_‘_,_ _5:5:555?55: .m. _ ' nfifln'll “E. “P! .__‘.._.._..h_p_.v=f._,..__.l._.,_h._\.,_m£5855.‘ ME? ‘.‘_._w_m_.:-:!:,: 2-2;: .====x_.=w_w . .. QR. \ ‘ =‘_==.=.=_=‘_ “L .. akém . a... 5'6! _ (Nkfl‘l! U 0 t \ "mm. : . =E=====,=m_== lll‘l. liiilllwlll‘.lllDIIli.llll\lll‘\\i4l\l.lll.l I .i-Iillll llli‘v‘ll Ill!‘ .EEE55.5.5555I.E:255:5::Eiizrii: .5:55.:=EEsiifisfi5E5. :55: ‘Winn mm’. TALL,’ Erlt‘yr ulrp A. :1 I: . .3! . .\ l . . \Axmmvvsflumwmzl ‘1A A A} A . . (A A r A A . . Al... I... . A r . Ci: 1 _ (v .w .. 2A, <..fi.\ A .1\1 _ . . ‘ Ad . \H A. ‘a r | A . A A A. A v \ . s1 .\ A r A A . Riv : _ .A A A A by. A A Q . l v | 5L I vv I \ > x K . \ A 1'1 A.‘ .AA AAA v v A A A . \A (A. A. . l A. \ I v \ . A A .1 . A . . . ~ . \ . . A ‘A. A A a \ A M . , o~ { - u l 1‘ \ I .A , I \ ll. . .A A. ‘A . _ A A. . A . I I I A . . v v. .- u . . | . . . A \A. 11 ~ \ < '\ A _ . , . . 3 ~ \ I . A A \ A A A A A . . x \ r . 1. \A‘ .l I I ‘ \ a II . r \ . . . J v . . . . J A. I A . A A {I .. \Al . . A \ A \ A A - _ . . A A . _ A A . . . h \ . .. A r v A \ r . \ . _ . . ‘ .\ . x . A ‘ . . J. A“ , A . \ . v 1! ~ A A \ . 1 A ~ , ‘v - A A A \ A > \ . . A . . A . .P \ 6' v I .- y .. . A 1 . A A _ ; A ~ // . , A f \ A r f x A I I . A 1 A.‘ A I \ A I v - 'l \ A \ / > _ AQ‘ 1 it \ ‘ A \ A . A . ~ . \ M 1 b A ~ A . \ A A \ . _ A . _ . . A a v \ A A ‘ _ ' ‘ ~ A A . AM > . v _ A?‘ . | A A x \ A A. A . A \ . ‘ t . \ Q A 1 \ \u \- \ - A A A _ .A \ ~ A , . _ \ A . .A. A 1 \ I A 4 ~ A . A A . _ _ L; A A .i A . l ( A \A v A . A .A. .. \ 1 . A a v, . . w I . \ ~ .1.. A . \\ A Q A l l I A A - _ A 4 . A \ . A. A A . . . A A . y . l I . . ~ ~ ~ \ ~ I n l- i A . A A , A I . . A . l . .. A a . _ _ \ A . . r . ~ . . . A A l I s A 1 A . . ‘ . 0 v 1 . . n A \ , v \ I 7 l a A.‘ I . ‘ .\ A A . A o x . I A K . . .. A . . - . . . .. I A _ _A I. . A‘ . I . .A k. . v I A .. p A.» . J I A \ v I A . l» A A A _ . w . 1 . _ _ A A A l . A . _ .~ \- . . . . . \ . . . A .A . . ~ \\ . A . , A , . ~ . A. , I I ‘ q - 1 a A A . A. . ‘L. . A I \ v A u A - r _ A I \, ~ A A _ ' ~ A . v A A \ .. ‘ J . .. T . , t . ‘I A. ' . v .. v .A I ~ ~ 1 . . A ._ . . . A . . A 1 , r . \ . ' _ v u . ‘A I | . . . A . . . . ‘ A. . n A‘ A . . . \ . \ I . ~ ~ A . A. . . I . K A . A. \ - . . . I A . .. .A . . 1 \ A ~ . . A » ~ . > \ r- . . A H . A . A . _ . \ A A ‘A . A A A \ y A . A i \ < A A AA. 1. HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES; \VITH N OTIOES OF ITS PRINCIPAL FRAMERS. ‘BY GEORGE TICKNOB, CURTIS. "11: m, 7 IN TWO VOLUMES. VQLUME L NEW-~ YORK: HARPER AND BROTHERS, Fmmxnm SQUARE. 1 8 6 5. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1854, by GEORGE T.CURTI& in the Clerk’s Ofiice of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts. 'z'o GEORGE TICKNOR, ESQ., THE HISTORIAN 0F SPANISH LITERATURE, BY WHOSE ACCURATE SCHOLARSHIP AND CAREFUL CRITICISM THESE PAGES HAVE LARGELY PROFITED, I DEDICATE THIS WORK, IN AFFECTIONATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF TIES, WHICH HAVE BEEN TO ME CONSTANT SOURCES OF HAPPINESS THROUGH MY WHOLE LIFE. PREFACE. A SPECIAL history of the origin and establish- ment of the Constitution of the United States has not yet found a place in our national literature. Many years ago, I formed the design of writing such a work, for the purpose of exhibiting the deep causes which at once rendered the Oenven- tion of 1787 inevitable, and controlled or directed its course and decisions; the mode in which its great work was accomplished; and the founda- tions on which our national liberty and prosperity were then deliberately settled by the statesmen to whom the American Revolution gave birth, and on which they, have rested ever since. In the prosecution of this purpose I had, until death terminated his earthly interests, the encour- agement and countenance of that illustrious person, ‘ whose relation to the Constitution of the United States, during the last forty years, has been not I Vl PREFACE. I inferior in importance to that of any of its found ers during the preceding period. Mr. Webster had for a long time the intention of Writing a work which should display the re- markable state of affairs under whose influence the Constitution was first brought into practical appli- cation; and this design he relinquished only when all the remaining plans of his life were surren- dered‘ with the solemn and religious resignation that marked its close. It was known to him that I had begun to labor upon another branch of the same subject. In the spring of 1852 I Wrote to him to explain the plan of my work, and to. ask him for a copy of some remarks made by his fa- ther in the Convention of New Hampshire when the Constitution was ratified by that State. I re- ceived from him the following answer. “WASHINGTON, March 7th, [1852]. “ MY DEAR SIR,— “ I will try to‘ find for 'you my father’s speech, as it was collected from tradition and published some years ago. If I live to see warm Weather in Marshfield, I shall be glad to see you beneath its shades, and to talk of your book. . “ You are probably aware that I have me'ditated the Writing of something upon the History of the Constitution and the Administration of Washing- PREFACE. vii ton. I have the plan of such a work pretty defi- nitely arranged, but whether I shall ever be able to execute it I cannot say: ——‘ the wills above be done.’ “ Yours most truly, “DANL. WEBSTER.” ‘Regarding this kind and gracious intimation as a wish not to be anticipated in any part of the field which he had marked out for himself, I re- p plied, that if, when I should have the pleasure of seeing him, my work should seem to involve any material part of the subject which he had compre- hended within his own plan, I should of course relinquish it at once. When, however, the period of that summer’s leisure arrived, and brought with it, to his watchful observation, so many tokens that “ the night cometh,” he seemed anxious to impress upon me the importance of the task I had under-. taken, and to remove any obstacle to its fulfilment that he might have suggested. Being with him alone, on an occasion when his physician, after a long consultation, had just left him, he said to me, with an earnestness and solemnity that can never be described or forgotten: “ You have a future; 1 have none. You are writing a History of the Con- stitution. You will write that work; I shall not. PREFACE. Go on, by all means, and you shall have every aid that I can give you.” The event of which these words were ominous was then only four weeks distant. Many times, during those short remaining Weeks, I sought “ the shades of Marshfield ”; but now it was for the offices and duties, not for the advantages, of friend- ship; - and no part of my work was ever submit- ted to him to whose approbation. sympathy, and aid I had so long looked forward, as to its most important stimulus and its most appropriate re- ward. But the solemn injunction which I had received became to me an ever-present admonition, and gave me—if I may make such a profession—the need- ful fidelity to my great subject. Whatever may be thought of the manner in which it has been treated, a consciousness that the impartial spirit of History has guided me will remain, after every ordeal of criticism shall have been passed. And here, while memories of the earlier as well as of the later lost crowd upon me with my theme, I cannot but think of him, jurist and magistrate, friend of my younger as well as riper years, who was called from all human sympathies before I had conceived the undertaking which I have now PREFACE. ix Fortunate shall I be, if to those in whom his blood flows united with mine I can completed. transmit a work that may be permitted to stand near that noble Commentary, which is known and honored wherever the Constitution of the United States bears sway. The plan of this work is easily explained. The first volume embraces the Constitutional History of the United States from the commencement of the Revolution to the assembling of the Conven- tion of 1787, together with some notices of the principal members of that body. The second vol- ume is devoted to the description of the process of forming the Constitution, in which I have mainly followed, of course, the ample Record of the De- bates preserved by Mr. Madison, and the oflicial Journal of the proceedings.1 1 In citing the “ Madison Pa- pers,” I have constantly referred to the edition contained in the fifth (supplementary) volume of Mr. Jonathan Elliot’s “ Debates,” &c., because it is more accessible to general readers. The accuracy of that publication, and its full and admirable Index, make it a very important volume to be con- sulted in connection with the sub- von. 1. b ject of this work. In this rela— tion, I may suggest the desira- bleness of a new and carefully re- ‘ vised edition of the Journals of the old Congress ;— an enterprise that should be the care of the national government. A great magazine or materials for our national history, from the first Continental Congress to the adoption of the Constitution exists in those Journals. X PREFACE. The period of our history from the commence ment of the Revolution to the beginning of Wash= ington’s administration is the period when our State and national institutions were formed. With the events of the Revolution, its causes, its prog ress, its military history, and its results, the people of this country have long been familiar. But the constitutional history of the United States has not been Written, and few persons have made them- selves accurately acquainted with its details. How the Constitution of the United States came to be formed; from what circumstances it arose; what its relations Were to institutions previously existing in the country; what necessities it satisfied; and what was its adaptation to the situation of these States, — are all points of the gravest importance to the American people, and all of them require to be distinctly stated for their permanent welfare. For the history of this Constitution is not like the history of a monarchy, in which some things are obsolete, while some are of present importance. The Constitution of the United States is a living code, for the perpetuation of a system of free gov- ernment, which the people of each succeeding gen- eration must administer for themselves. Every line of it is as operative and as binding to-day as it PREFACE. Xi was when the government was first set in motion by its provisions, and no part of it can fall into neglect or decay while that government continues to exist. The Constitution of the United States was the means by which republican liberty was saved from the consequences of impending anarchy; it secured that liberty to posterity, and it left it to‘ depend on their fidelity to the Union. It is morally certain that the formation of some general government, stronger and more efficient than any which had existed since the independence of the States had been declared, had become necessary to the con- tinued existence of the Confederacy. It is equally certain, that, without the preservation of the Union, a condition of things must at once have ensued, out of which wars between the various provinces of America must have grown. The alternatives, therefore, that presented themselves to the gener- ation by whom the Constitution was established, were either to devise a system of republican gov- ernment that would answer the great purposes of a lasting union, or to resort to something in the nature of monarchy. With the latter, the institu- tions of the States must have been sooner or later crushed; - for they must either have crumbled xii PREFACE. away in the new combinations and fearful convul sions that would have preceded the establishment of such a power, or else they must have fallen speedily after its triumph had been settled. With the former alternative, the preservation of the States, and of all the needful institutions which marked their separate existence, though a diflicult, was yet a possible result. To this preservation of the separate States we owe that power of minute local administration, which is so prominent and important a feature. of our American liberty. To this we are indebted for those principles of self-government which place their own interests in the hands of the people of every distinct community, and which enable them, by means of their own laws‘, to defend “their own palticular institutiQfiS; againstfenaclroachrbnents from without. Finally, the Constitution of the United States made the people of these several provinces one na- tion, and gave them a standing among the nations of the world. Let any man compare the condition of this country at the peace of 1783, and during the four years which followed that event, with its present position, and he will see that he must look to some other cause than its merely natural and PREFACE. material resources to account for the proud eleva- tion which it has now reached. He will see a people ascending, in the compara- tively short period of seventy years, from an atti- tude in which scarcely any nation thought it worth while to treat with them, to a place among the four principal powers of the globe. He' will see a na- tion, once of so little account and so little strength that the corsairs of the Mediterranean could prey unchecked upon its defenceless merchantmen, now opening to their commerce, by its overawing diplo- macy and influence, an ancient empire, on the ‘op- posite side of the earth we inhabit, which - has‘ for countless: ages~ been firmly closed against the whole world. He will first see a collection of thirteen “fee- ble republics on the eastern coast of North America, inflicting upon each other the manifold uries of rival and hostile legislation; and then again he - will behold them grown to be a powerful confederacy of more than States, stretching from the At- lantic to the Pacific, with all their commercial inter- ests blended‘ and harmonized by one superintending legislature, and protected by ‘one central and pre- ponderating power. He will see a people who had at first achieved ‘nothing but independence, and had contributed nothing to the cause of free government xiv PREFACE. but the example of their determination to enjoy it, founding institutions to which mankind may look for hope, for encouragement and light. He will see the arts of peace ——_ commerce, agriculture, manufac- tures, urisprudence, letters — now languishing be- neath a civil polity inadequate and incompetent, and now expanding through a continent with an energy and force unexampled in the history of our race, — subduing the farthest recesses of nature, and filling the wilderness with the beneficent fruits of civilization and Christianity. _ Surveying all this, -- looking back to the period which is removed from him only by the span of one mortal life, and looking around and before him, he will see, that I among the causes of this unequalled growth stands prominent and decisive, far over all other human agencies, the great code of civil government which the fathers of our re- public wrought out from the very perils by which they were surrounded. It is for the purpose of tracing the history of the period in which those perils were encountered and overcome, that I have written this work. But in doing it, I have sought to write as an American. For it is, I trust, impossible to study the history of the Constitution which has made us what we are. PREFACE. XV by making us one nation, without feeling how un- worthy of the subject -- how unworthy of the dig- nity of History — would be any attempt to claim more than their just share of merit and renown for names or places endeared to us by local feeling or traditionary attachment. Historical writing that is not just, that is not impartial, that is not fear- less, -— looking beyond the interests of neighbor- hood, the claims of party, or the solicitations of pride, — is worse than useless to mankind. BOSTON, July, 1854. CONTETNS OF VOLUME FIRST. BOOK I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE REVOLUTION TO THE ADOPTION OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERA- TION. CHAPTER I. 1774-1775. ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. - ORIGIN OF THE UNIoN. — SITUATION on THE CoLoNIEs BEFORE THE REvoLU'rIoN. Political Organizations of the Colonies Pug; Provincial Governments . . . . . . . . 4 Proprietary Governments . . . . . . . . 5 Charter Governments . .. 5 Causes of the Revolution 6 Local Legislatures . . . . . . '1 Power of the Colonies to unite, asserted by the Revolution . 8 Reasons why they were enabled to effect the Union . . 8 ~~ A General Congress . . . . . . . . 10 First Step towards it . . . . . . . . . ll Assembling of the Congress . . . . . . . 13 Delegates . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Method of Voting . . . . . . . . 15 Rights of the Colonies . . . . . . Separation from Great Britain not contemplated . . . 18 Relations of the Congress to the Country . . . . . 19 Authority of Parliament . . . . . . . . 20 Declaration of Rights . . . . . . . . 22 Cessation of Exports and Imports . . . . . 23 VOL. I 6 xviii CONTENTS. Another Congress proposed . . . . . . . . 25 Royal Government terminated in Massachusetts . . . . 25 Provincial Congress of Massachusetts . . . . . . 26 Battle of Lexington . . . . . . . . . 27 C H A PTE R II. 1775-.1776. THE SECOND CONTINENTAL CONGRESS.-—FORMATION AND CHARACTER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. ——APPOINTMENT OF A COM- MANDER—IN-CHIEF. ——FIRST ARMY OF THE REVOLUTION. New Continental Congress . . . . . . . 28 Delegates . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Colonies represented . . . . . . . . 29 Duration of this Congress . . . . . . . . 3 War commenced - . . . . . . . . . 31 Massachusetts and New York apply to the Congress for Direction and Assistance . . . . . . . . . 31 The Congress proceeds to put the Country into a State of Defence . 32 American Continental Army created . . . . . . 32 Washington chosen Commander-in-Chicf . . . . . 33 Measures to defray the Expenses of War . . . . . 34 Treasury Department established . . . . . . 35 General Post-ofiice organized . . . ' . . . 35 Militia . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Relations with Indian Tribes . . . . . . , . 35 Royalists _ . . . . . . . 36 The Congress advise Provisional Governments . . . . 37 Separation from England determined upon . . . . . 38 Suppression of the Royal Authority . . . . ' . 39 National Union formed before the State Governments . . . 39 The Revolutionary Government . . . . . . 40 Note on Washington’s Appointment as Commander-in-Chief . . 41 CHAPTER III. 1776-1777. CONTINUANCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVEENMENT.--DEOLAEATION or INDEPENDENCE.——PREPARATIONS FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT.— FORMATION OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMY. Independence proposed . . . . . . 49 Committee to prepare the Declaration . . . . . 50 CONTENTS. m Instructions to the Delegates . . . . . . . 51 Declaration adopted . . . . . . . . . 5! Consequences of its Adoption . . . . . . . 51 The Title “ United States of America” first used . . . 52 Articles of Confederation proposed . . . . . \53 The Revolutionary Congress, the Real Government . . . 54 \ Power of the Congress . . . . . . - . 55 General Washington’s Position . . . . . . . 55 Difliculties which he had to encounter . . . . . . 56 \ Machinery of Government defective . . . . . . 57 Formation of the Army ' . . . . . . . . 58 Remodelling of the Army . . . . . . . ' 59 Difliculties attending it . . . . . . . . 59 Committee appointed to confer with General Washington . . 60 Error of Short Enlistments . . . . . 60 Washington does not concur in their Expediency . . . 60 \ Powers of the National Government . . . . . . '62 Difiiculties attending their Exercise . . . . . . 63 Popular Feeling about the Grievances . ' . . . . 64 Tories . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Ofiicers of the Royal Government in New Hampshire seized . . 66 General Lee’s Offer to seize the Tories of New York . . . 66 He prepares to defend New York . . . . . . . 67 Orders to disarm the Tories in Queen’s County . . . . 68 Orders countermanded . . . . . . . . . 68 Washington’s Regret . . . . . . . . 69 His Directions to Lee . . . . . . . . . 70 Tories of Queen’s County arrested . . . . . . '71 Inhabitants of New York alarmed . . . . . . '71 Congress compelled to submit the Subject to the Colonial Authorities 72 Questions of Prize . . . . . . . . . 73 Origin of the American Navy . . . . . . . ‘73 Vessels fitted out to intercept the Enemy’s Supplies . . . 73 Falmouth burned . . . . . . . . . 74 Letters of Marque and Reprisal . . . . . . . 75 Prizes captured . 1 . . . . . . . . '75 Adjudication of Prizes . . . . . . . . . 76 Delay in obtaining Decisions . . . . . . 77 Means of defraying the Public Expenses . . . . 77 Paper Money issued . . . . . . . . . 78 Delay in Signing the Bills . l . . . . . . . 79 Pressing Wants of the Army . . 79 XX CONTENTS. Washington borrows Money of the Province of Massachusetts Bay ' 80 * Defects of the Revolutionary Government . . . . 80 Jealousy of Standing Armies . . . . . 80 Note on the Authorship of the Declaration of Independence . . 81 I C H A P T E R I V . JULY, 17'76—N0VEMBER, 1777. CONSEQUENCES or THE DECLARATION OF IsnEPENnENca—Rironmm- ZATION OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMY. —-—FLIGHT or THE CoNeREss FROM PHILADELPHIA.-—-PLAN or THE CONFEDERATION PROPOSED. Effect of the Declaration of Independence . . . . . 89 More vigorous and decisive Measures adopted by the Congress . 90 Mischievous Adhesion to State Interests . . . . . 90 History of the Army . . . . . . . . . 91 General Washington abandons the City of New York . . 91 Writes to the President of Congress . . . . . . 91 He retreats to the Heights of Haerlem, and again appeals to Congress 92 The Congress organizes a new Army . . . . . . 92 Number of Battalions raised by each State . . . . 93 Inducements to enlist . . . . . . . . . 93 Serious Defects in the Plan . .' . . . . . 93 Washington suggests a Remedy . . . . . . . 94 Promotion of the Oflicers provided for . . . . . 95 - Another Defect in the Plan . . . . . . . . 95 Massachusetts and Connecticut offer further Pay to their Men . 95 Washington remonstrates . . . . . . . . 96 Congress augments the Pay of the Army . . . . . 96 Ill Effects of the System . . . . . 96 Number of the American Forces near New York . . . 96 Washington’s Discouragement . . . . . . . 97 His Situation and Trials . . . . . . . . 97 His Retreat through New Jersey . . . . . . . 98 Loss of Philadelphia threatened . . . . 99 Washington asks for Extraordinary Powers from the Congress . 100 Powers intrusted to him . . . . . . . . 100 Unsettled Condition of the Political System . . . - 101 The Congress apologizes to the Governors of the States . . 102 Inaccuracy of their Position . . . - 103 The States acquiesce in the Powers granted to Washington . 104 V Articles of Confederation pending in Congress . . . 104 CONTENTS. 0" XXI Eminent Men retire from Congress . . . . . . 104 Delegations of the States renewed . . . . . . 105 Striking Instance of State Jealousy . . . . . . 106 Washington requires an Oath of Allegiance to the United States . 107 The Requisition denounced as improper . . . . . 107 Its Propriety . . . . . . . . . . 108 Formation of a new Army . . . - . . . 110 Embarrassments in the Formation of the Army . . . . 110 Persistence of the States in giving Extra Bounties . . . 110 Bounty offered by Massachusetts . . . . . . . 111 Army greatly reduced .' . . . . . . . 111 Washington hindered in his Efforts to plan and carry out a Cam- paign . . . . . . . . 112 Applications for Troops to defend particular Neighborhoods . . 112 Battle of the Brandywine . . . . . a The Congress leaves Philadelphia . . - . . . 113 Sir William Howe takes Possession of it . . . . 113 The Congress removes to Yorktown . . . . . . I 113 They resolve to consider the Articles of Confederation . . 114 The Plan of a Confederacy submitted to the several Legislatures . 114 Necessity for a National Government . . . . . 114 End of the Revolutionary Government approaching . . . 115 Want of a Civil Executive . . . . . . . 115 States engaged in forming Governments . .' . . . 116 Colonies accustomed to the Business of Government . . . 116 Practice of Representation familiar . . . . . . 117 Previous Political Training of the People . . . . . 118 Distinctions between the Departments of Government . . . 119 Ideas not yet applied to a General Government . . . 120 (Union of the People of the United States, as distinguished from a Union of the States, learned by a bitter Experience . . . 122 First Stage in the Constitutional History of the Country . . 123 C H A P T E R V . NOVEMBER, 1777 - MARCH, 1781. AnoP'rIoN or THE ARTICLES or CONFEDERATION. —-CEssIoNs or Was'r- ERN TERRITORY.-—FIRST POLITICAL UNIoN or THE STATES. Adoption of the Articles of Confederation . . . . I24 Causes which delayed the Adoption of the Confederation . . 125 Changes of the Members of Congress . . . . . 126 xxii CONTENTS. ‘The present Congress compared with that of 1776 . . . 127 Objections made to the Articles of Confederation . . . 128 Propositions for Amendments rejected . . . . . . 129 Objection made by the State of New Jersey . . . . 129 Their Suggestion rejected . . . . . . . . 130 Claims of the Larger States to Vacant Lands . . . . 131 Objection of the Smaller States . . . . . . . 131 Assent of Maryland to the Confederation withheld . . . 133 New York authorizes its Delegates in Congress to limit the West- ern Boundaries of the State . . . . . . 134 Congress urges other States to surrender a Portion of their Claims 134 Generous Example of New Jersey . . . . . . 135 Delaware follows it . . . . . . 135 Maryland adopts the Articles of Confederation . . . . 136 Virginia yields her Claim to some of her Territory . . . 137 Progress of the People of the United States towards a National Character . . . . . . . . . . 139 Security against a Dissolution of the Confederacy . . . 140 C H A P T E R V I . NATURE AND POWERS OF THE CONEEDEEATION. Nature of the Government established by the Confederation . . 142 Provisions in the Confederation for the States as separate Commu- nities . . . . . . . . 143 Form of Government established by it . . . 143 The Confederation a League for Mutual Defence and Protection . 144 Powers of Congress with regard to the External Relations of the Country . . . . . . . . . 144 Powers of Congress with regard to Internal Affairs . . . 145 Committee of the States to sit in the Recess of Congress . . 146 Restrictions imposed upon Congress . . . . . 146 Revenues of the Country . . . . . . . . 147 N 0 Provision for enforcing Measures adopted by Congress . 148 The United States enter upon a New Era of Civil Polity . . 149 The Confederation demonstrates the Necessity for a more perfect Union . . . . . . . . , . . 149 CONTENTS. BOOK II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE ADOPTION OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFED- ERATION, IN 1781, TO THE PEACE OF 1783. CHAPTER I. 1781-1783. ‘ REQUISITIONS.—-CLAIMS OF THE ARMY.—NEWBURGH AnnREssEs.—- PEACE PRocLAmEn—THE ARMY DISBANDED. Congress assembles under the Confederation Treaty of Peace Signed Treaty of Alliance with France . . . . . Delay of the States in complying with the Requisitions of Congress Washington addresses Letters to the States on the Subject of Fi- nance, and completing their Quotas of Troops . Force of the Army . *‘ . . . . . Discontents in the Army . . The Newburgh Addresses . . . . . . . Congress votes an Establishment of Half-Pay for the Oflicers . Impracticable Adherence to the Principles of Civil Liberty Provision for the Ofiicers found to be inadequate . . . . Congress recommends to the States to make Provision for the Ofli- cers and Soldiers . I. . . . . . . Pennsylvania places her Ofiicers upon Half-Pay for Life Congress pass a Resolve giving Half-Pay for Life to the Officers . Disappointment of the Officers . . . . . The Congress of the Confederation refuse to redeem the Pledge of the Revolutionary Congress . . . . . Oflicers offer to commute the Half-Pay for Life . Breach of Public Faith . . . . . Situation of Washington . . . . . . . 0 155 155 156 156 157 rss 158 159 160 161 162 162 163 163 164 164 165 166 167 168 Anonymous Address circulated among the Oflicers at N ewburgh Washington forbids an Assemblage at the Call of an Anonymous Paper . . . , . . . . . . He appoints a Day to hear the Report of their Committee . The Oflicers again refer their Claims to the Consideration of Congress Half-Pay commuted to Five Years’ Full Pay . . . a The Army disbanded . . . . . . . . Value of the Votes which fixed the Compensation of the Officers 168 168 169 170 170 171 xxiv CONTENTS. C HAPTER II. 1781-1783. FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES or THE CONFEDERATION.v-REVOLUTIONARI DEBT.—REVENUE SYSTEM OF 1783. Public Debt of the United States . . . . . . 172 Congress recommend a Duty upon Importations . . . . 173 Oflice of Superintendent of Finance established . . . . 174 Rhode Island refuses to grant to Congress the Power of Levying Duties . . . . . . . . . . 174 'Virginia repéals the Act by which she had granted this Power to Congress . . . . . . No Means of paying the Public Debts . . . . . 175 Another Plan for collecting Revenues recommended to the States 176 175 Strong Appeal to the People in Favor of it . . . . . 177 Claims of the various Classes of the Public Creditors . . 178 Character of the United States involved . . . . . 179 The Confederation a Government for Purposes of War . . ' 181 1, Its Great Defects . . . . . . . . . 181 The Moral Feelings an Unsafe Reliance for the Operations of Gov- ernment . . . . . . . . . . 183 Proofs of this in the History of the Confederation . . . 184 Design of the Framers of the Revenue System . . . . 185 Claims of the Army . . . . . . . . 186 Wisdom of proposing a Scheme of Finance during the Continu- ance of the War . . . . . . . . 186 Influence of the Revenue System of 1783 . . . . . 188 The System of 1783 different from the Present Constitution . 188 Note on the Half-Pay for the Ofiicers of the Revolution . . 190 Note on the Newburgh Addresses . . . . . . 194 ,4» CHAPTER III. 1781-1783. OPINIONS AND EFFORTS OF WASHINGTON, AND OF HAMILTON --DE- CLINE or THE CONFEDERATION. Washington's Relations to the People of this Country . . 200 His Address to them on resigning his Oflice . . . . 201 His Views at the Close of the War . . . . . . 202 Hamilton’s Opinions . . . . . . . . . 203 His Advice and Suggestions . . . 204 The Necessity for a Complete Sovereignty in Congress . . 204 CONTENTS. XXV Hamilton’s Entry into Congress . . . . . 206 Nature of a Federal Constitution not understood . . 206 Hamilton urges the Necessity of vesting the Appointment of Col- lectors of Revenue in the General Government . . . 208 Ratio of Contribution by the States to the Treasury uncertain 210 Hamilton desires to change the Principle of the Confederation . 211 Advises General Taxes to be collected under Continental Authority 212 An Attempt to substitute Specific Taxes on Land and Houses 212 It is determined to adopt Population as the Basis of Contribution 213 Hamilton’s Views on a Peace Establishment 214 Committee to arrange the Details of such a System 215 An Army and Navy necessary . . 216 No Provision in the Articles of Confederation for their Maintenance during Peace . . . . . . . 216 Hamilton advises Federal Provision for Defence 219 Congress driven from Philadelphia . . . . 220 Hamilton examines the Confederation . . . . . 221 . Its Defects . . . . . . . - . . 222, 223 If He proposesoto revise it . . . . . . . . 224 His Plan unsuccessful . . . . . . . . 224 Improvement in the Revenue System . . . . , . 225 Causes of the Decline of a National Spirit . . _ . 226 w ’ Falling off in the Attendance of Members of Congress . 226 <- Results of the Confederation . . . . . . . 228 Its Defects displayed . . . . . . . 229 ‘I, Another Government necessary for the great Duties of Peace 230 BOOK III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE PEACE OF 1783 TO THE FEDERAL CON- VENTION OF 1787. I CHAPTER I. JANUARY, 1784 ~MA'Y, 1787. DUTIES AND N ECESSITIES or CoNen'Ess. -- REQUISITIONS 0»: THE S'mrss. --REvENuE SYSTEM or 1783. State of the Union from 1783 to 1787 . . . . . Dangers and Evils which existed during the Four Years after the War . . . . . . . . . . . 234 vor... 1. d 233 xxvi cONTENTs. A New Congress . . . . . . . . . 235 Washington’s Resignation . . . - . . . 235 Congress urge the Attendance of absent Members . . . . 236 Ratification of the Treaty of Peace . . . . . . 237 Congress perpetually in Session during the War . . . . 238 Number of Delegates from each State . . . . . 238 Low State of the Representation . . . . . . . 239 Duties of the Government . . . . . . . 240 Supplies for the Year 1784 . . . . . . . . 240 How to be obtained . . . . . . . . . 241 Old Requisitions unpaid . . . . . . . . 241 Supplies necessary for the Year 1785 . . . . . 242 Supplies necessary for the Year 1786 . . . . . . 242 Rhode Island and New Jersey propose to pay their Quotas in their own Paper Currency . . , . . . 242 Inadequacy of Requisitions . . . . . . . 243 »— States which had assented to the Revenue System in February, 1786 244 L/ Congress make known the Public Embarrassments . . . 245 Impost granted by all the States except New York . . . 246 Argument used in Support of her Refusal. . . . . 247 L Hamilton’s Answer to it . . . . . . . . 247 Congress recommend to New York to reconsider the Revenue System 247 The Governor refuses to summon the Legislature . . . 247 Failure of the Revenue System . . . . . . . 248 CHAPTER II. 1784-1787. INFRACTIONS OF THE TREATY or PEAOE. Provisions of the Treaty of Peace . . . . . . 249 Departure of the British Troops from the Atlantic Coast . . 249 Western Posts retained . . . . . . . . I 249 Interests of British Subjects . . . . . . . 250 Confiscated Property . . . . . . . . . 250 Power of Confiscation belonging to the United States . . 252 Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . 252 State Laws prohibiting the Recovery of British Debts . . 253 Articles of the Treaty infringed by New York . . . 254, 255 Powers of the Government inadequate . . . . . 255 s‘. Treaty of Peace . . . . . . . . . 256 Violations of its Articles . . . . . . . . 257 CONTENT S. XXVI] O‘ Congress recommend to the States to repeal all Acts repugnant to the Treaty . . . . . . . . . 258 The two Countries remain in the same Position . . . . 259 CHAPTER III. 1786-1787. No SEcuRrrr AFFORDED BY THE CONFEDERATION To THE STATE GovERNMENTs—Srurs’s REBELLION m MASSACHUSETTS, AND ITS KINDRED DISTURBANCES. Defence against External Assaults, the Object of the Confederation 260 Construction of the State Constitutions . . . . . 261 Fundamental Doctrine of the American Constitutions . . 262 Commencement of Discontents in Massachusetts . . 263 The Confederation without Power to act upon the Internal Condi- tion of a State . . . . . . . . 264, 265 " State Governments exposed to the angers of Anarchy . . i 265 Insurrection in Massachusetts . . . . . . . 266 Debt of that State at the Close of the War . . . . 266 , Decrease of Exports and Fisheries . . . . . . 267 General Condition of the State . . . . . 267, 268 Private Debts . . . ; . . . . . . 268 The Tender Act . . . . . l. . . . 268 Effects of this Law . . . . . . . . . 269 ’ Shays’s Rebellion . . . . . . . . . 269 Firmness of Governor Bowdoin . ; . . . . . 270 Insurrection suppressed . . . . . . . . 270 Congress unable to interpose . . . . . . . 271 Hostile Disposition of the Western Indians . . . . 271 Troops to be raised by the New England States . . . . 272 Extent of the Disafi'ection in New England . . . . 273 Beneficial Efi‘ect of these Disturbances . . . . . 273 The Union necessary to the Preservation of Order . . . 274 Washington ’s Anxieties . . . . . . . . 274 C H A P T E R 1 V . ORIGIN AND N Ecassr'rr or THE PowER To REGULATE Comdsaca. Inability of the Confederation to manage Foreign‘ Commerce . 276 {A t Essential that a should be managed by the United States . . 277 Views of the Revolutionary statesmen . . . . 277, 278 Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries 279 xxviii coNTENTs. Negotiation of the Treaty with the Netherlands . l. . . 280 Duties and Imposts . . . . 4. . . . . 281 Congress without Power to enforce Treaty Stipulations upon the States . . . . . . . . - . . 282 Relations of the United States with Great Britain . . . . 282 Measure of Mr. Pitt . . . . . . ' . . 282 Change of the English Administration . . . . . . 283 Mr. Pitt’s Bill . . . . . . . 283 Views of the New English Administration . . . . 283, 284 American Trade excluded from the British West Indies _ . . 284 The three great Branches of American Commerce . . . 285 Congress apply to the States for further Powers . . . 286 Action of the States thereupon . . . . . . . 286 Success of Treaties dependent on the Grant of further Powers . 287 Incongruities in the Grants of the several States . . . . 288 Failure of the Attempt to negotiate ‘Commercial Treaties . . 289 Discordant Legislation of the States . . . . . . 290 CHAPTE R V. 1783-1787. THE Punmc LANDS.-—GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWESTERN TERRI- ToRY.-—.-THREATENED Loss OF THE WESTERN SETTLEMENTS. Relations of Congress to the Public Lands . . . . . 291 Efforts to procure Cessions from the States . . . . 292 Cession by New York . . . . . . . . 293 Disposal of the Territories . . . . . . 293 Power of Congress to acquire and hold Lands . - . . . 293 Its Constitutional Authority to deal with acquired Territory . 294 Cession of Northwestern Territory by Virginia . . . . 295 States to be formed from this Territory 296 Congress pass a Resolve for the Regulation of ceded Territory . 296' Principles, on which the Government of New States should be es- tablished . . . . . . . . . . 297 Provision for admitting New States into the Union . . . 298 Compact between the Old and New States . . . . . 299 The Public Lands the true Resources for the Payment of the Public Debt I ' . . . . . . 299 Slavery to be excluded from the New States . . . 299 Cession by Massachusetts and Connecticut of a Portion of their Ter- ritorial Claims . . . . . . . . 299, 300 Modification by Virginia of her Act of Cession . . . . 300 ' CONTENTS. XXIX , The States dividedwith Regard to the Mississippi . . 314, 315 i Cession of Lands by South Carolina . . . . 301 N 0 other Lands ceded to the United States before 1787 . . 301 Ordinance for the Government of the Northwestern Territory enacted 302 Its Provisions concerning Property . . . . . . 302 Civil Government of the Territory . . . . . . 303 Laws to be adopted . . . . . . . . . 303 Appointment of Civil Oflicers . . . . . . 304 Counties and Townships to be formed . . . . .. 304 Representation in the Legislature provided for . . 304 Articles of Compact between the Original States and the People and States in the Territory . . . . . . . 305, 306 Wisdom of this Scheme of Government . . . . 306, 307 Political Difliculties in the Management of this Territory . . 308 Threatened Loss of the Western Settlements . . . 309, 310 Washington’s Plan of uniting the Eastern and Western States . 310 He considers the Opening of the Mississippi not important . 311 The Southern Boundary of the United States, by the Treaty of Peace . . . . . . . . . . 312 Secret Article in that Treaty . . . . 1312 Spain refuses to concede the Navigation of the Mississippi. 7 . 313 Arrival of Guardoqui as Minister from Spain . . . . 313 The United States insist on the Right to navigate the Mississippi 314 The Right refused, but a Commercial Treaty tendered . . -. 314 Importance of this Treaty 314 Mr. Jay proposes a Middle Course . . . . . . 315 Treaty to be limited to Twenty-five Years . . . . . 316 Use of the River to be suspended for the same Period . . 316 Change in Mr. Jay’s Instructions . . . . . . . 317 I Seizure of American Property at Natchez . . . . 318 Inhabitants of the Western Settlements alarmed . . . . 318 Richness of their Territory . . . . . . . 319 Their Complaints of Congress . . . . . . . 320 Their Resolves . . . . . . . 321 - Retaliatory Seizure of Spanish Property . . . . . 322 The Executive of Virginia disavows the Act . . . . 322 Guardoqui adheres to his Position . . . . . 323 Committees of Correspondence formed in the West . . . v .323 The Inhabitants of Kentucky in Motion . a . u . . . 323 Remonstrances of Virginia on the Subject of shutting up the Mis- _ sissippi . . . . . . . 323 Their Delegates intercede with ‘the Spanish Minister 7 . ._ 3'24 XXX CONTENTS. Their Efforts ineffectual . . . . . . . . 324 The Vote of Seven States attacked in Congress . . . 325 Unconstitutionality of that Vote . . . . . . 325, 326 It is not rescinded . . . . . . . . . 326 Critical Position of the Country . . \ . . . . . 326 The Subject of the Mississippi postponed to await the Action of the Federal Convention . . . . . . . 326, 327 CHAPTER V1. 1783-1787. " DEcAY AND FAILURE OF THE CONFEDEEATION. -— PROGRESS OF OPINION. —STEPS wHIcH LED To THE CONVENTION or 1787.—INFLUENcE AND EXERTIONS 0F HAMILToN.-- MEETING OF THE CONVENTION. The Federal Power under the Confederation unequal to the Dis- charge of its Duties . . . . . . . . 328 The Confederation destitute of Political Sovereignty . . . ‘ 329 Capacities of the Country . . . . . . . 330 Diificulties in the Formation of a Federal Constitution . . 331 Progress of Opinion upon the Subject of a General Government 332, 333 Important Centres of Opinion . . . . . . . 334 Action of Massachusetts . . . . . . . . 334 Distress pervading the Commercial Classes . . . 334, 335 Governor Bowdoin’s Message . . . . . . . 336 The Legislature recommend a General Convention . . 336, 337 ‘Their Delegates in Congress refuse to present the Resolves . . 337 Congress desire only a Temporary Power over Commerce . . 337 Jealousy in Congress of the Changes likely to be made in the Gov- ernment . . . . . . . . . . 338 The Legislature of Massachusetts rescind their Resolutions . . 339 Condition of Congress in 1785 . . . . . . . 339 Action of Virginia . . . . . . . . . 340 Proposed Enlargement of the Powers of Congress over Trade . 340 Difl‘iculties between the Citizens of Virginia and Maryland . . 341 Meeting at Alexandria . . . . . . 341 Report of the Commissioners of Virginia and Maryland to their Governments . . . . . . . . * . 342 Virginia invites a Meeting of Commissioners from all the States at Annapolis . , . . . . . . . . . 343 Action of New York . . . 343 Final Appeal by Congress for the Establishment of the Revenue System of 1783 . . . . . . . 344 CONTENTS. nurxi Exertions of Hamilton . . . . . . The Revenue System agaf‘r rejected by the New York Legislature Commissioners appointed by New York to attend the Commercial Convention . . . . . Course of New York upon the Revenue System Five States only represented at Annapolis . Hamilton’s Original Plan, and its Modification . .* His Report . . . . . . . He desires an entirely New System of Government Caution in his Proposal His extensive Views . . . . - . . Reception of the Recommendation of the Annapolis Commissioners in Virginia . . . . Objections to it in Congres . . . . Report of the Commissioners taken into Consideration Opinions of different Members upon the Subject Legal Difliculties in the Way of a Convention . Views entertained in Congress Critical State of the Country . It impels Congress to Action . . . Influence of the Course of New York upon Congress Their Delegation instructed to move a Convention Failure of this Proposition . . . . . . Adoption of a Resolve proposed by the Massachusetts Members for the same Purpose . . . . . Mode of Amendment recommended by Congress . Importance of this Action of Congress Dangers of Inaction . . - . . . Importance of the Sanction of the Old Government, in the Formation of a new one . ' Hamilton’s Wisdom . . . . . . Reason for not intrusting the Revision of the System of Government \ to Congress . . . . . . 365, Powers of the Convention not defined by Congress Nature of the Crisis . . . . . . . . Danger of an Attempt to establish Monarchical Government . Washington ’s Opinions . . . . 370, Other Difliculties attending the Revision of the Federal System Sectional Jealousy and its Causes . . . 347, 352 - 357. 358, 371, 372, New Idea of a Union . . . . . Prevailing Feeling among Statesmen concerning the Convention Hamilton fully equal to the Demands of the Crisis . . 373, 345 346 346 346 347 34s 343 349 350 350 351 355 355 355_ 356 357 358 358 359 360 360 361 362 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 371 371 372 373 373 374 Xxxii CONTENTS. Assembling of the Convention . . . . . . . 374 Novelty of their Undertaking . . . p . . . 374, 375 State of Political Science in Modern Europe . . . . 375 The Results of English Liberty . . . . . 376, 377 . French Discussions . . . . . . . . 377, 378 The English Constitution an imperfect Guide . . . ~ . 378 Nature of the Problem . . . . . . . . 379 CHAPTER v11. THE FRAMERS or THE CONSTITUTION.-—-WASHINGTON, PnEstnENT or THE CoNvENTIoN. Embarrassments attending the Assembling of the Convention . 380 Discipline to which the American People had been subjected 381, 382 The Constitution the Result of Circumstances . . . 382 Consequences of a Want of Power in the First Government . 383 Its Incapacity . . . . . . . . . . 384 Sufl’erings of the People . . . . . . . . 384 Civil Liberty the Result of Trial and Suffering . . . 385, 386 Qualities of the Framers of the Constitution . . . 386, 387 Hamilton . . . . . . . . . . . 387 Washington . . . . . . . . . . 388 Madison . . . . . . . . . . . 388 Franklin . . . . . . . . . . 388 Gouverneur Morris . . . . . . . . . 388 Their Characters formed during the Revolution . . 388, 389 Diversities of Opinion in such an Assembly . . . . . 389 Patriotism of its Members . . . . . . . 390 A Republican System their great Object . . - . . 390 Slight Value of the Examples of "other Countries . . . 391 Necessity for a National Head . . . . 392 The New Government established without Violence . . . 393 Washington at Mount Vernon . . . . 393, 394 His Opinions upon the Powers of the Federal Government 394 —396 His F cars as to the Result of a Convention . . . . 396, 397 The Legislature of Virginia desire to place him at the Head of their Delegation . . . . . . . . . . 397 Refuses informally . . . . . . . . . 398 Declines a Re-election as President of the Society of the Cincinnati 398 Receives Ofi'icial Notice of his Appointment to the Convention . . 399 Declines the Appointment . . . . . . . . 399 The Insurrection in Massachusetts changes his Determination 399, 400 coN'rENTs. xxxm He leaves Mount Vernon for Philadelphia . . . . . 401 Is elected President of the Convention . . . . . 401 His great Object, to secure a Republican Government . . . 402 The Idea of a Monarchical Government entertained to some Extent 402 Coercive Power necessary in the General Government . . . 403 Washington’s Character as a Statesman . . . . . 404 His Fitness for the Chair of the Convention . . . . . 405 CHAPTER VIII. HAMILTON. Causes why Hamilton is less known at the present Day, than other Statesmen of the Revolution . . . . . . . 406 Immediate Effect of his Death upon the Count . . . 407 His Birth and Education . . . . . . . . 408 Very early Entrance upon Political Life . . . . . 408 His Essays on the Rights of the Colonies . . . . . 408 Appointed Aide-de-Camp to Washington . . . . . 409 Elected to Congress from New York . . . . .— . 409 A Member of the Legislature . . . . . . . 409 Delegate to the Federal Convention . . . . . . 409 One of the Authors of the Federalist . . . . . 409 Elected to the State Convention . . . . . . . 409 Secretary of the Treasury . . . . . . . 409 Retirement . . . ()0 . . . . . . . 409 Command of the Provisional Army . . . . . . 409 Practice of the Law . . . . . . . . . 409 Death . . . . . . . . . . 409, 410 Character . . . . . . . . . . 410-419 CHAPTER IX. MADISON. His Birth and Education . . . . . . . . 420 Entrance into Congress . . . . . . 421 His Influence in inducing Virginia to yield the Northwest Territory 422 Other important Services in the Congress of the Confederation 422, 423 Retires to Virginia 3 . . . . . . . . 423 Efforts for the Enlargement of Commercial Powers . . 423, 424 His Connection with the Events which led to the Convention 424 - 427 Appointed one of the Commissioners to Annapolis . . . 427 von. 1. e xxxiv cONTENTs. Drafts the Act of Virginia appointing Delegates to the Federal Con- vention . . . . . A 427 His Labors in the Convention . . ' . . 427, 428 Records the Debates . . . . . . . 428 His Character . . . 428 - 431 C H A P T E R X . FRANKLIN. His long Career of Public Service . . 433, 434 His distinguished Residences abroad . b . ‘ . 434, 435 Importance and Influence of his Presence in the Convention . 435 -437 His Objections to the Constitution . . . . 437 Sacrifices them to the Public Good . 437 His Efforts to produce Unanimity 437, 438 C H A P T E R X I . GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. Birth and Education . . . . . . 440 Views on the Independence of America . . 441 Services in Congress . 442 Appointed Assistant Financier . . . 443 Elected to the Federal Convention . . . . . 444 His Character 444 — 447 CHAPTER XII. KING. Birth and Education . . . . . . I . 448 Elected to Congress \ '. . . . , . 448 His Opinions on the Subject of a Federal Convention 449 His Views of the Insurrection in Massachusetts . 450 Disappointment concerning the Powers of the‘ Confederation . 450 Change of Opinion . . . . . 450, 451 View of the true Principle for the new Government 451 Introduces the Prohibition against Laws affecting the Obligation of Contracts ' . . . . ~. . His Character ' . . . . . . 452 453 CONTENTS. my CHAPTER XIII, CHARLES Cornswon'rn PINCKNEY Descent and Education . . . . . . . . 454 Military Career . . . . . . . . 454 Appointed to the Federal Convention . . . . . . His Course on the Slave-Trade, and the Regulation of Commerce 456 Vindication of the Framers of the Constitution . . . 456 - 460 Note on the Abolition of the Slave-Trade . . . ' . 460 CHAPTER XIV. WILSON. Birth and Education . . . . . . . . . 462 Emigration to America . . . . . 462 Services in Congress . . . . . . . . 462, 463 His Opinions in the Convention . . . . . 463, 464 Exertions for a Representative Government . . . “t . 464 Appointed Judge of the Supreme Court of the United Stateeg . 465 _ His Speech on the Constitution in the Pennsylvania Convention 465 —479 CHAPTER XV. RANDOLPH. An Aide-de-camp to Washington . . . . . . 480 Services in Congress . . . . . . . . 480 Elected Governor of Virginia . . . . . . . 481 Procures the Attendance of Washingto . . . . . 481 His Opinions on the Constitution, and the existing Crisis . 481— 485 Genealogy . . . . . . . . . . 485 CHAPTER XVI. CoNeLUsIoN OF THE PRESENT VOLUME. The Other Members of the Convention . . . . 486, 487 Responsible Position of the American People . 487, 488 xxxvi ‘ coNTENTs APPENDIX. Circular Letter of Congress recommending the Articles of Con- federation . . . . . . . . . . 491 Representation of New Jersey on the Articles of Confederation 493 Act of New Jersey accepting the Confederation . . . . 497 Resolutions passed by the Council of Delaware respecting the Arti- .cles of Confederation . . . . . . . . 498 Act to authorize the Delegates of the Delaware State to ratify the Articles of Confederation . . . . . . . 500 Instructions of the General Assembly of Maryland to their Dele- gates, respecting the Articles of Confederation . . 501 Act of the Legislature of New York, to facilitate the Completion of the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union among the United States of America . . . . . . 505 Report of the Committee of Congress as to the Proceedings of the Legislatures of Maryland, New York, and Virginia in Relation to the Articles of Confederation . . . . 506 Act to empower the Delegates of Maryland to ratify the Articles 0 " , Confederation . . 508 Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the States 509 Members of the Convention which formed the Constitution . . 516 BOOK I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE COMMENCEMENT on THE REVOLUTION To THE ADOPTION OF THE ARTI CLES or CONFEDERATION. ' VOL. 1. 1 CHAPTERI. 1774-1775. ORGANIZATION or THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESSu—ORIGIN on THE UNION. THE thirteen British colonies in North America, by Whose inhabitants the American Revolution Was achieved, Were, at the commencement of that strug- gle, so many separate communities, having, to a con- siderable exteiiwt,~ dili'ielrent political organizations and difi'erent municipal laws: but their various popula- tions spoke almost universally the English language, These colonies were!‘ Virginia, Massachusetts, 1 New Hampshire, "Connecticut, L‘{Rhode Island, Maryland, FNevv York,“ New Jersey, ‘QPennsylvania, 7 Delaware, i'North CarOIinaQ‘South Carolina, and‘it Georgia. From the times when they were respectively settled, until the union, formed under the necessities of a common cause at the breaking out of the Revolution, they had no political connection; but each possessed a domestic government peculiar to itself, derived di- rectly from the crown of England, and more or less under the direct control of the mother country. The political organizations of the colonies have been classed by jurists and historians under the 4 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [Boon 1. three heads of Provincial, Proprietary, and Charter governments. To the class of Provincial governments belonged the Provinces of New Hampshire, New Jersey, Virginia, the two Carolinas, and Georgia. These had no other written constitutions, or fundamental laws, than the commissions issued to the Governors appointed by the crown, explained by the instruc- tions which accompanied them. The Governor, by his commission, was made the representative or deputy of the King, and was obliged to act in conformity with the royal instructions. He was assisted by a Council, the members of which, besides participating with him, to a certain extent, in the executive functions of the government, constituted the upper house of the provincial legislature; and he was also authorized to summon a general -as- sembly of representatives of the freeholders of the Province. The three branches thus convened, con- sisting of the Governor, the Council, and the Repre- sentatives, constituted the provincial Assemblies, hav- ing the power of local legislation, subject to the rati- fication and disapproval of the crown. The direct ’ control of the crown over these provincial govern- ments may also be traced in the ,features, common to them all, by which the Governor had power to suspend the members of the Council from office, and, whenever vacancies occurred, to appoint to those vacancies, until the pleastue of the crown should be known; to negative all the proceedings of the assem- bly; and to prorogue or dissolve it at his pleasure. CH. 1.] FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. 5 The Proprietary governments, consisting of Mary- land, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, “were those in which the subordinate powers of legislation and gov- ernment had been granted to certain individuals called the proprietaries, who appointed the Governor and authorized him to summon legislative assemblies. The authority of the proprietaries, or of the legis- lative bodies assembled by the Governor, was re- strained by the condition, that the ends for which the grant was made to them by the crown\ should be substantially pursued in their legislation, and that nothing should be done, or‘ attempted, which might derogate from the sovereignty of the mother country. In Maryland, the laws enacted by the proprietary government were not subject to the direct control of the crown; but in Pennsylvania and Delaware they were.1 The Charter governments, consisting, at the period of the Revolution, of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, may be said, in a stricter sense, to have {possessed written constitutions for their general political government. The charters, granted by the crown, established an organization of the different departments of gOvern/ment similar to that in the provincial governments. In Massachusetts, after the charter of and Mary granted in 1691, the Governor was appointed by the crown; the Council were chosen annually by the General Assembly, and the House of Representatives by the people. In 1 1 Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution, O 160. ' 6 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK 1. Connecticut and Rhode Island, the Governor, Coun- cil, and Representatives were chosen annually by the freemen of the colony. In the charter, as well as the provincial governments, the general power of legislation was restrained by the condition, that the laws enacted should be, as nearly as possible, agree- able to the laws and statutes of England. One of the principal causes which precipitated the war of the Revolution was the blow struck by Parliament at these charter governments, commen- cing with that of Massachusetts, by an act intended to alter the constitution of that Province as it stood upon the charter of William and Mary; a precedent which ustly alarmed the entire continent, and in its principle affected all the colonies, since it assumed that none of them possessed constitutional rights which could not be altered or taken away by an act of Parliament. The “ Act for the better regulating the government of the Province of Massachusetts Bay,” passed in 17 7 4, was designed to create an executive power of a totally different character from that created by the charter, and also to remodel the judiciary, in order that the laws of the imperial gov- ernment might be more certainly enforced. The charter had reserved to the King the appoint- ment of the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, and Secretary of the Province. It vested in the General Assembly the choice of twenty-eight councillors, subject to rejection by the Governor; it gave to the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Coun- cil, the appointment of all military and udicial CH. 1.] FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. '7 officers, and to the two houses of the legislature the appointment of all other civil oflicers, with a right of negative by the Governor. The new law vested the appointment of councillors, udges, and magis- trates of all kinds, in the crown, and in some cases in the Governor, and made them all removable at the pleasure of the crown. A change so radical as this, in the constitution of a people long accustomed to regard their charter as a compact between them- selves and the crown, could not but lead to the most serious consequences. " The statements which have now been made are sufiicient to remind the reader of the important fact, that, at the commencement of the Revolution, there existed, and had long existed, in all’ the colonies, local legislatures, one branch of which was composed of representatives chosen directly by the people, accustomed to the transaction of public business, and being in fact the real organs of the popular will. These bodies, by virtue of their relation to the people, were, in many instances, the bodies which took the initiatory steps for the organiza- tion of the first national or Continental Congress, when it became necessary for the colonies to unite in the common purpose of resistance to the mother country. But it should be again stated, before we attend to the steps thus taken, that the colonies had no direct political connection with each other before . the Revolution commenced, but that each was a dis- tinct community, with its own separate political or- 8 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK 1. ganization, and without any power of legislation for any but its own inhabitants ; that, as political com- munities, and upon the principles of their organiza- tions, they possessed no power of forming any union among themselves, for any purpose what- ever, without the sanction of the Crown or Parlia- ment of England.1 But the free and independent power of forming a union among themselves, for objects and purposes common to them all, which was denied to their colonial condition by the princi- ples of the English Constitution, was one of the chief powers asserted and developed by the Revolu- tidn; and they were enabled to effect this union, as a revolutionary right and measure, by the fortu- 1 That a union of the. colonies into one general government, for any purpose, could not take place without the sanction of Parliament, was always assumed in both coun- tries. The sole instance in which a plan of union was publicly pro- posed and acted upon, before the Revolution, was in 1753-4, when the Board of Trade sent instruc- tions to the Governor of New York to make a treaty with the Six Nations of Indians; and the other colonies were also instructed to send commissioners to be present at the meeting, so that all the provinces might be comprised in one general treaty, to be made in the King’s name. It was also rec- ommended by the home govern- ment, that the commissioners at this meeting should form a plan of union among the colonies for their mutual protection and defence against the French. Twenty-five commissioners assembled at Al- bany in May, 1754,.from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. In this body, a plan of union was di- gested and adopted, which was chiefly the work of Dr. Franklin. It was agreed that an act of Par- liament was necessary to authorize it to be carried into effect. It was rejected by all the colonial Assem- blies before which it was brought, and in England it was not thought proper by the Board of Trade to recommend it to the King. In America it was considered to have too mpch of prerogative in it, and in England to be too democratic. It CH. 1.] FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. 9 nate circumstances of their origin, which made the people of the different colonies, in several important \\\~ senses, one people. They were, in the first place, chiefly the descendants of Englishmen, governed by the laws, inheriting the blood, and speaking the language of the people of England. As British sub- jects, they had enjoyed the right of dwelling in any of the colonies, without restraint, and of carrying on trade from one colony to another, under the regula- tion of the general laws of the empire, without re- striction by colonial legislation. They had, more- over, common grievances to be redressed, and a com mon independence to establish, if redress could not be obtained: for although the precise grounds of dis- pute with the Crown or the Parliament of England was a comprehensive scheme of government, to consist of a Gov- ernor-General, or President-Gen- eral, who was to be appointed and supported by the crown, and a Grand Council, which was to con- sist of one member chosen by each of the smaller colonies, and two or more by each of the larger. Its duties and powers related chiefly to defence against external attacks. It was to have a general treasury, to be supplied by an excise on cer- tain articles of c’onsumption. See the history and details of the scheme, in Sparks’s Life and Works of Franklin, I. 176, III. 22—55; Hutchinson’s History of Massachusetts, III. 23; Trumbull’s History of Connecticut, II. 355; Pitkin’s History of the United vor. 1. ‘2 States, I. 140— 146. In 1788, Franklin said of it: “The different and contradictory reasons of dislike to my plan make me suspect that it was really the true medium; and I am still of opinion it would have been happy for both sides, if it had been adopted. The colonies so united would have been sufiiciently strong to have defended themselves : there would have been no need of troops from England: of course the subsequent pretext for taxing America, and the bloody contest it occasioned, would have been avoided. But such mistakes are not new: history is full of the errors of states and princes.” (Life, by Sparks, 1. 178.) We may not join in his regrets now. 10 THE FEDERAL cONsTITUTIoN. [BOOK I had not always been the same in all the colonies, yet when the Revolution actually broke out, they all stood in the same attitude of resistance to the same j oppressor, making common cause with each other, ‘ and resting upon certain great principles of liberty, which had been violated with regard to many of them, and with the further violation of which all were threatened. ' It was while the controversies between the mother country and the colonies were drawing towards a crisis, that Dr. Franklin, then in England as the political agent of Pennsylvania, of Massachusetts, and of Georgia, in an oflicial letter to the Massa- chusetts Assembly, dated July 7th, 177 3, recom- mended the assembling of a general congress of all the colonies. “ As the strength of an empire,” said he, “ depends not only on the union of its parts, ' but on their readiness for united exertion of their common force; and as the discussion of rights may seem unseasonable in the commencement of actual war, and the delay it might occasion be prejudicial to the common welfare; as likewise the refusal of one or a few colonies would not be so much re- garded, if the others granted liberally, which per- haps by various artifices and motives they might be prevailed on to do; and as this want of concert would defeat the expectation of general redress, that might otherwise be justly formed; perhaps it would be best and fairest for the colonies, in a general congress now in peace to be assembled, or by means CG. 1.] FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. of the correspondence lately proposed, after a full and solemn assertion and declaration of their rights, to engage firmly with each other, that they will never grant aids to the crown in any general war, till those rights are recognized by the King and both houses of Parliament; communicating at the same time to the crown this their resolution. Such a step I imagine will bring the dispute to a crisis.” 1 The first actual step towards this measure was taken in Virginia. A new House of Burgesses had been summoned by the royal Governor to meet in May, I774. Soon after the members had assembled at Williamsburg, they received the news that, by an act of Parliament, the port of Boston was to be closed on the first day of the succeeding June, and that other disabilities were to be inflicted on the town. They immediately passed an order, setting apart the first day of June as a day of fasting, humiliation, and prayer, “ to implore the Divine interposition for averting the heavy calamity which threatened destruction to their 1 It is not certain by whom the of Burgesses. But Mr. Sparks first suggestion of a Continental Congress was made. Thomas Cushing, Speaker of the Massa- chusetts Assembly, and a corre- spondent of Dr. Franklin, appears to have expressed to him the opin- ion, previously to the date of Franklin’s oflicial letter quoted in the text, that a congress would grow out of the committees of cor- respondence which had been rec- ommended by the Virginia House thinks that no other direct and pub- lic recommendation of the meas- ure can be found before the date of Franklin’s letter to the Mas- sachusetts Assembly. Sparks’a Life of Franklin, I. 350, note. In the early part of the year 1774, the necessity of such a congress began to be popularly felt throughout all the colonies. Sparks’s Washing- ton, II. 326 12 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK I. civil rights, and the evils of civil war, and to give them one heart and one mind firmly to oppose, by all just and proper means, every injury to Amer ican rights.” Thereupon, the Governor dissolved the House. But the members immediately assem- bled at another place of meeting, and, having organ- ized themselves as a committee, drew up and sub- scribed an Association, in which they declared that the interests of all the colonies were equally con- cerned in the late doings of Parliament, and advised the local Committee of Correspondence to consult with the committees of the other colonies on the expediency of holding a general Continental Con- " gress. Pursuant to these recommendations, a popu- lar convention was hplden at Williamsburg, on the 1st of August, which appointed seven persons as delegates to represent the people of Virginia in a general Congress to be held at Philadelphia in the September following.1 The Massachusetts Assembly met on the last of May, and, after negativing thirteen of the Council- lors, Governor Gage adjourned the Assembly to meet at Salem on the 7th of June. When they/ "came together at that place, the House of Representatives passed a resolve, declaring a meeting of committees from the several colonies on the continent to be highly expedient and necessary, to deliberate and determine upon proper measures to be recommended ‘ Randolph, Richard Henry Lee, ry, Richard Bland, Benjamin Har- rison, and Edmund/Bendleton. George Washington, Patrick Hen- Y)” 1 These delegates were Peyton on. 1.1 FIRsT CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. 13 to all the colonies for the recovery and establishment of their ust rights and liberties, civil and religious, and for the restoration of union and harmony with Great Britain. They then appointed five delegates 1 to meet the representatives of the other colonies in congress at Philadelphia, in the succeeding Sep- tember. These examples were at once followed by the other colonies. In some of them, the delegates to the Con- tinental Congress were appointed by the popular branch of the legislature, acting for and in behalf of the people; in others, they were appointed by conventions of the people called for the express pur- pose, or by committees duly authorized to make the appointment.2 The Congress, styling themselves “ the delegates appointed by the good people of these colonies,” assembled at Philadelphia on the 5th of September, 1774, and organized themselves as a deliberative body by the choice of oflicers and the adoption of rules of proceeding. Peyton Ran- 1 Thomas Cushing, Spamdel Ad- ams, Robert Treat Paine, James Bowdoin, and John Adams. 2 The delegates in the Congress of; {1,17 74 from New Hampshire were appointed by a Convention of Dep- hties chosen by the towns, and re- ceived their credentials from that Convention. In Rhode Island, they were appointed by the General As- sembly, and commissioned by the ' Governor. 'In Connecticut, they were appointed and instructed by the Committee of Correspondence for the Colony, acting under au- thority conferred by the House of Representatives. In New York, the mode of appointment was vari~ one. In the city and county of New York, the delegates were elected by popular vote taken in seven wards. The same persons were also appointed to act for the counties of West Chester, Albany, and Duchess, by the respective committees of those counties; and another person was appointed in the same manner for the county of 14 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION [BOOK I. dolph of Virginia was elected President, and Charles Thompson of Pennsylvania Secretary of the Congress. N o precedent existed for the mode of action to be adopted by this assembly. There was, therefore, at the outset, no established principle which might determine the nature of the union; but that union was to be shaped by the new circumstances and relations in which the Congress found itself placed. There had been no general concert among the dif- ferent colonies as to the numbers of delegates, or, as they were called in many of the proceedings, “ com- mittees” of the colonies, to be sent to the meeting at Philadelphia. On the first day of their assembling, Pennsylvania and Virginia had each six delegates in attendance; New York had five; Massachusetts, New Jersey, and South Carolina had four each; Connecticut had three; New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Delaware, and Maryland had two each. The delegates from North Carolina did not arrive until the 14th.1 Sufi‘olk. The New York dele- gates received no other instruc- tions than those implied in the certificates, “ to attend the Con- gress and to represent” the county designated. In New Jersey, the delegates were appointed by the committees of counties, and were simply instructed “to represent” the Colony. In Pennsylvania, they were appointed and instructed by the House of Assembly. In the countIes of New Castle, Kent, and Sussex on Delaware, delegates were Elected by a convention of the freemen assembled in pursu- ance of circular letters from the Speaker of the House of Assem- bly. In Maryland, the appoint- ment was by committees of the counties. In ‘Virginia, it was by a popular convention of the whole Colony. In South Carolina, it was by the House of Commons. Geor- gia was not represented in this Congress. 1 Journals, I. 1. 12 CH. 1.] FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. As soon as the choice of ofiicers had taken place,1 the method of voting presented itself as the first thing to be determined; and the difficulties arising from the inequalities between the colonies in respect to actual representation, population, and wealth, had to be encountered upon the threshold. Insuperable obstacles stood in the way of the adoption of inter- ests as the basis of votes. The weight of a colony could not be ascertained by the numbers of its inhab- itants, the amount of their wealth, the extent of their trade, or by any ratio to be compounded of all these elements, for no authentic evidence existed from which data could be taken.2 As .it was appar- ent, however, that some colonies had a larger pro- portion of members present than others, relatively to their size and importance, it was thought to be equally objectionable to adopt the method of voting by polls. In these circumstances, the opinion was advanced, that the colonial governments were at an end; that all America was thrown into one mass, and was in a state of nature; and consequently, that the people ought to be considered as represented in the Congress according to their numbers, by the dele- gations actually present.3 Upon this principle, the voting should have been by polls, But neither the circumstances under which they were assembled, nor the dispositions of the members, 1 The President and Secretary 3 This opinion, we are told by appear to have been chosen viva Mr. Adams, was advanced by Pat- vace, or by a hand vote. John rick Henry. See notes of the de Adams’s Works, II. 365. hate, in Adams, II. 366, 368 2 Adams, II. 366. ' 16 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [Boon I. permitted an adoption of the theory that all gov- ernment was at an end, or that the boundaries of the colonies were effaced. The Congress had not assem- bled as the representatives of a people in a state of nature, but as the committees of different colonies, which had not yet severed themselves from the parent state. They had been clothed with no legislative or coercive authority, even of a revolutionary nature; compliance with their resolves would follow only on conviction of the utility of their measures; and all their resolves and all their measures were, by the express terms of many of their credentials, limited to the restoration of union and harmony with Great Britain, which would of course leave the colonies in their colonial state. The people of the continent, therefore, as a people in the state of nature, or even in a national existence as one people standing in a revolutionary attitude, had not then come into being. The nature of the questions, too, which they were to discuss, and of the measures which they were to adopt, were to be considered in determining by what method of voting those questions and meas- ures should be decided. The Congress had been called to secure the rights of the colonies. What were those rights’! By what standard were they to be ascertained? By- the law of nature; or by the principles of the English Constitution, or by the charters and fundamental laws of the colonies, re- garded as compacts between the crown and the peo- ple, or by all of these combined’! If the law of nature alone was to determine their rights, then all CH. 1.] FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. allegiance to the British crown was to be regarded as at an end. If the principles of the English Con- stitution, or the charters, were to be the standard, the law of nature must be excluded from considera- tion. This exclusion would of necessity narrow the ground, and deprive them of a resource to which Parliament might at last compel them to look.1 In order, therefore, to leave the whole field open for consideration,‘ and at the same time to avoid com- mitting themselves to principles irreconcilable with the preservation of allegiance and their colonial rela- tion to Great Britain, it was necessary to consider themselves as an assembly of committees from the different colonies, in which each colony should have one voice, through the delegates whom it had sent to represent and act for it. But, as if foreseeing the time when population would become of necessity the basis of congressional power, when the authority of Parliament should have given place to a system of American continental legislation, they inserted, in the resolve determining that each colony should have one vote, a caution that would prevent its being drawn into precedent. They declared, as the reason for the course which they adopted, "that the \ Nongress were not possessed of, or able to procure, ; the proper materials for ascertaining the importance of each colony.2 It appears, therefore, very clear, that an examina- 1 See the very interesting notes 2 Journals, 1. 10. of their debates in Adams’s Works, H. 366, 370- 377. von. 1. 3 18 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK 1. -- that system by the States. But there was no other alternative within the consti- tutional reach of Congress; and in the mean time, the revenue system, submitted as it necessarily was to the legislatures of thirteen different States, was, as far as it was assented to, embarrassed with the most discordant and irreconcilable provisions. It was' ascertained in February, 1786, that seven of the States had granted the impost part of the system, in such a manner, that, if the other six States had made similar grants, the plan of the general impost might have been immediately put into operation.2 Two of the other States had also granted the impost, but had embarrassed their grants with provisos, which . suspended their operation until all the other States should have passed laws in full conformity with the whole system.3 Two other States had fully acceded to the system in all its parts ;‘* but four others had not decided in favor of any part of it.5 1 Journals, XI. 34-40. Feb- 3 Pennsylvania and Delaware. ruary 15, 1786. 4 Delaware and North Caro 2 New Hampshire, Massachu- lina. setts, Connecticut, New Jersey, 5 Rhode Island, New York Virginia, North Carolina, and Maryland, and Georgia. South Carolina. ‘ on. 1.] THE cournnnnx'rron. 245 No member of the Confederacy had, at this time, suggested to Congress any reasonable objection to the principles of the system; and the contradictory provisions by which their assent to it had been clogged, present ‘a striking proof of the inherent difficulties of obtaining any important constitutional change from the legislatures of the States. The gov- ernment was founded upon a principle, by which all its powers were derived from the States in their cor- porate capacities; in other words, it was a govern- ment created by, and deriving its authority from, the governments of the States. They alone could change the fundamental law of its organization; and they were actuated by such motives and jealousies, as ren- dered a unanimous assent to any change a great im- probability. Still, the Congress of 17 86 hoped that, by a clear and explicit declaration of the true posi- tion of the country, the requisite compliance of the States might be obtained. They accordingly made known, in the most solemn manner, the public em- barrassments, and declared that the crisis had arrived, when the people of the United States must decide whether they were to continue to rank as a nation, by maintaining the public faith at home and abroad; or whether, for want of timely exertion in estab- lishing a general revenue, they would hazard the existence of the Union, and the great national privi- leges which they had fought to obtain.1 1 The report on this Occasion requisitions of Congress for eight (February 15, 1786), drawn by years past have been so irregular Rufus King, declared, “that the in their operation, so uncertain in 246 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [Boon 111. Under the influence of this urgent representation, all the States, except New York, passed acts grant- ing the impost, and vesting the power to collect it in Congress, pursuant to the recommendations of 1783, but upon the condition that it should not be in force until all the States had granted it in the same man- ner. The State of New York passed an act,1 reserv- ing to itself the sole power of levying and collect- ing the impost; making the collectors amenable to and removable by the State, and not by Congress; and making the duties receivable in specie or bills of credit, at the option of the importer. Such a de- parture from the plan suggested by Congress, and adopted by the other States, of course made the whole system inoperative in the other States, and there remained no possibility of procuring its adop- tion, but by inducing the State of New York to re- consider its determination. All hope of meeting the public engagements, and of carrying on the govern- ment, now turned upon the action of a single State. The principal argument made use of, by those who their collection, and so evidently unproductive, that a reliance on them in future as a source from whence moneys are to be drawn to discharge the engagements of the Confederacy, definite as they are in time and amount, would be not less dishonorable to the understand- ings of those who entertain such confidence, than it would be dan- gerous to the welfare and peace of the Union. The committee are therefore seriously impressed with the indispensable obligation that Congress are under, of representing to the immediate and impartial con- sideration of the several States the utter impossibility of maintaining and preserving the faith of the federal government by temporary requisitions on the States, and the consequent necessity of an early and complete accession of all the States to the revenue system of the 18th of April, 1783.” 1 May 4, 1786. cs. 1.] THE CONFEDERATION. 247 supported the conduct of New York, was, that Con- gress, being a single body, might misapply the money arising from the duties. ‘An answer to this pretence, from the pen of Hamilton, declared that the interests and liberties of the people were not less safe in the hands of those whom they had delegated to represent them for one *year in Congress, than they were in the hands of those whom they had delegated to represent them for one or four years in the legislature of the State; that all government implies trust, and that every government must be trusted so far as it is ne- cessary to enable it to attain the ends for which it is instituted, without which insult and oppression from abroad, and confusion and convulsion at home, must ensue.1 The real motive, however, with those who ruled the counsels of New York at this period, was a hope of the commercial aggrandizement of the State; ' and the jealousies and fears of national power, which were widely prevalent, were diligently employed to defeat the system proposed by Congress. After the passage of the act of New York, and the adjournment of the legislature, Congress earnestly recommended to the executive of that State to con- vene the legislature again, to take into its considera- ti on the recommendation of the revenue system, for the purpose of granting the impost to the United States, in conformity with the grants of other States, so as to enable the United States to carry it into im- mediate effect.2 The Governor declined to accede to 1 Life of Hamilton, II. 385. 9 August 11, 1786. 248 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK 111 this recommendation.1 Congress repeated it, declar- ing that the critical and embarrassed state of the finances required that the. impost should be carried into immediate operation, and expressing their opin- ion, that the occasion was sufficiently important and extraordinary for them to request that the legislature should be specially convened.2 The executive of New York again refused the request of Congress, and the fate of the impost system remained suspended until the meeting of the legislature, at its regular session in January, 1787. It was never adopted by that State, and consequently never took effect. ’ 1 The ground of his refusal was, laid before them, and so recently “ that he had not the power to con- as at their last session received vene the legislature before the time their determination, it cannot come. fixed by law for their stated meet- within that description.” Life of ing, except upon ‘extraordinary Hamilton, II. 389. occasions,’ and as the present busi- 9 August 23, 1786. uses had already been particularly CHAPTER II. 1784-1787. , INFRACTIONS OF THE TREATY OF PEACE. THE Treaty of Peace, ratified on the 14th of J anu- ary, 1784, contained provisions of great practical and immediate importance. One of its chief objects, on the part of the United States, was, of course, to effect the immediate withdrawal of the British troops, and of every sign of British authority, from the country whose independence it ack'nowledged. A stipula- tion was accordingly introduced, by which the King bound himself, with all convenient speed, and. with- out causing any destruction, or_ carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabit- ants, to withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets from the United States, and from every post, place, and harbor within the same. Although the ratifica- tion of the Treaty was followed by the departure of the British forces from the Atlantic coast, many im- portant posts in the Western country, within the in- contestable limit/softhe United States, with a consider- able territory around eemho\fthem, were still retained.1 1 Secret Journals of Congress, IV. 186, 187. rm. 1. 32 250 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. On the part of England, it was of great conse- quence to secure to British subjects the property, and rights of property, of the enjoyment of which the state of hostilities had deprived them. A war be- tween colonies and the parent state, which had sun- dered the closest intimacies of social and commercial intercourse, involved of necessity vast private inter- ests. There were‘ two large classes of English cred- itors, whose interests required protection; the Brit- ish merchants to whom debts had been contracted before the Revolution, and the Tories, who had been obliged to depart from the United States, leaving debts due to them, and landed property, which had been seized. Clear and explicit stipulations were inserted in the Treaty, in order to protect these inter- ests. It was provided that creditors on either side should meet with no lawful impediments to the re- covery of the full value in sterling money of all bona fide debts contracted before the date of the Treaty.1 It was also agreed, _ that Congress should earnestly recommend to the legislatures of the respective States to provide for the restitution of all estates, rights, and properties, which had been confiscated, belong- ing to real British subjects, and to persons resident in districts in the possession of his Majesty’s arms, and who had not borne arms against the United States; that persons of any other description should have free liberty to go into any of the States, and remain for the period of twelve months unmolested 1 Article IV. on. 11.] . THE CONFEDERATION. 251 in their endeavors to obtain the restitution of their property and rights which had been confiscated; that Congress should recommend to the States a recon- sideration and revision of all their confiscation laws, and a restoration of the rights and property of the last-mentioned persons, on their refunding the bona fide price which any purchaser might have given for them since the confiscation. It was also agreed, that all persons having any interest in confiscated lands, either by debts, marriage settlements, or otherwise, should meet with no lawful impediment in the prose- cution of ‘their just rights.1 It was further provided, that there should be no future confiscations made, nor any prosecutions com- menced against any person on account of the part he might have taken in the war, and that no person should, on that account, suffer any future loss or damage, either in person, liberty, or property, and that those who might be in confinement on such charges, at the time of the ratification of the Treaty in America, should be immediately set at liberty, and the prosecutions be discontinued.2 These provisions related to a great subject, with which, in the existing political system of this coun- try, it was difficult to deal. The action ,of the States, with regard to some of the interests involved in these stipulations, had been irregular from an early period of the war. The Revolutionary Congress, on the commencement of hostilities, had suffered the oppor- 1 Article V. 9 Article VI. 252 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION [BOOK m. tunity of asserting their rightful control over the subject of alien interests, except as to property found on the high seas, to pass away; and the consequence was, that the States had, on some points, usurped an authority which belonged to the Union. A Union, founded in compact, and vesting the rights of war and peace in Congress, was formed in 17 75; and from that time the Colonies, or, as they afterwards became, States, were never rightfully capable of pass- ing laws to sequester or confiscate the debts or prop- erty of a national enemy.1 After the great acts of national sovereignty which took place in 17 7 5 - 6, a British subject could not, with any propriety, be con- sidered as the enemy of Massachusetts, or of Vir- ginia; he was the enemy of the United States, and by that authority alone, as the belligerent, was his property, in strictness, liable to be seized, or the debts due to him sequestered. But neither the Revolution- ary Congress, nor that of the Confederation, appear to have ever exercised the power of confiscating the debts or property of British subjects, within the States, or to have recommended such confiscation to the States themselves.2 On the other hand, they did not interfere when the States saw fit to _do it. With regard to those inhabitants of the States who, adhering to the British crown, had abandoned the country, and left property behind them, it cannot so clearly be affirmed that the States should not have 1 See the Report made to Con— tober, 1786. Secret Journals. IV. gress on this subject by Mr. Jay, 209. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 00- 2 Ibid. C11. 11.] THE CONFEDERATION. 253 dealt with their persons or property. Congress, as we have seen, at an early period of the war, commit- ted the whole subject of restraining the persons of the Tories to the Colonies or States; and as Congress never assumed or exercised any jurisdiction over their property, it was of course left to be dealt with by the legislatures of the States, to whom Congress had declared that their several inhabitants owed allegiance.1 But as these persons, by adhering to the crown, might claim of the crown the rights and protection of British subjects, the propriety of confiscating or withholding their property would re- main for solution, at the negotiation of the Treaty of Peace, as a question of general justice and‘ equity, rather than of public law. The interests of both of these classes of persons were too important to be overlooked. Three mil- lions sterling were due from the ‘inhabitants of the Colonies to merchants in Great Britain, at the com- mencement of the war. At the return of peace, the laws of five of the States were found either to pro- hibit the recovery of the principal, or to suspend its collection, or to prohibit the recovery of interest, or to make land a good payment in place of money.2 1 Resolve of June 24, 1776. J ournals,II. 216. Ante, p. 52, note. 9 _An act passed by the legisla- ture of Massachusetts, November 9, 1784, suspended judgment for interest on British debts, until Congress should have put a con- struction upon the Treaty declar- ing that it was due. An act of the State of New York, of July 12, 1782, restrained the collection of debts due to persons within the enemy’s lines. Pennsylvania, soon after the peace, passed a law re- straining the levy of executions. Virginia, at the time of the peace, had existing laws inhibiting the recovery of British debts. South 254 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK 111. The purpose of the Treaty was to declare, that all bona fide debts, contracted before the date of the Treaty, and due to citizens of either country, re- mained unextinguished by the war; and consequent- ly, that interest, when agreed to be paid, or payable by the custom, or demandable as damages for delay of payment, was justly due. Over this whole subject of foreign debts, the national sovereignty, of right, had exclusive control; for confiscation of the prop- erty of a national enemy belongs exclusively to the power exercising the rights of war; and therefore whatever State laws might have been passed during the war, exercising rights which belonged to the na- tional sovereign, they could have no validity when that sovereign came to resume its control over the subject, and to stipulate that the right of confiscation, if it ever existed, should not be exercised. The State laws, however, existed, and remained in conflict with the Treaty, for several years, producing consequences to which we shall presently advert. The fifth article of the Treaty was infringed by an act passed by the State of New York, authorizing actions for rent to be brought by persons who had been compelled to leave their lands and houses by the enemy, against those who had‘ occupied them while the enemy were in possession, and declaring that no military order or command of the enemy should be pleaded in justification of such occupation.1 Carolina had made iland a good 1 Passed March 17, 1783. Se- ' payment, in place of money. (See cret Journals, IV. 267. Mr. J ay’s Report.) on. 11.] THE CONFEDERATION. 255 The sixth article was also violated by an act of the same State, which made those inhabitants who ha adhered to the enemy, if found within the State", guilty of misprision of treason, and refiered them i. incapable of holding office, or of voting at elections.1 The powers of the government were entirely inade- quate to meet this state of things. The Confedera- tion gave to the United States in Congress assembled the sole and exclusive right of determining on peace and war, and of entering into treaties and alliances. The nature of the sovereignty thus established made a treaty the law of the land, and binding upon every member of the Union; but there existed no means \ of enforcing the obligation. If the legislatures of the States passed laws restraining or interfering with the provisions of a treaty, Congress could only de- clare that they ought to be, and recommend that they should be, repealed. The simple and effectual intervention of a national judiciary, clothed with the ' power‘ of ‘ declaring void any State legislation that conflicted with the national sovereignty, and of giv- ing the means of enforcing all rights which that sov- ereignty had guaranteed by compact with a foreign power, did not exist. Resort, it is true, could be had to the State tribunals; and, on one memorable occasion, such resort was had to them with success. But the legislative power assailed the independence of the judiciary, and indignantly declared a decision, made with fairness by a competent tribunal, subver- 1 Passed May 12, 1784, after the Treaty had been ratified. Secret lournals, IV. 269—274. 256 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK HI sive of law ‘and good order, because it recognized the paramount authority of a treaty over a statute of the State.1 The efl'e'é:l of such State legislation upon the rela tions of the two countries was direct and mischievous. The Treaty of Peace was designed, and was adapted, to produce a fair and speedy adjustment of those re- lations, upon principles of equity and justice. But its obligations were reciprocal, and it could not exe- cute itself. It was made, on the one side, by a power capable of performing, but also capable of waiting for the performance of the obligations which rested upon the other contracting party. On the other side, it was made by a power possessed of very imperfect means of performance, yet standing in constant need of the benefit which a full compliance with its obli- gations would insure. After the lapse of three years from the signature of the preliminary articles, and of more than two years from that of the definitive Treaty, the military posts in the Western country were still neld by British garrisons, avowedly on account of the infractions of the Treaty on our part. The Minister 1 This happened in New York, in a case under the “ Trespass Act,” where a suit was brought in the Mayor’s Court of the City of New York, “to recover the rents of property held by the defendant under an order of Sir Henry Clin~ ton. Hamilton, in the defence of this case, contended, with great power, that the act was a violation of the Treaty, and the court sus- tained his position. But the legis~ lature passed resolves, declaring the decision to be subversive of law and good order, and recommending the appointing power “to appoint such persons Mayor and Recorder of New York as will govern them- selves by the known law of the land.” Life of Hamilton, II. 244, 245. on. 11.] THE cour‘nnnnn'rmn. 257 of the United States at St. J ames’s was told, in an- swer to his complaints, that one party could not be obliged to a strict observance of the engagements of a treaty, and the other remain free to deviate from its obligations; and that whenever the United ‘States should manifest a real determination to fulfil their part of the Treaty, Great Britain would be ready to carry every article of it into complete effect.1 An investigation of the whole subject, therefore, became necessary, and Congress directed the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to make inquiry into the precise state of things. His report ascertained that the fourth and fifth articles of the Treaty had been con- stantly violated on our part by legislative acts still in existence and operation; that on the part of Eng- land, the seventh article had been violated, by her continuing to hold the posts from which she had agreed to withdraw her garrisons, and by carrying away a considerable'body of negroes, the property of American inhabitants, at the time of the evacuation of New York.2 The serious question recurred, -— what was to be done’! The United States had neither committed nor approved of any violation of the Treaty; but an appeal was made to their ustice, relative to the con- duct of particular States, for which they were obliged the British government, on the sub- ject of the Western posts, in Feb- ruary, 1786. Secret Journals, IV 187 . 2 Secret Journals, IV. 209 1 Mr. John Adams was sent as the first Minister of the United States to the Court of St. J ames’s in 1785. He received this reply to a memorial which he addressed to von. 1. 33 l l f 258 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III eventually to answer. They could only resolve and recommend; and accordingly, after having declared that the legislatures of the States could not, of right, do any thing to explain, interpret, or limit the opera- tionqaf a treaty, Congress recommended to the States to pass a general law, repealing all their former acts that might be repugnant to the Treaty, and leaving to their courts of justice to decide causes that might arise under it, according to its true intent and mean- ing, by determining what acts contravened its pro- visions.1 This recommendation manifestly left the interests of the Union exposed to two hazards; the one, that the legislatures of the States might not pass the repealing statute, which would submit the proper questions to their courts, and the other, that their courts might not decide with firmness and impar- tiality between the policy of the State, on the one hand, and the interests of foreigners and obnoxious Tories, on the other. But this was all that could be done, and partial success only followed the effort. Most of the States passed acts, in compliance with the recommendation of Congress, to repeal their laws which prevented the recovery of British debts.2 But the State of Vir- ginia, although it passed such an act, suspended its operation, until the Governor of the State should issue a proclamation, giving notice that Great Brit- ain had delivered up the Western posts, and was 1 March 21, 1787. Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and 9 New Hampshire, Massachu- North Carolina passed such act-s setts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, ca. 11.; THE GONFEDERATION. 259 taking measures for the further fulfilment of the Treaty, by delivering up the negroes belonging tc the citizens of that State, which had been carried away, or by making compensation for their value.1 The two countries were thus brought to a stand, in their efforts to adjust the matters in dispute, and the Western posts remained in the occupation of British garrisons, inflaming the hostile temper of the Indian tribes, and enhancing the difficulty of settling the vacant lands in the fertile region of the Great Lakes.21 1 Pitkin’s History of the United 2 Marshall’s Life of Washing- States, II. 198. ton, V. 67, 68. CHAPTER III. 1786-1787. No SEcuRrTY AFFoRDED BY THE CoNFEDERATroN TO THE STATE Gav ERNusNTs—SHAYs’s REBELLION IN MAssAcnusETTs, AND rrs KIN DRED DISTURBANCES. N o federative government can be of great perma- nent value, which is not so constructed that it may stand, in some measure, as the common sovereign of its members, able to protect them against internal disorders, as well as against external assaults. The Confederation undertook but one of these great du- ties. It was formed at a time when the war with England was the great object of concern to the re- volted Colonies, and when they felt only the exigen- cies which that war created. Hence its most impor tant powers, as well as its leading purpose, concerned the common cause of resistance to a foreign domina- tion. A federal league of States independent of each other, formed principally for mutual defence against a common enemy, was all that succeeded to the gen- eral superintending power of the British crown, by which the internal affairs of each of them had al- ways been regulated and controlled, in the last re- sort. When the tie was broken by which they had Ca. :11] THE cournnnnxrrou. 261 been held to the parent state, each of them created for itself a new government, resting for its basis on the popular will, and deriving its authority directly from the people; but none of them provided for the creation of a power, external to itself, which might stand as the guarantor and protector of their new in- stitutions, and secure the principles on which they rested against violence and overthrow. Yet the con- stitutions thus formed, from their peculiar nature, eminently needed the safeguards which such a power could afford. These constitutions were admirably constructed. They contained principles imperfectly known to the ancient governments; found in modern times only in the government of England; and applied there with far less consistency and completeness. They em- braced the regular distribution of political power into distinct departments; legislative checks and balances, by means of two cotirdinate branches of the legislature; a judiciary in general holding oflice during good behaviour; and the representation of the people in the legislature, by deputies of their own actual election, in which the theory of such rep- resentation was more perfectly carried into practice than it had ever been in the country from which it was derived. But the fundamental \principle on which they all rested, and without which they could not maintain existence, required means of defence. They were established upon the great doctrine, that it is the right of every political society to govern itself, and for the purposes of such self-government, 262 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. to create such constitutions and ordain such funda- mental laws as'its own judgment and its own intelli- gent choice may find best ‘suited to its own interests. But society can act only by an expression of the aggregate of its members; and as there may be members who dissent from the views and determina- tions of the great mass of society, and it is therefore necessaryto decide with whom the power of compel- ling obedience resides, - since there must be obe- dience in order that there may be peace, —- nature and reason have determined that this power is {to reside with a majority of the members. The Ameri- can constitutions, therefore, are founded wholly upon the principle, that a majority expresses the will of the whole society, and may establish, change, and abrogate ‘forms of government at its pleasure.1 It follows, as a necessary deduction from this funda- mental doctrine, that so soon as society has acted in the formation and establishment of a government, upon this principle, no change can take place, but in the constitutional organs of their own will, has‘ had a fair trial. 1 Gibbon, with that graceful satire which knew how to hit two objects with the same stroke of his pen, describes hereditary monarchy as “ an expedient which deprives the multitude of the dangerous, and indeed the ideal, power of giving themselves a master.” The his- torian of the Decline and Fall be- gan to publish his great work, just as the American Revolution burst upon the world. Since that sen- tence was penned, the experiment of a system, by which the multi- tude give to themselves a master, ' We may-notfsaythat its trial is past, or that . the, system. is estab- lished beyond" ltht'ev possibility of further dangers] vBut we may with a just pride point to its es- cape, in the days of its first estab- lishment and greatest danger, and to the securities which the Consti- tution of the United States now afi'ords, against similar perils, when they threaten the constitutions of the States. on. 111.] THE CONFEDERATION. 263 by a new expression of the will of society through the voice of a majority; and whether a majority de- sires or has actually decreed a change, is a fact that must be made certain, and can only be made certain in one of two modes, -— either by the evidence and through the channels which the society has previous- ly ordained for this purpose, or by the submission of all its members to a violent and successful revolu- tion. The first constitution of Massachusetts did not designate any mode in which it was to be amended or changed. But no peaceable change can take place in any government founded on the expressed Will of a majority of the people, consistently with the principle on which it had been established, until it has been ascertained, in some mode, that a change is demanded by the same authority. The vital im- portance of ascertaining this fact with precision was not so clearly perceived, at that early period, as it is now. Seizing upon the newly established doctrine, which made them the sources of all political power, the people did not at once apprehend the rule which preserves and upholds that power, and makes the doctrine itself both practicable and safe. Hence, when troubles arose, individuals were led to suppose that they had only to declare a grievance, to demand a change, and to compel a compliance with their de- mand by force. So far as they reasoned at all, they persuaded themselves that, as their government was the creation of the people, by their own direct act. 264 THE FEDERAL coNsTrTuTroN. ~ [BOOK HI. bodies of the people could assemble in their primary capacity, and, by obstructing any of its functions which they connected with a particular grievance, produce a reform, which the people have always a right to make. By overlooking, in this manner, the only safe and legitimate mode in which the popular will can be really ascertained, they passed into the mischiefs of anarchy and rebellion, mistaking the voices of a minority for the ascertained will of society. To these tendencies, the recently established gov- ernments of New England, where the spirit of liberty was most vigorous, could oppose no efficient check; while, in any open outbreak, they were without any external defender, on whose power they could lean. The Confederation succeeded to the Revolutionary Congress, as we have more than once had occasion to observe, with less power than its predecessor might have exercised. It was formed by a written consti- tution, yet it was, strictly speaking, scarcely a gov- ernment. It was a close union of the States ; but it was a union from which all powers had been jeal- ously withheld which would have enabled it to inter- fere with vigor and success between an insurgent minority of the people of a State and its lawful rulers. The Revolutionary Congress was once pos- sessed of such large, indefinite powers, that, upon principles of public necessity, it might have assumed, in a great emergency, to hold a direct relation to the internal concerns of any Colony. It was, in fact, looked to, in some degree, for direction in the formation of the State governments, after it had on. m] 'rrrn cournnnnx'nou. 265 broken the bonds of colonial allegiance to the Eng- lish crown; and it might very properly have under- taken to support the governments whose establish- ment it had recommended. But such a relation between the early States and the ‘continental pow- er, though it certainly existed in 1776, was soon lost in the independent and ealous attitude which they began to occupy, and the Union rapidly assumed‘ a position, where the character of sovereignty which it appeared to wear when it promulgated the Decla- ' ration of Independence ‘was scarcely to be discerned. ‘At no period in the history of the Confederation did ‘ it act upon the internal concerns or condition of a State. Its written articles of union hardly admitted of a construction which would have enabled it to do so, and certainly contained no express delegation of such a power. . At the same time, some of the State governments, during the period of which we are treating, were sin- gularly exposed tov the dangers of anarchy. None of them had any standing forces of any consequence, three years after the peace, and the New England States had no military forces whatever but their mili- tia. N 0 State could call upon its neighbors for aid in quelling an insurrection, for their militia would not have obeyed the summons, if it had been issued; and no State could call upon the federal govern- ment, such an; emergency, with any certainty of success in the application.1 1 A power to interfere in the in- only have been exercised by a broad ternal concerns of a State could construction of the third of the Ar- von. 1.' 34 \\ ,! Ix ' I, {-_-_ 266 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK m. In such a state of things, the year 1786 witnessed an insurrection in Massachusetts of a very dangerous character, which, from the fortunate circumstance that her counsels were then guided by a man of sin gular energy and firmness of character, she was ust able to subdue. The remote causes of this insurrec- tion lie too far from the path of our main subject to be more than summarily stated. At the close of the Revolutionary war, the State of Massachusetts was oppressed with an enormous debt. At the breaking out of that war, the debt of the Colony was less than one hundred thousand pounds. The private debt of the State, in the year 1786, was ‘one million three hundred thousand ticles of Confederation, which was in these words: “ The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare; binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever.” When this is compared with the clear and ex- plicit provision in the Constitution, by which it is declared that “the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a repub- lican form of government,” there can be no wonder that a doubt was“ felt in the Congress of 1786—87 as to their powers upon this sub- ject It is true that the Massa- chusetts delegation, when they laid before Congress the measures which had been taken by the State gov- ernment to suppress the insurrec- tion, expressed the confidence of the legislature that the firmest sup port and most effectual aid would have been afforded by the United States, had it been necessary, and asserted that such support and aid were expressly and solemnly stip ulated by the Articles of Confeder ation. (Journals, XII. 20. Marc] 9, 1787.) But this was clearly not the case; and it was not gen erally supposed in Congress that the power existed by implication. All that was done by Congress to- wards raising troops, at the time of the insurrection, was done for the ostensible purpose of protecting the frontiers against an Indian in- vasion, as we shall see hereafter. ea. in. 1 THE CONFEDERATION. 267 pounds, besides two hundred and fifty thousand pounds due to the ofiicers and soldiers of the State line of the Revolutionary army. The State’s propor- tion of the federal debt was not less than one million and, a half of pounds? According to the customary mode of taxation, one third of the whole debt was to be paid by the ratable polls, which scarcely ex- ceeded ninety thousand.2 The Revolution had made the people of Massachusetts familiar with the great general doctrines of liberty and human rights ; but it had given them little insight into the principles of revenue and finance, and little acquaintance with the rules of public economy. No sufficient means, therefore, to relieve the people from direct taxation, by encouraging a revival of trade and at the same time drawing from it a revenue, were devised by the legislature. The exports of the State, moreover, had suffered a fearful diminution. The fisheries, which had been a fruitful source of prosperity to the colony, had been nearly destroyed by the war, and the mar- kets of the West Indies and of Europe were now closed to the products of this lucrative industry, by which wealth had formerly been drawn from the wastes of the ocean. The State had scarcely any other commodity to exchange for the precious metals in foreign commerce. Its agriculture yielded only a scanty support to its population, if it yielded so much; its manufactures were in a languishing con- dition; and its carrying trade had been driven from 1 Minot’s History of the Insurrection, p. 6. 2 Ibid. 268 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. the seas during the war, and was afterwards annihi- lated by the oppressive policy of England, which suc- ceeded the Peace. The people were every year grow- ing poorer than they had ‘been the year before, and taxes, onerous taxes, beyond their resources and al- ways odious, were pressing upon them with a con- stantly increasing accumulation, from which the po- litical state of the country seemed to promise no relief.’1 \/ But the demand of the tax-gatherer was not the sole burden which individuals had to encounter. Private debts had accumulated during the war, in almost as large a ratio as the public obligations. The collection of such debts had been generally suspended, while the struggle for political freedom was going on ; but that struggle being over, creditors necessa- rily became active, and were often obliged to be severe. Suits were multiplied in the courts of law beyond all former precedent, and the first effect of this sudden influx of litigation was to bring popular odium upon the whole machinery of ustice. In a state of society approaching so nearly to a democracy, the class of debtors, if numerous, must be politically formidable. They had begun to be so before the close of the war. Their clamors and the supposed necessity of the case led the legislature, in 17 82, to a violation of principle, in a law known as the Tender Act, by which executions for debt might be satisfied by certain articles of property, to be taken at an ap- praisement. This law was limited in its operation to 1 See the next chapter for some particulars respecting the trade of Massachusetts. Ca. m] THE CONFEDERATION. 269 one year; but in the course of that year it taught the debtors their strength, and gave the first signal for an attack upon property. A levelling, licentious spirit, a restless desire for change, and a disposition to throw down the barriers of“ private rights, at length- broke forth in conventions, which first voted them- selves to be the people, and then declared their pro- ceedings to be constitutional. At these assemblies, the doctrine was publicly broached, that property ought to be common, because all had aided in saving it from confiscation by the power of England. Taxes were voted to be unnecessary burdens, the courts of justice to be intolerable grievances, and the legal pro fession a nuisance. A revision of the constitution was demanded, in order to abolish the Senate, reform‘ the representation in the House, and make all the civil officers of the government eligible by the people. A passive declaration of their grievances did not, V however, content the disaffected citizens of Massachu- setts. They proceeded to enforce their demands. The courts of justice were the nearest objects for attack, as well as the most immediately connected with the chief objects of their complaints. Armed mobs sur- rounded the court-houses in several counties, and sometimes effectually obstructed the sessions of the courts. These acts were repeated, until, in the autumn of 1786, the insurrection broke out in a formidable manner in the western part of the State. The insurgents actually ‘embodied, and in arms against the government, in the month of Decem- ber, in the counties of Worcester and Hampshire, 270 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK In. numbered about fifteen hundred men, and were headed by one Daniel Shays, who had been a cap- tain in the continental army.1 The executive chair of the State was at that time filled by James Bowdoin; a statesman, firm, pru- dent, of high principle, and devoted to the cause of constitutional order. In .the first stages of the dis- affection, he had been thwarted by a House of Rep- resentatives, in which the majority were strongly inclined to sympathize with the general spirit of the insurgents; but the Senate had supported him. Afterwards, when the movement grew more danger- ous, the legislature became more reconciled to the use of vigorous means to vindicate the authority of the government, and a short time before it actually took the form of an armed and organized rebellion against the Commonwealth, they had encouraged the Governor to use the powers vested in him by the constitution to enforce obedience to the laws. The Executive promptly met the emergency. A body of militia was marched against the insurgents, and by the middle of February they were dispersed or cap- tured, with but little loss of life. The actual resources of the State, however, to meet an emergency of this kind, were feeble and few. A voluntary loan, from a few public-spirited individu- als, supplied the necessary funds, of which the treas- ury of the State was wholly destitute.2 At one time, so general was the prevalence of discontent, even 1 Minot’s History of the Insur- 9 Governor Bowdoin’s Speech to rection, p. 82 et seq. the Legislature, February 3, 1787. on. 111.] THE coNEEnEEATroN. 271 among the militia on whom the government were I obliged to rely, that men were known openly to change sides in the field, when the first bodies of troops were called out? Had the government of the State been in the hands of a person less firm and less careless of popularity than Bowdoin, it would have been given up to anarchy and civil confusion. The political situation of the country did not seem to admit of an application to Congress for direct assist- ance, and there is no reason to suppose that such an application would have been effectively answered, if it had been made.2 When the news of the disturbances in Massachug setts, in the autumn of 1786, was received in Con- gress, it happened that intelligence from the Western country indicated a hostile disposition on the part of several Indian tribes against the frontier settle- ments. A resolve was unanimously adopted, direct- ing one thousand three hundred and forty additional troops to be raised, for the term of three years, for the protection and support of the States bordering on the Western territory and the settlements on and near the Mississippi, and to secure and facilitate the surveying and selling of the public lands.3 From ' the fact that the whole of these troops were ordered to be raised by the four New England States, and 1 Minot. 9 In the spring of 1786, the State had asked the loan from Congress of sixty pieces of field artillery. The application was refused, by the negative vote of six States out of eight, one being divided, and the delegation from Massachusetts alone supporting it. Journals, XI. 65-67. April 19, 1786. 3 Journals, XI. 258. 30, 1786. October at‘ ‘r "‘ \ t 272 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. one half of them by the State of Massachusetts, and from other circumstances, it is quite apparent that the object assigned was an ostensible one, and that Congress intended by this resolve to strengthen the government of that State and to overawe the insur- gents.1 But this motive could not be publicly an- nounced. The enlistment went on very slowly, how- ever, until February, when a motion was made by Mr. Pinckney of South Carolina to stop it altogether, upon the ground that the insurrection in Massachu- setts, the real, though not the ostensible, object of the resolve, had been crushed. Mr. King of Massa- ‘chusetts earnestly entreated that the federal enlist- ments might be permitted to go on, otherwise the greatest alarm would be felt by the government of the State and its friends, and the insurrection might be rekindled. Mr. Madison advised that the pro- posal to rescind the order for the enlistments should be suspended, to await the course of events in Massa-' chusetts. At the same time, he admitted that it would be dificult to reconcile an interference of Congress in the internal controversies of a State with the tenor of the Articles of Confederation.2 The whole subject was postponed, and the direct question of the power of Congress was not acted upon. In the Con- 1 It was well understood, for in- stance, in the legislature of Vir- ginia, that this was the real pur- pose; for Mr. Madison says that this consideration inspired the ardor with which they voted, towards their quota of the funds called for to defray the expenses of this levy, a tax on tobacco, which would scarcely have been granted for any other purpose, as its operation was very unequal. Elliot’s Debates, V. 95. February 19, 1787. 2 Ibid. CH. 111] THE comnnmrrox. 273 vention which framed the Constitution, it was very early declared, that the Confederation had neither constitutional power, nor means, to interfere in case of a rebellion in any State.1 This generation can scarcely depict to itself the alarm which these disturbances spread through the country, and the extreme peril to which the whole fabric of society in New England was exposed. The numbers of the disaffected in Massachusetts amounted to one fifth of the inhabitants in several of the popu- lous counties. Their doctrines and purposes were embraced by many young, active, and desperate men in Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, and the whole of this faction in the four States was capable of furnishing a body of twelve or fifteen thou- sand men, bent on annihilating property, and can- celling all debts, public and private.2 But this great peril was not without beneficial consequences. It displayed, at a critical moment, when a project of amending the Federal Constitution for other purposes was encountering much opposi- tion, a more dangerous deficiency than any to which the public mind had hitherto been turned. While thoughtful and considerate men were speculating upon the causes of diminished prosperity and the general feebleness of the system of government, a gulf suddenly yawned beneath their feet, threatening 1 Ibid, 127, to General Washington. See a 2 This was the estimate of their letter from General Washington to numbers formed by General Knox, Mr. Madison. Works, IX. 207. on careful inquiry, and by him given von. 1. 35 274 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK n1. - its place. ruin to the whole social fabric. It was but a short time before, that the people of this country had shed their blood to obtain constitutions of their own choice and making. Now, they seemed as ready to over- turn them as they had once been to extort from tyranny the power of creating and erecting them in It was manifest, that to achieve the inde- pendence of a country is but half of the great under- taking of liberty; — that, after freedom, there must come security, order, the wise disposal of power, and great institutions on which society may repose in safety. It was clear, that the Federal Union alone could certainly uphold the liberty which it had gained for the people of the States, and that, to enable it to do so, it must become a government.1 From his retreat at Mount Vernon, Washington observed the progress of these disorders with intense anxiety. To him, they carried the strongest evi- dence of a want of energy in the system of the Federal Union. They did more than all things else to convince him that “ a liberal and energetic consti- tution, well checked and well watched to prevent encroachments, might restore us to that degree of respectability and consequence to which we had the fairest prospect of attaining.”2 He was kept accu- 1 Washington, writing to Henry Lee in Congress, October 31, 1786, says : “ You talk, my good sir, of employing influence to appease the present tumults in Massachusetts. I know not where that influence is to be found, or, if attainable, that it would be a proper remedy for the disorders. Influence is not gov- ernment. Let us have a govern- ment by which our lives, liberties, and properties will be secured, or let us know the worst at once ‘ Works, IX. 204. 2 Ibid. 208. on. 111.] THE CONFEDERATION. 275 rately informed of the state of things in New Eng- land, and the probability that he would be obliged to come forward, and take an active part in the sup- port of order against civil discord, was directly inti- mated to him? He had foreseen the possibility of this ; but the successful issue of the struggle relieved him from the contemplation of this painful task, and left to him only the duty of the whole weight of his influence and presence in the Convention, which was to assemble in the following May, for the revision of the Federal Constitution. 1 Ibid. 221. CHAPTER IV. ORIGIN AND NEOESSITY or THE POWER TO REGULATE CoMMERcn. AMONG all the causes which led to the establish- ment of the Constitution of the United States, there is none more important, and none that is less appre- ciated at\ the present day, ‘than the inability of the Confederation to manage the foreign commerce of the country. We have seen that, when the Articles of Con- federation were proposed for adoption by the States, the State of New Jersey remonstrated against the ab- sence of all provision for placing the foreign trade of the States under the regulation of the federal gov- ernment. But this remonstrance was without effect, and the instrument went into operation in 1'7 81, with no other restriction upon the powers of the States to regulate trade according to their pleasure, than a prohibition against levying imposts or duties which would interfere with the treaties then pro- posed. While the war continued, the subject was of comparatively little importance. But the return of peace found this country capable of becoming a great commercial‘, as Well as agricultural nation; and it could not be overlooked, that its government pos- sessed very inadequate means for establishing such on. Ivl] THE CONFEDERATION. 2'77 relations with foreign powers as would best develop its resources and‘ conduce to its internal harmony and prosperity. How early this great interest had attracted the attention of those who were most capa- ble of enlarged and statesmanlike views of the actual nature of the Union and the wants of the States, there are perhaps as yet before the world no suffi- cient means of determining. We know, however, that, before the peace, Hamilton saw clearly that it was essential for the 'United States to be vested with a general s'uperintendence ‘of trade, both for pur- poses of revenue and regulation; that he foresaw the encouragement of our own products and manufac- tures, by means of general prohibitions of particular articles and a judicious arrangement of duties, and that this could only be effected by a central author- ity; and that the due observance of any commercial treaty which the United States might make with a foreign power could not be expected, if the different States retained the regulation of their own trade, and thus held the practical construction of treaties in their own hands.1 ' ' But it does not appear that, among the other prin- cipal statesmen of the Revolution, these ideas had made much progress, until the entire incapacity of _ the Confederation to negotiate advantageous com- mercial treaties, for want of adequate power to en- . 1 Life of Hamilton, II. 233, 234. 1783, and especially the eighth res- See also his resolutions on the de- olution. Works of Hamilton, I] fects of the federal government, in- 269. tended to be offered in Congress in 278 THE FEDERAL coNsTITUTIoN. [BOOK In. force them, had displayed the actual weakness of its position, and the oppressive measures of other coun- tries had taught them that there was but one remedy ,for such evils. Then, indeed, they saw that the United States could have a standing as a commercial power among the other powers of the world, only when their representatives could be received and dealt with as the representatives of one, and not of thirteen sovereignties; and that, if the measures of other countries, injurious to the trade of America, were to be counteracted at all, it must be by a power that could prohibit access to all the States alike, or grant it as to all, as circumstances might require.1 1 Hamilton himself, in some pa- pers which he published in 1781, under the title of The Continental- ist, gave the general sum of Amer- ican statesmanship and its oppor- tunities, down to that period. The events of the next seven years gave it a wonderful development. “It would be the extreme of vanity in us,” said he, “not to be sensible that we began this revolution with very vague and confined notions of the practical business of govern- ment. To the greater part of us, it was a novelty; of those who under the former constitution had had opportunities of acquiring ex- perience, a large proportion ad- hered to the opposite side, and the remainder can only be supposed to have possessed ideas adapted to the narrow colonial sphere in which they had been accustomed to move, not of that enlarged kind suited to the government of an independent nation. There were, no doubt, ex- ceptions to these observations ; —— men in all respects qualified for conducting the public affairs with skill and advantage ; —-but their number was small; they were not always brought forward in our coun oils; and when they were, their influence was too commonly borne down by the prevailing torrent of ignorance and prejudice. On a ret- rospect, however, of our transac- tions, under the disadvantages with which we commenced, it is per- haps more to be wondered at, that we have done so well, than that we have not done better. There are, indeed, some traits in our con duct, as conspicuous for sound pol icy as others for magnanimity. But, on the other hand, it must also he confessed, there have been many false steps, many chimerical cs. IV.] THE CONFEDERATION. 279 The actual commercial relations of the United States with other countries, when the peace took place, were confined to treaties of amity and com- merce with France, Sweden, and the Netherlands; the two latter transcending, in some degree, the powers of the Confederation. In 17 7 6, the Revolu- tionary Congress had adopted a plan of treaties to be proposed to France and Spain, which contemplated that the subjects of each country should pay no duties in the other except such as were paid by na- tives, and should have the same rights and privileges as natives in respect to navigation and commerce? When a treaty of amity and commerce came to be concluded with France, in 17 7 8, the footing on which the subjects of the two countries were placed, in the dominions- of each other, was that of the most favored nations, instead of that of natives.2 The Articles of Confederation, proposed in 1777, and finally ratified in March, 17 81, reserved to the States the right of levying duties and imposts, excepting only such as would interfere with any treaties that might be made “ pursuant to the treaties pro- posed to France and Spain.” The United States could therefore constitutionally complete these two projects and Utopian speculations, in the management of our civil as well as of our military affairs. A part of these were the natural ef- fects of the spirit of the times, dic- tated by our situation. An ex- treme jealousy of power is the at- tendant on all popular revolutions, and has seldom been without its evils. It is to this source we are to trace many of the fatal mistakes, which have so deeply endangered the common cause ; particularly that defect which will be the object of these remarks, -— a want of pow- er in Congress.” Works, II. 186. 1 Secret Journals, II. 7, 8. 2 Ibid: 59. 280 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK m. treaties, and such as were dependent upon them, but no others which should have the effect of restraining the legislatures of the States from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or merchandise, or laying whatever duties or imposts they thought proper.1 In 1782, negotiations were entered into for a simi- lar treaty with the States General of the Netherlands. When the instructions to Mr. Adams to negotiate this treaty were under consideration in Congress, it was recollected that the French treaty contained a stipulation, the effect of which would enable the heirs of the subjects of either party, dying in the territories of the other, to inherit real property, with- out obtaining letters of naturalization.2 The doubt suggested itself, -- as it well might, — whether such an indefinite license to aliens to possess real property within the United States, was not an encroachment upon the rights of the States. It seems to have been expected, when the French treaty was entered into, that the States would acquiesce in this provision, on account of the peculiar relations of this country to 1 Articles of Confederation, Art. VI., IX. The expression in the sixth article was: “ N 0 State shall lay any imposts, 820. that shall in- interfere with any stipulations in treaties entered into by the United States the general power of levy ing duties and laying prohibitions. 2 Secret Journals, II. 65, 66. Art. XIII. of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France. The expression employed was, “goods States with any king, prince, or state, in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by Congress to the court of France and Spain.” The ninth article saved to the movable and immovable,” and the right of succession was given, ab intestato, without first obtaining letters of naturalization. on. IV.] THE CONFEDERATION. 281 France, and because of the saving clause in the Arti- cles of Confederation in favor of the I treaties to be made with that power and with Spain.1 But such a stipulation as this was clearly not within the mean- ing of that clause; and it was received with great re- pugnance by many of the States.2 In the treaty with the Netherlands, it was proposed to insert a similar provision; but it was found to be extremely improb- able that the States would comply with a similar engagement with another power. The language was therefore varied, so as to give the privilege of inherit- ance only as to the “ effects” of persons dying in the country; — an expression which would probably ex- clude real property, but which might possibly be construed to include it.3 With regard to duties and imposts, the Dutch treaty contained the same stipulation as the French, putting the subjects of either power on the footing of the most favored nations, and thereby holding out to the subjects of the United Provinces the promise of an equality, under the laws of the United States, with the subjects of France.4 The same stipulation was inserted in a treaty subsequently made at Paris with the King of Sweden.5 - If these stipulations were supposed or intended to 1 See a report on this prqjet of the treaty, made by Mr. Madison, July 17, 1782. Secret Journals, 111' 142 - 144. 2 Ibid. ' 3 Art. VI. of the Treaty of Am- ity and Commerce with the Neth- vor. 1 36 erlands, executed by Mr. Adams at the Hague, October 8, 1782 Journals, VH1. 96. 4 Ibid., Art. 11., III. 5 April 3, 1783. V11]. 386-398. Journals, 282 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. be binding upon the States, so as to restrain them from adopting, within their respective jurisdictions, any other rule than that fixed by the French treaty, for the subjects of the United Provinces and the King of Sweden, it is quite clear that the Articles of Confederation gave no authority to Congress to make them. They could have no effect, therefore, in producing a uniformity of regulation throughout the United States, with regard to the trade with Sweden and the Netherlands. ' The relations of the United States with Great Britain .were, however, far more important; than their relations with Sweden or Holland. When’ the war was drawing to a close, and the provisional articles of peace had been agreed upon, a measure was in preparation in England, under the auspices of Mr. Pitt, designed as a temporary arrangement of com- mercial intercourse between Great Britain and the United States, and which would have enabled‘ the government of this country to have formed a treaty so advantageous, that the States would doubtless vhave conformed their legislation to its provisions. That great statesman perceived, that it was ex- tremely desirable to establish the intercourse of the two countries on the most enlarged principles of reciprocal benefit, and his purpose was, by a pro- visional arrangement, to evince the disposition of England to be on terms of amity with the United States, preparatory to the negotiation of a treaty.1 1 Mr. Pitt’s bill was brought out of oflice immediately atter- in in March, 1783, and he went wards. Q on. 1v] THE CONFEDERATION. 283 But the administration, in which he was thenwChan- cellor of the Exchequer, went out of office imme- diately after he had proposed this measure, and their successors, following a totally different line of pol- icy, procured an 'act of Parliament authorizing the King in Council to regulate the commercial inter- course between the, United States and Great Britain and her dependencies? . . Mr. Pitt’s bill . was designed to admit the vessels and subjects of the United States into all the ports of Great Britain, in the same manner as the subjects and vessels of other independent‘ sovereign~ states, and to admit merchandise and goods, the growth, produce, or manufacture of this country, under the same duties and charges- as if they were the property of British subjects, imported in British vessels. It also 1' proposed to establish an entirely free trade be- tween the United States and the British islands, col- onies, and plantations in America. The new admin- ' istration, on the contrary, believing that this would encourage the American marine, to the ruin of that of Great Britain, and would deprive the latter of a monopoly in the consumption of her colonies, and in their carrying trade, resolved to reverse this entire policy. In this course, they were encouraged by . the views which they took of the internal situation of this country, and which were, to a great extent, jus- tified by the fact. They believed that we could not act, as‘ a nation, upon questions of commerce; that 1 April, 1783 284 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK m the climates, the staples, and the manners of the States were different, and their interests therefore opposite; and that no combination was likely to take place, from which England would have reason to fear retaliation. They supposed, that, inasmuch as the Confederation had no power to make any but general treaties, and as the States had reserved to themselves nearly every power concerning the regu- lation of trade, no treaty could be made that would be binding upon all the States; and that, if treaties should become necessary, they must be made with the States respectively. But they denied that treaties were necessary, and maintained that it would be unwise to enter at present into any arrangements by which they might not wish afterwards to be bound. They determined, therefore, to deal with this country as a collection of rival States, with each of which they could make their own terms, after the pressure of their policy, and the impossibility of escaping from its effects, had begun to be felt. They accord- ingly began, by excluding from the British West Indies, under Orders in Council, the whole Ameri- can marine, and by prohibiting fish, and many im- portant articles of our produce, from being carried there, even in British vessels.1 At the termination of the war, the foreign com- merce of the United States was capable of great ex- 1 July, 1783. Their idea was, would soon enter into all necessary that, if the American States should regulations with the consul, and choose to send consuls, they should that nothing more was necessary. be received, and consuls sent to See Lord Shet‘field’s Observations them in return - that each State on American Commerce. on. N] THE CONFEDERATION. 285 pansion. It consisted of three important branches,— the trade of the Eastern, that of the Middle, and that of the Southern States; each of which required at once the means of reaching foreign markets. The rice and indigo of the South might be carried to Europe. The Middle States might export to Europe tobacco, tar, wheat, and flour; and to the West Indies, pork, beef, bread, flour, lumber, tar, and iron. The Eastern States might supply the markets of Europe with spars, ship-timber, staves, boards, fish, and oil, and those of the West Indies with‘ lumber, pork, beef, live cattle, horses, cider, and fish. The whole of these great interests of course received a sudden and almost fatal blow from the English Orders in Council, and no means whatever existed of countervailing their effects, but such as each State could provide for its own people, by its own legisla- tion. 7 Congress, however, awoke to the perception of an eflicient and appropriate remedy, of a temporary character, and prepared to apply it, through an amendment of their powers. For ~ the purpose of meeting the policy of Great Britain with similar restrictions on her commerce, they recommended to the States to vest in Congress, for the term of fifteen years, authority to prohibit the vessels of any power, not having treaties of commerce" with the United States, from ‘importing or exporting any commodities into or ‘from any‘ of the States, and "also with the power of ‘prohibiting, for a like term, the ‘subjects of any foreign country, unless authorized \ by treaty, 286 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK 111 from importing into the United States any merchan- dise not the produce or manufacture of such coun- try.1 There was already before the States, as we have seen, in the revenue system of 17 83, a proposal to them to vest in Congress power to levy certain duties on foreign commodities, for the same period; and if these two grants of power had been made, and made promptly, by the States, Congress would have possessed, for a time, an effectual control over com- merce, and the practical means of forming suitable commercial treaties. But the proposal of the 30th of April, 1784, met with a tardy and reluctant attention among the States. Only one of them had acted upon it, as late as the following February, when the delegates for Maryland laid before Congress an act of that State upon the subj ect.2 New Hampshire was the next State to comply, in the succeeding J une.3 In the mean time, however, Congress prepared to prosecute negotiations in Europe, trusting to the chances of an enlargement of their powers, in pursuance of their recommendation. Accordingly, they proceeded, in the spring of 17 84, to appoint a commission to ne- gotiate commercial treaties, and settled the prin- ciples on which such treaties were to be formed. The leading principle then determined on was, that each party to the treaty should have a right to carry their own produce, manufactures, and merchandise 1 April 30, 1784. 3 By an act passed June 22- 2 February 14. 1785. Journals, 23, 1785; laid before Congress X. 53. October 10, 1785. Ibid. 353. cs IV.] THE CONFEDERATION. 287 in their own bottoms to the ports of the other, and to take thence the produce, manufactures, and mer- chandise of the other, paying, in both cases, such duties only as were paid by the most favored nation. The resolves appointing the commission also con- tained a very explicit direction, that “ the United States, in all such treaties, and in every case arising under them, should be considered as one nation, upon the principles of the Federal Constitution.” 1 Yet the Federal Constitution did not, at that very moment, make the United States one nation for this purpose. Its principles gave to Congress no authority which could prevent the States from pro- hibiting any exportations or importations whatever, as to their respective territories ; and the validity of these treaties, thus proposed to be negotiated with fifteen European powers, depended altogether upon the precarious assent of the thirteen States to the alterations in the principles of the Federal Constitu- tion which Congress had proposed. That assent was not likely to be given, so as to become effectual for the purposes for which it had been asked. The action of the States was found, in the spring of 1786, to present a mass of incongrui- 1 The commission consisted of Mr. John Adams, then at the Hague, Dr. Franklin, then in France, and Mr. Jefferson, then in Congress. Mr. J efl'erson sailed from 'Boston on the 5th of July, and arrived in Paris on the 6th of August, 1784. (Works, I. 49.) The powers with whom they were to nego- tiate commercial treaties were Rus- sia, Austria, Prussia, Denmark, Saxony, Hamburg, Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Genoa, Tuscany, Rome, Naples, Venice, Sardinia, and the Ottoman Porte. Secret Journals, III. 484-489. May 7 1784. 288 THE FEDERAL CoNsTITUTIoN. [BOOK III. ties, which rendered the whole scheme of thus increas- ing the federal powers almost hopeless. Four of the States had passed laws, conforming substantially to the recommendations of Congress, but restraining their operation until the other States should have complied.1 Three of the States had passed the requi- site acts, and had fixed different periods at which they were to take effect.2 One State had granted full powers to regulate its trade, by restrictions or duties, for fifteen years, with a proviso that the law should be suspended until all the other States had done the same.3 Another State had granted power, for twenty-five years, to regulate trade‘ between the respective States, and to prohibit or regulate the im- portation only of foreign goods in foreign vessels, but restricting the operation of the act until the other States had passed similar laws.‘ Still another State had granted powers like the last, but without limi- tation of time, and with the proviso that, when all the other States had made the same grants, it should become an Article of the Confederation.5 The three remaining States had passed no act upon the sub- ject.6 Upon these conflicting and irreconcilable pro- visions, Congress could take no other action, than to call the attention of the States again to the original proposal, and request them to revise their laws.7 1 Massachusetts, New York, 5 North Carolina. New Jersey, and Virginia. 5 Delaware, South Carolina, and 9 Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Georgia. Maryland. '7 See a report made in Con- 3 New Hampshire. gress, March 3, 1786. Journals, 4 Rhode Island. XI. 41. cn. IV.] THE CONFEDERATION. 289 While this discordant legislation was manifesting at home the entire impracticability of amending the Fed- eral Constitution by means of the separate action of the State legislatures, the commissioners abroad were engaged in efforts, nearly as fruitless, to negotiate the treaties which they had been instructed to make. The commission was opened at Paris on the 13th of August, 1784, and its objects announced to the differ- ent governments. France was not disposed to change the existing relations. England perceived the real want of power in the federal government, and recog- nized nothing in the commission but the fact that it had been issued by Congress, while the separate States had conferred no powers upon either Congress or the commissioners.1 Prussia alone entered into a 1 The Duke of Dorset, the Eng- lish Ambassador at Paris, wrote to the commissioners (March 26, 1785) as follows : “ Having communi- cated to my court the readiness you expressed in your letter to me of the 9th of December to remove to London, for the purpose of treating upon such points as may materially concern the interests, both political and commercial, of Great Britain and America; and having at the same time represented that you declared yourselves to be fully au- thorized and empowered to nego- tiate, I have been, in answer there- to, instructed to learn from you, gentlemen, what is the real nature of the powers with which you are invested, — whether you are mere- ly commissioned by Congress, or von. 1. 37 whether you have received sepa- rate powers from the respective States. A committee of North American merchants have waited upon his Majesty’s principal Sec retary of State for Foreign Affairs, to express how anxiously they wished to be informed upon this subject; repeated experience hav- ing taught them in particular, as well as the public in general, how little the authority of Congress could avail in any respect, where the interest of any one individual State was even concerned, and par- ticularly so where the concerns of that State might be supposed to militate against such resolutions as Congress might think proper to adopt. The apparent determina- tion of the respective States to reg- 290 THE FEDERAL CQNSTITUTION. [BOOK III. treaty, upon some of the principles laid down in the commission, and soon after it was executed, ‘the com missioners ceased to do any thing whatever.1 During the period which elapsed from the Treaty of Peace with England to the assembling of the Con- vention at Annapolis, the legislation of the different States, designed to protect themselves against the policy of England, was of course without system or concert, and without uniformity of regulation. At one time duties were made extravagantly high; at another, competition reduced them below the point at which any considerable revenue could be derived, At one time, the States acted in open hostility to each other; at another, they contemplated commer- cial leagues, without regard to the prohibition con- tained in the Articles of Confederation. N o steady system was pursued by any of them, and the ineffi- cacy of State legislation became at length so appar- ent, that a conviction of the necessity of new powers in Congress forced itself upon the public mind. ulate their own separate interests renders it absolutely necessary, to- wards forming a permanent system of commerce, that my court should oe informed how far the commis- sioners can be duly authorized to enter into any engagements with Great Britain, which it may not be in the power of any one of the States to render totally fruitless and ineffectual.” Diplomatic Cor- respondence, II. 297. 1 Jefi'erson’s Works, I. 50, 51. The whole proceedings of this com- mission may be found in the Diplo- matic Correspondence, II. 193 - 346. ' CHAPTER V. 1783-1787. THE Punmc Lamas. —-GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWESTERN TERRI- TORY.-—THREATENED Loss on THE WESTERN SETTLEMENTS. \ N, THE Confederation, although preceded b a cession of Western territory from the ’,State of New York for the use of the United ' States, dontained no grant of power to Congress to hold,. manage, or dispose of such property. :Tlfer‘e .had been, ‘while the Articles of Confederation were under discussion in Congress, a proposal to insert a provision, giving to Congress the sole and exclusive right and power to ascertain and fix the western boundary of such States as claimed to the Mississippi or the South Sea, and to lay out the land beyond the boundary so ascertained into separate and independent States, from time to time, as the numbers and circumstances of the inhabitants might require? This proposal was negatived by the vote of every State except Maryland and New J ersey.2 Its rejection caused the adoption of the Confedera- tion to be postponed for a period of more than two years after it was submitted to the States.3 Virginia 1 October 15, 1777. Secret 9 Ibid. .lour'als, I. 328. 3 See the account of the adop- 292 THE FEDERAL CoNsTITUTIoN. [BOOK 1n had set up claims to an indefinite extent of territory, stretching far into the Western wilderness, which were looked upon with especial jealousy by Mary- land; and when the Articles of Confederation came before the legislature of that State for consideration, the absence of any provision vesting in the Union any control over these claims, or any power to ascertain and fix the western boundaries of the great States, became at once a cause of irritation and alarm. The steps taken by Maryland to have this power intro- duced into the Articles have already been detailed.1 But the Articles could not be amended. Congress could only make efforts to remove this impediment to their adoption, by recommending to the States to cede their territorial claims to the Union. The first step which they took, for this purpose, was to rec- ommend to the State of Virginia, and all the other States similarly situated, not to make sales of unap- propriated lands during the continuance of the war.2 This was followed by a full consideration of the subject presented by the objections of Maryland and the remonstrance of Virginia. Declining to reopen the question of the merits of policy of attempting to engraft the proposed power upon the Confedera- tion, Congress deemed it more advisable to endeavor to procure a surrender of a portion of the territorial claims of the several States.3 In pressing a recom- mendation to this effect, they were greatly a' e by tion of the Confederation, ante, pp. 2 October 30, 17 \Jmgiajls 131 - 141. V. 401, 402. 1 Ante, pp. 131-136 3 September 6,)“780. ‘ on. v.] THE conrnnnnn'rmn. 293 the course of the State of New York, which had already authorized its delegates in Congress to limit its western boundaries, and to cede a portion of its vacant lands to the United States.1 They then im- mediately declared, by resolve, the purposes for which such cessions were to be held. The territories were to be disposed of for the common benefit of the United States; to be settled and formed into distinct republican States, which should become members of the Federal Union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence as the oth- er States. Each State so formed was to contain a suitable extent of territory, not less than one hun- dred, nor more than one hundred and, miles square; the necessary expenses incurred by any State " in acquiring the territory ceded, were to be reim- bursed; and ‘the lands were to be granted or set, tled at such times, and under such regulations, as should thereafter be agreed upon by the United States in Congress assembled, or any nine or more of them.2 The cessions were made under the guaranties of this resolve. Strictly speaking, there was no express ‘ constitutional power under which Congress could that act, either before or after the adoption of the, Articles of Confederation. Before that period, if the United States could acquire and hold lands, for any purpose, it could only be by the common attribute of sovereignty belonging to every government. Per- 1 February 19, 1780. 9 October 10, 1780. v‘, ' ‘l 294 THE .E‘EDEBAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. haps this power existed, by implication, in the revo- lutionary government; but the compact which was to constitute the new government contained no au- thority for the establishment of new States within the limits of the Union. But when, aside from the Articles of Confederation, and before they had been adopted, the Revolutionary/Q’Congress undertook, in 17 80, to hold out these inducements to the States, as motives for their adoption of that instrument, and these motives were acted upon and the cessions made, it must be taken that the territory came rightfully into the possession of the United States. Whether the adoption of the Articles, containing no power for the government of such territories, or for the admis- sion of new States into the Union, did not place the new government in a position here, if it acted at all, it would act beyond the sbke of its constitu- tional authority, certainly admitted of grave ques- tion.1 But the acquisition of the territory itself rested upon acts, which were so directly and ex- pressly connected with the establishment of the new Union under the Confederation, as to make the ac- quisition itself part of the fundamental conditions of that Union, and the principal guaranty of its con- tinuance. Among the declared purposes f r, wfich these acquisitions were made, was that oaxwfiriipg them into new States, to be admitted into nion; and as all the States acquiesced in and?‘ embraced this purpose, they may be said to have conferred 1 The Federalist. on. v.] THE CONFEDERATION. 295 upon Congress an implied power to legislate to car- ry it into effect. Still, the want of an express au- thority in the Articles thus to deal with acquired territory was afterwards felt and insisted upon, as the Confederation drew towards the close of its ca- reer? Virginia, in 1781, offered to make a cession to the United States of her title to lands northwest of the Ohio, upon certain conditions, which were not satisfactory, and the subject had not been acted upon in Congress when the revenue system of 1783 was adopted for recommendation to the States. Looking to the prospect of vacant lands, as a means of hasten- ing the extinguishment of the public debts, as well as of establishing the harmony of the Union, Con- gress accompanied the recommendation of the rev- enue system by new solicitations to the States which had made no cessions of their public lands, or had made them in part only, to comply fully with the for- mer recommendations. This drew from the State of New Jersey, apprehensive that the offer of Virginia might be accepted, a remonstranee against the cession proposed by that State, as partial, unjust, and illib- eral.2 Congress again took the subject into consider- ation, examined the conditions which the legislature of Virginia had annexed to their proposed grant, de- clared some of them inadmissible, and stated the con- ditions on‘which the cession could be received.3 Vir- ginia complied with the terms proposed by Congress, 1 Ibid. 3 September 13, 1783. 9 June 20, 1783. ' 296 TEE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. and upon those terms ceded to the United States all right, title, and claim, both of soil and jurisdiction, which the State then had to the territory within the limits of its charter, lying to the northwest of the river Ohio. That magnificent region, in which now lie the powerful States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, became the property of the United States, by a grant of twenty lines, exe- cuted in Congress by Thomas Jefferson and three of his colleagues, on the 1st day of March, 1784..1 Soon after this cession had been completed, Con- gress passed a resolve for the regulation of the terri- tory that had been or might be ceded to the United States, for the establishment of temporary and per- manent governments by the settlers, and for the 1 The granting part of the deed of cession, exclusive of its recitals, is as follows : “ That we, the said Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Hardy, Arthur Lee, and James Munroe, by virtue of the power and author- ity committed to us by the act of the said General Assembly of Vir- ginia before recited, and in the name and for and on behalf of the said Commonwealth, do by these presents convey, transfer, assign, and make over unto the United States in Congress assembled, for the benefit of the said States, Vir- ginia inclusive, all right, title, and claim, as well of soil as of juris- diction, which the said Common- wealth hath to the territory or tract of country within the lines of the Virginia charter, situate, lying, and being to the northwest of the river Ohio, to and for the uses and purposes, and on the con- ditions, of the said recited act.” The cession was made with the reservation of such a portion of the territory ceded, between the rivers Scioto and Little Miami, as might be required to make up the deficiencies of land on the south side of the Ohio, called the Green River lands, reserved for the Vir- ginia troops on continental estab- lishment. (Journals, IX. 67 - 69.) Subsequently, the act of cession was altered, so as to admit of the formation of not more than five, nor less than three States, of a size more convenient than that described in the act of cession and in the re- solve of October 10, 1780. (Jour- nals, XI. 139, 140. July 9, 1786.) 0n. v.] THE conrnnnnn'rron. 297 admission of the new States thus formed into the Union.1 This resolve provided, that the territory which had been or might be ceded to the United States, after the extinguishment of the Indian title, and when offered for sale by Congress, should be divided into separate States, in a manner specified; that the settlers on such territory, either on their own petition or on the order of Congress, should receive authority to form a temporary government; I and that when there should be twenty thousand free inhabitants within the limits of any of the States thus designated, they should receive authority to call a convention 2f representatives to establish a per- manent constitution and government for themselves, provided that both the temporary and permanent governments should be established on these princi- ples, as their basis: --‘1. That they should for ever remain a part of the Confederacy of the United States of America. 2. That they should be subject to the Articles of Confederation and the acts and ordinances of Congress, like the original parties to that instru- ment. 3. That they should in no case interfere with the disposal of the soil by Congress. 4. That they should be subject to pay a part of the federal debts, present and prospective, in the same measure of ap- portionment with the other States. 5. That they should impose no tax upon lands, the property of the United States. 6. That their respective govern- ments should be republican. 7. That the lands of 1 April 23, 1784. Journals, IX. 153. von. 1. 38 298 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK In. non-resident proprietors should not be taxed higher than those of residents, in any new State, before its delegates had been admitted to vote in Congress. The resolve also contained a provision, which ap- pears to have been designed to meet the want of con- stitutional power, under the Articles of Confedera- tion, relative to the admission of new States. It was declared, that whenever any of the States thus formed should have as many free inhabitants as the least numerous of the thirteen original States, it should be admitted by its delegates into Congress on an equal footing with the original\ States, provided the assent of so many States in Congress should be first obtained, as might at the time be competent to such admission. It was further declared, that, in order to adapt the Articles of Confederation to the condition of Congress when it should be thus increased, it should be proposed to the original States, parties to that instrument, to change the rule, which re- quired a vote of nine States, to a vote of two thirds of all the States in Congress; and that when this change had been agreed upon, it should be binding upon the new States. i After the establishment of a temporary govern- ment, and before its admission into the Union, each of the new States was to have the right to keep a member in Congress, with the privilege of debating, but not of voting. It was also provided, that meas- ures not inconsistent with the principles of the Con; federation, and necessary for the preservation of peace and good order among the settlers in any of the said on. v.; THE CONFEDERATION. 299 new States, until they had assumed a temporary gov- ernment, might, from time to time, be taken by the United States in Congress assembled. These provisions were to stand as a charter of compact and as fimdamental constitutions between the thirteen original States and each of the new States thus described, unalterable from and after the sale of any part of the territory of such State, but by the joint consent of the United States in Congress as- sembled, and of the particular State to be affected? New and urgent recommendations f llowed the pas- sage of this resolve, pressing \the/Stjaites to consider that the war was now happily brought to a close, by the services of the army, the supplies of property by citizens, and loans of money by citizens and foreign- ers, constituting a body of creditors who had a right to expect indemnification, and that the vacant terri- tory was an important resource for this great object.2 The subject does not Ogeem to have again occupied the attention of Congress until the spring of the following year, when a proposition was introduced and committed, to exclude slavery and involuntary servitude, otherwise than in punishment of crimes, from the States described in the resolve of April 23d, 1784, and to make this provision part of the COD]:- pact established by that resolves ' Soon afterwards, a cession was made by Massa- 1 April 23, 1784. Journals, IX. 3 This proposition was intro- 153. duced by Rufus King, March 16, 2 April 29, 1784. Journals, 1785, and was committed by the IX. 184. votes of eight States against four. 300 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK In. chusetts of all its right and title, both of soil and jurisdiction, to the Western territory lying within the limits of the charter of that State.1 In the suc- ceeding month, Congress adopted an ordinance for ascertaining the mode of disposing of the Western lands to settlers.2 In the \cqurse of the next year, the cession by Connectivcut was made, after" various negotiations, with a reservation to that State of the property in a considerable tract of country, since called the Connecticut Reserve, lying to the south of Lake Erie, and now embraced within the State of Ohio.3 . - . Before this transaction had been completed, it had become manifest, from the knowledge that had been obtained of the country northwest of the Ohio, that it would be extremely inconvenient to lay it out into States of the extent and dimensions described in the resolve of October 10, 1780, under which the ces- sion of Virginia had been made; and the legislature of that State were accordingly asked to modify their 1 April 19, 1785. 9 May 20, 1785. 3 September 14, 1786. Jour— nals, XI. 221 - 223. The deed of cession, and the act of Connecticut recited in it, do not disclose this reservation. Thqyterritory ceded is described by certain lines which include less than the whole claim of Connecticut. It appears from the Journals, under the date of May 22—26, 1786, and from vari- ous propositions considered between those dates, that the State of Con- necticut claimed to own a larger extent of territory than she pro- posed to cede ; and by way of com- promise, her claim was so far ac- ceded to, that Congress agreed to accept of a cession of less than the whole. The reservation embraced about six millions of acres. See Sparks’s Washington, IX. 178, note, where it appears that the right of the State to this territory was considered very feeble at the time. ' on v.] THE CONFEDERATION. 301 act of cession, so as to enable Congress to lay out the territory into not more than five nor less than three States, as the situation and circumstances of the country might require.1 This suggestion was com- plied with? A cession by South Carolina then followed, of all its claim to lands lying towards the river Missis- sippi ; 3 but no other cessions were made to the United States under the Confederation; those of Georgia and North Carolina having been made after the adoption of the Constitution.4 It appears, therefore, that, with the exception of the claims of South Carolina to territory lying due west from that State towards the river Mississippi, the United States, before the 13th of July, 17 87 , had become possessed of the title to no other terri- tory than that which had been surrendered to them by the States of New York, Virginia, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. The great mass of this territory was that embraced within the cession of Virginia, and lying to the northwest of the river Ohio; and after the whole title to this region, with the excep- tion of some reserved tracts, had become complete in the United States, it was subject to the resolves of 1780 and of 1784. The provisions of the resolve of 1784, however, were soon seen to be inconvenient and inapplicable to the pressing wants of this region. Immediate legislation was plainly demanded for this 1 July 9, 1786. , 4 That of North Carolina was 9 December 30, 1788. made February 25, 1790, and that 3 August 9, 1787. of Georgia, April 24, 1802. 302 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK 111. territory, which could not wait the slow process of forming first temporary and then permanent gov- ernments, as had been contemplated by that resolve. Congress had had cast upon it the administration of an empire, exterior to the Confederation, and rapidly filling with people, in which the rights and tenure of property, the preservation of order and tranquillity, and the shaping of its political and social destinies, re- quired instant legislation. This legislation was there- fore provided in the celebrated Ordinance for the Government of the Northwestern Territoiy, enacted July 13, 1787, which was designed to supersede and in terms directly repealed the resolve of 1784. As this fundamental law for a new and unsettled coun- try -— at that time a novel undertaking —- must al- ways be regarded with interest in every part of " the world, and as it lies at the foundation of the civil polity of a sixth part of these United States, its prin- ciples and provisions should be carefully examined. The territory was, for the purposes of temporary government, constituted one district, subject to be di- vided into two, as future circumstances might require. An equal distribution of property among the chil- dren of persons dying intestate, with a life estate to the widow in one third of the ‘real and personal estate, was made the law of the territory, until it should be altered by its legislature. Persons of full age were empowered to dispose of ' their estates by a written will, executed in the presence of three wit- nesses. Real estates were authorized to be conveyed by deed, executed by a person of full age, acknowl- cs. v.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 303 edged and attested by two witnesses. Both wills and deeds were required to be registered. Personal property was transferable by delivery. The civil government of the territory was to con- sist of executive, legislative, and judicial branches. A Governor was to be appointed fi'om time to time by Congress, and to be commissioned for three years, subject to removal; but he was to reside in the dis- trict, and to have a freehold estate there in one thbu- sand acres of land, while in the exercise of his oflice. A Secretary was also to be appointed from time to time by Congress, and to be commissioned for four years, subject to removal, but to reside in the district, and to have a freehold estate there in five hundred acres of land, while in the exercise of his office. There was also to be appointed a court of common law jurisdiction, to consist of three judges, any two of whom should form a court; they were to reside in the district, and to have each a freehold estate there in five hundred acres of land, while in the ex- ercise of their office; their commissions to continue in force during good behavior. The Governor and Judges, or a majority of them, were to adopt and publish in the district such laws of the original States, criminal and civil, as might be necessary and best suited to the circumstances of the district, to be in force in the district until the organization of the General Assembly, unless disap- proved by Congress, to whom, from time to time, they should be reported; - but the legislature, when constituted, were to have authority to alter them as they should think fit. 304 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. Magistrates and other civil Officers were to be ap- pointed by the Governor, previous to the organiza- tion of the General Assembly, for the preservation of peace and good order; After the organization of the General Assembly, the powers and duties of magistrates and other civil officers were to be regu- lated and defined by the legislature, but their ape pointment was to remain with the Governor. For the prevention of crimes and injuries, the laws to be adopted or made were to have force in all parts of the district, and for the execution of'process, criminal and civil, the Governor was to make proper divisions of the territory, and to lay out the portions where the Indian titles had been extinguished, from time to time, into counties and townships, subject to future alteration by the legislature. As soon as there should be five thousand free male inhabitants, of full age, in the district, upon giving proof thereof to the Governor, they were to receive authority to elect representatives from their counties or townships, to represent them in the General As- sembly. For every five hundred male inhabitants, there was to be one representative; and so on pro- gressively the right of representation was to increase, until the number of representatives should amount to twenty-five, after which their numbers and pro- portions were to be regulated by the legislature. The qualifications of a representative were to be pre- vious citizenship in one of the United States for three years, and residence in the district, or a resi- dence of three years in the district, with a fee-simple on. v.] THE conrnnnnnrron. 305 estate, in either case, of two hundred acres of land within the district. The qualifications of electors were to be a fieehold in fifty acres of land in the district, previous citizenship in one of the United States, and residence in the district, or the like free- hold and two years’ residence in the district. The Ordinance then proceeded to state certain fun- damental articles of compact between the original States and the people and States in the territory, which were to remain unalterable, except by com- mon consent. The first provided for freedom of re- ligious opinion and worship. The second provided for the right to the writ of habeas cmpus ; for trial by ury; for a proportionate representation in the legislature; for judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law; for offences not capital being bailable; for fines being moderate, and pun- ishments not cruel nor unusual; for no man’s being deprived of his liberty or property, but by the judg- ment of his peers or the law of the land; for full compensation for property taken or services demanded for the public; and that no law should ever be made, or have force in the territory, that should in any manner whatever interfere with or affect private con- tracts or engagements, previously formed, bona fide and without fraud. The third provided for the en- couragement of religion and education, for schools, and for good faith towards the rights and property of the Indian tribes. The fourth provided that the territory and the States to be formed therein should for ever remain a part of the Confederacy, subject to von. 1 39 306 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III the constitutional authority of Congress; that the inhabitants should be liable to be taxed proportion. ately for the public expenses; that the legislature in the territory should never interfere with the pri- mary disposal of the soil by Congress, nor with their regulations for securing the title to purchasers; that no tax should be imposed on lands, the prop- erty of the United States; that non-resident pro- prietors should not be taxed more than residents; and that the navigable waters leading into the Mis- sissippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying-places between them, should be common highways and for ever free. The fifth provided, that there should be formed in the territory not less than three, nor more than five States, with certain boundaries; and that whenever any of the States should contain sixty thousand free inhabitants, such State should be (and might be be- fore) admitted by its delegates into Congress, on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever, and should be at liberty to form a perma- nent constitution and State government, provided it should be republican, and in conformity with these articles of compact. The sixth provided, that there should be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes; but that fugitives owing service in other States might be reclaimed. American, legislation has never achieved any thing more admirable, as an internal government, than this on. v.] THE CONFEDERATION. 307 comprehensive scheme. Its provisions concerning the distribution of property, the principles of civil and religious liberty which it laid at the foundation of the communities since established under its sway, and the efficient and simple organization by which it created the first machinery of civil society, are wor- thy of all the praise that has ever attended it. It was not a plan devised in the closet, upon theo- retical principles of abstract fitness. It was a con- stitution of government drawn by men who under- stood, from experience, the practical working of the principles which they undertook to embody. Those principles were, it is true, to be applied to a state of society not then formed; but they were taken from states of society in which they had been tried with success. The equal division of property; general, not universal suffrage, but a suffrage guarded by some degree of interest in society; representative gov- ernment; the division of the three grand departments of political power; freedom of religious opinion and worship; the habeas corpus, trial by ury, and the course of the common law; the right to be hailed for offences not capital, and the prohibition of im- moderate fines and cruel or unusual punishments; the great principle of compensation for property or service demanded by the public, and the legislative inviolability of contracts; the encouragement of schools and the means of education, —were all taken from the ancient or recent constitutions of States. from which the greater part of the inhabitants of the new territory would necessarily come. A community 308 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK In founded on these principles was predestined to pros- perity and happiness. But it was in the provisions of the Ordinance rela- tive to the admission into the Union of the new States to be formed upon this territory, that the relation be- tween the existing government of the United States and its great dependency was afterwards found to in- volve serious difficulties. The Union was at that time a confederacy of thirteen States, originally formed mainly with reference to the exigencies of the war; and, although the Articles of Confederation had been ratified under circumstances which gave to the United States the authority to acquire this property, they had vested in Congress no power to enlarge the Con- federacy by the admission of new States. Yet the Ordinance undertook to declare that new States should be admitted into the Congress of the United States on an equal footing with the existing States in all respects whatever, without proposing to sub- mit that question to the original parties to the Con- federacy. ' It does not appear from contemporary evidence that this difficulty attracted public attention, at the time of the passage of the Ordinance. In the year 1787, the Confederation was laboring under far more pressing and alarming defects than the want of strict constitutional power to create new States. Pub- lic attention was consequently more engaged with the consideration of evils which affected the pros- perity of the original States themselves, than with the destiny of the new communities, or the method on. v.] THE CONFEDERATION. 309 by which they were to be brought into the Union. It was not immediately perceived, also, that a prop- erty, capable at no distant day of becoming a vast mine of wealth to the United States, as a great and independent revenue, had come under the manage- ment of a single body of men, constituted originally without reference to such a trust, and with no de- clared constitutional provisions for its administration. When, however, the Constitution was in the process of formation, the necessity for provisions under which Congress could dispose of the public lands, and by which new States could be admitted into the Union, was at once felt and conceded on all sides.1 Far more serious difliculties, however, attended the management by the Confederation of the interests of the Western country ; — difficulties which commenced immediately after the Peace, and continued to increase, until the course taken by Congress had nearly lost to the Union the whole of that immense region which now pours its commerce down the Mississippi and its great tributary waters. These difficulties sprang from the inherent weakness of the federal government, — from the absolute incapacity of Congress, constituted as it was, to deal wisely, safely, and efficiently with the foreign relations of the country and its internal affairs, under the delicate and critical circumstances in which it was then placed. After the Treaty of Peace, the Western settlements, flanked by the dependencies of Great Britain at the north and of 1 See Mr. Madison’s notes of Elliot, V. 128, 157, 190, 211,376, the Debates in the Confederation.I 381 310 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK 111 Spain at the south, and rapidly filling with a bold, adventurous, and somewhat lawless population, whose ties of connection with the Eastern States were al- most sundered by the remoteness of their position and the difliculties of communication, stood upon a pivot, where accident might have thrown them out of the Union. This population found themselves seated in a luxuriant and fertile country, capable of a threefold greater production than the States eastward of the Alleghany and Appalachian Mountains, and intersected by natural water communications of the most ample character, all tending to the great high- way of the Mississippi. A soil richer than any over which the Anglo-Saxon race had hitherto spread itself upon this continent, in any of its temperate climes; large plains and meadows, capable, without labor, of supporting millions of cattle; and fields destined to vie with the most favored lands on the globe in the production of wheat, were already accumulating upon the banks of their great rivers a weight of produce far beyond the necessities of subsistence, and loudly demanding the means of reaching the markets of the world. The people of the Atlantic States knew little of the resources or situation of this country. They valued it chiefly as a means of paying the public debts by the sale of its lands; but until they were in imminent danger of losing it, from the inefficiency of the national government, they had little idea of the supreme necessity of seeming for it an outlet to the sea, if they would preserve it to the Union. Washington, in the autumn of 17 84, after his re on. v.] THE CONFEDERATION. 311 tirement to Mount Vernon, made a tour into the Western country, for the express purpose of ascer- taining by what means it could be most effectually bound to the Union. The policy of opening com- munications eastward, by means of the rivers flowing through Virginia to the Atlantic Ocean struck him at once. On his return, he addressed a letter to the Governor of the State, in which he recommended the appointment of a commission, to make a survey of the whole means of natural water communication between Lake Erie and the tide-waters of Virginia. He does not seem at this time to have considered the navigation of the Mississippi as of great importance; but he thought rather that the opening of that river would have a tendency to separate the Western from the Eastern States? A year later, he held a clear opin- ion, that its navigation ought not at present to be made an object by the United‘ States, but that their true policy was to open all the possible avenues be- 1 His recommendation contem- plated a survey of James River and the Potomac, from tide-water to their respective sources ; then to ascertain the best portage between those rivers and the streams capa- ble of improvement which run into the Ohio; then to traverse and sur- vey those streams to their junction with the Ohio; then, passing down the Ohio to the mouth of the Mus— kingum, to ascend that river to the carrying-place to the Cuyahoga ; then down the Cuyahoga to Lake Erie, and thence to Detroit. He also advised a survey of Big Beaver Creek, and of the Scioto, and of all the waters east and west of the Ohio, which invited attention by their proximity and the ease of land transportation between them and the James and Potomac Rivers. “These things being done,” he said, “ I shall be mistaken if prej- udice does not yield to facts, jeal- ousy to candor, and finally, if rea- son and nature, thus aided, do not dictate what is right and proper to be done.” (Writings of Washing- ton, IX. 65.) This suggestion was adopted, and a commission ap- pointed. 312 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. tween the Atlantic States and the Western territory, and that, until this had been done, the obstructions to the use of the Mississippi had better not be removed.1 Those obstructions, however, involved the hazard of a loss of the territory to which the navigation of that river had already become extremely important. Their nature is, therefore, now to be explained. The Treaty of Peace with Great Britain recognized, as the southern boundary of the United States, a line drawn from a point where the thirty-first degree of north latitude intersected the river Mississippi, along that parallel due east to the middle of the river Appalachicola; thence along- the middle of that river to its junction with the Flint River; thence in a straight line to the head of St. Mary’s River; and thence down the middle of that river to the Atlantic Ocean? At the time of the negotiation of this treaty ‘Vest Florida was in the possession of Spain; and a secret article was executed by the British and American plenipotentiaries, which stipulated that in case Great Britain, at the conclusion of a peace with Spain, should recover or be put in possession of West Florida, the north boundary between that prov- ince and the United States should be a line drawn from the mouth of the river Yassous, where it unites with the river Mississippi, due east to the river Appalachicola? The treaty also stipulated, that the navigation of the Mississippi, from its source to the 1 Writings, IX. 63, 117- 119. 3 Executed November 30, 1782. August 22, 1785. Secret Journals, III. 338. _ 2 Article II. Journals, IX. 26. on. v.1 THE conrsnnnarrou. 313 ocean, should for ever remain free and open to the subjects of Great Britain and the citizens of the United States? When the treaty came to be ratified and published, in 17 84, the Spanish government was already ac- quainted with this secret article. .Iustly assuming that no treaty between Great Britain and the United States could settle the boundaries between the terri- tories of the latter power and those of Spain, or give of itself a right to navigate a river passing wholly through their dominions, they immediately caused it to be signified to Congress, that, until the limits of Louisiana and the two Floridas should be settled and determined, by an admission on the part of Spain that they had been rightfully described in the Treaty with England, they must assert their territorial claims to the exclusive control of the river; and also, that the navigation would under no circumstances be con- ceded, while Spain held the right to its control? To accommodate these difficulties, Congress resolved to send Mr. Jay, their Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to Spain; but his departure was prevented by the ar- rival in the United States of Don Diego Guardoqui, as Minister from Spain, charged with the negotia- tion of a treaty.3 Preparatory to this negotiation, the first instruc- tion which Mr. Jay received from Congress was, to 1 Article VIII. Journals, IX. 29. 3 Guardoqui arrived and was rec- 2 June 25, 1784. Communicat- ognized July 2, 1785. Secret J our ed to Congress November 19, 1784. nals, III. 563. Secret Journals, III. 517, 518. von. 1. 40 314 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK n1 ' insist upon the right of the United States to the ter- ritorial boundaries and the free navigation of the Mississippi, as settled by their treaty with Great Brit- ain.1 Upon this point, however, the Spanish Min- ister was immovable. A long negotiation ensued, in which he evinced entire readiness to make a lib- eral commercial treaty with the United States, con- ceding to their trade very important advantages; but at the same time refusing the right to use the Mississippi. Such a treaty was regarded as extremely important to the United States. There was scarcely a single production of this country that could not be advantageously exchanged in the Spanish Euro- pean ports for gold and silver. The influence of Spain in the Mediterranean, with Portugal, with France, with the States of Barbary, and the trade with her Canaries and the adj acent islands, rendered a commercial alliance with her of the utmost impor- tance. That importance was especially felt by the Eastern and Middle States, whose influence in Con- gress thus became opposed to the agitation of the subject of opening the Mississippi.2 Indeed, the pre- vailing opinion in Congress, at this time, was for not insisting on the right of navigation as a necessary requisite in the treaty with Spain; and there were some important and influential persons in that body ready to agree to the abandonment of the right, rath- er than defer longer a free and liberal system of trade 1 August 25, 1785. SecretJour- by Mr. Jay to Congress, August nals, III. 585, 586. 3, 1786. Secret Journals, 1V. 9 See the communication made 43. cu. v.1 THE conEEnEEATroN. 315 with a power able to give conditions so advantageous to the United States? The Eastern States considered a commercial treaty with Spain as the best remedy for their distresses, which flowed, as they believed, from the decay of their commerce. dle States joined in this opinion. Two of the Mid- Virginia, on the other hand, opposed all surrender of the right.2 In this posture of affairs, Mr. Jay proposed to Congress a middle course. Believing, as Washing- ton continued to believe,3 that the navigation of the 1 Henry Lee, then in Congress, wrote to Washington on the 3d of July, 1786, as follows: “Your reasoning is perfectly conformable to the prevalent doctrine on that subject in Congress. We are very solicitous to form a treaty with Spain for commercial purposes. Indeed, no nation in Europe can give us conditions so advantageous to our trade as that kingdom. The carrying business they are like our- selves in, and this common source of difficulty in adjusting commer- cial treaties between other nations does not apply to America and Spain. But, my dear General, I do not think you go far enough. Rather than defer longer a free and liberal system of trade with Spain, why not agree to the exclusion of the Mississippi’! This exclusion will not, cannot, exist longer than the infancy of the Western emi- grants. Therefore, to these peo- ple what is now done cannot be important. To the Atlantic States it is highly important; for we have no prospect of bringing to a con- clusion our negotiations with the court of Madrid, but by yielding the navigation of the Mississippi. Their Minister here is under posi- tive instructions on that point. In all other arrangements, the Span- ish monarch will give to the States testimonies of his regard and friend- ship. And I verily believe, that, if the above difliculty should be re- moved, we should soon experience the advantages which would flow from a connection with Spain.” (Writings of Washington, IX. 173, note.) 2 Washington’s Writings, IX. 205, 206, note. 3 Washington had not changed his opinion, at the time of these negotiations. On the 18th of June, 1786, he wrote to Henry Lee, in answer to his letter above quoted : “ The advantages with which the inland navigation of the rivers Potomac and James is pregnant, must strike every mind that rea- sons upon the subject; but there is, I perceive, a diversity of senti- ment respecting the benefits and 316 ~ TIIE FEDERAL CONsTITUTION. [BOOK III. Mississippi was not at that time very important, and that it would not become so for twenty-five or thirty years, he suggested that the treaty should be limited to that period, and that one of its articles should stipulate, that the United States would forbear to use the navigation of the river below their territories to the ocean. It was supposed that such a forbearance, carrying no surrender of the right, would, at the ex- piration of the treaty, leave the whole subject in as favorable a position as that in which it now stood. Besides, the only alternative to obtaining such an article from Spain was to make war with her, and en- force the opening of the river. The experiment, at consequences which may flow from the free and immediate use of the Mississippi. My opinion of this matter has been uniformly the same ; and no light in which I have been able to consider the subject is likely to change it. It is, neither to re- linquish nor to push our claim to this navigation, but in the mean while to open all the communica- tions which Nature has afforded be- tween the Atlantic States and the Western territory, and to encour- age the use of them to the utmost. In my judgment, it is matter of very serious concern to the well-being of the former to make it the inter— est of the latter to trade with them; without which, the ties of consan- guinity, which are weakening every day, will soon be no bond, and we shall be no more, a few years hence, to the inhabitants of that country, than the British and Spaniards are at this day; not so much, indeed, because commercial connections, it is well known, lead to Others, and united are diflicult to be broken. These must take place with the Spaniards, if the navigation of the Mississippi is opened. Clear I am, that it would be for the interest of the Western settlers, as low down the Ohio as the Big Kenhawa, and back to the Lakes, to bring their produce through one of the chan- nels I have named; but the way must be cleared, and made easy and obvious to them, or else the ease with which people glide down streams will give a different bias to their thinking and acting. When- ever the new States become so pop- ulous and so extended to the west ward as really to need it, there will be no power which can de- prive them of the use of the Mis- sissippi. Why, then, should we on. v.] THE CONFEDERATION. 317 least, it was argued, would do no injury, and might produce much good? These arguments prevailed, so far as to cause a change in Mr. J ay’s instructions, by a vote, which was deemed by him suflicient to confer authority to obtain such an article as he had suggested, but which was clearly unconstitutional. Seven States against five voted to rescind the instructions of August 25, 1785, by which the Secretary had been directed to insist on the right of navigation, and not to conclude or sign any treaty until he had communicated it to Congress? Mr. Jay accordingly agreed with the prematurely urge a matter which is displeasing, and may produce disagreeable consequences, if it is our interest to let it sleep’! It may require some management to quiet the restless and impetuous spirits of Kentucky, of whose con- duct I am more apprehensive in this business than I am of all the opposition that will be given by the Spaniards.” (IX. 172, 173.) On the 26th of July of the same year, he again wrote to the same gentl%an, expressing the same opinions; and on the 31st of Oc- tober, he said that these senti- ments “ are controverted by only one consideration of weight, and that is, the operation which the oc- clusion of the river may have on the minds of the Western settlers, who will not consider the subject in a relative point of view, or on a comprehensive scale, and may be influenced by the demagogues of the country to acts of extravagance and desperation, under the popular declamation, that their interests are sacrificed.” In July, 1787, he retained the same views as to the true policy of the different sections of the country interested in this question, but admitted that, from the spirit manifested at the West, it had become a moot point to de- termine, when every circumstance was brought into view, what was best to be done. (IX. 172, 180, 205,261.) 1 See Mr. Jay’s reasoning, Se- cret Journals, IV. 53, 54. 2 August 29, 1786. SecretJour- nals, IV. 109, 110. The States which voted to rescind these in- structions were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Con- necticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland; Vir ginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, voted not to rescind. Another resolution was carried on the following day (August 30), by 318 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. Spanish Minister on an article which suspended the use of the Mississippi, without relinquishing the right asserted by the United States.1 While these proceedings were going on, and be- fore the vote of seven States in Congress had been obtained in favor of the present suspension of this diflicult controversy, an occurrence took place at Natchez, which aroused the jealousy of the whole West. A seizure was made there, by the Spanish authorities, of certain American property, which had been carried down the river for shipment or sale at New Orleans? The owner, returning slowly in the autumn to his home, in the western part of North Carolina, by a tedious land journey through Ken- tucky, detailed everywhere the story of his wrongs and of the loss of his adventure. The news of this seizure, as it circulated up the valley from below, encountered the intelligence coming from the east- ward, that Congress proposed to surrender the pres- ent use of the Mississippi. Alarm and indignation fired the whole population of the Western: settle- ments. They believed themselves to be on thepoint of being sacrificed to the commercial policy off-‘the the votes of seven States, instruct- ing the Secretary to insist on the territorial limits or boundaries of the United States, as fixed in the Treaty with Great Britain, and not to form any treaty with the Span- ish Minister, unless those bounda- ries. were acknowledged and se- cured. Ibid. 111- 116. 1 This agreement was made be- tween the 29th of August, the date of the rescinding resolution, and the 6th of October, 1786. See Mr. J ay’s communication to Congress ‘under the latter date, Secret J our- nals, IV. 297 - 301. 2 This seizure was made on the 6th of June, 1786. Secret Jour- nals, IV. 325. on. v.] THE CONFEDERATION. 319 Atlantic States; and, feeling that they stood in the relation of colonists to the rest of the Union, they held language not unlike that which the old colo- nies had held towards England, in the earlier days of the great controversy. They surveyed the magnificent region which they were subduing flom the dominion of Nature; -- the inexhaustible resources of its soil already yielding an abundance, which needed only a free avenue to the ocean to make them rich and prosperous ;-—andthey felt that the mighty river which swept by them, with a volume of waters capable of sustaining the navies of the world, had been destined by Providence as a natural channel through which the productions of their imperial valley should be made to swell the commerce of the globe. But the Spaniard was seated at the outlet of this noble stream, sullenly refusing to them all access to the ocean. To him they must pay tribute. To enrich him, they must till those luxuriant lands, which gave, by an almost spontane- ous production, the largest return which American labgr had yet reaped under the industry of its own freQ hands. Their proud spirits, unaccustomed to restraint, and expanding in a liberty unknown in the older sections of the country, could not brook this vassalage. Into the comprehensive schemes of states- men, who sought to unite them with the East by a great chain of internal improvements, and thus to blend the interests of the West with the com- mercial prosperity of the whole country, they were too impatient, and too intent upon the engrossing 320 THE FEDERAL CONsTITUTION. [BOOK III object of their own immediate advantage, to be able to enter. What, they exclaimed, could have induced the ‘ legislature of the United States, which had been applauded for their assertion and defence of the rights and privileges of the country, so soon to en- deavor to subject a large part of their dominion to a slavery worse than that to which Great Britain had presumed to subject any part of hers’! To give up to the Spaniards the greatest share of the fruits of their toils,—to surrender to them, on their own terms, the produce of‘ that large, rich, and fertile country, and thus to enable them to command the benefits of every foreign market, -—- was an intolerable thought. What advantage, too, would it be to the Atlantic States, when Spain, from the amazing resources of the Mississippi, could undersell them in every part of the world! Did they think by this course of policy to prevent emigration from a barren country, loaded with taxes and impoverished by debts, to the most luxurious and fertile soil within the limits of the Union’! The idea was vain and presumptu- ous. As well might the fishes of the sea be 3'i‘épre- vented from gathering on a bank that afforded them ample nourishment. The best and largest part of the United States was not thus to be left uncultivated; a _ home for savages and wild beasts. Providence had destined it for nobler purposes. It was to be the abode of a great, prosperous, and cultivated people,— of Americans in feeling, in rights, in spirit, incapable of becoming the bondmen of Spain, while the rest CH. v.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 321 of their country remained free. Their own strength could achieve for them what the national power re- fused or was unable to obtain. Twenty thousand effective men, west of the Alleghanies, were ready to rush to the mouth of the Mississippi, and drive the Spaniards into the sea. Great Britain stood with open arms to receive them. If not countenanced and succored by the federal government, their allegiance would be thrown off, and the United States would find too late that they were as ignorant of the great valley of the Mississippi, as England was of the Atlan- tic States when the contest for independence began? 1 See the documents laid before Congress, April 13, 1787. Secret Journals, IV. 315-328. On the 30th of January, 1787, Mr. J effer- son thus writes to Mr. Madison, from Paris: “ If these transactions give me no uneasiness, I feel very differently at another piece of intel- ligence, to wit, the possibility that the navigation of the Mississippi may be abandoned to Spain. I never had any interest westward of the Alleghany; and I never will have any. But I have had great opportunities of knowing the char- acter of the people who inhabit that country; and I will venture to say, that the act which abandons the navigation of the Mississippi is an act of separation between the Eastern and Western country. It is a relinquishment of five parts out of eight of the territory of the United States; an abandonment of the fairest subject for the payment of our public debts, and the chaining VOL. I. 41 those debts on our own necks, in perpetuam. I have the utmost con- fidence in the‘ honest intentions of those who concur in this measure ; but I lament their want of acquaint- ance with the character and physi- cal advantages of the people, who, right or wrong, will suppose their interests sacrificed on this occasion to the contrary interests of that part of the Confederacy in posses- sion of present power. If they de- clare themselves a separate people, we are incapable of a single effort to retain them. Our citizens can never be induced, either as militia or as soldiers, to go there to cut the threats of their own brothers and sons, or rather, to be them- selves the subjects instead of the perpetrators of the parricide. Nor would that country quit the cost -of being retained against the will of its inhabitants, could it be done. But it cannot be done. They are able already to rescue .the naviga- 322 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [Boon III. Such was the feeling that prevailed in the Western country, as soon as it became known that a treaty was actually pending, by which the right to navigate the Mississippi might be suspended for a quarter of a century. That it should have been accompanied by acts of retaliation and outrage against the prop- erty of Spanish subjects, was naturally to have been expected. General George Rogers Clarke, pretend- ing to authority from the State of Virginia, under- took to enlist men and establish a garrison at Port St. Vincennes, ostensibly for the protection of the district of Kentucky, then under the jurisdiction of Virginia. He made a seizure there of some Spanish goods for the purpose of clothing, and subsisting his men, and sent an officer to the Illinois, to advise the settlers there of the seizures of American property made at Natchez, and to recommend them to retali- ate for any outrages the Spaniards might commit in that country.1 The executive of Virginia disavowed these acts, as soon as oflicially informed of them; ordered the par- ties to be brought to punishment; and sent a formal tion of the Mississippi out of the hands of Spain, and to add New Orleans to their own territory. They will be joined by the inhab- itants of Louisiana. This will bring on a war between them and Spain; and that will produce the question with us, whether it will- not be worth our‘ while to become parties with them in the war, in order to reunite them with us, and thus correct our error. And were I to permit my forebodings to go one step further, I should predict that the inhabitants of the United States would force their rulers to take the afiirmative of that ques- tion. I wish I may be mistaken in all these opinions.” (J eiferson, II. 87.) 1 Secret Journals, IV. 311 - 313. on. v.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 323 disclaimer, through their delegates in Congress, to the Spanish Minister? Guardoqui was not disturbed. He expected these occurrences, and maintained his ground, refusing to yield the right of navigating the river; and having assented to Mr. J ay’s pro- posal of an article which suspended the use for a pe- riod of twenty-five years, he was quite ready to go on and conclude the treaty. The people of the Western country, however, be- gan to form committees of correspondence, in order to unite their counsels and interests? The inhabit- ants of Kentucky sent a memorial to the General, Assembly of Virginia, which induced them to in- , struct their delegates in Congress to oppose any attempt to surrender the right of the United States to the free use of the Mississippi, as a dishonorable departure from the comprehensive and benevolent feeling that constituted the vital principle of the Confederation, and as provoking the ust resentment and reproaches of the Western people, whose essen- tial rights and interests would be thereby sacrificed. They also instructed their delegates to urge such negotiations with Spain as would obtain her consent to regulations for the mutual and common use of the river? The members from Virginia, with one excep- tion, concurred in the policy of these instructions,‘ 1 February 28, 1787. gress, April 19, 1787. Madison. 2 Madison. Elliot’s Debates, Elliot’s Debates, V. 103. V. 97. ‘1 Henry Lee did not approve of 3 These instructions were adopt- this policy. See Washington’s ed in November, 1786. Pitkin,~II. Works, IX, 205, note, 207. They were laid before Con- I 324 THE FEDERAL CONsTITUTION. [BOOK m. and at first addressed themselves to some conciliatory expedient for obviating the effect of the vote of seven States. They first represented to Guardoqui that it would be extremely impolitic, both for the United States and Spain, to make any treaty which should have the effect of shutting up the Mississippi. They stated to him, that such a treaty could not be en- forced; that it would be the means of peopling the Western country with increased rapidity, and would tend to a separation of that country fi~om the rest of the Union; that Great Britain would be able to turn the force that would spring up there against Spanish America; and that the result would be the creation of a power in the valley of the Mississippi hostile both to Spain and the United States. These rep- resentations produced no impression. The Spanish Minister remained firm in the position which he had held from the first, that Spain never would concede the claim of the United States to navigate the river. He answered, that the result of what had been urged was, that Congress could make no treaty at all, and consequently that the trade of the United States must remain liable to be excluded from the ports of Spain.1 Foiled in this quarter, the next expedient, for those who felt the necessity of preventing such a 1 See Madison’s account of two Guardoqui stated that he had had interviews with Guardoqui, March no conference with Mr. Jay since ‘13 and 19, 1787. Elliot,V. 98, 100. the previous October, and never At the first of these interviews. expected to confer with him again. on. v.] THE cournnnnnrrou. 325 treaty as had been contemplated, was to gain time, by transferring the negotiation to Madrid; and Mr. Madison introduced a resolution into Congress for this purpose, which was referred to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs? In a few days, the Secretary re ported against the proposal, and nothing remained for the opponents of the treaty, but to attack directly the vote of seven States, under which the Secretary had acted in proceeding to adjust with the Spanish Minister an article for suspending the right of the United States to the common use of the river below their southern boundary. The Articles of Confederation expressly declared, that the United States should not enter into any treaty or alliance, unless nine States in Congress as- sented to the same? It was very justly contended, therefore, that, to proceed to negotiate a treaty au thorized by a vote of only seven States, would expose the United States to great embarrassment with the other contracting party, since the vote made it cer- tain that the treaty could not be constitutionally ratified; and that the vote itself, having passed in a case requiring the assent of nine States, was not valid for the purpose intended by it. This was not 1 April 18, 1787. Madison. . came under consideration, Mr. Elliot, V. 102. On the next day Gorham of Massachusetts, accord- (April 19) the instructions of Vir— ing to Mr. Madison, avowed his ginia were laid before Congress, opinion, that the shutting of the but a motion to refer them also to Mississippi would be advantageous the Secretary was lost, Massachu- to the Atlantic States, and wished setts and New York voting against to see it shut. Ibid. 103. it, and Connecticut being divided. 9 Article IX. Ibid. When Mr. Jay’s report 326 THE FEDERAL coNsTITUTIoN. [BOOK III denied; but the advocates of the treaty, by means of a parliamentary rule, resisted the introduction of a resolution to rescind the vote of seven States? But while this dangerous subject was pending, the affairs of the country had taken a new turn. The Convention at Annapolis had been held, in the autumn of 1786, and the Convention called to revise the system of the federal government was to meet in May, 1787. It had become sure and plain, that a large increase of the powers of the national government was absolutely essential to the continuance of the Union and the prosperity of the States. Every day the situation of the country was becoming more and more critical. N 0 money came into the federal treasury; no respect was paid to the federal authority; and all men saw and ad mitted that the Confederation was tottering to its fall. Some prominent persons in the Eastern States were suspected of leaning towards monarchy; others openly predicted a partition of the States into two or more confederacies; and the distrust which had been created by the project for closing the Missis- sippi rendered it extremely probable, that the Western country at least would be severed from the Union. The advocates of that project recoiled, therefore, from the dangers which they had unwittingly created. They saw, that the crisis required that harmony and confidence should be studiously cherished, now that the great enterprise of remodelling the government 1 Madison. Elliot, V. 104, 105. on. v.] THE CONFEDERATION. 327 upon a firmer basis was to be attempted. They saw that no new powers could be obtained for the Federal Constitution, if the government then existing were to burden itself with an act so certain to be the source of dissension, and so likely to cause a dismem- berment of the Confederacy, as the closing of the Mississippi. Like wise and prudent men, therefore, they availed themselves of the expected and probable formation of a new government, as a fit occasion for disposing of this question; and after an effort to quiet the apprehensions that had been aroused, the whole matter was postponed, by general consent, to await the action of the great Convention of May, 1787? After the Constitution had been formed and adopted, the negotiation was formally referred to the new federal government which was about to be organized, in March, 1789, with a declaration of the opinion of Congress that the free navigation of the river Mississippi was a clear and essential right of the United States, and ought to be so considered and supported? 1 Ibid. 9 September 16, 1788. Secret Journals, IV. 449-454. CHAPTER VI. 1'783—1'787. DECAY AND FAILURE OF THE CoNFEDERATIoN.—-PRoeREss 0F OPIN- ION.—STEPS WHICH LED TO THE CoNvENTIoN OF 1787.--INFI.U- ENCE AND ExERTIONs 0F HAMILTON.—MEETING OF THE CONVEN- TION. THE prominent defects in the Confederation, which have been described in the previous chapters, and which were so rapidly developed after the treaty of 17 83, made it manifest, that a mere league between independent States, with no power of direct legisla- tion, was not a government for a country like this, in a time of peace. They showed, that this compact between the States, without any central arbiter to declare or power to enforce the duties which it in- volved, could not long continue. It had, indeed, answered the great purpose of forming the Union, by bringing the States into relations with each other, the continuance of which was essential to liberty; since nothing could follow the rupture of those rela- tions but the re'éstablishment of European power, or the native despotism which too often succeeds to civil commotion. By creating a corporate body of con- federate States, and by enabling them to go into the ‘PO on. v1.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 3g? money-markets of Europe for the means of carrying on and concluding the war, the Confederation had made the idea and the necessity of a Union familiar to the popular mind. But the purposesfland obj ects;[ of the war were far less complex tand intricat'ejthan the concerns of peace. It was comparatively easy to borrow money. _ It was another thing to pay it. The federal power, under the Confederation, had little else to do, before the peace, than to admin- ister the concerns of an army in the field, and to attend to the foreign relations of the country, as yet not complicated with questions of commerce. But the vast duties, capable of being discharged by no other power, which came rapidly into existence be- fore the creation of the machinery essential to their performance, exhibited the Confederation in an alarm- ing attitude. It was found to be destitute of the essence of po- litical sovereignty, — the power to compel the indi- vidual inhabitants of the country to obey its decrees. It was a system of legislation for States in their cor- porate and collective capacities, and not for the indi- viduals of whom those States were composed. It could not levy a dollar by way of impost or assess- ment upon the property of a citizen. It had no means of annulling the action of a State legislature, which conflicted with the lawful and constitutional requirements of Congress. It made treaties, and was forced to stand still and see them violated by its own members, for whose benefit they had been made. It owed an enormous debt, and saw itself, year by van. 1. 42 330 THE FEDERAL coNsTITUTIoN. [BOOK 111. year, growing more and more unable to liquidate even the annually increasing interest. It stood in the relation of a protector to the principles of repub- lican liberty on which the institutions of the States were founded, and on the first occurrence of dan- ger, it stretched forward only a palsied arm, to which no man could look for succor. It under- took to rescue commerce from the blighting effects of foreign policy, and failed to achieve a single conspicuous and important advantage. Every day it lost something of respect abroad and of confi- dence at home, until all men saw, with Washing- ton, that it had become a great shadow without the substance of a government; while few could even conjecture what was to rise up and sup- plant it. Few men could see, amidst the decay of empire and the absolute negation of all the vital and essen- tial functions of government, what was to infuse new life into a system so nearly effete. Yet the elements‘ of strength existed in the character of the people; in the assimilation, which might be produced, in the lapse of years, by a common language, a common origin, and a common destiny; —in the almost bound- less resources of the country;—and, above all, in the principles of its ancient local institutions, that were capable, to an extent not then conceived, of expan- sion and application to objects of far greater magni- tude than any which they had yet embraced. Through what progress of opinion the people of this country were enabled to grasp and combine these elements 0H. v1.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 331 into a new system, which could satisfy their wants, we must now inquire. In this inquiry, the student of political history / should never fail to observe, that the great difliculty of the case, which made it so complex and embar-l rassing, arose from the separate, sovereign, and inde- ,1 pendent existence of the States. The formation of i new constitutions, in countries not thus divided, in- volves only the adaptation of new institutions and forms to the genius, the laws, and the habits of the people. , The monarchy of France has, in our day, been first remodelled, and afterwards swept from the face of Europe, to be followed by a republican consti- tution, which has in its turn been crushed and super- seded. But France is a country that has long been subjected to as complete and powerful a system of centralization as has existed anywhere since the most energetic period of the Roman empire; and whether its institutions of government have or have not needed to be changed, as they have been from time to time, those changes have been made in a country in which an entire political unity has greatly facilitated the operation. In the United States, on the contrary, a federal government was to be created; and it was to be created for thirteen distinct communities; -- a gov- ernment that should not destroy the political sover- eignties of the States, and should yet introduce a new sovereignty, formed by means of powers, whose sur- render by the States, instead of weakening their pres- ent strength, would rather develop and increase it 332 THE FEDERAL CONsTITUTION. [BOOK III This peculiar difliculty may be constantly traced, amidst all the embarrassments of the period in which the fundamental idea of the Constitution was at length evolved. The progress of opinion and feeling in this coun- try, on the subject of its government, from the peace of 1783 to the year 1787, may properly be intro- duced by a brief statement of the political tendencies of two principal classes of men. All contemporary evidence assures us that this was a period of great pecuniary distress, arising from the depreciation of the vast quantities of paper money issued by the Fed- eral and State governments; from rash speculations ; from the uncertain and fluctuating condition of trade; and from the great amount of foreign goods forced into the country as soon as its ports were opened. Naturally, in such a state of things, the debtors were disposed to lean in favor of those systems of govern- ment and legislation which would tend to relieve or postpone the payment of their debts; and as such relief could come only from their State governments, they were naturally the friends of State rights and State authority, and were consequently not friendly to any enlargement of the powers of the Federal Constitution. The same causes which led individu- als to look to legislation for irregular relief from the burden of their private contracts, led them also to regard public obligations with similar impatience. Opposed to this numerous class of persons were all those who felt the high necessity of preserving invio- late every public and private obligation; who saw on. V1] THE CONFEDERATION. 333 _\ that the separate power of the States could not ac- complish what was absolutely necessary to sustain both public and private credit; and they were as naturally disposed to look to the resources of the Union for these benefits, as the other class were to look in an opposite direction. These tendencies pro- duced, in nearly every State, a struggle, not as be- tween two organized parties, but one that was all along a contest for supremacy between opposite opin- ions, in which it was at one time doubtful to which side the scale would turn? 1 “ The war, as you have very justly observed,” General Wash- ington wrote to James Warren of Massachusetts, in October, 1785, “ has terminated most advanta- geously for America, and a fair field is presented to our view ; but I confess to you, my dear Sir, that I do not think we possess wisdom or justice enough to cultivate it properly. Illiberality, jealousy, and local policy mix too much in all our public counsels for the good government of the Union. In a word, the Confederation appears to me to be little more than a shadow without the substance, and Con- gress a nugatory body, their ordi- nances being little attended to. To me it is a solecism in politics; indeed, it is one of the most ex- traordinary things in nature, that we should confederate as a nation, and yet be afraid to give the rulers of that nation (who are the crea- tures of our own making, appoint- , ed for a limited and short duration, ‘war I‘ ‘A a, and who are amenable for every action and may be recalled at any moment, and are subject to all the evils which they may be instru- mental in producing) sufiicient powers to order and direct the af- fairs of the same. By such policy as this, the wheels of government are clogged, and our brightest pros- pects, and that high expectation which was entertained of us by the wondering world, are turned into astonishment; and, from the high ground on which we stood, we are descending into the vale of confu- sion and darkness. “ That we have it in our power to become one of the most respect- able nations upon earth, admits, in my humble opinion, of no doubt, if we would but pursue a wise, just, and liberal policy towards one another, and keep good faith with the rest of the world. That our resources are ample and increas- ing, none can deny; but while they are grudgingly applied, or / /---.- 334 THE FEDERAL ooNsTITuTIoN. [BOOK III The three most important centres of opinion in the Union, before the formation of the Constitution, were Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York? The public proceedings of each of them, in the order of time, on the subject of enlarging the federal powers, are, therefore, important to a just understanding of the course of events which ended in the calling of the Convention. The legislature of Massachusetts was assembled in the summer of 1785. The proposal of Congress, made to the States in 1784, to grant the power of regulating trade, had been responded to by only four of the States, and the negotiations in Europe were failing from the want of it. Great uneasiness and distress pervaded all the commercial classes, and ex- tended to every other class capable of being affected by a state of things in which a large balance, occa- sioned by the extravagant importation and use of not applied at all, we give a vital stab to public faith, and shall sink, in the eyes of Europe, into con- tempt. “ It has long been a speculative question among philosophers and wise men, whether foreign com~ merce is of real advantage to any country; that is, whether the lux- ury, efi'eminacy, and corruptions which are introduced along with it are counterbalanced by the conven- ience and wealth which it brings. But the decision of this question is of very little importance to us. We have abundant reason to be con- vinced that the spirit of trade which pervades these States is not to be repressed. It behooves us, then, to establish just principles; and this cannot, any more than other matters of national concern, be done by thirteen heads differently constructed and organized. The necessity, therefore, of a control- ling power, is obvious; and why it should be withheld is beyond my comprehension.” Writings, IX. 139 - 141. 1 They are named in this order, because it represents the order in which they respectively acted upon the enlargement of the federal powers. 1 cs. v1.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 335 foreign manufactures, was thrown against the coun- try. The money of the State was rapidly drawn off to meet this balance, which its other exhausted means of remittance could not satisfy. It was im- possible for the State to recover its former prosperity, while Great Britain and other nations continued the commercial systems which they had adopted. It had become plain to the comprehension of all intelligent persons concerned in trade, that nothing could break up those systems so long as the United States were destitute of the same power to regulate their foreign trade, by admitting or excluding foreign vessels and cargoes according to their interests; and it needed only the popular expression of this palpable truth, enforced by a clear and decided executive message, to induce the legislature to act upon it? 1 One of the necessary and im- mediate efi'ects of the Revolution of course was, the loss/of the exclu- sive commercial advantages which this country had enjoyed with Great Britain and her dependen- cies; and the prohibitory acts and impositions, which fell with their full weight on the American trade, after the peace, were particularly disastrous to the trade of Massa- chusetts. The whale fishery, a business of great importance, had brought into the Province, before the war, 172,000 guineas per an- num, giving employment to Amer-- ican seamen, and not requiring the use of any foreign materials, ex- cept a small quantity of cordage. A duty was now laid on whale oil Governor in England of £18 per tun. In addition to the loss thus sustained, the exportation of lumber and pro- visions in American bottoms to the West Indies was entirely prohib- ited. Another great inconvenience, which came in fact to be intolera- ble, was the vast influx of British goods, consigned to English fac- tors for sale, depriving the native merchants, manufacturers, and ar- tisans of the market. At the same time, the revenue of the State, de- rived from impost and excise du- ties and a tax on auctions of one per cent., fell short of the annual interest on the private debt of the State, 30,000 pounds (currency) per annum, and a tax of 20,000 pounds (currency) was computed 336 THE FEDERAL CONsTITUTION. [BOOK III. Bowdoin gave the necessary impulse, and suggested the appointment of special delegates from the States to settle and define the powers wlh which Congress ought to be invested.1 I I I This message caused the adoption of the first reso- lution, passed by the legislature of any State, declar- ing the Articles of Confederation to be inadequate to the great purposes which they were originally designed to effect, and recommending a convention of delegates from all the States, for the purpose of revising them, and reporting to Congress how far it might be necessary to alter or enlarge the powers of to be necessary to cancel the debt, principal and interest, in fifteen years, and pay the ordinary charges of the government. Besides this, the State’s proportion of the fed- eral debt was to be provided for. It was in this state of things that two remarkable popular meetings were held in Boston, in the spring of 1785, to act upon the subject of trade and navigation, and to call the attention of Congress to the neces- sity for a national regulation ofcom- merce. The first was a meeting of the merchants and tradesmen, con- vened at Faneuil Hall on the 18th of April. They appointed a commit- tee to draft a petition to Congress, representing the embarrassments under which the trade was labor- ing, and took measures to cause the legislature to call the attention ' of the delegation in Congress to the importance of immediate ac- tion upon the subject. They also established a committee of corre- spondence with the merchants in the other seaports of the United States, to induce a similar action; and they entered into a pledge not to purchase any goodsdof the British merchants and factors residing in Boston, who had made very heavy importations, which tended to drain the specie of the State. The other meeting was an assembly of the artisans and mechanics, held at the Green Dragon Tavern, on the 28th of April, at which similar resolu- tions were adopted. It is quite apparent, from these proceedings, that all branches of industry were threatened with ruin; and in the efforts to counteract the effects of the great influx of foreign com- modities, we trace the first move- - ments of a popular nature to- wards a national control over com- merce. 1 Governor Bowdoin’s first Mes- sage to the Legislature, May 31 1785. on. v1.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 337 the Federal Union, in order to secure and perpetui ate its primary objects. Congress was requested by these resolves to recommend such a convention. A letter, urging the importance of the subject, was addressed by the Governor of Massachusetts to the President of Congress, and another to the executive of each of the other States. The resolves were also inclosed to the delegates of the State in Congress, with instructions to lay them before that body at the earliest opportunity, and to make every exertion to carry them into efl'ect.1 They were, however, never presented to Congress. That body was wholly unprepared for such a step, and the delegation of Massachusetts were entirely op- posed to it, as premature. It had been all along the policy of Congress to obtain only a grant of tempora- ry power over commerce, and to this policy they were committed by their proposition, now pending With the legislatures of the States, and by the instructions of the commissioners whom they had sent to Europe to negotiate commercial treaties. The prevalent idea in Congress was, that at the expiration of fifteen years, - the period for which they had asked the States to grant them power over commerce, —- a new commer- cial epoch would commence, when the States would » have a more clear and comprehensive view of their interests,‘ and of the best means for promoting them, whether by treaties abroad, or by the delegation and exercise of greater power at home. It was argued, 1 July 1, 1785. von. 1. 43 338 THE FEDERAL ooNsTITUTIoN. [BOOK III. also, that the most safe and practicable course was, to grant temporary power in the first ‘instance, and to leave the question of its permanent adoption as a part of the Confederation to depend on its bene- ficial effects. Another objection, which afterwards caused serious difficulty, , was, that the Articles of Confederation contained no provision for their amend- ment by a convention, but that changes should origi- nate in Congress and be confirmed by the State legis- latures, and that, if the report of a convention should not be adopted by Congress, great mischiefs would i follow. But a deep-seated jealousy in Congress of the radi- cal changes likely to be made in the system of gov- ernment lay at the foundation of these objections. There was an apprehension that the Convention might. be composed of persons favorable to an aris- tocratic system; or that, even if the members were altogether republican in their views, there would be great danger of a report which would propose an entire remodelling of the government. The delega- tion from Massachusetts, influenced by these fears, retained the resolutions of the State for two months, and then replied to the Governor’s letter, assigning these as their reasons for not complying with the directions given to them? The legislature of Mas 1 The delegation at that time ing and altering the Confedera consisted of Elbridge Gerry, Sam- tion” may be found in the Life uel Holten, and Rufus King. of Hamilton, II. 353. See also Their“ Reasons assigned for sus- Boston Magazine for 1785, p. pending the delivery to Congress 475. of the Governor’s letter for revis- ca. v1.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 339 sachusetts thereupon annulled their resolutions rec- ommending a Convention? It is manifest from this occurrence, that Congress in 1785 were no more in a condition to take the lead and conduct the country to a revision of the Fed- eral Constitution, than they were in 1783, when Hamilton wished to have a declaration made of its defects, and found it impracticable. There were sel- dom present more than five-and-twenty members; and, at the time when Massachusetts proposed to call upon them to act upon this momentous subject, the whole assembly embraced as little eminent talent as had ever appeared in it. They were not well placed to observe that something more than “ the declama- tion of designing men ” was at work, loosening the foundations of the system which they were admin- istering? They saw some of its present inconven- iences; but they did not see how rapidly it was los- 1 November 25, 1785. 9 Letter of Messrs. Gerry, Hol- ten, and King, delegates in Con- gress, to the Governor of Massa- chusetts, assigning reasons for sus- pending the delivery of his letter to Congress, dated September 3, 1785. Life of Hamilton, II. 353, 357. “ We are apprehensive,” said they, “ and it is our duty to declare it, that such a measure would produce throughout the Union an exertion of the friends of an aristocracy to send members who would promote a change of government; and we can form some judgment of the plan which such members would report to Congress. But should the mem- bers be altogether republican, such have been the declamations of de- signing men against the Confeder- ation generally, against the rota- tion of members, which, perhaps, is the best check to corruption, and against the mode of altering the Confederation by the unanimous consent of the legislatures, which effectually prevents innovations in the articles by intrigue or surprise, that we think there is great dan- ger of a report ‘which would invest Congress with powers that the honorable legislature have not the most distant intention to dele gate.” 340 THE FEDERAL CONsTITUTION. [BOOK III. ing the confidence of the country, of which the fol- lowing year was destined to deprive it altogether. Before the year 1785 had closed, however, Vir- ginia was preparing to give the weight of her influ- ence to the advancing cause of reform. A proposition was introduced into the House of Delegates of Virginia, to instruct the delegates of the State in Congress to move a recommendation to all the States to authorize Congress to collect a revenue by means of duties uniform throughout the United States, for a period of thirteen years.1 The absolute necessity for such a system was generally admitted; but, as in Massachusetts, the opinions of the members were divided between a permanent grant of power and a grant for a limited term. The advocates of the limitation, arguing that the utility of the measure Ought to be tested by experiment, contended, that a temporary grant of commercial powers might be and would be renewed from time to time, if experience should prove its eflicacy. They forgot that the other powers granted to the Union, on which its whole fabric rested, were perpetual and irrevocable; and that the first sacrifices of sovereignty made by the States had been the result of circumstances which imperatively demanded the surrender, just as the situation of the ' country now demanded a similar surrender of an irrevocable power over commerce. The proposal to make this grant temporary only, was a proposal to engraft an anomaly upon the other powers of the 1 November 30th, 1785. CH. v1.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 341 Confederacy, with very little prospect of its future renewal; for the caprice, the ealousy, and the diver- sity of interests of the different States, were obstacles which the scheme of a temporary grant could only evade for the present, leaving them still in existence when the period of the grant should expire. But the arguments in favor of this scheme prevailed, and the friends of the more enlarged and liberal sys- tem, believing that a temporary measure would stand afterwards in the way of a permanent one, and would confirm the policy of other countries founded on the jealousies of the States, Were glad to allow the sub- ject to subside, until a new event opened the pros- pect for a more efficient plan.1 The citizens of Virginia and Maryland, directly in terested in the navigation of the rivers Potomac and Pocomoke, and of the Bay of Chesapeake, had long been embarrassed by the conflicting rights and regu- lations of their respective States; and, in the spring of 17 85, an effort at accommodation was made, by the appointment of commissioners on the “part of each State to form a compact between them for the regu- lation of the trade upon those waters. These com- missioners assembled at Alexandria in March, and while there made a visit at Mount Vernon, where a further scheme was concerted for the establishment of harmonious commercial regulations between the two 1 The resolution introduced on table. Elliot’s Debates, l. 114, the 30th of November was agreed 115. Letter of Mr. Madison to to in the Delegates, but before it General Washington, of December was carried up to the Senate, it 9, 1785, Washington’s Works, was reconsidered and laid upon the IX. 508. 342 THE FEDERAL coNsTITuTIoN. [BOOK III. States? This plan contemplated the appointment of other commissioners, having power to make arrange- ments, with the assent of Congress, for maintaining a naval force in the Chesapeake, and also for establish- ing a tariff of duties on imports, to be enacted by the legislatures of both the States. A report, embracing this recommendation, was accordingly made by the Alexandria commissioners to their respective govern- ments. In the legislature of Virginia this report was received while the proposition for granting tem- porary commercial powers to Congress was under consideration; and it was immediately followed by a resolution directing that part of the plan which re- spected duties on imports to be communicated to all the States, with an invitation to send deputies to the meeting. In a few days afterwards, the cele- 1 What direct agency General \Vashington had in suggesting or promoting this scheme, does not appear ; although it seems to have originated, or to have been agreed upon, at his house. His published correspondence contains no mention of the visit of the commissioners; but Chief Justice Marshall states that such a visit was made, and in this statement he is followed by Mr. Sparks. (Marshall, V. 90; Sparks, I. 428.) Mr. Madison, writing to General Washington in December, 1785, refers to “the proposed appointment of commis- sioners for Virginia and Maryland, concerted at Mount Vernon, for keep- ing up harmony in the commer- cial regulations of the two States,” and says that the meeting of com- missioners from all the States, which had then been proposed, “ seems naturally to grow out of it.” (Washington’s Writings, IX. 509.) That Washington foresaw that the plan agreed upon at his house in March would lead to a general assembly of representatives of all the States, seems altogether prob- able, from the opinions which he entertained and expressed to his correspondents, during that sum- mer, upon the subject of conferring adequate commercial powers upon Congress. (See his Letters to Mr. McHenry and Mr. Madison of August 22d and November 30th. Writings, IX. 121, 145.) ca. v1.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 343 brated resolution of Virginia, which led the way to the Convention at Annapolis, was adopted by the legislature, directing the appointment of commission- ers to meet 'with the deputies of all the other States who might be appointed for the same purpose, to consider the whole subject of the commerce of the United States? The circular letter which transmit ted this resolution to the several States proposed that Annapolis in the State‘ of Maryland should be the place, and that the following September should be the time of meeting. The fate of this measure now turned principally upon the action of the State of New York. The power of levying a national impost, proposed in the revenue system of 17 83, had been steadily withheld from Congress by the legislature of that State. Ever since the peace, the State had been divided between two parties, the friends of adequate powers in Con- 1 This resolution, passed Janu- ary 21, 1786, was in these words : “ Resolved. That Edmund Ran- dolph, James Madison, Jr., Wal- ter Jones, St. George Tucker, Meriweather Smith, David Ross, William Ronald, and George Ma- son, Esquires, be appointed com- missioners, who, or any five of whom, shall meet such commis- sioners as may be appointed by the other States in the Union, at a time and place to be agreed on, to take into consideration the trade of the United States; to examine the relative situation and trade of the said States; to consider how far a uniform system in their com mercial regulations may be neces~ sary to their common interest and their permanent harmony; and to report to the several States such an act relative to this great object, as, when unanimously ratified by them, will enable the United States in Congress assembled effectually to provide for the same; that the said commissioners shall immedi- ately transmit to the several States copies of the preceding resolution, with a circular letter respecting their concurrence therein, and pro- posing a time and place for the meeting aforesaid.” 34A TIIE FEDERAL CONsTITUTION. [BOOK III. gress, and the adherents of State sovereignty; and the belief that the commercial advantage of the State depended upon retaining the power to collect their own revenues, had all along given to the latter an ascendency in the legislature. In 1784, they estab- lished a custom-house and a revenue system of their own. In 1785, a proposition to grant the required powers to Congress was lost in the Senate; and in 17 86, it became necessary for Congress to bring this question to a final issue. Three other States, as we have seen, stood in the same category with New York, having decided in favor of no part of the plan which Congress had so long and so repeatedly urged upon their adoption.1 Declaring, therefore, that the crisis had arrived when the people of the United States, by whose will and for whose benefit the fed- eral government was instituted, must decide whether they would support their work as a nation, by main- taining the public faith at home and abroad, or whether, for want of a timely exertion in establish- ing a general revenue system, and thereby giving strength to the Confederacy, they would hazard the existence of the Union and the privileges for which they had contended, —- Congress left the responsi- bility of the decision with the legislatures of the States? 1 Rhode Island, Maryland, and Georgia. 2 “The committee,” said the Report, “ have thought it their duty candidly to examine the prin- ciples of this system, and to dis— cover, if possible, the’reasons which have prevented its adoption; they cannot learn that any member of the Confederacy has stated or brought forward any objections against it, and the result of their C11. v1.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 345 It was now that the influence of Hamilton upon the destinies of this country began to be favored by the events which had brought its affairs to the pres- ent juncture. To his sagacious and watchful fore- cast, the proposal of a commercial convention, ema- nating from Virginia, presented the opportunity which he had long desired, to effect an entire change in the system of the federal government; while, at the same time, the final appeal made by Congress for the estab- lishment of the revenue system gave him an occasion to bring the State of New York into the movement whichétilad been originated by Virginial He deter- mined‘ at this system should be again presented to the legislature, for distinct approval or rejection, and that, if it should be rejected, the State should still impartial inquiries into the nature and operation of the plan has been a clear and decided opinion, that the system itself is more free from well-founded exceptions, and is better calculated to receive the ap- probation of the several States, than any other that the wisdom of Congress can devise. In the course of this inquiry, it most clearly appeared that the requisi- tions of Congress for eight years past have been so irregular in their operation, so uncertain in their col- lection, and so evidently unproduc- tive, that a reliance on them in fu- ture, as a source from whence moneys are to be drawn to dis- charge the engagements of the Confederacy, definite as they are in time and amount, would be not VOL. 1. 44 less dishonorable to the under- standings of those who entertain such confidence, than it would be dangerous to the welfare and peace of the Union. The com- mittee are therefore seriously im- pressed with the indispensable ob- ligation that Congress are under of representing to the immediate and impartial consideration of the several States, the utter impossi- bility of maintaining and preserv~ ing the faith of the federal govern- ment by temporary requisitions on the States, and the consequent ne- cessity of an early and complete accession of all the States to the revenue system of the 18th of April, 1783.” (Journals of Con- gress, XI. 35, 36 Februarv 15, 1786.) 346 THE FEDERAL coNsTITuTIoN. [BOOK III. send a representation to the Convention at Annapolis. He therefore caused the revenue system, as proposed by Congress, to be again brought before the legisla- ture, where it was again rejected; and he and his friends then threw their whole influence in favor of the appointment of commissioners to attend the com- mercial convention, and succeeded, — Hamilton him- self being appointed one of them? This great step having been taken, the course of the State of New York upon the revenue system of 1783, which brought her at length to an open con- troversy with Congress, tended strongly to aid the plans of Hamilton, and finally gave him the ascen- dency in the State itself. The legislature, in May, 1786, passed an act for granting imposts and duties to the United States, and soon afterwards adjourned. It was immediately pronounced by Congress not to be a compliance with their recommendation, and the Governor was earnestly requested to reassemble the legislature. This he declined to do, upon the ground of a want of constitutional power. Congress again urged the summoning of the legislature, for the pur- pose of granting the system of impost in such a man- ner as to enable them to carry it into effect, and the Governor again refused? ’ 1 Life of Hamilton, II. 374, 375. removable by Congress, they made 2 The legislature of New York were willing to grant the duties to Congress, but insisted upon reserv- ing the power of levying and col- lecting them; and, instead of mak- ing the collectors amenable to and them removable by the State, on conviction for default or neglect of duty in the State courts. This was a material departure from the plan recommended by Congress, and was entirely inconsistent with ca. v1.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 347 Arrived at Annapolis, Hamilton found there the representatives of five States only? He had come with the determination that the Convention should lay before the country the whole subject of the con- dition of the States and the want of an efficient fed- eral government. But the avowed purpose of the meeting was solely to consider the means of estab- lishing a uniform system of commercial regulations, and not to reform the existing government of the Union. New/ Jersey alone, of the five States repre- sented, had empowered her commissioners to con- sider of “ other important matters,” in addition to the subject of commercial regulations. Four other States had appointed commissioners, none of whom had attended; and the four remaining States had made no appointments at all? Under those circumstances, it was certainly a mat- the grants already made by sev- eral of the States. See the Report and proceedings in Congress on the New York Act, July 27 -Au- gust 23, 1786. Journals, XI. 153, 184, 197, 200. 1 New York was represented by Alexander Hamilton and Egbert Benson ; New Jersey by Abraham Clark, William C. Houston, and James Schureman; Pennsylvania by Tench Coxe; Delaware by George Read, John Dickinson, and Richard Bassett; Virginia by Ed- mund Randolph (Governor), James Madison, Jr., and St. George Tucker. 9 General Knox, writing to Gen- eral Washington under date of January 14, 1787, says: “You ask what prevented the Eastern States from attending the Septem- ber meeting at Annapolis. It is difficult to give a precise answer to this question. Perhaps torpid- ity in New Hampshire; faction and heats about their paper money in Rhode Island; and jealousy in Connecticut. Massachusetts had chosen delegates to attend, who did not decline until very late, and the finding of other persons to sup- ply their places was attended with delay, so that the convention had broken up by the time the new- chosen delegates had reached Phil- adelphia.” Writings of VVashing- , ton, IX. 513. l 5 \ l 348 THE FEDERAL CONsTITUTION. [BOOK III. ter of great delicacy for the commissioners of five States only to pass upon the general situation of the Union, and to pronounce its existing government de- fective and insufficient. Hamilton, however, felt that this opportunity, once lost, might never occur again ; and although willing to waive his original purpose of a full exposition of the defects of the Confedera- tion, he did not deem it expedient that the Conven- tion should adjourn without proposing to the coun- try some measure that would lead to the necessary reforms. He modified his Original plan, therefore, and laid before his colleagues a report, which for- mally proposed to the several States the assembling of a general convention, to take into consideration the situation of the United States. -In this document, it was declared that the regu- lation of trade, which had been made the object of the meeting at Annapolis, could not be effected alone, for the power of regulating commerce would enter so far into the general system of the federal government, that it would require a corresponding adjustment of the other parts of the system. That the system of the general government was“ seriously defective; that those defects were likely to be found greater on a close inspection; that they were the cause of the embarrassments which marked the state of public affairs, foreign and domestic; and that some mode by which they could be peaceably sup- plied was imperatively demanded by the public ne- cessities, — were propositions which the country was then prepared to receive. A convention of deputies on. v1.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 349 from the different States, for the special and sole pur- pose of investigating the defects of the national gov- ernment, seemed to be the course entitled to prefer- ence over all others.1 It was indeed the only method by which the ob- ject of the great statesman who drafted this report could have been reached. The Articles of Confeder- ation had provided, that they should be inviolably observed by every State; that the Union should be perpetual; and that no alteration should be made in any of the Articles, unless agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and confirmed by the legisla- ture of every State.2 To have left the whole subject to the action of Congress would have insured, at most, only a change in some of the features of the existing government, instead of the great reform which Ham- ilton believed to be essential, ——-the substitution of a totally different system. At the same time, the co- operation and assent of Congress were necessary to the success of the plan of a convention, in order that it might not seem to be a violent departure from the provisions of the Articles of Confederation, and also for the sake of their influence with the States. The proposal of the report was therefore cautious. It did not suggest the summoning of a convention to frame a new constitution of government, but “ to de- vise such further provisions as might appear to be necessary to render the constitution of the federal 1 Report of the Annapolis Convention, Elliot‘s Debates, I. 116; Hamilton‘s Works, II. 336. 9 Article XIII. I“ 350 THE FEDERAL coNsTITUTIoN. [BOOK III. government adequate to the exigencies of the Union.’9 It proposed also, that whatever reform should be agreed on by the convention should be reported to Congress, and, when agreed to by them, should be confirmed by the legislatures of all the States. In this manner, the proposal avoided any seeming vio- lence to the Articles of Confederation, and suggested the convention as a. body to prepare for the use of Congress a plan to be adopted by them for submis- sion to the States? At the same time, Hamilton undoubtedly contem- plated more than any amendment of the existing constitution. In 1780,11e had analyzed the defects of the general government, sketched the outline of a Federal Constitution, and suggested the calling of a convention to frame such a system? The idea of such a convention was undoubtedly entertained, by many persons, before the meeting at Annapolis. It had been recommended by the legislature of New York in 1782, and by that of Massachusetts in 1785. But Hamilton had foreseen its necessity in 17 80, more than seven years before the meeting at Annapo- lis; and, although he may not have been the author of the first public proposal of such a measure, his private correspondence contains the first suggestion of it, and proves that he had conceived the main fea- tures of the Constitution of the United States, even before the Confederation itself was established.8 1 Report, ut supra. 3 Ibid. The first public pro 2 See his letter to James Duane, posal of a continental convention is written in 1780, Life, I. 281-305. assigned by Mr. Madison to one CH. VL] 351 THE CONFEDERATION. The recommendation of the Annapolis commis- sioners was variously received. In the legislature of Virginia it met with a cordial approval, and an act was passed during the autumn to provide for the Pelatiah Webster, whom he calls “ an able, though not conspicuous \ citizen,” and who made this sug— gestion in a pamphlet. published in May, 1781. Recent researches have not added to our knowledge of this writer.v In the summer of 1782, the legislature of New York, under the suggestion of Hamilton, passed resolutions recommending such a convention. On the 1st A of April, 1783, Hamilton, in a. de- bate in Congress, expressed his desire to see a general convention take place. In 1784, the measure was a good deal talked of among the members of Congress, and in the winter of 1784 — 85, Noah Web- ster, an eminent political writer in Connecticut, suggested “ a new system of government, which should act, not on the States, but directly on individuals, and vest in Con- gress full power to carry its laws into effect.” In 1786, the subject was again talked of among mem- bers of Congress, before the meet- ing'a't Annapolis. (Madison. El- liot, V. 117, 118.) But Hamil- ton’s letter to James Duane, in 1780, 1 although not published at the time, was of course earlier than any of these suggestions. In that letter, after showing thatv the’ fun- damental defect of the then exist- ing system was a want of power in Congress he thus analyzes in advance the Articles of Confedera- tion, which had not then taken effect: -- “ But the Confederation itself is defective, and requires to a It is neither fit for 'V be altered. War nor peace. The idea of an uncontrollable sovereignty, in each, State, over its internal police, will defeat the other powers given to Congress, and make our Union feeble and precarious. There are instances, without number, where acts necessary for the general good, and which rise out of the powers given to Congress, must interfere 'with the internal police of the States; and there are as many instances in -which the particular States, by arrangements of internal police, can effectually, though in~ directly, counteract the arrange- ments of Congress. You have al- ‘ ready had examples of this, for which I refer to your own memory. The Confederation gives the States, individually, too much influence in the affairs of the army ; they should have nothing to do with it. The entire foundation and .disposal of our military forces ought to belong to Congress. It is an essential el- ement of the Union; and it ought to be the policy of Congress to de- stroy all ideas‘ of State attachment in'the army, and make it look up wholly to them. For this purpose, all appointments, promotions, and 352 [BOOK III. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. appointment of delegates to the proposed conven- tion. favor. In Congress, it was received at first with little Doubts were entertained there whether any changes in the federal government could be constitu- k a common sovereign. i danger is that the sovereign will , have too much power, and oppress provisions whatsoever ought to be In der by them. It may be appre~ / "bended, that this may be dangerous to liberty. But nothing appears more evident to me, than that we run much greater risk of having a weak and disunited federal govern- ment, than one which will be able to usurp upon the rights of the people. Already some of the lines of the army would obey their States in opposition to Congress, notwith- standing the pains we have taken to preserve the unity of the army. If any thing would hinder this, it would be the personal influence of the general,—-a melancholy and mortifying consideration. The forms of our State constitutions must always give them great weight in our affairs, and will make it too difiicult to blind them to the pur- suit of a common interest, too easy to oppose what they do not like, and to form partial combinations, subversive of the general one. There is a wide difference between our situation and that of an empire under one simple form of govern- ment, distributed into counties, prov- inces, or districts, which have no legislatures, but merely magistrat- ical bodies to execute the laws of There the the parts of which it is composed. In our case, that of an empire com- posed of confederate states, each with a government completely Or- ganized within itself, having all the means to draw its subjects to a close dependence on itself, the danger is directly the reverse. It is, that the common sovereign will not have power sufiicient to unite the differ- ent members together, and direct the common forces to the interest and happiness of the whole . . . . . . The Confederation, too, gives the power of the purse too entirely to the State legislatures. It should provide perpetual funds in the dis- posal of Congress, by a land-tax, poll-tax, or the like. All imposts upon commerce ought to be laid by Congress, and appropriated to their use ; for without certain revenues, a government can have no power; that power which holds the purse- strings absolutely, must rule. This seems to be a medium which, with- out making Congress altogether in- dependent, will tend to give reality to its authority. Another defect in our system is, want of method and energy in the administration. This has partly resulted from the other defect; but in a great degree from prejudice and the want of a proper executive. Congress have kept the power too much in their own hands, and have meddled too much with details of every sort. C11. VL] 353 THE CONFEDERATION. tionally made, unless they were to originate in Con gress and were then to be adopted by the legisla- tures of the States, pursuant to the mode provided by the Articles of Confederation. The legislatures, it Congress is properly a delibera- tive corps, and it forgets itself when it attempts to play the exec- utive. It is impossible that a body, numerous as it is, constantly fluctuating, can ever act with suffi— cient decision, or with system. Two thirds of the members, one half the time, cannot know what has gone before them, or what con- nection the subject in hand has to what has been transacted on former occasions. The members who have been more permanent will only give information that promotes the side hey espouse, in the present case, and will as often mislead as en- lighten. The variety of business must distract, and the proneness of every assembly to debate must at all times delay. Lastly, Con- gress, convinced of these incon- veniences, have gone into the meas- ure of appointing boards. But this is, in my opinion, a bad plan. A single man, in each department of the administration, would be great- ly preferable. It would give us a chance of more knowledge, more activity, more responsibility, and, of course, more zeal and attention. Boards partake of the inconven- iences of larger assemblies; their decisions are slower, their energy less, their responsibility more dif- fused. They will not have the same abilities and knowledge as an van. 1. 45 administration by single men. Men of the first pretensions will not so readily engage in them, because they will be less conspicuous, of less importance, have less oppor- tunity of distinguishing themselves. The members of boards will take less pains to inform themselves and arrive at eminence, because they have fewer motives to do it. All these reasons conspire to give a preference to the plan of vesting ' the great executive departmen of the state in the hands of indi- \ viduals. As these men will be, of course, at all times under the direction of Congress, we shall blend the advantages of a monar- chy in one constitution . . . . . . I shall now propose the remedies which appear to me applicable to our circumstances, and necessary to extricate our afi‘airs from their pres- ent deplorable situation. The first step must be to give Congress powers competent to the public exigencies. This may happen in two ways: one, by resuming and exercising the discretionary powers I suppose to have been originally vested in i them for the safety of the States, " and resting their conduct on the candor of their countrymen and the necessity of the conjuncture; the other, by calling immediately a con- i vention of all the States, with full 1 authority to conclude finally upon 354 [Boon III. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. Fwd-- was argued, could not adopt any scheme that might be proposed by a convention; and if it were submitted to the people, it was not only doubtful what degree of assent on their part would make it valid, but it a general confederation, stating to them beforehand explicitly the evils arising from a want of power in Congress, and the impossibility of supporting the contest on its pres- ent footing, that the delegates may come possessed of proper senti- ments, as well as proper authority, to give eflicaey to the meeting. Their commission should include a right of vesting Congress with the whole or a proportion of the unoccu- pied lands, to be employed for the purpose of raising a revenue, re- serving the jurisdiction to the States by whom they are granted. The Confederation, in my opinion, should give Congress a complete sovereignty; except as to that part of internal police which relates to the rights of property and life among individuals, and to raising money by internal taxes. It is ne- cessary that every thing belonging to this should be regulated by the State legislatures. Congress should have complete sovereignty in all that relates to war, peace, trade, finance; and to the manage- ment of foreign affairs; the right of declaring war, of raising armies, oflicering, paying them, directing their motions in every respect; of equipping fleets, and doing the same with them; of building fortifi- cations, arsenals, magazines', &c.; of making peace on such conditions as they think proper; of regulat- ing trade, determining with what countries it shall be carried on; granting indulgences; laying pro- hibitions on all the articles of ex- port or import; imposing duties, granting bounties and premiums for raising, exporting, or import- ing; and applying to their own use the product of these duties, only giving credit to the States on whom they-afe‘raised in the gen- eral account of revenues and ex- pense; instituting admiralty courts, &c.; of coining money, establish- ing banks on such terms, and with such privileges, as they think prop- er; appropriating funds, and doing whatever else relates to the opera- tions of finance ; transacting every thing with foreign nations; mak- ing alliances offensive and defen- sive, and treaties of commerce, &c. . . . . The second step I would recommend is, that Congress should instantly appoint the following great oflicers of state: a Secretary for Foreign Affairs; a President of War; a President of Marine; a Financier; a President of Trade. . . . . . These oflicers should have nearly the same powers and func- tions as those in France analogous to them, and each should be chief in his department, with subordi- nate hoards, composed of assist- ants, clerks, &c., to execute his orders.” (Life of Hamilton, I. 284-305.) on. V1] THE CONFEDERATION. 355 was also doubtful whether they could change the Federal Constitution by their own direct action. To these difficulties was to be added the further hazard, that, if the report of the convention should be made to Congress, as proposed, they might not finally adopt it, and if it should be rejected, that fatal consequences would ensue? The report of the Annapolis commissioners was, however, taken into consideration; and in the course of the following winter a report upon it was made in Congress, which conceded the fact that the Confeder- ation required amendments, and that the proposed convention was the most eligible mode of effecting them? But this report had to encounter the objec- tion, entertained by many members, that the meas- ure proposed would tend to weaken the federal authority, by lending the sanction of Congress to an extra-constitutional proceeding. Others consid- ered that a more summary mode of proceeding was advisable, in the form of a direct appeal to the peo- ple of every State to institute State conventions, which should choose delegates to a general conven- tion, to revise and amend, or change, the federal system, and to publish the new constitution for gen- eral observance, without any reference to the States, for their acceptance or confirmation.3 1 Abstract of an Address made to the Legislature of Massachu- setts, by the Hon. Rufus King, in October, 1786. Boston Magazine for the year 1786, p. 406. 2 Mr. Madison’s Notes of De- There were hates in the Congress of the Con- federation. Elliot, V. 96. 3 This was the opinion of Mr. Jay. He thought that no altera- tions should be attempted, unless deduced from the only source of 356 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. still others, who preferred that Congress should take up the defects of the existing system, point them out to the legislatures of the States, and recommend cer tain distinct alterations to be adopted by them.1 It was no doubt true, that a convention originat ing with the State legislatures was not a mode pointed out by the Articles of Confederation for effecting amendments to that instrument. But it was equally true, that the mere amendment of that instrument was not what the critical situation of the country required. On the other hand, a convention originating with the people of the States would un- doubtedly rest upon the authority of the people, in its inception; but, if the system which it might frame were to go into operation without first being adopted by the people, it would as certainly want the true basis of their consent. These difficulties were felt in and out of Congress. But it does not seem to have occurred to those who raised them, that the source from which the convention should derive its powers to frame and recommend a new system of government was of far less consequence, than that the mode in which the system recommended should be adopted, should be one that would give it the just authority, the people. He without further sanction. See his seems to have considered that, if the people of the States, acting through their primary conventions, were to send delegates to a gen- eral convention, with authority to alter the Articles of Confedera- tion, the new system would rest upon the authority of the people, letter to General Washington, of date January 7, 1787. Writings of Washington, IX. 510. 1 Letter of General Knox to General Washington, January 14, 1787. Writings of Washington, IX. 513. a cs. v1.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 357 full sanction and authority of the people themselves. A constitution might be framed and recommended by any body of individuals, whether instituted by the legislatures or by the people of the States; but if ' adopted and ordained by the States in their corpo-~ rate capacities, it would rest on one basis, and if adopted and ordained by the people of the States, acting upon it directly and primarily, it would ob- viously rest upon another, a different, and a higher authority. The latter mode was not contemplated by Con- gress when they acted upon the recommendation of the Annapolis commissioners. Accustomed to no other idea of a union than that formed by the States’ ~ in their corporate capacities as distinct and sover- eign communitiesvgkbelonging to a body constituted by the States, and‘ therefore officially related rather to the governments than to the people of the States; and entertaining a becoming and salutary fear of de- parting from a constitution which they had been ap- poinjed to administer, —- the members of the Con- gress of 1786 - 87 were not likely to go beyond the Annapolis recommendation, which in fact proposed that the new system should be confirmed by the ' legislatures of the States. But the course of events tended to a different re- sult, — to an actual, although a peaceable revolution, by the quiet substitution of a new government in place of the old one, and resting upon an entirely different basis. While Congress were debating the objections to a convention, the necessity for action 358 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK 111 became every day more stringent. The insurrection in Massachusetts, which had followed the meeting of the commissioners at Annapolis and had reached a dangerous crisis when their report was before Con- gress, had alarmed the people of the older States by the dangers of an anarchy with which the existing national government would be obviously unable to cope. The peril of" losing the navigation of the Mis- sissippi, and with it the Western settlements, through the inefficiency of Congress, was also at that moment impending; while, at the same time, the commerce of the country was nearly annihilated by a course of policy pursued by England, which Congress was ut- terly unable to encounter. Under these dangers and embarrassments, a state of public opinion was rapidly developed, in the winter of 1787, which drove Con gress to action. The objections to the proposal be- fore them yielded gradually to the stern require- ments of necessity, and a convention Was at last ac- cepted, not merely as the best, but as the only prac- ticable, mode of reaching the first great object by Which an almost despairing country might be re- assured of its future welfare. The final change in the views of Congress in re- gard to a convention Was produced by the action of the legislature of New York. In that body, as we have seen, the impost system had been rejected, in the session of 17 86, and the Governor of the State had even refused to reassemble the‘ legislature for the reconsideration of this subject. A new session com- menced in January, 1787, in the city of New York, CH, v1.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 359 where Congress was also sitting. A crisis now oc- curred, in which the influence of Hamilton was ex- erted in the same manner that it had been in the former session, and with a similar result. On that occasion he had followed up the rejection of the im- post system with a resolve for the appointment of commissioners to attend the meeting at Annapolis. It was now his purpose, in case the impost system should be again rejected, to obtain the sanction of Congress to the recommendation of a convention, made by the Annapolis commissioners. This, he was aware, could be effected only by inducing the legis- lature of New York to instruct the delegates of their State in Congress to move and vote for that decisive measure. The majority of the members of Congress were indisposed to adopt the plan of a convention; and although they might be brought to recommend it at the instance of a State, they were not inclined to do so spontaneously? The crisis required, there- fore, all the address of Hamilton and of the friends of the Union, to bring the influence of one of these bodies to bear upon the other. The reiterated recommendation by Congress of the impost system, now addressed solely- to the State of New York, who remained alone in her refusal, necessarily occupied the earliest attention of the new legislature? A warm discussion upon a bill intro- s1 1 Madison. Elliot, V. 96. legislature to consider the revenue 2 It was brought before them by system, “ a subject,” he observed, the speech of the Governor (Clin- “which had been repeatedly sub- ton), informing them of the reso- mitted to them, and must be well lutions of Congress, which had re- understood.” quested an immediate call of the 360 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III duced for the purpose of effecting the grant as Con gress had asked for it, ended, on the 15th of Febru- ary, in its defeat. The subject of a general conven- tion of the States, according to the plan of the An- napolis commissioners, was then before Congress, on the report of a grand committee ;1” and Congress were hesitating upon its expediency. At this critical junc- ture, Hamilton carried a resolution in the legislature of New York, instructing the delegates of that State in Congress to move for an act recommendingthe States to send delegates to a convention for the purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, which, four days afterwards, was laid before Congress.2 Virginia and North Carolina had already chosen delegates to the Convention, in compliance with the recommendation from Annapolis; and Massachusetts was about to make such an appointment, under the influence of her patriotic Bowdoin. In this posture of affairs, although the proposition of the New York delegation failed to be adopted,8 the fact that she had 1 Journals, XII. 15. February 21, 1787. 9 Ibid. The vote rejecting the impost bill was taken on the 15th of February. The resolution of instructions was passed on the 17th, and was laid before Congress on the 21st. 3 Mr. Madison has recorded the suspicious with which this resolu- tion of the New York legislature was received. Their previous re- fusal of the impost act, and their known anti-federal tendencies, gave rise, he says, to the belief that their object was to obtain a con- vention without having it called under the authority of Congress, or else, by dividing the plans of the States in their appointments of delegates, to frustrate them all. (Madison. Elliot, V. 96.) But whatever gi'ounds there might have been for either of these suspicions, the latter certainly was not well founded. The New York resolu- tion was drafted by Hamilton, and although it was passed by a body in which a. majority had not exhib' ited adisposition to enlarge the an on. V1] 361 THE CONFEDERATION. thus solicited the action of Congress was of decisive influence, when the members from Massachusetts fol- lowed it immediately by a resolve more acceptable to a majority of the assembly.1 _ thority of Congress, it was mani- festly not intended to prevent the adoption of the plan of a conven- tion. by Congress of an act, recommend- ing the States to institute a con- vention of representatives of the States to revise the Articles of Confederation; and the resolution introduced by the New York dele- gation into Congress proposed that the alterations and amendments which the convention might con- sider necessary to render the Ar- ticles of Confederation “ adequate to the preservation and support of the Union,” should be reported to Congress and to the States respec- tively, but did not direct how they should be adopted. This would have left open a great question, and seemed to be a departure from the mode in which the Articles of Confederation directed that amend- ments should be made. Probably it was Hamilton’s intention to leave the form in which the new system should be adopted for fu- ture action, without fettering the movement by prescribing the mode before the convention had assem- bled. But this'eourse was practi- cally impossible’. Congress could not be prevailed upon to recom- mend, a convention, without mak- ing the condition that the new pro- visions should be reported to Con- voL. I. ' 46 It contemplated the passage ' gress and confirmed by tne States. This gave rise to great embarrass- - ment in the convention, when it came to be admitted that the Con federation must be totally super- seded, and not amended; and it was finally disregarded. But it was the only mode'in which the con- vention could have been recom- mended by Congress, and without that recommendation, probably, it could not have been instituted. 1 The resolution introduced by the Massachusetts delegation, when that of New York had been reject- ed, after being amended, was final- ly passed in the following terms: “ Whereas, there is provision in the Articles of Confederation and ' Perpetual Union for making alter- ations therein, by the assent of a Congress of the United States, and of the legislatures of the several States; and whereas experience hath evinced that there are defects in the present Confederation, as a mean to remedy which several of the States, and particularly the State of New York, by ‘express instructions to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a con- vention for the purposes expressed in the following resolution; and such a convention appearing to be the most probable means of estab- lishing in these States a firm na- tional government, Resolved, That, 362 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK m The recommendation, as it went forth from Con gress, was strictly limited to a revision of the Arti cles of Confederation, by a convention of delegates, and the alterations and new provisions were to be reported to Congress, and were to be agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States. Thus the resolution pursued carefully the mode of amendment and alteration provided by the Articles of Confedera- tion, except that it interposed a convention for the purpose of originating the changes to be proposed in the existing form of government; adding, however, the great general purpose of rendering the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of govern- ment and the preservation of the Union. The point thus gained was of vast and decisive im- portance. That Congress should forego the right of originating changes in the system of government ;1 that it should advise the States to confer that power in the opinion of Congress, it is 1 The Articles of Confedera expedient that, on the second Mon- day in May next, a convention of delegates, who shall have been ap- pointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, and re- porting to Congress and the sever- al legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall, when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States, render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exi- gencies of government and the pres- ervation of the Union.” 'Journals, XII. 17. February 21. 1787 tion did not expressly require that amendments should be prepared and proposed in Congress. The thirteenth Article provided, that no alteration should be made, un- less it should “ be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the leg islatures of every State.” But it was clearly implied by this, that Congress were to have the power of recommending alterations, and this power was exercised in 1783, with regard to the rule of appor- tionment. ca. v1.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 363 upon another assembly; and that it should sanction a general revision of the Federal Constitution, with the express declaration of its present inadequacy, — were all preliminaries essential to a successful reform. Feeble as it had become from the overgrown vitality of State power, and from the lack of numbers and talent upon its roll, it was still the government of the Union; the Congress of America; the lineal suc- cessors of that renowned assembly which had defied the power of England, and brought into existence the thirteen United States. If it stood but the poor shadow of a great name, it was still a name with which to do more than conjure; for it bore a con- stitutional relation to the States, still reverenced by the wise and thoughtful, and still necessary to be regarded by all who desired the security of con- stitutional liberty. The risk of immediate attempts to establish a monarchical form of government was not inconsiderable. The risk that civil confusion would follow a longer delay to provide for the pressing wants of the country was greater. De- jection and despondency had taken hold of many minds of the highest order; while the great body of the people were desiring a change; which they could not define, and which they feared, while they invited its approach. In such a state of things, considerate men were naturally unwilling to turn entirely away from Congress, or to exclude its agency altogether from the processes of reform, and to embark upon the uncertain sea of political experiment, without chart or rule to guide their course; for no man~could tell 364 ' THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK in. what projects, what schemes, and what influences might arise to jeopard those great principles of re- publican liberty on which the political fabric had rested from the Declaration of Independence to the present hour of danger and distress. For the wise precedent, thus established, of pla cing the formation of a new government under the direct sanction of the old one, the people of this country are, indebted chiefly to Hamilton. Nothing can be more unfortunate, in any country, than the necessity or the rashness which sweeps away an es- tablished constitution, before a substitute has been devised. Whether the interval be occupied by pro- visional arrangements or left to a more open anar- chy, it is an unfit season for the creation of new institutions. At such a time, the crude projects of theorists are boldly intruded among the deliberations of statesmen; despotism lies in wait for the hazards by which liberty is surrounded; the multitude are unrestrained by the curb of authority; and society is exposed to the necessity of accepting whatever is of- fered, or of submitting to the first usurper who may seize the reins of government, because it has nothing on which to rest as an alternative. True liberty has gained nothing, in any age or country, from revolu- tions, which have excluded the possibility of seeking or obtaining the assent of existing power to the re- forms which the progress of society demands. In the days when the Confederation was tottering to its fall; when its revenues had been long ex- hausted; and when its Congress embraced, in actual on. V1.) THE CONFEDERATION. 365 attendance, less than thirty delegates from only elev- en of the States, it would have been the easy part of a demagogue to overthrow it by a sudden appeal to the passions and interests of the hour, as the first step to a radical change.1 But the great man, whose mature and energetic youth, trained in the school of Washington, had been devoted to the for- mation and establishment of the Union, knew too well, ' that, if its golden cord were once broken, no human agency could restore it to 'life. He knew the value of habit, the respect for an established, how- ever enfeebled authority; and while he felt and in- sisted on the necessity for a new constitution, and did all in his power to make the country perceive the defects of the old one, he wisely and honestly admitted that the assent of Congress must be gained to any movement which proposed to remedy the evil. But the reason for not moving the revision of the system of government by Congress itself was one that could not be publicly stated. It was, that the highest civil talent of the country was not there. The men 1 Governor Randolph of Vir- ginia, writing to General Wash- ington, on the 11th of March, 1787, and urging him to attend the Convention, said: “ I must call upon your friendship to excuse me for again, mentioning the Con- vention at Philadelphia. Your de- termination having been fixed on a thorough review of your situa- tion, I feel like an intruder when I again hint a wish that you would join the delegation. But every day brings forth some new crisis, and the Confederation is, I fear, the last anchor of our hope. Con- gress have taken up the subject, and appointed the second Monday in May next as the day of meeting. Indeed, from my private correspond- ence, I doubt whether the eaz'stence of that body, even through this year, may not be questionable under 0m present circumstances.” Sparks’s W'ashington, IX. 243, note. 366 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. to whom the American people had been accustomed to look in great emergencies, —- the men who were called into the Convention, and whose power and wisdom were signally displayed‘ in its deliberations, -- were then engaged in other spheres of public life, or had retired to the repose which they had earned in the great struggle with England. Had the at- tempt been made by Congress itself to form a consti- tution for the acceptance of the States, the control- ling influence and wisdom of Washington, Franklin’s wide experience and deep sagacity, the unrivalled capacities of Hamilton, the brilliant powers of Gou- verneur Morris, Pinckney’s fertility, and Randolph’s eloquence, with all the power of their eminent col? leagues and all the strength of principle and of char acter which they brought to the Convention, would have been withheld from the effort. One great man, it is true, was still there. Madison was in Congress - and Madison’s part in the framing of the Constitu tion was eminently conspicuous and useful. But without the concentration of talent which the Con- vention drew together, representing every interest and every part of the Union, nothing i could have been presented to the Statesa by the Congress of 1787, which would have commanded their assent. The Constitution owed as much, for its acceptance, to the weight of character of its framers, as it did to their wisdom and ability, for the intrinsic merits which that weight of character enforced. It was fortunate, also, that Congress did nothing more than to recommend the Convention, without CH. VL] 367 THE CONFEDERATION. undertaking to define its powers. The doubts con- cerning its legality, which led many persons of great influence to hesitate in sanctioning it, were thus re- moved, and the States were left free to join in the movement, as an expedient to discover and remedy the defects of the federal government, without fetter- eXplicit instructions.1 In ing their delegates with 1 The States of Virginia, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, North Caro- lina, and Delaware had appointed their delegates to the Convention before it was sanctioned by Con— gress. Virginia led the way; and the following preamble to her act shows with what motives and ob- jects she did so. “ Whereas, the commissioners who assembled at Annapolis, on the 14th day of Sep- tember last, for the purpose of de- vising and reporting the means of enabling Congress to provide efl‘ec- tually for the commercial interests of the United States, have repre- sented the necessity of extending the revision of the federal system to all its defects, and have recom- mended that deputies for that pur- pose be appointed by the several legislatures, to meet in convention in the city of Philadelphia, on the 2d day of May next, —- a provision which was preferable to a discus- sion of the subject in Congress, where it might be too much inter- rupted by the ordinary business before them, and where it would, besides, be deprived of the valuable counsels of sundry individuals who are disqualified by the constitution or laws of particular States, or re- strained by peculiar circumstances from a seat in that assembly : And whereas the General Assembly of this Commonwealth, taking into view the actual situation of the Confederacy, as well as reflecting on the alarming representations made from time to time by the United States in Congress, partic— ularly in their act of the 15th day of February last, can no longer doubt that the crisis is arrived at which the good people of America are to decide the solemn question, whether they will, by wise and magnanimous efforts, reap the just fruits of that independence which they have so gloriously acquired, and of that Union which they have cemented with so much of their common blood,—or whether, by giving way to unmanly jealousies and prejudices, or to partial and transitory interests, they will re- nounce the auspicious blessings prepared for them by the Revo- lotion, and furnish to its enemies an eventful triumph over those by whose virtue and valor it has been accomplished: And whereas the same noble and extended policy, and the same fraternal and afi'ec- tionate sentiments, which originally 368 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK 111. this way the Convention, although experimental and anomalous, derived its influence from the sources in which it originated, and was enabled, though not without difficulty, to meet the crisis in which the country was placed. That crisis was one of a singu- lar character; for the continued existence of the Union, and the fate of republican governments, were both involved. It was felt and admitted by the wisest men of that day, that if the Convention should fail in devising and agreeing, upon some system of government, at once capable of pervading the coun- determined the citizens of this Com- monwealth to unite with their breth- ren of the other States in establish- ing afederal government, cannot but be felt with equal force now as motives to lay aside every inferior consideration, and to concur in such further concessions and pro- visions as may be necessary to se- cure the great objects for which that government was instituted, and to render the United States as happy in peace as they have been glorious in War: .Be it‘ therefore enacted, &c., That seven commis- sioners be appointed, by joint bal- lot of both houses of Assembly, who, or any three of them, are hereby authorized as deputies from this Commonwealth to meet such deputies as may be appointed and authorized by other States, to as- semble in convention at Philadel- phia, as above recommended, and to join with them in devising and discussing all such alterations and further provisions as may be neces- sary to render the Federal Consti- tution adequate to the exigencies of the Union; and in reporting such an act, for that purpose, to the United States in Congress, as, when agreed to by them, and duly confirmed by the several States, will effectually provide for the same.” (Elliot, I. 132.) The instructions of New Jersey to her delegates were, “ to take into con- sideration the state of the Union as to trade and other important ob jects, and of devising such other provisions as shall appear to be ne- cessary to render the constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies thereof.” (Ibid. 128.) The act of Pennsylvania provided for the appointment of deputies to join with the deputies of other States “in devising, de- liberating on, and discussing all such alterations and further pro~ visions as may be necessary to ren- der the Federal Constitution fullv adequate to the exigencies of the on. v1.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 369 try with an efficient control, and essentially republi- can in its form, the Federal Union would be at an end. But its dissolution, in the state in which the country then was, must have been followed by an at- tempt to establish monarchical government; because the State institutions were destitute of the strength necessary to encounter the agitation which would have followed the downfall of the federal power, and yet some substitute for that power must have been found. But without civil war, and the most frightful social convulsions, nothing in the nature of Union, and in reporting such act or acts, ,for that purpose, to the United States in Congress assem- bled, as, when agreed to by them, and duly confirmed by the several States, will effectually provide for the same.” (Ibid. 130.) The in- structions of Delaware were of the same tenor. (Ibid. 131.) The act of North Carolina directed her dep- uties “to discuss and decide upon the most effectual means to remove the defects of our Federal Union, and to procure the enlarged pur- poses which it was intended to effect; and that they report such an act to the General Assembly of this State, as, when agreed to by them, will effectually provide for the same.” (Ibid. 135.) The in- structions to the delegates of New Hampshire were of the same tenor. (Ibid. 126.) The appointment of the delegates of Massachusetts was made with reference to the terms of the resolve of Congress recom- mending the Convention, and for von. 1. 47 the purposes declared therein. (Ibid. 126, 127.) The appointment of Connecticut was made with the same reference, and with the fur ther direction “to discuss upon such alterations and provisions, agreeably to the general principles of republican government, as they shall think proper to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union ; and they are further directed, pursuant to the said act of Congress, to re- port such alterations and provis- ions as may be agreed to by a ma- jority of the United States repre- sented in convention, to the Con- gress of the United States, and to the General Assembly of this State.” (Ibid. 127.) The reso lutions of New York, Maryland, South Carolina, and Georgia pur- sued nearly the same terms with the resolve of Congress. (Ibid. 127, 131, 136, 137.) 370 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK m. monarchy could ever have been established in this country after the Revolution. “ Those who lean to a monarchical government,” said Washington, “ have either not consulted the public mind, or they live in a region which (the levelling principles in which they were bred being entirely eradicated) is much more productive of monarchical ideas than is the case in the- Southern States, where, from the habitual dis tinctions which have always existed among the peo- ple, one would have expected the first generation and the most rapid growth of them. I am also clear, that, even admitting the utility, nay, necessity, of the form, the period is not arrived for adopting the change without shaking the peace of this country to its foundation. That a thorough reform of the pres- ent system is indispensable, no one, who has a capa- city to judge, will deny; and with hand and heart I hope the business will be essayed in a full conven- tion. After which, if more powers and more decision are not found in the existing form, if it still wants energy and that secrecy and despatch (either from the non-attendance or the local views of its members) which are characteristic of good government, and if it shall be found (the contrary of which, however, I have always been more afraid of than the abuse of them) that Congress will, upon all proper occasions, exert the powers which are given with a firm and steady hand, instead of frittering them back to the States, where the members, in place of viewing them- selves in their national character, are too apt to be looking, - I say, after this essay is made, if the sys- on. v1.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 371 tem proves inefiicient, conviction of the necessity of a change will be disseminated among all classes of the people. Then, and not till then, in my opinion, can it be attempted without involving all the evils of civil discord.”1 There were other difficulties besides those which may be called legal, or technical, attending this effort to revise the system of the federal government. The failure of that system, as it had been put in opera- tion in 1781, had, to a great extent, chilled the hopes of many of the best statesmen of America. It had been established under auspices which seemed to promise far different fruits from those it had actually produced. Its foundations were laid in the patriotism and national feeling of the States. The concessions which had been made to secure a union of republics, having various, and, in some respects, conflicting in- terests, seemed at first to guarantee the prompt and faithful performance of its obligations. But this fair promise had melted into most unsubstantial per- formance. The Confederation was framed upon a principle which never has enabled, and probably never will enable, a government to become effective and permanent, — the principle of a league. Another and a very serious cause for discourage- ment was the sectional jealousy and State pride which had been constantly growing, from the Decla- ration of Independence to the time when the States were called upon to meet each other upon broader 1 Sparks’s Washington, IX. 223, 225, 230, 236, 508-590. 37 2 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK In. grounds, and to make even larger sacrifices than at any former period. It is difficult to trace to all its causes the feeling which has at times ar- rayed the different extremities of this Union against each other. It was very early developed, after the different provinces were obliged to act together for their great mutual objects of political independence; but, even in its highest paroxysms, it has always at last found an antidote in the deeper feelings and more sober calculations of a consistent patriotism. Perhaps its prevalence and activity may with more truth be ascribed, in every generation, to the ambi- tion of men who find in it a convenient instrument of local influence, rather than to any other cause. It is certain, that, when it has raged most violently, this has ,been its chief ‘ aggravating element. The differences of neither manners, institutions, climate, nor pursuits would at any time have been suflicient to create the perils to which the Union of the States has occasionally been exposed, without the mischiev- ous agency of men whose personal objects are, for the time, subserved by the existence of such pecu- liarities. The proof of this is to be found in the fact, that the seasonable sagacity of the people has always detected the motives of those who have sought to employ their passions, and has compelled them at last to give way to that better order of men who have appealed to their reason. The difficulty of getting the assent of all the States to radical changes in the federal system, and the un- certainty as to the mode in which such changes could ' Cs. v1.1 THE CONFEDERATION. 373 be efi'ectively ad opted, were also among the reasons which led many persons to regard the Convention as an experiment of doubtful expediency. The States had hitherto acted only in their corporate capacities, in all that concerned the formation and modification of the Union. The idea of a Union founded on the direct action of the people of the States, in a pri- mary sense, and proceeding to establish a federal gov- ernment, of limited powers, in the same manner in which ‘the people of each State had established their local constitutions, had not been publicly broached, and was not generally entertained. Indeed, there was no expectation on the part of any State, when the delegates to the Convention were appointed, that any other principle would be adopted as the basis of action, than that by which the Articles of Confedera- tion contemplated that all changes should be effected by the action of the States assembled in Congress, confirmed by the unanimous assent of the different State legislatures. . The prevailing feeling, among the higher states- men of the country, was,‘ that the Convention was an experiment of doubtful tendency, but one that must nevertheless be tried. Washington, Madison, Jay, 'Knox, Edmund Randolph, have all left upon record the evidence of their doubts and their fears, as well as of their ‘convictions of the necessity for this last effort in favor of the preservation of a republican form of government.1 advanced to meet 1‘ Sparks’s Washington,IX. 223, 225, 230, 236, 508 - 520. I If‘ 374 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [Boon m. the crisis, with perhaps less hesitation than any of the. Revolutionary statesmen. His great genius for political construction; his large knowledge of the means by which a regulated liberty may be secured; and the long study with which he had contemplated the condition of the country, led him to enter the Convention with more of eagerness and hope than most of its members. He saw, with great clearness, that the diificulty which embarrassed nearly all his contemporaries —- the question of the mode of en acting a new constitution — was capable of solu- tion. He did not propound that solution in ad- vance of the assembling of the Convention; for it was eminently necessary that the States should not be alarmed by the suggestion of a principle so novel and so unlike the existing theory of the Union. But he was fully prepared to announce it, so soon as it. could be received and acted upon. It was under such auspices and with such views that the Convention assembled at Philadelphia, on the fourteenth day of May in the year seventeen hundred and eighty-seven. At that time, the world had witnessed no such spectacle as that of the deputies of a nation, chosen by the free action of great communities, and assem- bled for the purpose of thoroughly reforming its con- stitution, by the exercise, and with the authority, .of the national will. All that had been done, both in ancient and in modern times, in forming, moulding, or modifying constitutions of government, bore little on. V1] THE CONFEDERATION. 3'7 5 resemblance to the present undertaking of the States of America. Neither among the Greeks nor the R0- mans was there a precedent, and scarcely an analogy. The ancient leagues of some of the cities or repub- lics of Greece did not amount to constitutions, in the sense of modern political science; and the Roman re- public was but the domination of a single race of the inhabitants of a single city. In modern Europe, we find no trace of political science until after the nations were divided, and partial limits set to the different orders ‘and powers of the state. The feudal system, which acknowl- edged no relations in society but those of lord and serf, necessarily forbade all consideration of any forms of government which were not essentially founded on that relation; and it was not until that relation had been in some degree broken in upon, that there began to be any thing like theoretical inquiries into natural rights. When this took place, —- at the end, or towards the end, of the Middle Ages, — the peculiar forms of the European govern- ments gave rise 'to inquiries into the relation of sov- ereign and subject. From the beginning of the fif- . teenth down to the endv of the seventeenth century, there were occasional $cussions on the Continent, growing out of particular events, of such; questions as the right of the people to depose bad princes, and how far was lawful to resist oppression. But ‘questions- of constitutional form, or of the right of the people to arrange and distribute the different powers of government, or the best, mode of doing it, did not arise at all. 376 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. ’ [BOOK l. In England, from the time of the Conquest, until Magna Charta had gone far towards destroying ‘the system, a feudal monarchy had precluded all ques- tions touching the‘ form or the spirit of government. The chief traits of the present constitution, which arose in av great measure from the circumstance ‘that the lower orders of the nobility became gradually so much amalgamated with the people as to give rise to the distinct power of the commons, have all along been inconsistent with the enactment of new forms of civil polity ; although from the time of the Refor- mation to the Revolution of 1688, the active princi- ples of English freedom have, at different junctures, ‘ made advances of the utmost importance. The foun- dations on which the Stuarts sought to establish their throne were directly at variance with the spirit and principles of the Reformation, which totally de- nied the doctrine of passive and unlimited obedience, and which led to the struggles that gave birth to - the Puritans. Those severe reformers, whose church constitution was purely republican, naturally sought to carry its principles into the state. The result was the Parliamentary troubles of James the First, the execution of Charles the First under the forms of judicial proceeding, and th?’ despotism of Cromwell ‘under the forms of a commonwealth. Charles the Second returned, untaught by all that had happened, to attempt the reéstablishment of the Stuart princi- ples of unlimited obedience; and James the Second, who naturally united to them the Catholic religion, being driven from his kingdom, the question arose on. v1.1 _ THE CONFEDERATION. 37 '7 of a vacant throne, and how it should be filled. In all these events, however, from the death of Eliza- beth to the great discussions which followed the ab- dication of James the Second, the idea of calling upon the people of England to frame a government of their own choice, and to define the limits and powers of its various departments, never arose. The Convention Parliament discussed, and were sum- moned to discuss, but a single fundamental ques- tion, -— that involving the disposal of the crown. Still, the political troubles of England gave rise to many theoretical discussions of natural right, and of the origin and structure of society. As soon as Charles the First was executed, this discussion arose ' abroad, from his friends, who wrote, or influenced others to write, in defence of the divine right of kings. Hobbes and Filmer followed, in England, on the same side, and Milton, Locke, and Algernon Sidney vindicated the natural and inalienable rights - of the subjebt and the citizen. In the works of these great writers, the foundations of society are examined with an acuteness which has left little to be done in the merely speculative part of political inquiry. But the practical effect of their theories never fint farther than the promotion, to a greater or less extent, of the particular views which they de- sired to inculcate concerning the existing constitu- tion, or the particular events out of which the discus- sions arose. Nor should we forget what had been done in _ France, by the wise and cautious 'Montesquieu, or by von. 1. 48 378 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. the vehement and passionate Rousseau, and the writers of his school. The former, drawing all his views from history and experience, undertook to show, from the antecedents of each state, the charac- ter of its constitution, to explain and develop its pe culiar properties, and thence to determine the princi ples on which its legislation should proceed. The latter, starting from an entirely opposite point, and designing to write a treatise on Politics in the widest sense of the term, became a mere theorist, and pro- ' duced only certain brilliant speculations upon the social compact, of a purely democratic character, as fragments of a work which he never finished. . The crowd of writers, too, who preceded, and in part created the French Revolution, which was ust com- mencing its destructive activity as our Constitution was formed, really contributed nothing of practical value to the solution of such great questions as the mode of forming, vesting, and distributing the various branches of sovereign power. ' Thus there was little for American statesmen of that day to look to, in the way of theories which had been practically proved to be sound and useful. The constitution of England, it is true, presented to them certain great maxims, the application which was not unsuited to the circumstances and habits of a people whose laws and institutions had been de- rived from their English ancestors and their Eng- lish blood. But the constitution of England, em- bracing the three estates of King, Lords, and - Com- mons, had become what it was, only by the extortion on. v1.1 ’ THE CONFEDERATION. 379 from the crown of the rights and privileges of the two orders of the people. The American Revolu- tion, on the other hand, had settled, as the funda- mental principle of American society, that ‘all sover- eignty resides originally in the people; that they derive no rights by way of grant from any other source; and consequently, that no powers or privi- leges can exist in any portion of the people as dis- tinct from the whole. The English constitution could, therefore, furnish only occasional ‘analogies for particular details in the structure of departments, which might after all really require to be founded on different fundamental principles. But the great problem to be solved —for which English experience ' was of no value—was, so to parcel out those ortions of original sovereignty, which the people of t e States might be willing to withdraw from their State insti- tutions, as to constitute an efficient federal republic, which yet would not control’ and absorb the powers that might be reserved. But to comprehend the re- sults that were accomplished, and to understand the true nature of the system bequeathed to us, it is indispensable to examine in detail the means and processes by which it was formed. ’ Before we turn, however, to this great subject, the characters of the principal framers of the Constitution demand on our attention. , . , ~- 1. J CHAPTER VII. Tax FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION.—WAsHmeToN, PRESIDENT 0! THE CONVENTION. ’ THE narrative to which the reader has thus far attended must now be interrupted for a while, that he may pause upon the threshold of an assembly which had been summoned to the grave task of remodeling the constitution of this country, and _ here consider the names and characters of the men to whom its responsible labors had been intrusted. The civil deeds of statesmen and lawgivers, in estab- lishing and forming institutions, incorporating prin- ciples into the forms of public administration, and setting up the defences of public security and pros- perity, are far less apt to attract and hold the atten- tion of mankind, than the achievements of military life. The name, indeed, may be for ever associated with the work of the hand; but the mass of man- kind do not study, admire, or repeat the deeds of the lawgiver, as they do those of the hero. Yet he who has framed a law, or fashioned an institution in which some great idea is made practical to the con- ditions of human existence, has exercised the highest attributes of human reason, and is to be counted among the "benefactors of his race. Ca. vn] rrs FRAMERS. 4 381 The framers of the Constitution of the United States assembled for their work amidst difficulties and embarrassments of an extraordinary nature. No general concert of opinion had taken place as to what was best, or even as to what was possible to be done. Whether it were wise to hold a convention, whether it were even legal to hold it, and whether, if held, it would be likely to result in any thing useful to the country, were points upon which the most / opposite opinions prevailed in every State of the Union. But it was among the really fortunate, although apparently unhappy, circumstances under \ which they were assembled, ' that the country had experienced much trial, suffering, distress, and fail- ure. It has been a disagreeable duty to ‘describe the disasters and errors of a period during which the national character was subjected to the discipline of adversity. We now come to the period of com- pensation which such discipline inevitably brings. There is a law of the moral government of the universe, which ordains that all that is great and valuable and permanent in character must be the result, not of theoretical teaching, or natural aspira- tion, — of spontaneous resolve, or uninterrupted suc- cess, — but of trial, of suffering, of the fiery furnace of temptation, of the dark hours of disappointment and defeat. The character of the man is ‘distinguish- able from the character of the child that he once was, chiefly by the effects of this universal law. There are the same natural impulses, the same mental, moral, and physical constitution, with which he was 382 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. born into the world. What is it that has given him the strength, the fortitude, the unchanging princi- ple, and the moral and intellectual power, which he exhibits in after years’! It has not been constant pleasure and success, nor unmingled joy. It has been the hard discipline of pain and sorrow, the stern teachings of experience, the struggle against the consequences of his own errors, and the chas- tisement inflicted by his own faults. This law pertains to all human things. It is as clearly traceable in its application to the character of a people, as to that of an individual; and as the institutions of a people, when voluntarily formed by them out of the circumstances of their condition, are ‘necessarily the result of the previous discipline and the past teachings of their career, we can trace this law also in the creation and growth of what is most valuable in their institutions. When we have so traced it, the unalterable relations of the moral ' universe entitle us to look for the elements of great- ness and strength in whatever has been the product of such teachings, such discipline, and such trials. The Constitution of the United States was emi- nently the creature of circumstances; — not of cir cumstances blindly leading the blind to an uncon- scious submission to an accident, but of circum- stances which ofi'ered an intelligent choice’ of the means of happiness, and opened, from the experience of the past, the plain path of duty and success, stretching onward 'to the future. All that has been said in the ‘previous chapters tends to illustrate this on. v11] rrs FRAMERS. 383 fact. We have seen the American people, — divided into separate and isolated communities, without na- tionality, except such as resulted from a general com- munity of origin, - undertaking together the. work of throwing off the domination of their parent state. We have seen them enter upon this undertaking with- out- forming any political bond of a national char- acter, and without instituting any proper national agency. We have seen, that the first government which they created was, practically, a mere general council for the recommendation of measures to be adopted and executed by the several constituencies represented. We have seen no machinery instituted for the accomplishment, by the combined authority of these separate communities, of the great objects at which they were aiming; and although in theory the Revolutionary Congress would have been en- titled to assume and exercise the powers necessary to accomplish the objects for which it was assembled, we have seen that the people of the country, from a jealous and unreasonable fear of all power, would not permit this-to be done. The consequences of this want of power were inevitable. An army could not be kept in the field, on a permanent footing, capable of holding the‘ enemy in check. The city of New York fell into the hands of that enemy, the intermediate country between that city and the city of Philadelphia was overrun, and from the latter capital, the seat of the general government, the Congress was obliged to fly before the invading foe. _ 384 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK n1 Taught by these events that a more efl'ective union was necessary to the deliverance of the coun- try from a foreign yoke, the States at length united in the establishment of a government, the leading purpose of which was mutual defence against ex- ternal attacks, and called it a Confederation. But its powers were so restricted, and its operations so clogged and impeded by State jealousies and State reservations of power, that it lacked entirely the means of providing the sinews of war out of the resources of the country, and was driven to foreign loans and foreign arms for the means of bringing that war to a close. A vast load of debt was thus accumulated upon the country; and, as soon as peace was established, it became apparent, that, while the Confederation was a government with the power of contracting debts, it was without the power of paying them. This incapacity revealed the existence of great objects of government, without which the people of the several States could never prosper, and which, in their separate capacities, the States themselves could never accomplish. Now it is as certain as history can make any thing, that the whole period, from the commencement of the war to the end of the Confederation, was a period of great suffering to the people of the United States. The trials and hardships of war were suc- ceeded by the greater trials and hardships of a time of peace, in which the whole nation experienced that greatest of all social evils, the want of an eflicient and competent government. There was a gloom on. vrr] ‘ rrs rnarmns. 385 upon the minds of men, -— a sense of insecurity, —— a _ consciousness that American society was not fulfil- ling the ends of its being by the development of its resources and the. discharge of its obligations, —- which constituted altogether a discipline and a chastisement of the whole nation, and which we are not at liberty to regard as the mere accidents of a world ungoverned by an overruling Power. It was from the midst of that discipline that the American people came to the high undertaking of forming for themselves a constitution, by which to work out the destiny of social life in this Western World. Had they essayed their task after years of prosperity, and after old institutions and old forms of government had, upon the whole, yielded a fair amount of success and happiness, they would have wanted that power which comes only from failure and disappointment, — the power to adapt the best remedy to the deepest social defects, and to lay hold on the future with the ‘strength given by the hard teachings of the past. Civil liberty, — American liberty, — that liberty which resides in law, which is protected by great in- stitutions and upheld by the machinery of a popular , government, -- is not simply the product of a desire, or a determination, to be free. Such liberty comes, if it comes at all, only after serious mistakes, —- after frightful deficiencies have taught men that power ' must be lodged somewhere. It comes when a people have learned, , by adversity and disappointment, that a total negation of all authority, and a jealousy of all von. 1. 49 386 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [Boox III. restraint, can end only in leaving society without the defences and securities which nothing but law can raise for it. It comes ‘when the passions are ex- ' hausted, and the rivalries of opposing interests have worn themselves out, in the vain endeavor to reach what reason and justice and self-sacrifice alone can procure. Then, and then only, is the intellect of a nation sure to operate the fidelity and energy of its native powers Then only does it grasp the principles of freedom with the ability to incorpo- rate them into the practical forms of a public ad- ministration whose strength and energy shall give them vitality, and prevent their diffusion into the vagueness of mere abstractions, which return to so- ciety the cold and mocking gift of a stone for its craving demand of bread. The Convention was a body of great and disinter- ested men, competent, both morally and intellect- ually to the work assigned them. High qualities of character are requisite to the formation of a sys- tem of government for a wide country with different interests. Mere talent \ not do it. Intellectual power and ingenuity alone cannot compass it. There must be a moral completeness in the char- acters of those who are to achieve such a work; for it does not consist solely in devising schemes, or creat- ing oflices, or parcelling out jurisdictions and powers. There must be adaptation, adjustment of conflicting interests, reconciliation of conflicting claims. There must be the recognition and admission of great expe CH. VIL] . ITS FRAMIERS. 387 dients, and the sacrifice, often, of darling objects of ambition,'or of local policy, to the vast central pur- pose of the greatest happiness of the greatest num- ber. Hence it is, that, wherever this mighty work is to be successfully accomplished, there must be a high sense of justice; a power of concession; the qualities of magnanimity and patriotism; and that broad moral sanity of the intellect, which is farthest removed from fanaticism, intolerance, or selfish ad- hesion either to interest or to opinion. These qualities were preéminently displayed by many of the framers of the Constitution. There was certainly a remarkable amount of talent and intel- lectual power in that body. There were men in that assembl , whom, for genius in statesmanship, and for profound speculation in all that relates to the science of government,_the world has never seen overmatched; But the same men, who were most conspicuous for these brilliant gifts and acquirements, for their pro- found theories and their acute perception of princi- ples, were happily the most marked, in that assembly, for their comprehensive patriotism, their ustice, their unselfishness and magnanimity. Take, for instance, Hamilton. Where, among all the speculative phi- losophers in political science whom the world has seen, shall we find a man of greater acuteness of intellect, or more capable of devising a scheme of government which should appear theoretically per- feet’! Yet Hamilton’s unquestionable genius for political disquisition and construction was directed and restrained by a noble generosity, and an unerr- 388 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK n1. ing perception of the practicable and the expedient, which enabled him to serve mankind without at- tempting to force them to his own plans, and with- out compelling them into his own views. Take Washington, whose peculiar greatness was a moral elevation, which secured the wisest and best use of all his powers in either civil or military life. Take Madison, who certainly lacked neither ability nor 1nclination for speculative inquiries, and who had a mind capable of enforcing the application of what- ever principles he espoused. Yet his calm good sense, and the tact with which he could adapt theory to practice, were no less among his prominent char- acteristics. Take Franklin, who sometimes held ex- treme opinions, and occasionally pushed his peculiar fancies, springing from an excess of worldly wisdom, to the utmost verge of truth, but whose intellect was tempered, and whose whole character was softened, by the wide and varied experience of a life that had been commenced in obscurity, and was now closing with the honors of a reputation that filled the East- em as well as the Western hemisphere. Take Gou- verneur Morris, who was ardent, impulsive, and not ~ disinclined to tenacity of opinion; but he rose above all local and narrow objects, and embraced, in the scope of his clear and penetrating vision, the hap- piness and welfare of this whole continent. It was a most fortunate thing for America, that the Revolutionary age, with its hardships, its trials, and its mistakes, had formed a body of statesmen capable of framing for it a durable constitution. The on. v11] ' rrs FBAMERS. " 389 leading persons in the Convention which formed the Constitution had been actors, either in civil or military life, in the scenes of the Revolution. In these scenes their characters as American states- men had been formed. When the condition of the country had fully revealed the incapacity of its gov- ernment to provide for its wants, these men were naturally looked to, to construct a system which should save it fi'om anarchy. And their great ca- pacities, their high, disinterested purposes, their free- dom from all fanaticism and illiberality, and their earnest, unconquerable faith in the destiny of their country, enabled them to found that government, which now upholds and protects the whole fabric of liberty in the States of this Union. Of course no such assembly, in that or‘ in any other age, in this or in any other country, could be called together for such a purpose, without exhibiting a great diversity of opinions, wishes, and views. The very object for which they were assembled was of a nature to develop, to the fullest extent, the most conflicting opinions and the most opposite theories. X That object was to devise a system which should best secure the permanent liberty and happiness of a vast country. What subject, in the whole range of human thought and human endeavor, could be more complex than this? What occasion, among all the diversities of human affairs, could present a wider field for honest differences of opinion, and for severe conflicts of mind with mind’! Yet it should never be forgotten, was‘ the merit of this assembly, that, col- 390 “ THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. lectively and individually, they were animated by the most pure and exclusive devotion to the object for which they were called together. It was this high patriotism, this deep and never-ceasing consciousness that the great experiment of republican liberty turned on the 'result' of I their labors, as on the hazard‘ of a die, that brought at last all conflicts of interest, all diversities of opinion and feeling, into a focus of con- ciliation, and unanimity. More than once the reader will find them on the point of separating without having accomplished any thing ; and more than once he will see them recalled to their mighty task by the eloquence of some ‘master-spirit, who knew how to touch the key-note of that patriotic feeling, which was never wholly lost in' the jarring discords of de- bate and intellectual strife. For four months the laborious effort went on. The serene and unchang- ing presence of Washington presided overall. The chivalrous sincerity and disinterestedness of ‘Hamil- ton pervaded the assembly with all the power of his fascinating manners. The flashing eloquence of Gouverneur' Morris recalled the dangers of anarchy, which must be accepted as the alternative of an abortive experiment. The calm, clear, statesmanlike views of Madison, the searching and profound expo- sitions of King, the prudent influence of Franklin, at length ruled the hour. In examining ' their work, and in reading all that is left to us of their discussions, we are to consider the materials out of which they had to frame a sys- tem of republican liberty, and the point‘ of view, in Ca. v11; ITS FRAMERS. 391 reference to the whole subject, at which they stood. We are to remember how little the world had then seen of real liberty united with personal safety and public security; and how entirely novel the under- taking was, to form a complete system of govern- ment, wholly independent 0; tradition, exactly de- fined in a written constitution, to be created at once, and at once set in motion, for the accomplishment of the great objects of human liberty and social progress. The examples of Greece and Rome, the modern republics of Italy, the federal relations of the Swiss Cantons, and the distant approach to re- publicanism that had been seen in Holland, might be resorted to for occasional and meagre illustrations of a few general principles. But, unquestionably, the country which, up to that moment, had exhib- ited, by the working of its government, the great- est amount of liberty combined with the greatest public security, was England. England, however, was a monarchy; and monarchy was the system which they both desired, and were obliged, to avoid. If it was within the range of human possibility to establish a system of republican government, which would fulfil its appropriate duties, over this vast and rapidly extending country, that they felt, one and all, to be their great task. On‘ the other hand, they _ knew that, if to that form ‘they could -‘ not succeed in giving due stability and wisdom, it would be, in the words of Hamilton, “disgraced and lost among ourselves, disgraced and lost to mankind for ever}?1 1 Madison ’s Debates in the Federal Convention. Elliot, V. 244. 392 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK In. Here was their‘ trial, —- the difficulty of all their difficulties; and it was here that they exhibited a wisdom, a courage, and a capacity, which have been surpassed by no other body of lawgivers ever assem- bled in the world. Their country had, a few years before, passed through a long and distressing war with its parent state. The yoke of her domination had been thrown off, and its removal was naturally followed by a loosening of the bands of all authority, and an indis- position to all new restraints. The American Colo- nies had become independent States; and as the spirit of liberty which pervaded them .made indi- viduals impatient of control in their political rela- tions, so the States reflected the same spirit in their corporate ‘conduct, and looked with jealousy and dis- trust upon all powers which were not to be exercised by themselves. Yet it was clear that there were powers and functions of government, which, for the absolute safety of the country, must be withdrawn from the States, and vested in some national head, which should hold and exercise them in the name of the whole, for the good of the whole. The great question was, what that national head was to be; and the great service performed by the framers of the Constitution consisted in devising a system by which a ‘national sovereignty might be endowed with energy, dignity, and power, and the forms and sub- stance of popular liberty still be preserved; a system by which a supreme authority in all the matters which it touched might be created, resting directly on v11] WASHINGTON. 393 on the popular ‘will, and to be exercised, in all com- ing time, through forms and institutions under which that will should have a direct and perpetual and perpetually renewed expression. This they accom- plished. They accomplished it, too, without abolish- ing the State governments, and without impairing a single personal right which existed before they began their work. They accomplished it without violence; without the disruption of a single fibre in that whole delicate tissue of which society is made up. No drop of blood was shed to establish this government, the work of their hands ; and no moment of interruption occurred to the calm, even tenor of the pursuits of men, —- the daily on-goings of society, in which the stream of human life and happiness and progress flows on in beneficence and peace. First upon the list of those who had been called together for this great purpose, we are to mention him, without whose presence and countenance all men felt that no attempt to meliorate the political condition of the country could succeed. I have already given an account of the proceedings which led directly to the calling of the Convention; ‘ and have mentioned the interesting fact, that the impulse to those proceedings was given at Mount Vernon. Thither General Washington had retired, at the close of the war, with no thought of ever engaging again in public affairs. He supposed that for him the scene was closed. “ The noontide of life,” said he, in a letter to the Marchioness de La von. 1. 50 394 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. . [BOOK III. fayette, “is now past, with Mrs. Washington and myself; and all we have to do is to glide gently down a stream which no human effort can as- cend.” 1 i - But wise and far-seeing as he was, he did not fore- see how soon he was to be called from that grave and sweet tranquillity. He was busy with the con- cerns of his farm ; he was tasting the happiness of home, from which he had been absent nine long years; he was “ cultivating the affections of good men, and practising the domestic virtues.” But it was not in his nature to be inattentive to the con- cerns of that country for whose ‘welfare he had la- bored and suffered so much. He maintained an active correspondence with several of the most emi- nent and virtuous ,of his compatriots in different parts of the Union; and in that correspondence, running through the years 17 84, 17 85, and 1786, there exists the most ample evidence of the down-_ ward tendency of things, and of the fears it ex- ' cited. It had become evident to him that we never should - establish a national character, nor be justly consid- ered and respected by the nations of Europe, with- out enlarging the powers of the federal govern ment for the regulation of commerce. The obj ec- tion which had been hitherto urged, that some States might be more benefited than others by a commer- cial regulation, seemed to him to apply to every mat 1 Washington’s Writings, IX. 166. I on. m. 1 wasnme'ron. 395 ter of general utility. “ We are,” said he, writing in the summer of 1785, “ either a united people under one head, and for federal purposes, or we are thirteen independent sovereignties eternally counteracting each other. If the former, whatever such a majority of the States as the constitution points out conceives to be for the benefit of the whole, should, in my humble opinion, be submitted to by the minority. Let the Southern States always be represented; let them act more in union; let ' them declare freely and boldly what is for the interest of, and what is prejudicial to, their constituents; and there will, there must be, an accommodating spirit. In the establishment of a navigation act, this, in a particular manner, ought and will doubtless be attended to. If the assent of nine States, or, as some propose, of eleven, is neces- sary to give validity to a commercial system, it in- sures ‘this measure, or it cannot be obtained. “ Wherein, then, lies the danger? But if your fears are in danger of being realized, cannot certain provisos in the ordinance guard against the evil"! I see no‘ difficulty in this, if the Southern delegates would give their attendance in Congress, and follow the‘ example, if it should be set them, of adhering together to counteract combination. I confess to you candidly, that I can foresee no evil. greater: than disunion; than those unreasonable jealousies (I say unreasonable, because I ‘would have a ‘proper jealousy always awake, and " the United ,iSt'ates' on- the- watch to prevent individual States from infracting the con- stitution with impunity) which are continually poi-_ 396 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK 1n. soning our minds and filling them with imaginary evils for the prevention of real ones.” 1 But, while he desired to see the ninth article of the, Confederation so amended and extended as to give adequate commercial powers, he feared that it would be of little avail to give them to the existing Congress. The members of that body seemed to him to be so much afraid of exerting the powers which they already possessed, that they lost no opportunity of surrendering them, or of referring their exercise to the individual States. The speculative question, whether foreign commerce is of any real advantage to a country, he regarded as of no importance, con vinced that the spirit of trade which pervaded these States was not to be restrained. It behooved us, therefore, to establish just principles of commercial regulation, and this could not, any more than other matters of national concern, be done by thirteen heads difl'erently constructed and organized. The necessity, in fact, of a controlling power was obvi- ous, and why it should be withheld was, he declared, beyond his comprehension. With these views, he looked to the Convention at Annapolis as likely to result in a plan which would give to the federal government efficient powers for all commercial pur- poses, although he regretted that more objects had not been embraced in the project for the meeting. The failure of this attempt to enlarge the com- mercial powers of Congress, and the recommenda- 1 Washington’s Writings, IX. 121 \ Ga. v11] WASHINGTON. ' 397 tion of a general convention made by the Annapolis commissioners, placed the country in an extremely delicate situation. Washington thought, when this recommendation was announced, that the people were not then sufficiently misled to retract their error, and entertained some doubt as to the conse- quences of an attempt to revise and amend the Arti- cles of Confederation. Something, however, must be done, he said, or ‘the fabric which was certainly tottering, would inevitably fall. “ I think,” said he, “ often of our situation, and view it with concern. From the high ground we stood upon, from the plain path which invited our footsteps, to be so fall- en, so lost, is really mortifying; but virtue, I fear, has in a great degree taken its departure from our land, and the want of a disposition to do justice is the source of the national embarrassments; for, whatever guise or color is given to them, this I apprehend is the origin of the evils we now feel, and probably shall labor under for some time yet.” 1 At this time the legislature of Virginia were act- ing upon the subject of a delegation to the Federal Convention, and a general wish was felt to place Washington at the head of it. N o opposition had been made in that body to the bill introduced for the purpose of organizing and instructing such a delegation, and it was thought advisable to give the proceeding all the weight which could be derived from a single State. To a private intimation of this 1 Washington’s Writings, IX. 167. 398 ' THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. desire of the legislature he returned a decided refu- sal. Several obstacles appeared to him to put his attendance out of the question. ‘ The principal rea- _ son that he assigned was, that he had already de- clined a re-election as President of the Society of the Cincinnati, and had signified that he should not attend their triennial general meeting, to be held in Philadelphia in the same month with the Conven- tion.1 He felt a great reluctance to do any thing which might give offence to those patriotic men, the OfilCBI’S of the army who had shared with him the labors and dangers of the war. He had declined to act longer with that Society, because the motives and objects of its founders had‘ been misconceived and misrepresented. Originally a charitable institu- tion, it had come to be regarded as anti-republican in its spirit and tendencies. Desiring, on the one hand, to avoid the charge of deserting the officers who had nobly supported him, and had always treated him with the greatest attention and attach- ment; and wishing, on the other hand, not to be thought willing to give his support to an institution generally believed incompatible with republican prin- ciples, — he had excused .his attendance upon the ground of the necessity of attending to his private concerns. He had, in truth, ‘a great reluctance to appear again upon any public theatre. His health was‘ far from being firm; he felt the need and cov- eted the blessing of retirement for the remainder of 1 Washington’s Writings, IX. 212. 0n. v11] WASHINGTON. ' 399 his days; and although some modifications of the Society whose first President ' he had been, were then allaying the ' j ealousies it had excited, he with- drew from this, the last relation which had kept him in a conspicuous public position. But Washington at Mount Vernon, cultivating his estate, and rarely leaving his own farms, was as conspicuous to the country as if ‘he were still placed in the most active and important public sta tions. All eyes were turned to him in this emer- gency; all thoughts were employed in considering whether his - countenance ‘and his influence would be given to this attempt to create a national gov- ernment for the States whose liberties he had won. And his friends represented to him, that the posture of public affairs would prevent’ any criticism on the situation in which the contemporary meeting of the Cincinnati would place him, if he were to accept a seat in the Convention. Still, when the ofiicial no- tice of his appointment came, in December, he for- mally declined, but was requested by the Governor of the State’ to reserve, his decision.1 At this mo- ment, the insurrection in Massachusetts broke upon him like a thunderbolt. “' What, gracious God!” he exclaimed, “is man, that there should be such inconsistency and perfidiousness in his conduct! It was but the other day that we were shedding our blood to obtain the constitutions under which we now live, - constitutions of our own choice and 1 Washington’s Writings, IX. 21‘9. 4.00 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK n1. making,-- and now we are unsheathing the sword to overturn them! The thing is so unaccountable, that I hardly know how to realize it, or to per- suade myself that I am not under the illusion of a dream.”1 It was clear that, in case of civil discord and open confusion extending through any considerable part of the country, he would be obliged to take part onv one side or the other, or to withdraw from the con- tinent; and he, as well as other reflecting men, were not without fears that the disturbances in the East- ern States might extend throughout the Union. He consulted with his friends in distant parts of the country, and requested their advice, but still, as late as February, hesitated whether he should attend the Convention. In that month, he heard of the sup- pression of the rebellion in Massachusetts; but the developments which it had made of the state of so-. ciety, the necessity which it had revealed for more coercive power in the institutions of the country, and the fear which it had excited that this want might lead men’s minds to entertain the idea of monarchical government, finally decided him to accept the ap- pointment. The possibility that his absence at such a uncture might be construed into what he called “ a dereliction of republicanism,” seems to have influ- enced his decision more than all other. reasons. Con- gress, it is true, had now sanctioned the Convention, and this had removed one obstacle which had weighed _1 Washington’s Writings, IX. 2‘21. Ox. vrr] WASHINGTON. 401 with him and with others. He entertained great doubts as to the result of the experiment, but was entirely satisfied that it ought to be tried.1 He left Mount Vernon in the latter part of April. Public honors attended him everywhere on his route. At Chester, fifteen miles from the city of Philadel- phia, he was met by the Speaker of the Assembly of Pennsylvania and several officers and gentlemen of distinction, who accompanied him to Gray’s Ferry, where a military escort was in waiting to receive him and conduct him into the city. On his arrival, he immediately paid a visit to Dr. Franklin, at that time President of the State of Pennsylvania. 2 On the assembling of the Convention, Robert Morris, by the instruction and in behalf of the deputation of Pennsylvania, proposed that General Washington should be elected President. John Rutledge of South Carolina seconded this suggestion, observing that the presence of General Washington forbade any observations on the occasion which might otherwise be proper.8 His opinions, at the time when he took the chair of the Convention, as to what was proper to be done, and what was practicable, can only ‘be gathered from his corre- spondence. He had formed some general views of the principles on which a national government should be framed, but he had not proceeded at all 1 Washington’s Writings, IX. 3 Madison’s Debates, Elliot, V. 236. 123. , 2 Sparks’s Life of Washington, p. 435. von. 1 51 402 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK 111. to the consideration of details. The first and most important object he held to be, to establish such a constitution as would secure and perpetuate the republican form of government, by satisfying the wants of the country and the time, and thus check- ing all tendency to monarchical ideas. He had come to- the Convention, as we have seen, in order that the great experiment of self-government, on which this country had entered at the Revolution, might have a further trial beyond the hazards of the hour. He knew - he had had occasion to know—that the thought of a monarchy, as being necessary to the safety of the country, had been to some extent entertained. There had been those in a former day, in the darkest period of the war, who had proposed to him to assume a crown,-—men who could possibly have bestowed it upon him, or have assisted him to acquire it, - but who met a rebuke which the nature of their proposition and his char- acter should have taught them to expect. There were those in that day who sincerely despaired of republican liberty, and who had allowed themselves to think that some of the royal families of Europe might possibly furnish a sovereign fitted to govern and control the turbulent elements of our political condition. Washington understood the genius and character of the people of this country so well, that he held it to be impossible ever to establish that form of government over them without the deepest social convulsions. It was the form of the govern- ment against which they had waged a seven years’ on. v11] WASHINGTON. 403 war; and it was certain that, apart from all ques- tions of theoretical fitness or value, nothing but the most frightfirl civil disorders, menacing the very ex istence of society itself, could ever bring them again under its sway. He was also satisfied, that, whatever particular system was to be adopted, it must be one that would create a national sovereignty and give it the means of coercion. What the nature of that coercion ought to be, he had not considered; but that obedience to the ordinances of a general government could not be expected, unless it was clothed with the power of enforcing them, all his experience during the war, and all his observation since, had fully satisfied him. He was convinced, also, that powers of a more exten- sive nature, and which would comprehend other ob- j ects, ought to be given to the general government; that Congress should be so placed as to enable and compel them to exert their constitutional authority with a firm and steady hand, instead of ' referring it back to the States. He proposed to adopt no temporizing expedients, but to have the defects of the Confederation thoroughly examined and dis- played, and a radical cure provided, whether it were accepted or not. A course of this kind, he said, would stamp wisdom and dignity on their proceed- _ ings, and hold up a light which sooner or later would have its influence.1 Persuaded that the primary cause of all the public 1 Washington ’s Writings, IX. 250. 404 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III disorders lay in the different State governments, and in the tenacity with which they adhered to their State powers, he saw that incompatibility in the laws of different States and disrespect to the authority of the Union must continue to render the situation of the country weak, inefficient, and disgraceful. The principle with which he entered the Convention, and on which he acted throughout to the end, was, “ with a due consideration of circumstances and habits, to form such a government as will bear the scrutinizing eye of criticism, and trust it to the good sense and patriotism of the people to carry it into effect.”1 . , The character of Washington as a statesman has, perhaps, been somewhat undervalued, from two causes; one of them being his military greatness, and the other, the extraordinary balance of his mind, which presented no brilliant and few salient qualities. Undoubtedly, as a statesman he was not constructive, like Hamilton, nor did he possess the same abundant and ever-ready resources. He was eminently cau- tions, but he was also eminently sagacious. He had had a wide field of observation during the war, the theatre of which, commencing in New England, had extended through the Middle and into the Southern States. He had, of course, been brought in contact with the men and the institutions of all the States, and had been concerned in their conflicts with the federal authority, to a greater extent than any other 1 Washington’s Writings, IX. 258. on. v11.] WASHINGTON. 405 public man of the time. This experience had not prepared him—as the character of his mind had not prepared him—to suggest plans or frame institutions fitted to remedy the evils he had observed, and to apply the principles which he had discovered. But it had revealed to him the dangers and difficulties of our situation, and had made him a national states- . man, as incapable of confining his politics to the nar- row scale of local interests and attachments, as he had been of - confining his exertions to the object of ' achieving the liberties of a single state. He would have. been fitly placed in the chair of any deliberative assembly into which he might have been called at any period of his life ; but it was pre- eminently suitable that he should occupy that of the Convention for forming the Constitution. He had no talent for debate, and upon the floor of this‘ body he would have exerted less influence, and have been far less the central object. towards which the opinions and views of the members were directed, than he was in the high and becoming position to which he was i now called. CHAPTER VIII. HAMILTON. NEXT to the august name of the President should be mentioned that great man who, as a statesman, towered above all his compeers, even in that assem- bly of great men, — Alexander Hamilton. This eminent person is probably less well known to the nation at the present day, than most of the leading statesmen of the Revolution. There are causes for this in his history. He never attained to that high ofl‘ice which has conferred celebrity on in- ferior men. The political party of which he was one of the founders and one of the chief leaders became unpopular with the great body of his coun- trymen before it was extinct. His death, too, at the early age of forty-seven, while it did not leave an unfinished character, left an unfinished career, for the contemplation of posterity. In this respect, his fate was unlike that of nearly all his most distin- guished contemporaries. Washington, Adams, Jef- ferson, Madison, Jay, and in fact almost all the prominent statesmen of the Revolution, died in old age or in advanced life, and after the circle of their public honors and usefulness had been completed- on. vnL] HAMILTON. _ 407 Hamilton was cut off at a period of life when he may be said to have had above a third of its best activity yet before him: and this is doubtless one cause why so little is popularly known, by the pres- ent generation, of him who was by far the greatest statesman of the Revolutionary age. It is known, indeed, traditionally, what a thrill of horror - what a sharp, terrible pang -— ran through the nation, proving the comprehension by the entire people of what was lost, when Aaron Burr took from his country and the world that important life. In the most distant extremities of the Union, men felt that one of the first intellects of the age had been extinguished. __K From the utmost activity and public consideration, in the fulness of his strength and use- fulness, the bullet of , a duellist had taken the first statesman in America ; —— a man who, while he had not been without errors, and while his life had not been without mistakes, had served his country, ‘from his boyhood to that hour of her bitter bereavement, with an elevation of purpose and a force of intellect never exceeded in her history, and‘ which had caused Washington to lean upon him and to trust him, as he trusted and leaned upon no other man, from first to last. The death of such a man, under such cir- cumstances, cast a deep gloom over the face of so- ciety; and Hamilton was mourned by his contempo- " raries with a sorrow founded on a just appreciation of his‘ ‘greatness, and of what they owed to his intel- lect and character. But by the generations that have succeeded- he has been less intimately known than 408 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [Boox III. _w i’ of thought. many of his compatriots, who lived longer, and reached stations which he never occupied. He was born in the island of Nevis, in the year 1757; his mother being a native of that isl- and, and his father being a Scotchman. At the age of fifteen, after having been for three years in the counting-house of a merchant at Santa Cruz, he was sent to New York to complete his education, and was entered as a private student in King’s (now Columbia) College. At the age of seventeen, his political life was already begun; for at that age, and while still at college, he wrote and published a series of essays on the Rights of the Colonies, which attracted the attention of the whole country. These essays appeared in 1774;, in answer to cer- tain pamphlets on the Tory side of the contro- versy; and in them Hamilton reviewed and vindi- cated the whole of the proceedings of the first Con- tinental Congress. There are displayed in these papers a power of reasoning and sarcasm, a knowl- edge of the principles of government and of the English Constitution, and a grasp of the merits of the whole controversy, that would have done honor to any man at any age, and in a youth of seventeen are wonderful. To say that they evince precocity of intellect, gives no idea of their main characteristics. {They show great maturity ;- a more remarkable maturity than has ever been exhibited by any other person, at so early an age, in the same department They produced, too, a great effect. ' Their influence in bringing the public mind to the on. vnr] HAMELTON. 409 point of resistance to the mother country, was impor- tant and extensive. Before he was nineteen years old, Hamilton en- tered the army as a captain of artillery; and when only twenty, in 1777, he was selected by Washing- ton to be one of his aides-de-camp, with the 'rank of lieutenant-colonel. In this capacity he served until 17 82, when he was elected a member of Congress from the State of New York, and took his seat. In 1786, he was chosen a member of the legislature of ‘New York. In 17 87, he was appointed as a dele- gate to the Convention which framed the Constitu- tion. In the following year, when only thirty years old, he published, with Madison and Jay, the cele- brated essays called “The Federalist,” in favor of the form of government proposed by the Convention. In 1788, he became a member of the State Conven- tion of New York, called to ratify the Constitution, and it was chiefly through his influence that it was adopted in that State. In 1789, he took office in Washington’s, administration, as Secretary of the Treasury. In 1795, he retired to the practice of the law in the city of New York. In 1798, at Wash- ington’s absolute demand, he was appointed second in command of the provisional army, raised under the elder Adams’s administration, to repel an appre- hended invasion of the French. On the death of \Vashington, in 1799, he succeeded to the chief command. When the army was disbanded, he again returned to the bar, and practised with great reputation until the year 1804, when his life was voL I. 52 410 ' THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. terminated in a duel with Colonel Burr, concerning which the sole blame that has ever been imputed to Hamilton is, that he. felt constrained to accept the challenge. ' His great characteristic was his profound insight into the principles of government. The sagacity with which he comprehended all systems, and the thorough knowledge he possessed of the working of all the freer institutions of ancient and modern times, united with a singular capacity to make the experience of the past bear on the actual state of society, rendered him one of the most useful states- men that America has known. Whatever in the science of government had already been ascertained; whatever the civil condition of mankind in any age had made practicable or proved abortive; whatever experience had demonstrated; whatever the passions, the interests, or the wants of men had made inevita- ble, -— he seemed to know intuitively. But he was no theorist. His powers were all eminently prac- tical. He detected the vice of a theory instantly, and shattered it with a single blow. His knowledge, too, of. the existing state of his own and of other countries was not less remarkable than his knowledge of the past. He understood America as thoroughly as the wisest of his contem-g poraries, and he comprehended Europe more com- pletely than any other man of that age upon this continent.1 1 While these sheets are pass- writes to me as follows: “ One . ing through the press, Mr. Ticknor day in January, 1819, talking with CH, V111,] HAMILTON. 4:11 To these characteristics he added a clear logical power in statement, a vigorous reasoning, a perfect frankness and moral courage, and a lofty disdain of all the arts of a demagogue. His eloquence was distinguished for correctness of language and dis- tinctness of utterance, as well as for grace and dignity. . In theory, he leaned decidedly to the constitution of England, as the best form of civil polity for the attainment of the great objects of government. But he was not, on that account, less a lover of liberty than those who favored more popular and democratic institutions. His writings will be searched in vain for any disregard of the natural rights of mankind, or any insensibility to the blessings of freedom. It was because he believed that those blessings can be best secured by governments in which a change of rulers is not of frequent occurrence, that he had so high an estimate of the English Constitution. At the period of the Convention, he held that the chief want of this country was a government into which the element of a permanent tenure of office could be largely infused; and he read in the Convention —- as Prince Talleyrand, in Paris, about his visit to America,‘ he expressed the highest admiration of Mr. Ham- ilton, saying, among other things, that he had known nearly all the marked men of his time, but that he had never known one, on the whole, equal to him. I was much surprised and gratified with the re- mark ; but still, feeling that, as an American, I was in some sort a party concerned by patriotism in the compliment,v I answered with a little reserve, that the great mil- itary commanders‘ and the great statesmen of Europe had dealt with larger- masses and wider interests than he had. ‘ Mais, Monsieur,’ the Prince instantly replied, ‘ Ham- ilton avoit devz'né l’Europe.’ ” ' 412 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. an illustration of his views, but without pressing it —- a plan by which the Executive and the Senate could hold their oflices during good behavior. But the idea, which has sometimes been promulgated, that he desired the establishment of a monarchical gov- ernment in this country, is without foundation. At no period of his life did he regard that experiment as either practicable or desirable. Hamilton’s relation to the Constitution is peculiar. He had less direct agency in framing its chief pro- visions than many of the other principal persons who sat in the Convention; and some of its provisions were not wholly acceptable to him when framed. But the history, which has been detailed in the pre- vious chapters of this work, of the progress of federal ideas, and of the efforts to introduce and establish principles tending to consolidate the Union, has been largely occupied with the recital of his opinions, exertions, and prevalent influence. Beginning with the year 1'7 80, when he was only three-and-twenty years of age, and when he sketched the outline of a national government strongly resembling the one which the Constitution long afterwards established; passing through the term of his service in Congress, when his admirable expositions of the revenue sys- tem, the commercial power, and the ratio of contri- bution, may justly be said to have saved the Union from dissolution; and coming down to the time when he did so much to bring about, first, the meet- ing at Annapolis, and then the general and final Convention of all the States; -—-the whole period on. VH1] HAMILTON. 413 is marked by his wisdom and filled with his power. He did more than any other public man of the time to lessen the force of State attachments, to create a national feeling, and to lead the public mind to a comprehension of the necessity for an efficient na— tional sovereignty. Indeed, he was the first to perceive and to develop ' the idea of a real union of the people of the United States. To him, more than to any one else, is to be attributed the conviction that the people of the dif- ferent States were competent to establish a general government by their own direct action; and that this mode of proceeding ought to be considered" within the contemplation of the State legislatures, when they appointed delegates to a convention for the revision and amendment of the existing system.1 The age in which he lived, and the very extraor- dinary early maturity of his character, naturally re- 'mind us of that remarkable person who was two years his junior, and who became prime-minister of England at the age of twenty-four. The young- er Pitt entered public; life with almost every possi- ble advantage. Inheriting “ a great and celebrated name,” 2 educated expressly for the career of a states- man, and introduced into the House of Commons at a moment when power) was just ready to drop into the hands of any man capable of wielding it, he had only to prove. himself a brilliant and powerful de- bater, in order to become the ruler of an empire, 1 See his first speech in the Con- 2 Burke, ‘speaking of Lord Chat- _Vention, as reported by Mr. Madison. . ham. 414 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. whose constitution had been settled for ages, and was necessarily administered by the successful lead- ers of regular parties in its legislative body. That he was a most eminent parliamentary orator, a con- summate tactician and leader of party, a minister of ' singular energy, and a statesman of a very high order of mind and character, at an age when most men are scarcely beginning to give proofs of what they may become, -— all this History has deliberately and finally recorded. What place it may assign to him among the statesmen by whose lives and actions England and the world have been materially and per- manently benefited is ‘not yet settled, and it is not to the present purpose. to consider. The theatre in which Hamilton appeared, lived, and acted, was one of a character so totally different, that the comparison necessarily ends with the con- trast which it immediately suggests. Like. Pitt, in- deed, he seems to have been born a statesman, and to have had no such youth as ordinarily precedes the manhood of the mind. But, in the American colo- nies, no political system of things existed that was fitted to train him for a career of usefulness and honor; and yet, when the years of his boyhood were hardly ended, he sprang forth into the troubled af- fairs of the time, with the full stature of a matured and well-furnished statesman. He, in truth, showed himself to be already the man that was wanted. Every thing was in an unsettled and anxious state; -— a state of change and transition. There was no regular, efiicient government. It was all but a state on. vrn.] HAMILTON. 415 of civil war, and the more clear-sighted saw that this great disaster was coming. He was compelled, there- fore, to mark out for himself, step by step, beginning in 1774, a system of political principles which should serve, not to administer existing institutions with wisdom and beneficence, but 4:0 create institutions able to unite a people divided into thirteen indepen- dent sovereignties; to give them the attitude and capacity of an independent nation; and then to carry them on, with constantly increasing prosperity and power, to their just place in the affairs of the world. It was a great work, but Mr. Hamilton was equal to it. He- was by nature, by careful study, and by still more careful, anxious, and earnest thought, eminently fitted to detect and develop those resources of power and progress, which, in the dark condition of society that attends and follows an ex hausting period of revolution, lie hidden, like gener- ous seeds, until some strong hand disencumbers them of the soil with which they had been oppressed, and gives them opportunity to germinate and bear golden fruit. At the age of three-and-twenty he had already formed well-defined, profound, and comprehensive opinions on the ‘situation and wants of these States. He had clearly discerned the practicability of form- ing a confederated government, and adapting it to their peculiar condition, resources, and exigencies. He had wrought out for himself a political system, far in advance of the conceptions of his contempo' raries, and one which, in the hands of those who most opposed him in life, became, when he was laid 416 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. in a premature grave, the basis on which this gov- ernment was consolidated; on which, to the pres- ent day, it has been administered; and on which alone it can safely rest in that future, which seems so to stretch out its unending glories before us. Mr. Hamilton, therefore, I conceive, proved him- self early to be a statesman of greater talent and power than the celebrated English minister whose youthful success was in the eyes of the world so much more brilliant, and whose early death was no less disheartening; for none can doubt, that to build up a, free and firm state out of a condition of political chaos, and to give it a government capable of devel oping the resources of its soil and people, and of insuring to it prosperity, power, and permanence, is a greater work than to administer with energy and success -— even in periods of severe trial -“-— the con- stitution of an empire whose principles and modes of action have been settled for centuries. Hamilton was one of those statesmen who trust to the eflicacy of the press for the advancement and inculcation of correct principles of public policy, and who desire to accomplish important‘ results mainly through the action of an enlightened public opinion. That he had faith in the intelligence and honesty of his countrymen, is proved by the numerous writings which he constantly addressed to their reason and good sense, in the shape of essays or letters, from the beginning to the end of his career, upon subjects on which it was important that they should act with wisdom and principle. on. VH1.) HAMILTON. 417 His own opinions, although held with great firm- ness, were also held in subordination to what was practicable. It was the rare felicity of his tempera- ment, to be able to accept a less good than his prin- ciples might have led him to insist upon, and to labor for it, when nothing better could be obtained, with as much patriotic energy and zeal as if it had been the best result of his own views. The Constitution itself remains, in this particular, a monument of the disinterestedness of his character. He thought it had great defects. But he accepted it, as the best‘ government that the wisdom of the Convention could frame, and the best that the nation would adopt. In this spirit, as soon as it was promulgated for the acceptance of the country, he came forward and_ placed himself in the foremost rank of its advocates, making himself, for all future time, one of the chief of its authoritative expounders. He was very ably assisted in the Federalist by Madison and Jay; but it was from him that the Federalist derived the weight and the power which commanded the careful attention of the country, and carried conviction to the great body of intelligent men in all parts of the Union. The extraordinary forecast with which its luminous discussions anticipated the operation of the new institutions, and its profound elucidation‘ of their principles, gave birth to American constitu- tional law, which was thus placed at once above the field of arbitrary constructions and in the domain of legal truth. They made it a science; and so long as the Constitution shall exist, they will continue von. 1. 53 418 [Boox III. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. to be resorted to as the most important source of contemporaneous interpretation which the the country afford.1 annals of In the two paramount characters of statesman and 1 The current editions of the Federalist are taken from an edi- tion published at Washington in 1818, by Jacob Gideon, in which the numbers written by Mr. Madi- son purport to have been corrected by himself. There had been three editions previous to this. The first edition was published in 1788, in two small volumes, by J. & A. M‘Lean, 41 Hanover Square, New York, under the following title: “ ‘The Federalist: a Collection of ' Essays written in Favor of the New Constitution, as agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787.” The first volume was is- sued before the last of the essays were written, and the second fol- lowed it, as soon as the series was completed. The authentic text of the work is to be found in this edition; two of ‘ the authors were inthe city of New York at the time it was printed, and probably superintended it. It was reissued from the same type, in 1789, by John Tiebout, 358 Pearl Street, New York. A second edition was published in 1802, at New York, in two volumes, containing also “ Pacificus on the Proclamation of Neutrality, and the Constitution, with its Amendments.” A third edition was published in 1810, by Williams & Whiting, New York. I have seen copies of the first and second editions only, in the li- brary of Peter Force, Esq., of Washington, editor of the“ Amer- ican. Archives.” There are some discrepancies between the text of the first edition and that of 1818, from which the current editions are taken. By whom or on what au- thority the alterations were made, I have not been able to ascertain, nor have I learned when, or why, or how far Mr. Madison may have corrected or altered the papers which he wrote. Such of the changes as I have examined do not materially affect the sense; but it is very de- sirable that the true text of the Federalist should be reproduced. That text exists in the first edi- tion, which was issued while the Constitution was before the peo- ple of the United States for their ratification; and as the Federalist was an argument addressed to the people in favor of the adoption of the Constitution, the exact text of ‘that argument, as it was read and acted upon, ought to be restored, without regard to the reasons which may have led any of the writers, or any one else, to alter it. I know of no evidence that Colonel Hamil- ton ever made or sanctioned the alteration of a word. After the text of the Constitution itself, there is scarcely any thing the preserva- tion of which is more important than the text of the Federalist as it was first published. on. VIIL] _ HAMILTON. 419 j urist, in the comprehensive nature of his patriotism, in his fieedom from sectional prejudices, in his ser- vices to the Union, and in the kind and magnitude of his intellect, posterity will recognize a resemblance to him whom America still mourns with the fresh- ness of a recent grief, and who has been to the Con- stitution, in the age that has succeeded, what Hamil- “ton was in the age that witnessed its formation and establishment. Without the one of these illustrious men,- the Constitution probably would never have existed; without the other, it might have become a mere record of past institutions, whose history had been glorious until. faction and civil discord had turned it into a record of mournful recollections. The following sentences, written by Hamilton soon after the adjournment of the Convention, contain a clew to all his conduct in support of the plan of gov- ernment which that body recommended: — “ It may be in me. a defect of political fortitude, but I ac- knowledge that I cannot feel an equal tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a longer continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A nation without a national government is an awful spectacle. The establishment of a constitution, in a time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a prodigy, ‘to the completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety.” CHAPTER IX. MADISON. FROM Hamilton ‘we naturally turn to his asso- ciate in the Federalist, — James Madison, afterwards fourth President of the United States, — whose faith- ful and laborious record has preserved to us the de- bates of the Convention. 'Mr. Madison was thirty-six years old when he entered that assembly. His previous life had fitted him to play a conspicuous and important part in its proceedings. He was born in 1751, of a good fami- ily, in Orange County, Virginia, and was ‘educated at Princeton College in New Jersey, where he took the degree of Bachelor of Arts in 177 2. He returned to Virginia in the spring of 177 3, and commenced the usual studies preparatory to an admission to the bar; but the disputes between the Colonies and the mother country soon drew him into public life. In 1776, he became a member of the State Convention which formed the first Constitution of Virginia. He was afterwards a member of the legislature and of the ' Council of the State, until he was appointed one of / cs. 1.x] MADISON. 421 its delegates in Congress, where he took his seat in March, 1780.1 From this time to the assembling of the Federal Convention in 1787, his services to the Union were of the most important character. He entered Con- gress without a national reputation, but with na- tional views. Indeed, it may be said of him, that he came from his native Commonwealth, -- “ mother of great men,” —- grown to the full proportions of a continental statesman. At the moment when he appeared upon the larger theatre of the national in- terests, the Articles of Confederation had not been finally ratified by all the States. Maryland had in- sisted, as a necessary condition of her accession to the new Confederacy, that the great States should , surrender to the Union their immense claims to the . unoccupied territories of the West; Virginia had remonstrated against this demand; and the whole scheme of the Confederation had thus been long encountered by an apparently insurmountable ob- stacle.2 The generous example of New York,- whose Western claims were ceded to the United States in the month preceding Mr. Madison’s entry into Con- gress, had furnished to the advocates of the Union the means for a powerful appeal to both sides of this critical and delicate controversy; but it required great tact, discretion, and address to make that ap- peal effectual, by inducing Maryland to trust to the 1 Article “ Madison ” in the Tucker of the University of Vir- Penny Encylopaedia, written for ginia. that work by Professor George 2 Ante, pp. 131-141. 422 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. influence of this example upon Virginia, and by inducing Virginia to make a cession that would be satisfactory to Maryland. In this high effort of statesmanship — a domestic diplomacy full‘ of diffi- culties ——Mr. Madison took part. He did not pre- pare the very skilful report which, while it aimed to produce cessions of their territorial claims by the larger States, appealed to Maryland to anticipate the result ;1 but the vast concession by which Virginia yielded the Northwestern Territory to the Union was afterwards brought about mainly by his exertions. In 1782, he united with Hamilton in the cele- brated report prepared by the latter upon the refusal of the State of Rhode Island to comply with the rec ‘ ommendations of Congress for a duty on imports.2 In 1783, he was named first upon a committee with Ellsworth and Hamilton, to prepare an Address to the States, urging the adoption of the revenue sys- tem which has been described in a previous chapter, and the Address was written by The great ability and high tone of this paper gave it a striking effect. The object of this plan of revenue was, as we have seen, to fund the national debts, and to make a sufiicient provision for their discharge. I have already assigned to it the merit of having pre- served the Union from the premature decay that had begun to destroy its vitality ;"‘ and it may here be added, that the statesman whose pen could produce 1 It was drawn by James Duane 3 Ante, pp. 1'77 -179. of New York. 4 Ante, pp. 176, 186, 188. 9 Ante, pp. 174, 206 - 208. on. 1x, MADISON. - 423 the comprehensive and powerful appeal by which it was pressed upon the States, was certain to‘ become one of the chief founders of the Constitution of ~ which the plan itself was the forerunner. It set- tled the fact, that a national unity in dealing with the debts of the Revolution was a‘ necessary to ren- der its fruits a full reward for the blood, the toils, the cares, and the calamities which‘ had purchased them.” ' _ Such were Mr. Madison’s most important services in the Congress of the Confederation ;' but they are ‘ of , course not the whole. A member so able and of such broad and national ‘views must have had a large agency in every important transaction; and accordingly the Journals, during the whole period ‘of his service, bear ample testimony to his activity, his influence, and his zeal. ' , At the close of the war, he retired to Virginia, and during the three following years was a member of the legislature, still occupied, however, with the interests of the Union. His attention was specially directed to the subject of enlarging the powers of Congress over ‘the foreign trade of the country. It is a striking fact, and a proof of the comprehensive character ' of Mr. Madison’s, statesmanship, that Vir- ginia, a State not largely commercial, should have taken so prominent a part‘ in the efforts to give the control of ‘commerce, to the general government; -- an object which has justly been regarded as the cor- ner-ston'e of the Constitution. It arose partly from the accident of her geographical position, which 424 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK IIL made it necessary for her to aim at something like uniformity of regulation with the other States which bordered upon her contiguous waters; but it is also to be attributed to the enlightened liberality and forecast of her great inen, who saw in the imme- diate necessities of their own State the occasion for a measure of general advantage to the country. Mr. Madison’s first effort was, to procure a decla- '1 ration by the legislature of Virginia of the necessity for a uniform regulation of the commerce of the States byv the federal authority. For this purpose, he introduced into the legislature'a series of propo- - sitions, intended to instriict the delegates of the State in’ Congress to propose a. recommendation to the States to confer upon Congress power to regulate their trade and to collect a revenue from such regu- lation. This measure, as we have seen, encountered the opposition of those who preferred a temporary to a perpetual and irrevocable grant of such power; and the propositions were so much changed in the Committee of _ the Whole, that they were no longer acceptable to their original friends. The steps which finally led the legislature of Virginia to recommend a general convention of all the States have been de- tailed in a previous chapter of this work; but it is due to Mr. Madison’s connection with this move- ment, that they should here be recapitulated with reference to his personal agency in the various trans- actions. , A conflict of jurisdiction between the two States of Virginia and Maryland over the waters which cs IX.] MADISON. 425 separated them had, in the spring of 1785, led to the appointment of commissioners on the part of each State, who met at Alexandria in March. These commissioners, of whom Mr. Madison was one, made a visit to General Washington at Mount Vernon, and it was there proposed that the two States, whose conflicting regulations, ever since the peace, had pro- duced great inconvenience to their merchants, and had been a constant source of irritation, should be recommended by the commissioners to make a com- pact for the regulation of their impost and foreign trade. Mr. Madison has left no written claim, that I am aware of, to the authorship of this suggestion, but there exists evidence of his having claimed it in con- versation.1 The recommendation was made by the commissioners, and their report was adopted by both States; - by’ Virginia unconditionally, and by Mary- 1 In preparing the note to page 342 (ante), I refrained from at- tributing to General Washington the suggestion of the enlarged plan recommended by the Alex- andria commissioners, although it was concerted at his house, because there is no evidence, beyond that fact, of his having proposed this enlargement of the plan. Since that note was printed, I have learned in a direct manner, that Mr. Madi- son had stated to the Hon. Edward Coles, formerly his private secre- tary and afterwards Governor of Illinois, that be (Mr. Madison) first suggested it. In assigning, there- fore, to the different individuals who took a prominent part in the VOL. 1. 54 measures which led to the forma~ tion of the Constitution, the various suggestions which had an important influence upon the course of events, -— a curious and interesting inqui- ry, - I consider that to Mr. Madi- son belongs the credit of having originated that series of Virginia measures which brought about the meeting of commissioners of all the States at Annapolis, for the purpose of enlarging the powers of Congress over commerce ; while Hamilton is to be considered the author of the plan in which the Con- vention at Annapolis was merged, for an entire revision of the federal system and the formation of a new constitution. 426 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [Book III. land with the qualification that the States of Dela- ware and Pennsylvania should be invited to unite in the plan. After the commercialv propositions introduced by Mr. Madison had lain on the table for some time as a report from the Committee of the Whole, the re- port of the Alexandria commissioners was received and ratified by the legislature of Virginia. Although the friends of those propositions were gradually in- creasing, Mr. Madison had no expectation that a majority could be obtained in favor‘ of a grant of commercial powers to Congress for a longer term than twenty-five years. ' The idea of a general con- vention of delegates from all the States, which had been for some time familiar to Mr. Madison’s mind, then suggested itself to him, and he prepared and caused to be introduced the resolution which led to the meeting that afterwards took place at Annapolis, for the purpose of digesting and reporting the requi- site augmentation of the powers of Congress over trade.1 His resolution, he says, being, on the last day of the session, “ the alternative of adjourning without any effort for the crisis in the affairs of the. Union, obtained a general vote; less, however, with some of its friends, from a confidence in the success of the experiment, than from a hope that it might I The resolve was introduced by Mr. Tyler, father of the Ex-Presi- dent, a. person of much influence in the legislature, and who had never been in Congress. Although pre- pared by Mr. Madison, it was not offered by him, for the reason that a. great jealousy was felt against those who had been in the federal councils, and because he was known to wish for an enlargement of the powers of Congress. See Mad- ison’s Introduction to the Debates in the Convention, Elliot, V. 113. Cn. IX.] MADISON. _ 427 prove a step to a more comprehensive and adequate provision for the wants of the Confederacy.”1 Mr. Madison was appointed one of the commis- sioners of Virginia to the meeting at Annapolis. There he met Hamilton, who came meditating noth ing less than the general revision of the whole sys- tem of the Federal Union, and the formation of a new government. Mr. Madison, although less con- fident than the great statesman of New York as to the measures that ought to be taken, had yet for several years been equally ‘convinced that the perpe- tuity and efficacy of the existing system could not be confided in. He therefore concurred readily in the report recommending a' general convention of all the States; and when that report was received in the legislature of Virginia, he became the author of the celebrated act which passed that body on the 4th of December,/1’7 86, and under which the first appoint- ment of delegates to the Convention was made. It was also chiefly through his exertions, combined with the influence of Governor Randolph, that Gen- eral Washington’s name was placed at the head of the delegation, and that he was induced to ‘accept the appointment. Mr. Madison himself was the fourth member of the delegation. In the ‘Convention, his labors must have been far _ more arduous than those of any other member of the ' body. He took. a leading partin the debates, speak- ing upon every important question; and in addition to 1_ Ibid., p. 114. 428 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK 111. all the usual duties devolving upon a person of so much ability and influence, he preserved a full and careful record of the discussions with his own hand. Impressed, as he says, with the magnitude of the trust confided to the Convention, and foreseeing the interest that must attach to an authentic exhibition of the objects, the opinions, and the reasonings from which the new system of government was to receive its peculiar structure and organization, he devoted the hours of the night succeeding the session of each day to ‘the preparation of the record with which his name is imperishably associated. “ Nor was I,” he adds, “ unaware of the value of such a contribution to the fund of materials for the history of a Constitu- tion on which would be staked the happiness of a people, great even in its infancy, and possibly the cause of liberty throughout the world.”1 As a statesman, he is to be ranked, by a long in- terval, after Hamilton; but he was a man of emi- nent talent, always free from local prejudices, and sincerely studious of the welfare of the whole coun- try. His perception of the principles essential to the continuance of the Union and to the safety and pros- perity of the States, was accurate and clear. His studies had made him familiar with the examples of _ ancient and modern liberty, and he had carefully reflected upon the nature of the government neces- sary to be established. He was one of the few per-‘ sons who carried into the Convention a conviction 1 Introduction to the Debates, Elliot, V 121. cn. IX.] MADISON. 429 that an amendment of the Articles of Confederation would not answer the exigencies of the time. He regarded an individual independence of the States as irreconcilable with an aggregate sovereignty of the whole, but admitted that a consolidation of the States into a simple republic was both impracticable and inexpedient. He sought, therefore, for some middle ground, which would at once support a due suprem- acy of the national authority, and leave the local authorities in force for their subordinate objects. For this purpose, he conceived that a system of representation which would operate without the in- tervention of the States was indispensable; that the national government should be armed with a positive and complete authority in all cases where a uniform- ity of measures ‘was necessary, as in matters of trade, and that ‘it should have a negative upon the legisla- tive acts of the States, as the crown of England had before the Revolution. He thought, also, that the national supremacy should be extended to the udi- ciary, and foresaw the necessity for national tribu- nals, in cases in which foreigners and citizens of different States might be concerned, and also for the exercise of the admiralty urisdiction. He consid- ered two branches of the legislature, with distinct. origins, as indispensable; recognized the necessity for a national executive, and favored a council of re- vision of the laws, in which should be included the great ministerial oflicers of the government. He saw also, that, to give the new system its proper energy, it would be necessary to have it ratified by the au- 430 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK In thority of the people, and not merely by that of the legislatures.‘ ' l ‘ Such was the outline of the project which he had formed‘ before the assembling of the Convention. How far his views were modified by the discus- sions in which he took part will be seen hereafter. Asa speaker in a deliberative assembly, the suc- cessive schools in which he had been trained had given him a habit of self-possession which placed all his resources at his command. “ Never wandering from his subject,” says Mr. Jefferson, “into vain dec- lamation, but ‘pursuing it closely, in language pure, classical, and copious, soothing always the feelings of his adversaries by civilities and softness of expres-‘r sion, he rose to the eminent station which he held in the great national Convention of 1787; and in that of Virginia which followed, he sustained the new Constitution in all its parts, bearing off the palm against the logic of George Mason and the fervid declamation of Mr. Henry.‘ With these consummate powers were united a pure and spotless virtue, which no calumny has ever attempted to sully.”2 Mr. Madison’s greatest service in the national Con- vention consisted in the answers which he made to the objections of a want of power in that assembly to frame and propose a new constitution, and his paper on this subject in the Federalist is one of the ablest in the series. As this work is confined to the period which ter- 1 Letter to Edmund Randolph, .2 J efiferson’s Autobiography dated New York, April 8th, 1787 ‘Works, I. 41, edition of 1853. / f ,- er.“- CH. 1x4 MADISON. 431 minated with the adoption. of the Constitution, it is not necessary to examine those points on which the two principal writers of - the Federalist became sepa- rated from each other, when the administration of the ‘government led to the formation of the‘ first par- ties known in our political history. These topics it may become my duty to discuss hereafter, should I pursue the constitutional history of the country through the administration of Washington. At present, it may be recorded of both, that, upon al- most all the great questions that arose before the Constitution was finally adopted, the single purpose of establishing a system as efficient as the theory of a purely republican government would admit, was the object of their efforts; and that, although they may have differed with regard to the details and methods through which this object was to be reached, the purpose at which they both aimed places them in the same rank at the head of those ‘founders of our government, towards whom the gratitude of the succeeding generations of America must be for ever directed. I 1 The following extract from an autograph letter of Madison, hitherto unpublished; which lies before me, written after the ‘adop- tion of ' the Constitution, shows very clearly that he ‘concurred with Hamilton in the opinion‘ that the strongest government consistent with the republican form was neces- sary in the situation of this country. The letter is dated at Philadelphia, . December 10th, 1788, and is ad- ' dressed to Philip Mazzei, at Paris. “ Your book, as I prophesied, sells nowhere but in Virginia; a very few- copies only have been called for, either‘ in N ew' York or in this city. a The language‘ in which it is written will account for it. ‘In order to attract notice, I translated the panegyric in‘ the French Mercure, and had it made part of the advertisement. I did not translate the comment on the Federal Constitution, as you wished, because I could not spare the time. 432 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. as well as because I did not ap- prove the tendency of it. [Some of your remarks prove that Horace’s ‘ Cwlum non animum mutant quz' '' trans mare currunt’ does not hold without exception. In Europe, the abuses of power continually before your eyes have given a bias to your political reflections, which you did not feel in equal degree when you left America, and which you would feel less of, if you had remained in America. Philosophers on the old continent, in their zeal against tyr- anny would rush into anarchy; as the horrors of superstition drive them into atheism. Here, perhaps, the inconveniences of relaxed gov- ernment have reconciled too many to the opposite extreme. If your plan of a single legislature, as in Pennsylvania, &c., were adopted, I sincerely believe that it would prove the most deadly blow ever given to republicanism. Were I an enemy to that form, I would preach the very doctrines which are preached by the enemies to the government proposed for the United States. Many of our best citizens are dis- gusted with the injustice, instabil- ity, and folly which characterize the American administrations. The number has for some time been rap- idly increasing. Were the evils to be much longer protracted, the dis- gust would seize citizens of every description. , “ It is of infinite importance to the cause of liberty to ascertain the degree of it which will consist with ‘ the purposes of society. An error on one side may be as fatal as on the other. Hitherto, the error in the United States has lam in the excess. ’ “ All the States, except North Carolina and Rhode Island, have ratified the proposed Constitution; Seven of them have appointed their Senators, of whom those of Vir- ginia, R. H. Lee and Colonel Gray- son, alone are among the opponents of the system. The appointments of Maryland, South Carolina, and Georgia will pretty certainly be of the same stamp with the majority. The House of Representatives is yet to be chosen, everywhere ex— cept in Pennsylvania. From the partial returns received, the elec- tion will wear a federal aspect un less the event in one or two par- ticular counties should contradict every calculation. If the eight members from this State be on the side of the Constitution, it will in a manner secure the majority in that branch of the Congress also. The object of the anti-Federalists is, to bring about another general convention, which would either agree on nothing, as would be agreeable to some, and throw every thing into confusion, or expunge from the Constitution parts which are held by its friends to be essen- tial to it. The latter party are willing to gratify their opponents with every supplemental provision for general rights, but insist that this can be better done in the mode provided for amendments. “ I remain, with great sincerity, your friend and servant, “JAs. MADISON, JR.” CHAPTER X. FBANnrN. THE Convention was graced and honored by the venerable presence of Dr. Franklin, then President of the State of Pennsylvania, and in his eighty-sec- ond year. He had returned from Europe only two years before, followed by the admiration and homage of the social, literary, and scientific circles of France; laden with honors, which he were with a plain and shrewd simplicity; and in the full possession of that predominating common-sense, which had given him, through a long life, a widely extended reputation of a peculiar character. The oldest of the public men of America, his political life had embraced a period of more than half a century, extending back to a time when independence had not entered into the dreams of the boldest among the ‘inhabitants of the English Colonies. For more than twenty years be- fore the Revolution commenced, he had held a high and responsible office under the crown, the tration of which affected the intercourse and connec- tion of , all the Colonies; 1 and more than twenty years 0 1 In 1753,116 was appointed Dep- ish Colonies, from which place he uty Postmaster-General for thé Brit- was dismissed in 1774, while in vet. I. 55 434 TEE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK 111. before the first Continenfal Congress was assembled, he had projected a plan of union for the thirteen Provinces which then embraced the whole of the British dominions in North America.1 Nearly as long, also, before the Declaration of Independence, he had become the resident agent in England of sev- eral of the Colonies, in which post he continued, with a short, interval, through all the controversies that preceded the Revolution, and until reconciliation with the mother country had become impossible.2 Returning in 1775, he was immediately appointed by the people of Pennsylvania one of their delegates in the second Continental Congress. In the follow- ing year, he was sent as commissioner to France, where he remained until he was recalled, and was succeeded by Mr. Jefferson, in 17 85. With the fame of his two residences abroad - the one before and the other after the country had sev- ered its connection with England —— the whole land was filled. The first of them, commencing with an employment for settling the miserable disputes be- tween the people and the Proprietaries of Pennsyl- England, on account of the part he had taken in American affairs. 1 In 1754. See an account of this plan, ante, p. 8. 9 He first went to England in 1757, as agent of the Pennsylvania Assembly to settle their diflicul- ties with the Proprietaries, where he remainqd until 1762. In 1764, he was reappointed provincial agent in England for Pennsylvania; in 1768, he received a similar appoint- ment from Georgia; in 1769, he was chosen agent for New Jersey; and in 1770, he became agent for Massachusetts. His whole resi- dence in England, from 1757 to 1775, embraced a period of sixteen years, two years having been passed at home. He resided in France about nine years, from 1776 to 1785. on. x] ‘ rnANxmN. 435 Vania, was extended to an agency for the three other Colonies of Georgia, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, which finally led him to take part in the, affairs of all British America, and made him virtually the representative of American interests. His brief ser- vice in Congress, during which he signed the Decla- ration of Independence, was followed by his appoint- ment as Commissioner at the Court of Versailles, which he made the most important sphere that has ever been filled by any American in Europe, and in which that treaty of alliance with France was negotiated which enabled the United States to be- come in fact an independent nation. His long career of public service; his eminence as a philosopher, a philanthropist, and a thinker; the general reverence of the people for his character; . his peculiar power of illustrating and enforcing his opinions by a method at once original, simple, and attractive, — made his presence of the first impor- tance in an assembly which was to embrace the highest wisdom and virtue of America. It is chiefly, however, by the countenance he gave to the effort to frame a Constitution, that his services as a member of this body are to be estimated. His mind was at all times ingenious, rather than large and constructive; and his great age, while it had scarcely at all impaired his natural powers, had confirmed him in some opinions which , must certainly be regarded as mistaken. His desire, for example, to have the legislature of the United States consist of. a single body, for the sake ‘of sim- l ~ 436 ‘THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. plicity, and his idea that the chief executive magis- trate ought to receive no salary for his official ser- vices, for the sake of purity, were both singular and unsound. . I ' - But there were points upon which he displayed ex- traordinary wisdom; penetration, and forecast. ‘ When an objection to a proportionate representation in Con- gress was started, upon the ground that it would en- able the larger States to swallow up the smaller, he declared that, as the great States could propose to themselves no advantage by absorbing their inferior neighbors, he did not believe they would , attempt it. His recollection carried himv back to the early part of the century, when the union‘ between England and Scotland was proposed, and when the Scotch patriots were alarmed by the idea that they should be ruined by the superiority of England, unless they had an equal number of members in Parliament; and yet, notwithstanding the great inferiority in their representation as established by the act of union, he declared, that, down to that day, he did not recollect that any thing had been done in the Parliament of Great Britain to the prejudice of Scotland.1 Although he spoke but seldom in the Conven- tion, his influence was very great, and it was al- ways exerted to cool the ardor of debate, and to check the tendency of such discussions to result in 1 He added, with his usual quiet I believe, that the North Britons humor, that “ whoever looks over enjoy their full proportion ofemolu- the lists of public officers, civil and ment.” Madison, Elliot, V. 179. military, of that nation, will find, on. x,‘ FRANKLIN. ' , 437 irreconcilable differences. His great age, his vener- able and benignant aspect, his wide reputation, his acute and sagacious philosophy, —which was always the embodiment of good sense,— would have given him a controlling weight in a much more turbulent and a far less intelligent assembly. When - after debates in which the powerful intellects around him had exhausted the subject, and both sides remained firm in opinions diametrically opposed - he rose and reminded them that they were sent to consult and not _ to contend, and that declarations of a fixed opinion and a determination never to change it neither en- lightehed nor convinced those who listened to them, his authority was felt by men who could have anni- hilated any mere logical argument that might have proceeded firom him in his best days. Dr. Franklin was one. of those who entertained seribus objections to the Constitution, but he sac- rificed them before the Convention was dissolved. Believing a general government to be necessary for the American States; holding that every form of government. might be made a blessing to the people. by a good administration; and foreseeing that the . Constitution would be well administered for a long course of years, and could only end in despotism " when‘the people should have become so corrupted as to be incapable of any other than a despotic ‘govern- ment, he gladly embraced a system which he was astonished to find approaching so near to perfection. I “ The opinions I have had of its errors,” said he, “ I sacrifice to- ‘the public good. Within these walls 438 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK m. they were born, and here they shall die. If every one of us, in returning to our constituents, were to report the objections he has had to it, and endeavor to gain partisans in support of them, we might pre- vent its being generally received, and thereby lose all the salutary effects and great advantages, resulting naturally in our favor, among foreign nations as well as among ourselves, from our real or apparent una- nimity. Much of the strength and efliciency of any government in procuring and securing happiness to the people depends on opinion, — on the general opinion of the goodness of the government, as well as of the wisdom and integrity of its governors. I hope, therefore, that for our‘ own sakes as a part of the people, and for the sake of posterity, we shall act heartily and unanimously in recommending this Con- stitution (approved by Congress and confirmed by the conventions) wherever our influence may extend, and turn our future thoughts and endeavors to the means of having it well administered.”1 And thus, with a cheerful confidencein the future, sustaining the hopes of all about him, and hailing - every omen that foretold the rising gloriesv of his country,2 this wise old man passed out from the ‘assembly, when its anxious labors had been brought 1- Madison, Elliot, V. 554. 2 Mr. Madison has recorded the following anecdote at the end of the Debates, as an incident worthy of being known to posterity. “ Whilst the last members were signing, Dr. Franklin, looking to- wards the President’s chair, at the back of which a rising sun happened to be painted, observed to a few members near him, that painters had often found it difficult, in their art, to distinguish a rising from a setting sun. "I have,’ said he Ca. x.) FRANKLIN. _ 439 to a close with a nearer approach to unanimity than had ever been expected. He lived, borne down by infirmities, ' ‘ “ To draw his breath in pain ” for nearly three years after the Convention was dis- solved; but it was to see the Constitution established, to witness the growing strength of the new govern- ment, and to contemplate the opening successes and the beneficent promise of Washington’s administra- tion. Writing to the first President in 1'7 89, he said: “ For my own personal ease, I should have died two years ago; but though those years have been spent in excruciating pain, I am pleased that I have lived them, since they have brought me to see our present situation.”1 ‘often and often, inthe course of was rising or setting; but now, at the session, and the vicissitude of length, I have the happiness to my hopes and fears as to its issue, know that it is a rising, and not a looked at that behind the President, setting sun.’ ” without being able to tell whether it 1 Sparks’s Life of Franklin, 528 CHAPTER XI. ' GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. THIs brilliant, energetic, and patriotic statesman was born in the Province of New York, at Morrisania, —- - the seat of his family for several generations, --in the year 1752. He was educated for the bar; but in 177 5, at the age of three-and-twenty, he was elected a member of the Provincial Congress of New York, in which he became atv once distinguished. When the recommendation of the Continental Congress to the Colonies, to organize new forms of government, was received, he took a leading place in. the de- bates on the formation of a new constitution for the State; and when the subject of independence was brought forward, in order that the delegates of New York in the Continental Congress might be ‘ clothed with sufficient, authority, he delivered a speech of great power, of, which fragments only ' are p'eserved, but which evidently embraced the most comprehensive and statesmanlike views of the situation and future prospects ‘of this country. Speaking of the. capacity of America to sustain herself without a connection with Great Britain, he said: —- t on. x1] ’ cou'vnnnnun MORRIS. 441 “ Thus, Sir, by means of that great gulf which rolls its waves between Europe and America; by the situa- tion of these Colonies, always adapted to hinder or interrupt all communication between the two; by the productions of our soil, which the Almighty has filled with every necessary to make us a great maritime people; by the extent of our coasts and those im- mense rivers, which serve at once to open a commu- nication with our interior country, and to teach us the arts of navigation; by those vast fisheries, which, affording an inexhaustible mine of wealth and» a cradle of industry, breed hardy mariners, inured to danger and fatigue; finally, by the unconquerable spirit of freemen, deeply interested in the preserva- tion of a government which‘ secures to them the blessings of liberty and exalts the dignity of man- kind; -by all these, I expect a full and lasting defence against any and every part of the earth; ' while the great advantages to be derived from a friendly intercourse with this country almost render the means of defence unnecessary, from the great .improbability of being attacked. . So far, peace seems to smile upon our future independence. But that this fair goddess will equally crown our union with Great Britain, my fondest hopes cannot lead me to suppose. Every war which she is engaged must necessarily involve us in its detestable consequences; whilst, weak and unarmed, we have no shield of defence, unless such as she may please (for her own sake) to afford, or else the pity of her enemies and von. 1. 56 . 442 THE FEDERAL consrrrurron. [BOOK 1n. the insignificance of slaves beneath the attention of a generous foe.”1 In 1778, Mr. Morris was chosen a delegate to the Continental Congress from the State of New York. His reputation for talent, zeal, activity, and singular capacity for business, had preceded him. On the very day when he presented his credentials, he was placed upon a committee to proceed to Valley Forge, to con- fer with General Washington on the measures neces- sary for a reorganization of the army. He remained in Congress for two years, discharging, with great abil- ity and high patriotism, the most important functions, and subjected all the while to the most ust popular suspicions of his fidelity to the cause of the country. Few of all the prominent men of the Revolution sacrificed or suffered more than Gouverneur Morris. The fact that all the other members of his family adhered to the royalist side, and an ineffectual effort which he once made to visit his mother, at his ances- tral home, then within the British lines, gave his enemies the means of inflicting upon him a deep injury in the popular estimation. He was not re- elected to Congress; but short as his career in that body was, it was filled with services inferior to those of none of his associates. 1 Sparks’s Life of G. Morris, I. 103. The florid and declamatory style of this speech belongs to the period and to the youth of the speak- er. The breadth of its views and its vigor of thought display the char- acteristics which belonged to him , through life. He had a prophetic insight of the future resources of this country, and made many re- markable predictions of its great- ness. His biographer has claimed for him the suggestion of the plan for uniting the waters of Lake Erie with those of the Hudson, and upon very strong evidence. on. XL] GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. .443 Before he left Congress, in February, 177 9, he made — as chairman of a committee to whom cer- tain communications from the French minister in the United States were referred — a report which became the basis of the. peace that afterwards followed; and when the principles on which the peace was to be negotiated had been settled, he drew the instructions to the commissioners, and they were unanimously adopted without change.1 . On leaving Congress, Mr. Morris took up his resi- dence in Philadelphia, and resumed the practice of the law. His remarkable talent for business, how- ever, and his intimate knowledge of financial sub- I jects, led to his appointment as Assistant Financier with Robert Morris. In this capacity, he suggested the idea of the decimal notation, which was after- wards made the basis of the coinage of the United States.2 1 See the Report and the debates thereon, Secret Journals, II. 132 et seq. 2 In January, 1782, the Finan- cier made a report, which was ofli- cially signed by him, but which Mr. Jefferson says was prepared ‘by his Assistant, Gouverneur Mor- ris. It embraced an elaborate state- ment of the denominations and com- parative value of the foreign coins in circulation in the different States, and proposed the adoption of a mon- ey unit and a system of decimal no- tation for a new coinage. The unit suggested was such a portion of pure silver as would be a common measure of the penny of every State, without leaving a fraction. This common divisor Mr. Morris found to boom l440th of a dollar, or one 1600th of the crown sterling. The value of a dollar was therefore to be expressed by 1,440 units, and that of a crowii by 1,600, each unit con- taining aquarter of a grain of fine silver. Nothing, however, was done, until1’784, when Mr. Jeffer- son, being in Congress, took up the subject. He approved of Mr. Morris’s general views, and his method of decimal notation, but objected to his unit as too minute for ordinary use. Mr.- efi'erson proposed the dollar as the unit of account and payment, and that its 444 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. Having been appointed one of the delegates from the State of Pennsylvania to the Convention for forming the Constitution of the United States, Mr. Morris attended the whole session, with the excep- tion of a few days in June, and entered into its business with his accustomed ardor. To remove impediments, obviate objections, and conciliate jar- ring opinions, he exerted all his fine faculties, and employed his remarkable eloquence. But he is chiefly to be remembered, in connection with the Constitution, as the author of its text. To his pen belongs the merit of that clear and finished style, — that lttct'dus ordo,—— that admirable perspicuity, which have so much diminished the labors and hazards of interpretation for all future ages.1 The character of Gouverneur Morris was balanced ‘ by many admirable qualities. His ‘ self-possession was so complete in all circumstances, that he is said . to have declared, that he never knew the sensation, divisions and subdivisions should be in the decimal ratio. This plan was adopted in August, 1785, and in 1786 the names and characters of the coins were determined. The ordinance establishing the coinage was passed August 8, 1786, and that establishing the mint, on the 16th of October, in the same year. (J eiferson’s Autobiography, Works, I.‘ 52-54. Life of Gouverneur Morris, I. 273. Journals of Con- gress, X1. 179, 254.) 1 The materials for the final preparation of the instrument, con- sisting of a reported draft in detail and the various resolutions which had been adopted, were placed in the hands of a committee of revis- ion, of which Dr. William Samuel Johnson, of Connecticut, was the chairman; the other members be- ing Messrs. Hamilton, Gpuverneur Morris, Madison, and King. The chairman committed the work to Mr. Morris, and the Constitution, as adopted, was prepared by him. (See~Mr. ‘Madison’s letter to Mr. Sparks, Life of Gouverneur Mor- ris, I. 284. Madison’s Debates, Elliot, V. 530.) O on. xr] eouvnnnnun MORRIS. 445 of fear, inferiority, or embarrassment, in his inter- course with men. Undoubtedly, his self-confidence amounted sometimes to boldness and presumption; but we have it on no less an authority than Mr. Madison’s, that he added to it a candid surrender of his opinions, when the lights of discussion satisfied him that they had been too hastily formed.1 He was a man of genius, fond of society and pleasure, but capable of prodigious exertion and industry, and possessed of great powers of eloquence. He loved to indulge in speculations on the future . condition of the country, and often foresaw results which gave him patience under the existing state of things. In 1784., writing to‘ Mr. Jay, at a time when the clashing commercial regulations of the States seemed about to put an end to the Union, he said: “ True it is, that the general government wants energy, and equally true it is, that this want will eventually be supplied. A national spirit is‘ the natural result of national existence, and although some of the present generation may, feel colonial oppositions of opinion, yet this generation will die away and give place to a race of Americans.” 2 . He- was himself, at all times, an American, and never more "so thanv during the discussions of the Convention.~ Appealing to his colleagues to extend their. views beyond the narrow limits of place whence they derived their political origin, he de- clared, with his characteristic energy and point, that 1 Life of Morris, 1. 284-286. 2 Ibid. 266. 446 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. ‘ State attachments and State importance had been the bane of this country. “ We cannot annihilate,” said he, “ but we may perhaps take out the teeth of the serpents.”1 In truth, the circumstances of his life had pre- vented him from feeling those strong local attach- ments which he considered the great impediments to the national prosperity. Born in one State, he had then resided for seven years in another, from whose inhabitants he had received at least equal marks of confidence with those that had been bestowed upon him by the people among’ whom he first entered public life. In his political opinions, he probably went farther in opposition to democratic tendencies than any other person in the Convention. He was in favor of = an executive during good behavior, of a Senate for life, ' i and of a freehold qualification for electors of repre- sentatives. In several other respects, the Constitu- tion, as actually framed, was distasteful to him; but, like many of the other eminent men ‘who doubted its theoretical or practical wisdom, he determined at once to abide by the voice of the majority. He saw that, as soon as the plan should go forth, all other considerations ought to be laid aside, and the great question ought to be, Shall there be a national gov- ernment or not? He acknowledged that the alterna- tives were, the adoption of the “system proposed, or a general anarchy; — and before this single and fear- 1 Madison, Elliot, V. 276, 277. on. x11 GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. 447 ful issue all questions of individual opinion or pref- erence sank into insignificance.1 It is a proof both of his sincerity and of the estimate in which his abili- ties were held, that, when this great issue was pre- sented to the people, he was invited by Hamilton to become one of the writers of the Federalist.2 It is not known why he did not embrace the opportunity of‘ connecting himself with that celebrated publica- tion; but his correspondence shows that it was from no want of interest in the result. He took pains to give to Washington his decided testimony, from personal observation, that the idea of his refusing the Presidency would, if it prevailed, be fatal to the Constitution in many parts of the country.3 Mr. Morris filled two important public stations, after the adoption of the Constitution. He was the first Minister to France appointed by General Wash- ington, and filled that office from May, 17 92, until August, 1794. In February, 1800, he was chosen by the legislature of New York to supply a vacancy in the Senate of the United States, which he filled until the 4th of March, 1803. He died at Mor- risania on the 6th of November, 1818. “Let us forget party,” said he, ,“ and think of our country, which embraces all parties”? ‘1 Madison, Elliot, v. 556. 3 1bid.288-290. ' 2 Life, 1. 287. 4 Ibid. 517. CHAPTER XII. KING. RUFUs KING, celebrated as a jurist, a statesman, an orator, and a diplomatist, was sent to the Con- vention by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Born in her District of Maine, in 17 55, and gradu- ated at Harvard College in 17 7 7, he came very early into public life, and was rarely out of it until his death, which occurred in 1827, in the seventy-third year of his age. His first public service was in the year 177 8, as a volunteer in the expedition against the British in Rhode Island, in which he acted as aide-de-camp to General Sullivan. In 1780, he commenced the prac- tice of the law in the town of N ewburyport, and was soon after elected from that town to the legislature of the State. There he distinguished himself by a very powerful speech in favor of granting to the ' general government the five per cent. impost recom- mended by Congress as part of the revenue system I Oflvss. ‘He was soon after elected a member of Congress - from Massachusetts, in which body he took his seat on the 6th of December, 1784, and served until the CH. m1 KING. ' ' 4.49 close of the year 1787. He was thus a member both of the Convention for forming the Constitution and of the Congress which sanctioned and referred it to the people. He was also a member of the Con- vention of Massachusetts, in which the Constitution was ratified by that State. Mr. King did not favor the plan of a convention for the revision of the federal system, until after the meeting at Annapolis had been held; and, indeed, he did not concur in its expediency, until after the troubles in Massachusetts had made its necessity ap- parent. In 1'7 85, as we have seen, he" joined with the other members of the Massachusetts delegation in opposing it.1 In the autumn of 17 86, when the report of the Annapolis Convention was before Con- gress, he expressed the opinion, in person, to the legislature of Massachusetts, that the Articles of Confederation could not be altered, except by the consent of Congress and the confirmation of the sev- eral legislatures; that Congress ought, in the first instance, to make the examination of the federal sys- tem, since, if it was done by a ‘convention, no legis- lature would have a right to confirm it; and further, that, Congress should reject the report of a conven- tion, the most fatal consequences might follow. For these reasons, he at that time held Congress to be the proper body to propose alterations? _ 1 Ante, p.‘ 339, note. account of the stateof national at 2 Mr. King being in Boston in fairs. For an abstract of his ad- October, 1786, was desired ‘by the dress, see Boston Magazine for the legislature to attend and give an year 1786, p. 406. von. 1. 57 450 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK IH. At the moment when he was making this address to the legislature, the disturbances in Massachusetts were fast gathering into that formidable insurrection which two months afterwards burst forth in the inte- rior of ' the State.1 Mr. King spoke of these commo- tions in grave and pointed terms. He told the legis- lature that Congress viewed them with deep anxiety; that every member of the national councils felt his life, liberty, and property to be involved in the issue of their decisions; that the United States would not be inactive on such an occasion, for, if the lawful authority of the State were to be prostrated, every other government would eventually be swept away. He entreated them to remember, that, if the gov- ernment were in a minority in the State, they had a majority of every State in the Union to join them.2 He returned to Congress immediately. But there he found that the reliance which he had placed upon the ability of the Confederation to interfere and sup- press such a rebellion was not well founded. The power was even doubted, or denied, by some of the best statesmen in that body; and although the in- surrection was happily put down by the government of the State itself, the fearful exposure of a want of external power adequate to such emergencies pro- duced in Mr. King, as in many others,_a great change of views, bothlas to the necessity for a radical change of the national government and as to the mode of 1 Ante, p. 266 et seq. 9 Ibid on. 2111.] KING. 451 effecting it. His vote, in February, was given to the proposition introduced by the delegation of New York for a national convention; and when that failed, be united with his colleague, Mr. Dane, in bringing forward the resolution by which the Con- vention was finally sanctioned in Congress.1 The Convention having been sanctioned by Con- gress, no man was more ready than King to maintain its power to deliberate on and propose any alterations that Congress could have suggested in the Federal Articles. He held that the proposing of an entire change in the mode of suffrage in the national legislature, from a representation of the States alone to a representation of the people, was within the scope of their powers, and consistent with the Union; for if that Union, on the one hand, involved the idea of a confederation, on the other hand it contained also the idea of consolidation, from which a national char- acter resulted to the individuals of whom the States were composed. He doubted the practicability of annihilating the State governments, but thought that much of their power ought to be taken from them.2 He declared, ‘that, when every man in America might be secured in his rights, by a government founded on equality of representation, he could not sacrifice such a substantial good to the phantom of State sover- eignty. If this illusion were to continue to prevail, he should be prepared for any event, rather than sit down under a government founded on a vicious ' prin-. .1, .1 1 Journals, XH. 15-17. 2 Madison, Elliot, v. 212‘, 213. 452 THE FEDERAL coNsTITuTIoN. [BOOK III ciple of representation, and one that must be as short-lived as it would be unjust.1 There is one feature of the Constitution with which the name of Mr. King should always be con- nected, and of which he may be said, indeed, to have been the author. Towards the close of the session, he introduced the prohibition on the States to pass laws‘ affecting the obligation of contracts. It ap- pears that the Ordinance for the government of the Northwestern Territory, which had been passed by Congress about a month previous, contained a simi- lar prohibition on the States to be formed out of that territory. That any of the jurists who were concerned in the framing of either instrument fore- saw at the moment all the great future importance and extensive operation of this wise and effective provision, we are not authorized to affirm. But a clause which has enabled the supreme national udi- cature to exercise a vast, direct, and uniform influ- ence on the security of property throughout all the States of this Confederacy, should be permanently connected with the names of its authors.2 1 Madison, Elliot, V. 266. lating to contracts was in these 2 The Ordinance for the govern- ment of the Northwestern Terri- tory was drawn by Nathan Dane of Massachusetts. It was reported in Congress July 11th, 1787, and was passed July 13th. The com- mittee by whom it was reported were Messrs. Carrington and R. H. Lee of Virginia, Kearney of Delaware, Smith of New York, and Mr. Dane. The clause re- words: “ And in the just preser- vation of rights and property, it is understood and declared, that no law ought ever to be made or have force in the said territory, that shall in any manner whatever interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements, bond fide and without fraud previously formed.” On the 28th of August, Mr. King moved in the Conven- on. XIL] KING. 453 Mr. King was but little past the age of thirty when the Constitution was adopted. After that event, he went to reside in the city of New York, and entered upon the career of distinction which filled up the residue of his life, as a Senator in Con- gress, and as Minister to England. No formal biog- raphy of him has yet appeared; but when that duty shall have been discharged by those- to whom it appropriately belongs, there will, be added to our literature an account of a man of the most eminent abilities and the purest patriotism, whose influence and agency in the great transactions which attended the origin and first operations of the government were of the utmost importance. tion to insert the same clause in which it now stands in the Com the Constitution; but it was op- stitution. (Madison, Elliot, V. posed, and was not finally adopted 485; Journal of the Convention, until September 14, when it was Elliot, I. 311.) incorporated in the phra'seology in CHAPTER XIII. CHARLES CoTEswoRTn PINCKNEY. CHARLEs CoTEswoRTH PINCKNEY of‘ South Caro- lina, the eldest son of a chief justice of that Colony, distinguished both as a soldier and a civilian, was educated in England, and read law at the Temple. He returned to his native province in 1769, and commenced the practice of his profession; which, like many of the young American barristers of that day, he was obliged to abandon for the duties of the camp, when the troubles of" the Revolution began. He became colonel of the first regiment of the Caro- lina infantry, and served under General Moultrie in the defence of the fort on Sullivan’s ’Island. This gallant resistance having freed the South, for a time, from invasion, Pinckney repaired to the Northern army, and was made aide-de-camp to General Wash- ington; in which capacity he served at the battles of the Brandywine and Germantown. He afterwards acquired great distinction in the defence of South Carolina against the British under Sir Henry Clinton. On the return of peace, he devoted himself to the law, in which he became eminent. He belonged to that school of public men, who had been trained in on. x111.) CHARLES cornswon'rn PINCKNEY. ~ 455 ~ the service of the country under the eye of Washing- ton, and who had experienced with him the fatal defects of the successive governments which followed the Declaration of Independence. Of his abilities, patriotism, and purity of character we have the strongest evidence, in the repeated efforts made by Washington, after the establishment of the Consti- tution, to induce him to accept some of the most important posts in the government. He was, indeed, one of that order of men to whom Washington gave his entire confidence from the first. A ripe scholar, a profound lawyer, with Revolutionary laurels of the most honorable kind, —wise, energetic, and disinterested, —- it is not singular that the peo- ple of South Carolina should have selected him as one of their delegates to an assembly, which was to frame a new constitution of government for the coun- try to whose service his earlier years had been de- voted. General Pinckney entered the Convention with a desire to adhere, if possible, to the characteristic ' principles of the Confederation; but also with the wish to‘ make that government more effective, by giving to it distinct departments and enlarged pow- ers.1 But in the progress of the discussions, ,he Sur- rendered these views, and became a party to those arrangements by which mutual concessions between the opposing sections of the. Union made. adifl'erent form of government a practicable result. 1 Madison, Elliot, V. 133. - 456 THE FEDERAL ooNsTITUTION. [BOOK III. 1 He was a strenuous supporter of the interests of the slaveholding States, in all that related to their right to hold and increase their slave population, He contended earnestly against a grant of authority to the general government to prohibit the importa- tion of slaves; for he supposed that his constituents would not surrender that right. But he finally en- tered into the arrangement, by which the postpone- ment of the power to prohibit the slave-trade to the year 1808 was made a ground of consent on the part of the Southern States to give. the regulation of commerce to the Union. He considered it, he said, the true interest of the Southern States to have no regulation of commerce; but he yielded it, in consid- eration of the losses brought upon the commerce of the Eastern States by the Revolution, and of their liberality towards the interests of the Southern por- tion of the Confederacy. The framers of the Constitution of the United States have often been bitterly reproached for per- mitting the slave-trade to be carried on for twenty years after'the period of its formation; and the East- ern States have been especially accused of a sordid spirit of trade in purchasing for themselves the ad- vantage of a national regulation of commerce by this concession. ‘It is the duty of History, however, to record the facts in their true relations. At the time when the ‘Convention for framing our Constitution was assembled, no nation hadqprohibited the African slave-trade. The English Quakers, fol- lowing the example of their American brethren, had’ on. x111] CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY. 457 begun to move upon the subject, but it was not brought formally before Parliament until 1788; the trade was not abolished by act of Parliament until 1807, nor made a felony until 1810. N apoleon’s decree of 1815 was the first French enactment against the traffic. But in 1787, many of the members of the Ameri- can Convention insisted that the power to put an end to this trade ought to be vested in the new gov- ernment which they were endeavoring to form. But they found certain of the Southern States unwilling . to deprive themselves of the supply of this species of labor for their new and yet unoccupied lands. Those States would not consent to a power of immediate prohibition, and they were extremely reluctant to yield even a power that might be used at a future period. They preferred to keep the whole subject in their own hands, and to determine for themselves when the importation should cease. The members of the Convention, therefore, who desired the aboli- tion of this trade, found that, if they attempted to force these States to a concession that it ought to be immediately prohibited, either the regulation of commerce -— the chief object for which the Con- vention had been called — could not be obtained for ‘the new Constitution, or, if it were obtained, several of the Southern States would be excluded from the Union. The question, then, that presented itself to them was a great question of humanity and public policy, to be judged and decided upon all the circumstances that surrounded it. von. 1. l 58 458 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK m. _ Were they to form a Union that should include only those States willing to consent to an immediate prohibition of the slave-trade, and thus leave the rest of the States out of that Union, and independent of its power to restrain the importation of slaves’! Were they to abandon the hope of forming a new Constitution for the thirteen States that had gone together through all the conflicts and trials and sacrifices of the Revolution, or were they to form such a government, and secure to it the power at some early period of ' putting an end to this traflicl If they were to do the latter, -- if the cause of hu- manity demanded action upon this and all the other great objects dependent upon their decisions, —- how could the commercial interests of the country be bet- ter used, than in the acquisition of a power to free its commerce from the stain and reproach of this inhuman traflicl By the arrangement which was to form one of the principal “ compromises ” of the Constitution, American commerce might achieve for itself the opportunity to do what no nation had yet done. By this arrangement, it might be implied in the fundamental law of the new government about to be created for the American people, that the abo- lition of the slave-trade was an object that ought to engage the attention of Christian states. Without it, the abolition of this trade could not be secured within any time or by any means capable of being ‘foreseen or even conjectured. That the framers of the Constitution judged wise- IY; that they acted upon motives which will enable on. xnr] CHARLES co'rEswonrH PINCKNEY. 459 History to shield them‘ from all reasonable reproach; and that they brought about a result alike honorable to themselves and to their country, - will not be denied by those who remember and duly appreciate the fact, that the Congress of the United States, under the Constitution, was the first legislative body in the world to prohibit the carrying of slaves to the ' territories of foreign countries.1 It is no inconsiderable honor to the statesmen situated as General Pinckney and other representa- tives of the Southern States‘ were, that they should have frankly yielded the prejudices, and what they supposed to be the interests, of their constituents, to the great object of forniing a more perfect union. Certainly they could urge, with equal if not greater force and truth, the same arguments for the continu- ance of the slave-trade, which for nearly twenty years afterwards were continually heard in the Brit- ish Parliament, and which postponed its abolition until long after 'the people of England had become satisfied both of its inhumanity and its impolicy. Whether General Pinckney was right or wrong in the opinion that his constituents needed no national regulation of commerce, there can be no doubt of his sincerity when he expressed it. Nor can there be any doubt that he was fully convinced of the fact, when he asserted that they would not adopt a 1 Denmark, it is said, abolished take effect until 1804. 1 Kent’s the foreign slave-trade and the im- Commentaries, 198, note (citing portation into her colonies in 1792, Mr. Wheaton). but the prohibitions were not to 460 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. constitution that should vest in the national govern ment an immediate power to prohibit the importa- tion of slaves. He made, therefore, a real conces- sion, when he - consented to the prohibition at the end of twenty years, and he made it in order that the union of the thirteen States might be preserved under a Constitution adequate to its wants. For this, as well as for other services, he is enti- tled to a place of honor among the great men who framed the charter of our national liberties; and when we recollect that by his action he armed the national government with a power to free the Ameri- can name from the disgrace of tolerating the slave- , trade, before it was effectually put down by any other people in Christendom, we need not hesitate to rank him high among those who made great sacrifices for the general welfare of the country and the general good of mankind.1 1 In the first draft of the Con- ' 1800, prohibited the citizens and stitution reported by the Commit- tee of Detail, it was provided that the importation of ~such persons as the States might think proper to admit should not be prohibited. When the committee to arrange, if possible, certain compromises between the Northern and South- ern States was raised, this provis- ion, with other matters, was re- ferred, and it was finally agreed that the importation should not be prohibited before the year 1808. After the adoption of the Constitu- tion, Congress, by the acts of March 22d, 1794, and May 10, \ piracy. residents of the United States from > carrying slaves to any foreign ter~ ritory for the purpose of traffic. By the act of March 2, 1807, the importation of slaves into the United States after January 1, 1808, was prohibited under severe penalties. In 1818 and 1819 these penalties were further increased, and in 1820, the offence was made Although the discussion of the subject commenced in Eng- land at about the same time (1788), it was nearly twenty years before a bill could be carried through Parliament for the abolition of Ca. XIII] 4:61 CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY. the trafiic. Through the whole of that period, and down to the very last, counsel were repeatedly heard at the bar, in behalf of interested parties, to oppose the reform. The trade was finally abolished by act of Parliament in March, 1807; it was made a fel- ony in 1810, and declared to be piracy in 1824. While, therefore, the representatives of a few of the Southern States of this Union re— fused to consent to an immediate prohibition, they did consent to en- graft upon the Constitution what was in effect a declaration th'it the trade should be prohibited at a fixed period of time; and the trade was thus abolished by the United States, under a government of limited pow- ers, with respect to their own terri- tories, as soon as it was abolished by the “ omnipotent” Parliament of Great Britain. Moreover, by consenting to give to the Union the power to regulate commerce, the Southern‘ States enabled Con- gress to abolish the slave-trade with foreign countries thirteen 'years before the same trade was made unlawful to British vessels. CHAPTER XIV. WILSON. J AMES WILSON, a signer of the Declaration of In- dependence, and one of the early Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, was one of the first jurists in America during the latter part of the last century. .. He was born in Scotland about the year 1742. After studying at Glasgow, St. Andrews, and Edin- burgh, he emigrated to Pennsylvania in 1766. He became, soon after his arrival, a tutor in the Phila- delphia College, in which place he acquired great distinction as a classical scholar. He subsequently studied the law, and was admitted to the bar; and, after practising at different places, took up his resi- dence at Philadelphia, where he continued. to reside during the rest of'his life.1 For six years out of the twelve that elapsed from 1775 to the summoning of the Convention of 1787, he was a member of Congress. Concerned in all the great measures of independence, the establish- ment of the Confederation, the peace, and the reve Encyclopaedia Americana, Art. “ Wilson, James.” on. XIV.] wILsoN. 463 nue system of 1783, he had acquired a fund of po- litical experience, which became of great value. to the country and to himself. Although a foreigner by birth, he was thoroughly American in all his sentiments and feelings, and, at the time he entered the Convention, there were few. public men in the country who perceived more clearly the causes of the inherent weakness of the existing government. During the'war, he had always considered the States, with respect to that war, as forming one commu- nity ;1 and he did not admit the idea, that, when the Colonies became independent of Great Britain, they became independent of each other.2 From the Dec- laration of Independence he deduced the ‘doctrine that the States by which that measure was adopted were independent in their confederated character, and not as individual communities. This rather subtile distinction may seem now to have been of no great practical moment, since the Confederation had actually united the States as such, rather than the inhabitants of the States. But it was one of ‘the positions assumed by those who desired to combat the idea that the States, when assembled in Conven- ‘ tion, were restrained, by their position as equal and independent sovereignties, from adopting a plan of government founded on .a representation of the peo- ple. To this objection Mr. Wilson repeatedly ad- ’ dressed himself, and his**efl'orts**had great influence’ in causing the adoption 1 of the principle by which l Madison, Elliot, V. 78- 9 Ibid. 213. i 464 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK m, > union of the States. the people of the States became directly represented in the government in the ratio of their numbers. He showed that this principle had been improperly violated in the Confederation, in consequence of the urgent necessity of forming a union, and the impos- sibility at that time of forming any other than a As a new partition of the States was now impracticable, it became necessary for them to surrender a portion of their sovereign- ties, and to permit their inhabitants to enter into direct relations with a new federal union. He point- ed out the twofold relation in which the people must henceforth stand; -- in the one, they would be citizens of the general government; in the other, they would be citizens of their particular State. As both governments were derived from the people, and both were designed for them, both ought to be reg ulated on the same principles. In no other way could the larger States consent to a new union; and if the smaller States could not admit the justice of a proportionate representation, it was in vain to expect to form a constitution that would embrace and satisfy the whole country. i This great idea of a representative government was in fact the aim of all Mr. Wilson’s- exertions; and when the Constitution was formed, he enforced this idea in the Convention of Pennsylvania with singular power. His speech in that body is one of the most comprehensive and luminous commentaries on the Constitution that have come down to us from that period. It drew from Washington a high en on. x1v.] WILSON. 465 4' comium, and it gained the vote of Pennsylvania for the new government, against the ingenious and cap- tivating objections of its opponents. The life of this wise, able, and excellent man was comparatively short. In 17 89, he was ap- pointed by Washington a Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States. While on a circuit in North Carolina, in the year 17 98, he died at Eden- ' ton, at about the age of fifty-six. The character of his 'mind and the sources of his influence will be best appreciated, by examining some of the more striking passages of - his great speech on the‘ Con- stitution.1 1 The following extracts from the speech referred to will well repay a careful perusal. - “ Tacitus, — the profoundpolitician Tacitus, — who lived towards the latter end of those ages which are now denominated ancient, who un- doubtedly had studied the constitutions of all the states and kingdoms known before and in his time, and who certainly was qualified, in an uncommon degree, for understanding the full force and operation of each of them, considers, after all he had known and read, a mixed govern- ment, composed of the three simple forms, as a thing rather to he wished than expected. And he thinks that, if such a government could even no instituted, its duration could not be long. One thing is very certain, — that the doctrine of representation in government was altogether un- known to the ancients. Now, the knowledge and practice of this doc- trine is, in my opinion, essential to every system that can possess the qualities of freedom, wisdom, and energy. “ It is worthy of remark, and the remark may, perhaps, excite some surprise, that representation of the ‘people is not, even at this day, the sole principle of any government in Europe; Great--- Britain boasts— and she may well boast —- of the improvement she has made in politics by the admission of representation; for the improvement is important as far as it goes; but it by no means goes far enough. Is the executive power of Great Britain founded on representation’! This is not pre von. 1. 59 ' 466 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK in. tended. Before the Revolution, many of the kings claimed to reign by divine right, and others by hereditary right; and even at the Revolution, nothing further was effected or attempted than the recognition of certain parts of an original contract (Blackstone, 233), supposed, at some former remote period, to have been made between the king and the people. A contract seems to exclude, rather than to imply, delegated power. The judges of Great Britain are appointed by the crown.~ The judicial au- thority, therefore, does not depend upon representation, even in its most remote degree. Does representation prevail in‘ the legislative depart- ment of the British government? Even here it does notpredominate, though it may serve as a check. The‘ legislature consists of three branches,—the king, the lords, and the commons. Of these, only the latter are supposed by the constitution to represent the authority of the people. This short analysis clearly shows to what a narrow corner of 7 the British constitution the principle of representation is confined. I believe it does not extend farther, if so far, in any other government in Europe. For the American States were reserved the glory and the happiness of diffusing this vital principle throughout the constituent parts of government. Representation is the chain of communication between the people and those to whom they have committed the exerciseof the powers of government. This chain may consist of one or more links, but in all cases it should b sufficiently strong and discernible. “ To be left without gui or precedent was not the only difficulty in which the Convention wer involved, by proposing to their constituents a plan of a confederate re ublic. They found themselves embarrassed with another, of peculiar delicacy and importance. I mean that of draw- ing a proper ,line between the national government and the governments of the several States. It was easy to discover a proper and satisfactory principle on the subject. Whatever object of government is confined, in its operation and effects, within the bounds of a particular State, should be considered as belonging to the government of that State; whatever object of government extends, in its operation or effects, beyond the bounds of a particular State, should be considered as belonging to the government of the United States. But'though this principle be sound and satisfactory, its application to particular cases would be accompanied with much difficulty, because, in its application, room must be allowed for great discretionary latitude of construction of the principle. In order to lessen or remove the difiiculty arising from discretionary construction on this subject, an enumeration of particular instances, in which the application of the principle ought to take place, has been attempted with much industry and care. It is only in mathematical science that a line on. XIV.] WILSON. 467 can be described with mathematical precision. But I flatter myself that, upon the strictest investigation, the enumeration will be found to I be safe and unexceptionable, and accurate, too, in as great a degree as accuracy can be expected in a subject of this nature. Particulars under this head will be more properly explained, when we descend to the minute view of the enumeration which is made in the proposed Constitution. “ After all, it will be necessary that, on a subject so peculiarly deli- cate as this, much prudence, much candor, much moderation, and much liberality should be exercised and displayed both by the federal govern- ment and by the governments of the several States. It is to be hoped that those virtues in government will be exercised and displayed, when we consider that the powers ‘of the federal government and those of the State governments are drawn from sources equally pure. If a difference can be discovered between them, it is in favor of the federal government, because that government is founded on a representation of the whole Union ; whereas the government of any particular State is founded only on the representation of a part, inconsiderable when compared with the whole. Is it not more reasonable to suppose that the counsels of the whole will embrace the interest of every part, than that the counsels of any part will embrace the interests of the whole’! “I intend not, Sir, by this description of the difliculties with which the Convention were surrounded, to magnify their skill or their merit in surmounting them, or to insinuate that any predicament in which the Convention stood should prevent the closest and most cautious scrutiny into the performance which they have exhibited to their constituents and to the world. My intention is of far other and higher aim, —-to evince, by the conflicts and difliculties which must arise from the many and pow- erful causes which I have enumerated, that it is hopeless and impracti- cable to form a constitution which, in every ‘part, will be acceptable to every citizen, or even to every government, in the United States; and that all which can be expected is, to form such a constitution as, upon the whole, is the best that can possibly be obtained. Man and perfec- tion ! —a state and perfection ! -— an assemblage of states and per- fection! Can we reasonably expect, however ardently we may wish, to behold the glorious union?! “ I "can well recollect, though I believe I cannot convey to others, the impressionpwhich, on many occasions, was made by the diflieulties which surrounded and pressed the ‘ Convention. The great undertaking. some- times seemed to be at a stand; at other times, its motion seemed to be retrograde. At the conclusion, however, of our work, many of the members expressed their astonishment at the success with which it ter minated i 468 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. “ Having enumerated some of the difiiculties which the Convention were obliged to encounter in the course of their proceedings, I shall next point out the end which they proposed to accomplish. Our wants, our \ talents, our affections, our passions, all tell us that we were made for a state of society. But a state of society could not be supported long or happily without some civil restraint. It is true, that, in a state of nature, any one individual may act uncontrolled by others; but it is equally true, that, in such a state, every other individual may act uncontrolled by him. Amidst this universal independence, the dissensions and animosities be- tween interfering members of the society would be numerous and ungov‘ ernable. The consequence would be, that each member, in such a natu- ral state, would enjoy less liberty, and suffer more interruption, than he would in a regulated society. Hence the universal introduction of gov- ernments of some kind or other into the social state. The liberty of every member is increased by this introduction; for each gains more by the limitation of the freedom of every other member, than he loses by the limitation of his own. The result is, that civil government is neces- sary to the perfection and happiness of man. In forming this govern- ment, and carrying it into execution, it is essential that the interest and authority of the whole community should be binding in every part of it. i’ “The foregoing principles and conclusions are generally admitted to be just and sound with regard to the nature and formation of single gov- ernments, and the duty of submission to them. In some cases, they will apply, with much propriety and force, to states already formed. The advantages and necessity of civil government among individuals in so- ciety are not greater or stronger than, in some situations and circum stances, are the advantages and necessity of a federal government among states. A natural and very important question now presents itself, —- Is such the situation, are such the circumstances, of the United States? A proper answer to this question will unfold some very interesting truths. “The United States may adopt any one of four different systems. ~. They may become consolidated into one government, in which the sepa- rate existence of the States shall be entirely absolved. LThey may reject any plan of union or association, and act as separate and unconnected States. 3They may form two or more confederacies. ‘-[They may unite in one federal republic. Which of these systems ought to have been formed by the Convention’! To support, with vigor, a single govern- ment over the whole extent of the United States, would demand a sys- tem of the most unqualified and the most unremitted despotism. Such a number of separate States, contiguous’ in situation, unconnected and on. 'xrv.] WILSON. 469 disunited in government,.would be, at one time, the prey of foreign force, foreign influence, and foreign intrigue; at another, the victims of mutual rage, rancor, and revenge. Neither of these systems found ad vocates in the late Convention. I presume they will not find advocates in this. ‘Would it be proper to divide the United States into two or more confederacies? It will not be unadvisable to take a more minute survey of this subject. Some aspects under which it may be viewed are far from being, at first sight, uninviting. Two or more confederacies would be each more compact and more manageable than a single one extending over the same territory. By dividing the United States into two or more confederacies, the great collision of interests apparently or really different and contrary, in the whole extent of their dominion, would be broken, and, in a great measure, disappear, in the several parts. But these advantages, which are discovered from certain points of view, are greatly overbalanced by inconveniences that will appear on a more accurate examination. Animosities, and perhaps wars, would arise from assigning the extent, the limits, and the rights of the different con- federacies. The expenses of governing would be multiplied by the‘ number of federal governments. The danger resulting from foreign influence and mutual dissensions would not, perhaps, be less great and alarming in the instance of difl'erent confederaci'es, than in the instance of different, though more numerous, unassociated States. 7 “ These observations, and many others that might be made on the subject, will be sufficient to evince that a division of the United States into a number of separate confederacies would probably be an unsatisfac- tory and an unsuccessful experiment. The remaining system which the American States may adopt, is a union of them under one confederate republic. It will not be necessary to employ much time, or many argu- ments, to show that this is the most eligible system that can be proposed. By adopting this system, the vigor and decision of a wide-spreading mon- archy may be joined to the freedom and beneficence of a contracted re- public. The extent of territory, the diversity of climate and soil, the number and greatness and connection of lakes and rivers with which the United States are intersected and almost ~surrounded,—-all indicate an enlarged government to be fit and advantageous for them. The princi- ples and dispositions of their citizens indicate that, in this government, liberty shall reign triumphant. Such, indeed, havebeen the genera.’ opinions and wishes entertained since the era of independence. If those opinions and wishes are as well founded as they have been general, the late Convention were justified in proposing to their constituents one con- federate republic, as the best system of a national government for the United States. 470 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK 111 “ In forming this system, it was proper to give minute attention to the interest of all the parts; but there was a duty of still higher import, - to feel and to show a predominating regard to the superior interests of the whole. If this great principle had not prevailed, the plan before us would never have made its appearance. The same principle that was so necessary in forming it is equally necessary in our deliberations, whether we should reject or ratify it. “ I make these observations with a design to prove and illustrate this great and important"truth,—that, in our decisions on the work of the late Convention, we should not limit our views and regards to the State of Pennsylvania. The aim of the Convention was to form a system of good and eflicient'government, on the more extensive scale of the United States. In this, and in every other instance, the work should be judged with the same spirit with which it was performed. A principle of duty, as well as candor, demands this. “'We have remarked, that civil government is necessary to the per- fection of society; we now remark, that civil liberty is necessary to the perfection of civil government. Civil liberty is natural liberty itself, divested of only that part which, placed in the government, produces more good and happiness to the community than if it had remained in the individual. Hence it follows that civil liberty, while it resigns a part of natural liberty, retains the free and generous exercise of all the human faculties, so far as it is compatible with the public welfare. “ In considering and developing the nature and end of the system before us, it is necessary to mention another kind of liberty, which has not yet, as far as I know, received a name. I shall distinguish it by the appellation of federal liberty. When a single government is insti- tuted, the individuals of which it is composed surrender to it a part ot their natural independence, which they before enjoyed as men. When a confederate republic is instituted, the communities of which it is com- posed surrender to it a part of their political independence, which they before enjoyed as States. The principles which directed, in the former case, what part of the natural liberty of the man ought to be given up, and what part ought to be retained, will give similar directiQns in the latter case. The States should resign to the national government that part, and that part only, of their political liberty, which, placed in that government, will produce more good to the whole than if it had remained in the several States. While they resign this part of their political liberty, they retain the free and generous exercise of all their other facul- ties, as States, so far as it is compatible with the welfare of the general and superintending confederacy. on. XIV.] WILSON. 4'71 “ Since States, as well as citizens, are represented in the Constitution before us, and form the objects on which that Constitution is proposed to operate, it was necessary to notice and ‘define federal as well as civil liberty. “ These general reflections have been made in order to introduce, with more propriety and advantage, a practical illustration of the end proposed to be accomplished by the late Convention. ‘ “It has been too well known, it has been too severely felt, that the present Confederation is inadequate to the government, and to the exigencies, of the United States. The great struggle for Liberty in this country, should it be unsuccessful, will probably be the last one which she will have for her existence and prosperity in any part of the globe. And it must be confessed that this struggle has, in some of the stages of its progress, been attended with symptoms that foreboded no fortunate issue. To the iron hand of Tyranny, which was lifted up against her, she manifested, indeed, an intrepid superiority. She broke in pieces the fetters which were forged for her, and showed that she was unassailable by force. But she was environed with’ dangers of another kind, and springing from a very different source. While she kept her eye steadily fixed on the efforts of oppression, licentiousness was secretly undermin- ing the rock on which she stood. I ' ~ “ Need I call to your remembrance the contrasted scenes of which w have been witnesses’! On the glorious ‘conclusion of our conflict with Britain, what high. expectations. were formed concerning us by others! What high expectations did we form concerning ourselves I Have‘ those expectations been realized’.l No. What has been the cause’! Did our citizens lose their perseverance and magnanimity'! N 0. Did they be come insensible of resentment and indignation at any high-handed at- tempt that might have been made to injure or enslave them? No. What, then, has been the cause’! The truth is, we dreaded danger only on one side: this we manfully repelled. But, on another side, danger, not less formidable, but more insidious, stole in upon us; and our unsuspicious tempers were not sufficiently attentive either to its approach or to ' its operations. Those whom foreign strength could not overpower have wellni‘gh become the victims of internal anarchy. “ If we become a little more particular, we shall find that the foregoing representation is by no means exaggerated. ‘When we had baflied all the menaces of foreign power, we neglected to establish among‘ ourselves a government that‘would insure domestic vigor and stability. ' What was the consequence? The commencement of peace was the commencement of every disgrace and distress that could befall a people in a peaceful 4'7 2 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. state. Devoid of national power, we could not prohibit the extravagance of our importations, nor could we derive a revenue from their excess. Devoid of national importance, we could not procure for our exports a tolerable sale at foreign markets. Devoid of national credit, We saw our public securities melt in the hands of the holders, like snow before the sun. Devoid of national dignity, we could not, in some instances, per- form our treaties on our part; and, in other instances, we could neither obtain nor compel the performance of them on the part of others. De- void of national energy, we could not carry into execution our own reso- lutions, decisions, or laws. ‘ “ Shall I become more particular still’! The tedious detail would disgust me. The years of languor are now over. We have felt the dishonor with which we have been covered; we have seen the destruc- tion with which we have been threatened. We have penetrated to the causes of both, and when we have once discovered them, we have begun to search for the means of removing them. For the confirmation of these remarks, I need not appeal to an enumeration of facts. The proceedings of Congress, and of the several States, are replete with them. They all point out the weakness and insuificiency as the cause, and an eflicient general government as the only cure, of our political distempers. “ Under these impressions, and with these views, was the late Con- vention appointed; and under these impressions, and with these views, the late Convention met. “ We now see the great end which they ~proposed to accomplish. It was to frame, for the consideration of their constituents, one federal and national constitution, -— a constitution that would produce the advan- tages of good, and prevent the inconveniences of bad government; —-a constitution whose beneficence and energy would pervade the whole Union, and bind and embrace the interests of every part;-a constitution that would insure peace, freedom, and happiness to the States and people of America. “ We are now naturally led to examine the means by which they pro- posed to accomplish this end. This opens more particularly to our view the discussion before us. But, previously to our entering upon it, it will not be improper to state some general and leading principles of govern- ment, which will receive particular application in the course of our in- vestigations. “ There necessarily exists, in every government, a power from which there is no appeal, and which, for that‘ reason, may be termed supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable. Where does this power reside’! To this question writers on different governments will give different answers on. x1v.] WILSON. 4'73 Sir William Blackstone will tell you, that in Britain the power. is lodged in the British Parliament; that the Parliament may alter the form of the government; and that its power is absolute, without control. The idea of a constitution, limiting and superintending the operations of legislative authority, seems not to have been accurately understood in Britain. There are, at least, no traces of practice conformable to such a principle. The British Constitution is just what the British Parliament pleases. When the Parliament transferred legislative authority to Henry VIII, the act transferring could not, in the strict acceptation of the term, he called unconstitutional. “ To control the power and conduct of the legislature by an overruling constitution, was an improvement in the science and practice of govern- ment reserved to the American States. “ Perhaps ‘some politician, who has not considered with suflicient ac- curacy our political systems, would answer that, in our governments, the supreme power was vested in the constitutions.’ This opinion ap- proaches a step nearer to the truth, but does not reach it. The truth ilfi£££¥£¥£§f§l§fistn ‘116392532118’ abaselste, “(Linseed-lath powerremaz'ns in MEQJ‘IEJ As our constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people are superior to our constitutions. Indeed, the superiority, in this last instance, is much greater ; for the people possess over our constitutions control in act, as well as right. I “ The consequence is, that the people I may change the constitutions whenever and however they please. This is a right of which no posi- tive institution can ever deprive them. “These important truths, Sir, are far from being merely speculative. We‘, at this moment, speak and deliberate under their immediate and benign influence. To the operation of these truths we are to ascribe the scene, hitherto unparalleled, which America now exhibits to the world, —-a gentle, a peaceful, a voluntary, and a deliberate transition from one constitution of government to another. In other parts of the world, the ideaof revolutions in government is, by a mournful and an indissoluble association, connected with the idea of wars, and all the calamities attendant on wars. But happy experience teaches us to view such revolutions in a very different light, -— to consider them only as progressive steps in improving the knowledge of government, and in creasing the, happiness .of society and mankind. to,” , _ , , , t. f‘ 0ft have. I’ marked, with silent pleasure and admiration, the force and prevalence, through the United States, of the principle that the su- preme power resides in the people, and that they never part with it. It may be called the panacea in politics. There can be no disorder in the ,von. 1. 60 g 4'74 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK 111. community but may here receive a radical cure. If the error be in the legislature, it may be corrected by the constitution; if in the constitu- tion, it.may, be corrected by the people. There is'a remedy, therefore, for every distemper in government, if the people are not wanting to themselves; if they are wanting to themselves, there is no remedy. From their power, as we have seen, there is no appeal; of their error, there is no superior principle of correction. “There are three simple species of government;—-monarchy, where the supreme power is in a single person; aristocracy, where the supreme power is in a select assembly, the members of which either fill up, by election, the vacancies in their own body, or succeed to their places in it by inheritance, property, or in respect of some personal right or qualifi- cation; a republic or democracy, where the people at large retain the supreme power, and act either collectively or by representation. “ Each of these species of government has its advantages and disad~ vantages. , “ The advantages of a monarchy are strength, despatch, secrecy, unity of counsel. Its disadvantages are tyranny, expense, ignorance of the situation and wants of the people, insecurity, unnecessary wars, evils attending elections or successions. “ The advantages of aristocracy are wisdom, arising from experience and education. Its disadvantages are dissensions among themselves, oppression to the lower orders. “The advantages of democracy are liberty, equality, cautious and salutary laws, public spirit, frugality, peace, opportunities of exciting and producing abilities of the best citizens. Its disadvantages are dis- sensions, the delay and disclosure-of public counsels, the imbecility of public measures, retarded by the necessity of a numerous consent. “ A government may be composed of two or more of the simple forms above mentioned. Such is the British government. It would be an improper government for the United States, because it is inadequate to such an extent of territory, and because it is suited to an establishment of different orders of men. A more minute comparison between some parts of the British Constitution, and some parts of the plan before us, may perhaps find a proper place in a subsequent period of our business. “ .What is the nature and kind of that government which has been pro- posed for the United States by the late Convention 1 In its principle, it is purely democratical. But that principle is applied in different forms, in order to obtain the advantages, and exclude the inconveniences, of the simple modes of government. Sp “If we take an extended and accurate view of it, we shall find the on. XIV.] WILSON. ' 475 streams of power running in different directions, in different dimensions, and at different heights,-—watering, adorning, and fertilizing the fields and meadows through which their courses are led ; but if we trace them, we shall discover that they all originally flow- from one abundant fountain. “ In this Constitution, all authority is derived from the people. “ Fit occasions will hereafter offer for particular remarks on the differ- ent parts of the plan.” After an elaborate examination of the Constitution, he thus con- cludes : —— - “A free government has often been compared to a pyramid. This allusion is made with peculiar propriety in the system before you; it is laid on the broad basis of the'people; its powers gradually rise, while they are confined in proportion as they ascend, until they end in that most permanent of all forms. When you examine all its parts, they will invariably be found to preserve that essential mark of free govern- ments, — a chain of connection with the people. “Such, Sir, is the nature of this ‘system of government; and the important question at length presents itself . to our view,—.Shall it be ratified, or shall it be rejected, by this Convention’! In order to enable us still further to form a judgment on this truly momentous and interest~ ing point, on which all we have, or can have, dear to ‘us on earth is materially depending, let us for a moment consider the consequences that will result from one or the other measure. Suppose we reject this sys- tem of government; what will be the consequence"! Let the farmer say, — he whose produce remains unasked for; nor can he find a single market for its'consumptio'n, though his fields are blessed with luxuriant abundance. Let the manufacturer, and let the mechanic, say; they can feel, and tell their feelings. Go along the wharves of Philadelphia, and observe the melancholy silence that reigns. I appeal not to those who enjoy places and abundance under the present government; they may well dilate upon the easy and happy situation of our country. Let the merchants tell you what is our commerce; let them say what has been their situation since the return of peace, —- an era ‘which they might have expected would furnish ‘ additional sources to our trade, and a continu- ance, and even an increase, to their fortunes. Have these ideas been realized’! or do they not lose soineof their capital in every adventure, and continue the unprofitable trade from year to year, subsisting under the hopes of happier times under an eflicient general ' government’! The ungainful trade carried on by our merchants has a baneful influence on the interests of the manufacturer, the mechanic, and the farmer; and these, I believe, are the chief interests of the people of the United States. 476 THE FEDERAL CONsTITUTION. [BOOK III. A “ I will go further. Is there now a government among us that can do a single act that a national government ought to do’! Is there any power of the United States that can command a single shilling’! This is a plain and a home question. “ Congress may recommend; they can do no more: they may re- quire; but they must not proceed one step further. If things are bad now, —- and that they are not Worse is only owing to hopes of improve- ment or change in the system,-—will they become better when those hopes are disappointed! We have been told, by honorable gentlemen on this floor, that it is improper to urge this kind of argument in favor of a new system of government, or against the old one: unfortunately, Sir, these things are too severely felt to be omitted; the people feel them; they pervade all classes of citizens, and every situation from New Hampshire to Georgia: the argument of necessity is the patriot’s de- fence, as well as the tyrant’s plea. “ Is it likely, Sir, that, if this system of government is rejected, a better will be framed and adopted! I will not expatiate on this subject; but I believe many reasons will suggest themselves to prove that such expectation would be illusory. If a better could be obtained at a future time, is there any thing wrong in this‘! I go further. Is there any thing wrong that cannot be amended more easily by the mode pointed out in the system itself, than could be done by calling convention after convention, before the organization of the government! Let us now turn to the consequences that will result if we assent to and ratify the instru ment before you. I shall trace them as concisely as I can, because I have trespassed already too long on the patience and indulgence of the house. 3 “ I stated, on a former occasion, one important advantage; by adopt- ing this system, we become a nation; at present, we are not one. Can we perform a single national act! Can we do any thing to procure us dignity, or to preserve peace and tranquillity’! Can we relieve the distress of our citizens’! Can we provide for their welfare or happi- ness’! The powers of our government are more sound. If we offer to treat with a nation, we receive this humiliating answer: ‘You cannot, in propriety of language, make a treaty, because you have no power to execute it.’ Can we borrow money! There are too many examples of unfortunate creditors existing, both on this and the other side of the Atlantic, to expect success from this expedient. But could we borrow money, we cannot command a fund, to enable us to pay either the princi- pal or‘ interest; for, in instances where our friends have advanced the principal, they have been obliged to advance the interest also, in order on. XIV.] WILSON. 4:77 to prevent the principal from being annihilated in their hands by depre- ciation. Can we raise an army’! The prospect of a war is highly prob- able. The accounts we receive, by every vessel from Europe, mention that the highest exertions are making in the ports and arsenals of the greatest maritime powers. But whatever the consequence may be, are we to lie supine’! We know we are unable, under the Articles of Con- federation, to exert ourselves; and shall we continue so, until a stroke be made on our commerce, or we see the debarkation of a hostile army on ‘our unprotected shores’! Who will guarantee that our property will not be laid waste, that our towns will not be put under contribution, by a small naval force, and subjected to all the horror and devastation of war’! May not this be done without opposition, at least efl'ectual opposition, in the present situation of our country? There may be safety over the Appalachian Mountains, but there can be none on our sea-coast. With what propriety can we hope our flag will be respected, while we have not a single gun to firefin its defence? - “ Can we expect to make internal improvement, or accomplish any of those great national objects which I formerly alluded to, when we cannot find money to remove a single rock out of a river’! “ This system, Sir, will at least make us a nation, and put it in the power of the Unionto act as such. We shall be considered as such by every nation in the world. We shall regain the confidence of our citi- zens, and command the respect of others. “ As we shall become a nation, I trust that we shall also form a na- tional character, and that this character will be adapted to the principles and genius of our system of government: as yet we possess none; our language, manners, customs, habits, and dress depend too much upon those of other countries. Every nation, in these respects, should pos- sess originality; there are not, on any part of the globe, finer qualities for forming a national character, than those possessed by the children of America. Activity, perseverance, industry, laudable emulation, docility in acquiring information, firmness in adversity, and patience and magna- nimity under the greatest hardships; -,-from these materials, what a. respectable national character may be raised! In addition to this char- acter, I think there isv strong reason to believe that America may take the lead in literary improvements and-national importance. This is a sub- ject which, Iconfess, I have spent much pleasing time in-considering; That language, Sir, which shall become most generally known in the civilized world will impart great importance over the nation that shall use it. The language of the United States will, in future times, be diffused over a greater extent of country‘ than any other that we know 4'7 8 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK 111. The French, indeed, have made laudable attempts towardsestablishing a‘ universal language; but, beyond the boundaries of France, even the French language is not spoken by one in a thousand. Besides the free- dom of our country, the, great improvements she has made, and will make, in the science of government, will induce the patriots and literati of every ‘nation to read and understand-our writings ~on that subject; and hence it is not improbable that she will take the lead in political knowledge. ' “ If we adopt this system of government, I think we may promise. security, stability, and tranquillity to‘th'e governments of the different States. They would not be exposed to the danger of competition on questions of territory, or any other that have heretofore disturbed them. A tribunal is here found to decide, justly and quietly, any interfering claim; and now is accomplished what the great mind of Henry IV. of France had in contemplation,—a system of government for large and respectable dominions, united and bound together, in peace, under a superintending head, by which all ‘their difi'erences may be accommo- dated, without the destruction, of the human race. We are told by Sully that this was the favorite pursuit of that good king during the last years of his life; and he would probably have carried it into execution, had not the dagger of an assassin deprived the world of his valuable life. I have, with pleasing emotion,w seen the wisdom and beneficence of a less efiicient power under the Articles of Confederation, in the determination of the controversy between the States of Pennsylvania and Connecticut ; but I have lamented that the authority of Congress did not extend to extinguish, entirely,‘ the spark which has kindled a dangerous flame in the district of Wyoming. “ Let gentlemen turn their attention to the amazing consequences which this principle will have in this extended country; The several States cannot war with each other ; the general government is the great arbiter in contentions between them; the whole force of the Union can be called forth to reduce an aggressor to reason. What a happy ex change for the disjointed, contentious State sovereignties! “ The adoption of this system will also secure us from danger, and procure us advantages from foreign nations. This, in our situation, is of great consequence. We are still an inviting object to one European power at least; and, if we cannot defend ourselves,‘ the temptation may become too alluring to be resisted. I do not mean that, with an efficient government, we should mix with the commotions of Europe. N 0, Sir; we are happily removed from them, and are not obliged to throw our- selves into the scale with any. This system will not hurry us into war; on. XIVJ WILSON. 4'7 9 . it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large : this declaration must be made with the concurrence of the House of Representatives: from this circumstance we may draw a certain con- clusion, that nothing but our national interest can draw us into a war. ‘I cannot forbear, on this occasion, the pleasure of mentioning to you the sentiments of the great and benevolent man, whose works I have already quoted on another subject. M. Necker has addressed this country in language important and applicable in the strictest degree to its situation and to the present subject. Speaking of war, and the greatest caution that all nations ought to use in order to avoid its calamities,—‘ And you, rising nation,’ says he, ‘ whom generous efforts have freed from the yoke of Europe! let. the universe be struck with still greater reverence at the sight of the privileges you have acquired, by seeing you continually employed for the public felicity : do not offer it as a sacrifice at the un- settled shrine of political ideas, and of the deceitful combinations of war- like ambition; avoid, or at least delay, participating in the passions of our hemisphere; make your own advantage of the knowledge which experience alone has given to our old age, and preserve, for a long time, the simplicity of childhood; in short, honor human nature, by showing that, when left to its own feelings, it is still capable of those virtues that maintain public order, and of that prudence which insures public tran- quillity.’ _ “ Bermit me to offer one consideration more, that ought to induce our acceptance of this system. I feel myself lost in the contemplation of its magnitude. By adopting this system, we shall probably lay a foundation for erecting temples of liberty in every part of the earth. It has been thought by many, that on the success of the struggle America has made for freedom will depend the exertions of the brave and enlightened of other nations. The advantages resulting from thisxsystem will not be confined to the United States, but will draw from Europe many worthy characters, who pant for the enjoyment _' of freedom. It will’ induce princes, in order to preserve their subjects, to restore to them a portion of that liberty of which they have for many'ages been deprived. It will be subservient to the great designs of Providence with regard to this globe, -—‘the multiplication of mankind,‘ their improvement in knowl- edge, and their advancement in happiness.” (Elliot’s Debates, ll. 9')‘ - 434, 524- 529.) CHAPTER XV. RANDOLPH. ‘ EDMUND RANDOLPH, a “ child of the Revolution,“ was Governor of Virginia at the time of the Federal Convention. Probably it was on account of his position as the chief magistrate of the State that he was, by the general consent of his colleagues, selected to bring forward the Virginia plan of government, which was submitted at an early period of the delib- erations, and which became, after great modifications, the nucleus of the Constitution. At an early age, in August, 1775, this gentleman joined the army at Cambridge, and was immediately taken into Washington’s military family as an aide- de-camp.2 He served in this capacity, however, no longer than until the following November, when he was suddenly recalled to Virginia by the death of , his relative, Peyton Randolph, the President of the First Continental Congress. In 177 9, he became a member of Congress from Virginia, and served until March, 1782. 1 His own description of him- fled the Constitution. Elliot, self in a speech made in the III. 65. Virginia Convention which rati- 9 Washington’s Writings, IX. 66. f on. xv.] RANDOLPH. 481 In 1786, he was elected Governor of Virginia, succeeding in that ofiice Patrick Henry. In this capacity, it became his duty to secure the attend- ance of Washington upon the Federal Convention. This matter he managed with great tact and deli- cacy; and, by the aid of other friends, he succeeded in overcoming the scruples of the illustrious patriot then reposing in the retirement of Mount Vernon. Governor Randolph’s conduct with regard to the Constitution might seem ‘to be marked by inconsist- ency, if we were not able to explain it by the motive ' of disinterested patriotism from which he evidently acted. He brought to the Convention the most serious apprehensions for the fate of the Union. But he thought that the dangers with which it was surrounded might be averted, by correcting and en'- larging the Articles of Confederation. When, at length, the government which was actually framed was found to be a system containing far greater restraints upon the powers of the States than he believed to be either expedient or safe, he endeav- ored to procure a vote authorizing amendments to be submitted by the State conventions and to be finally decided on by another general convention. This proposition having been rejected, he declined to sign the Constitution, desiring to be free to oppose or advocate its adoption, when it should come before his own State, as his judgment might dictate. ' When the time for such action came, he saw that the rejection of the Constitution must be followed by disunion. He had wearied himself in endeavoring von. 1. ' - 61 482 THE FEDERAL ooNsTITuTIoN. [BOOK III. to find a possibility of preserving the Union without an unconditional ratification by Virginia. To the people of Virginia, therefore, he painted with great force and eloquence the consequences of their be- coming severed from the rest of the country. Vir- ginia was not, he said, invulnerable. She was ac- cessible to a foreign enemy by sea, and through the Waters of the Chesapeake. Her situation by land was not less exposed. Her frontiers adjoined the States of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina. ’ With the first she had long had a disputed bounda- ry, concerning which there had been imminent dan- ger of a War, that had been averted with the greatest difficulty. With Maryland, there was an ancient controversy upon the navigation of the Potomac, and that controversy, if decided on grounds of strict right, would be determined ‘by the charter of Mary- land in favor of that State. With North Carolina, too, the boundary was still unsettled. Let them call to mind, then, the history of every part of the WOl‘ld, Where independent nations bordered in the same Way on one another. Such countries had ever been a perpetual scene of bloodshed ; the inhabitants of one escaping from punishment into the other, —- pro- tection given to them, — consequent pursuit, vio- lence, robbery, and murder. A numerous standing army, that dangerous expedient, could alone defend such borders. ' On her Western frontier, Virginia was peculiarly exposed to the savages, the natural enemies of‘ the White race, Whom foreign gold could always incite Ca. xv.] RANDOLPH. 4:83 to commit the most horrible ravages upon her peo- ple. Her slave population, bearing a very large pro- portion to the whites,1 necessarily weakened her ca- pacity to defend herself against such an enemy. Virginia, then, must be defended. Could they rely on the militia’! Their militia did not, at the utmost, exceed sixty thousand men. They had per- formed exploits of great gallantry during the late War, ,but no militia could be relied on as the sole protectors of any country. ' Besides, a part of them would he wanted for the purposes of agriculture, for manufactures, and for the mechanic arts necessary for the aid of the farmer and the planter. They must have an army; and they must also have a navy. But how were these to be maintained with- out money’! The enormous debt of Virginia, in- cluding her proportion of the Continental debts, was already beyond her ability to pay from any revenue that could be derived from her present commerce. In this state of things, looking forward to the con- ' sequences of a dissolution of the Union, he could not but remind the people of Virginia of what took place in 1781, when the power of a dictator was given to the oommander-in-chief, to save the country from destruction. At some period, not very remote, might . not their future distress impel them to do what the Dutch had done, -- throw all power into the hands ‘of a Stadtholder'! How infinitely more wise and eligible than this desperate alternative would be a' 1 He stated the number of blacks to be 236,000, and that of the whites only 352,000. 484 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. [BOOK III. ' union with their American brethren. “ I have la- bored,” said he, “for the continuance of the Union,— the rock Of our salvation. I believe, as surely as that there is a God, that our safety, our political happiness and existence, depend 011 the union of the States; and that, without this union, the people of this and the other States will‘ undergo the unspeak- able calamities which discord, faction, turbulence, ‘war, and bloodshed have produced in other coun- tries. The American spirit ought to be mixed with American pride, to see the Union magnificently tri- umphant. Let that glorious pride, which once de- fled the British thunder, reanimate you again. Let it not be recorded of Americans, that, after having performed the most gallant exploits, after having overcome the most astonishing. difficulties, and after having gained the admiration of the world by their incomparable valor and policy, they lost their ac- quired reputation, their national consequence and happiness, by their own indiscretion. Let no future historian inform posterity that they wanted wisdom and virtue to concur in any regular, efficient govern ment. Should any writer, doomed to so disagreeable a task, feel the indignation of an honest historian, he would reprehend our folly with equal severity and justice. Catch the present moment, — seize it with' avidity, -for it may be lost, never- to be re- gained! If the Union be now lost, I fear it will remain so for ever. I believe gentlemen are sincere in their opposition, and actuated by pure motives; but when I maturely weigh the advantages of the on. xv.] RANDOLPH. 485 Union, and the dreadful consequences of its dissolu- tion; when I see safety on my right, and destruction on my left; when I behold respectability and happi- ness acquired by one course, but annihilated by the other, — I cannot hesitate’ in my decision.” 1 Norm. —The following-account of the genealogy of Governor Ran- dolph, for which I am indebted to one of his female descendants, was not received in season to be incorporated in the text. Edmund Randolph was the son of John Randolph and grandson of Sir John Randolph, each of whom was Attorney-General of the Colony under the royal government. He was educated at William and Mary’s College. Peyton Randolph, President _of the First Continental Congress, was also a son of Sir John Randolph, and of course was uncle of Edmund Ran- dolph, to whom he devised his estate. Sir John Randolph was one of five or six sons of William Randolph of Turkey Island in Virginia, from whom all the Randolphs in Virginia are descended. Of this William Randolph little is known, beyond the fact that he was a large landholder, and a nephew of Thomas Randolph, the poet, who flourished in the reigns of James I. and Charles I., 1605 - 1634. 1 Debates in the Virginia Convention, Elliot, III. 65-84, 85, 86. CHAPTER XVI. CoNoLIIsIoN OF THE PREsENT VOLUME. TI-IE limits of this volume do not admit of a farther description of'the Framers of the Constitution. The nine persons of whom some account has been given were the most important members of the Convention, and those who exercised the largest influence upon its decisions. But the entire list embraced other men of great distinction and ability, celebrated, be- ’ fore and since the Convention, in that period of the political history of America which commenced with the Revolution and closed with the eighteenth cen- tury. Such were Roger Sherman of Connecticut, Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, John Dickinson of Delaware, John Rutledge and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, and George Mason of Virginia. Of the rest, all were men of note and influence in their respective States, possessing the full confidence of the people whom they represented. The whole assembly consisted of only fifty-five members, representing twelve sovereign and distinct communities.1 That so small a body should have 1 For a full list of the Delegates, see the Appendix to this volume. on. xvr; couonusron on THE VOLUME. 487 contained so large a number of statesmen of pre- eminent ability is a striking proof of the nature of the crisis which called it into existence. The age which had witnessed the Revolution, and the wants and failures that succeeded it, produced and trained these great men, made them capable of the highest magnanimity, and gave them the intellectual power necessary to surmount the difficulties that obstructed the progress of their country to prosperity and re- nown. These, with a few of their contemporaries at that moment engaged in other spheres of public duty, are the men who illustrate and adorn it, and the knowledge of their lives and actions is of un- speakable importance to the people of the United States. ' ‘ To that people is committed a trust, which im- poses upon them a greater responsibility than now rests upon any other people on,‘ the globe. They possess a written and exact constitution of govern- ment,‘ framed with great wisdom by their own de- puted agents, and deliberately adopted and enacted by themselves. That Constitution rules over a coun- try of vast extent, inhabited by more than twenty millions of prosperous and intelligent freemen, who constitute one of the first nations of the world.' i N o where on the face of the globe has the experiment of self-government — that experiment so rarely tried, so rarely successful, and so important to the welfare of mankind -— been conducted on a scale so grand and imposing. To prevent a failure so disastrous to the best interests of the human race as the failure of l‘ 488 THE FEDERAL. ooNsTITUTIoN. [Boox III. that experiment here must inevitably become; to guard this Constitution, the work of their own hands, from every kind of attack; to administer it in the wise spirit in which it was framed; to draw from it the blessings which it was designed to con- fer; to unfold, to cherish, and to defend its great principles for the benefit of a countless posterity; — this is the high duty imposed by a noble ancestry and an overruling Providence upon the people of this Union of each succeeding generation. It calls upon them, with a remonstrance in whose tones there is both a Warning and a cheering voice, to remember that they have a country; to appre- ciate and fearlessly to survey the truth, that national honor and success, internal tranquillity and peace, reputation abroad and safety at home, can exist, for them, only under the Union which the Divine gov- ernment, for its own all-wise purposes, has made a necessity of their condition; and to see that the ruin of self-government in America must involve its ruin for the whole world.1 1 In this connection, I cannot avoid a reference to Dr. Francis LieberZs profound and admirable every department. The destruc- tion of such a system, therefore, would be the destruction of self- work “ On Civil Liberty and Self- government.” Whoever will fol- low that very able writer in his masterly exposition of the princi— ples of Anglican liberty, will be- come satisfied that the American branch of it is more strictly a sys- tem of “ self-government ” than any other, speaking with reference to the application of the principle to government in its most complete form- No one can suppose that the popular principles in the Eng- lish Constitution would continue to expand, as they have done for the last fifty years, if the correspond- ing principles in America were to be overthrown, or even if they were to receive a sensible check. APPENDIX. von. 1. 62 APPENDIX. IN CONGRESS. CIRCULAR LETTER OF CONGRESS RECOMMENDING THE ADOPTION OF THE ARTIOLEs OF CONFEDERATION. IN CONGRESS, YORKTOWN, November 17th, 177 7. Congress having agreed upon a plan of confederacy for securing the freedom, sovereignty, and independence of the United States, authentic copies are now transmitted for the consideration of the respective legis latures. This business, equally intricate and important, has in its progress been attended with uncommon embarrassments and delay, which the most anxious solicitude and persevering diligence could not prevent To form a permanent union, accommodated to the opinion and wishes of the delegates of so many States differing in habits, produce, com- merce, and internal police, was found to be a work which nothing but time and reflection, conspiring with a disposition to conciliate, could mature and accomplish. Hardly is it to be expected that any plan, in the variety of provisions essential to our union, should exactly correspond with the maxims and political views of every particular State. Let it be remarked, that, after the most careful inquiry and the fullest information, this is proposed as the best which could be adapted to the circumstances of all, and as that alone which affords any tolerable prospect of general satisfaction. Permit us, then, earnestly to recommend these articles to the imme- diate and dispassionate attention of the legislatures of the respective States. Let them be candidly reviewed, under a sense of the dificulty of combining in one general system the various sentiments and interests \ 4:92 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. of a continent divided into so many sovereign and independent communi ties, under a conviction of the absolute necessity of uniting all our counsels and all our strerigth to maintain and defend our common liberties; let them be examined with a liberality becoming brethren and fellow-citizens sur- rounded by the same imminent dangers, contending for the same illustrious prize, and deeply interested in being for ever bound and connected to- gether by ties the most intimate and indissoluble; and, finally, let them be adjusted with the temper and magnanimity of wise and patriotic leg- islators, who, while they are concerned for the prosperity of their own more immediate circle, are capable of ‘rising superior to local attach- ments, when they may be incompatible with the safety, happiness, and glory of the general confederacy. . We have reason to regret the time which has elapsed in preparing this plan for consideration ; with additional solicitude we look forward to that which must be necessarily spent before it can be ratified Every motive loudly calls upon us to hasten its conclusion. More than any other consideration, it will confound our foreign ene- mies, defeat the flagitious practices of the disaffected, strengthen and confirm our friends, support our public credit, restore the value of our money, enable us to maintain our fleets and armies, and add weight and respect to our counsels at home and to our treaties abroad. In short, this salutary measure can no longer be deferred. It seems essential to our very existence as a free people, and without it we may feel constrained to bid adieu to independence, to liberty and safety, — blessings which, from the justice of our cause and the favor of our Almighty Creator visibly manifested in our protection, we have reason to expect, if, in an humble dependence on his divine providence, we strenuously exert the means which are placed in our power. To conclude, if the legislature of any State shall not be assembled, Congress recommend to the executive authority to convene it without delay; and to each respective legislature it is recommended to invest its delegates with competent powers ultimately, in the name and behalf or the State, to subscribe Articles of Confederation and Iferpetual Union of the United States; and to attend Congress for that purpose on or be- fore the tenth day (f March next. ' APPENDIX. 493 NEW JERSEY. REPRESENTATION or THE STATE or New Jsnsnr oN THE ARTICLES or CONFEDERATION, READ IN CoNeREss, JUNE 25, 1778. To the United States in Congress assembled : The Representation of the Legislative Council and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey showeth : —— That the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Provi- dence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, proposed by the honorable the Congress of the said States, severally for their consideration, have been by us fully and attentively considered; on which we beg leave to remark as follows :— 1. In the fifth article, where, among other things, the qualifications of the delegates from the several States are described, there is no men- tion of any oath, test, or declaration, to be taken or made by them pre vious to their admission to seats in Congress. It is, indeed, to be pre sumed the respective States will be careful that the delegates they send to assist in managing the general interest of the Union take the oaths to the government from which they derive their authority; but as the United . States, collectively considered, have interests, as well as each particular State, we are of opinion that some test or obligation binding upon each delegate while he continues in the trust, to consult and pursue the for- mer as well as the latter, and particularly to assent to no vote or pro- ceeding which may violate the general confederation, is necessary. The laws and usages of all civilized nations evince the propriety of an oath on such occasions; and the more solemn and important the deposit, the more strong and explicit ought the obligation to be. 2. By the sixth and ninth articles, the regulation of trade seems to be committed to the several States within their separate jurisdictions, in such a degree as may involve many difliculties and embarrassments, and be attended with injustice to some States in the Union. We are of opinion, that the sole and exclusive power of regulating the trade of the United States with foreign nations ought to be clearly vested in the Congress; and that the revenue arising from ‘all duties and customs 494 TIE: FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. imposed thereon ought to be appropriated to the building, equipping, and manning a navy for the protection of the trade and defence of ' the coasts, and to such other public and general purposes as to the Congress shall seem proper, and for the common benefit of the States. This prin— ciple appears to us to be just, and it may be added, that a great security will by this means be derived to the Union from the establishment of a common and mutual interest. 3. It is wisely provided, in the sixth article, that no body of forces shall be kept up by any State in time of peace, except such number only as, in the judgment of the United States in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defence of such States. We think it ought also to be provided and clearly expressed, that no body of troops be kept up by the United States in time of peace, except such number only as shall be allowed by the assent of the nine States. A standing army, a military establishment, and every append- age thereof, in time of peace, is totally abhorrent from the ideas and principles of this State. In the memorable act of Congress declaring the United Colonies free and independent States, it is emphatically men- tioned, as one of the causes of separation from Great Britain, that the sovereign thereof had kept up among us, in time of peace, standing armies _ without the consent of the legislatures. It is to he wished the liberties and happiness of the people may by the Confederation be carefully and explicitly guarded in this respect. 4. On the eighth article we observe, that, as frequent settlements of the quotas for supplies and aids to be furnished by the several States in support of the general treasury will be requisite, so they ought to be secured. It cannot be thought improper, or unnecessary, to have them struck once at least in every five years, and oftener if circumstances will allow. The quantity or value of real property in some States may increase much more rapidly than in others; and therefore the quota which is at one time just will at another he disproportionate. 5. The boundaries and limits of each State ought to be fully and finally fixed and made known. This we apprehend would be attended with very salutary effects, by preventing jealousies, as well as contro- versies, and promoting harmony and confidence among the ‘States. It the circumstances of the times would not admit of this, previous to the proposal of the Confederation to the several States, the establishment ot the principles upon which and the rule and mode by which the deter- mination might be conducted at a time more convenient and favorable for despatching the same at an early period, not exceeding five years from the final ratification oi the Cbnfederation, would be satisfactory. APPENDIX. 495 6. The ninth article provides, that no State shall be deprived of terri- tory for the benefit of the United States. Whether we are to understand, that by territory is intended any land, the property of which was here- tofore vested in the crown of Great Britain, or that no mention of such land is made in the Confederation, we are constrained to Observe, that the present war, as we always apprehended, was undertaken for the general defence and interest of the confederating Colonies, now the United States. It was ever the confident expectation of this State, that the benefits derived from a successful contest were to be general and proportionate; and that the property of the common enemy, falling in consequence of a prosperous issue of the war, would belong to the United States, and be appropriated to their use. We are therefore greatly dis- appointed in finding no provision made in the Confederation for empow- ering the Congress to dispose of such property, but especially the vacant and impatented lands, commonly called the crown lands, for defraying the expenses of the war, and for such other public and general purposes. The jurisdiction ought in every instance to belong to the respective States within the charter or determined limits of which such lands ma’y be seated; but reason and justice must decide that the property which ex- isted in the crown of Great Britain, previous to the present Revolution, ought now to belong to the Congress, in trust for the use and benefit of the United States. They have fought and bled for it in proportion to their respective abilities; and therefore the reward ought not to be pre- dilectionally distributed. Shall such States as are shut out by situation from availing themselves of the least advantage from this quarter be left to sink under an enormous debt, whilst others are enabled, in a short period, to replace all their expenditures from the hard earnings of the whole confederacy’! 7. The ninth article also provides, that requisitions for the land forces to be furnished by the several States shall be proportioned to the number of white inhabitants in each. In the act of Independence we find the fol- lowing declaration :_ “ We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endued by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap- piness.” Of this doctrine it is not a very remote consequence, that all the inhabitants of every society, he the color of their complexion what it may, are bound to promote the interest thereof, according to their re- spective abilities. They ought, therefore, to be brought into the ac- count on this occasion. But admitting necessity or expediency to justify the refusal of liberty in certain circumstances to persons of a peculiar color, we think it unequal to reckon upon such in this case. Should it 496 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. be improper, for special local reasons, to admit them in arms for the de- fence of the nation, yet we conceive the proportion of forces to be em- bodied ought to be fixed according to the whole number of inhabitants in the State, from whatever class they may be raised. If the whole number of inhabitants in a State, whose inhabitants are all whites, both those who are called into the field, and those who remain to till the ground and labor in the mechanical arts and otherwise, are reckoned in the estimate for striking the proportion of forces to be fur- nished by that State, ought even a part of the latter description to be left outin another’.l As it is of indispensable necessity in every war, that a part of the inhabitants be employed or the uses of husbandry and otherwise at home, while others are called into the field, there must be the same propriety that the owners of a different color who are employed for this purpose in one State, while whites are employed for the same purpose in another, be reckoned in the account of the inhabitants in the present instance. 8. In order that the quota of troops to be furnished in each State on occasion of a war may be equitably ascertained, we are of opinion that the inhabitants of the several States ought to be numbered as frequently as the nature of the case will admit, once at least every five years. The disproportioned increase in the population of different States may render such provisions absolutely necessary. 9. It is provided in the ninth article, that the assent of nine States out of the thirteen shall be necessary to determine in sundry cases of the highest concern. If this proportion be proper and just, it ought to be kept up, should the States increase in number, and a declaration thereof be made for the satisfaction of the Union. That we think it our indispensable duty to solicit the attention of Con- gress to these considerations and remarks, and to request that the pur- port and meaning of them be adopted as part of the general. confedera- tion ; by which means we apprehend the mutual interest of all the States will be better secured and promoted, and that the legislature of this State will then be justified in ratifying the same. ' APPENDIX. 497 Aer or NEw JERSEY ACCEPTING THE CoNFEDERATIoN, PAssED NovEMBEn 19, 1778. An Act to authorize and empower the Delegates of the State of New Jersey in Congress to subscribe and ratify the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the several States. Whereas, Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Provi- dence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware‘, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, signed in the Congress of the said States by the Honorable Henry Laurens, Esquire, their President, have been laid before the legis- lature ‘of this State, to be ratified by the same, if approved: And whereas, notwithstanding the terms of the said Articles of Confederation and Per- petual Union are considered as in divers respects unequal and disadvan- tageous to this State, and the objections to several of the said articles, lately stated and sent to the general Congress aforesaid on the part of this State, are still viewed ‘as just and reasonable, and sundry of them as of the most essential moment to the welfare and happiness of the good people thereof: Yet, under the full ‘conviction of the present necessity 01 acceding to the confederacy proposed, and that every separate and de- tached' State interest ought to be postponed to the general good of the ' Union: And moreover, in firm reliance thatthe candor and justice of the several States will, in due time, remove as far as possible the inequality which now subsists : —- SE01‘. 1. Be it enacted by the Council and General Assembly of this State, and it is hereby enacted by the authority of the same, That the Honorable John Witherspoon, Abraham Clark, Nathaniel Scudder, and Elias Boudinot, Esquires,\delegates representing this State in the Con- gress of the United States, or any one or more of them, be and they are hereby authorized, empowered, and directed, on behalf of this State, to subscribe and ratify the said Articles of Confederation and Perpetual‘ _ Union between the States aforesaid. SEcT. 2. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That the said Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, so as aforesaid ‘ subscribed and ratified, shall thenceforth become conclusive as to this State, and obligatory-thereon. von. 1. A 63 498 THE FEDERAL CoNsTITUTIoN. DELAWARE. RgsoLurIoNs PASSED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF: DELA- wARE, JANUARY 23, 1779, REsrECTINc THE ARTICLES OF CON- FEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION, AND coNcURRED IN BY THE HoUsE OF AssEMBLY, JANUARY 28, 1779, PREVIOUS TO THEIR rAssINeA LAw To EMrowER THEIR DELEeATEs To SIGN AND RATIFY THE SAID ARTICLES 0F CONFEEERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION. ' Resolved, That the paper laid before Congress by the .dele gaté from Delaware, and read, be filed; provided, that it shall never be considered as admitting any claim\ by the same set up or intended to be set up. The paper is as follows, viz. :— IN THE COUNCIL, Saturday, January 23, 1779, P. M. The Council, having resumed the consideration of the committee’s reportpn the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, &c., came to the following resolutions therein :— Resolved, That this State think it necessary for the peace and safety of the States to be included in the Union, that a moderate extent of limits should be assigned for such of those States as claim to the Mississippi or South Sea; and that the United States in Congress assembled should and ought to have the power of fixing their western limits. Resolved also, That this State consider themselves justly entitled to a right, in common with the members of the Union, to that extensive tract of country which lies to the westward of the frontiers of the United States, the property of which was not vested in, or granted to, individuals at the commencement of the present war : That the same hath been, or may be, gained from the king of Great Britain, or the native Indians, by the blood and treasure of all, and ought therefore to be a common estate, to be granted out on terms beneficial to the United States. Resolved also, That the courts of law established within this State are competent for the purpose of determining all-controversies concerning the private right of soil claimed within the same; and they now, and at all times hereafter, ought to have cognizance of all such controversies: That > the indeterminate provision, in the ninth article of the Confederation, for deciding upon controversies that may arise about some of those private ‘I’ APPENDIX. 499 rights of soil, tends to take away such cogpizance, and is contrary to the declaration of rights of this State; and therefore ought to receive an alteration. . The Council, then, taking into consideration the strong and earnest recommendations of Congress forthwith to accede to the present plan of confederacy, and the probable disadvantages that may attend the further delaying a ratification thereof, — Resolved, That, notwithstanding the terms of the Articles of Confed- eration aforesaid are considered as in divers respects unequal and disad- vantageous to this State, and the objections in the report of the committee of this house, and the resolves made thereon, are viewed as just and rea- sonable, and of great moment to the welfare and happiness of the good people thereof; yet, under the full conviction of the present necessity of acceding to the confederacy proposed, and in firm reliance that the candor and justice of the several States will in due time remove as far as possible the objectionable parts thereof, the delegates appointed to represent this State in Congress, or any one or more of them, be authorized, empow- ered, and directed, on behalf of this State, to subscribe and ratify the said Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the several States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Provi- dence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,_ Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia; and that the said articles, when so subscribed and ratified, shall be obligatory on this State. Extract from the Minutes. BENJAMIN VINING, Clerk oft/re Council. Sent for concurrence. IN HoUsE 0F ASSEMBLY, Thursday, January 28, 1779. The foregoing resolutions being read three times, and considered, are concurred in. NICHQLAS VAN DYKE, Speaker. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1779. MR. M’KEAN, a delegate for Delaware, laid before Congress the following instrument, empowering the delegates of that State, or any of them, to ratify and sign the Articles of Confederation. His Excellency Cesar Rodney, Esquire, President, Captain-General, and Commander-in-Chief of the Delaware State, to all to whom these Pres- ents shall come, -- Greeting. 500 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. Know ye, That, among the records remaining in the rolls oflice in the Delaware State, there is a certain instrument of writing, purporting to be an’ act of the General Assembly of the said State, which said act is contained in the words and tenor here following, to wit : IN THE YEAR 1779. An Act to authorize and empower the Delegates of the Delaware State to subscribe and ratify the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Unim between the several States. Whereas Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Provi- dence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and v Georgia, signed in the general Congress of the said States by the Hon- orable Henry Laurens, Esquire, their then President, have been laid before the legislature of this State, to be ratified by the same, if ap- - proved :' And whereas, notwithstanding the terms of the Articles of Con- federation and Perpetual Union are considered as in divers respects un- equal and disadvantageous to this State; and the objections stated on the part of this State are viewed as just and reasonable, and of great moment - to the welfare and happiness of the good people thereof; yet, under the full conviction of ‘the present necessity of acceding to the present con- federacy proposed, and that the interest of particular States ought to be postponed to the general good of the Union; and moreover, in firm reli- ance that the candor and justice of the several States will in due time remove as far as possible the objectionable parts thereof: Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Delaware, and it is hereby enacted by the authority of the same, That the Honorable John Dickin son, Nicholas Van Dyke, and Thomas M’Kean, Esquires, delegates ap- pointed to represent this State in Congress, or any one or more of them, be, and they hereby are, authorized, empowered, and directed, on behall of this State, to subscribe and ratify the said Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the several States aforesaid. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That the said Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, so ‘as aforesaid subscribed and ratified, shall thenceforth become obligatory on this State. Signed by order of the House of Assembly. , NICHOLAS VAN DYKE, Speaker. Signed by order of the Council. . . THOMAS CoLLms, Speaker. Passed at Dover, February 1, 1779. APPENDIX. 501 All which, by the tenor of these presents, I have caused to be exem- plified. ' In testimony whereof, the great seal of the Delaware State is hereunto aflixed, at Dover, the sixth- day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-nine, and in the third year of the Independence of the United States of America. CEsAn RODNEY. By his Excéllency’s command. JAMEs BOOTH, Secretary. MARYLAND. FRIDAY, MAY 21, 1779. THE delegates of Maryland informed Congress that they have received instructions respecting the Articles of Confederation, which they .are directed to lay before Congress, and have entered on their Journals. The instructions, being read, are as fol- lows:— Instructions of the General Assembly of Maryland, to George Plater, William Paca, William Carmichael, John Henry, James Forbes, ana Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, Esquires. / GENTLEMEN, -- Having conferred upon you a trust of the highest nature, it is evident we place great confidence in your integrity, abilities, and zeal to promote the general welfare of the United States, and the particular interest of this State, where the latter is not incompatible with the former; but to add greater weight to your proceedings in Congress, and take away all suspicion that the opinions you there deliver and the votes you give may be the mere opinions of individuals, and not resulting from your knowledge of the sense and deliberate judgment of the State you repre- sent, we think it our duty to instruct as followeth on the subject of the Confederation, — a subject in which, unfortunately, a supposed difference 502 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. of interest has produced an almost equal division of sentiments among the several States composing the Union. We say a supposed difference of interests; for if local attachments and prejudices, and the avarice and ambition of individuals, would give way to the dictates of a sound policy, founded on the principles of justice, (and no other policy but what is founded on those immutable principles deserves to be called sound,) we flatter ourselves this apparent diversity of interests would soon vanish, and all the States would confederate on terms mutually ddvantageous to all; for they would then perceive that no other confederation than one so formed can be lasting. Although the pressure of immediate calami- ties, the dread of their continuance from the appearance of disunion, and some other peculiar circumstances, may have induced some States to accede to the present Confederation, contrary to their own interests and judgments, it requires no great share of foresight to predict, that, when those causes cease to operate, the States which have thus acceded to the Confederation will consider it as no longer binding, and will eagerly embrace the first occasion of asserting their just rights, and securing their independence. Is it possible that those States who are ambitiously grasping at territories to which, in our judgment, they have not the least shadow of exclusive right, will use with greater moderation the increase of wealth and power derived from those territories, when acquired, than what they have displayed in their endeavors to acquire them’! We think not. We are convinced the same spirit which hath prompted them to insist on a claim so extravagant, so repugnant to every principle of jus- tice, so incompatible with the general welfare of all the States, will urge them on to add oppression to injustice.’ If they should not be in- cited by a superiority of wealth and strength to oppress by open force their less wealthy and less powerful neighbors, yet depopulation, and consequently the impoverishment, of those States will necessarily follow, which, by an unfair construction of the Confederation, may be stripped of a common interest, and the common benefits derivable from the West- ern country. Suppose, for instance, Virginia indisputably possessed ot the extensive and fertile country to which she has set up a claim, what would be the probable consequences to Maryland of such an undisturbed and undisputed possession? They cannot escape the least discerning. Virginia, by selling on the most moderate terms a small proportion 01 the lands in question, would draw into her treasury vast sums of money; and in proportion to the sums arising from such sales would be enabled to lessen her taxes. Lands comparatively cheap, and taxes compara- tively low, with the lands and taxes of an adjacent State, would quickly drain the State thus disadvantageously circumstanced of its most useful APPENDIX. 503 inhabitants; its wealth and its consequence in the scale (if the confed- erated States would sink of course. A claim so injurious to more than one half, if not to the whole, of the United States, ought to be supported by the clearest evidence of the right. Yet what evidences of that right have been produced’! What arguments alleged in support either of the evidences or the right? None that we have heard of deserving a serious refutation. It has been said, that some of the delegates of a neighboring State have declared their opinion of the practicability of governing the exten- sive dominion claimed by that State. Hence also the necessity was admitted of dividing its territory, and erecting a new State under the auspices and direction of the elder, from whom no doubt it would receive its form of government, to whom it would .be bound by some alliance or confederacy, and by whose councils it would be influenced. Such a measure, if ever attempted, would certainly be opposed by the other States as inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the proposed Confed— eration. Should it take place by establishing a sub-confederacy, impe- rium in imperio, the ‘State possessed of this extensive dominion must then either submit to all the inconveniences of an overgrown and un- wieldy government, or suffer the authority of Congress to interpose at a future time, and to lop off a part of its territory, to be erected into a new and free State, and admitted into a confederation on such conditions as shall be settled by nine States. If it is necessary for the happiness and tranquillity of a State thus overgrown, that Congress should here- after interfere and divide its territory, why is the claim to that territory now made, and so pertinaciously insisted on’! We can suggest to our- selves but two motives; either the declaration of relinquishing at some future period a proportion of_the country now contended for was made to lull suspicion asleep, and to cover the designs of a secret ambition, or, if the thought was seriously entertained, the lands are now claimed to reap an immediate profit from the sale. We are convinced, policy and justice require, [that a country unsettled at the commencement of this war, claimed by the Britisli'dcrown, and ceded to it by the treaty of Paris, if wrested from the, common .enemy by the blood and treasure of the thirteen States, should be considered as a common property, subject to be parcelled out by Congress into free, convenient, and independent gov- ernments, in such manner and at such times as the wisdom of that assem- bly shall hereafter direct. Thus convinced, we should betray the trust reposed in us by our con- stituents, were we to authorize you to ratify, on their behalf, the Con- federation, unless it be further explained. 'We have coolly and dispas- 504 _ THE FEDERAL CONsTITUTION., sionately considered the subject; we have‘weighed probable inconven- iences and hardships against 'the sacrifice of just and essential rights; and do instruct you not to agree to the Confederation, unless an article or articles be'added thereto in conformity with our declaration. Should we - succeed in obtainingsuch article or articles, then you are hereby fully empowered to accede to the Confederation. That these our sentiments respecting our Confederation may be more publicly known, and more explicitly and concisely declared‘, we have drawn up the annexed declaration, which we instruct you to lay before Congress, to have it printed, and to deliver to each of the delegates of ‘the other States in Congress assembled copies thereof, signed by your- selves, or by such of you as ‘may be present at the time of delivery; to the intent and purpose that the copies aforesaid may be communicated to our brethren of the ‘United States, and the contents of the said declara tion taken into their serious and candid consideration. Also we desire and instruct you to move, at a proper time, that these instructions be read to Congress by their Secretary, and entered on the Journals of Congress. We have spoken with freedom, as became freemen; and we sincerely wish that these our representations may make such an impression on that assembly as to induce them to make such addition to the Articles of Confederation as may bring about a permanent union. A true copy from the proceeding of December 15, 1778. Test, T. DuoKETT, C. H. D. IN CONGRESS. SATURDAY, APRIL 1, 1780. r. THE committee to whom was referred the act of the legislature of the State of New York, entitled, “ An Act to facilitate the completion of the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union among the United States 'of America,” report,--— ' That, having met on the business, but not being able to ,agree to any resolution thereon, desire to be discharged; which act is in the words following, viz. : — APPENDIX. 505 An Act to jacilitate the Completion of the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union among the United States of America. Whereas nothing under Divine Providence can more effectually con tribute to the tranquillity and safety of the United States of America than a federal alliance, on such liberal principles as will give satisfaction to its respective members: And whereas the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union recommended by the honorable the Congress of the United States of America have not proved acceptable to all the States, it having been conceived that a portion of the waste and uncultivated terri- tory, within the limits or claim of certain States, ought to be appropri ated as a common fund for the expenses of the war: And the people of the State of New York being on all occasions disposed to manifest their regard for their sister States, and their earnest desire to promote the general interest and security; and more especially to accelerate the fed- eral ‘alliance, by removing, as far as it depends upon them, the before- mentioned impediment to its final accomplishment : Be it therefore enacted, by the people of the State of New York, rep resented in Senate and Assembly, and it is hereby enacted by the author ity of the same, That it shall and may be lawful to and for the delegates of this State, in the honorable Congress of the United States of America, or the major part of such of them as shall be assembled in Congress, and they the said delegates, or a major part of them, so assembled, are hereby fully authorized and empowered, for and on behalf of this State, and by proper and authentic acts or instruments, to limit and restrict the bounda- ries of this State, in the western parts thereof, by such line or lines, and in such manner and forjn, as they shall judge to be expedient, either with respect to the jurisdiction as well as the right or preemption of soil, or reserving the jurisdiction in part, or in the whole, over the lands which may be ceded, or relinquished, with respect only to the right or preemption of the soil. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That the territo- ry which may be ceded or relinquished by virtue of this act, either with respect to the jurisdiction as well as the right or preemption of soil, or the right or preemption of soil only, shall be and enure for the use and benefit of such of the United States as shall become members of the fed- eral alliance of the said States, and for no other use or purpose whatever. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That all the lands to be ceded and relinquished by virtue of this act, for the benefit of the United States, with respect to property, but which shall neverthe- less remain under the jurisdiction of this State, shall be disposed of and von. 1. 64 506 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. \ appropriated in such manner only as the Congress of the said States shall direct; and that a warrant under the authority of Congress for sur- veying and laying out any part thereof shall entitle the party in whose favor it shall issue to cause the same to be surveyed and laid out and re- turned according to the directions of such warrant; and thereupon letters patent under the great seal of this State shall pass to the grantee for the estate specified in the said warrant; for which no other fee or reward shall he demanded or received than such as shall be allowed by Congress. Provided always, and be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That the trust reposed by virtue of this act shall not be executed by the delegates of this State, unless at least three of the said delegates shall be present in Congress. State of New York, ss. I do hereby certify that the aforegoing is a true copy of the original act, passed the 19th of February, 1780, and lodged in the Secret‘ary’s ofiice. ROBERT HARPUR, D’y Sec’y State. WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1780. CoNGEEss took into consideration the report of the committee to whom were referred the instructions of the General Assembly of Maryland to their delegates in Congress respecting the Arti- cles of Confederation, and the declaratio‘n therein referred to; the act of the legislature of New York on the same subject; and the remonstrance of the General Assembly of Virginia, which report was agreed to, and is in the words following : —— That, having duly considered the several matters to them submitted, they conceive it unnecessary to examine into the merits or policy of the instructions or declaration of the General Assembly of Maryland, or of the remonstrances of the General Assembly of Virginia, as they involve questions a discussion of which was declined, on mature consideration, when the Articles of Confederation were debated; nor, in the opinion of the committee, can such questions be now revived with any prospect of conciliation: That it appears more advisable to press upon these States which can remove the embarrassments respecting the Western APPENDIX. 507 country a liberal surrender of a portion of their territorial claims, siIice they cannot be preserved entire without endangering the stability of the general confederacy; to remind them-how indispensably necessary it is to establish the Federal Union on a. fixed and permanent basis, and on principles acceptable to all its respective members; how essential to public credit and confidence, to the support of our army, to the vigor 01 our councils, and success of our measures, to our tranquillity at home, our reputation abroad, to our very existence as a free, sovereign, and independent people; that we are fully persuaded the wisdom of the re- spective legislatures will lead them to a full and impartial consideration of a subject so interesting to the United States, and so necessary to the happy establishment of the Federal Union; that they are confirmed in these expectations by a view of the before-mentioned act of the legisla- ture of New York, submitted to their consideration ; that this act is ex- pressly calculated to accelerate the federal alliance, by removing, as far as depends on that State, the impediment arising from the Western country, and for that purpose to yield up a portion of territorial claim for the gen- eral benefit. Whereupon, Resolved, That copies of the several papers referred to the committee be transmitted, with a copy of the report, to the legislatures of the sev- eral States; and that it be earnestly recommended to these States who have claims to the Western country to pass such laws, and give their delegates in Congress such powers, as may effectually remove the only obstacle to a final ratification of the Articles of Confederation: and that the legislature of Maryland be earnestly requested to authorize their dele- gates in Congress to subscribe the said articles. MARYLAND. MONDAY; FEBRUARY 12, 1781. THE delegates of Maryland laid before Congress a certified copy of an act of the legislature of that State, which was read as follows: -- ' 508 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. An Act to empower the Delegates of this State in Congress to subscribe and ratify the Articles of Confederation. Whereas it hath been said that the common enemy is encouraged, by this State not acceding to the Confederation, to hope that the union of the sister States may be dissolved; and therefore prosecute the war in expectation of an event so disgraceful to America; and our friends and illustrious ally are impressed with an idea, that the common cause would be promoted by our formally acceding to the Confederation : This General Assembly, conscious that this State hath from the commencement of the war strenuously exerted herself in the common cause, and fully satisfied that, if no formal confederation was to take place, it is the fixed determination of this State to continue her exertions to the utmost, agree- able to the faith pledged in the union,-from an earnest desire to con- ciliate the affections of the sister States, to convince all the world of our unalterable resolution to support the independence of the United States, and the alliance with his most Christian Majesty; and to destroy for ever any apprehension of our friends, or hope in our enemies, of this State being again united to Great Britain : Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland, That the delegates of this State in Congress, or any two or three of them, shall be, and are hereby, empowered and required, on behalf of this State, to subscribe the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plan- tations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and .Georgia, signed in the general Congress of the said States by the Honorable Henry Lau- rens, Esquire, their then President, and laid before the legislature of this State to be ratified, if approved; and that the said Articles of Confedera- tion and Perpetual Union, so as aforesaid subscribed, shall thenceforth be ratified and become conclusive as to this State, and obligatory thereon. And it is hereby declared, that, by acceding to the said Confederation, this State doth not relinquish, or intend to relinquish, any right or inter- est she bath with the other united or confederated States to the back country; but claims the same as fully as was done by the legislature of this State in their declaration which stands entered on the journals of Congress : this State relying on the justice of the several States hereafter, as to the said claim made by this State. And it is further declared, That no article in the said Confedera' tion can or ought to bind this or any other State to guarantee any ex- elusive claim of any particular State to the soil of the said back lands, APPENDIX. 509 or' any such claim of jurisdiction over the said lands, or the inhabitants thereof. By the House of Delegates, January 30, 1781. Read and assented to. By order, F. GREEN, Clerk. By the Senate, February 2, 1781. Read and assented to. ' By order, he MAOOIIREIN, Clerk. THOMAS LEE. [L. S.] I ARTICLES OF CCNFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION ~ BETWEEN THE STATES OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, MASSACHUSETTS BAY, RIIODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIoNs, CON- NECTICUT, NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY, PENNsYLvANIA, DELA- WARE, MARYLAND, VIRGINIA, NORTH CAROLINA, SOUTH CARO- LINA, AND GEORGIA. ART. 1. Thetstyle of this Confederacy shall be “ The United States of America.” ART. 2. Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by this Confedera- tion expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled. ART. 3. The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other for their common defence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare; binding themselves to assist each other against all force ofl'ered to or attacks made upon them on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence what- ever. . ART. 4. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the difl'erent States in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these States (paupers, vagabonds, and fugi- tives from justice excepted) shall be entitled to all privileges and immu 510 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. nitics of tree citizens in the several States ; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respec- tively, provided that such restriction shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State to any other State, of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also, that no imposition, du- ties, or restriction shall be laid by any State on the property of the United States, or either of them. If any person guilty of or charged with treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor in any State, shall flee from justice and be found in any of the United States, he shall, upon demand of the Governor or executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of his offence. Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the rec ords, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State. ART. 5._For the more convenient management of the general interests of the United States, delegates shall be annually appointed, in such man- ner as the legislature of each State shall direct, to meet in Congress on the first Monday in November, in every year, with a power reserved to each State to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead, for the remainder of the year. No State shall be represented in Congress by less than two nor by more than seven members; and no person shall be capable of being a delegate for more than three years in any term of six years; nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any oflice under the United States, for which he, or any other for his benefit, receives any salary, fees, or emolument of any kind. Each State shall maintain its own delegates in any meeting of the States, and while they act as members of the committee of the States. In determining questions in the United States in Congress assembled, each State shall have one vote.‘ _ Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress; and the members of Congress shall be protected in their persons from arrests and imprison- ments, during the time of their going to and from and attendance on Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace. ART. 6. No State, without the consent of the United States in Con gress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty with any king, APPENDIX. 511 prince, or state; nor shall any person holding any office of profit or trust under the United .States, or any of them, accept of any present, emolu- ment, oflice, or title of any kind whatever from any king, prince, or foreign state; nor shall the United States in Congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of nobility. N O two or more States shall enter into any treaty, confederation, or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue. N 0 State shall lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties entered into by the United States in Congress assembled, with any king, prince, or state, in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by Congress to the courts of France and Spain. No vessels of war shall be kept up in time of peace by any State, except such number only as shall be deemed necessary by the United States in Congress assembled for the defence of such State or itsttrade; nor shall any body of forces be kept up by any State, in time of peace, except such number only as, in the judgment of the United States in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defence of such State; but every State shall always keep up a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufiiciently armed and accoutred, and shall provide and have constantly ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field-pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition, and ca p equipage. N 0 State shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, unless such State be actually invaded by enemies or shall ,have certain advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such State, and the danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay till the United States in Congress assembled can be consulted; nor shall any State grant commission to any ships or ves- sels of war, nor letters of marque or reprisal, except it be after a decla- ration of war by the United States in Congress assembled, and then only against the kingdom or state and the subjects thereof against which war has been so declared, and under such regulations as shall be established by the United States in Congress assembled, unless ‘such State be infested by pirates, in which case vessels of war may be .fitted out for that occasion and kept so long as the danger shall continue, or until the United States in Congress assembled shall determine otherwise. ART. 7. When lan forces are raised by any State for the common defence, all oflicers of or under the rank of colonel shall be appointed by the legislatures of each State respectively by whom such forces shall be I 512 ' THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. raised, or in such manner as such State shall direct; and all vacancies shall be filled up by the State which first made the appointment. ART. 8. All charges of war and all other expenses that shall be in- curred for‘ the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States in proportion to the value of all land within each State granted to or surveyed for any person, as such land and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated, according to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled shall from time to time direct and appoint. The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several States, within the time agreed upon by the United States in Congress assembled. ART. 9. The United States in Congress assembled shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth article; of sending and receiving am- bassadors; entering into treaties and alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made, whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities what- soever; of establishing rules for deciding in all cases what captures on land or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall be divided or appro- priafed; of granting letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace; appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and establishing courts for receiving and‘ determining finally appeals in all cases of captures, provided that no member of Congress shall be appointed judge of any of the said courts. The United States in Congress assembled shall also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsist-ing or that hereafter may arise between two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever, which authority shall always be exercised in the manner following: whenever the legislative or executive authority or lawful agent of any State in controversy with another shall present a petition to Congress, stating the matter in question and praying for a hearing, notice thereof shall be given by order of Congress to the legisla- tive or executive authority of the other State in controversy, and a day assigned for the appearance of the parties by their lawfiil agents, who shall then be directed to appoint by joint consent commissioners or judges to constitute a court for hearing and determining the matter in question; ' . APPENDIX. 513 but if they cannot agree, Congress shall name three persons out of each of the United States, and from the list of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than seven nor more than nine names, as Congress shall direct, shall, in the presence of Congress, be drawn out by lot; and the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of them, shall be commissioners or judges to hear and finally determine the controversy, so always as a major part of the judges who shall hear the cause shall agree in the determination : and if either party shall neglect to attend at the day appointed, without showing reasons which Congress shall judge suflicient, or, being present, shall refuse to strike, the Congress shall proceed to nominate three persons out of each State, and the Secretary of Congress shall strike in behalf of such party absent or refusing; and the judgment and sentence of the court to be appointed, in the manner before prescribed, shall be final and conclu- sive ; and if any of the parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such court, or to appear or defend their claim or cause, the court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce sentence or judgment, which shall in like manner be final and decisive, the judgment or sentence and other proceedings being in either case transmitted to Congress, and lodged among the acts of Congress, for the security of the parties concerned: provided,_that every commissioner, before he sits in judgment, shall take an oath, to be administered by one of the judges of the Supreme or Su- perior Court of the State where the cause shall be tried, “ well and truly ‘ to hear and determine the matter in question, according to the best of his judgment, without favor, affection, or hope of reward ”; provided, also, that no State shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States. All controversies concerning the private right of soil, claimed under different grants of two or more States, whose jurisdictions as they may respect such lands and the States which passed such grants are adjusted, the said grants or either of them being at the same time claimed to have originated antecedent to such settlement of jurisdiction; shall, on the peti- tion of either party to the Congress of the United States, he finally deter- mined, as near as may be in the same manner as is before prescribed for de- ciding disputes respecting territorial jurisdiction bet‘ween difi'erent States. The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the ‘sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective States; fixing the standard of weights and measures throughout the United States; regu- lating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians not members of VOL. I. 65 I 514 THE FEDERAL coNsTITUTIoN any of the States, provided that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated; establishing and regulating post-oifices from one State to another throughout all the United States, and exacting such postage on the papers passing through the same as may be requisite to defray the expenses of the said ofi‘ice; appointing all oflicers of the naval forces, and commissioning all oflicers whatever in the service of the United States ; making rules for the government and reg- ulation of the said land and naval forces, and directing their opera- tions. The United States in Congress assembled shall have authority to appoint a committee to sit in the recess of Congress, to be denominated “ a Committee of the States,” and to consist of one delegate from each State, and to appoint such other committees and civil oflicers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States, under their direction; to appoint one of their number to preside, provided that no person be allowed to serve in the oflice of President more than one year in any term of three years; to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised for the service of the United States, and to appropri- ate and apply the same for defraying the public expenses; to borrow money or emit bills on the credit of the United States, transmitting every half-year to the respective States an account of the sums of money so borrowed or emitted; to build and equip a navy; to agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each State for its quota, in proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such State; which requisition shall be binding, and thereupon the legislature of each State shall appoint the regimental ofiicers, raise the men, and clothe, arm, and equip them in a soldierlike manner, at the expense of the United States; and the oflicers and men to be clothed, armed, and equipped shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on, by the United States in Congress assembled : but if the United States in Congress assembled shall, on consideration of circumstances, judge proper that any State should not raise men or should raise a smaller number than its quota, and that any other State should raise a greater number of men than the quota thereof, such extra number shall be raised, ofiicered, clothed, armed, and equipped in the same manner as the quota of such State, unless the legislature of such State shall judge that such extra number cannot be safely spared out of the same, in which case they shall raise, oflicer, clothe, arm, and equip as many of such extra number as they judge can be safely spared. And the oflicers and men so clothed, armed, and equipped shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on, by the United States in Congress assembled. APPENDIX. 515 The United States in Congress assembled shall never engage in a war nor grant letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the defence and welfare of the United States, or any of them; nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war to be built or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander-in-chief of the army or navy, unless nine States assent to the same; nor shall a question on any other point, except for adjourning from day to day, be determined, unless by the votes of a majority of the United States in Congress assembled. The Congress of the United States shall have power to adjourn to any time within the year, and to any place within the United States, so that no period of adjournment be for a longer duration than the space of six months, and shall publish the journal of their proceedings monthly, ex- cept such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military opera- tions, as in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the delegates of each State on any question shall be entered on the journal, when it is desired by any delegate; and the delegates of a State, or any of them, at his or their request, shall be furnished with a transcript of the said journal, except such parts as are above excepted, to lay before the legislatures of the several States. ART. 10. The Committee of the States, or any nine of them, shall be authorized to execute, in the recess of Congress, such of the powers of Congress as the United States in Congress assembled, by the consent of nine States, shall, from time to time, think expedient to vest them with; provided that no power be delegated to the said Committee, for the exer- cise of which, by the Articles of Confederation, the voice of nine States in the Congress of the United States assembled is requisite. ART. 11. Canada, acceding to this Confederation, and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into and entitled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other Colony shall be admitted into the same unless such admission he agreed to by nine States. ART. 12. All bills of credit emitted, moneys borrowed, and debts con- tracted by or under the authority of Congress, before the assembling oi the United States, in pursuance of the present Confederation, shall be deemed and considered as a charge against the United States, for pay- ment and satisfaction whereof the said United States and the public faith are hereby solemnly pledged. ART. 13. Every State shall abide by the determinations of the United 516 THE FEDERAL ooNsTITUTIoN. States in Congress assembled on all questions which by this Confedera- tion are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State. These Articles shall be proposed to the legislatures of all the United States, to be considered, and if approved of by them, they are advised to authorize their delegates to ratify the same in the Congress of the United States; which being done, the same shall become conclusive. MEMBERS OF THE CONVENTION WHICH FORMED THE CONSTITUTION?‘ Those with numbers before their names signed the Constitution. Those without numbers attended, but did not sign. The dates denote the first day of their attendance. Those in italics never attended. NEW HAMPSHIRE. 1. John Langdon, 23 July. 2. Nicholas Gilman, 23 July. John Pickering. Benjamin West. MASSACHUSETTS. Francis Dana. 4. Rufus King, 25 May. Elbridge Gerry, 29 May. Caleb Strong, 28 May. 3. Nathaniel Gorham, 28 May. RHODE ISLAND. [No appointment] CONNECTICUT. . William S. Johnson, 2 June. Oliver Ellsworth. 29 May. 6. Roger Sherman, 30 May. Ur * This Table is taken from the 12th volume of Mr. Sparks’s edition of Washington’s Writings, p. 426. APPENDIX. 517 NEw YORK. Robert Yates, 25 May. John Lansing, 2 June. 7. Alexander Hamilton, 25 May. NEW JERSEY. 8. William Livingston, 5 June. Jolm Neilson. 9. David Brearley, 25 May. Abraham. Clark. William C. Houston, 25 May. 11. Jonathan Dayton, 21 June. '— o 28. . Benjamin Franklin, 28 May. . William Patterson, 25 May. PENNSYLVANIA. - 16. Thomas Fitzsimons, 25 May. . Thomas Mifilin, 28 May. 17. Jared Ingersoll, 28 May. Robert Morris, 25 May. 18. James Wilson, 25 May. . George Clymer, 28 May. 19. Gouverneur Morris, 25 May. DELAWARE. \ . George Read, 25 May. 23. Richard Bassett, 25 May . Gunning Bedford, Jr. 28 May. 24. Jacob Broom, 25 May. . John Dickinson, 28 May. MARYLAND. . James McHenry, 29 May. 27. Daniel Carroll, 9 July. . Daniel of St. Thomas John Francis Mercer, 6 Aug. Jenifer, 2 June. Luther Martin, 9 J une VIRGINIA. George Washington, 25 May. George Mason, 25 May. Patrick Henry (declined). George Wythe, 25 May. Edmund Randolph, 25 May. James McClurg (in the John Blair, 25 May. room of P. Henry) 25 May. James Madison, Jr. 25 May. 29 30 34. 35. . William Blount (in the NORTH CAROLINA. Richard Caswell (resigned). l/Vz'llie Jones (declined). Alexander Martin, 25 May. 32. Richard D. Spaight, 25 May William R. Davie, 25 May. 33. Hugh Williamson (in the room of W. Jones), 25 May. room of R. Caswell) 20 June. SOUTH CAROLINA. John Rutledge, 25 May. 36. Charles Pinckney, Charles C. Pinckney, 25 May. 37. Pierce Butler, 25 May. 25 May 528 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. GEoRerA. 38. William Few, 25 May. George Walton. 39. Abraham Baldwin, 11 June. William Houstoun, 1 June William Pierce 31 Maw. Nathaniel Pendleton END OF VOL. I. “I F A. .H ILA-7 .aawa