THE
0
CONDUCT
OF THE
OPPOSITION,
And the TENDENCY of
Modern Patriotiſm, &c.
(Price One Shilling.)
JN
539
1734
H58
Hervey, Jahre Herwass
THE
CONDUCT
OF THE
OPPOSITION,
AND THE
TENDENCY
OF
Modern Patriotifm,
(More particularly in a late Scheme
to Eſtabliſh a MILITARY GOVERN-
MENT in this Country)
Review'd and Examin'd.
Nolumus Leges Angliæ mutari.
LONDON:
Printed for J. PEELE, at Locke's Head in
Amen-Corner. MDCCXXXIV.
JN..
539
1734
H58
English
Nilitup
17003
(5)
THE
CONDUCT
OF THE
OPPOSITION, &c.
P
Rofeffions of Fairneſs and Impar-
tiality are fuch worn-out Prefa-
ces to all polemical Writings,
and more particularly to politi-
cal Differtations, that I fhall neither give
my ſelf nor my Readers the Trouble of any
Exordium of that Kind; having neither
fo good an Opinion of my own Ingenuity,
nor fo ill a one of their Difcernment, as to
imagine I can perfwade them to believe
there is Candour where it is not, or that
they will want any Light but its own to
diftinguifh it where it is.
A 3
All
€ 19
-3-13-47
يد
(6)
All I fhall fay, is, that notwithſtanding
moft Authors at prefent feem to write, as
if Calumny and Flattery divided the whole
World, and that Truth had fo few Fol-
lowers that no body could repreſent any
thing but as their Prejudices conceive it,
or their Intereft induces them to defcribe
it; notwithſtanding Authors feem to con-
cern themſelves fo much more about Per-
fons than Things, and about the private.
Characters of Tranfactors, than the publick
Utility, or Detriment of their Tranfac-
tions; notwithſtanding, I fay, the almoſt
univerfal Prevalence of thefe epidemical
Errors, as I am fure I can difapprove the
Meaſures of fome Claffes of Men, without
feeling Rancour to any of the Individuals.
that compoſe them, fo I flatter my ſelf I
can love the Perſons of others, and eſteem
their private Character, without being by-
afs'd to think differently of their publick
Behaviour, than I fhould do without thoſe
Attachments.
And when I declare againft all Perfona-
lities, against the too frequent Practice of
mif-ftating Facts, declaiming to the Paf
fions of the People, and endeavouring to
blind their Reafon rather than enlighten it,
I
(7)
1
I muſt leave the World to judge, whether
I fall into the Errors I condemn, or fet
an Example of the Conduct I would re-
commend.
;
That the Freedom of this Country is the
Bafis of its Profperity, and confequently
what ought to be the primary Confidera
tion of all thofe concern'd in framing its
Laws, is a Propofition on which I am rea-
dy to join Iffue with thoſe who are the
loudeft Advocates for Liberty, and pretend
to be the ftouteft Champions in its Cauſe
but the two great Points fo often afferted,
and fo generally inculcated by the Oppofi-
tion, which are, that they themfelves are
conſtantly at Work in the Support and
Defence of our Liberties, and thoſe they
oppoſe as conftantly endeavouring to un-
dermine them; theſe two are Points to
which I can never agree: And in order to
give my Reaſons for diffenting, I fhall, in
the firft Place, examine, whether every Step
lately taken by the Oppofition has tended
to the Maintenance of Liberty, or to the
Introduction of fuch Confufion as could on-
ly fettle at laſt in the abfolute Deſtruction
of all Liberty in this Country.
In
(8)
In the next Place I fhall confider, whe-
ther any one Meaſure of the preſent Ad-
miniſtration has either directly attack'd,
or indirectly weaken'd our Liberties; and
whether this Country does not enjoy them
at this Day in as full Extent as it ever
did, in the moft free and profperous Era
that can be mark'd out in the Hiſtory of
this Government, from its earlieſt Infancy
to the preſent Hour.
And as nothing can conduce farther to-
wards manifefting the Sincerity of theſe
Opponents, when they declare the Intereft
of their Country is all they have at Heart;
or if they fincerely with it, how perfectly
well they underſtand it; I fhall now en-
deavour to diſplay in its genuine Colours
the laft Proof they have given of this
Zeal for Liberty in their military Pro-
ject; from whence the whole World may
fee how little theſe Patriot-Parents, of a
Tyrant-Child, either knew what their Off-
fpring in Maturity muft prove; or if they
did know, how little their Schemes and
Actions tally with their Words and Wri-
tings, their Conduct with their Profeffions,
or the Titles they deferve with thoſe they
affume.
But
(9)
But before I examine this Project, with
Regard to the great Support and Security
it would be to the Liberties of this Coun-
try, I cannot help making fome curfory
Reflexions on the great Decency and Ju-
tice ſhown by thefe Projectors on this
Occafion to the Crown; as well as their
confummate Wiſdom, Judgment and Saga-
city, in imagining this Project would tend
to the ingratiating of the Projectors to
the People, and to the Advancement of
that Popularity which, in all their Mea-
fures and Proceedings, they fo diligently
court and pompously affect,
Nor can I help obſerving how likely a
Road it muſt be to lead them to that Goal,
unneceffary to name, which they ever
have in View; to which every Step they
take is defign'd to lead, and which fecretly
animates all the different Warmth they
fhow either of real Enmity to thoſe they
oppofe, or pretended Friendſhip to thofe
they would ſeem to protect.
To point out the Decency and Juftice
obferved to the King in this Propofal, it
is only neceffary to reflect what Right the
King has to this Power of difplacing Offi-
B
cers,
( 10 )
cers, how long the Crown has been in Pof-
feffion of it; and if the only Inference that
can be drawn, from the Defire of taking a
Power from the reigning Prince which
every one of his Predeceffors enjoy'd, is
not this, that there never fat a Prince up-
on this Throne, who was fo unfit to be
trufted with that Authority.
As to the Right the King has to this
Power, it is indifputably the fame with
that he has to his Crown; as it is a Power
inherent in the Crown, from, I believe, the
earlieſt Eſtabliſhment of Monarchy in this
Ifland; one that in the moſt limited
Reigns was never attempted to be fepara-
ted from the regal Authority; and a Pow-
er thought fo neceffary to be in the Crown,
that even at that Time, when the Act
of Settlement was under Confideration,
when every Power of the Crown that could
be held dangerous to the Liberties of the
People was clog'd and fetter'd; when eve-
ry Branch of the Prerogative that was
thought detrimental to the Conftitution,
and to engroſs too much of that Sap that
fhould go to the Support and Nouriſhment
of the whole Tree, was clip'd and prun'd:
Even at this Time, in all the Limitations.
made to the Power of the Crown, this was
one
( 11 )
II)
'one never thought proper either to be a-
boliſh'd or abridg'd.
In Anſwer to this thefe Projectors fay,
that although it is a Power that ever has
been in the Crown, it is one ſo dangerous
to the Liberties of the People, that it
ought never to have been lodg'd there,
fince a Prince, by garbling and modelling
the Army according to his own Arbitrary
Pleaſure, (that is by putting out Men pro-
per for the Service of the Army, and put-
ting improper Men in) will have it in his
Power fo to fashion the Army, that the
Troops given for the Defence of the King-
dom may one Time or other be turn'd to
the Ruin of it.
But whatever People may write or fay
in this rambling Manner, it is only writing
plaufibly or talking popularly; it is declaim-
ing on Generals, but proving nothing in
particular; and is rather defcanting on the
Nature of all Power, than adapting their
Reaſoning to the prefent Purpoſe; for
wherever Power is, no Doubt it is liable
to Abufe; confequently it can never re-
quire much Art in any Sett of Men to pre-
poffefs the Ignorant, amufe the Credulous,
and alarm the Timid with Apprehenfions
В 2
and
(12)
and Fears of fuch poffible Abuſes, even
when there is not the leaft real Foundation
given for Sufpicions or Jealoufies of thoſe
Abuſes being made or intended.
Nor can it be an Argument, becauſe
Power may be abufed wherever it is lodg-
ed, that therefore it muſt be lodg'd no
where; for as no Society can be form'd
or preferv'd without fuperior Power placed
fome where, fo if Society be a Benefit to
Mankind, the Confideration of the Wife,
the Well-meaning, and the Prudent, will
not be to make that perfect which is inca-
pable of Perfection, or to form a Syftem
of Government not liable to Abufe; they
will not employ their Time in a chimeri-
cal Purſuit of a Place to lodge Authority
where there is no Danger, but in the
Choice of that Place where there will be
leaft.
And with Regard to the Cafe now un-
der Confideration, where can we think this
Power of difplacing Officers leaſt dan-
gerous, but in thofe Hands to which the
Wifdom of our earlieft Anceſtors did con-
fign it, and where their Pofterity, unhurt,
have left it to this Day.
Yet
(13)
Yet fuppofing what I am far from be-
lieving; that, from a Spirit of Innovation,
a Propensity to Novelty, and a Thirft for
Change, the Majority of the Kingdom were
for trying this dangerous Experiment; fup-
pofing they did with to lop from the
Crown this great Branch of its Preroga-
tive ; on what wife Motive could they
go about it, or by what equitable Method
could they ever effect it? they could ne-
ver do the one with Prudence, or the other
with Juftice; for Prudence would as little
attempt ſo material an Innovation in the
Conftitution, meerly from the Appréhen-
fion of imaginary Dangers, which the Ex-
perience of fo many Ages had not found
fatal, as Juftice could warrant either the
People or the Parliament's refuming from
the Crown an Authority placed there in
all Reigns, confirmed by the A&t of Settle-
ment, and which upon that Refumption
would not be veſted in the People, but
in the Officers of the Army.
And here in Truth lies the great Ob-
jection to all the general Reaſonings on the
juft Rights of the Crown and the People
when applied to this Queftion; That this
Project gives not to the People a Power
taken
( 14 )
taken from the Crown, but places it in
the Army independent of both.
When therefore the Habeas Corpus A
the Bill of Rights, and the Caſe of maki
the Judges for Life, are quoted to
port this Meaſure, as Points gain'd upo
the Crown, they are no Parallels to the
preſent Queſtion.
The Habeas Corpus Act was pafs'd in King
Charles the Second's Reign, upon many cry-
ing and notorious Inftances of illegal Impri-
fonments and Commitments of the Subject,
without being brought to Tryal; and was
made to protect the People againft grievous
and known Abuſes. But this military
Scheme to abridge the Power of the Crown,
was in Favour of the Officers of the Army
only, and with fewer Inftances of the Ex-
ercife of that Power, than was ever known
in any other Reign: Nor could the civil
Subject be benefited, but on the contrary
would be prejudiced by this Meaſure, as
the Check, which the civil Power of the
Crown now has on the military Power of
the Officers, would have been transferred
to the Officers themfelves; and confequent-
ly, like all other Checks when in the fame
Hands, with that Power on which they are
Checks,
(15)
Checks, would have become no Check
at all.
The Bill of Rights that was pafs'd after
the Revolution, upon a Change of Govern-
ment, was to remedy the Mifchiefs that
made the Revolution neceffary, and to fet-
tle the Conditions of the new Government
in fuch a Manner as to prevent the fame
Exceffes for the Future: Nor was it made
in Favour of a particular Sett of Men to
create a dangerous Independency in one
Clafs, where Independency would be more
dangerous than it could be in any other,
but to procure juft Rights and Privileges for
the whole Body of the People, for the Na-
tion in general, and to lighten the Weight
of the Civil Government, not to add to
that of a Military one.
To make either of thefe Inftances there-
fore parallel to the prefent Cafe, it muſt
be proved, that the Officers are now as
much opprefs'd as the whole Nation was
in King Charles, and King James's Reigns;
and that this Project was as conducive to
the national Good, as the Habeas Corpus
Act, and the Bill of Rights.
The
(16)
The Cafe of the Judges ought alfo to be
confider'd in a very different Light, as it
was a Provifion made for the Securities of
the Lives, Liberties, and Properties of all
the People. The Judges determine in all
Cafes not only between Subject and Subject,
but between the Crown and the People:
God forbid the Officers of the Army fhould
ever come to be fuch Arbitrators; but the
Judges being fo, whilft they held their Pla-
ces during the Pleaſure only of the Crown,
all that is valuable to us was precarious;
and this Point was immediately the Caufe
of the People; thoſe who ſay this Scheme
is equally fo, and that the Cafe of the
Officers is fimilar to that of the Judges,
must therefore affirm, that the Army is
as effential to our Conftitution, as the
Execution of the Laws of the Land; that
thoſe who prefide over the one, fhould be
as independent of the Crown, as thofe
who adminifter the other; that they are
both of equal Confequence, and ought
both to be equally permanent.
There is another Circumftance that effen-
tially prevents the Cafe of the Judges from
being any Parallel to the prefent Cafe, at
leaft with Regard to the Refpect fhewn to
the Crown when that Point was obtain'd;
which
(17)
which is, that when that A&: paſs'd to make
the Judges Places, quam diu fe bene gefferint,
it was not, (as I have been inform'd) abfo-
lutely to take away a formerly allowed
Power in the Crown, but to fettle and af-
certain a diſputable litigated Part of the
Prerogative; and even in this Inftance fo
much Reſpect and Regard at least were
fhewn to the Prince then upon the Throne,
that this Act was not to take Place during
his Life, but to leave the Prerogative of
the preſent Poffeffor juſt upon the fame Foot
it then was.
Which Provifion was no Part, as I ever
heard, of the preſent Project; nor indeed,
if it had, would it have made the Project a
lefs Evil to the Conftitution, tho' a more
remote one; or a lefs deftructive Project
for the People, tho' it might have foften'd
the Harſhneſs of its Countenance towards
the King.
As to the Anecdote of a great Lord and
Minifter, who offer'd this Thing to be done
in the late Reign, which thefe modern Pro-
jectors quote as their Juftification now: In
the first Place, I much doubt the Fact; but if
true, it is the ftrongest Thing that can be
urg'd against the prefent Projectors Con-
C
duct,
( 18 )
duct, either with Regard to the King or the
People; with Regard to the King, becauſe
the Conſent of the King in the late Reign
was fuppofed to be previously asked; which,
I believe, was not the Cafe now; and
with Regard to the People, this Example
is far from juftifying the Revival of this
Project; fince, if this Offer was formerly
made and not accepted, in all Probability,
it was, becauſe the Whigs of thofe Days,
and thoſe who fear'd an Army moft, thought
the Power of difplacing Officers would be
infinitely more dangerous in a Court Mar-
tial than in the Crown; and that the ma-
king an Army dependent only on itſelf,
would never tend to the making it leſs for-
midable; confequently that this Abridg-
ment of the Prerogative would have been
leffening the Power of the Crown, without
adding to the Security of the Liberties of
the People; and inftead of keeping the Ba-
lance between theſe two Scales, would be
throwing a Weight into a Third, that would
have turn'd the other two.
The fecond Light in which I propoſed to
confider this Project, was with Regard to
its Popularity, and the Degree in which it
would contribute to the Prefervation of the
Conſtitution, and the Maintenance of Li-
berty.
And
( 19 )
And if it is popular to própofe creating
a fourth Power in the Conftitution, inde-
pendent of the other three; or rather to
lay the Foundation of a Power to fubvert
the other three: If it is popular to fay
that, let Officers enter into what Cabals,
or form what Plots against the Govern-
ment they think fit, their Crimes fhall be
cognizable only to a Court Martial, and
confequently punishable only by one ano-
ther: If it is popular fo ta conftitute the
Army, that whatever Violences they com-
mit, or whatever Crimes they are guilty of,
their Commiffions fhall always be looked
upon as unalienable Pieces of Property,
unleſs taken from them by Members of
their own Fraternity, and thofe Members
perhaps Affociates in their licentious Prac-
tices, and Accomplices of their Crimes: If
it is popular ſo to regulate the Forces raiſed
for the Service of the State, that they fhall
be as dangerous to the State, as the Ene-
mies from which they are to guard it; and
that it fhall be a Moot-Point, whether it is
beſt to leave the Kingdom defencelefs a-
gainst foreign Invaders, or expofed to as
great Dangers from its domeftic Defenders:
In a Word, if it would be popular to make
the Officers of the Army the Maſters of the
C 2
State
( 20 )
State instead of the Servants of the State;
this Project might lay a jufter Claim to
Popularity than any yet ever formed or
propofed. But if a
But if a Project to weaken
every prefent Power fubfifting in our
Conftitution, and to fubftitute in their
Room a Power known but once in this
Kingdom, then felt with Calamity, Anar-
chy, and Confufion; and ever fince re-
member'd with Horror and Deprecation:
If a Project to renew fuch Times deferves
any hard Title or Character, this fure
might be rank'd with the moſt pernicious
that ever enter'd into a weak Head or a
bad Heart.
That this Project, if it had paffed into
a Law, would have made the Army more
independent than it now is, no One, I
believe, will difpute; tho' how far that
Independency would have gone, and what
Effects it would have had, may perhaps be
more problematical,
But if any Judgment is to be form'd
from the general Probability of future E-
vents, or from the univerfal Example of
paft Times in fimilar Cafes, this Project
muſt have terminated in the entire Subver-
fion of our prefent Form of Government,
and
( 21 )
and the Eſtabliſhment of the worst of all
Slavery, which is that of a Stratocracy, a
military Synod, arbitrarily dictating and
cruelly executing their own Laws, with-
out Controul, Redreſs, or Appeal.
I have the greateſt Refpect imaginable
for the preſent Officers of the Army, they
are moſt of them Men of Birth, many of
them Men of Fortune, and all of my Ac-
quaintance at leaſt among them, Men of
the niceft Honour and firicteft Integrity:
But as Power, like Avarice, is of a Nature
incapable of Satiety, and that the groffeft
Food that can be given to it, inſtead of
blunting, generally quickens it's Appetite,
fo it is not to be doubted but the future
Officers of the Army, like all other Fra
ternities, would, after this Acceffion of
Power, have endeavoured to ftretch their
Authority ftill farther, and to make the
reft of the Kingdom feel that Controul
from which they themfelves were freed:
Since the moſt natural Step for Mankind
to take, after fhaking off their own De-
pendence, is to impofè it on others; nor
can any Tranſition be more eaſy or more
frequent, than from ceafing to obey, to
begin to govern,
The
( 22 )
!
The King, after this Law had been
made, would not have been able, on the
jufteft Sufpicions of Difaffection to his
Government, without communicating them
to a Court Martial, to have removed any
one Officer from his Poft; though his In-
telligence had been of a Nature that he
had not the leaft Reaſon to doubt the
Truth of it; and yet fuch, that the re-
vealing it might be of the utmoft Confe-
quence.
And in this Situation what muft the
King have done? He muft either have dif
covered to the whole World what was of
the greateſt Importance to him to conceal,
or often kept among the Guards to his Per-
fon and the Defenders of his Government,
Men whom he knew to be in Plots and
Cabals to deſtroy the one, and overturn
the other.
One might fuppofe many Cafes where
Proof fufficient for a Court Martial to
break an Officer could not be made, and
yet fuch Evidence there might be againſt
him, or at leaſt ſuch ſtrong Sufpicion, that
a Prince would not only be thoroughly
juftifiable in removing him, but guilty per
haps
( 23 )
23.)
haps of the greateft Imprudence if he did
not.
To this it has been answered, that in
fuch Cafes the King might fend him upon.
Pofts where he would be less dangerous:
But the Ridicule of fuch an Anfwer is too
ftrong for any Body that repeats it, to
think it can be neceffary feriously to re-
fute it; or that every Reader must not
anticipate all one can fay to point out the
Abfurdity of fo weak a Defence.
But I will go ftill farther, and ſuppoſe
the Evidence againſt this difaffected Offi-
cer even strong enough for him to deſerve
Condemnation from a Court Martial ; I
will fuppofe it too to be Evidence of the
greateſt Crime an Officer can be guilty of,
which is Treafon; and yet I fhould be far
from fure that, even in this Cafe, he would
receive the Condemnation he merited from
thofe Judges.
For where there is a difputed Title to
the Crown, would it not be the Intereft
of an Independent Army always, if they
could, to keep a dependent King? And if
it would be their Intereft, what could an-
fwer that End more effectually, than fol-
lowing
(24)
lowing the Example of the Pretorian Co-
horts in the Roman Government, who con-
ſtituted themſelves always Umpires in the
Diſputes between the reigning Prince and
the Pretender to the Throne, held the one
in Fear, the other in Hope, both in Suf
pence, and made the Price of their Affif
tance to either, an Acknowledgment of
holding the Crown by their Grace, Favour,
and Support.
This was the Practice of the Pretorian
Bands; yet Tacitus tells us, that the
Power, and Weight, our Patriot Projec
tors would give the English Army at fet-
ting out, was one which theſe Romans ob-
tained the laft.
For though Sejanus, who was plotting
to depofe the Prince, by whofe ill-placed
Favour he rofe to that unmerited Gran-
deur he enjoy'd in the Commonwealth,
was the firft Man that chalk'd out the
Path, and paved the Way to the abſolute
Sway theſe military Tyrants afterwards
exerciſed in the Government; yet it was
not till the Time of the Contentions of
Otho and Vitellius, that this finiſhing Stroke
was given to their Authority, which was
the chufing their own Officers: But when
they
( 25 )
of Tacitus,
they gain'd that Point, theſe are the Words
Omnia deinde arbitrio Mi-
litum afta; Every thing afterward was
tranfarted by the Soldiery.
It may perhaps be objected, that as this
Project was not for giving the Army a
Power to chufe their own Officers, what
I have cited can be no Parallel to the pre-
fent Cafe; but as Mankind is fo formed,
that I fear the Generality of them turn
their Eyes more towards thofe, whoſe
Power in Futurity can alone fupport them,
than to thofe whofe Favour at firft ob-
liged them; fo it will eafily I believe be
acknowledged, that the giving a Court
Martial the fole Power of putting Officers
out, would amount to much the fame
thing as the allowing them the Power of
putting them in.
Had this Project therefore for eſtabliſh-
ing fuch Difcipline in England fucceeded,
I bould rather have lamented than won-
dered, if in future Times, I had ſeen the
English like the Roman Soldiery, dictating
to an intimidated impotent Senate, de-
pofing and crowning, making and unm
king Kings, at their Pleaſure, plundering
this populous and wealthy City to pay
D
them-
( 26 )
themſelves, and laying the whole Coun-
try in Blood and Confufion, on the leaft
Refiftance offer'd to the oppreffive Ordi-
nances of their capricious lawlefs Will.
It cannot be denied, but that an Army,
is in its Nature a Body, that muft obey,
or will command. And it is hard to jul-
tify Martial Law in an Army, but from
the Neceffity of fome abfolute Controul,
arifing from the Nature and Conftitution
of an Army. To punish Mutiny and Se-
dition therefore in the inferior and fubal-
tern Members of the Army with Death
or Cafhiering, only to preferve Order and
Difcipline within the Army, and yet to
leave an Army within the State, free and
independent of the Crown, and not fubject
to fuch Controul, and Authority, as our
Conftitution, and the Wiſdom of all Ages
and Nations has ever found neceffary, would
be to give the Generals and Commanders
of an Army, abfolute Power over that
Army, and leave the Nation fubject to a
moft ungovernable, or rather (in the mo-
dern Stile) to the moft All-governing,
All-dictating, All-directing, All-grafping,
Power-ingroffing Body of Men, that can
be luj poled to exift in any
any Nation.
I
(27)
I fhould be glad to reduce this Dif-
pute to one Point, and ask, Whether it
is not unavoidable, that the Military
Power ſhould be fubject and dependent
upon the Civil Power, or the Civil
Power fubfervient to the Military, and
which of the two Conditions is moft
confiftent with a free Government? Are
the Officers of State moft liable to dif
pute Power and Jurifdiction with the
Military Officers, or the Officers of the
Army to interfere with the Officers of
the State in their Sphere? Are the Of
ficers of the Army more free from Am-
bition, Avarice, Malice, and all other
Paffions incident to human Nature, than
the reft of Mankind? if they are not,
is it impoffible to fuppofe thofe Paffions
might inftigate them to defire, and in-
duce them to think themſelves equal to
the Management of all the Civil Go-
vernment? Should that ever be the
Cafe, is it impoffible to fuppoſe they
might, tranfported by thofe Paffions,
pretend to dictate to their Sovereign,
who fhall, or fhall not be Minifters of
State; with whom they will, or will
not ferve?
Has not this been done in
D 2
many
( 28 )
many Countries? and fhould it ever be
done here, what muſt the Prince in that
Situation determine? As the Law now
ftands, he may take his Choice, and
fupport thofe Minifters, that he thinks
ſerve him well and faithfully, and re-
move thofe Officers that prefume to
give him Law in Matters wholly fo-
reign to their Province. But if thoſe
Officers can be removed only by the
Judgment of themfelves, the Mini-
fters muſt be changed at the Will and
Difcretion of thefe Military Dictators:
And if that happens, who muſt we ſup-
pofe will fucceed? Would any thing
lefs fatisfy the Officers, than the Civil
Power being put into their Hands, or
would they ever ceafe to clamour and
mutiny, till this Ambition was gratified,
and theſe Views compleated? And when
they cannot forfeit their Military Com-
miffions, which have forced them into
the Civil Government, what fhall con-
troul them in either? The Govern-
ment is become Military, and King and
People muft by Degrees, and in certain
Confequence, become dependent upon
Them, who, by this notable Scheme,
were to be made independent of both.
The
( 29 )
The only Pretence for attempting
this great Alteration in the Conftitu-
tion, by making the Officers of the
Army independent of the Crown, was
to prevent the too great Influence of
the Crown in Parliament, by the great
Number of Officers of the Army, that
are or may be Members of either Houſe;
and to protect the Officers of the Army
from the Refentment of Minifters, for
their Conduct and Behaviour in Parlia-
ment. Had this been the real Miſchief,
the natural Remedy had been to have
made all Officers of the Army incapable
of Sitting and Voting in either Houfe
of Parliament, or to have made their
Commiffions independent of the Crown
during their Continuance in Parliament:
But as this on one hand had been in
Confequence an Exclufion of the Peerage
from ferving in the Army; or, on the
other, a great Severity to fome Officers
of the Army, and too great a Diftinc-
tion between the Officers of the Army
that were or were not Members; fo
this no ways ferved the preſent Pur-
poſe: For the Army was now to be
courted at the Expence of the Crown,
(or
(30)
(or at leaſt the Officers) ſo far as to make
the Military Power independent on the
Civil; which, in other Words, had been
to make the Civil dependent upon the
Military.
It would be tedious, if not endleſs,
to try to enumerate half the Inftances.
that might be given, of the Inconve-
miences and Fatality attending thoſe Go-
vernments that have ever given Com-
mands in their Armies for Life, or even
for a Term of Years. The ancient Hi-
ftories are full of them, and number-
lefs the Examples, where the utmoſt
Confufion immediately, and fovereign
Power ultimately, has been the Confe-
quence of fuch Grants.
The beſtowing the Military Govern-
ment of Provinces and Armies for a
Term of Years, was the Ruin of the
Roman Commonwealth; nor is it pof-
fible indeed, in the natural Progreſs of
Things, but that fovereign Power muit
follow the independent Command of
unconquer❜d Armies: The only Alter-
native therefore remaining to a People
mad enough to truft their Generals
with
( 31 )
with fuch Command, is to become the
Slaves of their Invader or their De-
fender.
Not a Century is yet pafs'd, fince we
faw what Havock only an independent
Houſe of Commons made in this King-
dom: And if breaking the Balance of
Power in this Conftitution, by making
a Houſe of Commons diffolvable only
by itſelf, could overturn all the other
Parts of the Government; is it to be
imagined, that a Project to make Offi-
cers removeable only by themfelves,
would not have produced as bad Effects?
If the Independency of a Parliament
(I mean an Independency not given by
our Conftitution) could bring Things in-
to fuch Confufion, what Confufion might
not be expected from the Independency
of an Army? If the firft, arm'd only
by Votes and Refolutions, could tyran-
nize in that Manner, what might not be
apprehended from the laft, who would
come arm'd with Fire and Sword? The
Confequence would
would not be hard to
gueſs, but may be plainly feen in the
Effects of that independent Parliament
delegating afterwards its Power to an
inde-
!
(32)
independent Army, when the whole
Kingdom became their Prey and their
Slaves; and thofe very Knaves and
Fools, who had conftituted the Power
of that Army, were the firft Sacrifices.
to the Outrages and Injuftices commit-
ted in the Exerciſe of it.
If therefore the Scheme of theſe
great, wife, and honeft Projectors tend-
ed to conftitute Independency in the
Army; and if Example as well as com-
mon Senſe and Reafon tell one, that
fuch muſt have been the Confequence
of that Independency: Let thofe who
have been long dazled by falfe Lights,
alarm'd with falfe Fears, and led on by
falfe Hopes; who have been miſguided
by falfe Repreſentations, and deceived
by falfe Profeffions; let thofe now fee
to what Centre, the little glimmering
Rays of Patriotifm that have fhewn
themfelves hitherto, only in fcatter'd,
diffufed Forms, are at laſt drawn and
collected in their full Force, Luftre, and
Glory: Let them behold to what Point
their popular Champions would bring
this Government, and what infinite Ob-
ligations they have to a Sett of Innova-
tors,
(33)
?
tors, Reformers, and Projectors, who
whilſt they have nothing but the Pre-
fervation of the Conftitution and the
Liberties of the People in their Mouths;
have nothing in View, or at Heart, but
the Gratification of long difappointed
Rage, private Piques, and particular
Refentments; and which rather than
not gratify, they would gratify at the
Expence both of our Liberties and our
Conftitution.
And if, from what has been already
faid, it does manifeftly appear how un-
wife, and imprudent it would be, ever
to conftitute an independent Army in
this Country, I would be glad to be
told by thefe All-reforming Projectors,
how the Dependency of it can be better
regulated, or more fafely conftituted,
than in the Manner it is at prefent.
The Number of Troops is annually
granted, and their Pay annually provi-
ded for by Parliament; the Officers,
who are to command thofe Troops, are
nominated and appointed by the Crown.
And as that Power of appointing, or
difplacing Officers is abfolutely vefted in
E
the
( 34 )
t
the King, fo it is a difcretionary Power,
which he is to exercife, as his own Wif
dom and Prudence fhall direct; to none
is he accountable for the Ufe of it, and
to none indeed, by the Nature of this
Power, is it poffible he ſhould be ac-
countable. For to allow the Parlia-
ment a Right, to oblige him to give
Reaſons, for what he thinks expedient
to be done when he exercifes this Pow-
er, would in reality be taking the Power
itſelf away;
fince if the Parliament
were not to be Judges of the Validity
of thofe Reaſons they exacted, and he
gave, and according as they approved
or diſapproved, confirm or reverfe what
he had done, the Communication of
his Reaſons for acting, would be to no
End: And if the Parliament were, to
be Judges of the Validity of his Rea-
fons, and accordingly confirm or reverſe
his Decrees; it would in effect be ta-
king this Power of nominating Officers
out of the Crown, and lodging it in
the Parliament; whereas theſe two di-
ftinct Powers of limiting the Number
of Troops that fhall be kept up, and
nominating thoſe who fhall command
them, are two Powers, which the Wif
dom,
(35)
dom of our Conftitution has thought fit
to divide, by vefting the. one in the
Parliament, the other in the Crown;
and fince it has done fo, for the Parlia-
ment to fay, who fhall be employed
to command the Troops, would be as
great an Innovation in our Conftitution,
as for the Crown to raiſe a greater
Number than the Parliament had or-
dered to be levied.
Who then, after all the boafted Friend-
ſhip, and facred Reverence profeſſed by
the modern Patriots for our Conftitu-
tion, are really the trueft Friends to it,
thofe, who under the Pretence of Re-
formation, but through a latent Defire to
produce Confufion, or at beft, from na-
tional experimental Syſtems, would make
fo material a Change in the Conftitution?
Or thoſe, who, preferring Practice and
Experience to Theory and Speculation,
defire to keep what they know to be
good, rather than change for what they
know nothing of; who, confcious of
the wife Structure of our Conftitution,
enjoying the Benefits of it, and acknow-
ledging they cannot mend it, are for
keeping it, in all its Parts, entire, and
E 2
in
( 36 )
in the unalter'd Form, in which it now
fubfifts?
Should this Attempt, with many o-
ther Schemes lately thrown out,to tye up
the Hands of the Crown, take Effect;
I think the Preamble to any Bill that
was to make fuch Propofals pafs into
Laws ought to be; That whereas the
Form of any Monarchical Government is
grown fo difagreeable to the Taste of the
People of England, and the Name of
King fo offenfive to their Ears; and
whereas a Republican Syftem would be
fo much more palatable to the one, and
the Name of Doge fo much more grate-
ful to the other; be it enacted, &c.
But if these are the Notions and Pro-
jects of any Sett of Men who call them-
Telves Whigs, and once acted on Whig-
principles; fuch Whigs, I hope, will
never have the Adminiſtration or new-
moulding of this Government; nor can
they have any other Excufe for the Ex-
ceffes of their prefent Conduct, than that
Sentence put into the Mouth of Cæfar
by Salluft, Omnia mala exempla bonis
initiis orta funt, That all Disorders
and
( 37 )
and Abuſes are good in their Begin-
nings.
I am very ready to agree, that this
Family, and this Government, can only
be ſupported by Men acting on Whig-
principles; yet theſe are not the Whig-
principles I mean ; I mean not fuch as
prevail'd in the Middle of the laſt Cen-
tury, but ſuch as animated thoſe Men,
who appear'd at the latter End of it.
Such Whig-principles as are not lefs a-
verfe to abolishing all Monarchy in
this Country, than to fuffering an ab-
fölute one; fuch Whig-principles as
brought about the Revolution, efta-
bliſhed King William, and concerted the
Act of Settlement of the Crown on
the prefent Royal Family; not Anti-
monarchical, Republican Whig-princi-
ples, (Principles defective in Theory,
and more extravagant when thought of
with a Poffibility of being reduced to
Practice ;) not fuch chimerical Whig-
principles as are imbibed from Euto-
pian Speculation, but the only honeft
and good Whig-principles, thofe of pre-
ferving a limited Monarchy in the Shape
and Faſhion we now enjoy it.
But
(38)
But to fuch Whigs this Project could
never be pleafing; nor was it indeed bet-
ter calculated to unite the Tories; for
tho' one Clafs of Tories would, from an
Inveteracy to the prefent Eftablifh-
ment of the Crown, be glad to wreſt a-
ny Authority out of the Hands of him
who enjoys it, and ſhake his Security,
by making the Officers independent of
him ; yet we know there is another
Party of Tories, who, zealous for the
Prerogative abftractedly confidered, would
not conſent to ftreighten and clip it,
let whofe Head foever wear the Crown;
and there is ftill a third Clafs, who from
fanguine, but, I hope, vain Hopes of the
Day approaching, when they fhall fee
the Crown on that Head they with it,
would perhaps be uneafy to have the
Crown reftored, with any of that Lu-
ftre diminished, which it boafted when
it was loft.
To whom then was this Queftion pa-
latable? Whofe Tafte was it made to
fit? And whofe Intereft was it to ferve?
Theirs alone, whofe Defpair drives them
to concert, abet, and affift all fuch
Meaſures,
(39)
Meaſures, and fuch Meafures only as
may outrage Particulars, and diftrefs the
Whole, by producing Confufion. Such
Men as fly to the poor Relief of teazing
thoſe whom they cannot wound; and
infulting the Power and Authority of a
Prince not lefs invulnerable by their vain
Refentment, than impregnable to their
vain Flattery; who hears the one, and
faw through the other, with equal Con-
tempt; confcious of his own Merit in
deferving the Affections of his People,
and fecure, from the eternal Prevalence
of Truth, that he muft, notwithſtand-
ing any temporary Diverfion by the
falfe Arts of a few, at laft unite and
poffefs them.
One who knows his own Strength,
and underſtands his own Intereft; who
is thoroughly fenfible by what Party he
is fupported, and by what Party alone
he can be fupported; who knows, that
it is thofe Principles and that Conduct
which laid the Foundation of his Efta-
bliſhment, that must maintain it; fuch
Principles, and fuch Men, as are equally
follicitous to maintain the Rights of the
Crown, the Privileges of Parliament,
and
( 40 )
and the Liberties of the People; that
are for preferving theſe three great af
fiftant and co-operating Springs on which
this Government moves, in the fame
juft, nice, and due Balance, in which
the Revolution Principles, and the Act
of Succeffion placed and poiſed them.
For to imagine that either Tories, or
fuch Whigs as are now in League with
Tories, ever would or could long main-
tain this Government, is extravagant
and abfurd ; for what can be more ab-
furd than to fuppofe, that either a Re-
volution Government could be fupport-
ed by Men of Anti-Revolution Prin-
ciples, or that any Regal Authority_at
all could be fupported by Men of Re-
publican Principles? Between this Scylla
and Charibdis, this Jacobite and Repub-
lican-party,the prefent Government muft
then fteer, in order to preferve a ſteady
or fecure Road: For as the laſt, by act-
ing confiftently with their Principles,
would bring this Nation into the Con-
fufion of Forty-one; ſo the former, by
preferving a Confiſtency in their Cha-
racters, would go near to produce an
Event, that would put one more in
Mind
( 41 )
Mind perhaps of the Year Sixty; the
One, if vefted with Authority, would
make Ufe of the Favour of the Crown,
only in order to deftroy the Power of
it; and the Other, with like Gratitude,
though from different Principles, receive
the Benefaction, in order to undoe the
Benefactor; and, by a Sort of Papiftical
Policy, as the Bigots to that Religion
think themſelves under no Obligation
to hold Faith, or obferve Promiſes to-
wards thoſe whom they call Hereticks;
fo would theſe Papists in Politicks
think themſelves bound, neither in Ho-
nour or Juftice, (though ever ſo much
obliged) to obferve Faith with one whom
they would call an Ufurper. By the
fame Way of Thinking, and the fame
Indulgence, that they are now abfolved
(or by which they abfolve themſelves)
from keeping folemn and publick Oaths,
they would efteem themſelves free from
obferving any the moft folemn private
Promiſes, Contract, or Covenant, that
could be made; they would hold it as
meritorious to fet every Tye and Confi-
deration at Nought, that did not tend
to the Service of him they call the
true King, as the moſt blinded Bigots
F
το
}
( 42 )
42)
to Popery could think it, to break
through all Engagements that did not
tend to the Propagation of what they
call the true Faith; thofe would no
more hold League withMen they thought
Rebels, than thefe with People they
thought Hereticks; the Jocobite Bi-
got would efteem himſelf honourably a
Knave to the one, as the Religious Bi-
got would prove confcientiously unjuſt
to the others; whilft both of them, from
an Affinity in their Way of Thinking,
and concomitant Principles for their
Rule of Acting, would make a Merit
to their King and their God of that Per-
jury, Treachery, and Ingratitude, which
lefs loyal and lefs pious Minds would
ftart to think of.
That this would have been the Caſe
even in the Reign of the late Queen,
when Men of this honourable, wife, and
virtuous Stamp were employed, I be-
lieve, no body that ever gave themfelves
Time to look forward into the Chain of
the moſt natural Confequences, and the
moſt probable Events, ever doubted.
When
(43)
When that weak unhappy Princefs
was prevailed upon to difmifs that
great, able, and fucceſsful Man her Ge-
neral, with that upright Stateſman and
fagacious Politician her Treasurer; when
ſhe had been prevailed upon, by chang-
ing her Adminiftration, to leave her-
felf deftitute of Allies Abroad, and
Friends at Home; to fhew both the
one, and the other, how little the
Steadineſs of her Counfels, or her Fa-
vour, was to be depended upon : When
the Whigs, by whom fhe was brought
to the Throne, and by whom he was
ſupported upon it, were difcarded and
difgraced: When the Tories, Enemies
to her Title, and not Friends to her
Perſon, were placed round the latter,
and vefted with Power to fubvert the
former In fhort, when the Tories, at
the latter End of that Reign, govern'd
this Country, does any one think (what-
ever he may fay) that the then Miniftry
was not determined to fet afide that
Succeffion, that by their Want of Time,
and the Favour of Providence to this
Land, has fince taken Place: And if
this was their Scheme and their View,
does
F 2
(44)
does any body imagine they could think
themſelves fecure either, of Succefs in
that Defign, or even in Safety in that
Situation, without their own Succeffor
upon the Spot? Or can any body be-
lieve, when they had brought him
here, if her Majefty had not naturally,
or unnaturally, flept with her Anceſtors
in Westminster-Abbey, that at leaſt and
at beft this unfortunate Princefs, this
abufed Miſtreſs, this blinded Protec-
trefs, and ill requited Benefactreſs of
thoſe faithful Servants and honeft Mi-
nifters, would not have been in the
Tower, and their new Idol on the
Throne.
And if this would have been the
Conduct of the Jacobite Party, even
towards a Branch of their own favou-
rite Tree, a Branch too under which
they received Shelter and Protection,
what Outrage might not be expected
from them towards any Shoot from a
foreign Stock, to which they have
been ſo long and fuch declared Enemies,
that no body can doubt but they would
be glad not only to lop a Branch, but
to cut up the very Root, deſtroy all
its
(45)
its fair and flourishing Fruits, and
extirpate the very Seed out of the
Land.
To try longer to impoſe that ſtale
Cheat, and tranſparent Falfhood, of al-
ledging all the Oppofition carry'd on
againſt the prefent Government, to be
level'd not at the Prince, but his Mi-
nifter, would now be to no Purpoſe;
it would be too grofs to be received
by the moſt credulous Ears, and too
coarſe not to be feen through by the
blindeft Eyes.
Whilft the Opponents had any Hopes
of removing the Minifter by approach-
ing the King, it is very true that all
their Shot was level'd at that fingle
Mark; but when they defpaired of
gaining their Point that Way, and
thought removing the King was the
only Way to remove the Minifter 15
the Tables were turn'd, and inftead of
collaterally hurting the Intereft of
the King, by imputing all his Mea-
fures to the Folly and Wickedneſs of
an ignorant, corrupt Minifter; they
threw away the Mask and the Scab-
bard
(46)
bard, turn'd the Point of their Wea-
pons directly to the King's own Breaſt,
and endeavour'd to caft the fame
Odium and Ridicule on the Perfon and
Character of the Mafter, that they
had formerly done on thofe of the Ser-
vant.
i
}
Thus when his Majefty, notwith-
ftanding all their Slander on his Mini-
fter, and Encomiums on themſelves, hap-
pen'd not to be convinced, againſt Ex-
perience, of the Want of Ability and
Integrity in one who had ferved him;
or to be willing implicitly, and meer-
ly on their own Recommendation, to
truft to the Integrity and Ability of
thoſe who offer'd to ferve him ;
when he took the unpardonable Liber-
ty of chufing Servants for himſelf,
and declining the Tender, theſe Gen-
tlemen were pleaſed to make him
of their Service; the Diſappointment
and Affront of this Refufal put them
upon trying other Methods to
tain that Power they wanted, and
feeing if they could not make him
do that by Force, which they could not
induce him to do by Choice.
•
ob-
The
(47)
The Means employ'd to execute
this wife and loyal Scheme, were Diſtreſs
and Clamour, diftreffing his Meaſures
Abroad, and raifing Clamour in eve-
ry Corner of the Kingdom at Home.
No juft Handle being given for
Complaint, fuppofed Handles were to
be taken, and the whole Country to
be blown up, by fuch monftrous Sto-
ries of Things being defign'd, that
were never thought of, and fuch ex-
travagant Mifrepreſentations of what
was really defign'd and thought of, that
even the Men, who endeavour'd to im-
poſe theſe Tales on the People in pub-
lick, laugh'd in private at the Folly
and Credulity of thoſe deluded Wretches,
whofe fufceptible Fears took that Im-
preffion, which the Art and Falfhood
of their Deceivers had try'd to make
upon their Minds.
But how little Knowledge muft the
Opponents have of the Steadineſs and
Refolution of the Prince, whom, by
theſe Methods, they endeavour'd to
ſtagger? How little muft they be ac-
quainted
( 48 )
quainted with his Difpofition and Sen-
timents, to imagine that what the fof-
ter Means of Infinuation could not ob-
tain, theſe rougher Applications of Out-
rage and Defiance would ever bring a-
bout? For befides the Temper of the
Prince, they have to deal with, not be-
ing juft of the likelieft Make to give
Way to Attacks of this Nature; his
Judgment (as well as his Temper) muft
have been of the weakest Frame, for
him not to difcern the many
and
great Inconveniences, which a Compli-
ance with the unreaſonable Clamour
they had raiſed, muft neceffarily have
brought upon him.
A Prince, who changes his Admini-
ftration by the Intrigues of the Court,
and Cabals of the Palace, runs no Rifque
of weakening his Power, and has no
Danger to apprehend from fuch a
Change, but that of being worſe fer-
ved: But a Prince that finds himſelf
obliged to part with a Minifter, by the
falfe Clamour of the People, and the
encouraged Infolence of a Mob; who
demand that Minifter without the Guilt
of one fingle Crime proved or charged
upon
(49)
upon him, to be difcarded upon their
arbitrary Dictates; a Prince who com
plies with fuch Solicitation, delegates
for the future all his Authority, and all
the Privilege of chufing his own Ser-
vants into the Hands of a riotous Mul-
titude, who from a Compliance of this
Kind in their Prince, would think they
had ever after a Right, like the Janiza-
ries in Turkey, to nominate his Servants,
and would appoint whom they pleaſed
to prefide in the State, whilft every Mi-
nifter who was employed, muft look up-
on himſelf as a Creature of the Mob,
not as a Miniſter of the King; and would
be impoſed on the King, or forced from
him, juſt as the confufed Clamour of
the Peoples capricious Voices fhould
ordain.
Nor, this Point of Democracy once
obtain'd, would the Authority of a Mob
ftop here; from giving Servants to a
Mafter, the natural Gradation would be,
that of giving a Maſter too to the Ser-
vants; whilft the Maffaniellos, Kets,
and Wat-Tylers of fuch Rioters, Fiſhe
er-men, Tanners, and Mafons, would
have as good a Chance to fit on this
G
Throne,
(50)
Throne, from the fudden Choice of a
heated Mob, as thofe great Princes, to
whom the beſt-weighed and cooleft De-
liberations of the whole Legiflature have
given an eftabliſhed and juft Title.
Both thefe Efforts therefore of the
Opponents to get into Power under his
Majefty, proving ineffectual, as he was
neither to be deceived and cajolled, nor
intimidated and driven; and the Oppo-
nents being as defperate in the Hopes
they had once conceived that the next
Parliament would change its Com-
plexion, as in their Hopes of the King
changing his Miniſtry; Rage fucceeded
to Policy, Refentment to Ambition, and
Revenge being the only Paffion they
could expect to gratify, they refolved
in every Shape to diftrefs the King, to
ftrike, in any part, at that Power they
could not get to adminifter, and to over-
turn that Government in which they
were not allowed to prefide.
In order to compafs the firft of theſe
laudable Deſigns, and which would fa-
cilitate the Road to the laft, the Alter-
native was given to the People, of ha-
ving
( 51 )
ving no Army in this Country, or fuch
a one as fhould by its Independency, be
in utrumque paratus, no readier to de-
fend the Government, under the lawful
King, than able to fubvert it, to make,
Way for the Pretender. At the fame
Time, to weaken the Power of the
Crown, and to hurt the Credit of it
in every Way they could, a Place-Bill
was to be paffed, the Foundation of
which was to be a Declaration, That no
body who ferv'd the King could be a
Friend to his Country; and the Effect
of it to be, that no body who did ferve
the King, fhould be able to fhow whe
ther he was a Friend to his Country or
not; being by this Bill to be ftigma-
tized with an Exclufion, whilft he had
any Share in the King's Service, (at leaſt
if he was a Commoner) from any Share in
the Legiſlature.
1
How much obliged the Commons.
muſt be to the Propofers of this Law,
by which all the great Employments
muft of Courſe be thrown into the
Nobility, is foreign to my prefent Pur
poſe.
Ga
The
( 52 )
The Qualification Bill, as it was mo-
delled, was another wife Propoſal to go
hand in hand with the others, and ex-
treamly confiftent with the Profeffions
the Introductors of it were making at
the fame time, in order to fupport the
other Propoſal relating to the Commif-
fions for Life; for the Reafon given for
defiring to make the Commiflions for
Life was, that the Officers in Parliament
might not be fo dependent on the
Crown, that they must there obey the
Injunctions of a Minifter, or ftarve;
and yet at the fame time a Bill is brought
in that muſt baniſh every Officer out of
Parliament, who, exclufive of his Com-
miſſion, is in ſtarving Circumſtances.
Such Inconfiftencies are urg'd in al-
moſt every part of the Conduct of thefe
Gentlemen, when compared with any
other; but as Diftrefs is their principal
Aim,fo let oneThing be ever fo inconfiftent
with another, provided each promotes
that great End, and that the Clamour
of the Day is fufficient for that Purpoſe,
it does its Office.
In
( 53 )
In this Manner do the oppofing Party
at preſent endeavour, in every Mea-
fure they concert, to pare from the Power
of the Crown, and to reprefent it as
one of the Fera Nature that every one
has a Right to attack, and an Intereſt to
deſtroy. Whether this is done (as I
have faid) in order to fubvert the Go-
vernment, or whether this Charge on
the Gentlemen who promote thefe Mea-
fures, and abet thefe Schemes, is an un-
juſt one, I defire to be decided only by
a fhort Review of the Doctrines incul-
cated this laft Year by that Speaking-
Trumpet of the whole Party the Craftf-
man. And if every Tenet in that poli-
tical Alcoran of a falfe Prophet does
not directly and evidently tend to the
Subverfion of the prefent Government,
I defire to have my Truth no better
thought of, than theirs ought to be,
when they profefs Loyalty to the King,
Regard to the Quiet of the Kingdom, or
a Defire to preſerve the Conſtitution and
the Liberties of England: But if it fhall
appear, that every Step taken, and every
Doctrine broach'd by the Craftfman's Sect
tends to Confufion; I would ask any
rea-
(54)
reaſonable unprejudiced Man, if Confu-
fion in this Kingdom (no Matter how
produced) could end in any Thing but
the Pretender; and if the Pretender could
come in that Confufion without putting
an End to the prefent Conftitution, and
our Liberties?
When the Craftfman endeavours to
exaggerate the Expences, both immediate
and confequential to the Revolution; to
tell the People the Blood and Treaſure it
has coft this Nation; does this tend to
putting a Government eſtabliſh'd by the
Revolution, in a pleafing or a diſadvanta-
geous Light; or to making the People of
England believe they have had a good,
or a hard Bargain?
When he tells you, that the only ef
fential Points of Liberty gain'd by the Re-
volution, were the Triennial-Bill, the Ex-
empting this Country from a Standing-
Army, and the Limitations annexed to
the Act of Settlement; and that thefę
three Ends have been defeated fince the
Acceffion of this Family; does he ſpeak
Truth? Or even if he did, would it be
a Truth which a Friend to the Acceffion
of this Family would have chofen tọ in-
force è
( 55 )
force? What can the Conclufion from
fuch Premiffes be, but that all the Blood
and Treature expended for the Revolu
tion is thrown away; that with Regard
to Liberty, we are upon the fame Foot
as before the Revolution; and if a Revo-
lution was then neceffary or adviſeable
for the Recovery of our Liberty, that the
Circumſtances of thefe Times call as
loud for a Revolution now, as the Cir-
cumftances of thofe Times did then.
When he ſays, that the Act of Set-
tlement is a Contract between the King
and the People, and that whenever the
King breaks any part of that Contract, the
People are abfolved from their Allegi-
ance and at Liberty to chufe another;
that the People are fole Judges whether
that Contract be broken or not; and
that the whole Nation in general now
complains of the Want of Obfervance of
it; What is and must be the Inference,
but that the People now actually are ab-
folved from any Allegiance, and at Li-
berty to take what King they pleaſe?
And if they are at Liberty to chufe a-
gain, In whofe Favour docs the Craftf
man
( 56 )
man try to prejudice them, when he a
dopts thoſe equally wife and loyal Sen-
timents of his Coadjutor Mr. Fog, that
declare the Preíervation of our Liberties
is the only Thing we have to confider in
the Choice of a King; and that with
Regard to our Liberties, it is a Matter
altogether indifferent, whether a Popish
or a Proteftant Prince be upon the
Throne?
He farther adds too, in order to remove
any Apprehenfions People might have of
Danger to the Nation in the Shock and
Convulfion of a Change; that not only
Minifters, but even Kings themfelves may
eafily be changed, and the Conftitution
yet remain unalter'd and unhurt.
But apart from the dutiful Regard of
this Infinuation to his Majefty at this
Time, if it is confider'd merely as a po-
litical Reflexion on Hiſtory and Govern-
ment, it proves this Author to be no more
a good Commentator, than he is a good
Subject, fince I defy him to fhew any In-
ſtance, in any Hiſtory, of any Time, or
in any Country, where, if the Conftitu-
tion and Government of that Country, in
which
( 57 )
which the Revolution has happen'd, has
not already been as abfolute (that is as
bad) as it could be, that that Revolution
has not fome Way or other chang'd the
Conſtitution, either from bad to good,
from good to bad, or from bad to worse;
but for a Revolution, where the Govern-
ment and Conftitution have been good
before that Revolution, and after it re-
main'd fo, I believe fuch a Revolution
never did happen, and in all Probability,
fince it never did, never will. The whole
Queſtion therefore between the Craftf
man's Sect and the Friends to the prefent
Government, is reducible to this Point;
Whether a Revolution in this Kingdom
is at this Time defirable, or not?
I have but one Queftion more to put to
the Defenders of the Craftfman's Honefty,
and his Followers Loyalty, and that is,
whether the new Diftinction he has coin'd
at the End of his metaphyfical Differta-
tions upon Parties, of fome People being
Friends to the Government but Enemies
to the Conſtitution; and others Enemies
to the Government but Friends to the Con-
ftitution, will bear any other Interpreta-
H
tion,
( 58 )
tion, than that he means to infinuate, that
the Followers of the Pretender are Friends
to the Conftitution; and the Followers
of King George its Enemies.
Had I been to write a Supplement to
the long Jingle of extreme pretty Words
put together in the Craftfman upon theſe
fublimated fuperfine Diftinctions of Friends
and Enemies to the Conftitution and Go-
vernment, there is a third Clafs I fhould
have added to the two he mentions, and
that is, the Clafs concerned in the late mi-
litary Project, whom I look upon to be
Friends neither to the Conftitution nor
the Government, but equally ready to
change both; or at leaft fo defirous to
change the laft, that, rather than fail in that
Attempt, they would facrifice the firft.
If then a Liberty to execute fuch Un-
dertakings, and gratify fuch Refentments,
be the Liberty for which theſe clamorous
Affertors and affected Patrons of Liberty
contend: If a Liberty to dictate to the
King, who fhall ferve him, or elſe to in-
fult him without Reprehenfion: If a Li-
berty to nominate Reprefentatives to the
!
People,
( 59 )
People, or elſe to ſtir them to Sedition un-
chaſtiſed: If a Liberty to pen every Law
the two Houſes of Parliament fhall make,
or elfe to reprefent them as a parcel of
penfion'd Tools and unqualify'd Hirelings,
with Impunity: If a Liberty to raiſe Re-
bellions with more Facility, by refcinding
the Riot-Act, and to give Rebellion a bet-
ter Chance for Succefs, by disbanding the
Troops kept up to fecure on any Emer-
gency the Peace of the State: If a Liber-
ty to put the Nation in Confufion under
the Pretence of a Spirit of Reformation:
If a Liberty to expofe this Kingdom, by
repealing the Septennial Bill, to all thofe
Miſeries of civil Contention that now har-
rafs and afflict the unfortunate Kingdom
of Poland; a Liberty to make every Town
in this Country like Praage, and every
Stream like the Viftula; by giving no
Reſpite to the Heats and Animofities of
contending Parties and Factions, and the
Tumults of an incenfed giddy Populace:
If a Liberty to employ all thofe Hands
in civil Strife, that ought to be employ'd
in cultivating the Land, and to make the
whole Country, one Year in three, re-
femble more the Madneſs of a Bacchanal,
H 2
than
(60)
than the Order of a civilized Society: If a
Liberty to deftroy one Man by Force and
Clamour, whom they cannot hurt by
Law or Reaſon: If a Liberty to encourage
the Enemies of this Government by Cor-
reſpondencies Abroad, and to create Ene-
mies to it by Cabals at Home: If a Liberty
for one Sett of Men in this Nation, like
the Decemviri in Rome, to engrofs to
themſelves the whole legiflative, and ex-
ecutive Power in the Kingdom; to abro-
gate (like thofe Roman Patriots and Re-
formers) all the Laws by which the State
hath hitherto been govern'd, and to in-
troduce and inftitute a new Body of Laws
of their own: If a Liberty for theſe Eng-
glish Decemviri to aboliſh the Authority
of King, Lords, and Commons, as the
Roman Decemviri did that of Confuls,
Senators, and Tribunes: In a Word, if
a Liberty for a motley amphibious Faction
to overturn a Whig-Government by Whig-
principles; or a Revolution-Government
by Jacobite-principles: If fuch are the
Liberties they want, and for which they
conteft, they are Liberties, which I be-
lieve thefe Gentlemen will never be al-
low'd; and Liberties, which when-ever
they
(61)
they take, I hope, they will be made to
repent, in the only Way that bad and
vitiated Minds are, capable of repenting,
which is by being punifhed for the At-
tempt.
The fecond Point I propofed to con-
fider in this Paper, was the Liberty now
enjoy'd in this Country, compared with
any Æra the moſt noted for the quiet
and profperous Enjoyment of Liberty
that can be mark'd out in the English
Hiſtory; but the Variety of Matter ari-
fing on the firſt Head, has already pro-
tracted this Differtation into fo great a
Length, that I fhall not now enter up-
on the other, but give it in a few Days
ſupplementally in a diftinct Paper.
I fhall add nothing more at preſent,
but to fay, I hope I have kept within
the Bounds I at first prefcribed my felf,
with Regard to my Manner of Writing,
though I have exceeded them with Re-
gard to the Length. I hope I have mi-
ftated no Fat; I am fure I have re-
flected on no particular Perfon; and if
in ſpeaking of whole Claffes, Factions,
and
(62)
and Parties of Men; if in delineating Mea-
fures, Schemes, and Projects, the Colours
may feem too thick, or grofly laid on,
or the Lines too ftrong, or coarſely drawn;
all I can fay is, that in deſcribing Vice,
it is impoffible to make it look like Vir-
tue, or in painting Deformity, to repre-
fent it like Beauty.
FINI S
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
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