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Nº.




T H E LIFE OF
MAJOR-GENERAL
GEORGE H, THOMAS
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Aº

THE LIFE
MAJOR-GENERAL
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GEORGE H, THOMAS


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yº
THOMAS B. VAN HORNE, U. S. A.
AUTHOR OF “HISTORY OF ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND”
^s.
VVITH PORTRAIT AND MAPS
- NEW YORK
CIH.A.R.L ES SC R IB NER'S SONS
I882
tºo 7,
T-4-
V2 to
COPYRIGHT, BY
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS,
I882.
GRANT, FAIRES & RODGERS,
Flectrotypers & Printers,
52 & 54 N. Sixth St.,
Philadelphia.
P R E F A C E
Gº THOMAS once said to the author: “Time and his–
tory will dome justice.” He however desired that a narrative
history of the Army of the Cumberland should precede all biographi-
cal representations of himself. It is probable that he overestimated
the direct and suggestive force of such a narrative to effect his own
vindication, and it is certain that he did not anticipate the disparaging
tenor of histories publishcq since his death. Justice has zeof been
done him, in the opinion of multitudes who believe him to have
been a very great man and general; and there is, therefore, need
of a book which has been written to give the well-defined reasons
for this belief.
Private and family letters have been excluded from this volume,
in deference to General Thomas' expressed opinion, that no strictly
personal communications should be published except with the con-
sent of those writing them. º
For the details of operations which have been analyzed and dis
cussed, the reader is referred to my History of the Army of the Cum.
berland, and Captain Ruger's accompanying Atlas, from which have
been taken reduced battle maps for this volume.
7
vi PREFA CE.
It is both pleasant and obligatory to acknowledge my indebtedness
to Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred L. Hough, of the Sixteenth Infantry,
for the privilege of quoting from his invaluable manuscript “Notes”;
to Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Robert N. Scott, Major of the Third Ar-
tillery, for copies of numerous important official papers from the War-
Record office, under his charge; to Lieutenant-Colonel G. C. Kniffin,
late of the Staff of the Twenty-First corps, for tables giving the
strength of the opposing armies in the central theatre of war, com-
piled for his forthcoming history—“The War in the West”; to Major
William H. Lambert, of Philadelphia, late of the Thirty-third New
Jersey Vol., for assistance in proof-reading, and in the revision and
verification of the text.
THOMAS B. VAN HORNE.
August 23d, 1882.
CON TENTS.
CHAPTER I.
Birth and Lineage—Cadetship and Graduation at West Point—Assignment to
the Artillery—Service in that Arm in the Florida War and in the War with
Mexico. - * * & ë te © e we g * I º tº g g & g & q & & g I–II
CHAPTER II.
Appointed Major in the Second Cavalry—Service in Texas—Maintains Alle-
giance to the General Government—Takes Command of his Regiment in
New York City—Is promoted in the Second Cavalry as Lieutenant-Colonel
and Colonel—Participates in General Patterson's Campaign in Virginia, in
Command of a Brigade—Appointed Brigadier-General of Volunteers. I2-39
CHAPTER III.
Thomas assigned to Command in Camp Dick Robinson, Ky.—Makes Prepara-
tions for an Advance into East Tennessee—Refuses to serve under General
O. M. Mitchell—Rebukes Ex-Governor Andrew Johnson–Does not believe
that the Enemy will advance from Bowling Green—Gains a Victory at Mill
Springs—Practicability and Advantages of his projected Movement into East
Tennessee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40–62
CHAPTER IV.
Thomas assigned to the Command of the “ Right Wing” before Corinth—Asks
to be relieved, and re-assigned to the Army of the Ohio–Difficulties in the
Way of Advancing rapidly from Corinth towards Chattanooga—Thomas
commands at McMinnville—Believes that General Bragg will invade Ken-
tucky—Recommends that he be resisted, first from McMinnville, and then
from Murfreesboro’—The Army of the Ohio moves back to Louisville—
Thomas appointed to command in Room of General Buell, declines, and
Buell is restored—Named as second in Command—The Army advances
against the Enemy—Battle of Perryville—General Buell again relieved. 63-83
V] 1
viii CONTENTS,
CHAPTER V., *
General Rosecrans assigned to the Command of the Army—Protest of General
Thomas—-Accepts Command of the “Centre"—Charged with repairing Rail-
road—Advance of the Army—Battle of Stone River—He opposes Retreat—
Tullahoma Campaign. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84–IOI
CHAPTER VI.
The Army crosses the Tennessee River—General Bragg.evacuates Chattanooga—
Pursuit is opposed by Thomas, but nevertheless ordered—The three Corps
widely separated—Thomas' Troops meet the Enemy at Dug Gap—Bragg's
Army concentrated, but fails to strike either of the isolated Corps—Army of
the Cumberland concentrated on the 18th—First day of Battle at Chicka-
mauga. e & g e & g &e * , e * º & & s * e : & e tº IO2–I23
CHAPTER VII. &
The Battle opens on the Left—Enemy repulsed—Changes in Positions of Troops
on the Right—That Wing routed—Thomas forms a new Line, and repulses
the Enemy—the Withdrawal to Chattanooga. . . . . . . . I24–15o
CHAPTER VIII.
Genaral Thomas assigned to the Command of the Department of the Cumber-
land—He reluctantly accepts—Operations to relieve the Army from Starva-
tion—Proposed Attack upon the Enemy's Position. . . . . . 150–166
CHAPTER IX.
Plan of Battle at Chattanooga—Advance of the Central Forces, November 23d—
Hooker’s Action on Lookout Mountain, on the 24th--Sherman's Action on
the 25th—Final Assault. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I67-200
CHAPTER X.
Pursuit of Bragg's Army—Preparations for the Spring Campaign—Operations
against Dalton—Concentration of the Army of the Cumberland. . 201—219
CHAPTER XI.
Advance to Buzzard’s Roost—Turning of Dalton—Action at Resaca—Movement
on Dallas—Assault of June 27th at Kenesaw Mountain—Flank Movement—
Advance on Atlanta—Battles of July 20th and 22d—Siege—Turning move-
ment—Action at Jonesboro. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220–248
CONTENTS. IX
CHAPTER XII.
Discussion of New Plans—Northward Advance of Hood's Army—Division of
the Armies—March to the Sea—Thomas charged with Defence of Tennes-
See e e e ſº tº º & • iº e g º & 9 º tº § {e g & * g 249–27O
CHAPTER XIII.
Hood advances towards Nashville—Instructions of General Thomas to General
Schofield—Operations at Columbia and Spring Hill—Battle of Franklin—
Concentration at Nashville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271-298
CHAPTER XIV.
Concentration at Nashville—Delay for Preparation—General Thomas urged to
fight, but postpones Battle first for Preparation and then for suitable weather
—Council of War—Plans and Hopes of General Hood—Thomas’ Plan of
Battle—Action of December 15th . . . . . . . . . . . 299-327
CHAPTER XV.
Action of December 16th–Defeat and Rout of Hood's Army—Relative strength
of the two Armies—The Issue the Vindication of Thomas . . . .328–346
CHAPTER XVI.
Pursuit of the Routed Army—Obstacles to Rapid Movement—Hood's Dimin-
ished Army Crosses the Tennessee River—Thomas Suggests the Establish-
ment of Civil Authority in Tennessee—Promotion of Thomas . 347–373
CHAPTER XVII,
Operations during the Winter and Spring of 1865—Discussion of General
Grant's Letters Censuring Thomas—Cavalry Expeditions—Wilson in Ala-
bama and Georgia—Stoneman in East Tennessee, Virginia and North Caro-
lina—Capture of Mr. Davis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374-397
CHAPTER XVIII.
Military Administration of Thomas during the period of Reconstruction of
Southern States—Honored by the State of Tennessee—Private Gifts Refused
and Public Honors Declined—He Refuses to be a Presidential Candidate—
The Society of the Army of the Cumberland. . . . . . . . 398–43o
X CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XIX.
His Life Saddened by Official and other Annoyances—His Death and Burial—
An Unfinished Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 I-454
CHAPTER XX.
Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455-465
APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
LIST OF MAP S.
THE FIELD OF WAR IN THE WEST.
LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS.
PERRYVILLE.
STONE RIVER,
CHICKAMAUGA.
CHATTANOOGA.
FRANKLIN.
NASHVILLE.
*** The maps are //aced at the end of the volume,
T H E LIFE
OF
GENERAL GEORGE H, THOMAS
CHAPTER I.
BIRTH AND LINEAGE–CADETSHIP AND GRADUATION AT WEST POINT
ASSIGNMENT TO THE ARTILLERY-SERVICE IN THAT ARM IN THE
FLORIDA WAR AND IN THE WAR WITH MEXICO.
EORGE HENRY THOMAS was born in Southampton
County, Virginia, July 31st, 1816. His father's family,
as the name indicates, originated in Wales, but by long
residence and intermarriage in England, became essentially
English before it was a second time transplanted. His mother
was a descendant of a prominent Huguenot family by the
name of Rochelle, which fled to America from the persecu-
tion of Louis XIV. Thus, on one side, the lineage of
George H. Thomas connected him with the English cava-
liers, and, on the other, with the best type of the French
people, while by long residence in Virginia both branches
became thoroughly American. His family, though com-
bining long lines of reputable ancestry and holding a high
social position, was not especially distinguished. There is
room, however, for speculation as to the subtle force of
2 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS.
heredity in moulding his character, and while it is not
known that it conformed closely to a distinct type found in
the paternal or maternal line, it cannot be doubted that its
remarkable excellencies were largely due to inherited qual-
ities and tendencies.
The first twenty years of his life were spent in a quiet
home subject to the moulding influences of a refined family
and elevating external associations. In his twentieth year
he completed with honor the prescribed course of study of
the Southampton Academy located near his home. Soon
after his graduation, he entered the office of James Rochelle,
his uncle, who, at the time, was county clerk. While acting
as deputy clerk, he commenced the study of law. But
another career soon offered itself. At this time the Honor-
able John Y. Mason represented in Congress the district
which embraced Southampton County, and having an ap-
pointment to a cadetship at the Military Academy at West
Point to offer to some young man in his district, he called
upon Mr. Rochelle, and offered it to his nephew. Mr.
Rochelle said in reply: “Let us call the boy and ascertain
what he thinks of the proposition.” The “boy" accepted
promptly, and the legal profession lost a worthy candidate
for its duties and honors, while the profession of arms
gained one of its highest ornaments.
Soon after his appointment young Thomas repaired to
West Point, and having passed the required examination,
was admitted as a cadet. He then returned to his home
for a short time. When he was about to take leave of his
family and friends, his uncle said to him : “Stop at Wash-
ington and repeat your thanks to Mr. Mason for your ap-
pointment.” When he had done this, Mr. Mason said to
him : “No cadet appointed from our district has ever gra-
duated from the Military Academy; and if you do not, I
never want to see you again.” But Thomas did not need
this spur; his character gave assurance that the traditional
failure would not be repeated by him.
IIIS YOUTH THE PROPHECY OF HIS MANHOOD. 3
It is to be regretted that more is not known of the early
life of so remarkable a man; but, doubtless, his youth was
the prophecy of his manhood. It is known that he was a
good son and brother, and the fact that he was selected for
appointment at the Military Academy may be accepted as
proof that his talents and character as revealed in his youth
inspired the confidence of the distinguished Congressman by
whom he was chosen to redeem the reputation of the district.
But one of the great lessons of his life, fraught with
blessing to the world, has been lost, since it is not known,
under what inspirations and circumstances and at what time
the ideals, of which his character and career were the reali-
zation, took definite shape in his own mind and conscious-
ness. Next in value to a life of such wonderful excellence
is a knowledge of its development—to know how much has
been due to natural tendencies and capacities, how much
to self-restraint and self-originating impulse and purpose,
how much to external suggestions and influences, and how
far he was himself conscious of the origin and development
of his character. But all this is now in the realm of infer-
ence. Naturally reticent, especially in regard to whatever
pertained to his inner life, he left no record of his early
life, although it was his intention, as expressed only a few
days before his death, to unfold the history of his youth.
So positive, however, was the symmetry and harmony of
all the elements of his character, and so uniform its devel-
opment with corresponding concord of character and ca-
reer, that it cannot be doubted that in his youth he had a
clear conception of a noble life and a strong conviction Of
its obligation.
The following story told by himself strikingly evinces
, the early existence of traits which his military career fully
illustrated. Having leisure for a short time in his youth,
he devoted himself to practical mechanics. He first visited
daily the shop of a saddler, observed closely his use of
tools, the shaping of each part of a saddle and their final
4. LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS.
combination. With knowledge and skill acquired by ob-
servation alone, he succeeded in his first effort in making a
good saddle. In the same way he learned to make boots
and furniture. It was his belief that he thus strengthened
faculties which subsequently found employment in forming
combinations of infinitely more importance than the adjust-
ment of the parts of a saddle, boot or desk.
He entered the Military Academy in June 1, 1836, and
graduated in regular course in the corresponding month of
1840, standing twelfth in a class of forty-two members,
General W. T. Sherman being sixth. His attainments were
broad and solid, and his character Commanded the respect
and esteem of professors and Cadets, and gave assurance
that in him an able and faithful officer was to be added to
the United States Army. He was an earnest and industrious
student, mastering the curriculum, and yet laying broader
foundations than such mastery indicates. His methods
and purposes at West Point harmonized with the subse-
quent tenor and movement of his life.
On the first of July, 1840, George H. Thomas was ap-
pointed second lieutenant in the Third Artillery. He served
at Fort Columbus, New York, until the following Novem-
ber, when he was ordered with his company to Florida,
where he remained on field duty until the termination of
the Indian war. He participated in Major Wade's capture
of seventy Seminole Indians, November 6th, 1841, and was
breveted first lieutenant from that date “for gallantry and
good conduct in the war against the Florida Indians.”
Lieutenant Thomas was transferred with his company to
New Orleans in February, 1842, and in the following June
to Fort Moultrie, South Carolina. In December, 1843, he
was assigned to company “C,” stationed at Fort McHenry,
Maryland. He was promoted first lieutenant April 30th,
1844, and in October joined company “E,” at Fort Moul-
trie. He was ordered upon recruiting service in February,
1845, and rejoined his company in March.
THE MEXICAN WAR. 5
On the 26th of June, with his company, he left Fort
Moultrie under orders to report to General Zachary Taylor.
Company “E.” arrived at New Orleans July 19th, and on
the 24th, under the command of Taylor, sailed for Texas,
and in August, with the Third and Fourth Infantry, took
position at Corpus Christi, being the first United States
troops to occupy the soil of Texas. With the Army of
Occupation, Company “E” advanced to the Rio Grande in
March, 1846, and was subsequently ordered with the
Seventh Infantry and Company “ I” Second Artillery, under
Major Brown, to garrison the fort opposite Metamoras.
These troops were subjected to bombardment from the 3d
to the 9th of May. Their loss, however, was slight, but
included the gallant Major Brown, who was succeeded in
command by Captain Hawkins of the Seventh Infantry.
On the 9th, the siege was raised in consequence of the de-
feat of the Mexican army by General Taylor at Palo Alto
and Resaca de la Palma, on the 8th and 9th. When the
defeated Mexicans were hastily crossing the river before
Taylor's pursuing forces, the artillery fire from the fort
increased their fright and confusion.
During June and July Lieutenant Thomas was detached
with a section of his battery, and was with the vanguard in
its advance to Reynosa and Camargo. Having rejoined his
company, he took part in the battles about Monterey, Sep-
tember 2 Ist-23d, and such was his bearing that he was
brevetted captain “for gallant and meritorious conduct.”
In his report, General J. P. Henderson, commanding Texan
volunteers, wrote: “I beg leave also, under the authority
of General Lamar, to compliment Lieutenant Thomas of
the artillery and his brave men for the bold advance and
efficient management of the force under his charge. When
ordered to retire he reloaded his piece, fired a farewell shot
at the foe and returned under a shower of bullets.”
General Twiggs, commanding First division, said, “Cap-
tains R. Ridgely and B. Bragg, and their subalterns, W. H.
6 I, IFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H. THOMAS.
Shover, G. H. Thomas, J. F. Reynolds, C. L. Kilburn, and
S. G. French deserve the highest praise for their skill and
good conduct under the heaviest fire of the enemy, which,
when an opportunity offered, was concentrated on them.”
The senior first lieutenant, Braxton Bragg, having been
promoted to a captaincy, Lieutenant Thomas commanded
Company “E” from November 2 Ist, 1846, to February 14th,
1847, when Captain T. W. Sherman assumed command.
He accompanied General Quitman's brigade in its march to
Victoria in December, 1846.
In the battle of Buena Vista, Feb. 22d–23d, 1847, Lieuten-
ant Thomas was conspicuous for efficiency and bravery, and
was subsequently brevetted Major “for gallant and merito-
rious conduct” in this battle. The following passages from
official reports prove that this reward was fully earned.
General Taylor said, referring to the subalterns of the
artillery, and including Thomas by name: “They were nearly
all detached at different times, and in every situation ex-
hibited conspicuous skill and gallantry.”
Captain T. W. Sherman wrote: “I was directed to take
my battery back to the plateau, where I joined Lieutenant
Thomas, who had been constantly engaged during the fore-
noon in the preservation of that important position, and
whom I found closely engaged with the enemy, and that,
too, in a very advanced position. * * * Lieutenant
Thomas more than sustained the reputation he has long en-
joyed in his regiment as an accurate and Scientific artil-
1erist.”
General Wool attributed the victory to the artillery:
“I also desire to express my high admiration and to offer
my warmest thanks to Captains Washington, Sherman and
Bragg, and Lieutenants O'Brien and Thomas, and their
batteries, to whose services at this point and on every part
of the field, I think it but justice to say we are mainly in-
debted for the great victory so successfully achieved by our
arms over the great force opposed to us–more than twenty
HIS NEIGHBO RS PRO UD OF HIM. 7
thousand men, and seventeen pieces of artillery. Without
our artillery we would not have maintained our position a
single hour.”
The victory at Buena Vista ended the war in Northern
Mexico, but Company “E,” Third Artillery, was left with
other troops south of the Rio Grande until August 20th,
when the last of our forces recrossed into Texas.
The Mexican war gave such fame to many young officers,
captains and lieutenants, as foreshadowed their distinction
as generals commanding great armies. Among these, per-
haps, no one was more distinguished than Lieutenant
George H. Thomas. His services in that war harmonized
logically and appropriately with the services which have
since gained him a place among the great soldiers of the
world. His conduct in Mexico foreshadowed his general-
ship in the war of the Rebellion. His gallantry at Monterey
and Buena Vista, which secured his brevets as captain and
major, was the promise of the generalship which at Chicka-
mauga and Nashville commanded his promotions as briga-
dier and major-general in the United States Army.
As was natural, the citizens of his native county felt
honored by his brilliant conduct in the Mexican war, and
doubtless the Congressman who had appointed him a cadet
at West Point and who had been gratified that the youth of
his selection had been the first from the district to graduate
from the institution, was in full sympathy with those who
gave expression to their appreciation of the gallantry of
Lieutenant Thomas by the presentation of a splendid Sword.
As the proceedings connected with the presentation of this
sword manifest the standing of Thomas in his native county
fourteen years before the civil war, in which he separated
himself from the men who were then proud of him, they are
given in full as published at the time:
“At a meeting of the citizens of Southampton County,
Virginia, at their court house at Jerusalem, on Monday,
the 19th of July, 1847—the meeting was organized by call-
8 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H, THOMAS.
ing Captain James Maget to the chair, and appointing L. R.
Edwards Secretary—Colonel William C. Parker rose, and
in his naturally eloquent and happy style, proceded to de-
liver a spirit-stirring eulogy upon the character and gallant
conduct of our two countrymen, Captain William Kello, of
the Eighth Infantry, and Brevet Captain George H. Thomas,
of the Third Artillery, the first named gentleman being then
at home, in the county, on leave on account of ill health, and
the latter with General Taylor in Mexico. He then proposed
the following resolutions, which were carried by acclamation:
Resolved, That whilst we glory in the unfailing fame which our
heroic army in Mexico has acquired for herself and country, our at-
tention has been especially drawn to the military skill, bravery and
noble deportment of our fellow countyman, George H. Thomas, ex-
hibited in the campaign of Florida, at Fort Brown, Monterey and
Buena Vista, in which he has given ample proof of the best requisites
of a soldier—patience, fortitude, firmness and daring intrepidity.
Resolved, That as a testimonial of our high appreciation of his
character as a citizen and a soldier, we will present to him a sword,
with suitable emblems and devices and that ———be appointed
a committee to collect by subscription a sum sufficient for the
purpose and cause to be fabricated a sword to be presented to the
said George H. Thomas, through the hands of his noble and heroic
commander, Major-General Z. Taylor.
“The chair then filled the blank with the names of the
following gentlemen (to wit): Colonel W. C. Parker, Robert
Ridley, Benjamin C. Pope, John Barham, Doctor Massen-
bury, Charles F. Urquhart, Jacob Barrett, Colonel Carr
Barnes, William G. Thands, Robert G. Griffin and Doctor
George W. Peete.
“On motion of George W. Peete, ordered that a copy of
these proceedings be published, and that a copy each be
presented to the mother and brothers of Captain Thomas,
and a copy be sent with the Sword.”
The sword, when made, was a beautiful one, and was
formally presented. The following is a description of it,
taken from the Philadelphia Bulletin, while the sword was
AFTER THE MEXICAN WAR. 9
on exhibition in that city by the makers, Horstman & Sons.
“The pattern of the sabre is that used by the United States
Dragoons. The blade is of the truest and prettiest steel,
finished in a manner that would defy superiority of work-
manship. The scabbard is of solid silver, standard value,
beautifully enriched with engraved scroll work encircling
military trophies, with the words: Florida, Ft. Brown,
Monterey, Buena Vista, and an engraved vignette of the
battle of Monterey. The hilt is of basket form, very
elaborately chased. The grip is solid silver, also enriched
with engraved scrolls. The pommel is of gold, grasping
an amethyst, and the rings and bands in bas-relief, and
upon the grip is engraved an elephant.”
At the time of the presentation of this sword, and until
the loyalty of George H. Thomas to the General Govern-
ment was demonstrated in the war of the Rebellion, he was
undoubtedly regarded as a true man and a brilliant officer
by his family, his admiring county friends, and by Vir-
ginians generally. But in striking contrast with the respect
and confidence exhibited by them in 1847, there was an
intensity of bitterness and animosity manifested after the
war began, which even his death did not arrest. Northern
men, in some instances, fought for the South, and yet none
of them have experienced such treatment from Northern
friends and the Northern people as did Thomas from his
family and his former friends.
Lieutenant Thomas' first assignment after the Mexican
war was to the charge of the commissary depot at Brazos
Santiago, where he remained until February Ist, 1849, when
he was relieved. In December, 1848, his company was
ordered to Fort Adams, Rhode Island, where he rejoined it,
August 1, 1849, at the expiration of a six months' leave of
absence, which was his first respite from active duty since
leaving West Point. He was transferred to Company “B”
of the same regiment on the 6th of August, and remained
at Fort Adams until September 12th, 1849.
IO LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
Upon the recurrence of hostilities between the citizens
and Indians in the Southern part of Florida, he was ordered
with his company to that State. Here he was intrusted by
the commanding officer to organize and direct an expedi-
tion against the remaining Seminole Indians. This was not
alone because he had knowledge of the country, but in chief
part because his character as an officer was such as to invite
a superior to lean upon him. His relations to this expedi-
tion and to the commanding officer gave the type of almost
all his Subsequent Service, even when an army commander.
He was then, as generally afterwards, the trusted, and, con-
sequently, the responsible subordinate. In this subjection
to an immediate superior he became famous as a general, a
fact that provokes the conjecture, that had he been given
early independence as a general, there would have been
great gain to the country.
He remained in Florida until December, 1850, when he
was ordered to Texas. At New Orleans, en route, he received
an order assigning him to duty at Fort Independence, in
Boston Harbor. He served at this post from January to
March, 1851, when he was appointed instructor of artillery
and cavalry at West Point. He was distinguished in this
service by a display of the same qualities which had given
him fame in the field. His loyalty to duty was always
supreme, and at the Military Academy he met all the re-
quirements of his office. It is still a source of pride to many
officers who served with distinction in the civil war, that
they were his pupils at West Point.
On the 7th of November, 1852, Lieutenant Thomas was
married to Miss Frances L. Kellogg, of Troy, New York.
In this relation, as in all others, there was the same com-
mingling of the highest and purest Sentiment, and a rigid
regard to duty. His home life realized the highest ideal
from first to last.
December 24th, 1853, he was promoted to a captaincy in
the Third Artillery, and when relieved from duty at West
JHIS COOLNESS AMID DAWGER. I I
Point, was assigned to the command of a battalion of artil-
lery, which he conducted to California by way of Panama.
He arrived at Benicia Barracks, near San Francisco, June
Ist, 1854, and was immediately assigned to duty at Fort
Yuma, in Lower California, to relieve Major Heintzelman.
He retained command at Fort Yuma until July 2 Ist, I855,
although he had been previously transferred to another arm
of the service with higher rank.
During one of his voyages from Charleston to New York,
in command of troops, he saved the ship and all on board
by arbitrarily displacing the captain and giving command
to the first officer. A violent storm was met off Cape
Hatteras, and the captain was too drunk to manage the ship
in such an emergency, and yet insisted on giving such orders
as made him the ally of the winds and waves in wrecking
the ship. The first officer reported the facts to Thomas,
stating at the same time that it would be mutiny for him to
disobey the captain, a responsibility he was unwilling to
assume. He insisted, however, that some one must take
control or they would inevitably be lost. Thomas then
made observations and convinced himself that the captain
was utterly unfit to command. He then sent for him and
told him to remain in his state room, and that he himself
would be responsible for the management of the ship. Un-
der the direction of the first officer the vessel outrode the
storm. In this simple action, as in all his subsequent con-
duct, his willingness to assume responsibility in emergencies
was clearly exhibited. He was never afraid of responsibility
in itself when free to act, and he never declined any duty or
command through distrust of himself.
CHAPTER II.
APPOINTED MAJOR IN THE SECOND CAVALRY — SERVICE IN TEXAS —
- MAINTAINS ALLEGIANCE TO THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT_TAKES COM-
MAND OF HIS REGIMENT IN NEW YORK CITY –IS PROMOTED IN THE
SECOND CAVALRY AS LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND COLONEL–PARTICI—
PATES IN GENERAL PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA, IN COMMAND
OF A BRIGADE—APPOINTED BRIGADIER—GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS.
Y an act of Congress of March 3d, 1855, four regiments—
two of cavalry and two of infantry—were added to
the Regular Army. Captain Thomas, although the lowest
of his rank in the Artillery, was appointed major of the
Second Cavalry, one of the new regiments, on the 12th of
May of that year. He joined his regiment at Jefferson Bar-
racks, Missouri, in September following. The organization
of these four regiments, especially the Second Cavalry, has
great interest from the fact that Jefferson Davis was Secre-
tary of War at the time, and his selection of officers warrants
the belief that he then anticipated the contest in which he
was so prominent—at least as a probable event—and that
in his appointments he had especial regard to the interests
of the Southern States. Southern officers were particularly
prominent in the Second Cavalry. In May, 1855, the four
field officers and many others were natives of slave holding
States. Albert Sidney Johnston was colonel; Robert E.
Lee, lieutenant colonel; W. J. Hardee was senior major;
and George H. Thomas, junior. At the opening of the war
twenty-five officers of this regiment were graduates of West
Point, and of these seventeen were natives of the South.
They were not only Southern men, but the best representa-
tives of that section in the army. As evidence of the mili-
I 2
APPOINTED MAJOR IN THE SECOND CAVALRY, 13
tary talent thrown into the Second Cavalry by Mr. Davis,
it may be mentioned that it furnished seventeen generals for
the war, of whom twelve were in the Confederate service.
Four of these generals commanded large armies, and four
others had independent commands with large forces.
Two considerations, in all probability, induced Mr. Davis
to appoint Captain Thomas a major in the Second Cavalry:
his birth in Virginia and his efficiency and gallantry in the
Mexican war. General Thomas always believed that Mr.
Davis had regard to a probable war between the Northern
and Southern States in organizing that regiment. The wri-
ter once asked him if he entertained this opinion. He
promptly answered that he did. And in reply to the ques-
tion : “Did not Mr. Davis depend upon you, as upon Gen-
erals Johnston, Lee, Hardee and other Southern officers to
fight for the South in the event of war P” he said: “Cer-
tainly he did.” Major Thomas and Lieutenants Royall,
Chambliss and Harrison were the only officers of this regi-
ment, born in a seceding State, who remained loyal; and
only three others, of Southern birth, Captain R. W. John-
son and Lieutenant Kenner Garrard, from Kentucky, and
Lieutenant Joseph H. McArthur, from Missouri, maintained
their allegiance to the General Government.
When Major Thomas had been on duty a short time with
his regiment he was ordered upon recruiting service. And
during its continuance the Second Cavalry was ordered to
Texas. He joined it there May 1st, 1856, and remained
with it in that State until November, 1860. During three
years of this period he was in command of the regiment,
in turn, at Fort Mason, San Antonio, Fort. Belknap and
Camp Cooper. In 1859 he commanded the escort which
accompanied the Texas Reserve Indians to the Indian Ter-
ritory. Soon after he explored, under orders, the country on the
head waters of the Canadian and Red Rivers. He was en-
gaged several months in the exploration of an unknown
region, and gathered much valuable geological and geo-
I 4. LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H. THOMAS.
graphical knowledge. He was especially fitted for this ser-
vice by habits of close observation, thorough scientific
attainments and unbounded enthusiasm.
A second similar expedition was required of him in the
Summer of 1860, in another field, embracing the sources of
the Concho and Colorado Rivers. As before, he gained val-
uable facts relative to the geological and geographical fea-
tures of the region. This expedition had another issue of
Some importance, since in conducting it Major Thomas fell
in with a predatory band of Indians, and re-captured the
animals which the Indians had taken from the white settle-
ments. In skirmishing with the Indians, August 26th, he
was severely wounded by an arrow, which passed through
his chin and penetrated his breast, so far as to fasten itself
firmly. He drew it out himself at the cost of severe pain.
This was the only wound he ever received, though he had
been previously exposed in battle, and more frequently after-
wards, from his utter disregard of personal danger.
His report of the skirmish with the Indians is subjoined,
to furnish a striking contrast with his subsequent reports of
great battles. In 1860, in command of cavalry, he fought a
lone Indian. In the years that followed he led into action
vast armies.
ExTRACT FROM REPORT OF AUGUST 31, 1860.
I have the honor to submit for the information of the department
commander, the following report of the operations of the expedition
under my command, to the head waters of the Concho and Colorado
rivers, during the months of July and August. * * * On the
morning of the 25th inst, about fourteen miles east of the mountain
pass, one of the Indian guides (Dloss) discovered a fresh horse trail
crossing the road. As soon as the packs could be arranged and our
wagons despatched with the remains of our baggage to the post, with
the teams (two sick—the hospital steward and a private of the band—
too sick to ride) I followed the trail with all the remainder of the de-
tachment and three guides, in a west northwest direction for about
forty miles, that day, traveling as long as we could see the trail after
nightfall. On the 26th, about 7 A. M., the Delaware guide (Dloss)
WG UNDED IN AN INDIAN FIG EIT, I 5
discovered the Indians, eleven"in number, at camp. He and their
spy discovered each other about the same time, and giving me the
signal agreed upon, the party moved at Once in a gallop for a mile
and a half before Coming in sight of their camp, which was located
on the opposite side of a deep ravine, (running north, and I pre-
sume, into the Clear Fork), impassable except at a few points. Here
we lost considerable time Searching for a crossing, and only suc-
ceeded, finally, in getting over by dismounting and leading our ani-
mals. In the meantime the Indians being already mounted and
having their animals collected together, had increased their distance
from us by at least half a mile. As soon as the crossing was effected
and the men remounted, we pursued them at full speed for about
three miles and a half further, pushing them so closely that they aban-
doned their loose animals, and continued their flight, effecting their
escape solely from the fact that our animals had been completely ex-
hausted by the fatiguing pace at which the pursuit had been kept up.
As we were gradually overhauling them, one fellow, more persever-
ing than the rest, and who still kept his position in the rear of the
loose animals, suddenly dismounted and prepared to fight, and our
men, in their eagerness to despatch him, hurried upon him so quickly
that several of his arrows took effect, wounding myself in the chin
and chest, also Private William Murphy, of Company “D,” in the left
shoulder, and Privates John Tile and Casper Siddle, of the band,
each in the leg, before he fell, by twenty or more shots. * * * By
this time the main body of the Indians, who were mounted on their
best animals, were at least two miles from us, retiring at a rapid
pace, and it being impossible to overtake them, on account of the
exhausted condition of our animals, the pursuit was discontinued.
•K- % * * -X- * * %
This report relates to an insignificant affair, but is never-
theless characteristic and carefully exact, as were his sub-
sequent reports of the operations of brigade, division, corps
and army. L!
sº
* {
Major Thomas had now served nearly twenty years in
the army with only one leave of absence, a fact which
proves his rare devotion to duty. On his return to his
post, however, he departed from his previous, self-imposed,
rule of official conduct, and applied for a year's leave
of absence. His application having been granted, he left
Camp Cooper November 1st, just before the Presidential
election which precipitated the secession of eleven of the
I 6 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H, THOMAS.
Southern States, with civil war as the necessary sequence.
It was too soon for General Twiggs, commanding the De-
partment of Texas, to take definite action in reference to
the anticipated withdrawal of the Southern States from the
Union, in the event of the election of the candidate of the
Republican party; but it was not too soon for this Southern
general to indicate his course should secession occur.
And Thomas bore with him from Texas the impression
that military affairs in that department were not in safe
hands.
His departure from Texas brought to him a perplexing
problem—the disposition of a slave woman, whom he had
purchased in Texas when it was not practicable to hire a
servant. This problem was not of difficult solution for an
ordinary slave owner; but with Major Thomas it was other-
wise, since, to use his own words, he “could not sell a
human being.” He had been accustomed to the service of
slaves all his life, and felt no scruples in purchasing one,
when in need of a servant. But when the question of the
sale of a slave became a practical one, the nature of the
transaction from this point of view was so repulsive to him
that it could only be answered in the negative, and although
it was against his pecuniary interest to take this woman
with him to Virginia, he resolved to do it. He was a
Southern man, at this time, so far as to introduce, by pur-
chase, a slave woman into his family where she would
always be treated kindly; but he revolted at the possibili-
ties of misery and cruel treatment which inhered in the
system of American slavery. He was not then an aboli-
tionist in the northern significance of that offensive term,
and doubtless he would have claimed, that, as a political
matter, the institution of slavery was recognized by the
National Constitution, and that any direct interference with
it by Congressional legislation, or partisan efforts to free
the slaves, trenched upon the rights of the Southern States.
But he could not sell a human being, one that he had made
RIND NESS TO HIS SLA VE. I 7
his slave by purchase, a transaction which made chattels of
men and women. A strong feeling obtained among the
more cultured and more humane classes in the South
against the sale of family or inherited slaves, and with
many, as with Major Thomas, there was a strong repug-
nance to the Sale of purchased slaves, apart from any oppo-
sition to the institution itself. In the purchase the horrid
possibilities were put out of view; but in Sale they would
force themselves into sight. Deciding not to sell his slave,
Major Thomas took her with him to his home in Virginia,
and did not see her again, after going north, until as a free
woman she became his voluntary servant. After the war
this woman claimed for herself and her husband and chil-
dren the protection of her old master, and although it was
both inconvenient and expensive for General Thomas to
take them, he had them moved from Virginia to Nashville,
Tennessee. They afterwards caused trouble and anxiety.
He tried to train them for a more independent life, and
made an effort to induce them to start for themselves. But
they were unwilling to leave him for an uncertain living,
and they therefore remained with him until he was ordered
to the Pacific coast in 1869. It being then impracticable
for him to give them further personal care, he induced his
brother living in Mississippi to give them employment, and
with their consent, he sent them to him. This brother,
Benjamin Thomas, was the only member of his family he
met after he left his home in 1860. It is probable that his
course in the war did not alienate the affection of this bro-
ther; if it did, there was a complete renewal of the old-time
regard after the conflict was over. *
This leave of absence, on the eve of the presidential elec-
tion, had no significance of a political or tentative character
The National emergency was then only dimly prospective,
and Thomas merely sought rest and the Companionship of
friends after a long period of unbroken service; but never-
theless in going north he placed himself in a position to
2
I 8 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
look calmly at the question of loyalty in all its relations to
personal obligation and patriotism, when free from all en-
tanglements of official connections and local influences.
And of how much worth to the Nation in the fast-coming
crisis, was this quiet major traveling northward from Texas
Had the morning despatches announced his movement
northward, only the smallest fraction of the people would
have known or cared who he was, or why he was traveling
towards Washington. He was only a major in the regular
army, who had been secluded from public view by service
for twenty years, mainly at outposts. But this seeming
was not the reality. A great soldier under the guise of a
major of cavalry was moving towards a career of a brilliancy
unsurpassed in American annals, And what had his ser-
vice revealed in prophecy of such a career P There had
been no war since he was a lieutenant to make him a great
general by the lessons of its campaigns and battles, and
yet in 1860 he was a consummate general. And in this
there is no mystery. Twenty years of service and study,
supplementing a technical military education, had given
him full competency for the highest positions offered by a
gigantic war. He had made the leisure of army life in
time of peace subservient to the highest possibilities of the
profession of arms. It was his habit to study the natural
sciences in the order suggested by the especial facilities
afforded at the different army posts. In Florida he studied
botany; geology and mineralogy in regions fruitful in spe-
cimens. At Fort Yuma he gave attention to the language
and traditions of the neighboring Indians. He learned to
speak the language of the Yumas, and made effort to reduce
it to a written form. By such pursuits, in connection with
unflagging professional study, he made full preparation for
his subsequent career as a general. And if other leading
commanders made mistakes when he did not, the fact may
be attributed to their inferior natural ability and inferior
professional attainments. It was not to be expected that
APPEARANCE AND CHARACTER. 19
generals, although graduates from West Point, who had
given the strength of manhood to civil pursuits, would
equal one who had devoted himself continuously and ear-
nestly for twenty-four years to the complete mastery of the
science of war.
If the outward indications of great strength had been
observed and considered, any one of ordinary discernment
would have readily believed that Major Thomas was able
to lead a great army to victory. He was about six feet in
height, with proportions large and symmetrical. His thick
hair and heavy beard were light brown, slightly tinged with
red and sprinkled with gray. His head was large, forehead
broad, eyes blue, features not entirely regular, but harmo-
nious and strong. His presence was commanding, and his
manners winning. His expression was usually exceedingly
mild ; but yet there was in the easily compressed lips and
change of cast in the soft blue eye, the plainest indication
of an iron will. His person and mien impressed strangers,
and few men would look upon him for the first time with-
out discerning his power and the certainty of its beneficent
exertion. He was the embodiment of strength, and yet his
power transcended all outward seeming. Beyond his sober
bearing and quiet dignity, the usual exponents of conscious
strength, there was in the frequent introspective look an
indication of the reserve power which was to be the source
of safety to great armies. He was destined to draw vast
masses of men to him in reverence and love by the force
and purity of his personal character, by the charm of mien
and smile and spirit, and to hold them to duty and despe-
rate daring by the subtle inspiration which emanated from
the power which great emergencies called forth, but never
exhausted.
On his way from Richmond to Washington, he was in-
jured by a railroad accident which occurred near Norfolk.
He jumped from the train, and though lighting on his feet,
his spine was so very seriously injured, that he was not
2O LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H. THOMAS.
able to travel for six weeks. And from this injury he
never entirely recovered. This continued spinal lameness
was one cause, at least, of his slow riding and deliberate
personal movements, so noticeable during the war. Mrs.
Thomas, who had preceded him from the South, joined
him at Norfolk, having been called to him by a telegraphic
despatch. They had expected to meet in New York.
When able to travel, he went to Washington, and calling
upon General Scott, expressed his conviction that General
Twiggs meditated treachery. He also expressed this con-
viction to General Jos. E. Johnston, quartermaster general.
At this time there had been no actual secession, except,
perhaps, in the case of South Carolina. His arrival at
Washington was about the time of the formal withdrawal
of that State. But this action was then clearly indicated
in other States, and his own action, in giving warning in
respect to military affairs’ in Texas, was positive proof of
his loyalty in the face of Southern movements. The su-
preme test, the secession of his own State, had not come;
but the probability of the withdrawal of the southern belt
of States was very strong, and the probable consequences
were plainly in view. It is true that there was then a strong
hope that civil war would be averted, and he doubtless met
multitudes at Washington, from the North and from the
South, who entertained this expectation. Such a war was
so abhorrent to the people of the North, that the thought
of it as actual was not willingly entertained, and with this
feeling the more noble and conservative people of the South
fully sympathized. How far Thomas was in sympathy
with those who believed that war would be averted, up to
the time of its actual outbreak, is not known ; but it is
known that he was positively loyal when he visited Wash-
ington in December, 1860.
Whether or not in consequence of the warning given by
Thomas, General Twiggs was soon after relieved from the
command of the Department of Texas, but not before his
ON THE E VIE OF THE REBELLION. 2 I
plan of operations in favor of the South had been fully
manifested. He had given leaves of absence to all officers
who desired to visit their respective states, to give them an
opportunity to gain a high position in the Confederate
army, or in State forces. Colonel Lee, who had com-
manded the Department of Texas since the preceding Feb-
ruary, took leave in December. Captain Van Dorn of the
Second Cavalry, having secured prospectively a brigadier
general's commission, had returned to command his regi-
ment in the expected disarmament of all the troops in the
Southwest. This officer served the South by offering in-
creased rank to commissioned and non-commissioned offi-
cers of the United States Army, on the condition of service
in the Southern army. And after General Twiggs had
been ordered to turn over his command to Colonel Waite,
and had, instead, surrendered his forces to the authorities
of Texas, Van Dorn had gone on board the Star of the
West, a vessel sent to Indianola to transport the disarmed
troops to the North, and having represented himself as an
officer of the United States Army, and wearing its uniform,
had ordered the ship back to New Orleans without the
troops. The troops had been detained that they might be
seduced from their allegiance. The Second Cavalry, with
no field officer with it, was involved in the common fate of
all the regular troops in Texas. Its colonel, Albert Sidney
Johnston, was in command of the Department of the Pacific,
Lt. Col. Lee and Major Thomas were on leave, and Major
Hardee was commandant of cadets, at West Point, and had
been for four years.
From Washington, Major Thomas went to New York,
and soon after wrote the letter to Colonel F. H. Smith,
superintendent of the Military Institute of Virginia, which
was published in July, 1870, as evidence that at the date
of the letter, he meditated withdrawing from the United
States Army, from political or sectional considerations.
During his life this charge was repeatedly made, arid after
22 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS.
his death it was emphasized. It was asserted that there
was a letter from him in existence, through which he offered
his sword to the Governor of Virginia. The reference was
doubtless to this letter to Colonel Smith, as no other has
ever been produced that can be construed to imply such a
purpose or act. Virginians were disappointed that he did
not at the call of his State resign his commission in the
United States Army, as did General Jos. E. Johnston, Col.
Robert E. Lee, and other officers from that State, and it
was natural, though unjust, that they should be bitter in
consequence. But there is no justification for the malicious,
unfounded charge that General Thomas ever intended to
join the rebellion.
The letter to Colonel Smith is here inserted :
NEW YORK Hotel, NEW YORK CITY,
January 18th, 1861.
COLONEL FRANCIS H. SMITH,
Sup’t Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Va.
Dear Sir: In looking over the files of the AVational Intelligencer,
this morning, I met with your advertisement for a commandant of
cadets and instructor of tactics at the Institute. If not already filled,
I will be under obligations if you will inform me what salary and
allowances pertain to the situation, as from present appearances I
fear it will soon be necessary for me to be looking up some means of
Support.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major U. S. Army.
The text of this letter, in absence of a knowledge of the
circumstances under which it was written, and interpreted
in the light of subsequent events, might lead to the conclu-
sion, that he then anticipated that the disorganization of
the United States Army, or such contingencies as the
struggle then imminent might involve, made it necessary
for him “to be looking up some means of support.” And
yet this letter, containing no direct or indirect allusion to
the secession movement or the condition of the country,
THE STATE OR TEIE NATION ? 2
and interpreted by circumstances then existing, had no
reference to anything but the means of support from an
honorable and useful position. The injury received near
Norfolk then threatened permanent disability; and think-
ing of leaving the army for this reason, he made inquiry of
the Superintendent of the Military Institute of his native
State in reference to a position advertised as vacant. Had
the expression, “from present appearances,” had reference
to the state of the country, the significance of his letter
could only have been that he did not intend to participate
in the war, then imminent; but in such an event, he desired
for himself a quiet life as a military instructor. But it had
no such significance. Virginia had not seceded, and her
attitude at the date of this letter, and subsequently for
months, was that of peace-maker. The leading statesmen
of Virginia were then active in their efforts to avert war.
Colonel Robert E. Lee was then intimately associated with
General Scott, General Jos. E. Johnston was then quarter-
master general of the United States Army, and both of
these prominent officers were, ostensibly at least, loyal to
the Government of the United States, the former accepting
the colonelcy of the First Cavalry as late as the 30th of
March.
Major Thomas remained in New York, on his leave of
absence, with gradual improvement of health, until April,
I 86 I.
As the events of January, February and March had
brought more plainly to view the inveterate antagonisms
that arrayed the North against the South, or rather the
Southern section against the Nation, Southern officers in
the United States Army became fully conscious of the
momentous question that demanded immediate decision—
the question of their adherence to the General Government
against their respective States, or their service under the
banner of the “Confederate States of America.” Acts of
war had been committed in the South, or acts of indepen-
24 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS,
dent State sovereignty, as claimed in that section, by the
seizure of arsenals and forts, and the secession of seven
States, but until the 12th of April there had been no actual
hostilities. During this period the more northern slave-
holding States and their representatives in the army were
Waiting in fearful suspense the issue of peace or war. The
Supreme moment came in the bombardment of Fort Sumter
by command of Jefferson Davis, President of the so-called
“Confederate States of America.” The thoughtful South-
ern men in the army could not array themselves against the
General Government without a tragic struggle. It would be
a superficial view of the case to assert that it was an easy
matter for these men, either to sustain the General Gov-
ernment against their respective States and a united South,
or to array themselves, at the call of their respective States,
against the flag which had been to them the symbol of the
Nation's power and glory, and of their own fealty. But be-
fore Orders were issued recalling Major Thomas from his
leave of absence to take command of his regiment in New
York, and transfer it to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, for
reorganization and equipment for active service, the ques-
tion of his duty was settled beyond revocation. He doubt-
less approached the question of duty to the whole country
against the demands of family, friends, State and section,
with a seriousness that contrasted strongly with the rash
hurry with which many Southerners broke their connection
with the army. There were few officers who were more
strongly bound to the South by traditions and associations
than George H. Thomas, and when the voice of family,
friends, State and section, supported by a moderate Southern
sentiment in favor of slavery, was heard and considered, the
call of Country, its unity and glory, past and prospective,
his indebtedness to it for education and office, and, perhaps,
above all, his sworn allegiance to it, with twenty years' Ser-
vice under its flag, had such weight that his “duty was
clear from the beginning.” His own views cannot be more
I, O YAI, FROMſ THE BEGINNING. 25
clearly presented than by a quotation from a letter pub-
lished by Colonel A. L. Hough, after the General's death,
which had especial reference to the assumption of General
Fitzhugh Lee, that Thomas had sought position in the
Southern army : “As a confidential staff officer, one of his
aides de Camp, I had the privilege of having many conver-
sations with General Thomas upon matters relating to the
war. The most important of these conversations I made
notes of at the time, with his knowledge and consent.
Among them is one on the subject of Fitzhugh Lee's letter,
which I copy from my note book. A slander upon the
general was often repeated in the Southern papers during
and immediately subsequent to the rebellion. It was given
upon the authority of prominent rebel officers, and not
denied by them. It was to the effect that he was disap-
pointed in not getting a high command in the rebel army
he had sought for, hence his refusal to join the rebellion.
In a conversation with him on the subject, the general said:
This was an entire fabrication, not having an atom of
foundation ; not a line ever passed between him and the
rebel authorities; they had no genuine letter of his, nor was
a word spoken by him to any one that could even lead to
such an inference. He defied any one to produce any tes-
timony, written or oral, to sustain such an allegation; he
never entertained such an idea, for his duty was clear from
the beginning. These slanders were caused by men who
knew they had done wrong, but were endeavoring to justify
themselves by claiming their action to be a virtue which all
men would have followed, and by blackening the character
of those who had done right. It was evident they were de-
termined that no Southern-born man, who had remained
true to his country, should bear a reputable character, if
continued and repeated abuse could effect a stain upon it "
Another conversation, showing his opinion of the authors
of these slanders, and his own views at the breaking out of
the rebellion, it is well to give, also ; it is as follows: “In a
26 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H THOMAS
discussion of the causes given for their action by some offi-
cers who deserted the Government at the beginning of the
rebellion, I ventured the assertion that, perhaps, some of
them at distant posts had acted ignorantly; that I had been
informed that some of them had been imposed upon by
friends and relatives, and led to believe that there was to be
a peaceable dissolution of the Union ; that there would be
no actual government for the whole country, and by resign-
ing their commissions they were only taking the necessary
steps towards returning to the allegiance of their respective
States, he replied: that this was but a poor excuse ; he
could not believe officers of the army were so ignorant of
their own form of government as to suppose such proceed-
ings could occur, and as they had sworn allegiance to the
government they were bound to adhere to it, and would
have done so if they had been so inclined. He said there
was no excuse whatever in a United States officer claiming
the right of secession, and the only excuse for their desert-
ing the government was what none of them admitted, hav-
ing engaged in—a revolution against a tyranny, because the
tyranny did not exist, and they well knew it.’ I then asked
him : “Supposing such a state of affairs existed, that ar-
rangements were being made for a peaceable dissolution of
the Union by the Government, the North from the South,
and that it was in progress, what would you have done P'
He promptly replied: “That is not a supposable case; the
government cannot dissolve itself; it is the creature of the
people, and until they had agreed by their votes to dis-
Solve it, and it was accomplished in accordance therewith,
the government to which they had sworn allegiance re-
mained, and as long as it did exist, I should have adhered
to it.’”
There is in this extract a clear recognition of the obliga-
tion of his oath to support the government, and at this very
point, the better class of Southern officers who joined the
rebellion, and who perhaps took this step, with reluctance,
TPIE PROOF OF LOYALTY. 27
made direct issue with Thomas. They claimed that their
oath of office was obligatory only while they held office, and
that all obligation ceased with resignation, especially when
their resignations were accepted. This assumption rests
upon the supposed fact that supreme allegiance is due to a
single State, rather than to the Union of the States, or Na-
tion represented by the General Government. The subtle
logic, by which the doctrine of State Rights was carried to
the complete negation of the national unity, or autonomy, had
no force with General Thomas, although he greatly re-
gretted the necessity of chosing between the General Gov-
ernment and his own State, in alliance with other Southern
States. And although he had not entertained Northern
views of the institution of slavery, he did not hesitate to
maintain his allegiance to the National Government. And
in contrast with those who claimed that the acceptance of
their resignations not only freed them from the service re-
quired by their oath of allegiance, but also permitted them
to extend their freedom to the extreme Sequence of array-
ing themselves in war against the National Government.
Thomas believed that there was a moral and legal obliga-
tion which forbade resignation, with a view to take up arms
against the Government. And from this point of view he
condeñned the National authorities for accepting the resig-
nation of officers, when aware that it was their intention to
join the rebellion as soon as they were in this way freed
from the obligation of their oath of allegiance. In his view,
resignation did not give them freedom to take up arms
against the General Government, and resting upon this
ground he did not wait till his own State had seceded to
make up his own decision, but made it in entire independ-
ence of her probable action in the National crisis.
On the Ioth of April, two days before the bombardment
of Fort Sumter, Major Thomas was ordered to take com-
mand of the Second Cavalry on the arrival of the first de-
tachment at New York, to send two companies to Wash-
28 LIFE OF GENERAL G FOR G E H, THOMAS,
ington for duty at Army headquarters, and conduct the
remaining companies to Carlisle Barracks. Before leaving
New York he arranged for Mrs. Thomas to join him at Car-
lisle in three or four days; but when at Harrisburg he heard
of the opening of the war at Fort Sumter, and knew that its
long continuance was inevitable, he telegraphed to her to
remain in New York, and subsequently informed her by
letter what his course would be. He also wrote to his sis-
ters in Virginia, in the same vein, and thereafter he ceased
to be a brother in their regard.
On the 17th of April the convention of Virginia passed
an ordinance of Secession, to be submitted to a vote of the
people of the State, on the fourth Thursday of May. At
first, no doubt, it was the intention of the convention to give
six weeks to the people for reflection and careful action, but
the proclamation of Governor Letcher, announcing the pas-
Sage of the ordinance of Secession, plainly indicated his
belief that it would be ratified by the people, and in this
proclamation he specifically gave the authority of his office
to military preparations, in expectation that Virginia would
be involved in war, and that her territory would be its leading
theatre. On April 25th, the convention passed another ordi-
nance, adopting and ratifying the Constitution of the “Pro-
visional Government of the Confederate States of Aßerica,”
but providing that its legal operations should cease if the
people of Virginia should by vote reject the ordinance of
secession. But by the authority of this second ordinance
there was a convention of Virginia and the Confederate
States, which subjected all the military operations of the
State forces to the control of the President of the Confed-
eracy. This action of the Virginia convention precipitated
the problem of duty upon all Virginians in the United
States Army. At their head stood Lieutenant General
Winfield Scott, commander-in-chief, who together with all
other natives of the State, was officially invited to discard
his allegiance to the General Government, and take high
LEE FOR THE STATE, 29
rank, if not corresponding rank, in the Confederate army.
Rumors that he had resigned were jubilantly circulated
through the South ; but he said: “I have not changed;
have no thought of changing; always a Union man.”
General Joseph E. Johnston, quartermaster general, offered
his resignation, which was accepted, on the 22nd. Colonel
Robert E. Lee remained at his residence at Arlington in
gloomy hesitancy until called upon by General Scott, on
the 19th, to define his position. The next day he tendered
his resignation, sending with it a personal letter to General
Scott, in which these statements were made : “It would
have been presented at once but for the struggle it has cost
me to separate myself from the service to which I have de-
voted all the best years of my life and all the ability I pos-
sessed. * * * Save in defense of my State I never desire
to draw my sword.” If the latter declaration did not indi-
cate a compromise with conscience it certainly did evince
his blindness in not discerning the logical consequence of
drawing his sword in defense of Virginia, when that State
was in virtual alliance with other Southern States against
the Government of the United States. To defend Virginia
under such circumstances was simply to involve himself in
all the phases of a general civil war, which from its objects
and conditions could only be conducted with reference to
the general issue, without special reference to the defense of
Virginia or any other State, on its own account. This de-
sired attitude and service lasted only three days. On the
22nd the convention of Virginia unanimously confirmed
Governor Letcher's nomination of Colonel Robert E. Lee
to command the military and naval forces of the State, with
the rank of major-general; and the day following, two days
before his resignation from the United States Army was ac-
cepted, and four before the notification of its acceptance was
written, and five days after Virginia militia had twice as-
saulted United States troops, this man who had offered his
resignation after a severe struggle, placed himself before the
3O LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS.
world as an enemy of the United States, by accepting the
position of commander-in-chief of the military and naval
forces of his native State. And from this position he soon
drifted into the formal service of the Confederate States.
This was made inevitable by the action of the Virginia con-
vention, which subjected the State forces to the orders of
Jefferson Davis, and on the IOth of May, “to prevent confu-
sion,” he was placed in command of the “Confederate
forces,” by the order of the Secretary of War of the “South-
ern Confederacy.” This effort to avoid confusion fore-
shadowed the speedy overriding of State Rights by a
government established to protect them, showing that im-
practicable theories do not long survive the test of war.
Everything that was done or proclaimed in Virginia from
the 12th of April till the State was in perfected alliance with
the Confederacy was based upon the assumption that the
ordinance of secession would be ratified by the people. So
also the resignations of Generals Johnston and Lee antici-
pated the endorsing vote of the people. The ordinance, in
its text, was made contingent, but these officers and others
ignored the possibility that its ratification would fail.
In striking contrast with many officers of the army from
Virginia, Major Thomas was at this time actively supporting
the General Government, in utter disregard of the action of
his native State. On the 21st of April, in obedience to
orders, he proceeded with four companies of his regiment to
aid in suppressing a mob of Maryland secessionists, that
threatened to tear up the track of the Pennsylvania Northern
Central railroad. The mob dispersed upon the arrival of
the troops, when Major Thomas returned to Carlisle. Upon
the acceptance of the resignation of Colonel Robert E.
Lee, Major Thomas was promoted to the position pre-
viously made vacant by his promotion. At this point these
prominent and popular Virginians, who had been intimately
associated in the brotherhood of arms, who had many traits
of character in common, representing the chivalry of the
THOMAS FOR THE NATION. 3 I
South, and the highest culture of the United States Army,
parted company forever, from radical difference of convic-
tions in regard to the relative claim of State and country.
With Lee it was a regard for family, native State and South-
ern associations, and not a desire to perpetuate slavery, nor
a conviction that secession was an absolute necessity. Before
the war he had been in favor of the gradual emancipation
of the slaves, and at the time of his resignation he was op-
posed to secession in the abstract. With Thomas, Southern
influences no doubt had force, being more decidedly South-
ern in his sentiments than Lee. If reports from Virginia
may be believed, an effort was made to give Thomas the
command of the State forces, from distrust of Lee, but the
latter yielded to pressure against positive convictions, and
drifted into the leadership of the forces in arms against the
eneral Government. The latter in taking Lee's place in
the Second Cavalry ignored the claims of Virginia and the
South and entered upon a career of remarkable patriotism
and brilliant generalship under the flag of his country.
May 3rd, Thomas was appointed colonel of the Second
Cavalry, in room of Albert Sidney Johnston, who had re-
signed from regard to the action of Texas, the State of his
adoption, whose claims upon him had been emphasized by its
peculiar relations to the General Government, and by the
intimate connection he had himself sustained to its inde-
pendence and early government. Before resigning his com-
mission as Colonel in the United States Army he had trans-
ferred his command to a regularly appointed successor, in
hope that he would be able to avoid participation in the
War.
The promotion of Thomas was rapid, but entirely regu-
lar, though indicating the extensive defection of the ranking
cavalry officers. Four field officers from the First and
Second cavalry regiments resigned and joined the rebel-
lion. Had Thomas been promoted out of the line of estab-
lished precedents, it might have been said that especial
32 I, IFE OF GENERAL G EORG E H THOMAS.
effort had been made to hold him in the army. But his
promotions were not complimentary. f
His early promotion to a colonelcy placed him above
most of the volunteer colonels, and opened the way for his
immediate command of a brigade. August 3rd, the desig-
nation of his regiment was changed by Act of Congress to
Fifth Cavalry. &
Colonel Thomas remained at Carlisle Barracks until the
Ist of June. On that day he received orders from Wash-
ington to report with four companies of his regiment and
the First City Troop of Philadelphia, to Major General
Robert Patterson, at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. Two
days after he was assigned to the comand of the First
brigade of the Army of Pennsylvania. Soon after he led
his brigade across Maryland to Williamsport, and crossed
the Potomac on the 2d of July, and participated the same
day in an engagement at Falling Waters, Virginia. In the
movement the next day from Falling Waters to Martins-
burg, Colonel Thomas was in front of the army, and skir-
mished with the enemy as he advanced. He led again
towards Winchester, and drove in the outlying forces of the
enemy at Bunker Hill on the 15th.
The action at Falling Waters was insignificant com-
pared with subsequent battles East and West; but it
was nevertheless the most imposing that occurred before
the battle of Bull Run. In it two Virginians participated;
Thomas J. Jackson, commanding the Confederate troops,
and George H. Thomas, commanding a brigade in the
Army of Pennsylvania. And the fact that this was their
first battle in the war of the Rebellion gave it impor-
tance. These two Virginians were alike in the strength
of their convictions. They were not enemies in war,
from the mere fact of holding positions in opposing
armies. No soldier in the Southern army was more
earnest in supporting the cause of the South than Jackson,”
* “Stonewall" Jackson.
ACROSS THE POTOMAC. 33
and no soldier in the Northern army was more positive in
sustaining the General Government and the National unity
than Thomas. Both were loyal to convictions of duty, and
neither hesitated to make extreme exertion in patriotic ser-
vice. But this early campaign in Virginia tested the
strength of Thomas far more than that of Jackson. The
latter was in Sympathy with the rebellion under the sway
of Southern traditions and sentiments; the former rose su-
perior to all such influences, and heartily supported the
National cause. Jackson was defending his native State;
Thomas was invading it to suppress an insurrection, in
which Virginia had assumed leadership. When therefore
Colonel Thomas, with drawn sword, crossed the Potomac
into that State, he subjected himself to the Supreme test of
loyalty; and yet so assured was he of the rightfulness of
his act, that he hesitated as little as when, in 1864, he rode
forth from Nashville to victory. Had he been wavering in
July, 1861, he would have halted on the north bank of the
Potomac, and asked for some other initiative to warfare for
the Union. But having deliberately settled the question of
duty in the crisis before he drew his sword, Virginians in
rebellion against the authority of the National Government
were the enemies of his country, and the “sacred soil” of
his native State was simply the enemy's territory.
General Patterson's campaign produced no results which
gave fame to any officer participating in it. General Jos.
E. Johnston Commanding the opposing army, joined General
Beauregard in time to turn the tide of battle at Bull Run.
For a time the blame for failure to hold Johnston in his
front fell heavily upon General Patterson. It was even
thought that after failure to hold the enemy at Winchester,
he should have reënforced General McDowell before or
during that engagement. The truth in the case, or rather
the discussion of the possibilities to General Patterson, is
not pertinent to this biography; but the opinion of General
Thomas in the premises certainly is. It was characteristic
3
34 LIFE OF GENERAI, G EORG E H, THOMAS.
for him to sustain his superior when he knew that public
opinion was against him, because, as he believed, the facts
were not known to the country. General Patterson asked
the advice of his officers as to the best method of vindica-
tion. In answer Thomas addressed to him, through another,
the following letter:
CAMP NEAR HYATTSTOwn, M.D.,
August 25th, 1861.
DEAR COLONEL :
Your note has just been handed me. I had a conversation with
Newton yesterday on the subject of General Patterson's campaign.
He was on the eve of writing to the general and asked me what he
should state was my opinion as to the general’s course. I told him
that he could say, that if I was situated as he was, I would make a
statement of all the facts to the general-in-chief or the Secretary of
War, fortifying it with copies of the orders, etc., and demand justice
at their hands, and if they were not disposed to give it, I would then
demand a court of inquiry.
- Yours truly, GEO. H. THOMAS.
P. S.—I think, however, that time will set the general all right, as
I see the papers are much more favorable to him than at first.
Subsequently he wrote the following letter in General
Patterson's vindication :
e
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Before Atlanta, Georgia, August 8th, 1864.
MY DEAR GENERAL :
Your favor of the 16th of July, was only received a few days
since, owing, doubtless, to the irregularities of the mails to the
front. In the council of war, at Martinsburg, I in substance ad-
vised an advance towards Winchester, at least as far as Bunker
Hill, and if your information, after the army reached Bunker Hill,
led you to believe that Johnston still occupied Winchester in force,
then to shift our troops over to Charlestown, as that move would
place our communications with our depot of supplies in safety, and
still threaten and hold Johnston at Winchester, which I understood
was all that you were expected or required to do. I should have
advised a direct advance on Winchester but for the character of the
troops composing your army. They were all, with the exception of
a couple of squadrons of the Second U. S. cavalry and two bat-
BRIGADIER GENERAL OF WOLUNTEERS 35
teries of regular artillery, three months' men, and their term of
service would expire in a few days. Judging of them as of other
volunteer troops, had I been their commander, I should not have
been willing to risk them in a heavy battle coming off within a few
days of the expiration of their service.
I have always believed, and have frequently so expressed myself,
that your management of the three months' campaign was able and
judicious, and was to the best interests of the service, considering the
means at your disposal and the nature of the troops under your com-
mand.
With much respect and esteem,
I remain, General, very sincerely and truly yours,
GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General U. S. V.
MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON, Philadelphia, Pa.;
These letters show his loyalty to his commander and his
willingness to bear the responsibility of advising the move-
ment for which General Patterson was severely censured.
A man less regardful of the truth and justice might have
been silent or evasive under such circumstances. His ac-
tion in this instance was consistent with his official and
personal conduct throughout his career. He gave cordial
support to his commander under all circumstances, even
when executing plans which he did not approve. Subse-
quent pages will illustrate the fact in numerous instances.
On the 17th of August, 1861, Col. George H. Thomas
was appointed a brigadier general of volunteers. Briga-
dier General Robert Anderson had accepted command in
Kentucky, his native State, on condition that he should be
permitted to select four brigadier generals to serve under
him. He had chosen W. T. Sherman, D. C. Buell and O.
|M. Mitchel, who had been previously appointed brigadier
generals, Sherman and Buell on the 17th of May, and Mitchel
on the 9th of August; on the 15th of August he was think-
ing of naming S. B. Buckner as the fourth subordinate brig-
adier general. At this time he invited his nephew, Lieutenant
Thomas M. Anderson of the Fifth Cavalry, to visit him at
Washington, to whom he mentioned his purpose of recom-
mending this Kentuckian for appointment. Lieutenant
36 JLIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H. THOMAS,
Anderson, now lieutenant colonel of the Ninth Infantry,
had lived in Kentucky before the war, in the practice of
law; and having full knowledge of Buckner's efforts, as
commander-in chief of the “State Guard,” to cause the se-
cession of that State, he readily convinced his uncle that
negotiations with him were useless. He then recommended
his colonel, George H. Thomas, for the vacant place, men-
tioning his conduct in General Patterson's campaign and
his pronounced loyalty. Vacancies in the Fifth Cavalry,
Caused by the defection of Southern officers, had been filled
by men from the North, who were in full sympathy with
the intense loyalty of the Northern people. Some of the
old officers were natives of the South, and these, with others
of Northern birth, were not slow to condemn abolitionists
and militia organizations, or to express sympathy with the
rebellion. One of this class so far forgot soldierly and pa-
triotic duty as to express gladness at the defeat of General
B. F. Butler's forces at Big Bethel, Virginia, and when told
by a new officer that he was fighting on the wrong side,
promptly challenged the offending comrade to a duel. To
compose this quarrel, Colonel Thomas required the imme-
diate withdrawal of the challenge, telling the officer who
offered it that he had given utterance to “improper and
unsoldierly sentiments.” General Anderson had served
with Thomas in the artillery, and regarding him as “one of
the very best officers in the army,” at once wrote his name
in his list, and went to the President to request his promo-
tion and assignment to service in Kentucky.
It is probable that the first recommendation of Thomas
for appointment as brigadier-general of volunteers was
made by the Hon. Samuel J. Randall, late Speaker of the
House of Representatives, who served as a private soldier
under him in Virginia. His letter to the Assistant Secre-
tary of War evinced a clear discernment of the character of
Thomas and a full appreciation of his ability as a com-
mander. As Mr. Randall anticipated the judgment of more
APPOINTMENT URGED BY MR. RANDALL, 37
than two hundred thousand men, who served under General
Thomas, his letter is subjoined:
SANDY HOOK, MD., AUG. 3, 1861.
FRIEND SCOTT :
I hear you are the Assistant Secretary of War. Rest
assured that no man delights more in your high position than I do.
I notice that the Government is now considering the appointment of
proper persons to be brigadier generals. In the name of God, let
them be men fully competent to discharge the duties of the positions
to which they may be assigned. Inefficiency is the evil of the hour.
This opinion is based upon our observation of nearly three months.
Most of the time, in fact nearly all of the time, we have been under
the command of Colonel George H. Thomas, now Commanding one
of the brigades here. He is thoroughly competent to be a brigadier-
general, has the confidence of every man in his command for the
reason that they recognize and appreciate capacity—which to them in
every hour of the day is so essential to their safety. Now, let me as
a friend of this Administration, in so far as the war is concerned and
the preservation of the Union is involved, urge upon Gen. Cameron
to select Colonel Thomas as one of the number of proposed briga-
diers. This appointment would give renewed vigor and courage to
this section of the army. I am, as perhaps you know, a private in
the First City Cavalry of Philadelphia, and I never saw Colonel
Thomas until I saw him on parade, and our intercourse has only
been such as exists between a colonel and one of his soldiers; hence
you see my recommendation comes from pure motives, and entirely
free from social or political considerations. I speak for and write in
behalf of the brave men who, in this hour of our country's peril, are
coming forward and endangering their own lives, and perhaps leav-
ing those most dear to them without a support. I write warmly,
because I think I know the necessity of the case. You will do the
country a service by giving my letter a serious consideration. I hope
to be in Washington some time about the 1st of September, when I
shall try to see you. Will you please present my regards to General
Cameron, and if he has time to read this letter, hand it to him.
Yours truly, SAMUEL J. RANDALL.
The most important fact mentioned in this letter is that
General Thomas, in a short campaign, elicited the confi-
dence of his soldiers through their appreciation of his ca-
pacity. There was to his troops, from first to last, such a
38 LIFE OF GENERAL G FORGE H. THOMAS,
revelation of prudence and power that extreme confidence
was inevitable. His orders were therefore always obeyed
by officers and soldiers without question, because they never
doubted the practicability of any requirement. This power
to call forth universal confidence in his generalship was one
of the causes of his uniform success, and will have frequent
illustrations in subsequent pages. Mr. Randall thus early
indicated the filial feeling of his soldiers towards him—a
feeling which found expression from the Army of the Cum-
berland, through the favorite appellation, “Pap Thomas.”
Colonel Thomas having been appointed a brigadier-
general of volunteers at the time mentioned, Lieutenant
Anderson bore from Washington to him a copy of the
letter of appointment and a personal letter from General
Anderson.
It has been asserted by Virginians, since the death of
General Thomas, that this promotion defeated his appoint-
ment as chief of ordnance, with the rank of colonel, in the
State forces of Virginia. If Governor Letcher and his old
friends in that State had at this time any expectation of his
accepting such a position they were indulging in a delusion,
which was forbidden by reasonable presumption as well as
by facts. He had in April disregarded the invitation of the
convention and Governor of Virginia, to all Virginians in
the United States Army, to come to the defense of the
State. He had accepted promotion in the Second Cavalry,
in room of Robert E. Lee, and Albert Sidney Johnston,
having previously taken command to refit the regiment for
active service, after it had been despoiled of arms and
equipments by the authorities of Texas. He had subse-
quently invaded his native State, an act demonstrative of his
loyalty to the General Government, and destructive of all
prospect of position or fair fame in Virginia. And yet it
has been seriously affirmed that the long suffering Governor
of Virginia, was holding a position for him until the 17th
of August, despite his unpardonable sin. At that date, it is
BRIGADIER–G ENERAL OF VOL UNTEERS. 39
reasonable to suppose, Governor Letcher was thinking of a
halter, rather than a commission, for Thomas, and it is
utterly false, as asserted, that the latter, whose life was un-
stained by a single act of deception and unmarred by an
equivocal attitude, was moved to irrevocable loyalty by his
appointment as brigadier-general of volunteers.
As there was a wide chasm between Thomas and disloyal
Virginians, it is not strange that his motives and actions were
misunderstood in his native State. But, in retrospect, it is
strange that the National authorities distrusted him in 1861,
or later in the war. It is evident, however, that Mr. Lincoln
reluctantly made him a brigadier-general. General Sher-
man thus mentions this reluctance in his “Memoirs:” “It
hardly seems probable that Mr. Lincoln should have come to
Willard's Hotel to meet us, but my impression is that he
did, and that General Anderson had some difficulty in pre-
vailing on him to appoint George H. Thomas, a native of
Virginia, to be brigadier-general, because so many South-
ern officers had already played false; but I was still more
emphatic in my endorsement of him by reason of my talk
with him at the time he crossed the Potomac with Patter-
son's army, when Mr. Lincoln promised to appoint him and
to assign him to duty with General Anderson.*
The assignment was made by the following order:
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, August 24th, 1861.
The following assignment is made of the general officers of the
Volunteer Service, whose appointment was announced in General
Orders No. 62, from the War Department:
To the Department of the Cumberland, Brigadier-General Robert
Anderson, commanding:
Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman.
Brigadier-General George H. Thomas.
By command of Lieutenant-General SCOTT.
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
* Memoirs, Vol. I, pp. I92, Ig3.
4O LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H, THOMAS.
CHAPTER III.
THOMAS ASSIGNED TO COMMAND IN CAMP DICK ROBINSON, Ky.—MAKES
PREPARATIONS FOR AN ADVANCE INTO EAST TENNESSEE-REFUSES
TO SERVE UNDER GENERAL O. M. MITCHEL–REBUKES Ex-Gov.
ERNOR ANDREW JOHNSON.—DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ENEMy
WILL ADVANCE FROM Bowling GREEN – GAINS A VICTORY AT
MILL SPRINGS-PRACTICABILITY AND ADVANTAGES OF HIS PROJECTED
MOVEMENT INTO EAST TENNESSEE. -
ON the 26th of August, 1861, Brigadier-General Thomas
was relieved from duty under Major-General N. P.
Banks, who had succeeded General Patterson, and ordered
to report to General Robert Anderson, at Louisville, Ken-
tucky. In compliance he reported on the 6th of September,
and on the I2th was assigned to the command of the troops
at Camp Dick Robinson, in room of Lieutenant William
Nelson, U. S. Navy.
When this newly appointed brigadier entered upon his
career as a general,the people of the country were hardly
cognizant of the fact. It was not generally known at the
time that he and General Sherman had been sent to Louis-
ville at the special solicitation of General Anderson, who
had accepted what he considered a very delicate and diffi-
cult service in his native State. In the light of the subse-
quent service of Sherman and Thomas, the action of Ander-
son in connecting them with the intricate problems of the
central line of invasion, through Kentucky, Tennessee and
Georgia, was one of the most important features of his short
administration as a Department Commander.
While en route from Louisville to his post General
Thomas was exposed to personal danger from the seces-
sionists of that region, who had been exasperated by the
PREPARATIONS FOR AD VAWCE. 4 I
failure of their friends to withdraw Kentucky from the
Union, and by the developed purpose of the National Gov-
ernment to establish military posts and camps in the State
and conduct military operations within its limits, without
regard to the sentiments of the people. Fortunately he
eluded his enemies on the way, and assumed command at
Camp Dick Robinson on the 15th of September. He found
about six thousand partially organized troops, that had been
collected together by Nelson, against the protest of both
loyal and disloyal Kentuckians.
From the time of his first anticipation of service in Ken-
tucky, Thomas had studied plans of operations, and had
Soon decided that the first step in their execution should be
the invasion of East Tennessee through Cumberland Gap.
He was so impressed with the importance of this line of
invasion, from military considerations alone, before he left
Washington, that he urged General Scott to authorize an
offensive movement on that line. He was the more eager to
conduct an expedition into East Tennessee when he saw in
his camp loyal soldiers from that region, who had fled from
the tyranny there reigning, and knew that a large part of
the citizens of that section were as loyal as his Tennessee
soldiers. He announced two objects for his projected move-
ment—to seize and hold the only railroad that connected
the northern parts of Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia,
and all of Tennessee, with the capital of the Confederacy,
and relieve from oppression the patriots of East Tennessee.
These objects turned his face towards Cumberland Gap at
the beginning of his service in Kentucky. But from the
first he met insurmountable difficulties. His position con-
nected him with local political and military affairs. Equip-
ments for his troops were long withheld, and when reën-
forcements were sent to him in response to his oft-repeated
urgent calls, new regiments were sent, without complete
equipments or transportation. Another embarrassment was
the impatience of the East Tennesseeans in his camp, who
42 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H. THOMAS.
were annoyingly clamorous for an advance to their homes.
Notwithstanding all his efforts he could not organize such an
expedition as promised success. He had men, but was
destitute of almost everything else that pertains to the
organization of efficient regiments and brigades. He an-
nounced a brigade organization as Soon as he had mustered
and nominally organized a few regiments. This brigade was
the first organized in Kentucky, and it was historically meet
that the general who organized the brigade which became
the nucleus of a grand army should, at the end of the war
muster out from that army nearly two hundred thousand
111621).
While active in preparing for the projected advance into
East Tennessee, he received a letter from Brigadier-General
O. M. Mitchel, commanding the Department of the Ohio,
stating that he had received an order from the Secretary of
War, directing him to repair to Camp Dick Robinson and
prepare the troops for a forward movement, first to Cumber-
land Gap, and ultimately into East Tennessee. At this
General Thomas was surprised and indignant. Had he been
averse, thus early in the war, to the responsibility of com-
manding troops in a bold invasion of the enemy's territory,
he would have cheerfully turned over his command to
General Mitchel, and as cheerfully served under him. But
he perceived that he was to be superseded by a gen-
eral who, although he was his Senior by a few days,
had no relation to the projected movement. He had
first suggested the invasion of East Tennessee, and had
done all that had been possible to prepare for it, and he re-
garded the order of the Secretary of War, relieving him
from command, as evidence that it was believed at Wash-
ington that he had been needlessly tardy in executing his
own plan, or as proof that for some unrevealed reason it was
desirable to put another general in his place, before it had
been possible for him to prepare for so important an enter-
prise. He claimed that he had a right under the circum-
REFUSES TO SERVE UNDER MITCHEL. 43
stances to a fair trial, before removal, no matter what might
be the feelings of the President and Secretary of War
towards him. The reason of this action of the Secretary of
War is not known to the writer, and he is not aware that it
has ever been revealed. It certainly, however, evinced
either distrust of Thomas as a general, or a want of confi-
dence in his loyalty to the National Government. He there-
fore as a protest against the indignity or suspicion, requested
to be relieved from duty with the troops that had been
under his command, objecting, under the circumstances, to
a subordinate position in connection with them. He was
eager, even at this stage of the war, to hold an independent
command. This fact so strongly evincing his self-confi-
dence was not known to the country, and his subsequent
quiet submission to service under a general of absolute
inferiority of rank, made the impression that from excessive
modesty or lack of confidence in himself he preferred a sub-
ordinate position. It will be shown in another connection
that he subsequently made emphatic protest against Service
under a general of inferior rank, when he considered him-
self entitled to the command of a large army, and failing
then, he thereafter submitted to an indignity repugnant to
every self-reliant soldier and abhorrent to martial traditions.
In asking to be relieved from service under General Mit-
chel, Thomas placed his case on a higher plane than that
of mere rank. With him it was a question of justice, in the
determination of rightful command. The subjoined letters
reveal his views and those of General Sherman in the pre-
mises: -
HEADQ'RS CAMP DICK ROBINSON,
Garrard County, Ky., Oct. I I, 1861.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL O. M. MITCHEL,
Com'd'g Dep't of the Ohio, Cincinnati, O.
“GENERAL: Your communication of the Ioth instant was received
to-day at the hands of Governor Johnson. I have been doing all in
my power to prepare the troops for a move on Cumberland Ford,
and to seize the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, and shall continue
44 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
to do all I can to assist you until your arrival here; but justice to
myself requires that I ask to be relieved from duty with these troops,
since the Secretary of War thought it necessary to supersede me in
command without, as I conceive, any just cause for so doing.
I am, General, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
GEO. H. THOMAS, Brig.-Gen'l U. S. V. Com'd'g.
HEADQ'RS CAMP DICK ROBINSON,
Garrard County, Ky., Oct. II, 1861.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
Com'd'g Dep't of the Cumberland, Louisville, Ky. :
GENERAL: I received an official communication to-day from
Brigadier General O. M. Mitchel, informing me that he had been
ordered by the Secretary of War to repair to this camp and prepare
the troops for a forward movement, first to Cumberland Ford, and
eventually to seize upon the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. As
I have been doing all in my power to effect this very thing, to have
the execution of it taken from me when nearly prepared to take the
field, is extremely mortifying. I have therefore respectfully to ask
to be relieved from duty with the troops on the arrival of General
Mitchel. I am, General, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant, -
GEO. H. THOMAS, Brigadier-General U. S. V. Com’d'g.
October 13, 1861.
GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS,
Com'd'g Camp Dick Robinson.
You are authorized to go on and prepare your command for
active service. General Mitchel is subject to my orders, and I will,
if possible, give you the opportunity to complete what you have
begun. Of course I would do all I can to carry out your wishes, but
feel that the affairs of Kentucky call for the united action of all en-
gaged. W. T. SHERMAN, -
Brig.-Gen. Com'd'g Dep’t of the Cumberland.
The execution of the order of the Secretary of War might
have ruined the reputation of Thomas as a General, and
deprived the country of one of its ablest commanders. It
would have produced distrust of his ability or loyalty, and
might have deprived him of an opportunity to reveal his
capacity as a General. The implied distrust of the authori-
ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY. 45
ties at Washington must have been exceedingly painful to
as true and sensitive a man as Thomas. Having taken a
loyal position in the National crisis with deliberation and
from a firm conviction of duty, he had a right to expect
just, if not generous, treatment from the President and Sec-
retary of War. A man less pure and strong might have
swerved from his loyalty under such provocation.
If the order for his removal from command was based upon
the fact that he had not advanced far towards East Tennessee,
the patience of the National authorities was to be still fur-
ther tried. The barriers to an advance were multiplied
quite as rapidly as preparations for it were made. The
enemy discerned the probability of such a movement, and
for the double purpose of defeating it and supporting the
cause of the Confederacy in Kentucky, put columns of
troops in motion towards Central Kentucky from Cumber-
land Ford, Barboursville and Tompkinsville. As these
movements were developed, General Thomas became more
urgent for reënforcements and munitions. The very fact
that the enemy had counter plans intensified in his view
the importance of the movement which he had projected.
To the enemy, the value of the railroad from Tennessee to
Virginia was greatly enhanced by the necessity of trans-
porting supplies from Tennessee to Richmond. He there-
fore made a show of aggression on Thomas's line of advance
to prevent offense on his part. This appearance of offense
on the part of the enemy, discouraged the loyal Tennessee
troops, and caused the loyal Kentuckians to be as clamor-
ous for defensive measures as the other class had been for
an advance into East Tennessee. In the midst of these
embarrassments, General Thomas' plans assumed greater
breadth. As soon as practicable, he threw some of his best
troops forward to Rock Castle Hills, and sent others in
support as fast as possible.
The enemy's first advances were evidently tentative, as
columns from different directions would present themselves
46 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS
and then withdraw. But it was soon apparent that the force
before Colonel Garrard's Third Kentucky infantry, at Rock
Castle Hills, under General Zollicoffer, had a more serious
purpose than mere menace, and General Thomas sent
Brigadier-General Schoepf, with Coburn's, Woolford's and
Steedman's regiments and Standart's battery to Garrard's
support. These troops reached Rock Castle Hills in time
to participate in the repulse of the enemy, October 20th.
The retreat of the enemy again opened the way for an
advance, and General Thomas threw forward Schoepf's
command to London and asked for reënforcements, muni-
tions and transportation. He also suggested that a co-
operative force should move up the Big Sandy River, while
he himself should advance by Barboursville to East Ten-
nessee, seize the railroad and then turn upon Zollicoffer and
capture him. But eager as he was to move forward he was
not willing to take so great a risk without an adequate
force. He waited here, though spurred by his own desire,
as he often afterwards delayed, when urged by his superiors,
until he could perceive the conditions of success. He thus
made a reputation for slowness, but avoided the failures that
ill-conditioned movements generally entailed.
While waiting for adequate resources, the loyal Tennes-
seeans became very impatient and almost openly mutinous.
Andrew Johnson, ex-Governor of Tennessee, addressed a
letter of complaint to Thomas, the purport of which is re-
vealed by the following communications:
HEADQUARTERS CRAB ORCHARD,
November 7th, 1861
Gover NOR ANDREW JOHNSON,
London, Ky.
DEAR SIR:
Your favor of the 6th instant is at hand. I have done all in my
power to get troops and transportation and means to advance into
East Tennessee. I believe General Sherman has done the same. Up
to this time we have been unsuccessful. Have you heard by what
authority the troops from London were to fall back 2 Because I have
LETTER TO ANDREW JOHNSON. 47
not and shall not move any of them back, unless ordered, because
if I am not interfered with I can have them subsisted there as well
as here. I am inclined to think the rumor has grown out of the fever-
ish excitement, which seems to exist in the minds of some of the regi-
ments, that no further advance is contemplated. I can only say that
I am doing the best I can. Our commanding general is doing the
same, and using all his influence to equip a force for the rescue of
East Tennessee. If the Tennesseeans are not content and must go,
then the risk of disaster will remain with them. Some of our troops
are not yet clothed, and it seems impossible to get clothing.
For information respecting the organization of regiments I send
you General Orders No. 90, War Department. If the gentlemen you
name can raise regiments agreeably to the conditions and instruc-
tions contained in said order, the Government will accept them, and
I hope will have arms to place in their hands in the course of two or
three months.
In conclusion I will add that I am here ready to obey orders, and
earnestly hope that the troops at London will see the necessity of
doing the same.
Very Respectfully
Your Obedient Servant,
GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Brigadier-General U. S. V.
HEADQUARTERS CRAB ORCHARD,
November 7th, 1861.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL SCHOEPF,
Com'd'g Camp Calvert, London, Ky.
GENERAL :
I find it necessary to reply to Governor Johnson's letter in the fore-
going, which I send to you for your information. It is time that dis-
contented persons should be silent, both in and out of the service. I
sympathize most deeply with the East Tennesseeans on account of
their natural anxiety to relieve their friends and families from the
terrible apprehension which they are now suffering. But to make the
attempt to rescue them when not half prepared is culpable, especially
when our enemies are perhaps as anxious that we should make the
move as the Tennesseeans themselves, for it is well known by our
commanding general that Buckner has an overwhelming force
within striking distance, whenever he can get us at a disadvantage.
I hope you will therefore see the necessity of dealing decidedly with
48 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H, THOMAS,
such people, and you have my authority and orders for doing so. We
must learn to abide our time or we will never be successful.
Respectfully Your Obedient Servant,
GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Brigadier-General U. S. V.
These letters met the questions at issue fairly and with the
decision of a man of nerve and power. He was himself in-
tensely eager for the advance demanded by Governor John-
son and the East Tennessee troops, but he was not prepared
for a successful expedition, and was himself a subordinate.
If prepared he could not have moved without orders, and
without adequate preparations he was unwilling to advance,
even if liberty had been given to him. He sympathized
with the impatient patriots, but military considerations were
paramount. When it is considered that he wrote so de-
cidedly to a man who had great political influence, there is
no room to doubt his boldness in the face of threatening
possibilities. Mr. Johnson may not have had a causative re-
lation to this order from the Secretary of War, but he cer-
tainly had knowledge of it,since he bore General Mitchel's
letter to General Thomas. When on his way to join the Tennes-
see soldiers, in Kentucky, General Thomas was bold to say to
this clamorous Governor, representing a congenial constit-
uency, that he was unwilling to move without due prepara-
tion. And as he was unwilling to move on such a condition
at the beginning of the war, so he continued reluctant to
initiate operations, in absence of favorable circumstances to
the end of the conflict. Few, if any, subordinate com-
manders were more averse to action when unprepared, or
more quick and forceful when preparations were sufficient.
Governor Johnson's intimation that the troops in advance
were to be withdrawn proved to be correct. General Sher-
man became convinced that the enemy had an overwhelm-
ing force at Bowling Green, and could advance at pleasure.
And on November 5th he wrote to General Thomas to hold
Zollicoffer in check and await events. Thomas doubtless
ORDERED TO WITHDRA W HIS TROOPS 49
alluded to this conviction in his letter to Governor Johnson,
and by the assertion that he was ready to obey orders made
provision for a consistent withdrawal of his troops from
London, though such a step was against his own judg-
ment. General Sherman had not in any other way intimated
to him that a retrograde movement was meditated, and he
hoped that it would not be required. But on the 11th he
was ordered by General Sherman to withdraw his troops
across the Kentucky River, as it was probable that Zollicoffer
had twenty thousand men. The next day Sherman
announced that he was convinced that General Albert
Sidney Johnston, who was then in command of the Confed-
erate forces in Kentucky and Tennessee, intended to ad-
vance with an army of about forty-five thousand men between
General Thomas at Crab Orchard and General A. McD.
McCook at Nolensville, on the Louisville and Nashville
railroad, with Louisville and Cincinnati as his objectives;
and he directed Thomas to hold himself in readiness to
withdraw to a point back of Danville, with the greater
part of his troops, leaving the remainder at Rock Castle
Hills. General Thomas in reply expressed his want of faith
in General Johnston's aggressive purpose, since his own in-
formation indicated that the enemy in his front was with-
drawing, and no such movement had been discerned by his
SCOutS. -
The withdrawal of Thomas' forces caused great suffering
and loss of men and material. Sickness was prevalent and
the march was a hurried one. As it was not generally
known at the time who was responsible for the movement,
censure was heaped upon him. Correspondents and critics
depicted the sufferings of the men, and the loss of material,
and discerning no compensative results, attempted to bal-
ance accounts with abuse of Thomas. Under this abuse
and misrepresentation he was silent, waiting as at other
times for “time and history to do him justice.”
This was the situation when General D. C. Buell assumed.
4
5O LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
command of the department on the I 5th of November.
Five days later the new commander ordered General Thomas
to move his command to Columbia, and subsequently di-
rectly to Lebanon. At this time General Johnston had fif-
teen thousand men at Bowling Green, and conjecture had
magnified his force threefold. General Buell lost no time
in concentrating his troops at first for defense, and subse-
quently for aggression. He did not approve of an advance
into East Tennessee, but proposed for himself a movement
upon Nashville, whenever his strength should warrant such
a step. Preparations for this movement upon Nashville
virtually defeated the East Tennessee expedition, although
efforts were subsequently made to set it on foot.
The withdrawal of the greater part of Thomas’ command
changed for the worse the situation in Eastern Kentucky,
besides neutralizing the important expedition into East
Tennessee. General Zollicoffer was swift to accept the
invitation for renewed aggression, given by the with:
drawal of the troops from London, and Crab Orchard,
and advanced against Somerset. In less than a week
after he left Danville, General Thomas was informed by Lieu-
tenant Carter, U. S. N., commanding a brigade of East Ten-
nessee troops that had been permitted by General Buell
to remain at London, that the enemy was advancing
in heavy force against Somerset, then held by a single
regiment. Carter also stated that he could not leave
his post to render assistance. Thereupon General
Thomas ordered Schoepf's brigade from Lebanon, and
Wolford's cavalry from Columbia, to Somerset. He sub-
sequently ordered regiments from the rear to the same place,
but his orders were countermanded by General Buell, who
also forbade him to send other reënforcements without his
authority. As he entertained a different view of the situation
at Somerset, and was intent upon advancing in another
direction, he declared that Schoepf's force was sufficient.
Soon after the enemy crossed the Cumberland River, and
HE ADVANCES TOWARDS SOMERSET; 5 I
then General Thomas asked permission to go to Lebanon
with reënforcements, but General Buell refused with the
remark that he would not be “diverted more than was ne-
cessary from more important matters by the annoying affairs
at Somerset.” Thomas was thus not only thwarted in the
invasion of East Tennessee, but was also restrained from
reénforcing his subordinate at Somerset. -
He was now in command of the First division of the
Army of the Ohio–the new designation of General Buell's
forces. This division* comprised sixteen regiments of
infantry, a regiment and a squadron of cavalry, and three
batteries of artillery, and was consequently a little army in
itself; but its component parts were widely scattered, and
its commander for some time was forbidden to unite them.
When, however, General Buell learned that the enemy
was fortifying on the north bank of the Cumberland River,
near Somerset, he directed Thomas, December 29th, to
move to the vicinity of Zollicoffer's position, communicate
with General Schoepf, and organize a combined attack by
Schoepf in front, and Thomas himself on the enemy's left
flank. These instructions prescribed a plan of battle, in
outline at least; but this plan, made from distant view and
on conjectural grounds, did not provide for the actual con-
ditions.
General Thomas began his march December 31st, and
after eighteen days of necessarily slow movement, in almost
constant rain and over almost impassable roads, reached
Logan's Cross Roads, ten miles distant from the enemy's
position. His orders required a conjunction with Schoepf
before he should attack the enemy. He therefore halted
his command, disposed his foremost regiments on two ad-
jacent roads, one leading directly to the enemy's position,
and the other running thither from Somerset. He placed
* For details of organization see Hist, Army of the Cumberland,
Vol. I, page 51,
52 LIFE OF GENERAI, GEORGE H. THOMAS,
detachments of cavalry and infantry far to the front to guard
against a surprise. The problem of uniting two columns
in the face of a concentrated enemy then demanded solu-
tion. Having selected the proper place, from the direction
of the roads, for the conjunction of his forces, either for an
advance against the enemy or for defense in the event of an
attack by him, he communicated with General Schoepf and
directed him to send three regiments to his position before
the enemy. These dispositions made it possible for him to
win a victory the next day in a battle opened by the foe.
These dispositions were judicious in their relation to his
own contemplated attack, and equally so for the defensive
action that was forced upon him. The great general is he
who can make provision for all possibilities, and this Thomas
did throughout the war, whenever he was free to act upon
his own judgment. e
The commanders of the Confederate army, Generals
George B. Crittenden and Zollicoffer, were aware of the
approach of General Thomas, and left their entrenchments
at Beech Grove, in hope of crushing him before he could
obtain support from Somerset, or be able to concentrate his
forces brought from Lebanon. The enemy moved from his
fortifications so early in the morning of January 19th, that
he marched the intervening ten miles, and attacked Thomas'
cavalry pickets at 5.30 A. M. But there was no surprise.
The pickets retired slowly, and then the two foremost regi-
ments held the enemy in check until General Thomas was
in person on his line of battle, where he aligned other
regiments as they arrived. When he had eight regiments
and two batteries on hand, he pressed the enemy in a bril-
liant charge, and drove him in rout to his intrenchments.
As the pursuit began, Colonel Steedman and Colonel Har-
lan from the rear, with their regiments, the Fourteenth Ohio
and Tenth Kentucky, and Schoepf, with his brigade, reached
the field. Preparations were made to attack the enemy in his
entrenchments on the 20th; but during the night he crossed
the river and escaped.
MILL SPRINGS. 53
In this first successful western battle, fought upon a plan
originated under the emergency of an attack by superior
forces, every movement from first to last was a harmonious
part of an action which was fought under circumstances that
would have brought defeat had they not been clearly per-
ceived and provided for by General Thomas. Seeing that
his four advanced regiments were not safe without support
which could be obtained from Somerset, before his rear
forces could arrive, he gave such orders to Schoepf as
brought three regiments under Carter to the left of the line of
battle, formed by the two foremost regiments, the Tenth
Indiana and Fourth Kentucky, at the moment the enemy
was moving to outflank and turn the left of the line. Two
other regiments were at hand—the Second Minnesota and
Ninth Ohio—to take the place of the Fourth Kentucky
and Tenth Indiana, at the moment of the exhaustion of
their ammunition; and the decisive charge, fully supported,
was made at the first moment that success was possible.
And by this charge the battle was won. There was no
slowness on the part of Thomas in his first battle, since
with unsurpassed quickness he provided for every contin-
gency, and by one blow which was made possible by pre-
vious dispositions, gained a brilliant victory. And he did
this while inspiring his soldiers by his own presence on the
line of battle and by his unflinching exposure to a common
danger. His conduct of this battle was a combination of
deliberate strategy and tactical dispositions, with the quick
inspiration that comes to great generals in trying emergen-
cies. If measured by the number of troops engaged—on
one side only eight regiments”—it was a great battle ;
but if estimated by its harmonies and its unity of force, it
was indeed a great action. And on the part of the com-
mander, there was no balancing of forces for attack and
# Fourth Kentucky, Tenth Indiana, Second Minnesota, Ninth Ohio, First and
Second East Tennessee, Twelfth Kentucky, and Kinney's Battery.
54 LIFE OF GENERA. L. G. EORG E H THOMAS.
reserve, for all were for attack, and support came when
support was needed. Raw troops were inspired to resist
and charge with the steadiness of veterans. The final
charge, indeed, evinced the spirit of soldiers made bold by
frequency of victory, rather than the usual timidity of un-
tried recruits. The enemy was outflanked by an unsup-
ported line of battle, and routed by inferior forces. Beyond
its conduct and forceful operations, the battle should be
measured by its moral effect and its agency in deranging
the enemy's defensive plans. Hitherto the National forces
had not gained an important victory in the West, although
large armies had been concentrated. Owing to an exag-
gerated estimate of the enemy's strength in Kentucky,
there had been no aggression of importance by the National
troops. And this battle, which was only incidental, as far
as the great plans and purposes of General Johnston and
General Buell were concerned, was the only positive victory
won in Kentucky during the war, although large armies
subsequently marched and maneuvered in that State. The
people of the West, whose patriotism had filled Kentucky
with citizen soldiers, and whose hopes had been paralyzed
by deferred success, were restored to faith in the triumph of
the National cause by the victory at Logan's Cross Roads—
an action designated by the enemy as the “Battle of Fish-
ing Creek,” and by ourselves as “Mill Springs.”
By this action the right of the enemy's defensive line was
completely broken, and about ten thousand men eliminated
from the operations which immediately followed. In the
life of General Albert Sidney Johnston, by his son, Prof.
Wm. Preston Johnston, it is shown that General Zollicoffer
crossed the river without orders, and in like manner the
battle of Mill Springs was fought. General Johnston had
been concealing his weakness for months by every artifice
possible; and had the forces on his right been successful,
it would not have enabled him to assume the offensive in
any other direction. But the temporary disintegration of
COMPLIMENTA R Y ORDERS. 55
one-fourth of his entire force imperiled his defensive line,
whose centre was at Bowling Green and left at Columbus,
Kentucky.
General Buell issued the following order in relation to the
action at Logan's Cross Roads:
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
Louisville, Kentucky, January 23, 1862.
General Orders No. 4o.
The General commanding has the gratification of announcing
the achievement of an important victory on the 19th inst., at Mill
Springs, by the troops under General Thomas, over the rebel forces,
some twelve thousand strong, under Gen. Geo. B. Crittenden and
Gen. Zollicoffer.
The defeat of the enemy was thorough and complete, and his
loss in killed and wounded was great. Night alone, under cover of
which his troops crossed the river from his intrenched camp and dis-
persed, prevented the capture of his entire force. Fourteen or more
pieces of artillery, some fifteen hundred horses and mules, his entire
camp equipage, with wagons, arms, ammunition, and other stores to
a large amount, fell into our hands.
The General commanding has been charged by the general-in-
chief to convey his thanks to General Thomas and his troops for
their brilliant victory. No task could be more grateful to him, se-
conded as it is by his own cordial approbation of their conduct.
By command of Brig. Gen. Buell,
(Signed.) JAMES B. FRY,
A. A. G. Chief of Staff.
The President of the United States also issued a compli-
mentary order:
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, Jan. 26, 1862.
The President, commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, has
received information of a brilliant victory achieved by the United
States forces over a large body of armed traitors and rebels at Mill
Springs in the State of Kentucky.
He returns thanks to the gallant officers and soldiers who won
that victory, and when official reports shall be received, the military
skill and personal valor displayed in the battle will be acknowledged
and rewarded in a fitting manner.
56 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H. THOMAS.
The courage that encountered and vanquished the greatly supe-
rior numbers of the rebel force, pursued and attacked them in their
intrenchments, and paused not until the enemy was completely
routed, merits and receives Commendation.
The purpose of this war is to attack and destroy a rebellious
enemy and to deliver the country from the danger menaced by trai-
tors. Alacrity, daring courageous spirit and patriotic zeal, on all
occasions and under all circumstances, will be expected of the Army
of the United States. -
In the prompt and spirited movements and daring battle of Mill
Springs, the Nation will realize its hopes, and the people of the United
States will rejoice to honor every soldier and officer who proves his
courage by charging with the bayonet and storming intrenchments,
or in the blaze of the enemy's fire.
- By order of the President.
_* EDw1N M. STANTON,
- Secretary of War.
On the 28th of January, the Legislature of Ohio passed a
vote of thanks to General Thomas and his troops. -
It is justly a matter of surprise that when the official re-
ports of the battle of Mill Springs were received at Wash-
ington, there was no farther recognition of the services of
General Thomas. The complimentary order did not men-
tion him as commander, and notwithstanding the President's
explicit promise of fitting recognition and reward to those
who displayed skill and personal valor, it was never fulfilled
in respect to the one of all others who displayed these sol-
dierly traits. General Thomas earned promotion in this
battle; but he waited long for it. Other generals received
high rank before they fought battles. Some were promoted
for comparatively trivial achievements. But for unexplained
reasons, Thomas' case was made an exception to a general
rule which obtained at least during the earlier stages of the
war. Report and conjecture attributed the treatment of
Thomas to the fact that he was a native of Virginia. The
words attributed to the President: “He is a Virginian, let
him wait,” was the accepted explanation at the time. Had
he then been appointed a major-general, he would have
HIS GENERALSHIP IN WIRO UG HT. 57
taken rank above both Grant and Buell, and would have
been entitled to an independent command early in the war.
He deserved such a position, because he was then a general
of the highest type, and perhaps as conscious of his power,
when in person he aligned his troops at Mill Springs as
when at Nashville he fought the most brilliant battle of the
war. And the fact that he was a native of the South only
enhanced his claim for recognition as a loyal general. His
generalship was not evolved by costly mistakes. It was not
battle-wrought in any sense, But it was inwrought in the
man himself by the combination of all the qualities of a
great captain, supplemented by twenty years of Self-imposed
professional study. And he who carefully analyzes his ser–
vices, in his subordination to others and in his independence
as an army commander, will regret that the President of
the United States did not do as he promised in his compli-
mentary order.
After the battle of Mill Springs, General Thomas was
again hopeful that he would be permitted to lead a column
into East Tennessee. General McClellan, commander-in-
chief, supported by the President, instructed General Buell
to give attention to such a movement. But the commander
of the Army of the Ohio, being intent upon establishing
coöperative relations with Major General Halleck, com-
manding in Missouri, made no effective efforts to send an
army into East Tennessee. He did nothing but collect
meagre supplies, and repair roads for a short distance
eastward from Lebanon. And very Soon the movement of
General Grant against the enemy's forts on the Tennessee
and Cumberland Rivers turned the Army of the Ohio to-
wards Nashville.
It is evident that General Thomas was the only general
of high position in Kentucky from September, 1861, to
February, 1862, who clearly apprehended the situation, and
who was bold enough to insist on an advance against the
enemy when other generals were trembling on the defensive.
58 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS
As he was during that period intent on conducting an army
of twenty thousand men into East Tennessee, it is pertinent
to ask if his plan was practicable and supported by strong
military considerations.
In the first place, it may be assumed that there were
enough troops in Kentucky when General Sherman was
relieved by General Buell, to maintain the defensive against
the enemy at Bowling Green, and give Thomas twenty
thousand men for his advance into East Tennessee. The
return, giving to the adjutant general at Washington the
number of troops in the Department of the Cumberland on
the Ioth day of November, five days before General Sher-
man gave place to General Buell, placed the aggregate at
forty-nine thousand six hundred and seventeen men, present
and absent. This aggregate included the Kentucky regi-
ments in process of organization, but excluded a large force
of home guards. At this time General Johnston had twelve
thousand five hundred men at Bowling Green, and eight or
ten regiments under General Zollicoffer on his right.
Thereafter General Buell's army increased far more rapidly
than General Johnston's. These facts prove the practicability
of the movement into East Tennessee prior to the battle of
Mill Springs. After that battle the way was open. General
Johnston then despaired of being able to hold his defensive
line should General Buell move against him. In fact, he
had known from the first that unless reënforced, he would be
compelled to fall back. On the 27th he wrote* to the Secre-
tary of War at Richmond: “I suppose a change of the
plan of operations has been made, and that the force intended
for East Tennessee will now be combined with the force on
this line, making an aggregate strength of probably more
than 50,000 men to be arrayed against my forces here.
“If the forces of the enemy are maneuvered, as I think
they may be, I may be compelled to retire from this place
* Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston, page 382.
A. S. JOHNSTON'S FEARS. 59
to cover Nashville with the aid of the volunteer force now
being organized which in that way could be brought into
coöperation.” Again, on the 8th of December, he wrote*:
“With the addition of Nelson's and Rosecrans' columns,
their force on this immediate line I believe ought not to be
estimated over 65,000 men.
“Our returns at this place show a force of between 18,-
OOO and 19,000, of which about 5,OOO are sick (about 3,600
at Nashville) and our effective force is under 13,000 men.”
And on December 25th he wrotei : “The position of
General Zollicoffer on the Cumberland holds in check the
meditated invasion and hoped-for revolt in East Tennessee,
but I can neither order Zollicoffer to join me here, nor with-
draw any more force from Columbus, without imperiling
our communications with Richmond, or endangering Ten-
nessee and the Mississippi Valley. This I have resolved not
to do, but have chosen, on the contrary, to post my inade-
quate force in such manner as to hold the enemy in check,
guard the frontier, and hold the Barren until winter termi-
nates the campaign, or if any fault in his movements is
committed, or his line exposed where his force is developed,
to attack him as opportunity offers.”
After his right was broken, he wrotei, January 22d: “A
successful movement of the enemy on my right would carry
with it all the consequences which could be expected by
the enemy here, if they could break through my defenses.
If I had the force to prevent a flank movement, they could
be compelled to attack this position, which, we doubt not,
can make a successful defense.
“If force cannot be spared from other army corps, the
country must now be roused to make the greatest effort it
will be called upon to make during the war. No matter
what the sacrifice may be, it must be made and without
* Life of Gen. A. S. Johnston, page 387. J
f Ibid., page 388.
f Ibid., page 426.
6O LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H, THOMAS.
loss of time. Our people do not comprehend the magni-
tude of the danger that threatens. Let it be impressed
upon them.”
These statements by the commanding general make it
clear, that after Mill Springs, he had no forces to throw be-
fore a column marching into East Tennessee.
If there were sufficient National forces in Kentucky be-
fore and after the battle of Mill Springs for the detachment
of twenty thousand men for the movement on Knoxville,
were there other military considerations to have warranted
it P. It was the most direct route to the heart of the South-
ern Confederacy, and in the light of subsequent events, it is
highly probable, if not certain, that it would have been the
best line for the initial invasion of the South from Ken-
tucky. The possession of the Tennessee and Virginia
railroad, at Knoxville, or at any other point east of Cleve-
land, would not only have interrupted the communications
of the forces in Tennessee and Kentucky with Richmond,
but would have broken all the railroad connections of the
Confederacy east and west, except by the railroad through
Augusta, Georgia. Had, therefore, General Thomas'
scheme been carried out, and had it been supplemented by
a railroad from Kentucky to Knoxville, as President Lincoln
recommended to Congress, there would have been estab-
lished the shortest possible railroad line to Chattanooga and
Atlanta, and Knoxville could have been made a permanent
base for operations towards Chattanooga and Atlanta, or
eastward into Virginia, or southeastward into North Caro-
lina. This railroad would have penetrated a mountain
region in East Tennessee filled with loyal citizens, and
would have been for this and other reasons more easily
guarded than any other line of supply for a Union army
operating in the central States of the Confederacy.
The importance of General Thomas' plan may be in-
ferred also from the fear of the enemy that it would be
attempted. A prominent Southern editor thus described
WISDOM OF HIS PLAN. 6 I
the situation, after the defeat at Mill Springs: “The armies
of the east and west are now connected by two lines of
railroad; one, the East Tennessee and Western Virginia,
passing through the mountain region of this State (Tennes-
see), and the other, the Weldon and Wilmington, running
along the Atlantic coast. Both of these roads are, in a
measure, somewhat exposed to the assault of the enemy,
the former being about seventy, and the latter about forty
miles from the advance of the Federal forces, on either ex-
treme, in Southern Kentucky and Pamlico Sound. Military
affairs are in a situation at present to especially indicate, if
not invite, a trial of this scheme. * * * In the mean time
strenuous efforts may be made to penetrate East Tennessee
by way of Cumberland Gap to reach the great trunk rail-
way at Knoxville or Greenville. * * * Despite the almost
insurmountable difficulties of accomplishing such an expe-
dition when every mountain pass should be made a Ther-
mopylae, the late success of the army near Somerset may
possibly attract his attention to its supposed practicability,
while he still exults with exuberant ecstacy over his tri-
umph. Indeed, we are already informed that General Buell
has despatched largereenforcements to Thomas and Schoepf
since the battle of the 19th, although their combined com-
mands were known to be three times as large as that of
Crittenden which had rallied at last accounts at Livingston,
fifteen miles from the Kentucky state line. * * * We have
to contend with the disagreeable fact that there is in East
Tennessee, the field of this operation, a large disaffected, if
not treasonable element, ready at all times to give aid and
comfort to the armed legions of the enemy on their coming.”
Thus there was in this plan of General Thomas, as in all
subsequent ones, the coincidence of extreme disadvantages
to the enemy in resisting its execution. If it is a wise
maxim in war to do what the enemy fears may be done,
the invasion of East Tennessee was desirable as well as
practicable in November and December, 1861, and espe-
cially so in January and February, 1862.
62 LIFE OF GENERAL G EORG E H. THOMAS.
Again, the importance of a firm hold of East Tennessee
by the National forces, early in the war, may be inferred
from their subsequent efforts to gain and hold that region,
and by the plans of the enemy to regain it and utilize it for
offensive operations. When General Bragg in 1862 formed
his plan to wrest Kentucky from the Union and establish
his lines on the Ohio River, one of his four columns moved
from Knoxville, turned Cumberland Gap, gained a victory
at Richmond, Kentucky, and menaced Cincinnati from the
hills south of Covington. When General Bragg declined
to meet General Buell in battle after the engagement near
Perryville, he retreated with his army to Knoxville. Nearly
a year later this general withdrew Buckner's forces from
Knoxville to concentrate an army to crush General Rose-
crans, and thus gave the place to General Burnside; but
when that plan had failed, he invited defeat at Chattanooga
by detaching Longstreet's corps to wrest Knoxville from
Burnside. During the winter following, when General Jos.
E. Johnston was meditating a movement to the north from
Dalton, Georgia, Confederate forces were maneuvering and
fighting in East Tennessee to open the way for his army.
And at last, when the Confederacy was in a desperate strait,
General Beauregard recommended that a vast army should
be concentrated, to be hurled from Knoxville upon Ken-
tucky and the Northern States. A place so important to
the enemy during the war was certainly important to the
National armies at its beginning.
The importance of the Knoxville line of aggression to
the National forces may also be inferred from the results of
offensive operations on another line, which at first were so
imposing. Forts Henry and Donelson, Nashville and Cor-
inth, Middle and Nouthern Tennessee and Sorthern Missis-
sippi, Alabama and Georgia, were gained; but all the more
important points, except Nashville, ſell back to the enemy,
to be re-gained at the cost of the battles of Iuka, Cor-
inth, Perryville, and Stone River.
CHAPTER IV.
THOMAS ASSIGNED TO THE COMMAND OF THE “RIGHT wing " BEFor E
CORINTH-ASKS TO BE RELIEVED, AND RE-Ass IGNED TO THE ARMY of
THE OHIO-DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF ADVANCING RAPIDLy FROM
CORINTH TOWARDS CHATTANOOGA – THOMAS COMMANDs AT McMINN-
VILLE-BELIEVES THAT GENERAL BRAGG will INVADE KENTUcky
RECOMMENDS THAT HE BE RESISTED, FIRST FROM McMINNVILLE, AND
THEN FROM MURFREESBORO'--THE ARMY OF THE opio Moves BAck
TO LOUISVILLE-THOMAS APPOINTED TO COMMAND IN ROOM OF GENE-
RAL BUELL, DECLINES, AND BUELL IS RESTORED–NAMED AS SECOND IN
COMMAND-THE ARMY ADVANCES AGAINST THE ENEMy—BATTLE OF PER-
RYVILLE-GENERAL BUELL AGAIN RELIEVED.
IN the movement of the Army of the Ohio from Nashville
to Savannah, Tennessee, General Thomas with his divi-
Sion was in the rear, and consequently did not participate
in the battle of Shiloh.
After that battle, General H. W. Halleck united the three
armies of his department and the detached forces on the field
before Pittsburgh Landing, and partially re-organized them
before advancing against the enemy at Corinth, Mississippi.
In the main he preserved the identity of his armies; but
his changes tended to complexity rather than unity in the
relations of his immense forces as a whole. Under the
semblance of a general army organization, he divided his
forces into five parts, designated, “Right Wing,” “Centre,”
“Left Wing,” “Reserves,” and “Cavalry,” each comprising
two or more divisions. General Grant was relieved from
the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and announced
as second in command. The “Right Wing,” comprising
four divisions of the Army of the Tennessee and the First
division of the Army of the Ohio, was given to General
63
64 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
Thomas; the “Centre,” including four divisions of the lat-
ter army, to General Buell; the “Left Wing,” or Army of
the Mississippi, with additional divisions, to General Pope;
the “Reserves” to General McClernand, and the “Cavalry.”
to General Gordon Granger. General Thomas had been ap-
pointed a major general of volunteers April 25th at the
solicitation of General Halleck, who had urged his promo-
tion, that he might assign him to the command of his
“Right Wing.” His division commanders were Major
General W. T. Sherman, Brigadier Generals Hurlbut, T. W.
Sherman, Davies, and McKean.
The advance of General Halleck's immense army towards
Corinth was very slow, and the plan of movement gave no
opportunity to Thomas or any other commander to display
ability in handling a large force. The commanding general
studiously avoided a general engagement by advancing
cautiously by parallels. There was heavy skirmishing from
day to day, and occasional reconnoissances in force with
resultant combats of trifling importance. Each forward
step was marked by an additional line of entrenchments.
Prior to the battle of Shiloh, there were no defenses before
the isolated camps of the Army of the Tennessee; but now
in striking contrast, the united armies passed each night
behind entrenchments all the way to Corinth.
The enemy, being too weak to accept battle or siege at
Corinth, retreated without serious loss in men, munitions
or supplies.
At Corinth General Thomas requested General Halleck
to relieve him from the command of the “Right Wing,”
or Army of the Tennessee, and transfer him with his old
division to the Army of the Ohio in order that General
Grant might be restored to his former position. He did
this because he had learned that General Grant had been
deeply hurt by his removal from the leadership of that
army. In this case, as in many others during the civil
war, he decided against his own interests, from regard for
CORINTEI. 6 5
justice. He was the junior in rank of General Grant,
General Buell and General Pope, and in consequence of
rank and former relations to the Army of the Tennessee,
he considered General Grant's claim to its command supe-
rior to his own.
In consequence of this singular request General Thomas .
descended from the command of an army of five divisions
and resumed his former position under General Buell in
command of one. This was a long step downward for a
general who was anxious to hold a large independent Com-
mand, but on the score of rank it was legitimate, and as
corps organizations had not then been instituted in our
armies, there was no place for a general between an army
and a division. It is true, however, that military history
seldom records such an act of Self-renunciation and gene-
rosity, and if General Thomas had not made himself pro-
minent in history by great achievements, he still would have
deserved a high place for virtues which rarely dominate
the ambition and jealousies of men devoted to war and
the attainment of personal glory.
On June 5th, General Thomas, by General Halleck's
order, was placed in command of Corinth and vicinity. He
was relieved from the command of the “Right Wing,” on
the IOth, and on the 22d was re-transferred to the Army
of the Ohio. -
Soon after Corinth was gained, the three armies which
had been combined for a short campaign were separated,
and were severally given distinct fields and aims. In the
projected operations, General Buell was ordered to move
his army eastward from Corinth, to gain, if possible, Chat-
tanooga, East Tennessee, and Northern Georgia. This
movement, in a circuitous way, was a return to what Gene-
ral Thomas had made effort to accomplish the year before.
There was, however, in the second plan, an inversion of
the objections which he had suggested and a multiplication
of obstacles.
5
66 LIFE OF GENERAI, GEORG E H THOMAS,
The advance from Kentucky to Knoxville, or some other
pointin East Tennessee, from Central Kentucky, would have
been direct from a reliable base; that from Corinth to Chat-
tanooga gave great exposure to Communications with East-
port, and necessitated the detachment of strong forces to
defend even those with Nashville. On the line through
Kentucky to East Tennessee, the forces in advance would
have covered the communications in a measure, and all
reserves might have been posted on the line of supply, but
on the line in Alabama and Tennessee, heavy detachments
from the field forces were necessary, even after the railroads
had been put in running order.
At the inception of the movement towards Chattanooga
General Buell, in compliance with orders from General
Halleck, gave attention to the repair of the railroad east-
ward from Eastport, but this project was soon abandoned
as impracticable. Thereafter all available means were di-
rected to the restoration of the two railroads leading from
Nashville to the Tennessee River and connecting at
Stevenson, Alabama. But the repair of these roads
retarded General Buell's eastward advance, and greatly
diminished the strength of the forces moving towards
Chattanooga. This slow movement and reduced strength
were fatal to success. Had a quick advance to Chattanoo-
ga been practicable immediately after the withdrawal of the
enemy from Corinth, that important strategic point might
have been gained. But two months gave opportunity to
the enemy to concentrate a large army there, another in
front of General Grant in Mississippi, and two columns in
East Tennessee. After repeated defeats in the West, he had
thus gathered troops at four points with the purpose of
uniting all of them in Kentucky to drive all the National
forces across the Ohio River. General Bragg had succeeded
General Beauregard in general command in the West and
the new commander hoped that he could recover all the
territory which had been lost in Mississippi, Alabama, Ten-
FROM OORINTH TO CHA TTA NOOGA. 67
nessee and Kentucky, and establish a defensive line, if not
an offensive one, on the Ohio river.
Early in June General Wood's and General Nelson's di-
visions were sent eastward from Mississippi to repair the
Memphis and Charleston railroad. General O. M. Mitchel's
division was already on that road, having moved south from
Nashville early in the Spring. On the I Ith of June Gen-
eral McCook's division moved eastward from Corinth and
General Crittenden's from Boonesville. These two divi-
sions passed the others on the road and took position at
Battle Creek far towards Chattanooga, early in July. As
fast as the repair of roads, the accumulation of Supplies and
other circumstances permitted, other forces moved east-
ward. General Thomas was left in the rear with his division
to guard against the contingency of attacks by the enemy
from the west and south-west, until a concentration
towards Chattanooga was practicable and imperative. He
was then ordered from Tuscumbia to Decherd and Soon
afterwards to McMinnville. He arrived at the former place
August 5th, and at the latter on the 19th. He was sent to
McMinnville by General Buell to command all the troops
that were to operate from that place, either to continue the
offensive or to resist the enemy in the event of aggression
on his part. By this time there were rumors and indica-
tions that General Bragg would advance from Chattanooga,
although his objective and line of march had not been de-
veloped. If Nashville was his objective he could advance
by Battle Creek and Stevenson, or across the mountains to
McMinnville or Sparta. If his purpose was to invade Ken-
tucky, he would cross into the Sequatchie Valley, while his
presence there would indicate equally such a movement or
an advance to Nashville by the more northern route. The
fact that he could cover his designs in his first operations,
gave General Bragg a decided advantage. On the supposi-
tion that he would advance to Nashville, General Buell was
to provide against the movement by Stevenson or by Mc-
68 JAIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS.
Minnville, and as the routes were somewhat widely sepa-
rated, there was danger of his falling upon unsupported
divisions or of having an Open way to his objective.
On the day that General Thomas reached McMinnville,
General Buell discussed the situation in a lengthy des-
patch : “The enemy crossed three hundred cavalry and
three thousand infantry at Chattanooga, yesterday. This
may be for the purpose of foraging in Sequatchie Valley,
but we must be prepared for more than that. Hold your
command in readiness to march at the shortest notice.* * *
You should by means of spies and scouts keep yourself
thoroughly informed of what is going on between you and
Chattanooga. * * * I shall concentrate your division
and McCook's at Tracy City or near there, and send Critten-
den up the Sequatchie Valley to about the Anderson road.
We must be prepared either to fight in detachments or con-
centrate rapidly, according to circumstances.” On the 22d
General Thomas telegraphed to General Buell: “I have
believed for a day or two that the demonstration in this di-
rection is intended to cover the advance of the enemy
toward Kentucky. * * * The citizens here think that
they will advance into Kentucky.” General Buell replied
the same day: “From General McCook's information this
morning, it seems almost certain that Bragg is marching on
McMinnville, his advance was on the top of Waldron's
Ridge last night. McCown is said to be crossing at King-
ston, and Withers at Harrison. Of course they will expect
to unite. What sort of ground can we take by Concentrat-
ing at McMinnville P How would it do to fight at Alta-
mont? Is the ground such as to give us the advantage of our
artillery?”
General Thomas replied the same day: “By all means
concentrate here. The enemy cannot reach Nashville by
any other route across the mountains unless by Sparta.
At Altamont, I am positively informed, that the enemy
would have an equal advantage with ourselves. Here we
URGES CONCENTRATION AT MOMINIVVILLE. 69
will have a most decided advantage, and by being here,
should he march by Sparta, we can meet him either there
or at Allen's Ford, across the Caney Fork. He is obliged
to pass this place or Sparta to reach Nashville. . . . I can-
not think that Bragg is coming here, either by the Hill or
Thurman road.” In immediate answer General Buell said:
“I can hardly think the enemy will attempt to march across
to McMinnville—at least, not immediately. It appears to
me that he will rather endeavor to get into North Alabama,
and perhaps strike across to Decherd. If we advance to Alta-
mont, we may thwart him in both and preserve our com-
munication with Decherd and Nashville. What think
you ?” General Thomas said in reply also on the 22d :
“We can get neither forage nor water at Altamont. It will
be as difficult for us to march across the mountains to Se-
quatchie Valley as for the enemy to come either to Alta-
mont or this place. I would not advise concentrating here
except for battle or for an advance into East Tennessee.
I think our connexion with Nashville will be better pre-
served by holding Decherd with a division to enable us to
concentrate either there, if threatened, or at this place. I
have also learned that Tupelo, Mississippi, has been aban-
doned, and most of the enemy at that place have been sent
to Chattanooga. I therefore do not apprehend any attempt
to seize North Alabama.”
The next day General Buell said: “There is no possibility
of our concentrating at McMinnville. We must concentrate
in advance and assume the offensive or fall back, at least, to
Murfreesboro.’ I deem the former the surest, and we will
act accordingly. I wish you, therefore, to move by a forced
march to Altamont, there to form a junction with McCook
and Crittenden and Schoepf” . . . There must be no delay
or failure. The enemy's advance was at the top of Wal-
dron's Ridge, ten miles from Chattanooga, night, before
* General Schoepf was commanding General Thomas' division.
7O LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
last, and talked of being at McMinnville to morrow : that
is hardly possible; but they must be met at the earliest
possible moment.” A day later he telegraphed: “In ad-
vancing to Altamont, take the Hickory Creek road, instead
of the Thurman road. This will put you on a shorter line
of retreat on Murfreesboro' by way of Manchester, and
brings us nearer together. . . . In the event of any reverse
which makes it necessary for the whole force to fall back, do so
by Manchester and Beech Grove, making a stand to check the
enemy whenever it can be done to advantage.” On the 24th,
General Thomas' scouts returned with intelligence that
the enemy would advance on McMinnville by two or three
routes, and that forces were at Pikeville and in the Sequat-
chie Valley. He then reported to General Buell that he
would move that afternoon in compliance with orders. It
is evident, however, from the foregoing quotations, that he
was exceedingly reluctant to move to Altamont, and the
issue of that movement proved that his reluctance was well
founded.
August 25th at 5 P.M., Thomas telegraphed to General
Buell from Altamont: “The enemy no nearer than Dunlap.
It is reported that there is one brigade there and one at
Pikeville. . . . Water scarce; only one spring here, and
not forage enough in the neighborhood to last for one day.
The road up the mountain is almost impassable; General
Wood has been from six o'clock until now, and has not
succeeded in getting his artillery up the road. I deem it
next to impossible to march a large army across the moun-
tains by Altamont on account of the scarcity of water and
forage and the extreme difficulty of passing over the road.
I will therefore return to McMinnville, and await further
orders. As I mentioned in one of my despatches, I regard
McMinnville as the most important point for occupation of
any. The occupation of McMinnville, Sparta and Mur-
freesboro' will, in my opinion, Secure the Nashville and
Chattanooga railroad.”
ALTA MONT AND MOMINNVILLE. 71
And thus without orders he abandoned a place to which
he would not have advanced unless under positive orders
issued after his own emphatic protest. In advance of trial,
he depicted the exact condition of Altamont as a place for
concentration.
The next day General Buell telegraphed: “Keep your
position at McMinnville, but make nothing like a perma-
nent establishment. Be always ready to move at a mo-
ment's notice. That Bragg is on this side of the river with
a large force is beyond all question. It is hardly probable
that it is merely for the purpose of demonstration, and we
must be prepared to concentrate promptly. Of course the
passage of So large a force across the mountains is difficult,
but not as much so as you would suppose from the road
you took. The Thurman road is very good, and the moun-
tain quite easy of ascent. The descent on this side is easy
enough by four roads, all diverging from Altamont; the
first going by Beersheba to McMinnville, the second by
Hickory Creek to McMinnville or towards Manchester,
the third also to Manchester and to Decherd by Pelham,
and the fourth by Cowan. The Beersheba road is excel-
lent for a mountain road. The question is, how to meet
an advance which may take either of these roads through
Altamont. The best position we could take would be
McMinnville, Altamont, and on the Thurman road, just
this side of Sequatchie Valley. We should not only be
able to concentrate against an advance on that road or the
Sparta road, but also to threaten his flank if he should
attempt to go into North Alabama by Battle Creek—a not
improbable thing on many accounts. The difficulty of
supplying ourselves on the mountains is, I think, the only
objection to the disposition I mention.”
On the 28th General Thomas said: “Troops at this place
can watch the direct Chattanooga road, the Dunlap, and
the Harrison and Pikeville roads, and by the system of
expresses to be established by Smith, I think I can give
72 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS,
you intelligence of the enemy before he can cross Se-
quatchie Valley.” The divergent views of these generals
had their foundation in a radical disagreement as to General
Bragg's plans and purposes. General Buell's suggestions
had reference to an advance of the enemy to Nashville
either across the mountains or by Battle Creek and Ste-
venson; and General Thomas, rejecting as improbable an
advance to Nashville by way of North Alabama, and be-
lieving that the invasion of Kentucky was to be the outcome
of Bragg's operations, would have made provision against
his advance from the Sequatchie Valley in the direction of
Kentucky, and the proposed concentration at McMinnville
would have provided also for the contingency of an advance
to Nashville from that valley. General Buell looked to the
right, and General Thomas to the left, and the subsequent
movements of Bragg's army proved the better discernment
of the latter.
General Bragg subsequently demonstrated towards
McMinnville, but did this simply to cover his advance
into Kentucky. He was most anxious to escape from
the mountains without meeting his foe in battle, and
for this reason adopted every possible maneuver and
artifice to make the impression that he would advance upon
McMinnville. And General Buell, acting upon the posi-
tive belief that Nashville was his objective, opened the way
for him to pass from the Sequatchie Valley and move upon
the shortest line to Kentucky.
On the 30th of August General Buell issued an elaborate
order, defining the movements of each division, to effect a
concentration of his army at Murfreesboro’. By this order
he placed General Thomas in the rear with Ammen’s” and
Wood's divisions, and directed him to keep a day's march
between his forces and the enemy and not to risk a battle.
On the 1st of September he asked General Thomas: “Do
* General Nelson's division.
MUR FREES BORO” 73
any circmstances present themselves which should make a
change in our movements advisable? Thomas answered: “I
think, as the movement has commenced, that it had better be
executed.” On the day following he told General Buell that he
had again heard that the enemy intended to march on McMinn-
ville. He then advised the concentration at Murfreesboro’,
from which place the main force should be thrown against
Bragg's army. He had said orf the º “If he (the
enemy is moving on Murfreesboro’ by Sparta, I think the
sooner we concentrate to meet him and drive him back,
the better; and Murfreesboro' seems to be the point from
which we should operate.” But in no way did he intimate
that the purpose of concentrating to resist General Bragg's
advance should be abandoned. He only, at the last, ex-
pressed a preference for Murfreesboro' as a base for offense.
Doubtless one strong reason for this preference was the
expectation that reënforcements would be met at Murfrees-
boro’. Two divisions were marching from Mississippi, and
Rousseau's division—formerly Mitchel's—had moved to
Nashville, on the line of the Nashville and Decatur rail-
road.
During the first three days of September all the divisions
and trains of the army were put in motion towards Mur-
freesboro', General Thomas with two divisions being in the
rear, reaching Murfreesboro' on the 5th. Here Gene-
ral Thomas met an order from General Buell to proceed to
Nashville by rail; and the meaning of this order was the
abandonment of the Suggested plan of operations from
Murfreesboro’. In this General Buell had not consulted
Thomas, but had decided on reaching that place, although
he there met General Jeff. C. Davis' division, General R. B.
Mitchell commanding, (sent by General Grant,) that he
would withdraw his army to Nashville. It is evident from
“his persistence in recommending a concentration, to resist
General Bragg, first from McMinnville and afterwards from
Murfreesboro’, that had General Thomas been in command
74 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS,
of the army, he would have fought the enemy south or
east of Murfreesboro’. General Buell withdrew five divi-
sions from McMinnville and contiguous points. He met
one other at Murfreesboro'. He could have drawn reën-
forcements from Nashville besides. General Bragg ad-
vanced from Chattanooga with five divisions of infantry,
and General Buell could have met him in battle by advanc-
ing from Murfreesboro' with seven divisions, at least.
September 7th, General Thomas was assigned to the
Command of three divisions and the post of Nashville.
These divisions were his own, Negley's, and Paine's divi-
Sion, General John M. Palmer commanding, which arrived
at Nashville on the 12th, from General Grant's army.
General Buell had, in the meantime, ascertained that Gene-
ral Bragg had not followed him to Nashville, but having
crossed the Cumberland River at Carthage, was moving
into Kentucky. He therefore moved north from Nashville
with six divisions — McCook's, Crittenden's, Ammen’s,
Wood's' Rousseau's and Mitchell's.
On the 13th General Thomas was ordered by General
Buell to march on the 15th, into Kentucky, with his own
division and Palmer's, but in view of the fact that General
Bragg might have detached a large force to operate against
Nashville, was permitted to leave Palmer's division at that
place if he deemed it necessary. He started from Nashville
on the I 5th with his own division, and on the 20th joined
the main army at Prewitt's Knob. All these changes in-
dicated the need of his services where careful management
was required or where fighting was expected. He was
nearest the enemy in the march of the army to Murfrees-
boro, and when it became known that General Bragg had
moved into Kentucky, went by order to the front. His
transfer from the rearguard to the vanguard usually indicated
a like transfer of emergencies, and in all his movements
and operations, he was at least as rapid as circumstances
demanded or orders required.
ASKS FOR BU ELL’S H2 ETENTION. 75
At Prewitt's Knob he was charged with the alignment
of the foremost divisions in anticipation of battle, but Gen-
eral Bragg declined to fight, and diverging to the east from
the direct road to Louisville, marched northward. In the
march to Louisville from Prewitt's Knob, General Thomas
was again in the rear of the army for its safety.
During General Buell's movement from Corinth towards
Chattanooga, the President, through General Halleck, com-
mander-in-chief, expressed dissatisfaction with his progress
and after the army reached Louisville, this dissatis-
faction eventuated in an order relieving General Buell from
command of the army and appointing General Thomas as
his successor. The command was actually turned Over,
but General Thomas requested that it should be restored to
General Buell. In a despatch to Washington he said: “Gen-
eral Buell's preparations have been completed to move
against the enemy, and I respectfully ask that he may be
retained in command. My position is very embarrassing,
not being as well informed as I should be as the commander
of this army and on the assumption of such responsibility.”
Upon the receipt of this despatch the order relieving General
Buell was revoked.
Perhaps no act of his life has been so misapprehended,
as this request for the retention of General Buell in com-
mand of the army, when he had been appointed his successor.
The people of the country and even his own friends have
attributed this act to his extreme modesty and distrust of
his own ability as a general. His despatch does not sustain
these suppositions, especially as explained by himself. He
did not positively decline the command. He requested
that Buell should be retained. But had this request
been denied, he would have accepted the position, although
the assumption of such responsibility on the eve of battle
was by no means inviting or in harmony with his views of
justice to Buell or himself. He considered it unjust
to General Buell to remove him at the culmination of
76 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
his operations. His request was based primarily on the
fact that Buell had completed his preparations to move
against the enemy, and secondly on his own embar-
rassments in taking the responsibility of commanding an
army on the eve of battle. In another connection it has
been shown that his perception of the demands of justice,
prompted him to protest against his own removal from com-
mand in September 1861. It is equally clear that for the
same reason he protested against the removal of Buell.
Knowing that his action had been attributed to modesty
he once said: “I am not as modest as I have been
represented to be. I did not request the retention of Gen-
eral Buell in command through modesty, but because his
removal and my assignment were alike, unjust to him and
to me. It was unjust to him to relieve him on the eve of
battle, and unjust to myself, to impose upon me the com-
mand of the army at such a time.” When responsible for
the issue of a battle he desired to give shape to the antece-
dent operations. He was modest and he was eager for an
independent Command, but he was not so modest as to un-
derate himself nor So eager for the command of an army, as
to desire it, when involving injustice to another general.
Had choice been offered to him between himself, as next in
rank to General Buell, and an alien general, he would have
accepted the command of the army without hesitation, on
the ground, that he had claims superior to any general of
his rank outside of the Army of the Cumberland, and that
embarrassments to a stranger would be greater than to
bimself.
It should also be stated that while General Thomas de-
sired an independent command it was not pleasant to him
to supersede another general. His idea of enlarged Com-
mand was to have his forces multiplied in his own hands,
and thus be promoted without the displacement and mor-
tification of another commander. This certainly was a
noble aspiration, one that harmonized with the transcendent
excellence attributed to him by his friends.
SECOND IN COMMAND. 77
Upon resuming command of the army, General Buell
named General Thomas as second in command. He had
previously organized three provisional corps, each compris-
ing three divisions, and designated as “First,” “Second”
and “Third,” and had assigned Major-General A. McD.
McCook, to the command of the “First,” Major-General
T. L. Crittenden to the “Second,” and Brigadier-General
C. C. Gilbert to the “Third.” The command of the Third
Corps belonged to General Thomas, by right, since his own
division was in it, and General Gilbert was then only a
brigadier-general by appointment of the President and was
never confirmed as such. General Thomas' position was
an ambiguous One. Nominally Second in command, in re-
ality, he was simply given the Supervision of General Crit-
tenden's Corps, and the small force of cavalry associated
with it. This arrangement placed two major-generals with
One Corps, and a brigadier-general of unperfected appoint-
ment in command of another. If the position of second
in Command had carried with it authority to act as com-
mander of the army in absence of the commanding gene-
ral, or in emergencies beyond his observation, the case
would have been radically different. But Thomas had no
more authority or independence than an ordinary corps
commander, and consequently his position was a false one,
being by designation higher than such a commander, while
in authority, only his equal. General Crittenden was sub-
ject to his orders in consequence of defined relations, but
no such relations subjected General McCook or General
Gilbert to his orders, whom by rank alone he could have
commanded in certain contingencies. But he had no
knowledge of the plans of the commanding general that
was not revealed by general orders, and consequently his
authority was confined to the corps on the right, and the
cavalry on that flank, except as it might be extended by
special instructions or by such events as usually devolve
the chief command upon the general of highest rank on the
field.
78 LIFE OF GENERAL, G EORG E H THOMAS.
The army moved from Louisville on the first day of Oc-
tober. The three corps marched upon as many roads and
converged first upon Bardstown, in expectation that the
enemy would there be met. From that place they moved
as before, to concentrate at Perryville. On the evening of
the 7th the three corps were well advanced towards that
town, though not abreast. Gilbert's corps in the centre
took position about three and a half miles distant. Mc-
Cook's corps on the left was some distance behind, and so
also was Crittenden's Corps. At the place designated in
orders for the encampment of Crittenden's troops, there
was no water. The men had marched all day in thick dust,
without water, and in the evening were almost famished.
There was no time to consult the commanding general, and
acting under a necessity which his orders had entailed,
General Thomas used the discretion which his orders did
not give, and moved the command to the right to the near-
est water that could be found in sufficient quantity for the
troops. -
In the evening of that day General Buell announced in
orders that a battle would be fought the next day. He pre-
scribed the movements which would bring his army into
line of battle, and gave special directions to the corps com-
manders to provide water, to last with sparing use, during
the expected action. He also directed them to report to
him in person, as soon as their respective commands had
attained position. The corps on the right and left attained
position on each side of Gilbert's, early on the 8th. By
noon the whole army was in position, and in line of battle,
except General Wood's division of Crittenden's corps, which
at that hour was two or three miles in the rear, but march-
ing towards its designated position in the line. General
Thomas had found the enemy in his front early in the morn-
ing, and for that reason he did not report in person when
his command had attained position, but sent Captain Mack
of his staff to report to General Buell the presence of the
PER R Y WILL E. 79
enemy, and ask for instructions. There is but one inter-
pretation of this refusal to report in person, as required by
positive orders, and this is, that he considered it so plainly
unadvisable, from military Considerations, that he was jus-
tified in remaining with his command. General McCook,
who had been informed by the officer in command of the
cavalry on the left that the enemy was not in his front, re-
ported to General Buell, in compliance with orders, but on
his return to his command found it engaged with the ene-
my. General Buell had decided not to fight that day, but
had not formally revoked his order of the previous evening.
General Bragg, however, had declined to wait, and Supposing
that he could strike and crush the foremost troops of the
National army before they could be supported from the rear,
massed three divisions, all he had in hand, and hurled them
first against General McCook's left division and the flank of
the army, and afterwards upon his other division on the
right. General McCook had only two divisions on the field,
eneral Sill's division having been sent to the left to ope-
rate against General Kirby Smith. General Jackson's divi-
sion on the left comprised two brigades of new troops, and
upon these untried soldiers the enemy made his initial at-
tack. General McCook sent a staff officer to the nearest
commander of Gilbert's corps—General Sheridan—and re-
quested protection to his right flank, or the right of Rous-
seau's division, and then gave his attention to his own left,
which was the left of the army as well. After severe fight-
ing against great odds, General Jackson's division repulsed
the enemy. The loss, however, was very great, including
General Jackson and his brigade commander—General Ter-
rel—and a large number of officers and men.” Having es-
tablished his left flank the corps commander turned to the
right to meet a far more threatening state of affairs. His
* Colonel Webster, commanding General Jackson's second brigade, was
killed in supporting the left of Rousseau's division later in the day.
8O LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS
request for support for the right of Rousseau's division had
not been regarded. The troops on the left of Gilbert's
Corps had moved away, leaving Rousseau's right in air.
General Bragg had sent Buckner's division up Doctor's
Creek to this uncovered flank, where it had been deployed at
right angles to McCook's line of battle, and thus with its
back to the rest of our army, it was moving against his ex-
posed right flank—exposed to extreme peril, and yet there
were six divisions of infantry behind Buckner's division as
it faced towards McCook's line. This was a situation per-
haps without parallel in the history of war. Three divi-
sions had attacked the left of an army of eight divisions
in line of battle, and yet one of these attacking divisions
had wedged itself between six of these eight divisions on
One side and two on the other, and turning its back upon
the six, moved upon the flank of the other two. And while
the conflict on the left of the National army was waxing
hotter and hotter, not an order was given for two hours
that directed support to the two isolated divisions. The
fact that three divisions àttacked an army of eight, and es-
caped severe punishment or capture, proves that grave er-
rors were committed by responsible commanders in General
Buell's army, and that a great opportunity was lost. If,
when Buckner's division was moving upon the flank of
Rousseau's division at right angles to the general line of
battle, the corps of Gilbert and Crittenden had wheeled to
the left, they would have enveloped Bragg's army, and cap-
tured or utterly crushed it. But General Gilbert's divisions
had moved forward and made possible the situation on the
left, and General Thomas was, by assignment, too far to the
right to apprehend the emergency on the left, while General
Buell was too far in the rear to learn through the noise of
battle that his army was engaged; and no member
of his staff and no headquarters' courier bore to the
rear tidings of the battle, but Captain Fisher, of General
McCook's staff, who had been sent with a second re-
PERRY WILLE. 8 I
quest for support from Gilbert's corps, and having failed
to secure it, went of his own accord to General Buell and
made known the attack of the enemy and the state of af.
fairs on the left of the army. General Thomas knew that
there was fighting on the extreme left of the army, but he
did not know whether it had resulted from offense or de-
fense on the part of the enemy. There was a corps com-
paratively unengaged on his own left, and he had heard
nothing from General Buell since his orders of the previous
evening announcing a battle for that day, and at no time
had his instructions been such as to authorize him to leave
his own command to direct the movements of the other two
corps. General Crittenden had been urgent that his corps
should advance against the enemy, but General Thomas had
refused permission for the assigned reason that he did not
know the plans of the commanding general. General Buell
had thrown his army before the enemy to take the offensive
himself, but while he was three or four miles in the rear,
behind intervening hills, without having authorized General
Thomas to take command of the army in the event of an
attack by the enemy, and without having given instructions
to his corps commanders for the conduct of defensive ope-
rations. Had General Crittenden moved forward directly,
he would not have aided General McCook, since General
Gilbert had so advanced and left McCook's right in
air. What was demanded by the situation was a wheel to
the left by Gilbert's and Crittenden's corps, the former
maintaining close connection with McCook's right. Had
this been done when the enemy first attacked the left of the
army, eight connected divisions would have enveloped
them, or had the two corps wheeled to the left when Buck-
ner's division was between Gilbert and McCook, the oppor-
tunity for the capture or annihilation of Bragg's forces
would have been still better. Had this been done, six di-
visions would have moved to the rear of the three divisions
that had been hurled against McCook.
6
82 JAIFE OF GENERAI, GEORG E H THOMAS.
Had General Thomas been second in command in super-
vision of the whole army, instead of a corps, he would have
been responsible for results in the absence of the command-
er-in-Chief And had he been thus in command, the issue
would doubtless have been radically different.
About 4 P. M., Captain Mack returned from General
Buell with verbal instructions to General Thomas to hold
one division in readiness to reënforce the centre if necessary
and to reconnoitre his own front to ascertain if the enemy
had reënforced his left or was withdrawing, and to report
the facts. Afterwards, he received no orders to advance.
After Sundown he received the following communication:
October 8, 6.30 P. M.
GENERAL:—The First corps, McCook's, on our left, has been heavily
engaged. The left and centre of this corps gained ground, but the
right yielded a little. Press your lines forward as much as possible
to-night and get into position to make a vigorous attack in the morn-
ing. If you have got your troops into position which you deem ad-
vantageous, it will not be advisable to make a change for the purpose
of complying with the General’s instructions for you, sent by Captain
Mack. It may be as well to have the division ordered to the centre
and let it wait where it is for further orders. The General desires to
see you in person as Soon to night as your duties will permit you to
COIſle. Respectfully, &c.,
J. B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
There had not been a strong force in front of General
Thomas at any time, but only such a line as General Bragg
deemed sufficient to cover his attack with massed forces
on the left of the National line.
The verbal instructions sent through Captain Mack in
the afternoon, and this written communication from Colonel
Fry at 6.30 P.M., do not even intimate that General Thomas
was expected to exercise any control of the troops on
the left of his command. His instructions pertained solely
to operations that evening on the right, as preparatory to a
battle the next day. He was directed twice to hold a di-
JB UELL REMO VED FROM COMMAND. 83
vision in readiness to move to the centre in the event of ne-
cessity, but of the necessity he was not to judge. He was
not instructed to ascertain the state of affairs on his left but
simply to hold his division in waiting for further orders.
Late in the evening, by General Buell's order, troops were
directed from the centre to assist General McCook in his
unequal contest—Gooding's brigade from Mitchell's divis-
ion, and Steedman's from Schoepf's were sent to his sup-
port, the former brigade as the first to participate in the
terrific contest on Rousseau's right was hotly engaged and
suffered heavy loss.
There was no action on the 9th and no pursuit until the
12th. As soon as the pursuit, which was fruitless in Con-
sequence of its late beginning, was terminated, General
Buell left the army with General Thomas and retired to
Louisville. On the 26th of October he directed General
Thomas to put the army in motion towards Bowling Green
and Glasgow.
Up to this time the military authorities, although fre-
quently differing from General Buell in respect to his actual
and proposed movements, had not restrained him in his
operations by peremptory orders. But after the battle of
Perryville, dissatisfaction with its issue and the pursuit of
the enemy, and a new disagreement in regard to the future
operations of the army led to a second and final removal of
General Buell from command.
CHAPTER V.
GENERAL ROSECRANS ASSIGNED TO THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY.-PRO-
TEST OF GENERAL THOMAS.—ACCEPTS COMMAND OF THE “CENTRE."—
RESTORING RAILROAD COMMUNICATIONS.—ADVANCE OF THE ARMY. —
BATTLE OF STONE RIVER,-HE OPPOSES RETREAT.-TULLAHOMA CAM-
PAIGN.
AJOR-General William S. Rosecrans was assigned to
the command of the army, in room of General Buell, by
General Orders No. 168, War Department, October 24, 1862.
By the same order the Department of the Cumberland was
restored, embracing that part of the State of Tennessee, ly-
ing east of the Tennessee River, with conditional limits to
the south. The forces of the department were designated
as the “Fourteenth Army Corps;” but ere long the army
bore the name of the department. General Rosecrans as-
sumed command October 30th. His army was then con-
centrating at Bowling Green, Kentucky, in compliance with
the Orders of General Buell.
In this assignment of General Rosecrans, General Thomas
was overslaughed on the score of rank, and for this and
other reasons he considered it unjust. If he was considered
worthy of this position on the 29th of September on the
ground of rank and service, he could see no reason why he
should be denied the command of the army on the 24th of
October. He, therefore, indignantly protested against the
assignment of General Rosecrans and against Service under
him. He thus wrote to General Halleck, commander-in-
chief:
Soon after coming to Kentucky I urged on the Government to
send me twenty thousand men properly equipped to take the field,
that I might at least make the attempt to take Knoxville and secure
84
PIE PROTEST'S AGAINST INJUSTICE. 85
East Tennessee. My suggestions were not listened to but were even
passed by in silence. But without boasting I believe I have exhibi-
ted at least sufficient energy to show that if I had been intrusted
with that expedition at that time (fall of 1861) I might have con-
ducted it successfully. Before Corinth I was intrusted with the
Command of the Right Wing, or Army of the Tennessee. I feel confident
that I did my duty patriotically, and with a reasonable amount of
Credit to myself. As soon as the emergency was over I was relieved,
and returned to the command of my old division. I went to my
duties without a murmur as I am neither ambitious nor have any
political aspirations. On the 30th of September I received an order
through your aid, Colonel McKibben, placing me in command of the
Department of the Ohio, and directing General Buell to turn over
the command of his troops to me. This order came just as General
Buell had by extraordinary efforts prepared his army to pursue and
drive the rebels from Kentucky. Feeling that a great injustice would
be done him if not permitted to carry out his plans, and that I would
be placed in a situation to be disgraced, I requested that he might
be retained in command. The order relieving him was suspended,
but to-day I find him relieved by General Rosecrans, my junior,
although I do not feel conscious that any just cause exists for over-
slaughing me by placing me under my junior, and I, therefore, am
deeply mortified and grieved at the course taken in this matter.
In this letter he was self-assertive, but not in violation of
true dignity, while he was remarkably careful to avoid offen-
sive personalities. He was intensely indignant and the letter
reveals this, but the measured words, though representing
strongly his own mortification, and his conviction of the
injustice to himself, had no venom for others.
He did not mention in this letter the fact that he had
asked to be relieved of the command of the Army of the
Tennessee, since it was not necessary in addressing General
Halleck to whom that request was made. He had considered
it necessary under the circumstances that he should make
this request, and recognizing this necessity, he went to his
duties “without a murmur.” To an ambitious general,—
one who desired high command, not so much for its own
sake, or for an opportunity for patriotic service, as for sub-
sequent political preferment, such a step backward in rank
86 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
would be disappointing, rather than humiliating. But he,
having no political aspirations, was willing to accept such
positions as the precedents of the service gave him, and did
not murmur when these precedents sent him to a far lower
command. The fact that he protested against the assign-
ment of his junior over him, indicates his repugnance to
humiliation when imposed by arbitrary power. It was not
humiliating to him to serve under General Buell in Com-
mand of a division, after he had been his peer in command-
ing an army; but his subjection to an alien general, his
junior, he regarded as an outrage. And in revealing his
indignation, he did not hesitate to recount his own Services
and to assert his ability to command an army.
In reply General Halleck wrote:
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, Nov. I 5, 1862.
GENERAL :
Your letter of October 30th is just at hand. I cannot better
state my appreciation of you than by referring you to the fact, that at
Pittsburgh Landing I urged upon the Secretary of War to secure your
appointment as major-general, in order that I might place you in
command of the Right Wing of the army over your superiors. It was
through my urgent solicitation that you were commissioned.
When it was determined to remove General Buell another per-
son was spoken of as his successor; and it was through my solicita-
tion that you were appointed. You having virtually declined the com-
mand at that time, it was necessary to appoint another, and General
Rosecrans was selected.
You are mistaken about General Rosecrans being your junior.
But that is of little importance, for the law gives the President power
to assign without regard to dates, and he has seen fit to exercise it in
this case and many others. -
Rest assured, General, that I fully appreciate your military capa-
city, and will do everything in my power to give you an independent
command, when opportunity offers. It was not possible to give com-
mand after you had declined it. t
Yours truly,
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
FITS REPLY TO HAL LECK 87
And thus General Thomas' request for the retention of
General Buell in command, because he thought his removal
at that time unjust to him, was made a bar to his own re-
assigment when the crisis had passed and circumstances
were radically different. It is apparent from General Hal-
leck's letter that some person or persons higher in authority
than General Halleck had not dismissed their distrust of
Thomas, either on the score of loyalty, earnestness in the
war, or capacity as a general. His assignment to the Com-
mand of the Army of the Ohio had been made at the urgent
solicitation of General Halleck, when another general had
been spoken of for the position, and it was not possible after
he had virtually declined it, to re-appoint him. Why it
was not possible is not expressly stated, but it is evident
that the opposition to his appointment to the command of
the army had been intensified by his request for the reten-
tion of General Buell.
In reply General Thomas wrote:
GALLATIN, TENN.,
November 21st, 1862.
MAJOR GENERAL HALLECK,
Comd’g U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.
GENERAL :
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of
the I5th instant, and to thank you sincerely for the kindness of its
tone. I should not have addressed you in the first place, if I had
known that General Rosecrans' commission was dated prior to mine.
The letter was written not because I desired the command, but for
being superseded by a junior in rank, when I felt that there was no
good cause for so treating me.
I have no objections to serving under General Rosecrans, now
that I know his commission dates prior to mine, but I must confess
that I should be deeply mortified should the President place a junior
over me without just cause, although the law authorizes him to do so
should he see fit.
I am General, very truly yours,
GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Major-Gen'l U. S. V.
88 I, IFE OF GENERAI, GEORG E H, THOMAS.
There is an important statement in this letter illustrating
his independence. He would not have written this for the
reason that he desired the command of an army. He
would not have asked for such a position, or sought it through
political influences, or in any other way. He did desire in-
dependence as a general, but he would not humiliate him-
Self by Seeking a higher sphere. In his first letter to Gen-
eral Halleck he asked for service in another part of the
Country, to avoid subjection to a junior in an army to which
he was attached by such ties as appeal to the heart of a true
soldier. But General Halleck had not been altogether can-
did in asserting that Rosecrans ranked Thomas, and when
the latter ascertained the true history of the case, he was
exceedingly indignant. General Rosecrans' commission as
a major-general of volunteers was dated August 16th, 1862.
When it was determined to assign him to the command of
the army, this date was arbitrarily changed to March 21st,
I862. His appointment as a major-general and his original
commission, made him the junior of Generals McCook and
Crittenden, as well as of General Thomas. When Rose-
crans first met Thomas, after his assignment, the latter
made inquiry in respect to the date of the former's commis-
sion, stating that he was opposed to the violation of the
rule which gave assignments according to rank. Having
been informed that Rosecrans’ commission bore date of
March 21st, 1862, he then said, that his objection to further
service in the Army of the Cumberland had been removed.
But when subsequently he ascertained that this date was
not the original one, and that it had been changed in seem-
ing deference to army traditions, he said to General Hal-
leck: “I have made my last protest while the war lasts.
You may hereafter put a stick over me if you choose to do
so. I will take care, however, to SO manage my command,
whatever it may be, as not to be involved in the mistakes
of the stick.”
He kept his promise to the end of the war, and then he
ACCEPTS COMMAND OF THE CENTRE, 89
asserted himself even more boldly than he did on the 30th
of October, 1862. -
Soon after assuming command of the army, General
Rosecrans offered to continue General Thomas in his posi-
tion as second in command, but he preferred a distinct, de-
fined office, and consequently was assigned to the command
of the “Centre,” composed of four divisions, with Generals
Rosseau, Negley, Dumont and Fry as commanders. The
“Right” and “Left” of the army contained three divisions
each and were commanded respectively by Major General
McCook and Major-General Crittenden.
General Rosecrans was as unwilling as General Buell had
been to move his army into East Tennessee, and at once
gave orders for the concentration of his forces at Nashville,
except those under General Thomas. The objects of the
new campaign were to defeat General Bragg's army and
restore the supremacy of the National government in Ten-
nessee, and as much further South as possible. The Sec-
ond object was indicated by the order which re-created the
Department of the Cumberland with limits contingent upon
the success of the army in gaining territory. To give suc-
cess to offensive operations it was first necessary to restore
railroad communications between Louisville and Nashville,
and then to accumulate supplies at Nashville as a secondary
base. This essential work was committed to General
Thomas and his troops, and no general was better adapted
to the service, since no one was more observant of details
in all matters that related to military operations.
General Thomas immediately established his headquarters
at Gallatin, Tennessee, and by the 28th of December prepa-
rations were completed for the advance of the army against
the enemy at Murfreesboro'. Abundant supplies had been
provided and the forces intended for the field had been con-
centrated at Nashville. The troops to guard the commu-
nications with Louisville were mainly drawn from General
Thomas' command, and consequently the “Centre” was
90 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE. H. THOMAS
weaker than the “Wings.” He had only Rousseau's and
Negley's divisions and two detached brigades from divis-
ions in the rear.
The grand units of the army having marched from Nash-
ville on different roads were abreast before the enemy near
Murfreesboro' on the 30th of December. The “Left” and
“Centre” attained position on the 29th, and General Rose-
crans, having concluded that General Bragg had retreated,
ordered General Crittenden on the evening of that day to
cross Stone River and occupy Murfreesboro'. In attempt-
ing to carry out this order General Crittenden ascertained
that the enemy had not retreated, and that the required
movement would imperil his corps. He therefore halted
his troops—some having already crossed the river—until
he could confer with the commanding-general. Afterwards,
with General Rosecrans' approval, the troops were recalled
from their perilous advance. During the afternoon of the
30th General McCook's troops were somewhat heavily en-
gaged near the ground which had been designated for their
position in battle.
General Bragg had expected an attack on the 30th and
had held his army in line of battle to meet it. At night
he determined to take the offensive himself, and made pre-
parations to open the engagement the next morning, intend-
ing to attack first with the left of his army. As a defensive
measure he had taken General McCown's division from re-
serve, and posted it on the left of his first line of battle. He
had done this to meet the expected attack on that flank.
But by this measure he had placed a division entirely be-
yond General McCook's right which rested on the Frank-
lin road. This fact had been ascertained by General Mc-
Cook and communicated to General Rosecrans on the after-
noon of the 30th. In the evening of that day General
Bragg, in preparation for offense, transferred Cleburne's di-
vision from the second line on his right to a corresponding
position on his left, and placed General Hardee in command
POSECRANS" LINE OF BATTLE, 9 I
of the two divisions which were to assail General Rosecrans'
right early on the 3 Ist. General Bragg had then placed
two divisions, or nearly two-fifths of his infantry, beyond
General Rosecrans' right flank, and in their support was
Wharton's brigade of cavalry. On the right bank of Stone
River, Breckinridge's division of Hardee's corps was formed
in continuation of the main line, and here were Jackson's un-
assigned brigades of infantry, and Wheeler's and Pegram's
brigades of cavalry in support. In all there were seven
brigades on the right bank of Stone River. This force was
held as a possible reserve, and for resistance in the event of
an advance in that direction by the left of the National
army.
The trend of General Bragg's line of battle was due north
from its left to the Franklin road, and thence nearly north-
east to Stone River. The general direction of General
Rosecrans' line was north and south. The distance be-
tween the two armies was least at the Franklin road, in con-
sequence of the bend in the enemy's line at that point.
General Bragg's line of battle was defective in formation.
This fact was demonstrated the next day by the commin-
gling of brigades from the divisions in parallel alignment.
The unity of the divisions was impossible under the cir-
cumstances. And the failure of General Bragg to carry his
first success to complete victory may be attributed, in part,
at least, to this cause.
General Rosecrans' line of battle was radically different and
greatly superior. It was formed by divisions in first and
second lines, and reserves. The brigades of each could act
together under the direct control of their common com-
mander. In other battles the same contrast can be traced.
General Rosecrans, besides, made his centre exceedingly
strong by holding a large division entirely in reserve, but
this was in provision for offense. At night, on the 30th,
the divisions in order, from left to right, were Wood's,
Palmer's, Negley's, Sheridan's, Davis', and Johnson's.
92 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS.
Rousseau's division was in the rear of Negley's, and
Van Cleve's was posted to the left and rear of Wood.
Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions were to cross the
river and advance to Murfreesboro’, in rear of Bragg's
army.* The Pioneer brigade was in position to cover these
divisions in crossing the river. The centre was made strong
to break through the middle of the enemy's line of battle.
General McCook's right flank rested upon the Franklin
road. General Davis' division faced a little east of south;
Kirk's brigade of Johnson's division on the right of Davis'
looked more to the east, and Willich's directly to the south.
In facing south Willich's brigade was nearly at right
angles to the enemy's line of battle. Baldwin's bri-
gade of Johnson's division was some distance to the rear
of Kirk; and General Stanley's cavalry was still farther in
the rear of the right flank of the army. General Bragg's
plan of battle was similar, in so far as he also intended to
take the initiative with the left of his army. But his plan
proposed a very different general movement. His four di-
visions of infantry west of the river were to wheel to the
right upon General Polk's right as a pivot. *
Each of the commanding generals was ignorant of the
purposes of the other, and each in the execution of his own
plan expected to throw the other upon the defensive. It
was, therefore, inevitable that continued aggression by
either army depended upon the success of its initial
attack. -
Preparations and circumstances gave the advantage to
General Bragg. His troops were in proximity to their
point of attack, with no intervening obstacle. While Gen-
eral Rosecrans' forces had a river to cross, a distance of seve-
ral miles to march, and a strong force of infantry and cav-
alry to rout before Murfreesboro’ could be gained.
* The withdrawal of these divisions the next morning made Palmer's left the
left flank of the army. This flank rested between the turnpike and railroad, a
short distance north of their intersection.
STONE RIVER, 93
General Bragg availed himself of his advantage and took
the initiative early in the morning of the 31st, with great
energy and tremendous effect. He wheeled his two over-
lapping divisions upon the right flank of the National army
and soon dislodged Willich's and Kirk's brigades, Kirk
having been attacked in front and flank. When these
brigades fell back and drifted to the right a new flank
was formed by General Davis' right brigade, Colonel Post
commanding, and Baldwin's brigade of Johnson's division
from reserve; but these brigades were soon overwhelmed,
General Davis, in the meantime, repulsed repeated attacks
in front with his remaining brigades—Carlin's and Wood-
ruff's. These lost and then regained their position, but
were finally compelled to fall back, Johnson's and Davis'
divisions made repeated efforts to stand against the enemy,
but with only temporary success, and they finally fell back to
the Nashville road in rear of the centre of the army. Under
the enemy's pressure Sheridan's division swung back until
it was at right angles to its first position, maintaining the
connection of its left with Negley's right. Immediately
thereafter General Thomas threw Rousseau's division on
Sheridan's right, to support him, should he maintain his po-
sition, and to resist the enemy should he fall back. After
these dispositions had been made the enemy repeatedly as-
sailed the three divisions. For some time his attacks were
repulsed, but Sheridan's division having exhausted its am-
munition went to the rear. Then came the Supreme crisis
of the battle. General Cruft's brigade of Palmer's division,
on the left of Negley, had previously retired a short distance
in consequence of the exposure of its left flank. After
Sheridan's division left the line both of Negley's flanks
were in air, and Rousseau was in the same condition, both
divisions being completely isolated, and soon after were
each nearly surrounded by the overlapping lines of the
enemy. General Thomas at once ordered Miller's and Stan-
ley's brigades of Negley's division to fall back, to save them
94. LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS.
from annihilation or capture. The withdrawal of these
troops exposed the right of Palmer's division, and Cruft's bri-
gade again fell back. The enemy, having been successful in
dislodging the right of the army, pressed with exultation
upon Rousseau's, Negley's and Palmer's divisions, which
were compelled to fight in all directions. Grose's brigade
of Palmer's division faced to the rear to meet the foe; Neg-
ley's brigades fought as they fell back, and Rousseau's three
brigades, Shepherd's, Scribner's and Beatty’s “were resisting
attacks in all directions.
This crisis carried with it the fate of the army. General
Thomas at once perceived that the only measure that would
save the centre and the army was the establishment of a
new line, which should connect itself with Crittenden's force
on the left, and with McCook's and other forces on the
right. Seldom has a new line of battle been formed under
similar circumstances. A permanent line was dependent
upon a temporary one, and to both in conjunction General
Thomas gave prompt attention. He sent his batteries to
the high ground selected for the permanent line, and then
formed part of his infantry on low ground in their front to
resist the advance of the enemy. Colonel Shepherd's regu-
lar brigade lost five hundred men, killed and wounded, and
Beatty's and Scribner's lost heavily in covering the move-
ments of other troops, and in fighting their own way to the
new position. General Rosecrans had sent the Pioneer bri-
gade to the centre, and its musketry and artillery fire also
covered the moving troops. After hard fighting Rousseau's,
Negley’s and Palmer's divisions were firmly connected, and
other dispositions made which placed the whole army in a
continuous line.
Early in the morning Van Cleve's division had moved
from reserve and formed by brigades in column to cross
Stone River, and lead in the movement on Murfreesboro.
* Col. John Beatty.
STONE RIVER, 95
Five brigades of Wood's division had also been withdrawn
from position to take part in the movement. But when Van
Cleve's foremost brigade had gained the farther bank, and
his second, the nearer one, both had been arrested by the
commanding General, who had ordered them and Hark-
er's brigade of Wood's division to the support of the Right
Wing. Colonel S. Beatty's brigade of Van Cleve's division,
followed by Colonel Fyffe's brigade, opportunely reached
the right of Rousseau's division immediately after the estab-
lishment of the new line. These fresh troops connected the
new centre with McCook's forces on the right. This line
of battle bent at the centre at right angles to the original
line, and was well refused on its right. The enemy attacked
this line repeatedly throughout its length, but was as often
repulsed.
Notwithstanding General Bragg's superior strength for his
turning movement, Hardee's two overlapping, divisions and
a great part of Wither's and Cheatham's divisions were nearly
exhausted before the new line of battle of the National army
had been established. As early as Io A. M., the time of the
crisis in the centre, General Hardee had called for reënforce-
ments. Three-fifths of General Bragg's army had been
moved against General McCook's corps, and afterwards
most of these forces fell upon Thomas's two divisions. And
in fighting McCook, and Thomas, and Palmer's division of
Crittenden's corps, all of General Bragg's army on the west
bank of the river had recoiled with heavy losses and broken
ranks. Bragg's only hope, thereafter, was in using all his
reserves against the left of Rosecrans' army. In an effort
to turn this flank, he sent four brigades from the east of
the river to General Polk. The left of the National army
was held by Palmer's division, and Hascall's and Wagner's
brigades of Wood's division. Schaeffer's brigade of Sheri-
dan's division was in rear, on the railroad, as a supporting
force. No fighting at any time was more severe than on
the left, when General Bragg was making his final effort to
96 . LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS,
win the day. In this struggle Hazen's brigade moved to
the left to a stronger position, and Hascall's brigade filled
the vacant space, on the right of the railroad. On the left
of Hazen's new position, and unconnected, Wagner's bri-
gade resisted the enemy; and its nearness to the river made
it necessary for Bragg to hold one brigade of Breckinridge's
division on the east bank. The conflict was fierce and pro-
tracted, and in failing to carry the left of the National army,
Bragg gave up the Offensive altogether.
In the evening Starkweather's brigade of Rousseau's di-
vision, and Walker's of Fry's, came upon the field; but as
Negley's two brigades were then in reserve in the centre,
these fresh troops were first posted to support General Mc-
Cook, and subsequently relieved the forces of General Crit-
tenden's corps that they might return to the left of the line.
General Thomas had only five brigades in the conflict on
the 3 Ist, and with this small force he arrested the success of
the enemy. Battles are won in a general way by the aggre-
gate force of all operations to which every officer who gives or
obeys an order, and every soldier who fires a cannon or a
musket, makes a contribution. However, in an engagement
of marked emergencies the action of a brigade, division, or
corps often stands out distinctly as saving an army. The
crisis at the centre was so distinct, that its mastery brought
General Thomas and his five brigades into boldest relief, as
having saved the army. The prompt dispositions of the
commander, and the steadiness and bravery of the subordi-
nate officers and men under circumstances which have often
brought confusion to generals and panics to Soldiers, give
the greater prominence to their action. General Thomas
gained greater distinction in other battles, but never did he
meet a crisis with more promptness and skill.
In the evening of the 31st, there was an informal meeting
of several officers, at General McCook's headquarters—a
small cabin in the rear of the line of battle. General Rose-
crans soon made known that he was thinking of retreat, and
STONE RIVER, 97
the discussion of this project lasted till midnight. General
Crittenden was vehement in his opposition to the with-
drawal of the army. General Thomas was quiet and soon
fell asleep on an improvised seat. Near midnight General
Rosecrans asked Surgeon Eben Swift, medical director of
the Department of the Cumberland, “if he had transporta-
tion sufficient to remove the wounded men.” The doctor
replied that there were five or six thousand wounded, but
many of them could walk, and there were enough wagons
and ambulances for those severely injured. The com-
manding-general then awoke General Thomas and said:
“Will you protect the rear on retreat to Overall's Creek P’’
Thomas promptly answered: “This army can't retreat,”
and then fell asleep again. He had doubtless decided
the matter for himself when it was first proposed, hence his
readiness to give his opinion, and resume his restful slum-
ber. He who had snatched his five brigades from the midst
of Bragg's army when receiving fire in front, flank and rear,
and had established a stable line under a cross fire of artillery
and musketry, was not in favor of giving the field to the
enemy.
The opposition of his corps commanders to the retreat of
the army did not, however, induce General Rosecrans to
abandon the project. About midnight he requested General
McCook to ride with him to the rear to select a new posi-
tion. The two generals rode to the bank of Overall's
Creek, a few miles towards Nashville, and viewed the
ground beyond that stream. General McCook objected
to the position, for the reason that it was so low as to be
commanded by artillery from the southern bank. When
returning, General Rosecrans observed fires on the west
of the road, and exclaimed: “The enemy is in our rear.”
He had directed General D. S. Stanley, commanding the
cavalry, to forbid fires that night; but some insubordinate
troopers had lighted torches, and the moving lights induced.
him to believe that the enemy had passed to his rear;
5
98 I, IFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS,
General McCook went at once to his command to prepare
it for action, and General Rosecrans rode back to the place
whence he started. As he rode up, he said: “We must
fight or die.” He then directed Generals Thomas and Crit-
tenden to put their corps in readiness for battle.
He evidently alluded to this personal reconnoissance, and
the circumstances that prevented retreat in the following
extracts from his official report: “Orders were given for the
issue of all the spare ammunition, and we found that we
had enough for another battle, the only question being,
where that battle was to be fought. >k >k >{< >k
“After careful examination and free consultation with
corps commanders, followed by a personal examination of
the ground in the rear as far as Overall's Creek, it was de-
termined to await the enemy's attack in that position, to
send for the provision train and order up fresh supplies of
ammunition, upon the arrival of which, should the enemy
not attack, offensive operations were to be resumed.”
General Rosecrans' report contains no allusion to his be-
lief that the enemy was in his rear, and it is not thereby
manifest how far it influenced his decision to hold his po-
sition.
During the 1st and 2d days of January the two armies
remained in close proximity, with no fighting beyond what
resulted from tentative offense by the enemy, until late in
the afternoon of the 2d, when there was a fierce conflict on
the east bank of Stone River. General Crittenden had pre-
viously sent across the river Van Cleve's division and
Grose's brigade of Palmer's division. Regarding these
troops and their artillery as a menace to Polk's line on the
opposite bank, General Bragg resolved if practicable to dis-
lodge them and ordered General Breckinridge to advance
for this purpose. Van Cleve's division was driven from
position and pursued to the river. But this action and its
result drew together a heavy force of infantry and artillery
on the west bank. About fifty guns were placed on high
STONE RIVER, 99
ground by Major John Mendenhall, General Crittenden's
chief of artillery, with his approval, and that of the com-
manding general, but their fire did not arrest the enemy who
came to the river to the left of these guns, some of the men
even crossing the stream. At this juncture Colonel John
F. Miller leading seven regiments of Negley's division,
without orders from his immediate commander, and against
the orders of another general of division, crossed the river
in the face of the enemy, and in a brilliant charge drove
Breckinridge's forces in rout far towards Murfreesboro’.
Afterwards General Jeff. C. Davis' division advanced to the
position coveted by General Bragg, and at once fortified a
battery upon it.
General Bragg's object had been a defensive one, simply
to gain a position on that side of the river, which com-
manded his line on the other bank. His troops, however,
went far beyond it in pursuing Van Cleve's division, and
then were driven back over it again by Miller's unbidden
charge. The failure of this operation induced Bragg to
abandon the general conflict, not considering his position
on the other side of the river tenable when exposed to an
enfilading fire of artillery. He feared also that the rising
water would divide his army. He maintained position,
however, until the night of the 3d, when to cover his retreat
his forces in front of General Thomas were active and an-
noying, and he obtained permission to make a night attack.
This resulted in the penetration of the enemy's line by
troops from Beatty's and Spear's brigades, the latter having
joined the army with trains. Early the next morning it was
discovered that General Bragg had retreated, leaving his
wounded at Murfreesboro’, but saving his material.
During the first six months of the year 1863 the Army of
the Cumberland remained at Murfreesboro' and was Com-
paratively inactive. The troops were employed in the
construction of elaborate fortifications and in divers minor
operations with defensive or tentative objects.
:
gº
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:
I OO LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H. THOMAS.
:
:
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:
Early in January the provisional corps, ‘Right Wing,”
“Centre” and “Left Wing,” were changed to permanent
corps d'armée. The “Right Wing ” became the Twentieth
corps, the “Centre’ the Fourteenth corps, and the “Left
Wing” the Twenty-first corps, commanded, as before, respec-
tively by Generals McCook, Thomas and Crittenden. The
Fourteenth corps, as finally constituted, comprised four
divisions, designated as first, second, third, and fourth, com-
manded respectively by Major-General Lovell H. Rous-
seau, Major General J. S. Negley, Brigadier-General J. M.
Brannan, and Major-General J. J Reynolds.
In this period of inaction at Murfreesboro' it was com-
mon for officers of all grades to obtain leaves of absence to
visit their homes, and trips to Nashville were frequent. But
the course of General Thomas illustrated his idea of the
duty of an officer holding an important command. The
months were passing slowly by and weary at last of mono-
tony and inaction, he asked permission to go to Nashville
for a day. There was at the time no prospect of operations,
offensive or defensive, for his command, and consequently
there was no need of his presence at Murfreesboro'. He
nevertheless, upon reflection, declined to go, because his
reason for asking for a day's leave had been a personal one.
Besides it was possible, he thought, though not at all
probable, that an action of some kind might take place in
his absence. This extreme view of duty was frequently
illustrated in his public and private life. He was not “off
duty” a single day during the war.
Late in June the Army of the Cumberland advanced
against its old enemy, the Confederate Army of the Tennes-
see, then holding the line of Duck River. In this movement
the Fourteenth corps was in the centre, its appropriate place,
and drove the enemy from Hoover's Gap and from several
positions in front of that gap. General McCook on the
right had a severe combat at Liberty Gap, but finally pressed
© º 0 • *e g
º
the enemy from the hills. Gen. Crittenden on the left did not
e e " ©
J.
• , tº a
TULLA HOMA CAMPAIGN. I O I
meet much opposition. When Bragg's army had been driven
from its defensive line on Duck River, Gen. Rosecrans
moved his army towards Manchester, and regarding this
movement as indicating either an attack upon his position at
Tullahoma,or the interruption of his communications, Bragg
fell back from that place. He did not consider himself strong
enough to meet Rosecrans in battle, and he consequently
retreated first to the Cumberland Mountains, and soon after,
across the Tennessee River to Chattanooga. The Tulla-
homa campaign was begun on the 23d of June and termi-
nated on the 4th of July. The enemy fought at the gaps
of the mountains, but the defense on the whole was feeble.
The result was the possession by the Army of the Cumber-
land of the region from Murfreesboro' to Bridgeport, Ala-
bama. -
At the close of the campaign the army advanced to the
northern base of the Cumberland Mountains, and there
halted to make preparations for a campaign south of the
Tennessee River. -
CHAPTER VI.
THE ARMY CROSSES THE TENNESSEE RIVER—GENERAL BRAGG EVACUATES
CHATTANOOGA.— PURSUIT IS OPPOSED BY THOMAS, BUT NEVERTHELESS
ORDERED–THE THREE CORPS WIDELY SEPARATED —THOMAS' TROOPS
MEET THE ENEMY AT DUG GAP—BRAGG'S ARMY CONCENTRATED BUT
FAILS TO STRIKE EITHER OF THE ISOLATED CORPS–ARMY OF THE
CUMBERLAND CONCENTRATED ON THE I&TH –FIRST DAY OF BATTLE
AT CHICKAMAUGA.
ATE in August, in compliance with peremptory orders
from Washington, the army again moved forward,
crossed the Cumberland Mountains, the Tennessee River, and
the mountains immediately south of that river, and on the 8th
of September, was encamped in Lookout Valley, near the
western base of Lookout Mountain. Here General Rose-
crans had his army in hand, except four brigades that had
advanced directly towards Chattanooga from the north. The
position of the army in Lookout Valley threatened General
Bragg's communications south from Chattanooga. The
Twenty-first corps was near the northern base of Lookout
Mountain, on the direct road to Chattanooga, the Fourteenth
corps was before Stevens' Gap, with its advance on the sum-
mit of the mountain, and the Twentieth corps was at Win-
ston's with its foremost troops also upon the summit. The
mountain then separated the two armies. General Bragg had
been withdrawing his army for two days on the road leading
to Lafayette, Georgia, and late on the 8th his rearguard retired
from Chattanooga. Very early the next morning General
Rosecrans was informed of the evacuation of the town.
General Bragg abandoned Chattanooga in expectation of
soon regaining it. His supplies were not sufficient for a
T O2
B.R.A.G. G. E. VACUA TES CHA TTA NOOGA. 1 O3
siege, and his army was not large enough to hold Chatta-
nooga and cover his communications. He consequently
moved sodth a few miles to save his Communications and
meet expected reënforcements, where his army might face
the mountain passes and strike unsupported Corps, as they
should debouch from different mountain gaps into the
eastern valley. At this time the Confederate authorities
were making efforts to give Bragg such an army as, in
their judgment, would enable him to vanquish the Army of
the Cumberland, to carry the war again to the north, and in
the farthest reach of hope to end the war with the independ-
ence of the Southern States. But to give strategic force to
a retreat that was imperative, General Bragg used various
stratagems to conceal his purposes. He sent men into the
National army to induce the belief that his army was re-
treating far to the South, and moved his forces as far as
practicable to manifest such a purpose.
The strategy which had compelled the evacuation of
Chattanooga was consummate. The forces sent by Gene-
ral Rosecrans first to Pikeville and afterwards directly to-
wards Chattanooga, had effectually covered the movement
of the army towards General Bragg's communications with
Georgia, and had, at the same time, so threatened his com-
munications with Knoxville, and the forces holding East
Tennessee, that Buckner's little army had been withdrawn,
and the easy possession of that region by General Burnside
had been thereby assured. The only effect of this strategy
which had not been favorable to the ultimate success of
Rosecrans, had been the reënforcement of Bragg's army
before Rosecrans by Buckner's command.
To gain Chattanooga the strategy was perfect, but for im-
mediate offensive operations South from that important point
it was radically defective.
When Rosecrans' army was in Lookout Valley, and
his detached forces—four brigades—on the north bank
of the Tennessee, with open ways into Chattanooga from
IO4. LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H, THOMAS.
the north and the south, he had gained the objective of his
campaign, and the concentration of his army in that town
could have been effected without resistance by the enemy.
But the pursuit of the enemy, not the occupation of Chat-
tanooga in force, became his object as soon as he was in-
formed that the town had been abandoned.
On the morning of the 9th, General Rosecrans sent the
following message to General Thomas:
HEADQ'RS DEPT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Trenton, September 9, 3.30 A. M.
MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS,
Commanding Fourteenth Corps:
A despatch is just received from General Wagner, dated 8.30 P.
M. yesterday, stating that Chattanooga is evacuated by the rebels,
and he will occupy it in the morning. The general commanding de-
sires you to call on him at once to consult in regard to arrangements
for the pursuit.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier General and Chief of Staff.
“P. S.—The order sending the Ninety-Second Indiana to recon-
noitre the mountain is revoked. The General commanding directs
you to order your whole command in readiness to move at once.
J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier General and Chief of Staff.
Thus before General Thomas was invited to consult with
General Rosecrans it had been decided to pursue the enemy,
and he was invited to consult only in reference to the pursuit.
But when the two generals met, Thomas opposed the pur-
suit altogether and presented military considerations of pal-
pable weight against the measure.
At the time of the abandonment of Chattanooga by the ene-
my, two corps of the Army of the Cumberland were within a
day's march of that place; one of these being very near, since
Wood's division of the Twenty-first corps occupied Chatta-
nooga at noon of the 9th. The Twentieth Corps was about
URGES CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMY. IO5
forty miles distant, and could have marched to Chattanooga
by noon on the IOth. By that time the main army could
have been concentrated in the town with strong detachments
on the road to Bridgeport. The mountain would have
covered the movement of the Fourteenth and Twentieth
corps down Lookout Valley, and Crittenden's corps could
have held the town and covered the approaches from the
south and east, aided by the brigades from the north bank
of the Tennessee. The concentration could have been
effected, if it had been the purpose of General Bragg to
oppose; but that it was not his intention is expressly stated
in his official report, and was evinced at the time by his
retreat far towards Lafayette, Georgia. Bragg was not ready
for battle in proximity to Chattanooga, and his army was not
in a position to prevent the concentration of the Army of
the Cumberland in the town, had that been General Rose-
crans' object. But the situation gave room for an easy, un-
restricted occupation by the whole army. All the roads on
the west side of Lookout Mountain were held by the Na-
tional army, and all converged upon the one which passes
over the ‘nose' of Lookout, where that mountain abuts the
Tennessee River, three miles from Chattanooga, and there
was no enemy near to prevent, or even contest, the use of
that road. There was not, therefore, a single obstacle to
the concentration, and this fact taken in connection with the
actual movement of a division into the place from the South,
the cróssing of troops into it from the north bank of the
river, and the march of two divisions in front of it from
Lookout Mountain to Rossville on the IOth, proves beyond
question that General Rosecrans had gained his objective
before he ordered the pursuit of the enemy. He must have
thought so himself, or he would not have established his
headquarters at Chattanooga behind his army.
In view of the manifest practicability of the concentration
of the army at Chattanooga, Thomas urged Rosecrans to
abandon his scheme of pursuit and establish his army at that
IO6 I, IFE OF GENERAL G EORG E H THOMAS.
point and perfect communications with Bridgeport and
Nashville. After this had been done, the offensive could
have been taken from Chattanooga as a base. General
Thomas did not know how far Bragg intended to retreat,
but independently of the enemy's plans he was urgent that
what had been gained should be made secure. He was
opposed to a movement that might bring on a battle when
the army having nearly exhausted its supplies, transported
from Bridgeport, could not follow up a victory, in the event
of winning one; and where, if defeat should be the issue,
the problem of supplies would be difficult of solution.
But believing that Bragg was retreating on Rome, Rose-
crans rejected Thomas' advice, and in doing so entered
upon a series of mistakes which culminated, when, by his
orders, movements were made on the second day of the
battle of Chickamauga, which gave the enemy the oppor-
tunity to break and rout the right of his army.
The views of the commanding generals in regard to the
situation before the battle of Chickamauga, and in reference
to the Supposed possibilities to each, are clearly given in
their official reports.
These extracts from General Bragg's report reveal his
views, purposes and movements.
“Immediately after crossing the mountains to the Tennes-
see, the enemy threw a corps by way of Sequatchie Valley
to strike the rear of General Buckner's command, while Burn-
side occupied him in front. * * * As soon as this change
was made, the corps threatening his rear was withdrawn;
and the enemy commenced a movement in force against our
left and rear. On the last of August it became known that
he had crossed his main force over the Tennessee River at
and near Caperton's Ferry, the most accessible point from
Stevenson. By a direct route he was now as near our main
depot of supplies as we were, and our whole line of commu-
nication was exposed, whilst his was partially secured by moun-
tains and the river. * * * The nature of the country and
ROSECRANS (ORDERS PURSUIT). Io.7
the want of supplies in it, with the presence of Burnside's force
on our right, rendered a movement on the enemy’s rear with our
inferior force impracticable.
“It was therefore, determined to meet him in front whenever
he should emerge from the mountain gorges. To do this and hold
Chattanooga was impossible, without such a division of our Small
force as to endanger both parts.
“Accordingly our troops were put in position on the 7th and 8th
of September, and took position from Lee and Gordon's mill to
Lafayette, on the road leading south from Chattanooga and front-
ing the slope of Lookout Mountain.”
General Rosecrans thus referred to the situation and the
pursuit in his report :
“The weight of evidence gathered from all sources was,
that Bragg was moving on Rome and that his movement
commenced on the sixth of September. General Crittenden
was therefore directed to hold Chattanooga with one bri-
gade, calling all the forces on the north side of the Tennes-
see across, and to follow the enemy's retreat vigorously,
anticipating that the main body had retired by Ringgold
and Dalton.”
After his consultation with General Thomas, General
Rosecrans issued the following order:
TRENTON, GA.,
September 9, 1863, IO A. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps:
The General commanding has ordered a general pursuit of
the enemy by the whole army. General Crittenden has started to
occupy Chattanooga and pursue the line of Bragg's retreat. Our forces
across the river from Chattanooga have been ordered to cross and join
General Crittenden in the pursuit. General McCook has been ordered
to move at once on Alpine and Summerville. The General com-
manding directs you to move your command as rapidly as possible
to Lafayette and make every exertion to strike the enemy in flank,
IO8 LIFE OF GENERAL G EORG E H. THOMAS,
and if possible cut off his escape. Colonel Wilder's brigade * has
been ordered to join you at Lafayette.
Very respectfully your obedient servant,
J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier General and Chief of Staff.
Nothing but the certainty that the enemy was retreating
with scattered forces to some remote point, could have
warranted such a separation of the three corps of the Army
of the Cumberland, as resulted from obedience to this order.
The movements in Compliance gave General Bragg the ad-
vantage for maneuver and battle. He had his army in hand
behind the mountains, with short lines to each of the three
corps of the National army in their complete isolation.
General Rosecrans had been bold to cross the Tennes-
See River without assured support on right, or left. But
when he had gained his objective it was more than bold to
Send one corps to the rear of General Bragg's concentrated
army, another towards its centre, and a third to its left, and
each of the three in perilous isolation. And it was one of
the most wonderful series of operations of the war, which
brought these corps from isolation into union in front of
the enemy, in time for battle.
Bragg had a large army when he left Chattanooga. The
five divisions that fought the battle of Stone River were
with him, two divisions had joined him from Mississippi,
and Buckner's two divisions from East Tennessee joined
immediately south of Chattanooga. He had then an army
of nine divisions of infantry immediately after leaving that
to Wn.
General Thomas was nearest this large army, and his
designated line of advance was directly towards its Centre.
He was therefore the first in peril. Besides no general
would forget that the overthrow of the central corps of an
army would doubly expose the other two. It was well,
* Reynolds' division Fourteenth corps,
CROSSES LOO KO UT MOUNTAIN. IO9
therefore, that the conduct of the perilous advance of this
Corps was committed to as prudent a general as Thomas.
On the 9th Negley's division moved over Lookout Moun-
tain and debouched into McLemore's Cove, and threw
forward skirmishers to Bailey's cross-roads. In the evening
Baird's division crossed the mountain to the eastern base.
Reports reached Thomas that the enemy's cavalry was
drawn up in line in front of Negley, and that a heavy force
consisting of infantry, cavalry and artillery, was concen-
trated at Dug Gap, beyond Negley's position.
Bragg was apprised of this advance, and promptly pre-
pared to meet it. The following extract from his report
gives his general plan of operations as well as his purpose
in respect to Thomas' movement: “During the ninth it
was ascertained that a column, estimated at from four to
eight thousand, had crossed Lookout Mountain into the
Cove, by way of Stevens' and Cooper's Gap. Thrown
off his guard by our rapid movement—apparently in retreat,
when, in reality, we had concentrated opposite his centre—
and deceived by the information from deserters and others
sent into his lines, the enemy pressed on his columns to
intercept us, and thus exposed himself in detail.” That
night Bragg formed a combination of three divisions and a
cavalry force to move against Negley the next day.
Early on the Ioth it was ascertained that Dug Gap had
been obstructed and occupied by the enemy's pickets. If
this was a device to invite the advance of Thomas it failed
of its object, since he was the more cautious in consequence
of an equivocal precaution on the part of the enemy. Gen-
eral Bragg made effort during the day to move his forces
against Negley, but twice, his subordinates failed to carry
out his orders. He did not however abandon the project
and at night gave orders for a far heavier combination for
the I Ith. Negley's division was exposed in three direc-
tions, through Dug Gap, farther to the left, through Cat-
lett's Gap, both in Pigeon Mountain, and on the low ground
I IO LIFE OF GENERAL, GEORGE H. THOMAS.
to the north. That evening Baird's division moved towards
Negley's position, and Reynolds and Brannan were ordered
to move forward early in the morning. The caution
evinced by General Thomas called forth the following des-
patch from General Rosecrans:
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, September Io, I863–9:45 P. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Commanding Fourteenth Corps:
The General commanding directs me to say General Negley's
despatch, forwarded to you at IO A. M. is received. He is disappointed
to learn from it thathis forces moveto-morrow morning instead of having
moved this morning, as they should have done, this delay imperiling
both extremes of the army.
Your movement upon Lafayette should be made with the utmost
promptness.
You ought not to incumber yourself with your main supply train.
A brigade or two will be sufficient to protect it.
Your advance ought to have threatened Lafayette yesterday even-
ing.
I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. P. DROUILLARD.
A. D. C.’’
Later he added: Captain
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, September 10, 1863—Io P. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS
Commanding Fourteenth Corps:
In addition to the accompanying despatch the General command-
ing further directs that you open direct communication with General
McCook and take care to hurt the enemy as much as possible.
It is important to know whether he retreats on Rome or Cedar
Bluffs.
If the enemy has passed Lafayette, toward Rome, he will threaten
McCook; if he has not passed this point, he will endanger Critten-
den.
Much depends on the promptitude of your movements.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. P. DROUILLARD.
£e
BRAG G O R D ERS A TTACK. I I I
These instructions exhibited an utter misapprehension of
the situation. Rosecrans still believed that Bragg was re-
treating and his plans had reference to pursuit. And
Thomas' slow advance under the circumstances did not
imperil either McCook or Crittenden, since the longer
Bragg was induced to operate against Thomas, the longer
would the other two corps be safe. Bragg had choice of
corps, as each in isolation was exposed to attack, and it was
not in the power of Thomas, McCook or Crittenden to give
aid to each other except as each could hold the enemy
to the offensive against himself. To be slow therefore under
the semblance of offense was the best policy. But at the
time that Rosecrans was framing his instructions to Thomas
to hasten his movements on Lafayette, Bragg had just moved
his headquarters to that place from Lee and Gordon's mill,
and was planning to move Seven or eight divisions of in-
fantry and a force of cavalry against the foremost divisions of
the Fourteenth corps in McLemore's Cove, as the following
order and extract from his official report plainly show :
HEADQUARTERS ARMY TENNESSEE,
Lafayette, Ga., I2 P. M., September Io, 1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL HINDMAN, Commanding, etc.
GENERAL:—Headquarters are here and the following is the infor-
mation :
Crittenden's corps is advancing on us from Chattanooga. A large
force from the south has advanced to within seven miles of this
point. Polk is left at Anderson’s to cover your rear. General Bragg
orders you to attack and force your way through the enemy to
this point at the earliest hour you can see him in the morning, Cle-
burne will attack in front the moment your guns are heard.
I am, General, etc.,
GEORGE W. BRENT, *
Assistant Adjutant-General.
“Orders were also given for Walker's reserve corps to
move promptly to join Cleburne's division at Dug Gap to
unite in the attack. At the same time Cleburne was directed
to remove all obstructions in the road in his front, which was
II 2 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
promptly done, and by daylighthe was ready to move. The
obstructions in Catlett's Gap were also ordered to be removed
to clear the road in Hindman's rear. Breckinridge's division,
Hill's corps, was kept in position south of Lafayette to
check any movement the enemy might make from that di-
rection.
At daylight I proceeded to join Cleburne at Dug Gap
and found him waiting the opening of Hindman's guns,
to move on the enemy's flanks and rear.”
General Hindman had been joined by Buckner's corps
the day before, so that Buckner's, Polk's and Walker's corps
and one division of Hill's corps, and a cavalry force, under
General Bragg in person, were included in the combination
against the two advanced division of the Fourteenth corps.
And yet these divisions and the other two behind them, es-
caped overthrow because they had not advanced in campli-
ance with the orders of General Rosecrans.
At 8 A. M., on the I Ith, Baird's division was formed on
the right of Negley’s. By this time it was known that the
enemy had removed the obstructions from Catlett's and Dug
Gap. Later in the day the enemy advanced through them
in heavy force, while another column approached from the
north. By skilful manuvers and gallant fighting Negley’s
and Baird's divisions, step by step, withdrew from the midst
of the three converging columns, and falling back towards
Lookout Mountain, were soon within supporting distance of
the other divisions of the corps. The strength of the ene-
my's columns developed the fact that there was a large army
before the Fourteenth corps. And yet General Rosecrans was
so far from apprehending the actual situation that he sent the
following despatch to General Thomas:
CHATTANOOGA, Sept. 12, 1863, II. I 5 A. M.
GENERAL :—Your despatch of Io.30 last night and of 4 o'clock this
morning, have been received. After maturely weighing the notes
the General commanding is induced to think that General Negley with-
THE ENEMY AT LEE AND GORDON'S MILL. II 3
drew more through prudence than compulsion. He trusts that our
loss is not serious, and that there will be no difficulty in holding the
gap. He despatched you last night to communicate with General Mc-
Cook and call him up if you thought necessary. He trusts this has been
done, if not, no time should be lost. * * * * It is very important, at this
time, for you to communicate promptly, that the General com-
manding may know how to manage General Crittenden's corps,
which will attack the enemy as soon as it can be gotten in position.
When a battle does begin it is desirable that every command should
do its best, and push hard, using the bayonet wherever possible.
I am, Sir, very respectfully your obedient servant.
C. GODDARD,
Assistant Adjutant General.
MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS,
Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps.
General Thomas mentioned subsequently that he thought
that the army should have been withdrawn to Chattanooga
as soon as he had developed the fact of Bragg's concentra-
tion in his front, and he claimed that a safe retreat could
have been effected by forced marches.
At this time the situation gave no promise that the ex-
pectations entertained by the commanding general, when
he ordered the pursuit of the enemy by his entire army,
would be realized. In obedience to orders of the 9th,
Crittenden had occupied Chattanooga with Wood's division,
had called over the troops from the north bank of the
Tennessee, and had put Palmer's and Van Cleve's divi-
sions in motion on the road to Ringgold. These divisions
had passed on the I Ith beyond Ringgold, and beyond the
right flank of Bragg's army, Wilder's brigade having ad-
vanced to Tunnel Hill. The enemy had been developed on
the Ioth on the road to Lee and Gordon's mill, and two
brigades of Wood's division—Harker's and Buell's—had
been moved from the Ringgold road to the one leading to
Lafayette, in consequence of information sent by Wood to
General Rosecrans, to the effect that General Bragg, with
the bulk of his army, was at Lee and Gordon's mill. This
fact was also indicated by the resistance offered to Harker's.
II 4 I, IFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS,
advance north of the mill. General McCook had crossed
Lookout Mountain to Alpine, and General R. B. Mitchell's
cavalry—Crook's and McCook's divisions—had recon-
noitred far toward Rome and Summerville without finding
the enemy. This fact, and the capture of prisoners of Long-
street's corps from Virginia, indicated the presence of
Bragg's army north of Alpine. McCook had thereupon
thrown his trains back upon the mountain, and having
sent a cavalry force towards Lafayette to develop the facts,
was, on the 12th, holding his troops in readiness to recross
the mountain upon receipt of orders to do so, or in the
event of the return of the cavalry with positive knowledge
of the concentration of Bragg's army at Lafayette. On
the 12th Crittenden's corps took position on the line of the
Chickamauga, with Van Cleve's division thrown across that
stream on the direct road to Lafayette, in the immediate
front of the enemy. And on the day that General Rosecrans
proposed that “Crittenden's corps should attack the
enemy as soon as it could be gotten into position,” General
Bragg turned from Thomas to direct Polk's corps and
other forces against Crittenden, first to crush his corps, and
then to turn again against the Fourteenth. Fortunately for
the National army this plan also miscarried, through the
default of subordinate commanders.
Bragg's order for the movement against Crittenden is
subjoined :
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE.
Lafayette, Ga., 6 P. M., September 12.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL POLK,
GENERAL :—I enclose you a dispatch from General Pegram.
This presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail,
and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This
division crushed and the others are yours. We can then turn on the
force in the cove. Wheeler's cavalry will move on Wilder so as to
cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success.
Very truly yours,
BRAXTON BRAGG.
ENE MY CONCENTRATED FOR BATTLE. II 5
Afterwards, Buckner's corps was moved in support.
General Bragg thus refers to the movement and its failure:
“Early on the thirteenth I proceeded to the front, ahead of
Buckner's command, to find that no advance had been made
on the enemy, and that his forces had formed a junction
and recrossed the Chickamauga. Again disappointed, im-
mediate measures were taken to place our trains and limited
supplies in safe positions, when all our forces were concen-
trated along the Chickamauga, threatening the enemy in
front.”
Lafayette was five miles distant from Dug Gap, ten miles
from Lee and Gordon's mill, eighteen from Alpine, and
fifteen from Ringgold. Bragg's army was mainly between
Lafayette and Dug Gap on his left, and Lee and Gordon's
mill in his front, and hence he held interior lines of ex-
treme shortness for Operations against an army divided
into three parts.
It is, therefore, demonstrable that had General Thomas
moved rapidly on the direct road to Lafayette, through Dug
Gap, as ordered, the defeat of his corps, or its capture,
would have been inevitable, and the fate of that corps would
have been the fate of the army. It is accordingly not
surprising, that when General Rosecrans had full know-
ledge of the facts, he frankly stated in his official re-
port that “It was, therefore, a matter of life and death to
effect the concentration of the army.”
When it was evident that General Bragg's army was con-
centrated north of Lafayette, McCook's corps was forty miles
distant from Crittenden's by the nearest road, and the dis-
tance from Lee and Gordon's mill, and from McLemore's
Cove to Bragg's army, was less than between the positions of
Thomas and Crittenden, while McCook's corps was much
farther from Thomas’ position than from the enemy before
Lafayette. But, notwithstanding the wide separation of the
corps, the intervening mountains, and the concentrated forces
of the enemy in proximity to Crittenden, the Army of the
II 6 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS,
Cumberland was united in time for battle. In abandoning
the offensive from the 13th to the 18th, Bragg lost his best
opportunity to overwhelm a single corps. During this
time Crittenden's corps stood before his army on the
opposite bank of the Chickamauga. Had he moved his
army forward, he would have forced this single unsupported
Corps back upon Chattanooga, or westward upon Lookout
Mountain, and while doing this he could have covered his
communications through Ringgold to Dalton.
At midnight on the 13th McCook received orders
to move two of his divisions to Thomas' support, and
guard his trains with the third. On the following day the
corps moved up the mountain, and on the 17th it was con-
centrated in McLemore's Cove. In the meantime the Four-
teenth corps had moved gradually towards Lee and Gor-
don's mill, to be in readiness to connect in one direction
with Crittenden and in the other with McCook. The ene-
my's forces were lying along the line of march on the right,
but not in such strength, at any time, as to arrest the move-
ment of Rosecrans' forces to the left. In the evening of the
18th General Thomas' head of column reached Crawfish
Springs, and there he received orders to move to the Chat-
tanooga and Lafayette road, at Kelley's farm, and to con-
nect his right with Crittenden's left, at Lee and Gordon's
mill. This night march was rendered necessary by the
movement of General Bragg's forces to his right, down the
right bank of the Chickamauga, on the 18th. He had in-
tended to cross that stream and attack General Crittenden
on that day, but he had been disappointed by the unex-
pected slowness of his forces in moving to position across
the stream, in part resulting from Wilder's resistance.
Bragg had been reënforced until he had ten divisions of
infantry, comprised in five corps of two divisions each. The
divisions comprised from three to five brigades each. He
had four divisions of cavalry, two on his right covering the
movement of his forces by that flank, and two on his leſt,
ROSECRANS” ARMY CONCENTRATED. I 17
to hold the gaps in Pigeon Mountain, and if possible, to di-
rect attention from the real movement on the other flank.
General Bragg had failed in three distinct efforts to strike the
Fourteenth and Twenty-first corps in their isolation, and it
was his purpose in moving his army down the Chickamauga
and across it, to envelop Crittenden's Corps, as the left of the
National army. Had Bragg made the attack on the 18th
he could have done this, but losing a day he lost the op-
portunity altogether, although his plan of operations for the
19th was based upon the belief that it was still practicable
to move his forces upon General Rosecrans' left flank, at
Lee and Gordon's mill, and interposing between the National
army and Chattanooga, to drive it back in rout upon the
mountain passes.
When the three corps of the Army of the Cumberland were
united on the evening of the 18th it was then practicable
to withdraw to Chattanooga, had General Rosecrans been
averse to fighting a battle on the left bank of the Chicka-
mauga. That stream divided the two armies, and Gen-
eral Bragg had no thought of crossing where there were
opposing forces. A part of his army had already moved
down the stream, and was across far below Lee and Gor-
don's mill, and his plan of battle was such as to give
Rosecrans on the night of the 18th the best possible op-
portunity to withdraw his army without harm. Rose-
crans had command of three roads to Chattanooga, the
Lafayette road, the Dry Valley road, and the one leading
along the eastern base of Lookout Mountain. The two
more easterly roads passed through gaps in Missionary
Ridge, and the third passed most of the way between Look-
out Mountain and high hills. These main roads and inter-
secting roads would have afforded facilities for rapid move-
ment and easy defense. By a forced march, on three roads
practicable for the movement of troops in column, the army
could have reached Chattanooga by the morning of the 19th,
since the most distant brigade was not more than fifteen
II 8 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS
miles from that place. It was not unusual during the war
for armies to retreat from the presence of other armies un-
der circumstances less favorable for quick movement than
in"this case. Had, therefore, General Rosecrans elected to
withdraw, he might have lost some of his wagons, but it is
highly probable that he could have saved them all. It is
certain that withdrawal was practicable, and he accepted bat-
tle on the field of Chickamauga from choice, and not from
compulsion.
General Thomas reached Kelley's farm with Baird's divi-
Sion about daylight, and having been informed by Colonel
Wilder that the enemy had crossed the Chickamauga in
force the evening before at Reid's and Alexander's bridges,
faced his troops towards these bridges across the roads
leading to them. Wilder's brigade of Reynolds' division
had taken position on the west of the Lafayette road, about
half way from Kelley's farm to General Crittenden's position.
General Thomas intended to place the other two brigades
of that division on the right of Baird to connect his right
with Wilder's left. When Brannan's division arrived at
Kelley's farm, Thomas posted it on the left of Baird.
Soon after it was reported that there was a brigade of
Bragg's army in proximity, which had been cut off the
night before by the burning of Reid's bridge by Colonel
Daniel McCook of the Reserve corps. In hope of captur-
ing this isolated brigade General Brannan was directed to
move forward on the road to the burnt bridge, to capture
the brigade or drive it back across the Chickamauga. This
movement developed the enemy and opened the battle, at
a point far north of the one where General Bragg expected
to take the initiative against General Rosecrans' left flank.
Brannan soon encountered Forrest's cavalry, which was
covering the right of Walker's corps, as that corps, Hood's
and Buckner's, and Cheatham's division of Polk's were
moving with a left wheel upon Crittenden. The cavalry
having, after a sharp conflict, given way before Brannan,
CHICKAMA UGA. I IQ
Bragg moved Walker's corps to Forrest's support. This
Corps, after a temporary success against Baird's division
was driven back, when other forces of the enemy were
turned to the right. In the meantime the first divisions en-
gaged on the left of the National army were reënforced,
and from Brannan's initiative both armies extended their
lines towards Lee and Gordon's mill. Early in the day
Crittenden had sent a brigade to his left to develop the
enemy, if coming against his position. Soon after, the
battle having opened far to his left, while no enemy was
threatening his position, he sent Palmer's division to
General Thomas. This division went into position to the
right of Baird. In the meantime General Rosecrans had
placed General McCook in command of all the troops on
the right of Crittenden, and directed him to send his own
divisions to the left as they should come upon the field.
Negley's division at the time was in position on the Chick-
amauga and was included with the cavalry in McCook's
command. The first division sent from the right to Thomas
was Johnson's division of McCook's corps, and this division
went into line on the left of Palmer. Soon after, General
Reynolds' division extended the line to the right. Thus
five divisions were thrown before the enemy as his line
was extended to his left. The lines of neither army were
able to maintain continuity, and each at times was broken.
The battle-field for the most part was thickly planted with
forest trees, which were a barrier to regularity in the move-
ment of troops and the maintenance of connected lines,
in the alternations of aggression and defense. Gradually,
however, with the oft repeated repulse of the enemy, Gen-
eral Thomas' line of five divisions became continuous and
stable. Having failed to drive Thomas from position, Gen-
eral Bragg advanced fresh troops—Buckner's corps—to-
wards the unoccupied space on the right of Reynolds. To
meet this effort to divide his army, General Rosecrans di-
rected Jeff. C. Davis' division of McCook's Corps, and
I 2G LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS.
Van Cleve's division of Crittenden's corps, to the right of
Thomas' line. These divisions were soon heavily en-
gaged, and Sheridan's division from McCook's corps, and
Wood's of Crittenden's were also sent to their support.
Later in the day Negley's division of Thomas’ corps was
also sent to this part of the field. Early in the aſternoon,
General Thomas Sent Brannan's division from his extreme
left to drive back the enemy who had penetrated the line
of battle on Reynolds' right. The enemy's success at this
point was the most threatening of the day, but Brannan's
timely support restored the connection of Reynolds with
the troops on his right.
In this action General Bragg's plan entirely miscarried.
Expecting to move seven divisions of infantry and two of
cavalry upon the left flank of Rosecrans' army at Lee and .
Gordon's mill, and then unite his entire army on that flank,
the battle was forced upon him so far to the north that one
of Crittenden's divisions had been posted opposite Bragg's
centre and the other two had moved at least a mile to con-
front the left of his line of battle. And instead of using the
remainder of his infantry against the front of Crittenden's
corps near Lee and Gordon's mill he was compelled to send
it down the Chickamauga to cross in the rear of his other
forces. To the defeat of this plan General Thomas con-
tributed largely. He was sent to the left by General Rose
crans but, except in compliance with this order, he was vir-
tually in independent command of more than half of the in-
fantry divisions of the army. Thomas disposed five divisions
for battle, and the troops under his command formed about
five-sevenths of the connected line of battle, and in trans-
ferring Brannan's division from his left to the right of Rey-
nolds he drove back the enemy after the line of battle
had been pierced. No general, in chief or subordinate com-
mand, was ever more quick or judicious in his dispositions,
or more forceful in fighting an enemy.
Late in the evening Thomas retired the left of his line a
NIGHT OF THE WINETEENTH. I 2 I
short distance to better ground, and directed the division
commanders to construct barricades of logs in front of their
troops.
It was so evident that the battle had been indecisive in
general issue, that both armies were conscious that the re-
newal of the conflict was inevitable.
During the night the corps commanders were called to
gether for consultation at the headquarters of the command-
ing general. At this conference General Thomas was
urgent that the right and right centre of the army should
be withdrawn to Missionary Ridge and the transverse hills
to the right and rear of the centre. The ridge and these hills
commanded the Dry Valley road and much of the ground
between that road and the one leading to Lafayette by Lee
and Gordon's mill. Had this suggestion been adopted the
defensive strength of the right would at least have been
doubled. The strength of the transverse hills was proved
on the following day, when Thomas with a part of
the army saved the whole of it. But had the entire right
of the army been where he would have placed it on the
second day of the battle, neither that part nor any other
would have been defeated.
The general trend of Missionary Ridge is north and
south, but this ridge is cut into separate hills and Series of
hills by deep depressions or gaps. A long depression
stretches from McFarland's house, first to the south and
then to the south-east, and cuts the ridge to its base.
Through this depression runs the Dry Valley road. At
McFarland's another gap running to the east is equally
deep. These two gaps isolate a series of hills, which
trend south from McFarland's to Villetoe's house on the
Dry Valley road, and, making nearly a right angle at the
latter house, stretch to the east. On the south of the hills
there is first low ground and then other hills, lower than the
main ridge, extending nearly to Widow Glen's house. On
the right side of this road, to one moving south, is Mission-
I 2.2 LIFE OF GENERAI, G EORG E H THOMAS.
ary Ridge; and on the left are the hills which connect
themselves almost to Widow Glen's. The right of the
army, if it had been withdrawn as General Thomas advised,
would have rested on the main ridge and upon the detached
hills.
The ridge trending north from the Dry Valley road at
Villetoe's, was the position taken by Steedman's, Brannan's
and Wood's divisions in the afternoon of the 20th, whose
strength was then fully tested. It should be mentioned in
this connection that had the right of the army, cavalry in-
cluded, been retired to these defensive positions, most of the
field hospitals would have been entirely uncovered. These
hospitals had been established on the 19th, near Crawfish
Springs, far in the rear and far to the right of the line of
battle on that day. They would have fallen into the hands
of the enemy had the right of the army been withdrawn
the night of the 19th, but had this been done, they would
have been speedily regained as one of the fruits of victory.
In seeming deference to General Thomas' suggestion,
General Rosecrans ordered Generals McCook and Critten-
den, to withdraw their troops. The former was to establish
a new line for the right, and the latter was to place his
troops to the left of the new line in reserve. At 11.45
P. M., the following order was given to McCook:
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Widow Glen's, September 19—11.45 P. M.
MAJOR GENERAL McCOOK,
Commanding the Twentieth Army Corps.
The General commanding directs you, as soon as practicable after
the receipt of this order, to post your command so as to form the
right of the new battle-front, and hold the same. Leave your out-
posts and grand guard where they now are till they are driven in by the
enemy, when they will fall back upon the main body of your com-
mand, contesting the ground inch by inch.
Very respectfully,
J. A. GARFIELD,
Chief of Staff.
THE ORDERS FOR THE TWENTIETH. I 23
Crittenden was ordered to place his two divisions in re-
serve to support McCook or Thomas:
HEADQUARTERs DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Widow Glen's House, Sept. 19, 1863—I 1.20 P. M.
GENERAL :
The General commanding directs me to inform you that Gen-
eral McCook has been ordered to hold this gap to-morrow, covering
the Dry Valley road, his right resting near this place, his left con-
necting with General Thomas' right. The General places your corps
in reserve to-morrow, and directs you to post it on the eastern slope
of Missionary Ridge to support McCook or Thomas. Leave the
grand guard from your command out, with instructions to hold their
ground until driven in, and then to retire slowly, contesting the ground
stubbornly.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.
CHAPTER VII.
THE BATTLE OPENS ON THE LEFT-ENEMY REPULSEID—CHANGES IN POSITIONS
OF TROOPS ON THE RIGHT-THAT WING ROUTED —THOMAS FORMS A NEW
LINE AND REPULSES THE ENEMY—THE WITH DRAWAL TO CHATTANOOGA.
LL the movements required by General Rosecrans' or-
ders were made during the night. General McCook
posted Sheridan's division on the slope of Missionary Ridge
to the right and rear of Widow Glen's with Davis' division to
the left of Sheridan, while General Crittenden placed Wood's
and Van Cleve's divisions still further to the left on the
eastern slope of the ridge. Wilder's brigade of mounted
infantry of Reynolds' division, by direction of the command-
ing general, reported to McCook for orders, and this
brigade was placed on the right of Sheridan. McCook, in
compliance with orders, made his dispositions to command
the Dry Valley road, and to hold the gap near Widow Glen's
house. Defenses were constructed during the night and early
morning which, with the natural strength of the position,
gave great firmness to the right flank of the army. But,
although four divisions had then been withdrawn nearly a
mile, there had been no corresponding recession of Negley's
and Brannan's divisions and the right flank of the former
was in air and far from supporting forces.
Very early in the morning of the 20th–6 A. M.–Gen-
eral Thomas requested that Negley's division should be
sent to him to take the position on the left of Baird which
Brannan's division had occupied at the opening of the
battle. Brannan's division was then in line on the right
of Reynolds, where it was needed, and Thomas de-
I 24
JHE ASKS FOR NEGLEY. I 25
sired to strengthen his left flank with Negley's division, an-
ticipating that the battle of the 20th would open at that
point.
At 6 A. M., General Thomas sent the following message
to General Rosecrans :
H’DO'RS FOURTEENTH A. C., DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Near McDaniels' House, Sept. 20, 1863–6 A. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL ROSECRANs,
Commanding Department Cumberland :
Since my return this morning, I have found it necessary to con-
centrate my line more. My left does not now extend to the road
that branches off at McDaniels' to Reid's bridge. I earnestly re-
quest that Negley’s division be placed on my left immediately. The
enemy's skirmishers have been discovered about three quarters of a
mile in front of our left and picket line, proceeding towards the
Rossville road. A division on my left would be exactly in their
front.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Maj.-Gen'l U. S. V. Com’d'g.
Upon receipt of the foregoing note General Rosecrans
issued the following conditional order: g
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
September 20, 1863–6.35 A. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCook,
Commanding Twentieth Army Corps :
General Negley's division has been ordered to General Thomas'
left. The General commanding directs you to fill the space left va-
cant by his removal, if practicable. The enemy appears to be mov-
ing toward our left.
Very respectfully,
J. A. GARFIELD,
Chief of Staff.
This order was not positive in its requirement, and in view
of all the facts the reason is not apparent, for directing Gen-
eral McCook to fill the space to be vacated by Negley's divi-
I 26 I, IFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS.
sion. His two divisions were required by a previous order
to extend the line of battle from General Thomas' right to
Missionary Ridge, in rear of Widow Glen's, General Rose-
crans' headquarters. General Davis had only two brigades
on the field, and had lost about forty per cent. of his men
on the 19th. McCook's troops could not form a strong line
from Negley's right to the point designated for the right
flank, much less from Brannan's right to that point. This
order then required that General McCook should move his
forces to the left, or use the discretion so plainly given. If
this order had been given to General Crittenden, who had
Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions in reserve on the eastern
slope of Missionary Ridge in readiness to support Thomas
or McCook, Negley might have been relieved early in the
day and been in position on the left of Baird when the bat-
tle opened.
The following extract from the report of General Thomas,
in relation to the removal of Negley's division to the left,
is subjoined :
After my return from department headquarters, and about 2
A. M., on the 20th, I received a report from General Baird that the
left of his division did not rest on the Reid's Bridge road as I had
intended, and that he could not reach it without weakening his line
too much. I immediately addressed a note to the commanding
general, requesting that General Negley be sent to take position on
General Baird’s left and rear, and thus secure our left from assault. Dur-
ing the night the troops threw up temporary breastworks of logs, and
prepared for the encounter which all anticipated would come off the
next day. Although informed by note from General Rosecrans
headquarters that Negley's division would be sent immediately to
take post on my left, it had not arrived at 7 A. M. on the 20th, and I
sent Captain Willard of my staff to General Negley to urge him for-
ward as rapidly as possible, and to point out his position to him.
Lieutenant-General Polk, commanding the right wing of
the Confederate army, was ordered by General Bragg to
assault General Rosecrans' extreme left at dawn on the
20th, and his divisions were directed to attack in turn to
A WAITING ATTACK. I 27
the left. Lieutenant-General Longstreet, commanding the
left wing, was to attack in the same order as soon as Polk's
left division was in motion, “and the whole line was then
to be pushed vigorously and persistently against the
enemy throughout its extent.” But the commander
of the right wing was not prompt in compliance and, during
his absence from his command, Bragg ordered a recon-
noissance, which developed the fact that the road to
Chattanooga to the left of Rosecrans' army was open, and
this knowledge intensified the eagerness of the enemy to
attack and turn Thomas' left flank. The reconnoissance
reported by Bragg, and the advance of the enemy on his
left mentioned by Thomas, were doubtless identical.
General Thomas had done all in his power to strengthen
the point selected by Bragg for his initial attack. Thomas'
plan was to place the artillery of Negley's division on
the eastern base of Missionary Ridge to the left and rear of
Baird's division, so as to sweep the space accessible for a
flank movement, and to place Negley's three brigades on
the left and in close connection with Baird. With an entire
division supported by three batteries of artillery, he believed
that the left flank of the army could be held against
the attacks of the enemy. But Negley was not per-
mitted by the commanding general to leave position until
relieved by other troops. The division at one time was
actually withdrawn, and was forming for the march to the
left, but was remanded to the line by General Rosecrans.
At 8 A. M. Beatty's brigade in reserve was permitted
to go to Thomas, but the other two brigades of Negley's
division were not relieved until much later in the morning
when Wood's division occupied the position vacated
by Negley. Beatty reached Thomas before the open-
ing of the battle, but his brigade, in a thin line, was un-
able to check Breckinridge's division, which marched round
Baird's flank at the time he was receiving an attack in front.
General Thomas' plan had miscarried through the retention
I 28 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS
of Negley's two brigades and all his artillery on the right.
Thomas knew that the left of the army was both vulnerable
and vital, and yet he was baffled in all his efforts to give it
strength.
When Beatty's brigade was broken and driven back,
Breckinridge advanced southward on the Lafayette road
far towards the rear of the centre of our army. For-
tunately there were two brigades and some reserve regi-
ments which Thomas could move against this daring divi-
Sion. Stanley's brigade of Negley's division, and Van
Derveer's, of Brannan's, advanced directly against the enemy,
and a few regiments of Palmer's division, which General
Thomas had previously sent to the support of Baird, faced
to the rear and struck him in flank. After a sharp conflict
Breckinridge's forces fled with broken ranks and heavy loss
around Baird's left flank to the sheltering woods beyond.
Not only was this turning movement signally defeated, but
every attack on Thomas' line, as it was taken up by Bragg's
divisions in succession to the enemy's left, was repulsed
from first to last. This line was secure, not from the strength
of its own left at Baird's position, but from the exhaustion
of Bragg's right wing. But on the right of the general line
of battle the enemy had been successful to a degree that
put the whole army in jeopardy.
The line formed by General McCook, in compliance with
the order of the commanding general, requiring him to
post his troops to hold the gap at Widow Glen's and cover
the Dry Valley road, although seen by General Rosecrans
during the early hours of the morning, did not finally meet
his approval; and having decided upon another change he
directed that the troops on the right should be moved to
the front and left.
In compliance, Sheridan's division was moved forward
from Missionary Ridge, one brigade advancing abreast,
but not in connection with the right of Wood's division,
which had at 9.45 A. M. taken Negley's position, and the
THE ORD ERS TO Me COO K. I 29
other two brigades taking posts to the right and rear of the
first. Davis' division was directed at first to the left and
forward by General McCook but, afterwards, by a direct
order to General Davis from General Rosecrans, it was ad-
vanced to an unoccupied space between Wood's right and
the left of Sheridan's advanced brigade. These movements
in some measure restored the line of the previous evening,
Davis having found in his designated position a rail barri-
cade which had sheltered troops on the 19th. The right of
this line, however, did not rest as far forward as on that day,
and on the right of Davis was not closely connected at
any time. There was a space of about three hundred yards
between Davis' right and the left of Sheridan's advanced
brigade, and the interval between that brigade and the other
two of the division, posted to the rear and right, was about
one fourth of a mile, while Wilder's brigade was still further
to the rear and right. It was necessary to post these four
brigades so as to hold the ground on that flank as far back
towards the Dry Valley road as possible, and the distance
was too great for them to form a connected line. This
flank of the army as then formed was exceedingly weak, but
a series of changes was soon after ordered by General Rose-
crans, which made it easy for the enemy to rout the infant-
ry on the right of the army, and completely isolate the
cavalry. The orders for these new movements are sub-
joined:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND,
In the field, September 20—Io. IO A. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCook,
Commanding Twentieth Army Corps:
General Thomas is being heavily pressed on the left. The
General commanding directs you to make immediate dispositions to
withdraw the right, so as to spare as much force as possible to reën-
force Thomas. The left must be held at all hazards, even if the right
is drawn wholly back to the present left. Select a good position
back this way, and be ready to start reënforcements to Thomas at a
moment's warning.
JAMES A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.
9
I 3O LIFE OF GENERAI, GEORG E H. THOMAS.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
In the field, September 20–IO.30 A. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCook,
Commanding Twentieth Army Corps:
The General commanding directs you to send two brigades of
General Sheridan's division at once, and with all possible dispatch,
to support General Thomas, and'send the third brigade as soon as the
lines can be drawn in sufficiently. March them as rapidly as you can
without exhausting the men, Report in person in these headquarters as
soon as your orders are given in regard to Sheridan's movement.
Have you any news from Col. Post 2
JAMES A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier General and Chief of Staff.
The second of these orders was received six minutes after
the first, and Lytle's and Walworth's brigades were
at once withdrawn from line and put in rapid movement to
the left. McCook ordered Wilder's brigade to close
to the left, and sent a staff officer to General Mitchell
with an order for the cavalry to close to the left also. There
was then an interval of a mile between the right of Wilder's
brigade and the left of the cavalry; but Mitchell reported
that he had been ordered by General Rosecrans to remain
at Crawfish Springs.
At 10.35 A. M. General Rosecrans sent the subjoined note
to Thomas: -
HEADQUARTERs D. C.,
- September 20, 1863–Io.35 A. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Commanding Fourteenth Corps:
The General commanding directs me to say, if possible refuse
your right sending in your reserves to the northward, as he would
prefer having Crittenden and McCook on your right.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
FRANK. S. BOND,
Major and A. D. C.
This despatch was returned thus endorsed by Thomas:
The enemy are pushing me so hard that I cannot make any
changes. The troops are posted behind temporary breast-works.
THE ORDER TO WOOD, I 3 I
It thus appears that when General Rosecrans asked
Thomas if he could not extend his line northward with his
reserves, that McCook and Crittenden should remain on
his right, two of Sheridan's brigades had been sent to
Thomas, leaving with McCook only three brigades of his
corps. And in ten minutes after Rosecrans had made this
inquiry of Thomas, and before the answer of the latter
could possibly have been received, the following was issued
which took from Crittenden all of his command on the
right except the two brigades of Van Cleve's division.
September 20–Io.45 A. M.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL WooD, Commanding Division.
The General commanding directs you to close up on Reynolds
as fast as possible, and support him.
Respectfully, etc.,
FRANK S. Bond,
Major and Aid-de-Camp.
The fact that this order was not sent through Gene-
ral Crittenden, the corps commander, emphasized the
requirement to make the movement as fast as possible.
At the time, Wood's left was aligned with Brannan's
right, while the left of the latter was in echelon with
Reynolds’ right. General Wood did not know where
Reynolds' division was posted, but he knew that the
troops on the left of Brannan were heavily engaged;
and, supposing that this was the reason of the order
from General Rosecrans, was prompt in withdrawing
his division, by brigades, in order from left to right, to
pass in rear of Brannan's division to the left. The or-
der for McCook to send two of Sheridan's brigades to
General Thomas followed closely General Rosecrans' order
to Davis, to take position on the right of Wood;
and then again, in a few minutes, General Wood received
his orders. The result was, that after General Sheridan
began his movement to the left, and while Wood's
I 32 IIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H, THOMAS,
last brigade was leaving position, the overlapping lines of
the enemy, at about I I. I 5 A.M., advanced upon Davis' two
brigades in furious assault, striking also Buell's brigade of
Wood's division in flank and rear. By the quick retire-
ment of this brigade, Davis' two brigades, of fourteen
hundred men in aggregate, were completely isolated. The
line on their left was open to Brannan's right, and
on their right was the space, previously held by Sheridan's
advanced brigades, upon which Laibold's brigade, while
marching in Column by divisions to close to the left, was
struck by the enemy in front and flank, and immediately
routed.
In this situation the only safety for Davis' division
was in quick withdrawal, and McCook, who had gone
to the right from Wood's position to order his remaining
troops to close rapidly to the left on Brannan, said to Davis,
as he rode up and saw lines five-fold stronger than his own
short, isolated line: “We must either stay here and be
lvilled or captured, or we must retreat.” And then, seeing
the hopelessness and futility of resistance, ordered Davis
to fall back. When Davis' division and the supporting
but distant brigade of Wilder, moved to the rear under
a terrific fire from the enemy, the whole line from Bran-
nan's right was gone. Sheridan's two brigades, in swift
motion to the left on the Dry Valley road, were halted to
resist the enemy as he swept over the vacant ground, but
successful resistance was then impossible, and, in the vain ef-
fort, General Lytle fell, and with him many officers and men.
Under the pressure of the enemy's vastly superior forces,
Sheridan's division and Wilder's brigade moved to the right
towards Crawfish Springs, while Davis' division was de-
flected to the left over Missionary Ridge. Generals McCook,
Sheridan and Davis, and numerous officers of the staff and
line, did all that was possible to rally the troops, but, under
a severe fire, this was impracticable.
The left wing of Bragg's army, strengthened during the
ROSECRANS RETIRES TO CHATTANOOGA. 133
night by fresh troops from Virginia, moved first upon a
feeble division without support on either flank, and resist-
ance thereafter was hopeless.
Two brigades of Van Cleve's division, also in motion to
the left, in compliance with orders from General Rose-
Crans, were also broken and driven upon Missionary
Ridge from the rear of Brannan's position. Brannan's
right was exposed by the withdrawal of Wood's division,
and his right brigade, attacked in front and flank, bent
back for Safety. Soon after, General Brannan retired
both brigades—Croxton's and Connell's—and posted them
some distance to the rear on a high, rounded knoll
on the line of hills which trends eastward from the Dry
Valley road. The cavalry and Wilder's brigade of mounted
infantry moved across Missionary Ridge into Chattanooga
Valley. A part of the infantry forces also drifted into that
valley. McCook ordered his two divisions to Ross-
ville, and by a detour they moved into the Dry Valley road
north of Thomas' final line. General Rosecrans rode imme-
diately to Chattanooga, to look after his pontoon bridges and
affairs in the rear of his army. Crittenden, his entire corps
having been ordered from him, followed, first to Rossville
and then to Chattanooga to report to the commanding
general. General McCook, with General Morton, chief
engineer of the army, and other staff officers, crossed
Missionary Ridge to the west, to reach Rossville by
a circuit. Noticing the ascending lines of dust, and
taking observations with a prismatic compass, General
Morton decided that the whole army was retreating.
The guide, against the protest of General McCook,
bore to the northwest, until Spear's brigade was met.
Learning, upon inquiry, that General Rosecrans was
at Chattanooga, and that he was himself nearer that place
than Rossville, and believing that by swift riding he could
Confer with Rosecrans, and arrive at Rossville as soon as
his troops, dashed into Chattanooga. Upon arrival he was
directed to remain with the commanding general.
I 34 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS,
The Only apparent reason for the orders of General Rose-
Crans, which weakened the right of his army until success-
ful resistance was impossible, was his belief that General
Bragg was moving his army by the right"flank, and that,
consequently, there was no danger of an attack in force
from his left. On the supposition that such an attack was
probable, the orders which opened the line at intervals were
injudicious in the extreme. That part of his line of battle
had been twice radically changed in a few hours, and the
fact that General Rosecrans gave direct orders to division
Commanders relieved his corps commanders of the respon-
sibility of maintaining a strong connected line of battle even
if they had had enough troops for such a line. His order to
General McCook of 6.35 A. M. plainly manifested his con-
jecture that the enemy was moving by the right flank, and his
Subsequent orders to that general to select a new position
for the right and make dispositions to withdraw his troops,
and afterwards for the actual withdrawal of a part of them, are
not easily explained except on this hypothesis. But there
had been no reconnoissance to determine the presence or ab-
sence of the enemy in front of his right, and General Thomas
had not been consulted, in time, as to the actual State of
affairs on the left. Doubtless, the repeated requests of
Thomas for reenforcements had, in General Rosecrans'
view, increased the probability that Bragg's army was
moving to the north to interpose between the battle-field
and Chattanooga. But, in fact, Thomas was only anxious
to give stability to the left of his line, which he knew
could not be effected without the troops which had been
promised early in the morning. He had himself weak-
ened that flank the day before to drive back the troops that
had pierced the line of battle on the right of Reynolds, and
the long delay of promised reënforcements made frequent
applications necessary. And notwithstanding orders were
given by General Rosecrans for the movement of Negley's,
Sheridan's and Van Cleve's divisions to Thomas, only
DELAY OF RENFORGEMENTS I 35
two brigades—Beatty's and Stanley's—joined him from these
divisions, until the Crisis on his left had passed. With these
two brigades,arriving separately, and the reserves of the di-
visions under his own command, he had driven the enemy
in rout from his rear, and thus defeated the movement, which,
according to General Bragg's plan of battle, was the most
important of all. The withdrawal of Sheridan's and Wood's
divisions from line did not help Thomas in defeating Bragg's
leading project, though it brought disaster to the right of
the army. If the order to General Wood to close up On
Reynolds and support him did not have reference to the
transfer of other troops to the left besides Sheridan's and
Van Cleve's divisions, the reason for it is certainly hidden.
If Brannan's division was out of line, as was partially indi-
cated by the relation of its left to Reynolds' right, it would
have been far easier to put that division into line than to
move Wood a division interval “to close up on Reynolds,”
who was not needing support. It was not necessary to move
Wood at all, unless Brannan was needed on some other
part of the field, and it had been decided to send him to the
left, where so many other troops were going. Brannan, had
two brigades in line, and, consequently, occupied the usual
division interval. In his official report General Rosecrans
thus mentioned General Thomas' requests for Support, and
the reason for the order to General Wood.
The battle in the meanwhile roared with increasing fury and ap-
proached from the left to the centre. Two aids arrived successively
within a few minutes, from General Thomas, asking for reënforce-
ments. The first was directed to say that General Negley had al-
ready gone, and should be nearly at hand at that time, and that
Brannan's reserve brigade was available. The other was direc-
ted to say that General Van Cleve would at once be sent to his
assistance, which was accordingly done.
A message from General Thomas soon followed, that he was
heavily pressed, Captain Kellogg, A. D. C., the bearer, inform-
ing me at the same time that General Brannan was out of line,
I 36 LIFE OF GENERAL G.EORG E H THOMAS.
and that General Reynolds’ right was exposed.* Orders were
despatched to General Wood to close up on Reynolds, and
word was sent to General Thomas that he should be sup-
ported, even if it took away the whole corps of Crittenden and Mc-
Cook. * * * *
General Wood overlooking the direction to “close up” on General
Reynolds, supposed he was to support him by withdrawing from the
line and passing to the rear of Brannan, who, it appears, was not
out of line, but was in echelon, and slightly in rear of Reynolds'
right.
But, in a letter addressed to the New York Tribune of
October 4th, 1881, General Rosecrans stated that General
Wood was to have closed on Reynolds, only when Bran-
nan had withdrawn his two brigades to go to General
Thomas. The terms of General Rosecrans' order, how-
ever, did not intimate that the required movement was
conditional.
General Thomas was related to the movements on the
right of the army only through his requests for reënforce-
ments and these repeated applications for promised troops
lost their true significance through no fault of his own.
In view of all the facts it is manifest that had
Negley's division, as a whole, been sent to General Thomas
early in the morning, no calls for reënforcements would
have gone from the left to the commanding general.
Thomas did not need more than one division to render his
left invulnerable, and he did not expect that the right would
be opened to the enemy by sending troops that had not been
promised. His requests were repeated because there was
first delay, and then troops were sent by brigades, too slowly,
to give firmness to the only weak point in his line. Had
he called for reënforcements after receiving a division, in its
unity, or even after he had been joined by three brigades,
* Colonel Kellogg has stated, that riding in rear of the line of battle, he ob-
served that Brannan's left was in rear of Reynolds' right, and, upon being
questioned, mentioned the fact to General Rosecrans.
JHE AGAIN ASKS FOR NEGI, EY. I 37
in turn, he would have sustained a nearer relation to the
orders of the commanding general.
At II A. M., Thomas sent the following note to Rosecrans:
• HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND.
Battle-field, Sept. 20th, 1863, II A. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL ROSECRANS,
Commanding Department Cumberland.
The enemy penetrated a short time since, to the road leading to
McDaniel's house, and I fear they are trying to cut off our commu-
nication with Rossville through the hills behind the centre of our
army. I think therefore it is of the utmost importance that Negley's
division be ordered to that point, the left of my line.
Very respectfully your obedient servant,
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Maj. Gen'ſ U. S. V. Com'd'g.
It is therefore manifest that as late as II A. M., the time
of the disaster on the right, Thomas repeated his request
for Negley's division, one brigade of which had previously
joined him; and yet at this hour Sheridan's two brigades
and Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions were in motion to
the left.
After noon General Thomas hearing firing on his right,
which was not explained by known facts, rode in that direc-
tion. He then had no knowledge of the state of affairs on
the right of the army or even on the right of his own line.
He first met General Wood with Barnes' brigade, who
reported that he had been ordered to support Reynolds.
General Thomas replied that Reynolds did not need support,
and directed him to move to the left to make that flank
secure. Barnes' brigade was thereupon sent to Baird's
position, and General Wood turned back to meet his other
brigades and take them to the same point. In the mean
time, however, there were unexpected developments on the
right of Reynolds. Captain Kellogg, who had been sent to
conduct Sheridan's division to the left, reported that he had
I 38 LIFE OF GENERAL G|EORGE EI. THOMAS.
been fired upon by a line of skirmishers, advancing in front
of a heavy force, in the rear of Reynolds' position. General
Wood had previously thrown Harker's and Buell's brigades
to the front on a hill to the left of Brannan's position. An
advancing column was now in view in their front, and at
first it was hoped that this was Sheridan's division, expected
from the direction in which this column was advancing.
But it was soon probable that foes not friends were ap-
proaching, and measures were taken to ascertain their iden-
tity. A flag was raised, and the fire thus elicited, made
known that the enemy was in rear of Brannan's former
position and indicated that changes had occurred on the right
which were plainly Suggestive of disaster, but not of its
real magnitude.
As another indication of what had occurred, General
Thomas learned that Brannan was far from the position
which he held in the morning. His position was on the
line of hills upon which Thomas had advised Rosecrans
to establish his line of battle. Necessity had done,
in part, what generalship had previously demanded.
A small force on these hills was now to fight a desperate
battle, not to win a victory, but to save the army. The
situation on the right of Reynolds was now exceedingly
critical. There was a wide space between Reynolds and
Wood, another more narrow between the latter and Brannan.
And on the right of Brannan to the Dry Valley road there
were no supporting forces. General Negley with his third
brigade and all his artillery had stopped for a short time in
this strong position but had disappeared, and with him
had gone Beatty's brigade from the left of the line,
while its commander was doing Service in the combination
which drove the enemy from the rear of that line. Although
Brannan's and Wood's troops were not connected, the
strength of the two positions compensated in a great degree
for the lack of continuity of line. Nothing saved the right
of this new line but the slowness of the enemy in availing
ARRIVAL OF GRANGER. I 39
himself of the open way on the right of Brannan, to turn
his position and take his line in reverse. In Brannan's and
Wood's commands there were nominally six brigades, but
the aggregate including broken forces was about five thou-
Sand men. The Successful resistance of these men to several
fierce assaults by the left wing of Bragg's army made it
possible for help to come from an unexpected source when
the enemy in heavy force had wheeled upon the hills on the
right of Brannan, and was moving to his rear. The long
line, of the enemy easily overlapped Thomas' short
line. He had not been able to connect the parts of that
line short as it was. From all the troops that had been
assigned to his command or drifted to him during the battle,
he could not spare a skirmish line to meet the enemy on the
hill made vacant by the retirement of Negley. Opportunely
General Gordon Granger, commanding the Reserve Corps,
reported to him in advance of two of his brigades.
This corps commander had been manoeuvering for several
days south and south east from the Rossville Gap, near the
Lafayette road, and having observed that the noise of battle
on the right was nearer than in the morning, had directed
General James B. Steedman with General Whittaker's and
Colonel John G. Mitchell's brigades of his division to ad-
vance towards the manifest conflict. General Thomas
ordered these troops to charge the enemy and drive him over
the hills. The charge accomplished this grand result, and
then the troops extended the line of battle from Brannan's
right to the Dry Valley road. In the mean time General
Thomas had put Hazen's brigade of Palmer's division
between Wood and Reynolds. The line of battle was then
nearly continuous throughout its length.
Against this line the left wing of Bragg's army was
moved in assault until it was completely shattered.* Both
* At 3 P.M., General Longstreet asked for reenforcements and General Bragg
replied, that the troops of his right wing had been so badly beaten back that they
would be of no service. Bragg's losses in aggregate were forty per cent.
Longstreet lost thirty-six per cent of his command on the second day, mainly
in the afternoon.
I 4O LIFE OF GENERAL, G EORG E H, THOMAS.
wings of that great army were broken in turn, by Thomas'
troops on the left and right of his line of battle. Late
in the afternoon many of his troops having exhausted their
ammunition, repulsed the enemy's attacks with the bayonet.
The ammunition train of the Fourteenth corps, and some
of the division trains had been sent to the rear by some
unauthorized person. Late in the day ammunition was
taken from Steedman and given to troops on his left.
It is not practicable to compute with accuracy the
number of troops on the last line of battle. There were
twenty brigades of infantry, including those that were mere
fragments, and all but two had been engaged on the first
day and nearly all had been heavily engaged during the
forenoon of the Second day. The aggregate could not have
exceeded twenty-five thousand men, and it may not have
included more than twenty thousand, or an average of
one thousand men to a brigade. With this meagre force
General Thomas repulsed thirty-five brigades of infantry
and five or six of cavalry, some of the latter fighting
as infantry. The mere statement of this disparity is enough
to prove the brilliant achievements of Thomas and the rem-
nant of the Army of the Cumberland.
At 3.35 P. M. General Garfield and Colonel Thruston,
chief-of-staff to General McCook, joined General Thomas.
The former bore instructions from General Rosecrans, giv-
ing Thomas discretion as to the immediate with-
drawal of the army. The reply was brief but emphatic:
“It will ruin the army to withdraw it now. This position -
must be held till night.” Colonel Thruston gave informa-
tion of the presence of Sheridan's and Davis’ divisions in the
Hong gap leading from Villetoe’s house to McFarland's.
General Thomas promptly requested Thruston to ask the
commanders of these troops to move upon that road to his
right. Colonel Thruston immediately rode over the hills
to the gap, and found not only Generals Sheridan and
Davis, but General Negley, also. These generals were
DA VIS MOVES FOR WARD. I4 I
holding a conference at McFarland's. When the message
was delivered Davis turned to his command and put it
in motion to the front, while the other two generals moved
with their troops to Rossville. From that place Sheridan
passed through the gap to the left of the army on the Lafay-
ette road.
After the left wing of Bragg's army had been gathered in
line of battle, before General Thomas' right, or new line, it
was practicable for troops to move across the hills east of
the Dry Valley road to Brannan's position, and the way
was open from McFarland's house through a transverse gap
to Thomas' field-position in the afternoon. Through this
gap a road passed east to the Lafayette road in rear of the
army. The distance from the Dry Valley road to the left
of the line of battle, or Baird's position, was about two miles.
All the troops, therefore, that reached the Dry Valley
early in the afternoon, could have moved across the hills or
through the transverse gap to any point in the line, or they
could have moved South on that road to the immediate
right of Steedman's flank, after he had driven the enemy
from the ridge on the right of Brannan. Colonel Thruston
passed from the extreme right to General Thomas, and so
did Surgeons F. H. Gross, and J. Perkins, medical directors
respectively of the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps. Dr.
Gross was on his way to Crawfish Springs, to look after the
wounded of his corps, when the disaster occurred. He was
unable to reach his destination, but he and Dr. Perkins re-
mained for several hours amongst the retreating troops,
caring for the wounded and Securing, as far as possible,
transportation for them to Chattanooga, and they finally
crossed the Dry Valley road to the rear of Thomas'
line. Two regiments of Van Cleve's division, the Forty-
fourth Indiana and Seventeenth Kentucky, also reached the
new line.
There were from seven to ten thousand men in fighting
condition in the vicinity of McFarland's house by 2 P. M., or
I 42 LIFE OF GENERAI, GEORG E H. THOMAS.
a little later, and if one half of these had been moved against
Bragg's left flank before four o'clock, his army might have
been totally defeated. When Longstreet was fight-
ing cavalry as infantry on that flank, theré was fear of an
attack upon his left. The adjacent hills offered splendid
positions for artillery and for an enfilading fire of artillery
and musketry. But unfortunately there was no general of
rank in that valley to take the responsibility of moving the
idle troops against the enemy at the most vulnerable point in
his line. Had General Rosecrans stopped at McFarland's
house, gathered his broken forces together, and led them
against the enemy on Thomas' line, or to the right of it, he
would have gained the chief glory of a decisive victory.
But in going to Chattanooga in ignorance of the stead-
fastness of the left and the left centre of his army he
lost an opportunity for great distinction. The subjoined
extract from his official report gives the circumstances un-
der which he went to Chattanooga, and the reasons for
his action.
“At the moment of the repulse of Davis' division, I was standing
in the rear of his right, waiting the completion of the closing of
McCook's corps to the left. Seeing confusion among Van Cleve's
troops, and the distance Davis's men were falling back, and the
tide of battle surging toward us, the urgency for Sheridan's troops to
intervene, became imminent, and I hastened in person to the ex-
treme right to direct Sheridan's movements on the flank of the ad-
vancing rebels. It was too late, the crowd of returning troops rolled
back, and the enemy advanced. Giving the troops directions to
rally behind the ridge west of the Dry Valley road, I passed down it
accompanied by General Garfield, Major McMichael and Major
Bond, of my staff, and a few of the escort, under a shower of grape,
canister and musketry for two or three hundred yards, and attempted
to rejoin General Thomas and the troops sent to his support by
passing to the rear of the broken position of our lines, but
found the routed troops far toward the left and hearing the enemy's
advancing musketry and cheers, I became doubtful whether the left
had held its ground and started for Rossville. On consultation and
further reflection, however, I determined to send General Garfield there
while I went to Chattanooga to give orders for the security of the pon-
THE ROCK OF CHIOKAMA UGA. I 43
toon bridges at Battle Creek and Bridgeport and to make preliminary
dispositions either to forward ammunition and supplies should we hold
our ground or to withdraw the troops into good position.”
All these objects could have been attained by orders
issued on the field, except the selection of a good position
for his army in the rear, but a new position was only a
consequence of utter defeat, and as to this General Rose-
crans was in doubt when he left the battle-field.
^ Seldom in war has such a burden of responsibility fallen
upon a subordinate, as upon General Thomas at Chicka-
mauga." The battle was left to him before noon on the
20th. He received no instructions from the commanding
general. He was ignorant of the disaster on the right until
the on-coming left wing of Bragg's army revealed
it. Uninformed as to the general situation, he could not
anticipate emergencies, but he was strong and versatile to
master them as they were developed. It was not a light
matter to command the Army of the Cumberland, as a
whole, against a vast army that had been gathered from the
East and West to crush it; an army superior in numbers,
and inspired by the hope that in winning a decisive victory
the general contest would be decided also. But, to take
command of half of the Army of the Cumberland, with no
supporting cavalry, with exposed flanks, and unconnected
lines—to be supreme on the field by the demands of the
situation rather than by the Orders of a Superior, and under
such circumstances to contend successfully against Bragg's
whole army, infantry and Cavalry, was an achievement
that transcends the higher successes of generals.
X General Thomas did all that was possible with his forces
on both days of battle. He suggested for the whole army a
position whose strength he demonstrated with a part He
discerned the importance of turning all the troops gathered
on the Dry Valley road, against the enemy's left flank. His
generalship in this battle cannot be measured alone by his
success in repulsing all the forces that moved against his
I 44 I, IFE OF GENERAI, G EORG E H THOMAS.
lines on both days. What he suggested, as well as what he
achieved, must be taken to give full breadth to his military
skill. Had his advice been taken, the battle of Chickamauga
would never have been fought, but Chattanooga would have
been fortified from choice, as it afterwards was from neces-
sity. He saved his corps and with it the army, by his cau-
tious advance towards Lafayette. And in the battle which
he would have avoided he used every resource with the
greatest skill to defeat the enemy. ^A general less calm and
self-reliant in undefined emergencies, less stubborn in de-
fense, less quick in disposing troops in the crises of battle,
or less masterful of resources and advantages, would never
have saved the Army of the Cumberland at Chickamauga.
No commanding general fought such a battle during the
war, and no other subordinate commander wrought such a
deliverance for an imperiled army and an imperiled cause.
There was but one Chickamauga and but one Thomas? It
should not therefore be a matter of Surprise that when
General D. H. Hill, after the war, mentioned three distinct
causes for the failure of the Southern arms, one of these
was the stubborn resistance of Thomas in this battle.
Neither is it strange that he was ever afterwards known as
the ROCK OF CHICKAMAUGA. to
After arriving at Chattanooga, General Rosecrans sent
the following despatch to his chief of staff:
CHATTANOOGA, Sept. 20, 1863.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL GARFIELD :
See General McCook and other general officers. Ascertain
extent of disaster as nearly as you can, and report. Tell General
Granger to contest the enemy's advance stubbornly, making them
advance with caution. -
Should General Thomas be retiring in order, tell him to resist
the enemy's advance, retiring on Rossville to-night.
By command of Major-General ROSECRANS.
WM. McMICHAEL,
Maj. and A. D. C.
GARFIELD TO ROSECRANS, I 45
General Garfield sent the subjoined note after joining
Thomas:
HEADQUARTERS GENERAL THOMAS,
Battle-field five miles south of Rossville,
Sept. 20, 1863, 3.45 P. M. (by courier),
GENERAL ROSECRANS
I arrived here ten minutes ago via Rossville. General Thomas
has Brannan's, Baird's, Reynolds', Woods', Palmer's and Johnson's
divisions here, still intact after terrible fighting. Granger is here,
closed up with Thomas, and both are fighting terribly on the right.
Sheridan is in, with the bulk of his division in ragged shape, though
plucky for fight. General Thomas holds his old ground of this
morning. Negley was coming down on Rossville from the road
passing where we saw the trains on our route. I sent word to him to
cover the retreat of trains through Rossville. I also met the Fourth
Independent battery at that place, and posted it in reserve in case of
need. As I turned in from the Rossville road to General Thomas, I
was opened on by a battery; one orderly killed, Captain Graves'
horse killed, my own wounded. The hardest fighting I have seen
to-day is now going on. I hope General Thomas will be able to hold
on here till night, and will not have to fall back farther than Ross-
ville, perhaps not any. All fighting men should be stopped there,
and the Dry Valley road held by them. I think we may retrieve
the disaster of this morning. I never saw better fighting than our
men are now doing. The rebel ammunition must be nearly
exhausted. Ours fast failing. If we can hold out an hour more it
will be all right. Granger thinks we can defeat them badly to-
morrow, if all our forces come in. I think you had better come to
Rossville to-night, and bring ammunition.
Very truly yours,
J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier-General.
To this General Rosecrans replied :
CHATTANOOGA, 9. IO P. M., Sept. 20, 1863.
BRIG.-GEN. GARFIELD, Chief of Staff:
Your despatch of 3.45 received. What you propose is correct.
I have seen Furay, who left at 5 P. M. I trust General Thomas has
been able to hold his position. a
Ammunition will be sent up. -
~ W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.
10
I 46 LIFE OF G EVERAI, G EORG E H THOMAS,
In the evening Thomas received orders from General
Rosecrans to withdraw the army, as shown by General
Thomas' official report, and by General Garfield's letter from
Rossville.
“I soon after received a despatch from General Rosecrans, direct-
ing me to assume command of all the forces, and, with Crittenden
and McCook, take a strong position, and assume a threatening atti-
tude at Rossville, sending the unorganized forces to Chattanooga for
reorganization, stating that he would examine the ground at Chatta-
nooga and then join me; also, that he had sent out rations and am-
munition to meet me at Rossville. I determined to hold the position until
nightfall, if possible, in the mean time sending Captains Barker and
Kellogg to distribute the ammunition, Major Lawrence, my chief of
artillery, having been previously sent to notify the different com-
manders that ammunition would be supplied them shortly. As soon
as they reported the distribution of the ammunition, I directed Cap-
tain Willard to inform the division commanders to prepare to with-
draw their commands as soon as they received orders.”
At 5.30 P.M., General Reynolds was directed to with-
draw from position and form a line near the Ridge road,”
to cover the retirement of the other divisions. In moving
as directed, General Reynolds encountered a brigade of the
enemy's troops that had moved round his right flank to his
rear. This brigade was routed by Turchin's brigade, and
was finally driven round Baird's flank by Willich's brigade
of Johnson's division.
When Reynolds' division had formed near the road, the
divisions, as rapidly as practicable, left the line and moved
towards Rossville. Baird, Johnson and Palmer were
attacked as they withdrew, and this fact gave the Confed-
erate generals opportunity to report that their last attack
dislodged our forces.
General Thomas and his troops had doubtless prepared
the way for a victory on the 21st, if the Army of the Cum-
berland had been gathered together in front of the enemy dur-
* The one leading through the gap to the Dry Valley road at McFarland's,
WITHD R A WS TO ROSS VILLE. I 47
ing the night of the 20th. General Bragg's army was not
in condition to renew the conflict. He had lost at least
two-fifths of his men, the remaining three-fifths had been
shattered, and he had no reserves. After such repulses and
losses, he could not have taken the offensive vigorously on
the 21st. But in a battle on the 21st General Rosecrans could
have had nearly, or quite, twice as many troops as fought
under Thomas on the afternoon of the 20th. Sheridan's divi-
sion, Spear's brigade of fresh troops, Col. Dan. McCook's bri-
gade, which had been only slightly engaged, and Minty's
brigade of cavalry could have been thrown on the left of
Thomas' line; while the troops of Davis, Negley and Van
Cleve, Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry, and five brigades
of Cavalry, could have moved against Bragg's left flank.
It is true that the condition of the enemy was not then
known, but the fact that Thomas had held his position
against Bragg's entire army would, doubtless, have sug-
gested to a commanding general who was on the field and
cognizant of the condition and positions of all his divisions
and brigades, that it was possible to defeat the enemy by
taking the offensive on the 21st. But General Rosecrans
was too far away to apprehend the situation and make pro-
vision for another battle on the field of Chickamauga.
As soon as his troops were in motion towards Rossville,
General Thomas rode thither, and, upon arrival, commenced
the formation of the army to resist the advance of the
enemy. He placed Crittenden's corps on Missionary Ridge
to the left of the Ringgold Gap, near Rossville,_his own
corps covering that gap and extending to the right upon
the Dry Valley road; McCook's across the valley towards
Chattanooga Creek, and the cavalry still further to the
right. The enemy approached very cautiously the next
day, but beyond an artillery duel there was no fighting.
At 8.40 P. M. General Garfield sent the following Com-
munication by telegraph :
I 48 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORGE H, THOMAS.
HEADQUARTERS DEPT OF THE CUMBERLAND.
Rossville, Georgia, 8.40 P.M., Sept. 20, 1863.
MAJOR GENERAL ROSECRANS:
I have this moment returned from the front. I wrote you a long
despatch as I arrived on the field and while the battle was in pro-
gress, but it was so difficult to get communication to the rear that I
fear you have not yet received it. Thomas has kept Baird's, Brannan's
Reynold's Woods' and Palmer's divisions in good order and has
maintained almost the exact position he occupied this morning, ex-
cept that his right has swung back nearly at right angles with the
Gordon's Mills and Rossville road. Negley has stopped about six
thousand men at this place. Sheridan gathered fifteen hundred of
his division and reached a point three miles South of here at Sunset;
Davis is here with his brigade. General Thomas has fought a most
terrific battle and has damaged the enemy badly. General Gran-
ger's troops moved up just in time and fought magnificently. From
the time I reached the battle-field, 3.45 P. M., till sunset the fight
was by far the fiercest I have ever seen ; our men not only held their
ground, but at many points drove the enemy splendidly. Long-
street's Virginians have got their bellies full. Nearly every division
on the field exhausted its ammunition—got supplies and exhausted
it again. Turchin's brigade charged the rebel lines and took five
hundred prisoners, became enveloped, swept around behind their
lines and cut its way out in another place but abandoned his prison-
ers. Another brigade was attacked just at the close of the fight,
and its ammunition being exhausted, it went in with the bayonet and
drove the rebels, taking over two hundred prisoners and have got
them yet. On the whole General Thomas and General Granger
have done the enemy fully as much injury to-day as they have suf-
fered from him, and they have successfully repelled the repeated
combined attacks, most fiercely made, of the whole rebel army, fre-
quently pressing the front and both our flanks at the same time.
The disaster on the right cannot of course be estimated now ; it must
be very considerable in men and material, especially the latter. The
rebels have, however, done their best to-day, and I believe we can
whip them to-morrow. I believe we can now crown the whole bat-
tle with victory. Granger regards them as thoroughly whipped to-
night, and thinks they would not renew the fight were we to remain
on the field. Clouds of dust to the eastward and northward seem to
indicate some movements to our left. Sheridan thinks they may be
projecting to come in directly on Chattanooga. I don't think so.
Your order to retire on this place was received a little after Sunset
and communicated to Generals Thomas and Granger. The troops
THE ARMY WITHDRAWN TO CHATTANOOGA. 149
are now moving back and will be here in good shape and strong
position before morning. I hope you will not budge an inch from
this place but come up early in the morning, and if the rebels try it
on accommodate them. General Mitchell left Crawfish Springs at 5
P. M. Our trains are reported safe with him. We have not heard
from General McCook. General Crittenden is reported with you.
General Lytle killed ; also Col. King and many officers. If I am not
needed at headquarters to-night, I will stay here ; I am half dead
with fatigue. Answer if I can do anything here.
J. A. GARFIELD,
Brig. Gen. Chief of Staff.
To this despatch the following reply was sent:
CHATTANOOGA, 9.30 P. M. Sept. 20, 1863.
BRIG. GEN. GARFIELD, Chief of Staff.
You may stay all night if the enemy are drifting towards our left.
Rossville position all right. Provision and ammunition have been
ordered up. I like your suggestions.
W. S. ROSECRANS.
Maj. Genl.
General Thomas considered the position untenable, since
all the gaps south of Rossville had been given to the enemy,
who could concentrate through them against General
McCook, and, by pressing him back, cut off the other
corps from Chattanooga. Thomas therefore advised Gen.
Rosecrans to withdraw the army to the town. And, in an-
ticipation of an order for this movement, he made prepara-
tions during the day for its execution at night. He received
orders at 6 P. M. to withdraw, and, in consequence of the
anticipatory preparations, the whole army, without the loss
of a man, moved to position before Chattanooga by 7 o'clock
the next morning. The fortifications, commenced on the
21st, were carried to completion as soon as practicable, when
the army was safe from all danger except starvation.
General Longstreet was opposed to the attempt to besiege
Chattanooga, and proposed to General Bragg that his army
should cross the Tennessee River east of the town, and by
operating northward, force Rosecrans to fall back to Nash-
I 50 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS.
ville: and after this had been effected, if insufficient trans-
portation should prevent a direct advance to the north, to
follow the railroad to Knoxville, destroy Burnside and then
from that point threaten General Rosecrans' communica-
tions north of Nashville. But General Bragg rejected this
plan, because in his view it was forbidden by military con-
siderations, as well as, by insufficient transportation. Be-
lieving that he could force General Rosecrans to abandon
Chattanooga, by preventing the passage of his supply trains
from Bridgeport, Bragg disposed his infantry and cavalry
so as to bring starvation to the army which he failed to
crush at Chickamauga.
NOTE.-In his account of the battle of Chickamauga, published in the Wash-
ington National ZYibune of March 25th, 1882, General Rosecrans has made this
Statement : -
“General Thomas, in the exercise of the discretion he had from me, withdrew
the troops from position to Rossville, where they were formed in line of battle,
where we remained through the next day.
But while this assertion directly contradicts the statements of Generals Thomas
and Garfield, it is not congruous with the following extract from General Rose-
crans' sworn testimony, given at Louisville, February 4th, 1864:
“The next time I saw him " (General McCook) “he arrived at Chattanooga
and reported to me at Wagner's Headquarters—I should think about 4.30 or
5 P. M. I directed him to wait a short time until I should hear from General
Garfield's report from the extreme front, informing him that he still held the
field, that Granger had gone up from Rossville, that portions of his and Critten-
den's corps were reported near Rossville, and that the arrival of a further report
from General Garfield would enable me to give him more definite instructions—
both to him and General Crittenden. On the arrival of the report from General
Garfield, I read it to him, or stated its substance, and directed him to go out to
Rossville and assume command of his corps, that he would occupy a position
near there, which General Thomas had been directed to select. This was given
to General McCook about 9.30 o'clock P. M.”
CHAPTER VIII.
GENERAL THOMAS ASSIGNED TO THE COMMAND OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
CUMBERLAND –HE RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTs—oper ATIONs to RELIEVE
THE ARMY FROM STARVATION.—PROPOSED ATTACK UPON THE ENEMY'S
POSITION. -
OON after the army was established in Chattanooga
a rumor obtained in the camps that General Thomas
was to succeed General Rosecrans. To free himself from
the imputation of intriguing against his commander, and
to express a deliberate conclusion, Thomas declared that he
would not accept the command of the army. He did this,
after the closing statements of the following despatch had
been communicated to him.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., Sept. 30, 1863.
C. A. DANA,
Nashville.
If Hooker's command gets safely through, all that the Army of
the Cumberland can need will be a competent commander. The
merits of General Thomas and the debt of gratitude, the Nation owes
to his valor and skill, are fully appreciated here; and I wish you to tell
him so. It is not my fault that he was not in chief command months
ago. - EDWIN M. STANTON.
Mr. Dana, who at the time was Assistant-Secretary of
War, inferred that Mr. Stanton alluded to President Lin-
coln, and in making known to Thomas the second sentence
Of the above despatch, attributed it to the President as well
as to the Secretary of War. With the manifestation of strong
feeling General Thomas requested Mr. Dana to say to both,
I5 I
I 52 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H, THOMAS.
that the knowledge of their appreciation of his services was
exceedingly grateful to him. But in reply to the statement
of Mr. Stanton in respect to chief command, he asked Mr.
Dana to state, that, “he certainly should be glad to hold an
independent command—to command an army;-but he
wished it distinctly understood that he could not consent,
under any circumstances that he could imagine, to take the
command held by General Rosecrans.” He made known
this decision with great earnestness.
When he first met Mr. Dana after his appointment to suc-
ceed Rosecrans, General Thomas said, “Well, you have got
ahead of me, this time, and I have no option but to obey
orders; but, I assure you, I never obeyed an order more re-
luctantly than this one.” This assignment was made October
16th, 1863, by General Orders No. 337, War Department,
which also appointed General Grant to command the Military
Division of the Mississippi, embracing the Departments and
Armies of the Tennessee, the Cumberland and the Ohio.
General Thomas’ reluctance to supersede General Rose-
crans did not result from lack of confidence in himself, nor
from distrust of the morale of his army, but mainly from
his fear of external complications. He knew that General
Rosecrans had been complicated politically, and not having
been fully acquainted with the cause he feared that he would
be similarly involved. He entertained the opinion from the
beginning to the close of the war, that military consider-
ations should alone rule in Shaping military operations; and
he desired no preferment for himself which could be gained
by political influence, or would entail political entangle-
ments. Besides, his assignment to supersede General Rose-
crans was objectionable for the same reason that had induced
him to request the restoration of General Buell to command,
after he had himself been named as his successor in orders
from Washington. He had fully sympathized with General
Rosecrans in his efforts to hold Chattanooga, and doubtless
thought that he should have had a fair opportunity to solve
JHIS LOYALTY TO ROSECRANS, I 53
the problem entailed by the battle of Chickamauga. The
fact that General Rosecrans had not taken his advice, to
concentrate his army at Chattanooga and establish secure
communications with Nashville when he had opportunity to
do so, did not affect his loyalty to his commander. He al-
ways decided questions of official duty unbiased by consid-
erations of personal advantage. He had protested against
the assignment of General Rosecrans over himself to com-
mand the Army of the Cumberland from regard to an im-
portant principle in the administration of military affairs;
but was now unwilling to supersede him in spite of the
fact that Rosecrans' Commission had been arbitrarily ante-
dated. Thus anxious, as he frankly expressed himself to
be, to command an army, he was still unwilling to accept
Such command unless it came to him without the men-
ace of political complications, and without the humiliation
of another general. He was, doubtless, over sensitive as to
his own liability to imputed intrigue for advancement, and
Over reluctant to accept a command in room of another
general. But these errors, if errors they should be called,
evinced on the one hand his abhorrence of unfair means of
Securing promotion, and on the other, unusual magnanimity.
General Rosecrans was aware of Thomas' unwillingness
to assume command of the army, and consequently yielded
his position with the kindest feelings.
In General Thomas' report to the Committee on the
Conduct of the War, he thus referred to the strength and
condition of the army at the time he assumed command.
The Department and Army of the Cumberland at that time com-
prised the following commands: the Fourth and Fourteenth army
Corps, at Chattanooga, three divisions of cavalry, the local garrisons of
Middle Tennessee, and the Eleventh and Twelfth army corps under
command of Major-General Joseph Hooker, just arrived from the
East, whence they had been despatched to reënforce the army at
Chattanooga, and which were, at the time of my assuming command,
guarding the railroad from Bridgeport to Nashville. The forces at
Chattanooga were in a very precarious condition from the difficulty
I54 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
of obtaining supplies, the only means of procuring which was by
wagons and over sixty miles of almost impassable mountain roads,
the enemy holding the river and the railroad between Chattanooga and
Bridgeport; and his cavalry had destroyed one large train laden with
supplies, numbering over three hundred wagons, on its way from
Bridgeport to Chattanooga. The question of holding Chattanooga
was them simply that of supplies. The animals were perishing by
hundreds daily, and the men were suffering from the Scantiness of
food; but they bore up cheerfully under their difficulties, appreci-
ating the impossibility of giving up Chattanooga, and inspired their
officers with renewed confidence in their self-sacrificing devotion. *
The first duty, therefore, of the new commander was the
deliverance of his army from the starvation which threat-
ened its hold upon Chattanooga, if not its own existence;
and fresh from his parting with General Rosecrans,
General Thomas addressed himself to the imperative work.
His first order, issued before he had formally assumed
command of the army, had reference to the movement of
Hooker's forces to Chattanooga, which had been projected
by General Rosecrans :
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
October 19, 1863—II P. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER,
Stevenson.
Major-Gen. G. H. Thomas directs me to state, that in obedience to
the order of the President of the United States he has assumed com-
mand of the Department of the Cumberland. He desires that you
will use all possible despatch in concentrating your command, and
preparing to move in accordance with the instructions of General
Rosecrans, leaving proper railroad guards
J. J. REYNOLDs,
Major-General and Chief of Staff.
This order was exceedingly courteous to General Rose-
crans; in giving a copy of it to the Committee on the Con-
duct of the War, General Thomas thus explained his action:
* Report to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, p. 117.
PLANS FOR RELIEF I 55
The instructions referred to in the above order, were to concen-
trate as much of his (Hooker's) command at Bridgeport as he could
safely spare from guarding the railroad between that point and Nash-
ville, and to hold himself in readiness to move at any moment
towards Chattanooga for the purpose of opening communication
with that place by river and by rail.
But no definite plan had yet been devised to gain posses-
Sion of the left bank of the Tennessee River, so as to sup-
port Hooker's advance with forces from Chattanooga.
Such was the condition of the army, that immediate steps
must be taken to open the Tennessee and the short
roads to Bridgeport, or the withdrawal of that army from
Chattanooga would be unavoidable. That no plan for at-
taining this object had been definitely formed, is evident
from the following statements by General Thomas :
Before he was relieved in command of the Department of the
Cumberland, General Rosecrans and his chief engineer, Brigadier-
General W. F. Smith, had consulted together as to means of relieving
the army at Chattanooga from the perilous condition it was in, owing
to the great difficulty of obtaining supplies, and had partially planned
the movement which was left to me to be completed when I assumed
Command, namely, to open a short route of supplies from Bridge-
port. i.
General Thomas was too just to permit, by his own
silence, the credit of a successful movement which he
had not originated to be given to himself. He there-
fore repeated General Rosecrans' instructions to General
Hooker, and disclaimed any other relation to the definite
plan proposed by General Smith, than approval and gen-
erous support in its execution. General Hooker could not
move with safety from Bridgeport until measures had been
taken to drive the enemy from the left bank of the Ten-
nessee River. Had his command moved into Lookout
Valley before support was practicable from Chattanooga,
* Report to the Joint Committee on the-Conduct of the War, p. 118.
f Ibid.
I56 LIFE OF GENERAL, G EORGE H. THOMAS.
General Bragg could have sent an overwhelming force
against him, and the army at Chattanooga would only
have witnessed the failure of the effort to avert starvation.
The definite plan was so evidently originated by General
Smith, that General Thomas gave him credit for its con-
ception and execution.*
The despatches sent by General Rosecrans at the close
of the battle of Chickamauga had so plainly revealed his
fear that he could not hold Chattanooga, that it was imag-
ined in Washington that he would needlessly abandon the
place. And doubtless General Grant's first despatch to
Thomas indicated some anxiety lest he should with-
draw the army before Grant could himself reach Chat-
tanooga. On the 19th of October he telegraphed : “Hold
Chattanooga at all hazards.” The terse reply of Thomas,
“We will hold the town till we starve” was equally the
expression of his own purpose and that of his army.
This bold answer had this significance also-the confi-
dence of General Thomas in his army, He knew that its
morale had been exceedingly good from the day it retired
from the battle-field of Chickamauga. In leaving that field
there had been no panic—no hurried retreat, even by those
troops who, through no fault of their own, were forced to
fight on conditions which forbade success. But the troops
on the right who lost their position, and those who with-
stood the whole Confederate army until they were with-
drawn by orders, were in no respect, except from the loss
of material, unfitted for the immediate renewal of the con-
flict. And no army had ever endured the reduction of its
ration to one-half, one-third, and one-fourth, with less Com-
plaint and less demoralization. The necessity of this re-
duction was apparent to every soldier, and every Soldier
* In his report to the Joint Com. on the Conduct of the War he said: “To
Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, chief engineer, should be accorded great praise
for the ingenuity which conceived, and the ability which executed the movement
at Brown's Ferry.”
ASSUMES COMMAND. 157
was as unwilling as the commanding general to abandon
Chattanooga.
On the 20th of October, General Thomas, in the follow-
ing order, assumed the command to which he had been as-
signed : º
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, Tenn., Oct. 20, 1863.
In obedience to the orders of the President of the United States,
the undersigned hereby assumes command of the Department and
Army of the Cumberland.
In assuming the control of this army, so long and ably com-
manded by Major-General Rosecrans, the undersigned confidently
relies upon the hearty coöperation of every officer and soldier of the
Army of the Cumberland, to enable him to perform the arduous duties
devolved upon him.
The officers on duty at the various departments of the staff, at
these headquarters, will continue in their respective places.
All orders heretofore published for the government of this army
will remain in full force until further orders.
GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. Vols.
General Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the evening of
October 23d. With his coming, General Thomas, though
an army commander, became subordinate to an imme-
diate Superior in rank, and as completely subject to di-
rection in handling his army as he had previously been in
the management of his corps He therefore made known
to General Grant, at once, the scheme which had been de-
vised for the relief of the army. The plan had been per-
fected in all its details, and needed only the approval of
General Grant. On the 24th, Generals Grant, Thomas,
and W. F. Smith, with other general and subordinate offi-
cers, examined the river below Chattanooga, William's
Island, and the hills on both banks of the river, in reference
to the proposed plan of operations. General Grant ap-
proved this plan and ordered its immediate execution.
I 58 LIFE OF GENERAL, G EORG E H. THOMAS
Thereupon, Thomas telegraphed definite instructions to
Hooker in reference to his movement, and promised him
coöperation from Chattanooga. General Hooker replied,
that he would commence his movement at daylight on the
27th. Orders were then issued for the coöperative move-
ments. Two brigades—Hazen's and Turchin's—and three
batteries of artillery under Major John Mendenhall, were
given to General W. F. Smith for his operations. His
plan provided that fifteen hundred men, with a sufficient
force of pontoniers, should embark on pontoons, and, at
night, glide past Lookout Mountain, held almost to the edge
of the water by the enemy's pickets, and debark on the left
bank of the river, just above Brown's Ferry.
For this service a part of General Hazen's brigade, under
his own command, was taken. The remainder of this bri-
gade, Gen. Turchin's brigade and the artillery were ordered
to march across the peninsula formed by the course of the
river, and take position on the wooded hill-side near the
ferry, to cover the troops on the pontoons should they fail
to land on the left bank, or to join them on that bank in
the event of their success. This expedition was eminently
successful. The pontoon boats hugging the right bank of
the Tennessee glided by the frowning mountain, gleaming
here and there with the enemy's camp-fires, and the troops,
with slight opposition, gained the left bank at the designated
place. A pontoon bridge was soon thrown by a detach-
ment of trained men from the First Michigan Mechan-
ics and Engineers, under Captain P. V. Fox, and fortifica-
tions for the two brigades were constructed on the enemy's
side of the river. Having accomplished all that the plan
of operations required of them, these troops were in posi-
tion to welcome Hooker's column to Lookout Valley in the
evening. And then the Tennessee River from Bridgeport to
Chattanooga was held by the coöperating forces.
In view of the fact that General Bragg's hope of regain-
ing Chattanooga depended upon his continued grasp of the
BROWN’S FERR Y. I 59
river and the short roads to Bridgeport, it is inexplicable that
he did not resist the advance of Hooker. He did attempt
late at night to cut off Geary's division of the Twelfth
Corps at Wauhatchie ; but failing in this he abandoned all
effort to intercept the newly established communications of
the beleaguered army.
The problem of supplies was thus brilliantly solved. The
boldness of the plan, the nice adjustment of all its details
and the importance of the results place these operations
among the prominent achievements of the war.
General Grant was as explicit as Thomas in denying any
connection with the plan beyond approval. On the 26th
of October, he sent the following despatch to Washington :
HEADQ'RS MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI,
Chattanooga, October 26, 1863.
MAJOR GENERAL HALLECK,
Washington,
* * * General Thomas had also set on foot before my arrival a plan
for getting possession of the river from a point below Lookout Moun-
tain to Bridgeport. If successful, and I think it will be, the question
of supplies will be fully settled. * * * *
U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.
Two days later he again telegraphed in relation to this
plan :
CHATTANOOGA, OCTOBER 28, 1863.
General Thomas' plan for securing the river and south side road
hence to Bridgeport has proved eminently successful. The question
of supplies may now be regarded as settled. If the rebels give us
one week more time I think all danger of losing territory now held
by us will have passed away, and preparations may soon commence
for offensive operations.
U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.
General Thomas fully sympathized with General Grant in
his purpose to take the offensive, although it will appear that
these generals twice differed as to the time for aggression.
On November 7th General Grant learned that Bragg
I 6O LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS,
had sent Longstreet's corps into East Tennessee, to wrest
Knoxville from General Burnside, and capture his army
or drive it back into Kentucky. As no direct assistance
from Chattanooga was then possible Thomas was ordered
to take the offensive immediately. The instructions given
him embraced objects and methods.
HEADQ'RS MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI,
Chattanooga, Tenn., November 7, 1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Commanding Department of the Cumberland.
GENERAL :—News just received from Major-General Burnside,
taken in connection with information given by a deserter just in, whose
statement you have, is of such a nature that it becomes an impera-
tive duty for your forces to draw the attention of the enemy from
Burnside to your own front. Already the enemy have attacked
Burnside's most easterly garrison of two regiments and a battery,
capturing the battery and about half of the forces. This corrobo-
rates the statement of the Georgia lieutenant as to the designs and
present movements of the enemy.
I deem the best movement to attract the enemy, to be an attack on
the northern end of Missionary Ridge with all the force you can bring
to bear against it, and when that is carried, to threaten and even at-
tack, if possible, the enemy's line of communications between Dal-
ton and Cleveland. -
Rations should be ready to issue a sufficiency to last four days,
the moment Missionary Ridge is in our possession—rations to be
carried in haversacks. Where there are not horses to move the artil-
lery, mules must be taken from the teams or horses from ambulances,
or if necessary, officers dismounted and their horses taken.
In view of so many troops having been taken from this valley and
from Lookout, Howard's corps of Hooker's command can be used in
this movement,
Immediate preparations should be made to carry these directions
into execution, The movement should not be made one moment
later than to-morrow morning.
You having been over this country and having had a better oppor-
tunity of studying it than myself, the details are left to you.
I am General,
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.
A TTACK POSTPONED. I 6 I
As soon as General Thomas received this order he sent
for General W. F. Smith, and the following quotation from
the letter of General Smith to the writer, under date of
April 7th, 1882, gives the conference and its result:
General Thomas said, that taking into account his numbers and
Condition, and the numbers and situation of the enemy, that the car-
rying out of the order meant disaster to us, and that I must endeavor
to get the order countermanded, and wait for Sherman’s army to
arrive.
After a somewhat protracted conversation, I suggested to him that
he should go up on the right bank of the river with me opposite to
the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and make an examination, to
which he assented, and we went up as far as the mouth of Chicka-
mauga Creek.
From there we made a scrutiny of the character of the ground and
the position of the right of the enemy on the ridge as marked by
their works and smokes, and it was evident that General Thomas, with
his command, could not turn the right of Bragg’s army without un-
covering Chattanooga. We then returned, and I went to the head-
quarters of General Grant, and reported the result of the reconnois-
sance, and told him in my judgment it was absolutely necessary to
wait for the arrival of Sherman’s army before attempting any
m Overment. .
The order was at once countermanded.
In his report and other official utterances, General Grant
gave his reasons for this action. In his report he thus
referred to his order and its revocation :
Ascertaining from scouts and deserters that Bragg was detaching
Longstreet from the front, and moving him in the direction of Knox-
ville, Tenn., evidently to attack Burnside, and feeling strongly the
necessity of some move that would compel him to retain his forces
and recall those he had detached, directions were given for a move-
ment against Missionary Ridge, with a view to carrying it, and
threatening the enemy’s communications with Longstreet, of which
I informed Burnside by telegraph on the seventh of November.
After a thorough reconnoissance of the ground, however, it was
deemed utterly impracticable to make the move until Sherman
could get up, because of the inadequacy of our forces, and the con-
dition of the animals then at Chattanooga ; and I was forced to leave
II
I 62 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS.
Burnside, for the present, to contend against superior forces of the
enemy, until the arrival of Sherman with his men and means of
transportation.”
In a despatch to General Halleck, November 21st,
General Grant again referred to this projected movement:
I ordered an attack here two weeks ago, but it was impossible to
move artillery. Now Thomas’ chief of artillery says he has to bor-
row teams from Sherman to move a part of his artillery to where it
is to be used. Sherman has used almost superhuman efforts to get
up even at this time, and his force is really the only one that I can
move. Thomas can take about one gun to each battery, and can go
as far with infantry as his men can carry rations to keep them and
bring them back. I have never felt such restlessness before as I have
at the fixed and immovable condition of the Army of the Cumber-
land. The quartermaster-general states that the loss of animals
here will exceed ten thousand. Those left are scarcely able to carry
themselves.
Professor Coppee, General Grant's first biographer, makes
a statement in accord with the passage above quoted:
His (Grant's) first idea was to attack Missionary Ridge without
delay, and of this plan he informed Burnside, telling him to hold
Knoxville to the last extremity. But a sober second-thought, suggest-
ed by that calm prudence, which is one of his best characteristics,
prompted him to wait the arrival of Sherman and his army, and thus
by skill and carefulness to leave little to chance. *
Had this projected movement been subsequently repre-
sented in history in harmony with these quotations, no fur-
ther reference to it would be necessary in this Biography.
But as Badeau has made statements so radically different,
their examination is imperative. This author states:
But Thomas announced that he had no horses to move his artil-
lery, and declared himself entirely and absolutely unable to move
until Sherman should arrive to coöperate. * * * * Neverthe-
less, Thomas' delay was a great disappointment. A prompt
* Grant and his Campaigns, p. 220.
SELF-FELIANT. I63
movement on the part of that commander would undoubtedly have
had the effect to recall Longstreet; but now it was possible that the
troops sent into East Tennessee might succeed in overthrowing the
occupation which was so important. * -
To emphasize this view of the case, the same author, in
closing his account of the battle of Nashville, thus refers
to the operations at Chattanooga, in connection with his idea
of Thomas' character:
Grant knew all this well. The same traits which were exhibited in
the Nashville campaign he had seen evinced at Chattanooga a year
before. The same provoking, obstinate delay before the battle, the
same splendid, victorious, irresistible energy afterwards. He believed,
indeed, in Thomas, more than Thomas did in himself. The subor-
dinate always shrank from responsibility.” +
He supports the assumption expressed in the last of these
sentences by a quotation from one of General Sherman's
letters to himself:
“Thomas always shrank from Supreme command and consequent
responsibility. i
These positive statements are utterly erroneous. Thomas
never shrank from Supreme command unless the conditions
of holding it were repugnant to him. He never shunned
responsibility when corresponding independence and ade-
quate resources were given to him. No man ever believed
in Thomas more fully than Thomas believed in himself. A
more self-reliant general never commanded in battle, a
more symmetrical soldier never lived. His forcefulness in
battle was the offspring of the same traits of character that
made him reluctant to fight when he could not command
adequate resources, or when additional preparations would
magnify success. This illogical jumble of praise and dis-
paragement evinces an utter misapprehension of the cha-
racter and generalship of Thomas.
* Mil, Hist. U. S. Grant. Vol. I. pp. 463,464.
f Mil. Hist, U. S. Grant. Vol. III., pp. 279, 28o. i Ibid. p. 28O.
I64 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS,
But General Thomas did not delay on the 7th of
November. He simply convinced General Grant that the
operations which he had ordered were utterly impracti-
cable. There was no room for delay since Grant counter-
manded the movement before the time for its execution.
Badeau has been exceedingly rash in asserting so posi-
tively, that “a prompt movement’’ on the part of Thomas
“would undoubtedly have recalled Longstreet.” If he has
done this by authority the case is better for himself, but
worse for General Grant. In the light of the subsequent
battle at Chattanooga, a careful historian, critic, or general
would be reluctant to put it beyond doubt that the execu-
tion of Grant's order of the 7th, would have recalled
Longstreet from East Tennessee. His recall was only one
of the objects announced for attainment by the execution
of this order. General Grant's objects, then, were identical
with those proposed for the subsequent battle, which was
fought upon conditions radically different from those ex-
isting on the 7th ; and although in that action all the other
objects named were attained, Longstreet was not recalled
from East Tennessee. -
On the 25th of November General Sherman led a
larger force against the northern extremity of Mis-
sionary Ridge, without success, than General Thomas
could have safely taken from Chattanooga on the 8th.
And when Sherman made his attack there were two other
offensive columns threatening the enemy's centre and left
flank. On the 8th, General Thomas had five divisions in
Chattanooga, three in Lookout Valley and one between
that valley and Bridgeport. Had Howard's corps been
withdrawn from Hooker, the latter would have had only
one small division with which to guard several miles of
the most exposed part of the vital communications with
Bridgeport. Besides it would have been difficult to deter-
mine how many of the remaining seven divisions could be
safely withdrawn from the long line of fortifications, stretch-
J) ANG ERO US POSSIBILITIES. I 65
ing around Chattanooga from river to river. And when the
attacking column, Composed of four, five or six divisions,
had reached the northern end of Missionary Ridge, Thomas'
army would have to be divided into four parts, and the
parts so widely separated that direct coöperation would
have been impossible.
General Bragg had eight divisions on his line after
the departure of Longstreet's Corps, and each of these,
except the one on the Summit of Lookout Mountain,
was nearer Chattanooga and Lookout Valley than the
point designated for Thomas' attack. Grant's plan of
operations opened up Several promising possibilities to
the enemy. Bragg could have massed his forces to
resist Thomas, interposed his army between Thomas
and Chattanooga, overwhelmed Hooker in Lookout Val-
ley, or stormed the fortifications of Chattanooga, had
they been held by a slender line of troops. In fine, the
Confederate army could have acted as a unit against the
smaller National army in fragments. Bragg would have
had choice of offense or defense, with greatly superior
advantages for either. If, therefore, the appointments of
the Army of the Cumberland had been complete, General
Thomas' reluctance to fight the enemy on the 8th of
November would have been justified by other circum-
StanceS.
In view of these facts, and in the light of the battle, fought
Soon after, there are doubtless many men having some
knowledge of war and of history, who will not admit the
truth of Badeau's assumption that the action prescribed for
Thomas by General Grant's order of November 7th would
have recalled Longstreet. This result would have been
improbable, even if a successful attack had been made by
Thomas on the northern end of Missionary Ridge, since,
according to the plan of operations, the dislodgement of the
enemy was to be supplemented by the rupture of the Com-
munications between Bragg and East Tennessee, and
I 66 LIFE OF GENERAL, GEORG E H, THOMAS.
by throwing the National army west of his communica-
tions with Dalton.
Badeau has not explained the discrepancy between his
own statements and those of General Grant. It is, there-
fore, left to conjecture whether this disagreement has re-
sulted from inexcusably careless writing, misapprehension
of the facts, or malign purpose on the part of Badeau, or a
change in the views of General Grant since the publication
of his official utterances.
During the ten days next following the revocation of
General Grant's order preparations for offensive operations
were prosecuted with great vigor.
On the 27th of October General Thomas was appointed a
brigadier general in the United States Army. This was
not a prompt recognition of his services in the battle of
Chickamauga. To have full force, a complimentary pro-
motion must tread on the heel of the achievements which
make it appropriate and necessary.
CHAPTER IX.
PLAN OF BATTLE OF CHATTANOoGA.—ADVANCE OF THE CENTRAL FORCEs,
NOVEMBER 231)—HOOKER'S ACTION ON LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, ON THE
24TH–SHERMAN'S ACTION ON THE 25TH-FINAL ASSAULT.
HE features of General Grant's final plan of battle at
Chattanooga, Tennessee, were definitely set forth in
his instructions to Generals Thomas and Sherman on No-
vember 18th, 1863. These generals were directed to pre-
pare for battle on the 21st. The following letter indicates
the plan of the commanding general :—
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Chattanooga, Tenn., Nov. 18, 1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS,
Commanding Department and Army of the Cumberland:
GENERAL:—All preparations should be made for attacking the
enemy's position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday morning at day-
light. Not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs
of the mountain, and other places, such definite instructions cannot be
given as might be desirable. However, the general plan you under-
stand, is for Sherman, with his force brought with him strengthened
by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennes-
see River just below the mouth of the Chickamauga; his crossing to
be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the
river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to carry the heights
from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel, before the
enemy can concentrate a force against him.
You will coöperate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga
Valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only
the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre,
and a movable column of one division, in readiness to move where-
167
I 68 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS,
ever ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly as
possible, on the most practicable line for making an attack up the
valley. Your effort will then be to form a junction with Sherman,
making your advance well towards the north end of Missionary
Ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible.
The junction once formed, and the ridge carried, communications
will be at once established between the two armies, by roads on the
south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on
those of the enemy.
Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily held by Geary's division,
and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old Army
of the Cumberland. Howard’s Corps can then be held in readiness
to act either with you at Chattanooga, or with Sherman. It should
be marched on Friday night to a position on the north side of the
river, not lower down than the first pontoon bridge, and there held
in readiness for such orders as may become necessary.
All the troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations in
their haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the
person of each infantry soldier.
Special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammu-
nition is not wasted, or unnecessarily fired away. You will call on
the engineering department for such preparations as you may deem
necessary for crossing your infantry and artillery over Citico Creek.
I am, General, -
Very respectfully, Your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
Major General U. S. V. Commanding.
The plan thus defined was a modification of a previous
one which had been formed before General Sherman arrived
at Chattanooga, and which involved an attack upon Look-
out Mountain. This attack was abandoned in consequence
of a reconnoissance on the north bank of the river by
Generals Grant, Thomas, Sherman, W. F. Smith, chief
engineer, and J. M. Brannan, chief of artillery of the Army
of the Cumberland, which had developed the fact that the
northern heights of Missionary Ridge were not occupied
by the enemy in force. The reason for this change of plan
is thus given in General Grant's official report:-
Upon further consideration, the great object being to mass all
GRANT"S PLAN. - I69
forces possible against one given point, namely, Missionary Ridge,
converging toward the northern end of it, it was deemed best to
change the original plan so far as it contemplated Hooker's attack
on Lookout Mountain, which would give us Howard's corps of his
command to aid in this purpose; and on the 18th the following in-
structions were given to Thomas. *
This final plan defines but one aggressive movement com-
bining the offensive strength of the armies of Thomas and
Sherman. To the latter was given the initiative against the
northern heights of Missionary Ridge, and to the former,
subsequent coöperation in Sweeping the enemy from the
ridge. There can be no accurate analysis of this battle
that is not based upon General Grant's avowed object of
massing all his available forces towards the northern ex-
tremity of Missionary Ridge, that by Sherman's initial
attack and Thomas' subsequent coöperation he might dis-
lodge the enemy and drive him away from his communi-
cations. To this object Grant most persistently adhered,
even after it was known that the anticipated conditions did
not exist. And it is absolutely certain that the actual ope-
rations of the battle, other than Sherman's effort “to carry
the ridge to about the tunnel” in independent movement,
were not indicated in the pre-announced plan of battle. If,
as several historians have asserted, General Grant's instruc-
tions to his chief subordinates were the history of the battle
in outline, the objects and relations of the operations of
the actual battle would have been distinctly mentioned
in these instructions. But if the only pre-directed
movement attempted beyond those that were plainly
preparatory, was Sherman's effort to carry the ridge to the
tunnel, and this failed, then Grant's pre-announced plan of
battle did not give the history of the actual conflict even in
outline. It is assumed in this history that the battle of
Chattanooga was not fought according to Grant's plan
in a single successful movement, beyond those of prepara-
* These are the instructions given by the order already quoted.
I 7o LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H, THOMAS,
tion, and that the influence of General Thomas gave shape
to a successful action whose conduct and specific results
had not been anticipated by General Grant.
During three days, from the 20th to the 22d inclusive,
General Grant postponed the battle from day to day, until
at last the 24th became the day fixed for its inaugura-
tion. This delay was due to General Sherman's failure,
until the 23d, to attain, with sufficient forces, his assigned
position on the north bank of the Tennessee River. Rain
and bad roads had retarded the march of his troops from
Bridgeport, and on the 22d the parting of the pontoon
bridge at Brown's Ferry arrested two of his divisions in
Lookout Valley.
At this juncture General Thomas was ready for battle.
He had made all the preliminary movements which had
been prescribed for his troops, in time for an earlier action.
He had designated Wood's division for the movable column;
had sent Jeff. C. Davis' division to report to Sherman; had
stationed Howard's corps between the pontoon bridge at
Brown's Ferry and the one at Chattanooga; his artillery had
been planted on the heights north of the river, and Colonel
Long's brigade" of cavalry had taken position to protect
Sherman's left flank, and afterwards to move up the river
upon the enemy's communications with Knoxville. Thus far
General Thomas had addressed himself earnestly to the exe-
cution of General Grant's plan of battle. But upon the an-
nouncement of the third postponement of the action he
began to make suggestions to General Grant, and urged
him to attack the enemy on the 23d. He feared that Gen-
eral Bragg would ascertain the plan of Sweeping the ridge
from the north, and concentrate to defeat it, and he proposed
that Howard's corps (the Eleventh) should be used by
General Sherman in room of his two divisions in Lookout
Valley, and that these divisions and Hooker's force
* This brigade had been sent to Sherman, in compliance with an order from
General Grant.
URGES A TTACK. I 71
should be hurled against Bragg's left flank on Lookout
Mountain simultaneously with Sherman's attack upon his
right on Missionary Ridge.
At the time this suggestion was made (Nov. 22d,) Bragg's
right rested at a point on Missionary Ridge, opposite the
left of our entrenched line on the east of Chattanooga and
several miles from the northern end of the ridge. He had
four divisions on the summit and western slope of Mission-
ary Ridge and on the line across Chattanooga Valley to
Lookout Mountain, and had not anticipated the proposed
effort of two armies to coöperate against his right flank.
Stevenson's division of his army held the summit of Look-
out Mountain, and Cheatham's and Walker's the front slope.
Had General Grant adopted Thomas' suggestion Sherman
would have had five divisions for his initial movement and
Thomas would have coöperated with him as prescribed
with four, making in all nine divisions, against Bragg's four
holding the long line from his right on Missionary Ridge
to Lookout Mountain. Had Sherman leaped quickly
across the Tennessee on the night of the 22d, Thomas
would have been ready for coöperation, while only one
of the four divisions that resisted Sherman on the 25th,
would have been on Missionary Ridge, and Bragg's right
flank would have been found far south of the tunnel. This
plan would have given General Hooker four divisions for
operations against Bragg's left flank and with the same
strategy he would have driven Cheatham's and Walker's di-
visions from the front of Lookout Mountain and eliminated
Stevenson's from the action, as he did on the 24th. On
these conditions a decisive victory would have been won on
the 23rd, General Grant would have thrown into the
action, every one of his thirteen divisions of infantry and
each of his three columns of attack would have had ade-
quate strength.
But Grant yielded to Thomas only so far as to per-
mit him to use for a demonstration against Lookout
172 LIFE OF GENERAL G.EORG E H THOMAS.
Mountain such forces as might be in Lookout Valley when
Sherman should be ready for action, and persisted in delay-
ing another day for Sherman to gather to himself all of his
divisions. It is demonstrable that the conditions for exe-
cuting Grant's plan, with a movement against Look-
out Mountain added, were more favorable on the 23d
than at any other time. The reason given by General
Thomas for Hooker's demonstration was that it would at
least aid Sherman, even if it did not result in assault, and to
aid Sherman was to contribute to the success of the
initial and dominant feature of Grant's plan. Thomas'
plan for the 23d would have assured the most nicely
adjusted coöperation of the three attacking columns.
As a war problem it offered every factor, or element, es-
sential to a brilliant solution. Bragg held a long line
and, consequently, one weak against Simultaneous at-
tacks upon flanks and centre, and no one competent to de-
termine the force of the several elements of a war problem
will deny that the best conditions that existed during the
three days of desultory fighting were present on the 23rd.
Had a general battle been delivered on that day, Bragg
would not at last have massed his entire army on Mis-
sionary Ridge for final defense. His positions on Look-
out Mountain and Missionary Ridge were exceedingly
strong, but his centre in the intervening valley, as he had
disposed his forces, was comparatively weak. Under the
attack of five divisions on one flank and of four on the
other, while there was a central column of four more for
coöperation, the enemy's long line would doubtless have
quickly crumbled.
The action of the 23d was not, however, such as Thomas
had suggested. Neither was it such as Grant had planned.
In semblance of a turning movement, Sherman had sent
Ewing's division to Steven's Gap. To meet this division
General Bragg withdrew some of his troops from line, and
this step led to the belief in his own army that it was to
RECONWOISSANCE ORD ER ED. I 73
be withdrawn. This error was reported by deserters to
Generals Sheridan and Wood; whereupon General Grant
directed Thomas to order a reconnoissance to ascertain the
truth or falsity of this report. It did not occur to either
Grant or Thomas that this reconnoissance, instituted to
ascertain whether or not there was to be a battle, would be-
come the first and ruling departure from Grant's plan. An
ordinary operation of this type to solve so simple a pro-
blem could not have produced such a result. But General
Thomas did not organize an ordinary reconnoissance. He
directed General Gordon Granger, commanding the Fourth
corps, to put in readiness for action his two divisions
then in hand in front of Chattanooga. He also directed
General Palmer, commanding the Fourteenth corps, to
support these divisions on their right by Baird's division,
and ordered General Howard with his corps * to perform a
similar office on their left. Five divisions were thus
disposed in readiness to utilize any possible developments.
Thomas made ample provision for emergencies with-
out having any definite anticipations. It certainly was
not expected that a reconnoissance with a definite object
would result in the advance of the central divisions
nearly a mile toward Missionary Ridge. But preparations
were made for a heavy fight, if necessary, to secure the
safety of the leading divisions and attain the object specifi-
cally mentioned by General Grant. In making ample pre-
parations to attain these objects, General Thomas made it
possible to produce a result which had a vital relation to all
the successful operations of the battle.
At 12.30 P. M. Wood's division with Sheridan's on its
right, dashed forward to a line of hills nearly half-way to
Missionary Ridge from the entrenchments east of Chatta-
nooga. The enemy was holding these hills and the inter-
vening low ground, but the onset of the two divisions was
* This corps had crosssed into Chattanooga on the 22d.
I 74 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS,
so sudden and resistless, that in an instant the enemy was
dislodged. Orchard Knob, the more imposing hill, was cov-
ered by Wood's division, and the knolls to the right by
Sheridan's. When Thomas saw Wood's flags on the knob,
he signaled to him : “You have gained too much to with-
draw, hold your position and I will support you,” and
immediately ordered Howard to move his corps abreast
of Wood's left, and Baird to advance his division to Sheri-
dan's right. - gº
At 3 P. M. General Grant sent the following despatch to
Washington :
CHATTANOOGA, NoveMBER 23, 1863–3 P. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
. General Thomas' troops attacked the enemy's left (sic.) at 2 P. M.
to-day, and carried his first line of rifle-pits, running over the knoll
one thousand two hundred yards in front of Wood's fort and low
ridge to the right of it, taking about two hundred prisoners besiles
killed and wounded. Our loss Small. The troops moved under fire
with all the precision of veterans on parade. Thomas' troops will
entrench themselves and hold their position until daylight, when
Sherman will join the attack from the mouth of South Chickamauga,
and a decisive battle will be fought.
U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.
This despatch reveals Grant's estimate of this advance of
the central line in its relation to Sherman's anticipated
movement across the Tennessee during the following
night, and his conjunction with Thomas in fighting a deci-
sive battle the next day. All his communications to Thomas
on the 20th, 21st and 22d, and this despatch to Gen-
eral Halleck, concur in expressing his expectation that
Sherman would be ready to attack at daylight of the
morning after he should begin to cross the river. And
this is an important factor in determining the hypothetical
relations of the anticipated operations of the battle as well
as in accounting for the actual Operations and their results.
GRANT'S CHANG ED PLANS, I 75
Referring in his official report to the action of the 23d,
General Grant said:
“Thomas having done on the twenty-third with his troops in
Chattanooga Valley what was intended for the twenty-fourth, bet-
tered and strengthened his advanced positions during the day, and
pushed the Eleventh Corps forward along the south bank of the
Tennessee River across Citico Creek, one brigade of which, with
Howard in person, reached Sherman just he had completed the
crossing of the river.”
It is difficult to harmonize the statement that Thomas
did on the 23d what was intended for the 24th with General
Grant's instructions, which defined Thomas' first move-
ment, the advance of his forces well toward the northern
extremity of Missionary Ridge, to form a junction with
Sherman. Neither does it agree with the order to Thomas
requiring a reconnoissance to ascertain the truth or falsity
of the reported withdrawal of Bragg's army. That
the advance of the central divisions directly forward was
accepted in room of their movement towards the northern
extremity of Missionary Ridge is certainly true, but the
establishment of a line of battle near Bragg's right flank
and center before Sherman's movement was developed,
was a radical departure from Grant's plan, and of itself
defeated the prescribed coöperation of Thomas with
Sherman towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge.
When Thomas' central divisions advanced directly for-
ward and entrenched a line, the movement was far from
being identical with the one prescribed for them on the
24th in Grant's plan, since they were then massed on
the right towards Rossville rather than on Thomas' left
towards Sherman's point of attack. The centre of Wood's
division rested on Orchard Knob, which was situated south
of east from Fort Wood. On the right of this division
were the divisions of Sherman, Baird and Johnson, while on
the left were Schurz's and Steinwehr's of the Eleventh
corps. The maintenance of this line, therefore, forbade the
176 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS
conjunction of Thomas' and Sherman's forces until the
latter should carry the summit of Missionary Ridge far
south of the tunnel. Yet the impossibility of their con-
junction, except on the condition of the abandonment of
Thomas’ “advanced positions,” did not induce General
Grant to forego his purpose to initiate his operations for
the dislodgment of the enemy with Sherman's attack, as
defined in his plan of battle, but it did eventually cause him
to weaken Thomas to strengthen Sherman.
The advance of the central divisions induced changes
also in Bragg's line. When Howard aligned his corps
on the left of Wood's division, his left overlapped
Bragg's right flank on Missionary Ridge, and led him to
believe that Thomas' advance indicated an effort to turn
his right flank and capture his depot of supplies at Chicka-
mauga Station in the rear of that flank. He had no know-
ledge of the purpose to attack his right with forces then in
position on the north bank of the Tennessee. But in
view of danger to that flank from the forces that had moved
toward it and overlapped it, he resolved to strengthen his
right at the expense of his left, and during the night of the
23d extended his line northward by transferring Walker's
division from the northern slope of Lookout Mountain to
Missionary Ridge.
Had there been a general battle on the 24th, as
Grant anticipated, the conditions would have been some-
what different from those existing on the 23d. Sher-
man had gained one division (Ewing's), but Osterhaus'
was still in Lookout Valley, and the pontoon bridge
at Brown's Ferry had again parted. The enemy's force on
Lookout Mountain had lost one division. Thomas and
Sherman would have had ten divisions for their co-opera-
tive attack against five divisions of the enemy on Mission-
ary Ridge, and the line across Chattanooga Valley.
In estimating the wisdom of General Thomas' persistence
in moving Hooker's column against Lookout Mountain on
ORDERS TO HOOKER. 177
the 24th, the fact that a general decisive battle was ex-
pected on that day must be kept in view.
When General Hooker ascertained from Grant's instruc-
tions to Thomas that he was to be left in Lookout Valley.
in command of troops that were to be inactive except in
the contingency of fighting on the defensive, he requested
General Thomas to permit him to go into the battle with
the Eleventh corps. The desired permission was granted,
but was afterwards recalled, when Thomas had gained
Grant's consent to use for offense the troops in Lookout
Valley. This consent was gained on the 22d, but no posi-
tive assurance was then given that Hooker would be reën-
forced from Sherman's army; General Thomas nevertheless
instructed Hooker to act offensively with Geary's and
Cruft's divisions, five brigades in all. General Grant did
not consent to the diversion of Osterhaus' division to Hooker
until it was certain that it could not join Sherman in time
for his movement across the Tennessee River. While the
final disposition of this division was still in doubt, Thomas.
sent the following despatch to Hooker:-
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, Tenn., Nov. 24th, I2.30 P. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HoOKER,
Lookout Valley :—
Intercepted rebel despatches are to the effect that the rebels.
expect us to attack them on their left in the morning. General com-
manding desires that you make demonstration early as possible after
daybreak on point of Lookout Mountain. General Grant still hopes,
Woods’ division (Osterhaus') will get across to join Sherman, in
which case your demonstration will aid Sherman’s crossing. If
Woods can’t cross, you can take the point of Lookout, if your de-
monstration develops its practicability.
J. J. REYNOLDs,
Major-General and Chief of Staff.
Later in the morning of the 24th it was ascertained that
Osterhaus' division could not cross in time to join Sherman
before his projected attack at daylight, and then General
I 2
178 I, IFE OF GENERAI, G EORG E H THOMAS.
Grant consented that it should be added to Hooker's slen-
der column for a movement which had been eliminated
from the plan of battle, for the purpose of giving the greatest
possible force to operations against the enemy's right flank.
General Thomas' instructions to General Hooker gave
him entire freedom as to the manner of attack. He was
required to demonstrate first, and if he deemed it practi-
cable to carry the position, he was authorized to attempt it;
in all other respects he was independent. General Thomas
was always ready to accord a just measure of independence
to subordinates who were held responsible for methods and
results. He also accorded to Hooker the merit of carrying
Lookout Mountain, except the origination of the move-
ment, which he claimed for himself, not as original in con-
ception, but in its relations to the actual battle.
It is safe to assume that Hooker adopted the best
possible plan to dislodge the enemy from Lookout Moun-
tain. He placed two brigades (Grose's and Woods')
in plain sight, to rebuild a bridge near the base of the
mountain and attract the attention of the enemy, while he
removed the remainder of his forces up the valley and up
the mountain side till the right of his line touched the
foot of the palisades—the perpendicular ledge of rocks that
walls the summit of the mountain. Having gained this
important advantage without the knowledge of the enemy,
he swept round the front with this enfilading line, and
Cheatham's division receiving fire in front, flank and rear,
fled before him. Stevenson's division on the Summit could
not render assistance except by a long, circuitous route,
and Hooker was too rapid in his pursuit, for help to come
to Cheatham's division, by any circuit, long or short. The
enemy, however, in his flight, found friendly shelter on the
eastern slope, among the trees, and behind huge fragments
of rocks which the elements had detached from the over-
hanging ledge. Here, also, reënforcements were met,
coming from Chattanooga Valley. Thus sheltered and Sup-
J, OOKO UT MOUNTAIN. I 79
ported, the routed enemy was enabled to cover the road
leading down the mountain from Summerville, until Steven-
son's division had descended, and then the whole force moved
across the valley to Missionary Ridge, burning the bridge
over Chattanooga Creek, to prevent immediate pursuit.
This victory was gained more by strategy than hard
fighting, but there was nevertheless all the fighting neces-
sary to give full force to the superb strategy. The grand
scenery and the roar of cannon from Moccasin Point height-
ened the thrilling effect of a battle fought in part above the
mist which shrouded portions of the mountain.
Hooker's operations turned Bragg's left flank, but made
it possible for the enemy to strengthen his right. This
result, however, could not have followed had there been a
general battle on the 24th. In the event of such a battle,
Hooker's action would have had its full effect, since no re-
énforcements from the valley could have been sent to pre-
vent the separation of Stevenson's division from the main
army, and there would have been two divisions less against
Sherman than there were on the following day.
When Bragg had lost Lookout Mountain and Chat-
tanooga Valley, his position on Missionary Ridge was
untenable, it being open to turning movements through the
gap at Rossville and the gaps farther south, and from the first
it had been exposed to such a movement round the north-
ern extremity of Missionary Ridge. General Bragg was
not ignorant of his exposure to turning operations on right
and left; and if a correspondent of the Richmond Dispatch,
writing under the nom-de-plume of “Sallust,” may be cred-
ited, orders were issued for the retreat of the army. These,
however, were revoked, on the supposition that better re-
sults would follow another day of battle.
At midnight General Thomas reported the operations of
the 23d and 24th in cipher:
I 80 LIFE OF GENERAL, G EORGE H. THOMAS
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., Nov. 24th, 1863, 12 M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:—
Yesterday, at half past twelve, Granger's and Palmer's corps,
supported by Howard's, were advanced directly in front of our forti-
fications, drove in the enemy’s pickets, and carried his first line of
rifle-pits between Chattanooga and Citico Creeks. We captured nine
commissioned officers, and about one hundred and sixty enlisted
men. Our loss about one hundred and eleven.
To-day Hooker, in command of Geary's division, Twelfth corps,
Osterhaus' division, Fifteenth Corps, and two brigades, Fourteenth
corps, carried north slope of Lookout Mountain, with small loss on
our side, and the loss to the enemy of five or six hundred prison-
ers—killed and wounded not reported. -
There has been continuous fighting from twelve o'clock until
after night, but our troops gallantly repulsed every attempt to retake
the position. Sherman crossed the Tennessee River before daylight
this morning, at the mouth of South Chickamauga, with three divi-
sions of the Fifteenth corps, one division of the Fourteenth, and car-
ried the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge. General Grant
has ordered a general advance in the morning. Our success so far
has been complete, and the behavior of the troops admirable.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General.
Thus passed the 24th, with no general decisive bat-
tle. In the afternoon of that day, Sherman gained po-
sition on Missionary Ridge, near the right flank of the
enemy. This flank rested on an elevation north of the
tunnel, with sloping ground towards the north, east and west,
and strong extemporized defenses to the north and west.
The deep depression in the ridge separated the two armies.
General Grant's announcement of a prospective decisive
battle on the 24th was certainly based upon the belief that
Sherman would cross the river during the night of the 23d,
and open the engagement at daylight the next morning.
He also expected such immediate success as would esta-
blish the condition for the coöperation of Thomas. It
certainly was not worth the trouble to conceal the first
stages of Sherman's movement, by hills and darkness, if
SHERMAN'S DEL.A. Y. I8I
the march from the South bank of the Tennessee River to-
wards the northern heights of Missionary Ridge could not
have been begun until one o'clock in the afternoon of the
24th. General Grant evidently designed that this move-
ment should be a surprise; and when it failed to be a sur-
prise it lost its special objective, and its exact relation to
his plan. Had Sherman made his attack at daylight on the
24th, in fulfilment of Grant's promise to General Halleck,
the enemy's right would not have been sheltered by defen-
ses on the summit north of the tunnel. The fact, there-
fore, that his attack was not made until the morning of
the 25th, presents this dilemma: either General Grant mis-
apprehended the conditions of the movement, or General
Sherman was needlessly tardy in executing it. Grant gave
Sherman six hours in which to cross the river and dispose
his troops for attack, and yet during the thirty hours next
after midnight on the 23d, Sherman only carried the
two northernmost heights of the ridge, with a skirmish
line in slight action. In fact Bragg, without serious
contest, gave up all the ground north of the deep depres-
Sion which cuts Missionary Ridge almost to its base,
because he did not wish to extend his line beyond that point.
General Grant's pre-announced plan of battle utterly mis-
carried, through General Sherman's delay in attacking the
enemy's flank, whether this delay resulted from defect of
plan, or default in execution. It was in reference to such a
possibility that General Thomas advised that a battle should
be fought on the 23d.
Grant's instructions to Thomas in relation to the action
of the 25th were embodied in the following note:-
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Chattanooga, Tenn., Nov. 24th, 1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS,
Commanding Army of the Cumberland.
GENERAL:— -
General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tun-
nel, with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel
182 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H THOMAS
and on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek. I have
instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the
morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in co-
operation. Your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge
directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the presence of the
enemy may require.
If Hooker's present position on the mountain can be maintained
with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from
where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with
all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable road.
Very respectfully,
U. S. GRANT,
Major-General Commanding.
Several important facts come to light in this note. Gen-
eral Grant was mistaken as to the degree of Sherman's
success, and his order to Thomas to attack simultaneously
with Sherman and in coöperation with him, was based
upon this misapprehension. Sherman had not car-
ried the ridge to the tunnel; his right was not at the tunnel
and on top of the hill; and hence the condition for the co-
ôperation of Thomas, mentioned specifically in the announce-
ment of Grant's plan on the 18th, had not been estab-
lished. Neither did General Grant, on the night of the
24th, think of using Hooker's troops against Missionary
Ridge the next day. He did not know that the enemy's
forces that had occupied Lookout Mountain were in motion
towards the main army on Missionary Ridge.
These illusions disappeared on the morning of the 25th,
and with them the practicability of Grant's instructions to
Thomas. -
The conditions for a general engagement on the 25th
were very different from those existing on the two previous
days. The two divisions which Hooker had driven from
Lookout Mountain, and the troops from the line across
Chattanooga Valley, were now on Missionary Ridge, and
Bragg's line was shorter by the distance from Missionary
FIO WARD JOINS SHERMAN. I83
Ridge to the crest and northern slope of Lookout Moun-
tain. The development of Sherman's operations against
the enemy's right flank had drawn Cleburne's and Walk-
er's divisions to the strong position north of the tunnel,
and with a line greatly shortened, Bragg had two divisions
free to move wherever needed.
Sherman attacked the right flank of the enemy early
in the morning, but failed to carry the summit imme-
diately north of the tunnel. General Grant observed his
movements and their results from Orchard Knob, and at
once gave orders for the movement of troops to his sup-
port. The evening previous, Thomas had, in compliance
with Grant's orders, made arrangements for the earliest pos-
sible coöperation with Sherman. He had directed How-
ard to throw his left forward, in readiness to connect with
Sherman's right as he should move southward. General
Grant had not specified the mode of coöperation, since
this was contingent upon Sherman's movements. The ad-
vance of Howard's left to the railroad, in anticipation of
touching Sherman's right, had only the effect to expedite
the march of the whole corps to Sherman at 9.45 A. M.
The state of affairs on the right was quite as unexpected
as that on the left.
As soon as Thomas had learned that the enemy had left
Lookout Mountain, he sent the following order to Hooker:
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
November 25th, 1863, 8 A. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER:—
Leave Carlin’s brigade * at Summertown road, to rejoin Gen-
eral Palmer. Move with the remainder of your force, except two
regiments to hold Lookout, on the Rossville road towards Mission
Ridge, looking well to your right flank.
By Command of GENERAL THOMAS.
J. J. REYNOLDs,
Major-General and Chief of Staff.
* This brigade had gone to Hooker the evening before.
184 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H, THOMAS.
A little later he modified these instructions :-
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Orchard Knob, November 25, 1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL HookER:—
I wish you and Palmer to move forward firmly and steadily
upon enemy's works in front, using General Sheridan as a pivot.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General.
This combination was not designed to interfere with
General Sherman's operations, but to supplement them.
It was however, abortive; Hooker's movement was ar-
rested at Chattanooga Creek, and Sherman's apparent need
of reënforcements induced General Grant to detach Baird's
division from the right of the central line, and send it
to Sherman. Thomas was then too weak in the centre for
any action except in support of forces on right and left.
With Sherman fighting for the tunnel and Hooker build-
ing a bridge over Chattanooga Creek, the forenoon and part
of the afternoon passed away. Sherman had been repulsed
in every attempt to carry the enemy's position north of the
tunnel. In the meantime the central divisions had been in-
active in the presence of General Grant. At 3 P. M. there
was no prospect of victory. The day was far spent; Hook-
er was not in sight on the right; Sherman having failed to
accomplish his mission was resting on the left; while ac-
cording to Grant's plan of battle, the condition for
the central divisions to begin their coöperative movement
did not exist. At this hour General Grant said “We must
do something for Sherman,” and thereupon ordered Thomas'
central line to advance and carry the rifle-pits at the base of
Missionary Ridge. Badeau thus describes the situation at
the time this order was issued :
Grant was watching the progress of the fight from Orchard Knoll
and seeing the danger to which Sherman was exposed he now or-
dered Baird's division of the Fourteenth corps to support the extreme
left, but Sherman sent word that he had all the force necessary and
SHERMAN'S EXPLA NATION. I85
Baird was put in position on Thomas' left. Baird accordingly
marched by the left flank in front of Fort Wood to take position on
Howard's right. This movement was plainly perceived by the
enemy, and impressed him with the idea that Grant's main assault
was to be made on the rebel right; a massive Column of Bragg's
forces soon was seen to move northward along the Crest of the ridge,
regiment after regiment filing towards Sherman.
Meanwhile the day was waning and Thomas' attack which was
to relieve Sherman had not been made. Grant looked eagerly for
the advance of Hooker moving north on the ridge with his left in
Chattanooga Valley, and his right thrown east of the ridge. *
From General Grant's own words and this statement of
Badeau, it is evident that this advance of the central divi-
Sions was designed to relieve the pressure upon Sherman ;
either to arrest supposed danger, or to open the way for his
success in gaining the enemy's position north of the tunnel.
General Sherman had expected General Thomas to attack
early in the day. In his official report he explicitly men-
tions this expectation:
Thus matters stood about 3 P. M. The day was bright and clear
and the amphitheatre of Chattanooga lay in beauty at our feet. I
had watched for the attack of General Thomas “early in the day.”
\
This watching for Thomas' attack was doubtless based
upon Grant's order of the evening previous, which
required Sherman to attack and Thomas to coöperate.
But Sherman was perhaps ignorant of the fact that
the order for the coöperative attack was induced by the be-
lief that he had carried the ridge to the tunnel, and that ac-
cording to the plan of battle the condition for the coöper-
ation of Thomas was established. The explanation of Gen-
eral Grant's action in first sending Howard's corps and then
Baird's division from General Thomas was his desire that
Sherman should turn the enemy's right before Thomas
should coöperate with him. And the fact that Thomas'
forces in the centre were by General Grant's order dimin-
* Mil. Hist. U. S. Grant, Vol. I, p. pp. 506, 507.
I86 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS.
ished from six divisions to eight brigades, while Sher-
man, after Baird's division reported to him, had seven
divisions clustered around the enemy's position at the tun-
nel, is incontestable evidence that no independent attack
was required of Thomas early in the day. It is therefore
an untenable assumption,-contradicted by Grant's orders.
and official report, though assumed to be true by many his-
torians,—that Sherman's attack was designed as a feint to
Cause Bragg to weaken his centre that Thomas might
storm it.
In General Sherman's Memoirs this passage is found:
The object of General Hooker's and my attacks on the extreme
flanks of Bragg's position was to disturb him to such an extent, that
he would naturally detach from his centre as against us, so that
Thomas' army could break through his centre. The whole plan
succeeded admirably, but it was not until after dark that I learned
the complete success at the centre, and received General Grant's or-
der to pursue on the north side of Chickamauga Creek. *
Badeau's statements are to the same effect:
Hooker was to draw attention to the right, to seize and hold
Lookout Mountain, while Sherman attacking Missionary Ridge on
the extreme left, was still further to distract the enemy ; and then
when reenforcements and attention should be drawn to both rebel
flanks, the centre was to be assaulted by the main body of Grant's
force under Thomas. #
The rebel centre, as Grant had foreseen, was weakened to save
the right; and then the whole mass of the Army of the Cumberland
was precipitated on the weakened point; the centre was pierced, the
heights carried, and the battle of Chattanooga won. †
This author gives the relative strength of the three col-
Ul IſlnS :
Hooker's force amounted to about ten thousand; Sherman’s
including Howard’s to over twenty thousand; and Thomas' Com-
mand included almost thirty thousand soldiers. ||
* Memoirs, Vol. I., p. 364, f Mil. Hist. U. S. Grant, Vol. I., p. 525.
f /øid., p. 528. | Zºid., p. 524.
MISTA KES OF GRANT"S BIOGRAPHERS. 187
And states that General Sherman told him :—
That he did not consider the hill for which he fought on Novem-
ber 23rd, (sic.) as very important in itself, and therefore used only
three regiments, in the original attack; but he made as much noise
and show as he could to alarm Bragg for the safety of that flank and
of the railroad bridge just in rear. His effort was to induce Bragg
to detach as much as possible from the centre, and so to weaken
that which Sherman knew from Grant would be the critical point of
the battle. *
Coppée referring to Sherman's attack says:
General Sherman's duty was twofold; to beat the enemy if possi-
ble and at all events to keep him in full force in his front while an
attack should be made in another part of the field. †
These historians have made two mistakes, one in calling
an unexpected result an object, and another in asserting that
it was the purpose of General Grant that the central forces
under Thomas in person should make an independent
assault. It is certainly true that Bragg did move
troops to his extreme right on the 24th and also on the
25th. Sherman's movement across the Tennessee with
four divisions, and his advance from the river, indicated
some great purpose. It was imperative that Bragg
should send to meet Sherman all the troops that he could
spare from his centre. On the 24th he sent Cleburne's and
Walker's divisions from the right of his line to establish a
flank at the tunnel. These were the troops that first resisted
Sherman on the morning of the 25th. When Howard's corps
was seen marching to Sherman, the danger to the enemy's
right flank was patent to Bragg. But by this time the troops
from Lookout Mountain were available, and first Stevenson's
division was sent to General Hardee, who was in command
of the right wing of Bragg's army. When afterwards
Baird's division followed the Eleventh corps to Sherman,
* Mil. Hist. U. S. Grant, Vol. I., p. 505.
f Grant and his Campaigns, p. 229.
I88 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H, THOMAS,
General Bragg sent Cheatham's division to the right. The
movement of these floating divisions to the enemy's right
induced the belief in the National army that Bragg
was weakening his centre to reënforce his right. This was
true, in one view, for the troops from Lookout Mountain
could have been used against Thomas. But Bragg's line in
front of Thomas remained unchanged, and he put together
before Sherman the troops that had composed the two
flanks of his original line. Now the attacks of Hooker and
Sherman had this result rather than that of drawing troops
from Bragg's centre to his flanks. Sherman was in sight,
with a very large force, menacing his right flank and com-
munications, and Hooker was not yet in view, and Bragg
sent the troops that had fought Hooker, to oppose Sher-
man, keeping his line before Thomas as it had been first
formed, on the 25th, after the withdrawal of them from
Chattanooga Valley.
There are many facts which prove that General Grant
did not regard the central column, after he had detached
Howard's corps from it, as his main reliance for carrying
the enemy's position, and he could not have meditated an
independent assault for it at noon, when he ordered Baird's
division to Sherman. When this was done, more than half
of all the infantry forces on the field of battle were subject
to Sherman, and of all the opposing forces more than half
were on Bragg's right flank. Had Sherman been con-
ducting a mere imposing feint, while Thomas was to assault
an exceedingly strong position as the culmination of the
battle, Grant would not have given seven divisions for the
feint and only three for the paramount effort. Neither is it
true that the “main body of Grant's forces”—“the whole
mass of the Army of the Cumberland”—was, at last, “pre-
cipitated on the weakened point.”
Of the nine divisions belonging to the Army of the
Cumberland, on the field of battle at the time of the final
assault, three were with Sherman and two with Hooker.
HELPING! SHERMA IV. I89
The three that were under Sherman, two regiments, ex-
cepted, were in the battle only as quiet reserves. Davis’
division was in the rear of Sherman's fighting forces,
and Howard's corps was between Missionary Ridge and
Chickamauga Creek at rest and undeployed. General
Davis, chafing under enforced inaction, requested per-
mission to turn the enemy's right flank by moving his
division to its rear, but this movement, which might have
produced decisive results, especially if Howard's corps, or
part of it, had participated, was forbidden by General Sher-
man. This movement would have supported the direct
attack most effectively, since there were no defenses on the
east side of the ridge, and the slope on that side was far
from steep. Besides it would have harmonized with Grant's
plan of dislodging the enemy by simultaneous attacks in
two directions closely coöperative. If, however, the dispo-
sition of forces made by General Grant in preparation
for the action and during the three days of battle, do not
prove that he expected more than an imposing feint from
Sherman, his official report written in retrospect of all
objects, operations and results, brings this truth into bold
relief.
It is not surprising that Grant did not order Thomas
with Baird's, Wood's, Sheridan's and Johnson’s divisions
to carry the summit of Missionary Ridge, since he had
only hoped to dislodge the enemy by an attack upon
his flank, supported by a simultaneous one in front. And
if he defined to himself the exact relation of the advance
of the four central divisions of carrying the lower de-
fences of the enemy, with Sherman's operations on the
left, or Hooker's on the right, he gave no intimation of
such relation to others at the time, beyond saying: “We
must do something for Sherman.” Badeau states that it
was in consequence of apprehended danger to Sherman
that General Grant ordered Baird's division to his support.*
* Mil. Hist. U. S. Grant, Vol. I. p. 506.
I 90 LIFE OF GENERAI, G EORG E H THOMAS.
Still it is not credible that any other fear was entertained
than that Sherman could not overcome the resistance of
the enemy. It could not have been supposed that with six
divisions in hand, Sherman was in danger of being thrown
upon the defensive. But acting upon the belief that Bragg
had greatly weakened his centre to maintain his right,
General Grant might have reasonably supposed that a
movement against his lower defences would cause the re-
turn, to the enemy's centre, of some of the forces that had
moved to his endangered right flank. This movement,
therefore, is easily explained, if considered as a diversion
in favor of Sherman. Neither is there mystery in it if it
was made, in accordance with Grant's report, in expecta-
tion that Hooker would be ready to coöperate with the
central forces, by the time they had carried the enemy's
rifle-pits at the base of the ridge. But on the supposition
that it was intended to be an independent attack upon the
enemy's line on the summit, it is involved in the pro-
foundest mystery. Since, if Grant intended that the
central divisions should storm the summit without sup-
port on right or left, he gave no instructions to his
subordinates, from General Thomas down, that suggested
such an effort as a possible contingency. These divisions
and their commanders of every grade had known for two
days that they were in line before the enemy for the pur-
pose of assaulting the summit, eventually, but had been
held in extreme quietness in the presence of General Grant,
while waiting for the success of other forces. Grant
stated in his official report that his instructions to
Thomas required that these troops should re-form in the
rifle-pits for the ulterior effort, but he nevertheless gave no
intimation that this ulterior effort was to be made without
further orders from himself. But in advance of trial, a
position under the artillery and musketry of the enemy
should have been regarded as a poor place to re-form a
line of battle. And this fact taken in connection with
HOOKER'S ADVANCE I 91
other circumstances, suggests the risk that this advance,
without assured support, involved.
The report of General Grant also asserts that the appear-
ance of Hooker on the enemy's left was to be the signal
for storming the summit of Missionary Ridge. But Gen-
eral Hooker was not in sight when the order for the ad-
vance of the central divisions was given. Neither was
there good ground for the expectation that he would appear
as early as 3 P. M. He did not leave Chattanooga Creek until
after 2 P. M. Thereafter he had to march several miles to
reach the left flank of the enemy. Time was required to
dispose his troops for action. Resistance to his advance
was to be expected; and the summit and slopes of Mis-
sionary Ridge from Rossville to the enemy's flank were
covered somewhat densely with woods which offered a bar
to rapid marching and gave help to the enemy in prevent-
ing a quick movement. Resistance was first offered at
Rossville, and afterward at several points on the summit,
but with no other effect than to slightly retard Hooker's
northward movement. The enemy had selected for his
advanced position on that flank the breastworks on the
crest, immediately north of Rossville, which our army had
thrown up the next day after the battle of Chickamauga;
and here two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery
had been posted. General Bragg's report does not give
the strength of the forces that were detached from the left
of his line of battle to oppose Hooker, but the feebleness
of the resistance at Rossville and other points gave proof
that want of time rather than the opposition of the enemy
prevented the appearance of Hooker on the left of Bragg's
line in front of Thomas as soon as expected.
The action prescribed for the central line was quickly
and gallantly performed. But when the troops reached
the rifle-pits at the base of the hill, and at some points on
the slope, they came under a terrific fire of musketry and
artillery. The quick action of at least forty cannon at
I 92 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H, THOMAS,
short range wrought fearful carnage in the rifle pits, and
this was supplemented by the deadly fire of musketry from
the summit. They had no orders to go forward, and none
to retreat. There were no supporting forces in sight on
right or left. The situation offered them the opportunity
to stand still and die, to go forward without orders to stop
the destructive fire to which they were exposed, or to re-
treat on the same condition to avoid it. The men in the
ranks and their immediate commanders chose to go for-
ward, and they speedily executed one of the most brilliant
assaults known to martial history.
The advance of the troops beyond the enemy's lower
breastwork was a surprise to all the generals on Orchard
Knob. General Grant had not ordered such an advance,
and General Thomas had been opposed to the movement
as ordered when there was no prospect of support from
Sherman or Hooker, and disregarding mere suggestions
from General Grant made earlier in the afternoon had not
sent the troops forward until positively ordered to do so.
Neither of these generals had any direct relation to this
unexpected assault beyond their concurrent agency in the
development of the situation which made it possible.
Thomas established his line on Orchard Knob and the
lateral hills when simply ordered to make a reconnoissance,
and Grant put the troops composing it under the fire of the
enemy and thus gave them an opportunity to gain a great
victory without orders. -
General Grant gave the following account of the opera-
tions of the 25th in his official report:-
Early in the morning of the twenty-fifth the remainder of How-
ard's corps reported to Sherman and constituted a part of his forces
during that day’s battle, the pursuit and subsequent advance for the
relief of Knoxville.
Sherman's position not only threatened the right flank of the
enemy, but from his occupying a line across the mountain and to the
railroad bridge across Chickamauga Creek, his rear and stores at
Chickamauga Station. This caused the enemy to move heavily
OFFICIAL REPORTS. I93
against him. This movement of his being plainly seen from the po-
sition I occupied on Orchard Knob, Baird's division of the Four-
teenth corps was ordered to Sherman's support, but receiving a note
from Sherman informing me that he had all the force necessary,
Baird was put in position on Thomas' left.
The appearance of Hooker's column was at this time anxiously
looked for and momentarily expected moving north on the ridge
with his left in Chattanooga Valley and his right east of the ridge.
His approach was intended as the signal for storming the ridge in
the centre with strong columns, but the length of time necessarily
consumed in the construction of a bridge near” Chattanooga
Creek, detained him to a later hour than was expected. Being sat-
isfied from the latest information from him, that he must by this time,
be on his way from Rossville, though not yet in sight, and discover-
ing that the enemy, in his desperation to defeat or resist the progress
of Sherman, was weakening his centre on Missionary Ridge, deter-
mined me to order the advance at once. Thomas was accordingly
directed to move forward his troops constituting our centre—
Baird's division (Fourteenth corps), Wood’s and Sheridan's
divisions (Fourth corps), and Johnson's division (Fourteenth
corps) with a double line of skirmishers thrown out, followed
in easy supporting distance by the whole force, and carry the rifle-
pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and when carried to re-form his
lines with a view of carrying the top of the ridge.
These troops moved forward, drove the enemy from the rifle-pits
at the base of the ridge like bees from a hive; stopped but a moment
until the whole were in line, and commenced ascent of the moun-
tain from right to left almost simultaneously, following closely the
retreating enemy without further orders. They encountered a fear-
ful volley of grape and canister from nearly thirty pieces of artillery,
and musketry from still well filled rifle-pits on the summit of the
ridge. Not a waver however, was seen in all that long line of brave
men ; their progress was steadily onward until the summit was,
in their possession.
General Thomas' report of the same operations is sub-
joined :—
“About noon General Sherman becoming heavily engaged with
the enemy, they having massed a strong force in his front, orders
were given for General Baird to march his division within supporting
distance of General Sherman; moving his command promptly in
the direction indicated he was placed in position to the left of Wood’s
* This bridge was over Chattanooga Creek.
13
I 94 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS
division of Granger's corps. Owing to the difficulties of the ground
his troops did not get into line with Granger's until about 2.30
P. M., orders were then given him to move forward on
Granger's left and within supporting distance against the enemy's
rifle-pits on the slope and at the foot of Missionary Ridge. The
whole line then advanced against the breastworks and soon became
warmly engaged with the enemy’s skirmishers; these giving way re-
tired upon their reserves posted within their works, our troops ad-
vancing steadily in a continuous line. The enemy seized with
panic, abandoned the works at the foot of the hill, and retreated
precipitately to the crest, where they were closely followed by our
troops, who apparently inspired by the impulse of victory, carried
the hill simultaneously at six different points, and so closely upon
the heels of the enemy that many of them were taken prisoners in
the trenches.”
General Thomas evidently did not know at the time his
report was written that General Baird actually reported to
General Sherman, and that the march thither and return,
rather than the difficulties of the ground had delayed him
in attaining position. -
The following passage is from the official report of Gen-
eral Sherman —
An occasional shot from Fort Wood and Orchard Knoll, and some
musketry fire and artillery over about Lookout Mountain, was all
that I could detect on our side; but about 3 P M. I noticed the white
line of musketry fire in front of Orchard Knoll, extending farther
and farther right and left and on. We could only hear a ſaint echo of
sound, but enough was seen to satisfy me that General Thomas was
at last moving on the centre. I knew that our attack had drawn vast
masses of the enemy to our flank, and felt sure of the result. Some
guns which had been firing on us all day were silent, or were turned
in a different direction.
It is evident from General Grant's language that when he
ordered the advance of the central divisions he expected
Hooker rather than Sherman to establish the condition for
assault. And Grant had then departed so far from his scheme
of massing “all the forces possible against one given point,
namely, Missionary Ridge, converging toward the north end
of it,” that he was dependent upon a general who by the
CARRYING MISSIONAR Y RIDG E. I 95
original plan had been consigned to inaction in Lookout Val-
ley, to give the signal for storming Missionary Ridge in the
centre. Grant had hoped that the signal would have come
from the opposite direction, where ten divisions could have
coöperated in an attack on front and right flank, but now
the experiment was in prospect with seven divisions, upon
the opposite flank. And the general, whose appearance
was expected to give the signal, had come from his pre-
scribed inaction in Lookout Valley, through the smoke of
his battle on the mountain's front and across Lookout
Valley, to the summit of Missionary Ridge. And yet
again the plan miscarried, because the direct attack trans-
cended orders, was begun too early and executed too quickly
for Hooker to reach the left of Bragg's continuous line, on
Missionary Ridge.
In many features beyond its success and the absence of
orders, this assault by about twenty thousand men sur-
passes the precedents of the American civil war, and those
of other modern wars. Its most remarkable feature was its
unity. The supreme moments of battle sometimes create
impulses more potent than plans and orders. And in the
absence of unusual inspiration, it is not probable that em-
battlements so long and lofty would have been Carried
throughout their extent almost at the same instant had each
officer of every grade been definitely instructed before and
as to the best mode of assault. So nearly together did
the four divisions reach the summit, that General Thomas,
seeing the crowning banners from Orchard Knob, reported
that the enemy's line was gained simultaneously at six
different points. This was not strictly true. According to
the testimony of General Baird and of some of the Confed-
erate commanders, Wood's central brigade first pierced the
enemy's line. The projection of the slope gave the enemy's
line-defenses first to this division, and it led to the Crest.
Nevertheless, the conditions gave a common impulse to the
- whole force to pass the lower rifle-pits; and although the
I96 LIFE OF GE WERA.J., G. EORG E H, THOMAS.
officers of higher rank were at first somewhat bewildered
and undecided, there was from first to last as much con-
Sonance of movement and as strict coöperation as could
have been attained under definite instructions. The origin
of the action, as well as its conditions, enforced concert of
action as fully as could have been possible under the orders
of one controlling mind. The division commanders acted
in unison as soon as the movement was so far precipi-
tated by the eagerness of the soldiers that its success was
dependent upon the instantaneous coöperation of the four
divisions. The summit might not have been held had not
all the divisions reached the crest at nearly the same
instant. When General Bragg was informed that his line
had been broken on the right of his own position, he made
effort to restore it by detaching troops from his own pres-
ence; but these troops and himself were instantly put to
flight by Sheridan's division. This fact shows that Sheridan
was so near the crest when Wood gained it, that Bragg's
effort to dislodge Wood miscarried at its inception; and in
turn Wood's enfilading fire diminished the resistance to
Sheridan's left brigade.
This assault was unique in its origin, conditions, con-
duct, and issue; and in the risk it involved it is almost
without parallel. This central line, at the time, alone
covered Chattanooga, and if the troops composing it had
retreated after carrying the lower defenses of the enemy, or
had failed in storming the summit, there would have been
no decisive battle that day, unless defeat had come to the
National arms. Had these troops been broken in organiza-
tion and spirit by defeat, retreat, and losses, Bragg's whole
army would have been between Sherman and Hooker
commanding the shortest lines to Chattanooga, with most
inviting possibilities on right and left. So far forth, there-
fore, as this action in origin, form and issue was unprece-
dented, is the degree of the risk apparent. Grant's order
required a movement involving great risk within its pre-
STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY I 97
scribed limitations, and the hazard of the subsequent un-
Ordered assault can hardly be estimated. -
There were, in these divisions, eleven brigades in line of
battle, one of Johnson's having been left in the entrench-
ments at Chattanooga. Bragg had nominally three divi-
Sions in his left wing, Anderson's, Bate's, and Stewart's.
But Anderson's Command was more than a full division, as
to it had been attached the troops that had been recalled
by the battle, while en route to Knoxville. The troops that
opposed Hooker at Rossville returned to the main line be-
fore it received the final assault. It may, therefore, be safely
assumed that the opposing forces in this action were approx.
imately of the same numerical strength, with the advantages
of position and the defensive more than doubling Bragg's
strength. It is not surprising, therefore, that he confessed,
in his official report of the battle, that he could not account
for the loss of a position which should have been held by
a line of skirmishers against any assaulting column. There
was one fact, however, which he may not have duly con-
sidered. Numerous transverse depressions divide the sum-
mit of Missionary Ridge, where his left wing was in line,
into numerous rounded hillocks; so that only a small part
of his line was in view from any point in it, while every one
of his soldiers could see the whole assaulting column, at
least in the first stages of its advance. This, perhaps, more
than anything else except the manifest spirit and momentum
of the assaulting forces, caused his troops to give up their
strong position. They did, however, resist. Bragg bore
testimony to this; and a loss of twenty per cent, in some
of Thomas' divisions gives proof of positive resistance. But
the Confederate troops did not fight as they had fought be-
fore, and as they did fight afterwards, in offense and defense.
In addition to the troops that formed Bragg's left wing,
Cheatham's division from the right participated in the action,
resisting Baird's division as it wheeled to the left upon the
crest. It is evident, therefore, that Cheatham's division, the
ęs
I98 LIFE OF GENERAL G.EORG E H, THOMAS.
last to leave Lookout Mountain, was made, by position and
circumstances, a reserve for each wing of the Confederate
army.
To this movement of Cheatham's, the resulting conflict
with Baird, and the general issue of the battle, General
Grant thus alludes in his official report:—
The resistance to Thomas' left being overcome, the enemy aban-
doned his position near the railroad tunnel in front of Sherman, and
by twelve o'clock at night was in full retreat; and the whole of his
strong positions on Lookout Mountain, Chattanooga Valley, and
Missionary Ridge, were in our possession, together with a large num-
ber of prisoners, artillery and Small arms. -
In the evening he wrote to General Sherman:-
No doubt you witnessed the handsome manner in which Thomas’
troops carried Missionary Ridge this afternoon, and can feel a just
pride, too, in the part taken by the forces under your command, in
taking first so much of the same range of hills, and then in attract-
ing the attention of so many of the enemy as to make Thomas' part
certain of success. The next thing now will be to relieve Burnside.
Having full knowledge of the facts thus briefly narrated,
General Thomas was justified in stating in his official report
that the battle was not fought in accordance with General
Grant's plan. He wrote:–
“It will be perceived from the foregoing report, that the original
plan of operations was somewhat modified to meet and take advan-
tage of emergencies which necessitated material modifications of that
plan. It is believed, however, that the original plan, had it been
carried out, could not possibly have led to more successful results.”
It will be believed by all who carefully analyze the ope-
rations of this battle, in their origin, relations, conduct, and
results, that the general who stated officially that the origi-
nal plan of operations was somewhat modified, exerted
potent influence in making the changes. He was a sub-
ordinate, was by the side of his superior in rank during
the battle, was restrained in handling his own army, and
yet his personality was felt in every successful operation.
THE ARMY OF THE CUMBER LAND. I 99
Another brief passage from his report demands insertion,
as characteristic of General Thomas :—
The alacrity and intelligence displayed by officers in executing
their orders, the enthusiasm and spirit displayed by the men who did
the work, cannot be too highly appreciated by the Nation, for the
defense of which they have, on so many other memorable occasions,
nobly and patriotically exposed their lives in battle.
All the Successful operations of this battle were executed
by troops from the Army of the Cumberland, except the
two brigades of Osterhaus' division, Fifteenth Corps,
under General Hooker. And this fact effectually refutes the
imputation that the morale of this army was impaired by the
battle of Chickamauga, and the succeeding situation at Chat-
tanooga. And yet there is little room to doubt that before
the battle, General Grant distrusted it for offense, believing
that a dispiriting defensive at Chattanooga, combined with
the loss of the battle-field at Chickamauga, had produced
such demoralization that it would not take the aggressive
boldly, unless under the leadership of another army and
the inspiration of its success. General Sherman, in his
Memoirs, is very explicit in asserting that this was Gen-
eral Grant's opinion —
General Grant pointed out to me a house on Missionary Ridge
where General Bragg’s headquarters were known to be. He also
explained the situation of affairs generally : that the mules and
horses of Thomas' army were so starved that they could not haul
his guns; that forage, corn, and provisions were so scarce that the
men, in hunger, stole the few grains of corn that were given to favor-
ite horses; that the men of Thomas' army had been so demoralized
by the battle of Chickamauga, that he feared they could not be got
out of their trenches to assume the offensive ; that Bragg had de-
tached Longstreet, with a considerable force, up into East Tennessee
to defeat and capture Burnside; that Burnside was in danger, etc.;
and that he (Grant) was extremely anxious to attack Bragg in posi-
tion, to defeat him, or at least to force him to recall Longstreet. The
Army of the Cumberland had so long been in the trenches that he
wanted my troops to hurry up to take the offensive first, after which
he had no doubt the Cumberland Army would fight well. *
* Memoirs, Vol. I., pp. 36I–2.
2OO I, IFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS.
General Grant's official utterances do not explicitly reveal
his distrust of this army, but some of them preceding the
battle imply such distrust. At any rate, he has made no
denial of General Sherman's statements in the premises,
And as his conduct of the battle accorded fully with the
assumption that he feared that the Army of the Cumber-
land would not fight well in Offense, except under the lead-
ship of another army, the evidence is conclusive that he
has been correctly reported. He certainly made persistent
efforts to unite Sherman's four divisions, postponing battle
for three days that this might be effected, and that General
Sherman might have his own troops for the initial attack.
It is equally true that, although only one of Sherman's divi-
Sions failed to join him, General Grant detached troops from
Thomas' central column, until there were more men from
the Army of the Cumberland under the commander of the
Army of the Tennessee than under Thomas himself. It
must therefore be inferred that there was a special reason for
Grant's adherence to his leading movement as long as there
was any probability of its success, a belief that Sherman's
Success was essential to victory; an inveterate attachment
to his own plan, which was subjected to experiment only
in the unsuccessful operations against Bragg's right flank;
or the fear of driving the enemy eastward rather than south-
ward, and thus still further endangering Burnside.
But the valor of the army from Chickamauga and
the trenches at Chattanooga won the battle, whether Gen-
eral Grant did or did not consider that a successful initial
attack by the Army of the Tennessee was essential to vic-
tory. And had this been achieved, history would have set
the service over against the saving help rendered at the bat-
tle of Shiloh, by the Army of the Cumberland, when,
under another name, it was commanded by General Buell.
But the effort to give corresponding aid at Chattanooga
having failed, the war did not give another opportunity to
balance the account.
CHAPTER X.
PURSUIT OF BRAGG'S ARMY-PREPARATIONS FOR THE SPRING CAMPAIGN.—
OPERATIONS AGAINST DALTON.—CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMY OF
THE CUMBERLAND.
RAGG'S routed army was pursued to Ringgold. At
that place a sharp conflict occurred between the ad-
vance of Grant's forces under Hooker and Cleburne's divi-
sion, the enemy's rear guard. General Grant had sent
Howard's corps with supporting forces across to the rail-
road leading from Cleveland to Dalton, to break that road
and prevent the passage of Longstreet's forces to Bragg, or
the detachment of troops from the retreating army to
strengthen the former against General Burnside. General
Bragg, however, having lost about six thousand by capture
alone in the battles before Chattanooga, had no thought of
still further diminishing his army, and was only intent upon
posting it in the nearest practicable defensive position.
Grant arrested the pursuit of the enemy at Ringgold,
although a small force advanced beyond that place. He
was still anxious in regard to affairs in East Tennessee, and
at once sent General Sherman with a very large force into
that region. Sherman had, in addition to his own army,
Howard's corps, Sheridan's, Wood's and Davis' divisions,
and a large force of cavalry under General Elliott, chief of
cavalry, all from the Army of the Cumberland.
The remainder of General Thomas' troops, after a part of
them had buried their dead comrades left upon the field
of Chickamauga, took position in the vicinity of Chatta-
nooga.
2O I
2O2 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H THOMAS
During the winter of 1863–4 the army was widely scat.
tered in Middle and East Tennessee, engaged in minor
military operations, repairing railroads, building bridges,
stockades, fortifications and store-houses, transporting sup-
plies and restoring the appointments lost at Chickamauga.
Its attitude was mainly defensive while accumulating sup-
plies and making preparations generally for an aggressive
Campaign into Georgia from Chattanooga as a base.
This state of affairs devolved upon General Thomas a per-
plexing administration. There was danger that while his
army was scattered from Nashville to East Tennessee, the
enemy concentrated at Dalton, Georgia, would break through
this long line at one of its weakest points. He was in the
field but once during the winter, all the remoter operations
of his forces having been, from necessity, submitted to sub-
ordinate commanders. He was under orders in February
to conduct operations in East Tennessee, but these orders
were revoked by General Grant because he thought it was
necessary to move against the enemy at Dalton, as a diver-
sion in favor of Sherman who was operating in Mississippi
against General Polk, with Mobile as a possible objective.
The correspondence relating to the projected operations
from Knoxville is subjoined :
Grant to Thomas, February 6, 1864:—
Reports of Scouts make it evident that Joe Johnston has removed
most of his force from your front, two divisions going to Longstreet.
Longstreet has been reenforced by troops from the East. This makes
it evident the enemy intends to secure East Tennessee if they can,
and I intend to drive them out, or get whipped, this month. For
this purpose you will have to detach at least ten thousand men be-
sides Stanley’s division (more will be better). I can partly relieve the
vacuum at Chattanooga by troops from Logan's command. It will not
be necessary to take artillery or wagons to Knoxville, but all the ser-
viceable artillery horses should be taken to use on artillery there.
Six mules to each two hundred men should also be taken, if you have
them to spare. Let me know how Soon you can start.
PROPOSED MO VEMENT TO KNOX VII, L.E. 2O3
Thomas to Grant, February 8, 1864:—
Your despatch of 2 P. M., February 6, was received that evening,
but only so much of it could be translated as to make me understand
that I am expected to detach from my command ten thousand men,
in addition to Stanley's division, and to report when I can start.
I can start a portion of the additional troops day after to-morrow,
but I do not see how they can be fed in an exhausted country,
until the railroad is completed to Loudon. I am in hopes of getting
the railroad completed and in operation to Loudon by Thursday
next. These ten thousand should be replaced by troops from
Logan's command immediately, else the enemy might take advan-
tage of my move towards Knoxville, and attack and capture this
place. It will require an entire division to hold the railroad secure
from here to Loudon.
Thomas to Grant, February Io, 1864:—
The engineer reports that he will have the railroad finished to
Loudon on Friday next. As they are very much in need of supplies,
at Knoxville, I think it will be best to allow time for accumulation
there before the troops from here move up. I will try to provide for
the defense of the place by placing a division of General Logan's
corps at Chickamauga Station, and Davis' division in front of Cleve-
land, to cover the railroad, taking with me Stanley's, Johnson’s and
Baird's divisions. Will you order the division of Logan to move to
this place as soon as possible P
Grant to Thomas, February Io, I864:—
Prepare to start for Knoxville on Saturday. I will order Logan to
send to Chattanooga all the troops he can, and still hold his line of
railroad. The number will probably be about five thousand men.
One division of your command will have to move out to hold the
road to the Hiawassee.
Grant to Thomas, February 12, 1864:—
Conversation with Major-General Foster * has undecided me as to
the propriety of the contemplated move against Longstreet. Schofield
telegraphs the same view. I will take the matter into consideration
* General Foster had succeeded General Burnside in command of the De-
partment of the Ohio, and on account of ill health had himself been superseded
by General Schofield.
2O4. LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H. THOMAS.
during the day, after further talk with Foster, and give you the con-
clusion arrived at. If decided that you do not go, I will instruct
Schofield to let Granger send off his veterans at once.
Should you not be required to go into East Tennessee, could you
not make a formidable reconnoissance towards Dalton, and if suc-
cessful in driving the enemy out, occupy that place, and complete
the railroad up to it this winter P
Thomas to Grant, February 12, 1864:—
I think an attack on Dalton would be successful, if you let me
have the division of Logan's during the movement.
Thomas to Grant, February 15, 1864:—
Your communication of the 13th, by General Elliott, was received
yesterday. Seven regiments of Logan's force have arrived. General
Matthias reports that the remainder will reach here to-morrow. My
plan was to place Matthias in reserve, near Cleveland, and march
with Stanley’s division, supported by two brigades of Matthias’, on the
road from Cleveland to Dalton, and, with the Fourteenth army corps,
take the direct road from here to Dalton, covering my advance and
right flank with cavalry. I have thought of the route you suggest, but
find, upon inquiry, that the roads across the mountain are so difficult
that they can hardly be considered practicable at this season of the
year. I have been considerably embarrassed by having Generals
Stanley and Davis summoned before the McCook court of inquiry
just at this time; but if it continues to rain through the day as it did
last night, I think nothing will be gained by starting just yet. In the
mean time, Stanley and Davis can get back by Wednesday. Should
the weather clear up, however, I will not wait. I intend to relieve as
much of the cavalry at Calhoun as I can with infantry, and send it
(the cavalry) toward Dalton, via Spring Place, in coöperation with
Stanley's force.
Thomas to Grant, February 16, 1864:—
I have just received a telegram from General Schofield, dated
February 14th, stating that he had reliable information that Longstreet
had advanced to Strawberry Plains, and had brought pontoon boats.
Schofield thought that he might intend to make a cavalry raid to cut
his communication with Loudon, or that he might advance to attack
Knoxville and asks me to send him reenforcements as early as
JOHNSTON APPOINTED TO COMMAND. 2O5
practicable. What shall I do 2 If reënforcements are sent to Knox-
ville, they will be detained there for the winter, and cannot make an
advance on Longstreet until the Loudon and Strawberry Plains
bridges are re-built. It will also be necessary to give up any demon-
stration against Dalton. But if Schofield can hold Knoxville, the
demonstration on Dalton can be made, and I hope with Success.
Captain Gay, just from Knoxville, and gone to Nashville, does not
mention such reports.”
Grant to Thomas, February 17, 1864:—
Longstreet cannot afford to place his forces between Knoxville
and the Tennessee. If he does, it will then be time to move against
him. The work of a raid on the road can soon be repaired, if it
cannot be prevented. Make your contemplated move as soon as
possible.
In assigning General Joseph E. Johnston to the command
of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee, the President
and Secretary of War impressed upon him the importance
of early operations against the Army of the Cumberland.
But fortunately General Johnston was detained by the neces-
sity of improving the morale and restoring the appointments
of his army impaired by the battle of Missionary Ridge,
as well as by the reported strength of the forces at Chatta-
nooga, Knoxville, and intermediate places.
General Thomas, however, discerned the possibilities to
the enemy concentrated at Dalton, while his own army was
diffused over a long line and greatly reduced by furloughs
granted to re-enlisting regiments. He was manifestly un-
willing to uncover Chattanooga, to save East Tennessee from
any real or supposed danger. During December, January,
and the first half of February, there was an army of forty
thousand men at Dalton, and at this time that army could
have taken Cleveland, and separated the forces holding
Chattanooga and Knoxville. Thomas was therefore wise in
mentioning the danger to Chattanooga, should a large force
be sent from that place to Knoxville.
The movement against Dalton was projected by General
|
2O6 I, IFE OF GENERAL, G EORG E H THOMAS.
Grant on the supposition that Johnston had detached
largely from his army to aid Longstreet against Burnside
in East Tennessee, and to assist Polk in resisting the ad-
vance of Sherman in Mississippi. The objects proposed
were, to gain Dalton, and, if that could not be effected, to
prevent the transfer of more troops to Polk. By orders
from Richmond, two divisions under General Hardee were
sent to Mississippi on the 7th of February, but no forces
had been sent to East Tennessee. General Thomas at first
believed that Dalton might be captured, if he could advance
from Chattanooga with a strong force; but when he ascer-
tained Johnston's strength, he considered the project im-
practicable.
On the 22d of February all the forces that could be
safely withdrawn from Chattanooga and the line of com-
munications, were put in motion towards Dalton. John-
ston's advanced troops were at Tunnel Hill, while his
other forces were holding positions of great strength south
of that point. As General Palmer, commanding the Four-
teeth corps, approached Tunnel Hill, the enemy retired to
Buzzard's Roost, an almost impregnable natural position,
commanding the railroad. On the 25th, Davis' division,
supported by Johnson's, made an unsuccessful effort
against the enemy. At this juncture General Thomas
joined his troops, and at once became convinced that
the enemy's forces outnumbered his own, and besides
were posted so as to more than double their strength in
defense. By this time the impracticability of supplying
his troops was fully developed, he therefore advised their
immediate withdrawal. General Grant, however, not having
heard of the issue of Sherman's campaign, counseled the
maintenance of the attitude that indicated an advance
to the heart of the South until General Sherman could
be heard from, and suggested measures for holding the
position before Buzzard's Roost. Deeming further men-
ace impracticable, Thomas retired his forces to their former
STRENGTH OF THE ENE MY AT DAL TO N. 2O7
positions; and this action had no evil result, as General
Sherman had turned back from Meridian, Mississippi,
before Thomas had set out from Chattanooga. General
Thomas ascertained, during his operations, that Johnston's
detached troops had returned, and he supposed his menace
had brought them back, whereas it was in consequence of
the countermarch of General Sherman.
The following despatches reveal the views of Grant and
Thomas in relation to the movement on Dalton —
Thomas to Grant, February 19, 1864:
Assistant Surgeon Jacob Miller, Sixth Missouri volunteer infantry,
arrived here yesterday from Dalton. He was captured at Lebanon,
Alabama, when General Logan sent out an expedition towards Rome.
He reports Cleburne's division at Tunnel Hill; Stewart's division
between Tunnel Hill and Dalton ; Walker two miles out from Dal-
ton, towards Spring Place ; Cheatham at Dalton, and Stevenson's
and Bate's divisions to the west of Dalton two miles. He saw all of
the camps, and estimates their force between thirty and forty thou-
sand. He moreover states that no troops have been sent away except
one brigade of infantry, which went to Rome about the first of this
month.
Thomas to Grant from Tunnel Hill, Ga., February 26,
I864, 7.30 A. M.:—
I arrived here last night. Davis and Johnson occupy the pass
at Buzzard's Roost. They have a force equal to theirs in their front,
who outnumber them in artillery. It is not possible to carry this place
by assault. General Palmer made the attempt to turn, yesterday,
with Baird's and Cruft's divisions, but was met by an equal force,
exclusive of their cavalry, and in an equally strong position as at Buz-
zard's Roost. After expending nearly all of his ammunition, he
retired during the night to Catoosa Platform. Our transportation is
poor and limited; we are not able to carry more than sixty pounds
per man; artillery horses so poor, that Palmer could bring but sixteen
pieces. The country is stripped entirely of subsistence and forage.
The enemy’s cavalry is much superior to ours. Prisoners taken yes-
terday report that a portion of Cleburne's division has returned. I
will await the development of this day, and advise you further.
2O8 I, IFE OF GENERAL, G EORGE H, THOMAS.
Grant to Thomas, February 27, 1864:—
It is of the utmost importance that the enemy should be held in
full belief that an advance into the heart of the South is intended,
until the fate of General Sherman is fully known. The difficulties
of supplies can be overcome by keeping your trains running between
Chattanooga and your position. Take the depot trains at Chatta-
nooga, yours and General Howard's wagons. These can be replaced
temporarily by yours returning. Veterans are returning daily. This
will enable you to draw reënforcements constantly to your point.
Can General Schofield not also take a division from Howard's corps ?
It is intended to send Granger to you the moment Schofield is thought
to be safe without him. - -
General Grant to General Whipple, (Thomas' chief of
staff), February 27, 6 P. M.:-
Information has reached Washington that orders have been given
for Johnston's army to fall back. General Thomas should watch any
such movement, and follow it up closely. Can't you draw teams
from Bridgeport and Stevenson, to send supplies to the front ? They
have teams in great numbers at those places. Every energy should
be exerted to get supplies and reënforcements forward. Troops will
leave here at the rate of two or three thousand a day for the front.
Many of them go to Chattanooga.
Thomas to Grant, February 27, 1864, Io P. M.:-
Your two despatches of this date received. I have just returned
from the front. My troops, after ceaseless labor under the greatest
embarrassments for want of transportation, reached within three miles
of Dalton, where they were received by the enemy strongly posted,
and in force fully equal to my own in infantry. His artillery and
cavalry was not only in better condition (as regards horses), but at
least two to our one in pieces and men. We found the country
entirely stripped of everything like forage, and our mules being in such
poor condition that double the number of teams we now have could
not supply the troops, I thought it best to come back to Ringgold, and,
if workmen can be found by Colonel McCallum, to go to work de-
liberately to repair the railroad, and advance as it progresses. The
present condition of the roads is not good, and one day’s rain would
render the part across Chickamauga bottom impassable for loaded
wagons. So it would be absolutely necessary to repair the railroad
PROPOSES TO TURN DAL TON. 2O9
to supply the troops at Ringgold. The fact of working on the road
would hold Johnston at Dalton, unless he intended to leave under any
circumstances. Howard's teams and the depot teams at this place
and Bridgeport are in no better condition than those belonging to the
divisions, all being composed of such mules as we have been able
to keep after a fashion during the winter. Johnston has no idea of
leaving Dalton until compelled, and having a force greater than I
now have under my immediate command, I cannot drive him from
that place. -
If Longstreet has retired, why can I not get Granger's two divi-
sions and my first cavalry division back 2 The little cavalry I had on
the expedition is completely run down from constant work and from
want of forage.
It should be observed that while General Thomas had but
four divisions of infantry and a small cavalry force with
which to advance against General Johnston, the latter had
nearly as large a force at Dalton, the last of February, as
he had in May, when General Sherman advanced against
him with more than orfe hundred thousand men.
Johnston, referring to his detachment of two divi-
sions to Polk, and the advance of Thomas against
Dalton, said in his report:
The force detached was probably exaggerated to Major-General
Thomas; for on the 23d the Federal army advanced to Ringgold;
on the 24th drove in our ourposts; and on the 25th skirmished at
Mill Creek Gap and in the corn valley east of Rocky Face Moun-
tain. We were successful at both places.
General Thomas' despatches to General Grant evince a
very clear perception of the situation. He assumed that
Johnston's position at Mill Creek Gap, or Buzzard's Roost,
if well defended, was impregnable, as was demonstrated
in the following May; and that the enemy would not
leave Dalton until compelled to do so, which was likewise
true. And he discerned the only way to dislodge John-
ston, and made it known to General Grant in the follow-
ing despatch, proposing to turn Dalton and take Atlanta.
with less than the whole of his own army:—
I4.
2 I O I, IFE OF GENERAL G EORG E H, THOMAS.
Thomas to Grant, February 28, 1864:—
General Butterfield, by my direction, has recently examined the
line between here and Nashville, and reports that he thinks six thou-
sand men will be sufficient to guard that line, two regiments of which
force should be cavalry. From what I know of the road between
Nashville and Decatur, two thousand infantry and two thousand cav-
alry will be sufficient to protect that line. One thousand infantry,
will be sufficient to protect the line from Athens to Stevenson. Pro-
bably both lines of communication can be guarded by six thousand
infantry and two thousand cavalry, a great portion of which should
be made up from the local militia of Tennessee, or troops organized
especially for the preservation of order in the State.
I believe, if I commence the campaign with the Fourteenth and
Fourth corps in front, with Howard's Corps in reserve, that I can move
along the line of the railroad and overcome all opposition, as far, at
/east, as Atlanta. I should want a strong division of cavalry in advance.
As soon as Captain Merrill returns from his reconnoissance along the
railroad lines, I can give you a definite estimate of the number of
troops required to guard the bridges along the road.
In his report to the Committee on the Conduct of the
War, General Thomas thus referred to the plan proposed
in his despatch to General Grant –
The above proposition was submitted to General Grant for his
approval, and if obtained, it was my intention (having acquired by
the reconnoissance of February 23d, 24th, and 25th a thorough
knowledge of the approaches direct upon Dalton from Ringgold and
Cleveland) to have made a strong demonstration against Buzzard's
Roost, attracting Johnston's whole attention to that point, and to
have thrown the main body of my infantry and cavalry through
Snake Creek Gap upon his communications, which, I had ascertained
from scouts, he had up to that time neglected to observe or guard.
With this view I had previously asked for the return to me of Granger's
troops and my cavalry from East Tennessee, and had already initi-
ated preparations for the execution of the above movement as soon
as the spring opened sufficiently to admit of it. See the following
telegrams in illustration. *
The despatches referred to had relation to the return of
his troops from East Tennessee, the repair of the railroad
towards Dalton, and the protection of the railroad to Nash-
* Report to Com. on Conduct of War, p. 198.
PLANS OF CONFEDERATE A UTHORITIES. 2 I I
ville. His plan of offense was a bold one for a single army,
and his purpose was to make it as large as possible, leaving
the fewest men behind that could hold the communications
securely. The plan itself will appear in another chapter;
and although it was not tested when or in the way that
General Thomas suggested, its merits cannot be questioned.
From December 1863 to May 1864, the project of a
forward movement by the Confederate army at Dalton was
discussed by the authorities at Richmond and General
Johnston. The latter urged that an increase of his army
and additional material were necessary should such a move-
ment be attempted. He proposed that Longstreet's com-
mand from East Tennessee and troops from Beauregard's
and Polk's departments should be promptly sent to him.
Rečnforcements to raise his army to seventy-five thousand
men were promised, but were not to be sent to him until he
should appoint a time for his advance.
The plan formed at Richmond required that he should
not attempt to capture fortified places, but to draw out
Thomas' troops, if practicable, and force them to battle in
an open field; failing in this, Johnston was instructed
to concentrate all available troops, break Thomas' line
at Kingston, East Tennessee, isolating the army at Knox-
ville, and then to strike and destroy the railroad leading
from Nashville to Chattanooga. The sanguine Confederate
leaders even hoped that Johnston would be able to move to
the rear of Nashville also, and reclaim the “provision
country” of Tennessee and Kentucky.
Had seventy five thousand men been given to Johnston
when Thomas' army was most scattered and weakest,
some, if not all, of these results might have been produced,
and had the army that wintered at Dalton, been hurled
against Thomas' line where it was weakest, from Cleveland
to Kingston, there might have been a serious derangement
of the plan of operations from Chattanooga as a base. But
the winter and much of the spring passed in the discussion
2 I 2 I, IFE OF GENERAL, GEORG E H THOMAS.
of plans, rather than in preparation for offense or defense,
and thus the opportunity was lost.
General Johnston, however, anticipated that General
Grant would take the offensive with a large army, and on
the 18th of March asked for immediate reënforcements to
meet Grant in battle should he advance and if successful
pursue his defeated army; or should Grant not advance,
to take the offensive himself, and proposed, if practicable, to
strike near Chattanooga, or to march into Middle Tennessee
through North Alabama. Still when General Sherman
advanced from Chattanooga in May, with an immense
army, or three armies in one, reënforcements from Polk's
department had not reached Dalton, and other service had
been assigned to General Longstreet.
On the 18th of March General Johnston wrote to General
Bragg, chief staff officer to Mr. Davis —
I expressly accept taking the offensive. Only differ with you as
to details. I assume that the enemy will be prepared to advance be-
fore we are, and will make it to our advantage. Therefore I propose
as necessary, both for the offensive and defensive, to assemble our
troops here immediately. Other preparations for advance are going
On. *
And yet on the first of May he reported an army of less
than forty-five thousand men at Dalton, when the offensive
was impracticable.
On the 25th of November, during the action on Mission-
ary Ridge, General Thomas thought of the burial of
the officers and men who were then falling as well as those
who had yielded their lives on other fields. Previous
to the advance which resulted in the rout of the Confederate
army, a line of troops in reserve coursed over a hill to the
right and rear of Sheridan's position, revealing a suitable
configuration for a National cemetery. Subsequently,
by his order, this hill was taken for this use. During
* Johnston's “Narrative of Military Operations,” page 298.
“ TIR ED OF STATE RIG HTS.” 2 I 3
the preparation of the ground he manifested great inter-
est in the work, and frequently rode out from the town to
note the progress and to make suggestions. He provided
amply for the work, by detaching troops, at times whole
regiments, for this duty. He directed not only that his
soldiers should be carefully buried, but that the grounds
should be beautified. And through his action in its estab-
lishment, and his support of those in charge, he made it the
type of the National cemeteries in the West, and caused a
change for the better in those in the East. It was meet
that the first National cemetery, founded by military order,
should give the ideal of the last resting places of the
Nation's heroes.
In conferring with General Thomas in regard to the plan
of burial, the chaplain in charge asked, if the dead should
be buried according to their several states. The general was
silent for a moment and then said very positively : “No, no.
Mix them up; mix them up. I am tired of state-rights.”
Whatever may have been General Thomas’ views of
this political dogma at the beginning of the war, it is
certain that in December 1863, he abhorred it. He rose
superior to its claims at the beginning of the struggle, so
far at least as to give unhesitating support to the General
government in suppressing a rebellion which resulted from
its application. He may not have brushed away at once
the subtleties by which the ablest statemen of the South
maintained the doctrine. But when he had seen the legiti-
mate fruits, in a gigantic war, and had perceived that the
Confederate government had been compelled to infringe
upon the recognized rights of states to give vigor to a war,
waged for their establishment, he grew “tired of state-
rights.” The logic of war, left no doubt in his mind, that
the rights of states, as understood in the South, stood op-
posed to complete National autonomy.
In accordance with his antagonism to state rights, Gen-
eral Thomas supported the government in declaring slaves
2 I 4 LIFE OF GENERAL G EORG E H THOMAS.
contraband of war, and in enlisting them as soldiers when
their freedom had been proclaimed by the President of the
United States. He was too pronounced in his loyalty and
too direct and severe in his logic, to falter when extreme
measures were adopted. He was, therefore, prepared for
the radical solution of the problems of the war as they
were developed in the various stages of the conflict. When
the enlistment of the manumitted slaves was ordered by the
National authorities no department commander performed
his duty in giving efficiency to Colored regiments more loy-
ally than General Thomas. He gave advice and encour-
agement to the Officers who were engaged in organizing
and commanding negro troops in his department. And
when these troops exhibited their proficiency in the manual
of arms and drill, he was often among the delighted spec-
tatorS.
General Thomas was strictly observant of the rules of
war in relation to the treatment of citizens of the South
when within his lines, giving them protection whenever
they could justly claim it, and visiting upon them just
punishment when they violated the restrictions imposed
upon non-combatant enemies. As an illustration of just
severity the following order, relating to murders by guer-
illas, is adduced:
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
* Chattanooga, Tenn., January 6, 1864.
GENERAL ORDERS No. 6.
It having been reported to these headquarters that, between seven
and eight o'clock on the evening of the 23d ult., within one and a
half miles of the village of Mulberry, Lincoln County, Tenn., a
wagon which had become detached from a foraging train belonging
to the United States was attacked by guerrillas, and the officer in
command of the foraging party, 1st Lieut. Porter, Co. A, 27th Indi-
ana volunteers, the teamster, wagon-master, and two other sol-
diers who had been sent to load the train (the latter four unarmed)
were captured. They were immediately mounted and hurried off,
the guerrillas avoiding the road, until their party halted about one
o'clock in the morning on the bank of Elk River, where the rebels
G UER II, LA WAR FAR E. 2 I 5
stated they were going into camp for the night. The hands of the
prisoners were then tied behind them, and they were robbed of
everything of value about their persons. They were next drawn up
in line, about five paces in front of their captors, and one of the
latter, who acted as leader, commanded “Ready,” and the whole
party immediately fired upon them. One of the prisoners was shot
through the head and killed instantly, and three were wounded. Lieut.
Porter was not hit. He immediately ran, was followed and fired
upon three times by one of the party, and finding that he was about
to be overtaken, threw himself over a precipice into the river, and
Succeeding in getting his hands loose, swam to the opposite side,
and although pursued to that side and several times fired upon, he,
after twenty-four hours of extraordinary exertions and great expo-
sure, reached a house, whence he was taken to Tullahoma, where he
now lies in a critical situation. The others after being shot, were imme-
diately thrown into the river. Thus the murder of three men—Newell
E. Orcutt, 9th Independent Battery, Ohio vol. artillery, John W.
Drought, Co. H. 22d Wisconsin volunteers, and George W. Jacobs,
Co. D, 22d Wisconsin volunteers, was accomplished by shooting and
drowning. The fourth, James W. Foley, 9th Independent Battery
Ohio vol. artillery, is now lying in hospital, having escaped by get-
ting his hands free while in the water.
For these atrocious, cold-blooded murders, equaling in Savage
ferocity any ever committed by the most barbarous tribes on the
continent, committed by rebel citizens of Tennessee, it is ordered
that the property of all other rebel citizens living within a circuit of
ten miles of the place where these men were captured, be assessed
each in their due proportion according to his wealth, to make up the
sum of thirty thousand dollars, to be divided among the families who
are dependent upon the murdered men for support:
Ten thousand dollars to be paid to the widow of John W.
Drought, of North Cape, Racine County, Wisconsin, for the support
of herself and two children.
Ten thousand dollars to be paid to the widow of George W.
Jacobs, of Delavan, Walworth County, Wisconsin, for the support of
herself and one child.
Ten thousand dollars to be divided between the aged mother
and sister of Newell E. Orcutt, of Burton, Geauga County, Ohio.
Should the persons assessed fail within one week after notice
shall have been served upon them to pay in the amount of their
tax in money, sufficient of their personal property shall be seized
and sold at public auction to make up the amount.
2 I 6 LIFE OF GENERAL, GEORG E H, THOMAS.
Major-General H. W. Slocum, U. S. Volunteers commanding
Twelfth army corps, is charged with the execution of this order.
The men who committed these murders, if caught, will be sum-
marily executed, and any persons executing them will be held
guiltless and will receive the protection of this army, and all persons
who are suspected of having aided, abetted or harbored these guer-
rillas will be immediately arrested and tried by military commission.
By command of MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
WM. D. WHIPPLE, Assist. Adjt-General.
These guerrillas were one day citizens, in pretension,
and the next day were engaged in the wanton murder of
our soldiers. Extreme measures were imperative to sup-
press this irregular warfare within the lines of his army,
and General Thomas did not hesitate to hold communities
responsible for such cowardly and cruel acts. These men
had the support of citizens who were protected by the
army, and as citizens the criminals themselves were pro-
tected. It was just that both classes should be punished as
far as this could be done, when the murders could not be
traced to individuals. The fines imposed and collected
were justly applied to the Support of the nearest relatives
of the murdered soldiers.
The Army of the Cumberland, under General Thomas,
never wantonly destroyed the property of enemies. There
were doubtless some cases of unauthorized spoliation and
destruction of property. For military reasons, as justified
by the laws and usages of war, property was taken by the
proper officers, and accounted for to the owners and to
the supply departments, beyond this all pillaging was
forbidden. And no army during the war was less ad-
dicted to pillage than the Army of the Cumberland. By
judicious and regular foraging during the East Tennessee
campaign General Davis' division was so well supplied,
and kept so close in hand as to call forth the official
commendation of General Sherman. And this division
simply represented the army.
PR EPA RING FOR SPRING CAMPAIG W. 2 I 7
The months of March and April were especially devoted
to preparation for a campaign in Georgia. While General
Thomas and his army were thus engaged against difficulties
neither few nor easily overcome, there was need of constant
watchfulrºss against probable offense by General Johnston,
who, as has been mentioned, was under orders to take the
offensive, and the weak points in Thomas' long line invi-
ted attack. The fears concerning Longstreet's movements
detained the Fourth corps and cavalry in East Tennessee.
It was therefore in doubt for several weeks which of the
opposing armies would first be ready for offense.
On the 17th of March General Grant assumed command
of the Armies of the United States, as lieutenant-general,
and on that day General Thomas was informed by him that
General W. T. Sherman had been assigned to the command
of the Military Division of the Mississippi. At this time
General Thomas ranked General Sherman by date of com-
mission as a major-general of volunteers, but the assign-
ment of the latter to the command of a military division
gave him seniority over all department commanders. Ap-
preciating this fact and having committed himself volun-
tarily to an unprotesting acquiescence in all orders affecting
his own position, Thomas quietly accepted the prescribed
subordination,-so quietly that it has since been assumed
that he preferred an inferior office through fear of the re-
sponsibility of chief command.
By the 1st of May the Army of the Cumberland was fully
prepared for the meditated campaign. It then comprised
about sixty-five thousand men for the field. The appoint-
ments of this army were then superb and its organization
perfect in detail. General Thomas had anticipated all its
WantS.
Few generals have been as exhaustive in prepara-
tion as he, when time permitted, and fewer still have
been so closely observant of details or so thoroughly
acquainted with the soldiers of a large army in their minor
2 I 8 I, IFE OF GENERAL, G EOI&G E H, THOMAS.
organizations. Lieut-Colonel Wilkinson, commanding the
Ninth Michigan regiment, which for a long time was head-
quarters guard, once said, that he was in constant fear lest
General Thomas should evince a more complete knowledge
of his regiment than himself. At times the general did
not see the regiment for months, and yet he could give the
names of the sergeants and the companies to which they
severally belonged. He was a close observer, and having
a very retentive memory, he often surprised those about
him by his intimate knowledge of the minutest details of
matters to which he had not seemingly given attention.
An illustration of the completeness of General Thomas'
professional knowledge is given in the following statement
of General Gates P. Thruston :
When I became a member of his staff, as judge advocate, it was
a matter of surprise to me to find how remarkably familar and ac-
complished he was with all matters of military law and precedent;
and other officers of his staff in the various departments often re-
marked to me that he seemed to know the usage, details and system
of each department of service as thoroughly as though he had
passed his entire military service in it. During two years
in the judge advocate's department I devoted almost my entire
time to fitting myself for the duties of the position. I sent to Europe
for books, and read everything pertaining to military law and that
branch of the service; yet in the preparation of court-martial orders,
or in the consideration of questions of law or precedent relating to
that department, the general was always ready with useful sugges-
tions and counsel, and seemed to have given more consideration to
these subjects than any other officer in the army. He also always
gave a willing and patient consideration to every case or question
brought before him.
During his earlier days he had made a careful study of military
and court-martial law, and had prepared notes of decisions from
various works on the subject, showing how painstaking and system-
atic he was in making himself master of all departments of his pro-
fession. * * *
I mention the foregoing merely to add my testimony to the com-
pleteness of his character. What was true of my department was
true as to all the other branches of the service, as far as I could
judge. He was master of them all.
THOMAS AND HIS ARMY. 2 IQ
The corps commanders were: Major-General Oliver O.
Howard, Fourth corps, Major-General John M. Palmer,
Fourteenth corps, and Major-General Joseph Hooker,
Twentieth corps. The division commanders of the Fourth
corps were: Major-Generals David S. Stanley and John
Newton and Brigadier-General Thomas J. Wood; of the
Fourteenth corps, Brigadier-Generals Richard W. Johnson,
Jefferson C. Davis and Absalom Baird; of the Twentieth
corps, Brigadier-Generals Alpheus S. Williams and John
W. Geary and Major-General Daniel Butterfield. Brigadier-
General Washington L. Elliott was chief of cavalry, and
Brigadier-Generals Kenner Garrard, Judson Kilpatrick
and Edward M. McCook, division commanders. *
While the Army of the Cumberland was magnificently
equipped, its morale was Superb. It had full confidence in
its commander, and no general ever had stronger faith in an
army than had Thomas in his soldiers. This mutual faith
gave greater power than was represented by mere num-
bers. It had always been unusually harmonious, in its
grand and minor units, free from parties, cliques and cabals.
It was now in its enlargement stronger than ever in its
essential unity, and being free from jealousy, it was ripe for
good faith and hearty cooperation with the other armies to
be associated with it in the projected campaign. In this
respect it was in full sympathy with its commander. Never
in the history of war, in any cause, or under any necessity
for the association and coöperation of armies of distinct
organization, was an officer more fully guided by regard
for the common object, than General Thomas. And yet
he was not indifferent to his own fame or that of his army.
* For full roster see Hist. Army of the Cumberland, Vol. II., pp. 31–39.
CHAPTER XI.
ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.
ADVANCE TO BUZZARD'S ROOST-TURNING OF DALTON.—ACTION AT RESACA –
MOVEMENT ON DALLAS–ASSAULT OF JUNE 27TH AT KENESAW MOUN-
TAIN — FLANK MOVEMENT — ADVANCE ON ATLANTA—BATTLES OF
JULY 20th AND 22D–SIEGE—TURNING MOVEMENT— ACTION AT JONES-
BORO”.
ENERAL SHERMAN’S armies moved forward from
their respective positions on Converging roads towards
Tunnel Hill and Snake Creek Gap, on the 5th of May.
The Army of the Cumberland advanced on the direct roads,
the Army of the Ohio on the road from Cleveland to Dal-
ton, and the Army of the Tennessee by Lee and Gordon's
mill through Villanow to the northern entrance to Snake
Creek Gap, a route that the enemy was not observing.
The tenacious adherence of General Thomas to his plan
of turning Dalton, first suggested to General Grant for
execution by the Army of the Cumberland alone, is evinced
by the following extract from the report of General Thomas
to the Committee on the Conduct of the War:
Shortly after his assignment to the command of the Military
Division of the Mississippi General Sherman came to see me at
Chattanooga to consult as to the position of affairs, and adopt a plan
for a spring campaign. At that interview I proposed to General Sher-
man that if he would use McPherson’s and Schofield's armies to dem-
onstrate on the enemy's position at Dalton by the direct roads through
Buzzard Roost Gap, and from the direction of Cleveland, I would
throw my whole force through Snake Creek Gap, which I knew to
be unguarded ; fall upon the enemy's communications between Dal-
ton and Resaca, thereby turning his position completely, and force
him either to retreat towards the east through a difficult country,
22O
SHERMAN'S LOST OPPORTUNITY. 22 I
poorly supplied with provisions and forage, with a strong probability
of total disorganization of his force, or attack me, in which latter
event I felt confident that my army was sufficiently strong to beat
him, especially as I hoped to gain a position on his communications
before he could be made aware of my movement. General Sherman
objected to this plan for the reason that he desired my army to form
the reserve of the united armies, and to serve as a rallying point for
the two wings, the Army of the Ohio and that of the Tennessee, to
operate from. *
In rejecting General Thomas' suggestions General Sher-
man lost the Supreme opportunity of the Atlanta campaign.
He adopted Thomas' plan so far as to send a smaller army
through Snake Creek Gap, but with a different object from
that proposed to him. His policy of holding the great army
as a reserve for the smaller ones, might have been effective
in a region which gave freedom of motion to his forces, but
was not suited to the mountain region of Northern Georgia.
In a direct advance the main army would necessarily en-
counter the enemy's strongest positions, while the smaller
armies in independent movement could produce no decisive
results.
General Sherman made provision for about eighty thou-
sand men to move directly against Johnston's position in the
mountains before Dalton, in feint or positive attack, as
circumstances might determine, and for twenty-three thou-
sand to pass through Snake Creek Gap to frighten the enemy
into retreat, and then to strike him in flank and rear as he
should run from Dalton to Resaca to save his communica-
tions. Thomas would have led his army of more than
sixty thousand men through that Gap to seize and hold
Resaca or the railroad north of that place, while leaving
fifty thousand men to cover the more important move-
ment by feigning a direct attack at Buzzard's Roost.
Seldom have mountains and a long, secluded gap offered
such aid to generalship. But the topography prescribed
* Report to Com. on Conduct of War, pp. 201–2.
222 LIFE OF GENERAL, G EORG E H THOMAS,
only one plan, a feint upon the enemy's position before
Dalton, and the movement of an army strong enough to
plant itself firmly on his communications. The practica-
bility of this plan was demonstrated by the operations of
the combined armies on the 8th, 9th and Ioth of May.
The views of General Sherman as to his plan of opera-
tions were expressed in his communications to General
Halleck and his army commanders. On the 8th he said to
Halleck :
I have been all day reconnoitering the mountain range through
whose gap the railroad and common road pass. By to-night McPher-
son will be in Snake Creek Gap, threatening Resaca, and to-morrow
all will move to the attack. Army in good spirits and condition. I
hope Johnston will fight here, instead of drawing me far down in
Georgia.
On the 9th he telegraphed to Washington :
We have been fighting all day against precipices and mountain
gaps to keep Johnston's army busy whilst McPherson could march
to Resaca to destroy the railroad behind him. I heard from McPher-
son up to 2 P. M., when he was within a mile and a half of the
railroad. After breaking the road good, his orders are to retire to
the mouth of Snake Creek Gap, and be ready to work on Johnston's
flank in case he retreats south. I will pitch in again early in the
morning. Fighting has been mostly skirmishing, and casualties
small. McPherson has the Army of the Tennessee, twenty-three
thousand, and only encountered cavalry, so that Johnston did not
measure his strength at all.
The day following, at 7 A. M., he telegraphed to General
Halleck :
I am starting for the extreme front in Buzzard Roost Gap, and
make this despatch that you may understand that Johnston aCtS
purely on the defensive. I am attacking him on his strongest points,
viz., west and north, till McPherson breaks his line at Resaca, when
I will swing round through Snake Creek Gap and interfere between him
and Georgia. * * * Yesterday I pressed hard to prevent Johnston
detaching against McPherson; to-day I will be more easy, as I be-
Mſ.C. PHERSON FAILS TO TAKE RESAOA. 223
lieve McPherson has destroyed Resaca, when he is ordered to fall
back to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap, and act against Johnston’s
flank when he does start. *
But General McPherson did not take Resaca, nor destroy
the railroad north of that place. He advanced to the vici-
nity of the town, posted his army on the south and west
for a little time, and then withdrew to the mouth of Snake
Creek Gap and fortified. In the advance from the gap a
Small force of cavalry was brushed away, but no other
resistance was offered by the enemy. At this time
Resaca was held by two brigades, comprising about three
thousand men, and there were no supporting forces nearer
than Dalton. These facts demonstrate the practicability of
the march of the Army of the Cumberland through Snake
Creek Gap before the enemy “could become aware of the
movement.” And had General Thomas been permitted to
execute his own plan, his army would have been firmly
planted on Johnston's communications at Resaca, be-
fore either the whole or a part of his army could have
marched from Dalton. General Thomas was as sanguine
that he could have whipped Johnston's entire army with his
own as that he could have moved through Snake Creek Gap
without his knowledge.
In the afternoon of the 9th, General Johnston was informed
by General Canty, commanding at Resaca, that the Army of
the Tennessee had passed through Snake Creek Gap, and
thereupon he sent Hood with three divisions to Resaca.
But on the IOth General Hood reported that the enemy had
retired, and he was then ordered to leave two divisions at
Tilton, one on each road, and to return to Dalton with the
third. Tilton is nearly half-way from Resaca to Dalton,
and these two divisions were disposed for a quick movement
to either place, as circumstances should require.
The reasons which have been assigned for the fruitless
advance of the Army of the Tennessee through Snake
Creek Gap on the 9th, are that Resaca was strongly forti-
224 LIFE OF GENERAL GEOśG E H. THOMAS,
fied and manned, and that the valley north of that place
was a forest. General Sherman stated, in his official report,
that “nothing saved Johnston's army at Resaca, but the im-
practicable nature of the country which made the passage
of troops across the valley almost impossible.” When at
the time General Thomas heard that the woods north of
Resaca were considered a barrier to an advance upon the
railroad, he simply asked: “Where were their axes?” On
the 13th his own army and Schofield's moved through these
woods to form a line of battle before Resaca.
When Sherman learned that McPherson had not broken
the railroad at Resaca, he sent the following letter to
Thomas :
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.
In the field, Tunnel Hill, May 10, 1864.
GENERAL:—I think you are satisfied that your troops cannot take
Rocky Face Ridge, and also the attempt to put our columns into the
jaws of Buzzard Roost would be fatal to us.
Two plans of action suggest themselves:
1st. By night to replace Schofield's present command by Stone-
man's cavalry which should be near at hand and rapidly move your
entire army, the men along the base of John's Mountain by the Mill
Creek road to Snake Creek Gap, and join McPherson while the
wagons are moved to Villanow. When we are joined to McPherson
to move from Sugar Valley on Resaca, interposing ourselves be-
tween that place and Dalton. Could your army and McPherson's
surely whip Joe Johnston P
2nd. I cast loose from the railroad altogether and move the
whole army on the same objective point leaving Johnston to choose
his course.
Give orders for all your troops to be ready with three days’ pro-
visions and to be prepared to march to-night. I expect to hear from
McPherson and Schofield as to their situation, also as to the near
approach of Stoneman. He was at Charleston yesterday, and is
apprized of the necessity for haste. Do you think any danger to
McPherson should make us delay one day ?
Please give me the benefit of your opinion on these points.
Yours, &c.,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major General Commanding.
MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Present.
2- PROPOSES TO SUPPORT MCPHERSON. 225
But on the same day General Sherman said to Halleck:
I must feign on Buzzard Roost but pass through Snake Creek
Gap, and place myself between Johnston and Resaca, where we
will have to fight it out. I am making the preliminary move. Cer-
tain that Johnston can make no detachments, I will be in no hurry.
This modification of plan did not bring the two generals
into much nearer accord. The appearance of the Army of
the Tennessee at Resaca on the 9th, and its quick retire-
ment to Snake Creek Gap, had given intricacy to General
Sherman's problem. As the town had not been attacked
nor a demand made for the surrender of the troops holding
it, and as no attempt had been made to seize or break the
railroad north of the place, McPherson's movement was
equivocal in Johnston's view, indicating danger to his
Communications, or a feint to cover direct operations
against Dalton. While, therefore, in doubt as to the real
significance of this movement Johnston was more watchful
against the advance of Sherman's forces on the direct road
to his position, as well as on the one to his rear through
Snake Creek Gap.
On the IOth, General Thomas addressed the following
letter to General Sherman :
“HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT CUMBERLAND.
In the Field, May Io, 1864,
MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of Mississippi.
“How do you like the idea of leaving General Schofield where he
is, placing General Howard in front of the gap to entrench himself
to hold the gap : Palmer's corps in reserve, with ten days provisions
and full supply of ammunition, to reënforce General McPherson, if
necessary, and send General Hooker's corps at once to support Gen-
eral McPherson 2 I make this proposition simply because I think
General Hooker's corps will be sufficient to enable General Mc-
Pherson to whip any force that Johnston can bring against him. Not
knowing what your plans may be I submit this for your consideration.
“I am General very respectfully your obedient servant,
GEO. H. THOMAS,
I 5 Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.”
226 LIFE OF GENERAL G EORGE H, THOMAS.
This letter is seemingly a reply to General Sherman's of
the same day, and yet the last sentence warrants the in-
ference that it was independently suggestive. It answers
directly or indirectly, the questions proposed by Sherman,
and yet at the time Thomas was evidently ignorant of the
plans of the former which were to follow the failure of
McPherson to change the situation. This letter, therefore, as
anticipating General Sherman's questions, evinces a persist-
ent thoughtfulness and a wonderfully clear apprehension of
possibilities. The practicability of his original plan had
been demonstrated by McPherson's movements, although
the great object proposed by Thomas had not been attained.
The instructions of Sherman to McPherson named a differ-
ent object, and yet the situation at Resaca demonstrated
so plainly the practicability of achieving all that Thomas
had promised, had he been permitted to lead his army
through Snake Creek Gap, that General McPherson was
subsequently censured for not departing from the course
prescribed by his orders.
Some of General Sherman's questions were indirectly
answered by General Thomas whether his letter was an an-
swer to Sherman's or written before that letter was received.
He had previously asserted that with his own army he
could whip Johnston, and in his letter he assumed that
reenforced by Hooker's corps, McPherson could whip
any force that Johnston could “bring against him;” and
he did not express his conviction that it was useless to
attempt to carry Johnston's mountain fortress, because he
had previously asserted that that position if well defended
could not be carried by assault.
In this letter of the Ioth, General Thomas virtually
made a re-statement of his original plan, with this differ.
ence however, that General McPherson was to be given
the vital movement with Hooker's corps added to his
army. His suggestions, if adopted, would have divided
Sherman's forces into two nearly equal parts, one-half to
SNA KE CREEK GAP 227
advance on Resaca or on the railroad north of that place,
and the other to maintain the feint on the north of Dalton.
He was not in favor of withdrawing any of the forces from
Buzzard Roost under the observation of the enemy. But
as Hooker had already moved towards Snake Creek
Gap, that corps could have joined McPherson unnoticed by
the enemy. Thomas suggested the fortification of How-
ard's position to strengthen the feint rather than to neu-
tralize it altogether by the withdrawal of the forces
from Buzzard's Roost. And had his second plan been
promptly tried with troops disposed as he recommended
all the circumstances gave assurance of success. From
the return of General Hood to Dalton on the IOth, to
the evening of the I Ith, Resaca was held by Canty's
troops. McPherson could have moved against Resaca
or to the railroad between that place and Dalton, with
a larger army than General Johnston had at hand and
at the same time he could have cut off from the enemy
, the two divisions of Polk's corps, one of which arrived
at Resaca from the south on the evening of the 11th.
This coincidence of plan with circumstances assuring suc-
cessful execution, is one of the marvelous, oft-recurring
proofs of the generalship of Thomas. And seldom has a
general been so generous and patriotic. He had been for-
bidden to carry out a plan of his own devising, and yet he
offered a corps of twenty thousand men to another com-
mander to execute that plan.
But General Sherman decided to move his entire force
through Snake Creek Gap on the 12th, except Howard's
corps and McCook's and Stoneman's cavalry, and gave or—
ders accordingly. On the 12th, all his infantry except How-
ard's corps moved through Snake Creek Gap. Early on that
day General Johnston reconnoitred his front before Dalton
to ascertain the number of troops at Buzzard's Roost and
other points, and early on the following morning he retired
his army to Resaca, General Polk's corps covering the
228 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
formation of Hardee's and Hood's corps in line of battle
before the town.
A large army could have advanced to the railroad north of
Resaca, at any time between the 9th, and evening of the 12th.
During this period Johnston had no forces there,or near
there, that could not have been shut up in the town or
driven back to Dalton. But when on the 13th, Sher-
man's armies debouched from the southern opening of
Snake Creek Gap, Johnston had at least fifty thousand
infantry and artillery, in part behind defenses, but all in
front of his communications. But had the Army of the
Cumberland instead of the Army of the Tennessee—sixty
thousand men in room of twenty three thousand—passed
through Snake Creek Gap on the 9th, or had the latter
army strengthened by Hooker's corps advanced on Resaca
on the I Ith, General Johnston in all probability would have
lost his communications if not his army.
Sherman's armies were put in array before Resaca
on the 13th, and on the next day there was an inde-
cisive battle. On the night of the 15th, to avoid being shut
up in Resaca, and a retreat with exposed flanks, General
Johnston retired with his army and his material. In shun-
ning a general engagement he gave up Rome and Kingston
and the railroad to the Etowah River. Here General Sher-
man halted for three days to give rest to his troops, repair
the railroad and accumulate supplies.
Despairing of bringing on a battle by direct pursuit, he
resolved to cut loose from his communications and move
past Johnston's left flank, and if possible reach his line of
supply at Marietta or the Chattahoochee River. His forces
having supplies for twenty days in wagon crossed the
Etowah on the 23d, and moved upon various railroads
leading to the southwest. In this movement the Army of
the Cumberland was in the centre, the Army of the Ten-
nessee on the right and the Army of the Ohio, on the left.
McCook's cavalry, in front of the central army, skirmished
NEW HOPE CHURCH. 229
with cavalry and infantry at Stilesboro' on the 23d. The
day following indications multiplied that General Johnston
had discovered the movement of Sherman's armies to his
left and was making efforts to defeat it.
On the 25th, the Army of the Cumberland advanced
upon four roads under orders to converge on Dallas. As
it progressed, resistance was offered by the enemy on the
road leading to New Hope Church. And it soon became
evident that Johnston had thrown his army across Sher-
man's line of march, in a strong position about four miles
from Dallas. As soon as General Geary's division in
advance began to meet strong resistance, General Thomas
apprehended the situation and sent from him all the mem-
bers of his staff, bearing messages, looking to the quick
concentration of his army before the enemy.
In emergencies no general was more prompt, or wise,
in his dispositions. At the time, his own army was scat-
tered, and the other two armies were not near for quick
support. The purpose of the enemy was not known, and an
offensive blow was not improbable. Sherman believed that
he had struck Johnston's right flank and proposed to turn
it. Thomas perceiving the danger to his scattered forces,
should Johnston take the offensive with his concentrated
army, addressed himself to supporting the troops that
first engaged the enemy, so as to hide the condition of his
army and ward off offense until his troops should be
gathered together.
The operations near Dallas were very much like those at
Resaca in form and issue. General Sherman made effort to
break Johnston's line and turn his flank, and finally
after heavy loss solved the problem, by moving his army
by the left flank to the railroad at Ackworth, leaving his
foe free to take position on his communications further
south.
The operations of the month of May cost the Army of
the Cumberland nearly nine thousand men, of whom eleven
23O LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H, THOMAS,
hundred and fifty-six were killed, and six thousand seven
hundred and fifty-two wounded. And there had been no
general engagement, and no success beyond pressing the en-
emy back by turning movements.
From the IOth of June to the 21st, the combined armies
advanced slowly towards Marietta, by attacking entrench-
ments and turning the enemy's flanks. Incessant rain
greatly retarded operations, and gave great discomfort to
Officers and men.
At the beginning of the campaign General Sherman had
prescribed shelter tents for his armies and had taken one for
himself. But General Thomas had been so far insubordi-
nate as to provide better appointments for himself and his
staff. Suffering from the injury to his spine, received in
1860, he deemed it necessary to make himself as comfort-
able as might be in Such a campaign. One evening he
observed that General Sherman, who had stopped for the
night was seemingly in destitution of the usual comforts of
a commanding general, and almost without attendants. He
thereupon sent a company of sharp-shooters * from his own
headquarters, to pitch tents, and devote themselves in other
ways, to the comfort of the commander-in-chief. This com-
pany and their service were accepted by General Sherman
for the remainder of the campaign, and the shelter tents
and other self-imposed privations were thrown aside.
On the 21st of June, Johnston's army was covering
Marietta, with his lines upon the two Kenesaw Moun-
tains, and the ground on the east of the greater—the
approach to the town from the north. The day following
Sherman made effort to advance the right of his line,
so as to threaten the enemy's communications between
Marietta and the Chattahoochee River. The forces making
this advance, were Hooker's corps, and the Army of the
Ohio. This movement caused Johnston to transfer Hood's
* 7th Independent Co. Ohio sharp-shooters, Lieut. McCrory commanding.
KULPS FIO USE. 23 I
corps from his right to his left. In the afternoon, Hood
attacked Hooker, when the latter had advanced to the
vicinity of Kulp's house. The conflict resulted in the
enemy's repulse.
At this juncture the Army of the Tennessee, recently re-
énforced by nine thousand men, under General Blair, was in
line of battle on the east of the railroad, touching the left
flank of the Army of the Cumberland near the base of the
greater Kenesaw. As shown by the following despatch
from Sherman to McPherson, Thomas suggested the ad-
vance of the Army of the Tennessee, to attack Marietta
from the north.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.
In the field, Big Shanty, June 22nd, 1864.
GENERAL:—General Hooker, this P. M. advanced to Kulp's house
two and a half miles southwest of Marietta, and reports finding three
corps. He was attacked twice and successfully repulsed the en-
emy. General Thomas thinks that that will be the enemy's tactics,
and that you ought to attack Marietta from that side of Kenesaw, but
I judge the safer and better plan to be the one, I indicated, viz: for
you to leave a light force and cover that flank, and throw the remain-
der rapidly and as much out of view as possible to your right.
You may make the necessary orders and be prepared for rapid
action to-morrow. So dispose matters that the big guns of Kenesaw
will do you as little mischief as possible.
W. T. SHERMAN.
Major General.
MAJOR-GENERAL McPHERSON,
Commanding the Army of the Tennessee.
General Sherman had the alternative of a turning move-
ment on right or left, or a direct attack on the enemy's
strong position on the mountains. General Thomas ex-
pressed a decided preference for a movement on Marietta
from the north. And when he made the suggestion the
approach in that direction had just been uncovered by the
transfer of Hood's corps to Johnston's left flank. General
232 I, IFE OF GENERAL GºoBGE H. THOMAS.
Johnston thus mentions this transfer in his official report:
“On the 21st, Hood's corps was transferred from right to
left, Wheeler's cavalry taking charge of the position which
it left.” It was manifestly impracticable for Johnston to
cover his communications securely and protect Marietta
on the north with a corps or any strong force of infantry.
There was danger in uncovering the rear of his troops on
the mountains, but it was not so great as in leaving his com-
munications open to the advancing right of Sherman's
armies. And Johnston hoped that this movement would
be maintained, and that his exposure on the north would
not be observed. But had Thomas' plan been adopted
and carried out, the enemy would have been taken at great
disadvantage. *.
Had the Army of the Tennessee advanced on Marietta
on the 23d, the confused flight of Johnston's army, or a
battle for which he was in no way prepared, would cer-
tainly have resulted. McPherson, with more than thirty
thousand men, would have been in rear of the mountains,
and Johnston could have made no dispositions to meet
him that would not have exposed his left flank and his
communications to the Armies of the Cumberland and the
Ohio. General Johnston acted upon a probability that
would not have become actual if General Thomas had been
in supreme command. He would have thrown an army
upon the enemy's most vulnerable point, and this would
have precipitated a general engagement where Johnston
had no defenses, or necessitated his retreat in daylight,
involving a peril that he most strenuously guarded against
throughout the campaign. If he had retreated, the Army
of the Tennessee would have been upon his rear and the
two other armies upon his flank. When, however, Hood's
corps was taken from the front of the Army of the Ten-
nessee, the attitude of Wheeler's cavalry induced General
McPherson to believe that the enemy was massing against
him. This belief, or other reasons, caused General Sherman
RENESA W MOUNTAIN. 233
to order his armies to move by the right flank until the
Army of the Tennessee confronted the mountains. This
movement was followed by the disastrous effort to break
through Johnston's line, where nature and art had rendered
his position exceedingly strong. If Thomas had been in
command Johnston would not have been on the mountain.
In his Memoirs General Sherman makes the following
StatementS :
During the 24th and 25th of June General Schofield extended
his right as far as prudent, so as to compel the enemy to thin out his
lines correspondingly, with the intention to make two strong assaults
at points where success would give us the greatest advantage. I
had consulted Generals Thomas, McPherson and Schofield, and
we all agreed that we could not with prudence stretch out any more,
and there was no alternative but to attack “ſortified lines,” a thing
carefully avoided up to that time. I reasoned, if he could make a
breach anywhere near the rebel centre, and thrust in a strong head
of column, that with the one moiety of our army we could hold in
check the corresponding wing of the enemy, and with the other
sweep in flank and overwhelm the other half. *
It is explicitly stated in this extract that General Sher-
man and his army commanders agreed that it would not be
prudent to attenuate the line any further, but is not made
clear whether the conclusion that “there was no alternative
but to attack ‘fortified lines’” was drawn by General Sher-
man alone, or with the concurrence of the other generals.
It is certain that a flank movement was not precluded by
the situation before the assault of the 27th, since such a
movement was successful afterwards. The testimony of sev-
eral of General Thomas' staff officers is explicit as to his
opposition to attacking the fortified lines before Marietta.
Five days before the assault he had suggested the advance
of the Army of the Tennessee on that town from the north-
east. He opposed a second assault most positively, and
was quick to approve the movement of the armies by the
* Memoirs, Vol. II., page 60.
234 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS,
right flank when it was first proposed by General Sherman.
It is clear, therefore, that General Thomas did not deem it
wise to attempt to carry the enemy's strong positions.
On the 24th, General Sherman directed the army com-
manders to make preparations to attack the enemy in force
on the 27th. Thomas was instructed to attack a point of
his own selection near his centre, and McPherson, after
feigning a movement on Marietta from the north, to make
his real attack South and west from Kenesaw. Each
attacking column was to endeavor to break a single point
and make a secure lodgment beyond, and to follow it up
toward Marietta and the railroad, in the event of success.
The required assault was made early on the 27th, and
the following despatch tells the result:
Thomas to Sherman, June 27, IO.45 A.M. –
Yours received. Harker's brigade advanced to within twenty
paces of the enemy's breast-works, and was repulsed with canister at
short range, General Halker losing an arm. General Wagner's
brigade of Newton's division, supporting General Harker, was so
severely handled that it is compelled to reorganize. Col Mitchell's
brigade of Davis' division captured one line of the rebel breast-
works, which they still hold. McCook's brigade was also severely
handled, nearly every colonel being killed or wounded. It is com-
pelled to fall back and reorganize. The troops are all too much
exhausted to advance, but we hold all that we have gained.
The failure of the assault rendered imperative the con-
sideration of some other movement. The views of General
Thomas appear in the following despatches.
At Io.30 P. M. General Sherman asked Thomas, “Do you
think you can carry any of the enemy's line? In answer the
latter telegraphed :
From Thomas to Sherman, June 27:—
Your dispatches of 11.45 A. M. and 1.30 P. M. received. Davis'
two brigades are now within sixty yards of the enemy's entrenchments.
Davis reports that he does not think he can carry the works by as-
sault on account of the steepness of the hill, but he can hold his
KENESA W MOUNTAIN, 2.35
position, put in one or two batteries to-night, and probably drive
them out to-morrow morning. General Howard reports the same.
Their works are from six to seven feet high, and nine feet thick. In
front of Howard they have a strong abattis. Davis' loss in officers
has been very heavy. Nearly all the field officers of McCook's bri-
gade, with McCook, have been killed or wounded. From what the
officers tell me, I do not think we can carry the works by assault at
this point to-day, but they can be approached by saps and the
enemy driven out.
Thomas to Sherman, June 27:—
Your despatch of 2.25 received. We still hold all the ground we
have gained, and the division report their ability to hold. They
also report the enemy's works exceedingly strong, in fact, so strong
that they cannot be carried by assault, except by an immense sacri-
fice, even if they can be carried at all. I think, therefore, the best
chance is to approach them by regular saps if we can find a favorable
approach to batter them down. We have already lost heavily to-
day, without gaining any material advantage. One or two more
such assaults would use up this army.
Thomas to Sherman, June 27—6 P. M.:—
“The assault of the enemy's works in my front was well arranged,
and the officers and men went to their work with the greatest cool-
ness and gallantry. The failure to carry them is due only to the
strength of the works, and to the fact that they were well manned,
thereby enabling the enemy to hold them securely against the assault.
We have lost nearly two thousand officers and men, among them
two brigade commanders, General Harker, commanding a brigade
in Newton's division, and Colonel Dan McCook, commanding a bri.
gade in Jeff. Davis' division, both reported to be mortally wounded,
besides some six or eight field officers killed. Both General Harker
and Colonel McCook were wounded on the enemy's breastworks,
and all say had they not been wounded we would have driven the
enemy from his works. Both Generals Howard and Palmer think
that they can find favorable positions on their lines for placing bat-
teries for enfilading the enemy's works. We took between ninety
and one hundred prisoners.
His proposition to approach the enemy's fortifications by
saps, was simply a substitute for a second assault, but he
undoubtedly preferred a flank movement. -
236 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
In the evening Sherman suggested a flank movement,
and to this Thomas eagerly acceded.
Sherman to Thomas, June 27, 1864.—9 P. M.:—
Are you willing to risk the move on Fulton, cutting loose from
Our railroad 2 It would bring matters to a crisis, and Schofield has
secured the way.
Thomas to Sherman, June 27 :—
What force do you think of moving with ? If with the greater part
of the army, I think it decidedly better than butting against breast-
works twelve feet thick and strongly abatised.
Thomas to Sherman, June 27 :—
How far is Fulton from the crossing of Olley's Creek P Will we
have to cross any other streams of much size P When do you wish to
start 2
On the Ist of July, General Sherman ordered his armies
to move by the right flank to compel Johnston to abandon
the mountains before Marietta. Thomas was required to
hold his position while McPherson should march his army
to the right to threaten the enemy's communications at the
Chattahoochee River. When this general movement was
fully developed on the 2d of July, Johnston availed
himself of the darkness of the following night, and covering
his rear with defenses at Ruff's Station, and afterwards in
front of the railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee, re-
treated in safety to the fortifications before Atlanta.
During the first two months of the campaign Sherman's
operations had a specific relation to General Grant's move-
ments in Virginia, but on the 28th of June he was freed
from the obligation to maneuver his armies with reference
to the retention of all Johnston's forces in Georgia. Hitherto
the great army in the East and the combined armies in the
THOMAS' INDIFFERENCE TO DANGER. 237
west had been so far coöperative that they were in turn to
prevent Lee from sending troops to Georgia, and Johnston
from detaching troops to Virginia. º
The temerity of General Thomas in exposing himself
to danger was illustrated on two occasions during the ad-
vance to the Chattahoochee River. At one time with Gene-º
ral Davis and other officers, he went to the picket line to
ascertain whether the enemy was in force in his front. On
the line there was a vacant log cabin, and to this house the
officers repaired, after leaving their horses in a depression
in the rear. The cabin proved to be a poor protection, as
there were openings between the logs, and a volley from
the enemy caused all except General Thomas to beat a hasty
retreat to their horses. The general, however, walked
slowly back, although he was plainly a mark for the enemy's
sharp-shooters. At a gate in the rear he stopped and faced
the enemy, and then walked slowly to his horse. He seemed
unwilling to retreat when alone, and consciously a target
for the enemy.
At another time he was invited by General Davis to ride
in the rear of Colonel J. G. Mitchell's brigade which was
sent on a reconnoissance. As the two generals rode in the
rear of the column they observed ripe blackberries by the
roadside, and dismounted to pick them. While thus en-
gaged bullets began to fall thickly around them, from
the enemy's cavalry that had come round the flank of the
reconnoitring column, then out of sight. General Thomas
did not even look up, but continued to pick the berries, re-
marking playfully, “Davis, this is eating blackberries under
difficulties.” General Davis, however, became anxious, lest
his commander should be killed or captured, and urged an
immediate retreat.
While halting his troops on the north bank of the Chat-
tahoochee River, that his construction corps might bring
the cars to his camp, General Sherman received the fol-
lowing despatches which hastened his advance on Atlanta:
238 LIFE OF GENERAI, GEORG E H. THOMAS.
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, July 16, 1864, Io A. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN :
The attempted invasion of Maryland having failed to give the
enemy a firm foothold north, they are now returning with possibly
twenty-five thousand troops. All the men they have here, beyond
a sufficiency to hold their string of fortifications, will be an ele-
ment of weakness by eating up their supplies. It is not improbable,
therefore, that you will find in the next fortnight reënforcements on
your front to the number indicated above. I advise, therefore, that
if you get Atlanta, you set about destroying the railroad as far to the
east and south of you as possible. Collect all the stores of the coun-
try for your own use, and select a point that you can hold until help
can be had. I shall make a desperate effort to get a position here
which will hold the enemy without the necessity of so many men. If
successful I can detach from here for other enterprises; looking
much to your assistance or anything elsewhere.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.
WASHINGTON, July 16, 1864–4.30 P. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN :
Lieutenant-General Grant wishes me to call your attention to the
possibility of Johnston's being reënforced from Richmond, and the
importance of your having prepared a good line of defense against
such an increase of rebel force. Also, the importance of getting as
large an amount of supplies collected at Chattanooga as possible.
H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, Chattahoochee, July 16, 1864.
GENERALS THOMAS AND MCPHERSON :
Despatches from Generals Grant and Halleck to-day, speak of
the enemy having failed in his designs in Maryland, and cautioning
me that Lee may in the next fortnight reënforce Johnson by twenty
thousand men. It behooves us therefore to hurry, so all will move
to-morrow as far as Nancy's Creek.
- W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
HOOD SUPERSED ES JOHNSTON 239
The Army of the Ohio and Howard's corps of the Army
of the Cumberland had previously crossed the river at points
north of the railroad bridge. On the 17th, the Army of the
Tennessee, on the extreme left at Roswell, crossed the river,
and moved toward the Augusta railroad, east of Decatur;
and Palmer's, and Hooker's Corps, crossed on pontoon
bridges at Paice's Ferry. During that day and the next
the three armies moved forward, and in the evening of the
latter, the Armies of the Tennessee and Ohio were in the
vicinity of Decatur, and the Army of the Cumberland
encamped on the right bank of Peach Tree Creek, between
the railroad on the right and the Buckhead road. Atthis time
the two armies on the left were several miles distant
from the one on the right, and the movements ordered
for the 19th had reference to their union before Atlanta.
When Johnston withdrew from the Chattahoochee River,
he posted his army on the south bank of Peach Tree Creek,
making that stream and the Chattahoochee, below their
junction, his line, covering the direct approaches from the
north. This line, however, was not to be a defensive one,
but a base for offense against Sherman's armies, as they
should cross the wide muddy channel of the creek.
General Johnston had concluded that the National armies
had been so greatly diminished in strength, that he could
safely bring on a battle in open field, when circumstances
were so plainly in his favor. But on the 18th he was suc-
ceeded in command by Lieutenant-General John B. Hood.
The new commander at once formed a plan to crush the
Army of the Cumberland, before help could be rendered by
either of the other two armies, then so far from its left.
Consequently, on the evening of the 18th and on the fol
lowing day, he formed a line of battle in proximity to the
south bank of Peach Tree Creek, with Stewart's corps on the
left, Hardee's in the centre, and Cheatham's on the right.
Cheatham's corps, supported on his right by the Georgia
State troops was entrenched to cover Atlanta, and at the
24O LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
same time prevent the transfer of reënforcements to Gene-
ral Thomas from the other two armies.
General Cheatham was directed to reconnoitre in front
of his left and post his batteries so as to Sweep the space
between his position and the south branch of Peach Tree
Creek, to separate McPherson and Schofield's forces from
those of Thomas. With his other two corps—Stewart's
and Hardee's—Hood proposed to crush the Army of the
Cumberland, and then to wheel his whole army upon Scho-
field and McPherson. It was intended that the assault
upon Thomas should be so bold and persistent as to quick-
ly overcome all resistance, and pressing him back into the
pocket formed by the Chattahoochee, the railroad embank-
ment and Peach Tree Creek, “to kill, wound or capture his
entire army.”
During the 19th, Howard's corps, Geary's division of
the Twentieth, and Davis' division of the Fourteenth corps
crossed Peach Tree Creek against positive resistance by
the enemy. At night this stream divided the Army of the
Cumberland, and placed it at a great disadvantage, in view
of Hood's plan of operations. On this day the two armies
On the left moved towards Thomas, but there was still a
wide gap between the right and left wings of the combined
armies.
Early on the 20th,the remaining divisions of the Army of
the Cumberland crossed the creek, but much of the artillery
was necessarily left on the north bank. The whole army
was now on the south bank, except Stanley's division of the
Fourth corps, which was in position to the left, between the
north and south branches, a position strong in itself, and
especially suited for the flank of an army, which was about
to receive a blow intended to effect its overthrow.
As matters then stood, Thomas' army was in readiness
to form line of battle, should the enemy attack, but a con-
flict was not then expected, since orders required an advance
on Atlanta.
ORDERS FOR AD VANCE TO ATLANTA. 24. I
( SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS NO. 39.)
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.
In the Field near Decatur July 19, 1864.
The whole army will move on Atlanta by the most direct roads
July 20th, beginning at five o'clock, A. M., as follows:
I. Major General Thomas from the direction of Buckhead, his
left to connect with General Schofield's right, about two miles north-
east of Atlanta, about lot I 5, near the house marked as Howard and
Colonel Hooker.
II. Major-General Schofield by the road leading from Dr.
Powell's to Atlanta.
III. Major-General McPherson will follow one or more roads
direct from Decatur to Atlanta.
Each army commander will accept battle on anything like fair
terms, but if the army reach within cannon range of the city without
receiving artillery or musketry fire, he will halt, form a strong line with
batteries in position, and await orders. If fired on from the forts or
buildings of Atlanta, no consideration will be paid to the fact that
they are occupied by families, but the place will be cannonaded
without the formality of a demand.
The General-in-Chief will be with the centre of the army, viz:
with or near General Schofield.
By order of Major-General W. T. SHERMAN.
L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
Compliance with these orders as far as practicable in the
morning of the 20th, did not bring Schofield's right and
Thomas' left into connection. The road from Buckhead
to Atlanta, and that from Dr. Powell's were too far apart to
effect this conjunction of lines, so far from the city as Peach
Tree Creek, since it was at least four miles from the point
on the main stream where the Buckhead road crosses, to
the point where the road from Dr. Powell's crosses the
south branch.
In moving to the left, Stanley's and Wood's divisions
marched on a road leading to Decatur, and having restored
a bridge burnt by the enemy, crossed the south branch of
Peach Tree Creek, three miles from the Buckhead road,
so that the gap between these two divisions and Newton's,
I6
242 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS,
on that road, was little, if any, less than three miles; and
if they moved to the left after reaching the south bank,
the distance was more than three miles at the time of the
action.
At this juncture there were nine divisions of infantry in
aggregate in the Armies of the Tennessee and Ohio, in con-
junction on the left, and the same number in the Army of
the Cumberland. And if it was impracticable to fill the
gap between the wings by the movement of one or both by
the flank, and if they were not each strong enough to fight
successfully the whole Confederate army, it was certainly
an error to diminish the Army of the Cumberland, when it
was advancing to meet a combination formed by General
Hood to crush it. But by General Sherman's order, Stan-
ley's and Wood's divisions were taken from Thomas, and
marched by the flank to close on General Schofield's right,
giving eleven divisions to the left wing, and leaving seven
divisions with Thomas, when, for the first time in the cam-
paign, the enemy in his full strength was to take the offen-
sive. To place Thomas at still greater disadvantage, the
general movement on Atlanta threw his left division for-
ward in air on the Buckhead road. General Johnston
had planned to take the offensive against Sherman's armies
at Peach Tree Creek; and General Hood had indulged
himself in the delusion that he could crush the Army of
the Cumberland as a whole on the south bank of that
stream. As the outcome of these projects, the blow fell on
Thomas when bereft of two divisions and a secure flank.
In preparation for the advance on Atlanta, General
Thomas directed General Newton of the Fourth corps to
move his division from the bank of the creek and ascend
the hill in proximity on the south. The road led over a
spur projecting towards the stream and commanding the
low ground covered with trees and bushes to the left.
Newton had but four pieces of artillery; but on reaching
this spur, he said to Captain Goodspeed, his chief of artil-
PEACH TREE CREEK. 243
lery: “It is well to have a reserve, put two guns here.”
His division then advanced to the hill with a strong skir-
mish line in front, which was soon arrested by the resistance
of the enemy. Newton then placed Kimball's brigade on
the right of the road, Blake's on the left, with two pieces
of artillery between them, and held Bradley's on the road
in rear. He then reported to General Thomas his impres-
sion that the situation had an “ugly look.” In the mean-
time his troops built a rail barricade.
Soon after Newton's advance, Geary's division of the
Twentieth corps moved nearly abreast, taking position
Some distance to the right, across a depression, and also
constructed a barricade. Williams' division of the same
corps formed on Geary's right, in the woods, closely con-
necting with Johnson's division of the Fourteenth corps,
while Ward's division, also of the Twentieth corps, re-
mained on the low ground facing the depression between
Newton and Geary.
Beyond the line of hills upon which these divisions had
taken position was first, a depression and then, another
Series of hills, and upon these Hood had posted his attack-
ing forces. He had maneuvered to hide his purpose that
he might attack the Army of the Cumberland while
it was constructing defenses. To this end he had
withdrawn his skirmishers, and had sent men into our lines
to report that the enemy was not in front in force.
But although a battle was not expected on the hills
south of Peach Tree Creek, neither Thomas nor his army
were surprised when it opened. A battle here had not
been indicated by the manner of the required movement
on Atlanta, nor by the removal of two divisions from his
left after his army had crossed the stream. But under
the circumstances better preparations for an action could
not have been made.
About 3 P. M., Hardee's central division advancing in
strong lines, without skirmishers, made a furious attack upon
244 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS
Newton in front as initial to assaults by divisions, in echelon,
from right to left. Soon Geary's and Williams' divisions
and Colonel Anson McCook's brigade of Johnson's division
were hotly engaged. Newton was isolated for a time, the
enemy bending back the right of Kimball's brigade and
the left of Blake's, and Bate's division having passed round
Newton's flank on the low wooded ground, and appeared
far to his left and rear. The two guns left on the spur and a
few soldiers from his broken skirmish line drove back this
flanking force, while Ward's division advanced promptly,
and drove the enemy from the depression between him and
Geary. From first to last all Hood's direct attacks were
repulsed. The crisis came with the re-appearance of Bate's
division to the left and rear of Newton. At this juncture
General Thomas rode to the bridge and ordered two bat-
teries which had just crossed to ascend the hill, on the
road, and hastening their movement by using his sword to
keep the horses at a gallop, he planted these guns with the
two left by Newton, on the spur. Here he sat on his horse
and directed their fire. They were loaded with ordinary
metal for short range and in addition with musket balls in
great abundance. By his conduct and his swiftness in
moving and firing his artillery—his only resource—he
saved his flank, and defeated the enemy. Seldom has an ar-
my commander done so much, by direct act, to defeat an
enemy and win a victory. And General Newton has de-
scribed to the writer, the imposing appearance of General
Thomas, as he sat on his horse, calm and resolute, in the
rear of the guns.
Hood attributed his defeat to the failure of Hardee to
attack with vigor. But the dead and wounded, thickly
strewn in front of Newton's and Ward's divisions and
on the flank and rear of the former, disprove this alle-
gation. General Hood's plan, formed and put on trial in
expectation of success against the entire Army of the Cum-
berland, utterly miscarried as against four divisions and
one brigade of that army. Cheatharn, posted and en-
J N FRONT OF A TLANTA. 245
trenched to prevent the transfer of forces to Thomas from
the Armies of the Ohio and the Tennessee, fought only
the divisions which moved from Thomas in the opposite
direction early in the day. The distance between the right
of Wood's division and the left of Newton's, was at least
two miles, since the former was beyond the confluence of
the two branches of Peach Tree Creek, and that is nearly
or quite two miles from the Buckhead road.
The issue of this battle gave proof that Thomas was
right in asserting that he could whip the Confederate
Army of the Tennessee with his own army. At the time
of the severest fighting an orderly rode up to General
Newton, stating that he had a despatch for him from
General Howard. Accepting this statement as true,
Newton read the message, which directed that a forward
movement should be made as there were none of the ene-
my's troops between Peach Tree Creek and Atlanta, but
did not then notice by whom it had been sent or to whom
addressed. He said to the orderly: “Tell General Howard
what you see here,” and put the despatch in his pocket.
The next day, however, he observed that it had been sent
by General Sherman to General Thomas.
Two days later Hood took the offensive against the
Army of the Tennessee. His first attacks were successful,
but he was again discomfited in the final issue. Early
in the action General McPherson fell, and the command
devolved upon Major General John A. Logan.
From the 22nd of July to the 25th of August, the
combined armies operated against Atlanta. There was
Severe fighting during this period in offense and defense.
Sherman gradually extended his entrenchments to his right,
south of the city towards East Point, in hope of overlap-
ping Hood's fortifications. But as the southern ends of
the two lines of fortifications kept abreast in their southern
extension, the project of gaining Atlanta in this way was
finally abandoned. At times General Sherman thought of
246 LIFE OF GENERAI, G EORGE H. THOMAS.
storming the enemy's fortifications; but to such a measure
General Thomas was positively opposed.
On the 6th of August Sherman said: “Instead of going
round East Point, I would prefer the enemy to weaken, so
we may break through at Some point, and wish you to
continue to make such an effort. I will instruct Howard
to do the same about the head of Utoy Creek, his right.”
The next day General Thomas replied: “I will keep the
attention of the enemy fully occupied by threatening all
along my front; but I have no hopes of breaking through
his lines anywhere in my front as long as he has a respecta-
ble force to defend them. My troops are so thinned out,
that it will be impossible to form an assaulting column
sufficiently strong to make an attack sure.”
As the alternative was, assault or turning movement,
General Sherman decided to throw his armies upon the
Macon railroad. On the 9th of August General Thomas
rode to the Chattahoochee River to select a position for one
of his corps and a cover for the surplus trains of the ar-
mies. From that day to the 24th, General Sherman post-
poned his flank movement for various reasons, chiefly to
try the effect of cavalry raids on the communications of
the enemy. These raids were partially successful, but did
not necessitate the withdrawal of the enemy from Atlanta.
Finally Sherman directed the army commanders to make
preparations for a general movement to the South. When
this scheme was perfected, and a time suggested by Sher-
man to put it on trial, Thomas asked for a few days'
delay to accumulate the requisite amount of forage and
to rest and “shoe-up" his cavalry horses. He was un-
willing to assault the strong fortifications before Atlanta,
and, therefore, gave cordial support to the turning move-
ment. His despatches in reference to the necessity of a
short delay are subjoined :
The teams of my command have only five days' forage on
hand; otherwise my command will be ready to commence the move-
JONESBORO”. 247
ment to-morrow. Colonel McKay tells me that in three days the
whole army could be supplied with ten days’ forage.
I would like to commence the movement without being hurried,
and can do so by Thursday night. I think the cavalry ought to have
a little rest and time to shoe up. I will be perfectly prepared by
Thursday with provisions and can arrange to get forage by Sandtown
the day after, if 'forage comes down.
On the 26th the withdrawal of the armies from position
before Atlanta was begun. The Twentieth corps, Major-
General H. W. Slocum, commanding, moved back to the
Chattahoochee River, the Fourth corps, Major-General D.
S. Stanley, commanding, and Garrard's Cavalry division,
Covering the movement. The next day the Fourteenth
Corps, Brevet Major-General Jeff. C. Davis, commanding,
withdrew from position.*
On the 30th, the Army of the Tennessee reached the
vicinity of Jonesboro’, and on that day the Army of the
Cumberland moved eastward from the West Point railroad'
to the Macon road, and thus connected with the Army of
Ohio. By this time General Hood had posted two corps,
Hardee's and Lee's, to attack the Army of the Tennessee
and drive it across Flint River. These corps attacked
Howard on the 31st, and were repulsed. Lee's corps then
withdrew to Rough and Ready. The next day the two
armies on the left moved towards Jonesboro’. The Four-
teenth corps took position on the left of the Army of the Ten-
nessee, or two corps of that army, the Fifteenth and Sixteenth,
the Seventeenth corps and Kilpatrick's cavalry having been
sent to the rear of Jonesboro’. That evening the Fourteenth
Corps, in presence of General Thomas and by his order,
attacked Hardee's corps, posted behind entrenchments, and
* General Howard had been assigned to the command of the Army of the
Tennessee soon after the death of General McPherson; General Stanley to
the Fourth corps; General Slocum to the Twentieth in room of General Hooker,
relieved at his own request; and General Davis to the Fourteenth corps in place of
General Palmer, relieved in the same way.
248 LIFE OF GENERAL G.EO RG E H. THOMAS.
dislodged it. It was meet that the Fourteenth corps should
make the only really successful assault of the campaign,
when for the last time it was to be in battle under its old
commander. The enemy regarded this attack as one of
extreme temerity, in view of the issue of previous assaults
by either of the opposing armies. Nevertheless one thou-
sand men, eight pieces of artillery and seven battle flags
were captured in the enemy's entrenchments. Why the
Army of the Tennessee did not wheel upon Hardee's flank
at the time of the attack in front is not apparent.
The issue of the two actions at Jonesboro was decisive
of the campaign. On the 1st of September General Hood
with Stewart's corps, left Atlanta to support the remainder
of his army. After the second defeat of Hardee at Jones-
boro’, an immense amount of war material and railroad
transportation was destroyed at Atlanta, and on the follow-
ing morning, September 2nd, the city was formally surren-
dered to Colonel Coburn, commanding the advance brigade
of the Twentieth corps. On that day Sherman advanced
to Lovejoy's Station, but after some hard fighting by Wood's
and Kimball's divisions of the Fourth corps, he issued or-
ders for the concentration of his armies at Atlanta.
In this campaign General Thomas approved of no move-
ment which was a failure, he disapproved of none which
was a success, and whenever his advice was rejected the
outcome proved that his plan would have met with every
condition of success.
CHAPTER XII.
DISCUSSION OF NEW PLANS–NORTHWARD ADVANCE OF HOOD'S ARMY-
DIVISION OF THE ARMIES —MARCH TO THE SEA-THOMAS CHARGED
WITH DEFENSE OF TENNESSEE,
HE possession of Atlanta was not a solution of the
great western problem. This city gave name to a
campaign; but it was not General Sherman's chief objective
in that campaign. His paramount objective from May to
September, 1864, was the Confederate Army of the Tennes-
see; and while that army maintained its organization, the pre-
scribed object of his advance from Chattanooga with a
hundred thousand men was unattained. Atlanta as a rail-
road centre and a place for the manufacture of war material
was of great value to the South. But it was not a strategic
point of the first importance, since it was easily turned by
Sherman, and soon afterwards by Hood. It was So far
from General Sherman's base of supplies, that no plan for
aggression southward from that city could be formed that
did not involve the abandonment of his northern Source of
supply. The problems demanding solution after he had
gained Atlanta were far more intricate than the one which
was partially solved by its capture.
The fact that their largest western army could not hold
this city was exceedingly depressing to the Southern peo-
ple, and the production of this effect was after all the great-
est result of the Atlanta campaign. The country was of
no value to the National cause except for the movement
of armies, and its loss opened to the enemy the way for
249
25O LIFE OF GENERAI, G EORG E H THOMAS.
offensive operations. Hood, having no city to defend
and no railroad to guard, was free to move in any direction
that promised success. The Atlanta campaign threw upon
the Confederate authorities the alternative of submission to
the National Government, or the concentration of their
western forces to turn back the invading armies from At-
lanta and restore hopes to their troops and their people.
The situation of the enemy was clearly revealed by Mr.
Davis in a despatch to General Hood:
RICHMOND, September 5th, 1864.
GENERAL J B. HooD :—Your despatches of yesterday received.
The necessity for reënforcements was realized, and every effort made
to bring forward reserves, militia, and detailed men for the purpose.
Polk, Maury, S. D. Lee and Jones have been drawn on to fullest
extent. E. K. Smith has been called on. No other resource remains.
It is now requisite that absentees be brought back, the addition
required from the surrounding country be promptly made available,
and that the means in hand be used with energy proportionate to
the country's need. JEFFERSON DAVIS.
While therefore Generals Grant and Sherman were look-
ing for a definite objective south of Atlanta for the armies
that were resting in that city in September, Mr. Davis and
his western generals were busy in forming a plan which
should unite for its execution all their available forces im-
mediately east and west of the Mississippi River, and in the
utmost stretch of hope they promised to the Southern
people the restoration of the earlier military status in the
West. The first step in the execution of this plan was
to force Sherman and his armies out of Georgia by the
movement of Hood's army upon their communications, and
then provision was to be made for resulting contingencies
by the transfer of the trans-Mississippi troops to Tennessee.
It was expected that a bold movement to the North would
inspirit the army, whose morale had been impaired by pro-
tracted and unsuccessful defense; that deserters would be
restored to their colors, and recruits gathered in large num-
NEW PLANS OF THE CONFEDERATES. 25 I
bers, for a grand effort to regain lost territory, and in the
end, establish the cause itself. To carry out this plan the
trans-Mississippi troops were to be joined with Hood's
army, and to give unity and appropriate expression to the
projected operations, General Beauregard, who had pre-
viously urged the abandonment of the great Southern cities,
including Richmond, that a vast army might be concen-
trated for an advance to the North, was given the command
of the military departments between the Allegheny Moun-
tains and the Mississippi River. These troops had been
previously ordered to cross the great river, but had been
prevented by General Canby. The new plan proposed a
repetition of the effort to transfer them, not as before to
defend Southern cities and productive territory, but to
capture Northern cities and gather supplies from Northern
soil. Prospectively Hood's army was to become bolder
as it grew stronger in its northward march.
This then was the plan which having previously miscar-
ried in some of its features was utterly defeated at Nash-
ville. It was first put upon trial against all the National
forces in the West; it was defeated after the withdrawal of
more than sixty thousand men that had resisted its first
stage of development. Though a failure in the end, who
will say that it was not the best plan that could have been
adopted by the enemy P. Both the North and the South
were at the time making final efforts. The effective strength
of the National forces was mainly represented by the Army
of the Potomac and the combined armies under Sherman,
while Lee's and Hood's armies correspondingly represented
the strength of the Southern Confederacy. And at no time
during the war had success in the West depended more
fully on the quick reënforcement of the Confederate Army
of the Tennessee.
While Generals Grant and Sherman were busy with the
problem of a campaign beyond Atlanta, General Hood
gave Sherman other employment by putting on trial the
252 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORGE H. THOMAS.
second grand Confederate scheme, of throwing our armies
back to the Ohio River.
Late in September, reports reached Atlanta that Hood's
army was in motion. It was supposed, at first, that Hood
was marching into Northern Alabama, the first steps in his
circuit round Atlanta indicating such a destination. But it
was soon apparent that he was moving upon Sherman's
communications in Georgia. About the same time news
came from the north that Forrest was operating against the
line of Sherman's communications in Tennessee. On the
26th of September Sherman sent Newton's division of
the Fourth corps to Tennessee to coöperate with the
local garrisons in repelling Forrest. Three days later, he
sent General Thomas with Morgan's division of the Four-
teenth corps to Tennessee. These dispositions were not
necessary as against Forrest, who had been driven to the
west by Generals Rousseau, Granger and Steedman, but
in part made provision against a menace by Hood's entire
army. The duty of defending the vital communications in
Tennessee with only two divisions of his army, besides his
local garrisons, was thus devolved upon General Thomas.
Unconsciously he had entered upon a campaign which,
though beset with embarrassments through all of its stages,
was in its outcome to bring the Crowning glory of his
C21°CC1".
General Thomas had hardly reached Chattanooga before
telegraphic communications with General Sherman were
broken ; and, for several days thereafter, the operations in
Georgia were involved in mystery. September 30th
Hood crossed the Chattahoochee River and moved upon
Sherman's rail communications. The latter at once put five
of his corps in hot pursuit, leaving the Twentieth corps at
Atlanta. When it was known at the North that Hood
was in Sherman's rear and had captured garrisons at
Ackworth, Big Shanty, Dalton and Tilton, there was uni-
versal alarm. It was known that Thomas had not suf-
HOOD'S WOR THWARD MO VEMENT. 253
ficient force to arrest, or greatly retard the advance of
the enemy into Tennessee.
This emergency had not been anticipated by Sherman,
and Consequently adequate preparations had not been made
to meet it. At best the troops in Tennessee were only equal
to the defense of the railroads against the enemy's cavalry.
In their consternation at Washington and City Point,
the military authorities hurried a few troops to Tennessee
from the North, but Thomas, as was frequently the case,
received more suggestions than reënforcements when he
needed the latter, and not the former.
When General Grant learned that Hood had captured
the garrison at Dalton, and had advanced thence nearly
to Lafayette, he inferred that Chattanooga was his objec-
tive, and advised Thomas to withdraw his garrisons from the
railroad leading from Columbia to Decatur and thence to
Stevenson. But the latter did not act in accordance with
this advice, and the subsequent movement of the enemy
to the west justified his decision. Hood had no thought
of attacking such fortifications as enclosed Chattanooga
when he could so easily pass around them. He had
hoped that his army would have been so inspirited by its
successful march to Northern Georgia that he could there
offer to meet Sherman in a general engagement. But in
this he was disappointed. He then proposed to march to
Gunter's Landing, cross the river into Tennessee, capture
Bridgeport and Stevenson, defeat Thomas wherever he
should present himself, march to Nashville, and thence into
Kentucky.” Had he thrown himself boldly upon Sher-
man's divided army at Gaylesville he might have won a
great victory. - -
When Hood moved to the west from the vicinity of
Lafayette, General Thomas sent Schofield up Lookout
Valley with Newton's and Morgan's divisions to oppose him
* “Advance and Retreat,” by General J. B. Hood, pp. 266-7.
254 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS,
should he turn to the northwest across that valley. When
afterwards he moved in apparent menace to Bridgeport,
Schofield was directed by Thomas to move to Caperton's
Ferry, a few miles below that place. This latter movement
was condemned by General Sherman, although it was di-
rectly in anticipation of Hood's meditated movement to that
point and other places on the line of communications be-
tween Chattanooga and Nashville. Gunter's Landing is
below Bridgeport, but Hood proposed to cross the Tennes-
See there and then move northeast. Had he carried out his
plan, these troops at Caperton's Ferry would have been
near the line of his advance. October 17th General Sher-
man telegraphed to Schofield: “Your first move on Tren-
ton and Valley Head was right, the move to defend Caper-
ton's Ferry is wrong. Notify General Thomas of these my
views.” This movement was useless, but only in consequence
of Hood's change of plan. Before reaching Gunter's Land-
ing he learned that it was impossible for Forrest to join him-
on the line of his proposed advance to Nashville, and conse-
quently he turned towards Decatur. -
October 26th Hood sent part of his army to threaten
that town. He called this menace a “slight demon-
stration " to cover the movement of his army to the west.
He would, however, have grasped the Tennessee River at
that point, had it been abandoned as General Grant sug-
gested. But when Hood's forces appeared before the town,
General Thomas was able to send reënforcements from
Chattanooga, and this may be cited as an instance of his
unerring foresight. Upon finding that Decatur was held
by a strong force, and having lost Some men in an action
brought on by Granger outside of his defenses, Hood
turned down the river to Tuscumbia, to meet reënforce-
ments, establish a new line of supply from Corinth as a
base, and perfect his preparations for advancing into Ten-
neSSée.
Thus without serious opposition Hood had executed
TVA WTS TO MO VE EASTWARD. 255
that part of the general plan, which, at the beginning, had
been assigned his army. He was now comparatively near
Nashville, near his base of supplies, at Corinth, and nearer
his expected reënforcements from the west bank of the
Mississippi than he had been at the beginning of his cam-
paign. He had drawn General Sherman with most of his
forces to Northern Georgia, but not out of that State in the
disastrous retreat predicted by Mr. Davis.
In the mean time Sherman had repeatedly sought
General Grant's permission to turn from the pursuit of
Hood and with his three armies march to the sea. But
Grant had refused for a time, he then gave his consent,
and afterwards recalled it. After Hood had marched to
the west, Sherman's requests were repeated, and, though
at first denied, were finally granted on the 2d of No-
vember.
General Thomas had been anxious to enter upon a cam-
paign south from Atlanta with his own army " but he was
opposed to General Sherman's project of moving with all
his field forces to the Atlantic coast, after General Hood
had established himself on the Tennessee River at Florence.
He therefore expressed his unwillingness to be left behind
to defend Tennessee with inadequate resources. He was
opposed also to the division of his own army, especially
when the greater part of it was to be taken from him. He
telegraphed to Sherman October 17th : “I hope you will
* General W. F. Smith, in a letter to the writer, states what follows:
“In June 1865 I met General Thomas at West Point. I had not seen him
aſter we parted at Chattanooga and he sat down and gave me an account of the
campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and told me of his subsequent proceed-
ings against Hood, winding up in the victory at Nashville. - -
“He also said to me that after he had entered Atlanta, he (Thomas) went to
Sherman and said, now you have no more use for me, let me take my little com-
mand and go eastward to the sea." Sherman replied to him that he could not
take the responsibility without consulting General Grant, which he would do
while they were repairing damages and refitting the army; that he heard nothing
more of it till he with his little army was ordered to face Hood—the only effec-
tive organization in the southwest—while Sherman took his army to encounter
the Georgia militia under Cobb."
256 LIFE OF GENERAL G EORGE H. THOMAS
adopt Grant's idea of turning Wilson loose, rather than
undertake the plan of a march, with the whole force
through Georgia to the Sea, inasmuch as General Grant
cannot coöperate with you as at first arranged.” There is
here, doubtless an allusion to a plan discussed at Atlanta,
involving the coöperation of General Grant, at Some point
in Georgia or South Carolina. At this date Sherman had
not promised to detach any of his field forces for the
defense of Tennessee, and he did not believe that Hood
would enter that State.” The next day Thomas tele-
graphed : “I have received your despatch from Ship's
Gap of yesterday noon. Am ready to carry Out your
orders should Hood attempt to come into Tennessee.
General Wilson will take a duplicate of this to you and
will explain my views on your plan of operations. * * *
There is one thing, however, I don't wish—to be in com-
mand of the defense of Tennessee, unless you and the
authorities at Washington deem it absolutely necessary.”
Thomas obeyed Sherman's order and sent to him
Newton's and Morgan's divisions. And the recall of these
troops plainly indicated that Sherman then intended to
march to the sea with his three armies, committing to
Thomas the defense of Tennessee with his local garrisons
and such other troops as could be drawn from the north
and west. It is not clear from General Thomas' subse-
quent utterances whether or not he was opposed to the
march to the sea with the forces finally taken by General
Sherman. But since that movement threw upon him the
defense of Tennessee, under circumstances of the greatest
discouragement, the discussion of the “March to the Sea.”
is pertinent to this story.
The march to Savannah, while Hood's army was in
Northern Alabama was the abandonment by Sherman of
* General Sherman had said: “Hood is not going to enter Tennessee. Keep
enough force to watch the river below and at the shoals, and let all the rest march
to me or to reënforce the railroad.”
THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 257
one of the two great objectives announced for the two
great coöperative campaigns which began in May 1864.
Lee's army, rather than Richmond was Grant's objective,
and Johnston's army rather than Atlanta was Sherman's.
The two cities in the rear of these armies respectively,
were only secondary objectives. And they were com-
paratively of no importance after the overthrow of the
two armies which so long fought before them. But the
march to the sea was to be made, not only when Hood's
army was farther north than in May 1864, but when the
movement would give back to the enemy the city of At-
lanta, and more of Georgia than had been gained by the
operations and battles of the Atlanta campaign. General
Sherman himself did not justify his march for the reason
that it was strategic. October 19th he telegraphed to Gen-
eral Halleck: “This movement is not purely military or
strategic, but it will illustrate the vulnerability of the
South.” And a few days later he wrote to General Grant:
On the supposition, always, that Thomas can hold the line of the
Tennessee, and very shortly be able to assume the offensive as
against Beauregard, I propose to act in Such manner against the
material resources of the South as utterly to negative Davis'
boasted threats and promises of protection. If we can march a
well appointed army right through this territory, it is a demonstra-
tion to the world foreign and domestic, that we have a power which
Davis cannot resist. This is not war, but rather statesmanship.
But this march was strategic, in so far as it had relation to
Grant's operations in Virginia. It was a long march to give
aid to Grant; but Sherman regarded it as a “shift of
base,’ as the transfer of a strong army, which had no
opponent, and had finished its then work, from the interior
to a point on the sea-coast, from which it could achieve
other important results. I considered this march as a
means to an end, and not as an essential act of war. * * *
I simply moved from Atlanta to Savannah, as one step in
17
258 LIFE OF GENERA. L. G. EORG E H THOMAS.
the direction of Richmond, a movement that had to be met
and defeated, or the war was necessarily at an end.” +
In this view this movement was strategic, but in fayor
of the East at the expense of the West, since it trans-
ferred to the Atlantic coast an immense army before the
great problem in the West had been solved, and by chang-
ing the conditions of its Solution, endangered all that had
been previously gained. The Confederate Army of the
Tennessee had come Out of the Atlanta campaign some-
what reduced in strength, but with organization intact,
and was on the Offensive, in hope of such accretions as
would render it relatively stronger than it had been six
months before, as against all the forces of the Military
Division of the Mississippi.
The discussion of the movement by Generals Grant and
Sherman embraced its effects upon affairs in Tennessee and
Georgia, as well as its moral effect.
On the 1st of November Sherman telegraphed to Grant:
As you foresaw and as Jeff Davis threatened, the enemy is now
in the full tide of execution of his plan to destroy my communica-
tions and defeat this army. . * * * - -
If I were to let go Atlanta and North Georgia and make for Hood,
he would do as he did here (Rome)—retreat to the southwest, leaving
his militia now assembling at Macon and Griffin to occupy our con-
quests, and the work of last summer would be lost.
And on the day following he said:
If I could hope to overhaul Hood, I would move against him
with my whole force; then he would retreat to the southwest, draw-
ing me as a decoy from Georgia. * * * No single army can catch
him, and I am convinced the best results will follow from our de-
feating Jeff Davis’ cherished plan of making me leave Georgia. * * *
Still, if he attempts to invade Middle Tennessee, I will hold Decatur
and be prepared to move in that direction ; but unless I let go At-
lanta, my force will not be equal to his.
“If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lost.”
* Memoirs, Vol. II., page 220.
THE MARCH TO THE SEA A UTHORIZED. 259
On the 6th of November Sherman wrote to Grant:
Now, as to the second branch of my proposition, I admit that
the first object should be the destruction of that army; and if Beau-
regard moves his infantry and artillery up into the pocket about
Jackson and Paris, I will feel tempted to move Thomas directly
against him and move myself by Decatur and Purdy to cut off his
retreat.
On the 1st of November Grant had telegraphed to Sher-
II].2.1] .
vº
Do you not think it advisable now that Hood has gone so far
north, to entirely ruin him before starting on your proposed cam-
paign P With Hood's army destroyed, you can go where you please
with impunity. I believed, and still believe, if you had started south
while Hood was in the neighborhood of you, he would have been
forced to go after you. Now, that he is so far away, he might look
upon the chase as useless, and he will go in one direction while
you are pushing the other. If you can see the chance for destroying.
Hood's army, attend to that first, and make your other move sec-
ondary.
But the next day Grant authorized the movement in these
words: “I really do not see that you can withdraw from
where you are to follow Hood without giving up all we
have gained in territory. I say, then, go on as you propose.”
The fact that Hood's army was the more important ob-
jective for Sherman is admitted by General Grant and him-
self in these despatches and letters. It is not evident that
any territory would have been given up by following Hood
which was not given up by the march to the sea. General
Sherman certainly surrendered all the territory which he
had gained by his previous campaign; and in his march to
Savannah, he avoided all fortified places and only retained
the privilege of the roads and a daily-shifting camp-
ground for his army. Had he followed Hood, after leaving
the Twentieth corps at Atlanta, he would have had in the
Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps and cavalry,
nearly or quite fifty thousand men, and with the mobile
forces under Thomas he would have had about seventy-five
26O IIFE OF GENERAL G EORG E H THOMAS.
thousand. In following Hood to the southwest or north-
west, or in any other direction, Sherman would have virtu-
ally protected his conquests in Georgia, because he would
have been between them and Hood. The movement to
the sea therefore gave up more territory than the pursuit
of Hood could have done, unless defeat had resulted.
It is not a little surprising, that Grant and Sherman
omitted all mention of the enemy's plan of operations,
and the possibility of the transfer of his western forces
to Hood, although they were not ignorant of Mr.
Davis' order requiring them to cross the Mississippi.
General Sherman even proposed to General Halleck to
diminish the forces guarding against their transfer.
On November 3rd he telegraphed :
I would advise the accumulation of all troops available up the
Tennessee River (now in good boating stage) about Clifton, subject
to General Thomas’ orders, and that Canby leave the Mississippi
River to be watched by gunboats and local garrisons, and push with
about fifteen thousand men for the Alabama River and Selma.
This march to the sea, however, was a success in this, that
it furnished evidence of what had been previously well
established, that Mr. Davis was not a true prophet, and
that the Southern Confederacy was a shell, as Grant had
foretold. But it removed Sherman after he passed south-
east of Atlanta, farther and farther from the true line of
march to Virginia.
While General Thomas was given the task of subduing
the army which had so long been Sherman's objective, the
latter took with him to the sea more than sixty thousand
selected men, together with the selected appointments,
which rightfully belonged to Thomas and the forces placed
under his command. In place of this immense force, two
divisions of infantry from Missouri" and recruits from the
*Two divisions of the Sixteenth corps which had been sent to General
Rosecrans. The other two divisions of that corps, under General Dodge, par-
ticipated in the Atlanta campaign. *
$
f
THE FOUR TEENTH CORPS 26 I
North were promised to Thomas. It is not therefore sur-
prising that with his clear discernment of the problem
given to him, he desired to avoid its embarrassments.
When he knew that Sherman would send troops from
Georgia, he requested that the Fourteenth corps should
be sent to him. But General Sherman refused, saying:
“It is too Compact and reliable a corps for me to leave
behind.” This corps belonged to Thomas by every tie
that can bind troops to a commander. He had organ-
ized and commanded its first brigade; he then com-
manded in Succession the division which embraced this
brigade, the Corps of which the First division formed a
part, and finally the army of which the Fourteenth corps was
a grand unit. He loved his entire army, as that army
loved him, but this thoroughly organized, well equipped
and gallant Corps laid the foundation of his fame as a
general, and to it he gave a degree of affection that he
could feel for no other similar organization. He was at
Washington at the close of the war to attend the “Grand
Review.” Before he had seen the Fourteenth corps at the
Capital, he met at a small dinner party as its first represen-
tative, Captain Robert Hunter of the Seventy-fourth Ohio.
Thomas at once began to ask questions about officers and
men, and finally said: “That corps made me what I am.”
But in place of the Fourteenth corps, thus denied him, the
Twenty-third, embracing two divisions, and yet constituting
a distinct army, was sent back to Tennessee.
On the 23d of October Sherman said to Thomas:
I do believe you are the man best qualified to manage the
affairs of Tennesssee and North Mississippi. * * * I can spare
you the Fourth corps and about five thousand men not fit for my
purpose, but which will be well enough for garrison duty in Chatta-
nooga, Murfreesboro' and Nashville. What you need is a few points
fortified and stocked with provisions, and a good movable column
of twenty-five thousand men that can strike in any direction.
A few days later General Sherman stated in a despatch to
262 LIFE OF GENERAL, G EORG E H, THOMAS,
General Grant, that if he followed Hood, his force, which
included the Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps
and cavalry, would not be equal to Hood's, and yet at first
Sherman proposed to give Thomas the Fourth corps and
five thousand men unfit for the field, telling him that he
would only need a movable column of twenty-five thousand
men, in face of the probability that the Confederate army
would invade Tennessee, reserving to himself seventy-five
thousand men for the march through the vacant Con-
federacy.
October 26th General Sherman issued the following order:
( SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS NO. IO 5. )
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.
In the Field, Gaylesville, Ala., October 26, 1864.
In the event of military movements or the accidents of war
separating the general in command from his military division, Major-
General Geo. H. Thomas commanding the Department of the Cum-
berland, will exercise command over all troops and garrisons not
absolutely in the presence of the general-in-chief. The commanding
generals of the departments, Armies of the Ohio and Tennessee, will
forthwith send abstracts of their returns to General Thomas at Nash-
ville, in order that he may understand the position and distribution
of troops; and General Thomas may call for such further reports as
he may require, disturbing the actual condition of affairs and mixing
up the troops of separate departments as little as possible consistent
with the interests of the service.
By order of Maj.-Gen. W. T, SHERMAN.
L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.
Hypothetically General Thomas had then a large army,
embracing the Fourth corps of the Army of the Cumber-
land, two divisions of the Sixteenth corps of the Army of
the Tennessee, the Twenty-third corps—the Army of the
Ohio, a large force of cavalry, mainly dismounted and
widely scattered, an indefinite number of raw troops, con-
valescents belonging to the four corps with Sherman, and the
local garrisons of the Department of the Cumberland. The
two divisions of the Sixteenth corps were due at Nashville
early in November, and the speedy coming of troops from
HIS COMMAND. 263
e
the North was promised. His corps commanders were
Major-General David S. Stanley, Fourth corps, Major-
General John M. Schofield, Twenty-third corps, Major-
General Andrew J. Smith, Sixteenth corps and Brevet
Major-General James H. Wilson, chief of cavalry of the
military division.
In a despatch to Thomas of October 19th General Sher-
man said:
Hood's army may be set down at forty thousand of all arms
fit for duty. He may follow me, or turn against you. If you can
defend the line of the Tennessee in my absence of three months,
it is all I ask.
General Grant made it a condition of the march to the sea,
that sufficient forces should be left with Thomas to enable
him to defend this line. October I Ith Grant telegraphed to
Sherman :
If you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be made,
holding the line of the Tennessee firmly, you may make it, de-
‘stroying all the railroad South of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you
think best.
And yet before the Fourth and Twenty-third corps had been
sent to Thomas, Hood had grasped this line at Florence.
Thomas was instructed by Sherman to hold defensively
Nashville, Chattanooga and Decatur, and yet he was told
“you must unite all your men into one army and abandon
all minor points, if you expect to defeat Hood.”
Had the Fourteenth corps been given to Thomas instead
of the Twenty-third, he would have been stronger by five
thousand men, and would have had a substantial basis of
unity for all his accessions, and an unpleasant question
of rank would have been avoided. General Stanley was
General Schofield's senior as major-general. Stanley com-
manded a larger Corps, and yet Schofield, by virtue of Com-
manding an army of two divisions, which represented a mili-
tary department, was his Superior in rank in another army.
It would have been a far more equitable division of the forces
of the military division if General Thomas had been left in
264 I, IFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS.
Tennessee with the Army of the Cumberland. Had this
been done, General Sherman would still have had forty-five
thousand men. The comprehensive plan of the enemy and
the strong probability that Sherman would not be opposed
in his march, demanded that Thomas should have had his
own army with which to defend Tennessee and the West.
This army in his hands would have overwhelmed Hood on
the banks of the Tennessee River, or followed him in any
direction he might have chosen for retreat, had he there
refused to fight.
The well-organized infantry forces which had been pro-
mised to General Thomas embraced about thirty-two thou-
sand men. The available cavalry, largely dismounted and
scattered in detachments throughout the division, was about
twelve thousand strong. The two divisions of the Sixteenth
corps promised early in November in Tennessee, did not
arrive at Nashville until the 3oth. From this cause, and
owing to the expiration of the terms of service of many
regiments, and the absence of other regiments that had
been sent North to vote, his army grew less, rather than
greater, at a time when reënforcements were most needed.
The Fourth corps arrived at Chattanooga, October 29th,
and was immediately sent by General Thomas to Athens,
Alabama. Hood had then thrown some of his troops across
the river at Florence. On the 29th, Thomas repeated his
application to Commander Pennock for gunboats to go up
the Tennessee River, and embarrass, if not prevent, the
crossing of the enemy at that point. He also telegraphed
to General Rosecrans to send the promised divisions of
the Sixteenth corps. November 5th Schofield arrived at
Nashville with the advance of his corps. He had been sent
in consequence of the declaration of Thomas, that he was
sure that Stanley's force was not large enough to drive
Hood's whole army back. With the arrival of Schofield,
there came a report from Johnsonville that an attack upon
that important place, by Forrest's cavalry, was immiment.
A WAITING DETVELOPMENTS. 265
Thereupon, Thomas sent Schofield thither. The latter
arrived at Johnsonville in the evening of the 5th, and
immediately reported that the enemy had retired. He was
then directed to leave a sufficient force to hold the place,
and to proceed to Pulaski and take command of the
troops at that place, in pursuance of orders previously given.
The Fourth corps was already there.
Badeau states that the whole of the Twenty-third corps
was sent to Johnsonville, and that “more than a week
was lost by this diversion.” ” But the last division
of that corps did not arrive at Nashville until the
9th, so that in reality not a day was lost in the move-
ment of the corps to the support of Stanley. It will
hardly be questioned that it was important to maintain
the river line of supply through Johnsonville. This
place was ninety miles from Nashville, and for this
distance only was the line guarded by land forces. Be-
yond, the gunboats had the mastery of the rivers. Had
there been delay in the movement of the Twenty-third
corps by the diversion of a part of it to Johnsonville, the
importance of that place as connecting the river and rail-
road transportation justified the action of Thomas, espe-
cially since at that time he expected to fight Hood in
Southern Tennessee. He had telegraphed to Sherman,
October 31st: “Commanding officer at Johnsonville expects
to be attacked daily, and I have no troops to reënforce
him, unless the Missouri troops should accidentally get
there in time to do so.” Sherman replied: “The fact that
Forrest is down about Johnsonville, while Hood with his
infantry is still about Florence, and Tuscumbia gives you
time for concentration.”
It was evident to General Thomas from the first that he
could not prevent Hood's army from crossing the Ten-
nessee, and that the defense of the line of that river
west of Stevenson was dependent upon the quick coming of
* Military Hist, U. S. Grant, Vol. III. page 187.
266 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H THOMAS,
the promised reënforcements. The water in the river having
fallen, the gunboats could render no assistance. Thomas’
Only hope therefore was, that he could retard Hood's advance
before he could gather his forces for a decisive battle. His
first step was, to throw the Fourth and Twenty-third corps on
the anticipated line of the enemy's advance, keeping his
Cavalry before his foremost forces. But as it was not
improbable that Hood would turn towards Huntsville
Thomas did not withdraw his troops from Decatur, nor from
the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad. He nevertheless
moved all that could be spared from Chattanooga to that
road, at Stevenson, to await developments.
October 29th General Sherman telegraphed :
If necessary break up all minor points and get about Columbia
as big an army as you can, and go at him. You may hold all the
cavalry and new troops, except new artillery, assigned to the corps
with me. I would like Dalton held, but leave that to you ; Chatta-
nooga of course and Decatur in connection with the boats. If, to
make up a force adequate, it be necessary, abandon Huntsville, and
that line and the Nashville and Decatur road, except so far as it
facilitates an army operating toward Florence.
I repeat, should the enemy cross the Tennessce in force, aban-
don all minor points and concentrate your forces at some point
where you cover the road from Murfreesboro’ to Stevenson. g
It should be noted that at this time Sherman desired
Thomas to hold Decatur because its maintenance would
facilitate the coöperation of the gunboats with the land
forces.
Telegraphic communication between Generals Sherman
and Thomas was broken November 12th. The last des-
patches between Nashville and Kingston, having historic
importance are inserted in full.
NASHVILLE, November 11, 1864, 9 P. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN :
Following from Granger received to-day. It confirms previously
reported position of the enemy :
D ESPATCHES OF WOVEMBER EL EVENTH. 267
“DECATUR, IIth, Io A. M.
“Ten men from Tenth Tennessee made prisoners; escaped Satur-
day night, from rebels. They confirm report of two corps having
crossed. One corps still on South bank. They assert that enemy
are still badly off for clothing, many being barefoot, but they are ex-
pecting clothing by train. They say railroad is not completed to
Tuscumbia, but only to Cherokee, fifteen miles from there.
They have train of wagons from Cherokee and one pontoon bridge
at foot of the island above old railroad bridge. They say enemy
are fortifying. Talk in their camps is they are going to Nashville.”
“R. S. GRANGER,
Brigadier General.”
Stanley from Pulaski reports nothing new. Water still very high.
It is hoped the rise would carry off the enemy's bridge. They
say it is trestled at both ends with pontoons in the middle. De-
serters say Georgia troops are disgusted and are deserting. Received
despatch from General Washburne to-day, dated Memphis,8th. He
says advices from Corinth, that but few troops there then ; that
cavalry have brought up a lot of conscripts, absentees from Hood's
army, who went towards Tuscumbia. Also reports enemy repairing
road from Cherokee to Tuscumbia. About 29th ultimo four thou-
sand rebel soldiers came down Blue Mountain railroad to Selma, and
were sent to Hood by the way of Meridian and Corinth ; also ten
car-loads ammunition from Selma. The impression is that Beaure-
gard intends to make Corinth his base, supplies being sent up
constantly on the Mobile and Ohio railroad. He was to send out
cavalry reconnoissance,9th, but says his force is not strong enough to
threaten Mobile and Ohio railroad much. Have not heard from
General A. J. Smith's troops since last report but daily expecting
him here. No reports from Hatch or Croxton to-day. Rear-Admiral
Lee informs me, he is pushing to put one ironclad on Tennessee
River, one on Cumberland, with a third convenient to be placed on
either according to necessity of the case.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., November II, 1864.
MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Nashville, Tennessee :
Despatch to-night received. All right. I can hardly believe
Beauregard would attempt to work against Nashville from Corinth,
as a base at this stage of the war, but all information seems to point
268 LIFE OF GENERAL, G EORG E H THOMAS.
that way. If he does you will whip him out of his boots. But I
think you will find commotion in his camp in a day or two. Last
night we burned Rome, and in two days more will burn Atlanta, and
he must discover that I am not retreating, but on the contrary, fighting
for the very heart of Georgia. About a division of rebel cavalry
made its appearance this morning South of the Coosa River, opposite
Rome, and fired on the rear guard as it withdrew. Also two days
ago some of Iverson's cavalry—about eight hundred—approached
Atlanta from the direction of Decatur, with a section of guns and
swept round toward Whitehall and disappeared in the direction of
Rough and Ready. These also seem to indicate that Beauregard
expected us to retreat. I hear of about fifteen hundred infantry
down at Carrollton, and also some infantry at Jonesboro’, but
what number I cannot estimate. These are all the enemy I know to
be in this neighborhood, though rumor is that Breckinridge has ar-
rived with some from West Virginia. To-morrow I begin the move-
ment laid down in my Special Field Order II 5, and shall keep things
moving thereafter. By to-morrow morning all trains will be at or
north of Kingston, and you can have the exclusive use of all the
rolling stock. By using detachments of recruits and dismounted
cavalry in your fortifications, you will have Schofield and Stanley
and A. J. Smith, strengthened by eight or ten new regiments and all
of Wilson's cavalry, you could safely invite Beauregard across the
Tennessee, and prevent his ever returning. I still believe, however,
that the public clamor will force him to turn and follow me, in
which event you should cross at Decatur and move directly towards
Selma, as far as you can transport supplies. The probabilities are
the wires will be broken to-morrow and that all communication will
cease between us; but I have directed the main line to be left and
will use it, if possible, and wish you to do the same. You may act
however on the certainty that I sally from Atlanta on the 16th with
about sixty thousand men well-provisioned, but expecting to live
liberally on the country.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
NASHVILLE, November 12th, 1864, 8.30 A. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN:
Your despatch of 12 o'clock last night received. I have no fears
that Beauregard can do us any harm now, and if he attempts to
follow you I will follow him as far as possible. If he does not follow
you, I will then thoroughly organize my troops, and, I believe, shall
have men enough to ruin him unless he gets out of the way very
SHERMAN'S MEMORY A. T. FA. UL T. 269
rapidly. The country of Middle Alabama, I learn, is teeming with
supplies this year, which will be greatly to our advantage. I have
no additional news to report from the direction of Florence. I am
now convinced that the greater part of Beauregard's army is near
Florence and Tuscumbia, and that you will at least have a clear
road before you for several days, and that your success will fully
equal your expectations.
GEORGE H. THOMAs,
Major-General.
From Cartersville, Georgia, General Sherman simply ac-
knowledged receipt of the last despatch.
In his “Memoirs,” General Sherman makes this state-
ment in regard to these despatches:
On the I Ith General Thomas and I exchanged full despatches.
He had heard of the arrival of General A. J. Smith's two divisions at
Paducah, which would surely reach Nashville much sooner than
General Hood could possibly do from Florence, so that he was per-
fectly satisfied with his share of the army. *
And in a letter to General Grant, dated Savannah, De-
cember 16th, he wrote:
I myself am somewhat astonished at the attitude of things in
Tennessee. I purposely delayed at Kingston until General Thomas
assured me that he was all ready ; and my last despatch from him
of the 12th of November was full of confidence, in which he promised
me that he would ruin Hood if he dared to advance from Florence,
urging me to go ahead and give myself no concern about Hood's
army in Tennessee.
General Sherman could not have had these despatches
before him when he made these allegations, or he certainly
would have avoided so erroneous an interpretation of them.
General Thomas did not state that he had heard of the
arrival of A. J. Smith's two divisions at Paducah, but said
that he had “heard nothing from him since last report.”
He did not assure Sherman that he was all ready; he did
not urge him to go ahead, nor did he promise uncon-
ditionally that he would ruin Hood if he advanced from
* Memoirs, Vol. II., page 169.
27o I, IFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS.
Florence. In reply to Sherman's despatch of the 11th,
which mentioned the forces that were coming to him, he
simply said, that in the event of the enemy declining to
follow Sherman, he would organize these promised troops,
and expressed the belief that he would have enough to
ruin Beauregard, “unless he gets out of the way very
rapidly.” Thomas was conscious on the 12th of Novem-
ber that he was not then prepared to engage the enemy.
Smith's troops were expected at Nashville at this time,
and Thomas' promises to Grant and to Sherman were made
in expectation that these troops would join his other
forces before Hood's army would advance from Florence.
October 25th Thomas said to General Grant: “If Rose-
crans' troops can reach Eastport early next week, I shall
have no further fears, and will set to work to prepare for our
advance as Sherman has directed should Beauregard fol-
low him.” At that time he expected to meet Hood in
Southern Tennessee, or to be in readiness to pursue him
should he follow Sherman, as Sherman had repeatedly pre-
dicted.
When General Sherman turned south from Kingston,
and severed his telegraphic connection with Nashville,
General Thomas became an independent commander.
CHAPTER XII."
HOOD ADVANCES TOWARDS NASHVILLE-INSTRUCTIONS OF GENERAL THOMAS
TO GENERAL SCHOFIELD–OPERATIONS AT COLUMBIA AND SPRING HILL–
BATTLE OF FIRANKLIN–CONCENTRATION AT NASHVILLE.
OR several days after the 12th, the only indication of
Hood's advance was the improvement of his bridges;
but on the 19th, his forward movement was fully developed.
Then General Thomas knew that the only policy which was
practicable was to check Hood's movements whenever it
was possible, until the National army was strong enough to
meet its opponent in battle.
With the full development of Hood's movement obstacles
to successful resistance multiplied on every hand. Thomas
could not obtain horses and equipments for his dismounted
cavalry, although he had sent his horseless troopers to
Louisville to meet them. Fresh troops did not arrive in
numbers equal to the veterans who were daily going north,
and General A. J. Smith's divisions were long delayed ent
7 oz/fe.”
* “HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT MISSOURI.
“St. Louis, November 7, 1864–4 P. M.
“MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS.
“General A. J. Smith's command, formerly Generals A. J. Smith and Mower's
divisions, numbering nine thousand effective men, will commence leaving here
as early as the tenth instant for Paducah, Kentucky, with orders to report
arrival at that place to you by telegraph, the Sixty-first Illinois volunteers,
numbering fully two hundred and sixty effective Veterans left here for
Paducah yesterday, and the Seventy-second Illinois volunteers, numbering
six hundred effective men, was to leave Cairo last night, or this morning, for
Paducah. There will also leave here within next four days in addition to the
troops herein before named six regiments and two batteries numbering over
four thousand effective men. Four.of these regiments and one battery will be
271
272 I, IFE OF GENERAI, G EORG E H THOMAS,
For several days the situation was alarmingly unpromis-
ing. Adequate resources had not been given to Thomas
to prevent invasion of Tennessee. Hood had been bold
enough to move to the rear of an army of nearly one hun-
dred thousand men; had captured garrisons in front of that
great army after it had faced to the north ; had encamped
his army where General Bragg massed his forces to crush
Rosecrans; and then had turned westward with purpose of ul-
terior aggression. Hood was now advancing towards Nash-
ville, and the game of war had been so played that the gen-
eral who had been promised ample forces to maintain the
line of the Tennessee, had not been able to concentrate
thirty thousand men before him without endangering
strategic points for which great battles had been fought.
And the strategy which embraced all operations East and
West had put in jeopardy all that had been gained in the cen-
tral theatre of war, by depriving Thomas of two-thirds of
his army at a time when it was possible for the enemy to
reénforce Hood from the west bank of the Mississippi, and
give him overwhelming strength. The vigilance of General
Canby and his subordinate commanders in patrolling the
great river in steamers, and in guarding the crossings, with
land forces, defeated a combination which had it been
off to-day, these troops have been directed to report to the commanding officer at
Paducah until the arrival of General A. J. Smith, and then to report to him,.un-
less otherwise ordered by you. There is about three hundred effective cavalry of
Winslow's command that did not go forward in pursuit of Price beyond La Mine
Bridge which will reach here in four days from this time, under order of Major
General Sherman, to go to Memphis. If you desire it to accompany General Smith,
who wants it very much, you are authorized to so order it from here. The re-
mainder of Winslow's cavalry is with Generals Rosecrans and Curtis' cavalry
continuing the pursuit of Price, and it will be some time before it will be back.
Major General Rosecrans may be able to send you more troops than are mention-
ed in this dispatch. He will at least use every exertion in doing so. Should you
desire any change in the orders as to the destination of these troops, please com-
municate the desired change to Generals Rosecrans and Smith at this place who
will at once make it for the troops under their respective commands.
“By command of Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT.
JoHN A. RAWLINs, Brigadier General and Chief of Staff.”
CANB Y'S IMPORTANT SER VICE. 273
effected would have reversed the military status in the West.
Fortunately for the country Canby rendered a service which
has never been appreciated, but one which made it possible
for Thomas, though later than the national fear and General
Grant's impatience demanded, to annihilate one of the
two armies upon which the existence of the Southern
Confederacy depended.
October 18th Canby sent the following despatch to Sher-
Iſla ſ] .
NEW ORLEANS, October 18, 1864.
MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN:
“I learn from an intercepted despatch from Jeff Davis to Kirby
Smith, dated Montgomery on the 30th, that the orders to cross the Mis-
sissippi River had been received. I presume that a duplicate of this de-
spatch reached Kirby Smith, as Magruder's force, about eighteen or
twenty thousand men, suddenly left General Steel's front and moved in
the direction of Washita River. I have sent a fast boat to communi-
cate this intelligence to the troops and gun boats on the river. And as I
have about eight thousand troops afloat, and will at once increase the
number, I think the crossing can be prevented. The crossing will
probably be attempted in the neighborhood of Gaines Landing.
E. R. S. CANBY,
Major-General.
To show that General Canby discerned the plan of the
enemy, a paragraph from a despatch of General N. J. T.
Dana, sent from Vicksburg Nov. 8th, addressed to either
General Sherman or General Thomas, and received by the
latter, after the former had marched to the south, is here
quoted:
“The enemy is threatening to cross to the east side of the Mississip-
pi River at Gaines Landing where Major-General Reynolds is ready
for them.”%
*The writer said to General Canby, at Portland, Oregon, a short time before his
death, “I have traced an intimate connection between your operations on the
Mississippi River and those of General Thomas in Tennessee in November and
December 1864, in defeating the enemy's plan of operations. This connection
seems to have been overlooked by historians.” He replied “Such a connection
did exist, and my efforts were directed to prevent the crossing of the Mississippi,
I8
274 I, IIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H. THOMAS.
;
;
:
:
That this plan of campaign was known at Washington is
evident from the following despatch :
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 6, 1864—I P. M.
LIEpTENANT-GENERAL GRANT, City Point, Va.
What I meant about Canby was whether, considering the uncer-
tainty of Sherman’s movements and the large force with which
Beauregard was operating against Thomas and the Mississippi River, it
would not be best for Canby to give up sending troops to the coast of
Georgia, and operate against Beauregard the best he could from the
Mississippi River. I understand that the Mobile and Ohio railroad has
been repaired as far north as Corinth, which is made Beauregard's
depot, and that the Mississippi and Tennessee railroad is repaired to
Holly Springs. I also learn from Generals Dana and M. L. Smith,
that the enemy are preparing to occupy the left bank of the Mississippi,
so as to secure the crossing of Kirby Smith's forces to the east side.
General Curtis reached Fayetteville, Ark., on the 2d, and raised the
rebel siege of that place. He then pushed on for Fort Smith, where
General Thayer is besieged, and will probably reach there to-night or
to-morrow. Whether Steel is doing anything I cannot learn. At any
rate, Price will be disposed of within the next two or three days, and
it seemed to me that if Canby were relieved from the proposed expe-
dition to the Georgia coast he could, with Reynolds’ forces, with what
Steel could spare, and with what he could collect on the Mississippi
River, so operate on Beauregard's communications as to greatly re-
lieve Sherman ànd Thomas. From all the despatches and telegrams
received here, it seems that Beauregard is collecting into West Ten-
nessee and Northern Mississippi every man he can raise in Mississippi,
Alabama, and Georgia.
H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
This grand plan of the Confederate leaders had been
formed to be put upon trial against all the National forces
in the West. It was defeated by Thomas and Canby after
River by the western Confederate forces that made efforts to do so in pursuance
of orders from the Confederate President. This I found out from an intercepted
despatch to Kirby Smith, of which I informed General Sherman.” He then pro-
duced a copy of this despatch in cipher, and laughing said; “I cannot now read
it, but it was deciphered at the time.”
:
i
;
DA VIS’ VIEWS OF THE SITUATION. 275
Sherman with more than sixty thousand men had gone to
the sea.
During the period of Sherman's inaction in Northern
Georgia, neither Beauregard nor Hood was ignorant of his
purpose to march Southward. But it was not their inten-
tion to follow him with Hood's army. It was expected
that their own campaign in Tennessee and Kentucky would
compensate for any harm Sherman might do in Georgia.
Mr. Davis was consulted, and his views were expressed in
the following communication :
RICHMOND, November 7th, 1864.
GENERAL J. B. HooD.
No troops can have been sent by Grant or Sheridan to Nash-
ville. The latter attempted to reënforce the former but Early's
movements prevented it. That fact will assure you as to their con-
dition and purpose. The policy of taking advantage of the reported
division of his (Sherman's) forces when he cannot re-unite his army
is too obvious to have been overlooked by you. I therefore take it for
granted that you have not been able to avail yourself of that advan-
tage, during his march northward from Atlanta. Hope the oppor-
tunity will be offered before he is extensively recruited. If you keep
his communications destroyed, he will most probably seek to con-
centrate for an attack on you. But if, as reported to you, he has sent
a large part of his force southward, you may first beat him in detail,
and subsequently, without serious obstruction or danger to the
country in your rear, advance to the Ohio River.
JEFFERSON DAVIS.
General Hood inferred that his proposition to invade
Tennessee was not approved by the Confederate President,
since his approval was contingent upon the defeat of Sher-
man in detail before this step should be taken. The diffi-
culty of properly supplying and equipping his army was an
obstacle to an early advance, and the failure of the western
Confederate forces to cross the Mississippi River made him
cautious while General Sherman was near enough to give
trouble. Hood lost nearly a month on account of supplies.
But when Sherman began his march from Kingston it
276 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H THOMAS
was deemed impracticable for Hood to follow him, owing
to the great distance between the two armies; besides
Such a step would be regarded as a retreat, and con-
sequently would be more disheartening to the Confederate
army and the Southern people than to offset aggression in
Georgia by an offensive campaign in Tennessee. And it
was believed that the opportunity to defeat the National
forces in that State had come. The subjoined passage
from Hood's report reveals his conception of the situation
and his hopes:
When our army arrrived at Florence it had entirely recovered
from the depression that frequent retreats had created. The enemy
having for the first time divided his forces, I had to determine
which of the two parts to direct my operations against. To follow
the forces about to move through Georgia under Sherman would be
to again abandon the required territory to the forces under Thomas,
with little hope of being able to reach the enemy in time to defeat
his movement, and also to cause desertion and greatly impair the
mora/e, or fighting spirit, of the army, by what would be considered a
compulsory retreat.
. I thought the alternative clear that I should move upon Thomas.
If I succeeded in beating him, the effect of Sherman's movement would
not be great and I should gain in men sufficiently to compensate for
the damages he might inflict. If beaten I should leave the army in
better condition than it would be if I attempted a retrograde move-
ment against Sherman.
When Hood's aggressive movement was developed
Stanley's corps was at Pulaski; Cox's division of the
Twenty-third corps was on the Columbia road, north of
Pulaski; Ruger's division was on Duck River holding
the crossings at Columbia, Williamsport, Gordon's Ferry
and Centreville; and the cavalry forces under Generals
Hatch and Croxton and Colonel Capron, were in front
of the enemy near Florence. Thomas had relieved the
two brigades left by Schofield at Johnsonville, and had
sent them to Duck River early in the month. General
Schofield had in hand eighteen thousand infantry and four
HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO SCHO FIELD. 277
brigades of cavalry. His instructions from General Thomas
Were :
If the enemy advance in force as General Hatch * believes, have
everything in readiness to fight him at Pulaski, if he advances on
that place, or cover the railroad and concentrate at Columbia.
Should he attempt to turn your right flank, in the latter case, that is,
the attempt to turn your right flank, General Hatch should cover the
fords and ferries across Duck River and hold them when you con-
centrate at Columbia.
The policy indicated was to be continued until sufficient
forces were concentrated to fight a battle. The enemy
quickly turned Pulaski by advancing on the roads west of
the place, but by a forced night-march the Fourth corps
and Cox's division of the Twenty-third corps reached
Columbia before Hood. It was equally impracticable
to prevent the turning of Columbia. Schofield placed
his infantry before the town on the south bank of Duck
River and constructed fortifications. Wilson's cavalry was
posted up and down the stream to watch against turning
movements on right or left. During the 24th and 25th, the
enemy skirmished with dismounted cavalry and on the 26th
and 27th, he pressed against the National forces with in-
fantry but made no assault.
On the 24th,Thomas telegraphed :
If you cannot hold Columbia you had better withdraw to the
north bank of the river. From the description given, I supposed the
line was sufficiently short to enable you and Stanley to hold it
securely and have a reserve.
The next day he said:
In case you have to move to the north bank of Duck River, I
wish you to keep some cavalry on the south side of it, to observe
and delay Hood's advance on Chattanooga railroad as much as
possible.
* General Wilson had not yet gone to the front, being engaged at Nashville in
mounting and equipping his men. -
278 LIFE OF GENERAL GIEORGE EI. THOMAS,
And on the 27th :
Your despatch of Io A. M., yesterday received: I will send you
all available infantry I can raise. I expect some of Smith's com-
mand here to-day and will send it forward as rapidly as possible.
On the night of the 27th, Schofield crossed from the
town to the north bank. Hood's plan was, to feign
with two divisions of cavalry, to hold Schofield at Co-
lumbia, until he could move seven divisions of infantry and
all his cavalry to the rear of the National army, and thus
effect its overthrow.” This scheme was so nearly accom-
plished that its final failure was one of the most remark-
able events of the war. Its success in the first stages was
due to the fact that Schofield maintained his position
at Columbia, after a turning movement was fully de-
veloped, and against the explicit instructions of Thomas.
On the 28th Thomas telegraphed to Schofield:
If General Wilson cannot succeed in driving back the enemy,
should it prove true that he has crossed the river, you will neces-
sarily have to make preparations to take up a new position at
Franklin behind Harpeth, immediately, if it becomes necessary to
fall back.
This was in answer to Genéral Schofield's report on the
27th, as follows:
(ºr
My information though not very satisfactory leads me to believe
that Hood intends to cross Duck River above Columbia and as near
it as he can. I shall withdraw to the north bank to-night and en-
deavor to prevent him from crossing.
This withdrawal was simply from the town to the north
bank. During the 28th, Wilson became fully satisfied,
that the enemy was moving to turn the position, and so in-
formed Schofield and Thomas. *
On the 28th, Schofield telegraphed:
The enemy has crossed in force a short distance this side of the
* See “Advance and Retreat,” page 283.
FIIS INSTRUCTIONS TO SCHOFIELD. 279
Lewisburg pike, at noon to-day, and has driven our cavalry back
across the river on that pike at the same time. The force is reported
to be infantry, but I do not regard it as being probable. Wilson
has gone with his main force to learn the facts and drive the enemy
back, if possible. -
At this time, and subsequently,General Schofield believed
that Hood had an army of fifty thousand men before Co-
lumbia. In Schofield's official report he gave the following
estimate of Hood's strength ;
The enemy's force was variously estimated at from thirty to forty
thousand infantry, and from ten to twenty thousand cavalry; the
largest estimate for the infantry and the smallest for the cavalry are
In OSt probably, nearly accurate.
To give opportunity for an army, which, according to
his own words, was more than double his own strength, to
reach his rear, was to invite his own overthrow, and with
it the most direful consequences to the National cause.
His instructions from General Thomas were explicit in
forbidding the maintenance of position at Columbia until
such an emergency was possible.
At 3.30 A.M., on the 29th, Thomas telegraphed :
I desire you to fall back from Columbia and take up your posi-
tion at Franklin, leaving a sufficient force at Spring Hill, to contest
the enemy’s progress until you are securely posted at Franklin.
He then had hope that General Smith's divisions would
arrive in time to fight the enemy at Franklin.
At 8.30 A. M., Schofield replied:
The enemy's cavalry has crossed in force on the Lewisburg pike,
and General Wilson reports the infantry crossing above Huey's mills,
about five miles from this place. I have sent an infantry reconnois-
sance to learn the facts. If it proves true, I will act according to
your instructions of the morning.
f
General Wilson thus explains his action in his official
report:-
28O LIFE OF GENERAL G EORG E H. THOMAS.
By this time (between 7 and 8 P.M.) it had become evident
that the entire rebel cavalry force (three divisions), had crossed, and
were directing their march towards the Lewisburg pike, an excellent
macadamized road, leading to Franklin, and therefore at 8 P. M.,
I sent a despatch by courier to General Schofield, informing him of
the fact, and that no part of Forrest's force, up to dark, had moved
towards the Franklin pike. During the night several prisoners were
brought in, from whom I received valuable information. At I A. M.,
I sent a despatch to General Schofield, informing him that the force
which had crossed at Huey's mill was Forrest's corps of cavalry,
consisting of Chalmers', Jackson's, and Buford's divisions, and Biffie's
regiment; that the rebel infantry were to have begun crossing two
hours before, by three pontoon bridges, under construction at the same
place. Believing this information to be perfectly correct, I therefore
suggested that our infantry should reach Spring Hill by IO A. M., of
that day. I regarded my force too small, with Hammond's and Stew-
art's brigades absent, to cover the Lewisburg pike, and at the same
time the dirt roads leading to Spring Hill; and believing that General
Schofield, with the infantry, would have plenty of time, marching by
the Franklin turnpike, to reach Spring Hill, or any intermediate point,
before the enemy, marching by bad dirt roads, made worse by the
heavy rains which had recently fallen, I determined to keep my en-
tire force on the Lewisburg turnpike, and hold the enemy as long as
I could, hoping by good management to get no farther back that
day than to the Ridge meeting-house.
It is therefore manifest that General Wilson, whose duty
it was to discover the intentions and movements of the
enemy, informed General Schofield that a turning movement
was developed, advising his immediate withdrawal from
Columbia, and that General Thomas, at 3.30 A. M., on the
29th, directed him to withdraw and take position at
Franklin.
Supposing that his instructions of 3.30 A.M., had been
obeyed, and that his army was then at Franklin, at I I P. M.,
Thomas telegraphed to Schofield at that place:
General Wilson has telegraphed me very fully the movements
of the enemy yesterday and this morning. He believes Forrest is
aiming to strike this place, while the infantry will move against you,
..and attempt to get on your flank. If you discover such to be his
movement you had better cross Harpeth at Franklin, and then retire
MO VEMENT TO SPRING FIII, L. 28 I
along the Franklin pike to this place, covering your wagon train
and the railroad.
But at the date of this despatch, Wood's division, fol-
lowed by Kimball's, was approaching Spring Hill, having
two divisions of the enemy in their rear, and coming into
the immediate presence of Seven divisions of infantry, and
all of the enemy's cavalry. This situation, so exceedingly
critical, together with the dangers of the day, had resulted
from the operations of the two armies on the 29th.
General Schofield, in his official report, thus describes
the situation during the 28th, and the morning of the 29th :
The crossings below Columbia were guarded by General Ruger's
infantry, and General Wilson had all his cavalry, save one brigade,
to guard the river above. The troops rested in this position during
the 28th, and I had strong hopes of being able to hold the line of
Duck River, until reënforcements should arrive. But I learned from
General Wilson about 2 A. M., on the 29th, that the enemy's cavalry
had forced a crossing near the Lewisburg pike, and about daylight
in the morning, that his infantry was also crossing at Huey's mills,
five miles above Columbia, from which a road leads into the Frank-
lin pike at Spring Hill. The enemy might endeavor to reach the
latter place in advance of me, and thus cut off my retreat, or strike
me in flank near Duck River, or both. He had already forced a
column of cavalry between General Wilson and me, and cut off all
communication between us. I therefore sent General Stanley with
a division of infantry on one line to Spring Hill to hold that point
and cover the trains; General Cox was left in his position to hold
the crossing at Columbia; Generals Wood and Kimball were put in
line, facing Huey's mills with a brigade thrown forward to recon-
noiter, and General Ruger was ordered to move on to the pike, in
rear of Rutherford's Creek, leaving one regiment to hold the ford
near the railroad bridge, the bridges having been destroyed.
In compliance with orders, General Stanley at 8 A. M.,
moved to the rear with Wagner's and Kimball's divisions,
the trains, and ambulances, and all artillery that could be
spared. By the time he reached Rutherford's Creek which
was bridgeless, the enemy's turning movement was plainly
developed. Colonel Post's brigade, from General Wood's
282 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H, THOMAS
division, had reconnoitered up Duck River, and had reported
that Hood's infantry were crossing the river, and advancing
towards Spring Hill. To guard against a flank attack at
Rutherford's Creek, Kimball's division was left on the south
bank, With Wagner's division alone Stanley proceeded to
Spring Hill.
By this time General Hood had advanced so far in the
execution of his plan, as to place his army in Schofield's
rear, and to him, doubtless, its complete success was
then assured. Having left two divisions of Lee's corps to
maintain the feint upon Schofield's position at Columbia,
Hood had at dawn of day, led Cheatham's and Stewart's
corps, and one division of Lee's across the pontoon bridges,
and advanced at their head on the road leading from
Huey's mills to Spring Hill. Forrest's cavalry had preceded
Hood on the Lewisburg road, following Wilson till well
abreast of Spring Hill, and then turning towards that place.
So that at II.30 A. M., when Stanley with Wagner's division
was within two miles of Spring Hill he was informed that the
enemy's cavalry was approaching from the east. Thereupon
the division moved rapidly forward and drove Forrest from
the place. Stanley then directed General Wagner to form
as long a line as possible with Opdycke's and Lane's bri-
gades to cover the trains and the town, and throw Brad-
ley's brigade forward to the front and right, to a wooded
knoll about three fourths of a mile to the east, to guard the
approaches from that direction.
Meanwhile Hood had left four divisions of his infantry
under Stewart, at the crossing of Rutherford's Creek on
his line of march, two and a half miles from Spring Hill,
to guard against Schofield's escape to the defences of Mur-
freesboro’, and was advancing upon Stanley with Cheatham's
Corps.
At this juncture Schofield's forces were widely scat-
tered. Cox's division was on the bank of Duck River, op-
posite Columbia. Kimball's division had been moved
SPRING HILL. 283
back from Rutherford's Creek to join Wood's, and these
two divisions were faced to the east, as against the enemy
approaching from Huey's mill. One half of Ruger's
division was far down Duck River, without orders to join
the main army, and the other half was on the Franklin
turnpike at the crossing of Rutherford's Creek. While
Schofield's forces were thus scattered, Hood had seven
divisions of infantry and all his cavalry within support-
ing distance, near Stanley's single division at Spring Hill,
as General Wilson had, in his despatch of I P. M., predicted
they would be. A more critical situation could hardly be
imagined for an army of inferior strength.
During the forenoon and first hours of the afternoon Colo-
nel Post had frequently reported from his position up the
river that the enemy's forces were moving northward from
Huey's mill, and although his reports had been promptly
sent by General Wood to General Schofield, it was not until
3 P. M. that the latter became convinced that the enemy had
turned his position.
General Schofield in his official report thus mentioned
his conviction and his consequent dispositions:
About 3 P. M., I became satisfied that the enemy would not attack
my position on Duck River, but was pushing two corps direct for
Spring Hill. I then gave the necessary orders for the withdrawal of
the troops after dark, and took General Ruger's troops and pushed
for Spring Hill to reopen communication with General Stanley, and
was followed, at a short distance, by the head of the main column.
At the same hour, 3 P. M., Hood at the head of
Cheatham's corps was within two miles of Spring Hill, and
looking upon the trains and artillery, under guard of a sin-
gle division, eight miles from the nearest support, gave
orders to General Cheatham to advance his corps, take pos-
session of the road at or near Spring Hill, and to hold it,
promising support by the four divisions then so near. But,
notwithstanding, Stanley with one division was in complete
284 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS,
isolation from noon until 7 P. M., the time of Schofield's
arrival at Spring Hill with half of Ruger's division, there
was no fighting that imperiled Stanley. Hood had detach-
ments of cavalry north and west of the town, three divi-
sions of infantry directly before it, and four others near
by ; and yet no attack was made, except by Cleburne's
division late in the afternoon, when it fell furiously on
Bradley's brigade. After a sharp conflict Bradley was
compelled to fall back to the rear of the right of Lane's
line immediately before the town. As Cleburne advanced,
he received a heavy fire of eight pieces of artillery, posted
by General Stanley near the town, and also an enfilading
volley from Lane's more advanced troops. A vigorous at-
tack in the afternoon by a corps of infantry supported by a
strong force of cavalry would have necessarily overwhelmed
a single unsupported division of infantry. The reason given
by Cheatham, as reported by General Hood, for not attack-
ing, was “that the line looked a little too long for him
and that Stewart should first form on his right.” And this
statement is sustained by the fact that Cheatham restrained
Bate from attacking with his division, when under orders
from Hood to do so.
The line formed by Lane's and Opdycke's brigades was in-
deed long, but consequently very weak, since nearly all their
regiments were greatly extended in an attenuated skirmish
line. Colonel Lane held the Ninety-seventh Ohio imme-
diately in front of the town, placing the One Hundredth
Illinois nearly a mile in advance, one company of the Fortieth
Indiana between them as flankers, and the remainder of his
brigade, to the left of the One Hundredth Illinois as skir-
mishers. Colonel Opdycke on the left of Lane, stretched out
his brigade to a very great length, and kept his slender re-
serves in constant motion from the cover of the woods to
open view to deceive the enemy as to the strength of the
force in his front.
* “Advance and Retreat,” p. 286.
SPRING HILL, • 285
Effort was made by Hood late in the evening to
place Stewart's Corps on the right of Cheatham on the Frank-
lin road, but night fell before the movement had been effected.
It is hardly credible that seven divisions of infantry and
three of cavalry completely surrounded one small division and
the wagon trains of the army, and yet they neither attacked
the slender line, nor held the road north of Spring Hill with
a strong force. General Hood has given to history, as the
reason for the loss of one of the most promising opportuni-
ties ever offered to a general, the disobedience of a subordi-
nate. Had Wagner's division been crushed, even late in the
evening, the escape of the troops south of Spring Hill would
have been impossible, except through the blunders of the
enemy. Ten divisions, including cavalry, would have been
before them on their direct line of retreat to Franklin and
Nashville, and two in their rear. Against such odds and
Such disadvantages of position, three divisions and a half,
scattered for miles along a single road could hardly have
escaped utter destruction.
In moving from Rutherford's Creek with Ruger's troops,
General Schofield found the enemy upon the road south
of Spring Hill, but not in such force as to arrest his move-
ments. Schofield arrived at Stanley's position at 7 P. M.,
the hour when the movement of the three remaining divisions
from Columbia began, and learning that the enemy was on
the road north of Spring Hill, went forward three miles
to Thompson's Station to find only deserted camp fires,
where Forrest's troopers had been stationed to prevent the
retreat of our army during the night. Returning at mid-
night, General Schofield met Cox's division, which in turn
was joined by Wood's and Kimball's. Upon the with-
drawal of General Cox from the bank of Duck River, the
two divisions of Lee's corps which had kept up the feint
with vigor during the day, crossed from the town and then
pressed upon the rear of Kimball's division as it moved
towards Spring Hill. The head of each division found the
286 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS,
enemy on the road south of that place, and Kimball skir-
mished with the enemy in his rear.
The danger to the little army did not pass away with
Hood's failure to put his forces on its line of retreat, but
at I2 P. M., the situation at Spring Hill was still exceed-
ingly critical. There were possibilities, still open to the
enemy, that threatened the loss of a train of five hundred
wagons and many of the troops. It was only necessary for
Hood to advance his lines a few hundred yards to fire into
troops and trains as they passed along the front of his army.
At the town there was a bridge so narrow that two wagons
could not pass it abreast, and yet the army, with the artillery
and wagons could only be saved by crossing it before
daylight. At Io P. M. General Schofield at the head of
his own corps moved on to Franklin, leaving General
Stanley with his corps and the train of the army in front
of the enemy. With admirable skill, however, Stanley sent
the train over the narrow bridge, and covering it with a
line of troops all the way to Franklin, snatched his corps
and the appointments of the army from Hood's inclosing
grasp.
At Spring Hill General Hood lost the great opportunity
of his campaign. He had thrown ten-twelfths of his army
twelve miles in Schofield's rear, and he could have attacked
an inferior army widely scattered. His advantages even as
against Stanley after Schofield and the Twenty-third corps
had moved towards Franklin, were far beyond ordinary
precedents. One small corps, encumbered with its artillery
and the trains of the army, would have been an easy prey
had Hood ordered an advance, when he knew that troops
and train as they slipped from his grasp were almost
touching the guns of his pickets.
For the situation at Spring Hill, General Thomas was in
no way responsible. He had first given contingent orders
for the withdrawal of the army from Columbia whenever a
turning movement should be developed. He then had
FRANKLIN. 287
positively ordered a withdrawal fifteen hours before the last
divisions began their retreat from Columbia; but even with-
out these orders Schofield had ample information and advice
from Wilson to justify the movement at early dawn.
The march of the enemy from Spring Hill to Franklin,
retarded as it was, by the spirited skirmishing of Opdycke's
brigade as rear guard to Our army, Consumed the greater
part of the following day.
General Thomas did not expect a battle at Franklin. He
had not been able to gather his forces to offer battle, and
at II P. M., on the 29th he had ordered General Schofield
to retire from Franklin to Nashville, should the enemy
develop a movement to turn Franklin.
Thomas had left nothing undone that he deemed prac-
ticable, to gather an army of adequate proportions, having
resorted, even, to requests for militia from the North. He
had been authorized to call for militia by General Sher-
man, who had written, November 2nd, “To make all
things sure you can call on the Governors of Kentucky
and Indiana for some militia, cautioning them against a
stampede, no matter what occurs. Try and avoid, as I
know you will, all false alarms.”
As soon as the direction of Hood's immediate advance
from Florence had been clearly indicated, Thomas had with-
drawn the troops from Decatur and united them with Steed-
man's command on the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad
in provision for resistance should the Confederate army turn
towards that road. General Smith's advance arrived at
Nashville on the 30th, but not in time to reënforce Scho-
field that day.
The action at Franklin occurred in the afternoon of the
30th. Upon arriving at Franklin, General Schofield had
given personal attention to the repair of the bridges, that
his artillery and trains might pass to the north bank of
the Harpeth as quickly as possible, leaving General Cox
commanding the Twenty-third corps to put in position to
288 I, IFE OF GENERAI, G EORG E H. THOMAS.
defend the crossing, that corps and the advance of Stanley's.
Cox, with his two divisions, Ruger's and Reilly's, and
Kimball's of the Fourth, formed a line around the town
from river to river.
By direction of General Schofield, Wood's division moved
to the north bank of the Harpeth River to cover the flanks
should the enemy attempt to cross above or below the town,
and Wagner's division was left in front of the line of battle
to retard the enemy's advance. The position assigned to
this division was about one-third of a mile from the en-
trenched line, in open exposure.
Regarding this exposure as needless as well as extremely
dangerous, Colonel Opdycke protested against it, and was
permitted by General Wagner to take his brigade within
the lines. Being familiar with the position, Opdycke
posted his brigade in rear of Carter's Hill,—the key point
of the defensive line. It was well that this discretion was
permitted since this brigade proved to be the only reserve
when the line gave way at Carter's Hill and on each side of
that vital point. In this protest Colonel Opdycke did the
thinking which in the outcome enabled him and his brigade
to render the service which saved the army.
Colonel Lane, later in the day, in a more indirect way,
also protested against the position of his brigade in front
of the line. He had been stationed on a hill much farther
from the main line, and, having observed the formation of
the enemy for battle, had sent word that unless withdrawn,
his brigade would be captured. When retired from this
perilous position, he was ordered to form on the right of
Conrad’sº brigade of Wagner's division. Lane's line
when formed was well refused. Observing the move-
ments early in the afternoon, he became fully confirmed in
his belief that Hood intended to attack, and requested
Captain E. G. Whitesides, the adjutant general of the
* General Bradley had been severely wounded at Spring Hill.
FRANKLIN. 289
division, to report that belief to General Wagner. The
report was made, and Wagner directed Whitesides to com-
municate the information to General Stanley. The message
was delivered to Stanley in the presence of General Scho-
field, but the two brigades in advance of the main line were
not withdrawn.
These brigades extemporized defenses and awaited the
advance of the enemy.
At 4 P. M. Stanley was with Schofield on the north
bank of the Harpeth, nearly two miles by the road from
the centre of the line of battle, and neither general antici-
pated an engagement that day. Hitherto Hood had not
attacked entrenched lines except in feint at Columbia; and
the obstacles to a successful turning movement were
not greater at that place than they were at Franklin.
Besides, the trains, for which the defensive attitude had
been assumed were rapidly crossing the Harpeth and
moving on to Nashville. The lateness of the hour also
increased the improbability of an action on that day.
But these considerations had no weight with General
Hood, and having massed his forces heavily in his centre,
he hurled them against the two brigades in front.
Conrad's brigade was more directly in the line of advance
but held position until the enemy was upon it. Broken at
once by the onset of Hood's army, this brigade fled hur-
riedly through the fortifications which were abandoned by
the troops stationed to hold them. The enemy followed
closely and occupied the defenses. The retirement of Con-
rad's brigade, exposed Lane's left flank, and he promptly
ordered his brigade to fall back. He was also followed
closely by the enemy, but breaking through our own abatis,
his brigade entered the entrenchments to the right of the
Columbia road, and most of the men having withheld their
fire, wheeled at the defenses and poured a volley into the
foremost pursuing troops and then formed a triple line
in the vacant trench.
I9
29O LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H, THOMAS,
These brigades as they fell back formed a screen for the
enemy, and some of the forces following Conrad passed to
the rear of our works at the key-point. Thus the main line
was broken by the impact of friends and foes. Carter's
Hill was as near the bridges as was the right flank of the
army, and almost as near as the other flank. The two
batteries captured by the enemy on the line were turned to
right and left to enfilade the line, while towards the breach,
Hood's massed central forces were rapidly advancing. Op-
posite the breach, one hundred yards within, there was a
single brigade, a self-appointed reserve. Across the river
there was a division before Schofield's headquarters, but too
far off to give support in the supreme moment. Help from
the flanks of the line was impossible.
Had Opdycke and his brave troops waited for orders
the day might have been lost. But there was no delay.
Commander and men alike discerned the emergency and
the only way to save the army. When Opdycke turned
to give the order, he found that his troops unbidden had
prepared for the desperate charge, and with bayonets al-
ready fixed, they heard the ringing command, “First brigade
forward to the lines.” And with a heroism, consonant with
the supreme exigence, commander and men rushed to the
breach and in hand-to-hand fight drove the enemy from
Carter's Hill, changed again the direction of the twice cap-
tured batteries and saved the army.
From that moment until late at night, the enemy moved
in frequent assaults upon the whole line, but at Carter's
Hill the conflict reached the utmost fury. To this point,
General Hood advanced his reserves from every quarter, and
although it was, at first, opposite the strong centre of his
army, yet against it, with reckless bravery, division com-
manders led their men. And hither in support of Opdycke,
all the rallied troops were thrown. The victory turned upon
the quick formation of Lane's brigade in the works, the gal-
lant action of Opdycke and his brigade, and subsequently
FRANKL, IN. 29 I
upon the stubborn resistance of all the troops in line of
battle.
The mistake was the posting of the two brigades in front
of the line of battle. A small force may retard the advance of
army, when in marching order, but such a force only invites
disaster, when thrown before an army formed for battle.
The object of placing these brigades before the main line
was doubtless to check the enemy's advance, and the resist-
ance necessary to effect this result, made their retreat per-
ilous to themselves, and to the army behind them. These
brigades were in a false position. They knew that they
were expected to resist the enemy, and that the degree of
their resistance was to be determined by circumstances
rather than by orders. They constructed barricades in
sight of the army behind them, and in view of all the gen-
erals who turned their eyes to the front. These extempor-
ized defenses were the prophecy of their stubborn resistance.
And when Hood's army moved towards them, they had the
alternative of retreating without fighting or awaiting the
onset of the enemy. They chose to hold their position as
long as possible, in compliance with the orders of the divi-
sion commander.
When General Stanley heard the roar of the opening
conflict, he left the presence of the commanding general and
galloped to the line of battle, and yet he was too late to
order the advance of Opdycke's brigade. When General
Cox, commanding at the time all the troops on the south
side of the Harpeth, first perceived that the enemy had
gained Carter's Hill, he started an order to Opdycke to move
his brigade forward to the breach, but the quick advance of
that brigade, anticipated the order which miscarried in
passage. The form of the action was such as to give oppor-
tunity for personal bravery rather than generalship. Gen-
eral Cox displayed wisdom, in the formation of the line of
battle and the construction of breast works. This done the
repulse of the enemy was effected mainly by the bravery
292 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
and brilliant fighting of the men, and the officers with them
on the line. But in this service the ranking generals were
conspicuous. Stanley's horse was killed under him, and he
was himself wounded, when on the line with his troops.
Cox was active in rallying the troops that were broken in
organization by the first attack of the enemy upon their ad-
vanced position, and those that were driven from Carter's
Hill; and by voice and gallant bearing in the extreme ex-
posure to the terrific fire of the enemy, inspirited his men
throughout the conflict. The division commanders and their
troops as a whole were unflinching in their resistance.
The action of Opdycke and his brigade was never-
theless distinctive. The commander rode to Carter's Hill
in front of his line, emptying and breaking his pistol,
and after his horse was shot, leading his men on foot, he
clubbed a musket and fought hand-to-hand with the
enemy. Emulating his example the officers and men of
his brigade, forced the enemy from the key-point, and
held it to the close of the action. Instances of such bravery
and success are rare in history. General Hood bore testi-
mony to the splendid morale of his army. And this was
evinced by the death of five of his generals, the wounding of
six, the death of seventeen hundred and fifty men, and four
thousand wounded. And there was equal energy and cour-
age throughout the defensive line from river to river. More
than half the losses in the National army, were from Wag-
ner's division. The two brigades posted in front, lost heavily
in fighting the centre of Hood's line, and in retreating under
fire to our main line. And Opdycke's brigade sustained
great loss, in driving the enemy from Carter's Hill.
During the day, General Wilson's troopers on the left were
brilliantly engaged, first in driving back the enemy's cavalry
across the Harpeth, and subsequently in successfully
resisting all of Forrest's attempts to gain the north bank of
that river, and fall upon the flank and rear of the Union
army.
FRANKLIN. 293
This action at Franklin was not a battle in the broad
signification of that term. There was no strategy and no
maneuvering, except by Cavalry. Hood Stormed a position
virtually fortified, and was repulsed in every assault. The
conflict was made possible by the fact that Thomas' or-
ders were not promptly obeyed. The late withdrawal
from Columbia, endangered the little army at Spring
Hill, and made it possible for Hood to attack at Franklin.
Franklin was as easily turned as Pulaski, or Columbia,
and previous to the action of the 30th, General Thomas had
decided that it was impracticable to concentrate south of
Nashville the forces intended for a general battle and had
given orders for the retirement of his army to that place.
After the engagement he repeated his orders for this move-
ment. For this action he has been severely censured.
On December 3rd, in a letter to General Sherman, General
Grant expressed his opinion that Thomas Ought not to have
withdrawn his army to Nashville. His language is sub-
joined:
“Thomas has got back into the defenses of Nashville with Hood
close upon him. Decatur has been abandoned and so have all the
roads, except the main one leading to Chattanooga. Part of this
falling back was undoubtedly necessary, and all of it may have been.
It did not look so, however, to me. In my opinion Thomas far out-
numbers Hood in infantry. In cavalry Hood has the advantage
morale and numbers. I hope yet that Hood will be badly crip-
pled, if not destroyed.” ”
This is positive censure of Thomas for the abandonment of
Decatur and the retirement of his army to Nashville. And
yet Grant had previously advised the abandonment of De-
catur. This, however, was previous to Sherman's southern
movement, and previous to the stipulation that the line of
the Tennessee was to be held.
On the 13th of October, Grant had telegraphed to General
Halleck:
* Sherman’s Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 205.
2.94. LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS.
“I think it will be advisable for Major General Thomas now to
abandon all the railroad from Columbia to Decatur, thence to
Stevenson. This will give him much additional force.”
When this opinion was made known to Thomas he re-.
plied: -
“Forrest's pickets are on the south bank of the river, and if Crox-
ton and Granger were withdrawn, I am satisfied he would push across
the river and operate against our direct line of communication with
no adequate force to successfully oppose him.”
General Thomas held Decatur when there were sound
military reasons for doing so, and when there were none, he
abandoned the place.
General Sherman also expressed the same opinion as
Grant. December 16th, he wrote to Grant:
“Why he did not turn on him at Franklin after checking and
discomfiting him surpasses my understanding. Indeed, I do not
approve of his evacuating Decatur, but think he should have assumed
the offensive against Hood from Pulaski, in the direction of Waynes-
burg. I know full well that General Thomas is slow in mind and in
action, but he is judicious and brave, and the troops feel great con-
fidence in him. I still hope he will out-maneuver and destroy
Hood.” <
It had been the intention of Thomas from the first to
avoid a general battle until Smith's divisions could be united
with Schofield's forces. And whether he was right or
wrong he deliberately adhered to that purpose. But with-
out Smith's troops and his local garrisons he was not supe-
rior to Hood in infantry, and there was too much at stake to
risk a battle except on the best conditions possible.
The generals who have censured Thomas with such free-
dom did not win victories without having armies greatly su-
perior to those opposing them. And for a long period, or
from the battle of Chickamauga, to the beginning of the
Tennessee campaign, the National forces in Tennessee and
# Memoirs Vol. II., p. 209.
FRANKLIN. 295
Georgia had been far stronger than those of the enemy, and
yet there had been no decisive victory in a great battle ex-
cept at Chattanooga. In the Atlanta campaign the enemy
had been weakened by attrition rather than by heavy blows.
The offensive when carried to positive assault by either army,
had resulted in failure, except at Jonesboro.
Under conditions of conflict radically different, it was.
not possible for Thomas to hold the railroad through
Athens, Huntsville and Decatur, without risking a battle at
or near Pulaski, when his army was numerically inferior to
Hood's. And when the enemy had advanced far towards
Nashville, it was eminently judicious to transfer the troops
from Decatur to the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad,
which he had intended to hold and which he had been di-
rected to hold. He was at the time censured for giving up
Decatur and the line of railroad from Columbia to that
place, and he has since been most severely criticised be-
cause he did not abandon his important posts in order to con-
centrate his forces to meet Hood in Southern Tennessee. It
was no part of his plan to decoy Hood to Nashville, but he
intended to meet him in battle, as soon as actual circum-
stances promised a decisive victory. Had it been possible
to send Smith's forces to Franklin, this would have been
done. Before the action at Franklin he asked General Scho-
field if he could hold that place until reënforcements could
reach him.
At noon of November 30th Schofield replied:
Your despatch of Io 25 A. M., is received. I am satisfied that I
have heretofore run too much risk in trying to hold Hood in check,
while so far inferior to him in both infantry and cavalry. The
slightest mistake on my part, or failure of a subordinate during the
last three days might have proved disastrous. I don’t want to get
into so tight a place again.
I will cheerfully act in accordance with your views if you think it
expedient to hold Hood back as long as possible. When you get all
your troops together and in fighting condition we can whip Hood
296 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H. THOMAS,
easily, and, I believe, make the campaign a decisive one. Before
that the most we can do is to husband our strength and increase it as
much as possible.
When later in the day, and yet before the action, General
Thomas ascertained that he could not send Smith's com-
mand to General Schofield before the 2d or 3d of Decem-
ber, he asked Schofield if he could hold Hood in check
three days. The reply was made at 3 P. M.
I have just received your despatch asking if I can hold Hood here
three days. I do not believe I can. I can doubtless hold him one
day, but will hazard something in doing that. He now has a large
force, probably two Corps in my front, and seems preparing to cross
the river above and below. I think he can effect a crossing to-
morrow in spite of all my efforts to prevent, or to-night if he attempts
it. A worse place than this for an inferior force could hardly be
found. I will refer your question to General Wilson this evening,
yet fear he can do very little. I have no doubt Forrest will be in
my rear to-morrow doing some greater mischief.
It appears that I Ought to take position at Brentwood at, once.
If A. J. Smith's divisions and the Murfreesboro' garrison join me
there I ought to be able to hold Hood in check for some time. I have
just learned that the enemy's cavalry is already crossing three miles
below. I will have lively times with my trains again.
General Wilson had previously advised a concentration
at Nashville, and Thomas had believed that he could not
gather his forces together south of that city, until on the
3Oth Smith's foremost division arrived, and then he asked
Schofield if he could hold Hood at Franklin for three days,
and thus give time to concentrate the army there.
General Thomas intended from the beginning of the cam-
paign, to fight the enemy at the earliest movement possible.
With this intention he had given instructions which, if they
had been strictly obeyed, would have kept the little army
across Hood's front continually, in hope that first at Pulaski
and in turn at Columbia and Franklin, he would be ready
for battle. And at last, not knowing what was possible, he
asked General Schofield if he could hold the enemy in check
long enough for Smith's forces to join him.
DECATUR WISELY ABANDONED. 297
The supposition, therefore, that a successful battle
could have been fought south of Nashville rests upon
the assumption that Smith's forces were not essen-
tial, or that Thomas Ought to have abandoned all his
important posts, and effected a concentration at Pulaski or
Columbia before Hood's line of advance was fully indi-
cated. There were no sound reasons for withdrawing from
important Strategic points before Hood's movements were
fully developed. Decatur was far west of the only railroad
south of Nashville which it was practicable to defend, and
when Hood had advanced far towards Nashville, it was
wise to transfer the garrison from Decatur to Stevenson;
otherwise these troops would have been eliminated from
the general problem. Had Hood won a victory at
Nashville he would have gained Decatur also, had its
garrison remained, and that place was so far from his line
of retreat, when defeated, that its possession was of no value
to him. The abandonment of Decatur had been authorized
by General Sherman, at least by implication. October
29th he telegraphed to Thomas :
“I repeat, should the enemy cross the Tennessee in force, aban-
don all minor points, and concentrate your forces at some point
where you can cover the road from Murfreesboro’ to Stevenson.”
When Hood had crossed the Tennessee River and ad-
vanced towards Nashville by way of Pulaski and Colum-
bia, Decatur certainly was a minor point. If the line of
the Tennessee could have been held by Thomas, Decatur
would have been an exceedingly important point, both for
the coöperation of the gun boats with the army, and for ope-
rations against an enemy south of that river. But whether
directly or indirectly ordered, the abandonment of that place
was eminently judicious, and from this point of view rather
than from an analysis of his conflicting instructions, General
Thomas decided to transfer its garrison to Stevenson. He
made provision, as far as possible, for the contingency of
Hood's divergence to the Nashville and Chattanooga
298 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS.
railroad, and held the more important points on that road
throughout the campaign. The main force on that road un-
der General Steedman moved north, step by step, in corre-
spondence with Hood's advance towards Nashville, and
arrived at that city on the first day of December.
The problem for Thomas was an intricate one, in view of
all circumstances, including the possibilities to the enemy,
and he displayed consummate generalship in its solution.
Hood did no serious harm from first to last. He did
not capture a single garrison. He had in fact only two
Opportunities, one at Spring Hill, and the other in the ac-
tion at Franklin, and these were given to him by Schofield,
through no fault of General Thomas. Hood lost the first
through his own blunders, and the other was wrested from
him with the bayonet.
The responsibility for the failure to arrest the advance of
Hood south of Nashville did not rest upon Thomas, but
upon the general who precipitated the situation in Ten-
nessee, by withdrawing more than sixty thousand men, be-
fore an army adequate for a decisive battle had been con-
centrated for Thomas.
It is not wonderful that the interest of the people of
the North was withdrawn from Sherman's march to the sea
and centred upon Thomas' operations in Tennessee. As
Hood's army advanced northward, the fear of the Northern
people grew more intense day by day. Yet amidst all the
anxiety of the people, and of his superiors and subordinates,
General Thomas was calm and self-poised, displaying an
energy that knew no abatement, gathering his resources
with a clearness of vision that brought to his view all the
elements of his problem in their individual force and con-
current effect. The emergency culminated when General
Hood took position before Nashville, but the anxiety of
the country gained force until the shout of victory from
Brentwood Hills, on December sixteenth, dispelled anxiety
altogether, and sent a thrill of joy throughout the land.
CHAPTER XIV.
CONCENTRATION AT NASH VILLE — DELAY FOR PREPARATION – GENERAL
THOMAS URGED TO FIGHT, BUT POSTPONES BATTLE FIRST FOR PREPARA–
TION AND THEN FOR SUITABLE WEATHER—COUNCIL OF WAR —PLANS
AND HOPES OF GENERAL HOOD-THOMAS' PLAN OF BATTLE-ACTION OF
DECEMBER 15TH.
N the first day of December General Thomas had in
hand at Nashville all the troops available for battle,
except a part of his cavalry that had been sent north
to be remounted. He then felt secure against attack,
but not prepared for offense. His purpose was to crush
his foe; and this intention was one cause—perhaps the
dominant one—for his delay of a few days against a
pressure of suggestions and positive orders, which might
have moved a weaker man to fight the enemy regardless
of consequences. But he preferred the loss of command
to fighting before he had made preparations to crush
Hood's army. He had three corps of infantry from as
many military departments, together with mounted and
dismounted cavalry, a large element of raw troops, con-
valescents from the four corps with General Sherman, and
six regiments of negro troops, and he requested permission
to delay a week, that he might give the semblance of unity
to this heterogeneous mass, remount his Cavalry, and pro-
vide transportation for the pursuit of the enemy, in the
event of victory.
These forces did not constitute an army according to any
proper ideal of such a body—one with established relations
running through all its units great and Small, and with Cor-
responding sentiment and esprit-du-corps. It was not an
army as compared with the Army of the Cumberland. That
299
3OO LIFE OF GENERAI, GEORG E H. THOMAS,
army comprised three fighting corps of infantry—the Fourth,
Fourteenth and Twentieth—and a body of cavalry, having
commanders änd soldiers bound together by battle-wrought
sympathies and fixed organic relations.
General Thomas did not distrust the troops thus loosely
connected, but he would have preferred his own army,
cemented by the traditions of oft-repeated battle, and the
spirit and discipline that result from long-continued rela-
tions and service. He did not propose, however, to give
perfected compactness to his forces, but only to take time
enough to drill his raw troops, remount his cavalry and
provide the necessary transportation.
In the following despatch to General Halleck, Thomas
described the situation at Nashville, and made known
his plans:
NASHVILLE, December Ist, 1864, 9.30 P. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington, D. C.
After General Schofield's fight of yesterday, feeling convinced
that the enemy very far outnumbered him, both in infantry and
cavalry, I determined to retire to the fortifications around Nashville,
until General Wilson can get his cavalry equipped. He has now
about one-fourth the number of the enemy, and consequently is no
match for him. I have two iron-clads here, with several gunboats,
and Commodore Fitch assures me that Hood can neither Cross the
Cumberland, nor blockade it. I therefore think it best to wait here
until Wilson can equip all his cavalry. If Hood attacks me here, he
will be more seriously damaged than he was yesterday. If he re-
mains until Wilson gets equipped, I can whip him, and will move .
against him at once. I have Murfreesboro' strongly held, and
therefore feel easy in regard to its safety. Chattanooga, Bridgeport,
Stevenson, and Elk River bridges have strong garrisons.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
His expressed intention to postpone battle for a few days
to remount his cavalry, produced intense Solicitude at
Washington, and greatly disturbed the equanimity of Gen-
eral Grant. The lieutenant general, having been called
URGED TO FIGHT. 3OI
upon by his superiors at Washington, to consider the situa-
tion at Nashville, entered upon this service with an energy
that had no parallel in the war. He opened a series of
despatches suggestive, hortatory and mandatory, which
would have unwisely deprived General Thomas of the
independence that had been accorded to army commanders
from the beginning of the war. The President, it is true,
had ordered such commanders to enter upon campaigns,
but in no case had such a general been entirely restricted
in his discretion, or overruled in his judgment as to ade-
quate preparations.
General Grant's attention was called to the situation at
Nashville by the following despatch:
WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, Dec. 2, 10.30.A. M.
LIEUT.-GENERAL GRANT, City Point:
The President feels solicitous about the disposition of Thomas
to lay in fortifications for an indefinite period, “until Wilson gets
equipments.” This looks like the McClellan and Rosecrans strategy
of do nothing, and let the enemy raid the country. The President
wishes you to consider the matter.
EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
Immediately upon receipt of this despatch Grant tele-
graphed to Thomas : -
If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, we will
lose all the roads back to Chattanooga, and possibly have to abandon
the line of the Tenenssee River. should he attack you it is all well,
but if he does not, you should attack him before he fortifies. Arm
and put in the trenches your quartermaster's employés, citizens, etc.
Ninety minutes after the foregoing, a despatch of the
same general purport, but more specific in instructions, was
Sent :
With your citizen employés armed you can move out of Nash-
ville with all your army, and force the enemy to retire or fight upon
ground of your own choosing. After the repulse of Hood at Frank-
3O2 LIFE OF GENERAI, GEORG E H THOMAS.
lin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to Nashville, we should
have taken the offensive against the enemy, but at this distance may
err as to the method of dealing with the enemy. You will suffer
incalculable injury upon your railroads if Hood is not speedily dis-
posed of. Put forth, therefore, every possible exertion to attain this
end. Should you get him to retreating give him no peace.
In reply to this despatch Thomas sent the following at
IO P.M., the same day:
Your two telegrams of II A.M., and 1.30 P.M.,to-day are received,
At the time Hood was whipped at Franklin I had at this place but about
five thousand men of General Smith's command, which added
to the force under General Schofield, would not have given me more
than twenty-five thousand men. Besides, General Schofield felt con-
vinced that he could not hold the enemy at Franklin until the five
thousand could reach him. As General Wilson's cavalry force also
numbered only about one-fourth that of Forrest, I thought it best to
draw the troops back to Nashville, and await the arrival of the re-
mainder of General Smith's force, and also a force of about five
thousand commanded by General Steedman, which I had ordered
up from Chattanooga. The division of General Smith arrived yes-
terday morning, and General Steedman's troops arrived last night.
I now have infantry enough to assume the offensive, if I had more
cavalry; and will take the field any how as soon as the remainder
of General McCook’s cavalry reaches here, which I hope it will in
two or three days.
We can neither get reënforcements nor equipments at this great
distance from the North very easily, and it must be remembered that
my command was made up of the two weakest corps of General
Sherman's army, and all the dismounted cavalry except one brigade,
and the task of reorganizing and equipping has met with many
delays, which have enabled Hood to take advantage of my crippled
condition. I earnestly hope, however, in a few more days I shall
be able to give him a fight.
It will be observed that General Thomas did not in-
tend a long delay. He wished to call to him the cavalry
then in Kentucky, obtaining horses and equipments.
He explained the necessity of withdrawing his army from
Franklin, and mentioned his embarrassments with marked
GRANT STILL URGING ATTACK. 3O3
particularity. He probably did not put much faith in Gene-
ral Grant's statement, that he could move out against the
enemy, and either force him to retire, or choose for him a
field of battle, since the general on the defensive has choice
of ground, especially, when his army covers its communi-
cations and line of retreat.
On the 5th, Grant with greater emphasis, urged Thomas
to attack, and suggested the danger of delay. In an-
swer General Thomas stated that he hoped in three
days to mount a sufficient force of cavalry.
The next day, December 6th, Thomas was ordered per-
emptorily to attack and wait no longer for a remount of
cavalry. Grant said: “There is great danger in delay re-
Sulting in a campaign back to the Ohio.” Thomas replied:
“I will make the necessary disposition, and attack Hood
at once, agreeably to your orders, though I believe it will be
hazardous with the small force of cavalry now at my ser-
vice.” In the effort to fulfil this promise, he met with
obstacles that convinced him that he could not then fight a
battle with such results as he desired, and consequently he
resolved, though with the consciousness of great personal
hazard, to wait until the 9th or IOth.
On the 8th, Grant said to General Halleck : “If Thomas
has not struck yet, he ought to be ordered to hand over
his command to Schofield. There is no better man to
repel an attack than Thomas, but I fear he is too cautious
to take the initiative.”
In reply Halleck said, “If you wish General Thomas re-
lieved give the order. No one here will, I think, interfere.
The responsibility, however, will be yours, as no one here,
so far as I am informed, wishes General Thomas removed.
Before issuing an order relieving Thomas, Grant again
urged him to attack. Late on the 8th, he telegraphed :
It looks to me evidently the enemy are trying to cross the Cum-
berland, and are scattered. Why not attack at once P By all means
3O4. Ll FE OF GENERAI, GEORG E H THOMAS.
avoid the contingency of a foot-race, to see which, you or Hood,
can beat to the Ohio. If you think necessary, call on the Gover-
nors of States to send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy, if
he should cross the river. You clearly never should cross except in
rear of the enemy. Now is one of the fairest opportunities ever
presented of destroying one of the three armies of the enemy. If
destroyed he can never replace it; use the means at your com-
mand, and you can do this, and cause a rejoicing from one end of
the land to the other.
But General Thomas was firm, replying the same even-
ing:
I can only say in further extenuation, why I have not attacked
Hood, that I could not concentrate my troops, and get their trans-
portation in order, in shorter time than it has been done, and am
satisfied that I have made every effort that was possible to complete
the task.
On the 9th Grant directed that Thomas should be
Ordered to turn over his command to Schofield, but on the
same day suspended the order.
CITY POINT, VA., December 9, 1864—II A. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington, D. C. :
Despatch of 8, P. M., last evening from Nashville, shows the
enemy scattered for more than seventy miles down the river, and no
attack yet made by Thomas. Please telegraph orders relieving him
at once, and placing Schofield in command. Thomas should be or-
dered to turn over all orders and despatches received since the battle
of Franklin, to Schofield. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL's OFFICE,
Washington, December 9, 1864.
(General Orders, No. —),
The following despatch having been received from Lieutenant-
General Grant, viz.: “Please telegraph orders relieving him (General
Thomas) at once, and placing (General) Schofield in command,” the
President orders: I. That Major-General J M. Schofield relieve, at
once, Major-General G. H. Thomas, in command of the Department
and Army of the Cumberland.
II. General Thomas will turn over to General Schofield all or-
ders and instructions received by him since the battle of Franklin.
E D. Towns END, Assistant-Adjutant General.
THOMAS UNMOVED BY THE EATS. 3O5
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON,
December 9, 1864–4 P. M.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT, City Point:
Orders relieving General Thomas had been made out when his
telegram of this P. M. was received. If you still wish these orders
telegraphed to Nashville, they will be forwarded.
H. W. HALLECK,
Chief of Staff.
CITY POINT, V.A., December 9, 1864–5.30 P. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington :
General Thomas has been urged in every possible way to attack
the enemy ; even to the giving the positive order. He did say he
thought he should be able to attack on the 7th, but he did not do so,
nor has he given a reason for not doing it. I am very unwilling to do
injustice to an officer who has done so much good service as General
Thomas has, however, and will therefore suspend the order relieving
him, until it is seen whether he will do anything.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
General Thomas had no knowledge of the appointment
of Schofield as his successor until years afterwards, but
learning from Halleck that Grant had expressed dissatis-
faction, and anticipating his own removal, Thomas tele-
graphed General Halleck :
I regret that General Grant should feel dissatisfaction at my de-
lay in attacking the enemy, I feel conscious that I have done every-
thing in my power to prepare, and that the troops could not have
been gotten ready before this. And if he should order me to be
relieved I will submit without a murmur.
In the same despatch he also stated that a terrible
storm of freezing rain, then prevailing, rendered an attack
impossible until it should cease.
On that day he also telegraphed to Grant:
I have nearly completed my preparations to attack the enemy
to-morrow morning, but a terrible storm of freezing rain has come
on to-day, which wil make it impossible for our men to fight to any
advantage. I am, therefore, compelled to wait for the storm to
break and make the attack immediately after. Admiral Lee is.
2O
306 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H, THOMAS
patrolling the river above and below the city, and I believe will be
able to prevent the enemy from crossing. * * * * Major-
General Halleck informs me that you are very much dissatisfied with
my delay in attacking. I can only say, I have done all in my power to
prepare, and if you should deem it necessary to relieve me I shall sub-
mit without a murmur.
General Grant replied:
I have as much confidence in your conducting the battle rightly
as I have in any other officer, but it has seemed to me you have been
slow, and I have had no explanation of affairs to convince me other-
wise. Receiving your despatch to Major-General Halleck of 2 P. M.,
before I did the first to me, I telegraphed to suspend the order
relieving you until we should hear further. I hope most sincerely
that there will be no necessity of repeating the order, and that the
facts will show that you have been right all the time.
The impossibility of attacking the enemy while the hills
were covered with ice, still further complicated the case. .
Late on the I Ith, General Grant said :
If you delay attacking longer, the mortifying spectacle will be
witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio, and you will be
forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. Let there be no
further delay. Hood cannot stand even a drawn battle so far from
his supplies of ordnance stores. If he retreats and you follow, he
must lose his material and most of his army. I am in hopes of re-
ceiving a despatch from you to-day announcing that you have moved.
Delay no longer, for weather and reënforcements.
General Thomas was not then waiting for reënforcements.
He had announced his readiness for battle on the IOth, and
was only waiting for the melting of the ice. In his reply to
this peremptory order he said:
I will obey the order as promptly as possible, however much I
may regret it, as the attack will have to be made under every disad-
vantage. The whole country is covered with a perfect sheet of ice
and sleet, and it is with difficulty the troops are able to move about on
level ground. It was my intention to attack Hood as soon as the
THOMAS AND HOOD STORM BOUND. 3O7
ice melted, and would have done so yesterday had it not been for
the storm.
He subsequently called his corps commanders together,
consulted them in reference to his peremptory orders, made
effort to move his army into position for attack, but found
that it was utterly impossible to fight a battle until the ice
should melt, and on the 12th so reported to General Halleck :
I have the troops ready to make the attack on the enemy as soon
as the sleet, which now covers the ground, has melted sufficiently to
enable the men to march. As the whole country is now covered with
a sheet of ice so hard and slippery, it is utterly impossible for troops
to ascend the slopes or even move on level ground in anything like
order. It has taken the entire day to place my cavalry in position,
and it has only been finally effected with imminent risk and many
serious accidents resulting from the numbers of horses falling with
their riders on the road. Under these circumstances I believe that
an attack at this time would only result in a useless sacrifice of life.
And again on the I3th :
There is no change in the weather, and as soon as there is, I shall
move against the enemy, as everything is ready and prepared to
assume the offensive.
* g
Thomas had previously resolved to abandon all efforts to
attack the enemy until the ice should melt, since the barrier
to his own action, also kept the enemy quiet in his camp.
Badeau referring to the movement of the enemy's cavalry
under Lyon into Kentucky, and the operations against Mur-
freesboro’, states:
Thus Hood had become bold enough to throw large detachments
of infantry and cavalry both to the north and south of Nashville, and
in spite of the storms and ice that held Thomas fast, the rebel troops
were in constant motion. *
This historian must have failed to look at the dates of
- * Mil. Hist, U. S. Grant, Vol. III. p. 247.
3O8 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS.
these movements. Hood's forces operated against Mur-
freesboro' on the 5th, 6th and 7th, and on the 8th, General
Milroy Sallied from his defenses and routed the enemy.
General Lyon with a small force crossed the Cumberland
River into Kentucky, near Clarksville, on the day the storm
began. Both movements preceded the ice blockade that
held Thomas and Hood fast in their camps. Lyon was
promptly followed by the National cavalry and closely
pressed till he was driven back to Tennessee.
But the impossibility of attacking the enemy, of which
General Grant had been repeatedly advised, did not change
his view of the situation, and on the 13th, he ordered Major-
General John A. Logan to proceed to Nashville and take
command of the army, provided that on his arrival, Thomas
had still made no advance; and on the I 5th,General Grant left
City Point, Va., for the same destination. Both generals
were arrested on the way, by the news of the battle of the
I 5th, Logan at Louisville and Grant at Washington.
Several interesting thoughts are suggested by Grant's des-
patches in relation to Thomas and the situation at Nash-
ville. Grant’s recommendation to Halleck to call upon
the Governors of States to send a force of sixty thousand
men into Louisville to meet the enemy, should he cross the
Cumberland River, and his instructions to Thomas to
arm the employés of the quartermaster's department, gave
proof of an emergency in the West which had not been
anticipated, and for which no adequate provision had been
made in the distribution of our veteran forces. It is cvident
that the equilibrium of distribution, East and West, which had
been maintained from the beginning of the war, had been
overthrown at the culmination of the second great plan of
the enemy for offensive operations in the West. It was not
a new measure to call out the militia, and to arm civilians in
the employ of the government. This had been done re-
peatedly to meet emergencies. Soldiers for one hundred
days had been enrolled to hold the rear of the two great
GRANT'S MISA PPR EHENSIO W. 3O9 •r
National armies in the spring of 1864. The citizen employés
of the government had been thrown into the entrenchments
at Washington, when a Confederate army had come into
the rear of the Army of the Potomac, and menaced the Na-
tional Capital during the Summer of that year. Other
emergencies had called forth similar efforts. But when such
measures were considered imperative in December 1864,
there was an emergency in the West, where, a short time
before, there had been a vast preponderance of National
forces, and the situation at Nashville pointed to the im-
mense army, marching to the Sea through the vacant in-
terior of the Southern Confederacy. The withdrawal of
this veteran army had destroyed the equilibrium of the Na-
tional forces.
Grant's declaration, that Thomas had at Nashville “one
of the fairest opportunities " to destroy an army of the
enemy, that had ever been presented, was made when Grant
was proposing such defensive measures as only threatening
emergencies justify. In forecasting a battle at Nashville,
or the probable invasion of Kentucky, in face of the belief
which Grant entertained in common with Thomas and other
generals, that Hood entered Tennessee with an army of
fifty thousand men, it was a stretch of the imagination, to
regard the opportunity for the destruction of that army as
one of the fairest ever presented. The precedents of the
war, certainly, did not support such a hope. In view of
the supposed or actual strength of Hood's army, the situa-
tion at Nashville was not as promising for the complete
overthrow of the enemy as other situations in other cam-
paigns had been. One hundred thousand men had been
repeatedly hurled against forty or fifty thousand, without
destroying the inferior army. History presents few in-
stances, if any, in which one army of slightly Superior
numerical strength, and of equal morale, has destroyed
another army when the latter has had freedom of mo-
tion. But history does give instances without number
3 IO LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS.
in which armies with communications open to the rear
have maintained existence and gathered a fair share of
results, in defense, against armies of far greater strength.
Our Own civil war, prior to December, 1864, was not want-
ing in such cases. If, therefore, there was ground for the
prophecy of disastrous results from Hood's threatening
attitude before Nashville, there was no ground for the as-
Sumption that the opportunity to Crush his army was “one
of the fairest opportunities ever presented.” . On the suppo-
sition that it was possible for Hood, with an army at his
back, to advance still further from his base, it certainly was
possible for him to retreat from Nashville.
It is evident, also, that there were reasons for Grant's
urgency for an immediate attack, which were foreign to the
situation at Nashville. Dccember 14th Halleck telegraphed
to Thomas :
It has been seriously apprehended, that while Hood, with a part
of his forces, held you in check near Nashville, he would have time
to coöperate against other important points left only partially pro-
tected. Hence, Lieutenant-General Grant was anxious that you
should attack the rebel forces in your front, and expresses great dis-
satisfaction that his order has not been carried out. Moreover, so
long as Hood occupies a threatening position in Tennessee, General
Canby is obliged to keep large forces on the Mississippi River to pro-
tect its navigation and to hold Memphis, Vicksburg, cto , although
General Grant had directed a part of these forces to Coöperate with
Sherman.
Every day's delay on your part, therefore, Seriously interferes
with General Grant’s plans.
It is evident from this despatch, that Thomas was urged
to engage Hood's army under forbidding circumstances,
because it was feared that Hood, if not compelled to fight
immediately at Nashville, would detach forces to menace
remote cities, and because the postponement of battle would
prevent Canby's coöperation with Sherman.
The situation at Nashville was, therefore, from first to
CONTING ENCIES OF THE CAMPAIG. N. 3 II
last, complicated with Sherman's march to the sea. Gen-
eral Canby was patrolling the Mississippi to prevent
the transfer of troops from the west bank of that river
to Hood; and General Thomas was required at first,
to fight before he was fully prepared, and then, when
an action was impossible, in order that Canby might
move to the support of General Sherman when he should
touch the Gulf of Mexico or the Atlantic Ocean, or
make a diversion somewhere in the South to prevent a
concentration against his army of more than sixty thousand
men. It was not enough that this great army should have
been eliminated from western operations, detailing upon
Thomas a campaign overcharged with embarrassments;
but he was also commanded to fight a battle against his
own judgment, to release Canby from duty on the Mississippi
that he might coöperate with Sherman in the outcome
of his march through a State where there was no great
army to offer resistance, and but few organized troops to
witness his progress, except from Safe seclusion.
In his despatch to Thomas, of December 8th, General
Grant mentioned three armies as the Support of the re-
bellion. These, doubtless, were Lee's at Richmond, Hood's
at Nashville, and Kirby Smith's, on the right bank of the
Mississippi. Two of these were then making effort to
unite in order to change the military status in the West.
After the battle of Nashville, Grant informed Thomas that
he was pursuing one of the two armies upon which the
Southern Confederacy rested.
Badeau has given great prominence to the fact that
the lieutenant-general had plans, the execution of which
General Thomas' delay was defeating. The following
quotations will show how damaging this delay was sup-
posed to be :
In the meantime the situation at Nashville was becoming
daily more humiliating and dangerous. *
* Mil. Hist. U. S. Grant, Vol. III., p. 230.
3 I 2 I, IIFE OF GENERA. L. G. EORG E H THOMAS.
In reference to the rupture of telegraphic communica-
tion with Chattanooga, this author laments:
And this was the mortifying sequence to the great campaigns
of Grant and Sherman for Chattanooga and Atlanta. *
It was far from being necessary to risk the security of Tennes-
see, or the upsetting of Grant’s plans at the South and East, as well
as the West, in order to raise or equip another thousand or two of
horse.i.
Thus the delay of Thomas might defeat operations a thousand
miles away. i
It was not only Nashville that Grant was considering, but Louis-
ville and the country beyond the Ohio. ||
When it is considered that General Grant had said to
Thomas, that if he destroyed Hood's army there would
be only “one army left to the so-called Confederacy, capa-
ble of doing us harm,” it seems incredible that Grant had
plans of operations that did not have their centres at
Richmond and Nashville. If he had plans that looked
in other directions, they were extremely vicious. On the
supposition that the two armies—Lee's and Hood's—
supported the rebellion, General Grant had, in permitting
the march to the sea, eliminated Sherman's large army
from the final problem, unless that army by a long circuit
was to appear at Richmond. If it was anxiety for Sherman,
as apart from the relations of his movement to the opera-
tions in Virginia, that prompted Grant's urgency for an im-
mediate battle at Nashville, then he turned away from one
of the two dominant objectives, to give attention to an in-
cidental military enterprise
The peremptory order to Thomas to fight regardless of
weather and reënforcements, suggests the question:
What is the degree of independence ordinarily given to
army commanders, conducting operations on fields re-
mote from the stations of the commander-in-chief?
# Mil. His., U. S. Grant, Vol. III., page 231.
f Ibid, p. 220. j. Ibid, p, 220. | Ibid, p. 22I.
HIS SELF. R ELIANCE. 3 I 3
The refusal of Thomas to fight when under positive orders
to do so, was either an act of insubordination, or one of
legitimate independence as an army commander. But
whether he was insubordinate, or contending for the inde-
pendence inherent in his position, General Thomas did re-
fuse to fight; from the 6th to the Ioth of December, be-
cause, in his judgment, his preparations were not adequate,
and from the IOth to the 15th, because upon trial he had
found that he could not safely move his troops to position
for battle. He was conducting operations far from the sta-
tion of General Grant, and as this fact enhanced his respon-
Sibility as an army Commander, it gave corresponding inde-
pendence.
When General Rosecrans was peremptorily ordered, in
August 1863, to move against the enemy, he indignantly
inquired of General Halleck whether his order was “in-
tended to take away my discretion as to the time and man-
ner of moving my troops.”
Halleck's reply was : “The orders for the advance of
your army and that its progress be reported daily are
peremptory.”
But Rosecrans, afterwards had full freedom, as to
maneuver and time of battle. And instances are rare,
if any can be found, wherein a distant Superior denied dis-
Cretion to an army commander as to preparations and time
of battle. General Thomas’ view of his own case was well
expressed by him to the writer:
“I thought, after what I had done in the war, that I
ought to be trusted to decide when the battle should be
fought. I thought I knew better when it should be
fought, than any one could know as far off as City Point,
Virginia.”
This was a strictly personal view, but doubtless under-
lying it, there was a clear pcroeption of such independence
for an army commander as corresponded with his respon-
sibility for results. He did not ask for a long delay, and
3I4. LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS,
was ready for battle in seven days after his last infantry
force arrived at Nashville. After that time he was ready,
but for five days more a general movement of his troops
to position, or an attack in force, was impossible.
General Grant certainly distrusted Thomas"in the peculiar
situation at Nashville. He said to Thomas, “It has seemed
to me you have been slow;” and said of him, “I fear he
is too cautious to take the initiative.” But whatever was
the degree of Grant's distrust, so long as he retained
Thomas in command, he should have given him the
discretion which has been generally, if not always, awarded
to army commanders, not in the presence of Superiors. If
Grant meant by Stating Thomas was slow, that he was re-
luctant to fight a battle until he was prepared, Grant was
right. If he meant that Thomas was slow in preparing
for the battle, Grant was wrong. Thomas was not over
cautious at Nashville or any where else. He was bold
always, without being rash ; and cautious without being
timid. No general was more cautious when there was
need of caution, and no one ever bolder or more force-
ful when the time for action came; nor was there ever
a general more Stubborn when required to act against
his own judgment. And it may well be doubted if any
general ever did so much in so short a time, towards
organizing, equipping and mounting his forces for bat-
tle, as did General Thomas between the Ist and Ioth of
December.
With full knowledge of the situation in its interior em-
barrassments and exterior complications, General Thomas
made his preparations and dispositions for attacking Hood's
army. He was calm and strong, in resisting the pressule
from Washington and City Point, and in his attitude no
general has ever been more heroic or patriotic. He was
heroic in his independence, and self-reliance, and in his pro-
mise to submit without a murmur to loss of command, and
in calmly bearing the burden of responsibility, resulting,
FIOOD IN FRONT OF WASH VILLE. 3I 5
from a state of affairs that had not been regarded as pos-
sible by the people of the North.
General Hood took position on the hills south of Nash-
ville on the 2nd and 3rd of December. His main line ex-
tended from the Hillsboro' turnpike on his left to the
Chattanooga railroad on his right. His right was well
offered, his left somewhat refused. The railroad embank-
ment, gave protection on his right flank, his left rested on
isolated hills partially fortified, and defended by artillery.
In his centre, was an advanced entrenched line to strengthen
his grasp of the Franklin turnpike, his direct line of retreat.
The left of this line, almost touched the salient of
Thomas' line, held by the Fourth corps. Hood's line
was nearly seven miles in length, but did not touch
the Cumberland River at either end, and consequently
Nashville was not invested even on the south side of
the river, though, it is fair to say, all communication be-
tween Thomas' army and the Country South of it was sus-
pended.
The advance of Hood, to Nashville, to drop the offensive
before his prominent objective, would have been a mystery
if he had not himself explained it. He knew that he was
not strong enough for further offense, and that unless reën-
forced his campaign must fail before its purpose was well
developed. He had had dreams of commanding a great
army in Kentucky. He had in fancy established his army
in that State, with his left at Richmond, covering by its ex-
tension to the right, the gaps in the Cumberland Mountains
and the roads into Virginia. In expectation he had defeated
Thomas and all other commanders in Tennessee and
Kentucky, and had brought support to General Lee in Vir-
ginia, in advance of Sherman's aid, by way of Savannah, to
Grant. But, in reality, Hood had seated himself to await
his expected reënforcements from the right bank of the
Mississippi River, hoping, in the meantime, that through a
successful defensive, he might follow a defeated army into
3 I 6 LIFE OF GENERAI, G EORG E H THOMAS,
Nashville. And if his own estimate of his strength is ac-
cepted as true, he was to achieve this crowning success
with less than twenty-five thousand men.
The plan upon which he was operating was doubtless
a good one for a large army such as had existed in
his imagination, when first he thought of an advance
through Tennessee and Kentucky to Virginia. But it was
inviting the doom which soon fell upon him and his people,
to sit down before Thomas. Hood's movement through
Tennessee had brought no recruits to his army. The watch-
fulness of General Canby prevented the coming of reënforce.
ments from Kirby Smith. And if Hood had made a hopeful
advance from Franklin, the sight of the fortifications before
Nashville, and of the forces holding them, had thrown him
upon the defensive with no thought of attack, turning move-
ments, or further advance, except in the remote possibility,
that a successful defensive and reënforcements should give
reality to his visions of victory in the West, and afterward
in the East. The army at Nashville was too strong to be
attacked and too strong to be put in his rear, by his own
advance into Kentucky. If he had anticipated its strength,
he would doubtless have waited for his promised reënforce-
ments at Florence. His plan had miscarried, and yet he
did not retreat, but waited before Nashville in semblance of
offense, until Thomas Sallied from his entrenchments to
crush him.
Hood's advance to the Tennessee River, as the first step
in the execution of a great plan, had been justified by its
success. His advance from that river to Nashville, without
strength to continue the offensive, regarded by himself as
imperative, under the circumstances, resulted in a failure
in striking contrast with his first success. Had he marched
first to meet his expected reënforcements, and forced for
them a passage over the Mississippi, his subsequent north-
ward march might have resulted in victories in Tennessee
and Kentucky. But to offer himself in his reported weak-
PIOOD'S HOPES AND PLANS, 3 I 7
ness, to Thomas, was the extreme of folly. The issue of
the combat at Franklin should have arrested his advance,
until at least, his reënforcements had joined him. It is ut-
terly incredible, however, that he could have hoped for suc-
cess by any turn of fortune with an army of twenty-five
thousand men, or that he would be permitted a long waiting
for reënforcements.
It is not easy to get the true history of a campaign of
such issue from him who planned or conducted it, especially
when its failure carried with it, the cause for which the war
had been waged. But weak as Hood represented himself
to be, he nevertheless acted as if he felt secure on Brent-
wood Hills. Before the battle he sent a part of his cavalry
into Kentucky, and another greater part, with two brigades
of infantry to operate against Murfreesboro’. And this he
certainly would not have done, without strong confidence
in his army, and the advantages of the defensive.
In Hood's official report this passage is found:
On the second of December the army took position in front of
Nashville, about two miles from the city. Lieutenant-General Lee's
corps constituted our centre, resting upon the Franklin pike, with
Cheatham's corps upon the right and Stewart's on the left and the ca-
valry on either flank extending to the river. I was causing strong de-
tached works to be built to cover our flanks intending to make them
enclosed works, so as to defeat any attempt of the enemy should
he undertake offensive movements against our flank, and rear. The
enemy still held Murfreesboro' with about six thousand men strongly
fortified. He also held sumall forces at Chattanooga and Knoxville.
It was apparent that he would soon have to take the offensive to re-
lieve his garrisons at those points or cause them to be evacuated, in
which case I hoped to capture the forces at Murfreesboro' and should
then be able to open communication with Georgia and Virginia.
Should he attack me in position I felt that I could defeat him and
thus gain possession of Nashville with abundant supplies for the army.
This would give me possession of Tennessee. Necessary steps were
taken to furnish the army with supplies which the people were ready
and willing to furnish. Shoe shops were in operation in each brigade.
We had captured sufficient railroad stock to use the road to Pulaski,
3.18 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS.
and it was already in successful operation. Having possession of
the State we should have gained largely in recruits and could at an
early day have moved forward to the Ohio, which would have frus-
trated the plans of the enemy as developed in his campaign towards
the Atlantic coast.
And from his book “Advance and Retreat,” written after-
wards, the following passage is quoted:
After the failure of my cherished plan to crush Schofield's army
before it reached its strongly fortified position around Nashville, I
remained with an effective force of only twenty-three thousand and
fifty-three. I was therefore well aware of our inability to attack the
Federals in their new stronghold with any hope of success, although
Schofield's troops had abandoned the field at Franklin, leaving their
dead and wounded in our possession, and had hastened with consid-
erable alarm into their fortifications—which latter information in re-
gard to their condition after the battle I obtained through spies. I
knew equally well that in the absence of the prestige of complete vic-
tory, I could not venture with my Small force to cross the Cumber-
land River into Kentucky, without first receiving reënforcements
from the Trans-Mississippi Department. I felt convinced that the
Tennesseeans and Kentuckians would not join our forces, since we
had failed in the first instance to defeat the Federal army and cap-
ture Nashville. The President was still urgent in his instructions
relative to the transference of troops to the Army of the Tennessee
from Texas, and I daily hoped to receive the glad tidings of their
safe passage across the Mississippi River.
Thus, unless strengthened by these long-looked for reënforce-
ments, the only remaining chance of success in the campaign, at
this juncture, was to take position, entrench around Nashville and
await Thomas' attack, which, if handsomely repulsed, might afford us
an opportunity to follow up our advantage on the spot and enter the
city on the heels of the enemy.
I could not afford to turn southward unless for the special pur-
pose of forming a junction with the expected reënforcements from
Texas and with the avowed intention to march back again upon
Mashville. In truth, our army was in that condition which ren-
dered it more judicious, the men should face a decisive issue
rather than retreat—in other words, rather than renounce the honor
of their cause without having made a last and manful effort to lift
up the sinking fortunes of the Confederacy.
I therefore determined to move upon Nashville, to entrench, to
PHOOD'S B L UNDERS. 3 IQ
accept the chances of reënforcements from Texas, and, even at the
risk of an attack in the meantime by overwhelming numbers, to
adopt the only feasible means of defeating the enemy with my re-
duced numbers. viz. to await his attack and if favored by success to
follow him into his works. I was apprised of each accession to
Thomas' army but was still unwilling to abandon the ground as long
as I saw a shadow of probability of assistance from the Trans-Mis-
sissippi Department, or of victory in battle, and, as I have just re-
marked, the troops would, I believed, return better satisfied even
after defeat if, in grasping at the last straw, they felt that a brave and
vigorous effort had been made to save the country from disaster.
Such, at the time, was my opinion, which I have since had no reason
to alter. *
General Hood's first blunder in the conduct of the cam-
paign was in not attacking General Sherman at Gaylesville
when he had only sixty thousand men; his second was
waiting so long at Florence without effort to help his
promised reënforcements across the Mississippi River; the
third was, his failure to crush Schofield at Spring Hill; and
the fourth was his offer of himself to Thomas, to be crushed.
On the whole, though entrenched, Hood's army grew
weaker day by day. It was not well supplied, and the out-
come of this semblance of a siege was doubtful in the ex-
treme in the view of all the thoughtful men of that army.
The dropping of the offensive by an army which was to
have been inspired by constant advance and success, of itself
impaired the morale of the Confederate troops.
With the National army the case was radically different.
Organization, discipline and conscious advance in prepara-
tions for battle and pursuit, gave spirit and purpose to the
soldiers within the entrenchments at Nashville.
The corps commanders at Nashville were Major-General
John M. Schofield, commanding Twenty-third corps; Major-
General Andrew J. Smith, commanding Sixteenth corps;
Major-General James B. Steedman, commanding a provi-
sional corps, comprising his own forces from the District of
* “Advance and Retreat," pp. 299, 300.
32O LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
the Etowah, the garrison of Nashville under Brigadier-
General John F. Miller, and the employés of the quarter-
master's department, under Brigadier-General James L.
Donaldson ; Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood, command-
ing Fourth corps; and Brevet Major-General James H.
Wilson, chief of the cavalry of the Military Division of
the Mississippi, commanding the Cavalry Corps of that
military division.
These generals were called together for consultation
twice, before the battle of Nashville. The first meeting
was called by General Thomas even after he received his
peremptory order to attack the enemy. He then made
known the nature of the orders which he had received from
General Grant, and that he had decided that obedience was
impracticable. This meeting was informal and not in all
respects in the form of a council of war. The command-
ing general, contrary to the custom or law which obtains
in such councils, opened the conference with an announce-
ment of his own decision. The other generals, however,
observed the authoritative usage of councils of war, and
expressed their views in the inverse order of their rank,
unanimously sustaining General Thomas in his purpose to
withhold battle until the ice should melt.
The second meeting was held at 3 P. M., on the 14th.
The ice had melted and a battle was practicable on the
following day. This meeting was in form a council of
war. The commanding general requested suggestions as
to a plan of battle, and the Corps commanders spoke in
the inverse order of their rank. But in so far as it was in
reality a council of war, it was a departure from General
Thomas' usual course in forming plans. It is not, there-
fore, probable that had he been in command of his own
army, he would have invited his ranking subordinates to
suggest a plan of battle. No general ever sustained more
cordial relations with his officers of all grades, but no
commander was more independent of their aid in forming
FIIS PLAN OF BATTLE, 32 I
his plans. It is probable, if not certain, that had the Army
of the Cumberland, in its unity, been at Nashville, he
would have announced his plan to his corps commanders
before inviting suggestions from them. But having three
corps commanders, from three distinct armies, he re-
quested suggestions, although from his official men-
tion of this meeting, it is evident that his chief object in
calling them together, was to make known his own plan
and give the necessary instructions for its effective execu-
tion. At this time, and ever afterwards, he regarded Gen-
eral Schofield as unfriendly to himself, and this conviction
may have moved him, to defer in full measure to his sub-
ordinates.
In nothing was General Thomas' independence and self-
reliance more fully manifested than in his habit of forming
plans in all situations, and his boldness in suggesting
them to his superiors in rank. To himself, in advance of ex-
periment, his own plans were always demonstrably prac-
ticable. And no plan of his was ever put upon trial with
resultant failure. For his superiors to adopt his sugges-
tions was to succeed, to reject them was to fail.
In this meeting at Nashville, General Wood proposed a
plan, which General Thomas said would be adopted with
some added details. He approved General Wood's plan,
doubtless, because it harmonized with his own previously
formed. He expected to deliver battle on the Ioth, and
his plan for it must have been matured before that day.
Immediately after the adjournment of the conference,
or council of war, General Thomas announced his plan of
operations with unusual precision, as follows:
Major-General A. J. Smith commanding detachment of the Army
of the Tennessee, after forming his troops on and near the Harding
pike in front of his present position, will make a vigorous as-
sault on the enemy's left. Major-General Wilson commanding
the Cavalry corps Military Division of the Mississippi, with three
divisions will move on and support General Smith's right, assisting
2 I
322 LIFE OF GENERAL G EORG E H THOMAS,
as far as possible, in carrying the left of the enemy's position, and
be in readiness to throw his force upon the enemy the moment a
favorable opportunity occurs. Major-General Wilson will also
send one division on the Charlotte pike, to clear that road of the
enemy and observe in the direction of Bell's Landing to protect
our right rear until the enemy's position is fairly turned, when it
will rejoin the main force. Brigadier-General T. J. Wood com-
manding Fourth Corps, after leaving a strong skirmish line in his
works from Lawren's Hill to his extreme right, will form the re-
mainder of the Fourth corps on the Hillsboro’ pike to support
General Smith's left and operate on the left and rear of the enemy's
advanced positions on the Montgomery Hill. Major-General Scho-
field commanding Twenty-third army corps will replace Brigadier-
General Kimball's division of the Fourth corps with his troops,
and occupy the trenches from Fort Negley to Lawren’s Hill with
a strong skirmish line. He will move the remainder of his force
in front of the works and coöperate with General Wood, protect-
ing the latter's left flank against an attack by the enemy. Major-
Gen. Steedman, commanding District of Etowah, will occupy the inte-
rior line in rear of his present position, stretching from the reservoir on
the Cumberland River at Fort Negley with a strong skirmish line, and
mass the remainder of his force in its present position to act accord-
ing to the exigencies which may arise during these operations. Brig-
adier-General Miller with, troops forming the garrison of Nashville,
will occupy the interior line from the battery on hill 2 Io to the extreme
right, including the enclosed work on the Hyde's Ferry road. The
quartermaster’s troops, under the command of Brigadier-General
Donaldson, will, if necessary, be posted on the interior line from Fort
Morton to the battery on hill 2 Io. The troops occupying the interior
line will be under the direction of Major-General Steedman, who is
charged with the immediate defense of Nashville during the opera-
tions around the city. Should the weather permit, the troops will be
formed to commence operations at 6 A. M. on the 15th, or as soon
thereafter as practicable.
General Thomas subsequently slightly modified this plan
by directing General Steedman to make a feint against the
enemy's right to veil the effort to turn his left.
In outline this plan did not depart radically from the
type most frequently adopted—a feint to conceal the real
attack,--but in the details, in the tactical combinations, in
the close relation of the various assaults, and in the deter-
NASBITVILLE FIRST DAY 323
mination of the strength of the various attacking columns,
there was displayed generalship that will bear comparison
with the skill of the most famous soldiers of the world. For
the first time in his career, Thomas was permitted to plan a
great battle for himself, and it was historically meet that
the general who had never failed to originate plans of oper-
ations, or to suggest modifications of those formed by su-
periors in rank, which were not exactly coincident with the
conditions necessary for their successful execution, should
for his last and greatest battle, form a plan which with only
slight modifications, made by himself, was carried out with
transcendent results.
Seldom has a battle been fought in more exact conformity
to plan, than the battle of Nashville, and this is true, not
only in comparison with the great battles of our civil
war, but also in comparison with those of Europe, fought
by the great masters of war. The leading features of
the plan, and of the battle itself, were the feint upon
the enemy's right, and the combinations of infantry and
cavalry in overwhelming attacks upon his left, resulting
in doubling up successive portions of his line, and finally
dislodging him altogether. It was unlike the typical
battle of the Confederate commanders—massing so heavily
against a flank as to forbid a strong general line of
battle. Thomas made provision for a strong line of battle
throughout its entire length, for overwhelming attack-
ing columns, for a feint which might have been easily
changed to a successful turning movement, and for security
to his rear in the event of unsuccessful offense. Hood's
hope of following a defeated army into the city of Nashville
would not have been realized had he repulsed every
attack made upon his entrenched army. In these re-
spects and others, the battle of Nashville was distinctive,
illustrating generalship which comprehended the minutest
details, as well as the grandest combinations.
The morning of the 15th was foggy, and under the veil
3.24. I, IFE OF GENERA. L. G. EOR G E H THOMAS.
of densest mist, the cavalry and infantry made the move-
ments required by the orders of the commanding general,
though the cavalry were delayed by the march of Smith's
infantry, to the left, across their front instead of their
rear, as was understood and agreed between Wilson and
Smith.
About 8 o'clock the fog had so far lifted, that it was
deemed advisable to open the battle, and Brigadier-General
W. D. Whipple, chief of staff, bore an order to General
Steedman to move in feint against the enemy's right. This
feint was vigorously executed by Colonel Morgan's brigade
of colored troops, and Lieut.-Colonel Grosvenor's provis-
ional brigade, producing the impression upon General
Hood that his right flank was in danger. He consequently
sent troops thither from his centre and left.
In the meantime, the cavalry divisions, some of them by
a long circuit had reached the rear of the enemy's left flank.
This device having caused Hood to concentrate on his right,
the movement to turn his left by a combination of infantry
and cavalry was put upon trial. General Smith's corps had
been formed with Garrard's division on the left of the
Harding turnpike, McArthur's on the right of that road,
and Colonel Moore's in reserve. General Wilson had
connected Hatch's division of cavalry with McArthur's
right, and posted Croxton's brigade on the right of Hatch,
holding Knipe's division in reserve. These forces, thus
formed, wheeled to the left, and carried several of the
enemy's advanced positions. The cavalry, after getting
within reach of the enemy, assaulted on foot, and fell upon
him, in flank and rear, simultaneously with the direct attack
of infantry in front. In this initial assault, four guns and
one hundred and fifty prisoners were captured. A second
position was carried in the same manner. The coöpera-
tion of infantry and cavalry was so perfect, that while each
force claimed the captured guns and prisoners, they were
rightly common property. Subsequently General Hatch in
NASH VILLE-FIRST’ D.A. Y. 325
independent movement carried a position farther to the
right, and captured a battery without the direct aid of
infantry. Garrard carried a position on the left of the
Hillsboro' road, and Wood was equally successful. His
corps had been formed with Elliott's division on the right,
Kimball's in the centre, and Beatty's on the left, each
division providing its own reserve. Wood first carried
Montgomery Hill, with Post's brigade of Beatty's division
supported by Streight's; and afterwards each division of
the Fourth corps carried the enemy's entrenched line in
its front.
The lines of advance were converging, and General
Thomas, after the first successful assaults, made new
dispositions. He moved Schofield's corps from reserve in
rear of Wood and Smith, to the right of the latter; Scho-
field then advanced beyond the redoubts first captured by
Wilson and Smith, crossed the Hillsboro' road, and a valley
beyond, and drove the enemy from hills overlooking the
Granny White turnpike. On the extreme left, Steed-
man was equally successful ; Colonels Morgan and Gros-
venor turned the enemy's right flank, and Colonel Thompson,
commanding a brigade of colored troops, crossed Brown's
Creek, and carried the left of Hood's fortifications on the
Nolensville turnpike.
In this action the enemy was forced from his first and
second lines and pressed back to an entirely new position,
where he spent the night in making defenses. General
Thomas was successful in every operation, and although the
victory was not yet decisive, he and his army felt the strong-
est assurance of the utter defeat of the enemy when a new day
should give opportunity to renew the conflict.
In accordance with his disposition to underestimate his
own failures, General Hood, in his report of the battle and
in his book, only admitted that, towards evening, he lost the
outposts on his left with the artillery and small force hold-
ing them, while in fact he gave up his entire position—his
326 LIFE OF GENERAL G.EORG E H THOMAS.
advanced line and his main line,—and he lost seventeen guns
and twelve hundred men by capture. He thus mentioned
his change of position
Finding that the main movement of the Federals was directed
against our left, the chief engineer was instructed to carefully select
a line in prolongation of the left flank; Cheatham's corps was with-
drawn from the right during the night of the 15th, and posted on the
left of Stewart—Cheatham’s left flank resting near the Brentwood
Hills. In this position the men were ordered to construct breastworks
during that same night. *
Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee's report furnishes evidence
of the abandonment of their first position:
During the night Cheatham's corps was withdrawn from my
right and moved to the extreme left of the army. The army then
took position about one mile in rear of its original line, my corps be-
ing on the extreme right.
General Hood, in taking a new position and preparing for
further defense, expressed confidence in his army, although
he complained that its morale had been impaired by General
Johnston holding it to the defensive for a long period
behind fortifications. Had Hood so elected he could
have retreated during the night of the 15th, far more
easily, and with less demoralization to his troops, than after
a second defeat; that he did not then retreat gives proof of
the wildest infatuation. No general with common prudence,
with an army of such reported weakness, would have taken
position for battle, against an army such as Hood's own
belief gave to Thomas. And it taxes the most expansive
credulity to put the least faith in Hood's statements, that
during the action of the 16th, he formed a plan for offense
against such an army. If his army was not stronger than
he represented it to be, nothing but the expectation of
reénforcements from the southwest justified his remaining
* “Advance and Retreat,” page 302.
NASH VILLE-FIRST DAY. 327
before Nashville until Thomas was ready for battle. To con-
tinue the conflict after the action of the 15th, with the ex-
pectation that ulterior offense would be possible, evinced
madness rather than generalship.
It was not known on the evening of the 15th, whether
Hood would retreat or await another attack, General Thomas,
therefore, gave instructions to his corps commanders, which
had reference alike to battle or pursuit.
Thomas and his army thought only of decisive victory
as the issue of further fighting, and in this belief the authori-
ties at Washington, General Grant and the Northern people
fully sympathized. The lieutenant-general, en route to
Nashville, halted at Washington, and in common with the
President and the Secretary of War, sent official congratula-
tions to Thomas. General Logan turned back from Louisville,
because the condition upon which he was to take command
of the army had passed away. And throughout the North
the rebound from extreme anxiety intensified the joy
which the news of battle and success produced.
CHAPTER XV.
ACTION OF DECEMBER 16th I–I) EFEAT AND ROUT OF HOOD'S ARMY-RELA-
TIVE STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES.–THE ISSUE THE WINDICATION OF
THOMAS.
OOD'S new line, shorter by two and a half miles than
the former one, coursed over the detached hills in front
of the main Brentwood range. A series of hills on the east,
trending southwest, and another on the west, trending
Southeast, form at their termination in these directions
the Brentwood Gap, through which the Franklin road
passes. His left having been driven back so far, was
necessarily well refused, bending back at right angles
at a point near Schofield's position. This angle was
upon a fortified hill, and from that point the line extended
southward to another hill, also fortified. The right rested
at Overton Hill, another entrenched position.
During the night General Schofield felt uneasy, being on
the right of the infantry and not far from the enemy, and
requesting reënforcements, Colonel Moore's division of
Smith's corps was sent to him and placed by him in
reserve. The entrenchment of his position gave additional
evidence of Schofield's disquietude.
Hood's right had been withdrawn so far during the
night, that the forenoon of the 16th was spent in de-
veloping his new position in that quarter. Early in the
morning Wood, in compliance with the order of General
Thomas, advanced to the Franklin road, and formed his
corps with Elliott's division on the right of that road,
Beatty's on the left of it, and Kimball's in reserve. He
then advanced three-fourths of a mile and encountered the
328
NASH VILLE SECOND DAY 329
enemy's skirmish line, behind barricades, a half mile in
front of his main line. In concert with Wood's movement,
Smith on his right and Steedman on his left, advanced
to the immediate presence of the enemy. To protect the
rear of the left flank of the army, Steedman ordered
Colonel J. G. Mitchell's brigade of Cruft's provisional
division to advance and hold Riddle's Hill. Wilson
moved to the rear of Hood's left as rapidly as prac-
ticable. He had his corps in hand, Johnson's division
having removed to the Hillsboro’ turnpike from the ex-
treme right towards Bell's Landing, in consequence of the
retirement of the enemy from his front during the night.
Hood's forces in front of Hammond's brigade were very
demonstrative early in the day, and skirmished sharply to
resist Wilson's advance.
The rough and slippery ground and the dense forest
between the cavalry and Hood's left flank greatly retarded
Wilson's movement, it being necessary for his men to dis-
mount and advance on foot. But by noon he had formed
a continuous line of skirmishers in front of Hatch's
division and Hammond's brigade of Knipe's division, while
Croxton's brigade was in readiness to support Hatch or
Hammond. This line of cavalry was parallel to the enemy's
line of infantry, facing towards Nashville, or to the north, its
left connecting with Schofield's right. General Schofield's
line faced to the east, except a part on the left, which
curved around the angle in the enemy's line. The remain-
der of the line of infantry—Smith's Wood's and Steedman's
—looked directly to the South. The enemy's flank, there-
fore, was in a pocket, Our lines facing it on the north, west
and South.
General Thomas gave in his report a full account of the
preliminary operations of the I6th, in compliance with his
instructions of the previous evening.
At 6 A. M. on the 16th Wood's corps pressed back the enemy's
33O LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
skirmishers across the Franklin pike to the eastward of it, and then
Swinging slightly to the right, advanced due south from Nashville,
driving the enemy before him, until he came upon his new main line
of works, constructed during the night on what is called Overton's
Hill, about five miles south of the city and east of the Franklin pike. .
General Steedman moved out from Nashville by the Nolensville pike
and formed his command on the left of General Wood, effectually
securing the latter's left flank, and made preparations to coöperate in
the Operations of the day. General A. J. Smith's command moved
out on the right of the Fourth corps (Wood's) and, establishing con-
nection with General Wood's right, completed the new line of battle.
General Schofield's troops remained in the position taken up by them
at dark on the day previous, facing eastward and towards the enemy's
left flank, the line of the corps running perpendicular to General
Smith's troops. General Wilson’s cavalry, which had rested for the
night at the six-mile post on the Hillsboro pike, was dismounted and
formed on the right of Schofield's command, and by noon of the 16th,
had succeeded in gaining the enemy's rear and stretched across the
Granny White pike, one of his two outlets towards Franklin. As soon
as the above dispositions were completed, and having visited the dif-
ferent commands, I gave directions that the movement against the
enemy's left flank should be continued. Our entire line approached
to within six hundred yards of the enemy's at all points. His centre
was weak as compared to either his right at Overton's Hill, or his left
on the hills bordering the Granny White pike. Still I had hopes of
gaining his rear and cutting off his retreat from Franklin.
General Thomas rode to the six-mile post on the
Hillsboro' turnpike, and met General Wilson between 9 and
Io A. M. Wilson was then endeavoring to carry out the
original plan of battle, by making efforts to gain the rear of
the enemy's line of battle, but meeting stronger opposition
than he had anticipated, he suggested to General Thomas
that the cavalry should be transferred to operate against
Hood's right flank. General Thomas, however, directed
him to continue his movement, as already begun, until he
found it impracticable to attain the end in view, in which
event, the cavalry corps might be moved to the opposite
flank. Wilson then reënforced Hatch's and Hammond's
dismounted skirmishers, and by noon reached the rear of
Hood's left flank. The attainment of this position by
SCHO FIELD'S DEL.A. Y. 33 I
Wilson was to be the signal for a general attack from right
to left, Wilson and Schofield to take the initiative in con-
junction.
When the cavalry, at noon, had gained position in the
rear of Hood's left flank, Wilson sent a messenger to in-
form Generals Thomas and Schofield that he was ready to
move against the enemy. Schofield, however, did not ad-
vance, but at I P. M. requested reënforcements. General
Thomas was so anxious that the prescribed coöperative at-
tack should be made, that at first he directed General Smith
to send another division to Schofield But when Smith
protested against being left close to the enemy with only one
division, Thomas sent General Whipple, his chief of stafſ,
to ascertain if Schofield needed reënforcements. General
Whipple having reported that it was not necessary to take a
Second division from Smith, General Thomas revoked the
order which required that one should be sent.
In the meantime General Wilson, being very im-
patient at the delay of Schofield, sent one staff officer after
another to Thomas to make known his readiness to
attack, and finally rode round the left of Hood's line to
learn the cause of the failure of the infantry to attack.
At 3 P.M., Generals Wood and Steedman, weary of waiting,
attacked Hood's right flank, on Overton Hill, with Post's
and Thompson's brigades supported by Streight's. This
assault, though vigorous and well Sustained, was unsuccess-
ful, except in causing General Hood to send troops to his
right from his centre and left.
After this action on his left, General Thomas rode towards
his right flank to hasten, if possible, the coöperative attack by
Schofield and Wilson. As he reached the position of the
Sixteenth corps, Smith referred to him a request from
General McArthur for permission to assault the salient
of Hood's line directly in front of Couch's division of the
Twenty-third corps. Thomas said: “No ; the prescribed
order df attack gives the initiative to General Schofield
332 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H, THOMAS.
in conjunction with the cavalry, and I desire the main-
tenance of this order; I will ride to General Schofield's
position and hasten his attack.” When he met Scho-
field he directed him to advance against the fortified
position in his front. Schofield was reluctant to move from
fear of the loss an assault would produce, and Thomas
said: “The battle must be fought, if men are killed.”
While the matter was under discussion, Thomas looked to
the left, and observing that McArthur was moving upon
the angle in the enemy's line, said to General Schofield:
“General Smith is attacking without waiting for you;
please advance your entire line.” At this moment General
Wilson called the attention of the commanding general to
the movement of the cavalry upon the fortified hill, on the
extreme flank of Hood's line. Both assaults were suc-
cessful, and, almost at the same instant, McArthur's division
moving southward, carried the angle of Hood's line, and
Wilson's troops, moving in the opposite direction and
striking the enemy in reverse, gained the other important
position.
When the shout of victory from the right was heard,
the divisions of the Fourth corps and Steedman's troops
moved upon the enemy with resistless force, and Hood's
right was as quickly routed as his left had been. The com-
bined attack of Smith and Wilson was made at 3.30 P. M.,
and by 4 P. M., the left half of Hood's army was in confused
retreat. A few minutes later the other half was routed.
But unfortunately night was too near at 4.3O P. M., on a
dark foggy afternoon in December, for the triumphant army
to gather the fruits of such a victory. Had the attack on
the right been made at noon the result would have been
different. As it was, Hood's army was utterly broken, his
troops in confusion and panic rushed towards Brentwood
pass, but the darkness arrested pursuit by the infantry.
Referring to the delay on the part of Schofield, General
Smith wrote in his official report:
MCA R THUR'S ASSA ULT. 333
The Twenty-third corps was on my right in the entrenchments
thrown up by them the night before and nearly at right angles with
my present line. Expecting that corps to take the initiative, as they
were on the flank of the enemy, I held the command in its present
position, keeping up a slow artillery fire at their line without eliciting
any reply. About I o'clock I received a request from General Scho-
field and, a few minutes later, an order from you (Thomas) to send
another division to his assistance, he having retained the one sent at
daylight that morning, not having any reserve and my whole line
being immediately in front of the enemy and liable to be attacked
and broken at any point wherever a brigade should be withdrawn,
I therefore sent a staff officer to him to state the condition of my
Command and ascertain if he could not get along without the division.
The officer reported to me that General Schofield's line was not en-
gaged, and upon the condition being reported to him, that he said he
did not need the additional force, consequently it was not sent. About
3 o'clock P. M., General McArthur sent word that he could carry the
line on his right by assault. Major-General Thomas being present
the matter was referred to him and I was requested to delay the
movement until he could hear from General Schofield to whom he had
sent. General McArthur not receiving any reply and fearing if the
attack should be longer delayed the enemy would use the right to
strengthen his works, directed the first brigade, Colonel W. L.
McMillen, Ninety-fifth Ohio infantry, commanding, to storm the hill
on which was the left of the enemy's line, and the second and third
brigades of the division to attack in front, when the first should be
half-way up the hill.
General Schofield presented the case as follows:
“During the morning, therefore, our operations were limited to
preparations for defense, and coöperation with the cavalry, which
was operating to strike the Granny White pike in the rear of the
enemy. About noon the troops on my left (Generals Smith and
Wood) having advanced and come in contact with the enemy in his
new position, the enemy again withdrew flom his left a considerable
force to strengthen his right and centre, when I ordered General
Cox to advance, in conjunction with the cavalry, and endeavor to
carry a high wooded hill beyond the flank of the enemy's entrenched
line and overlooking the Granny White pike. The hill was oc-
cupied by the enemy in considerable force but was not entrenched.
My order was not executed with the promptness or energy which I
334 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H, THOMAS
had expected, yet probably with as much as I had reason to expect,
considering the attenuated character of General Cox's line, and the
great distance and the rough ground over which the attacking force
had to move. The hill was, however, carried by General Wilson's
cavalry, (dismounted) whose gallantry and energy on that and other
occasions which came under my observation cannot be too greatly
praised. Almost simultaneously with this attack on the extreme
right, the salient hill, in front of General Couch, was attacked and
carried by General Smith's troops, supported by a brigade of Gen-
eral Couch's division, and the fortified hill in front of General Cox,
which constituted the extreme flank of the enemy's entrenched line,
was attacked and carried by Colonel Doolittle's brigade of General
Cox's division, the latter capturing eight pieces of artillery and two
to three hundred prisoners.”
General Hood distinctly recognized the effect of McAr-
thur's assault :
About 3.30 P. M., the Federals concentrated a number of guns
against a portion of our line, which passed over a mound on the left
of our centre, and which had been occupied during the night. This
point was favorable for massing troops for an assault under cover of
artillery. Accordingly the enemy availed himself of the advantage
presented, massed a body of men—apparently one division—at the
base of this mound, and under the fire of artillery which prevented
our men from raising their heads above the breastworks, made a
sudden and gallant charge up to and over our entrenchments. Our
line thus pierced, gave way; soon thereafter it broke at all points,
and I beheld, for the first and only time, a Confederate army aban-
don the field in confusion. *
General Hood made no reference to the cavalry which
gained his rear and assaulted his line in reverse, in conjunction
with the direct attack of infantry in front, but during the ac-
tion of the 16th, he sent this despatch to General Chalmers:
“For God's sake drive the Yankee cavalry from our left
and rear, or all is lost.” This message was captured by
General Wilson and sent to General Thomas at noon on
the I6th.
In fact the action of the cavalry in this battle was one of
* “Advance and Retreat,” pp. 302 and 303.
|WILSON'S CA VA LR Y. 335
its remarkable features, and justified all the efforts of Thomas
and Wilson to re-mount and equip as large a force as possible.
It is true that this was done primarily to resist the enemy's
cavalry and reap the fruits of victory in pursuit, but when
through the mistake of Hood, only one division of his
cavalry presented itself on his left flank, Wilson's forces,
mounted and dismounted, established a precedent for the
fighting of cavalry which may be the prophecy of a complete
revolution in the methods and operations of that arm. In
no battle of the war did cavalry perform a more brilliant
part, and in no other was such an opportunity afforded to
troopers. Had the cavalry been equally divided to operate
upon the flanks of the infantry instead of being massed on
the right, the battle of Nashville would have lost one of its
salient features. General Thomas gave Wilson an opportu-
nity to show what cavalry can do to dislodge an entrenched
enemy, and cavalry had never before been employed so
admirably and effectively in a great battle. It was a different
office from that given to the tens of thousands of horsemen
who followed Murat in the wars of Napoleon, but an
equally effective one, though less imposing in movement
and charge. At Nashville the cavalry had something
to do, beyond the development of the enemy's position and
guarding the flanks of infantry lines, their frequent service
in battle. In this action, Wilson's corps assaulted the ene-
my's entrenched lines, in independent movement and also in
coöperation with the infantry. It is true that they dismounted
to attack, but they rode to position, in some instances by a
circuit of twenty miles, and in no case in less than five.
A large force of cavalry was a condition of the decisive
victory at Nashville; since by the unprecedented coöpera-
tion of cavalry and infantry the pivotal advantages were
gained. The infantry on the left had no direct help from
the cavalry, but on the right the turning movements
were made by Wilson, and by his coöperation the strongest
positions of the enemy on that part of his line, were carried.
336 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
The achievements of Wilson's corps stand against all
possible criticism, as the justification of all the efforts that
had been made to give it efficiency, and fully compensated
for the consequent postponement of the action. The fact
that General Thomas had been a cavalry officer for many
years, may account in part for his desire to equip as large a
force of this arm as was possible, but doubtless the para-
mount reason, was his belief that a strong corps of cavalry
could be effectively used at Nashville.
This battle, in its conduct, immediate results, and remote
effects, takes rank with the great battles of the world. Each
distinct operation was a connected part of the whole, measured
and adjusted in the mind of him, who not only planned the
battle, but gave it unity and force by Special instructions to
his corps commanders before it occurred, and during its
progress. By it one of the two great armies of the Con-
federacy was eliminated from the final problem, and with
the total overthrow of that army, the very cause which
it had so long and so gallantly sustained was lost.
The change in the grand strategy made General Thomas
chief where he had been subordinate. Deprived of two corps
of his army, with “broken forces,” he smote to death
one half of the rebellion. Denied permission to go with
Sherman to the sea, he was given the grandest opportunity
for patriotic service and martial fame which the war afforded.
The estimates of the strength of the two armies engaged
at Nashville have been exceedingly conflicting. General
Thomas' estimate of the strength of Hood's army, when it
advanced from Florence, was based upon the reports of the
generals who were operating against its northward move-
ment. He made preparations to meet in battle an army of,
at least, fifty thousand men. And prior to the publication
of General Hood's estimate of the strength of his army it
was generally believed that he had this number of men of all
arms. It is not unusual for defeated generals to underesti-
mate their forces, and Hood has certainly done this in ac-
HOOD'S ESTIMATE OF HIS FORCE. 337
counting for his failure. But if his army was no larger than
he has represented it, his rashness in advancing to Nashville
has no parallel in the war. Generals have often been com-
pelled to enter upon defensive campaigns with forces inferior
to those of their enemies; but they have not often taken the
offensive when their objects and hopes have been so out of
proportion to the strength of their armies. Beauregard, as
well as Hood, is open to the charge of extreme rashness, if
the army which he sent upon remote aggression was as
weak as it was reported to be by its commander.
On December 6th General Beauregard thus concluded a
long letter to the Confederate President, in which he dis-
cussed the prominent features of the situation in the West:
Under these circumstances, after consultation with General Hood,
I concluded to allow him to prosecute with vigor his campaign into
Tennessee and Kentucky, hoping that by defeating Thomas' army
and such other forces as might hastily be sent against him, he would
compel Sherman should he reach the coast of Georgia or South Car-
olina, to repair at once to the defense of Kentucky, and, perhaps
Ohio, and thus prevent him from reënforcing Grant. Meanwhile sup-
plies might be sent to Virginia from Middle and East Tennessee,
thus relieving Georgia from the present constant drain upon its
limited resources.
His endorsement upon General Hood's report of the
Tennessee campaign expresses the belief that Hood had a
larger army than Thomas, until the latter was reënforced at
Nashville. He wrote:
It is clear to my mind, that after the great loss of life at Franklin,
the army was no longer in a condition to make a successful attack
on Nashville, a strongly fortified city, defended by an army nearly
as strong as our own, and which was being reënforced constantly by
river and railroad.
Hood's return of December IOth,” gives an “aggregate
present” of 36,356 men, but this number did not include
two divisions of cavalry and four brigades of infantry. He
* See Appendix.
22 tº
338 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H. THOMAS,
had all his forces at Nashville, except Jackson's division of
cavalry and two brigades of infantry.
It is demonstrable from other facts that Hood greatly
underestimated the strength of his army at Nashville.
According to the report of Colonel Parkhurst, provost-
marshal general of the Army of the Cumberland, Hood lost
during the Tennessee campaign, about fifteen thousand
men by capture and desertion. To this number should be
added for his total loss, the killed in battle and skirmish,
which at Franklin alone was seventeen hundred and fifty,
and the unreported desertions. He had eighteen thousand
men, infantry and artillery, at Tupelo, Miss., Jan. IOth, 1865.
If to this number his cavalry is added, whose approximate
strength was nine thousand, a loss of nearly thirty thou-
sand is shown. And yet he claimed that he lost only ten
thousand men in the campaign.”
Hood's return on November 6th, 1864, is as follows:
Effective total present, . & & . 30,600
Total present, g iº e o e 4O,74O
Aggregate present e * tº ge • 44,7 I9
The “effective total " included Jackson's division of cav-
alry, but did not embrace Forrest's corps—Buford's and
Chalmers' divisions—nor the infantry reënforcements which
joined his army at Florence later in the month. These
added, his “aggregate present,” comprised from fifty-five to
sixty thousand men, when he crossed the Tennessee River.
But General Hood made his 30,600 “effectives,” as reported
November 6th, the basis of all his subsequent estimates, of
strength and losses, in the different stages of his campaign.
He asserted twice, in the book published after his death,
that his cavalry numbered 2306 men.f But this was the
number of “effectives” reported for Jackson's division
alone. The exact number of men embraced in the three
* “Advance and Retreat," page 335.
f “Advance and Retreat,” pp. 298, 310.
STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES. 339
divisions of cavalry, under General Forrest, is not known,
since returns for Buford's and Chalmers' divisions, during
the Tennessee campaign are not found in the archive office
at Washington. Colonel Kniffin's table, comprising extracts
from consolidated returns for Dec. IOth, gives an aggre-
gate, exclusive of two brigades of cavalry, of fifty thousand
and thirteen men.” General Hood admitted a loss of
Seven thousand five hundred and forty-seven men before he
reached Nashville,f and if this number is added to the ag-
gregate on December Ioth, as given by Colonel Kniffin, he
had at Florence an army of fifty-seven thousand five
hundred and sixty men. Now General Hood stated
that he had less than twenty thousand “effectives” at Nash-
ville, after deducting the force under General Forrest at
Murfreesboro’. But he had at Nashville all of his forces
except Jackson's division of cavalry and two brigades of
infantry. In his official report the following statements
are made :
I had sent Major General Forrest with the greatest part of his
cavalry and Bate's division of infantry to Murfreesboro' to ascertain
if it was possible to take the place. After a careful examination and
reconnoisance in force, in which, I am Sorry to say, the infantry be-
haved badly, it was determined that nothing could be accomplished
by assault; Bate's division was withdrawn, leaving Forrest with
Jackson's and Buford's cavalry in observation. Mercer’s and Palm-
er's brigades of infantry were sent to replace Bate's division. Shortly
afterwards, Buford's division was withdrawn and ordered to the right
of the army on the Cumberland River.
General Thomas had at Nashville about fifty thousand
men for offensive operations.
A large part of this aggregate was not heavily engaged
on either day of battle. General Schofield lost from his
corps, which was only slightly engaged on either day, eleven
men killed, and one hundred and fifty-three wounded. In
* See Appendix. f “Advance and Retreat," page 298.
† Ibid, page 305.
34O LIFE OF GENERAL G EORG E H, THOMAS,
striking contrast with this loss of a corps, General Smith
lost from one brigade, on the second day, three hundred
and fifteen killed and wounded. On that day Moore's divi-
Sion, from Smith's command, being in reserve to Schofield,
was not in the action.
It is therefore evident, that Hood having a larger army
than reported, and having entrenched positions, had
superior advantages at the battle of Nashville. And yet
his strong positions were carried by forces that, in all pro-
bability, did not outnumber his own.
Badeau, in estimating the strength of Thomas' army at
Nashville, is scarcely less inaccurate than was General
Hood, in estimating his own army. Badeau thus states
Thomas' strength:
The interior works were manned by quartermaster's employás,
so that all the enlisted troops of the command could be put into
action.* Thomas' infantry was now fifty-five thousand strong, Hood's
about twenty-two thousand. The National cavalry in front of Nash-
ville numbered twelve thousand, the rebel, seventeen hundred. †
This aggregate of sixty-seven thousand men is contrasted,
in the same sentence with Hood's aggregate of twenty-three
thousand, seven hundred, and the sentence itself, forms part
of a general account of General Thomas' dispositions for
battle. And yet according to the return which he quotes,
the fifty-five thousand infantry included, besides, the gar-
rison of Nashville, all the troops at Murfreesboro' and Chat-
tanooga, and intermediate posts. Whatever may have
been the intention of Badeau, his confused statements are
quite as misleading as meditated deception could have made
them.
If, however, it is true that Thomas overestimated Hood's
army, so did Grant and other generals. If Thomas gath-
ered superabundant resources and made Superfluous prepa-
* It was not the intention of Thomas, at any time, to put all his enlisted
troops into the action.
f Mil. Hist., U. S. Grant, Vol. III., page 251.
HIS JUDG MENT WINDICATED BY VIOTOR Y. 34 ſ
rations, his action in this respect may be set over against
Grant's excessive fear that direful consequences would fol-
low the postponement of battle for a few days. Thomas
did not expect the advance of Hood's army into Ken-
tucky; Grant did. The lieutenant-general feared that Hood
would detach from his army to operate against remote
cities, when he had abandoned the offensive and was hoping
for victory, as the result of a successful defense, or the com-
ing of expected reënforcements from Texas, while Thomas
quietly but energetically, made his preparations for a battle
in which he routed and destroyed Hood's army.
Thomas' losses were light as compared with results and
in view of the fact that his army attacked an entrenched
enemy. Only three hundred and eighty-seven men were
killed, twenty-five hundred and fifty-eight wounded, and
one hundred and twelve captured or missing, in aggregate
three thousand and fifty-seven.
General Grant thus referred to the battle of Nashville in
his “Report of the operations of the Armies of the United
States from the date of my appointment to command :”
Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient, over, as it
appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was in-
creased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry
across the Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared he would cross his
whole army and give us great trouble there. After urging upon
General Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offen-
sive, I started west to superintend matters there in person. Reach-
ing Washington City I received General Thomas' despatch an-
nouncing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the
battle had progressed. I was delighted. All fears and apprehen-
sions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied but that General Thomas
immediately upon the appearance of Hood before Nashville, and
before he had time to fortify should have moved out with his whole
force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry,
which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it im-
practicable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of
Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of
that distinguished officer's judgment.
342 LIFE OF GENERAI, GEORGE H, THOMAS.
In this report General Grant explicitly admits that
Thomas could not attack, at the time that he ordered him
to do so, “without regard to weather or reënforcements,”
but he maintains that the battle should have been fought
before the inclement weather prevented. From his point of
view, this is the best representation of the case that he
could have made.
However, the consequences of delay were not such as
Grant feared. The cavalry force sent into Kentucky
did no harm, and was promptly followed and driven
back into Tennessee by General E. M. McCook, with two
brigades of his division. It is true that Hood en-
trenched his position in front of Nashville, but this did not
prevent defeat. Had Thomas attacked Hood, as soon as
he had taken position, he would have found an entrenched
line. In the last stages of the war no army, even when on
the offensive, ever encamped for a night near the enemy,
without entrenching. Hood entrenched his second position,
the night after he lost his first.
General Sherman, also admits that the battle vindicated
General Thomas :
Meantime, on the 15th and 16th of December were fought in front
of Nashville the great battles, in which General Thomas so nobly
fulfilled his promise to ruin Hood, the details of which are fully given
in his own official reports, long since published. Rumors of these
great victories reached us at Savannah by piecemeal, but his official
report came on the 24th of December, with a letter from General
Grant, giving in general terms the events up to the 18th, and I
wrote at once through my chief of staff, General Webster, to General
Thomas complimenting him in the highest terms. His brilliant vic-
tory at Nashville was necessary to mine at Savannah, to make a com-
plete whole, and this fact was perfectly comprehended by Mr. Lincoln,
who recognized it fully in his personal letter of December 26th,
hereinbefore quoted at length, and which I also claimed at the
time in my Special Field Order, No. 6, of January 8, 1865. *
The following letters, first published by General J. Watts
* Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 219.
HIS ACCOUNT OF NAS HIVILLE, 343
De Peyster, and inserted by his permission, show that Gen-
eral Thomas criticised himself for failing to capture Hood's
army :
WASHINGTON, May 30th, 1874.
MY DEAR GENERAL -
“I have not been able to write to you until now, and threw aside
even to-day matters pressing on me, to write to you even briefly, for
my mind is full of other subjects. It was I that mentioned to you,
Thomas' address or account of his Nashville campaign. There was
previously a small club in Washington that met at each other's
houses, taking them in succession, for conversation upon and dis-
cussion of scientific subjects. The evening was closed by an in ex-
pensive supper. It was usual for a member to invite any stranger
in Washington, who might be supposed to take an interest in such
matters. Finally it became the custom for the member at whose
house the meeting took place, to give an account of anything that
he thought interesting, or have some friend do so.
One evening when the club met at General Eaton's (commis-
sary-general of subsistence) General Thomas was present and
gave us an account of his Nashville campaign, illustrated by maps.
There were only about fifteen persons present. The exceeding
modesty and diffidence of General Thomas made a very strong
impression on me. He reminded me of a diffident youth at West
Point undergoing the yearly examination, whose suffering on such
occasions, only those afflicted with diffidence can comprehend and
remember, which they do to the last days of their lives. The per-
spiration gathered profusely on his forehead. This painful diffidence
in a man who had had such experiences greatly surprised me, and
its simplicity almost amused me. Occupied as I had been all
through the war with what was taking place with the Army of the
Potomac, I knew but little of the manner in which the operations
of other armies had taken place. General Thomas' account gave
me a different view of his operations and the battle of Nashville
from what I had previously had, and corrected some erroneous im-
pressions. He seemed to me just as simple-hearted as when I had
met him in Florida at the time he joined his regiment coming fresh
from the Military Academy.
Sincerely yours,
A. A. HuMPHREYS.
MAJOR-GENERAL DE PEYSTER, N. Y.
344 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H THOMAS
“NORWICH, CONN., May 30th, 1874.
MY DEAR GENERAL DE PEYSTER :
In answer to your favor of the 23rd, I would state that I recall
very readily the account which Gen. Geo. H. Thomas gave one
evening before a scientific club in Washington of the battle of
Nashville. He had drawn plans showing the position of the
opposing forces, and pointed out the order of attacks as made in the
different points along the line, and stated the results of the several
movements. Substantial success was attained by the Union forces
at every point, the enemy was beaten back, and the close of the
first day indicated strongly what became complete on the day fol-
lowing—his thorough defeat.
“I scarcely need say that we all listened to General Thomas with
rapt attention and with great gratification. His plans and statements
were so clear and explicit that I think every one present must have
obtained a good idea of the plan of the battle and of the manner
in which it was fought. What struck me very forcibly and I ple-
Sume others present were impressed in the same manner, was the
apparent forgetfulness of himself, in connection with the events he
was describing. Had we not known that he was the commanding
general, and that every movement was the result of the action of his
mind and will, we should never have imagined it from any allusion
he made to himself. But when he came to pronounce an opinion
upon the whole subject and to point out, as he did, what he called a
grave error of judgment, he made himself prominent at once and
threw the blame entirely on himself.
At the close of the first day, he says he ought to have detached a
force and sent it round to the rear of the enemy and cut off his re-
treat. Had he done so, he would have captured nearly or quite the
whole of Hood's army. As it was Hood was enabled to effect his
retreat. I asked him if he was not pronouncing a rigorous and
unjust judgment, and suggested that at the close of the first day it was
impossible for him to decide whether Hood's forces were thoroughly
demoralized and defeated or not. That if he had detached a force
of sufficient strength to the enemy’s rear to cut off his retreat,
whether it would not have so weakened his attacking columns the
second day, that they would have fought with less confidence of
victory, and whether, if Hood's men had known that their retreat
was cut off, it might not have given them the energy of despair and
impelled them to fight so as to turn back the tide of victory. He
did not yield at all to my suggestions: he said that a general must
be prepared to take some risks, and that Hood's army ought all to have
FIOOD HOPEFUL OF SUCCESS, 345
been captured. The entire absence of all self-assertion on the part
of General Thomas, his unaffected modesty, were most conspicuous
the whole evening. It seemed to me that had any other officer but
himself been in command, he would never have indulged in so
Severe a criticism of his conduct.
Believe me very truly yours,
L. F. S. FOSTER.”
The last sentence of Senator Foster's letter is indeed true.
Much as General Thomas differed from his superiors in
respect to the operations in which he participated, he never
indulged in criticism, except to his most intimate friends, or
in unfolding his own views for historical record.
The decisiveness of the victory on the second day at
Nashville may have suggested to General Thomas the
movement to the enemy's rear, as the one which would
have resulted in the capture of Hood's entire army. This
victory has certainly led to the supposition that this army
had been so demoralized by the battle of Franklin, that it
did not fight at Nashville with its traditional vigor. Some
of the evidences of General Hood's faith in the morale of
his army have already been mentioned—his advance to
Nashville, his first and second entrenched positions, and his
purpose to assume the offensive. During the action of the
I 5th, the left of his line had been driven back four miles, and
yet he was confident of successful defense. He did not
anticipate disaster, as the following quotation indicates:
I did not, I might say, anticipate a break at that time, as our
forces up to that moment had repulsed the Federals at every point
and were waving their colors in defiance crying out to the enemy,
‘Come on, Come on.’ Just previous to the fatal occurrence, I had
matured the movement for the next morning. The enemy’s right
flank by this hour, stood in air some six miles from Nashville, and
I had determined to withdraw my entire force during the night and
attack this exposed flank in rear. I could safely have done so, as I
still had open a line of retreat. *
If Hood had not been confident of success in defense,
* “Advance and Retreat," p. 303.
346 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS
it would have been a glaring error to leave his detached
forces at Murfreesboro' without orders to move, until his
army was retreating from Nashville. The fact that there
were troops at Murfreesboro' and in Kentucky proves this
confidence, almost as conclusively as the withholding of
orders until the night of the 16th.
But believing subsequently in the practicability of the
capture of Hood's army by the movement of a strong force
to his rear on the night of the 15th, Thomas was bold to
declare his error in not doing so. In the face of so decisive
a victory most generals would have been silent in regard to
after-thoughts whose expression would diminish their fame,
but Thomas was truthful even when the truth was against
himself.
An anecdote will show how calm and how thoughtful of
minor matters General Thomas was on the morning of the
fifteenth of December, although under the weight of great
responsibility, and perplexing embarrassments. As he rode
through the city to the field of battle, he suddenly halted
the accompanying cavalcade of staff officers and escort, and
beckoned Major Mills to him from the side-walk. The
major was one of the quartermasters on duty at Nashville,
charged with the issue of fuel. The general asked: “Have
I drawn all my allowance of coal for this month P” Receiv-
ing a negative answer, he then said: “Will you please send
fourteen bushels of coal to Mr. Harris, my neighbor P I
was out of coal and borrowed this number of bushels from
him the other day.” The promise having been given, he
expressed his thanks and rode on. Who else in the crisis
of his career, expecting every moment to be overtaken by
an order relieving him from command, would have given
attention to a matter so trivial P
An anecdote, related by a gentleman connected with the
Sanitary Commission, illustrates the extreme calmness of
General Thomas in the most critical moments of battle.
This gentleman went to the battle-field at Nashville, to wit-
HIS OPINION OF THE WEG RO, 347
ness the action and observe the bearing of the commanding
general. He therefore kept as near Thomas as practi.
cable, and only once noticed the slightest gesture indica-
tive of interest in the operations of the army. Having
ordered an assault, General Thomas and his staff were watch-
ing the advance of the attacking column. Suddenly an
officer exclaimed: “General, they have stopped.” The
sententious reply was: “They have not.” The troops were
then near the enemy's entrenchments and all knew that the
crisis had come, but the only indication the general gave of
his consciousness of the decisive moment, was a gentle
stroke of his beard. There was no change of countenance
or mien when the troops leaped over the enemy's entrench-
ments. This Serenity of bearing in battle, was, no doubt, a
potent cause of the uniform steadiness of soldiers in his
presence, even in the most threatening emergencies of
battle.
The colored troops displayed bravery and other soldierly
traits at Nashville. When riding over the field General
Thomas saw their dead commingled with the bodies of
white soldiers, he said: “This proves the manhood of the
negro.” Morgan's brigade participated gallantly in
Steedman's feint, on the first day, and Thompson's brigade
assaulted on the left of Post's brigade, on the second day,
with marked steadiness and bravery. In an address before
the New York Historical Society, General De Peyster
quoted the words of General Thomas which give his esti-
mate of those troops and their race:
It will take time for the regeneration of the negro, but he will
come out purified by the terrible ordeal to which he has been sub-
jected, and assume an honorable position in the ranks of humanity.
That which is too weak to stand the protracted trial will perish ; that
which is too thoroughly infected with the poisonous influence of
slavery will slough off; but the remnant will be found to be men,
and discharge their duties as citizens in our midst. *
* “ Nashville—the Decisive Battle of the Rebellion."
348 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H THOMAS
It was meet that he who had given official and personal
encouragement to those in his department who organized
and disciplined negro soldiers, should witness their valor in
battle and bear testimony to it; and that the former slave-
holder should condemn slavery, and express hope for those
who had been subjected to its poisonous influences.
CHAPTER XVI.
PURSUIT OF THE ROUTEI) ARMY-OBST ACLES TO RAPID MOVEMENT—
HOOD'S DIMINISHED ARMY CROSSES THE TENNESSEE RIVER—THOMAS
SUGGESTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL AUTHORITY IN TENNESSEE-
TROMOTION OF THOMAS, w
LTHOUGH the battle of Nashville resulted in a vic-
tory unprecedented in its decisiveness, in view of
circumstances and conditions, it did not exempt General
Thomas from instructions and orders from the Capital and
from General Grant, in reference to the pursuit of the defeated
enemy. With the official congratulations to Thomas and
his army, were mingled exhortations to vigorous pursuit.
Thomas was told that he had a great opportunity, and was
urged so strongly to destroy Hood's army in retreat as to
imply, that the victorious general was either ignorant of the
grand possibility, or needed special spurring to gather the
fruits of victory. He had been urged beyond precedent to
fight the enemy, and when he had fought one of the most
brilliant battles in the world's history, he was pressed with
equal vigor to do, what he would have done without sug-
gestion from his superiors. Seemingly the difficulties of the
pursuit were overlooked, and the only recognized barrier to
the complete overthrow of the enemy was the sluggishness
of Thomas. But in fact the difficulties were almost insur-
mountable, and the sluggishness altogether imaginary.
General Hood did not lose the Franklin road, his direct
349
35C LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H, THOMAS,
line of retreat. His army to save itself, dropped all material
that impeded its rapid movement. A few brigades that
maintained organization formed a stalwart rearguard, con-
scious of the importance and peril of their office. Hood
moved as far as possible during the night of the 16th, and
the distance then gained was of immense advantage.
General Wood with his corps pursued rapidly for several
miles, but was unable to overtake the enemy. General
Wilson remounted his cavalry, and continued the pursuit
till I I P. M. The night was rainy, and intensely dark.
About four miles north of the Harpeth, General Hatch
encountered Chalmers' division formed in line across the
road. Hatch immediately dismounted a part of his division,
and deployed his men on each side of the road, and then
charging the enemy's centre with the Twelfth Tennessee
cavalry, Colonel Spaulding leading, broke the line and
routed the whole force; capturing General Rucker, then
commanding the division, and three guns. This action took
place about ten o'clock at night.
General Wilson has given the following anecdote: Gen-
eral Thomas frequently said to Wilson during the first half
of December, “they are treating me like a boy,” and
as often asserted that, if let alone he would whip Hood.
Late at night, on the 16th, when on the Granny White turn-
pike in pursuit of the enemy, Wilson heard a horseman
approaching; soon General Thomas rode up, offered his
hand and said, “I told you we could whip Hood,” and in
an instant rode back to his quarters.
Before daylight on the 17th, Wilson's corps was again in
motion ; Knipe's, Croxton's, and Hatch's troops on the
Granny White turnpike, and Johnson's, on the Hillsboro'
road. General Knipe leading, found the enemy strongly
posted at Hollow Tree Gap, on the direct road, four miles
north of Franklin. The enemy was again charged in front
and on his flanks, and quickly dislodged, losing four hun-
dred and thirteen prisoners and three colors.
PURSUIT OF HOOD. 35 I
The cavalry then advanced, and crossed the Harpeth
River at Franklin, and at the fords above and below the
town,” advancing thereafter on the Columbia, Carter's Creek,
and Lewisburg turnpikes, under orders to move rapidly for-
ward, and endeavor to press round the flanks of the enemy's
rearguard. This accomplished, it was expected that by
direct and flank attacks, Hood's last organized brigades
would be broken and dispersed. Late in the evening the
enemy was found in open fields, one mile north of the west
Harpeth. Wilson at once ordered Hatch and Knipe to
charge the flanks of this force, and Lieutenant Hedges, with
a detachment of the Fourth U. S. cavalry to attack its
centre on the road. The enemy opened with artillery, but
Wilson's forces, undeterred by this fire charged his centre
and flanks, drove him from position and captured his guns.
Darkness prevented further pursuit.
General Hood thus mentioned this action in his official
report:
During this day's march the enemy's cavalry pressed with great
boldness and activity, charging our infantry repeatedly with the
sabre, and at times penetrating our lines.
Early in the morning of the 17th, the Fourth corps ad-
vanced, first to Franklin, and then in the rear of the cavalry
on the Columbia turnpike.
Early the next morning the Cavalry Corps, although out
of rations, renewed the pursuit, in the endeavor to strike the
rearguard at Spring Hill. But the enemy having marched
rapidly could not again be brought to a stand.
“The densely wooded country, muddy roads, and plowed
fields, rendered almost impassable by the constant rain,
made it very difficult for the troops, traveling on the right
and left of the pike, to get forward fast enough to overtake
the enemy marching on the pike.”f
* General Wilson, in compliance with orders from General Thomas, had sent
Johnson's division on the Harding Turnpike to turn Franklin.
f General Wilson's Report of Operations of Cavalry Corps, Mil. Div. of Miss.
352 IIFE OF GENERAL, G EORG E H, THOMAS,
It was General Thomas' intention to hurry his infantry
forward on the main road, and move his cavalry on lateral
roads to intercept the enemy. But this proved to be im-
practicable. The protracted rain rendered the natural
roads almost impassable for cavalry, and the branching
roads diverged too much from the enemy's line of retreat
to be used for flank movements. The infantry was there-
fore compelled to follow in the rear of the cavalry.
Thomas soon perceived that he could not reach Hood's
army by direct pursuit, and sent Steedman's forces to
Decatur and beyond, in hope of destroying his bridge or
intercepting his fugitive troops south of the Tennessee River.
This movement also, though quickly accomplished, failed
in its main object, but several detachments of cavalry from
the Fifteenth Pennsylvania, Second Michigan, and the
Tenth, Twelfth and Thirteenth Indiana regiments, consti-
tuting Colonel William J. Palmer's brigade of Wilson's
corps, advanced from Decatur upon Hood's line of retreat
in Mississippi, captured a large supply train, a pontoon train,
and defeating detachments of cavalry, captured a large
number of prisoners. This movement to the south bank of
the Tennessee had another object, the re-occupation of
the abandoned posts. e
Generals Wilson and Wood advanced under constant
rains to Rutherford's Creek on the 19th. Here there was
delay, the enemy had destroyed the bridge and the deep
swift current forbade fording. The next day a bridge was
extemporized and Hatch's division crossed and advanced
rapidly to Columbia, but found that the enemy had crossed,
and lifted his pontoon bridge. At noon on the 21st,
the pontoon train arrived at Rutherford's Creek. A bridge
was thrown at once, as the Fourth Corps joined the cavalry
at Columbia. At this place was also delay resulting from
the difficulty of throwing a bridge in the extreme cold
which followed the rain, and of adapting it, when thrown,
to the continued subsidence of the water. The Fourth
DIFFICULTIES OF THE PURSUIT. 353
Corps crossed Duck River on the evening of the 23rd, and
the cavalry the next morning.
General Hood had hoped, when he began to retreat, that
he would be able to hold the line of Duck River defensively,
but when he had retreated to that river, the condition of his
army was such as to forbid any measure but a run for life.
He was joined at Columbia by Forrest's command from
Murfreesboro’. He had then a stronger rearguard with
a new commander. Besides, the country south of Colum-
bia gave better positions for defense. Hood's rear forces
were encountered at Linnville, and at another point north
of Pulaski, and driven from position. The rearguard was
closely followed through that town by Colonel Har-
rison's brigade of cavalry. In his haste the enemy left
the bridge over Rockland Creek, but halted in a narrow
pass beyond. Here he turned upon Harrison and captured
one of his guns, but lost fifty prisoners when Hatch,
Croxton and Hammond moved upon his flanks. At
Sugar Creek he abandoned an entrenched position as soon
as Wilson developed preparations to attack. At this point
the pursuit was abandoned in consequence of information
that Hood's fugitive forces had crossed the Tennessee
at Bainbridge, where a pontoon bridge had been in waiting
for some time. This crossing was effected in sight of the
gunboats under Admiral Lee, sent to that place to inter-
cept the retreat.
While the weather and other circumstances favored the
pursuit of Hood's army, Thomas lacked the requisites
for rapid pursuit by his whole army. He was com-
pelled to depend upon trains for supplies, as the country
contiguous to Hood's line of retreat had been previously
stripped of provisions for his army. Had there been
supplies in that region, their collection would have im–
peded pursuit. Numerous streams, swollen by several days
of rain, crossed the road upon which Hood retreated, and
General Thomas had been deprived of Colonel George P.
23
354 LIFE OF GENERA. L. G. EORG E H, THOMAS.
Buell's Fifty-eighth Indiana regiment of trained pontoniers
and bridge-builders. The march to the sea had taken away
this invaluable regiment, which had had astonished General
Sherman by its swiftness in throwing pontoons on the way,
and in restoring a heavy bridge over the Ogeechee River.
An effort had been made by Colonel Merrill, in compliance
with orders from General Thomas, to construct pontoons
and organize a force of pontoniers, but there had not been
sufficient time to provide a sufficient number for such a
pursuit, or to train a battalion of pontoniers. These were
needed since the enemy destroyed as far as possible all
bridges behind him. There had been a slight delay in
consequence of the error of a staff officer in writing Mur-
freesboro' instead of Nolensville, in an order from General
Thomas for the movement of the pontoon train. The train
however had gone but a short distance toward Murfrees-
boro’ before it was turned across to the Nolensville road
and thence on a fine road to Rutherford's Creek. The one
road to Columbia through Franklin was too crowded with
troops and trains for a quicker movement on that road.
While using all his resources to overtake and crush
Hood's army, Thomas was indignant that it was considered
necessary to urge him from day to day to exert himself to
gain these ends. He was still more tried by the suggestion
of reasons for the vigorous pursuit of Hood's army.
General Grant, upon his arrival at Washington, on the
15th, introduced the official spurring which was continued
for several days thereafter. His first despatch was at I 1.30
P. M., of that day.
I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a despatch from
Van Dusen, detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go no
further. Push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is entirely
destroyed. Your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break
up Hood's army and make it useless for future operations. Do not
stop for trains or supplies but take them from the country as the
enemy has done. Much is now expected. ©
UNNEED ED SUGG ESTIONS 355
On the 18th, at noon, he telegraphed :
The armies operating against Richmond have fired two hundred
guns in honor of your great victory. Sherman has fully established
his base on Ossabaw Sound with Savannah fully invested. I hope
to be able to fire a salute to-morrow in honor of the fall of Savannah.
In all your operations we hear nothing of Forrest. Great precau-
tion should be taken to prevent him crossing the Cumberland or
Tennessee Rivers below Eastport. After Hood is driven as far as it
is possible to follow him, you want to re-occupy Decatur and all
other abandoned points.
In the same spirit, General Halleck telegraphed on the
2 I St :
Permit me, General, to urge the vast importance of a hot pursuit of
Hood's army. Every possible sacrifice should be made, and your
men for a few days will submit to any hardships and privations to
accomplish the great result. If you can capture or destroy Hood's
army, General Sherman can entirely crush out the rebel military
force in all the Southern States. He begins a new campaign about
the first of January, which will have the most important results if
Hood's army can now be used up. A most vigorous pursuit on your
part is therefore of vital importance to General Sherman's plans. No
sacrifice must be spared to obtain so important a result.
To this despatch General Thomas replied:
Your despatch of 12 M., this day is received. General Hood's
army is being pursued as rapidly and as vigorously as it is possible
for one army to pursue another. We cannot control the elements,
and you must remember that to resist Hood's advance into Ten-
nessee, I had to re-organize and almost thoroughly equip the force
now under my command. I fought the battle of the fifteenth and
sixteenth instants, with the troops but partially equipped, and, not-
withstanding the inclemency of the weather, and the partial equip-
ments, have been enabled to drive the enemy beyond Duck River,
crossing two streams with my troops, and driving the enemy from
position to position without the aid of pontoons and with but
little transportation to bring up supplies of provisions and am-
munition. I am doing all in my power to crush Hood's army
and, if it be possible, will destroy it. But pursuing an enemy
through an exhausted Country, over mud roads completely sogged
*ith heavy rains, is no child's play, and cannot be accomplished
as quickly as thought of. I hope, in urging me to push the
enemy, the department remembers that General Sherman took
356 I, IFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS.
with him the complete organization of the Military Division of
the Mississippi, well equipped in every respect as regards ammuni-
tion, supplies and transportation, leaving me only two corps partially
stripped of their transportation to accommodate the force taken with
him, to oppose the advance into Tennessee of that army which had
resisted the advance of the army of the Military Division of the Mis-
sissippi on Atlanta, from the commencement of the campaign till its
close, and which is now, in addition,aided by Forrest's cavalry. Al-
though my progress may appear slow, I feel assured that Hood's
army can be driven from Tennessee and eventually driven to the
wall by the force under my command. But too much must not be
expected of troops which have to be re-organized, especially when
they have the task of destroying a force, in a winter's campaign,
which was able to make an obstinate resistance to twice its numbers
in spring and summer. In conclusion, I can safely state that this
army is willing to submit to any sacrifice to crush Hood's army, or to
strike any other blow which may contribute to the destruction of the
rebellion.
Thus boldly and truthfully did General Thomas describe
the situation, and vindicate himself and his army.
Badeau's comments upon this despatch as follows:
The defence was eloquent, but on orfe or two points hardly fair.
Sherman left Thomas much more than two corps, as has been repeat-
edly shown ; and Thomas had been, since the 3d of October, in
command of all the district north of the Tennessee. His headquar-
ters were established at the greatest depot west of the Alleghanies,
where thousands of quartermaster's employés were at his disposal
to provide transportation, and every facility was afforded for supply-
ing and equipping his troops. Few armies during the war were bet-
ter furnished than that which fought so successfully at Nashville. It
was to ensure this readiness that Thomas had so persistently re-
treated and delayed; and during the few days before the battle, he
had himself repeatedly assured the general-in-chief, that he was en-
tirely ready for offensive operations, and waited only for favorable
weather. The completeness of his success demonstrates that he was
ready. As to the willingness of both Thomas and his army to make
every sacrifice and every effort, that had been displayed on many
fields, but never more conspicuously than in this campaign. Nothing
was at fault but the disposition for elaborate preparation which,
at all times, and under all circumstances, was so marked a feature
of Thomas' character. *
* Mil. Hist., U. S. Grant, Vol. III, pp. 267 and 268.
HIS REPL Y TO HA. L.L.EOK. 357
It is clear that General Thomas referred to the forces of
the Military Division of the Mississippi, organized for field
service—those that had participated in the Atlanta cam-
paign. The garrisons were included in the forces of the
Department of the Cumberland, but the Army of the Cum-
berland, distinctively, embraced the troops organized and
equipped for field service. In this view of the case Thomas
was strictly accurate. Sherman did take with him the com-
plete organization of the Military Division of the Mississippi,
well equipped in every respect as regards ammunition, sup-
plies and transportation, leaving Thomas only two corps,
partially stripped of their transportation.
Thomas held command north of the Tennessee subject to
Sherman's orders until the I2th of November. It is true
that Sherman did not interfere with the management of af-
fairs at Nashville as a depot of supplies, but it is not true
that every facility was offered Thomas for supplying and
equipping his troops, and Something more than quarter-
master's employés are needed to provide transportation for
an army. General Thomas could not get horses for his
cavalry rapidly, even by sending his dismounted men
back to Kentucky, and it was still more difficult to in-
crease his army transportation at Nashville. Nashville was
a large depot, but the mules and wagons were drawn from
the North. General Smith's troops went to Nashville by
water and were almost entirely destitute of transportation.
The troops from garrison duty were in like condition.
When General Thomas reported himself “entirely ready
for offensive operations,” he did not mean that his army
was fully equipped for the pursuit of the enemy to the Ten-
nessee River. He had been ordered to fight without regard
to weather and reënforcements, and at the earliest moment
after the ice melted, he engaged the enemy. The army at
Nashville was doubtless well furnished for battle, but it was
not well furnished for the pursuit, as General Thomas truth-
fully asserted in his despatch to General Halleck. It is true
358 I, IFE OF GENERAI, G EORG E H. THOMAS.
that Thomas always insisted on adequate preparations, and
his disposition in this regard was vindicated by his uniform
success. No American general surpassed Thomas—if any
equalled him—in discerning beforehand what forces and
preparations were needed for campaign and battle.
Badeau is manifestly in error in supposing that General
Halleck might have been ordered by the Secretary of War
to send his despatch of the 21st.” Such a supposition is pre-
cluded by Mr. Stanton's despatch of the next day, which
most emphatically disclaimed any sympathy with the tone
and purport of the one which General Thomas so indig-
nantly answered. The Secretary of War said:
I have seen to-day General Halleck's despatch of yesterday, and
your reply. It is proper for me to assure you, that this department
has the most unbounded confidence in your skill, vigor and deter-
mination to employ to the best advantage all the means in your
power to pursue and destroy the enemy. No department could be
inspired with more profound admiration and thankfulness for the
great deeds, which you have already performed, or more confiding
faith that human effort could do no more, and no more than will be
done by you and the accomplished and gallant officers and soldiers
of your command.
Secretary Stanton had been impatient of General Thomas'
delay, and his utterances in respect to the postponement
of offensive operations had not been complimentary. But
this despatch made full atonement for all previous dis-
paragement. In view of the great victory the supposition
that Thomas needed urging was abhorrent to Stanton, and
his opinion of Halleck's despatch impelled him to speak in
strongest praise and in expression of the firmest confidence.
No matter who, or what, inspired Halleck's despatch, Mr.
Stanton was quick to free his department from the appear-
ance of sympathy with it.
In reply to the Secretary of War, Thomas telegraphed:
* Mil. Hist. U. S. Grant, Vol. III. page 265
SHERMAN’S “ SPARE ARMY.” 359
I am profoundly thankful for the hearty expression of your con-
fidence in my determination and desire to do all in my power to de-
stroy the enemy and put down the rebellion, and in the name of this
army, I thank you for the complimentary notice you have taken of all
connected with it, for the deeds of valor they have performed.
On the 22d, Grant also telegraphed Congratulations:
You have the congratulations of the public for the energy with
which you are pushing Hood. I hope you will succeed in reaching
his pontoon bridge at Tuscumbia before he gets there. Should you do
so, it looks to me that Hood is cut off If you succeed in destroying
Hood's army, there will be but one army left to the so-called Confede-
racy, capable of doing us harm. I will take care of that, and try to
draw the sting from it, so that in the spring we shall have easy sail-
ing. You have now a big opportunity, which I know you are avail-
ing yourself of. Let us push and do all we can before the enemy
can derive benefit, either from the raising of negro troops on the
plantations, or white troops now in the field.
General Grant does not state in this despatch that he
expected Sherman, with his large army, to assist in draw-
ing the sting from Lee's army, but that this was his ex-
pectation is evident from the fact that Sherman was
under orders at the date of this despatch, to transport his
army by sea to Virginia. On the 27th, Grant assented
to Sherman's march through the Carolinas to Virginia, and
then wrote to General Sherman :
Your confidence in being able to march up and join this army,
pleases me, and I believe it can be done. The effect of such a cam-
paign will be to disorganize the South, and prevent the organization
of new armies from their broken fragments. Hood is now retreating,
with his army broken and demoralized. His loss in men has prob-
ably not been far from twenty thousand, besides deserters. If time
is given, the fragments may be collected together, and many of the
deserters re-assembled. If we can, we should act to prevent this.
Your spare army, as it were, moving as proposed, will do it. * * * *
I have thought that Hood being so completely wiped out for present
harm, I might bring A. J. Smith here with fourteen to fifteen thou-
sand men. With this increase I could hold my lines, and move out
with a greater force than Lee has. It would compel Lee to retain
36O I, IFE OF GENERAL G EORG E H THOMAS,
all his present force in the defenses of Richmond, or abandon them
entirely. This latter contingency is probably the only danger to the
easy success of your expedition. In the event you should meet Lee's
army, you would be compelled to beat it, or find the sea coast. Of
course I shall not let Lee's army escape, if I can help it, and will not
let it go without following to the best of my ability.
Without waiting further directions, then, you may make your
preparations to start on your northern expedition without delay.
Break up the railroads in South and North Carolina, and join the
armies operating against Richmond as soon as you can.
From this outline of the projected operations on the
Atlantic coast, the special anxiety for the complete de-
struction of Hood's army becomes apparent, and the inspi-
ration of Halleck's despatch of the 21st, to Thomas is taken
out of the realm of doubt. It is equally apparent that
Grant thought of dismembering Thomas' army while it
was in pursuit of the enemy, that he might be able to hold
his lines, and move out with a greater force than Lee
could command, and thus compel him to hold Richmond
with his entire army, or abandon that city altogether. There
was already a vast preponderance of National troops on the
Atlantic coast. The Army of the Potomac outnumbered the
Confederate Army of Virginia, and the Confederate leaders
had not been able to gather an army South of Richmond,
half the size of Sherman's. The only strong reason for the
dismemberment of the army that achieved the victory at
Nashville, before the condition of Hood's forces was known,
was the immediate reënforcement of the Army of the Po-
tomac.
On the 21st of January, Grant wrote a letter to Sherman,
which sharply censured Thomas for lack of vigor in the
pursuit of Hood's army, and also, for his unwillingnéss to
advance into Alabama:
Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign into
the heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis, Mary-
land, with his corps. The advance (six thousand) will reach the sea-
THE COMPLETEST VICTORY OF THE WAR. 36I
board by the 23d ; the remainder following as rapidly as railroad
transportation can be procured from Cincinnati. * * * * *
I was induced to do this because I did not believe Thomas
could possibly be got off before spring. His pursuit of Hood indi-
cated a sluggishness that satisfied me he would never do to con-
duct one of your campaigns. The command of the advance of the
pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed far behind.
When Hood had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had
reached it, Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State,
from which he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport.
He is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty,
but is not good on a pursuit. He also reported his troops fagged,
and that it was necessary to equip up. This report and a determi-
nation to give the enemy, no rest, determined me to use his surplus
troops elsewhere.
Thomas is still left with a sufficient force, surplus, to go to Selma
under an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to, to know
whether he could go, and if so, by which of several routes he would
select. No reply is yet received. Canby has been ordered to act
offensively from the sea coast to the interior, toward Montgomery
and Selma. Thomas' forces will move from the north at an early
day, or some of his troops will be sent to Canby.
General Thomas frequently asserted with great boldness
that he followed Hood's army as rapidly as possible, and
made every practicable effort to destroy it. In this way he
positively refutes General Grant's allegation of sluggishness,
although he never saw the letter in which this charge is
made.
In view of the conflicting assertions of Grant and Thomas,
it may be asked, when during the war, under correspond-
ing or different circumstances, was a defeated army fol-
lowed so far, so vigorously, or so disastrously to itself, as in
the case of the pursuit of Hood's army? And if the adverse
circumstances of this pursuit are considered, the assumption
can be sustained, that it surpassed all other efforts to de-
stroy armies in retreat that were made during the war. All
things considered, the victory at Nashville transcended all
other victories of the war, and no other pursuit so fully
supplemented a decisive victory, in effecting the destruction
of an army.
362 I, IFE OF GENERAL, GEORGE H, THOMAS,
\,
In no other campaign of the war was an army SO broken
by field operations, as was Hood's in Tennessee. It
was virtually annihilated. The broken column of four-
teen thousand men, lost five-sevenths of its strength by
desertion on its way to North Carolina, from Mississippi.
The meagre remnant wandering across the continent, dis-
pirited and feeble, the only force distinctly representing the
grand, heroic Confederate Army of the Tennessee, told the
story of Nashville, and of the pursuit which followed. And
yet this spiritless column of less than five thousand men,
was the only offset made by the enemy to the eighty or
ninety thousand veteran soldiers sent to the Atlantic Coast
from the Military Division of the Mississippi.
Thomas was ordered by General Grant to depend
upon an exhausted country for supplies, and obedience
would have arrested the pursuit almost at its beginning.
With insufficient transportation he was retarded in the pur-
suit, but without any he could not have pursued at all.
He did trust his advanced forces to subordinates, but
when and where did ever an army commander take per-
sonal command of his vanguard in pursuing a defeated
army P. The character and service of the generals to whom
he entrusted his leading corps, cavalry and infantry, cer-
tainly justified his action. When Grant sent General
James H. Wilson, to be chief of cavalry of the Military
Division of the Mississippi, he said to Sherman, that
Wilson would add fifty per cent. to the strength of the
cavalry. Surely a general thus endorsed, who had, besides,
in the operations preceding the battle of Nashville, and in
that action, proved that this endorsement was just, could be
safely trusted to conduct the operations of his corps out of
the sight of the commanding general, when the place as-
signed him in the pursuit was the legitimate position for the
chief of cavalry. And Thomas did not err in placing
General Wood, commanding the Fourth Corps, in the ad-
vance with the cavalry. The Fourth Corps had engaged in
G ENERALS WILSON AND WOOD. 363
some of the severest conflicts of the Atlanta campaign and
had sustained its reputation in the battles of Franklin and
Nashville, and the general who commanded this corps in
the 'action at Nashville, had been prominent as a division
commander at Stone River, Chickamauga, Missionary Ridge,
and in many of the severest conflicts in Georgia. It was
therefore fitting that General Thomas should associate Wood
with Wilson in leading his forces in the pursuit of Hood's
army.
General Thomas, however, was near the head of his army
until he reached Pulaski, forty miles from the Tennessee
River. Here he remained until the pursuit terminated, but
he nevertheless gave specific directions to Generals Wilson
and Wood in respect to the operations on the other side of
Pulaski. The operations beyond that place were as much
the result of his personal direction as the previous move-
ments had been. General Wood in his official report ex-
plicitly mentions the directions given by General Thomas,
in regard to the movements south of Pulaski, and also gives
the general character of the pursuit:
On the following morning, the twenty-fourth, I was detained
until twelve M., waiting for the cavalry to come up and move out.
Shortly after the cavalry had passed out through my camp, Brevet
Major-General Wilson sent me a message to the effect that he had
found the ground so soft that he could not operate off the turnpike,
and begging that I would not become impatient at the delay he was
causing in the movement of my command. At twelve M., the road
was free of the cavalry, when the corps was put in motion and
marched sixteen miles that afternoon and encamped two miles south
of Linnville.
Sunday morning, the twenty-fifth, the corps followed closely on
the heels of the cavalry, passed through Pulaski from which the cavalry
had rapidly driven the enemy's rearguard and encamped for the night
six miles from the turn on the Lamb’s Ferry road. The corps
marched sixteen miles on the twenty-fifth, the last six miles on a
road next to impracticable from the depth of the mud. As we could
not have the use of the turnpike further south than Pulaski, I or-
dered all the artillery of the corps, but four batteries, to be left at
364 LIFE OF GENERAL, G EORG E H, THOMAS.
Pulaski, using the horses of the batteries left to increase the horses
of the pieces taken with the command to eight, and of the caissons
to ten horses each. I also ordered that only a limited number of
ammunition wagons, carrying but ten boxes each, should accompany
the command. These arrangements were necessary on account of
the condition of the road on which the enemy had retreated.
'Without extra teams to the artillery carriages and lightening the
usual load of an ammunition wagon, it would have been impractica-
ble to get the vehicles along; a vigorous pursuit would have been
impossible. These dispositions were reported to the commanding
general. He directed me to follow the cavalry and support it. The
pursuit was continued with all possible celerity to Lexington, Ala-
bama, thirty miles south of Pulaski. Six miles south of Lexington,
Brevet Major-General Wilson learned certainly on the twenty-eighth
that the rear of the enemy had crossed the river on the twenty-
seventh and that his bridge was taken up on the morning of the
twenty-eighth. These facts were reported to the commanding
general who ordered that the pursuit be discontinued. To continue it
further at that time, besides being useless, even if possible, was really
impossible. Of the pursuit it may be truly remarked, that it is without
a parallel in this war. It was continued for more than a hundred
miles at the most inclement season of the year over a road, the
whole of which was bad, and thirty miles of which were wretched
almost beyond description.
General Wilson’s official utterances are in striking har-
mony with those of General Wood :
The rebels retreated that night (Dec. 24th,) to the vicinity of
Pulaski, but the next day were driven through that place closely
pressed by Harrison's brigade. The bridge across Richland Creek
was saved by the celerity and good management with which Colonel
Harrison handled his command, so that without delaying he con-
tinued the pursuit, and by 2 P.M., came up with the enemy, strongly
entrenched at the head of a heavily wooded and deep ravine, through
which ran the road. The country was so difficult and broken, that
the men of Harrison's brigade were necessarily in weak order, but
nothing daunted they pressed the enemy's skirmishers back to their
fortified position. Here they were compelled to halt, and while the
troops of Hatch's Croxton’s and Hammond's commands were
marching through the woods to their support, a few hundred of the
enemy’s infantry, for the first time since the battles about Nashville,
sallied forth from their breast-works, and drove back Harrison's at-
tenuated skirmish line, and captured one gun of Smith's battery, “I,”
THE PURSUIT OF HOOD. 365
Fourth United States artillery. They were promptly driven back,
but had succeeded in getting the captured gun off. Hammond,
Croxton and Hatch moving on the flanks of their position, they aban-
doned it hastily, just before night, leaving about fiſty prisoners in
our hands.
On the 26th the pursuit was continued to the Sugar Creek, the
enemy falling back, and making but slight resistance. At the latter
place they took up a strong position, and held it until General Ham-
mond had developed his forces, and got ready to attack. Hastily
withdrawing, they continued their march throughout the night. It
had now become evident that no effolt on the part of my command
could again bring Forrest to risk another engagement. Having
neither rations nor forage, and learning that the main body of the
rebel troops had already reached the south side of the Tennessee, I
directed the corps to halt, and the next morning I sent Colonel
Spaulding, of the Twelfth Tennessee cavalry, with five hundred
picked men, after the enemy, with directions to continue the pursuit
until he had reached the Tennessee River. He reached the river at
Bainbridge early on the morning of the 28th, the last of the enemy
having crossed and taken up the bridge during the night. The road
from Pulaski to Bainbridge was as bad as it could possibly be, the
country through which it runs, almost entirely denuded of forage and
army supplies. Both men and forces suffered greatly. Hood having
effected his escape, the corps was ordered to Eastport for the purpose
of refitting and resting. Before this order was received, however,
Hatch, Hammond and Harrison had marched to Athens, on the
road to Huntsville, in pursuance of previous instructions from Gene-
ral Thomas.
* 3& -X- -X- -Y: -X- -Y- *
Before closing this report it may not be improper to say, that
through fine entire campaign the bravery and steadiness of the cavalry
troops, new and old, were most conspicuous. Nothing could have
been more admirable than their conduct on the Harpeth, in the two
days’ battle at Nashville, in the affair on the west Harpeth, or in the
pursuit which followed. I know of no battles of the war where the in-
fluence of the cavalry was more potent, or of any pursuit sustained so
long and well. The results of the campaign added to those fol-
lowing the same policy in the Army of the Potomac, clearly de-
monstrate the wisdom of massing the entire cavalry of an army, and
it is to be hoped will obtain from the War Department a recognition
of the corps already organized.
The following statement from General Wilson supple-
ments this report:
366 I, IFE OF GENERAI, GEORG E H THOMAS.
In pursuit of Hood's army, the cavalry lost about five thousand
horses, from exhaustion, exposure, and insufficient forage. This fact
alone is sufficient to show the difficulties which were encountered and
the resolution with which they were surmounted.
There is, therefore, the strongest concurrent testimony
from Generals Thomas, Wilson and Wood, to the fact that
the pursuit of Hood was conducted with great vigor, and
with disastrous results to the enemy. Neither is it true, as
Grant wrote to Sherman, that Thomas intrusted the ad-
vance to subordinates, and that when Hood crossed the
Tennessee River, Thomas had not much more than half
crossed the state. General Thomas did trust the very
efficient generals who commanded his two corps—cav-
alry and infantry—which led in the pursuit from Nash-
‘ville to the Tennessee, in all matters of detail, but, from
first to last, they moved in obedience to his instructions.
And when Hood crossed the Tennessee, Thomas was at
Pulaski, which place he had reached before the enemy
crossed that river, and the operations beyond that place
were conducted under his orders, which were as specific as
is usual to corps commanders. General Wilson received
orders from General Thomas on the 27th, to pursue the
enemy to the Tennessee, and then endeavor to cross at
Eastport, Miss., under cover of the gunboats, and destroy
the Memphis and Charleston railroad bridge over Bear
Creek. When the last of Hood's army crossed the Ten-
nessee, Schofield's corps was at Columbia, Smith's at
Pulaski, Wood's and Wilson's south of Pulaski, and General
Thomas was in the best possible position to direct the
movements of his entire army, should the forces south of
Pulaski, develop the necessity for the advance of Smith and
Schofield. A part of the cavalry in rear of General Wilson
was directed to Athens by General Thomas, and seldom, if
ever, has an army commander kept scattered forces in
motion more completely by his own orders.
If General D. H. Maury may be believed, the opinion did
A CONFEDERATE GENERAL'S OPINION. 367
not obtain amongst those who fled from Nashville, that there
was a lack of vigor on the part of the troops who drove the
enemy through rain, Snow, Cold and mud across the State
of Tennessee, and over the Tennessee River.
In the “Southern Historical Society Papers” for June,
1876, General Maury thus refers to General Thomas and
the battle of Nashville:
It is charitable to believe that in making these dispositions for
his own movements and for the defense of Nashville, Sherman must
have estimated the personal resources of General Thomas very
highly ; the result amply justified such an estimate. The army, with
which Thomas gained his great victory, was largely made up of forces
detached for the occasion from other armies, of new levies and of dis-
mounted cavalry, some of whom were remounted in presence of the
enemy, and was therefore ill-fitted to cope with the veteran army of
Hood. s
So impatient was the Federal Government of the delay of Thomas'
in attacking Hood, that on the 9th of December he was ordered to
be relieved from the command of the army.
The order was, fortunately for Halleck, suspended. Thomas
would not attack till he was ready. His victory was decisive. But
even after that, the Washington City generalissimo, Halleck, com-
plained that Thomas did not press Hood's army.
I have never heard anybody who was in Hood's army at that
time, justify Halleck’s complaints on this score. Thomas’ own letter
replying to these indiscreet strictures, shows the stuff of which the
writer was made.
In calm review of these operations, it is but fair to say that in the
whole course of the war, there was no finer illustration of generalship
exhibited by any Federal commander than General Thomas' defense
of Nashville.
General Grant was palpably in error in his later criti-
cisms of the conduct of Thomas in the pursuit of Hood's
army. And these later criticisms are palpably in conflict
with his commendation of Thomas for his vigor in pur-
suing the enemy. The facts, however, vindicate Thomas.
His generalship, as displayed in the conduct of the entire
campaign, will bear comparison with that of any other gen-
eral in any other campaign of the war. If success is ac-
cepted as the criterion of generalship, his conduct of the
368 LIFE OF GENERAI, G EORG E H THOMAS.
Operations and battles of this campaign, gives him a place
beside the great captains of the world. If a higher stand-
ard, and one more just is adopted, his generalship stands
in boldest relief. Success may depend upon the action of
subordinates, or a good army may win victories despite the
blunders of its generals. But the higher criterion, takes
into account the mastery of resources, provision against
the possibilities to the enemy, and the nice adjustment and
aggregate force of all Operations.
Had the battlé of Nashville been fought in summer or
early autumn, and a victory been won, with no subsequent
pursuit, history would have given this action a place in the
category of great conflicts. But fought in winter, and Sup-
plemented by a pursuit scarcely less disastrous to the enemy
than the battle itself, conducted with meagre transportation,
when wagons were the only dependence for supplies, across
swollen streams, with scant appointments for bridging them,
in rain, Snow, Cold and mud, the operations as a whole are
lifted into prominence even in the narrow range of trans-
cendent military achievements.
A general's opinion of another soldier, has no rightful
place in history, unless sustained by facts. A great
general's higher relations to history should not be en-
dangered by his own utterance of unsupported statements
—made from afar and in ignorance of facts—in regard
to another great general, whose achievements have given
him an unequivocal and brilliant fame. Grant and Thomas
will both be accurately weighed when all partialities and
prejudices are laid aside, and this will be done without
reference to their opinions of each other. History has
nicely adjusted balances, though their use is often long de-
layed.
An estimate of Hood's loss in men, has been given. His
loss in material was correspondingly great. He admitted
a loss of fifty-four pieces of artillery, but the actual number
was seventy-two. The road from Nashville to Bainbridge
I, ETTER TO GO VERNOR JO HNSON. 369
was strewn with small arms and light equipments. Thomas
gathered his resources and formed his plans to crush Hood's
army, and that purpose was more fully accomplished, than
Thomas himself imagined when the remnant of that army
Crossed the Tennessee River.
General Hood attributed the failure of his campaign to
three causes, “the unfortunate affair at Spring Hill, the
short duration of daylight at Franklin,” and “the non-
arrival of the expected reënforcements from the Trans-
Mississippi Department.” +
Upon the 29th of December General Thomas announced
the conclusion of the pursuit and campaign, and congratu-
lated his army upon its achievements. The reasons assigned
for this action were the state of the roads south of the
Tennessee River, and the consequent impossibility of sup-
plying the army for offensive operations. His army also
needed rest and re-equipment. In connection with the con-
gratulatory order, he gave directions for the location of his
forces in winter cantonments. He ordered Smith's corps to
take post at Eastport, Mississippi, Wood's at Huntsville
and Athens, Alabama, Schofield's at Dalton, Georgia, and
Wilson's near Huntsville, except one division which was to
be sent to Eastport. These troops had been in the field for
a long period, many of them since the advance of General
Rosecrans south of the Tennessee River. Thomas pro-
posed to give them a short rest, and make preparations for
a new campaign. But his orders did not meet the approval
of General Grant and were consequently countermanded.
On the 30th of December General Thomas addressed the
following letter to Andrew Johnson, military governor of
the State of Tennessee :
H'DQR'S DEP'T OF THE CUMB., PULASKI, TENN.,
Dec. 30, 1864, 9 P. M.
BRIG. GEN’L AND. JOHNSON,
Military Governor of Tennessee, Nashville:
As the enemy is now entirely driven out the State of Tennessee,
* “Advance and Retreat," page 304.
24
37O LIFE OF GENERA.J., G. EORG E H. THOMAS.
I would respectfully suggest that immediate measures be taken for
the reorganization of the civil government of the State, as it is de-
sirable, if possible, to place as large a force of the army beyond the
borders of the State, and as close to the enemy as we can, and #
should be very happy to be assured that I could leave the State in
the hands of the citizens. All should certainly now feel that the
establishment of rebel authority in the State of Tennessee is
hopeless, and their own interests should induce them to return to
their allegiance to the United States and restore peace to their State
without any further quibbling.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Comd'g.
In this suggestion General Thomas evinced both wis-
dom and patriotism. Having thus early recommended
the cessation of military rule in Tennessee, he was exceed-
ingly careful during the years in which that State was in-
cluded in his military division, not to trench needlessly upon
the prerogatives of civil government. And although the
full restoration of the civil power would necessarily abridge
his own authority, he was quick to recommend the re-
organization of the civil government of the State of Ten-
nessee. This was, probably, the first request that invited
a military governor of a seceded State, to lay aside his
martial prerogatives and put in operation methods of ad-
ministration, that were purely civil. In this action Gen-
eral Thomas plainly indicated his belief that in this coun-
try military rule is utterly abnormal, and should be set
aside at the earliest moment consistent with social order and
the demands of a state of war. With such a general com-
manding the armies of a free country, the liberties of the
people would never be imperiled by the supremacy of
military authority.
December 24th, General Thomas' appointment as major-
general in the United States Army was made known to
him by the Secretary of War, through the following de-
spatch :
MAJOR-GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY. 37 I
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
December 24th, 1864.
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAs,
Headquarters Dep't Cumberland,
zyża Nashville, Tenn.
With great pleasure I inform you, that for your skill, courage and
conduct in the recent brilliant military operations under your com-
mand, the President has directed your nomination to be sent to the
Senate as a major-general in the United States Army, to fill the only
vacancy in that grade. No official duty has been performed by me
with more satisfaction, and no commander has more justly earned
promotion by devoted, disinterested and valuable services to his
Country. EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
This despatch is exceedingly complimentary and fully re-
cognizes General Thomas' services in the war—especially
in the Tennessee campaign. But when he read it, he was
for some time silent, lost in thought and seemingly forget-
ful of his promotion and the tenor of Secretary Stanton's
language. During his silence, he doubtless recurred to the
treatment he had received from the National authorities,
recalling the fact that he had been twice overslaughed dur-
ing the war, and that a suitable recognition of his services,
at the battle of Mill Springs would have made him a major-
general of volunteers in January 1862, and at the battle of
Chickamauga, a major-general in the United States Army
in 1863, when these respective promotions would have given
larger commands early in the war and consequently, better
opportunities to serve his country and enhance his own
fame. Then turning to Surgeon George E. Cooper, medi-
cal director of his department, he handed to him the de-
spatch announcing his promotion, and said: “What do you
think of that P” When Dr. Cooper had read it, he replied:
“Thomas, it is better late than never.” The general then
said with measured words: “I suppose it is better late
than never, but it is too late to be appreciated; I earned this
at Chickamauga.” His emotion, as he uttered these words,
became too strong for his self-poise in this unguarded
372 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
moment, and he gave way to the strongest possible indica-
tion of intense feeling. The feeling that he had been mis-
trusted in his loyalty, had been denied promotions when
fairly earned and had been subjected to humiliating subor-
dination to inferiors in rank, overpowered the stern soldier
whose eye had never changed expression in the Supreme
moments of battle, and whose face had never blanched in
extreme personal danger, and for a moment he gave up the
mastery of himself.
His calm, dignified bearing under circumstances that
deeply wounded his nature, so intensely sensitive, has led
to the belief that he was indifferent to rank and correspond-
ing command. But in this, as in other matters affecting
chiefly his inner life, he was utterly misapprehended by
those who supposed that they knew him well. He was
really known only by the few who called forth confiding
friendship.
Some time after he said to a friend: “There is one thing
about my promotions that is exceedingly gratifying. I
never received a promotion they dared to withhold. After
Chickamauga they could not refuse a commission as bri-
gadier-general in the United States Army. And after
Nashville, a major-general's commission.”
Thus in positive self-assertion he declared that he had
forced his promotions from those who had long disregarded
his claim to higher rank. A modest self-respecting man,
when he does abandon his habitual reserve, is likely to ex-
press himself strongly. This, at least, was true of Thomas.
But the calm movement of his life was never disturbed, ex-
cept by some surprise that especially touched his heart,
or was excessively annoying. And the occasional loss of
equipoise made more prominent the habitual restraint of a
forceful nature.
During the operations in Middle Tennessee, affairs in
East Tennessee, also, demanded attention. In apparent
coöperation with Hood General Breckinridge assumed
R ESOL, UTIONS OF THANKS. 373
the offensive, defeated General Gillem's force at Bull's
Gap on the 13th of November, and then advanced to-
ward Knoxville In the emergency General Thomas sent
troops from Chattanooga and Kentucky. But upon the
appearance of reënforcements Breckinridge retreated. As
General Hood's broad plan included his own advance
through East Tennessee to Richmond, the advance of the
enemy towards Knoxville, doubtless, had direct relation to
operations in Middle Tennessee. Hood had asked for
Breckinridge's command for his western operations, but
had been refused. General Lee was holding this force for
use either in Virginia or Tennessee. But Thomas made
dispositions to defeat the enemy's plans throughout the
campaign. His maintenance of a full garrison at Mur-
freesboro' was a great disappointment to Hood, since
that place was second only to Nashville as an objective
in Tennessee.
The Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States adopted the following resolution March 3rd, 1865:
That the thanks of Congress are due and are hereby tendered
to Major-General George H. Thomas, and the officers andºsoldiers
under his command for their skill and dauntless courage by which
the rebel army under General Hood was signally defeated and
driven from the State of Tennessee.” -
The General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, re-
solved, November 2nd, 1865 :
That the thanks of the General Assembly in their own name and
in the name of the people of the State of Tennessee, be presented to
Major-General George H. Thomas, and the officers and soldiers un-
der his command for his wise and spirited, and their brave and
patriotic conduct in the battle of Nashville, in defense of the capi-
tal of the State, in December 1864, and that a gold medal be struck
in commemoration of the great and decisive event and be presented
to him.
CHAPTER XVII.
OPERATIONS DURING THE WINTER AND SPRING OF 1865—DISCUSSION OF
GENERAL GRANT'S LETTERS CENSURING THOMAS—CAVALRY EXPEDITIONS
—WILSON IN ALABAMA AND GEORGIA—STONEMAN IN EAST TENNESSEE,
VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA-CAPTURE OF MR. DAVIS.
N the first day of January, 1865, the rebellion was
manifestly near its end. It was not indeed known in
the North that one of the two great armies that kept the
rebellion alive had been virtually annihilated by General
Thomas and his army, but it was known that Hood had lost
heavily in Tennessee, and that his forces had been driven
in routihcross the Tennessee River. It was evident after this
campaign that the overthrow of General Lee's army would
end the war. All projected operations, therefore, East and
West, had primary reference to the defeat of Lee's army, as
Hood's had been defeated at Nashville. General Sherman's
great army had been withdrawn from the central theatre of
war, to give aid in the end to General Grant at Richmond;
and when near Savannah, Sherman had received Orders to
transport his army by sea to Virginia, and to do this with-
out waiting to reduce that city. When it became known
that it was impracticable to obtain sufficient transports, an
advance through the Carolinas was projected by Sher-
man, and approved by Grant. This movement then
became for a time the central one, and the remotest
western operations were to be conducted, as coöperative,
more or less directly, with this paramount enterprise. All
374
GRANT'S PLANS, 375
'western movements, therefore, had these objects; to prevent
the transfer of Hood's shattered army to North Carolina,
and to attract the enemy's attention in various quarters, so
that no other troops should go in this direction from the
West and Southwest.
According to Badeau, Grant's plans widened into unpre-
cedented comprehensiveness in the last stage of the war,
and while Lee's army was the ultimate objective, the
first series of operations were directed, so as to aid Sher-
man's movement to Richmond. The following passage,
without distinctly mentioning the paramount objects, gives
in outline the breadth of Grant's plans:
Grant's plans at this time assumed a grander and more compre-
hensive character than at any other epoch of the war. The concen-
tration of his armies went on from the most distant quarters, and
coöperative movements were directed on a scale hitherto quite un-
precedented. *
If this passage is put by the side of Grant's declaration
to Thomas, that if he would destroy Hood's army, only one
army would be left to the Confederacy to do harm, the in-
ference is unavoidable that this final breadth of plan centred
first upon Sherman's northward march from Savannah, and
then upon the conjunction of two great armies against
Lee. The operations required of General Thomas during
the winter and spring of 1865, had relation to these objects.
When General Grant required Thomas to revoke his
order placing his army in winter cantonments, General Hal-
leck wrote, December 31st :
Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant directs all your available forces not
essential to hold your communications, be collected on the Tennessee
River, say at Eastport and Tuscumbia, and be made ready for such
movements as may be ordered. * * * * * Please give us the
earliest possible notice of Hood's line of retreat, so that orders may
* Mil, Hist. U. S. Grant. Vol. III. page 363,
376 LIFE OF GENERAL, GEORGE H. THOMAS,
be given for the continuance of the campaign. Lieutenant-General
Grant does not intend that your army shall go into winter quarters.
It must be made ready for active operations in the field.
A new campaign was plainly indicated, but its purpose
and field were not made known, and the inference was
warranted that Thomas was to conduct it; still it was not
the intention of Grant, as will be shown hereafter, that
Thomas should command in aggressive operations. But it
was to be his duty to prepare his troops for other generals
to command them.
Sherman, however, was urgent that Thomas should ad-
vance into the heart of Alabama. In a letter to Grant of
December 24th, after requesting that all detachments and
convalescents belonging to his own army should be sent
to him, he said: “I do not mean to cripple Thomas, be-
cause I regard his operations as all-important, and I have
ordered him to pursue Hood down into Alabama, trusting
to the country for supplies.” As Thomas had not heard
from Sherman since he started for the sea, the latter in
his letter to Grant must have referred to his parting in-
structions. On the I Ith of November he had said to
Thomas :
By using detachments of recruits and dismounted cavalry in
your fortifications, you will have Schofield and Stanley, and A. J.
Smith, strengthened by eight or ten new regiments, and all of Wil-
son's cavalry. You can safely invite Beauregard across the Tennes-
see, and prevent his ever returning. I still believe, however, that the
public clamor will force him to turn and follow me, in which event
you should cross at Decatur, and move directly towards Selma as far
as you can transport Supplies.
At the time these instructions were given, and ever after-
wards, General Thomas supposed that they had reference
to Hood's prospective action in immediately following
Sherman, and not to a winter campaign after Hood
had been defeated, and was running for life through the
GHER MAN'S INSTRUCTIONS. 377
marshes of Mississippi. To move an army through the
sparsely settled region of North Alabama, upon roads made
boggy by protracted rains, across Swollen and bridgeless
rivers, immediately after a campaign which had entailed
long marches, two battles and minor conflicts, was an en-
terprise radically different from the conditional one sug-
gested by General Sherman in November.
General Grant had, however, thought of dismembering
Thomas' army before Thomas had ordered his troops into
winter quarters. On the 27th of December, in consenting
to Sherman's march from Savannah through the Carolinas
to Richmond, Grant said:
I have thought that Hood being so completely wiped out for pre-
sent harm, I might bring A.J. Smith here with fourteen to fifteen thous-
and men. With this increase I could hold my lines and move out
with a greater force than Lee has. It would compel Lee to retain all
his present force in the defenses of Richmond, or abandon them en-
tirely. This latter contingency is probably the only danger to the
easy success of your expedition.
Badeau thus mentions Grant's purpose to take troops
from Thomas :
The torpor of Thomas in the Nashville campaign had determined
the general-in-chief to entrust to that Commander no more operations
in which prompt, aggressive action was necessary. Hood's move-
ments, however, were for a while uncertain, and on the 30th of
December Grant said to Halleck :
“I have no idea of keeping idle troops at any place, but before
taking troops away from Thomas, it will be advisable to know whether
Hood's army halts at Corinth. I do not think he will, but think he is
much more likely to be thrown in front of Sherman. If so, it will be
just where we want them to go. Let Thomas collect all his troops
not essential to hold his communications at Eastport, * * * * and be
in readiness for their removal where they can be used.” “
It is evident, also, that on the 30th of December, the
transfer of Hood's army to the front of Sherman was ex-
pected and desired. t
* Mil. Hist. U. S. Grant. Vol. III., p. 365
378 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H, THOMAS
On the 2d of January General Halleck telegraphed:
The orders of General Grant to concentrate your forces on the
Tennessee were not intended to interfere in any manner with your
pursuit of Hood, or your cutting off his lines of railroad, etc.
On the 4th, Thomas, from Eastport, replied to several
despatches:
In my telegram of 12 M., of the 21st, I reported the condition of
the roads in this region of country, and since writing that telegram,
an officer sent by me on a flag of truce towards Columbus has re-
turned. He succeeded in getting ten miles beyond Fulton, and re-
ports that both the road he went out on, and the one he returned
by, are at this time impracticable for artillery and wagon trains. I
have also received the same reports from reliable scouts and from
refugees, of the condition of the roads leading from Tuscumbia,
zyża Russellville to Tuscaloosa and Columbus. I therefore think
it will be impossible to move from the Tennessee River upon Mont-
gomery and Selma, with a large force during the winter. It was my
purpose, after having driven Hood out of Tennessee, to have assem-
bled my available force at or near Huntsville, Ala., for the winter,
and as soon as the roads became practicable in the spring, to cross
the Tennessee at Whitesburg and Decatur, move by Summerville
and Blountsville, through Brown's and Murphree's valleys, via
Elyton, Cedar Grove, Montevallo, Somerville, upon Selma, this coun-
try having been represented to me as being perfectly practicable
and abounding in supplies. That Country, however, is in the same
condition as ſhe country between this point and Columbus, Miss. ;
and I do not believe, I could make a winter campaign with any rea-
sonable chance of complete success, starting from either this point or
Decatur. Should General Grant determine upon a campaign from
some point on the Gulf, I could send General Canby, A. J. Smith's
command, and all of the cavalry now here except two divisions,
feeling able to securely hold the line of the Tennessee, and all the
territory now held in East Tennessee, with the Fourth army corps,
the troops in East Tennessee, and two divisions of cavalry.
General Thomas had inferred that he was expected to
make a winter campaign south from the Tennessee River,
and knowing the difficulties, if not impossibilities, he
strenuously opposed it, but nothing of this kind was then
A WINTER CAMPAIGN IMPRACTICABLE. 379
required, and the inquiries made about Hood's movements
had reference to the dismemberment of Thomas' army, and
not for its advance. On the 7th of January General Grant
wrote to General Halleck : “Order Thomas, if he is assured
of the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send Scho-
field here with his corps, with as little delay as possible.”
General Thomas had learned that Hood had not halted
at Corinth, and therefore sent Schofield east on the 14th,
and then the Departments of the Cumberland and Ohio were
united under his command.
On the 15th there was a change of plan ; on that day
Grant said to Halleck :
I now understand that Beauregard has gone west to gather up
what he can save from Hood's army, to bring against Sherman. If this
be the case, Selma and Montgomery can be easily reached. I do not
believe, though, that General Thomas will ever get there from the
north. He is too ponderous in his preparations and equipments to
move through a country rapidly enough to live off of it.
But the instructions sent to Thomas by Halleck on the
19th, were not in accordance with Badeau's statement, that
it was the purpose of Grant to intrust no operations to
Thomas “in which prompt aggressive action was neces-
sary.” On that day Halleck said:
General Grant has directed that no more horses be sent to your
command until the proposed expeditionary force of General Canby
is supplied. General Canby has been ordered to collect all his availa-
ble forces at some point on the Gulf, and to move against Selma and
Montgomery. It is the wish of General Grant that your army should
coöperate by moving upon the same points, if you can be ready in
time, or iſ this cannot be done, that all of your troops not required
for defense should be sent to the Gulf to operate with General Canby
on that line. It is understood that Beauregard has gone west to bring
the remains of Hood's army to North Carolina, to oppose Sherman.
If so, Canby can easily reach Montgomery, and if not, his movement
will hold Hood in check, and keep him away from Sherman. You
will please communicate your views upon these proposed operations,
stating what line you propose to take, looking to Selma as the objec-
tive point, and by what date you will be ready to move; or if you do
38O LIFE OF GENERA. L. G. EORG E H THOMAS,
not propose a winter campaign from your present base, state how
many men you can send to the Gulf. This information is necessary
in order that General Grant may give final instructions for winter
operations. If Hood comes to this coast, he will probably leave
behind a part of Forrest's Cavalry to make raids and demonstrations,
but they will not be strong enough to do any serious harm.
There is no doubt that Thomas, both before and
after Schofield's corps was taken from him, was op-
posed to a movement with a large force into Alabama.
To him the proposed campaign seemed utterly impractica-
ble in winter. The uncertainty with regard to Hood's pur-
poses as well as the condition of the roads, alike forbade
an early movement. Subsequently, events proved that Gen-
eral Thomas was wise in opposing this projected winter
campaign. It was indeed the purpose of the Confederate
leaders to move the remnant of Hood's army into North
Carolina. In their view the march of Sherman's army north
from Savannah necessitated the concentration of all their
available forces in that State, to prevent if possible the con-
junction of that army with the Army of the Potomac before
Richmond. But the southward march of Thomas' army,
had it been practicable, could not have prevented the trans-
fer of Hood's forces to the East, since it would have been
easy for them to have crossed Thomas' line of march with-
out meeting his army. And every other object proposed
for the movement of infantry into Alabama was sub-
sequently attained by Wilson's cavalry corps. And
such a cavalry expedition, Thomas had discussed with
Wilson earlier than it was ordered, as he had also sug-
gested the employment of A. J. Smith's command on the
Gulf, long before he was directed to send it thither.
General Hood had retreated to Tupelo, Miss., where to
prevent unlimited desertions he had furloughed several
thousand men, cavalry and infantry. Subsequently, four
thousand men were sent to Mobile; the cavalry under For-
rest was detached to operate in Mississippi and Alabama,
CA VAL R Y EXPEDITIONS. 38 I
and about fourteen thousand men started for North Caro-
lina, of whom, if Hood's statement may be credited, only
about four thousand joined General Jos. E. Johnston before
the battle of Bentonville, and one thousand afterwards, nine
thousand having deserted on the way. There was no need
therefore, of a campaign in Alabama in the winter of 1865,
either to pursue Hood's broken forces, or to prevent their
transfer to North Carolina. What was needed was full
preparation for the movement of a cavalry force into the
heart of Alabama, as soon as practicable, and the request of
Thomas for horses had reference to such an expedition.
On the 29th Halleck said to Thomas: “I presume
General Grant will give you orders about coöperating as
soon as Canby is ready to take the field.” But on the 31st,
Grant, in a long letter, sent very different instructions:
With this I send you a letter from General Sherman. At the
time of writing it, General Sherman was not informed of the depletion
of your command by my orders. It will be impossible for you at
present to move South, as he contemplated, with the force of infan-
try indicated.
General Sherman is advised before this of the changes made, and
that for the winter you will be on the defensive. I think, how-
ever, an expedition from East Tennessee under General Stoneman,
might penetrate South Carolina, well down towards Columbia, de-
stroying the railroad and military resources of the country, thus
visiting a portion of the State which will not be reached by Sher-
man's forces. He might also be able to return to East Tennessee
by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, thus releasing some of our
prisoners of war in rebel hands. Of the practicability of doing this,
General Stoneman will have to be the judge, making up his mind
from information obtained while executing the first part of his instruc-
tions. Sherman's movements will attract the attention of all the force
the enemy can collect, thus facilitating the execution of this. &
Three thousand cavalry would be a sufficient force to take.
This probably can be raised in the old Department of the Ohio,
without taking any now under General Wilson. It would require,
though, the re-organization of the regiments of Kentucky cavalry,
which Stoneman had in his very successful raid into Southwestern
Virginia.
382 LIFE OF GENERAL, G EORGE H. THOMAS.
It will be necessary, probably, for you to send, in addition to the
force now in East Tennessee, a small division of infantry to enable
General Gillem to hold the upper end of Holston Valley, and the
mountain passes in rear of Stoneman.
You may order such an expedition. To save time, I will send a
copy to General Stoneman, so that he can begin preparations with-
out loss of time, and can commence his correspondence with you as
to these preparations.
As this expedition goes to destroy, and not to fight battles, but to
avoid them, when practicable, particularly against anything like
equal forces, or where a great object is to be gained, it should go as
light as possible. Stoneman's experience in raiding will teach him
in this matter better than he can be directed.
Let there be no delay in preparations for this expedition, and
keep me advised of its progress.
In this letter General Thomas was explicitly told that he
was to be on the defensive for the winter, that he should
send an expedition into North Carolina, composed of cav-
alry already in East Tennessee, that it was to be intrusted
to General Stoneman, and that Thomas himself was to have
nothing to do with it except to assist in preparations.
This letter was received on the 6th of February, and
General Thomas promptly addressed himself to preparation
for an early movement by Stoneman. On the I2th, he tele-
graphed to General Halleck :
Have orders from General Grant to furnish an outfit of about
three thousand cavalry for General Stoneman, and to do this shall
require about one thousand additional horses, which I would respect-
fully request you will give instructions to Major W. P. Chambliss,
inspector of cavalry at Louisville, to furnish immediately.
Thomas had sent with Smith about eight thousand
animals, five thousand of them being cavalry horses.
On the 13th of February Grant telegraphed to Thomas
to prepare a cavalry expedition of about five thousand men
to penetrate Northern Alabama, as coöperative with Canby's
movement against Mobile and Central Alabama. Thomas
had decided upon such a service for his cavalry, immediately
UNTR UTH FUL CRITICISM. 383
after the close of the Nashville campaign. He believed that
Wilson could attain every object which had been mentioned
by General Grant, as calling for the movement of his infan-
try forces into Alabama. He then suggested to General
Wilson to move on Selma and Montgomery, and after gain-
ing these places to operate towards Mississippi, Mobile, or
Macon, as circumstances might Suggest or demand.
Acting under Grant's instructions of February 13th,
Thomas arrived at Eastport on the 23d, and gave immediate
attention to the expedition now authorized by the lieu-
tenant-general, and previously suggested by Thomas to
Wilson. But there was delay in the advance of the cavalry
southward, mainly for two reasons; want of horses, and the
fact that Wilson's movement was to be coöperative with
Canby's, and the time of starting was dependent upon
Canby's operations. The necessary postponement of these
cavalry expeditions has been made the basis of an exceed-
ingly untruthful criticism of General Thomas by Badeau.
Meanwhile the same peculiarities which had distinguished
Thomas in November and December, had become apparent in
January, and February, and March. On the 25th of January Grant
said to Halleck: “When Canby is supplied, horses may be sent up
the Tennessee, as General Thomas requests, and let him use all ex-
ertion to get off during the first favorable weather we may have. It
is a great pity that our cavalry should not have taken advantage of
Hood's and Forrest's forces being on furlough. They could have
fed on the enemy, and where they could have collected their own
horses.” Yet it was to collect and equip this cavalry that Thomas
delayed so long at Nashville, and, after two weeks' pursuit of the
enemy, he was unwilling to send it out again without another season
of equipping and delay. *
In ordering Stoneman's movement, General Grant, as has
been mentioned, prescribed the forces which he should take,
even to their number, and Thomas was simply required to
help in preparations. And when he asked for horses, he
* Mil. Hist. U. S. Grant, Vol. III, page 392,
384 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H THOMAS.
was told that Canby must be first supplied. And as to any
Operations for his infantry or Wilson's cavalry, he was
denied all freedom. The plans were repeatedly changed, as
were his instructions. He had indeed decided that it was
impracticable to make a winter campaign with his infantry,
but had he been given freedom to plan and execute, and
had horses been supplied, Wilson would have moved from
Eastport at the earliest moment possible. General Wilson
in the emergency, had asked permission to impress horses
in the North, and General Thomas was curtly told by Gen-
eral Halleck, in accordance with Grant's suggestion to him,
that Alabama and Georgia were the places to impress
horses. And if it had not been seriously proposed, it would
have been a trenchant burlesque, to plan a cavalry expedi-
tion for midwinter, and have the dismounted men supplied
with horses from the region from which the enemy had
drawn his own horses in his last desperate effort to make a
successful campaign in Tennessee. And as to the mounting
of cavalry at Nashville, it should be remembered that
Thomas had sent five thousand mounted men to Canby
from Wilson's command, and that number, and the waste
in the pursuit of Hood, would more than make up the num-
ber of horses he had at the battle of Nashville, while Stone-
man's force was to be taken from East Tennessee, and not
from Eastport, and horses were denied Stoneman until
Canby could be supplied. General Thomas was not, there-
fore, responsible for the delay of Stoneman or Wilson.
On the 14th of February, General Grant said to Thomas:
General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against
Mobile and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of about
twenty thousand men, besides A. J. Smith's command. The cavalry
you haye sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the
available cavalry already in that section, will move from there east-
ward in coöperation. Hood's army has been terribly reduced by the
severe punishment you gave it in Tennessee, by desertion consequent
upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to
oppose Sherman. I take it, a large portion of the infantry has been
CANB Y'S PROPOSED MOVEMENT. 385
so withdrawn. It is so asserted in the Richmond papers, and a mem-
ber of the rebel congress said a few days since in a speech, that
one-half of it had been brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman.
This being true, or even if it is not true, Canby's movement will at-
tract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance from your
standpoint easy. I think it advisable, therefore, that you pre-
pare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold
it in readiness to go south. The object would be threefold:
first to attract as much of the enemy’s force as possible, to insure
success to Canby; Second, to destroy the enemy's line of commu-
nications and resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces
brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably
be the points to direct the expedition against “ ” * * *. Now that
your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what number
of men you can put into the field. If not more than five thousand
men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. It is not de-
sirable that you should start this expedition until the one leaving
Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. I do
not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon
as I learn. If you should hear through other sources before hearing
from me, you can act on the information received.
Grant also inquired as to the number of men Thomas
would be able to send.
It thus appears that as late as February 14th, the expe-
dition projected for Wilson's cavalry corps was not to start
until Canby's cavalry were out from Vicksburg three or
four days, or a week.
February 22d Grant wrote:
I have it from good authority, that orders have gone out from
Richmond to the commanders at Mobile, to hold that city to the last
extremity. This raid causes a concentration of the rebel forces in
that quarter, and makes your cavalry expedition effective and easy,
and will tend in the end to secure all we want without a long march
into the interior by our infantry forces.
In this last conclusion General Grant came into agree-
ment with the views entertained by General Thomas early
in the winter.
February 27th Grant instructed Thomas as follows:
“General Stoneman being so late in making his start from East
25
386 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H THOMAS.
Tennessee, and Sherman having passed out of the State of South
Carolina, I think now his course had better be changed. It is not
impossible that, in the event of the enemy being driven out from
Richmond, they may fall back to Lynchburg with a part of their
force, and attempt a raid into East Tennessee. It will be, there-
fore, better to keep Stoneman between our garrisons in East Ten-
nessee and the enemy. Direct him to repeat the raid of last fall,
destroying the railroad as far towards Lynchburg as he can. Sheri-
dan starts to day from Winchester for Lynchburg. This will vastly
favor Stoneman.
Referring to East Tennessee, Grant added :
It is not impossible that we may have to use a considerable force
in that section the coming spring. Preparations should be made to
meet such a contingency.
Acting immediately upon this hint, Thomas promptly led
the Fourth corps into East Tennessee. And Grant said to
him when he heard of this movement:
I think your precaution in sending the Fourth corps to Knoxville
a good One. I also approve of your sending new troops to Chatta-
nooga. Eastport must be held, particularly whilst troops are ope-
rating in Alabama.
It was not until March Ist, however, that General Grant
made Wilson's movement independent of Canby's. He
then telegraphed to Thomas:
In view of the fact that Forrest is about Jackson, Miss., it will be
well for Wilson to start before the Vicksburg forces. The latter may
not be able to make their way across Flint River, until Wilson has
created a diversion in their favor.
The only delay, therefore, that was possible for Thomas
and Wilson, according to Grant's instructions, was subse-
quent to March 1st, and the causes of this are set forth in
the following extract from General Wilson's report:
The instructions of Lieutenant-General Grant, transmitted to me
by General Thomas, after directing me to be ready to march as soon
as General Canby’s movement had begun, allowed me the amplest
WILSON'S EXPEDITION. 38 7.
discretion as an independent commander. It was first intended that
the expedition should begin its movements by the 4th of March, but
heavy rain-storms setting in, the Tennessee River became much
swollen and the roads impassable.
Lieutenant-General Grant having directed all the surplus horses
purchased in the West to be sent to General Canby, there were no
means left in the hands of the cavalry bureau to mount Hatch's
division. I therefore directed him to turn over his few remaining
horses to General Upton, and continue the instruction of his command
at Eastport.
In compliance with Grant's instructions of March 1st,
Wilson made effort to start from Eastport on the 4th, and
then swollen rivers and impassable roads delayed him until
the 22d. Stoneman started about the same time, not hav-
ing obtained horses for an earlier movement. Eastern ope-
rations were also delayed by high waters, impassable roads,
and other causes. Sherman delayed at Savannah from the
20th of December till the Ist of February, although under
orders to go to Richmond as soon as possible. And Grant
himself was restrained in movement in the vicinity of Rich-
mond by impassable roads. On the I6th of March he wrote
to Sherman:
Lee has depleted his army but very little recently, and I learn of
none going South. Some regiments may have been detached, but I
think no division or brigade. The determination seems to be to hold
Richmond as long as possible. I have a force sufficient to hold
our lines, all that is necessary of them, and move out with plenty
to whip his whole army. But the roads are entirely impassable.
Until they improve I shall content myself with watching Lee, and be
prepared to pitch into him, if he attempts to evacuate the place. * * *
Recruits have come in so rapidly at the West, that Thomas has now
about as much force as he had when he attacked Hood. * * * * I
told him to get ready for a campaign towards Lynchburg, if it be-
came necessary. He never can make one there or elsewhere, but
the steps taken will prepare for any one else to take his troops and
come east, or go toward Rome, whichever may be necessary. I do
not believe either will.
But Thomas had only the Fourth corps of infantry,
388 LIFE OF GENERA. L. G. EORG E H THOMAS.
that was equipped for the field, and this corps he conducted
into East Tennessee, not to move into Virginia, but to offer
resistance to General Lee, should he escape into East Ten-
nessee. In his official report, General Thomas thus men-
tioned this movement:
About this period (March 20th), reports reached me of the possi-
bility of the evacuation of Lee's army at Richmond and Petersburg,
Virginia, and in that event, of his forcing a passage through East
Tennessee, via Lynchburg and Knoxville. To guard against that
Contingency, Stoneman was sent towards Lynchburg to destroy the
railroad and military resources of that section and of Western North
Carolina. The Fourth army corps was ordered to move from
Huntsville, Alabama, as far up into Tennessee, as it could supply
itself, repairing the railroad as it advanced, forming in conjunction
with Tillson's division of infantry, a strong support for General
Stoneman's cavalry column, in case it should find more of the
enemy than it could conveniently handle, and be obliged to fall
back.
Badeau's statements—seemingly made by authority—and
Grant's utterances alike evince, that in the opinion of the
latter, Thomas was too slow to be intrusted with opera-
tions that required “prompt aggressive action,” and this un-
reasonable and unsustained opinion has been given as his-
tory, with seeming indifference to truth and justice.
Grant and Thomas differed as to the proper time to attack
Hood's army at Nashville, and the former attributed the
postponement of action from the 2d to the 9th of De-
cember to the sluggishness of Thomas, when it was due to
his clear apprehension of the situation, and the adoption of
measures which brought a decisive victory.
And these generals again differed as to the practicability
and need of a winter campaign into Alabama with infantry
and cavalry, and subsequent developments proved that
Thomas was right in opposing such a campaign. But the
early advance of his army and Grant's oft recurring change
of plan plainly indicated that it was not long intended that
he should move on Selma with a large force of infantry.
GRANT AND THOMAS. 389
It is strange that General Grant could have looked back
through the long line of successful operations conducted
by General Thomas, and conclude that he was unfit to be
intrusted with one of offensive purpose, and that therefore
it was just to merely employ him to gather troops for other
generals to use, and not let him know that this humiliating
service was required of him. In Striking contrast, however,
with Grant's opinion that Thomas could never make a cam-
paign to Lynchburg or elsewhere, he moved so quickly
into East Tennessee without orders, as to elicit the hearty
commendation of the lieutenant-general.
In the face of all the facts the assertion that General
Thomas exhibited any sluggishness in the administration of
military affairs in the winter and spring of 1865, or at any
other time, cannot be sustained. He did all that he was or—
dered to do, and he would have done far more than he did
do, if he had not learned in the Tennessee campaign, that
he had little freedom as an army commander. After that
campaign, his instructions were conditional, in a great
measure, and he was censured for delays which resulted in
part from the non-action of other generals, and in part from
the denial of needed resources, or from obstacles that re-
strained all other commanders, East and West. There were
impassable roads in Alabama, as well as in Virginia, and
long marches were projected in the former State, and only
short ones in the latter.
His reputed slowness will be discussed in another con-
nection; in this, it is enough to say, that he gave successful
execution to every plan formed by himself for his own com-
mand; and that when, as an army commander, he partici-
pated in operations in conjunction with other generals of
the same rank, he was as quick to move, and as effective
in movement as any other general. The operations and
achievements of the Army of the Cumberland in the battles
before Chattanooga, and in the Atlanta Campaign, fully
illustrate this fact.
39C) LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS.
In planning and conducting the Tennessee campaign,
General Thomas had placed his generalship and his energy
in boldest relief, and from November, 1864, to April, 1865,
he had done more to crush the rebellion than any other
general, if not more than all others combined.
General Sherman had marched to the sea and through
the Carolinas, but in Virginia little had been accomplished,
and General Grant had repeatedly expressed fear as to the
Outcome of Sherman's operations. In retrospect it seems
almost incredible that Grant should have been so solicitous
for the safety of Sherman while marching north from Sa-
vannah. He did fear, however; first, that the enemy would
gather together on the line of Sherman's march all his frag-
mentary forces from the West and South, and then that Lee
would withdraw from Virginia to resist his advance. Grant
expressed this fear to Sherman when he consented to his
northward march from Savannah; he then said, in addition
to what has already been quoted:
In the event you should meet Lee's army, you would be com-
pelled to beat it,or find the sea coast. Of course I shall not let Lee's
army escape if I can help it, and will not let it go without following
to the best of my ability.
On the 21st of January he mentioned other grounds for
fear :
From about Richmond I will watch Lee closely, and if he de-
taches many men, or attempts to evacuate, will pitch in. In the
mean time, should you be brought to a halt anywhere, I can send
two Corps of thirty thousand effective men to your support from the
works about Richmond,
Thus, before General Sherman had begun his march from
Savannah to reënforce the army operating against Rich-
mond, General Grant was seriously considering the proba-
bilities consequent upon that march—a battle with General
Lee's army to prevent its withdrawal to oppose Sherrnan,
the pursuit of that army southward from Richmond, or the
detachment of thirty thousand effective men from the Army
STONEMA N'S EXPEDITION. 39 I
of the Potomac to support Sherman, should he be brought
to a halt. These surmises plainly show that the weakness
of the enemy was the only justification of the plan of
operations. Our three Eastern armies were widely sepa-
rated, but the time had come when interior lines gave no
opportunities to Confederate generals. It had not been
practicable for Generals Thomas and Canby to prevent the
transfer of the remnant of Hood's shattered army to North
Carolina, but with this accretion, the army on Sherman's
line of march was not large. Lee was not strong enough
to hold his works and resist an advance in force upon
his communications. Sherman's army, therefore, was not
needed at Richmond, and the chief results of its long march
were the indecisive battle of Bentonville and the surrender
of the residuary Confederate army on the Atlantic coast.
After the battle of Nashville, Lee's army sustained the
ebbing life of the rebellion, and the widely separated, but
unsparing operations of the National armies only touched
its quivering extremities.
General Stoneman's cavalry was concentrated at Mossy
Creek, March 22d, and on the 24th moved to Morristown,
Tennessee. Stoneman was under orders to advance towards
Lynchburg, Virginia, and then into Western North Caro-
lina, to destroy railroads and the military resources of the
enemy on his line of march. He moved through Jones-
boro’ to Boone, North Carolina; thence through Wilkes-
boro' and Mount Airy, to Hillsville, Virginia. Here divid-
ing his command, he destroyed a depot of supplies at
Wytheville and the bridges and railroad near Salem. He
then captured Christiansburg, Taylorsville and Martins-
ville, and having united his forces advanced to Danbury,
North Carolina. He then in turn moved to Germantown,
Salem, Greensboro’, Danville and Salisbury. From Salis-
bury he sent detachments to Morgantown and Asheville.
At the latter place General Gillem, who had taken chief
command a few days before, was informed by the enemy
392 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H. THOMAS.
of the existence of a truce established by Generals Sher-
man and Johnston. This information, though not fully
believed at first, arrested the expedition which had wrought
great damage to the enemy in the defeat of all oppos-
ing forces, and in the destruction of railroads, manufac-
tories, machine-shops, war-material, and cotton.
General Wilson's cavalry Corps crossed the Tennessee
River on the I 8th of March, and moved southward on the
22d. The corps at first was divided into detachments on
various roads, to glean supplies from the country. The first
important objective was Selma, and the division com-
manders, Generals McCook, Upton, and Long, under or-
ders from Wilson, conducted several distinct operations,
which utterly defeated the plans of General Forrest, and
finally drove him and his troops into the fortifications before
Selma, where Wilson united his forces. Although the de-
fenses were strong and well manned, they were stormed
and carried, April 2d. General Long, with fifteen hundred
men, advanced under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry
for several hundred yards, and leaping over deep wide
ditches and high parapets, dislodged the enemy by one of
the most brilliant assaults of the war.
Ten days after the capture of Selma, Wilson received the
surrender of Montgomery, the first capital of the Confed-
eracy. The objects for this expedition, specified by General
Grant, had then been attained.
On that day and the next, the corps moved towards
Macon. On the 20th, when within fifteen miles of the city,
Colonel Minty, commanding the Second division in room
of General Long wounded at Selma, met a flag of truce,
borne by General Robertson, who also bore a message from
General Cobb addressed to the commanding officers of
United States forces. Minty forwarded this message to
General Wilson, and dashed into Macon. Upon receiving
information that a general truce had been proclaimed by
General Sherman, Wilson had decided to halt his com—
SHERMAN'S ARMISTICE. 393
mand at the defenses of Macon, and then act with delibera-
tion, in respect to the announcement made through the
enemy. However, before he could Overtake his foremost
troops, or reach their commander by an order sent by a
staff officer, the city had been surrendered to Colonel
White of Minty's division.
The two western cavalry expeditions were arrested ; one
in North Carolina, and the other in Georgia, by advices of
a general armistice, received through the enemy. The Con-
federate officers at Macon, including General Howell Cobb,
protested against being held as prisoners of war, on the
ground that such action on the part of Wilson was a viola-
tion of an armistice. But General Wilson decided that he
would hold them as prisoners of war, since he could not
acknowledge the binding force of an arrangement made
outside the limits of the military division, when his only
information concerning the alleged armistice had been com-
municated by the enemy.
The problem, which embarrassed the generals of cavalry
in North Carolina and Georgia, threw also upon General
Thomas a most intricate problem. By Sherman's order
Thomas was in command of all the forces of the Military
Division of the Mississippi, “not absolutely in the presence
of the general-in-chief.” There was at first room to doubt
the existence of an armistice that was binding upon himself
and the troops under his command. It was not foreign to
the precedents of war for an enemy to use deception to
arrest operations that could not be withstood, but it had not
been customary in war to communicate orders of such im-
portance through an enemy. General Thomas desired to
recognize fully the authority of General Sherman, at the
same time he was not willing to trust to the enemy as
a channel for the communication of Sherman's orders.
He was, however, relieved from this dilemma before his
own action was imperative, by the Official announcement
from Washington that the convention to which Generals
394 LIFE OF GENERAI, GEORG E H THOMAS.
Sherman and Johnston were parties had been annulled, and
that offensive operations should be immediately resumed.
The surrender of all the regular Confederate forces, east
of the Chattahoochee River, soon followed the renewal of
hostilities; and on the 7th of May General Taylor surren-
dered to General Canby, all those between that river and
the Mississippi.
The questions proposed to Mr. Stanton by General
Thomas, show how careful he was to avoid all mistakes :
“Was the arrangement between Generals Sherman and
Johnston the same as that between Generals Grant and
Lee P I have by authority offered General Grant's terms to
D. Taylor, and to the commanding general in Northern
Georgia. Guerrilla bands also desire to surrender. Am I
authorized to grant them any terms ?”
General Thomas had anticipated General Grant by a
month in prescribing this service for his cavalry, believing
that under the circumstances, Wilson's corps could do all
that was necessary in the way of aggression in Alabama.
In this he was right, as was illustrated by Wilson's un-
interrupted success from Eastport to Montgomery. The
resultant loss to the enemy, in war-material and Cotton, was
immense.
Beyond Selma, General Wilson acted as an independent
commander, under the wide discretion given him by
both Grant and Thomas. He chose Columbus, Georgia,
for his next important objective after Montgomery, a
place of great value to the enemy on account of its mili-
tary stores, railroad transportation, gun boats, armories,
arsenals and work shops, and was besides the key to South-
ern Georgia. The town was situated on the left bank of
the Chattahoochee River, was strongly fortified and held
by three thousand men, but it was successfully stormed,
under the cover of night, by four hundred men from Up-
ton's division, Colonel Noble of the Third Iowa cavalry
leading. This small force dashed over bridges strongly
WILSON'S EXPEDITION. 395
defended, and drove the enemy from his fortifications be-
yond. These troops, however, were well supported by
Other forces, in provision against a probable repulse. This
action occurred on the 17th of April, and resulted in the
capture of twelve hundred prisoners, fifty-two guns in posi-
tion, the rebel ram Jackson, a large number of locomotives,
and immense quantities of arms, stores and cotton. The
Same day La Grange captured Fort Tyler, at West Point,
taking three hundred prisoners, three guns, and a large
quantity of Supplies.
Jefferson Davis, and several of his prominent associates,
were captured near Irwinsville, Georgia, May 1oth, by Colonel
Pritchard of the Fourth Michigan cavalry. Colonel Harnden,
of the First Wisconsin cavalry, was also near with his regi-
ment, having followed Mr. Davis' line of flight for three
days. These regiments belonged to Wilson's corps and
were operating under his direct instructions, transmitted
through their respective division commanders.
After the surrender of all the Confederate forces east of
the Mississippi River, the cavalry of the Military Division
of the Mississippi was disposed throughout the South to
maintain order as against guerrillas, and all citizens who
were unwilling to accept the situation.
At the close of the war there were six major-generals in
the Regular Army, and General Thomas was the junior.
Learning from a friend in Washington, that the country
was to be divided into five military divisions, to be com-
manded respectively by the five ranking major-generals,
while he was to command a department, he was intensely
indignant, and at once adopted measures to avert the hu-
miliation if possible. At the time, Brigadier-General John
F. Miller was commanding the post of Nashville, and as he
was intimately acquainted with President Johnson, he was
requested by General Thomas to bear a message to the
President. General Thomas had a map giving the proposed
boundaries of the military divisions and departments, and
396 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.
the names of the generals to be severally assigned to their
command; placing this map in the hands of General Miller,
Thomas said:
“I wish you to take the first train for Washington, and
tell President Johnson that during the war I permitted the
National authorities to do what they pleased with me; they
put my juniors over me, and I served under them ; the
life of the Nation was then at stake, and it was not then
proper to press questions of rank, but now that the war is
over and the Nation saved, I demand a command suited to
my rank, or I do not want any.”
He also commissioned General Miller to present to the
President a list of officers recommended by himself for
brevet appointments, stating that in this respect the Army
of the Cumberland had not been treated as liberally as
other armies.
Upon arrival in Washington, General Miller called upon
the President, who then had rooms in the Treasury building,
and told him that he bore a message from General Thomas,
and requested an audience at the earliest practicable mo-
ment. The President replied that he would hear him
at once, and invited Miller to his private room. When
they were alone General Miller delivered his message, pre-
sented the map and said; “General Thomas has not ex-
pressed a preference for any part of the country, but as
he served during the war in the States between the
Mississippi and the Alleghenies, I would suggest that
his command should embrace some of these States.” The
President said in reply: “You know my appreciation of
General Thomas :” and after considering the matter, State
by State, he drew a line with his pencil along the outer
boundaries of Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama,
and Georgia, said: “That is the military division for
General Thomas,” and placing the point of his pencil on
Nashville, added: “There are his headquarters.”
These five States were then embraced in the Military
STANTON AND THOMAS. 397
Division of the Mississippi, and the decision of the Presi-
dent necessitated the assignment of General Sherman to a
command in another section of the country.
Soon after this occurrence, General Thomas called on the
Secretary of War. Mr. Stanton complimented him upon
his eminent services during the war, and said : “I have
always had great confidence in you.” Thomas replied:
“Mr. Stanton, I am sorry to hear you make this statement.
I have not been treated as if you had confidence in me.”
Mr. Stanton having reiterated his declaration, Thomas
replied:
“I must accept your assertion but will say, nevertheless,
that I have not been treated by the authorities, as though
they had confidence in me.”
These declarations of General Thomas plainly manifested
that he had been deeply wounded by the action of the Na-
tional authorities, although he had been silent during
the war, except in his self-assertive letters to Generals
Mitchel and Sherman in 1861, and to General Halleck
in 1862. These letters and his claim for appropriate
recognition at the close of the war show that he was as
sensitive as other generals, although his patriotism re-
strained him from the ordinary revelation of outraged feel-
ing during the war.
CHAPTER XVIII.
MILITARY ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS DURING THE PERIOD OF RECON-
STRUCTION OF SOUTHERN STATES-HONORED EY THE STATE OF TEN-
NESSEE-PRIVATE GIFTS REFUSED AND PUBLIC HONORS DECLINED–HE
REFUSES TO BE A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE––THE SOCIETY OF THE
ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.
Y direction of the President, January 17th, 1865, the
epartment of the Ohio was united with the Depart-
ment of the Cumberland, which embraced such parts of
Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, as were held by the
troops of General Thomas' command.
General Thomas at once gave earnest attention to the
condition and wants of the people of his department. There
was social and political chaos, and destitution was al-
most universal. That he might use his authority to the
best. advantage, he requested permission through the fol-
lowing despatch to make known to the Secretary of War
the policy which he desired to adopt.
NASHVILLE, TENN., April 29, 1865.
Hon. E. M. STANTON.
Your despatch announcing the surrender of Johnston has been
received. The condition of the people of North Mississippi, North
Alabama, North Georgia, and Western North Carolina, is deplora-
ble. With the view of restoring confidence and a return to law I
respectfully request that Major-General Steedman may be permitted
to go to Washington to explain the policy I should like to adopt for
the government of those sections until the civil authorities can be
398
MILITAR Y DIVISION OF THE TENNESSEE. 399
established on a permanent basis. I desire to send General Steed-
man because he fully understands my views, and can explain the
present condition of the region referred to completely.
G. H. THOMAS,
Major-General.
This despatch emphasized his advice to Governor John-
son and manifested his strong desire for the establishment
of social order and the consequent abridgment of the mili-
tary power.
In June, 1865, the Department of the Cumberland was
discontinued, and the Military Division of the Tennessee
was organized. General Thomas was assigned to the com-
mand by the following order of the President:
WAR DEPARTMENT,
* Washington City, June 7, 1865.
MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS, Commanding, etc.
GENERAL :
By order of the President you have been assigned to the com-
mand of the Military Division of the Tennessee, embracing the De-
partment of Kentucky, department of Tennessee, department of
Georgia, department of Alabama and Department of Florida; head-
quarters at Nashville.
The Department of Kentucky embraces the State of Kentucky,
Major-General Palmer, commanding ; headquarters at Louisville.
The Department of the Tennessee embraces the State of Tennes-
see, Major-General Stoneman to command ; headquarters at Knox-
ville. -
The Department of Georgia embraces the State of Georgia, Major-
General Steedman to command ; headquarters at Augusta.
The Department of Alabama embraces the State of Alabama,
Major-General C. R. Woods to command ; headquarters at Mobile.
The Department of Florida embraces the State of Florida and
ſey West, Major-General A. A. Humphreys to command ; head-
quarters at Tallahassee.
You will at your earliest convenience proceed to take command
of your military division.
By order of the President.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
4OO I, IFE OF GENERA. L. G. EORG E H THOMAS.
Later, the Department of Mississippi was added by direc-
tion of the President. This was probably done in conse-
quence of the inquiry made in the following despatch to the
Secretary of War:
NASHVILLE, TENN., June 22, 1865.
Hon. E. M. STANTON.
Having completed all necessary arrangements for winding up
the affairs of the Department of the Cumberland, I have published
my order assuming command of the Military Division of the Tennes-
see. Official papers referring to railroads in the State and Depart-
ment of Mississippi have been sent to me from your office for action.
I am led to believe that, although in your official letters to me of
June 7th the State of Mississippi was lºt included in my command,
it was an oversight. Please inform me if you intended to include
Mississippi in the Military Division of the Tennessee.
G. H. THOMAS,
Major-General,
By General Order No. 1 18, War Department, the De-
partments of Mississippi and Florida were assigned to the
Military Division of the Gulf, commanded by General
Sheridan, and the Military Division of the Tennessee was
made to include the Departments of Tennessee, Kentucky,
Georgia and Alabama; but Mississippi was again added
October 7th, 1865, by General Order No. 142, War De-
partment. As finally organized the division was divided
into three departments, Department of the Cumberland,
embracing Kentucky and Tennessee, Major-General George
Stoneman commanding ; Department of the South com-
prising Georgia and Alabama, Brevet Major-General
Charles R. Woods commanding; and Department of Mis-
sissippi, Major-General Henry W. Slocum commanding.
The administration of military affairs in so many of
the States lately in rebellion, connected General Thomas
very intimately with the measures of the National Govern-
ment, for their reconstruction.
While President Johnson was devising a general policy
he sent South on tours of inspection Generals Grant,
THE SOUTH AFTER THE WAR. 4Of
Thomas and Schurz, directing them to ascertain the senti-
ments and purposes of the people. General Thomas re-
ported as follows:
NASHVILLE, TENN., December 12, 1865.
Hon. E. M. STANTON :
I reached here night before last. Have during my trip visited
Vicksburg, Jackson, and Meridan, Miss. ; Mobile, Montgomery,
Selma, and West Point, Ala. ; Atlanta, Kingston, and Dalton, Ga.
The prevailing sentiment seems to be a desire to restore the rebel
States to their old relations and functions, but many of the people
are unfriendly to the people of the loyal States, and to those who
have continued loyal to the Government of the United States in the
South. The Legislature of Mississippi adjourned without ratifying
the Constitutional Amendment. Suspicion is, that the second clause,
if ratified, will empower Congress to interfere in the international
legislation of the several Southern States affecting the social and
political status of negroes. I found Governor Humphreys disposed
to acquiesce promptly in the decision of the President to continue
Governor Sharkey as Provisional Governor, but both feared that a
public announcement of such a decision after he (Humphreys) had
been inaugurated would be very disastrous to the effort to reconstruct
the State. I therefore advised that they and General Wood, who
was also present at the interview, have a complete understanding of
what I believed to be the policy of the President;-I then explained
what I believed his policy to be, in general terms, stating it as nearly
as I could remember, in the words of his replies to the delegations
from South Carolina, Virginia, and other States, who had called on
him ;-and coöperate cordially together to carry out its provisions.
This advice seemed to be well received by both Governors. I there-
fore hope that there will be no further trouble. I believe that the
recognition of Governor Humphreys as Provisional Governor of Mis-
sissippi would have a more beneficial effect in relieving the anxiety
of the people on the subject of final reconstruction and recognition.
The people of Alabama are either more practical or more loyal than
the Mississippians. The Legislature is a dignified body, and seems
ready to meet the emergency and to act on the various questions pre-
sented fully, and seems sincerely desirous of the reconstruction of
the Senate in complete harmony with the policy of the President.
The Governor elect (Patten) will not consent to be inaugurated until
he can be recognized by the President. I did not visit Milledgeville,
as the President did not express a desire that I should. I believe,
also, had I gone, my visit would have caused as much uneasiness in
the minds of the members of the Legislature of Georgia as my visit to
26
4O2 LIFE OF GENERAL G EORGE H, THOMAS,
**
Jackson did in Mississippi. The last symptom of open rebellion in
Alabama is exhibited by the self-styled Bishop of Alabama and the
women. I hope to be able to settle the bishop's case in a few days.
GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Major-General.
In this report, as in his subsequent utterances, General
Thomas was exceedingly fair and candid, giving a truthful
representation of affairs as they came under his observa-
tion without reference to their relation to a defined policy.
During January and February, I866, General Thomas
was repeatedly called before the Congressional Committee
on Reconstruction to testify concerning “the condition of
the States which formed the so-called Confederate States of
America.”
The following passages from his testimony are quoted
from the report of that Committee.
EXAMINATION BY MIR. BOUTWELL.
Question.
What is the state of the public mind now in the three States you
have described (Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia), with reference
to the Government, as compared with the condition of the public
mind soon after Lee's surrender P
Answer.
I do not know that I am competent to give a decided answer to
that question, because the reports I received soon after Lee's surren-
der were generally from persons who traveled hurriedly through that
section of the country. I think that in the great majority of cases
they were disposed to look on the most favorable side, immediately
after the surrender of Lee and the downfall of the Confederacy, and
perhaps they did not investigate as closely as persons would at the
present time. The universal report made to me by persons traveling
through those States at that time was to the effect that the mass of
the people were very happy at the downfall of the rebellion, and at
their prospect of soon getting again under the Constitution and Gov-
ernment of the United States.
Question.
Do you know anything, from information or report, of secret or-
ganizations in the South, said to be hostile to the Government of the
United States ?
TEIE SOUTH AFTER THE WAR. 4O3
Answer.
I have received several communications to that effect; but
the persons who have given me this information have desired that
their names should not be mentioned, and as yet no direct accusa-
tions have been made in regard to any one person, or any class of
persons. There have been steps taken to ascertain the truth of the
matter. The persons communicating with me are reliable and truth-
ful, and I believe their statements are correct in the main. But how
far this dissatisfaction extends, I am not as yet able to say. It does
exist to a certain extent, and I am taking measures to obtain as much
information on the subject as I can.
Question.
To what States does this information relate P
Answer.
It relates to all the States lately in rebellion. I think there is no
real danger to be apprehended, because the military authority and
power of the Government is not only feared in those States, but I
think it is ample to put down any serious demonstration.
Question.
Is this information from different sources, each entirely indepen-
dent of the other 2
Answer.
Yes, sir.
Question.
So far as you are informed, what are the nature and objects of
this organization ?
Answer.
To embarrass the Government of the United States in the proper
administration of the affairs of the country, by endeavoring or mak-
ing strong efforts to gain very important concessions to the people of
the South; if possible, to repudiate the National debt incurred in con-
sequence of the rebellion, or to gain such an ascendency in Congress
as to make provision for the assumption by Congress of the debt in-
curred by the rebel Government. Also, in case the United States
Government can be involved in a foreign war, to watch their oppor-
tunity, and take advantage of the first that occurs to strike for the
independence of the States lately in rebellion.
Question.
Do you know of any persons of influence being implicated in
this movement 2
4O4. LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS,
!
Answer.
As yet I have not ascertained that any persons of influence
are implicated in it, and I will further state in justice to the people
of the South, that I know of many men who were prominent in
the rebel army, who I believe are now honestly trying to become
good citizens of the United States. They have been paroled by the
m litary authority, have applied to the President of the United States
for pardon, and are awaiting his decision. They have set them-
selves to work quietly to earn an honest livelihood in some practical
and peaceful manner, thereby setting a good example to the other
people of the South.
EXAMINATION BY MR. GRIMES.
Question.
You also stated as a reason why, in your opinion, the State of
Tennessee ought to be represented in Congress, that in case that
was done, the rebel people there would abandon their hopes of an-
other outbreak. Have you any reason to believe that they still en-
tertain the opinion, or that any considerable portion of them do, that
there may be another outbreak 2
Answer.
I have received communications from various persons in the
South, that there was an understanding among the rebels, and
perhaps organizations formed, or forming, for the purpose of gain-
ing as many advantages for themselves as possible; and I have
heard it, also, intimated that these men are very anxious, and would
do all in their power to involve the United States in a foreign war,
so that, if a favorable opportunity should offer they might turn against
the Government of the United States again. I do not think they will
ever again attempt an outbreak on their own account, because they all
admit that they had a fair trial in the late rebellion, and got thoroughly
worsted. There is no doubt but what there is a universal disposition
among the rebels in the South to embarrass the Government in its
administration if they can, so as to gain as many advantages for
themselves as possible.
General Thomas' reports to the War Department of a
later date are remarkable, in showing a thorough know-
ledge of the condition of affairs and of feeling in the States
included in his command, and of the results to be feared in
DURING THE RECONSTRUCTION. 4O5
the future from the unrestrained lawlessness permitted by
the civil authorities, after they had become supreme.
In his annual report for the year ending September 30,
1868, he said:
The state of society as regards the non-observance of law, and
the want of protection for life and property has not at all improved, and
in some sections is decidedly worse. I had hoped that with the good
crops and increased substance obtained, the people would appre-
ciate the blessings of peace and plenty, and abstain from that petty
lawlessness, so often engendered or stimulated by poverty; but on the
contrary, it would appear that with increased means the spirit of law-
lessness is more actively exhibited.
He then gave the history of the rise and the progress of
a secret political organization, known as the “Ku-Klux-
Klan,” afterwards fully developed in the South, and adds:
Well authenticated information leads me to believe that the
Ku-Klux Klan was primarily but a species of organization without
settled plans; but the peculiar condition of Tennessee, the inability,
unwillingness and apathy of the local authorities, combined to de-
monstrate that if organized thoroughly, upon a semi-military basis, the
society could maintain itself, extend its power, and perform whatever
it sought to do, without let or hindrance, its great purpose being to
establish a nucleus around which the adherents of the late rebellion,
active or passive, might safely rally, thus establishing a grand politi-
cal society, the future operations of which would be governed by cir-
cumstances fast developing in the then peculiar era of exciting public
eventS.
The report thus closes:
The controlling cause of the unsettled condition of affairs in the
department is that the greatest efforts made by the defeated insurgents
since the close of the war have been to promulgate the idea that the
cause of liberty, justice, humanity, equality, and all the calendar of
the virtues of freedom suffered violence and wrong when the effort
for Southern independence failed. This is, of course, intended as a
species of political cant, whereby the crime of treason might be
covered with a counterfeit varnish of patriotism, so that the precipita-
tors of the rebellion might go down in history hand-in-hand with the
defenders of the Government, thus wiping out with their own hands
4O6 LIFE OF GENERAI, G EORG E H. THOMAS.
their own stains; a species of self-forgiveness amazing in its effrontery,
when it is considered that life and property,+justly forfeited by the
laws of the country, of war, and of nations, through the magnanimity
of the Government and people,_were not exacted from them.
General Thomas was not at all bitter in feelings towards
those who were active and prominent in sustaining the cause
of the South. Indeed he was exceedingly generous to such
as solicited his help in their efforts to regain citizenship, and
was also very liberal when pecuniary aid was needed. Soon
after the war, to the surprise of a great many people, he
and General Hood exchanged cordial greetings, and break-
fasted together at the Louisville Hotel. He met other pro-
minent Confederate generals with equal cordiality, extend-
ing to some of them the hospitality of his home. But he
declined all personal intercourse with those Southerners
whose renewed loyalty did not survive the President's
pardon for treason.
Soon after the close of the war, military commanders
were restrained in the employment of their troops, except
when called upon to act by the Governors of the States.
This gave supremacy to civil law, but it placed loyal men at
the mercy of officials who were often influenced by a regard
for their own popularity, rather than by desire for the pro-
tection of the citizens of the South, who had dared to sus-
tain the National cause. In his orders and in the employ-
ment of his troops he was careful not to transcend his au-
thority, but in his prescribed sphere he was strict in main-
taining the supremacy of the National Government and
was eager to give legitimate protection to persecuted loyal-
ists. As the commander of a large military division he had
power to suppress an outbreak against the National autho-
rity without reference to the opinions and wishes of the
local civil authorities, but he was restrained by orders, from
all interference with mere political controversies. Once
when there was danger of violence as the outcome of such
a controversy he asked for special instructions.
June 19th, 1866, Governor Brownlow issued a proclama-
A W APPLICATION FOR TROOPS. 4O7
tion convening the General Assembly of the State of Ten-
nessee in extraordinary session, to ratify or reject the
Constitutional Amendment abolishing slavery, which had
been submitted to the States, by concurrent resolution of
the Congress of the United States, adopted during the first
session of the 39th Congress. The action of Congress and
the meeting of the General Assembly of Tennessee in ex-
traordinary session, produced intense excitement through-
out the State, and the loyal members of the Legislature,
and the loyal citizens generally believed that an attempt
would be made, by the friends of slavery and the “Lost
Cause,” to break up the Legislature by force. From the
tone of the newspapers and the communications made to
him, by loyal citizens, General Thomas expected that such
an effort would be made, and regarding the refusal of mem-
bers to attend the sessions of the House of Representatives,
as foreshadowing disorder and violence, he so far entertained
the applications for troops, made by Governor Brownlow
and the sergeant-at-arms, to arrest recalcitrant members,
that he referred the matter to General Grant, and requested
instructions. He had been authorized to aid Governor
Brownlow in conducting elections for members of Con-
gress and members of the State Legislature but he had re-
ceived no directions from Washington that warranted his
interference with the Legislature in session.
The formal application of the sergeant-at-arms, is sub-
joined, Governor Brownlow's was not preserved.
STATE HOUSE, NASHVILLE, TENN.,
July 14th, 1866.
BRIG.-GEN. W. D. WHIPPLE, A. A. G.,
GENERAL–I have the honor to request that a detail of fifteen
men (soldiers) be placed at my disposition for the purpose of sending
for and arresting the Honorable H. H. Marable, member of the
House of Representatives, as per resolution passed by the House
and order issued to me, originals of both of which are enclosed.
I am, General, very respectfully,
WM. HEYDT,
Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives,
Please return enclosed.
408 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H, THOMAS
JULY I4TH, 1866.
LIEUT.-GEN. U. S. GRANT, Washington, D. C. :
Some of the members of the House of Representatives of the
Tennessee General Assembly conduct themselves in very refractory
manner, absenting themselves to prevent a quorum, thus obstructing
business.
The Governor cannot manage them with the means at his dis-
posal, and has applied to me for military assistance. Shall I furnish
it P GEO. H. THOMAS, Maj. Gen. U. S. A.
In compliance with the following instructions of the Sec-
retary of War:
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, July 17th, 1866.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT:—In reply to Major-General Thomas'
telegram of the 14th, you will please instruct General Thomas that the
facts stated in his telegrams do not warrant the interference of
military authority. The administration of the laws and the preser-
vation of peace in Nashville belong properly to the State authori-
ties, and the duty of the United States forces is not to interfere in any
controversy between the political authorities of the State; and General
Thomas will strictly abstain from any interference between them.
Yours truly, EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary cf War.
General Grant replied as follows:
JULY 18th, 1866.
MAJ. GEN. GEO. H. THOMAS, Nashville, Tenn. :
The facts stated in your despatch of the fourteenth, do not
warrant the interference of military authority.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut. Gen'1.
Thus instructed, General Thomas replied to Mr. Heydt :
HEADQUARTERS, MIL. DIV. OF THE TENNESSEE.
“Nashville, Tenn., July 19th, 1866,
WILLIAM HEYDT, ESQ., Sergeant-at-Arms,
House of Representatives, Nashville, Tenn. :
Sir :—I have the honor, by direction of the Major-General com-
manding, to inform you that your application for a detail of soldiers
to assist you in arresting certain members of the House of Representa-
tives, was referred by Major-General Thomas to Lieutenant-General
Grant, commanding armies of the United States, and it has been by
him directed that the case will not warrant the interference of the
MAG WAWIMITY OF THE GO VERNMENT 4O9
military authority. Please find enclosed your orders, which you re-
quired to be returned.
Very respectfully your obedient servant.
GEO. W. HowARD,
Ass’t Adj't Gen.
Late in 1865 General Thomas was obliged to inter-
fere with ecclesiastical affairs in his military division.
Bishop Wilmer, of the Protestant Episcopal Church
in Alabama, advised his clergy to omit the prescribed
prayer for the President of the United States. Compliance
on their part called forth an order from Major-General Chas.
R. Woods, commanding the Department of Alabama, for-
bidding them to preach or perform divine service, and
closing their places of worship until such time as the bishop
and they should “show a sincere return to their allegiance
to the Government of the United States, and give evidence
of a loyal and patriotic spirit by offering to resume the
prayer for the President of the United States and all in
civil authority, and taking the amnesty oath prescribed by
the President.”
This order was authorized by General Thomas. By the
following order the imposed restrictions were removed :
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE TENNESSEE,
Nashville, Tennessee, Dec. 22d, 1865.
GENERAL ORDERS,
No. 40.
Armed resistance to the authority of the United States having
been put down, the President, on the 29th day of May last, issued his
Proclamation of Amnesty, declaring that armed resistance having
ceased in all quarters, he invited those lately in rebellion to recon-
struct and restore civil authority, thus proclaiming the magnanimity
of our Government towards all, no matter how criminal or how de-
serving of punishment. Alarmed at this imminent and impending
peril to the cause in which he had embarked with all his heart and
mind, and desiring to check, if possible, the spread of popular appro-
bation and grateful appreciation of the magnanimous policy of the
President in his efforts to bring the people of the United States back
to their former friendly and national relations one with another, an
individual, styling himself Bishop of Alabama, forgetting his mission
4 IO I, IFE OF GENERAI, GEORG E H THOMAS,
to preach peace on earth and good will towards man, and being ani-
mated with the same spirit which through temptation beguiled the
mother of men to the commission of the first sin—thereby entailing
eternal toil and trouble on earth—issued, from behind the shield of
his office, his manifesto of the 20th of June last, to the clergy of the
Episcopal Church of Alabama, directing them to omit the usual and
customary prayer for the President of the United States and all others
in authority, until the troops of the United States had been removed
from the limits of Alabama ; cunningly justifying this treasonable
course, by plausibly presenting to the minds of the people that civil
authority not having yet been restored in Alabama there was no oc-
casion for the use of said prayer, as such prayer was intended for
the civil authority alone, and as the military was the only authority
in Alabama, it was manifestly improper to pray for the continuance
of military rule. This man, in his position of a teacher of religion,
charity, and good fellowship with his brothers; whose paramount
duty as such should have been characterized by frankness and free-.
dom from all cunning, thus took advantage of the sanctity of his posi-
tion, to mislead the minds of those who naturally regarded him as a
teacher in whom they could trust, and attempted to lead them back
into the labyrinths of treason. For this covert and cunning act he
was deprived of the privileges of citizenship, in so far as the right to
officiate as a minister of the Gospel, because it was evident he could
not be trusted to officiate and confine his teachings to matters of re-
ligion alone—in fact that religious matters were but a secondary con-
sideration in his mind, he having taken an early opportunity to sub-
vert the church to the justification and dissemination of his treasona-
ble sentiments. As it is, however, manifest that so far from enter-
taining the same political views as Bishop Wilmer, the people of
Alabama are honestly endeavoring to restore the civil authority in
that State, in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution of
the United States, and to repudiate their acts of hostility during the
past four years, and have accepted with a loyal and becoming spirit
the magnanimous terms offered them by the President; therefore the
restrictions heretofore imposed upon the Episcopal clergy of Ala-
bama are hereby removed, and Bishop Wilmer is left to that re-
morse of conscience consequent to the exposure and failure of the
diabolical schemes of designing and corrupt minds.
By command of MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS :
WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant General.
The other case was that of the Rev. John H. Caldwell,
SUSTAINS LOYAL MEN. 4 II
of the Methodist Episcopal Church South, who for taking
in good faith the amnesty oath, and preaching sermons
setting forth the rectitude of the institution of slavery in
itself, and at the same time portraying the abuses of slavery
by the Southern people, was required to give up his pastoral
charge and vacate the parsonage, at Newnan, Georgia.
The order and letters, in relation to this case, follow :
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE TENNESSEE.
Nashville, Tenn., Sept. 13, 1865.
SPECIAL ORDERS, }
No. 79.
13. The Rev. John H. Caldwell, a loyal minister of the Gospel
of the State of Georgia, having forwarded to these headquarters
complaint against John B. McGeehee, presiding elder of the Metho-
dist Episcopal, Church South, and other disloyal persons, for ill treat-
ment and persecution received from them, an investigation of the
case has developed the following facts:
The Reverend John H. Caldwell, pastor in charge of Newnan
and Palmetto Station, in the Georgia Conference of the Methodist
Episcopal Church South, was duly and lawfully appointed to take
charge according to the rules and discipline of that Church.
The Rev. John B. McGeehee, presiding elder, contrary to, and
in violation of the laws and customs of the Church, has ordered and
required him to give up the pastoral charge of his churches, to turn
his family out of the church parsonage, because he (Caldwell) did
on the 11th day June, 1865, preach a sermon at Newnan, therein
setting forth the abuses of the institution of Slavery and advising
the citizens to accept the amnesty proclamation offered by the
President of the United States, and to become good and loyal citizens.
It further appears that Presiding Elder McGeehee ordered the
Rev. Mr. Kimble, a returned rebel chaplain, to take pastoral charge
of Caldwell's churches and ordered Caldwell to Haroldson, Missouri,
a place in a remote and obscure part of the La Grange district, where
he would have a very limited sphere of usefulness and no means
whatever of supporting his family.
It is accordingly ordered by the Major-General commanding that
the Reverend John B. Caldwell be immediately re-instated in posses-
sion of the churches of Newnan and Palmetto Station, and that he be
upheld therein by the United States authorities of the district of
Atlanta, and also that his family be protected in the quiet possession
4 I 2 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS.
of the church parsonage, until the expiration of the regular term
for which he was appointed to officiate in those churches.
If the Rev. J. B. McGeehee, presiding elder, or the Rev. Mr.
Kimble attempt, in any way, to prevent the execution of this order
or to interfere with the Rev. Mr. Caldwell in the discharge of his
pastoral duties, in his proper churches, they will be placed in arrest.
% * * * •x- * * *
By command of MAJ.-GEN'L THOMAS.
GEO. W. HOWARD,
Ass’t-Adjt. Gen’l.
NEWNAN, GA., Nov. 9th, 1865.
To MAJ.-GEN. THOMAS,
Commanding District of Tennessee,
Nashville, Tenn.
General :
I regret exceedingly the necessity of again troubling you with
my case, but my presiding elder has made a charge against me, to
be tried by the Georgia Conference, which meets in Macon, Georgia,
on the 15th inst.
His charge is immorality, and the following is specification No. 1 :
“That in seeking the Special Military Order No. 79, the Rev. J. H.
Caldwell deceived the Federal Authorities as to his antecedents.”
What I wish now is, if agreeable to you, to send me a brief note
certifying that I did not deceive you as to my antecedents. That I
told you when I first applied to you for protection, that I was a rebel
during the war, and had said hard things, and I think I alluded to
some of those things in a printed Fast day sermon, a copy of which
my presiding elder sent you.
There is a deep and wide-spread prejudice and persecution of
me amongst the preachers of the Conference, on account of that
order. Yet if it was to do over, I would be constrained again to
apply for protection, as I did.
Just as I expected, the presiding elder, has in all his charges
and specifications, suppressed all reference to the sermon on slavery,
and just as I anticipated, has charged me with disobedience in not
going to Haroldson, Missouri, to which he assigned me.
There never was any difficulty, or any complaint against me,
until I preached the sermon against the abuses of slavery. I was
the first preacher, in the State, to recommend the citizens to accept
the Amnesty. I did it for myself and recommended it to them.
The persecution all grew out of that sermon, and it is an effort
on the part of my presiding elder, and others, to revive the old
despotism of public opinion, to suppress free speech upon this sub-
REASONS FOR HIS ACTION. 4 I 3
ject. They know that they cannot do it directly, hence they resort
to side issues to inflame prejudices, and deter others from following
my example. Such orders, as No. 79, are necessary in order to pro-
tect liberty, until a different public sentiment shall obtain in the
South.
I stand then, or fall, General, upon this single principle—the
right of free speech. Let them assail and persecute me, as they may,
this is my principle—on this ground, and this only—I invoke and be-
seech the authorities of my country to protect and uphold me.
If you would say in your note to me, that for this purpose alone,
the application was made to you, and for this purpose the order was
granted, it would do me a great deal of good before my Conference.
With profound esteem, believe me, General, your most obedient
and humble servant,
JOHN H. CALDw ELL.
Please address the note directed to me, at Macon, Georgia, as I
shall start there before it could reach me here. J. H. C.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE TENNESSEE.
Nashville, Tenn., December 18, 1865.
REv. JoHN H. CALDwell,
Macon, Ga.
Sir :
The Major-General commanding directs me to acknowledge
your communication of November 9th, and in reply to state that, in
your former communication to him, you made a full and free state-
ment of your antecedents, and an impartial account of the facts,
connected with the attempt to dispossess you of your pastoral charge.
He was not in any way deceived, or misled, in his action on the
subject.
Very respectfully,
Your obedient Servant,
WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Brig.-Genl. and Chief of Staff.
General Thomas interfered with ecclesiastical affairs, in
the cases mentioned, on the same grounds that the civil
courts have since entertained suits, the violation of canoni-
cal law or of established usages, and for the additional
reason that the violation in these cases was induced by
hostility to the Government of the United States, and to
those who loyally sustained it. The Episcopal bishop of
Alabama and the clergy of that State violated a usage
4 I4 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H. THOMAS.
established by the highest ecclesiastical authorities, and
the presiding elder overstepped the prerogatives of his office.
In anticipation of the assignment of General Thomas to
the Military Division of the Tennessee, the General Assem-
bly of the State of Tennessee adopted the following Joint
Resolutions, June 12th, 1865:
Whereas, the pleasing intelligence has reached us, that the dis-
tinguished soldier and commander, Major-General G. H. Thomas,
has been assigned to this military division:
Resolved, by the General Assembly of the State of Zennessee,
That we do most heartily congratulate our citizens upon the appoint-
Inent of this model Soldier, possessing as we do the most unbounded
confidence in his ability and judgment, and believing that under his
rule, early peace and quiet and Unionism will prevail in every section
of our State.
A'eso/ved, further: That we tender to the President and War De-
partment, our special thanks for their assignment of General Thomas
over this military division, and, with his consent, we propose to adopt
him as a Tennesseean, General Thomas having endeared himself to
us, both by distinguished services, and by many acts of noble and
unostentatious kindness.
General Thomas in the following letter accepted the ten-
der of citizenship :
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Nashville, June 28, 1865.
HoN. A. J. FLETCHER,
Secretary of the State of Tennessee.
Sir –I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a copy of
Joint Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee,
conferring on me the distinguished honor of adopting me as a citizen
of the State. For this magnanimous and courteous act of the General
Assembly words cannot express my profound appreciation.
“With the sincere hope that their patriotic efforts may inspire public
confidence and restore the State to a state of peace and prosperity.
I remain, dear sir, very respectfully,
Your ob't serv’t,
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-Genl, U. S. A.
J2RESENTED WITH A GOLD MEDAL. 4I 5
The estate of General Thomas was settled under the laws
of Tennessee, to the advantage of Mrs. Thomas who alone
deserved to inherit his property.
On the 2d of September, 1865, the following resolution
was adopted :
Resolved, by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee,
That the thanks of the General Assembly, in their own name and in
the name of the people of the State of Tennessee, be presented to
Major-General George H. Thomas, and the officers and soldiers un-
der his command, for his wise and spirited, and their brave and
patriotic conduct in the battle of Nashville, in defense of the capital
of the State,in December, 1864, and that a gold medal be struck in
commemoration of the great and decisive event, and be presented
to him.
That the medal exhibit on the one side, a head of Major-General
Thomas in profile, with inscription around it, “To Major-General
George H. Thomas, from the State of Tennessee,” and on the other
side, the capitol and other appropriate inscriptions.
That the Governor of the State of Tennessee cause and procure
the gold medal to be struck at as early a day as practicable, and pre-
sent the same to Major-General Thomas, with a letter of thanks, in
the name of this General Assembly, and of the people of the State
of Tennessee.
On the reverse of the medal procured in obedience to
the foregoing resolutions was inscribed—“I will hold the
town till we starve.”
The medal was presented to General Thomas, with im-
posing ceremonies, on the second anniversary of the battle
of Nashville, December 15th, 1866.
In presenting the medal Governor Brownlow spoke as
follows:
The pleasant duty devolves on me, of presenting to you on this
interesting occasion the elegant gold medal voted to you something
like a year ago, by the General Assembly of Tennessee, whose mem-
bers—Senators and Representatives—now surround you. And al-
though this medal is the finest article of the kind yet executed in
America, its value to you does not consist in the amount of the pre-
cious metal it contains, nor yet, in the exquisite workmanship of the
artist, but in the motives which prompted the gift, and the patriotic
4I 6 I, IFE OF GENERAL, GEORG E H. THOMAS.
source it originates from. It is intended to express the high regard in
which you are held by a loyal Tennessee legislature, as a military
chieftain, a tried and devoted patriot, and a modest unassuming
gentleman.
General, in no spirit of flattery, I must be permitted to say, that
in the great struggle of four years, which recently convulsed the Na-
tion, of all military commanders, you are perhaps the only one that
never lost a battle, and in the government of armies and departments
never made a mistake.
There is something very appropriate in the presentation of this
medal to-day, and in this capitol, the anniversary of the battle of
Nashville. Two years ago to-day, at the head of a gallant army, you
were engaged in a deadly conflict with the enemies of our country
around this city; and two years ago to-morrow you closed out that
conflict, saving this city from ruins, and sending the cohorts of trea-
son howling into Dixie, “away down South in Dixie.” A portion
of the enemy remained to receive their long lost rights—the only
rights that traitors are entitled to—Funeral Rights.
Trusting that you may never have occasion to command an-
other army on the field of carnage, and that you may live long to
enjoy the fruits of the victories you have contributed to achieve, I
hand this medal over to one who will never dishonor it.
In reply General Thomas said:
Governor Brownlow, and Gentlemen of the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Legislature of Tennessee : º
Profoundly sensible of the high honors you have this day con-
ferred on me, I confess myself totally unable to thank you in appro-
priate terms. Be assured, however, of my sincere appreciation of
these honors, and particularly of the compliments which you have
paid to the officers and soldiers who participated with me in defeating
the enemy two years ago to-day at Nashville.
Some thirty years ago I received my diploma at the Military
Academy, and soon after a commission in the Army.
On receiving that commission I took an oath to sustain the Con-
stitution of the United States, and the Government, and to obey all
officers of the Government placed over me. I have faithfully endeav-
ored to keep that oath. I did not regard it so much an oath, as a
solemn pledge on my part to return the Government some little ser-
vice for the great benefit I had received in obtaining my education
at the Academy.
While I cannot venture to speak of myself, without fear of being
accused of egotism, I can, with pleasure, sincerity, and pride, speak
THE TENNESSEE PORTRAIT. 4I 7
of the brave soldiers and officers who, at the commencement of the
late war, voluntarily came forth from the private walks of life, and
devoted their lives to the defense of the Government established by
our fathers.
It has been my pleasure, on all occasions, to witness the devotion
of our army, and I, to-day, take pride in saying, that no other
Country on earth ever produced such another army as that which as-
sembled to put down the rebellion.
After relating the circumstances, that made the campaign
in Tennessee possible, and briefly narrating the operations
South of Nashville, General Thomas thus tersely described
the battle before that city:
On that day (December 15th) General Steedman commenced the
battle on the left and so occupied the attention of the enemy, that he
appeared entirely to forget the other portions of his line, and con-
centrated heavily at that point, evidently expecting a battle there.
This was expected in my programme, and after General Steed-
man had opened the battle and been engaged about half an hour,
the troops were moved on their respective positions, and, almost like
men in review, took post after post, and drove the enemy to the
hills.
The next day, by the skilful maneuver of the cavalry comman-
der, the enemy's left was entirely turned ; and then, by one of the
most gallant assaults I have ever witnessed, the entire line of the
enemy was swept from left to right. And so ended one of the
Strongest and most daring armies the enemy ever equipped.
It is with the greatest pleasure that I avail myself to-day of the
opportunity of speaking in praise of those gallant men and officers
then under my command.
On the 25th of August, 1866, by the following resolution,
the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, authorized
the purchase of a portrait of General Thomas.
Section I.-Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State
of Tennessee, that the life-size portrait of Major-General Geo, H.
Thomas, now in the Senate Chamber, by artist Geo. Davy, of the
city of Washington, painted at the urgent request of loyal citizens
of the State of Tennessee and state officials, be secured for the State
of Tennessee, and be placed within the Capitol building in memory
and honor of his fidelity to and services as a soldier in defense of
the Constitution of the United States and its Government and our in-
stitutions as established by the fathers.
27
4.18 LIFE OF GENERAL, G EORG E H, THOMAS.
Section 2. — That the artist paint on the portrait the badge of
the Army of the Cumberland as he may be instructed to do.
The Military Division of the Tennessee was discontinued,
ard the Department of the Tennessee created August 6th,
1866. This department embraced the same territorial sub-
divisions, differently designated, hence its establishment did
not diminish the command of General Thomas. It com-
prised three districts and four. sub-districts:
District of the Cumberland, Major-General Stoneman
commanding, embracing Kentucky and Tennessee; Sub-
District of Kentucky, Brevet Major-General Jeff. C. Davis,
commanding; Sub-District of Tennessee, Brevet Major-
General Clinton B. Fisk commanding ; District of Missis-
sippi, Major-General Thomas J. Wood commanding; Dis-
trict of the Chattahoochee, Brevet Major-General Charles
R. Woods commanding, embracing Georgia and Alabama.
Sub-District of Georgia, Brevet Major-General Davis
Tillson commanding ; Sub District of Alabama, Major-
General Wager Swayne commanding.
March I Ith, 1867, General Thomas was assigned to com-
mand the Third Military District, but was relieved March
I5th at his own request, and appointed to command the De-
partment of the Cumberland, comprising the States of
Rentucky, Tennessee and West Virginia.
On the 17th of August, 1867, General Thomas was ordered
by the President to take command of the Fifth Military
District and the department comprising the States of Lou-
isiana and Texas, in place of General Sheridan, but for
the reason given in the following order, the assignment of
General Thomas was revoked and General Hancock was as-
signed to that command.
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
NO. 81. Washington, August 27, 1867.
I.—The following orders have been received from the President:
GENERAL ORDERS, | HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
THE FIFTH MILITARY DISTRIOT. 4 IQ
HXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D.C., August 26, 1867.
Sir: In consequence of the unfavorable condition of the health of
Major-General George H. Thomas, as reported to you in Surgeon
Hasson's despatch of the 21st instant, my order dated August 17,
1867, is hereby modified so as to assign Major-General Winfield S.
Hancock to the command of the Fifth Military District, created by
the Act of Congress passed March 2, 1867, and of the Military De-
partment comprising the States of Louisiana and Texas. On being
relieved from the command of the Department of the Missouri by
Major-General P. H. Sheridan, Major-General Hancock will proceed
directly to New Orleans, Louisiana, and, assuming the command
to which he is hereby assigned, will, when necessary to a faithful ex-
ecution of the laws, exercise any and all powers conferred by Acts of
Congress upon District Commanders, and any and all authority per-
taining to officers in command of Military Departments.
Major-Geiferal P. H. Sheridan will at once turn over his present
command to the officer next in rank to himself and proceeding, with-
out delay, to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, will relieve Major-General
Hancock of the command of the Department of Missouri.
Major-General George H. Thomas will, until further orders, re-
main in command of the Department of the Cumberland.
Very respectfully yours,
ANDREW JOHNSON.
General U. S. GRANT,
Secretary of War, ad interime.
II.-In compliance with the foregoing instructions of the Presi-
dent of the United States, Major-General P. H. Sheridan will, on
receipt of this order, turn over his present command to Brevet Major-
General Charles Griffin, the officer next in rank to himself, and pro-
ceed, without delay, to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and will relieve
Major-General Hancock, in command of the Department of Mis-
SOllſ 1.
III. On being relieved by Major-General Sheridan, Major-
General Hancock will proceed, without delay, to New Orleans, Lou-
isiana, and assume command of the Fifth Military District, and of
the Department composed of the States of Louisiana and Texas.
IV.-Major-General George H. Thomas will continue in com-
mand of the Department of the Cumberland.
By command of GENERAL GRANT,
E. D. Townsen D,
Assistant Adjutant General.
42O LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS.
His headquarters were at Nashville from October, 1864,
to November Ist, 1866, and at Louisville, from November
Ist, 1866, to May 15th, 1869.
On the 21st of February, 1868, President Johnson re-
quested the United States Senate to confirm General
Thomas, as brevet lieutenant-general, and general in the
army. It was believed throughout the country that, had
this been done, the President would have displaced General
Grant as commander-in-chief, and assigned General Thomas
to the command of the army, upon his highest brevet rank.
Whatever may have been the belief of Thomas, he based
his objection to the confirmation of the nominations, and
his request to the President to recall them, on other
grounds.
LOUISVILLE, February 22, 1868, 2.30 P.M.
Hon. B. F. WADE,
President United States Senate :
The morning papers, of Louisville, announce, officially that my
name was yesterday sent to the Senate for confirmation as brevet
lieutenant-general and brevet general.
For the battle of Nashville I was appointed a major-general in
the United States Army. My services since the war do not merit so
high a compliment, and it is now too late to be regarded as a compli-
ment, if conferred for services during the war.
I, therefore, earnestly request that the Senate will not confirm
the nomination.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General.
The next day he sent the following despatch to President
Johnson :
NASHVILLE, TENN., Feb., 23, 1868.
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
The Washington despatches to the Louisville %urnal of yester-
day, say, my name has been sent to the Senate recommended for
the brevet rank of lieutenant-general and general.
Whilst sincerely thanking you for the proposed compliment, I
earnestly request you to recall the recommendation. I have done
no service since the war to deserve so high a compliment, and it is
THE PRESIDENCY, 42 I
now too late to be regarded as a compliment, if conferred for services
during the war.
GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Major-General.
General Thomas was strongly solicited to become a candi-
date for the Presidency in 1868. In speaking of this pres-
sure to Colonel Hough, he stated that nothing but duty to
his country, at the call of the whole people, irrespective of
party, could ever induce him to make the personal sacrifice
of undertaking the onerous duties of the Presidency; that to
be a candidate of a political party, and have his personal and
family affairs pried into, and heralded before the public, and
to be harassed and persecuted by politicians and office
Seekers, was an ordeal he would not submit himself to,
under any circumstances.
When he was importuned a second time to become a can-
didate, his friends assumed that it was his duty to abide by
the wishes of the people, but he again resisted with even
greater firmness, declaring:
“I have maturely considered the subject, and am ex-
tremely averse to permitting such a disposition to be made
of me. As an American citizen I have a right to choose my
course in life, when not contrary to the laws of my country,
and as such, I certainly do not choose to enter public life.
If the American people consider me entitled to one-half the
credit for my services attributed to me in the army, they
must accord to me the full rights of an American citizen,
and if permitted to exercise these rights, then no one can ob-
ject to my preferring to remain an officer in the army, to being
placed in any other position under the Government. I am also
afraid that the military arm is becoming more or less infected
with politics; let us by all means keep that branch of the pub-
lic service free from the taint of intrigue and party strife.”
General Thomas gave expression to his purpose in his replies
to the numerous letters written to him in relation to the sub-
ject.
* * Manuscript notes of Lieut. Col. Alfred L. Hough.
422 I, IFE OF GENERAL G. EORGE H, THOMAS,
In 1867 he wrote:
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Louisville, Ky., April 20th, 1867.
GENERAL J, WATTS DE PEYSTER,
59 E. 21st St., New York City.
Dear Sir :
I received your favor of the 9th inst., some days ago, but have
not had time to reply until to-day.
First, you must permit me to acknowledge my grateful sense of
your kind appreciation of my services;
Second, I will here state, and hope you will report for me, whenever
you hear my name mentioned in connection with the Presidency of the
United States, that I never will consent to being brought before the
people as a candidate for any office. I have too much regard for
my own self-respect to voluntarily place myself in a position where
my personal and private character can be assailed with impunity by
newspaper-men, and Scurrilous political pettifoggers and demagogues.
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
GEO. H. THOMAS.
And in 1870:
SAN FRANCISCO, MARCH 8, 1870.
Mr. JoHN TYLER, JR., *
Dear Sir: I have received your two letters, dated Oct. 27, 1869,
and Feb. 1, 1870. I did not reply to the first because it only reached
me some time after my return to this place. In reply to the political
portion of the second, I again assure you, in all sincerity, that I have
no ambition in the direction of the Presidency, and, therefore, shall
not allow my name to go before the people as a candidate for that
office in 1872, or at any subsequent date, while there are so many
able statesmen in political life to be drawn upon. And is it not
rather early to begin to look for another Republican candidate for
the next Presidential term P Grant is still young, has not, as yet, com-
mitted any serious mistake, and if he continues steadfast to the prin-
ciples enunciated in his inaugural, will be entitled to the second term
or at least to the nomination, as an expression of the approbation of
the party, for his past services.
My life, for the last thirty years, has been passed in the military
service. During that time I have acquired tastes and opinions re-
specting public duties and responsibilities, which do not harmonize
with the prevailing ideas of the present day. I could not, therefore,
hope to meet with such encouragement from the people as the
Executive of the United States must have, to assure a successful ad-
\
DUTY THE RULE OF HIS LIFE. 423
ministration, and the consequent prosperity and advancement of the
nation.
My services are now, as they have always been, subject to the
call of the government in whatever military capacity I may be con-
sidered competent and worthy to fill, and will be cordially under-
taken whenever called upon to render them. All civil honors and
duties I shall continue to decline.
Respectfully and truly,
GEO. H. THOMAS.
Towards the close of the war it became necessary for him
to decide whether or not it was appropriate and in accord
with duty for a man in public life to accept a reward from
his friends or from citizens for public services. He decided
this question in the negative, and so positively that many
persons considered him over sensitive. His views are thus
reported by Colonel Hough :
“While fully appreciating the motives which induce these
kind offers, I contend that I cannot accept them and be
wholly, independent. Whatever my services were, they
were rendered to the country, and whatever reward for
these services the government might offer me, I could ac-
cept freely without being under obligations to any person ;
but if I accept gifts from one or more individual citizens who
owe me nothing more than respect and esteem, by doing so
I place myself under obligations to them, which I could not
cancel as a private citizen, and would not as a public offi-
cer; and to hold myself wholly independent, I make it a
rule of my life to refuse all such offerings.”
When General Thomas first heard that it had been pro-
posed to raise a large sum of money to present to him as
an expression of gratitude for his services during the war,
he promptly sent the following letter to the gentleman who
originated the project.
HEADQUARTERS, DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Eastport, Miss., Jan. I7, 1865.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE CINCINNATI GAZETTE :
Dear Sir: From an article I saw yesterday in the Louisville Press,
424 I, IFE OF GENERA. L. G. EORG E H. THOMAS.
I am led to believe that, at your suggestions, the citizens of Cincin-
nati and Louisville are about to raise a sum of money, for the pur-
pose of presenting me with a suitable testimonial of their appreciation
of my services since the war commenced. Whilst I am duly and
profoundly sensible of the high compliment thus proposed to be paid
to me, I would greatly prefer, and, if not premature, request that any
sum which may be raised for that purpose may be devoted to the
founding of a fund for the relief of disabled soldiers and of the in-
digent widows and orphans of officers and soldiers who have lost
their lives during the war. I am amply rewarded when assured that
my humble services have met with the approbation of the Govern-
ment and the people.
With much respect, I remain your obedient servant,
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General, U. S. A.
He also refused a gift of silver-plate, offered by citizens
of Nashville, some of whom had been members of his staff.
He did however accept from his staff a handsomely jeweled
badge of the Army of the Cumberland. A large" number
of the volunteer officers who were members of his staff
during the war were about to be mustered out of the
service, and they, with those who were to remain with
him, were anxious to leave with their chief Something
to remind him of them in their separation. When they
called on him to present the badge he was surprised and
greatly affected, and although averse to accepting gifts, he
did not feel at liberty under the circumstances to reject
this one.
General Thomas was greatly interested in the Society of
the Army of the Cumberland from its organization in
February, 1868, until his death. He was its first president,
but was present only at the meetings in Cincinnati and Chi-
cago. Since his death a draped and vacant chair, and his
portrait at every meeting have reminded the members of
the society with pathetic force that their commander and
president, the central figure in the army and in the Society,
has passed away.
At the banquet of the Society in Cincinnati at the first
R EPI, Y TO TOAST –“G ENERAL THOMAS.” 425
reunion, in response to the toast, “General Thomas,” he
spoke as follows:
MR. PRESIDENT AND GENTLEMEN :
I thank you for the toast. At the same time, it is most too per-
Sonal for me to attempt to reply to it. Again, my predecessors have
occupied nearly the whole field of discussion to-night, and left me
in a pretty bad scrape. I don’t know how I shall draw out. Never-
theless I will try to do so; I will make the attempt. I did intend to
relate our withdrawal from the front of Atlanta, to take up those
three lines of march, upon the enemy’s rear and line of retreat, which
our illustrious commander, General Sherman, has just now so graphi-
cally described. He, you see, has anticipated me. As the presi-
dent of this association, I desired, also, to allude briefly to the ser-
vices and merits of my predecessors. My immediate predecessor,
General Thurston, has ably done that, and I find myself forestalled
a second time. Now you see how desperate my condition is; you
all know that I am a modest man and never speak unless I am
forced to. I was once offered the command of the Army of the Cum-
berland when I thought it should not be taken from a gentleman
who had claims for it, I therefore declined it. I would not permit
myself to be made use of to do him an injury. At a later day, with-
out any thought of such a position being thrust upon me, the com-
mand of the Army of the Cumberland was given to me. You know
very well the occasion. It was when we were tied up, in a measure,
at Chattanooga. We did not have a great deal to eat, then, you
know, and we economized our rations, and proposed to starve before
we gave up that place.
Gentlemen, you know the Army of the Cumberland expressed
that sentiment to the country, and you also know that we would
have starved before we gave up Chattanooga. The whole country
had confidence in that declaration. Rečnforcements came as soon
as they could be got to us. We waited patiently, diminished our ra-
tions from day to day, until they became almost a myth, but the day
came when the Army of the Tennessee, on our left, opened the way
to relief and final triumph, by crossing the Tennessee River, and
taking a strong position on Mission Ridge The next day the reën-
forcements from the Army of the Potomac, which were not then in-
corporated with the Army of the Cumberland,” carried that high
* The Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, were not incorporated with the Army of
the Cumberland until April 4th, 1864, when they were consolidated, to constitute
the Twentieth Corps, but from the previous October they had been attached to
that army, and subject to the orders of its commander.
426 LIFE OF GENERAI, GEORG E H THOMAS,
point on our right, Lookout Mountain, which opened the eyes of the
enemy to the danger of his position. That gave us great encourage-
ment. We felt that we could get something to eat before long.
The next day was the grand finale. The enemy, thinking he had
us entirely in his power, forgot himself and lost Lookout Mountain.
To retrieve his disaster he concentrated upon our illustrious friend
upon my right, (General Sherman) the leafler of the combined armies
afterward. That concentration gave the Corps under my immediate
Command, an opportunity, in Soldier parlance, “to make a straight
line for the top of Mission Ridge.” We carried it; we held it; and
we hurled the broken enemy across Chickamauga Creek. Well do I
remember when, after the battle was over, right on the top of the hill,
I fell among some of my old Soldiers, who always took liberties with
me—who commenced talking and giving their views of the victory.
When I attempted to compliment them for the gallant manner in
which they had made the assault, one man very coolly replied:
“Why, General, we know that you have been training us for this
race for the last three weeks.” Just at that moment, not knowing
exactly what to say to him, I looked over my shoulder and saw a
steamboat coming into Chattanooga, I said, “we have trained you
as long as we want to ; there come the rations !”
Now, gentlemen, my time is very nearly up. I will close by
touching upon one subject which no gentleman has touched upon to-
night. It is this : the civilizing influences of discipline, both in the
army and navy. We have not only broken down one of the most
formidable rebellions that ever threatened the existence of any
country, but the discipline of the Army of the Cumberland alone has
civilized two hundred thousand valuable patriots and citizens. I have
traveled a little since the war was over. Wherever I have been,
whether on a steamboat or by rail, I have either seen on the steam-
boat, engaged in peaceful occupations of merchant Sailors, or I have
seen in the fields along the railroad, engaged in peacefully following
the plow, and setting an example of industry worthy to be followed
by all the country, men innumerable dressed in blue. They did not
disdain to wear the uniform. They gloried in it, and I hope that
such sentiments, and such civilizing influences as have been pro-
duced by this war will serve for all time to inspire this Nation with
such a feeling of patriotism that no enemy can ever do us the least
harm.
This speech fully sustained the general's assertion of
modesty. He was called upon to speak of himself, and yet
LO VED AND HONORED BY HIS SOLDIERS. 427
in giving a history of affairs at Chattanooga, in October and
November, 1863, he kept himself out of view, as much as
possible. In another connection, it has been stated that he
made the declaration, “We will hold the town till we
starve,” for his army as well as for himself. But in referring
to this historic utterance, he put his army in the foreground,
as expressing a sentiment which elicited the confidence of
the whole country.
His soldiers took “liberties” with him, because he was
so kind to them, so prompt to return every salute, so
thoughtful of their interests and so careful of their lives. But
though free to speak him, they were moved by affection to
do his bidding and submit to wholesome discipline. General
Garfield, in an oration at Arlington, Virginia, on Decora-
tion-Day, May 30th, 1868, mentioned an incident illustrative
of this feeling:
I can never forget an incident illustrative of this thought, which
it was my fortune to witness, near sunset of the second day at Chick-
amauga, when the beleaguered but unbroken left wing of our army
had again and again repelled the assaults of more than double their
numbers, and when each soldier felt that to his individual hands were
committed the life of the army and the honor of his country. It was
just after a division had fired its last cartridge, and had repelled
a charge at the point of the bayonet, that the great-hearted com-
mander took the hand of an humble soldier and thanked him for his
steadfast courage. The soldier stood silent for a monent, and then
said, with deep emotion, “George H. Thomas has taken this hand
in his. I'll knock down any mean man that offers to take it here-
after.” This rough sentence was full of meaning. He felt that some-
thing had happened to his hand which consecrated it.
At the business meeting of the society a resolution was
offered, which had a decided political bearing, for this
reason General Thomas pronounced it out of order, saying:
This association was organized for the purpose of a renewal of
our fraternal relations to each other, and not for the purpose of
engaging in political discussions. At the same time that I decide
the gentleman out of order, I return him thanks for giving me this
opportunity of expressing my views on the subject.
428 I, IFE OF GENERAI, G EORG E H THOMAS.
The purpose of General Thomas to avoid all personal
connection with politics, and his approval of political activ-
ity by those who returned to civil life at the close of the
war, are manifested by the subjoined letter:-
LOUISVILLE, Aug. 7, '68
MESSRS. John CoBURN,
O. P. MoRTON, ). Committee.
A. H. CONNER,
Gentlemen, I have the honor to receive by this morning's mail,
your favor of the 5th inst., inviting me to join with the soldiers and
sailors of Indiana in a mass convention, to be held at the city of
Indianapolis, on the 2d day of September next. Your very cordial
invitation commands my sincere thanks, and though I take no part
in politics, permit me to express the great pleasure I have derived
from observing the firm and almost universal support offered by the
soldiers and sailors throughout the country to all measures calculated
to restore it to a condition of peace and quiet, thereby showing that
those most willing to support the Government in times of peril can
be relied upon to inaugurate and maintain measures best calculated
to maintain the peace and prosperity of the Nation. I am, gentle-
men, very respectfully your obedient servant,
GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. A.
In December, 1868, the Societies of the Armies of the
Cumberland, Tennessee, Ohio and Georgia, met together in
Chicago. At this grand reunion General Thomas presided,
and if he had not known it before, he then learned that he was
appreciated by fifteen hundred officers, representing nearly
a half million of men who fought in the war of the Rebell-
ion. In the introduction to “The Army Reunion,”—the
volume comprising the reports of the proceedings on that
occasion,-the enthusiasm aroused by the presence of
General Thomas and by allusion to him is thus described:
None of the great soldiers of the war had aroused in the Armies
of the West a more worshipful enthusiasm than he who sat first
among the leaders assembled on the ample platform of the Opera
House, on the evening of the 15th, General George H. Thomas.
The events of his career and the qualities of his character had
THE ARMY RE UNION IN CHICAGO. 429
equally wrought in all observers the conviction that history rarely
shows the world a man more compact of all the abilities and man-
ners of a great soldier, and rarely affords to greatness a finer oppor-
tunity than was his on the memorable field of Chickamauga, and
when the last desperate advance of the rebellion was crushed before
Nashville. An incident of this evening of Commemoration, the un-
exampled burst of irrepressible emotion which greeted a reference to
General Thomas in the oration of General Belknap, strikingly con-
firmed the judgment of those who selected this modest hero and
admirable soldier to sit between Grant and Sherman at the head of
the great reunion assemblage. With gallant courtesy the orator of the
Army of the Tennessee had spoken of “the determined soldier" and
“beloved commander’ of the Army of the Cumberland, “Thomas
the Rock of Chickamauga,” when with instant accord every heart in
the vast assembly, soldiers of every army and all ranks leaped be-
yond all bounds of usual excitement, into such a storm of applause
as hardly once in a century falls upon human ears. It was a fit
recognition of one who is justly thought to have shown himself, by
the side of his great equals, an ideal Soldier.”
When General Thomas rose before this assemblage and called
for the reve?//e by the drum corps, an outbreak of enthusiasm from
re-united comrades followed, which, for the moment, made all other
demonstration insignificant. i.
And during the continuance of this great meeting every
movement and every utterance of General Thomas caused
a renewal of the outburst of applause.
At the banquet which ended this reunion, General
Thomas, replying to the toast, “The Army of the Cumber-
land,” spoke as follows:
FELLOW COMRADES OF THE ARMIES OF THE TENNESSEE, OF THE
OHIO, OF GEORGIA, AND OF THE CUMBERLAND : We have assembled
in this city where we have a grand reunion of the four armies which
had the good fortune to serve together in the West, where we claim
that we did some good duty. To wind up these interesting proceed-
ings, we have assembled here this evening to unite together in a so-
cial banquet to testify towards one another our fraternal love, begotten
amid hours of danger, and when we were attempting to discharge
our whole duty to our country. These sentiments, I know, are en-
tertained by the Army of the Cumberland and the three other armies.
* “The Army Reunion,” p. 13. f Ibid, p. 15.
43O LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS,
But as their representative to-night, I wish to express to you again
the fraternal feeling which we hold towards all of you. The cordial
manner in which we have been received by the citizens of Chicago
should ever be remembered by us as a demonstration of their
patriotic feeling. Therefore, I wish to tender to them, in behalf not
only of the Army of the Cumberland, but of the other army societies
here, our heartfelt thanks. As our time is limited, and there are
several other speeches to make, you must excuse me from saying
any more. I bid you good night.
I am now requested to present a toast which was expected from
me at the close of the regular toasts this evening. I give you, “The
Citizens of Chicago. Their enterprise is proverbial and their
liberality no less so. The latter will be long remembered by the
united armies of the Tennessee, the Ohio, the Cumberland and
Georgia.”
These were the last spoken words, to the members of the
Society of the Army of the Cumberland, from their beloved
and revered commander. In the only two speeches made
by him in response to the toasts, “General Thomas’ and
“The Army of the Cumberland,” the traits of their com-
mander as he was known to them all, were fully displayed.
His regard for duty—his earnest patriotism—his modesty—
his liberal praise of others, and his affectionate recognition
of the brotherhood of those who saved the country.
Not being able to attend the reunion of the Society of
the Army of the Cumberland at Indianapolis on the fifth
anniversary of the battle of Nashville, General Thomas
sent the following letter:
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., November 26, 1869.
DEAR GENERAL :
I have waited until to-day, before answering your letter of the
3d inst, hoping that I might be able to inform you that I could be
present at the approaching annual reunion of the Society of the
Army of the Cumberland.
Much as I regret that I shall not be able to shake you all by the
hand on the 15th of December next, I shall be compelled to forego
the pleasure. Indianapolis is so far from San Francisco, and there
being apprehensions of Indian outbreaks in this region, I do not
HIS LETTER TO THE SOCIETY. 431
think it prudent to leave my command for so long a time, as will be
required to go to Indianapolis and return.
I appreciate fully the friendly sentiments of your letter, which
are all the more acceptable from the fact that similar sentiments
come to me from many quarters.
It was my hearty desire, from the beginning to the end of the
late war, to accept with cheerfulness, and perform with zeal and hon-
esty, whatever duties devolved upon me. At the same time it was
my constant endeavor to impress those who were with me and under
niy command, with a sense of the importance of the services they
had undertaken to perform. This, I am happy to say, was an easy
task. The Army of the Cumberland, from the highest officers to the
privates in the ranks, was distinguished throughout the war for subor-
dination, unity and concert of action within itself, as well as for the
cheerſulness with which it united its destinies and divided the hard-
ships of service, at all times, with whatever troops it came in con-
tact with in the service, entertaining no jealousies of, but a lively
sentiment of friendship and esteem for all engaged in the defense
of the Government.
Although I shall not be able to be with you in person, my heart
will rejoice with you, in the happy reunion which I know you will
have.
I am, very truly, your friend,
GEORGE H. THOMAS,
- Major-General, U. S. A.
GENERAL NATHAN KIMBALL,
Chairman Executive Committee,
Society, Army of the Cumberland.
This letter was his first and only written commun-
ication to the Society, and in it he did full justice to him-
self and his army. A more patriotic commander or a more
patriotic army never fought for country or for freedom.
CHAPTER XIX.
HIS LIFE SADDENED BY OFFICIAL AND OTHER ANNOYANCES.–HIS DEATH
AND BURIAL. —AN UNFINISHED PAPER.
URING the last year of his life General Thomas was
needlessly harrassed. One extreme annoyance was
the necessity of protesting against what he considered a
degradation. The circumstances have been related by two
members of his staff. fe
The statement of Colonel Alfred L. Hough is as follows:
“After the war had closed and matters were settled in
kentucky, Tennessee and adjoining States, General Thomas
feeling that he had served a long time in the West, and both
he and Mrs. Thomas being Eastern people, desired to go
East, and made a personal request to have command of the
Eastern Division. He was informed that this had been pro-
mised to General Meade, or he could have had it; and this
ended the matter for the present, for if he could not go East.
he was well satisfied where he was, in Louisville, Kentucky.
In the autumn of 1868, I accompanied General Thomas
to Washington, where he was ordered on a court of inquiry,”
and where we spent several weeks. Soon, after the Presi-
dential election, General Grant then being President-elect,
I accompanied General Thomas on an evening call upon
General Grant. We were late, and found the general alone.
He asked us into the library, and there we spent an hour
or more, there being present, General and Mrs. Grant, Mrs.
Grant's father and myself, no others. The conversation
* General Thomas was president of the court of inquiry appointed Septem-
ber Io, 1868, to investigate the official conduct of General Dyer, chief of
ordnance. The court convened at Washington November 9, 1868, and was
dissolved May 15, 1869, its findings and opinions having been approved and con-
firmed by President Grant.
432
ASSIG NED TO THE PACIFIC. 433
was general, until General Grant suddenly turned it and
said: “Thomas, there has got to be a change on the Pacific
coast, and either you or Sheridan will have to go there;
how would you like it?' General Thomas hesitated a mo-
ment, and then replied: “As for myself I would have no
objection to serving there, but on Mrs. Thomas' account I
would not want to take her any further away from her
friends in the East. Before General Grant could reply,
Mrs. Grant spoke up and said: ' Your having a wife is one
reason why you should go there instead of Sheridan, as he
ought to stay here, where he can get one.’ This was said
laughingly, and caused a smile from the others, and imme-
diately the conversation was changed by General Grant, not
another word being spoken on the subject; and General
Thomas assured me it was never mentioned to him again
at any time, until the interview between himself and General
Sherman hereafter described.
“I have given the words as spoken, because I remember
them well, and am satisfied they are substantially correct.
“When we left the house, we had gone but a few steps,
when the general turned to me and said: “Hough, we are
going to California, that was settled to night,’ and we talked
over the prospects that evening.
“The court of inquiry adjourned for the holidays, and was
reconvened again in 1869, but I did not accompany the
general again to Washington. While he was there, and
after the inauguration of General Grant as President, he was
assigned to the command of the Military Division of the
Pacific, and what occurred at the time he told me of at our
first conversation after his return to Louisville, to make the
move. To understand the following, I must state that
General Thomas commanded a department only, while the
command in California was a division then commanded by
General Halleck. General Thomas said he had heard a
good deal of talk about General Halleck being removed
from his command, and recollecting what had occurred at
28
434 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS,
our visit to General Grant, expected he would have to go,
but he said nothing about it. One day he was informed by
General Sherman that General Schofield had been decided
upon to relieve General Halleck and take command of the
Military Division of the Pacific. He then asked General
Sherman what was to be done with him—Thomas—and Sher-
man answered, he would remain where he was. At this the
general told me he was astonished and indignant, and told
General Sherman that he would not stand it, his rank
should not be degraded; he said he exhibited a good deal
of feeling, in fact he was angry, and expressed himself
plainly, that if this programme was carried out, to give his
junior a division, while he commanded a department, he
would publicly protest against it. Whereupon General
Sherman, who appeared to be a good deal worried, assured
him, he would see that he was protected against any indig-
nity, or words to that effect.
“The consequence of this resistance from the general
was, that the programme was changed, and General Thomas
was sent to the Pacific coast, but what occurred at the time
was what annoyed General Thomas; he relieved General
Halleck, but immediately the old department of General
Thomas, with headquarters at Louisville was added to, and
a division created, and General Halleck assigned to it. He
always felt that, at least, he should have been left at Louisville
to command the new division. This is all there was of the
matter. General Thomas did not want to go West, but
would rather go than have his rank degraded. Schofield
was to be elevated at his expense, and only his vigorous
protest prevented it. And after all, as it turned out, he
could have been left where he was, and had a command
equal to his rank; but this was denied him. All this an-
noyed him, and he felt it, especially as he believed that it
was all caused by General Grant not feeling kindly toward
him, why, he could not tell. He said he knew General
Grant did not like him, but that he had never said or done
COL. KELLOGG'S STATEMENT. 435
any thing to cause such a feeling ; the only reason he could
ever imagine for Grant's feeling toward him, was that after
the battle of Shiloh, when Halleck assumed Command,
Grant's army was for a short time commanded by him
(General Thomas), and that Grant rankled under the re-
membrance of it, in fact he was, as the general wrote to me
from Washington, ‘vindictive.’”
In a letter addressed to the Society of the Army of the
Cumberland, at the reunion in Chattanooga, September,
1881, replying to a letter from General John M. Schofield,
dated June 10, 1880, also addressed to that society, Colonel
Sanford C. Kellogg, for years an aide-de-camp to General
Thomas, narrates the circumstances attending the general's
assignment to the Military Division of the Pacific:
“General Schofield refers to his original assignment to
the command of the Military Division of the Pacific in
1869, when General Grant became President, and he (Gene-
ral Schofield) became major-general, to fill the vacancy
which resulted from General Grant's advancement. The
facts as related by General Thomas are these : being on
duty in Washington, on the Dyer court of inquiry, about
the time of General Grant's first inauguration as President,
March, 1869, General Thomas was surprised to learn that,
by a re-arrangement of the military divisions, his junior in
rank, General Schofield, was to be assigned to the important
command of the Military Division of the Pacific, whilst he,
General Thomas, was to remain in the far less important
Department of the Cumberland. General Thomas then
offered to put forth a protest in writing, from which he was
dissuaded by General Sherman, and contented himself by
declaring that he should proceed to apply formally in their
relative order as to choice, for the Military Divisions of the
Atlantic, the Missouri, and the Pacific. He wanted the
Division of the Atlantic particularly, as he had served so
many years at remote frontier stations. And since the
beginning of the war of the Rebellion he had seen no service
436 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS
in the East. His selection was met with the reply that
General Meade was to have the Division of the Atlantic, as
General Grant had promised it to General Meade. General
Thomas then announced his intention of applying for that
division every four years, until he got it. The Military
Division of the Missouri, with headquarters at Chicago, was
his second choice, but that had been assigned to the lieute-
nant-general. General Thomas then selected the Division
of the Pacific, and, notwithstanding an order is said to have
already been prepared assigning General Schofield to it, it
was given to General Thomas. General Schofield claims
the order was changed at his request; that may have been
the case. Had it not been changed, General Thomas, who
was Smarting under a sense of injustice, declared it his in-
tention to have placed his views in writing of what had
become imperative in an officer of his rank.”
General Thomas assumed command of the Military Di-
vision of the Pacific on the 1st of June, 1869. Soon after he
reached San Francisco he proceeded on a tour of inspec-
tion, which is thus described by Colonel Hough :
“Starting on the 15th day of June, accompanied by his
personal staff, to whom were assigned different departments
of duty in the inspection, he visited the line of interior
military posts, extending through Nevada, Idaho, Oregon,
and Washington Territory, passing down the Columbia
River to Portland. Here he embarked on a small steamer,
and proceeded to all the military posts in Alaska, extend-
ing his journey to a small detachment on St. Paul's Island
in Behring's Sea, thence returning to San Francisco, where
he arrived on the 16th of September, having been gone three
months, and traveled about eight thousand miles. The
result of this inspection was a report to the War Depart-
ment, wherein he made such representations as induced a
very important reduction of the military force in Alaska,
causing a corresponding reduction of expenses. His in-
tention was in the ensuing year to continue his inspection
through the southern part of his command.”
THE TENNESSEE PORTRAIT. 437
General Thomas described this tour to General Rucker,
in Chicago, during the autumn of 1869, and concluded
with the remark that “it was fast traveling for a slow
man.”
General Thomas was greatly annoyed by a proposition
made in the latter part of 1869, by some members of the
General Assembly of Tennessee, to sell the portrait of him-
self, which had been purchased at a cost of one thousand
dollars by the more loyal Legislature of 1866.
As soon as the proposal was published, General Thrus-
ton, residing at Nashville, offered on behalf of himself and
two or three other friends of General Thomas, to refund
the money and remove the portrait from the State Library;
similar offers were promptly made by General Thomas and
by his brother, Benjamin Thomas, residing at Vicksburg,
Mississippi.
General Thomas' opinion of the proposal to sell the por-
trait, and his purposes in view of the proposal, are expressed
in the following letter, which he wrote to a member of the
Legislature :
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., Dec. 31, 1869.
HON. D. A. NUNN :
Dear Sir, I received your favor of the 20th, yesterday, and as I
am sure of your friendly feeling toward me, I take great pleasure in
giving you my reasons for offering to refund to the present Legisla-
ture of Tennessee the cost of the portrait of myself, ordered to be
painted by the Legislature of 1866, and remove it from the Library
of the Capitol of your State. I will premise by stating that although
I regretted at the time, the Legislature of 1866, had ordered by joint
resolution, a portrait of me, to be painted and placed in the State
Library, yet being convinced it was done through motives of friend-
ship and esteem,-the joint resolution having been passed without
my knowledge,_I felt a natural delicacy in declining a compliment
so unexpected, assured as I was of the sincerity of the act. From
that day until the extraordinary proceedings had in the present Le-
gislature, I had been led to believe that the act of the Legislature of
1866 had been generally approved throughout the State. On being
informed of these recent proceedings, self-respect as well as a pro-
per appreciation of the act of the Legislature of 1866, required that
I should relieve the members of the present Legislature from the
438 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS
possibility of seeing a disagreeable picture every time they went into
the State Library. The same reasons impelled me to inform the
Speaker that I shall return the medal as soon as I can get to New
York, where I had it deposited last spring, before leaving the East
to assume duty on this coast. Now let me assure you, that in taking
the course I have, I disclaim any intention whatever to reject the
compliment extended to me by the Legislature of 1866, but simply
wish to return to the Legislature which repudiates their act, as far as
in my power to do so, compensation for what they seem to consider
a wrong perpetrated by a former Legislature on the people of that
State in my behalf.
I am very truly yours,
GEO. H. THOMAs,
Major-General, U. S. A.
This characteristic letter and deserved rebuke, elicited an
explanation from the member who offered the resolution to
sell the portrait. He claimed that he offered it as a joke
to Satirize certain falsely economic measures then before
the Legislature. But as there was no condemnation of the
proposition by the Legislature as a whole, the proceedings
were insulting in the extreme.
While still Smarting under this insult, General Thomas
wrote the following letter:
SAN FRANCISCO, Feb. 21st, 1870.
GEN. J. H. WILSON,
U. S. Army:
My dear General,—I had the pleasure to receive your letter of
the 12th, this morning.
I have notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Tennessee Legislature, that I will return the gold medal to the Legis-
lature of Tennessee, as soon as I can get to New York City, where it
is now on deposit for safe-keeping.
In reply to this notification, the Speaker wrote me, protesting
against my returning the medal ; tried to explain away any apparent
attempt to insult me by the resolution offered in the Legislature, etc.
I know Tennessee character so well that I place no value what-
ever on the Speaker's attempted explanation, but as I cannot now
get the medal, it being packed away with other articles in the same
box, I shall wait until I have an opportunity to unpack the box,
when I shall return it to the Legislature.
SOHO FIELD'S LETTER TO THE TRIB UNE. 439
I agree with you entirely in your expression of disgust at the man-
Ther in which the situation and condition of the army under my
command for the defense of Tennessee in the fall of 1864, is persis-
tently ignored by parties trying to justify themselves for the course
taken by them in regard to the operations of that army. But feeling
confident that the country will fully understand the condition of the
army left with me, and as fully justify me in all that I did to delay
battle until my troops were in a condition to strike an effective blow,
when the history of the Tennessee campaign is written, I have
not allowed myself to be drawn into the present controversy.
Chaplain Van Horne is now engaged in writing the history of the
Army of Cumberland, and I have no doubt will clearly and satisfac-
torily detail all the circumstances connected with the defense of Ten-
nessee against Hood's invasion. In connection therewith he will
also give a history of the operations of your cavalry after the battle
of Nashville. Any information or suggestions you may feel disposed
to communicate to him, he will be most happy to receive, as it is
both his desire and mine that the history of the Army of the Cum-
berland shall be as complete and reliable as possible.
His address is Rev. T. B. Van Horne, Milwaukee, Wis.
Very truly yours, w
GEO. H. THOMAS.
On the 12th of March, 1870, a communication, signed
“One who fought at Nashville” appeared in the Wew York
Tribune, so severely criticising General Thomas' conduct of
the Nashville campaign, that he determined to answer it.
He believed that General Schofield was directly or indirectly
the author of the paper, and regarded this attack upon him-
self, as another manifestation of Schofield's enmity.
Shortly after the close of the war, General Thomas said to
the writer, that he had felt that he would have an enemy
in his command, when first he heard that General Schofield
with his corps would join him from Georgia, instead of the
Fourteenth corps, for which he had previously made appli-
cation. He feared thus early, that an effort would be made
to remove him from the command of the army. And the
peculiar state of affairs before and after the battle of Nashville
strengthened his conviction that General Schofield was
intriguing against him. Soon after the war he was informed
44O I, IFE OF GENERA. D. G. EORG E H THOMAS.
by General Sherman, that he had given Schofield choice
between service with himself in the march to Savannah, or
with Thomas in Tennessee. This fact, taken in connec-
tion with other circumstances, was nearly equivalent to
positive proof to Thomas, that he had been right in his
first feeling. He did not then know that Schofield had
been named in orders as his successor, immediately before
the battle of Nashville. This fact was made known to him
in San Francisco, when he superseded General Halleck in
command of the Military Division of the Pacific. At a ban-
quent given in his honor by Halleck, the latter mentioned
the circumstances under which the order relieving Thomas
of the command of the army at Nashville had been written,
retained and suspended. General Halleck did not at first
give the name of the general that was to take the command,
but finally said: “The name of the man in that order was
John M. Schofield.” Then General Thomas, with no little
excitement of manner replied: “I knew it, I knew he was
the man.”
The Tribune article was regarded as a more open display
of General Schofield's enmity. And on the last day of his
life, General Thomas departing from his habitual silence
under misrepresentation, addressed himself to the prepara-
tion of the true story of the Nashville campaign. $
The antecedent conversation and the sad issue of General
Thomas' effort are thus reported by Colonel Hough. The
general Said :
“‘That criticism upon my plan is really funny reading.
I am only astonished that the letter should have been
published, for some of its statements are easily refuted,
and others show an insubordination and intrigue that will
astonish the public. The answer to it is a good and just
one, and whoever wrote it has my thanks.” I am now
satisfied that what I have suspected for some time is
* A communication signed “Another Man,” in reply to the previous letter,
was published in the Tribune of March 19th, 1870.
HIS OPINION OF SCHO FIELD. 44. I
true, that is, that General Schofield intrigued for my re-
moval, to enable him to get my command. I have long
known that he asked to be sent back to me from Atlanta
to Nashville, which always Surprised me, as there was
apparently at this time a much greater opportunity for
gaining distinction with General Sherman than with me,
and now I can understand it. Now that he is piqued, that
the order placing him in command is called a blunder, he
is endeavoring to right himself before the public by attack-
ing me, who have had nothing to do with this discussion;
but it will fail, for plenty of my old officers will answer
him, as I am assured by letters now. I say him, because
the article was directly inspired by him. I am assured of
this on the authority of a friend in St. Louis.
“‘It is an Outrageous article, and as a military criticism is
ridiculous, and easily answered, as it is in this first reply to
it; it will create much indignation among the officers who
fought at Nashville, who will be astonished at some of the
statements. At one statement, though, I am amazed, and
it convinces me of Schofield's duplicity, and that is, that he,
one of my subordinates should have applied, in his letter
of December 26th, 1864 to General Grant, without my
knowledge, to be transferred with his command to the At-
lantic; this is the first time I ever heard of this application.
What will reflecting people say after hearing of this letter P
If a subordinate officer can presume to ask that his com-
mander be weakened to the extent to which this article
states General Schofield did, is it not also reasonable to
suppose that he had written letters previously to General
Grant, so commenting on affairs at Nashville, as to suggest
to him the propriety of substituting Schofield for me, and
thereby have originated the causes for his present disagree-
able situation. In the matter of winter quarters; suppose I
had been permitted by General Grant to place my troops
in winter quarters in accordance with my order, and after
hearing of Sherman's successful march to the sea and
442 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG E H THOMAS.
intention to move in the direction of Richmond to join
Grant, he does not see that I could have cooperated with
Sherman by moving through the northern part of Georgia,
Western North Carolina, and East Tennessee towards the
same objective point, thus aiding somewhat towards the
final triumph of our forces in Virginia. This, or whatever
was necessary, would have been done by me, if my plans had
not been upset by this letter of Schofield of December 26th,
now for the first time known to me.’
“The above is about all, at least the substance of all he
said, closing the conversation with a request that later in
the day, I would take the papers and make such notes upon
the criticism of his plan as were suggested to me; in the
mean time he wanted to examine them more thoroughly
himself. I left him with the papers before him. When I
returned, some time afterward, he had been stricken down,
Upon his desk were the papers, and his unfinished notes
upon them, stopping in the middle of a line and sentence.”
The last moments and the death of General Thomas are
described by Colonel Hough as follows:
“General Thomas came to the headquarters at his usual
time, about 9.30 A.M., March 28th, 1870, spoke to me Say-
ing, ‘Good morning, Colonel,' as he passed the open door
of my room, and entered his private office. About 9.45
A. M., I went into his room for transaction of the current
business of the day. After finishing that, which was per-
formed as usual, we entered into private conversation, and
talked for some time. He was very communicative, and
apparently in his usual health. About IO.30 A.M., I parted
from him, and soon after left the headquarters to attend to
Some private business. I returned about 1.45 P.M., and
found him lying on a lounge in his room attended by several
physicians; was told that he had fallen in a fainting fit,
about fifteen minutes before that he had come out of his
room saying: ‘I want air,’ and immediately fell. When I
saw him he was rallying from the attack, and was told by
FIIS DEATH. 443
the physicians, that it was apparently a fainting fit, probably
caused by indigestion. In the course of half an hour he
said he had no pain, except about the right temple. This
pain, one of the physicians told me, was a bad sign, but still
he grew better, and insisted upon getting up, which he did
for a few moments, and again lay down. Shortly after-
wards Mrs. Thomas arrived and sat by his side. He spoke
to her, and a few words passed between them. While wait-
ing for the action of the remedies administered, all had left
the room but Mrs. Thomas and myself. I observed he
was speaking, and putting my ear down heard him say, he
felt easier and had no pain; he looked up to Mrs. Thomas,
who leaned down to him, and he spoke to her. Shortly
after this I saw him struggle, with a convulsive movement
about his chest, and try to rise, which he could not do. I
called the physicians from the outer room, and one of them
told me at once that it was apoplexy. Every attention was
given to him, but he was unconscious, and gradually sunk
until twenty-five minutes past seven o'clock, when he died.
He did not struggle, only giving a convulsive Spasm at the
last moment.”
The report of the general's dangerous illness had drawn
a large number of officers to headquarters, but within
the private office, at the last moment, were Mrs. Thomas,
her sister, Miss Kellogg, the attending army Surgeons,
Drs. McCormick and Murray, Colonels Hough, Willard,
and Kellogg, of the personal staff, and two or three other
officers. The body was immediately embalmed, and on
the next day was conveyed to the Lick House, where the
general had resided. As soon as practicable, after private
religious services, the remains, in charge of Colonel Wil-
lard, were borne to Troy, New York, for burial.
The private office was promptly closed by Colonel
Hough, and not opened until, at the request of Mrs.
Thomas, the papers it contained were examined for the
purpose of separating the personal from the official.
444 LIFE OF GENERAL G EORGE H. THOMAS,
Colonel Hough thus wrote, concerning this examination:
“This sad duty occupied me three days. Of course many
of the papers were deeply interesting, but all of them only
confirmed the strength and beauty of his character; not a
paper was destroyed, and not one need ever be by Mrs.
Thomas.”
The death of General Thomas caused universal mourn-
ing. He had few enemies, a vast number of true personal
friends, and the people generally regarded him as one of
the best and purest public men of the country, as well as
one of the greatest generals of the war of the Rebellion.
Memorial meetings were held throughout the Northern
States, and the newspapers were filled with expressions
of the Nation's grief, and of the people's appreciation of
his character and services. The Congress of the United
States, the General of the Army, Governors, State Legis-
latures, civic corporations, and associations of Soldiers and
of citizens, gave utterance to grief and eulogy.
In the House of Representatives, March 30th, unanimous
consent having been granted, Mr. Randall moved the
adoption of the following resolutions:
Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assemb/ed, That the Senate
and House of Representatives have heard with deep regret of the
sudden decease of Major-General George H. Thomas, endeared to
the country by a series of unbroken, patriotic services during a pe-
riod of thirty years.
Section 2.—And be if ſurf/her reso/ved,—That his distinguished
career in the defense of his country against foreign and domestic
enemies, his never faltering faith and zeal in the maintenance of
the Union and the integrity of the Government, and his stern execu-
tion of every trust confided to him, constitute a record in life made
memorable in death.
Section 3.−And be it further reso/ved,—That the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House, are hereby authorized to make
such arrangements in connection with his obsequies as will attest the
sympathy of Congress at this national bereavement.
MEMORIA I, MEETING AT WASHING TO W. 445
In supporting his motion Mr. Randall said:
Mr. Speaker, having in the early part of the war served immediately
under General Thomas as a non-commissioned officer I have
deemed it not inappropriate to offer these resolutions. No words of
mine can add lustre to his record. His heroic deeds are inseparably
interwoven with the history of our country. * * * * * * *
The two Houses of Congress concurring in the adoption
of these resolutions, they were approved by the President
April 5th, and published in orders by General Sherman
April 20th. The President of the Senate, Vice-President
Colfax, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Hon. James G. Blaine, on the 30th of March reported for
the approval of the Senate and House of Representatives
arrangements for a memorial meeting and the funeral as
follows:
I. Meeting in the Hall of the House of Representatives on Tues-
day evening, April 5th, to be presided over by General Jacob D. Cox,
Secretary of the Interior, and to be under the supervision of the
committee of arrangements, appointed by the officers who served
with General Thomas; the Senators and Representatives to attend.
II. A joint committee of thirteen, composed of six Senators and
seven Representatives, to attend the funeral of General Thomas as
representatives of the Congress of the United States.
This report having been approved, the Vice President ap-
pointed Senators Wilson, Cameron, Trumbull, Thayer, War-
ner and Casserly; the Speaker of the House appointed Rep-
resentatives Logan, Garfield, Banks, Slocum, Washburn,
Randall afid Stokes.
The meeting in the Hall of the House of Representatives
was attended by the President and the members of his Ca-
binet, the Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States,
the Senators and Representatives, Officers of the Army and
Navy, the Judges of the District Courts and many others,
officials and citizens. Addresses which eloquently portrayed
the character and services of General Thomas were deliv-
446 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORGE H. THOMAS.
ered by Generals Cox, Sherman, Garfield, Slocum, and
Schurz, and Chief Justice Chase.
The following orders were issued by the General of the
Army :
GENERAL ORDER HEADQUARTERS of THE ARMy,
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
NO. 34. Washington, March 29, 1870.
It has become the painful duty of the General to announce to
the Army the death of one of our most exalted generals, George H.
Thomas, who expired last evening, at half past seven, in San Fran-
cisco, California.
There is no need to turn to the archives to search for his history,
for it is recorded in almost every page during the past ten years; but
his classmate and comrade owes him a personal tribute, in which he
knows every member of the Army shares. General Thomas entered
the Military Academy in the class of 1836; graduated in 1840, and
was commissioned as a second lieutenant, Third Artillery, and
sent to Florida. He served with his regiment continuously until De-
cember 24, 1853, when he became a captain, having been particu-
larly distinguished at Monterey, and Buena Vista, Mexico. On the
I2th of May, 1855, he was appointed to the Second Cavalry as major,
and served with that regiment continuously, until be became its
Colonel, on the 3d of May, 1861. The great civil war found him at
his post, true and firm, amidst the terrible pressure he had encoun-
tered by reason of his birth-place—Virginia; and President Lincoln
commissioned him as a brigadier-general of volunteers, and sent him
to Kentucky There, too, his services were constant, and eminent
in the highest degree. He won the first battle in the West, at Mill
Spring, Kentucky, and, from first to last, without a day's or hour's
intermission, he was at his post of duty, rising steadily and irresisti-
bly through all the grades to the one he held as major-general of the
Regular Army, at the time of his death. At Shiloh, Corinth, Perry-
ville, Stone River, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and Nash-
ville, he fulfilled the proudest hopes of his ardent friends, and, at the
close of the war, General George H. Thomas stood in the very front
rank of our war generals.
The General has known General Thomas intimately since they sat
as boys on the same bench, and the quality in him, which he holds
up for the admiration and example of the young, is his complete and
entire devotion to duty. Though sent to Florida, to Mexico, to Texas,
to Arizona, when duty there was absolute banishment, he went cheer-
HIS DEATH ANNOUNCED TO THE ARMY 447
fully, and never asked a personal favor, exemption, or leave of ab-
sence. In battle he never wavered. Firm, and full of faith in his
cause, he knew it would prevail; and he never sought advancement of
rank or honor at the expense of any one. Whatever he earned of
these were his own, and no one disputes his fame. The very imper-
Sonation of honesty, integrity, and honor, he will stand to us as the
beate idea/ of the soldier and gentleman.
Though he leaves no child to bear his name, the old Army of the
Cumberland, numbered by tens of thousands, called him father, and
will weep for him in tears of manly grief.
His wife, who cheered him with her messages of love in the darkest
hours of war, will mourn him now in sadness, chastened by the sym-
pathy of a whole country.
The last sad rites due him as a man and soldier will be paid at
Troy, New York, on the arrival of his remains, and of his family,
and all his old comrades who can be present are invited there to
share in the obsequies.
At all military posts and stations, the flag will be placed at half
staff, and fifteen minute guns fired on the day after the receipt of
this order; and the usual badges of mourning will be worn for thirty
days. By command of General SHERMAN.
E. D. TownsenD,
Adjutant General.
GENERAL ORDERS, HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE.
No. 37. Washington, April 3, 1870.
The body of Major-General George H. Thomas will be buried at
Troy, New York, on Friday, April 8th, at 12 o'clock, noon, and the
ceremonies will be conducted in military order, under the supervision
of Major-General George G. Meade, commanding the Military Di-
vision of the Atlantic. The escort will be a battalion of eight compa-
nies, and General Meade is authorized to use two companies of the
engineer battalion from Willet's Point, two companies of the general
recruits from Governor's Island, and the band from West Point.
All officers of the Army who can be spared from duty, all civil
officers of the General and State Governments, members of the
Volunteer armies, civil societies, and citizens generally, are invited
to be present, to manifest their respect to the memory of him who
holds a sacred place in the heart of every American.
By command of General SHERMAN.
E. D. Towns END,
Adjutant General.
448 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS,
The funeral ceremonies and services at Troy on the 8th
of April, were imposing and solemn. Public buildings,
hotels, stores and many private houses were draped, and
business generally was suspended. There were in attend-
ance, President Grant, Secretaries Belknap, Boutwell, Robe-
son and Cox, the joint committee of Congress, the Governor
of New York and his staff, the two Houses of the General
Assembly, officers of State and State troops, officers of the
Army and Navy, delegates from the Society of the Army
of the Cumberland and from the Grand Army of the Re-
public, civic societies and municipal officers from the neigh-
boring cities and a great multitude of people. The pall
bearers were Generals Meade, Schofield, Hooker, Rose-
crans, Hazen, Granger, Newton and McKay. The escort
was composed of two companies of Engineers, two
of Artillery and four of Infantry, of the United States
Army, under the command of General Wallen. The Ninth
and Tenth brigades of the National Guard of the State of
New York, and a number of other organizations, military
and civil, took part in the parade, which was a mile in length.
The religious services at St. Paul's Episcopal Church
were conducted by Bishop Doane, of the Diocese of Albany,
and the Rev. Drs. Cort, Potter, and Walsh, and the Rev.
Mr. Reese. At the conclusion of the services in the church,
the remains of the great general, followed by an immense
cortege, were conveyed to Oakwood Cemetery, amid the
tolling of bells and firing of minute guns, and there depo-
sited in the city receiving vault to await final burial. Here
Bishop Doane conducted the commitment service, and the
escort closed the military honors by firing the prescribed
salute.
In the evening, General Stewart L. Woodford, Lieutenant-
Governor of the State of New York, delivered an address
upon the life and character of General Thomas, before a
large audience, in the First Baptist Church of Troy.
The body of General Thomas was finally interred in the
FIIS TOMB. 449
family lot, in Oakwood Cemetery, where Mrs. Thomas has
erected a massive monument in the form of a sarcophagus,
surmounted with an American eagle, grasping in its talons
an accurate representation of the Sword used by the general
during the war.
On the front, in raised letters, is this inscription, encircled
by a wreath of oak and laurel,
GEORGE H. THOMAS,
MAJOR-GENERAL U.S. A.
BORN IN SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY, VIRGINIA,
JULY 31, 1816.
DIED, SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
MARCH 28, 1870.
The members of the Society of the Army of the Cum-
berland, present at the funeral of General Thomas, held a
meeting at Troy, and invited General James A. Garfield to
deliver an oration on the life and character of General
Thomas, at the next reunion of the Society. In com-
pliance with this request General Garfield pronounced an
eloquent eulogy before the Society, November 25th, 1870,
at Cleveland, Ohio; in which he gave an analysis of General
Thomas' character and a brief history of his career, extolled
his loyalty and patriotism, and magnified his generalship,
especially at the battle of Chickamauga.
At this meeting, the society adopted the following reso-
lutions, reported by General Charles Cruft, in the absence
of General Garfield, chairman of the committee on memo-
rial to General Thomas:
On the 28th of March, 1870, Major-General George H. Thomas,
the great soldier, who has presided over this society from its institu-
tion, fell at his post with all his harness on. His spirit returned to
God who gave it, and the memory of his greatness and goodness is
all that is now left to us. His death was a national calamity and an
irreparable loss to his comrades. Therefore be it
Aeso/ved, That it is vain by words to attempt to express our loss,
or to describe the grief which pervades this society in view of this
sad event.
29
45O LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H TITOMAS,
Reso/ved, That the banners of this society be draped in mourning
and that an appropriate memorial page be inscribed upon its records.
Reso/ved, That some fitting monument should be erected by his
countrymen to mark the spot where the remains of our beloved
commander rest, and that this society shall take the initiatory steps
for its erection, and to that end a committee of one from each
State represented in the society be now appointed, to arrange some
method to procure the necessary ſunds, and to provide a design,
specifications and estimates therefor, and to report at the next meet-
ing.
Resolved, That the president shall appoint some comrade to pre-
pare a biography of General Thomas, and collate and arrange the
obituary proceedings of the various States and associations in honor
of his memory with a view to future publication by this society.
As the result of this action, a splendid equestrian statue of
General Thomas, produced by J. Q. A. Ward, was unvailed
at Washington on the 19th of November, 1879. Congress
appropriated brass cannon for this statue, and authorized its
location, on the circular reservation, at the intersection of
Massachusetts, Vermont and Rhode Island avenues, and
Fourteenth and M streets. In an eloquent address Hon.
Stanley Matthews portrayed the character of General
Thomas, and for the society, presented the statue to President
Hayes, as the representative of the people of the United
States. The President, with suitable words, accepted this
gift for the people.
The unfinished paper, found upon the desk of General
Thomas is appended :
“The article in the Tribune was evidently brought out by
the assertions in the Gazette correspondence that Grant
would have committed a serious blunder had he relieved
Thomas by Schofield, who as appears by the article, claims
the battle of Franklin was fought under his immediate
supervision, and was so eminently successful, that he con-
sequently was as acceptable to the army as General Thomas.
(That may or may not be.) It is hoped that the troops
would have done their duty under any commander; but
THE WASH VILLE CAMPAIG W. 45 I
Wood and Stanley and many other officers of rank, who
participated prominently in that battle, know the peculiar
situation of affairs that rendered it necessary, General
Thomas should remain in Nashville to receive the reën-
forcements which were arriving daily, supervising and ex-
pediting their equipment (the cavalry sent back by General
Sherman being all dismounted, the new regiments arriving
from the States needing camp equipage, etc., to enable them
to take the field), and that Schofield happened to command
the troops immediately opposing the advancing enemy, by
virtue of his position as an army commander, (he command-
ed the Army of the Ohio). The criticisms on the plan of
battle and point of attack, (referring to Nashville), are too
unimportant to notice. With regard to the mistake of not
using IO,OOO to great advantage, the original position of the
Io,000 men, (Schofield's Army of the Ohio, Twenty-third
corps, in reserve), being central, rendered them available
for promptly reënforcing Steedman, should the enemy con-
centrate so heavily on him as to endanger his position,
when he made his demonstration on the enemy's right, to
draw attention from the real point of attack.
“Steedman having reported early in the morning that he
could not be driven from his position, this reserve was no
longer needed where it then was, and was ordered to form
in support of Smith, and support him in his advance on the
enemy's left. Smith's advance leaving an interval between
his right and the left of the cavalry, the IO,OOo men
were ordered to fill up the gap, and became engaged to-
ward the close of the day's operations. It is therefore left
to candid minds to judge, whether the IO,OOO men were
advantageously posted originally and afterwards used to
advantage, or not.
“It is believed that no other officer of high rank in the
army, except the writer of the Tribune article, will say that
General Thomas was so fully convinced that the enemy had
retreated at the close of the first day of the battle, that he
452 LIFE OF GENERAL G. EORG E H THOMAS.
gave no orders to continue operations the next day, but
ordered a pursuit. The blunder of the pontoon train is
admitted in so far, that the staff officer who wrote the order
to the commander of the train, by mistake wrote Murfrees-
boro’ pike, instead of Nolensville pike, and the train had
gone a mile or two on that pike before the mistake was
discovered, but it was promptly rectified before it had gone
four miles out of the way, and then joined the army, and
got to the front perhaps as quickly as it could have done by
the Franklin pike, as it marched across the country by a
free and practicable road. It could not have reached Frank-
lin, under any circumstances, in time to place a bridge for
the crossing of the troops when the infantry reached that
point. It was always supposed, too, that every officer of
high rank, who fought in the battle of Nashville, knew that
until Duck River was crossed, the enemy could be pursued
with any prospect of success, only by the main road. Har-
peth River, Rutherford Creek, and Duck River, were all
then rendered impassable by high water, in consequence of
the thaw, the day before the battle, and heavy rains during
the battle. All bridges over those streams, for twenty or
thirty miles on either side of the main road, had been de-
stroyed. All practicable roads north of Duck River,
emerged from the main road, and consequently troops fol-
lowing them would have been soon separated from the
main column, and placed beyond supporting distance. The
report of General Thomas explains the difficulties in laying
a pontoon bridge across Rutherford Creek, and accounts
for the delay at that stream, and also at Duck River. After
Duck River was crossed at Columbia, the Waynesboro' and
Lawrenceburg roads might have been taken by a part of
the force, which in all probability could not have reached
thereby the flank of the enemy in time to have inflicted any
serious damage, because Hood had by that time placed his
main column south of Richland Creek, and within a day's
march of the point on the Tennessee River, where his pon-
THE WASHTVII, L E CAMPAIG. W. 453
toon bridges had been in position for several weeks. The
above sufficiently accounts for the statement in the Tribune
article, that a corps frequently did not march more than its
length in three days.
“The infantry corps were at all events on the main road,
where they could have been made available in case there
was any necessity for using them, while the Fourth corps
closely following up the cavalry, enabled General Wilson to
do exactly what “One who fought at Nashville” says might
have been done if the infantry had been marched along the
main road with three days' rations in haversacks.
“Wilson's cavalry was constantly harassing the enemy's
flanks, whenever the condition of the roads and streams
would admit of his doing so; and it was this vigorous
conduct of the cavalry which caused the enemy to retreat
with such haste, as to get beyond the reach of the main
column before all the infantry could cross Duck River.
“The writer virtually admits that General Schofield be-
lieved there was no further necessity for pursuit after the
enemy had crossed Richland Creek at Pulaski, as he says
on the 26th of December he wrote to General Grant that
Hood's army was then used up, that there was no further
need of his troops in Tennessee, and asked to be ordered to
the Army of the Potomac.
“Here there is a little discrepancy between the 77-iöume
article and the actual facts. The writer says after the escape
of Hood, General Thomas published an order placing the
troops in winter quarters, and Commenced planning a cam-
paign for the next spring and summer against Corinth, etc.
By reference to General Thomas' report, it will be seen that
the order was issued on the 30th of December. Schofield
says on the 26th. Perhaps General Schofield was not aware
of the reasons for this objectionable order.
“The report of General Sherman to the Committee on
the Conduct of the War will explain it, as it will there be
seen that General Thomas was expected to take care of
454 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H, THOMAS
Tennessee, until Sherman reached the sea and gave further
instructions. (Smith's corps was to go to Eastport, Miss.;
Wood's corps to Huntsville and Athens; Schofield's corps
to Dalton; Wilson's cavalry between Huntsville and East-
port, along the Tennessee River).
“If, when General Thomas was sent back to Nashville,
his army had been sent with him, or the Fourteenth and
Fourth corps, there would have been no cause for the present
newspaper contest about the battle of Nashville. There is
ample proof already published that Thomas had at his com-
mand when Hood commenced his movement against Sher-
man's Communication, only a small division of troops
stationed along the two lines of communication between
Nashville and Chattanooga to protect them against small
raiding parties. When he reported the situation to General
Sherman, and applied for reënforcements to meet the ad-
vance of Hood, the Fourth corps and dismounted cav-
alry were first sent, and General Thomas was informed that
he would get reënforcements by several new regiments
then on their way to join Sherman's army. Afterwards
Thomas was informed that A. J. Smith's command would
be ordered to join him from Missouri.
“Thomas then urged that additional reënforcements
should be sent him, as most of the convalescent troops at
Chattanooga belonged to different corps and different
armies, and could not be relied upon from want of effective
organization to more than defend that place. Schofield was
then ordered to report to Thomas.
“With the exception of the Fourth and Twenty-third
corps, Croxton's, Hatch's and Capron's brigades of cavalry,
all the troops sent by Sherman had to be equipped for
field service, including transportation. To attend to the
equipping of this force, as well as to be able to correspond
with General Sherman, Thomas was compelled to remain in
Nashville, whilst he placed Schofield in immediate charge
of the troops engaged in watching the movement of Hood,
PHIS LAST WFITTEN WORDS. 45.5
and retarding his advance on Nashville. This necessity
existing until the army fell back to Nashville, gave Schofield
the opportunity to fight the battle of Franklin. This was a
very brilliant battle, most disastrous to the enemy, and as
the writer in the Tribune says, no doubt contributed mater-
ially to the crowning success at Nashville "
Colonel Kellogg has added: “A few blurred and dis-
connected lines follow as the angel of death hovered
near him, and then General Thomas fell to the floor of his
office unconscious.”
CHAPTER XX.
CHARACTERIZATION.
ENERAL THOMAS discerned all that is pure, noble
and Spiritual in human life. Few men have had as
lofty ideals of public and private conduct, and seldom have
men approximated more nearly to subjective standards, or
conformed in outward life more fully to convictions of duty.
One of his most prominent characteristics was his breadth
of sympathy with all the rightful interests of men. His
Country, its integrity and destiny, commanded extreme
devotion. At the beginning of the war, against his family
with all its wealth of affection, his State with her traditions
of leadership and power, his section with time-honored
institutions and chivalrous sentiment, and against a degree
of personal sympathy, he was victorious in the struggle
between sentiment and duty, and gave himself to his coun-
try in the great civil war, with the most unselfish and most
ardent patriotism.
The interests of his country and his countrymen of all
classes, not only in war but in peace, held no second place in
his heart. His benevolence was as broad and strong as his
patriotism. He gave money freely to the poor, but he gave
what was far better, the strongest sympathy to men of this
class, and to the wronged and suffering of every class. He
loved children, and would often turn aside from congenial
friends to call forth the prattle of the youngest child, or the
fresh thoughts of a boy or girl. His winning attentions
caused the young to love him. An hour with him has
given to many persons now in adult life, impressions at
once cheering and lasting, and multitudes of obscure men
recall his attention and kindness with warmest gratitude.
456
. THE PURITY OF HIS LIFE 457
He was in accord with all efforts for the intellectual and
moral improvement of his race. He once said: “The
best memorials for those considered great, were institutions
which would prove a blessing to men.” Having rank and
social position himself, he was comparatively indifferent to
these distinctions in others, and always estimated men by
their revealed characters, and not by meretricious sur-
roundings. And yet he was as far removed from the plane
of the demagogue as man can be.
He was chaste in life and conversation. Immorality of
every type was revolting to him, and vice was odious. His
taste was elevated, as shown in the appointments of his
home, and his choice of books and friends. His culture
was broad and refined, the result of the constant study of
the natural sciences, the science of government and war,
literature, history and religious truth. He was always pro-
foundly interested in the important problems of statesman-
ship, but he despised the low methods frequently adopted
by political parties. He was originally a Whig in political
faith, but in deference to army traditions and personal
taste, he was never a partisan. After the war he enter-
tained radical views of reconstruction, and was consequently
in Sympathy with the higher aims and wiser measures of
the Republican party.
He was positive in his opinions but free from intolerance.
To him wrong and revenge were equally abhorrent, right
and mercy equally attractive. When the war was over he
was ready to restore friendly relations with those who were
willing to resume allegiance to the Government they had
fought to destroy, but he kept aloof from all Southerners
who persisted in opposing reconstruction. No patriot was
more eager to supplement his service in the war, with
efforts to restore the country to peace and unity, and this
paramount object was the burden of all his later public ut-
terances.
He was as modest as a strong man conscious of his
4 58 LIFE OF GENERAL G EORG E H THOMAS.
strength could be. He was not in the least degree ostenta-
tious, and always avoided ovations and other proposed de-
monstrations in his honor. But he was not wanting in
self-respect, and did not underrate his own services, never,
however, boasting of his achievements, never making pre-
tentious claims, and never being unduly sensitive in the
default of expected recognition. He was self-assertive only,
when threatened with humiliation, and never so in a way
to injure others. He was too modest and too self-respectful
to ask for promotion, and never permitted others to request
advancement for him, and while he never desired a position
legitimately held by another general, and could not have
enjoyed one which he had not earned, he was susceptible
of deepest wound when his just claims were ignored. But
although exceedingly sensitive, he bore with calmness the
1most palpable injustice to himself, in the dispensation of
commissions and commands by the National authorities.
He was too great and too patriotic to persist, during the
war, in demanding a command to which he was entitled, but
when the war was over, he was too strong to be resisted
when he did assert his claims. He seldom spoke of this
injustice, but he felt it so keenly that it doubtless short-
ened his life. His declaration that promotion came too
late to be appreciated, manifested the depth of his wound.
He believed that he earned at Chickamauga the commission
which was given after Nashville, but in the interim he
moved in the path of duty so grandly and uncomplainingly,
that it was supposed that he was indifferent to such rewards,
and was afraid of supreme command. His sublime pa-
tience, however, under forgetfulness of his Services and
misapprehension of his motives must not be alleged as evi-
dence of timidity or weakness. That he moved on unfal-
teringly in the path of patriotic service, without permit-
ting his feelings to warp his official conduct, when he
was overslaughed and denied well-earned promotion, was
due alone to his loyalty to duty, an element of character
FIIS FAITH AND LIFE CONSISTENT 459
pre-eminent in the cluster of remarkable traits, which made
him truly great. His ambition was naturally as strong as
is common to great soldiers and generals, but it was placed
under just restraint by a firm, pure character, an overmaster-
ing sense of duty and an unprecedented generosity.
He was as careful of the reputation of others as he was
sensitive with regard to his own. If he executed the or—
ders of a superior in rank, he mentioned the fact in his offi-
cial report. . If a subordinate was successful, he gave him
credit either for efficient obedience to orders, or for valua-
ble service without orders. Those who served under him,
felt assured that their reputation was safe in his hands. And
the charge has never been made that he claimed for himself
what rightfully belonged to others, whether superiors or
subordinates. This uniform course was in happy contrast
with the selfish appropriation of glory frequently made
by commanding generals.
He was a firm believer in the Christian religion, and,
especially in the last few years of his life, felt the obligation
and the paramount importance of conformity to its precepts,
and a public profession of his faith, near the close of his life,
was only prevented by the annoyances which had crowded
upon him just before the time appointed for this step. He
would have united as a communicant with the Protestant
Episcopal Church at Louisville, Kentucky, in 1869, had he
not deemed himself then unable to perform so solemn
a duty with profound calmness and freedom from worldly
care. But his religious feelings and his faith found
expression through his declarations and well regulated life.
He once said, that he did not see how any one could
be an infidel, and then discoursed at length upon Some
of the more profound and mysterious doctrines of Chris-
tianity. And, in integrity of character, in purity of life, in
extreme regard for the right and true, in the performance of
duty as demanded by affection, friendship and citizenship, in
benevolence and charity, in justice and generosity to
46O I, IFE OF GENERAI, G EORG E H THOMAS.
known enemies, and in firmness of faith, he exemplified in
his daily life the teachings of the divine founder of Chris-
tianity. His chief fault was violence of temper, but the re-
currence of outbursts of passion only after long intervals,
proved that he overcame a strong natural tendency in main-
taining habitual self control.
But however excellent his personal character, it will be
as a soldier and a general that he will be chiefly known in
history, and this volume has failed in its purpose, if its
analysis of his campaigns and battles has not shown that
he possessed all the qualities of a great commander. He
was endowed with the necessary natural faculties and qua-
lities, and was besides a master of the science and art of war.
Few generals have been as thoroughly conversant with all
the details of the organization, equipment, training, move-
ment, and effective handling of armies in offense and de-
fense; few generals have had as perfect knowledge of every
element of military administration in peace and war.
He knew well the limitations of martial laws, and the pro-
vince and usages of martial courts and the necessary sub-
ordination of military power in a free government. Before
the war he had had only a limited experience in military
administration, and yet his breadth of knowledge was un-
usually extensive. He was equally well acquainted with
the relations of civil and martial laws, and the international
precedents for military administration, in the absence, or
only partial supremacy, of civil courts in an enemy's country,
when belligerent rights had been recognized. His decisions
and orders during the period of reconstruction evinced
wisdom, justice and legal exactness.
But in his sphere as a general in command of large forces in
important campaigns and battles, he stands forth in greatest
prominence and power. He was a strategist, and yet he
had fewer opportunities for grand strategy than any other
general who commanded as large an army in several hard
fought battles. Having come to the command of an army
FIIS GENERALSHIP 46 I
late in the war, he had no opportunity to plan an offensive
campaign, and as an independent commander, he conducted
only one defensive campaign, with an aggressive battle for
its conclusion. But his plan as suggested to General Scott
in the summer of 1861, and the plans proposed subsequently
to Generals Buell, Rosecrans, Sherman and Grant, prove
that Thomas was master of strategy.
His projected East Tennessee campaign; his plan of
meeting Bragg, as he emerged from the Sequatchie Valley;
his advice to Buell immediately after the battle of Perry-
ville to move his army quickly to Danville on Bragg's line of
retreat; his objections to the pursuit of that general's army
in September, I863, after he had withdrawn it from Chat-
tanooga; his proposition to place the right and right centre
of our army in a strong defensive position for the second
day of the battle of Chickamauga; his insistence on hasten-
ing the opening of the battle at Chattanooga ; his movement
of Hooker against Bragg's left flank on Lookout Mountain ;
his suggestion to turn the enemy's left flank on Missionary
Ridge on the last day of that battle; his offer to Grant and
Sherman to turn Dalton by the movement of his army
through Snake Creek Gap; his proposition, when McPher-
son's effort had failed, to give the Twentieth corps to that
general; and his recommendation that Johnston should be
dislodged from his mountain fortress by the advance of the
Army of the Tennessee upon Marietta from the northeast;
prove that he was master of strategy, grand and minor.
An accurate, exhaustive analysis of his suggested and
actual operations reveals an unerring forethought—an organ-
ization of victory by the accurate discernment of possibilities
and a skillful use of resources. Napoleon defined the Science
of war, as a “calculation of chances.” To make this defini-
tion wholly, or in great part, true, a very wide signification
must be given to the word chance, since it is possible for a
great general, in most cases, to either anticipate the action of
the enémy, or to forbid him choice by the manner of attack.
462 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H THOMAS
The common misfortune of generals is to form plans in the
execution of which the enemy refuses to perform his pre-
Scribed part. Thomas, however, was never disappointed in
the action of his foe; he commanded his own army and
the one opposed to it, at the same time.
As a tactician he was unsurpassed. No general ever dis-
posed troops for battle, or moved them during the progress
or emergencies of an action, with greater skill, or more
safety to his men. Never by his fault did an enemy strike
an exposed flank, and never did he fail to give his troops
every possible advantage.
At Mill Springs, by skillful handling, he made veterans
of soldiers in their first battle; at Stone River, he threw
isolated divisions upon a stable line, under the onset of a
triumphant enemy, without more loss of life than often
occurs in connected lines; at Chickamauga, he evoked order
on the first day from the confusion incident to the meeting
of two large armies, with unformed lines; on the second
day he first shattered Bragg's right wing, and then with
a slender line repulsed all the attacks of his left wing; and
in this battle, during two days of severest conflict, the troops
under his command suffered less loss than some of those
who fought for a few hours on other parts of the field; at
Peach Tree Creek, he repulsed Hood's forces with a line
of four divisions and one brigade, giving them connec-
tion under a fierce attack of two corps fighting to initiate
the overthrow of Sherman's combined armies; and at
Nashville he was supreme in tactical combinations, re-
vealing the art of “being the stronger” at the predeter-
mined points of attack, and displaying minor strategy, or the
“strategy of tactics,” in perfection.
He was denied, by his long subordination, the opportunities
for grand strategy, which often came to other generals, but
his subjection to the orders of superiors in rank did not
prevent an extraordinary exhibition of well-ordered and
effective tactics in the execution of plans which he did not
THE FAITH OF HIS TROOPS. 463
approve. And the Supremacy of a generous self-negation
was constantly shown, in his career by his loyalty to those
officially over him, under this crucial test.
In his campaigns and battles, whether as chief or subor-
dinate, he manifested unmeasured reserve power. He was
master of every situation within the range of his command.
No disaster or emergency, entailed by the blunders of others,
ever obscured his mental vision, or impaired his judgment.
In plainly developed circumstances of most portentous im-
port he never was dismayed, and never failed to magnify his
resources by their skillful use. And when situations were
undeveloped and emergencies undefined, and when the in-
formation of the enemy's strength and purposes was con-
flicting, he determined his action as judiciously as when he
had the guidance of positive facts. Even his more tenta-
tive movements generally developed into pivotal operations
directed against key-points in the enemy's fine. When
others, were confused and agitated, he was clear, unimpas-
Sioned and immovable, none knowing his plans until they
were formally made known by himself, or revealed by results.
His quick response to all drafts upon his strength is sug-
gestive of a reserve of power whose limits can only be con-
jectured.
His self-reliance was evinced by his faith in his own
plans, and the faith of his troops in their commander was a
great factor of his uniform success. His order or expressed
opinion removed all doubt, and every officer and every sol-
dier of the army expected success in the face of seeming
impossibilities. In the darkest moments of the battle of
Chickamauga, when reports of disaster came thick and fast,
his only answer was, “This position must be held.” The
longer men served under him, the stronger was their confi-
dence in his generalship, and the greater their love for his
person and character. This trust in his generalship, which
without pretense, or ostentation, he inspired in every soldier
of his army, was perhaps the most potent of all the ele-
464 LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H, THOMAS
ments of his success in battle. No troops ever gave up a
position to the enemy when fighting in his presence, and no
movement in campaign or battle, ordered by himself upon
his own judgment, resulted in failure.
It is probable that in the history of war, no army ever
surpassed the Army of the Cumberland, in giving confidence
and love to its commander, and the Sentiment and yeorale
of that army, coupled with the guidance of his transcendent
generalship, made it the most successful in the war of the
rebellion.
General Thomas was not slow as a general, and yet
it has been alleged by partisan historians that he was
sluggish. If to be dignified and manifestly deliberate in
personal movements and speech ; if to ride slowly on a
horse which reflected in his paces, his rider's freedom from
ostentation and from the affectations of dash and spirit
which some commanders exalt to the plane of general-
ship; if to withhold a battle in waiting for adequate, prepa-
rations against public clamor and official impatience; if to
resist precipitate operations when haste was not an element
of success; if one or all of these facts are proofs of sluggish-
ness, then was Thomas slow indeed. It would have been
unseemly for a man of such proportions and marked expres-
sion of self-poise and power, to be given to the quick bodily
motions and mental agitation, which flow from a mercurial
temperament and an Ostentatious spirit. And Swiftness
as a general is not inconsistent with a thorough exhaustive
preparation, or with an unwillingness to strike a blow when
by waiting it could be made more forcible.
He was not slow in gathering his resources, forming his
plans, and moving his forces, when he thought the time
for action had come. He was deliberate and methodical
when time and circumstances permitted, but when adequate
preparations had been made, or when emergencies called
for quick dispositions, Napoleon himself did not more
fully display the flashes of genius than did Thomas. In
JHIS CHARACTER AND HIS C.A.R.E.E.R. 465
coöperative movements he was always on time; in adhe-
rence to the details of a premeditated plan, he was both
strict and prompt, and in the fluctuations and crises of battle
he was never out of harmony with the general operations.
Even when deliberate he avoided the error of over-cautious
generals, in waiting for every element of their problem,
and yet in his discernment of essential preparations, he was
so unerring that he was always successful, when he did
move against the enemy. His delays never gave an ad-
vantage to his foe, and never deprived himself of one.
The career of Thomas was strictly the sequence of his
character. A career seemingly grand may result from circum-
stances rather than from character, but there is then no evi-
dence of real greatness. But where the character of a man,
with opportunity, plainly creates his career, the harmony
of history has full realization.
General Thomas passed through every grade in the Regu-
lar Army to major-general, commanding successfully every
unit of an army. His fame was largely attained in his
subordination to immediate superiors in rank, but its
crowning fulness came with his command of a large army
in the conduct of a great campaign and battle. If resources
and losses are put in the balance against achievements,
he had no peer in the war of the Rebellion.
Such was his career. But if his character in its symmetry
and strength is measured, his career, is lacking in breadth
and completeness. His manifest capabilities demanded
grander opportunities. But within the limits of possible
agreement more complete consonance of character and
career has never been revealed in history. And in both,
George H. Thomas was second to none in representing all
that is best and noblest in the life of the freest and greatest
Nation on the globe.
APPENDIX.
RO STER OF TROOPS
ENGAGED AT MILL SPRINGS, KENTUCKY.
JANUARY 19, 1862.
NATIONAL TROOPS.
COLONEL MCCOOK'S BRIGADE.
9th Ohio Infantry, . . . . . . . . . . . . Colonel Robert McCook.
2d Minnesota Infantry. . . . . . . . . . . & H. P. Van Cleve.
COLONEL MANSON'S BRIGADE.
Ioth Indiana. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Colonel M. D. Manson.
4th Kentucky. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ſ & S. S. Fry.
Ist Kentucky Cavalry . . . . . . . . . . . * & Frank Wolford.
Battery C. 18th Ohio Artillery, . . . . . . Captain D. Kinney.
Capt. Wetmore's Battery.
Near the close of the action GENERAL S. P. CARTER came upon the field with
1st Tennessee Infantry, . . . . . . . . . . . . Colonel R. R. Byrd.
2d Tennessee Infantry, . . . . . . . . . . . . “ J. P. T. Carter.
I2th Kentucky, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . “ W. A. Haskins.
Battery B., 1st Ohio Artillery, . . . . . . . . . Captain W. E. Standart.
Later, GENERAL SCHOEPF, from Somerset, joined in pursuit of the enemy, with
17th Ohio Infantry, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Colonel J. M. Connel.
31st Ohio Infantry, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . & 4 M. B. Walker.
38th Ohio Infantry, . . . . º ( & E. D. Bradley.
The other two regiments of Colonel McCook's brigade also joined in the pur-
suit, viz.:
I4th Ohio Infantry, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Colonel J. B. Steedman.
Ioth Kentucky Infantry, . . . . . . . . . . . . a t J. M. Harlan.
The losses, 39 killed and 207 wounded, occurred in the 9th Ohio, 2d Minnesota,
Ioth Indiana, 4th Kentucky Infantry', and Ist Kentucky Cavalry.
CONFEDERATE TROOPS.
I5th Mississippi Infantry, . . . . . . . . . . . . . Colonel Walthall,
17th Tennessee * { tº m e º e º a º a º a tº gº ** Newman.
I9th { { a tº a • * * * * * * * * * * * “ Cummings.
20th * { ( c. • * * * * * * * * * * * * “ Battle.
25th t a tº . * * * * * * * * * * * * * “ Stanton.
28th t t 4 & * * * * * * * * * * a s a “ Murray.
29th {{ (t . . . . . . . . . . . . . “ Powell.
I6th Alabama t ( - - - - - e º e - - - e a ‘‘ Wood.
Rutledge's Battery, 4 guns. 2 Battalions of Cavalry.
McClung's Battery, 2 guns. 2 Independent Companies.
The losses were, 192 killed, and 200 wounded and prisoners.
469
47O APPENDIX.
ORGANIZATION OF U. S. FORCES
COMMANDED BY
MAJOR GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS
5
AT THE
BATTLE OF NASHWILLE, TENN, DEC, 15 AND 16, 1864,
[Compiled from the Records of the Adjutant General's Office.]
FOURTH ARMY CORPS.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOMAS J. WooD.
FIRST DIVISION.
First Brigade. Second Brigade. Third Brigade.
Col. Isaac M. Kirby. Brig.-Gen. Walter C. Whitaker. Brig.-Gen. William Grose.
21st Illinois. 96th Illinois. 75th Illinois.
38th Illinois. II5th Illinois. 8oth Illinois.
31st Indiana. 35th Indiana. 84th Illinois.
81st Indiana. 21st Kentucky. 9th Indiana.
90th Ohio. 23d Kentucky. 3oth Indiana.
IoIst Ohio. 45th Ohio. 36th Indiana (Det’m't.
51st Ohio. 84th Indiana.
- 77th Pennsylvania.
SECOND DIVISION. -
Brigadier-General Washington L. Elliott.
First Brigade. Second Brigade. Third Brigade. A.
Col. Emerson Opdycke. Col. John Q. Lane. Col. Joseph Conrad.
36th Illinois. Looth Illinois. 42d Illinois.
44th Illinois. 40th Indiana. 5Ist Illinois.
73d Illinois. 57th Indiana. 79th Illinois.
74th Illinois. 28th Kentucky. I5th Missouri.
88th Illinois. 26th Ohio. 64th Ohio.
125th Ohio. 97th Ohio, 65th Ohio.
24th Wisconsin.
A PPENDIX. 47 I
THIRD DIVISION.
Brigadier-General Samuel Beatty.
First Brigade. Second Brigade. Third Brigade.
Col. Abel D. Streight.
(1) Col. P. Sidney Post, (Wounded). Col. Frederick Kneffler.
(2) Lt. Col. Robt. L. Kimberly.
89th Illinois. 59th Illinois. 79th Indiana.
51st Indiana IS, 4t Ohio. 86th Indiana.
8th Kansas. 71st Ohio. I3th Ohio.
15th Ohio. 936 Ohio. I9th Ohio.
49th Ohio. I24th Ohio.
ARTILLERY BRIGADE.
Major Wilber F. Goodspeed.
Indiana Light Artillery. 25th Battery.
Kentucky Light Artillery. Ist Battery.
1st Michigan Light Artillery. Battery E.
Ist Ohio Light Artillery. Battery G.
Ohio Light Artillery. 6th Battery.
Pennsylvania Light Artillery. Battery B.
4th U. S. Artillery. Battery M.
TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS.
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN M. SCHOFIELD.
SECOND DIVISION.
Major-General Darius N. Couch.
First Brigade. Second Brigade. Third Brigade.
Brig.-Gen. Joseph A. Cooper. Colonel Orlando H. Moore. Colonel John Mehringer.
I3oth Indiana. Io'7th Illinois. 9Ist Indiana.
26th Kentucky. 8oth Indiana. - I23d Indiana.
25th Michigan. J29th Indiana. 5oth Ohio.
99th Ohio, 23d Michigan. I83d Ohio.
3d Tennessee.
6th Tennessee.
IIIth Ohio.
II8th Ohio.
Artillery.
Indiana Light Artillery. I5th Battery.
Ohio Light Artillery. 19th Battery,
First Brigade.
Col. Chas. C. Doolittle.
I2th Kentucky.
I6th Kentucky.
Iooth Ohio.
Io.4th Ohio.
8th Tennessee.
THIRD DIVISION.
Brigadier-General Jacob D. Cox.
Second Brigade. Third Brigade.
Col. John S. Casement. Col. Israel N. Stiles.
65th Illinois. II2th Illinois.
65th Indiana. 63d Indiana.
I24th Indiana. . I2Oth Indiana.
Io9'd Ohio. - I28th Indiana.
5th Tennessee.
472 APPENDIX.
Artillery.
Indiana Light Artillery. 23d Battery.
Ist Ohio Light Artillery. Battery D.
DETACHMENT OF ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE.
MAJOR-GENERAL ANDREW J. SMITH.
FIRST DIVISION.
Brigadier-General John McArthur.
First Brigade. Second Brigade.
Col. Wm. L. McMillen. Col. Lucius F. Hubbard.
I 14th Illinois. 5th Minnesota.
936 Indiana. 9th Minnesota.
Ioth Minnesota. IIth Missouri.
72d Ohio. 8th Wisconsin.
95th Ohio. Iowa Light Arty. 2d Bat.
Ill. L. Art. Cogswell's Bat.
SECOND DIVISION.
Third Brigade.
(1) Col. S. G. Hill (killed).
(2) Col. William R. Marshall.
I2th Iowa.
35th Iowa.
7th Minnesota.
33d Missouri.
2d Mo. L. Art. Bat. I.
Brigadier-General Kenner Garrard.
First Brigade. Second Brigade.
Colonel David Moore. Colonel James I. Gilbert.
II9th Illinois. 58th Illinois.
I22d Illinois. 27th Iowa.
89th Indiana. 32d Iowa.
21st Missouri. Ioth Kansas.
Ind. L't Art. 9th Bat, Ind. L. Art. 3d Bat'y.
THIRD DIVISION.
Colonel Jonathan B. Moore.
First Brigade.
Colonel Lyman M. Ward.
72d Illinois.
40th Missouri.
14th Wisconsin.
33d Wisconsin.
* Artillery.
Third Brigade.
Colonel Edward H. Wolfe.
49th Illinois.
II7th Illinois.
52d Indiana.
178th New York.
2d Ill. L. Art. Bat. G.
Second Brigade.
Colonel Leander Blanden.
81st Illinois.
95th Illinois.
44th Missouri.
Indiana Light Artillery. I4th Battery.
2d Missouri Light Artillery. Battery A.
APPENDIX. 473
PROVISIONAL DETACHMENT, (DIST. OF THE ETOWAH.)
MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES B. STEEDMAN.
PROVISIONAL DIVISION.3%
Brigadier-General Charles Cruft.
First Brigade. Second Brigade.
Col. John G. Mitchell.
Second Brig. (Army of the Tenn.)
Third Brigade.
Col. Benjamin Harrison. Lt. Col. Chas. H. Grosvenor,
Col. Adam G. Malloy.
Artillery.
68th Indiana Infantry.f 20th Indiana Battery.
18th Ohio Infantry.f
Colonel Thomas J. Morgan.
I4th U. S. C. T.
I6th U. S.
17th U. S.
I8th U. S.
44th U. S.
I
C. T.
C. T.
C. T. (battalion).
C. T
18th Ohio Battery.
Colonel Charles K. Thompson.
I2th U. S. C. T.
13th U. S. C. T.
Iooth U. S. C. T.
POST OF NASHVILLE.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN F. MILLER.
2D BRIGADE, 4TH DIVISION, 2OTH ARMY CORPS.
Colonel Edwin C. Mason. -
45th New York.
I79th Ohio.
I42d Indiana.
176th Ohio. I82d Ohio.
UNATTACHED.
3d Kentucky.
28th Michigan.
173d Ohio.
78th Pennsylvania.
44th Wisconsin.
45th Wisconsin.
Veteran Reserve Corps.
GARRISON ARTILLERY.
MAJOR JOHN J. ELY.
Indiana Light Art., 2d Battery.
Indiana Light Art., 4th Battery.
Indiana Light Art., I2th Battery.
Indiana Light Art. 21st Battery.
Indiana Light Art. 22d Battery.
Indiana Light Art., 24th Battery.
Ist Michigan Light Art. Battery F.
Ist Ohio Light Art., Battery E.
Ohio Light Art., 20th Battery.
Ist Tennessee Light Art., Battery C.
1st Tennessee Light Art. Battery D.
2d U. S. Colored Light Art., Battery A.
QUARTERMASTER'S DIVISION.”
COLONEL JAMES L. DONALDSON,
* Composed mainly of detachments belonging to the 14th, 15th, 17th and 20th army
corps, which had been unable to rejoin their proper commands serving with General Sher-
man's army, on the march through Georgia. *
+ Attached to Third brigade.
# Detached with Pontoon train.
* Composed of Quartermaster's employés.
474 APPENDIX.
CAVALRY CORPS.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES H. WILSON.
ESCORT.
4th United States.
FIRST DIVISION.3%
First Brigade.
Brig.-Gen. John T. Croxton. -
8th Iowa. 2d Michigan.
IIth Kentucky (Mounted Infantry.) y Ist Tennessee.
- Artillery.
Illinois Light Art., Board of Trade Battery.
FIFTH DIVISION. +
Brig.-Gen. Edward Hatch. ”
First Brigade. Second Brigade.
Colonel Robert R. Stewart. Colonel Datus E. Coon.
3d Illinois. 6th Illinois.
IIth Indiana. - - 7th Illinois.
I2th Missouri. 9th Illinois.
Ioth Tennessee. 2d Iowa.
I2th Tennessee.
Artillery.
Ist Illinois. Battery I.
SixTH DIVISION.
Brig.-Gen. Richard W. Johnson.
First Brigade. - Second Brigade.
Colonel Thomas J. Harrison. Colonel James Biddle.
I6th Illinois. - I4th Illinois.
5th Iowa. 6th Indiana.
7th Ohio. 8th Michigan.
3d Tennessee.
Artillery.
4th United States, Battery I.
SEVENTH DIVISION.
Brig.-Genl. Joseph F. Knipe.
First Brigade. Second Brigade.
Colonel J. H. Hammond. Colonel G. M. L. Johnson.
9th Indiana. I2th Indiana.
Ioth Indiana. I3th Indiana.
19th Pennsylvania. 6th Tennessee.
2d Tennessee.
4th Tennessee.
Artillery.
Ohio Light Artillery. 14th Battery.
ADJUTANT GENERAL's OFFICE.
Washington D. C. April 19th, 1882.
sº R. C. DRUM, Adjutant-General.
*The 2d and 3d Brigades of this division, under the division commander Brig.-Gen. E. M.
McCook, were absent on an expedition into Western Kentucky.
APPENDIX. - 475
RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE U. S. FORCES COMMANDED BY MAJOR
GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS, AT THE BATTLE OF
NASHVILLE, TENN., DEC. I 5 AND 16, 1864.
,--—-”
Compiled from nominal lists of casualties, returns, etc., in the Adjutant Geni's Office.

y— f Captured
Killed. Wounded. Or
missing.
COMMAND. 5 § à | 6
w E. e E. E. º
O .# C) .92 O | .98 §
{E º: ‘E | F | f | 3 || 3:
O ſº O ſº O | [...]
Fourth Army Corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I22 || 6 I 22
Twenty-third Army Corps. . . . . . . . . . . . : IO . 7. #:
Detachment Army of the Tennessee . . . . . . . . . 4. 72 43 || 627 2 748
Provisional Detachment (District of the Etowah). § Izo 25 606 65 825
Garrison of Nashville” . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garrison Artillery* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Quartermaster's Division*. . . . . . . . . . . .
Cavalry Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 34 || 2I 249 I 22 || 329
Grand Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 29 358 162|2,396 || 1 || Iril 3,057
* No loss reported.
§
i

Extracts from the Consolidated Morning Reports of the Army of the Cumberland, and of the Military Division of the
Mississippi, Serving in the Atlanta Campaign.
PRESENT FOR DUTY EQUIPPED. # 45
% IE
- § §
Infantry. Cavalry. Artillery. Q4 #
STATION. COMMANDING OFFICER. TROOPS, r— # §
w; wº - b0 vo
§ G | | | 3 || 3 || 3 || 3 || 8
O O O <!
Nashville, Dec. 20th, 1862. Maj.Gen. George H. Thomas . Centre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IoI48 73O 2232O . . .
Gen. Rosecrams § { A. McD. McCook. . |Right wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ 5539 74o 23364 . . .
& iſ T. L. Crittenden . . |Left wing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I273 - - - 652 21341| . . .
t{ D. S. Stanley . . . . Cavalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - s 3758 . . . . 4860] . . .
Troops Engaged at Stone River . . . . . . . .3842.3% . . . aſsº. . . . 2122* 71885 . .
- - l
Murfreesboro’, June 20, 1863. Maj. Gen. Thomas . . . . . . 14th Army corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . I247| 20999 . . . - - 46 1248| 28256| . .
Gen. Rosecrans. * { McCook . . . . . . 20th “ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84ol 12744. . . . . . 28| 944. I7429] . .
K; Critte, den . . . . . 2 I St “ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947| 12485} . . . 32| IO5I I707O . . .
& 4 Granger . . . . . . Reserve Corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899; 14898] . . . . . . . 32 587| 19885 . . .
{{ Stanley . . . . . . . Cavalry corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 535| 752O 5 164 II.855 . . .
• Artillery res-rve, and unattached . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - 55| IIo7 29, 528 I 3 4.77|| 529 .
Total, Army of the Cumberland. . . . . . 3988, 62233| 564 8048 156, 4471. 95.024. . . .
Winchester, Ten., Au. 31,1863, Maj. Gen. Thomas . . . . . . 14th Army corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . II32 | 20338] . . 47| 1252 26608. . .
Gen. Rosecraps. 6. McCook . . . . . . 20th “ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 || 1233o . . 3ol IoIo | 16734 . .
{ { Clittenden . . . . . 2 ISt “ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 744 I 2 I I5] . . . 35| Ioč4 || 17168 •
{< Granger . . . . . . . Reserve corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86o | 15313| . . . . . . . 28| 839 20254 . . .
{{ Stanley . . . . . . . Cavalry corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561 948o 6|| 162 | 12701 . . .
Artillery Reserve, Engineers . |Escorts and detached . . . . . . . . . . . 5.I II 60 38 632 I5 364 1705] . . .
Total, Army of the Cumberland . . . . . 3595 || 61256 598 |IoII2 I61| 4693 9517ol . . .
º - | l
Chattanooga, Nov. 20, 1863, Maj. Gen. Thomas. . . . . . . 4th and I ºth Army corps . . . . . . . . . 2227 | 36034 . . . . . . . 46|| 182x 49246. . . .
Gen. Grant. & 3 ooker. . . . . . . 11th and 12th Army corps. . . . . . . . . 544 || 9371 | . . . . . . . 8| 190 17776. . . .
& & Sherman. . . . . . 15th and 17th Army corps, (4th div.) 955 14262 . . . . . . . 3o 858 || 25367] . . .
Brig.-Gen. Elliott . . . . . . . Cavalry corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 1827| 38o 5740 8| 200 I 1852. . . .
Artillery Reserve, Engineers . |and detached. . . . . . . . ... • - - - - - - I77 222 I . . . . . . . 38|| 1405 || 4590] . . .
Comprising only troops near Chattanooga. . . 4032 | 63715) 38o 5740 130 / 4474 / 88831 | . . .


* Officers included.
Chattanooga, Dec. 31, 1863. Maj.-Gen. Thomas . . . . . . Army of the Cumberland (4. I4, 20, A. C.). 3526 || 64710 502 || 8576 | 1.43 || 4793 || 79363| 306
Gen. Grant. “ Sherman . . . . . Army of the Tennessee (16th A. C.) . . . 937 || 13514| 13 | 184 22 | 894 | 19001 || 48
Brig.-Gen. Cox. . . . . . . . . Army of Ohio (23d A. C.) . . . . . . . . . 763 | 15051 || 365 6361 IoI 34O7 || 33772 204
Comprising only troops in East Tennessee . 5226 || 93275|| 880 15121 266 9994 |132136|| 568
Chattanooga, April 20, 1864. |Maj.-Gen. Thomas. . . . . . . Army of Cumberland, (4th, 14th, 20th A. C.)| 3220 |67490 || 446 | 81.41 | 1.44 || 5036 |Io5347 . . .
en. Sherman, § { McPherson . . . . . Army of the Tennessee, (15th A. C.) . . . 759 |II437 27. 372 26 827 19127 . . .
& & Schofield . . . . . . Army of the Ohio, (23d A. C.) . . . . . . . 249 | 89 II | 139. 3549 I5 || 459 || 15880 . . .
se Total, army in field, Georgia . . . . . . . 4228 |87838 612 |12062 | 185 6322 |I40354 . .
Ackworth, Ga., June Io, 1864. |Maj.-Gen. Thomas . . . . . . Army of the Cumberland . . . . . . . . . 2928 54528, 308 | 6627 8o 2709 80922. . . .
Gen. Sherman. & 4 McPherson. . . . . |Army of the Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . 1784 || 34656| 12 273 4o 1689 || 47608. . . .
• & Schofield. . . . . . Army of the Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466 | Io90ol 226 || 4535 6| 21o- 17573 . . .
Total, army in field, Georgia . . . . . . . 4422 | 87428 535. IT 435| 126|| 4608 || 461.03] . . .
Atlanta, Aug. 31, 1864, Maj.-Gen. Thomas . . . . . . Army of the Cumberland . . . . . . . . . 2481 |43901 & º e º 'º 75|| 21.96 || 59890) Io2
Gen. Sherman. & 4 Howard . . . . . Army of the Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . 1275 |23564 5o 774 48 1708 || 39060 86
Cé Schofield . . . . . Army of the Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518 |19764 235 3707 37 1196 || 19356 76
Brig.-Gen. Elliott . . . . . . Cavalry corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 || 1487 527| 7967 14| 375 | 16278| 20
Total, army in field, Georgia. . . . . . . . 4o 6 |93513 | 812 || 9448 || 174 - 5575 |134584, 284
Nashville, Dec. To, 1864, Brig.-Gen. T. J. Wood. . . . . |4th Army corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62o 12808 26|| 718 17639 . . .
Gen. Thomas. Maj-Gen. Schofield. . . . . . . |23d “ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472 9077 16| 642 | II664. . . .
Brig.-Gen. A. J. Smith . . . . |Detachment, Army of the Tennessee 534 924 I 27| 749 || I3197| . . .
Maj.-Gen. Steedman. . . . . . Crufts’ Division, Thompson's Brigade, 121 5238 * I gº s & e a s g º e
Brig.-Gen. J. F. Miller. . . . . . Post forces, Nashville, . . . . . . . . . . 39 I2 I9 | . . . . . . . . I9 750 tº gº
Brig.-Gen. J. H. Wilson. . . . Cavalry in field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * * * . . . 464 || 7775 e i + e s * e
Total, regular organizations. . . . . . . . 1786 |37583 / 464 || 7775 88| 2859
Col. J. L. Donaldson . . . . . Quartermaster's division . . . . . . . . . No returns on file.
It is not within the power of the War Department to state the exact number of troops engaged on either side in the battle of Nashville. General
Crufts' command, consisting of four brigades, was composed of regiments, detachments, and in lividual officers and er:listed men, en route to Sherman's
army in Georgia, and temporarily cut off from their respective commands.
of all arms at 52,000.
From all sources of information at my command I estimate the total strength
G. C. KNIFFIN.
i
§

§.
i


Extracts from the Consolidated Morning Reports of the Confederate Army of fie Tennessee.
PRESENT FOR DUTY EQUIPPED. +. d
5 IC
3 §
- Infantry. Cavalry. || Artillery. ã, #
STATION. COMMAND, NG OFFICER. TROOPS, . 5
e # (a)
g * 2 g g g bſ) tº
@ ſ: (l) C. 4) C @ C
O q} O (l) C.) () th d
£ > £ > {E > bſ) O
. O O O <g
Murfreesboro’, Tenn., Dec. Io, Polk's Corps . . . . . . . . . Cheatham and Withers . . . . . . . . . . 1264 |15242 25| 493 39| IOOS |19503
1862. ardee's Corps.. . . . . . . . Cleburne Breckinridge, McCown & Jackson 1395 |17211 6| 135 40| 951 |21754
Cavalry, Wheeler's Div. . . . Pegram's brigade. . . . . . . . . . . . . tº º 40 g 441| 6372 . . . . . . 8899
Total . . 2659 |32453 ) 772 7ooo 79' 1956 Ro156
Tullahoma and Shelbyville, Polk’s Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * & 4 & 6 & 2 & 4 & I 254 I 4O42 * * * 38|| 7 II (18615
Tenn., June Io, 1863. Hardee's Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 * e s & * I 79 |14333 * tº º º 28 421 | 18658
Staffs, Escorts, Engineers and Reserve Artillery . . . . . . . . & a w 32 223 39| 664 26 430 || 1448
Cavalry, Forrest's Division . . Wheeler's corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 2727 | 1257|12287 18| 446 |16254
3 Dist. Tenn., Chattanooga. . and Roddy's cavalry . . . . . . . . . . . . # * & # = | “g e º & 4 & 2| 58 || 4457
Total 2693 31325 | 1296 |12951 112 | 2066 (59.432 g
Chattanooga, Tenn., Aug. 31, Polk’s Corps . . . . . . . . Cheatham and Hindman . . . . . . . . . I324 I 3 I24 tº ºn 38|| 724 |17965 3
1863. H ll's Corps . . . . . . . . , Cleburne Stewart and Walker . . . . . . 1275 |1526o * 27] 574 |2O379 28
Reserve Infantry . . . . . . Liddel’s and Reserve Artillery . . . . . . 334 || 3868 * … I s e is 32 577 || 58ol 26
Cav. lny, Forrest's division and Wheeler's corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 706 || 9963 17| 378 |14085 2O
Staffs, Escorts, and Engineers 64 244 2O || 329 . . . . . 8o3 º
Total . . . . . .2997 ||32496 || 726 |Io292 II4] 2253 |59033 IO8
Rečnforcements. Buckner, Preston’s Div. Inf... Pegram and Scott's Cavalry. . . . . . . . 383 ſ 5659 | 405 || 4825 2x 90o | 1.4321 28
Returns of August 31st. Breckinridge . . . . . . . . . Three brigades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 to 4653 º, º gº is sº 9| 221 6231 I2
- Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . Gregg's and McNair's brigades . . . . . . . 271 || 2664 5 71 || 3611 4.
Longstreet, Hood three brigades|McLaw's two brigades . . . . . . . . . . 58o 5854 . . . 7664 tº º
Total . . . . . I544 |18830 | 405 || 4825 35| 1192 |3|1827 44
- G. and Total . . . . . 4541 51326 1131 15117 I49) 3445 '9086o I52
Missionary Ridge, Sep. 27, 63. Statement of effectives . . . . [Infantry and Artillery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36142 | . . . . . . . . . . . . 2704 | . . . . .
Missionary Ridge, Oct. 31.) Longstreet's Corps . . . . . . I 374 I3729 ) . . . . . . . 47] 745 (2 Iooſ, -
1863. - Jheatham's corps. . . . . . . I489 |14157 | . . . . . . . 44| Ioz4 |21699 *
Breckinridge's corps . . . . . and Artillery Reserve . . . . . . . . . . . II.70 |IS429 217| 1216 |22882 ge
Total 4O33 lºsis | º, & e | tº º tº 308 3x85 loss37 se
Missionary Ridge, Nov. 23, Hardee's corps*. . . . . . . .
Cheatham, Cleburne, Stevenson, Walker 1785 (17176 • . . . . 84] 1420 11750o . . .
1863.f Breckinridge's corps* . |Bate, Hindman, Stewarts . . . . . . . . I O24 |I2524 * 1 - - - 32| 884 || 1800 | . . .
- - Total 2809 (297oo 86. 2304 (433Oo |.
Dalton, Ga., Dec. 3d, 1863. Hardee's corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16679 1120
Breckinridge's corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 12C I 814 | . . .
Total . |2788o | . . . . . 1934 (36768
Dalton, Ga., Dec. 31, 1863. Hardee's corps . . . . . . . . |Four divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1799 19688 . . 50} 989 (27970 45
indman's corps . . . . . . . Three divisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 479 |I4I49 | . . . . . . . 4o 762 |2O315 36
Wheelers corps, Staff, Escort, Engineers and Artillery Reserve. . . . . . 62 || 474 543 56.13 37| 764 91.76 36
Total . . . 35 -8 lsº l 543 56.13 | 127 2515 '51456 117.
Dalton, Ga., April 20, 1864. Ha dee's corps . . . . . . . . . [Four divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1823 17604 48) 946 24871 48
'Hood's corps. . . . . . . . . Three divisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1557 17633 . . . . . . . . 44| 861 || 23460 36
Staff, Escort, Engineers, and |Reserve Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 | 409 33 || 564 35| 792 || 1385| 32
Wheeler’s corps . . . . . . . . Kelly, Roddy and Hume . . . . . . . 523 2613 I 27 5027 . . .
Total 3446 35646 556 3177 128 l 2626 '54743 II.8
Atlanta, Ga., Aug. 12, 1864. Hardee’s corps . . Four ivisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I3O3 |IoI2O * - - 7of 1182 16703
Lee's corps. . . . . . . . . . Three divisions. . . . . . . . . tº e - 1161 |Io841 57| IoA9 |16428
Stewart's Corps . . . . . . . . Three divisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 || 9253 - - - 53| 973 |I3991
Staff, escorts, and Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 337 33 549 . . . . . . I554
Wheeler's corps and Jackson's division. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 || 97lo 23| 57I |I7335
Total 3533 lºo.45.1 ! 1209 10269 203 3775 (660II l.
Florence, Ala., Nov. 6, 1864.] Lee's corps . . . . . . e Four divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 || 7852 * I º 42] 7c5 12693
Stewart's corps . . . . . . . . Three divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 7879 * || - 52| 76o 12484
Cheatham’s corps. . . . . . . Three divisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . II 27 | 9783 is 1 - - - 39| 706 |15205
Staff, Escort, and Engineer . . . . . . . . . . tº a e º e a 64 375 8] 305 . . . . . . . 864
Jackson's division. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . e e º 'º e º 'º e a I97| 2001 I3| 234 || 3473
Total 31 II (25889 205 || 2306 | 1.46 24os 44719
Near Nashville, Dec. Io, '64 |Lee's corps. . . . . . . . . . Three divisions. . . . . . . . . . . 838 6940 * 42| 705 || 1760 | . . .
Stewart's Corps. . . . . . . . Three divisions . . . . . . . . . . - - 632 || 4491 e - 52| 760 | 8809 -
Cheatham's corps. . . . . . . Three divisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702 || 6536 e i - - - 39| 706 |: 1450
Staffs, escorts, and Engineer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 || 375 8| 305 . . . . . . . 864
Jackson's Division . . . . . . Cavalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197| 2001 13| 234 || 3473 e
Total . . . . / 2217 / 18342 205 || 2306 | 1.46 | 2405 |36356
Field Returns, Sept. 30, 1864 Forrest's Cavalry Corps . . . . [uford's division, and Rucker's brigade . 3ooſ 2960 6|| 168 3857
A Palmer's, Mercer’s, Sears' and Cockrell's brigades f . . . . . . . . . . . 900 75Oo e - e. • - - 98co
- Total 31.17 25842 505 || 5266 152 2573 |5Oor 3
Tupelo, Miss., Jan. 20th, 1865. From Genl. Hood’s “Inspection Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . * → I694 II.5ozł7 . . . . . . / 130 l 2063 (18934 . . .
Note—Aggregate present in Confederate returns includes sick, extra-duty men, and other non-combatants. The “Present for ºuty Equipped” embraces only
“Effectives present” and their officers.
Longstreet. ani Buckner's Division added to his command, giving Hardee four Divisions and Breckinridge three.
Prisoners, 6532.
£ On detached service when return was made, probable strength as per November return.
any troops carried in column of aggregate could be used in an emergency.
* Walker’s division detached from
f Losses, killed and wounded, 2190:
i
&
N
§


-Rs
CO
O
i
Complete list of Officers who served on the staff of Major General Geo. H. Thomas, U. S. A., from 1861 to 1870.
PERIOD.
- REGIMENT OR
NAME. RANK. CORPS. DU’ſ IES.
FROM TO
Geo. E. Flynt........................ Captain”.......... A. A. G., U. S. Vols...|A. A. G. and Chief of Staff...... Sept. 20, 1861..[Oct. I9, I863...
A. C. Gillem. ....... ............ Captain........... A. Q. M., U. S. A.....|Chief Quartermaster .............. Nov. 12, 1861...|Feb. 12, 1862 ..
A J. Macka Captain........... “ U. S. Vols... Division and Chief Q. M......... Nov. 1, 1861....[Oct. Ig, I863...
* I tº Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I,ieut. Col....... “ U. S. Vols...|Chief Quartermaster............... Aug., I864..... June, 1865.
* s - • * º Sept. 20, 1861,...|Feb. 23, 1862.
G. Perin............................... Major..... ....... Surg. U. S. A............|Medical Director................ { Oct. 20, 1863...|May, 1864.
D. P. Smith...... .................. Major............. Surg. U. S. Vols........ Medical Director.............. ... ...|Feb. 23, 1862...|May 30, 1862.
G. D. Beebe......................... Major............. “ ................ t { " …............... Aug. 7, 1862....|March 16, 1863.
- —C ſ|Jan. I863......... Oct., 1863.
A. Von Schrader.... .............. ..] Lieut. Col....... A. I. G., U. S Vols ...|Inspector-Genet al............... l Sept., I864.......|May 31, 1867.
C. O. Loomis........................ Colonel...........|Ist Mich. Artillery......|Chief of Artillery...................|Jan., 1863........|Feb. 26, 1863.
James R. Paul.................... ...|Captainf.........|C. S., U. S. Vols........ Chief Commissary.................. Jan., I863 ....... Oct. Ig, 1863.
- - z º - A. A. D. C. Comdg. Escort. Jan., I863....... July, 1863
J. D. Barker......................... Ist Lieut......... I Ohio Cav............ Act. Asst. Insp. Genl... ........... Dec., I863....... Feš' I864.
E. J. Meeker............ ............ Ist Lieut......... 3 Wis. Vols.............. A. A. D. C. Signal Officer ...... Jan., I863........ Feb., 1863.
R. F. Just............................ 4 & .......|I4 Ohio Vols........ * * * * 4 4 & * { • * * * * * * * “ . . . . . . ( a
L. J. Hollipeter.................... " ......... 49 Ohio Vols........... & 4 & 4 “. ........ “ ....... Oct. I9. I863.
J. S. Lutz ............................ " ......... Io Ind. Vols.............. ( ; & 4 4 & “ ....... * * * {
A. K. Taylor............... . ....... 2d Lieut......... 3 Ohio Vols. ............ & 4 a & & & { { t ( t t
G. W. Landrum.................... " ........ 2 Ohio Vols.............. & t ( & 4 ( " ....... ( & &
{ { t ( t { {
( & e " ........ • * * * * * * July, 1863
T. J. Kelley............. ............ “ ......... Io Ohio Vols......... { Chief Signal Officer............... July, 1863....... Sept., I863.
* Promoted Maj. June II, 1862, Lieut. Col., Jan. 28, 1863.
f Promoted Lieut. Col., Jan. 28, 1863.
º
W. Quinton..........................
J. H. Connelly............ .........
John Bachtell
H. C. Jones..........................
F. H. Gross........ .... ... .....' ...
J. P. Willard............ ...........
S. C. Kellogg........................
Wm. Clandenin............
W. E. Lawrence....................
J. G. Parkhurst.....................
G. C. Moody...... ge e s m e º e º ſº e º e s e º e º e
W. A. Lester........................
E. F. C. Klokke....................
H.C. Barrell........................
s º ºs e º e º e s is a s a e s tº e º e º 'º º º
tº gº tº e º 'º º º º
J. J. Reynolds. ....................
Jos. C. McKibbin............... tº º &
W. D. Whipple
C. Goddard ................... , is © a tº tº p
*
* * c e s & 6 tº º ſº y º g g g º e º º
A. P. Porter..........................
Sam'l Simmons.................... s
2d Lieut.........
( &
a &
Captain...........
Major ............
Captain
Captain......... tº s
I9 Ill. Vols. ... .........
37 Ind. Vols.............
I3 Ohio Vols............
I8 Ohio Vols..... ......
Surg. U. S. Vols.........
A. D. C. U. S. Vols...
A. D. C. U. S. Vols...
Surg. U. S. Vols..... |
A. A. D. C. Signal Officer........
* * a & 4 &
& c * { f :
& e º e º gº tº g
( & ( & £ &
Medical Director...................
Aid de Camp.......................
Aid de Camp. ..... .................
Medical Director..................
Major............ Ist Ohio Art............. Chief of Artillery....................
an Provost Marshal....... ............
Colonel........... 9th Mich. Vols....... { Prov. Mar. General......... ......
Captain ..........|19th U. S. Inf........... Commissary of Musters....... & © tº e
e A. A. D. C. Signal Officer........
Captain........ ...|23d Ky. Vols.......... { Chief Signal &#. sº º ºs e e º tº $ tº e º is tº e
Ist Lieut......... 24th Ill. Vols............. A. A. D. C. Signal Officer.......
Asst. Surg........ 27th Ill. Vols............|Medical Purveyor........ ..... tº dº ſº
Ist Lieut......... |2I Ill. Vols......... ..... A. A. D. C. Signal Officer........
Citizen............ .............................. Topographical Eng................
Ist Lieut......... 38 Ill. Vols............ ... A. A. D. C. Signal Offieer.......
Maj. Genl....... U. S. Vols....... ...... ... Chief of Staff........................
Colonel........... Add. A. D. C. U. S. V. Act. Asst. Insp. Gen'].............
Brig. Genl....... U. S. Vols................ Asst. Adjt. Genl.....A...............
Lieut. Col....... t 6 “ ............... * & " ............... .....
Major ............ “ " ......... ...... & t “ .....................
Captain........... { { " ...... ......... & “ .............. ......
Major ............ 4 * " ............... udge Advocate.....................
Captain ......... A. D. C. U. S. Vols...|Actg. Judge Advocate............
Lieut. Col....... A. I. G. Vols............ Asst. Inspt. Genl....................
: --- * Senior Quartermaster.............
Major *.......... A. Q. M., U. S. A... | Chief Quartermaster..............
Major............. A. Q. M., U. S. A...... Chief Quartermaster..........., ...
Captain .......... & t U. S. Vols...|Asst. Quartermaster...... ........
Lieut. Col....... C. S. U. S. Vols......... Chief Commissary Sub............
& { { t { {
. |March II, 1863.
March 21, 1863.
March 16, 1863.
Feb.,
Feb. 5, 1863 ....
March 21, 1863.
Feb., I864.......
April 9, 1863....
April, I863......
Sept., I863.......
April, t&63......
June, I863......
& 4
July, I863..... .
Oct. 20, 1863....
& 4 { {
* * * * *
Aug. 1864.
Oct. 20, 1863.
( & 1 &
Oct. Ig, 1863.
3 y 2 :
§ { { {
( & * {
{ { & 4
Mch. 28, 1870.
Mch. 28, 1870.
April I, I863.
Dec., 1864.
Oct. I9, 1863.
Oct., 1865.
Oct. Ig, I863.
Oct. 19, 1863.
( & * {
t & * &
Sept., 1863.
|Oct. Ig, I863
Sept., 1863.
Dec., 1863
....|Jan., 1864.
.....|March 28, 1870.
..|Dec., 1863.
Aug., 1864,
.....|Jan., 1864.
....|April, I865.
.....|June, I864.
.....|Feb., I864.
....|Aug. 1864.
Oct., 1866.
. Aug., I864.
...|April, 1864.
.....|Feb., I865.
.....June, I864.
* Promoted Col. A. Q. M., of Vols. Aug. 2, 1864.
i
3.
†.
i
PERIOD.
REGIMENT OR
NAME. RANK. CORPS. DUTIES.
FROM TO
G. C. Kniffin........................ Lieut. Col....... C. S. U. S. Vols......... Asst. to Commissary Sub........ Oct. 20, 1863...|Dec., 1863.
Dallas Bache............ ... ...... Captain........... Asst. Surg., U. S. A. Staff Surg. & Assist. Medl. Dir. & 4 “.....|June 26, 1865.
Jas. F. Weeds....................... Captain ..... .....|Asst. Surg., U. S. A.... Mºjº Inspector......... ..... ... [Oct. 20, 1863....|Jan., 1865.
* in # hief Topographical Eng......... [Oct. 20, 1863....
Wm. E. Merrill......... ..... .....|Captain”......... Topl. Eng., U. S. A. | Chief Engineer.......... * * * g g g g g g tº e & Sept. #. Aug., I865.
T. G. Baylor........................ Captain.......... Ordnance U. S. A...... Chief of Ordnance..... ............ Oct. 20, 1863. ..|Aug., I864.
Wm. A. Marye..................... [Ist Lieut......... { { “ ...... Asst. to Chief of Ordnance ....., tº “. ...|June, 1864.
Wm. F. Smith.............. .........|Brig. Genl....... U. S. V..... ..............!Chief Engineer...................... { { “. ...|Dec., 1863.
J. St. C. Morton.................... |Captain.......... Engr., U. S. A ..|ASSt. to Chief Engineer.......... § { “. ...|March, 1864.
J. M. Brannan............ tº º tº º is e º 'º e a Brig. Gen........ U. S. Vols................ Chief of Artillery.................... t ( “ ...|June 26, 1865.
Major.............|Judge Adv'ate U.S. V. Inspector of Artillery.............. Sept. I864.......|Feb. 1865.
A. H. Thurston............ .........|Major............. Surg. U. S. V............ Asst. Medical Director..... ......|Oct. 20, 1863. Jan. 1864.
J. Bates Dickson....... ...... Captain .......... A. A. G. U. S. Vols....|Asst. Adjt. Genl............... ..... { { “. ... s &
S. Perkins, Jr....................... “ .......... A. Q. M. U. S. Vols...|Asst. Quartermaster............... £ 4 “ .. * {
T. J. Cox........................... * * “. .......... & 4 4 & © º “ “ ..................... “ “ .. { {
J. B. Stubb........................... “ ....... <& & & tº dº f : & & tº te is & 4 “ .. & 4
C. H. Irwin.......................... “. .......... & 4 { { tº tº e £ 6 ſ & tº gº tº e º 'º e º 'º g º ºs e º ºs e a º & & g & “ .. { {
S. J. Little........................... “ ---------- C. S. U. S. Vols........, |ASSt. Commissary Sub............. & 4 “ .. & t
S. D. Henderson................... “ .......... “ “ ......... { { . & 4 • * * * * * * * * * * f : “ ... 4 & -
Wm. M. Wiles .................... Lieut. Col....... 22d Ind. Vol............. Provost Marshal General......... {t 6t Feb., 1864.
H. H. Seyes................... ..... Major... ... Surg. I5th Ohio......... Medical Inspector....., tº gº tº e º e º e s tº º e & I “ ... Jan. 1864.
J. H. Young................. ........ Captain .......... I5th U. S. Inf............ Commissary of Musters........... § { “. ...|June, 1864.
J. C. Peterson.............. & e º ºs is e º 'º a “. .......... & 4 “. ........ ....|Act. Asst. Inspector General.... t & “. ...|April, 1864.
G. M. L. Johnson................. " .......... 2d Ind. Cav.............. “ “ . tº tº gº tº & t !' ... |Dec., 1863.
R. M. Goodwin. .......... • * * * * * * * “ f.......... 37 Ind. Vols............ Asst. Prov. Marshal General.... & ſt “. ...|June, 1865.
Dec., 1863.
Major............. Judge Adv'ate U.S. V. Asst. to Chief of Artillery........ ( & “. ...|Feb. 1865.
John Mendenhall......... ſº tº º e º º | Lieut. Col....... Asst. Insp. Gen. U.S.V. Asst. Insp. Genl..................... Feb. 1864........ Sept. 1864.
G. S. Hubbard, Jr............ .....
Captain ..........
88th Il). Vols............
Act. Asst. Inspector General....
Oct. 20, 1863.
* Mustered in as Col. 1st U. S. Vet. Vol. Eng. Aug. 39, 1864.
† Appointed Capt. & A. A. G.TU. S. Vols. Sept. 19, 1864.
Elias Casper............ ..............!Captain...... ..., |74 Ill. Vols ......... ..... Asst. Pro. Marsh. General.......
A. F. Snodgrass..... e e º e º e e º 'º e º e s tº a " .......... I Ohio Vols.............. [Secret Service........................
M. D. Wickersham................ “ *..........|79 Pa. Vols............... Act. Asst. Quartermaster.........
Wm. C. Margedant................|Captain...........|Io Ohio Vols........... Asst. Topographical Eng.........
A. L. Hough ........................ Captain........... I9th U. S. Inf............|ASSt. Commissary of Musters...
Geo. K. Sanderson................. Ist Lieut......... I5th U. S. Inf........... {4 “ *
W. G. Widemeyer....... ......... [Ist Lieut.........|I6th U.S. Inf............ Asst. Commissary of Musters...
Henry S. Burt.......... tº e º ſº tº t e º tº t w is § { .........|63d Ohio Vols........... Act. Asst. Inspector General....
Henry M. Cist............. e e º e ee e. e. “ f.........|74th Ohio Vols....... ..., |Act. Asst. Adjt. General..........
M. J. Kelly..........................| “ ...... © tº º #. U. S. Cav............ Chief of Couriers.................
Ist Lieut..... ... 56th Ohio Vols......... Actg. A. D. C.,.......... tº G & B e. e. e. tº e s - a
Wm. L. Porter.................. { Captain ......... A. A. G. U. S. Vols...|Asst. Adjt. General......... © e o a e º a p
J. H. Reynolds.....................|Ist Lieut......... 6th Ohio Vols........... Act. A. D. C. ................... tº º e º v
W. W. Barker.......................|Ist Lieut.f......|5th Tenn. Cav.......... .[Asst. Commissary Sub...... © º 'º e º 'º'
T. J. Spencer...... ..................|2d Lieut......... 5th Tenn. Cav....... ...|ASSt. to Chief of Ordnance .....
W. Mills...... ........................|Captain .......... 74th Ohio Vols.......... Act. Asst. Quartermaster.........
W. C. Bunts......................... “. .......... [I25 Ohio Vols........... Act. Asst. Adjt. General..........
W. H. Brackew..... .............. Ist Lieut......... 4th Ind. Cav............. Secret Serv. & Asst. P. M. Gen.
G. P. Thruston............ ..... ...|Major.............|A. A. G. U. S. Vols.....|Actg. Judge Advocate...........,
J. J. Kessler.......... ...... • * * * * * * * * Ist Lieut........, |49 Ohio Vols............. Asst. Pro. Mar. General..........
D. N. Kasson.......................|Ist Lieut......... 24th Wis. Vols.......... & “ ..........
Southard Hoffman................, |Major ............ A. A. G. Vols............ Asst. Adj. General......... tº 9 tº e º 'º e º s
R. H. Ramsey....................... Captain?......... “ { { • * . . . . • - - - - * { * { • a s a e º e s tº © tº º e º 'º e -
Henry Stone ........................ Captain........... A. A. G. U. S. Vols....|ASSt. Adjt. General.................
George Burroughs.................|Ist Lieut......... Eng. U. S. A............|Asst. to Chief Eng..................
H. C. Wharton...... 9 e s e a e º e o e e s 6 e Ist Lieut. ...... & 4 " ........... & 4 " ..................
W. J. Twining .....................|Ist Lieut......... Eng. U. S. A............. Asst. to Chief Eng........... ......
H. B. Adams........... ....... .....|Captain .......... I9th Mich. Vols.........|Asst. to Pro. Mar. Genl..........
H. M. Duffield..................... Captain...........|9 Mich. Vols ........... 4 4 & 6 * { e e º e º e º e º 'º e
Oct. 20, 1863. ..
t ( “. ...|Sept. 1864.
...|June 26, 1865.
Oct. 20, 1863....
& 4 “. ...|Mch. 28, 1870.
& 4 * {
& a t &
Sept., I864. ..
Oct. 20, 1863. ..
4 & “. ...|June, 1865.
...|Dec., 1866.
... [Oct. 20, 1863....
4 : “. ...|Mch. I3, I865.
March 13, 1865.
Oct. 20, 1863....
– 4 6 “. ...|Feb., 1865.
Oct. 20, 1863. ..
* & “. ...|Jan., I864.
ſ &
& 4 ( &
& 4 4 &
Dec., 1863. ...
Jan., I864. ...
4 & ...|Feb., I864.
...|July, I864.
...|June, I865.
...|May, 1866.
...|Jan. 7, 1865.
Feb., I864. ...
& 4 ...|March, 1865.
Feb., I864. ...
a t ...|June 15, 1865.
..|April, I865,
Feb., 1864.
t &
( &
Dec., 1863.
July, 1864.
March, 1864.
Feb., 1865.
Sept., 1864.
Sept. 1865.
Aug., I865.
June, I864.
June, 1864.
July, 1865.
Dec., I865.
i
June, 1865.
April, I864.
* Appointed Captain A. Q. M. Vols. April 7, 1864.
† Appointed Captain & C. S. of U. S. Vols. June 30, 1864.
| Mustered in as Lt. Col. 1st U. S.
f Appointed Captain & A. A.
A
3 Promoted Major A. A. G. U
Vet. Vol., Eng. Sept. 1864.
G. U. S. Vols. April 20, 1864.
. S. Vols. Jan. 27, 1865.
-R-
CX)
Q9
#
i
PERIOD.
REGIMENT OR
NAME. RANK. CORPS. DUTIES.
- FROM TO
G. Bauer...... ........................ Ist Lieut......... I5 Mo. Vols..... ........|Topographical Engineer ......... Feb., I864...... Jan., 1865.
H. Bakhaus.......................... " ...... ... Io8 Ohio Vols., ......... In charge of Blank Office. ..... " ...... July, 1865.
V. B. Hubbard..................... Major............. Surg. U. S. Vols........|ASSt. Medical Director............ |May, 1864....... Jan., I865.
Geo. E. Cooper..................... " ............. i ( " .....-- Asst. to, and Medical Director. § { ...|Aug., I865.
John Rzhia.......'• • * * * * * * * * * • * * * * * * * Captain........... I9 U. S. Inf......... ..... Asst. Topographical Engineer.|June, 1864....... Sept., 1864.
C. K. Smith.......................... " .......... A. Q. M. U. S. Vols....|Asst. to Chief Quartermaster...|July, 1864.......|Jan., 1865.
J. P. Wright......................... Captain ...'....... Asst. Surg. U. S. A....|Asst. Medical Director............ July, I864. ...|Jan., I865.
O. E. Michaelis..................... 2d Lieut......... Ord. U. S. A........... |Asst. to, and Chief of Ordnance|. “ ... Dec., I864.
E. L. Hartz...... ................... Captain .......... A. Q. M. U. S. A....... Asst. Chief Quartermaster........ 1 & ...|July, I864.
G. B. Garner, ........................ “ .......... I5th Pa. Cav.,........... Act. Asst. Quartermaster......... { { ...|Sept., 1864.
Edward Ruger.............. • * * * * * ... “ '.......... I3th Wis. Vol............ Suptdg. Top. Eng. Office......... & 4 ..|Nov., 1864.
A. J. McKay. ..... .............. Lieut. Col....... A. Q. M. U. S. W...... Chief Quartermaster............... Aug., I864. ...|June, I865.
J. C. Reid................. • e e s • e s • * * * Captain.......... C. S. U. S. V........... Asst. to and Chief C. S............ Sept., 1864. ...|Feb., 1866.
John Sargent........................ “. ........ ... 5I Ohio Vols............|Asst. Pro. Marsh. General....... ‘. ...|Nov., 1865.
N. D. Randall.................'• * * * * " .......' ... I5 Mo. Vols.............|Secret Service....... ................. 4 & ...|Aug. 1865.
S. A. Wiggin....... • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * “ ........ ... 9 Mich. Vols............ In charge Mil’y Prison, Chat'ga * { ..|Sept., I865.
Edward Knoble.................... [Ist Lieut......., |2|I Ky. Vols .............|Act. Asst. Inspt. Genl.............. t it ... Feb., I866.
E. A. Erdman.......... .... it tº ſº tº gº º is is tº Ist Lieut......... I5 Mo. Vols............ ... Asst. Staff Q. M.............. ...... £ & ... July, I865.
S. P. Voris...... see e s a • e s = • • * * * * * * * * * Captain..........|38 Ill. Vols........... ....|ASSt. to Judge Advocate...... * G is { { ...|Aug., I866,
S. C. Lyford................. • * * * * * * " ........ Ord. U. S. A........... [Chief of Ordnance.................. Oct., 1864. ...|Nov. 1864.
W. A. Sampson,.................... “. ......... 66 Chio Vols ............ Asst. Staff C. S...................... * & ...|Feb. 1865.
F. G. Tulledge............. .........|Ist Lieut......... 84 Ind. Vols.............. Act. Asst. Inspect. General......|Nov., 1864. ...|June 26, 1865.
A. W. Kummell.................... Lieut. Col....... I3 Wis. Vols ...... ...., |Asst. Chief of Ordnance.... ..... Dec., 1864. ...|Feb., 1865.
Flamen Ball......................... Captain ....... ...|A. A. D. C. U. S. Vols|Actg. Judge Advocate............ Jan., 1865. ...|June 26, 1865.
A. Mordecai......................... “. ......... Ord. U. S. A............ Asst. to Chief of Ordance....... & 4 * tº ſº 4 &
J. M. Blair........................... “. ......... C. S. Vols............ ... Asst. to Chief C. S................., Feb., I865. ... £6 t &
J. E. McGerr... ....... ..., |Major............. Surg. U. S. V......... .. Asst. Medical Director............ Feb., I865. ...|Aug., 1865.
J. W. Slavens......... ..............|Ist Lieut...... ...|73 Ill. Vols............... Act. Commissary of Sub....... . ( & ..|June 26, 1865.
Thos. McDermott.................. Captain .......... 9 Tenn. Cav. ............|ASSt. to Chief Com. of Musters. March, 1865. ...|June 26, 1865.
Geo. W. Howard.................. “. .........A. A. G. U. S. V. ...... Asst. Adjt. General................ April, 1865. ...|Sept., 1866.
A. W. Wills............... d tº e e s e e s see * { • - - - - - - - - A. Q. M. U. S. V. ....., |Asst. Quartermaster............... June, 1865. ...|June, 1866.
Z. B. Tower. .......................|Brig. Genl....... U. S. Vols................|Chief Engineer. .............. ...... * { ... Jan., I866.
J. B. Hays ....... ................. Captain. .........|I9 U. S. Inf........ * † ſº tº º º Asst. Com. Muster.................. { { ...|July, I865.
C. M. Keyser...... ........... ...... Captain.......... I5 U. S. C. T............ In charge of A. G. Office......... { { ...|April 9, 1866.
Chas. DeBroeckh........ * g º & e º sº gº tº e Ist Lieut.........|45 N. Y. Vols............ Topographical Eng............... & 4 ... July, I865.
B. K. Roberts....................... Captain........... A. A. G., U. S. Vols...|Asst. Adjt. Gen................ ..... July, 1865. ...|June, 1866.
R. W. Johnson......... ............ Brig Genl....... [U. S. V.............. .. ... Pro. Marsh. General...... ......... Oct., 1865. ... [Oct., I867.
E. B. Kirk........................... Captain .......... A. Q. M. U. S. A...... Asst. Quartermaster...... • * * * * * * * * July, 1866. ...|Aug., 1866.
J. E. Summers......................|Major ...... .... Surg. U. S. A............ Medical Director.................. Aug., I866. ... [Oct., I866.
J. P. Ruggles......... ...............|Ist Lieut.........|5 U. S. Cav............... Act. Asst. Adjt. General..........|Sept. 1866. ... { { B-
D. B. Sackett...... ............ .. ..., |Colonel. ........ Insp. Genl. U.S. A...... Inspector General................... Oct., I866. ...|Oct. I868: HS
Thos. Swords........................ “ ......... A. Q. M. U. S. A...... Chief Quartermaster .... ........ & & ... April, I869. HS
M. P. Small........... .............. Captain. ......... C. S. U. S. A............ Chief Com. Sub..................... £ & ... |May, I869. §
J. Simpson,........... ...............|Major ............ Surg. U. S. A............ Medical Director........ • & & º 'º & tº º º tº 4 & c ...|April 6, 1867. º
S. R. Hamill......................... Captain........... A. Q. M. U. S. A....... Staff Quartermaster................. Nov., 1866. ...|Jan. 1, 1868. tº
A. B. Hasson........................|Major.............|Surg. U. S. A. ........... Medical Director...................|March, 1867. ...|May, I869. >
F. H. Ross.................. ......... Captain.......... 25 U. S. Inf.............. Act. Signal Officer.................|Jan., 1869. ... |May, I869. g
H. C. Ransom....................... [Lieut. Col....... Q. M. Dept. U. S. A. Chief Quartermaster............... April, I869. ... { {
Roger Jones............. ...... ...... “. .........A. I. G. U. S. A........ Inspector General.................. June, 1869.......|Mch. 28, 1870.
Robert Allen.................. ... ... Colonel........... Q. M. U. S. A.......... Chief Quartermaster............... “ ...... & 4 & t
M. D. L. Simpson ................, Lieut. Col. ... Sub. Dept. U. S. A....|Chief Commissary Sub........... & 6 ...... “ { {
Robert Murray............ ........ “ ...... Med'l Dept. U. S. A..|Medical Purveyor................. “ ...... ( & § {
Hiram Leonard..................... “. ...... Pay Dept. U. S. A...... Chief Paymaster.................. " ...... Nov. 1869.
Henry M. Robert,................. Major ............ Eng. Corps...............|Engineer duty.................... .. “ ...... Mch. 28, 1870.
C. W. Raymond.................. Captain .......... “. ............... “ ........... ........... " ...... § { ... “
W. B. Hughes...................... “. ......... A. Q. M. U. S. A.......|Depot Quartermaster.............. " ...... & 4 & f
W. R. Smedburg................... ( & ... ... I4 U. S. Inf..............|Chief M. and D, O. & A. A. G. " ...... * { § {
R. W. Kirkham..................... Lieut. Col....... Q. M. Dept. U. S. A...|In charge Clothing Depot.......|Dec., I869....... Feb. Io, 1870.
-R-
CO
CJT
IND EX.
CKWORTH, Ga., 229, 252.
Adams, Fort, R. I., 9.
Alpine, Ga., IO7, I I4, et seq.
Altamont, Tenn., 68, et seq.
Ammen, Gen.
division of, 72, 74.
Anderson, Brig.-Gen. Robt.
34, 36, 38, et seq., 40.
Anderson, Gen. S. R.
division of, I I I, I97.
Anderson, Thos. M., 35, et seq.,
38.
Annapolis, Md., 36O.
Arlington, Va., 29, 427.
Asheville, N. C., 391
Athens, Ala., 2 Io, 264, 295, 365,
et seq., 369, 454.
Atlanta, Ga., 34, 60, 209, et seq.,
22 I, 237, 239, et Seq., 245, 249,
et seq., 268, et seq., 312, 389,
4OI, 425, 441, 446. .
Augusta, Ga., 399.
ADEAU, Gen.,
I62, 164, et seq., 184, 189,
265, 302, 3 II, 340, 356, 358,
374, 377, 379, 383, 388.
Bainbridge, Tenn., 353, 365, 368
Baird, Gen. Absalom.
division of, Io9, et Seq, I I2,
I 18, et seq., 124, 126, et seq.,
I37, I4I, I45, et seq., I48, 173,
et seq., reënforces Sherman,
184, et seq., 187, et seq., at
Missionary Ridge, 193, 195,
I97, et seq., 203, at Catoosa,
2O7, 219
Baldwin, Gen.
brigade of, 92, et seq.
Banks, Gen. N., P.
succeeds Patterson, 40, 448
Barboursville, Ky., 45, et seq.
Bardstown, Ky., 78.
Barham, John, 8,
Barker, Capt., 146.
Barnes, Col., brigade of, I 37.
Barnes, Col., Carr, 8.
Barrett, Jacob, 8.
Bate, Gen., division of, I97, at
Dalton, 2O7, 244, 284, 338.
Batteries:
Kinney's, 53.
Mendenhall's, 99, 158.
Standart's, 46.
4th United States, 364, et Seq.
9th Independent, 215.
Battle Creek, Tenn., 67, 71, et seq.
Beatty, Gen. Jno., brigade of, 94,
99, I27, et Seq., I 35, 325,
328,
Beatty, Col. S.,
brigade of 95, 99, 127, et seq.,
I35, 138, 325, 328.
Beauregard, Gen. G. T.,
33, 62, 66, 2 IO, urges an ad-
vance north, 251, 257, 259,
269, et seq., 270, 274, et seq.,
376, 379.
Beech Grove, Ky., 52.
Beersheba, Tenn., 71.
Belknap, Fort, Tex 13.
Belknap, Gen., 429, 448.
Bell's Landing, Tenn., 322, 329.
Benicia Barracks Cal., 90.
Bentonville, N. C., 381, 391.
Biffie, Col., regiment of, 280.
Big Bethel, Va., 36.
Big Shanty, Ga.,, 252
Blaine, Hon, Jas. G., 445.
Blair, Gen., 23.I.
Blake, Col., brigade of 243, et
Seq.
487
488
IND EX.
Blountsville, Ala, 378.
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 335, 461,
464,
Bond, Maj. Frank S., I 30, et seq.,
I42.
Boone, N. C., 391.
Boonesville, 67.
Boston, Mass., Io.
Boutwell, Hon. G. S., examination
by, 402, et seq., 448.
Bowling Green, Ky., 48, 50, 55,
58, 83, et seq.
Bradley, Gen., - * .
brigade of 243, 282, Sharp
conflict with Cheatham, 284.
Bragg, Gen. Braxton, 5, 6.
62, 66, et seq., 71; movements
of 72, et seq.; repulsed by
McCook, 79, et seq; new cam-
paign against, 89, et seq.;
preparations for offense, 90,
etseq.; at battle of Stone River,
93, et seq.; gives up the of
fensive, 96, orders Breckin-
ridge forward, 98, retreat of,
99, et seq. ; evacuates Chat-
tanooga, IO2, et seq.; report
of, Ioč, pursuit of IO7, et seq.;
report of, Io9, et seq.; order
of, I I4, failure of his move-
ment, I I 5, reënforced, I 16, at
Chickamauga, I 19, et seq.;
his orders to Polk, 126, et seq.;
success of, I 32, et seq.; Con-
dition of his army, 147, be-
sieges Chattanooga, I49, et
seq.; 186, 188, sends Long-
street into East Tennessee,
I59, et seq.; possibilities for,
165, 170; position of, 174, et
seq., 175; changes in his line,
176, defeat of, 179, 181, et seq.;
186, et seq.; 190, report of,
191, 195, et seq.; strength of,
I97, 199, et seq.; pursued to
Ringgold, 20I, 212, 272, 461,
- et seq.
Brannan, Gen. J. M.,
commands division under
Thomas, Ioo, ordered to move
forward, I Io, at Chickamauga,
I 18, et seq.; I22, 124, 126,
128, 131, et seq.; retreat of,
I33, 135, et seq.; I45, I48;
reconnoissance of, I68.
Brazos Santiago, 9.
Breckinridge, Gen. John C., -
division of, 91, 96, 98, 98, II 2,
127, et seq.; 268, 372, et seq.
Brent, Geo. W., I I I.
Brentwood, Tenn., 296, 298, 317,
326, 328, 332.
Bridgeport, Ala., IOI, IO5, et seq.;
I 50, 153, et seq.; I 58, 164,
I7O, 208, et Seq.; 253, et seq.;
3OO.
Brown, Fort. 8, 9, et Seq,
Brown Major, 5.
Brownlow, Gov., 406, et seq., 415
et seq.
Brown's Ferry, Ala., I 56, 158, 170,
176.
Buckhead, Ga., 24I, et seq., 245.
Buckner, Gen. S. B., 35, et seq.,
47, 62, 80, IO3, IO6, joins
Bragg, IO8, I I2, advances
against Thomas, II 5.
Buell, Gen. D. C., 35, 49, et seq.,
54, et seq., 57, et seq., 61 et
seq., given command of “Cen-
tre,” 64, et seq., despatches of
68, et seq., orders Thomas to
Nashville, 74, Thomas ap-
pointed his successor, and
order revoked, 75, et seq.,
mistakes of 79, et seq., re-
lieved of command, 83, et
seq., 89, II 3, 131, 138, 200,
461.
Buell, Col. Geo. P., 353 et seq.
Buena Vista, Mex., 6 et seq., 446.
Buford, Gen., division of 28O, 338,
et seq.
Bull Run, Va., 32, et seq.
Bull's Gap, Tenn., 373.
Bunker Hill, Va., 32, 34.
Burnside, Gen. A. E., 62, IO3, IO6,
et seq., I 50, attacked by the
enemy, 160, et seq., 198, et
seq., 201,2O3, (note), 2O6.
Butler, Gen. B. F., 36.
Butterfield, Gen. Daniel;
2IO, 219.
Buzzard's Roost, Ga., 206, et seq.,
209 et seq.,.22O, et seq., 227.
IND EX.
CAR} Ill., 271.
Caldwell, Rev. John H., 4 Io,
et. Seq.
Calhoun, Tenn., 204.
Camargo, Mex. 5, et seq.
Cameron, Gen.,37, 445.
Camp Cooper, see Cooper, Camp.
Camp Dick Robinson, see Dick
Robinson, Camp.
Canby, Gen. E. R. S. 251, 260,
vigilance of, 272, et seq., 3IO,
et seq., 316, 361, 378 et seq.,
proposed movement against
Mobile 381 et seq., 39 I, 394.
Canty, Gen., 221, 227.
Capron, Col., brigade of, 276, 454.
Carlin, Gen., brigade of 93, 183.
Carlisle Barracks, Penn., 24, 28,
32.
Carlisle, Penn., 28, 30.
Carrollton, Ga., 268.
Carter, Gen., 50, 53.
Carter's Hill, Tenn., 288, 290, et
Seq.
Cartersville, Ga., 269.
Carthage, Tenn., 74.
Casserly, Senator, 445.
Catoosa Platform, 207.
Catlett's Gap, Ga., Io9, II2.
Cedar Bluffs, Ga., I Io.
Cedar Grove, Ala., 378.
Centreville, Tenn., 276.
Chalmers, Gen., division of 280,
334, 338, et seq., 350.
Chambersburg, Penn., 32.
Chambliss, Maj., W. P., 13, 382.
Charleston, S. C., 4, II.
Charleston, W. Va., 34.
Charlotte Pike, Tenn., 322.
Chase, Chief Justice, 446.
Chattanooga, Tenn., 60, 62, 65, et
seq., 7 I, 74, et seq., IOI et
seq., IO7, et seq., II6, I27, 133,
et seq., I4I, et seq., I46, I48,
et seq., I 58, 167, et seq., I 59,
199, 20I, et seq., 208, 2 I I, et
seq., 22O, 238, 253, et seq.,
26I, 263, et Seq, 295, 3OO, et
seq., 315, 317, 340, 373, 386,
; 425, et seq., 435, 446, 454,
40 I.
Cheatham, Gen., division of 95,
171, 178, 188, 197, et seq., at
489
Dalton, 2O7, 239, et seq., 244,
282, at Spring Hill, 283, 285,
317, 326.
Cherokee, Ala., 267.
Chicago, Ill., 424, 428, 430, 436, et
Seq.
Chickamauga, Ga., 6, IO6, et seq.,
I43, et seq., I47, I 53, 167,
I99, 20I, et seq., 294 363, 37 I,
et seq., 427, 429, 446,449, 458,
461, et seq.
Christiansburg, Va., 391.
Cincinnati, O., 49, 62, 361, 423, et
SCO. .
claſſile Ky., 308.
Cleburne, Gen., division of 90, I I I,
et seq. 183, 187, conflict at
Ringgold, 20I, 2O7, sharp con-
flict with Bradley, 284,
Cleveland, O, I60, 20I, 2O3, et
Seq., 2 IO, et Seq. 22O, 449.
Clifton, Tenn., 260. .
Cobb, Gen., Howell.
225 (note) 392.
Coburn, Col.
regiment of, 46, 248, letter to,
428.
Colfax, Vice-Pres., 445.
Columbia, Ala, 253, 266, 294 et
seq. 366.
Columbia, Ky., 50.
Columbia, Tenn., 276, et seq., 285,
287, 289, 293, 296, et Seq, 38 I,
et Seq., 334, 452.
Columbus, Fort, N. Y., 4.
Columbus, La., 394.
Columbus, Ky., 55, 59.
Columbus, Miss., 378
Connell, Gen., brigade of, 433
Conner, A. H., 428.
Conrad, Col., brigade of, 288
et seq.
Cooper, Camp, Texas, I 3, et seq.
Cooper, Dr. Geo. E., 37
Cooper's Gap, Ga., IO9
Coppée, Prof., 162, 187
Corinth, Miss., 62, et seq., 64, et
Seq, 67, 75, 85,254, et seq., 267,
274, 377, 379, 446, 453.
Corpus Christi, Texas, 5
Cort, Rev. Dr., 448
Couch, Gen., division of 33 I, 334.
Covington, Ky., 62.
490
IND EX.
Cowan, Tenn., 7 I.
Cox, Gen. Jacob D., division of,
276, et seq., 281, et seq., 285,
287, et seq., 29I, et seq., 333,
et seq., 445 et seq., 448.
Crab Orchard, Ky., 46, 47, 49 et
Seq.
Crawfish Springs, I 16, 122, 130,
I32, I4 I, I49,
Crittenden, Gen. Geo. B., 52, 55,
61, 67, et seq., 74.
Crittenden, Gen., T. L., assigned
to command of Corps, 75,
et seq., 88 commands left wing,
89, ordered to occupy Mur-
freesboro, 90, at Stone River,
94, 96, opposes a retreat, 97,
et seq., commands 2 Ist Corps,
IOO, et seq., IOS, directed to
hold Chattanooga, IO7, et
seq., I Io, et seq., position of
his Corps, I I 5, et seq., at
Chickamauga, I 19 Rosecrans’
order to 122, et seq., position
of, I24, Crittenden I26, 130,
et seq., retreats to Chattanoo-
ga, 133 et seq., 146, disposi-
tion of, I47. I 50 (note)
Crook, Gen., division of, I I4.
Croxton Gen., brigade of I33, 267,
276, 324, 329, 353, 364, et seq.,
454.
Cruft Gen., division of 93, et seq.;
I77, at Catoosa, 207, 329, 449.
Cumberland Ford, Ky., 43, et seq.
Cumberland Gap, East Tenn., 41,
et seq., 61, et seq.
Curtis Gen., Cavalry of, 272, 274.
DAlºš. Ga., 229.
Dalton, Ga., -
62, Io'7, I 16, 16o, 166, 201, et
Seq., 204, 207, et Seq., 22O, et
seq., 227, 252, et seq., 263, 369,
4OI, 454, 461.
Dana, C. A., I 5 I, et Seq,
Dana, Gen. N. J. T., 273.
Danbury, N. C., 391.
Danville, Ky., 49, 461.
Danville, Va., 391.
Davies, Gen., division commander
under Thomas, 64.
Davis, Gen. Jeff. C., division of,
73, 91, 99, I 19, 126, 129, 131, et
seq., 140, goes to the front,
I41, repulse of, I42, I47, et
seq, reports to Sherman, 170,
189, 201, 203, Summoned be-
fore the McCook Court of In-
quiry, 204, 206, at Buzzard's
Roost, 207, officially com-
mended, 216, 219, 234, et seq.,
240, 247, commands district of
Kentucky, 418.
Davis, Jefferson.
12 et seq., president of the
Confederate States, 24, 30, 205,
212, 250, 255, 257, et seq., 260,
273, 274, (note), et seq., 318,
337, capture of 395.
Davy, Geo., 417.
Dayton, L. M., 24I, 262.
Decatur, Ala., 2 IO, 253, et Seq,
258, 263, 266, 287, 293, et seq.,
352, 353, 376, 378.
Decatur, Ga., 239, 24I, 268.
Decherd, Tenn., 67, 69, 7 I.
DePeyster, Gen. J. Watts, 342 et
Seq., 347, 422.
Dick Robinson, Camp, Ky, 40, et
SeC.
Doºhdan Guide, I4.
Doane, Bishop, 448,
Dodge, Gen., 26O.
Donaldson, Gen. Jas. L., 32O, in
battle of Nashville, 322.
Donelson, Fort, Tenn., 62.
Doolittle, Col, 334.
Drought, Jno. W., 215.
Drouillard, Capt. J. P., I IO.
Dug Gap, Ga., IO9, et seq., II 5.
Dumont, Gen., 89. -
Dunlap, Tenn., 70, et seq.
Dyer, Gen. 432, (note) 435.
ARLY, Gen., 275,
Eastport, Miss., 66, 270, 355,
361, 365, et seq., 369, 375, 377,
et seq., 386, et seq., 394, 454.
Eaton, Gen., 343. Z
Edwards, L. R., 8. tº:-
Elliott, Gen., Washington L., with
Sherman, 20I, 2O4 325, 328.
Elyton, Ala. 378.
Ewing, Gen., division of, 172, 176.
IND EX.
FALLING WATERS, W. Va.,
2
32.
Fayetteville, Ark., 274.
Fisher, Capt., 8o.
Fishing Creek, Ky., battle of, see
Mill Springs.
Fisk, Gen. Clinton B, 418
Fitch, Commodore, 3OO.
Fletcher, Hon. A. J., 414
Florence, Ala., 255, 263, et seq.,
269, et seq., 276, 287, 316, 319,
336, 338, et seq.
Foley, Jas. W., 215
Forrest, Gen.
Cavalry of, I 18, et seq., 252,
254, 264, et seq., 28O, 282, 285,
292, 294, 296, 302, 338, et seq.,
353, 355, et seq., 365, 380, 383,
386, 392
Fort Adams, see Adams, Fort.
Fort Belknap, see Belknap, Fort.
Fort Brown, see Brown, Fort.
Fort Columbus, see Columbus,
Fort.
Donelson,
Fort.
Fort Henry, see Henry, Fort.
Fort Independence, see Indepen-
dence, Fort.
Fort Leavenworth, see Leaven-
worth, Fort.
Fort McHenry,
Fort.
Fort Mason, see Mason, Fort.
Fort Moultrie, see Moultrie, Fort.
Fort Sumter, see Sumter, Fort.
Fort Tyler, see Tyler, Fort.
Fort Wood, see Wood, Fort.
Fort Yuma, see Yuma, Fort.
Foster, Gen., 203, et seq.
Foster, Hon. L. F. S., 344, et seq.
Furay, W. S., 145.
Fox, Capt. P. D., 158.
Franklin, Tenn., 278, et seq., 285,
et seq., 289, et seq., 296, 302,
et seq., 318, 337, et seq., 345,
349, et seq., 354, 363, 369, 450,
452, 455.
French, Lieut., S. G., 6.
Fry, Col. Jas. B., 55, 82 under
Thomas, 89, 96.
Fulton, 236.
Fyffe, Col., brigade of 95.
Fort see Donelson,
see McHenry,
49 I
GALLATIN, Tenn., 87, 89.
Garfield, Gen. J. A., IO4, Io8,
I 22, I25, I29, et Seq., I4O, I42,
I44, et seq., despatches to Rose-
Crans, I45, I 50 (note), et seq.,
427, 445, et Seq., 449.
Garrard, Gen. Kenner, 13, 46, 219;
247, 324, et Seq.
Gay, Capt., 205.
Gaylesville, Ala., 253, 262, 319.
Geary, Gen. Jno. W.,
division of, I59, 168, 177, 180,
2 I 9, 229, 24O, 243.
Germantown, N. C., 391.
Gilbert, Gen., C. C., assigned Com-
mand of Corps, 77, et seq.
Gillem, Gen.
372, 382, 39 I.
Glasgow, Ky., 83
Goddard, C., II 3
Gooding, Gen., brigade of, 83
Goodspeed, Capt. 242.
Granger, Gen. Gordon, given com-
mand of the Cavalry, 64, I39,
Rosecrans' message, to I44;
I45, 148, I 50 (note), at Chat-
tanooga, 173, I86, 193, 204,
2O8, et seq., 252 254, 448.
Granger, Gen. R. S.
266, et seq., 294.
Granny White Turnpike, 328, 330
333, 350
Grant. Gen. U. S.
57, 63, Thomas' considera-
tion for 64 et seq., 73 et seq.,
his telegram to Thomas I 56,
arrives at Chattanooga I 57 et
seq., his order to Thomas 160
et seq., his instructions to
Thomas I67, orders a recon-
naissance toward Missionary
Ridge 173, his change of plans
175 et seq., his official report
192, his lack of confidence in
the Army of the Cumberland
199 et seq., his letters to
Thomas 202 et seq., made
lieut.-gen. 217, 236, letter to
Sherman 238, moving towards
the South 250, his orders to
Thomas 253, permits Sherman
to march to the Sea 255 et seq.,
492
IND EX.
Grant, Gen. U. S.,
telegram to Sherman 263,269,
despatch of 272 et seq., 275,
censures Thomas' course 293,
frets under Thomas' delay 300
et seq., relieves Thomas 3O4,
revokes order 305 et seq., 32O,
327, 337, 340, et seq., 349,
continues to urge Thomas for-
ward 354 et seq., his opinion
of Wilson 362, 366 et seq.,
plans of 374 et seq., letters of
381, et seq., 400, 407 et seq.,
4I9, et Seq., 422, 429, 432
et seq., 44I et seq., 445, 448,
45O, 453.
Grant, Mrs. U. S., 432, et seq.
Graves, Capt., I45.
Greensboro, N. C., 391.
Greenville, Tenn., 6.I.
Griffin, Genl. Chas., 419.
Griffin, Ga., 258. -
Griffin, Robt. B., 8.
Grimes, Hon. J. W., examination
by, 404, et seq.
Grose, Gen.,
brigade of, 94, 98, 178.
Gross, Surgeon F. H., 14.I.
Grosvenor, Col.,
brigade of 324, et seq.
Gunter's Landing, Ala., 253, et seq.
HALlº Gen. H. W., 57, 63,
urges Thomas' promotion, 64,
et seq., his dissatisfaction with
Buell, 75, his correspondence
with Thomas, 84, et seq.,
Grant's despatch to, I 59, 162,
I74, 18O, et seq., Sherman's
Communication to, 222, 225,
238, 257, 260, despatch of, 274,
293, 3OO, 3O3, et Seq., 3 IO, 3.I.3,
355, 357, et seq., 260, 367, 375,
377, et seq., 38 I, et seq., 384,
397, 433, et Seq., 44O.
Hammond, Gen.,
brigade of, 28O, 329, et seq.,
353, 364, et seq. -
Hancock, Gen. W. S., 418.
Hardee, Gen. W. J., 12, et seq., 21,
90, et seq., 95, 187, sent to
Mississippi, 206, 228, 239, et
Harker, Gen.,
seq., 243, et seq., 248 et Seq,
brigade of 95, II 3, 137, loses
his arm, 234, mortally wound-
ed, 235.
Harlan, Col., 52.
Harnden, Col., 395.
Haroldson, Mo., 4 II, et seq.
Harpeth River,Tenn.,278, 280, 287,
350, et seq., 365.
Harris, Mr. 346.
Harrisburg, Penna., 28.
Harrison, Col., brigade of 353, 364,
et seq.
Harrison, Lieut., I 3.
Harrison, Tenn., 68, 7 I.
Hascall, Gen., brigade of 95, et seq.
Hasson, Dr., 419.
Hatch, Gen., division of 267, 276,
et Seq., 324, 329, et Seq., 350,
et seq., 364, et seq., 387, 454.
Hatteras, Cape, N. C., Io. -
Hawkins, Capt., 5.
Hazen, Gen., brigade of, 96, 139,
I88, 448.
Hedges, Lieut., 35I.
Heintzelman, Gen., IO.
Henderson, Gen. J. P., 5.
Henry, Fort, Tenn., 62.
Heydt, Wm., 407, et seq.
Hill, Gen. D, H., corps of, I 12,
I44.
Hillsboro’, Tenn., 322, 325, 33O.
Hillsville, Va., 391.
Hindman, Gen., I I I, et seq.
Hoge's Run, 32.
Hollow Tree Gap, Tenn., 350.
Hood, Gen. Jno. B.
at Resaca, 223, at Dalton, 227,
et seq., 230, et seq., Supersedes
Johnson, 239, et seq., his at-
tacks repulsed, 244, Successes
of, 245, attacks the Army of
the Tennessee, 247, leaves At-
lanta, 248, tries to force Sher-
man out of Georgia, 25O, et
seq., pursues Sherman, 252,
et seq., in Northern Alabama,
255,6tseq., pursued by Thomas,
261, et seq., 266, 269, ad-
vance of, 270, Davis' despatch
to, 275, decides on an offen-
sive campaign in Tennessee,
IND EX.
Hood, Gen. Jno. B.
276, plans of, 278, advancesto-
wards Spring Hill, 282, etseq.,
advances to Franklin, 287,
et seq., losses of, 292, superior
strength of 294, et seq., storm-
bound, 305, et seq., 3II, in
front of Nashville, 315, et seq.,
official report of, 317, et seq.,
at battle of Nashville, 323, et
seq., his lack of prudence, 326,
et seq., his flank attacked, 331,
et Seq, report of, 334, Strength
of 336, et seq., retreat of, 349,
et seq., Surmises concerning,
377, et seq., retreats to Tu-
pelo, 380, et seq., 383, ex-
changes cordial greetings with
Thomas, 406, 439, 453, et seq.,
462.
Hooker, Gen. Jos.,
I5 I, I 53, Thomas confirms
Rosecrans' instructions to,
I 54, et seq., moves to Brown's
Ferry, I 58, et seq., 164, et
seq., I69, et seq., 17 I, et
seq., 176, et seq., Thomas' or-
ders to, 177, et seq., 182, de-
spatch to, 183, Thomas' order
to, I84, et seq., 188, et seq.,
advance of, 171, et seq., his
conflict at Ringgold, 201, 219,
225, et seq., 23O, et seq., 239,
448, 461.
Hoover's Gap, Tenn., Ioo.
Horstmann & Son, 9
Hough, Col. Alfred L., 25, 42 I, 423,
432, et seq., 436, 440, et seq.
Howard, Gen., 160, 164, 168,
et seq., at Chattanooga, I70,
173, et seq., 176, 18O, directed
to connect with Sherman, 183,
sent to reënforce Sherman, 185,
et seq., 188, et seq., reports
to Sherman, 192, in Tennes-
See, 2OI, 2O8, et seq., 219, 225,
227, 235, 239, et Seq., 245, et
seq., commands Army of the
Tennessee, 247.
Howard, Col. Geo. W., 409, 412.
Huey's Mills, Tenn., 280, et seq.,
Humphreys, Gen. A. A., 343, 399,
4OI.
493
Hunter, Capt. Robt., 261.
Huntsville, Ala., 266, 295, 365,
369, 378, 388,454.
Hurlbut, Genl., division com-
mander under Thomas, 64.
Hyattstown, Md., 34.
LLINOIS, Regiments of,
61st, 27 I.
72nd, 27 I.
IOOth, 284.
Independence Fort, Mass., Io.
Indianapolis, Ind., 430.
Indiana, Regiments of,
4th, I4I.
Ioth, 53, 252.
12th, 252.
I3th, 252.
4Oth, 284.
58th, 354.
92nd, IO4.
Indianola, Tex., 21.
Iowa, Regiment of, 3d, 394.
Irwinsville, Ga., 395.
Iuka, battle of, 62.
Iverson, Gen., cavalry of, 268.
ACKSON, Gen., division of Cav-
alry, 28O, 338, et seq.
Jackson, Gen., killed, 79.
Jackson, Miss., 386, 401, et seq.
Jackson, Ga., 259.
Jackson, Gen. Thos. J., infantry,
32, et Seq., 91.
Jacobs, Geo. W., 215.
Jefferson Barracks, Mo., Io.
Jerusalem, Va., 7.
Johnson, Gen. R. W., 13, 91, et seq.
I IQ, I45, 175, 188, at Mission-
ary Ridge, 193, IQ7, 203, unsuc-
cessful effort of, 206, at Buz-
zard's Roost, 207, 219, 255, at
Nashville, 329, 350, 35I (note.)
Johnson, Andrew, 43, 47, et seq.,
Governor of Tenn., 369, et
Seq. President, 395, et seq., 398,
400, 406, 409, 414, 418, et seq.
Johnsonville, Tenn., 264, et seq.,
276.
Johnston, Gen. Albert Sidney,
12, et seq., 2I, resigns, 31, 38,
49, et seq., 54, his estimate of
Union forces, 58, et seq.
494
IND EX.
Johnston, Gen. Jos. E., 20, et
seq., offers his resignation 29,
et seq., 33, et seq., 62, 202,
2O5, et seq., reports received
concerning his army, 208, et
seq., asks for reënforcements,
2 I I, 217, 22 I, et seq., dis-
covers Sherman's movements,
229, official report of, 231, re-
treats to Atlanta, 236, et seq.,
Superseded by Hood, 239, 242,
et seq., 257,326, 381,391,394,
398, 461.
Johnston, Prof. Wm. Preston, 54.
Jones, Gen., 250. -
Jonesboro, Tenn., 247, et seq., 268,
295, 39 I.
KP#9. Capt. Wm., 8.
Kellogg, Col., Sanford C., I 35,
et seq., I46, 435, 443, 455.
Kellogg, Miss, 443.
Kellogg, Miss Frances L., (wife of
Gen. Thomas) Io.
Kelley's Farm, I 18. -
Kenesaw Mountain, Ga., 230, et seq.
Kentucky, Regiments of,
3rd, 46.
4th, 53.
IOth, 52.
12th, 53.
17th, 14.I.
Kilburn, Lieut., C, L., 6.
Kilpatrick, Gen. Judson, 219, 247.
Kimball, Gen. Nathan, brigade of.
243, et seq., 248, 28 I, et Seq,
285, et seq., 288, 322, 325, 328.
Kimble, Rev. Mr., 41 I et seq.
King, Col., I49.
Kingston, Ga., 266.
Kingston, Tenn., 68, 2 Io, 228.
Kinney, Capt., battery of 53.
Kirk, Gen., brigade of 92, et seq,
Kniffin, Col., 339.
Knipe, Gen., division of 324, 329,
35O, et Seq.
Knoxville,Tenn.,60, et seq., 66,84,
IO3, I 50, I60, et seq., 170, 192,
I97, 202, et Seq., 2 II, 317, 373,
386, 388, 399.
Ku-Klux-Klan, 405, et seq.
Kulp's House, 23.I.
LAAYETTE, Ga., IO2, IO5, IO7,
et seq., I IO, et Seq, I 12, etseq.,
II 5, et seq., II 8, 12 I, I27, 139,
I4 I, I44, 253.
La Grange, Col., captures Fort Ty-
ler, 395. -
Laibold, Gen., brigade of 132.
Lamar, Gen., 5.
Lane, Col., brigade of, 282, 284,
288, et seq., prompt action of,
29O.
Lawrence, Maj., 146.
Leavenworth, Fort, Kan., 419.
Lebanon, Ala., 207.
Lebanon, Ky., 50, et seq., 57.
Lee, Admiral, 267, 305, 353.
Lee and Gordon's Mill, Ioy, I I I,
II 3, II 5, et seq., I48, 22O.
Lee, Gen., Fitzhugh, 25.
Lee, Gen. Robt. E., 12, et seq., 20,
et seq.; offers his resignation
29, et seq., 38, 237, et seq., 247,
257, 25I, 282, 285, 3II, et seq.,
3I 5, 317, 359, et Seq., 373 et
seq., 377, 387, 390, 394, 402.
Lee, Gen. S. D., 250, 326.
Letcher, Gov., 28, etseq., 38, et seq.
Lewisburg Pike, Tenn., 279, et
Seq., 35 I.
Lexington, Ala. 364.
Liberty Gap, Tenn., IOO.
Lincoln, President,
39, 43, 45, 55, et seq.; 60, 75,
77, 86, et seq.; I 5 I, I 54, I 57,
3OO, et seq.; 327, 37 I, 446.
Linnville, Tenn., 353, 363.
Livingston, Tenn., 61. -
Logan Cross Roads, 5 I, 54, et seq.
Logan, Gen., Jno. A.,
2O2, et seq. ; 207, succeeds
McPherson, 245, order to pro-
ceed to Nashville, 308, 445.
London, Ky.,
46, et seq.; 49, et seq.
Long, Gen., at Chattanooga, 170,
392.
Longººse, Gen. J.,
62, I I4, 127, 139 (note), I42,
I48, his advice to Bragg, I49,
sent into East Tennessee, 16o,
et seq.; 163, et seq.; 199, 201,
et seq.; 206, 209, 2 II, et seq.,
2 I7. -
IND EX.
Lookout Mountain, IO2, IOS, IO7,
Io9, II2, I I4, II6, et seq.;
188, 165, 168, et seq.; 176, et
Seq.; 186, et seq.; I94, 198,
426, 461.
Loudon, Tenn., 203, et seq.
Louis XIV., I.
Louisville, Ky., 40, 49, 55, 75, 78,
89, 150 (note), 270, 3O4, 312,
382, 399,420, 422, et seq., 428,
432, et Seq., 459.
Lovejoy Station, Ga., 248.
Lynchburg, Va., 386, et seq.
Lyon, Gen.,
Cavalry of, 307, et seq.
Lytle, Gen.,
brigade of, I 30, death of, 132,
I49.
CARTHUR, Gen.,
division of 324, 331, et seq.
McArthur, Lieut. Jos. H., 13.
McClellan, Gen., 57, 301.
McClernand, Gen.,
given command of
serves,” 64.
McCook, Col. Anson G.,
brigade of 244.
McCook, Col. Daniel,
brigade of, I 18, 147, 234, et
seq., mortally wounded, 235.
McCook, Gen. A. McD., 49, 67, et
seq., 74, assigned command
of Ist Corps, 70, et seq., re-
pulses Bragg, 79, et seq., 88,
commands right wing, '89,
engagement of 90, 92, at
Stone River, 94, et seq., meet-
ing at his headquarters, 96, et
seq., commands 20th corps,
IOO, et seq., ordered to pursue
Bragg, IO7, et seq., I IO, et
seq., at Alpine, I 14, position
of his Corps, II 5, et seq., at
Chickamauga, I 19, Rose-
Crans' order to, 122, et seq.,
position of, I24, et seq., 128,
et seq., retreats to Chatta-
nooga, I 33, et seq., I42, Rose-
Crans' message to, I44, 146,
disposition of, I47, 150 (note).
et seq., 204.
& ( Re-
495
McCook, Gen. Edw. M.,
Division of, 219, cavalry of,
227, , et Seq., 3O2, 342, 392.
McCormick, Dr., 443.
McCown, Gen., 68, 90.
McCullum, Col., 208.
| McDowell, Gen., 33.
McGeehee, Rev. John B., 41 I et
Sec.
McHºy. Fort, Md., 4.
McKay, Col. 247.
McKay, Gen., 448.
McKean, Gen., division com-
mander under Thomas, 64.
McKibbin, Col., 85.
McLemore's Cove, Io9, I I I, I 15,
et seq.
McMichael, Maj. Wm., 142, 144.
McMillen, Col. W. L., 333.
McMinnville, Tenn., 67, et seq.,
392, et seq., 412, et seq.
McPherson, Gen., army of 220,
222, et seq., 23 I, et seq., 236,
24O; Ordered to move on
Atlanta, 24I ; death of 245,
461.
Mack, Capt.,
79, 82.
Macon, Ga., 246, et seq., 258, 383.
Maget, Capt, Jas., 8.
Magruder, Gen., 273.
Manchester, Tenn., 70, et seq., IoI.
Marable, H. H., 4O7.
Marietta, Ga., 228, 230, et seq.,
236, 461.
Martinsburg, W. Va., 32, 34.
Martinsville, Va., 391.
Mason, Fort, Tex., 13.
Mason, Hon. John Y., 2.
Massenbury, Dr. 8.,
Matamoras, Mex., 5.
Matthews, Hon. Stanley, 450.
Matthias, Gen., 204. |
Maury, Gen. D. H.
259, 366, et seq.
Meade, Gen. Geo. G.
432, 436, 447, et seq.
Memphis, Tenn., 267, 310.
Mendenhall, Maj. Jno., battery of,
99, I 58. . .
Mercer, Gen., brigade of 339.
Meridian, Miss., 207, 267, 4oſ.
Merrill, Col., 2 IO, 354.
496
INDEX.
Michigan, Regiments of,
Mower, Gen. -
division of, 271 (note).
Mulberry, Tenn., 214.
Murat, 335.
Murfreesboro’, Tenn., 69, et seq.,
72, et seq., 89, et seq., 92,
94, 99, et seq., 261, 266, 282,
296, et seq., 300, 3OI, et seq.,
317, 339, et seq., 346, 383, et
Seq., 373, 432.
Murphy, Wm. I 5.
Murray, Dr., 443.
NASHVILLE, Tenn., 7, 17, 33,
50, 57, et seq., 66 et seq., 89,
Ist, I 58,
2d, 352,
4th, 395,
9th, 218.
Mill Creek Gap, Ga., 209, 224.
Milledgeville, Ga., 401.
Miller, Dr. Jacob, 207.
Miller, Gen. John F., brigade of
93, 99, 32O ; his position at the
battle of Nashville, 322, 395,
et seq.
Mills, Major., 346.
Mill Springs, Ky., battle of, 53, et
seq., 60 et seq., 37 I, 446, 462
Milroy, Gen. ,308.
Milwaukee, Wis., 439.
Minnesota, Regiment of, 2nd, 53.
Minty, Col., brigade of, I47, 392,
et seq.
Missionary Ridge, Ga., II 7, 12 I,
123 et seq., 126, et seq., I32,
I33, 160, 165, 167, et seq.,
2O5, 212, 363, 425, et seq., 461.
Missouri, Regiment of, 6th, 207.
Mitchel, Col. J. B., 237.
Mitchel, Gen. O. M., 35, Supersedes
Thomas, 42, et seq., 48, 67,
73,397. -
Mitchell, Col. J. G., brigade of,
329.
Mitº. Gen. R. B., 73, et seq.,
83, I I4, 130, 139, at Crawfish
Springs, I49, 234.
Mobile, Ala., 202, 380, 383, et seq.,
399, 40I. .
Monterey, Mex., 5, et seq., 446.
Montevallo, Ala., 378.
Montgomery, Ala.,
273, 361, 378, et seq., 383, 392,
394, 4OI.
Moore, Col.,
division of 324, 328, 34O.
Morgan, Col.,
324, et Seq., 347.
Morgan, Gen.,
division of, 252, et seq., 256.
Morgantown, N. C. 391.
Morristown, Tenn., 391.
Morton, Gen., 133.
Morton, Hon. O. P., 428.
Moultrie, Fort, 4, 5.
Mount Airy, N. C., 391.
et seq., IOO, IO6, 149, et
seq., 163, 205, 209, 2 II, 251,
253, et seq., 261, et seq.,
285, 293, et seq., 383, et
seq., 388, 391, 395, et seq.,
408, et seq., 424, 429, et seq.,
446, 450, et seq., 458.
Negley, Genl. J. S., division of, 74,
under Thomas, 89, et seq.,
92 et seq., 99, IOO, IO9,
et seq., I I2, at Chickamau-
ga, I IQ, et Seq., I24, et seq.,
I34, et seq., moves to Ross-
ville, I4I, I45 et seq.
Nelson, Genl. William, 4o et seq.
59, 67, 72.
New Hope Church, Ga., 229.
Newnan, Ga., 4 I I, et seq.
New Orleans, La., 4, IO, 21, 273,
4 IQ.
Newton, Gen. John., 34, 219, 234,
et Seq., 242, et seq., 252, et
seq., 256, 448.
New York, II, 2O, et seq., 27 et seq.,
438.
Noble, Col., 394.
Nolensville, Tenn., 49, 330, 354,
452.
Norfolk, Va., 19, et seq.
Nunn, Hon. D. A., 437.
O'Bº' Lieut., 6.
Ohio, Regiments of,
9th, 53.
I4th, 52.
74th, 261.
95th, 333.
97th, 284.
IND EX.
Opdycke, Gen.,
brigade of, 282, 284, 287, et
seq., prompt action of 290,
et Sed.
Orchard Knob, Tenn., 174, et seq.,
I83, et seq., 192, et Seq.
Orcutt, Newell E., 215.
Osterhaus, Gen.,
division of, 176, et seq., 199.
Overall's Creek, Tenn., 97, et seq.
Overton Hill, Tenn.,331.
PAEUGAH, Ky., 269, 271.
Paine, Gen. division of, 74.
Palmer, Gen., brigade of 339.
Palmer, Col. Wm. J., 352.
Palmer, Gen. John M., 74, 91, et
seq., 98, II 3, I IQ, 128, 139,
I45, et seq., at Chattanooga,
I73, 18O, I83, et seq., at Tun-
nel Hill, 296, et seq., 219, 225,
235, 239, 247, (note), 399.
Palmetto, Ga., 4 II.
Palo Alto, Mex., 5.
Panama, Io.
Paris, Ky., 259.
Parker, Col. Wm. C., 8.
Parkhurst, Col., 338.
Patten, Gov., 4OI.
Patterson, Gen’l. Robt., 32 et seq.,
39, succeeded by Banks, 4O.
Pegram, Gen., brigade of, 9.I., I I4,
Peete, Dr. Geo. W., 8.
Pelham, Tenn., 71.
Pennock, Commander, 264.
Pennsylvania, Regiment of, I 5th,
352.
Perkins, Surg. J., I4I.
Perryville, Ky., 62, 78, 436, 461.
Petersburg, Va., 388.
Philadelphia, Penn., 32.
Pikeville, Tenn., 70, et seq., Io9.
Pittsburgh Landing, 63, 86.
Point Isabel, Texas, 5.
Polk, Gen., 92, 95, 98, I I I, et seq.,
II4 ; ordered to assault Rose-
Crans' left, 126, et seq., 202,
2O6, 209, 2II, et seq., 227,
25O.
Pope, Benj. C., 8.
Pope, Gen., given command of
“Left Wing,” 64, et seq.
Porter, Lieut., 2I4, et seq.
497
Portland, Oregon, 273 note, 436.
Post, Col., 93, 28 I, 283, 325, 331,
347.
Potter, Rev. Dr., 448.
Powell, Dr., 241.
Prewitt's Knob, 74, et seq.
Price, Gen., 272, note 274.
Pritchard, Col., 395.
Pulaski, Tenn., 265, 267, 276, et
Seq. , 293, et Seq.; 317, 353,
363, et Sec.; 453.
Purdy, Tenn., 259.
Qº MAN, Gen., 6.
RANDALI, Hon. Saml. J., 36, et
Seq , 444, et Seq.
Rawlins, Gen. John A., 272, note.
Reese, Rev. Mr., 448.
Reilley, Gen., division of, 288.
Resaca, Ga., 22O, et seq.
Resaca-de-la-Palma, Mex., 5.
Reynolds, Gen. J. J.,
commands division under
Thomas, IOO, I Io, at Chicka-
mauga, I I 8, et seq., 124, 131,
I34, et Seq. , I45, et Seq. ; I 54,
I77, I83, 273, et seq.
Reynolds, Lieut., J. F., 6.
Reynosa, Mex., 5.
Richmond, Ky., 62.
Richmond, Va.,
I9, 59, 206, 2 I I, 238, 251, et
Seq.; 3 I I, et Seq.; 355, 360,
373, et seq.; 385, et seq.; 390,
et Seq. , 442.
Riddle's Hill, Tenn., 329.
Ridgley, Capt., 5.
Ridley, Robt., 8.
Ringgold, Ga., IO7, II 3, II 5, et
Seq., I47, 20I, 2O8, et seq.
Robertson, Gen., 392.
Robeson, Sec., 448.
Rochelle, James, 2.
Rochelle Family, I.
Rock Castle Hills, 45, et seq., 49.
Rocky Face Ridge, 224.
Rome, Ga., IO6, et seq., I Io, I 14,
2O7, 228, 258, 268, 387.
Rosecrans, Gen. W. S., 59, 62.,
supersedes Buell, 84 et seq.,
dates of his commission, 88,
32
498
IND EX.
Rosecrans, Gen. W. S.
plans new campaign against
Bragg, 89 et seq., at Battle of
Stone River, 93, proposes a
retreat, 96 et seq., moves his
army towards Manchester,
IoI, in Lookout Valley, 20I
et seq., his letter to Thomas,
IO4, rejects Thomas' ad-
vice, IO6, report of, IO7,
despatches to Thomas, I IO,
II 2, position of his army,
II 5, at Chickamauga, I 19 et
seq., orders to McCook and
Crittenden, 122 et seq., his
orders to McCook, I29, to
Thomas, I 30, retires to Chat-
tanooga, I.33, report of, I 35,
his letter to Mezzy York 777-
bune, I36, report of, 142, des-
patch to Garfield, I 44 et seq.,
telegram from Garfield, I48,
statements relating to Chicka-
mauga, 150 (note) Superseded
by Thomas, I 52,260, note 264,
270, 272, 301, 313, 369, 448,
46I.
Rossville, Ga., IO5, I 33, 137, I 39,
I4I et seq., I 50 (note) I75,
I79, I83, IQI et Seq., I75, 179,
I83, IQI et seq., IQ7.
Roswell, Ala., 239.
Rough and Ready, Ga., 247, 268.
Rousseau, Gen’l. Lovell H., di-
vision of, 73 et seq., 79 et seq.
83, under Thomas, 89 et seq.,
92 et seq., IOO, 252.
Royall, Lieut. W. B., 13.
Rucker, Gen"l., 350, 437.
Ruff's Station, 236.
Ruger, Gen’l., division of, 276, 281
et seq., 288.
Russellville, Ala., 378.
ST. LOUIS, Missouri, 44 I.
Salem, Va., 39.I.
Salisbury, N. C., 38 I, 39.I.
Saltillo, Mex., 6.
San Antonio, Tex., 13.
San Francisco, Cal., 422, 430, 436,
et seq., 446.
Savannah,Ga. 256, et seq., 315, 355,
374, et seq., 387, 390, 440.
Savannah, Tenn., 63.
Schaeffer, Col., brigade of 95.
Schoepf, Genl., 46, et seq., 50, et
seq., 61, 69,83.
Schofield, Genl. John M., 203 et
seq., 208, 220, 224 et seq., 233,
236, 240 et seq., 253 et seq.,
at Nashville, 263 et seq., 268,
276, et seq., at Spring Hill 279
et seq., ordered to retire to
Nashville, 287, 294 et seq., 298,
3OO, 3O2 et seq., 318 et seq.,
his part in Thomas' plan of
battle of Nashville, 32.2 et seq.,
delay of 33 I et seq., 360, 366,
at Dalton 369, 376, sent East,
379 et Seq., 434 et seq., 439 et
seq., 448, 45O, et seq.
Schurz, Genl. division of, 175, 4oo,
446.
Scott, T. A., ass’t. Sec'y. War, 36
et seq.
Scott, Genl. Winfield, 20, 23, offer-
ed high rank in Confederate
Army, 28 et seq., 36 et seq.,
39, 4 I.
seriº Col., brigade of, 194.
Selma, Ala., 260, 267, et seq., 361,
376, 378, et seq., 383, 385, 388,
392, 394, 4OI.
Seminole Indians, capture of, 4,
expedition against, Io,
Sharkey, Gov., 4OI.
Shepherd, Col., brigade of, 84.
Sheridan, Gen. P. H.,
79, 91, at Stone River, 93, 95,
at Chickamauga, I2O, 124,
I28, et seq., moves to Ross-
ville, I4O, et seq., 147, et seq.,
at Chattanooga, 173, 189, at
Missionary Ridge, 193, 196,
with Sherman, 20I, 212, 275,
386, 400, 418, et seq., 433.
Sherman, Gen. T. W., Com-
mands battery in Mexico, 6,
division commander, under
Thomas, 64.
Sherman, Gen. W. T., 4, 35, 39, et
seq., 44, 46, et seq., 58,
division commander under
Thomas, 64, 161, et seq.,
Grant's instructions to, 167,
et seq., carries northern ex-
499
Smith, Gen. Kirby, 79, 250, 273, et
seq., 3II, 316.
Smith, Gen. M. L., 274.
Smith, Gen. W. F., 7 I, I 55, his
plan approved by Thomas
and Grant, I 56, et seq., 161,
I68, 255, note.
Snake Creek Gap, Ga., 22O, et seq.,
26 I.
Somerset, Ky., 50 et seq., 61.
Somerville, Ala., 378.
Sparta, Tenn., 67, et seq., 73.
Spaulding, Col., 350, 365.
Spear, Gen., brigade of, 99, I 33,
I47.
Spring Hill, Tenn., 279, et seq.,
, 293,298, 310, 351, 369.
Spring Place, Tenn., 207.
Standart, Capt., battery of 246.
Stanley, Gen. D. S., 92, et seq.,
I28, 135, 202, et seq., 219, 240,
et seq., 247; at Nashville, 263,
et seq., 267, et seq., 28 I, et
seq.; skillful retreat of, 286,
288, et seq.; wounded, 292,
376, 45 I.
Stanton, E. M., Secy. of War, 42,
et seq., 48, 56, 86, I 5 I, et seq.,
3OI, 327, 358, 370, et seq., 394;
compliments Thomas, 397, et
seq., 408.
Starkweather, Gen., brigade of,
IND EX.
Sherman, Gen. W. T
tremity of Missionary Ridge,
180, his delay, 181, et seq.,
heavily reënforced, 184, et
seq., his report of Mission-
ary Ridge, 199, et seq., sent
to East Tennessee, 2OI, et seq.,
in Mississippi, 206, 212, Com-
mends Davis, 216, assigned
command of division of the
Mississippi, 217, rejects Thom-
as' suggestion, 22 I, letters to
Thomas and Halleck, 224, et
seq., battle at Resaca, 228,
correspondence with Thomas,
234, et seq., gives orders to
move South, 246, telegraphic
communication cut off, 252,
forced into Northern Georgia,
255, Grant permits him to
“march to the Sea,” 255,
et seq., despatches between
Thomas and him, 266, et seq.,
his misinterpretation of Thom-
as' despatches, 269, et seq.,
instructions to Thomas, 287,
293, et seq., orders to Thomas,
297,302, 3Io, et seq., 319, 336,
et seq., his vindication of
Thomas, 342, 355, et seq., 359,
et seq., 366, et seq., 374, et
seq., 387, 390, et seq., armis-
tice of, 392, et seq., assigned
another Command, 397, 425,
426,429, 434, et seq., 440, et
seq., 445, et Seq., 45 I, 453, et
seq., 461, et seq.
Shiloh, battle of, 63, et seq., 199,
435, 446.
Shover, Lieut., W. H., 6.
Siddle, Casper, I 5.
Sill, Gen., 79.
Slocum, Gen. H. W., 216, 247,
4OO, 445, et Seq. r"
Smith, Col. F. H., of Military In-
stitute, Virginia, 21 et seq.
Smith, Gen. Andrew J., 16th
corps, 263, 267, et seq., 278 et
seq. 287, 294, et seq., 3O2,
319, 32 I, et seq., 33O et Seq.,
report of, 333, et seq., 357, 359,
364, 366, at Eastport, 369,376,
et seq., 380, 382, 384, 45 I.
t ( sº of the West,” 21.
Steedman Gen. Jas. B., 46, 52, 83,
I22, 139, et seq., 252, 287,
298, 3c2, 319; his position in
battle of Nashville, 322, et
Seq., 33 I, et Seq., 347, 352,
398, et seq., 417, 45 I.
Steel, Gen., 273, et seq.
Steinwehr, Gen., division of I75.
Stevens' Gap, Ga., IO2, IO9, 172.
Stevenson, Ala., 66 et seq., 72,
IO6, 208, 2 IO, 253, 265, et seq.,
294, 297, 3OO. . .
Stevenson, Gen., division of, 17 I,
I78, et seq., 187, 207.
Stewart, Col., brigade of 28O.
Stewart, Gen. A. P. division
of, IQ7, 207, 239, et seq.,
leaves Atlanta, 248, 282, 282,
317, 326.
500
IND EX,
Stilesboro, Ga., 229.
Stokes, Representative, 445.
Stoneman, Gen. George, cavalry
of, 224, 227, his expedition in
North Carolina, 381 et seq., in
East Tennesee, 386, et seq.,
399, et seq., 418.
Stone River, battle of, 62, 93, et
seq., IoS, 363, 446, 462.
Strawberry Plains, 204, et seq.
Streight, Col., brigade of, 325, 331.
Summerville, Ga., IO7, I I4, 179,
378.
Sumter, Fort, 24, 27, et seq.
Swayne, Gen. Wager, 418.
Swift, Surgeon Eben, 97.
ALLAHASSEE, Fla., 399.
Taylor, Gen. D., 394.
Taylor, Gen. Zachary, 5 et seq.
Taylorsville, Va., 39.I.
Tennessee, Regiments of,
Ist, 53; 2d, 53; IOth, 267;
I2th, 350, 365.
Terrel, Gen., killed, 79.
Thands, Wm. G., 8.
Thayer, Gen., 274, 445.
Thomas, Benj., 17,437.
Thomas, George Henry, birth of, I ;
graduates, 4; brevetted Ist
lieutenant, 4 ; promoted Ist
lieutenant, 4 ; brevetted cap-
tain, 5; in Mexico, 5; brevetted
major, 6; is presented a sword,
8; directs an expedition against
Seminole Indians, 9; ap-
pointed instructor at West
Point, IO; promoted cap-
tain, IO; in California, I I ;
appointed major of 2d Cav-
alry, I2; wounded, I 4; his
views on slavery, 16; personal
appearance, Ig; his letter to
Col. Smith, 2 I, et seq.; his
views of Secession, 24; ap-
pointed lieut.-Col. 2d Cav., 30 :
Col. 2d Cavalry, 3 I ; at bat-
tle Falling Waters, 32; his
opinion of Patterson's cam-
paign, 34; appointed brig. gen-
eral, 35 ; in Kentucky, 40 et
seq.; superseded by Mitchell, |
42, et Seq., victory at Mill
Thomas, George Henry.
Spring, 53; his plans, 60 et
Seq.; given command of Right
Wing, 63; appointed major
gen., 64; resumes his former
position, 65; correspondence
with Buell, 68, et seq.; at
Nashville, 74 ; declines to
supplant Buell at Perryville;
78, et seq. ; protests against
Serving under Rosecrans, 84,
et seq.; assigned command of
“Centre,” 89; at Stone River,
93, et Seq. ; Opposes a retreat,
97; Commands I4th Corps,
IOO ; consulting with Rose-
Crans, IO4; ordered to pursue
Bragg, IO7, et seq.; position
of his Corps, I I 5, et seq.; at
Chickamauga, I IQ, et seq.;
asks RóSecrans for Negley,
I25; repulses Bragg, 128; em-
barrassed on account of delay
in sending Negley, I 37, et
Seq.; Success of, I40; re-
ceives orders to withdraw his
army to Chattanooga, I49;
I 50 (note) appreciated in
Washington, I 5 I ; super-
sedes Rosecrans, I 52 ; tele-
gram from Grant, 156; Grant
approves his plans, I 57 et
seq.; Ordered to move against
the enemy immediately, 160;
misapprehension of his char-
acter, 163; appointed brig.
gen. U. S. A., 166; instructions
from Grant, 167, et seq.; he
urges an attack, 17O, et Seq.
preparations for battle, Chat-
tanooga, 171 et Seq.; car-
ried rifle-pits on Missionary
Ridge, 191 et seq.; correspon-
dence with Grant, 202 et seq.;
selects Missionary Ridge as a
National Cemetery, 212 et seq.;
his course with guerrillas 2I4
et seq.; his army, 219; letter
from Sherman 224 et seq.; in-
structions to attack the foe 234
et seq.; correspondence with
Sherman, 234 et seq.; indiffer-
ence to danger, 237; ordered
,--
INDEX.
Thomas, George Henry.
to move on Atlanta, 24.I; in
Tennessee, 252 et seq.; is re-
fused the 14th corps, 261; des-
patches between Sherman and
him, 266 et seq.; against Hood
27O et seq.; not responsible
for Spring Hill, 286; censured
for withdrawing his army to
Nashville, 293, postpones at-
tacking Hood, 294 et seq.; pre-
parations for action,299 et seq.;
Grant orders Schofield to
Supersede him, 3O4; suspends
order, 305; explains delay,306
et seq.; plans his own, battle.
32 I et seq.; his faith in cav-
alry justified, 335 et seq.; at a
scientific club in Washington,
343 et seq.; calmness of, 346
et seq.; his pursuit of enemy,
349 et seq.; Stanton's Compli-
mentary dispatch to, 358 ;
Grant's ditto, 359; conclusion
of his campaign, 369; made
maj.gen., U.S.A., 370 et Seq.;
opposes a winter Campaign,
379 et seq.; sends a message to
Pres. Johnson, 395; Military
Division assigned him, 396
et seq.; testifies concern-
ing condition of South, 402
et seq.; obliged to inter-
fere in ecclesiastical affairs,
4O9 et seq.; adopted by the
State of Tennessee, 414et seq.;
declines brevet of lieutenant-
general, 42O, to be candidate
for Presidency, 421 et seq.;
refuses gifts, 423 et Seq.;
president of the So. of Army of
the Cumberland, 424 et seq.;
sent to the Pacific coast, 434
et seq.; Schofield's enmity to-
wards, 439 et seq.; last mo-
ments of, 442 et seq.; burial
of, 447 et seq.; unfinished pa-
per of, 450 et seq.; character
of, 456 et seq.
Thomas, Mrs. Geo. H., Io, 20, 28,
4I 5, 432 et Seq., 443, 449.
Thomas, John (father of Gen.
Thomas), I.
50I
Thompson, Col. brigade of color-
ed troops, 325, 331, 347.
Thruston, Col., Gates P., 140, et
seq., 218, 425, 437.
Tile, John, I 5.
Tillson, Gen’l. Davis, 388, 418.
Tilton, Ga. , 223, 252.
Tompkinsville, Ky., 45.
Townsend, Gen. E. D., 39, 3O4,
419. 447.
Tracy City, Tenn., 68.
Trenton, Ga., IO7, 254.
Troy, N. Y., Io, 443, 447, 449.
Tullahoma, Tenn., 2 Io, 2 I 5.
Tunnel Hill, Ga., II 3, 206, et seq.,
22O, 224. -
Tupelo, Miss., 338, 380.
Turchin, brigade of, I46, I48.
Tuscaloosa, Ala., 378, 385.
Tuscumbia, Ala., 67,254, 265, 267,
et seq.; 359, 375, 378.
Twiggs, Gen., 16, 20, et Seq,
Tyler, Fort, 395.
Tyler, John, Jr., 422.
PTON, Gen., 387, 392, 394.
Urquhart, Chas, F., 8.
AN CLEVE, Gen., division of,
92, 94, et seq., 98, et seq., II 3 et
seq., I2O, I24, 126, 131, 133,
et Seq., I42, I47.
Van Derveer, Gen., brigade of,
I 28.
Van Dorn, Capt., 21.
Van Dusen, Gen., 354.
Van Horne, Rev. T. B., 439.
Vicksburg, Miss., 3 Io, 384 et seq.,
4QI, 437. -
Victoria, Mex., 6.
Villanow, Ga., 220, 224.
WARE, Hon. B. F., 42O.
Wade, Major, 4.
Wagner, Gen., brigade of, 95, et
Seq., IO4, 234, 28 I, et seq.,
285, 288, et seq., losses of, 292.
Waite, Col., 2 I.
Waldron's Ridge, Tenn.,68, et seq.
Walker, Col., brigade of, 96.
Walker, Gen., corps of, I I I, II8,
et seq., 17 I, I76, 183, 187,
2O7.
5O2
INDEX.
Walsh, Rev. Dr., 448.
Wallen, Gen., 448.
Walworth, Col., brigade of, 130.
Ward, Gen., division of 243, et seq.
Ward, J. Q. A., 450.
Warner, Senator, 445.
Washburne, Gen., 267, 445.
Washington, Capt., 6.
Washington, D. C., 2, 18, 20, et
Seq., 32, 35, 37, et Seq., 4 I, 45,
55 et seq., IO3, 156, 208, 222,
256, 274, 300 et seq., 314, 327,
341, 343, 354, 367, 371, 395
et Seq., 4O7, 4 IQ, et Seq., 432
et Seq., 45O.
Wauhatchie, Tenn., I 59.
Waynesburgh, Tenn., 294, 452.
Webster, Col., killed, note 79.
West Point, Ala., 395,401.
West Point, N.Y. 2, 4, 6, 9, et seq.,
19, 2I, I 55, 343,446, et seq.
Wharton, Brigade of 91.
Wheeler, Gen’l. J. B. brigade of,
9I, II 4, 232.
Whipple, Gen. W. D. 208, 216; at
battle of Nashville, 324 et seq.,
33 I 4O7, 4 IO, 4 I 3.
White, Col., 393.
Waitesburg, Ala., 378.
Whitesides, Capt., E. G., 288, et
Seq.
Whittaker, Gen., 139.
Wilder, Col., Io8, I 13, et seq., I I6,
I 18, 124, 129, et seq., I47.
Wilkesboro, N. C., 391.
Wilkinson, Col., 218.
.Williams, Gen. Alpheus S. 219, 243,
et seq.
Williamsport, Tenn., 276.
Williamsport, Md., 32.
Willard, Capt. I26, 146, 443.
Willich, Gen. brigade of, 92, et seq.,
I46.
Wilmer, Bishop, 402, 409 et seq.
Wilson, Genl. Jas. H. 256, 263,
268, 277, et seq., 287, activity,
292, 296, 3OI, et seq., 320,
position in battle of Nashville
322 et seq., attacks Hood's
rear 330, et seq., victory of,
Wilson, Gen. Jas.
335, his pursuit of Hood, 350,
et seq., Grant's opinion of,
362, et seq., near Huntsville,
369, 376, his raid in Alabama,
38O, et seq., his capture of
Selma, 392 et seq., 438, 445,
452, et Seq.
Winchester, Va., 32 et seq., 386.
Winslow, Genl. cavalry of, 272.
Winston's Gap, Ala., IO2.
Wisconsin, Regiments of,
395, 22d, 2 I 5.
Withers, Genl. 68, 95.
Woodford, Gen1. Stewart L., 448.
Wood, Fort, 175, 185, 194.
Wood, Gen'l Thomas J., 67, at
Altamont, 70, 72, 74, 78, 91, et
Seq., 95, IO4, II 3, I2O, I 22,
I 24, 126, et seq., I31, et seq.,
I45. I47, 17O, at Chattanooga,
I73, et seq., 189, at Missionary
Ridge, 193, et seq., with Sher-
man, 20I, 219, 24 I, et Seq.,
248, at Spring Hill, 281, et
seq., 285, at Franklin, 288,32O,
et seq., his part in the battle
of Nashville, 322, et seq., 333,
his pursuit of the enemy, 350,
352, 362, et seq., at Hunts-
ville, 369, 401, 418, 451, 454.
Woodruff, Col., brigade of 93.
Woods, Gen'i. C. R., at Chatta-
nooga, 177, etseq., Commands
Dept. of Ala , 399, 409, 418.
Wolford, Col. regiment of, 46, 50.
Wool, Gen’l., 6.
Wytheville, Va., 391.
I St,
YUMA, Fort, Io, I8.
ZOLLIgor FER. Gen'1., 46, 48,
50, et seq., 54, et seq., 58, etseq.
0
SCALE
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MAP OF THE
IB A TT L E O El
C HIIC EQA. M. A U G. A.
Commanding U. S. Forces
MIAJ. GEN. W. S. ROSECRANS
Commanding Rebel Forces
GENERAL BRAXTON BRAGG
September 19th. and 20th. 1863.
Part of Crook's $
2 mal. Pos
*SE
.*.* tº sº.
§§§
º
Positions of United States Forces = =
Positions of Rebel Forces - - -
º scALE of MILEs ł
H–H–à– 2 3
p
NoTE.—The accompanying Map of Chickamauga, though giving the general position accurately, does
not, ºn the Opinion of the author, represent with entire correctness the right of our line of battle on the second
day at the moment of the enemy's attack. The change which then eacisted will be easily understood by
reference to the teact.




































































TMIAL E O EV
THE BATTLEFI ELD OF
LO GAN'S CR O S S R O ADS,
- O R
2^ MILL SIPRINGS,
º' º January 19th. 1862.
*** \, - Commanding U. S. Forces,
©campoºsier tº M. A. J. G. E. N. G., EI, TEI O M A. S.
sgºpºulo º \,, Commanding IRobel Forces,
X cºins; G. E. N. G., R., C R ITT E N D E N.
* Compiled by
Edward Ruger
late Supt. Topographical Engineer Office,
4. Army of the Cumberland.
-1
;*
#
p
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Camp Batt’y/B. & C.
S}} h. Ohio
:
i
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DESIGNATION OF POSITIONS OF FORCES
U.S. REB EL
IFirst Position tº-3 tº E3
Second on gº-ºº: cº-ººrºº
Third y 9 gº-º-º:
JFinal y? tº-Errrrºº &=º-º-º:
SOALE J
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%
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;
























MAP OF
THE BATTLEFIELD OF
PERRY VILLE, KY.
Commanding U. S. Forces, Sº?, —(?)—
MAJ. GEN. D. C. BUELL. & * .
.
|
<< %.
& º, 3. *
Commanding Rebel Forces, º & “, %. * $2. \
*:Nº.2, *aw. . "A ſº ”, Q.
GEN, BRAXTON BRAGG, & sºlº
g e N * §§ Tºgew
Compiled by *Nº. twee,
Edward Ruger N...". "...sº
late Supt. Topographical Engineer Office, fººeºs
Army of the Cumberland. ; ** *
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R. R. FROM tº soº ... º. *: wº DESIGNATION OF POSITIONS OF FORCES.
s'. Nº ge, Sºº's
*** §§:T. W. C. A U.S. REBEL
.* N Rºmº gº e g a. *-* -
Wº: §§ & © §§§ º Gen. Gilbert's Corps evening Oct. 7th. 1862. =
sº sº jºº "“ ‘...... • ‘ºftwº s
§. º §ººl Troops on the 8th. before action. fºr-º-;
:*:N×Wºw "
*
Troops after dark evening of the 8th. rº-º:
º SoALE OF MILES
t-
Troops on the 8th. while engaged. ==º cº-
i–à–; ; – ) l 2































































































|MAIP OF {
THE BATTLE FIELD OF
STONE RIVER,
NEAR MURFREESBoRO, TENN.
December 30th. 1862 to Jan. 3rd. 1863.
COMMANDING U. S. FORCES,
MAJ. GEN. W. S. ROSECRANS.
COMMANDING REBEL FORCES,
GEN, IBRAXTONIBRAG.G.
Compiled from Capt. Michler’s Map by
Edward Ruger
late Supt. Topographical Engineer Office,
Army of the Cumberland.
8CALE OF MILE8
t l I l t —l
0 }{ % % I 2
Limes of works erected by U.S. Torces -- ~ Av.
Limes of works erected by Jºeliel Forces T-J-
Positions of U.S. Forces - - - - - - - - - -
Positions of Rebel Jºurces - - - - - - - - - -
zº
źord 'N - NºN
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L^e,
A-
see e
Ti
l
• ****
*=
sº-ºº:
Er
oboe do. Picket ſ took command, Oct. 23, 1863. &
Positions
of Armies before the Battles.
vion Army when Gen. Grant CH ATT ANOOG A, . . . .
'• gºoutºorºonrºd from wº
* Chickamauga to Chattanooga, and thence by
: , bº - - - 2%
Rebel Army .. ) { { ... . . . with the operations of the National Forces .” River to Brown's Ferry, relate to the opera-
do. Picket Line | tions of Gen. W. F. Smith at Brown's Ferry
Position of Gen. Hooker's Corps after under the command of - * * e - & A-. Tº º ºvº- y
- e which, in conjunction with General Hooke's
Gen. Smith's movement at Brown's Ferry, .* {}
MAJ. C. E.N. U. S. C. RANT
Gen. Sherman’s first position. $/ opening of a shorter line of supplies.
Line developed by Reconnoissance Compiled by § part of October.
S. ** a sº ºn. ׺ ve \ * - ."
%% ..". º * Edward Ruger, . sº...', R saw Sº
Oºtte O ntons (120 Pontons containing 3000 * .* fº Swº sº s S.
* * ** Wºº & Rºw a º t ep. of the Cumberland. s' s sº $: , Ś
7xen Qf Gen. Sherman’s Corps were floated Late Sup Top. Eng. Office Dep. of /Ağ Şū s” gºs sº £º §
- - SS: ; His Sº Jºãº §: ºss S5 S.
down the Tennessee River to the mouth of f ... Yº | ww. sº A.sº S
* - * - -w- - - - - #: *AN.WS :* S&S '' *
the South Chickamauga at midnight Nov. 23–24). - ºrsºs § #ºs &
* . . , Ch". 3 - Milliki
Tuesday, Nov. 24. augg 9}- * 14ttaken
& Bojº §'s Stat.
**C. §ish
Position of General Hooker's Corps at the ... . sº. As s N §§ §: ~ ; - 2-
battle Qf Lookout Mountain. '? . . . * \ . ‘. . w
Position of Gen. Sherman's Corps in the morning.
& 8 $ $ * { * { ſº tº § { evening.
Wednesday, Nov. 25.
Rebel Line in the morning. Their infantry
on the top of Mission Ridge massed heavily
on the right against Sherman.
Aroutes taken by Hooker.
Ground covered by a chârge of the Army of
the Cumberland in the afternoon.
Lines of Rebel retreat.
. P.]{artin
*
\' Crutchfield
in carrying by assault the Rebel position
along the crest of Mission Ridge.
'a-º-º-º-s
operations at Wauhatchee, resulted in the
w
Sº, is
*śS.
§§§
Sº N****'. 'SNN\\º
\\ i.S
§§§ t;
Authorities,
Map of Battlefield Qf Chattanooga prepared at U. S.
Coast Survey Office from surveys Qf Gen. W. F. Smith.
Gen. W. F. Smith's Map of the Battlefield of Chattanooga.
v . $' -
W.
s
: W . : ‘. . . .
r xº~...~~ - - -
T - - • * * : * > . ; º -
Wauhatches *.
<> Captain W. E. Herrill's Map of Chattanooga and its
&y approachés. *
; Captured Rebel Maps.
Official Reports.
5 k's
º:
§: º h +=~! scale of Mues t º
H. 0 * $$ 3; 1 2 3.
Robert Clarke & Co. Publishers. RUSSELL, STRUTHERS & Co., ENGRs, N.Y.



































































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|N FRONT OF
FR. A. N. KLIN, TEN N.
Where the U. S. Forces,consisting of the 4th.
& 23rd. Corps and the Cavalry Corps M.D.M.
all under the command of
MAJ, GEN. J. M. SCHOFIELD
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November 30th. 1864
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MAP OF
THE BATTLEFI ELDS
|N FRONT OF
NAS HVILLE,
Commanding U. S. Forces,
IMAleſ. G. E.N. G. H. THOMA.S.
Commanding Rebel Forces,
G. E.N. J. B. H.O.O.D.
Dec. 15th. & 16th. 1864.
COMP! LED FROM GEN. TOWER'S MAP BY
Edward Ruger
te Supt. Topographical Engineer Office,
Army of the Cumberland.
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EXPLANATION
• Lines of works erected by U.S. Forces ====
* Lines of works erected by Rebel Forces –C–T-
JPositions of U.S. Infantry and Artillery
Positions of U.S. Cavalry
N.
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SCALE OF MILES
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*
§




























































































THE GAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR.
“The scheme of the Messrs. Scriòners in their series of “Campaigns of the Civil War' is
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the result will be incomparably */e best ºnz/itary history of the awaz’, as a whole, that cazz any—
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with a degree of success that wiłż be more and more oëziozes as it draws to a conclusion.”—
ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL.
The approval given by the press to this series has been emphatic and
unanimous. The even more important popular verdict is best shown in
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A New Volume—Ready in September.
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TURKISH LIFE IN WAR TIME.
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200I 241979
DCT 12 1979
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