SCHAFFTER. The speed of the freight train, so far as computing the pay is concerned, is based on a speed of 12 miles per hour and if the train runs 100 miles at 12 miles per hour that is equivalent to 8 hours. If they are running 125 miles, we determine it by dividing 125 by 12 , and that is equivalent to 10 hours. Now on a 125-mile run, he will receive 10 hours' pay at the straight rate. Mr. HALLECK. Well, going back to the time when you originally started as a conductor, what were your average monthly wages? TRAIN LENGTHS 273 Mr. SCHAFFTER. That all depended on how many times, how much time you put in. Mr. HALLECK. I mean, your average monthly wage, as nearly as you can give it. Mr. ScnArrrEi. As I said, $3.63 for an 8-hour day. Now, it de- pended on how many of those 8-hour days you got. Mr. HALLECK. Well, if you remember, or if you know, what was your average monthly wage? That would be the only way I can get any adequate conception of it. I do not know that it has much to do with this particular hearing, but I am curious about it. Mr. SCHAFmR. I cannot tell you exactly, because I do not know. Mr. HALLECK. I am not asking you exactly. If you do not remember, of course, you cannot answer. Mr. SCHAFFTER. If I received $3.63, which I did, and I worked 30 8-hour days in that month, I received $108.80. Mr MARTIN. How much? Mr. SCHAn'rER. $108.80. Mr. HALLECK. If you work 30 days now as a conductor, what would it be? Do you know what your average monthly wage is running now? Mr. SCHAFFTER. My average wage now? Mr. HALLECK. As a conductor on the Pennsylvania. Mr. SCHAFFTER. On the run I am on, a distance of 132 miles one way and 133 the other-that is because of a variation of the movement of the train at the final terminal-I only make 20 days in a calendar month. That is 20 of those single trips in a calendar month on the assignment I am working on now. The distance is 132 miles in one direction and 133 miles in the other direction. The rate of pay in one direction is $9.32. There are 20 single trips in there, and that would be $186.40. Mr. HALLECK. For 20 days, as compared with the figure you gave for 30 days when you started? Mr. SCHAFFTER. The 30 days were only 8-hour days, only 8-hour days, which means on runs of 100 miles or less, but in this case all of the runs and all of those days are over territory of 132 miles. Mr. HALLECK. How long does it take you to make that run? Mr. SCHAFrrER. And, that varies. We have made that run in as low as 7 hours, and then again it takes us 15 hours to make it. If we have a short train, a single train, with only one engine, the probabilities are we will make a good run, and we will make it in less time, but if we have a long, heavy train with two engines then we know that we are going to be delayed and going to take longer. Mr. HALLECK. Let me ask you this specific question. Are you working an average monthly number of hours less now than you were when you started as a conductor? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Less hours? Mr. HALLECK. Per month. Mr. SCHAFFTER. Per month? Mr. HALLECK. Per month; are you working less hours per month now than you were when you started as a conductor? Mr. SCHAFFTER. I doubt very much if I am working less hours. Mr. HALLECK. That is all. Mf. BULWINKLE. All right, you may proceed, Mr. Schaffter; go ahead with your statement. 274 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. SCHAFFTER. Mr. Congressman, you asked something with regard to the locomotives. Did you ask about the weight? Mr. EICHER. Yes; these I-1 engines. Mr. SCHAFFER. The I-1 is the kind the Pennsylvania used. Probably you have seen them, with the main reservoirs, that is, the air tanks, on the front of the engine. Those locomotives weighed slightly over 300 tons, in-working order. That is the one that has the tractive effort of 90,000 pounds thatI referred to. Now, in regard to the -safety rule you asked about. You asked a question. I have discovered another safety rule book here that was issued between the time the one I referred to and the one you were looking at. I referred to two of them. The first one was issued under date of November 1, 1912. Then we have another one issued under date of November 1, 1933. Mr. Farquharson advises me that he could not locate that safety rule at all in the old book, dated November 1, 1912. It is not in there. But, here is one issued October 1 1929. We have that book containing safety rules, and under No. 1507 we have this rule: Watch to avoid injury from sudden starting, stopping, lurch, jerk, of loco- motive, car, or train. That is all there is. Mr. EICHER. Let me ask this, for the purpose of the record. Is it true that in 1929 is the first appearance in the safety rule book of any rule that is similar to the present rule No. 1508? Mr. SCHIAFFTER. Yes. Mr. EICHER. Covering that same general subject? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes, sir. I was mistaken. I thought that rule was in here. Probably I was confused with the two books. Now, you will notice in the safety rule book that was issued in 1912, that rule does not appear. It apparently was not necessary to issue any rule of that kind in 1912; but we find in 1929, we find it here .worded in two lines, under rule 1507. Mr. MARTIN. That is what I was getting at in my questions a while back, with a view to seeing what, if any, light it would shed on the time of the origin of these'long trains and the complaints from the men operating the trains of difficulty in operating and accidents growing out of them. Mr. SCHAFFTER. You may find the answer to your question Mr. ETCHER. I am finished, so far as I am concerned. Mr. MAPES. Mr. Chairman Mr. BULwINxL. Mr. Mapes. Mr. MAPES. You are in active service as a conductor, at the present time? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes, sir. Mr. MAPEs. What proportion of the trains that you operate are longer than 70 cars, and what proportion are shorter than 70 cars in length, would you say? Mr. SCHAFFTER. That question takes in a large scope. As a matter of fact, the movement of a light engine is considered as a train move- ment. It is my understanding that the Interstate Commerce .Com- mission regards a light engine as a train movement, the same as our book of rules, or operating rules, contemplate a light engine moving TRAIN LENGTHS 275, with one or more engines coupled, with or without cars displaying markers. I think that is the definition we find in connection with compiling reports for the Interstate Commerce Commission. On page lo1 you have a definition as to what constitutes a train. But, in regard to the proportion of trains, as I have already stated, when sufficient freight has accumulated, it is the practice to run a long train with two engines; but where they have established symbal serv- ice, freight trains operating between two points, if the freight has not accumulated, then naturally the trains have to depart with less cars. Mr. MAPEs. In your operation of trains on this 132 miles, or 133 miles, depending upon the direction, how many of them are 70 cars. in length or more and how many are less? - Mr. SCHAFFTER. I wish I had my records here. I have a record of the movement of every train I am in charge of in each direction, and in the service I am operating in between Columbus and Canton. The majority of the trains are more than 70 cars in length. Mr. MAPES. Would you say that over half of them are over 70 cars in length. Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes; more than half of them. Up to the time of the present repression in business, it was very seldom that we left Canton with less. That is on our trip to Columbus, it was very seldom we left there with less than 85 cars. It was from that on up to 120,. as I stated. Mr. MAPES. How and where are these long trains made up. Mr. SCHAFFrER. How they are made up? Mr. MAPES. Yes. Mr. SCHAFFTER. In the yards. Mr. MAPES. Yes. Mr. SCHAFFTER. For instance, train CC-1, usually is called at Can- ton, the crew is called, to report at 5 a. m. We have the freight that originates at Canton. That consists of considerable steel, because Canton is a great steel manufacturing center. We have steel that comes in there on other trains from Youngstown, Niles, Pittsburgh, Warren, and so forth. We have freight that comes from Buffalo and Erie. Several trains come into Canton. And, we get what we call the connections. The train is made up of freight originating in Canton; freight originating at other points, and that is brought in there on those trains, and there usually is a delay, if the connections are late. There is a delay and it requires switching, switching of the cars from the incoming train in order to make up our train. Then as a rule we will have to double over that, couple our engines on the cars we receive off of one of those trains, pull theih out, throw the switch; back that cut of cars onto another track which contains cars, in the make-up of our train; then pull those out, and then back on to what represents the rear end of the train. Mr. MAPES. Starting from nothing, how long does it take to make up a train of 150 or 170 cars in length? Mr. SCHAFFTER. To make it up? Mr. MAPES. Yes. Mr. SCHAFFTER. That all depends upon the nature of the freight, where it originates, and what its destination is. If you have a train of coal, have a solid train of coal, there would be no switching. Or 276 TRAIN LENGTHS if you have a train of iron ore coming in from a particular terminal, and destined to particular points, there would be no switching of that train. Mr. MAPES. Of course, it has got to be made up somewhere. Mr. SCHAFFTER. But, you are referring to the testing of the trains, and so forth? Mr. MArES. No. I am referring to loading the cars and assembling them and getting them into a train. Mr. ScHArFER. A train such as we haul between Canton and Columbus requires considerable time. There would be no definite period of time. One train would probably require 30 minutes, and another would require more than 3 hours. Mr. MAPES. Are they made up mostly at junction points, or not? Mr. SCHAFFTER. We have a connection that comes in from Erie and that connection, that train, leaves Erie and he picks up enroute a number of cars at a number of points and he will come into Canton with his train. Then it all depends. Some of the cars in the head end of that train will go to Fort Wayne; some of them Chicago; which requires movement over on the main line. Mr. MAPES. What I am trying to ascertain is this: Suppose one of the roads running out of Washington wanted to haul a train of 150 cars.' How long would it take it to accumulate that number of cars before it could get a train of that length here in Washington, or at any other given point? Mr. SCHAFFTER. There is no definite amount of time that you could use as a basis for computing that. Mr. MAPES. There has been some criticism of these long trains because of the delay in the delivery from the shipping point to the point of destination, and if you can give us some idea of the extent of that delay, it would be helpful. Mr. SCHAFFTER. I think I have covered it, because these trains are delayed enroute and it requires longer, as a rule, to move a long train than a shorter train. It does over the territory where I am working. Mr. MAPES. You have covered the question of running time, but you have not told us much about how much time it takes to assemble the cars to make up the train before it starts out. Mr. SCHAFFTER. If we would make a comparison as between the length of time that it requires and the time consumed in assembling a trail of 70 cars, it is obvious that it would require less time to assemble that train than a train of twice that length. Mr. MAPES. That is so, but how much less? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Assuming that the 70-car train required the same amount of switching and that there were the same number of move- ments required to be made in the assembling of the 70-car train as there would be proportionately in assembling the 140-car train, then it only requires one-half as long to assemble the 70-car train as it would the 140-car train. Take CC-1 leaving Canton, that is, for instance, on Monday morning. Mr. MAPES. I am not talking about "leaving Canton," but I am talking about how long it takes to get the cars together. How long is it from the time the first car is loaded before it starts for its destination because the road is waiting for the entire 150 cars to make up the train? TRAIN LENGTHS 277 Mr. SCHAFFTER. Well, I can answer that. If they make up a short train, that is, a train of 60 to 70 cars, such as we get at Canton on Monday morning, because there is no business over Sunday, or very little, that train gets prompt movement and is made up promptly. We get out of those yards in possibly one-half of the time we will in case we have to make up a hundred or a hundred and ten or a hundred and twenty-car train. It usually does not require more than one-half of the time on the short train on Monday as it does on the other days, and I say that because I have had the experience of working on Mondays, when the trains are shorter than they are on other days of the week. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Mapes, have you finished? Mr. MArEs. Yes. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Schaffter, how long did you say that you had been operating trains of over 70 cars? You answered a little while ago. I believe. Mr. SCHAFFTER. I said 12 years, approximately, when we got the heavy locomotives. Mr. BULWINKLE. During that 12 years, how many accidents have you suffered, if any, on account of operating trains? How many accidents or injuries to yourself, if any, have you suffered? Mr. SCHAFFTER. I received the two accidents that I sustained on long trains. That is the accident Mr. BULWINKLE. Just let us get down to it, because we only have 30 minutes. You say in the 12 years, you have suffered two injuries to yourself, in 12 years. Mr. SCHAFFTER. That is, of the kind, severe. I have been bumped and bruised on many, many times, on the rear end of long trains. Mr. BULWINKLE. While you were operating trains of over 70 cars,. which you are operating the majority of time, did you? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes, sir. Mr. BULWINKLE. Now, in trains of less than 70 cars, how many times have you been bruised or bumped? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Due to slack or impact? Mr. BULWINKLE. Yes, sir. Mr. SCHAFFTER. I am not prepared to recall any. I cannot recall any. Mr. BULWINKLE. All right, sir. How many times were you bruised? You said that you were injured twice. Now, how many times were you bruised in operating 70-car trains, during the last 12 years? Mr. SCHAFFTER. I suppose dozens of times. Mr. BULWINKLE. Can you get at it accurately? If not, can you give us an estimate? Was it a dozen times? Mr. SCHAFFTER. At least. Mr. BULWINKLE. Was it more than 12 times? Mr. SCHAFFTER. More than 12 times. Mr. BUWINKLE. Well, how many more? Mr. SCHAFFTER. I am not in a position to tell. Mr. BULWINKLE. Would you say 20 times? I am trying to find out. what is happening in these two groups you are referring to. Mr. SCHAFFTER. The injuries were more or less local, like bruises: from being thrown up against something. 278 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. BULWINKLE. I am asking you how many times you have been bruised from being thrown up against something, for instance. Mr. SCHAFFTER. Or, a bump on the head. Mr. BULWINKLE. Yes, sir. Mr. SCHAFFTR. Bruises on the shoulder. Mr. BULWINKLE. All right; any injuries that you say you have had. How many times do you think it woud be? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Oh, I cannot tell you exactly. Mr. BULwINKLE. All right. Mr. O'BRIEN. You have to report those injuries, do you not, to your superiors when you receive them? Mr. SCHAFFTER. We are supposed to report any injuries. Mr. O'BRIEN. Is there a record on your railroad showing those injuries? Mr. SCHAFFTER. There is of those injuries. Mr. O'BRIEN. Is there some way that we can get that record which shows what they are? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Well, the small, minor injuries, such as a bruise on the leg, or a bruise on the arm or shoulder, or a bump on the head, trainmen do not report those. They avoid reporting those accidents. Mr. BULwINKLu. Now, coming back to my line of questions: You cannot recall a single time that you were bruised or injured-I want to get that correct, because of your answer just now-when operating trains of less than 70 cars. Mr. SCHAFFTER. On an injury? Mr. BULWINKLE. You said that you had not been injured in trains of less than 70 cars. Mr. SCHAFFTER. I would not say that I never have been bruised on a train of less than 70 cars. I said that I could not remember any case where I had gotten a severe bruise on a train of less than 70 cars. It appears I have on trains of less than 70 cars. Mr. BULwINKLE. How many time would you say on that? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Far less than I have sustained injuries on trains of over 70 cars. Mr. BULWINKLE. How many times less? Mr. SCHAFFTER. I can say that I have never been injured, that is, so far as a reportable accident is concerned, on a train of less than 70 cars. Mr. BULWINKLE. But you were injured twice on trains of over 70? Mr. SCHAFFrER. This one was not a reportable accident. Only one. Of the two I refer to, one was a reportable injury, where I lost approximately 2 weeks' time. Mr. BULwINKLE. Yes. Mr. SCHAFFTER. The other I was off probably 2 or 2 days. I went back before the expiration of 72 hours. Mr. BULWINKLE. Now, you spoke of the recession in business just now. What length of trains have you been operating since the reces- sion started in and, when did it start in on your railroad? Mr. SCHAFFTER. It affected us, I believe, in October. The freight began to fall off. The volume of it was reduced. Mr. BUIWINKLE. December was the lowest month? Mr. SCHAFFTER. I could not tell you that, unless I take my reports and sum them up for the months and show the number of cars moved. TRAIN LENGTHS 279 Mr. BULWINKLE. Since the recession started, have you operated many over 70-car length trains? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Oh, yes, sir; yes, sir. Mr. BULwINKLE. How much has it been reduced, by the recession? Mr. SCHAFFTER. You mean, how many trains? Mr. BULWINKLE. You told Mr. Mapes just now that up to the time that the recession started, a majority of the time you operated as a conductor on trains of more than 70 cars. Then you said when the recession started it fell off. How many trains have you operated since the recession started with over 70 cars? Was it 40 percent, or 35 percent ? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Oh, more than that. A majority of them were over 70 cars. But, we have not run up to 124 cars as I stated before. The aver- age was not as great. The average train was shorter, due to the recession, than it was before. Mr. BULWINKLE. Since the recession started, have you been bruised or injured on any of these trains that you have operated? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Since October? Mr. BULWINKLE. Yes, sir. Mr. SCHArFTER. I do not remember any. I do not recollect that I have sustained any bruises since then. Mr. BULwrNKLE. Or no accidents or injuries to you? Mr. SCHAFFER. No, sir. Mr. BTLWINKLE. On this division of the Pennsylvania, taking it prior to the recession, were more trains operating with 70 cars or more under 70, on the division prior to October? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Were more trains operated prior to October? Mr. BuLWINKLE. What percentage of trains were over 70 cars in length, operating on this division of the Pennsylvania Railroad that you are on; with 70 cars or more? Mr. Scum rrEn. At what period? Mr. BuLwINKLE. At any time in the year 1937 prior to the recession. Mr. SCHAFFTER. As I said before, I could not tell you that. On the particular service that I am engaged in, the majority of them are over 70 cars. Mr. BULwINKLE. Well, you do not know anything about the rest of the trains that were operating on that division during that period? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes; I know we have locals that operate that haul short trains. We have a local that operates between Orrville and Mount Vernon. We have another on the south end between Mount Vernon and Columbus. Now, I would not have the figures showing what percentage of them were less than 70 cars. Mr. BULWINKLE. I realize you have not got the figures, but I thought you being present all of the time, could give some information to the committee. Mr. SCHAFFTER. I can give you the information that on these runs that operate between Columbus and Canton in the work I am engaged m. The majority of them are more than 70 cars. Mr. BULWINKLE. The majority of the trains? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes, sir. Mr. IBULWINKLE. All right, then. Go ahead with your statement. 280 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. SCHAFFTER. In conclusion, I wish to say as men of experience, upon whom the responsibility of train operation rests, we are vitally interested in the elimination of what we consider most nerve-wracking and hazardous conditions attending our occupation, and a greater degree of safety for ourselves and our fellow workers, and we look forward with eager anticipation, anxiety and hope for the passage of Senate bill 69. Thank you. Mr. BULWINKLE. Is that all? Mr. SCHAFFTER. Yes, sir. Mr. BULwINKLE. Are there any further questions? Thank you. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Farquharson, you have about 20 minutes, if you can use that time. STATEMENT OF ,. A. FARQUHARSON, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, EDITOR AND MANAGER OF THE RAILROAD TRAINMEN, BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, WASH- INGTON, D. C.-Resumed Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I believe when we adjourned yesterday that Mr. Wolverton had stated that he wished to ask some questions, or that there was a question that I had not answered, and you asked, Mr. Wolverton, that you be privileged to continue this morning. Mr. WOLVERTON. That is right, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FARQUHARSON. May I make this request to the committee, please, that in the presentation of the accident reports, I have not been permitted so far to go into a detailed explanation of them or call your attention to particular cases that I think you are entitled to, because I am not foolish enough, I hope, to believe that as busy as you all are that you will have the opportunity to read the approximately 2,000 cases that have been submitted to you and, when I have finished with Mr. Wolverton's questions, may I ask that I be permitted to make that explanation for this reason: I am being cross-examined on some- thing that I have not testified to, and I would like to be able to put in my statement and then I have no objection to answering any questions that any of you wish to ask, and if I cannot answer, I will tell you so. Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to Mr. Farqu- harson doing that which he has requested right at this time. In fact, it might be helpful if he did so, and I prefer to permit Mr. Farqu- harson to proceed with his case in the manner he thinks would be most advantageous. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I thank you very much for that, Mr. Wolverton. Mr. BULWINKLE. All right, you may proceed, Mr. Farquharson. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now, referring to those 530 cases that I submit- ted to you. It was my intention to call your attention to some of the cases and to show you, if I could, the seriousness of the result of these slack actions. I referred the other day to case No. 20, which is on that list in the volume you have. And I think that I got down to case No. 36. In that case, that was a similar case, with a helper engine pushing on a train when an air hose bursted on the head end and the helper engine came through the caboose and crushed Brakeman Grimes to death TRAIN LENGTHS 28J The same sort of operation as Mr. Schaffter has just testified to on the stand before I came on. Mr. MABTIN. I do not believe I have a copy of that. Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is the Senate hearings. Now, moving on to case No. 48. We come to the case of Brakeman P. N. Bosley. Mr. BULWINKLE. Will you give us the. page, please, Mr. Farqu- harson ? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I have marked the Senate hearings on 265 and the pages are a little different. You have the other and I will try to get it for you. That case is No. 48, and is on page 63. January 13, 1930: Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railroad at Lusta, Okla. Train No. second 71, with 104 cars. Train broke in two, 3 cars from engine. Shock on rear end of train was so severe Brakeman P. N. Bosley was knocked from cupola of caboose to the floor, fracturing his skull and killing him instantly. Case No. 70, on page No. 64: August 12, 1929: Southern Railroad at Lexington, Ky. Train No. extra (301 south, with 85 cars. Train made emergency stop because of automatic train control. The shock was so severe on the rear end of the train that Brakeman E. Dungan was thrown from the rear platform of the caboose under a train moving in the opposite direction on a parallel track, severing his left arm above the elbow. Now let us go over to case No. 94 on page 66, on the Pennsylvania Railroad. October 25, 1928: Pennsylvania Railroad at St. Marys. Train No. extra 45-45-4633, with 97 cars. Engine 4633 was shoving against caboose when the air was applied from engine 4545 pulling the train. Helper engine shoved caboose over end sill of first car ahead crushing Conductor William Gilmartin between the caboose and next ear. Lost 7 months and 5 days' time. Train delayed 3 hours. Now, we come to case No. 124. You will find that on page 68. November 22, 1925: Norfolk & Western Railroad at Vickers, Va. Train No. extra 1715, with 115 cars. Made emergency stop, injuring Conductor E. J. Lackes, who was riding in the caboose, hurting him so severely that he was still unable to return to train service on July 16, 1929, and we are advised probably never will return to train service. Train was delayed 2 hours and 30 minutes. The next is case No. 145, which is on page 70. February 24, 1932: Pennsylvania Railroad, central region; train extra engine 6771; east of WG ,block station. Conductor Garrett injured ; rough stop made within the confines of the interlocking plant. Reprimanded for violation of safety rule 1507. He was reprimanded for a violation of the rule that the witness preceding me has testified to, that he was not, while that train was moving, hanging onto something. How could you move within .a terminal and know where you are going, if you were in the middle of the caboose hanging onto something? Now, we come down to case 152, which will be found on page 70: March 6, 1932: Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad, Clifton Forge division, at Back- bone. Va., train extra 1548, engine 1548, 106 cars in train. Defective knuckle broke in head car ; conductor and flagman injured. Delay east-bound 3 hours and west-bound 8 hours. Extra 1548 moving west up Allegheny Mountain at a speed of 18 miles per hour ; knuckle broke on head car, derailing three cars in one place, two in another, and knocked five off; the caboose was badly damaged and caught fire. Now, it is not uncommon that when these shocks come that the stove is knocked loose in the caboose and a fire started, and fortunately so 282 TRAIN LENGTHS far we have not had both men knocked out at the same time where the caboose caught fire, but in 68 times in the cases I gave you in the 1407, and 51 times in the 530 cases the conductor and brakeman were both knocked out, and if the caboose had caught fire before anybody got there, they would have been burned to death. Now, case No. 177, found on page 73: October 10, 1931: Norfolk & Western, extra 2101, at Roanoke, Va., 80 cars in train. When entering the yard the engine was derailed, supposedly by splitting a switch. I will explain that to you. The switch point is brought right to a sharp point and brought up against the rail closely so that a train coming along will pass over that; but if it is split and somebody runs through that, and bends it, then it does not form a close contact with the rail and another train approaching may start up an adjoining track and is derailed. Or, of course if it is spread, one wheel might start up one set of rails and another up the other set of rails, or a track diverging from it. But, here is what happened: Conductor J. C. Rucker was injured and was in the hospital at Roanoke for some time, after which he returned to work, but he again entered the hospital for an operation and died. Flagman O. D. Mohler was knocked from the top of his cab and landed on the con- crete pavement, from which injury he was rendered completely dis- abled and mentally deranged. And, he has been confined since that time. Case No. 184 on page 74. That is on the same type of collision that the witness who appeared before me talked to you about this morning, where the conductor was making out his report and how he was down in the body of the caboose working, unprepared for the shock; and just listen to this one. August 28, 1933: Union Pacific; extra 5007 with 122 empties out of Council Bluffs, Iowa, for Grand Island, Nebr. When the extra reached the Chicago & North Western crossing, about 1 mile east of Fremont, Nebr., the air hose between the tender of the engine and head car became disconnected, causing the air in the train to go into emergency while the train was running about 15 miles per hour. Sudden stopping of the train threw Conductor Hacker against the edge of a desk, striking his stomach and severing the colon ; he suffered terribly for about 84 hours, when he died. Now, surely, that demonstrates to you what the shock means and how the man making out his reports, sitting at a desk in a caboose is up against. Now, let us go to case No. 190 on page 74. That is on the Soo Line, the Minneapolis, St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Railroad. November 29, 1928: Soo Line ; 105 cars in train. Near the siding of Black Wolf the train suddenly stopped, hurling Brakeman Starr a distance of approximately 6 feet, striking door frame in forward end of caboose. Injury received caused total and permanent disability and the railroad company settled with him out of court, paying $11,000; he suffers constantly. Mr. MARTIN. How have you selected these cases out from among the others? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, I read those all over, and I selected the cases that I thought were most important and would draw to the attention of the committee the seriousness of some of the injuries that men are receiving in these cabooses in order that we would not be TRAIN LENGTHS 283 misled by the statement that we may have a bruised back or a bruised shoulder only ; that these accidents are more severe than that and that in each instance there is a possibility of a very much greater injury than the injury that was received by the witness who was just here, for example. A man may have a cervical vertebra fractured. A little more and he might have completely broken his neck. But there are many in these 1407 cases where men suffered from fracture of the cervical verfebra. They may suffer from the fracture of the cervical vertebra, or the lumbar vertebra, and those are injuries that constitute a permanent injury, regardless of what may be said. You never get over them. You may work again, but if so, these men are working under a handicap and will suffer from that injury all of their life. Now, the next is 191: February 25, 1931: Soo Line, Fond du Lac division ; train No. 21, operating between North Fond du Lac, Wis., and Stevens Point; 100 cars in train. It was necessary to slow down and stop train to make a set-out at South Oshkosh,. resulting in an unusual jar, which threw Brakeman Kuehl from the rear plat- form of caboose into the center, against the stove and coal box, striking his back and head. IHe was in the hospital for 2 years, under direction of specialists, who were unable to bring about a cure. His case was settled out of court for approximately $9,000. He is totally and permanently disabled physically and mentally, with no hope of improvement. Now, going on to case No. 204 on page 76: November 12, 1932: Main Central, train B-11, engine 4000, 99 cars in train. Train hauled into siding at Hermon Pond ; flagman got off and threw up switch behind train, then climbed on top of caboose; he had just started to go over top of train when train bunched and he was thrown off top between cars ; one car and caboose passed over him but in some way he was able to clear the equipment and he was not dragged but in falling he fractured left arm in three places. He was at Bangor Hospital for some time, then went home to Portland (his home) and into a hospital there for treatment; later went home but was not able to do any work for a long time on account of bones in arm not knitting together. That is, he had a fibrous union and is unable to work again, be- cause with a fibrous union there is no stiffness in the arm and it just flops around and is of no value to a man in the train service. Now, let us go down to case 208. Southern Pacific, West Weber, Utah, September 17, 1931. Emergency appli- cation of air. Conductor C. A. Peterson thrown against cupola stand, injuring left shoulder. Brakeman P. L. Brunette thrown from cupola to floor injuring left shoulder, and rendered unconscious. Now, get these. There were other brakemen in that train. There were two cabooses on the hind end of that train. They were dead- heading a freight crew on one of these long trains to another terminal to meet the business coming back instead of running two shorter trains; they were deadheading a deadhead caboose and these other men were in the deadhead caboose. Brakeman R. C. King thrown from cupola to floor, third and seventh verte- brae in neck fractured. 0. M. Davison, deadhead conductor, was thrown from bunk to floor, receiving injury to right shoulder. One hundred and twenty-four empties (Pacific fruit express) and one deadhead cab and crew. Dust col- lector on third car back of engine was broken off. Burnette was off 60 days: Peterson, 60 days ; King, 6 months 9 days ; Davison, 60 days. In that case, there were 122 Pacific fruit express cars and deadhead caboose, and the regular caboose, and the cause of that was a defective 284 TRAIN LENGTHS triple valve where the dirt had gotten in the triple and caused an emergency application of the air when a service application was being attempted by the engineer. Now, case No. 210 on the Southern Pacific, near Engle, Utah, March 24, 1932. Air hose between third and fourth car from engine burst, causing an emergency application of the air, and Conductor C. A. Peterson thrown to floor-pardon me, I have got the wrong case. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Farquharson, it'is 12 o'clock now. Mr. FARQUHARSON. All right, we can start with case 209 when we meet again. Mr. BULwINKLE. All right. The committee will stand adjourned until Tuesday morning at 10 o'clock. (Thereupon, at 12: 01 p. m., the committee adjourned to meet Tuesday, January 25, 1938, at 10 a. m.) TRAIN LENGTHS TUESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1938 HoUsE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Charles F. Lea (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Mr. Farquharson, you may proceed. STATEMENT OF J. A. FARQUHARSON, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE,. EDITOR AND MANAGER OF THE RAILROAD TRAINMEN, BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, WASH- INGTON, D. C.-Resumed Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, when I was on the witness stand last Friday I was picking out certain accidents in the group listed under the 530 that I gave to you, and I had intended to go through and pick out some accidents in the 1,407 that I listed for you; but they are all before you and possibly those that we have described would draw a true picture of the general con- dition in all and so in order not to bore the committee and lengthen these hearings, I will not say any more about them; but to say to each of you and each member of the committee, that if there is any question about these accidents that I will be glad to answer you if there is a question raised in your mind, I will be glad to do it, but in order to expedite these hearings I am willing to pass on over a de- scription of certain accidents within this group. Mr. BULwINKLE. How many have you, Mr. Farquharson? Mr. FARQUHARsON. Well, there is possibly 100 more and I might want to call your attention to 100 of them; but that would take a long time and they are, I think, pretty well described in what I have spoken to you about. There was in particular-and the number of it I will furnish the clerk later-one which describes very well the fear with which these men are covered during the trip, which happened on the Missouri Pacific where the conductor heard the crash coming and he ran and jumped off of the train rather than try to face it in the caboose. His head hit the rail and he suffered a fractured skull, was off 84 days, but fortunately he jumped off of the caboose, because the caboose was never moved. It was destroyed, and it is not uncommon that cabooses are so badly damaged that the men in there cannot escape injury. Now, with that I want to proceed. 47891-38---19 285 286 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. MAPES. In cases of that kind what happens to the cars? You say that the damage to the caboose is so much that it is a total loss? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir; and in the description of the accidents that are there, you will find the cars were damaged in certain blocks on the head end and then in other blocks they were not, and then in other blocks in the train they were damaged on the rear end or throughout the train; and further in other cases the car bodies crumbled under that shock and the cars buckled, were derailed. The shock is carried all of the way through, Congressman, and the damage is done all of the way through the train. Mr. EIcHER. Do you know, Mr. Farquharson, of any statistics as to the amount of property damage? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Sir? Mr. EICHER. I do not suppose that you have any statistics-any reliable statistics-as to the amount of damage to railroad equipment? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes ; that can be found. Mr. EICHER. Aside from personal injuries, I am speaking now. Mr. FARQUHARSON. No. Mr. EICHER. I said, aside from personal injuries. I am talking about property damage. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Personal injury is not kept and the damage of the shipinent is not kept; but the damage to track and equipment and the cost of clearing the wreck is kept in the Interstate Com- merce Commission's report and it is from those reports that I drew off the amount of damage that I show you on those large charts that I gave you. Mr. EICHER. What was that amount again, Mr. Farquharson? And, is that for 1 year? Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is 19 months. But that is only a small portion of what it costs. I cannot call it offhand, but I will look it up and let you know exactly what they reported in the year 1936, because it can be found in the Accident Bulletin No. 105 for the year 1936; but what I showed, and they did not report, was $1,521,274 on those 1,407 cases. Mr. MARTIN. Let me ask you something. Suppose a draw bar pulled out back 50 or 60 cars, what do you do nowadays; chain up? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I do not think that we have a chain that would be strong enough to move that stuff now. The car would be set out. Possibly we would have to set out the head-end and then come back and chain up to that one car and set it out, and then couple up again. But, right on that point, I want to give you this thought: When- ever a long train suffers a severe slack action damage there will always be certain defects that are visible. You would set those cars out. But there are always defects or always damage done to the cars that are not detectable and from a witness who I will put on later, we will show you that after maybe the next stop, the defect that was not detected first will cause another wreck because it is not possible for those long trains to stand that shock without doing damage to equipment that might not be detectable. It will go on but finally let go. At the hearing before the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee in 1934 on S. 2625, Mr. J. W. Smith, vice president and general man- ager of the Boston & Maine and Main Central.Railroads, speaking for the Association of American Railroads, in opposition to the TRAIN LENGTHS 287 train-limit bill, stated: "We cannot afford to operate modern loco- motives unless they are loaded somewhere near their capacity," and this statement, gentlemen, speaks for itself and proves that it is the policy of the railroads to hold cars in a terminal until the tonnage equal to the capacity of the locomotive, or nearly so, has been assem- bled and that policy has done more to drive away from the rail- roads the cream of railroad business than anpthing else they could have done; that policy has given birth to and nourished the truck competition in the country and I believe it is a matter of general knowledge that the trucks in the country are handling 4 percent of the freight handled and that 4 percent is the cream of the business, and I am sure represents in revenue a greater percentage than in tons. Mr. W. H. Day, manager of the transportation department of the Boston Chamber of Commerce, and several other like bodies, testify- ing at the hearings on S. 27 and S. 344, against the train-limit bill and speaking for the above-mentioned chambers of commerce, and so forth, stated: A few months ago I had a traffic test made in the State of Connecticut on the' so-called Boston Post Road, one of the principal highways connecting Boston and New York, to determine the extent of the truck traffic and this study disclosed that every hour of the day and night the average of loaded trucks passing a given point exceeded 100 and if we were so conservative as to estimate the average load as 5 tons it would mean that motor trucks transport 12,000 tons per day, or 3,600.000 tons per working year of 300 days over this one highway, and a very similar situation prevails throughout the country. He then went on to testify that- this is not a local situation. We are having solid truck loads of meat flowing into New England States every day from all sections of the Middle West, auto- mobile tires in solid truck loads are coming in every day, and we have certain manufactured goods flowing in from Omaha, Nebraska, two or three trips a week into Boston. and stated further on the same question that the Connecticut Manu- facturers' Association had placed witnesses on the stand to testify that truck transportation had been forced upon them and that they were now using trucks as far west as the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers; in other words, involving hauls of more than 1,000 miles, and this was one of the type of witnesses that was brought in to oppose this safety Jegislation, posing as a man representing tie big industries of New England and then testifying that the people he represented did not patronize the railroads. If Mr. Day's clients had given the business to the railroads that they have been giving to the trucks, railroad revenues would have been greatly increased and if the rail- roads, instead of holding freight until the tonnage of a large locomo- tive had been accumulated, had moved freight as expeditiously as the truck evidently had done, then possibly Mr. Day's clients would have patronized the railroads. Right here let me make this observation: The railroads of this country are one of the strongest arms of our national defense and to that extent are indispensable to the welfare of our Nation, and they are also indispensable insofar as the transportation of pas- sengers and freight are concerned and deserve protection against the bootlegging policy pursued by trucking companies in handling freight. It is discouraging to find the railroads bringing in wit- nesses from chambers of commerce to testify against a safety meas- lire, of which they know nothing, except that they assume that it 288 TRAIN LENGTHS will cost something and they might have to, in some measure, bear a small portion of that cost, and at the same time they are giving their business to the worst enemy and keenest competitor the rail- roads have ever had-the trucks. Now I know that you are flooded with that sort of propaganda. Each one of you is receiving that, and before I close I will read a statement of their own as to how far they have gone to get this information. Now, getting back to Mr. Smith, general manager of the Boston & Maine and Maine Central Railroads, testifying further on S. 2625 at page 178 stated: It has been said by the proponents that it was impossible to give inspection ^to long freight trains. Every train, before leaving its terminaL is thoroughly inspected and passed upon by competent car men, and it is the duty of every employee along the right-of-way, including section men, crossing watchmen, .agents, operators, and trainmen to observe passing trains and indicate to the man on the head or rear end if there are any hot boxes, brakes sticking, or brake beams down. With the engineer and head brakeman on the head end and the conductor and flagmen on the rear, they can, when trains are operat- ing around curves, watch for any defects ; they can also, by their sense of smell, discover hot boxes and hot wheels. As you gentlemen know, there is no odor that can be more readily detected, regardless of the direction of the wind, than that of hot iron or burning waste. We notice that in driving our automobile along the road and we wonder whether it is our engine that is hot or whether it is someone's else's. This statement is an admission on the part of the railroads that on the long trains they know you cannot detect the defects. as well as you could upon the shorter train and they issue instructions for section men, signal men, station force, and trainmen on passing trains to observe the trains and, by signal, indicate to the crew of the long train any defects that might be detected. Let us analyze that a little further: Section men work 8 hours a day, 6 days a week, on some roads and as low as 3 days a week on some roads, and the length of the section may extend over a district of 20 miles. A train- man has no knowledge of where the section man may be located, nor the signal man, and most of the stations are open at only certain periods of the day to meet passenger trains and possibly local freight trains, and in the agreements the railroads have with their station agents they have provided for the spread of a day, I believe, to the extent of 13 hours, that is the agent will work 8 hours within a spread of 13 hours so as to accommodate the passenger-train move- ment. So, you can see, gentlemen, that while they allege we have a right to depend upon those men to warn us of a defect on a long train, the men are not there 16 hours in a 24-hour period to give that information. Going back to Mr. Smith's statement that the train is thoroughly inspected in the terminal before it leaves, did anyone ever hear of a car breaking down while it was standing in a terminal? The de- fects occur on moving trains, moving under the strain of lurch, jerk, and shock that is ever constant as a train moves over the rolling country and around curves, and then is when the defects occur, not while the train is standing in the terminal and it is at the inter- mediate stops between terminals that trainmen should have oppor- tunity to make a standing and a full train running inspection in order to detect leaks in the train line that cause emergency applica- tion of the air brakes when a service application only is intended; TRAIN LENGTHS 289 to detect defective air brakes that do not release and leave the brakes set upon a car, which eventually will overheat the wheels and burst them and cause a wreck, such as is shown in the exhibit I prepared in connection with the 1407 accidents occurring in 1936 and 1937; and to also have opportunity to detect loose brake beams, because when a brake is set the brake will be pulled against the wheel but when the brake is released if the brake hanger is broken the brake beam will drag and when it catches on something in the track it will invariably be torn loose and cause a break-in-two and emergency application of the air, and cause a wreck. We should have an opportunity to observe in a rolling inspection. We can detect loose drawbars, leaky air hose, sticking brakes, maybe a defective triple, which may cause the brake to stick. A hand brake may be set, or a train line may have been overcharged-the air pressure-and the engineer could not release the brakes until he drew that pressure off by setting the brakes or until the train-line pressure was equalized. Mr. Smith deals with the passing of signals, and said that from his personal experience he had no difficulty under ordinary weather conditions, by the use of flags of newspapers by day and by lantern or fusee by night, in getting signals to the head end of the train. "Of course," lie said, "there were times when, on account of weather conditions, or other reasons, we had to place ourselves in different positions along the train where signals could be transmitted from one point to the other; at other times, it was necessary that we walk from one position to another in the transmission of signals." Now, gentlemen, he spoke there of giving a proceed signal with a fusee. A fusee is a stop signal or a caution signal depending upon the color of the flare and here is a railroad official admitting that, in order to pass signals on long trains, you would use a stop signal to give a go-ahead signal or back-up signal. Gentlemen, is that not an admission on the part of the railroads that they know that signals cannot be transmitted from the head end to the rear end of these long trains? Mr. Smith, in speaking of slack action, testified at the same hear- ing, page 178: You get that creeping on the caboose, and you have not felt the slack going up against the head end of your train, or if you have not got the sense of pull on that train to know the slack is taken out, then you put your feet and hands out and brace yourself so that you will be able to expect the jar and take care of it. In the 530 accidents that I submitted to the Senate committee at the hearing, case No. 100 involved an accident on the Boston & Maine Railroad caused by an emergency application of the air, where a towerman had fixed the signals for the train to proceed over the crossing, but when the train was close to the signals he reversed them to stop and the engineer made an emergency application of the air. Mr. Smith, explaining that accident, said: In regard to the Chelmsford case, there is an interlocking plant located at this place and as extra 2715 approached the interlocking plant the signals were clear for the train to proceed, but the towerman, controlling the movement of the signals, took them away from the train, with the result that the engineer made an emergency stop. There was no excuse for the towerman taking the signals away from this train and he was reprimanded for doing so. The engineer would have done the same thing in stopping this train if it had con- 290 TRAIN LENGTHS sisted of only 40 cars. I have been knocked around in the caboose just as hard with 50 cars as I have with 85, 80, or 100. Gentlemen, this was an emergency applicatie1n of the air and there was no creeping on of the brakes on the caboose that Mr. Smith talked about, nor is there ever in an emergency application of the air. The mere fact that the towerman was disciplined for doing what he did, did not heal the wounds suffered by Brakeman Masters, nor prevent slack action from emergency applications of air on trains in the future, and I want to emphasize again that there is no prewarning of shock when an emergency application of air occurs on a train. If, according to Mr. Smith's testimony, a man should know and be prepared, it means just this: That a man must place himself somewhere in the caboose, braced with his hands and feet to withstand the shock for the entire trip, and now I ask you, if the man was doing that how could he be out on the rear of the caboose inspecting passing trains, getting train orders, or place himself some- where in the middle of the train so as to transmit signals? . Now, what is a train crew in most of our States? It is a head brakeman, a conductor, and a flagman, and rule 99 is positive. There is no exception to that rule that when a train stops the flagman must go back immediately a sufficient distance to insure protection to that train. Then, one man is way back here in the country protecting that train; the head brakeman is on the head end of the train; the con- ductor may be on the head end of the train; they may have to pick up or set out at one of those stations. There may be an order board out where he has to get an order and they pull out of there, and I say to you gentlemen that there are many trains in this country that are leaving stop points and do not know whether the flagman is on the caboose or not. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Farquharson, I want to come down to the essential elements that you consider necessary in any evidence that may follow in this so we can expedite the hearing. I am going to ask you this: Now, let us get your contentions and see if I am not right in this. Your contentions are that this bill should be passed on account of the injuries to the crew and train service employees on freight trains of over 70 cars. Is that correct? I am just taking them down. Mr. FARQIHARsON. No; not the injuries alone. Mr. BULWINKL. Well, I am coming down to the other things. Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is one of the reasons. Mr. BULWINKLE. That is one of the reasons; injury to train crew. Mr. FARQUHARSON. YeS, sir. Mr. BULWINKLE. It was stated somewhere on that account of the operation of trains of 70 or more cars in a train there was danger to pasenger trains. The second was injury to passengers and crews on passenger trains. Is that true? Mr. FARQUHAESON. Yes. I am ready to show you a case where a passenger train collided with the wreck of a freight train that buckled in this manner. TRAIN LENGTHS 291 Mr. BULWINKLE. Now then, the third is injury to persons at high- way grade crossings in automobiles caused by trains of over 70 cars. Is that correct? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I never alleged that, Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BULwINKLE. Well, we will cut that out. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I would like to answer you. Mr. BULwINKLE. Now then, the fourth is the damage, of course, to the railroad property, both to the trains, passenger and freight, and other property. That is correct, is it? Mr. FARQUHARsON. That is one of the factors. Mr. BULWINKLE. Well, I am trying to give you all of them. Now, is that all, so far as the injuries and damages to the railroad prop- erty is concerned? Mr. FARQUHARSON. The length of the train makes it impossible for us to pass signals and properly interpret them from one end of the train to the other. Mr. BULWINKLE. When you do that, that causes injury; that causes a wreck or an accident which leads to injuries to persons or property, does it not? Mr. FARQUHARsON. Well, let 'me put it to you this way, Mr. Con- gressman. Mr. BULWINKLE. All right. Mr. FARQUHARSON. That if we were able to pass signals and see them, and the train was shortened up, we would have an opportunity to detect defects, exchange signals, stop the train and correct the defects, and that we do not have now when the distance is too great to pass a signal from the hind end to the front. Mr. BULwINKLE. All right. And then, correction of defects. Now then on the other hand, you say that this will be beneficial to th4 companies because it will obviate the loss of freight due to long trains. That is one of the reasons; beneficial from a financial stand- point ? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. I think we must give a service equal to that given by our competitors if we expect to hold our business and ever hope to recover any we might have lost. Mr. BULwINKLE. And then there is the question of damages which the railroad companies have paid for injuries to employees and to passengers and the damages that they have paid for their own prop- erty, to repair their own property, and for the loss of other individ- uals on the train. Now, is there anything else besides that? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Let me just state our position on that. We have never said there will not be wrecks. They are bound to come. Mr. BULwINKLE. I know that. Mr. FARQUHARsON. But, we do say that there will be a certain type eliminated that will reduce that cost and reduce it materially. Mr. BULWINKLE. Well, you do say that the hazard is increased? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. Mr. BULwINKLE. By trains that have over 70 cars. Mr. FARQUHARsON. Yes. Mr. BULwINKLE. Now, is that approximately what your contention is? Is that what you are wanting to bring to the attention of the committee? 292 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. FARQUHARSON. I think that you have covered all of them, Mr. Bulwinkle. That is in a general way. The three principal things are first, safety ; reducing the train so that it is controllable; secondly, reducing it so that we could exchange signals from one end to the other and give us an opportunity for proper intermediate inspection between terminals. Mr. BULwINKLE. All right, sir. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Because many of the runs today are the equiv- alent of 200 miles of a freight train. Mr. BULWINKLE. Then you said just now that you would tell the committee about the injuries or about the accidents caused to pas- senger trains by these trains of over 70 cars buckling and causing wrecks. Can you give us some of those facts? Mr. FARQUHARSON. In the testimony that I offered before, I re- ferred to it. There was a wreck at Deans, N. J. Mr. BULWINKLE. When was that, Mr. Farquharson. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I will dig it up here. Will you pardon me while I look for it? Mr. BULwINKLE. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I did not expect that question at this time and I did not set that out. I will find that for you. Mr. BULwINKLE. Just give it from your recollection and fill in the details later, to save time. Mr. FARQUHARSON. And I can bring this right up to date, pretty well. Mr. BULWINKLE. All right. Mr. FARQUHARSON. This one at Deans, N. J., is a wreck where there was no application of the air. The train was rolling along over the rolling country and it broke in two and then followed an application of the air. It was broken in two by the slack running out as it went over these knolls.. That was hit by a passenger train that was wrecked and when that was done it was hit by another passenger train. On the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad (one of the causes of that I have shown you), a passenger train had been di- verted to the opposite track and was running against the current of traffic around a freight train. Just as the passenger engine got to the head end there was a wreck of the freight train, buckling out, and the passenger train hit it, killed the engineer and fireman and had it been just a fraction of a second later the engine would have passed that point and the coaches would have gotten the shock of that wreck. On the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad last December, just last De- cember, a freight train was coming up the mountain and an engine on the head, helper engine behind; a car buckled again. The brake- man was looking at the train as it was coming around this curve and he hollered to the engineer, "hold her." But just then the train parted and the brakes held her, went into emergency. The brakeman grabbed his lantern, and the fireman grabbed a fusee and jumped into the opposing track, because the headlights of the passenger train were showing around that curve, and the emergency stop signal was given, and the engineer, on the passenger train, applied all of the power he had to stop that train, but it went into the wreckage. Six passengers were injured there. The pusher engine kept on coming TRAIN LENGTHS 293 through the caboose and the cars on the hind end, when the slack caught her, but fortunately the men on the hind end somehow got out. That was in December. But, I want to submit that definitely to you gentlemen. On the Pennsylvania Railroad there was a train with 102 cars, a double header, pulling over the hill and when about half the train was over the hill the engineer shut off his engine, because then they would coast on down the hill. When the hind end of that train came over that hill the slack ran into the head end of that train; it caused an emergency application of the air, because a car buckled in the face of number 36, a double header, coming about 50 miles an hour and the records show the car must have buckled in front of her about 700 feet ahead and number 36 hit it. Both engines were turned over. Both engineers were killed. One fireman was killed. The other fireman was badly scalded. Three dining-car employees were injured. One express messenger, two deadhead -railroad employes, and five passengers were injured, and the wreckage of that train spread across four tracks and across a spur track, and gentlemen, I cannot think of anything that more thoroughly demonstrates the force of this slack action; these long strings of cars coupled together running into something with such force that they buckle and when I showed you the photographs of the wrecks in Oregon on the test trains-remember there was no defect there. That simply was an application of air brakes on a long train where the slack from the hind end went into it and you saw the pictures where the car did not stop in the right-of-way. It was thrown out of the right-of-way. It went clean up to the pavement on the highway paralleling it and so that is not an exaggeration of anything. That was a true picture that was taken at the time of the accident and these reports are not my reports to you. They are reports of the Interstate Com- merce Commission's investigators. Mr. BULwINKLE. Now let me ask you this. In all five of these instances you refer to, those were trains of over 70 cars, were they? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. BULwINKLE. Now, how many more 4o you know of, in your own knowledge, that have happened in the last 4 or 5 years, or by years, if you have any? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, Mr. Buiwinkle, I want to be very frank with you. I did not expect that question at this time and I cannot lay my finger on it, but I will have it for you. I will get you every one of them and have them written up and submitted to you as an exhibit, and that will expedite this. Mr. BULWINKLE. Then, of your own knowledge, how many trains of less than 70 cars have caused accidents of this kind? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I have in mind, and I cannot give you the date, where there was a derail of a short train going over a switch. Now, what derailed it, nobody knows, but it was in a double or triple track section and the freight train was crossing over and something in the cross-over derailed her. It might have been a rail bolt loose or something. I do not know what caused it. I do not think the reason was assigned, and it hit a passenger train, and I think there is a case in the record where a freight train of 36 cars had a break down of a truck and hit a freight train standing on the side track. I think that is in the record before you. 294 TRAIN LENGTHS I have given you all of that in that exhibit. I have not tried to cover up anything. I assure you that I have not. Mr. BULWINKLE. I know that you have not, but I just want' to get it so that we could have the number, if you could recall without going into details, in the same period of time that you put in the informa- tion with regard to trains of over 70 cars, and see what you can do about the less than 70 cars. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, Mr. Bulwinkle, I have given you those two and that is all I positively can call to my mind at this time. Mr. BULWINKLE. All right. I am through, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FARQUHARsON. Well now, gentlemen, I do not want to deal with this progaganda matter any more than to make this statement, and I take it from one of the railroad's own publications, because I want you to know about it because of the propaganda you are get- ting, where a man spoke at a meeting and he said this: "In the district of a certain Congressman there are so many manu- facturing plants," and be said, "I will tell you how to handle it." And, this was his line, to go to the manager of that plant, ask the manager to go to his employees and say to them, "If this bill passes, I will have to cut your wages" and, "You get them to contact their Congressman." Now, gentlemen, I say truthfully, and I think most of you agree, that no one can determine definitely just what this cost is; but on an assumed. cost by the enemies of this bill, they have gone and asked employees of the factory, threatening them that their pay might be cut. I do not want to flood Congress with a lot of telegrams. I was here when the public-utilities hearings were on. I was right in Chairman Rayburn's office when he showed me 57 telegrams coming from his district and the signatures were of people that had been dead for 10 years, some of them, and some of them had not lived in the district for 15 years. I do not want to do that with you. I am not going to stoop to do that. I want to tell you the truth as best I can and have you make a decision. Now, gentlemen, I would like to put on a witness, if I may. Mr. MARTIN. Before you do, I want to ask you a question or two. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. I want to say under the heading of propaganda: I believe I have got a letter from every grange in my district against this bill. Those letters advised me that the membership voted unani- mosly against it. Most of these granges I have never heard from in the last 5 years about any farm legislation or any other legisla- tion pending in Congress or anything else. It looks quite obvious that somebody here in Washington has just instructed those people to write those letters down here. They also said that they had voted unanimously to abolish the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Mr. CROSSER. What? Mr. MARTIN. Voted unanimously to abolish the Interstate Com- merce Commission and the Securities Exchange Commission. TRAIN LENGTHS 295 I want to go back to one phase toward which questioning has been directed somewhat, and that is with reference to the possibility of increased grade crossing accidents through increasing the number of trains. That is a rather conjectural possibility, and perhaps my questions are conjectural. It occurred to me, and I do not know whether you have anything on this phase or not, that a similar and greater possibility of grade- crossing accidents was involved in these high-speed, streamline trains, which make up to 115 miles an hour and commonly run 100 miles per hour. Now, I have found by a little figuring that a train running 100 miles per hour would travel a half mile in 25 seconds, while a freight train would probably require a minute and a quarter to cover the same distance; that is, a big freight train. Are not these very high speeds conducive to an increase in crossing accidents? It appears to me a train could be a mile away when a man gets his car to the track and it could still get him before he got across. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Congressman, I thank you for asking that question. Mr. MARTIN. I may say here I intend to follow that question up if the hearings here are to be dragged out by members of the com- mittee cross-examining witnesses at great length about possibly in- creased crossing accidents from 70 cars as compared to 150-car trains. I think it is entirely proper to- go into this other question. It would seem to me that there is obvious danger of increased accidents from trains traveling across the country so fast that they could be entirely out of the line of vision when a man starts over the grade crossing and still would get him. Mr. FARQUHARSON. As I said, Congressman, I am very grateful to you for having asked that question. Mr. Wolverton had asked the same question I think on last Thursday and we agreed to take it up later. I have given that question careful consideration and I want to make this statement to you gentlemen, that it is not the number of trains run that is causing grade-crossing accidents. It is the 30,000,000 automobiles and about 3,000,000 trucks. That is where your excess has come from-the automobile and not the train. And, the second thing is, reasoning that to a final conclusion, that if more trains were going to cause more accidents, let us view it from this angle: If tomorrow the railroads were all offered five times the business that they have today and they had to run five times as many trains, do you think they would holler grade-crossing accidents and say, "We cannot take your business because it will increase grade- crossing accidents?" And that brought me to this honest conclu- sion-and without trying to be humorous or without trying to be sarcastic-it brought me to this honest conclusion, that they are using grade-crossing accidents as an excuse and not as a valid reason. Mr. MARTIN. I would like to add to that upon the grade-crossing situation, my sympathy goes to the fellow in the cab. The fellow who wants to beat a train to a crossing gets hit or runs into the side of a train, gets his worry over in one trip. All he has to do is just 296 TRAIN LENGTHS make one meeting of that kind and his troubles are at an end; but with the men up in the cab it is inevitably a constant strain and worry on them that at every grade crossing they may meet some fool right in the middle of the track. Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is true, Mr. Congressman, and at every grade crossing an emergency application of the air may have to be made in order to try to prevent hitting somebody. That is true. Mr. BtLWINKLE. Now, I do not know whether he is referring to me in connection with highway accidents or not. As I stated just now, I am trying to eliminate the issues involved. Mr. MARTIN. I am referring to all of that line of questioning which just seems to me to be purely speculative. Mr. BTULWINKLE. Then, I say, Mr. Farquharson, you did not mean to agree with Mr. Martin just now when he said that increased speed of these trains would create more grade-crossing accidents, because your contention is that the railroads should have faster trains in order to deliver freights faster. Mr. FARQuHARSON. Now, let me answer you. Mr. BULwINKLE. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. You stop at a grade crossing here to let a 100-car train-or a 125-car train. 150- or 175-car train pass, and when that passes you, you are standing here, and as it goes on out of your view, your view of the other track is being shut off, and this train is moving, say 20 miles an hour, but here comes a fellow down the opposite track coming toward you at 100 miles an hour and he will be there from a point beyond your vision and, chances are, meet you, unless you exercise this common-sense rule, to let the hind end of that train pass until you can see up the track far enough to know that one of the 100-mile-an-hour trains is not creeping up on you. Mr. BULWINKLE. Yes; but that does not quite answer the question. You did not mean to agree with Mr. Martin just now when he said increased speed of these streamline trains would add to the grade- crossing accidents. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I think that- Mr. BULwINKLE. That is all I want. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I think this, Mr. Bulwinkle, the engineer, when he approaches a grade crossing, he gives two long and two short whistles, and I believe the rule is now to carry the last whistle as near to the crossing as you can and keep the bell ringing. Of course, the time from the time that you can hear that whistle on a 100-mile- an-hour train until it is on the crossing is less than it would be on a slower train. But in order to prevent railroad accidents at cross- ings, I think that you all, as I stated before, did the proper thing, used appropriated money to start a grade-crossing-elimination pro- gram, and I think you were right. Mr. BULwINKLE. But your contention, if I understood it, is that the railroads should, in justice to the public who ship freight, have shorter trains and quicker trains. Mr. FARQUHARsoN. That is right, sir. I agree to that. Mr. BULwINKLE. Yes. TRAIN LENGTHS 297 Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now, I made this statement about this propa- ganda, and at the time I did, I did not know whether I could quickly Jay my hands upon it, but here it is. The American Traffic Club, a railroad magazine-and I want to read now what they said about this, and this is the speech of Mr. John Philip Hill, Baltimore, Md., a former Congressman [reading]: As an illustration of what one can do, we have in my old congressional dis- trict, the Third District of Maryland, a most important manufacturing concern called McCormick & Co. McCormick & Co. employ a great many people, some of whom live in the Third District, others of whom have friends in the Third District. If McCormick & Co. goes to the Congressman from the Third Dictrict and says, "This train-limit bill is going to mean an increase in cost in my pro- duction ; it is going to mean a decrease in what I am able to pay in wages, a decrease in what I am able to pay in other things," it has a lot more effect on the Congressman than if he gets a letter or a telegram. Telegrams and letters are useful in emergencies. Letters of explanation after the conference for record are advisable, but if one of a Congressman's constituents comes to him and says, "I represent, as you know, four or five hundred employees who repre- sent five times that many human beings in the family, many of whom are. voters," it has a very great effect on the Congressman. What did I do when I was in the House? I was not on the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee of the House, but I would go to Washington after hearing from my constituents in Baltimore and having formed my own opinion on such a bill as the train-limit bill, I would go to see every member- of the Interstate and Forbign Commerce Committee, and tell them individually' why the Third Congressional District was against such a bill. The determina tion of proper train length is a function of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the House Committee on Interstate Commerce and Foreign Commerce should give the Senate bill an unfavorable report. Ladies and gentlemen, this is a perfectly practical, simple thing. You elect your Congressman. You are responsible for whom you put in Congress. What you must remember is that your Congressmen want to do what they want done; they can't represent you unless they have adequate information. People who are in favor of these bills, for months have been interviewing Congressmen. There is the statement from their magazine, and, gentlemen, I will not stoop to that kind of stuff. I will tell you that. Now, I am ready to introduce a witness, and I would like to intro- duce at this time, if there are no questions Mr. WOLVERTON. I have a few questions, Mr. Farquharson. Mr. FARQUuARSON. Yes. Mr. WOLVERTON. Are you familiar with the number of people who were killed at grade crossings in the year 1936? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Wolverton, I could not, just offhand, say; but I know where to get the information. Mr. WoLVERTON. I have before me Accident Bulletin No. 105 of the Interstate Commerce Commission, which shows that there were 1,789 people killed and 4,930 injured. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. WOLVERTON. Do you know of any other feature of railroad operation that shows so many persons killed or injured in any par- ticular way which exceeds that? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No; Mr. Congressman, I do not. . There are about a million railroad employees and there are 30,000,000 auto- mobiles and trucks, so I assume that the injury to the autoists would be proportionately greater; but if you take a million autoists and compare them with a million railroad employees, then there would be more injuries to the railroad employees than to the autoists. 298 FT RAIN LENGTHS Mr. WOLVERTON. If I remember, you stated that three trainmen had been killed during the year 1936 or 1937, I forget which, as a result of slack action, sudden jerks, and so forth. Mr. FARQUARSON. Five, and one man died later. That was in 1936. Mr. WOLVERTON. Making five? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Six. There were five killed and one died later. Mr. WOLvERTON. In view of the fact that the principal argument you have presented for the enactment of this bill relates to casualties from slack action and the total number has been six, and the total number that have been killed at grade crossings, and the total num- ber injured, is so vastly greater, I am considering if there is not another humane side which we should consider in addition to that human side to which you have already made reference. It seems to me that the disparagement when we consider the num- ber killed and injured in train operation and the number killed and injured in grade-crossing accidents makes the latter a matter of very grave importance. Therefore we should consider whether the in- creased number of trains which would result from splitting them into lengths not exceeding 70 cars would increase the possibility of grade-crossing accidents to any appreciable extent. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I do not think it would increase them. Sup- pose we had to increase the train service 100 percent. Grade-crossing accidents would not increase 100 percent. I want to call your atten- tion to this on the bulletin that you have got before you now, if you will turn to it. We ran more trains in 1936 than we did in 1935, and grade-crossing accidents were less. Mr. WOLVERTON. This is probably due to the fact that there have been grade-crossing eliminations, or other safety devices installed. There has been a very definite program put on throughout the entire Nation to eliminate grade-crossing dangers. When we consider the question, as you have done, from the humane basis, it seems to me that we must consider the humanity of it from every standpoint. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I quite agree with you, Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WOLvERTON. And not confine it to just one class of employees. If there is no train moving over a crossing there cannot be any ac- cident, can there? Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is right. Mr. WOLvERTON. If one train goes over it there is possibility of an accident, and if two trains go over there is just twice the pos- sibility of an accident, and so on. So, every time you increase the number of trains that go over a particular crossing you increase the possibility of the number of accidents. Now, to what extent, if any, in your opinion, would the number of trains be increased as a result of legislation of this character. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, Mr. Wolverton, I think that on certain divisions of the railroads in this country there is going to be an in- crease of the trains run. I will say there will be an increase of the trains run on the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad, where they are hauling 160 cars now ; and on the Virginian, where they are hauling 160 and as high as 170 and 180, and on the Great Northern, on the Masaba Range, where I think we have shown one train in here of 190. Now, there are going to be increases there. TRAIN LENGTHS 299 Mr. WOLVERTON. Every time you increase the number of trains going over the crossing, do you not necessarily increase the possibility of accidents at that crossing? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I am not quite so sure of that, but I would like to finish my answer to your first statement. Now, those are roads that are handling ore, and coal, and that is a fixed business. But on the great mileage of the United States they are handling the business as it is tendered to them, general merchandise, and the average length of a train is only 46 cars. Now then, if there was a distribution of the cars among the trains run, I do not think that there would be any more trains run on the majority of the mileage of the country. I am inclined to the thought there may not be, because I had a check-I have it here-on the Northern Pacific, in 5-day freight movement in one direction. They handled 1,722 cars. They ran 28 trains. That was only 62 cars to the train. But they ran some trains of 30 cars and they ran some of over 100, because, as they testified, it is not cheap, it is not good business to run the big locomotive unless you have very nearly her tonnage. Now that is a line, Mr. Wolverton, as you know, east and west line, and it is usually merchandise. Mr. WOLVERTON. Do I understand, Mr. Farquharson, you are not willing to admit that by the passage of this bill it would increase the number of trains to be run. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Necessary to be? Mr. WOLVERTON. Additional trains to carry the traffic. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Oh, it will increase them on certain divisions; yes, sir. Mr. WOLVERTON. Does it not follow, as a matter of fact, that if it increases the number of trains, it increases the number of trains that go over the grade crossings of that road, and with each additional train there is a possibility of increased accidents? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I do not agree with you there, Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WOLVERTON. It seems to me that it is so apparent that it is almost unnecessary to state it. Why are you not willing to admit that such is the fact and then let us endeavor to find out whether it is merely speculative or whether there is something really substantial back of it. Whethet it is speculative, or whether it is real, depends on the number of trains that this legislation would increase. From that standpoint it would seem to me we can figure the possibility of increased accidents at grade crossings. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, I think I understand you, Mr. Wolver- ton, and I do not want you to think that I am trying to spar and keep away from that. I think I get your point now clearly and if I am wrong, I am just wrong; but I think I now have it. Mr. WOLVERTON. I do not think you are trying to avoid any ques-- tion I am asking. I did have a little resentment at the suggestion that inquiries along this line were of a speculative character. Mr. MARTIN. Yes; and I am going to make some more when you get through. Mr. WOLVERTON. I intend to ask every question I wish to get the facts in the case. 300 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Wolverton, as I told you, I want to answer the best I can. I think now I have what you have in mind. The more trains run and the more automobiles that cross the railroads, of course there is a possibility of an accident, and going upon the theory if you run one train and one automobile crosses, there is a possibility of an accident, and it increases with the number of trains and the number of automobiles. I think that is entirely possible. I think it is a speculative possibility, however, because you may run a thousand cars across there and with careful drivers who would not ever go across the crossing without knowing whether a train is approaching, would not have an accident. Mr. WOLvERTON. With the figures we have, we are able to deter- mine fairly accurately, from year to year, the exact percentage of accidents per number of train miles traveled. It would seem to me that if the passage of this legislation in- creases the number of train miles traveled throughout the Nation, we can gage rather acurately as to the increased number of acci- dents likely to result fatally or result in injuries. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well now, I think I answered that and I want to say to you now again that what we are talking about in connec- tion with this legislation is a noncontrollable slack action in a train and there is not any uncontrolled slack action in an automobile. It can stop on a dime and start on a dime and if the driver will just stop, look, and listen when he approaches the railroad crossing, instead of trying to beat the train across or run into the side of a train lie can avoid an accident. And, when he is running into the side of a train, he might run into an abutment on an overhead crossing. He is possibly more liable to do that than he would be to hit the side of a train, because of the noise of the train rolling over the track and the fact that it was moving. I do not disagree with Mr. Wolverton's statement the more trains and more automobiles, the more possibilities of accidents. I agree with that, but I do not want you to overlook, gentlemen, that we are talking about an uncontrollable slack action. Mr. CROSsER. May I ask a question? Mr. WOLvERTON. I had not quite finished, but you may proceed. Mr. CROssER. No. I will wait until you have finished. Mr. WOLvERTON. I have done some figuring, Mr. Farquharson, along that line and that is the basis or reason of the questions I have asked. I find that during the 13-year period, from and including 1924 to 1936, there were in each year between six and seven casual- ties at grade grossings per million train-miles run, except in the year 1935 when there were 7.09 that year, per million train-miles. Now, assuming as a basis of comparison, if the passage of this bill would result in the running of 60,000,000 additional train-miles to carry the 1936 freight traffic, is it not a logical expectation that there would be at least 60 times 6 casualties or 360 more highway grade crossing casualities than there would be if the bill had not passed? Mr. ARQUHARsON. No; Mr. Wolverton, I will not agree to that. Mr. WoLvRTON. You see what I am trying to get at. The records of accidents at grade -crossings shows that they were on an average of six fot every million train-miles traveled. TRAIN LENGTHS 301 Now, assuming chat this bill would increase the train-miles trav- eled by 60,000,000 miles, would not that increase the number of casualties by 60 times 6, the average for 1,000,000 train-miles, or 360? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, if the same ratio applied through all of the years. Mr. WOLVERTON. I am taking this ratio on the basis of 13 years. Mr. FARQUHARSON. The reason I cannot agree with you, I would like to demonstrate it this way: There are fewer people killed going across this crossing right here in front of this building that is heavily traveled, as you go to the Capitol, than there is on the less densely traveled streets out here in the District. There is the example, and I think that where there is a frequency of train service and you approach that with the knowledge of that, that is a reason to you to stop, look, and listen, before you start across. It is the one where you do not see anything and there is not a frequency of trains that you take the chance and the one you get hit on. Mr. WOLVERTON. I can readily realize some crossings are more likely than others to produce accidents, but the average I have given covers a period of 13 years and covers all classes of crossings, and I base it upon the assumption that if there should be 60,000,000 additional train-miles traveled, that would make just 60 times the average of 6 casualties per million miles or an increase of 360. And, if I carry figures still further, based on that 13-year period, I find that the fatalities are about one-fourth of all accidents at crossings, and therefore there would be approximately out of that 360 additional accidents about 90 deaths. Now, if you place those figures against the six who died as a result of slack action, you can understand that I am speaking from a humane standpoint just as much when I consider the question from the standpoint of a person crossing a railroad track as when I con- sider it from the standpoint of the trainmen engaged in operating the train. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, Mr. Walverton, you have gone back 13 years and there was a difference in the registeration of automobiles each year. There have been more of them. I do not know how that might affect the figures. Mr. WoLvRToN. It would seem that an increase in the number of automobiles would undoubtedly increase the number of accidents at grade crossings. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Let me finish, please. Mr. WOLVERTON. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Thirteen years ago we ran more trains than We are running today. We were doing a pretty good business 13 years ago. We were running a good many more trains. There were not so many automobiles. The number of trains has been going down and the number of automobiles registered has been going up. I am studying it as carefully as I can in my mind, and I do not know how you can take 13 years and make a true average, because the trains were greater in number 13 years ago than they are now and the automobiles were lower. I do not know the point in between where the true average could be found. 47891-38--20 302 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. WLvETON. I am inclined to think, Mr. Farquharson, that you would find that last year's average would be greater than it was 13 years ago. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I think you are right. Mr. WOLvERTON. I thought I was putting it on the most favorable basis possible when I extended it over a period of 13 years instead of taking only the past year. At the present time there are approximately 26 million automobiles and 4 million trucks in operation. That is certainly more than there were 13 years ago, and therefore as the number increases, the number of accidents increase, and, with each succeeding year as the number of automobiles increase, the number of accidents increase, except insofar as there may be a decrease by the elimination of grade cross- ings or otherwise providing additional safety devices at grade crossings. I do not want to consume too much time, but merely to indicate that if we are going to base this legislation on a humanity basis then there are other humane elements which are entitled to be given some consideration. Mr. WITHRow. I wonder if I might ask a question before you proceed? Mr. WoLvERToN. Yes. Mr. WITHRow. There are many ramifications to this question of crossing accidents. As a matter of fact, do you not think a factor that probably contributes as much as anything else to the frequency of accidents at grade crossings is the fact that the carriers do not adequately protect grade crossings, as indicated by for instance the 8 hours' service stretched over 13 hours. Mr. FARQUHARSON. The grade crossings, of course, by law, are sup- posed to be marked. Possibly it is a fixed signal. Upon that may be "Stop, look, and listen." It may be a plain board with that wording upon it; it may be a cross-arm signal; it may be a wigwag; it may have an electric bell; it may be a man at the crossing; and it may be gates to protect. I would say this, that we need more crossing protection and the Congress recognizes it. I do not like to repeat this, but you did recognize it. You did appropriate millions of dollars for grade- crossing elimination and that was because there was inadequare grade-crossing protection. I agree with you on that, Congressman. Mr. WITHROW. I have in mind this. I know several crossings in my district where at one time they had three shifts of watchmen on the crossing. Then they reduced it to two shifts, and I believe now on one of them I particularly have in mind, they have one man and a very elderly man. And he is there for 10 hours, and he is only there at the period they think trains will be run over the crossing. Now, if any other trains go over the crossing at any other period, why, I believe that that crossing is not adequately protected, and the point that I would like to make is that if that is happening in my district it is reasonable to assume it is happening all over the United States. If we are going to go into the detailed ramifications of this thing, we ought to know how many accidents happen when the watchmen TRAIN LENGTHS 303 are not on duty, and those accidents can be directly attributed to the lack of adequate protection to the crossing. Another point right there I believe is this: Most of these crossing accidents could be avoided, provided the motorists would use rea- sonable judgment in approaching the crossing and stop, look, and. listen, as they are supposed to do. Is that not so? Mr. FARQUTHARsON. That is true. Mr. WITHRow. Well, to me, there is a great deal of difference be- tween that type of accident and the type of accident we are discuss- ina here today, namely, uncontrollable slack-action accidents. %'Ir. FARQUHARsON. That is true. Mr. WITHROW. As I understand, and I believe your testimony has clearly brought out, the men on the rear of long freight trains can- not protect themselves because it is not possible to brace themselves enough to protect themselves even though they know the jolt is coming. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHROW. Now, to me. there is a great difference between an accident that could be avoided if a man used reasonable judgment and an accident that cannot be avoided. Mr. WOLVERTON. Is that all, Mr. Withrow? Mr. MARTIN. Is the witness going to answer that question? I want to say either at this point or after Mr. Wolverton has finished, I want to ask the witness two or three questions. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Crosser has asked for recognition tempo- rarily. Mr. WoLvErnToN. Have you finished, Mr. Withrow? Mr. WITHROW. That is all. Mr. WOLVERTON. Of course, whether it is due to a person's own fault, does not seem to me to be the determining cause, because after all it must be some frailty of human nature that brings about such a great number of deaths at grade crossings and we are interested whether they could have been avoided or not. I would like to bring out another feature that I think has some bearing on the question of the humaneness of the legislation and I do not mean to discount that feature as you have presented it Mr. Farquharson, but, merely to also apply your humane reasoning to the other employees who are engaged on the railroad in the operating service. My question is this: Does not the frequency of trains increase the hazards for other railroad employees than those who are actually engaged in operating the particular train? Mr. FARQUHARSON. You mean those working along the right-of- way? Mr. WoLVERTON. Yes; you may use such as an illustration. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I do not know. I cannot say that. I cannot say that. Mr. WoLvrow. Well you do have knowledge, Mr. Farquharson, that casualties happen among maintenance-of-way men as result of trains operating over the road where they work? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Occasionally. Mr. WOLvERTON. Would it not necessarily follow that the more trains operated the greater likelihood there would be of accidents? 304 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Wolverton, I could not say that now, be- cause when a section foreman is working with his gang on the tracks he is looking out for them. He advises them when to get out of the way, get off of the track. There is always someone looking for something coming. That must be true, because when there is a train approaching the track must be safe for the train to go over, and so these men working there are expecting trains and the fore- man will tell his men to get off. I cannot see, Mr. Wolverton-and I want to make this clear again-that when you know there is something coming ; you are prepared for it; when you are expecting something to come you are prepared for it; you take care of yourself and I could not answer you now on maintenance of way or on bridge men, whether, more are killed during a season when we run more trains than when we did not run so many. I could not answer that. I have not checked it up, but I cannot see the danger or reason for that, because you have got the man there who is on the ground and you have got a section foreman that must see that his "flock" is off the track when that train is going to use it; because no man is going to stand there and try to bump a train. They are going to get off. Now, truly, I cannot say that I could under any circumstances say that there would be more accidents. Mr. WOLVERTON. Even though we are not able to understand how it happens, or why it happens, the fact is it does happen, does it not? Mr. FARQUIARSON. I would not say that. I have not checked that. So, I do not know whether more section men are killed. Mr. WoLvEIToN. I am not asking whether there were more or whether there were less. I am merely asking whether the frequency of trains operated does not increase the hazard of maintenance-of- way employees. Mr. FARQUHARSON. It might slow down the track work, but I am not going to say it increases the hazards. Mr. WouvEToN. In other words, you do not think there is any difference as far as hazards are concerned to the maintenance-of- way group that is working on the railroad whether the number of trains passing over that road would be one or whether there would be 100 trains passing over it? Mr. FARQUHARSON. There possibly might be a greater hazard, but maybe that could be worked out. I do not know. Mr. WOLVERTON. I do not think, Mr. Farquharson, that it is un- reasonable to think that the frequency of trains would necessarily increase the hazard that is incurred by other employees of the rail- road, and that the hazard increases as the number of trains increases. I have before me accident bulletin 105 of the Interstate Commerce Committee. It shows the number of employees on duty, train service and nontrain, casualties occurring in the year 1936 and it shows that of trainmen there was one killed Mr. FARQUHARSON [interposing]. What table are you reading fronh Mr. Wolverton? Mr. WoLVERrON. Page 14. It shows the number of trainmen killed and also shows the number of other employees killed. So, the fact remains that employees other than trainmen, are killed as the result of the operating of trains. TRAIN LENGTHS 305 Mr. FARQUHARSON. You are talking of summary No. 22, are you not? Mr. WOLVERTON. Twenty-one and twenty-two ; yes. The thought I have in my mind is this: There are approximately 225,000 trainmen who are subject to some of the hazards that you have urged as a reason for the passage of this bill. There are approximately the same number, 225,000 employees of maintenance: of-way, structural employees, section men, and so forth for whom, it would seem to me, an additional hazard is increased when you in- crease the number of trains. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Wolverton, are you reading from sum- mary 22? Mr. WOLVERTON. Twenty-one. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Are you reading subsequent fatalities? Mr. WOLVERTON. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Which means that a man died after expiration of 24 hours from time of the injury. Mr. WoLvERTON. That is found in table 21, right above. That is taken from the totals. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Table No. 21. Mr. WOLVERTON. That is the one I had before me when I asked the question. Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is train accidents and train-service acci- dents. Mr. WOLVERTON. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. There were 108 trainmen killed and 421 injured in train accidents and there were 257 trainmen killed in train-service accidents and 7,525 injured in train-service accidents. Now, if you will check that with me, you will find that the total number of accidents resulting in casualties, the train accidents were 590 and 277 persons were killed; 1,547 were injured, but of those killed, of that 277, 109 were trainmen, and of that 1,547 injured, 421 were trainmen. Now, in the train-service accidents there were 20,141. There were 4,897 persons killed and 16,045 were injured; 257 of those of that 4,897 were trainmen and 7,525 were trainmen of the 16,045 injured. Now, on the other one, that is, if you want to go to trespassers, there were 2,631 trespassers killed-and during the depression. gen- tlemen, the freight trains have looked like passenger trains-loaded with poor fellows migrating around this country trying to get a job, and in this very bulletin, if you will just check the accidents and see the number of boys who were killed, who were trying to get a job, riding freight trains around this country, their age, and the slaughter that it took, while they were trying to find a job to live on- they are the trespassers. Mr. WOLVERTON. The figures to which I have referred indicate the Possibility of accident to other employees than to those who were designated as trainmen. The maintenance-of-way employees are ap- proximately the same in number as the number of trainmen. That is, 225,000, and I have also noted in a book containing information that I have here that there are 127,545 transportation employees other than train, engine, and yard, including telegraphers, crossing flag- men, station agents, and so forth. I would assume that there would 306 TRAIN LENGTHS be some increased hazards for them as well as the others with the increase of the number of trains operated. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now, Mr. Wolverton, let me go further, if you will turn over to table 21 and take the line next to that, listed as trainmen, and take other employees. Now, if you have got your trainmen, get the other employees, and you will find that there were 11 of them killed, as against 108 trainmen; there were 116 injured as against 421 trainmen; and in the train-service accidents there were 172 of them killed, that is, other employees, as against 257 trainmen and 784 of them injured as against 7,525 trainmen, and that is all other employees. Now, there is your ratio under summary No. 21. Mr. WOLVERTON. I will look at that more carefully when I have additional time. The thought I want to bring before you is that there are other individuals interested in transportation whose hazard increases as the number of trains increase and that, therefore, we cannot confine our consideration entirely, if we wish to be humane, we cannot confine it entirely to one class of employees, but must consider all. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, Mr. Wolverton, can I just make one statement there in answer? Mr. WOLVERTON. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. We know there are going to be trainmen killed. If every train is limited to 70 cars there will still be trainmen killed. There will still be trainmen injured. We know that. That is a part of the gamble; that is the risk we take in life when we pick that kind of a job. I know that it will not all be eliminated. And, I know that we will not stop the automobile accidents, and they may increase; but I ask you again, to keep in mind, that what we are asking for in this bill is the elimination of an uncontrolled machine; one that the brakes will not work on: one that is so great it cannot stand its own weight; it crumbles under its own weight. The cars crumble that have a coupler that cannot stand a 500,000-pound shock, and a sill that can stand 250,000 pounds side strain on it, and they crumble under this. We are only asking for the elimination of this uncontrolled ma- chine. Put it within control and we will take it. We have always taken it. We have never fallen down. Mr. WOLVERToN. Mr. Farquharson, if the size of the train is de- creased and thereby increase the number of trains to be run, do you not think it will increase the possibility of accidents that are al- ready happening on short trains and which in many instances are similar to those which happen on long trains? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No, Mr. Wolverton. I think I know cars, and trains, and slack. I think I know enough about them to say "no." The point may be this, Mr. Wolverton, that a short train may have an accident and if they were all short trains and you were charg- ing the -accidents to the short trains rather than to the accidents, why, of course, that would be true. Mr. WOLVERToN. What I have in mind is this: You, or one of the other gentlemen who preceded you, said that there had been three casualties as a result of slack action, of quick, short, jerky stops, and it is my recollection that those cases were all on trains less than 70 cars in length. If that is true, then it would seem to me that if you TRAIN LENGTHS 307 double or increase by one-third the number of short freight trains, you will increase the possibility of accidents of the character that the reports show do occur to just that extent, would you not? In other words, you do not eliminate accidents entirely by decreasing the size or' length of the train, do you? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Wolverton, no; there will be accidents on short trains; there will be accidents on light engines; there will be accidents on automobiles-on any moving thing there are accidents, of course. Mr. WOLVERTON. You see what I am trying to get at is this: the mere decreasing of the length of the train does not necessarily elimi- nate the cause of the accident, because the same accidents that hap- pen on trains over 70 cars in length have happened on trains less than 70 cars in length. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Some; but more on long trains. There is not the slack action on the short train that there is on the long train and that is what we are talking about here. Mr. WOLVERTON. Whatever that percentage is, it will be increased in proportion to the increased number of trains, will it not? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, now, I will have to give an example there. Suppose that you broke a side rod on a locomotive handling 50 cars, then as I get your statement you would be obliged to say that every side rod that was broken would be chargeable to short trains. Now, a wheel may break. It may be a clean break. A rail may break and that could break in front of a 100-car train or a 50-car train, and it wouldn't make any difference how many trains went over that rail until it broke, and it would not make any difference how many miles a car wheel rolled over the rails until it broke, and it might break in a short train or a long train, and I cannot, Mr. Wolverton, for the life of me say we are going to increase the accidents. If I get your thought it is that running short trains creates accidents that do not exist on long trains. I do not know that. I would say "no," as I know railroading. There are all of the possibilities of acci- dents upon a long train that there are upon a short train, plus this uncontrollable machine we are talking about. - Mr. WOLVERTON. It seems to me that whatever accidents can hap- pen on short trains are increased in number when you increase the number of short trains that are run. Therefore, when you increase the number of short trains by splitting the long trains up, you increase the possibility of such accidents as you have shown by your figures do occur on short trains. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, I think, Mr. Wolverton, if they were all short trains then they would all be charged to the short trains, and that is all the answer I can give. Mr. WOLVERTON. But that would not eliminate all of the casualties you are speaking of ? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I have said repeatedly, Mr. Wolverton, if you Will cut the machine down until it is under control, we will still have accidents and kill men as long as there are railroads. We will still kill and cripple men. Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Chairman, I fear I may have taken more time than is fair to other members of the committee who may wish to ques. tion the witness today. Mr. CROssER. I do not want to interrupt until you have finished. .308 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. WOLVERTON. I have gone to a great deal of trouble during the last day or two to collect information, using Arizona and Nevada as a comparison, as to the effect of the 70-car-limit law in one State as compared to the other State where such a law is not in effect. I selected Nevada and Arizona for the purpose instead of Cali- fornia and Arizona as the witness did. Some of the figures in the resultant percentages are very astonishing. I had intended going into that but it will take some considerable time to do so. Mr. CROSSER. Go ahead. Mr. O'BmEN. We are going to be here a long time. Mr. CROSSER. I think Mr. Wolverton ought to finish his examina- tion. Mr. WOLVERTON. The hour is getting late and I am perfectly willing to wait until tomorrow, or any other time, or not at all, if it seems best. The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to go on with your examination now? Mr. WOLVERTON. The hour is so late that I do not want to take up the time now. Mr. Martin and Mr. Crosser desire to ask some ques- tions. Instead of starting now with my line of questions, I can wait until tomorrow or some other time. The CHAIRMAN. Then you may resume tomorrow morning. Is that the idea? Mr. WOLvERTON. I would like to. Mr. CROSSER. I do not want to interrupt. Mr. WOLVERTON. You are not interrupting me. Mr. CROSSER. Mr. Farquharson, I believe that you have by implica- tion at least covered the point about which I desired to inquire. It is not possible to say mathematically, is it, just what would happen if the number of trains should be increased, but there is a psychological factor involved, is there not, that increasing the number of trains would increase the care which is exercised by those traveling on the highway? They would approach that crossing with a much greater degree of caution if there are 100 trains a day than would be the case if there were only 1 train each day. Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is true. Mr. CROssER. I know that that is my own experience. I cross a lot of railroads going from here to Cleveland. I travel by auto- mobile a great deal. I know that at certain highway crossings, not a great many trains cross each day and one does not feel the same concern at such places as is the case where he knows there are a great many trains crossing. In other words the consciousness on the part of a great majority of automobilists of heavier than ordinary traffic, increases the care exercised by them so that it would not be true, mathematically, that there would be the same proportion of increase in the number of accidents as the proportion of increase in the number of trains. You see what I mean? Mr. FARQTJHARSON. That is my thought. Mr. CROSSER. The psychological factor which I have mentioned undoubtedly would play a part, it seems to me. There might be some increase. What it is nobody could tell. I recall that some years ago before this very committee there was examined a mechanical device, to be used at highway crossings to stop automobiles at crossings when trains should be approaching. TRAIN LENGTHS 309 The Interstate Commerce Commission's experts, as I recall, were not very enthusiastic about it because they said that would cause a relaxa- tion of care on the part of the engineer, if that were relied upon entirely; he would rely on the automatic mechanism and thereby would not be using the great degree of care that an engineer should be using all of the time. I know that there was a great deal of criticism of that mechanism for that reason. Ts that correct? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I think that is true. Mr. CROSSER. The same principal, of course, is involved here. It is purely a psychological thing. Of course, what you are discussing is the accidents that occur as the result of slack action. That has no necessary connection with traffic-I mean with crossing accidents-at all does it? You might treat the question of slack action without referring to crossing acci- dents, altogether? Mr. FARQUIIARSON. Absolutely. Mr. CROSSER. Of course, we could carry the logic of the thing to the extent of saying if we did not operate any trains over the cross- ings, we would not have any accidents, but on the other hand you would have no business. Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is true. We would have to go out of business. And, may I say to Mr. Wolverton, so that this Nevada matter can be started out. I spent yesterday down at the Commission. I have checked 1936 over again and I have checked it for trains under 70 cars and over 70 cars, and I worked until late into last night on it so that I can answer your questions, when you come to it. I will have the information. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Farquharson, I want to ask a few questions with regard to the possibility of increasing grade-crossing accidents as the result of increasing the number of trains, for the purpose of indicating if I can, at least to my own mind, just where Mr. Wolver- ton's line of questions leads to. Now, it is a fact, is it not, that at certain seasons of the year there is a very large increase in train movements, particularly passenger- train service. That is true, is it not? Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is true. Mr. MARTIN. Have you any figures to indicate what in a certain season, perhapsi during the summer season, such increase might amount to, as compared to the regular traffic, passenger traffic? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Congressman, I cannot give you that. That can be gotten, I think, right here in the city of Washington. We could get the Florida winter passenger business as a comparison to the summer business, and I can, by tomorrow, tell you what the average increased passenger-train service is between here and the east coast of Florida. I can get you that. Mr. MARTIN. Is it not possible that on many of these roads dur- ing the summer season there may be double the number of passenger trains running? Mr. FARQUHARsON. That would be true over the Denver & Rio Grande, and on out to the west coast. Mr. MARTIN. During that season they run passenger trains in sections, do they not? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. 310 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. MARTIN. How many sections do you know of, that you might say are commonly run as passenger trains during the peak of the passenger traffic, the heaviest traffic? Do they not run as many as six or seven or more sections of the same train? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Congressman, I would not want to say just how many sections, but unless the Santa Fe operations have been changed since I left that territory, they tan out there a second section of train No. 3. Now, odd numbered trains go west and even numbers come east. And No. 3 was the limited, and they had several sections of No. 3 to the coast loaded and then they ran what was called D. H. Q empty cars-back. Then when the season was over we ran the several sections of No. 4 east and D. H. Q. west again to pick up the travelers out on the coast. And, they ran possibly three or four sections a day. Now, the passenger travel is usually increased in good times and decreased in bad times. Mr. MARTIN. Well, are there not times when they run half a dozen or more sections of the same passenger train? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I think that is true, and I believe I was on the coast the night that the limited first left there, what we called the Chief on the Santa Fe, and I think that they went out in eight sections that night, and I think the Union Pacific ran its limited train out in eight sections that night over the coast. Mr. MARTIN. How far apart are those sections run? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Oh, about 10 minutes. Mr. MARTIN. About 10 minutes apart? Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is on starting out. And now, they close in before they get to the terminal, they close in on each other, and possibly a minute or two apart. Mr. MARTIN. Would not all arguments against increases in the number of freight trains apply with even greater force to the in- crease in the number of high-speed passenger trains during these seasonal activities? Would not the same arguments apply there that are being applied against the possible increase in the number of freight trains? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Now, I get your question clearly. Mr. MARTIN. And that great increased activity and speed of pas- senger trains also coincides with much greater automobile travel? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. We have here in the District of Columbia, according to the papers, about 100 automobile "killings" a year, and possibly 10 to 20 times that many injuries. We also have a lot of streetcar accidents. The same argument would apply there, would it not? It would look like the indicated remedy for automobile' accidents and streetcar accidents in Washington would be for Congress to pass an act limiting the number of streetcars and automobiles oper- ating on the streets of Washington. Do you not think that if the number was cut about in half we would have less accidents? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I think that is true. Mr. MARTIN. I want to ask a question or two about the motorcars. They run motorcars on railroads now, do they not? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes; I think there is in service now what they call a rail-highway car. You can run it on the highway, and then TRAIN LENGTHS 311 put it on a track and drop the flanges down, and in about 5 minutes run it on the railroad. Mr. MARTIN. What kind of service is that? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, Mr. Congressman, right now, I cannot recall definitely where that service is in effect, but if my memory serves me correctly, there is one of them in operation on this little electric line which runs over here from Alexandria out to Fairfax and on out that way. I think that is right. Mr. MARTIN. The handcars are motorized, too? Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is true. Mr. MARTIN. On all railroads now there are rules covering the operation of motorcars in addition to the regular train service, and the train dispatchers issue orders for the operation of these hand- cars and motorcars. Mr. FARQUHARSON. A section man leaving his section to go upon the road on a motorcar, with his crew upon it, is supposed to get a line-up from the dispatcher of what there is coming, and then pro- ceed under that line-up. If he were going to enter a very dangerous piece of crooked track, why it would be his duty to flag through there. That is, to follow a flagman and, if any danger showed up, lift his machine off the track. Mr. MARTIN. Are not these motorcars involved in crossing acci- dents? Do they not increase the crossing hazards? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, they increase the number, the chance of two moving bodies coming together. I do not know whether there is any record of them having hit anything or not. Mr. MARTIN. You do not have any statistics on crossing accidents caused by the additional motorcars, in addition to the regular rail- way equipment? Mr. FARQUHARsON. No; I have not. Mr. MARTIN. Let me ask you this: Did you anticipate that tii objection of increased grade-crossing accidents result from 70-car trains would be stressed as it is being stressed in these hearings? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I did not. I did not for this reason, that if tomorrow, as I have stated, five times the business that the railroads are now doing today were tendered them to do, and they had to run five times that many trains, they would not let the grade-crossin matter stand in the way of accepting that business. Mr. MARTIN. How many trains a day run on the Pennsylvania Railroad, freight and passenger both, between here and New York City? Do they not run one every few minutes? Mr. FARQUHARSON. It is a very frequent service. I do not know. Mr. MARTIN. It is several times more frequent than any railroad in theWest, is it not? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. I think the Pennsylvania runs the greatest number of trains that any railroad in the United States runs. I am positive of that. Mr. MARTIN. I think that it may be advisable, in view of the great importance which is attached to the conjectural possibility of in- creased grade-crossing accidents, for you to get some sort of a show- ing in the record as to that. I would suggest that you get a showing in the record as to how many trains of all characters, all types, move daily in the 24-hour period between Philadelphia and New York City on the Pennsylvania Railroad, or whatever railroad carries the great- 312 TRAIN LENGTHS est traffic between those two cities, and then, say, between St. Louis and Chicago over the same type of road; and I will give you one more suggestion, we will say, between Chicago and Denver. This is my idea exactly, that you will find that there are several times more trains moving over one of those sections than over the other. So, if this line of reasoning is controlling in this hearing, it seems to me the remedy would be simply to just simply reduce the number of trains on roads that had the greaest traffic and therefore naturally subject to the greatest number of grade-crossing accidents. It strikes me that this whole line of questioning is very novel and far-fetched, but it is being considerably stressed in this hearing, and I think if you can introduce such a showing as that in the record, it may be of some value to meet this objection. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I do not know that I can get the information that you seek, Congressman. I will make an effort, but I do not know how I will be able to find the number of trains that are run. But, as I explained the other day, we would have to go over the train sheets of each dispatcher's district on the various railroads. But I will make an effort to try to get it. I will assure you of that. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Farquharson, are you about through now with your presentation? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. I was ready to put on witnesses. The CHAIRMAN. How many more witnesses have you? Mr. FARQUHARSON. There are two who are not here today. But I expect them tomorrow, and, there are five here today. The CHAIRMAN. Do you anticipate they will be able to complete tomorrow morning? Mr. FARQUHARSON. They will not be on the witness stand very long unless there is a lot of cross examination. Their statements are already prepared, and deal with their own specific cases. The CHAIRMAN. Then you will resume the witness position in the morning to conclude your examination, to be followed by these other witnesses. You will complete your testimony tomorrow if possible. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I will not present any more evidence now. I assume that you will give us an opportunity for rebuttal by brief or something of that sort? The CHAIRMAN. We will certainly give you an opportunity to file briefs. So the committee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. Mr. WOLVERTON. I would like to inform the witness that the ques- tions I had in mind deal with or make a comparison between the States of Nevada and Arizona with respect to the number of acci- dents resulting in the operation of trains less or greater than 70 cars in length. I mention it so that he may be as well prepared on that particular aspect as he might wish to be. The CHAIRMAN. Very well, the committee will stand adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. Mr. EICHER. May I have time with the witness tomorrow? The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Eicher. (Thereupon, at 11: 58 a. m., the committee adjourned to meet the following morning, Wednesday, January 26, 1938, at 10 a. m.) TRAIN LENGTHS WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1938 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the conunittee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence F. Lea (chairman), presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Mr. Farquharson, you may proceed. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Chairman, when we adjourned yesterday noon. Mr. Wolverton had asked for certain information which I gathered up. As he is not here and as I stated yesterday, I am pre- pared now to start with my witnesses and in order that there may be no delay, I would like at this time to put on a witness. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I would like at this time, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, to introduce Mr. Carter, an employee of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad, who has a statement to submit to the committee. The CHAIRMAN. Very well, Mr. Carter. STATEMENT OF W. A. CARTER, HINTON, W. VA. Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is W. A. Carter and I live at 184 Main Street, Hinton, W. Va., I am 54 years of age. I entered the service of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad as a brakeman on November 1, 1905, on the freight district Hinton to Clifton Forge; was promoted to the position of freight conductor in 1911. On account of the frequent introduction of larger motive power, I have never enjoyed a regular position as conductor. When I first entered service, the average east-bound train was about 35 loaded cars, about 2,200 tons; today we are handling trains of from 125 to 150 loaded east-bound cars, depending upon the capacity of the cars and the hauling capacity of the engines, about 11,250 tons. West-bound we are handling from 135 to 160 empty cars. On the east-bound load movement we have a helper engine out of Hinton to the summit of the Alleghany Mountains, which is placed behind the rear car in the train but ahead of the caboose. On April 1, 1935, 1I was rear brakeman on extra 1583 west, with 157 empty coal cars. Just after the engine had passed through Manna Tunnel, it hit a rock and dirt slide, derailing the engine and several cars, and causing an emergency application of air. Conductor Yago and myself were riding in the cupola of the caboose.- The severe 313 314 TRAIN LENGTHS slack action threw theconductor to the floor and rendered him mo- mentarily unconscious. I had my feet braced against the opposite seat in the cupola, but the run-in shock was so great that my left knee was dislocated and my knee turned backward; upon the rebound I was thrown backward in the cupola, hitting my back upon the arm rest of the cupola seat. The impact of this was so great that my back was severely bruised, back muscles were torn loose as well as my right kidney. All the lights on the caboose were extinguished by the shock and the stove was knocked loose from its fastenings and thrown against the wall, disconnecting the pipe and throwing the lid off; the flame of the fire was coming out against the side wall of the wooden caboose and I called to the conductor but he did not answer, so I got out of the cupola .as quickly as I could and got some water to extinguish the fire to prevent the caboose from being burned. The conductor was not seriously injured and went back to flag a light engine that was following us. When the light engine came up behind the caboose the conductor went to the head end to see what the trouble was; the caboose and the last five cars had broken off from the balance of the train by the rebound and were separated about 20 feet from the balance of the train. When the excitement had died down I found that I was unable to stand and I laid down on the cushion of the caboose, where I remained for about 45 minutes, when I was put on the first west-bound passenger train and sent to Hinton and imme- diately placed in the hospital, where I remained for a period of 19 days. My left leg was strapped with adhesive tape and I was permitted to return to my home, with instructions to report to the hospital once a week until otherwise instructed. I was off duty 5 months and 9 days. My average monthly earnings was approxi- mately $170. About 2 months after I returned to work I was forced to acce'pt a settlement with the railroad company for $415, being advised that it was not the policy of the company to pay more than half time for time lost. My leg did not entirely recover for approxi- mately 1 year after I had returned to work. Thank you. Mr. MAPES. May I ask a question? The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mapes would like to ask a question. Mr. MAPES. You stated that on your run the trains were from 120 to 150 cars long. You mean that that was the general rule? Mr. CARTER. At the present time we have out of Hinton from 135 to 150 loaded cars east-bound. Mr. MAPES. Every trip that you make? Mr. CARTER. Practically every trip, depending upon the capacity of the cars and the hauling capacity of the engines. Mr. MAPES. Do you handle any local freight? Mr. CARTER. We handle local freight, but not on those long trains. Those are classed as dead-freight tonnage trains which consist pri- marily of coal. Mr. MAPEs. Well, if your run was one exclusively on those trains and they handled no local freight, you did not handle any local freight, personally? Mr. CARTER. Not over this trip; no, sir. We have local freight runs and we have manifest runs and we have dead-freight runs. TRAIN LENGTHS 315 Mr. MAPES. Did you handle any local freight, or did you run exclusively on long trains? Mr. CARTER. I do not understand your question. We do not handle local freight on those long trains. Mr. MArES. I understand that, but I also understood that you ran on the long trains, quite exclusively, so that I assume that you did not personally handle local freight, or the train that you were on did not handle any local freight; is that right? Mr. CARTER. It did not. The CHAIRMAN. That is all. We thank you Mr. Carter. Mr. FARQUHARsON. Mr. Chairman, the reason that I put this wit- ness on is this train collided with a slide of rocks and you have heard the witness testify as to the result of the shock. Now, I want to put on another witness whose train did not collide with anything. The train line broke in two and caused an emergency application of the air, and I want to put on Mr. Ezelle. STATEMENT OF C. V. EZELLE, VICTORIA, VA. Mr. EZELLE. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, my name is C. V. Ezelle and I reside at Victoria, Va. I have been em- ployed on the Virginian Railway as a brakeman since December 18, 1912, and I was promoted to conductor on November 18, 1918, but because of the frequent introduction of larger power I have never held a regular assignment as a conductor. When I entered the serv- ice of the railroad the largest train was 80 cars, approximately 5,840 tons. The average length of such a train was approximately 3,400 feet; today, however, the trains average from 125 to 175 cars, with an average tonnage of approximately 13,000 tons, and average train length of approximately 6,250 feet. I hold seniority on the district between Norfolk and Roanoke, Va. On May 18, 1936, I was head brakeman on train extra 729 west from Sewells Point, Va., to Victoria, Va. The train consisted of 37 loads and 122 empties, making a total of 159 cars in the train, which ameunted to 6,400 feet in length. About 9:30 p. in., when passing Tidewater Junction, I picked up message from a tower operator to the effect that something was dragging under the train. This mes- sage had been telephoned to the tower operator by a crossing watch- man at Fairinount Park. I told the engineer to slow down at Ford Plant crossing and I would get off with a lighted fusee to inspect the train as it pulled by me and if I found anything wrong I would give him a signal and for him to pull on to Morgan, Va., a coal and water station, and wait until I had opportunity to walk to the head end again. I found nothing wrong with the train but before we got to Morgan and while passing Boaz, Va., about 11:15 p. in., without any warning the brakes went into emergency on the head end of the train, causing a severe slack run-in, the shock of which knocked all the lights out on the inside of the caboose, the marker lights on the outside of the caboose and two window frames in the cupola were knocked out and fell upon the ground. The stove was torn loose from the floor moorings and broken in three pieces. At the time of the accident I was riding on the north side in the cupola of the ca- boose. The severe shock of the emergency application of the brakes knocked me through the front window, stunning me, and when I 316 TRAIN LENGTHS came to sufficiently to see what had happened Conductor Roberts was lying on the floor of the caboose with the bowl of the stove on his shoulders. Brakeman Phars who was also in the cupola of the caboose, had been knocked through the side window of the cupola, injuring his arms. Conductor Roberts had been thrown by the shock into the end wall of the locker and he sustained severe cuts about his head and shoulders; he was off duty 6 days. Brakeman Phars was off duty 4 days. After we regained some composure, Conductor Roberts and I lighted the lanterns and together we made an inspection of the train. We found several cars tnocked off center and train lines broken on the rear portion of the train, and upon arrival at the head end of the train we found a journal had burned off on the second car behind the engine, which derailed that car and the follow- ing 13 cars and was the cause of the emergency application of the brake. The train was wrecked so badly that we were not able to repair and move it and a wreck train was called from Norfolk to handle the wrecked cars on the east end of the train and another wreck train called from Victoria to take care of the wrecked cars on the west end of the train. At about 3:50 a. m. I was placed in an automobile and driven across country to the town of Franklin, Va., about 12 or 14 miles distant. There Dr. Raiford made X-ray of my right foot and ankle and told me the X-ray did not show a fracture and it appeared that I was only suffering from a sprain. I returned to the wreck at Boaz, where the crew was ordered to take the first car which had not been derailed and proceed to Victoria, our terminal. Upon arrival there I was relieved from duty and placed under the care of the company physician, Dr. Whitehead. On June 2, there having been no improvement in my condition, Dr. Whitehead sent me to Norfolk to report to Dr. Todd, a company physician who is a bone specialist, who made additional X-rays and found my leg to be fractured above the ankle. He then put my leg in a cast where it remained for over 3 months, during which time I, of course, was not able to work. The total time lost was 5 months and 26 days, but the railroad reported to the Interstate Commerce Commission that I would be off duty probably 60 days. I returned to work November 14, 1936. On March 10, 1937, 3 months and 24 after I had returned to work, I was rear brakeman on train extra 726 west, which consisted of 171 cars, which made the train 6,880 feet in length. We stopped at Seneca, Va., at about 8: 35 a. m. and had attained a speed of approxi- mately 18 miles per hour. I was on the rear end of the caboose to catch an order hook being delivered by the operator; after catching the hook, the train had gone about two or three car lengths when the brakes went into emergency on the head end of the train, knocking several cars off center, breaking several train lines, knocking all the wheels of the twelfth car, or the one hundred and fifty-ninth car in the train, off the rails; also knocked the caboose off center. Inside the caboose the entire top was knocked off the stove and was found lying against the front door; the fire was scattered on the floor of the caboose and had it not been for a barrel of water, which was TRAIN LENGTHS 317 also knocked over, the fire would have burned the caboose but the water turned over on the fire. At the time of the accident I was taking the order out of the hook and the slack and jam of the train knocked me backward into the door of the caboose, knocking me unconscious. When I regained consciousness I was laying on the rear platform of the caboose. When I fell, I fell backward, catching my leg under me in a twisted posi- tion, badly wrenching, twisting and spraining my right leg. Conductor A. D. Connell, who was riding in the cupola 'at the time of the accident, was knocked by the severe shock which followed the emergency application of the air brakes to the floor of the caboose, fracturing seven ribs; when he was next seen he was lying on the ground near the head end of the caboose. There were no breaks in the hoses or couplers, and the first defect found in the train was a broken train line 62 cars behind the engine. All cars that were found to be off center and all broken train lines were behind the sixty-second car and the whole train was jammed against the engine. Fortunately, this accident happened at a telegraph station where an operator was on duty. He immediately notified the dispatcher at Victoria, who sent Dr. Smith from Alta Vista, Va., a point 16 miles west of where the accident occurred. I had regained consciousness only a few minutes before the doctor arrived, and he sent me to Victoria as soon as the track was cleared so the passenger train could pass. I was placed under the care of Dr. Kendig at Victoria, and I was bedfast there for over 10 days and was then sent to Nor- folk under the care of Dr. Todd, who placed me in Sarah Lee Hospi- tal where I remained 2 weeks and was then sent home to Victoria, with instructions to return to the hospital at Norfolk once a week until otherwise instructed. I was off duty 7 months and 19 days. Conductor Connell completed the trip and one-half of another trip, when he was unable to go farther, and he was sent to the Roanoke Hospital at Roanoke, Va., where it was found he had seven frac- tured ribs ; he was off duty about 3 months. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I wish to appeal to your sense of fairness and regard for the safety'of frain-service employees, now.in active service like myself, to give your favorable consideration to S. 69 now before you. I thank you. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boren. Mr. BoRrN. I would like a little enlightment. I believe that the statement has frequently been introduced "of larger power." Is that a correct representation of something you used in your statement, or the gentleman before you? Mr. EZELLE. In the purchase of new engines Mr. BorEN. You mentioned being a conductor, but not constantly a conductor. because of the frequent introduction of larger power. Mr. EZELLE. Here is what I mean by that: You see, in buying new equipment, they buy larger cars, and in buying new engines they buy larger engines, and when I first went in the service of this company there were not any malet engines on the district on which I worked, and since that time they have put malet engines in the 47891-38--21 318 TRAIN LENGTHS service altogether on all those drag runs. In other words, slow freight runs. Mr. BOREN. How does that affect the constancy of your service as a conductor? Mr. EZELLE. Well, to this extent: If it were not for those large engines, and those long trains-in other words, they handle the same number of cars in one train as they handled in three trains when I went into the service. If it were not for that I would have had a job as a conductor, whereas I only have a job as a conductor in an emergency or just when a vacancy shows up that there is no one else to fill at the time. Probably I happen to be oldest man in the terminal. Mr. Box. Now, you mean by that that there are fewer trains. Mr. EzELLE. That is it, exactly. Mr. BOREN. Running longer trains has kept you from being pro- moted. Mr. EZELLE. That is it. Mr. BoREN. Then that would indicate that if there is smaller chance for promotion at the top of the bracket of service, there is small opportunity for employment in the lower brackets. Mr. EzELL. Yes, sir. Mr. BOREN. Does not that also mean that you are not a conductor. because of the fewer number of trains and longer trains, and does it not also mean that there are fewer men employed as the result of the longer trains? Mr. EZELLE. Well, you might term it that way. Possibly you did not understand what I meant by saying that the long train and larger equipment had prohibited me from having a job as a conductor in the service at this time. Now, you understand that there are men dropping out of the serv- ice and there are people promoted to other branches of the service which would promote the junior man; but instead of that being true now with promotions, with the larger equipment and larger engines, longer trains and cutting off of trains, and such as that, it has held just about where it was when I went to work for the railroad. Mr. BoREN. But if there were as many train crews employed, in proportion to the growth in number of cars, and so on, in the service, then you would have been promoted to the job as conductor, would you not? Mr. EZELLE. Oh, I would have a job as a conductor; yes. Mr. BoREN. What I am trying to get at is this: I gather from what you say that there is a direct relation between the number of men employed on the line and the length of the trains. Mr. EzELLE. Well, the same number of men, trainmen, are em- ployed now, but the same number of men do not perform regular service that they did at the time I entered this service. Mr. BoREN. Approximately the same number of men are employed now in handling 100 cars as used to be employed in handling 30 or 40 cars. Mr. Ezzaii. Yes. Mr. fBoEN. Thank you. Mr. EICHER. Can you give a little clearer mental picture of wat happens when a freight car is knocked off center. In other words. TRAIN LENGTHS 319 will you describe the fastenings, the size and strength of them, that are torn apart when a car is knocked off center. Mr. EZELLE. Well, the center pin is an idle pin, working in the frame of a car, also in the body of a car, and it works in what is known as the truck bolster. It fits in a casing plate and this pin is idle. There is no fastening to it in any way at all. It fits in this center sill; in other words, in the center of the truck bolster and the center of the car bolster on each end; and the impact of a train running together that way will knock the body of the car from the truck, and, of course, this pin has no way of being fastened. It is an idle pin there, and that is what we mean by "knocking the car off center," if the truck runs ahead or back. Mr. EICHER. Does the pin get broken? Mr. EZELLE. No; no. I have known it to be the case that the pin was knocked plumb out of the socket in the truck and lost down on the track. Mr. EICHER. How big is the pin? Mr. EZELLE. About two and a half inches in diameter. Mr. EICHER. That is all. Mr. PEARSON. Mr. Chairman. .The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pearson. Mr. PEARSON. Mr. Ezelle, I did not understand the length of the train involved in the second accident. Mr. EZELLE. Six thousand eight hundred and eighty feet. Mr. PEARSON. How many cars? Mr. EZELLE. One hundred and seventy-one. Mr. PEARSON. From your observation as a railroad man, based upon your experience and observation as well, what in your judg- ment would have been the result in these two accidents that you have related had those trains not exceeded 70 cars in length? Mr. EZELLE. We would not have had all of the cars knocked off of center; you would not have had the amount of slack, and the fact of the business is there would not be such accidents. Your cars would not be knocked off center. Mr. PEARSON. Well, ordinarily in an emergency application of air brakes in a train, say, of 70 cars in length, is there, as a matter of fact a very severe shack in the take-up of the slack? Mr. EzELLE. That is it, exactly. I will make it a little plainer to you. With an ordinary stop, not anything at all to happen, say, going along-everything going along good-and they stop those trains at a coal or water station or any other place that they have to stop with what is known as the independent brakes on the engine, not using the train brakes-in the other words, the automatic brake- and when you shut one of those engines off-what we mean by "shut- ting an engine off" is quit working steam-that is, with the engine driving; well, when this train of 170 cars of slack runs in against the Mallet engine, why it is just like running into the side of a mountain somewhere. That is just with ordinary stops, and if you are not accustomed to it, it will take a man who is not accustomed to it and beat him to death on the rear end in one trip. Mr. PEARSON. Is that same thing true of a train of 70 cars in length ? Mr. EZELLE. No, sir. You do not have the slack. Of course, you have slack, you understand, but you do not have near as much. 320 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. PEARSON. You have some jolt from the application of the air, but not as great? Mr. EzELLE. You do not have such a shock as would knock you off of your feet. With the slack on one of those long trains it is im- possible for you or anybody else, even a man experienced on the job, if he is not guarded, to stand on his feet when it just runs in with an ordinarily good stop. In other words, you are lucky to get some stops without that. The same thing is true in starting up. Even in pulling up to a coal or a water station, or heading into a sidetrack, and the slack will bunch ; and then when we start away, pulling away, that is what is known as slack run-out. That is just as bad as the other one and will get you just as badly as slack run-in. Mr. PEARSON. One is taking up the slack and the other is the run- ning in of the slack? Mr. EZELLE. That is it exactly. Mr. EICHER. It is like a whipcracker, is it not? Mr. EZELLE. That is a good way to illustrate it; just in one way and out the other. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman-' The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. Is there any relation or connection between the length of the train and the amount of freight which the road carries and the income of the employees on the trains or in the terminals, or anywhere else? Mr. EZELLE. I do not understand your question. Mr. BoREN. When you were running a 40-car-length train, what was your income at that time? Mr. EZELLE. Well, I could not exactly say right offhand, but it was on a different scale of pay. In other words, as well as I remember it was $2.75 a hundred. Mr. BoREN. Well now, the point I am getting at, if it was $2.75 a hundred then, and there is a similar scale of pay now, are you not compensated to some degree, according to the load that the train carries? Mr. EZELLE. No, sir. You are on a mileage basis. It is on a mileage basis. The contract, working agreement, is based on mileage. Mr. BoREN. Then there is no relation at all between train length and anyone's income, whether in the train service, whether in the engine service, or whether a conductor or an engineer, or whatever he might be? Mr. EZELLE. There are different rates of pay for the engine crew. They have a different rate of pay from the train crew. Mr. BoREN. Different rates; different methods? Mr. EZELLE. The engine crews' rate of pay is based on the weight of the drivers; in other words, the weight of the engine; and the train crews' pay is based altogether on mileage. Theirs is based on weight and mileage. Mr. BoREN. Then I take it that shorter trains and the introduc- tion of possibly smaller power, would have the effect of reducing the pay of the engine crew. Is that correct? Mr. EZELLE. The weight on the drivers is the basis. The smaller the weight on the drivers, the smaller the pay for the engine crews. TRAIN LENGTHS 321 That is for the engineer and the fireman, but the same rate of pay applies to the trainmen, whether the train is a mile and a half long or we have one car. Mr. BOREN. In spite of that fact, the engineers and firemen who are working on your line are for this bill and want to see it enacted? Mr. EZELLE. Yes, sir. Mr. BOREN. Even realizing that it has a possibility of reducing their income? Mr. EZELLE. Yes, sir. Mr. BOREN. Has that question come up in your discussions? The fact that their salaries might be reduced as an after effect? Mr. EzELLE. I cannot say that I have ever heard anyone mention it that way. The CHAIRMAN. Is that all? Mr. BOREN. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. We thank you, Mr. Ezelle. Mr. EZELLE. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Yesterday when the committee adjourned Mr. Wolverton was conducting an examination of Mr. Farquharson. This morning, Mr. Wolverton, we proceeded with Mr. Farquhar- son introducing two of the short witnesses who are for the pro- ponents. I understand these men have been waiting here for some time and are anxious to return to their homes. Mr. Wolverton, will you be here tomorrow in case this hearing should not conclude for the proponents today? Mr. WoLvERTON. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. And is it satisfactory with you for us to proceed with these other witnesses Mr. WOLvERToN. Perfectly so. The CHAIRMAN. Then, you may proceed, Mr. Farquharson. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I want to introduce Mr. Hughes, another em- ployee in the service of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad; a conductor at this time. If Mr. Hughes has any difficulty in reading his statement, I will read it for him. STATEMENT OF H. G. HUGHES, HINTON, W. VA. Mr. HUGHEs. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is H. G. Hughes. I reside at Hinton, W. Va., and my age is 59 years. I am married and have three children, one of whom, together with my wife, is dependent upon me at this time for their support. I entered the service of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad first as an engine wiper at the age of 18 years, in 1897. In 1900 I was transferred to road service as a brakeman. I was promoted to the position of freight conductor May 8, 1906, but the frequent introduction of heavier motive power on the railroad made it im- possible for me to enjoy a position as regular conductor until some time in 1917. I have since worked as a regular conductor, except for a short time in 1922. I was promoted to the position of extra passenger conductor in 1935. Until that time my service was en- tirely confined to freight service, with very few exceptions. When I entered the service on the Chesapeake & Ohio as a brakeman the 322 TRAIN LENGTHS train limit was 29 loaded cars, or 37 empty cars; today the train limit on the division on which I work, between Hinton and Handley, W. Va., is 160 loads or 160 empties; on some occasions I have had as many as 174 cars in my trains. In other words, we are handling as many as five times the number of cars per train today as we did at the time I entered service, and more than 10 times as much net tonnage per train as we did when I entered the service. On July 26, 1935, I was conductor on a freight train, extra 1589 west, in which there were 112 cars; at Deep Water, W. Va., we were making a stop to back over on the east-bound main line, in order to permit a superior train to pass us; there was an emergency applica- tion of the air. I was riding on the rear end of the caboose, my right hand grabbing the handhold near the roof of the caboose and my left hand holding the brake wheel on the rear of the plat- form of the caboose. The slack action was so great that I was thrown against the end of the caboose, striking my thigh against a grab iron, and also my side, shoulder and head against the end of the caboose, inflicting a very deep and painful bruise on my right thigh. I was momentarily rendered unconscious. The flagman, who had gotten off at the cross-over switches to line them up for the back-up movement, seeing that I was injured, returned to the ca- boose and laid me down on the cushion, but I continued on to Hand- ley-the end of the trip-although I was unable to move around. Upon arrival at Handley I was assisted by the brakeman to the Y. M. C. A. and they stated that if I would not ask for relief and go home on a passenger train they would do the work on the return trip; I agreed to this and rode the caboose the next day back to Hinton and went immediately to the hospital, where an examination proved the injuries that I have stated before, the doctor stating to me that the bruise on my hip was as severe as a fracture, and I was sent home with instructions to report back to the hospital three times a week for treatment. I was unable to stand on my right foot for more than 60 days and then when I was able to stand it was found that my right ankle was partially paralyzed and examination showed that a nerve had been injured. I was off duty in excess of 90 days. The nerve injury still exists. Before returning to work in freight service it was necessary to have a metal brace to support my ankle; the first brace I made, and worked with it for about 3 weeks, when I was walking alongside the train one evening and the brace broke and my ankle turned; I fell to the ground, injuring my arm, shoul- der and collarbone, but being only 34 miles from home I completed the trip, and laid off and went to the chief surgeon in Richmond, Va., Dr. Oppenheimer, who authorized the purchase of another brace, which I was compelled to wear until I entered passenger service a year later. I was forced to take a settlement for less than the full time lost. My long experience qualifies me to testify that the nervous strain under which men work on the rear end of long trains is so great that when a trip is completed they are more exhausted than if they had been engaged ini more laborious service for the entire day, and, speak- ing for myself and the men I represent as legislative representative of Lodge No. 913, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, I earnestly urge this committee to report favorably on S. 69 and give us the relief to which we know we are entitled. TRAIN LENGTHS 323 The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hughes. Mr. BOREN. May I ask one question of Mr. Hughes? The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Hughes, you have had experience both on passen- ger and freight trains? Mr. HUGHES. Yes, sir. Mr. BOREN. Out of your experience is there any reason to fear, in passenger service, the length of the freight trains from the stand- point of passing them? Mr. HUGHEs. Absolutely ; yes, sir. We have a fear that in passing these long freight trains that something will happen to that train and- it will foul the track upon which we are moving and cause a serious accident possibly to the passengers; injury to the train crews. It has happened. Mr. BOREN. Does that develop the common effect of having the conductors of the passenger trains, or the engineers, or whoever does it, does that develop the effect of having them make the practice of slowing down the passenger train in passing freights even in the open country? Mr. HUGHEs. When they are passing one another? Mr. BOREN. Yes. Mr. HUGHES. Not that I know of. It does not on my division. Mr. BOREN. I mean, does that fear cause them to have a tendency to slow up when they do pass each other? Mr. HUGHES. Well, I would like to answer this way: That it is possible the fear might enter the hearts or the minds of the engine crews more so than it would the train crews on account of the trains buckling and fouling the track on which they are moving. Mr. BOREN. And you believe then that the men in the passenger service have a real interest in seeing the freight train length limited? Mr. HUGHEs. Absolutely; yes, sir. Mr. BOREN. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hughes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Chairman, I now want to introduce Mr. Beach, an employee of the Pennsylvania Railroad, who has been permanently injured and is not now in the service or ever will be again. STATEMENT OF EMMETT T. BEACH, ALLIANCE, OHIO Mr. BEACH. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Emmett T. Beach. I reside at Alliance, Ohio. I was regularly employed as a freight conductor on the Cleveland division of the Pennsylvania Railroad. On April 26, 1935, I departed froq Conway, Pa., on train E. D. No. 1, engine 6851, at 8:38 p. m., from Toledo, Ohio. The train consisted of 42 loads and 51 empties, making a total of 94 cars, including the cabin car; 4,130 tons. The crew consisted of Engineer G. R. Burr, Fireman E. C. Cam- pau, Flagman L. T. McCarty, and Brakeman Jonas Easley. A regular terminal inspection was made and we departed with brakes reported in proper working condition. Upon arrival at Millbrook, we took on coal and water and a helper engine No. 1318, in charge of Engineer G. W. Miller, Fireman G. E. Beckner, and Flagman John Bullen. The helper engine was attached to the rear of my 324 TRAIN LENGTHS train, and at this point the whole train was again given an inspec- tion, including a road test of the air brakes. Upon departing from Millbrook, we experienced run-ins and run-outs of slack, due to ascending and descending grades, the most severe of which occurred at Shreve and again at the east end of Lakeville. At this point I was sitting in the cupola of the cabin car, when I noticed fire flying from the wheels of a car in front of the cabin car, some several car lengths ahead. I got down out of the cupola and called this fact to the attention of the flagman. As I stepped on the rear platform I hollered for the men in the cabin car to look out and about this time the helper engine No. 1318 plowed through the cabin car, completely demolishing it and throwing part of it across the east- bound main line and into a lake adjacent to the right-of-way. Brakeman Bullen and Easley and myself were all seriously and permanently injured and our names have been removed from the roster of the railroad. Brakeman Bullen's injuries consisted prin- cipally of a fracture of the spine, fractured ribs, and fractured col- lar bone. Brakeman Easley suffered a fracture of the cheek bone and he was hit on the head with something that scalped him. My injuries consisted of a compound fracture of the right leg, two broken vertebraes, nine broken ribs, right lung punctured in two places, and also a dislocated shoulder. The three of us were taken to the Wooster, Ohio, hospital. I was in the hospital and under the doc- tor's care for over a year and a half and I still require a doctor's care occasionally. Mr. Easley has left Canton and I do not know to what extent he may have recovered. Mr. Bullen still resides in Canton and is still unable to do anything. This accident occurred at Lakeville, Ohio. Investigation devel- oped that a lock key in the coupler had come out of the second car ahead of the caboose, permitting the drawbar to drop on to the track between the rails. This lock key was later found on the track about a mile east of the point where the wreck occurred.. I entered train service on the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1907: left the Pennsylvania Railroad and worked on other roads for some- time, and returned to the Pennsylvania in 1911. I have been in- jured on many previous occasions by slack run-in and slack run-out on long freight trains and I know the constant strain that a train- man is under when working on long trains where there is a great deal of slack action, and also the nervous strain that a man is under when he knows there is a defect and he cannot transmit a .signal to the head end of the train because of the distance, and when he is also aware of the danger there is of breaking a train in two when attempting to apply the air from the rear of the train, and I wish to urge upon this committee the necessity of passing this legislation. It will, I know, make for more safe train operation. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Beach. Mr. BEACH. Thank you. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Chairman, I now wish to introduce Mr. Sullivan, who is in actual train service. He will show you in his testimony that when you break one of those long trains in two you do a lot of damage that is not detectable and possibly before the com- pletion of that trip you will have another break in two. I now want to introduce Mr. Sullivan. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sullivan. TRAIN LENGTHS 325 STATEMENT OF E. J. SULLIVAN, FREIGHT CONDUCTOR ON PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD, WASHINGTON, D. C. Mr. SUmIVAN. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, my name is E. J. Sullivan, and I reside in Washington, D. C.. I entered the service of the Pennsylvania Railroad as an extra freight brakeman, on May 12, 1913, and except for a furlough of 16 months for military service during the World War, I have been in continuous service on the Pennsylvania Railroad, as a road freight, or yard brakeman, or conductor, up to the present time. At more or less regular intervals during the past 2 years I have been engaged as a regular brakeman, regular flagman, extra con- ductor, or regular conductor in the freight service operated by the Pennsylvania Railroad, between Potomac Yard, Va., and Jersey City, N. J., a service which operates through a part of five States and the District of Columbia for a distance of 223 miles. The maxi- mum number of cars hauled in one train at one time in this particular service is 125 cars, and the maximum speed permitted is 50 miles per hour. In view of the fact that I am intimately acquainted with the serv- ice in question, as well as other classes of road freight and yard service, I feel that I am qualified to testify as to the many great advantages and safety features which might be derived by train service employees, and the public in general, from legislation which would limit the number of freight cars in one train, at one time, to a maximum of 70 cars. Some years ago, it was the practice for road-freight crews, moving in road-freight service between Potomac Yard, Va., Baltimore, Md., and Wilmington, Del., over the Baltimore and Maryland divisions of the Pennsylvania Railroad, to handle freight trains which con- sisted of from 45 to 60 cars and the service was of great satisfaction to train-service employees, in that they could handle their trains with safety and dispatch, for the reason that the length of the train permitted communication at all times by means of hand signals be- tween employees on the head end and rear end of the train; also, they were enabled to inspect their trains with little delay while standing, and they were able to make frequent running inspections of their entire train while moving, to detect hot journals, sticking brakes, swinging doors, or any other condition which might endanger their train or freight or passenger trains moving on adjacent tracks. Today, unfortunately, the conditions are quite different. A road- freight crew leaving Potomac Yard, Va., destined to Jersey City, N. J., or vice versa, with a freight train which consists of 125 cars, loaded or empty, moving at a high rate of speed, in a service which requires that every minute of delay must be accounted for, has a great responsibility, for the reason that the train is approximately 1 mile long and no matter how keen the sense of sight of the mem- bers of the crew may be, it is physically impossible for them to see more than one-half of the train at one time, and they must, of course, trust to the Almighty to inspect and take care of the other half. The motive power of the service in question is electric instead of steam, and when the train leaves the dispatching terminal the con- ductor and head brakeman are on the head end and the rear brake- man, or flagman, is on the rear end of the train. It is customary 326 TRAIN LENGTHS for the conductor to ride on the head end of the train for several very good reasons; first, one of the rules on a division over which the service operates requires that the conductor be on the head end if there are cars to set off or pick up; second, if the conductor is on the head end and trouble develops en route he is in a better posi- tion to act quickly and efficiently, but the main reason for the con- ductor being on the head end of the train is that he is fearful of personal injury which might occur to him on the rear end from sudden and severe stops caused by bursting air hose, broken knockles, or train parting for some unknown reason. Mr. MARTIN. Would you mind a question right there? Mr. SUJLIVAN. No, Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. You spoke of the reason why the conductors are rid- ing on the head end being because of fear of injury if they rode in the way car. I do not think it has been put in evidence, but I have heard state- ments made here in the committee room that railway officials, operat- ing railway officials above the train service--I do not know their designation-superintendents, trainmasters, or what-have refrained from riding in the way cars for the same reason; that they do not ride the way cars any more on these long trains like they used to ride them. Do you know anything about that? Mr. SULLIvAN. Why, Mr. Martin, I can answer that question this way: In my particular service we frequently have an assistant road foreman, probably an assistant trainmaster, or someone in an official capacity to ride the train; but in this serviceI have the first time to see one of those gentlemen on the rear or cabin car. They usually ride the motor. Mr. CROSSER. What was that? Mr. SULLIvAN. We have motors instead of locomotives. Our line is electrified. We have electric motors. Mr. MARTIN. I thought formerly it was the custom for such officials as superintendents and trainmasters, and so forth, when they went over the division, to ride in the way car. A locomotive inspector, or an official in the motive-power department might ride the engines, but I thought this other type of official customarily rode the rear end of the train. Mr. SULLIVAN. No. Mr. MARTIN. I say formerly, not now. Mr. SULLIvAN. I believe they used to; yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. How long have you been in the service? Mr. SULLIVAN. I will have been in the service 25 years on the 12th of next May. Mr. MARTIN. You may proceed. Mr. SULLIVAN. These accidents invariably cause a terrific shock to the rear end of the train, and if employees, who are riding on the rear end when stops of this nature are made, are not injured, it is simply because they are indeed very fortunate. It is very difficult for the average person, who is not engaged in train service, to understand the hardships and severe physical and mental strain imposed on train-service employees since the adoption of the extremely long freight train, but if the average person could put himself in the place of a freight crew, with a train of 125 cars, TRAIN LENGTHS 327 moving at a speed of 50 miles per hour, when they can see only a part of their train and when they are momentarily expecting a sudden or severe application of the air brakes to take place, which might be caused by burning a journal off, dragging brake riggings, bursted wheels, bursted air hose, or train buckling, any of which may wreck the train and foul freight or passenger trains moving on adjacent tracks, with possibly a great loss of life, I am sure that train-service employees would ,then get the ruling they are praying for. Now, for the benefit of the committee, I would like to cite perform- ance of a long freight train and the performance of a short freight train between Potomac Yard, Va., and Jersey City, N. J., for four successive trips of trains on which I was assigned as a front brakeman. December 11, 1937, train M. D. 12, a long train. Train crew or- dered at Potomac Yard, Va., for 3: 15 a. m.; respite at Potomac Yard until 5: 15 a. m.; left Potomac Yard at 7:22 a. m., with 91 loaded and 2 empty cars; picked up one car at Gwynns Run, Balti- more; picked up 11 cars at Bay View, Baltimore; set off 8 cars at Edgemoor, Del.; picked up 12 cars at Edgemoor, Del.; two dragging brake riggings and one broken knuckle at Meadows, N. J.; set oif 32 cars at Waverly, N. J.; arrived at Harsimus Cove, N. J., with 75 cars; relieved at 8:55 p. m. on account of hours-of-service law; deadheaded to Meadows, N. J., and finally relieved at 10:40 p. m. crew moved on this trip a total of 110 loaded and 7 empty cars, anA crew was on duty a total of 19 hours and 25 minutes. December 15, 1937, train M. D. 12-a short train. Crew ordered at Potomac Yard, Va., at 3:15 a. m.; left Potomac Yard at 5 a. m.; with 41 loaded and 1 empty car; set off 5 cars at Edgemoor, Del.; picked up 9 cars at Edgemoor, Del.; set off 10 cars at Waverly, N. J.; set off 36 cars at Harsimus Cove, N. J.; relieved at Meadows, N. J., at 1:20 p. m.; crew moved a total of 51 cars, ran 228.1 miles, and re- lieved in 10 hours and 5 minutes. December 19, 1937, train M. D. 12-a long train. Crew ordered at Potomac Yard, Va., for 3: 15 a. m.; left Potomac Yard, Va., at 6: 13 a. m., with 109 loaded cars; delayed at Havre de Grace, Md., for 50 minutes to inspect train for reported hot box; delayed 50 minutes at Newport, Del., on account of an emergency application of air brakes, and on inspection of train found broken knuckle on the eighteenth car and broken branch pipe on the one hundred and second car; de- layed 3 hours at Wilmington, Del. on account of an emergency ap- plication of air brakes, which emergency application caused a ter- rific shock; after careful inspection of train found the following: Broken knuckle on second car, drawbar pulled out on the fourteenth car, nineteenth car off track, train lines broken on the thirty-seventh and fortieth cars, drawbars mashed together on the sixtieth and sixty- first cars, broken train line on the one hundred and third car; a total of seven cars were shifted out of this train for repairs before train was ready to proceed from Edgemoor, Del.; while pulling into receiving yard at Harsimus Cove, N. J., emergency application of air brakes took place; after careful inspection of train found broken knuckle on forty-third car and drawbar pulled out of the ninety-seventh car; this crew moved a total of 118 cars and conductor and front brake- man walked approximately 8 miles in inspecting this train between the 328 TRAIL LENGTHS initial and final terminal; crew relieved at Harsimus Cove, N. J., at 7: 05 p. m. on account of the hours of service law. I have one more case. Mr. MARTIN. Before you pass to the next case, does a trip such as you described in that trip result in an investigation? Are you called on the carpet over a performance like that! Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, we were not in this case, Mr. Martin; no, sir. Unless it develops some failure on the part of the employees that causes this particular kind of accident we are not called in. Mr. MARTIN. Now, notwithstanding the series of accidents you have described, the engineer was not charged or considered by the company as having been negligent or incompetent in handling the train? Mr. SULLIVAN. Not to my knowledge. Mr. MARTIN. So that these accidents are considered by the com- pany to have happened from causes beyond his control? Mr. SULLIvAN. I think that is quite true. Mr. MARTIN. And were inherent in the character of the train he was pulling or handling? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed. Mr. SULLIvAN. On December 23, 1937-a short train. Crew ordered at Potomac Yard, Va., for 3:15 a. m.; left Potomac Yard, Va., at 5: 13 a. m. with 63 loaded and 5 empty cars; set off 10 cars at Edge- moor, Del.; picked up 16 cars at Edgemoor, Del.; set off 24 cars at Waverly, N. J.; set off 50 cars at Harsimus Cove, N. J.; crew relieved at Meadows, N. J., at 1:30 p. m.; crew on duty 10 hours and 15 minutes. Attention is called to the fact that symbol train M. D. 12 is sched- uled to leave Potomac Yard, Va., at 4: 30 a. m. daily and to arrive at Jersey City, N. J., at 1 o'clock p. m. daily, and it may be noted that on the dates mentioned above, when this train had less than 70 cars it arrived at its final destination on schedule time, but on the dates on which it had 90 cars or more it arrived at its final destination from 6 to 8 hours behind its scheduled time. I was regularly employed as a flagman in the service mentioned above from August 16, 1935, to March 4, 1936, inclusive, after which period of time I was compelled to take a yard brakeman's assign- ment in Washington Yard, Washington, D. C., on account of ner- vousness caused by the constant lurch, jerk, and slack action of the long freight trains, on which I was the flagman, and under no cir- cumstances in the future would I accept assignment as a flagman in thik or any other service where it is the practice to haul the ex- tremely long freight trains, unless I was forced to do so on account of a drastic reduction in force. Mr. MARTIN. Just a question. Do you mean by that last observa- tion that you have seniority rights which would enable you to select other types of trains? Mr. SULIvAN. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. But the necessity of going out on the trains that you may refuse to go out on, because of your seniority rights, must be filled by junior men on the list? Mr. SuLLrvAN. They are. TRAIN LENGTHS 3C9 Mr. MARTIN. They have got to go on the job you will not go out on, whether they want to go or not, or quit? Mr. SULLIVAN. That is the idea. Mr. MARTIN. And you can only keep out of that type of service by reason of your long seniority? Mr. SULLIVAN. That is it; yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Is that all? Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kennedy. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. Sullivan, you did not tell us what injury you sustained as a result of that accident. Mr. ULLIVAN. On the particular dates that I mentioned? Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Yes. Mr. SULLIVAN. I was the front brakeman. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Did you receive any injuries at all? Mr. SULLIVAN. Fortunately not; no, sir. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Were there any other employees injured? Mr. SULLIVAN. No, sir. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. The only real damage was the loss of running time, was it not? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. sir. My first thought after this serious trouble we had at Wilmington, Del., after I had noticed that the south-bound passenger track was clear and not blocked by wrecked cars, was for my flagman. I did not stop until I got to the rear end to see if he was still alive, and I was greatly surprised to find that he was alive and not injured; but he told me that he was well padded in the deck of the cabin car with cushions, fortunately, at the time. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Did you say that you were surprised to find him alive? Mr. SULLIVAN. I was surprised to find him alive or not seriously injured, one or the other. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Can you tell us how many men have been killed on that particular run during the past year? Mr. SULLIVAN. No; I could not tell you. I do not know of any. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Do you know whether or not any have been killed? Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, I do not know, Mr. Kennedy. I know that there have been some men killed and quite a few injured between Washington and New York. Now, I could not tell you. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Have you any idea whether it is 1, 10, 20, 50, or 100? Mr. SULLIVAN. No; I could not say exactly, the definite number. I did not make any check-up. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Would you not know if an employee bad been killed on that run ? Mr. SULLIVAN. There have not been any killed on this particular run to my knowledge. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Why were you so surprised to find that the employee on the rear end of the train was alive if there have not been any killed? Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, because of the severity of the shock. The shock was so great that it knocked my motor ahead about two car 330 TRAIN ENGTHS lengths, on the head end. It was one of the most terrific shocks I ever experienced on the head end of a train. Mr. KENNEDY of New York. That is all. Mr. MARTIN. I want to ask one more question. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTN. What is the attitude of the company toward this thing of the conductor riding on the head end of a long train and leaving only one man in the way car? I did not know that that was permissible. Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, insofar as I know, Mr. Martin, there have not been any exceptions taken to it, because on one of the divisions over which we operate the service, they require the conductor to be on the head end when there is work to be done and usually you have work to do. The CHAIRMAN. All right, thank you. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Chairman, I now want to introduce a wit- ness, Mr. Wilhelm, formerly employed upon the Western Maryland Railroad, who was injured and his injuries are permanent. He will never again enter railroad service. He is out of the railroad service. STATEMENT OF CHARLES THOMAS WILHELM, ALMA, MICH. Mr. WILHELM. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, my name is Charles Thomas Wilhelm. I reside at Alma, Mich. ip to December 30, 1937, I resided at 613 Washington Avenue, Hagers- town, Md. I entered the service of the Western Maryland Railway as a brakeman on August 27, 1917, and continued in the service as a brakeman and conductor, having been promoted in 1926. On May 3, 1936, I was working as a brakeman on a freight train, Extra 1129, west, which train was made up of 160 empty coal cars. Upon approaching Hancock, Md., at a speed of approximately 15 miles an hour, the engineer applied the air brakes in an emergency in an effort to avoid hitting a man sitting on the track. At that time I was sitting on the right-hand side of the caboose in the bunk, there being no cupolas on the Western Maryland cabooses, and the severe slack action threw me against something and I was rendered uncon- scious, and when I regained consciousness I was lying on the floor alongside the flagman who also had been rendered unconscious. I shook him and he came to in a short time. My head, arms, and back were so painful and my left leg so stiffened that I could not get up. The flagman finally recovered enough to walk about 20 car lengths to a telephone booth and notify the train dispatcher that I was seriously injured and unable to move. The flagman returned to the caboose and started to put wet towels on my head as per the dispatcher's instructions, but I told him it was not my head that was hurt as bad as my leg was, as I thought my leg was broken and I knew I needed a doctor and hospitalization. After waiting an hour and 40 minutes, the conductor, who was riding on the engine, came to the caboose and he and flagman assisted in get- ting me off the caboose to a taxicab where I was taken to the Han- cock passenger depot, where a company doctor was, and he gave me first-aid treatment and I was then sent to Hagerstown, Md., in a taxicab, to the Washington County Hosnital, where I was confined for 11 days. TRAIN LENGTHS 331 I wish to state that it is customary for the front brakeman to drop off of the engine on a grade 10 miles west of Hagerstown and look the train over as it pulls by and then catch the caboose and ride to the first stopping point that lie can reach the head end. After I was released from the hospital May 14, 1936, I was on crutches for 4 months, then had to walk with a cane for more than 3 more months. I was given a steel brace to wear on December 17, 1936, and still have to wear the same. Late in October I secured a very unsatisfactory settlement from the legal department of the Western Maryland Railway with no future employment for my 20 years' service, and on November 10, 1937, I received the following letter: Mr C. T. WILHELM, Brakeman, Hagerstownn A1d.: The following entry has been made on your service record : "Closed as a trainman" account of your being physically unable to perform duties as such. G. A. TOPPER, Trainmaster, Western Maryland Railway Co. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. STATEMENT OF J. A. FARQUHARSON; NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, EDITOR AND MANAGER OF THE RAILROAD TRAINMEN, BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, WASH- INGTON, D. C.-Resumed Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Chairman, I had another witness who was to have been here this morning, but for some reason he has been delayed. There are one or two witnesses I did not have an oppor- tWnity to get in, and I want to read into the record a report of acci- dents that I feel is worthy of being called to your attention. This is on the Pennsylvania Railroad-and I wish to call to your attention the fact that the Pennsylvania Railroad runs more trains than any other railroad in the world, and so if we come across more accidents here on the Pennsylvania, those which were sent in to us, why, it is because it is close by and the men know me and know we have been gathering the information. But here is a case where both men were knocked out again. [Reading:] Extra 2526 was pulling out of Marysville yard with 112 cars at a speed of about 15 miles per hour when train parted because of worn couplers; air went on in emergency when train parted. Conductor Kauffman and Flagman Miller were both knocked unconscious by the shock. Front brakeman went back along train to locate trouble and found that the train had parted between the eleventh and twelfth cars. He coupled the train and was going to leave. Yard crew working at stock pen saw train stop and thought it unusual that 10 one came out of cabin to protect rear of train and went to investigate. They found conductor and flagman both unconscious. Conductor of yard crew (aled yardmaster at Enola yard to get a doctor. The doctor came to rear of train and revived both men. Had this accident happened a little further out of the yard or had not been observed by the yard crew, the train would have Went on down the road with both men in cabin car unconscious, adding the additional hazard of rear-end collision to the extreme hazard of long-train operation. Mr. MARTIN. Let me ask you a question. Do you think it proper and safe on long trains to have only one man in the way car? Mr. FARQUHARsON. No; I do not. 332 TRAIN LENGTHS Here is one I have been asked not to use the name of the man, and if the committee does not want to accept it on that basis, I will not read it. The man asked me not to give his name. [Reading:] On April 25, 1937, a train consisting of 160 cars left Fulton en route- That is in Richmond. That is freight cars- en route to Newport News. About 12 miles from Fulton the conductor and rear brakeman discovered a stuck brake about 30 cars from the rear. They at once made an effort to get a signal to the engine by using green flares for a distance of 7 miles, but due to the length of train it was impossible for the engine crew to see these flares. Realizing there was a passenger train coming in the opposite direction, this being double track, and judging from the amount of fire that was coining from under the train, the conductor thought it advisable to apply the air from the rear and stop before we met this passenger train as there was fear of derailment which might cause a serious accident. He applied the air from the rear, realizing the fact that it would probably pull out a drawbar or break a knuckle, and, while the air brakes were being applied from the rear we met this passenger train and in about 30 car lengths after meeting this train the wheel bursted from this stuck brake and the train was derailed. I read that to you gentlemen so that you might understand more clearly what these men who have just testified are trying to put over to you with regard to the nervous strain that they are under all of the time, with instructions, "Don't touch that air unless it is an emergency." The whole responsibility is placed upon a man looking at fire fly- ing from under his train and wondering what he is going to do. Mr. WoLVERTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question right there. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WOLVERTON. I am asking this question, Mr. Farquharson, at the request of Mr. Knutson, and he has been requested to do so by a constituent. The question is this: What guaranties are air-brake manufacturers willing to make on air-brake equipment for a train of 70 cars or lower. I do not know whether you can answer that or not, but I am asking it because I was requested to do so by Mr. Knutson, who was unable to be present today and who otherwise would have done so as requested by his constituent. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Why, Mr. Wolverton, I do not know what promise or guaranty they can make. Mr. WOLVERTON. I did not think you were the one to ask, but I have done so because of the request that has come to do so. I will seek the information at another time from a later witness. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Now, I want to read you another one that hap- pened, and this relates to the death of Brakeman Lyons [reading: Walter J. Lyons, 36 years old, was the rear brakeman on a train of 120 cars destined from Jersey City, N. J., to Edgemoor, Del. When passing Millhani Junction, July 6, 1930, brake beam on car broke, cutting the air hose and setting the brakes throughout the length of the train. The impact was so great that it knocked said rear brakeman off the front end of cabin and ran over him. He suffered the following injuries: Fractured skul, fractured pelvis, and both legs amputated below the knees. He died the same date in St. Francis Hospital, Trenton, N. J. His widow resides at No. 2625 Market Street, Wilmington, Del. Here is a man who wanted to come here to testify, but he received this too late to get him in here, because I expected that we would have the witnesses on sooner. TRAIN LENGTHS 333 This happened on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at New Castle Junction. A train of 138 cars; a high and low drawbar crossed this train to part; that is, one was higher than the other. He said he was flagman on the caboose and "It knocked me down, fracturing my skull and other serious injuries, causing me to be unable to follow my line of work as flagman since that time. I never will be able to work again." That is signed "C. V. Arnold." Now, gentlemen, the question was asked the other day when a brakeman was testifying about the time that was consumed in mak- ing reports and how they have to sit on the bunks on a caboose with a clip board on their hands while one man read the car numbers to the other. And here is one that happened recently, on December 14, 1937 [reading]: On December 14, 1937, extra train with engine 4838, operating over the Fair- mont, Morgantown & Pittsburgh branch, of the Pittsburgh eastern subdivision, Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, in charge of Conductor R. B. Treutle, Brakeman E. D. Henderson, Flagman C. R. Kunkle, Engineer J. L. Wilson, and Fireman C. L. Shannon, was dispatched out of Connelsville, Pa., with 125 empty coal cars, destined for Fairmont, W. Va. On arrival of this train at Smithfield, Pa., 15 empty cars were set off, leaving 110 cars for Fairmont, W. Va. At Gans station, approximately 49 miles from Smithfield, en route to Fairmont, a knuckle broke on the head car causing the train to part. Conductor Treutle and Flagman Kunkle were sitting at the desk in the caboose. Flagman Kunkle was facing in the direction the train was running and Conductor Treutle was facing the opposite direction. When the train parted, the sudden stop threw Flagman Kunkle against the desk, tearing it loose from the wall. Flagman Kunkle had one of his kidneys torn loose, hurt internally, and was rendered unconscious. He was taken to the Connellsville State Hospital and remained there for 11 days. At the present time, he is confined to his room, not knowing when he will be permitted to leave the room. Flagman Kunkle is a member of Lodge No. 218, but his condition is such that he would be unable to make the trip to Washington to testify at the hearings. Now, Mr. Sullivan testified before you about the damage done on a long train and when you set out the bad-order cars and proceed to move and any severe shock comes then ordinarily you have an- other severe application or break in two, because there are defects that are not detected after the first. But here is a case on the Rock Island Railroad between Silvis, Ill., and Peoria. Conductor H. Schlimm, Brakemen Frank Fisher and Jess Davis were called out of Silvis, Ill., with Engineer J. Dwyer, and engine 2578, for an 89-car train for Peoria, Ill. Before leaving, the air was tested by carmen and nothing was found to be wrong with the air brakes, so these men started out of Silvis yard, and, in crossing over the west-bound main line to reach the east-bound main line, which was necessary for the engines to pass over a ramp which controls the movement of trains in automatic train control territory, which this division and engines are equipped with, and when the engine passed over this ramp it was covered with ice from a recent rain and wet snow, and the train control passed over this, but on account of the ice on this ramp it caused it to be a dead ramp, thereby setting the air brakes, and the brakes went into emergency, knocking Con- ductor Schlimm against the front door of the caboose, knocking out an oak panel in the door, also rendering him unconscious, and it was 47891-38---22 334 TRAIN LENGTHS necessary to take him to a hospital in Moline, Ill. Brakeman F. Fisher was knocked against the caboose injuring his arm, but did not make report of same, or lay off, but Conductor Schlimm was off one trip and advised that he had X-ray pictures taken at the hos- pital of his neck, but they showed nothing. This train was backed back into the yard, and awhile later another crew was called for this same train. This time it was Conductor J. Malcolm, Brakemen D. Trimmer and G. Booth, also engineer C. Scheller and engine 2586. This crew took this train out of the yard and about 9 miles they had trouble with the train breaking in two. This was corrected and they proceeded, and at Geneseo, Ill., 15 miles from Silvis, this, engine also struck a ramp covered with ice which caused it to be a dead ramp and set the air brakes in the same manner as they had set at Silvis. This time Conductor Malcolm was on the steps of rear platform to put off consist of train, and had started up on platform when the stop came and he was knocked up against the end of the caboose discoloring both of his eyes and injuring him in such a way that they set the train out at Geneseo and returned to Silvis with their caboose, and another conductor had to be called for the run out of Silvis. Conductor Malcolm is still off. The next day another crew was called for the same train and they took it to Peoria without any further trouble. Now, there is the movement of a long train which proves what Mr. Sullivan had testified to that when you break one of .these trains in two you can maybe see a defect, but when you couple up again, the other damage that is done that is not detectable will ordinarily create a second break in two, and that is the strain that these men are work- ing under. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Farquharson, do you think that you will be able to conclude this morning? The committee will have to adjourn in about 20 minutes and Mr. Wolverton had some questions lie wanted to ask you. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I would like to do that very much. And Mr. Kenney asked me a question that I did not answer the other day. You asked me, Mr. Kenney, a question and it will take me just a minute. If I can get that off, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. All right. Mr. FARQUHARSON. You asked me, Mr. Kenney, how many bruises, strains, lacerations, and so forth, were suffered, and if that was broken down in this report in the accident bulletin. And I told you it was. At the time I could not find it, but it will be found on page 10, at the bottom of Accident Bulletin No. 105. Mr. MARTIN. I would like to ask a few more short questions before Mr. Wolverton starts, so as not to break into his questions. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. I want to go back to the question, Mr. Farquharson, regarding this practice of the conductor riding the head end on these long trains. Now, that would then put the engineer, firemen, head brakeman, and the conductor all on the head end, would it not? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. What necessary function would be performed by four of them looking back along the line of the train, as far back as they TRAIN LENGTHS 335 could see. There would not be any necessity in having all four of them doing that, would there? Mr. FARQUHARSON. No. Mr. MARnIN. Now then, going back to the way car: The lone man in the way car could not possibly watch both sides of the train as far as it is visible at the same time, could he! Mr. FARQUHARSON. No, sir; and he would have to step across from one side of the cupola to the other frequently to watch the train if he is going to observe it around curves, and then reverse first one way and then the other. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Farquharson, it has seemed to me as the hear- ings have progressed that it would be helpful to have information as to the effect of the operation of trains 70 cars in length or greater as compared to those of a lesser number. It seems to me that possibly the most accurate information that could be gotten with respect to that would be by making a comparison between the State of Arizona in which the 70-car-length bill has been in operation since 1912 and some other State of like character where it has not been in operation. The place which opened up the easiest possibility of obtaining that information was the record of the case that was tried in the State of Nevada where the question had been raised as to whether a 70-car- length-limit bill promoted safety, as had been advocated by the pro- ponents of that bill. I was interested, also, from the standpoint that the court in that case, composed of three Federal judges, had found that the legisla- tion did not, in their opinion, justify itself from a safety standpoint. I therefore took the trouble of looking into the facts in the case that had been presented to the court and upon which the court based its opinion and I find the facts which I would like to present and ask if you have any explanation to make of them or whether there are elements in connection with them which should be considered with which I am not acquainted. Now, for instance, I found-and may I say right here that the report of the special master to the court stated that none of the facts which I am about to relate had been disputed--I find that in all classes.of employees engaged in road freight-train service, be- tween 1929 and 1934, that in Nevada there had been 77 accidents or casualties and in Arizona 153; that the percentage or average of casualties per 1,000,000 train-miles was 7.37 in Nevada, and in Ari- zona it was 11.64; and that the average casualty based upon 100,- 000,000 car-miles, as distinguished from train-miles, in Nevada, showed 10.17 and Arizona 21.38. In other words, only about half in Nevada that it was in Arizona. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wolverton, I did not catch the figure you just quoted for Nevada. Mr. WOLVERTON. 10.17 in Nevada; 21.38 in Arizona. In other words, approximately one-half in Nevada of what it had been in Arizona. In 1935 the total casualties in Nevada had been 7 and in Ari- zona 21. And the average, based upon 1,000,000 train-miles, was 4.39 in Nevada and 10.48 in Arizona. In other words, about twice as high in Arizona. 336 TRAIN LENGTHS And based upon the 100,000,000 car-miles average in Nevada it was 5.68 and in Arizona 18.56, or more than three times as much in Arizona as in Nevada. Now, Mr. Chairman, I have other figures that seem to me very appropriate to the study that we are making but it may take too long to read them all into the record. It may be that the com- mittee would not be interested in having them; but if we do have the time and it would seem appropriate to give the other figures which I have ascertained from a study of the report in the particular case to which I have referred . The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Wolverton, you use your discretion about that. Mr. WOLVERTON. The report showed that between 1923 and 1935 that the freight train-miles traveled in Nevada was 5 percent greater than in Arizona. Notwithstanding this fact, the average number of accidents was much less in Nevada than in Arizona. Mr. FARQUHARSON [interposing]. What year is that? Mr. WOLvERTON. From 1923 to 1935. Mr. FARQUHARSON. 1923 to 1935, 5 percent more train-miles in Nevada? Mr. WOLVERTON. Yes; now, if you consider the subject from the standpoint of volume of traffic Mr. FARQUHARSON. Could I ask a question there, Mr. Wolverton? Mr. WOLVERTON. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Was that on any particular railroad or all of the railroads in Nevada? Mr. WOLvERTON. It is my recollection it was the Southern Pacific which was the plaintiff in that particular action, and I assume that they compared their figures in Nevada with their railroad operation in Arizona, although I will say to you frankly, Mr. Farquharson, I am not clear. just as this moment whether those figures covered all railroads in those two States or only the Southern Pacific, which was the plaintiff in that action. The CHAIRMAN. Can anyone present answer that question? Mr. MAsoN. I participated in the Nevada case. The figures cited by Mr. Wolverton relate to the Southern Pacific's own trains in both States. The CHAIRMAN. And not other roads? Mr. MASON. Not other roads. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Mr. WOLVERTON. That was my understanding. I was not certain, however, but it seemed that way from my reading of the testimony. Mr. FARQUHARSON. The reason I stopped you is you have got two important main lines through Arizona, the Santa Fe and the South- ern Pacific, while in Nevada you have got the Southern Pacific and the Western Pacific, which cannot compare with either one of the other properties in volume of business done. Mr. WOLVERTON. In my opening observation in presenting these figures, I said that after having done so if there were any other ele- ments that should be considered that would change the effect of the figures, it would be helpful to have someone present such. So, if the statistics on the other railroads, for all railroads in those two States, would change materially the figures or the percent- ages I have given, it would be very appropriate and very helpful to the committee to have you give them. TRAIN LENGTHS 337/ Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, I would like to ask a question to clear it up. Mr. WOLvERTON. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. You stated that there were a great many acci- dents in Arizona and made a comparison with train-miles. That may be very confusing. Were those all of the accidents that hap- pened on the railroads in the State of Nevada? Mr. WoLVERTON. Under the headings that I gave. Now, there are others that I can give that have been broken down. For instance, on the question of derailments, I have the figures on derailments. That has been the subject of some extensive question- ing here, accidents that happen as a result of derailments, and dbris piling over into the other tracks, and so forth. I think these figures I have for such accidents relate to all rail- roads in the two States. Mr. FARQUHARSON. The point that I am getting at now is the bill before us, and I do not want this committee to get confused. All we have asked you for here is to cut down the size of this machine so that we can work with it and I repeatedly said to you all yester- day that there were certain accidents on the railroad that would con- tinue. Now, if the Southern Pacific or any other company pick up all of the accidents that were had on the railroad, I would not be able to answer you whether that was right or not, because when I checked down there at the Commission, I did not check nontrain accidents or nontrain service accidents. I checked just train and train service accidents on trains of 70 cars or over. I did not check passenger equipment. Mr. WoLvERTON. The facts that I have given you, Mr. Farquhar- son, were obtained from my reading of that case. I am certain that they relate to train and train-service accidents. So the point you are now making is eliminated, if my understanding of what I am reading is correct, and I think it is. Now, I have just referred to the question of accidents relating to derailments, for instance, because that has been referred to here as a possible cause of accidents not only to employees but also those who would be traveling as passengers or employees on other trains, either on the same or on an adjoining track. I find that from 1923 to 1934 in Nevada there were 52 derail- ments. Twenty-six were on long trains derailed and 26 were short trains derailed, while in Arizona there were 78 derailments and all those 78 derailments were on trains of less than 70 cars. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes; because we do not run any trains longer than 70 cars in Arizona and we run more.trains. Mr. WOLvERToN. That is the point I am making, that there were 78 derailments in Arizona where you only run shorter trains as compared to 52 in Nevada and only 26 of those were on long trains. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, Mr. Wolverton, that is a summarization of a very extensive lot of evidence and if the railroads want to introduce that, then they should break it down and cover all of the service that that refers to, because I think now from general knowl- edge the Santa Fe Railroad is a railroad that does as much business, I think, as any other railroad running off of the west coast and it enjoys a double track system of railroad from the coast to Chicago, 338 TRAIN LENGTHS and the Southern Pacific, on the southern end, now enjoys a double track system in that it has built a new line from Yuma by way of Phoenix to Tucson and it brought the El Paso Southwestern, which gave it a double track from Tucson into El Paso, but its lines are separated by a good many miles at different points; but if you take the total of*the freight trains moving through Arizona, I would like the railroads to show this, just how many trains the Santa Fe ran and how many trains the Southern Pacific ran on the main line in this long freight train movement and separate from that movement the injuries that occurred on the branch lines that were in the min- ing districts, where the men were switching, operating on a 4 and 5 percent grade, and the men who were switching in the yards. Let them separate that, because all we have laid before you is train move- ments on main lines; through train movements. That is what we have laid before you. We have not gone back and fine-combed all of the branches and gotten the long trains and the short trains. But, I did do this, upon request, I went back the other day and I checked, or rechecked the year 1936, for through-train movement where wrecks occurred on trains of less than 70 cars and that was the question that was before us when we adjourned, and I am pre- pared to answer that. But, I still insist that the railroads want to put on every accident, let them break them down and tell where they got them and com- pare the full through-train movements of Arizona with the full through-train movements in Nevada, and I will bet my right arm right now that they will find Arizona had more through-freight mileage than did Nevada. Mr. WOLVERTON. Is that your explanation of these figures? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I cannot answer those; but I say when you pick a railroad, and then throw in all kinds of accidents, that is not what is before this committee. The question before you, as com- mitteemen, is the question of what is happening on trains of over 70 cars and it should not be destroyed nor your vision dimmed in any manner by bringing in what happened in Nevada, when all of the accidents were dragged in, and other matters. I think that is foreign to this question. There was a single State that had enacted a law that the rail- roads later protested, I believe, upon the ground that the State did not possess the right to pass such a law, and this question is again different in that respect. Having met that sort of argument we were forced to come to the Congress to have the law applied to all of the States, and I would not attempt to answer how they drag in all of those, because I could not, but there is another reason, and it was raised the other day, and it might as well be answered now. I read into the record what the Interstate Commerce Commission itself said about the 'tendency on the part of railroads not to report acci- dents. And right now I am going to ask the privilege of having included in this record the testimony of the witness Anderson of the Atlantic Coast Line who will answer those questions. Mr. WOLVERTON. Who is Mr. Anderson? Mr. FARQUHARSON. General chairman of the Brotherhood of Rail- road Trainmen, Atlantic Coast Line. Mr. WOLVERTON. Are you going to bring him here as a witness? TRAIN LENGTHS 339 Mr. FARQUHARSON. I want to introduce the testimony that he gave on S. 69. Mr. WoLVERTON. In the Senate committee? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, Sir. Mr. WOLVERTON. Is he available for giving testimony before this committee? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. He is not in town. Mr. WOLVERTON. Of course, it is a matter for you to decide, but it seems to me if it is important enough to have the testimony read into the record then he is important enough to appear personally before this committee and give his testimony. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman Mr. WoLvERTON. But, may I say again, Mr. Chairman, my effort to obtain information has been as a result of the.statement you made the first day and with reference to which I indicated an interest,. when you compared Arizona and California and said there had only been one accident in Arizona as compared with 28 in California. You remember I said at that time, to make a proper comparison we should have other features before us than merely one State as, against another. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes. Mr. WoLvERToN. As a result of that, I became interested in the subject. It was your comparison between Arizona and California that created my interest. It seemed to me that the contrast might have been favorable or it might have been unfavorable if other than Arizona and California had been used as a contrast. I am not re- sponsible for the facts as they appear in this case as between Ari- zona and Nevada. In presenting the facts I have asked you to make. such observations concerning them, explanation or otherwise, as you might wish to do. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Well, Mr. Wolverton, I did what you asked me to do. Mr. WOLVERTON. I am not in a position as a member of this com- mittee to have the knowledge of railroad management or the knowl- edge that comes to the representatives of the great brotherhoods who are interested in the passage of this legislation. I have sought to get information along these lines, because it has not been presented, up to this point, and I am anxious to get all of the information that is possible, whether it is from your witnesses or whether it is from those who will follow, in order that we may make a determination that is fair to all who are concerned and that humanity, as it enters into it, may likewise be considered, and that we may take into consideration all classes of employees as well as the traveling public. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Wolverton, you asked me to break down Nevada following up Mr. Wadsworth's question when we made the comparison of Arizona and California. I said to you at that time, and I have checked the statements prepared by the Interstate Com- merce Commission, that there were 28 accidents in the State of Cali- fornia and there was 1 accident in the State of Arizona for the year 1934, and that that accident occurred in Arizona when a man was attempting to get on a moving train and the slack action ran out and while he was in the air catching the caboose, he fell. 340 TRAIN LENGTHS Now then, I went back and checked Nevada and you all can check Nevada easily from the regorts that I gave you in the 1,407 cases. The Southern Pacific Co. s accidents are all together and all I had to do was to go down and find out how many there were in Cali- fornia; how many there were in Nevada; and then give it to you here, and how many there were in Arizona. There were not, of course, any accidents on trains of over 70 cars in Arizona because they do not run trains of over 70 cars; but in the year 1936 there were five in the State of Nevada. I did not check the sort of trains in Nevada, because it was not before us. But when the question was raised again as to how many men were injured on trains of less than 70 cars in the State of Ari- zona. So I went back again and I checked the year 1936, accom- panied by Mr. Sullivan, who testified here this morning, and here is what I found in Arizona: That on January 15, 1936, there was a freight train of 63 cars, and a journal broke on the locomotive due to a progressive fracture of the axle. On January 11, 1936, on a train of 63 cars, there was a wheel bursted and it was found that there was a progressive interior fracture, upon investigation. There was one on February 26, when an axle broke on a locomo- tive and it was found that it was a progressive fracture, not capable of being detected under ordinary inspection, is the way they put it. On July 6, 1936, at Kim, Ariz., 65 cars and the slack action threw Brakeman Barker against a stove, and he suffered bruises and a rupture on the right side. There were 65 cars in that train, and I want to impress upon you here that when we first introduced this legislation, we asked for 62 cars, and we could not get any place, and we went to 70 cars, and we will admit that there is danger in trains between 60 and 65 cars, and 65 and 70 cars. Then, at Buchan, Ariz., the slack ran out-now, I want you to get this case carefully-the slack ran out as the brakeman was walking toward the cupola after boarding cab, after closing switch, the side switch, and threw him against the cupola and injured the ninth rib. Now, here is what happened, is bound to be what happened; when he was pulling out of that side track-because this evidently was a slack run-in, because he certainly would not get on the head end of the caboose when he had thrown the switch behind him-he ran to get on the hind end of the caboose, and when that fellow was pulling away, opening up to start to climb the hill, his engine slipped, and the slack ran into the caboose and caught this man walking in the caboose at that moment, and threw him against the cupola and broke this rib. Now, the next one was on June 7, 1936, at Aden, Ariz., Southern Pacific extra 3300, 61 cars. Another engine axle broke with a pro- gressive fracture, a main axle of engine. The next one is June 16, 1936, at Anchor, Ariz., extra 3714, west, 09 cars. As conductor attempted to board caboose his hand slipped off grab iron and he fell to ground. And that could have happened TRAIN LENGTHS '34_ on one car. There was not any slack action on that. He just missed his hand hold and fell to the ground. Tucson, Ariz., August 27, 1936, 64 cars. As Conductor McNeece was going out on rear end of cab, slack ran out, throwing him against ladder, fracturing the bone in left elbow. They had arrived at Tucson. They were pulling into the P. F. E. yards. That is the refrigerating yard, where the ice houses are, and they were pulling into the yard, and McNeece was walking out of the caboose when the slack ran out, and he was thrown against the ladder, fracturing a small bone in the left elbow, and he will be off for probably 20 days. On June 9, at Estrella, Ariz., with a 55-car train, another axle broke on the engine from a progressive fracture. Now, there is what happened in Arizona in 1936, and if we had checked all of the others under that, we would have found the same condition, and could have added that many more to the accidents we submitted to you. Now, that is information I thought you asked for. Now, here is one in Nevada, at Ditho, Nev. On September 15, 1936, on South- ern Pacific Railroad, third number 564, 64 cars. Train broke in two due to emergency application of air and run together, damaging four cars and $1,500 was the cost of the damage placed upon that by the railroad. Now, that is what I was asked for. That is what I gathered up, and that is what the railroads submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission upon the reports filed. The reports were supplied by the railroads, and are accidents upon which they must report, and now, if I may be privileged to give each member a copy of those reports, report forms, so that you will know how the Interstate Commerce Commission requires railroads to report. Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Farquharson, those figures you have just given all relate to trains of less than 70 cars in length, and they indicate that the length of the train had nothing to do with the accident. Mr. FARQUHARSON. That is, the length of the train has nothing to do with slack action? Mr. WOLVERTON. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARsON. Oh, no, Mr. Wolverton. I cannot imagine - Mr. WOLVERTON. Well, the accidents to which you have referred happened on trains of less than 70 cars. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WOLVERTON. Then, if you double the number of trains less. than 70 cars, you would probably have a doubling of those figures. Mr. FARQUHARsoN. If you double the length of the train you will have twice as much slack action and twice as much severity on the jerk and the run-in, and twice as much opportunity to kill a man as you have there. If you are going to step off of that counter to the floor, you would have possibly 4 feet to drop, but if you dropped from the ceiling of this room to the floor, you would probably fracture a bone in your body, or maybe it would kill you. That is the difference between 70 cars and 140 cars. Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Chairman, I will conclude by placing in the record one other statement of fact. I found from the source that I 342 TRAIN LENGTHS previously referred to that in freight-train operations, that the cas- ualties to freight conductors, brakemen, flagmen, from 1923 to 1928, in Nevada, were 151, and in Arizona, 213. From 1929 to 1935 there were 64 in Nevada and 123 in Arizona, making a total for those 12 years of 215 in Nevada and 338 in Arizona. Now, the reason that those years have been divided, as I understand it, was because from 1929 to 1935, there has been a considerable in- crease in the average length of trains in Nevada. And, notwithstand- ing that fact the number of casualties decreased in proportion to a greater extent there than they did in Arizona. The figures from the case to which I have referred, I understand, are taken from the reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Mr. FARQUHARSON. The railroads make the reports to the Interstate Commerce Commission. They could have reported everybody that skinned their hand in Arizona, and not reported the man who skinned his hand in Nevada. Mr. WOLvERTON. I have no objection. I think it would be per- fectly proper for Mr. Farquharson to have the privilege later, if he wishes, to submit such facts as he may wish that would in any way explain or check what seems to be the apparent effect of the figures that appear in the report which I have read into the record. The CHAIRMAN. The question raised seems to be a practical one based upon experience and knowledge of the trains operated in two States. In one State with all trains under 70 cars, and the other partly under 70 and partly over. Of course, value of the figures depends upon whether the conditions of operation are similar, whether they are based on similar conditions. If they are based on similar conditions, of course that is very important evidence. Either side here will have an opportunity in the future to present an analysis of these figures. Of course, they are not very enlightening unless they are based upon similar conditions. Mr. WoLvERTON. May I say in that connection, Mr. Chairman, the decision of the court, and also the opinion of the court, was based on and made a particular point of the fact that the conditions in the two States were sufficiently similar and that the figures were comparable. The CHAIRMAN. Is that opinion of record? Has it been placed in the record? Mr. WOLvERTON. Yes. Mr. FORT. We will offer it, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wolverton said that it had been put in the record. Mr. WoLVERToN. I thought it had. Mr. FORT. Not in the record of this case. Mr. WOLVERTON. Not in the record of this case. Mr. Chairman, do you mean in the record of this particular hearing ? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mr. FORT. We will put it in the record. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kennedy wants to ask a question. You want to make a statement, Mr. Farquharson. Mr. FARQTJHARsON. I just want to make this one remark. There is no way that I know of that I can answer the question Mr. Wolverton has put up to me to answer. If you put in the record the number TRAIN LENGTHS 343 of million of car miles made in the State of Nevada, the million car miles made in Arizona, I do not know how to get that. I cannot get it. That is a statement made that involves something that I could not find out. I cannot answer that. There is no way I can obtain that information. It is not broken down, and there is nowhere that I can get it. The CHAIRMAN. Those figures are based on Interstate Commerce Commission reports? Mr. FARQUHARsON. I could not get the Interstate Commerce Com- mission reports for the million car miles, for an individual State, that I know of. The CHAIRMAN. We will have a representative of the Interstate Commerce Commission before us before we get through, and see whether we can clear that up. Mr. FARQUHARSON. The Interstate Commerce Commission records from which I got the information you asked for is from those reports that I have just given you. Mr. WOLvERToN. Mr. Chairman, from my reading of the case I would say that the figures I have used were before the Special Master, who took the testimony at the request of the court, in the form of ex- hibits, and it is my further understanding that those exhibits were taken from the statistics and files of the Interstate Commerce Com- mission. The CHAIRMAN. Well, we can ascertain that before we get through. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. Mr. Farquharson, am I correct in understanding that you are here representing the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. KENNEY of New Jersey. Does the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen belong to the Association of Railway Labor Executives? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Not at this particular moment. Mr. KENNET of New Jersey. That is all. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Now, we thank you, Mr. Farquharson. Before the committee adjourns, we would like to have a brief executive session. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman, we have a quorum call. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson, could you present what you have today for the record? The committee will have to adjourn and get over to the House shortly. Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman; I just have a short statement to present here from Mr. Arthur J. Lovell. The CHAIRMAN. Then you will be permitted to put it in the record at this point, and when the committee adjourns, we will meet at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, and the opponents will be ready to proceed? Mr. FoRT. Yes, sir. Mr. JoHNsON. Mr. Chairman, in the event I want to make a short statement tomorrow morning, will I have the privilege of making that statement? It would only take 2 or 3 minutes. The CHAIRMAN. We will allow you 2 or 3 minutes. Mr. JOHNSON. It will not take long. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Before we adjourn, Mr. Bulwinkle asked me to submit to you a list of collisions of passenger trains and freight 344 TRAIN LENGTHS trains as a result of the wrecking of long freight trains, and debris from the long freight trains going over on the track, and I have that information here, and I am willing to submit that in any form that you want. The CHAIRMAN. Very well, we will examine that with a view to determining what portion of it we may want for the record. (Thereupon, at 12:13 p. m., the committee proceeded to the con- sideration of other business, after which it adjourned to meet the following morning, Thursday, January 27, 1938, at 10 a. m.) TRAIN LENGTHS THURSDAY, JANUARY 27, 1938 HoUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. M., in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence F. Lea (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. We are very much shocked this morning to learn of the death of Congressman Kenney, a member of this committee. He has served with us for a number of years. He has been a very able and faithful member. His untimely death is a great loss to our committee. We feel that it is proper, out of respect to his memory, that we adjourn. The committee will meet tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. (Thereupon, at 10:05 a. in., the committee adjourned to meet the following morning, Friday, January 28, 1938.) 345  TRAIN LENGTHS FRIDAY, JANUARY 28, 1938 HoUsE of REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE oN INTERSTATE AND FoiIrN COMMERCE, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the- committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence Lea (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Mr. Johnson, you wanted 2 or 3 minutes. STATEMENT OF W. D. JOHNSON, VICE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, ORDER OF RAILWAY CON- DUCTORS, WASHINGTON, D. C.-Resumed Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Mr. Arthur J. Lovell, vice president, national legislative representative of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, has been confined to his home and to his bed for some time on account of illness and has asked me to read the following into the record: BROTHERHOOD OF LocoMoTIvE FIREMEN AND ENGINEMEN, Washington, D. C., January 17, 1938. Mr. W. D. JOHNSON, Vice President, National Legislative Representative, Order of Railway Conductors, Washington, D. 0. DEAR SIR AND BROTHER : As illness prevents my personal appearance before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, it will be appre- ciated if you or one of our colleagues will present the attached statement indi- cating the attitude of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen in support of S. 89, the train limit bill, on which hearings are now in progress. Thanking you for your assistance in this matter, I am, Very fraternally, ARTHUR J. LovELL, Vice President, National Legislative Representative. STATEMENT OF ARTHUR J. LOVELL, VICE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE FIRE- MEN AND ENGINEMEN, IN SUPPORT OF S. 69 At the thirty-second convention of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, held in Columbus, Ohio, beginning June 8, 1931, the following action was taken by the delegates assembled : "That the international president be, and is hereby, authorized and directed, to bring this matter (national law governing length of trains) to the attention of other interested railroad labor organization executives, with the view of instituting a movement to assure a Federal law regulating the length of trains in the United States and Canada, when, in their judgment, the time is Opportune." Later this same convention went on record favoring a train length not to exceed the equivalent of 70 cars. This action was reaffirmed by the thirty-third convention of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, held in Milwaukee, Wis., beginning 347 348 TRAIN LENGTHS June 7, 1937, and the international president instructed to put forth every effort to secure the passage of this legislation at the earliest possible date. During my presentation, Mr. Chairman, I was requested by Con.. gressman Boren, of Oklahoma, to prepare a brief statement setting forth the claims paid by the accident-insurance department of the Order of Railway Conductors during some given period of time. Therefore, in response to the request made by Congressman Boren, I have prepared a computation setting forth the month; trains 70 cars or more, time lost, other accidents, outside of rear-end shock, deaths and dismemberment claims, and the total amount of all claims for the 12 months in the year of 1937. What we mean by deaths and dismemberments is we pay the amount of the policy for death or for the loss of a hand above the wrist or the loss of one foot, eye, or hearing. And, I would like for that to be made a part of the record, and I have sufficient copies here for each member of the committee. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Mr. JOHNSON. Also in response to the request made by Congress- man Wolverton, I checked our exhibits 1, 2, Ia, and 2a and I have prepared a statement setting forth the numniber of claims paid by our accident-insurance department during the period August 1929 to January 1, 1938, covering claims in the State of Arizona charge- able to rear-end shock and for a like period of time for claims paid in the State of Nevada, and I would like for that to be made a part of the record, and I have sufficient copies here for each member of the committee to have one. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. (The statement above referred to is as follows ) WASHINGTON, D. C., January 28, 1938. Hon. CnALEs A. WOLVERTON, Member, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.: I have made a check of Order of Railway Conductors' exhibits Nos. 1 and 2 and 1A and 2A, and I found that the accident-insurance department of the -Order of Railway Conductors paid five claims covering injuries on account of rear-end shocks on trains of less than 70 cars in the State of Arizona during the period August 1929 to January 1, 1938 (8 years 5 months). The claims are as follows: Claim No. 10577, exhibit 2, June 30, 1931, 28 cars, Southern Pacific Railway ; claim No. 10888, exhibit 2, October 20, 1931, 57 cars. Southern Pacific Railway ; claim No. 11014, exhibit 2, November 23, 1931, 51 cars, Southern Pacific Railway ; claim No. 11508, exhibit 2, March 24, 1932, 60 cars, Southern Pacific Railway ; claim No. 16867, exhibit 2A, July 15, 1937, 66 cars, Southern Pacific Railway. For the same period of time, we paid three claims in the State of Nevada, as follows : Claim No. 13036, exhibit 1, June 22, 1933, 74 cars, Southern Pacific Railway ; claim No. 16023, exhibit 1, July 10, 1936, 122 cars, Southern Pacific Railway ; claim No. 14953, exhibit 2, May 5, 1935, 60 cars, Western Pacific Railway. W. D. JOHNSON, Vice President, Order of Railway Conductors. Mr. JoHNSON. Now, I was requested also by Mr. Halleck, of Indiana, to prepare certain information with respect to our four exhibits. I had that practically prepared, but I reconsidered it and decided to put a little more information in the report I intend to render. Therefore, I would like to request, when I complete that report, that I be privileged to also have that incorporated in the record. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. (The matter referred to is as follows:) TRAIN LENGTHS 349 WASHINGTON, D. C., January 26, 1938. To the Chairman and Members of the Committee: In compliance with request of Congressman Boren, I am quoting below tabula- tion covering total number of claims paid by the Accident Insurance Depart- ment, Order of Railway Conductors, for the year 1937. The table shows: 1. Month. 6. Time lost, weeks and days. 2. Claims on trains, 70 cars or more. 7. Amount of claim. 3. Time lost, weeks and days. 8. Number of other accidents. 4. Amount of claim. 9. Death and dismemberment claims. 5. Claims on trains less than 70 cars. 10. Total amount of all claims. Trains Trains Deaths Total Month 70 cars Time l Amount lass Time lost- Amount Oer m amount and of claim than 70 - of claim socts me- of all more cars denMs claims (1) (2) (3) (4) (E) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) Weeks Days Weeks Dos January.- 16 121 5 $2,990.00 10 117 $2, 404. 98 38 3 $15, 849. 17 February..-.. 1 4 14. 29 7 39 825. 00 73 2 16, 193.86 March---- 4 36 3 870.72 5 17 4 439.28 76 2 17,592.85 April---------... 6 16 397.13 3 57 5 1,442.86 48 3 17,937.80 May.----------4 79 5 1,412.86 1 5 17.86 53 4 20,496.07 June----------2 4 3 110.72 3 8 4 214.28 61 4 21,664.90 July -----------4 17 4 439.29 1 1 1 28.57 55 2 11,341.34 August..-- 3 8 6 157.14 1 1 4 39.29 44 0 6,938.49 September... 3 11 4 289.28 0----------------------56 1 9,435.53 October---- 2 6 4 119.98 2 5 1 128. 57 67 3 14, 518.84 November.... 4 10 2 257.13 1 2 1 53.57 I 44 1 6,407.82 December----------.----------------------2 2 4 64.28 75 3 18, 164.19 Total--- 49 315 5 7,058. 54 36 253 1 5, 658.55 590 28 175, 540.88 W. D. JOHNSON, Vice President, Order of Railway Conductors. Mr. JOHNSON. And, it is my further understanding that we will be given sufficient time to prepare our rebuttal in answer to submis- sion of opponents of this bill. Is that correct? The CHAIRMAN. I presume you will be ready to follow along within a reasonable time on that? Mr. JOHNSON. We will. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Mr. JOHNsON. We will be prepared at that time. STATEMENT OF J. A. FARQUHARSON, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, EDITOR AND MANAGER OF THE RAILROAD TRAINMEN, BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, WASH- INGTON, D. C. Mr. FARQUHARSON. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Farquharson. Mr. FARQUHARSON. May I be privileged to submit an answer to a statement that was made by the Southern Pacific counsel during the time I was testifying relative to those merchandise trains operating between San Francisco and Los Angeles. It will only take me a moment. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Mr. FARQUHARSON. During the time I was on the stand I spoke of the L. C. L. business handled on the west coast division of the Southern Pacific. I know that that had originated by putting L. C. L. freight in a baggage car and giving it passenger train 47891-38----23 350 TRAIN LENGTHS movement. I was not sure of the operation and I asked counsel if that service was still in existence and his reply was "Yes, and we are handling over 70 cars." The CHAIRMAN. What service was that, Mr. Farquharson? Mr. FARQUHARSON. That was the fast merchandise service which is now in effect. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I immediately wired my chairman on the Southern Pacific Railroad for that information and I want to put into the record now the movement of that service and explain it briefly. That service is operated as a second section of a passenger train and they are handling it in that manner, and here is the record for the month of December: 26 cars, 27 cars, 25 cars, 26 cars, 25 cars, 25 cars, 25 cars, 25 cars, 25 cars, 26 cars, 25 cars, 26 cars, 24 cars, 22 cars, 22 cars, 23 cars, 22 cars, 22 cars, 23 cars, 22 cars, 23 cars, and so on. Now, this train I want you to understand moves as a second sec- tion of a passenger train and between two other passenger trains and it is moving up and down on passenger train schedule. They have not handled over 50 cars. Mr. MArES. Have you mentioned all the trains that made that run in the month of December? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Yes; I have gone from the 1st to the 31st of December. Mr. EICHER. You said there was no train as long as 30 cars during the entire month? Mr. FARQUHARSON. Not in this month, no, on that railroad. Mr. EICHER. In that L. C. L. service? Mr. FARQUIJHARSON. Yes. And, the point I was making was in answer to Mr. Martin's question that if we gave the more frequent service, would not this business be brought back and I want to leave with this committee the fact that this originated by putting L. C. L. freight in a baggage car in a passenger train and now have developed until we are moving that many loads up and down the coast every night on passenger-train schedules. Now, we come to the long trains of 70 or more for the same month, and we find that they were handling 94, 96, 96, 79, 94, 72, 96, 99, 92, 71, 99, 72, 72, 93, 95, 94, 99, 82, 73, 97, 95, 99, 74, 95, 97, 99, 97, 95, 97, 96, 85, 74, 92, 95, 95, and 98. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Farquharson, could you not extend that in the record? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I would like to, Mr. Chairman. I would like to be privileged to do that, and to go further into detail and show you the passenger trains between which this freight train is moving. It is all spelled out, and I will be glad if I may write that up in detail and submit it later. But I did not want that to stand in the record. The CHAMMAN. That would not be of any unusual length, would it? Mr. FARQUHARSON. I will put it all on less than one page. I would like to put these tables in the record at this point. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. (The tables referred to are as follows:) Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on Friday, January 28, I asked permission of the committee (which was granted) to introduce a tabulation of fast merchandise trains and drag freight trains operating in both directions between San Francisco and Los Angeles. TRAIN LENGTHS 351: It will be noted that the fast merchandise trains operate out of San Francisco as second section of passenger train No. 70, and operate out of Los Angeles and into San Francisco as second No. 1 fast passenger train. Attached there is found a tabulation for the month of December, 1937, showing the time leaving San Francisco, loads and empties in the train, cars picked up at San Jose, arriving time at Watsonville Junction, and the running time between San Francisco and Watsonville Junction. The next sheet shows the same between Watsonville Junction and San Francisco ; the next sheet gives the same information but covers the slow-freight movement, which is approximately double the time of the fast merchandise. The next sheet shows the tine for dead freight between San Luis Obispo and Watsonville Junction, a distance of 152 miles, and the footnote shows the fast-freight movement, which is 4 hours and 20 minutes over this 152-mile district, while the slow-freight movement averages from 6 hours an, 55 minutes to 13 hours and 40 minutes. On the next movement slow freight from San Luis Obispo to Santa Barbara, a distance of 119 miles, the fastest slow- freight movement is 5 hours and 35 minutes and the longest is 13 hours and 40 minutes, while the fast merchandise movement over this district is in 3-hoar schedule. The next sheet shows the fast-freight movement between Santa Barbara and Los Angeles, and it will be noted that this movement, but on two occasions, exceed 4 hours, the balance of the time running between 2 hours and 50 minutes and 3 hours and 40 minutes, while the slow-freight movement, the fastest movement was 4 hours and 35 minutes and the longest 13 hours and 30 minutes. It should be borne in mind that this fast-freight movement moves on passenger schedule and is a regular daily service, moving on passenger schedule between passenger trains. This service has recovered from the highways a great deal of business that formerly was handled by trucks and if the railroads were to mod- ernize their service by faster freight train service generally, the same beneficial results would follow on all of the railroads of the country. J. A. FARQUHARsON, National Legislative Representative, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. East-bound movement of fast merchandise trains (P. M. T. service) between San Francisco and Watsonville Junction, coast division, Southern Pacific lines, during month of December 1937; length of district, 97 miles Cars Picked Cars Run- Date Laigtime, up. Arvn ie Date San Francisco p san Watsonville fing Loaded Empty Jose Loaded Empty time Dec. 1_--------740p. .. 26 1 16 10:30 p. m- 42 1 2 50 Dec. 2---------------do-------- 27 1 1 10:46 p. m 45 1 3 06 Dec.3---------------do--------25 1 15 10:45p.m 40 1 3 05 Dec. 4---- ----------------------- ---------- ---- Doe.5------------ ---------------- -------- --- ------------------- -------- -------- -------- Dec.6---------------do---------26 1 15 10:30 p. m. 41 1 2 50 Dec. 7--------------do---------25 1 15 10:38 p. m.... 40 1 2 58 Dec. 8---------------do---------25 1 19 '0:40 p.m. 44 1 3 10 Dec. 9---------------do-25 1 18 10:38p. m -- 4.3 1 2 58 Dec.10-------------do-25 1 17 10:45 p. m... 42 1 3 05 Dec. 11 ------------------------ -------------------------------------- Dec. 12------------------------------------------- Dec. 13---------------do---------25 1 16 10:45 p. m----. 41 1 3 05. Dec. 14---------------do---------26 1 18 10:35 p. m..... 44 0 2 55 Dec. 15---------------do - 25 1 18 10:25 p. m-.... 43 0 2 45 Dec. 16---------------do---------26 1 17 12:06 a.m._._ 43 1 4 2 Dec. 17 ---------- do---------24 1 18 10:53 p. m 42 0 3 13 Dec. 1- ----------- ---------------- ---------------------------------------- Dec. 19...................................... Dec. 20-------------do---------22 1 17 10:30 p. m 39 1 2 50 Dec. 21-------------do---------22 1 17 10:55 p. m 39 1 3 15 Dec. 22-------------do---------23 1 19 10:50 p. m 42 1 3 10 Dec. 2&----------------do-------- 22 1 18 10:54 p. m 40 1 3 14 D ec. 24- - - - - - - --- - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - Dec. 25 Dec.26-------------- --------- Dec.27---------------do---------22 1 16 10:35p._m 38 1 25 Dec. 28---------------do-------- 23 1 17 10:35 p. m 40 1 2 55 Dec. 29- _...-........do-------- 22 1 18 10:35 p. m 40 1 2 5 Dec. 30... .---..do---------23 1 16 10:44 p. m 39 1 3 04- NOT.-This train operates as first-class train 2/70 between San Francisco and Watson- ville Junction, as indicated on pp. 4 and 8, Coast Division Timetable No. 144. 352 TRAIN LENGTHS W estbound movement of fast merchanise trains (P..31. T. service) between Watsonvile Junction and San Francisco, coast division, Southern Pacific Line, during the month of December 1927; length of district 97 miles Cars Set Cars Dae Leaving time, out, Arriving time, Running Watsonville San San Francisco time Loaded Empty Jose Loaded Empty firs. Miin. Dec.1-----------__5:55 a. m--- 22 1 12 8:42 a. m--- 10 1 2 47 Dec.2----------- ----- do--------- 24 1 11 8:45 a. m.-- 13 1 2 50o Dec. 3--------------do-------22 1 11 8:40 a.mr--- 11 1 2 45 Dec. 4------------ 5:47 a. m--- 24 1 11 8.45 a. m 13 1 2 48 Dec. 5-------------------- -------- -------- -------- ---------------- ------- -------- -------- Dec. 6----------------------------- -------- ----- ----------- ---- ------------- Dee. 7------------ 5:45 a. m-_. 24 1 14 8:456a. m--- 10 1 3 0 DecS------------ 5:66a. m--- 25 1 13 - ----------- 12 1 2 50) De.9- ------5:47 a. m--- 24 1 13 - ---- ------- 11 11 2 48 Dec. 10 ----------- 5:52 a. . 23 1 12- d------11 1 2 52 Dec. 11 ----------- 6:02 a. m---- 28 1 12- o--- -------- 11 1 2 43 Pec. 12----- --------------- ------- -------- -------- ---------------- ------- ------- --- --- Pee. 13------- ----- ----------------------- ----- ------ ---------- Dec. 14 --- ---- :45a. m--- 23 0 12 8:45 a.m 11 1 550 Dec. 15------------ ----- ------ 22 1 10 ---do---- 12 0 3 00 Dec. 16----------- 6:02 am... 22 0 11--do--_ 11 1 2 . 43 Dec. 17---- -----5:52 a. m.--- 24 1 12- d------12 1 2 50 Dec. 18 ---------- 6:03 a. m--- 22 1 11- d------11 1 2 42 Dec. 19--------------------- ------ ------------------- ----- ---------- Dec.20 --------- ------ -------------_-_----------- -------- ------- Dec.2?1----------6:41 am--------22 -8 11 9:24 a. m--------11 8 -2 4 Dec. 22 -----------68:14 a. m--- 22 1 12 8:40 a. m--- 10 1 2 26 Dec. 23----------- 5:57 a. m--- 28 1 17- d------11 6 2 37 Dec. 24----------- 5:55 a. m_ 21 1 11 8:44 a. m--- 10 1 2 49 Dec. 25----------------- -------- -------------- ----------------- -------- ------ ---------- Dec. 26 --------------------- ----------- ------- -------------- ------- -------- ---------- Dec. 27-------------- ---------------- -------- -------- --_------- -------- ----__ Dec. 28----------- 6:00 a. m--- 20 1- 11 8:45 a. in--- 9 1 2-45 Dec. 29----------- 6:05 am--- 22 0 12 9:05 a. m-__ 10 1 3 00 Dec. 30------------ do--------- 23 0 13 9:O0 a. m__ 10 1 2 55 Dec. 31 ----------- 6:265a. m--- 20 1 11 8:55 a. M__- 9 1 2 30 Norv.--Thls train operates as first-class train 2/No. 1 between Watsonville Junction and San Francisco, as indicated on pp. 3 and 9, Coast Division Timetable No. 144. TRAIN LENGTHS 353 Trains o1fsnore than 70 cars run between San Francisco (Rayhore), San Jose, wnrd TWatsonville Jimewtionl, coast division, Southern Pacific Lines, during month of December 1937. Length of district, 92 miles (turn-around) Watson- yille Junction, San Jose, and return 104 miles) Eastward trains Westward trains Dats Cars Ton- Cars Ton- Train p______ ag, in Total Train nave, in Total No. thou- cars No. thou- cars Loaded Empty sands Loaded Empty sands 1------- ------ 1-766 87 7 7,843 94 X3668 96 0 9,237 96 1----------------- X3321 0 96 ,137 96 X13208 5 24 ,394 79 2------------------ 1-766 79 17 7,125 96 X3734 87 11 9,307 98 2----------------- X2781 0 79 3,940 79 X2712 7 91 4,817 98 3--------------- 1-766 81 13 7,066 94 X3689 54 44 7,507 98 3--------------- 3-766 20 2 4,903 72 X3208 16 78 ,665 94 4------------------ 1-766 88 8 7,226 96 X3671 90 7 9,010 97 4-----------------23X3209 8 91 ,727 99 X3766 96 2 8,810 97 5_---------------__1-766 73 19 7,222 92 X3207 53 31 6,717 .84 6-----------------__ 766 34 37 6,001 71 X3209 30 9 6,400 .89 6---------------- X2594 1 98 ,394 99 X3215 47 24 6,466 71 7------------------- 1-766 65 7 ,466 72 X3734 65 24 7,27 89 7------------------ --- ---------------X3208 19 79 ,08 98 8----------------- X2581 0 72 3,813 72 X3661 6 9 28 8,212 97 8------------------ 1-766 83 10 9,320 93 X3207 43 30 5,731 73 9------------------1-766 89 6 8,005 96 X3654 86 10 8,812 96 9------------------------ -------- -------- ----------X3208 44 30 5,192 74 10------------- --- 1-766 81 9 7,444 94 X3671 50 46 7,201 96 10--------- ------- X3209 0 99 5,346 99 X3234 44 48 5817 92 10------------------------ -------- -------- ----------X3232 30 54 ,632 84 11----------------- 1-766 47 36 6, 136 82 X3670 45 2 6, 710 97 11------------------------ -------- -------- ----------X3209 2 .34 5,984 86 12------------------------ -------- -------- ----------X3689 42 3 2, 590 97 12----------------------- -------- ------------------- X3215 32 63 5705 95 13------------------------ -------- -------- ----------X2566 14 7 4,220 71 13------------------------ -------- -------- ----------X3234 49 39 6,883 88 14------------------------ -------- -------- ------- ------ X3232 31 60 6,031 91 14------------------------ -------- -------- ----------X321 47 24 6,716 71 15----------------- 1-766 70 3 6,244 73 X3676 74 23 8,39 87 15------------------------ -------- -------- ----------X2817 58 14 5,369 72 16----------------- 1-766 76 21 7, 280 97 X3681 56 40 7, 259 96 16----------------------- -------- -------- ----------X2760 36 54 6,408 90 17----------------- 1-766 84 11 7,460 96 X3673 69 30 8,079 99 17------------------------ -------- -------- --------1 3215 36 4 6081 89 IS----------------- 1-766 6 43 7, 169 99 X3756 73 8 7, 562 81 19----------------- 1-766 17 57 4, 728 74 X3269 64 10 , 824 74 19----------------- 2-766 89 6 7, 936 9 X3672 76 21 8,387 97 19------------------------ -------- -------- ----------X3232 29 65 5,413 94 20----------------------- -------- -------- ----------X3208 0 86 4,769 96 21---------- ------ 1-766 76 22 7,433 97 X3671 38 59 6,503 97 21---------------- X3208 0 99 5,287 99 ------------- -------- -------- -------- 22----------------- 1-766 78 19 7, 141 97 X3207 56 18 , 730 73 22 ----------------------- -------- -------- ----------X321 11. 67 3,480 78 23----------------- 1-766 73 22 6, 665 96 X3675 56 41 7, 564 97 23------------------------------ ------------- X3232 47 26 5,483 73 24----------------- 1-766 ---83 14 7,70 97 X3689 53 44 7,248 97 24------------ -------- -------- -------- ------- -------- X3208 54 18 6,028 72 25------------------ 766 90 6 7,984 96 X3681 73 25 8,428 98 26------------------ 766 34 51 6,486 861X3674 73 17 7,215 90 26 ----------------------- -------- -------- ----------X3273 19 80 ,726 99 26----------------------- -------- -------- ----------X2481 7 91 4,966 98 27----------------- 2-766 0 74 3,956 74 X13209 46 28 6,46 73 28----------------- 1-766 81 11 7,672 92 X3724 18 76 ,402 93 28 ----------------------- -------- -------- ----------X3208 43 30 ,319 73 8--------------- ------- ----------------- X3207 44 29 6,232 73 29--------- 1-766 83 12 8,423 96 X3673 31 65 6, 067 96 30--------- 1-766 83 12 7, 049 96 X3734 1 42 6,468 93 30--------------------------__-- X3207 5 27 5,965 82 30---------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- X3209 38 47 5,996 8 31----------------- 1-766 91 7 8, 640 98 X370 36 61 6, 439 956 Average running time east-bound trains on this district 5 hours, 30 minutes; average running time, west-hound trains, 4 hours, 30 minutes. heaverage running time between Watsonvlle Junction and San oJse, 3 hours and 15 minutes, 1 way, or 52 miles. NOTE.-3.5 fast merchandise trains (P. M. T. service) were operated n this district, handling an average of 24 cars to each train, consuming approximately 4 hours, 20 mi- utes, over the district. 354 TRAIN LENGTHS Coast Division Southern Pacific lInes, December 1937 TRAINS OF MORE THAN 70 CARS RUN BETWEEN SAN LUIS OBISPO AND WATSON VILLE JUNCTION. LENGTH OF DISTRICT 152 MILES Date Numberate NumberTime of cars of cars 1 --------------------- ,---------------- 4 -------------------- -................... --------------------- 7 -------------------- .-------------------- 9- .. .. ... .... 10..- ....- ..... ... .-- 11 ------------------- 12.......----..-......... 13------------------- 14.-.--................... 18...----................ 96 91 88 84 88 88 70 90 90 92 80 98 84 99 71 86 71 83 99 71 90 94 81 99 85 73 88 88 74 71 79 72 83 99 85 71 79 76 79 77 78 H. 10 10 10 8 10 9 8 8 9 10 10 9 6 7 S 9 7 9 9 7 8 11 9 12 11 9 9 7 8 11 7 9 8 10 8 7 9 9 10 9 9 in. 05 30 20 20 35 05 40 30 00 00 20 20 30 30 10 25 10 40 10 40 40 00 20 20 20 35 55 50 40 05 30 10 40 00 55 30 35 55 25 35 20 18...... ..----.---. 17.. ..- .....- .---- .- 18------------------- 20--.--..---------- 22------------------- 23.-.. -.-. ----. -. .- 24...................... 25-..........-------. 26. ..- ..-- - 27 --. -- . ..- ..- ..-- 28..- .... -- - .---- 29. ._ ...-.- -- .- ....-- 30----_------------- 31-.. .- .-.-- .- ....--- 82 88 86 90 99 93 77 70 99 91 84 71 100 74 71 71 71 70 81 77 90 99 99 85 99 98 84 99 85 80 74 94 85 98 77 99 93 H. 10 7 8 10 11 9 10 8 7 9 9 6 7 8 6 8 8 7 10 9 7 8 10 11 7 8 7 9 8 9 9 8 9 8 9 8 13 m. 00 25 30 20 00 30 35 10 55 00 50 30 55 40 55 25 20 25 25 10 50 40 50 45 30 45 40 00 05 20 35 00 20 45 55 10 40 NOTE.-35 fast merchandise trains (P. M. T. service) were operated on this district, handling an average of 24 cars to each train, consuming approximately 4 hours, 20 minutes, over the district. TRAIN LENGTHS Coast Division Soutften& Pacific Lines, December 19 37--Continued 355 TRAINS OF' MORE THAN 70 CARS RUN BETWEEN SAN LUIS OBISPO AND SANTA BARBARA. LENGTH OF' DISTRICT 119 MILES Date Number Time Date Number Time of cars of cars H, m. IL im. 1--------------------------- 93 8 25 18-------------------------- 88 830 71 7 50 78 8 30 99 8 00 74 5 30 2--------------------------- 7 70 98 9 34 3--------------------------- 89 8 25 17-------------------------- 91 7 40 91 12 55 71 8 30 70 8 10 71 6 30 4-------------------- ----- 75 8 55 72 8 35 74 8 05 18-------------------------- 89 8 45 72 10 10 74 7 55 _--_ 72 7 40 19-------------------------- 72 7 05 99 9 00 98 7 35 73 10 00 20-------------------------- 72 13 00 8 -------------------------- 70 8 3021----------------- -------- 72 8 50 7--------------------------- 88 7 40 22-------------------------- 70 7 55 8--------------------------- 83 7 20 72 8 20 8 730 73 5 06 72 8 50 70 8 15 91 10 25 23-------------------------- 74 7 10 9--------------------------- 90 7 10 97 7 25 78 5 2024-------------------------- 71 5 45 99 9 35 84 7 15 70 5 25 71 8 15 10-------------------------- 73 12 05 28---------------------- ---98 8 40 72 5 55 73 5 30 73 10 25 27-----------------------74 6850 74 7 55 96 8 10 13-------------------------- 71 9 1028-------------------------- 70 10 55 73 13 40 72 8 10 72 6 05 29-------------------------- 863 6828 14-------------------------- 70 5 35 71 5 25 70 8 05 73 8 30 i5-------------------------- 79 10 05 30------------------------- 71 11 10 74 7 25 95 7 10 74 7 20381-------------------------73 6830 70 12 55 74 8 15 NOTE.-35 fast merchandise trains (P. M. T. service) were operated on this district, handling an average of 24 cars to each train, consuming approximately 3 hours over the district. Freight trains1x of more than 70 ears between Los Angeles and Santa Barbara during month of December 1937. Length of district, 100 miles Dae Tan Number Time over Tri Number Time over Dae Tan of cars district Dt ri of cars district H. i. H. in. 1------------ X-3671 74 5 15 16 -------------- X-2446 74 5 10 1---- ------ X-3724 74 5 25 17 -------------- X-4425 98 6 55 2--------------- X-3674 74 5 20 18 -------------- X-244 98 7 50 2--------------- X-3766 7 7 05 is-------------- 1/812 96 7 00 3--------------- X-3674 70 5 35 19-------------X-3689 71 8 30 3--------------- 1/812 .99 7 20 2-------------- X-4425 73 3 35 4--------------- X-5043 97 5 30 21 -------------- X-3675 70 3 45 4------------ X-3668 80 7 25 21--------------- 812 72 8 30 5-------- X-5043 74 6 10 22------------- X-3668 74 5 55 7-------- X-3675 87 13 30 22------------- X-1803 74 8 10 7--------------- X-5020 99 10 55 23---- ----_----X-4313 70 9 15 7-------- X-3657 96 s 4 23 -------------- X-4317 73 5 10 8--------------- X-3724 70 7 45 24-------------- X-4424 90 5 15 8--------- --X-3678 74 4 55 25-------- ---- X-508 74 3 4 9-------- 812 73 5 55 25--------------X43654 71 7 50 9-------- X-3744 74 4 55' 25 -------------- X-367 77 s 55 9-X-5043 97 8 25 26-------------- X-5018 84 5 25 i----- X--5048 94 4 35 .28--- ---------50s44 94 1i, 25 12-------------- 812 71. 5 35 29------------- X-5017 92 7 50 14-------------- X-388i 72 4 35 80-------------- 2/812 70 4 55 14------------- X-3675 74 5 05 30------------- X-5022 72 45 14------------- r 812 88 7 10 31-------------- X-3674 74 5 00 15-------- X-36768 88 35 ---------- - -W75 72 4 8 ' Above trains bad 2 or moreengies In order to maintain above running te. 356 TRAIN LENGTHS Fast merchandise trains (P. M. T. service) between Los Angeles and Santa Barbara during month December 1937. Length of district 104 miles Number Time over Number Time over Date Train of cars district Date Train of cars district H. m. II. m. 1------------.--.2/2 23 2 50 16.--------------2/2 23 2 55 1-------------- 2/69 28 3 10 16.-------------- 2/69 28 3 15 2-------------- 2/69 26 3 11 17-------------- 2/69 26 3 10 2-------------- 2/2 24 3 37 17--------------- 3/76 24 3 18 3----------------2/2 27 3 15 18--------------- 2/2 23 3 10 3--------------- 2/69 27 3 12 20-------------- 2/69 33 3 40 4--.------------- 2/2 23 2 55 21--------------2/69 26 3 17 6-------- ----- - 2/69 26 3 10 2L - 2/2 20 3 05 7------------.--. .2/69 29 3 15 22--------------- 2/2 20 3 15 7-_- .-- .....---- 2/2 24 3 02 22--------------2/69 32 3 15 8----------------2/2 24 2 50 23--------------- 2/69 25 3 10 8------------- 2/69 27 3 10 23--------------2/2 23 3 00 2/69 27 3 10 24-.-------------- 3/2 20 4 25 9.-- ....... --... -2/2 23 3 05 27.--------------- 2/69 24 3 10 1 ..------------2/69 26 3 10 28.--------------2/2 19 3 15 1)- -------------- 2/2 25 3 28 28-.-------------- 2/69 25 3 15 11-... -.... --... -2/2 24 3 00 29.--------------2/69 25 3 20 13.------------2/69 26 3 10 29-.-------------- 2/2 21 3 05 14-----...--. ---. 2/2 22 3 15 30-..-------------- 2/2 21 3 02 14 .--------------2/69 26 3 10 30..-----------..... 2/69 24 3 10- 15.--- .......---- 2/69 25 3 15 31------------ 6/76 18 5 35 15__-- ----- 2/2 24 3 00 Mr. MARTIN- Just before you leave, Mr. Farquharson: With refer- ence to the question I asked you the other day about the number of trains for 24 hours operating on the Pennsylvania Railroad between New York and Philadelphia and then on some railroad between Chi- cago, and perhaps two other points. Do you recall that question? Mr. FARQUI]ARSON. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. I want to say with regard to that I was not asking for any information whatever except as to the number of trains. That is all. That is, trains of all types operating over each of the divisions that you may see fit to make some statement about, and if you are able to get that I wish you would put that in as an exhibit in connection with your remarks, and instead of having it strung out some place else through the record, put it in in connection with those remarks. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I will try to get that. The CHAIRMAN. When you correct your statement in the record, you can insert the figures at that place if it is agreeable. Mr. FARQUHARSON. May I just at this time say to you, sir, that the time on this train between San Francisco and Watsonville Junction, that is the first freight division of this fast train. The longest run- ning time was 3 hours and 14 minutes. And they are operating there on an average of less than 3 hours, on about 2 hours and 50-some minutes, while the drags, not on the same division, on a longer divi- sion I will admit, but a less thickly settled territory, because as you know, Mr. Chairman, moving out of San Francisco down the pen- insular to San Jose, we are running through one city after another. But, on the long division between Watsonville and San Luis Obispo they have been taking from 9 hours to 14 hours and 45 minutes to go over the division, while the freight trains that I was telling you about are moving on passenger train schedule at a speed on that territory of over 33 miles an hour. I just wanted the record corrected and I will submit it to you on one sheet of paper. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. TRAIN LENGTHS 357 Mr. MARTIN. But, you understand, Mr. Farquharson, that all I want is the number of trains operating per day of 24 hours on certain divisions, and I am not asking for any other information than that. Mr. FARQHHARSON. Yes, Sir. Mr. MARTIN. You understand I do not take stock in that feature of this inquiry about the possibility of increase of grade-crossing accidents, automobiW accidents, due to the possible increase in the number. of trains, but since it has been gone into so exhaustively I thought I would like to have for my purposes, figures on the number of trains operating over different divisions every 24 hours. Mr. FARQUHARSON. I do not know how I can get that, but I will try, Mr. Congressman. The CHAIRMAN. We will now hear from the opponents of the bill. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Congressman Buwinkle re- quested that I submit a list of accidents where long freight trains buckled and were hit by other trains. Attached you will find a list of 10 cases, which I submitted at previous hear- ings, and five additional cases that occurred in 1936 and 1937. J. A. FARQUHARON, National Legislative Representative, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. (Supplemental report of accidents on trains of over 70 cars, referred to and submitted by the witness, will be found at the end of this testimony.) These 10 all occurred on territory where the main line consists of 2, 3, or 4 tracks; in 7 of these cases where freight trains were wrecked, passenger trains moving on parallel tracks collided with the wreckage, and in 3 cases where more than one engine was in use to propel the train, the helping engine, shoving behind the cab of a freight train, crashed through the caboose. These accidents cost the lives of 18 persons and injured 230, and 177 of the injured were passen- gers, so this picture reveals the public interest in the proposed legislation. The first one occurred on April 17, 1931, on the Pennsylvania Railroad near Spruce Creek, Pa., where the wreckage of a freight train consisting of 108 cars had spread onto an adjacent track, a passenger train collided with the wreckage, which resulted in the death of 2 employees and the injury of 34 passengers and 3 other employees. There was a broken flange on a train of 82 cars. That is something that might have been detected if we had had opportunity to go along and inspect the train. If there is a broken flange, there is an opportunity to detect that. On May 20, 1928, there was a derailment of a freight train on the Pennsyl- vania Railroad at Johnstown, Pa., where the wreckage was struck by a pas- senger train traveling in the opposite direction on an adjacent track, resulting in the death of 1 employee and the injury of 23 passengers. In this case a broken wheel caused the accident by overheating-something that could have been detected if proper opportunity for train inspection had been given. Now, with reference to a 99-car train, on November 25, 1928, there was a derailment of a freight train on the Baltimore & Ohio near Eagle, W. Va., where the wreckage was struck by a passenger train moving in the opposite direction on an adjoining track. This accident resulted in the death of 2 employees, the injury of 4 passengers, 2 Pullman employees, and 15 railroad employees. And, gentlemen, that was the crack B. & O. train that ran into that wreck where this flange broke. Had it been a second later, instead of the passenger engine plow. ing into that wreckage, it would have plowed into the side of that train, and the consequences would have been much worse so far as the list of passengers was concerned. There is another one with 106 loads, where the slack action in the train broke the train in two on October 25, 1929. There was a derailment of a freight train, the wreckage of which was struck by a passenger train traveling in the same direction on an adjacent track, on the Pennsylvania Railroad at Iron Hill, Md., resulting in the death of 1 employee and injury to 23 passengers and 2 other employees. Here is another train with 128 cars, 2 cabooses. This was a defective rail. On July 11, 1929, there was a derailment of a freight train, the wreckage of which was struck by a passenger train on the Erie Railroad near Corning, N. Y., 358 TRAIN LENGTHS which resulted in the death of 2 em'ployees, 2 mail clerks, and injury to 51 passengers. Here is another case of a train with 100 loads, where slack action again caused the train to break in two. On June 7, 1932, there was a derailment of a Penn- sylvania Railroad train near Dean, N. J., in a rolling country. I think anyone watching that territory, observing the physical characteristics and the topog- raphy, will realize that it is a rolling country, where the slack is always running in and out. There was a derailment of a freight train on the Pennsylvania Railroad, the wreckage being struck by a passenger tragi running in the same direction on an adjacent track, which resulted in the injury of 42 passengers and 12 employees. Here is another one, with 75 cars, where a defective brake rigging came down. That could have been detected, no doubt. On February 10, 1933, there was a derailment of a freight train, the wreckage of which was struck by another passenger train traveling in the other direction on the Erie Railroad. It resulted in the the death of one employee and the injury of another. Another instance of a 99-ear train with a defective coupler, March 4, 1930. A freight train on the Erie broke in two, and the rear end of the caboose was forced up on the pilot of a helper engine coupled behind the caboose. The acci- dent resulted In the death of one employee and injury to another. There is a case where two engines were employed to propel the train, one shoving behind the caboose. When the brake was applied the first engine stopped and the other engine went right through the caboose and crushed one man to death. On a 69-car train there was a defective coupler, on the Southern Railway, February 15, 1928, near Flippin, Ga., and the caboose was crushed by the engine of a passenger train that was assisting this train. There-was a defective coupler. The helper engine was shoving behind the caboose. The train broke in two and the engine came right through the caboose and killed the brakeman in the caboose. Here is one of 62 cars. There was more tonnage than the engine could handle. In that case the train broke in two and the caboose was crushed by the helping engine. It came right on through and crushed the brakeman to death. Gentlemen, I want to make this statement, that this use of engines behind the cabooses should be stopped. It is not safe. I realize that it is a quick way to get rid of an engine. When you get to the summit you can cut the engine off and you are all done; you can let it go. If it is ahead of the caboose, you have got to make a running switch. Your caboose is on the rear end of the train, and it is not safe to have a locomotive behind the caboose, with men riding in the caboose, because a broken air hose or anything might cause an accident which would result in the death of everybody in the caboose. BALTIMORE & OHIO R. R. On December 1, 1937, there was a derailment on a freight train on the Balti- more & Ohio Railroad near Great Cacapon, W. Va., the wreckage of which wa struck by a passenger train traveling in the opposite direction on an adjaceit track, resulting in the injury of 11 passengers. East-bound freight train extra 6146 consisted of 102 loaded steel cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 6146, and was in charge of Conductor Keenan and Engineman Trussell, and was running on track 3 at a speed estimated to have been between 20 and 25 miles per hour when it became derailed at a farm crossing east of Great Cacapon. West-bound passenger train No. 7 consisted of one mail car, one express car, one combination car, one coach, one lounge car, and five Pullman sleeping ears, in the order named, of all-steel construction, hauled by engine 5003, and was in charge of Conductor Keyser and Engineman Myers, and was running on track 1 at a speed estimated to have been between 15 and 30 miles per hour when it collided with the wreckage of extra 6146. PENNSYLVANIA R. B. On November 29, 1936, there was a derailment of a freight train on the Pennsylvania Railroad near North Judson, Ind., the wreckage of which struck a freight train moving in the opposite direction on an adjacent track, resultilng in the death of one employee. The investigation of this accident was me in conjunction with a representative of the Public Service Commissiop of Indiana. TRAIN LENGTHS 359 Train IL-3, a west-bound freight train, consisted of 87 cars, 2 deadhead cabooses, and 1 service caboose, hauled by engines 6979 and 6800, and was in charge of Conductor Coats and Enginemen Clemens and Marsh. This train de- parted from Race (Logansport yard), 43.5 miles from North Judson, at 7:25 p. in., according to the train sheet, passed Kenneth, the last office open and 36.5 miles from North Judson, at 7: 46 p. in., and when approaching North Judson at a speed estimated to have been between 45 and 50 miles per hour the eighty-fourth car was derailed to the left and struck the rear portion of Train NW-88 which was moving eastward on the adjacent track. Train NW-88, an east-bound freight train, consisted of 62 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 6817. On October 26, 1936, there was a derailment of a freight train on the Pennsyl- vania Railroad near Menlo Park, N. J., the wreckage being struck by a freight train traveling in the opposite direction on an adjacent track, resulting in the death of 1 employee and the injury of 3 employees and 1 livestock caretaker. This accident was investigated in conjunction with the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities Commissioners. Extra 6865, a west-bound freight train, running on track 3, consisted of 122 empty cars and a caboose, hauled by steam engine 6865, and was in charge of Conductor Houck and Engineman Allen. While traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 10 and 15 miles per hour, the train parted between Pennsylvania Railroad empty box cars 84098 and 46156, the ninth and tenth cars, respectively, resulting in the air brakes being applied in emergency and causing the one-hundred-fourth and one-hundred-fifth cars to buckle out of the train and foul track 2 directly in front of train second P-18, and struck the cars that buckled out of extra 6865, while running at a speed estimated to have been between 30 and 35 miles per hour. On March 27, 1936, there was a derailment of a freight train on the Penn- sylvania Railroad near Manor, Pa., the wreckage being struck by a passenger train traveling in the opposite direction on aa adjacent track, which resulted in the death of three employees, and the injury of five passengers, one express messenger, three dining-car employees, and two railroad employees. This acci- dent was investigated in conjunction with the Pennsylvania Public Service Com- mission. Train Nt-1, a west-hound freight train, consisted in the order named of helper engine 4288, road engine 6867, 53 empty cars, 1 loaded car, 2 empty cars, 45 loaded cars and a caboose, and was in charge of Conductor Haggart, Pilot- Engineman Welshans, and Enginemen Nicol and Romigh, respectively. While approaching Manor on track 3, moving at an estimated speed of 15 to 20 miles per hour, the train buckled near the middle, causing the fifty-fifth car, S. F. R. D. 12716, an empty refrigerator car to become dislodged and foul track 2 directly ahead of train No. 36. Train No. 36, an east-bound passenger train, consisted in the order named of helper engine 5439, road engine 262, two postal cars, one express car, one refrigerator car, one passenger-baggage car, one coach, one dining car, and six Pullman sleeping cars, and was in charge of Conductor Johnson and Enginemen Snyder and Kuhn, respectively. This train passed CP block station, the last open office; at 12: 08 a. in., according to the train sheet, 2 minutes late, running on track 2, passed signal bridge 3292, the signals displaying proceed, and on reaching a point 756 feet beyond while traveling at a speed estimated to have been between 45 and 50 miles per hour the lead engine struck the body of the refrigerator car in train Nt-i. New York Central Railroad On August 29, 1937, there was an accident on the New York Central Railroad at DeWitt freight yard. Train No. AD-19, engine 2972, with 127 cars in train. Emergency application of the air brakes caused such a sudden shock that all the crew on rear of train was temporarily incapacitated, so that at least 5 minutes elapsed before protection could be given trains on adjacent tracks Eighth rear car was doubled up but luckily it Just cleared train No. 9, fast mail and passenger, as Flagman Place did not revive soon enough to flag No. 9 a sufficient distance to insure full protection. The result was that No. 9 received short flag and proceeded some distance past crippled car before train came to stop. Had the eighth rear car not cleared train No. 9, which often happens when cars double up and they do not clear adjacent tracks, No. 9 would have been wrecked as a result of this long train. Conductor J. J. Hopkins and Flagman L. Place were injured. '360 TRAIN LENGTHS STATEMENT OF J. CARTER FORT, GENERAL SOLICITOR OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, WASHINGTON, D. C. Mr. FORT. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, my name is J. C. Fort and my address Transportation Building, Wash- ington, D. C. I am General Solicitor of the Association of American Railroads and I speak here for the members of that association. The membership includes practically all Class I railroads in the United States. These railroads operate 94 percent of the total mileage in the country. The railroads are a unit in opposing this bill with as much vigor as they can command. They think the bill is an affirmative and serious menace to safety. They think it is a very immediate threat to the welfare of the entire industry and to the welfare of the com- munities served by the industry, and to the welfare of all who look to the industry for a livelihood. They believe that you cannot do a greater disservice to the em- ployees of the railroads than to pass this bill. Mr. BIJLWINKLE. Are you going to explain your opposition? Mr. FORT. In very considerable detail, Major. Many witnesses will follow me and will support every statement which I make with fig- tires and statistics, so far as they are available. I have no prepared statement to read to you and I have no formal speech to make to you. What I shall say is more or less by way of introduction. I will be followed by a rather large number of witnesses including practical railroad men, who are charged each day with tie duty of operating these trains, and men who have made special studies of the statistics which deal with the safety feature. I will be followed also by witnesses who have made special studies on the cost feature and the service feature. Now, my purpose will be to try to develop for you what we take to be the issues presented by this bill. They are not so obvious. The questions which are presented are quite involved and complex. Mr. BULwINKIE. What are the issues which you say arise from this bill? Mr. FORT. Major, if it is the pleasure of the committee to inter- rogate me as I proceed, I have no objection. On the other hand, if you would prefer that I complete my statement in some order, I will do that, I will, if you wish, state the issues as I see them now. I would be very glad to do so. Mr. BULwINnL. It is perfectly all right, anyway you want to go ahead; but, you had made the statement. Mr. Forr. That is the purpose of this introductory statement. Mr. BLWINnaKE Yes. If you wish to present the issues to the committee. Mr. FoRT. Perhaps I should immediately state the issues, as we see them. Of course there are three questions involved here; three major questions. First, the effect that this bill would have upon safety; second, the effect that this bill would have upon cost; and third, the effect that it would have upon railroad service to the public. Now, of those three questions by far the most important is the question of safety. We think that the safety feature alone utterly TRAIN LENGTHS 361' condemns this bill. We do not come here to ask you to overbalance the safety considerations by other considerations. I want to make that perfectly clear at the outset. Other considerations are of very great importance and they are considerations which the committee, of course, will want to bear in mind, but they are secondary to safety. On the question of safety, Major, you asked me to outline the issue as we see it. The issue is not such a simple one as might appear. The proponents of the bill have-said to you that this is a slack surge bill, so far as safety is concerned, .and that other features should be disregarded. Of course, that is an impossibility. A doctor could not administer a drug considering only one effect and disregarding other effects and more important ones. You must look to the net result. The first question, so far as safety is concerned, is what effect this bill would have upon safety of railroad operation, keeping in mind the entire field of accidents incident to railroad operation, not one particular kind of accident to one particular class of persons. In that connection another question presents itself. How is that test to be made? Is it to be made by contrasting -the operation of one individual short train with one individual long train? Mani- festly not. The comparison must be between the type of operation which is now employed and which involves the running of so-called longer trains when the physical, traffic, and other conditions permit and justify the running of such trains, and the type of operation which the bill would require, with all trains artificially limited to 70 cars. Now, of course, as I have said, the question is not whether one particular short train would be more or less safe than one particular long train, other conditions being equal, because other conditions would not be equal. The principal difference in conditions would result from the fact that this bill would require us to run a great many more train units than we run today to carry the same business. That is a very important consideration, as I shall show you. Generally speaking, I have outlined the fundamental issues on the question of safety, as we see them. From what I have said, it is apparent that the questions presented to you by this bill are not like the questions which are ordinarily presented to a committee of Congress. Such questions generally are questions of-broad public policy. Here the principal questions are purely factual questions and for that reason, if I may be permitted to do so, I would like to say that I think this committee has followed a wise course in permitting each side fully to develop its case. Only a judicial or scientific approach to a question of this kind can. possibly serve the purpose which you want to serve and enable you to pass upon the merits of a bill of this character. On the Senate side there were no hearings on this particular bill. In 1934 and 1935 there were hearings on train-length bills before a subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce, and neither of those subcommittees which heard the evidence ever re- ported one of those bills favorably. I think you have followed the proper course, if I may say so with- out being presumptuous, in having the full committee hear the evidence on this bill. No amount of wisdom and no preconceived notions would enable a member to pass upon questions such as those here presented until he had obtained a very complete knowledge of 362 TRAIN LENGTHS the facts which lie behind the proposed legislation and the facts which weigh for it and those which weigh against it. At a very early stage of the hearing the chairman stated that it is not important who is in favor of this bill and who is against it; that the question is whether or not the bill is meritorious. Certainly, we would be the last to dispute the correctness of the chairman's view. Nevertheless, there has been a certain amount of confusion with respect to the endorsements which the bill has had from railway labor. In order to dispel that confusion I consulted over the telephone with Mr. George Harrison who is chairman of the Railway Labor Executives' Association. That association includes in its membership 20 of the 21 so-called standard railway labor organizations, the or- ganization of trainmen which is represented here by Mr. Farqu- harson, being the only national organization which is not at this time a member of that association. Mr. Harrison informed me that the Railway Labor Executives' Association has not endorsed this bill; that it has not endorsed any train-length bill since 1935, and that its endorsement at that time was only for the 1936 session of Congress. I am speaking now of that association as an association. There are certain individual members of the association which have en- dorsed this bill; for example, the engineers. They were represented before you by Mr. Corbett. You heard him say that they had en- dorsed it, although as I recall it, he said that the endorsement was made by a committee of three or four, which had been given au- thority to reach a conclusion one way or the other. You also heard from Mr. Johnson, speaking for the conductors, and a letter from a representative of the firemen has been read. So certain of the individual organizations representing the so- calleA operating groups have endorsed the bill, but I am informed that the Railway Labor Executives Association, as such, has not. Mr. BonaR. Mr. Fort, do I gather from that remark that it is your opinion, or your intent that we should believe, that the other railway labor associations are not in sympathy with the bill? Mr. FORT. I was getting to that. I would not myself seek to draw any conclusions or ask this committee to draw any conclusions in that connection. I am merely telling you the facts as they have been told to me. Mr. Wrmnow. Would you mind telling the circumstance under which you obtained this information from Mr. Harrison? Was it a telephone conversation? Mr. FoR. Yes. I am glad to tell you. The other day, you will recall, this question arose before the committee and there seemed to be some doubt about it. That being so, I called Mr. Harrison at his office in Cincinnati. In response to a question, I was told exactly what I have told this committee. Mr. MAPFs. May I ask a question ? The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mapes. Mr. Fon. Yes, Mr. Mapes. Mr. MArEs. As I understand your statement, it is that Mr. Harri- son said that the association did not endorse this bill, but that it did recommend the passage of a train limit bill in 1935 to be brought up in Congress in 1936. Is that correct? TRAIN LENGTHS 363 Mr. FORT. That is true; yes, sir. Mr. MArEs. Of course, this particular bill could not have been recommended at that time, because it could not be introduced until this Congress. Mr. FoRT. Yes, sir. Mr. MAPES. Was the action of the association in 1935 a recom- mendation of legislation limiting the length of trains, limiting the length of freight trains to 70 cars? Mr. FORT. I believe at that time there was more than one bill and some bills limited trains to 70 cars and some limited them to 70 cars or not more than half a mile. Mr. MAPEs. But, in substance, it recommended legislation of the same type as this bill; is that correct? Mr. FoRT. That is the way I understand it. Mr. MAPES. I am a little confused about these rumors I hear. What is your interpretation of the statement of Mr. Harrison? Is it that the association is not in accord with this particular bill? Mr. FoRT. Mr. Mapes, I would prefer not to try to interpret it. Mr. Harrison did not go any further than I have indicated. Mr. MAPES. You have referred to the statement of the chairman of the committee to the effect that legislation ought to be considered on its merits without reference to who is for or against it, which, of course, is right; but I do not understand what your conclusion is or what your wish us to include as to the position of Mr. Harrison toward this bill. Does he draw a distinction between the legislation endorsed by the association in 1935 and this bill? I do not know that it is of any great importance, but I wondered just what your purpose was in quoting him as you have. Mr. FORT. The only reason I have gone into it at all is because the record is very confusing as to the position of the so-called 20 groups represented by the Railway Labor Executives Association. Mr. MAPEs. You would not expect the association to meet every other day and pass upon legislation, would you? Mr. FoRT. Well, from what I know about their diligence, I think that they would meet every day if they saw any occasion for it. Mr. EicnER. Mr. Fort, do you know whether or not the policy- making body of the association has given any consideration to or taken any action on this question at all since it passed the Senate? Mr. FoRT. No. All I know is what I have said; and that is, that in 1935 some such legislation was endorsed for the 1936 session, and that there has been no endorsement since that time, and that there has appeared before this committee as yet no one speaking for that association. Mr. BoREN. To pursue the inquiry a little further, is it customary for these 20 or 21 groups, as the case may be, to present a united front affecting perhaps only one of the groups? Mr. FoRT. I have seen it done many times. Mr. BoREN. I was wondering whether any of the other organiza- tions are affected by this legislation other than the four who have appeared here on behalf of the bill. Mr. FoRT. Well, I think that the maintenance-of-way men and the signalmen would have their safety much jeopardized by this bill. Mr. BOREN. The signalmen have a separate organization? Mr. Font. Yes, sir. 364 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. BOREN. They are 1 of the 20? Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. The same is true of the maintenance-of-way men. Mr. BoREN. Are we to understand by signalmen, that that includes a signalman in the train crew? Mr. FORT. In the train crew? Mr. BOREN. Yes. Mr. FORT. No; the signalmen are made up of the men who maintain and install the signals along the right-of-way, as I understand it. Mr. WITHRow. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Withrow. Mr. WITHEOw. Do you really interpret his statement as opposition on the part of the signalmen and others relative to this legislation? Mr. FORT. You say, do I? Mr. WITHROW. Yes. Mr. FORT. No; Mr. Withrow. I say, as I said at the beginning, that I have no interpretation whatever to make of it. I am only telling you the fact. Mr. WVITHRow. It seems so unusual to have an organization endorse legislation of a similar nature in 1935 and endorse it for that time only. I have been very much interested in this type of legislation and Mr. Harrison during that time has expressed keen interest in it and at the last session of Congress he spoke to me three or four times relative to legislation before the committee and from his conversa- tions with me, why, there could be only one conclusion on my part, and that is that he was interested in the passage of this particular legislation. Of course that was in 1937. Mr. FORT. Yes; so far as I know the association may later endorse this bill. They may later come out against it. I do not know. I am merely telling the committee now that at the present moment, as I understand it, the bill is not endorsed by the Railway Labor Execu- tives Association. Mr. WITRnow. You are basing that upon your telephone conversa- tion with Mr. Harrison? Mr. FORT. Absolutely. As I have said, certain operating groups of employees have endorsed it, and some of those operating groups are members of this Railway Labor Executives Association. The train and train service employees amount to about 20 percent of the total railway employees. So, as the record stands before this committee, this could not very well be called a railway labor bill. There are certain elements of railway labor which have endorsed it, and it stands that way at this time. All of this is, of course, beside the question. As the chairman sug- gested, the question has to do with the merits of the bill. What I have said was merely intended to dispel some confusion which has grown up. Aside from these certain groups of railway labor, which I have mentioned, there has been no endorsement of the bill. There has been no endorsement from shippers, although proponents say the bill would improve.service to shippers. Shippers know that the bill would very much impair their service, and I understand that some will appear before you later to speak on that point. TRAIN LENGTHS 365 Corning back to the merits of the bill: As I have said, they are three questions, safety, cost, and service. And, the most important of these, by far, is safety. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Fort, then you agree that there is no employment feature entered here, or do you include the employment angle in the bill? Mr. FORT. In the element of cost. There would be unnecessary employees added by this bill. But all of the money going into costs would not go to those men by any means. There would be extra fuel costs, extra train costs of one kind of another. The entire addi- tional costs would not go to additional labor. I shall take up each one of those questions in turn, but before I do, I would like to refer to some general considerations which form the background for a consideration of each one of those questions. During the World War and the period which immediately fol- lowed the World War, the capacity of the railroads was taxed to the limit. At that time considerable apprehension grew up that the railroads would not be able adequately and efficiently to take care of the growing needs of the transportation of this country and to play their proper part in national defense. So, in 1923 there was a concerted movement on the part of the railroads to develop a program for improvement and betterment which would give assurance that in the future the railroads would be able economically and surely to take care of the transportation needs of the country and any requirements of national defense that might develop. As a result of that program, the railroads spent some $8,000,000,000 gross between 1923 and the present time-and they expended a very large part of that money between 1923 and 1929-in capital improve- ments. Those capital improvements were, generally speaking, of this nature-grades and curves were reduced. Track structure was strengthened. Bridges were strengthened. Sidings were lengthened. Yards were rearranged. Heavier power was bought. Better cars were bought. That was all for the purpose of increasing the efficiency and safety of railroad operation. Now, these improvements enabled the railroads to adopt operating methods which are now known as modern operating methods, a very important feature of which is the running of so-called longer trains, when traffic conditions and physical conditions justify the running of those trains. The great expenditure to which I have referred has made this type of operation possible. The program of improvement in railroad plant and facilities was faithfully carried out and it succeeded, I think, far beyond the hopes of anyone who was concerned in it. It resulted in an almost miraculous improvement in safety. It resulted in sharply cutting unit operating costs. It resulted in bringing about a railroad service to the public far superior to any which had been offered before and far superior to any which is offered in any other country. About 90 percent of the freight trains are now run on schedules. Schedules have been quickened to such an extent that on fruit, 3 days have been chopped off the schedule from the Pacific coast 47891-38-24 I 366 TRAIN LENGTHS to New York; 2 days to Chicago. Two days have been taken from the schedule on fruit from Florida to New York. The merchandise service from Pittsburgh to New York, I think, was cut 2 days, and other freight service 1 day. Overnight deliver- ies have been established for as far as 400 miles. I do not intend to go into this fully. Mr. Symes and other wit- nesses will discuss the service feature in some detail, but I do wish to say that modern operating methods have resulted in a railroad service which is faster, more reliable, and far better in every way than ever before. Between 1923 and 1937 the average length of trains increased from 39.9 cars to 47.2, or 18 percent. That is one of the features of modern operation. Mr. BULwINKLE. You have given 14 years there. Mr. FORT. Fifteen years. Mr. BULwINKLE. Coming down to a shorter period of time, have you got anything which will show where the great increase was, between what periods? Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. That shows a rather interesting fact, Major Bulwinkle. I have the figures from 1923 to 1930. I will read them by years. In 1924, 41.7; 1925, 43.8; 1926, 45.2; 1927, 46.5; 1928, 48.1; 1929, 48.6; 1930, 48.9. Nineteen hundred and thirty was the peak. The depression set in at that time and since then the railroads have not expended the tremendous sums in betterments and improvements to their property that they were spending during the period 1923 to 1929. Now, since 1930, we have these figures: 1931, 47.9; 1932, 44.8; 1933, 45.8; 1934, 46.2; 1935, 46.2; 1936, 46.4; 1937, 47.2. You will see that the average length of trains now is about what it was in 1928. There has been no increase in the average length of trains for the past 10 years. Any impression, which may have been created that train lengths have shown a startling increase in recent years is wholly unjustified. Things are now just what they were 10 years ago, as measured by the average length of train. Mr. BULwiNKLE. Are you running the same number of trains in 1937 you did in 1928? Mr. FoR. The same number? Mr. BULWINKLE. Yes. Mr. FORT. Many fewer, because of the decline in traffic due to the depression. Mr. BULWINKLE. I mean, before the depression of October. Mr. FORT. There was a relatively small volume of traffic even before the depression beginning in October compared with the traffic in 1928 and 1929. I can give you the train-miles for each year if you like. Mr. MARTIN. May I ask a question there? Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. Referring to your statement about the great im- provement which has been made in the roadbed, the track and the eluipment, and so forth, resulting in the great acceleration or speed- ing up and safety of service that you refer to-and I think unques- tionably all those improvements have occurred-to what extent, if you have any figures to show it, has the service that you refer to as having been speeded up and time cut off from coast to coast and be- TRAIT LENGTHS 367 tween other terminals that you mentioned, to what extent does that involve long trains, and the type of commodities the very long trains handle? There has been testimony showing trains up to-I suppose that that is an excessive case-203 cars; but take the 100-car trains, the 120-car trains, and the 40- and 50-car trains. Mr. FORT. Take first the fruit from the Pacific coast. Much of that fruit is carried by the Southern Pacific, and I mention that because I have seen some of their figures on trains carrying fruit through Nevada where a special study was made because of the case in Nevada involving the State train-length law. There are districts where the average length of trains is 80 to 86 cars. That is the average length. The fruit moves in long trains. Coal, ore, wheat, and empty cars, for example, quite generally move in long trains. In fact, almost any commodity may and does move in long trains to a considerable extent. Now, much of the merchandise receiving fast movement, moves in long trains. And this should not be overlooked. The method of operation involving the operation of so-called long trains has a direct bearing upon the speed of local trains and other short trains. The running of long trains decreases the trains on the line and minimizes congestion and interference, thus speeding up the movement of all trains, long and short. So, the whole operation is a fabric, interwoven. The fact that one particular train is not a long train does not mean that the move- ment of that train is not greatly affected by modern operating meth- ods which involve the running of long trains. That is what you had in mind, Mr. Martin? Mr. WoLVERTON. Mr. Fort, with regard to the figures you have given relative to the average length of trains, are you dealing en- tirely with freight trains? Mr. FoRT. Average length of freight trains; yes, only freight trains. Mr. WOLvERTON. That is what I wanted to know. Mr. FORT. In fact, everything I say has to do with freight trains, unless I particularly mention passenger trains. Now, during the period when the average train length has in- creased, the average speed of freight trains has increased from 10.9 to 16.1 miles per hour, or 48 percent. That involves all types of freight trains, including local trains, through trains, manifest trains, and dead-freight trains. Of course, many freight trains are run at much higher speeds. Mr. MARTIN. What is the average speed of passenger trains; or have you got that? I am not asking you the exact figure. Mr. FORT. I am told, Mr. Martin, that it is about 35 miles an hour. Mr. MARTIN. And the speed of freight trains now is about 16 miles an hour? Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. Of course, it is easy to be misled by an aver- age, unless you keep in mind that it is an average. There are some trains which run faster and some which run slower, but that is the average. Mr. MARTIN. I know that. Mr. FORT, I will give you these figures with respect to average speed of freight trains. In 1923 it was 10.9-and I will just read every other year; 10.9; 11.8; 12.3; 13.2; 14.8; 15.7; 16; 16.1. So 368 TRAIN LENGTHS you see the increase has been progressive as the result of the develop- ment in plant and facilities to which I have referred. Mr. MARTIN. Are fruit trains handled clear across the country with as much as 80 or 90 cars? Mr. FoRT. Mr. Martin, the trains are operated in different lengths on different divisions, depending upon the grades on those divisions; depending upon the amount of traffic that is available without wait- ing, and depending upon other conditions. So that the train would not run across the continent at that length. On some divisions it would be that length; on some divisions it would be shorter; and on some divisions it might be longer. Mr. MARTIN. When you hit our backbone country in Colorado they would be shorter, I presume. Mr. FoRT. I should think so. Mr. MARTIN. Out where "the backbone grows." Mr. FORT. The Baltimore & Ohio has an operation which will be explained to you by Mr. Van Horn, the general manager. It is rather striking, and indicates what the actualities are. They have two divisions which adjoin, as I understand it. On one division long trains are operated. On the other there are no trains over 70 cars, because of grade conditions. During the period of increasing train lengths, there has been a 48-percent increase in average speed; a quickening of schedules; a tremendous improvement in safety; reduced operating costs; and reduced rates and fares. That has all accompanied the increase in train length. Mr. WITHRow. In regard to the speed of trains, I do not know whether I just got this clear or not, and I do want to get it clear. We will take for instance the movement of cars from St. Paul, Minn., to Chicago, Ill.; a distance of more than 400 miles. Those cars would have to pass through two terminals. How would you obtain the average speed of the train? Does that mean the speed between ter- minals, say from St. Paul to the first division point, or does it take into consideration the length of time that cars, the cars in the train, were held over for switching, icing, etc.? Mr. FORT. Mr. Withrow, when you speak of the average speed of a train, you take only the time between the terminals. Mr. WITHROW. Not the time consumed at the terminal? Mr. FORT. No, sir; but when you speak of the schedule time from the Pacific coast to New York, or the schedule time from Chicago to New York, or Chicago to Texas, or Florida to New York, then that covers not only the running time but the time in terminals. Speaking of the scheduled time, since there has been so much said about it: Mr. Sullivan, who appeared as a witness for the pro- ponents of this bill, and who ran from Potomac Yard to New York, and appeared before you very recently, referred to four trips of a scheduled train that ran from Potomac Yards to New York. The train leaves every day about 5 o'clock in the morning. Sometimes it is a long train with as many as 123 cars; sometimes it is a short train with less than 60 cars, because it does not wait for the accumu- lation of tonnage. It takes the tonnage available at the starting time. The point I am making is this. Mr. Sullivan took 2 long trains. He showed that the 2 long trains were on the road something like 16 hours-it was necessary to relieve the crews under the 16-hour law. TRAIN LENGTHS 369 Then he took two short trains. How wonderful they were. They ran on scheduled running time, which is some 8 hours. It is 228 miles. That seemed to me so completely out of line that I thought it must be an extraordinary occurrence rather than a representative one. So I had a check made of all of the trains that ran during December and January up to date from Potomac Yard to New York on that par- ticular run, and the facts are rather interesting. During that period there were 37 trains on that particular run of more than 70 cars, that is, 71 to 125, the average being 101 cars for those long trains. The average elapsed time for those long trains was 7 hours and 59 minutes per train. The scheduled running time is 8 hours and 30 minutes, so you see those long trains, on an average, during that 2 months, ran faster than the scheduled running time. Mr. MARTIN. Will you pardon me right there? Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. In addition to the length of time required to get those two long trains from Potomac Yards to New York, I think he also went into accidents to the trains caused by slack action. Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. That is a different matter. Mr. MARTIN. One, it seems to me, he said they had very great difficulty in finally getting the train there. I do not recall what it was, but there were various slack-action accidents involved. Mr. FORT. I am going to talk a good deal about slack action, but at the moment, I am considering service. And, I am calling attention to the performance of those long trains. During that same time on this same run they ran 10 short trains of 43 to 68 cars, with an average of 55 cars per train, and the average elapsed running time was 7 hours and 47 minutes, or only 12 minutes less than the average time for the long trains that ran during that period. I call that to your attention simply to make it clear that these two long trains and two short trains that Mr. Sullivan referred to are not in any way representative of the performance of long trains and short trains on that run, as indicated by the 2 months' record. Now, I have been endeavoring to lay a foundation for a discussion of the particular questions of safety, costs, and service, and I have tried to show you that during the period since 1923, when the rail- roads spent great sums of money to enable them to operate as they now do, including the running of long trains, there was coincidentally an improvement in service, an improvement in safety and a decrease in the cost of operation. You have heard it said that this bill would halt progress in rail- roading. That is true in a sense, but it is only half of the truth. It would turn back railroad operating methods for a score of years. It would not freeze operating methods as they are today which would be had enough, but it would turn back operating methods for 20 years or more, and as a result it would greatly impair the value of facilities which we already have. Many of the engines which we have now could be operated on these short trains only wastefully. They are larger and more powerful than are needed on such trains. Much of the money which has been spent in grade reduction and in the reduc- tion of curves need not have been spent if trains were going to be limited to 70 cars. Many of the sidings are much longer than they need to be if only short trains are to be operated. 370 TRAIN LENGTHS Existing roundhouses will accommodate larger engines than would be needed, but will not accommodate as many engines as would be required. And so right on through our facilities. Their use value would be tremendously lessened if we were required to undertake a kind of operation different from that for which these existing facilities were designed. I think that is obvious, and I will not labor it any further. Mr. MAPES. May I interrupt you there? Mr. FORT. Yes. Mr. MAPEs. Do you use these high-powered engines-on short trains or do you have special engines for the short trains, and special engines for the long trains? Mr. FORT. Mr. Mapes, what I say about that, I would like to have checked and confirmed by operating officers who will follow me. Generally speaking, we try to use an engine that is in accord with the tonnage to be hauled. In other words, we try to have a powerful engine for a heavy-tonnage train. Mr. MAPES. Take the run from Potomac Yard to New York that you speak of. Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. Mr. MAPES. Do you have engines in the yard so as to put a lighter engine on the short train and a heavier one on the long train? Mr. FORT. I do not think that you would find any exact matching, day by day, of the engine and the tonnage, but in a particular service where the tonnage would average or generally run at certain figures we have engines that comport with the tonnage to be expected. Now, as I have said, the question of safety, as well as the question of service and cost, must be considered by contrasting the type of operation which we have today with the type of operation which we would have if this bill were passed. The principal difference between the two types of operation would be that caused by the running of additional train units which this bill would require. On the basis of 1937 business, if this bill had been in effect, we would have been required to run 60,000,000 more freight-train miles than we did run. That figure will be explained to you by Dr. Parmelee, who has made a special study of the subject. Mr. MARTIN. Can you say roughly what the total freight-train mileage was in 1937 so that we might make a comparison between that and the 60,000,000 train-miles? Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. This would be about 12 percent more; an addition of about 12 percent in freight-train miles. Some of the proponents have said that we would not be required to run extra trains except in special cases and they have attempted to establish that by theory, and their theory is this: The average train is only 47 cars, so we would take the excess cars off our long trains and put them on our short trains and we would not have any more trains. Of course, that is based on a good many fundamental misconcep- tions of practical operation. Some railroads run a great many long trains. Other railroads run relatively few. We could not take the excess cars off long trains of one railroad running from New York TRAIN LENGTHS 371 to Washington and put them on the short train of another railroad running from Richmond to Lynchburg. It just could not be done. Furthermore Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Fort, there has been some testimony intro- duced giving the average length of trains as 47 cars. Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. Mr. WoLvERTON. And it has been stated that this legislation would permit the railroads to increase the average train length to 70. Mr. FORT. Yes. Mr. WOLVERTON. Will you tell me how the average of 47 is ar- rived at? Mr. FORT. Yes. That is. very interesting. That is a statistical average and it is arrived at in this way: 'The total car-miles run in the United States are divided by the total train-miles-I am speaking of freight train and freight car miles-and the average of 47 is obtained. That is a statistical average and it serves some purposes very well; but it is extremely misleading when used for other purposes. Mr. WOLVERTON. Does it include all trains run on the small divi- sions, as well as the large through trains? Mr. FORT. It includes everything, even an engine and a caboose with no cars. An engine and a caboose is considered a train. Mr. BULwINKLE. Short-line railroads too? Mr. FORT. Yes. We are speaking of class I railroads, but some of them-I do not understand just what you mean relative to short- line railroads. Mr. BULwINKLE. Well, take a line about 100 miles long, which is operated by the Southern in North Carolina. Mr. FORT. That is operated by the Southern, you say? Mr. BULwINKLE. Yes. Mr. FORT. It would include that. Mr. WoLvERTON. Does it include the trains which may run, we will say, on the feeder lines to the main tracks? Mr. FoRT. Oh, yes; it includes branch-line trains. Mr. WOLVERTON. So that in my State it would include trains run from Bridgeton to Camden, where the branch line would join the tracks that would carry the cars across the continent? Mr. FORT. Oh, yes sir. Mr. WOLVERTON. So then it includes all the way-freight trains on branch lines? Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. It includes everything of that kind. But here is the point I was trying to make a moment ago, Mrr Wolverton Mr. WOLVERTON. The thought which occurred to me is this: Take that type of traffic, if I may continue to use Bridgeton and Camden as an illustration, it would be pretty hard for me to recollect a freight of that size running between those two points. It would be very unlikely that a train of 70 cars would run between those cities as a regular thing. So, the passage of this legislation would not help in that instance by saying you could increase those trains to 70 cars it you wish. to, because in that case you do not need to run trains of 7 or more car lengths. 372 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. FORT. You are entirely right about that. There are several features bearing on that point to which I should like to call the committee's attention. The first one, as I have said, is a statistical point and dry as such points are, it is nevertheless important. This average of 47 is arrived at by taking the total freight-car miles and dividing it by the total freight-train miles, including all freights, of whatever length. You can see that what is thus at- tained is the average length of the average freight train. Now, as a matter of fact, when a freight train is making a run, it does not continue through the whole district ordinarily with the same number of cars. Take a freight train which leaves with 40 cars. It runs half of its trip with 40 cars and picks up 40 more, and then has 80 for half of its trip. That freight train, of course, would be outlawed by this bill, because its maximum length would be greater than 70 cars, but that freight train, statistically, would have an average of only 60 cars. So in speaking of 47 cars as the average length of a freight train, you must keep that in mind. But, getting beyond that and passing the statistical feature, the suggestion of the proponents that we could fill out our short trains is based upon the misconception that on a particular railroad short trains and long trains are run in equal proportions over all divisions, which is not true at all. We have branches on railroads where we run only short trains. They cannot be filled out with the cars in excess of 70 on the main-line trains. We have divisions on our main line where long trains are run, and we have other divisions where they are not run. Of course, in such cases, the short trains on one division could not be filled out with cars taken from the long trains on another division. We have divisions where the average length of train is over 70 cars. As I have said, there is a division of the Southern Pacific handling fruit where the average length of train is over 80 cars. Now, how are we going to fill out there? But, getting down to a division where we run long trains, and we run short trains, and our average length of trains is under 70 cars, and both short and long trains are run in the same direction. Even then this fill-out theory would not work. Why does a railroad run one train of 110 cars and another train of 20 cars between the same points in the same direction? There is a reason for it. Railroad trains are not like trolley cars, one just like another, following each other over the road. Some trains perform certain classes of service and others perform other classes of service. Some of them are fast manifest through trains; some of them so-called dead freight through trains, and some of them are local trains. We cannot indiscriminately place cars on any train without de- stroying the service on the railroad. We cannot ordinarily take cars off of the fast through freight trains of over 70 cars in length and add them to a local train that is serving local points on the line without having a serious delay, and we cannot do it without handicapping the local train in doing its switching work. Mr. Corbett suggested that we are losing local business and that we could get it back if we cut the trains to 70 cars. Local trains do not usually have 70 cars. It is rare to find a local train with over 70 cars. So this bill would not affect local trains in that respect as a rule. TRAIN LENGTHS 37$ The only effect it would have on local trains would be this: Through trains are preferred over locals, and locals must take sidings in order to let through trains pass. If we cut through trains to 70 cars and thereby multiply through trains, the result would be greater inter- ference with local trains and a slowing up of local service. I was addressing myself to the contention of the proponents that the number of trains and train-miles would not be greatly increased by the 70-car limitation. We say that such a suggestion indicates a fundamental misunder- standing of actual operations, and I shall call to the stand operating men who are thoroughly versed in operating methods and practices,. and to whom the committee will address any questions that it sees fit. With this background, I now come back to the outstanding question hre, and that is the question of safety. As I have said, the implications involved in this question are not readily understood until the background has been explained. The question is not whether a 20-car train running between A and B is more safe or less safe than a 100-car train running between the same- points, all other things disregarded, because we cannot disregard other and related conditions. The question is whether or not the type of operation possible now is more safe than the type of operation which this bill would require, keeping in mind the whole field of accidents. Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Fort, does the character of the locality over- which the train is operating in any manner determine the size and character of the train ? Mr. FORT. It has a great bearing on it; yes, sir. Mr. WOLVERTON. Would there be localities in which it would be- unwise to operate a train 70 cars in length? Mr. FORT. Well, under any conditions, you mean? Mr. WOLvERTON. Yes. Mr. FORT. There are localities where under present conditions such trains are not operated because of grades. Mr. WOLvERTON. I have in mind that this proposed legislation draws no distinction as to different sections of the country, even though there may be a great difference in the character of territory or terrain to be traveled by the train. Mr. FORT. Yes, sir; the legislation is wholly inflexible and inelastic. Mr. WOLvERTON. For that reason, does the element of safety depend entirely upon the length of the train that is being operated, or should the locality in which the train is operated also be taken into consideration? Mr. FoRT. That, and a great many other features. The point which you suggest, of course, is absolutely sound. I do not like to use the word "foolish," which came to my mind, but it would seem to be foolish to overlook all of the varying conditions. which are encountered in operation and attempt to make an inflexible rule. Mr. WOLvERTON. Well, it seemed that way to me, without having the knowledge that you folks have from an operating standpoint. In other words, where you have a flat country like Kansas and Compare that with the winding roads of Colorado-that has been referred to by Mr. Martin-or to compare it even with the flat country 374 TRAIN LENGTHS of New Jersey, with its much heavier traffic, than elsewhere. There are so many elements that enter into it that I am wondering just to what extent you can determine safety merely from the standpoint of the number of cars in the train. Mr. FoRT. This bill in that respect, as in a great many others, is guilty of a very gross oversimplification. You are quite correct in that. It may be that the proponents of this bill owe a primary responsi- bility to a certain class of employees; but that is not true of the rail- road managements. The responsibility of the railroad managements as to safety runs equally to all classes of employees and to the general public. And the responsibility of this committee, of course, is even broader than that of the railroad managements, if possible, and runs to every feature of the public interest in safety and in nonwasteful and efficient railroad operation. Your committee comes to this question of safety not without a guide. This is not the first time the question has arisen. It has been examined in the most thoroughgoing, painstaking, critical, and comprehensive manner on two occasions. I speak of the Arizona train limit case, and the Nevada train limit case. Judge Booth, who will be our next witness, participated in the trial of both of those cases. I do not think there is a man in the country who knows more about the subject of train limitation than Judge Booth, and he will explain to you at considerable length the issues and the find- ings in those cases. In the Arizona case there were 50 days given to trial and in the Nevada case something like 100 days. In those cases witnesses were subject to cross-examination, that great safeguard. There was a unanimous court in the Arizona case and a unanimous court in the Nevada case. So that you have all six judges, and also the master in each case, who have been unanimous in their view that a bill of this kind would not promote safety. An investigation, such as was carried on in these cases, is the only type of investigationwhich can throw a sufficient light on questions of the kind here presented. No man is so wise that he can tell whether a bill of this kind will promote safety or impair safety unless he knows the facts. Mr. MAPES. May I ask where the Arizona case was tried? Mr. FORT. The Arizona case was tried in the United States District Court for Arizona, a three-judge statutory court. Mr. MAPES. Was the same true in the Nevada case? Mr. FORT. The same was true in the Nevada case, except that it was tried in the United States District Court for Nevada. Mr. MAPEs. When was that case tried? Mr. FoRT. The Nevada case? Mr. MAPES. The Arizona case. Mr. FORT. The Arizona case was decided in 1933, and the Nevada case in 1937. Now, in the Nevada case, the court found-and I am going to call your attention only to the ultimate finding : A careful review of all of the evidence warrants the conclusion that from the standpoint of safety to the public, to travelers on railroads, and to railroad em- ployees, the Nevada train-limit law bears no reasonable relation to safety but if enforced would impair and lessen the safety of plaintiff's present method of freight-train operation in Nevada. TRAIN LENGTHS 375 And further found-and this is very significant: The frequency of train and train-service accidents is directly related to the number of train units operated and when more train units are run than are necessary to handle a given amount of traffic the hazard of accidents in han- dling such traffic is correspondingly increased. Mr. MAPES. It would be fair to say, would it not, that the court did hold that it would be safer for the employees on the shorter than on the longer trains? Mr. FORT. No; I do not think so, Mr. Mapes. What you have in mind is this-the court held that so far as a patricular type of acci- dent was concerned, a slack-action accident, on a short train, there would be somewhat less likelihood for an accident than on an indi- vidual long train. Bearing that in mind, the court's final conclusion was, as I have just stated, that from the standpoint of safety to the public, to the travelers on the railroads and to the railroad employees, the train limitation would not promote safety, but would impair it. Mr. MAPEs. But the slack hazard on the long train would be greater than on a short one, as I read the opinion of the court. Mr. FORT. The holding on that point was as I have indicated. Mr. MAPES. The court held that the slack hazard would be greater on the long trains than on the short trains. Mr. FORT. Mr. Mapes, I do not think that is correct, but Judge Booth will follow me immediately and he will be glad to talk to you about that point. Mr. MAPEs. Did the court not say that as to certain hazards, par- ticularly what is referred to as slack-action hazards, they increased with the number of cars in the train? Mr. FORT. I do not believe that the court goes as far as you have suggested. The court found that slack surge accidents would be more likely to occur on a long train than on a short train, but the court was not speaking of all types of accidents to which train service employees are subjected and neither was it speaking of one operation involving the running of long trains as contrasted with another involving only short trains, even as to slack surge accidents. We will go into that at some length. I know what you have in mind and we will try to meet it. Mr. MAPES. If they did not have in mind accidents to employees on the train, what, in your judgment, did they have in mind? Mr. FORT. They had in mind particular accidents to employees on trains. Mr. MAPES. What? Mr. FORT. Slack surge. I think that is what the court was talking about. Mr. MAPES. There would be more injury to the employees because the slack action on long trains is greater than it is on short trains? Mr. FORT. So the court held. Mr. MAPES. Yes. Mr. FORT. On slack accidents alone, but they constitute a very small part of the accidents to employees on trains and other types of acci- dents would be greatly increased to employees on trains. This would be an antisafety measure, we think, clearly, and we think we can establish that to you independent of anything in the decision of the court of Nevada. But the finding of the court from the point of view 316 TRAIN LENGTHS of the employees was that the 70-car limitation would not promote safety. Mr. EICHER. Do you have the citation of those cases? Mr. FORT. Yes, sir; and we have here the printed findings of fact of the court in the Nevada case. When Judge Booth speaks to you we will give you copies of those findings. And I may say that those findings constitute a treatise on the subject of train limitation and its effect on safety and service. I do not think there has ever been anything written which is a more comprehensive and complete consideration of every 9uestion which arises in connection with the statutory limitation of train lengths than those findings. Mr. MAPES. May I interrupt you just a minute? Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. Mr. MAPEs. I have had the impression that the Arizona law was in force and that there had not been any steps taken to attack that case. I have a copy of the decision of the court in the Nevada case. Mr. FORT. Yes. Mr. MAPES. Can you straighten me out on that? Is the train-limit law on the statute books in Arizona in force in the State of Arizona? Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. Mr. MAPES. And did the court sustain the law? Mr. FORT. No, sir. This is what happened in the AVzona case- and to any extent that I may not tell the whole story, Judge Booth will. The lower court held in the Arizona case that the Arizona law was unconstitutional and that it had no relationship to safety. That was a case where the railroad companies were seeking to enjoin the attorney general of Arizona from enforcing the law and the injunction was granted in the lower court. The case was then carried to the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the mean- while the gentleman who was attorney general of Arizona ceased to be the attorney general and a new attorney general was appointed or elected. When the case came to the Supreme Court of the United States that Court held that since the defendant in the case was no longer the attorney general and the new attorney general could not be substituted as defendant, the question had become moot. The Supreme Court of the United States did not pass on the merits of the Arizona case at all. That was some time in 1933. The case has never been retried in the lower court. The Nevada case came on about that time and was tried, but Judge Booth, as I said, will explain that to you. Mr. MAPEs. Then what is the status of the Arizona law? Mr. FORT. The Arizona law is in effect by virtue of the fact that the attorney general of the State ceased to be attorney general while the case was on its way up to the Supreme Court. Mr. MAPEs. And the decision of the lower court then is of no effect so far as the law is concerned? Mr. FORT. That is true. Mr- BoREN. Is it not also true that there has not been any fur- ther trial of the case in Arizona, because the attorney general refused to make a statement as to whether he will enforce the law or not? Mr. FORT. Well, I cannot speak from my own knowledge. I have TRAIN LENGTHS 377 been told that the new attorney general refused to threaten to en- force the law. Mr. BoREN. To pursue that thought a little further. If that is the reason that the railroads have not gone ahead to make a test case on this law, what is there behind it? What are the penalties in the Arizona law? Are they so severe that the individual risk is out of proportion with the cost that there is to the railroads in operating trains under a 70-car length? Mr. FORT. The penalties are very severe. I cannot speak with as much authority on the Arizona situation as can Judge Booth, who actually handled the case there and who will follow me as a wit- ness, and I believe it would serve the purpose of the committee better if you address those questions to Judge Booth. Mr. BOREN. I will explain what I had in mind. It was this: You are going to refer in your testimony to the cost? Mr. FORT. Yes. Mr. BOREN. Well, there must be some element here in the Arizona situation which would indicate whether or not the railroads can afford to bear the cost of the 70-car length train. What deterrent is there in the law? I will leave that question for the following witness. But, the thought in my mind is, what deterrent is there in that law that makes a railroad company willing to refrain from attacking it? You say that there is great cost in operating trains of 70 cars. There must be something there in connection with the costs. Mr. FORT. There are very high penalties under the law. Mr. BoREN. I think that we might get the difference in relation between the costs of it. This angle will be developed a little bit later ? Mr. FORT. It will be cleared up. Mr. MARTIN. Let me ask a question. Mr. MAPES. Are the railroads actually complying with the Ari- zona law? Mr. FORT. Yes, that Arizona law as you know was passed in 1912 and has been in effect since that time. Mr. WITHROw. Twenty-five years. Mr. MAPES. Notwithstanding the decision of the court with refer- ence to the Nevada law and the Arizona law both? Mr. FORT. Yes. The Arizona case went, as I suggested, to the Supreme Court with the results I have stated. Mr. MAPES. I say, notwithstanding that decision, the railroads are actually complying with the Arizona law? Mr. FORT. Yes. Mr. BOREN. May I ask just one more question? The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. Oklahoma has a train-limit law. Mr. FoRT. Yes. Mr. BOREN. You have enjoined that law? Mr. FORT. Yes. Mr. BOREx. Did you enjoin that law by the same process of acting on the determination of the attorney general to enforce the law? Mr. FORT. As to whether there was threats or not to enforce the law ? Mr. BOREN. Yes. 378 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. FORT. Yes; there was a threat to enforce in that case. Mr. BOREN. Now, pursuing that thought as to the reasons. I do not know what the penalties are in any of these statutes; but I think it should be shown here why the railroads have not been willing to face the penalties by actual tests of the law, in order to give us a clear understanding of what the railroads honestly think is the cost of the 70-car limitation. You see, if you are permitting it in Arizona, there must be some relation in your mind between the cost of testing the law and the cost of operating under the 70-car limitation. Mr. FORT. We will bear that in mind and try to throw as much light on it as possible. Mr. MARTIN. I would like to ask one question. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. Referring to the Arizona law. I would like to ask this, if a Santa Fe freight train leaves Los Angeles for Chicago with more than 70 cars, do they at a terminal on the Arizona State line or close to it, cut down the number to 70 until they get across to the next State? Mr. FORT. If they left California with more than 70 they would have to do that. Mr. MARTIN. They would have to reduce the number of cars in the train? Mr. FORT. Yes. Mr. MARTIN. Do you know whether they 'do that or whether they just leave Los Angeles with 70? Mr. FORT. Whether they find it cheaper to make the reduction at that point and then consolidate beyond or run the short trains from origin until they get beyond Arizona and then consolidate them into long trains, I do not know; but there will be a witness on the stand who does know. Mr. Mahoney of the Santa Fe will be called as a witness. Mr. MARTIN. Do you know when the 70-car limitation went into effect in Arizona? Mr. FORT. 1912. Mr. MARTIN. In 1912. Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. And you have been operating under it all of the ensuing 27 years? Mr. FORT. All of this time-25 years. Mr. MARTIN. The roads which are affected there are the Southern Pacific and the Santa Fe, those two roads? Mr. FORT. Yes. Mr. MARTIN. They ought to have a definite knowledge as to just how the Arizona law affects them. Mr. FORT. They have a very definite knowledge and Judge Booth will convey it to the committee. Mr. WOLVERTON. Has any legal contest ever been made of the Arizona law? Mr. FORT. Yes. Mr. WOLvERTON. On the same basis as in Nevada? Mr. FORT. Yes; Mr. Wolverton. I explained that, and Judge Booth, the witness who will follow me, will explain it in further detail. The law was enjoined by the lower court, and the attorney TRAIN LENGTHS 379 general of Arizona was enjoined from enforcing the law on the ground among others, that it had no relation to safety. The case was carried to the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the meanwhile there was a change in the incumbent of the office of the attorney general of the State of Arizona. For that reason the validity of the statute was not passed on in the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. EiCHER. Is the Nevada case on its way to the Supreme Court? Mr. FORT. No. There was no appeal taken by the State and the time was permitted to run. The decision of the District court is final. Mr. BOREN. I think, Mr. Fort, that is worthy of thought there, the fact that you have never made a test by breaking the law. You have never actually made a test of these statutes by breaking the law? Mr. FORT. Never, so far as I know. Mr. BoREN. Does that indicate that there is a real division of opin- ion among the legal staffs of the railroads as to the constitutionality of the State law? Mr. FORT. There is no division at all, so far as I know. It merely means that no lawyer, if he can find any other course to follow, would advise a client to take the course that might pile up very large pen- alties. Judge Booth tells me that the penalty is $1,000 for each train each day in Arizona. Now, you see the penalties would be perfectly staggering. Mr. WITHROW. On those trains with over 70 cars? Mr. FORT. Yes. Mr. BOREN. But that still does not dispel from my mind the thought of constitutionality, which must be in the minds of the legal staffs. It just seems to me that if the law is clearly unconstitutional, there would be no hesitancy in attacking it regardless of what the penalties might be. Does it include an element of impounding funds, and that sort of things, when you operate trains of a greater length than 70 cars? Mr. FORT. You speak of what is clearly unconstitutional. There might be a thousand lawyers who think a statute is clearly unconsti- tutional, but unless they found it necessary, they would not gamble with millions of their clients' monevs, if there was some other way to go about it. We have now pending in the courts the Louisiana case, and th~e Oklahoma ease. Mr. WITHROw. Mr. Fort, has there been any attempt to repeal the Arizona act over this 25-year period? Mr. FORT. I do not know. Mr. WITHRow. That, of course, would be an orderly way out. Mr. FORT. Yes; that would be one way out. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Fort, you are getting into the situation of the witnesses on the other side, in that your testimony consists mostly of interruptions and questions. Here is an interesting and I think rather weighty phase of this situation as it has occurred to my mind, with reference to the Arizona law, and that is this: Arizona is a very large but sparsely settled State. It constitutes a big segment of the mileage of the Southern Pacific and the Santa Fe Railroads. Now, that State produces very little local traffic. While it is very large, geographically, it is sparsely settled and I would venture the opinion that its local traffic is inconsiderable in comparison with the 380 TRAIN LENGTHS through, coast-to-coast traffic that passes through it and the Arizona law would have its major' effect on your through traffic. It is cer- tainly interesting to note the fact that they have had that law in operation for 25 years in Arizona. I confess I do not know much about train-limit laws. It has been a rather hot issue in the State legislature in my State, Colorado, for the last 20 years, but this is the first time it has hit me. And it is very significant that you have been able to comply with that law in that State, over which your main traffic is your through traffic without it having so seriously affected your train operations so as to require you to go into court and get rid of that law if pos- sible, a long time ago. It looks like if you could put up with that kind of law in Arizona, you could in New Mexico, which is a com- parable State, and Colorado, which is a comparable State, and Texas, and other States. Mr. FORT. Mr. Martin, it did very seriously affect railroad opera- tions, and if you want me to attempt to go into it, I will be glad to do it; but we have a special witness who can with much more author- ity speak about it. It did very seriously impair operations in Arizona and it was attacked in 1929 and remained in the courts until 1933. In 1929 there was an attack upon it. It was successful in the lower court. It went off on a technicality in the higher court, as I just said, and it will be covered very fully by Judge Booth. Mr. WADSwORTH. May I interrupt there? Mr. FoRT. Yes. Mr. WADSwORTH. Is it true, and I assume it is, that the Arizona law, enacted in 1912, did not produce any profound effect upon the operation of railroads in Arizona until the expansion program was begun :n 1923? . Mr. FORT. You are entirely correct. In the early days of that law the 70-car limitation was not the handicap to operations that it be- came in later years and that is why the law suit was filed in later years rather than in the earlier years. Mr. WOLvERTON. Mr. Fort, before you proceed, may I make just one observation? There has been some point made of the fact that this law has been in operation in Arizona since 1912. Therefore it must be a good law. The thought has occurred to me that if it has been in operation since 1912, because it is such a good law, how is it that other States have not recognized that fact long before this? There has been some agitation in many other States of the Union at different times for legislation of this kind, but such legislation has never been en- acted except in the four States of Nevada, Louisiana, Arizona, and Oklahoma. Mr. FORT. That is right, and in only one of those States, Arizona, is the legislation in effect, and it is in effect in that State by reason of a curious combination of circumstances which I tried to summarize in passing and which will be developed very fully by Judge Booth. Mr. WOLVERTON. It is interesting to see that the people of Arizona are 27 years ahead of.everybody else in the United States, and that other States have not caught up with them on that line of legislation. Mr. FORT. There has been a statement made here by some witnesses who have favored this bill, and particularly by Mr. Sullivan, that TRAIN LENGTHS 381 the flagmen are apprehensive and nervous by reason of the long train. In this connection, I would like to read to you something which I think is interesting. The organization which is represented here by Mr. Farquharson, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, publishes an official magazine known as the Railroad Trainman. And Mr. Farquharson is the edito'r and manager of that magazine. In the issue of July 1937 there is an article, and I will offer the entire article to the committee, if the committee desires, which speaks of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and their families. The article states: There is no group of more than half a million persons anywhere on this globe more happy and contented than is this one. On an average there is a greater satisfaction in life for a greater number than in any other occupation. And again: There is no class of workers who labor under better conditions than do those in road and yard service. I simply submit to you whether that statement, made not in the heat of trial, is consistent with the statements made in this hearing about terror, nervousness, and things of that kind. I think that the committee may possibly reach the conclusion that Mr. Sullivan is more apprehensive than are some people. He was riding as a front brakeman on this train to New York when there was slack action. He was apprehensive that his flagman might be killed, but he was not killed. He was not even hurt, so far as the testimony shows. Mr. Sullivan became so apprehensive that he went into yard service. Mr. Sullivan was the witness who called attention to the two short and the two long trains. The two long trains were so bad and the two short trains were so good. But when we looked at the 2 months' record we found a differefit picture. Now, some people are more apprehensive than others. 1I'do not think you will find that train service employees, generally, are apprehensive. They are high-grade men. I do not think ha,.you will find any such attitude as might have been suggested toy9uthen you heard some of these witnesses speak. Certainly, whia J' ed from this Railroad Trainman issue of last July is not consisteptand cannot be reconciled with any thought that these men live? i. of terror. Mr. WITHRow. Mr. Fort, at the same time, you would not want to say that you are better qualified to say as to how employees feel rid- ing in the.caboose of a long train, behind 100 cars, than the men who work on the trains. Mr. FORT. No. Mr. Wxnow. You would not say that you are better qualified than they are themselves? Mr. FORT. But perhaps I might be better qualified than one par- ticular one. Mr. WoLvERTON. Mr. Fort, I want to clear my mind up as to the testimony of Mr. Sullivan to which you have just referred. Was Mr. Sullivan the conductor who rode at the head of the train instead of in the caboose? 47891-38-25 382 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. FORT. He is the one who was a brakeman and rode on the head end of the train from Potomac Yard to New York, and he is the one who spoke of conductors being required on some of those divisions to ride at the head end of the train; yes. And, he was not injured, so far as his testimony showed. He had been a brake- man for 25 years and he had never suffered an injury. He just seemed to run to apprehension more than injury. Mr. PEARsoN. Mr. Fort, he is the same man, as I recall, who tes- tified that even though he had seniority rights, he had waived those rights and had taken a job in the yards. I accepted that statement of his as some evidence of his sincerity when he said that was a place he simply would not fill because of the personal terror that he felt. Mr. FORT. I was not questioning his sincerity. Mr. EICHER. Would there be available statistics to indicate how many men have done the same thing Mr. Sullivan has done in order to keep off of the long trains? Mr. FORT. Yes. This is interesting- You know there is a brake- man on the front and a flagman on the rear of a train. They call them a brakeman on the front and a flagman on the back. The man who has seniority can choose where he wants to ride- whether on the front or the back, and I am told-and witnesses who will follow me will have first-hand information on that point-that 9 out of 10 men choose to ride in the back and not on the front. Mr. WITHRow. You are not testifying to that, however? Mr. FORT.. I was asked the question. Mr. WITHRow. I say, you are not testifying to that. That will all be supported by someone who will follow you? Mr. FORT. Oh, yes. Mr. WITHRow. I See. Mr. MARTIN. Did you say that you would produce evidence show- ing that nine times out of ten these men prefer to ride on the rear end of a long train? Mr. FORT. Yes. Mr. MARTIN. In preference to the front end? Mr. FORT. That is my understanding, and as Mr. Withrow sug- gests, I have no personal knowledge of that. Mr. MARTIN. There has been testimony to the contrary and it is just based on practical experience. I have given quite a bit of significance to such testimony as throwing light on what I consider to be the real issue involved in the bill, which has gone far afield I think in connection with some inquiries. The real issue as I understand it is slack action on long trains. Now, quite a bit of testimony, or some testimony has been given for instance that officials, operating officials, avoid riding on the tail end of the train, and ride on the front end. There has been testimony that conductors do the same thing, so that we have a 125-car train with four men in the cab and one in the way car. Mr. Sullivan's name has been mentioned several times. He said- and I can understand what he means-that his seniority enabled him to choose his service and he chose the shorter against the long train, and he also said that all of this avoidance of riding in the way car was to escape the danger of slack action in long trains. And there is also evidence to the effect, and the rule which has TRAIN LENGTHS 383 been cited substantiates it, that the men are required on the way car to be on guard against slack action at all times and brace themselves and hold themselves in a position of safety when riding long trains. There is also evidence to the effect that that rule came into effect somewhere around about 25 years ago, is about 25 years old. That in- dicates a recognition on the part of the companies themselves that there is an added hazard and danger in the long train. I refer to that testimony generally. Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. All I can say is that we will have witnesses from whom I believe you will find that there is no avoidance of trains by operating officers; that they do ride on them. We will have one witness who told me, and he will tell you, that it is not unusual at all for him to put his car right on the back of a long freight train. But the difference, Mr. Martin, between you and me is that you say you regard this as a slack-surge case. I think it clearly cannot be regarded as a slack-surge case unless we look at the midget and look away from the giant, and I hope when I get through t shall have convinced you of that fact. If I have not, it is only because of my lack of ability, because it is a very obvious thing that this is not a slack-surge case. That is only one minor feature in it. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fort, it is now after 12 o'clock and the com- mittee will stand adjourned until Tuesday morning at 10 o'clock. (Thereupon, at 12: 03 p. m., the committee adjourned to meet Tues- day, February 1, 1938, at 10 a. m.)  TRAIN LENGTHS TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1938 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIvES, COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, W ashnqton, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. M., in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence F. Lea (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Mr. Fort, you may proceed. STATEMENT OF 3". CARTER FORT, GENERAL SOLICITOR OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, TRANSPORTATION BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D. C. Mr. FouRT. May it please the committee, on last Friday I attempted to point out the issues as we see them which this bill presents. I stated that there were three main questions: Safety, service, and cost, and that the most important was safety. I sought to lay a foundation for a discussion of each of the three questions, and I called attention to the fact that modern operating methods, which include the running of long trains had been made possible by huge expenditures on improvements and betterments since the World War, and that they have resulted in greater safety, better service, and more economical operations than have ever been known heretofore. I stated that about 42.5 percent of the traffic of the country is now being carried by trains of more than 70 cars, and that the bill would outlaw modern operations and reinstate an outmoded and wasteful operation which would require about 60,000,000 additional train-miles each year to carry a volume of business equal to that of 1937. I said to the committee that each of the questions--safety, service, and cost-must be approached by contrasting present operating methods with those which the bill would compel, involving the running of many additional trains. I also drew the committee's attention to the obvious fact that the bill must be judged by its effect on all railroad accidents and not by reference to a particular class of accidents. I stated, however, that I did not mean to suggest that accidents or injuries of any particular class would be favorably affected by the bill. We believe that the bill would increase accidents of all kinds, and particularly those which are most serious. This I shall explain later. Accidents are not related-and this is the very foundation of the case, as we understand it-accidents are not related to the length of 385 386 TRAIN' LENGTHS trains but to the number of trains. This is a fact that you should never lose sight of. It is clearly established by statistics covering the record of accidents over a long period of time. They will be explained to the committee by following witnesses with the aid of charts. There is an unmistakable relationship between the number of train-miles and the number of accidents. When the hearing closed last Friday I had just started to speak of the safety feature, after having tried to lay a foundation which I thought would make the separate issues of safety, service, and cost more readily understood. I discussed the Arizona and Nevada cases, where it was held that a bill such as this would not promote safety. It was particularly held in the Nevada case that the effect of the bill would be to impair safety. I shall now take up discussion of the safety feature, at the point where we were interrupted at adjournment last Friday. A representative of the Pennsylvania Railroad has just handed me a statement which is of some interest in connection with the testimony of the apprehensive witness, Mr. Edward J. Sullivan. It is a history of his accident record and it comes from the relief department of the Pennsylvania Railroad. It shows that a payment was made to him because of injury sustained in September 1930. The injury was a fracture of ribs, right side, traumatic. The relief department ad- vises that this was an accident off duty, due to a fall in a bathtub at home. The CHAIRMAN. Due to what, did you say? Mr. FORT. A fall in the bathtub at home. There is no record of any other accident to Mr. Sullivan as far back as the records go, which is 1925, so that he might well extend his apprehension to bath- tubs. The impression may have been left with this committee that the railroads are neither alert, diligent, nor concerned with respect to safe operation. I am sure, however, that witnesses for this bill did not intend to leave any such impression. Mr. Corbett, for example, testified for the proponents. I call attention to his answer to the following question from Mr. With- row-I quote the question: Well, do you not feel as though the railroad companies have built up a psychology of safety first in this country and created that psychology? Mr. Corbett answered: I think that the railroads should be commended for having done that, and I believe that they have done more in the advancement of safety than probably any other line of industry or any other kind-of service. Then in answer to the following question from Mr. Halleck: As a matter of fact, the records of the railroads in respect to the safety of people riding on passenger trains, is almost perfect, is it not? Mr. Corbett replied: I think so. The truth is, of course, that safety on the railroads has become a byword and that the men are as proud of that as the managements. It is the result of the joint efforts of the men and the managements, and both have a right to be proud of it. It is due in part to men TRAIN LENGTHS 87 with records such as Mr. Corbett has, who ran for 32 years without ever having a black mark against him. Mr. BULWINKLE. While we are talking about accidents, Mr. Fort, what do you say that these gentlemen, Mr. Farquharson, Mr. John- son, especially, has said of the number of accidents or injuries suf- fered by the train crews; are their statements correct? Mr. FoRT. Are their statements correct? Mr. BULWINKLEI. Yes; as to the number that ensued during the various years. Mr. FoT. We will have something to say about that later. In large part, I think they are correct. However, I think that their statistics are incomplete and fragmentary. They deal with isolated cases and the data have almost no probative value. Mr. BULwINKLE. They gave the total number of cases in all? Mr. FoRT. Mr. Farquharson's total of 1,407 accidents- Mr. BULwINKLE. Yes. Mr. FoiT. Was a total of selected accidents which included none or just a very few on trains of under 70 cars. It was not related to tram-miles, or car-miles, or any other unit or standard. I think you will find that his figures are without any particular significance. Now, of course, there are accidents on railroads. There is a certain amount of hazard in any moving body, and there is a certain amount of hazard in connection with railroad operation. It has been reduced to a point that no one thought could be reached, but there remains a certain amount of hazard. When you hear about railroad accidents, I ask you to bear in mind the tremendous background of exposure. You know, there were 39,000 people killed last year in the United States in automobile accidents. So, when you get in a great field of exposure your figures necessarily mount even if there is relative safety. On the railroads, for example2 we have about a million employees ; we have about $26,000,000,000 invested in property; about 416,000 miles of track; and 3,800 miles of bridges alone. Every day there are 70,000,000 passengers carried 1 mile and every day a billion tons of freight are transported 1 mile. Every day there are 2,500,000 train-miles. Now, with such a background as that, and with such a business Mr. BULwINKLE. Did you think you could compare that with the automobile traffic? Mr. FoRT. I did not mean to make a comparison with automobile traffic. I referred to the automobile traffic merely as indicating that, when you have an enormous background of exposure, you have neces- sarily a large number of accidents. Mr. BULWINKLE. There are 30,000,000 automobiles operating every day. Mr. FORT. Well, something like that. Mr. BULwINKLE. And probably they are operating 500,000,000 automobile-miles a day. Mr. FoRT. I do not know. Mr. BTJTwINKLE. It is impossible to compare that with this. Mr. FORT. I did not mean to make that comparison, Mr. Congress- man. I meant simply to make this point: That when you think of accidents on railroads, in order to get a sense of proportion and 38g TRAIN LENGTHS sense of perspective about it, it is absolutely necessary to bear in mind the tremendous size of the industry and of its operations. Mr. BULWINKLE. Well, this is a thing that has been bothering me and I would like for you to start telling me about it. Others who are to come can if you cannot. What limit, if any, should be placed upon train lengths? Mr. FORT. I would say none. Mr. BULwINKLE. Then it does not increase the hazard if you have 200 cars or 250 cars. Mr. FoRT. Not under the circumstances where such trains are run. Trains of 200 cars are very, very rare, and trains of 250 cars are not run. Mr. BmwINKLE. Well, I am talking about if we should increase them all to 150 or more cars, is there not more hazard? Mr. FoRT. If all trains were increased to 150 cars? Mr. BULwINKLE. Yes. Mr. FoRT. Well, I think you have got to keep in mind that you are dealing with a practical situation and that it is impossible for all trains to be increased to 150 cars in length. Mr. BULwINKLE. All right. We will take the part of the trains then that are increased to 150 or 200 or 250 cars. What I want to know is, should there ever be any limitation on the number of cars in the train? Mr. FORT. Whether there should ever be a limitation is what I might call a long question. Mr. BULWINKLE. Well, that is what I am asking; a long question. Mr. FORT. I think there should not. Mr. BULwINKLE. I am dealing with a long subject. Mr. FoRT. There is no occasion whatever for any limitation at this time. Mr. BULWINKLE. I am dealing with a long subject when I am talking about a 200-car train. Mr. FoRT. Yes; you are. Mr. BULWINKLE. That is where we are starting from. Mr. FoRT. The question whether the time will ever be. reached when there should be any limitation is a question for a prophet. I say that the operating conditions and operating methods which are in use today do not justify any statutory limitation of any kind. Mr. BULwINKLE. Well, your contention is then that it does not make any difference how many cars there are in a train, that it does not add any extra hazard to the train crew. Mr. FoRT. I would not say that is an accurate way to state it. I say that this is the proper way to state it, if I may be pardoned. Mr. BULwINKLE. Go ahead. Mr. FoRT. The method of operation which we have today, involv- ing the running of so-called long trains-and that is a term meaning a train of over 70 cars the way I use it-is a much safer method of operation not only to the general public but also to the employees than the method of operation which would be necessary if you lim- ited trains to 70 cars, and if you in that way put a great number of additional train units on the tracks. That is the question and the answer, as I see it. TRAIN LENGTHS 389 Mr. BULwINKLE. Well, has any railway system any limitation; has any classI railroad, I am speaking about, any limitation on the number of cars in a train now? Mr. FoRT. Formal limitation? Mr. BULwINKLE. Yes. Mr. FORT. I do not know of any which has a formal limitation. Mr. BULwTNKLE. Does the Pennsylvania Railroad-let me ask you if the Pennsylvania System does not prohibit or have an order that no train shall be in excess of 125 cars? Mr. FoRT. I do not know whether there is a formal limitation or not. I think that the Pennsylvania trains, as a matter of operating practice, are ordinarily 125 cars or less. I do not know. We will have a Pennsylvania witness, Mr. Rill, and he can tell you about that. Mr. BULwINKLE. All right, sir. I just wanted to find out whether you were going to stop it, and where you were going to stop. Mr. FoRT. Well, the point I mean to make is that the question which I believe is before the committee is not the narrow question of whether one particular short train would be more or less safe than one particular long train, if all other conditions were the same, because other conditions will not be the same. We would have addi- tional train units on the track. I do not think that a very exceptional running of a train 200 cars long would justify the Congress of the United States in enacting such revolutionary legislation as this, which would result in a usurpation of the managerial functions of railroads far beyond anything that has ever been suggested in a bill that has been seriously considered by this Congress. Mr. BULWINKLE. That would be true if it were not the duty of the Congress to consider the hazard to the traveling public and the employees on that road. Mr. FORT. I have no difference in view at all as to that. If there is a hazard, a substantial hazard, that justifies regulation, Congress is always justified in intervening, but if there is not, then intervention which would have all these far-reaching effects would be bureaucracy of the very worst type. So, that leads us back to the issues presented by the bill. Mr. BULWINKLE. All right. Mr. flALLECK. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr.- Halleck. Mr. HALLEOK. I wonder if I might ask a question at this point. As I understand this, Mr. Fort, you take the position that the railroads, including both management and employees, have been continually striving for safer operation. Mr. FonR. Yes, sir; and very successfully. Mr. HAILECK. Would it be fair to say that there are possibly many things that might be done in respect to the operation of the railroads that might in some measure, at least, as respecting some people, pro- mote more safety? Mr. FonR. Mr. Congressman, I think you point right to what I believe to be the heart of this case. The best safety results, taken as a whole, come from a balanced program, not a program which overemphasizes one feature and leads to underemphasis on other fea- tures, but a balanced program which looks toward the best safety result as a whole. 390 TRAIN LENGTHS For example, the improvements which the railroads made in their plant and equipment from 1923 to 1936 was a tremendous contribut- ing factor toward safety as a whole and a much more significant force than some little safety contraption here, or some little safety contraption there. I do not know whether I make myself clear or not; but you must look at the whole field of railroading in order to bring about the greatest safety, and that is what we have been trying to do. I may add that we have had the most astonishing success working along those lines. I will call your attention to figures in just a moment. The way we have been going has turned out to be the right way. It has improved safety in a measure that people did not think was possible. That being so, I say it would be an unwise thing, a perfectly reckless thing, for Congress to interfere in such a revolutionary manner with the underlying methods of operation which have brought such a high degree of safety. Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Fort, do you think it is fair to.say that on some occasions in respect to proposed safety measures, there must be some balancing of the achievement in safety with the matter of continuing operation of the railroads, as a matter of economy? Mr. FORT. Well, theoretically, of course, that is true. For example, if you did not run any trains at all you would not hurt anybody. Neither would you have any service. And, I suppose that if the District government or the United States Government should take a half billion dollars and put it into widening bottlenecks in the Dis- trict of Columbia and digging tunnels under the streets for pedes- trians to walk in, and then should spend another hundred million dollars every year in the same way, it might well be that you would save an accident here or there. But the fact that you do not make expenditures of this character does not properly lay you open to the charge of balancing a dollar against an accident. There are, of course, practical limitations to everything. On the general subject of safety, however, and to dispel any in- advertent impression that the railroads have not been alert and have not been successful in attempting to bring about safety, I call your attention to this statement in the opinion of the Supreme Court in the so-called Railroad Retirement Act case (295 U. S. 330), which was decided in 1935. I read from the opinion: The trial court found, and its finding is not assigned as error : "Railroads were, when the act was enacted,"- And that was in 1934- "and are now, operated efficiently and safely and more efficiently and much more safely than at any time in history." Let me read you also from a statement by W. H. Cameron, the managing director of the National Safety Council, which -was made at the sixty-fourth annual dinner of the New York Railroad Club, in New York, on December 10, 1935. I quote as follows: The railroad safety record is and should be an inspiration to every other industry. The hazards of heavy machinery, high speed, and scattered opera- tions were heavy handicaps in the effort to achieve safety on the railroads. These obstacles and others, however, have been surmounted by the persistence and vision of both safety men and executives, who were determined that the loss of life and loss of property growing out of railroad accidents should be reduced to an absolute minimum. TRAIN LENGTHS 391 I do not like to labor this point, but it is important, because it is not true that the railroads have been unmindful of their duties with respect to safety. They have been diligent, and they have been extraordinarily successful. If they had not been diligent; if they had not been successful; then, Mr. Congressman Bulwinkle's suggestion, that the Government would be justified in intervening would be correct; but they have been dili- gent and I would say that they have been much more successful than they would ever have been if they had been restricted by statutes such as that now proposed. Now, Mr. Louis Wiley, of the New York Times stated on June 8, 1934. The railroads have accepted public safety as a public trust. They have made safety the first tradition of the railroads and have spared no effort or expense to guarantee, so far as human brains can forsee, all precautions against acci- dents * * *. Even through these years of depression, there has been no sacrifice of the essential of railroad service, which is safety. Mr. BOEN. Mr. Chairman. Mr. FORT. Would you mind if I finished reading this? Mr. BOREN. No. Mr. FoRT (continuing). No form of travel is equally safe. That condition has not come about without intense concentration of our railroad executives and every employee, upon the obligation of the roads to carry us safely. I say we are following the methods which bring about safety and they have brought about safety, and they are bringing about in- creasing safety, as times go on. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Fort, assuming that the analysis that you have just read is correct and that the general field of accidents have been reduced. Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. Mr. BOREN. Going from that general field to the specific field of shock on rear end or either end of trains, do the railroads take the position that the lessening of the number of cars would not decrease the number of shock accidents? Mr. FoRT. We think it would increase the number of shock acci- dents, and I will tell you why that is so. I am coming to that feature in regular order a little later. Additional stops and starts and the additional taking of sidings would give new opportunities for accidents of that type, If we run additional trains, we would have additional train meet- ings; additional train passings; additional taking of sidings, and they would create opportunties for additional shock accidents in the caboose. Bear in mind that train meets and passes multiply when the num- ber of trains is increased. They do not increase in the same ratio that the number of trains increase; they increase in the ratio of the square of the increase in the number of trains run. If we run 2 trains each way on a single track railroad during the same period of time, we have 4 train meets; but if we run 4 trains each way during that period on a single track railroad we have 16 train meets, all of which require stopping, starting, and the taking of sidings, and give greatly increased opportunity for shock accidents. I am 392 TRAIN LENGTHS going to show you later that during the period when the train lengths increased, accidents from sudden stops, starts, jerks, and lurches decreased in a very striking way, and I will get to those figures in just a little while. Mr. BoREw. Might I make one observation and ask you one more question before you finish here? Mr. FORT. Yes. Mr. BoRm. In relation to the reports of the number of accidents-- particularly I refer to the two States that have come up a number of times in the discussion: Arizona and Nevada. Mr. FoR. Yes, sir. Mr. BoREN. In studying those reports, I cannot, with any ease at all, correlate the two reports. Labor representatives have broken down the reports in such a way as to show a clear analysis between the shock accidents and others, and have shown individual cases, and so on, and thus far you have used something more of a general analysis, and I would like to see you put into the record some definite comparisons. Mr. FORT. Mr. Congressman, I think perhaps you were not here at the time I opened my statement. I shall be followed by witnesses who will deal specifically and concretely with all of the figures, and my purpose has been merely to try to explain what we take to be the fundamental issues which should control this case. If, when we get through, there are any figures we have not put in-I do not think there will be--we will certainly get them and give them to you. Mr. BOREN. Very well. Now, aside from the direct relation of the 70-car train length, to shock accidents, there has been introduced considerable evidence here of the force and effect of the shock acci- dents on the rear end and there have been some questions along the line of what else could be done to prevent these accidents, such as padding the way cars and various suggestions, and I wonder if at some time in your statement or some of the witnesses succeeding you, if we can expect some analysis of that particular problem. It is probably more or less aside from the direct relation of the 70-car train limit. Do you follow what I have in mind? Mr. FoRT. Yes. I had not planned to go into that particularly myself, because after all, my time is limited in order to give the other witnesses an opportunity; but we will develop that so far as it can be developed. Mr. BOREN. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FORT. I think it is very important, if I may say so, that the committee, and anyone else interested in this subject, should not permit its attention to be diverted to a narrow or false issue. The issue in this case is not slack accidents. That is one element in the issue; but that is a very minor one, as you will see from the figures I shall call to your attention a little later. That is a very minor factor in the entire picture which would be affected by this bill. Mr. WrRow. Mr. Chairman. The CHAMMAN. Mr. Withrow. Mr. Wrrmtow. May I ask Mr. Fort a question? Mr. FoRT. Yes. TRAIN LENGTHS 393: Mr. WITHROw. Although you have not operated trains, and are not in the operating division, you understand what an automatic coupler is? Mr. For. Yes, sir. Mr. WrrHRow. And air brakes, that is, an engine beneath the car. Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHROW. Do you know of any two appliances that the rail- road companies have adopted that have done more toward develop- ing safety and efficiency than those two? Mr. FORT. Well, I suppose it would serve your purpose if I say I think they have done a tremendous amount of good. Mr. WITHRow. Is it not a fact that you could not operate without air brakes and without automatic couplers? Mr. FORT. Well, if you take air brakes away and replace them with nothing, you are entirely right. Mr. WITHRow. It is not your claim that the railroads voluntarily equipped their cars and engines with automatic couplers and air brakes, is it? Mr. FORT. Mr. Withrow, that is a question which has been brought up time after time. The fact is, of course, that the railroads de- veloped the automatic coupler. They put it in general use without any statute whatever. There was finally a statute which, as I under- stand it, had the effect of making uniform practices which were already in general use. There is nothing comparable between the automatic-coupler statute and a statute such as is now proposed which strikes at the very heart of modern operating methods. There was an interesting debate on the Senate floor in connection with the automatic-coupler statute which I would be glad to show you. It was stated, time after time, that there was no general rail- road opposition to the bill, but that certain railroads opposed it. The railroads developed the automatic coupler. They put it into general use. Congress did not develop it. Mr. WITHROW. And, did the railroads do that voluntarily? Mr. FORT. They put it into general use voluntarily, according to my information. Mr. WrrIHRow. Without any statute? Mr. For. There was finally a statute, but the statute was enacted under the circumstances I have tried to explain. Mr. WITHROw. All right then, how about the air brakes? Mr. FORT. The air-brake situation I am not quite so well informed about. I just read that debate on the automatic-coupler bill, day before yesterday, so that it is fresh in my mind; but this I know is true with respect to air brakes : They also were developed and put into general use by the railroad companies themselves. Mr. WITHROW. That is all. Mr. EICHER. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eicher. Mr. EICHER. Are we going to have the benefit, Mr. Fort, later on in the hearing, of the testimony of someone who is qualified to talk about the technical, engineering aspect of air-brake development ? Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. Mr. Withrow, in connection with your remarks, the extraordinary improvement in safety which has come about on the railroads has 394 TRAIN LENGTHS not come about by reason of requirements of legislation. The most striking improvement took place between 1923 and the present, and during that time there was no so-called safety legislation of any consequence. As to that conclusion, I look for confirmation to no less authority than Mr. Whitney, who is president of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, which Mr. Farquharson represents here. In a speech which Mr. Whitney made at the tenth annual meeting of the Safety Section, American Railway Association, Denver, Colo., in July 1930, he made certain statements which I shall read to you. I have his entire speech available for inspection, and I would be glad to put it in the record. This is what Mr. Whitney said: We have now reached a stage of refinement in safety practice which does not readily lend itself to the precisions of legislative enactment. And further: Approximately one-third of all the acts of Congress, which the Interstate Commerce Commission is required to administer, are laws to promote the safety of travelers and employees upon our railroads. This, I call particular attention to: However, the most striking developments in railroad safety have appeared in the last 10 years. They have not come by reason of any new legislation of consequence nor through any special improvements in the methods of admin- istration or enforcement. That is Mr. Whitney's statement. Mr. WITHRIOw. He says during the last 10 years? Mr. FoRr. Yes. Mr. KENNEDY. When was that statement made? Mr. FORT. In July 1930. Quoting further from Mr. Whitney: I wish to be clearly understood. This statement should not by any implication be interpreted as adverse criticism of the public authorities charged with the administration of our safety laws. I believe the Interstate Commerce Com- mission has made an enviable record in its administration of these safety regula- tions and, if I may be permitted a personal word in passing, I wish to pay special tribute to the contribution of the Honorable Frank McManamy, the distinguished chairman at the present time of the Commission. The notable progress in safety made during the last 10 years, in my opinion, has been achieved in part by reason of better organization among railroad managements effected through the American Railway Association. Your hon- ored president, Mr. Aishton, deserves no small credit in this particular. But even more important I Would cite the much improved relations between man- agements and their employees, which has done much to encourage cooperative efforts in respect of safety. In my opinion the results of such Joint efforts will alwayd outdistance in point of accomplishment the mandates of public regula- tion. Then, skipping and quoting again: We have passed -beyond that phase of railroad safety wherein the spectacular emotional appeal was employed to force safety improvements. I am merely trying to get before this committee a rational picture of the actual situation. The railroads have improved safety conditions consistently, con- tinuously, and almost in a spectacular manner as the result of the methods of operation which they are now following, and nothing but harm could come of such an intrusion as this bill would make upon the function of railroad management. In that connection, I want TRAIN-LENGTHS tX95 to get to some figures. One would think from the very fact that such a bill is proposed, that railroad operation had become less safe during the period when the length of trains has been increased, but just the opposite is true. The fact is that during this period there has been a striking improvement in safety. Between 1923 and 1936 the average freight train length increased about 16 percent, from 39.9 cars to 46.4 cars. During this same period train accidents decreased from 27,500 to 8,300, or 70 percent. When I speak of train accidents, I do not mean accidents which necessarily resulted in casualty. Some did, but much the greater number did not. In 1923 there were 1,592 train accidents which resulted in casualty A casualty is any injury, serious or minor, which incapacitates a man for 3 days or more. There were 1,592 of these accidents which resulted in casualties in 1923. In 1936, when the length of trains had increased substantially, there were 590, or 63 percent less. Mr. BxmwINKLE. Are these reports from the Interstate Commerce Commission? Mr. FORT. Yes, sir; these are the statistics of the Interstate Com- merce Commission. Mr. BILwINKLE. Do the railroads report all of the accidents they have to the Interstate Commerce Commission? Mr. FORT. The accidents which were reported to the Interstate Commerce Commission are reported in accordance with the statute of the United States requiring that they be reported and requiring that they be reported under oath. If there is a falsification in con- nection with the reports, it is a criminal offense. I would say there are no other statistics of accidents with anything like the same as- surance and guaranty of reliability as these statistics of the Inter- state Commerce Commission. That does not mean that there may not, of course, at times, be mistakes. Mr. BILwINKLE. What do you mean by an accident? Mr. FORT. What do I mean by an accident? Mr. BULwINKLE. Yes; what does the statute mean by accident that the railroads report upon? Mr. FORT. It is all described in the Commission's regulations coy- ering reports. Would you like for me to read from them? Mr. BULwINKLE. Just in brief. You can give it. I do not want you to go into any minute details. Mr. FORT. Well, a train accident is any accident which results in damage of $150 or more, whether or not there is a casualty. A cas- ualty is any injury which incapacitates a man from work for as long' as 3 days. A train-service accident is an accident which results in a casualty in connection with the operation of a train, regardless of whether or not any property damage is done. Mr. BULWINKLE. Is it true or is it not true, that quite a number of these train-service employees continue to work. They probably may be injured and not stay off over 3 days? Mr. FoT. Well, undoubtedly some injuries are so minor that they do not require the employee to stay off over 3 days; yes, sir. 396 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. BuLwINKl. I believe it was testified here in some case where this man was carried on a stretcher, the conductor was carried into the caboose and still conducted his work. He still continued. That was not reported. Do you remember hearing that from one of the witnesses? Mr. FORT. Yes, sir; I heard that. Mr. BULwINKu&. Well, are there many such cases as that, do you suppose ? Mr. FORT. I would suppose that there would be extraordinarily few. There was testimony in one of the hearings before the Senate committee by Mr. Warfel, a Union Pacific safety man who has spent his life in this work. He said that although in any type of statistics or method of reporting, there will be times when errors occur, in- stances of that kind had not been sufficient in number to change i any way the significance of the figures. Of course, Mr. Congress- man, when you compare the figures over a period of years such as from 1923, to 1936, any error of that kind would not affect the relationship from year to year. Mr. MAPEs. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mapes. Mr. MAPEs. Mr. Fort, I would like to ask you a question. Mr. For. Yes. Mr. MAPEs. Have you, or has anyone, a break-down of the accidents so that we can tell what accidents are the result of slack action and what ones are not? Mr. FoRT. Mr. Congressman, you cannot tell what accidents are the result of slack action with any exactitude; but you can tell this: The Commission has a classification of accidents and casualties due to sud- den stops, starts, jerks, or lurches of locomotives or cars. Now, all slack-surge accidents are included in those accidents, although there are a great many other accidents also included which would not properly be called slack-surge accidents. Mr. MAPEs. Are those divided so as to indicate how many occurred on trains of 70 cars and how many on trains of more than 70? Mr. FORT. No, sir. In the Commission's figures, there is no such separation as that; but there was a special study made when the safety features of operation in Nevada were compared with those in Arizona, where there was an arbitrary maximum length of 70 cars, and that study will throw much light on your question. Mr. MAPES. Is that the only place where the statistic's throw any light on the question ? Mr. FORT. So far as I know, that would throw more light on it than any other figures. The Commission does not publish its figures in that form. It does not break them down by the length of trains. It takes a special study to do that. Mr. MAPES. Do the individual roads keep any separate classifications of that kind? Mr. For. There is no uniform practice by railroads. Some may and some may not. There will be safety witnesses who will follow me who I think can give you a better answer to that question. Now, if the chairman please, I was speaking of the reduction in the number of train accidents which has taken place during tis period when the length of trains had been increasing, and I said that the total train accidents had been reduced by 70 percent in 1936 as compared TRAIN LENGTHS 397 with 1923, and that the number of such accidents resulting in casualties had been reduced 63 percent. Mr. BULWINKLE. What was the reduction in personnel between 1923 and 1936? Mr. FoRT. There was a very considerable reduction, but probably the figures that I will give are more important. Mr. BULWINKLE. All right. Mr. FoRT. I refer to the number of train-miles run in the 2 years. There were fewer train-miles run in 1936 than in 1923. In 1923 there were 1,245,000,000 train-miles run, while in 1936 there were only 905,000,000. So in order to get the accident figures on a comparable basis you should make allowance for the difference in the train-miles. I have done that, and I find that on a train-mile basis, the improvement in the number of train accidents between 1923 and 1936 was 58.6 percent. The rate of decrease was 58.6 percent on a train-mile basis. If we take a car-mile basis as the measure the decrease was 65.3 percent, because the trains had lengthened. Thus it appears the reduction in accidents was not due to the de- crease in volume of operation, because when a unit basis is used, that is, the rate of train accidents per 1,000,000 train-miles, we find a re- duction in the rate of approximately 60 percent. When only those train accidents which resulted in casualties are considered, we find a reduction on a train-mile basis between 1923 and 1936 of 49.2 percent, and on a car-mile basis a reduction of 57.4 percent. We must, of course, relate the number of accidents to some base or it is meaningless. I was speaking of train accidents, all train accidents, but let us consider casualties to thei men who are particularly active in spon- soring this bill. I am referring to train and engine service employees. Mr. Congressman, you wanted to know about those. Mr. BULWINKLE. That is all right; continue with this phase. Mr. FORT. Drawing to a smaller focus, and coming from all train accidents to all casualties to road freight train and engine service employees, we find exactly the same trend during the period from 1923 to 1936, when the length of trains was increasing. In 1923 there were 436 fatalities to men in road freight train and engine service, and there were 18,214 casualties of all kinds, major and minor. In 1936 the figures had been reduced to 170 fatalities and 4,099 total casualties. In other words, there was a reduction of 77 percent in the total casualties to freight-train service employees during this period of time, and a reduction of 61 percent in the fatalities. Now, getting down to a train-mile basis: On a train-mile basis, taking all casualties to these men who work on freight trains, there was a reduction of 70 percent, and on a car-mile basis, a reduction of 74 percent, which shows that the operation of trains during this period of time has resulted in a much higher level of safety than ever had been attained under the old system of operation. Bringing the question down to even a closer focus: I have a state- ment here which shows the casualties to road freight conductors and brakemen in train-service accidents due to sudden stops, starts, 47891-38-26 398 TRAM LENGTHS lurches, or jerks of trains. This statement covers only the conduc- tors and brakemen and only the accidents due to the particular cause as to which the bill is supposed to be helpful. What do we find? We find in 1923 total casualties of 1,957, and in 1936 total casualties of 674, a reduction of 65.6 percent. This relates to the very accidents proponents of the bill are talking about. But do not think for a moment that all of these accidents that I speak of, due to sudden stops, starts, jerks, and lurches, are due to slack surge, because they are not, but all slack-surge accidents are included in these. The Interstate Commerce Commission has no clas- sification which includes only so-called slack-surge accidents. As a companion statement to the statement that I just read, relating to train-service accidents, I have another statement relating to train accidents due to the same causes, and that shows a decrease in cas- ualties of from 219 in 1923 to 63 in 1936, or an improvement of 71 percent. If the committee please, there are some very significant conclusions to be drawn from these figures. Of the train-service accidents in 1936 there were 3 killed and there were 4 killed in the train accidents, or a total of 7 killed during the year due to sudden starts, stops, lurches, and jerks. But of those 7 deaths shown in the Commission's records, not one was a man killed in the caboose of a long train. There was one who subsequently died to which Mr. Farquharson called attention. Of the three fatalities in 1936 in train-service accidents due to sudden stops, starts, lurches, and jerks, one was on a train of 9 cars; one was on a train of 11 cars; and one was on a train of 18 cars. Mr. MAPEs. How were they caused? Mr. FORT. The one on an 11-car train was a switching accident. The safety witnesses who will follow me will explain each one of those accidents and show the details. Mr. MAPES. Were they due to slack action? Mr. FoRT. No; I do not think so. They were due to sudden stops, starts, jerks, or lurches. If there had been a slack-action fatality, it would have been included in those figures. Now;I was speaking of train accidents. There were four fatalities during 1936, but not one of those involved a man in the caboose of a long train. One was an engineer and one was a fireman, and they were on a 46-car train. Another was a passenger engineer on an electric train, and he had just two cars. The fourth was a freight engineer on a 26-car train. So, of these seven fatalities falling within this classification, not a single one of them was due to a long train or even occurred on a long train. I am trying to bring home to the committee, if I can, the relative unimportance of accidents of the type to which this bill is directed as compared with other accidents. I will hurry along in order not to take too much of your time. In addition to the so-called slack-surge accidents, proponents of the bill have taken a good deal of time and have talked a good deal about- accidents due to misunderstanding of hand signals. They have said that hand signals cannot be understood on long trains. TRAIN LENGTH$ 399 The Commission keeps a separate classification of casualties due to the misunderstanding of hand signals and the statistics of the Commission show that not a man has been killed as a result of mis- understanding of hand signals since 1930. In fact, since 1930, in 6 years, there have been only six casualties of any kind due to that cause, including not a single death. In 1936 there were two casualties due to misunderstanding of hand signals, but both of those occurred on short trains in switching'service; one on a 17-car train, and one on a 15-car train. Mr. MAPEs. Are we to understand that hand signals are given on these long trains, so that there is a possibility of misunderstanding them, or is it impossible to make hand signals on a long train? Mr. FORT. When a long train is moving, as I understand it, and operating witnesses will explain this-there is no occasion to give any signals from the rear of the train to the engineer except a stop signal. The engineer does not have to distinguish between signals or interpret signals. Mr. MAPES. As I understand the testimony of many of the pro- ponents of this legislation, it is that it is impossible to give hand signals on these long trains, and if that is true, perhaps these lists of accidents where hand signals are misunderstood, does not apply to the long trains at all. Is that a fair conclusion? Mr. FORT. I do not believe that would be entirely a fair conclusion. Mr. MAPES. Why? Mr. FORT. You may be correct as to cases where it would be im- possible to give any signals at all. Mr. MAPEs. That is the way I understood the testimony., Mr. FORT. The testimony is that you cannot see these signals in many instances either on long trains or short, due to curves, weather conditions, and so forth. Mr. MAPEs. If they cannot be seen, they cannot be misunderstood. Mr. FORT. Well, they might be seen, but not well enough for the engineer to understand them. Mr. WoLvER'oN. How many accidents happened as a result of fail- ure to see signals? Mr. FORT. How many? Mr. WOLVERTON. Yes. Mr. FORT.' I will have something on that in just a moment. Another point which proponents have made is that the safety of operation has been impaired because of inability to inspect long trains, with resulting accidents caused by defects in or failure of car equipiment. We have the statistics dealing with accidents of this character, and we find that the.casualties to train- and engine-service employees caused by defects in or failure of car equipment were 207 in 1923 and 58 in 1936. There was an improvement of 72 percent. In 1936 there were three people killed by reason of accidents growing out of such defects and they were the same three that I have already called your attention to in connection with train accidents, due to sudden stops, starts, lurches, and jerks. That is, to say, the failure of equipment resulted in a sudden stop or start and the deaths were classified under both headings. TRAIN LENGTHS So there was a duplication. One who was killed was in a 46-car train, and another who was killed was a fireman, and another who was killed was an engineer on a 26-car train. So you will see that no new element of hazard with respect to defects on equipment has been introduced by the running of the longer trains. Accidents from failures of equipment have steadily decreased and they have been reduced to a point which is far better than any point ever reached before. I am trying merely to offset any idea that the committee may have gotten that these accidents mentioned by proponents have grown in number as train lengths have grown. On the contrary, they have decreased in a most striking manner. Mr. Wolverton, in answer to your question as to failure to stop- and Mr. Mapes, you may be interested in this, too-as to failure to stop when signals could not be seen: In 1936 there were 17 accidents, but there were no casualties at all from that cause. Mr. WOLVERTON. Were those accidents due to the length of the train? Was that cause of the inability to see the signals? Mr. FORT. We can break that down by train lengths, and we will be glad to do that. Only one of those 17 accidents occurred on a train of more than 70 cars. Most of the trains involved were very short, 12 having less than 20 cars. Mr. WITHROw. Were those accidents reported to the Interstate Commerce Commission? Mr. FoRT. Yes. In connection with proponents' assertion that long trains result in shock and rough handling, statements were made by certain witnesses that we were spending money repairing freight cars that were broken up by being roughly handled, and that we were spending money paying for shipments which were damaged, and peo- ple who were injured by shocks and rough handling. Let us see what has actually happenea in that connection. Freight car repairs chargeable to operating expenses: In 1923, $475,433,689 was spent on freight car repairs. Of course, only a small portion of that had anything to do with repairing cars that had been damaged. Generally the money was spent for ordinary re- pairs and upkeep such as any equipment or machinery requires. In 1936 that expense had dropped down to $183,002,001. As you look over the figures covering each year for the period 1923-36, you see that there has been a constant decrease. In 1923, $18.56 was spent for the repairs of cars per 1,000 car miles, whereas in 1936 the corresponding expense was $8.10. So the theory of the proponents of this bill with respect to car repairs, like a good many of their other theories, simply will not stand examination in the light of facts. The same reduction is to be found in railroad loss and damage ex- penses. Mr. BULWINnE. Right there. It strikes me as probably true that quite a large amount of old cars were discarded and they bought new cars in the period between 1923 and 1936. Mr. FORT. That is entirely true, Mr. Congressman, and in order to- Mr. BULwINgxn. That would make a difference. Mr. FouT. In order to make a true picture, it is necessary to re- duce the car repair expense to a car-mile basis for each year. TRAIN LENGTHS 401 The expense per 1,000 car-miles in 1923 was $18.56; in 1924, $15.22; 1925, $13.91; 1926, $13.21; 1927, $12; 1928, $11.23; 1928, $11.37; 1930, $9.98; 1931, $8.44; 1932, $6.88; 1933, $6.54; 1934, $6.74; 1935, $7.33; and 1936, $8.10. Mr. BULWINKLE. There has been quite a number of discarded freight cars during that period of time, has there not? Mr. FORT. Retired freight cars? Mr. BuLWINKLE. Retired old freight cars from use? Mr. FORT. Oh, yes, sir; cars are retired every year. The general trend of car-repair expenses throughout the entire period of 13 years has been downward; this is true also of the other items of expense to which attention was called by proponents. Take the loss and damage expenses. Of course, that covers not only expense for property damaged en route, but also expense for property which is pilfered, and it covers claims on shipments which do not make scheduled running time and miss the market. Never- theless, the comparison over a period of years is significant. Now, in 1923, the total of loss and damage claims was $52,156,217. In 1936 it was $25,548,734. In 1923 it was $52,156,217; 1924, $50,173,983; 1925, $45,175,102; 1926, $42,759,645; 1927, $41,661,011; 1928, $40,225,793; 1929, $42,884,- 472; 1930, $38,073,829; 1931, $28,720,923; 1932, $20,789,785; 1933, $17,- 307,930; 1934, $19,655,781; 1935, $21,809,639; and 1936, $25,548,734. It is clear therefore that the theory that long trains have resulted in rough handling and in an increase in loss and damage payments will not stand the light of the facts. We find a similar situation in connection with the cost of clearing wrecks. In 1923, this cost was $11,419,872; 1924, $9,020,918. In 1936 it was $2,965,079, and year by year it has gone down. In 1923 it was $11,419,872; 1924, $9,020,918; 1925, $8,361,223; 1926, $8,487,299; 1927, $7,684,798; 1928, $6,476,538; 1929, $6,389,986; 1930, $4,371,570; 1931, $2,885,015; 1932, $1,923,241; 1933, $1,897,613; 1934, $1,919,082; 1935, $2,289,776; and 1936, $2,965,079. Take the cost of injury to persons. If railroad operation had be- come more and more hazardous of course, that cost would have re- flected it. But, in 1923 it was $40,535,177, and in 1936, it was only $24,218,507. Mr. MAPEs. Does that take into consideration employees? Mr. FORT. All people. Mr. MArES. Both passengers and employees? Mr. FORT. Employees, passengers, trespassers, people injured at grade crossings, everyone. Mr. MArEs. Including passenger trains as well as freight trains? Mr. FORT. Including all trains and including all employees. Mr. WITHROw. Have you any figures that would give us the ap- proximate cost of operation per gross ton ? Mr. FoT. You mean operating costs.? Mr. WITHROw. Yes. Mr. FORT. Yes. Mr. WITHROW. Or, will some one give that? Mr. FORT. Yes. Mr. WITHRow. That will be all right. Mr. FORT. I can get it right now, if you want me to. 402 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. WITHROW. No; it will be satisfactory to wait until you get to it. Mr. WoLvER'ow. During the same period that you have just referred to, as showing a material decrease in the amount of damage caused by accidents, has there been likewise a drop in the percentage of acci- dents in the same period? Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. Mr. WOLVERTON. I mean as to individuals. Mr. FORT. Casualties. Mr. WOLVERTON. Yes. Mr. FORT. Yes. There has been. I called attention to that. There was a decrease in train accidents during that period of approximately 70 percent and a decrease in train accidents which resulted in casualties of approximately the same percentage. Mr. WOLVERTON. Has that been due to the tendency on the part of the railroads to improve the character of equipment that is used? Mr. FORT. That has played a part in it. The money which the railroads spent to improve their tracks and bridges and equipment contributed to improved safety. Moreover, the fact that fewer trains are being run now than were run in past years is a factor of importance in bringing about the improvement in safety. Mr. WOLvERToN. Is there a tendency among the railroads to im- prove the structure of freight cars? Mr. FORT. Of what? Mr. WOLVERTON. To improve the construction of freight cars? Mr. FORT. Yes. The standards have been advanced right along. An example which comes to me is the elimination of the arch-bar truck. The arch-bar truck has now been outlawed by voluntary action on the part of the railroads, and a different type of truck has been prescribed as standard in its place. Specifications with respect to wheels and to various other parts of the cars, including couplers and draft gears, have been stepped up all during this period. Mr. WOLVERTON. Has the use of steel in the construction of pas- senger coaches resulted in a decrease in the number of casualties? Mr. FoR. It is my impression that it has. Mr. WOLVERTON. Is there a similar tendency to use steel in the construction of freight cars, or parts of freight cars? Mr. FORT. I think all freight cars are either all steel or have a steel underframe. That is a requirement, as I understand it, for the inter- change of cars. Of course, more and more cars are all steel. Mr WoLVERTON. I noticed on my last trip homeward that some freight cars appeared to have steel ends, while the remaining portion is wood. The end is of steel. Mr. FouT. Well, generally speaking, there can be no doubt that every month and every year there is constant improvement in the equipment. Safety improvement has been accomplished over a period of years, by a balanced, rational program of expenditure. Now, Mr. Chairman, I come to what I think is a very important feature of this case. I have shown you how the safety record has improved from 1923 to 1936. TRAIN LENGTHS 03g But, from 1935 to 1936 there was no improvement. From 1935 to 1936 the number of accidents increased and the rate of accidents in- creased. That was mentioned in the Senate report and given a mis- taken significance. It is very significant, but it is necessary to understand its true significance. In 1936 business turned up. There were a great many more train- miles run in 1936 than there were in 1935 and, as a result not only the number of accidents increased but the rate of accidents per train increased, because the number of accidents increased not in the same ratio as the number of train-miles increased, but in a greater ratio. Other conditions remaining unchanged, accidents will increase when train-miles increase, and in a greater ratio. This is clearly established by the statistics and was recognized by the Interstate Commerce Commission in its Accident Bulletin No. 105, covering the calendar year of 1936. There the Commission sets forth a chart-and we will bring like charts before you later-showing the trend of accidents over a period of years. The Commission said this: This curve shows that accidents fluctuate in number both downward and upward in greater ratio than the changes in volume of traffie. That strikes to the heart of this case. A realization of the fact that the number of accidents fluctuates with the number- of trains, but in greater ratio, leaves no doubt that, if you pass this bill and put 60,000,000 unnecessary train-miles on the railroads, you are going to increase not only the number of accidents but the rate of accidents per train-mile. Mr. EICHER. Does volume of traffic necessarily mean volume of trains? Mr. FORT. The volume of traffic would have nothing to do with safety except as it is reflected in train units. In 1930 total train-miles decreased 8.9 percent; freight train-miles decreased 12 percent; but total train accidents decreased 28 percent. That is, between 1929 and 1930. Total casualties to road train and engine service employees de- creased 34 percent. That is between 1929 and 1930, when the number of train-miles decreased 8.9 percept. Now, let us see what happened in 1936, as compared with 1935, when the trend in train-miles .was the other way. The total number of train-miles in 1936 was 9 percent greater than in 1935. The freight train-miles were 13 percent greater, but the total train acci- dents were 26 percent greater, and the total casualities to road, train, and engine service employees were 30 percent greater. That is exactly what will happen if you pass this bill and multiply train units on the railroads. And the figures show it, not only for 1 year, but right through a long course of years. This we shall show at some length by a following witness. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fort, in connection with the increased num- ber of trains to be used, have you estimated the increased nunber of men who would be employed in the train service? Mr. FoiT. Have we estimated it?$ The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 404 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. FoRT. I have not; but just insofar as the number of trains is increased, there would be, of course, an increase in the number of employees in train service as an immediate result. But if you are looking to the make-work features of the bill, you must iook beyond the immediate future. This is a period of the most intense competi- tion in transportation. The railroads are in competition with other and new forms of transportation. If railway operating costs are to be run up artificially, there is not any doubt that in the long run, and not such a very long run either, the railroads will be so handi- capped in their competitive struggle that they will lose traffic. In the end there will not be any more railroad employees, and I do not think you will have as many. I doubt whether you will have any more train and engine service employees, and you will certainly have many fewer employees in other services, because the railroads cannot pay out in wages money which they haven't got. There is no way I know of that you can escape the philosophy of arithmetic, as I think Mr. Justice Holmes called it. If railroad operating expenses are to be run up sky high by statu- tory requirements, the railroads are going to be crippled in competi- tion and everyone depending on the railroad industry is going to suffer sooner or later. The CHAIRMAN. I suppose that question would be broadened to determine the extent to which increases would be consistent with economical operations. Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. On the other hand, awhile ago you were arguing that the wider the front or peril, the greater is the number of casual- ties; the more men you employ gives them a broader contact, of course, with the possibility of accidents. Mr. FoRT. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. The number of men would have a relation from that standpoint as well as increasing employment. Mr. FoRT. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. If you could increase the number of men at the same expense of operation, that would be beneficial? Mr. FORT. Yes; from an employment point of view, but not from a safety point of view. The more men we employ, the more we multiply the opportunity for accident, due to negligence. There is no body of men, I believe, who are more careful and more diligent than railroad men in matters of safety. Nevertheless, man failure is an inevitable factor in any work. Sixty-four percent of the serious accidents investigated by the Bureau of Safety of the Interstate Commerce Commission over a long period of years are chargeable to the negligence of the employees. As you multiply the number of employees, of course, you multiply the opportunity for so-called employee negligence, and I am not using "negligence" in any critical sense but in a technical sense. Mr. WITHRow. Where did you get those figures? Mr. FORT. From the Interstate Commerce Commission, as shown by its independent investigations. I am speaking of the investiga- tions which the Bureau of Safety makes through its own repre- sentatives, Mr. Withrow. I do not mean for a moment these figures indicate that railroad employees are careless or negligent, but per- fection is something which will never be reached in any human effort. TLVAIN LENGTHS 4W5 Mr. WInniow. Well, I do not think that gives quite a clear pic- ture, because the definition of negligence is based on the reports that the Interstate Commerce Commission's safety department receives from the railroads. Mr. FORT. No, sir; not the reports I am talking about. I am talk- ing about only those accidents independently investigated by the Bureau of Safety of the Interstate Commerce Commission where the conclusions are not at all the conclusions of the railroad officers but the conclusions of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Mr. WITHROW. I see. Then these are just haphazard cases taken by the Interstate Commerce Commission which they choose to investi- gate? Mr. FORT. No; they are not haphazard at all. They are the serious and important cases which the Commission in its discretion regards as worthy of investigation. They are the cases involving fatalities and serious injuries, and I would not say that the Commission is in any sense haphazard in its selection of cases. Mr. WITHROW. Of course, they did not investigate very closely the accident that occurred to the partner of the man who testified here, who, so far as the Interstate Commerce Commission's records are concerned, was carried as probably being back to work in 30 days, and he died. Mr. FORT. That was an accident which was not investigated by the Commission, so far as I know. Mr. WITHROW. That is the point I am making. Mr. FORT. That apparently was not a sufficiently serious accident for the Interstate Commerce Commission to investigate, or, at least, they did not think it was at the time. Mr. WITHROw. That was quite a serious accident. He died. Mr. FORT. Yes; it was a serious accident; but the Commission investigates those accidents which it regards as the most serious ones. Mr. WITHROW. I do not think they are quite fair when they say that 68 percent of the accidents are due to negligence on the part of the employees, based on that type of an investigation. Mr. FORT. They are classified by the Commission in that way. Mr. WITHRow. It would be better to say that 68 percent of the accidents that were investigated. Mr. FORt. That is what I did say. It just means in those acci- dents the man-failure element was present. Mr. WrntRow. I see. Mr. FORT. And that as you multiply your men you multiply your opportunity for man-failure. If it please the chairman, we will bring before you charts illus- trating the trends that I have tried to outline, and showing that the increase in the number of accidents is related to the number of train- miles and not to the length of trains. For example, taking 1923 as a base, in 1929 the average length of train had increased by some- thing over 20 percent and the employee casualty rate had decreased more than 40 percent. When you follow through that period, com- paring the total train-miles with the total train accidents, you will find almost, year by year, a direct relationship between the total train-miles and the total train accidents. That will also be illustrated to you through a comparison between the Arizona figures and the Nevada figures. In Arizona and Nevada, 406 TRAIN LENGTHS the Southern Pacific carried almost the same number of car-miles--- about 5 percent more in Nevada than in Arizona-but because of the limitation of trains in Arizona the railroad was required to run more trains to handle the same number of car-miles in Arizona than in Nevada. We will show a comparison of the accident rates in the two States over a long period of years which demonstrates that Nevada had a very much better accident record, with an average length of train of 80 cars in 1934 than Arizona with an average train length of less than 58 cars. Mr. Sullivan will explain that to you at some length. Now there is one other point on the safety feature which I wish to bring to your attention. In 1936 the fatalities caused by sudden stops, starts, jerks, and lurches-and that is what proponents are talking about all of the time-were one-tenth of 1 percent of all fatalities incident to rail- road operation.- That is what we are shooting at with this bill. Mr. Congressman Martin, you said the other day that you thought this was a slack-surge case. I say that slack-surge is the smallest thing in the case. Even the one-tenth of 1 percent includes accidents which are in no sense due to slack-surge, and it will be borne in mind that not one of the fatalities due to sudden stops, starts, jerks, or lurches, as shown by the Commission's statistics, occurred on a train of more than 70 cars. I have been speaking of fatalities. Consider now injuries. Only 3 percent of injuries incident to railroad operation in 1936 were due to sudden starts, stops, jerks, or lurches. So, there is your picture. There are your high lights and shadows. Consider now employee accidents alone. Accidents due to sudden stops, starts, Jerks, and lurches accounted for only 114 percent of employee fatalities in 1936 and only 81 percent of employee injuries. Now let us see where we stand when we try to look at the picture as a whole: The most important source of casualties on a railroad is the striking and running over of people either at highway grade crossings or along the right-of-way. There is your real problem. Crossing accidents are largely beyond the control of the railroad company and accidents involving persons struck and run over on the right-of-way are also to a large extent beyond the control of the railroad company. In 1936 there were 3,712 fatalities of persons who were struck and run over, as compared with 7 from sudden stops, starts, jerks, or lurches. So, when we are trying to help one thing, we must be sure that we do not hurt something else that is very, very much more important. Mr. BULWINKLE. What do you mean by "that is very, very much more important"? Mr. FORT. I mean this, that if you decrease the length of trains in an effort to improve the shock situation at the rear of the trains, you automatically increase the number of trains and when you auto- matically increase the number of trains you automatically increase the number of people who will be killed by being struck and run over by trains. Mr. BULwrNKLE. Well now, I want to know how many, if this bill should pass, become a-law, how many more trains would you actually have? TRAIN LENGTHS 407 Mr. FORT. We would have, as nearly as we can calculate it, 60,- 000,000 additional train-miles on the basis of 1937 business, which was a subnormal business. Mr. BULWINKLE. How many more trains would that be? Mr. FORT. Well, the accurate measure is your train-mile. If you will assume Mr. BULWINKLE. No; I cannot measure it in my mind by a train- mile. I cannot measure the highway-crossing accidents. Mr. FORT. You mean, what would be the percentage of increase? Mr. BULWINKLE. Yes. Mr. FORT. There would be an increase of 12 percent in freight trains and about 6.6 percent in all trains, freight and passenger. Now, let us see how that works out- Mr. SADOWsKI. That was 1935 you mentioned? Mr. FORT. No; 1937. I have the figures right here with respect to grade crossing casual- ties, and that is another thing I want to get to. There was some suggestion from the bench the other day that the matter of grade-crossing accidents was somewhat speculative; but the records show that it is far from speculative. We have examined the record for each year, from 1923 to 1936, and have compared the number of casualties at grade crossings with the number of train- miles run and we have found that there have been almost exactly seven casualties per million train-miles every year. In 1923 there were 6.89; 1924, 7.20; 1925, 7.18; 1926, 7.59; 1927, 7.36; 1928, 7.68; 1929, 7.65; 1930, 6.81; 1931, 6.70; 1932, 6.71; 1933, 6.62; 1934, 7.15; 1935, 7.64; and 1936, 7.41. You see how nearly constant was the relationship of casualties at grade crossings to the number of train-miles run. That is what you would expect as a matter of common sense. Therefore, if we run another million train-miles, we will have seven more casualties with perhaps a little variation. If we run 60,000,00 more train-miles we will have 60 times 7, or 420, more grade-crossing casualties, and that is an expectancey that is just as definite as any expectancy could be. Approximately one-fourth of the casualties in grade-crossing acci- dents are fatalities so that an increase of 420 casualties would mean an increase of 105 fatalities at grade crossings, or at the rate of about 1.80 per additional train-miles run. Fatalities resulting from persons being struck and run over at places other than grade crossings in 1936 amounted to 2.13 per mil- lion train-miles. An addition of 60,000,000 train-miles would point to an increase in fatalities of this kind of 128 per year. Accordingly, if this bill should be passed and the train-miles increased by 60,000,- 000 per year, there is every reason to look forward to killing approxi- mately 230 more people each year at grade crossings and other places on the right-of-way than would be killed if this bill were not passed. There is every reasonable expectancy that this is the result which must be anticipated if the bill should be passed. This additional hazard cannot be overemphasized. I wish to speak in all moderation, but it is a difficult subject to speak mod- erately about or even think moderately about. Mr. BtraWNKYE.Your figures on highway grade crossings apply only to class I railroads, or to all railroads? Mr. FORT. All railroads. 408 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. WITHROW. Mr. Fort, the same number of cars would be oper- ated over crossings regardless of whether there were 70 cars or 150 cars in the trains. Mr. FORT. That is true. Mr. WrTHuow. What percentage of accidents at railroad crossings are caused by the motorist driving into the side of the train? Mr. FORT. I have those figures for you. Mr. WOLvERTON. Mr. Fort, right there Mr. Wnaunow. I think that we ought to have that. Mr. FORT. What is that? Mr. WITHuow. I would like to have the approximate percentage, if it is convenient for you to give it. Mr. WoLvERToN. Is it not about 30 percent? Mr. FORT. About 30 percent; and then, of course, most of those run into the front part of the train. Mr. WITHROW. No; I do not have that in mind. But there are 30 percent of the accidents that would not be affected materially by the increase in trains. Mr. FORT. Oh, no; because those who run into the side of a train run into the front end of the train. They do not run into the train back of the seventieth car, with very, very few exceptions. That cannot be calculated absolutely and definitely, but you can calculate it to some extent. Of the accidents which occur as a result of an automobile running into the side of a train, which amount to about 30 percent of all grade- crossing accidents, only 10 percent are cases where the automobile runs into the last quarter of the train. There are no statistics avail- able showing just what car is run into; the only separation made in the statistics being a separation into first, second, third, and fourth quarters of the train. Only about 23 percent of the freight-train miles are run by trains having more than 70 cars. Of course, all acci- dents involving the running into the last quarter of the train, in con- nection with trains of more than 70 cars, would not involve hitting a train beyond the seventieth car, but the large part of accidents in which an automobile hit a train beyond the seventieth car would involve hitting the last quarter.of the train. From what I have said, it follows that of all grade-crossing acci- dents in connection with freight trains only about seven-tenths of 1 percent would involve automobiles running into the last quarter of the train. And many accidents would be included in this seven- tenths of 1 percent which do not involve an automobile hitting a train beyond the seventieth car. These figures are rough, but it may be said with confidence that the number of highway-crossing acci- dents due to automobiles running into the side of trains of more than 70 cars, at a point beyond the seventieth car, is relatively negligible. Mr. QUINN. How many grade crossings are there in the United States? Mr. FORT. According to the statistics of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in 1926 there were 235,158 grade crossings between class I steam railways and highways. The figure for 1936 is 232,902, a re- duction of about 1 percent. In other words, the number of grade crossings has remained prac- tically constant. TRAIN LENGTHS 409 Mr. QUINN. Have you the figures of the number which have been eliminated in the last year? Mr. FORT. I have some figures which may be helpful to you. In an address by Thomas H. McDonald, Chief, United States Bureau of Public Roads, at the annual convention in Chicago, March 17, 1937, it was pointed out that during the 3% years beginning with July 1933, some 3,146 grade crossings had been eliminated. In that same speech Mr. McDonald said: It is only the repetition of axiomatic knowledge common to those in the railway and highway field that we are certain to have for many years a very large number of grade crossings. Mr. QUINN. I am interested, because the worst grade-crossing situation in the United States is at McKeesport. Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WOVERTON. I assume that with each succeeding year there is a decrease in the number of grade crossings, but there has been also an increase in the number of automobiles and trucks in use. Mr. FORT. I was going to say, Mr. Wolverton, there is a very interesting statistical situation there. There has been some improve- ment in the grade-crossing situation, and at the same time there has been an increase in the number of automobiles. Those things have operated in such a way, taken altogether, as to leave from year to year the relationship between the number of casualties at grade crossings and the number of train-miles practically constant. Mr. WOLVERTON. It seemed to me that was probably the explana- tion for the percentage remaining so constant throughout the period of years that you have mentioned. Mr. FORT. Yes, sir; that is correct. Mr. WoLvERToN. With an increase in the number of trains going over the grade crossings there would be an increase in the number of opportunities to run into the side of the trains or to be hit by a train. Mr. FORT. Run into the side of trains? Mr. WOLvERTON. Yes. Mr. FoRT. There would be; that is true. Mr. WOLvERTON. I understood you to say that the percentage of accidents at, grade crossings per million train-miles was approxi- mately seven. Mr. FORT. Seven casualties-that is, fatalities or injuries. Mr. WOLVERTON. If your estimate is correct that there would be an increase of 60,000,000 train-miles as a result of the passage of this legislation, that would likely produce an additional 420 casualties at grade crossings. Mr. FORT. At grade crossings alone. Mr. WOLVERTON. I further understood you to say that 25 percent of those casualties resulted in fatalities. Mr. FORT. That is the general average. Mr. WoLEroN. That would increase the number of fatalities then by 105. Mr. FORT. That is grade crossings alone. Mr. WOLVERToN. What were the figures as to that you gave a few moments ago?$ 410 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr, FORT. I gave the figures not only on grade crossings but people struck and run over along the tracks and the total increase to be expected would be about 230. Mr. WoLvErroN. Then that is the cause of my misunderstanding. Your figures included casualties along the tracks. I had figured that it would be an increase of 105 at grade crossings. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin, you wanted to ask a question; and then the committee will have a brief executive session. Mr. MARTIN. I hardly have time, because I have a meeting over at the Capitol at 12 o'clock. I asked Mr. Farquharson some questions along this line the other day. I asked him to get if he could the total number of trains of all kinds operating every 24 hours over the Pennsylvania Railroad be- tween New York City and Philadelphia and between Chicago and a couple of other points. It seems to me that you are putting up a rather strong argument against any increase, seasonal increase, in train service, and so forth, which is very great during certain seasons of the year; perhaps on the Pennsylvania Railroad between Philadelphia and New York at certain seasons, the trains must move just a few minutes apart all day long. Those increases would present an increase in hazard at the grade crossings, and therefore there should not be any increase in the number of trains. Mr. Farquharson pointed out that an increase in tonnage, an in- crease in railroad business, might put on many of these divisions a greater number of trains than even the 70-car train bill will put on with the business remaining static or normal. I have found that the argument which was being made, which I have found most difficult to give a great amount of weight or cred- ence to, is the proposition that the 70-car train would increase the number of freight trains to such an extent that it would present a grade-crossing hazard. I commented on the fact that perhaps the 100-mile-an-hour passenger train as compared with a freight train, presents a very much greater crossing hazard than putting on a few more freight trains, yet there would not be any suggestion that the railroad could not run the 100-mile-an-hour train by reason of that fact, and, of course, it cannot be argued that they should not put on all of the trains that their traffic would call for even if they had to run a train every 10 minutes for 24 hours in the day. Mr. FoRT. Of course-have you completed your statement? Mr. MARTIN. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Would it be agreeable to let Mr. Fort answer that in the morning, Mr. Martin? Mr. MARTIN. Yes. I have to go over to the House. Mr. FORT. Mr. Chairman, I will not take more than 10 minutes longer and I am sorry to have taken so much time. The CHAIRMAN. very well. You may conclude your statement in the morning. We might take recognition of the fact that we have a new member on the committee, Mr. Quinn, of Pennsylvania, who represents that great State, from the standpoint of population, resources, industry, and transportation. We hope he will remain here and be a useful member and will enjoy service on the committee. TRAIN LENGTHS 411 The committee will stand adjourned except for a short executive session, until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. (Thereupon, the committee proceeded to the consideration of other business, alter which it adjourned until 10 a. m., the following morn- ing, Wednesday, February 2, 1938.)  TRAIN LENGTHS WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1938 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FoREIGN COMMERCE, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence F. Lea (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Mr. Fort, you may proceed. STATEMENT OF 1. CARTER FORT, GENERAL SOLICITOR OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, WASHINGTON, D. C. Mr. FORT. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee- Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman. When we adjourned yesterday I had asked Mr. Fort quite a lengthy question, or perhaps made a statement intended as a question, which related to the angle of increased cross- ing hazard from the increased number of trains which might re- sult from such legislation as this. I want to just reshape that a bit. I hope I can do it without making a new question. From this phase of the hearing it appears that if these long trains were cut down to 70 cars that would increase the railway-crossing hazard. Now, as I view it, that is a hazard that would not necessarily have any relation to the legislation. The real question would not be how you got an increased number of trains; but the increased number of trains itself. If, for instance, you had two 140-car trains on a division and you cut that into 70 cars each, you would get 4 trains insteadof 2; but you could get the same result if there was sufficient business pick-up to put on 4 trains. As was stated by Mr. Farquharson-and, of course, it is a well known fact-we have seasonal pick-ups in passenger business in which as many as S sections of a passenger train are run at in- tervals of about 10 minutes, and if there were a hazard in this leg- islation, why, the same hazard would exist where you put on 8 sections of a passenger train running 10 minutes apart and maybe at 2 to 3 times the speed of a freight train. Then, of course, you know, we also have sections of the country, divisions, which run 10 times more trains than they do on other main-line sections of railways. Now, I would not argue for a minute that the remedy for that situation was to cut the trains off; but I might think, however, that if the increased crossing hazard of putting on a few more 47891-38---27 413 414g TRAIN LENGTHS trains was an answer to this legislation, why it would be equally applicable to the other situation. Mr. FoRT. Mr. Martin, I think that you are entirely correct in your conclusion that the adding of trains for any reason increases the highway-crossing hazard and if you did not run any trains at all you would not have any hazard, and if you ran more trains than were necessary to carry the business, that would increase the hazard. That would be an unnecessary increase in the hazard. The point here I think is that if you increase the trains unneces- sarily then you increase the hazard unnecessarily. If you increase the trains because business picks up, you are increasing the hazard, but you are increasing the hazard because there is no way to avoid it. As I have said, the only way to avoid all hazard would be to run no trains at all. I have taken a good deal more time than I intended to take, and for that reason I will cut my statement short and talk only a very few minutes. I will not develop some things I had expected to develop, but they will be developed by other witnesses. Yesterday I was speaking of the hazard of persons being struck and run over at grade crossings and elsewhere. I called attention to the number of persons killed and injured in this way. I did not, however, mention the fact that in 1936, 148 employees were killed by being struck and run over. So, it is a hazard not only to the public, but also to employees and a very much greater hazard to employees than slack-surge accidents, which, as shown by the commission's statistics, did not result in a single fatality to a man on the rear of a long train during 1936. Now, there are other hazards in railroading which have much more importance than the hazard. from slack surge or shocks. For example, in getting on and off cars and locomotives, many persons are injured and killed. In 1936 there were 313 killed and 3,543 in- jured in that manner. If this bill is enacted and we are required to run a greater number of trains to carry a given amount of business, we will have greater interference on the railroad lines and a tremendous increase in the number of train meets and passes with the resultant necessity for trains to take sidings. This will all bring about innumerable addi- tional train stops. It will greatly increase the necessity for train service employees to get off and on trains for the purpose of throwing switches, affording flagging protection, etc., and will necessarily mul- tiply the opportunity for casualties suffered while employees are getting on and off cars and locomotives. This type of accident, as I have said, is much more important than shock accidents, or those resulting from misunderstood hand signals and other accidents which have been emphasized by proponents of this bill. Of course, collisions are serious accidents, when they take place, and this bill would increase the opportunity for collisions not merely in the ratio of the number of trains but, on a single-track line, in the ratio of the square of the number of trains, because the number of meets and passes do not increase in proportion to the number of trains, but much more rapidly than the number of trains increase. Mr. WrrnRow. Mr. Fort, then your argument is that the oftener you have to stop, the more danger there is in men being hurt getting on and off trains; is that it? TRAIN LENGTHS 415 Mr. FORT. That is true; yes, sir. Mr. WlTHRow. Well, how do you figure that it will be necessary to stop more times if they should rin the shorter trains? Mr. FORT. Because there would be more meets between trains and more passes and it would be necessary for more trains to take sidings and stop. Mr. WTHow. But you are assuming that almost all of the rail- road tracks are single tracks. Mr. FORT. Well, 85 percent of it is. Mr. WITHOW. In regard to the main line. Mr. FORT. Eighty-five percent of the railroad mileage. Mr. WITHRow. That figure takes in branch lines and you do not have any 70-car trains there anway. Mr. FORT. I do not know the exact percentage of single-track main line Mr. Withrow, but a very large percent of main line is single track. Mr. WITHROW. You are taking into consideration the mileage in that proportion, the branch lines? Mr. FORT. Yes, sir, I am, in the 85-percent figure. Mr. WITuRow. And they do not run 70-car trains on the branch lines now, except on very few of them. Mr. FORT. That is correct. Mr. WnrnRow. So in order to get a true picture to the committee, it is necessary for you to break it down and tell us just exactly how many miles of main lines are double tracked and how many single tracked. Mr. FORT. I now have the information you requested; 78 percent of main line is single track. Mr. WruRow. On double track, I think it would be a distinct ad- vantage to run the shorter trains, because you would not have to stop as often, because you have the flexibility of movement. Mr. FORT. On the matter of flexibility, we have some operating men who will talk to you about that. A good deal has been said here about the danger to a train on double track as a result of the possibility of fouling a train coming in the opposite direction or being fouled by such a train. Now, if a train is derailed on a double track railroad from what- ever cause there is an opportunity to foul an adjoining track and an opportunity for a train on the adjoining track to strike the train which has become derailed. There must be, however, the coincidence of a derailment a'nd a train coming in the other direction at that time. Perhaps, the principal cause for derailments is a failure in equip- ment, but they are also caused by defects in track, obstructions on track, etc. The buckling of trains is a relatively unimportant cause of foul- ing adjoininog tracks as compared with derailments generally. There were, I thin, in 1936, eleven cases where there were injuries by reason of a train fouling another train on an adjoining track, but in only two of those cases was there any so-called buckling of a long train. As train meets are greatly increased by increasing the number of trains run, there is a corresponding increase in the opportunity of one train fouling another on an adjoining track. Accidents of that kind would, clear y, be increased by running additional trains. 416 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. Farquharson brought before the committee six witnesses. Naturally as an advocate and proponent of the bill, he would bring witnesses who he thought would help his cause. Yet of his six witnesses, only three had been injured in what could properly be called slack surge actions. If you recall, in one case, the train ran into a rock slide. If a train runs into a rock slide, it makes no difference whether there is oie car or a hundred. Whether you have any slack or not, there is a sudden stop and shock, whether the train has one care or a hundred. Mr. WITHROW. Do you mean to say that the jolt would not be any more serious with one than a hundred? Mr. FORT. When you run into a rock slide ? I think it would be exactly the same whether there is 1 or 100, because in any event the train and caboose would stop at once. Mr. WITHROW. Of course, you have never operated a train and you really cannot appreciate the assumption that you are making. Mr. FORT. Mr. Withrow, if a moving body like a train runs into a rock slide, it stops suddenly. It will not stop any more suddenly whether it has 1, or 30, or 50 cars. Mr. BuLwiKLE. If that moving object is absolutely solid, I will grant that, but where there is slack between several portions of the moving object it would make a difference. Mr. WJTHROW. Mr. Fort. Mr. FORT. Could any of the cars in such a train stop any quicker than the engine? Mr. WITHROw. Just a moment. I think that we can develop that. Here you have your object in front of the engine and you run into it. Mr. FORT. Yes. Mr. WITHROW. If you have, we will say, a foot of slack to each car. Mr. FORT. Yes. Mr. WITHRow. As there is just about that, from 10 to 12 inches; when the train is moving that slack is stretched out. When the engine stops in going up against this object, if you have 70 cars, you have 70 feet of slack, we will say, just for the sake of argument, or if you have 125 cars you have 125 feet of slack. Now, in other words, when you strike that object which is sta- tionary, you have 100 feet or more of slack, and you go up against it, running possibly one and one-half times the length of this building, and do you mean to say that it is impossible to get more shock from that? Mr. FORT. Mr. Withrow, I believe you misunderstand this question. Mr. WITHRow. No; I think you do. Mr. FORT. I intended to say you misunderstand what I am trying to say. Suppose you have a car, one car, that runs into a brick wall. Now, when it runs into the brick wall it stops right there. Nothing could stop more suddenly than that car is going to stop. If instead of 1 car you have 70 or 100 and the first one runs into a brick wall and the others run up as the result of the slack which is, as voi know, partially controlled by its friction control, the only res"lt of the slack is that it reduces, to some extent, the snddenness of11 - st onof the last car, and that car does not stop as suddenly as the first car. Mr. WITHRow. That just is not the way it works out -in the road And, if you.had operated a train you would know that. TRAIN LENGTHS 417 Mr. FORT. Well, I can't believe you are right. Have you ever run into a rockslide ? Mr. WITHROW. No; but I have stopped suddenly and been hurt three or four times. Mr. FORT. Our experience about rock slides then just about bal- ances. Mr. HALLECK. By the way, Mr. Fort, somewhere along I know that it has been suggested to me that you ought to get on the back end of the train to be safer, because some of the front cars will take up some of the shock if you do have a collision. Mr. FORT. That slack is partially controlled by friction draft gears, as you know. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Fort, I just thought of what an expert automo- bile driver said the other day about high-speed driving on the high- ways. I got quite a kick out of it. He said if anything happens above 50, why, it does not make much difference how much above 50 it was. Mr. FORT. I think that is correct. Mr. MARTIN. I suspect you think, then, if a thing stops dead, why, it does not make much difference how dead it stops. Mr. FORT. It is like the old statement that when a thing is full it can contain no more. Mr. WITHROW. Of course, the train did not stop immediately when it hit these rocks. It continued on a ways. It did not stop imme- dately. It is not possible to stop an object of that heft so quickly. Mr. FORT. I think it stopped rather suddenly. Mr. WITHROw. What did it do; did it derail? Mr. FORT. All I know was what the witness said. Mr. WITHROw. I was not here when he testified. I am sorry. Mr. FORT. As I understood it, the train ran into a rock slide and stopped without any hesitation. Another witness that Mr. Farquharson produced was hurt when a pusher engine ran through a train from the back. Now, of course, whether a train is long or short, if the first part of the train stops and the pusher engine does not stop, there will be an accident. Mr. WITHROW. Of course, if you did not need a pusher engine you would not have one. Probably you would not need one if shorter trains were operated. Mr. FORT. I do not think that follows; but at any rate, there was no slack involved in that accident, and one of the six witnesses had not been hurt at all. . So much for the safety, which will be covered very much more fully by following witnesses. On the cost feature, I will not take your time. Dr. Parmelee will cover that. I will merely say that, according to our estimate, the bill would result in an increase of $100,000,000 a year, approxi- maely, in out-of-pocket operating expenses. In addition to that, there would be the immediate need, in order to bring the service up as nearly as possible to what it is now-and it cannot be brought back to where it is-there would be an immediate need for an ex- penditure of close to half a billion dollars for the purchase of new equipment, the rearrangement of facilities, and so forth. It is not necessary for me to ask this committee where the railroads would get that money. This committee knows as well as anyone the 418 TRAIN LENGTHS financial condition of the railroads today. Whether they would get the money by increased rates or whether they would get it by re- duced wages, or how they would get it, is a question. On the question of service, we shall have several witnesses who are entirely familiar with actual operating conditions. In the re- port of the Senate committee it was said, in effect, that since there would be more trains there would be better service. That, I think reflects a complete misunderstanding of railroad operations, but I will not undertake, in view of the time I have already consumed, to speak on that point. Other witnesses will cover it. They will talk, among other things, about the fruit movement and the effect of train limitation on that movement; about the effect on the movement of wheat from the Middle West; on the movement of coal; on the effect the bill would have on terminal operations in great terminals like Chicago; and on the effect to be anticipated with respect to rail service to and from New York. This committee should not forget: in case of an emergensy in- volving national defense, when the need for the railroads is always very great and when there is a peak movement of both passengers and freight, there would be no way to reestablish the conditions which would have existed in the absence of a bill of this kind. This could not be accomplished by repealing the law, because the railroads would have become accommodated to short-train operation. They would have power for short-train operation. They would have sid- ings for short-train operation. They would have round houses for small power. You could not repeal this law and thereby reinstate conditions which would have existed if it had not been passed. If you should pass this bill, you would be cutting the carrying capacity of the railroads definitely and once and for all. The CHAIRMAN. Would that not depend a great deal on the length of time before repeal occurred? Mr. FORT. Yes. I mean if the law had been in effect for a number of years and the physical facilities had been accommodated to the law, then you could not enlarge the carrying capacity of the rail- roads when you needed to merely by repealing the law. Mr. WITHROW. Mr. Fort, I wonder if I might ask you a few questions? Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHRow. In your testimony you said that 42.5 percent of the tonnage was hauled on trains of over 70 cars. Mr. FORT. That was true in 1936. Mr. WITUOW. In 1936? Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHROW. You do not have the figures available on 1937? Mr. FORT. No. You get figures like that, Mr. Withrow, only as the result of special studies. Mr. WITHROW. You have the figures for 1936. Mr. FORT. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHROW. I have the figures for 1936 and I wonder if we could sort of compare them. Mr. FoRT. I will be glad to. Where did you get your figures, Mr. Withrow? Mr. WITHROW. From the Interstate Commerce Commission. Mr. FORT. There are not any figures of the kind kept by the TRAIN LENGTHS 419 Interstate Commerce Commission, so far as I know. We had to make a special study to get it. Mr. WITHROw. I have this, there were total cars originated in the United States 25,950,951 and that 8,066,658 were hauled in trains of over 70 cars, which would make 31 percent. Mr. FORT. I do not think that the Commission has any figures which would throw any light on the traffic carried in trains of more than 70 cars. I am quite sure it does not. Mr. WITHROW. I will check on that, however. Mr. FORT. We have our figures. Mr. WITHRow. Yes. Of course there is this, in that connection, that it is pretty hard to draw any comparison because a great deal of the heavy freight would be hauled in the longer trains. Mr. FORT. Yes. Mr. WITHRoW. And the perishable freight there would be an in- clination to put that in, especially the less than car load lots, in fast freights, which are shorter. Mr. FORT. Perishable freight moves in long trains, Mr. Withrow. Mr. WITHROw. Yesterday when you were testifying I asked you questions relative to automatic couplers and air brakes and you took the position that the railroad companies had voluntarily installed automatic couplers and air brakes. Mr. FORT. To a very large extent. Mr. WITHROW. Yes. I just want to refer you and the Committee to the report of the Coordinator of Railroads, Senate Document 119, page 169. It reads as follows: There is plenty of evidence that the railroads cannot be depended upon to deal voluntarily and without Government intervention with safety matters. Many of them could be depended upon, but by no means all, and the low standards maintained by the more irresponsible would vitiate the good intentions of the majority. The history of the air brake, automatic train couplers, and other safety devices is proof of this fact. Mr. FORT. I never saw that statement before. Mr. MARTIN. Whose statement is that? Mr. Wrrmow. That is the statement of the Coordinator in his report to the Seventy-third Congress, second session. It is Senate Document No. 119. Mr. HALLEcK. That refers to the fact that a majority did in fact, or have in fact, adopted safety devices, but the so-called irresponsible fringe had not. Mr. WrmiRow. It does not say "irresponsible fringe." It said probably the majority could be depended upon, but there were those who could not and in order to have compliance we must either have legislation or authority vested in some commission to take care of it. Mr. FORT. The Coordinator, as you recall, had a statutory obliga- tion to report to Congress and make recommendations to Congress. He was in office 4 years? Mr. WITHRow. Yes. Mr. FORT. He never recommended legislation of this character, as you know, so that if any conclusions are to be drawn from the statement you read Mr. WrrHRow. Well, this is not in regard to any particular legis- lation. This seems to apply generally to most all safety legislation. Mr. FORT. I understand that. 420 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. WrrHRoW. It is a condemnation of the policy of permitting the railroads to do as they pleased relative to safety. Mr. FoRT. I understand that, but I do not believe the Coordinator would say that the railroads have not been very diligent about safety matters and have not, as Mr. Corbett stated here, made prob- ably greater advances than any other industry with respect to safety. Mr. WITHROw. Well, apparently, the Coordinator does not agree with you on the advances that the railroad companies have volun- tarily made relative to automatic couplers and air brakes. That is the particular point that I wanted to make. Mr. FORT. I would like to read the report entirely through, to- gether with other reports, before I accept that conclusion. Mr. WITHROW. That is proper. It is found on page 169. Mr. FORT. Mr. Withrow, I made the statement that 44 percent of the traffic moved in trains of over 70 cars in 1936. I was not exactly correct in that. It is 42 percent. In conclusion: You will recall that Mr. Corbett said that in 1897 trains were very short and now they are very long; but that an engineer gets less money today per ton-mile or per unit of traffic than he did in 1897. Mr. Corbett was misinformed about that. The statistics of the Commission show that in 1897 an engineer received 31 cents per thousand traffic units. A passener mile is three train units and a ton-mile is one train unit. In 1897 the engineer received 31 cents and he now receives 35 cents per 1,000 traffic units. ' Mr. WITEow. By ton-mile, you mean cargo? Mr. FoRT. I mean net ton-miles. Mr. WITHROW. Net ton-car-miles? That is, the cargo? Mr. FoRT. That is right. Mr. WiTuRow. Freight in the car. Mr. Fo1T. That is what the railroad gets paid for carrying. Mr. WITHROw. Of course, that computation does not take into consideration-in other words, if you follow that out to its ultimate conclusion, you do not pay the train and engine crew anything for pulling a car if it is empty. Mr. FORT. No. That does not follow. Mr. WITHROW. Yes. Then, you do not take into consideration either in that computation the increased tonnage in the equipment over this period of years. In other words, refrigerator cars are heavier now than they were then, which adds considerable tonnage to trains. Mr. FORT. I think we are losing sight of the point. Mr. Corbett indicated that by reason of this increase in the tonnage hauled an engineer now receives less per unit of work in the sense of work accomplished for the railroads than he did in 1897. The fact is that he receives more and when net ton-miles or traffic units are used as a basis, you have about as good a basis for that comparison as you could find. Thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Fort. TRAIN LENGTHS 421 STATEMENT OF HENLEY C. BOOTH, GENERAL ATTORNEY OF THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO., SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. Mr. BooH. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: My name is Henley C. Booth. I am a general attorney of the Southern Pacific Co., with my office and headquarters at 65 Market Street, San Francisco. I have been a member of the law department of that company for 27 years. At the request of the Association of American Railroads, I appear to make a statement as to litigation in the Fed- eral courts in several States on the subject of limiting the length of railroad trains. First, I desire to give you a brief outline of my experience in that litigation. Although the employee organizations here represented have made many attempts in many State legislatures to secure a limitation of the length of freight trains, such a law has been passed and approved in but four States-Arizona, Nevada, Louisiana, and Oklahoma. Arizona was the first State to limit the number of cars in a rail- road train. The Arizona law took effect in 1912 and limited freight trains to 70 cars, exclusive of caboose, and passenger trains to 14 cars. It was passed by the legislature and then, with several other acts, was submitted to referendum and approved at an election in 1912. Therefore the State legislature has no power to repeal or amend it. It is being observed today. As to that I shall later ex- plain. The Nevada law was approved in March 1935 and limited all trains to 70 cars, exclusive of caboose. It has never been enforced because of proceedings in the United States District Court for Nevada which I shall briefly describe. The Louisiana law was passed in June 1936 and limited passenger trains to 16 cars, and freight trains to 70 cars, exclusive of caboose, "except to permit such trains to pick up cars carrying perishable goods or livestock." As the result of proceedings in the United States District Court of New Orleans, which proceedings I shall also describe, that law has never been enforced. The Oklahoma law was passed at the session of 1937, and its en- forcement has been held up by suits in the United States District Court for the.Western District of Oklahoma, to which I shall later, but very briefly, refer. For the Southern Pacific Co. I had immediate charge of one of the Arizona Train Limit cases, that in which that company was plaintiff, from the beginning to the end of the case in association with Messrs. Baker & Whitney, our counsel for Arizona. I likewise had immediate charge of the Nevada Train Limit case in associa- tion throughout the trial with Mr. Burton Mason, our commerce attorney, who may appear before you later. There were nine suits filed in the United States District Court at New Orleans by the nine railroads affected by the train-limit law. Those suits I will later describe. At this time I merely wish to say that I was employed by the Louisiana Railroad Association as counsel in all of the nine cases, cooperated closely with Louisiana railroad counsel in the preparation of the comnlaints and supporting affidavits, and presented to the three-judge Federal court the nine 422 TRAIN LENGTHS applications for interlocutory injunctions, all of which were granted early in December 1936. So much merely as a background for what I shall have to say. On the first day of this hearing, your clerk distributed among you printed copies of the Senate subcommittee hearings in June 1935 to which frequent reference has been made. I made a statement to the Senate subcommittee at that hearing. It begins at page 148 of that print and I respectfully ask that you consider that statement in con- nection with this. THE ARIZONA TRAIN LIMIT CASES When that law was adopted in the year 1912, as now, the two prin- cipal railroads of Arizona crossed that State from west to east; the Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railway crossing the north central part and the Southern Pacific the south central part. In 1912 the operation in or across Arizona of freight trains con- taining more than 70 cars was rare, infrequent, and difficult, and not a standard practice on either the Santa Fe or the Southern Pacific. Their fixed plant-and particularly their sidings and passing tracks-as well as their locomotives, were not adapted to the standard long-train operation which afterward became universal on their lines-except, because of the law of 1912, in Arizona. I personally know the circumstances under which the Arizona law was adopted because I attended committee meetings at that session of the legislature as an attorney for Southern Pacific Co., going there from San Francisco for that purpose. While the limit fixed by the Arizona Act of 1912 was 14 passenger cars and 70 freight cars, it is true that at that time.and as a matter of practical railroad operation, the sidings or passing tracks on the single track main line of the Southern Pacific in Arizona did not per- mit operation as a standard practice of trains longer than 70 cars. The same was generally true of passing tracks on the Santa Fe in that State. It would have been difficult if not impossible for either rail- road to have shown substantial damage by the law. So the Arizona law preserved to the Arizona railroads all the freight train operations of which their plant was at that time practically capable. Since I prepared this statement I have received from San Francisco a resum6 of Working Time Table No. 71 of the Southern Pacific Co., Tucson Division, of December 22, 1912. A working time table is a booklet, usually about 8 by 14 inches, which is issued exclusively for the use of the employees who are con- nected with the movement of trains and is changed from time to time as the regular train schedules of that division are changed. Those schedules are printed. Any operating rules that apply only or particularly to that division are printed therein; also the length of sidings on the division so that the engineer and conductor may know whether a given siding has a sufficient length and clearance to hold a particular train. At that time a 3,200 foot siding within clearance, that is, long enough so that the engine would not foul or be too near the main track, was considered a 70 car freight train siding and at the time this legislation was passed, early in 1912, the Southern Pacific was completing a siding extension program in Arizona designed to facili- TRAIN LENGTRS 423 tate the operation of trains up to 70 cars by means of these 3,200 foot sidings. This is not a matter of my recollecting things 25 years back. I have checked this statement I am making and my recollection is verified by that recent check. There were 80 sidings on the 394 single track main line in Arizona which was then our only main line in Arizona, the Phoenix line and the South line not then having been acquired. There were 80 sidings between Yuma and Cavot, Ariz., which is on the New Mexico State line. Forty-two of those were 3,200 feet long. Fifteen of them were under 3,200 feet and about 23 of them were over 3,200 feet. So that as a practical proposition operation on that single-track line of trains of over 70 cars was impracticable with those siding installa- tions. And that is why I say that the Arizona law preserved to the rail- roads all of the freight-train operation of which their plants were at that time practically capable. In other words, it froze our freight- train operation to the then existing capacity of the plant; but it did not, as this bill attempts to do, turn back the clock 15 years and put us on a basis of operation in Arizona that we were working under 15 years before 1912, for which I suppose we should be duly grateful. No serious attempt was made to show by statistics or expert testi- mony that freight trains over 70 cars or passenger trains over 14 cars were unsafe. The measure was frankly advocated by railway train- and engine-service employees as one to prevent decrease of employment by the future running of trains in excess of the prohib- ited lengths, and the consequent running of fewer trains. The length of the sidetracks and passing tracks of Arizona rail- roads in 1912 is what has given rise to the 70-car limit that has been used in most attempted legislation, including that in Nevada, Louisi- ana, and Oklahoma. From any conceivable safety standpoint that limit-70 cars and no more-is purely arbitrary; it is unrelated to any established mechanical, statistical, or operating facts. I am not testifying before you as an expert on mechanical, statistical, or oper- ating facts. I shall demonstrate that point by the findings of the courts to which I shall presently refer. The length of passing tracks in Arizona in 1912, in other words, has furnished .the measurement for the proposed straight jacket on American commerce. And if with the kind of equipment then in use, 70 cars was a reasonably safe limit in Arizona in 1912, and a limit is needed today--which we strongly deny-what should a modern limit be with the tremendous improvement in railroad plant, motive power, and equipment that has taken place since 1912? Let me read, if you please, a passage from the findings of the three- judge court in the Arizona train-limit case which deals with this very question. The locomotive and cars now used on plaintiffs' main lines in Arizona and else- where since 1912, have been greatly improved and made stronger and better able to withstand service conditions. Locomotives have heavier frames and running gears, improved and strengthened brake equipment ; draft gears and attachments ; and air pumps of increased capacity. The boilers also have been much improved and many locomotives are equipped with feed water heaters, super-heaters, and other modern devices. Engine failures have been greatly reduced-on the Santa Fe, 90 percent-despite the fact the engines now run for much greater distances Without overhauling than they did in 1912. 424 TRAIN LENGTHS Of the passenger cars used in 1912, a large percentage-about 70 percent on the Santa Fe-had wooden underframes. Now, structural steel and cast steel has almost fully replaced the woodin passenger-car construction. That was the point brought out by Mr. Wolverton's question yesterday, I believe. In 1912 about 30 percent of the Santa Fe, and about 40 percent of the Southern Pacific freight cars had wooden underframes; but such cars have been with- drawn from main line and interchange service; modern draft gears have more than double the shock-absorbing capacity of the old type ; in 1926 the manu- facturer of the old type of freight-car wheels-which were subject to being cracked by the heat caused by brake applications-was abandoned, and because the average service life of freight-car wheels is from 6 to 7 years, soon all cars will be equipped with the present standard single-plate cast-iron wheels which can withstand any heat produced by the brakes, thus eliminating breakage through overheating ; since 1924 a new type of graduating spring has been placed in the air brake triple valves on freight cars, thus practically eliminating unintended-referred to by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the wit- nesses as "undesired"-emergency-brake applications; and train break-in-twos, formerly largely caused by the air brakes on individual cars applying with much greater force than on other cars, have been reduced from 70 to 80 per- cent, the ratio in 1929 en the Southern Pacific being only 1.19 train break-in- twos per million car-miles. And then it goes on to tell about the double tracking and the amount of money spent since on these lines in Arizona. And yet, apparently, it was considered by the proponents of the bill at that time that a 70-car limitation was a fair and just limitation, and I can say, remembering the political history of that period, that if they had really wanted any less limitation there is not any doubt in my mind but what the Arizona legislation of 1912 would have given it to them. Mr. MARTIN. Might I ask a question there? Mr. Boon. Yes, Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. You have mentioned four States now as having passed the train limit law; that is, Arizona, Nevada, Louisiana, and Okla- homa. Mr. BooTr. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. Do you know in how many more States the State legislatures have considered such legislation? For instance, I be- lieve California passed one-the California Legislature passed an act, which was vetoed by the Governor. Mr. BOOTH. The California legislature passed an act in 1935 which was vetoed by Governor Merriam, and you will find in my statement in the proceedings of 1935 before the Senate committee to which I referred awhile ago a list of the protestants against that bill which included practically every agricultural and shipping industry in the State of California. Mr. MARTIN. Do you know how many more States, and if you do know them could a list of them be put in the record, in which the legislation has been passed or attempted to be passed, as to train-limit laws? Mr. BOOTH. That information is either here in the library of the Association of American Railroads or in a similar library in Chicago. I will see that that information is furnished to the committee, and particularly to you, if you do not happen to be present that day. Mr. MARTIN. I think it would also throw a little light on the situa- tion if the year in which this legislation was first attempted in these States. TRAIN LENGTHS 425 Mr. BOOTH. I think the first attempt after Nevada was in Virginia, in 1913. I think that Mr. Doak, who was afterward Secretary of Labor, as the sponsor for that legislation, but I will that the infor- mation is furnished. Mr. MARTIN. The significance, I might say, frankly, of such testi- mony, would be that it seems to indicate that there has been a growing recognition of the issue presented by very long trains. Mr. BOOTH. I think the persistent activity of the gentlemen who have these bills introduced accounts for it. Mr. MARTIN. Now, in that connection, I might say, roughly, that the testimony is that it is somewhere around 25 since the long trains began to come into the picture as an issue. A rule has been put into evidence, a railroad rule, operating rule, requiring men riding in the way cars to very rigidly brace themselves, a thing which I think is impossible in connection with certain other duties, in order to safeguard themselves against possible injury due to slack action. It seems that that rule was adopted around about 25 years ago. The adoption of such a rule I would consider as a recognition on the part of the companies themselves of the extra hazard or danger from slack action. It has also been testified that operating officials refuse to ride in the way car and choose the cab, and even conductors or employees who have sufficient seniority to escape that service on the rear of the trains do.so. I would consider all of those developments as a recognition of the (Linger of the very long trains, separate and apart from any legis- lative efforts to put a period to the length of the train. It looks like the attempted legislation was simply the result, rather than the cause, of the situation we are confronted with here today on this bill. Mr. BoOTH. Well, those points you make were all brought to the attention of the courts in these cases, very strongly insisted upon in argument, and presumably given the weight to which they were entitled. Mr. WITRow. You mentioned the fact that the farm organizations had opposed the legislation in California, I believe. Mr. BOOTH. Yes. You will find a list of the opponents to the legis- lation printed in connection with my testimony that I gave in 1935 before the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate Com- merce of which Senator Lonergan was chairman. Mr. WITHROw. Their opposition was based upon the assumed addi- tional freight costs. They did not pass upon the question of whether or not it would be safer. They were fearful that freight rates would be increased? Mr. BOOTH. And they could not market their products as easily and profitably; they could not get the service, in other words. Mr. WITHROW. You said that probably this was due to the per- sIstence of the individuals who had introduced the legislation. Mr. BooH. I am not criticizing theirs any more than they should criticize mine. Mr. WITHRow. No; of course not. But, that is rather unfair, do you not think? 426 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. BooTH. No. I think it is perfectly natural for a man to serve the organization which employs him. If I ever get to the point where I cannot serve mine, I will step out. I will probably be asked to step out. Mr. WITHROW. I think that that probably can be likened to a cir- cumstance, or something that happened in the State of Wisconsin at the time that it was proposed that the lesislature should comel the railroad companies to provide an additional man on their light- engine movements; light engines should be manned by a fireman, an engineer, and a conductor. The same arguments were used, that it would increase the cost; that it would not do any good-just be hiring another man to be riding about-and that argument had a very fine appeal to the public. I believe it was. in 1929 or 1930, however, that that was made a part of the law of the State of Wisconsin. Prior to that time there had been many, numerous, incidents where they had had accidents involving light-engine movements, where they did not have a pilot or conductor on the engine, and since the statute has been enacted there has not been, to my knowledge, one accident in the State of Wisconsin involving a light-engine movement. So, a lot of times, some of the things that seem so ridiculous to the public are not so ridiculous after all. The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Booth. Mr. BOOTH. It was not until well after the beginning of the gen- eral improvement program of 1923 which has been referred to by Mr. Fort and in which the Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific partici- pated, that the Arizona law became particularly burdensome to the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific and even then they bore the burden without taking any steps to be relieved from it until 1929, when each of them filed a bill in equity in the United States District Court for Arizona asking that the court restrain the then attorney general, Mr. K. Berry Peterson, from enforcing the law. There has been misunderstanding in some quarters as to the grounds upon which we attacked the Arizona law. They were, briefly stated- First, that it involved a field of regulation in which if regulation was necessary Congress had the sole regulatory power under the commerce clause. Second, that it violated the rights of each railroad under the due- process clause of the fourteenth amendment by being unreasonable and arbitrary and bearing no reasonable relation to the safety of persons or property. Third, that the law unduly and unreasonably regulated, burdened, and directly interfered with interstate commerce, and, furthermore, that it necessarily operated extraterritorially. There were other and secondary objections, all of which, together with those I have briefly outlined, you will find listed and discussed in the final opinion of the three-judge Federal court in these cases, dated March 8, 1933, and reported as Atchison, et cetera, RaiwaY Co. v. LaPrade and Southern Pacific Co. v. LaPrade (2 Fed. SupP- 855). On the filing of these bills of complaint the United States district judge for Arizona, Hon. F. C. Jacobs, as required by section 266, Judicial Code, called to his assistance Hon. Curtis D. Wilbur, senior TRAIN LENGTHS 427 United States circuit judge for the ninth circuit and Hon. A. F. St. Sure, United States district judge for the northern district of Cali- fornia. The two cases were consolidated and Mr. Joseph E. Morrison, for- mer United States attorney for the district of Arizona, was appointed as special master under the equity rules. The railway brotherhoods actively participated in the hearings before the master and in the subsequent proceedings. They specially employed Mr. Donald R. Richberg, who was in the cases from their beginning to their end, in- cluding the hearings before the master. The hearings took 52 days of the master's time, nearly 10,000 typed pages of testimony being taken, and a great many graphic and statistical exhibits filed. Cross- examination was freely indulged in and the case was not hurriedly tried. I sat through those hearings and I know that considerably more than half of the testimony was devoted to the issue of whether the law was, as claimed by the defense, a necessary and desirable safety regulation or whether, as we claimed, it was an impairment of the safety of operation. All of the points proponents have used here were presented there. The master filed a voluminous report sustaining the railroads on all the grounds they urged. After the filing of the master's report and on January 3, 1933, Mr. Peterson, the original defendant, was succeeded as attorney general of Arizona by Mr. Arthur T. LaPrade. We thereupon moved to substitute Mr. LaPrade. The motion was granted over Mr. LaPrade's objection and the three-judge Federal court proceeded to make spe- cial findings, stating therein that it did so- from a nexamination of all of the evidence but without treating the master's report as presumptively correct, and entirely independent of said master's re- port. Accompanying those findings it filed its opinion, reported in 2 Federal Supplement, page 855, to which I have referred, and which sustained our claims of invalidity on all the grounds we argued. Those were the first findings by any court on the subject of the relative hazards of short-train and long-train operation in the hand- ling of the freight traffic the railroad must receive, carry, and dehiver. The new Arizona attorney general was not satisfied to remain substituted as a defendant in the case. He had formally objected to substitution, and declined to say whether he would enforce the law. When the district court granted substitution, he applied to the United States Supreme Court for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus to direct the three-judge court to dismiss the case. The sole grounds of his petition were that the suit was against his predecessor as an individual, that he, the petitioner, had not threatened to enforce the train-limit law, that the suit abated on the- original defendant's retirement from office, and that there could be no substitution or revival except under specific statutory authority, which was lacking. Nowhere in that petition or in the briefs or in the oral arguments before the court, in which I participated, was the correctness of the three-judge court's findings on the merits subjected to challenge. Nor did the Supreme Court in its opinion, which closed with a direc- 428 TRAIN LENGTHS tion to the three-judge court to dismiss the case, even intimate that the merits of the case were involved in the mandamus proceeding. You will find the Supreme Court's opinion reported as Ex Parte LaPrade (May 22, 1933, 289 U. S. 444; 77 L. Ed. 1311). The cases were dismissed by the three-judge court following the decision of the Supreme Court and in obedience to its mandate. They were not, as Mr. Fort inadvertently stated last Friday, sent back for further hearing. That is entirely plain from the Supreme Court's opinion, to which I have referred you. The testimony was not before the Court. .We are still obeying that law, and our failure to bring new suits can, I think, be satisfactorily explained. Mr. MARTIN. May I ask a question there? Mr. BOpTH. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. Was that not a rather novel situation in attempting to test the constitutionality of a law, to have proceedings brought against an individual so that the death or resignation, or removal from office of that individual might cause the suit to abate? Mr. BOOTH. No, it was not. It was not novel at all. This it what the United States Supreme Court decided. The injunctions sought are not aimed at the State or the office of attorney general or to restrain exertion of any authority that belongs to either. Each complaint charges that, because of a void enactment and the purpose of defend- ant under color of his office to enforce it by means of suits which it purports to authorize, plaintiff is prevented from operating trains that are of suitable size and necessary for the proper conduct of the transportation business, and so continuously suffers great and irreparable injury. The suits were brought against defendant, not as a representative of the State but to restrain him individually from, as it is alleged, wrongfully subjecting plaintiff to such unauthorized prosecution. And then it cites the famous Minnesota rate case, Ex Parte Young, (209 U. S. 123) in which the same procedure was adopted. The difficulty in all these cases is the eleventh amendment, pro- viding that suit shall not be brought against a State without its consent; unless you can find a statute under which there is continuing authority to sue the officer as distinguished from the individual, you have got to go into equity against the individual. Mr. MARTIN. Well, are all of the suits to test individual State laws brought in the same manner as that case was? Mr. BoOTH. In some cases it is possible to sue boards or commis- sions where there is a lap-over in office and a continuing authority, and where the change in personnel of the commission does not make any difference. But ordinarily where a suit is brought against an attorney general, or an individual who occupies that office, you must bring it against him personally, unless the State consents that it be brought against him as a representative of the State. Does that answer your question? Mr. MARTIN. It does, but it strikes me that it would be the duty, no matter what the State law was, it would be the duty of the Attor- ney general to enforce it and the action ought to be against the act of enforcement :rather than just agvinst the State officer as an individual, whose death, retirement, or removal from office would cause the suit to lapse. TRAIN LENGTHS 429 Mr. BooTH. On last Friday several of your members and par- ticularly Mr. Boren questioned Mr. Fort as to why the railroads had taken no further steps to challenge the Arizona law. I can speak only for the Southern Pacific Co., although I under- stand that the situation of the Santa Fe is and has been relatively the same as ours. There are several reasons why the Southern Pacific Railway Co.. has not renewed its efforts to be relieved from the Arizona law. The first is that Arizona has not given its consent to be sued as a State, or by a suit against its officers, as such officers, that would amount to a suit against the State, in any form of proceeding that would test that law without hazarding the penalties prescribed by the law. The second is that the Supreme Court opinion in 289 U. S. 444,, to which I have referred you, makes it plain that a suit against -the attorney general as an individual who in his official capacity has. the right and authority to enforce the law is violated, must be based on allegation and proof that he threatens to and intends to enforce the law if violated. Without that allegation there can be no equitable relief. Mr. La Prade, the attorney general who succeeded the original' defendant in the Arizona. cases, was formally asked by both rail- roads after the Supreme Court opinion was handed down whether it was his intention to enforce the law and whether he would prose- cute if the law was violated. He replied that he had not made up his mind as to the constitu- tionality of the law, but that he intended to examine the voluminous record to which I have referred and to devote such time thereto as would be consistent with the other duties of his office, and might give us an answer later-an answer which he never gave. That request was made on him in May 1933, a few days after the Su- preme Court opinion was filed. The term for which he was elected expired on January 1, 1935. Mr. MARTIN. Will you pardon me there? Mr. BooTH. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. The history of the Arizona case would seem to indi- cate that it might be within the power of the States to prevent the questioning of the constitutionality of any State law. It looks to me as though what happened down there would open limitless possi- bilities by which a State could just permanently prevent that ques- tion from being tried out. Mr. BOOTH. Well, I hope that I remain in the practice long enough to read an opinion by the Supreme Court reversing itself in the Arizona case; but until it does so, I am afraid plaintiffs in cases of that kind are subject to being stymied as we were in the Arizona case. It soon became obvious that even if the attorney general threatened to enforce the law we could not hope to get an injunction suit to trial and to find decree against him before his term of office exired; and if he was not reelected, anything short of a final judgment against him would be ineffective. As a matter of fact, he was not reelected, and even if he had threatened us, and we had sued him,, we would have found ourselves at the expiration of his term of 47891--38-28 430 TRAIN LENGTHS office in exactly the same position we were in when he succeeded Mr. Peterson. The reluctance of Attorney General La Prade to give us a day in court or his pre-occupation with other official duties lasted throughout his single term of office, which expired with the year 1934. His successor as attorney general of Arizona, Mr. John Sullivan, held office during 1935 and 1936. We were unable to get from himn during those 2 years a declaration of his intention to enforce or not to enforce the 70-car law if we violated it. Similarly, although we endeavored to secure such a declaration from Mr. Joe Conway who succeeded Mr. Sullivan as attorney gen- eral of Arizona, and who now holds that office and has held it since the first Monday in January 1937, Mr. Conway has not seen fit to declare his intention with regard to enforecement. I believe that none of the lawyers among you can read the opinion of the Supreme Court in 289 United States 244 to which I have referred and fail to come to the conclusion that in the absence of an Arizona State statute giving us the right to sue the attorney general, or some other official, or the State itself, to enjoin the enforcement of this law or otherwise test it, we can maintain no injunction suit as a binding test of that law. To put it in legal phraseology, no matter how persuasive the Nevada decision may be, it is not res judicata as to the validity of the Arizona law. Mr. MARTIN. Will you pardon me there again? Mr. BOOTH. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. It occurs to me, of course, there is a way in which you could get at this thing, by following the rule that I follow about smoking; smoke everywhere until they tell me to stop. Mr. BOOTH. I am coming to that. Mr. MARTIN. You could try it out down there. You would not need to get up against a million dollars worth of fines, but you could just start in to running these long trains and see what would happen and not run too many of them, of course, but just enough to cause the State to act. Mr. BooTi. Well, I am coming to that right now. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Booth, in that connection, have you considered the possibility of a suit under the Declaratory Judgments Act? We have a Federal Declaratory Judgments Act. Mr. BOOTH. Yes, we have considered that; but as I recall, the con- clusion we came to was we could not allege any controversy until the attorney general took a stand opposed to us. There is, I think, a State declaratory law in Arizona; but whether or not there is, under the-Federal law we could go into the Federal courts if we could allege sufficient facts. Mr. WOLvERTON. Does the Arizona law leave it to the discretion of the attorney general as to whether it shall be enforced or not? Mr. BOOTH. That is the effect of the Supreme Court's decision. I will soon read the penalty clause, but the effect of the Supreme Court's decision is this-I am reading from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case, as reported in 289 United States 444. As shown above, the purpose of the suits was to prevent a wrong about to be committed by defendant .acting outside, and in abuse of the powers of his office. The wrongs threatened or committed by him constitute no ground for injunction against petitioner. Plaintiffs did not allege that petitioner threatened or intended to do anything for the enforcement of the statute. The mere declara- TRAIN LENGTHS 431 tion of the statute that suits for recovery of penalties shall be brought by the attorney general is not sufficient. Petitioner might hold, as plaintiffs maintain, that the statute is unconstitutional and that, having regard to his office oath, tae rightly may refrain from effort to enforce it. Mr. WOLVERTON. Is the statement you have just read, the state- ient of the Court? Mr. BooTH. That is the statement of the United States Supreme Col rt. Mr. WOLVERTON. In what case? Mr. BOOTH. In the mandamus proceedings (289 U. S. 444) in which the lower court, three-judge court, in Arzona was directed to dismiss the Arizona train limit case after they had filed their opinion and findings in the case, on the ground that the new attorney general whom we had substituted in the case was not a proper party because it was not alleged that he had made any threats; as a matter of fact we could not allege that, because he had not made any threats. Mr. WOLVERTON. What action had the previous attorney general of Arizona taken that gave you grounds to proceed? Mr. BOOTH. He had stated that he intended to enforce the law. Mr. WOLVERTON. Of course, the State legislature passed the law. Mr. BOOTH. Yes, sir. Mr. WOLVERTON. Did the legislature provide in the law a discre- tionary power in the attorney general as to whether it should be enforced or not? Mr. BOOTH. The Supreme Court held as I have just read. Mr. WOLVERTON. I am asking whether the statute itself provided a discretion. Mr. BOOTH. No; the statute itself left nothing to the discretion of the attorney general. Mr. WOLVERTON. Did it become the duty of the attorney general to enforce the law that had been passed by the State legislature? Mr. BOOTH. That was precisely our argument to the Supreme Court. Mr. WOLVERTON. The Court evidently took the view that there was no relief to be granted until the attorney general had actually taken some step to enforce the statute or at least threatened to do so? Mr. BOOTH. That is it precisely. They went back to the old case of Ex Paste Young (209 U. S. 123), the Minnesota rate case, with which you doubtless are familiar, and applied that to it. In fact, that is the theory upon which we brought these suits. Mr. WrrIROw. Has there been an attempt to repeal the statute in the State of Arizona in these 25 years? Mr. BooTH. It cannot be repealed except by vote of the people on an initiative measure voted upon by them at a general election or an election held for that purpose. Mr. WOLVERTON. Of course, the situation still is possible of deci- sion if you proceeded to ignore the provisions of the statute and proceedings were brought against you for violation of the statute. Then, an opportunity would be provided to test the constitutionality of the law. Mr. BooTH. That has been very seriously considered, and I am coming to that phase of the case immediately. Without launching into a lengthy legal discussion I will say frankly that so far as we have been unable to find any course we can safely follow to make a flew court test of the Arizona law. Our search has not ended. 432 TRAIN LENGTHS The third reason why we have not again tried to bring the Arizona situation to a test is that the penalties for a full-time, long-train operation in Arizona are cumulatively enormous and pro- hibitive and, further, that nothing short of a general disregard of the law would materially reduce operating expense. The present system of operation into and through Arizona would have to be rearranged, heavier locomotives transferred to that territory to handie longer trains, and in short our operations in Arizona would be made over again. But meantime a penalty would be incurred for each train run. The penalty section of the Arizona train-limit law provides, section 647-3, of the Arizona Revised Statutes, Edition of 1928: SCTION 3. Any person, firm, association, company, or corporation, operating any railroad in the State of Arizona, who shall wilfully violate any of the provisions of this act, shall be liable to the State of Arizona for a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars, nor more than one thousand dollars, for each offense; And we construe that to mean an offense is committed when you run a train of over 70 cars, not that one day constitutes an offense, but that each day constitutes an offense, just as a liquor dealer who sells liquor without a license is violating the law every time he sells an individual a drink. It is not violated simply by opening his doors in the morning. [Continuing reading:] and such penalty shall be recovered, and suits therefor brought by the attorney general, or under his direction, in the name of the State of Arizona, in any county through which such may be run or operated: Provided, however, That this act shall not apply in cases of engine failures between terminals. Mr. WOLVERTON. I assume your difficulty is due to the fact that the State authorities are unwilling to cooperate with you in making one case a test case. Mr. BOOTH. Yes, sir. Mr. WOLVERTON. In other words, to have the constitutionality tested, the State authorities could select one violation as a test case or they may not have proceedings brought against your company for the first offense, or the second, third fourth, fifth, and so on, and you might be permitted to go on indefinitely and then finally a proceeding would be brought against the company for the accumu- lated penalties. I understand you consider that would be a risk that you do not care to have your company take and therefore from a practical standpoint it was necessary for your company to observe the law. Br. BOOTH. If I had not known that you knew nothing about these figures, I would have thought that you had seen the telegram to which I am about to refer. On last Friday I asked our department in San Francisco that made our operating studies in both the Nevada and the Arizona cases to telegraph me an estimate of the number of freight trains over 70 cars that would have been operated in Arizona by Southern Pacific Co. free of the law's restrictions. Mr. WOLvERTON. I understand your position to be that because of the fact that you were unable to get the attorney general to say definitely whether he would or would not enforce the statute, then as long as he refused to make a definite statement, you had no basis for equitable relief by injunction. Mr. Boom. Yes. TRAIN LENGTHS 433 Mr. WOLVEBTON. I assume you have thought that if he was un- willing to cooperate to the extent of stating what his intentions were, then you felt fearful about violating the law to make a test case for fear that you might be permitted to continue to do so over a long period of time and then suddenly be called upon to face a very substantial accumulated penalty. Mr. BooTH. Well, as to the present attorney general, I cannot say; but as to past attorneys general, I think the same influences that op- erated to seal their lips on the subject of willingness to prosecute would have made it extremely difficult to enter into negotiations for a test case. Mr. WOLVERTON. I had in mind the same thought evidently that Mr. Martin had, that it was unusual not to be able to have a test case. I can see now that it is due to the unwillingness of the State officials to cooperate in having a test case. Mr. BooTH. Well, a real test case, even if we cooperated with them and had one prosecution, we will say-tried that in the State court- we could only get up to the United States Supreme Court on a Federal question. If the attorney general instituted a series of prosecutions, why then we might by a bill of peace or some other form of equity procedure get a case to the United States Supreme Court in which we had asked for a three-judge court, and thus go direct to the United States Supreme Court. Mr. WoLvERToN. Upon what theory did you proceed in the Nevada case? Mr. Boorn. I will explain that when I come to it, if you please. The procedure is just bristling with technical difficulties. Mr. WITHROw. What do you mean by the influences that actuated the attorney general not to give you an opportunity for a test case? Mr. BOOTH. Why, the brotherhoods in Arizona did not want to go through another Arizona train-length case. 'Mr. WITHROW. I don't blame them. Mr. BooTH. Neither do I. Mr. WITHROw. But why would that make any difference if they were so dead wrong, why would the public support them? Mr. BooTH. The public has not had a chance to say whether it is supporting them or not. There is no initiative pending. Mr. WITHRow. The attorney general certainly would be responsible to the public, would he not? Mr. BOOTH. I do not know. Mr. WITHROW. I do not understand just exactly what you mean by these influences. I do not think it quite fair to attack in that manner the methods used in Arizona or the operations of the State of Arizona, or the attorney general's office. Mr. BOOTH. I think when a railroad, which is a very substantial taxpayer and employer of labor, and one of the greatest factors in the development of a State, goes to an attorney general and asks him whether he will or will not enforce a law, I think it is entitled to an answer. If it does not get an answer, I think it is because of some invidious influence which is at work which prevents that answer. That is what I mean, and I fully realize these proceedings will be reported. 434 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. WITHROW. It seems to me that under the orderly processes we have that you would have proceeded in some way where you could have gotten that permission. If there is a State statute which pre- cludes you from getting an opportunity why can you not amend that? Mr. BOOTH. It is the absence of a State statute which precludes us. Mr. WITHiow. Then why do you not initiate legislation that will permit you to and put the issue right up to the State Legislature of Arizona? It seems to me that would be the orderly way of doing it. Mr. MARTIN. Have you ever had a comparable situation within your experience or within your knowledge, to that now existing in Arizona with respect to this law? Mr. BOOTH. Never. In the 42 years I have practiced law, I have never seen or heard of such a situation. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kennedy. M. KENNEDY. Mr. Booth, I am bit confused on the question of Mr. Withrow as to the statute. I got the impression from your state- ment that it was part of the organic law of the State, the law so far as the Constitution is concerned? Mr. BOOTH. No, Mr. Congressman, it is not. For all practical pur- poses it is. It was passed by the legislature and then with a nun- her of other bills, it was referred to the people at a general election by a referendum the same year. Arizona has the initiative and referendum in its original constitution which was approved by the Congress. This was in 1912, at the first session of the Arizona Legis- lature after statehood, and it was under the referendum, petition method; sufficient signatures were obtained to put this and other bills on the ballot and the people approved this and some other bills. Now, that makes it to all intents and purposes, as though it were imbedded in the constitution. The constitution can only be amended by a vote of the people. This law can only be amended or repealed by a vote of the people. The legislature cannot touch it. I think all of you are familiar with that, as most of us, I guess, in our own States have these initiative and referendum provisions. Mr. WITHROw. That applies to actual train length legislation? Mr. BooTH. Yes. Mr. WITHROw. But it is within the purview of the legislature, if they so desire, to initiate legislation that will permit you to test the constitutionality of the act. That is within the purview of the legis- lature, is it not? Mr. BooTH. Certainly. Mr. WOLVEBTON. I take it that it would be unnecessary to have any legislative action or any further referendum to the people, if the attorney general will state definitely it is his intention to enforce the act. Then you would have the basis upon which you could go into court. But you are prevented from going into court by way of in- junction proceedings because the Attorney General has not threatened to enforce the act. Is that the situation? Mr. Boom. Yes. The procedural difficulties, in defending a prosecution in a State court for violation of a criminal statute and setting up a defense of unreasonableness under the fourteenth amend- ment and the invalidity of the act under the commerce clause, are simply tremendous. It is only in a court of equity that you can get TRAIN LENGTHS 435. a case of this kind properly and thoroughly tried and in that effort, as I say, we have so far been unsuccessful. Mr. WOLVERTON. In your opinion, is this a wrong without a remedy? Mr. BooTH. So far it has been. Mr. WITHROW. But, there is a remedy. The legislature has the power. Mr. BooTH. I understand that perfectly. Mr. WITIRow. Then, it is not a wrong without a remedy. You have the orderly processes of law as a remedy. You can amend the statute. Mr. BooTH. Who can; we can? Mr. WITHRow. Well, you can take your case to them. I do not link it is quite fair for you to say that there is not a remedy. There definitely is a remedy and that is in amending, or providing a statute that will permit you to test this case in the State of Arizona. Your remedy is in Arizona and you have a remedy there. Mr. WOLVERTON. I think, Mr. Withrow you misunderstood my ap- plication of the principle that it is a wrong without a remedy. I referred to court proceedings, not to the remedy such as you speak of which might be by legislative action. Mr. WITHROW. Yes. Mr. WOLVERTON. In other words, there is no court procedure evi- dently that can be taken to test the Constitutionality of the law. This is the result of the Supreme Court's decision. The railroad company in this case cannot attack the constitutionality of the act because the attorney general who is the enforcing officer has refused to state his intention to enforce it, and without any such threat as to his intention, there is no basis under the Supreme Court decision on which the railroad company can proceed in the court to test the law. Mr. WITHROW. I understand that; but I was just fearful that your saying there is no remedy will be misconstrued, because there is a remedy and has been a remedy ever since this has been on the statute books. Mr. WOLVERTON. I think, Mr. Withrow Mr. BOOTH (interposing). You mean go to the State and ask it to waive the eleventh amendment. Is that what you mean? Mr. WITIIRow. Yes; I probably have that in mind, and I believe there are numerous other ways to get it before the public. If it is so obviously unfair, it seems to me that it ought to be very easy. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kennedy. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Booth, do I understand that you have pursued every available remedy to have this matter tried out or reargued in the State of Arizona? Mr. BooTH. We have considered every remedy. We have not brought a new suit, because as I say we could not get the attorney general to declare himself on the subject. Mr. KENNEDY. Well, the fact that you have not been able to have the matter reheard or have a rehearing, before a proper tribunal, is not due to any laches on your part, is it? Mr. Boorn. Not at all. We have not gone to the legislature, a& Mr. Withrow suggests, and asked them to let us into court. 436 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. KENNEDY. Has there ever been a proposal to that effect by any member of the legislature? Mr. Boorn. Not that I know of. I believe there was some such suggestion at one of the special sessions, but it was not embraced in the call and the legislature could not pass on it. Mr. KENNEDY. The impression I get from your argument is that if there were a remedy, you would avail yourself of it without delay. Mr. BooTH. We would go into court as soon as we could prepare the papers. Referring again to this question of disobeying the law. The reply I got by telegram as to the number of trains over 70 cars in length that would have been run by the Southern Pacific Co. in Arizona if it put in an unrestricted operation, is on the basis of the calendar year 1937's traffic and trains. The trains actually operated were 13,560. Those that would have been operated under unrestricted operations, 10,292, or a saving of 3,268 trains per year. I do not have the train miles. Of the trains that would have been operated there would have been 6,793 over 70 cars and 3,499 under 70 cars. Now, consider the penalties that would have accrued on the only kind of an operation that would do us any good in Arizona. The only kind of an operation that would justify the transfer of heavier power and the complete remodeling of our operation from El Paso to Los Angeles, because the operations all follow one from the other and interlock. At the minimum penalty of $100 for each offense, the annual pen- alty would have been $679,300, and at the maximum penalty of $1,000 for each offense, $6,793,000. The attorney general could, in view of the Arizona statutes of limitation, allow those penalties to accrue for 364 days without suing on any of them. Mr. WOLVERTON. Is that for 1 year? Mr. BooTH. Yes, sir. Mr. WoLVERTON. How many years could it continue before it would be necessary because of the statutory limitation or otherwise to bring a proceeding for the penalties? Mr. BoOTH. That question was asked of me here. I tried to look up the Arizona statute and I was not quite sure myself, so I wired our counsel, Baker & Whitney, last Friday; Baker & Whitney in Phoenix, Ariz. They replied that there was some difference of opinion as among counsel; that it depended on whether this penalty was classi- fied as a misdemeanor or as a recovery suit; but that he would have at least a year, or putting it finely, 364 days, within which these penalties could be allowed to accumulate before he filed his first suit and he might have 4 years under another view of the statute, and under still another view of the statute, namely, that the State is never barred from recovering anything unless there is a limitation put by it on the recovery, he might have forever. Mr. WOLVERTON. So, the figure you have given for 1 year is illustra- tive of an accumulated penalty that would increase according to the number of years that the law was violated. Mr. BooTm. This is on the basis of the 1937 traffic, which was 1,758000,000 revenue ton-miles moved over Arizona rails. TRAIN LENGTHS 437 Our traffic in 1929 was 1,914,000,000 revenue ton-miles, and our traffic in 1927, when the study was made that resulted in the findings in the Arizona case was 1,601,000,000 revenue ton-miles. So I think 1937 is fairly representative unless there is a very heavy decrease. Mr. WoLvERTON. Naturally one would have the thought, if the act is unconstitutional, why has there not been some test made of it. You have answered that by stating that the decision of the Supreme Court precluded you from making the test which you sought to make, and that the only way in which the law could be tested would be that which had been indicated in the question of Mr. Martin, namely, by actually violating the law and depending upon the penalty action and then take an appeal in the event it is decided against your company. If there could be one test case then there would not be any real practical difficulty in the way from too large a penalty involved. I have asked how long it would be possible for the State authorities to permit violation of the law without bringing a penalty action, having in my mind the thought that if it went over a considerable number of years it would amount to a very considerable sum. You have stated it might have been over $6,000,000 for 1 year, so that if 4 years was the limit within which the penalties act might be brought, then you would be subject to penalties aggregating more than $24,- 000,000, and if there is no time limitation of the right of the State to proceed for a penalty, the collectible amount would be increased to an indefinite amount. It would depend upon when the penalty was sought to be enforced. Mr. BooTH. There is another consideration in the testing of the validity of a statute, and that is that any careful lawyer prefers to be on the plaintiff's side instead of the defendant's. In other words, if you are testing the validity of a statute by submitting to arrest and the district attorney finds that he is getting the worst of it, he can walk in and dismiss the case and you have no appeal, nothing to appeal. I had that happen to me early in my practice. Mr. WOLVERTON. As long as he kept dismissing the action, you would not have anything to worry about. Mr. BOOTH. You would not have any test, either. Mr. WOLvERTON. That is true. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Booth, I would like to ask you a question along the lines I questioned Mr. Fort briefly. You mentioned the Los Angeles-El Paso terminal in connection with the Arizona law. Is it the practice of the Southern Pacific to start long trains from these terminals and then break them up at or near the Arizona State line, or do you operate 70-car trains all of the way through between El Paso and Los Angeles? Mr. BOOTH. I asked one of the officials of our lines who was here in Washington that question last night. He is very familiar with the facts, and you understand I cannot testify as to operating con- ditions. Mr. MARTIN. Yes. Mr. BooTH. But he tells me that generally speaking, the eastbound trains, trains which handle perishables principally, shipments from California, are broken up at Yuma, which is on the Colorado River just at the boundary line between California and Arizona and that the westbound trains, generally speaking, are broken up at Lordsburg, 438 TRAIN LENGTHS N. Mex., or sometimes El Paso. Lordsburg is about 15 miles over the line east of Arizona and El Paso is about 160 miles from the Arizona line. . But, that situation is gone into at very great length in the Arizona case, and there is a finding of the court on it, to which I will refer later. I do not want to take the time to run through these findings now. Mr. MARTIN. The result would be that they would be broken down at Yuma and then continue on as 70-car trains. If you started at Los Angeles with a 100-car train and it was broken down to a 70- car train at Yuma, when you reached Lordsburg, N. Mex., there would not be any such amount of accumulated traffic there to be picked up and continued on from; there with the 100-car train, but you would continue on to El Paso at any rate with a 70-car train from Lordsburg to El Paso? Mr. BooTH. The Southern Pacific main line through New Mexico has very little traffic originating on it. Mr. MARTIN. So that if the train is broken down to comply with the Arizona law it would remain perhaps a 70-car train from there on? Mr. BooTH. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Did you mean to answer "Yes" to Mr. Martin's question? Mr. BOOTH. Yes; my answer, generally speaking, is that the trains are broken up. The CHAIRMAN. And continue as 70-car trains beyond Arizona? That is what I understood was what Mr. Martin was asking you. Mr. BOOTH. No. I think in some cases they are consolidated, and in others they continue on. You see, El Paso is the eastern terminal of our line. Mr. MARTIN. It appears that it would affect the Santa Fe much more than the Southern Pacific. Mr. BooTH. The court so found. The court found $600,000 increase in onerating costs to the Santa Fe and $400,000 on the Southern Pacific. The CHAIRMAN. That is, the court found that there would be that much additional operating expenses? Mr. BooTH. They found that additional operating expenses to which they were put by the law based on the traffic of 1927, just the converse of the Nevada situation. In Nevada we showed what operating expensese we would be put to if the law were put in effect. In Arizona we showed what unnecessary expenses we were being put to as a result of the law being in effect. Mr. MARTIN. As I understand you to say, $600,000 more in the case of the Santa Fe and $400,000 more in the case of the Southern Pacific. Mr. BOOTH. $400,000 more in the case of the Southern Pacific, on its principal main line. We did not put in any figures on the other lines. That was on the principal main line. Mr. MARTIN. What year was that? Mr. Boom. Based on the traffic of 1927, which in our case was 1601,000,000 revenue ton-miles of freight as compared with 1,758,- 000.000 in 1937. Mr. MARTIN. Have you got the figures of the total operating ex- penses over the same territory for the same year? TRAIN LENGTHS 439 Mr. BooTH. What is that question? Mr. MARTIN. Have you got the figures showing the total operating expenses of the Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific through Arizona for the same year from which you give the figures for the increased cost of operation? Mr. BooTH. No; I do not have them. I do not have them here in Washington, unless they are in the library of the American Associa- tion of Railroads in the form of printed briefs that were filed, and I do not know whether they have those or not. Mr. MARTIN. What I have in mind is whether that would throw any light on the question of increase in the cost of operating ex- penses if the law were made a national law. Mr. CROSSER. Mr. Booth, the Southern Pacific runs as far east as New Orleans, does it not? Mr. BooTn. It runs as the Texas & New Orleans, owned by the Southern Pacific, but the Southern Pacific Lines end at El Paso. The former El Paso & Southwestern runs north to Tucumcari, N. Mex., and joins with the Rock Island at that point. At El Paso the Southern Pacific, Pacific Lines, it connect with the Texas & New Orleans Railway, which is a Southern Pacific property running east toward and to New Orleans and the old El Paso & Southwestern line which is now owned by the Southern Pacific Co. running north to Tucumcari, N. Mex., where it joins the Rock Island. As freight comes into El Paso the trains are broken up and cars classified; usually some go north over the El Paso & Southwestern, eventually over the Rock Island, and some east over the Texas & New Orleans, and that is why I said El Paso is our eastern terminal. Mr. CROSSER. Of course, the property is Southern Pacific, just the same. Mr. BOOTH. Yes, sir; the Texas & New Orleans Railroad is Southern Pacific property, separately operated. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kennedy. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Booth, could you tell us whether or not there is much freight originating in Arizona, as compared with the through freight movement? I thought that you might be able to give me that information. Mr. BOOTH. There is considerable, but I cannot now give you the figure. There is a large movement of agricultural products out of the irrigated Salt River Valley, irrigated from the Roosevelt Dam and also qute a considerable movement from the irrigated land around Yuma and then, of course, when the mines and smelters are in opera- tion there is a large movement there; but I cannot give you the figures offhand. Mr. KENNEDY. How does that compare with the fruit traffic? Mr. Boomr. Very much less; very much less. Mr. KENNEDY. Could Arizona sustain herself on her own freight and traffic if she did not have the large movement of interstate traffic over their lines? Mr. BOOTH. Well, I think they would certainly have railroad ser- vice. How good it would be, I do not know. I do not remember the proportion of intrastate to through interstate traffic in Arizona. Mr. KENNEDY. You have large passenger traffic from Los Angeles to Yuma, especially in connection with the divorces, do you not? 440 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. BOOTH. I think that they go by air now. They are in too big a hurry. Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Booth, you have been speaking with respect to the additional cost that was incurred as a result of this statute. Did the original proceeding in which you sought to restrain the attorney general from enforcing the act contain evidence of the additional cost that would be incurred? I assume that the proceed- ing to which you have referred, for substitution of the new attorney general in place of the previous one whose term expired, was merely a motion under a section of the United States statutes to make the new attorney general a party to the original suit. Mr. BOOTH. That was all. Mr. WOLVERTON. And for that reason I have assumed that you have put in the record the same facts which you probably used in your original proceeding. Mr. BooTH. The facts were not before the Supreme Court at all. They were presented by comparatively Mr. WOLVERTON. Do you mean in the last proceeding, or in the first proceeding? Mr. BOOTH. The facts of the Arizona case, the merits of the litiga- tion, were not before the United States Supreme Court at all. Mr. WOLVERTON. I understand that; but when you filed your orig- inal proceeding against the Attorney General who threatened to enforce the act, did you, in presenting that case to the court, include in your record or state of the case the facts and figures that would show the increased cost of operation under the statute? Mr. BooTH. Very fully. Mr. WOLVERTON. Do you have a copy of that portion of the case? Mr. BOOTH. No, I do not have, but I can wire and get it by air mail. Mr. WOLVERTON. If you can, I would like to see it. Mr. BOOTH. If you want me to, I will read this. M" WOLVERTON. My reason for making the inquiry is this: There has been information as to cost given wide publicity which has found lodgment in the minds of people who have written to me about this legislation. Many seemed concerned with respect to the increased cost that this legislation would probably make necessary. It has seemed to me that with actual operations in the State of Arizona there might be some basis upon which the committee could determine whether there would be any additional cost of operation. It is for that reason that I thought that if I could see the state of the case that had the figures of cost in Arizona, I might be able to gather some information that would be helpful in determining this question of increased cost. Mr. BooTH. I would like to read this Arizona finding into the record before we adjourn in answer to Mr. Wolverton's question. The financial burden imposed upon the plaintiffs by the Arizona law is another important question. The Santa Fe's bill of complaint alleges that from a cost study, which the plaintiff "believes and alleges" to be correct, their freight train expenses on the main line between Barstow, Calif., and Belen, N. Mex., would be reduced over $600,000 annually, together with various additional savings not taken into account in the cost study. The bill of com- plaint of the Southern Pacific Co. alleges that its cost study shows that by long-train operation on its main line between Indio, Calif., and El Paso, Tex., via Maricopa and Lordsburg, their freight-train expenses could be reduced over $400 000 annually. The witness A. L. Conrad, assistant general auditor for the Santa Fe, conducted its study, and Vaile S. Andrus, assistant to the TRAIN LENGTHS 441 vice president, conducted the Southern Pacific study, and the evidence shows that each of these auditors has had vast experience in that line of work. I want to interpolate at this point that Mr. Andrus is the man to whom I wired and who furnished the data I just read into the record about the additional trains. Mr. Andrus is not an auditor. He is an ex-operating man and has been head of the bureau of transporta- tion research for a number of years. The finding continues: They prepared work sheets containing 33 items necessary to be considered in making a careful estimate, including tonnage, number of cars in the various trains, time of departure and arrival, and mileage traveled by all locomotives in connection with the movement of traffic. Timekeepers inserted the wage information called for by the work sheets, including wages of enginemen on train engines, double-header engines, helper engines while double-heading and wages of trainmen. There is also an estimate of fuel consumption and many other factors. The total estimated savings of the Santa Fe Co. were $0G4.- 738.33. The showing of estimated savings for the Southern Pacific Co. is $417,858.81. These estimates seem to be accurate and reliable and to fully justify and establish the allegations of the bills on this question. Mr. WOLVERTON. Who made that statement? Mr. BooTIf. This is the opinion of the court in the Arizona case signed-it is not the opinion of the court, but the findings of the court in the Arizona case, signed by Curtis D. Wilbur, United States circuit judge, A. F. St. Sure, United States district judge, F. C. Jacobs, United States district judge. At the beginning the court says that it has "announced its inten- tion to prepare findings of facts and conclusions of law reflecting its independent judgment upon the entire record." Mr. WOLVERTON. Is the opinion you refer to found in the supple- ment? Mr. BOOTH. No, sir; these are the findings. They were filed in typewritten form and I have a copy of them, if you care to read them. I intend to insert them in the record here. Mr. WOLVERTON. The reason I am making this inquiry is a few days ago the figures of accidents in Arizona were used for a com- parative basis with respect to the number of accidents to employees, pedestrians, and others as a result of decreasing the length of trains and increasing the number of trains, and it seemed to me that with such a law in effect in Arizona it would also be very easy to submit figures to show the increase of cost of operation over what it would have been if the trains had been longer. If that information is available it seems to me it has a bearing on the question and should be given consideration. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wolverton, it will be necessary at this time to adjourn until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. Mr. WOLVERTON. Very well, Mr. Chairman. Mr. WITROw. I wonder if I can ask one question. Mr. EICHER. Will Judge Booth continue his statement tomorrow morning? The CHAIRMAN. Yes.. Mr. EICHER. If he does not, I would like to ask a question. Mr. BooTH. I can continue tomorrow. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. (Thereupon, at 12:03 p. m., the committee adjourned until 10 o'clock the following morning, Thursday, February 3, 1938.)  TRAIN LENGTHS THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1938 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence F. Lea,. (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Mr. Booth, will you proceed? STATEMENT OF HENLEY C. BOOTH, GENERAL ATTORNEY OF THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY CO., SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.- Resumed Mr. BOOTH. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee: First I wish to correct in the record the statement I made at the conclusion of yesterday morning's session, in answer to one of Mr. Wolverton's questions. I read a statement of the Arizona court on the subject of operating costs in that case, and I told Mr. Wolverton they were from the findings of the court. As a matter of fact, they were from the opinion which is reported in the Federal Supplement to which I gave the citation. In connection with my statement yesterday as to the condition of the Santa Fe Railroad in Arizona when the bill of 1912 was passed,. I have secured from Mr. W. K. Etter of Chicago, the vice president in charge of operations of the Santa Fe, confirmation of the recollec- tion that I had and expressed in my statement. Mr. Etter says: When the bill was approved on May 16, 1912, Santa Fe had in Arizona 38& miles of first main track and 75 miles of second track. Longest passing tracks at that time were 3,500 feet, only long enough to clear train of 70 cars, engine, and caboose. At that time power east of Winslow was 789 and 825, class Consolidations- That is a type of locomotive- capable of handling only about one-half capacity of power now used. West of Winslow 900 and 1600 Santa Fe type engines. Capacity about 65 percent of Power now in use. Grades have been materially reduced since 1912. ie informed me by a later telegram that the power referred as having the greatest tractive power is that in use in Arizona at the present time. Mr. WrrHRow. Mr. Chairman.- 443 444 TRAIN LENGTHS The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Withrow. Mr. WITHRow. Mr. Booth, I intended to be here at 10 o'clock and ask you a question. If I will not interrupt your trend of thought, I would like to ask it now. Mr. BOOTH. Perhaps if you care to, you can do so now, before I enter another phase of the discussion. Mr. WITUROW. Yes. My question was in regard to the findings of the court that you were quoting from yesterday before we adjourned. Mr. BOOTH. Well, I stated just before you came in this morning that I was quoting from the opinion of the court instead of the findings. It is the same thing. Mr. WITHRow. The thing that I wanted to make clear for the record was this, that when you were quoting from the findings, but what you said was the court said that these were the alleged costs. This was the alleged cost to the Santa Fe and to the Southern Pacific. I believe it was $600,000 and $400,000; $600,000 for the Santa Fe and $400,000 for the Southern Pacific. Mr. BOOTH. It says in the beginning of the quotation which I read, those were costs that we alleged. Mr. WITHROW. Those are the alleged costs, but I was afraid that it might be construed that it was the finding of the court that those were the costs. Mr. BooTH. They are the findings of the court that those were the costs. Mr. WITRnow. I did not so interpret them. Mr. BoOTH. It says that these estimates seem to be accurate and sufficiently reliable to justify and establish the allegations of the bill on this question. If you will go to the record as the reporter has it yesterday, you will have no misgivings on the subject. First, they say what the complaint alleges, and then they describe how the costs were arrived at, and then they say that the testimony supports the allegations in the bills of complaint. I will state, Mr. Chairman, with the utmost deference to the mem- bers of the committee, that I have prepared this statement in sec- tions. I do not think that the sections are very long, and from my standpoint, I think they are not any more than adequate to present the points. If questions can be deferred until the end of each section, it may be found that I have stated the answer to the question in that section in a much briefer way than I can extemporaneously. I merely want to add to what I said yesterday regarding it. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Booth, in response to that suggestion: It is always a question here as to how to proceed to save time and yet give the witnesses a chance to put over their case. Naturally a man likes to put over his case in his own way. It is very difficult for the Chair to enforce that rule against asking questions. But, is it agreeable to the committee here for the witness to pro- ceed without interruption until he has completed his statement ? Now, if we make that agreement I would like to enforce it, or else not try. Mr. BULwINKLE. The trouble is, we do not have all of the members of the committee here and others will be dropping in a little bit later. The CHAIRMAN. If the committee agrees on that, we will see if we can comply with it. ThAIN LENGTHS 445 Mr. BULWINKIE. Suppose we say that those who are here agree to it. Mr. BooTH. I am merely making the suggestion that you let me complete a section of my statement, not the entire statement. The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will let you proceed that way. Mr. MAPES. What do you mean by a section? Mr. BooTH. A topic. Mr. MAPES. What is a topic? Mr. BooTR. They are not very long. Mr. BULwINKLE. How will we know when you get through with a topic ? Mr. BooTH. I will say so. The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed. Mr. BooTH. The final reason why we have not gone forward in Arizona is the trial of the Nevada Train Limit case, closely followed by the introduction and passage by the Senate of the bill now before you. The Nevada Train Limit case was on trial from August 1935 to April 1936, and was not finally decided by the three-judge Federal court until February 23, 1937. The decree did not become final until May 23, 1937. Even if we had had the necessary declaration from the Attorney General of Arizona, we would not have instituted suit there while the Nevada case was going on because of the immense amount of preparation required for, and the labor of actually trying such a case, as well as the engagement of our forces in the Navada case. But, early in 1937, Senate 69, the bill now before you was, with other national train limit bills, introduced in the present Congress. A national train limit law would enter the field of train-length legisla- tion affecting interstate commerce and, under decisions with which you are thoroughly familiar, would preclude any State legislation on the same subject and would entirely suspend any such existing State legislation including the Arizona law. Thus at least until this Con- gress adjourns it appears inadvisable to institute any new State litigation except to preserve an existing status-as in Oklahoma and Louisiana. Out of deference to the members of the committee who asked ques- tions on "this subject last Friday, I have devoted more time to this feature of the hearing than I had intended to. I trust that I have answered their questions. But, after all, what the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific have done or failed to do since the Supreme Court's order of dismissal of the Arizona cases should not prejudice the other 135 American class I railroads in this hearing. Perhaps it is fortunate for those roads in this hearing that we have continued to operate under the Arizona law. That containued oper- ation has, by comparison with the Southern Pacific operations in Nevada and the Santa Fe operations in New Mexico, conclusively shown, as found by the 3-judge court in the Nevada case, that the long- train operation is far safer, substantially more efficient, and much more expeditious than a compulsory limitation to 70 cars. Nor has our failure to proceed further in Arizona in any way im- paired the factual findings or conclusions of the 3-judge court in the Arizona case, to which I will now briefly refer. 47891-38--29 446 TRAIN LENGTHS Now, that concludes my explanation of why we did not proceed further either by an attempt at court suit or by violating the law to bring the Arizona issue to a head. On yesterday, if I may interpolate this in my statement, Mr. Martin asked me to put in a statement of the number of times and various State legislatures which had considered train limit bills. He put one interpretation on it, which he was kind enough to state, and we put quite another interpretation on it. His interpretation is in the record and our interpretation is that the great number of times this bill has been submitted to legislatures and the fact that only four times has the bill gone on the statute books, is some indication at least of public sentiment on the question. But be that as it may, here are the figures for what they may be worth one way or the other. Up to January 1, 1938, there have been introduced "train limit" bills 90 times in the legislatures of 34 States. In four of these States such bills have been enacted into law; in 30 States they have failed of enactment, and in the legislatures of 14 States no such bills have been introduced. I have here a statement which was made up in the Bureau of Eco- nomics of the Association of American Railroads which shows the States in detail and the legislatures in which they were introduced, and without reading it, I will ask the reporter to copy it in the record, if that is satisfactory to Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. Yes. Mr. Boom. May that be done, Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. Very well, that may be done. (The statement referred to is as follows:) STATEMENT SHOWING STATES IN WHICH TRAIN-LENGTH LAWS HAVE BEEN ENACTED Synopsis of acts, lirmitation as to cars State Year enacted Freight Passenger Arizona..-....---------------------------------------------------- 1912 70 14 Louisiana----------------- ----------------------- 19306 70 16 Nevada..-..--...-..------------------- ---------.. 1935 70 - - Oklahoma-------------------- ----------.....--..-.-_ ----- 1937 70 -- TRAIN LENGTHS 447 STATEMENT BY STATES IN WHICH TRAIN-LIMIT BILLS WERE INTRODUCED IN THE LEGISLATURES THEREOF AND FAILED OF ENACTMENT " Syosis of acts, limitation as to ars State Year enacted ________ Freight Passenger Alabama-------------------------------------------------------- 131 70 14 Arkansas ------------------------------------------------------- 1931 M65 ---- Do --------------------------------------------------------- 1933 50........- California ---------------------------------------------------- 1931-3335-37 70 14 Do--------------------------------------------------------- 1927-29 1 74 Colorado-------------------------------------------------------- 1929 05 '16 Do--------------------------------------------------------- 1931 70 14 Do--------------------------------------------------------- 1935-37 70 14 Connecticut---------------------------------------------------- 1933-37 70 14 Delaware ------------------------------------------------------ 1937 () ----- Florida--------------------------------------------------------- 1937 70 14 Idaho--------------------------------------------------------- 1931-33-35-37 70 14 Illinois--------------------------------------------------------- 1929 () ----- Do--------------------------------------------------------- 1931 70........-- Indiana--------------------------------------------------------- 1929 70........-- Do ------------------------------------------------------- 1931 () ---- Do--------------------------------------------------------- 1933-35 70 - Do--------------------------------------------------------- 1935 70 14 Iowa---------------------------------------------------------- 1933-35 () 14 Kansas--------------------------------------------------------- 1929 () ----- Kentucky--------------------------------------- --------------- 1930 70 1t Do ----------------------------------------------- --------- 1932-34 70 -------- Michigan------------------------------------------------------- 1935-37 70 14 Minnesota ------------------------------------------------------ 1927 ( ....). Do--------------------------------------------------------- 1929 () ----- Do--------------------------------------------------------- 1931 () ----- Do--------------------------------------------------------- 1935-37 () 14 Missouri-------------------------------------------------------- 1929 () ----- Do--------------------------------------------------------- 1933 70 14 Montana---------------------------------- ------------------- 1935-37 70 14 Nebraska ----------------------------------------------------- _ 1929 85 -- Do--------------------------------------------------------- 1931 60 -------------------------------- 13 5- Do~rey------------------------------------------------------ 1933 ($ Ne~esy-----------------------------19-270(14 Do ------------------------------------------------------ 19332 70 14 Do--------------------------------------------------------- 19337 7 14 De eo ------------------------------------------------------ 1934-7 70 14.... New ---M ----ico --------------------------------"--------------- 13--37 7..... Dho' ------------------------------------------------------- 1931-33-37 17 14 Oho-----"---------------------------------------------------- 193-33 (4) 14 Dreo-------------------------------------------------------- 19353M7 14 Pennsylvania--------------------------------------------------- 1931-(35 70 -- 14 D o- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- - 931 70 10 Do--------------------------------------------------------- 1933 70 ----- Do--------------------------------------------------------- 1935-37 70 14 Texas---------------------------------------------------------- 1933 70 14 Do-------------------------------------------------------- 195 70 - ,Utah---------------------------------------------------------- 1931-33 70........-- Virginia ----------------------------------------------------- 1935-37 70 14 Wahn 5--------------------------------------- 1930 75 -_--- WtVirginia ---------------------------------------1933-3-0 1 1-__. 93353 70 14 D a -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - 1935 125 1 8. Wisnn---------------------------------------------------- 1937 70 14 Wo i 1929-31 -e. Do--------------------------------------------- 14 ' With qualifications. =Not known. "4 mile. '3.00o feet 'Public service Commission to determine length of trains signals could be sea ' Gliving railroad and warehouse commission jurisdiction. ' 1 miles '3,300 fee. STAEMENTr SHOWING STATES IN THE LEWISLATUMS OW WHICH INO TRAIN UIMITP BILLS HAVE BEN INTROIDtCEI Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennese, Vermont. 448 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr BOOTH. Now, I wish to refer briefly to the opinion of the three-judge court in the Arizona case, quoting from the reported opinion in 2 Federal Supplement, 855. From the language of the Arizona statute the limitation of train lengths is made to apply to all trains under all circumstances, and without exceptions. It treats each freight car and each passenger car as a unit, unrelated to any condition under which it is operated, irrespective of its construction,, type, length, and weight, or whether it is empty or loaded, and if loaded to what extent. It is, therefore, arbitrary and unreasonable. (Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U. S. 315.) The defendant's contention that the Arizona Statute is a necessary safety measure for the protection of railroad employees is not sustained by the evi- dence. The statistical records of the Santa Fe Company, exhibit 30, show that for the 7-year perior of 1922-29- This evidence, by the way, was taken in 1930 and 1931. he train miles per casualty to freight train employees, on the New Mexico long and short trains, as follows: Long train miles per casualty-------------- -------------------130,000 Short train miles per casualty___---------------------------------115,000 This exhibit also shows that as to freight train employees that 7-year period, car miles per casualty were as follows: Car miles per casualty on short trains--------------------------5, 796, 703 Car miles per casualty on long trains-------------------------10, 967, 245 About two to one in favor of the long trains. From these statistics, it appears that if the traffic handled in' the New Mexico short trains during that 7-year period had been handled by the long trains, almost half of the short train casualties would have been eliminated. And then, a brief quotation as follows: 'The defendant's contention that this statute is necessary for the protection of the public at grade-crossings is equally untenable, for as a matter of com- mon knowledge the danger of accident increases as the number of trains increase. We are convinced from the evidence that the law bears no reasonable relation to safety of persons or property. The findings of the three-judge court are quoted at considerable length beginning at page 157 of the printed hearings of S. 27 and S 344 of the Senate subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce, June 4 to 19, 1935, copies of which you have before you. I quote portions of these findings as there printed. I have here about two closely typewritten pages from the findings. The first is finding XV relating to grade crossings. They are in the printed findings. Then, findings XVII relating to air brakes; and finding number XXV which states that: One of the greatest hazards to which passengers are subjected arises from collisions. The increased train density caused by short freight and passenger train operation increases the number of opportunities for collisions and the hazard from collisions * * * (The matter referred to is as follows:) FINDING xv The evidence shows that the train-limit law does not affect the grade- crossing accident risk attendant upon the operation of any particular train, but by increasing the number of trains operated it perforce increases, in the same proportion, the grade-crossing hazard arising from the operation of all trains. TRAIN LENGTHS 449 FINDING XVHI The principal contention of defendant, and the one to which most of his evidence was directed, is that the freight-train provision of the Arizona law is a valid exercise of the State's police power because of the alleged lack of efficiency of the air-brake system in trains of over 70 cars; that because the brakes on all cars in a train do not apply or release concurrently but on one car after another, and because the application or release of the air brakes does not always have a uniform effect on the speed of the various cars, because some of them may be loaded and others empty or the brakes on some cars may apply or release more slowly than others, shocks are caused in various cars in the train and particularly in the caboose; and that while such shocks occur on freight trains of all lengths, the hazard to freight-train employees there- from is greater on trains of over 70 cars than on shorter trains. In effect defendant's principal claim is that the speed of long freight trains and of the various cars therein cannot be properly and safely controlled by the air brakes used by plaintiffs. Those are the same type of air brakes and appur- tenances that are used on freight trains of all lengths throughout the United States. It is somewhat more difficult and requires somewhat more care on the part of engineers to control by power brakes the speed of long freight trains and of the various cars therein than to control the speed of short freight trains and the various cars therein. On that point the evidence most favorable to defendant, when considered alone, shows no more than that on account of such greater difficulty of control, individual trainmen run a somewhat greater risk of receiving nonfatal injuries from slack action when working on long trains than when working on short ones. But in territories not governed by the Arizona- law, where both long and short freight trains are run in accordance with traffic requirements, under the "standard long train operation" defined in finding I hereof, individual freight train employees at times work on short trains and at other times on long ones. Because all traffic offered must be handled, the running of short trains, exclusively, necessarily results in running more trains which not only increases train collision and grade crossing hazard, but also the hazard of casualties due to other causes of accident, such as those incident to extra meets and passings, in connection with which employees go on top of trains, and also leave or board them while in motion to open or after closing switches, to make running inspections, and for other necessary purposes, connected with train operation, and at times receiving very severe injuries and even being killed while doing so. The number of meets and passings does not vary in proportion to the number of trains run, but varies in proportion to the square of the number of trains run. Thus, if on an operating division there are 5 trains moving in each direction, there will be 25 meetings points ; if the number of trains is increased to 7, there will be 49 meeting points ; if to 9, 81 meeting points. The evidence also shows that the hazard from train shocks and all causes of accident, except the grade-crossing hazard, has been steadily reduced coin- cidentally with the adoption of "standard long train operation"; that the de- crease in the fatality and injury rate of road freight employees since 1916 (being the first year for which national casualty statistics covering that class of employees were published by the Casualty Commission) has been considerably greater than the decrease in the casualty rate of passengers, and also of all classes of persons exposed to the risks arising from train operation; and that the risks of individual freight train employees from all causes of accidents is no greater on long trains than on short trains. Thus, during the 5-year period of 1925-29 on the 551 mile Salt Lake Division of the Southern Pacific, in Nevada and Utah, where 38,504 short and 50,709 long freight trains were operated, there were 847 long trains per freight train employee casualty reportable to the Interstate Commerce Commission and 740 short trains ; and a similar study by the Santa Fe showed that between Gallup and Clovis, N. Mex., 384 miles, for the 7-year period of 1923-29, long freight trains ran 130,885 train miles per freight train employee casualty and short trains, 115,899 train miles. I do want to read one short paragraph as a concluding phrase of the Arizona three-judge court on the question of safety, which they state in the opinion as well as in the findings. They say that these findings were made after an independent examination by the 450 TRAIN LENGTHS court of the record and not in reliance on the master's findings, which were equally our way. I quote: The evidence further shows that a given volume of traffic handled under the long train method can be moved with a considerably less number of casualties to road freight train employees as well as to all other employees and to the public than result when the same volume of traffic is handled in short freight trains, because such casualties depend upon the number of trains or train miles run, and not upon train lengths; and that the casualty risk of freight train employees as a class is reduced by long train operation in practically the same proportion that the number of trains is reduced by such operation. Thus, the Santa Fe study in this finding above referred to showed the long freight trains carried cars 1,967,245 car miles per reportable freight train employee casualty and the short freight trains 5,796,703 car miles. In other words, if the short train traffic in that instance had been carried with the same casualty rate as the long train traffic, the total number of employees' casualties on the short trains would have been reduced almost one half; and the grade crossing hazards to the public also would have been reduced almost one half. FINDING XXv One of the greatest hazards to which passengers are subjected arises from collisions. The increased train density caused by short freight and passenger train oper- ation increases the number of opportunities for collisions and the hazard from collisions. * * * I have come to the end of my brief discussion of the Arizona Train Limit Case, and I shall be glad, if the members desire to ask any questions, to endeavor to answer them to the best of my ability. The CHAIRMAN. I understand from what you said that the court held that both from the standpoint of train-mile average as well as car-mile average, that there would be less injuries in the long train than in the short train. Mr. BOOTH. Less injuries per million train-miles or per hundred million car-miles. The CHAIRMAN. How would it be probable that there would be less accidents in a train of 100 cars than in a train of 50 cars? What explanation do you have of that? Mr. BcOTH. They are not there, Mr. Chairman, comparing one train of 100 cars with another train of 50 cars. What they say is that if you have a given volume of traffic to move which the railroad must move as a common carrier under its tariffs, it can be moved more safely, much more safely, by moving it under the long-train method; when the tonnage is there to handle in long trains, and the power is sufficient, and other conditions concur, it can be moved much more safely under long-train methods than it can be under short-train methods. We do not attempt to say that if you have two parallel tracks on one a train of 100 cars running, and the other one a train of 50 cars, under exactly the same conditions. The CHAIRMAN. But the comparison has relation to the volume of traffic moved in either case, as I understand it. Mr. BOOTH. Yes; the comparison has relation to the hazards inci- dent to the movement of the traffic which the railroad, as a common carrier, must handle. The CHAIRMAN. As between moving it in long trains and short trains, there would be more accidents under the short-train methods for the same volume? Mr. Boorn. Yes; on the train-mile or car-mile basis. TRAIN LENGTHS 451 The CHAIRMAN. But, if you compared one train with another, a long train, as contrasted with a short train, in that even, would there not be less accidents on the short train if you omitted the other basis entirely ? Mr. BooTH. I do not think that such a comparison has ever been made. The closest that I know of, and I am appearing here merely to call attention to the findings of the court, not as an operating witness The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mr. Boom. Is in the Nevada findings, which I will read presently. There are there set up and described the factors which contribute to this so-called slack action we have been talking about, and the other factors that contribute to other accidents. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Mr. EIcHim. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eicher. Mr. EICHER. Mr. Booth, if I understood it correctly, in your pre- liminary statement yesterday you said that you were going to point out in the court's finding of facts, statements to the effect that as a matter of practical operation, there was no mechanical objection to a train of any length. Have you as yet come to the stage where you can present that? Mr. BooTH. No, I have not, but perhaps I did not express myself plainly. I said that the 70-car limit-70 cars which you will find in this statement of the various attempted legislation in the various states I have put into the record here-is a sort of a fetish, "70 cars"-I said that there had never been produced any mechanical or scientific or statistical proof that justified the limitation of trains to exactly 70 cars. That came from the length of sidings in Arizona in 1912 and has been followed slavishly ever since. Mr. EICIER. My point is this: I understood you to say that you were going to present some court findings which discussed that question. Mr. BOOTH. Yes; I will give you, each of you, a full copy of the Nevada findings, and that is the next point I am coming to, Mr. EICHFR. But, I would like to have my attention called to the particular discussion of the court so I can question you on it after I have had a chance to read it. Mr. BooTH. Inside of 5 minutes, I will have before you a copy of the Nevada findings. Mr. MAPES. May I ask a question? The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mapes. Mr. BooTH. Yes; Mr. Mapes. Mr. MAPES. The court in the Arizona case makes this statement: Southern Pacific Exhibit No. 27 shows that in 33 States on main-line districts of 15 first-class railroads, the freight trains consist of from 86 on the Southern 8y. in the District of Columbia to 179 cars on the Baltimore & Ohio R. R. in Indiana. Are those figures maximum, or are they average trains? Mr. Boom. Those are maximum. We put an exhibit in the Aizona case, the exhibit that is referred to there, showing the longest train operations throughout the United States, and that statement by the court is a resum6 of that exhibit. But those were the maxima. No 452 TRAIN LENGTHS railroad in the world ever averaged-unless possibly one of the ore roads in the northwest-179 cars to a train. Mr. MAPES. Testimony has been put in in these hearings showing at least one train of 203 cars. Mr. BOOTH. Yes. Mr. MAPEs. That, then, is the finding in this case? Mr. BoorT. Well, the findings in that case were based on operations in 1930, 1I am sure; but from all of the testimony I have heard in these cases, and even in legislative hearings in State legislatures, of which I have attended many, I have never heard anyone claim that a 200-car train was a representative train. That is a very rare, very unusual train. Mr. MAPES. This statement does not refer to representative trains either, as I understand you. Mr. BOOTH. It is not an average statement. Mr. MAPES. It refers to the maximum? Mr. BooTh. The maximum, yes. I am very sure of that. I tried the case. Mr. MAPES. At the time of the hearing on this case, then, the max- imum length was 179 cars? Mr. BOOTH. I think that is the longest train we had any evidence of-179 cars. We did not have all of the railroads. Mr. MAPES. Of which you had any evidence, you say? Mr. Boor. Yes. We had evidence from only about 30 railroads out of 135 or 140 class I railroads in the United States. We simply made a sort of a spot check over the United States, beginning on the Atlantic coast and running to the Pacific coast. We' did not attempt to give any accurate picture of all of the operations of all of the class I roads. Mr. Mapes. What is the occasion for a 203 car-length train? Mr. Booth. Well, I do not know. I am not an operating man. I never saw one. Mr. Mapes. Do you think that there ought to be any limit to the length of trains? Mr. BOOTH. I think that should be left, and can be very well left, to managerial discretion, but I do not think, if you will permit me to say so, now that you have asked my opinion, that a rigid, inflexible limit should be put on that is applicable to every place under every situation and condition in the United States, irrespective of grades, power, traffic conditions, conditions of equipment, or anything else. That is only my opinion, but I am not trying to intrude it on this- Mr. MAPES (interposing). In your younger days, were you ever in the train service? Mr. BooTH. No. I have not ridden a freight train for 35 years. Mr. MAPES. Did the court in either the Arizona or the Nevada case attempt to make any finding as to the relative severity of accidents on long trains as compared with those on short trains? Mr. BOOTH. I am not sure but what there is something in the Nevada findings on that subject, and if there is you will have the complete set of findings before you in just a few minutes. Mr. MAPEs. You do not recollect what those findings were? Mr. BoOTH. No; I cannot state them offhand. This pamphlet which will be distributed gives the findings and there are 89 pages of findings. TRAIN LENGTHS 453 Mr. WOLvERThN. May I direct your attention again to the questions which were submitted to you by the chairman in which inquiry was made as to the possibility of increased accidents in the operation of one class of trains as against another? I did not understand you to infer that there was less likelihood of accidents on long trains, merely because they happen to be long trains, but from the standpoint that the longer the train, the fewer the trains that would have to be run, therefore, the less probability of accidents. Mr. BoomH. That is the theory that was adopted by the court in both the Arizona and the Nevada cases. Mr. WOLVERTON. In other words, if a long train is split up into two trains as operating units, there is just double the opportunity for accidents that there would be in operating one train. Mr. BOOTH. Yes; that is the argument that Mr. Fort outlined and it is the argument that is carried to a conclusion in the findings of the court in both the Arizona and the Nevada cases. Mr. WOLVERTON. And may I say in answer to the inquiry that was just made by Mr. Mapes that my study of the Nevada case, which included a comparison between trains operated in that State and Arizona, to which I have already referred on a previous day showed, if the figures are the correct figures, and I assume that they are, having been taken from the Interstate Commerce Commission's reports, that the amount of damage done, property damage, was far less in Nevada than in Arizona, based upon the number of accidents and character of the accidents. Mr. Boor. Yes. That is gone into very fully in the master's find- ings which were adopted. Mr. WoLvEEToN. I had those figures before me on the date I referred to them, but u.nfortunately did not bring them with me this morning. Mr. MAPEs. Did the figures make any comparison between the se- verity of the accidents on the long and short trains as well as compar- ing the number of trains in the two States? Mr. WOLvERTON. Yes. Mr. BoOr. Yes; there is something said in there about it, in the findings of the court, in the Nevada case, to which I shall refer to and with which Mr. Sullivan, the succeeding witness, will deal more in detail, as.to the severity of the accidents as well as the number of acci- dents and particularly this very class of accidents that the proponents have been talking about. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Booth, from your experience of 25 years in the handling of this kind of legislation and your knowledge of the railroad situation in the United States, I wish you would name the railroads, if any, that have exercised their managerial discretion in the limitation of train lengths on their system. Mr. BOOTH. Well, I am not familiar with the operating practices on all of the railroads of the United States. Mr. BULwINKLE. Have you heard of any? Mr. BooTH. I heard it stated here, and I believe it is true, that the Pennsylvania has a limitation of 125 cars. I did not get that from any Pennsylvania official. That was just railroad gossip. A Pennsyl- vania official will be on the stand here and can be asked about it. I do not know of any other limitation. I know we have not on the Southern Pacific. We have certain tonnage limitations and divisions where the power and the grades are such that the locomotives must be limited 454 TRAIN LENGTHS to the amount of tonnage they can handle, and that naturally limits the number of cars, either loaded, in the one case, or empty in the other. Mr. BULWINKLE. Well, the Pennsylvania is the only railway that you have heard of. Mr. BOOTH. That I have heard of, and I did not hear that from any official of the railroad. Mr. BULWINKLE. All right. Mr. MAPEs. Can you give, Mr. Booth, somewhat in detail, the num- ber of accidents on the short and long trains over this period of years that you referred to? Mr. BooTH. In Nevada and Arizona? Mr. MAPES. Yes, sir. Mr. BoomH. Those all will be given to you in very great detail by Mr. Sullivan, who is to follow me. I do not want to encroach upon his territory, because he is an operating and statistical man, and I am not. THE NEVADA TRAIN-LIMIT CASE The Nevada Legislature met in January 1935, and it soon became apparent that it was likely that after several failures by the train- service employees to secure a train-limit law in that State the 1935 legislature would grant their request. It did so, by the Nevada train-limit law of 1935, to which I have already referred. The attorney general of Nevada, who was reelected in 1934 for a 4-year term, announced that he would prosecute any carrier that vio- lated the new Nevada law. By that announcement a basis was fur- nished for the same character of suit as that tried in Arizona. Before I proceed with a brief discussion of that case, I will ask your clerk to distribute among you copies of this pamphlet entitled "The Nevada Train-Limit Case," in which are printed in full the findings of the three-judge court in that case. No appeal was taken from the decree entered on those findings and that decree became final on the 23d of May 1937. These findings form the latest judicial discussion of the issues of fact that are before you in this hearing; they cover national as well as State statistics and, I respectfully submit, should be printed in the record of these proceedings. I respectfully ask, Mr. Chairman, that those findings be printed as an appendix to my statement. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Mr. BooTH. Thank you. The Nevada Train Limit Act is chapter 26 of the Nevada Statutes 1935, page 32, approved March 11, 1935, and by its terms was to have been effective 60 days later. It is printed in full on page 4 of the printed findings I have handed you and, as I have stated, attempted to limit the number of cars in any train to 70 freight or other cars, exclusive of caboose. Early in April 1935 the Southern Pacific Co., the Union Pacific Railroad, and the Western Pacific Railroad Co. each filed in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada a bill of complaint against Gray Mashburn, attorney general, as an individual and not at attorney general of Nevada, to restrain him from enforcing the provisions of the train-limit law, and in the complaints asked for TRAIN LENGTHS 455 interlocutory injunctions pending hearing on the merits. Hon. Frank H. Norcross, judge of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, called to his assistance Hon. Clifton Mathews, circuit judge, and Hon. Harold Louderback, United States district judge for the northern district of California, who thereafter met as a special statutory court and granted an interlocutory injunction to each of those three railroads 3 days before the law was to take effect. It was agreed that only the Southern Pacific case should be tried and that the other two cases would abide by the results of the South- err Pacific case. The court appointed Hon. M. A. Diskin, former attorney general of the State of Nevada, as a special master to hear the testimony and to report findings. The hearings began in Reno on August 5, 1935, and continued with short intermissions until April 15, 1936. There were 105 hearing days, during which 7,220 type pages of testimony were taken and 267 documentary and statistical exhibits received in evidence. Mr. Mason and I sat through the taking of the testimony, considerably over half of which was devoted to the issue of safety. The attorney general called 64 witnesses, of whom 63 testified entirely, or almost entirely, on the question of safety. The testimony was, generally speaking, along the same lines as the showing that has been and will be made before you, because the showing has always been made in the safety cases and all State legislatures that I have attended-and these have been several-by the proponents, first, that it was a slack action bill pure and simple, with an additional argument as to the features of inspection and signals. Our showing was, and our claims were first, that a 70-car limit is not a safety measure, but that its enforcement would greatly impair the safety of railroad operations; second, that it would impose trenen- dous and unnecessary expenses for the operation of additional and unnecessary trains, and an enormous new capital investment for additional equipment and facilities, as well as the impairment of existing facilities used in the operation of the long train program; and finally, that it would disorganize the present services to the shippers and receivers of freight and eventually result in passing on the increased operating expenses to the number of the public who initially pay. and bear the charges, and through them to the con- sumers. Putting it in another way, the points relied upon by us in the Navada case were the same as those I have outlined as having been involved in the Arizona case. Between the two cases there is no difference in principle. In the Arizona case we showed the extent to which the safety, economy, and expedition of our operation in Arizona would be improved by permitting us to operate substantially long freight trains and the court so found; in Nevada we showed that safety, economy, and expedition of operation would be greatly lessened if the law were permitted to become effective and the court so found. In the Nevada case, the National and State safety statistics which were used in the Arizona case were, generally speaking, merely brought down to date, with the added advantage to us that over 5 years had elapsed since the trial of the Arizona case and we were therefore able to show in the Nevada case an additional comparison between the results of the standard long freight trains in Nevada and a 70-car limit in Arizona, and a further recession in the frequency 456 TRAIN LENGTHS rates of all classes of train and train service accidents on the railways of the United States as a whole. Mr. WOLVERToN. May I ask you a question right there, Judge? Mr. BooTm. Yes, sir. Mr. WOLVERTON. Is there any difference in the character. of the terrain between the two States? The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wolverton, we had an agreement here a while ago that the witness might proceed to the end of a topic and then be open to questions. Mr. WOLVERTON. I beg your pardon. I did not know of such ar- rangement having been made. Mr. BOOTH. That point will be specifically answered in just a few pages here. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair assumed to enforce that rule. Mr. WOLVERTON. I think it is very wise, and the answer of the wit- ness indicates the wisdom of it when he says that the question I asked would have been answered if I had waited a few minutes. The CHAIRMAN. Very well; you may proceed. Mr. BOOTH. As I started to say, we also had the advantage of showing the court a further recession, after the trial of the Arizona case, in the frequency rates of all classes of train and train-service accidents on the railways of the United States as a whole. When I say all classes, I mean the so-called slack action accidents as well. Although in the Nevada case no special counsel was employed for the defense, which was conducted by the attorney general and his chief deputy, it was well understood and openly proclaimed that the employee organizations were financing and actively assisting in the defense-except as to counsel fees. The State legislative representa- tives of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, Order of Railway Conductors and Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engine- men sat with the defense counsel, at counsel table, throughout the hearing and occasionally there was present the State legislative rep- resentative of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. At the request of the State legislative representative of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, we furnished him an extra copy. of each of our numerous statistical exhibits and operating studies so that, as he stated, lie might send them to the headquarters of his brotherhood. I do not mention this participation of the employee organizations in the Nevada case by way of criticism; they had a perfect right to do what I have described. The bill was passed at their instigation and it was no more than fair to the State that they should assist in every legitimate way in defending against an attack on the law. But none of these organizations can plead ignorance of the Nevada case, of the thoroughness with which it was tried, or of the complete- ness with which every issue that is before this committee was pre- sented to the master and the court in that case, and judicially and comprehensively passed on by them. We do not, of course, claim that the findings in the Nevada case are binding on this committee, but we do respectfully submit that they are entitled to serious considera- tion and to great probative effect. I have mentioned the fact that by far the larger part of all the testimony of the Nevada case was devoted to safety. I should add that in our case in chief as well as in rebuttal we followed the same general line of proof as that we will submit to this committee, except TRAIN LENGTHS 4 67 that the time we had at our disposal in Nevada permitted more elabo- ration and discussion than can be had -within the necessary limits of this hearing. We submitted and the court made specific findings on national sta- tistics taken from the records of the Interstate Commerce Commission covering all classes of train accidents, train-service accidents, and grade-crossing accidents. We presented elaborate and detailed com- parisons of our operations in Nevada and Arizona, beginning with the year 1923. If ever there has been a laboratory test of the wisdom and effect of a police-power statute it has been that afforded by the compelled operation under a 70-car freight-train limit in Arizona, contrasted with a freight-train operation in Nevada unlimited by anything ex- cept the dictates of safety, expedition, and economy, and the testi- mony in the Nevada case abundantly showed, as the court specifi- cally found, that the operation in Nevada was much safer, much more: efficient, and substantially more economical, than that in Arizona. It will not do to say, as some have loosely intimated since the coming of the Nevada decision, that the Southern Pacific operations in the two States are not comparable. Let me first call your atten- tion to the paragraph in finding IV of the three-judge court in the Arizona case, where it is held: The Southern Pacific main lines cross southern Arizona on comparatively light grades and through much level desert territory. They also are well con- structed and there are no unusual or difficult operating conditions on its Arizona main lines. And then let me call attention to certain findings of the three- jullge court in the Nevada case. Finding 23 (g), pages 57 and 58: Since 1912 plaintiff has been operating its railroad lines in Arizona in full compliance with the provision of the Arizona law limiting car units in trains to 70. Operating methods differ only because of the law's restrictions in Arizona, whereas in Nevada the long-train method of operation has prevailed for several years and now prevails. The plaintiff's statistical showing of its operation in Arizona particularly as related to train accidents and train service accidents is uncontradicted and, when considered with the evidence as to Nevada train and train service' accidents, affords a fair and reliable basis of comparison between operations as a whole as well as between a freight train operation limited to 70 cars, exclusive of caboose, and a standard long train operation, as to the hazard of accidents (1) to all employees, (2) to freight train employees, and (3) to freight traiu employees from so-called slack action. Earlier in the findings in the Nevada case the court said-in this quotation specifically answers Mr. Wolverton's question: Finding 14 (b), page 28: Operating conditions, rules, traffic handled, and operating methods in Nevada are substantially similar to the conditions existing in Arizona. The improver ments in railroad and equipment have also progressed proportionately. For' the purpose of making a comparison on the subjects of efficiency and economy of operation the only factor that would make the conditions dissimilar is the- one attributable to the effect of the Arizona train limit law on Arizona operation. We believe that the Nevada-Arizona comparisons as they will be graphically explained to you by Mr. Sullivan who was our safety statistical witness in both cases and who has a further background Of operating experience, and as they appear with great elaboration in the findings of the court beginning at page 57 cannot be cancelel 458 TRAIN LENGTHS out of the reckoning by statements of mere opinion or by the selection of accidents here and there to.fit a preconceived theory. The presentation of the defendant's case in Nevada on the subject of hazard in train operation was almost entirely confined to slack action accidents and to accidents resulting from defects or failures in equipment. They insisted, as the proponents have insisted here that the case was primarily if not almost entirely a slack action case; although they did make some excursions in the realm of passing signals and inspection of trains and cars for defects. They strenu- ously objected to our showing, by national statistics, of the continued progress in the safety of train operation considering all causes of accident and all classes of accident since the year 1923, with which our statistics began in the Nevada case as they will begin here. They said that the comparison between the Nevada and Arizona operation had nothing to do with the case, although the record was never favored by an explanation of their reasons for that conclusion. They had, however, selected from Utah, Nevada, and California all of the slack action accidents on long trains that they could conven- iently find and also a number of train accidents without casualties occurring to long trains: These they offered, just as the proponents have here, in a mass of statements, unaccompanied by statistics as to other accidents or casualties and entirely unrelated to any recognized basis of comparison or computation of frequency. They called many individuals as witnesses who had been injured in slack action accidents on the so-called long train. In many cases we were able to show by the same witness that he had been in a slack action accident in a short train, which was not mentioned in his direct testimony. And in the consideration of the slack action cases in Nevada we matched each long train casualty with one of the same or greater severity on a train of substantially less than 70 cars in Nevada and Arizona. In the 13-year period, 1923 to 1935 there were 105 slack casualties on short trains in those two States as against 71 on long trains in Nevada. (Nevada findings, p. 60.) I do not criticise the method that was adopted by the defense, because they could not have hoped to win the safety issue on any statistical data or logical presentation of the facts. They did all that anyone could do in the defense of a 70-car bill under the rules of evidence and subject to cross examination. Their testimony was carefully considered and the issue was found against them. In discussing the Nevada defendant's attempt to pick and choose accidents here and there to support the reasonableness of the law the court said on page 78 of the printed findings under its discussion of defendant's evidence: The evidence, statistical and otherwise, of train and train-service accidents on plaintiff's lines in California and Utah and Los Angeles and Salt Lake Rail- road line (Union Pacific) in Nevada is not sufficiently complete or related to accept bases of measuring accident or casualty frequency to afford a basis for findings. I am impressed with the applicability of that finding to the multi- tude of individual and selected cases that have been presented by pro- ponents in this hearing. This is what the court said of their plan of defense. I read from page 77 of the printed findings: Defendant's evidence addressed to hazards incident to long-train operation was confined principally to a showing of casualties occurring-in railroad opera- TRAIN LENGTHS 459 tion due to slack action accidents. Casualties occurring on railroads from other causes not involving slack action and railroad employees other than those exposed to the hazard of this type of accident were not included in the proof offered in support of this issue. SAFETY STATISTICS-SANTA FE RAILWAY That brings me to the discussion by the court of the safety statis- tics on the Santa Fe Railroad. I think it has been suggested in this hearing or somewhere else-by some of the proponents of this bill that we never talked about the Santa Fe Railroad records in Arizona, just talked about the Southern Pacific. In the first place you cannot make any Nevada-Arizona compari- son for the Santa Fe, because the Santa Fe does not run through Nevada. But it does have a continuous line over which there is a vast movement of fruit and other exports from California through Ari- zona, New Mexico, and so on, to Chicago, and it is the movement on that continuous line in the short-train territory and long-train terri- tory-the short-train territory in Arizona and a little over the boun- dary, and the long-train territory in New Mexico that I want to refer to very briefly. In addition to the national and Nevada-Arizona casualty statistics we produced in the Nevada case testimony from the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Co., the through freight trains of which operate between California, Kansas City, and Chicago partly through the short-train territory of Arizona and partly through New Mexico, where there is no prescribed limit on the number of cars in a train, nor any voluntary limit imposed by the carriers. I have already read to you the finding of the Arizona court regarding Santa Fe casualty statistics for the period 1922 to 1929 and at this time will only ask you to read finding 23 (i) at page 64 of the Nevada findings, which compares the short-train and long- train operations of the Santa Fe for the 12 years 1923 to 1934, inclu- sive. The statistics there analyzed cover only road freight trainmen and enginemen on duty and deal with casualties to them resulting from the operation of road freight trains while those men were on or getting on or off of such trains; on the train, getting off, getting off and on, and of course includes slack action accidents. The so- called slack-action casualty can only occur while the man is on or getting on or off of the train; so that the Santa Fe statictics in the Nevada case necessarily included all slack action casualties. You will see that in the Santa Fe long-train territory, where the same traffic is being carried as that which moves through the short- train territory,;the casualty showing is substantially better on either a train-mile or car-mile basis than it is in the short-train territory. SAFETY STATISTICS-CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY Now, as to the Chesapeake & Ohio and the number of accidents on the Chesapeake & Ohio, long-train accidents. A number of acci- dents have been testified to in one way or another and considerable has been said in this hearing about long-train operations on the Chesapeake & Ohio. In preparing the Nevada case for trial, we selected the Chesapeake & Ohio as an example of outstanding long-train operation in the eastern part of this country. Our selection was influenced and deter- 460 TRAIN LENGTHS mined, no doubt, by the fact that it was then operating long trains to a greater extent perhaps than all but a few American railroads, and also that it had as a result of that long-train operation, or, at the very least, concurring with it, one of the finest safety records in the United States. Mr. F. D. Beale, an official of that company, testified in the Nevada case and was subjected to a lengthy and searching cross examination. He will make a statement here and because of his intention to do so I merely wish to call your attention to the finding of the Nevada court with respect to the testimony of the Chesapeake & Ohio, which is finding 23 (j), pages 65 and 66 of the printed findings. From statistics there printed, which were presented under oath, you will see that it is found that in spite of the very large increase in average cars per train during the 10 years preceding January 1, 1935, the casualties to train and enginemen in road freight services decreased nearly 60 percent on a train-mile basis and over 70 percent on a car- mile basis during that period. SAFETY STATISTICS ON THE WESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD The Western Pacific operates through Nevada. It has compara- tively light traffic, and in part operates on the same rails that we do. That is, we have a paired track operation, the Southern Pacific and the Western Pacific. The Western Pacific, as I said, operates through Nevada and the Southern Pacific and the Western Pacific uses the Western Pacific rails eastbound for a distance of about 178 miles and both roads use the Southern Pacific rails in the opposite direction, using their own crews and own equipment, and everything of that sort. If you will turn to finding 23 (k) in the Nevada case you will find a brief state- ment of the Western Pacific Railroad Co. casualty statistics on pages 66 and 67. During the years 1929 and 1934, inclusive, that road oper- ated over 43,000 trains in Nevada, of which about 33,500 were 70 cars or less and about 9,700 of 71 cars or more. The long trains operated in each of those years varied from 99 to 136 cars. During that 6 years there were three so-called slack-action casualties to road freight brakemen, none to conductors. The first was in 1929 on a 58-car train, the second was in 1931 on a 127-car train, and the third was in 1934 on a 70-car train--one slack-action casualty out of 9,700 trains of 71 cars or more. PASSING SIGNALS On page 74 of the Nevada findings the court discusses the ques- tion of passing of signals from the caboose to the engine of a moving freight train. This point will be so completely covered by others who are to follow me and particularly by the national statistics show- ing the very great improvement in the frequency rate of such acci- dents, that I will content myself with reading from page 74 of the Nevada court's findings: I want to refer briefly to the findings in the Nevada court on the subject of the passing of signals, principally because there is some language in here that will no doubt be seized upon with great pleasure by my friends of the opposition. TRAIN LENGTHS 46t On page 74 of the findings in the Nevada case the court discusses. the question of passing of signals from the caboose to the engine of a moving freight train. The court says: While the train is in motion there is but one signal that needs to be used by a conductor or brakeman in a caboose and that is the stop signal. When the train is at a standstill and a "proceed," or "back up," or other signal is to be given from the ground or the top of the train to the engineer no accident can result if the engineer does not see the signal. The signal. is repeated until it is seen and acknowledged. In a moving train brakemen are at or near the middle of long trains and signals can be relayed. When, a stop signal has not been complied with the conductor can stop the train by the use of the conductor's valve in the caboose. The operation of this valve applies the brakes in emergency. This application is made first on the caboose and then on the next car ahead serially toward the head of the train. There can be no slack action shock in the caboose where this emergency appli- cation is made. In the daytime 70-car length is the maximum distance a hand and arm signal can be seen and clearly interpreted. During the period 1923 to 1935 no reportable train or train service accident due to failure to observe or to properly interpret signals has occurred in Nevada ; and only one reportable train accident has occurred during the same, 13-year period. In this accident there was involved only the movement of a helper engine and two cars and a caboose. One of the witnesses before you illustrated by a number of com- plicated gestures, signals he claimed were used by conductors. He was not explicit to the effect that they were used on moving trains. No one has ever claimed that an engineer and conductor can converse in sign language'on even a 30-car train. THE SAFETY EVIDENCE IN THE NEVADA CASE I would like next to refer, not at any great length, to the safety evidence in the Nevada case. We did not consider that the Nevada case was a slack-action case; but the defense did, and therefore much of our testimony as well as the greater part of theirs, was devoted to that subject. Slack and its possibilities and effects are subject to certain laws of mechanics, dynamics, and physics. Opinion and guess work can no more change the operation of those laws than they can affect a mathematical problem. When all of the hundreds upon hundreds of pages of testimony on both sides of the Nevada case were stripped of casual observation, mere opinion, and isolated, infrequent, and unusual occurrences, the slack-action testimony was summed up by the master and the court in a few pages to which I desire to call your attention. First-and I think this answers Mr. Eicher's question of a few minutes ago-first on pages 44, 45, and 46 of the printed findings, the' court describes the draft rigging and the action of the draft gears on a freight car, and then. the court made the finding, beginning on page 46, and which is headed (d). FACTORS AFFlCTING SLACK ACTION ; AMOUNT DEVELOPED IN OPEATION I beg your indulgence while I read that finding: There are a number of factors affecting the amount of slack existing in a train, at any particular time while the train is in motion, and also affecting the slack action which may occur in the event of a sudden stop, either through emergency action of the brakes or otherwise. Thus, for example, when a train 47891-38---30 462 TRAIN LENGTHS Is in motion, Immediately after starting from a standstill, the draft riggings in the head portion of the train will be extended, so as to increase the distance between cars somewhat more than if the cars were standing free. In the center and rear portion of such train, however, the draft gears would be but slightly extended, if at all, although the free slack at the coupler faces would be completely stretched. If an emergency application should take place, even though at or near the head end of the train, the potential slack action which might be developed could not exceed the amount of the increased distance between cars, created by the compression of the draft gears due to the starting effort of the locomotive, plus the amount of the increased distance between cars, created by the compression of the draft gears due to the starting effort of the locomotive plus the amount by which the draft gears might be compressed in the opposite direction upon impact, plus whatever free slack might be developed at the coupler faces. The total amount of slack thus created normally would not exceed, on the average, more than 7 to 8 inches per car throughout the train. In general, more slack, and consequently greater slack action in the event of an emergency, will be developed when a train is at low speed, accelerating from a stop, than would be developed in the same train while proceeding at normal road speed between stations; both because of the momentum developed at higher speeds ; and further because when trains are in motion, the draft gears tend by their action to adjust the slack. The grade upon which a train is proceeding has a substantial effect upon the slack, and consequently upon the slack action ; if a train is proceeding against an adverse grade, the tendency is for the slack to be somewhat more stretched than if the train were on level track ; whereas, if a train is proceeding down- grade, the slack will be bunched or compressed to a much greater extent than on level track. Whether a train is accelerating or decelerating likewise has a substantial effect upon the slack, and the consequent slack action. As above stated, if a train is moving from a stop, or is attaining a higher speed, the tendency is for the slack to become somewhat more stretched than if the train is slowing down, or preparing to stop, or is about to stop. The speed of the train, the extent to which the slack is extended or bunched, the consist of the train whether all loads or empties, and if partly loads and partly empties the position of the loads and empties in the train, and the action taken by the engineer, have a very definite effect upon the slack action resulting from an emergency stop. It appears that normally the slack action at the rear of a freight train is more severe, at speeds of 10 miles per hour or less, than at ordinary road speeds of 30 to 40 miles per hour, other conditions as to consist of train grade, and length of train being equal. If a train consists of loads, slack action will be less severe than if the train consists of all empties, because the braking power upon the loaded cars is much less, in proportion to the weight thereof, and the momentum of the loads is greater, than in the case of empties. If the train consists partly of loads and partly of empties, and the loads are at the head end of the train, the slack action at the rear will be less severe than if the empties were at the head end of the train, the slack action at the rear will be less severe than if the empties were at the head end of the train and the loads behind. In ordinary train operation the extent and amount of slack in freight trains, and whether the slack is extended or bunched, are to some extent within the control of the engineer, who, by manipulation of the air brakes, and the power of the engine, and giving due consideration to the railroad grade over which the train is operating, may so handle the train as to avoid severe shock or slack action at the rear end of the train. In situations in train operation where the train is brought to a sudden stop by a bursted air hose, broken air pipe, or kin- dred accident to car units, the engineer would have no control over the slack that may be then present in the train. Each car in a freight train affords a potential amount of slack and the more car units there are in freight trains the more potential slack will be present. Each additional car in a freight train furnishes an amount of resistance to slack action by added spring or friction capacity. The maximum amount of free motion or slack that may exist between the two coupled freight cars is 12 inches. The statement that when the train is in motion all this slack is extended is not supported by evidence. Neither does the evidence sustain the contention that when an emergency stop is made by the application of the air brakes at or near the head end of the train there will invariably be a run-in of slack from the rear TRAIN LENGTHS 463 equal to approximately 1 foot per car for each car of the train behind the point of application. In normal operation the total amount of slack which exists between two coupled cars does not exceed 7 to 8 inches per car. It appears from the evidence that in the operation of long trains, in many instances, severe jolts and jerks have occurred in the rear end of the train from slack action and that injuries have been suffered by brakemen and conductors as a result thereof. The record contains similar results from the operation of trains with car units of 70 cars or less. Emergency stops on long trains have taken place without causing severe slack-action shocks to the caboose or injuries to the occupants. Emergency stops upon short trains have occurred with severe slack-action shocks to the caboose and to the occupants thereof. The evidence shows that the different results, as hereinabove indicated, on long and short trains arise because of the presence or absence, in the particular operation, of the factors directly contributing to slack action. The court then, beginning at page 49, under the heading, "23. Safety of Operation as Affected by Train Lengths: Accident and Casualty Statistics," proceeds for 33 printed pages to discuss national statistics, Southern Pacific statistics, Nevada and Arizona compari- sons and other statistics and claims relating to train operation with trains of varying lengths, to some of which I have specifically re- ferred. On page 82 it concludes its findings in the subject of safety with a succinct finding entitled "Effect of Law as a Safety Measure." May I read that finding as a statement of the philosophy-the rationale-of our denial of the ostensible claim that Senate bill 69 is a safety measure? The finding which I am about to read was, apparently, regarded as of so great importance by the 3-judge court that it included that find- ing, word for word, in its opinion in the case, Southern Pacific Co. v. Mashburn, Attorney General (18 Fed. Supp. 393), from which Mr. Mapes read to Mr. Fort at last Friday's hearing. Before I read that finding to you, I will take that 3-judge opinion and read what is there said preceding and following the finding. After describing the Nevada act and the suit itself, the court says, in its opinion: The case has been finally submitted upon objection filed by defendant to the report of the special master appointed to take the testimony and report pro- posed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The report of the special master is voluminous and covers evidence taken in respect to experience as regards hazards of a number of the principal railroad systems in the United States in addition to that of defendant. It also covers the cost to defendant to remodel its system to comply with the law, such cost being approximately $350,000 in addition to an increased annual expense in excess of $500,000. Almost immediately following is the passage Mr. Mapes mentioned and summarized, and which I shall read in full. Mr. Mapes did not attempt to read the passage in full. He merely referred to it. The main reliance of the defendant that the act in question is within the proper purview of State legislation is that a greater hazard exists in the opera- tion of trains in excess of 70 cars than exists in trains of that number or less. That certain hazards, particularly what is referred to as slack hazard, increase with the number of cars in a train is established without serious question. If the question of hazard was to be determined solely upon the basis of accidents with attendant injuries occurring upon trains of cars in excess of the statutory limit the answer would unquestionably be that hazard increased with the length of train. Many other elements however enter into the problem, the principal one 464 TRAIN LENGTHS being the volume of freight to be moved to and from points in California al Utah. From the special master's Summary of the Evidence we quote: "Expanding to a full year's operation the traffic moved for this 2-months' period, it will be observed that for 1934 there would have been involved 5,793,725 thousand gross-ton miles. To move this total traffic in obedience with the provisions of the train-limit law would require 5,150 additional freight trains than those actually used in handling such traffic. These freight trains would have traveled 556,897 additional freight-train miles. Of this total addi- tional freight-train miles thus accruing, 488,388 would be allocated to Nevada operation and 68,509 to extra-territorial operation." The court then and immediately says: The special master's proposed finding on "Effect of Law as a Safety Measure" is as follows : I now continue to read from the quotation of that finding in the court's opinion in 18 Federal Supplement, 393: 27. EFFECT oF LAW AS SAF-nrr MEASURE The operation of plaintiff's railroad on Nevada line under the law, by re- stricting the number of car units in trains, would reduce the amount of po- tential slack that exists between coupled cars of a freight train, thereby affecting one of the factors that contributes to the severity of slack-action acci- dents; it would make the work of inspecting and supervising freight trains while in motion less arduous ; by reducing the number of car units in a train the law would reduce the potential hazards arising from defects in car equipment as to individual freight trains operated ; but this hazard would not be elim- inated by short trains when the total volume of freight traffic to be transported is considered. The benefits thus accruing by the law's operation would be substantially more than offst by an increased number of accidents and casual- ties from other causes that would follow the limitation of car units in freight trains to handle the same volume of freight traffic that can be and is effi- ciently handled without such limitation. The frequency of train and train-service accidents is directly related to the number of train units operated, and when more train units are run than are necessary to handle a given amount of traffic the hazard of accidents in handling such traffic is correspondingly increased. I will pause for a moment in the reading of this finding to call your attention to the paragraph I have just read and to compare it with Accident Bulletin No. 105 of the Interstate Commerce Commis- sion, calendar year 1936, which was not released for public distribu- tion until some time after the findings in the Nevada case were signed and filed. On page 2 of that bulletin there is a chart showing the number of train accidents per million units of locomotive miles and motor-train miles for the years 1922-36 inclusive, locomotive and motor-train miles being a basis of measurement which is practically the same as train-miles. That chart relates to all steam railways in the United States. Of the chart the Commission says: A more comprehensive view of the trend in train accidents is afforded by chart II, in which the number is related to locomotive and motor-train mileage during the period 1922-36. The peak occurred in 1923, the year after the shop- men's strike. This was followed by a gradual decline until 1934 and an up- swing thereafter through 1936. This curve shows that accidents fluctuate in number both downward and upward in greater ratio than the changes in volume of traffic. That opinion that accidents fluctuate in number both downward and upward in greater ratio than the changes in volume of traffic is merely another way of saying what the 3-judge court said in the finding I have just read, that the frequency of train and train- service accidents is directly related to the number of train units operated and when more train units are run than are necessary to TRAIN LENGTHS 465 handle a given amount of traffic, the hazard of accidents in handling such traffic is correspondingly increased. Now, continuing with finding 27 on page 82, of the Nevada findings: The limiting of freight trains on plaintiff's Nevada line to not more than 70 cars will result in compelling plaintiff to operate substantially more freight trains to carry a given volume of freight traffic than it would operate under the long-train method. Based upon the 1934 traffic volume, if the same had been transported under the law's restrictions it would have required 5,150 additional freight trains, or an increase of 32.8 percent in the number of freight trains that were actually operated to move this traffic and the additional number of train meets and passing would have been approximately 8,500. The operation of such additional number of trains would require a greater number of telegraphic and telephonic train orders and would increase the hazard of train and train-service accidents resulting from misunderstanding or forgetfulness of train orders. The additional number of trains would increase the number of employees and thereby increase the hazard of casualties that are related to the number of train units operated. Such additional trains would increase accidents and casualties in yards, accidents to section men, signal maintainers, grade-crossing accidents, head-end and rear-end collisions. The additional number of locomotives required to operate additional trains would increase the hazard of accidents or casualties that is related to the number of locomotives operated. A careful review of all the evidence warrants the conclusion that from the standpoint of safety to the public, to travelers on railroads, and to railroad employees, the Nevada train-limit law bears no reasonable relation to safety but if enforced would impair and lessen the safety of plaintiff's present method of freight-train operation in Nevada. Following the finding I have just read, the opinion continues: The court approves and adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted for consideration by the special master. Defendants' exceptions to certain of the findings of facts so submitted are overruled. Plaintiff is entitled to a decree granting a permanent injunction as prayed for, Atchison, T. c S. F. Ry. Co. v. LaPrade, (2 F. Supp. 855). Decree will be entered accordingly. CLIFTON MATHEWS, Circuit Judge. HAROLD LOUDERBACK, District Judge. FRANK H.: Noaceoss, District Judge. And the court proceeded to make and file the findings of which you have been furnished printed copies. Of course the effect of a judicial opinion is not to be determined by taking isolated expressions, wrenching them from their context, and ignoring their connotations or by giving undue weight or prominence to one finding to the exclusion of others. The opinion of the court in the Nevada case and the findings it adopted and signed should be viewed as a whole and so viewed, I most respectfully submit, they sustain to the fullest our opposition to Senate 69. Before I come to the Louisiana train-limit law, if any of the gentlemen of the committee desire to ask me any questions, I will be glad to try to answer them. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eicher. Mr. EICHER. I have been following your discussion of this section, but I have not yet had an answer to the question that has been revolving in my mind as to the status of the scientific development that dependable mechanical controls have reached, that are available 466 TRAIN LENGTHS to the engineer to enable him to operate the train, regardless of its length, in normal operation, with reasonable safety. Mr. BooTH. I do not think that is covered specifically. In the Nevada findings there is a lot of talk about it, though. Mr. EICHER. The only thing I see in that discussion is at the bottom of page 47, where it hints in the direction of the questions I have in mind. Let me read just a few lines at the bottom of page 47 of these Nevada findings: In ordinary train operation the extent and amount of slack in freight trains, and whether the slack is extended or bunched, are to some extent within the control of the engineer, who, by manipulation of the air brakes, and the power of the engine, and giving due consideration to the railroad grade over which the train is operating, may so handle the train as to avoid severe shock or slack action at the rear end of the train. Now, that brings to my mind the question of how far engineering science has developed the air brake, and the triple valve, which I understand to be the heart of the air brake; how far has that developed to this end, namely, what are the maximum units in the length of a train with which, under normal operation, the operation of that air brake is dependably under the control of the man in the engine. Mr. BooTH. Well, I will say frankly, my opinion on such a question would not be of any value to the committee, and I do not know of any judicial finding on the subject. I think if there had been I would know about it. Mr. EICiER. I had the impression you were going to refer to something like that. Mr. BOOTH. I cannot refer you to any findings fixing any maximum length within which operation is safe. Mr. ETCHER. Now, just one further question. In your statement before the Senate committee in 1935 there were included findings in the Arizona case, I believe. Mr. BOOTH. Yes. Mr. EICHER. On page 161 of those hearings I see this paragraph-- it is not long, and I would like to read the paragraph with the con- sent of the chairman. The quotation is from the findings in the Arizona case, as follows: The Interstate Commerce Commission has never found or held that long freight and passenger trains were not reasonably safe and never has reconi- mended that any limit be placed thereon. But as a result of an investigation instituted by it in 1922 it made an interlocutory report in 1924 (Investigation of Power Brakes and Appliances, 91 I. C. C. 481) wherein, after making tests upon trains of different lengths, including 100-car freight trains, it found that air brakes should be improved and better maintained. Thereafter at Purdue University laboratory tests of various improved appliances were made by the American Railway Association in cooperation with representatives of the Bureau of Safety of the Interstate Commerce Commission during the years 1925-28; and during the years 1929 and 1930 road tests under the same auspices were conducted in Oregon and California with freight trains of 50, 100, and 150 cars on light, moderate, and heavy grades; but no final report or order has been made in said proceedings, which is still pending and undetermined. What is the current history with reference to those investigations, if you know, or is there anyone here who can tell us? Mr. BooTH. I am a little uncertain about that. That would have to be put in by the succeeding witnesses. My impression is that there has been no formal report of the Commission since that time. TRAIN LENGTHS 467 I am very sure of my ground when I say that the Commission has never attempted to fix by any administrative order any maximum length of a freight train which should be operated with any type of air brakes. I would prefer, if I may be permitted, not to get into that subject. It is a subject I did not prepare myself on. Mr. EiCHER. I asked the question because of the statement you made yesterday. Mr. BooTH. I am quite sure that it will be covered by succeeding witnesses. In fact, we have discussed that at our committee meet- ings, and that is on the program. Now, I want to take up Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. I want to ask one question with reference to statistics shown on page 65 of this Nevada train-limit case. You made some statement a while ago that this included slack action cases, but I want to point out that it does not differentiate between slack action cases and others. Mr. BooTH. No; it does not. Mr. BOREN. And I want to request that such a differentiation be made, if that is possible, here or later in the hearings. Mr. BooTm. Well, I do not know whether we can do that. These figures were put in by the Santa Fe. The mileage figures were pre- pared in their general office in Topeka; the accident figures were prepared by their general office in Los Angeles from the form T reports. Testimony as to operating conditions was given by its present superintendent of transportation, Mr. Mahoney, at that time assistant superintendent of transportation. What the break-down is, I do not know. The idea was in putting them in that if a man has a broken leg, it does not make any difference whether he has fallen from a side ladder or whether he gets it in a caboose. The question was, from our standpoint, whether this operation by the long-train method of handling the mass of traffic was safer or less safe by the short- train method. Now, the Santa Fe thought it would be illustrative and argumen- tative, so far as figures may be argumentative, for them to show the accidents in the short-train district and the long-train district that occurred while men were on or getting on, or getting off of trains, and that includes the slack-action accidents and does not include just one class of broken legs. It includes all classes of broken legs and so on. Mr. BOREN. I see that it is in relation to the general picture. Nevertheless, I am making a formal request either of you or later witnesses that there be some differentiation shown between these general cases and slack-action cases. Mr. BoOTH. We will try to find that. Mr. BoREN. I want to ask one other question if I may, Mr. Chairman. Due to the discussion here that your company abided by the 70- car-train-limit law in Arizona, I hope that you will make some state- ment to show why. I think you should show why you have not broken that law for the purpose of a test case. 468 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. BOOTH. If I may do so, I will ask the clerk to hand you a copy of my statement and you will find that subject, I think, very fully treated in the discussion I gave yesterday. Mr. BOREN. Did you also in testifying yesterday, or have you as yet, shown what expense will be involved to the railroads by the enact- ment of legislation such as is here proposed? There has been a general reference to it. Mr. BOOTH. No. That will be given through Dr. Parmelee, head of our bureau of economics. Mr. BOREN. But, we can be certain that we will get the informa- tion as to the general cost of the longer trains to the railroads. Mr. BOOTH. Yes; you may be sure that that will be shown to the committee. Mr. BOREN. That is all. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. I would like to ask Mr. Booth one question before he proceeds, in reference to the slack-action issue. It appears to be the desire on the part of the proponents of the bill to focus attention upon and limit consideration to, as much as possible, the hazard and dangers growing out of slack action on long trains. I understand the opponents to take the position that that is just a very small part of the picture and entirely too limited and that consideration ought to be given to and that we should take into consideration all of the safety improvements of all characters that have been made by the railroads and all character of trains, and all chracter of accidents, and so forth. In that connection, what I thought was a comparable illustration occurred to my mind, and that was this: We will say, for instance, that there is a State automobile highway running from Baltimore to Wheeling, W. Va., and that it is over a varied topography. Now, there is a steep hill on that road some place. There is a hill steeper than any other hill between Baltimore and Wheeling, or there is a sharp curve in some bad place that renders it more liable to acci- dents, and in the course of time it is noted that there are more accidents on this steep hill or on this sharp curve than any other stretch of road between the two terminals, and complaints are made about it to the State highway commission, and that something ought to be done about this steep hill, about this sharp curve or both of them if they were in the picture. Now, the highway commission would not counter these complaints with the suggestion that you are just picking out two places on this road and there are not so many accidents on all of the rest of the road. W4 do not get so many complaints about the rest of the road or the rest of the hills on the road. The issue would be there, as I see it, the issue would be whether this hill complained of, or this curve complained of, was causing accidents which could be eliminated by cutting the hill down or straightening the curve out. Mr. BoOTH. Yes. But, Mr. Martin, if it could be shown by reliable statistics from other highway commissions that when you cut out a curve of that particular kind, you get a hazard from a great many other causes in other parts of the road, that ought, I think, to be TRAIN LENGTHS 46} considered, and I think the commission might be inclined to hesitate cutting out the curve and so far as the illustration you gave is appli- cable to our situation or at all comparable, that would be my comment on it. Mr. MARTIN. I concede that it is perfectly proper and the com- mittee should consider any showing that can be made that there is a constantly decreasing number of accidents on long trains due to im- provements in roadbed and trackage and engines, and cars, and safety devices, and all of the equipment; but it seems to me that the real issue is whether the greater length of the train until it reaches 125, 130, 140, and 150 cars, as testified to, is accompanied by increased hazards just due to the extra train length. Mr. BoOrn. That is a difference in theory which my friend, Mr. Farquharson, for many years, and myself, have been just as far apart as the North and South Poles. We have both been on the same side of the table, the legislative table; but the ends of the table were pretty far apart. My associate, Mr. Mason, calls my attention to pages 78 and 79, Mr. Eicher, of the printed findings and I think that you might find something in there along the lines about which you were inquiring. I have just a few more pages and I think that I can finish well before 12 o'clock. THE LOUISIANA TRAIN LIMIT LAW In addition to limiting freight trains to 70 cars, exclusive of caboose, and passenger trains to 16 cars (except that any train might pick up cars carrying perishable goods or livestock) the Louisana law of 1936 required three men as helpers instead of the two com- monly used in switching crews. The law exempted railroads oper- ating less than 100 miles of main track in Louisiana. The nine railroads that operated in Louisiana and that were affected by the law filed seperate suits in July 1936 in the United States District Court at New Orleans, accompanying their complaints with extensive affidavits and, on those complaints and affidavits they asked for restraining orders, which were granted, and for inter- locutory and final injunctions against the members of the Public Service Commission and the Attorney General. I may add paren- thetically they had stated their intention to enforce the law. The grounds of complaint against the train-limit provisions of the law were, generally-in fact the bills were drawn on the basis of the Nevada case-the same as those in the complaints in Arizona and Nevada and included substantial delay to and interference with inter- state commerce, large additional cost in operating a greater number of trains to handle traffic that was being properly handled by existing methods, and that the law bore no reasonable relation to safety. Discrimination was also charged in favor of railroads that fell within the 100-mile exemption. The charges were supported by detailed affidavits made by ranking operating officials of the nine railroads and it is noteworthy that on the hearing nearly four months after the affidavits were served; of the motions for interlocutory injunctions the affidavits as to addi- tional cost, interference, and delay were not denied by the Deputy 470 TRAIN LENGTHS Attorney General and special counsel who appeared for the defendant officials. The uncontradicted affidavits as to additional costs, that were neces- sarily based on the running of additional and unnecessary freight trains to handle the traffic of 1935 showed the following annual totals. Annual out-of-pocket cost, not including switch crew or capital investments- Lousiana train limit cases Railroad : Per year Texas & New Orleans----------------------------------$275,000 Kansas City Southern-------------._---------------------- 122, 973 Illinois Central------------------------------------------ 70, 441 Yazoo & Mississippi Valley__--------------------------------232,000 Texas & Pacific--_-..---------- -___-----------__----.- 153, 000 Louisiana & Arkansas Railway-----------------------------22,800 Missouri Pacific--------------------------------------- 489, 886 New Orleans, Texas & Mexico------------------------- 103, 350 Gulf, Mobile & Northern----------------------------------127, 000 Total---------------------- ----- 1, 596, 450 And those were merely selected expenses: Wages, fuel, engine-house expense, and repairs to locomotives. Those were the four major items. They take up probably 97 cents out of the dollar; so-called selected expenses, and these do not include any expenses for addi- tional capital expenditure that would have to be made. Early in December 1936 the nine motions for interlocutory injunc- tions were argued at New Orleans before the three-judge Federal court, consisting of Circuit Judge Foster and District Judges Ken- nerly, of Texas, and Borah, of Louisiana. The injunctions were granted on all the grounds urged. No writ- ten opinion was filed. At that time the Nevada ease had not been decided by the three-judge court and it was understood that if that case was later decided against the defendant, the Nevada attorney general, the Louisiana cases would not be tried. They have never been tried or pressed for trial and the Louisiana law has never been made effective. THE OKLAHOMA TRAIN LIMIT CASES As I have stated, the Oklahoma Legislature of 1937 passed and the Governor approved a bill forbidding the operation in that State of any train consisting of more than 70 freight, or other cars, ex- clusive of caboose. My information as to this case is exceedingly limited. I have only had a very brief, summary of it by letter from one of the counsel. 1 am not in the case. But the following-named nine railroads filed bills of complaint in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Oklahoma seeking to enjoin the enforcement of that law: The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. Panhandle & Santa Fe Railway Co. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. Frank O. Lowden, James E. Gorman, and Joseph B. Fleming, trustees of the estates of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. and the Chicago, Rock Island & Gulf Railway Co. TRAIN LENGTHS 471f The Kansas City Southern Railway Co. J. M. Kurn and John G. Lonsdale, trustees, St. Louis-San Fran- cisco Railway Co., debtor. Guy A. Thompson, trustee of Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., debtor. United States District Judge Edgar S. Vaught made orders re- straining the law's enforcement, and on December 18, 1937, those orders, by consent of all the parties were continued in full force and effect until May 2, 1938. I was not connected with those cases and am not advised whether the motions for interlocutory injunctions will be presented next May, or whether a further continuance may be sought. Mr. BoREN. May I interrupt to ask if that is all of the railroads in operation in Oklahoma? Mr. BOOTH. I do not know, Mr. Boren. INJURY To PUBLIC SERVICE There is, I respectfully submit, another persuasive applicability of the Arizona and Nevada train-limit cases to the bill you are now considering. It bears directly on the testimony you will hear re- garding public service and supports the protests of many groups of shippers. In the findings in each of those cases, the 3-judge court specifically held that the evidence showed that the 70-car liimt law was a traffic- delay law and not a traffic-expediting law. In Arizona, said the court (finding VIII): In addition to being subjected to that financial burden, plaintiffs' trans-State and other interstate freight traffic moving out of, into, across, or within Arizona is greatly interfered with and delayed ; And also with respect to the long-train operation in other States, the same court said (finding VII): The evidence shows that the practice of standard long-train operation as defined in finding I does not retard, but on the contrary, expedites the move- ment of freight-train traffic and passenger-train traffic, and that long trains do not delay the delivery of the traffic therein. If you will refer to the printed pamphlet containing the Nevada findings, you will see on pages 34 to 38 (finding 18C) how positively the 3-judge court held that the interstate traffic that moved in or through Nevada would be seriously and continuously delayed and interfered with by a 70-car limit and how explicitly it described the reasons for that delay. It is but a truism for me to say that it makes no difference to ship- pers or receivers of freight whether the free flow of transportation of their freight is constructed or interfered with by a State law or by a National law. The effect on their business and their pocketbooks is the same. And one does not have to be a railroad operator or an economist to realize that the national law would have a much more adverse effect on commerce than a law confined to a single State because the delays under it would be cumulative from terminal to terminal and from railroad to railroad. The cutting down of through schedules as the result of long-train operation, which subsequent witnesses will de- scribe, is a striking confirmation-if confirmation be required-of 472 TRAIN LENGTHS the correctness of the findings of the six Federal judges on that sub- ject; the only judicial findings in existence that are based on exten- sive hearings under the rules of evidence with full opportunity for studied and deliberate cross-examination and from written and oral arguments. INCREASED COST OF OPERATION Permit me to summarize briefly the direct increase in operating cost in several States compelled by a 70-car train-limit law as shown in the cases in which I was counsel. In Arizona, based on the 1927 traffic, the court found a direct in- crease of $600,000 per year in Santa Fe operating expenses and of $400,000 per year on but one main line of the Southern Pacific (finding VIII, p. 43). These findings I have read. In Nevada, based on 1934 traffic volume, the court found that the law would compel an increase of $600,000 per year in Southern Pacific operating expense (finding 19, p. 40, printed findings). In Louisiana, the combined annual expense to the nine railroad plaintiffs, according to the uncontradicted affidavits I have described, would have been close to a million six hundred thousand dollars in the year 1935. These are not fanciful figures and cannot be lightly brushed aside by general statements and by talking about filling out branch line and local trains with through cars or cars moving in an opposite direction. The figures I have quoted were sworn to by the men who run those properties, men who are familiar with every detail of their operation. In Louisiana they were unchallenged and in Arizona and Nevada they met with unanimous approval of three Federal judges in each of those States. To me, and I hope, to you, they afford striking confirmation of the cost figures of the Nation's railroads that will be here submitted; increased costs that inevitably under inexorable economic laws will be passed on to the public. THE NEVADA FINDINGS ARE NATIONAL, NOT LOCAL IN CHARACTER Those findings should by no means be treated as dealing entirely with a merely local or parochial situation, I hope you will conclude, although they deal with lines of railroads which even when they are handling peak traffic would look like light traffic to any of these eastern lines in the eastern district. One of these eastern lines would think that the 17,000 or 18,000 trains per year of operation we had across Nevada was a sort of a branch-line operation in Pennsylvania or Ohio; but, nevertheless, the comparison remains as a comparison of train for train, car for car, ton for ton, and is applicable to the eastern situation. Furthermore if a 70-car limit would increase meets and passings and number of trains to such an extent in the West, what would this bill do in the East? That is what our witnesses will try to tell you. That case, however, was tried on a national basis and the findings taken as a whole constitute an accurate, exhaustive, and compre- hensive treatise on the general subject now before you. Please refer to the finding beginning on page 10 dealing with the "General rail- TRAIN LENGTHS 473 road improvement in recent years," to that beginning on page 12, headed, "Long train operation is a general practice on major steam railroads throughout the United States," and the subfinding on page 12 headed, "Improved schedules and performance; increased effi- ciency," wherein also the standardization of operating practices throughout the country is particularly found. Also be again referred to the discussion beginning at page 49 of "Safety of operation as affected by train lengths," where the court devotes 11 subfindings to national statistics on the subject of train and train-service accidents. Mr. Sullivan, who will follow me, will bring those national statistics down from 1933 to include 1936, the latest statistics that the Inter- state Commerce Commission has released in comprehensive form. We called operating, accounting, and statistical officials of standard American railroads from Portland, Maine, to Portland, Oreg. On the basis of 1933 statistics, those witnesses depicted conditions and results on 42.48 percent of the miles of road operated by class I rail- roads during that year; and during the same year the roads they represented handled over 9 billion train car-miles, or 51.21 percent of the entire freight-car mileage of American railroads. The findings of the court also reflect the national cost and eco- nomic statistics presented by Dr. Julius H. Parmelee who testified at length on those subjects in the Nevada case, and will testify here. That case was tried along national as well as local lines and those findings, we respectfully submit, are entitled tQ be so regarded. In conclusion, may I express my sincere appreciation of the courtesy of the chairman and of the members of this committee, and my sincere hope that the facts I have endeavored to present to you will be of some assistance at least in the consideration I know that you will give to this very important measure. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. I want to ask a question with reference to the cost analysis that you made in the close of your statement. Can that analysis be broken down in such away as to show the cost with relation to employment and with relation to increased ma- chinery or equipment, or maintenance, or whatever you have? Mr. BoOTr. Those were the cost figures as found by the court in the States I have mentioned, and'I do not have any figures here that would break them down, generally speaking. Mr. BOREN. The thing that I am trying to arrive at is, there has been some discussion of the employment angle, and I want to see if there is any direct relationship between the 70-car train and the problem of employment and also in relation of employment to cost in the increased cost of operation. Mr. BooTH. Well, of course, wages of train and engine men form a very large part of train-mile costs. The percentage varies with different schedules of pay, and different classes of service. I have forgotten what the general national average is; but it is rather substantial. The finding in the Nevada case was that there was an added pay- roll expense of $243,000 out of the $600,000. Mr. Mason tells me that that was not the findings; that that was the evidence, that $243,000 out of $600,000 was added pay-roll expense. 47.4 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. BoREN. Then in your opinion there is a direct relationship between the problem of employment and the interest of railroad labor? Mr. BooTH. But they say this is not an employment measure. We have not discussed this from that standpoint. They say that it is not an employment measure at all, and it was so stated on the floor of the Senate. Mr. BOREN. I understand that. The early witnesses for railroad labor indicated that the measure was entirely one of safety. Mr. BooH. Yes. Mr. BoREN. But they were questioned at length about that view- point, and I just want to be certain whether or not railroad manage- ment held that the employment feature was one of the major motives behind it. Mr. BOOTH. Of course, Mr. Boren, every added train you put on the railroads means added costs and most of these train- and engine- men are paid on the basis of 8 hours or less, or 100 miles, or less, whichever makes the higher amount, which is considered as a day's work and then there are allowances for overtime. You cannot run a train, a freight train, without employing an engineer, fireman, conductor, and I believe at least two brakemen as a minimum in most States. Mr. BOREN. So you think approximately one-third of that cost in the Nevada case would apply more or less generally to labor, and that that same scale would apply more or less generally to the country as a whole? Mr. BOOTH. I would not like to express my views on that. I would much prefer that you ask Dr. Parmelee that question. Jie will be on the witness stand; he has the national picture, and I do not have. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. On the phase of increased employment, apparently, the issue originated at a time when that was not an issue or a consideration. Mr. BooTH. You mean in Arizona? Mr. MARTIN. No; in the country generally. I do not understand that back 25 years ago when this issue began to rise that the question of unemployment was so acute as to cause the railroad men to figure out that if they could cut the train length down, they could put more men to work and apparently the issue has persisted and grown, without any let-up ever since during thefpast 25 or 30 years. Mr. BOOTH. Well, employment was a distinct factor in the Arizona situation. They were kind enough, as I said, to fix the limit at the practical limit of the length of the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific sidings in Arizona, but they wanted to freeze us at that point, so that the sidings would not be extended and heavier power put in there and longer trains run. Again, I am not saying that in the way of criticism. That was their business. We objected to it, but our objections were overruled. They did give us everything we could do at the time in Arizona, and that was a 70-car train. They did not try to set us back 15 years as this bill does. The CHAIRMAN. We thank you, Mr. Booth. TRAIN LENGTHS 475 Mr. BooT. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, again, most sincerely. (The pamphlet entitled "The Nevada Train Limit Case" follows:) THE NEVADA TRAIN LIMIT CASE A copy of the unanimous findings of a special three-judge United States District Court on February 23, 1937, holding the Nevada 70-car train-limit law of 1935 invalid, on the ground, among others, that it would impair and lessen the safety of train operation. Printed January 1938 by the Association of American Railroads in connection with its opposition to the Train Limit Bill (S. 69, 75th Cong.) PREFACE The taking of testimony in the Nevada Train Limit Case before the Special Master occupied 105 hearing days between August 5, 1935, and April 15, 1936. The transcript of that testimony embraced 7,220 typed pages, of which con- siderably more than half dealt with the issue of whether the law bore a reasonable relation to safety. Of the 265 exhibits that were received, considerably more than half were on the safety issue. The preamble to the following Findings (pp. 1-3) gives a brief history of the proceedings. In this reproduction of the typewritten Special Findings as signed by the three Federal judges, certain findings, by being printed in bold-face type, have been emphasized as having special bearing on the issues discussed at the hearing on Senate Bill 69, 75th Congress, which began on January 11, 1938, before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. No appeal was taken from the Final Decree entered on these Findings and the Nevada Train Limit Law has never been placed in effect. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will adjourn, except for a brief executive session, until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. IN THE DISTICT COURT OF THE UNITFD STATES IN AND FOR THE DIsTnict or NEVADA SoUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff, V. In Equity No. H. 143 GRAY MASHIIBURN, Attorney General of the State of Nevada, Defendant. SPEcIAL FINDINGS oRS FACMI AND CONCLUsIONS OF LAW (Filed March 15, 1937, O. E. Benham, Clerk, by 0. F. Pratt, Deputy) PEAMELE The plaintiff filed herein on April 1, 1935, its verified bill of complaint, together with notice of motion for an interlocutory injunction. The issues as tendered by the pleadings presented matters within Section 266 of the Judicial Code. Hon. Frank H. Norcross, Judge of the above entitled court, called to his assistance Hon. Clifton Mathews, Circuit Judge, and Hon. Harold Louderback, District Judge; and said three judges thereafter met as a special statutory court, and considered and passed upon plaintiff's said motion for an interlocutory injunction, and granted the same. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the proceedings which was denied and an answer was thereafter filed. It appearing from the pleadings that an exceptional condition existed requiring a reference of said cause to a special master, thereafter, pursuant to Equity Rule 59 and responsive to a joint written request of the parties in that behalf, said statutory court duly made and entered its order on June 25, 1965, referring said cause to M. A. Diskin, Esq., as Special Master. Thereafter, in accordance with notice given to respective parties, said special master proceeded to and did conduct hearings and receive evidence both oral and documentary beginning on the fifth day of August 1935, and continuing there- 476 TRAIN LENGTHS after from day to day with short intermissions until April 15, 1936, when said hearings were completed. At said hearings and on the taking of testimony plaintiff was represented by George S. Brown, Esq.; John S. Belford, Esq.; Henley C. Booth, Esq.; Guy V. Shoup, Esq., and Burton Mason, Esq. The defendant, Hon. Gray Mashburn, appeared in person and was also represented by Hon. W. T. Mathews, Deputy Attorney-General of the State of Nevada. At the conclusion of the hearing it was stipulated and agreed in open court by and between the parties that briefs on the facts and the law should be filed with special master prior to the final presentation of his report to the court. Plaintiff agreed to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thereafter, each of said filings was made with said Special Master. On November 7, 1936, and pursuant to aforesaid order of reference dated June 25, 1935, said special master duly presented and filed his report in this cause, together with his recommendations respecting the findings of fact and conclu- sions of law, and the final judgment and decree to be made and entered by the court herein. With said report said Special Master duly returned to the Court all of the evidence, both oral and documentary, that had been received at the hearing before him, together with a statement of such evidence as had been offered by either party, but upon objection had not been received. Thereupon, and on or about December 31, 1936, defendant filed his exceptions to the aforesaid report and recommendations of the Special Master; and there- after, on January 8, 1937, this cause duly came on for final hearing and argu- ment before the Court, all the members thereof being present and participating ; and was duly argued by counsel for the respective parties. At said final hearing and argument it was stipulated and agreed, in open court, by and between counsel for the parties, that the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and briefs of argument, previously filed with the Special Master, should also be deemed to have been submitted to the Court, for its consideration herein. Now, therefore, having duly considered the matters presented at said final hearing and arugment, and in said briefs of parties, and each and all of defendant's said exceptions, and having duly examined the record of the evidence herein, in the light of said briefs, arguments, and exceptions, and having duly reviewed the aforesaid report of the Special Master, and being now fully advised in the premises, this Court does hereby, pursuant to Equity Rule 70, make the following special findings of fact and conclusions of law in this cause: SPEIAL FINDINGS OF FACT 1. WORDS DEFINED "Nevada line" as used herein refers to the districts within the State of Nevada, and adjacent portions of California and Utah, where the Nevada Train Limit Law, hereinafter referred to, may affect railroad operations of plaintiff, if and when said law is enforced. 2. CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS The bill of complaint in the above entitled action seeks injunctive relief against enforcement by defendant of the provisions of that certain Act of the Legislature of the State of Nevada, commonly known and referred to as the Nevada Train Limit Law, (Statutes of Nevada, 1935, chapter 26, page 32) as the same applies to all interstate traffic transported by plaintiff. 3. THE PARTIES The plaintiff is now and at all times herein mentioned has been a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Kentucky, and a citizen and resident of that state. It is, and has been, engaged in the transportation of freight and passengers, as a common carrier in interstate commerce, and in operating lines of railroad extending from, to and between points in the states of Oregon, California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, Texas and New Mexico. Defendant, Gray Mashburn, is a citizen and resident of Carson City, Ormsby County, State of Nevada, and is the duly elected, qualified, and acting Attorney- General of the State of Nevada. It is his statutory duty to commence and prosecute, and/or direct the institution and the prosecution of suits for penalties TRAIN LENGTHS 477 for every violation of the Nevada Train Limit Law, the Statute herein sought to be set aside (Statutes of Nevada, 1935, chapter 26, page 32). 4. TEXT OF LAW-THREAT OF ENFORCEMENT BY DEFENDANT The law in question is known as "Nevada Train Limit Act" and is Chapter 26, Statutes of Nevada, 1935, page 32. It was approved March 11, 1935, and is now, and was at the date complaint was filed, a law of the State of Nevada. The Act provides : "Chapter 26-An act to promote the public safety and the safety of travelers upon railroads and the safety of railroad employees by limiting the number of cars that may be operated in trains operated on railroads in the State of Nevada ; providing a penalty for the violation thereof and for the recovery of such penalty by suit; providing certain exceptions in the act; and other mat- ters properly connected therewith. (Approved March 11, 1935.) "The People of the State of Nevada, Represented in Senate and Assembly, Do Enact as Follows : "Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, association, company, or corporation, or any receiver of any railroad company operating any railroad in the State of Nevada, to operate or cause to be operated, or permit to be operated over his, their, or its line of railroad, or any pdrtion thereof, any train of cars consisting of more than seventy freight or other cars, exclusive of caboose. "Sec. 2. Nothing in this act shall be construed to apply to the operation of any of the trains mentioned in this act in the event of disablement, breakdown, or mechanical failure of the motive power of any such trains between freight division terminals. "Sec. 3. Any person, firm, association, company, or corporation, or any receiver of any railroad company, who or which shall violate any of the pro- visions of this act, shall be liable to the State of Nevada for a penalty of five hundred dollars ($500) for each offense ; and such penalty shall be recovered in a suit brought therefore in the name of the State of Nevada by the attorney- general or, under his direction, by the district attorney of the proper county in a court of competent jurisdiction in any county of the state in or through which the line of the railroad upon which it is alleged there was operated a train or trains in violation of this act may run or be operated. "Sec. 4. This act shall take effect sixty days after its passage and approval." It is the duty of defendant expressly imposed upon him by said Train Limit Law to enforce the provisions of said law, if and when the same is violated. Said defendant has threatened and now threatens that, in the event of a violation of said law by plaintiff, he will institute or cause to be instituted against plaintiff proceedings to compel compliance with said law, and to collect from plaintiff the penalties therein provided for each such violation. 5. DESCRIPTION OF PLAINTIFF'S LINES OF RAILROADS (a) Genernl of System. Plaintiff's main line of railroad extends from San Francisco, California, to Portland, Oregon ; and from San Francisco through Roseville, California, across Nevada to Ogden, Utah ; and from San Francisco, southeasterly to Los Angeles, California, and thence to Tucumcari, New Mexico. At each of said points (other than Tucson and Yuma), as well as at numerous other points, plaintiff's lines connect with the lines of other interstate rail carriers and enter into and become part of through routes for the transportation of freight between all parts of the United States and to and from foreign countries. This system is known as the Pacific Lines. (b) Nevada Lines. (1) Main Line, Double-track, Principal Stations, Character of Traffle.-Plain- tiff's principal line across the State of Nevada diverges from the main route be- tween San Francisco and Portland at Roseville, California. The latter place is a division point. From Roseville, the main line to Ogden extends easterly and north- easterly across the summit of the Sierra Nevada mountains through the station of Truckee, California, and enters the State of Nevada at Calvada. Calvada is approximately 120 miles easterly from Roseville and about 20 miles easterly from Truckee. From Calvada, said1 line extends easterly and northeasterly 47891-38 31 478 TRAIN LENGTHS through the cities and stations of Reno, Sparks, Lovelock, Imlay, Winnemucca. Battle Mountain, Carlin, Elko, Wells, and Montello to the station of Tecoma, Nevada, a point about four miles westerly from the Utah-Nevada bundary line. The total length of plaintiff's said principal main line within the State of Nevada is approximately 444 miles. In addition to the above described main line, plain- tiff has an auxiliary main line in the State of Nevada which joins the principal main line at the station of Fernley, Nevada, and runs northwesterly across northeastern California, to a junction with the -San Francisco-Portland line at Klamath Falls, Oregon. Plaintiff's principal main line across the State of Nevada consists in part of double-track, in part of single track, and in part of track, which, although single, is operated as double-track by virtue of an operating agreement with the West- ern Pacific Railroad Company. Said main line is double-track from Roseville, California, to a point where it crosses the California-Nevada boundary line (Cal- vada). It continues for a distance of 17.6 miles to a point east of Sparks; thence single-track for a distance of 94 miles to a point near Perth, thence double-track for a distance of 66 miles to a point near Rose Creek, thence single-track for a distance of 14 miles to Weso. From Weso to Alazon, a distance of approximately 183 miles on the rails of the plaintiff and 178 miles on the rails of the Western Pacific the plaintiff's line, although single-track, is operated as paired track with the Western Pacific, under the agreement heretofore mentioned. All the east- bound trains of plaintiff being operated over the rails of the Western Pacific between Weso and Alazon, while all westbound trains of the plaintiff are operated over plaintiff's own rails between Alazon and Weso. From Alazon, plaintiff's said main line is double-track for a distance of 12.5 miles to.Moor, thence single- track for a distance of 24.6 miles to Valley Pass, thence double-track for a (us- tance of about 31 miles to the point where it crosses the Nevada-Utah state line. The main line is double-tracked for some distance easterly from Tecoma and at that station the tracks used for eastbound and westbound movement diverge au(l continue divergent for a distance of approximately 12 miles, converging again at the station of Lucin, Utah, a point about eight miles east of the Nevada-Utah boundary. From Lucin plaintiff's line extends eastward for a distance of ap- proximately 104 miles to Ogden, Utah. There are no stations of the plaintiff immediately adjacent to the Nevada boundary line upon either track and at the points where the easterly and westerly tracks of plaintiff's said line cross the Nevada boundary the tracks are separated by a distance of approximately one and one-half miles. Substantially all of the interstate freight traffic moved by plaintiff across the State of Nevada moves over the main lines just described, either in whole or in part. The great preponderance of such traffic, with the exception of traffic orig- inating at or destined to points within the State of Nevada, is handled by plaintiff upon its principal main line which extends between Calvada and Tecoma, Ne- vada. A small proportion of such interstate traffic is also handled by plaintiff over its Fernley-Klamath line, which traffic reaches or leaves the princini main line at Fernley. (2) Helper Districts; Grades.-"Helper districts" are those sections of the line where grades or other physical conditions are such as to require the use of one or more additional locomotives to handle freight trains which are nor- mally handled by one locomotive. There are two regular helper districts on the Nevada lines, one for eastward trains only and extending from Wells to Moor, a distance of nine miles; the second, for westward trains only, extending a distance of 21.3 miles from Montello to Valley Pass. Helper locomotives are used to some extent in the grade territory on the line between Wendel and Alturas. The Nevada line, as above described, is located for the most part in compara- tively level territory. On sections adjacent to the California-Nevada State line considerable grade is encountered, especially from Roseville, California, to Cal- vada. In this section the line crosses the Sierra Nevada Mountains and between Roseville and the summit (Norden) the grade opposed to eastward traffic is 2.45. From Calvada to Truckee, California, the grade opposed to westward traffic is 1 percent. From Calvada eastward to Sparks the ruling grade opposed to westward movement is about 1 percent. Between Sparks and Wells the grade is practically level with no ruling grades in excess of 1 percent This section of the line travels for the most part through desert country and for many miles presents no obstruction to the view of the railroad right-of-way. From Wells eastward to Moor the grade opposed to eastward movement is 1.4 percent. From Moor to Valley Pass, 24.6 miles; the grade is less than one-half of 1 per- cent. From Valley Pass to Montello, 21 miles, the eastward line descends a grade TRAIN LENGTHS 479 for a maximum of 1.5 percent and between these two points the grade opposed to westward traffic is about 1.35 percent. From Montello to Lucin the eastward line descends with a maximum grade of 1.4 percent, the westward line between these two points presents a grade of .55 percent. Between Fernley and Wendel, California, the grade is 0.98 percent. Between Wendel and Alturas, Cali- fornia, the grades attain a maximum of about 2 percent. 3. NEVADA LINE OPERATION (a) Subdivisions and Terminals. For operating purposes the Nevada line has been subdivided into divisions and divisions are further divided into subdivisions. Freight-train terminals are stations at the termini of subdivisions. Through freight trains originate at ter- minals and move through subdivisions to the next terminal where the run ends. Local train runs may terminate at intermediate points. The following stations upon the Nevada line are freight-train terminals : Roseville, California ; Sparks, Imlay, Carlin, Montello, and Ogden. These several stations with the exception of Montello are points where the run of freight-train crews begins and ends. Through freight trains arriving at Sparks from either direction are usually re- constituted there with much switching. At Imlay and Carlin generally no change is made in through freight trains other than changing of caboose and locomotive. Freight trains operating over the line between Fernley and Wendel geenrally originate at Sparks and terminate at Wendel. On the southward op- eration, trains originate at Wendel and terminate at Sparks. This district is known as the Alturas subdivision. (b) Locomotive and Crew Changes. The Roseville to Sparks district is a part of the Sacramento subdivision and constitutes a through run for crews and locomotives. The district between Sparks and Imlay is identified as Sparks subdivision of the Salt Lake division and is a through run for train crews. In many instances, locomotives on through freight trains are operated on to Carlin, a distance of 285 miles, with- out change. The Winnemucca subdivision is the district between Imlay and Carlin and is a through run for freight-train crews. Locomotives and cabooses on all trains except when changed at Imlay are changed at Carlin. The district between Carlin and Ogden at the present time constitutes a through run for both locomotives and train crews and is composed of two freight-train subdivi- sions. The district between Carlin and Montello is known as the Elko subdivi- sion and between Montello and Ogden as the Ogden subdivision. These terminal locations and locomotive and train crew operations have not Varied for the past several years, except in 1933 the practice of changing train crews at Montello was discontinued and they are now permitted to run be- tween Carlin and Ogden in both directions. (c) Operating Rules. Plaintiff has caused to be printed and has issued and delivered to all em- ployees in train service two books of rules entitled (a) "Rules and Regulations of the Transportation Department" and (b) "Rules and Regulations Govern- ing Care and Operation of Air Brake and Air Signal Apparatus." These rules govern the operation of freight and other trains on the Nevada lines and upon the system generally. The Western Pacific Railroad Company has also caused to be printed and has issued and delivered to all employees in train service rules and regulations governing the operation of trains. These rules are effective between the stations of Weso and Alazon as to Southern Pacific operation and to train crews operating on Western Pacific track between these two points. The rules and regulations of both operating companies provide general instructions governing operations which are required to be observed by all employees, except in certain instances to meet special local conditions deviations are permitted by special instruction bulletins or orders. The afore- said rules and regulations if fully complied with and observed by said em- ployees provide safe operating rules for passenger and freight trains now being operated on said lines as well as any additional trains that might be required to be operated. Examinations on rules and regulations. and opera- tions generally, including air brake service, are given employees in train service from time to time. For this purpose examination and instruction cars in Charge of competent persons at periodic intervals are moved through the entire system and employees are instructed and examined on the rules and operating features, including air brakes and other matters. 480 TRAIN LENGTHS (d) Inspection. Each freight train arriving at Roseville, Sparks, Carlin, and Ogden from both directions and the freight car units contained therein are inspected by men employed in the car service department of plaintiff's lines. The inspection thus made consists of an examination of the car wheels, couplers, end sills, center sills, bolsters, brake beams, connecting rods. An inspection is also made of air brakes, air hose connections, and other parts of the air brake system. These operating units of a freight train receive frequent inspection by train crews while on the road between terminals. While the train is moving a constant watch is directed by the crew to the different car units and each time a train is stopped an examination of the same is made. At stations, other than points where the inspection is made by the car service department, an inspection is made by the train crew. Cars received by plaintiff from connecting lines at interchanging points are subjected to inspection before being accepted for handling and if the car needs repair it may be rejected, this in accordance with the rules promulgated by the Association of American Railroads. The evidence shows that for the year 1934 a total of 124,795 freight cars, loaded and empty, were received at Ogden from the Nevada line in an eastward movement. Of this number 67,262 cars were refrigerator cars. During the'same period in the westward movement over Nevada lines a total of 131,320 cars were received at Ogden and of this number 65,224 cars were empty refrigerator cars. Refrigerator cars are owned by the Pacific Fruit Express Company and this corporation has issued printed instruc- tions to employees, designating in detail the inspection required to be made of each refrigerator car and the method of same. Empty refrigerator cars re- ceived at Roseville from the Nevada line are inspected in this manner before being released for re-loading. All refrigerator cars that are loaded in originat- ing territory are given such inspections before being sent to loading stations. Such an inspection is also made at Ogden. 7. GENERAL RAILROAD IMPROVEMENT IN RECENT YEARS (a) Roadbed and Equipment. A Class I railroad is defined according to the classification of the Interstate Commerce Commission as one which receives annually gross earnings of one million dollars or more. This class operates more than 90 per cent of the mileage in the United States and receives more than 97 per cent of the total earnings of the steam railroads of the country. In 1923, railroad executives, members of the American Railway Association, met in New York and outlined a program to increase the capacity of the rail plant and the efficiency of the service. The principal factor in the program was the development of larger units of train operation. This was accomplished by strengthening tracks, bridges, and roadbeds ; new railroad locomotives de- signed, heavier trains were installed to replace the less efficient type of power and new freight cars of greater capacity were acquired. Between the years 1923 and 1930 railroad traffic was increasing at a very rapid rate, reaching the peak in 1929. To have an adequate capacity to meet traffic demands railroads were required to purchase and place in service a very large number of new locomotives and freight cars of the more modern type. The new locomotives acquired were equipped with super-heaters, feed-water heaters, air pumps of newer design, air reservoirs of increased capacity, back pressure indicators, power reverse gears, and improved brake equipment. Tractive effort or tractive power is defined as the effort of the pressure ex- erted by the steam in the cylinders to turn the driving wheels, measured at the rim tread of the driver. The average weight per steam locomotive, exclu- sive of tender, has increased from 83 tons in 1914 to 125 tons in 1933, while the average weight on the drivers has increased from 67 tons to 100 tons in the same period. The average tractive power per locomotive in the same period of time increased 27.4 per cent. The average tractive power per steam locomotive in 1923 was 39,177 pounds; between 1924 and 1933 the average trac- tive power per freight locomotive for locomotives of Class I railroads only increased from 46,060 pounds to 53,314 pounds. In 1922 the average capacity of the freight cars in service on railroads of the United States was 43.1 tons; in 1933, 47.5 tons. In 1922, 68.8 per cent of all of the freight cars in service on Class I railroads were of steel or underframe construction. In 1933, 91.1 per cent of the total in service consisted of such construction. TRAIN LENGTHS 481 Roadbed improvements consisted of replacements with heavier rails, new ties and ballasts, reduction of curves, increasing length of passing tracks and side- tracks, enlarging yards and improving and reconstructing bridges and trestles. In many instances the equipment purchases made by railroads were under express authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to Section 20-A of the Interstate Commerce Act. 8. LONG TRAIN OPERATION IS A GENERAL PRACTICE ON MAJOR STEAM RAILROADS THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES (a) Long Train Operation. By "long train operation" is meant the practice of handling freight traffic in freight trains containing substantially more than 70 cars, whenever the char- acteristics of the traffic awaiting movement are such that a train of such length can be more efficiently and economically operated than a shorter train ; and to handle in short trains (i. e., of 70 cars or less) such traffic as cannot be conveniently or economically handled in longer trains. Much detailed testimony was offered by representatives of major steam line railroads and many exhibits were received in evidence establishing long train operation. The general purport of this evidence shows an increased number of freight cars in freight train operation from 1923 to 1934. The period from 1930 on shows somewhat of a decline but this is attributable to the falling off of freight traffic and not to any change in the practice. The average number of cars per freight train on Class I railroads in 1922 was 38.4; in 1930, 48.9; 1933, 45.5; 1934, 46.2. The testimony of W. L. Kirk establishes that long train operation is today followed as the customary and ordinary method of operation upon substan- tially every major railroad system throughout the United States. The evidence contains many exhibits submitted by various railroads showing their method of operation and these exhibits establish beyond controversy that long train operation is the standard and regular practice. The railroads thus operating include nearly all of those connecting with plaintiff's lines and many of plaintiff's competitors. (b) Improved Schedules and Performance; Increased Efficiency. For the purpose of expediting the movement of certain classes of freight from point to point within a carrier's line and to insure a speedy delivery of such traffic at far western and eastern points on lines of foreign carriers, the han- dling of through freight trains is arranged and dispatched upon published and agreed schedules. These schedules on occasions are participated in by three or more carriers. Green fruits, livestock, and certain classes of merchandise are moved thusly in what is termed expedited or manifest trains. This character of shipment has greatly increased in recent years and, when traffic is sufficient, is handled in trains of 80 to 85 car units at a speed of 55 miles per hour. Con- tributing factors to such performance include improvements in roadbed equip- ment and operating methods. Competition in these freight movements requires a consistent adherence to schedules and this requires uniform time operation from western to eastern points and vice versa on two or more railroad lines. The undisputed testimony shows that, concurrently with the greatly im- proved (i. e., faster) schedules, the freight moving thereunder is delivered upon or in advance of its scheduled time of arrival in more than 95 per cent of all cases. As showing the improved efficiency of operation which has accompanied the development of the long-train program, plaintiff submitted exhibits and testimony showing operating records on Class I railroads from 1922 to 1934. In addition, testimony and exhibits were received in evidence from officials connected with several railroads addressed to the same subject matter and classified under typical operations. The evidence submitted, showing the result of operations of Class I railroads, establishes that from the year 1922 to 1934 average speed of all freight trains increased 43.2 per cent. The average gross ton miles per train hour for all freight trains of Class I carriers was 16,188 in 1922, and in 1934 it amounted to 28,041, an improvement of 73.2 per cent. The average payment per revenue car loaded for the same class railroads for loss and damage to freight in 1922 was one dollar and eleven cents ($1.11) per car; in 1933, fifty-two ($0.52) cents per car. 482 TRAIN LENGTHS The average expense per thousand revenue ton miles for transportation expenses only for all Class I railroads was four dollars and sixty-two cents ($4.62) in 1922; and three dollars and ten cents ($3.10) in 1933. The average consumption of fuel in 1922 was at the rate of 163 pounds of coal per thousand gross ton miles ; in 1934 it amounted to 122 pounds of coal per thousand gross ton miles. Referring now to typical operations, the evidence shows that on the Chesapeake and Ohio railroad miles per hour of freight train movement increased 44.8 per cent in 1934 over 1924, and the average gross train load increased 53.1 per cent. The costs for clearing wrecks decreased from nine dollars and fifty-three cents ($9.53) per thousand locomotive miles in 1924 to one dollar and seventy-five cents ($1.75) in 1934. On the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe railroad freight train miles per hour increased 44.62 per cent; pounds of coal for one thousand gross ton miles decreased 25.15 per cent comparing 1934 with 1923. The total freight operating expense per thousand net ton miles for the same period decreased 22.69 per cent. Erie Railroad-speed per hour of freight trains increased 75.2 per cent; gross tons per train increased 34.8 per cent; consumption of coal per thousand gross ton miles decreased 36.9 per cent, comparing the years 1920 with 1934. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul-increase in speed per hour, 39 per cent: consumption pounds of coal per thousand gross ton miles decreased 25 per cent ; average cost conducting transportation per hundred gross ton miles reduced by 39 per cent. The comparison was between 1934 and 1922. Boston and Maine Railroad-the speed in miles per hour increased 42.3 per cent in 1934 over 1933; cost per thousand gross ton miles decreased 62.8 per cent over the same period. (c) Operating Conditions and Rules. The evidence discloses that the method of operation, the physical facts sur- rounding the same, and rules and regulations by which operation is governed are for the most part, except where local conditions require changes, closely comparable as between plaintiff's lines and the railroad lines of which the record contains typical examples of the method of operation. 9. CHARACTER OF FREIGfT TRAFFIC HANDLED OVER NEVADA LINES UPON WHon THE LAW WILL OPERATE (a) Interstate Character. The aggregate total of revenue tons carried one mile (for brevity called "revenue ton-miles") for a particular state or district is ascertained by multiply- ing the total tonnage of freight carried by the total distance over which each ton is transported ; and this result gives the measure of the total volume of the revenue freight transportation service rendered. The revenue ton miles of freight transported in Nevada by plaintiff during the five-year period, 1930 to 1934, inclusive, amounted to 6,578,892,924 and 99.74 per cent thereof was interstate traffic and 0.26 per cent during said period related to intrastate traffic. Of the total freight revenue earned by plaintiff's lines in Nevada during this period 99.25 per cent related to interstate freight while the revenues from Nevada intrastate freight were but 0.75 per cent of said total; these revenues being allocated to the State of Nevada in accordance with the formulas prescribed by the Nevada Public Service Commission. During the same years 92.47 per cent of the total traffic originated and terminated outside Nevada and moved across the State of Nevada as over a bridge. (b) Need for Expedition. The "bridge traffic" handled over the Nevada lines consists principally of fruits, vegetables, grapes, lemons, lettuce, etc., livestock and other products requiring delivery at destination without delay. The record shows that for the period from the years 1930 to 1934, inclusive, 611,217 freight cars were received at Ogden over the Nevada line for eastward movement. Of this number 362,555 consisted of loaded refrigerator cars. Dur- ing the same period a total of 601,733 cars was received at Ogden for west- ward movement over Nevada lines and of this total 314,112 cars represented empty refrigerator cars. These cars are used for transportation of perishable freight. A special study of the eastward and westward traffic over the Nevada lines for the year 1934 was made and more detailed information is contained in this study in reference to a classification of the traffic received at and forwarded to Ogden by the Nevada lines during this period. A total of 107,503 loaded freight cars were received at Ogden for movement eastward. TRAIN LENGTHS 483 Of this number 105,330 represented shipments of cattle, sheep, loaded refrigera- tor cars, red manifest, and green manifest. Manifest is a designation synonym- ous with rapid transportation. For the movement westward from Ogden over the Nevada lines 46,327 loaded freight cars were received and of this number 44,004 contained freight known as expedited or manifest freight. The total freight car shipments represented by these figures, during the periods of time stated, moved over the Nevada line and practically the greater portion thereof originated or terminated at points outside of the State of Nevada. In order to avoid damage, and insure arrival for marketing, perishable freight including livestock, as well as so-called manifest freight, must be handled as speedily as practicable. The handling of livestock must comply with the requirements of the Federal 28-Hour Law. Westbound empty refriger- ator cars must be transported over the Nevada lines with expedition so that a supply of empties may be available at the California and Oregon terminals for the transportation of fruits, vegetables, etc. Additional testimony was received consisting of a study of the distribution of interstate traffic crossing California-Nevada State line at Calvada and represented the study of freight movements for the months of January, Febru- ary, March, October, November, and December 1933. The months of December, January, and February represent months of light traffic ; October is the month of heavy traffic. The six months indicated present a fair cross-section of the year's business on the Nevada line as to the distribution of the traffic between perishables, livestock, and other movements, as well as to points of destination. The total freight car shipments for this period was represented by 68,790 cars. Of this total movement, 46,360 freight cars were loaded with perishable and livestock freight. The westward traffic over the Nevada lines, crossing the Cali- fornia-Nevada line at Calvada, for the same period was represented by 18,358 loaded freight cars ; of this number 4,394 represented freight shipments of perishable and livestock cargo. 10. THE ESTABLISHED METHOD FOR HANDLING sUCH TRAFFIC PRIOR TO AND ON THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE LAW (a) Nevada Line Long Train Operation. The Answer of defendant admits "that the operation of freight trains con- taining more than 70 cars, exclusive of the caboose, is the general practice on the main lines of plaintiff in the State of Nevada," (Defendant's Answer, page 5, lines 2-5, inclusive). With this admission it remains only to determine from the evidence the extent of this practice. Beginning with the year 1925 and continuing each successive year thereafter until 1935, the freight trains transporting interstate traffic over plaintiff's Nevada lines have increased in length from year to year. In 1923 the average train length was 52.6 cars, including caboose. There was a gradual increase in long-train operation year by year thereafter ; and in 1934 the average train length was 87 cars, including caboose. For the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1935, 37.04 per cent of the east- ward trains ioving between the California-Nevada line and Sparks, and 48.91 per cent of the corresponding westward trains, consisted of more than 70 cars, exclusive of caboose. Between Sparks, Nevada, and the Nevada-Utah state line, during the same period, 79.23 per cent of the westward freight trains and 83.11 per cent of the eastward freight trains contained more than 70 cars. 47.84 per cent of the westward trains, and 21.54 percent of the eastward trains, on the Fernley-Wendel line during that period, were long trains. The evidence contains a study of the freight trains operated on the Nevada lines between Imlay and Montello, during the months of February and Sep- tember, for the years 1927, 1929, 1932, and 1934. This study reflects a pro- gressive increase in the average length of such trains. The following are the significant facts of this operation: 484 TRAIN LENGTHS Between Imlay and Montello Per Cent of Trains Over 70 Cars Containing Year (Feb. & Sept.) TotaledCasoniig 71-80 81-90 91l& Over (1) (m) (n) (o) 1927.--.... --------------------------------------------- .--- -53. 1 28. 8 18. 1 1929..--------------------------------------------------------.----. 53.3 25.2 21.5 1932----.- . ......----------------------------------------------------------14.2 17.5 88.3 1934-... . . .. ... ..----------------------------------------------------------5.4 13.8 80.8 Plaintiff has been enabled by increasing progressively from year to year the practice of long train operation to handle a comparatively heavy volume of traffic, with a relatively less number of trains than in the years prior to the inauguration of such practice. On the Salt Lake Division, in 1925 the average cars per train, including caboose, was 62.4. This had increased in 1934 to 87.0, including caboose, or an increase of 39.42 per cent. The total gross ton miles in 1925 exceeded 1934 by 2.25 per cent. In comparing the total loaded and empty car miles the operation in 1934 exceeded the operation in 1925 by 0.75 per cent. The total train miles in 1925 exceeded the total train miles made in 1934 by 38.99 per cent. The train miles in 1934 were 668,451 less than made in 1925. (b) System Operation of Long Trains. A similar practice of long train operation now prevails, and generally has prevailed, on plaintiff's entire system, except in the State of Arizona. For a five-month period in 1934 on the entire system, except Arizona, long trains were in proportion to the total number of trains operated, as follows : Oregon-...--..-------------------------------------- .- 18.46 California---.. -------------------------------------22. 25 Utah----------------------93. 29 New Mexico---------------------.-- ---------------- 6.20 Texas---.-......---------------------------- 6. 64 The average train length (exclusive of caboose) on the entire system in- cluding Arizona, beginning with 1922, was as follows: 1922, 42.4 cars; 1926, 47.7 cars; 1930, 51.5 cars ; 1934, 51.7 cars. 11. RESULTING EFFECTS OF SUCH OPERATION ON (a) Schedule Performance. Plaintiff in conjunction with connecting lines at Ogden and beyond maintains guaranteed time schedules for the handling of certain through freight traffic east- ward and westward across Nevada lines. A guaranteed schedule obligates the railroads participating therein to make delivery of the freight handled there- under at the specific schedule times under penalty of loss and damage claim payments for spoilage, or loss of market price. Plaintiff under its agreement with connecting carriers is required to make delivery of eastbound freight to its connections at Ogden! at definite times determined according to the hour of departure from Roseville, California. Roseville is the concentrating point for eastward bound perishable blocks and other freight from California. Cars containing traffic of this) description are made into trains for eastward movement. These cars are segregated into "fruit blocks" containing from ten to 100 cars. Such blocks are identified by number and carry this identification throughout their eastward movement. The schedule of these trains is based upon a specified departure time at Rose- ville from which is computed a specified maximum time enroute to Chicago. Illinois. Due to the fact that several such eastward trains leave Roseville in the course of the day, and all cannot leave at precisely the same time, the times enroute of trains leaving after the basing departure hour are shortened and all such trains are so handled as to arrive at the Chicago market upon an equality. The following may be cited as an illustration: trains leaving after 3 A. M. and up to 7 P. M. are operated so as to make up, or run-off the inter- val after 3 A. M. and prior to their departure, such interval being known as "run-off time." TRAIN LENGTHS 485 Certain traffic movements westward over the Nevada line are maintained on demand schedule by plaintiff in conjunction with connecting carriers. These schedules provide for definite maximum times enroute from Chicago to San Francisco. A certain specified portion of said total time is assigned 'to the district between Ogden and Roseville. The character of traffic handled in westbound scheduled trains is material for automobile assembling plants on the Pacific coast, raw material for manufacturing plants, merchandise, and some livestock. Export traffic destined to off-shore movement from San Francisc Bay is also included. Trains carrying this westbound traffic operate daily and are identified; one train is called the C.S., or California Special; one the K.S.F., or Kansas City-San Francisco. Schedules are also maintained for freight movements to and from Oregon and northern California handled over the Fernley-Alturas line. The schedule improvements brought about by plaintiff and its connections since the adoption and development of the long-train program on the Nevada lines have materially shortened the average time both in intermediate terminals and enroute of trains operating under such schedules. This long-train operation has reduced the relative number of train units and lessened the number of train meetings and passings. The evidence shows that prior to the year 1926 the over-all schedule time for perishable freight from Roseville to Chicago was 154 hours with no provision for run-off time. The proportion of said time assigned to the district from Roseville to Ogden was 60 hours. In 1926 the over-all time from departure at Roseville to arrival at Chicago was reduced by including a provision for run-off time not exceeding 12 hours. This resulted in reducing the actual elapsed time to not more than 142 hours. The elapsed time between Roseville and Ogden was also reduced. In 1929 a further reduction to 146 hours was made in the over-all schedule time between these two points, and provision was also made for a 16-hour run-off. This resulted in a schedule of actual elapsed time between the two points of 130 hours. The schedule elapsed time assigned to the Roseville- Ogden district became 50 hours and 27 minutes. In 1934 a further adjust- ment was made in the schedule to provide for a total elapsed time of 124 hours. The proportion assigned to Roseville-Ogden district was reduced to 44 hours 30 minutes. The producing areas in California from which shipments are moved to Rose- ville for concentration were divided into zones one and two. In 1932 the areas comprising these zones were considerably extended and embraced a great deal more territory on main and branch lines of plaintiff in California. The effect of such enlargement was to reduce, as to the additional points included, the actual time in transit from points of production to points of final delivery in the east. Schedule times for the handling of perishable freight originating in Oregon and moving over the Klamath Falls-Fernley line have also been reduced. Similar reductions have been made in west bound schedules for freight moving from Chicago and other related points to San Francisco, and handled over the Nevada lines. In 1920 the schedule for westbound manifest freight originating at Chicago provided for morning delivery on the tenth day at San Francisco. The elapsed time between Ogden and Roseville was 75 hours. In 1926 the schedule was reduced to provide delivery on the ninth morning at San Francisco. The elapsed time between Ogden and Roseville was reduced to 65 hours. In 1928 the schedule was again reduced to provide delivery in San Francisco on the eighth morning. In 1929 delivery in San Francisco on the seventh morning was inaugurated and the elapsed time between Ogden and Roseville was reduced to 35 hours 30 minutes. In 1934 the schedule provided for not more than six days enroute from Chicago to San Francisco. During the year 1934, 1,390 identified perishable blocks originated at Roseville and were handled to Ogden ; and of this movement only 51, or 3.7 percent, failed to make the scheduled arrival at Ogden ; 96.3 percent of such movement was handled by the plaintiff to its connections at Ogdeni upon or in advance of schedule. In the westward movement during the months of January, April, July, and October, 1934, 123 identified manifest trains handling through freight from plaintiff's connection at Ogden and destined to San Francisco were oper- ated ; and of this number 12 percent failed to make the schedule and 87% Percent were handled by plaintiff so as to arrive at destination upon or in advance of schedule time. 486 TRAIN LENGTHS (b) Economy and Effciency. For a determination whether the long-train method of operation has resulted in improved economy and efficiency, comparisons must be made between the periods of time on the Nevada lines, including the Salt Lake division, when a substantial portion of the traffic was moved in units of 70 cars and less, an; periods when the long-train operation, as it is defined, became the governing factor in the traffic movement. Prior to 1925 plaintiff operated comparatively few long trains over any of its lines. After that date, however, and down to the present time the practice of operating a substantial number of long trains has been followed, and the number of such train operations has progressively increased from year to year down to the present time. For the purpose of making a comparison, years prior to 1925 can properly be classified as a short train period and the years from 1925 to the present time can be classified as a long train period. In making this comparison there are certain recognized indices of efficiency and economy of operation which may be used as a yardstick. They include average speed of freight trains, measured in miles per hour ; average gross-ton miles made, per freight train-hour ; average net-ton miles made, per freight-train hour; average consumption of fuel, per thousand gross-ton miles, by freight trains ; average cost per thousand revenue ton miles, for all operating expenses, and for transportation expenses only ; average cost per thousand car miles, for all operating expenses and for selected operating expenses. The above-enumerated terms being technical, it is necessary that they be de- fined and the following is a correct definition as disclosed by the evidence : The average train speed is the average speed measured in miles per hour, of the trains, while on the road between terminals, the times at stops between terminals being included, but not the time consumed at terminals. The average gross-ton miles made per freight-train hour is the total weight handled, exclusive of the weight of locomotives, but including the weights of both cars and their contents, multiplied by the miles over which such total weight was moved, the latter figure being then divided by the number of hours during which the freight trains handling the weight were on the road. Thc average net-ton miles per freight-train hour is the total weight of the ecutcunts of the cars only, not including any of the weights of locomotives or of the cars themselves, multiplied by the miles over which such weight was moved, the latter figure being then divided by the number of hours during which the freight trains handling the traffic were in operation. The average consumption of fuel per thousand gross-ton miles is the total amount of fuel consumed by locomotives handling freight trains, measured in units equivalent to pounds of coal, divided by a figure obtained by multiplying the total gross weight including the weight of locomotives, handled in such trains, measured In thousands of tons, by the total number of miles over which the tonnage was moved. The average cost per thousand revenue-ton miles, for all operating expenses, for freight train operations on the system is the figure in cents, obtained by dividing into the total operating expense of freight train operation, the figure obtained by multiplying the total number of revenue tons of freight handled by plaintiff, by the miles over which such freight was moved. The average cost per thousand revenue-ton miles, for transportation expenses only for freight train operations on the system includes no costs incurred for maintenance of way or general overhead, but only those expenses directly in- curred in operation of trains. As to the effect from the standpoint of efficiency and economy due to long train operation on the system generally, consideration must be given to the fact that this operation includes the State of Arizona where the program can- not be fully carried out because of the restrictions of the Arizona Train Limit Law. For comparison purposes the same items which furnish the yardstick for making this measurement on the Nevada lines can be employed to determine the result of long train operation on the system generally. In reference to the Salt Lake division the evidence shows that train speeds for main line freight trains increased from 15.0 miles per hour in 1924 to 20.8 in 1934. A special study of the speeds of through freight trains operated be- tween Roseville and Sparks comparing average speeds made during the twelve- month period ending June 1929, with the average speed made during the twelve- month period ending June 1935, shows that the number of trains eastward de- creased 44 percent, the number of cars per train increased 27 percent, and the TRAIN LENGTHS 487 miles per hour increased 19 percent; for westward trains the number of trains decreased 39 percent, the cars per train increased 18 percent, and the speed improvement increased 14 percent. The net-ton miles per train hour for all Salt Lake division freight trains in 1924 were 13,513, and in 1934 were 20,860. During the same period for main line through freight trains operating east- ward and westward between Sparks and Ogden upon the Salt Lake division the gross-ton miles per train hour in 1924 were 34,058 and in 1934 were 76,- 712. The evidence shows that the improvement as to both of these items progressed steadily from year to year. Fuel consumption, by main line freight trains on this division, was at the rate of 87 pounds of coal per thousand gross ton miles, in 1924. In 1934 fuel was consumed by such trains at the rate of 69 pounds of coal per thousand gross ton miles. In the matter of selected operating expenses only, for the Salt Lake division, the cost per thousand gross-ton miles in 1924 was 64.6 cents, and in 1931 this cost was reduced to 45.7 cents. By reason of change in the accounting department methods in 1932 no segregation was made thereafter between main line and branch line expenses, and locomotive repairs were not compiled by divisions. The comparison, therefore, must be made between the years 1924 and 1931. In 1924 the average length of main line freight trains on the Salt Lake division was 57.6 and in 1931, 80.0. The selected operating expense figures include cost of fuel, wages of train service employees, engine house expense of locomotives, other supplies and expense for locomotives, certain train supplies and expense, and cost of repairs of locomotives used in freight train service. The average cost, for all operating expenses per thousand car miles, on the Salt Lake division in 1924 was $79.53, and in 1934 had declined to $36.25. Cars per freight train on the plaintiff's Pacific lines increased 21.4 per cent when operations for the year 1922 are compared with 1934; freight train speed in miles per hour in the same period increased 46.8 per cent ; the average gross-ton miles made per freight train hour for all freight trains on the system increased from 17,688 in 1922 to 31,670 in 1934, or an increase of 79.0 per cent. The average net-ton miles per freight train hour increased from 7,258 in 1922 to 10,375 in 1934, an improvement of 42.9 per cent. The system rate of fuel consumption in freight train service was reduced from 147 pounds of coal per thousand gross-ton miles in 1923 to 106 pounds of coal in 1934. The system average cost per thousand revenue ton miles, for freight service transportation expenses only, declined from $5.47 in 1922 to $3.95 in 1933. Where comparisons, as made above, were made for years other than 1922 and 1934 the record furnished no information respecting these two years. 12. IMPROvEMENTS MADE ON NEVADA LINE AND SALT LAKE DIVISION TO INAUGURATE AND MAINTAIN LONG TRAIN OPERATION The answe'r of the defendant admits that if the expenditures were made (as alleged in paragraph V A of the Complaint) "they were made for the purpose of increasing the length and the loading of trains," (Defendant's Answer, page 4, lines 5 to 6). (a) Roadbed and Structures. Plaintiff's tracks, road bed, bridges, and other structures are regularly in- spected, carefully maintained, and in excellent physical condition. They are fully capable of sustaining safely the weight of the heaviest equipment owned or operated by plaintiff. There is no reason, whether from the standpoint of climatic condition, or track, grades, curvatures, or other operating conditions or the strength or capacity of railroad structures and equipment now owned and used, why plaintiff cannot operate upon its Nevada line a very substantial number of freight train units consisting of many more than 70 cars, exclusive of caboose. Since 1920 plaintiff has made many improvements on its railroad in the State of Nevada. Included in such improvements the evidence shows that ap- proximately 107.79 miles of track have been laid with 90-pound rail, replacing a rail of lighter weight. In Utah track improvement of this nature approxi- mates 69.5 miles. In Nevada for a distance of 230 miles and in Utah for a distance of 62.9 miles, 110-pound rail was laid. In addition to this, 112- pound rail for a distance of 84.4 miles was also laid. 130-pound rail was laid 488 TRAIN LENGTHS for a distance of 42 miles in Nevada and 21.8 miles in Utah. 131-pound rail replaced 14.4 miles in Nevada and 1.9 miles in Utah. On the Western Pacific portion of the paired-track territory rails weighing 110 and 112 pounds were laid for an approximate distance of 130 miles in place of 85-pound rail. In addition to the above improvements, there was also constant repair and re- newal of bridges, trestles and culverts and replacements where needed of wooden bridges, trestles, and culverts by steel or concrete structures. The standard for main track between Lawton, Nevada, and Ogden, Utah, is 3,250 ties per mile. Crushed rock ballast, for an approximate distance of 240 miles in Nevada, has replaced gravel ballast and such ballast has been placed at greater depth under the track than was previously the practice. In some instances the ballast has been placed at a depth of twelve inches under the ties. Since 1920, 298 spans of wooden structures have been replaced, while the Great Salt Lake trestle has had the entire deck replaced. Yard facilities at various terminals were enlarged and extended, railroad sidings were also ex- tended, and additional double track was constructed in Nevada. Railroad ties have been renewed, improved types of block signals have been installed together with installation of automatic signals at grade crossings. (b) Locomotive; Car Equipment. The answer of defendant admits "that more powerful locomotives have been acquired by plaintiff." (Answer, paragraph V, subdivision (a), line 1.) The further admission is made that some but not all of the locomotives used by plaintiff in Nevada at the present time are built with heavier frames, running gears, and draft gears; and that such locomotives are equipped with feed- water heaters and super-heaters. (Answer, paragraph V, subdivision (b), page 4, lines 12 to 15, inclusive.) The evidence shows that since 1920 a considerable number of new locomotives have been purchased or built by plaintiff, and, after the same were acquired, were used on the Nevada lines. On the particular portion of the Nevada line from Roseville, California, to Sparks, Nevada, it is shown that between the years 1904 and 1913, 272 locomotives were acquired and of this number 223 had a tractive power of 43,300 pounds and 49 a tractive power of 85,040 pounds. Between 1925 and 1927, 49 locomotives were acquired with a tractive power of 84,200 pounds each. In 1928 and 1929, 26 locomotives were acquired with a tractive power of 112,760 pounds each, and in 1930 and 1931 a total of 25 locomotives with a tractive power of 124,300 pounds each. These several locomotives were used on the Nevada line between Roseville, California, and Sparks, Nevada. On the Nevada line between Sparks, Nevada, and Ogden, Utah, between the years 1901 and 1915 none of the locomotives acquired had a tractive power in excess of 53,630 pounds each. The total number of such locomotives repre- sented in this class was 377. Between 1917 and 1921, 53 locomotives were acquired with a tractive power of 65,300 pounds each. During the period from 1921 to 1925, 117 new locomotives were acquired with a tractive power of 75,150 pounds each and between 1923 and 1930, 77 locomotives were acquired with a tractive power of 57,510 pounds each. These locomotives were used on the Nevada lines between Sparks and Ogden. Such newer and heavier locomotives, especially those used in freight service on the Nevada lines, are nearly all equipped with modern devices, including super-heaters, feed-water heaters, air reservoirs of increased capacity, back pressure indicators, and power reservse gears. The locomotives of the older classes that were retained in service were from time to time improved by adding to their equipment some of the devices hereinabove designated. In view of the fact that the defendant's answer admits that new locomotives, if purchased, were acquired and used in operating trains on the Nevada line in units consisting of more than seventy cars, it makes it unnecessary to make a more detailed finding as to the present use of these locomotives in operation on the Nevada line for the handling of long trains. In 1922, plaintiff owned on its Pacific lines a total of 35,464 freight cars. Of this number 32,179 were constructed of steel, steel underframe, and cars with steel center sills. Wooden freight cars numbered 3,285. In 1931 plaintiff owned 55,455 freight cars or an increase of 19,991 cars since the year 1922. Of this number 54,486 freight cars were steel, steel underframe and cars with steel center sills, and 969 freight cars were of frame construction. On January 1, 1936, the total number of freight cars owned by plaintiff was 47,695, and ex- cluding therefrom logging cars, narrow gauge cars, and cabooses, of the total number owned 57.13 percent were equipped with friction draft gears. TRAIN LENGTHS 489 From 1931 to 1934 of the total freight cars transported over Nevada lines 53.5 percent represented Pacific Fruit Express Company refrigerator cars. It appears that on August 31, 1935, the total number of standard Pacific Fruit Express cars in service was 37,733, and of this number 37,081 are equipped with friction draft gears and 652 are equipped with spring draft gears. Modern single plate cast iron wheels are in universal use upon both the freight and refrigerater cars aforesaid, the older double plate type of wheel having been almost completely replaced. Air brake apparatus upon the afore- said cars has been improved ; and among other improvements has been the universal installation of heavier graduating springs in the. triple valves. All freight cars now in use in through and interchange freight service upon plaintiff's lines are built with steel underframes; cars having a wooden under- frame have been withdrawn from such service. 13. EXPENDITURES AND OUTLAY FOR SUCH IMPROVEMENT (a) Roadway and Fixtures. The evidence will now be reviewed to determine the uncontroverted facts respecting the investments made by plaintiff on the Nevada line and Salt Lake Division to inaugurate and maintain this type of operation. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the reproduction costs less deprecia- tions including additions and betterments at record cost to December 31, 1934, show the facilities located within the State of Nevada are valued at $41,463,000. The record contains certain statistical exhibits showing the net investment by plaintiff for permanent improvements made to its roadbed and fixed structures in the territory between Roseville and Ogden for the period between June 30, 1916, and December 31, 1934. This amounted to $24,109,752 after deducting the amount set up for retirements. Between the periods 1924 and 1934 the net investment on the same items in the same territory was the sum of $19,497,107 over and above retirements. An examination of the same record shows that the net additional expenditures made in Nevada upon roadbed and fixed structures, over and above retirements, from June 30, 1916, to December 31, 1934, amounted to $7,861,025 and of this amount $6,178,583 represented the net cost in Nevada for these items after deducting retirements for the period from 1924 to 1934. As stated, the expenditures included only an outlay for roadway and fixed structures. In considering the Pacific lines of plaintiff, it appears that $14,331,000 was expended for net additions and betterments from December 31, 1930, to Decem- ber 31, 1934. The money so expended was allocated only to roadway and fixed structures. (b) Locomotives and Freight Cars. Between the years 1922 and 1931, inclusive, plaintiff expended in the building and purchasing of locomotives $28,338,000. For this expenditure plaintiff acquired 303 new locomotives with a total tractive power of 23,418,440 pounds. The locomotives acquired between the years 1925 and 1927 were at a cost of $90,000 each. In the period between 1928 and 1929 the cost increased to $132,000 each, and those acquired between the years 1930 and 1931 represented a cost of $139,000 each. Greater tractive power and heavier types are reflected in increased cost. These expenditures were all made pursuant to expressed authority granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the provisions of Section 20 "A" of the Interstate Commerce Act. As heretofore stated in Finding 12(b), many of said locomotives, particularly those of the types ac- quired during and since 1925, have been and now are assigned to service upon the Nevada lines, including both the Salt Lake Division, and the subdivision between Roseville and Sparks. The sum of $584,233 has been expended on side tracks in excess of 4,000 feet on plaintiff's line between Roseville, California, and Ogden, Utah. 14. NEVADA LINE COMPARED WITH ARIZONA AS TO EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY OF OPErATION (a) Arizona Train Limit Law. The pleadings admit that there is at present in effect in the State of Arizona a statute enacted in 1912 and popularly known as Arizona Train Limit Law. This law in so far as it relates to freight train operation is substantially the same as the Nevada law. 490 TRAIN LENGTHS (b) Arizona-Nevada Operations Compared. Operating conditions, rules, traffic handled, and operating methods in Nevada are substantially similar to the conditions existing in Arizona. The improve- ments in railroad and equipment have also progressed proportionately. For the purpose of making a comparison on the subjects of efficiency and economy of operation the only factor that would make the conditions dissimilar is the one attributable to the effect of the Arizona Train Limit Law on Arizona operation. The evidence shows that on the Tucson division of plaintiff's lines in Arizona the average length of trains, exclusive of caboose, for main line freight trains was 57.8 cars in 1924; 60.3 cars in 1931, and 59.6 cars in 1934. The road speed of main line freight trains on the division increased from 14.4 miles per hour in 1923 to 19.8 miles per hour in 1934. The cost per thousand gross ton miles for freight-train service in 1924 was 68.8 cents ; in 1931, 65.5 cents. The gross ton miles per train hour between Yuma and Tucson via Maricopa increased from 33,637 in 1923 to 58,506 in 1934. The net ton miles per train hour in 1924 was 10,911; in 1934 was 12,937. In comparing Arizona operations with operations on Nevada line we find that the miles-per-hour improvement registered in Arizona was practically the same as the improvement on the Salt Lake division. The cost per thousand gross ton miles on the Salt Lake Division in 1924 was 64.6 cents and in 1931, 45.7 cents. The gross ton miles per train hour made by eastbound through freight trains operated on the Salt Lake division between Sparks and Ogden increased from 35,840 in 1923 to 84,491 in 1934. The net ton miles per train hour improved on the Salt Lake Division between 1924 and 1934 was 83 percent while on the Arizona line between the same years the im- provement was nineteen percent. 15. NEVADA TRAFFIC COMPARED TO TRAFFIC ACROSS ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO The freight traflic handled upon plaintiff's main lines crossing southern Ari- zona and New Mexico is predominantly interstate in character, and is further similar to that handled over the Nevada lines, in that the loaded movement consists predominantly of perishable agricultural products, livestock, and manufactured articles of relatively high value ; while the empty-car movement consists, in large part, of refrigerator cars being returned from eastern markets for further loading in the Arizona and California producing districts. About 63 percent of the cars moved eastward by plaintiff during the 5 years, 1930-1934, over its lines across Arizona, and southern New Mexico, to El Paso, Texas, were refrigerator cars carrying perishable freight. About 58 percent of the cars moved westward during said 5 years, from El Paso over said lines, were empty refrigerator cars, being moved to the producing areas in California and Arizona for further loading. The volume of the traffic thus handled into and out of El Paso, during the 5-year period 1930-1934, was slightly greater than the volume of the traffic handled by plaintiff into and out of Ogden during the same period ; but the total volume of the traffic, measured in freight-car miles, handled by plaintiff in the states of Arizona and Nevada, respectively, during each of the years 1923-1935, inclusive, was very nearly the same. Plaintiff, in handling its traffic into and across the State of Arizona has, how- ever, since the enactment of the Arizona Train Limit Law conducted said oper- ations of its interstate trains in conformity with the provisions of said law. 16. PLAINTIFF'S LINES IN ARIZONA : DESCRIPTION : COMPARISON WITH NEVADA LINES The operating conditions upon plaintiff's main lines across southern Arizona and New Mexico are closely similar to those upon the main lines in Nevada and Utah. The evidence shows, however, that there are more miles of adverse grades on the Tucson division than on the Salt Lake division, particularly with respect to eastbound traffic. Between Yuma and Lordsburg, Arizona, there is a greater mileage of helper districts than between Sparks and Ogden. The heavi- est ruling grade encountered between Yuma, Arizona, and El Paso, Texas, in either direction is 1.4 percent. Plaintiff's main lines in Arizona and New Mexico are well constructed and like the main lines in Nevada are equipped with block signals. TRAIN LENGTHS 491 17. EFFECT OF THE TRAIN-LIMIT LAW UPON PLAINTIFF'S OPERATIONS The Redispatching Study. To determine the effect of the Train-Limit Law upon its operations, plaintiff conducted a study of the trains and traffic handled over its Nevada lines during the months of February and October, 1934. The 2 months selected were typical and representative of the year 1934. February was the month of the lightest traffic volume and October the month of heaviest traffic volume. The volume of the traffic handled in the 2 months taken together constituted slightly less than one-sixth (15.709 percent) of the total for the entire year. The study of railroad operations thus made is referred to herein as "The Redispatching Study." This study involved a detailed analysis of each of the freight trains actually operated by plaintiff over Nevada lines as to consists, speed, and other essential features of its operation ; and the complete rearrangement, into "re- dispatched" trains, of the cars and traffic actually moved, so as to conform the plaintiff's operations for the purpose of the study, to the conditions which would be created and compelled, if the law were enforced. In making said study it was assumed that all the conditions which actually urevailed upon said lines during the two months mentioned would have con- tinued to prevail, except to the extent that the limitations imposed by the law would have required modifications of plaintiff's operating methods, and certain changes in the types of locomotives used. The redispatching study was care- fully conducted under the direct supervision of experienced and qualified oper- ating and executive officers of the plaintiff, by chief train dispatchers who now and for many years past, have supervised the operation and movement of plaintiff's trains on the Nevada lines. The result of this study presents as accurate a determination as possible of the effects of the law in the following particulars : (1) in requiring additional train service to be operated by plain- tiff on the Nevada lines; (2) in creating or aggravating delays to and inter- ference with plaintiff's trains and cars and the traffic transported therein ; and (3) in imposing additional expense upon plaintiff's operations. A similar study, covering operations over the Fernley-Wendel line during May 1935 was also made by plaintiff for the same purposes. In comparing results obtained under actual and redispatched operations, it appears that between Carlin and Ogden in actual operation the use of a water car on trains permitted the elimination of several water stops. In redispatched operations, water cars were not used, and stops for water were required at Elburz and other points, involving an average delay of five or six minutes. The equipment of locomotives with feed-water heaters effects a savihg in water and fuel consumption. 18. EFFECT OF NEVADA TRAIN LIMIT LAW ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE TRANSPORTFD ON NEVADA LINE (a) Extra-territoriac Effect; Changing Car Units Beyond State Lines. In order to comply with the Nevada law, long trains moving from points cutside the state would either have to be reduced in length, to not more than 70 cars each, at some point at or near the state boundary, or at points further distant ; or all trains would have to be operated, in units of 70 cars or less, from the terminals where made up, over the entire distance to the state line. Trains originating in Nevada, and moving to points outside the state, would have to be made up in units of 70 cars or less, and operated as such to the first subdivision terminals in the adjoining states, unless they were stopped at points nearer the state boundaries, and there built up into longer trains. For the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1935, 37.54 per cent of the freight trains moving eastward and 48.91 per cent of those moving westward between Roseville, California, and the Nevada-California boundary, consisted of more than 70 cars, exclusive of caboose. During the same period, out of the total number of freight trains moving across the Nevada-Utah boundary, 79.23 per cent of the westward and 83.11 per cent of the eastward trains consisted of more than 70 cars, exclusive of caboose. Freight trains cannot be split up or .consolidated without terminal facilities. West of the State of Nevada the nearest terminal is located at Roseville, Cali- fornia, a distance of 120 miles from the Nevada boundary line. The nearest terminal east is located at Ogden, a distance of 110 miles east of the Nevada- Utah boundary. No facilities now exist at Calvada or at any other point adja- cent to the Nevada-California line where trains in excess of 70 cars, originating in California, could be split up to conform with the Nevada law or trains origi- 492 TRAIN LENGTHS nating in Nevada could be consolidated into larger units entering California. The same conditions exist on the Nevada-Utah boundary line with the same result. Similar conditions also exist on the Fernley-Alturas line. Because of the topography at these points and location of present railroad tracks, the establishment of terminals at the state boundary lines could only be accomplished, if at all, by an expenditure of not less than $500,000 on the Utah line and a sum approximately $300,000 on the California line. The nearest points to the boundary at which re-consisting of trains and storage of ears could be conducted are Truckee, California, about 20 miles west of the Nevada-California boundary, and Lucin, Utah, about eight miles east of the Utah-Nevada boundary. The operation of plaintiff's freight trains in compliance with the provisions of the Nevada Train Limit Law would thus require the reconsisting (both reduc- tion, and building up) of all plaintiff's interstate trains at points beyond the Nevada state boundary line in the states of California and Utah. (b) Operation of Additional Extra-territorial Train Mileage. So that train movements on plaintiff's Nevada lines would be in accordance with the requirements of the Nevada law a change from present operation would therefore be necessary. Freight trains arriving at Lucin, Utah, for westward movement and containing more than 70 cars would be reduced at this point before entering the State of Nevada. Cars in excess of 70 would be left at Lucin. Freight trains arriving at Truckee for eastward movement would be reduced at this point and cars in trains in excess of 70 would remain at Truckee. The freight cars left at Truckee and Lucin would be handled in one of two ways ; either by train with less than 70 cars following a train which had set out those in excess of 70 cars, or by the operation of a turn-around local. At the conclusion of each day's business this turn-around local would handle the entire accumulation of the cars set out by the aforesaid trains. A turn-around local working between Montello and Lucin would handle the car units at Lucin and a similar movement would operate between Sparks and Truckee. For the two-month period covered by the redispatching study, to-wit : Febru- ary and October 1934 the average length of eastward trains operated between Truckee and Sparks was 75.6 cars. Operation under the law would have reduced the average length of the trains thus operated to 65.2 cars. The average length of eastward trains operated between Montello and Lucin and Lucin and Ogden, Utah, during the same period consisted of approximately 103 cars. In opera- tion under the law the average length of eastward trains between Montello and Lucin would have been G5.0 cars and between Lucin and Ogden, 83.2 cars. The average length of trains operated in both directions between Sparks and Wendel in May 1935 was 76.4 cars. In operation under the law the average would have been 59.3 cars. On the westward movement between Ogden and Lucin the average length of freight trains was 94.0 ears. In operation under the law it would have been 83.8 cars. Between Lucin and Montello the average length of westward trains was 94.3 cars and under the operation of the law it would have been 65.4 cars. Between Sparks and Truckee, California, the average length of westward trains was 73.6 cars, and under the operation of the law it would have been 64.2 cars. The distance from Truckee, California, to the Nevada state line is 20 miles. From Lucin, Utah, to the Nevada state line is 8 miles and between Nevada- California boundary and Wendel the distance is 16 miles. The redispatching study shows, and it is hereby found, that if the same actual volume of freight traffic which was in fact transported over the Nevada lines in 1934 had been handled in compliance with the provisions of the Nevada Train Limit Law, in the manner herein described, such operation would have resulted in the development of 68,509 extra-territorial train miles. Of this number 10,313 addi- tional train miles would be operated in the State of California between Truckee, California, and the Nevada state line. Between the California-Nevada state line and Wendel there would accrue 1,630 extra-territorial miles in the State of California. Between the Utah-Nevada state line and Ogden the extra-terri- torial operation would result in additional train miles in the State of Utah amounting to 56,566 train miles. If the same volume of traffic that was actually handled during the months of February and October 1934, between Truckee, California, and Sparks, Nevada, had been transported under the provisions of the Nevada Train Limit Law, 81 additional trains would have had to operate, and said trains would have accumulated 3,078 additional train miles. Corre- TRAIN LENGTHS 493 spondingly, 70 additional trains would have had to be operated between Lucin, Utah, and Ogden, Utah, to handle the freight movement, and in that district there would have accrued 7,140 additional train miles. Between Montello, Nevada, and Lucin, Utah, this new method would have required 204 additional trains, and 3,762 additional train miles. Between Sparks, Nevada, and Wendel, California, 18 additional trains would have been required over the Nevada lines, with 2,016 additional train miles. The actual volume of traffic handled during the months of February and October 1934, represents 15.709 per cent of the total traffic transported over those lines during the year 1934. (c) Delays. The enforcement of the provisions of said law against plaintiff would and will result in delay to, and interference with the handling of plaintiff's interstate trains operating on Nevada lines both within and without the boundaries of Nevada. The delays and interference thus accruing to traffic transported would be caused by (1) interference with and delays to cars and trains at terminals; (2) delays to individual cars, as distinguished from trains at stations other than terminals ; (3) interference with and delays to trains while on the line between terminals. (1) Terminal Delays-Among the terminal delays which would be directly occasioned by the enforcement of the law's provisions would be those due to (a) reducing long trains as they approach the Nevada state boundary line to lengths not exceeding 70 cars ; (b) building up trains, after they have left Nevada, to normal langths permitted by laws of adjoining states. These delays will occur outside of the State of Nevada. The long train operation between Roseville and Sparks as presently conducted over plaintiff's lines represents' about 43 per cent of the total train movement between these two points. Under the law's operation long trains when moving eastward would either have to be made up at Roseville as short trains or stopped at some point enroute before entering Nevada, and there re-consisted so as to con- form to the law. In movement westward trains would have to be made up as short trains at Sparks and operated either as such, through to Roseville, or stopped at some point enroute after leaving Nevada and there built up into longer units. Under present operations more than 93 per cent of plaintiff's trains moving between Ogden and the Utah-Nevada line are long trains. To comply with the provisions of the law these trains would either have to be operated over the entire distance, 110 miles, in Utah as short trains or be stopped at some point in Utah, there to be reduced if moving toward Nevada, or built up, if moving from Nevada. Plaintiff's trains moving between Fernley and Alturas are also, in many in- stances, long trains. Operation under the law would require such trains to be re-consisted at Wendel. The distance between Wendel and the Nevada-California boundary line is approximately 16 miles. (a) Rosevile Delays. Compliance with the Nevada Train Limit Law would result in delay to many of plaintiff's eastward trains at Roseville, because of additional switching nec- essary to place in one block at the head end of each train of more than 70 cars, the cars contained therein and intended to be set out at Truckee in order to reduce said train to the length permitted by law. The delay ensuing to each train thus requiring and receiving additional switching and as to all of the cars therein would amount to thirty minutes. If said switching was not performed at Roseville additional switching would be required at Truckee over and above that otherwise required in setting out excess cars at that point ; such additional switching would cause additional delays. Under present operations some switch- ing is done at Roseville for the purpose of placing cars at the head-end of the train when the destination of such cars is Reno or points west. Switching opera- tions are also performed at this point for placing empty cars on the head-end of the train. These switching operations, however, take place between the first and second inspection of the train and the time available is sufficient to permit such switching by yard forces with no additional delay. (b) Truckee Delays. The long trains in eastward movement arriving at Truckee would, in opera- tion under the law, be required to stop at that point and set out a sufficient num- ber of cars to reduce the total car units in the train to the maximum permitted 47891-38-32 494 TRAIN LENGTHS by the law. These set-out cars would be placed upon the storage tracks in the Truckee yard. Operating under the plan adopted in the redispatching study set-out cars would be handled eastward from Truckee either by a special local turn-around service or by a later eastward train having less than 70 cars upon arrival at Truckee. A delay of 20 minutes would be caused each train required to stop at Truckee for this purpose. Each train obliged to stop at Truckee and pick up cars set out from long trains and stored at Truckee to await movement eastward would be delayed at Truckee for varying periods. Westward trains originating at Sparks under the law's operation would move as far as Truckee with not more than 70 cars each. Freight cars on hand at Sparks, in excess of the number which could be lawfully handled, would be moved to Truckee by the Sparks-Truckee turn-around local and at that point would be set out on storage tracks to be picked up by following short trains ; said follow- ing trains would thus be stopped at Truckee to fill their consists and proceed on to Roseville. Trains required to pick up cars at Truckee would each be delayed not less than 20 minutes. At times during the winter months due to the snow condition cars could not be set out or picked up at Truckee ; all trains in both directions between Sparks and Roseville when these conditions would prevail would be operated as short trains. =c) Wendel Delays. Plaintiff's trains operated over the Alturas-Fernley lines and moving to Nevada would be delayed at Wendel whenever necessary for such trains to reduce their consists in order to comply with the law. Based upon informa- tion obtained from the redispatching study of the traffic handled over the Fernley-Wendel line in May 1935 it appears that out of a total of' 3,368 cars handled during that month 577 would have been delayed at Wendel if the law had been in effect ; the average delay per car being twelve hours four minutes. The operation hereinabove described showing train movement through Truckee from Roseville to Sparks and the delays experienced by reducing car units would have like application over the Alturas-Fernley line. (d) Fernley Delays. About 35 per cent of the trains moving from Fernley to Wendel are long trains. Under the law's operation excess cars in such trains would have to be left behind for later handling. Cars handled in trains moving from Wendel to Fernley, and destined for points east of Fernley, would be set out at that point to await movement in trains whose consist out of Sparks was less than 70 cars to permit the set out cars to be handled. It appears from the evidence under present operation, delays are ex- perienced at Fernley for consolidation purposes and in some instances this delay has amounted to three or four hours. Parts of fruit blocks are held over at Sparks and taken to Fernley and there consolidated with the C. S. train from Alturas. Such operation requires freight cars to remain at Fernley until the arrival of the fruit train from Alturas for movement eastward. (e) Lucin Delays. Long trains arriving at Lucin from Ogden would be required to reduce their car units at that point prior to entering the State of Nevada. Re-consisting such trains at this point would entail an average delay of 30 minutes. Cars set out of said trains would be handled by turn-around service operating between Montello and Lucin. Certain of plaintiff's eastward trains operating from Montello to Lucin would, if the law were in effect, set out their entire consist at that point. The engine and caboose and crew of each train would then operate trains westward to Montello in the turn-around service. The cars thus set out at Lucin and intended for eastward movement would be picked up by following trains operated between Lucin and Ogden as long trains. Eastward cars thus set out would be delayed at Lucin for varying periods. Eastward trains required to stop at Lucin to fill their consist would be delayed approximately 30 minutes. In certain instances to avoid delay to perishable freight eastward short trains moving from Nevada, if the law were in effect, would be operated through Lucin and into Ogden with a consist of not more than 70 cars. The redispatching study showed that, in certain instances, eastward cars would have been delayed at Lucin, in operation under the law, for periods ranging from one hour and fifteen minutes to four hours. TRAIN LENGTHS 495 (2) Delays to Cars at Stations.-These delays would ensue because of the fact that freight cars, although ready for movement, could not be handled in the first succeeding train because their addition to such train would increase the units beyond 70 cars. (3) Delays to Trains Enroute: Meets and Passings.-In the operation of freight and passenger trains over plaintiff's lines in the affected territory, as well as over railroads generally, it is frequently necessary for trains to meet and pass each other. The term "meet" is generally understood to refer to the operation whereby two trains proceeding in opposite directions on the same track go by each other. The term "pass" is generally understood to refer to the operation whereby one train, having overtaken one or more preceding trains going in the same direction on the same track, runs around and there- after precedes the train or trains overtaken. Train meets normally occur only in single-track territory ; passes may occur either in single or double track territory. Whenever a meet or a pass occurs, at least one of the trains involved is normally required to stop, and is thus delayed to a certain extent. The greater the number of meets and passes required in the operation of trains over a particular district or subdivision, the greater in the aggregate will be the delays to and interferences between the trains affected thereby. The redispatching study showed that if the law had been in effect throughout the year 1934, plaintiff would have been thereby compelled to operate opproxi- mately 5,150 additional freight trains over that part of its principal main line between Sparks and Ogden; and further that the additional meets and passes in that district, over and above those actually made, occasioned by and due entirely to the operation of said additional trains, would have numbered approximately 8,500. (d) Operation of Additional Trains; Reduction of Train Lengths. The operation of plaintiff's trains in strict compliance with the provisions of the law will cause the average, and the maximum, lengths of plaintiff's freight trains to be greatly reduced; a greater number of trains will be required to operate in transporting the traffic and there will be thus accumulated a greater number of train miles and locomotive miles in handling the same traffic volume. The redispatching study, among other things, shows the law's effect upon the average train length in the movement of traffic redispatched for the months of February and October 1934; in actual operation the average length of train in westward movement from Lucin to Montello consisted of 94.3 cars ; under the law the average train length would have been 65.4 cars. Between Montello and Carlin, westward, in actual movement, the average train length was 83.6 cars ; under the law, the average would have been 63.1 cars. Between Carlin and Imlay, westward, the traffic was actually moved in trains of an average length of 89.7 cars ; under the law the average would have been 64.8 cars. Between Imlay and Sparks the average actual train-length westward was 90.2 cars; under the law this average would have been 66.0 cars. The average length of the eastward trains in the same districts, during the same period, were closely similar to the averages of the westward trains; and the average train-length in.those districts of the corresponding eastward trains operated under the law would also have been closely comparable to those above stated for westward trains operated under the law. Between Montello and Lucin, Utah, and Lucin and Ogden freight traffic was transported in actual movement in trains averaging approximately 103 cars; transportation of this same traffic under the restrictions of the law would have reduced the average train-length between Montello and Lucin to 65.0 cars, and between Lucin and Ogden to 83.2 cars. It is shown by the redispatching study that if, during the year 1934, the transportation of traffic over plaintiff's Nevada lines had been conducted in strict compliance with law, plaintiff would thereby have been required to operate 556,897 additional train miles and 588,593 additional locomotive miles in han- dling the same volume of traffic. 19. FINANCIAL BURDEN IMPOSED BY LAw'S OPERATION If plaintiff is compelled to conduct and carry on its railroad operations under the provisions of the Nevada Train Limit Law, adidtional operating and other expenses would and will be thereby imposed upon and incurred by plaintiff in an amount shown by plaintiff's evidence to be not less than $600,000 per year. This additional expense will accrue solely by reason of said law. Said expense and the whole thereof would and will be recurring, continuous, and irreparable, 496 TRAIN LENGTHS and exclusive of any adidtional capital outlays required of or imposed upon plaintiff by reason of said law. The total sum of $600,000, as hereinabove found, represents the difference between (1) the operating and other expenses actually incurred by plaintiff on the Nevada line during the year 1934 under the long-train method of freight operation; and (2) the corersponding expenses which would be incurred, based upon 1934 traffic volume, on said Nevada line, if plaintiff were compelled to operate short trains as required by the law. Of the said sum $600,000 per year accruing as foresaid $565,299 per year would represent the several amounts designated as additional "selected operat- ing expenses." This term includes locomotive fuel, train-men's and engine-men's wages, engine house expense, other locomotive supplies and expenses, and loco- motive repairs. $30,000 per year represents the sum accruing by reason of the payment for additional train dispatches and train order telegraphers required to handle the additional train movements. $11,175 per year represents the annual interest charge upon additional capital investment made necessary because of the law's provisions. These additional investments cover the following items: (a) Expenditures for additional track and other facilities at Truckee and Lucin; (b) Expenditures for 16 hdditional cabooses ; (c) Classified repairs necessary to restore 25 Mikado-type locomotives to serviceable condition, which said locomotives would not be required or used (assuming the volume of traffic on the Nevada line to be continued at the 1934 level), if it were not for the operating necessities imposed by the law. Expenses of maintaining the additional facilities at Truckee and Lucin amounting to $2,859 per year. It appears from the evidence that the result of the law's operation on Nevada lines will cause additional expense accruing to plaintiff for other specific items ; for these items there is a failure of proof as to the definite amount which plaintiff would be required to expend therefor and the evidence does not warrant a further finding. These items include (a) additional maintenance of cabooses ; (b) additional cost of maintenance of way and structures because the law would compel the development of at least four per cent more gross-ton miles of locomotive weight ; (c) the cost of transporting additional fuel con- sumed in additional train service. Extra-territorial Portion of Added Cost. The larger portion of said additional annual expense imposed by the law would be incurred by plaintiff within Nevada, but a portion thereof, including items which can be accurately computed, would be incurred outside of Nevada becaused they are occasioned by changes in or additions to plaintiff's operation conducted wholly within California and Utah. In the item of selected operating expenses there is included $67.433 per year which will be expended beyond the boundary line of the State of Nevada. In addition to this is the annual interest charge amounting to $5,007 per year for capital investment on additional facili- ties at Truckee and Lucin. To be added to this amount is the expense of main- taining these aditional facilities amounting to $2,859 per year. Necessity for expenditures for certain other items accruing by reason of the law's operation is established by the evidence. The amount of such expendi- tures, however is not shown. These items include: wages for additional train dispatchers and train order telegraphers at railroad points outside the State of Nevada ; allocation on the cost of additional cabooses based upon the mileage operated in California and Utah ; repair cost of 25 Mikado-type locomotives, the amount thereof to be prorated on mileage operated in Utah and California; cost of transporting over plaintiff's lines the additional fuel required for additional operation in California and Utah. 20. INCREASED INVESTMENT IMPOSED BY LAW (a) Extra-territorially in Track and Fixed Structures. For plaintiff to conduct the transportation of railroad traffic on Nevada lines in full compliance with the law it would and will be necessary to immediately ex- pend and invest $156,881 in the construction of additional permanent trackage and facilities, and in necessary alterations of existing trackage and facilities, at Truckee and Lucin. No part of said investment would be required if it were not for the law. The operation of reconsisting trains and storing of cars at said points which plaintiff would have to perform in complying with the law are described in paragraphs 18 (A), (B) of these Findings. To perform TRAIN LENGTHS 497 said operation efficiently and economically and to reduce delays to trains and cars, it would be necessary to make substantial changes in and additions to the yard and station facilities at both points ; the facilities now available are inadequate for these purposes. The net cost of the required additions and changes at Truckee amounts to $25,461. The net cost of the additions and changes at Lucin will be $141,420. Heretofore, in these Findings, it has been determined that there is no station or other point on plaintiff's line either at the Utah-Nevada boundary or between that point and Lucin, Utah, where the facilities required for the operation compelled by the law now exists. There is likewise no station or other point on plaintiff's line either at the Nevada-California boundary or between that point and Truckee where the facilities required for operations compelled by the law now exist. (b) For equipment. Based upon the volume of freight traffic transported in 1934 over the Nevada line, if the same volume were moved in compliance with the law, it would have required the employment of 16 additional cabooses, costing an average of $3,066 each. The total capital outlay for these additions would be $49,056. There is no type of locomotive owned by plaintiff which so nearly fits the size and loading of the trains that would be operated in obedience to the law's provision, as the Mikado type; and that is the type most suitable to handling trains under the restrictions of the law in the territory between Sparks and Ogden. If the heavier locomotives presently in use in transporting freight traf- fic were employed in operation under the law there would be a sacrifice in locomotive efficiency of approximately 25 percent; the use of the Mikado type in such service would entail a sacrifice of locomotive efficiency averaging between five and eight per cent. For the purpose of restoring to serviceable condition 25 Mikado type locomo- tives which in 1934 were not needed for the handling of current traffic and were then standing spare and unserviceable, plaintiff would have been required, solely because of the conditions created by the law (if it were then in effect), to expend and invest not less than $156,550.00. 21. ENFORCED WASTE OF INVESTMENT (a) Nullification of Investment in Tracks, Structures, aod Sidings. On the Nevada line, not including terminals, auxiliary tracks or sidings have been constructed and Psed for purposes of meeting and passing of trains. Many such sidings have been constructed the capacity of which exceeds that required to serve a 70-car train including engine and caboose. The total amount in lineal feet by which these sidings exceed sufficient capacity at each siding to contain a 70-car train with engine and caboose is 83,000 feet ; and the total amount actually expended in constructing said excess track capacity amount to $268,473. It does not appear from the evidence that under the law's operation the amount thus expended for excess sidings or auxiliary tracks would be wasted. Since 1912 the Arizona Train Limit Law has been fully observed by plaintiff in its operation within that state. Under Arizona operation sidings or auxiliary tracks have been constructed and used with a capacity for holding trains from 75 to 100 cars in length and in some instances exceeding 100 cars in length. It would appear, therefore, that under short train operation the investment that is made in such sidings or auxiliary tracks is not wasted. For the purpose of per- mitting plaintiff to carry out to a greater degree of efficiency and economy its long-train operation within the State of Nevada, rails, ties, roadway generally including bridges, have been repaired and strengthened. The expenditures made for these improvements were made for the purpose of long-train operation. The law will prevent the use of these improved facilities for the purpose for which the improvement was made and will thereby operate as a curtailment of the particular use. However, the investment and expenditure thus made would not be completely nullified under the law's operation. (b) Nullification of Investment in Equipment. 'Large expenditures were made by plaintiff in recent years in the purchase and construction of the new and more powerful types of locomotives presently in use on the Nevada line. These locomotives are substantially more powerful than needed for the handling of short trains which will operate under the law. These locomotives are adapted to long-train operation and are more powerful than needed for short-train operation. 498 TRAIN LENGTHS While the use for which said locomotives were purchased will be impaired by operation under the law, the value of said use is not capable of exact determination. 22. SLACK AND RESULTING SLACK-ACTON IN FREIGHT TRAIN OPRFtATIQN ; DEFINED, CAUSE AND EFFECT (a) Description of Draft Rigging. Freight cars and freight trains are coupled together by means of devices known as couplers, a coupler being located at each end of each car. Each coupler is attached to a draft gear, which is in turn attached to the underframe, and thus to the body of the car. The purpose of the draft gear, as hereinafter more fully explained, is to cushion and absorb the striking and pulling shocks received by the car in the operations of coupling and train movement generally, and thereby to protect the car body and the lading within the car from injury and damage. The draft gear and coupler, with necessary connections and at- tachments, are collectively termed the draft rigging. When cars are coupled together, forming a freight train, there exists at the coupler faces a small amount of play or free motion (varying from % inch to 1/ inches) as between each pair of coupled cars. This is provided for in the construction of the couplers themselves, and is necessary to the proper operation of freight trains, in that it permits the lateral and vertical movements Necessary to enable trains to round curves, pass over dips and humps in track, and, in starting, assists in enabling cars to be moved successively instead of simulta- neously, which would be required if couplings were solid In addition to the free motion of the coupler faces, there is a certain amount of play or motion which exists between coupled freight cars, the amount of which varies, and depends upon the extent to which the draft gears are com- pressed by impact. (d) Action of Draft Gears. Draft gears presently in use on freight cars are of two general types : (1) the friction type, which uses both springs and friction members; (2) the tan- dem-spring type, which employs heavy springs, but has no friction members. All of plaintiff's freight cars (including, for this purpose, refrigerator cars owned by Pacific Fruit Express Co.) used in interchange service are equipped either with approved types of friction draft gears, or with tandem-spring gears ; and, as theretofore found, by far the greater proportion of such cars are equipped with friction gears. Whenever a push or impact, as, for example, in the coupling of cars, or a pull, as, for example, in the starting of a train, is given to an individual car, that impact or pull is transmitted first to the coupler itself, and then through the coupler shank to the draft gear, and thereby causes the draft gear to be compressed. Because of the construction of the draft gear, compression takes place in the case of pull as well as upon impact, or so-called "buff." When force is applied to the coupler with sufficient rapidity to produce shock, the draft gear absorbs the shock to the limit of its capacity, and dissipates this shock energy, through the absorptive power of the springs, and the heat created by the op- eration of the friction member. The standard type of friction draft gear requires the application of from 200,000 to 500,000 pounds of striking or pulling force at the coupler face in order to produce complete closure of the draft gear; I. e., in order to produce the maximum amount of motion of which the draft gear is capable, and before any shock is transmitted to and directly received by the underframe of the car itself. The total amount of motion of which a standard friction type of draft gear is capable, in the event of the application of force sufficient to cause complete closure, is 2% inches from the mean or normal position. The potential motion of a tandem-spring draft gear is about 2 inches, from normal position to complete closure; and this may be developed by application of from 60,000 to 65,000 pounds pressure. (c) Slack and Slack Action Deflned. These terms are not synonymous. By the term "slack" is meant free motion at coupler faces plus play or motion existing between coupled cars of a moving train when the draft gears are compressed. By the term "slack action" as used herein is meant the accumulated effect of such motion as it may be created or brought into play by train operation. Slack and slack action with resulting shocks exist and occur in trains of all lengths. TRAIN LENGTHS 499 (4) Factors Affecting Slack Action; Amount Developed in Operation. There are a number of factors affecting the amount of slack existing in a train, at any particular time while the train is in motion, and also affecting the' slack action which may occur in the event of a sudden stop, either through emergency action of the brakes or otherwise. Thus, for example, when a train is in motion, immediately after starting from a standstill, the draft riggings in the head portion of the train will be extended, so as to increase the distance between cars somewhat more than if the cars were standing free. In the center and rear portion of such train however, the draft gears would be but slightly extended, if at all, although the free slack at the coupler faces would be completely stretched. If an emergency application should take place, even though at or near the head end of the train, the potential slack action which might be developed could not exceed the amount of the increased distance between cars, created by the compression of the draft gears due to the starting effort of the locomotive, plus the amount by which the draft gears might be compressed in the opposite direction upon impact, plus whatever free slack might be developed at the coupler faces. The total amount of slack thus created normally would not exceed, on the average, more than seven to eight inches per car throughout the train. In general, more slack, and consequently greater slack action in the event of an emergency, will be developed when a train is at low speed, accelerating from a stop, than would be developed in the same train while proceeding at normal road speed between stations ; both because of the momentum developed at higher speeds ; and further because when trains are in motion, the draft gears tend by their action to adjust the slack. The grade upon which a train is proceeding has a substantial effect upon the slack, and consequently upon the slack action ; if a train is proceeding against an adverse grade, the tendency is for the slack to be somewhat more stretched than if the train were on level track ; whereas, if a train is proceed- ing down-grade, the slack will be bunched or compressed to a much greater extent than on level track. Whether a train is accelerating or decelerating likewise has a substantial effect upon the slack, and the consequent slack action. As above stated, if a train is moving from a stop, or is attaining a higher speed, the tendency is for the slack to become somewhat more stretched than if the train is slowing down, or preparing to stop, or is about to stop. The speed of the train, the extent to which the slack is extended or bunched, the consist of the train whether all loads or empties, and if partly loads and partly empties the position of the loads and empties in the train, and the ac- tion taken by the engineer, have a very definite effect upon the slack action resulting from an emergency stop. It appears that normally the slack action at the rear of a freight train is more severe, at speed of 10 miles per hour or less, than at ordinary road speed of 30 to 40 miles per hour, other conditions as to consist of train, grade, and length of train being equal. If a train con- sists of loads, slack action will be less severe than if the train consists of all empties, because the braking power upon the loaded cars is much less, in proportion to the weight thereof, and the momentum of the loads is greater, than in the case of empties. If the train consists partly of loads and partly of empties, and the loads are at the head end of the train, the slack action at the rear will be less severe than if the empties were at the head end of the train and the loads behind. In ordinary train operation the extent and amount of slack in freight trains, and whether the slack is extended or bunched, are to some extent within the control of the engineer, who, by manipulation of the air brakes, and the power of the engine, and giving due consideration to the railroad grade over which the train is operating, may so handle the train as to avoid severe shock or slack action at the rear end of the train. In situations in train operation where the train is brought to a sudden stop by a bursted air hose, broken air pipe, or kindred accident to car units, the engineer would have no control over the slack that may be then present in the train. Each car in a freight train affords a potential amount of slack and the more car units there are in freight trains the more potential 'lack will be present. Each additional car in a freight train furnishes an amount of resistance to slack action by added spring or friction capacity. The maximum amount of free motion or slack that may exist between two coupled freight cars is twelve inches. The statement that when the train is in motion all this slack is ex- tended is not supported by the evidence. Neither does the evidence sustain the contention that when an emergency stop is made by the application of TRAIN LENGTHS the air brakes at or near the head end of the train there will invariably be a run-in of slack from the rear equal to approximately one foot per car for each car of the train behind the point of application. In normal operation the total amount of slack which exists between two coupled cars does not exceed seven to eight inches per car. It appears from the evidence that in the operation of long trains, in many instances, severe jerks and jolts have occurred in the rear end of the train from slack action and that injuried have been suffered by brakemen and conductors as a result thereof. The record contains similar results from the operation of trains with car units of 70 or less. Emergency stops on long trains have taken place without causing severe slack action shocks to the caboose or injuries to the occupants. Emergency stops upon short trains have occurred with severe slack action shocks to the caboose and to the occupants thereof. The evience shows that the different results, as hereinabove indicated, on long and short trains arise because of the presence or absence, in the particular operation, of the factors directly contributing to slack action. 23. SAFETY OF OPERATION AS AFFECTED BY TRAIN LENGTHS : ACCIDENT AND CASUALTY STATISTICS (a) Accident Reports to Interstate Commerce Commission. Pursuant to the Accidents Reports Act (36 Stat. 350; U. S. Code, Title 45, Secs. 38 et seq.) the Interstate Commerce Commission has for many years required monthly reports of railway accidents, in considerable detail, on forms prescribed by the Commission and filed under oath by the carrier. Those reports are annually summarized in accident bulletins published by the Com- mission in statistical form wherein the accidents so reported are tabulated and segregated in great detail by classes and causes and in accordance with the classification of accidents contained in the Commission's rules for reporting accidents. Reportable railway accidents are divided into three primary groups: train accidents, train-service accidents, and non-train accidents. Reportable train accidents are those-with or without casualties-that arise in connection with the operation or movement of trains, locomotives, or cars, and result in damage to the equipment or other railway property in excess of $150, including cost of clearing the wreck and local expense of transferring lading (but not damage to lading). Reportable train-service accidents are those that arise in connection with the operation or movement of trains, locomotives, or cars, and result in casualties to persons, but not damage to equipment or other railway property in excess of $150 as just defined. Reportable nontrain accidents are those that do not result directly from the operation or movement of trains, locomotives, or cars. A casualty is not reportable unless it results in the death of a person, or injury to an employee either on or off duty sufficient to incapacitate him from performing his ordinary duties for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident, or injury to a person other than an employee (which includes passengers) if the injury is sufficient, in the opinion of the reporting officer, to incapacitate the injured person from following his customary vocation or mode of life for a period of more than one day. Train accidents and train-service accidents are reported on a form prescribed by the Commission and designated as Form T, a separate sheet being used for each reportable train accident or train-service accident. All the statistical showings of train and train-service accidents received in evidence were based on the statistics of accidents actually reported to that Commission or reportable to that Commission. The Nevada statistics of acci- dents and casualties on plaintiff's lines included with those reported to the Commission a few that were reportable under the rulesof the Commission and through inadvertence had not been reported but a record of which was in the plaintiff's files. (b) Bases for Computing Accident and Casualty Rates. Train accidents vith or without casualties, or casualties alone, may be measured, as to their frequency, on the basis of locomotive miles, train miles, or car miles operated ; casualty frequency may also be measured against man- hours worked, or man-miles traveled. In its published accident statistics the Interstate Commerce Commission measures train accidents against locomotive miles, and casualties against locomotive miles, and man-hours; in addition to those bases the railroads of the United States, including plaintiff, use both TRAIN LENGTHS 501 the train-mile and the car-mile basis. Man-hours and train-miles are commonly used as bases for measuring casualty frequency in relation to the exposure of employes to injury. The car-mile basis is used and is appropriate to determine casualty frequency in relation to the volume of traffic moved. The locomotive- mile is also a satisfactory basis for comparing the frequency of casualties sustained in train and train-service accidents in all classes of service, because all classes of train service accumulate locomotive miles ; whereas certain classes of service, such as yard service, and light-engine movements, do not accumulate train-miles or car-miles. A train-mile is the movement of a train a distance of one mile. A locomotive- mile is the movement of a locomotive a distance of one mile, under its own power. A car mile is a movement of a unit of car equipment a distance of one mile. Man-hours represent the period, expressed in hours of time, that employes are on duty. A man-mile represents a mile that an employe actually travels on duty. The term "casualty," as used in these findings, includes both deaths and personal injuries, and, unless otherwise specified, means a casualty reportable to the Interstate Commerce Commission under its Rules for Reporting Accidents. (e) National Accident and Casualty Statistics. Tables are in evidence which were compiled from the published statistics of the Interstate Commerce Commission for the years 1923-1933, inclusive, and which relate to the frequency of reported accidents and casualties on all of the Class I railroads of the United States. (1) All Employees.-The tables referred to show that accompanying the increase in the length of freight trains on Class I railroads from 1923 to 1933 there has been a continuous and marked downward trend in the frequency of casualties to all classes of railroad employes on duty due to all classes of accidents-train, train-service, and nontrain accidents; casualty rates for all classes, per million man-hours being for 1923, 30.89, and for 1933, 6.96, a de- crease of 23.93 casualties per million man-hours, or an improvement of 77 per cent comparing 1933 with 1923. The rate of decrease was gradual, each year having a lesser rate than the preceding year. (2) Trainmen on Duty All Classes.---Considering casualties sustained only by trainmen on duty, in train and train-service accidents, in all classes of service. On Class I railroads during the same eleven-year period the 1923 rate was 39.60 per million man-hours ; and there was a gradual decrease until the rate of 13.79 was reached in 1933; a decrease, in eleven years, of 25.81 casualties per million man-hours ; or 65 per cent, comparing 1933 with 1923. The term "trainmen" includes engineers and motormen, firemen and helpers, conductors, brakemen, and flagmen, engaged in passenger, freight, yard, or work service ; also train baggagemen, but not engine hostlers. (3) Conductors, Brakemen, and Flagmen.-Considering only the statistical showing relating to road freight conductors, brakemen, and flagmen on duty on Class I railroads of the United States (as distinguished from all trainmen in all classes of service) it appears that over the period of twelve years from 1923 to 1934, inclusive, there has been a general downward trend from year to year in the number of such employes killed as well as those injured, whether considered in the absolute number, or in the casualty rates, measured against either million man-hours worked, or million freight train-miles, of hundred million freight train car miles operated. Comparing the average casualty rates for the six years 1929-1934 with the earlier six years 1923- 1928, the improvement or decrease percentage on the man-hour basis is 36.8 per cent; on the train-mile basis 50.1 per cent, and on the car-mile basis 53.2 per cent. Comparing the year 1934 with 1923, the improvement rate on the man-hour basis is 50.4 per cent ; on the train-mile basis 68.9 per cent, and on the car-mile basis 72.4 per cent. (4) Trainmen-Slack Action Accidents.-Casualties to all classes of train- mnen on duty, all classes of service, sustained in train accidents and train- service accidents on all classes of railroads in the United States caused from sudden stopping, starting, lurch or jerk of train or car, measured on the million train-mile basis, show a continuous downward trend year after year from 1923 to 1933; the rate being 5.76 in 1923 and 1.79 in 1933-an improvement or decrease of 68 per cent, comparing 1933 with 1923. The decrease in absolute number of trainmen's casualties in train and train-service accidents, from the causes grouped as slack-action accidents, is also shown by the same statistics to be as follows: freight train miles de- creased from about 641,000,000 in 1923 to about 396,000,000 in 1933 or 38 per cent ; but the deaths from such accidents decreased from 47, in 1923, to 10, in 502 TRAIN LENGTHS 1933 or almost 80 per cent ; and the personal injuries therefrom, from 3,647 in 1923, to 697, in 1933 or 80 per cent. The decrease in the casualty rate per million train-miles from so-called slack action has been continuous from year to year with slight fluctuations throughout that eleven-year period. -(5) Conductors, Brakemen, and Flagmen-Slack Action.-When considera- tion of the type of casualty due to sudden stop, start, lurch, or jerk of train or car is confined to casualties to Road Freight Conductors, Brakemen, and Flagmen on duty-as distinguished from all classes of trainmen-in train- service accidents alone, on all classes of railroads in the United States, and related to the number of miles that freight trains were operated, the casualty rate per million train miles in 1923 was 3.30, and in 1933 it was 1.13-an im- provement or decrease of 66 per cent. The decrease in absolute number of road freight conductors, brakemen, and Gagmen on duty killed and injured in the so-called slack-action group of acci- dents is shown to be as follows : freight-train miles decreased 38 per cent as above stated, from about 641,000,000 in 1923 to 396,000,000 in 1933; but the number of such employes killed in slack-action accidents decreased from 12, in 1923, to 4, in 1933, or 66 per cent, and those injured from 2,102, in 1923, to 444, in 1933, or 78 per cent. Relating these same casualties-killed and injured-to the total freight-train car-miles operated for the same years, a steady downward trend year after year is alslo shown with an improvement or rate of decrease of 69.8 per cent, comparing the 1933 rate of 2.49, with the 1923 rate of 8.25 casualties, per hun- dred million freight-train car-miles. (d) Train Accidents-National. Train accidents involving property damage in excess of $150 with or without reportable casualties, are classified as collisions, derailments, locomotive-boiler accidents, other locomotive accidents, and miscellaneous train accidents. The total number of all types of train accidents in all classes of service, per million train miles, decreased from 22.0 in 1923 to 7.1 in 1933-or an improvement of 68 per cent-and the number of head-on and rear-end collisions per million train miles has been reduced from .75 in 1923 to .18 in 1933 or an improvement of 76 percent. The downward trend from year to year has been fairly uniform. Fewer trains running on the road provide fewer opportunities for head and rear-end collisions. Tain accidents caused by defects in or failures of equipment on all railroads of the United States, and the casualties to trainmen sustained in such accidents, greatly decreased during the 11 years 1923 to 1933. The total number of train accidents caused by defects in or failures of equipment has been steadily reduced from 11,822 in 1923 to 2,324 in 1933, or 80 per cent. Re- lating those totals to the number of train miles operated, produces a rate of 9.49 accidents per million train miles in 1923 and a rate of 2.95 in 1933-an im- provement or decrease of 69 percent. Trainmen's casualties in these accidents did not exceed in any one of the years one casualty in 5,000,000 train miles which was in 1923; the rate per million train miles in 1923 being .19 and in 1933, .05-an improvement or decrease of 74 per cent. From 1923 to 1933, the decrease in the accident rate per million train miles was practically uniform from year to year, and comparing the 1933 accident rate with the 1923 rate, accidents due to defects in or failures of locomotive boilers or other parts and appurtenances, the decrease was 41 per cent ; trucks decreased 63 per cent, wheels and axles decreased 67 per cent, power brakes and appurtenances decreased 73 per cent, handbrakes and appurtenances decreased 76 per cent, couplers decreased 83 per cent,, draft rigging decreased 75 per cent, and car bodies and other parts decreased 82 per cent. Illustrating how few casualties are sustained in any year by trainmen in all reportable train accidents due to defects in or failures of equipment along with the continuous decrease from 1923 to 1933, it appears that in the year 1933, not one trainman was killed, and only 43 trainmen suffered reportable injury, or at the rate of but one injury for each 18,269,000 train miles operated. Although during the period, 1923-1933, covered by. the National statistics in evidence there have been substantial improvements in the road-bed and equip- ment of American railroads, it is clear from a consideration of all of the -evidence in the case that a considerable part of the improvement in casualty rates on those railroads during the same period is directly attributable to the adoption and growth of the long-train method of handling freight traffic, because thereby a substantially less number of train units were operated than would have been operated for the same volume of traffic had not the long-train policy been followed. TRAIN LENGTHS 503 (1) Equipment Failures and Collisions-National.--The defendant introduced a showing for the years 1923-1933 covering all train accidents, as well as colli- sions and derailments, caused by defects in or failures of equipment under the same classification of failure causes referred to above ; except that those due to defects in or failures of locomotive boilers or other parts and appurtenances were omitted. Only the total number of accidents in the absolute was shown ; no comparison was made on any basis of measurement to show trends, nor was any casualty showing attempted. An anlysis of that showing by comparing the absolute number and also relating the accidents themselves as well as the casualties to trainmen on duty occurring in those accidents, to the total locomo- tive miles operated, shows that there was a reduction of 20,379 in the total number of accidents ; from 26,954 in the three years 1923-1925, to 6,575 in the three years 1931-1933--or 75.6 per cent, and an improvement or reduction on a locomo- tive mile basis of 62.5 per cent. In no year were there many trainmen casual- ties in all of these train accidents, but there were 15 less killed and 319 less injured in the three years 1931-1933 than in the three years 1923-1925. Com- paring the casualty rate on a locomotive mile basis for the same three-year periods, the improvement or decrease was 50.5 per cent. Illustrating the infre- quency with which casualties to trainmen occur in all reportable train accidents due to defects in or failures of equipment: in the year 1933, 25,621,920 loco- motive miles were operated for each casualty to a trainman on duty. Collisions and derailments caused by defects in or failures of equipment, during the three years 1931-1933 were fewer by 16,857 or 76.6 per cent than in the three years 1923-25. Comparing the same three-year periods, the improvement or decrease on a locomotive mile basis was 64.1 per cent. For the year 1934 there were 264 train accidents due to defects in or failures of equipment with 254 resulting in derailments. In 1933 the total due to this cause was 253 with 249 derailments. (e) Commission's Investigation of Train Accidents-National. The Interstate Commerce Commission has a Bureau of Safety through which it conducts the investigations authorized by Section 3 of the Accident Reports Act. The Bureau summons and examines witnesses, investigates at the scene of the accident and elsewhere and makes a detailed report and conclusions to the Commission which officially publishes summaries of those reports quarterly and has done so at least since the year 1927. Such investigations have been held as to more than 90 per cent of collisions, derailments or other accidents which resulted in fatalities to passengers or employes. During the seven-year period, 1928-1934, the Bureau investigated 559 train accidents, all of which are summarized in the Commission's said quarterly re- port; of that number 285 involved freight trains, of which 183 were collisions, 98 were derailments and 4 were miscellaneous train accidents. Those 285 accidents involved 380 freight trains of which 294, or 77.3 per cent, consisted of 70 cars or less ; of that 294 trains 178 or 60 per cent contained 40 cars or less. Negligence of employes was the cause assigned by the Bureau for 194 acci- dents it investigated involving freight trains, or 68.1 per cent of the 285 freight train accidents investigated. Of the number charged to negligence of employes 232 of the trains involved, or 82.2 percent, consisted of 70 cars or less. Defects in or failures of equipment were charged with 37 freight train accidents, an average of slightly over five accidents per year, or 13 per cent. During that seven-year period the Bureau investigated no freight train accident on plain- tiff's lines in Nevada nor elsewhere on plaintiff's lines except one involving a train of 40 cars or less that occurred October 26, 1933, on a branch line near Monterey, California. Although under Section 3 of the Accident Reports Act the Commission is empowered to make and has frequently made such recommendations as it may deem proper, it did not in any of the quarterly reports for the seven years 1928-1934 above referred to find that the length of a train had any bearing on the accident or that the accident might have been avoided had a train been shorter, or make any recommendations respecting train length. It made rec- ommendations in many other respects. (f) Accident Statistics-Plainti ff's Pacific Lines. As hereinbefore found, plaintiff's railway system operations are in seven states, and except in Arizona it has carried forward the standard long freight train method of operation from its adoption as a policy in 1923. (1) )Tmployes on Duty-All Classes of ,service-Train and Train-Service Ac- cidents.-Its total locomotive miles in all classes of service, have with some fluctuations declined from 51,136,000 in 1923 to 32,851,000 in 1933 and the man- hours worked by trainmen, all classes of service, from 25,055,000 in 1923 to 504 TRAIN LENGTHS 12,422,000 in 1933. In absolute number reported casualties to all classes of em- ployes on duty, all classes of service, in train and train-service accidents, de- clined during that 11-year period from 36 killed to 13 and from 770 injured to 221. Measured per million locomotive miles there was a continuous, but slightly fluctuating decline from 15.76 casualties to 7.12 or an improvement of 54.8 per cent. (2) Trainmen wn Duty-All Classes Service.-Casualties to trainmen on duty all classes of service, sustained in train and train-service accidents continuously, but with slight annual fluctuations, similarly declined during those 11 years. Per million locomotive miles the decline was from 12.89 to 6.24, or 51.6 per cent improvement ; per million man-hours worked, from 26.30 to 16.50, an improve- ment of 37.2 per cent. (3) Train Accidents.-During the eleven years 1923 to 1933 the plaintiff's system operations were: in 1923, about 51 million locomotive miles and in 1933 nearly 33 million. The reported train accidents have steadily decreased, with slight annual fluctuations, from a total of 487 in 1923 to 152 in 1933 and, on a million locomotive mile basis, from 9.52 in 1923 to 4.63 in 1933, an improvement rate of 51.37 per cent. During the same period train accidents due to collisions--which are directly related to the number of trains operated- showed an almost steady decline from 142 to 33; those due to derailments declined gradually from 231 to 44. The 142 collisions in 1923 are equivalent to 2.78, and the 33 in 1933 to 1.00 collisions per million locomotive miles, representing an improvement of 64 per cent, comparing 1933 with 1923. Likewise, the 231 derailments in 1923 are equivalent to 4.52 and the 44 in 1933 to 1.34 derailments per million locomotive miles, or an improvement of 70 per cent. (g) Nevada-Arizona Casualty Statistics. The details of each reportable train and train service accident in Nevada for the 13 years, 1923-1935, are set forth in exhibits received in evidence. A complete showing has been made of the plaintiff's operations in Nevada for 13 years in so far as they have involved accidents and casualties. The same showing has been made of train and train service accidents on plaintiff's lines in Arizona for the same period by statistical charts of all those accidents reported by plaintiff to the Interstate Commerce Commission. (1) Similarity of Operating Conditions-Nevada-Arizona.-Since 1912 plain- tiff has been operating its railroad lines in Arizona in full compliance with the provisions of the Arizona law limiting car units in trains to 70. Operating conditions, character and volume of traffic transported are substantially similar in Nevada as compared to Arizona. Operating methods differ only because of the law's restrictions in Arizona, whereas in Nevada the long-train method of operation has prevailed for several years and now prevails. The plaintiff's statistical showing of its operations in Arizona particularly as related to train accidents and train service accidents is uncontradicted and, when considered with the evidence as to Nevada train and train service acci- dents, affords a fair and reliable basis of comparison between operations as a whole as well as between a freight-train operation limited to 70 cars, exclusive of caboose, and a standard long-train operation, as to the hazard of accidents (1) to all employes, (2) to freight train employes, and T3) to freight train employes from so-called slack action. From 1929 to 1934 the operation of long freight trains in and through Nevada has greatly predominated. The year 1923 showed a partial beginning of increase in the length of trains in that state, and it assumed greater propor- tions each year until 1928. Prior to 1926, the operation of short trains greatly predominated. (2) All Classes of Employes-All Classes of Service.-In comparing railroad operations in Arizona with Nevada as to all casualties to all classes of employes on duty in all classes of service sustained in train and train service accidents from 1923 to 1934, inclusive, it is found that the following appears : TRAIN LENGTHS 505 All Classes of Employees on Duty, All Classes of Service, States of Nevada and. Arizona Casualties Locomo- Per Million Total tive Miles Total Cas- Locomo- (Thou- ualties tive sands) Miles-- Average 1923-1928: Nevada. ...... ...-----------------------------------------------27,309 241 8.82 Arizona..- . ... ...------------------ ----------------------------- 31,779 459 14.44 1929-1934: Nevada-......------------------------------------------------21,665 104 4.80 Arizona -----------------------------------------------27,985 271 9.68 1935: Nevada---..----------------------- ----.......-...---.3,114 8 2.57 Arizona ------------------------------------------------4,123 44 10.67 (3) All Classes of Employes-Road Freight Trains.-The total freight train miles (thousands) operated in Arizona from 1923 to 1928 amounted to 14,194 and in Nevada, 13,197; the total casualties for this period, to all classes of employees in road freight train service, in Arizona were 258, and in Nevada 173. On a million train mile basis the average in Arizona was 18.18 and in Nevada 13.11. On the basis of 100 million car miles the average in Arizona was 34.96 and 22.49 in Nevada. During the period from 1929 to 1934, inclusive, there accrued by operation in Nevada 10,455 (thousands) freight train miles and 13.143 (thousands) in Arizona. On a 100 million car mile basis the Nevada accident rate during the period was 10.17, and the Arizona rate 21.38. Comparing 1935 operations in Nevada and Arizona, the total casualties to employes in road freight train service in Nevada amounted to 7, and in Arizona to 22. The casualty rate per million train miles in Nevada was 4.39, and in Arizona 10.48. The casualties per 100 million car miles were 5.68 in Nevada, and 18.56 in Arizona. (4) Road Freight Conductors, Brakemen, and Flagmen.-The evidence shows that the frequency of casualties to road freight conductors, brakemen, and flagmen on duty sustained in train and train service accidents for the 13-year period has been more favorable to Nevada in every year, on the train-mile basis, except in 1934 where the difference is only .61 (less than one casualty) per million freight train miles. During this period there were 12 casualties in Arizona and 11 in Nevada. On the car-mile basis the Nevada frequency of casualties has been less every year except in the year 1923.. In this year the average train length was less in Nevada than Arizona. During the period from 1923 to 1935, inclusive, nine road freight conductors, brakemen, and flagmen on duty were killed in Nevada and ten in Arizona ; 213 injured in Nevada, and 345 in Arizona. Measured on a freight car mile basis, the freight traffic in Nevada during the 13-year period exceeded that in Arizona by about five per cent. Com- paring the seven years, 1929 to 1935, two were killed in Nevada and three were killed in Arizon'a; 70 were injured in Nevada and 137 in Arizona. Comparing the years 1929-1934 with the previous six years, 1923-1928, the decrease in the casualty rate on a train-mile basis in Nevada was 46.17 per cent and in Arizona, 38.20. (5) Slack-action Casualties to Trainmen, Nevada -Arizona.-Casualties result- ing from this type of accident are confined almost entirely to road freight conductors, brakemen, and flagmen on duty, occur most frequently when they are in the caboose, occasionally when on top of the train, and infrequently when they are on the side of a car or caboose, or attempting to board or leave a car or caboose. The Arizona train-limit law has been observed long enough and under such circumstances, as to afford a fair basis for judging whether a law limiting the length of a freight train to 70 cars, exclusive of caboose, can be said to be reasonably effective in the prevention or minimization of slack accidents and incident casualties. There is in evidence a reliable statistical comparison of plaintiff's freight train operations as between the States of Nevada and Arizona, and as to the occurrence of "slack-action" casualties, for the 13-year period, 1923-1935, inclusive. Considering the casualties in their absolute number during that period, there were more on short trains, in Arizona, than there were on long trains in Nevada ; there being 82 such casualties, including one killed in Arizona, and 506 TRAIN LENGTHS 71 casualties, none of whom were killed, on long trains in Nevada. Analyzing the combined total number of this particular type of casualty occurring in both states, it is shown that there were 105 casualties ; 82 in Arizona and 23 in Nevada (including two killed, one in Arizona and one in Nevada, on short trains), against 71 casualties, none of whom were killed, on long trains in Nevada ; or almost 50 per cent more casualties on short trains than on long trains. During the seven years, 1929-1935, inclusive, there were three more casualties of this kind in Arizona, where there were 41, than there were in Nevada, with 38, although the traffic measured in freight train car miles was 5.5 per cent greater in Nevada. There were no reportable casualties from "slack" and "slack-surge" accidents in Nevada during the five months from November 11, 1929, to April 10, 1930; none during the eleven months, October 13, 1930, to September 20, 1931; none during the six months December 18, 1932, to June 22, 1933; none during the five months October 30, 1963, to March 16, 1934; none during the five months May 11, 1934, to October 1, 1934, and none during the five months March 1, 1935, to August 12, 1935. There was but one reportable slack or slack-surge accident to a conductor, brakeman, or flagman on plaintiff's lines in Nevada during the period of almost two years from October 13, 1930, to July 13, 1932. There were 359 days in 1929, 358 days in 1930, 364 days in 1931, 361 days each in 1932, 1933, and 1934, and 362 days in 1935 when no accident of this type caus- ing casualties occurred. Reduced to a percentage basis, it appears that on slightly more than 97 per cent of the days out of that seven-year period, no casualties of the type mentioned occurred in Nevada. The casualty rate for that type of accident, on either a train-mile basis or car- mile basis for any one year, fluctuates greatly, for example: the average casu- alty rate, on a train-mile basis, for the six years, 1929-1964, inclusive, was 3.25 in Nevada, and 2.89 in Arizona, a difference of .36 casualty per million train miles in favor of Arizona. On a car-mile basis of comparison, the difference of .72 casualty per 100 million freight-train car-miles (Nevada, 4.49 and Arizona, 5.31) is more favorable to Nevada. Comparing the six years, 1929-1934, inclusive, with the earlier years. 1923- 1928, inclusive, there has been a decrease of 22 casualties of this type in Nevada, and a decrease of three casualties in Arizona. On a train-mile basis the casualty rate shows a 23.35 per cent improvement in Nevada, but in Arizona the rates are the same or without improvement. On a freight-train car-mile basis, the decrease in Nevada was 38.32 per cent and in Arizona 4.5 per cent. For the 12 years. 1923- 1934, inclusive, when short-train operations predominated for the earlier years, and the length of trains was steadily increasing until the operation of long trains became predominant in the later six years in Nevada, the average casualty rate, per million train-miles was only slightly higher ; .91 casualty (less than one) more, in Nevada than in Arizona ; and per hundred million car-miles the Nevada rate was .47 casualty less. When the comparison between Nevada and Arizona is confined, to the six years, 1929-1934, inclusive, the casualty rate, based on the number of freight-train car-miles operated, is lower or more favorable in Nevada than Arizona by .82 casualty per 100 million car miles. (6) Caretakers in Cabooses-Nevada-Arizona.-Persons carried under contract in freight train cabooses are usually livestock caretakers and messengers accom- panying banana and other perishable shipments. Since November 20, 1925, there have been no reportable casualties to persons of that class on plaintiff's line in Nevada. There were two casualties on September 25, 1922, at Wells, Nevada, caused by a rear-end collision of a 47-car train with a 30-car train. On No- vember 20, 1925, a livestock caretaker was injured by falling between cars while walking over the top of the train. In Arizona during the same period there were 13 of such persons injured on short trains. In March 1935 on an 82-car train a conductor was thrown by slack action shock and landed on two stockmen who were sleeping on the floor of the caboose. One of the stockmen was slightly bruised but no one was hurt. (7) Serious Casualties-Nevada-Arizona---Comparing the freight train opera- tions in the two states for the period 1923-1935, as to their production of fa- talities or amputation of limbs of freight conductors, brakemen and flagmen in train and train-service operations, it is found that there were, in Nevada, nine deaths and four amputations, none of which occurred on a long train, except one amputation ; while during the same period in Arizona there were twelve deaths and four amputations, all of which occurred on short freight trains. Slack action was assigned as the cause of one death in Nevada on a 60-car train and TRAIN LENGTHS 507 one amputation. That cause was assigned for one death in Arizona on a 64-car train and one subsequent fatality on a 66-car train; no amputations. There has been no fatal injury to a road freight conductor, brakeman, or flagman in Nevada since June 6, 1930. (8) Casualties Classifed-Nevada-Arizcrna.-Freight train operation under the Nevada Train Limit Law will require the movement of more train units than are now necessary to transport a given amount of traffic. Operation in Arizona is typical of this result and produces substantially a greater number of train miles than Nevada in handling the same traffic volume expressed in car miles. It appears from the evidence, based upon 1934 traffic volume, that operation under the law would require 8,500 additional meets and passings of trains. The evidence shows a comparison between Nevada and Arizona operations for the period beginning 1923 and ending 1934 together with the casualties to road freight conductors, brakemen, and flagmen in road freight train operation. The classification of causes are those used by the Interstate Commerce Commission in its rules for reporting accidents. The following tabulation shows the total casualties in Nevada and Arizona during the period specified from the causes indicated and is fully sustained by the evidence. Road Freight Train Operation-Casualties to Road Freight Conductors, Brakemen, and Flagmen Miscellaneous train Total casualties Operating hand Getting on or off accidents & miscel- brakes cars or locomotives laneous I rain service accidents Period Nevada Arizona Nevada Arizona Nevada Arizona Nevada Arizona (1) (2) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1923-28---------------151 215 5 24 30 47 97 131 1929-34--------------. . 61 123 1 12 7 26 48 79 Totals, 12 years .. -- 215 338 6 36 37 73 145 210 (9) Derailments Reported as Train Aceidents-Nevada-Arizona.-During the 12-year period, 1923-1934, there were 52 derailments in Nevada causing damage to property amounting to $50,975; of this number 26 occurred on long trains and 26 on short trains. In Arizona for the same period there were 78 derail- ments with property damage amounting to $159,385. Analyzing the total of the two states, it is shown that of the total 104 happened in short train operation and 26 on long trains., For the 12 years, 1923-1934, continuing the comparison between Arizona and Nevada, it appears that in Nevada based upon per million train miles the rate was 2.20 and in Arizona 2.85. The damage to property 10r million train miles in Nevada was $2,155 and in Arizona, $5,830. Based per 100 million car miles the total for the same period in Nevada was at the tate of 3.41 compared to 5.37 in Arizona ; with damage to property ensuing thereby at the rate of $3,340 per 100 million car miles in Nevada, and $10,694 in Arizona. In 1935 there were no reportable derailments in Nevada from these causes, although 1,596,000 freight train miles and 123,216,000 freight train car miles were operated. In Arizona there were three reportable derailments with an aggregate damage of $12,274. The freight train miles operated were 2,100,000 and the freight car miles, 118,552,000. (h) Comparison of Short and Long Train Periods in Nevada with Each Other. For the three years 1923, 1924, and 1925 the plaintiff's freight trains operated in Nevada averaged 52.56 cars per train. For the period 1933, 1934, and 1935, plaintifrs freight trains operated in Nevada averaged 78.13 cars per train. In the first period 6,556,000 freight-train miles were operated which resulted in 344,585,000 freight-car miles. Due to the increase in the length of trains in the second period the total freight-train miles dropped to 4,472,000, though the freight-train car miles increased to.349,387,000. In the first period there were five deaths, four of them brakemen working on trains of less than 55 cars and one of them a railroad police officer who fell from a 60-car train. In the first period there were 106 reportable injuries to trainmen and enginemen, 96 of which were to freight conductors, brakemen, and flagmen. In the second period there were no deaths; there were 28 trainmen and enginemen injured of whom 508 TRAIN LENGTHS 27 were freight conductors, brakemen and firemen. The total casualties for the two periods were 114 in the first period and 29 in the second period. Based per 100 million freight-car miles, there were 33.08 casualties in the first period, -and on the same basis, 8.30 in the second. (i) Santa Fe Casualty Statistics-Comparing Short-Train and Long-Train Operations. As part of its system operations the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company operates a standard steam railway from Los Angeles, California, to Chicago, Illinois, which passes through Needles, California, 12 miles west of the Arizona line, Winslow, Arizona, and Gallup, Belen and Clovis, New Mexico. The distance from Needles to Gallup is 419.7 miles, 385.7 of which are through Arizona, and from Gallup, through Belen, to Clovis is 383.9 miles. The char- acter of freight traffic and equipment handled through Arizona and New Mexico on that main line is substantially the same as that handled by plaintiff through Arizona and New Mexico, through interstate traffic greatly preponderating. That railroad has observed the Arizona train limit law, the effect of which is to control the length of freight trains in both directions between needles and 'Gallup, the nearest freight-train terminal east of Arizona (32 miles from the state line), and to shorten the length of east-bound freight trains between Gallup and Belen (a freight-train terminal) a distance of 144 miles. Between Belen and Clovis (a freight-train terminal), a distance of 240 miles, standard long freight train operation is predominant, and has been for a number of years. There is no New Mexico state law that limits the length of freight trains. The evidence shows an exclusively short train operation between Needles and Gallup (383.9 miles), a standard long train operation between Gallup and Belen (144 miles) somewhat modified as to east-bound freight trains by the effect of the Arizona law, and an unrestricted and unmodified standard long train operation between Belen and Clovis (240 miles). Casualties on the above portions of the Santa Fe lines, resulting to road freight trainmen and enginemen on duty, from the operation of through, local, and mixed road freight trains, and occurring while on, or getting on or off road freight trains, as such casualties were reported to the Interstate Commerce Commission by the carrier, and their relation to train and car miles are found to be: Casualties per 100 Casualties per 100 Average cars per million train million freight train (average) miles (average) car miles (aver- age) Clovis to Gallup to Clovis to Gallup to Clovis to Gallup to Gallup Needles Gallup Needles Gallup Needles Total, 12 years---.--------.....--71.38 54. 49 7. 14 9. 06 10.01 16.36 Total, 6 years, 1923-28-.-------------------69. 71 52. 43 8. 19 10. 15 11. 75 19.56 Total, 6 years, 1929-34-------------------73.44 57.01 5.85 7.72 7.96 13.42 Improvement 1929-34 compared with Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent 1923--28----------------------------__-------------- 28.57 23.94 32.26 30.06 (j) Chesapeake and Ohio Railway-Casualty Statistics. The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway is a Class I Railroad of 3.117 miles of road operating in the states of Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Ohio, In- diana, and Illinois, and the District of Columbia. The railroad consists of both heavy or mountainous grade and relatively light or water grade, the heavier grades varying from .57 per cent to 2.67 per cent. A large portion of the mileage consists of double track and the main lines are equipped with block signals, most of which are automatic signals although there are some manual block signals ; a portion of the territory in the automatic block signal system has the additional protection of automatic train control. Depending upon the character and availability of traffic, facilities, and grade conditions, both long and short trains are operated. The system freight opera lions of the Chesapeake and Ohio were large and the increase in train leaghths TRAIN LENGTHS 509 progressive and pronounced from 1924 to 1934, as appear from the following statement of the evidence: Casualties -Trainmen, Engine, Freight Road Freight Service Year train F reight Average miles (thou Cars per Per Per sa~s sandsands ) Number 100,000 million train car miles miles 1924--------- .------------- -------- 13,945 745,379 53.5 287 2.06 0.89 1929---------- ------------------------- 14,975 957,501 63.9 154 1.03 .16 1934----- .-- ------------------------- 9,969 752,995 77.9 80 0.83 .11 Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Improvement -1934 over 1924....---------.------------------------------72. 1 59. 7 71.8 It further appears that on the Peninsula Subdivision the average freight train lengths increased from 70.0 cars in 1934 to 131.9 in 1934; on the Rivianna Subdivision from 75.2 to 122.2; on the James River Subdivision from 72.0 to 118.0; on the Logan Subdivision from 63.5 to 119.0, and on the Northern Sub- division from 73.7 to 121.6. (k) Casualty Statistics-Western Pacific Railroad Company: The Western Pacific Railroad Company operates through Nevada from Cali- fornia to Salt Lake City, Utah. Its main track mileage is 429 miles and sub- stantially parallel but is some distance removed from the main line of plaintiff from Calvada to the Utah state line. The westward trains of the Western Pacific operate over the Southern Pacific portion of paired track operation from Alazon to Weso, about 183 miles. In Nevada the character of freight traffic handled by the Western Pacific is substantially the same as that by the plaintiff, although very much less in volume. No train or car-mile figures were furnished for the Western Pacific but the freight trains operated by it during the six years, 1929-1934, were 43,242 in number, of which 33,516 were 70 cars or less, and 9,726 were 71 cars or more, the longest train operated in each year varying from 99 to 130 cars. During the six years, 1929-1934, there were on the short train two casualties to road freight brakemen-none to conductors-attributed to break-in-twos, sudden starting or stopping or emergency application of air brakes. One was in 1929 on a 58-car train. The other in 1934 on a 70-car train. During the same period there was but one of this type of casualty on trains of 71 cars or more, which occurred in 1931 to a brakeman on a 127-car train. During the six years, 1929-1934, the casualties per year from all causes in train and train- service accidents to Western Pacific road freight train and enginemen on duty ranged from three to seven per year, with a total of 29. (1) Nevada Casualty Rate Compared.-There has been a decrease in report- able casualties in train and train-service accidents resulting from operation of road freight trains. The evidence of those casualties in Nevada for the 13 years 1923-1935 is complete. Considering that 13 years in two periods, the first including the six years 1923-1928, and the second the seven long-train years, 1929-1935, the following is found: (a) All classes of employes on duty: per million train-miles, 1923- 1928, 13.11 casualties ; 1929-1935, 6.97 casualties: an improvement of 46.83 per cent ; per hundred million car-miles, 1923-1928, 22.49 casualties ; 1929-1935, 9.54 casualties: an improvement of 57.58 per cent. (b) Road freight conductors, brakemen and flagmen on duty: per million train-miles, 1923-1928, 11.37 casualties; 1929-1935, 5.89 casualties : an improvement of 48.20 per cent ; per hundred million car-miles, 1923- 1928, 19.50 casualties; 1929-1935, 8.07 casualties: an improvement of 58.61 per cent. (c) Road freight conductors, brakemen and flagmen on duty caused from sudden starting, stopping, lurch or jerk of trains: per million train-miles, 1923-1928, 4.24 casualties ; 1929-1935, 3.15 casualties : an improvement of 25.71 per cent; per hundred million car-miles, 1923-1928, 7.28 casualties; 1929-1935, 4.32 casualties : an improvement of 40.66 per cent. 47891-38- 33 510 TRAIN LENGTHS (m) Casualties While Train Standing. All casualties in train and train-service accidents do not occur while the train in motion. Of the 258 reportable casualties in Nevada to all classes of plaintiff's employes on duty sustained in train and train-service accidents in road freight train operation during the 13 years, 1923-1935, 63 occurred while the trains were standing, and 49 of the 63 occurred on short trains. Casualties occurring while trains are standing are closely related to the number of trains operated, but have no relation to the length of the train. (n) Grade Crossing Accidents. It is true as contended by defendant that the Victory Highway, which para- llels plaintiff's line across the State of Nevada, carries the major portion of traffic across the State of Nevada. The evidence shows that said highway throughout the State of Nevada when it crosses said railroad does so by an underpass or overpass. Such crossings are now being constructed over the railroad lines of the Western Pacific in the territory where plaintiff uses such tracks in paired-track operation. On the auxiliary main line of the plaintiff from Fernley to Wendel there are within Nevada 25 crossings at grade on the public highways over plaintiff's tracks. On plaintiff's principal main line through the State of Nevada between Calvada and the western boundary of Utah there are 133 crossings of public highways at grade. It also appears from the evidence that none of the 158 main line public crossings is protected by mechanical crossing gates but 16 ae protected by wig-wag signals. In addition to the above there are 116 private crossings at grade on plaintiff's main lines in Nevada, the use of which is covered by an agreement between the user and the railroad or restricted by swinging gates. During the period from 1921 to 1934, inclusive, a total of 39 casualties oc- curred at grade crossings between trains, engines, or cars on the one hand and vehicles on the other. Of this number 21 passenger automobiles were struck by trains resulting in 17 deaths and 19 injuries. Ten passenger automobiles ran into trains with two deaths and 14 injured. Four automobile trucks were struck by trains with two dead and six injured. One animal-drawn vehicle was struck by train. Three pedestrians were killed by being struck by train or engine. Of the above total 33 occurred in cities or towns on grade crossings that now remain unprotected by an underpass or overpass. The more trains that are operated the greater will be the hazard from this class of casualties. (o) Train Accidents-Nevada. Much evidence was introducted by both parties on the subject of train acci- dents. It is found that that class of accident bears no direct relation to the number of cars in a freigh train. The two principal causes of train accidents are negligence of employes and defects in or failures of locomotives or cars. In point of number and frequency minor causes have been collisions, defects in or failure of track or roadway structures, acts of God such as storms or floods. Train accidents caused by negligence of employes are directly related to the number of trains run, since additional trains require additional employes and afford additional opportunity for the disobedience or forgetfulness of rules or orders as well as the overlooking of fixed and other signals used in train operation. Accidents caused by defects in locomotives are directly related to the number of locomotives run. Accidents caused by defects in cars are related to the individual car regardless of the length of the train in which it is hauled, except, that the more cars in a train the more opportunity for defects in car equipment. Related to locomotive miles, freight-train miles and freight-train car-miles, the train accidents on plaintiff's lines in Nevada, reported to the Interstate Commerce Commission during the 13-year period 1923-35 as caused by colli- sions, derailments, locomotive boiler accidents, other locomotive accidents, and miscellaneous train accidents, show a substantial rate of improvement, not- withstanding some increase in "other locomotive accidents." During the six- year period 1923-28 the frequency of such accidents was: per million freight locomotive miles-------------------------7. 79 per million freight train miles-----------------------------8.18 per 100 million freight-train car-miles_----------------------14. 04 TRAIN LENGTHS 511 During the seven-year period 1929-1935, when the standard long freight train operation greatly predominated, the frequency of such accidents was: per milliom freight locomotive miles_----_____ __._.__.__.._. 5.81 per million freight train miles--.-------------------------- 6.14 per 100 million freight-train car-miles---------------------- 8. 40 The improvement in the seven years 1929-1935 compared with the six years 1923-1928 was : per million freight locomotive miles----.----------------- 25. 4% per million freight train miles-------------------------- 24. 9%o per 100 million freight-train car-miles.-----.....--------------- 40. 2% An even greater improvement was shown in the casualty rates in those classes of train accidents as follows: 1923-1928: per million freight locomotive miles-------------- 1. 01 per million freight train miles_-_-__..______..--..- 1.06 per 100 million freight-train car-miles.------------- 1.82 1929-1935: per million freight locomotive nilles---------------. .55 an improvement of 45.5% per million freight train miles.--------------------. 58 an improvement of 45.3% per 100 million freight-train car-miles------------- 80 an improvement of 56.0% (p) Freight Train Derailments-Nevada. Classifying the reportable derailments caused by defects in or failures on freight car equipment, by the classification of accidents described by the Inter- state Commerce Commission, they fall into seven general classes: (1) trucks, (2) wheels and axles, (3) air brakes 'and appurtenances, (4) hand brakes and brake rigging, (5) couplers, (6) draft rigging, (7) car bodies and other parts of equipment. During the six years, 1923-1928, reportable derailments from such causes were 2.80 per million train miles and 4.81 per 100 million car miles; during six-year period 1929-1934 the frequency was 1.43 per million train' miles, an improvement of 48.9 per cent over the preceding period, and 1.98 per 100 million car miles, an improvement of 58.8 per cent over the preced- ing period. There were no such derailments in Nevada in 1935 and none since September 23, 1934. The reportable damage in such derailments, which in- eludes only damage to equipment or other railroad property, including the cost of clearing wrecks, amounted to $40,096 during the first period and $10,879 dur- ing the second six-year period. There were three trainmen injured in two of such accidents during the second period and none during the first period. ((I) Point in Train Where Break-in-Two Occurs. There is a distinct class of slack-action accident which occasionally results in a casualty and which is caused by the train breaking in two. The break-in-two may occur from a defective coupler or a coupler knuckle breaking, from a draw-bar pulling out, from a trespasser stepping on a cutting lever, or from the derailment of a car immediately ahead of the break. The separation of the two cars separates the air hose between the two cars and causes emergency application of the air-brakes, as distinguished from a service application. The brakes are not so applied simultaneously throughout the train, but are applied first on the car each side of the break and then serially, but rapidly, on each car toward the caboose and on each car toward the engine. Slack- action may occur if the other conditions producing it are such as to permit as to permit it to be developed. It appears that on the long trains operated by plaintiff in Nevada there is no difficulty in keeping up the air pressure throughout the train so that the brakes in any part of the train will apply as effectively in emergency as on a short train. The number of cars between the caboose and the point where the train separates and not the total number of cars in the train, is the factor to be considered together with other slack action producing factors in determining the severity of the slack-action shock, if any, at the rear end or at any point behind the break. The number of ears ahead of the break has nothing to do with the shock experienced at the caboose or at any point behind the break. Casualties which the evidence shows were due to slack action from this cause would not be related to the number of car units operating in the train on which the accident occurred. 512 TRAIN LENGTHS (r) Heavier Graduating Springs. The evidence shows that of 34 casualties caused by slack action other than break-in-twos, air hose and brake pipe failures, and engineers' emergency appli- cations on both long and short trains on plaintiff's lines in Nevada during the 13-year period 1923-1935, 15 of such casualties resulted from undesired emer- gency application of the air brakes, due, judging by the circumstances anl there was no evidence to the contrary, to a light graduating spring in the triple valve which is part of the air brake mechanism underneath each car. The five of these casualties which occurred on short trains occurred prior to 1926, none since. Eight of the ten of those casualties which occurred on long trains occurred prior to 1929, the ninth in 1933 and the tenth in 1935. The evi- dence shows without contradiction that by 1929 the use of a heavier gradu- ating spring, which prevents such undesired emergency action as that above described, had become practically universal and compulsory after January 1, 1935, on cars offered in interchange, as well as standard on all of plaintiff's cars and on all cars of the Pacific Fruit Express Company. The 15 casualties above referred to formed 15.8 per cent of the total of 95 slack-action casualties on both long and short trains during the same period, and it is found that slack action accidents on either long or short train due to that particular cause are no longer to be considered a factor of any material consequence in train operation. 24. HAZARDS oF PARTICULAR ACCIDENTS IN LONG TRAIN OPERATION RELIED UPON BY DEFENDANT TO SUSTAIN THE LAW AS A SAFETY MEASURE (a) Safety of Travelers Upon Railroads. (1) Buckling Freight Cars.-With respect to defendant's contention that operation of long freight trains in Nevada produces a hazard to operation on adjoining or double track caused by cArs buckling and fouling adjoining track with danger to trains using that track the evidence does not warrant a finding of fact sustaining defendant's claim. During the 13-year period 1923-1935, no collision or accident of any type has occurred on plaintiff's line in Nevada, caused by colliding of a train on one main track with the wreckage of a train accident occurring on an adjacent track. Since 1929 there have been 29 accidents to plaintiff's freight trains in Nevada, caused by derailments or buckling cars in freight trains of over 70 cars in length. In two of these cases the adjoining main track was blocked but no ac- cident occurred. In eleven cases there was no fouling because double tracks were divergent. In sixteen cases there was no fouling of adjoining tracks although the distance between the tracks at the point of the wreck did not exceed 13 feet. For a seven-year period (1929-1935) of long-train operation on the Nevada lines, it thus appears that in only two cases would there exist any hazard of wreck from this cause. (2) Additional Hazards to Other Trains Caused by Inability of Trainnw? to Give Flag Protection on Account of Injuries from Slack Action Accidents on Long Trains?1-Defendant contends that trainmen riding in the caboose of a long train may be so incapacitated by slack action caused by an emergency stop of the train, as to be unable to give to their train the flagging protection to the rear required by the operating rules; that this presents a hazard to follow- ing trains. This contention is not sustained by any substantial evidence. There is no record of any slack action accident to any of plaintiff's long trains. in Nevada, in which each and every trainman in the caboose was in- capacitated to the extent that he was unable to give flag protection to the rear. We find that the hazard of collision from a following train, even if flag pro- tection could not be given by any of the occupants of the caboose, is very slight because of the fact that plaintiff's main lines are equipped throughout with automatic block signals which operate independently of manual flagging protection. There is no testimony to show that any long train operated on plaintiff's lines in Nevada, or elsewhere, and which had been subjected to an emergency stop, has been collided with by a following train, whether the effect of the emergency stop was the cause of the trainmen riding In the caboose to be injured and thus unable to give flag protection, or otherwise. 'All of the sub-headings that follow on this page to and including page 82 state what the defendant Attorney General claimed and are not findings of the court, as will appear from what follows under each of those sub-heads. TRAIN LENGTHS 513 (3) Passenger Train Safety-(a) In Nevada.-The evidence does not sustain a finding of fact that the operation of long trains in Nevada creates a hazard to passenger train operation. The hazard to passenger trains or other trains by long train operation is confined by defendant to that arising from buckling cars and the fouling of adjoining tracks by wrecks and the inability of trainmen because of injuries from slack action to properly flag following trains. In addition to the fact that no accidents or collisions have occurred on Ne- vada lines since 1923 from any of these causes, casualty statistics showing passenger train safety fail to reflect increases in railroad accidents or casualties from long train operation. During the 13-year period, 1923-1935, in Nevada there have been no passengers killed and but 15 passengers injured in train or train-service accidents, while on or getting on or off passenger trains. One trainman and two enginemen were killed and seven trainmen and three enginemen injured. Seven other employes were injured and none killed, and six other non-trespassers were injured and none killed. The average casualty ratios in Nevada during the period from 1923 to 1935 were as follows: passenger casualties, per million passengers carried, 3.39; per 100 million passenger miles, 1.32; per million train miles, .83. Employes : per million train miles, 1.11. There were no deaths of or injuries to passengers, employes, or non-tres- passers during the year 1935. No passenger, employe, or other person on a passenger train has suffered injury due to the operation of a freight train or due to a passenger train being involved in an accident with a freight train since October 5, 1925. (b) Class I Railroads of the United States.-For the years 1923 to 1934, inclusive, it is shown that casualties to passengers in train accidents on Class I Railroads of the United States decreased from 41 to 12 and the number of passengers injured from 2,582 to 392. The number of passengers carried de- creased from about one billion to about four and one-half million. Considering train and train-service accidents to passengers the number killed decreased from 137 in 1923 to 27 in 1934 and in persons injured the number decreased from 5,745 in 1923 to 1,860 in 1934. (b) Safety of Railroad Employees: (1) By long Train Movement Proper Interpretation of Manual Signals Is 1fade Diffcult and Hazard of Injuries in Picking Up Train Orders Eists (See note page 72).-While the train is in motion there is but one signal that needs to be used by a conductor or brakeman in a caboose and that is the stop signal. When the train is at a standstill and a "proceed," or "backup," or other signal is to be given from the ground or the top of the train to the engineer no acci- dent can result if the engineer does not see the signal. The signal is repeated until it is seen and acknowledged. In a moving train brakemen are at or near the middle of long trains and signals can be relayed. When a stop signal has not been complied with the conductor can stop the train by the use of the con- ductor's valve.in the caboose. The operation of this valve applies the brakes in emergency. This application is made first on the caboose and then on the next car ahead serially toward the head of the train. There can be no slack action shock in the caboose where this emergency application is made. In the daytime 70-car lengths is the maximum distance a hand and arm signal can be seen and clearly interpreted. During the period 1923 to 1935 no reportable train or train service accident due to failure to observe or to properly interpret signals has occurred in Ne- vada.; and only one reportable train accident has occurred during the same 13-year period. In this accident there was involved only the movement of a helper engine and two cars and a caboose. While a train is moving it is a common practice for train orders to be received by members of the crew. These train orders are placed 'on a hoop which extends from a handle. A member of the train crew for the purpose of receiving such train orders goes to the rear steps of the caboose and from this point extends his arm so that it goes through the hoop as the train passes a point where the hoop is held extended by the train operator. The evidence shows that no reportable casualties from this cause have ever happened in Nevada and no witness testified to any such casualty. (2) Train Crews on Long Trains are in Constant Fear of Injury by Slack Action Accidents on Long Trains and Are Thereby Rendered Less Efficient and Alert in the Performance of their Duties (See note page 72).-We find that a 514 TRAIN LENGTHS number of trainmen, who had heretofore been severely injured by slack action accidents on long trains on plaintiff's line, testified that when riding in a caboose on long trains they experience a fear for their safety because of slack action accidents that may ensue. Each of these witnesses was involved either directly in or as a witness to very severe slack action accidents on long trains. That the fear thus expressed was and is actually experienced by each of them there can be no doubt from their testimony. That this mental state reduces or decreases the alertness or efficiency of these trainmen in the performance of their duty does not appear from the evidence. Neither is it disclosed by the record in what manner the safety of train operation would be adversely affected thereby. (3) The Number of Car Units in Long Freight Trains Results in Greater Hazards Than in Short Trains Because Proper Inspection and Supervision Cannot Be Made While in Operation.-This contention of the defendant is not sustained by the evidence. When a train is moving, the head brakeman usually rides upon the locomotive ; the swing brakeman frequently rides in the caboose but may be anywhere upon the train; the rear brakeman and the conductor ride in the caboose. Each member of the train crew is required to and does maintain a careful watch over those cars within range of his vision. The normal range of vision is approximately 70-car lengths. There is no testimony which establishes that any derailment or other accident on a moving train caused by defects in or failure of equipment on long trains could have been averted through detection by members of the train crew if the train had been of 70 cars or less. It is shown, without contradiction, that during the year 1934, 13,602 freight and mixed trains were operated upon plaintiff's Salt Lake Division in Nevada. In this movement 909 defects in the operation of freight cars in such trains were detected by members of the train crew. All these defects were reported by train conductors on their time returns and delay reports. Seven hundred sixty-seven of the defects were detected either while the trains were enroute or upon arrival at final terminal. Five reportable casualties to persons resulted from accidents due to said defects ; none of said casualties being fatal. During this year the total freight car miles aggregated more than 117 million with an average of 23,442,968 freight-car miles for each casualty. It further appears that of the 372 hot boxes that were reported, 256 were detected on the road and no train accidents resulted therefrom; that of the 46 sticking brakes in train operation, 42 were discovered on the road ; that of the 50 defects in coupler knuckles, 49 were discovered on the road and one in the initial terminal. Of the five casualties referred to above one brakeman was injured due to sudden stop by broken branch pipe on the fourth car from the engine ; a conductor and brakeman were injured by slack action in caboose caused by broken arch bar on the 88th car from the locomotive; one brakeman injured by slack action caused by air hose bursting on the 19th car from engine ; conductor injured by slack action due to failure of train line on 66th car from locomotive and 34th car from caboose (100-car train). Considering the distance each of these cars was removed from the caboose or locomotive and the nature of the defects causing the accident it is apparent that the number of car units in the train in no way contributed to the failure of the train crew to discover same. (4) Employes Being Transported in the Caboose on Long Trains Are Subject to Hazard from Slack Action Accidents. (See note page 72).-In railroad operation it becomes necessary on occasions to move freight crews from home terminals to points along the railroad so they 'can go on duty. They are also moved from railroad points where their work terminates to home terminals. To accomplish this purpose members of the crew ride in the caboose of a freight train and the term "dead heading" is used to describe their status. They come within the classification of "employes off'duty." It is not true, as contended by defendant, that the operation of long freight trains creates an undue hazard to employes off duty lawfully riding on a freight train, and particularly to trainmen "dead-heading." During the seven-year period 1929-1935 there was no reportable casualty sustained by an employe off duty in a train or train-service accident to a road freight train of plaintiff in Nevada. During the six-year period 1923-1928 there were in Nevada on plaintiff's line 9 casualties to employes off duty, including one death: a track laborer struck by a train. Of the eight injured-1923-1928-four "dead-head" trainmen were injured on long trains, and two dead-head brakemen and one track laborer in- jured on short trains: one bridge foreman being injured by stumbling on ground and falling under train. TRAIN LENGTHS 515 (5) Slack Action Casualties.-Defendant's evidence addressed to hazards in- cident to long train operation was confined principally to a showing of casual- ties occurring in railroad operation due to slack action accidents. Casualties occurring on railroads from other causes not involving slack action and railroad employes other than those exposed to the hazard of this type of accidents were not included in the proof offered supporting this issue. (a) Nevada Long and Short Train Casualties-Comparison. We find from the evidence that duringthe period from 1925 to 1929, inclusive, in plaintiff's operation in Nevada 38,504 short trains were run with eight slack action casualties and 50,799 long trains with 30 slack action casualties. That 4,813 short trains were operated to one slack action casualty and 1,693 long trains to one slack action casualty. That during the period from 1929 to 1935, no reportable slack action casualties occurred on short trains. In 1930, 54 per cent of the freight trains operating in the State of Nevada consisted of long trains. In 1931 they represented 61 per cent; 1932, 62 per cent ; 1933, 65 per cent ; 1934, 70.5 per cent. On plaintiff's line between Sparks, Ne- vada, and the Utah line for the year ending June 30, 1935, a total of 12,677 freight trains operated and of this number 2,391 trains were run with car units of less than 70 and of this total 1,827 trains were of car units of less than 50; 10,286 freight trains had a consist of over 70 cars. The short trains that were operated during the period from 1929 to 1935 are not comparable to the short trains that would be operated under the law. It cannot be assumed that the short trains that would run to handle all the traffic operating under the law's restrictions would be of the same average length in car consist as the short trains that were operated in local and occasional serv- ice from 1929 to 1935 and which produced no slack action casualty. In opera- tion under the law freight trains will move with car units in each train as close to 70 cars as is practicable. (b) Other Evidence Addressed to Slack Action Casualties Submitted by De- fendant. The evidence, statistical and otherwise, of train and train-service accidents on plaintiff's lines in California and Utah and Los Angeles and Salt Lake railroad line (Union Pacific) in Nevada is not sufficiently complete or related to accepted bases of measuring accident or casualty frequency to afford a basis for findings. (c) Effectiveness of Air Brake Control and Its Bearing on Slack Action Acci- dents. Defendant contends that due to the lapse of time between the application of the brakes on the freight cars at the head end of the train and on the rear end of the train slack action shocks ensue in long train operation when the air is applied either from a break-in-two of the train line or emergency application of the air. It is also contended that the modern air brakes do not function rap- idly enough to prevent such shocks. Automatic air brakes work upon the principle of equalization of pressure. This is brought about through the operation of the triple valve that is located under each car in a freight train. This valve is part of the air brake appliances. Air brake control in normal train .operation rests with the engineer. A train is charged with compressed air by the engineer forcing the air from the loco- motive back through the pipe line and through branch pipes to each triple valve and its auxiliary reservoir. To apply the brakes on freight cars the engineer reverses the process and withdraws air from the train line. This reduction of pressure on the train pipe side of the triple valve causes air to flow from the auxiliary reservoir through the triple valve to the brake cylinder and applies the brakes. This method is used to stop freight trains when an emergency or service application is made by the engineer. In making the reduc- tion in the air line it is not a simultaneous application of the brakes on each car throughout the train. The brakes apply first to the cars back of the loco- motive and thereafter successively until the brakes in the last car in the train are reached. Air brakes are applied on a moving freight train either by the engineer in an emergency or service application or by conductor operating the valve in the caboose or any action that causes the train to part. The record contains no reportable casualties on long trains from slack action where the air brakes were applied by service application by the engineer. No reportable casualties have occurred on the Nevada lines, caused by the emergency application of the air brakes by the engineer in either long or short 516 TRAIN LENGTHS train operation since August 7, 1928. From 1923 to 1928, nine accidents result- ing in eleven casualties occurred from slack action due to emergency stops. One of these occurred on a train of 39 cars ; three occurred on a train of fifty cars ; one on a train of 54 cars ; and four on trains of over 70 cars ; a total of seven on short trains and four on long trains. There is another class of emergency application designated as an "undesired emergency." A break in the train line allows the air to immediately q scape, causing an instantaneous reduction of air and an immediate application of the air brakes commencing with the car ahead and immediately behind the point in the train where the break occurs and in each succeeding car. The point on a freight train where the break-in-two occurs would be one of the principal factors in determining the resulting slack action from such an occurrence. It appears from the evidence that on a ninety-car train a break-in-two of the air line of the train on the 40th car from the locomotive, other conditions being equal, would produce no more slack than a similar occurrence on a 70-car train with a break-in-two or a separation of the air line on the 20th car from the locomo- tive. The evidence further shows that the application of air brakes in emergency by an engineer on a freight train is a rare occurence. The necessity for the en- gineer to use an air brake in emergency is directly related to the number of trains operated and not to the length of the train. The contention urged by the defendant is not sustained by the evidence. 25. LONG TRAINS CAUSE DELAY IN TRAFFIC MOVEMENT (See note page 72) (a) Delays Caused by Saw-bys. Defendant contends that the practice of standard long train operation fre- quently results in long delays to both freight and passenger trains operated in the affected territory, because of the fact that, at numerous stations in said territory, the track capacity of the side tracks used for passing is inadequate to hold a long train, and that meets or. passes of trains, when they take place at any of said stations can only be accomplished by means of the operation known as "sawing-by"; that such operation causes delays to the trains involved, and other following and approaching trains. The evidence does not sustain or support defendant's contention. It appears that there are two kinds of "saw-bys"; first, that involved by a meet or pass between trains, one of which is longer and the other shorter than the siding to be used by the train which clears the main tracks ; second, that involved when both of 'the trains involved are longer than the siding at which the meet or pass occurs. The delay to trains created by the first type of saw-by is negligible ; but if a saw-by of the second type occurs, it may cause considerable delay. Saw-bys of the latter character are practically unheard of. It appears that trains are so dispatched, and their movements from point to point so controlled, as to avoid any necessity of such an operation. One of plaintiff's witnesses, a chief train dispatcher, could recall only two such instances in his 15 years' experience, both of which were due to employee negligence. There is no testimony to show, that any identified or manifest train, moving over plaintiff's principal main line, has ever suffered serious delay, or been caused to arrive late on schedule at any terminal, because of having been involved in a complicated "saw-by" operation. (b) Delays of Long Trains at Sparks. In present operation trains consisting of fruit blocks and parts of fruit blocks in eastbound movement are held at Sparks in some instances for periods of from one hour to over five hours for the purpose of consolidation. It is claimed that these delays would be eliminated by short train operation. Considering the evidence respecting long train operations in 1934 and schedule performance in handling of eastbound traffic, it appears that while delay is experienced at Sparks for consolidation purposes the schedule performance of these trains made on the completed run to Ogden is not adversely affected thereby. There is no showing that any car or cars so held at Sparks were delivered late at Ogden or final destination. TRAIN LENGTHS 517 (c) That Trains Between Roseville and Sparks Are Largely Short Trains and Would Not Be Affected by Operation Under the Law. The findings of fact set forth under subdivision 18 (a), (b), and 10 (a) fully cover the extra-territorial effect of the law and particularly between Sparks and Truckee and Truckee and Roseville, California, and require a negative finding on this affirmative contention. 26. SHORT TRAIN OPERATION MEANS SPEEDIER TRAFFIC MOVEMENT WITH MORE SAFETY (a.) Trafflc as a Whole Could Be Mare Speedily Transported in Short Trains Than in Long Trains Because of Greater Ease of Handling Short Trains (See note page 72). A finding of fact has heretofore been made (11 (a) ) establishing reduction in running time of freight trains on Nevada line. Finding of fact 18 (c), (1), (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) establishes delays accruing by operation under the law. These findings require a negative finding respecting defendant's contention. (b) In Short Train Operation as Heretofore Carried Out in Nevada, Many More Trains, Both Freight and Passenger, Were Operated with Greater Speed and Safety Than Under the Long Train Method. Present Railroad Rules Are Adequate for This Purpose (See note page 72). Finding of fact 6 (c) fully discusses operating rules governing operations on plaintiff's line in Nevada. Finding of fact 11 (a) compares schedule per- formance of long train operation with schedule performance of short train operation. The safety features of railroad operation incident to long and short trains is set forth in finding of fact 23 (h) and (1). The findings, however, as made require a negative finding on this contention. 27. EFFECT OF LAW AS SAFETY MEASURE The operation of plaintiff's railroad on Nevada line under the law, by restrict- ing the number of car units in trains, would reduce the amount of potential slack that exists between coupled cars of a freight train, thereby affecting one of the factors that contributes to the severity of slack action accidents ; it would make the work of inspecting and supervising freight trains while in motion less arduous ; by reducing the number of car units in a train the law would reduce the potential hazards arising from defects in car equipment as to individual freight trains operated ; but this hazard would not be eliminated by short trains when the total volume of freight traffic to be transported is considered. The benefits thus accruing by the law's operation would be sub- stantially more than offset by an increased number of accidents and casualties from other causes that would follow the limitation of car units in freight trains to handle the same volume of freight traffic that can be and is efficiently han- dled without such limitation. The frequency of train and train-service accidents is directly related to the number of train units operated, and when more train units are run than are necessary to -handle a given amount of traffic the hazard of accidents in handling such traffic is correspondingly increased. The limiting of freight trains on plaintiff's Nevada line to not more than 70 cars will result in compelling plaintiff to operate substantially more freight trains to carry a given volume of freight traffic than it would operate under the long train method. Based upon the 1934 traffic volume if the same had been transported under the law's restrictions it would have required 5,150 additional freight trains or an increase of 32.8 per cent in the number of freight trains that were actually operated to move this traffic and the additional number of train meets and passings would have been approximately 8,500. The operation of such additional number of trains would require a greater number of telegraphic and telephonic train orders and would increase the hazard of train and train-service accidents resulting from misunderstanding or forget- fulness of train orders. The additional number of trains would increase the number of employes and. thereby increase the hazard of casualties that are related to the number of train units operated. Such additional trains would increase accidents and casualties in yards, accidents to section men, signal main- tainers, grade crossing accidents, head-end and rear-end collisions.. The addi- tional number of locomotives required to operate additional trains would increase the hazard of accidents or casualties that is related to the number of locomotives operated. 518 TRAIN LENGTHS A careful review of all the evidence warrants the conclusion that from the standpoint of safety to the public ; to travelers on railroads, and to railroad employes, the Nevada train limit law bears no reasonable relation to safety but if enforced would impair and lessen the safety of plaintiff's present method of freight train operation in Nevada. 28. EXTENT OF PENALTIES IMPOSED BY THE LAW Section 3 of said Train Limit Law provides a penalty of $500 for each violation thereof ; that is to say, for each long train operated in Nevada, upon and after the date when the law by its terms was to have become effective. In the 12 months ending June 30, 1935, plaintiff operated, upon its main lines in Nevada, more than 11,800 long trains. If the law had been in effect, throughout said period, plain- tiff would have been liable to the State of Nevada for cumulative penalties, totaling more than $5,900,000. Said sum last mentioned fairly represents the amount of the cumulative annual penalties for which plaintiff would be liable, under the terms of the law, if it were to disregard and violate the same and were to continue the practice of standard long-train operation heretofore allowed. 29. REGULATION OF LENGTHS OF INTERSTATE TRAINS AN EXCLUSIVE NATIONAL SUBJECT The permissible number of cars in an interstate train is a subject of national, and not local concern ; it is a subject which, if any regulation thereof be needed, requires a general system of uniformity of regulation ; and it is a subject which, if regulated at all, should and must be regulated by Congress, and not by the several states. It is wholly impracticable to construct and maintain railroad terminals exactly on state lines or to split up or consolidate through trains except at terminals. State regulation results in extra-territorial regulation with sub- stantial delays to interstate commerce beyond the state boundary. 30. FINANOJAL BURDEN IMPOSED RY THE LAW A FACTOR IN DETERMININo ITS UNREASONABLENESS The additional expense, as. hereinbefore found, that the plaintiff would be compelled to incur, in complying with the Train Limit Law,-is a factor that may and should be, and has been, taken into consideration as a factor, but not the sole or controlling factor, in finding (as is hereby found) that the law, considered as an exercise of the police power of the state in an attempt to promote public safety, the safety of travelers, and the safety of railroad employes is, insofar as plaintiff is concerned, unreasonable, arbitrary, and without any reasonable relation to its declared objects, or to those claimed by the defendant. Viewed entirely apart from the effect of the law on interstate commerce, as hereinbefore found, and from the financial burden on such commerce imposed thereby, the law creates and during its life, will perpetuate a financial burden on the plaintiff that is, under any fair and reasonable view of the evidence, entirely out of proportion to, and far in excess of, any safety to the public, to travelers upon plaintiff's railroad, or to employes of plaintiff, that can or will be promoted thereby. 31. FURTHER ARBITRARY EFFECT OF THE LAW As to plaintiff's operations into, across, and out of Nevada the Train Limit Law is further arbitrary and unreasonable, in that by its terms it is made to apply to any and all trains, in all circumstances except those described in Section 2 of the Act, whether a train be of all loaded cars, or all empty cars, or partly of loaded and partly of empty cars, each car being treated as a unit regardless of its construction, type, length, weight, or condition, or whether loaded or empty. 32. IMPAIRMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S FACILITIES BY THE LAW The necessary effect of the said Train Limit Law, if enforced as threatened by defendant, will be substantially and continuously to impair the use and usefulness of the facilities used and usable by plaintiff in the carriage of interstate freight, into, out of, and across and through the State of Nevada. TRAIN LENGTHS 519 33. FINANCIAL BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE The additional and unnecessary expense, as heretofore found, of plaintiff's compliance with the Train Limit Law, is and will and would be a substantial, direct, and continuing burden upon plaintiff as an interstate common carrier by railroad, and upon the interstate commerce carried on by plaintiff into, out of, across, and through the State of Nevada by means of its freight trains. CONLUsIONs oF LAw I The matter in controversy in this case, exclusive of interest and costs, greatly exceeds the sum or value of $3,000; and said case is a suit of civil nature, in equity, between citizens of different states, and arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States; therefore, this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case and of the parties hereto. II Under the statutes of Nevada, and particularly under the express terms of the Nevada Train Limit Law (Chapter 26, Nevada Statutes of 1935), the validity of which is herein challenged, it is the mandatory duty of the defendant, the duly elected, qualified, and acting Attorney-General of Nevada, to commence to prosecute, or direct the prosecution of, suits and other pro- ceedings to compel compliance with the said Train Limit Law, and to impose and collect the penalties therein provided for every violation thereof ; and said defendant has expressly threatened and now threatens to and will, unless restraiined and enjoined by the decree and judgment of this or some other competent court, institute and prosecute such suits and proceedings against the plaintiff, in the event said plaintiff should violate said Train Limit Law. The damage and injury which plaintiff will inevitably sustain, if said law should be enforced against it, would be great and irreparable. Plaintiff cannot disregard said law, and invite or await prosecution by said defendant, for the purpose of obtaining a judicial review of the validity thereof, without being subjected to the severe and cumulative penalties which would and will shortly accrue if such course be followed, and said law found to be valid and binding in proceedings for its enforcement. Plaintiff, as a citizen and resident of the State of Kentucky, has no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law in this, or any other court of the United States. III Said Train Limit Law is unconstitutional and void as to interstate trains, which term includes substantially all of the trains operated in both directions over plaintiff's main lines in Nevada, because regulation of the permissible number of cars in an interstate railroad train passing from one state to an- other, or passing from one state through another into a third, or passing through a number of states, or passing over lines within a single state, is a subject over which exclusive legislative jurisdiction was and is vested in Con- gress by the Commerce Clause (Subd. 3 of Section 8 of Art. I), of the Con- stitution of the United States ; the subject of the length and consist of such interstate trains being one which requires a general or national system and uniformity of regulation, if such regulation should for any reason be required. IV Said Train-Limit Law is further unconstitutional and void, and in violation of said Commerce Clause, because its necessary, practical, and inevitable effect is, and would and will be, to regulate the length of the interstate railroad trains operated over plaintiff's lines, not only within Nevada, but also in adjoining portions of the states of California and Utah. V Said Train-Limit Law is further unconstitutional and void, and in conflict with said Commerce Clause, because its necessary, practical, and inevitable effect is, and would and will be, directly and substantially to interfere with 520 TRAIN LENGTHS and to regulate the operation of plaintiff's interstate freight trains in Nevada, and also in California and Utah, and to delay and interfere with the continuous movement of said interstate freight trains between Nevada and other states, and also because its necessary and Inevitable effect is, and would and will be, to impair unreasonably the usefulness of facilities employed, as well as their use by plaintiff, in the transportation of interstate commerce from, to, and across the State of Nevada. VI Said Train-Limit Law is further unconstitutional and void, and in conflict with said Commerce Clause, because its necessary and inevitable effect is and would, and will be to impose direct and substantial financial burdens upon the interstate commerce carried on by plaintiff, both within Nevada, and also in the adjacent states of California and Utah, and to impair the use and usefulness of the transportation facilities employed by plaintiff in the carriage of interstate commerce from, to, and across the State of Nevada. VII To the extent to which said Train-Limit Law has, or may have, or is intended or claimed to have, the effect of limiting the number of cars in a train to the maximum number which can safely be controlled or stopped in one train by the use of the types of air brakes and their appurtenances now employed on such trains, or by any other form of train-control or other safety devices, said law is void, in that it attempts to and does enter a legislative field already entered and therefore occupied by Congress: the Congress having, under the provisions of the Safety Appliance Act as amended (45 U. S. Code 1, Sections 1, 9) and the provisions of Section 26 of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U. S. Code 1, Section 26) delegated to the Interstate Commerce Commission full and com- plete authority to investigate and determine the adequacy of the air brakes, and their appurtenances, and each and all other forms of train-control and other safety devices, used or proposed to be used upon locomotives, cars, and trains, operated in interstate commerce, and by order to prescribe the form and type thereof, and from time to time to issue such amendatory and supplementary orders as said Commission may deem necessary or desirable in the exercise of the power thus delegated to it, which power and authority said Commission has duly exercised ; and the Congress having, more particularly, in and by such statutes, necessarily empowered said Commission to determine whether the types of air brakes and their appurtenances presently used or proposed to be used upon trains in interstate commerce are or will be adequate and effective, safety and properly to control and to stop trains of the lengths now being operated by plaintiff in interstate commerce, both within and without the State of Nevada. VIII Said Train-Limit Law is further unconstitutional and void, and in violation of both the aforesaid Commerce Clause, and also the Due-Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, in that it operates and will and would operate arbitrarily and unreasonably to deprive plaintiff of its property, without due process of law, because: (a) Sail law fixes maximum train lengths very much lower than those which generally obtain elsewhere throughout the United States, under operating condi- tions substantially similar to those upon plaintiff's main lines in Nevada ; (b) Said law makes no allowance for grade or other operating conditions, or for the construction, type, weight or length of the cars composing the trains, or whether such cars are loaded or empty, or, if loaded, the weights of the loads therein; (c) Said law imposes a great and substantial burden of expense upon, inter- ference with, and delay to interstate commerce, and impairs the use and use- fulness of plaintiff's transportation facilities ; (d) Said law bears no reasonable relation to health or safety, and will not and would not, if it became effective, either eliminate or to any substantial extent reduce any existing hazard, but on the contrary. will, and would, create certain hazards which do. not now and would not otherwise exist, and increase other hazards and dangers of railroad operation in numerous respects. TRAIN LENGTHS 521 IX Plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction as prayed for in its bill of complaint, as to each and all of its train carrying any interstate commerce or traffic or engaged in interstate transportation, and to costs against defendant. Dated: As of February 23, 1937. CLrFoN MATHEWS, Circuit Judge. HAROLD LOUDERJACx, District Judge. FRANK H. Nonoxoss, District Judge. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, District of Nevada, ss: I, o. E. Benham, Clerk of the District Court of the United States for the District of Nevada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a full, true, and correct copy of the original Special Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in case of Southern Pacific Company, a corporation, vs. Gray Mashburn, etc., No. H-143: now on file and of record in my office. In Testimony Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court, at my office in Carson City, this the 15th day of March, A. D. 1937, and in the year of our Independence the 161st. [SEAL] 0. E. BENHAM, Clerk. By J. P. FoDmnN, Deputy. (Thereupon, at 11: 58 a. in. the cornmittee adjourned to meet the following morning, Friday, February 4, 1938, at 10 a. m.)  TRAIN LENGTHS FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1938 HOUsE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Washington,D.C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence F. Lea (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. STATEMENT OF HENLEY C. BOOTH, GENERAL ATTORNEY OF THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY CO., SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.-- Resumed Mr. BooTH. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to continue my talk, but so much was said yesterday about the Arizona findings that I have here two copies of them and I will ask to have them printed as a part of my statement. I am handing one copy to the clerk for ready reference by the members of the committee ,and one copy to the reporter for insertion in the record, and handing the other copy to Mr. Farquharson. The CHAIRMAN. I might say in that connection that about a year ago this committee had an understanding that where documents are presented for inclusion in the record that the admission of them at the hearing is on condition of checking up the length, and if they be found reasonable they may be inserted. That is, consent to insert in the record is always subject to approval from that standpoint, and I am not casting any suspicion that your statement is not properly directed to the subject; but I just mention that for all those who may present statements. Mr. BooTH. Well, the findings in the Nevada case which were handed to the committee yesterday were somewhat lengthy, as you will see, but it seems to me, from our standpoint at least that. they are sufficiently important to deserve inclusion in the record. The CHAIRMAN. It will not be the desire of the committee to exclude anything that properly belongs in the record. Mr. BOOTH. These I mention this morning are the Arizona find- ings which were referred to a number of times by members of the committee and myself yesterday. The CHAIRMAN. Very well, it may be received. 523 524 TRAIN LENGTHS (The statement referred to is as follows:) IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DIsTRICT OF ARIZONA Atchison, Tokepa and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Arthur T. LaPrade, Attorney General. Equity No. 195 Southern Pacific Co. v. Same. Equity No. 196 SPECIAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW By orders entered herein July 17, 1930, the above entitled cases were con- solidated and referred to Joseph E. Morrison, Esq., as special master, who heard the evidence under a stipulation that all evidence introduced by any party to either case should be considered as evidence in both cases, and transmitted a transcript of such evidence, together with his report, to this court on July 29, 1932. Defendant then filed exceptions to the special master's report and also moved the court to suppress said report and to hear the cases upon the evidence taken by the special master. The consolidated cases were thereupon set for hearing upon said motion and for final hearing on October 24, 1932, but upon the objection of defendant, and at his request that the cases be continued for not less than 60 days, and that an order be entered permitting him to file a brief on his motion and a brief on the merits to be answered by plaintiffs before final hearing, the cases were continued ; thereafter, pursuant to an order entered October 31, 1932, briefs were filed by plaintiffs and defendant, and the cases came on for hearing on the motion to suppress and for final hearing on February 8, 1933. Thereupon, plaintiffs presented applications and motions under section 780 of the United States Code to substitute as party defendant in said cases Arthur T. LaPrade, who became Attorney General of the State of Arizona on January 3, 1933; and the defendant, K. Berry Peterson, presented motions to abate and dismiss the cases on the ground that his term of office as Attorney General of Arizona expired on January 3, 1933. Plaintiffs' motions to substi- tute were granted ; and thereupon said Arthur T. LaPrade, who was present in open court, entered by himself and through his counsel a special appearance for the purpose of moving the court to dismiss the above-entitled cases as to him and to vacate its orders substituting him as defendant, and formally moved the court to vacate its said orders of substitution and to dismiss said cases, which motion was denied. Thereupon, the court being ready to proceed with said final hearing, the defendant, Arthur T. LaPrade, through his counsel announced that he elected to stand on said motion and with his counsel left the courtroom and declined to proceed with said final hearing; whereupon the court directed counsel for plaintiffs to proceed therewith, and said cases were on February 8 and 9, 1933, argued by counsel for plaintiffs. After consideration of said argument and of the briefs on the merits filed by the respective parties, and from an examination of all the evidence, but without treating the master's report as presumptively correct and entirely inde- pendent of said master's report, the court found and hereby pursuant to Equity Rule 70 finds the facts specially in the above-entitled cases as follows : The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. (hereinafter referred to as Santa Fe) and Southern Pacific Co. (hereinafter referred to as Southern Pacific), plaintiffs in the above-entitled cases, are, respectively, railroad cor- porations organized and existing under the laws of the States of Kansas and Kentucky, and citizens and residents of those States. Under section 13 of article 22 of the constitution of Arizona the term of office of the attorney general extends until his successor is elected and qualifies. The original defendant in each of said suits, K. Berry Peterson, was at and for sometime prior to the institution of said suits and thenceforth and until the 3d day of January, 1933, the duly elected, qualified, and acting attorney general of the State of Arizona. On January 3, 1933, having been theretofore duly elected as such attorney general to succeed said K. Berry Peterson, the defend- ant, Arthur T. LaPrade, qualified as such officer and since said January 3, 1933, has been and now is the duly elected, qualified, and acting attorney gen- eral of the State of Arizona. Both said original and substituted defendants are and since prior to the institution of these suits have been citizens of the State of Arizona and residents of the city of Phoenix in said State. For brevity, trains containing cars in excess of the maximum permitted by the Arizona law (known as the train-limit law) set forth in the conclusions TRAIN LENGTHS 525 of law, infra, and in each of the bills of complaint, which limits freight trains to 70 cars, exclusive of caboose, and passenger trains to 14 cars, are referred to in these findings as "long trains"; and trains within the limits fixed by the Arizona law are referred to as "short trains." The term "interstate trains" is used in these findings to mean all trains carrying any interstate traffic or commerce or engaged in interstate transpor- tation. By the expression "standard long-train operation" as used in these findings is meant the practice of hauling freight traffic in freight trains containing substantially more than 70 cars, and hauling passenger train traffic (which traffic includes passengers, United States mail, baggage, and express) in pas- senger trains of more than 4 cars, whenever volume, destination, and character of traffic to go forward by train is such that a long train can be more effi- ciently and economically operated than can a short train; but to handle in short trains such traffic as cannot be conveniently or economically handled in long trains. II The Santa Fe lines extend from California across northern Arizona to Chicago, Ill., and pass through, or into, 10 States. The line upon which trans- continental traffic is moved between California and Chicago starts at Barstow, Calif., where the Santa Fe northern and southern California lines converge, and runs in a general easterly direction, passing through Needles, Calif., about 11 miles westerly of the Colorado River, which is the California-Arizona boundary line. From Needles it runs through Seligman and Winslow, Ariz., to Gallup, N. Mex.-about 20 miles east of the easterly Arizona boundary line ; from Gallup it runs through Belen and Clovis, N. Mex.; Amarillo, Tex.; Wel- lington, Augusta, and Emporia, Kans.; and Kansas City, Mo. The Southern Pacific main lines run from San Francisco, Calif., to Portland, Oreg., and Ogden, Utah ; and also run from San Francisco through Los Angeles to Yuma, Ariz., and thence across southern Arizona to El Paso, Tex., and Tucumcari, N. Mex. The major portion of the interstate freight traffic which crosses Arizona over the southern Arizona route of the Southern Pacific is moved on its main line across Arizona that runs through Indio, Calif., Yuma, Maricopa, and Tue- son, Ariz., and Lordsburg, N. Mex., to El Paso, Tex. That main line is referred to in these findings as the Maricopa-Lordsburg line. The Southern Pacific has another main line (called the Phoenix line) which departs from the Maricopa- Lordsburg line at Weliton and runs thence northeasterly to Phoenix and thence southeasterly to Picacho, where it joins the Maricopa-Lordsburg line. A third Southern Pacific main line (called the Douglas line) leaves the Maricopa- Lordsburg line at Tucson, running thence via Douglas, Ariz., to El Paso, Tex. The Maricopa-Lordsburg line of the Southern Pacific, together with the Phoenix line, extending from near Yuma almost to Tucson, and the Douglas line, extending from Tucson to El Paso, make practically two lines from Yuma to El Paso, but except for short stretches of double track near Yuma and Tucson, they are operated as single-track lines, Passenger trains which cross Arizona use both lines, but because the route between Yuma and Tucson via Phoenix is longer than via Maricopa, interstate freight trains between Yuma and Tucson move via Maricopa. Between Tucson and El Paso about 65 percent of the freight trains move via Lordsburg and about 35 percent via Douglas. III Railroad operating conditions on plaintiffs' lines of railroad in Arizona and elsewhere, and on railroads throughout the United States generally, substan- tially differ from the operating conditions which existed in 1912, when the Arizona train-limit law was passed, because since 1912 great improvements have been made to road and equipment. Tracks, roadbeds, and bridges have been made stronger ; grades and curves have been reduced or eliminated ; side and passing tracks have been lengthened ; block signals and other safety devices have been installed ; and improved methods of operation have been adopted. Post-war expenditures, which have been enormous in amount, have in many instances been sanctioned by the Interstate Commerce Commission through authorizations of security issues under section 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act. Particularly is this true with respect to the acquisition of large and powerful locomotives designed and used for the operation of long 47891-38- 34 526 TRAIN LENGTHS trains, the purchase of most of which has been financed through equipment- trust certificates. Class I railroads-those having annual operating revenue of $1,000,000 or more--during the years 1923-29 expended about $6,000,000,000 for additions and betterments. Such expenditures were made largely for the purpose of increasing train lengths and train loads and safety of operation, so as to bring about efficiency and economy. Iv The Santa Fe main line across northern Arizona is well constructed. The portion east of Winslow, over 100 miles in length, runs on a plateau, with but a light grade, along the valleys of the Little Colorado River and the Rio Puerco; the operating conditions are favorable, being better than those which obtain on most of the main lines of the Santa Fe and other railroads in the prairie States. On the Santa Fe main line between Barstow and Winslow, the "ruling grade"-defined as the maximum ascending grade long enough to limit the tonnage of trains moving between any two points-is, in each direc- tion, about 1.4 percent, except in the 23-mile eastbound helper district from Ash Fork to Supai, where it is 1.8 percent. But similar gradients are found on the main lines of many other railroads on which long trains are operated in many States. The Southern Pacific main lines cross southern Arizona on comparatively light grades and through much level desert territory. They also are well con- structed and there are no unusual or difficult operating conditions on its Arizona main lines. Railroads generally as well as plaintiffs' main lines in Arizona are not con- structed on uniform grades but at light grades for as long a distance as pos- sible and then for comparatively short distances on heavier grades. By this method of construction and the use of helper engines on the short, steep grades, full advantage is taken of the lighter grades, trains are handled over the entire line by single crews without being broken up in sections, and the full power of the locomotives actually in use at all points on the line is utilized to the greatest extent practicable. V The locomotives and cars now used on plaintiffs' main lines in Arizona and elsewhere have since 1912 been greatly improved and made stronger and better able to withstand service conditions. Locomotives have heavier frames and running gears, improved and strengthened brake equipment, draft gears and attachments, and air pumps of increased capacity. The boilers also have been much improved and many locomotives are equipped with feed water heaters, superheaters, and other modern devices. Engine failures have been greatly reduced-on the Santa Fe, 90 percent-despite the fact the engines now run for much greater distances without. overhauling than they did in 1912. Of the passenger cars used in 1912 a large percentage-about 70 percent on the Santa Fe-had wooden underframes. Now, structural steel and cast steel has almost fully replaced the wood in passenger-car construction. In 1912 about 30 percent of the Santa Fe and about 40 percent of the Southern Pacific freight cars had wooden underframes, but such cars have been withdrawn from main-line and interchange service ; modern draft gears have more than double the shock-absorbing capacity of the old type ; in 1926 the manufacture of the old type of freight-car wheels-which were subject to being cracked by the heat caused by brake applications-was abandoned, and because the average service life of freight-car wheels is from 6 to 7 years, soon all cars will be equipped with the present standard single-plate cast-iron wheels which can withstand any heat produced by the brakes, thus eliminating breakage through overheating ; since 1924 a new type of graduating spring has been placed in the air-brake triple valves on freight cars, thus practically eliminating unintended- referred to by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the witnesses as "undesired"-emergency brake applications; and train break-in-twos, formerly largely caused by the air brakes on individual cars applying with much greater force than on other cars, have been reduced from 70 to 80 percent, the ratio in 1929 on the Southern Pacific being only 1.19 train break-in-twos per million car-miles. In Arizona 288 miles of second track have been constructed since 1912 by the Santa Fe. In connection with such construction, heavy grades were reduced and sharp curves eliminated. The Southern Pacific since 1920 has spent approxi- mately $9,000,000 in Arizona, mostly for heavier rails, better ballast, extension TRAIN LENGTHS 527 of passing tracks, large turntables, improving terminals, and installing block signals ; and it also has spent about $13,000,000 for rehabilitation and construc- tion work on the Phoenix line. The track, roadbed, and bridges on both the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific. main lines in Arizona and elsewhere are capable of carrying the heaviest engines owned by those companies, and there is no reason from the standpoint of climatic conditions, or of track grades or curva- tures, or the strength and capacity of road and of equipment now ownd and available, why the Southern Pacific and the Santa Fe could not at once put into effect the operation, on their Arizona main lines, of a very substantial num- ber of passenger-train units of substantially more than 14 cars and of freight- train units of substantially more than 70 cars, and thereby effect immediate, substantial, and much-needed operating economies. VI In 1912 freight trains containing more cars than the Arizona limit were operated mostly on favorable grades or consisted in whole or substantial part of empty cars. Largely by reason of improvements made since that time the operation of long through trains, containing either loaded or empty cars on main trunk lines--including those of each plaintiff-outside of Arizona has become common railroad practice, and maximum freight-train lengths outside of Arizona are very much greater than those permitted therein. Except in Arizona and contiguous territories affected by its said train-limit law, freight is now transported from any part of the country to all other parts in long trains on dependable schedules as a result of which it moves from one-half to one-third faster than a decade ago, and at greatly reduced rates, thus making possible Nation-wide distribution and consumption of the products of Arizona and Cali- fornia, as well as those originating in other States. Trains are handled by modern locomotives whose runs now extend for several hundred miles, in many cases passing through or across two or more States, and whose efficiency and economy of operation depend on the extent to which the trains they haul are heavy enough to utilize to the fullest practicable extent the tractive power they produce. This improved method of operation has almost eliminated car short- ages, and has made it possible greatly to reduce stocks of merchandise formerly carried to protect against traffic congestion-all to the great benefit of the commerce of the country which is largely dependent upon prompt and reliable railroad transportation at reasonable rates. VII By its terms the Train Limit law applies to and regulates trains only within Arizona. But it is wholly impracticable to split up or consolidate trains at State boundary lines unless terminals are there located. While the Southern Pacific has a terminal at Yuma adjoining the westerly boundary line of Arizona, its nearest New Mexico terminal is at Lordsburg, about 20 miles east of the Arizona line ; and the nearest terminals of the Santa Fe to Arizona are situated at Needles, Calif., and Gallup, N. Mex., which are respectively about 11 miles west and 20 miles east of Arizona. Therefore, the Arizona law completely controls train lengths between the boundary lines of Arizona and the terminals in California and New Mexico nearest thereto. But on account of the trans- portation service required and furnished California perishable freight, ordin- arily traffic requirements forbid its delay either while trains are being split up at the first terminal west of Arizona or while trains are being consolidated at the first terminal east of Arizona. Consequently, in many instances east- bound perishable freight trains, originating at California points, must be made up into Arizona size trains at points of origin and the short Arizona trains must be transported intact to Belen, N. M., and El Paso, Tex., over 100 miles east of Arizona, both of which are icing stations and diversion points where consolidations may be effected with a minimum of interference and delay. And the power and crews used to transport the Arizona size east-bound trains from their originating points in California to Needles and Yuma and from Gallup and Lordsburg to Belen and El Paso must be returned to their western termini, it is necessary either to run short, west-bound trains from Belen and El Paso and from Needles and Yuma, or to bring the locomotives without load and the crews without work but under pay. "Standard long-train operation" as defined in finding I is shown by the evidence to be a general practice on the trunk main lines of class I steam 528 TRAIN LENGTHS railroads throughout the United States and on. the main lines of the ran- roads of each of the plaintiffs (except in Arizona and contiguous territory affected by the Arizona Train Limit law) under operating conditions sub- stantially the same as those on any of the main lines of either plaintiff in Arizona. The evidence shows that the practice of standard long-train operation as definet in finding I does not retard, but on the contrary, expedites the move- ment of freight train traffic and passenger train traffic, and that long trains do not delay the delivery of the traffic therein. VIII Outside of Arizona and adjoining territories where its law has extraterri- torial effect, the standard long freight train method of operation has resulted in greatly reduced transportation costs, but because of the Arizona law, the only one of its kind in the United States, plaintiffs are subjected to a financial burden of substantially more than $1,000,000 per annum, being the difference between the expenses of the short freight train method of operation now required by the Arizona law, and the expenses of the standard long freight train method of operation (as defined in finding I) which would be adopted but for the law, amounting in the case of the Santa Fe on the Barstow-Needles portion of its main line to over $600,000, and in the case of the Southern Pacific, on the Indio--El Paso portion of its Maricopa-Lordsburg main line, to about $400,000 each year ; and but for said law substantial additional savings could be made by the Southern Pacific by standard long-train operation on its 251 miles Phoenix auxiliary main line and its 341-mile Douglas auxiliary main line, both of which constitute portions of its through routes from Cali- fornia to destinations east of Arizona, but neither of which was included in the detailed cost studies made by that company. Substantial additional savings, not included in the cost studies made by either company or in the above figures, could also be made by both companies by running (and utilizing to the fullest practicable extent the tractive power of) large locomotives between points outside of Arizona and points therein, and shifting, in order to take care of peak seasonal business, their large locomotives between their Arizona lines and similar lines outside of Arizona, which would reduce the aggregate number and aggregate tractive power of locomotives re- quired and increase the efficiency of the locomotives used on all such terri- tories. On a tractive-power basis large locomotives cost less than smaller ones, and under standard long-train operation plaintiffs' motive-power investment will be reduced because less total tractive power at a lower cost per unit will be required to handle the total traffic. Furthermore, under standard long-train operation substantially less fuel will be required, and the cost of hauling com- pany fuel will be substantially reduced. In addition to being subjected to that financial burden, plaintiffs' transstate and other interstate freight traffic moving out of, into, across, or within Arizona is greatly interfered with and delayed; and there is also great delay to and interference with the interstate freight traffic moving on their main lines in California and New Mexico, because, as stated in finding VII, the trains on those lines, destined to points across or within Arizona, must be initially made up, or, either at the nearest terminals to Arizona or at terminals farther re- moved, split up, to fit the Arizona law ; and trains moving across Arizona or from points within that State, destined to points in adjoining States, must either at the first terminals outside of Arizona or at terminals farther removed be consolidated so as to avoid carrying with them increased short-train operat- iwg expenses until they reach destination. IX While the financial burden imposed on passenger-train operation by the Train Limit law is not as great as that imposed on freight-train operation, neverthe- less in the case of each plaintiff it is substantial in amount ; and the law has an even greater extraterritorial effect on passenger-train operation than on freight-train operation. Except in the State of Arizona, passenger trains of more than 14 cars are operated by plaintiffs and railroads generally wherever the traffic requirements make such operation advisable ; and in the aggregate, great numbers of such trains are operated. Motor vehicle and airplane com- petition makes it imperatively necessary that passenger-train operation be car- ried on with the utmost economy. TRAIN LENGTHS 529 Because of the Arizona law a large number of passenger trains must be initially made up or, before reaching that State, split up so as to comply with that law; and in order to minimize the effects of that law and avoid splitting up trains, cars are constantly being removed from long passenger trains and placed in shorter trains at terminals near Arizona and at terminals farther removed-wherever the shifting may be done with a minimum of interruption to traffic. In addition to passenger traffic carried on regular trains-which fluc- tuates greatly from day to day-in many cases special trains for Pacific coast points are chartered by parties too large to be properly accommodated in 14-car trains but who, for social or business reasons, desire to travel together. They can travel by plaintiffs' Arizona lines only if willing to be subjected to the inconvenience of having one or more baggage or other cars not actually occupied by them hauled in some other train while in Arizona. Consequently, plaintiffs are placed at a disadvantage in soliciting such business in competition with lines running to the Pacific coast north of Arizona ; and the parties who travel via plaintiffs' lines must be discommoded on their trip within or across Arizona. The evidence shows that from August 10 to September 10, 1930, and during December of that year, extra sections involving 11,270 train miles and an extra expense of about $9,000 were run in and through Arizona by the Santa Fe because of the law ; also that solely because of said law the Southern Pacific ran about 15,068 passenger train miles in running extra trains during the year 1930 at an extra expense of about $15,000. The cost of dead-heading the extra crews and returning the extra engines from destination points of the extra trains to home terminals and of sending extra engines and extra crews from home terminals to points where the extra trains originated, is not included in the amounts stated above ; nor is any allowance therein made for the extra expense, delay, and interference caused outside of Arizona by the shifting of cars from train to train in connection with the splitting up, in compliance with the train limit law, of trains destined to points within or beyond Arizona and the consolidation of trains after leaving Arizona so as to stop the increased expenses caused by its law as soon as practicable, but said expenses are sub- stantial and are of constant occurrence. X The permissible number of cars in an interstate train is a subject of national and not local concern ; it is a subject which, if any regulation thereof be needed, requires a general system or uniformity of regulation ; and it is a sub- ject which, if regulated at all, should be regulated by Congress and not by the several States. For it is wholly impracticable to move railroad terminals to state lines or to split up or consolidate through-trains except at terminals, and at some terminals perishable freight trains cannot be delayed for splitting up or consolidation purpose. If other States should regulate train lengths in accordance with their several notions as to what would be proper within their respective boundaries, all such regulations necessarily would have wide extraterritorial effect as does the Arizona law, and to comply with their con- flicting provisions would seriously embarrass through interstate train opera- tion; and if other States should adopt either the Arizona limitation, or dif- ferent and conflicting limitations based on their several notions as to the proper length of freight and passenger trains, the efficiencies and economies resulting from long-train operation would be eliminated, much of the enormous investment which makes such operation possible would be rendered nonproductive, and enormous additional investment for new train tracks and other facilities and for additional locomotives would be required. XI The evidence shows that the necessary effect of the Arizona train limit law is frequently to delay interstate passenger trains of each of the plaintiffs which are crossing, or entering or about to enter, or leaving or about to leave Arizona; that the traffic on such trains consists almost in its entirety of passengers, bag- gage, and express moving from one State to another and that practically all of said interstate passenger trains so delayed carry United States mail. 530 TRAIN LENGTHS XII The evidence shows that the necessary effect and operation of said train limit law is substantially to impair the usefulness of the facilities used, as well as those usable by each of the plaintiffs in the carriage of interstate commerce across, into, and out of the State of Arizona. XIII The evidence shows that the additional and unnecessary expense of inter- state freight train and interstate passenger train operation to which each of said plaintiffs is subjected as herein found, and which it could avoid but for said law, is a substantial and direct burden on the said interstate commerce carried on by such plaintiff by means of its interstate trains. XIV National casualty statistics, based on carriers' reports made under oath and under penalty, and on forms prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, pursuant to the Accidents Reports Act (36 Stat. 350) of 1910, are compiled and published for each year by that Commission in accident bulletins, which, par- ticularly in the case of post-war bulletins, among other things list the casualties, if any, resulting from hundreds of causes of accident. The classification of causes of accident is so complete that opposite many of them no casualties for the year are recorded. The detailed information in the bulletin covers not only the important, but also the minor causes of accident and the resulting casualties and inferentially shows that any claimed cause of accident not therein listed is not substantial. None of the bulletins show the casualties occurring on trains of different lengths although that information is required by the Commission's rules to be furnished when the accident is in any way connected with the movement of the train. The national casualty statistics set forth in these findings are compiled from those annual accident bulletins. Those statistics show that coincident with the great increase in train lengths throughout the United States (save in Arizona) since the enactment of the Arizona law in 1912, has come greatly increased safety to railroad employees and the public. This great improvement in safety has been made in spite of the fact that casualties resulting from grade-crossing accidents involving auto- mobiles practically have doubled. In 1929 there were 6;326 persons killed and 36,717 persons injured by freight- and passenger-train operation; 2,085, or about one-third, of such fatalities, and 6,347, or about one-sixth, of such injuries resulted from grade-crossing accidents involving automobiles. In 1917, the first year for which statistics covering casualties resulting from automobile 'grade- crossing accidents were published by the Commission, such accidents were responsible for only about one-ninth of the fatalities and only about 4 percent of the nonfatal injuries sustained as a result of train operation. XV Defendant contended that grade-crossing accidents involving automobiles are increased in number or severity by long-train operation because long trains cannot slow down or stop as quickly as short ones, but this contention is with- out merit. For the evidence shows that the difference in the stopping distances of long and short trains is very slight, but even if it were substantial, the extra stopping distance, in view of the facts surrounding grade-crossing accidents, would have practically no effect thereon. In cases where approaching automo- biles are seen by the engineer in time to stop, he does not apply his brakes or even slacken speed but merely sounds his whistle and rightly assumes down to the last moment that the automobile will stop for the train to pass. Ordi- narily, automobiles which do stop do not do so until almost on the track. Consequently, it is only at the last instant before a collision that the air brakes are applied because before that time the engineer cannot know an automobile driver does not intend to stop. So far as the automobile is concerned, the effect of a brake application made by the engineer at the last instant before a collision occurs is hardly appreciable. The evidence shows that the train-limit law does not affect the grade-crossing-accident risk attendant upon the operation of any particular train, but by increasing the number of trains operated it perforce increases, in the same proportion, the grade-crossing hazard arising from the operation of all trains. TRAIN LENGTHS 531 XVI The word "slack" is used to refer to the distance which two coupled cars cau move toward or away from each other without becoming uncoupled. Freight-car couplers are fastened to draft gears (shock-absorbing devices) which in turn are fastened to the underframes of the cars which are rigid. As the couplers are pushed together or pulled apart portions of the draft gears move back and forth, but friction blocks and/or springs in the draft gears offer resistance and in' ordinary train operation prevent substantial slack-action shocks. The movement permitted by each pair of draft gears is about 11 inches and the play between couplers about 1 inch, making a total possible slack movement of about 12 inches per car. "Slack action" is the movement of one or more cars toward or away from one or more cars, within the 12-inch slack limit. Slack action and slack- action shocks exist in trains of all lengths ; however, if the speed of all the cars in the train is so controlled as to be kept uniform or accelerated or decelerated at the same rate, the cars will not bump together and slack-action shocks will not result, but unless such speed is so controlled slack-action shocks will result. XVII The principal contention of defendant, and the one to which most of his evidence was directed, is that the freight-train provision of the Arizona law is a valid exercise of the State's police power because of the alleged lack of efficiency of the air-brake system in trains of over 70 cars; that because the brakes on all cars in a train do not apply or release concurrently but on one car after another, and because the application or release of the air brakes does not always have a uniform effect on the speed of the various cars, because some of them may be loaded and others empty or the brakes on some cars may apply or release more slowly than on others, shocks are caused in various cars in the train and particularly in the caboose; and that while such shocks occur on freight trains of all lengths, the hazard to freight-train employees therefrom is greater on trains of over 70 cars than on shorter trains. In effect, defendant's principal claim is that the speed of long freight trains and of the various cars therein cannot be properly and safely controlled by the air brakes used by plaintiffs. Those are the same type of air brakes and appurtenances that are used on freight trains of all lengths throughout the United States. It is somewhat more difficult and requires somewhat more care on the part of engineers to control by power brakes the speed of long freight trains and of the various cars therein than to control the speed of short freight trains and the various cars therein. On that point the evidence most favorable to defend- ant, when considered alone, shows no more than that on account of such greater difficulty of control, individual trainmen run a somewhat greater risk of receiv- ing nonfatal injuries from slack action when working on long trains than when working on short ones. But in territories not governed by the Arizona law, where both long and short freight trains are run in accordance with traffic requirements, under the "standard long-train operation" defined in finding I hereof, individual freight-train employees at times work on short trains and at other times on long ones. Because all traffic offered must be handled, the running of short trains exclusively necessarily results in running more trains, which not only increases train collision and grade-crossing hazards, but also the hazard of casualties due to other causes of accident, such as those incident to extra meets and passings, in connection with which employees go on top of trains, and also leave or board them while in motion to open or after closing switches, to make running inspections, and for other necessary purposes con- nected with train operation, and at times receiving very severe injuries and even being killed while s&' doing. The number of meets and passings does not vary in proportion to the number of trains run, but varies in proportion to the square of the number of trains run. Thus,.if on an operating division there are five trains moving in each direction, there will be 25 meeting points ; if the number of trains is increased to 7, there will be 49 meeting points ; if to 9, 81 meeting points. The evidence also shows that the hazard from train shocks and all causes of accident, except the grade-crossing hazard, has been steadily reduced coinci- dentally with the adoption of "standard long-train operation"; that the decrease in the fatality and injury rate of road-freight employees since 1916 (being the first year for which national casualty statistics covering that class of employees were published by the Commission) has been considerably greater than the 532 TRAIN LENGTHS decrease in the casualty rate of passengers, and also of all classes of persons exposed to the risks arising from train operation ; and that the risks of indi- vidual freight-train employees from all causes of accident is no greater on long trains than on short trains. Thus, during the 5-year period of 1925-29 on the 551-mile Salt Lake Division of the Southern Pacific, in Nevada and Utah, where 38,504 short and 50,709 long freight trains were operated, there were 847 long trains per freight-train employee casualty reportable to the Interstate Commerce Commission and 740 short trains ; and a similar study by the Santa Fe showed that between Gallup and Clovis, N. Mex., 384 miles, for the 7-year period of 1923-29, long freight trains ran 130,885 train-miles per freight-train employee casualty and short trains 115,899 train-miles. The evidence further shows that a given volume of traffic handled under the long-train method can be moved with a considerably less number of casualties to road freight-train employees as well as to all other employees and to the public than result when the same volume of traffic is handled in short freight trains because such casualties depend upon the number of trains of train-miles run and not upon train lengths ; and that the casualty risk of freight-train employees as a class is reduced by long-train operation in practically the same proportion that the number of trains is reduced by such operation. Thus, the Santa Fe study in this finding above referred to showed the long freight trains carried cars 10,967,245 car-miles per reportable freight-train employee casualty and the short freight trains 5,796,703 car-miles. In other words, if the short- train traffic in that instance had been carried with the same casualty rate as the long-train traffic, the total number of employee casualties on the short trains would have been reduced almost one-half ; and the grade-crossing hazard to the public also would have been reduced almost one-half. XVIII Defendant contended that casualties resulting from broken wheels or journals due to overheating justify limiting freight trains to 70 cars, but the evidence shows those classes of accidents occur on trains of any length and have no real or substantial relation to train lengths. Moreover, such accidents are respon- sible for a comparatively negligible number of casualties because, as shown by the accident bulletins of the Interstate Commerce Commission, during the years 1922-29, only 16 persons, including 10 trespassers, were injured in train acci- dents caused by the breaking of journals and cast iron wheels due to over- heating, whereas during the same 8-year period 14,876 persons were killed and 46,466 persons injured in grade-crossing accidents involving automobiles. XIX As to defendant's contention that freight trains should be limited because of alleged dangers arising from misunderstanding or failure to receive signals ex- changed or attempted to be exchanged between the caboose and locomotive on long trains, the evidence shows that with respect to ability to see signals, con- ditions existing on the major part of plaintiffs' main lines in Arizona are at least as favorable, and in many places more favorable, than those existing throughout the United States. The country is open, and, except in very re- stricted areas, devoid of timber, and the air is unusually clear and free from smoke. Any train limit based on the ability to see from one end of the train to the other at all times and under all conditions would necessarily restrict freight trains to much less than 70 cars, and obviously that is impracticable. None of defendant's 32 witnesses from train and engine service testified that he had ever seen or heard of any freight-train employee being injured because of in- ability to exchange hand signals with another employee. In 1929, as shown by Accident Bulletin No. 98, only one person was killed and two persons injured on trains of all lengths in train accidents resulting from "vision obscured by fog, snow, or other weather conditions (no negligence)" and "view obscured by escaping steam, darkness, etc. (no negligence)," being code Nos. 4429 and 4430. With respect to train accidents caused by negligence in connection with hand signals, said bulletin shows that in 1929 no one was killed and that only 17 persons were injured. XX The evidence with regard to defendant's contentions that the Arizona law is valid because there are or might be more trespassers per train on long freight trains than on short ones shows that the law cannot reeasonably be con- TRAIN LENGTHS 533 strued to have the object of limiting the use of trains by trespassers, or to have any reasonable relation thereto. XXI With respect to defendant's contentions that the Arizona law is valid because its prevents the use in Arizona of large locomotives, which would or might cause transverse rail fissures, the evidence shows it is not the total weight of a locomotive but the weight per individual axle or pair of drivers, and whether the drivers are properly counterbalanced, which determines the effect of a given locomotive on the track ; and while, obviously, it would be possible to construct a locomotive of such weight per pair of drivers or with drivers so improperly counterbalanced that its operation might increase broken- rail accidents, yet it is equally obvious that the number of drivers placed on a locomotive and the counterbalancing thereof, as well as the weight per individual axle or per pair of drivers, are matters of design and construction which do not depend upon or have any real or substantial relation to train lengths. XXII With respect to defendant's contentions that the Arizona law was, or is, intended to safeguard train employes against dangers which might be in- curred in manipulating retainers, which are a part of the air brake system, the evidence shows retainers are now, and under long freight-train operation would be used in Arizona on the Santa Fe main line only on the 23-mile Suapi-Ash Fork main line district, and on the Southern Pacific Arizona main lines occasionally on one grade between Tucson, Ariz., and Lordsburg, N. Mex., and that there is no hazard attendant upon operating retainers that is related to the number of cars in the train. With respect to defendant's contention with regard to alleged crossing blocking dangers, the evidence shows that the law cannot reasonably be con- strued as an attempt to prevent the blocking of street or highway crossings by trains of any class, or to have any reasonable relation thereto. The plain- tiff's lines in Arizona run through few towns or cities and 'for the most part through sparsely settled desert territory. XXIII The Interstate Commerce Commission has never found or held that long freight and passenger trains were not reasonably safe and never has recom- mended that any limit be placed thereon. But as a result of an investigation instituted by it in 1922 it made an interlocutory report in 1924 (Investiga- tion of Power Brakes and Appliances, 91 I. C. C. 481) wherein after making tests upon trains of different lengths including 100-car freight trains, it found that air brakes should be improved and better maintained. Thereafter at Purdue University laboratory tests of various improved appliances were made by the American Railway Association in cooperation with representatives of the Bureau of Safety of the Interstate Commerce Commission during the years 1925-28; and during the years 1929 and 1930 road tests under the same auspices were conducted in Oregon and California with freight trains of 50, 100, and 150 cars on light, moderate, and heavy grades ; but no final report or order has been made in said proceeding, which is still pending and unde- termined. XXIV The only hazard with respect to which there is any evidence showing that it has any reasonable relation to the length of passenger trains is the com- paratively slight hazard arising from slack action ; that is, from taking slack in starting, from jerks while starting or running, or from rough or sudden stops. The evidence shows, and it is common knowledge, that sudden backward movements followed by jerks frequently occur in connection with starting passenger trains, and that they depend upon the skill of the engineer and whether the locomotive or locomotives attached to the train have enough power to start the entire train at once, as must be done when the slack is stretched, or wheher the slack must first be bunched so as to enable the locomotive to start one car at a time. The evidence also shows that casualties sustained by persons when passenger trains are being started or by jerks when the trains are running are almost negligible as to number or severity. 534 TRAIN LENGTHS Defendant's principal claim as to passenger-train control is that there is some danger to passengers when passenger trains are rapidly slowed down or stopped by air brakes, particularly when emergency brakes are applied in connection with grade-crossing accidents or for other reasons. The evidence shows casualties to passengers due to emergency stops are extremely rare. Thus (see table No. 78 and code No. 4412, Interstate Commerce Commission Accident Bulletin No. 98), as a result of the thousands of emergency brake applications made in 1929, in connection with grade-crossing accidents, no passengers were killed and only 17 were injured ; but 2,085 motorists were killed. During that year passenger trains ran about 565 million miles and carried passengers about 31 billion miles (I. C. C. Statistics of Railways, 1929). It is the motorists and not the train passengers who get hurt in grade-crossing accidents. XXV One of the greatest hazards to which passengers are subjected arises from collisions. The increased train density caused by short freight and passenger train operation increases the number of opportunities for collisions and the hazard from collisions. It appears from the evidence that there are no hazards peculiar to the operation of a single long passenger train that do not also arise from the operation of a single short passenger train, and that the aggregate dangers to passengers and others arising from the long-train method of operation are less than those arising from the short-train method of operation, because under the former method fewer freight and passenger trains are run. It is also contended that the Arizona train limit law was and is intended to minimize alleged dangers arising from the fact that on long passenger trains passengers may have to walk farther between dining cars or stations and the space occupied by them in the train. The evidence fails to show any injuries in any way related to this contention, and shows that the Arizona law has no reasonable relation to station facilities, nor to the number or location of dining cars carried on passenger trains. It appears from the evidence with regard to defendant's contention con- cerning alleged dangers arising from claimed difficulty in heating long passenger trains that, except for a comparatively short season, no heat at all is required in Arizona passenger trains, and that the law bears no reasonable relation to any such alleged dangers. XXVI The evidence shows that the Federal Boiler Inspection Act, and the power- brake provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts and section 26 of the Interstate Commerce Act cover all of the dangers or alleged dangers within the purview of the train limit law with respect to which there is any evidence showing or tending to show they exist and bear any real or substantial rela- tion to the number of cars in a train, and said Federal statutes and said train limit law are directed to the same subjects and operate upon the same objects. XXVII Long freight and passenger trains are commonly, safely, and economically operated throughout the United States outside of Arizona over lines of rail- road substantially the same as plaintiffs' main lines in Arizona, and there is no reason from the standpoint of safety or any other standpoint why the length of plaintiffs' freight and passenger trains in Arizona should be limited to 70 and 14 cars, respectively. XXVIII Because the train limit law fixes maxima very much lower than those which generally obtain elsewhere throughout the United States under operating con- ditions substantially the same as those obtaining on any portion of either plaintiff's main lines in Arizona, and because it makes no allowance for grade or other operating conditions. or for the construction, type, length, or weight if the cars composing the train, or whether such cars are loaded or empty, and, if loaded, the weight of the load, and because it imposes a great and substantial burden of expense upon and interferes with and delays the com- merce carried on by plaintiffs and each of them on their main lines in Arizona and impairs the usefulness of their facilities, and because it bears no reasonable relation to safety, it is arbitrary and unreasonable. TRAIN LENGTHS 535 XXIX That all the substantial allegations of fact in the respective bills of com- plaint in each of the above-entitled cases are established by the evidence. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW And pursuant to equity rule 70% the court also states separately its con- clusions of law, as follows : I The matter in controversy in each of the above-entitled cases, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds the value or sum of $3,000, and each of said cases is a suit of a civil nature between citizens of different States and arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States; therefore, in each of said cases the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and of the parties thereto. . II The defendant is the duly elected, qualified, and acting attorney general of the State of Arizona ; in him is vested the exclusive power and upon him is imposed the mandatory duty to commence and prosecute or to direct the institution and prosecution of suits for penalties for every violation of the Arizona train-limit law, which law is an act of the Legislature of the State of Arizona approved by the Governor of said State May 16, 1912, and by the electors of said State at a referendum election on November 5, 1912, and was then entitled "An act limiting the number of cars in a train," and is now sec- tion 647 of the revised laws of Arizona of 1928, Civil Code, and is in the words and figures following, to wit: "SEC. 647. Train limit of cars; penalty.--It shall be unlawful for any per- son, firm, association, company, or corporation, operating any railroad in the State of Arizona, to run, or permit to be run, over his, their, or its line or road, or any portion thereof, any train consisting of more than seventy freight, or other cars, exclusive of caboose. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, association, company, or corporation, operating any railroad in the State of Arizona, to run, or permit to be run, over his, their, or its line or road, or any portion thereof, any passenger train consisting of more than fourteen cars. Any person, firm, association, company, or corporation, operating any railroad in the State of Arizona, who shall willfully violate any of the provisions of this act, shall be liable to the State of Arizona for a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars, nor more than one thousand dollars, for each offense ; and such penalty shall be recovered, and suits therefor brought by the attorney- general, or under his direction, in the name of the State of Arizona, in any county through which railway may be run or operated, provided, however, that this act shall not apply in cases of engine failures between terminals. (Sees. 1, 2, 3, ch. 43, L. '12; referred measure passed at general election 1912.) " Said act as passed had no preamble and no declaration of purpose other than that contained in its title; and it is a continuing statutory threat against each of said plaintiffs. III Under the laws of the State of Arizona no way or procedure is provided whereby either of the plaintiffs may test the validity or obtain a judicial re- view of said train-limit law except by violating the same and thereby being subjected to prosecutions for penalties imposed by said law, which are cumula- tive in character. The damages and injuries which by reason of said train-limit law are daily sustained by each of said plaintiffs are great and irreparable, and neither plain- tiff can disregard said law and invite or await prosecutions thereunder without being subjected to the enormous penalties that shortly would accrue if sucha course were followed and said law sustained. Plaintiffs, therefore, have no adequate remedy at law. IV That the train-limit law is unconstitutional and void as to interstate trains- which term is used in these conclusions to mean all trains carrying any inter- state traffic or commerce, or engaged in interstate transportation-because the 536 TRAIN LENGTHS permissible number of cars in a railroad train passing from one State to another, or passing from one State through another into a third, or passing through a number of States, is a subject over which exclusive legislative juris- diction was and is vested in Congress by the commerce clause (par. 3 of see. 8, art. I) of the Constitution of the United States. V Said subject of the permissible number of cars in an interstate train is a subject that requires a general or national system and uniformity of regulation, if such regulation for any reason be required. VI That the train-limit law is in contravention of the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States and void, because its necessary effect is to impose a direct and substantial burden upon and directly and sbstantially to interfere with and regulate the operation of plaintiffs' interstate freight and passenger trains across and within Arizona as well as in California and New Mexico ; and also because its necessary effect is to determine the number of interstate trains to be run by plaintiffs not only within Arizona but also within adjoining portions of California and New Mexico ; and also because its necessary effect is to impair the usefulness of the facilities used as well as those usable by each of the plaintiffs in the carriage of interstate commerce across, into, and out of the State of Arizona. VII That Congress, by the train-supply or train-service clauses of the car-service provisions (pars. 10 to 17, inclusive, and par. 21 of sec. 1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, delegated to the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to prescribe for the purpose of providing reasonably adequate train service, the number of interstate trains to be operated ; and that because the train-limit law, as it applies to interstate trains, prescribes the number to be operated by limiting the number of cars therein, it is in conflict with said Federal legislation and therefore void. VIII The defendant's claim that the train-limit law was or is intended to prevent transverse rail fissures, which occasionally develop, by making it impracticable and uneconomical to use heavy locomotives in Arizona, is without merit because the law does not purport to regulate locomotive sizes, and because, as found herein, the effect of a locomotive on rails does not depend upon its total weight but upon its weight per pair of drivers and whether the drivers are properly counterbalanced; and no such purpose could lawfully be within the purview of the train-limit law because full power over the size, design, weight, or con- struction of locomotives was delegated to and is now vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission by Congress by the Boiler Inspection Act of February 17, 1911 (ch. 103, 36 Stat. 913), as amended by the act of March 4, 1915 (ch. 169, 38 Stat. 1192), and the act of June 7, 1924 (ch. 355, 43 Stat. 659) being sections 23 to 35, inclusive, of title 45 of the United States Code. IX Because the Arizona train limit law attenpts to enter a legislative field com- pletely occupied by Congress, it is void to the extent to which it is claimed that it is designed or intended to confine or has the effect of confining the num- ber of cars in a freight train or passenger train to the maximum number of cars which properly and with reasonable safety can be controlled in one train by the type of air brakes and their appurtenances now used on such trains or by any other forms of automatic train-stop or train-control devices or other safety devices which may hereafter be approved or ordered by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Said occupied field is that field of legislation under said commerce clause already occupied by Congress by the passage of the power brake provisions of the Safety Appliance Act as amended (title 45, ch. 1, sees. 1 and 9, U. S. C.) and by addition in 1920 to the Interstate Commerce Act of section 26 (title 49, sec. 26, U. S. C.) vesting in the Interstate Commerce Com- mission power to order the installation of automatic train-stop or train-control devices or other safety devices. TRAIN LENGTHS 537 x The said Boiler Inspection Act, and the said power-brake provisions of the Safety Appliance Acts and section 26 of the Interstate Commerce Act cover all the dangers or alleged dangers within the purview of the train-limit law with respect to which there is any evidence showing or tending to show they exist and bear any real or substantial relation to the number of cars in a train, and said Federal Statutes and said train-limit law are directed to the same subjects and operate upon the same objects. The train-limit law therefore merely amounts to an unlawful attempt to supplement said Federal legislation. XI Because the train-limit law fixes maxima very much lower than those which generally obtain elsewhere throughout the United States under operating con- ditions substantially the same as those on plaintiffs' main lines in Arizona and because it makes no allowance for grade or other operating conditions, or for the construction, type, length, or weight of the cars composing the train, or whether such cars are loaded or empty, and if loaded, the weight of the load, and because it imposes a great and substantial burden of expense upon, inter- ference with, and delay to interstate commerce, and impairs the usefulness of the transportation facilities of each plaintiff, and because it bears no reason- able relation to safety, it is an undue, unreasonable, and unlawful burden upon and interference with interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, and also operates unreasonably and arbitrarily to take plaintiffs' property without due process of law in violation of the due-process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. XII That each of the plaintiffs is entitled to a permanent injunction as prayed for in its bill of complaint, as to trains carrying any interstate commerce or traffic or engaged in interstate transportation. It is hereby ordered that the above and foregoing findings of fact and con- clusions of law be entered of record in each of the above-entitled cases as the special findings of fact and conclusions of law in that case. CuRms D. Witnuu, Circuit Judge. A. F. Sr. Sua, District Judge. F. C. JAcOBs, District Judge. The CHAIRMAN. I may say, too, I presume that a number of wit- nesses here intend to present statements, and it is the practice of the committee to permit a witness who offers a statement and speaks, in part covering the matter, to permit him to include with his state- ment portions that he may choose not to read during the hearing. It frequently happens that a witness is satisfied to include part of his statement in the record, without taking time to read it before the committee. So, any witness will have that privilege. In fact, we rather en- courage witnesses to follow that course. Mr. Sullivan, you may proceed. STATEMENT OF J. 3. SULLIVAN, ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT, SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO., OGDEN, UTAH Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sullivan, I understood from Mr. Fort that you are going to speak on safety. Mr. SULLIVAN. That is correct. 538 TRAIN LENGTHS The CHAIRMAN. And that your subject is divided into several dis- tinct heads. Mr. SUrnvAN. That is correct. The CHAIRMAN. And that it would be desirable to you, if agreeable to the committee, to proceed without any interruption until the end of a section. Mr. SULJvAN. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. And when you reach the end of a section, if you will advise the committee, then questions will be in order. If that is agreeable to the committee, we will proceed in that way. Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, I would appreciate that very much. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee: My name is J. J. Sullivan, and I reside at Ogden, Utah, where I am employed as assistant superintendent of the Southern Pacific Co. I entered the service of that railroad at Lordsburg, N. Mex., in April 1904, and with the exception of 18 months during the World War, 15 months of which I was also engaged in railroad operation in France, my 34 years of railroad service has been with that company. For the past 17 years I have been trainmaster, terminal trainmaster, and as- sistant superintendent, serving in the States of Arizona, California, Oregon, Nevada, and Utah; and as special representative on the general manager's staff covering the entire railroad. As trainmaster and assistant superintendent, I have ridden many thousands of miles in the caboose of both long and short trains. I have had consider- able experience in the preparation and analysis of railway-accident statistics, having prepared the accident and casualty exhibits and testified thereto in the Arizona and Nevada train limit eases. I ap- pear on behalf of the Association of American Railroads in opposi- tion to Senate bill S. 69, which is designed to limit the length of freight trains to 70 cars. Any consideration of the question of safety to railway employees, or to the public generally, cannot be confined to a particular type of accident affecting a certain class of employee, if in the attempt to reduce that particular type of accident, it will cause more accidents to employees in other classes of service, to the public generally, as well as more accidents from other causes to the very class of em- ployees intended to be benefited by the elimination or reduction of the particular type of accident, but which would not be reduced. Any personal injury to an employee or any other person causes concern, regardless of the manner in which the injury occurs, and the degree of concern is naturally influenced by the severity of the injury and the circumstances under which the accident occurred. It should make no difference whether it occurred to a conductor or a brake- man, while attempting to get on or off his train, whether it was due to falling from a car or to a severe bump he might have received in the caboose, or from any of the many other causes, or whether it was a yardman, yard clerk, a car inspector, or signal maintainer, or some other employee who lost his life or a limb, or has been otherwise seriously injured by being struck by a train. Accidents and per- sonal injuries must be considered in their aggregate aspect. We think that the unmistakable effect of the bill would be to increase substantially the hazard of railroad operation rather than decrease that hazard, and my testimony, which is supported by sta- TRAIN LENGTHS 539 tistical tables and charts, will be devoted largely to a discussion of our position on this point. The chief reason why the hazard of accident will be increased is because the number of train units will be increased, and because the number of train units is a very important factor bearing on the ques- tion of safe operation. Other factors being equal, railroad accidents fluctuate both upward and downward in greater ratio than the change in the number of train units, or the change in the volume of train-miles. The safest method of operation, from the stand- point of both the public and the railroad employees is that which permits the running of the fewest number of trains to handle a given volume of business. We will show you that during the period of increasing train lengths railroad accidents of all kinds, and the frequency rate of such accidents, showed a very sharp and con- tinued decrease, and this was true also of that type of accidents of which you have heard so much--the so-called slack surge or rear end shock accidents. What I have said is true generally, not only of what might ordi- narily be thought of as accidents in connection with railroad opera- tion, but also of highway grade-crossing accidents. Highway grade- crossing accidents, as this committee well knows, present far the most serious safety problem with which the railroads are now con- fronted. Beyond any doubt, accidents of this character increase in direct ratio with the increase in number of trains run. In this, they differ from other types of accidents to which I have already referred, which tend to increase, other things being equal, in somewhat greater ratio than the increase in number of train-miles run. The statements which I have made will be supported in large part by statistical records taken from the annual accident bulletins of the Interstate Commerce Commission, covering experience over a period of years. However, before I call your attention to the sta- tistics and figures, perhaps it would be worth while to spend a few moments in indicating to you the reasons why an increase in num- ber of trains run results in an increase in accidents and injuries and why such increase in accidents and injuries is in somewhat greater ratio, other things equal, than the increase in number of trains run. It is not necessary to be familiar with railroad operation to under- stand readily that the hazard of collision between trains increases about in the proportion of the square of train units run. If only one train is operated on a single-track line during a given time, obviously there is no possibility for collision. If two trains are run in opposite direction, there would be one possibility of collision, which is another way of saying there would be one train meet. If two trains in each direction are run, there would be four train meets and four possibilities of head-on collision. In other .words, while the number of trains would double, the number of train meets would increase four times. If three trains were operated in each direction, there would be nine train meets, or an opportunity for nine head-on collisions. This element of hazard is important when it is under- stood that almost 85 percent of the total main track railroad mileage and 78 percent of the main line as distinguished from branch line mileage in the United States is single track. There would also be, of course, with trains of different speeds and classes, a multipli- cation of opportunities for rear-end collisions. 540 TRAIN LENGTHS Very much the same situation exists with respect to many other sources of possibilities of accidents and injuries. A very large per- centage of injuries to engine and train service employees occur in connection with stops and starts, with the incidental getting on and off trains, and occur at the time a train is standing, when the men are on the ground, or on and about the train. An increase in the number of train meets and train passes, of course, means an increase in the number of trains which must take siding, and in that connec- tion must stop and start. A large part of the injuries to employees in engine and train service do not occur while they are on trains moving along the road in uninterrupted movement. Thus as to a large class of injuries, it will be seen that the opportunities or proba- bilities of injury would obviously increase more rapidly than the train units increase. Little need be said with respect to grade crossing accidents. It is plain to everyone, and this is supported by the facts to which I shall call attention later, that the more trains that are operated over a given grade crossing, the more will be the accidents to be expected at that crossing. A relatively large proportion of injuries in connec- tion with railway operation occur to employees working on the tracks, and to people who are not employees but who may rightfully be on the tracks. It is entirely plain that the hazard of injury to such employees and such other persons would be increased at least in the ratio of the increase in train units. What I have said up to this point has been introductory and for the purpose of indicating the significance of the figures to which I shall now invite your attention. The actual figures fully support our conclusion that the bill under consideration would operate to increase the danger incident to railroad operation. I shall call your attention to the data used in my statement and some of the definitions. My conclusions will be based largely on a series of tables and charts. The figures appearing in the tables, and on which the charts are based, were taken from the published reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission, unless I indicate specifically that the data is from another source. Reference to the specific table or summary in Interstate Commerce Commission Accident Bulletins from which the figures were obtained will be shown on each of the tables introduced. In order that members of the committee may readily follow the dis- cussion, copies of the tables and charts will be handed you. An enlarged copy of the charts will be placed on the easel in order that they may be more readily followed. If there is no objection by the committee, I believe that it would be desirable for the record to carry a reproduction of the tables and charts at the place in the record where they are presented. The Interstate Commerce Commission classifies railway accidents under three principal heads, namely, train accidents, train-service accidents, and nontrain accidents. Obviously, nonetrain accidents, as the name implies, in no way involve the movement or operation of trains, locomotives, or cars, and therefore have no relation to this bill. A train accident is defined by the Commission as one, with or without casualties, arising in connection with the operation or move- ment of trains, locomotives, or cars that results in damage to equip- ment or other railway property in excess of $150. Train accidents include, therefore, all accidents of any consequence to trains and cars, TRAIN LENGTHS 541 such as collision, derailments, and locomotive-boiler accidents, not only while operating on the road, but in yards and terminals as well. I may call attention to the fact that in that property damage of $150 is included, in addition to damage to property, the cost of clearing tracks. A train-service accident is defined by the Commission as one aris- ing in connection with the operation or movement of trains, loco- motives, or cars, that results in casualties to persons, but not in dam- age to equipment or other railway property in excess of $150. Mr. MARTIN. Pardon me. Mr. Chairman, I think that there is one question that ought to go in right there. I would like to ask it and if it does not come in there I will withdraw it. The CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon; Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. I would, like to ask one question and if it is not ap- plicable to this point, I will withdraw it. The CHAIRMAN. Will that be satisfactory to you, Mr. Sullivan? Mr. SULLIvAN. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. I just want to ask, then. do train accidents also in- volve injuries or are all of the cases of personal injury classed as in train-service accidents? Mr. SULLIVAN. No, sir, Mr. Martin. If the particular accident in which the person was injured involved property damage, including cost of clearing wreck, exceeding $150, the casualty is classified as a train accident casualty and it is not included in the train-service classification. Mr. MARTIN. So there is no duplication? Mr. SULLIVAN. There is no duplication. Mr. MARTIN. Thank you. Mr. MAPES. Will you repeat that? I did not understand it. Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Martin asked the question whether all per- sonal injuries were included under train-service accidents or whether they were included in train accidents. A train accident involves personal injuries. That is, where the damage to property, including the cost of clearing the wreck exceeds $150, the casualty occurring in that accident would be included in the train-accident classification of injuries and would not be included in the train-service classification. In other words, you will find casualties in both classes of accidents. Mr. MAPES. I should think that there would be very few train-serv- ice accidents which did not involve a train accident. Mr. SULLIvAN. There would not be any so classified as "train-service accidents" if it were such an accident as to meet the classification of the Interstate Commerce Commission as a train accident. Mr. MAPES. Do they classify many accidents as "train-service acci- dents"? Mr. MAPES. Do they classify many accidents as train-service acci- dents? Mr. SULLIVAN. That is where you find the bulk of the casualties, in train-service accidents. Mr. MARTIN. That means that men were not injured and that the property was not damaged to exceed $150. That is the way I under- stand it. 47891--38-35 542 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. MAPEs. On these long trains where there is an accident suffi- cient to be classified as a "train-service accident," I should think there would be bound to be a train accident. Mr. SULMvAN. That is not true, Mr. Mapes. Mr. MAPEs. It is not? Mr. SULLIvAN. No, sir. Mr. MAPES. A man could go up against the side of a caboose with sufficient force to get his arm broken, or his neck broken without doing any damage to the train? Mr. SULLIVAN. That is possible, although I do not want to give the impression here that all of these accidents are included in the train-service group, or that those men all receive broken necks or broken arms, because if there is just a bump, and it disables a man for more than 3 days, it would be included in the train-service group. Mr. MAPEs. I did not think that that would be possible. Is there any controversy over the classification? Mr. SULLIVAN. No; not that I know of. That classification has been used by the Interstate Commerce Commission for a great many years. The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Sullivan. Mr. SULLIvAN. At this time, I will introduce table I, showing casualties to employees on duty in train and train-service accidents, all steam railways in the United States, and chart I, showing trends in average cars per freight train and in frequency of casualties to employees on duty in train and train-service accidents, years 1923-36. (The table and chart referred to above are as follows:) T Aiz .-Casualties to employees on duty in train and train-service accidents, all steam railways in the United States Casualties to employees on duty in train and train Average service accidents Total casual Year cars per Locomotive- , ties per ril- freight - miles lion locomo- train Fatali- Nonfatal Total tive-miles ties injuries caseual- (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 1923--------------------.--- 39.9 1,813,181,000 1,563 39,476 41,039 22.63 1924-------------------------- 41.7 1, 725, 780,000 1,192 32,174 33,366 19.33 1925-------------------------- 43.8 1, 751, 747, 000 1, 228 32, 245 33,473 19. 11 1926------------------------- -45. 2 1,833, 273, 000 1, 292 33,926 35, 218 19. 21 1927------------------------- -46.5 1, 776, 842, 000 1, 166 27,926 29, 092 16.37 1928.-------------------------- 48. 1 1, 745, 908, 000 962 23,591 24,553 14.06 1929.-----..-------------------.. 48.6 1, 777, 614, 000 1,069 21,970 23.039 12.96 1930.-------------------------- 48.9 1, 590, 844, 000 712 13,533 14,245 8.95 1931------------------------- - 47.9 1, 360, 294, 000 488 9,433 9,921 7.29 1932.------------------------- 44.8 1, 131, 396, 000 430 7,187 7,617 6. 73 1933.-------------------------- 45.8 1,107,036, 000 395 6,383 6,778 6.12 1934---------------------- 46.2 1, 156, 220, 000 408 6,692 7, 100 6. 14 1935-------------------------- 46.2 1, 183,046, 000 434 6, 656 7,090 6.00 1936------------------------- -46.4 1, 320,813, 000 547 8,846 9,393 7.11 Source: Accident statistics and locomotive-miles from annual accident bulletins of the Interstate Com- merce Commission, Summary No. 21 and table No. 97. Average cars per freight train (car-miles per train- mile) from other published reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission. SAFETY TO EMPLOYEES GENERALLY Mr. SULVAN. At this time, I invite your attention to the very decided improvement in safety of railway employees over a period of years, particularly during the time when average freight-train lengths were being gradually but steadily increased. Table I and TRAIN LENGTHS 130 .- 12 - - - --"- - Aveg r cart . 110 per freighttrain - 100 90C.- ---- 80 ------ 70--- E oyee casualty rat e 6----- 30 40 30 -- 20 0-- - 10-- 0 Mg 130 120 110 100 90 80 60, 50 40 1Q° N- 04 N H 4 H HV H'' *! v1 % r"7 r'1 0% .4 .4 .4' chart I have been prepared from statistics of the Interstate Com- merce Commission to show, for the years 1923 to 1936, the average- freight-train length in cars, and the casualty frequency rate to all employees on duty who sustained injury in train and train-servicer accidents. An examination of these figures shows that average freight train length reached its maximum in 1930, having increased more than 22 percent from 1923, during the time the casualty rate applying to employees on duty as a whole was being reduced 61 percent. While no claim is made that the marked improvement in the safety of employees on duty during this period was due entirely to increasing the length of freight trains, it was a very important factor. Mr. FORT. On that chart, Mr. Sullivan, which line means which t. Mr. SuLLIvAN. The top or broken line was the line I was discuss- ing and I will discuss the table and chart later. The top or broken line appearing on this large chart, a smaller copy of which has been handed to you, represents the relative length of trains compared with 1923 used as a basis and shown as 100. The unbroken bottom line represents the average employee cas- ualty rate, based on locomotive miles. Improvement in track and structures, as well as locomotives and car equiprnent, and the adoption and enforcement of better operating- practices each played their part. What we desire to emphasize is 544 TRAIN LENGTHS the fact that increasing the length of freight trains did not introduce a new or particular hazard of operation; nor was it accompanied by an increase in casualties to employees on duty. To the contrary, it was actually accompanied by a substantial reduction in casualties, and it proportionately reduced those hazards directly related to the operation of any unnecessary train units to handle a given amount of traffic. I am going to another subject from there. Mr. MARTIN. Then, Mr. Sullivan, what has been your personal experience in slack action? You say you have been an operating official and as an operating official you have ridden freight trains a great deal. I want to inquire about what personal experience you have had, if any, in slack action. Mr. SULLIVAN. My first experience as an operating officer was in 1920 as a trainmaster in the State of Arizona between Yuma and Tucson. That service continued for over 2 years. Of course, in Arizona no trains of over 70 cars were ever operated,. because the train limit law was in effect during that time. Later my experience extended to a California division where there was some valley, but generally mountainous'-grades. The heaviest grade on that particu- lar railroad was located in the territory where I worked, 2.2 and 3.3 percent. Possibly I have ridden in the caboose of freight trains, both long and short trains, during the past 17 years between 150,000 and 200,000 miles. I have ridden as many as 2,500 to 3,000 miles in a single month. I have never been injured, myself, in the caboose by slack action, and I have never been on a train where anyone else was injured. I do know that in Arizona during the period when I was a train- master, that men were injured in the caboose, and I do know that men have been injured in trains of over 70 cars on other parts of the railroad; but as to that particular type, when you relate it to the large number of trains operated, the magnitude of the operation, they are extremely rare. Mr. MARTIN. Has your experience been continuous? I mean, in recent years too, in riding the rear end of trains? Mr. SumvAN. With the exception of a period of about 2 years when I was on the general manager's staff and during the trial of the Nevada train-limit case, and during the several months when I was engaged in the trial of the Arizona train-limit case, I was ac- tively riding freight trains a great deal of the time, particularly when I was trainmaster. Mr. MARTIN. Have you talked with the men operating the trains, engine and trainmen, and conductors, considerably about the long train? Mr. SuLLivAN. I have not referred to the long-train operation par- ticularly. In the last 2 years that is the only operation, practically, that we have had in the State of Nevada and the State of Utah. Possibly 98 percent of the traffic is through interstate traffic. We have very, very few local trains, which would include the shorter trains, and fully 80 percent, or possibly a little more, of the trains are substantially more than 70 cars. So that is every-day operation. There was no particular reason to direct attention to the long- train operation. Mr. MARTIN. That is in Arizona? TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. SULLIVAN. No, sir; in Nevada and Utah, where I am stationed at the resent time. Mr. MARTIN. What is the attitude of the men generally? It is one of opposition to the very long trains, is it not? Mr. SULLIVAN. There are reasons for that, Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. There apparently has been enough opposition to attempt to do away with them in three States; that is, Arizona, Nevada, and California. Mr. SULLIVAN. The opposition to long-train operation certainly cannot be from any standpoint of safety when in a State where such operation prevails we have had only one rear-end shock accident in almost 2 years, as compared with the other types of accidents which occur, and on a very, very large number of trains no accidents of any kind ever occur. Mr. MARTIN. Then, in your opinion, the constant efforts before State legislatures and succeeding in those cases, and finally getting a train-limit law, it is your position that there is not any real justi- fication for such legislation. Mr. StLLIvAN. Absolutely none from a safety standpoint. Mr. MARTIN. That it just puts the legislatures in those States in the position of having burdened the railroads with unnecessary legislation? Mr. SULLIVAN. That is my opinion. Of course there is only one State in the Union in which that law is in effect and I know from my own personal knowledge and experience that was a great burden. Mr. MARTIN. There has been considerable attention devoted to the question of increased crossing hazards, from the increased number of trains. I will admit that, apparently, that has become more or less my hobby on the bill, and it is like threshing over old straw. You have stressed it and have referred to the increased hazard to rear-end collisions from the increased number of trains. Now, a witness for the proponents mentioned the running of as many as eight sections of a passenger train. Ordinarily just one section of a passenger train is run, is it not? That is on the ordi. nary schedule? Mr. SULLIVAN. On an ordinary schedule, one train is run on that schedule. Mr. MARTIN. Now, we have great seasonal pick-ups in which as many as eight sections are run, and I think there are more than that even; more than eight sections of a passenger train. Now, those sections run ordinarily about 10 minutes apart, and many times much closer. They run at very high rates of speed, at perhaps two or three times as high a rate of speed as a freight train. I do not see how any possible increase in the number of freight trains that could come out of this law could even approximate the increased danger that would be involved, and mind you, that is not simply the danger of damage to a box car and two or three train- men. That is danger to a passenger train loaded with people. I say, I do not see how any possible danger can come out of this legislation that would even approximate the running of eight high speed passenger trains within 10 minutes of each other, from the standpoint particularly of rear end collisions. Mr. SULLIvAN. Well, the fact, Mr. Martin, that there are no more collisions than there are even under the conditions that you men- 546 TRAIN LENGTHS tion, certainly reflects the high degree of care that railroad em- ployees take in everyday operation. I do not want even to intimate that there is any great hazard, but the fact remains, that occasion- ally collisions do occur, both head-on and rear-end collisions. Ob- viously, if there was only one train on the railroad, there could not be a collision with another train; but if the number of meets of trains is increased, particularly on a single track-no human being is infallable, and all you need to have for a collision is a momentary lapse, either an engineer or train crew overlooking train orders or inadvertently getting by a block signal. They have occurred, as in- vestigations of the Interstate Commerce Commission's Bureau of Safety shows that they occur, and I will treat on that subject later on in my statement; but there is a direct relation to this question of collisions with the operation of the number of trains. Mr. MARTIN. Well now, that would obtain though, regardless of how you got the increased number. It is a well-known fact, is it not, that we have divisions in this country main-line divisions, in which there are 10 times more trains operated daily, maybe 20 times, more than there are on other main- Line divisions. For instance, you have a few freight trains a day in Arizona as compared with the number on the Pennsylvania Rail- road between here and New York. I do not know how many you have, but I would say it is very few as compared with that. Mr. SULLIVAN. That is correct, as compared with the eastern rail- roads. Mr. MARTIN. And relatively few on the Santa Fe. While, when you get down in this country they follow each other dEy and night, all day and all night long, probably running 20 times more trains over a division between here and New York City, than you would between Lordsburg, N. Mex. and Yuma, Ariz. Then we all know you have your seasonal pick-ups, not simply in passenger traffic, but in freight traffic and perhaps your seasonal ,pick-ups in freight and passenger traffic which occurs every year results in a vastly greater increase in the number of trains per day than any pick-up that could be brought about in the number of trains in freight service by cutting the 110, 125, or 120 car trains down to 70. You might pick up one or two trains a day on a division under the operation of the law, more than you have now; but I think it is pretty generally known that your pick-up through seasonal activities might be double the normal traffic you have during the rest of the year which carries with it the danger of increased crossing accidents, and increased collisions. Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Martin, when you say the increase of one or two additional freight trains a day, I do not believe that that is entirely correct. From my own personal knowledge of what you have referred to as a relatively small operation in Nevada and Utah and Arizona, I do know in Nevada or Utah, that if the 100-car trains that are generally operated handling the fruit eastward were cut to 70 cars under the provisions of this bill, there would be an increase of from 30 to 40 percent in the number of trains. Mr. MARTIN. Yes. Mr. SrULVAN. Now, if that increase in trains would apply to a small State, with which I am familiar, and if the restriction is extended to this eastern country where the predominance of opera- tion occurs, and where there are far more automobiles and more TRAIN LENGTHS 547 grade crossings, I think it is apparent to anyone that it would in- crease the hazard at grade crossings. As to collisions, they are relatively few in number, which I think is a tribute to the American railroad men, but as I stated before they do occur and any increase in number of trains will result in an increase of that hazard. You just cannot get away from it. Mr. MARTIN. Even if that were conceded to be true, it is a ques- tion as to whether it should be controlled. I would not propose that because there was an increased hazard in running eight sections of a passenger train 10 minutes apart at 50 or 60 miles an hour that that would mean they should not be run. I would simply say that we have got to have this service and that if it creates extra hazards, we have got to meet the hazards. Now, because I take this line on this phase of the hearing, that does not mean, by any means, that my mind is closed. I recognize the fact that there has been an objection raised to the legislation that is entitled to serious consideration. I thought Mr. Booth made a point in connection with the fact that the Arizona law was passed in 1912, 70-car limit trains, and perhaps that was pretty close back to the beginning of the long train becoming an issue. I do not know what your figures would show if you. brought in all these bills that have been introduced in the 34 State legislatures as to when the first was introduced or when it was first introduced in each one; but generally speaking the issue began 25 or 30 years ago. Now, he pointed out, and properly so, the very great improve- ment that has been made in every respect in railroad operation in that period of time: The roadbed, elimination of curves, cutting down hills, heavier rails, better locomotives, better equipment of all kinds, and safety devices, and he raised the question as to whether even if it were conceded that the 70-car limit was a proper limit 25 years ago it would be a proper limit under the very different conditions existing now. I think that those things are entitled to very serious consideration of the committee, but I am just frank to say that I am not able to get this thing at all of the danger of increased casualties from rear end collisions, collisions with auto- mobiles, accidents at grade crossings, by putting on two or three more trains a day over a division, when no matter how many they put on on that division, we will have other sections of the country where there are grade crossings and automobiles which will normally operate maybe 10 times more trains a day than that division will operate, and that just leads to the absurd conclusion that what we ought to do is just stop running so many trains. Mr. SuLLvAN. Mr. Martin, I think that there is a difference in the consideration of that angle. There are a certain number of trains, both freight and passenger, that are absolutely necessary to be operated, and it is the duty of the transportation facility to render service to the public that it is required under the law. What I am particularly stressing is the operation of any unnecessary number of trains to handle that traffic. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Chairman. Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BUmwINKL. Mr. Sullivan, did I understand you to say that the average train length was 100 cars in these long trains in Utah and Nevada? 548 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. SULLIVAN. I said that is the general practice in operation of the fruit trains eastward, with the present power, at this time. They are not exactly 100 cars in length. Sometimes these trains consist of 95 105 or 110 cars. Kr. bULwINKLE. What is the maximum number of cars in trains. What is the maximum number of cars? Mr. SULLIVAN. Since I have been there we have not operated over 125 and that was only on occasions. Mr. BULwINKLE. Why is it that you have not operated over 125? Mr. SULLIvAN. Because of the capacity of the locomotives and the traffic conditions, and the siding capacity. Mr. BULwINKLE. Any other reasons. It is not for any other reason? Mr. SULLIVAN. It is not for any other reason that I know of. The traffic is handled from day to day, depending on the amount of 'traf- fic offered to be handled. During the fruit-loading season in Cali- fornia, a shortness of refrigerator cars from the East may result in an urgency for moving them at the east end of the Southern Pacific where I am located. We have no reservoir of locomotives to draw on. It is not an intermediate division point. We cannot borrow from the Union Pacific, and if the need for refrigerating cars is sufficient we put 125 in a train, whereas if there is not a great ur- gency there may be less. It is controlled entirely by traffic, the facili- ties we have, and the locomotives assigned to that particular division. Mr. BULwINKLE. Do you contemplate increasing that length any? Mr. SULLIVAN. Not that I know of. It is very difficult to look into the future. Mr. BULWINKLE. That is what you are doing, looking into the fu- ture, all of the time? Mr. SULLIVAN. We certainly are. Mr. BULWINKLE. All right ; that is all. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Halleck. Mr. HALLECx. Do I understand that it is your position that the number of highway grade-crossing accidents increases in about the same ratio as the number of trains crossing over the highways. Is that correctly stated? Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Halleck, I shall show that to you graphically later in my presentation. It carries a very marked relationship to the train miles operated. Mr. HALLEcK. There has been some talk here about some question regarding the operation of sections of passenger trains. Are.those operations a matter of necessity, for more efficient op- eration, or are they such as might well be done away with and the passenger trains made longer? Mr. SUInvAN. They are predicated entirely on the demands of the traffic. There is a certain amount of passenger traffic to be moved, and if the number of passengers is so great that they cannot be accommodated in one section of the train, it is absolutely neces- sary that the train be operated in one or more additional sections, depending on the volume of traffic offered. Mr. HALLECK. Is there a limit to the number of passenger cars that the passenger locomotive can handle? Mr. SULLIVAN. There is no limit, except in the State of Arizona. Mr. HALLECK. I mean, a practical limit, not a legal limit. TRAIN LENGTHS 549 Mr. SULLIVAN. That depends a great deal on the character of the traffic and the locomotives that the particular railroad may have available for handling passenger traffic. I have ridden on passenger trains of all lengths, from 3 cars to 17, depending upon the territory and the railroad. Mr. HALLECK. Are you going to give us a comparison of the num- ber of people injured at highway-crossing accidents, in relation to injuries to employees on the railroads? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Mr. HALLECK. Have you ever heard any serious contention that the increasing of the number of trains going over highway crossings would not increase substantially the hazard to the people using the highways? Mr. SULLIVAN. It is recognized generally that the operation of trains over a grade crossing creates a hazard and the operation of additional trains increases just to that extent that same hazard. Mr. HALLECK. That is all. Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman. Mr. CROSsER (presiding). Mr. Wadsworth. Mr. WADSWORTH.'Referring for a moment to the length of pas- senger trains mentioned by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Halleck). I suppose the length of passenger trains is governed in some degree by your loading facilities? Mr. SULLIVAN. To some extent. That is not a very important factor. Mr. WADSWORTH. It is not? Mr. SULLIVAN. It may be on some railroads; hut I mean generally, throughout the United States, it is not. Mr. WADSWORTH. I meant by that, the length of the station plat- forms. Mr. SULLIVAN. I understood that is what you had in mind, Mr. Wadsworth, but I do not believe that is controlling. It may be on some railroads. Mr. WADSWORTH. Does the element of adherence to schedule come into it? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Mr. WADSWORTH. I thought that the question about the length of passenger trains was interesting and perhaps it would throw some light on this general question. You say you have been on passenger trains of 17 cars? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Mr. WADSWORTH. Would a passenger train of that length be prac- tical, speaking of the divisions on which you work? Mr. SULLIVAN. At certain seasons of the year it would be quite general and I may say, that those trains are handled in a highly sat- isfactory way, without difficulties; without injury to anyone. Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Chairman. 'Mr. CROSSER (presiding). Mr. Halleck. Mr. HALLECK. Is it true, Mr. Sullivan, that the intensity or serious- ness of slack action increases in some ratio to the length of the train? Mr. SULLIVAN. That is only one factor, and I am going to touch on that later. The length of the train is only one of the elements, and I would say not an important one. 550 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. HALLECK. Well, would you, in respect to that specific ques- tion-of course if you are going to answer or comment on it, I will not press that matter. Mr. SULnIvAN. I can answer the question now, but I cover it more or less in detail later in my statement. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Sullivan, notwithstanding the extra hazard at these grade crossings, that does not deter you when the necessity arises, from operating extra trains, does it? Mr. SULLIvAN. It does not. . Mr. CROSSER (presiding). Are there any further questions? You may proceed, Mr. Sullivan. Mr. SULLVAN. I am now discussing the question of train accidents, that type of accident as distinguished from train-service accidents where damage to railway property, including the cost of clearing wrecks, exceeds $150. Table II which is now presented for your con- sideration is an exhibit showing the number of train accidents, to- gether with the car-miles and train-miles that were run upon the railroads of the United States during the years 1923 to 1936, in- clusive. The figures include the number of train accidents which were accompanied by casualties as well as the number in which there were no casualties. Attention is invited to the very small proportion which result in casualties; for example, in 1936 the number was only 7 percent. Car-miles, which provide a measure of the volume of business han- dled, are determined by adding together all the miles run by all the freight, passenger, and other cars that moved upon the railroads during the period. Train-miles, which provide a measure of train density, or the fre- quency of trains operated upon the railroads, are determined by adding together all the miles run by freight, passenger, or other trains that were operated during the period. The three items, namely, car-miles, train-miles, and train acci- dents, considered together, provide basic figures for showing the trend in accidents and the effect that shortening or lengthening of trains has had upon the occurrence of accidents in the past. They also af- ford a reliable basis for predicting what will inevitably happen in the future, if through legislation or otherwise the lengths of trains are arbitrarily shortened ; that is, if the railroads of the country are compelled to operate trains contrary to the method that experience has shown to be safe and efficient. From table II it will be seen that in round figures car-miles dropped from twenty-nine and a half billion in 1923 to twenty-five and a half billion in 1936, a reduction of 13 percent; that in the same period train-miles dropped from a billion and a quarter to 906,000,000, or 27 percent ; and that the total train accidents dropped from 27,497 to 8,286, or 70 percent. It should be pointed out here that as the length of trains is in- creased, the number of trains used in handling a given number of cars is decreased with a proportionate decrease in train-miles. For example, if 10 trains of 70 cars each were converted into 7 trains of 100 cars each it would be equivalent to a reduction of 30 percent in the number of trains and a corresponding reduction in the train- miles, but with no change in the number of cars handled or in the number of car-miles run. TRAIN. LENGTHS 551 There is a very definite conclusion to be drawn from a comparison of the three percentage figures I have mentioned, namely, at 13-per- cent reduction in car-miles and a 27-percent reduction in train-miles, which was accompanied by a 70 percent reduction in train accidents. The greater decrease in train-miles than in car-miles resulted from increasing the lengths of trains during the period under review. This increase in train lengths lessened the number of trains operated upon the railroads, and as the number of trains was decreased the hazard of accidents was also decreased. As the number of train units operated has a material effect on the occurrence of train ac- cidents, this reduction in the number of trains had considerable to do with the reduction of 70 percent in train accidents. This very marked improvement in the occurrence of train accidents is even more remarkable when the number of accidents related to the magnitude of the operations is considered. Take the year 1936 as an example: In that year the total lengths of all tracks, including main tracks, yards, and sidings, operated by the railways, was 416,000 miles. The railways operated 906 million train-miles and 25 billion car-miles. Going back to the total of 8,286 train aecidents occurring in that year, and relating them to the other factors just mentioned, we find that 109,000 train-miles and 3,000,000 car-miles were operated for each train accident that occurred, or at the rate of only 1 per day for each 18,300 miles of railway track throughout the United States. When the comparison is confined to the 590 train accidents in which casualties occurred, the showing is even more remarkable. It shows that there were 1,535,000 train-miles and 43,000,000 car-miles operated for each accident, or at the rate of only 1 per day for each 257,300 miles of track. (The tables referred to are as follows:) TABLE I--Number of train accidents-All steam railways in the United Stater Number of train accidents Year Total car-miles Total train- Number Number Total miles resulting not re- trai in casual- suiting in ain ties casualties (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 1923_-. ..------------------------------29,432,500,120 1,245,099,061 1,592 25,905 27,497 1924.-._._------------------------------ 28,889,084,826 1,204,301,537 1,244 21,124 22,36 1925.- ..-------------------------------30, 785, 543, 271 1, 220,845, 788 1, 195 19, 590 20, 785 1926 __..------------------------------32,666,043,078 1,248,897,015 1,316 19,761 21,077 1927_---- .-- ... -.._.._. 32,462,178, 176 1,220,987,075 1, 027 17, 949 18,075 1928 ._._.------------------------------32,994, 940, 295 1,202,678,319 951 15,998 16,949 1929 ------------------------------33,828, 943,108 1, 214, 360, 204 943 16,242 17, 185 1930 ------------------------------30,177, 596, 002 1,106, 386, 213 703 11,610 12,313 1931 ------------------------------25,608,791,534 965,220,987 509 7,543 8,052 1932 ------------------------------20, 350, 867,340 821,157,678 395 5,375 5,770 1933 ------------------------------20,597,254,007 786,719,851 417 5,206 5,623 1934 ------------------------------22, 179, 787, 345 818, 472, 986 453 5, 570 6, 023 1935- ------------------------ -----22, 512,343, 241 829,197,817 458 6, 093 6, 551 1936 ------------------------------25,588,228,699 905,748,875 590 7,696 8,286 Decrease, 1936 under 1923: Amount.--------- .----------------3,844,271,421 339,350,186 1,002 18,209 19,211 Percent------------------------------ 13.1 27.3 62.9 70.3 69.9 Source: Accident statistics from Annual Accident Bulletins of the Interstate Commerce Commission Summary No. 21 and table No. 61. Car-miles and train-miles from other published reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission. DefmiMons.-A "train-mile" is the movement of a freight, passenger, or work train a distance of 1 mile. A "car-mile" is the movement of a unit of freight, passenger, or work car equipment a distance of 1 mile. A "train accident" is an accident, with or without casualties, arising in connection with the operation or movement of trains, locomotives, or cars that results in damage to equipment or other railway property in excess of $150. 552 TRAIN LENGTHS 130-- ---------- -- ---- ---- --- - 120---------------- - cTotal aer-miles 100 -- -- - -- .-- - ina' train--a-l-- -- ------ - 50 Total 45f__ n accidents. 3 0 - - 10 - -. C0 -- - - -- --- -_ 0 100 0 v N N N N N N N O+ o" v 0% O.e- rI&4 r+ r r- H H H ol H N m- r4 '0 TRAIN ACCIDENTS Graphic chart II, which I now present for your consideration, is based upon the figures contained in table II, to which I have just re- ferred. The basic figures in each case have been reduced to index numbers, 1923 equaling 100. Thus the trend lines are on a common base and comparable one with the other. Three trend lines are shown upon the chart. The upper line shows the trend in total car-miles, the middle one shows the trend in total train-miles, and the third, or bottom line, shows the trend in train accidents, using 1923 as the base in each case. Comparing the car-mile and train-mile lines, the effect of increas- ing average lengths of train is readily seen. Had train lengths re- mained the same during the period, the two lines would, of course, have coincided, or in other words, one line would have shown the trend of both train-miles and car-miles. From this chart it is evident that the number of train-miles has a definite and very important bearing on the number of train accidents. The chart covers the entire period from 1923 to 1936. The chart may be divided into 3 major periods for purposes of analysis; the first from 1923 through 1929; the second from 1930 through 1932; and the third from 1933 through 1936. During the first period, that is to say, from 1923 to 1929, the number of train-miles remained fairly constant, although there were fluctuations to which I shall call attention later. The number TRAIN LENGTHS 553 of train accidents decreased and this was due principally to the tre- mendous improvement in plant and facilities, in track and equip- ment, which the railroads made during that period. In other words, generally speaking, the improvement in safety in the first period from 1923 to 1929 was not brought about by a decrease in train units, but was the result of other factors influencing safety. Yet all that time, 1923 to 1929, freight-train lengths were steadily increasing. Consider now the second period from 1930 to 1932: You will ob- serve that during this period there was a decided decrease in total train-miles and that the rate of decrease in train accidents was much greater than it was during the first period, or prior to 1929 when there was little change in the number of train-miles. This improve- ment in the safety record during the period 1930 to 1932 took place in spite of the fact that during that period the railroads did not have available and did not spend annually the very large sums in improvement of their plant facilities that they spent in the period prior to 1930. Now what I mean by money spent in improvement is capital ex- penditures and not the money that is generally spent in maintenance. The improvement in safety during the second period from 1930 to 1932, which was much more rapid than in the period prior to 1930, must be accounted for very largely by the decrease in train-miles. Consider now the third period, that is, 1933 to 1936. You will see that during this period the number of train-miles increased materially and that at the same time there was an increase in the number of accidents. The increase in the number of accidents was somewhat more rapid than the increase in train-miles. During this third period, from 1933 to 1936, just as in the second period, 1930 to 1932, there was no tremendous capital expenditures by the railroads on their track and equipment such as the expenditures which took place in the first period from 1923 to 1929. The conclusion is unavoidable, as a result of the consideration of these three main periods, that, other things being equal, the fre- quency of train operation is an important factor in safe operation. The number of train accidents decreases with the decrease in train- miles, and in greater ratio, and the number increases with the in- crease in train-miles, and in greater ratio. A further analysis of the chart is also significant. Takin again the first main period between 1923 and 1929, you will see that the number of train accidents decreased more rapidly in those years where there was a decrease in train-miles than in those years where there was no decrease. For example, there was a 19-percent decrease be- tween 1923 and 1924 in train accidents, while there was about a 4-per- cent decrease in train-miles. In 1925 and 1926 there was an increase of about 4 percent in train-miles and the decrease in train accidents was only about 6 percent as compared with the 19-percent decrease in 1924. During the years 1927 and 1928, while train-miles were showing a slight decrease, there was a 19-percent decrease in train accidents, but during the year 1929 when train-miles increased slightly there was no decrease in train accidents but, on the other hand, a slight increase of about 1.5 percent. The more closely the chart is studied the more inevitable is the conclusion that the train accident rate declines when the frequency of trains operated declines, other factors which bear upon safety remain- ing unchanged. 554 TRAIN LENGTHS That concludes my treatment of this portion of the train-accident question. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask a question about that chart. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. There are three lines on the chart. Is the top line the car-miles? Mr. SULLIVAN. That is the total car-miles. Mr. MARTIN. And the next line the train-miles? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. And the bottom line Mr. SULLIVAN. Is the total train accidents. Mr. MARTIN. Train accidents. Mr. SULLIVAN. That is, that type of accidents where the property -damage to the railroad, including the cost of clearing the wreck, exceeded $150. Mr. MARTIN. The chart shows that the car-miles reached its peak in 1929. Mr. SULLIVAN. In 1929; yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. It had gone up fairly steadily from 1923 to 1929. Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. There was a slight drop in 1924. Mr. MARTIN. Yes. While the total train-miles during that period went down to below 100. Mr. SULLVAN. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. It went down somewhere probably around 98 and you attribute the marked decrease in train accidents during that same 6-year period, when apparently train accidents dropped from 110 to about 92, to that ? Mr. SULLIVAN. That is correct. Mr. MARTIN. Do you attribute that to the decrease in train miles? Mr. SULLIVAN. No; that is largely Mr. MARTIN (interposing). Due to long trains? Mr. SULLIVAN. No; due largely to the improvement in facilities, the track and structures, cars and locomotives. Mr. MARTIN. Did I understand you to say that the train length reached its maximum in 1930? Mr. SULLIVAN. That is correct. Mr. MARnN. Has 'it been at a standstill since then or has it de- creased? Mr. SULLIVAN. It has decreased. Mr. MARTIN. Has the decrease been due to loss in tonnage; de- creased business?$ Mr. SULLIVAN. It is largely due to that. You will notice by refer- ring to chart I, which shows the average cars per freight train, that 'for the year 1930 the average train length was 22.5 percent more than it was in 1923. In 1931 it took a drop until in 1932 it was only 12 percent more than what it was in 1923; and, relatively speak- ing, the average train length from 1932 has not approached any- where near the peak of the period of from 1927 to 1930. Mr. MArtiN. But it would if there was an increase in tonnage. Mr. SULLIVAN. It would, if there was an increase in traffic which would merit the increase. Mr. MARTIN. Then, the length of train would be increased if you lad the additional tonnage? TRAIN LENGTHS 555 Mr. SULLIVAN. There would be an increase in the average train length, not the length of any particular train, but the average train length would show an increase. Mr. MARTIN. It has been mentioned in the testimony that the Pennsylvania Railroad has voluntarily limited its train lengths to 125 cars. Do you know anything about that situation? Mr. SULLIVAN. The first I knew of that was when I heard it dur- ing these proceedings. Mr. MARTIN. But perhaps no other road in the country has so limited its trains. Mr. SULLIVAN. I know nothing of that at all. Mr. MARTIN. Do you think if there is another business pick-up that the maximum of 1929 in train lengths will be exceeded? Mr. SULLIVAN. It is hard to anticipate that. I do not see why the average train length should not approach the peak period of 1929 or 1930. Mr. MARTIN. It is principally what we call dead freight that is handled on the long trains, is it not? Mr. SUiLivAN. No. That is not true. Mr. MARTIN. Well, I am talking about the extra long trains. I know that you have stated that you move fruit in 80- and 90-car trains. Do you move livestock in trains that long? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. Do you know what the maximum is on your fruit and stock trains, about what you consider the maximum number of cars? Mr. SULLIvAN. I have no information of what the practice is in the United States. From my own experience I know that the oper- ation of fruit trains of 100 or 105 cars is a regular practice. Some- times there are even more than that. I have personally ridden stock-car trains containing 90 cars of stock. That was all of the stock there was to move at that particular time. Mr. MARTIN. Is there something which prompts them to run 100 cars as a maximum in those classes of commodities like livestock and fruit? Mr. SULLIvAN. No. I would not say that the maximum was 100 cars per train for fruit, because I do not know of trains of consider- ably .more than 100 which have been handled. It depends upon the movement of the traffic and the amount of it that there is to move. I can recall readily in my experience the operation of 125- or 140-car trains of cantaloupes into Yuma, Ariz. That was not unusual, and the operation was very satisfactorily handled. Mr. MARTIN. Were they shipped to the eastern markets? Mr. SULLIvAN. Yes, sir; originating in the Imperial Valley of southern California and destined entirely for eastern markets. Mr. MArES. How long would it take you to get 100 cars of canta- loupes in one locality; how long would it take to get a train of 100 cars loaded? Mr. SULIivAN. The loading of cantaloupes, of course, is not all at the same loading track or same loading plant. Every shipper has one or more, usually more, loading docks. He will load during certain periods, depending upon the weather and the ripening of the melons. Everyone is loading at the same time, and these cars are pulled at a certain hour. Usually the hour is agreed upon between the carriers and the shippers. 556 TRAIN LENGTHS They have what is called switcher trains and hauler trains. After the cantaloupes are loaded and ready to move 125 or 140 cars would be gathered up in about 45 minutes. Mr. MAPEs. You would not have any way of telling how long it had taken or how much time had expired from the time the first car was loaded until the last one was loaded? Mr. SULLIVAN. Usually the loading of hundreds of cars is under- taken at the same time. I can recall the movement in 1923 through Yuma, when there were 700 cars of cantaloupes moving just as fast as one train could arrive, be split up into other trains, and get them started eastward. There is no delay after the shipper has completed his loading and furnished shipping instructions to the railroad. It is a very speedy movement both in the assembling, after loading, and the movement toward the markets. Mr. MAPEs. There is no practice of putting loaded cars on the siding and waiting for other cars to be loaded? Mr. SULLIVAN. Not in that particular movement, no, sir: or any other fruit-loading territory any place on the Pacific coast. Mr. MAPES. It is hard for me to visualize these total car-mile and total train-mile figures. Your chart shows that in 1923 there were 27,000 total train accidents. Have you any way of estimating or any figures to tell how many trains were actually operated in that year? Mr. SULLIVAN. No ; there is no way of determining that, Mr. Mapes. The train is such a peculiar element, if I may refer to it as that. The Interstate Commerce Commission defines a train as the move- ment of units of equipment between two points in charge of the same train crew. Now, if you had a run of 50 miles, a turn-around local freight, or a through freight running 250 miles, under that definition each one would be counted as a train. That is the reason why it is so neces- sary to have some unit of measurement that reflects the service ren- dered by those units. Mr. MAPES. Is a train an operation by an individual separate train crew between two terminals or designated points. Mr. SULLIvAN. Yes, sir. It is not capable of any comparison of any kind that I can conceive of. Mr. MAPEs. Is a new engine put on every time a new crew is put on? Mr. SULLIvAN. Different railroads have different practices. Gen- erally, I think, the railroads of the country try to use, where they can, long locomotive runs. I am entirely familiar with a locomotive run of 535 miles which involves the change of crews three times. Mr. MAPES. With the same or three different engines? Mr. SULLIVAN. The same locomotive. That is one of the important items of efficient freight-train operation. Mr. MAPES. I had an idea that each engineer had his own engine, but that is not correct? Mr. SULLIVAN. They have never had during my experience. The first time I ever saw such a practice was during the war. Mr. MARTIN. One more question. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Sullivan, do you have the number of and type of accidents chargeable to train and train-service accidents shown by the Interstate Commerce Commission's reports? TRAIN LENGTHS 557" Mr. SULLIVAN. The accident bulletins of the Commission show those classifications, and I have copies of those bulletins. Mr. MARTIN. Have you got them in any summarized way that could be put into the record-that is, the number of those two types. of accidents as shown by the Interstate Commerce Commission? Mr. SULLIVAN. That information can be collected. I do not have it here for presentation. I may say that train accidents include collisions-that is, where- two moving engines, or two units of equipment, or two trains collide.. They include also derailments due to defects and failures of equip- ment, maintenance of way, and other causes. They also include. locomotive failures, locomotive boiler explosions, and miscellaneous train accidents where there is damage to property. Train accidents as a group provide a better basis to show the trend in accidents than does any segregated item; but it can be furnished if you wish it. Mr. MARTIN. Would practically all of the slack-action injuries be shown in the train accidents? Mr. SULLIVAN. No; they would not, but a few would. I have an exhibit showing that. Mr. MARTIN. But most of those fall into train service accidents. rather than train accidents? Mr. SULLIvAN. They most frequently fall in the group of train- service accidents; yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. Would that be by reason of the fact that the shock was not sufficient to cause $150 property damage? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes; because if it caused damage of more than $150, it would be classed as a train accident. Mr. MARTIN. Have they got on the Southern Pacific a rule that has been introduced in the hearings here requiring men riding in the way cars to protect themselves against slack-action accidents by holding and bracing, and so forth? Mr. SULLIVAN. No; the Southern Pacific has no such rule. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask one question. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. I want to ask with relation to the shipping of live- stock, and referring to your personal experience in that connection: Is there, to your knowledge, any disposition on the part of the shippers of livestock to wish to ship on short trains and refuse to have their cars of livestock go into a long train, or in other words, request that they be shipped in a short train in. order to avoid shock accidents? Mr. SULLIVAN. I have had considerable experience both in Arizona and Nevada, and in the northern part of the Sacramento Valley, Mr. Boren, in the shipment of stock. When I mentioned a train of 75 cars of cattle, that was an unusual case, but I personally rode the train. Usually a train of stock, shipment of stock, would be anywhere from 25 to 50 cars. That is the normal movement that I have had experience with. I have never had any request or complaint from any stockman that I was in contact with, objecting to the number of cars on the train on which his stock was being handled. Mr. BOREN. Upon what basis is the limitation of the length of trains of livestock? 47891--38-36 558 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. SULLVAN. From my own experience the livestock shipments originate at points other than at a terminal, or points where other commodities are loaded. Naturally the shipper is provided the train service to load his shipment and then it is continued in whatever direction he wishes it to move; but it is not unusual for the shipments of two shippers to be consolidated into one train, one shipment being loaded at one point and another at a different point, both going in the same direction and to the same market. Mr. BOREN. And there is never any objection on the part of the shipper to possible slack action accidents that might involve his livestock? Mr. SULLIVAN. If they have ever made any objections of that kind, it has never been made at the time the shipment was made. Mr. BOREN. Is it not a fact that part cars of staple goods and loaded cars of livestock, and so forth, are more apt to be damaged at the rear of a long train than in the middle or front thereof ? Mr. SULLIvAN. Well, if it were located in either place, it would not be in the middle of the train, Mr. Boren, but generally it is more convenient to have those cars on the head end of the train, because certain services have to be rendered. If it is a solid stock shipment and it has to be taken to corrals for unloading, it is easier for the yard engine or crew handling the train to set the cars out at the corrals from the head end rather than the rear end of the train. Mr. BoREN. Do your records or the records of any railroad show that damage to staple goods such as boxed goods, or trunks, or what- ever may be shipped, has any correlation between the place in the train those goods are located? I mean by that, if you have a report that the goods that I ship over a line were damaged, does that report show what position in the train that car of goods was? Mr. SULLIVAN. The report itself would not, but frequently investi- gations are conducted as to where the damage occurred. I would say there are as many cases where the car was on the head end of the train as on the rear end. But usually damage of that kind -can be traced to terminal and yard operations, where the equipment generally, and unfortunately, receives rough handling. The impacts are more severe in the yards. But, as to being able to tell actually where the damage occurred or under the circumstances it occurred, unless it was an actual train accident, it is almost impossible to determine that. Mr. BoREN. That is all. Mr. MARTIN. Is there any precautionary practice, generally, of put- ting the more easily damaged freight, such as livestock, and so forth, at any particular place in the make-up of the train-front end of the train, middle of the train, or rear? Mr. SULLIVAN. I do not think so, from the standpoint of damage. Generally, livestock is handled on the head end. Frequently the shipper of the stock will request that it be handled on the hind end. It depends a great deal on where the shipper wants it handled. As to other commodities, we have certain commodities that we specify shall be handled near the caboose so that the trainmen can watch it. That refers particularly to traffic that is subject to pilferage. Mr. MAPES. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mapes. TRAIN LENGTHS 559 Mr. MAPEs. In answer to a question by Mr. Boren, you stated that if any complaints had been made by the shippers of livestock due to injury to their stocks because of slack action on the long trains that those complaints were not made at the time of the shipment. Will you just explain what you had in mind by that qualification? Mr. SULLIVAN. I understood Mr. Boren's question was whether or not the shippers made any complaint at the time their shipments were offered for movement-whether they protested or complained about the number of cars in the train-and I never had any experi- ence of that kind. That is distinguished from the type of complaint that may be contained in a claim filed for damage. Mr. MAPES. Do you mean to infer that the shippers have had such injuries and made claims for them after the shipment? Mr. SULLIVAN. No; not to long trains, but rather to rough han- dling, and usually they are in trains of considerably less than 70 cars. Mr. MAPEs. Have you, in your experience, known of claims to be made where the shipper has emphasized the fact that the train was long and that the injury might have been caused by the fact of the long train and the increased slack action? Mr. SULLIVAN. I have no knowledge of any such claims. The CHAIRMAN. Is there any rule about the placement of explo- sives in trains in reference to the length of the train or the location in the train ? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir; but not with relation to the length of the train. It specifies that they must be a certain distance from the locomotive or from the caboose. The CHAIRMAN. I understood you to infer awhile ago that there had been an effect upon casualties as a result of the lack of capital expenditures since 1932. Is that correct? You spoke of light capi- tal expenditures. Mr. SULLIVAN. Since 1929 a relatively smaller expenditure has been made than in the period 1923 to 1929. The CHAIRMAN. What was the point in that? Mr. SULLIVAN. The railroads have not been able to continue the capital improvement program, such as straightening out curves, lay- ing heavier rails, heavier track structures, more ballast, double tracking, increasing the length of sidings, as they did from 1923 to 1929. Also, the purchases of newer freight-carrying cars and loco- motives has been materially curtailed since 1929. The CHAIRMAN. So it is your judgment that the improvement in casualties had been to some extent receding; that is, the decrease in the number of casualties had to some extent been retarded due to the lack of capital expenditures. Mr. SULLIVAN. No. The CHAIRMAN. They have not decreased so rapidly; is that the point? Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, I did not want to take credit for this very marked decrease in train accidents in that period 1923 to 1929 and say that it was entirely .due to increasing the length of trains. A great part of the improvement was the result of the better- ments in plant, in track structures, and in equipment. The improvement since that time, rather than being the result of heavy capital expenditures for betterments to property, has followed 560 TRAIN LENGTHS the trend in train-miles. In other words, as the train-miles decreased, the train accidents decreased. The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed. Mr. SULLIVAN. I now turn to the subject of freight-train em- ployees. Table III is now presented for your consideration. (The table referred to is as follows:) TABz III.-Casualties to road freight train and engine-service employees in train and train-service accidents-Engineers, firemen, conductors, and brake- men and flagmen in road freight service [Class I Steam Railways in the United States] Casualties to road freight trainmen in train and train- Year Freight car- Freight train- service accidents miles miles Fatalities Nonfatal Total injuries casualties (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 1923.....------------------------------25,618, 484, 192 641, 453, 297 436 17, 778 18, 214 1924 ---- ------------------------25, 032,107,179 600, 751, 856 295 13,955 14,250 1925..- ... ..-----------------------------26,832,767,587 613,122,740 292 13,710 14,002 1926----------......-------------------28, 602, 714, 426 633,054,707 311 14,270 14,581 1927-----------------------------28,395,641,802 610,883,001 298 11,851 12,149 1928-------- -- ------------------28,972,991,656 603,117,834 197 9,970 10.167 1929.-...------------------------------29,744,751, 567 613, 444, 410 247 9,118 9,365 1930-------------- ---------------26,334,688, 274 539,392, 133 195 5, 906 6, 101 1931.----------------------------- 22,223,280,450 465,896,830 136 4,213 4,349 1932.- .....-----------------------------17, 515, 922, 032 392. 680, 079 117 3, 286 3,40 1933-----------------------------17,997,943, 127 395,649,870 104 2.883 2,987 1934--------- -------------------- 19, 488, 248, 971 424, 074, 611 135 3,109 3.244 1935 .-----------------------------19, 746, 754, 391 430, 008, 548 141 2, 998 3, 139 1936----.--..----------------------22,592,896,788 486,340,892. 170 3,929 4,099 Decrease 1936 under 1923: Amount------------------ -----3,025,587, 424 115, 112, 405 266 13.849 14,115 Percent------------------------------ 11.8 24.2 61.0 77.9 77. Source: Casualty statistics from Annual Accident Bulletins of the Interstate Commerce Commission table 55. Car-miles and train-miles from other published reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Definitions: A "freight-car-mile" is the movement of a unit of freight-car equipment a distance of 1 mile. A "freight-train-mile" is the movement of a freight train a distance of 1 mile. A "train accident" is an accident, with or without casualties, arising in connection with the operation of movement of trains, locomotives, or cars that results in damage to equipment or other railway property in excess of $150. A "train-service accident" is an accident arising in connection with the operation or movement of trains, locomotives, or cars that results in casualties to persons but not in damage to equipment or other railway property in excess of $150. Mr. SULvAN. Table III is an exhibit of personal injuries sus- tained by road freight train and engine service employees during the period 1923 to 1936, inclusive, together with the freight-car- miles and freight-train-miles that were run upon the railroads during that period. This embraces the class of employees that proponents claim would be favorably affected by the bill. Freight-car-miles and freight- train-miles are used because the class of employees under considera- tion are engaged in freight-train service. The three items, car-miles, train-miles, and casualties to freight- train-service employees, considered together, provide basic figures for showing the trend in casualties and the effect that shortening or lengthening of trains has had upon the occurrence of accidents to this class of employee in the past and for predicting what may happen in the future. From this table it will be seen that from 1923 to 1936, freight-car- miles dropped 12 percent and freight-train-miles dropped 24 per- TRAIN LENGTHS 561 cent, and during this same period casualties to road freight-train- service employees dropped 77 percent. Comparing the 1936 figures with the peak traffic year of 1929, we find a 24-percent decrease in freight-car-miles, a 21-percent decrease in freight-train-miles, and a substantial decrease of 56 percent in casualties, notwithstanding a slight upturn in 1936 from 1935. What was said in connection with previous tables and charts cov- ering general employee safety and train accidents applies equally here. "briefly, lessening the number of unnecessary trains upon the railroads reduced the liability to accident, and therefore lessened the number of casualties from all causes to this particular class of employees. Chart III, which is now presented for consideration, shows graphi- cally the figures contained in table III to which I have just referred, and as in the case of previous charts, the basic figures have been indexed on the basis of the year 1923 equalling 100. Four trend lines are indicated on the chart, the top line showing average cars per freight train, the next line showing the freight-car-miles, the next the freight-train-miles ,and the bottom line showing the casualties to road freight train and engine service employees. (Chart III referred to is as follows:) 130 - -- - - -- -- 1230 _ _20 120 POP 11- 4,cfAveraeoars 1no . f eraiim ra S- -T0-, J-.-4 . Frei1 Ca!' 1l 0rA r-f -sW.al& vf -4 - - 80-- - - -- 70 - - - ---- - - - Freight - - train-miles . 60 - - -- 50 - - 40 - Casualties 30 - - .20 . -- 10 - M C - wf t ~ \ a w _ 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Nv c N 4 N N C, o ~ n "A. r-1 -! H N r- oa &11 o0 CP H H 9 #4 M ".6 r{ fl ,so fn 562 TRAIN LENGTHS Although the chart covers the period 1923 to 1936, it may well be divided into three periods for the purposes of analysis and explana- tion. The years 1923 through 1929, with slight drops in 1934 and 1937, covered a period of increasing freight traffic; the years 1930 through 1932 included the severe decline of the depression, and the years 1933 through 1936 covered the partial recovery from the lows of the depression period. Let us consider first the 7-year period 1923 through 1929. The widening spread between the second and third lines, representing freight-car-miles and freight-train-miles, respectively, was due to car-miles increasing in greater proportion than train-miles, and was the result of increasing the length of trains, as reflected in the top line of the chart. Directing our eye to the vertical line representing the year 1929, and bearing in mind that the heavy horizontal line marked 100 represents the year 1923, we see in comparing 1929 with 1923 an increase of almost 22 percent in the average length of trains, a 16-percent increase in the volume of traffic represented in car-miles, and a decrease of 4 percent in freight-train-miles. This question, then, naturally presents itself: What effect has increasing train lengths had on the safety of road freight train and engine service employees? The answer is readily found in the heavy solid trend line at the bottom of the chart. Casualties to the particular train service employees I have referred to were 49percent less in 1929 than they were in 1923, although the volume of traffic was 16 percent greater, the average length of trains was 22 percent greater, and train-miles were only 4 percent less, as previously stated. The period 1930 through 1932 presents a somewhat different pic- ture. Traffic slumped violently during those years, accompanied by sharp decreases in casualties. Then followed the period of partial recovery, 1933 to 1936, and the effect of increasing train-miles on cas- ualties is clearly shown in the lower two lines on the chart. It will be noted that at no time since 1930 has the average train length been as high as during the period 1927 to 1930, although there has been some slight increase from the low of 1932. The narrowing down of the spread between freight-car-miles and freight-train-miles is reflected in the reduction in average train lengths. The narrowing of the spread between car-miles and train-miles was due to reduced amounts of traffic offered, which resulted in the operation of many trains with considerably fewer cars. Reviewing the 14-year period as a whole, we observe from comparing 1936 with 1923, a 16-percent increase in train length, a 12-percent decrease in freight car-miles, a 24-percent decrease in freight train-miles, but the very substantial 77-percent decrease in casualties. It will be shown by a following witness that if this bill had been in effect in 1937 it would have put 60,000,000 more freight-train-miles on the rails in that year, an increase of 12 percent over the number operated in 1936. Referring to Table III, it will be seen that a 13- percent increase in train-miles in 1936 was accompanied by a 31-per- cent increase in casualties. An additional increase of 12 percent in train-miles, such as this bill would require, would have much the same effect, that is an increase of substantially more than 12 percent in casualties. That would be the effect of this bill on the safety of road freight-train service employees. The trend lines on the chart, and the statistics given in the table point unmistakably to that con- TRAIN LENGTHS 563 clusion or to a result of this bill directly opposite to that which is claimed by proponents. The next subject that I go to relates to sudden stops and starts of trains. The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions? You may proceed, Mr. Sullivan. Mr. SULLIVAN. Table IV, which I now present for the considera- tion of the committee, is an exhibit showing the injuries sustained by road freight conductors and brakemen in train service accidents due to sudden stops and starts of trains, as shown in causes 7007 to 7010 of the annual accident bulletins of the Interstate Commerce Com- mission. (Table IV, above referred to, is as follows:) TABLE IV.-Casualties to road freight conductors and brakemen in train-service accidents due to sudden stop, start, lurch, or jerk of train [All steam railways in the United States] Year Freight car- Freight train- Fatali- Nonfatal Total cas- miles miles ties injuries ualties (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 1923---------------....---------------25, 618, 484, 192 641,453,297 11 1,946 1,957 1924 ----------------------------- 25, 032, 107, 179 600, 751, 856 8 1,667 1,675 1925------------------------------26, 832,767, 587 613, 122, 740 10 1,818 1, 828 1926--------------- --------------28, 602, 714; 426 633,054, 707 8 1,922 1, 930 1927--------- -------------------- 28,395, 641, 802 610, 883, 001 10 1,777 1,787 1928.-----.-----------------------------28, 972, 991, 656 603, 117, 834 6 1,571 1,577 1929 -----------------------------29,744, 751,567 613, 444, 410 4 1,451 1,455 1930------- .-----------------------26,334,688,274 539,392,133 5 971 976 1931-----------------------------------22, 223, 280, 450 465, 896, 830 5 709 714 1932-----------------------------------17,515,922, 032 392,680,079 4 499 503 1933----------------------.--- ----..-.17, 997, 943, 127 395,649, 870 3 417 420 1934----------------------------------19, 488, 248, 971 424, 074, 611 3 493 496 1935----------------------------------19, 746, 754, 391 430, 008, 548 3 509 512 1936--------------------------------- 22, 592, 896, 768 486, 340, 892 3 671 674 Decrease 1936 under 1923: Amount....------------------------ 3, 025, 587, 424 155, 112, 405 $ 1, 275 1, 283 Percent.------------------------------ 11.8 24.2 72.7 65.5 65.6 Source: Casualty statistics from Annual Accident Bulletins of the Interstate Commerce Commission, table No. 80, lines 7007, 7008, 7009, and 7010. Car-miles and train-miles from other published reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Definitions: A "freight-car-mile" is the movement of a unit of freight car equipment a distance of 1 mile. A "freight train-mile" is the movement of a freight train a distance of 1 mile. A "train-service accident" is an accident arising in connection with the operation or movement of trains, locomotives, or cars that results in casualties to persons but not in damage to equipment or other railway property in excess of $150. Mr. SULLIVAN. This is the type of casualty that occurs in other than in train accidents where the damage to property to the railroad exceeds $150. These are of the type of accidents which proponents claim enact- ment of this bill would reduce. They persistently claim that the bill is in the interest of safety; that the protection of trainmen rid- ing in the caboose against injury from slack-action accidents is its primary purpose. The terms "slack" and "slack action" are not synonymous. The proponents speak of slack in a freight train as though it was some defect-something that should not exist. But slack between the cars in a freight train is indispensable. Without it the train could not round a curve; nor could an engine start a train of ordinary com- mercial length on a level or ascending grade. "Slack" is the free motion at coupler faces, plus the play or motion existing between b564 TRAIN LENGTHS coupled cars of a moving train. "Slack action" is the accumulated effect of such motion as it may be brought into play by train opera- tion. Slack and slack action exist and occur in trains of all lengths. The length of the train is only one, and not the most important, factor in determining whether shock from slack action will occur, and to what extent. The speed at which the train is moving, the grade, whether it is ascending or descending, whether the train is accelerating or decelerating, the composition of the train as to all loaded cars, all empty cars, or one with both loaded and empty cars, and the relative position of such cars in the train are all important factors. The occasion or necessity for emergency stops of long trains by the engineer is rare and is not influenced by the length of the train. 'The causes for undesired emergency applications of brakes caused by trains parting, air hose bursting, brake pipes breaking, and the like have been greatly reduced by the building of stronger equip- ment and the retirement of older cars, the development of better and stronger draft gear and couplers, the manufacture of stronger air hose, and the use of improved quality of pipe for train line. Returning to a discussion of the table: As in previous tables, the number of freight car-miles and freight train-miles are set forth in columns 2 and 3, and the casualties in columns 4, 5, and 6. The cas- ualties shown include those which occurred on trains of less than 70 cars, as well as those of over 70 cars. The Commission's statistics do not segregate accidents as between the lengths of trains involved. Congressman. Wolverton asked Mr. Johnson a question concerning a figure of 13 fatalities to employees on duty in the year 1936, shown under code cause 7007-sudden stopping, starting, lurch, or jerk of locomotive, car, or train, reported in table No. 80 on page 54 of Interstate Commerce Commission Accident Bulletin No. 105. I ob- tained copies of the reports covering these particular accidents, and find that none of the 13 fatal injuries occurred on trains of over 70 cars. Nine of them were sustained by yard conductors and brakemen, as distinguished from road trainmen, during switching operations in yards, involving cuts or drafts of cars of from 1 to 25 cars. One fatality occurred to a shop laborer while closing a hopper door of a car, when the car was coupled to during a switching move- ment involving 28 cars. Three of the fatalities were sustained by road freight conductors and brakemen, 1 on a 9-car train, 1 on an 11-car train, and 1 on an 18-car train. These three fatalities are the ones shown on the table that I have just presented for the year 1936. From table IV, as was true of the two previous tables, it will be seen that while freight car-miles decreased only 12 percent in 1936 under 1923, train-miles decreased 24 percent, reflecting an increase in the length of freight trains during the period and consequently a lessening of the number of trains required to handle the business offered. During the same period, casualties to road freight con- ductors and brakemen from sudden stops and starts decreased 66 percent. In addition to this improvement of 66 percent, I would like to point to the relative infrequency of this particular type of acci- dent in recent years by relating the casualties occurring to the train- miles and car-miles operated. Take the year 1936, for example: Divide the number of train-miles and car-miles by the number of casualties, and we find only 1 casualty from this cause for every TRAIN LENGTHS 565 721,000 train-miles and 33,500,000 freight car-miles operated, or the equivalent of 1 of such casualty for 227 trips of a freight train from New York to San Francisco. This bill would not only fail in reducing accidents from sudden stops and starts, but it would greatly increase the opportunities for accidents from all causes. Chart IV, which is now presented, shows graphically the figures. contained in the preceding table. As in the case of the two preced- ing charts, the three top lines represent average cars per freight train, freight car-miles, and freight train-miles. 3 - - 230 120 --- --,Amer oars rr 120 d1Ofreight train Lt ±.c. t+9Lk0r1 110 100 -- 100 . - ..Freight ear-miles 9 , .4. Freight train-miles so . - -------__ -- 40 - - - - --- Casualties 30--1- 20- --- -I 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 iu - ! ! 4 .4 - r-1 ,H4 r. r-4 "'r4 r4 , r}4 r4 0 As the fluctuations in freight-traffic volume and freight-train dens- ity has been discussed in connection with the previous tables, I shall not repeat it here. The heavy solid line at the bottom represents the casualties sustained by road freight conductors, brakemen, and flag- men in train service accidents caused by sudden stops and starts, also. shown in the preceding table. Aside from the upturn in 1925 and 1926, a substantial reduction in this type of casualty, much greater than the decrease in train- miles, took place during the period of increasing train length to 1930.. Since 1930, the fluctuation more or less followed the trend in train- miles, particularly the upward trend since 1933. The trend line cov- ering accidents since 1933, rising slightly more than the train-miles, indicates, everything else being equal, as I stated before, that these .566 TRAIN LENGTHS accidents fluctuate downward and upward in greater ratio than the changes in train-miles. This is true because a large percentage of this type of accident occur when trains are being brought to a stop, and inasmuch as the meeting of opposing trains on single track is a common cause for stopping, we may expect accidents from this cause to increase in the same proportion as the meets on single tracks increase, as I explained in an earlier part of my statement. That closes the discussion on the slack surge accidents in train- service accidents, which will be followed by a discussion of those occurring in train accidents. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BULwINKLE. What, in your opinion, could be done to still further reduce the fatalities and casualties, we will say? What should be done? Mr. SULLIvAN. Well, it is an obligation of the railway manage- ments, and they all recognize it. I know that this responsibility extends to division officers, the class to which I belong, and that any casualty, any accident, regardless of the type, must be reduced. To single out a certain type of accidents and say how they may be eliminated is a difficult question to answer. Mr. BJwINKLE. I did not ask you to eliminate; I asked for fur- ther reductions. Mr. SULLIVAN. I think that the gradual improvement in equip- ment and the care that employees generally take in preserving their own safety has an important bearing and is an important factor. My analysis of numerous accidents of this type, and investigations which I have personally conducted, show that at the time of the accident the employee was not even exercising ordinary care. I have no desire to represent to the committee that the handling of any kind of a freight train or the comforts compare in any way with the passenger train; but there are certain things on a train of any length, a freight train of any length, that a man in the caboose should not do, it does not make any difference if it is 15 cars or whether it is 100 cars. He cannot be walking around like he does in the diner or observation car of a passenger train and it has been my own experience that over half of this type of casualties result from men walking around or doing things in the caboose which they had no right to do at the time, and the injury resulted therefrom. That is further explained by the fact that in a number of cases two or more men are riding in the caboose and only one is injured. I think that employees are generally aware of that and whether it is 50 cars, 40 cars, or 100 cars, they must take some reasonable precaution for their own safety. Mr. BULwINKLE. Well, you said half of the accidents were caused by that. What causes the other half? Mr. SULLIvAN. There are certain types of accidents that are not frequent and which the man himself cannot prevent. There is that character of accident, even if the man were using ordinary caution, the accident would have occurred, and that is not confined, Mr. Bul- winkle, to trains of over 70 cars. Mr. BULwINKLE. I am not speaking of any particular length of train. Mr. SULLvAN. I am talking about trains of all lengths. TRAIN LENGTHS 567 Mr. BULWINKLE. I am, too. Now, you stated just now that there -was an improvement on the railroads by the improvement of certain things. What did you mean by that? Mr. SULLIVAN. There is a gradual improvement of equipment. I think one of the greatest things that is being done is the total elimi- nation of the arch-bar trucks. Mr. BuLwINKLE. Of what? Mr. SULLIVAN. The arch-bar trucks as distinguished from the solid truck sides. A second factor is the elimination of double-plate wheels, which in earlier years was a frequent cause of serious train accidents and injuries to employees. Another device which is more modern and which practically eliminates this particular type of acci- dent is the brake rigging and brake-beam supports under the cars, so that if there is some mechanical failure it does not permit the brake beam to fall and to drag upon the tracks, causing accidents. Mr. BULwINKLE. Are all cars equipped with that? Mr. SULLIvAN. They are being equipped with it; yes, sir. In fact, there is a very marked improvement being made in the freight-car equipment at the present time. Mr. BULWINKLE. All right; that is all, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. It has been testified in the hearings that about 20 percent of the number of freight trains would be involved in this legislation; that is, about 20 percent of them are more than 70-car trains. I do not know but what somebody has stated 15 percent, but my best recollection is that it was stated at 20 percent. Are there any statistics showing what percentage of the total ton- mage handled by freight trains would be involved in this legislation? Mr. SULLIVAN. I do not know of it. I have an idea there is a following witness who would be able, perhaps, to state that. Mr. FORT. I stated, Mr. Martin, that about 42% percent of the car-miles are carried in trains of over 70 cars. Mr. MARTIN. Thank you. Mr. MAPES. Mr. Chairman- The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mapes. Mr. MAPES. I would like to ask a question. It is quite apparent that table III and table IV that you have presented apply only to freight trains, but it is not so apparent to me whether tables I and II apply to freight and passenger trains. Mr. SULLIVAN. Table I includes passenger and all classes of service, all classes of employees. Mr. MArES. That includes passenger trains as well as freight trains?1 Mr. SULLIvAN. Yes, sir. Mr. MArEs. Table I Mr. SULLVAN. Yes, sir. Mr. MAPES. How about table II Mr. SULLIvAN. Table II includes all types of trains. Mr. MAPEs. And tables III and IV Mr. SULLIVAN. Are confined to freight trains. The CHAIRM.AN. You may proceed. 568 TRAIN LENGTHS SLACK AND SLACK-SURGE CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM TRAIN ACCIDENTS Mr. SULLIvAN. I will now turn to slack and slack-surge casualties resulting from train accidents, or that type of accidents in which the damage to railway property exceeds $150. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sullivan, it is almost time to adjourn, and I presume you could not finish in 5 minutes or so with this subject? Mr. SULLIVAN. I could, without questioning. The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps we had better adjourn and you can begin with that on Tuesday morning. The committee will stand adjourned. Mr. Holmes makes a request for permission to submit a statement for the record from Congressman Culkin, of New York. Mr. BOREN. I want to explain to Mr. Holmes and to the committee that it will be my personal policy before this committee to object to inserting in the record any letters that are expressions of opinions which show that that expression of opinion has been solicited, with- out any direct interest on the part of the individuals concerned in the problem at hand. I have-and I hope that this is on the record-I have numerous wires, letters, and that sort of thing in behalf of this legislation from people whom I have addressed and received replies from, who have admitted that their wires were sent by request of somebody else. I have many wires and letters-a copy of one of such letters I passed around this morning-which from corresponding with the individuals concerned I found that they had no direct interest in or knowledge of the legislation at hand, but sent such letters on solicitation, and it will be my purpose, not only as to this but any other legislation be- fore this committee, and I think this ought to be a matter of record also, to object to having any information inserted in the hearings or any opinions inserted in the hearings that are not the direct and voluntary expressions on the part of the individuals who write them, and if there is any information which has not been shown to be voluntary included in the record here I shall have to object. The CHAIRMAN. As I understand, the statement offered by Mr. Holmes does not transgress the basis of your objection. Is that true, Mr. Holmes? Mr. BOREN (interposing). Mr. Chairman. I have no objection to the insertion of this material in the record, but I want to restate definitely my conviction that this sort of solicited propaganda on either side of the question of legislation brought here is not helpful to the committee, not proper in the public interest, and that careful surveillance of such information should be maintained by this com- mittee on both sides of any subject that comes in; and I make the announcement for the record that it will be my permanent policy to be watchful about such things and to protest on every hand the insertion of any material in the record that might be solicited mate- rial from one party to another. the party sending it not having any direct information or knowledge concerning the legislation at hand. Mr. SADOwsKL. It is understood, however, that the objection of one member of the committee to the insertion of material in the record will not necessarily stop it. The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that is true. The question as to what goes into the record finally will be left to the committee as a whole, if that becomes necessary. TRAIN LENGTHS 569 Mr. BOREN. I make that statement only in reference to unanimous- consent requests. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair perhaps, under a wrong assumption, made the statement in connection with Mr. Holmes' offering. The admission of that statement might involve a policy that would be- come embarrassing in view of the tremendous number of communi- cations sent to this committee. So, I would suggest that we withhold the matter for the present. Mr. BoREN. In order that I might not be misunderstood as to my stand here, I want the record to show that it has been my personal policy-except where I have been able to double check through correspondence and find that the individual had some knowledge or interest in the legislation-it has been my individual policy to refuse consideration except for communications as came from individuals who had some direct knowledge of or interest in the legislation, and I want it clearly shown that that is my attitude. Mr. HOLMES. I ask unanimous consent that my request may be expunged from the record. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the offer will be withdrawn. Mr. BOREN. And I ask that any reference I made in connection with Mr. Holmes' offer be also expunged from the record, but that the general statement of policy be kept in the record. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered. The committee has pursued a policy in the past which I think would probably meet your objection. Frequently people interested in legislation send in communications that have no value as evidence in aiding the committee, and there is a limit to which it would be practical to permit such matters to go into our records. So it fre- quently occurs-has occurred in the past-that the cormittee has received those communications and ordered them filed with the clerk, but not to be printed in the record, and, of course, it is always agreeable to the committee to receive such communications and keep them on file until the matter in question is disposed of. The committee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock Tuesday morning. (Thereupon, at 12:03 p. m., the committee adjourned, to meet Tuesday, February 8, 1938, at 10 a. m.)  TRAIN LENGTHS TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1938 HOUsE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence F. Lea (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. You may proceed,-Mr. Sullivan. STATEMENT OF J. J. SULLIVAN, ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT, SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO., OGDEN, UTAH Mr. SULLrVAN. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee: On Friday I had just completed the discussion of the so-called slack- surge accidents resulting from train-service accidents. Also, on Friday Congressman Martin, referring to table No. II, covering train accidents, inquired if I had made any break-down of the accidents. Since that time I have prepared two tabular state- ments, one showing the total number of train accidents, broken down as between collisions, derailments, locomotive-boiler accidents, other locomotive accidents, and miscellaneous train accidents, as I de- scribed in reply to him. Also, I have prepared a similar tabular statement of the same accidents, confined to freight trains only. If this serves Mr. Martin's purpose and there is no objection on the part of the committee, I would like to have the statements incor- porated -in the record. Mr. MARTIN. Just at that point, since you have mentioned that break-down----- The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, those may go into the record. 571 572 TRAIN LENGTHS (The statements referred to are as follows:) Total number ot train accidents, all steam railways in the United States Loco- Other Miscel- Year Collisions Derail- motive locomo- laneous Total ments boiler tive train accidents accidents accidents 1923 ----- ---------------------------- 7,115 16,708 67 971 2,636 27,497 1924----- ---------------------------- 5, 166 14, 259 46 756 2,141 22, 368 1925---------------------------------- 5,166 12,759 29 748 2,083 20,785 1926 ---.....------------------------------- 5,572 12,606 30 732 2,137 21,077 1927--...--------- ---..-------------------4,803 11,370 22 664 2,117 18,976 1928---.----------------------------- 4,302 9,938 25 552 2,132 16,949 1929--------------------------------- 4,435 9,871 16 712 2,151 17,185 1930-------------------------------- 2,979 6,967 29 742 1,596 12,313 1931-..---------------------------------1,913 4,554 15 633 937 8,052 1932- --..--------------------------- 1,265 3,321 9 525 650 5,770 1933----....---------------------------- 1, 219 3, 291 15 463 635 5, 623 1934--------------------------------- 1,317 3,489 24 535 658 6,023 1935---.------------------------------- 1,251 4,031 8 536 725 6,551 1936-------..--.--.----------.----------1,767 4,926 15 674 904 8,286 Decrease, 1936 under 1923: Amount...----- ..----------------- 5,348 11,782 52 297 1,732 19,211 Percent-----------------------..---. 75.2 70.5 77.6 30.6 65.7 69.0 Source: Annual Accident Bulletins, Interstate Commerce Commission, table No. 61. Train accidents involving freight trains, all steam railways in the, United States Loco- Other Miscel- Derail- motive locomo- laneous Total Year Collisions ments boiler tive train accidents accidents accidents 1923-----.---------------------------- 2,364 12,926 49 645 1,748 17,732 1924-----.-.._---.-.------------------ 1,712 11,156 34 457 1,489 14,848 1925---------- ----------------------- 1,524 9,739 20 441 1,419 13,143 1926.-----__----------------------- 1,586 9,56$ 16 410 1,3p5 12,975 1927--------------------------------- 1,414 8,718 17 358 1,441 11;948 1928------ ..---..--------- ----.- 1,294 7,510 16 306 1,446 10,572 1929---------.------------------------. 1,242 7,349 12 420 1,434 10,457 1930------..--------------------------- -843 5,203 17 413 1, 073 7, 549 1931.--..-------------------------------- 629 3,390 7 343 584 4,953 1932-.------------------------------- 426 2,457 5 277 368 3,533 1933-...------------------------------ --412 2,518 6 268 361 3,565 1934----.------------------------------- 452 2,650 13 311 362 3,788 1935...---------------------------------418 3,170 5 318 402 4,313 1936---------------------------------473 3,858 10 414 526 5,281 Decrease, 1936 under 1923: Amount----------------..------- 1,891 9,068 39 231 1,222 12,451 Percent.---------------------------80.0 70.2 79.6 35.2 69.9 70.2 NoE.-Includes accidents involving a single freight train, two or more freight trains, or a freight and passenger train. Source: Annual Accident Bulletins of the Interstate Commerce Commission, table No. 53. Mr. MARrni. I want to ask a question. I read in the papers yes- terdaymorning, or this morning, where a passenger train-I think it was in Arkansas-struck a stalled automobile at a crossing killing three of the train crew and three passengers. The total was six killed. It seems like this car stopped on the crossing and there were a couple of boys in it. They tried to shove it off, but the train was coming at a speed estimated at 70 miles an hour, so they just jumped for safety, and the train hit the car. It raises the question in my mind-I do not know that I will ask for an answer to it, because it looks like we get so far afield in some of these things that we just have a mass of statistics covering all sorts of subsidiary questions without getting us very far-but just as I was reading that, the question occurred to my mind as to whether TRAIN LENGTHS 573 there were any statistics available showing the proportion of passen- ger to freight trains-that would be exclusive of yard service. I do not mean that kind of service. But passenger and freight trains operated in the country and the proportion of crossing accidents involving both types, passengers and freights. You know a great deal of attention has been directed to the propo- sition that the increase in the number of freight trains involved in this legislation would create a greater crossing hazard and I have rather leaned to the view that the big crossing hazard is from fast passenger trains rather than freight trains. Of course, if the figures should disprove that theory that is something else. I do not have any private opinion in the matter. It just strikes me that is where the big hazard is. I know, for instance, here recently there was a fast passenger train which hit a bus out here at Rockville, and I think it killed about 17 people. I remember since I came here last fall a passenger train between here and Baltimore hit an automobile on a crossing down somewhere near Laurel and killed the engineer, and my attention has just been called to another case this morning where a passenger train hit a stalled automobile and doused the locomotive with gasoline and burned up the engineer and the traveling engineer, killing them in the cab. I feel that neither side need to rest their case on crossing hazards from a few more freight trains. Both of them have advanced very substantial arguments on other matters for and against the bill, but if we are going into that, why, I think we ought to develop that as fully as it can be developed and there might be a comparative showing between the two types, passenger and freight, as involved in crossing accidents. It might be worthy of consideration. Mr. SuuTvAN. As to the mention of this derailment that we read about in the papers: We generally refer to the grade-crossing hazard as one applicable particularly to the vehicle, and the annual report of the Interstate Commerce Commission on page 89 shows that in 1936 there were 74 such derailments resulting from collision with vehicles at public crossings. Table 53 of the annual accident bulletin carries a table which answers your other question as to the proportion of passenger and freight trains. For example, in the year 1936, under number of highway grade- crossing accidents classified as train-service accidents, it is shown that there were a total of 4,063, which includes all classes of service, but when related to freight trains there were 1,845, and passenger trains, 1,606. Now, on the basis of train-miles it would be about 50-50. I have prepared no statement of those figures over a period of years, but that is typical of what the more recent figures show. Mr. MARTIN. Would that show the proportion of passenger to freight trains involved in those accidents? I will not ask for it at the moment. I am just calling attention to it. Mr. SULLIvAN. This table itself does not show it, but we can relate it against the passenger-train miles and freight-train miles which would be a'proper basis of measurement, rather than on a per-train basis. Mr. MAnxTI. Of course we all know, in a general way, and, as a result of my brief service a long time ago, it has occurred to me per- 47.91-3----37 574 TRAIN LENGTHS haps with greater force than to other men who have never seen any railway service. Freight trains, of course, move a great deal slower than passenger trains. In addition, these modern freight locomotives are very heavy and it looks to me like they are more safely constructed in the way of pilot and so forth in front to safely hit an obstacle on the track. I mean with safety to the crew. As I said before, I am not particu- larly worrying about this fellow who gets in front of a train on a crossing, because he gets liquidated and his suffering is over. He just has to make one meeting point of that kind. Whereas, the engine crew are under the continued stress and strain of the possi- bility of seeing someone on every crossing every day. While that is true of the freight, the much heavier battleship type of freight engine they have nowadays, and much lower speed, it appears to me that these fast passenger engines, and especially these Diesels, when I look at the front of them, they do not look much stronger-of course they are-than streetcars. I never can see one of them without feeling that I would not desire to be on the head-end when they hit an automobile or a truck, going at 80, 90, or 100 miles an hour. They do not seem to be nearly so well calculated to rid the track of obstructions and stay on it themselves. In this case where the automobile stalled and drenched the engine with gasoline and burned the engineer and the traveling engineer to death I mentioned a moment ago, it seems that the driver knew that this train was coming more than a mile away, but it was coming at such a terrific rate of speed that perhaps it rattled the driver to some extent. Other people tried to shove the car off the track. If that had been a freight train they probably would have had at least twice, maybe three times, as much time to get off the crossing. So, it looks to me that so far as crossing hazards are concerned, the greatest hazard is or ought to be the very rapidly moving passenger train as against the freight trains. I do not make that as an argument at all for abolishing passenger trains or cutting down the number of them; but just wit reference to the bearing on the weight that ought to be given in connection with consideration of the bill to increase in crossing hazards. Mr. SULLIvAN. Just before adjournment on Friday table V was dis- tributed, but it has not been discussed. Additional copies have been provided in case any of the members of the committee failed to retain the copy they had. The CHAIRMAN. Are you passing to a new subject, Mr. Sullivan? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. About what is the average speed at which these trains in excess of 70 cars travel? Mr. SULLIvAN. It has been my experience that the speed of trains 'is the same, regardless of the number of cars, unless there is some impediment in the grade that would reduce it. My own experience with trains of around 100 cars is that they travel at the maximum speed permitted by the railroad and naturally the short trains are not permitted to run any faster. The CHAIRMAN. On an average, about what would that speed be? Mr. SULLIVAN. It varies throughout the United States, from 40 to 55 miles an hour. TRAIN LENGTHS 575 The CHAIRMAN. If a train were moving at the rate of 50 miles an hour on level ground, about what distance would be required to stop where it is desired to stop as promptly as possible? Mr. SULLIVAN. There are figures available; but a tonnage freight train, with an emergency application of the brakes, would travel fully a quarter of a mile. A high-speed passenger train will travel farther than that at maximum sped. The CHAIRMAN. Is the pressure of the brakes on the wheels suffi- cient to lock the wheels in making a stop like that? Mr. SULLIVAN. The adjustment of the brake lever is such that it will not slide the wheels. It is the friction and heat applied to the brake shoes through the rim of the wheel that brings the train to a stop; but at high speed with an emergency application, it is prac- tically impossible to slide the wheels. Mr. WITHROw. Do you not have trouble with flat wheels on engines any more ? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. Mr. WITHROw. What is that from? Mr. SULLIVAN. Flat wheels on engines usually result from an application of the brakes when moving at slow speed, the drivers locking, as it is commonly described. SLACK AND SLACK-SURGE CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM TRAIN ACCIDENTa I shall now turn from a discussion of the preceding table and. chart, confined to slack and slack-surge casualties to road freight. conductors, brakemen, and flagmen sustained in train-service acci- dents, that is, the type of accident resulting in injuries, but without property damage exceeding $150. However, there are certain classes. of train accidents which may also cause injury to trainmen in the caboose, but the statistics of the Interstate Commerce Commission do not definitely classify them as they do the train-service accidents, nor does the Commission show the casualty figures separately for road-freight conductors, brakemen, and flagmen, under those par- ticular causes of train accidents. I have prepared a separate show- ing which includes casualties to all train and engine-service em- ployees occurring in train accidents caused by negligent handling of air brakes, defects in or failure of car equipment, emergency or severe application of air brakes, and due to slack of train, not otherwise provided for. I do not wish to be understood as con- sidering that all of the casualties shown occurred in the caboose, or resulted from slack or slack-surge. I have included all of the casualties in train accidents which by any stretch of the imagina- tion might have been caused from slack action in order to give as correct a picture as is possible to obtain from available statistics. Table V is now presented for your consideration. 576 TRAIN LENGTHS (The table referred to is as follows:) TABLE V.--Casualties to all train- and engine-service employees in train accidents inivolving sudden stop, start, lurch, or jerk of trains, including negligent handling of air brakes, all steam railways in the United States Year Freight-car- Freight-train- Fatalities Nonfatal - Total miles miles injuries casualties (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 1023..- ....-.-.--.---..--- 25, 618, 484,192 641, 453,297 7 212 219 1924-----..--------------------------25,032, 107, 179 600, 751, 856 7 155 162 1925--. .------------------------26,832, 767,587 613,122, 740 9 149 158 1926.--..------------------------------28, 602,714, 426 633, 054, 007 4 160 164 1927-- --.-----------------------28, 395, 641,802 61,883,001 2 147 149 1928..------.- ...-...........--...--28, 972, 991,656 603, 117, 834 5 147 152 1929--------..--------------------29, 744, 751, 567 613, 444, 410 9 156 165 1930-----------------------------26, 334, 688, 274 539, 392, 133 7 97 104 1931 -----------------------------22,223,280,450 465,896,830 2 74 76 '1932. ----....------------------------17, 515,922,032 392, 680, 079 2 59 61 1933- --------..----...--17, 997, 943, 127 395, 649, 870 ---- 47 47 1934 ------- --------------------- 19, 488, 248, 971 424, 074, 611 3 44 47 1935.----------------------------- 19, 746, 754, 391 430, 008, 548 2 59 61 1936---- -----------------------22,592, 896, 768 486, 340, 892 4 59 63 Decrease. 1936 under 1923: Amount--------..---------------- 3, 025, 587, 434 155,112, 405 3 153 156 Percent------------------------.. ---11.8 24.2 42.9 72.2 71.2 Source : Casualty statistics from Annual Accident Bulletins of the Interstate Com- merce Commission, table No. 64, lines 1500 to 1588; table No. 65, lines 2300 to 2988; table No. 66, lines 4433 to 4437. Car-miles and train-miles from other published reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Definitions : A "freight-car-mile" is the movement of a unit of freight-car equipment a distance of 1 mile. A "freight-train-mile" is the movement of a freight train a distance of 1 mile. A "train accident" is an accident, with or without casualties, arising in connection with the operation or movement of trains, locomotives, or cars that results in damage to equp- ment or other railway property in excess of $150. Mr. SUTLIVAN. By an examination of reports filed with the Inter- state Commerce Commission covering the four fatalities shown for the year 1936, I learned that none of them involved road freight con- ductors, brakeman, or flagmen in the caboose, but included a freight engineer and fireman of a 46-car train, a passenger engineer handling two units of electric equipment, and a freight engineer on a 26-car traih, which indicates that casualties in any of the other years shown on this table may likewise not have occurred to trainmen in the caboose, due to slack action. Your attention is invited to the relative infrequency of these casual- ties, 63 in the entire United States for the year 1936, and I have already called attention to the fact that the four fatilities in 1936 were not associated with "slack" and "slack surge." Further examination of the table discloses that while freight car-miles were decreasing 12 percent and freight train-miles 24 percent, the casualties of the particular type we are discussing were being reduced 71 percent. Mr. SUULIVAN. I now introduce chart V, which is based on the figure shown at table V. TRAIN LENGTHS (Chart V, above referred to, is as follows:) 577 :l1 -7777vY70 [130 - -. ..4.147 110 "-"ags-- 10 " %%per frt.train 00 000 00 ----- 100 Freight car-wiles 90 --- -90 Freight F 80 Irai - - 0 50 ---50 Casualties 30 -- 30 20 ....- 20 10 10 0 0 . - - . . - .- .. - - WI ~ ~ ~ G 4 1% ' t % C r CqtN Cd d d Cd Mb ON. ON Mk0 al0' a%' P4 r1 P4 . . 4.4 o - en liWI t U- ' .4i .4 4 . . ...r 4 . V Mr. SULLIVAN. The three trend lines at the top are exactly the same as on the other charts presented. The same analysis and explanation offered for the trend in train accidents on chart II, covering train accidents, applies equally to casualties here. The relationship be- tween the casualty line, which is the bottom line, and the train-mile line, the line next to the bottom, is self-evident. That completes the discussion under that particular topic. The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed. TRAIN ACCIDENTS CAUSED BY DEFECTS IN OR FAILURES OF CARS AND CASUALTIES RESULTING THEREIN Mr. SULLIVAN. I now turn to a discussion of train accidents caused by defects in or failure of cars and casualties resulting therefrom. This type of train accident is, of course, included in the total shown in table II, previousl, submitted. Much has been said by proponents of the bill about car equipment failures and the alleged difficulties experienced by trainmen in making inspections on the road due to the length of freight trains. They claim that this ineffectual inspection due to the increased number of cars per train is a continuing cause of wrecks. 578 TRAIN LENGTHS Inspection of car equipment is a function performed by a special- ized class of employees nown as car inspectors. A corps of such employees are stationed at yards and terminals where trains are class- ified and made up, and at other points where railroads interchange cars with each other. These car inspectors make a thorough visual inspection of the equipment, including the structure of the car itself, the couplers and 'drat ear, the truck assembly, including the side bearings, wheels, journal bearings, and the lubricating material in journal boxes, the air brakes and appurtenances, including air hose, and the brake rigging, as well as the safety appliances which include the side and end ladders and steps, uncoupling devices, running boards, and hand brakes. In other words, before a train of cars is turned over to a crew of trainmen to move from a terminal, every car in that train has received the inspection of a specially trained and qualified class of employees. Proper inspection by trainmen under certain circumstances is ad- anittedly necessary but not to the degree that the proponents would like to have you believe. Neither is there the need for the frequent inspection by trainmen of a standing train on the road, with £he modern freight equipment of today, compared with the needs of 25, or even 15, years ago, when there were still in service so many cars of wooden frame and otherwise weaker construction, double-plate cast-iron wheels, arch-bar trucks, weak draft gear, and less modern brake rigging But what does the record of accidents show? Table VI, which is now presented, is an exhibit showing the num- ber of train accidents, and the casualties therein to train and engine- service employees, arising from defects in, or failure of, cars. As defects in equipment are peculiar to the car rather than to the train, the total car-miles are also shown in the table. The table shows that although the total car-miles were only 13 percent less in 1936 than in 1923, the number of train accidents due to defects in equipment dropped 73 percent, and casualties to train and enginemen in such accidents show a reduction of 72 percent. Surely it cannot be seri- ously contended that defects in, or failure of, equipment present a prolific source of injuries when in a movement of 251A million car- miles on the railroads in the United States only 58 casualties to all classes of train-service employees in the year 1936 occurred, or at the rate of but 1 casualty from those causes in the movement of 440,- 000,000 cars a distance of 1 mile. This remarkable reduction has occurred during a period in which the average length of trains increased 16 percent and includes al accidents from such causes, whether on long or short trains, whether at the front or rear end of the train, or whether due to invisible de- fects or mechanical failures that no human agency could detect. I shall refer later to the question of train accidents, insofar as their occurrence to any particular length of trains in coscerned, in a dis- cussion and explanation of an analysis which was made of the reports of accidents investigated by the Interstate Commerce Commission's Bureau of Safety. TRAIN LENGTHS 579 (Table VI is as follows:) TABLE VI.-Train accidents caused by defects in, or failure of, car equipment, all steam railways in the United States Casualties to train and Number engine-service employees Year Total car-miles of acci- dents Fatali- Nonfatal Total ties injuries casualties (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 1923-----------..-------------------------29,432,500,120 10,849 6 201 207 1924---..-----.-------------------------- 28,889,084,826 8,606 5 141 146 1925--.----.---------------------------- 30,785,543,271 7,498 8 132 140 1926-----------------------------------32,666,043,078 7,299 3 132 135 1927.-.._..-----------------------------------32,462,178,176 6,871 2 123 125 1928---....--------------------------------- 32,994,940,295 6,217 5 117 122 1929------ ---.-------------------------- 33,828,943,108 6,049 6 131 137 1930---------- ---.-------------------------30, 177, 596,002 4,418 5 86 91 1931-...-----------------------------------25,608,791,534 2,659 2 61 63 1932---------------------------------- 20, 350, 867,340 1,952 2 53 55 1933 ----------------------------------- 20, 597, 254,007 1,964 ---- 41 41 1934---.-------------------------------------22,179,787,345 2,099 3 39 42 1935-----------------------------------------22,512,343,241 2,267 2 56 58 1936-------------------------------------------25,588,228,699 2,878 3 55 58 Decrease 1936 under 1923: Amount------------------------------3,844,271,421 7,971 3 146 149 Percent--------------------------------- ---13.1 73.5 50.0 72.6 72.0 Source: Casualty statistics from Annual Accident Bulletins of the Interstate Commerce Commission, table No. 65. Car-miles from other published report of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Definitions: A "car-mile" is the movement of a unit of freight, passenger, or work car equipment a dis- tance of 1 mile. A "train accident" is an accident, with or without casualties, arising in connection with the operation or movement of trains, locomotives, or cars that results in damage to equipment or other railway property in excess of $150. Mr. SULLIVAN. That concludes my treatment of that portion of accidents. Mr. EICHER. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eicher. Mr. Ercrnm. How do you explain the abrupt drop between the figures of 1929 and 1930? Mr. SULLIvAN. In total casualties? Mr. ETCHER. Yes. Mr. SULLivAN. Between 1929 and 1930 there was a very marked reduction in train-miles; and furthermore, we were starting to get the real benefit of the great increase in number of heavier and more modern cars that had been purchased by the railroads from 1923 to 1929. You will notice that there was quite a drop in the traffic, measured in car-miles from 1929 to 1930. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sullivan, what is the difference in the weight, approximately, of the average freight car today as contrasted with the car that prevailed, say, 18 years ago? Mr. SULLIVAN. Those figures are available, Mr. Chairman. I can- not recall just what they are now; but I know that the average weight is considerably more now than it was during that period. I can get that figure for you. The CHAIRMAN. Heaivier rails ar not required on account of heavier cars, are they? Mr. SULLIVAN. Not particularly. Heavier rails enter into the en- tire program of safe operation. Larger locomotives and increased tonnage handled by the trains have a bearing on the necessity for heavier rails. 580 TRAIN LENGTHS The CHAIRMAN. But it is the engine that really requires the heavier rail, is it not? Mr. SULLIvAN. Not altogether. The wear on rails generally, and the usefulness of the rail, is based on the tons that are hauled over it, whether it is the engine or whether it is the load behind the engine. Furthermore, the heavier rail is necessary for the heavier equip- ment in the passenger trains and the speed at which they are operated at the present time. Mr. QUINN. On your road, what weight are they using on the main line? Mr. SULLIVAN. It depends on the amount of traffic, but generally it is 110 pounds to 130 pounds. In the curve territory and on grades, the heavier rail is used. Mr. QUINN. Do you use the 151-pound rail? Mr. SULLIVAN. I do not believe we have any 151-pound rail at the present time. There is some 142-pound rail in some of the mountain- ous districts where heavy curvature exists. Mr. QUINN. Are you using the process rail with hardening process on the end ? Mr. SULLIVAN. I do not know just what particular kind of rail is being used. It is the rail that is generally used by the railroads of the country. Mr. QUINN. The Pennsylvania is using 151-pound, with hardening process on the end joints. Mr. SULLvAN. Of course, in proportion to the amount of traffic handled, the Southern Pacific does not handle anything near the- amount of tonnage that a railroad like the Pennsylvania does. Mr. PEARsON. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pearson. Mr. PEARSON. If the railroads operated more short trains as a result of this proposed statute, would there be an increase in the total car-miles? Mr. SULLIVAN. No; there would be no increase in the total car- miles. Mr. PEARSox. By what reasoning do you arrive at the conclusion there would be no increase? Mr. SULLIVAN. The number of car-miles, Mr. Pearson, is controlled entirely by the amount of traffic moved, and the movement of empties to the point at which the equipment would be required for such load- ing. For instance, you might have a certain amount of traffic to offer. It does not change the volume of car-miles, whether you handle the car-miles in twice as many trains or not. It is entirely controlled by the traffic to be moved. Mr. PEARSON. Well, I notice in studying this table VTI that, almost without exception, as the total car-miles increase the number of accidents increase proportionately. Now, if it is true that operating shorter trains will not tend to increase the total car-miles, it would not be fair to use this table as being indicative of the fact that an increase in the number of trains would result in a proportionate increase in the number of accidents, would it? Mr. SULLIvAN. The reason that the car-mile is used, Mr. Pearson, is because a defect or failure of a car is associated with an individual TRAIN LENGTHS 581 piece of car equipment. It does not make any difference whether that particular car which is responsible for an accident is in a short train or in a long train, or a train of any number of cars. It is the true measuring stick of a failure of a car. it is the element which rep- resents the movement of that equipment. Mr. PEARSON. Well, would any different rule apply if you took the total freight-train-miles as a yardstick? Mr. SULLIVAN. That can be related to the number of train-miles. As a matter of fact, in table II, which includes all train accidents and includes this type of accident, was related to or against train- miles, because some of those accidents have a direct bearing, or are controlled by the number of train-miles operated. I shall now turn to a discussion of hand signals. HAND SIGNALS Proponents of this bill have undertaken to create the impression that difficulty in transmitting hand signals from one end to the other on so-called long trains seriously affects the safety of railroad opera- tion. There is only one hand or lantern signal that can have any possible connection with safety insofar as the operation of a moving freight train is concerned, and that is a stop signal. If a train is standing and a proceed signal, or a back-up signal is given and not acted upon, nothing can happen except delay. If the train is actu- ally in motion there is no occasion for these two signals. In the case of moving freight trains, desired stops are usually by prearrangement. In other words, the engineer is informed by the conductor or a trainman before departure from the terminal, or from a station en route, where the stops are to be made. In many cases the only stops to be made are for water and fuel, or to clear superior trains. That is to meet some opposing superior train or take a siding to let some more important train pass. In all such cases there is no necessity for a stop signal from the rear of the train. The occasion for stop signals from the rear of trains is actually infrequent, and occur when trainmen detect some condition in the train or receive signals from other employees on the ground that something is wrong. The only classification in the Interstate Commerce Commission's accident statistics which relates to train accidents that might have resulted from inability to interpret such signals, is "misunderstanding of hand signals," and ordinarily such accidents occur in switching operations. If there had been any such difficulty as claimed by the proponents of this bill, the bad results would have been reflected in the Accident Statistics of the Interstate Commerce Commission. To demonstrate that the misunderstanding of hand signals is not a common cause of train accidents, I present at this time table VII which shows the number of such train accidents and casualties to train and engine service employees from that cause. The two injuries shown on the table for the year 1936 were in connection with yard movements, one involving movement of a cut of 15 cars, and the other a cut of 17 cars. 582 TRAIN LENGTHS (Table VII, above referred to, is as follows:) TABLE VII.-Train accidents caused by misunderstanding of hand signals, all steam railways in the United States Casualties to train and Num- engine service em- Year Train-miles ber o ployees dents Killed Injured Total (1) (?) (3) (4) (5) (6 1523 -----------------------------------------1,245,099,061 98 2 5 7 1924-.--.------------------------------------1,204,301,537 74 6 6 1925----- ..-...---------------------..--- 1, 220,845, 788 123 .-..-... 8 8 1926-.--..-----------------------------..1,248,897,015 114 -.....-. 9 9 1927....-.--------------------------------------------1,220,987,075 77 -..-...- 7 7 1928 -----------------------------------------1,202,678,319 81 ----.... 6 6 1929----------.. .-------------------------------1,214,360,204 91 .--_ 2 2 1930------------- ----------------------------1,106,386,213 45 2 1 3 1931.--------------------------------------------965,220,987 33 1932---..------------------------------------821,157,678 25-------------------- 1933 ------------------------------------------786,719,851 24.................. 1934---------.... ----------------------------------818,472,986 25 1 1 1935----------- -------------------------------829,197,817 33 3 3 1936 --------------------------------------905,748,875 33 2 2 Source: Accident statistics from Annual Accident Bulletins of the Interstate Commerce Commission, table 64, line 1307. Train-miles from other published statistical reports of the Interstate Commerce Com- mission. Mr. SULLIVAN. That closes the discussion on hand signals. Mr. PEARSON. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pearson. Mr. PEARsoN. That table includes injuries of all kinds, no matter how small or unimportant they might be? Mr. SULLIVAN. If it occurred in a train accident, that type of acci- dent in which property damage, including the cost of clearing of the wreck, exceeded $150. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Sullivan, that property-damage table has no rela- tion to what the expense might be to the railroads in connection with the injury to individuals? Mr. SULLIVAN. No; it does not. Mr. BOREN. I mean by that, five people might be killed and, if there was only $10 worth of property lost, those five people would not be included in a table like this? Mr. SULLIVAN. No. If the damage to the equipment in the train, the track, and the roadway, and other appurtenances of the track and the cost of clearing the wreck all amounted to $150 or less, it would not be considered a train accident. Mr. BOREN. Regardless of how many people were killed? Mr. SULLIVAN. That is true. In that case, the casualty would be included and reported in the table of the Interstate Commerce Com- mission under "Train-service accidents." Mr. MARTIN. Have you a table of train-service accidents; due to misunderstanding of hand signals? Mr. SULLIVAN. There is no classification under train-service acci- dents that could be directly traced to this question of signals. Mr. BOREN. Now, suppose there were an accident to a passenger train and a number of people were killed, but no property damage- TRAIN LENGTHS 583 doubtless such a case could be visualized-where would the Interstate Commerce Commission report that? Mr. SULLIVAN. Under that situation, Mr. Boren, it would not be reported as a train accident; but any accident, derailment, or colli- sion involving a passenger train in which there were fatalities-I cannot conceive of any situation where there would not be at least $151 damages, when you consider that there must be included the cost of clearing up the accident, any damage to the roadway, and damage to cars and locomotives in the train. Mr. BOREN. Well, let us suppose that it was a grade-crossing acci- dent at which 30 people riding in a school bus were killed. Mr. SULLIVAN. That would be classified under the "Grade crossing" heading of the train-service accident group. If it also resulted in a derailment of the train and there was some property damage, you would find that accident, including the casualties, in the train-acci- dent group under that particular head. Mr. BOREN. Then, I would like to make this observation in con- nection with the tables you have here presented. Unless you go ahead with a further table to show the accidents in the train service, it strikes me that this sort of a report is largely meaningless. In your showing between the years 1923 and 1936 the total accidents are car- ried over in your right-hand column, but admitting at the same time that the total accidents which do not involve any great amount of property damage are not carried here, I cannot see how there is any particular interpretation to be placed on these tables in relation to the question in hand. Mr. SULLVAN. The proponents have alleged that the inability to transmit hand signals from the rear end of the train to the head end is a prolific cause of accidents, and they have gone further in the submission of their list of accidents and discussion of accidents and said that if you have a hot journal, or if you have a hot wheel, the men on the rear of the train are unable to transmit signals to the engineer, with the result that an accident or a derailment occurs. Take that statement for its face value and confine it to derail- ments, or train accidents, resulting from the failures of wheels and axles, which includes broken wheels, where they could not stop the train, or a burned-off journal, where they could not stop the train. You would expect to see that particular type of train accidents re- maining stationary, or at least showing no improvement; but the facts are to the contrary. If you compare the year 1936 with 1923, there is shown a large decrease in that particular type of train acci- dent, along with other types of train accidents. If I remember the figure, it is 67 percent, 1936 under 1923. Mr. BOREN. And do you allege that accidents of that nature, caused as iS illustrated in your previous statement, are negligible except as they involve more than $150 property damage? Mr. SULLIVAN. When they are directly traced, Mr. Boren, to the misunderstanding of the signals, a special study would have to be made; but you would find that fully 95 percent of the injuries oc- curring due to the misunderstanding or failure to see hand signals involves switching operations, never the operation of a long train, and in switching operations it usually involves the movement of any- where from 2 to 3, to possibly 40 or 50 or 60 cars. In other words, there is absolutely no relation between this question of hand signals from the rear to the head end and train accidents. 584 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. BoREN. On long trainsa Mr. SUImvAN. On long trains, or shorter trains. Mr. BoREN. You mean then that the accidents because of mis- understanding of hand signals in switching processes have no rela- tion to the length of the train? I mean by that that the length of the train makes it impossible to see one end to the other in switching operaions, and they have no relation? Mr. SULLIVAN. It may have an indirect relation, but what usually happens in switching operations is that the men are not in a proper position to give or relay the signals and, when the employee giving the signal passes from view, the engineer fails to stop the movement, which he might be making, and an accident occurs. Mr. BOREN. Well, I am willing to consider a table of this nature showing the number of accidents due to misinterpretation of signals where the accident involves more than $150 property damage if, and only if, we can have also information showing what accidents, as the result of misinterpretation of hand signals, where $150 worth of property damage did not occur and the question of whether or not the length of the train enters into it can be determined from the two tables. Mr. SUIvAN. Of course, as I stated earlier in my presentation, the figures that I am relying on are those published in the tables of the Interstate Commerce Commission in their Accident Bulletins. I have to confine myself to the code causes that they use in explaining the accident. Furthermore, the statistics do not show the accidents as to trains of different lengths. So naturally, any information such as train- service accidents could not be traced directly or even remotely to hand signals. A special study would have to be made of every indi- vidual accident report on file with the Interstate Commerce Com- mission, for the reason they do not make that segregation themselves in such detail as to make that kind of analysis. Mr. BOREN. The table you present here has no definite relation to the length of the train, except as you indicate in your statement that the number of accidents has decreased, when it is assumed that the length of the train has increased. Is that correct? Mr. SULmvAN. I would like to say that table VII has no bearing whatever to the length of the train. Possibly an analysis of acci- dents would show that the vast number involved yard operations, or if they are on the road they involve operations of that road train while performing switching operations; but there has been this contention by the proponents that the failure to give signals, the failure to see signals, and the misunderstanding of signals, is a prolific cause of train accidents. Now, if it is a prolific cause of accidents, the Interstate Commerce Commission would show something in that direction; they would have statistics to allow us to reach some conclusion as to whether it is a cause or whether it is not a cause. Mr. PEARSON. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pearson. Mr. PEARsON. Mr. Sullivan, I notice in table VII that in 1930 there was a decrease in total train-miles of a little less-in fact, considerably less-than 10 percent under the train-miles in 1929, whereas during 1930 there was a decrease in the number of accidents of over 50 percent. Is there any way to account for that wide dif- TRAIN LENGTHS 585 ference in the percentage of the 2 years as they are related to each other ? Mr. SULLIVAN. In that particular type of accident, I have ex- plained before, Mr. Pearson, as being confined to yard operations, any material decrease in train-miles means a decreased activity in the yards and, as I have stated before, these accidents fluctuate both upward and downward in greater proportion than the train-miles. Mr. PEARSON. That seems to be the largest variation of any year and I thought possibly there was some particular reason why it was true in that year. Mr. SULLIVAN. That is the only explanation that I can offer at this time. PASSENGER sAFETY Still another serious potentiality, if this bill is enacted into law, is the effect on safety of railroad passengers, since, of necessity, they are transported over the same rails as the freight. The highly favorable record of passenger safety on American railroads is too well known for extended comment here. The effect of this bill on the safety of railroad passengers is obvious. The increased hazard to passenger trains, because of the increased number of freight trains on the road, and the fact that passenger trains and freight trains operate on the same tracks, is. another serious argument against enactment of the bill. Any un- necessary increase in the number of freight trains increases the, hazard of collisions. On that question you will find an answer to the proportion of this particular type of accident when it is considered along with all of the others investigated by the Bureau of Safety of the Interstate Commerce Commission which I shall analyze later. I now turn to this question of investigations of train accidents by the Interstate Commerce Commission through its Bureau of Safety. Mr. BULWINRLE. Wait just a minute, before you get too far away. Were there any accidents last year or the year before on account of freight trains of 70 cars in length in the United States? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes; there were one or two collisions, and there were also some cases of passenger trains striking the wreckage of freight trains which included trains of over 70 cars as well as under 70 cars. I do not recall the exact number. Mr. BULwINKLE. I wish you would give the number of each. Mr. SULLIVAN. This is for the year 1936. A passenger train con- sisting of eight cars struck a freight car which was fouling the track on which it was operating. The engine and all cars in the passenger train were derailed. The obstruction on the track was the first car ahead of the caboose in a freight train of 39 cars. The car was derailed because of a broken arch bar. A passenger train consisting of 13 cars struck the wreckage of a. freight train in which a car was buckled. That freight train had 102 cars. Mr. BULwINKLE. How many casualties in that accident? Mr. SULLIVAN. There were six casualties-two engineers and a fire- men were killed, two dining-car waiters were injured, and one of the firemen was injured. 586 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. WITHROW. Have you the property damage? Mr. SULLIVAN. No; I do not have the property damage in this memoranda, but I can obtain it for you, sir. A 1-car passenger train collided with an obstruction caused by a freight-train accident due to the failure of an arch bar on a freight car in a train of 36 cars. Those are the only accidents of that type involving passenger trains. Mr. BULWINKLE. For the year 1936? Mr. SULLIvAN. For the year 1936; yes, sir. Mr. WITHROW. Are you quoting from the reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission? Mr. SULLIVAN. That particular information was from reports on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission, filed by the railroads. Mr. BULWINKLE. And there were not any more accidents such as you spoke of? Mr. SULLIVAN. Not in 1936; not involving passenger trains. There are some others involving freight trains. Mr. BULWINKLE. How many were there involving freight trains; just roughly, Mr. Sullivan? Mr. SULLIVAN. A 5-car freight train struck the wreckage of a 58-car freight train. A freight train of 57 cars collided with the wreckage of a 40-car freight train. A freight engine handling 1 car collided with the wreckage of a freight train caused by a broken wheel on a train of 30 cars. A freight train of 75 cars collided with the wreckage from a train of 69- cars. A freight train of 89 cars collided with the wreckage of a freight train of 125 cars. A freight train consisting of 61 cars-no; the derailment of a car in a 90-car train collided with a train of 61 cars. Those are all in 1936, involving freight trains. Mr. BULWINKLE. Now, there is no record, of course, in the Inter- state Commerce Commission of how many times trainmen or flagmen, by proper signals, prevented wrecks or wrecks were avoided? Mr. SULLIVAN. No; there are no statistics of that kind, because naturally no accident had occurred, and no record was kept. Mr. BULwINKuE. You do not have any estimate of the number of those? Mr. SULLIVAN. I do not have the slightest idea, Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BULWINELE. All right. Mr. SULLIVAN. I will now turn to investigations of train accidents by Interstate Commerce Commission's Bureau of Safety. INVESTIGATION OF TRAIN ACCIDENTS BY INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION BUREAU OF SAFETY Under the provisions of the Federal Accident Reports Act, ap- proved May 6, 1910, the Interstate Commerce Commission was dele- gated the authority to investigate all collisions, derailments, or other accidents resulting in serious injury to persons or to the property of -a railroad. The act further. provided that the Commission should make reports of such investigations, stating the cause of the accident, together with such recommendations as it deemed proper. By an order dated December 8, 1928, railroads were required, effective TRAIN LENGTHS 587 January 1, 1929, to report to the Interstate Commerce Commission by telegram any collision or derailment resulting in the death or serious injury of one or more persons, including any collision with a motor vehicle at a grade crossing resulting in the death or serious injury of any passenger, employee, or other person riding on the train in- volvedin any such collision. Even prior to 1928 there was a similar order requiring such tele- graphic reports of collisions and derailments to be made to the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Interstate Commerce Commission through its Bureau of Safety, investigates a large percentage of the train accidents which result in fatalities to passengers and employees, and such investiga- tions are independent of any investigation conducted by the rail- roads. I have made a detailed analysis of the reports of such investiga- tions by the Bureau of Safety, as reported in their quarterly sum- maries, for an 8-year period, 1928 to 1935, inclusive, insofar as the operation of a freight train was in any way involved in the accident. The detailed results of this analysis have been extended to a 16- page document which is too bulky to be incorporated in the records of this hearing, but I shall be glad to hand copies to the clerk for the information of the committee. The effect of these collisions or accidents is contained in the bulle- tin. The first page shows the total number of accidents investigated by the Bureau segregated as between collisions, derailments, num- ber of persons killed and injured; the number of cars in the train, by groups; the nature, the cause, responsibility for the accident, and, as to the question where failures on the part of employees were in- volved, the classification of the employee is shown. Throughout the detail, the particular accident is indexed as to the name of the railroad on which it occurred and, in the exact language of the Bureau of Safety, the cause and responsibility for that accident. The Interstate Commerce Commission in its annual statistics sum- marizes the causes of train accidents under (1) negligence of em- ployees, which includes oversights, forgetfulness and noncompliance with rules; (2) defects in, or failures of equipment; (3) defects in or improper maintenance of way and structures; and (4) miscellaneous causes, and I have followed the same classification in my summariza- tion of the accident investigation reports issued by the Bureau of Safety. Their investigation reports are complete as to description of trains, number of cars in train, cause and responsibility of accident, in addition to the facts and circumstances of the accident. I desire to present for the-record table No. VIII. (Table VIII above referred to is as follows:) TABLE VIHI.-Accidents involving freight trains investigated by Bureau of Safety, Interstate Commerce Commission7 years 1998 to 1985 Persons Number of freight trains involved as to various lengths in cars Total Percent Numn- Gnrlcueof total beretf 70 cars and less Over 70 cars Gnrlcueace- ace- 40 41 51 1 71 81 91 Over_______ dents dents ifled Injured and to to to to to to Oe Total -___ less 50 60) 70 80 9 0 100 Num- Per- Nur- Per- er cent er cent 1 2 s 4 5 a 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Negligence of employees------------ Defects in or failures of equipment------- Defects in or improper maintenance of way and structures -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Miscellaneous causes.......................--- OfrandtotaL--------------- 64. 2 14.3 6.9 14.6 215 48 23 49 243 75 44 95 1, 420 252 174 256 160 14 12 21 35 6 2 7 26 6 4 2 32 5 21 11 18 7 2 4 14 6i 1 4 8 5 17 7 11 311 56 25 5i0 254 31 20 41 81.7 55.4 80. 0 820 57 2S 5 9 10(4O 335 1I 4 i72,102 207 -I I - - ~, - - 1 I - t* - - - - 38 1 60 1 31j1 251 15 25 442 3461 78.3 - 96 r __ _ __ _ _ r__ _ __ _ _I___ _ II___FI_ J1 1 I __F I I I I I I I I Source: Quarterly Summaries of Investigations by Bureau of Safety, Interstate Commerce Commission. i i 18. 3 44. 6 20.0 21.7 I' C)I TRAIN LENGTHS 589 Mr. SULLIVAN. Table VIII is a copy of the summary appearing on the second sheet of my analysis of the 8 years of investigations. It shows that there were 335 accidents investigated, involving a total of 442 freight trains. Column 2 shows that 64 percent were charged to negligence of employees, 14 percent to defects in or failures of equipment, 7 percent to defects in or improper maintenance of way and structure, and 15 percent chargeable to miscellaneous causes. Attention is invited to column 16, which shows that of all the freight trains involved in all of the accidents, 78 percent contained 70 cars or less. Quarterly summaries of accident investigations conducted by the Bureau of Safety have not been published for the entire year 1937. I have, however, made an analysis of the individual reports of the Director of the Bureau for 1937, which are the basis for the Quar- terly Summaries. During 1937 reports covering 102 accidents inves- tigated have been published, in 62 of which the operation of 79 freight trains were involved. The 62 accidents included 35 colli- sions involving 52 freight trains, and 27 derailments involving that number of freight trains. Of the 62 accidents investigated, 35 of them, or 56 percent, were attributed to negligence of employees, which, as previously stated, includes forgetfulness, oversights, and noncompliance with operat- ing rules: 11 accidents, or 18 percent, were charged to defects in or failures of equipment; 6 accidents, or 10 percent, were charged to defects in or improper maintenance of way and structures; and 10 accidents, or 16 percent, to miscellaneous causes. Of the 50 freight trains involved in the 35 accidents charged to negligence of employees, 42 trains, or 84 percent, consisted of 70 cars or less, and 8 trains, or 16 percent, had more than 70 cars. Of the 11 trains involved in accidents charged 'to defects in or failures of equipment, 8 trains, or 73 percent, had 70 cars or less, and only 3 trains, or 27 percent, had more than 70 cars. Of the 6 accidents involving that number of freight trains charged to defects in or improper maintenance of way and structures, 5 of the trains had 70 cars or less, and 1 train, or 16 percent, had more than 70 cars. Of the 10 accidents involving 12 freight trains charged to miscel- laneous causes, 11 trains, or 92 percent, contained 70 cars or less, and 1 train had more than 70 cars. Of the total number of 79 freight trains involved chargeable to all causes, 66 trains, or 84 percent, consisted of 70 cars or less, and 13 trains, or 16 percent, had more than 70 cars. Although section 3 of the Accident Reports Act authorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission to make recommendations, and it has frequently made such recommendations in connection with its investigation of accidents, it did not in any of the quarterly reports for the 8 years 1928 to 1935, previously referred to, or in the indi- vidual investigation reports for 1937 which I examined, find that the length of a train had any bearing on the accident, or that the accident might have been avoided had a train been shorter, or make any recommendation respecting the train length, although recom- mendations were made in many other respects. I want to emphasize that the investigations shown in this table were not made by railroad officials but by inspectors of the Interstate 47891-38-38 590 TRAIN LENGTHS Commerce Commission's Bureau of Safety, at or near the scene of the accident with authority to inspect equipment, track, and other structures, and with full power to call witnesses and to inspect all documents, train sheets, and so forth. That concludes the discussion of accidents investigated by the Bureau of Safety. The CHAIRMAN. This statement does not purport to cover all acci- dents of that period, does it? Mr. SULLivAN. It does not. It only includes collisions or derail- ments coming under the category of train accidents, and in a very few instances includes collisions of trains with motor vehicles on highway grade crossings; but it does include that type of accident which ap- parently the Interstate Commerce Commission considered serious enough, or of at least sufficient consequence, to justify investigation. The CHAIRMAN. It is apparently a report based on partial reports of the statistics, is it not? Mr. SULLIVAN. It represents an investigation of only a portion of the accidents which occurred, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Is it known what the reasons were for selecting these particular trains? Mr. SULIVAN. I could express an opinion, in view of the order of the Commission in December 1929 in which it requires carriers to notify the Commission by wire of any collisions or derailments in which there was serious injury or heavy property damage. Now, of that type of accidents, the Interstate Commerce Commis- sion, through its Bureau of Safety considered it important apparently to investigate certain of these accidents by their field investigators. The CHAIRMAN. Of course, what I really had in mind was whether or not this table properly reflected the whole of the accidents of similar train lengths. Mr. SUtLIVAN. I will say that from checks of collisions that I have made for certain years and for a group of years, it would afford a cross section of train accidents in general; that is, collisions and derailments; in other words, by comparing the percentage of the causes of all train accidents with those investigated. While they are not exact, they are reasonably in accord. Furthermore, I made a check over a 3-year period to see what por- tion of the train accidents investigated were those in which fatalities occurred to employees and passengers and I found that in those 3 years the Commission investigated all of the train accidents which contributed slightly more than 90 percent of the fatalities to pas- sengers and employees. In other words, they investigated the accidents in which there were serious consequences. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Sullivan, it may be a little out of order at this place, but I would like to ask this for my information: In all these tables, all railroads of class I and all other railroads are included? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir; unless they are indicated otherwise. Mr. BULWINKLE. Well, they are very, very seldom indicated on any of these charts that you have given. Mr. SULLIVAN. I 'think that is true. Mr. BULwINXLE. For instance, your total train miles and your total car-miles show all railroads. Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. TRAIN LENGTHS 591 Mr. BULWINKLE. Now, what proportion of that total train miles and total car-miles are on railroads not of class I? Mr. SULLIVAN. I will get the exact figure for you, Mr. Bulwinkle, but I am told that it is over 95 percent of the train and car-miles on class I railroads. Mr. BULWINKLE. On class I railroads? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Mr. BuLWINKLE. Well, then what percent of these accidents that you have in these charts happened on the class II railroads? Mr. SULLIVAN. I would have to check that for you, sir. Mr. BUIAWINKLE. Well, for further information, very few of the class II railroads have trains of 70 cars or more on them, do they? Mr. SULLIVAN. I am not familiar with that situation, sir. Mr. BULWINKLE. That is all, for the present. Mr. SULLvAN. I think, so far as the Commission's statistics are concerned, it is only in certain classes of train-service accidents that we would be able to get the casualties except for the class I and the other classes of railroads, and as to train accidents I do not believe the figure is available in the accident bulletins. Mr. BULWINKLE. Well, on the smaller railroads, short line rail- roads, many of them use poorer equipment than is used on class I railroads, do they not, both in freight cars and other equipment? Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Bulwinkle, that is not true as to freight equip- ment. If that particular railroad interchanges equipment with the class I railroads, the equipment must meet A. A. R. interchange re quirements. In other words, the equipment on the other than the class I railroads, unless the movement is confined entirely to their own line, is of the same type and must meet the same requiremeiit as those operated on the railroads of the country as a whole. Mr. CROssER. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Crosser. Mr. CROssER. I would like to know whether or not you have any statistics as to the percentage of grade crossings which have been eliminated. Mr. SULLIVAN. I do not have the percentages, but I was just get- ting to that. I was going to start with the grade-crossing subject. Mr. CROSSER. Well, let it go then. Mr. SULLIVAN. Since you have asked the question, Mr. Crosser, on page 89 of the annual report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, dated November 1, 1937, they state at the bottom of the page: Progress has continued in the elimination of railroad and highway crossing at grade. As shown by reports of the carriers, during that calendar year 1936, 2,134 grade crossings were eliminated ; however, in the same period, 491 grade crossings were added, the net reduction being 1,643. The total number of cross- ings of all character at the end of the year was 232,902. In an address by Mr. MacDonald, Chief of the United States Bureau of Public Roads, in Chicago, March 17, 1937, he pointed out that. during the 3 years beginning with July 1933 some 3,146 grade crossings had been eliminated, while the 3,000 were important cross- ings, there still remained about 233,000. Mr. Fort calls my attention to the comparative figures of 1926 and 1936. The net decrease in the number of grade crossings between those 2 years represents about 1 percent. In 1926 there were 235,158 grade crossings and the figure for 1936, as I previously gave, was 232,902. 592 TRAIN LENGTHS . GRADE-CROSSING ACCIDENTS I come now to the effect of this bill on grade-crossing accidents. The passage of a short train bill and the resulting increase in num- ber of trains run will greatly increase the number of deaths and injuries at highway crossings, and even if the bill prevented all the slack surge accidents, which, of course, it would not, the number prevented would be small indeed as compared with the many addi- tional deaths and injuries that would occur at crossings. Statistics of the Interstate Commerce Commission show that since 1923 there has been a yearly average of 2,030 deaths and 5,587 in- juries at railroad highway grade crossings due to pedestrians, auto- mobiles, or other vehicles being struck by trains. It is an established fact that the fewer trains operated, the less accidents there will be at railroad highway crossings. Conversely, the more trains that are operated, the more accidents there will be at crossings. It cannot be denied that there is a very close relation between the number of trains as well as the number of automobiles passing over a given crossing when grade-crossing hazards are con- sidered. It follows, therefore, that the additional trains that would be made necessary by the train limit bill to handle a given volume of business would result inan increase in such accidents in about the same proportion as any increase in trains. Thus far, I have considered all classes of persons involved in cross- ing accidents, but it is important to bear in mind that 92 percent of all casualties at crossings involve the occupants of automobiles. I therefore present for the consideration of the committee table IX, covering accidents at grade crossings involving automobiles only, and graphic chart IX, which is based on the figures contained in the table. (Table IX and chart IX are as follows:) TABLE IX.-Casualties in highwa/ grade-crossing accidents in which automobiles were involved, all steam railways in the United States Total cas Total cas- Total train- Automobiles Nonfatal Total cas ualties per ualtiesper Year miles registered Fatalities injuries ualties million auto- train, mobiles miles registered (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 1923---------------1, 245, 099, 061 15, 092, 177 1, 759 5,416 7, 175 5.76 4.75 1924----------------1, 204, 301, 537 17, 591, 981 1, 688 5, 650 7, 338 6.09 4. 17 1925--------------- 1,220,845,788 19, 954, 347 1,784 5,916 7, 700 6.31 3.86 1926---------------1, 248, 897, 015 22, 001, 393 2, 062 6,358 8,420 6.74 3.83 1927-----------------1, 220.987, 075 23, 127, 315 1, 974 6, 068 8, 042 6. 59 3.48 1928--------------- 1, 202, 678, 319 24, 493, 124 2, 165 6, 218 8, 383 6.97 3.42 1929--------------- 1, 214, 360, 204 26, 501, 443 2, 085 6,347 8, 432 6.94 3.18 1930--------------- 1, 106, 386, 213 26, 523, 779 1,695 5, 206 6,901 6. 24 2. 60 1931-------------- 965, 220, 987 25, 814,103 1, 580 4,336 5,916 6. 13 2. 29 1932---------------- 821, 157, 678 24, 136, 879 1, 310 3, 778 5,088 6. 20 2.11 1933.-..---- -- 786, 719,851 23, 827, 290 1,305 3, 496 4, 801 6. 10 2.01 1934-----------------. 818, 472, 986 24, 933, 403 1,320 4, 099 5, 419 6. 62 2. 17 1935-----------------829, 197,817 26, 221, 052 1,442 4,434 5,876 7. 09 2.24 1936----------------- 905, 748,875 28, 221, 291 1, 519 4, 662 6, 181 6.82 2.19 Decrease 1936 under 1923: Amount..-------- 339,350,186 1 13, 129,114 240 754 994 1 1.06 2.56 Percent..---.27.3 187.0 13.6 13.9 13.9 118.4 53.9 l Increase. Source: Casualty statistics and automobile registrations, Annual Accident Bulletins of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Summary No. 24. Train-miles from other published reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission. TRAIN LENGTHS 593 144 -340 130. _ _ - - 130 Automobile registrations 11- no0 01004 _ _ - 80 f_ 4 _ _ _ _ _80 f\Ttmi train-miles- 4. 0 r Cauusties4A -+ rr 60_ _ _ _ __60 __ _ __ _ _ _ _40 F4 4 - a' a cm ~ .- av A o+ tr1 .D rn "' a' a r 4 Mr. SULLIVAN. From this table it will be seen that a decrease of 27 percent in train-miles in 1936 under 1923 was accompanied by a decrease in total casualties at highway crossing accidents involving automobiles of 14 percent, notwithstanding an increase of 87 percent in the number of automobiles registered. An examination of column 7 of the table shows a remarkable uni- formity in the number of casualties at highway crossings per million train-miles run, particularly since 1926, the number in round figures ranging from 6 to 7. When train-miles go up crossing accidents go up, and when train-miles go down crossing accidents go down. It is only natural that this would result. This is clearly shown on the chart as the train-mile line and the casualty line follows practically the same course, with only minor fluctuations one way or the other. The trend lines on the chart are based on the year 1926 taken as 100. Now, if the train-limit bill had been a law in 1937, on the basis of the 1937 volume of business it will be shown by a succeeding witness that it would have required the operation of 60,000,000 additional freight-train miles in the United States. It may be conservatively estimated that between 360 and 420 additional casualties to occupants of automobiles at highway grade crossings would have followed this increase in train-miles. As the ratio of fatalities in such accidents has been about 1.75 per million train-miles, we may expect that this figure would include about 105 additional fatal injuries. 594 TRAIN LENGTHS As there is this very definite relationship between the number of trains operated and the hazard of grade-crossing accidents, and as the running of any unnecessary trains to handle a given amount of traffic would unquestionably increase unnecessarily the number of persons killed and injured at grade crossings, there should be no limitation by law that would compel the operation of any unnecessary trains. Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WOLVERTON. Does the same trend take place when train-miles are increased with respect to accidents to employees, as that chart indicates takes place with reference to grade-crossing accidents? Mr. SULLIVAN. I will touch on that later, Mr. Wolverton, but it does not follow the same trend as does the grade-crossing accidents. Mr. WOLVERTON. Does it have a tendency to increase the number of accidents ? Mr. SULLIVAN. It does; yes, sir. Mr. WOLvERTON. You will touch upon that a little laterI Mr. SULLIvAN. Yes, sir. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman. The CnAIMAN. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. Can you indicate from the statistics you have just quoted the probable number of people injured in grade-crossing acci- dents because of the increased number of trains that the 70-car train- limit law would result in as compared to the total number of accidents in train-service operations that has been referred to, alleged to be cut down or wiped out because of this legislation? Mr. SULLIVAN. I have some figures for the year 1936, representing the actual casualties to other nontrespassers, of which the greater number are the occupants of vehicles. I also have some figures that show the total number of employees killed and injured. Now, as to the employees, I have already introduced a table to show that in 1936 there were 737 casualties both on long trains and short trains from the so-called slack surge accidents. The total number of employees killed and injured was 9,614. Now, the 737 related to the total number of the employees. The 9,614 shows that the slack surge represented slightly less than 8 percent of the total casualties to employees. Mr. BOREN. Of the total casualties of grade-crossing accidents? Mr. SULLIVAN. The total number at highway grade crossings for 1936, and that only includes, of course, the occupants of vehicles, was 6,181, and the slack surge accidents was 737. That number represents about 12 percent. Mr. BOREN. And in your opinion the increased number of trains would amount to about 20 percent of the total trains now in service if this law were instituted? Mr. SULLIVAN. The increase is estimated at 60 million train-miles. That represents an increase of 6.6 percent in the total train-miles and 12 percent when considered on the freight-train operations alone. Mr. BOREN. Twelve percent? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. Mr. BOREN. Then it would mean approximately 12 percent more trains on the railroads than are now on the railroads. Mr. SULLIVAN. Twelve percent more freight trains; yes, sir. TRAIN LENGTHS 595 Mr. BOREN. And do you think then that it is definite that there will be 12 percent more grade-crossing accidents? Mr. SULLIVAN. I think when you follow the trend line over the period of years it is unmistakable that we will certainly have that percentage of increase. Mr. BOREN. Then just reducing your figures, this 12 percent of the total number of grade-crossing accidents would mean ttat this legis- lation, in your opinion, would increase the total number of grade- crossing accidents approximately what? Mr. SULmvAN. Roughly about 400. That is to the occupants of vehicles. Mr. BOREN. And offset by the possible reduction in the 700 slack- action accidents that are represented in the other table. Mr. SULLIVAN. Which the proponents claim would be reduced, but of course, which I cannot subscribe to. Mr. BOREN. That is all. Mr. SULLIVAN. Furthermore, may I continue my reply to Mr. Boren, remembering that this number submitted, in 1936, as to the long trains, they were not nearly as serious in result as to fatalities as were the grade-crossing accidents. I think that there has already been introduced a statement in connection with that 737 that there were none killed, although there was a subsequent fatality reported on a 76-car train. Mr. BOREN. And that 700 includes both long and short trains? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. Mr. BOREN. Do you have the number of fatalities with reference to grade-crossing accidents in that same year? Mr. SULLIVAN. Fatalities in 1936 to occupants of motor vehicles numbered 1,519. Mr. BOREN. And only one on the trains? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir; and in passing, when we refer to the sub- sequent fatalities, the number injured under the grade-crossing acci- dents heading unfortunately includes a very large number also which subsequently become fatal. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. I have touched on this phase of the increased hazard at grade crossing. I did that earlier in the hearing this morning and have done so many other times since the question was first raised. I do not propose to go back over all of that ground again. You stated, Mr. Sullivan, that the number of train operations bear a direct relation to the number of grade-crossing accidents. Now, conceding that to be true, that would not necessarily, as I see it, have any material connection with this legislation viewed in the light of traffic conditions over the country. I do not know the exact figures, but I do not suppose that your road, the Southern Pacific, between Los Angeles and El Paso, operates daily more than 10 per- cent--certainly not more than 20 percent-I doubt very much if they operate 20 percent-of the number of trains that would pass over the Big Four Railroad or the Pennsylvania Railroad here on the Atlantic seaboard. Assuming that you would operate 20 percent of the trains of the Pennsylvania or the Big Four, it would follow that there ought to be five times as many grade-crossing accidents on these railroads as. there are out there on your road. 596 TRAIN LENGTHS Now, it seems to me that it all leads to a reductio ad absurdum, as the lawyers would state it, and that the remedy for this thing would be to cut off some of these trains on the eastern seaboard. It does not make any difference how you arrive at the number of trains. It is the number of trains, whether you arrive at them by this legislation or by increased traffic. It has been pointed out a number of times that in the seasonal pick-up in trafftc they will run eight or nine sections of a passenger train and run them 10 minutes apart and run them at two or three times the speed of a freight train, obviously very greatly increasing the hazard, and that there are seasonal pick-ups on all of the roads in which there is a very large increase in the number of trains handled. I would not be surprised if you dig up the figures and bring them in here, but that there are many lines, and many divisions of the country where at certain seasons they operate 100 percent more trains than they do during the ordinary normal season. Now, assuming that to be the case, and applying it to your figures of a moment ago that this legislation would cause about a 12-percent increase in the number of trains, I understand that the 70-car or longer train constitutes about 20 percent of the number of trains. That is, of the total number of freight trains in operation in the country. But, if it caused a 12-percent increase, you would have nine freight trains, about, where you now have eight, would you not? That is about what it would amount to in actual train units, would it not? Mr. SULLIvAN. It would depend upon what the prevailing opera- tion is at the present time, compared to what it would be under the 70-car-train limit. Mr. MARTIN. Well, we will take it on the average. It is around 12 percent and that increase would mean about nine freight trains where you now have eight. Mr. SULLIVAN. Twelve percent would be in round numbers nine trains for eight now operated. Mr. MARTIN. I say, that is what it would be in round numbers. Mr. SULLvAN. Mr. Martin, those figures, from which the 12 per- cent is obtained is all of the railroads in the country, and there is a bare possibility that there is some area on which there is a greater number of grade crossings, and an increase in the number of trains associated with the number of automobiles using the grade crossing would far exceed the 12 percent. Mr. MARTIN. But, all we can get at now is just a general average. It would be about a nine-train operation as against eight, with a 12-percent increase. Mr. SULLIVAN. That figure is relatively correct; yes, sir. Mr. MARTIN. And that sort of an increase would not be at all com- parable with the seasonal increase that occurs both in freight and passenger trains on all of the roads in the country, would it? Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, it depends on what you use as a base. Mr. MARTIN. When you have your fruit, stock, and wheat runs in the West, you probably increase your number of freight-train oper- ations a day 100 percent. There may be seasons when you increase them 200 percent out on the Pacific coast. Mr. SILXvAN. I think there is a big difference, Mr. Martin. in these increases that are brought about by increases in traffic. The TRAIN LENGTHS 597 obligation of the carriers is to render service, and any unnecessary number of trains to handle the same amount of traffic such as may be brought about by legislation is not comparable to an increased num- ber of trains due to increased traffic volume. Mr. MARTIN. Of course that argument would not merely apply to freight trains. It would apply to passenger trains, increase in the number of passenger trains, no matter from what cause. It would apply also to the number of automobiles which operate on the high- ways. It would apply to the number of trucks. It would apply to the number of streetcars in all of the municipalities in the country. It would apply to airplanes and every other means of transportation used by man. The rule would inevitably apply that the number of accidents would increase with the number of units in operation, and it would not matter whether you got that increase by law, by a fixed arbitrary limit on these different types of transportation, or whether it came from the natural increases which are occurring in all lines all of the time. So that it does not seem to me that just trying to single out of this whole vast picture the freight trains of the country which are unquestionably the slowest and safest moving methods of trans- portation in the whole field-I do not think there can be much argument about that--just about the safest thing that is moving across the face of the earth today is the big, heavy freight train. It does not seem to me that just singling that out of the whole picture and saying that this thing will cause, possibly, more crossing accidents, when there is no limit put on the number of operations in any other field with the same attendant hazard, and as I say, it does not make any difference how you get the increase in the num- ber of trains. It is the fact of the increased number that causes the increased hazard. And is the answer to that increased hazard to be found in the reduction of the number of trains operated or the number of any of these other forms of transportation? Is it not rather other safeguards? If there is an increased hazard, then meet that increased hazard. Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, Mr. Martin Mr. MARTIN (continuing). I will concede that if you run two trains over a track in 24 hours instead of one there are just twice as many chances of an accident happening to the train or on the crossing, and that could be continued on ad infinitum. As I say, that condition prevails uniformly in every line of operations, and if we want to get the absolute zero of danger, the maximum of safety, the way to do it would be to stop all forms of transportation, because if anything moves it might hit something else. Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, we have the trains with us, and we have the automobiles with us, and I think the answer to everything you say, Mr. Martin, is reflected in the charts. I cannot see any- thing but that it is absolutely unmistakeable. Take just the recent years, 1933 to 1936. As the train-miles went up the automobile accidents went up. Mr. BULWINKLE. But are you considering in that, too, that you had an increase in the number of automobiles? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir; there is a direct relation to the number of automobiles using the crossings. 598 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. BuLwINKLE. Because in 1936 you had, according to your charts, about 28,000,000 automobiles registered and in 1937 there were nearly 31,000,000. Mr. MARTIN. And you have had an increase in the number of fools running them, too. The CHAIRMAN. It will be necessary for the committee to hold an executive session at this time. Mr. MARIN. That is about the only thing where no qualifications whatever are required, to run an automobile. The CHAIRMAN. At the conclusion of the executive session the committee will adjourn to meet at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. Mr. WrrHnow. Mr. Sullivan, you will be on the stand tomorrow? Mr. SULLIvAN. Yes, sir. (Thereupon, at 11:40 a. m., the committee proceeded to the con- sideration of other business, after which it adjourned to meet at 10 a. m., Wednesday, February 9, 1938.) TRAIN LENGTHS WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1938 HOUsE Of REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITT18 ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Woshingtor, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence F. Lea (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. You may proceed, Mr. Sullivan. STATEMENT OF 1. 3. SULLIVAN, ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT, SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO., OGDEN, UTAH-Resumed Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, yesterday I had just completed a discussion of highway grade-cross- ing accidents and I am now ready to go to the question of persons struck or run over by trains, cars, or locomotives. Mr. WITHROW. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Withrow. Mr. WITHROW. I want to ask a question or two, if you please, right there. Mr. SULLIVAN. All right, Mr. Withrow. Mr. WITHROw. In regard to grade-crossing accidents, and their in- crease with the frequency of service, do you take that into considera- tion when you put on more passenger trains? Mr. SULLIVAN. The question really is not taken into consideration. We know that any increase in trains, with the same amount of ve- hicular traffic over grade crossings, will increase the hazard of grade- crossing accidents. Mr. WITHRow. What percentage of trains are passenger trains? Mr. SULLIVAN. I can only give the percentages as to train-miles and, train for train, I could not give you that figure. Mr. WITHROw. Train for train is very important. Have you any figures that would show the relationship between the grade-crossing accidents that involve passenger trains and grade-crossing accidents that involve freight trains? Mr. SULLIVAN. I do not have those figures, but I can calculate that. from the statistics. Mr. WITHEow. I think it is very important that we have them, because it would seem to me that the ratio of accidents, involving passenger trains at grade crossings, would be much higher than in- volving freight trains. Therefore, if that is true, it would not be fair to say that an increase of 15 or 20 percent, or 10 percent, in the freight trains, or 12 percent, would increase the grade-crossing acci- dents say 12 percent, because we are not dealing with passenger trains here, we are dealing with freight trains. 599 600 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. SULIVAN. As I recall the figures, Mr. Withrow, they are in very close relationship, based on 1936. If you related the accidents resulting from both classes of service to the train-miles, it does not make any difference whether it is a freight train or a passenger train or a light-engine movement-any unit of equipment, a train, or an engine which gets into a crossing accident. Mr. Wrriow. I understand that, but to me it seems obvious that an object traveling 90 miles an hour is more apt to pick someone off at a grade crossing than an object moving slower. Mr. FonT. Mr. Withrow, later today, we can give you the actual figures. We could do that in just a few minutes. Mr. Wrrmow. That is very fine. Mr. SurmvAN. Table X which I now present, shows the number of fatal and nonfatal injuries sustained by employees and other persons, respectively, as the result of being struck or run over by cars, loco- motives, or trains at places other than highway crossings during the period 1923 to 1936, inclusive. (Table X, above referred to, is as follows:) TAnuE X.-Persons struck or run over by cars or locomotives at places other than highway grade crossings, all steam railways in the United States Total employees Other persons Total persons Total train- miles Fatalities Nonfatal Fatalities Nonfata Fatalities Nonfatal injuries injuries injuries 1923------------------1, 245, 099, 061 584 856 1, 887 1,431 2,471 2,287 1924---------------- 1, 204, 301, 537 422 742 1, 759 1, 273 2, 181 2,015 1925------------------1, 220,845, 788 450 764 1, 826 1,223 2,276 1, 987 1926--.------------..-1,248,897,015 559 816 1,879 1,296 2,438 2,112 1927-..---- -. -- 1, 220, 987,075 450 675 2, 037 1, 284 2, 487 1, 959 1928-..------.--------- 1,202,678,319 412 499 1,841 1,140 2,253 1, 639 1929------..---------1, 214,360, 204 470 550 1,718 1, 061 2, 188 1, 611 1930--.------------------ 1,106,386, 213 254 306 1, 574 970 1,828 1, 276 1931--....-----------965,220,987 178 197 1,552 825 1,730 1,022 1932-----.------------ 821,157,678 142 154 1,448 757 1,590 911 1933-.----.---.---------786, 719, 851 120 151 1,672 807 1, 792 958 1934--------------------818, 472, 986 136 185 1, 589 809 1, 725 994 1935-------------------- 829,197,817 150 161 1,644 797 1,794 958 1936--------------------. 905, 748, 875 183 199 1,743 887 1, 926 1, 086 Decrease 1936 under 1923: Amount--------------339, 350, 186 401 657 144 544 545 1,201 Percent--------------- 27.3 68.7 76.8 7.6 38.0 22.1 52.5 Source: Annual Accident Bulletins of the Interstate Commerce Commission, table 79. Mr. SULLTvAN. The purpose of this table is to show the heavy toll taken each year, both among employees and other persons, on account of being struck and run over by trains, locomotives, and cars at places other than highway grade crossings. It includes maintenance of way and structures, employees struck and run over while working on the track, bridges, and tunnels, employees operating or riding track vehicles, such as handcars and motorcars, employees of all occu- pations walking on or crossing tracks in yards or elsewhere, and other accidents of a similar character. It includes persons other than employees, struck and run over at private crossings, while cross- ing tracks other than at crossings, walking on, or too close to the tracks on which trains are operating, in cities, towns, or other places. It is also a type of accident that contributes a larger proportion of fatalities, as compared with nonfatal injuries, than any other type of accident. In other words, when a person is struck or run over by a train in about 60 percent of the cases the result is fatal. In the TRAIN LENGTHS 601 case of employees alone, over the period of years 1923 to 1936, 42 percent of the accidents resulted fatally, and in the year 1936 the ratio was almost 48 percent. Furthermore, this is a type of accident that is directly affected by the operation of trains, and naturally the running of any unnecessary trains which would result if this bill became a law would increase the hazard of being struck or run over by trains in the same ratio as the increase in train units. It is hardly necessary to look any further than the figures for the year 1936 to comprehend the serious character and results of this class of accident. A total of 1,926 killed-of which 183 were employees, and this includes 21 road freight conductors, brakemen, and flagmen-presents a picture bear- ing on railroad safety not to be passed without serious consideration. The fatalities and nonfatal injuries shown on table X when added to those in table IX previously presented, which covers casualties in highway grade-crossing accidents, reduces to relative insignificance the number of injuries sustained by trainmen from the so-called slack surge or rear-end shock accidents on the longer trains. Chart X, which is based on the figures shown in table X, requires little in the way of explanation, except to invite attention to the close relationship between the top trend line, reflecting the train-miles, and the bottom line, representing the total casualties. In this chart the year 1926, as in the preceding chart, is used as a base. (Chart X, above referred to, is as follows:) 140 140 J 130 t3v 120 120 110 110 100 100 90 - -- -- 9 Train-iles SO I 80 70 70 Casualties to .... All Prsons m 60 60 40 40 NO g M4 r4 4 m H r4 MrM a., afl a' a' ' aON. 602 TRAIN LENGTHS That closes the discussion on that part of my statement. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BULWINKLE. You had quite an increase in 1936, I notice. Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Mr. BULWINKLE. And there was also an increase in the total train- miles, of course. Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Mr. BUTJWINKLE. What caused that increase in 1936? Mr. SULLIVAN. The increase was due to the increase in the num- ber of train-miles. The exposure to injury, of course, is there. Those cases are directly related to the traffic units moving, measured in train-miles, and, as has been stated before, accidents tend to in- crease in greater proportion than the increase in traffic units. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. I want to ask you one question. I did not get to hear the opening of Mr. Sullivan this morning. I had constituents on hand. I want to refer to page 4 of this pamphlet entitled "The Long and Short of It," where it states that trainmen casualties, fatalities, and nonfatalities due to sudden stops, starts, slack-surge, in 1935, were only 5 percent of all employee casualties. Would that include all branches of employment, section men, shop- men, yardmen, and office men-in fact, all employees of the railway companies? Mr. SULLIVAN. This is the first time that I have seen that pam- phlet. It is nothing that has been prepared by the railroads. Mr. MARTIN. You do not present this? Mr. SULLIVAN. No, sir. Mr. FORT. Mr. Martin, I think it may not be clear to the com- mittee that that was not published by the railroads. Mr. MARTIN. I notice now that it was not prepared by them. Mr. SULLIVAN. I heard this mentioned by Mr. Farquharson, or Mr. Johnson, but this is the first time I have seen it. I have not had an opportunity to check'the figures. Mr. MARTIN. Since you did not present it, Mr. Sullivan, I will not ask any questions on it. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sullivan, yesterday I asked you a question about the distance in which a train could stop after the brakes were applied. As I recall, you stated that a 100-car train moving at the rate of 50 miles an hour on level ground required about a quarter of a mile to stop. Now, I would like to ask what distance would be required to stop a train say of 60 cars moving at the rate of 50 miles an hour on level ground, if required to stop immediately. Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, if I said a train of 100 cars, mov- ing 50 miles an hour, I did not mean that, because I have never had any experience at all with freight trains exceeding 40 miles an hour, and the stopping distance at 50 miles an hour would be con- siderably more than a quarter of a mile. The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose it was a train moving 40 miles an hour over level ground, what distance would be required to stop it? TRAIN LENGTHS 603 Mr. SULLIVAN. Between a quarter and a half of a mile A little over a quarter of a mile. The CHAIRMAN. What distance would be required to make that stop with a train of 60 cars at that speed? Mr. SULLIVAN. With the same braking ratio on the cars and iden- tical weight, there would not be a great deal of difference. It would be a little shorter, possibly. The CHAIRMAN. A shorter train would stop a little quicker? Mr. SULLIVAN. Just a bit shorter; yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. I suppose under normal conditions the shorter length train would be pulled by a lighter engine; would it? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Would that make any difference in the time re- quired to stop? Mr. SULLIVAN. It has some bearing on the question. The CHAIRMAN. In which way? Mr. SULLIVAN. The heavier engine with heavier braking power might stop a bit shorter than a lighter engine that does not have the more severe braking power. On a grade the influence would be the other way. The heavier engine would take a greater distance to stop on account of the weight of the engine continuing to pull the train along. The CHAIRMAN. Going up hill, what would be the difference, if any? Mr. SULLIVAN. That would depend upon the grade. Ascending a grade there would be a tendency for the weight of the train itself to stall the train. I could not see that there would be any difference in stopping a train on a descending grade with 100 cars as against 60 cars. The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any tests that have been made showing the distance that trains would travel after the brakes are applied, at different speeds? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. I was endeavoring to locate some figures. I have them based on tests that have been made on our own railroad on freight trains, at various speeds and with various weights, up to 40 miles an hour. I think I can obtain those figures for you, sir. The CHAIRMAN. If it is convenient we will be very glad to have them. Mr. WITHROw. Mr. Sullivan, you are associated with the Southern Pacific, are you not? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Mr. WrrHRow. You operate freight trains at higher speeds than 40 miles an hour, do you not? Mr. SULLIVAN. Not that I know of. That is the speed restriction on our property. Mr. WITHRow. Why, I thought when Mr. Farquharson was testify- ing he turned to some representative of the Southern Pacific and asked him a question and that gentleman said, "Yes; and the trains of more than 70 cars in length," and they travel faster than 40 per hour. Mr. SULLVAN. Wel; that particular train is not classed as a freight train. Mr. WITIRow. Then, it is not a 70-car train? Mr. SULLIVAN. No; not that particular train. 604 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. WITHROw. Then whoever gave the information from the Southern Pacific was wrong in saying that was a train of more than 70 cars? Mr. SULLIVAN. I did not give the information. Mr. WrrmRow. I heard the gentleman say it. He thought it was quite a joke. Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, I did not make the statement and I can ex- plain what that train is, its service and equipment, if you wish it. It is primarily a passenger train with steel wheels, handling freight. Mr. WITHROw. Then the gentleman was wrong when he injected himself into the discussion; he was wrong. Mr. SULLIVAN. I will say frankly, that he was mistaken in what he said; but I do not concur in what he said. Mr. WrIHRow. I see. That is perfectly all right. Mr. SULLIvAN. I think it is quite possible he misunderstood what was being discussed, because his statement is manifestly incorrect. Mr. FORT. He did misunderstand and he will be here as a witness later. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Sullivan, you were present when Mr. Farqu- harson, I think it was, gave us these pictures of these tests out in California and Ore ont Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Mr. BULWINKLE. Do you know anything about those tests? Mr. SULLIVAN. I do not know a great deal about them. What they called the heavy-grade tests were made on territory over which I had supervision. That is the 3.3 grade of the Siskiyou Mountains. Mr. BULwINKLE. Do you concur in what Mr. Farquharson said about those tests? Mr. SULLIVAN. Absolutely not. Mr. BULwINKLE. Will you explain? Mr. SULLIVAN. I do not know about the operating details, the kind of equipment that was used. I have never seen the results, as to the technical features; but if you would rather reserve your question for a man who does know, who was there, he can explain it. Mr. BULwINKLE. All right. Mr. SULLIVAN. I would like to discuss the accident record for the year 1936. Much was said in the report on this bill by the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, and by proponents of the bill, regarding the increase in casualties in various classes in 1936 as compared with 1935. Instead of that being an argument in favor of enactment of this bill, it is distinctly an illustration of one of the principal arguments against it, from a safety standpoint, as has already been shown. However, we wish to make additional comment on this point, in view of the emphasis thereon in the report of the Senate committee. The Interstate Commerce Commission's statistics show that the average length of freight trains in the United States was only two- tenths of a car greater in 1936 than it was in 1935-or practically the same length. No one claims that there was any important change in operating conditions generally in the United States as between those 2 years. However, business materially increased in 1936 over 1935, so that 486,000,000 freight-train miles were run in 1936 as against 430,000,000 in 1935, or an increase 'of 56,000,000 train miles. On page 5 of the Interstate Commerce Commission's accident bulletin TRAIN LENGTHS 605 for the calendar year 1936, the Commission points out the causes, or to use their own words: "The kinds of accidents which were prin- cipally responsible for the increase in employee fatalities" in that year. When one comes to analyze the causes of the accidents which represent those increases, it will be seen that the very cause which will operate to produce a greater number of accidents under a bill limitipg the length of trains, produced the greater part of the increase in accidents in 1936 over 1935, because of the additional number of trains run. Let us consider the employees killed under the several causes re- ferred to by the Commission: There were 58 killed in collisions in 1936 as against 16 in 1935; 42 in derailments as against 38; 12 in locomotive boiler accidents as against 5; 24 in coupling or uncoupling locomotives or cars as against 16; 16 in operating hand brakes as against 10; 22 in coming in contact with fixed structures as against 16; 148 being struck or run over, not at public crossings, as against 128 in 1935; and 165 against 127 under miscellaneous causes of train- service accidents. Now those are fatalities and naturally there is some relationship between the nonfatal injuries and fatalities in those types of accidents. These increases occurred during a year when there was an increase in train miles. The hazard increases with an increase in the number of trains and that would be true regardless of whether that increase in trains is due to increased traffic, or to a law compelling a larger number of trains to handle the same amount of traffic now handled by a smaller number of trains. That completes the analysis of the 1936 comparison. NEVADA-ARIZONA COMPARISONS I now turn to the Nevada-Arizona comparisons. Before I go into the question of comparison in Nevada with the long trains which were operated in Arizona where they are restricted by law, I would like to clear up some doubt that may have developed in the minds of the committee from statements that were made by Mr. Farquharson. Different members of the committee-I think Mr. Wadsworth was one, and Mr. Wolverton was another-asked about sudden stops and slack accidents in Arizona. Mr. Farquharson selected the year 1934 for some reason. He de- scribed the only accident that occurred in that State in 1934. Now, 1934 was the only year in about 15 in which there was only one of that particular type of accidents. The other 14 years range all of the way from 3 to 11. But that is not the most important feature. The way he described the accident leads me to believe that he had been misinformed as to the circumstances under which it occurred. At the hearing on Thursday, January 20, in response to a question by Mr. Wadsworth, Mr. Farquharson, among other things in re- ferring to slack accidents in Arizona, stated: In Arizona there was one, and this is the kind of slack accident it was : The man was getting on the train, and while he was running and in the air with his hand like this [indicating] and his foot like this, to catch the stirrup, the slack ran out and he missed the stirrup and fell. 47891-38--39 606 TRAIN LENGTHS Now, that is not the way the accident happened at all. It occurred under circumstances very similar and under the same conditions as the type he referred to that occurred on trains of over 70 cars. I would like to read the report of the Southern Pacific filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission covering that accident. It was a 64-car train and the accident occurred at Dragoon, Ariz., on No- vember 27, 1934 [reading]: McNeece was swing brakeman, and as train was leaving Dragoon made usual rolling inspection and then caught on rear end of caboose. As he was getting up in cupola, crossing over under the monkey bar into cupola on the left or south side, having hold of grab iron with left hand and reaching for hold with right hand, slack action in train caused him to lose his balance and fall as he lost his hold with left hand, then dropping to caboose floor, resulting in above injury. Cupola, steps, and platform were inspected and found free from defects. I happen to know this gentleman very well, who was injured, and I recognize his signature. I would like to read his letter addressed to the claim agent of the company dated January 29, 1935, 2 months after the accident. occurred. This is to the claim agent, and incidentally this letter was written at least 30 days after the accident report was filed with the Inter- state Commerce Commission [reading]: I went to see Mr. Wilson, our superintendent, about some money on my claim on account of my accident when leaving Dragoon on November 27, 1934. I was swing brakeman on Ex. 5006 west, leaving Dragoon at 12: 20 a. m. I was climbing up in the cupola to watch train down the hill. The slack was jerked out of train and caused me to fall to the floor of caboose, and I fractured my right elbow. I have lost 62 days and I am making claim for full time as brake- man from Tucson to Lordsburg, pool freight brakeman. It will be 10,800 miles up to January 31, 1935, and in money it will be $582. This was the job that I was on at the time of the accident, and the doctor says that I will be off about 30 days longer. That explanation is simply for illustration, to show to the com- mittee that the casualties reported in all of the States, and partic- ularly in Nevada and Arizona, the comparisons which I will make, are exactly on the same basis under the same rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the only difference being that in Arizona they all occur on trains of less than 70 cars. I shall now turn to some Nevada-Arizona casualty comparisons. Question has frequently been directed to the relative safety of employees in the operation of trains of 70 cars and less, and trains of over 70 cars. The operations by the Southern Pacific Co. in the States of Nevada and Arizona will answer the question. In addition to a statistical comparison of accident and casualty records, as be- tween the two States, my conclusions will also be drawn from my own experience riding and supervising the movement of freight trains in both of those States. In Arizona, no train exceeding 70 cars in length has been operated since 1912, due to the enactment of the train-limit law in that year. In Nevada, the running of trains of substantially more than 70 cars in the predominant operation, and has been for several years. For several years past, fully 80 percent of the trains have consisted of substantially more than 70 cars. For the purpose of testifying for the Southern Pacific in the Nevada train limit case, I made an extensive study of the occurrence of reportable accidents and casualties in the States of Nevada and Arizona for a period of 13 years from 1923 to 1935. I had access TRAIN LENGTHS 607 to copies of all the reports of accidents made by the Southern Pacific to the Interstate Commerce Commission. These copies were carefully checked against photostat copies of the originals on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission at Washington. Therefore, all re- portable accidents were included under their respective groups in the showing for both States on exactly the same basis. I desire to emphasize that nontrain accidents were not included in either State. On the showing for freight train operation, only accidents involving the operation of road freight trains were included. Any showing involving the operation of road freight trains were included. Any showing confined to road freight conductors, brakemen, and flagmen only included injuries to that class of employees. Of the accidents attributed to sudden stopping, starting, lurch, or jerk, the basis of compilation was exactly the same for both States. The railroads operating in Nevada and Arizona are required by law to submit annual reports of their operations to the State com- Missions, and those reports contain comparable statistics of locomo- tive miles, train-miles, and car miles operated in various classes of service within the State, reported on the same basis and in the same manner as to the Interstate Commerce Commission. It was possible, therefore, to relate the occurrence of accidents in both States against a common basis of measurement. In this connection, Chairman Lea inquired of Mr. Farquharson if the occurrence of accidents should not be related to the tonnage han- dled, to which a negative reply was given. I would like to make this observation: There is no possible way of arriving at any satisfactory conclusion as to the relative frequency of accidents unless a com- parison is made on some recognized basis of measurement, either of exposure to injury, or covering the movement of a given amount of traffic. If this bill had contemplated a tonnage limit, rather than cars in a train, a comparison on a tonnage basis, as suggested by Chairman Lea's question, would be the proper basis. However, as the bill provides for a car limit rather than tonnage, car-miles is a proper basis when consideration is being given to the movement of an equivalent amount of traffic, and the train-mile is a proper basis of measuring train and engine employee exposure to injury. Except for the provisions of the Arizona train-limit law, operating conditions and the character of traffic are very much the same in the two States. The same number of employees compose the train crews in both States, and the employees in both States are subject to exactly the same-code of rules. The Southern Pacific operates practically the same amount of main-track mileage in the State of Nevada as it does in Arizona, 816 and 808, respectively. During a 13-year period, 1923 to 1935, in- clusive, there was a difference of slightly less than 5 percent in the total freight-car miles, there being that much more in Nevada. How- ever it required over 16 percent more train-miles in Arizona to handle the lesser amount of trafic than in Nevada. It is necessary to confine the comparisons between the States of Nevada and Arizona to the Southern Pacific because neither the UTnion Pacific or Western Pacific which operate in Nevada operate in Arizona, and the Santa Fe which operates in Arizona does not operate in Nevada. 608 TRAIN LENGTHS I shall present two charts one showing the casualties to all classes of employees on duty incidental to the operation of road freight trains, and the second chart showing casualties to road freight con- ductors, brakemen, and flagmen sustained in train and train-service accidents on the Southern Pacific Lines in Nevada and Arizona for the years 1923 to 1936, inclusive. The charts have been prepared to reflect in graphic form the data contained in exhibits introduced by me under oath in the Nevada train-limit case, as previously stated, covering the period 1923 to 1935, which has been supplemented by comparable data for the year 1936. The charts are in a different form than those covering national statistics previously introduced, and have been prepared to show com- parative train lengths and casualty rates in the two States for each year. The upper section on both charts reflects the average length of freight trains, the heavy line representing Nevada and the broken line representing Arizona. The lower section of the charts shows the casualty rates, the heavy line Nevada and the broken line Ari- zona. The broken lines representing Arizona on the photographic enlargement on the easel are shown in red. The average train length is shown in cars and the casualty index is based on the rate per 100 million car-miles, as stated on the chart. Car-miles have been used in making these comparisons in order to show the effect of a restricted operation such as exists in Arizona against the unrestricted operation in Nevada, when considering the movement of a given amount of similar traffic. CASUALTIES TO ALL CLASSES OF EMPLOYEES, ROAD FREIGHT OPERATION-- NEvADA-ARIZONA I desire at this time to present chart XI. (Chart XI is as follows:) CASUALTIES TO ALL CLASSES OF EMPLOYES ON DUTY. ROAD FREIGHT TRAIN OPERATION SUSTAINED IN TRAIN AND TRAIN SERVICE ACCIDENTS sos8 AVERAGE 778 AVERAGE NUMBER 74 NUMBER CARS a 8 CARS TPERN 4 PER TRAILN 20TRAIN. 54 54 52 52- 5o 50 CASRALTIES 40 40 CASUALTIES 35 35 PER 23 NmnZOA 25 PER 100 MILLION 20 20 100 MILLION CARQMILESdl O A A Ab O i evC dAR LE s . TRAIN LENGTHS 609 Chart XI shows the casualty rate for all classes of employees' in accidents resulting from the operation of road freight trains. This includes fatal and nonfatal injuries sustained by employees on duty, regardless of their occupation, if the injury was caused by the opera- tion of a freight train. It includes injuries to the trainmen and enginemen who were engaged in the operation of freight trains, as well as other employees on duty who might have been struck or run over or otherwise injured by freight trains. Just to give in idea of the comparative casualty rates representing the lines for the two States I shall give you the rates for every third year. 1923: Arizona, 47.0; Nevada, 43.8. 1926: Arizona, 36.4; Nevada 14.7. 1929: Arizona, 24.4; Nevada, 14.0. 1932: Arizona, 21.8; Nevada, 10.0. 1935: Arizona, 18.6; Nevada, 5.7. In 1936 the Arizona rate was 26.7 and Nevada 14.8. Permit me to invite attention to the much lower casualty rate in Nevada year after year notwithstanding increasing train lengths in Nevada from 1923 to 1934, train lengths decreasing slightly through 1935 and 1936. If there is anything to the claim that limiting the length of freight trains to 70 cars promotes safety of freight-train operation, we should expect to find a lower casualty rate in Arizona than in Nevada, but we actually find the reverse. Attention is also invited to the greater improvement in the casualty rate in Nevada than in Arizona over this spread of years from 1923 to 1936, the im- provement being 85 percent in Nevada, and 65 percent in Arizona. I can go to the next chart, or I can respond to any questions that you may wish to ask at this time. Mr. EIcnnt. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eicher. Mr. EiOHER. Is there any difference in operating conditions in the two States by reason of there being more terminals or division points in one State than in the other? Mr. SULLIVAN. The conditions are not exactly the same. That is they are not identical. The number of terminals is the same, and they are as near comparable as any two States that you could find. The findings of the court, or the facts of the court upon which the fiindings were based, stated that operating conditions were similar. I shall now turn to a camparison of casualties to road freight con- ductors, brakemen, and flagmen, Nevada-Arizona. 610 . TRAIN LENGTHS The next is chart No. XII. (Chart No. XII is as follows:) CASUALTIES TO ROAD FREIGHT CONDUCTORS, BRAKEMEN AND FLAGMEN ON DUTY SUSTAINED IN TRAIN AND TRAIN SERVICE ACCIDENTS eo so AVERAGE 778 AVERAGE NUMBER 7NUMBER CARS 7 CARS PER 66PER 64 EVADA 6 TRAIN 6 - 62 TRAIN 54 54 52 *52 50 50 CASUALTIES 40 40 CASUALTIES 35 .35 PER 30p30 PER 25 A* m10NA 25- 100 MILLION 20 100 MILLION CAR MILES 10 wA 10 CAR MILES 5 5 Chart No. XII is similar to the previous one, except that the showing is confined to road freight conductors, brakemen, and flag- men actually on duty in that class of service. It includes fatal and nonfatal injuries to these employees from all causes including any sustained from the so-called slack-surge or rear-end shock. In other words, it is a complete showing on the relative safety of freight con- ductors, brakemen, and flagmen in a restricted operation, on the one hand, against one that is not, on the other hand. As was done with the previous chart, I shall give the comparative casualty rates representing the two States for every third year. 1923 Arizona, 35.0; Nevada, 39.4-and I will mention at this point, you will notice from the chart that average cars per train in Nevada in 1923 were less than in Arizona-casualties in Arizona in 1926, 28.4; Nevada, 10.9. 1929: Arizona, 20.0; Nevada, 10.7. 1932: Ari- zona, 16.8; Nevada, 9.9. 1935: Arizona, 14.3; Nevada, 5.7. 1936: Arizona, 11.3; Nevada, 6.2. Attention is invited to the lower casualty rate in Nevada than in Arizona in every year commencing with 1924. The improvement from 1923 to 1936 in the casualty rate in Nevada was 84 percent, and in Arizona 68 percent. I desire to emphasize the observation pre- viously made, but confine it only to this class of employee. If there is anything to the claim that limiting the length of freight trains to 70 cars promotes the safety of conductors, brakemen, and flagmen, we should expect a lower casualty rate in Arizona, but the chart reflecting the facts shows to the contrary. As to the slack and slack-surge accidents in Arizona and Nevada: The occurrence of the so-called "slack" and "slack-surge" accidents to conductors, brakemen, and flagmen in both Arizona and Nevada TRAIN LENGTHS 611 has been so infrequent during recent years, that instead of attempt- ing to reflect a comparison by the presentation of a table or chart, I shall quote from the special findings of fact by the three-judge Federal court in the Nevada Train Limit case on this question. A phamphlet containing those findings in full, as signed by the three Federal judges, has already been distributed to you and also a printed extract from the finding I ask to have distributed, and you can follow the reading, and also for your information, if you desire it. Mr. WITHROW. While he is distributing that, I wonder if you would state just exactly what is a casualty. Mr. SULIVAN. A casualty includes a fatality or an injury in the case of an employee, either on duty or off duty, where the disability is for more than 3 days within 10 days immediately after the cas- ualty or the accident. Mr. WrrHROw. And has been reported to the Interstate Commerce Commission? Mr. SULLIVAN. As reported to the Interstate Commerce Commis- sion. I shall quote from pages 60 and 61 of the printed pamphlet. The court said, in part: The Arizona train limit law has been observed long enough and under such circumstances as to afford a fair basis for judging whether a law limiting the length of a freight train to 70 cars, exclusive of caboose, can be said to be reasonably effective in the prevention or minimization of slack accidents and incident casualties. There is in evidence a reliable statistical comparison of plaintiff's freight train operations as between the States of Nevada and Arizona, and as to the occurrence of slack-action casualties, for the 13-year period, 1923 to 1935, inclusive. Considering the casualties in their absolute number during that period, there were more on short trains, in Arizona, than there were on long trains in Nevada ; there being 82 such casualties, including 1 killed, in Arizona, and 71 casualties, none of whom were killed, on long trains in Nevada. Analyzing the combined total number of this particular type of casualty occurring in both States, it is shown that there were 105 casualties; 82 in Arizona and 23 in Nevada (including 2 killed, 1 in Arizona and 1 in Nevada, on short trains), against 71 casualties, none of whom were killed, on long trains in Nevada, or almost 50 percent more casualties on short trains than on long trains. During the 7 years, 1929-35, inclusive, there were 3 more casualties of this kind in Arizona, where there were 41, than there were in Nevada, with 38, although the traffic measured in freight train car-miles was 5.5 percent greater in Nevada. There were no reportable casualties from slack and slack-surge accidents in Nevada during the 5 months from November 11, 1929, to April 10, 1930; none during the 11 months, October 13, 1930, to September 20, 1931; none dur- ing the 6 months, December 18, 1932, to June 22, 1933; none during the 5 months, October 30, 1933, to March 16, 1934; none during the 5 months, May 11, 1934, to October 1, 1934; and none during the 5 months, March 1, 1935, to August 12, 1935. There was but one reportable slack or slack-surge accident to a con- ductor, brakeman, or flagman on plaintiff's lines in Nevada during the period of almost 2 years from October 13, 1930, to July 13, 1932. There were 359 days in 1929, 358 days in 1930, 364 days in 1931, 361 days each in 1932, 1933, and 1934, and 362 days in 1935 when no accident of this type causing casualties occurred. Reduced to a percentage basis, it appears that on slightly more than 97 percent of the days out of that 7-year period, no casualties of the type mentioned occurred in Nevada. The casualty rate for that type of accident, on either a train-mile basis or car-mile basis for any 1 year, fluctuates greatly, for example; the average cas- ualty rate, on a train-mile basis, for the 6 years, 1929-34, inclusive, was 3.25 in Nevada and 2.89 in Arizona, a difference of 0.36 casualty- Less than half. 612 TRAIN LENGTHS Per million train-miles in favor of Arizona. On a car-mile basis of comparison the difference of 0.72 casualty per 100 million freight-train car-miles (Nevada 4.49, and Arizona, 5.31) is more favorable to Nevada. Comparing the 6 years, 1929-1934, inclusive, with the earlier 6 years, 1923- 1928, inclusive, there has been a decrease of 22 casualties of this type in Nevada, and a decrease of 3 casualties in Arizona. On a train-mile basis, the casualty rate shows a 23.35 percent improvement in Nevada, but in Arizona the rates are the same or without improvement. On a freight-train car-mile basis, the decrease in Nevada was 38.32 percent, and in Arizona 4.5 percent. For the 12 years, 1923-1934, includve, when short-train operations predominated for the earlier years, and the length of trains was steadily increasing until the operation of long trains became predominant in the later 6 years in Nevada, the average casualty rate per million train-miles was only slightly higher ; 0.91 casualty (less than 1) more, in Nevada, than in Arizona ; and per hundred million car-miles the Nevada rate was 0.47 casualty less. Less than half. When the comparison between Nevada and Arizona is confined to the 6 years, 1929-1934, inclusive, the casualty rate, based on the number of freight-train car-miles operated, is lower or more favorable in Nevada than Arizona by 0.82 casualty per 100 million car-miles. On the general question of safety, the court further stated, as shown on page 83 of the printed pamphlet: A careful review of all the evidence warrants the conclusion that from the standpoint of safety to the public, to travelers on railroads, and to railroad employees, the Nevada train limit law bears no reasonable relation to safety, but if enforced would impair and lessen the safety of plaintiff's present method of freight-train operations in Nevada. Since this hearing commenced accident reports on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission have become available for the complete year of 1937. It is possible, therefore, to present casualty comparisons on the Southern Pacific between Arizona and Nevada for that year. I have prepared a tabular statement showing these comparisons and I desire to introduce it at this time. The statement is divided into three sections: (A) Casualties to all classes of employees, road freight-train oper- ation, the casualty rate in the last column for each State being on a comparable basis with the casualty rates shown on chart XI. (B) Casualties to road freight conductors, brakemen, and flagmen, the casualty rate in the last column of the -statement for each State being on a comparable basis with the casualty rates shown on chart XII. (C) Casualties to road freight conductors, brakemen, and flagmen caused from sudden stopping, starting, lurch, or jerk of trains, which affords a means of comparison, either in their absolute number, on a train-mile basis, or on a car-mile basis, with the data analyzed in the findings of the 3-judge court in the Nevada case for previous years, which I have just read. TRAIN LENGTHS613 (The tabular statement referred to is as follows:) Southern Pacific Lines, Arizona compared with Nevada, year 1937 A. CASUALTIES TO ALL CLASSES OF EMPLOYEES, ROAD FREIGHT TRAIN OPERATION Number Casualties per- Million 100 mil- Killed Injured Total train- lion car- miles miles Arizona------------.-----------------------------_1_1 33 34 12.25 23.00 Nevada---------------------------------------- 11 13 14 6.97 9.30 B. CASUALTIES TO ROAD FREIGHT CONDUCTORS, BRAKEMEN, AND FLAGMEN Arizona ------------------------------- -------- 11 30 31 11.171 20.97 Nevada._ ...----------------------------------------._. 1 13 14 6.97 9.30 C. CASUALTIES TO ROAD FREIGHT CONDUCTORS, BRAKEMEN, AND FLAGMEN CAUSED FROM SUDDEN STOPPING, STARTING, LURCH, OR JERK OF TRAIN Arizona. . ..----------------------------------------- 0 9 9 3.24 6.08 Nevada--------------------------- --------------- 0 4 4 1.99 2.66 BASIC DATA Average Freight Freight cars per train- train car- train 2 miles a miles 4 Arizona ----------------------------------------------------53.2 2,775,692 147,847,128 Nevada- - .......----------------------------------------------------75.0 2, 007, 305 150, 562, 445 1 A brakeman in Arizona fell from a 50-car train. and killed; a conductor in Nevada getting off engine han- dling 1 car fell, struck by journal box of tender, and killed. 2 41 percent greater in Nevada, 3 27.6 percent less in Nevada. 4 1.8 percent more in Nevada. Attention is invited to the figures at the foot of the statement, showing a difference of only 1.8 percent in the traffic handled meas- ured in car-miles, it being greater in Nevada, although it was handled in Nevada with 27 percent less train-miles than in Arizona. On a car-mile basis, there were almost two and one-half times as many casualties to all classes of employees injured in road freight- train operation in Arizona than in Nevada; over twice as many road freight conductors, brakemen, and flagmen from all causes in Ari- zona than in Nevada; and over twice as many to this class of em- ployees in Arizona than in Nevada when limited to the injuries re- sulting from "slack" and "slack-action" accidents. Derailments due to defects in freight-car equipment, Arizona- Nevada. On Wednesday, January 26, Congressman Wolverton inquired of Mr. Farquharson as to the number of derailments on long- and-short trains in Nevada and Arizona caused by defects or failures of equipment, because the proponents had pointed to that type of acci- dent as a possible cause of injury to employees and other persons. No conclusive response was given to the question by Mr. Farquhar- son. Evidence was introduced by me in the Nevada train-limit case, showing that on the Southern Pacific lines during the 12-year period 1923 to 1934 there were in Nevada 26 derailments on short 614 TRAIN LENGTHS trains and 26 derailments on the longer trains caused by defects in or failures of freight-car equipment, with aggregate property dam- age of $50,975, against 78 derailments in Arizona from the same cause, all on short trains, with aggregate property damage of $159,385. In other words, there were 26 more derailments and $108,000 more damage in Arizona than the combined short- and long-train derailments in Nevada from the same causes with only a 5-percent difference in the total car-miles. In 1935 there were no derailments from this cause in Nevada, against three which occurred in Arizona with $12,274 property damage. To give a more recent picture: In 1937, according to the accident reports on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission, there were 13 such accidents with $20,000 damage in Arizona, all on short trains, compared with only 4 in Nevada with $1,900 damage, 2 of which were on short trains, and only 2 on long trains-one on a 72-car train and one on a 74-car train, respectively. This clearly shows that train accidents due to defects in or failures of car equipment are definitely associated with the car and not the train, and that the operation of longer trains has no tendency what- ever to increase the hazard from this type of accidents shown here as well as the experience in the country as a whole, as shown on previous exhibits. That concludes my discussion of the Nevada-Arizona comparison. Mr. WITHROw. Mr. Sullivan, in regard to your comparisons, you are comparing Arizona and Nevada. Mr. SumvAN. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHROW. And you have gone to quite some length. As I un- derstand it, both the Southern Pacific and the Santa Fe operate in Arizona. Mr. SUUmvAN. That is right. Mr. WInHROw. And only the Southern Pacific in Nevada? Mr. SULLIvAN. Along with the Western Pacific and the Union Pacific in Nevada. Mr. WInHROw. I see. And that the mileage of track in Arizona of the Southern Pacific and the mileage of track in Nevada is about the same? Mr. SULLIvAN. The main-track mileage; yes, sir. Mr. WrHnow. You did, however, say that there were some differ- ences in the operations due to what? Mr. SULLIVAN. I did not say there were any differences in opera- tion except as to train limits. There are slight differences in the topography. The terminals are not located the same distance apart. In other words, it is not possible to get exactly the identical physical conditions on any railroads in two different places; but, as the Court said they are comparable. Mr. WITHROW. Well, it does make quite a difference. How many terminals are there in Nevada? Mr. SULLvAN. Four. Mr. WrrHow. How many terminals have you in Arizona? Mr. SULLIVAN. Five. Mr. Wrrnow. That would naturally increase the hazard, would it not? Is it not usual to do the switching at the terminals? Mr. SmuSvAN. Any movement, either switching or anything else, increases the hazards. TRAIN LENGTHS 615 Mr. Wrrmow. Switching is done at terminals and naturally there would be more of an increase in those hazards if you have five ter- minals in Arizona and four in Nevada. Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes; you have 16 percent more trains in those five terminals than you do in Nevada. Mr. WITHROw. I say that would naturally increase the hazards. Mr. SULLIvAN. Absolutely. The injuries :speak for themselves. They actually have more. Mr. WrrHRow. The point I want to make-and you probably are the only one who can make this information available-is this com- parison depends a great deal on the type of operations in Nevada and Arizona. Does much business originate there in Nevada? The car-mile does not tell the whole story. Mr. SULLIVAN. It tells the whole story, Mr. Withrow. That is the amount of traffic you move in the two States, of course. Mr. WrrTnow. Of course, a great deal depends upon the switching that must be done at these respective terminals. Now, I am not familiar with the operation of those terminals, and you have not made us familiar with them. Those are things which definitely enter into the comparison. I do not know whether you ever operated a train-but I know that you are familiar with the opera- tion of trains-that it is quite natural that where more ground work is done you are going to have the more injuries; and it is not fair to take all of your short trains and compare those with all of the longer trains, because quite naturally, where the ground work is done, there is the greatest hazard. Mr. SULLIvAN. Absolutely. Mr. Withrow if you did not have the restrictions in Arizona you would not have any switching. The trains coming into Utah from California go straight through with- out being touched. Maybe you would change the caboose. I was at Yuma myself for over 2 years. One of the biggest prob- lems there is breaking the long trains into smaller trains, and try- ing to get the smaller trains over the railroad. I will admit that all of these things enter into the hazard, but you increase the hazard in all your terminals when you increase the number of trains that have to be switched or handled in those terminals, whether it is 1 terminal or 6. Mr. WITHROW. That means that there would be more work in Arizona, because you are breaking up the trains. Mr. SULLIVAN. Surely. That is what results from this restricted operation. Mr. WITHROw. Would that not definitely be reflected in the acci- dents? Mr. SULLIVAN. Absolutely Mr. WTHRow. Then when the train gets into Nevada you do not have the switching to do on it, normally. Mr. SULLIvAN. Not a bit. Mr. WITRow. Naturally then, you have less casualties in Nevada than you would in Arizona. Mr. SULLIvAN. That is the reason we have less. Mr. Wrrimow. Well, if that is the reason then is it not due to the fact that you have less slack accidents? It is because your casualties are less in Nevada than in Arizona, because you do less switching in Nevada than in Arizona. 616 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. SULLIVAN. No, Mr. Withrow. Are we talking about the same thing? Are we talking just about road freight conductors, trainmen, and flagmen, or are we confining this just to slack action involving sudden stops or starts? Mr. WITHROW. We are speaking about casualties, injuries. Mr. SULLIVAN. In the aggregate? Mr. WIrntow. Yes. Mr. SULLIVAN. All of the casualties? Mr. WITHRow. Yes. Mr. SULMVAN. Absolutely. I agree with you heartily. The re- striction on operation in Arizona is responsible for all these casual- ties that you say occur due to a number of other reasons than the re- strictive operations, restrictions of the law, which requires all of this switching, which requires the operation of so many trains, which necessitates so many more employees being exposed to injury in handling the same amount of traffic in Arizona than in Nevada. Everything you say is absolutely correct. Mr. WITHEOw. Well, then your comparison is-I cannot follow you in your comparison. Mr. SULLIVAN. I am sorry. It is perfectly clear to me. Mr. WrrHRow. No doubt, but it is not to me. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sullivan, are these large trains pulled into Arizona before the switching occurs, or does the switching take place before they move into Arizona? Mr. SULLIVAN. In Arizona practically all of the trains are inter- state; the traffic moves across the State; but when they arrive-of course, I have not been down there for many years-but they are trains of all the way from 90 to 140 cars, and you have to take off enough cars so that the train leaving Yuma will not exceed 70 cars, excluding the caboose. There is not a great deal of classification switching such as you will find around some terminals, where there are a great many destination connections that have to be made. The CHAIRMAN. The Arizona law permits 100-car trains to move into Arizona and then be reduced afterward in Arizona? Mr. SULmvAN. That is correct. Yuma is right on the line, right at the Colorado River, and trains from California come to rest with whatever number of cars they have within the State of Arizona. Possibly it is a movement of about a quarter of a mile in Arizona to where they come to rest in the terminal. The CHAIRMAN. Is there a comparable situation when they depart from Arizona? Mr. SULLIVAN. You mean west-bound? The CHAIRMAN. Well, I had in mind east-bound; but in either case. Mr. SULLIVAN. For west-bound trains, the number of cars is made up at Yuma Ariz., for movement into California. In other words, you do not have to observe the provisions of the Arizona law for that short movement to the Colorado River. The CHAIRMAN. On the east-bound trains at the east boundary of Arizona, when making contact or making up of trains east-bound, is the large train made up in Arizona, or is it made up in New Mexico? Mr. SULLIVAN. After operation of the 70-car trains across the State, frequently they are consolidated at Lordsburg, N. Mex., for TRAIN LENGTHS 617 movement into El Paso. In many cases the 70-car train continues across the State of New Mexico to El Paso. The CHAIRMAN. At the point where no switching is involved of the long trains occurs at the eastern boundary of the State is that inside of Arizona or inside of New Mexico? Mr. SULLIVAN. Inside of New Mexico. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask one more question, Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Now, do you mean to say that it is the breaking up of these large trains that causes the extra hazard in Arizona? Mr. SULLIvAN. No; that is one. The CHAIRMAN. That is one factor? Mr. SULLIVAN. Simply one factor. Mr. Withrow referred to casualties to trainmen that might result from switching. That is only one factor. But, operating this increased number of trains on a single-track railroad contributes to a great many other casualties in getting on and off the trains, because any increased number of trains multiplies greatly, in direct ratio, the stops that must be made for trains to meet, and that does not mean that just one train has to stop. Frequently both trains approaching a meeting point have to stop. If the train entitled under its priority to hold the main truck arrives at the meeting point first, it has to stop. Then, the other train is required to take the siding and it has to stop. All of those things contribute to increasing the number of casualties to road freight conductors and brakemen. The CHAIRMAN. As I understood you are not contending that there is less hazard in operating short trains in Nevada than there is in operating short trains in Arizona. Mr. SULLIVAN. There is no comparison, because you cannot operate long trains in Arizona. The CHAIRMAN. I mean, as between the short trains in each of those two States. Mr. SULLIVAN. The only comparison which was made on the short trains in Nevada was in the derailments and also comparing the aggre- gate number of slack surge accidents. The CHAIRMAN. So, you have made no comparison as between the operation of short trains in Nevada and the short trains in Arizona? Mr. SULLIVAN. Not in this study; but I have figures to show the comparison between the 3 years when short trains greatly predomi- nated in Nevada with the 3-year period when 80 percent of the trains operated were long trains, and I can furnish those figures, if you wish them. The CHAIRMAN. What I had in mind is to try to explain this dif- ference, if there is any difference, between Nevada and Arizona, out- side of the basis of comparison you have presented. That is what I am really interested in. Mr. SULLIVAN. In Nevada, you have a lower casualty rate because a train starting in either direction, from Ogden on the east, or Sparks, Nev., on the west, going east, has practically nothing to do but run. There is no necessity for setting out cars, or to pick up cars. There is no necessity for any switching at terminals. There is no necessity for continually stopping, meeting opposite trains. Those freight trains all run from 60 to 120 miles without a stop, and as long as a. 618 TRAIN LENGTHS train is continuing in motion there is practically no chance for an injury to the men on the train or in the caboose. The CHAIRMAN. But, if we accept the proposition that there is less hazard and fewer casualties where long-train operation prevails than where short-train operation prevails, then the question would reduce itself to one of slack action accidents to the crew. Mr. SnnvAN. That is true. The CHAIRMAN. In that case you contend that there would be less casualties to the crew on long trains than in the short trains under those conditions, that is, from slack action? Mr. SULmvAN. You do not have today any operation that I know of, except in Arizona, which would be similar to the operation under the provisions of this bill. If the provisions of this bill were in effect all over the country, you would have a very large increase and a very wide operation of trains from 65 to 70 cars, but taking the experience in the State where you have that kind of operation, it shows conclusively that the identical type of accidents occur on trains of that length as occur on longer trains. I think I am justified then in saying that if you had similar operations all over the United States, you would have every one of those slack accidents that occur on the long trains, and due to the very large multiplied number of stops that you would have to make with the shorter trains, you would have an increase in the number of shorter train casualties over what you have at the present time. The CHAIRMAN. Would it be your contention as between indi- vidual trains, a short train as compared with a long, that there would be more injuries from slack action on the long, but in the aggregate movement of the traffic there would be less injuries on the long operations than on the short operations? Would that be your contention? Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, I think that on a train-for-train basis, take one train as against another, you might likely have more slack-surge injuries on the long train, but in the aggregate you would have more under the short-train method of operation than if they were all long trains. That is, if trains were all 70 cars or less in length you would have more than now occur on the long trains of today. The CHAIRMAN. If we assume then that it is true, what, if any- thing, could be done to give greater safety to the train-service em- ployees in the long trains? Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, the question of safety in the caboose, and when related to the total number of accidents, is relatively imma- terial. I do not now recall what the figures are. I have the figures on the list submitted by Mr. Farquharson. There were three hun- dred and some accidents. I am not trying to minimize any type of accident, and particularly that kind, but taking that figure for what it is worth, there were three hundred and some odd. Some were serious; the majority were not. In the majority disability was not extensive. When you relate that number to the magnitude of railroad opera- tions all over the country from which he selected those accidents, I would say they are very infrequent in number. The railroads are doing everything they can, not only to eliminate that type of accident, but all other types as well. TRAIN LENGTHS 619 I mentioned the other day about the improvement in freight-car equipment. There was some evidence introduced about the installation of the heavier graduating spring in air brakes. It was mentioned in the findings of the Nevada court. This has had the effect of reducing undesired emergencies. The improvement in arch-bars; the elimination of the double-plate wheels, avoiding the breaking of wheels; the elimination of the breaking of arch-bars, which cause derailments and which result in slack action; all of these causes of accidents are being gradually eliminated. The CHAIRMAN. I take it that the preventable accidents from slack action more particularly occur to the men in the caboose. Mr. StLUVAN. That is true. The CHAIRMAN. And what has been done to improve the safety of the men in the caboose, or what further thing should be done to provide practical safety for the men in the caboose? Mr. SULLIVAN. I am not thoroughly informed, but I understand that the mechanical division of the Association of American Rail- roads, and the research department have for a long time been giving consideration to changes in the design of cabooses in order to recommend to the railroads such things as the removal of sharp corners on the interior, which is a frequent cause of a man being injured when thrown against those sharp corners. Consideration is being given to improvement of draft gear in the caboose suitable for a car that is idling along on the rear end of a train. The CHAIRMAN. That question, of course, is not directly involved in this bill itself, but it seemed to me the logic of your argument leads to that, that the possible remedy was in the improvement of the caboose. That is, that seemed to be the cause or the place where the greatest casualties exist. Mr. SULLIVAN. I think the railroads can be depended upon, in their research, to develop those things; but the point that I would like to make here, in connection with the cabooses, while the pro- ponents claim that this particular type of accident will be reduced, I am just as confident as I am standing here that they will occur on a train of 70 cars. In other words, drawing a line that a train of 70 cars is going to be the safe train and that you will not have this particular type of accident-that is not true. The CHARMAN. Of course, I take it that when we deal with safety, we deal with the question of preventable accidents. Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. And we have to recognize the difficulties, because accidents will occur in any kind of train operations. As to this bill, the evidence in support of it is particularly directed to injuries on cabooses, as I understand it, and so naturally that is a very acute part of this problem as to what, if anything, further should be done to take care of that situation and this train limit is proposed as a remedy; but I was inquiring to see what if any other dependable remedy there is. Mr. SULLIVAN. I think the figures which have already been sub- mitted, Mr. Chairman,,.show that the railroads have made great progress in eliminating even this type of accident, because all that is necessary is to refer to those that have occurred in the previous years and compare those in the statistics for later years. That has Roo ullrd TRAIN LENGTHS been brought about by improvements the railroads themselves have made. It has not been brought about as a result of any legislation that I know of. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BUIWINKLE. Mr. Sullivan, for my own information, is there any comparison as to the cost of operating the Southern Pacific in Nevada and Arizona. Mr. SULLIVAN. I do not have the figures, but they are a matter of record in the decision in the Arizona Train Limit case, which re- sulted from very extensive cost studies that were conducted. I do not know what the figures were, but the costs are very much greater in Arizona. Mr. Fort tells me that Judge Booth gave those figures. Mr. BULwINKLE. I did not hear him. I was not here. Mr. MARTIN. He gave $600,000 more for the Sante Fe in Arizona for the short-train operation over the long-train operation and $400,000 more for the Southern Pacific. Mr. SULLIvAN. I believe that was based on 1927 traffic and pre- vailing rates of pay, and labor and material costs, and things of that kind. The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed. Mr. EICHER. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eicher. Mr. EICHER. Mr. Sullivan, is there in prospect any air-brake im- provement that gives promise of reducing the violence of shock at the rear end of the long trains under normal operations by the engineer? Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Eicher, this tremendous violence has been re- ferred to a good deal. I would not say that in regular operations there are violent shocks. We do have them on very rare occasions; but there is an air brake, which is an improvement over the old type, that is being installed on the cars of American railroads today. There are not yet enough in service to permit me to form any con- clusion of the real benefits to be obtained from them. There have only been a few cars in any train that I have ridden on so equipped. Mr. EICHER. But their use is being gradually extended? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir; all new cars constructed must have that new air-brake equipment. Mr. EICHER. Now, Mr. Sullivan, I would like to clear up in my own mind the statistical bases that have been used distinguishing between slack surge casualties and the casualties that are grouped under, say division C of your 1937 comparison, where it groups all casualties caused from sudden stopping, starting, lurch, or jerk of locomotive, car, or train. Is there any break-down of the statistical basis that includes only 'what are properly called slack-action accidents or slack-surge casualties? Mr. SULuvAN. I will read you, if you wish, the casualty rates for that particular type of accident to put it on a comparable basis with the other charts, but I will not give you each year. I will take each third year, like I did with the other. TRAIN LENGTHS 621 In 1923-and this is the year I mentioned where the average length in Nevada was less than in Arizona. Nevada, 16.11; Arizona, 7.64. 1926, it was 1.55 in Nevada; Arizona, 8.01. Mr. EICHER. I understand, but do you have anything in these charts before us from which we can break that down ourselves? Mr. SULLIVAN. No; there is no chart for the slack-surge casualties, for the reason that the rate is so very low, and on account of the fluctuations, the lines would be continually crossing each other across the face of the chart. Mr. EICuER. I notice from this excerpt from the findings of the three-judge Federal court that their discussion is confined to slack- surge casualties. Mr. SULLIVAN. That is only a part of the findings on accidents. Mr. EICHER. I have been wondering where I could go to find a statement of the actual statistics that support those conclusions of the three-judge court and their findings. Mr. SULLvAN. I have before me, Mr. Eicher, the exhibits from which the court came to those conclusions. Of course, there are a mass of figures, and apparently they only selected the portion which suited their purpose in rendering their decision; but I have before me the exhibit that was introduced in evidence which shows from 1923 to 1935-the figures on 1936 have become available and I have added those-that shows all casualty rates; shows the number of accidents and casualties in the aggregate, the total, for the various comparable periods both for Nevada and Arizona. Mr. EICHER. And it breaks them down, segregates them as to slack-surge accidents as compared with all other accidents that might come within the general language of sudden stopping, starting, lurch, jerk of locomotive, car, or train? Mr. SUILLVAN. They do. There are three exhibits. One shows all of the employees in the aggregate involved in road freight-train operations. Of course that includes all. Then another break-down is confined to road freight conductors, brakemen, and flagmen in road freight-train operations. Mr. EICHER. They would be the men who are riding in the ca- booses. Mr: SULLIVAN. That is it. In the cabooses or out on the trains, or on the engine. Mr. EICHER. That is all. Mr. WrrHRow. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Withrow. Mr. WITHROW. Mr. Sullivan, in your tables, you take all freight trains. Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHRow. Do you think that that gives a fair picture, com- parative picture? Do you not think it would be better and that we could get a clearer picture, if we were to take out of that table the so-called way freights that operate over every division, because the character of their work is so much different and certainly those trains would not be affected by the enactment of this legislation, and they are in your comparison. Mr. SULLIVAN. If you took out the casualties, Mr. Withrow, you would not be able to get comparable train miles or car miles in order 47891-38----40 622 TRAIN LENGTHS to relate the injuries to them; but this legislation does affect your way freights, and if you took out the local freights in Arizona and in Nevada, you would not take out very many. It is not comparable with an operation such as in California, or some of the thickly populated districts of the east. Mr. WITrRow. But you have included them not only in Arizona and Nevada, but likewise in the figures you have given for all of the United States. Now, it is not quite natural that you .would have more injuries on those short trains that really would not be materially affected by this bill than you would on longer trains, by reason of the frequency of their stopping, by reason of the nature of the work that they do? Mr. SULLIvAN. There are certain types of casualties that you will find more frequently in the local freight service, but whether it is through freights or whether it is local freights, that is one of the points I am making. The greatest hazard in freight-train opera- tions, whether it is through freight or whether it is local, comes from the continual stopping. If you can keep a train in motion there is less liability of injury, but if you increase the number of trains, whether it is through trains or locals, that have to stop for any reason, you are going to increase the stopping for meeting purposes, and there is more liability of men becoming injured. Mr. WrTrow. I agree with you there, but you have not really answered my question. You know, regardless of how much fre- quency of service you have, these local trains have to stop at stations and they have to do their work and they have to do switching. Men have to get on the rear end and head end of trains and cars. They have to do that more on these particular trains. Therefore, there is more hazard there. You would have slack-action accidents there as well, because of the frequency of the stops and the men getting on and off at switches to do their work. Do you really feel as though those trains should be included as the basis in this comparison ? Mr. ,SULLIVAN. If you include them in one year and in andther year, it does not change your basis of comparison. Mr. WrrIHROw. Oh, yes it does, because it materially shows that here you are taking a class of trains where the hazards are greater and you are comparing them with the longer trains. This particular group of trains will not be materially affected by this legislation. Mr. SULLIVAN. Arizona and Nevada offer the only basic comparison I am able to make between long and short trains. Your contention does not enter into the picture at all there on account of the limited operation of local trains. With regard to the national picture, we have to take the statistics where we find them and the way in which they are presented by the Interstate Commerce Commission. So, if the local and way trains and through freights are all in- cluded in one year and they are all included in another year, one year is absolutely on a comparable basis with the other. That is the only way I could make any comparison between the long trains and the short trains, because the figures are not available for that purpose on a national basis. Mr. Wrrnow. I know that you are using them as a comparison, but my point is that it does not give us a true picture of the relative TRAIN LENGTHS 63 hazards on the ordinary freight train of less than 70 cars and the ordinary train of more than 70 cars. It just does not give us the picture. The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed. Mr. SULLIVAN. I would like to take up for brief discussion the testimony by Mr. Farquharson for the proponents. Mr. Farquhar- son, for the proponents, introduced a list of 530 accidents occurring on trains of 70 cars or more, during the years 1927 to 1935, although the list also includes some accidents which occurred from 1920 to 1926. The same list was introduced at the Senate committee hearing in 1935. A check of his compilation shows that in 50 of the cases the train consisted of 70 cars or less. In 29 instances the same ac- cident is listed twice, and in 2 cases the same accident appears three times. In other words, over a period of 14 years he found 449 in- stead of 530 accidents occurring on trains of more than 70 cars. The list includes only a certain type of accident, and as to that type all of the accidents occurring on shorter trains are not included. Eight- een of the accidents are also included in the list of insurance-claim payments by the Order of Railway Conductors for the period August 1929 to January 1, 1936, submitted by Mr. Johnson. Mr. Farquharson also presented a list of 1,407 train and train- service accidents which he selected and which occurred during the year 1936 and the first 6 months of 1937, and including also certain additional accidents which occurred from July to November 1937, as well as some in the year 1935. Mr. Farquharson stated that those accidents were taken from reports of the railroads to the Inter- state Commerce Commission. This list of 1,407 accidents includes 845, or 60 percent of the total, in which no casualties occurred. He submitted a summarization of the list as to the cause and effect of the accidents. He also submitted a summary, which I think is somewhat misleading, where he showed the number of accidents in trains of various lengths. On his list he said that there were 1,407 wrecks. That list said 1,407 wrecks. If that list had said 1,407 accidents, possibly I should not have taken any exception to it; but I do not think it is proper where the report of the railroads clearly show no damage to equip- ment that he properly call those accidents wrecks, when there is so much testimony here, according to the rulings of the Commission, as to what constitutes train accidents. I think that is what is called a wreck. In other words, there were not 1,407 wrecks listed in that enumeration of his. When this list of 1,407 accidents was introduced to your conimittee, he stated that the list had been prepared from the reports of the railroads to the Interstate Commerce Commission, but the statement was only partly correct. The extent to which his statement is not correct, in my opinion, has considerable bearing on the consideration that may be given to the statements submitted. The information furnished on the list of accidents as to the name of the railroad, the place and date of accident, the name of persons injured and extent of damage is no doubt correct. In many in- stances, however, the description of the accident, the effect and cer- tain conclusions as to the cause, both direct and remote, are unques- tionably not from the reports on file with the Commission, and I say that on the basis of a test comparison made of some of the accidents 624 TRAIN LENGTHS listed by Mr. Farquharson with the reports of the railroads on file with the Commission. Attention is invited to a few of these instances. Item 46 on the third sheet states: This case shows the possibility of air not releasing on long trains and the need of rolling inspection. This statement does not appear on the report of the railroad on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission. I wish to call your particular attention to item 69 on the next sheet, covering a 59-car train. This list states: This case shows .the violence of slack action on trains of less than 70 cars. This narrative, however, does not appear in the report of the railroad. Item 398 on the eighteenth sheet states: This was the tenth car behind engine, and too far from caboose to detect odor. This is something aside from the report, and he does not say why the men on the engine did not detect the' hot-box. Item 725 on the thirty-first sheet states that engineer attempted to stop with independent brake to avoid use of automatic air. This statement is not a part of the report filed with the Interstate Com- merce Commission. Item 1357 on the fifty-seventh sheet states: Emergency application of air failed to stop train, hit slide, engine and ears derailed. There is no such statement in the report filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, which states that it was cloudy, raining, and dark, that the train was moving at 20 miles per hour, derailed engine and nine cars account striking slide of about 600 cubic yards rock and earth. The ones quoted are simply examples. Probably the most important defect in his presentation is that lie has not included, except in a very few instances, a list of accidents occurring on shorter trains due to the identical causes responsible for the long-train accidents, and this omission applies to train accidents as well as personal injuries. There is no doubt that by the method he adopted, he selected only such of the reports made by the railroads as he believes supports his theory, omitting those that do not. Much has been said by the proponents about the rear-end shocks in the caboose. Mr. Farqu- harson has selected all of the reports of injuries occurring on trains of more than 70 cars, and has avoided listing those occurring on trains of 70 cars and less, with the exception of a very few, un- explained, that might give the impression that this type of accident is more infrequent than it actually is on the shorter trains, when com- pared with those occurring on the longer trains. In this connection, several members of this committee made in- quiry of Mr. Farquharson as to the frequency of slack injuries on long trains as compared with short trains. On Wednesday, January 19, in reply to a question by Congressman Bulwinkle, which I am TRAIN LENGTHS 625 sure was not correctly answered, lie stated (quoting Mr. Farqu- harson): Now, then, in the reports that I have given you in the recapitulation there, you will find that there were 374 conductors and brakemen injured on long trains in the year 1936. Now, then, subtracting that from 674, you will find that there were 300 injured on trains of less than 70 cars. His figures of 374 included injuries sustained in train accidents, that is, accidents which were accompanied by damage to railway property in excess of $150, as well as train-service accidents, and should have been confined to train-service accidents alone, in view of the fact that he was relating his figures to the train-service table on page 55 of Accident Bulletin No. 105 for the year 1936. Naturally this would greatly reduce the figure representing those that occurred on the shorter trains. In order to correct this faulty comparison, I have carefully counted the slack-surge injuries in train-service accidents occurring on trains of over 70 cars shown on Mr. Farquharson's list of 1,407 accidents for the year 1936, which amount to 337 injuries. Deducting these 337 injuries from the 3 killed and 671 injured, shown under this cause in table No. 80, page 55, of Accident Bulletin No. 105, we have a remainder of 3 killed and 334 injuries to road-freight conductors, brakemen, and flagmen on trains of less than 70 cars. As to the train accidents with or without casualties which lie has selected, doubtless to support his theory of inspection, misunderstand- ing signals, and rear-end shock caused by defects in, or failures of equipment, evidently the same process has been followed of selecting only certain train accidents as was used in the case of so-called rear- end shock injuries on trains of 70 cars or more. Upon checking the list, I find a total of 872 train accidents, 532 in the year 1936, and 340 in the year 1937, only 8 trains of 70 cars or less for 1936, and 13 for 1937 being included. I have had a check made of the reports of all train accidents made by the railroads to the Interstate Commerce Commission involving freight trains due to defects in or failures of car equipment for the year 1936. These are exactly the type listed by Mr. Farquharson, defects and failures of trucks including arch bars, wheels and axles, air brakes including defective triple valves and burst air hose, hand brakes and brake rigging, couplers, draft rigging, and weak cars. The total number of those accidents is 2,241. Of that number 705, or 31 percent, involved trains of over 70 cars, and 1,536, or 69 percent, involved trains of 70 cars or less and also of that number 54.7 of the trains were less than 60 cars. The last item on Mr. Farquharson's summary of the 1,407 accidents shows that there were 68 instances where the conductor and flagman were both injured and there was no one to protect the rear of train. The mere fact that both men were injured does not in itself warrant the statement that the reAr of the train was not protected, nor that the injuries in every case disabled the men to such an extent that they were unable to protect their train. In any event, the list of 1,407 accidents discloses none that were due to the failure of trainmen. who might have been injured, to protect their train. However, an examination of the reports of investigations by the Bureau of Safety for the 8 years 1928 to 1935, shows 23 accidents involving freight trains which they attributed directly and solely to the failure of 626 TRAIN LENGTHS trainmen to protect the train. In all these cases investigated the men involved were not suffering from injury. In passing, it is interesting to note that of the freight trains involved in the accidents investigated by the Bureau of Safety charged to train flagging, 73 percent of the trains consisted of 70 cars or less, and 27 percent contained over 70 cars. In conclusion, in what I have said I have tried to present a true picture of progress in safety on American railroads during the 14 years, 1923 to 1936, inclusive, and in some of the showings for the year 1937. It is clear that the frequency of train accidents in the United States was reduced during the period by about three-fifths; the frequency of casualties to road freight train and engine service employees was reduced nearly three-fourths, and the frequency of casualties from sudden stops and starts was reduced three-fifths. These large reduc- tions were accomplished during a period of generally increasing freight train lengths, and but for this fact, highway-crossing acci- dents would have shown a big increase. The statistics also show a very definite relationship between train- miles and accidents. The principle involved is that an increase in train-miles is accompanied by a substantially greater increase in accidents, and conversely, a decrease in train-miles is accompanied by a substantially greater decrease in accidents. To repeat the quo- tation from the Interstate Commerce Commission on this head : Accidents fluctuate in number both downward and upward in greater ratio than the changes in volume of traffic. It is evident that the carriers in adopting the long-train method of operation have given to this country the safest railroad services, as well as the most adequate, efficient, and economical in the history of mass transportation. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, the bil you now have under consideration is not a safety measure. If enacted it will not reduce accidents upon the railroads, but on the contrary, it will increase them. I thank you. The CHAIRMAN. That concludes your statement? Mr. SULL~vAN. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. We thank you. Who is the next witness? Mr. FoRT. Mr. Brown. Mr. BULwINKLE. Mr. Chairman, it is near adjourning time and we are going to have to be on the floor pretty promptly I think today. I am wondering if it would not be well for us to adjourn at this time. The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have 20 minutes. We might save 15 minutes if the witness can proceed for about 15 minutes. Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Withrow asked me a question and I promised to give him the information. I have the information now, if I might permitted to present it to him. The CHAIRMAN. That will be satisfactory. Mr. SULLIvAN. He asked the question with relation to grade-cross- ing accidents as to freight and passenger trains. For the year 1936 the accidents per million train-miles were: For passenger trains, 3.9; and the accidents per million freight train-miles were 3.8. TRAIN LENGTHS 627 I brought additional copies of my statement with me, and I have them for distribution to the members, if you wish to have them. Mr. MARTIN. Will you pardon a question there? The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. That did not give any consideration as to the com- parative number of trains of each type which shows that the passen- ger-train casualties were 3.9 per million train-miles and freight train casualties 3.8 per million train-miles. In the distribution of the acci- dents, as I understood, it shows passenger trains as compared with freight trains and that the number of accidents was 3.9 and 3.8. Mr. SULLIVAN. That is the accident rate. The freight train-miles were 486,340,892. That is 54 percent of the total train miles. The passenger train-miles was 404,675,612. Now, relating those two factors to the number of automobile acci- dents occurring you find them on a comparable basis. In other words, there were 3.8 accidents per million train-miles freight trains, and 3.9 accidents per million passenger-train-miles. in other words, as many accidents involving freight trains as passenger trains. Mr. MARTIN. Exactly, but what I am getting at is the comparative number of trains. The freight trains, of course, would be 4, or 5, or 6 times longer than the passenger trains. So just giving us the train-miles would not give any indication of the number of trans. Mr. SULLIVAN. When you relate that, the train units to miles, it puts them on a comparable basis, whether a passenger train or a freight train. In other words, a passenger train running 100 miles gives you 100 train-miles. A freight train running 100 miles creates 100 train- miles. Mr. MARTIN. Would any figures be available to show the number of accidents as between the two types of services; would there be any figures which would show the actual number of each type of trains? Mr. SULLIVAN. There are no figures available to show that. Mr. MARTIN. Involved in the figures you have given us? Mr. SUL~ivAN. I think I explained earlier in my statement the diffi- culty of arriving at that figure. It just cannot be computed. You can use some arbitrary basis. It was suggested to me that you could determine the number of freight trains by dividing the total number of freight-train-miles by 120, because someone determined that 120 is the average length of the freight train run, or if you wished, you could divide it by 100. Mr. WotvERToN. When you place it on the basis of accidents per million train-miles traveled, it makes no difference whether it is pas- senger or freight; you get the same comparative basis. Mr. SULLIVAN. No difference at all. It is on exactly the same basis. It is the movement of a unit of equipment, whether it is a freight or a passenger the same distance. 628 TRAIN LENGTHS STATEMENT OF R. W. BROWN, VICE PRESIDENT IN CHARGE OF OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE, READING CO. AND CENTRAL RAILROAD CO. OF NEW JERSEY The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a lengthy statement? Mr. BROWN. Well, I have had my statement prepared in three sec- tions, Mr. Chairman, and I have tried to make each of them as brief as I could. The first is 12 pages and deals generally with safety from a practical operating standpoint. The second deals with the actual operation of the roa as it is now, and tries to work out some sort of a comparison between the present operation and what it would be in the future, and the third relates entirely to the service that is now afforded the public. The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is now near adjournment time. Perhaps we had just as well adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning and you may make your statement then. Mr. BROwN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. (Thereupon, at 11: 50 a. m., the committee adjourned to meet the following morning Thursday, February 10, 1938.) TRAIN LENGTHS THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1938 HoUsE of REPRESENTATIVES, CoMMIrEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Washingtan, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Clarence F. Lea (chairman) presiding. Mr. CROSSER (presiding). The committee will be in order. Mr. Fort, please call your next witness. Mr. FORT. Mr. Crosser, Mr. Brown, vice president of the Central Railroad of New Jersey and the Reading Railroad, will be our next witness. However, before he begins to testify, I might answer a question which was asked yesterday by, I think, Mr. Lea, the chair- man. He asked how far it took to stop a 50-car freight train and how far it took to stop a 100-car freight train under the same condi- tions. I have obtained this information since yesterday from Mr. George Wood. He said that, with a braking force of 60 percent of the empty-car weight-and I should say the ordinary braking force is somewhere between 60 percent and 70 percent of the empty-car weight, a percentage which would keep the wheels from locking and sliding-a 50-car freight train, when loaded, may be stopped from the speed of 30 miles an hour in approximately 800 feet, on level track, with an emergency application; and a 100-car train, under the above conditions, in approximately 1,000 feet-that is, 900 feet as against a thousand feet. The same 50-car train may be stopped from a speed of 50 miles an hour in approximately 2,800 feet, and a 100-car train, as above, in approximately 3,000 feet. That is, the difference between the 50-car train and the 100-car train at 50 miles an hour would be the difference between 2,800 feet and 3,000 feet. Freight cars do not all brake alike.. Some are braked at 60 percent, some 70 percent, and some at 80 percent. Therefore, individual stops will not be the same for all loaded cars or all loaded trains. Thus, records of various tests made will show variations in stopping distances. The above test was made with full loaded cars, which would stop less quickly than empty cars. If that is the information which the committee wanted, I thank you. Mr. CRossr. Yes; thank you. 629 630 TRAIN LENGTHS STATEMENT OF R. W. BROWN, VICE PRESIDENT IN CHARGE OF OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE, READING COMPANY AND CENTRAL RAILROAD OF NEW JERSEY-Resumed Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is R. W. Brown. I am vice president, in charge of operation and maintenance, of the Reading Co. and the Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey. I appear here in behalf of the Association of American Railroads, which represents the class I railroads of the United States. I will discuss this bill from the point of view of a practical operating man. I have had 362 years of experience in railroad service, beginning at the age of 17 as laborer in a cinder pit; at 19 as locomotive fire- man; and at 22, and for 7 years thereafter, as locomotive engineer on a main-line single-track division in Illinois and Indiana. Mr. MARTIN. You started in just where I did, but you got further. I never got over on the right-hand side. Mr. BROwN. After what I have gone through during the last 15 years, I think you are more fortunate than I am. Since 1912 I have held the position of road foreman of engines, supervisor of locomotive operation, trainmaster, division superintend- ent, and general superintendent on nine operating divisions of the Baltimore & Ohio between St. Louis, Mo., and Philadelphia, Pa., and vice president and general manager of the Central Railroad of New Jersey, and for 2 years I have been vice president of the two properties. Now, the proponents have urged the passage of this bill as a safety measure, with respect both to railroad employees and the public. Contrary to the contentions of proponents, the present method of freight-train operation has promoted safety, as is evidenced by the remarkable record outlined to you by Mr. Sullivan, the preceding witness. This striking improvement in safety attained by the railroads in the past several years has occurred during the very time that the operation of the so-called long trains has become prevalent. I will undertake to explain as briefly as I can some of the oper- ating problems which are presented in consideration of this bill. I realize the grave responsibility which rests upon the committee and I hope I shall be able to call your attention to certain features which will be helpful to you in reaching your conclusions. Mr. Chairman, at this time I wish to repeat what I said yester- day morning, that I have prepared this presentation in three sepa- rate groups. This is the safety angle from an operating'standpoint and practical operation of the railroads as they are conducted today. I thought you would like to have a clear picture of that and then, the third is the character of service that we are rendering to the public, and if it will please the committee, I can go right on through each section and at the end of the sections call it to your attention and endeavor to answer any questions you may have to ask. Mr. CROssER. You prefer to finish without being interrupted? Mr. BROWN. That is right. Mr. CROSSER. I think that the committee feels that way about it. Mr. BROwN. Thank you. TRAIN LENGTHS 631 Before entering upon a general discussion as to the effect this bill would have on our freight-train operations serving the public, I would like to dwell briefly on certain important changes in railroad operations since the World War. Car shortages, a very important matter; by reduction in delivery, and so on. From 1917 to 1922, that is to say, during the period of the World War and immediately thereafter, the physical capacity of the rail- roads of this country was severely taxed, and it was evident to all that if the growing needs of the country for transportation were to be met adequately and efficiently it would necessarily involve the betterment and improvement of railroad plant, equipment, and facil- ities generally, and the improvements and modernization of operating methods. In the spring of 1923, railroad executives inaugurated a vigorous program designed for plant improvement and increased operating efficiency. This program included the strengthening of bridges and road bed; reduction of curvature and grades; installation of block signals and other safety devices; construction of terminal and show facilities; and the purchase of larger cars and locomotives. This program of rehabilitation of plant, facilities, and equipment, while very costly, was designed to provide means to move in the safest, most efficient, and economical manner possible, not only the business handled at that time, but also an increasing business antici- pated in the future. The results of the program are evidenced in many ways in the freight service: By increasing the average speed of freight trains 47.7 percent since 1923; by operation of longer freight trains result- ing in a greatly improved safety record; by elimination of car short- ages; by reduction in delivery time of important freight between principal cities of the country. I felt it necessary to give you this brief background in order to show the real need for the improved facilities provided and the new equipment which has been purchased since 1923, and, further, in or- der to show that the small locomotives in service prior to that time, a number of which have now been scrapped, would not have served our needs under present-day conditions. The railroad managements, consisting in almost every instance of men who have come up from the ranks and who are thoroughly trained in railroad operations, met the problem that was confront- ing them in 1923 and established the foundation of our present serv- ice, and as the years progressed built it up to meet the requirements of public demand for improved and cheaper transportation services. It is true in the railroad industry, as in any other business, indus- trial or commercial, that progress must be made with the times; and as railroads have but one commodity to sell-namely, transportation- they must be fully equipped to meet at all times any ordinary or emergency condition which may arise. The railroads of the United States offer the shipping public today the best transportation service in the world, one that will move freight more expeditiously and safely than ever before and at a low average cost to the shipper. Now, as to the bill itself: In order that a clear picture be made to you, I will endeavor to present the facts on a comparable basis, that 632 TRAIN LENGTHS is, present-day operation as compared to that of the future, should such legislation as this train-limit bill be enacted. This bill prohibits the operation of any train of more than 70 freight or other cars, exclusive of caboose; but the point in interest to the public and the railroads is the limitation of 70 freight cars to a train. The proponents claim that a train of more than 70 cars cannot be operated safely because signals cannot be effectively exchanged be- tween the men on either end of the train; the 70 cars is the maximum on which air brakes are effective; and that the work required of men on the rear end of such trains is not safe. All of these claims I shall now discuss. There has been presented by Mr. Sullivan statistics which clearly prove that the present form of railroad operation is safer for em- ployees and the public than any method that has been employed heretofore. As to the danger which the proponents claim exists due to slack action in freight trains: As a result of my personal observation and experience while a locomotive engineer, and later as an operating officer in charge of freight-train operations in various territories, I wish to make the direct statement to the effect that the result of so-called slack action on freight trains, regardless of their length, when the train is being stopped or started bears a direct relationship to the manner in which the engineer performs his duty in the operation of the locomotive or his handling of the air-brake application. Locomotive engineers are familiar with this condition, and one of the requirements in order to be classed as a competent engineer is to be able to prevent harsh run of slack by a gradual control of the slack from the head end. An entirely different situation with respect to slack exists on our railroads today than in former years, due in large measure to the advancement made in the improved construction of freight-car equip- ment. All freight-train cars today are of either solid-steel construc- tion or are equipped with steel underframes, and draft or drawbar equipment is of the most modern type, so constructed as to prevent excessive movement of the drawbar and to absorb the shocks the car encounters. Whether or not a train may be long must be considered in the light of operating conditions, grades, curvature, character of ton- nage, and so forth. It cannot be treated as an absolute term, but only relative in consideration of the foregoing factors. In a territory where the track is of level nature, heavy-tonnage trains can be handled by a modern locomotive and a greater num- ber of cars per train will result. The size of train an engine can successfully handle is based on the total tonnage of the train and not by the number of cars it contains. A modern type of locomo- tive can handle a train of 100 or more cars on a level railroad as successfully as it could handle a train of 40 cars in a territory where heavy grade conditions exist. My experience over a period of years permits me to state definitely that an engineer with a heavy modern type of locomotive can handle the trains today with less difficulty, and more efficiency and safety, than the engineer of yesterday with a small locomotive loaded to its full capacity. Also, the modern TRAIN LENGTHS 633 locomotive of today is equipped with a number of special devices, all designed to overcome the difficulties the engineer of yesterday was called upon to encounter. Much has been said concerning the so-called slack action, espe- cially on the longer trains, and the impression may be gained by one not familiar with railroad operation that a dangerous condition exists on the rear end of a freight train each time the train is started and stopped, as well as while in motion. Such is not true. During my years of service as an operating officer on various divisions, and under varying operating conditions, I have always maintained the habit of riding freight trains, both the head end and rear end, continuing this practice to my present position. During this period of time I have never had occasion to feel unsafe while in a caboose, nor have I been subjected to unusual shocks or any condition that a man of ordinary railroad experience has not accus- tomed himself to. Neither have I found any condition to exist that would cause me to feel that I should discontinue the practice. During the presentation of the case by the proponents, consider- able stress was laid on the fact that officials generally do not ride the rear end of large trains and I think that one of the members of the committee asked one of the proponents, Mr. Farquharson, I think. whether officials did place their office car on the rear end of long trains, and I had a check made in order to give you absolute facts. I had a check of the movement of the office car to which I am assigned, and while I say that I have ridden over every mile of track in the engine and caboose on every division of which I have been in charge, and that takes in the Baltimore & Ohio from St. Louis to Philadelphia, and all of their branch lines-that statement could be general, but what I wanted to say now is specific. In sup- port of this statement, I wish to say that in addition to the large number of freight trains on which I rode, both in the caboose and on the locomotive, during my 5 years as vice president and general manager of the Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, I did during the years 1932 to 1935, inclusive, place my office car on the rear end of 41 freight trains, regardless of their length, and moved over freight-operating divisions, either day or night. On these trips, I took care of my office duties, ate meals, and on several occasions dur- ing the night went to bed and slept without interruption. These trips were made on trains of varying lengths, 12 of which exceeded 70 cars in number, with a maximum of 142 cars on 1 train, operating over a division of descending and ascending grades of a maximum of 1.9 percent, or 98 feet to the mile. This office car is equipped with an air gage which shows the pres- sure contained in the train line of the air brake. It also indicates the pressure in the brake cylinder of the car when the air brakes are applied. It is my practice when riding in the car, when attached either to freight or passenger trains, to observe the pressure shown on the gage at the time the train was being stopped. At no time did I ever ob- serve a failure of the gage to register a reduction in the train line pressure and a build-up of pressure in the brake cylinder under the car, which was the rear car in the train, when stops were being made on freight trains, regardless of the number of cars in the train. 634 TRAIN LENGTHS These observations of the manner in which the brakes applied, and results obtained on the rear end of long trains under actual road- operating conditions, confirmed the correctness of the terminal air- brake test made while the train was standing in the yard. Rules in effect on the class I railroads today require that air-brake equipment on all cars in a train, including the caboose, be applied and released by the engineer, witnessed by the car inspectors and members of the crew, before the train is permitted to leave the terminal. All mem- bers of the train and engine crews are thoroughly familiar with this requirement, and both engineer and conductor must know that the proper test has been made. I make the statement concerning my observations of the results of the air-brake operation on this office car, which was the last car in the train, because the terminal test of the brakes on trains is required by rules, and because of the statement made by the proponents to the effect that the modern air-brake equipment in use on our trains today will not properly operate on trains of more than 70 cars in length. I would further add that on all of the trips I have made under such conditions with the office car on the rear end of these trains, there were no trips in which criticism of the handling of the train by the engineer could be made, but to the contrary I was able in each in- stance, to compliment the engineer on the manner in which he con- trolled the action of the trains while stops were being made. There were no particular runs chosen and at no time was advance information given that I planned on such trips, but I took the trips as they came, under varying conditions and with different engineers. I might say it was with 18 different engineers. I just checked that this morning. So, we have got at least 18 good engineers over there who are first-class men. The car was handled on the extreme end of the train, back of the caboose, in order that I could obtain a full view of the railroad, this being possible because of the steel underframe cabooses in operation on our freight trains. At this time I wish to comment on the statement made by the proponents to the effect that members of the crew working on the rear end of long trains are subjected to extreme hazards and fear. Dur- ing my supervision of freight-train operations I have noticed that the trainman holding the most seniority because of greatest length of service almost invariably exercises his seniority rights and chooses the position on the head end of the train on the locomotive. It has always been my understanding this practice prevailed because the work to be performed on the caboose was more satisfactory to the men than that required on the head end. I wish to inject this information: In order to give the committee facts, which you have indicated you want in every instance and are entitled to, I had a check made of all through freight crews on the Reading and the Jersey Central, both roads I am associated with, and 95 percent of the through freight crews have the oldest man in the caboose. That is a check of the railroads in the eastern region. It runs around between 85 and 88 percent. A check was made 2 years ago of the western group-and the length of the train has not changed-so that I do not think that there has been any change. The check shows that around 87 percent of the train crews who are TRAIN LENGTHS 635 operating the so-called long trains, the man who has the right to exercise seniority chooses the rear end instead of the cab. Mr. WITHROw. I wonder, before you leave that subject, if I might ask a question. Mr. BROWN. If it is permissible with the chairman. Mr. WITHROW. I do not want to interrupt you. Mr. BROWN. If the chairman agrees, it is perfectly all right with me, Mr. Withrow. We had an agreement that I would finish a topic. Mr. WITHROW. That is all right. I would prefer that you go ahead. Mr. BROWN. I prefer doing it, if it is satisfactory to you, sir. Mr. WrrHROw. That is very fine, sir. Mr. BRowN. Therefore, again let me repeat, the question of train length, so far as successful and safe operation is concerned, bears a direct relationship to the operating condition to which the train is subjected, and no universal rule can be applied by establishing a train length that can receive the same handling under the varying conditions that exist. Also the action that takes place on the rear end of a freight train when stops and starts are made bears a direct rela- tionship to the manner in which it is operated from the head end rather than the number of cars in the train. It has been said that some railroads have in effect instructions requiring that signals be transmitted from the rear end to the head end of trains at given points. On a majority of the railroads this condition does not exist, but even if it were the fact, the only signal that there would be any occasion to give, in connection with the oper- ation of through freight trains, would be the passing of a stop signal. It is the practice generally that this be done by use of a flag, or a newspaper, or whatever they have in their hands in the daytime, when weather conditions permit and when weather conditions are not favorable, and during darkness, a lighted fusee will be used. The action to be further taken depends entirely on the condi- tions existing and if they are of such nature that requires the train to be stopped, the crew on the rear of the train are instructed to apply the air brake according to standard instructions. which are issued for this purpose. Contrary to what has been stated here, the usual application is not an emergency application but rather by the gradual reduction of the brake pipe pressure by means of a valve located on the caboose, creating a result similar to that done by the engineer with the engine equipment, but performed in a different manner. Statements were made here that would lead one to believe that the application of brakes from the caboose is highly dangerous, and it was referred to as the process of setting the brakes in emer- gency. In actual practice on freight trains of varying length gradual application of the brake from the rear by a member of the crew is not an unusual condition, and it is only on rare occasions that any irregular results occur. As to the effect of an emergency application of the brake from the rear should same be necessary. On one of my trips with the office car behind the caboose of a train of 97 cars the knuckle of the caboose coupler opened while we were 'descending a grade of 46 feet to the mile, applying the brakes on my car and those of the entire train in emergency. You 636 TRAIN LENGTHS will note this emergency application was from the rear of the caboose. When the stop was made the office car was separated from the caboose by a distance of several car lengths. Due to the descending grade and the fact that a helper locomotive was available, this locomotive was used to place my car against the caboose. After coupling was made, air coupled up, and brakes properly tested, the train pro- ceeded after a delay of 35 minutes. There were no rear end shocks and no one was injured. To indicate clearly to the committee that this occurrence created no thought of fear on my part of riding on long freight trains, I merely point out that 1 month later my car was placed on the same scheduled train, operating over the same territory-incidently a distance of 90 miles. That train consisted of 107 cars and no unusual condition occurred. The most serious result that can occur from such an emergency action on the rear of trains is the parting of the train between two cars, due to brakes being applied too severely instead of gradually by a member of the crew on the caboose, or by other emergency applications creating a surge in the train in the opposite manner than would occur were brakes suddenly applied by the engineer on the head end, causing a run out of slack, the weight of the head end of the train causing the train to part, and brakes fully apply on the entire train but no run-in of slack is experienced. During the years of my experience in freight-train operation I have never known or heard of a case where injury occurred to em- ployes on the rear of trains as the result of air being applied from the caboose. I wish to add further that trains of 70 cars in length would not be the answer to the complaint so far as exchange of signals is concerned, as curvature and other obstructions along the right-of-way, as well as weather conditions, would prevent transmission of signals even with trains very much shorter in length than provided for in this bill. Trains of various lengths have been operated successfully ever since the inception of railroads under prolonged periods of severe weather conditions, wherein signals could not be seen from the head end to the rear of the train regardless of length. The operation of trains under these conditions are safeguarded by rules and instructions which permit their safe operation. All cars are equipped with power brakes with a continuous air-brake pressure connection to the caboose, which permits the brakes upon the train to be applied from that point at any time. The employees on the head end of trains are furnished orders covering the movement of their trains and are governed by routing or block signals of various types, rules, and timetable authority, and as long as the train remains intact, can proceed to destination without communication or advice from a single member of the crew on the rear. When any condition arises which necessitates stopping of the train by employees on the rear, they may do so safely by use of conductor's valve. Much has been said as to the necessity for the transmission of signals because of hot boxes and defective equipment under cars. As has been explained to you by Mr. Sullivan, these causes have been materially reduced during the period of change in the method of operation of trains, as I have described to you. Records indicate a reduction of 73.5 percent in train accidents due to defective equipment of cars and locomotives between the years 1923 and 1936, which has been made TRAIN LENGTHS 637 possible by the construction of more modern types of equipment and the very decided improvement in the method of equipment inspection. Very definite rules covering the inspection of equipment, both loco- motive and cars, are in effect on all the railroads in the country. Some are local requirements, others are rules made effective as a result of recommendations of the various committees of the Associa- tion of American Railroads, and these are enforced by all of the railroads as uniform practice. Others are covered by rules adopted by railroads as a whole and approved as standard practice by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Efforts on the part of the officers of all the railroads: First, to keep their equipment in proper condi- tion; second, to cover rigid inspection at interchange points all cars passing from one road to the other; third, by constant check of all cars at intermediate and terminal yards by trained men thoroughly acquainted with car construction and who devote their entire time to the thorough inspection of all parts on the car in order to detect any defect that may exist on any part of the equipment that might develop while en route, all of which has had the effect of placing the car equipment on the American railroads in the highest standard of maintenance, thereby reducing to a very low minimum the possibility of accidents due to broken equipment on cars between terminals. The favorable effect produced by this high standard of inspection and maintenance has made possible the operation of long through freight trains at high speeds on all railroads, and runs of from 75 to 150 miles without stopping for any purpose is not unusual, as loco- motives are equipped with tenders for sufficient fuel supply for the entire trip and with large water carrying capacity which on some roads is replenished if necessary at track pans while the train is operating at uniform speed. Therefore, as trains, regardless of their length, cannot leave termi- nals until by air-brake test the crew of the train knows the brakes under each and every car of the train have been applied and released by engineer, and as the operation of the brake while the train is in motion is no different from that when the train is standing, it is conclusively proven there is no foundation for the statement by the proponents to the effect that air-brake equipment now in use will not properly operate on trains of more than 70 cars. Trains are being safely operated without exchange of hand signals between members of the crew on each end of the train regardless of train lengths or existing weather conditions, and the control of the train so far as stopping is concerned is in the hands of the members of the crew on the rear. Their claim that there is necessity for the exchange of hand signals to provide safe operation of trains is not based on facts. Claim of the proponents that the work on the rear end of long freight trains is dangerous and creates fear in the minds of the men required to perform this work is not sustained by the men themselves, as trainmen almost invariably exercise their rights to choose the lo- cation in the caboose in preference to the position on the locomotive. 47891--38----41 638 TRAIN LENGTHS GRADE CROSSINGS Referring to the proponents' claim of increased safety to the public. I wish to dwell for the moment on the subject of grade crossing accidents, the records in connection with which have already been presented by Mr. Sullivan. It should be generally recognized that the frequency of train move- ments over grade crossings, whether protected or unprotected, has a serious effect on the possibility of grade crossing accidents, and to bring this fact more clearly to you, I wish to point out that when studies are made by representatives of the State public utility com- missions or other public bodies to determine the adequacy of protec- tion afforded at highway and railroad crossings at grade, two condi- tions are considered: First, the number of train movements over the bighway crossings; second, the amount of highway traffic, either vehicular or pedestrian, over the crossing. Any noticeable increase in the number of train movements operated over a crossing is recog- nized as an increased hazard, and has a decided bearing on the recommendations made concerning the character of protection to be required. While much has been done toward elimination of grade crossings, this applies only to those of more important nature. The continuous growth of our country and expansion of our cities creates a condition that causes continual opening up of new grade crossings to the extent that there will be little noticeable reduction in the number of crossings at grade. Therefore the increased number of trains necessary to operate should this bill become a law will create a condition at highway crossings whereby the hazard to the public and to engine and train employees as well will be materially increased. Mr. Chairman, that ends the first of the three sections of the presentation. Mr. EICHER. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eicher. Mr. EICHER. May I ask you a question, Mr. Brown? Mr. BROWN. Yes, Mr. Eicher. Mr. EICHER. Would you explain just how and why the elimination of seasonal or periodical car shortages would be made more probable with longer trains that with shorter trains? Mr. BROWN. Yes, Mr. Eicher. My presentation is prepared in three sections. The first simply deals with safety from a practical operating standpoint. The second has to do with the detailed opera- tions of our trains and on our railroads today, and the third has to do with the service and the character of service that is rendered. Now, I can answer your question now Mr. EIcHER. Will you reach that later on? Mr. BROWN. Yes; it will be covered fully in both operations and in service. Mr. EICHER. All right. Mr. BULWINXLE. When you use the term "highway grade cross- ings," do you include street crossings in that too? Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir. In other words, any crossing of the railroad, either highway or street. TRAIN LENGTHS 639 Mr. BULwINKLE. You have comparatively few highway grade crossings, have you not, leaving out the street grade crossings? Mr. BROWN. No; no1 we have a large number of highway crossings outside of the city limits, you mean? Mr. BULWINKLE. Yes, sir. Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; we have a large number of them. Mr. BuLwINKLE. Are there more street crossings than you have highway crossings? Mr. BROWN. Well, that depends entirely on the locality. In the territory in which I am located now it is in a very dense industrial and manufacturing territory, of course, the grade crossings-we have a large number of cities, and the grade crossings in the cities pre- dominate; but there are, of course, a large number of highway cross- ings and grade outside of the cities, the secondary and less traveled highways, and even with the main highways. Mr. BUTwINKLE. Are your street grade crossings protected? Mr. BROWN. It all depends on the amount of traffic over it. We have conditions in one city, for example, where we will have 24-hour crossing watchmen and gate protection at one crossing; possibly at a crossing on the other side of that we will have 16-hour protection-gate and man-then the next one will be protected with flashlight and no man on it. And at the outside we have crossings that are not protected at all. Now, we have the same number of trains passing over all of the crossings, but it is a combination of train traffic and highway traffic that creates the necessity for either crossing elimination, as an ex- treme, 24-hour crossing protection by man and gate, and then on down to flashlight and no protection at all. Now, if your travel is at all heavy over the crossing, so far as- trains are concerned, generally the crossings are protected within the city limits. Mr. BULWINKLE. Then how about your highway grade crossings! Does the same thing apply there? Mr. BROWN. You have the same conditions applying to that, and the crossings at outlying points or points outside of the cities or com- munities are taken care of by the automatic flasher light as the gen- eral rule. Some have the bell, but that is becoming more or less obsolete. People travel too fast now. They could not hear a crossing bell ringing if they had their cars open. So it is usually a flashlight,. and we are continually placing those in service as the traffic in- creases. But the principal thing that is checked first-and I want to have that clearly understood, because I have been in as the representative of the railroads in so many of the hearings for protection-and the first thing that we must determine, and we must determine this every time, is the travel and how that travel has increased or decreased; and that increase in travel has a very decided bearing on whether or not more adequate crossing protection should be afforded. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Brown, just one question. Of course, it is true, as you say, that with each additional train traveling over a division there is an increased crossing hazard. No body could dispute that statement. But, if you had now 10 freight trains and 10 passenger trains operating over a given division every 24 hours and then the traffic increased, called for 10 additional 640 TRAIN LENGTHS freight trains and 10 additional passenger trains, just doubling the crossing hazard, you would not give consideration to the increased crossing hazard in deciding whether or not you would put on the additional trains, would you? Mr. BROWN. Contrary to that, we do, Mr. Congressman. Mr. MARTIN. You would put on the trains, would you not? Mr. BROWN. Yes. We also put on crossing protection. I have this concrete example. For instance, the Jersey Central operates a large number of commuter trains, in fact, our passenger service into Jersey City each day averages about 145 to 150 trains a day into the station and that many out. We serve the seashore along the Jersey coast with the New York & Long Island branch division and frequently through the summer they run what they call "pot- luck excursions." Some fellow originates an excursion plan and then sells as- many tickets as they can in order to get the reduced rate. Well, on those days, we operate as high as 25 to 30 extra passen- ger trains. Mr. MARTIN. You operate from 25 to 30 extra passenger trains in 1 day and on one division? Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; and those trains will be going down over a double track railroad where we handle nothing but passenger trains, and it is not unusual for 15 of those trains to be moving at one time spaced an automatic block apart. Mr. MARTIN. Now, right there Mr. BROWN (continuing). Now what we do with that, where we have partial crossing protection, we extend the protection, either starting it earlier in the morning in order to take care of the early trains or extend it later on in the evening to take care of the balance, and then we put on an average from 25 to 30 crossing watchmen at all points where there is any travel at all. We call the section fore- men out or section men out and put them out and give crossing pro- tection to crossings that ordinarily are not considered at all. Mr. MARTIN. Assuming that this bill were to become law. There could not be any possible increase in the number of freight trains such as you have just instanced in the situation you have been dis- cussing, where you pA on 15 or 20 or more trains in a day. Your statement that you meet that situation by taking increased precau- tion against crossing hazards has been a thought that I have had in mind since this matter was first raised, that the mere fact that there will be an increased hazard would not be an answer to the legislation which might require additional trains, but that that ought to be met in some other way. I am rather impressed with the view that even though this would occasion an additional number of freight trains on some lines, it seems to me the addition would be negligible as compared with the seasonal increase just such as you have mentioned there. Here you have a situation where you have trains, high-speed pas- senger trains, chasing each other all day long just a block apart, creating obviously a very, very, much greater hazard than could pos- sibly be created by this bill. You might decide yourselves to reduce your trains to 70-car trains or 80-car trains, or 90-car trains. Your road might come to the conclusion that these trains were too cumbersome; that you needed TRAIN LENGTHS (41 a much faster service than was permitted by the long-train opera- tions. I have heard someone say-I believe I got it in a letter this morn- ing, stating that the Southern Pacific in California-Mr. Sullivan could tell about that-in order to meet truck competition has put on a very short, very fast freight service on the Southern Pacific in California. But, if you decided yourselves to go down to a limit of cars on trains and increase the crossing hazards, you would take the same precautions you take when you put on additional passenger trains. So while there has been some propositions advanced that seem to me are entitled to great weight in connection with this legislation, I confess I cannot see the matter of additional freight trains, three or four more freight trains a day, on heavy traffic lines, would be any answer to the legislation. You might decide to do that your- selves, like the Pennsylvania. As stated, the Pennsylvania has volun- tarily limited their trains to 125 cars which would necessitate some more trains, and that creates an additional crossing hazard. You could meet that situation in just exactly the same way you describe you meet the hazard with your increased passenger service during certain seasons. Mr. BROWN. Why, Mr. Martin, in answer to your statement, I think when the description of our present-day operations and of the service we render is given and it clearly pictures our condition it will indicate to you what would be necessary to be done with this law enacted so far as the increase in the number of through trains are concerned, that you will find that the comparison between the extra passenger trains run in the territory that I refer to and the number of additional freight trains run on the main lines would be more favorable to the passenger trains because on the New York and Long Branch Division, in the summertime, at which time these trains are run on occasional Sundays, the Jersey Central and the Pennsyl- vania operate joint service and in the summertime they operate 72 scheduled passenger trains in each direction over that piece of track, so if you add 20 trains more to the 72, why that gives you the ratio. I think that would at least explain to you the increase in freight trains that would be necessary at least on that ratio. Mr. MARTIN. Let me just ask you another question there. Have you ever made any estimate as to how many more freight trains would be required daily on a given division, say, of the Central of New Jersey, if the 70-car limit was in operation. Mr. BROWN. Thirty-one-percent increase in the number of through freight trains. Mr. MARTIN. How many? Mr. BROWN. Thirty-one-percent increase in the number of through trains operated. Mr. MARTIN. Through trains? Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHRow. Freight trains? Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHROW. How many through freight trains do you operate daily on a given division? You say there would be a 31-percent increase. How many are you operating now, normally? 64A2 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. BROWN. We operate about 55 or 57 through trains, but we operate in addition to that about 130 or 135 short trains that would not be increased by this bill. Mr. MARTIN. Do you operate 65 or 70 trains both ways? Mr. BROWN. That is both ways. That is the aggregate; yes, sir. I have that here. In other words, to get the picture just a little more clearly before you, Mr. Martin, in order to get this freight-train operation so that it will contain facts that you can question me on I have taken the operation as it actually occurs on the Reading and Jersey Central and have picked it to pieces, and I will lay it out in front of you, and invite any inquiry on it. Mr. MARTIN. Then, in addition to your 65 or 70 through trains you operate about 135 local freights? Mr. BROWN. Yes, exactly. Mr. MARTIN. Then you operate all this passenger service? Mr. BROWN. It makes a pretty busy job, I will admit. Mr. MARTIN. It just seems to me that the only limit there could be on a piece of railroad like that would be the saturation point of moving. It would not be a question of just increasing it 20 or 30 percent, but just be a matter of being able to move over the road. It would not make any difference if it does make 31 percent more. Mr. BROWN. On the date that this check was made we handled a total of 193 freight trains of which 51 were through freights. Mr. MARTIN. Some of these gentlemen who have been complaining of crossing hazards represent transcontinental railroads out in the great open spaces that would not operate that many trains in a week. You are able to operate 10 times more trains then they do and safeguard against crossing accidents and then they come in and complain if they have to put on another train or two trains a day out there, when a train is an event, more or less, and they complain of the crossing hazard. Mr. BROWN. I do not want to get ahead of my story, Mr. Martin, but I will say to you, so far as increased business is concerned, I will explain under this method of operation we have, we can stand quite an increase in business without materially increasing the num- ber of trains we operate under the present system. Mr. MARTIN. I would like mighty well to see you get it. Mr. BROWN. I appreciate that. Are there any further questions, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed. Mr. BROWN. I would just like, while we are still talking about those particular things, I would just like to take about a minute or two of your time here. Mr. Farquharson in his presentation of these train accidents listed 10 cases on the Jersey Central and 14 on the Reading and I made a study of those to see whether or not defects in equipment could have been detected by an inspection by the crew, and if that was responsible, or whether hand signals could have pre- vented them. In none of the 10 cases on the Jersey Central was there a question of hand signals involved, and so far as the failure of equipment was concerned, there was not any of that except draw- bar equipment. Now, on the 14 cases on the Reading there were 3 cases there that had broken equipment and one of them was due to an arch bar breaking on the ninth car from the engine with 77 cars, and I think that they will agree, or anybody else will agree that if you had 18 TRAIN LENGTHS 643 cars on a train it would be just as difficult for the conductor to see here as it was for the engineer on the head 6nd, 9 cars from the engine. And, one of them -was a derailment of the thirty-third car from the head end. The one that might have caused some argument was a train of 120 cars that had a brake beam down on the sixty-fourth car, but a tower man at the interlocking crossing and a man on the ground noted that, detected it and passed the signal to the flagman, who acknowledged it and stated that the reason for not applying the brake on the rear end was not because he was afraid of the danger, but he thought that he might stop the train with the engineer in a tunnel 4% miles away. But, that was not the fact. Now, there is just one other accident that I want to refer to be- cause it is of particular interest to me. I told you that in my earlier service I had been an engineer on the Baltimore & Ohio, back in the early part of this century. Case Number 148, as listed by Mr. Farquharson, is shown as a slack-surge case and he reports it as slack running in, and, I must take exception to that, because on that 80-car train, I happen to know all about it. I was with the Baltimore & Ohio, and I just happened to check over these reports, and I see this case. The facts of the case are that the cross pin came out of the coupler on the seventy-fourth car. That was between the sixth and seventh car from the caboose, and the train parted, and it injured the conductor, and he was off 53 days. And my reason for saying that is that that conductor is my brother, and he runs daily on the long trains of the Illinois division of the Baltimore & Ohio, and he chooses to be a conductor, because he desires that, not because he had to continue that. I have talked with him during the time of his injury. He told me what it was and it was not slack action, because he was knocked down by the emergency application of the brake on the six cars, and then upset completely when the six cars ran into the head end, because they were loads, and the cars on the head end were empties and stopped sooner than he did. I just mention that because it brought back to my mind a very clear picture of my experience as an engineer back in 1908 to 1912 when I pulled that boy as a brakeman and conductor-and I am serious about this, gentlemen-and at that time we handled trains of as much as 70 cars; but we did not think about 70 cars being the limit. The trains were long then as they are now. Any train is long, when you give the enine its maximum capacity to pull; but the only time that I felt safe with that boy was when I got him in the caboose and when I once gut him in the caboose of the train, regardless of the length, I knew that he was safe until he had to get out of that caboose and perform some work. I am serious about that, gentlemen. When I say that, I am here as a witness against this bill, with a brother running those trains, and I want to say fur- ther that the matter of long trains has never been discussed between us. It has never been discussed with me in the thirty-six years by the trainmen, conductors, engineers, and firemen, and I have heard more of the train length, the dangers of 70 cars, since I have been this hearing than I have heard all of the 36 years I have been in the service. That is from a practical standpoint. 64 TRAIN LENGTHS I have been a member of safety committees for 28 years, on which there have been members of the four train service organizations. They have brought up every subject under the sun that has to do with safety, at our request, and I was also on the safety committee as an engineer, and I have never once heard the question of danger in long trains mentioned in a single safety meeting nor have I ever read of that statement being made in any meeting when I read the minutes of the meetings. Mr. EICHER. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eicher. Mr. EICHER. It is in the record, as I recollect, it, that upon at least one of the railroads-I forget now which one-the suggestion that trainmen riding in cabooses take extra care to avoid personal injury, did not appear in the rule books until about 1929. Would you have any comment to make on that question? Mr. BROWN. I could not say about the date. I know that whether that rule has appeared in the rule books or not, I do not know; but I know that it has been a matter of comment on, either on the engines or the cabooses, or riding a single car, that a man just must not ride on anything moving, a moving car, at all, without he supports himself. Now, I have read over several of those rules since this hearing started because I was rather surprised at the comments made on it, because it is only one-well, it is one of about a thousand safety rules we have on the Reading, and the Jersey Central, and it is not any different than to tell an engineer that in going through a tunnel or where there are close clearings he should not put his head out of the cab. That is what we do. We simply take advantage of the oppor- tunities that have come to practical men from experience and tell the other fellow that he should not do things that have caused injuries either to the officials or himself. That is in line with safety. That is what we are trying to do. That has had a considerable bearing on the record that has been made. And, the same is true in the handling of passenger trains. Mr. EICHER. I was merely wondering whether or not any argu- ment could be made based on the claim that there had been an increased hazard to the men in the caboose as a result of or arising out of the increased use of long trains, and that the fact that this rule appears for the first time in 1929 is at least inferentially an admission on the part of the railroad management that there is such increased hazard. That is what I would like to have some light on. Mr. BROWN. The rule that we have in effect does not just stop at the caboose. I cannot quote the exact wording of it, but it is in suk- stance to the effect that men riding in cabooses or on cars, while mov- ing, should be on guard to prevent injury of that sort. That is the purpose of it. In other words we tell our men in the yards while riding cars down through the yards to be on guard. We have a number of men injured in the yards on account of cars going a little bit too fast and even have occasions of brakemen injured. We have an occasion of a brakeman who was injured at Ashley, and I men- tion that because in this list here, in this report here, there is mention of injuries to men on the rear end of trains at Ashley. He said, on account of slack action. Well, it was shock. They were knocked down and they were injured. But, right at the same TRAIN LENGTHS 645 point on this descending grade of 60 feet to the mile, the brakeman after being on the train, safely handling the train over the road, 120 -cars, cu tthe caboose off and coasted down behind a train. He forgot that the train had stopped and run into it and it knocked him down and he was injured. So I do not know where you get to that point at all. We try to tell them in these rules that they should safeguard them- selves against that sort of an accident. Mr. WOLVERToN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wolverton. Mr. WOLvERTON. Does the rule to which Mr. Eicher refers have any special application to long trains as distinguished from short trains? Mr. BROWN. It does not on our roads. It just simply says cabooses, cars, on trains and applies to cars, moving cars. We have the same thing as to the man walking over the top of a train. He is crossing from one car to another in the train, and when the train is being started or stopped, it is a danger that he recognizes exists. Mr. WOLvERTON. Then, it is a safety rule that is applicable regard- less of the length of the train? Mr. BRowN. Yes, on any moving car, Mr. Wolverton. It does not make any difference whether it is one car or 125, it is just the same. Mr. WiTHRow. Mr. Brown, in regard to the accident involving your brother. Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHRow. You said that it was the sixth car Mr. BROWN. I said six cars broke off. It was on an 80-car train. The coupler pin broke between the seventy-fifth and seventy-fourth car and it was an 80-car train and he was on the rear end. So, it broke off 6 cars and the caboose, and they were loaded with coal. Mr. WrrHROW. Loaded with what? Mr. BROWN. Loaded with coal and they were empties on the head end, so when the brakes were applied, the back cars separated; but the shock of the emergency application knocked him down. Then the cars ran together and that finished the job, as he said. Mr. WrrnRow. He was injured when the cars ran up against the train? Mr. BROWN. No; he was knocked down and had his ankle hurt. He was upset in the beginning. He was conscious of that, all of the time, but when he got through and hit the rear end of the train Mr. WITHROW. He was unconscious? Mr. BROWN. He did not know exactly what happened; that is, he could not tell what happened. The flagman, however, was not hurt. Mr. WITHROw. But he was sure that he received his injury in the first shock rather than when he hit the train? Mr. BROWN. That was when he was upset. Mr. Wrrimow. Although he was knocked semiconscious or uncon- scious when he hit the train? Mr. BRowN. I suppose that is what is meant by that. But, the fact was he was overbalanced and hurt. He had a broken ankle. That is what happened. Mr. WrraRow. I would like to ask a question or two in regard to the testimony that you have given relative to your experience with 646 TRAIN LENGTHS long trains; that is, having your car placed on the rear end of long trains. You said over a period of 5 years you had had your car placed on the rear end of 41 freight trains. Mr. BROWN. That is right. Mr. WITHRow. And 12 of them had been over 70 cars in length. Mr. BROWN. That is right. Mr. WITHROW. One was a 142-car train. Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHRow. Now, did you travel over the entire division when your car was placed on those trains? Mr. BROWN. The distance traveled varied from .25 to 133 miles. Mr. WITHRow. Do you think that frequency of travel that would give you a pretty good idea of normal shock experienced on freight trains? You have traveled on trains of 70 cars or more 12 times in 5 years? Mr. BROWN. I did not say that. I said in addition to the number of trains I have ridden in the caboose. Mr. WITHROW. I mean, with your car on the rear of trains. Mr. BROWN. That is right. Mr. WITHROW. Then being subject to all of the operating condi- tions on long trains. Mr. BROWN. That is right. Mr. WITHROw. Twelve times in 5 years. Do you think that is frequent enough to give you a good idea? Mr. BROWN. If you will take my statement for the value that there is in it. I have said, Mr. Congressman, in addition to the number of trains that I have ridden in the caboose, which I had no record of. I merely gave this information because it is concrete and I can give the day, the time, and the place. Now, it was just--I wanted to tell you the absolute facts-that I gave that information for. I have ridden hundreds of trains in the meantime, because about nine-tenths of the trips I make on the rail- road are made on freight trains. Mr. WITHROw. These are trips you kept a record of as to the gage Mr. BROWN. No; I do the same thing on freight trains. They have got an air gage in the caboose and they never make a stop but what I have got a chance to look at that gage. Mr. WITHROW. I do not think that 12 trips are sufficient to base judgment on as to the operation of slack. I understand you are vice president. Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir. Mr. WITHROW. When you were an engineer, how did you feel when you were informed at the terminal or the dispatcher told you to pick up the vice president's car, and place it on the rear end? Did you not feel that you were going to have a mighty fine trip from there in? Mr. BROWN. I never had that experience. Mr. WrnTow. Well, as a matter of fact, wouldn't you have felt that way? Mr. BROWN. I can appreciate what you had in mind, but just let me say this, as a matter of record, that the first trip or two in which I placed a car on these trains, the engineers were very much con- cerned about it. Mr. Wrrxnow. I am not surprised. TRAIN LENGTHS 647 Mr. BROWN. But after that, after that, they were glad I was on the train. Now, I can give you a further illustration of how the trains were handled, if you desire it, on every trip that I made. I put a towel on a dresser and put a glass of water two-thirds filled with water on that dresser, and I have never yet found the wate spilled or a wet ring around where the glass was, on the 41 trips. I am only giving you that in support of the statement that where starts and stops are made they are absolutely under the control of the engineer, and they were. Mr. WITHROW. Whenever a vice president's car is put on the rear end of a freight train, that makes that freight train a superior freight train and it is not delayed and never does it, as a rule, take siding for other trains, although according to the timetable the train may be an inferior train and there is every reason to believe that the tram would be handled in a very fine sort of a way. Mr. BROWN. As a matter of fact, Mr. Congressman, the railroad I referred to is double tracked, and we do not go into sidings to meet trains, and we operate our trains at a speed at which one seldom overtakes another, unless it is a passenger train, and we do that with 100, 110, and 115 cars. That is the beauty of present-day operation. We have locomotives that will handle so-called long trains faster and more efficiently than the small engines did with the so-called shorter trains. There is not any such a thing as a long train, Mr. Congressman. It is just a question of what that engine will handle, and the engi- neer is more capable of handling the capacity of the engine today than he was of the engine of yesterday. Mr. WITHROw. All right. Then, in regard to rear-end applica- tion; the application of the brakes from the rear end: Why is it that normally we are fearful, the men operating the trains, are fearful of applying the brakes from the caboose with the so-called conduc- tor's valve ? Mr. BROWN. Well, I must say again, Mr. Congressman, I am learn- ing something since I have been at this hearing. If that condition exists, please do not spread that information as to the Jersey Central and the Reading, because they do not have that fear over there. Mr. WrIHRow. I am afraid you are assuming a little too much. Mr. BROWN. Only what I get from the men. Mr. WITHROW. What is the difference between the application; what happens; what is the difference between the application of the air brakes from the head end and the application of the air brakes from the rear end? Taking into consideration the air pumps? Mr. BROWN. The pump does not have anything to do with the brakes. Mr. WITHRow. It has a great deal to do with them. When you apply the brakes on the head end, do you not cut off the supply of air from the pumps to the train line? Mr. BRowN. That is right. Mr. WrrHRow. All right. Then, when the brakes are applied from the rear end, does the engine not keep pulling, and pumping air, when the brakes are applied from the rear end? Mr. BROWN. Yes; it can just keep pumping all it wants to. Mr. WrrHRow. Does that not make quite a difference? 648 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. BROWN. Sir? Mr. WITHROW. Does that not make quite a difference? Mr. BROWN. Absolutely none, only in the length of time that is required to stop the train. That is all. I say that for this reason. There is not a trainman with any experience who will come in and tell you or tell this committee that they can open up the angle cock on the rear of a long train and that the train will keep on, proceed- ing, because of the fact that the pump is pumping air back into the train line faster than it can go out through the angle cock on the rear. It just cannot be done, because the capacity of the pump is not great enough to do it. You can go to the rear of the tender and part the hose and you cannot get more than 30 pounds pressure on the train line, and that is due to the back pressure trying to force the air out through the locomotive. You cannot even charge the locomotive with angle cock open. Mr. WITHRow. I understand that. Mr. BROWN. Now, to get to your point: You have the air fully charged to the rear end of the train and when the conductor opens the valve, lie opens it gradually, and he keeps on opening it until finally the valve is wide open and when that valve is wide open, you can have two pumps on the head end or you can have five pumps on the head end, and not put the air back through the train line, be- cause the train line is not large enough to keep a full pressure of air throughout that entire train while it is wide open on the rear end. You cannot do that, and as long as the pressure has been reduced, the brakes will apply. It takes longer to stop a train under those conditions than it would if the air was applied from the head end of the train; but you can stop the train that way. Mr. WITUROW. When you apply the brakes from the rear end with the conductor's valve that is an abnormal stop and an abnormal strain on the draft timbers and all of the equipment on the rear end of the train, is it not? And, if there is any weakness you are liable to have trouble. Is that not the reason we do not want to apply the brakes from the rear end? We do it as a last resort. Mr. BROWN. The fact of the matter is that the only thing that keeps that train running is the power of the locomotive. Now, if you had the locomotive cut off the train would stop itself. The only thing that keeps it going is the engine working, and that engine is not strong enough to pull the drawbars out on a steady pull, so you can apply the brakes from the rear end and all that happens is that the train stops because the locomotive cannot continue to move that train. Now, of course, when you put the brakes in an emergency, which has been referred to as the usual practice, but it is not. When the brakes go on in an emergency and the slack has been bunched in the train, you get an unusual condition of slack running out at the head end due to the excessive weight, but if that slack is already stretched out as happens in about 99 cases out of a hundred, just as I referred to here when the office car broke off of the caboose and. parted the hose, and. opened up the angle cock on the rear end of the caboose, the last car in the train, the brakes went into emergency, and they were descending the grade, and nothing happened. Mr. Wrrmxow. Well, the valve in the rear end, the conductor's valve, is merely a hole in the pipe. It is just similar to an. angle cock, is it not, or almost that, with an air gage? TRAIN LENGTHS (O9 Mr. BROWN. Yes. Mr. WITHUow. It is not the type of equipment you have on the head end. Mr. BROWN. That is right. You do not need it. Mr. WITHROW. All right. Now, you mentioned the fact that 95 percent of the men on your railroad, in freight service, exercised their seniority rights and rode the rear end of the train. In other words, there were only 5 pecent of the senior men who choose to ride the head end. Mr. BROWN. Yes. Of 92 crews on the Reading in only two crews have the oldest men chosen the front end. Mr. WITHRow. Well, you know as well as I do, that the conductor is the man who places the men. Mr. BRowN. They do not on the Reading or the Jersey Central. Mr. WITHRow. They do not? Mr. BROwN. As long as a man is qualified as a flagman, he exer- cises his seniority rights. Mr. WITHRow. The conductor has charge of the train. Mr. BROWN. That is all right. The conductor cannot overrule seniority as long as he is efficient. The same is true of the brake- man, if he is capable of handling his work, and properly qualified as a flagman, if he chooses to be flagman, he can be flagman if that is. what he wants. That is seniority. Mr. WITHRow. Well, of course, the conductor is judge as to those qualifications, and who is going to work on the rear end and who is going to work on the head end. Mr. BROWN. Do you think that any labor organization would permit the conductor to require a man to work in a place where the man himself thought it was unsafe? It could not be done. Mr. WITHRow. You say it is not? Mr. BROWN. Neither would we permit it. The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed. Mr. BRowN. I wish now to take up the matter of the operation of our freight trains. Proponents of the bill have claimed that by its enactment there will be no appreciable increase in the number of trains operated, their claim being based on the fact that statistics show that an average of 46.4 cars were handled per train in the. United States in 1936. The figure of 46.4 cars per freight train represents the result obtained by dividing the total number of train miles made by all freight trains on the class I railroads into the total number of cars: miles on these railroads. Average speed of trains is arrived at by dividing the total train hours into the total train-miles. As stated, these figures represent the average for the railroads in the country as a whole and are used for comparative purposes with those of other periods to determine nationally whether or not safety,. service and efficient operation is being accomplished. It therefore stands to reason that these national figures cannot be used as a measuring stick for any one railroad because of the varying Operating conditions as between railroads. However, the various railroads make use of the same formula in order to check their own operations, and as the operating conditions on each division of the same railroad system vary due to the different classes of service 650 TRAIN LENGTHS required and character of territory in which operated, it is necessary again to break down these figures for use by each division. Therefore, while the statistics show that the average cars per train operated on railroads as a whole equals 46.4 cars, this average varies greatly as between railroads and between different divisions on the same railroad system. I appreciate I have taken up much of your valuable time in this detailed explanation, but I have done so in order to make it plain that there is no logical basis for the proponent's claim that the excess cars remaining from trains operating over 70 cars could be placed in trains that operated with less than 70 cars. In order further to clear up this question in the minds of the committee, I would like to give you a practical description of rail- road operation, separating the service into various groups, explaining the necessity for and the requirements exacted of each group. While I am speaking for the railroads as a whole, I feel it would be of interest to you if I gave a description of the operation of the two railroads with which I am connected, namely, the Reading Co. and the Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey. My general experi- ence has been on three separate railroads, extending from the Mis- sissippi River to the Atlantic coast, and serving 10 States in that territory, and I feel qualified to say that the service I will describe is characteristic of that experienced by the other railroads. The two railroads with which I am now connected serve a dense industrial and manufacturing territory, and also serve the Schuykill, Wyo- ming, and Lehigh districts in the anthracite coal field, and the per- centage volume of one class of service performed to another may vary somewhat from that of other railroads, even though the char- acter of service is the same. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boren. Mr. BOREN. Just before passing up the charts, I would like to ask one question. Mr. Brown, you referred to the absence of fear on the part of people on the two ends of the train with relation to the length of the train. Mr. BROWN. Yes. Mr. BOREN. Do you feel that this cause would be safe if it were left to a referendum of the men in the train service? I mean, do you think that a ballot of the men in the train service would verify your opinion that they are not afraid of long trains? Mr. BROWN. May I state, Mr. Boren, that my statement is based entirely on experience. In other words, I dealt entirely with that when I said I had not at any time ever had the matter brought up with me as to the fact that men were afraid to ride the rear of the train and the fact that they were not afraid; that they prefer the rear end to the locomotive was evidenced by the fact that about 85 percent of the men generally bid in the rear end of the train and I thought if it was dangerous, if the long-train operation was more dangerous on the rear than it was on the head end they would exer- cise their rights and take the head end. Mr. BOREN. But, you do not contemplate bringing train crews, or men, here as witnesses to support that viewpoint? Mr. BROWN. I would not see any necessity for me doing it, be- cause they have never at any time made any statement that it was TRAIN LENGTHS 651 unsafe and they have had plenty of opportunity. In all of the dealings with the organizations representing these men with which I have had contact for 25 years, I have never heard one representa- tive of the trainmen's organizations raise that contention. Mr. BOREN. From your statement, Mr. Brown, it just occurs to me since we have had some railroad engineers, conductors, and brake- men here testifying in exact opposition to the viewpoint you here represent, it strikes me that if what you say is true we should be able to receive some such testimony from the men themselves in that connection. Mr. BnowN. Well, as I recall it, the principal witness who told of the fear that he had in riding long trains, I think, is Mr. Sullivan, of the Pennsylvania. He is the man who got off of the train and went back into the yards. He was the same man who gave the informa- tion to the effect that the operation of long trains in that particular territory was less satisfactory than the operation of short trains, which was disproved at a later point, and I wish to make this state- ment, that as I recall, Mr. Sullivan stated that the officers did not ride the cabooses on those trains. I talked with the operating vice president of the Pennsylvania, whom I have known for some time, without telling him why I wanted the information, I asked Mr. Morris if he had been riding any freight trains recently, and he told me that he had and he had ridden some on the caboose and some on the motors, between Potomac Yards and Jersey City, and he also had ridden some on the main line, and he had a number of times had his office car on the rear end of trains. I merely make that statement to prove that, or rather to show, that the testimony given that officers do not ride freight trains on the Pennsylvania was not based on facts, because I got that personally from the man who does. Mr. BOREN. I only asked this question because there is some pre- sumption, of course, from the testimony that has been given as to what the men believe about it. But the only actual testimony that has come in here from the men themselves has been strikingly and entirely contrary to the statement you have made here. That is all, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. How much more of a statement have you, Mr. Brown? Mr. BROWN. About seven pages. The *CHAIRMAN. The committee will have to have an executive session in about 10 minutes. You may proceed. Mr. BROWN. At this time I wish to present charts of the Reading Railroad and the Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, showing their various lines, and the traffic density in each section. Coal traffic is shown in dark lines, and freight other than coal is shown in pinlr lines, each line representing 100,000 net tons hauled per mile and the figures shown with each section indicate the total tonnage handled in each classification during the year 1936 in each direction. You will note the various sections into which the roads are divided, each indicating a break in the volume of tonnage hauled due to the variation in the amount of traffic handled over the road or originating or terminating in each section. 652 TRAIN LENGTHS As previously explained, in addition to handling through over- head traffic, these railroads pass through dense industrial, manufac- turing, and mining territories, and it is significant that the various; sections into which each map is divided represents the divisions of the various industrial sections along the line. I point this out particularly at this time because it is within each of these separate districts shown that the use of the short turn-around trains, switch-run trains, and mine-run trains are operated. The ter- ritory in which each of these trains operate is in most instances con- fined to one or two of these short districts. You will note certain lines of road leading off from the main system on which traffic density is very light and in some instances not sufficiently heavy to register. These are known as branch or feeder lines serving the local communities and the work performed on these lines is by local freight trains. In the upper left-hand corner of the Reading map, encircled in dotted lines, is shown the line of road, on which the traffic density is indicated in black, serving the Schuylkill Valley anthracite coal fields. In the upper left-hand corner of the Jersey Central map, en- circled in dotted lines, is the portion of line serving the Wyoming anthracite coal fields. These sections are in mountainous territory in which heavy grades prevail. The work incident to serving these mines, which consists of the placing of empties and pulling of loads and accumulating them at assembly points, is performed by mine-run crews operating in short mileage service. The pink lines indicate net tons of freight other than coal and represent to a great extent business handled by symbol or through trains. These trains usually operate from one end of the line to the other over various routes and make stops at various points en route to pick up loads in the dense traffic areas, or to set off loads of various commodities for distribution within these localities, and move- the coal from the various assembling points to destination, as well as handles empties from the various terminals to the mine districts. Therefore we have two separate and distinct train operations; one to handle the through traffic from one end of the road to the other, traffic picked up at the various assembling points to be moved beyond the respective districts or traffic to be set off at the various dispatch- ing points. This type of train is known as through or symbol classi- fication. The other group consists of those whose activities are con- fined to the limited area as described by the divisions shown on the map. Their sole duty is to perform the switching in that district or limited area, distributing or assembling cars that have been or are to be moved in through or symbol trains. I am also presenting a chart on which is shown the regular through symbol trains operated by each road, the details of which I will explain later. Therefore, to picture more clearly to you the difference in the two operations referred to, that is, through service and local pick-up, road, and switching service, I took for an illustration, the operations of the two roads during a midweek day, April 21, 1937, on which date average conditions prevailed. On the Reading Railroad a total of 483 freight trains were oper- ated, divided as follows: TRAIN LENGTHS 653 Symbol trains 77, of which 24 had more than 70 cars, maximum number 108, and average 82.7 cars per train; and 53 trains of 70 cars or less with an average of 51.2 cars per train. Other through trains totaled 54, of which 37 consisted of more than 70 cars, maximum number 129 cars, and averaged 94.3 cars per train; and 17 trains of 70 cars or less, averaging 56.7 cars. All other freight trains, which included local and way freight, traveling shifter and mine runs, totaled 352, of which 5 trains handled more than 70 cars, maximum number 131 cars, an average of 95.2 cars per train; and 347 trains of less than 70 cars, averaging 17.1 cars per train (298 crews) (268 yard crews). Therefore, to handle the business on the Reading that day, you will note a total of 131 through-freight trains were operated, of which 77 were of the fast freight or symbol class, and 54 of coal or other through trains, and these trains handled from one destination to another and to and from connections of the various railroads, the road haul business that was offered. A portion of this freight delivered by one railroad connection is moved over our lines and delivered to another railroad connection and is termed through-freight business. A large portion of the busi- ness handled however, either originated or terminated in the indus- trial territory and the coal regions. After such cars had been moved over the line by through trains, the district switchers, locals, way freight and mine runs, of which 352 were operated, performed the work of distributing these cars on sidings, either loaded or empty at mines or industries, and they also pick up loads or empties from such sidings for out-bound movement by the through trains. The distance operated by these road-switching trains is necessarily short due to the extensive amount of switching required of them within the limited areas. Therefore, these road-switching trains are not available for through road-haul movements as the proponents of the bill would have you believe. It will be noted there was a total of 131 through trains operated on the Reading of which 61 carried more than 70 cars, and 70 carried 70 cars or less, but of this total, 77 were operated on regular pub- lished schedules and these trains moved from various terminals mak- ing a total of 100 different connections with 19 other railroads, also effecting delivery of freight at particular points for regular place- ment time. No two trains carry cars originating at the same points at the same time requiring delivery at the same point and at the same time. The major portion of these symbol trains make connections at various interchange points connecting with symbol trains of other railroads and the delivery time set for each such connection must be made to avoid interference with the continuity of the through movement of the cars. As to the operations of the Central Railroad of New Jersey on the same day. I will not burden you with much detail, except as it differs from that of the Reading operations. One hundred and ninety three trains were operated, of which 43 were symbol; 14 having more than 70 cars, maximum 116, and aver- aged 83.3 cars per train; 29 had 70 cars or less and averaged 50.5 cars per train. Eight other through trains of more than 70 cars, 47891-38--42 654 TRAIN LENGTHS maximum 131, averaging 102 cars per train; and one through train with 70 cars (193 crews) (121 yard crews). Local freights, traveling shifters, and mine runs working in those districts total 141, of which 5 trains handled more than 70 cars, maximum 91, and averaged 80 cars per train; 136 handled less than 70 cars and averaged 24 cars per train. The character of service rendered by the two roads corresponds, except in volume and you will note that the Jersey Central operated a total of 43 symbol and 9 tonnage trains to handle business offered, while it required 141 local, pick-ups, and mine runs to perform the road switching incidental to picking up or distributing the cars handled by these through trains. Of the 43 symbol trains operated, 17 are scheduled to leave Jersey City each day and 16 are scheduled to arrive, and we mix those in with 147 passenger trains of each direction and all leading from the vicinity of the passenger terminal, and, similar to the Reading serv- ice, each train handles cars originating at various points along the line, as well as cars received from railroad connections, for delivery at different destinations and other railroad connections. Where con- nections and destinations are the same, the acceptance time of the cars leaving the terminal and the required delivery time at the con- nections and destinations vary and cannot be combined. The description I have just completed, covering the operations on the two named railroads, is characteristic of the service performed on the other railroads in the country, as the method of operating symbol trains is necessarily similar on all railroads. Even where any train of less than 70 cars is operated over a division of any railroad it is either because of operating conditions which require it to be done, or because of insufficient traffic offered for the destination of that train. One would be led to believe by the statements made, that trains are built up in yards merely by grouping together on one track all cars as they are received, and when a given number of cars, regard- less of destination or commodities loaded, are switched together an engine and caboose are put on and the train dispatched, and that the cars left over are then added to other cars as they arrive until a sufficient number of cars have been accumulated for another train and then dispatched in the same manner. Should the yard opera- tions be as simple as that, a railroad man's trouble would be over. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brown, it will be necessary for the committee to adjourn so far as the hearing is concerned at this time to meet next Tuesday morning at 10 o'clock. Mr. BROWN. All right, sir. The CHAIRMAN. We will appreciate it if the audience will give us the room as promptly as possible. (Thereupon, at 11:45 a. m., the committee proceeded to the con- sideration of other business, after which it adjourned.) TRAIN LENGTHS TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1938 HOUSE OF REPREsENTATIVES, COMMlTTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Vashington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the committee room, New House Office Building, Hon. Alfred L. Bul- winkle, presiding. Mr. BULWINKLE (presiding). The committee will be in order. The first witness is Mr. Day, manager of the Transportation Bureau of the. Boston Chamber of Commerce, Boston, Mass. STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. DAY, MANAGER OF THE TRANSPOR- TATION BUREAU OF THE BOSTON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, BOSTON, MASS. Mr. DAY. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen: My name is William H. Day. My experience in the field of transportation covers a period of approximately 35 years. Since 1924 I have been employed as man- ager of the Transportation Bureau of the Boston Chamber of Com- merce. In an effort to conserve the time of you gentlemen and avoid duplication of testimony, I have been authorized to speak for the New England Shippers Advisory Board, the New England Traffic League, the New England Paper and Pulp Traffic Association, the Associated Industries of Massachusetts, the Manufacturers Associa- tion of Connecticut, Inc.; the New Hampshire Manufacturers Asso- ciation, the Boston Chamber of Commerce, the New Bedford, Mass., Board of Commerce, and the Fall River, Mass., Chamber of Com- merce, which organizations represent in a substantial way the busi- ness life of New England, including many thousands of shippers and receivers of freight. We appear in opposition to S. 69 and any similar legislation. New England is the home of more than 16,000 industries, situated as they are, geographically, in the extreme northeastern section of the country, far away from the sources of their raw materials and many of the foremost consuming markets. Good transportation service at a price that will permit the products to properly move is so 'essential to their success that they consider it necessary to ac- tively interest themselves in any proposal offering indications of so undermining the financial structure of the rail carriers serving them as to prohibit a continuation of services at rates now enjoyed. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, those I speak for are fearful that the passage of the bill here at issue will have that effect. 655 656 TRAIN LENGTHS Twenty years ago some of our New England railroads thought they were going a pretty good job when they moved a west-bound carload of freight from an interior New England point to the various Hud- son River gateways at the western boundary of New England, a dis- tance of some 200 miles, in 2 days, and I am inclined to believe that they did, considering what they then had to do with. Now, the rail carriers are subject to criticism when they fail to move such traffic into the middle west, an average haul ,of a thousand miles, in approximately the same time. During the past 10 or 15 years our New England railroads have so speeded up long-haul traffic that today it is not uncommon to find potatoes produced in Aroostook County, Maine, reaching the Boston market, a distance of some 350 miles, quicker than the order of noti- fication or bills of lading necessary to establish ownership in Boston via United States mails. Now, what has made this service possible? My answer is the greatly improved motive power of today which is able to haul bigger loads, longer distances, more quickly, safely, and economically, than the motive power of yesterday could haul lighter trains shorter dis- tances, and we must not forget that as a prerequisite to this forward step our railroads were obliged to spend hundreds of millions of dol- lars improving their facilities and equipment. However, this combination of events has resulted in the best of freight service we ever enjoyed. It has enabled our industries to ex- pand their fields of endeavor and better meet the hand-to-mouth buy- ing methods of today, to the mutual advantage of established busi- ness and the railroads. Naturally we view with a lot of apprehension any possibility of so undermining existing practices as to adversely affect business. In the early stages of this hearing I heard some of those represent- ing labor express the opinion that the longer trains of today cause unnecessary delay in the handling of freight traffic at terminals and that this practice had reacted to the disadvantage of shippers and re- ceivers of freight. I wish to state, in no uncertain terms, that this statement is absolutely contrary to our experience over a period of years. As a matter of fact terminal delays are now so few and far between that it is becoming increasingly difficult to find them, insofar as long-haul, carload traffic is concerned. In this connection, it is interesting to observe that considering the raliroads of the country as a whole, in the year 1926 some $3,380,936 or 8.8 percent of all freight claims paid was charged to damage trace- able to delays while in 1936 this element of damage was reduced to $796,274 or 3.8 percent of all freight claims paid. As illustrative of the New England situation, in 1926, 6 percent of all of the damage claims paid by the Boston & Maine Railroad were traceable to delays, while in 1936 this ratio was reduced to 1.02 per- cent. In our opinion this remarkable improvement, both in a sectional and national way is traceable in a substantial degree to the increased efficiency made possible by the train service of today. Further, I heard representatives of labor express the opinion that the slack produced by the longer trains of today has so contributed to rough handling as to increase losses and damage claims. Again, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I want to say that this is contrary to the actual experience of the many thousands of shippers and receivers TRAIN LENGTHS 657 of freight that I represent; contrary to the facts developed by the railroads through the use of impact recorders, and contrary to the actual claim records of the railroads. Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman Mr. BTwINKLE. Mr. Boren. Mr. BoiEN. Mr. Day, what do you refer to as impact recorders? Mr. DAY. Impact recorders, Mr. Congressman, are a clock device which the railroads or shippers can install in a car in such a way that no one will have any idea it is there. When the car commences to move, the clocking device commences to work and a reel of paper commences to unfold recording, if you please, from the time the car starts until it reaches its destination, through a series of lines whether or not any rough handling has occurred, and if it has occurred the time will show when it occurred, and that time when checked with the train sheets permits the railroads to determine just where, if you please, the rough handling recorded occurred. Mr. BOREN. You mean then that the machine or the device would record the effect of slack action? Mr. DAY. If as a result of slack action there was rough handling as has been claimed and that rough handling was to an extent as to actually cause damage, the recorder would show it absolutely. There is no question about it. Mr. BOREN. In order that I may understand that clearly, do you refer to rough handling of the car itself or rough handling of some particular box or package of goods in the car? Mr. DAY. I refer to rough handling of the car itself from the time the car starts in motion with one of these devices installed. They commence to work with a series of lines as the paper unfolds. If it jumps into what is know in railroad circles as columns 1 and 2, it is realized that the jar was sufficiently slight as to cause no damage to an extent that would hurt the freight. If perchance the line jumps into column 3, it is recognized that the jolt was of an extent that would reasonably cause damage. Then the railroads immediately see what time that particular jolt occurred and if the time recorded on the sheet is 3: 30 p. in., then they take the train sheets and check them to see where, if you please, the train was at 3: 30 p. m., and there is the place where the jolt occurred and they can definitely determine whether it was at a station, in a yard, or in road haul service. Now, in New England there has been a great deal of missionary work done by the railroads with those devices, particularly on the lines of the Boston & Maine and the Main Central Railroads. Since the matter of long trains became an active issue, particular attention for a period of time was paid to that character of service, and these devices were installed in cars so as to definitely tell them just what the experience was. I believe that for several years the Boston & Maine used those devices for an average of between 300,000 and 400,000 miles of road service each year in an effort to satisfy them- selves just what the actual circumstances were. Mr. BOREN. You indicated here that the railroads have a device that might clearly show the difference between the shock effect of slack action as between long and short trains, if a sufficient number of cars were in the train. Mr. DAY. Well, that is not exactly what I am undertaking to say, Mr. Congressman. I am undertaking to tell you that the impact re- 658 TRAIN LENGTHS corder, as I understand it, when installed in any car, whether it be on a short train or a long train, will definitely show the railroads upon completion of the haul whether or not there was anywhere in the transit rough handling, and if there was rough handling they can definitely check where that rough handling occurred. Now, that is all I am undertaking to say. Mr. BOREN. But would you not agree that if that machine or de- vice works as you say it does work that you could put such a device in the rear car of a 70-car train across Arizona and make a graph from the shock effect there, and then put such a device in a long train, one of these through trains we have heard so much about here, and record on another graph a comparative illustration of exactly what the effect is as between a 70-car and 150-car train? Mr. DAY. Mr. Congressman, I have on occasions conferred with railroad management on the matter of rough handling in an effort to settle questions that shippers were interested in. These recorders have been installed, and I have been furnished and have in my office at the present time, for instance, an actual check showing everything which happened from the time a car left its original point until it reached its destination. Now, that can be installed in any sort of a freight car on any sort of a train; and my understanding is that it will record the sort of story that I have unfolded to you and in fool-proof fashion. I further understand that in some sections of the country today shippers who have been experiencing difficulties in the movement of some particular kind of traffic where there has been some damage occurring are anxious to find out the whys and wherefores surround- ing them, and they, like the railroads, now frequently take these de- vices and install them in cars where they are experiencing difficulty, even unbeknown to the railroads, and then when the car reaches its destination they take out the long roll of paper and commence to unfold it. If there appears on there any indication of rough han- dling they check the time and then go to the railroads and see where that car was at that particular time, and in that way they get their information. Mr. CROssER (presiding). Are there any further questions? Mr. MARTIN. Just one question, Mr. Chairman. Mr. CROSSER. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. That shock-recording device works on the same me- chanical principle as speed recorders and many other devices, such as those that register vibration, and so forth. Mr. DAY. That is true. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, this bill here before you is being urged as a safety measure. Naturally the various organizations that I appear for favor safeguarding both the public and the railroad employees to the fullest possible extent; but in view of the perfectly obvious fact that the more trains there are to handle a given amount of business, the more opportunities there will be for accidents, both to the public and to the railroad employees as a whole, plus the fact that the records of the Interstate Commerce Commission made public by its Bureau of Statistics show very clearly that during the period since the World War, when the average length of trains increased substantially, and the use of so-called longer trains became more and more prevalent, there was a striking improvement in the safety TRAIN LENGTHS 659, records of the railroads with respect to trains and train-service em- ployees, as well as with respect to employees and the public generally,. there is every indication that the real purpose of this bill is to create additional and unnecessary jobs at an expense that will unduly bur- den our railroads and, perhaps, result in the deterioration of service now enjoyed and which the public can ill afford to lose. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Chairman. Mr. CROSSER. Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BULwINWLE. How many extra jobs will it create? Mr. DAY. I would not care to attempt to answer that question. Mr. BULWINKLE. You made the statement. Mr. DAY. If you will Mr. BULwINKLE (interposing). You made the statement it would create extra jobs. Mr. DAY. That is right; but you asked me how many it will create.. Mr. BULWINKLE. Now, how many extra, according to your state- ment, will it create? Mr. DAY. I would only undertake, Mr. Congressman, to answer that in this way: If today, as illustrative, between Boston and the Hudson River gateways at the western boundary of New England, a given railroad is operating six trains, we will say each handling.an average of 140 cars Mr. BULWINKLE (interposing). Well, do they now? Mr. DAY. I would not say that they would average that number; but taking that particular run, long haul west-bound and east-bound freight, coming from your trunk-line railroads to your New England terminal, Boston, the habit is to run very, very heavy trains. I would say that when business is normal such trains would seldom operate with less than 100 cars. Mr. BULWINKLE. Do they ever reach as many as 140 cars? Mr.DAY. Yes, sir. I have seen them have more. Mr. BULwINKLE. How many more? Mr. DAY. Oh, I have seen them operating 145, 150, and 152. Now, if as the result of the passing of this bill the limit of such trains is restricted to 70 cars, then obviously there must be two trains at least to do the work that one is now doing and that means addi- tional engine crews, additional employees at terminals, and possibly to other extents. That is a question that the railroads can far better answer as to the exact change that will be brought about; but it seems to me elemen- tary that if you have to have two trains to do the work of one you are going to have twice as many employees. Mr. BULWINKLE. You are speaking now for all New England? Mr. DAY. That is true. Mr. BULWINKLE. In your statement here this morning you are speaking for all New England? Mr. DAY. New England shippers. Mr. BULWINKLE. And you, of course, know the facts so far as the New England shippers and the railroads are concerned. Now, how many extra trains would it require in New England? Mr. DAY. I would not dare answer that question. Mr. BULWINKLE. How many extra employees would be required in New England; not on just one road going into Boston, but on all roads. 660 TRAIN LENGTHS Mr. DAY. I would not dare answer that question. I would not attempt to, Mr. Congressman. I would say probably there are in the neighborhood of 20 percent of the trains operated in New England, freight trains, that would be adversely affected by any such limitation as is proposed. Mr. BULWINKLE. In your opinion it would be then increased about one-fifth. Mr. DAt. That is right. Mr. BULWINKLE. In the number of trains. Mr. DAY. That is right. Mr. BULWINKLE. You may proceed. Mr. DAY. It is unnecessary for me to remind you gentlemen of the serious financial conditions of our railroads. The only thing they have to sell is transportation and any increase of their operating costs must be reflected in the prices they charge for services rendered. How- ever, as a practical matter, this is much easier said than done, because they are confronted on all sides by most active competition and they have learned by bitter experience that high freight rates not only stimulate the diversion of traffic but also localize business to the detriment of established industry as well as themselves. Mr. BULWINKLE. Is your organization protesting against the increase in freight rates? Mr. DAY. No, sir. Mr. BULWINKLE. Are you approving of it? Mr. DAY. We have taken this position: We have felt, and still feel, very strongly, that in many instances railroad freight rates have already reached the ceiling of reasonableness, and consequently there has been considerable doubt in our minds as to whether or not the increase which the railroads are now seeking would accomplish the desired purpose. However, we realized that they were confronted with a real urgency. It seemed to us that they had to obtain addi- tional money and obtain it quickly. It seemed to us that the only way open to them at the moment was through an increase of freight rates and consequently we set aside our own ideas and in the proceed- ing to which you have referred appeared before the Interstate Com- mnerce Commission declaring ourselves along the lines I have to you. Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman. Mr. CROssER. Mr. Martin. Mr. MARTIN. Do you apprehend that the proposed increase would have any appreciable effect on the volume of traffic, that is, in the way of decreasing traffic? Mr. DAY. Yes, sir. I think, Mr. Congressman, that every time railroad freight rates are increased, the natural result is a shrinking