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THE BRITISH NAVY.
VOL. IV.
LONDON : PRINTED BY.
SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STILET SQUARE
AND PARLIADIENT STRELT
THE BRITISH NAVY:
ITS STRENGTH, RESOURCES, AND
ADMINISTRATION.
BY
»
:
SIR THOMAS BRASSEY, K.C.B., M.P., M.A.
AUTHOR OT WORK AND WAGES
'LECTURES ON THE LABOUR QUESTION' FORLIGY WORK AND INGLISI WAGIS
AND 'BRITISH SEAMEN.'
VOLUME IV.
PART IV.
DOCKYARDS, RESERVES, TRAINING, PENSIONS.
BLING A REPRINT OF
PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES, LETTERS, PAPERS
AND ADDRESSES, WITH ADDITIONS.
+
LONDON:
LONGMANS, GREEN.
AND CO.
1883.
All righis reserved.
VA
454
B82
V.4
Ref Stacks
3-2-53
82107
PREFACE
TO
THE FOURTH VOLUME.
THE PRESENT VOLUME is a reprint of naval publications on a
variety of subjects, and extending over a long series of years.
The collection is necessarily disjointed and fragmentary.
Each speech or pamphlet was prepared for a special occa-
sion, and, where it was sought to gain the approval of the
Navy and of Parliament to more or less novel proposals,
repetition of statement and argument was inevitable. It is
hoped that the statistics, facts, and opinions which are here
brought together may be useful to those interested in ques-
tions of naval administration.
Many of the subjects dealt with in this volume have been
already disposed of in a satisfactory manner. The Controller
of the Navy has the invaluable aid of Mr. Barnes. The
position of the professional officers has been the subject of a
recent inquiry by a departmental committee. The first and
second classes of the Naval Reserve have been effectively
organised. A beginning has been made in the enrolment of
vi
PREFACE TO THE FOURTH VOLUME.
a Colonial Naval Reserve both in Canada and Australia.
The constitution of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers is
still under consideration. Other questions are less advanced.
The training system is not yet perfected, but this important
subject can never cease to engage the attention of the
Admiralty, the constant changes in the methods of naval
warfare involving corresponding modifications in the training
of the Navy.
CONTENTS
OT
THE FOURTH VOLUME.
PART IV.
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
(PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES, LETTERS, PAPERS, AND ADDRESSES.)
SECTION 1.
CONTROLLERSHIP OF THE NAVY.
PAGE
4
1
Comparative cost of dockyard and contract work
Instructions for the Controller of the Navy
Naval superintendents in dockyards
Position of shipbuilding officers in dockyards
Promotion in dockyards
Dockyard accounts
Remarks in Committee of Supply on the Controllership of the Navy.
Distribution of duty and responsibility at the Admiralty. Letter to the
Times.
6
9
10
11
13
18
21
SECTION II.
DOCKYARD ADMINISTRATION.
Amendment to Mr. Seely's motion on Admiralty administration. House of
Commons, February 25, 1873
Observations in Committee of Supply on the Navy Estimates, April 30, 1874
Piece-work in dockyards
Dismissals of workmen
Decay of boilers
26
33
35
36
37
+
viii
CONTENTS OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.
SECTION III,
PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS OF THE NATI.
PAGE
.
Motion made in House of Commons. August 1, 1879
Report of Megæra' Commission
Report of Admiral Smart's Committee
Preparation of Estimates
French professional staff
Three English schools of naval architecture
Professional officers of the United States Navy
40
42
44
45
46
47
50
+
SECTION IV.
ADMIRALTY ORGANISATION.
c
Motion of Mr. Corry. House of Commons, March 18, 1872 .
Board of Admiralty
French Conseil d'Amirauté'
Committee of 1861 on the Board of Admiralty
Duties of Controller
Appointment of Surveyor of the Navy
Remarks of Mr. Samuda
Mr. Childer's
Mr. Goschen
54
55
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
07
SECTION V.
RECENT NAVAL ADMINISTRATION.
+
0
7
Pamphlet published in 1872
Changes introduced by Mr. Childers
Mr. Reed, designs for ironclad ships
Loss of the Captain'
The Flying Squadron
The abolition of a separate class of officers for navigating duties
Establishment of a Naval University
M. Lamy. Praise of Mr. Childers's administration
Position of the English Navy
Shipbuilding policy:-
Speed and dimensions ,
Mercantile auxiliaries
On the manning of the Navy
Naval Reserve
Naval University
66
67
72
72
73
75
76
78
80
81
83
84
85
86
1
SECTION VI.
OUR NAVAL STRENGTH AND POLICY.
Contemporary Review, 1876
88
4
CONTENTS OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.
ix
SECTION VII.
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS OF THE NATY.
0
Cost of repairs in France, Germany, and England compared
Analysis of foreign squadrons
Large expenditure on repairs when compared with building
Increased expenditure on repairs
Cost of repairs of certain ships
Delays in construction
Economy through the substitution of iron for wood in construction
Length of foreign commissions
Deterioratiou of boilers
Training of engineers
PAGE
100
105
107
109
110
113
114
116
118
123
SECTION VIII.
STATE OF THE NAVY AS DEBATED DURING THE GENERAL ELECTION, 1880.
+
1
.
.
.
Speech of Mr. W. H. Smith
Speech of Mr. Childers
Letter from Mr. Goschen
Letter to the Editor of the Times from Mr. Shaw-Lefevre
Leading article in the Times
Letter to the Editor of the Times from Sir E. J. Reed
Letter of the Compiler to the Editor of the Times
Leading article in the Times
Letter of Sir Spencer Robinson
134
138
140
142
145
149
153
158
162
+
.
SECTION IX.
GENERAL POLICY OF THE ADMIRALTY, AND REMARKS ON THE NAVY
ESTIMATES, 1881 TO 1883.
A
.
.
$
0
Remarks of the Compiler. House of Comvions, March, 1881
Memorandum on Navy Estimates, 1881-1882
Leander' class
Barbette armament
Personnel of the Navy
Training of seamen
Naval expenditure compared with foreign trade .
Fleet in commission
Expense accounts.
Regulations for management of boilers
Iron and composite ships
Piece-work
Committee on yard-craft
166
173
173
173
174
176
176
178
179
179
180
181
181
.
.
.
X
.
CONTENTS OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.
SECTION X.
EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES,
1881.
Colston banquet
The Shipwrights' Company
Annual address at Hastings
PAGE
186
189
191
PART V.
NAVAL RESERVES.
SECTION I.
Introductory remarks
204
Comparative numbers of the maritime population of the chief naval Powers. 209
Inscription maritime
211
Impressment
212
SECTION II.
.
Necessary strength of our Naval Reserve.
Speech of Captain Willes, R.N.
Captain Colomb, R.N.
Captain J. C. R. Colomb
Captain Goodenough, R.N.
216
221
224
226
227
27
SECTION III.
EFFICIENCY OF THE ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE
236
SECTION IV.
REGULATIONS FOR DRILL
248
SECTION V.
RECRUITMENT OF THE RESERVE FROM THE TISHERMEN AND SEAMEN OF
THE COASTING TRADE
258
SECTION VI.
REGULATIONS FOR THE ENROLMENT OF BOYS IN THE THIRD-CLASS ROYAL
NAVAL RESERVE
266
CONTENTS OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.
xi
}
SECTION VII.
PAOK
272
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS
294
Regulations for the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers
Reports of the Admiral Superintendent on the Royal Naval Artillery
Volunteers
Address of the Compiler to the Liverpool Brigade
308
312
SECTION VIII.
STEAM NAVAL RESERYE.
318
SECTION IX.
OFFICERS OF THE COAST DETENCE FORCES
322
.
SECTION X.
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
.
0
.
Paper read at the Royal Colonial Institute, June 7, 1878
Speech of Captain Bridge, R.N.
Captain Colomb, R.N.
Admiral Scott
Address to the Bradford Chamber of Commerce, January, 1880
331
349
352
355
360
SECTION XI.
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE,
Parliamentary speeches :-
April 3, 1873
April 17, 1874.
372
389
SECTION XII.
STRENGTH OF THE NAVAL RESERYE IN 1882.
Compiler in answer to Mr. Gourley, House of Commons, August 1, 1882 400
xii
CONTENTS OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.
PART VI.
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
SECTION I.
TRAINING OF ENGIN DER OFFICERS.
PAGD
Remarks of Compiler. House of Commons, March 15, 1878.
408
SECTION II.
MEMORANDUD ON THE TRAINING OF STAMLN.
0
412
415
417
422
423
.
.
.
.
Importance of the subject.
Training in the British Navy
Training in the German Navy
Training in the French Navy
Training in the American Navy
Defects in the British system :-
Paper by Commodore Wilson
United Service Institution, July 2, 1875
1875
Loss of the Vanguard'
Fitting out of the 'Aurora' and 'Eurydice'
Training in sailing ships
brigs
flying squadrons
the mercantile marine
the surveying service
gunnery
.
425
425
429
432
434
446
449
457
460
461
.
.
.
09
SECTION III.
ENGLISII AND FOREIGN OPINIONS ON THE INSTRUCTION OF THE NAVY
IN STEAM TACTICS
464
SECTION IV.
MOTIONS IN FAVOUR OF ABOLISHING A SEPARATE BRANCIL OF OFFICERS
FOR NAVIGATING DUTIES.
Lord Sudeley :
House of Commons, June 7, 1872 .
April 25, 1876.
488
513
.
CONTENTS OF THE FOURTH VOLUME. .
xiii
SECTION V.
DOCKYARD AND NAVAL OFFICERS.
PAGE
530
537
541
.
Motion by Compiler. House of Commons, June 13, 1871
Speech of Mr. Goschen
Speech of Sir John Hay
Admiralty on the formation of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, January,
1873
Observations on the course of study at the Naval University by Compiler,
House of Commons, July 6, 1877
Report of Committee on the Royal Naval College
Fleet circular. Royal Naval College Prizes. December 9, 1880
543
.
547
554
558
SECTION VI.
EDUCATION OF OFFICERS FOR THE MERCANTILE MARINE,
Remarks by Compiler. House of Commons, May 16, 1876
562
.
SECTION VII.
6
EXPERIENCES IN THE
SUNBEAM.'
.
Voyage round the world
Storm in the Bay of Biscay, February, 1881 .
Gale off Flamborough Head, October 22, 1881
508
573
576
PART VII.
RETIREMENTS AND PENSIONS.
NAVAL OFFICERS OF THE CONSULAR SERVICE.
House of Commons, June 10, 1873
584
APPENDIX.
}
ARMY REORGANISATION COMMITTEE,
Evidence by the Compiler
590
INDEX
605
PART IV.
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
VOL. IV,
B
PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES.
SECTION I.
CONTROLLERSHIP OF THE NAVY.
SPEECHES DELIVERED IN PARLIAMENT,
APRIL 27, 1871. JULY 15, 1872.
Reprinted from Hansard, with additionul quotations from Blue-books and
Parliamentary Papers. References to salaries are omitted.
1 2
SPEECH DELIVERED ON THE CONTROLLERSHIP
OF THE NAVY.
April 27, 1871.
Sir T.
Brassev.
April 27,
1871.
Compara
tive cost of
dockyard
work and
ships huilt
by, con-
tract.
MR. BRASSEY, in rising to call attention to the multifarious duties
of the Controller of the Navy, and to move a resolution on the subject,
said, the attention of the public had been drawn to this office of late,
from a combination of circumstances. An impression had prevailed
that dockyard work was unnecessarily costly, and exaggerated state-
ments were frequently put forward as to the cost of the vessels built
in the public yards. If the ships built by the contractors were con-
structed at a loss to the builders, the argument against dockyard
management, founded on a comparison with the assumed cost of
contract work, fell to the ground. In point of fact, heavy losses
were sustained on the contracts for the earlier ironclad ships. The
table prepared by Mr. Reed, giving the cost of all contract built
and Government-built broadside ships, up to January, 1868, gave
the following comparison of actual outlay on labour and materials
for the hull alone, without percentage for general charges :-
Contract-built,
Government-built.
Tons
Cost of hull
Tons
Cost of hul
49,931
47,606
£2,706,600
(or £54 per ton)
2,625,117
(or £55 per ton)
In the case of the Achilles,' 6,121 tons, the cost of the hull was
375,4731., and in that of the Northumberland,' 6,621 tons, the
cost was 479,8741.
It was necessary that the Government should possess ample re-
sources for building ships of war in the public dockyards. This
was clearly established in the long experiences of the last great
naval war.
The prices per ton for line-of-battle ships, built by
contract in the Thames, advanced from 17.51. in 1771 to 201. in
1795, 211. in 1800, and 361. in 1805. If there were no public
establishments, the cost of naval construction in times of pressure
would be increased in an inordinate degree, and fatal delays might
take place in the completion of outfits and repairs.
CONTROLLERSHIP OF THE NAVY.
Ō
{ccommo-
pro-
In the debate on the Navy Estimates in 1864, Mr. Laird gave Mr. Laird,
other reasons for the maintenance of the dockyards. It had, he Necessity
observed, been said that the private dockyards would supply the for dock
necessary dock accommodation in time of war. This was, however, dation,
quite a mistake. Merchantmen rarely drew 22 feet of water. The
great object was to limit their draught of water to 19 or 20 feet.
But a large man-of-war seldom drew less than from 26 to 28 feet.
The argument for maintaining the dockyards in their full Memoran-
efficiency in time of peace, and making the most of the resources fessional
they contained, was ably stated in a memorandum addressed by the oficers
,
professional officers to the Controller in 1868. The opinion was
expressed that, as the dockyards exist, their resources should be
utilised as far as possible. If in the principal home yards ship-
building were suppressed, the entire cost would be brought to bear
on the secondary work of maintaining ships in ordinary, and refitting
those in commission. The apparent cost of maintenance and repair
would thus be enhanced to a monstrous extent. Dockyard economy
ought to consist of something by which the public money is really
saved ; but this suppression of shipbuilding works in the dockyards
would only add to the public outlay, by employing other establish-
ments to perform those works which the existing establishments
were equal to.'
While the criticisms on dockyard extravagance were probably Dockyard
exaggerated, it was generally admitted that it was more costly by dearer than
ten per cent. than similar work in private yards. It was a fair contract
question whether the difference in cost was not fully made up in
superior workmanship and durability ; but while admitting the
general success of our dockyard administration, there was reason to
hope that some improvement might be effected. The vote for stores
and wages in the home dockyards exceeded 1,500,0001. A saving
of only five per cent. would amount to 75,0001.
It was patent to all who had in any way investigated the subject, Centralisa-
that in the administration of those large dockyard establishments
there was too much concentration of detail and management at
Whitehall, and the fact that the Controller, who was responsible for
the management of those establishments, was an over-worked officer,
arose to a great extent from that excessive concentration of responsi-
bility in London. At the last inquiry into the management of the Duke of
dockyards, the Duke of Somerset stated that it was impossible for
any person, however able, adequately and efficiently to discharge all
the duties imposed at that time on the Controller.
10 :er cent.
tion at
Whitehall.
Somerset.
6
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
-
Memoran-
for the
Controller.
The soundness of that opinion of the Duke of Somerset will be
dum of in- fully established by a perusal of the memorandum which he pro-
duced in his examination before the Commission on Dockyards, on
June 19, 1860, and which it may be useful to insert with this reprint
of the compiler's speech.
6
S
> >
· Instructions for the Controller of the Navy.
Your duties consist in the control of all expenditure incurred for
the building, the repair, and the outfit of vessels in Her Majesty's
Navy. These works, therefore, whether they be performed in the
naval yards or by contract, are placed under your direction and
management.
'For the discharge of these important duties you are invested
with such authority as will enable you, by the exercise of due
vigilance, to regulate the numerous sources of expenditure for
which you are responsible to the Board of Admiralty.
You are to control the various services in the dockyards, which
may be briefly classed under the following heads :
Ships building.
converting
making good defects of and refitting.
fitting for sea.
fitting for steam ordinary.
fitting for the divisions of reserve.
maintaining in ordinary.
(Yard craft.
Construction and repairs of steam machinery and boilers.
"You are authorised to correspond with the Superintendents of
the dockyards, who in all matters connected with your department
will communicate with you, and receive orders from you.
'You are to prepare and submit to their Lordships before the
commencement of each financial year a programme of the works
relating to your department to be performed within the year.
· This programme must show the actual state of the ships then
building, and also the state to which you propose they should be
advanced by the end of the financial year, with the number of men
to be employed on each ship, and the probable cost.
* The programme should contain similar information in reference
to ships to be converted within the year.
• You will submit to their Lordships your suggestions as to the
number and proportion of the various artificers and labourers to be
employed in the several departments of the dockyards and factories
CONTROLLERSHIP OF THE NAVY.
7
under your control. You will regulate the numbers with reference
to the vote for wages, and you will at all times recommend such
alteration of the numbers employed, and such revision of expenditure
ás may best, in your opinion, contribute to the economy and efficiency
of the dockyards.
You will from time to time transmit a return of the names of
those artificers and workmen who from age and infirmity are in-
capable of performing a proper day's work, with a statement of their
age and time of servitude.
‘You are, as often as your other duties will permit, to visit the
dockyards, in order to inspect the works in progress, and to ascertain
that your directions are carried out with promptitude and economy.
* Any orders which you may wish to give to the Superintendent
should be in writing.
“You are to recommend such measures as you may think fit for
the preservation of ships in the several divisions of steam ordinary,
and you will ascertain the condition of the vessels, of the machinery
and boilers, so that you may be enabled accurately to inform their
Lordships of the time in which these vessels could be ready for
service. You will see that the timber used in the dockyards for
the building and repair of vessels is suitable, and duly seasoned,
and if you should see occasion you will call their Lordships' attention
to the quantity and quality of timber in store.
“You will carefully observe the quantity of timber, and of other
stores employed in the works under your control, and immediately
direct their Lordships' notice to any defects in the supply, and to
any waste in the expenditure.
“You will receive every month a scheme of works from the several
dockyards, so that you may be able to watch the progress making
in the approved programme, and have it in your power to modify
the works whenever the alteration may be rendered necessary by
the exigencies of the public service. A return is to be made from
your office at the end of every three months, showing the general
progress of work in the several dockyards, and the number of men
employed.
You will submit to their Lordships, when required, designs of
vessels to be built either in the naval yards or by contract, as they
may direct, and you will lay before them such details respecting the
vessel, its estimated cost, the machinery, and the armament pro-
posed, as may enable them to form a judgment in each case before
they sanction the design. Whenever vessels, or machinery for
vessels, or for dockyard purposes, are to be supplied by contract,
8
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION:
you are to submit to their Lordships the names of persons qualified
to tender, with such further information as may be necessary.
· The tenders are to be opened by you, and then submitted to
their Lordships with your observations as to which may be most
eligible for acceptance. When the tender has been accepted, you
are to communicate with the person, and take steps for the due
execution of the contract. While the work contracted for is in
progress, you are to send an inspector as often as you think fit,
who will report to you on the state of the work, and you will not
give a certificate for the payment of any instalment until you are
satisfied with the condition of the work, unless the circumstances
of the case induce you to make a special submission to their Lord-
ships.
“The examination of candidates for Chief Engineers of the Royal
Navy will be conducted in your office, and you will from time to
time recommend for promotion to that rank, and to subordinate ranks,
such Assistant Engineers as may possess the requisite qualifications.
You will also regulate all other examinations of Assistant Engineers,
and of candidates for entry into the engineer branch of Her Majesty's
Navy; and you will recommend the Chief and other Engineers for
appointment to Her Majesty's ships.
When vacancies occur in the dockyards, whether for the superior
or inferior officers, if they are such as require to be filled up, you
are, after consultation with the Superintendent of the yard, to
submit the names of the several candidates, in accordance with the
regulation promulgated on March 13, 1853.
* The examinations of candidates for the situation of Master Ship-
wright's Assistant will be conducted in your office, or in such manner
as their Lordships may direct.
* All other examinations which take place in the dockyard depart-
ments under your control will be forwarded to your office for sub-
mission to their Lordships, and you will assist to the best of your
ability in rendering these examinations just towards the candidates,
and beneficial to the public service.
You will, as heretofore, consult with the Senior Naval Lord upon
all matters connected with the preparation of ships for commission,
the repairs of ships in commission, the ships in the steam reserve,
the state of work in the dockyards, and generally with the business
of your office.
· The foregoing instructions may not embrace the whole of your
duties, but they will serve for your general guidance; and in the
discharge of these duties, if you should at any time see the means
of introducing improvements or measures calculated to promote
CONTROLLERSHIP OF TIIE NAVY.
9
economy in any branch of Her Majesty's service connected with your
department, it will be your special duty to submit it to the Board of
Admiralty.'
The comprehensive character of the duties of the Controller was New duties
abundantly evident, and they had been materially increased by troller.
recent changes. The departments of gunnery and stores had been
added to the former scope of his functions, already more than
sufficiently onerous; and he had been made a inember of the Board
of Admiralty.
While the Controller himself could not possibly discharge all Responsi-
the duties imposed upon him, the fact that he was nominally held dockyard
responsible absolved those officers who had the actual charge of the officers,
detail of dockyard business from the wholesome responsibility which
ought properly to rest upon them. He would suggest that the
Controller should be relieved of a portion of his duties by giving a
inore independent authority to the local officers of the dockyards.
He might attach undue importance to that suggestion ; but if he
represented any principle of administration in that House, it was the
successful application of the principle of decentralisation to the largest
industrial affairs.
The Adiniral Superintendent must be retained, because it was Admiral
Superin-
necessary to have in those establishments a naval officer of high rank
to represent the Admiralty, to check the requisitions sent to the
dockyards by the captains of ships, to superintend the steam reserve,
and to see that every vessel fitted in those yards was duly equipped
for naval service.
This subject was ably discussed by the late Admiral Denman in Admiralty
support of his essay on Admiralty Administration ':--
tration,' by
'No man exists who possesses the qualifications which would Admiral
enable him to undertake the skilled management of all the branches Joseph
of the matériel of the Navy, and neither the Constructor nor the
Engineer wonld brook the superiority of the other, were either to
fill the office of the Surveyor of the Navy.
A naval officer filling the office would neither pretend to construct
a ship nor to perform the duties of the Engineer-in-Chief, but he
would have far greater knowledge of the various elements necessary
to constitute an efficient ship of war under all the circumstances she
may have to encounter, than either, for his whole life has been
passed in the practical experience of the subject, and his professional
credit and success has been bound up with it.
* The joint action of the seaman, the ship-builder, and the
engineer, is secured by the superintendence of an Admiral over the
several branches, which must be combined in harmonious action to
tendent.
Adminis-
Deninan.
}
10
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
The Ad-
,
produce good results; it would be therefore difficult to improve the
existing system in this respect.
The same subject was ably discussed in a pamphlet on "The
Admiralty,' by a flag officer :
There has been an intention to abolish the officer of Naval
by a flag Superintendents of Dockyards, and this mischievous project may be
Officer.
revived. Should it be carried into effect in the great outfitting
ports, the link will be wanting which has hitherto connected the
dockyard with the fleet, and by means of which the incessant
business in which both must co-operate has been so advantageously
conducted. The result will be, that when some considerable
pressure of work is thrust upon the dockyards, they will be in a
state of utter confusion and insubordination. The Government
expectations of progress in the work will on some emergency be
disappointed, and the blame which should rest upon mischievous
administrators will be heaped upon those who are the unhappy
executives in disorganised departments.
Whilst work is hindered
and time lost in accusations mutually bandied between a frightened
Government and indignant officers struggling to expedite an ar-
rangement under an impracticable system, the enemy's fleet may
be sweeping the Channel. The principle of having a naval chief in
the dockyards had worked so well previously to Sir James Graham's
administration and had produced such good results under the most
trying conditions to which this country had ever been subjected, that
he carried the principle still further, and for the Commissioner, who
was a naval officer holding a civil office, he substituted a Superin-
tendent, with his flag flying. The proposed scheme must have
emanated from a brain wholly uninformed as to the necessities of
the service.
During his examination before the Dockyard Commission of 1860,
Somerset,
in reply to a question whether the Controller should be a naval
officer, the Duke of Somerset replied :-'It would be a source of
great inconvenience if you had a civilian at the head of the
dockyards. You must have naval officers to communicate with
captains who want things to be done for their ships. . . . If there
were any yard in which you might have a civilian, it would be such
a yard as Pembroke. There you would not have the same clashing
with officers of the Navy as in other yards. I have not considered
the subject with a view to appointing a civilian, nor do I know whom
Tshould find qualified to carry out such a business.
Speech of His (Mr. Brassey's) proposition was that the shipbuilding work
Compiler, of the dockyards should be placed in the hands of a professional
April 27,
Duke of
1860,
1871.
CONTROLLERSHIP OF THE NAVY.
11
rank in
France.
officer, on whom there should rest an undivided responsibility in
respect of those duties; and in order to secure the services of men
fully competent to undertake that great responsibility, it would be
necessary to improve their social status. It was the opinion of the
most competent authorities that a promoted workman was not in all
cases the fittest person for administrative functions, involving more
or less general knowledge of a vast variety of trades, and that, in
order to have the highest professional office in each dockyard well
filled, they required the services of men who possessed not only a
knowledge of workmanship but also an appreciation of finance.
The title of Master Shipwright was not much coveted by the Relative
persons employed in that capacity, nor. was it quite suitable to the
principal officer appointed to undertake the work of shipbuilding
in one of Her Majesty's yards. The title of Naval Constructor
would be more appropriate; and the relative rank of those officers
should also be improved, as in France, where the officer at the head
of the shipbuilding work in a duckyard held relative naval rank with
a captain ; and where the highest officer connected with shipbuilding
held the rank of a rear-admiral. The Companionship of the Bath
might likewise be given from time to time as a recognition of long
and meritorious service on the part of those officers.
Turning to the general subject of dockyard organisation, a Indepen-
valuable economical reform would be effected if the principal ship- mates from
building offices in each of the naval yards, before commencing to dockyards.
build a ship or undertake any important repairs, were called upon to
furnish an estimate of the probable cost. Independent estimates
from subordinate agents had been found of the greatest advantage in
the execution of railway works. He would further suggest that the
names of the officers by whom the several estimates were framed
should be made known to Parliament, and that they should be held
responsible for any serious discrepancy between the actual cost and
the original estimate. If the dockyards were treated more completely
than at present as separate establishments a most valuable incentive
to efficiency and economy would be applied to those charged with
their management.
Turning to the question of promotion in the dockyard, the Dockyard
promo-
present system was very unsatisfactory.
In the debate in the House of Commons on the Navy Estimates Lord
for 1864, Lord Clarence Paget said, in reference to the report of the Clarence
Royal Commission of 1861 on Dockyards :
• The Duke of Somerset repudiated the idea of allowing each
chief officer of a department to appoint all the officers under him.
tions,
12
DOCK YARIS AND NATAL ORGANISATION.
Sir
Baldwin
Walker.
Lord
Clarence
Paget,
1863.
The appointment of the subordinate officers should rest with the
responsible Minister. This, indeed, was one of the principal differ-
ences between the Royal Commissioners and the Admiralty.'
The same views were expressed in the reply of Sir Baldwin
Walker to the recommendation of Admiral Smart's Committee on the
subject of the supervision of dockyards. “No experienced practical
person,' he said, 'can question that the good working of the dock-
yards must depend on the subordinate officers. The Committee,
however, seem to consider that if the superior professional officers
had more direct and personal power over their subordinate officers,
proper results would be realised, or, if not, that such superior officers
should be removed---not interfered with or controlled. In a great
department like the Admiralty there must be gradations of authority.
To give any individual officers in a dockyard direct and personal
power over other officers to such an extent that if certain results
were not realised that alone would justify their removal, is probably
what the Board would never consent to. If they did, existing rules
must be set aside, as well as the authority to the Surveyor and to the
Superintendents.
Precisely similar opinions were expressed in 1865 by Lord
Clarence Paget, in his place in the House of Commons:
“There is another circumstance connected with the dockyards
which hon. gentlemen have overlooked when they talk of discharging
persons who are not very competent. If a private individual has in
his dockyard a man who does not suit him, he sends him about his
business. I should like to know what would be said if, in our
dockyards, we sent people about their business because they did not
exactly suit us.
A widely different view of the best system for regulating the
promotion of workmen was conveyed in the memorandum of De-
cember 1864, submitted by Mr. Childers to the Duke of Somerset :-
Connected with the economical employment of labour were the
reputed characters of the workmen. Every man who intelligently
and actively exerts himself ought to be assured that his character
for industry and ability does not depend upon casual reports, but
that it becomes matter of record year by year of his service. The
establishment book should be filled up with a report of character.
The best record would be the confidence of foremen: the best in-
centive the knowledge that they have the power to promote.'
Even among some of the humblest grades of the artisan class
promotions, he believed, were made, not directly by the local officer,
but by reference to the central authority in London. That was
Memoran-
dum. Mr.
Childers,
1864.
Speech of
Compile,
April 27,
1871.
CONTROLLERSHIP OF THE NAVY.
13
with dock-
of 1865 on
manufac-
altogether, wrong. The central authority must depend, in such
cases, upon the report of the local officer, and the responsibility should Responsi-
bility
rest with those who were personally aquainted with the claims and should rest
qualifications of the workmen. If that system were more fully yard staff.
adhered to, changes of the Government would be less prejudicial to
the efficiency of the dockyards. Sir Baldwin Walker stated in
evidence that, during the thirteen years he held office, no less than
seven changes of administration had taken place.
The suggestions which he was now putting forward were approved Committee
and recommended by the Committee appointed in 1865 to consider dockyard
the cost of articles manufactured in the dockyards. They reported tures
that the difference between the Government departments and the
private trade is that in the latter the directing agents are selected
from any quarter in which the greatest aptitude may be found, and
salaries are paid that attract as much ability as the concern can
afford to retain. In the private trade labour is rendered productive
to the utmost degree, ensuring cheapness of manufacture, even in
combination with high rates of wages, by direct and discretionary
supervision. The principle mainly relied upon in these establish-
ments is that of active and intelligent personal responsibility.
With reference to the accounts of expenditure, the system of Delay in
decentralisation should be fully applied to the royal dockyards, and
each dockyard should be treated as an independent establishment.
By this means any great delay which existed at present in presenting
to Parliament the audited accounts for ship-building would be
avoided. The last accounts for 1867–68 were only submitted to the
Accountant-General for his approval in November 1870, more than
two years after the expenditure had taken place, and for the purpose
of criticism they were useless.
The importance and the practicability of a prompt audit of Sir James
accounts, were points fully recognised in the evidence given by Sir Graham,
James Graham before the Select Committee of the House of Commons
of 1861 on the Board of Admiralty.
'I am assured,' he said, "by Sir R. Bromley and Mr. Anderson,
who are the highest living authorities with respect to accounts, that
there is no difficulty in so framing accounts, on the principle of
double-entry, that at once, year by year, Parliament may be told
what has been spent in the building of any ship of war.
'If it shall appear that ships built in dockyards cost 35l. per ton,
which, if built in merchants' yards, would cost only 20l. per ton, the
public will soon begin anxiously to enquire whether the difference
is really justifiable.'
audit of
accounts.
14
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
1871.
Committee
on Admi-
con-
money's,
1865.
On more than one occasion attention had been directed to the
delay in the publication of dockyard management and expense
accounts. The critical use of such accounts is of little value after
an interval of from three to four years has elapsed.
Speech of
The accounts might be produced more speedily if they were
Compiler,
April 27,
audited locally. The audit of all accounts connected with his late
father's great works was completed on the scene of operations.
The Committee of the House of Commons of 1865 on Admiralty
ralty
Moneys and Accounts examined Sir Spencer Robinson at
siderable length on the subject of dockyard accounts. His views
were conveyed in the replies to questions, froin which the following
extracts are taken :--
“The system, which I think we should at any rate try, in order
to see whether it would work, is that of completely separating each
dockyard from another, and of submitting the Navy Estimates in a
radically changed form.
‘You, in fact, would present to Parliament the whole of the ex-
penditure at each place, as if it were the sole establishment of the
Commissioners for the Navy?
"I think that it ought to be so managed as to keep every dockyard
entirely separate. The new system would be beginning with the
dockyard and coming to the Admiralty merely for comparison and
check and observation ?-Yes; I think that this question tends
very much to pointing out that the restriction to centralisation is
rather advisable in these matters than not, and I quite think so.'
The great object of administration, in a manufacturing business,
is to obtain the best results from the labour employed. The super-
vision of the labour is, after all, the vital part, and for this we must
· look, not to the Accountant, but to the shipwright and professional
officers.
The Report of the Committee of 1865 on Dockyard Manu-
Committee facturing and Expense Accounts contains the following observations
on the same subject :-
facturing "We satisfied ourselves that, either locally or centrally, an ex-
accounts,
amination, sufficiently independent to be satisfactory, is applied to
every class of payment made on account of the naval service.
But our attention was called, especially, to the system of local
audit applied to the payment of wages at the naval establishments
ashore. We found that these payments were not subjected to any
detailed examination at the central office; and, accordingly, we
visited Chatham Dockyard, Devonport Dockyard, the Marine Barracks
and Victualling Establishments at. Plymouth, with a view of ascer-
Observa-
ou dock-
yard magu-
-
1865.
CONTROLLERSHIP OF THE NAVY.
15
taining how far this system of local audit could be relied upon. We
came to the conclusion that there was a sufficiently independent
check at these establishments to prevent any unreal or unauthorised
payment being charged in the accounts; and that, having regard to
the nature of the expenditure, the local check, which was concurrent
with the payment, was infinitely preferable to a postponed check at
the central office.
“The particularity of record characterising the deckyard system
of accounts is not observed in the private trade or in public companies.
In the case of the latter, general confidence in the management
saves much book-keeping. If a private firm is satisfied with the
results of manufacture through the conclusive test of profit, nothing
more is required. . If the country found that the ships built in
the dockyards were produced as cheaply as they could be built
elsewhere, Parliament and taxpayers would be well satisfied. . .
* The Committee considered that prompt transmission and weekly
accounts of expenditure for labcur were of primary importance.
With regard to dockyard accounts generally, they should, so
far as they extend, be rendered with a fulness that will be satisfactory
without an elaboration that would be excessive.'
The mode in which the dockyard accounts are now prepared was Mr. Staus-
explained to Parliament in 1864 by Mr. Stansfeld, who had been feld, 1864.
specially commissioned to prepare a system of dockyard accounts.
The first account to which he would refer was the expense account,
compiled from the workmanship sheets of labour and the notes for
stores. These sheets were kept by the inspectors of the dockyards,
and were compared by the accountants of the yards with the pay-
ment of wages by the accountants. They were posted to the ships
by the audit-clerks. The stores were valued according to the store-
keeper's rate-book, and posted by the audit-clerks.
The efforts of Mr. Stansfeld, Mr. Childers, and Mr. Seely, have
resulted in establishing for the Navy a perfect system in matter of
account. The Globe newspaper, in an article published in July, 1876,
describes, in not exaggerated terms of praise, the returns now supplied
by the Admiralty to Parliament:
“We have lately received the most remarkable and most useful of
all the returns presented by the Board of Admiralty to Parliament.
The shipbuilding accounts of the Navy are unique, and we can only
wish for a time when such elaborate and exhaustive information as
they contain may be furnished by every department under the
Crown. All other departments are content with merely laying before
the country what may be called their banker's book; they show us
16
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
the sums placed to their credit in the shape of grants from the
House of Commons, and they show the cheques they draw against
these amounts in the shape of an appropriation account or an account
of surplus and deficiencies. But what value the country gets for the
money thus expended never appears, unless a special return relating
to a particular item of expenditure is called for by some over-curious
private member. The Admiralty, on the contrary, shows in its
expense accounts precisely how much is spent on every ship of the
Navy, whether the annount is for building or repairing, whether it is
for the ship, or the engines, or the stores required for equipping it for
sea service.
Not only this, but it gives exactly the value of stores
in hand at each naval yard, the depreciation of stock by keeping or
by conversion, the income and capital of each yard, the expenses
incurred in conversions and manufactures, and a hundred other
things which are useful to members of Parliament and their con-
stituents in arriving at a fair estimate of the value they receive for
the money they spend. And yet this is not all ; the Admiralty
expense accounts do more, for they enable us year by year to get a
complete history of every ship in the Navy, whether in commission
or reserve, if only some money is spent upon them. They show us
what ships are being built, what are prepared for service, what are
kept in commission, what are maintained in reserve in a state of
efficiency, and, lastly, what are broken up. They form, in fact, for
the dilettante economist, a complete vade mecum, and furnish to the
inquiring taxpayer, as regards shipbuilding expenditure, a conclusive
answer to the question how the money goes.'
The present Accountant-General has laboured diligently to make
the record of expenditure more concise, without omitting any
details which are essential. He supplies an explanatory preface to
the numerous tabular statements previously issued, and he has
furnished the means of instituting a correct comparison between the
work proposed to be done in the way of shipbuilding and repairs,
and the amount actually accomplished in the dockyards. He has
effected a not less important improvement in the promptitude with
which the returns are now published. The Parliamentary account of
shipbuilding transactions in 1878–79 was presented to Parliament in
May, 1880."
M. Lamy, a distinguished naval critic, in a speech delivered in
the French Assembly in 1878, was able to point to the system of
accounts established in our own country as a model for imitation by
the French authorities. In England, he said, everything was
determined beforehand, with regard to the cost of repairs. The
Shipbuild-
ing traus-
actions,
1878-9.
Ni. Lumy.
CONTROLLERSHIP OF THE NAVY.
17
1871.
number of workmen to be employed is strictly ascertained, and the
account of expenditure is scrupulously examined at the beginning.
English administrators are convinced that repairs, unless carefully
controlled, are a fruitful source of extravagant expenditure. An
exact account is kept of the materials worked up in the construction
and repair of ships. Vouchers are required for every item, and a
minute control is maintained. The very moderate expenditure of the
English naval administrators on the matériel of their feet is due to this
careful supervision. The large expenditure on the repair and fitting-
out of ships in France is attributed by M. Lamy to the want of clearness
in their system of accounts. He entertained no doubt that with that
supervision those services would be less costly to the public purse;
and that millions of francs, now absorbed annually in repairs, might,
under a better system, be devoted to the construction of new ships.
The staff of the Controller must be in all respects efficient, and Speech of
sufficiently numerous to enable the Admiralty officials to make more April 27,
frequent visits than hitherto to the Royal Dockyards. No supervision
at Whitehall could be so effective as personal inspection. The
master's eye did more in accelerating the despatch and improving
the quality of the work, than the most voluminous correspondence
and the most intricate returns.
In support of the preceding observations, taken from the speech Duke of
Somerset,
of the Compiler, the evidence given by the Duke of Somerset and
Sir Baldwin Walker, before the Committee of 1860, may be
appropriately quoted. The Duke of Somerset believed that for the
proper efficiency of the dockyards it was necessary that they should
be more frequently visited by the Controller. When he had visited
the dockyards with the Controller, on one or two occasions, it did ap-
pear that things had been done of which he had not been informed,
and that expenditure had been incurred without his knowledge.
We have the same views expressed by Admiral Jurien de la Admiral
Gravière, who has repeatedly observed that the Minister of Marine de la
should be a frequent personal visitor to the ports. The attempt to Gravière.
carry on the business of the dockyards by telegraph is, as he truly
says, the very worst plan possible.
1860.
VOL. IV,
*C
18
DOCK YARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
SPEECH IN COMMITTEE OF SUPPLY ON NAVAL
ESTIMATES.
July 15, 1872.
Reprinted from "Hansard.
:
Hansard,
July 15,
1872.
MR. BRASSEY : In his interesting speech, the noble Lord who has
just sat down (Lord Henry Lennox) has severely criticised the ap-
pointment of a Surveyor of Dockyards. If the relations between that
officer and the Controller of the Navy were intended to be such as
the noble Lord has described, the expediency of the appointment
would be extremely doubtful; but if the duties of a Surveyor of
Dockyards are laid down with judgment, he would be able to render
valuable service. If a comparison be made between the constitution
of the Admiralty and a commercial establishment charged with the
control of a business of equal extent, the cost of the Admiralty
Office bears an exaggerated proportion to the amount of business
which it conducts. Yet, notwithstanding the large amount of the
expenditure, the Department seems to be weak in its administrative
power, while the clerical staff is unnecessarily large. Facility for the
tabulation of returns and records will not secure good administra-
tion. It was well observed by my right hon. friend (Mr. Childers),
in the course of his examination before the Megæra' Commission,
that, ' No mechanism which the thought of man can devise will be
perfect, unless those who have to work it do work it thoroughly. If
somebody neglects his duty, there is no system of duplication or
triplication which will effectually detect it in all cases. Responsi-
bility is the keystone of good administration.'
The higher officers of the Admiralty are overworked; but if you
want to relieve them of some portion of their burden, you must
employ as their assistants persons of high qualifications, and with
that technical knowledge without which the management of a
manufacturing business cannot be successfully conducted. In his
examination before the 'Megæra 'Commission, Sir Spencer Robinson
CONTROLLERSHIP OF THE NAVY.
19
1
quoted a passage from a memorandum addressed to the Admiralty in
January 1861, in which the necessity for such assistance is strongly
urged. Having explained the increase of work, he did not propose
to their Lordships any increase in the number of clerks, but he did
most earnestly submit for their consideration that the proportion of
superior clerks should be increased. To the same effect, in another
portion of his evidence, he said that each department of the
Admiralty should have a secretary, who should be under the general
superintendence of the Chief Secretary: “As to each of the depart-
ments,' said Sir Spencer Robinson, 'I can say confidently that the
want of a secretary almost kills us, it wears us to death. The cry of
despair, which was uttered by the late Controller of the Navy, has
been sent forth before by many an exhausted official.
The redundance of clerical, the deficiency of administrative power,
which may be observed in every department under Government,
have been criticised by all who have examined the constitution of
the public departments in a comprehensive and philosophical spirit.
In an able article in the Quarterly Review for July 1869, three
principal reforms are described as being urgently required in every
branch of the public service-greater concentration, fewer clerks,
and higher pay. The reviewer very judiciously urges that while the
clerks for the mechanical duties should be chosen from a class which
could aspire to high posts, the other class should consist of
young
men trained by the best education England can afford, desirous of a
somewhat easier and surer life than the struggles of the Bar offer,
preferring administrative work, or conscious of administrative ability.
In endeavouring to strengthen their constructive staff, the Admiralty
are pursuing a most judicious course. The appointment of a Surveyor
of Dockyards, as a medium of communication between the Controller of
the Navy and those establishments, should be the means of consider-
ably reducing the too voluminous correspondence between Whitehall
and the naval yards. The cumbrous nature of the present system
cannot be appreciated without a few figures. Sir Baldwin Walker
informed the Committee on the Management of Dockyards in 1860,
that in the Surveyor's Department in 1834 the number of letters
amounted to 3,698 with four clerks, in 1848 to 6,758 with seven, in
1850—when the Steam Department was transferred to the Surveyor
of the Navy—to 10,650 with 11; in 1854 to 22,259 with 11; in
1856--the period of the Russian War—to 32,178 with 16; and in
1859, to 36,296 with 16. Sir Spencer Robinson has recently made
a statement to the “Megæra' Commission showing how the corre-
spondence had steadily increased in recent years. He said that in
c 2
20
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
1863 the number of letters in his department was 60,000, and the
number of clerks 29; while in 1870 the letters were 70,000 with
30 clerks. That such an increase should be allowed in the corre-
spondence is conclusive evidence that the system of concentrating the
management of the dockyards in the office of the Controller in
London had been carried too far. By the appointment of a Surveyor
of Dockyards the immense mass of correspondence now conducted
by the Controller may be diminished and a very valuable reforin
effected.
The Controller will be enabled to pay more frequent personal
visits to the dockyards, and all who have had experience in adminis-
tration know that the presence of the master's eye will infuse a
vigour into the work which is being carried on, such as cannot be
secured by any other means. The necessity for strengthening the
department of the Controller with an additional professional officer,
holding a high and confidential position, has been recognised by
many high authorities. Admiral Smart's Committee on the Mar-
agement of the Dockyards, which was appointed in 1859, stated in
their report that they were of opinion that if the dockyards were
frequently visited by a practical shipwright, and a practical engineer
officer, representing the Surveyor of the Navy, it would be attended
by many beneficial results. Better judgments would be formed of
the persons most fit for the promotions which are constantly occurring
in the different grades.
The energies of the officers, from the principal officers downwards,
would be more advantageously drawn forth. In 1861, in his evidence
before the Committee of the Board of Admiralty, the Duke of
Somerset said that the Controller, being at Whitehall, could not really
know sufficiently well what was going on in those various distant dock-
yards, and had not the means of sending some one frequently enough
to ascertain. In consequence, he had attached to the department of
the Controller another shipwright officer to assist in those inquiries.
In view of these recommendations, I trust that the motion of the
noble Lord may not be carried. I myself most anxiously desire to
see an officer of the rank of Deputy Controller at the head of
every yard ; but even when we have improved both the position and
the
pay of the principal shipwright officers, an additional inspecting
officer on the staff of the Controller is equally necessary. For his
wise decision to increase the administrative power of the Constructive
Department of the Admiralty, and to substitute for a redundant
correspondence a more effectual system of supervision by personal
observation and control, the First Lord of the Admiralty deserves the
arm commendation of this House.
CONTROLLERSHIP OF THE NAVY.
21
SUBDIVISION OF LABOUR AT THE ADMIRALTY.
To the Editor of the 'Times.
1
Sir, -In his recent disclosures to the “ Megæra 'Commission the Times, Feb.
2, 1872.
Secretary of the Admiralty has partially drawn aside the veil of
official reticence, and has seriously alarmed the public by his revela-
tions. In a time of acknowledged difficulty, it is conceivable that
suggestions for the improved management of the dockyards, even
though they come from an independent source, may not be in-
opportune.
For upwards of a quarter of a century, from the table at which
I am writing, my father directed, with truly marvellous facility, the
labours of a body of workmen often six times as numerous as the
artizans employed in the dockyards, and engaged on engineering
works of the greatest magnitude in every quarter of the globe. The
system he adopted, although simple, was yet so efficient that he
never failed to bring a contract to a successful termination. The
salient feature of his system was decentralisation. With keen
vigilance he watched the progress of the most distant operations,
but he rarely interfered in the details of management.
The Admiralty regulations for the management of the dockyards
are so combined as to concentrate authority to the utmost degree in
the hands of the officials at Whitehall. My father's main object, on
the contrary, was to fix the responsibility of management on his
local representatives. Wisely recognising the limits imposed, by the
remoteness of the scenes of operations, upon his powers of personal
superintendence, he directed his attention generally to the selection
of a well-qualified lieutenant. The choice once made, his most anxious
care was given to strengthen his subordinate's position, and to invest
him with the magical influence which the master's eye, to whatever
quarter it is directed, will always exercise.
Not without diffidence, these details are presented to the public,
in the belief that a close analogy exists between the business of
22
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
dockyard administration and that of the large contractor for
engineering works. In both cases the scene of operations is beyond
the ken of the central authority. In both, many questions arise
which cannot be dealt with so effectually at head-quarters as on the
spot. For shipbuilding, as in the construction of the railway, the origi-
nal design, the approval of the estimate of cost, and the supervision
of the works, are the special functions of the engineer, while the or-
ganising of the labour, and the economy in the use of materials, are
the province of the contractor. Efficiency is thus the primary object
of the engineer, as economy is the primary object of the contractor
A like subdivision of responsibility should be established in the dock-
yards.
In imitation of the subdivision of labour which has been adopted
with excellent results in the construction of railways, I would suggest
that the Controller should no longer be regarded as the shipbuilder
of the Navy, and that he should in future confine his attention to
that portion of his present duties which properly comes within the
sphere of the naval architect. He should be represented in each
dockyard by a highly qualified naval architect, bearing the title of
Deputy Controller, who should be responsible for the supervision of
the work in progress. All that belongs to the department of the
shipbuilder, as distinguished from the naval architect, should be
placed in the hands of the master shipwrights of the dockyards.
The Controller, in truth, is an overworked officer. He is re-
sponsible for the designs and equipments of ships in construction,
for the maintenance of ships in reserve, and the repairs of ships in
commission. It is a mistake to add to this immense mass of work
the internal management of each dockyard. As the engineer is to
the contractor for the railway, so the Controller should be to the
principal professional officer in each dockyard.
Before any new work is begun, an estimate of the cost of building
or repairing a ship, according to the plans approved by the Controller,
should be obtained from the dockyard where it is proposed that the
work should be done. This estimate should be most carefully
scrutinised by the Controller, and modified where necessary. The
modifications, unless a special protest be made, should be considered
as having been accepted by the dockyard officers, who would be
responsible for any excess of cost beyond the revised estimate. This
suggestion is borrowed from the practice of contractors for public
works, whose preliminary estimates are generally made by the
member of their staff who, if his tender be accepted, would be
entrusted with the immediate supervision of the contract.
CONTROLLERSHIP OF THE NAVY.
23
Under the system suggested, Parliament would no longer be
asked to vote a certain number of men to be employed in the dock-
yards, thereby most unwisely interfering with the discretion of those
who alone are competent to determine the amount of labour required.
Parliament, instead of voting a fixed number of men, should vote
the supplies necessary according to the estimate of the Controller
for carrying out a definite amount of work. We now say there shall
be so many men, and we assume, though it by no means follows, that
we may therefore reckon on the completion of the programme of
work within the financial year.
The Admiralty interfere far too much in the details of dockyard
management. They determine the number of artificers to be
employed and the work on which every man is to be engaged. All
promotions, even among the humblest grades of artizans, require
their sanction. Every day's work in a dockyard depends more or
less upon the directions received by the morning's mail from
Whitehall. Hence it is that the correspondence at the Admiralty
has become so voluminous, that important papers are forgotten, and
innumerable letters signed by persons who are totally ignorant of
their contents.
Leaving the duties of the Naval Superintendents, as the local
representatives of the Admiralty and the naval service, substantially
unchanged, let us pass from the dockyards to the supervision of the
ships in reserve. I propose that the fleet in reserve should be
divided into subdivisions. The number of vessels composing a
subdivision should be kept within moderate limits, and a professional
officer should be appointed to take charge of each subdivision, whose
duty it should be to make himself minutely acquainted, by continual
surveys, with the condition of every ship placed under his superin-
tendence. Had such a staff as I have proposed been in existence
before the ‘Megæra' was lost, a Royal Commission would not have
been necessary in order to ascertain who was responsible for that
disaster.
The manipulation of details must rest with the Naval Department,
but I would venture to hazard the opinion that eight surveyors,
three at Portsmouth, three at Devonport, and two at Sheerness,
would, under the direction of the Controller, be able to keep them-
selves accurately informed of the condition of every available ship
in the Navy. Objection may be raised to the expense of such a
staff, but if we assume that the salary of the Surveyors of the Navy is
fixed at 1,0001. a year, the annual expenditure on the additional staff
would not exceed two per cent. on the cost of our largest ironclads.
24
DOCK YARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
.
Speaking generally, the surveyors would perform, under the
directions of the captains of the same reserve, the same duties which
are now undertaken by the shipwright officers of the dockyards; but
inasmuch as the latter are at present confessedly overworked, there
is reason to hope that the Navy would be better managed if they
were relieved of a portion of their duties.
Once more I say in conclusion, extreme centralisation is the
principal cause of dockyard mismanagement. To high Parliamentary,
and perhaps to our permanent officials also, the surrender of a portion
of their authority may be an unwelcome change, but they ought to
recognise the necessity for the sacrifice.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
THOMAS BRASSEY.
PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES.
SECTION II.
DOCKYARD ADMINISTRATION.
SPEECHES DELIVERED IN PARLIAMENT.
t
FEBRUARY 25, 1873. APRIL 30, 1874.
Reprinted from ' Hansard,' with additional quotations.
26
DOCK YARDS ANI) NAVAL ORGANISATION,
SPEECH ON MOVING AN AMENDMENT TO MR. SEELY'S
MOTION ON ADMIRALTY ADMINISTRATION.
In the House of Commons, February 25, 1873.
MOTION made, and Question proposed : That this House, in order
to remedy certain defects in the administration of the Admiralty,
recommends the Government to take into consideration the propriety
of administering that department by means of a Secretary of State;
and further, of appointing to the offices of Controller and of Superin-
tendent of Her Majesty's Dockyards persons who possess practical
knowledge of the duties they have to discharge, and also of altering
the rule which limits their tenure of office to a fixed term of years.'
-(Mr. Seely).
MR. BRASSEY : The Motion of the hon. Member for Lincoln
refers to two separate departments of naval administration-namely,
the organisation of the office of the Admiralty, and the management of
the dockyards. The Amendment which he (Mr. Brassey) had placed on
the Paper referred to the former subject only; but, inasmuch as the
management of the dockyards was by far the more important and
difficult problem of the two, he proposed to apply himself mainly to
that branch of the subject.
Good administration in dockyards could never be secured except
by appointing competent men to manage them on the spot, with
plenary powers to carry out, according to their own judgment, the
instructions received from the Admiralty. The managers of dock-
yards should be held individually responsible for failure in the
performance of their duties, and receive a liberal recognition for
faithful service. Having seen how vain the attempt has been to
manage the dockyards from Whitehall, he could not but turn for
guidance to his father's experience, which showed that a business,
almost as large and complicated as that of the Admiralty itself,
could be managed with success, by the delegation of the responsibility
of local administration to well-selected agents.
Local
responsi-
bility.
DOCKYARD ADMINISTRATION,
27
Since he had the privilege of addressing the House on this Lessons
subject, the loss of the "Megæra' had furnished another convincing loss of the
proof of the entire dependence of the central office on the local ‘Megæra.?
officers in the dockyards. Mr. Reed, in his evidence before the
Megæra' Commission, disavowed any intention to undertake the
supervision of 750 ships from Whitehall. "He did not consider that
it had been any part of the Chief Constructor's duty to be responsible,
or to see even that the master shipwrights did their work thoroughly.
A master shipwright was the highest shipbuilding and repairing
officer belonging to the Admiralty, and the office of the Chief
Constructor and his staff was only that of adviser to the Admiralty
i on professional questions relating to that work. His own opinion
was that, if any action were taken, which tended to weaken the
responsibility of the dockyard officers, and to place the care of the
ships in the Admiralty office, for every mishap that we now had in
the Navy we should have a hundred afterwards.
Mr. Barnaby expressed a similar opinion. Sir Spencer Robinson
took the same view: When,' he said, ' you put a man at the top of
his profession as a master shipwright, you put the greatest possible
confidence in him; you take such steps as you can to remind him of
the importance of the work he has to perform, and any further inter-
ference would be disastrous to the best interests of the public service.'
From what class, then, are the managers to be selected? A Admiral
Superiu-
naval officer of the highest rank must be at the head of the dockyard, tendent
but for good workmanship and economy we must look to the
professional officers of the yards. Whenever Admiral Superin- officers.
tendents have been before Commissions on dockyard management,
they have universally declined to accept any responsibility either as
to expenditure or workmanship, alleging that the professional officers
were solely responsible. But if this be the case, the nominal
responsibility of the Admiral for the internal econoiny of the dock-
yards, and the practice of requiring him to affix his signature to
every document relating to shipbuilding, must be prejudicial to the
public service. The great changes recently carried out in naval
administration seem to have left this serious evil untouched. In
his evidence before the 'Megæra' Commission, Mr. Andrew Murray
said that while the Admiral or Captain Superintendent was neces-
sary in a dockyard as a head, he should not be concerned in its
details, or in the management of the men. But, unfortunately,' he
said, “it is the case with the rules now—and they seem to be
attempting to go further in that direction--that they take the power
out of the hands of the principal departmental officers.'
and pro-
fessional
28
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Lord
Clarence
Paget,
April 3,
1865.
1
Mr. Reed urged very strongly a similar criticism: The ship-
building officers in the Admiralty have not,' he said, 'any power of
controlling a dockyard, and if the result of this inquiry should be to
establish an arrangement by which they should be authorised and
enabled to look after the ships, I would consider it to be a very
happy result.' Mr. Reed further expressed an opinion that “the
naval officer should be consulted on all parts of the ship which relate
to his professional work, but the want of a definition of the ship-
builder's duties, and of the naval officer's duties, worked very great
mischief, and a great change in that respect was necessary.
The following observations on the same subject by Lord Clarence
Paget in the House of Commons on April 3, 1865, are here in-
serted :
* There, are, no doubt, many arguments in favour of appointing
scientific civilians to superintend dockyards; but the business of the
dockyards is not confined to shipbuilding. I believe I may say that
building forms the smallest portion of the business. There are the
numerous details which sailors alone can criticise and determine
upon. Moreover, if you were to put your dockyards into the hands
of a civilian, you would have the captains wanting their ships altered
and fitted ; and it is well known that captains ask for a great many
little things, which it would be extravagance to grant, and which a
civilian would grant, because it is only a superior naval officer who
can decide what is really necessary to be done to the ship.'
In a dockyard, the Superintendent must always be required, as
the local representative of the Admiralty; and his experience afloat-
the more recent that experience the better-would enable him to
exercise a most beneficial supervision over the equipment of the
ships. But these duties were entirely distinct from those involved
in the internal management of the yard. The responsibility for all
details should be with the professional officers, and it should be re-
cognised by an adequate position, and by allowing a larger share of
authority in matters of discipline and promotion.
Pay and
Having agreed that we want the best shipbuilders in the country
position of
professional as managers of dockyards, we had now to consider what steps should
be taken to induce the most qualified men to enter the public
service. Thë pay should be gradually raised. Owing to the in-
sufficiency of the salaries, we were continually losing some of the
most valuable subordinate shipbuilding officers in the dockyards.
The surveyors at Lloyd's were almost all obtained from the
dockyards. Large salaries were not the only means of making the
employment attractive. The relative rank of the professional officer
officers.
DOCKYARD ADMINISTRATION.
29
statt.
should be considered. The civil manager of each dockyard should
have adequate relative rank. He should rank with, but after, a rear-
admiral, or at least with, but after, a post-captain. Again, honorary
distinctions had never of late been bestowed, though meritorious
services in the dockyards gave as good claim to the Order of the
Bath as the work in any department of the Civil Service of the
Crown. The same neglect of our great naval shipbuilders was not
manifested in former days, when Sir William Sepping and Sir
William Rule were distinguished—and very properly so—by some
mark of the favour of their Sovereign. That men of so much ability
as some of the present master shipwrights should be induced to
remain in the public service, was a clear proof how easily the Govern-
ment might make such employment attractive.
The professional officers should not be promoted workmen. Men Recruit-
promoted from the ranks often show that melancholy dread of professional
responsibility which was so painfully exhibited in the “Megæra '
inquiry. Sir Spencer Robinson gave a strong opinion on this subject
when he said that, “ knowing the timidity, and the sort of want of
straightforwardness which belong to the class from which many of
those officials were sprung, he' considered that, being aware that
they had committed an oversight, the whole of their evidence was
untrustworthy.
Sometimes the most suitable officer might be appointed from a
private establishment, but as a general rule he would be found
among the subordinates trained in the service. Occasionally a naval
officer might have had an opportunity of showing a special fitness
for the post.
Having made a happy choice of a fit person, it remained to con- Superior
sider what modifications might be desirable in the duties of the be relieved
appointment. The correspondence should be materially reduced. of. formal
Sir W. Edmondstone told the “MegæraCommissioners that the
master shipwright was more occupied in office work than in the
practical part of his duty; and that he was completely dependent
on the assistant master shipwright and the foremen. The most
elaborate returns afford no security for economy. Immediate skilful
personal supervision over the labour employed and the conversion
of materials can alone secure economical administration. Every
master shipwright should be relieved of the duty of appending his
signature to documents which he signs as a mere matter of forrn.
A highly qualified confidential secretary should be assigned to every
master shipwright, who should be authorised to deal with all matters
of office routine. When a ship was to be built or repaired in the
duties.
**
30
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Personal
confidence.
dockyard, the master shipwright should be required to make a careful
examination of the work, and prepare his own estimate. If this
estimate were approved, and the work ordered, his name should be
inserted in the Naval Estimates, in a separate column, opposite the
figures for which he was responsible. This practice would tend
materially to create a sense of individual responsibility, which would
never be felt by officials who were allowed to screen themselves from
criticism behind the nominal authority of the Controller or Admiral
Superintendent.
The various suggestions which had been proposed could not be
adopted, unless the Admiralty placed implicit reliance on their staff.
Personal confidence between principal and agent could only be
established after many years of careful training and thorough trial
in subordinate positions. The head of a private business had the
means of putting his agents to such a test; but in the public service
under a Parliamentary system, where political and personal con-
siderations caused frequent changes, the same opportunity of long-
continued observation of the conduct of subordinates was rarely
given to a Minister at the head of a department. At the same time
he was convinced that the more we decentralised, the more vigorous
and economical our dockyard administration would be.
Among the illustrations which might be adduced to show the
evil effects of excessive concentration of authority at the Admiralty,
none could be more striking than the present arrangements for the
promotion of workmen. The events which were daily occurring
around us showed the difficulty of managing large bands of workmen.
The professional officers were responsible for workmanship and
economy in dockyards, and yet the artizans employed under their
directions were placed under the Admiralty Superintendent for the
regulation of discipline, while their promotion depended on the
approval of the Controller in London. The Controller could have
no knowledge of the individual merits of the workmen, but his
nominal intervention deprived the local officers of their legitimate
authority over the men. It was because the central authority had
no other means of testing the capabilities of the workmen that
recourse had been had to the plan of applying a literary test to
artizans who were candidates for promotion. The qualifications
required were manual skill and diligence; but inasmuch as the
central authority would not trust the local officers, the aspirant
workman was tested by examination papers, although it must often
happen that the most skilful artizan with the pen was the least
skilled in the use of the adze and the saw.
Promotion
of work-
men.
DOCKYARD ADMINISTRATION.
31
in pro-
gramme.
With regard to the tenure of office of the Superintendent, who Term of
was a temporary, and of the master shipwright, who was a permanent ment of
officer, if the latter were raised to the position of manager of the Summent-
yard, there seemed no reason why the present rules as to the
appointment of Admiral Superintendent should be changed.
Before finally quitting the subject of dockyard economy, he would changes
urge the importance of avoiding spasmodic and violent alterations in
the shipbuilding programme. The right hon. Member for Pontefract
had very wisely laid down a scheme for the production of a given
quantity of armoured and unarmoured ships each year. The number
of workmen, the supply of materials, the arrangement of the machinery,
must be regulated with reference to the amount of work proposed.
As regards the armoured ships, our policy must mainly depend on
the preparations of other Powers. The condition of foreign navies
was accurately known, and no important changes could be effected
suddenly, or without our knowledge. The unarmoured ships could
be rapidly produced whenever required, both in public and private
yards. A large staff of workmen would not therefore appear to be
necessary for the sole purpose of building vessels of that class,
thongh enough must always be retained to undertake repairs of the
fleet.
Encouragement was much wanted, both for workmen and sub- Rewards
officers--such as foremen. A percentage on profits was inadmis- forework-
sible; neither could a percentage on savings be proposed without
the risk of important work being scamped. But a distribution of
gratuities to deserving workmen, on the satisfactory completion of
any difficult work, might be a valuable stimulus to exertion.
He would now say a few words on the government of the Navy Board of
by a Board. He had on a former occasion supported without
Admiralty
a motion very similar to that now introduced. Further consideration
had induced him to withdraw from his former position. The inquiry
held before the Duke of Somerset's Commission, and the strongly
expressed opinions of Sir John Hay, Sir Frederick Grey, Sir Alex-
ander Milne, and Sir Sydney Dacres, had convinced him that he
was ill-advised in advocating the dissolution of the Board. When
the First Lord was--as it usually happens--a civilian, it must be
right that he should have an opportunity of hearing more than one
opinion on a controverted naval question. It must also be well that
all the members of the Board should have a general knowledge of
the proceedings of the Admiralty. Again, in matters of patronage
it must be undesirable that a Minister should be entirely dependent
on a single adviser. The Navy was a scattered service. Only a
reserve
32
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
certain number of officers could have served under the personal
observation of one individual, and it must be impossible for an
Admiral to place the same confidence in officers he has never seen in
service, which he feels in those who have been under his own
command. The presence of other officers at the council table of the
First Lord would secure fair consideration for the claims of those
who were not personally known to the First Sea Lord. It did not
follow that the advice of the Board should impair the authority of
the First Lord. In commercial life many boards were governed by
the chairman with autocratic power. How much more easy must
it be to secure a similar supremacy at the Admiralty, where the
authority of the First Lord was effectually protected, both by usage
and by the influence due to those personal qualifications, without
which he would not have been selected to fill such an important
post! The charms, too, of antiquity are universally recognised in
an ancient country; and if by wisdom in practice all that is
objectionable in point of form could be effectually remedied, it
would not be wise to make a change on theoretical grounds. At
the Admiralty, as in other departments of the Government, 'that
which was best administered was best.' The hon. gentleman con-
cluded by moving the amendment of which he had given notice.
Amendment proposed, To leave out the words Secretary of
State, in order to insert the words a Board of Admiralty with
such modifications of constitution and procedure as experience has
shown to be desirable,-(Mr. Brassey),--instead thereof.
Question proposed, “That the words “Secretary of State” stand
part of the question.
T)OCKYARD ADMINISTRATION.
33
OBSERVATIONS IN COMMITTEE OF SUPPLY ON
NAVY ESTIMATES,
April 30, 1874.
Republished as a Memorandum with additional quotations.
chen.
The proper attitude which should be taken by the political critic Naval ex-
in reference to naval matters was well described by Mr. Goschen, not a party
in his speech on naval administration, addressed to the citizens of Mr. Gog-
London, at the Fishmongers' Hall :-
"We have a profession which has come down through centuries,
animated by the traditions which have clustered around it in the
history of our country, and those who are connected with the force
know that to them is committed indeed a high trust of which any
man might be proud, and I have felt that, whether in office or out
of office, it would be my duty to do what I could on behalf of the
force. The words "out of office” may not be without their signi-
ficance at the present moment. One can do something when one
is in office. I think that those know little of the constitution and
habits of this country who do not know that out of office also a
great deal may be done. I will venture to say something upon this
occasion that I would not have said during the three years during
which it has been my duty to administer the affairs of the Navy, and
it is this—that the conduct of affairs connected with the Navy no
doubt becomes more and more difficult in proportion as those
functions are performed in the full glare of light, which the press
and the criticism of the public of the present day bring to bear upon
every detail of the administration. I have never made this a cause
of complaint, and do not make this a cause of complaint at this
moment; but much passes which tends, though those who produce
this effect do not intend it, to weaken the authority of the Admiralty
and those who are bound to preserve the discipline of the Navy; and
attempts are sometimes made which cause a kind of separate feeling
VOL. IV.
D
3.
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
between the Admiralty and the officers of the Navy. I deplore any-
thing of this kind; for nothing is more important than that con-
fidence should exist between those who administer the force and
the force itself. The duties of a civilian connected with the Navy,
as I have always thought, were very delicate and peculiar, but I
always thought it was his duty to understand and master them, so
as to be the organ of the feeling of the services in the House of
Parliament, in the same way as it is his duty to let the profession
know what is the feeling of Parliament, as representatives of the
great body of taxpayers by whom the services are supported. It is
the duty, I think, of those who are in opposition, and I shall
endeavour to perform the duty, to maintain the authority of the
central power, and to show that that authority is intact, and, above
all, not to attempt to make a party battle-field of the great services
of the country. Everyone who has had to administer a great
service will have learnt much; and I trust the lessons I have learnt
will not be entirely thrown away. It will be my pleasure if I have
to discharge that duty in opposition to remember the interests of
that great profession with which I have been identified for some
time, and to show that no feeling of party, no rivalry, and no political
considerations could induce me, or anyone over whom I can exercise
any influence, to do that which would decrease the power of this
country as regards her Navy. It would be indeed a bad thing for
one set of politicians to cry down the ships built by another party
and vice versâ, because in that case the country would come to the
conclusion that there were no ships worth having.'
The average yearly expenditure for the ten years previous to
1869 was 11,587,0411., and for the next five years 9,785,9151. Expe-
rience had proved that the earlier estimates of the late Administration
did not make adequate provision for the repairs of ironclads and
the construction of a sufficient number of unarmoured vessels.
No real economy could be obtained in dockyard and naval
administration without observing the principle of an equable rate:
of expenditure. In an essay on work and wages he had drawn
attention to the fact that in 1865, when there was great pressure
on the labour market, and wages reached a point at which they
had never stood before, the shipwrights at Sheerness were content
to work at 4s. 6d. a day when they could have obtained 6s. 6d. at
many shipbuilding establishments on the banks of the Thames.
They preferred more moderate wages with a certainty of employment
to higher wages without such certainty.
The efficiency of the labour in Her Majesty's yards was ac-
Uniformity
in the ex-
penditure
necessary
to econo-
my.
Steady em-
ployment
reduces
wages.
Wages.
Mr. Stans-
feli, 1864.
.
DOCKYARD ADMINISTRATION.
35
knowledged by Mr. Stansfeld, in a speech delivered in the House
of Commons on March 14, 1864.
* The greater bustle of the private dockyards is due partly to
the greater crowding. The shipwrights there receive seven shillings
per day; in Her Majesty's dockyards they receive from four to six
shillings, and sixpence for superannuation. ..
The body of men in the dockyards are of great value in times
of pressure, with the piece-work system.'
The introduction of the piece-work system into the dockyards Piece work
has been recommended, on the ground that the payment of labour by
results is the most effective guarantee of efficiency and economy
of
production. The 'witnesses from the dockyards, who have been
examined by Parliamentary Committees, have frequently given evi-
dence in this sense.
Mr. Thomas Ingram, Clerk of the Works at the Royal William Mr.
Ingram.
Victualling Yard, Plymouth, reporting on the organisation of his
department to the Earl of Camperdown, gave the results of his
experience as follows:--
“Having been connected with Government works for the long
period of upwards of forty years, I have witnessed many changes
during that time in the mode of doing the work ; and I have no
hesitation in saying that the works have never been done more
economically or more satisfactorily than at present, under the con-
tract system. The only thing to guard against is the increase of
day-work; for there is no question that day-work, in any department
of the public service, is more expensive than work by measurement;
and my experience teaches me that men employed on day work
generally feel but little interest in expediting it.
Work done on the contract system, as at present, is preferable
to a return to the former system of hiring a number of artificers
and labourers, and attaching them to the establishments under the
control of others, to do the work.'
In spite of the disadvantageous conditions, from the strictly
economical point of view, which inevitably result from payment by
time rather than by piece-work, we have the testimony, not only
of parliamentary officials, but of men of great practical experience, to
the effect that the work in the dockyards is executed at a fair price.
Mr. Laird, when examined before the Select Committee of the Cheapness
House of Commons on Admiralty Moneys and Accounts, gave some dock yards.
important evidence on the subject :
'I should say that the dockyard wages are lower than in many
private yards-certainly than in those of London and Liverpool.
of labour in
Mr. Laird.
D 2
36
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Dismissals
of work-
men,
* And they obtain these men at lower wages, because they hold
out the prospect of pensions and continuous employment ?—Yes; it
is a very great inducement to men to work at lower wages. At the
different dockyards there are a great number of men, their sons, and
their grandsons, who get into the same employment because of the
pensions. I consider that a private firm has to pay the current rate
of wages of the time, and of course pays a higher rate generally
than is paid in the dockyards, because of the pensions to dockyard
servants."
Hasty dismissals of workmen from the dockyards should therefore
be avoided as tending to impair the confidence of permanancy, but
it did not follow that the reduction of the numbers of established men
was impolitic. If the number of men on the establishment were
unduly increased, the dockyards might be encumbered with many
useless people, against whom no definite charges could be made, and
who could not therefore be got rid of.
The Liberal administration having been frequently charged with
inconsistent conduct in relation to the dockyard workmen, the answer
of Mr. Childers to these charges, as contained in his speech to his
constituents at Pontefract, on the occasion of the dissolution of
Parliament, in 1874, may here be inserted.
When I took office at the Admiralty I found that the administra-
tion of it bad for many years been feeble and vacillating. I found
that there were two great evils which were destroying the efficiency
of Her Majesty's Navy, those obstacles being an enormous number
of officers—far more than could possibly be employed—and the
scattered condition of the fleet all over the world. In 1867 the
number of men employed in the dockyards was increased by some
1,400, and between February and July, 1868, the number of men
was reduced by more than 4,600, 4,300 of whom were discharged
without either pension or gratuity. I found that the late Board of
Admiralty, after having proceeded to an unprecedented extent in the
building of ships, suddenly came to the resolution to build no more
ships. I introduced a system of perfect responsibility, in the first
place; in the second place, I determined to deal with the immense
list of officers. I found that there were some 7,900 officers of all
ranks employed in sea service, and something like 1,100 civil officers
employed on shore-in all, some 9,000 officers. Before I had left
the 9,000 had become 7,000; at the present time the number is
6,400.
In addressing his constituents at Woolwich on the same subject,
Mr. Gladstone said :—'I now come to a question of great local
Mr. Chil-
ders, 1874.
Mr. Glad-
stone.
DOCKYARD ADMINISTRATION.
37
interest to you, upon which an old controversy has been revived.
There is a gentleman named Liardet, whose address to you I have
the advantage of holding in my hand. He says he will always
oppose the miserable policy of cheeseparing, of which in this borough,
and especially in Woolwich and Deptford, you have had such pitiful
examples. Now, what is the fact with regard to this “ cheeseparing
economy?” The fact is this :—For once economy was practised by
a Conservative Government, and it was a Conservative Government
which practised the cheeseparing economy in Woolwich and Dept-
ford. I will recite to you again the facts which I recited to you at
Blackheath in 1871, and they are briefly these :-On January 1,
1868, the number of persons employed as labourers in the dock-
yards was 20,213. On December 1, 1868, which was the day I
was summoned to Windsor for the formation of a Government, the
number had been reduced from 20,213 to 15,954. It was further
reduced under the present Government from 15,954 to 14,511. The
result is that the reduction made by us was a reduction of 1,463,
and the reduction by those who came before us, by the friends of Mr.
Boord, was 4,359.'
Turning to the general condition of the Navy, the following ob-
servations of the Compiler are republished from Hansard's Reports :-
The slow progress in the construction of ships suggested in- Repairs
quiries as to whether it was possible to effect some economy in the mature
large expenditure on the repairs of the Navy. The decay of the boilers.
boilers in Her Majesty's ships involved a large expense, and he had
lately made an investigation with the view of ascertaining whether
there had been anything either in the construction or the mode of
using the boilers of our ironclads which had led to their premature
deterioration. From a recent return, it appeared that the Minotaur,
completed in 1867, and the Valiant,' in 1868, were now receiving
new boilers, and that the ‘Bellerophon,' completed in 1866, received
new boilers in 1870. In these cases the duration of the boilers was
decidedly inferior to the results obtained in the merchant service.
By the kindness of Mr. Burns, one of the owners of the ships of the
Cunard service, he was enabled to state the results obtained in two
steamers belonging to that company. The steamship “Russia* left
Liverpool on her first voyage on May 15, 1867, and in November
1872 completed her fifty-third voyage to and from New York. In
this service she had run 328,600 knots, and was then laid up for
repairs. Her boilers were lifted and retubed and the bottoms re-
newed, a new steam-chest and funnel were added, and her engines
were put in thorough working order, the whole being effected at a
from pre-
38
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Engineers
selected
from
private
trade.
total cost of 16,4441. She left Liverpool again in the following
March, and up to March last had performed ten additional voyages,
or 62,000 knots. The 'Scotia' left Liverpool on her first voyage to
New York in May 1862, and commenced her seventy-eighth trip in
April 1874, having in the interval run a distance of 483,600 knots.
It was found that the Cunard steamers required retubing after about
fifty voyages between Liverpool and New York, and the boilers were
then retubed, but not renewed in any other way. He questioned if
any such result had as yet been accomplished in a man-of-war.
Again he entertained some doubts as to whether the boilers of the
ships in reserve were as carefully preserved as they ought to be. It
was the practice, he believed, until a recent period, to get up steam
at least once a year in every ship in the reserve. He was informed
that such a plan was most detrimental to the boilers.
It remained to be considered whether the appointment and pro-
fessional instruction of the engineers of the Navy left anything to be
desired. It seemed to him that too many highly educated men were
employed in the engine-rooms of our men-of-war. Skilled mechanics
would perform the manual duties as well or better, and they would
not feel the social disadvantages of the junior grades of engineer
officers nor the same discontent at the want of promotion. A change
in this direction had recently been made with satisfactory results in
the United States Navy. There were in our service a class of engine-
room artificers. These men had become more and more essential on
board ships fitted with the complicated appliances introduced into
the later ironclads. They ought to be operative mechanics of the
highest class.
The system of introducing into the Navy engineers from the
private engine-building establishments had been abandoned. All our
engineer officers were now trained by the Government, and it was a
question whether that training was in all cases as practical as it ought
to be. He should be glad to see the opportunity still given to
the sons of employés in the dockyards to become engineers in the
Navy; but he should recommend that a certain proportion of the
appointments should be given to individuals coming with satisfactory
recommendations from the great engine-makers.
Engine-
room
artificers.
PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES.
SECTION III.
THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS
OF THE NAVY.
SPEECH DELIVERED IN PARLIAMENT,
AUGUST 1, 1879.
From ' Hansard's Reports,' with numerous additional quotations, and the
omission of references to salaries.
40
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION,
THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS OF THE NAVY.
August 1, 1879.
Responsi-
bility of
profes-
sional
officers.
MR. BRASSEY rose to call attention to the responsibilities, rank,
and emoluments of the professional officers in Her Majesty's naval
yards. He said the position of the constructive departments in our
dockyards was a most important question. If the constructors of
the Navy were inefficient our dockyard management would be a
failure, our ships would be too costly, or they would be badly built.
On these two cardinal points of cost and workmanship the construc-
tors were solely responsible. It was laid down in the well-known
memorandum prepared by Sir Spencer Robinson for the information
of the Duke of Somerset's Committee on the Board of Admiralty,
that the Superintendent was in no sense responsible for the quality
or the cost of the work done in the dockyards. He was the vehicle
through which orders passed from the Admiralty to the heads of
departments, but, if a work which ought to have been done for
10,0001. cost 16,0001. he was not called upon to account for this excess.
When a question was asked he directed the master-shipwright to
reply. All the naval superintendents who were examined by the
Dockyard Commissioners in 1860 took a similar view of their position.
It was obvious that the superintendent,' whose previous expe-
rience had been that of a sea officer, could not be held responsible
for the performance of duties which more properly belong to the
shipbuilder. The Controller of the Navy himself did not profess
to be a competent authority on professional questions. Sir Baldwin
Walker, after twelve years' service as Controller of the Navy, told
the Dockyard Commissioners that he was not a professional officer,
nor competent to give an opinion with reference to shipwrights.
Turning from the executive to the professional officers, Mr.
Saunders, the Chief Constructor at Chatham, stated in his evidence
before the Committee on the Store Department, in 1876, that the
superintendent of the yard was responsible for the general manage-
Sir
Baldwin
Walker,
M2
Saunders
THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS OF THE NAVY.
41
Hall.
ment, for the maintenance of discipline, and for the distribution of
the various Admiralty orders to the heads of departments. His
naval experience was valuable in determining questions as to the
fittings and internal arrangements of the ships under construction;
but the professional officers were responsible for the quantity and
quality of the work performed. Only recently, the Captain Superin-
tendent had very properly observed, in supporting his position, that
if there were any failure in carrying out the programme of works,
it was he who should be held responsible.
The saving in the cost of the 'Iron Duke' and other vessels, for Admiral
which Admiral Hall claimed great credit for Pembroke Dockyard,
was ‘attributed by that gallant officer solely to the attention and
skill of the professional men. Admiral Chamberlain confirmed the
view taken by Admiral Hall. When asked whether he held himself
responsible for the economy with which a ship was built, and for
seeing that a ship was completed within the estimates sent down
from the Constructor's Department, he replied that he could not
say he considered himself strictly responsible. An account of the
expenditure on each ship was brought to him every week, for his
information, and if anything appeared to him unsatisfactory, he
questioned the Chief Constructor on the subject.
The inquiry into the loss of the Megæra ' brought out distinctly
the sole responsibility of the professional officers for advising the
Captain Superintendent, and through him the Board of Admiralty,
as to the seaworthiness of a ship for any voyage or service that she
was to undertake. He wished to disclaim any desire to see the
naval superintendents of dockyards superseded by civilians. The Admiral.
argument in favour of naval superintendents was well put by Admiral Necessity
Hall, in his evidence before the Stores Committee. While admitting superin-
that a naval officer could not pretend to be a shipwright or an engi- tendents.
neer, he considered that he might be expected to possess other still
more important qualities, such as common sense, sound judgment,
and self-command. Being unconnected with any class in the dock-
yard, he is readily acknowledged by all as their superior. And as
he has to superintend the acts of officers of a good many different
professions, the fact that he has been familiar from his earliest years
with the article which the dockyards are employed to manufacture, viz.,
a ship, is a more useful general qualification than that he should pos-
sess the intimate acquaintance of an expert with any particular trade.
It was obviously most important that the constructors should be Admiral
qualified to bear the weight of responsibility thrown upon them. They Committee
should be men of education, technical knowledge and experience, and
for naval
Smart's
42
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
with ability to direct the labours of large bodies of men; and he
asked the House seriously to consider whether the rank and emolu-
ments of these officers were sufficient to command in all cases men
of the necessary qualifications for the public service.
Their position was the subject of very serious consideration on
the part of the Committee on Dockyard Economy, of which Admiral
Smart was the chairman. The report of Admiral Smart's Committee
was presented so long ago as 1860; but its suggestions are equally
applicable to the state of things now existing. The Committee
recommended that the status of the civil officers in dockyards should
be raised. They thought that the line between the employers and
the employed had been very indistinctly drawn, and that there had
been a tendency to class the chief professional officers among the
employed. They thought that the master shipwrights and chief
engineers should thenceforward be looked upon as commissioned
officers, and be considered as identified with the Adiniralty as the
directors or employers of the labour, and not with those who execute
the actual manual labour. A superior position in society, and a
superior education, would always have their weight, when placed in
a proper position. The views of the Committee would be confirmed
by our general experience of human nature. Respect for authority,
as it was truly said by Dr. Johnson, was more easily granted to one
whose father has had it than to an upstart. While on the one hand
deference was not so readily yielded by workmen to a chief promoted
from the ranks, as to an officer possessing greater social advantages, on
the other hand, officers not born to command were frequently afraid
of the responsibility of the position to which they had been raised.
The impressions drawn from their inquiry into the loss of the
Megæra' drew from the Commissioners some strong observations on
this point. They said: “We feel compelled to remark that we have
formed, however unwillingly, an unfavourable opinion as to the mode
in which the administration of Her Majesty's Dockyards is generally
conducted. The officers appear to us too often to have done no
more than each of them thought it was absolutely necessary to do,
following a blind routine in the discharge of their duties, and acting
almost as if it was their main object to avoid responsibility.
The defects in the regulations at present in force with reference
to the selection of men for the principal professional positions in the
dockyards, and the inadequacy of their position in the service, could
not be illustrated more clearly than in the observations addressed by
Mr. Oliver Lang, the able Master-Shipwright at Chatham, to the
Dockyard Commission of 1860,
Megæra'
Commis-
sion.
Mr. Oliver
Lung.
THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS OF THE NAVY.
43
Abethell
Barnes.
called
structor.
“I do not,' he said, ' myself object to a considerable infusion of
the working class, and their being allowed to rise to the highest
offices in the branch ; but, at the present time, it is not that, but it
is the shutting out of the sons of gentlemen entirely. No gentleman
can put his sons into it. I have five sons myself, and not one of
them have I the slightest intention of bringing up to my own profes-
sion in the service.'
Similar opinions had been elicited by Admiral Smart's Committee, Messrs.
from the dockyard officers whom they had examined. Both Mr. and Edye.
Abethell and Mr. Edye considered that men of higher education than
could be expected from a labourer brought up at the dockside ought
to be selected for the superior positions in the dockyards.
No substantial change had been made in the system of recruiting Mr.
officers for the Constructor's Department since Mr. Lang's evidence
was given. It was stated by Mr. Barnes, the Surveyor of Dockyards,
in his evidence before the Stores Committee, that the present master
shipwrights, in almost all cases, had been originally entered as
apprentices in the Dockyards. The master shipwright was now called Master -
shipwright
chief constructor; but his position was still subordinate in relative
rank to that of the master attendant. The head of the shipbuilding chief con-
department, who at Portsmouth had from 4,000 to 5,000 men under
him, was subordinate to the head of the rigging department, who
had at that dockyard 440 men under his orders. Sir Houston Sir
Stewart had very justly called attention to this anomaly; and
his opinion on this point might be received with the more ready
acceptance, because he was a strong advocate for the retention of
a naval officer at the head of every dockyard.
He had referred to the case of the Megæra,' as an example of Dockyard
the disasters that might occur from neglect of duty, but neglect of
duty in the form of omission to do a thing which ought to have been
done was happily a rare occurrence in Her Majesty's dockyards.
Extravagance and waste in going beyond the necessity of the case in
the matter of alterations and repairs were far more common,
and
had done nothing to encourage thrift and economy. The results
that necessarily followed had been pointed out and perhaps ex-
aggerated, not only by committees and commissions but by inde-
pendent critics of great authority. Those results were due to the
absence of any direct pecuniary interest in economising expenditure.
In his “Essay on Over-legislation,' Mr. Herbert Spencer said:-
Walk through a manufactory, and you see that the stern alter-
natives of contrivance or ruin dictate the saving of every penny.
Visit one of the national dockyards, and the complaints you make
Houston
Stewart.
extrava-
gance.
we
44
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Admiral
Smart's
on any glaring wastefulness are carelessly met. In all social agencies,
in which duty done and income gained do not go together, a like
indifference, or, it may be, corruption, is found, and is greater or less
in proportion as the dependence of income upon duty is remote.'
Admiral Smart's Committee had referred to this question in their
Committee
. report. They thought that too little regard had been paid to cost as
distinguished from workmanship, and they recommended that some
tangible mode should be provided by which any officer could be able
to claim the credit of public approbation for any economy to the
public service, which had been obtained by his good management.
Persons accustomed to administrative business would readily concur
in the observation of Lord Clarence Paget that 'where one dockyard
is found to conduct the business more economically than another, it
should be an understood thing that the officers of that yard, who had
by their attention to these important matters caused a saving of
public money, should be advanced--that encouragement should be
given to economy.”. Nothing, however, had been done to carry out
that suggestion. No instance had occurred of an officer having been
dismissed or suffering a loss of salary for extravagance, nor had any
officer been promoted or pecuniarily rewarded for economical ad-
ministration. When a ship of unprecedented dimensions and novel
design was successfully launched, it was the custom to give a paltry
gratuity to the chief constructor at the dockyard where the vessel
had been built; but the absence of any such encouragement as Lord
Clarence Paget recommended was apparent in the estimates which
are presented to the House from year to year.
Inequality There was no equitable principle in the amounts of the salaries
of salaries.
awarded to the chief constructors at the several yards. The chief
constructors at Portsmouth received 8501. for supervision over an
annual expenditure of 326,1911. on wages and probably an equal
amount on stores. The chief constructor at Pembroke had 7001. a
year for supervision over a body of men whose aggregate wages
amounted to 97,0001.
In connection with this subject he would call attention to the
strong representations which had been made by Admirals Hall,
Chamberlain, Fellowes, and Sir Cooper Key to the Committee on
Stores, as to the great importance of constant personal supervision of
the work in progress on the parts of the chief constructors in the
Pembroke. several dockyards. The success attained in Pembroke Dockyard in
building ships within the estimates had been exemplified in several
remarkable cases which were quoted by Admiral Hall. The
Penelope ? was the first ironclad ship' built at Pembroke. The
Personal
super-
vision.
THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS OF THE NAVY.
45
Chamber-
Fellowes.
estimate for her construction was 150,0001., the actual cost
146,0001. The estimate for the 'Inconstant' was 158,6891.; the
actual cost' 138,5851. The estimate for the Iron
Iron Duke' was
200,0001. the cost 146,0001. ; the expense of building the same ship
hy contract would have been 209,0001. These results he attributed
to the great care which the professional officers at Pembroke were
able to bestow on their work from having time enough at their dis-
posal to give the requisite attention to the details of construction.
Admiral Chamberlain expressed a similar opinion. 'In all my Admiral
experience,' he said, 'I have never known a chief constructor who laiu.
had a moment to spare, and I have invariably lamented that he has
not had much more time to be out of doors, superintending the
workmen.
Admiral Fellowes made a strong representation on the same Admiral
subject. He said that it was imperative that the constructive duties
of the yard should receive more attention. There were at Chatham
3,800 men, who were working night and day, and there was only one
chief constructor and one constructor ; whereas under the old system
the work would have received the supervision of a chief constructor,
two constructors, and other officers, and this at a time when a
smaller number of men were employed, and the dockyard covered
only 90 acres instead of as at present 500 acres.
The efficiency of the local officers was the only guarantee for the Dismissals
for neglect
good administration of the dockyards. If a disaster occurred such as of duty.
the loss of the “ Megæra, or the explosion on board the “ Thunderer,
the vials of Admiralty wrath were poured out in a cumbrous and
not very useful fashion in long minutes and pages of new instructions,
neither of these being really needed to explain the nature of their
duties to dockyard officers worthy of their positions. Dismissals
should be more frequent for flagrant neglect of duty, while ability
and fidelity in a very difficult and responsible public employment
should be generously rewarded.
According to the present practice, the officers of the yards had Estimates
prepared
but a small share in the preparation of the estimates. Admiral
Foley, being questioned on this point by the Stores Committee, said ralty.
that he had nothing more to do with the preparation of the estimates
than meeting the Controller of the Navy at the yard and talking
over what the work for the ensuing year was to be. From Sheerness
yard they simply sent up an account of the amount of work to be
done, and the estimates for carrying out the programme were made
in the Controller of the Navy's department. Admiral Hall made a
similar statement, adding that when a ship is ordered to be built, the
at Admi-
16
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Local esti-
mates.
Controller of the Navy informs the dockyard that for material and
labour a certain sum has been allowed to be expended.
With the view of strengthening the sense of responsibility in the
dockyard officers, for cost as well as workmanship, he would propose
that, whenever it was contemplated to build a ship in a particular
dockyard, the Chief Constructor should be called upon to prepare an
estimate of the cost. That estimate should be revised at the Admiralty,
and when an agreement had been finally established between the
Admiralty and their local officers as to the amount of the estimate, the
figures should be bracketed, in the next Navy Estimates, with the
name of the dockyard officer who was responsible for them. A spirit
of emulation would thus be encouraged between the different yards,
while bad workmanship might be prevented by the frequent super-
vision of an Admiralty surveyor. The work, in short, should be
carried on in the same way as if the Admiralty were a shipowner,
who had let a contract for the construction of a ship to a shipbuilder,
and paid for the work done on the certificate of one of Lloyd's
surveyors.
He had already explained that, in offering these suggestions, he
did not advocate any sudden change in the present form of dockyard
administration. He quite appreciated the reluctance of the First
Lord to give large salaries to officers with whose qualifications he
must be imperfectly acquainted. This difficulty would, however,
become sensibly lessened now that the Admiralty had reorganised
the staff of the Constructor's Department, and made the professional
appointments in the dockyards and at Whitehall interchangeable.
It should be considered a promotion to a chief constructor, who had
been working under the eye of the superior officers of the Navy, to
be taken froin Whitehall and appointed to a dockyard.
The organisation of the French Constructive Department had
sional stuff. been referred to by the hon. member for Nottingham in his speech
of last session on our shipbuilding policy. It was equally worthy of
examination in connection with the points to which he now called
attention. The French professional officers held a higher relative
rank than we had accorded to our constructors. The 'Ingénieurs
de la Marine’ were selected from the 'Ecole Polytechnique,' and
their promotion was secured by an appropriate gradation of ranks
corresponding with those established in the executive branch of the
Navy. The staff included an inspector-general, who ranked with
but after a vice-admiral. He resided in Paris and made periodical
visits to the ports. Under him were eleven directors of naval
construction, all ranking immediately after a rear-admiral in the
French
profes-
THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS OF THE NAVY.
47
French Navy but before a captain. At the ports the constructive
departments were represented by an inspector-in-chief of the naval
administrative services, who was charged in the name of the Minister
of Marine with the supervision of all the professional work in the
dockyards. The inspector was subordinate in rank to the Préfet
Maritime, who was a vice-admiral, but in the discharge of his duties
he acted under the orders received from the Minister of Marine and
corresponded directly with him. The constructive staff for the
English Navy should be selected from the Academy at Woolwich.
They would receive their special training at Greenwich, and at the
dockyards. They should have an honorary relative rank, like that
which was given in the Corps of Naval Architects in the French
Navy, and be entitled to the privilege of wearing a civil uniform.
The criticisms of foreigners were often most suggestive. M. Xavier
Raymond, formerly a frequent contributor on naval subjects to the
pages of the Revue des Deux Mondes, made the following remarks
in his volume entitled Les Marines de la France et de l'Angleterre :
'By an anomaly most remarkable the administration of the
Navy is conducted by a Board, and that Board is selected almost
exclusively from one only of the numerous specialities which must
be combined in order to constitute a naval establishment. Of the
six individuals who form the Board, two are members of Parliament,
and do not belong to the Navy. The four others are naval officers.
The administrative branches, works, and buildings, naval construc-
tion, gunnery, health are rigorously excluded.
As for the constructors in the ports, if their salaries were not
inadequate, they occupied a position of inferiority in relation to
the executive branches unworthy of the talent and the services of
several of their number. The result was that certain individuals,
and those perhaps the most distinguished, have left the service.
The name of Mr. Reed is, quoted as a prominent example.'
In the German Navy, a special staff of officers, entitled Engineers German
profes-
of the Navy,' had been formed, to superintend the construction of sional staff.
ships and machinery, and the engineering works of the dockyards.
This staff was divided, according to their respective duties, into
three classes, charged with the construction of ships, the construction
of machinery, and engineering works. A regular gradation of ranks
had been established, at the head of which are the directors, eight
in number. The subordinate ranks include eleven engineers-in-
chief, twenty-three engineers, and twenty-two sub-engineers.
It may be convenient to introduce the following historical review Schools of
of the various efforts to establish an effective system of training for architec-
naval
ture.
48
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Daval architects in connection with the Navy, taken from a paper
published in the Annual of Naval Architecture, 1874, entitled
* Three English Schools of Naval Architecture:'--
* Until the beginning of the present century no attempt was
made in this country to provide systematic and thorough professional
training for naval architects. Indeed, the Commission of Naval
Revision of 1806 recorded the opinion that the highest officers then
responsible for the design and construction of the vessels of the
Royal Navy were, as a body, sadly ignorant of the theory of naval
architecture, and lacking in general education. Such was the con-
dition of things in this country sixty years after Bouguer, in his
famous Traité du Navire, had outlined the great principles which
still govern the practice of the naval architect. No wonder, therefore,
that the Report of the Commission led to the attempt to remove
this blot upon our fame as a maritime people by the establishment
at Portsmouth of the first School of Naval Architecture. This
school was opened at the commencement of 1811, and was conceived
in the grandest spirit, at least so far as the building was concerned,
for over 30,0001. are said to have been expended on its erection.
The school thus founded remained in operation for more than
twenty years, but only trained about forty students. It was intended
exclusively for the education of a higher class of apprentices, who
were guaranteed appointments to important offices in the Royal
Dockyards on the satisfactory completion of their course ; and it was
an experiment in a direction which has always found favour with
many persons who consider it preferable to provide candidates for
the higher professional offices from the better-placed and more
liberally-educated classes. The artisan class was not expected or
desired to supply students to this school, and only the lower grades
of promotion were left open to their ambition. This is not the place
to discuss the wisdom of such a policy ; it must suffice to state the
facts, and to add that the expectations of the students were so badly
realised, that a large proportion of them quitted the Government
service before many years had elapsed. Amongst the best known of
Dr. Inman's pupils must be named Mr. Isaac Watts, late Chief Con-
structor of the Navy. Messrs. Reade, Chatfield, and. Creuze, also
attained a prominent position by their Reports on Naval Construc-
tion, and designs for sailing ships of various classes. The school
was closed by Sir James Graham, when First Lord of the Admiralty,
in 1832.
The second School of Naval Architecture was opened at Ports-
mouth in 1848. The Rev. Joseph Woolley was the Principal. Quite
THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS OF THE NAVY,
49.
a different policy was pursued from that followed in 1811 for the
first school. Entry to the new school was made contingent upon
merit, not upon birth or connection ; instead of introducing a hard-
and-fast division between classes and shutting out the lower from
advanced training, or the prospect of promotion to the highest posts,
all candidates were placed upon an equal footing. Those apprentices
who by their progress in the studies of the dockyard schools, and
by their position on the examination lists, proved themselves best
adapted for receiving the higher education, were selected to receive
it, and subsequent experience has proved that, to say the least,
nothing has been lost by this change of policy. It was accompanied,
however, by another change which seems more open to question-
there was no promise of after-appointinent to positions such as
those for which the education of the students best fitted them.
The second school had a brief existence. Sir James Graham, ,
whose conduct had the merit of consistency, if questionable in
other respects, closed it also after it had been at work for about five
years, and had trained some score of students; and for the second
time an end was put to the hopes of efficient training for naval
architects. Among Dr. Woolley's pupils were. Mr. Reed and Mr.
Barnaby.
“Ten years elapsed after the closing of this school before another
attempt was made to provide for the education of English naval
architects. The great features of the new scheme were decided
upon early in 1864, and the necessary funds were provided in the
Estimates for 1864-65. Objections were, of course, raised in certain
quarters, but they were met without difficulty, and Parliamentary
approval was obtained. The course of instruction was settled by Mr.
Reed, acting on behalf of the Admiralty, and Dr. Woolley and
Captain Donnelly, acting on behalf of the Lords of the Council ; their
labours being greatly assisted by the suggestions of the Council of
the Institution of Naval Architects, whose advice was asked for
respecting the course of study for private pupils.
• Dr. Woolley was appointed as the Inspector-General, under whose
direction the studies were to be conducted; and no better guarantee
could have been given that these studies would be both thorough
and extensive, his previous experience at Portsmouth and his
eminence as an authority on the theory of naval architecture
peculiarly fitting him for the post. Mr. Merrifield was appointed
Principal, Mr. Purkiss (the Senior Wrangler of that year) became
Vice-Principal, and the instructorships in Chemistry, Shipbuilding,
Engineering, Drawing, &c., were well filled. And so on November 1,
VOL. IV.
E
50
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
tugineer
students.
1864, was commenced under the most promising auspices the third
English School of Naval Architecture.
• As regards the purpose for which this higher training was given,
the Admiralty Circular announcing the formation of the school was
not very precise, simply stating that it was hoped by this means to
obtain a superior class of officers for the dockyards and the Engineer
Department of the Navy. The students were, in fact, cautioned
against regarding any superior position as guaranteed to them by
their appointment to the school; their future was to be determined
in acccordance with their merits. The engineer students having
been originally entered with the view of being trained for after-
employment in the Navy, of course knew the worst that could happen
to them; but the naval architects knew absolutely nothing of their
probable employment after leaving the school until a precedent had
been created by the appointments of the first set of students who
completed their course. On the other hand, the students were at
first under no legal obligation to remain in the service of the
Admiralty; and of this freedom not a few have since availed them-
selves, accepting higher and more lucrative appointments in private
establishments.
"That sufficient work to utilise the training of all the Admiralty
students can be found at the Admiralty, in the dockyards, the Navy,
and elsewhere, is certain; that it is advantageous and economical to
utilise their acquirements as fully as possible cannot be denied; but
that the Government service has not hitherto offered sufficient
inducements for such men to remain is evident from the fact that no
less than seven naval architects and an equal number of engineers
have voluntarily quitted it and entered other employment.'
The subjoined extract from the report of the Secretary for
1877–78 will indicate the plans in contemplation on the part of the
naval administration at Washington :
One disadvantage under which the Government has laboured in
building ships has been occasioned by its neglect to educate its
shipbuilders.
It is believed that we should soon be supplied with a sufficient
number of competent naval constructors by selecting them from the
young men who enter the Naval Academy and show an aptness or
predilection for mathematical and mechanical studies. There are
many who enter there whose natural taste lies in this direction, and
to whom such studies would be more attractive than those purely
nautical. They enter the Navy for life, and have to be provided
for by the Government. If, therefore, a certain number of cadet-
Secretary
U.S.N.,
1877-78.
THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS OF THE NAVY,
51
midshipmen, willing or desirous of entering the corps of naval con-
structors, and most proficient in the studies before named, should
pursue, for two years at least, a course of study exclusively devoted
to the object to be attained, that is, to mathematics and their appli-
cation to mechanics, descriptive geometry, drawing, with kindred
subjects connected with their future profession, à corps of raval
architects, fully competent for planning and constructing the best
ships, would, in a few years, be supplied.'
He would venture to urge that the constructors of the Navy French
should be constituted as a distinct corps like the 'Ingénieurs de
training.
la Marine’ in France, and that we ought to have one or more naval
architects in every dockyard capable of preparing competitive designs
for new ships. In the French service the work of the central office
was limited to the specification of the qualities and the general
features of the new ships it was proposed to build. The programme
having been prepared at head quarters the dockyards were invited
to furnish competitive designs, and the most successful was selected.
That plan insured a wide development of ideas, and prevented the
shipbuilding of the Navy falling into a groove under the direction
of a single mind.
Turning from the dockyards to the Council of Construction. The Salaries.
responsibility for the design and construction of new ships and for
supplying those ships with proper machinery rested exclusively
with the civil members of the staff of the Controller of the Navy.
The Controllers themselves have on all occasions most fully acknow-
ledged their dependence on the aid of professional men.
It was on this ground that the abolition of the office of Controller Controller.
had been recommended by many naval authorities with extensive Frederick
Grey.
experience at the Admiralty. Sir Frederick Grey, in his evidence
before the Duke of Somerset's Committee, said that he should
recommend that the office of Controller should be abolished, and
the second Sea Lord put at the head of the dockyards and the
Constructive Department, the Chief Constructor being made principal
officer like the other principal officer. He rested his recommendations
on the ground that the naval head could not possibly look into the
details of the Constructor's business, that naval advice was more
valuable in laying down the requirements which any particular
design that might be called for ought to meet, and that the Con-
troller ought to be responsible for the design on which it was his
duty to advise the First Lord.
He had no desire to see changes suddenly introduced without
regard to the individual merits of the officers employed. He fully
Sir
E 2
52
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
appreciated the difficulties of the political heads of the Admiralty
in this matter. They might be excused if they hesitated to give
a very rapid advancement to officers of whose capacity they could
have but scanty personal knowledge. They would all agree, however,
that talent could only be attracted to the public service and retained
in it by offering positions worthy of acceptance. The Admiralty
might begin as opportunity offered by improving the position of
heads of departments at Whitehall. The case having been stated,
he would leave it with confidence to the experienced judgment and
mature consideration of the First Lord of the Admiralty and his
colleagues.
PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES,
SECTION IV.
ADMIRALTY ORGANISATION.
SPEECH IN PARLIAMENT ON THE MOTION OF MR. CORRY.
MARCH 18, 1872.
Reprinted from 'Flansard,' with additional quotations.
VOL, IV.
3
54
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
ADMIRALTY ORGANISATION,
MR. BRASSEY agreed with the right honourable gentleman the
Member for Tyrone in thinking that Parliament ought not to treat
the discussion of naval affairs as a party question. He earnestly de-
precated the introduction of party feeling into their deliberations on
naval affairs. We were too apt to condemn our administrators hastily
for trivial errors of judgment. It might therefore interest the House
to hear an opinion as to the condition of the English Navy which
had recently been expressed by Admiral Porter, and published with
the last report presented to Congress by the Secretary to the United
States Navy.
Admiral
Admiral Porter said :
-By referring to the list of ironclads of
l'orter,
foreign nations and comparing it with that of last year, you will
U.S.N., on
the state of perceive a large increase in that class of vessels. The fleet of Great
the Navy.
Britain in particular is most formidable. Never, in the history of
England, was she better prepared for war than at the present inoment
in ships, material, officers and men. That I know to be the case
from actual inspection of her vessels of war by our most intelligent
officers. The introduction into our Navy of the “Monitor” system
was the death-knell of the great wooden fleets of Europe. England
in particular suffered by that change; but, nothing discouraged, the
Board of Admiralty went to work, and devised plan after plan, until
the British fleet has now the best and finest equipped iron ships in
existence, capable of contending with the combined navies of
Europe. To suppose that this Board of Admiralty, so unjustly criti-
cised, had not made mistakes would be out of the question ; but
their errors are comparatively few, and have in most instances been
rectified.'
The country should accept with confidence this favourable opinion
of a distinguished American Admiral.
The same favourable opinion was expressed in his recent publica-
Engineer
tions by Mr. King, when comparing the ship-building policy of Eng-
King,
land, France, and Germany. Speaking of the shipbuilding programme
of the French Navy, he said :--
Chief
U.S.N.
ADMIRALTY ORGANISATION.
55
The English Admiralty have pursued a different and a wiser course.
Instead of spending their great resources on the construction of ships which
were mere facsimiles of each other, they have, with rare exceptions, in suc-
cessive designs made onward steps in offensive and defensive power. From
the very first, the English designers struck out an independent course.
Mr. King spoke in very different terms of the German Navy:
German
Navy.
No originality has yet been exhibited in naval architecture by the
German constructors or engineers. It has been thought sufficient to repeat
the types which the English have tried and found successful, and as a con-
sequence of this, considering the long time it has taken them to build an
armoured ship, and the advancement recently made in naval construction
in England, they are now completing types far inferior to the late English
designs, and they will have nothing to match the Thunderer,'' Devasta-
tion,' or 'Dreadnought,' nor the Russian · Peter the Great, nor the Italian
· Dandolo' and 'Duilio, to say nothing of the “Inflexible.'
The whole subject of Admiralty organisation was beyond the Board of
Adn:irally.
scope of a single speech. He wished, therefore, to confine what he
had to say to the department of the Controller. In passing, however,
he would remark that as a civilian the First Lord of the Admiralty
must have naval advice, and whether the advisers were called a
Board, a Council, or a Committee, the result would be practically the
same.
Important evidence on this subject was supplied by the witnesses
who were examined by the Select Committee on the Board of
Admiralty, of 1861 :-
The Duke of Somerset said:
For the administration of the Navy, I begin by assuming that it is
necessary to have a Cabinet Minister at the head of the department.
That Cabinet Minister will very seldom be an officer of the Navy, or
at least of such standing in the profession, as well as standing in Parlia-
ment, as would make him a fit person to be in that position. I then
consider that he must have naval officers to assist and guide him; and
that without such assistance, in the form of a Board or Council, he would
be helpless.
It would be a great advantage to a person, even if he were a naval man
at the head of such a department as the Admiralty, to have other naval
officers who have seen service in different parts of the world.
The First Lord has often exercised power absolutely.
What the First Lord would wish to do would be to get at the right
opinion, after having heard the opinions given by different naval men. I
cannot see any possibility of any great inconvenience arising from differences
between different menibers of the Board.
In his evidence before the Admiralty Committee of 1860 Sir
Maurice Berkeley said :-
Duke of
Somerset.
56
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Sir Maurice
Berkeley.
Admiralty
Adminis-
tration.
The three senior Naval Lords should be entirely non-political. You
should appoint them as you do the superintendents of the dockyards, or the
admirals on stations, and should appoint them for a certain number of
years. The three Naval Lords should be retained by each succeeding
Government, and go out in tun.
I should like to see a permanent element of the Board of Admiralty.
The necessity for the adoption of the suggestions made by Sir
Maurice Berkeley is sufficiently shown in the observations of Admiral
Denman in his essay on · Admiralty Administration ’:
It is unnecessary to insist at any length on the evil of divided councils,
which must often occur amongst six persons brought together by the
chapter of accidents, without previous knowledge of each other's views;
and, in fact, the Admiralty often represents nothing so completely as the
endless diversity of opinion which prevails among naval officers; a diversity.
which, on the other hand, is partly accounted for by the absence of any
standard course of policy to be discovered in the conduct of successive
naval administrations.
In a period of not much more than thirty years, up to 1859, there were
seventeen changes in the First Lord of the Admiralty, giving an average
tenure of office to each of about one year ten months two weeks; and, during
the same period, the total number of changes in those who have managed
the affairs of the Navy, as members of the Board, and Secretaries of the
Admiralty, amounted to 103.
The changes have occurred recently in a yet more rapid succession, for
within the last eight years there have been four general changes of the
Board with that of the Government, and there have been five First Lords,
with thirty-four changes in all of members of the Board and Secretaries.
Sir John Pakington was the principal witness against the ad-
ministration of the Navy with the assistance of a Board.
Sir John
Pakinyton.
'I am inclined,' he said, 'to think that professional advice might be at
the command of the Minister, without adopting the plan of a separate
council, solely for the purpose of advice, by placing naval officers of emi-
nence and power at the heads of the departments.'
The state of opinion with reference to the maintenance of a Board
of Advice at the Admiralty may be summed up as follows :-
1
Witnesses in favour of a Board.
The Duke of Somerset
Sir James Graham
Sir Francis Baring
Sir G. Seymour
Admiral Bowles
Sir C. Wood
Sir M. Berkeley
Witnesses opposed to co Bocom.
Sir John Pakington
Sir J. Cochrane
Admiral Denman
1
.
57
ADMIRALTY ORGANISATION.
Elliot.
chairman.
The qualifications to be desired in naval officers appointed to Admiral
serve on the Board of Admiralty, were described in the evidence of
Rear-Admiral George Elliot:
The great wants of the service are systematic views of permanent
organisation, and a power working in the Admiralty constantly to grasp
the scientific improvements of the day, and apply them to the service. To
supply these wants, your naval administrators should be selected for their
practical experience. In fact, you should have a Minister of Marine,
with naval officers at the heads of the departments, who could form a
council to give advice to the Minister upon all the leading points upon
which he might require to be informed; and they should have indepen-
dent departmental power to carry out their own views, being responsible
to the Minister for their acts in carrying out the details of the service.
I think there should be (and I feel very strongly on this point)
another Lord of the Admiralty, specially appointed to overlook the con-
struction of ships and fitting of ships. The position of Civil Lord of the
Admiralty should be filled by a Naval Lord.
As to the introduction at the discussions of the Board of Ad- Action of
Boards de-
miralty of topics which are irrelevant or of inferior importance, his pends on
experience, which was not small, of the management of commercial
business by means of Boards assured him (Mr. Brassey) that where
the Chairman exercised a proper control no difficulty need be expe-
rienced on that score. As public opinion, whether wisely or not,
seemed to associate the recent misfortunes of the Navy with the
altered constitution of the Board, and to demand a revival of the
old system of management which had never broken down in the hour
of trial, he hoped it would be reconstituted with such modifications
as might be desirable.
In France, the Navy was governed by a Minister of Marine, Frenca
assisted by a Council chosen by himself. The Minister of Marine d'Ami-
had absolute authority under the Chief of the State. He was assisted
by a Conseil d'Amirauté' which he consulted, whose opinions
were recorded ; but the Minister acted on his own responsibility, and
when he thought fit, disregarded its advice. Public opinion was
unfavourable to this system, of which it had been said that profusion
and confusion were synonymous terms.
In France, changes had not been less frequent than in England.
The Duke of Somerset, in his evidence, taken by the Select Com-
mittee on the Board of Admiralty of 1861, said that since the year
1800 there had been forty-six Ministers of Marine in France, with
an average tenure of office of fifteen months each. Of these eighteen
were naval officers, and twenty-eight civilians.
Among the witnesses examined before the Duke of Somerset's
Conseil
rauté.
58
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
as a mem-
Rear-
Admiral
G. Elliot.
Evidence Committee there was almost complete unanimity of opinion against
as to posi-
tion of the the elevation of the Controller to the Board.
Controller
The following evidence was taken by the Committee of 1861 on
ber of the the Board of Admiralty :-
Board.
Rear-Admiral G. Elliot: The duties of the Controller are quite suffi-
ciently laborious without his being at the Board to represent his depart-
ment there.
The duties of the Controller are so laborions, that he has neither time to
attend the Board meetings, nor to go about to the dockyards and see what
is going on, as he ought to do; nor has he time to inquire sufficiently into
inventions and improvements. The Controller would have plenty to do
in carrying out the details of his office, acting upon the instructions he
receives from the Minister, as a subordinate of a department, through the
department Lord.
Sir Michael
Sir Michael Seymour : To give the Controller a seat at the Board
Seymour. would be to run away with a great deal of valuable time. I think that,
provided the Controller has the power—which of course he has—of commu-
nicating with the Board whenever he thinks it necessary, that is sufficient.
Sir C. Wood : The great evil of the Navy Board is its independence.
The fact that the Board of Admiralty could not control the Navy Board,
was the real reason of its being abolished; and I think it would be a great
misfortune, either to reconstitute the Navy Board or to create an indepen-
dent Controller or Surveyor.
Sir James Sir James Graham : The Navy Board fulfilled the principal duties, if
(iralam.
not the whole of the duties, now conducted by the Controller.
They had control of the dockyards, very much as the Controller now has,
but with this difference, that the Controller acts under the direct orders
of the Admiralty, while the Navy Board acted as an independent Board-
with a most voluminous correspondence with the two Boards; the Navy
Board being thus indirectly under the imperfect control of the Admiralty.
In 1832 the Navy Board and the Victualling Board were abolished,
these departments being consolidated under the Admiralty.
Sir C.
Wool.
Opinion of
Sir Spencer
Robinson.
In the paper prepared by Sir Spencer Robinson in 1867 the
elevation of the Controller to the Board was recommended; but with
due deference to so great an authority, he ventured to think that
recommendation a mistake, and that the best course would be to
appoint an additional Lord to the Board, whose especial duty it
should be to superintend the dockyards.
It had been admitted by many most competent naval authorities,
among them the Duke of Somerset, that it was impossible for any
one individual, however great his ability, to discharge with efficiency
the great amount of work which fell to the share of the Controller.
Sir Spencer Robinson hąd expressed a different opinion; but the
disclosures recently made before the 'Megæra? Commission showed
Controller
Over-
worked.
ADMIRALTY ORGANISATION.
59
· ministri
that the superintendence of the dockyards by the Controller was not
so efficient as could be desired.
Under the Orders in Council the custody of the Store Department New duties
was added to the heavy catalogue of the duties devolving on the froller.
Controller, while at the same time he was raised to the position of a
member of the Board. These changes threw a large amount of
additional work on the Controller ; while at the same time the staff
of the Store Department was reduced, the place of Chief Engineer
was abolished, and the former second in command, with the insigni-
ficant title of engineer assistant, and the trilling addition of 501. to
his former salary of 5501., became the Controller's chief adviser in the
Steam Department of the Navy.
To relieve the Controller of a portion of his duties it would be Committee
on Designs.
desirable to appoint a standing Committee on Naval Inventions and
Designs. Such a Committee was strongly recommended by Admiral
Elliot in his evidence before the Committee of 1861. It would enable
the Admiralty to consult competent advisers on difficult questions,
which were continually arising, while maintaining the responsibility
which properly belonged to that department.
Relief might be given to the Controller, in his capacity as ship- Shipbuild-
builder of the Navy and manager of the dockyards. The advice of a
ing ad-
naval officer was required to control in a general way the matériel of tion of the
the fleet; but it by no means followed that the Controller, who had
had the training, not of a shipbuilder, but of a sea officer, should be
required to become, as if by a wave of the enchanter's wand, a prac-
tical shipbuilder.
It was said by Admiral Elliot in 1861 that the best qualification
for the Controller was recent experience on active service at sea.
But if the Controller was to become the practical manager of the
yards, he should serve a long apprenticeship in that capacity, and
during the period of his novitiate he must mainly be dependent on
the advice of his subordinates. A frequent change in the person
holding the post of Controller would, therefore, be undesirable; but,
on the other hand, if he remained in office too long the great advan-
tage of recent experience at sea would be lost. The only escape from
this dilemma which he could discover, was to relieve the Controller
from the direct and immediate inanagement of the yards by appoint-
ing a practical shipwright, who would take charge of that department
under the general supervision of the Controller.
The Committee of 1860 bad said that if the clock yards were Committee
frequently visited by a practical shipwright and engineer officer, yard econ-
representing the Surveyor of the Navy, it would be attended by ony, 1860.
on dock-
60
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Personal
inspection
of dock-
yards.
many beneficial results : orders would be interpreted aright and more
strictly carried out; better judgments would be formed of persons
fit for promotion, and the energies of the officers more advantageously
drawn forth.
The Committee of 1860 laid stress on the necessity of securing
a more strict compliance on the part of the dockyard people with
the orders of the Admiralty, and on the advantage of possessing
better means of forming a judgment of the persons most fit for
promotion. These were important objects. The private employer
was able to watch closely the progress and capabilities of the work-
men in his employ, and so to promote them with much greater
confidence than could possibly be felt by the political head of an
administrative establishment, who had not the same opportunities
of close and constant personal supervision, and who seldom continued
in office long enough to gain a personal knowledge of his staff. If
a permanent head of the shipbuilding department were appointed,
he would be able to give to the Admiralty the same valuable advice,
for the promotion of civilians in the dockyards, which the Admiralty
now received from their naval advisers with regard to the promotion
of officers in the military branch of the service. It would rarely
be possible to induce men of high position in the commercial world
to enter the Admiralty service. Competent men for the higher
appointments in the dockyards must therefore be trained in those
establishments. For the peculiar task of managing a dockyard,
the service itself would generally afford the most satisfactory
training
A Surveyor of the Navy, a high civil officer acting under the
Controller, might render service to the Admiralty in other ways.
Considering how frequently political accident led to changes at the
Admiralty, there would be a great advantage in having a permanent
officer responsible for details, and whose presence at the Admiralty
would be a guarantee for the continuity of the system of manage-
ment in the dockyards. The recommendations of Admiral Smart's
Committee were recognised as valuable by the then Board of Ad-
miralty; and the Duke of Somerset proposed to appoint a second
assistant constructor; so that by having two officers of that rank it
would be possible that one or other of them should be always absent
from Whitehall engaged in paying personal visits to the dockyards.
He did not think it altogether judicious to entrust the manage-
ment and inspection of the dockyards to the Chief Constructor of
the Navy. A Chief Constructor ought to be selected for his talents
as a naval architect; but a naval architect might not be a good
Surveyor
of the
Navy.
Distinction
between
naval
architec-
ture and
dockyard
super-
Visivu.
ADMIRALTY ORGANISATION.
61
muda.
manager of large bodies of artizans, and might have little inclination
to deal with those dry details upon the skilful manipulation of which
economical management depended. In railway administration
there was a broad distinction between the qualifications of the
engineer who designed and those of the contractor who executed
the works. It seemed clear, therefore, that it would be an advantage
to appoint an additional officer on the staff of the Controller, having
the rank of a principal officer of the Navy, whose sole business it
would be to superintend the building of the ships from the designs
prepared by the Controller, and to watch over the general manage-
ment of the dockyards.
In conclusion, he confidently asserted that the more completely Decentral-
we adopted in our dockyard management the system of decentralis- isation.
ation combined with strict and close supervision on the part of the
central authority, the more completely we should insure the efficiency
of the British Navy.
Mr. SAMUDA:... He agreed with the hon. Member for Hastings Mr. Sa-
(Mr. T. Brassey), that many changes might most advantageously be
introduced. A very great error was made when they got rid of Mr.
Lloyd, the Chief Engineer. The whole security and safety of the
Controller depended on that officer and the Chief Constructor. The
Controller should be fortified with the very best engineering
assistance, for they were in such a state of change as probably no
previous age had seen. For upwards of 100 years the work of the
Admiralty was comparatively trifling, but now no sooner was a ship
built than her plan of construction had to be reconsidered, to meet
the requirements of the rapid progress that was made, meanwhile,
in artillery. Mr. Lloyd had been replaced by his assistant, able, no
doubt, but very inferior in practice and general position. They had
also got rid of Mr. Reed. He did not think Mr. Reed had on all
occasions been absolutely correct, but he endeavoured to bring
forward that general, comprehensive, and continuous improvement
that the progress of science was continually necessitating, and for
which the Admiralty was greatly indebted to hiin ; and no one
should succeed him who did not possess the very highest qualifications.
It was impossible to think of filling his place by a Committee,
though the First Lord might strengthen himself with considerable
advantage by acting on these suggestion of the hon. Member for
Hastings, and have a permanent Committee to advise him, not upon
mere inventions, but upon actual designs; and such a Committee,
in conjunction with the Chief Constructor and Chief Engineer,
would enable him to go on improving our ships. Then, again,
62
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Mr. Chil.
ders.
these officers ought to be of a permanent character; it would be a
misfortune that they should be changeable at short intervals. One
fact ought never to be lost sight of, and that was that a dockyard
was a gigantic factory, demanding energetic supervision from per-
manent chiefs who thoroughly understood the business they had to
direct, and who certainly ought to hold their positions for a certain
number of years. Attention to these points would, he hoped, main-
tain for our Navy the supremacy it had held in the past.
Mr. CHILDERS: . . . Turning to the subject of the dockyards and
their superintendence by the Controller, I may say that I listened
to the speech of the hon. Member for Hastings (Mr. T. Brassey)
with great interest, and that with many of his recommendations
I cordially agree. In the first place, I fully admit that I think that
my right hon. friend will agree with me upon the fact that the
Controller's office is under-manned. The arrangements respecting
the Controller's office were very carefully considered by me, in
conjunction with the late Chief Constructor, and I was ready to
appoint an assistant if they had required it; and I still think that
such appointment should be made. With regard to the Engineer's
department, I do not think that we made a mistake in bringing it
under the control of the Constructor of the Navy. I also agree with
the hon. Member as to the insufficiency of the salary paid to the
engineer under the Constructor ; and I should like to see it raised. .
The fact is that, in my opinion, we give all our professional officers
too small salaries. There are, doubtless, many Government depart-
ments where there is a redundancy of officials, whose numbers
might be reduced with advantage; but at the same time, the
majority of our great engineer officers are underpaid, and I trust
that my right hon. friend (Mr. Goschen) will be able to persuade
the House that it is for the advantage of the public service that
some of these salaries should be raised.
Mr. GOSCHEN : . . . My hon. friend the Member for Hastings spoke
of a superintending Lord over the Controller ; but by the arrange-
ment which he had suggested there would have been a Deputy
Controller, and there would have been two superintending authorities
to one actually working authority. I agree entirely with my right
hon. friend the Member for Pontefract, that the Controller should
be an officer so high in position at the Admiralty that he should be
held responsible for the work he does, and that his responsibility
should not be diminished by passing through a superintending Lord.
The one point I consider absolutely essential in the Controller of
the Navy is that he should be an officer appointed for a fixed term
Mr. Gos-
chen,
ADMIRALTY ORGANISATION.
63
of years. One of the great difficulties of administering by a fluc-
tuating Board is that you do not get sufficient permanence in the
highest officers. . .
We have heard to-night of the very great difficulties attending
the work of the Controller, and on this head I may say I agree very
much with the remarks of my hon. friend the Member for Hastings.
With respect to the labours and position of Controller, the fact
is really this: he is not only nominally responsible, but has to perform
work almost beyond the powers of any.one man. The great abilities
and industry of Sir Spencer Robinson and Mr. Reed produced this
result: they tended to draw into the hands of the Controller nearly
the whole of the intelligent work of that department. They liked
to do as much as they possibly could of the work of the department;
and thus an amount of labour not only of thought, but of detail,
was thrown on the Controller, with which even a man of superior
capacity found it difficult to grapple. It will therefore be a satis-
faction to us to relieve the Controller of a great portion of routine
work, which ought not to be performed by a man whose brains would
be more profitably occupied in attending to larger questions in the
interests of the public service. We therefore propose to appoint a
Deputy Controller who shall also have the title of Director of Dock-
yards, and whose special business it shall be to attend to the official
working of the dockyards, and to deal, without reference to the
Controller, with most of those questions which touch merely the
administration of the dockyards. In that way we hope to relieve
the Controller of a large portion of the laborious duties, and, at the
same time, to ensure the more effectual working of the dockyards.
LETTERS, PAPERS, AND ADDRESSES.
SECTION V.
RECENT NAVAL ADMINISTRATION.
I. REPRINT OF A PAMPHLET, PUBLISHED IN 1872.
II. ADDRESS DELIVERED AT HASTINGS, 1875.
VOL. IV.
10
66
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
RECENT NAVAL ADMINISTRATION.
A Review of the Situation in 1872.
Originally published as a Pamphlet.
British
Importance In the wars which have lately desolated some of the fairest
of the Navy regions of Central Europe, the relative naval strength of the belli-
gerents has had little effect on the issue of campaigns. Hence
Empire.
there may have been a tendency to underrate the importance to our
own country of her naval resources. It must, however, be borne in
mind that we are an insular and not a continental people, and that
no invading army can reach our shores until we have been deprived
of the command of the seas. The imaginary battle of Dorking could
not have been fought unless the British fleet had been destroyed by
torpedoes; and we need only ascend to the days of our grandfathers
to see how the authentic events of history confirm the hypothesis of
fiction. At Boulogne, in 1805, Napoleon, with an army of 200,000
men, assembled to invade, and, as he firmly believed, to conquer
England, was condemned to hopeless inaction ; because Villeneuve,
after his escape from Toulon, was so closely pursued by Lord Nelson
in a chase of memorable persistency, and so bravely fought by Sir
Robert Calder, that he was compelled to take refuge in Vigo Bay,
having failed to secure, even for 24 hours, the command of the
English Channel. But a Navy is invaluable to England, as well for
the defence of the country, as to protect our interests abroad. The
recent abrogation of the stipulations of the Treaty of 1856, which
imposed a limit on the naval development of Russia in the Black
Sea, may be followed at no distant date by other demands.
As an Asiatic and a colonial Power, we are deeply concerned in
the fate of the Turkish Empire and its dependencies; and, while
our fleet remains supreme in the Mediterranean, our communication
with the East cannot be intercepted. Further general arguments, in
support of a liberal appropriation of the national income to the main-
tenance of the Navy, can scarcely be required.
The career of Mr. Childers at the Admiralty will fill a notable
Mr. Chil-
ders.
--
RECENT NAVAL ADMINISTRATION.
67
page in the history of our naval administration. He will be re-
membered for his independence of obsolete tradition, for his un-
flinching devotion to public duty, for the invigorating influence of his
personal example throughout the service, especially in the civil
departments, and for the large, and in many respects judicious re-
ductions which he effected in our former naval expenditure. The
maintenance on foreign stations of numerous cruisers, but ill adapted
for modern warfare, involved the country in serious expense, without
adding to our influence and prestige. Irrespective of the diminution
of force, considerable economy has been obtained by the creation of
the purchase department, and the adoption of commercial principles
in the business transactions of the Navy. The practical result of the Compara-
new system may in some degree be ascertained, by comparing the victualling.
cost per man of victualling and clothing the Navy under the most
recent naval administrations :
Year
First Lord
Seamen
auc
Marines
Vote for
Victualling
and Clothing
Anouut
per Man
8.
1866–67
1867-68
1869-70
1870-71
1871-72
Duke of Somerset
Mr. Corry
Mr. Childers
Mr. Childers
Mr, Goschen
68,400
67,300
63,300
61,000
59,800
1,235,188
1,241,614
1,172,268
968,857
1,038,202
£
d,
18.1 2
18 9 0
18 10 4
15 17 7
17 í 2
In 1870–71 we observe a considerable reduction; but in moving the
naval estimates Mr. Childers took care to explain that it was really
only 178,0001., and that there was a redundant store of clothing. A
reduction so obtained could not be permanent, and in the following
year there was, as might have been expected, a considerable addition
to the estimates.
From the figures which have been quoted, it appears that while Dockyard
extravagant prices may have been paid for anchors, cables, sperm oil, gance ex;
aggerated
and the like, the general cost of the supplies under the old régime
had not largely exceeded their market value. The extravagance of
former naval administrations, so severely and justly condemned by
public opinion, was caused, not so much by the greater cost of dock-
yard in comparison with contract work, as by continual alterations
of ships while on the stocks, and by expensive and injudicious
repairs.
Mr. Childers was scarcely patient enough in introducing organic changes.
Precipitate
changes in every department of the Admiralty. The uncertainty of
official life suggests a reason why an able and energetic Minister is
sometimes tempted to undertake a difficult task, without first sitting
F 2
68
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
À
Impolitic
to break
up a staff.
down and sufficiently counting the cost. The Admiralty has perhaps
suffered more than any other great department of the Government
from frequent Ministerial changes. In 1866 the Duke of Somerset
was First Lord, and in the short interval of time which has since
elapsed Sir John Pakington, Mr. Corry, Mr. Childers, and Mr.
Goschen have rapidly succeeded him in an office which cannot be
filled with satisfaction either to the Minister himself, to the Navy,
or to the country at large, without considerable experience in its mul-
tifarious and difficult duties. Of all the statesmen included in the
above enumeration, Mr. Corry alone has concentrated his powers,
throughout a long and useful career, on the administration of the
Navy.
As in the reorganisation of the Admiralty, so in the dismissal of
many important officers, Mr. Childers made numerous and rapid
changes. The Constructor's department must have been disorganised
by the almost simultaneous resignation of Sir Spencer Robinson and
Mr. Reed. The appointment of a Royal Commission makes it pre-
mature to suggest explanations; but it is clear that independence of
conduct and character, and the authority, which experience alone
can give, are essential to our permanent officials.
The dismissal of heads of departments, if intended as a measure of
economy, is a mistake. The closing of an unnecessary dockyard and
the reduction of our foreign squadrons must largely diminish ex-
penditure; but the salaries of a small superintending staff are a
trifling addition to the estimates during peace, while their skill in
dockyard organisation and familiar knowledge of the war require-
ments of a Navy give unlimited power of expansion, should any
emergency arise. In commercial life it would be deemed a suicidal-
policy to break up the tried and well-trained staff of an establishment,
whenever a lull occurred in trade.
The subordination of every department connected with the
matériel of the Navy may have been an administrative improvement;
but, whatever his rank in relation to the Chief Constructor, a skilled
mechanical engineer must be absolutely indispensable at Whitehall.
An officer is surely required, not inferior in knowledge, experience,
and professional status to the managing partners of our leading
engineering firms, to take charge of the complicated and costly
machinery of our ships of war. The sum of 334,6901. has been
voted for the purchase of machinery in the current financial year;
yet the head of the steam department of the Admiralty is called 'an
engineer assistant, and receives a salary of 6001. a year.
A similar objection applies to the constitution of the purchase
Underpaid
officers.
.
69
RECENT NAVAL ADMINISTRATION.
department. When this branch of naval business was entrusted to
Mr. Baxter, it would appear to have been taken for granted that his
commercial experience would enable him to conduct the more im-
portant transactions without professional assistance. The permanent
head of the department was accordingly regarded as a comparatively
subordinate officer, with a salary proportionate to his limited
responsibilities. But the exigencies of Ministerial etiquette no less
than the caprices of popular favour made it impossible for Parlia-
mentary officials to count on a long term of office. Mr. Baxter has
already shared the varying fortunes of his colleagues; and his suc-
cessors will rarely possess a special knowledge of the quality or price
of naval stores.
Before Mr. Childers took office, the Board of Admiralty consisted Board of
Admiralty.
of a First Lord, four Naval Lords, and a Civil Lord, with a Parlia-
mentary and a Permanent Secretary. Under Mr. Childers, the Board
was composed of a First Lord, a First Naval Lord, a Second Lord and
Controller, a Junior Naval Lord, and a Civil Lord, with a Parliamentary
and a Permanent Secretary, as before. The First Naval Lord was
made responsible to the First Lord for advice and action in matters
relating to the fleet and the personnel of the Navy; while the Con-
troller was in like manner responsible for the construction and mate-
rial of the fleet. As a consequence of the changes in the Board the
naval element was reduced. While two Naval Lordships were abolished,
the Controller had a seat in their stead. But when the Russian
note arrived, Mr. Childers expressed his conviction that another
Naval Lord should be appointed, thus clearly indicating an opinion
that the reduced naval staff was insufficient to meet the pressure of
A sea officer's career may be an indifferent education in naval
architecture and shipbuilding, yet naval supervision is not the less
essential to naval efficiency. The United States Navy has been
recently surveyed by a board of distinguished officers. Their report
gives ample warning against the undue suppression of the naval
element. Of all the vessels visited not one,' they affirm, 'no, not
a single one, is effectually fit in these times to cruise at large in war,
or to cope with the cruisers now possessed by the more formidable
Powers of Europe.' They attribute this state of things to the
settled indisposition, until a very recent period, to invoke the experi-
ence of the Navy.'
It was unwise to give the Controller a seat at the Board. The
experience of commercial undertakings has shown the impropriety of
making the responsible head of a department a member of the Board,
under whose directions it is his duty to act. The adıninistrative
war.
70
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
must be subordinate to the deliberative functions; and subordina-
tion and responsibility can no longer be preserved when the depart-
mental officer becomes himself a member of the governing body. In
order to exercise a strict supervision over the dockyards, a good per-
manent officer is required, subordinate to the Board of Admiralty,
not co-equal in authority. This department should be placed under
the charge of a member of the Board whose naval experience would
enable him to exercise a valuable control over his professional
officers. If this arrangement should hereafter be adopted, the office
of Controller might be abolished; while the Chief Constructor, who
should be a naval architect of eminence, would be raised, in accordance
with the suggestion of Sir Frederick Grey, to the dignity of a prin-
cipal officer, like the other principal officers of the Navy.
Mr. Childers abandoned the old-established practice of daily
consultations with the members of his Board. The necessary infor-
mation on professional matters may doubtless be obtained by a civilian
First Lord, without having recourse to a formal Council ; but in the
distribution of naval patronage the advice of a Board is almost indis-
pensable. The Navy is of necessity a scattered service. An admiral
may rise to the high dignity of First Naval Lord, and know nothing
of officers who have not served under his own immediate command.
The united experience of a Board'will secure full consideration for the
claims of every individual.
Mr. Childers having been compelled to resign by ill-health, the
result of excessive devotion to his public duties, a more judicious
choice of a successor could not have been made. Mr. Goschen, while
ready to consider every proposal for the improvement of the Navy, has
wisely preferred to retain existing systems, even when theoretically
imperfect, rather than make hasty changes, the value of which
has not been distinctly established. He has also shown that which,
in a civilian at the head of the naval service, is a great merit, a de-
termination not to adopt à priori views on technical matters. On
the other hand, when the exercise of authority has been necessary,
Mr. Goschen has been equal to the occasion, and has not been
deterred from doing his duty to the country by the disagreeable nature
of his task.
In consequence of the recent changes the organisation of the
Admiralty has acquired an exceptional interest. Systems are in
ordinary times of much less importance in their practical results than
the abilities of those by whom they are administered. At the Ad-
miralty, as in every department of the State, that which is best
administered is best. The author has once recommended that the
Mr. Gos-
chen.
.
General
organisa-
tion.
RECENT NAVAIL ADMINISTRATION.
71
Board of Admiralty should be abolished. Further reflection has con-
vinced him that the change would not be expedient; and it becomes
a duty to himself, unimportant as it may be to the public, to retract
the opinion he once too hastily expressed.
Turning now to the matériel of the Navy, the subjoined compa- Matériel.
rative statement of the ironclad fleets of the principal maritime
Powers may be examined with interest:
Ironclad Ships.
Ships
Guns
Tons
Forse-power
64,710
13,386
United States
North Germany
Italy
Russia
France
Er.gland
54
9
22
20
63
54
133
55
201
141
1,100
720
3,600
11,380
5,200
30,000
39,240
43,279
148,800
196,226
0
Including both armoured and unarmoured vessels, the tonnage of
the British Navy is 666,000; of the French, 469,000; of the Navy of
the United States, 186,552 tons.
In ocean-going ironclads our fleet is superior to the united navies
of the world. But in vessels of moderate draught the comparison is
less satisfactory. The Admiralty, however, have admitted the neces-
sity of adding to the fleet of gunboats. The Cyclops’and three sister
turret ships, drawing 15 ft. 6 in., and protected by armour of from
eight to ten inches in thickness, are either completed or in progress.
Objection has been raised to the designs both of these vessels and of
the Devastation;' but a committee, composed of men eminent in
science and officers of high naval reputation, has pronounced them to
be safe and stable ships. The estimates for the current year provide
for the construction of 15,512 tons of shipping. Of this total 3,712
tons, according to the programme laid down in the estimates, represent
the addition to the flotilla of gunboats. A question has been raised
as to the value for paval warfare of small vessels which can be sunk
by a single shot; but the same objection could be urged against
vessels of much larger size. To resist the formidable missiles of the
most recently invented artillery, armour-plating is required of such
weight and thickness that it could not, even if limited to the bow
alone, be applied to a vessel of twice the tonnage of the “Staunch.
An increase of tonnage may no doubt be desirable; though even in a
seaway good practice can be made by well-trained gunners from the
smaller gunboats of the Staunch 'type. It is still more satisfactory
to know that some of our most recent ocean-going ironclads have
72
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Mr. Reed.
elicited the highest approval of competent and impartial authorities.
Captain Macomb, of the United States frigate “Plymouth,' who
accompanied the “Monarch' on her voyage across the Atlantic,
pronounced her to be the most formidable and effective ironclad
vessel of war for ocean service in the world. Our earliest ironclads,
the Warrior' and the “Agincourt,' are the finest sea-going vessels
we possess; but their armour is easily penetrated by modern artillery,
and they are too long to be handled under sail, or to attempt, with
any chance of success, to ram an enemy of more moderate dimen-
sions.
Mr. Reed, who appreciated the disadvantage of the excessive
length of the earlier ironclads, determined to try the experiment of
shorter and handier ships. He believed that no loss of speed would
result from reducing the length of the ships, provided that the same
power in proportion to the area of the midship section were given to
the shorter as to the longer ships. The event has fully justified his
anticipation. In the shorter vessels, which Mr. Reed has designed,
the same speed is obtained as in the longer ships; but they carry
more powerful guns, and the armour is infinitely heavier than in the
larger ships of his predecessors.
For the purposes of war the designs of Mr. Reed exhibit impor-
tant improvements; but in sea-going qualities they are inferior to
the longer and less heavily armoured ships. The most serious fault
of the later ironclads is their uneasiness in a seaway. This fault is
the inevitable result of the attempt to give to vessels of reduced
dimensions the heaviest guns and an enormous weight of armour.
Only ships of the largest size could support such prodigious burdens.
To increase their stability, additional ballast has been placed in the
most recent ships. It would have been better to have worked up
more material in their frames and plating, and thus to have combined
the advantage of greater stability with additional structural strength.
While Mr. Reed deserves much credit for the general excellence
of his designs, it is certain that all his productions have not been
equally successful. He has acquired in the office of Chief Constructor
much valuable information; and it is, therefore, not a little dis-
appointing that he should now be free to give to other nations the
benefit of his dearly-bought experience. It seems difficult to un-
derstand why his past services should have been rewarded by the
payment of a lump sum of 5,0001. instead of by an increase of salary,
which would have been an inducement to remain at Whitehall.
A general review of our recent shipbuilding operations would
be imperfect without some reference to the loss of the Captain.'
The · Cap-
tain.'
RECENT NAVAL ADMINISTRATION.
73
The ship was capsized from carrying too great a press of sail in squally
and boisterous weather. But the fact that she could not be allowed
to incline to an angle, which in a high freeboard ship is commonly
permitted under sail, is a proof that there was grave misapprehension
as to the amount of stability which she possessed. The late Controller
and Chief Constructor were but too well justified, as the event has
proved, in pronouncing it impossible to give full sail-power with
safety to low freeboard ships. The blame for the loss of the Captain'
ought in fairness to be divided ainong a number of individuals, and
nobody can be accused of having clearly foreseen the terrible disaster
which actually occurred.
The lessons to be drawn from the disaster seem to be that full
sail-power cannot be given to ships of the low freeboard type, and
that the Admiralty should never allow the opinions of its responsible
advisers to be overruled by an agitation out of doors. Public opinion
on such a subject is based on imperfect information, and must
therefore possess little value in comparison with professional expe-
rience.
Before the accession of Mr. Childers to office it had been too much The
Flying
the custom to keep our ships of war in harbour during winter. By Squadron.
that means no doubt ropes and sails were economised, but young
officers had little opportunity of learning to handle their ships in
gales of wind. By forming the Flying Squadron, as a school for
seamanship, and by uniting the Mediterranean and the Channel
Squadrons, for exercise in steam evolutions, new opportunities of
learning their profession have been given to naval officers. It is not
necessary that the flying squadrons should always be despatched to
distant seas; although the experience to be obtained in a voyage
round the world must be valuable to every sailor. Frequent practice
in entering and leaving port may sometimes be more instructive
than a long and monotonous passage across the ocean. It may be
urged that the ships of which the Mediterranean Squadron has of late
been mainly constituted could not have been kept at sea in winter,
without exposing them to a strain which they were ill-fitted to bear.
It would, however, have been better to have retained the wooden
ironclads in the Reserve Squadron at home, and to have despatched
the iron armoured ships to the Mediterranean.
It is desirable that the vessels selected for commission should
be capable of being handled under sail. The flag-ship of an Ame-
rican Admiral is generally an armed auxiliary screw clipper. The
Americans have shown themselves perfectly ready to throw tradition
to the winds, and to adopt the most novel types, to meet the
74
DOCKYARDS ANI) NAVAL ORGANISATION.
6
ranean
changing exigencies of war; but in peace they have wisely recognised
the value of full-rigged ships. In his Annual Report for 1869, Mr.
Robeson, the Secretary of the United States Navy, well observes that
lounging through the watches of a steamer, or acting as firemen
and coal-heavers, will not produce in a seaman that combination of
boldness, strength, and skill which characterised the American
seaman of the elder day. The habitual exercise by an officer of a
command the execution of which is not under his own eye, is a poor
substitute for the school of observation, promptness, and command,
found only on the decks of a sailing vessel.' We have fortunately a
numerous fleet, well adapted for purposes of instruction. We have
36 ships of the line, 27 frigates, and 22 corvettes. These vessels
ought not to be recklessly condemned.
Mediter-
The author would venture to suggest that in future no full-
Squadron. rigged ironclads should be sent to the Mediterranean in time of
peace, but that a squadron of mastless turret ships should be kept in
reserve at Malta. From their deep draught the Royal Sovereign’
and the Devastation are almost useless in English waters. In the
Mediterranean, where there are few shoals, and the principal ports
are accessible to vessels of any draught, they might be employed to
greater advantage. On the line of communication between Gibraltar
and the Suez Canal, to defend which in time of war would be the
primary duty of our Navy, the facilities for obtaining a supply of
coals are such that canvas is not absolutely essential. In the Medi-
terranean, again, the winds are variable and seldom blow long with
sufficient force to propel a heavy ironclad, even at the moderate speed
of five knots an hour.
As a general principle, it will be admitted that where sails are
not indispensable, they are an incumbrance to a ship of war which is
intended to go into action under steam. It is only in mastless ships
that the advantage of the turret system can be fully developed, and
in a purely economical point of view mastless turret ships have much
to recommend them. It is not their least important merit that they
require less than half of the crew of a fully-rigged ship of equal
tonnage.
If a squadron of mastless ships were kept in reserve at Malta,
the seamen of the Mediterranean Squadron could in the winter be
exercised in the turrets, both in harbour and in the Malta channel.
The crew of the "Hibernia'could become the shipkeepers of the pro-
posed reserve; and accommodation for the crews of ships under
repair in the graving docks could be provided in the vacant buildings
in the victualling yard.
:
RECENT NAVAL ADMINISTRATION.
75
The recent misfortunes of the Navy must have strengthened the The navi-
convictions of those who had already disapproved of a distinct class officers.
of officers for navigating duties. It has been urged in support of
the present system that a special class of officers, whose attention is
confined to navigation and pilotage, will acquire a degree of pro-
ficiency in those branches of the naval profession which cannot be
attained by the executive officers, who have many other duties to
perform. On the other hand, it must be admitted that, as the ex-
ecutive officers are, under the regulations of the service, made jointly
responsible with the navigating officers for the safety of their ships,
we ought to give them opportunities of acquiring practice in navi-
gation in every stage of their professional career. The executive
officers who were held responsible for running the ' Agincourt'on
the Pearl Rock had probably entrusted their ships too much to the
navigating officers. Nobody, who is acquainted with the rudiments of
navigation, will suppose that any one of the four executive officers can
have ascertained, even by laying a parallel ruler on the chart, whether
the course suggested to the Admiral in command by the master of
the fleet would take the ships of the inner line to a safe distance
from the Pearl Rock. Yet, so long as the navigation is regarded as
a mystery beyond the reach of an executive officer, and this appears
to be the view of those who are opposed to any change in the present
system, so long the adoption of the principle of non-intervention
in all that relates to navigation will be a more or less general
result.
The committee, appointed in 1862 to consider the position and
duties of the master class, recommended that ten lieutenants
should be allowed as an experiment to volunteer for staff duties. This
suggestion has never yet been adopted, but the recent misfortunes of
the Navy make it appear that the change proposed might prove bene-
ficial to the service.
Captain Washington, the Hydrographer of the Navy, was
member of the committee of 1862. The abolition of a separate class
of officers for navigating duties was strongly recommended in a
memorandum which he appended to the report of the committee.
He pointed to the fact that many young lieutenants, commanders,
and captains do actually navigate the smaller vessels and gunboats
which they command. He urged that to entrust pilotage and navi-
gation to masters begets indifference to those duties in lieutenants
and officers of the main executive branch; and, referring to the re-
sponsibility of the masters for steering a large ship of war in battle,
he asked if it was conceivable that, when a steam ram was about to
1
а
76
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
give the stem to an opponent, the captain of the ram should dele-
gate his authority to the master at that critical moment.
This
being so, should he not,' he asks, ' have a training for handling and
steering his ship promptly under any emergency? Would he not feel
far more confidence in himself had he passed through the grades of a
navigating officer, and for some years had charge of the steering and
conning of a ship? Very recent events point to this mode of warfare
as likely to play a prominent part in any future action. Would it be
wise, then, to wait until the time of need, before training our young
executive officers to acquire that self-reliance and confidence which
can only be gained by continual practice?'
After cruising for a short time in the Channel in a suitable
vessel for instruction in navigation, executive officers would have
no more difficulty in becoming proficient in navigation than in
learning gunnery on board the 'Excellent.'
It is said that the abolition of the navigating class must involve
an increase in the number of lieutenants, and that unless the
number of captains be augmented, which is not desirable, the stagna-
tion of promotion would be still more disheartening than at present.
Might not this objection be met by giving inducements to officers to
retire as commanders and lieutenants into the Reserve, which should
be organised for the defence of the coast ? The officers of the Coast
Defence Reserve might receive the full pay of their rank, and ought
to reside at the ports at which the men under their immediate com-
mand are enrolled. In consideration of the advantage of a settled
home, and their comparatively easy duties in time of peace,
they should only be eligible for promotion for services rendered
during war.
Commanders and lieutenants might also find employment as
representatives of mercantile houses abroad, as superintendents of
packet stations, and in command of our great sailing clippers and
mail steamers. When large subsidies are given for the conveyance of
the mails, it is a question whether the mail service might not be
performed with greater advantage to the public by the Royal Navy.
The sum of 3,500,0001. was paid for the hire of transports during the
Abyssinian expedition. The British Indian Steam Navigation Com-
pany received the enormous sum of 257,410l., or 25l. 9s. per ton,
for the hire of 10,114 tons of shipping for nine months and eighteen
days; while the Bombay and Bengal Steam Navigation Company
had actually offered to sell their fleet to the Government at 271.
per ton.
Naval
University.
The education of naval officers is another important and difficult
RECENT NAVAL ADMINISTRATION.
77
subject. Is is perhaps unnecessary to reiterate opinions already ex-
pressed, but it will be well to insist once more on the importance of
a Naval University. For this purpose the vacant buildings at
Greenwich present unrivalled advantages. There is ready access
from Greenwich to many large engineering establishments, and to
the private shipbuilding yards on the Thames. The Royal Observa-
tory, the Gun Factories and Arsenal at Woolwich, the Dockyard at
Chatham, the School of Gunnery at Shoeburyness, the lecture rooms
of eminent professors in London, are close at hand, and together offer
advantages not to be obtained elsewhere. The Naval University
should be open to officers of the merchant service, on passing a pre-
liminary test examination. It may not be chimerical to hope that, by.
offering to the mercantile marine the same education which we
provide for the Navy, a bond of union will have been established
between the two branches of a great profession, which both in peace
and war is invaluable to England. The tone of the one will have been
raised, the sympathies of the other will have been enlarged, the
jealousies which have too long divided them will have disappeared,
when the officers of both services participate in the advantages of a
higher training than they have hitherto received, and in the
respon-
sibilities and the honours, which belong to all to whom we look
for the effectual protection of our shores.
In consequence of the recent changes in the distribution of power
in Europe, the maritime supremacy of England is now more conspi-
cuous than at any period since the peace of 1816. We no longer
observe with anxiety the naval development of France. In the
United States unnecessary expenditure on warlike preparations is stead-
fastly resisted. The statesmen of the North German Confederation
have shown no disposition to incur the enormous expense of creating
a fleet which might be regarded as a rival to our own. Our naval
administrators may, therefore, proceed, with ample opportunity for
deliberation, to organise a force for the defence of the coast, and to
improve the reserve which we already possess for the general service
of the fleet. With a good system of reserves, not only will our fleets
be manned with a promptitude and efficiency not hitherto attained,
but a considerable reduction will also be justified in the standing force
in time of peace.
The improvement of our Navy may be to some among us a repug-
nant task, because associated in their contemplation with all the
horrors of war; but the English patriot will desire to maintain the
naval supremacy of his country, as the only reliable guarantee, in
anxious and threatening times, for the integrity of his native land,
78
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
and as an instrument, in the hands of generous and far-seeing states-
men, for the preservation of peace and the progress of civilisation.
M. Lamy,
1878.
The foregoing paper is included in the collection introduced in
the present publication, because it contains many opinions to which
adhesion is still unreservedly given.
With reference to the administration of Mr. Childers, the lapse
of time serves but to strengthen the Compiler's conviction that the
general course of policy was in the right direction, though pursued
perhaps with too much vigour. No higher testimony could be given
to the excellence of the work actually accomplished by Mr. Childers
than that of M. Lamy, the ablest independent critic in the French
Chamber on questions of naval administration. In his speech in
1878, M. Lamy said :-
'En Angleterre, en 1859, la marine semblait pencher vers la
décadence; le conseil d'amirauté paraissait sans vigueur; les créa-
tions de matériel étaient médiocres, les frais généraux écrasants, les
budgets mal ordonnés, la comptabilité incomplète, et l'on pouvait
dire en pleine chambre des communes que l'amirauté laissait échapper
chaque année entre ses doigts plus de 1 million de livres sterling
sans qu'elle s'en aperçût.
Ce fut, comme aujourd'hui, au retour du parti libéral au pouvoir
que les chambres et l'opinion publique s'unirent pour combattre le
mal. Une grande enquête fut ouverte par le Parlement, et comme
il arrive presque toujours quand une cuvre doit réussir, il se trouva
un homme qui se l'incarna et eut le désir de l'accomplir.
‘M. Childers, pendant huit ans, dirigea tous les travaux, contrôla
tous les résultats, assit solidement, par le temps et l'étude, une
grande réforme, et il ne prit enfin le pouvoir que pour l'accomplir.
Grâce à cet effort, l'Angleterre possède aujourd'hui la flotte la
plus puissante; elle a les arsenaux les plus économiquement entre-
tenus, la comptabilité la plus simple et le personnel le mieux payé
et le plus heureux.
RECENT NAVAL ADMINISTRATION.
79
ANNUAL ADDRESS TO CONSTITUENTS.
Delivered at Hastings, January 22, 1875.
The late Administration deserves the grateful appreciation of the Reductions
of expendi-
country, for a greater amount of excellent work than has been ture.
accomplished in an equally short space of time within the remem-
brance of the present generation. They have made earnest efforts to
reduce our growing expenditure. The task was alike difficult and
thankless, and the difficulty was increased, as I feel bound to confess,
by an injudicious parade of their intentions in this regard, which
made all whose interests were in any way affected predisposed to
complain of ungenerous treatment.
Notwithstanding the reductions effected by the late Administra- tive es
Compara-
tion, the sum we expend on the Navy largely exceeds the expenditure penditure
of any other naval Power. Our naval estimate is four times that of Powers.
Germany, and Germany is now regarded, not without reason, as a
most important naval Power; while, if we turn to the United States,
which, whatever may be the actual condition of their Navy, would
undoubtedly prove, in any protracted war, our most powerful naval
antagonist, we again find that our expenditure is more than double
the amount voted by Congress for the American Navy. It cannot
indeed be doubted that if we were able to pursue the same policy
which is adopted in Germany, and our whole expenditure were
concentrated upon our ironclads, we should exbibit an incontestable
superiority in that special class of vessels. Why is it that, with an
expenditure by comparison so great, we apparently fail' to get value
for our money, and to maintain a naval ascendency in proportion to
our outlay?
The explanation is to be found in the greater cost of our iron-
clad ships individually, in the large expenditure on wooden ships,
constructed to perform the miscellaneous services commonly called
the police of the seas, and in the greater number of seamen and
marines which it is the policy of this country to maintain in time
of peace.
80
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Our iron-
clad fleet.
Our naval
With these heavy demands on our resources, we have undoubtedly
failed to produce so many armoured vessels as the country might
otherwise have been entitled to expect. But I am not prepared to
admit that a comparison of our own strength with that of other
Powers, even in respect to ironclads, is so unsatisfactory as it has
been represented. In moving the estimates last session, the First
Lord of the Admiralty made a discouraging report to Parliament of
the condition of the fleet. The country was alarmed by his state-
ment; but what did he propose in order to place the country in a
proper state of defence ? The number of men originally proposed
for the dockyards in 1874–75 was 14,300. He added 695 to their
number, and he made a saving on the vote for stores. If an altera-
tion so slight was sufficient to aliay the alarms of the present
Administration on coming into office, I must say that those alarms
would appear to have been altogether groundless and unreasonable.
When we proceed to examine closely the alleged inferiority of
supremacy. our own country, it will be evident that there is no just reason for
apprehension. Russia, France, Germany, and the United States,
are the only Powers which can be regarded as maintaining a Navy
for other than strictly defensive purposes. It is certain that England
is equal to any three of these four Powers; and the contingency of
their being united in an offensive alliance against this country is
too remote to be seriously entertained. Naval strength, moreover,
must be measured, not merely by the actual condition of the fleet,
but by the capabilities of the several Powers to make additions to
their naval force. From this point of view, the United States must
be regarded as our most powerful rival; but the resources even of
the United States are much inferior to our own. We have hitherto
been shipbuilders for all the other Powers in Europe, and the expe-
rience and resources of our private yards, if absorbed exclusively by
the British Government, would rapidly supply us with a fleet which
could defy the world. As our shipbuilders would furnish us with
ships, so our merchant service should supply the Navy with seamen.
These vast resources, both for building and manning a war Navy,
must be properly organised. Let it not, however, be supposed that
the strength of England consists mainly in her unused and unde-
veloped resources. In actual preparation we hold an incontestable
superiority. The public has been alarmed by the reports of the
Russian ship ‘Peter the Great. But that ship is still far from com-
pletion. The condition of the Navy of the United States has been
described by their most competent authorities as deplorable. In
France it has been determined to make such reductions in the naval
RECENT NAVAL ADMINISTRATION.
81
essential.
expenditure as to render it impossible to make any considerable
additions to their ironclad fleet.
Special attention has of late been drawn to the growth of the
German Navy. The entire programme, which is to be completed in
1882, includes the eight first-class ironclads already built, eight
armoured corvettes, of which two are built, twenty unarmoured
vessels, of which thirteen are completed, two monitors, and fifteen
torpedo boats, of which three are completed, and three are building.
Laying aside therefore all groundless alarms, what should be the Our own
policy of British naval administrators in regard to shipbuilding ? 1 Shipbuild-
quite agree with those who refuse to be content with a fleet on paper.
It is neither statesmanlike nor honest to put forward fictitious
statements of strength. It is certain that many ironclads belonging
to other Powers, which are included in the enumeration of their
fleets, are unfit for service; but, for ourselves, let us take care to
maintain all ships in perfect order. Speed is one of the most Speed
essential qualifications of a man-of-war. A fighting ship with worn-out
boilers is for many purposes hors de combat. It is admitted that
many of our ships require new boilers, and, whatever be the cost, the
work must be promptly done. It is the duty of the Admiralty to
make a thorough investigation of the causes of this rapid deteriora-
tion. I cannot but ask myself whether it is not possible that
among the engineers of the Navy there will be found a certain
number who, however proficient in theoretical knowledge, are want-
ing in practical experience; and whether it may not sometimes
occur that boilers are entirely renewed which might have been made
efficient with partial repairs.
I have shown, as I hope, that there is no immediate occasion for Moderate
misgiving as to the comparative strength of our Navy. On the other dimensions.
hand, it is true that a certain number of our ironclad ships, built at
the time when armoured vessels were first introduced, are worn out
or have become obsolete. I am quite prepared to support a temporary.
increase of expenditure for the purpose of replacing these ships with
ironclads of more modern type. The country is well able to bear any
necessary outlay for this purpose, and, looking at the inferiority of
our army to the military forces of the continental Powers, it must be
admitted that our claims to rank as a first-class Power will be forfeited
if we fail to maintain our maritime ascendency. But, while I am
prepared for some increase in the vote for shipbuilding, I am not
prepared to sanction proposals for building ships of the costly type
which some naval constructors recommend. The best type for a
fighting armoured cruiser, as distinguished from an armoured coast-
VOL. IV.
G
82
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
defence vessel, is still in debate. Many of our highest authorities are
beginning to question the value of armour, considering that it is
impossible for any armour to resist the artillery which is now being
constructed. In the French Navy the course of opinion is no longer
running in favour of armoured ships. It is given as a reason for
not enlarging the programme for the construction of armoured ships
for the German Navy, that it is desirable to await the result of our
experiments before proceeding with a vast outlay on ships which may
be condemned as obsolete in a few years. The United States have
hitherto abstained altogether from building sea-going ironclads ; and
when we know that the stoutest armour we can employ will not
suffice to resist our heaviest guns, and that armour is no defence
whatever against the two most dangerous weapons of modern warfare
-I mean the ram and the torpedo-enough has been said to show
that it cannot be wise to spend 500,0001. in the construction of
armoured ships.
The German fleet contains the most powerful ironclad vessels for
cruising purposes in any foreign Navy. They have one ship which has
cost more than 500,0001., but their other vessels are of smaller dimen-
sions, and their next most thickly armoured ship has a displacement of
6,000 tons, as compared with the 9,595 tons of the ‘König Wilhelm.'
Naval architects are in the habit of putting before us designs for
ironclads of enormous strength and speed. We cannot but admire
these displays of their science and ingenuity: but when we have
before us the probable development of the powers of attack by means
of torpedo boats, I question the policy of throwing all our eggs into
so few baskets. He is the most practically successful naval architect
for purposes of war, who can combine the greatest amount of offensive
and defensive power with moderate dimensions and reasonable cost.
If the Admiralty should feel justified in limiting the dimensions of
our ironclads to 5,000 tons, and the cost of each ship to 250,0001.-
so that, for an equal expenditure, we should have two ships in lieu
of one, two “Shannons' for one “Inflexible,'— I should say that they
were imposing a wise restriction on the creative fancy of the ship-
building department.
I have already alluded to the expenditure on the unarmoured
shipbuild- classes as an explanation of the small appropriation from the amounts
ing.
voted under our naval estimates for the construction of ironclads. At
the present time England has of unarmoured ships 132, France 52,
Germany only 17, and we have in addition 170 gun-boats and
despatch-boats. A return iñ July last shows that we had 52 more
vessels of the same class building or ordered to be built in the year
Our unar-
moured
RECENT NAVAL ADMINISTRATION.
83
auxiliaries.
1874. With our vast colonial possessions, and busy maritime com-
merce, we are called upon to maintain a fleet of this description, such
as no other naval Power is required to send forth. The vast expense
thus involved may in a certain sense be regarded as an insurance ef-
fected upon our commerce, which is indirectly recouped to the nation 2;
and, so viewing it, we may be the more reconciled to an increased
expenditure for our Navy. But it is a question whether we have not
gone somewhat beyond the necessities of the case. Mr. Childers
wisely reduced our foreign squadrons, and more may be done in the
same direction.
The British merchant Navy may be made a powerful auxiliary to Mercantile
the fighting Navy. The Cunard and other companies would furnish a
matchless fleet of ships of the 'Alabama'class, but capable of steaming
at far higher rates of speed, and carrying coals for a much greater dis-
tance. The Germans look to their lines of Atlantic mail steamers as
a valuable reserve for the Navy, and our immense resources in the
same class of ships should be taken into account before we proceed
with the construction of large and costly additions to our unarmoured
Navy. We are paying to the Peninsular and Oriental Company an
annual subsidy of 500,0001., and the company is under no obligation
to furnish a contingent to the Navy in time of war. So large a sub-
sidy should not have been granted without imposing some conditions
for the greater security of the nation.
Having said so much as to the ships of the Navy, I cannot dwell Board of
Admiralty.
on the important question of reform in the Admiralty in London.
The great fault of our dockyard management is the excessive con-
centration of authority in the Controller's office at Whitehall. The
consequence is that the Controller is overworked, and that his subor-
dinate local officers have not sufficient encouragement to exert their
inventive faculty to economise expenditure in the dockyards. The
other Lords of the Admiralty, and especially the First Sea Lord, are
almost as much overworked as the First Lord himself. As advisers
upon naval policy, the Sea Lords of the Admiralty should have more
time at their disposal for calm consideration and consultation with
one another. To every Sea Lord a naval secretary of the rank of post
captain should be appointed, to whom should be remitted the charge
of the entire routine of the department. The Sea Lords would thus
be relieved of an infinity of details, and be better able to attend to
greater questions.
In the dockyards, the officer at the head of the shipbuilding de- Dockyard
partment, who bears the entire responsibility for the cost and work-
manship of the vessels built under his supervision, is not sufficiently
officers,
G 2
84
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Manning
the Navy.
recognised. The office of Master Shipwright should be gradually
advanced in dignity and responsibility. The civil managers of the
dockyards, when they do their duty, are as well worthy of the honour
of knighthood as any class of persons in the Queen's service. With
the prospect of distinction, and an appropriate relative rank with the
officers of the Royal Navy, the post of Master Shipwright, under a :
more suitable designation, would attract to Her Majesty's service the
ablest shipbuilders in the country. The advancement of the office
does not imply any derogation from the authority of the admiral
superintending, who would remain equally indispensable, as the local
representative of the Admiralty, as the medium of communication
with the Board, and as a superior consulting officer on all questions
of equipment for the sea service and for naval warfare.
I have referred to the strength at which the personnel of the
Navy is maintained. In the Navy Estimates, as it was pointed out
by the Committee of 1858, every vote is influenced by this considera-
tion, as the number of seamen involves a corresponding increase in
the force of ships, and in the expense of bringing them forward for
service. Our expenditure from this cause is incomparably greater
than that of any other Power, as the following figures will conclu-
sively prove. Our force of officers and men, including marines, is
60,000; that of Germany may be estimated at 7,000 of all ranks,
including 4,500 seamen; that of the United States at 10,600, in-
cluding 1,200 marines.' It must be remembered that a large per-
sonnel entails not merely a heavy expense in pay and provisions,
and in the repair and fitting out of ships, but a large vote for pensions.
Our expenditure for half-pay and pensions absorbs nearly one-fifth
of the entire amount appropriated to the naval service. It is there-
fore a question of supreme importance whether it is essential to
maintain so large a personnel in time of peace. The Germans have
four admirals on their lists, we have fifty; they have forty-one
captains, while we have a hundred and fifty.
It will be objected that there is a deficiency in the supply of
good seamen for the merchant service. I can only say that I have
never experienced any difficulty in obtaining good seamen, and that
I do not offer higher wages than are now being paid in many branches
of the mercantile marine. Some of those from whom the complaints
of the deficiency of seamen proceed have little right to expect to
command the services of valuable men. The wages offered in the
sailing ships proceeding on long voyages compare unfavourably with
those paid in steamers on shorter and less arduous voyages, and are
much below the earnings "of tolerably skilled artizans on shore.
RECENT NAVAL ADMINISTRATION.
85
serve,
The system of engaging large crews for a long voyage at a moment's
notice is not well calculated to secure the services of desirable men.
In what other trade would an employer expect that he could secure
forty skilled men at a moment's notice? In other occupations,
employers, rather than allow a body of good workmen to disperse,
will give them employment, even at a temporary loss to themselves.
In the Navy it is the continuous service system which has so greatly
improved the personnel of the fleet. Shipowners will be compelled
to imitate the continuous service system of the British Navy, as
the only means of securing good crews.
It may, however, be the case that, whatever be the advantages Training
held out, a sufficient number of qualified men could not be obtained the Re-
ships for
to raise the Reserve to such a strength as would justify some reduc-
tion in the personnel permanently attached to the Navy. It may
also be assumed that men cannot be as well trained in the merchant
service as in training ships under the direction of the Admiralty.
Hence it may be considered advisable, from a national point of view,
to grant a subsidy to the training ships, which the shipowners are
now so anxious to see established, in order to provide the merchant
service with the supply of seamen they require.
Such, at least, was the opinion of the Royal Commission on Un-
seaworthy Ships ; and I sincerely hope that their recommendations
may be adopted by the Government. For the Naval Reserve it
would be a great advantage that all the boys, on leaving the training
ship, should pass through a short term of service in the Navy, and if
they cannot be distributed in sea-going ships, where perhaps some
difficulty is already experienced from the extreme youthfulness of
the crews, brigs might be attached to the training ship, commanded by
naval officers, similar to those attached to the training ships at Ports-
mouth and Plymouth. It must always be remembered that, however
large the personnel in time of peace, it can never suffice to meet
the emergencies of war. The war Navyof 1810 was manned by 113,000
seamen. The peace Navy of 1817 was reduced to 13,000. If such
expansions of the Navy are necessary in war, it is only by drawing
seamen from the merchant service that our ships can be manned.
And the process will be more satisfactorily conducted if we prepare
for an emergency by careful organisation in friendly concert with
the leading shipowners of the country.
The same policy may be followed in regard to officers. Many Officers of
pupils from the Conway' and the Worcester’ would be well qualified,
with a short service in the Navy, for commissions in the Naval
Reserve. It is impossible to employ afloat all the officers on the active
Reserve.
86
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
list. The Admiralty should encourage some of those 109 unfortunate
lieutenants, who are living ashore on a miserable half-pay, to follow
up their profession by taking employment in the mercantile marine.
The command of one of our great ocean-going steamers or clippers is a
position which cannot be unworthy of a naval officer, and there are very
few of those lieutenants on half-pay who could not add considerably to
their professional knowledge if they were to command a fine clipper ship
on a voyage round the world. The introduction of our unemployed
naval officers into the merchant service would be a mutual benefit to
both branches of the national marine.
Naval
I must not allow these remarks on the officers of the Navy to
College at
Greenwich. close without a reference to the naval university at Greenwich. It
is an institution which, in an early speech in the House of Commons,
I strongly recommended to the favourable consideration of Mr.
Goschen ; but the regulations, as at present laid down, require
careful revision. All lieutenants should be required to study at the
college for a period of nine months. The voluntary students at the
present time are compelled, out of six hours of study per day, to
devote three, and sometimes four, to mathematics. Two hours a week
at the utmost are devoted to foreign languages. Mathematics,
though always most valuable, are not an indispensable branch of
knowledge for a naval officer, while, on the other hand, ignorance of
modern languages is a too common deficiency in the profession.
Mathematics are not required to lay a gun or to navigate a ship, and
it is a mistake to force men over thirty years of age to an ungrateful
study. Lastly, it should be pointed out that the inducements to
voluntary study at Greenwich are insufficient. Officers who devote
themselves seriously to work, and can pass suitable test examinations,
should be allowed full-pay for a limited period of study.
LETTERS, PAPERS, AND ADDRESSES, .
SECTION VI.
OUR NAVAL STRENGTH AND POLICY.
Reprinted from the Contemporary Review, April 1876.
88
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
OUR NAVAL STRENGTH AND POLICY.
6
Contemporary Review,' April 1876.
tion as a
Naval
Anxiety as PUBLIC attention has lately been directed to the relative strength
to our posi-
of our own and foreign navies. With the true and natural instincts
Power. of an insular people, the momentous importance of the subject has
been universally recognised. The mere enumeration of the armoured
fleets, built and building for foreign nations, has given rise to a
certain uneasiness, which, however, the facts of the case do not
justify, and which it is therefore very desirable to allay.
Our exact position can be best ascertained by referring to the
most competent observers in other countries. It is not less difficult
for nations than for private individuals to form a just judgment of
themselves. We do not look for impartiality in the mutual criticisms
of contending politicians, neither can we rely on the popular
impressions of the day, in making a comparison of the armed
strength of nations. A sound opinion on questions so momentou
and difficult can only be formed by a few professional men, who are
acquainted with all the facts, and can examine the situation without
national bias or prejudice. It may not, therefore, be inopportune,
at a time of active controversy on naval subjects, to furnish to the
British public the means of estimating the relative strength of the
Navy, upon evidence derived from an independent and impartial
source.
American
opinion.
It is only in those countries where the Government is directly
responsible to a popular assembly, that the administrative depart-
ments are allowed to make an unreserved statement of the exact
condition of the naval and inilitary forces, or to comment freely, in
speeches and published reports, on the armed strength and resources
of other Powers. There is no reserve on these subjects in England,
and none in the United States. It is from America, therefore, that
we shall endeavour to obtain a reliable view of the condition of the
British Navy. Here it inay not.be superfluous to explain that the
OUR NAVAL STRENGTH AND POLICY.
89
U.S.N.
state of the United States Navy is not, as with us, reviewed annually
in a long speech by the Secretary at the head of the department.
The subject is more satisfactorily treated in a report addressed to the
President, to which are appended separate reports from the head of
each branch of the naval service, together with a general report, to
which we propose more particularly to refer, from the Admiral
occupying for the time being the position of chief naval adviser to
the department. That important post has been held for many years Admiral
by Admiral Porter, an officer of the highest distinction in the poster:
American Navy. In his successive annual statements, Admiral Porter
has more than once referred to the condition of the British Navy,
and always in high terms of praise :-
• Who,' he says, in his reports for 1874, 'can interfere with British com-
merce, or maltreat a British subject in any part of the world without pay-
ing damages? The combined navies of Europe could not approach the
English coast with safety.'
In another passage he says:
The West Indian drill has made it apparent to our officers that our
combined force of vessels was incapable of a successful encounter with a
fleet a quarter as large, built on modern principles. Indeed, one such ship
as the British 'Inflexible' ought to go through a fleet like ours, and put
the vessels hors-de-combat in a short time. We have no ordnance that
would make any impression on such a ship at a distance of 600 yards; and
no vessel of equal speed in our Navy could be placed under her fire by a
prudent commander.
The reliability of this highly reassuring testimony from Admiral Statement
of M. Dis-
Porter will be confirmed upon a comparison of the numerical strength lère.
of the armoured fleets of the principal maritime Powers.
In our comparison a certain thickness of plating will be assumed
as essential in order to justify us in including a ship in the category
of armoured vessels. Monsieur Dislère has laid it down that armour
of less than seven inches cannot be regarded as a protection against
modern artillery. Without entering into discussion on the soundness
of this opinion, we have accepted it, in the present instance, for the
purpose of making a comparative estimate of the strength of the
most powerful maritime nations of Europe in first class ironclads.
Excluding gun-vessels, France possesses a fleet of twenty-six iron-
clad ships; but, of these, twenty-two are built of wood, and five only
are armoured with plating exceeding seven inches in thickness. There
are in construction in the French naval yards the 'Redoutable,' of
8,500 tons and 1,500 horse-power, two ships of the “Colbert’type, the
Friedland' and the Suffren, of 8,164 tons, three ships, the 'La
6
90
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
German
Navy.
Galissonnière, the “Triomphante,' and the Victorieuse, having a
displacement of 3,445 tons, of 500 horse-power, and armed with ten
guns, and, lastly, the “Tempête,' of 4,452 tons, and 375 horse-
power, and the 'Tonnerre,' of 5,495 tons and 900 horse-power. The
future strength of the French armoured Navy was defined in a pro-
gramme laid down in the year 1872, when it was determined to build
seven ironclads of the first class, five of the second, and eight coast-
defence vessels. Of the first class five ships are built and three are
building; of the second class there are three ships building; and of
the coast-defence class two ships are building and four are built. It
was proposed that the programme should be completed within ten
years, but for this purpose an annual expenditure of 30,000,000 francs
was required. The estimates, however, for the French Navy have
been much reduced ; and the appropriation for the construction of
ironclad ships has thus far been limited to an annual sum of
20,000,000 francs.
In 1873 a programme was laid down for the construction of the
armoured fleet of the German Navy. The plan included the con-
struction of eight first-class ironclads, to be protected by armour ex-
ceeding seven inches in thickness. All these ships are completed.
Six corvettes were proposed. They were to be plated with 6-inch
armour only. One vessel of this class, the "Hansa,' is now in com-
mission, and two other corvettes of the same type are building.
Seven monitors were included in the programme. Two of these
have been built; and the construction of the remaining five vessels
has been abandoned, the German Admiralty being now of opinion
that the harbours on the coast can be more effectually defended by
means of torpedoes and gunboats. Lastly, it was intended to build
two armoured batteries; but these have likewise been abandoned.
The Russian Navy possesses twenty-nine armoured vessels. In
this number, however, are included monitors intended solely for
coast defence, of from 1,600 to 1,400 tons, and plated with 42-inch
armour. Only two sea-going vessels, protected by armour exceeding
seven inches in thickness, have been completed. The ‘Peter the
Great,' which has been so much discussed and dreaded, though
launched in 1872, still remains unfinished.
It will be seen from the above statement that, if we make a com-
parison of the British armoured Navy with the fleets of France,
Germany, and Russia, we possess in our fifteen ships, all built of iron,
none plated with armour of less than seven inches in thickness, and
some defended by a cuirass composed of armour of from sixteen to
twenty-four inches, as in the case of the Inflexible, and from four-
Russian
Navy.
OUR NAVAL STRENGTH AND POLICY.
91
j
teen to sixteen inches, as in the case of the Dreadnought,
* Thunderer,' and 'Devastation,' a fleet at least equal, if not superior,
to those of the three Powers united.
Passing from a review of our present situation to a consideration Future
shipbuild-
of our future shipbuilding policy, it will be the duty of our states- ing policy.
men to take care that, while adequate provision is made for the
security of the country, we do not exceed the scale of expenditure
which is strictly necessary. The vast armies maintained in continental
Europe are a dishonour to the age in the which we live. Let us Bloated
not, without grave necessity, arouse the susceptibilities of other armaments.
nations by reckless additions to our naval estimates which will pro-
bably lead to corresponding expenditure elsewhere. We lay heavy
burdens on the taxpayers of this country: we check the accumula-
tion of those resources which can alone supply the means of enduring
the strain of a protracted naval war; and, after all, the relative strength
remains unchanged. It is equally clear that the composition of the
fleets we may have to encounter, and the nature of the naval opera-
tions which would probably be directed against us, must be taken
into consideration in determining what type we ought to adopt in
the future for our fighting vessels.
France and the United States are our most serious naval rivals.
Shipbuild-
In actual preparation, both of personnel and matériel, and in the ing policy
scale of their annual expenditure, the French are far ahead of any and the
other maritime Power. On the other hand, by their capability for States.
building and manning a fleet, by their inexhaustible capacity for
bearing taxation, by their unrivalled ingenuity, by the number and
skill of their seafaring population, and by the absolute security of
their principal harbours from attack by sea, the United States,
although at present the least prepared of all the Powers of the first
rank, would, in any long protracted naval war, unquestionably become
the most formidable adversary with whom we could have to contend.
There is happily little probability that the problem will be solved
by actual experience in war; and the question is only raised in
these pages as a subject for abstract discussion. Thus regarded,
however, it is very interesting, and indeed essential, to know what
is in the contemplation of the two most important maritime Powers.
Their views have been clearly indicated in recent publications by
very eminent authorities. For the United States we shall refer to
Admiral Porter ; and the current opinion of the French Navy has
been recently and very fully stated both by Monsieur Dislère and by
Baron Grivel, a distinguished naval officer, in his essay entitled De
la Guerre Maritime.
92
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
In both countries it is admitted that pitched battles on the
ocean could not be fought with success against a nation possessing
the unassailable superiority which we have acquired in sea-going
armoured ships.
In his annual report for 1875, Admiral Porter says:
Admiral
Porter,
U.S.N.
It is only by destroying the commerce of a great nation that we could
bring her to terms. Hence iron vessels, like the Alabama,' roaming over
the ocean, sinking and destroying, would do more to bring about peace
than a dozen unwieldy ironclads cruising in search of an enemy of like
character.
Baron
Grivel
>
For this reason he recommends for the American Navy a fleet
of swift wooden cruisers, of at least 1,200 tons, with the heaviest
batteries, and a speed of not less than fourteen knots.
The same policy has been advocated by M. Dislère and by Baron
Grivel. The views of these able writers are identical, and they both
refer to the naval history of their country for evidence and illus-
tration. Baron Grivel truly says that the problem every nation has
to solve may be stated thus :—-Given, a naval expenditure of so
many millions a year, in what proportion shall our naval preparation
be applied.
(1st. To coast defence.
2nd. To the protection of commerce.
* 3rd. To ships intended to engage in great combats, in line of
battle?
With a view to the elucidation of this subject, the naval history
of France is reviewed in an able summary. It is pointed out that
no naval battle has ever produced the same decisive results which
have so often followed from victories gained on land, or has
brought about in the same way the immediate conclusion of a
treaty of peace. The fruitless efforts and cruel sacrifices of the
naval forces of France are properly insisted upon, as an additional
objection to the policy of engaging in those contests between fleets
of line-of-battle ships, which in former times were so persistently
renewed, and which were as advantageous to England as they
detestable, in their results, to her enemies. It is recom-
mended that, whenever France may be engaged in war with a
great maritime nation, she should look to the exhaustion of her
opponent, through the injuries inflicted on trade and industry, as the
most effectual, and indeed the only, means of bringing her to terms.
It is pointed out that England is five times stronger in shipping
than France; a superiority naturally arising from the circumstance
were
OUR NAVAL STRENGTH AND POLICY.
93
that the one is an insular and the other a continental Power. With
such immensely superior resources, it is easy, it is contended, to foresee
the inevitable result of a series of naval battles. "The Minister who,
with wise discernment, shall have selected the fitting time and
opportunity for employing the naval forces of France, and shall
have been able to reach the weak point of the enemy, with compara-
tively limited naval means, will, in the opinion of Baron Grivel,
‘have rendered a greater service to France than Colbert and Richelieu.'
It is, indeed, demonstrated in the page of history that the glory
won by the great naval armaments of France is small, by comparison
with the brilliant achievements of the expeditions conducted on a
less ambitious scale. Between February 1, 1793, and December
31, 1795, the French took 2,095 merchantmen, while, within the
same period, their own losses did not exceed 319 vessels.
If the genius of Napoleon, who once wrote to Bernadotte, 'I have a
hundred ships of the line, and yet I have not a Navy,' had employed the
same sum of money in the construction of swift and well-armed vessels of
much smaller dimensions, a guerilla warfare might have been carried on
upon every sea, which would have brought him ample compensation. A
comparison of the vulnerable surface presented by the maritime commerce
of Great Britain and France respectively will suffice to show where the one
has most to lose, and the other most to gain.
auxiliaries.
Another able French writer, Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, in his Admiral
able essay, La Marine d'Aujourd'hui, while viewing with evident re- In Gravière.
luctance the necessity for abandoning the attempt to maintain the
supremacy of the sea, admits, nevertheless, that the destruction of the
enemy's commerce may be the last resource of the weaker side; and
such a' policy, he acknowledges, it would be necessary to pursue,
should France ever be called upon to engage in a naval contest with
England.
The reasonableness of the views thus developed by the most Mercantile
thoughtful men in the French Navy must convince our own naval
administrators that, in the event of war, our commerce would be
assailed by as many Alabamas' as our enemies could equip and send
forth against us.
Our most obvious means of defence would consist
in arming with guns and torpedoes every available steamer in our
merchant service. Our unrivalled superiority in ocean-going steamers
adapted for conversion into cruisers, would go far to compensate for
our greater vulnerability. It would not, however, be safe to rely
solely on the merchant steamers for the protection of commerce.
As an additional security, I should be glad to see added to our
Shannon
Navy numerous vessels with sufficient armour-protection to give them
class.
94
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
a great advantage in an encounter with unarmoured vessels, although
not adapted to contend on equal terms with enormous ships of the
Inflexible' type. For the protection of commerce, an equal sum
would be spent to greater advantage in building ships of the Shan-
non'class, two or three of which can be built for the amount expended
on one ‘Inflexible.' For an encounter with an 'Alabama,' the 'Shan-
non' is a superfluously powerful antagonist. If, however, we could
send.forth a sufficient number of Shannons' to cruise at sea for the
protection of commerce, the dread of an encounter with an armoured
vessel, from which there would be no possibility of escape, might have
the effect of deterring the enemy's 'Alabamas' from venturing to
sea.
Policy of
Naval
Powers.
Ironclads
indispen-
sable.
It has been shown that we have no reason to expect that other
maritime Powers will expend a large proportion of their comparatively
limited resources on costly ironclads of the Inflexible' type. In
point of fact, we know that neither the Americans, the Russians, nor
the Germans, contemplate at present any addition to their fleets of
armoured ocean-going ships of high freeboard. The Americans are
building no new ironclads of any description. The efforts of the
Russians are eencentrated in the construction of one or two ‘Popoff-
kas’; and the Germans, content with eight splendid ships, have de-
cided to build no more first-class ironclads at present. The French
have a few fine ships in construction ; but the work is being carried
on with a deliberation which shows that serious doubts are entertained
as to the expediency of building any ships of so large a type.
Under these circumstances, what course should be adopted by the
British Admiralty ? With our immense maritime interests, we cannot
afford to sit still like other Powers, who do not depend for their exist-
ence on their commerce. Laying it down, therefore, as an absolute
rule, that our present scale of expenditure shall not be exceeded, un-
less and until the naval expenditure of other Powers shall unhappily
have been considerably augmented, the question we have to consider
is how best to apply the ample resources placed at the disposal of the
Admiralty by a confiding and generous Parliament. This is essen-
tially a naval question ; but even unprofessional minds must be con-
vinced, upon an impartial review of the publicly expressed opinions
of the most competent authorities, that the gun, the ram, and the
torpedo, are indispensable elements of the English naval force; and
that the advantage of arınour, in an engagement between an armoured
and an unarmoured vessel, is such that we cannot venture as yet to
abandon the construction of ironclad ships.
The most recent changes in naval warfare have tended to augment
OUR NAVAL STRENGTH AND POLICY.
95
ment of
the relative power of offensive weapons, as compared with the means Develop-
of defence. Although, therefore, we cannot venture as yet to abandon offeusive
armour altogether, it seems more important to strengthen the fleet power.
in weapons, which are certain to be formidable for attack, rather than
to accumulate armour, which, as a means of defence, is of more doubt-
ful value. The fleet, which has a decided superiority in numbers and
in the power of its guns, its rains and torpedoes, cannot fail to inflict
many irresistible blows, wbile possessing in the wide distribution
of its force perhaps the best security that can be obtained against,
similar weapons in the hands of an enemy.
Pending the discovery of a really reliable automatic torpedo, the Torpedoes.
English Navy should be furnished with an ample store of that simpler
form of torpedo, which is exploded on contact, and is carried at the
extremity of an outrigger some forty feet in length. Torpedoes of
this description have been long in use in the American service, and,
in the hands of men of unflinching courage, would do terrible destruc-
tion. Admiral Porter has graphically described how, 'when the
battle commences, and the ships are enveloped in smoke, rams and
torpedoes will have pretty much their own way; and the more smoke
there is, the better it will be for them.' The ships of the Minotaur'
class have been criticised for their insufficient armour and their exces-
sive length: but they would become most formidable if they were
supplied with torpedo-boats, which they could carry in larger num-
bers than it would be possible to stow in a shorter vessel.
A general and decided concurrence of opinion has been estab- Rams.
lished in favour of steam rams; and as the ram becomes increasingly
formidable in proportion to its mobility or handiness, and the smaller
the tonnage the more easily, cceteris paribus, a vessel can be
manæuvred, it is clearly desirable to limit as closely as possible
the tonnage of all ships intended to be used as rams. Both Baron
Grivel and M. Dislère have recommended that rams for purely
harbour defence should be built without guns.
In rams intended for a wider field of operations, artillery would
appear to be indispensable. In his observations on the best type of
ram Baron Grivel truly says that when we take into view the diffi-
culty of ramming an enemy in the side at right angles, it is evident
that there would be ample opportunity in a naval engagement for
the effective employment of artillery. The addition of guns involves
considerable increase of tonnage, though it is to be hoped it will not
involve the unwieldy dimensions we have unfortunately reached in
our most recent ships.
For bombardments, and for operations against the coasts and Monitors,
96
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
harbours of an enemy, guns are, of course, indispensable. It was on
this ground that Mr. Reed especially insisted, in a recent speech in
the House of Commons, that the construction of ironclads should be
prosecuted with undiminished activity. As, however, a moderate
draught is essential for operations on a coast, ships of the 'Inflexible'
type are not available for such a service. No officers have had so
much experience in naval operations against batteries as the Ameri-
cans who served in the Civil War; and Admiral Porter has stated
in his report for 1875, that after examining over a hundred plans of
foreign ironclads, he thought he was justified in the conclusion that
a vessel like the “Miantonomoh' was better adapted for protecting
coasts and harbours, and for engaging land batteries, than any ship
yet built.
General Von Stosch has decided on abandoning the con-
struction of monitors for the defence of the German harbours, be-
lieving that gunboats and torpedoes will be sufficient for that purpose.
Torpedoes, however, are not available for offensive operations against
land batteries ; and should we find ourselves engaged in the shallow
waters of the Baltic, or the north coasts of Europe, a flotilla of moni-
tors would probably be of great value. The Russians possess fourteen
monitors, while we have only four vessels of the 'Gorgon'type. · An
addition to the number should therefore be proposed in the programme
for next year.
It may be urged that, the smaller the dimensions, the more quickly
a vessel can be built, and that it is less important therefore to proceed
with the monitors than with ships of a larger class. But even moni-
tors could not be laid down and completed within the short space of
time in which modern conflicts have been decided. In any case, if
monitors can be built quickly, gunboats can be built far more quickly,
and on this ground it would be impolitic to spend more on small
unarmoured vessels than is necessary to supply the immediate wants
of the Navy.
We have now to consider, lastly, the most difficult problem of
modern naval construction-viz., the best type to adopt for line of
battle. The progress of events has shown that offensive weapons
have gained a complete ascendency over the means of defence.
Armour no longer affords an impenetrable target to projectiles; and
it gives no protection whatever against the ram and the torpedo.
Armour, of sufficient thickness to be a shield against the fire of the
guns now extensively mounted on board ship, must be so weighty
that it is impossible to protect the high sides of ocean-going vessels;
and we must be content if we can give protection to the water-line,
and to the engines and boilers.
In the great uncertainty which envelopes the future of naval con-
Battle-
ships.
1
OUR NAVAL STRENGTH AND POLICY.
97
creation of
feet.
struction, the Admiralty are clearly right in completing the armoured
vessels already commenced, before undertaking new designs. In a Prince de
paper published by the Prince de Joinville in the Revue des Deux Objections
Mondes, in 1867, and republished with additions in 1871, he endea-
to rapid
vours to show, from the experience derived from the American Civil armoured
War, that in all international struggles the relative strength of the
naval forces of the contending Powers must exercise an important
influence on the issue of the conflict. He thinks that the fleet must
be strong enough, not merely to commit depredations on commerce, but
to maintain the command of the seas. The naval policy recommended
for France by the Prince de Joinville is inspired by ambitious aims;
and yet even he does not advise that the construction of armoured
ships should be prosecuted too rapidly, or that many vessels should
be laid down simultaneously.
'Such rapid progress is being made in these days in inventions, and
in their application and perfection, that what seemed the last word
of science yesterday is out of date to-day. If, therefore, too many
ships of a uniform type are laid down at the same time, a risk is in-
curred of building at a great cost vessels which may be condemned
as useless, before they can be completed for service.
Whatever may be the type adopted, we trust that, for the future,
our naval constructors may be directed by Parliament to confine
themselves within the limits of tonnage laid down by Admirals
Elliot and Ryder, who, in their separate reports, as members of the
Admiralty Committee on recent designs for ships of war, expressed
their conviction that distribution rather than concentration of force
should be the aim of the naval architect, and that a tonnage of
9,000 tons should never be exceeded.
We may now proceed to recapitulate our various suggestions for General
the future shipbuilding policy of the Navy. The construction of
first-class armoured ships should not be discontinued. Whatever
may be the final issue of the contest between armour and projectiles,
armour is still essential to enable a ship of war to engage in line of
battle. But, while the construction of ships of the most formidable
type is still carried on, we venture to hope that a portion of the
expenditure will in the future be appropriated to the construction of
a considerable number of small armoured vessels for special services,
and we would particularly invite the attention of the Admiralty to
the strong recommendations, by officers of foreign navies, in favour
of rams without guns for general service, and specially for the defence
of harbours, and to the high estimate formed by the American officers
of the monitor type for the purpose of attacking land batteries.
conclu-
sions,
VOL. IV.
H
98
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
It affords us much satisfaction to acknowledge, in conclusion,
that, when we pass in review, calmly and dispassionately, the most
recent phases of the shipbuilding policy of the British nation, it
must be pronounced on the whole to have been eminently successful.
The gradual development of our power, in a succession of original
designs, embracing every kind of innovation upon the types in vogue
fifteen years ago, reflects the highest credit on the naval and pro-
fessional officers, by whom the shipbuilding programme of the
Admiralty has been advised and executed.
LETTERS, PAPERS, AND ADDRESSES.
SECTION VII.
ON THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS
OF THE NAVY.
H2
100
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
ON THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS OF THE NAVY.
Cost of
repairs in
French
BEFORE entering upon other matters it may not be superfluous to
remark that all sudden changes of policy in naval administration
ought to be avoided. Large dismissals of workmen shake the con-
fidence of those employed in the dockyards; a spasmodic increase
of activity is always costly, and designs not sufficiently considered
are often disappointing, and involve great expense in subsequent
alteration. Differences of opinion have arisen between successive
Boards of Admiralty as to the appropriation of the resources of the
dockyards. Some have advocated the policy of keeping the fleet at
all times in thorough repair, while others have urged that in a time
of peace we should devote ourselves to building, as being a slower
process than repairing.
As we are engaged in criticising, it ought in fairness to be
stated that the English Admiralty have been more successful than
dockyards. the French in checking expenditure on repairs. The Financial
Commission of the French Senate, in their report for 1877, direct
special attention to the fact that for the construction and repair of a
fleet of about half the tonnage, 6,000 more men are employed in the
French dockyards than in the English. In our own dockyards 16,109
workmen are employed, at a total charge of 1,008,8541., or 621. 188.
per head; while 26,000 men are employed in the French dockyards, at
a total charge of 920,000l. It is difficult to arrive at the exact cost
of new ships built in the public yards; but we know that the cost of
ships built by contract is about the same in both countries. The
difference, if any, is in favour of the English shipbuilders. When
we come to the cost of maintenance and repairs, as stated by M.
Dislère in his exhaustive analysis of the naval expenditure of the two
countries, we find a marked and striking contrast.
!
England
France
Ships in commission
Cost of labour
Total cost of labour and material
255,000 tons
3,580,000 francs
30 francs
170,000 tons
3,730,000 francs
91 francs
per ton
11
ON THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS OF THE NAVY. 101
)
If we may venture to accept the data supplied by M. Dislère, it
would appear that the repairs of the French fleet are three times as
costly as the repairs of the English fleet.
In the debates in the Chamber of Deputies on the Naval Estimates
for 1880, M. Eugène Farcy exposed the mistakes of the French naval
administration unsparingly. He quoted the case of the armoured
ram Taureau,' the turret of which, after completion, was condemned
as defective, another turret being constructed to replace it. When
the new turret was completed, it was discovered that no means of
access had been provided, and the armour, of 12 c/m. in thick-
ness, was cut with the cold chisel in order to make the necessary
aperture. The Taureau' made an unsuccessful trial, and numerous
alterations were required, the result being that the final cost of the
ship was no less than eight million francs, as compared with the
original estimate of five millions. Similar mistakes were made in the
case of the “ Tonnerre,' a vessel of the same class.
M. Farcy referred to the case of the Victorieuse,' which was
fitted out to carry the Admiral's flag in the Pacific. When supposed
to be ready for sea, it was found that extensive repairs were required.
The vessel had descended the Charente from Rochefort, and having
received her armament and stores, it was ascertained that she was
not fit to go to sea. She could not ascend the river again, as she
had her armament on board, and was therefore sent to Brest to be
docked. At Brest it was ascertained beyond doubt that the ship was
not seaworthy, and the 'Magicienne' was accordingly fitted out to
take her place. The sum wasted in this case was not less than
620,000 francs.
M. Farcy referred to the case of the transport - Aveyron.'
This vessel was fitted out on May 5, 1878, and when required for
service on December 5 following, it was found that she was not fit to
be employed. It was accordingly necessary to fit out another trans-
port, the Corrèze,' for the same service. A short time afterwards the
same thing occurred in the case of the Dryade,' another transport,
which was found unfit for service, and for which the Européenne
and afterwards another ship were selected as substitutes.
It is the fashion to find fault with the naval administration of
this country. The administration of a service of such complexity
cannot be free from error, but the work, in the main, is done in a
manner which oughi to give satisfaction to the country. Those who
criticise the British Admiralty so severely should sometimes look
abroad, to see how they manage these things in foreign countries.
In Russia the "Peter the Great' cost fifty per cent. more than.
.
+
102
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
+
that valuable vessel the 'Devastation': and the Vice-Admiral Popoff,
which cost 420,000l., represents to the Russian taxpayer little more
than the value of old iron.
Upon the question of the cost of work in our own and in foreign
dockyards, the figures given by M. Dislère offer some interesting
particulars. The French · Duquesne,' he points out, might be com-
pared with H.M.S. 'Inconstant.' The type was the same in each
case, and the displacements were 5,436 and 5,560 tons respectively.
The cost of the French ship was 300,0001.; that of the English ship
was 228,0001. In the second class, the “Duguay-Trouin,' of 3,177
tons, corresponds with the Volage,' of 3,143 tons, in our own
Navy. The French ship cost 164,0001., while the cost of the English
ship was 134,0001. A comparison of the cost of the engines, taken
as a separate item, results not less favourably to our own country.
The amount expended on the engines of the “ Duguay-Trouin,' with
6,589 indicated horse-power, is 96,0001., while the cost of the engines
of the 'Inconstant, with 7,460 indicated horse-power, is 76,0001.
Again, the engines of the 'Bourayne,' of 960 indicated horse-power
cost 12,4001.; those of the Encounter,' of 2,156 indicated horse-
power, cost 19,6001.
Considering the relative numbers of the ships maintained in
commission in the two navies, and the new tonnage produced in
the dockyards, it is a remarkable circumstance that, while the number
of workmen in the English establishments is fixed at 16,000, the
number in the French dockyards in recent years has been from
22,000 to 28,000. The wages of all classes of workmen in the French
service have been recently advanced five per cent., and a promise
has been made by the Minister of Marine of an advance of fifteen
per cent. within two years. The Government undertake to bring
the wages in the dockyards to the level of those in the private
trade.
In the German Navy, where the integrity and economy of the
administration have never been questioned, we find, from statistics
published in the Revue Maritime, that the cost of maintenance has
attained proportions even more serious than those which have at-
tracted so much attention in this country.
As a whole the administration of the British dockyards will
opinions of challenge comparison with any other. Its defects are inherent in
dockyard every Government establishment. Its merits have been loudly extolled
by the successive committees on the French Naval Estimates; by
Chief Engineer King, of the United States Navy; by M. Dislère, and
many equally competent critics.
Favourable
administra-
tion.
ON THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS OF THE NAVY. 103
.
Mr. King, in his European Ships of War, pays a high tribute
of praise to our dockyard administration : "The system of dockyard
administration is the best in existence. One fan.iliar as I am
with dockyard duties and with workshops generally, at home and
abroad, cannot but feel impressed on observing the prompt and
businesslike way in which the duties are carried on in these great
British naval establishments. No idle officers or loitering persons
are to be seen in any place within one of these yards at any time
during working hours.
“The contrast between these admirably conducted establishments
and those of France and other continental countries, Germany ex-
cepted, is noticeable soon after entering the gates. There, and
especially in France, numerous idle officers in uniform, and loitering
workmen, may be seen in every department entered.
Mr. King, in another report on the dockyards and iron works of
France and England, speaks in the highest terms of the admirable
workmanship of the 'Achilles. During the ten months that she
had been afloat not a wine-glass of water had leaked into her, a cir-
circumstance unprecedented in the history of shipbuilding.
Gratifying as it is to receive such assurances from foreign ob- Compara-
servers, the conviction that we do not suffer by comparison should
not diminish our anxiety to improve and perfect our organisation.
England,
Let us therefore examine the reasons why the relative expen- France, and
Germany.
diture on building is so much less in England than in France and
Germany. It has been the settled policy of this country for many
years past to spend a much larger sum on the personnel in proportion
to the matériel than is expended in other countries excepting France,
The large number of officers and men maintained in our Navy entail,
not only a direct expenditure in pay and building and repairing sea-
going ships, but also in retired pay and pensions. The non-effective Non-effec-
votes may be estimated at two millions. The entire expenditure,
ordinary and extraordinary, on the German Navy is only 2,250,0001.
The growth of the non-effective expenditure may be appreciated
by a comparison with the estimates of twenty years ago. In 1860–
61 the total amount of the estimates was 12,836,0001., or in round
figures 2,340,0001. more than the estimates for 1880-81. At the
earlier date the total amount of the non-effective vote was 1,353,0981.,
or 591,0001. less than the amount which Parliament is called upon
to vote for the ensuing financial year.
tive naval
expen-
diture in
tive votes,
Having referred to the non-effective vote, the large expenditure Compara-
on the maintenance of our foreign squadrons may be specially men- diture of
tive expen-
104
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
the naval
Powers on
mainte-
nance of
ships in
commis-
sion.
tioned as involving a serious deduction from the sum available for the
construction of fighting ships. Our armoured shipbuilding advances
but slowly, because we have accepted the self-imposed duty of main-
taining the police of the seas, while other countries, evading their
share of this burdensome obligation, are able to concentrate their re-
sources on fighting ships. It was calculated by Sir Spencer Robinson
that for every man voted for the Navy 101. were required in wages to
artificers.
It is interesting here to notice that for a period of a hundred and
fifty years prior to the great naval war, an expenditure of 41. per man
per month was found sufficient to cover the ordinary services for the
maintenance of the fleet in commission. In 1798 the sum voted was
increased to 71. per man, distributed as follows:
Wages
.
€ S.
a.
1 17 0
3 0 0
1 18 0
0 5 0
U
Remarks
of the
Secretary
of the
United
States
Navy,
1869.
Ironclads
in commis-
sion in
British
Navy.
Ironclads
Wear and tear of ship
Victualling
Ordnance.
The report of the Secretary of the United States Navy in 1869
called attention to the marked difference in the expenditure on ships
in commission in the principal mercantile countries. At that date
the ships of war in commission under the United States flag repre-
sented a total tonnage of 55,455 tons, or one-eightieth of their total
mercantile tonnage. At the corresponding date the tonnage of the
French ships of war in commission was 250,000, or one-eighth of their
maritime tonnage. The English ships in commission represented a
total of 328,614 tons, or one-seventeenth of the total maritime
tonnage.
In the year 1880 the British force of ironclads in commission in-
cluded four ships in the Channel fleet, six in the Mediterranean, one
on the North American station, two on the Pacific station, two on the
China station, and nine reserve ships. At the present time the
in commis- French foreign-going ironclads are only two in number, one of these
being employed as a flagship in the Pacific and the other on the China
Navy.
station. Nine ships are kept together in European waters as a
squadron of evolutions, and one ironclad is under trial. The German
squadron of evolutions consists of four ships, and these are kept in
commission only during the summer months. Our expenditure on
the repairs of ironclads is much heavier than that of any other
maritime Power, and this arises from the large number in commission
in time of peace. Taking an average of years, it may be assumed
that the cost of repairs will be about 10,0001. per annum for each
ironclad in commission. A good administration should seek to keep
French
ON THE MAINTENANCE ANI) REPAIRS OF THE NAVY. 105
mont.
ships in perfect fighting order. It cannot be a wise policy to fit out
every new ship for a three or four years' commission.
Should a war
break out, the vessel may require new boilers, and be unavailable for
active service when urgently wanted.
M. Bethmont, the author of the able report of the Committee of M. Beth-
the French Chamber on the naval estimates for 1878, has shown that in
Germany 66 per cent. of the money voted for the Navy is devoted to
the construction of new ships. The corresponding percentage in
Russia is 62 per cent. ; in England, 36 ; in France, 35 per cent.
According to M. Dislère, our expenditure in maintaining ships in M. Dislère.
commission amounts to 2,200,0001. The French expenditure is
900,0001. The proportion, therefore, is as 2:1 to 1. With this outlay
we keep up 130 ships of 255,000 tons displacement, manned by
31,600 men, while the French have 89 ships of 179,000 tons, manned
by 17,350 men, the displacement of the ships being as 1.5 to 1, and
the strength of the crews as 1.8 to 1. Every man afloat costs in
France 531. 48. ; in our own service, 661. a year. The total expen-
diture 'on ships in commission, including repairs, stores, and coal, on
ships in reserve and old ships in reserve may be estimated at
1,410,9231.
The very different measure in which the cost of the police of the Analysis of
seas is apportioned, as between this country and France and Germany, foreign
will be most effectively illustrated by giving a short analysis of the
composition of their respective fleets on several foreign stations.
If we compare our squadrons in the South Atlantic and on the South
east coast of America with the corresponding forces maintained
under the French flag, we find that the French have in the South
Atlantic at Guyenne, Senegal, and in the West Indies two first-class
cruisers, three corvettes, and two sloops, with other smaller vessels,
forming a total of 12,360 tons. Our own forces comprise a total of
33 ships, with an equivalent tonnage of 47,040 tons. In the Pacific Pacific.
we have two ironclads of an aggregate tonnage of 12,099 tons, and
9,112 tons of unarmoured vessels, distributed in seven ships; the
French have one ironclad of 4,214 tons, and five unarmoured vessels,
with a total tonnage of 4,896 tons; the Germans have one ironclad
of 3,610 tons, and three unarmoured vessels of 5,331 tons.
When I was in the Pacific all our ships except the Shah' were
sensibly inferior in speed, and three were very inferior in tonnage,
to the French ships. It is a question whether a reduced number
of larger vessels better adapted to make long voyages under sail on
the wide waters of the Pacific might not be at once more serviceable,
aud less expensive. In the discussion on the Naval Essays of 1878
fleets on
stations.
Atlantic.
106
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
China.
at the United Service Institution, Captain Long, who had just
returned from the Pacific, said : " Telegraphic communication forms
a new element in the question of the distribution of our naval forces.
It is more valuable to have a powerful vessel that can go rapidly
from your telegraphic centre, performing the service you require,
and come back rapidly ready to perform another service, than to
have a number of smaller vessels which are less capable of performing
rapid passages, and may not perhaps be ready for months. A change
in the direction indicated by Captain Long has lately been made,
the Comus' and ' Albatross' having been commissioned as reliefs
for five smaller vessels.
On the China station we have two ironclads, of a total tonnage
of 8,785 tons, and nineteen unarmoured vessels, of a total tonnage
of 21,293 tons and 141 guns. On the same station the French
have nine vessels, of 10,670 tons and 38 guns, and the Germans
four vessels, of an aggregate tonnage of 6,519 tons and 28 guns.
The flag of the United States is represented by the "Swatara,
· Richmond,'' Ashuelot,''Monocacy,'' Alert,' and 'Palos”; total 43
guns.
The Russian squadron includes the following vessels : ‘Minin,
armoured corvette, 5,740 tons, 16 guns; "Najezdnik,' “Djigit,' and
“Razboynik,' corvettes, each of 1,334 tons, and three guns; 'Asia,'
converted merchant steamer; gun-vessels : “ Abrek,' 1,069 tons and
seven guns; "Tunguz,' 706 tons, four guns; and the 'Gomostai,
Nerpe,'' Morge,' Sokol, 'Mandjour,' and · Ermak, gunboats.
Setting aside special emergencies, and looking only to the ordi-
nary duties of the police of the seas, it is a matter for very grave
consideration how far it is necessary to maintain so many small
vessels in commission in China. The suggestion that our ships
should he fewer in number, but of a more powerful class, would
seem to apply to the China squadron not less than to our fleet on
the Pacific station. Commander Hayes, in his prize essay, recom-
mends vessels of the Comus' class, as cruisers capable of steaming
against the monsoon. It requires careful management to bring our
flagship, the "Audacious,' against the monsoon from Singapore to
Hong Kong. It is necessary to coal at Labuan, to hug the shore,
and to adopt, in short, every expedient for husbanding the inadequate
supply of coal. These measures involve delay in making the passage,
which might be of most serious consequence in the emergency of
>
war.
1 This statement refers to the number of ships in 1878. During 1880 it has
been considerably increased.
ON THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS OF THE NAVY. 107
Indies.
maintained
On the East India station we have twelve vessels, of 16,141 East
tons; the French have four vessels, of 4,463 tons. On the Australian
station we have nine vessels. In the surveying service we have
six ships ; on particular service, fifteen ships, and ordered home nine
vessels. None of these are ironclads.
It should be the policy of every Administration to keep down Squadrons
the expenditure on the construction and repair of vessels which add partly for
training
nothing to the fighting strength of the Navy. It is, however, to be the Navy.
borne in mind that the Navy is maintained in time of peace partly
for the purposes of training, and a sufficient number of ships must
therefore be maintained to give employment to the officers, on whom
we must rely in time of war. Regarded as a training service, the
naval force now employed is perhaps barely sufficient for its purpose,
and could not safely be reduced. The composition, however, of the
force to be maintained, its distribution, and the substitution of a
flying squadron for a more stationary service, affording fewer oppor-
tunities of acquiring experience at sea, are subjects which deserve
much careful consideration. Money would be saved by training our
young seamen in the Mediterranean in a squadron of sailing vessels
of the · Cruiser 'type.
sources
ture on
Probably everyone who has been connected with the Admiralty Naval re-
has experienced the same disappointment, when he has come to absorbed by
realise how large a proportion of the money voted is absorbed in expendi-
maintenance, and how small a proportion is represented by permanent repairs.
additions to the strength of the fleet. It is because the dockyard
resources have been so largely appropriated to repairs that the
expenditure on the construction of new ships has hitherto borne a
smaller proportion than might have been desired to the total outlay.
The armoured construction in the dockyards and by contract, Mr. Shaw-
according to Mr. Shaw-Lefevre's return, was :-
Lefevre's
return;
tons built.
Tons
1874-75
1875-76
1876-77
1877-78
1878-79
8,457
14,276
11,448
7,113
8,430
C
The estimates for 1880-81 provide a total amount of 860,0001.
for the construction of 7,231 tons weight of armoured shipping,
which may be roughly set down as equivalent to 11,500 tons of
displacement, a tonnage which would represent the addition to the
Navy list of one Inflexible,
108
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
The programme proposed by Mr. Childers as representing the
normal requirements of the British Navy included 12,000 tons of
armoured, and 7,500 tons of unarmoured ships. Of this tonnage
4,000 tons were to be built by contract. This was estimated to
give three new ironclads, one frigate, one corvette, and six small
vessels annually. Taking the life of an ironclad at twenty years, this
would produce and keep up a force of fifty to sixty ironclads.
In 1878 M. Dislère gave the following comparative view of the
navies and naval constructions of the two countries :-
French
estimates
and ship
building
pro-
gramme.
England
France
Tons
Tons
Ships afloat--Modern fleet
Wooden fleet
In construction
241 513,000
27 107,000
53 65,600
176 382,000
61 150,000
61 39,600
Germany.
For every 1,000 tons of the modern fleet afloat England was
constructing 102, France 104 tons. The whole sum voted for naval
construction and repairs in the French estimates of 1879 was
2,450,0001. Half of this amount is appropriated to the building
of new ships. In France, by a decree of the National Assembly in
1875, an annual credit of 1,200,000l. was set apart for the construc-
tion of 48 new ships, including 16 first-class ironclads, 12 second-
class ironclads, and 20 coast-defence armoured vessels, all to be
completed in 1885.
Germany devotes 1,200,0001. to the ordinary expenditure of the
Navy, and 1,700,0001. to the extraordinary expenditure. Of the
extraordinary expenditure about 800,0001. are devoted to ship-
building, 30,0001. to torpedoes and torpedo-boats, and 40,0001. to
the armament of the fleet. The German programme includes
sixteen armour-plated ships of the first class, to be completed
in 1882.
The English estimates provide for an average annual expenditure
of one inillion sterling on the construction of armoured, and three-
quarters of a million on unarmoured ships.
While admitting that there is no cause for misgiving as to our
present position as a naval Power, the expenditure in her Majesty's
dockyards demands serious consideration with a view to discover a
means of curtailing the cost of maintenance and repair. We may
building for have, a force of more than respectable power in comparison with
Navy. foreign navies, but in view of the efforts of rival nations it becomes
our urgent duty to curtail wasteful expenditure, and to apply the
Important
to reduce
cost of
mainte-
nance and
increase
ship-
British
1
ON THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS OF THE NAVY, 109
I
Mr. Chil-
money saved by judicious retrenchment to the construction of fight-
ing ships.
The extent to which the resources of the dockyards are absorbed Efforts of
in the maintenance of our large force of ships in commission is clearly ders.
shown in the Appendix to the Estimates, giving the appropriation of
men from year to year. A great effort was made by Mr. Childers to
increase the proportion of men employed in building. In 1870-71,
the number was 6,349, as against 4,793 employed in repairs. It
was found by experience that these numbers could not be maintained,
and in 1872–73,5,639 men were appropriated to building, and 7,102
to the repairs of the fleet. In the estimates for 1880–81 we have
5,795 for building, and 9,769 for repairs.
The rapid increase in the expenditure in repairs is clearly shown Analysis of
shipbuild-
in the report on the shipbuilding accounts of 1877–78 by Mr. ing ac-
Hamilton, the Accountant-General. The aggregate expenditure, 1877–78.
counts,
extending over a period of nine years, is given in the following
table:
Ironclads
Unarinoured
Total
6
€
1
1869-70
1870-71
1871–72
1872–73
1873-74
1874-75
1875–76
1876-77
1877-78
1878–79
130,743
182,065
87,595
158,923
291,381
320,229
321,871
207,446
489,182
430,677
446,549
478,551
397,342
389,983
524,601
672,570
631,806
600,210
580,243
650,219
577,292
669,616
484,937
545,916
815,982
992,792
953,677
807,656
1,069,435
1,080,296
The next table gives the sums spent on shipbuilding, as distin-
guished from repairs :-
Ironclads
Unarmoured
Total
1
!
+
1869–70
1870-71
1871-72
1872–73
1873-74
1874-75
1875–76
1876-77
1877-78
1878-79
1,076,384
1,014,215
695,038
299,825
385,959
742,164
1,058,463
940,318
1,948,472
631,195
310,699
316,599
489,134
509,262
904,069
785,997
554,755
1,181,642
973,970
876,854
1,387,047
1,330,814
1,184,172
8099,087
1,290,028
1,528,161
1,613,218
2,121,260
2,922,442
1,508,049
110
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
During the nine years, 1869–78, we expended 6,676,3471. on
building, and 5,224,7091. on the repairs of our unarmoured vessels.
In the same period the expenditure on the construction of armoured
ships amounted to 8,792, 5951., while the expenditure on repairs was
2,619,5121. Going back to the first introduction of ironclads into
the Navy, we find that, while the total expenditure from 1859 to
1868-69 was 116,000,0001., only 10,000,0001. were expended in
building ironclad ships.
The previous observations will have afforded some explanation of
the reasons why a comparatively small proportion of the money
voted for the Navy is applied to the construction of fighting vessels.
It has been the policy of this country to maintain a force of ships in
commission far exceeding the corresponding numbers in the French
and German Navies. Admitting, however, that the maintenance of
such a force entails inevitably a large expense, there is reason to believe
that our expenditure has not in all cases been judiciously applied.
The following statement gives the cost of construction, date
of completion, and subsequent expenditure on repairs of certain
armoured ships :
Cost of
repairs of
armoured
ships.
Date of Completion
Total cost
Cost of Repairs to
Diarch 22, 1879
€
.
1
Invincible
Ayincourt
Swiſtsure
Northumberland
Triumph .
Warrior
Devastation
Glatton
Iron Duke
Monarch .
Repulse
Sultan
October 1, 1870
December, 1868
June 27, 1872
October, 1868
April 8, 1873
October, 1861
April 19, 1873
April 24, 1872
January 21, 1871
August 5, 1869
January 30, 1870
October 10, 1871
249,203
483,000
267,718
490,680
268,561
377,292
361,438
223,101
208,763
371,415
247,282
374,777
101,262
156,195
42,336
170,202
79,888
200,185
33,100
28,548
97,960
159,077
70,543
89,302
Cost of re-
pairs of
certain un-
armoured
vessels.
The extent to which expenditure on repairs has been carried may
be best understood by quoting a few examples, taken from the
returns obtained by Mr. Goschen, Mr. Shaw-Lefevre, and Sir John
Hay. Limiting our view to the unarmoured vessels, we find in the
class of corvettes that the Wolverine,' of 2,431 tons, was repaired
at a cost of 38,0911., and the “Druid, of 1,871 tons, at a cost of
36,0001. The Thetis,' another wooden vessel of the same class,
built at Devonport, in 1871, at a cost of 76,2001., and the En-
counter,' of 1,934 tons, built at Sheerness, in 1873, at a cost of
73,3001., were each repaired at an expense of 30,0001., after one
1
ON THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAİRS OF THE NAVY. 111
class.
commission. Seven small wooden corvettes, of the “Danae 'class,
of 1,755 tons, were repaired at an average cost for each of 30,2941.
The return No. 312, for 1878, shows the cost of repairs to six wood-
built sloops of from 1,000 to 1,400 tons, including the 'Amethyst,
· Briton, Dido,'Druid,' and the Encounter,' and Thetis,' which
have already been mentioned. Although neither of these ships had
done more than five years' service, the cost of repairs to the six was
estimated at 166,0001., and the actual cost was probably not far short
of 200,0001.
The wooden vessels of the Royal Navy are built of the best
materials, and are so fastened as to make them eligible for a sixteen
years' class at Lloyd's ; and get the expenditure on repairs in the
cases cited was equal to half their original cost, within a period of
from twelve to fourteen years.
The cause of the rapid decay of corvettes of the 'Danae 'class was Danne'
discussed in the columns of the Broad Arrow of December 20, 1879.
The writer asserts that the frame timbers had been fitted too closely,
leaving half the number of air-spaces that are usual in the mercantile
navy, and impeding ventilation, which is the best preventive of the
growth of fungus in timber.
Passing on to the smaller class, the ‘Fantôme 'sloop, of 894 tons, Bird
was repaired at a cost of 17,7801.; while seven gun-vessels of the
Bird 'class, of 774 tons, were repaired at an average expense for each
of 16,9701., and ten composite gun-vessels, of 584 tons, at an average
cost of 10,9651. The expenditure on repairs in these two classes
was, as nearly as possible, half the original cost of the hull and
machinery.
The same tendency to extravagance in repairs and alterations
exists in every Navy, and the explanation is not far to seek. It was
remarked by M. Lamy, an eminent authority on naval subjects, in
the debates in the French Chamber in 1878, that it is the ambition
of every officer to make his ship as perfect as possible. Vessels
under construction have no natural protectors.
The last report of the Accountant-General on the dockyard Report of
expense accounts calls attention to the alterations of the ships pur- tant-lene-
chased out of the vote of credit in March, 1878. Up to March 31, expense
accounts,
1879, the cost of the 'Neptune' had been raised from 600,0001. to
632,8221. The cost of the Superb' had been raised froin 453,4751.
to 489,3221. The cost of the Belleisle' had been raised from
243,4461. to 267,1861.
The cost of alterations in other cases is given in the following ac- Cost of al-
count, showing first estimates and final cost of hull on completion of ironclads.
class and
gun-vessels.
1878-9.
112
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
armoured ships launched from H.M. dockyards during the last ten
years :
Name
First Estimate
for Hull
Tinal Cost of
Hull on
Completion
Remarks
6
€
Alexandra.
Devastation
Dreadnought
311,000
236,000
269,000
395,792
290,660
493,035
.
Glatton
Iron Duke
Rupert
Shannon
Sultan
Téméraire
Thunderer
Agamemnon
Ajax
Inflexible
.
143,666
200,686
169,000
168,000
320,000
281,000
236,000
350,000
350,000
401,000
Laid down 1873
1869
1870
(but subsequently
reconstructed)
Laid down 1868
1868
1870
1873
1868
1873
1869
1876
1876
1874
189,133
146,314
192,139
233,902
281,576
367,739
306,346
1385,000
1385,000
1563,497
"
.
6
Our Naval
Coast De-
fences.'
In a lecture delivered at the Midland Institute, Birmingham, on
March 27, 1871, Sir E. Reed suggested that preparations should be
made for the construction of ships in time of war, by providing keel-
sons, stern-posts, frames, and the heavier parts of the machinery,
postponing the completion of the ships until they were required for
service. By the adoption of his plan, he contended that the most
suitable types could be adopted, and the vessels built in conformity
with the most recent developments of maritime warfare. The follow-
ing extracts are taken from Sir E. Reed's paper :
We have at our hands abundant material and labour for turning
out an enormous number of small-size coast-defence vessels, in an ex-
Address at tremely short time, provided—1, that all our plans for the production
Birming-
of these vessels are in perfect readiness; 2, that we construct before-
March 27,
1871. Sir hand the sterns, stern-posts, engine-shafts, and other parts, which
1. J. Reed, necessarily take time to produce, and which no amount of labour and
K.C.B.
no expenditure of money can possibly produce quickly. By the wise
expenditure of a sum equal to the price of a single vessel, upon those
essential parts which take a considerable time to manufacture, we
may possess ourselves of the means of quickly producing ten vessels
whenever they are wanted. This plan has the recommendation of
possessing great elasticity. A vessel may undergo great modifications
of idea and of design, consistently with the employment of the same
stern, stern-post, engine-shafts, &c., in each case; and it will be an
immense advantage if, instead of crowding our harbours with vessels
1 Estimated vessels in hand.
ham,
M.P.
ON THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS OF THE NAVY. 113
construc
built on certain fixed and unalterable types, we adopt measures which
will leave us free to improve our designs while holding in our hands
the means of suddenly developing our powers.'
It is a regrettable result of the long delays in the completion of
our ships that they are comparatively out of date when they are first
commissioned. Ships can be and ought to be constructed with greater
expedition. The report of the Commission of the French Chambers
on the Naval Estimates for 1879 refers particularly to this subject.
It is pointed out that in 1876, 90,000 tons were building in the
English and 130,000 tons in the French dockyards; that twenty-three
ships had been commenced in England and forty-seven in France ;
that eight armoured ships were in progress in England and eighteen
in France; and that of the 130,000 tons on the stocks in France it
had been proposed to complete 24,600, whereas of the 90,000 tons
undertaken by England 32,500 were to be completed.
M. Lamy, in criticising the French Naval Estimates of 1878, M. Lamy.
Delays in
spoke in terms of condemnation of the system adopted in France,
the construction of too many ships being attempted at the same time, tion.
and the completion of each vessel being proportionately delayed. In
the year 1878 one second-class ironclad, one armoured coast-defence
vessel, one gunboat, and four small sloops and one transport were
completed, while five ironclads, two armoured coast-defence vessels,
and two gunboats were commenced, the amount of work executed
upon each of the new vessels varying from oths to 10 and
ths. M. Lamy complained that the result of this policy was
that each ship occupied too long in construction, the latest ideas
being rarely embodied in the completed design.
M. Lamy's speech in the Chambers contained the following obser-
vations:
· La lutte qui s'est engagée entre le canon et la cuirasse a lancé «Rev.
l'artillerie dans une voie de progrès gigantesques, continus, dont chacun
est marqué par un changement dans la structure des navires. Le 1878,
temps n'est plus aux escadres composées de navires de même modèle.
Chaque navire est un type supérieur à ceux qui l'ont précédé, inférieur
à ceux qui vont le suivre. Enfin, les bâtiments sont en fer; par suite,
la lenteur des constructions a cessé d'être nécessaire.
“Quelle conclusion a été tirée de ces faits par toutes les marines du
monde et par notre conseil d'Amirauté ?
“C'est qu'il faut ne construire à la fois qu'un très-petit nombre de
types, mais quand on se résout à en construire un, le pousser avec
une grande activité, de façon à produire dans les conditions les plus
15
100
Mar.
March
p. 731.
VOL. IV.
I
114
· DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
rapides un navire qui, pendant un instant au moins, soit le dernier
terme du progrès.'
Commis-
sion ou
French
Navy
Estimates,
1879.
General
expenses.
Tron should
be substi.
tuted for
wood.
The report of the Commission on the French Budget for 1879 calls
attention to the striking differences in the time occupied in building
ships of similar type in the private and public shipbuilding yards.
The ' Foudroyant,'armoured ironclad of the first class, was built by the
State in five years. The “Duperré,' a more important ship, was built
in a private yard in three years and six months. The Caiman,' coast-
defence ship, was built by the State in five years ; the 'Requin,' of
the same type, by a private firm in three years and a half. The
Duquesne,' first-class cruiser, was finished in six years; the “ Tour-
ville,' a sister ship, was built by a private firm in two years and nine
months. The report contains a large number of examples equally
remarkable.
The total amount of votes six and ten, for the ten years 1869–79,
was 33,202,5801. The total expenditure, direct and indirect, on the
building of contract-built and dockyard-built ships, and on repairs,
was 28,621,9441. The difference between the total sum voted by
Parliament and the actual expenditure on ships shows that the
general expenses of the yards are a serious drain on the Naval
Estimates.
The excessive expenditure on repairs would be much reduced by
the gradual substitution of iron for wood-built and composite vessels.
Iron ships are now universally preferred by mercantile shipowners,
not only for their superior strength, but because they are less costly
to maintain. The want of durability in the wooden ironclads has been
shown by the disappearance of the large fleet of ships of that class,
which we originally created. It has been proved in France by the
enormous expenditure in repairs.
In a letter to the Times on February 28, 1876, Sir E. Reed
called attention to this subject :--
· The greatest waste and decay has been going on, as was clearly
foreseen, among our wood-built ironclads. When ironclads came
into vogue we had many partly built wooden line-of-battle ships on
the stocks, and vast stores of Italian and English oak adapted for
the construction of many more. It was well understood that iron
was much more suitable for the purpose than wood, and our first
ships (“Warrior," " Defence,” &c.) were built of iron. But the tempta-
tion to utilise the timber hulls and timber stores was very great and
very natural, and the Admiralty of the day yielded to it, knowing
perfectly well that wood-built ships sheathed in iron armour would
Letter of
Sir E.
Reed,
February,
1876.
ON THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS OF THE NAVY. 115
be short-lived. We can scarcely blame them; I less than most
persons, for at my request, and when I had placed the design of the
iron “Bellerophon” in their hands, they ceased entirely to build
new armoured ships in wood, and never afterwards even converted
more than one or two of those remaining on the stocks.
The official Navy List for this year indicates how soon the wood-
built ships have decayed. The following wood-built ironclads are
there relegated to Harbour Service, which means no service at all, or
next to none :
Iudicated
horse-power
Caledonia
6,832 4,538
Enterprise
1,350
692
Lord Clyde
7,842 6,064
Ocean
6,832 4,244
Prince Consort
6,832 4,234
Royal Oak
6,366 3,704
Royal Sovereigu
5,080 2,436
Zealous
6,096 3,448
Tons
.
.
.
The rapidity of the decay of such ships may be inferred from the
fact that two of the above ships were ordered to be built from my
drawings a few months before I was appointed Chief Constructor in
1863. One of them, then on the stocks, was completed subsequently,
(By some neglect of the editor of the Navy List, two at least of the
above vessels appear also in the list of efficient ships, from which he
seems to have omitted to remove them; they therefore appear twice
over.) I must add to the above list of decayed wood-built iron-
clads the following vessels, which, although not yet officially reduced
to the class of harbour ships, are built of wood, have undergone
more or less decay, and must very soon disappear from the efficient
list :
Favourite
Lord Warden
Pallas.
Repulse
Research
Royal Alfred
Tons
3,232
7,842
3,787
6,190
1,741
6,707
Indicated
horsc-power
1,773
6,706
3,581
3,347
1,012
3,434
0
It may not be out of place to mention here that the Austrian
authorities have lately replaced the wooden sides of three of their
ironclads with iron sides, adding additional armour in vital places-
a conversion which Herr Romako states will not cost more than the
building of one ironclad.
The difference in the cost of maintenance of wood and iron ships is Mr. W. H.
brought very clearly into view by Mr. W. H. White in his Manual White.
I 2
116
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
of Naval Architecture. The deterioration in a wood ship is not far
from twice as great as that in an iron ship in equal times. The
usual allowance for wood ships is that in from twelve to fifteen
years the casual repairs to meet ordinary wear and tear of the hulk,
apart from accidents, would about equal the first cost; for iron ships
the corresponding term would probably be twice or thrice as great.
During the eight years 1866–74 over 124,0001. in all was spent upon
the Warrior,' an average annual outlay of about one-twenty-fifth
part only of the first cost. The same proportionate outlay occurred
also in the Defence' and Resistance. The 'Bellerophon,' in eight
years, only had spent upon her one-thirty-third part of the first cost,
and this included repairs after her collision with the Minotaur.' In
their first five years of service the Invincible class cost annually
only about one-eightieth part of their first cost.
The wood or composite construction has hitherto been preferred
for cruisers, because the copper sheathing was held to be essential to
prevent fouling. The greatly increased facilities for docking on
many foreign stations make this consideration less important than
formerly. On the China station, for example, vessels can now be
docked at Hong Kong and Singapore, Whampoa, Shanghai, Nagasaki,
and Yokohama. In the Mediterranean we possess ample accommoda-
tion at Malta. On the East India station large graving docks exist
at Suez, Bombay, and Calcutta; on the Australian station at
Melbourne, Sydney, and Otago; on the Pacific station at Esquimault
and San Francisco; and on the North American station at Bermuda
and Quebec. Vessels to be employed in the training-service will
rarely be absent from England more than six months.
Remarks as The great expenditure on repairs in the Navy, as compared with
pediency of the mercantile marine, has been justified on the ground that when a
ship is being prepared for a commission of five years it is necessary
to condemn many things, which 'might be passed as serviceable and
reliable for a more limited period. This suggests for consideration
whether the ordinary duration of a foreign commission might not be
curtailed, without disadvantage to the public service in other respects,
and with a distinctly beneficial result in reducing the wasteful ex-
penditure on repairs.
It would be a boon to the seamen if Her Majesty's ships were to
remain a shorter time on foreign stations. The following statements
are from evidence given before the Manning Committee of 1859.
Sir Charles Napier said: 'I do not see the necessity for keeping ships
in the Mediterranean for three or four years.
four years. If you had a Channel
Fleet they could be relieved occasionally, and the men might come
to the ex-
shorter
commis-
sions.
ON THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS OF THE NAVY. 117
home to see their wives and families. This would give great satisfac-
tion.' Sir Alexander Milne pointed out that in the merchant service
the men were never out of England more than eight or ten months,
whereas in the Navy they might be three or four years away. He
believed that this was one cause of the dislike of the naval service.
Admiral Milne said: “I think that the young seamen do not like
being kept long in the home ports. They have equally a dislike to
long foreign service, that is, to periods cf five years on a foreign
station.' Admiral Denman said: One cause of the unpopularity of
the Navy is the great length of time ships are kept abroad. I should
propose, therefore, that no ship should, under ordinary circumstances,
be kept on a distant station for more than two years and a half.
If kept longer, the emergencies of the case could be provided for by
an increase in pay.' Opinions were expressed in the same sense by
men who had risen from the ranks. Mr. Smith, Boatswain, of
Pembroke Yard, when asked: “Have the seamen of the fleet any
just cause of complaint ?' replied, 'I can state one or two, one being
the great length of time they are kept on foreign stations. So, too,
Mr. Brown, shipping master at Limehouse, speaking of coasting
sailors, said, “Their great objection to the Navy is the long period
on the foreign stations. Were they relieved oftener, the service
would be much more popular.'
In the old days of sailing ships complaints were constantly heard of
the irregular detachment of vessels for foreign service, and the almost
interminable periods they were kept away from home. The late Lord
Cochrane stated in the House of Commons that men-of-war had been
retained on distant stations for upwards of fifteen years at a time, and
he gave one instance of such a vessel returning home with but one of
the original crew on board. Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, in his
Essay entitled La Marine d'Autrefois, says: "There is nothing more
dreary and monotonous than the ordinary routine of service on foreign
stations. Ships of war revolve, almost always, in the same circle,
visiting every year the same localities. Our foreign naval stations,
he says, 'are not only useless, they are positively cruel. It has been
proposed to substitute for a permanent establishment of ships on
particular stations, cruising squadrons. Such is the general wish of
the Navy, and to such a proposal I give my unreserved adhesion.'
The present practice of keeping ships four years on a foreign
station had its origin in days long past, when months were occupied
in voyages that are now performed in an equal number of weeks.
There may be numerous instances in which a ship could be sent
abroad for a period of two years at a light expense, whereas it would
118
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
be necessary to spend three or four times as much in order to keep
her out eighteen months longer. More frequent change of scene and
employment would cheer the spirits and improve the health of
officers and men. In making long passages at shorter intervals
valuable experience would be gained.
Deteriora-
tion of
boilers.
The premature deterioration of boilers is one of the most serious
causes of wasteful expenditure in the Navy. Taking the period
1869-78, Mr. Hamilton points out in his recent report that, whereas
only fifty-six boilers were fitted in the first five years, in the last five
no less than ninety-three were supplied to the Navy. Six boilers
were fitted to armoured ships in the first period, while twenty-one
were so fitted in the last period of five years. Here, as the Times
observes, we have a definite clue to much of the increased expenditure
in repairs, which has been making its mark on the cost of the Navy
generally during the past five years.
In justice to the Admiralty it should be pointed out that the
recent increase of the fleet has been much more considerable in the
armoured than the unarmoured ships. The number of ships in-
creasing year by year, it follows that in the second five years a larger
number of boilers would require renewal than in the first five years.
Further, most of the engines of the earlier ships being fitted with
common condensers, the boilers had an average life of about twelve
years; while the engines of the later ships, baving surface condensers,
the boilers had an average life of about eight years only.
Again, of the 21 ships fitted in the second period, thirteen were
fitted in the two years 1877–78, at a time when it was determined,
on account of the state of affairs in the East, to expedite the repairs
of ships and the fitting of new boilers, in order that all available ships
might be ready for service if required.
Thus the increase for armoured ships appears to be mainly due to
three reasons :
(1.) The increased number of ships.
(2.) The introduction of the surface condenser.
(3.) The unusually large number of ships brought forward for
service in the two years 1877–78.
The increase in the number of unarmoured vessels fitted with new
boilers in the second period is also owing in a considerable degree to
the increase in the number of vessels. Twenty-two were launched
in the years 1867 and 1868, and in each of the years 1876 and 1877
17 vessels were fitted with new boilers.
The removal and renewal of boilers involve a large outlay in the
ON THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS OF THE NAVY, 119
+
ment of
committee
shipwright's department, amounting in the case of a first-class iron-
clad to from 40,0001. to 60,0001. The previous loss of speed, and
the possibility that ships may be under repair when they are urgently
required for service, are still more grave considerations.
There seems reason to believe that greater durability might Appoint-
be insured if due skill and care were exercised. Impressed with this
conviction, the late Board of Admiralty appointed two committees, on me
one under Sir Cooper Key, to report on the personnel of the me- officers and
chanical department of the Navy, the other under Admiral Sir George manage-
Elliot, with instructions to ascertain the causes of decay in boilers,
and the best means of preserving them. Their inquiries revealed Results of
a state of things which was far from satisfactory. The appendix to their in-
quiries.
the Report of the Boilers' Committee show that no less than fifty-
eight ships, including several armoured vessels, had received new
boilers in less than six years, or practically after serving only one
commission. In six cases the boilers had been renewed in less than
ment.
four years.
are
Our information is brought down to a still later date in a return Sir John
Har's re-
obtained in the last Session of Parliament by Sir John Hay. Between turn.
January 1, 1869, and January 1, 1879, 166 ships had been fitted
with new boilers, and in no less than sixty instances after a service
of under seven years. In fifteen ships the boilers were renewed
after five years; in twenty-two ships after less than seven years?
service. The endurance in these sixty cases was one-third less than
the average in the mercantile marine.
Among the heaviest repairs included in Sir John Hay's return Armoured
the armoured vessels :— Triumph, 55,8681.; Audacious,' ships.
47,0771. ; Invincible,' 68,231l. ; • Iron Duke,' 63,7501. In none of
these cases had the boilers been on board more than six years.
Turning from ironclads and unarmoured ships to despatch vessels,
the expenditure on repairs to the “Helicon' was 16,2941. ; Lively,'
19,9471. ; and · Salamis,' 25,508l. ; in each case after less than five
years' easy service.
If the repairs required were of such a costly nature, the presump-
tion is strong that it would have been cheaper in the end to have
purchased new ships. The 'Lily' and Violet' have lately been
built by Messrs. Laird for the North-Western Railway for the service
between Holyhead and Dublin, at a cost of 100,0001. They have a
tonnage 0.M. of 1,626 tons, 3,000 indicated horse-power, and steam
twenty miles an hour. With some modifications bearing on their
coal-carrying capacity, they could have been adapted for any service
on which the Admiralty despatch vessels are employed, and the
120
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
boiler en-
dnrance iu
expenditure of 50,0001. in the purchase of a new vessel would cer-
tainly have been more advantageous than an outlay of 33,0001.
in the repair of the “Enchantress.
Prior to the improvements recently effected in the system, the
Superior
endurance of boilers in the Navy was considerably shorter than in
mercantile the mercantile marine. With rare exceptions the average endurance
of the boilers in the principal Atlantic and other services is about
nine years, and the mileage run exceeds 500,000 miles. The report
of the Boiler Committee contains a tabular statement, giving some
important statistics obtained from the principal Atlantic and other
services. The following figures are taken from a return furnished
by the Inman Company :
marine
When
Boilers put
on board
Mileage
Yu1
Days
steam-
ing
No. of
times
steam
raised
Present
condition of
Boilers. Will
last for
4 yrs.
2 yrs.
.
.
City of Brooklyn
City of Paris :
City of London
City of New York
City of Antwerp
Dec. 1868 316,000 1,113
Dec. 1865 471,000 1,564
Jan. 1867 366,000 1,340
Feb. 1865 390,600 1,526
Nov. 1866 | 339,400 1,109
104
158
118
126
122
3
yrs.
1 to 2
yrs.
2 to 3 yrs.
Troopships.
The ships included in the above return were never laid up,
the
necessary repairs having been effected between the voyages.
The work done by troopships is decidedly less severe than that of
an ordinary merchant steamer. They make long passages at uniform
and moderate rates of speed, and have ample time in port for all
necessary repairs. But even in ships of this class the endurance of
the boilers is unequal, and compares unfavourably with the mercantile
marine. The Indian troopships make on an average two voyages
annually, yet no less than 28 per cent. of their original cost was ex-
pended on repairs in the first ten years of their existence. New
boilers were supplied to the Tamar' in 1876 at a cost of 45,0001.;
and they have lately undergone extensive repairs in order to make
them last another two years. : On the other band, the 'Himalaya,
which received new boilers in 1874, at a cost of 30,0001., is still
efficient. The expenditure on both these ships bas been rery great.
Between January 1, 1874, and January 1, 1879, the cost of repairs to
the Himalaya,' 4,490 tons, was 54,135l. ; "Tamar,' 4,857 tons,
66,8671. ; and Orontes, including lengthening, 141,7761. The
• Orontes' was an old-fashioned trooper, and a new and much more
efficient vessel could have been built for the money expended on the
alterations. The system of replacing worn-out ships by new ships,
ON THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS OF THE NAVY. 121
the old ships being taken in exchange by the contractors in part
payment, is universally adopted by the Cunard Company, and might
with great advantage be followed by the Admiralty.
It has been urged that the introduction of surface condensers, Surface
condensers.
and the use of high-pressure steam in compound engines, have
shortened the life of boilers. Let us again refer to the experiences
of the mercantile marine. The returns supplied to the Boiler Com-
mittee by the White Star' line give particulars of three ships
fitted with superheaters, the steam being superheated to a tempera-
ture of 300°. The mileage already run varies from 169,000 to
131,000 miles, and the number of days under steam from 625 to
460. The estimated duration of the boilers is in each case six years,
and this period may be considerably exceeded.
The responsibility for repairs must be divided between the Ad- Engineers
miralty, the executive, and the mechanical officers. The engineers too often,
are changed too often. In the case of the “Nymph' three engi-
neers in succession were in charge during one commission of four
years and four months. A totally different system prevails in the
mercantile marine. The plan adopted by the Peninsular and
Oriental Company was described by Mr. Lamb, the Superintendent,
in a paper specially prepared for the information of the Boiler Corn-
mittee. The chief engineer and his juniors are appointed as soon as
the ship is completed. They are promoted in the same ship as far
as possible, and if a change is made, only one engineer is removed at
a time, so as to retain as many as possible of those who are familiar
with the engines and boilers. Mr. Lamb is of opinion that, if a
similar course were adopted in Her Majesty's service, it would be
most advantageous.
The utmost care should be exercised in the selection of the best Boilers
materials for the construction of boilers. No policy can be more niade at
extravagant than that of attempting to save weight by the use of the dock-
light boilers. The boilers made at the dockyards are much cheaper
than those supplied by contract. In some cases the saving has
amounted to 6l. per horse-power. . The boilers of the - Black Prince,'
made at Portsmouth in 1873, cost 13,4511. Similar boilers made
at the same time by contract cost 20,7501. It is a subject worthy of
the most serious consideration whether it might not be desirable to
nake more boilers in the dockyards. The greatest pains are taken
y private companies to secure the use of the best materials. The
steel plates for the fast Channel steamers the “Lily' and the Violet,
lately built by Messrs. Laird for the London and North-Western
Railway Company, were supplied
from Crewe,
should be
122
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Loss of
speel and
deteriora-
tion of
boilers
from
cramped
boiler
space.
room.
The limitation of space in the engine-room of men-of-war is
another source of difficulty. In ironclads it is contracted as much as
possible, in order to reduce the area of side requiring protection by
armour. In unarmoured vessels, in order to keep the machinery and
engine and boilers below the water-line, the engine-space is deficient in head
The "Thistle' class of twin-screw composite gun vessels
have been largely employed on the China station. It has been im-
possible to preserve the planking beneath the boilers ; because no
room has been left for men to creep through, in order to effect the
necessary repairs.
Want of space may lead not only to deterioration of boilers, but
to loss of speed. Similar failures from a like cause have not beeu
uncommon. The same defect may sometimes cause an almost un-
endurable state of things as regards the temperature of the stokehole,
especially in small ships. In the Sea Gull,' commissioned in 1867
for service on the West Coast of Africa, the temperature of the stoke-
hole, on the occasion of the full-speed trial at Plymouth, was 138°.
The complicated entanglement of design and difficulty of access
to every part of the engine, which constitute the special defects in
the machinery built for the Navy, are due to the restrictions as to
space imposed on the builders, with a view to protection from the
risks of battle. It is worthy of consideration whether it might not
be desirable to give more space to the engine-room and boiler, and
to protect these highly vulnerable parts, not by keeping everything
below the water-line, but by a belt of armour on the inner side of the
bunkers.
A ship of war must necessarily be designed specially for the day of
battle. If roomy quarters be provided for the crew, if ample space
and weight be allowed for the engines and boilers, and if large coal-
carrying capacity be provided, all very essential matters viewed in-
dividually; a large vessel must be built. Increase of size diminishes
bandiness and increases cost, and much importance is always natu-
rally attached to the question of cost. Special consideration has
therefore been always given to economising weight and space for
engines and boilers.
Then again, protection of the engines and boilers from shot has
always been considered of paramount importance, and to ensure this
as far as possible the engines of the Navy have been mostly made on
the horizontal plan. This is not so good as the vertical plan, espe-
cially for large engines, either in respect of good working or of
accessibility, and the length of stroke is more limited. But if a ship
of war were to go into action with the cylinders standing up unpro-
ON THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS OF THE NAVY. 123
tected, or with a line of steam-piping or the top of a boiler exposed
to shnt, she would, against modern artillery, be speedily at the inercy
of her enemy.
In merchant ships the weight allowed for engines and boilers is
always ample, and the space available is also ample ; vertically, indeed,
it is unlimited. These facilities render the designing and construc-
tion of machinery for merchant ships a far easier task than the de-
signing and construction of machinery for the Navy. The fair view
of the case would be rather, whether the designers of machinery for
the Navy had done the best they could under the conditions imposed.
The following comparison will show the great difference between
the two types of machinery. The engines of the Indian troopship
'Euphrates,' made a few years ago by Messrs. Laird, are exactly like
the engines this firm has made for ships belonging to the Pacific
Company, the National Company, &c., sailing from Liverpool, which
have been very successful at sea. The engines of the “Euphrates'
developed on trial 3,906 indicated horse-power, and the total weight
of the machinery, including water in the boilers, is 1,007. The en-
gines of the Iris' were made about the same time, and the steam .
pressure is the same. The total weight of the machinery of the
* Iris,' including the weight of the water in the boilers, is 1,015, or
practically the same as the weight of that of the “Euphrates;' but
the engines of the 'Iris' developed as the average of a six hours'
trial 7,061 indicated horse-power, or 80 per cent. more power than
those of the “Euphrates.'
Turning from the Admiralty to the executive officers, the en- Complaints
gineers complained to the Boiler Committee that the work in their neer
department was neglected, because the stokers were constantly taken Stokers
away for drill on deck. The smaller the ship the more serious did other
this objection become.
Mr. Trail, the Chief Surveyor of the Board of Trade, suggested Insufficient
that orders were sometimes given from the deck, without knowledge raising
of the evil consequences which must ensue, through the sudden
contraction and expansion, when sufficient time is not allowed for
getting up or letting down steam. The subject of steam should not
be neglected in the early instruction of naval officers. All executive
officers should go through a course of steam, which would qualify the
captain of a man-of-war to exercise a valuable supervision as well in
the engine-room as in all other departments of his command.
Sometimes the instructions issued by the Admiralty have not Instances of
injudicions
been obeyed with intelligence and discretion. Economy in fuel, for appication
example, is enjoined ; and as the formation of scale, while it pre-
taken for
duties.
steam.
124
DOCKYARDS ANI) NAVAL ORGANISATION.
H.M.S.
• Auda-
cious.'
Sir Ed.
ward Reed
on effi-
nival en
of rules luid serves the boilers, tends also to increase the consumption of fuel,
Admiralty. some engineers have prevented its accumulation altogether, and so
caused a rapid deterioration of the boilers. Instances have occurred
in the Navy where both systems have been tried in the same ship.
The boilers of the "Audacious' were taken out, after four years'
service in the Coastguard, the vessel having cruised only occa-
sionally in the summer, working with from one-third to two-thirds
of her boiler-power. At one period, as the Boiler Committee were
informed, an endeavour had been made to form some scale in her
boilers ; at another, the desire had been to keep them quite fresh.
It is obvious that of these two systems of treatment one must have
been wrong. It further appeared from the evidence of Mr. Robinson,
that the boilers had undergone rapid deterioration from neglect, in the
interval before the engines were taken over from the contractors.
In his well known work, Our Ironclad Ships, Sir Edward Reed
bas strongly insisted on the imperfect acquaintance with their duties
ciency of
which was sometimes exhibited by engineers in the Navy. The
gineers following passages are taken from Sir Edward Reed's book :-
One of the results of the publication of this work will, I trust,
be to induce persons to look a little more closely than heretofore to
the true causes of the different performances of the ships, both under
steam and under canvas. It is not only idle, it is contrary to com-
mon sense and common experience, to visit upon the designer all
those shortcomings which are obviously the consequences of imperfect
management. I appeal to the experience of the best seamen in our
Navy, when I ask if ships do not perform very differently in different
hands. The sailing of a ship is by no means an art in which all
persons are equally skilful. In like manner the performances of the
ships under steam are, as I have shown in the text, subject to the
greatest possible variations by differences of management. If allowed
a month or two at sea under steam, with the necessary coal for the
purpose, and with freedom from external control, a good captain
and engineer would ascertain the number of engine revolutions
required for every grade of speed with the greatest ease and nicety,
and would add to this knowledge all those nice adjustments and
minor modifications of the engines, which would not only prevent
these derangements, which sometimes result in large repairs, but
would also lead to great economy of fuel, of lubrication, and of
labour. . Another month or two of cruising alone under canvas
would enable officers to bring out the best qualities of their ships,
and would avoid those strange anomalies and discrepancies which
abound in some reports of the squadron sailings of our ironclads.
ON THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS OF THE NAVY. 125
Committee.
t
6
The Engineer-in-Chief, in his report to the Boiler Committee, Mr.
Wright's
attributed the rapid deterioration, which had occurred in numerous report to
instances, to incompetence and neglect. In the Daphne,' described Builer
as the worst case we have ever had,' the boilers were condemned
in less than three years. In the corvettes “Eclipse,' Nyınph, and
· Vestal,' they were removed after one commission. The “Sirius, '
after receiving new boilers, and being thoroughly overhauled, at a
cost of 27,0001., was returned to Keyhain in two years, so thoroughly
broken down that the engines were removed for refit. In the
Niobe, on the other hand, the amount spent in repairs, during
her first commission of more than four years, had been only 1341.,
and, when paid off at Bermuda, the boilers were in a good state of
repair. In two other corvettes of the same class, fitted with the
same machinery, the boilers were found in equally good condition
for a second commission.
Mr. Wright concluded his report with the just observation that,
where such widely different results are attained, it is clear that the
endurance of the boilers mainly depends on the management of the
engineers in charge. He believed that some engineers in the
service were imperfectly acquainted with the causes of corrosion,
and he proposed that further instructions should be issued, and
that a more careful supervision should be made of the elaborate
returns periodically sent in to the Admiralty by the engineers in
charge of Her Majesty's ships.
All Mr. Wright's suggestions are valuable, and should be adopted.
New regulations have been issued, and the engineers have now been
made acquainted with the most effective methods for the preservation
of boilers ; but it is vain to indulge the hope that efficiency can be
secured in every engine-room in the Navy by the inspection of
returns prepared by the same individuals, whose conduct and
management are to be subjected to criticism. Success in the de-
partment of the sea-going engineer is a question essentially of detail,
and it has been well said by M. Turgot that it is impossible to direct,
by fixed rules and close and constant inspection, a multitude of
operations too wide in their range to be brought under the review
of the central authority, and depending on a variety of conditions
which can neither be controlled nor foreseen. It is better to rely
on the sense of personal and direct responsibility, enforced by rewards
for merit and punishment for failure, rather than on regulations of
a more or less arbitrary character. The dismissal of incapable men,
the prospect of accelerated promotion as the reward of skill and devo-
tion to duty, and a thoroughly practical training, will prove more
126
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Present
in
without
effectual remedies for the occasional failures in the engine-room in
Her Majesty's ships than volumes of new regulations.
Training of Experience and care on the part of engineers, who have received
engineers.
a thorough preliminary training, are absolutely indispensable. It
system
becomes, therefore, of great importance to ascertain bow far these
qualities are secured under the present system of training. Under
the existing regulations, a young engineer commences his naval
career with an examination on entry. Having passed the examina-
tion, the engineer student spends six years in the dockyards, com-
bining, as far as may be, some practical training with theoretical
instruction in the schools. His course of education concludes with
nine months' study at the Royal Naval College.
Engineers
It is the great defect of the present system that young engineers
appointed
to ships
are appointed to sea-going ships, with no previous experience
the management of machinery at sea. In time of peace, when
previous
experience. ships are only occasionally under way, and usually steam at a low
speed, the chief engineer can give special attention to the instruction
of junior engineers. He could not do so in time of war, In the
dockyards many young engineers are attached to ships undergoing
repairs, rather in the capacity of watchmen, for the prevention of
fire, than as mechanical officers. The necessity for more practical
experience in sea-going ships has been recognised by the Committees
which have been lately engaged in the reorganisation of the me-
chanical department of the Navy. While wisely advising that the
engineer officers in commissioned ships should be reduced in number,
and replaced by artificers, Sir Cooper Key's Committee proposed
mendations
that junior assistant-engineers, on leaving college, should be ap-
Key's Com- pointed to troop and store ships in addition to the complement for
six months or longer.
Engineers
From the nature of the duties it is impossible to give to the
Navy in time of peace that practical experience in driving powerful
sime price machinery at a high speed in all weathers, which is obtained in the
Navy as in merchant service. Many engineers spend years attached to harbour
chant ser- ships, or in ships which are seldom under steam, and are still more
rarely driven at full speed. It should be the policy of the Admiralty
to keep down the number of engineers, so that it should not exceed
the strict requirements of the service, looking to the mercantile
marine to supply the additional engineers, who would be required
in the event of war.
An effort should be made to obtain further opportunities for
engineers of acquiring practical experience. There should be no
insuperable obstacles to be encountered in the attempt to pass a
Recom-
of Sir
mittee.
cannot
have the
vice.
ON THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS OF THE NAVY. 127
I
Mr. Raren-
Reed
certain number of our naval engineers, for a limited period of service, Naval
engineers
through the mercantile marine. The plan has been suggested by might be
some authorities of great practical experience. In a paper by Mr. merchant
Ravenhill, read at the meeting of the Institution of Naval Architects, service.
held at Glasgow in 1877, the following remarks occur : 'All those bill
.
who are in any way conversant with the Royal Navy must admit
that such experience as the commercial marine affords cannot easily
be obtained in Her Majesty's ships. The transport service is limited,
and the hours named for departure are not always adhered to. The
mail steamers are timed to leave at a certain hour, and even if all
is not in perfect order the chief engineer must be ready. Such a
school can alone afford the training a sea-going engineer should
receive, and I am sanguine enough to hope that the day is not far
distant when some arrangement will be made between the Admiralty
and our large steam companies, for a junior Royal Naval engineer
to have an opportunity afforded him, if only for a period of twelve
munths, of obtaining experience with machinery, at times pressed
to the utmost, in all seasons and in all weathers.
Sir E. J. Reed warmly supported Mr. Ravenhill's proposition, Sir Is. J.
saying that he thought it most desirable that the officers of the
Royal Navy should be made familiar with the practice of the mer-
cantile marine. He refused to admit that the suggestion was beset
with insuperable practical difficulties. In time of peace naval en-
experience
gineers can never have an opportunity of witnessing such perform- in Atlantic
ances as those of the mail steamers, making regular passages
throughout the year between Liverpool and New York, at an average
speed sometimes exceeding 16 knots, or those of the ships which
now accomplish the voyage between St. Vincent and Australia
without easing the engines.
The engineers employed in the great mail services are required Rapid re.
not only to maintain the highest speeds at sea, but to examine and merchant
repair the machinery under their charge with the utmost possible
expedition. In the Atlantic trade, large steamships run for years
with intervals of a week, and sometimes less, in a home port between
their repeated voyages. Expedition in the repair of machinery is
not required in the Navy in time of peace. It might be of vital
importance in war. The young engineers of the Navy have much to Experience
learn, not only in developing the capabilities of machinery, but also
in the management of boilers. Whatever may be the result of the meut.
scientific researches of the Admiralty, it would be an important step
in advance, if the practice of the Royal Navy were assimilated to
that of the most successful services in the mercantile marine.
Valuable
steamers.
service
in boiler
inanage-
128
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Social
claiins and
practical
duties of
engineers.
Mr.
Gordon.
The conflict between the social claims of the new class of engi-
neers in the Navy and the practical duties they are. engaged to dis-
charge came out very clearly in the course of the recent depart-
mental inquiries.
• The following question and answer are taken from the evidence
of Mr. Gordon, superintending engineer of the West India Steam-
packet Company. Mr. Gordon, when examined by the Boiler
Committee, was questioned as follows :-11,815. Are there any
remarks you can make from your previous experience in different
managements of boilers, which you think would be of service to the
Committee ?-With regard to surface-condensing boilers, the main
and only thing is to pay particular attention to keeping the boilers
clean. Get a good practical engineer, who is not afraid of dirty
work, and will see that the work is properly done, and put plenty
of zinc plates in your boilers, and see that your feed does not go
through copper tubing. I think, if you adopt these precautions,
you will have a good lasting boiler ; but if you employ a careless
man or a man too big for his work, and the business is not attended
to properly, your boilers will be done for in a year or two. You
must have men who will attend to their work, or else all the
improvements which you make are lost, through nothing being fol-
lowed out.'
It is generally admitted in the Navy that the engineers entered
under the old system are among the most valuable in the service.
They were entered under the conditions of the Admiralty Circular
of 1847, which required that candidates for appointments should
prove their practical ability as mechanics, and be so far acquainted
with the elements of theoretic mathematics as to understand the
general principles of steam machinery. The requirements of the
Board of Trade at the present time do not exceed the qualifications
demanded by the Admiralty in 1847; and the ample sufficiency of
this limited examination is fully attested by the perfection of result
in the 3,000 ships under the management of the 8,500 engineers
of the mercantile marine. In punctuality, immunity from break-
down, regularity of speed for long distances, and continuous hard
work, their performances cannot be excelled.
Cadet engineers are trained for the United States Navy at the
Academy at Annapolis, and great pains are taken to make the
instruction as practical as possible. The department possesses a pair
of large marine engines, with boilers attached, which are worked
under steam by the cadets themselves. But even with these ad-
vantages the Board of Visitors have reported that the training is
General re-
marks on
the articles
and evi-
dence
quoted.
American
Naval au-
thorities
propose
that train-
ing of
cadet en-
gineers
shivuld be
ON THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS OF THE NAVY. 129
incomplete, and they have recommended that the most promising completed
in Eng-
cadets should spend one or two years in the engineering establish- land.
ments of Great Britain.
Entire success, as it was urged by the Broad Arrow, is impos-
sible under any regulations which necessitate the whole of a naval
engineer's education being obtained at a place where, throughout
the whole course of his studies, he never sees an engine made.
Less risk would be encountered of entrusting the costly machinery A Naval
of our ships of war to unpractised hands if the number of engineers in Reserve of
the Navy were reduced, and the means of expansion provided from a ani stokers.
reserve of engineers. The 3,500 engineers belonging to the French
Navy are chiefly employed in the merchant service, and would join
the Navy in full practice whenever called upon to do so. It is not
wise to keep more engineers in the Navy than it is possible to employ
regularly in the duties of their profession. On the other hand, it
would be unreasonable to look to the merchant service to furnish
engineers of high qualifications in answer to an unexpected summons.
A reserve of engineers and stokers should be formed, composed of
experienced men, and thus, by a small periodical payment, provision
would be made for the eventualities of war, without encumbering the
Navy with officers whose pay and pensions are a serious additional
charge to the Navy, but whose numbers are so excessive that it is
impossible to deal with individuals on a really liberal scale.
Since the introduction of artificers into the service their number Proportion
has been steadily increasing, while the engineers have been pro- neengere
portionately reduced. There seems reason to believe that the duced, and
movement might be carried considerably further. The duties would increased.
be done more efficiently, and at a reduced scale of expenditure, by
substituting mechanics, who would be satisfied with the status of
warrant officers, for men of higher education and less practical skill,
whose social aspirations are inconsistent with the nature of their
duties. The fluctuations of numbers are shown in the following
returns:
VOL. IV.
K
130
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Return, showing how the Engineer Oficers at present in the Service are employed.
Rank
Serving in sea-going
Ships, including
Ist Reserve Ships
Serving in Ships in
the Reserves, at
tlie several Ports
Dockyards, Torpedo
Service, &c.
At the Royal Naval
College
Half-pay
Rorne for disposal
in the Reserves
Totals
1
2
117
3
54
3
20
2
29
10
220
Chief, and inspectors of
machinery
Chief engineers
Engineers and assistant
engineers
Engineers and assistant en-
gineers for temporary
service,
388
60
33
19
6
13
519
26
2
--
28
1
Totals
5.53
119
56
19
37
13
777
June 15, 1880.
(Signed)
G. FINLAISUN.
Number of Chief Engine-Room Artificers and Engine-Room Artificer's
in the Navy, including those in Indian Troopships.
Borlie
Chief L. R. A.'s
and I. R A.'s
.
1
+
.
.
April ], 1872 (actually borne)
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880 (partly estimated).
June 1, 1880
176
204
224
282
312
429
578
631
610
612
.
.
+
93
.
.
(Signed)
R. G. C. HAMILTON,
Accountant-General, &c.
The following table gives a comparative statement of the numbers
borne :-
Artificers
Engineers
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
June 1
176
204
224
282
312
429
578
631
618
612
974
964
953
929
903
888
817
835
777
ON THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS OF THE NAVY. 131
of boilers.
Periodical
The mechanical branch requires a certain number of superior
officers. They should be formed into a staff eorps, in some respects
answering to the French génie maritime. A staff. officer of naval
engineers should be attached, as in the French Navy, to every flag-
ship, and one or two should be appointed to each first-class ironclad.
In the subordinate ranks skilled mechanics would be more useful.
There should be a careful inspection, at least once a year, of the Inspection
boilers of every ship in commission by a superior engineer officer.
Were these surveys carefully made at sufficiently frequent intervals,
it would be impossible for a ship to arrive in England, at the close of
her first commission, with the boilers worn out in three years and
a half; the only explanation afforded being that the engineer had
kept the boilers empty, and that, as he had not received the report
of the Boiler Committee, he did not anticipate the mischievous effects
which would result from the improper system he had adopted.
It is considered essential, in order to maintain the efficiency of
Her Majesty's ships, that they should be periodically inspected in inspection
gunnery and seamanship, and that the whole internal economy of abroad.
the vessel should be brought under the eye of the superior officer.
The inspection of the boilers and machinery should form an essential
and prominent feature of the general inspection by the Admiral in
command. It is the duty of the gunnery officer of the flagship to
inspect in gunnery, and on the same principle an inspector of
machinery, or the chief engineer of the flagship, should attend the
Admiral and examine thoroughly the boilers and engines. The
report of the inspecting officer of machinery on matters connected
with his department should form an integral part of every inspection.
Orders to this effect have been recently issued.
The duties of inspectors of machinery, one of whoin should
be attached to every flagship, would not be limited to half-yearly
inspections. These officers should be in constant communication
with all the engineers in charge in the fleet, giving advice on all
points of difficulty, periodically and closely examining the engine-room
registers, going on board all the ships on the station, and inspecting
the condition of the engines and boilers at uncertain intervals, taking
opportunities of being present on the occasion of full-power trials,
and generally assisting the Admiral to maintain the efficiency of the
machinery of the fleet. The flag-inspectors of machinery should
be men of the highest reputation in the service. Their posts should
be the prizes of the profession.
K 2
LETTERS, PAPERS, AND ADDRESSES, .
SECTION VIII.
THE STATE OF THE NAVY,
AS DEBATED DURING THE GENERAL ELECTION, 1880.
Reprinted from the 'Times.'
134
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
THE STATE OF THE NAVY,
AS DEBATED DURING THE GENERAL ELECTION, 1880.
MR. W. H. SMITH.
Reprinted from the Times, March 26, 1880.
State of the
Navy in
1874.
war.
war.
On March 25, 1880, the First Lord of the Admiralty and Sir C.
Russell, V.C., the Conservative candidates for Westminster, addressed
a meeting of their supporters at Exeter Hall; the Right Hon. Sir
J. D. Hay in the chair.
In the course of his observations Mr. W. H. Smith said : The
cost of the Army and Navy resolved itself into this-keeping the
country in a condition of peace as an alternative to a condition of
It would have been a bad thing for the peace of this country if
during the last six years they had purchased economy at the cost of
To understand that, they had only to look back to the Crimean
War, and to consider the dire charge for that war in money, men,
and sorrow.
It had been his duty to administer the Navy during
the last two years and a half, and a very anxious time it had been.
Well, he read the other day a paragraph from a speech in which the
condition of the Navy was referred to, and the speaker said that Sir
Spencer Robinson, who had been responsible some time since at the
Admiralty for the construction of ships, and whose reputation in that
respect had always been of the very highest kind, had said that since
1874 matters had most gravely altered, and that our condition had
become seriously worse. Now he should be guilty of a dereliction of
duty if he did not notice the statement that the condition of the Navy
now as compared with 1874 was enormously inferior. He believed
the speaker had made a very grievous mistake. What Sir Spencer
Robinson did intend to say, he was informed, was that in 1870 the
condition of the Navy was satisfactory, but that in 1874 it had fallen
THE STATE OF THE NAVY, 1880.
135
Smith.
state of the
very considerably. The fact was that in 1870 the Liberal Govern- Mr. W. H.
ment inherited, through the exertions of his right hon. friend the
late Mr. Corry, a very fine fleet; but in 1874 the fleet had fallen
into a very decrepit condition. He should deserve impeachment
before his fellow-citizens if during his term of office he had per-
mitted the fleet of England to fall in the slightest degree in
efficiency or in strength either of material or men. The Navy of
England was her first line of defence, but it had other very difficult
and important duties to discharge. The Navy of England was the
police of the seas. No other nation cared about the order of the
seas compared with England. Wherever our ships went, there it
was expected a man-of-war should be; and wherever a slave existed,
there it was expected should be found a man-of-war or man-of-war's
boat to release him. Many a fine fellow laid down his life on the
coast of Africa simply for the duty imposed upon him by the Navy
to rescue those poor miserable slaves from a life of bondage.
He would now read a return made to him to-day. He called Return on
to-day from the permanent officers of the Admiralty for a return Navy, 1880.
of the armoured ships of England completely ready for service on
April 1, 1874, and of the ships ready to go into action now on
March 25, 1880. That return was made on the faith of the per-
manent officers of the Admiralty, of whom, strangely enough, not
a single one had been appointed by him or by the Conservative
Government; they had been appointed by his predecessors, Mr.
Goschen and Mr. Childers. Let him not be misunderstood. He
did not impute to the permanent officers of the Admiralty the
possibility of colouring the return. Well, on April 1, 1874, of
ironclad ships fit to go into action there was 101,044 tons. Those
ships were moved by 74,908 indicated horse-power, and they had
guns which at one discharge could throw 37,000 lbs. of metal. Against
the 101,000 tons of ironclads in 1874, there was now 272,000 tons.
Against the 74,000 horse-power then, there was now 195,000 horse-
power. Against the 37,000 lbs. weight of metal which could be
thrown then, there was now 111,000 lbs. That was to say, our ships
were two-and-a-half times more numerous, and their weight of
metal was three times as heavy as it was then. That was the
result of spending more money, for he admitted that during the
last six years they had spent more money than their predecessors.
But there was economy which was wasteful and extravagant, and
there was expenditure which was the greatest possible economy.
Let it not be imagined that he imputed to the predecessor of the
!
136
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Smith.
Mr. W. H. late Mr. Ward Hunt a desire to do anything inconsistent with his
duty as First Lord of the Admiralty, but he was the victim of
circumstances. Mr. Goschen was as anxious as he was to maintain
the fleet in a state of efficiency, but he found that the whole
thought of the Admiralty had been directed to building ships, and
they had allowed the engines and boilers to become useless and
ineffective. They might as well have at the railway stations a fine
lot of engines ranged alongside and not one of them able to move.
But the Adınıralty had taken a practical course with their ships,
and now they had 270,000 tons of ironclads ready for war, against
100,000 in 1874. Let it not be supposed he had any desire to
attack an adversary; he was defending himself against a statement
made in the North a few days ago. He would never have uttered
a word had it not been for the attacks made upon him. He had
always maintained that the question of the Army and Navy was
a question of the country, and it was a dire misfortune that they
should be made the shuttlecocks of party.
Coming now to our unarmoured vessels, frigates, corvettes, and
gunboats, there were of them on April 1, 1874, 80,703 tons, moved
by 72,472 horse-power. The tonnage now was 122,427, and the
horse-power 133,186. That was to say, the tonnage of effective
ships ready to do their duty had been increased by 50 per cent.,
and the borse-power by something like 60 per cent.
What was the
consequence? We were now in a position to discharge our duty. We
were in a position to give reliefs. When Mr. Ward Hunt came into
office it was not possible to relieve the ships after their regular
commissions had expired, because there were not others to take
their places. The condition of the boilers and engines had so
deteriorated that we could not give the ships the relief they re-
quired ; but now we were in a position to do so. He believed that
England would require to make greater efforts still to place her
Navy in a position of preponderance-not with any desire to take
up a position of hostility to other nations; but we had duties to
discharge which other nations had not, and therefore it was essen-
tial that our strength should be preponderating.
He was struck the other day by a paragraph which appeared in
penditure :
Russia, a foreign newspaper, and which showed that while in 1865 Russia
France, and
Germany. spent 22 millions for warlike purposes, in 1879 she spent 36 millions ;
that while France in 1865 spent 17 millions, in 1879 she spent 27
millions; and that while Germany spent 10 millions in 1865, she
spent 21 millions in 1879 for warlike purposes. These figures
War ex-
THE STATE OF THE NAVY, 1880.
137
Smith.
meant very much more than appeared at first sight, because in Mr. W. H.
those countries the soldier was taken whether he willed it or not;
he was taken by conscription; he was not paid wages which he
could not earn; and the figures given did not at all express the
burden upon those countries of these tremendous armaments. But
they were a warning to us that we must be on the watch.
.
138
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
MR. CHILDERS.
Reprinted from the . Times,' March 30, 1880.
!
Building
and main-
tenance of
the Navy
under Mr.
Childers,
Mr. Gos-
chen, and
Smith,
me.
At a meeting at Pontefract on March 29, 1880, Mr. Childers made
the following observations:-
When I became First Lord, in 1868, I found that my predecessor,
Mr. Corry, had decided greatly to cut down the estimates and to
build at that time no more ironclads. I at once reversed this policy.
Mr. W.H. It seemed to me much more important to be well ahead in building
new ships with the last improvements than to patch up old ones,
and I decided that some 20,000 tons of shipping should be built
every year, of which 13,000 should be the most powerful ironclads.
This was steadily done by myself and Mr. Goschen, who succeeded
We built rather more, in fact, than our programme, and we
spent much less in patching. Some of our most powerful ships
would only be required when war broke out, and a few weeks' work
would then be wanted to complete them. Some of the older iron-
clads had so little armour that they would not be wanted at the
beginning of a war, and they, too, inight be left to be put in
thorough condition later on; but we pushed on our fighting power,
and though it is said that we did not renew boilers fast enough,
I find as a matter of fact that we did so as rapidly as our successors,
who in their first three years only renewed the boilers of eight iron-
clads.
Now, what has Mr. Smith done? In the first place you must
remember that no ironclad is yet twenty years old, which is the
common life of a ship; so that, as no one can improvise a Navy,
every year sees a longer list. But Mr. Smith has left out of the
ironclads we built under cover of the words ' fit to go into action,' all
those which we had completed all but a few weeks, as they were not
wanted in peace time, and all those with their armour, which there
was no hurry to get ready, and added all these to his list. So that,
whereas we built some 13,000 tons a year, while he has only built
THE STATE OF THE NAVY, 1880.
139
M.
Childers,
8,000 or 9,000 tons a year and only completed two of all the ships
his Board designed, he would convey the impression that just the
opposite is the case. We may, perhaps, gentlemen, have made
mistakes, but if there is one thing more than another for which
history will give us credit it is for our determination to be ahead of
all the world in our fighting Navy; while the most that our successor
can say is that, with far more money at their disposal, they have
barely kept up with the great maritime Powers.
140
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION:
1
MR. G. J. GOSCHEN.
Liberair
and Conser-
vatives
equally
pledged to
maintain
the effi-
ciency of
the Navy.
At a meeting held at Devonport the following letter from the
Right Hon. G. J. Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty under the
Liberal Government, to Mr: Sellar, on naval and dockyard adminis-
tration, was read :-
Unicorn Hotel, Ripon : March 25, 1880.
'I regret extremely that I have not been able to comply with
your wish that I should address the electors of Devonport. I had
quite hoped to have been able to get away for two days, but I find
that the great distance renders it quite impossible for me to visit
Devonport during my contest here. I should have liked to have
spoken on naval affairs, and to have replied to many of the unjust
charges which are brought against the late Administration.
'I have been always so adverse to bringing party spirit to bear on
questions connected with the Navy and with the dockyards that I
have abstained, perhaps to too great an extent, from answering party
attacks with similar weapons. If I had been with you I should have
endeavoured to show that the interest I took in the Navy and in the
dockyards was quite as deep as what has been displayed by our
successors. We, on our side, have never been profuse in expressions
of what we would do for any particular class if we were in power.
The promises of our opponents, on the other hand, have. generally
been extravagant. The men in the dockyards will judge to what
extent the hopes held out to them by Conservative candidates at the
last election have been realised. Without being pledged, and under
no political pressure whatever, I thought it my duty in the year
1873 to raise the wages in the dockyards to an extent largely
affecting the estimates. It was a time when the high prices of all
materials were putting a very heavy strain on those estimates; yet, with
the consent of my colleagues in the Cabinet, I proposed and carried
the increase in taxes because I thought it was right. I scarcely
think I have alluded to this fact, in political speeches either in or out
THE STATE OF THE NAVY, 1880.
141
Mr.
Goschen.
of the House of Commons until now, and, if I recall it now, it is only
in reply to those incessant charges against us of undue parsimony
which are circulated in all the dockyards for electoral purposes. I
would it were possible to exclude such topics from political contests;
but if they are forced upon you at Devonport, you are entitled to refer
to the past, though I am sure that even in the heat of the contest
Liberal candidates will not follow the course of holding out hopes
which neither party, as experience has shown, can fulfil.
My recollections of my connection with the dockyards, though six
years old, are still fresh enough to make me feel deeply anxious that
the present contest should be decided there, as elsewhere, on purely
political considerations, and not on the totally unfounded assumption
that we Liberals should be less determined than the Conservatives,
not only to maintain the efficiency of the Navy, but to do justice to
all who are concerned in the management, the construction, the
maintenance, and the manning of the fleet.
6
!
142
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
MR. SHAW-LEFEVRE.
To the Editor of the ' Times.'
in the
tonnage
constructed
under the
Conserva-
tive Ad-
ministra-
tion.
Deticiency Sir,—With reference to the speech of the First Lord of the Admi-
ralty in Westminster on Thursday last on the subject of the Navy,
in which he drew a comparison between the condition of ships in
April, 1874, when the present Government came into office, and
at the present time, I hope I may be permitted through your
columns, on behalf of the late Administration, to say that I entirely
dispute the figures which Mr. Smith produced and his method of
comparison.
The comparison depends upon the opinion formed now, after
six years, of a vast number of individual vessels in various conditions ;
and a return of an argumentative character drawn up for the purpose
of a political speech gives every latitude for placing ships on one or
other side of an arbitrary line which divides those which are or
were fit to go into action from those which are not fit.
It would be impossible to go into full details upon sucb a subject,
but if the return referred to by Mr. Smith is drawn up on the same
plan as a return moved for by Sir John Hay last year and recently
laid before Parliament, I could point out a number of vessels most
unfairly put into the list of those alleged to be unfit for action in
1874, and as many most questionably placed in the list at the
present time as fit for action, and which if judged of by the same
test as that applied to 1874 should be excluded.
I have the more reason to complain of the method of comparison
made by Mr. Smith, as during the last days of the late session he
refused to give me a return which would have enabled the public
to judge of the actual progress made in the building of armour-
plated ships in the dockyards and by contract during the time the
present Government has been in office.
A recent return bad shown that 96,397 tons of new ships had
been built in the dockyards and by contract (irrespective of the
THE STATE OF THE NAVY, 1880.
143
Lefevre.
vote of credit of 1868) in the five years 1869–73, and that of this Mr. Shaw-
tonnage 62,698 were armour-plated; while for the last five years
the total tonnage was 94,894, and of armour-plated vessels only
49,697 tons, showing a deficiency in the last period of 13,000 tons.
I had reason to believe, however, that this return overstated the
tonnage of ironclads built in the last five years. I accordingly moved
for a return which would give in detail the names of the ships and
their tonnage built or partially built since April, 1874; at the same
time I constructed a table in this form from materials provided in
successive estimates. The result is that for the five years 1869-73
there were built 56,211 tons of armoured vessels, or at the rate of
11,240 tons per annum, and for the six years 1874–79 there were
built in the dockyards and by contract out of the ordinary votes only
42,867 tons, or an average of 7,124 tons, or less than two-thirds
of the average of the previous five years.
The table also shows, as Mr. Reed recently pointed out in the
House of Commons, that no single ironclad vessel has been com-
menced and completed in the dockyards in the six years; that the
'Inflexible,' which was commenced in 1873, is still incomplete, and
that the “ Ajax' and 'Agamemnon, commenced in 1877, are still
little more than half complete.
In addition to the vessels built or bought out of the ordinary
votes there are the four ironclads bought out of the vote of credit,
with a tonnage of 18,430. Even with this addition the average for
the last six years has been only 10,000 tons, as compared with an
average of 11,200 tons for the previous five years; apart from these
purchases, the building in the dockyards has been most dilatory
and insufficient for the maintenance of the feet in comparison with
those of France and other countries
When I add that the money spent in the dockyards during the
last six years has been at the rate, as nearly as possible, of one
million a year in excess of the average of the previous period,
making an aggregate of nearly six millions; that to this must be
added another 11 million representing the advantage due to the
greatly reduced price of shipbuilding materials, coals, which I estimate
at 10 per cent.; and that another million and a half were spent out
of the vote of credit, I think it will be universally admitted that
the result is most unsatisfactory. For the aggregate excess of nine
millions, as compared with the previous five years, we might have
built, at least, 18 ironclads of the size and cost of the 'Devastation,
or we might have built a fleet of unarmoured vessels more numerous
than all we have now afloat. What has become of the money is a
2
144
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Lefevre..
Mr. Shaw- question which naturally arises. A very sınall part of it has been
spent in repairing ironclads. I ventured, in the discussion on the
Navy Estimates in 1879, to give numerous instances of wasteful
expenditure-of vessels being repaired for more than their value;
of vessels, such as the troopship'Orontes, lengthened at a cost of
141,000l., considerably more than the cost price of a new vessel ;
of the inordinate price given for the “Independencia, and the
immense sums spent on subsequent alterations, bringing her cost
to nearly double the cost of the “ Devastation. No answer was even
attempted by Mr. Smith to these charges.
I am your faithful servant,
G. SHAW-LEFEVRE.
Reading, March 27.
Armour-plated Ships built or commenced in Her Majesty's Dockyards
since April 1874.
Tons
weight
Tons weight
built
before 1874
Tons weight
built
since 1874
Remaining to
be built
April 1, 1880
1
.
.
1,456
354
5,201
3,275
326
79
Alexandra
Téméraire
Thunderer
Dreadnought.
Shannon
Inflexible
Ajax
2011
Colossus
Conqueror
Majestic
Polyphemus
6,100
5,535
5,950
7,350
3,370
7,300
5,901
5,901
6,150
4,198
6,150
1,615
4,644
5,180
749
4,075
3,044
6,518
3,390
3,362
762
730
710
703
1
803
2,519
2,539
5,318
.
3,468
5,440
912
-
10,691
33,867
20,991
Armour-plated Ships built by Contract since April 1, 1874.
Tons weight
Nelson
4,500
Northampton
4,500
Total
9,000
.
0
Armour-plated Ships bought out of the Vote of Credit in 1878.
Tons weight
Superb .
5,950
Neptune
6,080
Belleisle
3,200
Orion
3,200
Total.
18,430
.
.
0
.
THE STATE OF THE NAVY, 1880.
145
OBSERVATIONS OF THE TIMES, MARCH 28, 1880, ON
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY.
1880.
It is curious that while Mr. Bright has been denouncing warlike Alleged
expenditure as no better than throwing money to the bottom of the deficiency
sea, it has been made a complaint against the Government by Lord tion, 1874–
Hartington that they have not maintained the Army and Navy in
due efficiency. It is one of the last charges which would be expected
to be brought against a Conservative Administration, but it is one
which, when advanced on responsible authority, must always command
attention from the public. The Navy, in particular, is the peculiar
pride of the British people; and perhaps this is one reason why
controversy respecting its efficiency is perpetually raging.
The
disputes of successive First Lords or Chief Constructors resemble
the quarrels of architects. Each in turn maintains that the construc-
tions and designs of his predecessors or successors were of the most
imperfect character, and denounces the result of their work as com-
paratively valueless. Soon after the present Ministry had taken
office, the late Mr. Ward Hunt, then First Lord of the Admiralty,
startled the House and the country by declaring that we had little
more than a phantom fleet; and though by subsequent explanations
he relieved the alarm thus created, his criticism remained as a
general charge against the naval administration of the preceding
Government. Now, it appears, the tables are to be turned, and the
Liberal leaders are advancing a precisely similar accusation against
the present administration of the Admiralty, and are making it a
strong point in their case against the Government. The charge as
first brought forward by Lord Hartington was recently answered
by Mr. Smith, in one of his speeches to the electors of Westminster;
and to this reply two rejoinders are made this morning-one in a
speech by Mr. Childers at Pontefract, the other in a letter from Mr.
Shaw-Lefevre, which will be found in our columns. It is, we fear,
impossible to come to a definite conclusion on the dispute from the
materials thus supplied. But they raise a question of very great
VOL. IV.
L
146
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Times.
mainte-
nance
nate in
the pro-
grammes
of succes-
1
nistrations.
interest to the country, and one which demands thorough discussion
in the new Parliament.
Shipbuild-
Mr. Smith's reply to the original charge against him involved two
ing and
statements. The first was a re-assertion of Mr. Ward Hunt's de-
scription of the state of the Navy as inherited from his predecessor;
alternately
predomi- the second was an allegation that its efficiency has been vastly
increased under the present Government. The fact was,' he said,
that in 1870 the Liberal Government inherited, through the
sive Adlmi- exertions of the late Mr. Corry, a very fine fleet; but in 1874 the
fleet had fallen into a very decrepit condition. In contrast with this
result of Liberal administration, he read a return, for which he had
just called upon the permanent officials of the Admiralty, upon whose
faith it rested. According to this return, on the 1st of April, 1874,
of ironclad ships fit to go into action there were 101,044 tons; these
ships were moved by 74,908 indicated horse-power, and they had
guns which at one discharge could throw 37,000 lbs. of metal. At the
present time, against the 101,044 tons of ironclads thus prepared for
action there are 272,000 tons; the available horse-power has been
increased from 74,000 to 195,000; and as against the 37,000 lbs.
weight of metal there can now be discharged 111,000 lbs. That was
to say, our ships are two and a half times more numerous and their
weight of metal is three times as heavy as it was then.' He added
that this was the result of spending more money, for he admitted
that during the last six years they had spent more money than their
predecessors. At the same time he does not accuse Mr. Ward
Hunt's predecessor of indifference to the state of the Navy, but
describes him as the victim of circumstances. Mr. Goschen was
as anxious as he was to maintain the fleet in a state of efficiency, but
he found that the whole thought of the Admiralty had been directed
to building ships, and they had allowed the engines and boilers to
become useless and ineffective. They might as well have at the
railway stations a fine. lot of engines ranged alongside, and not one
of them able to move. These are formidable figures, and the
explanation offered of them is very simple and intelligible. What
is Mr. Shaw-Lefevre's reply? A great part of his letter may, we
think, be disregarded as irrelevant to the issue. He takes great
pains to show that the Government have been backward as compared
- with their predecessors in building new ironclads. But, whatever
dispute there may be in respect to the details of the work executed,
this allegation appears to be in 'substance admitted. Mr. Smith's
very complaint of the late Administration is that they spent too much
money on construction and too little on repairs. The same may be
THE STATE OF THE NAVY, 1880.
147
Times.
said of Mr. Childers's speech. He practically admits the justice of
Mr. Smith's description of the policy of the Government in which he
was First Lord. He found, he said, that his predecessor, Mr. Corry,
had decided quietly 'to cut down the estimates, and to build at that
time no more ironclads.' In other words, Mr. Corry had determined
to devote his chief attention to rendering our existing ships more
efficient. Mr. Childers at once determined to reverse this policy.
'It seemed to me,' he says, 'much more important to be ahead in
building new ships with the last improvements than to patch up old
ones.' This was steadily done by himself and by Mr. Goschen who
succeeded him. “We built rather more, in fact, than our programme,
and we spent much less in patching.' Here, it will be seen, are two
definite policies placed in contrast, and fully acknowledged by their
authors. Mr. Goschen clearly summed up this part of the question
in the late debate on the Navy Estimates. There were,' he said,
two distinct policies which a First Lord could adopt-one the
repairing, the other the building of ships. Now, the right honour-
able gentleman had adopted the former, and the result was the
complaint as to the paucity of the ships he was building. . . . The
late Government pursued a different policy. They concentrated a
great deal of their attention on building, and were in consequence
abused for not having repaired sufficiently.' This being admitted to
be the state of the case as between the two Governments, the public
will be much inclined to come to the conclusion that one has about
as much to say for itself as the other, and that, in all probability, each
of the two policies is as good in its time and place, provided it be not
carried too far. If our Constitutional system provides us with alter-
nate administrations at the Admiralty, of which the one builds ships
and the other periodically brings them up to a proper state of effici-
ency, we shall not, after all, be so very badly off. At all events, the
difference between these two systems is at each period a question of
policy which must be dependent on circumstances, and a mere change
from the one to the other does not of itself constitute a valid charge
against the efficiency of an Administration.
But the question raised by Mr. Smith was of a different character.
Either policy, as we have said, may be carried too far; and his
statement is that, whereas the late Government had allowed the
Navy to become decrepit' from want of repairs, he has more than
doubled its efficiency by attending to them. Mr. Shaw-Lefevre's
answer to this part of his adversary's case amounts to a simple
denial of the trustworthiness of the return from which he quotes.
The comparison, he urges, depends upon the opinions formed re-
E 2
148
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Times.
specting a vast number of individual vessels in various conditions ;
and it is impossible to place reliance on 'a return of an argumenta-
tive character, drawn up for the purpose of a political speech, which
gives every latitude for placing ships on one or other side of an
arbitrary line which divides those which are or were fit to go into
action from those which are not fit.' Mr. Childers's reply is of the
same nature, but to some extent admits the technical accuracy of
Mr. Smith's statement. He defends his policy by urging that some
of our most powerful ships would only be required when war broke
out, and a few weeks' work would then be wanted to complete them.'
Some of the old ironclads would not be wanted at the beginning of
a war, ' and they too might be left to be put in thorough condition
later on.' Mr. Smith's return, according to him, is made up by
leaving out of account, under cover of the words “fit to go into
action,' all the ironclads which needed 'but a few weeks' to render
them fit for service. It is evident that any number of ambiguities
may be concealed under either of these two rival statements. On
the one hand, it may be a matter of somewhat arbitrary opinion
whether a ship is 'fit to go into action ;' on the other, very different
opinions may be formed as to the value of a Navy in which there
are several ironclads which need “a few weeks' to render them fit
for work. The question depends on the precise meaning of the
terms employed; and in the absence of further explanation it is
difficult for the public to form any opinion on the merits of the
controversy. At the same time, it must be observed that Mr.
Smith's figures exhibit a contrast which can hardly be explained
away by the deduction of two or three vessels more or less from the
rival catalogues. He describes our present ships as two and a half
times more numerous, and their weight of metal three times as
heavy. If this be. at all near the truth, the additional money
which Mr. Shaw-Lefevre accuses him of having wasted, and which
he admits having spent, is very well accounted for. The dispute,
as we have said, will need very careful discussion when Parliament
meets. Meanwhile, it would seem that the country may draw
some reassurance from the dispute. The Liberals are quite satisfied
with the state of the Navy when they left office; and the Conserva-
tives claim, without being altogether contradicted, to have at least
maintained its full efficiency. Between the two, and their mutual
criticisms and rivalries, it is probable that we have never really had
a phantom fleet, and that at the present moment, at all events, it
is quite equal to any demands which are likely to be made upon it.
..
THE STATE OF THE NAVY, 1880.
149
SIR E. J. REED.
To the Editor of the “ Times.'
Criticisms
On Mr.
return on
upon it.
SIR, I am not satisfied with the manner in which the discussion Times,
April 17,
upon the above subject has been left in your columns, and, as the 1880.
question is one which justly causes no little anxiety throughout the
country, I shall be glad of an opportunity of throwing further light Smith's
In the last naval debate in the House of Commons I took the state of
the Navy
some pains to show that the progress of ironclad shipbuilding had in 1880.
been extraordinarily dilatory under the present Administration, and
that the programme for the future operations of the Royal Dockyards
was to the last degree unsatisfactory, and even absurd. Upon this
demonstration other adverse statements were based, and under the
provocation thus given Mr. W. H. Smith offered a reply at Exeter
Hall on March 25, in which he asserted (from a return which no
one outside the Admiralty has seen) that the ironclad ships now in
a state of readiness for sea are from two to three times as numerous
and as strong as they were in 1874. Now, so far as the figures
given go, they ought undoubtedly to be welcome to all lovers of the
country, and that they have some substantial value and significance
I most readily admit. But, at the same time, it is my duty to point
out that such figures cover the most dangerous assumptions, and,
if accepted as a true test of naval strength, would lead the Navy to
ruin. The very standards adopted—viz., tonnage, steam-power,
and weight of broadside-are utterly false tests of strength and
fighting efficiency; while the lumping together of the oldest and
most effete vessels with the most modern is a process of which a
child would scarcely be capable in a serious discussion. That
tonnage is no true standard will be obvious to all, from the fact
that the old · Warrior,' with her 4l-inch armour over a small portion
of her, figures in Mr. Smith's estimate as of 6,109 tons (B.M.);
while the · Dreadnought,' with her 14-inch armour, appears there
as of 5,030 tons, although the “Dreadnought' is probably the most
powerful finished ironclad in the world, while the Warrior' has
150
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Reed.
Sir E. J. long ceased to be regarded as an ironclad at all, or, at least, is con-
sidered to be one of the weakest we possess. As regards the standard
of steam-power, the same sort of contrast exists, the very earliest and
most useless standing on a level with the latest and most powerful
ships. As regards the third standard, weight of 'shot and shell
thrown, every one knows that, although ten shells of 100 lbs. weight
each would be perfectly useless in a naval attack upon other iron-
clads, they would weigh as much as one shell of 1,000 lbs. weight,
which alone might destroy any one of the early ironclads. Mr.
Smith's standards are, therefore, utterly fallacious, and the country
may well feel alarmed when its Navy is committed to men who
know no better than to employ such tests of naval strength.
Next allow me to set forth in some detail the process by which
Mr. Smith has built up his Exeter Hall figures. There are first the
five ships of his predecessors, which have been finished in the Royal
Dockyards, and of which one (the Thunderer ') was nearly complete
when the present Government took office. These are :~ Alexandra,?
* Téméraire," "Thunderer,' 'Dreadnought,' and 'Shannon ;' tonnage,
28,680; indicated horse-power, 32,100. Next there are the four
vessels of the Hydra' class, to which Mr. Shaw-Lefevre made
reference in the Times of Saturday last. One of the four-the
Gorgon '-- was completed and commissioned by the last Govern-
ment; and the other three were so very nearly complete that that
Government, and not the present, ought to be credited with them.
These give :--- Cyclops,' 'Hecate,' and Hydra;' tonpage 8,190,
indicated horse-power 5,000. We must add to these the only two
ironclads produced out and out (by contract) by the present Govern-
ment-viz., 'Nelson 'and Northampton; 'tonnage, 9,000; indicated
horse-power, 12,000; and likewise the ships purchased out of the
extraordinary War Vote of Credit -- tonnage, 18,200; indicated
horse-power, 24,230. These are, I believe, the total results of the
ironclad shipbuilding operations of the Government during their
six years of power, and may be brought together thus :-
6
6
.
Ships begun and advanced by their predecessor
Hydra'class
Ships built by contract
Ships purchased with Vote of Credit
Tonnage
28,680
8,190
9,000
18,200
64,070
In. II. P.
32,100
5,000
12,000
24,230
73,330
1
Here we have 64,000 out of the 170,000 tons, and 73,000 out
of the 120,000 indicated horse-power, which Mr. Smith claims to
have added to the efficient ironclad Navy of the country since 1874.
THE STATE OF THE NAVY, 1880.
151
Reed.
It is obvious that, roughly speaking, about one-half of the quantity Sir EJ
is due to work executed by his predecessors; and that in the case
of vessels of the ‘Hydra’class, and of the Thunderer' and 'Dread-
nought,' advantage has been taken, in swelling the figures, of the
mere accident of a few ships being just short of completion when
the Government was changed in 1874. There are none of the iron-
clads commenced by the Government in this state at the present
moment.
Any impartial person inspecting the above figures must clearly
see that when the results of the labours of their predecessors and
of the War Vote of Credit are taken away the Government produc-
tion of new ironclad ships has been most unsatisfactory, and if
similar negligence were persisted in the pre-eminence of our Navy
would soon be gone.
But what they have been unable to perform in fact by ship-
building they have succeeded in appearing to accomplish by ship-
repairing, and Mr. Smith's quantities of efficient tonnage and horse-
power have been inflated to large proportions by counting in a crowd
of -ironclads of the old type which have undergone repair or refit.
That they have been rightly and wisely repaired and refitted I readily
admit, and I praise them for having done the work; but I blame
them, and I blame them with whatever severity I can command,
for availing themselves of this fact for the purpose of inspiring the
public with an amount of confidence in themselves and in the
present state of the Navy which would be entirely fatal if indulged
in. Out of the many ironclad ships repaired (about a dozen) there
are but three (Hercules,'"Audacious,' and 'Lord Warden') which
were not laid down before my appointment to the Admiralty as long
ago as 1863. All the others (* Warrior,' • Black Prince,' “ Achilles,
Minotaur,” “Agincourt,'' Northumberland, Hector, Prince Albert,
· Wivern ') are of the oldest type, with armour which is no longer
considered worthy to be called armour, and devoid of most of the
qualities of a modern ironclad. And yet they swell the aggregate of
Mr. Smith's figures by 50,000 tous and by nearly 50,000 indicated
horse-power.
It appears needless to pursue the inquiry further. That the Building
neglected
First Lord and the Government deserve the credit of preventing in order to
even old and comparatively worthless ironclads from falling in large push on
numbers out of repair cannot be doubted; but they deserve, in my
opinion, the severest censure for neglecting to push forward the
ships of modern type, and for squandering six whole years and an
excessive dockyard expenditure without having added a single iron-
152.
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Reed.
Sir E. J. clad ship of their own initiation to the Royal Navy in the Royal
Dockyards, or having even brought any approximately to completion.
There will now be a change of Government, and with it there
must be a great change in the dockyard programme for the coming
year. Whoever may undertake to administer the Navy, if I should
to-morrow obtain a seat in Parliament I shall feel it my duty to
urge upon the House of Commons a very considerable modification
of the present shipbuilding proposals of the Government.
I should have been delighted to have seen Mr. Smith retire
from his high office with perfect credit; as it is, he retires with
much credit I willingly admit, but nevertheless under conditions
which make his removal from office give new hope for the greatness
and power of our naval service.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
E. J. REED.
Royal Hotel, Cardiff : April 5.
THE STATE OF THE NAVY, 1880.
153
MR. BRASSEY.
To the Editor of the 'Times.'
workmen
1866-1870.
SIR, -. Having watched the administration of the Navy during the
last fifteen years with close attention, I venture to offer a few
observations on the controversy between the First Lord of the
Admiralty, Sir Spencer Robinson, and Mr. Shaw-Lefevre, on the
subject of shipbuilding in our dockyards.
It must be admitted by every impartial observer that the re- Number of
ductions in the number of workmen in the dockyards were carried in dock-
too far in the earlier years of Mr. Gladstone's Administration. But Fards in
the responsibility for those reductions belongs at least as much to
Mr. Corry and to Sir Spencer Robinson as to the able administrators
who filled the office of First Lord of the Admiralty in the late
Cabinet. The reductions proposed to Parliament by Mr. Childers
were based on a report prepared in 1870 by Sir Spencer Robinson,
as Controller of the Navy, for the guidance of the Board, of which
he himself was a member. The report opens with a review of the
dockyard expenditure during the four preceding years. It gives
the number of men employed in the dockyards and the expenditure
on wages from year to year. In the estimates for 1866–67, pre-
pared by the Duke of Somerset's administration, provision is made
for 18,618 artificers, and for an expenditure in wages of 1,065,1941.
No appreciable change was made in these figures in the estimates
for the following year, for which Sir John Pakington was responsible.
In 1868–69 there was much discussion at the Admiralty in reference
to the estimates, and the late Mr. Corry, who had originally con-
templated a large addition to the shipbuilding work, both in the
dockyards and by contract, finally proposed a reduction of 3,049
artificers in the Government establishments. The number borne
in the previous year having been for some time in excess of the
number voted, no less than 4,000 men were discharged, and arrange-
ments were made for closing Deptford yard. No reduction under
succeeding administrations was so sweeping as that enforced under
154
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Mr.
Brassey.
Numbers
provided
for in
1870–71.
the Admiralty of 1868. Where great fluctuations occur from year
to year in the amount of work carried out in the dockyards, economy
is impossible. The sudden change of policy adopted by Mr. Corry
offered a bad precedent to succeeding administrations.
In the estimates for 1869-70, as revised by Mr. Childers, the
number of artificers and labourers to be employed in the dockyards
was reduced by 1,130; but the total tonnage to be built fell short of
the amount for the previous year by 986 tons only, and the ironclad
construction was actually raised from 7,538 to 8,866 tons. The
construction of new ships was prosecuted, nevertheless, with unabated
activity by diminishing the strength of our foreign squadrons, and
thus lessening the demands on the dockyards for repairs and reliefs.
The estimates for 1870–71 were framed in accordance with the
rigorous principles of retrenchment to which Mr. Gladstone's Admi-
nistration were pledged, and the pruning-knife was applied almost
exclusively to dockyard expenditure. The number of workmen was
fixed at 11,276, being a reduction of 2,866 as compared with the
previous year. Mr. Childers belonged to a Cabinet determined on a
vigorous effort to keep down expenditure ; but the economies for
which he is responsible were made with the entire concurrence of his
professional adviser. Sir Spencer Robinson had stated, in the report
already quoted, in reviewing the shipbuilding operations in the dock-
yards in 1869–70, that the very great care exercised in undertaking
repairs, and the steady discouragement given to expending money on
obsolete ships, showed that a larger provision had been made under
the head of repairs and maintenance than was strictly necessary.
Hence the administration was able in 1870 to propose a considerable
reduction in the number of artificers for the ensuing year. . . . To
keep pace with the wants both of ironclads and of wooden ships an
addition of about 19,000 or 20,000 tons per annum is fairly necessary.
Of this, about 15,500 tons, equally divided between armoured and
unarmoured ships, might be built in our dockyards. I believe that
11,000 artificers and 625,0001. in wages would build the above
amount annually and maintain what it is really necessary to main-
tain.'
Sir Spencer Robinson was clearly under the impression that the
previous expenditure on repairs had been extravagant. While as-
senting to an aggregate reduction of not less than 2,866 men, he
had at the same time contemplated a new distribution of the dock-
yard labour, allotting only 4,927 men to repairs, and increasing the
number employed in shipbuilding by 450. The extent to which the
reduction in the cost of maintenance was proposed to be carried
THE STATE OF THE NAVY, 1880.
155
1
under the new arrangements may be readily understood from a Mr.
Brassey.
comparison of the numbers appropriated to this branch of dockyard
work in 1869–70 with the corresponding numbers in previous years.
The figures are as follows :—1869–70, for repairs, 8,243 men ;
1868–69, for repairs, 9,833 men; 1867-68, for repairs, 8,296 men;
1866-67, for repairs, 11,936 men.
The policy of retrenchment in the expenditure on repairs, com-
bined with an increase in the construction of new tonnage, as
proposed by Sir Spencer Robinson, was resolutely adopted by Mr.
Childers; and, notwithstanding the great diminution in the number
of men employed, he succeeded, in 1870–71, in completing 9,567 tons
weight of ironclad construction in the dockyards.
It cannot be denied that these results were attained by a restric-
tion of the appropriation for repairs which has not been warranted by
increased experience in the wear and tear of an ironclad fleet. Iron
hulls, when properly cared for, possess great durability; but boilers
deteriorate rapidly, and considerable sums are constantly being
expended, in alterations in the rig, the armament, and the fighting
equipment.
The first note of alarm was sounded by Sir Spencer Robinson
Sir Spencer
himself, in a paper dated August 4, 1870, only seven months after he Robinson's
had expressed his approval of great economies in the expenditure on dum of
August,
repairs. Reviewing the condition of the Navy, and the state of 1876.
preparation for contingencies which might possibly arise out of the
Franco-German war, he reports that, of 39 ironclads in the hands of
the Navy only twenty-two were available for general service, and that
six special ships were similarly available for special service. He con-
sidered that the provision in the dockyards was insufficient for secure
neutrality, and that any delay in making further preparation was
fraught with danger to the country.
No time was lost by Mr. Childers in giving effect to the urgent
recommendations of his responsible professional adviser, and, a vote
of two millions having been taken for additional armaments, a sum
of half a million was applied by a Board minute of August 9 to the
completion of the repairs of ironclads, expediting the “Thunderer'
and the Dreadnought,' and the payment of the first instalments
on the four armoured vessels of the Cyclops' class. In the estimates
for the following year, provision was made for 12,850 men, being
an addition of 1,574 to the numbers voted in the previous year,
which had been cordially accepted by Sir Spencer Robinson as
sufficient for the wants of the Navy. In the interval, however, he
had been brought face to face with the stern possibility of a European
Memoian-
156
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Mr.
Action
Mr. Gos-
chen.
war, and his views as to the requirements of the Navy had been so
Brassey. completely changed by the altered circumstances that he thought
it his duty, in a confidential paper of January 13, 1871, to make
a formal representation to Sir Sydney Dacres that 13,500 artificers
was the lowest number which would suffice, and that, even with
that very considerable augmentation, the necessary work would be
stinted and starved. In the paper in question, he expressed his
conviction that Mr. Childers, whose health had given way from
overwork in the public service, would have approved the proposed
addition to the strength of the dockyards. No difficulty, however,
taken by
was experienced with Mr. Goschen. In the first estimate prepared
under his supervision, the number of workmen was raised to the
standard which Sir Spencer Robinson had insisted upon, and in the
following year a further addition was made of 1,380 men to the
strength of the dockyards.
The increase in dockyard expenditure, which it had been found
impossible to prevent even under the effective control of Mr. Childers
and Mr. Goschen, was continued for the first two years after the
accession of the present Administration to power. It reached its
culminating point in 1875–76, when the vote for wages amounted
to 1,025,4771., being an increase of 394,0741. as compared with the
year 1870–71. No material reduction has been made in the interval,
and the increased expenditure has been mainly devoted to the
repair and maintenance of the fleet. In 1875–76 the armoured
construction was only 10,641 tons, as compared with 9,567 tons in
1870–71, and the unarmoured construction fell away from 3,942 to
3,516 tons.
It is impossible to conclude this review of recent dockyard
administration without acknowledging the efforts of the eminent
public servants who have followed one another at the Admiralty to
protect the interests of the taxpayers; but when it is attempted to
make political capital out of the alleged neglect of a Liberal Ministry
to maintain the fleet in a condition for active service, it is the duty
of impartial and attentive spectators to remind the public that the
reductions in the dockyards were due, not to a desire to stint the
Navy, but to inexperience in the wear and tear of ironclad ships.
The policy of Mr. Childers was not merely approved, but suggested
by Sir Spencer Robinson. In the early years of the Liberal adminis-
tration the appropriations for the maintenance of the fleet were
inadequate; but the subsequent increase in the aggregate expen-
diture, almost the whole of which has been absorbed in repairs,
must have been watched with the deepest concern by all who desire
THE STATE OF THE NAVY, 1880.
157
construc-
France.
that the power and efficiency of the Navy should grow in proportion Mr.
Brassey.
to its cost.
Between 1874 and 1879 thirteen ironclads, with a total displace- Armoured
ment of 101,252 tons, were launched from the English dockyards. tion in
In the same interval the French launched 65,775, and the Germans England,
Germany,
36,577 tons of armoured ships. The list of armoured ships in con- and
struction in the French dockyards, as given in the last issue of the
Année Maritime, included five first-class and seven second-class
ships, and six first-class and two second-class coast-defence vessels.
In the German dockyards three armoured ships of the Sachsen'
type, of 7,400 tons, and eight armoured gunboats of the Wespe'
type, of 1,000 tons, are in various stages of progress. Ironclad ships
are now being built in the German and the French dockyards at
least as rapidly as we are building for our own 'Navy, and from a
naval point of view it is perhaps satisfactory to be assured that the
formidable fleets now building for the most ambitious naval Powers
on the Continent are not likely to be combined against us.
The annexed table is taken from the Navy Estimates and from
a return of tonnage built, which was obtained by Mr. Shaw-Lefevre.
Dockyards.
Total weight of hull already built
Year
Artificers
Wages
Ironclads
Unarmoured
Tous
1870–71
1871-72
1872-73
1873-74
1874 75
1875–76
1876–77
1877-78
1878–79
11,276
12,850
12,858
13,500
15,120
16,000
16,109
16,109
17,565
631,403
706,538
712,571
841,658
967,214
1,025,477
1,015,947
1,014,829
1,015,102
Tons
9,567
6,261
5,789
5,003
7,916
10,641
7,920
5,940
6,912
3,942
7,167
6,632
6,817
3,388
3,516
5,517
6,112
4,817
To be built
1879-80
16,111
1,012,038
7,493
4,658
I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
THOMAS BRASSEY.
April 5, 1880.
158
„DOCKYARIS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
OBSERVATIONS OF THE TIMES ON THE PRECEDING
LETTERS.
Mr. Ward
Hunt and
Smith.
The Times. Amid the electoral turmoil of the last ten days it is possible that
Policy of
a discussion on the state of the Navy, which has been carried on
Mr. W. H. both in election speeches and in letters published in our columns,
has attracted less attention than it deserves. All parties are osten-
sibly agreed that questions concerning the national defences, more
especially those which turn on the condition and efficiency of the
Navy, are not to be used as mere weapons of party warfare. Some-
how or other it always seems to happen, in spite of this salutary
understanding, that when either party succeeds the other in office
it discovers that its predecessor has been mismanaging the Navy,
and has left it in a lamentable state of inefficiency. When the
present Government came into office in 1874, Mr. Ward Hunt, who
was then First Lord of the Admiralty, created no little alarm, in
moving the Navy Estimates, by declaring that he would not be
satisfied with a phantom fleet and dummy ships. The natural in-
ference was that this was all that his predecessors at the Admiralty
had left him. But the public alarm was soon allayed when it was
found that Mr. Ward Hunt was prepared to accept his predecessor's
estimates with very slight modifications, and that a few hundreds
of thousands were all that he needed to restore the Navy to what
he considered a state of efficiency. Latterly the charge has been
retorted. Again we are told that the state of the Navy is unsatis-
factory, and that the present Government has mismanaged it,
although it has spent a good deal more money than its predecessors.
In six years it has built no ironclads of its own in the dockyards,
and has not even completed some that were already begun when it
took office. To this Mr. Smith replies that the policy of the Govern-
ment has been to repair ships as they needed it rather than to build
new ones rapidly, and that the expenditure sanctioned by Parliament
will not suffice for both purposes at once. This defence was practi-
THE STATE OF THE NAVY, 1880.
159
cally endorsed by Mr. Goschen in the debate on the Navy Estimates Times.
in the last session of Parliament. But Mr. Smith has what, at any
rate, appears to be an even more complete defence than this to offer.
In a speech delivered a fortnight ago, he revived the forgotten scare
of his immediate predecessor, and again accused the former Govern-
ment of allowing the fleet to fall into a very decrepit condition.
Now, however, he tells us, such has been the energy of the present
Board of Admiralty, that as compared with 1874 'our ships are two
and a half times more numerous and their weight of metal is three
times as heavy as it was then.'
So far it would seem as if Mr. Smith had the best of the argu-
ment. But his speech only served to renew the controversy. Besides
his speech and that of Mr. Childers in reply to it, we have printed
letters from Mr. Shaw-Lefevre and Mr. Reed, from Mr. Smith himself,
from Sir Spencer Robinson, and from Mr. Thomas Brassey--that is
to say, from the present and a former First Lord of the Admiralty,
from a late Secretary to the Admiralty, from a former Controller of
the Navy, from a former Chief Constructor, and from an independent
critic of naval affairs whose opinion is justly respected. It certainly
ought to be possible to draw some definite conclusion from this
conflict of officials and experts. We will not perplex our readers
with all the details of a long and intricate discussion; but we are
disposed to think that they will not be very far wrong in coming
to the conclusion that each party is keenly alive to the necessity of
maintaining the Navy in a high state of efficiency, though, as a
Shipbuild-
matter of fact, each has pursued the same end by the adoption of ing under
Mr. Corry,
different means. To go back to 1868, Mr. Corry decided in that Mr. Chil
year to reduce the estimates, and to build no more ironclads for the Mr. Gos-
present. Mr. Childers, who succeeded Mr. Corry, decided to reverse
this policy, though he endeavoured still to keep down expenditure
by a re-organisation of dockyard administration. His efforts in this
direction were to some extent frustrated by the outbreak of the
Franco-German war, and by the practical failure of some of the
proposed measures of reform. Mr. Goschen continued the policy of
Mr. Chílders in building new ships, and during his administration
the dockyard expenditure was gradually increased by the necessity
of employing a much larger number of artificers in order to complete
the work annually provided for in the estimates. When the present Attention
Government came into office in 1874, Mr. Ward Hunt reverted to
alternately
the policy, formerly pursued by Mr. Corry, of repairing existing to building.
and repairs.
ships in preference to building new ones, and the same policy has
likewise been pursued in the main by the present First Lord of the
chen.
directed
160
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Times.
Admiralty. Now, it is clear that if this is in substance a true
account of the matter, the public has, so far, little reason to complain
of the policy of either party. Each is admittedly necessary in turn,
while both cannot be pursued together. It is quite another question
whether the policy of Mr. Childers and Mr. Goschen was as efficient
as it should have been, or whether that of Mr. Ward Hunt and Mr.
Smith has not been more extravagant than it need be—in other
words, whether Mr. Goschen left dummy ships' and a decrepit
fleet,' and whether Mr. Smith has been 'patching up old ships' at
an excessive cost and presenting a fallacious appearance of strength
by placing obsolete ironclads in a line with the latest specimens
of naval construction, or accrediting ten shells of 100 lbs. with the
same offensive and destructive power as a single shell of 1,000 lbs.,
as Mr. Reed accuses him of doing. With the acknowledged policy
of either party there does not seem to be much fault to be found;
but fair criticism of its execution in detail is not only permissible
but highly advantageous to the public service. Perhaps, however,
for criticism of this latter kind Parliament is the more appropriate
place; there only can mis-statements be at once corrected and mis-
understandings promptly removed. A running controversy over-
loaded with statement and counter-statement, with returns alleged
to be fallacious, and with comparisons declared to be inisleading, is
apt to bewilder the public, and to divert its attention from the
main question at issue, which is whether the Navy has been succes-
sively maintained by each party in such a state of efficiency as to
enable it to deal with all such emergencies as it is reasonable and
prudent to take into account. If one party is to be accused of leaving
a decrepit fleet and the other of patching up useless ships and of
squandering money on repairs, and if each can successfully rebut
the charge, it is difficult for plain men to believe that party spirit
has been entirely excluded from a discussion which certainly ought
to be free from it.
There is nothing more easy in this country than to get up a
scare about the Navy. It is the sort of thing that periodically
recurs whenever a change of Government is imminent, or has lately
taken place. Perhaps this is inevitable when each party has identified
itself with a policy which is the necessary complement of that of
the other ; but it is none the less to be regretted. There is no
point on which the nation at large is more sensitive than that of
the condition of its Navy, and yet "there is none on which, owing to
the recriminations of technical critics, it is more difficult for out-
siders to form an accurate and decisive opinion. After all, we
+
Satisfac-
tory vicw
of tlie state
of the
Navy.
THE STATE OF THE NAVY,
161
1880.
Times.
cannot but place some trust in the responsible Ministers of either
party. What the nation wants is a Navy sufficient for all practical
purposes, and it would certainly wish to believe that this is the
primary care of each successive Administration. The choice of the
best means for securing that end it is very willing to leave to those
who are responsible for it. Naval science is so technical, naval
warfare is so entirely changed in all its conditions, that it is practi-
cally impossible for the public to judge of many of the questions at
issue regarding them. It is very apt to be frightener by the as-
sumption that England's naval supremacy is virtually at an end
because some nation has a ship with thicker plates and bigger guns
than any of ours, or because the fleets of several natións combined
can be proved on paper to be capable of overpowering all the ships
that we could array against them. A new gun is found capable of
piercing the thickest plate, and in a few weeks a thicker plate is
rolled, which in its turn defies the gun. Thus the battle rages
from year to year, and we are subject to periodical panics, as though
the fighting power of a fleet could be accurately measured by size
of gun and weight of armour alone. It seems to us that the true
policy of naval administration is to take science for its servant, and
not for its master; to keep steadily abreast of all that science can do
and all that mechanical skill can accomplish, to fit the fleet for its
duties in time of peace, and to take a reasonable estimate of the
possible and probable contingencies of war. It is a significant fact
that England builds ships of war for all nations, and that all nations
come to England to study the best methods of naval administration.
The explanation is that we are acknowledged to know more about
the matter than others, and to turn our knowledge to at least as
good an account. This is the true secret of our naval supremacy,
and so long as we have confidence in ourselves and exercise a
reasonable foresight we need entertain no serious fear of losing it.
VOL. IV.
M
162
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
SIR SPENCER ROBINSON.
To the Editor of the Times.'
SIR,—I certaiuly do not regret having published an article in the
Nineteenth Century on England as a Naval Power, though it has
brought no little trouble on me in my endeavours to prevent a party
use being made of the facts I there stated. I can only rejoice at
finding the condition of the Navy occupying the attention of such
· distinguished men as Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Childers, Mr. Smith, Mr.
Shaw-Lefevre, Mr. Reed, and Mr. Brassey-a condition which, on
very different grounds, they all consider more or less unsatisfactory.
I cannot doubt that the attention thus called to it will lead to the
insecure position of our country-intimately depending for its
existence on its naval power-being exchanged for one of just and
reasonable security. The question ought certainly not to be treated
from a party, still less from a personal, point of view. But as, from
a mistaken knowledge of the relative positions and power of the First
Lord of the Admiralty and the Controller of the Navy, Mr. Brassey
blames Mr. Corry and myself for reductions effected in the Navy
Estimates, I must remind him that the First Lord of the Admiralty
penditure is only one of a council, subordinate himself to the Prime Minister,
by Prime and from my own knowledge I can state that his decisions as to the
expenditure necessary for the Navy are, or were, frequently overruled.
The First Lord is, or used to be, told, and he repeated it to the
Controller of the Navy, 'You can only have so much money for the
matériel of the Navy; do the best you can with it.' My own ex-
perience was that careful consideration of how the money allowed
by the Government could be most beneficially applied always took
place between the First Lord and the Controller of the Navy. The
latter, though a trusted and influential subordinate, was the servant
of the Government, and if he carried his remonstrances too far he
was liable to the rebuke, that some one must govern the country,
and it is not the place of the Controller of the Navy to do so.'
The estimates for 1870–71 presented a large reduction on those
Naval ex-
determined
Minister,
THE STATE OF THE NAVY, 1880.
163
Robinson.
in dock-
>
of previous years, principally in the votes referring to the matériel. Sir Spencer
These reductions are much censured by Mr. Brassey. They were, Reduction
as I have just described, initiated by the Government. Belonging yards,
to a reforming Administration, painfully conscious as I was that, 1870–71.
notwithstanding strenuous efforts, there was a large amount of waste
and mismanagement under our former dockyard system, I proposed
the very large reductions in dockyard expenditure, coupled with a
thorough reform already begun in our dockyard establishments, the
cardinal point being the substitution of management and direct
responsibility in these establishments for superintendence. I worked
zealously and cordially under my immediate chief to effect all the
reductions rendered necessary by the Government's decision. I
believed that, under certain conditions, in which Mr. Childers
entirely agreed, the number of men proposed (11,256) could perform
the amount of work which was necessary for our then wants. I had
been able to report in the early part of 1870 that every ironclad,
exclusive of those just launched, with one exception (the 'Lord Clyde,
under repair), was either in commission or ready for sea; that we had
built in the dockyards upwards of 8,500 tons (builder's measurement)
of ironclads during the preceding twelve months; that the programme
of wooden shipbuilding had been substantially complied with ; and
that the reliefs for foreign service had been easily met out of the
reserves.
I have great doubts whether a similar and as satisfactory state-
ment could have been made in many subsequent years. The measure increase
of reduction I proposed was to a great extent experimental. Its in 1870.
success depended on many conditions, which could not be positively
secured, such as the maintenance of peace, a different arrangement
of the force to be employed on foreign stations, an absolute refusal
to make capricious or unnecessary alterations in ships already built, as
well as to repair useless and obsolete ships, the cordial co-operation
of all concerned in and out of the Admiralty, the completion of very
extensive reforms, the exercise of forethought, method, and thrift not
always to be relied on in subordinates; so that, when all these things
are duly weighed, I have since come to the conclusion that, although,
perhaps, justified in taking the part I did, it would have been more
prudent to have made those reductions less extensive, and to have
assumed rather the part of the unwilling than that of the willing
horse in these transactions. Peace came to an end in the very midst
of our reforms and while reductions were still in progress; some of the
other conditions on which I had based my convictions of success also
failed me; and in consequence I at once used all the influence I
Reasons for
demanded
M 2
164
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Sir Spencer possessed to obtain such an increase in our naval force, and, con-
Robinson.
sequently, in our naval expenditure, as appeared to me under the
altered conditions of the world to be necessary. I did not succeed
either in obtaining an adequate temporary increase in our dockyards
for the current year or anything like what I considered was required
for naval matériel in the following year, early in which I ceased to be
Controller of the Navy. I think Mr. Brassey is mistaken in suppos-
ing that there was no difficulty made by Mr. Goschen, who succeeded
Mr. Childers as First Lord, in granting that addition to the workmen
in the dockyards which I had urged in 1871-72; the number of
workmen was, notwithstanding my protest (referred to by Mr.
Brassey, and communicated by me to Mr. Goschen after I had left
office), maintained at 12,850 men, and it was not till 1873–74 (two
years afterwards) that the number he proposed reached 13,500, which
I had considered necessary in 1871–72. Admitting, for the sake of
argument, that I was entirely responsible for the reduction in
1870–71, and that it was an error to have proposed it, that error was
not fully carried out. It lasted from March to the middle of July.
It was then remedied as far as I could possibly do so myself or
persuade others to do. It seems a little unreasonable to assert,
under these circumstances, that every impartial observer must admit
that the reductions in the number of workmen in the dockyards was
carried too far in the earlier years of Mr. Gladstone's Administration,
and that the responsibility for these reductions belongs at least as
much to Mr. Corry and Sir Spencer Robinson as to the able adminis-
trators who filled the office of First Lord of the Admiralty in the late
Cabinet.'
I have given some of the reasons why I cannot concur in this
opinion, and why I believe it to be unjust to Mr. Corry as well as to
myself. There are other points in Mr. Brassey's interesting letter
to which I might take objection, but I have trespasseờ very much
indeed on your space, and thanking you for having allowed me to
do so.
I remain, Sir, your obedient servant,
ROBERT SPENCER ROBINSON.
61 Eaton Place, S.W.
ADDRESSES, LETTERS, AND PAPERS.
SECTION IX.
ON THE GENERAL POLICY OF THE
ADMINISTRATION,
AS EXHIBITED IN THE NAVY ESTIMATES, 1881–1883.
166
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
DISCUSSION IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THE
NAVY ESTIMATES FOR 1881.
Mr.
Brassey.
House of
Commons,
March
1881.
Repairs.
MR. T. BRASSEY said his hon. friend, Mr. Trevelyan, had drawn in
outline a sketch of the policy which the Government were now pro-
posing, and he only ventured to interpose in order to supply a few
additional details. The Government had no reason to complain of
the tone in which the estimates had been discussed.
The right
hon. gentleman, the late First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. W. H.
Smith), had referred to the diminished expenditure in regard to
repairs by contract. There could be no doubt that it might be
desirable in an emergency to call in the assistance of contractors, but
such a step must necessarily be expensive, the labour employed by
contractors being much more highly paid than labour in the dock-
yard. The right hon. gentleman had also expressed his regret that
more vessels were not included in the programme for repairs. He
(Mr. Brassey) wished it was possible to keep every ship at all times
in a perfect state of repair. At the present time, however, they
were well prepared to meet any exigency which might arise. There
would be completed, and ready to send to sea in the present year,
no less than ten ironclads, one frigate, 24 corvettes, 15 sloops,
19 gun-vessels, two paddle-boats, and one surveying vessel.
The right hon. gentleman had objected to the plan of working
overtime. The Admiralty were following the advice of those high
officers in the Navy who had had the greatest experience in these
matters, and it was only proposed to resort to overtime to a very
limited extent. Machines were used in the construction and repair
of ships, which it was sometimes advantageous to keep in motion for
a longer time than the ordinary dockyard hours.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, Sir Edward Reed, had spoken
with satisfaction of the change that was about to be made in
the armament of the 'Shah.' It was a matter for congratulation
that the Admiralty were enabled, by the great improvements that
Overtime,
New arma-
mente.
Shah.'
GENERAL POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION.
167
of the
were taking place in modern gunnery, to give to those large and
noble ships a more effective armament.
With regard to the engineer officers in the Navy, the immense Engineers
importance of their duties was fully appreciated at the Admiralty. Navy.
Our ships were most complex structures. They were armed with
guns worked by hydraulic gear, and engines were used for all the
important work. It was obvious, therefore, that the engineers had
acquired a position of immense importance, and he could assure hon.
members who had spoken on the subject that there was no disposi-
tion on the part of the present Board of Admiralty to deny what was
just to the engineers. Constant efforts had been made to improve
their position in late years. The question of cabin accommodation
had been alluded to by his hon, and gallant friend opposite. As a
sea officer, the hon. Member must have known that it was a subject
of great difficulty. The late Government had instituted an improved
system of training for the engineers, and the result must be to
advance materially the position of those officers. While anxious to
improve the position of the engineers, it was the duty of those who
were responsible for the administration of the naval service to take
care that the number of those officers did not exceed the strict re-
quirements of the service. There had been a great increase in the
number of engine-room artificers, and their claims to an improved
position were constantly pressed upon the Admiralty. It was by a
combination between the engineer officer in command, and the
artificer under his orders, that the duties of the engine-room could
best be conducted.
In dealing with the numerous demands which had been made Pay and
on them, the Board had adopted it as a ruling principle that it
pensions.
inexpedient for a Government, as soon as it acceded to office, to
make considerable changes in the scale of pay and pensions. The
artificers employed in the dockyards should not be encouraged to look
for some improvement of pay as soon as a change took place in the
Government of the country. Such an idea would interfere most
seriously with the spirit of loyalty which ought to animate the service.
The hon. Member for Cardiff had criticised, as it was natural Criticisms
he should, the shipbuilding policy of the Admiralty. He did not Reed on
deprecate that criticism ; on the contrary, he was thankful for it, and design for
Warspite,'
he considered that his hon. friend was doing a public duty in criti- and “Im;
périeuse.'
cising the Admiralty, even with severity. He should not enter on
a controversy on professional matters; but, so far as he could supply
information on the points raised, he should endeavour to do so. The
Secretary to the Admiralty had drawn attention to the unprecedented
was
168
DOCKYARDS AND NATAL ORGANISATION,
speed of sixteen knots an hour which it was proposed to give to the
armoured cruisers designed under the instructions of the present
Board, and to the four' Leanders' projected under the late Board.
No demonstration could be needed to show the great importance of
strengthening the British Navy with vessels of great speed.
It might be objected that the armoured cruiser was too costly.
This assertion might be tested by a comparison with the 'Northamp-
ton,' which had the same displacement, and cost 325,000l. In the new
cruiser we must add 19,0001. for the greater engine-power, 20,0001.
for the steel-faced armour, and 10,000l. for the substitution of
copper for zinc sheathing. These additions brought up the total to
424,0001., and the actual estimate for the cruiser was 427,0001. In
point of fact the cost of the hull was the same, and the differences
were represented by the armour and the increase practically of three
knots in speed. The comparison might be made in another way.
The cost of the hull for the Nelson’ was 278,0001. To this should
be added 20,0001. for the steel-faced armour, and 10,000l. for the
copper sheathing of the new cruiser. These amounts brought
up
the
total to a sum of 308,0001. The difference between this amount
and the sum of 375,0001., the actual estimate for the hull, was fully
represented by the torpedo fittings and the increased cost of labour
upon the harder material.
The limited protection had been criticised. The French con-
structors were unsurpassed in skill and science, and yet in attempting
to combine complete protection along the water-line with the necessary
condition of speed they had been compelled to make many sacrifices
in other points of scarcely inferior importance.
If we looked from the French to other navies we should find no
practical example to encourage the hope that complete protection,
both for the guns and their crews, and for the buoyancy and stability
of the ships could be obtained by any other means than by adopting
extraordinary proportions of breadth to length. The Italians had
failed to do this in their first large ships, the Duilio' and the
· Dandolo,' which were protected with side-armour amidships only, and
in which the protection of the water-line was given up for about two-
thirds of the ship in favour of the system of a cellular raft on a water-
tight armoured deck. In the still larger vessels of the Italia' type
they had boldly given up the attempt to protect buoyancy and stability,
in a ship in which it was considered essential to obtain a high rate of
speed. Side-armour had been entirely suppressed, the raft body and
armoured under-water deck being substituted.
In Germany the latest ships which had been built were the four
GENERAL POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION.
169
corvettes of the “ Sachsen 'type. These were vessels of 7,400 tons dis- Sachsen
type.
placement, with a speed of fourteen knots, being two knots less than
that of our cruisers, with a difference of only 600 tons in displace-
inent. The armament of these ships consisted of six 26-c/m, or
18-ton guns, as against the four 18-ton and six 6-inch guns with
which our protected cruisers would be armed. In the • Sachsen'class
all the guns were mounted en barbette, and were therefore as much
exposed as in our armoured cruiser. The citadel was protected with
10-inch armour. The extremities, both before and abaft the citadel,
had no vertical armour, reliance being placed, as in our own ships,
on a horizontal armoured deck. In the General Admiral,' the latest
example of the armoured cruiser in the Russian Navy, the protection
was limited to a belt from four feet above to four feet below the
water-line.
In the Austrian "Tegethoff' the armour-belt terminated, 32 feet "Tegethof.
from the stem, in a transverse bulkhead, the forward compartment
being filled with cork. This feature was commended by Sir Edward
Reed in his paper describing the Tegethoff,' read at the Institution
of Naval Architects. Where armour extended round the bow, and
was carried down at the stem to considerably below the ram point,
the bow would be protected from much local damage in ramming
iron vessels. Where the ram was a subordinate feature, as in the
Tegethoff, it might be unnecessary to burden the bow with so
much protection.
The value of length as an element of speed might be shown by in-
numerable examples. Many were quoted in the list of converted ships
referred to in Sir Edward Reed's work on ironclads. The most re-
cent constructions afford some remarkable cases in point. The
Colossus,'' Majestic,' and Collingwood’ had an extreme breadth of
68 feet, as compared with 66 feet in the “ Ajax' and “ Agamemnon,
but their length had been extended from 280 feet—as in the “ Ajax'
-to 325 feet. With these more favourable proportions of length
and breadth an additional speed of one knot had been obtained with- Reasons
for adopt-
out increasing the indicated horse-power. In preparing the design ing fine
for the armoured cruisers, proposed in the present estimates, a similar lines in
question arose. To obtain the required speed of sixteen knots with tended for
a length of 300 feet, 8,800 indicated horse-power would have been cruisers.
necessary With a length extended to 315 feet, 8,000 indicated
horse-power is sufficient. The first cost would be the same in either
case, but the longer ship would be able to realise her greatest speed
with much less coal consumption.
For ships designed to keep the sea, to chase for considerable dis-
6
service as
170
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION:
General
merit of
design.
tances at high speeds, and to maintain that speed perhaps against a
long and deep head sea, the advantages of length were of paramount
importance. The growing tendency towards ships of great propor-
tionate length, which we saw in the mercantile marine, showed
clearly the conclusion drawn by shipowners from their practical ex-
periences. The problem which was presented to them was altogether
different from that with which we had to deal in designing ships for
battle ; but the armoured cruiser was intended to give chase to priva-
teers very similar in proportion to the Atlantic liners, and considera-
tions of coal endurance compel us to approximate to forms which
had been found to yield the most favourable results in the attain-
ment of bigh speed with the lowest consumption of coal. It was
not in the smooth waters of the measured mile, but in the deep swell
of the open ocean, that the advantages of the long bow and easy
entrance would he most conspicuous.
In the armoured cruiser they believed they were making a
notable stride in naval architecture. The ship was designed to pro-
tect our commerce, and to be a terror to slower and less formidable
vessels. Viewed in this aspect, the speed of sixteen knots, the
elevated and powerful armament, distributed en barbette, instead of
being concentrated in two turrets or a confined battery, the important
addition of six light armour-piercing guns under cover on the main-
deck, the breechloading armament, and the admirable accommodation
for the crew when at sea, presented a combination of features in some
respects entirely new, which should commend to the hearty approval
of the Committee the design they had the privilege to propose.
Manning of With reference to the manning of the Navy, he might be able to
the Navy.
give a few figures which would complete the statement made by his
hon. friend. The total number proposed for the service for the
ensuing year was 35,200, as against 35,700 last year, and 35,150 for
the two preceding years. The number of seamen now proposed would
equal the average number provided in the four years from 1875 to
1879. While the number of seamen remained stationary the number
of the non-seamen class showed a marked increase. The number was
11,731 at the present time, and in the steam Navy there was a constant
tendency to increase. Taking the seamen and the non-seamen class
together, there was an aggregate increase from 29,125 in 1875 to
30,988 as proposed in the present estimates. In 1880-81 the total
number was 31,433.
Ships in
He quite admitted what his right hon. and gallant friend opposite
(Sir John Hay) had said with regard to the accumulation of seamen
in the home ports, but he must remind the Committee that the accu-
cummis-
sion,
GENERAL POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION.
171
seameni.
mulation was not due to a reduction in the number of ships in com-
mission. On May 1 the total complement of the ships in commission
was 33,755, against 33,649 on February 1, which was practically the
same figure.
He looked upon the training of the Navy with the deepest Training of
interest. The system of training was, he believed, in its initial
stages, perfect; but there was reason to regret the considerable delay
in passing boys into sea-going ships. The Admiralty were doing
their best to reduce the period of detention in the harbour.
The Flying Squadron afforded the best means of training boys for
the Navy, and the Admiralty had sent a powerful fleet on an extended
voyage, under the command of Lord Clanwilliam. The estimates
now proposed included a long list of ships well adapted for cruising
under sail.
With regard to the Royal Naval Reserve, to which his right hon. Royal
friend had referred, an increasing number of prime seamen were Reserve.
coming forward to enrol themselves in the Reserve. He had received
a few days ago a report of a meeting at Liverpool, at which a number
of shipowners were present, all of whom concurred in the opinion that
a distinct change and improvement had taken place in the character
of our merchant seamen. He hoped the advance already made in
the numbers and efficiency of the Naval Reserve would continue, and
that, should there be any necessity for increasing the strength of
the Reserve, they would find no difficulty in doing so.
Sir JOHN HAY: What is the character of the 5,496 men in the
second class of the Reserve ?
Mr. T. BRASSEY said that the second class of the Reserve was
most satisfactory, although it was not pretended that the qualification
of these men was the same as the men of the first-class Reserve.
There were one or two collateral points to which, in justice to the
Navy, he wished to refer. In the recent gales the services of the
Coastguard in saving life were conspicuous. During the last five
years many hundreds of lives had been saved by the gallant exertions
of the Coastguard.
A general survey brought into view many services beyond the ordi- Surveys in
nary range of duty which are rendered hy the Navy to humanity and
civilisation. In a most interesting memorandum the Hydrographer
had sketched in outline the extensive and useful labours of the last
year. Our surveyors had been at work in the English and the
Bristol Channels, and their sphere of operations had embraced New-
foundland and Queensland, the West Indies, Fiji, the islands of the
West Pacific, China, and Japan. The Sea of Marmora had been
progress.
172
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
admirably charted, and the examinations now being made in the
channels leading from the Straits of Magellan to the Gulf of Peñas
gave promise of very useful results, in enabling ships to double the
continent of South America in sheltered channels, and thus avoid the
high seas experienced in going round Cape Horn.
In conclusion he desired to say that it had been the guiding
principle of the present Board to avoid organic changes, and to do
their best to improve and perfect the machinery they found in opera-
tion. They had thought that economy and efficiency would be best
maintained by preserving the continuity of naval administration.
They knew that the best thoughts of a long succession of able sea-
officers and civilians had been given to the improvement of the Navy.
They had undertaken their task in a spirit of reverence for the great
traditions of that noble service, and they hoped that they might
be as successful as their predecessors in maintaining a good Navy for
their country.
GENERAL POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION.
173
MEMORANDUM ON THE POLICY OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATION, AS EXHIBITED IN THE NAVY ESTI-
MATES FOR 1881-82.
Leander'
In considering the shipbuilding programme for 1881-82, the large
increase in the construction of armoured tonnage is the first point
wbich will attract attention.
Turning from the amount of tonnage to be constructed to the Speed of
question of type, two prominent features will be noticed. The first
class.
is the high speed which will be attained in the two armoured cruisers
and the four unarmoured cruisers of the Leander' type. Each
of those ships is intended to attain a measured-mile speed of at least
sixteen knots. In proposing so considerable an addition to the Navy
in swift cruisers, we were making a serious effort to strengthen our-
selves where we had hitherto compared unfavourably with foreign
Powers.
Extraordinary efforts have recently been made to increase the
strength of the Russian Navy in vessels of a very moderate dis-
placement, and not powerfully armed, but with a speed considerably
exceeding that of our own corvettes of the same tonnage. With
the French we compare favourably in cruisers of over fourteen knots
speed. In cruisers of thirteen-knots speed we have a great advantage,
but in the intermediate class, capable of steaming fourteen knots,
we had only three ships to twenty-two in the French Navy. In
armament, in their speed of sixteen knots, in the protection of
vital parts by internal armour, bulkheads, and numerous compart-
ments, our unarmoured ships of the 'Leander' class may challenge
comparison with 'vessels of similar displacement in any foreign
Navy.
Our programme was remarkable, not only for the speed of the six Barbettes
ships to which I have referred, but also for the extended use of compared.
the system of mounting guns en barbette. This system appeared
in 1880, for the first time, in the Collingwood. It was proposed
in 1881 for the two armoured cruisers. The comparative value of the
and turrets
174
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION. -
barbette and the enclosed turret is a question which can never be
settled definitively without the experience of actual warfare. To
some it may appear that the crews of the guns mounted en barbette
will be unduly exposed to the destructive effects of the fire from
inachine guns.
The French constructors consider that the crew
will obtain shelter from vertical fire under the flying-decks which
they erect over all their open towers, while they are protected from
horizontal fire by the guns and the armoured parapets of the barbette
turrets. The barbette system offers advantages in the facilities for
bringing the gun to bear on an enemy in rapid movement, while
the reduction in the weight of the tower admits of three heavy guns
being mounted for two in enclosed turrets. These are very valu-
able features in sea-keeping cruisers with a high freeboard, and not
intended to fight at close quarters in the line of battle. Various
plans for the protection of the gunners in the barbettes from the fire
of machine-guns are under consideration.
Our guns would probably have been mounted long ago in bar-
bettes but for our reluctance to abandon the muzzle-loading system.
Long muzzle-loading guns cannot be worked in barbettes. Long
breech-loading guns can be. The French, having adopted the
breech-loader, were able to take advantage of the consequent economy
of weights.
Turning from the matériel to the personnel, the numbers which
Parliament was asked to vote, in the estimates for 1881-82, for the
fleet-services afloat were 35,200, as compared with 35,700, and
35,150 for the two preceding financial years. The numbers taken in
the estimates for 1881-82 were the numbers actually serving on
November 1, 1880. The reduction, as compared with the figures
shown in the estimates for 1880-81, was due to the loss of life in
the 'Atalanta,' and the falling off in the supply of boys to the
training-ships, and, as a consequence, in the number of boys and ordi-
nary seamen serving in the fleet.
The number of flag-officers and retinues was increased by the
appointment of an additional Admiral to the command of the Flying
Squadron. In the ranks of the commissioned officers there was a
slight reduction in the numbers of sub-lieutenants, navigating sub-
lieutenants, assistant paymasters, and engineers.
In making up the Vote I., it was proposed for the year 1881-
82 to provide for 19,108 seamen, as compared with 19,833 in
1880-81, 20,207 in 1879, and 19,172 in 1878. If the comparison
be carried back to former years, it will be found that in 1870 the
number of seamen was 18,344. That number was maintained, with
Numbers of
seimen.
GENERAL POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION.
175
seamen in
ironclads.
no material variation, until 1875, when a sudden increase of 300 men
is observable. The increase in numbers in 1879 calls for some
explanation. It was made, as it were, by a stroke of the pen. In
1877, an Admiralty order had been issued that sailmakers and sail-
makers' crews, and ropemakers, should be rated as seaman-class men.
The order took effect in 1879, and the numbers thus added to the
seaman-class may be estimated at 400. In the same order it was
directed that masters-at-arms and ship's corporals, about 460 in
number, should be removed from the seaman-class, but a long delay
occurred in carrying into effect this part of the order. The addition
to the seaman-class, and the marked decrease in the waste, from
2,601 in 1877-78, to 2,308 in 1878–79, account for 700 out of the
total increase of 1,000 men between 1878 and 1879. The number of
seamen proposed for the financial year 1881-82 was equal to the average
numbers for 1875, 76, 77, '78. It exceeded by 400 the numbers
of the seaman-class in 1874, and by 750 the numbers in 1873.
While the aggregate numbers were not only maintained, but Reduced
comple-
even showed considerable additions, as compared with former years, ment of
our force of seamen had been increased, in relation to our require- mastiess
ments for the manning of the Navy, in a far larger sense than a mere
comparison of numbers would indicate. Mastless ironclads, with a
complement of 350 men, one-third of whom are seamen, are taking
the place of masted vessels in the line of battle. In view of the
altered conditions, we should anticipate, as we actually find, that
the numbers in excess of complements have largely increased. The Increase in
excess was 4,761 on December 1, 1871, 4,788 on the same date
in 1873, and 6,416 in 1880. The permanent supernumeraries disposable
in the home ports, consisting mainly of seamen qualifying for
gunnery in the · Excellent' and Cambridge,' and men borne in
the “Indus,' “ Asia,' and 'Pembroke, for ships in reserve, were
1,213 in 1873, as against 1,564 in 1880. The disposable supernu-
meraries in the home ports increased from 2,529 in 1873 to 3,189
in 1880, the supernumeraries abroad from 1,046 to 1,663 in the
same period. The rapid augmentation in the number of the dis-
posable seaman-class nen is due mainly to the increased proportion
which the artificers and engine-room complements bear to the total
strength of a ship's company.
We had in 1881 11,647 of the non-
seamań class, as against 11,208 on May 1, and the numbers show
a constant tendency to increase. The steady accumulation of sea-
men in the home ports is not due to any reduction by the present
Board in the number of ships in commission. The total comple-
ments in Her Majesty's ships in commission were 33,768 on May 1,
supernu-
mcrary and
men.
176
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Reserves of
scamen,
1881. They were 33,649 on February 1. In the numbers in the
several ratings no appreciable change has occurred. The petty
officers and leading seamen were 5,921 on May 1, 1881, and 5,859
in February. The number of able seamen showed a slight increase,
from 8,470 to 8,513.
In reviewing our resources generally for manning the Navy, we
may fairly look to the Reserves, no less than to the number of men
actually borne for fleet service. The Coastguard on shore has been
maintained for many years at an average strength of 4,000 men.
The Naval Reserves have averaged, since 1868, 15,785 men.. The
number at the present time is 17,256, and while this increase has
taken place in the numbers, the reports which have been laid before
Parliament from the distinguished officers who have inspected the
force—including Sir Harry Keppel, and Admirals Elliot, Tarleton, and
Phillimore—have been increasingly satisfactory as to the physique,
the discipline, the gun-drill, and the general efficiency in all the
other exercises in which the Naval Reserves are instructed.
Training of The training of our seamen is a subject closely allied with the
seamen.
manning of the Navy. In its initial stages seamanship is taught
on a perfect system. The preliminary training in harbour should be
followed up by transferring the boys, as they leave the training
ships, with the least possible delay to sea-going ships. In many in-
stances the boys are detained too long in the ports. The evils which
must inevitably ensue were forcibly described by Commodore Wilson,
in valuable papers on training, read at the United Service Institution,
after the completion of his term of service as superintendent of the
training ships. The majority of the lads must inevitably deteriorate,
and the love of adventure, which attracted them to sea, is dis-
couraged in the suspended animation of the receiving ships or the
ironclads of the First Reserve.
It is a delusion to suppose that a liberal expenditure in pay,
victuals, and clothing is sufficient to turn landsmen into seamen.
Hitherto naval opinion has been unanimous that a sailing ship
without auxiliary power is the school in which seamanship can be
most effectually studied. In conformity with this view, the
* Eurydice' and 'Atalanta'were successively fitted out. The melan-
choly disasters which befell them have been carefully investigated by
two committees, and it is not necessary to enter now upon these pain-
ful topics. No ships of the same class are now to be found in the
Navy, and none will be constructed in the future. While our
experiences in the case of the 'Eurydice' and the 'Atalanta ' have
been so strangely sad, we have had a third training ship for many
GENERAL POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION.
177
years, of which the ablest officers in the Navy have spoken in terms
of the highest praise. The "Cruiser,' a sloop from which the boilers
had been removed, was sent out to the Mediterranean when the late
Sir Hastings Yelverton was in command. I have been assured by
his then flag-captain, Admiral Brandreth, that the Cruiser' was
found most valuable. Every batch of officers and seamen sent out
for temporary service in this vessel showed a sensible improvement
in seamanship. I have reason to believe that the system has been
not less warmly approved by Sir Geoffrey Hornby and Sir Beauchamp
Seymour. If additional vessels were employed in the same service,
we sbould know that we were carrying out a plan that had been long
tried and had yielded excellent results, and which would be under
the constant supervision of the able officers who are always to be
found in command in the Mediterranean. We should have the
advantage of a suitable climate, less inclement in the winter than
our own, free from the destructive and irresistible hurricanes which
occasionally rage in the Atlantic, but quite boisterous enough at
times to give experience to seamen.
The question of multiplying vessels of the Cruiser' class as
training ships must be considered side by side with the demands,
always more or less urgent, for the maintenance, if not the increase,
of our foreign squadrons. Should it be found practicable to with-
draw two or three gunboats from the foreign stations, and to com-
mission an equal number of training ships in the Mediterranean, we
should effect a substantial saving, and we should certainly add to
the opportunities afforded to officers and men of acquiring a know-
ledge of seamanship.
While the supplementary methods of instruction were receiving
careful consideration, the best and most practical training was being
given to a large body of officers and men in the Flying Squadron,
under the command of Lord Clanwilliam, and the estimates for 1881–
82 included a long list of ships to be brought forward for commis-
sion, of a class particularly adapted for instruction in seamanship.
In considering the general question of our naval expenditure, it Naval ex-
is necessary, in justice to those to whom its administration has been penditure
entrusted, to look back over a series of years, and to compare the to trade.
fluctuations in that expenditure with the growth in the value of the
trade, for the protection of which our Navy is maintained. In the
year 1858–59 the effective expenditure for the Navy was 7,106,0001.,
the non-effective 1,334,000l. In 1870–71 the effective expenditure
was 7,308,0001., while the non-effective had increased to 1,705,0001.
The estimates for the ensuing year provide for an effective expen-
in relation
VOL. IV.
N
178
: DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
diture of 8,434,0001, while the non-effective expenditure amounts
to 2,063,0001. If we compare the expenditure on the Army in the
same interval, we find that the effective expenditure has grown from
9,337,0001. to 12,797,0001., with an increase of half-a-million in the
non-effective expenditure.
The increase in the foreign trade and tonnage of our merchant
navy has been out of all proportion with the increase in our naval
expenditure. The total tonnage of British merchant ships was
5,711,000 tons in 1860, 7,149,000 in 1870, and 8,462,000 according
to the last returns. Reckoning the carrying power of steamships as
fourfold that of sailing ships, we have half the mercantile tonnage
of the globe.
Germany, with a mercantile tonnage of 1,129,000, spends
890,0001. on the maintenance and construction of her fleet. France,
with 976,000 tons of merchant shipping, expends 2,893,000l. on
building and repairs, and employs 26,000 workmen in her dockyards.
England, with an excess of tonnage over the French mercantile
marine of seven million tons, employs only 16,000 men in her dock-
yards, at an expenditure, under Votes 6 and 10, of 3,323,0001.
With these figures before us, it cannot be said that England is
leading the way in an aggressive policy, or in the direction of
extravagance.
The more extended commercial relations of the United Kingdom
involve a corresponding increase of responsibility upon the Navy for
the maintenance of the police of the seas. The tonnage of our
ships in commission is 255,000, as against 171,000 tons in the
French Navy. The maintenance of the ships in commission involves
a proportionate deduction from the sum available for the construction
of new ships. It was stated in an article published last year in the
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, that the entire force of the Ger-
man Navy on foreign stations consisted of 16 ships, 130 guns, and
3,411 men; a considerably smaller force than we maintain on the
China Station alone. From an Admiralty point of view, it would
certainly be desirable to make a considerable reduction in the num-
ber of small gun-vessels in commission on foreign stations. Gun-
vessels are ill-adapted for cruising in war, or for instruction in
seamanship in time of peace. They are too slow to give chase to
privateers, and too vulnerable for coast warfare. As a preparation
for war, our expenditure would be applied to advantage in building
powerful ironclads, or cruisers of the Leander' class, rather than
in the construction and repair of gunboats, which are of no great
service, except for the police of the seas, and which, in proportion
Fleet in
commis-
sion.
GENERAL POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION.
179
accounts.
to the complement they carry, are very costly to maintain. It is in
compliance with the demands of the Foreign Office, and exclusively
for commercial and peaceful purposes, and not by the desire of the
Admiralty, and as á preparation for war, that we maintain small
gun-vessels in such considerable numbers in our squadrons abroad.
This should be taken into consideration by those who might otherwise
be disposed to regard the whole cost of the Navy as expenditure
on a war service.
In introducing estimates which involve additional expenditure, it
will be expected on the part of a Liberal Government that evidence
will be afforded that strict attention has been given to economy. It
is satisfactory to be able to give an assurance that we are gradually
introducing reforms which must substantially reduce the cost of
maintenance of the fleet.
The expense accounts of the Navy, showing the cost in labour Expense
and materials of every service performed in the dockyards, are now
presented with a promptitude which in former years was deemed to
be impracticable. When I first entered Parliament, these accounts
were two or three years in arrear. The expense accounts for the last
financial year were before us in the middle of February. Extravagance
will be checked, when it is known that every transaction will be
brought to notice before it is too late to call those who are responsible
to account. The Accountant-General, acting in his capacity of
auditor on behalf of the Admiralty and the public, has, during the
last two years, introduced some useful criticisms, in the form of a
preface to the expense accounts. He has this year directed especial
attention to the large expenditure upon repairs. The number of
men employed in repairs, and the corresponding consumption of
materials, have long been a black spot in our naval administration,
and it will be gratifying to know that some real progress has been
made in diverting the resources of the dockyards from maintenance
to construction.
Costly repairs, both to the hulls and the machinery of Her New regu-
Majesty's ships, have been rendered necessary by the premature manage-
deterioration of boilers. The boiler endurance of the Navy has builers.
compared unfavourably with that of the merchant service. We have
seen boilers condemned in five years, which ought to have lasted ten
years. The attention of the late Board of Admiralty was directed to
this question, and they appointed two Committees, the one on the
pay and training of the engineers, the other to investigate the causes
of the decay of the boilers. An improved system of training for our
engineers has now been established, and directions as to the best
lations for
N
180
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
methods of treating boilers under all conditions of climate have
been given in the new edition of the Steam Manual. The diligent
observance of these revised instructions will secure a fair endurance
in the boilers of Her Majesty's ships.
The present Board have carried forward the work of their pre-
decessors. The inspections of ships by the flag officer in command
have hitherto been confined mainly to matters connected with
discipline, seamanship, gunnery, and the general good order of the
vessels examined. The engines and boilers, being a comparatively
recent innovation, have not received the same amount of attention.
It has now been directed that the chief engineers of flag-ships shall
periodically inspect all the boilers in the squadron, and report their
condition to the Admiralty. The new order will make it impossible
for an incompetent engineer to allow the boilers under his charge
to deteriorate through a long commission without attracting obser-
vation.
Superior The substitution of iron for wood as the material chiefly used in
of iron and the construction of ships, will prove another effectual means of
composite
economising expenditure. The universal experience of the private
ships.
shipowners has shown the superior economy of iron as compared with
wood-built ships. Composite ships share, to a large extent, in the
advantages of iron, in regard to durability and facility for repair.
Every ship lately added to the Navy is of iron, steel, or composite
construction. It may be that in the annual cost of maintenance
an iron ship offers no advantages as compared with a wooden ship,
but where the iron ship is maintained in thoroughly good order
there is practically no structural or local deterioration, and there-
fore the expense of renewals must be considerably diminished in a
Navy of iron-built ships.
Alterations have been another fertile source of dockyard expendi-
ture, and they have tended to swell the apparent cost of maintaining
the Navy. It must, however, be observed that where an alteration
is made with the view of substituting an improved armament, or to
meet the changes which the progress of invention is continually
introducing in naval warfare, such an alteration cannot fairly be
classified as an expenditure for mere maintenance and repair. In
any case the expenditure is of a character which comes under the
direct control of the Parliamentary authorities, who must be con-
sulted, and must give their direct approval before any extensive
alterations are undertaken.
There is yet another step to be mentioned, tending to economy,
on inciden- which has been taken by the present Board. At the instance of Mr.
Committee
GENERAL POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION.
181
work.
Shaw-Lefevre, a Departmental Committee was appointed to examine
the whole question of the growth of incidental expenditure in the
dockyards. After careful inquiry, they have made proposals to the
Board, which will have the effect of enabling the accountants in the
several dockyards, who are the local representatives of the Accountant-
General as the auditor of the Navy, to check more closely the
appropriation of the expenditure on labour and materials to the
different ships and services. It will be their duty to keep the
superintendents informed, by means of weekly returns, of the expen-
diture on all the services which are being carried out in the dock-
yards. By comparing the actual with the estimated cost, the
superintendents will have an effectual means of detecting cases of
extravagance, and it will be their duty to demand explanations from
the responsible heads of the professional staff.
Passing from repairs to the construction of new ships, there is less Piece-
room for extravagant and unchecked expenditure, and, as a matter of
fact, the dockyards, with all the inevitable disadvantages of Govern-
inent administration, have competed on fairly equal terms with the
private contractors as to cost, while the work executed is generally
believed in the Navy to be somewhat superior in character.
Her Majesty's ships would cost less if they were built by piece-
work; but insuperable difficulties exist in the introduction of piece-
work in the great establishments of Devonport, Portsmouth, and
Sheerness, and, to a certain extent, at Chatham. The three yards
first named are called upon to undertake all the repairs of the Navy.
The demands are of necessity fitful and uncertain, depending upon
political exigencies which it is impossible to foresee. In these yards,
if contracts were let to large gangs of men, for any of the impor-
tant operations which are carried on in private yards by sub-contract,
the men so employed could not be taken from their work at a
moment's notice to fit up a transport or repair an ironclad. Thus
the main purpose for which the yards are maintained would be
frustrated.
At Pembroke the conditions are more favourable; and at that
yard, by the good management of the superintendents and their
professional officers, and by the advantageous terms on which
Government can deal with the local labour market, the cost of
construction has been brought down to a figure which could scarcely
be reduced, if the contract system were substituted for day-work,
under the present close supervision.
Good administration, it is hoped, will be promoted by an inquiry Committee
which is about to be held, by means of a Departmental Committee, on vard
craft.
182
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Non effec-
tive vote.
into the entire organisation of the Constructor's staff. The Com-
mittee on Incidental Expenditure have recommended that a separate
inquiry should be made into the cost of the maintenance, and the
necessity for the dockyard craft, said to be not less than five or six
hundred in number, and varying in size from an old three-decker to
a jolly-boat. It is probable that an examination will show that the
necessary work can be carried out with fewer vessels and a propor-
tionate economy in repairs.
In the expenditure on the personnel of the Navy the growth of
the non-effective vote has long been increasing, and has become a
most serious feature in the naval estimates. In the hope that the
present movement may be arrested, and that with the lapse of time
some reduction of expense may be effected, a mixed committee of
naval officers and civilians has been appointed to inquire into this
grave question. We know that all engagements already entered into
must be observed. We know that while the servants of the Crown,
in whatever capacity, have been partly paid in wages and partly in
pensions, we cannot withdraw the pensions without increasing the
wages. But, whatever the result may be, it seems impossible to allow
the non-effective charge to reach its present magnitude, without
satisfying ourselves that no steps are possible to check its future
increment.
Enough has been said to show that, in proportion to the demands
upon its resources, the British Admiralty has a smaller amount at its
disposal than any other naval administration, and if we now occupy a
position of strength, with which the country may be well content, it
is because the Ministers who in succession have presided over the
important department of the Admiralty have shown prudence, fore-
thought, and economy, and, still more, because the Navy has behind
it a mercantile marine capable of furnishing practically inexhaustible
reserves in men, and in the power to build and to repair, which is
derived from the commercial industry of the country.
When we measure our position with that of other nations it is not
the least of the advantages we enjoy that we are guarded by the sea
froin invasion. As Mr. Cobden so powerfully argued in his pamphlet
on the Three Panics, our island fortress is the more secure because
it is so compact. “If,' he said, 'we imagine that our Army and Navy
were reduced one-half, does any person seriously apprehend that these
islands would be in danger of being molested by any European
Power? If such there be, let him recollect that the British Empire
contains a population of twenty-five millions of free people, compressed
within a space of little more than three hundred miles squarem-pro-
Economical
expendi-
ture on
British as
compared
with
foreign
navies.
Mr. Cob-
den on
naval
strength
of British
Empire.
GENERAL POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION.
183
bably a denser crowd of human beings than was ever before found
upon a similar area ; and, further, let it be borne in mind that rail-
roads are now in progress for connecting one extremity of England
with the other in such a way that not only any required force of men,
but the entire munitions of war may be transported in twelve hours
from Lancashire or Yorkshire to the coast of Sussex or Kent, thus
converting, as it were, the entire island into a fortified position of
such wonderful strength that the genius of Vauban or Marlborough
could not have conceived anything so formidable. Which is the
Power of the Continent that will make a descent upon a people placed
in such an attitude ?'
ADDRESSES, LETTERS, AND PAPERS.
SECTION X..
EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES,
1881.
186
DOCKYARDS AND NATAL ORGANISATION.
-
COLSTON ANNIVERSARY BANQUET.
Bristol, November 12, 1881.
Reprinted from the Times.'
SIR T. BRASSEY, on rising to return thanks on hehalf of the Navy,
said: I have to thank you for the hearty reception you have given
to the toast of the Navy. In responding I desire to express iny
unqualified admiration for our officers and seamen. It is the highest
praise that can be given to say that in their spirit of devotion and
their efficiency they are worthy of the traditions of their noble
service. The confidence in our seamen, which all must feel who
have been in close contact with the service, is fully shared by the
country; but when we turn from the men to the ships the same
confidence is not felt in our position, These doubts are not in-
spired by the mere spirit of political partisanship. In recent
articles, the Pall Mall Gazette, a rather sympathetic organ on our
side of the question, has been asking in anxious tones for official
Shipbuild- information. I
information. I propose to give you a comparative statement of the
indraling expenditure of England and France respectively on armoured con-
struction. It is unnecessary to look to other European countries. In
Russia the construction of ironclads has been abandoned ; in Germany
little is being done ; and, owing to the recent incidents in Tunis, we
may rest assured that the great ironclads which are slowly approaching
completion in Italy will not be engaged in any combined operations
likely to be prejudicial to British interests. In the present position
of affairs the action of the British naval administration must depend
mainly on the policy pursued by the French Government. In ships
actually ready for sea our ironclad fleet compares favourably with the
French, but in process of time this may cease to be the case should
armoured shipbuilding in France be continued with the activity dis-
played since the close of the Franco-German war. In the interval
which lias elapsed since 1877 the total armoured tonnage launched
has been 29,171 tons for the French, and 21,704 tons for the British
France.
EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES.
187
solures,
Navy, and while our Navy Estimates for the present year provide a
sum of 750,0001. for armoured construction, no less than 1,081,0001.
has been voted for the French Navy. It is obvious that this disparity
cannot long continue. From an English point of view it seems im-
possible to justify the lavish expenditure of the French, and I would
venture to hope that the friendly representations of our Foreign
Office would not be without their effect in relieving is from the
necessity of imposing additional burdens on the British taxpayer,
For ourselves there is not the slightest need for precipitation. We.
may be calın and confident, because we know our inherent strength.
In case of necessity the unlimited resources of our private yards
would be utilised in combination with the dockyards. If Parlia-
ment voted the money, there would be no practical limit to the
shipbuilding capabilities of this country. Setting aside the dock- Extent of
yards, united Europe could do nothing in coinparison with our private our re-
industrial establishments, if their efforts were concentrated on ship-
building for war. As a member of the Board of Admiralty, I am
naturally anxious for larger appropriations; as a politician, I can look
round on a wider horizon, and I see how the Navy of England has
gained in the most substantial elements of strength, and that without
cost to the British taxpayers. The mercantile marine is the back-
bone of the Navy, and never had the mercantile marine so many
splendid steamships capable of conversion into auxiliaries to the
fighting fleet as it has at the present time. Recent political events
have been equally reassuring. I have already alluded to the occur- Friendly
relations
rences on the shores of the Mediterranean, and when we look across
the broad Atlantic we find a new and most welcome addition to our
strength in the cordial relations which now exist between the United
States and Great Britain. It is not the policy of the United States
to maintain a considerable Navy in time of peace, but they are
potentially our most formidable rival on the seas. In former and
less happy times an unnatural jealousy divided the two great branches
of the Anglo-Saxon race. The apprehension of a rupture with the
United States may indeed have been remote, but it was a source of
weakness, and we are in a proportionate degree reinforced by the
recent manifestations in both countries of the warmest sentiments of
mutual amity. The generous homage paid to the British flag at
Yorktown and to the star-spangled banner in the centre of our own
metropolis are incidents full of happy augury for the future. The
United States and Great Britain now stand shoulder to shoulder as
they have never stood before, and we number together 100,000,000
people. In the speeches of succeeding speakers the claims of the
with the
United
States.
188
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Liberal party will be urged by those who stand high in the counsels of
the party. But I may, perhaps, remind you that the generous repara-
tion which was offered to the United States at Geneva was the work of
the Liberal party. It was denounced at the time by our political
opponents as a national humiliation, but we all accept to-day with
deep satisfaction the results which have followed from a policy of
justice. Something yet remained to be done which was beyond the
scope of politicians and diplomatists. One touch of nature makes
the whole world kin,' and Her Majesty was enabled from her exalted
station to express what England felt on the death of General Garfield.
Our message of sympathy was conveyed with a true womanly tender-
ness, which has won the heart of America for the Queen and her
people. The friendship between Great Britain and the United
States, which has been steadily ripening, and is now, I trust, secured
to us for ever, is more to England than a hundred ironclads. For-
give me for this digression, if it is a digression, and let me once more.
thank you on behalf of our gallant seamen.
EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES,
189
THE SHIPWRIGHTS COMPANY.
December 2, 1881.
Reprinted from the . Times.'
MR. H. C. ROTHERY proposed «The Navy, Army, and Reserve
Forces,' and jocosely deprecated any omen being drawn from the
circumstance that he who had to propose the toast of the Navy was
the Wreck Commissioner.
Sir THOMAS BRASSEY, on rising to return thanks for the Navy,
said :-- Master, my Lord Mayor, and Gentlemen, --Since I have
been connected officially with the Admiralty I have often had the
privilege of replying to the toast of the Navy. On former occasions
I have been glad to use the opportunity of saying, on behalf of our
officers and seamen, how well they merit the gratitude and admiration
of their fellow-countrymen. As we are met together this evening
under the auspices of the Shipwrights' Company, it seems appropriate
to refer to the signal services rendered to the country by our naval con-
structors. The names of the late Mr. Oliver Lang, of Sir Edward
Reed, Mr. Barnaby, and his colleagues, Mr. Barnes and Mr. White,
will long be remembered in connection with the transformation of our
fleet of wooden three-deckers into armoured turret-ships. When we
look back to the naval history of our country we see that the ships
were seldom worthy of the gallant crews who manned them. The
qnaint caravels' in which Drake, Raleigh, Frobisher, and Hawkins
met and vanquished the Armada were poor specimens of naval archi-
tecture in comparison with the tall and stately floating castles of the
Spaniards. Descending to later times, the ships in which Nelson
and his brave companions in arms performed deeds of incomparable
valour were dull sailers. The best ships in our fleets were the prizes
we had captured. In the present day we no longer look to a foreign
source to furnish models and methods of armament for the British
Navy. Though we have been slow to protect our ships with armour,
we have more than recovered the ground which was lost before the
190
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
building of our armoured fleet was undertaken. In the older type of
broadside ironclads the 'Alexandra,' now the flagship in the Mediter-
ranean, has no rival, and as battle-ships the high free board turret-
ships, the Dreadnought,'Devastation, and “Thunderer,' are un-
doubtedly the most powerful afloat. In connection with the subject of
shipbuilding I am glad to have this opportunity of calling attention to
the benefits which have resulted, not only to the executive, but to
the civil branches of the Navy from the establishment of the Naval
College at Greenwich. We now possess facilities such as never existed
before for giving to students of naval architecture a high scientific
education, in combination with a practical training at the dockyards.
It will be satisfactory to the public to know that these advantages are
appreciated, and that there is an eager competition, especially on the
part of the clever students in the dockyard schools, for the privilege
of gaining admission to Greenwich. Before I sit down, and while I
am on the subject of construction for the Navy, I should like to pay
a cordial tribute of praise to Sir Houston Stewart, who, after a dis-
tinguished service of ten years, has within the last few days ceased to
be Controller of the Navy. Sir Houston Stewart has witnessed many
changes, and directed many improvements. He has done more than
this. He has set to every member of that great branch of the service
over which he has presided a high example of devotion to the public
service. He has thought nothing of himself. His sole aim has been
the good of his country, and in all the varied and difficult personal
relations of his office he has been courteous, kind, and just. It is by
the efforts of men of his stamp that the naval reputation of this
country has been created and is worthily sustained. Gentlemen,
I thank you for having drunk the health of the Navy.
EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES.
191
1
ANNUAL ADDRESS TO THE ELECTORS OF HASTINGS
AND ST. LEONARD'S.
December 9, 1881.
moured
SIR THOMAS BRASSEY said :-In my annual statement you will natu- Progress of
rally look for some information on naval affairs. It has been the main and unar-
object of the present Board to increase the armour construction of construc-
the Navy, to supply the fleet with fast cruisers for the protection of tion.
commerce, and to introduoe a breech-loading armament into our
fighting ships. In the estimates submitted to Parliament in the
last session, considerable provision was made for carrying out these
objects. Eleven thousand tons of ironclads are to be built in the
financial year, the corresponding figures for the four preceding years
being 7,231, 7,732, 8,430, and 7,653 tons.
In view of the constant modifications in the methods of naval
warfare, and the absolute impossibility of combining in a ship of
reasonable dimensions all the qualities required, we are naturally
averse to a prodigal expenditure on armoured vessels. The neces-
sity for increased construction for the British Navy has been created
by the recent action of the French Naval Administration. It should
not, however, be inferred from this remark that we have been led by
the spirit of rivalry into a reckless and useless extravagance. What-
ever be the ultimate result of the introdnction of the torpedo, and
the increased power of the gun, large ships must always be required
for an ocean-going Navy, and it is certain that we cannot as yet
venture to throw off armour from our fighting ships.
While we have made a sensible addition to our armoured con-
struction, we have not neglected the duty of providing the Navy
with unarmoured vessels. In our last estimates we proposed to
build 8,035 tons, as compared with 8,715 and 9,502 tons in the
previous two years.
Having stated the amount of tonnage to be built, I desire espe-
cially to direct attention to the speed of our new ships. Since we
192
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Improved
speed in
recent
ships.
• Colling-
wood
type.
came into office we have laid down four armoured ships. Two are of
the Collingwood' type, designed under the late Administration;
their speed will be 15 knots, or one knot more than any armoured
ships in the French Navy of the same displacement, and two knots
faster than our own Ajax' and 'Agamemnon,' both recent ships of
the same tonnage. In the two armoured cruisers designed by Mr.
Barnaby and Mr. White, under the instructions of the present Board,
the speed will be 16 knots. These armoured cruisers will be faster
than all the ironclads of foreign Powers, except the far larger and
costlier ships now building in Italy. In addition to the armoured
cruisers, we have laid down four 16-knot unarmoured cruisers of
the "Leander' type.
As we are proposing two repetitions of the Collingwood,' it may
be desirable to describe shortly the distinctive features. The most
important change introduced into these vessels is the disposition of
the armour. In the central-citadel turret ships it forms the wall of
the citadel. In the “Collingwood' it is taken away from the central
citadel, and formed into separate fixed barbette towers. Between
the barbettes, and above the upper deck, is a large battery, protected
by l-inch steel plating from the fire of machine guns, and containing
6-inch breech-loading guns, fought at ports 14 feet above water.
The guns in the turrets are 22 feet above water. The battery is
protected from a raking fire by winged bulkheads plated with 6-inch
armour. The crew will be berthed in the upper battery, and will
have accommodation infinitely superior to that of any turret ship.
The present Board have had under their consideration plans for a
more formidable vessel. But they cannot bring themselves to believe
that it is prudent to expend a million sterling on a single hull.
The constant development of the penetrating power of the gun
must tend to lessen the value of armour. What, therefore, are we
to do in order to protect our ships? The policy must be some-
thing of the nature I will now describe to you. We must separate
the part of the ship which is above water from the submerged por-
tion of the hull by a horizontal armoured watertight deck; and a
minute cellular sub-division of both sections of the ship, especially
of that which is below the water-line, would seem to be the best
system of protection from heavy shot and the Whitehead torpedo.
If we cannot prevent penetration, we may localise the injuries received.
If this be a sound view of the object, to which naval architecture for
fighting purposes should be directed, armour will be used not so
much to protect buoyancy and stability as to furnish a shield for the
gunners, the guns, and the delicate machinery employed to work
General
principles
of design
for ar-
moured
ships.
EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES.
193
of the
them. It will be retained to prevent that happening which hap-
pened at Sinope, to keep out shell, and the still more destructive
bullets from machine guns, and thus to lessen the fearful carnage
which would take place on decks crowded with men at quarters.
The unarmoured construction is a far less perplexing problem Designs
for the British Navy. We shall always require for the police of the forum:
seas vessels capable of cruising both under steam and sail, and for ships.
the protection of commerce in war we require ships of high speed,
of great coal endurance, armed with numerous long-range guns, and
with a full armament of machine guns.
Turning from the matériel to the personnel, the estimates of last Personnel
year were criticised for the reduction in the number of seamen from
Navy.
19,883 to 19,108. It is, however, to be observed that the numbers
of the year 1880-81 were abnormal. The strength of the Navy in
seamen for the present year will be equal to the average in numbers
in the years 1875, 1876, and 1877. While the number of the
seamen has been maintained the number of the non-seaman class,
which comprises the engine-room complements and artificers, now so
necessary for the efficient manning of our mėn-of-war, is rapidly
increasing. We have now 11,647 of the non-seaman class, as com-
pared with 11,200 in the preceding year. The non-seaman class
having been greatly increased, and the number of the seaman class
having been maintained, while the complements of seamen in our
mastless ironclads have been very largely reduced, a rapid augmen-
tation has necessarily taken place in the supernumeraries available
for manning the Navy. In addition to these regular forces we have
a splendid reserve of 4,000 men in the Coastguard. Behind the
Coastguard we have a Naval Reserve of 18,000 men, the cream and
flower of our merchant seamen. During the past year I have visited
the drill batteries at Falmouth and Lerwick, and the drill ships at
Bristol, Shields, Sunderland, and Liverpool. On all sides I hear a
favourable report of the Naval Reserve. They would be an in-
valuable support to the Navy if they were called upon to serve. The
establishment of the Royal Naval Reserve has been of advantage to
the Mercantile Marine no less than to the Navy. A month spent
every year under the discipline of a man-of-war, and the habits of
precision acquired in gun drill, are a most useful training to a
merchant seaman.
Before I pass to other subjects I would call attention to the
economy with which the naval administration of this country is of navn!
cxpéudi.
conducted. In doing so it is important to notice that a large deduc- ture to
tion must be made from our naval estimates for the non-effective
VOL. IV.
Relation
Comincrce.
o
194
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
.
services. Having no conscription in this country, we have to obtain
labour in the open market, and in competition with the private
employers. We have, therefore, to pay indirectly in the cost of
training, and in pensions, what the working people consider an
equivalent to the remuneration obtainable in ordinary industrial
occupations. It is the policy of the Admiralty to pay young seamen
on a comparatively moderate scale, making large additions as they
advance to higher ratings, and giving a handsome pension to seainen
who have completed twenty years' continuous service. This system
has had the most beneficial effect on the Navy, but it has imposed
a heavy charge on the estimates. The non-effective votes for
1881-82 amount to no less than 2,063,0001. out of a total of
10,896,0001. The rate of increase may be appreciated from the fact
that the non-effective votes are half a million more than when I first
entered Parliament. Having given this explanation, I will ask you
to confine your attention to the effective votes for the Navy.
· In looking back over a series of years, it will be found that while
an extraordinary growth has taken place in our trade and shipping,
the naval estimates have remained practically stationary. The effec-
tive votes for 1881-82 were 8,662,0001. The exports and imports
were 697,000,000l. ; the steam tonnage under the British flag was
2,723,000 tons. In 1874-75, the last years of the former Liberal
Administration, the effective votes amounted to 8,624,0001., with a
total foreign trade of 668,000,0001. and 1,870,000 tons of steam
shipping. Under the Duke of Somerset, who was the First Lord of
the Admiralty in the Liberal Administration from 1859 to 1865, the
naval estimates were far in excess of the present amounts. In 1863,
and again in 1864, 9,300,0001. were voted for the Navy. In the
following year, being the year of Lord Russell's Administration, the
amount was reduced to 8,978,0001. At that time the value of our
imports and exports was 200,000,0001. less than at present, and our
steam shipping was less than a third of the present tonnage.
The facts which I have laid before you appear so conclusive as to
the strict economy which has been exercised in our naval expenditure,
that the question will rather be whether we are doing enough to
provide for the security of our vast empire and our extended com-
merce. Upon this point it is difficult to be precise without entering
into invidious comparisons with other Powers. I must, therefore,
ask
you to be satisfied with a general assurance that we are at the
present moment in a satisfactory position.
With reference to the future, I have shown that we are well pre-
pared for manning the Navy, that we have made a marked advance
EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES.
195
1
state of
ance.
on the amount of construction carried out under the late Adminis-
tion, while I have expressed a hope that our future programme will
exhibit a further development of our shipbuilding operations without
appreciably adding to the public charge. Looking to the enormous
resources in the private industry of the country, there is always
an advantage in postponing expenditure as long as possible, and thus
securing that the latest improvements shall be introduced into our
ships.
I must not trespass on your patience by further observations on On the
naval affairs. The temptation is strong to dwell on subjects which Ireland.
excite no party animosity in preference to the difficulties with which
Parliament will have to grapple in the ensuing session. The reform
of our procedure will be a prominent feature, and any proposal for
considerable change must give rise to discussion and provoke resist-
Whatever the proposals of the Government may be, the
power of promptly suspending a refractory member will be the most
effective means for preventing obstruction.
If the House or the
Speaker had possessed adequate powers to deal with the misconduct
of members, that section of the Irish representation which has acted
under the orders of Mr. Parnell would have been long since reduced
to silence. Such a result would perhaps have created an additional
grievance in Ireland, but it is the only means of enabling Parliament
to meet the just demands of England and Scotland.
The condition of Ireland is the paramount anxiety of all concerned
in public affairs. Ireland remains to-day wbat it has been for cen-
turies—the misery of British statesmanship and the weak spot in the
British Empire. At different times widely differing policies have
been pursued towards Ireland. The system of Cromwell, if it had
been relentlessly followed, would have been successful in the end. It
would have been successful if, in the higher view of politics, it could
have been a success to extirpate or completely subjugate the native
race. In later times we have adopted the principle of political
equality. Whatever laws and institutions we thought good for our-
selves were thrust upon the people of Ireland, a population totally
different in temperament from the Anglo-Saxon. The results, as it
might naturally have been expected, have not been uniformly happy.
In our own times we have given the Irish complete religious equality.
In the Land Act we have given such protection to the interests of
the Irish tenant as no legislature has ever sanctioned before, and we
have offered the mediation of the State to adjust their differences
with their landlords. Last, not least, the patience of Parliament has
been inexhaustible in listening to the tale of Irish grievances.
02
196
ON THE STATE OF IRELAND).
And now, having done all this, having done all that seems practicable
for a united Parliament to conciliate and to pacify, what reward have
we received ? Have we won the gratitude of the Irish ? Have we
created a feeling of contentment? Is the hatred of the Roman
Catholic Celt less inveterate than it was fifty years or a century ago ?
With pain and mortification we must acknowledge that no indications
whatever appear of the dawn of brighter days. It is maintained by
Opposition speakers that the present situation of Ireland is attributable
entirely to the hesitation of the Government to assert its authority
by the suppression of free speech and the imprisonment of the leaders
of disaffection. I wish I could believe these statements. It would,
indeed, be an easy solution of our difficulties if it were possible by a
change of Ministry to reconcile the Irish to our rule. Who can
doubt that the present Government would gladly resign their offices
in order to give such a priceless boon to their country ? For my own
part I maintain that the Government were justly entitled to hope
that their generous intentions towards Ireland would be appreciated,
and that special measures of repression would therefore be unneces-
sary. To gag the Press and to deny the right of public meeting is a
policy alien to the whole spirit of our Government and Constitution,
from the time of Magna Charta downwards. It is by giving them
their freedom, and by granting the most ample guarantee for personal
liberty, that we have made the authority of our Government re-
spected, and have secured the cordial adhesion of many and diverse
populations in every portion of our world-wide empire.
In all the vast dominions of the Queen, nowhere save in Ireland
do we discover any signs of disaffection. It may be thought that
such a result might be looked for in India, because the Oriental races
are docile and submissive, but we have been equally fortunate in our
dealings with other races. In Lower Canada, in the Mauritius, and
the Channel Islands we number among our fellow-subjects large
French populations. The Queen has no more loyal subjects. We
have given them self-government, and they are contented under our
rule. In our most recent acquisition of Cyprus a short experience
has proved equally reassuring to the Greek and to the Turkish
inhabitants.
It is idle to maintain that by the adoption a few months earlier of
the measures which have been authorised under the Peace Preserva-
tion Act we should have prevented the estrangement which we now
deplore in Ireland. That estrangement has its origin in the an-
tagonism of race, and has descended through long generations to
the times in which we live. Under a rule of liberty it has been more
EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES.
197
outspoken, but it has not been more deeply felt than before. The
hatred of the Roman Catholic Celt towards England is not new, but
we are learning by experience that it cannot be kept in check by the
means which have been found effective in former days. The dis-
loyalty of Ireland is sustained by resources from without which have
never before been brought into play.
During the last generation a vast emigration has been going for-
ward from Ireland, and the Irish settlers in America, though they have
prospered there, still cherish a bitter hostility towards England.
Those hostile sentiments find a practical expression in lavish subscrip-
tions to the funds of the Land League. It is by these means that
large numbers of men are enabled to devote themselves, whether in
secret or openly, to the direction of the insurrectionary movement,
and, unhappily, so long as leaders can be found, the Celtic population
of Ireland is ripe for revolt. The animosity-so far as it exists, and
I do not know how far—which severs Ireland from England is at
once socialistic and national, but the national feeling is the real
stumbling-block to British statesmanship. Where the laws are
just and equitably administered and it is the firm resolve of
the people of England that this shall be the case in Ireland—the
socialistic movement can be subdued, because all the owners of pro-
perty, on however humble a scale, can be won over to the side of the
Government.
I have the more confidence in the healing influence of just laws
upon the social disaffection in Ireland because the tenantry have in
numerous cases received cruel treatment, and often from landlords
almost as poor as themselves. We have a proof of this in the de-
cisions of the sub-commissions of the Land Court. It is no answer
to say that the majority of the landlords have been easy-going and
even generous. As the Devon Commission truly said, a single case
of hardship, under the sanction of the law, will create a feeling of
great uneasiness throughout a wide district. When the Land Act
has been longer in operation such cases of oppression will not be
found, but in Ireland more than this is demanded by popular anti-
pathy. In the present condition of Ireland, and in the existing
state of public opinion in this country, the duty of the Government
is clear, and they have done their best to fulfil it.
It is idle to suppose that the Legislature has completed its task
in relation to Irish affairs. Far greater changes than any which have
hitherto been sanctioned may yet take place, but those changes, if
they are to produce permanent good, must be both gradual and
approved by the great body of popular opinion. In the meanwhile
VOL. IY,
03
198
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
Position of
the Liberal
1
party in
Hastings.
the just rights of property must be protected, and crime must be
prevented. It is not for me, a subordinate member of the Adminis-
tration, to speculate as to the future, or to express an immature
opinion. It is sufficient to say that I gave my votes for the Land Act
in the firm conviction that that measure was inevitable and the best
solution of the question which was practicable. For the Government,
I assert that they have thus far done all that in the circumstances
was possible to vindicate the authority of the law. For the future
the dark and troubled future—it is a source of deep satisfaction to
know that we have as our leader the ablest and the most generous
statesman whom the public life of England has produced.
Turning from Imperial to local matters, I shall venture to make
a few observations on the political situation in this constituency.
The most sanguine Liberal must admit that, in 1881, we are not as
we were in 1868, when you first returned me to Parliament. We
have sustained defeats both at the Parliamentary and the municipal
elections. We have lost in Sir Ughtred Kay-Shuttleworth a very
valuable member of the House of Commons. I trace these defeats,
in part, to general causes. There is reason to believe that a com-
munity, largely composed of persons in the enjoyment of comfortable
competencies, is not exactly the quarter in which the party of
progress would look for the most earnest and vigorous support. The
strength of the Liberal party is to be found in the industrial centres
lying north of the Trent. It is the demand of those constituencies
which makes the Liberal party a necessary feature of English
politics. Without us you would have revolution.
returned Mr. North and myself as your representatives, these con-
siderations were appreciated by the people of Hastings. The claims
of the masses were recognised in this borough, which had so long
had the responsibility of returning two members to Parliament,
while populations far exceeding you in numbers were unrepresented.
I cannot believe that the Liberal cause in this place is lost for ever.
We must do more for the political cultivation of the less instructed
electors. It is easy to understand the Conservative tendencies of the
wealthy, but when a poor man, whose bread has been freed from
taxation and whose vote has been given to him by the exertions of
the Liberal party, turns round on his benefactors, such conduct can
only be explained by his ignorance of politics. I have had to contend
against many influences which would lead me into the Conservative
camp; I have nothing to gain by any change that may be proposed,
but I know, as all who have studied history must know, how dangerous
When you
1
EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES.
199
it is to be guided in politics by a blind devotion to personal
interests.
Ye friends to truth, ye statesmen who survey
The rich man's joys increase, the poor's decay,
'Tis yours to know how wide the limits stand
Between a splendid and a happy land.
I have therefore thrown in my lot with the party of progress and
reform, and I have never yet had cause to regret it. More especially
do I count myself fortunate in having had for my leader from the
time when you first sent me to Parliament the most illustrious
statesman of modern times. Mr. Gladstone's consummate abilities
have made him the object of the taunts and abuse of political foes; but
those who can look upon public affairs without the prejudice of party
will give to that great man the honour to which he is entitled for
devotion to the noblest objects of statesmanship, for the varied and
consummate gifts which he brings to bear on the most difficult
questions of legislation and administration, and for the encourage-
ment which he has given to culture by personal example. Above all
this, Mr. Gladstone has maintained through half a century a spotless
reputation. He has never been prompted by motives of personal
ambition to take part in the trickery of politics. His high character
is a tower of strength, and it is because they know they can trust
him that the leader of the Liberal party possesses the hearts of the
people of England.
It is time that I should bring these observations to a close. I
have only to announce to you as a parting word that whenever a
general election takes place I shall consider it my duty to the Liberal
party in this borough to present myself once more as a candidate for
their suffrages. In seeking to continue your representative, I am
not influenced by personal ambition; I have no desire for political
advancement. For any services I may have rendered I have been
rewarded beyond my deserts. I am thankful to you for having given
me the opportunity of devoting the best years of my life to the
public service, but if you should now think fit to remand me to a
more private station, I shall accept your decision without a murmur
or a sigh. Of my claims to your continued support it is for you to
judge. As you all know, I have devoted myself to a particular line,
in which I hope that I have been useful. Of your local interests I
have not been unmindful. Three times already you have pronounced
in my favour, and I shall look for a like result on a future occasion,
even though my seat should be attacked by a candidate of boundless
200
DOCKYARDS AND NAVAL ORGANISATION.
resources. Where the appeal lies to large communities of men it
will generally be found that substantial justice is done. It would be
unjust to put aside an old servant whose fidelity has borne the test
of many years, and I still indulge the hope that the sentiments of
affection which bind me to the people of Hastings and St. Leonar d's
will be reciprocated by my indulgent constituents.
PART V.
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
SECTION I.
INTRODUCTION.
204
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
INTRODUCTION.
OF all problems in Naval Administration, the formation of reserves
of seamen is the most important and perhaps the most difficult.
Admitting that it is the imperative duty of a statesman to avail
himself of the resources which are furnished to his hand by a
thriving and busy commerce, as the true naval defence of his country,
it would be vain to rely upon those resources, as available for
Need of or- national defence, without careful organisation in peace. This has
yanisation.
been fully recognised by those maritime Powers by whom compul-
sory service has been established, and their task has been compara-
tively easy. Under our more liberal institutions, reserves, whether
for the Army or the Navy, can only be provided by a great expendi-
ture both of time and money. The Crimean war exposed the weak-
ness of our resources for manning the Navy. Raw levies of landsmen
were hurried on board our fleets, and, for many weeks after the open-
ing of our campaigns in the Baltic, our ships were but imperfectly
prepared to meet an enemy. After the conclusion of the war an
inquiry was undertaken by a Royal Commission under the direction
of Lord Cardwell, and a scheme was worked out which remains un-
changed in all its leading features, and which has been entirely suc-
cessful. We have not attained to the numbers recommended by the
Commission, but we have a force at our disposal fully equal to the
probable demands for the manning of an armoured fleet.
There may be a lingering feeling of distrust, or even jealousy, in
the Navy towards the Naval Reserve. Some officers may think that
an equal sum spent on the Navy proper would secure a more tangible
result. But all must admit that an efficient and numerous reserve
would be of far more value, in an arduous and protracted campaign,
than a few more seamen permanently maintained in the Navy during
peace.
In olden days our merchant seamen may have distrusted and
A strong
Reserve
necessary
INTRODUCTION.
205
1
mercantile
marine.
disliked the naval service. These ancient prejudices, now happily Former
prejudice
passing away, will be more and more effectually removed in pro- in the mer.
portion to the pains which are taken to make the advantages of the chant ser-
vice against
the Royal
Royal Navy more generally appreciated and understood.
Nary.
Our ports are still too seldom visited by men-of-war. According
to the unanimous testimony of naval officers, the presence of our
fleets would serve to awaken in the merchant service an interest in
the Royal Navy, which can never be felt unless the two services are
occasionally brought into contact with each other.
“Wherever the Royal Navy is best known, there the seamen are
most ready to join it.' Hampshire, Dorsetshire, and Cornwall, the
counties in which our dockyards are situated, supply the greater
number of seamen to the Royal Navy. It is our duty to encourage
by every possible means the loyal sympathies of our seafaring popu-
lation.
As one of the representatives in Parliament of an ancient Cinque The Ar-
Port, I am reminded of the illustrious efforts of our commercial mada over-
thrown by
marine in the destruction of the Spanish Armada. Compared with the a fleet
equipped
navies of modern days, the scale of our operations in those distant times by the
may appear insignificant. All our sailors, in the reign of Elizabeth,
amounted to about 14,000 men ; and there were not more than four
vessels belonging to the merchants which exceeded 400 tons; but it
still remains a memorable fact that a Navy, whose splendid achieve-
ments fill one of the brightest pages of our history, was mainly
composed of vessels equipped by the commercial towns and the
nobility and gentry of England. Of the 140 ships which were
assembled to oppose the Spanish Armada, only 28, according to Hume,
belonged to the Royal Navy; and those renowned seamen, Drake,
Hawkins, and Frobisher, who commanded the fleet under Lord
Howard, were masters in the Merchant Navy.
Descending to later times, we may refer to the evidence given to Evidence
the Lords' Committee on the Navigation Laws by Admiral Sir George Byam
Byam Martin.
Martin,
quoted by
The merchant service, he held, was everything to the Navy, while W. S.
Lindsay.
the Navy, he was convinced, could not exist without it. He was Hist. Àier-
unable adequately to express his surprise at the loose assertions Shipping,
which had been made, for every person who remembered the muster
of the Navy immediately preceding the war in 1793, could not fail
to know that the glorious victory of June 1, 1794, under Lord Howe,
was gained by the merchant seamen of the kingdom. We had not
then, he said, 20,000 men, and these men were scattered over the
globe when the war broke out; it was therefore the merchant service
of Sir
chant
vol. iii.
p. 178.
206
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Our naval
which enabled us rapidly to man some sixty sail of the line, and
double that number of frigates and smaller vessels. By promptly
bringing together about 35,000 or 40,000 seamen of the mercantile
marine, Admiral Gardiner was able at once to proceed to the West
Indies with seven sail of the line, nine frigates and sloops of war;
Lord Hood to man twenty-two sail of the line, and a large number
of frigates and sloops, with which he occupied Toulon and took
Corsica; while, by its aid, other squadrons were sent to America and
to the East Indies to protect our interests in those quarters. The
command of seamen from the merchant service also enabled Lord
Howe to occupy the Channel with twenty-seven sail of the line and
numerous frigates, thereby affording security to our own homes, and
the means of protecting our colonies and commerce by detached
squadrons.
A Navy unsupported by an extensive mercantile marine is a
supremacy hothouse plant, which may indeed produce great results for a time,
but cannot endure the severe strain of a long-protracted war.
No nation can be a really formidable naval Power which does not
possess an adequate maritime population. Russia, a half-Oriental,
and Turkey, a semi-civilised State, can purchase or build ironclad
ships; but their maritime resources would speedily be exhausted
in war, because they lack the support of a flourishing mercantile
marine.
Napoleon possessed a fleet of eighty line-of-battle ships, a force
quite sufficient to have enabled him to contend with England for the
mastery of the seas. But all his naval operations failed, because
unsupported by a vigorous merchant service. The successive rulers
of the Russian empire have made great efforts to create a powerful
Navy. Under Peter the Great, Catherine II., and the Emperor
Nicholas, the utmost pains were bestowed on the Russian fleet. The
Crimean War revealed how fruitless their efforts had been. The
United States have never maintained a large standing Navy; and
yet they are justly reckoned amongst the most considerable of the
maritime Powers.
Every statesman who has been responsible for the administration
of the Navy must have been deeply impressed with the necessity for
an adequate reserve. In giving evidence before the Committee on
the Admiralty of 1858, Sir James Graham said :-
My attention when I was last at the Board of Admiralty, from
the end of 1852 to 1855, was very much directed to the urgent
necessity of providing a reserve of seamen available at all times, and
measures were taken to create such a force.'
INTRODUCTION.
207
1
ment could
not be
The great plan for the creation of the Royal Naval Reserves as
at present established was originated by the Manning Commission of
1859, under the guidance of Lord Cardwell. The details of their
schemes will be examined in a subsequent section; but the main
arguments for the constitution of a powerful reserve as set forth in
their report, may be quoted here as an appropriate introduction to
the present inquiry :
"The evidence of the witnesses, with scarcely an exception, shows Impress-
that the system of naval impressment, as practised in former wars,
could not now be successfully enforced. We speak,—not of any objec- carried into
effect,
tions to that system, which may exist in our minds on the score of
humanity or justice; nor of the political excitement to which, in the
opinion of some witnesses, the revival of that system would give rise;
nor of the strong and determined opposition with which, according to
others, it would be met ;---we speak rather of difficulties arising from the
altered circumstances of the times. The sailor, who wished to avoid
impressment, would have much greater facilities than formerly for
desertion in foreign ports, and for his escape after his arrival at
home. The improvements in gunnery, also, have effected a complete
revolution in naval warfare, and have rendered it absolutely neces-
sary that our vessels should in any future war be manned, not by a and would
promiscuous collection of untrained men, such as impressment for- not provide
trained
merly provided, but by seamen who are practised gunners.
“The French system, by which every seafaring man is liable to
serve on board a ship of war during a term of years, and is bound to
come forward when required, could not be successfully applied to
this country, where the relative proportion between the merchant
seamen and the Navy is so different. Added to which, it would be
open to many of the objections which affect the system of impress-
ment.
"The ballot has been suggested, but we think it is open to most The ballot
of the same objections, and that it would fail to provide any great is open to
number of men on an emergency. The ballot for the Militia would objections,
act on the whole adult population, out of which probably not more
than 100,000 would be required at one time; the ballot for the
Navy, on the other hand, would act upon a much smaller body of and would
men, of which a much larger proportion would be required. Again,
severely
the ballot for the Militia would fall on a resident population; the on the
ballot for the Navy on a floating population, a large portion of whom, population.
when their services would be required, would be absent from the
country.
“ Looking to the very large - naval armaments which we were
meri.
press
maritime
208
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
A further
force of
Its suffer-
ings in
time of
war ;
in peace
most ad-
to it.
forced to maintain in former wars, amounting at one time to no less
from 20,000 than 147,000 men, it seems desirable that we should be able to add
to 30,000
required.
to the reserves of which we have spoken a further force of from
20,000 to 30,000 seamen well trained in gunnery. The problem to
be solved is, how far it may be possible to obtain from the mer-
cantile marine and the seafaring population of the kingdom, a
volunteer force of seamen, all trained in gunnery, who could be
relied upon to come forward when their services were required.
“The earliest and most disastrous consequences of war will fall
upon the shipping interest. On them the greatest ulterior difficulty
will be imposed of carrying on their business during the continuance
of hostilities. Under any system of defence, the necessities of the
Navy must withdraw seamen from the merchant service, and raise
the rate of wages. If, then, by timely precautions during peace, we
precautions can diminish the probability that war will occur at all, and to this
end nothing will conduce so much as a knowledge on the part of
vantageous foreign Powers that our defences are impregnable;—if we can secure
that, on the outbreak of war, the Channel and neighbouring seas
shall be at once rendered safe for ships and cargoes homeward
bound ;--if we can abolish or modify the risk that the employment
of seamen will be abruptly suspended by embargo or interfered with
by impressment;-if we can attach the sailor to his country, and
prevent the disposition, which has hitherto prevailed, of seeking
service under other flags ;-the owners of our commercial marine will
reap the greatest advantage. To them, therefore, we look with
confidence for a cordial and patriotic co-operation in promoting
during peace a system which is intended to accomplish these
results.'
Royal
The Royal Naval Reserve affords the best means of manning our
fleets in the supreme emergency of war.
only re-
To some perhaps it may appear an unnecessary expense to create
manning a
reserves of seamen in time of peace. It may be thought that, with
war Navy.
a small addition to our ordinary naval means, we should be able to
cope with the navies of every maritime Power inferior to our own;
and that, in the event of our being unhappily engaged in a war with
the United States, our only serious rival, large numbers of seamen
would be thrown out of employment, and readily volunteer for the
Navy. It may be urged in reply, that, even if our ordinary trade
were interrupted by war, the demands upon the merchant service,
for the conveyance of troops and stores, would give full employment
to our seamen; and that it is accordingly essential to secure for the
State, by the payment of an annual retainer, or by giving a bonus
Naval Re-
serve the
:
source for
INTRODUCTION.
209
to apprentices, a prior claim to the services of the best seamen we
possess.
In a debate in the House of Commons in 1858, it was stated by Sir C.
Napier.
Sir Charles Napier that the merchant service only furnished 400
seamen to our Baltic fleet in 1854, and 300 in 1855. The wages of
able seamen in the merchant service trading to the Mediterranean
rose from 458. a month in 1845 to 658. a month in 1855. In 1853
the number of seamen employed in the Royal Navy was 31,000, and
in the merchant service 254,000. In 1854, the first year of the Crimean
Crimean War, the numbers were 46,000 and 266,500 respectively.
The relative numbers of the maritime population afford the most Compara-
reliable standard by which the naval resources of the principal
maritime Powers may be compared ; and the superiority of Great maritime
Britain, as set forth in the following tabular statement taken from
Admiral the Baron Grivel's work, De la Guerre Maritime, is esta-
blished beyond all question :-
War,
tive re-
sources of
Great Britain
United States
France
Norway
Total seafaring popu-
lation
Available for the
fleet
420,000
350,000
170,000
243,000
180,000
60,000
62,000
.
.
.
+
1
According to another estimate there are in the British Mercantile
Marine 407,000 seamen, exclusive of men in British ships in the
colonies and abroad.
The total number includes:
Masters and mates (certificated)
38,200
Ditto (not certificated)
10,000
Fishermen
· 150,000
Other sailor men
151,000
Firemen
14,000
Apprentices
11,000
Boys in fishing boats
13,000
If the French system were adopted in England, and the naval Total num-
conscription were extended to all the classes included under the
British
regulations in force in France, such as the crews of coasters, fisher- seafaring
populaticn.
men, boatmen, and the workmen in the private shipbuilding yards
and the dockyards, the English total would be from 700,000 to
800,000 men.
While the numbers of the maritime population of France are
inferior, the organisation for manning the Navy has been thoroughly
developed by the Inscription Maritime, established under Louis XIV.
In the memorandum prepared by Mr. Pennell in 1852 the highest
ber of
VOL. IV.
P
210
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Maritime.
.
.
authority is attributed to the estimate of M. Languihais, a member of
the parliamentary commission on the Navy, appointed in 1851. In
that authentic document it was shown that France holds in hand a
body of 60,000 seamen, of whom 40,000 are stated to be eminently
fitted for war.' Deducting from the total number the 16,000 men
Inscription (exclusive of officers) now serving in the (French) fleet, there remain
44,000 men in reserve, exclusive of marines, liberated seamen,
landsmen, conscripts, &c., who, if called out, would swell the total
number to about 120,000.
Upon the best estimate that can be formed, it appears that these
44,000 men could be embarked within the undermentioned periods :-
In a fortnight
10,000 to 12,000
In a month
10,000 to 12,000
In two months
20,000
Total
44,000
The efficiency of the organisation of the Inscription Maritime was
fully tested in the Franco-German war with results which were placed
on record by Admiral Jurien de la Gravière in La Marine d'Aujour-
Chui.
“Quand la guerre éclata, la France fit appel aux ressources de
l'inscription maritime.
‘En quelques jours, les équipages demandés furent au complet;
ils ne furent pas seulement au complet, ils furent admirables,
entièrement composés d'hommes robustes, aguerris, et dès le premier
jour prêts à faire campagne. Un embarquement de trois ans au
moins sur les bâtiments de l'État les avait façonnés aux diverses
fonctions qu'ils allaient être appelés à remplir. Toute médaille
malheureusement a son revers. Pendant que les ports de guerre se
réjouissaient, la consternation régnait dans les ports de commerce.
The most experienced shipowners and merchant captains of
France were examined before the Committee of Inquiry on the
French Merchant Service, which sat under the presidency of M.
conscrip-
Rouher in 1862. According to their unanimous testimony, the con-
scription was the principal cause of the stagnation in the maritime
development of their country. Cases were cited of gentlemen,
holding degrees from the University of France, who had gone to sea
comparatively late in life, and reached the rank of chief officers in
large steamers, who had been compelled to serve in the Navy for
three years as ordinary seamen. The obligation to serve in the Navy
in France commences at the age of twenty and continues to the age
The dislike to this liability deters a large number from
going to sea.
Freach
maritime
tion.
of fifty.
INTRODUCTION.
211
conclusions
This opinion is confirmed by M. Xavier Raymond in Les Marines M. Xavier
Raymond.
de la France et de l'Angleterre 1815–1863: “La France est moins
avancée qu'elle ne l'était au jour où Colbert publia ses fameuses
ordonnances sur la marine, car notre armée navale d'aujourd'hui n'est
guère plus nombreuse que celle de Louis XIV,
'Le chiffre de la population maritime est resté et reste stationnaire,
parce que le régime que l'on a imposé aux marins a dégoûté de la
profession un grand nombre d'hommes en général, et particulièrement
le plus grand nombre de ceux qui eussent concouru au développement
de cette branche de l'activité nationale par leurs lumières, par leurs
capitaux, par l'influence que donne une position sociale élevée au-
dessus de la moyenne. A presque tous ceux-là, eussent-ils la voca-
tion la plus décidée, on a pendant longtemps fermé l'accès de la
marine. S'ils voulaient naviguer, il leur fallait entrer dans la marine
militaire, il n'y avait pas d'autre débouché.'
On the other hand, it is but fair to acknowledge that the same General
aversion does not extend to the humbler grades of the seafaring as to In-
population. When recently cruising on the western coasts of France, Maritime.
I had opportunities of ascertaining the views of many French seamen
and pilots, and I was assured that the maritime conscription was not
unpopular. It must, however, be observed, that in all cases my
informants had already performed their service in the French Navy,
and were looking forward to the early enjoyment of the pension, to
which, at the age of fifty, they would be entitled. The conscription
probably assumes a different aspect, according as the seaman bas or
has not performed his term of service in the Navy.
There is reason to believe that the inscription when first estab-
lished was popular with the seafaring population of France. Colbert's
great object was to induce a greater number of youths to go to sea.
He would not, therefore, have inaugurated a system calculated to deter
them from becoming sailors. Since the modification of the regula-
tions in 1867, the normal length of service in the French Navy bas
been reduced to six years. But notwithstanding the alleviation in
the severity of the law, the conscription has become generally
unpopular with the rising generation of sailors, and the abolition of
the compulsory service in the Navy would be found the surest means
of increasing the naval resources of France. In parts of Germany
an effort has been made to induce people to become sailors by
granting them exemption from military service. It was observed
by M. Rouher, during the course of the inquiry over which he
presided, “Les Hambourgeois font des marins par l'exemption du
P 2
212
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
+
ment im-
service militaire, tandis que nous, au contraire, nous les faisons par
l'inscription.
Impress-
In this country the spirit of liberty, which happily pervades all
possible, our political institutions, makes it impossible to rely any longer on
compulsion as a means of recruiting for the Navy. Since the great
war, we have had two Reform Bills, and it is certain that the opera-
tions of the pressgang, which, sixty years ago, was most unpopular,
would now be impracticable. The loss of the former legal power to
compel seamen to serve in the fleet is not, even from a naval point
of view, a subject for regret. Even in days gone by impressment was
a most unsatisfactory expedient. It is now impossible. The facilities
of escape by railway and steamship, and the sympathy of public
opinion with men torn from their homes against their will, would
render impressment no longer practicable. The recent Reform Bill
has happily so extended the franchise that no man, however humble
he may be, is without a relative or friend in the electoral body.
Imagine the agitation which would take place, and which would
undoubtedly find expression in Parliament and the press, if the
electors, their friends, or their relatives, were kidnapped and carried
off forcibly to Her Majesty's ships under the cruel operation of the
old law of impressment. In former days, when the law of impress-
ment was in force, great difficulty was experienced in keeping men
enlisted by force on board the ships to which they were appointed.
Lord Nelson complained bitterly that his ship was compelled to lay
off the Nore, at a distance of seven miles from the land, in the impress
service; and declared that he was as much separated from his wife,
as if he were in the East Indies.
'Impressment,' as it was observed by Mr. C. H. Pennell, in his
Memoran. paper written in 1852, on the Manning of the Navy, “is a measure
dlum, 1852. which the country itself recoils from using. It is unsuited to the
character of the age; harsh in its exercise; exhausting in its
process, and more than problematical in its results. By the substi-
tution of a volunteer service of trained seamen for the compulsory
service of untrained men, we should seek to exemplify, on a large
scale, the sound experimental wisdom contained in the old naval
adage, “One volunteer is better than two pressed men.”
The number of men to be obtained by impressment has been
much exaggerated. In 1814, not more than 30,000 men were
obtained under the combined operations of bounties and impressment.
Nor let it be supposed that impressment was a cheap means of secur-
ing seamen for the Navy. It was stated by Mr. Pennell that the
impressment system cost in the nine years ending 1773, 1,359,1561.
Mr. Pen-
nell.
INTRODUCTION.
213
men.
Lord Nelson, in his paper on the Manning of the Navy, to which
I have already referred, dwells strongly on the desertion which so
commonly occurred in a fleet manned under the impressment system.
"It will be found,' he observes, that whenever a large convoy is
assembled at Portsmouth, and our fleet in port, not less than 1,000
men desert from the Navy; and I am sure that one-third of this
number, from loss of clothes, drinking, and other debauchery, are lost
by death to the United Kingdom.'
The following statement, made by Lord Clarence Paget in the
House of Commons in the session of 1860, abundantly confirms all
that has been said of the inefficacy of impressment: During the
years 1811, 1812, and 1813, the closing period of the great war with
France, there were pressed into the service 29,405 men, while the
number of those who deserted was 27,300, so that the total gain to
the country during those three years, by impressment, was 2,105
But in order to bring those men thus compulsorily into the
service, 3,000 good sailors had been employed on shore' as pressgangs.
Therefore the country actually lost about 1,000 men during those
three years under the system.'
It would be unreasonable to rely on the lofty and unselfish patriot-
ism of necessitous men serving before the mast. Mere enthusiasm
would not induce the merchant seamen to join the Navy if employ-
ment were being offered at an increasing rate of pay. On the other
hand, I do not believe that a large proportion of the men of the
Royal Naval Reserves would desert if they were called upon to serve.
The opinion of Admiral Key and of a great majority of the shipping
masters is strong on this point. If, however, our just expectations
were disappointed, and the men belonging to the Royal Naval
Reserve did desert our flag, the law could be set in motion against
them, and popular feeling would be as earnest in support of the
measures which might be taken for securing the deserters, as it
would be opposed to all attempts to enforce the arbitrary right of
impressment.
SECTION II.
NECESSARY STRENGTH OF OUR NAVAL
RESERVES
VOL. IV.
*P4
216
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
NECESSARY STRENGTH OF OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
The neces-
sary naval
force not
ble num-
ber.
In urging a renewed effort to improve and increase our Reserves it is
assumed that the standard at which the Navy should be maintained
an invaria- is not an absolute but a relative quantity.
There is no difficulty in maintaining the force of blue-jackets in
Our train the Navy up to the present standard of 18,000 men, or any larger
.
number which might be deemed necessary. The system of training
boys in the service itself is undeniably efficient, although open to
some objection on the ground of the great expense involved, and the
separation which it tends to perpetuate between the Navy and the
merchant service. The training ships afford to the sons of our
labouring population one of the most eligible employments which
they can select; and no difficulty is experienced in inducing any
number of boys, who may be required, to enter the service.
With a considerable reduction in our present force of seamen, we
should still be perfectly secure against any conceivable combination
of naval Powers against us. When the German empire has a naval
force composed of only 3,500 seamen and boys; when our most
serious rival in point of naval resources, the United States, is
satisfied with a force composed of about 7,000 seamen; and when it
is remembered that the personnel of the Russian Navy, though
numerically large, is entirely an artificial creation (the total
number of seamen in the Russian mercantile marine not exceeding,
according to the Almanach de Gotha, 9,000 men), England may
safely rest content with the actual state of her Navy in time of peace.
But, inasmuch as our requirements in a time of war cannot be
expansion measured by the standard accepted by Continental Powers, it is
required.
essential that we should have at our disposal greater means of
expansion. We ought, therefore, to possess the power of creating a
Navy on an emergency sufficiently strong to protect all our more
important lines of communication, and to defend our coasts from
invasion. It is to a well-organised Naval Reserve that we must look
for the means of manning the feets which it may be necessary to
equip in time of war.
Greater
means of
NECESSARY STRENGTH OF OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
217
1
seameil
than
dum by
A large standing Navy in peace is necessarily costly in this
country, where the pay and pensions of seamen are far more liberal
than under the compulsory system by means of which foreign navies
are recruited. In France, the pay of the able seaman is ls. 2d. a Wages of
day; in Russia it is about 3d. a day; and in England it is 1s. 7d. higher in
a day. The comparatively high rate of wages established in our own
England
Navy affords an additional argument in favour of the policy of looking abroad.
rather to the reserves than the standing naval force for the supply
of seamen for a war Navy.
The opening remarks of the memorandum prepared by the late Memoran-
Mr. W. S. Lindsay for Mr. Childers deserve the attentive considera- Mr.W. s.
tion of every naval administrator:
Lindsay.
We possess elements of power not enjoyed by any other country;
these and our wealth are in a great degree the true measure of our
strength. Let us then consider how we can best utilise them in the
emergency of war, so as to render less necessary the maintenance
during peace of an expensive standing force, which interferes with
our industry, the source of our wealth, and by increased and perma-
nent taxation curtails our means, and consequently our power in the
time of need. Voting supplies for war during the time of peace, so
far from resembling the premium of insurance which prudent men
pay for the protection of their property, a too common argument in
favour of extravagant estimates, should, I think, rather be con-
sidered as depreciating the value of the stock which we ought to
husband. If we had saved only. two millions sterling every year out
of the Army and Navy Estimates since 1815, and allowed them to
fructify in the hands of the people, or appropriated them towards the
reduction of the National Debt; or had we created a reserve fund
against possible war, that comparatively small yearly sum, accumu-
lating with interest and compound interest at the rate of 31 per
cent. per annum, would now have placed at our disposal more than
three hundred and twenty millions, which I need hardly say would
go a long way towards bringing to a speedy and favourable close
almost any European war in which we are likely to be engaged.
“When I entered Parliament in 1853, our Navy Estimates were
under seven millions, but since the close of the Crimean War, or
during the last twelve years of peace, they have never been less than
ten millions, though in some years previous to 1853 they were only
about half that amount.
'Steam and electricity have within the last few years most
materially facilitated our means of communicating rapidly with all
parts of the world, and have enabled us to place at almost any given
218
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
point a force sufficient to vindicate our rights in half the time we
should have taken even in 1853.
The necessary strength of our Reserves of the several classes is a
point which must be determined by the Executive Government from
time to time, according to the circumstances of the political situation.
In the great war we had 145,000 men in the Navy. Sir Maurice
Berkeley considered that the permanent force should be raised to
30,000 seamen, of whom 6,000 to 8,000 should be employed at home.
In a memorandum on the Reserves of Seamen for the Royal Navy,
printed for private circulation, Sir F. Grey expressed an opinion
that an addition of at least 15,000 bonâ-fide seamen would be required,
with probably 7,000 men of other classes, and 2,500 officers, to raise
our Navy to the war standard of 84,500 officers and men.
The Royal Commission of 1859 proposed to have 4,000 seamen
in the home ports, with a reserve force of 11,000 Marines, the Coast-
guard being maintained at a strength of 12,000, and the Royal
Naval Reserve at 20,000 men.
The actual numbers are :
-Coast-
guard 4,300, Royal Naval Reserve first class 12,000, second class
4,962, third class 76, Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers 1,209.
“The introduction of mastless ships, the substitution of steam
power for sails, of mechanical appliances for manual labour, and the
changes in naval armament, have considerably reduced the necessary
large addi- complement of a ship of war. Yet, while fully recognising the
expendi-
altered character of modern navies, the reserves of seamen, recom-
mended by the Royal Commission on Manning, might be exhausted
by the drain of a long-protracted war with a combination of naval
Powers, whose attacks might be directed rather against the commerce
than the fleets of this country,
Our Re-
serves
should be
increased
without a
tional
ture.
In the following paper by the Compiler, read at the Royal United
Service Institution on April 21, 1873, Admiral Tarleton, C.B., Lord of
the Admiralty, in the chair, an attempt was made to elicit the opinion
of the naval profession with reference to the strength at which the
reserves of the Navy should be maintained under the altered con-
ditions of modern warfare.
There are three problems, which I will specially single out for
discussion.
'I. What number of seamen ought we to endeavour to enrol,
whether in the first or second class Reserve, or as Naval Coast
Volunteers ?
‘II. To what extent may we venture to rely on the merchant
service to provide officers for our Navy in time of war ?
NECESSARY STRENGTH OF OUR NAVAL RESERVES. 219
G
seamen.
“III. What are the most effectual means of raising and training
a force for the especial purpose of coast defence ?
I proceed to apply myself to the first of the three problems,
which I have submitted for the consideration of the Institution.
The inquiries, instituted in 1852, as to the probable require-
ments of the British Navy, elicited the usual divergency of opinions
from the naval officers who were consulted.
Sir John Stirling estimated that 60,000 men would be necessary
to man the Navy in time of war. Admiral Denman, on the other
hand, believed that, on the outbreak of a war, a fleet of 100,000 men
would be immediately required; but, inasmuch as of the 40,000
employed in 1852 only 15,000 were seamen, he believed that of the
60,000 additional men required for a war Navy, only 23,000 need be
The effect of modern mechanical appliances, in relation to
the manning of the Navy, was scarcely perceived at the time of the
Crimean war; but the fact that the number of seamen and Marines
employed in the British fleet, at that period, never exceeded 68,000,
afforded some indication of the coming change.
· In the recent civil war in America, the Navy of the United States
was increased to vast proportions. Land defences of great strength
were attacked by their ships. An effectual blockade was main- .
tained along 3,500 miles of coast. A fleet of cruisers was despatched
in chase of the “ Alabama," and other piratical vessels, to every part
of the world. To perform these varied services, some 671 vessels
were employed ; but such was the effect of modern changes in naval
warfare, that the number of men employed in the United States
fleet never exceeded 51,000 men. The blockade of Charleston is one
of the most striking examples of the reduced numbers of seamen
required in modern naval warfare. The report of the Secretary of the
United States Navy on Armoured Vessels, published in 1866, contains
a despatch from Admiral Dahlgren, dated off Morris Island, January,
1864, in which the following observations occur:“The complete-
ness with which four little monitors, supported by an ironclad
frigate, have closed Charleston, is well worth noting. These four
monitors, which thus keep watch and ward, muster eight guns and
320 men, which is almost insignificant compared with the work
done.'
• The conditions of naval warfare have, in our days, been so com-
pletely revolutionised that the experience of the past affords but a
slight clue to the requirements of the future.
In 1805, a year
memorable in our annals for the crowning naval victory of Trafalgar,
114,000 seamen and Marines were voted for the naval service. This
number was increased, in subsequent years, to 147,000; but it is
220
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
certain that our naval power derived, no advantage from the increase
in the numerical strength of our naval forces.
An eminent officer of the United States Navy, Admiral Golds-
borough, has stated, in a memorandum addressed to his Government,
that the most effective vessels for coast defence will be swift and
handy armourclad ships without guns, and to be used.exclusively as
rams. By the adoption of vessels of the type recommended by
Admiral Goldsborough, the number of men in our Sotilla for coast
defence might be materially diminished.
“The last Royal Commission on the Manning of the Navy, report-
ing in 1860, had not the experience of the American war as a guide
for determining our probable requirements. But, inasmuch as their
report contains the latest authoritative exposition of professional
opinion in our own Navy, it deserves attentive consideration.
• The following statement exhibits the whole amount of reserve,
which they recommended:
Men
.
Reliefs in the home ports
Coastguard
Marines embodied
Ditto, short-service pensioners.
Seamen, short-service pensioners
Royal Naval Volunteers
Naval Coast Volunteers
4,000
12,000
6,000
6,000
3,000
20,000
10,000
60,000
Since the publication of the Report of the Royal Commission of
1859 naval warfare has been almost revolutionised.
When on a
recent occasion I introduced a motion in the House of Commons,
on the condition of our Naval Reserves, I urged the appointment of
a Select Committee to inquire into the subject, mainly on the ground,
that in consequence of the immense changes which have taken place,
the number of seamen required for the Reserve could no longer be
taken as definitely settled by a report drawn up some fifteen years
ago. How great a change has taken place in this regard was clearly
shown in the able speech of Mr. Shaw-Lefevre, in which he pointed
out that, at the date when the inquiry of the last Royal Commission
was held, the flag-ship in the Mediterranean required a complement
of from 600 to 700 blue-jackets, while for the present flag-ship, the
"Lord Warden," 200 are sufficient; and, if the “Devastation” re-
presents the flag-ship of the future in European waters, then 100
able seamen will do the work for which, in the good old times of
full-rigged three-deckers, a crew of 900 seamen was essential.
'I believe I am correct in saying that at the present moment we
have not more than thirty-two or thirty-three ironclads afloat adapted
NECESSARY STRENGTH OF OUR NAVAL RESERVES. 221
seainen.
for cruising in distant waters, or for service in which the aid of sail-
power may be regarded as indispensable. Some years must elapse
ere our ocean-going ironclad fleet can be increased to a total number
of fifty vessels. If it be fair to take the crew of the “Lord Warden"
as representing the average number of seamen required for one-half
of our ironclad fleet; and if the complement of the “ Devastation"
may be accepted as the normal number for ships of her class; and,
to judge from the naval estimates of the present year, one-half of
our new ironclads will be mastless ships; then it would appear pro-
bable that we should require for the complements of a fleet of fifty
of the most powerful ironclad ships, not more than 7,500 bonâ-fide
For an equal number of ships of the type to which the
flag-ship in the Mediterranean of fifteen years ago belonged, we should
have required a force of 30,000 seamen. The inference seems to be
irresistible, that in a future naval war we shall not require so many
seamen as formerly for our ocean-going line-of-battle ships. Making
every allowance, therefore, for the increased importance of the
commerce, and assuming that in consequence of the withdrawal of
the troops, the defence of the colonies will be in a larger sense than
heretofore committed to the Navy, I venture to submit it, as my
opinion, that we no longer require 20,000 seamen in our first-class
Reserve. The first-class Reserve now numbers about 12,000 seamen,
very carefully selected ; and if 10,000 men responded to their coun-
try's call, we should find it difficult to make use of their services.
Hence, I arrive at the conclusion that we are in a highly satisfac-
tory position, as regards the numerical strength of our Naval Reserve.
"The policy of creating additional means of training seamen for
the Reserve must depend mainly on the views entertained in the
Navy as to the strength at which that Reserve should be maintained.
If our present Reserve be really inadequate, then training ships with
brigs attached as sailing tenders should be at once established, at
least in London and Liverpool. If, on the other hand, the actual
strength of the Naval Reserve is adequate, then naval reformers will
not be justified in urging upon the consideration of Parliainent pro-
posals for training young seainen for the Reserves at the public
expense.'
DISCUSSION.
Captain WILLES, C.B., R.N.: My excuse for speaking this evening is
simply that, for three years and a half, I superintended at the Admiralty
the Coastguard and Naval Reserve during the absence, I may say, of our
gallant chairman fronn Whitehall. In the first place, I must on the part
of the Navy thank Mr. Brassey for the very great interest he takes in
222
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
naval affairs. We are only too glad to see an honourable member who
will bring naval matters before the House, and discuss them fairly, as he
does; and we hope the time is not far distant wlien he will bold an im-
portant post, either at the Board of Trade or at the Admiralty. Mr.
Brassey has, indeed, in his interesting lecture, raised some most important
questions; and I fear that, in endeavouring to touch on some of these, I
may exceed the limited time allotted by the rules of this Institution. Ten
hours instead of ten minutes would still leave much unsaid, and I there-
fore trust I may meet with indulgence, should I be led to transgress. Mr.
Brassey has alluded to the fact of there being so few naval members of
Parliament. I shall be very glad if he, or anyone else, will tell me how
that is to be remedied. To begin with, we are, as a rule, poor men, and
secondly, it is very difficult for us to serve our profession and Parliament
also. If we go into Parliament we must take a party side, and this too
ofton injures our professional career. At the same time I think it is
unfortunate for the service that we are not, like the Army, numerously
represented; for, although I have a great respect for members of Parlia-
ment in general, it is almost impossible that any man should discuss, with
advantage, purely technical questions of which he has had no personal
experience. The retirement scheme of Mr. Childers I believe to have been
for the good of the Navy generally, but it increased the difficulties in the
way of naval officers sitting in Parliament. An officer cannot well enter
the House until he is qualified for flag rank; then, after a few years, he
either must treat his constituents badly by resigning his seat when he
wants to hoist his flag, or relinquish the service altogether.
Mr. Brassey alluded to the remarkable divergence of opinion prevailing
amongst naval officers. Well, it is certainly to be regretted, but cannot
be remedied. We go to sea, when very young, under different kinds of
officers. We often im bibe our ideas entirely from them, and they may be
said to influence the whole of our future career. I particularly remember,
for I was one of the Lifeboat Committee alluded to by Mr. Brassey, when
the diversity of opinion, as the evidence given by the witnesses shows, was
so remarkable.
Mr. Brassey invites naval officers to state what number of seamen, as
a Reserve, would be required in case of war. Now, that is one of the
most difficult problems he could possibly put forward. What war is it to
be ? Is it to be a maritime war or a European war? That is to say, is it
to be a war with America or a European Power ? If it was war with the
latter, I believe, to commence, we are well provided, but if it is war with
America, then we should have to cover the sea with 'Alabamas' to protect
our commerce, and he would be a very clever person who could say how
many. Then comes another question. What is to be the ship of the
future? If the Devastation' is to be the type, the number required
would be very small; but I believe the time is not very far distant, and
that there are some of the younger members present who will see it, when
armour will be entirely taken off our ships. We may not go back to three-
deckers, but I believe we shall return to frigates and corvettes with many
guns and large crews, then we should require a very large number of men
NECESSARY STRENGTH OF OUR NAVAL RESERVES. 223
in the Reserves. But looking at the immediate future,' an expression
made use of by Lord Dufferin's Committee which sat at the Admiralty
last
year, I believe we are tolerably rich. If the Naval Reserve could be
raised again to the number which the Admiral in the chair left in 1869
(namely, 16,000), with our Coastguard and our Pensioner Force (which
is very considerable), I think we might be quite happy. But the question
is, how to keep up that 16,000. It is a very important subject. When
the present Government came into office, I think the naval representative,
Mr. Childers, held the opinion which I was sorry to hear Commander
Gilmore again express this evening, of the Naval Reserve, and, you will
remember, he called them out on a Whitsuntide cruise. It was a very
bad time of the year, and we only collected 1,600 or 1,700; but Mr.
Childers came back from that cruise convinced that, whether it was right
or whether it was wrong to establish the Naval. Reserve in the first
instance, it never should be abolished. Admiral Key, who commanded
thie squadron, pointed out certain defects in the system, and he certainly
did hit upon some of the blots nientioned by Commander Gilmore. The
consequence was, a Committee sat at Whitehall (of which I was a member),
and recommended considerable modifications, in order to remedy the evils
pointed out by Admiral Key and other officers. What was the result
These restrictions, as they were called by Mr. Brassey, reduced the force
to 11,500 'men; but these 11,500 men were certainly prime seamen, In
the meantime other difficulties arose, and there was no greater one than
the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal has indirectly hurt our Naval Reserve,
because, for the moment, it has swept away a large number of sailing ships,
and has increased the number of steamers immensely, and the steamers
that now go to India, China, and Australia through the canal are manned
by inferior seamen, who are not qualified for the Naval Reserve. Again,
the increase of steamers in our home trade has acted against us. I was at
a seaport the other day, and meeting an old shipmate, I asked him why he
had not joined the Naval Reserve. His reply was, “It is impossible now,
Sir. We cannot take our drills. These steamers along the coast come in
and go out of port again so rapidly.' So great is the competition, that
their cargoes are taken out and the vessels loaded again and started fre-
quently in forty-eight hours, so that the men have not time to take their
drill. Therefore, we have the Suez Canal and the immense increase of our
steam commerce acting against us, and how the Naval Reserve is, under
the circumstances, to be raised even to 13,000 efficient men is a puzzle."
I have been absent some months from England, and therefore only to-day
read Sir Frederick Grey's pamphlet, and if anybody here has not read it, I
| Return from Board of Trade, December 21, 1872, points to a considerable
decrease in the crews of steam vessels, thus-
Proportion of men to 100 tons.
1854
7.47
1869
4.92
1870
4.67
1871
•
:: 4:55
224
OUR NAVAL RISERVES.
would advise him to do so. I was in the House of Commons when Mr.
Goschen made the speech which Sir Frederick Grey alludes to, and for the
moment I thought Mr. Goschen was right. He said that he did not con-
sider it any part of the duty of the State to educate sailors for the mercan-
tile mai'ine. But it must, sooner or later, be done. Sir Frederic Grey
says, very truly, 'We must keep up our Naval Reserve. You cannot go
back to the navigation laws. The competition is so great you cannot intro-
duce apprentices forcibly into the merchant service, and therefore the State
must help tho mercantile marine. The men that we want for the Naval
Reserve of the future must be trained men, for the gallant Admiral very
properly points out, that those who were collected together in the panic of
1859--60 are not what we want now, and therefore, as the State gains by
the competition and extreme riches of the country, produced, I believe, in
a great mensure by the abolition of the navigation laws, the Chancellor of
the Exchequer must eventually spare a part of his surplus to assist the
mercantile marine; and the men, in some way or other, must be passed
through a short course of training in a man-of-war. How it is to be done
I cannot tell you, for I know well, and so does the gallant Chairman, that,
at this moment, we do not know what to do with the boys we are obliged
to train for the Navy, for we have now to train every one of our seamen
from boys. Instead of the merchant service being, as formerly, a nursery
for the Navy, it is just the reverse, and positively the establishment of
this very Naval Reserve, giving the men 101. a year, tends to keep them
out of the Navy. But it is a necessity. The Naval Reserve cannot be
abolished, so that the sooner the State takes it up the better. We must
have a larger force at sea in the Navy. We must have more unarmoured
ships; we must have more regular training ships, and there must be a
regular system for our Reserves as our lecturer has said, under some dis-
tinguished Commander-in-Chief. Then comes the very difficult question,
What are we to do for officers in case of war?' I daresay Mr. Brassey
is a wxle that every naval officer, whether on half-pay or retired pay,
can, by the power now extant, be called upon to serve in case of an
em urgency; therefore, I think that it would be possible to get the necessary
officer's. They would be a little rusty, no doubt, but I believe many and
many a young officer who for private leasons bas retired from the Navy,
would gladly come forward in case of an emergency, and therefore the
officer difficulty may be got over. How to keep officer's efficient for war
is what no one can say. You cannot have a larger force. Parliament
say, 'We will give you 60,000 men and the proper proportion of officors.'
You cannot have any more, and yet if war breaks out to-morrow, that
force must be trebled or quadrupled; but that we could get officou's better
than in the last war I thoroughly believe.
Captain COLOMB, R.N.: Mr. Braşsey, although he appeals especially to
naval officers, feels quite as strongly as naval officers do that this question
is an imperial question--one which naval officers are not likely to view
from a broad stand-point--not from the stand-point from which it ought
to be thoroughly and clearly viewed. The divergence of naval opinion
was adverted to by Mr. Brassey, and was to a certain extent confirmed
1
NECESSARY STRENGTH OF OUR NAVAL RESERVES. 225
by my friend Captain Willes. My experience of that divergence is this,
that it is a divergence on the surface, and that if you bring two naval men
of apparently completely opposite opinions together, and go a little below
the surface-a little below the mere words that they happen to utter at
the moment, you will find that there is a very much greater consensus
of opinion than you would have at first supposed. I do not think that
we must take American experience at all, unless we take it as making for
an increase of our naval force. The American commerce, as we all know,
entirely disappeared from the seas, simply because she was not prepared for
a naval war.
The strength of the first-class Naval Reserve Mr. Brussey sets at 12,000,
and considers it satisfactory, and I understand him further that he woull
diminish it by 2,000, and that he thinks 10,000 would be enough. Now,
,
I agree with Captain Willes most distinctly and strongly on the point. I
understand him to say, that in some way we must incorporate the mercan-
tile marine; either by transfusing from the mercantile marine into the
Navy, or from the Navy into the mercantile marine. I feel that now most
strongly, and I think it has a larger bearing than that which concerns the
Navy immediately. I think that we have, in recent events, very clear
proof that unless the Government does take some steps towards assisting
the mercantile marine in the manner suggested by Captain Willes, that great
service will go on deteriorating, as we have some reason to fear it is doing
now. Mr. Brassey asks have our own seamen deteriorated ? I think we
should bnd, if we took naval officers and examined them superficially-as I
have stated - that some would say they have, and others would say they
have not. But I think if you wont a little closer and cross-examined them,
they would say, ' We never were in so fine a condition as to our seamen in
the Navy as we are at this moment-taking the individual seaman.' The
point as to the officers of the Reserve, as Captain Willes says, is a very
difficult one. I think that, carrying out the policy of diminishing the
number of naval officers who are on the Navy List, and who are, therefore,
intimately connected with, and interested in, the Navy, we run some very
great risks. We come next to the Coast Volunteers; and I think Mi.
Brassey, unless I am very much mistaken, is under a misapprehension is
to the chief reason of the unpopularity of the Coast Volunteers. The objec-
tion I have always heard alleged against them has been that they were under
a peculiar engagement,they were not liable to be called beyond a certain
distance from the coast of England. That I have always understood to be
the real objection to the force. Far-seeing mon argue that in time of war,
when you had got men, you could not pledge yourself to use them within
a certain distance of the coast of England. You might want them anywhere.
That, I have understood, was the real objection.
This brings me to another important point which Mr. Brassey has
brought forward. I have viewed with the greatest alarm the growing
feeling in England that our defence is round our coasts. Now, in the old
times of our country's history, it was a const-defence certainly that we used,
but it was a defence on our enemies' coasts, to prevent them leaving their
harbours, and that, I am certain as I stand here, is our true policy still.
VOL. IV.
Q
226
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Then, Mr. Brassey advises that our Coast Volunteers should be increased
and our first reserve diminished, as I have before noticed. If you enter
these liardy fishermen ; and if you spend money, time, and trouble in
training them, and if you engaged that they shall serve on board your
ships not at a certain distance from the land, but where you want them,
then I agree with Mr. Brassey that you have in those men a most valuable
force. But if, on the other hand, you are looking to train them for coast
defence, I should be afraid. I had the pleasure the other day, through the
kindness of Mr. Brassey, of seeing his Volunteers; and I am not prepared
to agree with Captain Willes in his remarks upon that force, because,
although the force may be small and may not be capable of doing much,
and although it might cost a little money, yet in these times, I do think
that however and wherever you can get the public really interested in the
Navy, he' who does it performs a really good office.
Captain J.C. R. COLOMB, late R.M.A.: With your permission, Sir, I
should like to make one or two remarks. Mr. Brassey invited discussion
upon a number of points, which were not only of importance to the Navy,
but to the country at large. First of all, Mr. Brassey invites discussion
with regard to the required strength of our Naval Reserves. Next to the
efficiency of the reserves. Let us take a war with European Powers-and
see what forces can be brought to bear against us.
I think it will appear
that the number of guns in ironclads that could be brought to bear upon
this country amounts to about 1,800. Therefore, taking that as a rough
estimate 1,800 guns may possibly be opposed against you, by a combination
against you of all the civilised powers of Europe, you may fairly suppose
that 1,800 of our guns would be a fair match, and, therefore, basing an
estimate on the number of men required for the guns, you get at something
like a possible calculation for the number of inen you probably would
require for manning the fleet to oppose a European combination. But if,
as it is not at all within reasonable probability that the whole of Europe is
going to be arrayed against us, you take two-thirds of this total number of
guns, you will find that the number of men required for our ironclad fleet
would be 40,000.
Now, with regard to the quality of the reserve. From some experience
on board ship, and with military forces regular and irregular on shore, I
confess that I l'egard, with considerable apprehension the numerical ques-
tion of the reserves taking too prominent a place. I think it is a matter of
very serious importance that discipline should be the thing to which we should
first of all look. Now, where men are only brought together for a short
period of training, it is very hard to get discipline. Drill is not discipline;
the training of men at a gun is, no doubt, valuable and good, but you must
not compare a man only so trained with a man who has been for years
under discipline. This was shown very forcibly at the siege of Paris. In
Paris, for three months they were training gunners night and day. No
opportunity was neglected to create an efficient force of Artillery to hold
the forts. After three months of training, night and day, the hour at last
came when the training was to be put to the test, and those who remember
the account in the Times of the fall of Fort Avron, will agree with me that
NECESSARY STRENGTH OF OUR NAVAL RESERVES. 227
it is discipline, and discipline only, that will enable gunners, however well-
trained, to stand the brunt of war. No good artilleryman would have
given up such a position after one day's firing. Now, they must have
known their duty after three months, but they had not the discipline; and
I call your attention to that statement for the sake of showing that the
mere fact of providing training at short periods may make a man handy at
a gun-may make him know his duty at a gun-but unless you have had
a sufficiently long opportunity for instilling into that man habits of dis-
cipline, in the hour of your great distress you may find that, although he
is a trained man, he is not all the man you want to fulfil the duties required
of him.
With regard to the remark which fell from Captain Willes respecting
the officers, and with regard to the speech of the Secretary to the Admiralty
(in reply to Mr. Brassey's very able speech upon Naval Reserves), in which he
spoke about the difficulty there was in educating seamen, because there was
no room on board ships for them, I wish to make just one remark. Captain
Willes said, the difficulty was, that you do not know how to employ your
officers in time of peace, and the difficulty that the Secretary to the
Admiralty pointed out was that there was no room on board ship for them.
Now, of course, one is very apt to get off a subject on to one's hobby; but I
totally deny that that is a state of things which it is necessary should exist,
or that it is a system which will last. You are paying 150,0001. a-year for
the half-pay of naval officers whom you cannot employ, because there is no
l'oom, for them on board ship. You are also, and I beg particularly to draw
the lecturer's attention to this before the question of amateur officers is
taken up at all, you are also paying 150,0001. a year to another class of
officers (Marines), whom you are putting on board ship and educating for the
purpose of being put on board ship, and when you put them on board ship
you cannot employ them; you have nothing for them to do. Consequently,
you are blocking up your ships, which ought to be training schools for all
the men and officers that you should en ploy. You are blocking up and
are filling every place with men who could be more useful elsewhere. I
speak with regard to the Marine force, that is the Marine Artillery and the
Infantry.
Captain GOODENOUGH, R.N.: My object in rising is to give a short
statement of the numbers of men in the Naval Reserves of other countries,
and I shall not violate confidence or state a word that is not in printed or
published papers when I give a short sketch of them. As we all know,
the most complete and most interesting Naval Reserve which exists in
Europe is that of France, which has now existed some 250 years, has
always been progressive, and as to whose discipline there has never been
a single hitch or doubt. The numbers under that Naval Reserve Act of
France are at this moment about 172,000 men,--that includes all the men
of all ages, from eighteen to fifty. I do not mean to say that the whole
of these men are efficient, but we may get some idea of the number of
efficient men when we know that for some years past there have been
about 15,000 men afloat, and about 7,000 men in l'eserve in barracks, and
that behind these men there are in reserve double the number of drilled
Q2
228
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
men that are on actual pay, making a total of about 65,000 or 66,000 men
between the ages of twenty and thirty-six. They are not all born seamen,
but the great majority are brought up to the sea from the age of fourteen
or fifteen-fishermen, and men who have been to sea in various capacities.
Some 4,000 every year are drafted to the French Navy from the con-
scription of the army. Those men are specially drilled to the exercise of
small arms. A fair number of these afterwards enter the Inscription
Maritime, which confers very great advantages on all who consent to join
it, and who reside at naval ports. I should be quite unable to enter into
the conditions of the French Naval Reserve Act, but it is to be found in
the French printed regulations, and is of the utmost interest. At all times
in the history of the English Navy those who have sought to work out
some registration of British seamen have been those who have had some
experience of the French service, beginning with Lieutenant St. Lo, who
was in prison in France and who when he returned to England made his
remarks in a pamphlet on the registration of seamen, entirely derived
from the French system.
There are about 80,000 seafaring men in North Germany. Those sea-
faring men are described as being not merely foreign-going seamen but
as fishermen and also men who work about the docks and harbours. No
large proportion of those men have passed through the naval service, but
some 3,000 have been enrolled for some time past, and at the present
moment there are some 5,000 serving. You may always say when you
speak of any German force, that the force enrolled under their organic law
has twice the number of its representatives in reserve; so that if there
have been 5,000 enrolled in the German Navy there are 15,000 men, if
all reserves are called out, without calling up the See-wehr or See-sturm.
In Austria very much the same number of men and very much the
same law exist. In Italy something of a similar law exists; but there it
does not suit so well, because they have an immense maritime, population.
Italy has a maritime population of 225,000, chiefly fishermen, but of whom
a great number man those Genoese barques of which so many are employed
in the carrying trade, and some few steamers trading to all parts of the
world. The Italian law states that the seamen are divided into classes,
each class being composed of men who reach the age of eighteen, during a
single year. As there are a very large number of men, the Navy enrols
only, say, one-fifth of a class, but when the Reserves are called up for actual
service, the law obliges the Government to take the whole of the class;
therefore it has for every drilled man to take four undrilled men before it
can touch the men of the other classes. I mention this to show that an
organic law for the compulsory service of seamen does not suit all
countries; it suits admirably a small maritime population, but it is not
adapted to a large maritime population. The French system is the one
which alone, as far as I know, suits every class in France admirably, for
there their Navy is largely in excess of the protection required by their
merchant service.
Reverting to Mr. Brassey's excellent paper, I think the most valuable
suggestion which he has made, and the one most likely to bear fruit,
NECESSARY STRENGTH OF OUR NAVAL RESERVES. 229
is that with reference to an Inspector-in-Chief of the Naval Reserve.
Wherever that idea had its birth, and it has now been spoken of largely
for some time, this is the first place in which it has had public expression,
unless my memory fails me, and Mr. Brassey may have already spoken of
it in the House of Commons. I think that from the date of the appoint-
ment of an Inspector-in-Chief of Naval Reserves, you may expect to see
first of all the exact facts publicly reported and spoken of as to the con-
dition of Naval Reserves, then an exact comparison between the men in
one part of the country and in another, and finally the exact wants of the
Naval Reserve made known as to officers. (Mr. Brassey :' The comparison
between year and year.') And also the comparison between year and year.
There are many other points I should like to touch upon, but as the hour
is so late I will merely advert to one, viz., as to the numbers of men who
are likely to be required, and I think the speakers generally have seemed
rather satisfied with the present number of men whom we can call upon
for foreign service. I am by no means so: I look upon 10,000 men as
very small, particularly when you consider that that is not a number that
you will be able to lay your hand on at once. You will probably be able
to lay your hand immediately on 2,000, and within a little time afterwards
on another thousand. During the war between France and Germany the
largest number of men the French had called out at any one time was over
72,000; it is true that a large number of those were on shore, but that does
not afford any argument, and if we look at the commencement of a war we
see the immense advantage which a large reserve gives. The French were
able (although they did not use it), within twenty-one days, to fit out a fleet
of ten or eleven ironclads and to have them ready to send to the Baltic.
Everybody knows we could not do that. A point on which Mr. Brassey
asked for our opinion, is that of the condition of merchant seamen.
sorry to say I am not in a position to judge of the comparative aptitude
and comparative worth of our merchant seamen at the present day ; but
I take it that there exist at the present moment as large a number of good
English seamen as there ever existed, but that the number has not kept
pace with the wants of the merchant service. The whole question of
this training of merchant seamen is a question very closely bound up
with that of technical training in other trades and professions. We heard
a great deal a few years ago about the want of technical training in all
trades and professions. The trade of seamen is essentially one which
requires technical training. In former years, where each ship had a large
complement compared to what she has now, and where there was a large
proportion of boys entered, the training of boys for their profession as sea-
men went on insensibly. Shippers got men as they wanted them, and
therefore people did not care to inquire how they got them. But at the
present day nobody wants boys; they cannot be economically employed
as hands, and therefore it is absolutely necessary that we should have a
system of technical training which will prepare lads for their work as men
afloat. Whether they are to get that technical training by the combination
of merchants and local boards to found schools, or whether they are to get
it by the assistance of the State, I do not pretend to say, but there is no
I am
230
OUR NAVAL RESERVES,
1
doubt the State must interest itself in the matter; and one way in which
it can do so is by compelling the proper manning of merchant ships. We
know that a great many are exceedingly ill manned, and we frequently
hear of ships being manned by men of different countries, who cannot
understand each other. That is a matter in which the State can interfere,
by declaring that the ship shall be efficiently manned, and that the crew
shall be inspected by a proper person before the ship goes to sea. That
again would compel the local authorities and local boards to institute a
system of training under which men could be brought up, so that ships
might not be stopped by an officer of the central Government from pro-
ceeding to sea for want of men. There are three classes of Reserve of
which Mr. Brassey has spoken, and when speaking of those for coast-
defence, I must say I have always thought fishermen and that class of men
could be made most useful. We should want to defend our coast, not so
much by guns probably, although there we should require a certain number
of men, but to a larger extent by obstructions and torpedoes, and in that
case we should at once have to fall back on the assistance of fishermen, who
know the set of the tides, the creeks and estuaries, and are perfect hands in
the management of boats. I must say I regret very much indeed that, in
consequence of the better state of preparation of the Engineer officers and
men for the questions of the day continually submitted to them, the defence
of the coast of this country has fallen into the hands of the Engineers. It
ought to have fallen into the hands of the Navy, but simply from the want
of preparation of naval officers in the use of electric torpedoes, the whole
thing has fallen into the hands of Engineers instead of into naval hands.
In Germany, where they have studied this point very closely, because they
look upon their defence in a future war as being almost mainly confined to
the defence of their coast, they had before their war with France a sort of
combined corps. There also the Navy was not duly prepared; they had
no naval officers who had the amount of technical knowledge to enable
them to lay down and fight with torpedoes, and therefore they were obliged
to have a certain number of Engineer officers, to whom they attached a
number of seamen, with naval officers to command them, who worked
under them and carried out a certain number of experiments. At the con-
clusion the whole thing was altered. They had then found out that the
grand difficulty in torpedo warfare and coast defence by torpedoes and ob-
structions was the management of boats; no amount of technical knowledge
of torpedoes could enable sappers or Engineer officers to manage boats;
only a seaman's experience was of any good there. Therefore they altered
their whole system, and at this moment the defence of the coast of Germany
is confided to a Torpedo-Abtheilung of the Naval Reserve, which numbers
300 men, always employed, and about 1,000 men when the Reserves are
called up. Therefore I think that portion of our Naval Reserve could be
very well employed in this manner.
Mr. BRASSEY : With regard to the point on which I was very anxious
to have the opinions of naval officers, namely, as to whether or not the
Reserve we at present have is sufficient, I have heard, with the decpest
interest, the opinions given to us by Captain Willes, Captain Goodenough,
NECESSARY STRENGTH OF OUR NAVAL RESERVES. 231
Captain Colomb, and other officers, and I take it that I must accept it as
the opinion of all those officers that our present reserve of 12,000 seamen
is scarcely adequate to meet the demands of a naval war. If that be the
fair representation of the state of opinion in the Navy, then I arrive at the
conclusion that there is a good ground for recommending the adoption of
some of those suggestions which were made by the Commission of 1859,
with a view of assisting in the training of seamen to serve in time of peace
in the mercantile marine, but who were to be available for the naval
service in time of war. I have on various occasions endeavoured to promote
the adoption of those means, but those whose duty it has been to defend
the policy of the Admiralty have asserted that there was no necessity for
a larger reserve than we have at present. But if I may venture to proceed
on some future occasion, confident in the belief that it is desirable to have
a larger reserve, I shall have a basis of operations which will give me a
greater opportunity of promoting those measures which have been l'ecom-
mended by the Royal Commission. With regard to the number of officer's,
if the system of half-pay, under which we undoubtedly have a great number
of naval officers in reserve, is not in itself objectionable, then I think we
may dismiss from our minds any feeling of anxiety as to the reserve of
officers. The present system does, undoubtedly, furnish a great number
of officers, but a large number of gallant gentlemen are necessarily on
half-pay. Then with regard to the Coast Volunteers. I have been taken
to task very severely for saying that there had been a certain laxity in
the enrolment of unfit persons in that force. But I find from the opinions
expressed this evening that I had not made a very great mistake. I am
glad to find gallant officers think that in our fishing population there are
elements of strength for the country in the hour of need; and I am quite
sure that if the proper means be taken, the fishermen could be induced to
join the Reserve. They are, no doubt, a slow and somewhat suspicious
body. I take it if you wanted to attract a large number of those fine
hardy Scotch fishermen into the Navy, it would be a very imprudent thing
to send an officer born in Hampshire to enlist them. A good Scotch name
would be capital introduction to the fishermen of Scotland. They are a
class of men wbose confidence is not very easily won; but I do not despair
of being able to attract the fishermen to join the Coast Volunteers. I am
very grateful to the gallant officers for the kind terms in which they have
spoken of my lecture, and I shall always take the deepest interest in the
Royal Navy.
The CHAIRMAN : With regard, first of all, to the officers, I find that there
are at the present moment 278 officers of the Royal Naval Reserve on our
Navy List. Striking off seventy-eight of these as officers, who are honorary
or disabled by age, and who might not be prepared to come forward, yet
200 of these would, I think, be exceedingly valuable for manning our
improvised men-of-war (such as the Peninsular and Oriental line of
steamers) with a gun mounted for the protection of commerce, and also
in commanding transports. Last year, the Admiralty obtained an Order
in Council for the enrolment of 200 midshipmen for the Royal Naval
Reserve, to be taken from the Worcester' and the Conway. These
232
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
1
young gentlemen are very much socially of the same status as ourselves;
of good education, and no doubt they will be a very valuable supplement
to the officers of the Navy. Then, with regard to the Royal Naval
Reserve itself, I had to go into the figures, a short time ago, on the Naval
Estimates, and I found, taking our peace Navy at 19,000 blue-jackets, we
could maintain that force by the entry of about 3,000 boys, so that we are
self-supporting as far as the peace Navy is concerned, and in the event of
a war, we should then have to fall back on our reserves. We have, at this
moment, something under 12,000 men in the Royal Naval Reserve. These
are men who certainly are, whatever may be said by some speakers in this
room, the élite of the mercantile marine. They are men who must have
been five years at sea and one year an able seaman, and I appeal to
Admiral Elliot and also to Admiral Keppel and Sir William Codrington,
who have inspected the drill ships, to say whether they have not been
surprised at the efficiency of these men at drill, and the ready way in
which they manned the guns. I believe that they are reliable. I may
estimate that the numbers that we shall be able to supplement the peace
Navy by would be 6,000, that is estimating that one-half would be abroad,
and those men with the Coastguard. The naval pensioners and the
remaining Coast Volunteers would man all our ships with blue-jackets
that we could possibly provide for them, and there would be then 6,000
men in reserve. I do not mean to say the number of our ships ought not
to be very much increased on the outbreak of hostilities, but we should
have enough men to start with, and then other men of the Reserve coming
home would form a further reserve to fall back upon. With regard to the
Coast Volunteers, and the strictures passed upon them, I certainly had
recommended that they should be gradually let drop. As they were
constituted, the Act of Parliament, in the first instance, ran, 'seafaring
men and others.' That gave great latitude to the officers, who were very
anxious to show as many as they could on their lists. In the next place,
the Act ran that they were not to be taken more than 100 leagues from
the land. The Duke of Somerset, when in office, had that altered, and
they may be taken now any distance from the land; but, however, the
class of men you wanted to enrol did not come forward. Those were the
fishermen whom Mr. Brassey spoke of very rightly as being most valuable
people for coast-defence and the manning of gunboats; but these men
would not give up their occupations to go on board ship, to live for thirty
days amongst people of different habits to their own. Therefore, they
do not come forward, and we have only got the 'longshore men such as
Lord Frederick Kerr has described. I quite agree with Mr. Brassey that
if we could organise the plan of having gunboats to go to the great fishing
centres we should be able to obtain the services of these men, and with a
drill of, say, a week at a time, the men coming off in the morning and going
ashore in the evening, you would be able to obtain as many men as you
required to release your seamen for distant service, and to perform all the
duties you would require on the coast and in the estuaries.
With regard to the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, I should like to
say a few words. Mr. Brassey has taken great interest in the formation
NECESSARY STRENGTH OF OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
233
1
of this corps, and I think that they do deserve great praise and encourage-
ment for the way in which they have thrown themselves into this move-
ment. It is the first time that there has been any movement towards the
Navy of a purely voluntary character. The Volunteers hitherto are all
paid and well paid, but these men had given up their time and at very
great personal inconvenience have been on board the drill ship in the West
India Docks, drilling through the winter in the evenings after their work
has been over. I, myself, can testify that they showed very great pro-
ficiency in drill for the short time they were instructed, and the instructors
tell me they never had people to instruct who showed so much intelligence
or zeal in attempting to acquire a knowledge of the drill. The great
difficulty with regard to them, if they are to be encouraged, is to give
them facilities for training. Of course if, as Mr. Brassey says, he can
obtain the formation at different ports of different corps, it would be
necessary to provide gunboats for their training, and I do not know exactly
where the gunboats are to come from. I am afraid we should find it very
difficult to assist them in that way.
With regard to the Reserves in the Colonies, it is true that there are a
number of seafaring men, fishermen, there, who would be available for
their coast-defence; but I think we may safely leave it to the Colonies
themselves to protect their own hearths and homes. They would have
power to legislate for themselves, and a little encouragement from this
country is all that they would require.
I will not detain you any longer, but will only say that these discussions
are extremely valuable, because they are the only way of discovering our
weak points, as the test of the efficiency of the Reserve can only be put in
practice when the safety of the country is endangered.
SECTION III.
EFFICIENCY OF THE ROYAL NAVAL
RESERVE.
236
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
EFFICIENCY OF THE ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
Admiral
Efficiency In point of efficiency the Reserve has fully answered all reason-
of the
Royal able expectations, and has been highly commended by a long
Naval
Reserve.
succession of distinguished naval men, who, as inspecting officers,
have had the best opportunities of becoming acquainted with the
force. The list of these officers' includes, among others, Captain
Gardner, Admirals Ryder, Cooper Key, Warren, and Elliot, all of
whom have spoken in terms of commendation of the Royal Naval
Reserve, and have fully recognised its value to the Navy.
Opinions of
In 1864, it was stated in the report of Commodore Ryder, that
Ryder. 4,258 men of the Royal Naval Reserve had been drilled in London,
and that only 83 of them had been punished by fines. Their gun
drill was as good as possible. In the discussion on the Naval Essays
of 1878 at the Royal United Service Institution, June 21, 1878,
Admiral Ryder said: “As to our Reserves, I had the honour of
commanding our Reserves for three years, and I believe the system
is a thoroughly good one. I believe we have some 14,000 now in
the first-class Reserve, and a few thousands in the second, also an
invaluable body. Our Reserves, barring that they are much too few
in number, are in a wholesome condition.'
Captain Captain Gardner, in his report in 1868, stated that in a recent
inspection he had seen 758 men. 'I have now to remark, he
continues, "that the seamen of the Royal Naval Reserve seen by me
at the outports and in the West India Docks during my tour, are
prime seamen of the mercantile marine. The Northern men are
chiefly employed in the Baltic, Greenland, and North American
trades. Those of London and Bristol, &c., are in the East Indian,
China, Australian, Coast of Africa, and coasting trades; the whole
Sir Walter forming a fine, intelligent, able-bodied set.' Again in 1867, we are
Tarleton,
informed, in the report of Rear-Admiral Tarleton, that the eight
commanders of the drill-ships are officers of experience, on whom
reliance may be placed; and that there are, in the Royal Naval
Reserve
Gardner
R.N.
K.C.B.
EFFICIENCY OF THE ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
237
Fit for petty officers' ratings
leading seamen
good able seamen
fair able seamen.
Men
1,250
1,800
4,800
1,150
99
9,000
The conduct of the Royal Naval Reserve had been very good. Only
one man had been dismissed from the force during the year.
In 1869, in the report of Rear-Admiral Cooper Key, on the cruise Sir Astley
of the Reserve Squadron, the following observations occur: "The Cooper
seamen of the Reserve are little inferior in physical condition to the K.Ö.B.
seamen of the Royal Navy. As regards the intelligence of the sea-
men of the Reserve, willingness to do their duty, and general conduct,
all the reports concur in placing them on a par with our own men.
They have in general made good use of the short periods allowed
annually for drill; their knowledge of the great gun and rifle
exercises is very creditable; and although few of them have had the
opportunity of either drilling at our heavy guns, or seeing them fired,
they adapted themselves readily to the new drill, and worked the
9-ton guns with steadiness when firing at a inark. It must be evi-
dent from the foregoing remarks that I consider the Royal Naval
Reserve as a valuable means of manning the fleet on an emergency,
or during war.
The favourable reports of 1870 and 1871 will be an encourage- Reports of
ment to those who desire to improve the Reserves, in the belief t.bat 1870–71.
they will form a valuable addition to our naval resources.
Admiral Warren, in his report from Sheerness, in 1870, says that Admiral
he had inspected 783 men in ships at Harwich, the West India Docks,
the Scotch ports, Sunderland, Hartlepool, and Hull, and considered
them a very serviceable body of men, well forward in their great gun,
rifle, and cutlass exercises.
Vice-Admiral Hon. C. Elliot, reporting from Sheerness, in 1871, Vice-
says that he inspected the same ships as Admiral Warren, and Hon. C.
that he saw 600 men. They were fine, able-bodied men, fit for the
service, and apparently of the best class of merchant sailors. The
opinion,' he says, 'I have formed of the whole body, as a reserve for
the Navy, is a very favourable one. I was remarkably struck with
the right goodwill with which they in general went to work at their
drills, showing greater spirit, or esprit de corps, than I expected to
find ; and, on the whole, their knowledge of the drills was good for
the limited time devoted to them. Their conduct while under
instruction was, in all the ships, spoken of as highly satisfactory.'
Warren.
Admiral
Elliot.
238
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Inefficient
men more
promptly
Weeded
out.
If there are men of the Reserve who are incapable or ill con-
ducted, they ought to be discharged from the service. It is far
better to reduce the number, and obtain at once that general
efficiency in the Reserves, which a more careful preliminary inquiry
will in future establish and maintain.
The carelessness with which the entries for the Reserve were con-
ducted was the principal cause of the former complaints of the Royal
Naval Reserve.
Admiral Warren, in his report of 1870, remarked: “The register
requires strict revision. There are many men who come to drill
who have not been at sea for years, nor intend going again. At
Dundee, I was told, some were gaining a living as cabmen ; one was
a chimneysweep; another I spoke to had been a stoker discharged
from H.M.S. “Nile," thirteen years ago. At Shields, many of them
work on the river. At other places on the East Coast, several were
employed in the mines,
'In order to ensure their following a seafaring life after their entry
in the force, when they appear for drill, they should be called on to
produce proof to the commanding officer of the drill-ship as to how
and where they had been employed in the interval.?
The following extracts from recent reports give the latest official
impressions of the value and efficiency of the Naval Reserves. The
first series of quotations is taken from Sir Walter Tarleton's report of
his inspection in Scotland in 1876:-
*As the Royal Naval Reserve in the North of Scotland are
principally employed in the whaling and fishing trade, and can only
attend their drills in the winter months, I was obliged to select this
season for my inspection.
'I proceeded, on January 7, to visit several drill-ships and Royal
Naval Reserve batteries, and beg to submit the following report for
their Lordships' consideration :-
H.M.S.
'I arrived at Dundee without giving any intimation of my coming,
• Unicorn,'
drill-ship and immediately proceeded on board the “Unicorn" drill-ship, where
at Dundee. I found 147 first class, and 11 second class, men undergoing their
drill.
• The 1st class are very fairly efficient in great-gun, rifle, and
sword exercise ; and the 2nd class, who are only in their first or
second year of enrolment, are quitë as expert as might be expected.
'I mustered and noticed the men individually :
-The 1st class
have the appearance of good powerful seamen, and the 2nd class,
though younger, are above the standard of the ordinary seamen in
the Navy. Their average height is 5 ft. 61 in. They do credit
EFFICIENCY OF THE ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
239
;
Inverness.
to the instruction they have received, and the supervision of the
commander. .
'At Aberdeen I inspecter 114 men of the 1st class, and 50 of the H.M.S.
2nd class, drilling on board the “ Clyde.” The 1st class men were drill-ship
,
very good at all their exercises, and the 2nd class good ; the physical dieen.
appearance of both very good. The drill-ship is very complete and
satisfactory, and the instruction of the men is carefully attended to.
“At Peterhead Battery I found 69 1st class men, and 19 2nd, all Peterhead
Battery.
very fairly efficient in rifle and cutlass exercises, and steady, though
somewhat slow, at the great guns. This is accounted for by there
being only two 32-pounders on truck carriages, and the men do not
get sufficient exercise. Two targets were shot away at a range of
800 yards.
“At Kessock Ferry.-The "Netley" gunboat is stationed here Kessock
temporarily until the arrival of the “ Brilliant.” There were on drill 'erry,
in the gunboat and on shore 171 men, viz., 19 ist class, and 152
2nd. They were fairly advanced with rifle and sword exercises,
which they undergo in a shed hired for the purpose. As might be
anticipated, the men know little of gun drill, as the two guns
available on board the “Netley” do not afford sufficient training for
the number of men on drill at one time. The 1st class are on the
average good A.B.'s, and the 2nd active and robust young men, who
have already much improved, and, doubtless, will advance with each
year's training
* At Lerwick, in the Shetland Islands, I found 278 men assembled, Lerwick.
of whom 115 were 1st class, and 163 2nd class. The first class are
amongst the best seamen that this country produces, their average
height being 5 ft. 81 in. They are very attentive to their drills, and
are efficient in rifle and sword exercises ; but as there are only two
exercising guns, and one 32-pounder for shot practice, they have not
sufficient instruction to make them quick and expert gunners. The
2nd class are a promising and docile set of young men, very attentive
under instruction and willing to learn. I consider they will be
valuable as they get older and have more training. Their average
height is 5 ft. 7 in. ...
"The Shetlands are one of the most important centres of the Royal
Naval Reserve in the United Kingdom. I am informed that nine-
tenths of the male population, who are physically capable, go to
sea,
and, with few exceptions, they join the Royal Naval Reserve. It
would seem to be good policy to foster ihis nursery of seamen, at a
time when complaints are made of their scarcity in the mercantile
marine, from which the Royal Naval Reserve are drawn. ...
240
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Stornoway.
the 66
'I next proceeded to Stornoway, where I found drilling, on board
Flirt and on shore, 128 men, of whom 4 were 1st class and
124 2nd, while about 20 more were waiting to be taken on, but
whom there was no room to drill. ... There are not the means at
present of giving these men sufficient gun exercise, the two guns in
the “ Flirt” only being available; but those men I saw at the guns
were profiting by the instruction, and in rifle and cutlass exercise
they were fairly efficient. They are a robust athletic set of young
men, averaging 5 ft. 7 in. in height, and presented a better appear-
ance than I had looked for. Lieutenant O’Rorke informs me that
they improve rapidly under instruction, and that those of the second
year are much in advance of those of the first. ...
• In concluding this report I would observe that I consider the
Royal Naval Reserve to the north of the Tweed as amongst the best
and most reliable seamen in the force. The 1st class, who are
engaged in whaling, the Baltic and timber trades, are hardy and
excellent seamen. The Shetlanders are particularly appreciated by
shipowners for these qualities, and their steadiness of conduct and
fidelity to their engagements.
“The 2nd class will be a valuable body of men after a year or two's
training, and from being employed at home will always be imme-
diately available.
'I do not anticipate the least difficulty in obtaining what men are
required on the proclamation of war, and am convinced that they
would serve the country with loyalty and devotion if called out.
'I am, &c.
(Signed) J. W. TARLETON,
"Admiral Superintendent, Naval Reserves.'
Sir Walter
Tarleton.
Report of
1877.
Let us now turn to the general remarks in Sir Walter Tarleton's
report of 1877 on resigning the command of the Naval Reserves :-
On a review of the Act for the establishment of a Reserve
Volunteer Force of seamen passed in August 1859, and the state of
the Reserves at the present time, 17 years afterwards, I think it
must be admitted that it has fulfilled the intention of its framers.
It was given to them to solve a question which had always been a
vexed one and a source of anxiety to the country, viz., how to man
our ships in the event of any sudden increase to our Navy, and to
provide a sufficiency of seamen to carry on naval- operations when
war was declared, while the men so employed should be absorbed on
the conclusion of peace in the mercantile marine.
The difficulties found in obtaining men on the breaking out of
6
EFFICIENCY OF THE ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
241
1876.
6
the war with Russia made a deep impression, and the resolution was Report of
taken not again to be placed in so defenceless a position, but there Tarleto,
were many points which had to be considered before a scheme could
be produced, the machinery of which should work.
• The service of the seamen was to be voluntary, as conscription
in this country could not be enforced, and the rude method of im-
pressment would not be tolerated. One of the evils of that mode of
raising men had been to create an almost insurmountable prejudice
in the merchant seamen against the Royal Navy; they had also a
dislike to drill, or soldiering as they called it, of any kind. They
were actively employed in voyages to all parts of the world. In the
face of these difficulties, it was a bold measure to make it lawful
for the Admiralty to raise and keep up a number of men not to
exceed 30,000 from the merchant service.
Again, the interest of the shipowners at first sight would appear
to be opposed to the scheme, as it would deprive them in time of
peace of the services of their servants for 28 days in each year, and
altogether, should the men be required for the Navy, in time of war.
"The practical working of the Act has shown that, in peace time
at least, the shipowners have suffered no inconvenience. The men
are permitted to take their drill whenever it best suits them, and at
periods of 7, 14, 21, and 28 days, while on the other hand the quali-
fications insisted on on enrolment, and the medical examination, are
guarantees for the character and ability of the Royal Naval Reserve
man.
The retainers which he receives and the prospect of pension
operate as inducements to steadiness and against desertion, and
altogether have a beneficial effect on the whole mercantile marine,
so that the shipowners now give a preference to Royal Naval Reserve
men whenever they can get them.
“The prejudices of the seamen have been worn down by mixing
with men-of-war's men, when under instruction. The considerate
treatment of the officers, and a month's discipline out of the year,
have also had a marked effect, and I have seen bodies of Royal Naval
Reserve march and go through all the exercises with as much steadi-
ness as a well-trained crew of men-of-war's men. The result is, that
there are now enrolled in both classes nearly 20,000 out of the
30,000 sanctioned by the Act.
* The vital question is whether, after all the expense the country
has been put to, and will have to bear prospectively, for the organisa-
tion and maintenance of the Royal Naval Reserve, will the men be
forthcoming when they are wanted? This can be tested only in the
day of trial, when the Queen's Proclamation shall call the Reserve
VOL. IV.
R
242
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Report of
Sir Walter
Tarleton,
1876.
out for active service; but I hold that we have as reliable guarantees
that the men will present themselves, as under any system that
could be devised on the basis of voluntary service. The men have
entered on an engagement to serve, they have received drill pay and
retainers under this engagement, and, without being branded by
public opinion, could not shrink from the fulfilment of their duty.
As a fact, a great impetus was given to enrolment when the “ Trent "
affair pointed to possible hostilities with the United States.
It would be doing an injustice to the élite of the merchant service
to suppose that they are entirely devoid of patriotism, and would
not desire to serve in defence of their country. Their prejudices
against service in the Royal Navy have been in a great measure
removed, and they would feel themselves competent from previous
training to work the guns and handle a rifle and cutlass.
* On the other hand, should any reluctance be shown by the men,
there are many ways by which the Government could enforce their
service. The whereabouts of the Royal Naval Reserve, both at home
and abroad, is carefully registered; the men at home could be taken
hold of and brought to the nearest ship bearing the pendant, and
draughted where required. Men abroad could be taken out of their
ship by any man-of-war they might fall in with. On arrival of any ship
coming from abroad in which it was known Royal Naval Reserve men
are serving, a boat from the nearest man-of-war could board her and
take only the Royal Naval Reserve men. The men forfeit all claims
to pension or future pay who fail to coinply with the call. Lastly,
they are liable to be treated as deserters, and to incur all-the penalty
attached to that offence, should they fail to appear when called out.
'It has been proposed at different times to call out the Royal
Naval Reserve as a rehearsal, and as a means of ascertaining what
number could be embarked on short notice, also to accustom them
to service in men-of-war. As a test of numbers I consider the
attempt made some years ago to embark a portion afforded no reliable
data. By dint of agitation at the northern ports, a certain number
of volunteers were collected, but as it was entirely optional with them
to go or stay, the majority were not willing to give up the employ-
ment in which they were engaged.
'I can understand that under certain circumstances it might be
a desirable policy for the Government to embark the Royal Naval
Reserve in Her Majesty's ships, but in such a case I am of opinion
that no option should be given to the men. The Admiralty should
order their embarkation under Clause III., and the men should be
subject to the penalty declared in Clause XX. of the Royal Naval
Reserve Act, 22 and 23 Vict. cap. 40, if they did not attend.
A
EFFICIENCY OF THE ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
243
Sir Walter
1876.
· As to the importance of embarking the men to accustom them Report of
to service in a man-of-war, I think this has been over-rated, so far Tarleton,
as the first class are concerned. These men are seamen, and do not
require instruction in seamanship. They are not used to move aloft
with the same alacrity as men-of-war's men, but this is a small
matter. What the merchant seaman requires is to be made familiar
with the great gun exercise, and to handle the sword and rifle-to
be steady and silent under instruction, and to obey implicitly the
orders he receives. This training he will receive on board the drill-
ship especially set apart for this service, or at the batteries repre-
senting a section of a ship, better than on board of a man-of-war,
where his teaching interferes with the routine of the ship, and where
he is surrounded by matters to take off his attention, and is looked
upon as an intruder by the ship's company. In most cases where
the men have been drilled in the district ships, the result has not
· been satisfactory, and there has been a difficulty in embarking or
disembarking them, or providing for their instruction in the ship's
occasional absence.'
Sir Walter Tarleton was succeeded by Admiral Phillimore, and
on resigning his command in 1879, he again reported in favourable
terms of the constitution of the Naval Reserve.
The number of Reserves sanctioned by Parliament is 30,000.
The Reserves have, however, never attained that number, and the vote
for several years has been for 20,000. Even this number is not
obtainable in the present state of the mercantile marine, except by
admitting a Second-class Reserve from the fishing populations quali-
fied for the duties of ordinary seamen afloat. The number of able
seamen in the Reserve fluctuates, as reported by Sir Walter Tarletun,
between 12,000 and 13,000.
The actual numbers in-
.
First Class
12,506
12,000
November, 1876, were
November, 1879, were
Second Class
5,491
4,962
Third Class
None
76
.
1
Care has been taken, however, to eliminate from the first class
all those who, in the first period of their enrolment, had settled down
to a shore life, and given up the sea as a profession, and the present
force is composed of a very fine body of seamen, the leading and best
men of our merchant ships.
Since the publication of a former pamphlet by the present Com-
writer, much new testimony to the efficiency of the Naval Reserve Cyprian
has been privately supplied from naval officers of all ranks and wide A Bridge,
experience. Commander Cyprian A. Bridge, R.N., when serving
R.N.
R 2
244
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Opinion of
Com-
in the Hawk,' at Queenstown, had about 140 Reserve men,
mander
who went through their course of drill in parties of a dozen or
Cyprian
Bridge, twenty at a time. It was said, on good authority, that the Cork men
R.N.
were the least good specimens of the whole Naval Reserve. Yet,
the men who were drilled on board the Hawk' . were adınirable
in physique and in morale also. Indeed, if they had a fault, they
seemed too respectable.' Captain Bridge did not notice among
them one of those fine, dashing, devil-may-care fellows, who are
alternately winning and breaking the heart of their commanding
officer.' He commanded a gunboat for some time, and had five
Reserve men, who had joined the service, in the crew. They were
simply invaluable; and he did not notice about them the fault,
generally attributed to merchant seamen by naval officers, of absence
of personal cleanliness.' 'I would,' he writes, willingly have parted
with any twelve other men rather than those five. All our Reserve
men were admirably drilled, and they had that intense love for
gun-
drill which I have noticed animates all merchant seamen who ship
on board men-of-war. Whenever I hear an officer decrying the Re-
serve, I make a point of questioning him as to his knowledge of the
force, and I am able to assert that I never heard a single one, who
had had any personal experience with the Reserve, say a word against
the force; except one individual, who complained that we were paying
the finest men in the country 61. a year to keep out of the Navy.'
Opinions of
In discussing the value of the Naval Reserve generally, Com-
mander Parsons, of H.M.S. 'Dædalus,' observes : The Admiralty
should decide for themselves this question—" Do we want men fit
for topgallant and royal yardsmen of a flying squadron, or do we
want men who could work the anchor and cables, man the boats,
steer, heave the lead, and fight the guns of heavy ironclads in time
of war?” If you want great smartness aloft, not many men are to
be got from the merchant service. If the efficient performance of
the other duties enumerated constitutes a sufficient qualification-
and undoubtedly, in my opinion, the latter is what you really want
--then many good men can be obtained from the merchantmen.'
* You may,' he adds, “be interested to know that I consider the men
who drill on board the “Dedalus” in several respects quite equal to
the average of our own ships' companies. The gunner, who drills
them, who has lately joined from H.M.S. “ Cambridge," tells me
that he considers them, at the end of their 28 days, quite as well up
in their drill as the average man-of-war's man in sea-going ships. We
have been strict, and have weeded out some indifferent men, and
possibly we may have frightened away a few more.'
Com-
mander
Parsons
R.S.
EFFICIENCY OF THE ROYAL NAVAL RISERVE.
245
mander
Commander Brent, after three years in command of a drill-ship, Com
summed up the opinion which he had formed in highly favourable Brent, R.N.
termis:
'Ist. The First-class Reserye man is a bonâ-fide able seaman.
2nd. The Second-class Reserve man is a good ordinary seaman,
thoroughly accustomed to the sea.
“ 3rd. The physique of the men is exceptionally good of those I
saw, an average of 5 ft. 6 in. of height, 10 stone 8 lbs. of weight, and
35] inches of chest measurement.
• 4th. The men pay attention to their drills, becoming as a rule
efficient.
"5th. That their conduct is good on the whole, the leave-break-
ing giving the greatest trouble, and that, as far as was required of
them in the drill-ship, they adopted without trouble man-of-war
ways.
'I would that the Reserve man knew more of the Royal Navy,
and that both officers and men of the Royal Navy had more to do with
him. I wish to see a closer connection between the two, a connec-
tion made by acquaintance, which is far better than any lecture.
For this reason I should like to see an admiral in command of the
Reserves with a regular staff; not a retired admiral, but one on the
active list who has just been in command of a squadron, with his
staff and flag in one of the drill-ships, and having a tender that he
might move about the coasts. I should also like to see captains
for the Reserve districts, and in the drill-ships, besides the com-
mander, a lieutenant; none of the officers to stay too long, except
the civilians, who, as at present, should be seniors; the same
routine of drill carried out in each drill-ship, and emanating from
the admiral; all drill-ships alike, and as the officers come from
seagoing ships, like all ships in the service afloat, the same regu-
lations and discipline; a perfectly strict naval discipline through
all, a distinctive dress for the first-class men. This is so much
needed, that I must press it for a moment. The second-class men
are dressed as men-of-war's men, and right well they look, and the
first-class man should be dressed the same; but the money to pay
for his clothes should come out of his retainer, and not his drill
pay. He comes on drill as a means of gaining a livelihood, and a
few shillings out of the guinea is of vital consequence, whereas out
of the retainer he would not feel it so much. The order for a dress,
however, should only be compulsory on all men entering, or when
making a fresh engagement.
While formerly attending the drills on board H.M.S. 'President,'
246
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Personal
experience
on board
H.M.S.
« Presi-
dent.'
I had opportunities which, under ordinary circumstances, it is not
easy to obtain, of becoming personally acquainted with the seamen
belonging to the Reserves. The impression left on iny own mind
is decidedly favourable. The men of the Reserve exhibited much
intelligence in learning the gun-drill. As a rule, they evinced
real interest in their work. During the dinner-bour you will
invariably see some of the Reserve men taking their friends round
the gun-deck of the ' President,' and explaining, with evident pride
in their own recently-acquired knowledge, the working of the guns,
the adjustment of the sights, and the mechanism of the breech-load-
ing rifles. The intelligence exhibited by the seamen of the Naval
Reserve in picking up the details of the great-gun drill was, in many
cases, quite remarkable. A thorough knowledge of the drill is not
easily acquired ; and the duties of the number one of a detachment
cannot be performed without strict attention to the orders given,
considerable readiness, and a clear and cool head.
It is possible that the seamen of the port of London are men of
à superior class, and that, in the outports, the same readiness to
submit to discipline might not be displayed. In this regard, local
experience must be the only reliable guide. I can but speak of
what has passed under my own observation.
Fourteen instructors are attached to the ' President. Of these
invaluable men, it is not possible to speak in terms exceeding their
deserts. Admirably trained in their work, remarkable for their
intelligence, and most judicious in maintaining their authority
over the seamen of the Reserve, these instructors do the highest
credit to the school of navai gunnery on board the ' Excellent,' and
to the Royal Navy generally. With such men to lead, it may be
confidently predicted that the Naval Reserve would be found, ini
a time of national emergency, an effectual safeguard for the country.
SECTION IV.
RECRUITMENT OF THE RESERVE, AND
REGULATIONS FOR DRILL.
248
OUR NAVAL RESERVES
RECRUITMENT OF THE RESERVE, AND REGULATIONS
FOR DRILL.
Regula-
tions for
the Naval
Reserve.
Age of
entry.
IF pains be taken, by means of pecuniary rewards, and in other
ways, to encourage the seamen of the Reserve to learn their duty,
and if the incompetent and careless are rejected, there need be no
anxiety as to the general efficiency of the Reserve. The real point
of difficulty lies in the recruitment for the force. The unnecessary
stringency of some of the regulations, relating to the entry of sea-
men and their attendance at drill, caused many seamen to withdraw
from the Reserve, and prevented many candidates from being en-
rolled, who were capable of rendering valuable service.
The regulations as to qualifications at present in force are as
follows:
“The limits of age on entry have been fixed :
'For the Second-class Reserve, not under nineteen nor above
thirty.
For the First-class Reserve, not above thirty years of age, ex-
cept in the case of men who have been discharged from the Royal
Navy as able seamen with good characters; these may be enrolled in
the Reserve if they are physically fit, provided they do not exceed
thirty-five years of age.
‘Every applicant for the Second-class Reserve, except appren-
tices as mentioned below, must prove that for three years he has
followed a seafaring life either in foreign-going, coasting, fishing,
or other vessels, and of these three years' service, six months' service
at least as ordinary seamen. In the case of an apprentice who has
completed his indentures for a term of not less than three years in
any class of vessel, no further proof of service will be required. No
man will be eligible for the Second-class Reserve unless he knows
the compass, can steer, and is able to pull a strong oar.
· Every applicant for the First-class Reserve, except apprentices
as mentioned below, must prove at least five years' sea service, within
Sea service.
RECRUITING AND DRILL.
249
the last ten years, and of these five years' service one year's service
,
at least as able seaman in foreign-going or regular coasting vessels.
In the case of an apprentice who has completed his indentures for
a term of not less than four years, one year of which has been
served in foreign-going or regular coasting vessels, no further proof
of service will be required.
‘Every applicant must produce certificates of good character, and
must prove that he has been at sea within the four months prior to
his making application for enrolment, and must declare that it is his
intention to follow the sea--service for a period of at least five years.
Promotion from Second to First Class.
Any Naval Reserve man belonging to the second class will be Promotion.
promoted to the First-class Reserve, provided as follows:
(a) That he is of good character, and is likely to continue
physically fit for active service in the Fleet, and is not above
thirty years of age.
(6) That he has belonged to the Second-class Reserve for a
period of not less than two years.
(c) That he has served for a period of not less than twelve
months as an able seaman in the British merchant service
since his enrolment in the second class.
(d) That he can heave the lead, and pass a satisfactory ex-
amination as an A.B. before a naval officer.
(e) That he has made satisfactory progress and passed satis-
factory examination in gunnery.
Forms of application for promotion R. V. 32 may be obtained of
the Registrars of Naval Reserve.
Pensions and Provisions for Old Age.
No Second-class Naval Reserve man will, except he is wounded Pensions.
or injured on service or on drill, be entitled to any pension from the
Naval Reserve for service in the second class only; but any Naval
Reserve man who is promoted from the Second- to the First-class
Reserve will be entitled to add to such time as he may serve in the
first class half of the time served by him in the second class, to
count towards time for a pension.
Each First-class Naval Reserve man will, under the following
conditions, be entitled to a pension of 121. a year :-
(a) If the Naval Reserve man joined the Reserve when above
thirty years of age, he must, in order to become entitled to a
250
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
pension, have belonged to it for a period of at least fifteen years.
If he joined when under thirty, he must have belonged to it for
at least twenty years.
(6) Broken periods of service in the Reserve will count
towards a pension in the Reserve, provided the intermediate
time subsequent to enrolment in the Reserve has been served
in the Royal Navy.
(c) If the Naval Reserve man has been called out by Royal
Proclamation for actual service in the Navy, his time of actual
service will, in the Navy, count as twice the actual period, e.g.,
if a man has belonged to the Reserve for twelve years, and has
been called out by Royal Proclamation for three out of those
twelve years, his whole time will be considered as fifteen years.
(d) Subject to the conditions mentioned above, and subject
also to the due performance by the Naval Reserve man of his
duties as a member of the Reserve, the pension will be given
to every First-class Naval Reserve man who attains the age
of sixty.
(e) Subject, as aforesaid, the pension will also be given to any
Naval Reserve man who previously to attaining the age of sixty
years is incapacitated from earning his livelihood, provided
that his incapacity is not due to his own imprudence or miscon-
duct. Rejection by the medical officer on the ground of physi-
cal incapacity to serve in the Navy will not alone be accepted
as proof of incapacity to earn a livelihood, but special evidence
will be required. If a Naval Reserve man who has been pen-
sioned on the ground of incapacity, resumes the sea service,
his pension will be suspended until he attains the age of sixty.
A Naval Reserve man, whether belonging to the first or second
class will, if wounded or injured on service or on drill, be entitled
to the same pension to which any seaman in the Navy of the same
rating would be entitled for a similar wound or injury, and if killed,
slain, or drowned on service or on drill, his widow (if any) will be
entitled to the same gratuities out of Greenwich Hospital Funds as
the widow of any other seaman of the Navy of the same rating.
The Naval Reserve pensioners will be liable to be called on to serve
in the Royal Navy, in the same manner and subject to the same
conditions as other naval pensioners, but, subject to this liability,
they will be allowed to follow whatever occupation they please. If
they do serve in the Navy they will continue to receive their pensions
as Naval Reserve men, in addition to their pay and allowances as
seamen of the Fleet or petty officers as the case may be.
RECRUITMENT OF THE RESERVE.
251
tions for
The qualifications insisted upon were described in more ample Qualifica-
detail by Captain Brent in the valuable paper already referred to, Naval
Three Years with the Naval Reserve,' read at the United Service Reserve, ns
defined by
Institution :
Captain
Brent, R.N.
“The First-class Reserve man must be under thirty years of
age,
unless he has been in the Royal Navy, when he may be entered
under thirty-five; he must produce certificates of good character, and
prove that he has at least five years' sea service during the last ten
years, with not less than one of these five as an able seaman. The
Second-class Reserve man must be between nineteen and thirty years
of age, and prove that for three years he has followed a seafaring life,
of these six months as ordinary seaman. Apprentices who have
completed three years of their indentures, and fishermen, can be
taken for this class.
The Registrar reads to the man the rules, explains what drill he
must perform yearly and what voyages he can take; how at certain
periods he can take longer voyages, provided he has done so much
drill; that he must dress himself for drill in a decent suit of dark
blue clothing if a first-class man, and in the uniform provided for
him if a second-class man, and take care to let no sinall matter escape
the man's attention, especially as to penalties. The man, when he
perfectly understands what is required of him, signs a declaration
that he is willing to serve in the Reserve for a period of five years,
and is then sent with this declaration to the nearest naval officer.
On arriving at, we will say, a drill-ship, the man is measured to
see that he is of the standard height (5 ft. 4 in.), and is then
medically examined—an examination, as a rule, by the Senior Staff
Surgeon, and exactly the same as any man for entry into the
Navy.
Having passed the medical examination, the man is examined
in seamanship, and as sometimes men are accepted who have a
difficulty in proving their sea service, great care has to be taken with
the First-class Reserve, that a bonâ-fide able seaman, one who can
hand, reef, and steer, is obtained ; for second class, the seamanship
required is simply to steer, pull a good strong oar, and to box the
compass, and there is therefore but little trouble in their examina-
tion; but the examination of the first-class men was upon the
following points :
Passing an earring
Steering with the wheel
Boxing the compass
Taking the lead
Swinging it
Marking it
252
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Knotting and splicing, and
making all necessary hitches
and bends
Passing a stopper on a cable
or fall
Strapping a block
· Turning in a dead-eye
Racking a lanyard
Using a parbuckle
Reeving running-rigging fore
and aft
Using a palm and needle
Working a cringle
Pulling a good strong oar
"The examination I have quoted is one not directly ordered, but
naval officers having to see that able seamen are entered, I adopted this
to meet the case ; the result in my opinion is, that we have in the First-
class Reserve a thorough body of sailor men. For the Second-class
Reserve I never pressed a very strict examination as to knowledge of
the compass, the few I saw being unmistakably seafaring men; though
their knowledge of the compass was one of the most limited nature, I
accepted them.
It will be observed that a seaman cannot be enrolled in the Naval
Ages of
Reserve after he has passed the age of thirty. The Appendix to the
Reserves,
as reported Report of the Joint Committee, appointed by the Admiralty and the
Board of Trade, to revise the regulations of the Royal Naval Reserve,
contains a statement showing the ages of the seamen in the Reserve
in the year 1869 :
Naval
to tlie
Board of
Trade.
.
Age
20 to 25
26 to 30
31 to 35
36 to 40
Above 40
No.
3,783
6,336
3,642
1,624
677
.
.
16,0.62
Relaxa-
tiori af
certain re-
gulations.
From an examination of these figures it may fairly be argued
that, whatever limit of age may be fixed for enrolment, the Reserve
will be mainly composed of the younger seamen of the merchant
navy.
The regulations, under which men were compelled to withdraw
from the Reserve, unless they continued at sea, shut out a large
number of valuable men, who were thorough seamen, and were em-
ployed about the docks, or as riggers or bargemen. Many of the
seamen thus excluded were still in the habit of making short voyages
in ships proceeding from port to port on our own coasts. It would
be a scandal that there should be any men in the Reserve who were
not bonâ-fide seamen ; but, in order to exclude unfit persons, it was
DRILL OF THE RESERVE.
253
not necessary to frame rules so stringent as to keep out others, as to
whose efficiency there could be no reasonable doubt.
The Coastguard are regarded, and most justly so, as our first
and best Reserve. But a seaman in the Navy is eligible for the
Coastguard after only seven years' service as an able seaman. As
soon as he joins the Coastguard, his practice afloat is limited to a
month's cruise, of which month, not more than a fortnight is actually
passed at sea, every second year. In alternate years the Coast-
guardsman is sent to the Reserve ship, to which he is attached, for
a month's instruction in gun-drill. All the remainder of their time
is employed in patrolling the coast, and opportunity is very rarely
afforded for the performance of any of the duties which properly
belong to a seaman. If, with such a limited opportunity of keeping
up their knowledge, the seamen in the Coastguard are found to
retain their seamanship in a satisfactory manner, it is clear that men,
following the occupation of riggers, who are employed in doing sea-
men's work all their lives, must retain, in an equal or greater degree,
their former aptitude and efficiency.
Since the preceding pages were first published, revised regula-
tions have been issued. To the First-class Reserve uniforms are
issued free of charge, and a man may be re-enrolled for a third period
of five years, although he may intend to reside on shore, provided he
served afloat during the first and second periods of five years.
Considering the extremely liberal terms which are offered, it Batteries
cannot but be a matter of surprise that a larger number of seamen ships.
do not join the Reserve. The limited number of places at which
the drills are carried on, is one of the principal reasons why the
number of seamen in the Reserve does not increase. The President'
is the only drill-ship for the port of London, and this circumstance
must suffice to prove how limited are the facilities afforded under the
present arrangements to the large number of eligible men who reside
within the metropolitan district. In order to reach the widely scat-
tered maritime population of London, it is essential that the places
of drill should be multiplied. Greenwich, Woolwich, the vicinity of
the Tower, and a suitable situation on the Surrey side of the Thames,
below London Bridge, may be suggested as localities in which it is
most desirable to establish drilling places for the Naval Reserve.
At first the scheme for the formation of a Second-class Naval Reserve
was a failure; but it was unreasonable to expect that young seamen class Re.
should voluntarily submit to the irksome discipline prescribed for
this branch of the Reserve. Much dissatisfaction was expressed at
the regulation, compelling the Second-class Reserve to reside on board
and drill-
Second-
SCI've.
254
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
the Coastguard ships during the period of annual training. It was
not easy to discover the reason why the privilege of living on shore,
when undergoing their annual drill, should be accorded to the First-
class and withheld from the Second-class Reserve. The rule, which
compelled the men in the Second-class Reserve to go through their
drills on board the Coastguard ship, caused much unnecessary
inconvenience. A man residing in London, instead of being drilled
on board the ‘President' with the senior division of the Reserve, was
compelled to go down to Harwich to drill on board the · Penelope.'
This regulation caused the majorit.y of the men in the Second-class
Reserve to be separated from their friends and families during the
whole period of their annual training. There was real hardship in
such a separation in the case of young seamen desiring to go through'
their drills, as many would do, in the short interval which they had
to spend in England between two extended foreign voyages.
The regulations as to the age of entry for the Second-class Reserve
were too stringent. Instead of limiting the age of admission to from
eighteen to twenty, it was proposed by the Compiler that it should
be from seventeen to twenty-five. The Committee of 1852 on the
Manning of the Navy, recommended that the age of admission for
Naval Coast Volunteers should extend from eighteen to twenty-five.
In many cases the age of seventeen seemed not too young; and if a
candidate were otherwise eligible, it was absurd that he should be
prevented from joining the Reserve if more than twenty years of age.
These difficulties have for the inost part heen provided for by the
new regulations, which contain inany modifications, the principal of
which are the following :-(a) The regulations for the second class
have been framed with the view of enrolling the pick of the young
men employed in fishing vessels and other seagoing craft, who,
although not possessing the qualifications of able seamet., are never-
theless well adapted for service in gunboats or floating batteries,
where a practical knowledge of gunnery will be of greater importance
than a practical knowledge of reefing and furling square sails. (6)
Instead of having only seven places round the coast where these men
could be enrolled and drilled, the new arrangements provide upwards
of 140 places for enrolment, and forty-four places for drill, so that
men of the Second-class Reserve will be enrolled and drilled at the
same places as men of the First-class Reserve. The difference,
therefore, between the qualifications of the two classes will be in
knowledge of seamanship only, the First-class Reserve man being an
able seaman, practically acquainted with all the work on board a
square-rigged ship, and the Second-class Reserve man an ordinary
SECOND-CLASS RESERVE.
255
seaman in a square-rigged ship, or one accustomed only to fore-and-
aft vessels. The First-class Reserve man being better skilled as a
seaman than the second-class man, will consequently be better paid.
(c) Provision is also made for promoting men from the second class
to the first class when they are qualified. (d) The standard height,
which used to be 5 ft. 5 in., has been reduced to 5 ft. 4 in.;
but men under the standard height will be enrolled, if specially
eligible. (e) Additional facilities have been afforded for drill, and
encouragement is given to Reserve men of both classes to make
themselves efficient with great gun, rifle, and cutlass by additional
pay and other privileges. (f) Trained men of the first class are
eligible, under certain conditions, for appointment to the Coast-
guard; but the appointments of Reserve men to the Coastguard
are not to exceed five per cent. of the total number of vacancies in
the year.
It will be observed that none of these modifications involve the
surrender of any important guarantee for discipline or efficiency.
But it often happens that srnall concessions will remove objec-
tions which are strongly felt; and it was the opinion of persons,
who were intimately acquainted with the habits and feelings of
sailors, that, if the rules were relaxed, the strength of the Royal
Naval Reserve would be rapidly increased.
• Experience has shown that the removal of needless obstacles has
been attended with most satisfactory results.
The Second-class
-
Reserve. has been raised to 5,331 men, while the first class has
been maintained at about 12,000, the average number of the last
five years.
SECTION V.
THE RECRUITMENT OF THE RESERVE
FROM THE FISHERMEN AND SEAMEN
IN THE COASTING TRADE.
VOL, IV,
S
258
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
THE
RECRUITMENT OF THE RESERVE FROM THE
FISHERMEN AND SEAMEN IN THE COASTING
TRADE.
Manning
Committee,
1851.
THE enrolment of fishermen in the Reserves has been advocated
by our most experienced naval reformers—by Sir Charles Napier ; by
Admiral Berkeley; by Sir William Hall; by Admiral Hastings; by
the late Admiral Sir David Milne, and by many other most dis-
tinguished naval officers.
In 1851, a Committee was appointed by the Admiralty, to con-
sider the manning of the Navy, consisting of Rear-Admiral Fanshawe,
and Captains the Hon. R. Dundas, Peter Richards, and Sheppard.
They reported that a coast militia was a highly desirable force, and
recommended that 5,000 or 6,000 men should be raised for the Coast-
guard. In some parts they anticipated that there would be a greater
disposition to enrol than in others. It was not, however, essential
that the numbers in each district should be equal. They recom-
mended that the age of admission should be from eighteen to thirty-
five, and that the men should be chiefly trained in the use of the
great guns, under the superintendence of the Coastguard, at the seasons
of the year which would least interfere with their occupations as
fishermen.
The Committee adverted to the large number of excellent seamen
who could be obtained in Scotland, and to the general ignorance of
the advantages offered by the Royal Navy existing in that country,
and they recommended that a Scotch naval station should be estab-
lished. Something has already been done in this direction. First
Reserve ships are stationed in the Clyde and at Queensferry. It would
be desirable to add two or three vessels, more adapted for cruising
round the Scotch coasts, and visiting many of the smaller ports and
more remote fishing stations. Indeed, it might have been expected
that the supervision of our naval defences would have been considered
a task quite important enough to justify the appointment of an
THE RECRUITMENT OF THE RESERVE.
259
tions of
Admiral to the command of the Scotch station, as there now is an
Admiral in command of the Irish station at Queenstown. Such was
the opinion of Admiral Sir R. Dundas, and it was confirmed by
similar testimony from Sir Alexander Milne, Commander Eden, and
Sir James Graham.
The physical power and hardy qualities of the Scotch fishermen Qualifica-
must be seen to be appreciated. Admiral Sir Reginald MacDonald, fishermen.
when commanding a Coastguard ship on the Clyde, enrolled in a
few weeks 600 men in the Coast Volunteers. They averaged one
inch taller and two inches more in girth round the chest, than the
Marines on board his ship, although the latter were a remarkably
fine body of men.
Our fishermen possess all the qualifications proposed for the
Second Class Reserve. They can steer; box the compass; heave
the lead ; and pull a strong oar.' They have been from their boy-
hood on the water, and they are more robust, and better prepared to
encounter the hardships of the sea than the regular seamen of the
Navy, trained in far greater luxury, and whose regular course of duty
does not involve the same constant exposure to bad weather in small
craft in the winter season.
The local knowledge of the fishermen is another important quali-
fication. Our regular men-of-war's men and the seamen of our
mercantile marine being chiefly employed on foreign service, it is
impossible to over-estimate the advantage of having a body of men
in our Reserve who possess an intimate acquaintance with the intri-
cate navigation of our own coasts.
The fishermen employed in their daily avocation upon our own
coasts will contribute to the service of the Navy an intimate know-
ledge of an intricate navigation, with which from long habit they
have become familiar, but which the officers and men brought up in
the Navy, and chiefly employed on foreign stations, have few opportu-
nities of studying. Those naval officers, few in number, who are
acquainted with the navigation among the sandbanks' extending
along the eastern coast of England, from the South Fureland to the
north of the Huraber, can appreciate the immense importance of
manning for a Coast Defence Flotilla with seamen possessing a local
knowledge of that coast.
The fishermen never sail under a foreign flag. They have fixed
places of residence, can always be found when their services are
required, and their moral character is in the highest degree meri-
torious. Referring to the men to be obtained on the coast of Essex,
and of whose qualifications and conduct I have had the best opportu-
82
260
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Captain
Gardner,
R.N.
nities of judging, I cannot speak too highly in their praise. The
fishermen in my employ, exposed, when serving in a yacht, and
under a lax discipline, to the temptations of foreign ports, have ever
shown themselves superior to all the enticements of the shore, and
have regularly remitted to their families more than two-thirds of
their earnings. The result is happily manifested in the comfort of
their village homes, which are all that the philanthropist could
desire. The short and simple annals of the poor contain no more
creditable or reassuring tale than the story of these, my humble but
beloved companions on many a pleasant cruise-pleasant, because of
their good conduct and faithful discharge of every duty.
To some it may appear doubtful whether all the dash and élan
required for naval operations is to be found among the stay-at-home
people, who earn a livelihood in our fisheries. Had they seen, what
the Author has often witnessed, the agility, the seamanlike resource,
and the nerve, which these men never fail to display in the ever-
varying incident and adventure of sea-life, they would no longer
doubt their aptitude, if properly trained, for every duty which the
crews of our Coast Flotilla may be called upon to perform.
The attempt to form a Second Class Reserve was a failure at the
outset, because the fishermen were ineligible, and the only seamen
who could join the force belonged to the same class from which the
Royal Naval Reserve was recruited, the only difference lying in the
degree of seamanlike experience and skill required. Captain Gardner
pointed out that the obligation to drill for twenty-eight consecutive
days on board the Reserve ships, if too onerous for the Royal Naval
Reserve, would be equally hard to the men of the Second Class
Reserve, who belonged to the saine class, made the same foreign and
coasting voyages, and had no more opportunity of spending time
on shore with their friends.
It was stated by Captain Gardner, in a paper read before the
United Service Institution, that owing to the stringency of the regu-
lations as to height, physique, age, character, and qualifications as
seamen, there could be few remaining in the merchant service
available for the First Class Naval Reserve; but that there were
thousands of seamen well qualified for the Second Class Reserve.
If it was intended that the Second Class Reserve should be formed
as a substitute for the Royal "Coast Volunteers, the qualifications
required in candidates for adınission into the force were unnecessary.
The original idea was that all the fishermen or boatmen should be
eligible for the Coast Volunteers; but, under the regulations for the
entry of the men into the Second Class Reserve, a knowledge of
3
Stringency
of original
regula-
tions.
THE RECRUITMENT OF THE RESERVE.
261
fisheries.
Joinville.
encore.
sion 1859.
seamanship as practised in square-rigged vessels is insisted upon, and
thus our 'long-shore population whose services in gunboats would be
invaluable were excluded from our sea militia.
The fishing population is regarded by French naval authorities as French
an invaluable and essential element in their Navy, and it inay
be
observed that it is the only branch of the French mercantile marine
which has of late exhibited any tendency to increase.
In a pamphlet on the condition of the French Navy in 1865, Prince de
Prince de Joinville observed :-La seule branche de notre naviga-
tion qui ne dépérisse pas en ce moment est la pêche. Celle qui se
fait sur le littoral voit les chemins de fer assurer un débouché et une
plus grande valeur à ses produits par le transport rapide du poisson.
Quant à la grande pêche, celle qui arme pour l'Islande et Terre-Neuve,
elle se maintient, grâce aux avantages protecteurs dont elle jouit
Grande et petite pêche font donc aujourd'hui l'emploi de la
majeure partie de notre personnel naval, à la différence de ce qui se
passe chez les autres peuples marins, où elles ne sont qu'un accessoire.
The Royal Commission of 1859, confirming the high estimate Commis-
which had been formed of our fishing population by the Committee
of 1852, advised that the force should be raised to 10,000 men, and
recommended that the Royal Naval Reserve should be divided into
two divisions, the first consisting of able seamen from the merchant
service and school-ships, and the second division recruited from the
resident seafaring population ; in other words, the fishermen and
seamen employed in the coasting trade. It was contemplated that
the second division would absorb the Royal Naval Coast Volunteers.
About the same date à very similar plan was put forward in
France. It is thus described by Baron Grivel in La Guerre
Maritime:-
'Frappé de ces considérations, l'amiral Hamelin, ministre de la Baron
marine, assembla, en 1859, sous la présidence du vice-amiral de Tinan,
une commission qui élabora un projet d'institution des marins gardes-
côtes. Il ne nous appartient pas d'entrer dans des détails qui n'ont
pas été rendus publics, ni de chercher à pénétrer les causes et la
résistance qui vinrent paralyser cette patriotique pensée ; mais, en
remontant aux anciennes ordonnances pour y puiser plus d'une pensée
utile, voici comment on pourrait esquisser les traits saillants de la
nouvelle institution :
* Recrutement des canonniers gardes-côtes parmi les marins classés.
de plus de quarante ans, laissés dans leurs foyers, en vertu de la levée;
permanente.-Cadre de paix comprenant les gens de mer à industries
sédentaires ou périodiques, tels que les pêcheurs et les petits cabo-
S 3
A
Grivel.
VOL. IV.
262
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
sence.
teurs,” réunis pendant la morte saison des pêches, pour des exercices
annuels.-Cadre de guerre s'élargissant pour recevoir “les longs-
courriers et les grands-caboteurs.”— Rassemblement annuel des
compagnies de canonniers-marins pendant quinze jours aux batteries
désignées des postes et quartiers, en échange d'une indemnité de
présence.-Instruction dirigée par des officiers de marine assistés
de sous-officiers et canonniers brevetés.--Transport annuel du per-
sonnel d'instruction par les trois divisions de gardes-pêches des côtes
de France.-Exercices variés, tir du canon de côte à boulets, sur des
buts flottants mouillés au large ; tir du fusil Chassepot, arme porta-
tive des canonniers-marins gardes-côtes ; mouillage et enlèvement
des torpilles; installation, mise en place des estacades et obstructions
destinées à barrer les passes des ports et les entrées des rivières.-Pour
plus de simplicité, en temps de paix, ce service serait dirigé et
inspecté par les trois capitaines de vaisseau commandant les divisions
du littoral.Les marins seraient admis à compter le temps passé au
service des côtes comme temps de service a l'Etat.—Pour 8,000
marins des côtes qui, avec 5,000 douaniers, formeraient le cadre de
paix, la dépense se bornerait à 480,000 francs d'indemnité de pré-
Tout au plus, en temps de paix, cette dépense atteindrait-
elle un million, en comprenant les poudres et les projectiles
d'exercice.'
It is the more desirable to enrol fishermen in the Reserves because,
during the intervals of enforced idleness in the fisheries, they can
attend the necessary drills without inconvenience. At Hastings
additional hands are always employed in the herring and mackerel
season, from April till November. During the trawling season not
much more than half the number are employed at sea. Those who
remain at home, if fortunate enough to be the owners of boats, are
occupied in mending their nets, but a large proportion of the remain-
ing hands are dependent on parish relief. At such a time, the
opportunity of earning a moderate rate of remuneration for attendance
at gun-drill should be eagerly sought by the unemployed fishermen.
The general idea, which the promoters of the Coast Volunteers
had in view, was clearly described by Lord Halifax in his evidence
ralty, 1861. before the Select Committee on the Board of Admiralty in 1861.
• It was,' he said, “intended to carry out more fully the step which
had been taken by Sir James Graham in forming the Naval Coast
Volunteers. They were attached to the Coastguard ships in divisions
as far as they could be, and that measure had very great success.
I
inspected several ships' companies in 1857, and March 1858, and
their numbers were as follow : There were 5,776 enrolled-4,448
Committee
on Board
of Admi.
3
THE RECRUITMENT OF THE RESERVE.
263
trained, 441 under training, and 61 had volunteered for the Navy.
I think that justice has never been done to the Naval Coast Volunteers.
They have been objected to on the ground that they would not go
for foreign service. It was never intended that they should do so.
The object of forming that body was to provide for the defence of the
coast, in case of need, in such vessels as could be employed along the
coast. If they were men habitually going on foreign voyages
you could not depend upon finding them when you wanted them.
The object, of course, was to have men with a certain acquaintance
with naval matters, used to boats and small vessels, and whom you
could at any time lay hands upon and put on board gunboats, and
vessels of that description, at the different ports. The general
scheme was, that there should be attached to all the Coastguard
ships a small flotilla of gunboats, to be manned by the Naval Coast
Volunteers. It so happened that we were removed from office before
we had time to carry it out; but I believe it would have afforded
a very efficient defence all round the coasts of this country. I do
not see why the Naval Coast Volunteers should not have been carried
to many thousand men. I believe they might have been carried to
20,000 or 30,000 men, all round the country. I believe that they
may be still carried to that extent, if properly managed and encou-
raged by the Coastguard officers in the different districts.
The most desirable men for the Coast Defence Sea Militia are to Chief
fishery
be obtained at Penzance, Brixham, Brighton, Hastings, Folkestone, harbour.
Deal, Barking, Colchester, Lowestoft, Yarmouth, Cromer, Berwick,
Dunbar, Newhaven, Anstruther, Aberdeen, Peterhead, Cromarty,
Wick, Shetland, Orkney, and the western islands of Scotland.
Our seafaring population at first regarded with wonted suspicion Eligibility
the invitation to join the Reserves. Their prejudices have been men for
overcome by kind treatment. Many, who were anxious to join the
Reserves, were excluded by their want of experience in square-rigged
vessels. To reject these men altogether, when our gunboat flotilla
and our mastless turret-ships will require large numbers of men
trained to gunnery and accustomed to the sea, but in which agility
aloft can never be required, was a policy so blind and prejudiced, that
it is difficult to understand how it could ever have received the sanc-
tion of our naval authorities.
The rules for admission into the Coast Volunteers, with the recent
modifications are so framed as to require only such seamanship as
every experienced fisherman must possess. Training in gunnery and
small-arm drill are the only additional qualifications needed, to make
our fishermen thoroughly useful in the Coast Defence Flotilla.
of fisher-
Reserve.
264
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Officers for
Coast De-
fence Re-
serve.
Officers should be selected to command the Coast Defence Reserve
who have exhibited special aptitude for that branch of the service.
They should reside at the principal fishing ports, and be permanently
attached to the Coast Defence Service. By these means they would
have the inestimable advantage of being personally acquainted with
the men under their command.
In his evidence on the manning of the Navy in 1852, Admiral
Berkeley insisted that special care should be taken in the selection
of officers for the Coast Defence Service. It was essential that all
the officers, and particularly the commanding officer, should be ac-
customed to the fishermen and they to him. In addition to the
proposed drills in gunnery, and the use of small arms, officers and
men should make themselves locally acquainted with the channels
and entrances to the harbours in their respective districts, and be
instructed in the use of the torpedo, and its application to coast
defence.
SECTION VI.
REGULATIONS FOR THE ENROLMENT OF
BOYS IN THE THIRD-CLASS ROYAL
NAVAL RESERVE.
LETTER
ADDRESSED TO THE COMPILER IN 1879 BY CAPTAIN BOURCHIER, R.N.,
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE EXMOUTH.'
266
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
REGULATIONS FOR THE ENROLMENT OF BOYS IN
THE THIRD-CLASS ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
The following Regulations have been recently issued for the enrolment
of a Third-class Reserve:
Regula-
tions for
Third Class
Reserve.
as
Conditions of Admission to the Third-Class Royal Naval Reserve.
The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are prepared to grant
to the committee of management of a mercantile training ship the
sum of three pounds for every boy trained thereon who joins the
third class of the Royal Naval Reserve. The conditions are
follows:
'Boys on joining a ship for sea-service will be eligible for enrol-
ment in the Third-class Royal Naval Reserve who fulfil the under-
mentioned conditions, viz. :-
'1. They must have been for li years under training on board a
training ship, and subject to inspection by officers appointed by the
Admiralty and the Board of Trade. They must also be under engage-
ment to serve in a merchant ship at sea.
62. They must be 16 years of age, not less than 5 ft. 1 in. in
height, and 30 in. chest measurement; of robust frame, intelligent,
sound and healthy constitution, free from physical defects or malfor-
mations, and not subject to fits.
(3. They must be able to read and write, and show satisfactory
proficiency in cutlass, sinall-arm, and gunnery drill, as well as in
elementary subjects connected with navigation and seamanship, such
as log, lead, compass, rowing, swimming, reefing and furling sails,
steering, knotting, splicing, stropping, and rule of the road, and
produce a certificate of good character from the captain of the train-
ing ship.
64. When enrolled they will be supplied annually with a suit of
uniform clothing, consisting of a blue serge frock, a pair of blue cloth
THIRD-CLASS ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
267
A
trowsers, and a cap, of the value of 1l. 10s., and receive while under
training the same pay as Boys First Class, viz., 7d. a day, and the
same allowances per day for subsistence as members of the Second-
class Reserve, with travelling passes to and from drill.
65. They must sign an engagement to serve for four years from
the age of 19, and will be required to undergo in each year while in
the Third-class Reserve 28 days' drill on board a drill ship or at a
Naval Reserve battery, and be subject to discipline, and liable to
serve in the same manner and to the same extent as members of the
Second and First-class Reserve.
66. They will on attaining the age of 19 years, provided they have
SERVED SIX MONTHS at sea, be transferred to the Second-class
Reserve and afterwards promoted to the First-class Reserve, if in all
respects qualified.
67. The service of boys in the Third-class Reserve, who pass from
it through the second into the first class, will count at the rate of
three years' service for one year's time towards pension, provided
they comply with the regulations as to drill and reporting their where-
abouts.
68. The usual form of enrolment will have to be obtained of a
Registrar of Naval Reserve, and filled up by the boy, and on the
enrolment being completed the sum of three pounds (31.) will be paid
to the committee of the training ship.
69. Thèse regulations do not apply to boys brought up in reforma-
tory ships.'
It may be interesting to compare the regulations established for Rules for
the admission of boys into the Navy with those authorised for the of boys
into Navy
Third-class Reserve.
Boys for the Navy must be over 15
and not above 16 years of age,
over 4 feet 101 inches high, from 15 to 151 years of
age, to measure not less than 29 inches round
the chest,
over 4 feet 112 inches high, from 151 to 16
without
age, to measure not less than 294 inches round shoes.
the chest.
over 5 feet 1 inch high, from 16 to 161 years of
age, to measure not less than 30 inches round the
chest,
able to read and write fairly,
strong, healthy, well-grown, active, and intelligent,
admission
and Third-
class Re-
selye.
A
years of
B
268
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
free from all physical malformation,
must be able to pass a strict medical examination by the
surgeons of the ship,
must never have had fits.
They must have the written consent of parents or nearest relations,
and must produce a certificate of birth from the Registrar of the
district in which they were born, or a declaration made by one of
their parents before a magistrate, of the day on which they were
born.'
Amend-
ment in
rules for
Third
Class.
In a letter to the Compiler of November 25, 1879, Captain
Bourchier suggested for consideration several modifications in the
regulations for the enrolment of the Third-class Reserve:
"The age for enrolment in the Third-class Royal Naval Reserve is
16 years and upwards, height 5 ft. 1 in., chest measurement 30 in.,
and time served in training ship eighteen months.
* This age is too great, and the standard for height and chest too
high, for us to pass but a very small number indeed into the Reserve.
'In this ship, and I believe in all other mercantile training ships,
the boys are supposed to be off the hands of the ratepayers, or the
charitable, at the age of 16 years. This regulation, if observed
strictly, at once cuts us entirely off from the Reserve. Before reaching
the age of 16 years well-trained and well-grown lads are in every
way able to earn their own living at sea, and do so. The boys therefore
go to sea in large numbers without even having had a chance of
being enrolled in the Reserve, although the Admiralty pay a Gunnery
Instructor to teach them, and provide guns, rifles, and cutlasses to
this and other ships for that purpose.
The following is really what is required in order that suitable
and well-trained boys may be enrolled in the Third-class Royal Naval
Reserve.
‘Time served in a mercantile training ship 18 months as hitherto.
That the age for entry should be 15 to 15 years, as for the boys
entered for the Royal Navy according to note A in enclosed circular.
At that age the height should be 4 ft. 101 in., and girth of chest not
less than 29 in. (See Queen's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions
February 1879, page 96, chap. VIII.) This is the standard as used
at that
age in the Royal Navy until a recent period. For boys of a
greater age than 15), the standard might of course be higher, but
somewhat less than that specified in the paragraph referred to, for
the Royal Navy. (See note B in enclosed circular.)
THIRD-CLASS ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
269
'I submit that if the regulations for the enrolment of the Third-
class Royal Naval Reserve were modified as above, it would admit of
the entry of the finest of our well-drilled and well-trained sailor
boys, and that we should in time go far to improve the Mercantile
Marine in the same manner as the Royal Navy has in late years been
so much improved. The training of very large numbers of boys
would be utilised by the State when the boys became men, through
their being under the obligation to continue at sea for some years.'
SECTION VII.
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY
VOLUNTEERS.
272
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
A.
Proposal
to establish
Naval
In addition to the various corps or descriptions of force, already
enumerated, there are indications that the spirit of the Volunteer
Volunteers. movement, which has shown so much unanticipated vitality, will be
exhibited on the sea as well as on the land. In 1872 a scheme was
laid before the present writer for the formation of a corps of Naval
Volunteers. The gentlemen by whom the movement was initiated
were accustomed to yachting and boating, and fond of the sea. They
offered to go through a course of gun drill, and, in addition, to serve
afloat for 14 or 21 days every year, in a gunboat, if such a vessel
could be supplied for their instruction. The proposal as brought for-
ward by the late lamented Mr. Booin, the senior executive officer of the
London Brigade of Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, seemed to contain
the germs of a movement, which might in the end prove extremely
important, and which appeared, to judge by his recent speech at
Liverpool, to command the sympathies of Mr. Goschen.
Arrange-
The scheme was gradually matured, and much consideration was
required in working out the details. The preliminary gun drills for
Naval Volunteers were carried on without serious inconvenience, and
without any addition to the public charge, on board the drill ships
of the Royal Naval Reserve. Distinct hours were set apart for the
drill in the afternoon, in the summer months, after the seamen of
the Royal Naval Reserve had completed their daily task. It was
stipulated that a full gun's crew of Volunteers should attend; other-
wise the drill did not take place. When a number of Volunteers,
sufficient to form a crew for a gunboat, had been passed as efficient
in gun drill, had proved their ability to pull a strong oar, and been
instructed in small-arm and company drill, it was arranged that they
should be formed into a distinct corps. A gunboat was to be fitted
out, and stationed in the port to which the corps belonged, in charge
of a commissioned officer, or in some cases a gunner of the Royal
ments for
drill.
THE ROYAL: NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
273
Navy, with a small staff of petty officers, and a detachment of
marines. To this gunboat it was proposed that the corps should be
attached, and the drills thenceforward conducted on board. In the
summer the gunboat was to be sent to sea manned by crews of
Volunteers. They were to be required to pay their own expenses of
uniform and messing, and to perform, when embarked, all the duties
of the vessel as seamen before the mast. A portion of the expense
of the permanent staff of the gunboat was to have been defrayed by
subscriptions among the members of the corps and their friends.
The possibility of training Volunteers to the use of the great guns
afloat was established with little delay. A hundred gentlemen were
provisionally enrolled in a corps, which formed the London contingent
of the force now officially designated as the Royal Naval Artillery
Volunteers. By permission of the Admiralty, the members of the
London contingent were allowed to drill on board H.M.S. -President,
the drill ship of the Naval Reserve, in the West India Docks. Being
engaged in other occupations throughout the day, the drill took
place twice a week in the evening. These drills commenced in
October, 1872; and those members of the force who joined at that
date, and who had attended most regularly, had, previous to the first
unofficial inspection by Admiral Tarleton, exactly the equivalent
of seven days' drill in the Naval Reserve. The instruction thus
received was necessarily incomplete, and from the impossibility of
assembling the Volunteers in daylight, it had been imparted under
the most unfavourable circumstances. Yet, in spite of every dis-
advantage, Admiral Tarleton expressed the greatest satisfaction at
the progress which had been made. In his address to the Volunteers,
he rightly attributed their rapid advance, in the very limited time,
to their superior intelligence and education, and the interest which
they had felt in their work. It would be unjust not to attribute the
proficiency attained, in an equal degree, to the care, the patience, and
the zeal displayed by the instructors attached to H.M.S. ‘President.'
From the gunner downwards, all had been unwearied in their efforts
to train the new recruits for the Navy. The instructors had shown
remarkable tact in uniting the deference due to the members of a
force so peculiarly constituted, with the necessary strictness and
authority in enforcing attention to the drill.
In the then provisional constitution of the force, great personal
inconveniences had been suffered, which were easily obviated when
permanent arrangements were made. The President' being
moored in the West India Docks, the Volunteers had been compelled
to perform a tedious and uncomfortable journey, occupying, in going
VOL. IV.
*
T
274
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Liverpool
corps.
and returning to the ship, a period of two hours, in addition to the
time actually spent at drill. When permanent arrangements were
made, it was proposed that the drills should take place, either in a
battery fitted up at Somerset House, or on board a gunboat appro-
priated to the Volunteers, which might be regarded as the head-
quarters or miniature receiving ship of the Volunteer Naval Service.
If an old harbour ship were selected, it was thought that the most
convenient place for her moorings would be in a situation adjacent to
the Thames Embankment, and therefore easily accessible. A berth
opposite Somerset House, near the Thames police hulk 'Royalist,
seemed the best that could be chosen.
As regards facilities for drill, the Liverpool contingent had at
least as much difficulty to encounter as their London brethren. The
' Eagle,' the drill ship of the Naval Reserve of the port of Liverpool,
was at that date moored on the Cheshire side of the Mersey. Το
cross the river occupies a quarter of an hour, and the Volunteers had
to march a mile through a lonely and miserable part of Birkenhead,
in order to reach the drill ship. It was proposed that a 6-ton gun
should be placed in a battery at the St. George's pier head, con-
structed to represent the section of a ship, or that a gunboat should
be moored in one of the Liverpool docks, in a central position. The
Volunteers would thus be enabled to learn their work, without being
exposed to the unnecessary inconvenience to which they were sub-
jected when first enrolled.
For the command of the Volunteer force it was thought that it
would be a great advantage, if an officer were permanently appointed
to the gunboat in which the Volunteers were instructed. It appeared
to be almost impossible to find Volunteers to act as officers of the new
branch of the Naval Reserve. Few amateurs have the necessary
nautical experience, or leisure to devote to the duties of such a
command.
The Naval Reserve has suffered much from the omission to appoint
naval officers to the command. It seemed probable that the Reserve
of Volunteers would equally suffer, unless the force were placed under
the supervision of a naval officer. Continuous attention is required
to ensure that the drills are properly carried out, to keep the instruc-
tors to their duty, and the Volunteers in a proper state of discipline
when attending drill. The work of recruiting for the force might be
immensely advanced by an energetic and judicious naval officer, who
knew how to meet the many difficulties incidental to a naval experi-
ment, and whose personal influence might contribute immeasurably
to the popularity of the force.
Arrange-
ments for
the com-
inand of
Volunteers.
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
275
ment of
The first unofficial inspection of the London contingent of the Appoint-
Naval Volunteers having attracted the attention of the public in some Captain
degree to the movement, as an interesting and promising experiment, ton, R.N.
inquiries were addressed to the author from various influential
gentlemen, resident in, or connected with, other ports asking for
information as to the constitution and regulations of the pioneer
contingent in London. It was impossible to afford the necessary
assistance or encouragement to the gentlemen who had evinced their
willingness to take an initiative in this important movement in their
several localities without a voluminous correspondence, or the far
more effectual means of personal communication. But to visit all the
ports, where there was a reasonable prospect of successfully fostering
the movement, was a task beyond the compass of any individual who
had other important and engrossing pursuits. It was therefore
absolutely essential to the success of the movement, which Mr.
Goschen had himself initiated, that a naval officer, of the rank of
commander or captain, should be attached to the staff at Whitehall,
whose duty it should be to superintend the drill and discipline of the
London contingent, to acquaint himself with their constitution and
regulations, to inspect from time to time the contingents at other
ports, and to make representations to the Admiralty as to any improved
arrangements which might be found practicable for carrying on the
drills. It was obvious that it would be another and a most important
branch of such an officer's duty to visit the ports from which well-
authenticated communications were received from gentlemen who
were willing to co-operate in raising a contingent of Volunteers.
The visit of a judicious officer, in answer to such communications,
would often secure the formation of a contingent in a case in which,
without such encouragement and assistance, the task would be
abandoned.
There had been no hesitation at the War Office to appoint a
numerous staff of inspectors and adjutants to the various corps of
land Volunteers. There could be no just reason why hesitation
should be felt in consenting to some expenditure, trifling in com-
parison with the object in view, for the purpose of securing the ut-
most efficiency in the various branches of our Naval Reserves.
The Volunteers had passed through their first ordeal successfully.
They had been inspected at quarters, and had gone through the small-
arm and cutlass drill to the complete satisfaction of the distinguished
admiral by whom they had been inspected. But a further and
much more difficult experiment was still to be tried, ere it could be
affirmed, with any reasonable confidence, that the work which the Royal
T2
276
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Difficulties
and objec-
tions.
!
Naval Artillery Volunteers were ambitious to undertake was practicable
for those who were not by profession sailors. These representations
were appreciated at the Admiralty, and Captain Codrington, to whom
the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers are so much indebted, was
appointed to superintend the first organisation of the force.
Persons who questioned the possibility of supplementing our Naval
Reserves with a corps of Volunteers might fairly insist on the difference
between gun drill on board a stationary vessel, moored in a canal, and
the practical working of naval guns of large calibre in a gunboat in
a sea way. It would have been presụmptuous to refuse to admit the
force of these objections, until, by actual trial afloat, the capability
of the Volunteers had been tested. The seamen of the Royal Navy
would supply the necessary knowledge of seamanship, and lead the
way; but the Volunteers would have to perform all the manual
labour. Decks must be scrubbed down every morning, hammocks
stowed, brass-work and gun-carriages cleaned. Some of the work
they would have to do was laborious, and much of their duty would
be of a kind never before undertaken by educated landsmen.
In the face of these admitted difficulties, the sanguine promoters
of the Volunteer movement believed that if it were well directed
numbers would not be wanting. The London contingent was composed
of gentlemen commencing a commercial career, in salaried positions
in the banks, the insurance offices, and in private firms. A valuable
nucleus had already been formed in the Post Office. These gentle-
men were all addicted to boating, and fond of athletic exercises. It
was obvious that the stratum of society to which the recruits already
obtained belonged was very large. It embraced the entire middle-
class of England; the backbone of the country. The expense of
membership was not beyond the reach of young men of moderate
means. The uniform cost 51., the subscriptions were half-a-guinea
for entrance money, and a guinea for the annual subscription. On
the other hand, these items were beyond the reach of the labourer
or the artisan. In short, it might be said that the personal constitu-
tion of the contingent faithfully represented the original conception
of the land service Volunteer.
The first conceptions of the pioneers of the Naval Volunteer move-
ment were presented to Mr. Goschen in the following letter :-
Letter to
Mr. Gos-
chen.
24 Park Lane, W.: June 27, 1873.
Dear Mr. Goschen,-Herewith I enclose a memorandum con-
taining the regulations proposed by Captain Codrington for the
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
277
acceptance of the Naval Volunteers, together with their amendments
and my own observations.
* As a Member of Parliament, I am perhaps hiassed in favour of
official views, and, throughout the discussion to which the memorandum
relates, you will observe that in the main I lean rather to the Admiralty
than to the Volunteer opinion.
. By communicating personally with the Naval Volunteers in
London, Liverpool, and other places, Captain Codrington will have
done much to facilitate a decision as to the most satisfactory plan of
organisation of the Volunteers. It was essential to know the opinions
entertained by those who had taken an active part in initiating the
movement in the various ports. But, having ascertained the views
of the Volunteers, the Admiralty must now decide for themselves
what the organisation of the force ought to be, and they should
prepare a Bill for the approval of Parliament in conformity with their
own conclusions. It is impossible to satisfy everybody. The most
enthusiastic persons are often the most crotchety. You will never
arrive at a decision if your plans are to await the approval of all the
various corps of Volunteers, before they are finally adopted at head-
quarters. I therefore venture to advise that you draw up your own
scheme for embodiment in an Act of Parliament, and that you
then say to the Volunteers : “These are the conditions we insist upon.
If you will accept them we will most gladly avail ourselves of your
services, but if you cannot fulfil our requirements we must decline to
receive you into the Navy.” To the Volunteers I have said: “Do not
ask the Admiralty to bind themselves by Act of Parliament to con-
ditions which may be found by experience to detract materially from
the valne of your services. On the other hand, do not bind your-
selves to a long period of service in time of peace. Thus you will
have it in your power, if the regulations are unreasonable, to with-
draw whenever you please, from an irksome and disagreeable service.”
Plenary powers for the Admiralty to make rules, and, for the
Volunteers, the right to quit the service on short notice, are the
points upon which, as it appears to me, the two parties to the nego-
tiation may fairly insist. These conditions being accepted, I can see
no difficulty in preparing a suitable scheme of organisation. What
is the basis upon which the plan should be constructed? What kind
of service do the Volunteers offer to perform for the country? They
are prepared to act as Naval Artillerymen on board gunboats and
vessels adapted for coast defence in the time of war.
All necessary
means for instructing them in their duties must be provided; and,
as a Naval Artilleryman will be much more efficient if he has some
278
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
knowledge of the duties of a sailor, and as target practice afloat is
absolutely essential, it must be desirable that the Volunteers should
embark at frequent intervals in a gunboat; and a cruise of seven
days' duration every year will doubtless tend materially to their
general efficiency.
* In these opportunities of going afloat, which are an essential
part of their training, you have the means of encouraging large
numbers of men who have a passion for the sea, to join the Naval
Volunteers.
• Provided that the regulations are satisfactory on this important
point of occasional service afloat, I am satisfied that the majority of
the Volunteers will be ready to accept the terms on which the Admi-
ralty may find it necessary to insist.
'In the appointment of officers, the Admiralty must have full dis-
cretion. It would obviously be their desire to make a good selection;
for it is clear that the appointment of an unpopular officer would lead
to the rapid withdrawal of members from the corps with which he
might be connected. I will not, in this letter, enter upon the subor-
dinate point of uniform, as to which I have made a suggestion in the
accompanying memorandum.
Lastly, as to discipline. The provisions of the Act under which
the land Volunteers are embodied will doubtless be taken as a prece-
dent, and it will be the duty of the Admiralty to lay down, and the
Volunteers must cheerfully accept, whatever modifications may be
required in order to meet the peculiar exigencies of the sea service.
“I venture, in conclusion, to express the hope that there may be
no further delay in preparing a short Act, authorising the Admiralty
to enrol a force of Naval Volunteers, and to issue, from time to time,
such regulations as may be necessary to ensure the discipline and
efficiency of the Naval Volunteer force.
'I am, dear Mr. Goschen, yours faithfully,
THOMAS BRASSEY.
'Right Hon. G. J. Goschen, M.P.'
After careful consideration, the Admiralty determined to accept
the proposals which had been submitted to them, and an Act
was passed, authorising enrolment of the new contingent of the
Reserve forces.
The possibility of training landsmen to work heavy guns afloat had
Volunteers been recently proved by a successful experiment, which had been
carried out by the Canadian Government on the vast inland seas within
the limits of the Dominion. In the drill season of 1871-72, three
Naval
THE HOYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
279
>
batteries of garrison artillery, forming part of the militia of the pro-
vince of Ontario, embarked in succession on board the gunboat
* Prince Alfred' for eight days, and were practised at gun drill and
in firing shot and shell. The vessel, while the Volunteers were on
board, cruised on Lakes Erie and Huron. From personal inquiries
addressed, during a visit to Canada, to the commander of the gun-
boat, the compiler was satisfied that a satisfactory degree of pro-
ficiency was reached by the volunteers. The batteries consisted of
two officers and forty-eight men, two officers and twenty-five men,
and three officers and thirty-eight men, respectively. While em-
barked, each battery of the Volunteers was exercised twice at target.
practice, and once at night quarters. The Prince Alfred' was
armed with two Armstrong and four brass howitzer guns. While the
militia were assembled in the camp of instruction, on the Goderich,
the gunboat took part in the operations. On one occasion, when the
Volunteers were embarked, they were inspected by Sir Hastings
Doyle.
No unforeseen difficulties have arisen in carrying out a proposal
essentially tentative and experimental. The Volunteers have not
found life at sea too severe an ordeal; and the experiment deserves
patient trial. If only 1,000 Volunteers can be found willing to give
their unpaid services to their country, their patriotism deserves
recognition, and they will have the proud satisfaction of knowing
that they may be enabled to set a high example in a good cause to
many who may hereafter follow.
There is nothing new in the idea of Volunteer artillery for coast Cinque
defence afloat; but to my friend Colonel E. Vernon Harcourt, com-
tillery.
manding the Cinque Ports Volunteer Artillery Brigade, the credit Colonel
peculiarly belongs of having endeavoured to develop a force of that
description in connection with the Volunteer movement, of which he
was one of the earliest promoters. In 1860, Colonel Harcourt had an
interview with Lord Clarence Paget on the subject, and in 186 i he
addressed a letter to the Admiralty, informing their Lordships that he
had enrolled 70 sailors and seafaring men at Hastings, and had regu-
larly drilled them at garrison guns. He asked that, in addition to
the ordinary means of instruction on shore, the men should be
embarked on a gunboat or other vessel of war, which should be
allowed to touch at Hastings in the summer for that purpose. The
request was refused by the Admiralty. In answer to a question put
by Mr. North, my late respected colleague in the representation of
Hastings, Lord Clarence Paget said that the expense was the sole
reason why the Admiralty could not comply with the request which
had been made for the temporary loan of a gunboat. The subject
Ports Ar-
Harcourt,
280
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
was taken up by the press, and the Marine Volunteers found many
warm and influential advocates. The Times, the Daily Telegraph,
and other leading journals, severely criticised the ill-timed parsimony
of the Government. It was very properly observed that, when the
Admiralty were going to ask the country for 13,000,0001., it was
idle to pretend that they could not afford a gunboat for Volunteer
practice. It was urged that it was just as reasonable that men
should offer their services as Volunteers for the Marine Artillery with-
out wishing to enter the Navy, as that volunteer riflemen should be
willing to be drilled, and to serve in the event of invasion, without
wishing to enter the Army. Boatmen, who would feel out of their
element in a large square-rigged ship, would be invaluable in a gun-
boat. But if they were to enter for general service in the Navy, they
might find themselves exposed to much annoyance from being sent
to sea in a vessel to which they were not accustomed. In the
debates which followed the speech of Lord Clarence Paget in moving
the naval estimates, in 1861, Mr. Bentinck pleaded that every
encouragement should be given to the Volunteers, on whose behalf
Colonel Harcourt had applied for the gunboat at Hastings. Sir
James Elphinstone recommended that the aid of the gentry should
be invoked, who might, by their influence, form a body of Volunteers
from among the 300,000 fishermen, bargemen, boatmen, and others,
included under the general term of aquatics, who would be willing
to practise gunnery in gunboats or gunvessels, and, in case of need,
materially strengthen our naval forces. Mr. Lindsay, in commenting,
in the same debate, on the condition of the Naval Reserve, expressed
his regret that a slap in the face had been given to those men who
had been willing to incur the expense and trouble of being drilled
into a Volunteer corps. Mr. Laird also, in a letter addressed to the
Times, had urged that the Government might efficiently and
economically man vessels for local coast defence, by accepting the
services of flatmen, boatmen, and others; a class of men who would
not volunteer for service abroad in Her Majesty's Navy. The pres-
sure thus brought to bear on the Admiralty, both in Parliament and
the press, was not without effect.
It was shortly afterwards
announced in the House of Commons by Lord Clarence Paget that
as soon as the Volunteers had learned their drill at batteries on shore,
at the Coastguard stations, the Admiralty would consider to what
extent gunboats might be appropriated for the purpose of embarking
them, and giving them their sea legs. Nothing, however, was ever
done in fulfilment of this pledge, and the corps with which I have
the honour of being connected is the first which has had any
encouragement from the Admiralty.
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
281
B.
THE Admiralty having obtained authority from Parliament, under ani
Act passed in 1873, to organise and enrol a force of Royal Naval
Artillery Volunteers, it became necessary to publish for the informa-
tion of the public a general description of the scheme, which had
been authorised for the organisation of the force. The pamphlet,
prepared in 1874 by the compiler, with the above object, is here
inserted.
THE ORGANISATION OF THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY
VOLUNTEERS EXPLAINED).
Ir has been thought desirable to publish the following statement, Royal
for the purpose of giving some explanation of the services, duties, Artillery
privileges, and general organisation of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers
Volunteers.
'In inviting persons to enrol themselves in the corps, the Lords How to be
Commissioners of the Admiralty desire to extend the Volunteer recruited.
movement, so successfully established as an auxiliary to the land
forces, to the defence of this country by sea. The proposal is novel
and unprecedented in its character. In any other country than our
own, it would, in all probability, be visionary. In England, however,
we possess a guarantee for the success of such an undertaking, which
cannot be found elsewhere. A taste for maritime pursuits pervades
this insular nation, and the hope may therefore be confidently
entertained that the appeal, now made to the patriotism of the
nautical and aquatic sections of the community, will not be urged in
vain.
• Eminent naval authorities have, for many years past, recom- Naval
mended the formation of a corps, for the purposes of coast defence, favour of
in
composed of persons who, while not possessing the wider experience such a
of the seaman, are accustomed to the management of boats, and in
the constant habit of going afloat. The Act for the Royal Navy
Artillery Volunteers, passed in the last session at the instance of the
force.
282
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
The
harbour
defence
only.
Admiralty, and the regulations recently issued under that Act, afford
the most convincing proof that, in the estimation of those who are
actually responsible for the efficiency of the naval service, such a force
is desirable. The concurrence of the naval members of the late
adrninistration in the various steps which have been taken, may
likewise be quoted, in order to show that there is a general
desire, among those to whom the welfare of the Navy is an especial
object of solicitude, for the success of the movement, which it is the
object of the present writer to explain.
'It has been already stated that coast defence, and not service at
sea, constitutes the especial sphere proposed for the Royal Naval
Artillery Volunteers. The term coast defence is perhaps, in a certain
sense, a misnomer. The defence of the most important of our com-
mercial harbours against an attack from the sea could not be effectu-
ally conducted by a force composed exclusively of men trained for
the land service alone. The approach to all the great ports of the
United Kingdom from the sea involves the navigation of extensive
estuaries, where floating batteries, and armed rafts, and the use of
torpedoes, are essential to a complete defence, and would in point of fact
effectually prevent the nearer approach of a hostile fleet. In the laying
out of torpedoes on an extensive scale,a flotilla of boats would be required;
and in furnishing crews for such boats, the well-trained oarsmen, who,
it is hoped, will be found willing to enrol themselves in the Royal
Naval Artillery Volunteers, would be enabled to render valuable
service. In all probability, by their co-operation in the hour of danger,
they would release an equal number of highly trained seamen, who
would form the crews of sea-going cruisers. All our greatest ports,
London, Hull, Newcastle, Glasgow, Bristol, Southampton, Belfast,
Dublin, Cork, are situated at the head of an extensive estuary, or at
some distance from the mouth of a navigable river.
The mere
enumeration of these names is sufficient to show how large a sphere
there might be, in the event of a threatened invasion, for the employ-
ment, in the important and essential task of harbour defence, of an
auxiliary force composed, not of trained seamen, but of persons who
may be described generally as aquatics.
'It is to be observed that a mere oarsman, although not trained
at the great guns, or in the use of rifle and cutlass, would be enabled
to do good work in a service in which the use of boats must be largely
resorted to; and that, in order to take a number at a gun mounted
on a raft, such as the “ Nancy Dawson," which the late Captain Cole
improvised for our naval operations in the Sea of Azof, or to serve in
a gun's crew in a floating battery for harbour defence, neither sea
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
283
legs nor sea experiences are indispensable qualifications. For such
duties those qualities are required which equally combine to make
a good gunner and a good soldier, whether afloat or on shore-a fair
share of physical strength and activity, intelligence, and, above all,
courage and patriotism.
Designed, as the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers have been, for The force
the especial work of coast and harbour defence, it is not necessary that neederote be
the corps should be very numerous. It certainly need not exceed the
numbers of our amateur yachtsmen and oarsmen, for whom the
opportunity, now offered, of taking their share in the national defence
is chiefly intended. Enough will have been done, if a brigade can
be formed at each of the principal ports, of a strength varying from
200. to 600 men.
'Having described the general scope of the duties, which would The
training
devolve on the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, in the event of
required.
their being called out for actual service, the nature of the training
proposed for the members of the force may be briefly explained. The
first consideration must be to familiarise them, to some extent, with
the management of boats. This instruction might occupy much time
in a corps composed of men who had never been in the habit of going
on the water; but, as the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer corps is to
be recruited in a large proportion from among aquatics, many of their
number may be expected to possess this qualification without the
necessity for special instruction.
“The next point to claim attention will be the exercise of the great
guns. Here I venture to affirm, from personal experience, that the
naval gun drills have been, in every detail, so carefully considered,
the instructors are so completely masters of the subject which they
have to teach, and the mechanical appliances are such effectual sub-
stitutes for heavy manual labour, that a few days of constant atten-
tion will suffice to make a volunteer a useful man in a gun's crew.
The class of recruits required for the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers
possesses advantages of intelligence and education, far beyond those
which the practical seamen can enjoy; and we may anticipate, from
the experience already acquired, that they will form some of the
smartest gun's crews in any branch of the naval service. There is
neither insurmountable difficulty, nor unduly fatiguing labour,
in the drill at the great guns. The intricacies could be mastered in
a few days, if the volunteers were kept continuously at drill, as
they necessarily would be, should they ever be called out for actual
service.
“The essential point in a Volunteer corps is to secure men
284
Orr.
Facilities
for drill.
physically capable of doing their work, and who may be confidently
relied upon as ready to serve, whenever they may be called
upon.
• The small-arm exercises are still more easily mastered. A rowing
man will find himself able to use his cutlass efficiently in a few hours;
and, after a couple of days of continuous drill, he would be able to go
through the manual and platoon exercises with satisfactory smartness
and precision.
· Rowing and yachting gentlemen will perceive that they will have
no difficulty in acquiring the knowledge of their drills, which is
required in order to make them efficient, in the winter months.
They will not find that their favourite amusements on the water, in
the summer months, are incompatible with service in the Royal
Naval Artillery Volunteers.
‘Every effort will be made to afford to those, who may be willing
to join the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, the necessary facilities
for learning their drills. For the London brigade, the “ Rainbow," a
gun vessel well adapted for the purpose, is now being fitted out at
Chatham. This vessel will be ready in two months from the date of
this publication; and, when completed, will be moored in the Thames
in a convenient position, off Somerset House. Should such an
arrangement be found convenient for members of the Corinthian
and other yacht clubs at Erith, it is possible that the “ Rainbow” may
be moved, from time to time, to moorings near the pier at Erith ;
and, should a desire be expressed by the members of rowing clubs
higher up the Thames, an effort will be made to move the vessel to
moorings near the boat-houses of any rowing clubs, which have their
head-quarters below Kew Bridge.
“No positive promise, however, can be given that the “ Rainbow
shall be moved. There are many points to consider, such as draft of
water, height and width of arches, and obstruction of the navigation
of the river.
"For those clubs which are established still higher up the river,
where there is not sufficient water to float the “Rainbow," facilities
for instruction may be provided by mounting a 64-pounder gun on a
raft, which could be towed from place to place, and moored to the bank
of the river adjacent to the boat-houses belonging to the clubs.
instructor would accompany the raft; and, during the winter months,
arrangements might be made for giving to Volunteers an opportunity
of going through their small-arm drills in a drill-shed, or other con-
venient place, available for the purpose. Thus it may be found
possible to extend the system of instruction, by effectual, yet inex-
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
285
tions as
officer-
pensive means, far up the Thames, and so to embrace towns such as
Reading, Maidenhead, Henley, Windsor, and even the head-quarters
of rowing, the University of Oxford.
'Inquiry having been made as to whether members will be
expected to appear in uniform, whenever they attend drill, it may
not be superfluous to mention that the regulations are silent on this
point. Members will only be required to wear uniforin on special
occasions, of which due notice will be given.
* Members of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer corps may Regula-
therefore rest assured that they will have the opportunity of being to drill.
thoroughly instructed in the drills, in which it is considered desirable
that they should be proficient.
The drills will comprise those for great guns, rifle, pistol, and
cutlass, as in the Royal Navy, and no deviation from these drills is
to be permitted.
‘All drills will be carried out by the instructor, attached to the The
brigades, under the officer-instructor. The permanent staff of a instructor.
brigade will consist of an officer-instructor and one petty officer-
instructor for each battery. The officer-instructor will be commis-
sioned as a lieutenant in the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, and
will be selected from officers of or retired from the Royal Navy, of
and above the rank of lieutenant. He will keep the muster-rolls,
and it will be his duty to make himself acquainted with all the
members of his brigade, and their qualifications. He will superin-
tend all drills and exercises, and is to have complete control over the
petty officer-instructors, and to be responsible to the Admiralty for
their conduct and efficiency.
“On the important point of the number of attendances at drill, Attend-
the regulations require that every Volunteer must attend at least two drill
.
drills a month, until he has obtained the standard of an efficient.
An efficient must be able to perform in a satisfactory manner the
duties of any number except No. 1 at heavy gun exercise, or at re-
volving gun exercise, as applicable to the 64-pounder guns mounted
in gunboats; and he must be possessed of a good knowledge of the
manual, platoon, and cutlass exercises.
It has already been explained that these qualifications may easily
be acquired in a fortnight of continuous attendance at drill, by the
application of a very ordinary amount of intelligence and attention.
The regulations expressly avoid the imposition of any compulsory Service
service afloat in time of peace. Target practice afloat is obviously afloat not
essential to the efficiency of a naval gunner; and it is therefore desi- sory.
rable that every Volunteer should have a fair number of opportunities
ances at
6
286
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
of taking part in this useful exercise. In a long summer's day, the
members of the London Brigade may embark in a gunboat at Erith
or Gravesend, proceed to the Maplin Sands, off Shoeburyness—which
is the most convenient place for firing practice over a sea range-and
return to London by a convenient hour in the afternoon or evening.
It will doubtless be the desire of every Naval Volunteer to avail him-
self of a sufficient number of opportunities for target practice, to
secure his own efficiency. But, as there are many who will be anxious
to have a greater amount of exercise afloat, every Volunteer, who
wishes it, may embark once a year, and remain for a period of eight
days in a gunboat, manned by a crew to be furnished from the bat-
tery to which he himself belongs. It should, however, be observed
that, when called out for actual service, the Volunteers will not be
liable to embark in sea-going vessels. Whenever so assembled,
they will serve on board any of H.M. ships employed in the defence
of the coasts of the United Kingdom : unless, indeed, they volunteer
for, and are found capable of doing duty in, seagoing cruisers. They
will not be required to go aloft, or to attend to the fires in the stoke-
hole. They will, however, have to accommodate themselves to the
berthing and messing arrangements usual for the seamen of the
Royal Navy.
Regula- “The regulations recently issued contain ample information as to
the organisation of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers; and their
by the
Admiralty. practical effect will be summarised in the following extracts from the
code of rules.
“The Volunteers are raised under the Act passed in 1873. They
will be called out by Royal proclamation, and will be liable to serve
in any vessels employed for coast defence. They will be liable to
perform all the ordinary duties of the vessels in which they may be
embarked, in the same manner as those duties are performed by the
regular crews of Her Majesty's ships, except those duties that can
only be performed by practical seamen.
· The Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer force, for administrative
purposes, will be formed into brigades. A brigade will consist of
four or more batteries of from sixty to eighty men, and will be de-
signated by a local name.
The following table contains the authorised establishment for
brigades and the batteries composing them :
tions issued
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
287
Battery
Brigade
of four
batteries
Brigade
of six
batteries
Brigade
of eight
batteries
1
1
2
2
2
71
1
4
4
8
8
1
· 6
6
12
12
12
421
1
8
8
16
16
16
563
275
Lieutenant-commander .
Sub-lieutenant
Chief petty officer
First-class petty officer .
Second-class petty officer
Buglers
Leading gunners and gunners (equiva-
lent to leading seamen and able
seainen)
Staff :
Lieutenant-instructor
First-class petty-officer instructor .
Surgeon
Bugle major.
Armourer
51
195
301
403
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
1
6
1
1
1
1
8
1
1
1
80
320
480
640
Total enrolled
60
240
360
480
“In this table, two numbers divided by a line signify the maxi-
80
mum and minimum strength-thus means not more than 80 and
60)
not less than 60.
Persons wishing to organise a corps to form part of a brigade of
Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers should place themselves in com-
munication with the Secretary of the Admiralty.
· Whenever it is practicable, a brigade will be formed at each of
the large ports in the kingdom, and the batteries composing the
brigade. will be raised in the immediate neighbourhood of the
port.
- When the Volunteers are not of sufficient strength at any port
to form a brigade, the batteries enrolled on a part of the coast formed
into a district will be formed into a brigade, and will be called a
district brigade.
* The object of this organisation is to unite separate batteries
under one head, to secure uniformity among them, and to afford
them the advantage of an officer-instructor.
Candidates for enrolment as members of the Royal Naval
Artillery Volunteers must be of good character, and physically fit for
the service; their eligibility will be judged by the commanding
officer of the corps, assisted by such others of the corps as he may
think fit to appoint for that purpose.
“No person below the age of 17 is to be enrolled in the corps
without the special authority of the Admiralty.
288
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
'Boys of 14 years of age and upwards may be enrolled for the
purpose of being trained as buglers.
'Men belonging to any other force liable to be called out for
service in case of war are not to be enrolled.
'Apprentices are not to be enrolled without the consent of their
masters.
Persons dismissed from any other service or corps for misconduct
are not to be enrolled without the special sanction of the Admiralty.
• The commanding officer of a corps is to give to any Volunteer,
on his quitting the corps, a certificate of discharge, when requested
to do so by such Volunteer.
· Every member has power to withdraw from the corps upon
giving 14 days' notice to that effect.
· Enrolled members are classed as efficients and non-efficients.
All enrolled members who do not fulfil the conditions above
referred to are reckoned as non-efficients.
* Each brigade will be commanded by a lieutenant commanding.
Each battery will be commanded by a sub-lieutenant.
'In each battery there will be, as it has already been stated, oue
chief petty officer, two ist class, and two 2nd class petty officers.
"The petty officers of a battery will be selected by the command-
ing officer of the battery.
“When assembled for drill or inspection, the Volunteers will be
under the cominand of the senior naval officer of the district. When
the Volunteers are assembled for drill, the senior officer will be re-
presented by the officer-instructor, a retired commander, or gunnery
lieutenant of the Royal Navy, whose duty it will be to see that all
drills are properly carried out.
When afloat, the Volunteers are to be, in all matters whatsoever,
under the command of the captain or commanding officer of the ship
in which they may be.
• The authority of the officers commanding batteries is strictly
limited to their own batteries only. The discipline will be the same
throughout the corps, and will be enforced by the lieutenant com-
manding the brigade, in conformity with the regulations issued by
the Admiralty.
The lieutenant commanding will make arrangements for drill,
securing, so far as it may be necessary, separate hours for each
battery. Before adopting any final arrangements for drill, he will
confer with the officer-instructor.
*There may be an occasional general muster of the corps, when
considered necessary by the lieutenant commanding.
6
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
289.
The batteries will take precedence at general parades according
to their numbers, and not according to the seniority of their respec-
tive commanding officers.
“The brigade staff will not be attached to a battery, but will act
under the lieutenant commanding only.
Officers of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers rank with, but
after, officers of the Royal Navy and Royal Naval Reserve of their
respective ranks.
‘All officers of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers will be com-
missioned by the Admiralty.
“The commanding officers of brigades will recommend, for the
consideration of the Admiralty, names of persons for the appoint-
ments and promotion of officers in their brigades.
“The appointment of an honorary commander to a brigade is
allowed, and such honorary lieutenants and sub-lieutenants as the
Admiralty may think fit to sanction.
• Officers in full pay in the Navy or Army are not eligible for
other than honorary commissions.
"The uniform approved for the officers resembles generally that
worn by officers of the Naval Reserve, silver being substituted for
gold lace.
• The principle upon which the Volunteers should be officered The officers
has been one of the most frequent subjects of discussion among those corps
.
who have associated themselves with the movement from the com-
mencement, and who have been provisionally enrolled, with the
sanction of the Admiralty, in anticipation of the passing of the Act
of Parliament of last year.
A desire has been expressed that no officers should be appointed
to the corps, but that the Volunteers should serve.only under direct
naval command. Practically, the desire, so strongly felt, has been
fulfilled in the arrangements which have actually been made.
· Whenever called upon to serve afloat, or when embarked for the
purpose of training, the Volunteers will be under the command of
the officer, commanding the ship, in which they may be. When
embarked for their first cruise in the autumn of the present year,
the arrangements were, of necessity, experimental and provisional.
There was a natural desire on the part of the officer commanding the
“Foam” to meet the wishes of the Volunteers themselves in every
possible way, consistent with the efficient performance of the service,
and the carrying on of the drills and exercises required. The same
considerate spirit will doubtless prevail on all future occasions; but
the Volunteers, who make themselves acquainted with the regulations,
VOL. IV.
U
299
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
6
will clearly perceive that, whenever they embark, they place them-
selves under direct naval authority; and that, when afloat, their own
officers are vever to assume any naval command whatever, unless
ordered to do so by their superior naval officers,
The officers of the Volunteers will do their utmost to assist the
naval officers to preserve discipline. They may, if they think fit,
set an example to their men by taking an active part in all the
duties and manual exercises. They may fall in at quarters, and take
any number at the gun. In short, they may become, as much as
they please, active working seamen and efficient practical gunners.
It is for them to use their own discretion in determining how much
or how little they shall participate in the drills and exercises ordered
by the naval officers in command.
“When at drill, as it has already been pointed out, the officer-
instructor will superintend the instruction of the Volunteers, and he
will be responsible that all exercises are properly carried out, in
accordance with the regulations from time to time laid down for the
instruction of the Royal Navy. It will thus be evident that the
paramount and undivided authority of the naval officers over the
Volunteers when afloat, and the superior responsibility of the officer
of instruction when the Volunteers are at drill, so largely over-
shadow the anthority of the officers of the Royal Naval Artillery
Volunteers in all matters, excepting those which relate to discipline
and the civil administration and organisation of the corps, that it
could not reasonably be expected that retired naval officers of rank
should volunteer to become battery officers in the Royal Naval
Artillery Volunteer Corps. Naval officers of less exalted rank do not
often retire, if they have a great zeal for the service. Some excep-
tions, however, there must be to this general rule; and it is probable
that a certain number of retired officers from the junior ranks of the
Navy will, hereafter, kindly offer their services to command brigades
or batteries in the ports or districts in which they may happen to
reside. The Volunteers will at all times feel a pride in availing
themselves of such opportunities of acting under officers who have
received a high professional training in Her Majesty's naval service.
“While the effect of the arrangements, which have been described,
necessarily limits the sphere of the officers of the Royal Naval Artillery
Volunteers, their services, in several important points, are not the less
essential It is to them that the Admiralty must look for the
exercise of their personal influence, in inducing recruits to join their
respective brigades and batteries ; and their moral influence will be
the principal security for the maintenance of good discipline in a
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
29.1
force composed exclusively of Volunteers. Although, under the
regulations, no fixed standard of efficiency is expressly required in an
officer of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer force, those among
them, who can command sufficient leisure for the purpose, will readily
appreciate how excellent an effect must be produced by the personal
example of an officer, who will take pains to make himself acquainted
with the drills and exercises, in which the men under bis command
are instructed. He will have the opportunity of obtaining the same
certificate of proficiency, which is given to those officers of the Naval
Reserve, who become qualified to drill the seamen of the Reserve at
the great guns, and in the small-arm exercises.
With the view of enlisting, in support of the Naval Volunteer
movement, the potent influences which are derived from the esprit
de corps, wherever it may reasonably and prudently be encouraged,
it is proposed to associate certain batteries in the London brigade
with some of the principal rowing and Corinthian yacht clubs on the
Thames, and to give commissions to any gentlemen, otherwise
eligible, who are instrumental in rasing a full battery of Naval
Volunteers.
* The following list of some of the principal rowing clubs will serve The row-
to show the large number of gentlemen, from whom assistance may Corinthian
be expected, in promoting the success of a movement for extending clubs.
the Volunteer service to a certain sphere of naval operations :
!
Name of Rowiug Club
London
Kingston
Thames
Ino
Waldegrave
Twickenham
West London
Oscillators
North London
Grove Park
Isleworth
Ilex
Molesey
No. of Members
480
425
300
300
200
175
170
162
150
150
100
100
.
•
“The Corinthian yacht clubs on the Thames are equally able to
render assistance, and are indeed capable of raising, if they think fit,
an entire brigade for the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer Corps.
The resources of the clubs located on the banks of the Thames
have been particularly specified; because the present writer, in his
connection with the movement under consideration, is more imme-
6
v 2
292
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
The
Volupteer
movement,
diately identified with that river. Readers of these pages, residing in
the vicinity of any of our great ports, will doubtless be able to discover
equally ample materials for the foundation of a sufficient force, for
the purposes of co-operation in the defence of the coast, in their own
neighbourhood. A corps, though it may be raised at some distance
from the sphere of its intended operations, in the event of threatened
invasion, will not be the less valuable for the defence of a great
port.
“The railway and the telegraph afford the means of concentrating
large bodies of men in a few hours at any port on the shores of the
United Kingdom. Wherever the Coastguard are stationed, the
means exist of giving instruction to the Naval Volunteers. All the
out-ports, at which men have been enrolled, can be visited by a gun-
boat at frequent intervals, to embark the Volunteers for target prac-
tice afloat; while those who wish to go to sea for an eight days' cruise,
will have, every year, the opportunity of doing so.
• In conclusion, it may not be superfluous to offer a few observa-
tions on the Volunteer movement generally. The most cogent
inducements to Volunteer activity may appear to be wanting at the
present time. Our country is happily not threatened with the danger
of foreign invasion. A becoming modesty will deter any individual
connected with the Volunteer service from arrogating to himself any
share in the prestige and distinction, which are the special privilege
of the Regular services. It is an essential feature of the present
movement that there shall be no contribution from the State in
the form of pecuniary reward for services rendered; and that every
effort shall be made by the Volunteers to impose as small a burden
as possible on the Exchequer. The sterner sense of duty, which is
now encouraged among the Volunteers for land service, is opposed to
ail attempts to gain popularity for the auxiliary forces by festivals,
holidays, and entertainments.
While, however, all these inducements and attractions are with-
held, a higher standard of efficiency in the officers and the men is
properly insisted on. In presence of the difficulties which arise from
the altered conditions of the service, some earnest friends of the
Volunteer movement have been oppressed with doubts, as to the pos-
sibility of stimulating the patriotism of the country to such a pitch
that Volunteers shall still be forthcoming in a time of profound
peace. I do not conceal my individual opinion that compulsory
service may fairly be required, from every individual of military age,
when the country is in danger. Unfortunately, so strong a measure
would probably meet with an amount of resistance, which could not
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
293
be overcome in this free country, where nothing affecting the social
habits and prejudices of the people can be proposed, which is not
universally popular. But I venture to hope that we may rely, in
the absence of direct legal compulsion, on motives even more power-
ful than the strong arm of the law. If every man who is capable of
co-operating in the defence of his country should feel himself com-
pelled, by his sense of duty and patriotism, to enter his name in the
roll of her defenders, the liability to service, thus imposed by the free
will of the Volunteer upon himself, will be a far more effectual safe-
guard than legal compulsion, for the security and the honour of
England.
"The Volunteer movement affords the occasion for teaching, in
the most practical form, the duty of self-sacrifice in a worthy cause.
'In the artificial conditions of modern society, there are multi-
tudes of men, who, in the ordinary exercise of their vocation, are
unduly deprived of the opportunities for physical exercise and deve-
lopment. More especially is this true of the younger members of
the professional and commercial classes. To them an appeal is now
most earnestly made on behalf of the Royal Naval Artillery Volun-
teers. In taking a part in our drills and exercises, they will do a
work beneficial to themselves individually, and conducive to the
welfare of their country.
294
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
REGULATIONS FOR THE ROYAL NAVAL. ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.'
Constitution and Establishment.
Authority.
Liability
to actual
service.
Corps, defi-
nition of
1. The 'Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers' are raised under the 'Royal
Naval Artillery Volunteer Act of 1872.'
They are subject to the provisions of that Act, and to all regulations
made with regard to them by the authority of the Admiralty.
2. By Royal Proclamation, the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers may
be assembled for actual service; and whenever so assembled, they will be
liable to serve on board any of Her Majesty's ships or vessels employed in
the defence of the coasts of the United Kingdom, or in any of the tenders
or boats attached to such vessels.
They will also be liable to perform all the ordinary duties of the vessel
in which they may be embarked, in the same manner as those duties are
performed by the regular crews of Her Majesty's ships, except those duties
that can only be performed by practical seamen.
They will not be required to go aloft, or to attend the fires in the stoke-
hole.
They will accommodate themselves to the berthing and messing arrange-
ments usual for the seamen of the Royal Navy.
3. A corps is a body of persons who combine, under common rules, to
form a part of the Naval Artillery Volunteer Force.
The members of a corps are either enrolled or honorary.
Enrolled members are persons of every grade, whose names are duly
entered for service in the muster-rolls of a corps.
Honorary members are persons who contribute to the funds of a corps,
but are not enrolled for service.
4. The Naval Artillery Volunteer Force, for administrative purposes,
will be formed into brigades, and each brigade will consist of four or more
batteries of from 60 to 80 men.
5. Each brigade will be designated by a local name, in addition to its
number in the force.
Each battery will be designated by its number in the brigade.
Every corps will bear a local name only.
6. Each brigade will be commanded by a lieutenant commanding.
Each battery will be commanded by a sub-lieutenant.
Every corps will have a commanding officer, who will of necessity be
the senior officer belonging to the corps, no matter what his rank may be,
and who will be responsible, under the Naval Artillery Volunteer Act,
1872,' for the management of the internal affairs of the corps.
7. The following table contains the authorised establishment for brigades
and the batteries composing them :
Enrolled
members.
Formation.
How to be
named.
Coinmand-
ing officers.
Establish-
ment
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
2956
Battery
Brigade
of four
batteries
Brigade
of six
batteries
Brigade
of eight
batteries
.
.
.
1
1
2
2
2
71
1
4
4
8
8
8
275
1
0
0
12
12
12
421
1
8
8
16
10
16
563
Lieutenant-cowmander.
Sub-lieutenant
Chief petty officer
First-class petty officer.
Second-class petty officer
Buglers
Leading gunners and gunners (equiva-
lent to leading seamen and able
seamen)
Staft':
Lieutenant-instructor
First-class petty officer-instructor
ictor:
Surgeon
Bugle-major
Armourer
51
125
301
403
1
1
4
1
1
1
1
6
1
1
1
1
8
1
1
]
0
80
320
480
640
Total enrolled
60
240
860
480
In this table, two numbers divided by a line signify the maximum and
minimum strength-thus & means not more than 80 and not less than 60.
for the
formation
of a new
formation.
Formation of Corps.
8. Persons wishing to form a corps to form part of a brigade of Royal Course to
be pursued
Naval Artillery Volunteers should place themselves in communication with
the Secretary of the Admiralty.
9. The Admiralty, in considering offers of the services of a new corps, corps
.
will have regard to the number of corps or batteries already existing on Reason for
the same part of the coast where the proposed corps would be.
10. The formation of a new corps will not be sanctioned, unless a New corps
sufficient number of persons to form a battery are prepared to enrol them- not to be
selves, and whilst any battery already existing in the locality is below its under cer-
establishment.
11. In offering the services of a new corps for acceptance, it should be
stated :
given on
(a) The place proposed for its bead-quarters.
application.
(6) The number of persons who are prepared to enrol themselves,
(c) The name and address of some person with whom communica-
tions on the subject may be made.
(d) The brigade of which it will form a part.
(e). That a proper place will be secured for the safe custody of any
Government arms and ammunition which may be issued.
tain cir-
cumstances.
Informa-
tion to be
(Form in Appendix A.)
12. Whenever it is practicable, a brigade will be formed at each of the Single
large ports in the Kingdom, and the batteries composing the brigade will brigade.
be raised in the immediate neighbourhood of the port.
296
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
District
brigade.
When the Volunteers are not of sufficient strength at any port to form
a brigade, the batteries enrolled on a part of the coast formed into a district,
will be formed into a brigade, and will be called a District Brigade.
The object of this organisation is to unite separate batteries under one
head, to secure uniformity among them, and to afford them the advantage
of an officer-instructor.
Rank of
the force.
Precedence and Command.
13. The “Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer Force' takes precedence
immediately after the Royal Naval Volunteers 'established by the Act
of 1859.
14. The relative precedence of the brigades forming the force is deter-
of brigades. mined by the date on which they were first severally established.
15. The relative precedence of corps is determined by the date on which
the Secretary of the Admiralty has first received a letter offering the services
Precedence
Precedence
of corps.
of the corps.
Precerlenca
of officers
with
others.
of officers
with each
other.
of officers
of same
date,
16. Officers of the Roval Naval Artillery Volunteers rank with, but
after, officers of the Royal Navy and Royal Naval Reserve of their respective
ranks.
Precedence
17. The relative precedence of officers of the whole force is determined
solely by the rank and date of their commissions in the force.
18. The relative precedence of officers bearing commissions of the same
Precedence date is determined by the order in which their names appear in the Navy
List.
Nothing in these regulations is to give a claim to any officer of the
Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers to assume command of any of Her
Majesty's land forces on shore, nor to any officer of Her Majesty's land
forces to assume command of any of Her Majesty's naval forces.
But when officers of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers are employed
on shore on joint service with Her Majesty's Land Forces, their relative
rank shall carry with it all precedence and advantages attaching to the
rank with which it corresponds, except command as aforesaid.
19. All Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, when assembled for drill or
under com- inspection, or voluntarily doing any naval duty either afloat or on shore, will
be under the command of the commander-in-chief, or senior naval officer of
the district within which such Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers are under-
going drill or inspection, or doing duty.
assembled.
20. The officers and petty officers of the Royal Naval Artillery Volun-
teers shall command each other, and the gunners and buglers of the force,
agreeably to their respective ranks, in all matters relating to their
specially.
duties; but none of them are ever to assume any naval command or
authority whatsoever, unless ordered, to do so by their superior naval
officers, and they are to be, in all matters whatsoever, under the com-
mand of the captain or commanding officer of the ship in which they may
be, and of the officer of the watch for the time being whatsoever his rank
To be
mand of
senior
naval
officer
whenever
Not to as-
sume naval
commend
unless
ordered.
may be.
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
297
Honours and Decorations.
21. A guard of honour may be provided as a matter of course for a Guards.
member of the Royal Family, or the Admiralty, on arrival in the neighbour-
hood of the head-quarters of a brigade; but in no other case will any body
of the Naval Artillery Volunteers take part in any public procession or
ceremony, or form a guard of honour, without the special authority of the
Admiralty or the senior naval officer of the district.
22. The only decorations that may be worn on the left breast are those Decora-
tions.
given by the Queen or by a Foreign Sovereign.
In the last case mentioned, Her Majesty's permission to accept and wear
the decoration must have been granted.
The medal of the Royal Humane Society may be worn.
ment.
meud.
commission
in other
forces.
of full-pay
Officers.
23. All officers of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers will be commis- Appoint-
sioned by the Admiralty.
24. The commanding officers of brigades will recommend for the con- Command-
sideration of the Admiralty, names of persons for the appointments and ing officers
promotion of officers in their brigades.
In order to enable the Admiralty to judge the qualifications of the
persons recommended, the commanding officer will forward, with his re-
commendation, a statement giving the name, age, residence, place of educa-
tion, and occupation or profession of the candidate, as well as a medical
officer's certificate, stating that the candidate is in good health and fit to
perform the duties of an officer.
25. If any person recommended for an appointment as an officer holds a Holding a
commission in the Royal Navy or other force, the nature of such commis-
sion should be stated in the letter of recommendation.
26. Officers on full pay in the Navy or Army are not eligible for other Eligibility
than honorary commissions.
officers.
27. The appointment of an honorary commander to a brigade is Honorary
allowed, and such honorary lieutenants and honorary sub-lieutenants as com-
mander.
the Admiralty may think fit to sanction.
28. The appointments of an honorary chaplain and staff-surgeon to a Honorary
chaplain
brigade are allowed at the discretion of the Admiralty.
29. The appointments of all honorary officers will cease whenever the geon.
force is called out for actual service, unless the Admiralty shall see fit to Honorary
accept the services of any such officers who may volunteer for active
service.
30. No officer holding an honorary commission can, in virtue of it, take
precedence of any officer holding a substantive commission of the same of honorary
rank.
31. Every officer is required to possess a competent knowledge of his Officers to
duties, and to give a proper attendance at the drills of his corps.
knowledge,
Any officer who does not attend the number of drills prescribed for the of duties,
enrolled Volunteers of his corps, to qualify them for certificates of efficiency,
and sur-
appoint-
when to
cease.
Precedence
officers.
possess a
&c.
298
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
will not be allowed to retain his commission unless the Admiralty may see
special reasons for a relaxation of this regulation.
Appoint-
meut.
Leading
gunners.
Petty Officers.
32. The petty officers of a battery are appointed by the commanding
officer of the battery, from among the enrolled members of the battery.
33. Leading gunners may be appointed by the commanding officer of a
battery, in the proportion of one to every twenty of enrolled gunners.
34. A petty officer or leading gunner may be reduced by the command-
ing officer of a brigade, for any sufficient cause; such cause to be judged by
the officers of the brigade sitting as a Court of Inquiry.
Reductiun.
Enrolled Members.
Qualifica-
tivul
Age.
Disquali-
fication.
35. Candidates for enrolment as members of the Royal Naval Artillery
Volunteers must be of good character and physically fit for the service;
their eligibility will be judged by the commanding officer of the corps,
assisted by such others of the corps as he may think fit to appoint for that
purpose.
36. No person below the age of 17 is to be enrolled in the corps without
the special authority of the Admiralty.
Boys of 14 years of age and upwards may be enrolled for the purpose of
being trained as bug.ers.
37. Men belonging to any other force liable to be called out for service
in case of war are not to be enrolled.
Apprentices are not to be enrolled without the consent of their masters.
Persons dismissed from any other service or corps for misconduct are
not to be enrolled without the special sanction of the Admiralty.
38. The commanding officer of a corps is to give to any Volunteer, on,
his quitting the corps, a certificate of discharge, in Form B. of the Appendix,
when requested to do so by such Volunteer.
39. Enrolled members are classed as efficients and non-efficients.
40. An efficient member must have fulfilled the conditions prescribed by
the Admiralty from time to time.
41. All enrolled members who do not fulól the conditions above referred
to are reckoned as non-efficients.
Certificate
of dis-
charge.
Classifica-
tion,
Efficients.
Non-eff-
cients.
Number
and posi-
tion.
Honorary Members.
42. The number of honorary members attached to any corps is not regu-
lated by the Admiralty, and such members are not included in the muster-
roll of the corps to which they are attached.
They are not subject to discipline nor allowed to interfere with the
duties of the corps, but they are permitted to wear its uniform, unless a
special provision to the contrary is contained in the authorised rules of the
corps.
Rules.
43. In order to give legal force to the rules of a corps for the manage-
ment of its affairs, they must be submitted to the Admiralty for approval.
Must be
approved.
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
299
44. All rules which are to be forwarded for approval must be transmitted to be
in duplicate, one copy to be retained at the Admiralty, the other to be re-
turned to the corps, with any alterations that may be required.
duplicate.
trans-
mitted in
Courts of Inquiry.
45. A court of inquiry is not a judicial body; it has no power to ad- Nature of.
minister an oath.
It is to be considered as a Board of which the Admiralty or an officer
in command of a brigade or corps may make use, to assist him in arriving
at a correct judgment on any subject upon which it may be expedient to in-
stitute an inquiry.
46. The duties of a court of inquiry depend on the instructions which Duties of.
the convening authority may think proper to give.
It may be either employed merely in collecting and arranging evidence,
or it may, in addition, be directed to give an opinion as to the facts esta-
blished by that evidence; but it has no power to pronounce any judgment as
to the course to be taken by the convening authority in dealing with those
facts.
When facts connected with the conduct of an individual are submitted
to the investigation of a court of inquiry, it is necessary that the instructions
for the guidance of the court should be sufficiently specific, as regards matter,
names, dates, and places, to convey clearly to the court the nature of the
subject into which it is appointed to inquire, and also to enable the person
whose conduct is called in question to know what he has to answer.
It rests with the authority who orders the assembly of the court of in-
quiry to decide whether it shall be open or close.
All evidence taken by a court of inquiry is to be recorded as nearly as
possible in the words of the witness and in the order in which it is re-
ceived.
The proceedings when closed are to be signed by the president and mem-
bers, after which they are to be forwarded by the president to the convening
authority.
47. A court of inquiry may be re-assembled as often as the superior May be re-
authority may deem necessary, and on every occasion of its meeting it is
competent to receive and record new evidence.
The commanding officer of a brigade is authorised to assemble a court Power of
of inquiry, to investigate any matter with which he himself has the power ing officer
of dealing.
Discipline.
48. The course to be adopted as to the discipline of the Volunteers will
be found in Part III. of the Naval Artillery Volunteers Act.
49. Meetings are not to be held in the corps for the purpose of express-
Meetings
ing an opinion upon the acts of a commanding officer, or of recommending held on
him to take a particular course of action ; nor are memorials to be drawn actions of
superiors.
up to the same effect; and no meetings except those called together by or
under the authority of the commanding officer of a brigade or corps, who
will be responsible for doing so, will be recognised.
assembled.
commanda
to assem-
ble.
not to be
300
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
receive
to salute
of all ser-
vices.
If any Volunteer has cause to think himself aggrieved, he will l'e-
present his case to the commanding officer of his battery. Any appeal
against the decision of the commanding officer of the battery will be made
through him to the commander of the brigade, and any further appeal will
be made through both these officers to the Admiralty.
Not to
50. Members of the force are not, individually or collectively, to attend
attend
political meetings, or join in public political discussion or demonstrations in
political
meetings
uniform.
in uniform.
51. Bands of Volunteer Brigades are not to appear in uniform, for any
Bands of
music. purpose, without the consent of the commanding officer of the brigade.
Permanent 52. Members of the permanent staff will be held responsible that they
staff not to do not allow themselves to be complimented, either directly or indirectly,
resents. by presents or collective expressions of opinion from persons who are serving
or who have served in the brigade to which they are attached.
Volunteers
53. Officers and men of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, when in
uniform, are to pay the customary marks of respect to such officers of the
superiors
Navy, Army, and Auxiliary Forces as are entitled to be saluted by officers
and men of corresponding rank in their own service.
54. Every officer and petty officer shall make himself acquainted with,
and shall duly observe and obey, and as far as in him lies, enforce the due
all regula- execution of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer Act, 1873, and the
regulations for the 'Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer Force,' together with
all regulations, instructions, and orders, which may from time to time be
given or issued by the Admiralty, or by any superior officer, and shall in
all respects conform his conduct to the customs and usages of Her Majesty's
Naval Service.
Discipline
55. When Royal. Naval Artillery Volunteers are assembled with the
Regular Forces of the Army in camp or for training, they will be under the
· Naval Discipline Act, 1866,' in the same manner as if they were on actual
service, and will be placed under the immediate command of an officer of
Her Majesty's Navy.
Camp rules will apply in all respects to the Royal Naval Artillery
Volunteers.
The Naval Volunteers must perform the camp duties of fatigue, cook-
ing, &c.
Case of
56. In case of grave misconduct of any of the Royal Naval Artillery
misconduct Volunteers whilst on board any of H.M. ships for the purpose of training,
ing to be the officer in command of the ship will report the circumstance to the
reported.
Admiralty through the usual channel.
Officers to
observe
and enforce
tions.
in camp
when train-
Conditions
on which
to meet
under
arms.
Brigaded
with other
forces.
Assemblies of the Force.
57. The Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers are not to assemble under
arms for any purpose unconnected with parade, drill, or rifle practice, except
with the approval of the Admiralty.
58. The Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers may, when circumstances
permit, be brigaded with other forces, the sanction of the Admiralty having
been previously obtained.
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
301
or camp.
ammu-
* 59. When any of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers desire to visit Visiting
any garrison or camp as a naval body, the permission of the Secretary at garrison
War must first be obtained through the Admiralty.
Upon all occasions of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers entering
a garrison or camp as a body, the officer in command must duly report his
arrival to the senior naval officer present, or, if there is not one, he will
wait on the officer in command of the garrison or camp.
60. When the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers are brought together Command
under arms, at rifle-shooting matches, or other occasions, with other volun- at rifle-
shooting
teer corps, or with any of Her Majesty's Land Forces on shore, the officer malches.
in command of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, present, shall take
care that everyone under his command complies with all the regulations
of the Land Forces relative to the camp or ground on which they may be,
and he shall confer with the senior officer of the Land Forces, and act
in concert with him, so that the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers may in
all cases act in accordance with the orders under which the Land Forces
are acting ; but it is to be distinctly understood that nothing in this regula-
tion is to give a claim to any officer of Her Majesty's Navy, or of any Naval
Volunteer Corps, to assume command of any of Her Majesty's Land Forces,
nor to any officer of Her Majesty's Land Forces to assume command of any
of Her Majesty's Naval Forces.
61. When the Volunteers, at the termination of an exercise, are to Surplus
return by railway or boat to their head-quarters, the arms are to be examined, nition to
and all the ammunition which has not been expended must be collected and be col-
placed in a metal or leather case, with a view to its being conveyed in safety
to the head-quarters.
Stores.
62. The commanding officer of a corps is responsible to the Admiralty Responsi-
for all stores which are supplied by Government for the use of the corps.
bility for
63. Each corps will be supplied gratuitously with arms from the Govern- Arms to be
ment stores to the full number of its enrolled members, if required.
supplied by
64. The arms to be supplied are in Appendix C.
65. Before any. Government arms can be issued, it is necessary that the Description
Admiralty shall be satisfied that one or more places of security for the custody
of the arms have been provided at the expense of the Volunteers. The drill to be avail-
ships, Coastguard stations, or police stations will probably be available in able before
some places for the purpose.
supplied.
66. Commanding officers of corps are to apply for the arms required in Applica-
the prescribed form of requisition given in Appendix D., addressed to the
Secretary of the Admiralty.
67. The arms of a brigade will be marked previously to their issue, and Marking
a request to that effect is to be inserted in the requisition on which the arms
are demanded.
No other marks than those on them when issued are on any account to
be put on the arms.
68. All arms issued to the corps remain the property of Her Majesty's Respon-
Government, and the commanding officer for the time being is held respon- arms.
sibility for
lected.
and care of.
Governo
ment.
of arias.
Armouries
arms are
tioni for
arnis.
arms.
302
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
aid care
of arms.
arms.
sible for their being at all times in a serviceable state, and for their being
returned into store when required in good condition, fair wear and tear
excepted.
Cleaning
69. Great attention should be paid to the proper cleaning and care of
the arms entrusted to the Volunteers, and the commanding officers are to
point out to those under their command that, should rust be allowed to
accumulate on any part of a rifle, it must inevitably impair the accuracy
and efficiency of the weapon.
Depositing 70. The arms are to be deposited after drill in the armouries of the bri.
gade or corps, except when the commanding officer may judge it experlient
to permit members of the brigade to keep their arms at their own houses.
As the commanding officer is responsible for the condition of the arms,
this permission may be withdrawn by him whenever he may consider it
necessary.
The arms retained in private custody will be subject to inspection at
any time, and they are to be examined at least once in six months by the
commanding officer of the brigade or officers appointed by him for that
purpose.
71. Arms requiring repair are to be deposited with the gunner of the
Repairs of drill ship to which the brigade is attached.
72. Repairs of arms arising from fair wear, found to be necessary in
Charge for order to make the arms serviceable, will be executed free of charge; the
repairs.
expense of other l'epairs will be borne by the corps.
73. Ammunition in the following proportion, to be reckoned from the
Allowance 1st April in each year, is allowed :
arms,
of ammill-
nition.
For Guns.
For each battery of Brigade
.
100 shot
25 shell
30 blank
01
For each trained man
efficient
And for the battery
4 shot
2 shot
25 shell
30 blank
.
1'or Small Arms.
!
Gratis
Allowed to be
purchased
Total
For every efficient for his first year's service:
Rifled ball,
Blauk
Pistol
Caps
70
10
100
110
50
50
100
110
120
60
200
220
50
.
For every efficient after his first year's service:
Rifled ball.
Blauk
Pistol
Caps .
1
.
70
60
100
110
120
60
150
170
50
60
.
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
303
tion.
Requisitions for small-arm ammunition, in accordance with the established Storing of
proportion, are to be forwarded to the commanding officer of the nearest ammuni-
drill ship or district coastguard ship for transmission to the nearest control
officer. Special demands should be forwarded to the Secretary of the
Admiralty by the captains of the above ships for approval, on form given in
Appendix E.
74. Every brigade is required to provide a secure place for the custody
of its small-arm ammunition ; but in cases where the store of ammunition
is sutficiently large to make it desirable that it should be stored in the
magazines of any of Her Majesty's ships, used as drill ships for the
Volunteers, commanding officers of such ships will afford facilities for its
l'eception.
75. Every care is to be taken in the conveyance and general handling of Convey-
ammunition, and the regulations and customs of the Royal Navy in that ance of am-
munition.
l'espect are to be strictly adhered to.
76. Metal cylinders, or leather cartridge cases, for conveying the surplus Metal
ammunition collected from the pouches of Volunteers, under the provisions &
cylinders,
of Article 61, will be supplied at cost price.
77. No article of equipment will be returned into store for the purpose Return of
of being replaced, until it has become thoroughly unserviceable. No
serviceable
articles will be returned into store on account of being of an obsolete or obsolete.
pattern without the authority of the Admiralty.
78. All arms or other stores supplied free of cost and placed in the Stores lost
custody of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, are, if lost, destroyed, or injured
to be paid
or injured by fault or neglect, to be paid for by the corps.
79. All demands for stores, in accordance with the established pro- Demands
portion allowed, are to be made out in the War Office forms in use in Her for stores.
Majesty's Navy, and are to be forwarded by the commanding officers of
brigades to the nearest drill ship or Coastguard ship for transmission to
the nearest control officer. Special demands should be forwarded to the
Secretary of the Admiralty for approval by the captains of the above-
named ships.
Drill
c.
articles un-
for.
carried
80. The drills of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers will comprise Nature of.
the drills for great guns, rifle, pistol, and cutlass, as in the Royal Navy,
and no deviation from those drills is to be permitted.
81. All drills will be carried out by the instructors attached to the By whom
brigades under the officer-instructor, and when on board any of Her to be
Majesty's ships they will be also subject to the supervision of the com- out.
manding officer of the ship.
82. The qualification necessary for an efficient will be found in the Qualifica-
Appendix F, and may be amended as the Admiralty may from time to tion for
time think necessary.
83. A badge of efficiency will be worn by men who were returned as Badge of
'efficient' in the last annual brigade. The badge will consist of a chevron efficiency.
of silver lace worn on the right arm above the wrist.
Men who have been five times returned as efficient may wear one star,
efficient.'
304
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Trained
man.
Non-effi-
cients to
attend
drills.
Firing
practice
super-
intended.
and those who have been returned ten times may wear two stars abɔve
the badge.
84. Volunteers who pass the examination for trained man, as in the
Royal Navy, will be so designated, and will wear two chevrons of silver
lace on the right arm above the wrist.
85. Every Volunteer must attend at least two drills a month until he
has obtained the standard of an efficient.'
86. No firing practice with great guns is to be carried on by Volunteers,
except under the superintendence of an officer of the Royal Navy, or of an
officer-instructor of Volunteers, unless a relaxation of this rule has been
especially sanctioned by the Admiralty.
87. Sword bayonets are not to be worn at gun-drill, or when moving
powder.
No smoking is on any account to be allowed in the vicinity of magazines
or cases containing powder.
No persons are to be allowed to congregate round barrels or cases con-
taining powder.
Powder cases or barrels are not to be opened either inside a magazine,
or immediately outside the door.
to be
Precautions
when at
gun-prac-
tice.
Allowances.
On actual
service.
Not op
actual
service.
Wounds or
injuries on
service or
drill.
88. When on actual service the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers will
receive the same pay, allowances, and victuals as the officers and con-
tinuous service seamen of the ranks and ratings in the Royal Navy of
relative rank, and will have the same means of allotting pay to wives,
relatives and friends, and whilst on actual service will be treated in the
same manner in every respect.
89. When not on actual service and embarked on board any of Her
Majesty's ships for more than forty-eight hours, the Volunteers will be
victualled for the whole time they are so embarked, or receive compensa-
tion for provisions at the rate of ls. 6d. per day; but when they are
embarked for less than forty-eight hours, they will not receive victuals or
an allowance in lieu.
90. If a Volunteer is wounded or injured on service or on drill, he will
be entitled to the same pension to which any seaman in Her Majesty's
Navy would be entitled for a similar wound or injury; or if killed, slain,
or drowned on service, or on drill, his widow (if any) will be entitled to
the same gratuities out of Greenwich Hospital Funds as the widow of any
other seaman of the Navy of the same rating.
91. Volunteers taken seriously ill or injured whilst undergoing drill,
may be sent to a naval hospital or sick quarters for treatment.
92. Applications for pensions, or compensations for injuries or hurts
received whilst on service or drill, are to be specially made to the Ad-
miralty; the nature and cause of the injury are to be fully reported, and
the names of the witnesses, as also whether blame was attributable to the
Volunteer making the application, when the case will be considered as it
deserves.
Hospital
or sick
quarters.
Applica-
tions for
pensions.
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
305
93. Volunteers are allowed to purchase at the Government rate any Purehase
of clothing,
clothing or necessaries that may be requisite for their outfit or dress as
belonging to the corps.
&c.
Permanent Staff
sition.
ment.
selected.
other
ap-
94. The permanent staff of a brigade will consist of one officer-instructor Compo-
to the brigade, and one petty officer-instructor for each battery composing
the brigade.
95. The appointments to the permanent staff will be made by the Appoint-
Admiralty, and will be tenable for a term of five years, or for such lesser
period that the Admiralty may think fit.
96. The officer-instructor will be commissioned as lieutenant in the Officer
Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, and will be selected from officers of, whence
or retired from, the Royal Navy, of and above the rank of lieutenant.
97. The officer-instructor will be required to undergo a course of in- Qualifica
struction in one of the gunnery ships to qualify him for the duties of in- tion.
structor in heavy and truck gun drills, rifle, pistol, and cutlass exercises.
98. As the services of an officer-instructor will be at all times required Not to hold
by the Volunteers, he will not be permitted to follow any profession or ap-
pointment.
pointment, public or private.
99. No officer whose age exceeds fifty years is eligible for the appoint- Age.
ment of officer-instructor.
100. Ari officer-instructor of Naval Volunteers is purely a staff officer, Rank and
and except for the purpose of instruction, is not entitled, by virtue of his position.
superior rank, to take the command of any force of Naval Volunteers,
when an officer of the corps is present.
101. An officer-instructor is appointed to give instruction to the General
Volunteers. He is subject to the orders of his commanding officer, and he
is required to assist him in carrying on the naval duties of the brigade;
but he is not to take any part in the civil affairs of the brigade.
It is his duty to keep the muster-rolls of the brigade, and to make
himself acquainted with all the members of the brigade, and their qualifica-
tions and dispositions.
He is to superintend the drills and exercises of the brigade, and is to
have complete control over the petty officer-instructors of the several
batteries, and is responsible to the Admiralty that their duties are properly
performed, and that the drills are in accordance with those laid down for
the Royal Navy.
102. The officer-instructor is required to keep a diary of the instruction Diary.
imparted by him to the Volunteers according to Form G. Appendix. This
diary is to be certified by the commanding officer of the brigade, and trans-
mitted to the Admiralty on the 1st of every month.
103. The officer-instructor will, under the commanding officer of the Control
over Petty
brigade, have control over the petty officer-instructors, both as regards Officer
their discipline and their duties as instructors; and he will, should he instructors.
have occasion, report any misconduct or inconpetency of a petty officer-
instructor to the Admiralty.
VOL. IV.
duties,
X
306
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Petty Officer-Instructor's.
Rank and
position.
Duties.
104. The petty officer-instructors will have the rank of first-class petty
officers in the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer Force, and will be selected
from pensioned petty officers of the Royal Navy, and must hold a certificate
from one of the gunnery ships of competency as an instructor in heavy and
truck gun drill, rifle, pistol, and cutlass exercises.
They will be purely staff petty officers, and will not be entitled, by
virtue of their superior rank, to take the command of any of the Naval
Volunteers, when a petty officer of the corps is present, except for the
purpose of instruction.
105. The petty-officer instructors are to give instruction to the Volun-
teers under the direction of the officer-instructor. They are subject to the
command of their superior officers of the naval Volunteers, and are to
assist them in carrying on their naval duties, but they are not to take
any part in the civil affairs of the brigade.
106. The petty officer-instructors will be expected, on all occasions, to
set an example of what the Naval Volunteers should attain to, and they
will only be allowed to retain their position so long as they conduct them-
selves as petty officers of the Royal Navy should do.
They are to consider the officer-instructor as their immediate head, and
apply to him in all matters that may be necessary.
107. The petty officer-instructors will each keep a diary of the instruc-
tion imparted by him to the Volunteers according to form in Appendix H.
This diary is to be certified by the commanding officer of the battery, and
transmitted weekly to the officer-instructor.
108, The permanent staff will receive pay as follows:
Officer-instructor
10s. per day.
Petty officer-instructor
3s. per day
Conduct.
Diary.
Pay of per-
maneut
staff.
A
Uniforın.
FOR OFFICERS.
Distinctive
lace.
109. The uniform to be worn by the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers
is to be of the same pattern as for officers of the corresponding ranks in the
Royal Navy, with the following exceptions, viz. :
110. Instead of each distinctive stripe of half-inch gold lace round the
sleeve, there is to be a stripe formed of two waved lines of quarter-inch silver
braid, running parallel to each other so as to form bands three-quarters
of an inch wide, the blue cloth to show quarter of an inch between the lines
of braid.
111. The buttons to be of the naval pattern, with the letters R.N. on
one side of the anchor and A.V. on the other side.
The crown and anchor to be gilt, and the remainder of the button
Buttons,
silver.
Epaulettes.
112. The epaulettes to be silver, and, instead of the anchor on the
THL ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
307
epaulette, there is to be a badge consisting of an anchor in the centre, sur-
rounded by the words 'R. N. A. Volunteers,' embroidered in gold.
Crown and stars, when worn on the epaulettes, to be embroidered in
gold.
cap.
113. Instead of the bullion loop on the cocked hat, the loop to be Hat.
formed of two silver braids, waved as on the coat sleeves, and the tassels to be
silver.
114. The badge for the cap to have the letters R.N. placed on one side Badge for
of the anchor, and the letters A.V. on the other side.
The anchor and letters to be embroidered in gold, and the surr
rrounding
laurel leaves in silver. The crown to be embroidered in gold and silver, as
in the naval pattern.
115. The plate of the sword-belt and the swivel to be silver. The crown Sword-belt
and anchor on it to be gilt, and the letters R.N.A.V. on each side of the
anchor, also gilt.
116. All lace and embroidery, except where otherwise ordered in these Lace and
regulations, is to be of silver.
dery.
embroi-
DRESS UNIFORM.
Dress uni-
form.
117. Coat the same as undress.
Trowsers.—The lace on the seam to be silver.
Sword-belt. The embroidered lines to be silver.
The dress trowsers and sword-belt to be worn only on such occasions as
are customary in the Royal Navy.
PETTY OFFICERS AND GUNNERS.
118. The uniforn to be of the same pattern as for petty officers and
seamen of the Royal Navy, with the following exceptions, viz. :
119. The buttons on jackets of chief petty officers to be of silver, the Buttons.
same as those of the officers.
The buttons of the petty officers and gunners to be of the same pattern,
but of black horn.
120. The tape trimmings of the white frock to be waved in the same Trimmings.
manner as the braid on the coat sleeves of the officers.
121. All badges are to be of silver embroidery on the jackets, and of Badges.
silver or white on the blue serge.
On the white frock they are to be blue.
122. The cap ribbon to have a crown and anchor in front, with the Cap
letters R.N. on one side of the anchor, and the letters A.V. on the other.
ribbons.
The crown and anchor and letters to be embroidered in silver on a black
silk ribbon.
The letters to be five-eighths of an inch in size.
Correspondence and Returns.
123. All official correspondence from the Volunteer brigades except the
correspondence of the officer-instructor in his capacity of instructor, is to
proceed from the commanding officer, or to pass through him.
X 2
308
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
C.
Having explained the original design of the founders of the
Naval Volunteer movement, and printed in extenso the regulations
laid down by the Admiralty, it only remains to show with what
degree of success the Naval Volunteers have passed through the early
stages in the development of the force.
The Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers have been spoken of in the
warmest terms, both by Sir Walter Tarleton and Admiral Phillimore.
The farewell report of Sir Walter Tarleton, 1877, concludes with
the following observations:-
Report of
Sir Walter
Tarleton,
1877.
* Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers.
'I attach the last returns showing the strength of this force.
The London brigade has shown much zeal and perseverance in
acquiring a knowledge of the gun drill and small arms, and they have
cheerfully submitted to privation and discomfort in going out in a
gunboat.
“I attach the report of the lieutenant commanding the gunboat
on the last cruise.
“I am of opinion that they would be found useful in the event of
war in the defence of the estuaries, while in peace they serve as
a connecting link between the Volunteer movement and the Royal
Navy.
* The Liverpool brigade is increasing in number and efficiency
under a new commanding officer and instructor.
‘At Bristol the movement has never been popular, and unless
more energy is shown, and more Volunteers enrol, it seems question-
able whether the expense of maintaining the staff of instructors should
be continued.
* An intimation to this effect to the commanding officer might
stimulate further exertion.
(J. W. TARLETON,
Vice-Admiral Superintendent Naval Reserve.'
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
309
Admiral
1878.
The report of Admiral Phillimore in 1878 was equally favour- Report of
able :
Pbillimore,
'1 New Street, Spring Gardens, S.W.: February 20, 1878.
Sir,- In accordance with instructions from the First Lord of the
Admiralty, I have the honour to report on the present condition of the
Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers.
*This corps was enrolled in accordance with the Act of Parliament
in 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 77).
"The opinion of my predecessor on the Royal Naval Artillery
Volunteers is given at page 7 of his confidential report, on quitting
office, dated 18th October 1876:—“That they would be useful in the
event of war, in the defence of the estuaries, while in peace they serve
as a connecting link between the Volunteer movement and the Royal
Navy."
Since the date of this report the strength of the force has changed
as follows:
Strength in
October 1876
Present
strength
383
3841
London Brigade, forned 1873, with batteries
at Hastings and Brighton .
Liverpool Brigade, formed 1874, with batteries
at Southport, Carnarvon, and Bangor
Bristol Brigade, formed 1874,
205
69
5062
112
Total
657
1,002
It will thus be seen that the movement maintains its position,
and that at Liverpool it has developed itself very much.
Both at London and Liverpool the condition of the Brigade is
excellent. The Volunteers drill with celerity and precision, and are
extremely zealous. They cheerfully conform to discipline, and are
desirous of improving themselves in every way when embarked for
their annual drill.
'I have not inspected the Bristol Brigade this year, but the
Returns show a number of only 50 “ efficient" against 62 “non-
efficient."
Though I concur generally in the views expressed by my prede-
cessor, it is difficult to define the exact duties to which these
Volunteers would be applied in case of war: much would depend
upon the localities of the different corps. For instance, the detach-
ments at Hastings and Brighton would not be likely to be called on
1 1876: 50 officers and men at Brighton. 65 officers and men at Hastings.
1878: 46 at Hastings. 55 at Brighton.
? 1878: 36 at Southport. 39 at Bangor. 71 at Carnarvon (not formed till
after October 1876).
310
OUR NAVAL RESERVES,
for the defence of the estuaries. They might assist in manning any
batteries, whether on shore or afloat, near the coast. In some places
they might supply the place of the Coastguard temporarily, if that
force should be suddenly embarked. They might furnish guards at
rendezvous and places of embarkation to preserve order. Many of them
have become expert artillerists.
“There is one distinctive feature in the Naval Artillery Volunteers :
they get no capitation grant; so they defray all the expenses of their
own uniforms, and thus set an excellent example to all the seaports
of men who learn the use of arms, and voluntarily submit themselves
to discipline, in order that they may become more useful citizens in
time of war by contributing in person and in purse to the defence of
the coast.
'I think the movement assists in making the Naval Service better
appreciated and understood at certain places, and consequently in-
creases the popularity of the Navy generally, which, if more seamen
were required for ships of war, might be of great value in facilitating
fresh entries.
“I have, &c.
(Signed)
AUGUSTUS PHILLIMORE,
Admiral Superintendent.
• The Secretary of the Admiralty.'
Report of
Admiral
Philliinore,
1879.
On the completion of his term of service as Admiral Superinten-
dent of the Reserves, Admiral Phillimore addressed a gratifying
note to the Compiler on the general condition of the Naval Volunteer
force:
Naval Reserves, 1 New Street, Spring Gardens, S.W.: November 14, 1879.
'My dear Mr. Brassey, I think you will like to see the copy of
the letter I have written to Lord Ashley about the London Brigade
of R.N.A.V.
"I have in my farewell report to the Admiralty drawn their
attention to the slow but steady increase of the force, thus:-
London (including Brighton and Hastings)
Liverpool (including Bangor and Carnarvon)
Bristol,
In 1876
383
205
69
In 1879
444
572
167
Total
657
1,183
All this without any capitation grant (and I think Jersey and the
Isle of Man will each have their brigades in another year) tends to
show clearly that there was room for the movement. The Duke of
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
311
Edinburgh is to relieve me on the 21st, so I must say my farewell to
you from my official capacity.
Yours sincerely,
6 AUGUSTUS PHILLIMORE.'
The Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer movement may be regarded
as a connecting link between the Navy and the civil population. In
the ordinary duties of the service the Navy is necessarily kept apart
from the main stream of the national-life. The Navy wants the sym-
pathy of the country. It gives us in return a share in its traditions,
and the high examples of self-sacrifice, patriotism, and devotion, which
we have before us, and shall do well to follow, in the lives of Nelson
and the band of heroes by whom he was surrounded, and in the long
succession of officers, who, without his opportunities of distinction,
have spent their lives in loyal service of the country.
The admirable appearance of the Naval Volunteers at Windsor is
an event so recent, that it does not fall within the scope of the
present compilation, which is limited to a reprint of former publica-
tions. The views and the labours of the Compiler in his official
capacity are necessarily of a confidential character. It will be enough
for him to say that his interest in the Naval Volunteers cannot be
weakened by his closer connection with the administration of the
Navy.
312
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
1
D.
Distribu-
tion of
prizes.
II.M.S.
• Engle.'
In 1880 the annual distribution of prizes in connection with the
Liverpool Brigade of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers took place
on board H.M.S. - Eagle.' The following report of the proceedings
is from the Liverpool Daily Post. Lieutenant-Commander E. S.
Inman presided.
Lieutenant INMAN, in addressing the audience with regard to
the work done by the corps, had pleasure in stating that it had been
satisfactory, and equal to what had been done in previous years. As
regarded numbers, the corps was at the present moment similar in
strength to what it was last year, and the seeming absence of an
increase might be accounted for by the fact that they had taken what
were called "paper men' off the list and had added real recruits;
therefore, they were stronger rather than weaker. The actual detail
of the work done had been very satisfactory. Their efficiency was
equal, if not better, than what it had been in past years. He had
great pleasure in thanking those who had given the prizes for compe-
tition, for they were dependent to a great extent upon their friends'
support in that respect. He was glad to say that the competition
for prizes had been great, and that the members had turned up well
for the various prizes. After referring to the great service Mr.
Goschen had rendered in starting the Naval Volunteer movement,
the speaker said if they could get those in high places to recognise
that they could be of some importance as a defence to the port, there
would be a better hope for their progress as a corps. The difficulty,
however, was that they could not afford to leave their home in Liver-
pool for any length of time, but if an arrangement could be made
whereby they should not leave Liverpool but assist in the defence of
their own river, there would be no difficulty in procuring as many
men as might be required as an auxiliary or help in the defence of
the port.
After distributing the prizes, which were read out by Lieutenant
Squire, R.N.,
THE ROYAL NAVAL ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
313
Volunteer
movement.
Mr. BRASSEY, M.P., who was received with loud applause, addressed Prospects
the corps. He said: This is the second time I have had the pleasure Naval
of seeing the Liverpool Brigade of Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers
in my official capacity as your honorary commander. I have seen
you at drill. I am to-day to distribute prizes to the most efficient
members of the corps. More than ordinary interest attaches to the
present occasion. We, the original promoters of the Naval Volunteer
movement, cannot disguise from ourselves the fact that it is in a
critical position, and has reached a turning-point in its history. We
must either develop into a permanent, more numerous, and more
widely distributed force, or we must go through the painful process
of decay. It is now nine years since the Naval Artillery Volunteers
were called into existence by the Admiralty, over which Mr. Goschen
presided. The idea of a sea militia is of old date, and has always
been popular, and when Mr. Goschen, in two speeches, the one
delivered at Liverpool and the other at the Sailors' Home in London,
made an appeal to the shipowners and to the seafaring and sea-loving
population generally, to co-operate with the regular forces of the
Navy, his appeal met with a prompt and hearty response. I had
the honour of being asked by the pioneers of the Naval Volunteer
movement in London to become the channel of communication with
the Admiralty. We were met in a liberal and encouraging spirit.
As a tentative measure, the Volunteers were permitted to go through
some preliminary drill on board the 'President,' the drill-ship of the
Naval Reserve in London. It was speedily established that they
were thoroughly able to carry out what they had undertaken—to
work naval guns and to man and arm boats. The necessary Act of
Parliament was obtained, and with the assistance of Captain Cod-
rington, now in command of the Steam Reserve at Portsmouth, to
whose patience, tact, and sound judgment the success of the Naval
Volunteers is largely due, we were finally constituted as an integral
though subordinate part of the naval forces of the Crown. Our
subsequent history must be briefly sketched. The Royal Naval
Artillery Volunteers are now some 1,400 in number. Brigades
have been established in London, Liverpool, and Bristol, with de-
tached batteries at Brighton and Hastings, and at Carnarvon and
Southport. The members of the corps have been thoroughly
instructed by the highly qualified men appointed for that purpose
from the Excellent. They have embarked in considerable numbers
in the three gunboats which have been annually placed at their
disposal, and they have received the highest commendation from
the Admirals Superintendent of the Reserves, Sir Walter Tarleton
314
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Prospects
of the
Naval
Volunteer
movement.
and Admiral Phillimore, and from the lieutenants in command of the
gunboats. Speaking on behalf of the Admiralty, I may say that we
appreciate most highly the zeal, the public spirit, and the intelligence
which have been displayed by Lieutenants Graves, Bell, and Inman,
who have in succession held the command in Liverpool, and, indeed,
by all the officers and men who have enrolled themselves in the ranks
of the Naval Volunteers. Having referred to the more promising
features of our past experience, I must make a frank acknowledg-
ment that our exchequer is exhausted, and that we have to face an
insurmountable difficulty in raising the necessary funds by casual
and uncertain subscriptions. The same difficulty was encountered
in the case of the land-service Volunteers. The first promoters of
the Naval Volunteer movement, anticipating that the number re-
quired would be comparatively small, and knowing that they had
enthusiastic friends behind them, declined to accept or to apply for
any pecuniary assistance. Experience, however, has shown that the
movement cannot be maintained elsewhere than in London without
the aid of a capitation grant. In Liverpool the liberality of the local
subscribers has been taxed to the uttermost, and the officers.in com-
mand have been called upon to defray expenses on a scale which
makes it impossible for any gentleman without ample resources to
accept a commission. At Bristol the corps has never been able to
reach the full strength of a brigade of five hundred men. At the
outports it has been found impracticable to form even the nucleus of
a harbour-defence corps without a subsidy. Under these circum-
stances, the public will not be surprised to learn that applications
have recently been forwarded to the Admiralty from the officers in
command of each of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteer corps,
praying for the assistance of a capitation grant. The proposal will
receive full consideration; but no decision can be taken until the
mixed naval and military committee, appointed to inquire as to the
best means of defending all our commercial harbours, has made its
report. If the Volunteers are recognised as an essential element in
the defence of our coasts, the Government will be justified in granting
them the small measure of assistance for which they have at last
most reluctantly applied. The Naval Volunteer movement merits
encouragement on many grounds. It is an additional link between
the Navy and the civil population. The brave fellows who man our
fleet are of necessity a class apart, and the Volunteers who are brought
into close contact with them when under instruction, are the only
members of the civil population with whom the blue-jackets are asso-
THE ROYAI; NAVAL. ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
315
of the
Volunteer
movement.
ciated while on active service. If it is an advantage to the Navy to Prospects
be associated with the civil population, naval influences will be not Naval
less valuable to the civilians who join the Naval Volunteers. Disci-
pline, self-sacrifice, and devotion to duty are the root and source of
naval efficiency; and it were well for everyone of us to receive a
training in such a school as the Navy. There are those who view
with regret the growth and tenacity of the Volunteer movement.
They think it keeps alive a military spirit. Such a result may be
regretted by philosophers, but it will not be unwelcome to those who
are responsible for the defence of the country. We are perpetually
threatened, and to be prepared at all points is the best means by
which war can be averted. It was truly said by Lord Palmerston
that a country can never negotiate an honourable peace nor exercise
a wholesome influence abroad unless men are impressed with the
belief that under just provocation it can fight, and means fighting.
A high state of civilisation is not without its attendant drawbacks.
We should encourage everything which tends to infuse a manly spirit
and vigorous habits into our sedentary existence. The rashness of
the sportsman in the hunting field may rise into cool courage in the
din of battle. If it were only as an athletic exercise for the young men
in our seaport towns, I venture to think that the Naval Volunteer
movement deserves support. But the drills and exercises of the
Volunteers must be viewed in a more serious aspect. Limited as
their sphere may be in the active operations of war, the assistance
which the Naval Volunteers might be able to render in an emergency
should not be undervalued. The recent reductions in the number of
blue-jackets in the Navy have been explained in the House of Com-
mons, and I only allude to the subject now in order to state that I
see no possibility of an addition to the personnel of the Navy with-
out a much more. considerable expenditure than any Government is
likely to propose. It becomes, therefore, a matter of importance to
increase the strength and efficiency of our auxiliary forces. We
must make the most of our Naval Reserves, and we certainly cannot
afford to despise the services which the Volunteers are thoroughly
capable of rendering in coast defence. Let it be remembered that
every effective Volunteer sets free a blue-jacket, a marine artilleryman,
or a marine, to man the fleets which must be maintained at sea to
guard our communications and to fight our battles. I may be asked
to advise as to the best policy for the Volunteers to pursue in the
immediate future. I venture to say that there is no necessity for
agitation. The Admiralty are in possession of your views. It is
316
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Prospects
of the
Naval
Volunteer
movement.
obvious that their final decision as to pecuniary aid must depend on
the report they receive from the Harbour Defence Committee, and
that report must be materially affected by the evidences which the
Volunteers afford of their capabilities. There never was a time in
the history of the Volunteer movement when the duty was more
imperative on every Volunteer to be regular in his attendance at
drill and to do all in his power to make himself thoroughly efficient.
SECTION VIII.
STEAM NAVAL RESERVE.
318
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
STEAM NAVAL RESERVE.
HAVING dealt with the more general question of a supply of sea-
men and officers, our Steam Reserve cannot be entirely omitted from
consideration. In a Parliamentary Paper on the Supply of Coals to
the Navy allusions were incidentally made to the insufficient number
of trained stokers in the Navy. Admiral Willes, in a report to the
Admiralty as Commodore of the Reserve Squadron on August 16, 1870,
made the following observations :—The amount of smoke made by
the Reserve Squadron during the late cruise might be attributed to
had stoking. I have for a long time studied the probable state of
the engine-room in the event of a sudden war. So far as the ships
of the Reserve Squadron are concerned, some few would have, in
addition to the small number of stokers allowed them, some able
stokers, although much out of practice, from the shore force, with
the addition of raw hands from the Steam Reserve, whilst others
would have nothing but raw hands in addition to the present nucleus.
Ships in the Channel Squadron could not have more than one-half
good stokers to hand, and on the outbreak of a war indifferent stoking
would be the rule rather than the exception. Again, in the report
of the Engineer-Assistant of the Admiralty on the trials of coal in
Indian troop-ships, we are told that in the Serapis ’ half the comple-
ment of stokers were second-class landsmen, who had to be taught,
and that this was also the case with the Crocodile.' Admirals
Elliot and Ryder, in their report on the designs of our ships of war,
incidentally alluded to the unsatisfactory force of stokers in the Navy,
of whom they say that they are not only insufficient in number, but
also of very inferior physique. In the Crimean War, owing to the
great demand for engineers who had had experience in driving high-
pressure engines, many incompetent men were appointed. So it
will always be when an emergency occurs, and there are no Reserves
on which we can rely. It is true that in the event of war it is
always possible to obtain a supply of engineers and stokers from the
t
OFFICERS OF THE COAST DEFENCE FORCES,
31.9
mercantile marine hy giving sufficiently liberal wages in the Navy,
But, in order to attract men from the mercantile marine to the
Royal Navy, the pay in the Royal Nary must be materially increased,
in defiance, probably, of loud complaints on the part of shipowners,
as to the unequal competition which they will suddenly be compelled
to encounter. With the immense advantage that we possess in the
great steam fleet of the mercantile marine, this country ought not to
be exposed to the chance of a difficulty in obtaining engineers and
stokers for the Navy in any emergency, however sudden. A Steam
Reserve should, therefore, be formed, composed of men who should
engage to serve in Her Majesty's ships when called upon to join the
Navy in the event of a war. There are 3,500 engineers belonging to
the French Navy, of whom, in times of peace, the most part are
allowed to serve in merchant steamers of any country, and France
would be enabled by this means to prɔvide every ship of the Navy in
time of war with engineers in full practice.
There is reason to believe that many stokers would enter the
Reserve on the same terms as the seamen. They could have a
certain amount of instruction in the use of arms, and when the sea-
men went out in the gunboat attached to the drill-ship, for target
practice, the stokers could work the engines, under the direction of
the engineers. During their four weeks' drill, they could go from
time to time for instruction in the art of driving the engines, and
would receive, according to their merits, first, second, or third class
certificates.
SECTION IX.
OFFICERS OF THE COAST DEFENCE
FORCES.
VOL. IV.
Y
322
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
OFFICERS OF THE COAST DEFENCE FORCES.
Reserve.
Oficers of We need not anticipate a difficulty in finding officers to command
our Naval Coast Volunteers. Many officers have been retired against
their will under a recent Order in Council at the prime of life. It
would be only just to afford them an opportunity of rendering
further services to their country by giving them charge of the
Reserves,-a duty which many would be happy to undertake for
a small addition to their retired pay.
According to the provisions of the Order in Council of February
1870, for which Mr. Childers is responsible, the number of flag-
officers on the active list of the Navy is to be reduced to 50;
captains, 150; commanders, 200; and lieutenants, 600. Assuming
that a considerable number of new appointments may be created in
connection with the Naval Reserve, the staff of officers allowed under
the Order of Council is more than sufficient for our peace require-
ments. It is painful to many officers to sever their connection abso-
lutely with the Navy, even when they have no desire to serve unless
in the emergency of war. They should be invited to enrol them-
selves on a reserved list, composed of officers who, in consideration of
certain advantages in the rate of their half-pay, would consent to
waive all further claim for employment during peace, but would
engage to serve, whenever called upon to do so, in time of war. By
this means, our resources for expanding the Navy would remain
unimpaired; while officers, who were unable to find occupation
outside their own profession, would command a better chance of
obtaining employment.
Employ- The appointment of a staff of officers to command and organise
retired and the Reserves would be another useful application of the energy of our
half-pay
half-pay officers. It is certain that close and intelligent supervision
by a permanent staff of inspecting officers would promote efficiency;
while the personal intercourse between the officers and men would
establish, in the seamen of the Reserve, a greater spirit of loyalty to
the Navy, and create habits of discipline.
of
officers in
Reserves.
OFFICERS OF THE COAST DEFENCE FORCES.
323
I am induced, in deference to the strong opinions of many naval Lord Fitz-
hardinge.
officers, and specially to the views which, as I have been informed,
were entertained by the late Lord Fitz-Hardinge, to abandon the
idea of giving the command of the Royal Naval Coast Volunteers to
the Coastguard, and making it a special and separate branch of our
naval service. I abandon my first idea with the less reluctance,
because, as I have already observed, I am satisfied that the drill and
command of this force could be carried out efficiently, and at a
trifling cost to the country, by half-pay and retired officers, who
would be only too glad to devote their enforced leisure to the good
of their country. I have been informed by retired officers that
employment in connection with our coast defence service, even
without additional pay, would be highly appreciated by many of their
number. The necessity for keeping up a flow of promotion through
the Navy has led to the enforcement of rules for compulsory retire-
ment, which have come hardly upon numerous officers in the full
enjoyment of health and strength, and animated by an earnest zeal
in their profession. It would be easy to find a sufficient number of
officers from the retired list qualified in every respect to command
the Coast Defence Reserve, and only a trifling addition to the hand-..
some pensions now given would be expected. Indeed, I am con-
fident that the mere sense of being still connected in a useful
capacity with the naval profession, instead of being unwillingly and
for ever placed on the shelf, would be an immense gratification to
naval officers who had been compelled to retire.
A naval officer, who cordially approves the scheme herein set forth, Letter
informs me that at the age of fifty-one he was relieved by the bounty retired
of the country from the misery entailed on him by the wretched officer.
half-pay of 10s. 6d. a day, supplemented by his small private means.
But, for his retired pay of 4651. a year, he would have been only too
glad to command a training ship under the Board of Trade; or, with
allowances for a house, a horse, and travelling expenses, he would
have been ready to command a district. In conclusion, my corre-
spondent, a captain on the retired list, observes : '1 do not mean to
say that I am fit for tropical service, or for a cruise in the winter off
Brest, but I am qualified, nay, better qualified than I was twelve years
ago, froin sobered temper and experience, to train boys, and to deal
with men of the Reserve Forces. I cannot but think the State should
have some return for the liberal salary I receive, and which I should
be only too glad to give.'
The formation of an able staff of superior officers, in connection Flag ofti
with the Reserves, is the best and only guarantee for their efficiency. Reserve.
from a
cers of
y 2
324
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Ten years ago, when provision was made for Reserve forces numbering
in the total 21,200 men, the highest appointment, in immediate con-
nection with the Reserve, was that of Controller of the Coastguard,
an appointment which was held by a post-captain in the Navy. In-
specting Officers for the Reserves would render valuable service.
Seeing that the post of Commander-in-Chief at each of the naval
ports, an office which cannot be compared in importance with that
of Commander-in-Chief of the Reserves, is always held, and very pro-
perly so, by an admiral of high rank, there was an obvious inconsis-
tency in entrusting the superior command of the Reserves to one post-
captain. That inconsistency has been removed by the appointment
of an admiral to command the Reserves.. With a larger staff of com-
manding officers the efficiency of the Reserves would be still more
thoroughly secured.
Valuable results would follow froin a closer and more continuous in-
spection of our Reserves for coast defence by experienced flag officers.
The admirals in command of the Reserve should be constantly on the
move, inspecting the scattered forces under their charge, and making
themselves acquainted with all accessible points on the coast, and
with the best means of defending them fronı attack by a combination
of our naval and military resources. The flag commands in the Royal
Naval Reserve and Coastguard Volunteers, and the Controllership of
the Coastguard ought to be regarded as among the very highest
appointments, and should be given to some of the ablest admirals in
the service. In the absence of supervision by officers of high rank,
specially appointed for that duty, who could both effectually superin-
tend the drill and discipline of the force, suggest improvements in
its organisation, and supply a channel of communication with the
Admiralty, in which both the men of the Reserves, and the country
could have confidence, the large outlay on our Reserves did not at
first produce such a result as the naval service and the taxpayers
might fairly have anticipated. A very different policy has prevailed
in the organisation of the staff for our Volunteers on shore. An
admiral sent on an occasional tour of inspection is not a sufficient
substitute for an officer of equal rank especially devoted to the duty.
An officer holding a high command in the Reserve would feel that
his professional reputation was intimately involved in the success or
failure of these branches of the personnel of the Navy; and he
would be stimulated in the highest degree to bring all his experience
and professional knowledge to bear upon the effectual execution of
his important duties.
While the cominand of the Naval Reserve in active service would de-
+
Mr. W. S.
Lindsay.
OFFICERS OF THE COAST DEFENCE FORCES.
325
volve principally on officers of the Royal Navy, we may confidently look
to the merchant service to supply a large number of valuable officers.
The late Mr. W. S. Lindsay, in referring to this subject, in his inde-
pendent report as a member of the Manning Commission, said :-
* There are now in the merchant service a large number of well-
educated men, of a good social position. Since the passing of the
Merchant Shipping Act they have been tested in navigation and sea-
manship as severely as naval officers before a public board...
The masters in the merchant service would become lieutenants in
no way inferior to many of the officers now in the Royal Navy.
The formation of a reserve of officers, as well as of men, from the
merchant service, to meet the emergency we have to provide against,
would conduce materially to facilitate the raising of the necessary
reserve of seamen. These officers of the Reserve would in fact be-
come voluntary recruiting officers for the Navy.'
An important step has recently been taken to carry out the views
expressed by Mr. Lindsay. In a speech delivered in 1872, Mr.
Guschen said:
“There is nothing in which those connected with the Royal Navy Midship-
are more interested than in the mercantile marine of this country, Reserre
.
both as regards officers and men. I am sure it would be a source of
the greatest satisfaction to all interested in the Royal Navy to see a
close relationship established between that service and such institutions
as the “Worcester" and the “ Conway.” A wish has been expressed
and put before the Admiralty that steps should be taken, by which
we may utilise for the benefit of the public service those who have
been trained on board those ships; and I am now very glad to be
able to select a certain number of cadets from the “ Worcester," in
order to make them midshipmen in the Royal Naval Reserve.
The policy indicated by Mr. Goschen has been followed up by his Order in
successors, and new regulations have quite recently been issued. The Council
,
Order in Council of June 28, 1880, runs as follows:-
• Whereas there was this day read at the Board a memorial from
the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admi-
ralty, dated the 19th of June 1880, in the words and figures following,
viz. :-“Whereas your Majesty was graciously pleased by your Order in
Council of 15th October 1872, to establish the rank of midshipman in
the Royal Naval Reserve, and whereas it has in our opinion become
advisable to make provision for the promotion of the most deserving
of these midshipmen to the higher rank of sub-lieutenant although
not fully qualified for that rank under existing regulations, and for
the removal from the list of the Royal Naval Reserve of those mid-
1880.
326
QUR NAVAI, RESERVES.
shipmen who have either failed to obtain their certificates in the
mercantile marine suitable to their age, or to keep up their drills, we
most humbly submit that your Majesty may be graciously pleased
by your Order in Council to establish the following regulations :
661. Midshipmen Royal Naval Reserve who formerly passed
tbrough a course of training in the Worcester' or 'Conway,' to be
eligible for promotion to the rank of sub-lieutenant on completing
six years' service in the Royal Naval Reserve, provided (a) that they
hold master's or chief mate's certificates of competency under the
Merchant Shipping Act, (b) that they are not in arrear in their drill
and have obtained a certificate from the commander of one of the
drill ships, that they are competent to instruct and drill men of the
Royal Naval Reserve. (c) That they have followed the sea service
as their profession throughout the time they have served as midship-
men in the Royal Naval Reserve.
666 2. The names of midshipmen who fail to obtain these qualifi-
cations for promotion at twenty-five years of age to be removed from
the lists of the Royal Naval Reserve, except in any special case to be
judged by us, where prolonged service abroad is the cause of the
failure to qualify under these regulations.”
'Her Majesty, having taken the said memorial into consideration,
was pleased, by and with the advice of her Privy Council, to approve
of what is therein proposed. And the Right Honourable the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty are to give the necessary directions
herein accordingly.
C. L. PEEL.
Short
courscs in
gunntry.
It has been suggested that the efficiency of the mercantile officers
for naval commands would be materially increased if the same privi-
leges were given to them which are granted to the land-service
volunteers. This could be accomplished by allowing officers to be
attached to H.M.S. " Excellent' or 'Cambridge,' in order to acquire
practical acquaintance with their duties. In granting such facilities
the Admiralty would be providing for the Reserves the same instruc-
tion which the military authorities afford to the Volunteer officers
of the land-service when attached to a regiment of the regular
forces.
In France it has always been considered an important object of
naval policy to preserve a close connection between the Navy and the
mercantile marine.
In his speech, on February 19, 1877, at the opening of the ses-
sion of the Société des Études Maritimes, Vice-Admiral the Comte
Comte de
Gueycon,
OFFICERS OF THE COAST DEFENCE FORCES.
327
C
de Gueydon enlarged on the importance of a reserve in the mercantile
marine for the war Navy.
The importance,' he said, ' of the duties of merchant captains is
not sufficiently appreciated in France. The merchant service has
given to the country Jean Bart, Duguay-Trouin, and a host of illus-
trious names. It cannot be denied that something ought to be done
to attract men of superior talent into a career which offers so many
opportunities as the sea. Experienced officers are urgently needed
whenever it may be necessary to fit out the fleet in reserve. Captains
in command of large merchant ships are no longer fitted as in former
days to take their place as lieutenants in armoured rams. Hence it
is necessary to form a cadre of officers of reserve, for which officers
should be eligible after one year's service in the Navy; and on passing
a suitable examination as a mark of recognition, officers of Reserve
should be eligible for promotion to the rank of captain, having the
relative rank of a colonel in the army, and lieutenant. They would
be allowed to wear a uniform on occasions when officers of the Navy
in the mail service are allowed to wear it.'
It may here be remarked that no encouragement has hitherto Ilonorary
been given to shipowners, marine superintendents, or masters in the Naval
Reserve
merchant service, to exert themselves to obtain recruits for the
to ship-
Reserves. If such persons would give a preference to Reserve men,
when shipping crews; especially if, in those services which the sea- superinten-
men esteem the most highly-the great lines of mail steamers-only
seamen of the Reserve were allowed to enter as able seamen : such
a regulation would have an immense effect in stimulating enrolments
in the Reserve. As an inducement to those on whose favourable
opinion the Reserve depends so much, some reward should be given
for the exercise of their influence. The most obvious reward should
be a step of rank in the Reserve.
Similarly, with the view of stimulating the Registrars, on whom
so much depends, to exert themselves to induce recruits to enter the
Reserve, their services might be recognised by giving them the rank
of honorary paymaster in the force.
rank in
owners and
marine
dents.
SECTION X.
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
A LECTURE
DELIVERED BEFORE THE ROYAL COLONIAL INSTITUTE,
FRIDAY, JUNE 7, 1878.
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
331
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
It is not surprising that the idea of organising a Colonial Naval
Reserve should have been deferred to the present time. The growth
of our Colonial Empire has been so rapid that the resources, out of
which such a force could be created, have only lately been called into
existence.
It has been remarked by Mr. Wilson, in his recent volume on the
resources of modern countries, that none of the colonies were of great Growth of
promise before 1845. Canada languished ; New South Wales—then Coloni:s.
including Victoria and Queensland—was a feeble settlement, still
troubled by a residuum of transported criminals; the Cape of Good
Hope was almost Dutch. The total English population of the whole
of our foreign possessions did not, in 1850, exceed 2,000,000. The
population of these colonies has at least quadrupled in thirty years, and
in some cases is tenfold what it was in 1845.
Visitors to the Exhibition now being held in Paris will see abun-
dant and gratifying proofs of the marvellous development of our Paris Ex-
colonies, and of their ability to provide adequate means of self-defence. hibitiou,
The Australian Governments have wisely embraced the opportunity
of showing to the world their varied and valuable products. From
New South Wales we have copper, silver, lead, marble, tin, slate, and
opals, wine—including all the varieties of the French and German
vineyards—tobacco, and, perhaps most important of all, wool. From
Western Australia we find leather, timber, silk, coal, lead, and wines.
Victoria, which boasts of 800 varieties of trees and flowering shrubs,
exhibits also coal, wines, and cloth manufactures. She reminds us,
by means of pyramidal models, of the value of her productions of gold,
and of the exceptional good fortune of certain adventurers. From
the Cross Reef Mine 1,000,0001., from the Long Tunnel 221,262
ounces, from the Port Phillip Company's workings 1,500,0001. have
been extracted. Queensland exhibits malachite, gold, copper, cinna-
bar, chrome, iron, plumbago, and antimony, sugar, coffee, wheat, maize,
tobacco, silk, and wool. Lastly, South Australia exhibits copper, tin,
vines, timber, leather, wool, and tobacco,
1877.
332
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
The following table, prepared by the Registrar-General of New
South Wales, gives the latest Australian statistics.
With such evidences of progress before us, we are justified in form-
AUSTRALASIAN
Statistical Return showing the Relative Positions and Aggregate
NAME OF COLOXY
New South Wales
Victoria
South Australia
310,937
88,198
380,070
714,012
£4,475,059
888,500
4,621,5201
255,087
£1,662,498
£1,272,721
1,730,088
£526,366
£1. 15s. 7 d.
£14,198,84?
£1. 19s. 4 d.?
£15,035,538
£2. ls. 3d.
£5,014,150
£19. 17s. 8{d.
£13,086,819
£16. 18s. 5 d.
£12,454,170
£19. 13s. 1 d.
£4,762,727
£18. 6s. 6 d.
£14. Os. 4d.
£18. 13s. 5d.
£27,285,666
£27,489,708
£9,776,877
£38. 4s. 3 d.
£30. 18s. 94d.
£38. 6s. 6fd.
736
1,125
559
Area in square miles
Estimated mean population of
1879
Revenue of 1879
Proportion of revenue of 1879,
raised by taxation
Rate of taxation per head of
population.
Value of imports for 1879
Value of imports per head of
the population
Value of exports for 1879
Value of exports per head of
the population
Total value of trade, imports
and exports
Value of tradę per head of the
population.
Miles of railway open, December
31, 1879
Miles of railway in course of
construction, Dec. 31, 1879
Miles of telegraph lines open,
December 31, 1879
Miles of telegraph wire open,
December 31, 1879
Miles of telegraph in course of
construction, Dec. 31, 1879:-
Length of lines (miles)
wire (miles
Number of acres under crop in
1879
Number of horses in 1879
cattle
sheep
pigs
Estimated population on Dec.
31, 1879
Public debt on Dec. 31, 1879
Rate of indebtedness per head
of population
286
741
2521
7,517}
3,155
4,393
12,426
5,736
5,934
4973
4973
23
47
850
1,010
635,641
360,038
2,914,210
29,043,392
256,026
1,688,275
216,710
1,129,358
8,651,775
144,733
2,271,058
130,052
266,217
6,140,396
90,548
734,282
£14,937,419
899,333
£20,050,753
259,287
£6,605,760
£20. 6s. 104d.
£22. 5s. 103d.
£25. Is. 62.
i For the financial year ended June 30, 1 879.
2 This rate has been calculated according to the mean population of the financial year
ended June 30, 1879 (878,243).
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
333
ing the brightest hopes for the future prosperity of the great Anglo-
Saxon communities in the Antipodes. The page of their history is
short, but they are a vigorous and energetic people, eager to embrace
OOLONIES.
Importance of the Australasian Colonies, at the close of the Year 1879.
NAMIC OF COLOXY
Queensland
Tasmania
Western
Australia
Total
New Zealand
Total
for Australasian
Colonies
669,520
26,215
1,000,000
2,474,940]
105,342
2,580,2821
214,180
£1,461,824
111,208
£375,367
28,668?
£196,315
2,211,655
£12,792,583
448,124 2,659,779
£3,134,905 £15,927,488
£631,280
£236,404
288,330
£4,485,198
£2. 188. 111d.
£3,080,889
£2. 2s, 6d.
£1,267,475
£3. ls. 7 d.
£407,299
£2. Os. 83d.
£39,004,198
£1,441,838 25,927,036
£3. 48. 4d. £2. 4s. 83d.
:£8,374,585 £47,378,783
£14. 78. 8id. £11. 78. 11 d. | £14. 4s. 1 d. £17. 12s. 8}d. €18. 13s. 9d. £17. 16s, 3d.
£3,431,031 £1,301,097 £494,883 £35,533,730 £5,743,126 £41,276,856
£16. Os. Ed. €11. 13s. 11 d. £17. 5s. 3d.
£16. Is. 3 d. £12. 16s. 3 d. £15. 10s. 4li.
£6,514,923
£2,568,572
£902,182
£74,537,928 £14,117,711 £88,655,639
£30. 8s. 4d. - £23. ls. 11d.
£31. Is. 4d. £33. 14s. 014. £31. 108. 0gd. £33. 6s. 7}d.
72
3,167
1,171 4,3381
503
172
305
193
9377
937.1
5,871
731
1,5633
23,2363
3,605
26,8413
7,891
949
1,580
34,516
9,300
43,816
14
14
3
1.3881
1,575
1,3881
1,5752
3
101,052
163,083
2,800,633
6,065,034
64,686
156.184
24,578
129,091
1,834,441
38,312
65,4913
32,411
60,617
1,109,860
20,397
4,917,701
926,872
7,300,126
52,844,898
614,702
2,218,7824 7,136,4833
137,7685 1,064,640
578,4305 7,878,556
13,069,3385 | 65,914,236
207,337 822,039
217,831
£10,196,150
112,469
£1,786,800
28,668 2,251,890 463,729 2,715,619
£361,000 £53,937,872 €23,958,311 | £77,896,183
£12. lls. 10d. | £23. 195. 01. £51. 138. 314. L28. 13s. 8 d.
£46. 16s. (d. £15. 178. 8d.
Population on December 31.
.. Includes 1,406,018 acres after having been broken up, including such as in hay, but ex-
clusive of 1,936,281 acres of grass-sown lands which had not previously been broken up.
According to the returns of March, 1878.
334
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Necessity
for organ-
ising
means of
defence.
Lieut.
Eardley-
Wilmot.
every opportunity afforded by a bountiful nature, and labouring
valiantly in the spirit of their well-chosen motto, Advance Australia.'
The time seems now to have arrived when the colonies should be
reminded of their obligations to provide for their own self-defence,
and of their duty to take a part in those naval and military prepara-
tions, the cost of which should be borne in due proportions by the
whole empire.
The necessity for the organisation of a Naval Reserve for the
defence of the colonies has been recognised by many writers and by
several gallant officers, who have delivered lectures on this subject
in the theatre of the Royal United Service Institution. The brothers
Colomb have been among the foremost in urging the need of such a
force. They have shown what are the strategical points which are of
the most vital importance to the integrity of the British Empire, and
have earnestly recommended the appointment of a Royal Commission
to examine the subject.
In his essay selected for publication by the judges appointed to
award the gold medal of the Royal United Service Institution,
Lieut. Eardley-Wilmot insists very earnestly on the question of
colonial defence:
* Though England has never carried on a defensive warfare, in so
far as the Navy is concerned, but has always exhibited a vigorous
offensive movement as the best defence, yet in the contingency of an
enemy's force eluding our vigilance and appearing off any of our pos-
sessions, there should exist some defensive organisation to offer a
successful resistance.
'I am afraid that few of our colonies possess this, and also that
we were somewhat hasty in withdrawing our troops till such had been
assured.
British Columbia and Vancouver's Island would be practically
helpless in case of attack, for six years ago, when I was stationed in
the Pacific (and the state of things is, I think, still unchanged) there
was not a single fortification, or gun mounted. We must en-
deavour to provide something out of the materials at hand. A
country like Canada has great resources in this respect. An extended
frontier and vast fisheries give her a seafaring population numerically
large. Here is the foundation of a splendid Naval Militia. Give
them training, and you have a reliable force in time of need. But
before dealing with this part of the subject, it is necessary to deter-
minem 1st. What points are to be strengthened ; 2nd. In what
manner they shall be defended.
For the defence of colonial harbours we require vessels carrying
6
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
335
ness.
commenda-
the heaviest guns, and protected by armour-plating of average thick-
Attached to these vessels should be a certain number of gun-
boats, carrying one heavy gun, with sufficient beam to give a steady
platform, without aiming at great speed, a quality not essential to
harbour defence.
'Furthermore, torpedoes must be largely made use of. To supply
the men to work these various weapons, I would suggest that our
principal colonies have a small standing Navy, just sufficient to keep
the ships in order and for training, and that a Reserve be formed,
similar to our own Naval Reserve.
'It is certain, however, that little can be done without material
assistance from this country in some shape ; and we could well afford
a certain sum annually for such an object, in addition to turning
over to our colonies guns and ships that we no longer require.'
Nothing has been done in the line indicated by these suggestions, These re-
and we find ourselves at the present moment contemplating the pos- tions
sibility of war, and utterly unprepared with the means of defending neglected.
the important outlying members of the empire by those local forces
which might so easily have been organised. Readers of the papers
published in the Nineteenth Century will remember the imaginary
but
very forcible description, recently given by Sir Garnet Wolseley,
of a Russian squadron performing a cruise of circumnavigation, making
war on all our most valuable settlements, and winning a series of
inglorious triumphs by levying black mail on rich seaports which
could offer no resistance. It would, perhaps, be found more difficult
to carry out such a series of operations than to describe them with
the ready pen-which Sir Garnet so well knows how to use—but the
bare conception of such a state of things ought to be unendurable
alike to the people of the mother-country and of her dependencies.
From an imperial point of view, the best defence of the colonies
consists in a powerful Navy; and it is because the naval service is
constituted in part for the defence of the colonies that we may
reasonably claim for all our dependencies contributions in equitable
proportions, to be mutually and amicably determined, towards the
naval expenditure of the country.
The latest tables, showing the progress of British mercantile Colonial
shipping, give the total tonnage of the mercantile navy of the British naval
Empire at 8,133,837 tons, and the tonnage of the United Kingdom
only at 6,336,360 tons. The difference between these amounts
(1,800,000 tons) represents a total tonnage for the colonies but
slightly inferior to the combined tonnage of the French and German
Empires.
resources.
336
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
The statistical tables, which have recently been presented to
Parliament, contain gratifying evidences of the rapid increase in the
tonnage of our colonial shipping. I give a few figures to show how
widely distributed and elastic are the resources from which our
Imperial Navy might be recruited, if Naval Reserves were organised,
as they ought to be, in our colonial possessions.
Tonnage of Vessels on the Register.
Colony
1871
1873
1875
1876
Victoria
Port Adelaide
Tasmania,
New Zealand
Canada
Steamers
9,608
Sailing vessels. 52,970
Total tonnage. | 17,048
Steamers
2,422
Sailing vessels. 15,125
Total
27,107
Steam
Sailing
10,622 12,656
55,688 61,228
22,361 22,866
3,135 2,773
14,894 | 15,544
30,035 | 42,025
6,783
1,073,718
-
7,192
1,260,893
1
-
.
Queensland.
Total tonnage
Total tonnage
1873 British Entered 170,173
Cleared 169,476
Foreign
5,999
6,876
1875 British
390,069
362,703
Foreign
5,165
6,245
It must be evident that the owners of colonial shipping will be
quite able to contribute their share of the cost of defending the
harbours from which they trade.
Hitherto the colonies have enjoyed complete exemption from
the burden of military and naval expenditure. In an article on
"The Defence of our Empire,' in the July number of Fraser's Maga-
zine, Mr. Baden-Powell gives the following table, showing the rela-
tive positions of the Spanish colonists in South America, and of the
more fortunate inhabitants of the British colonies.
The Colonial Governments are now beginning to consider the ques-
tion of local defence, and in one or two instances they have provided
low. freeboard ironclad turret-ships for that purpose. Victoria has
lately voted a sum of 350,0001., together with an annual outlay of
73,0001., to provide ships, artillery, torpedoes, and rifles for the local
defence. New South Wales has voted a like sum for the same object.
The colony has formed a Volunteer Naval Brigade of 250 men, the
annual expenditure on this little force being 3,9161. In the Canadian
Dominion, a committee appointed by the Royal Halifax Yacht Club,
iu a report dated April 14, 1873, strongly recommend the organisa-
tion of a Naval Reserve, a Coastguard to protect property in the
event of shipwreck, and a Lifeboat Institution.
Preparan
tions
already
begun.
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
337
.
Country
Revenue
Expenditure on
Arny and Navy
Population
.
Chili
Brazil
Argentine Republic
Bolivia
Colombia
3,800,000
12,000,000
4,300,000
600,000
3,000,000
600,000
2,500,000
1,150,000
390,900
160,000
2,000,000
10,000,000
1,800,000
1,700,000
800,000
23,700,000
4,800,000
16,300,000
North America
West Indies
Cape
West Coast
4,700,000
1,650,000
2,620,000
230,000
16,000,000
2,500,000
280,000
Illl
4,000,000
1,200,000
1,100,000
(200,000 white)
630,000
(1,500 white)
2,500,000
3,200,000
180,000
.
Australasia
Straits and East
Gibraltar, Malta, &c.
ill
U
£27,930,000
12,810,000
These preliminary and spontaneous efforts justify the presump-
tion that the colonial governments would be fully prepared to bear
their share of the expenditure required for any complete scheme of
naval organisation and defence, and we may pass on to consider what
kind of force would be most useful for colonial service.
No practical difficulty need be anticipated in raising a Naval
Reserve in the colonies. If it be intended to provide the means
of manning seagoing ships, the Naval Reserve, which has been
formed for the defence of the mother-country, presents a model for
imitation. If coast and harbour defence alone is attempted, the
system of organisation adopted for the Royal Naval Artillery Volun-
teers may be followed with advantage.
The most effective means of defending the larger ports would Plans of
consist in ironclads or turret vessels rather than in forts. Captain Colomb,
Colomb, R.N., has urged, in his prize essay, that the main object of R.N.
our naval policy consists in the maintenance of our communications
by sea, and that our coaling stations abroad are the principal strategical
positions which it is essential to guard. He argues that this object
will be best attained by the maintenance of an adequate seagoing
fleet, charged with two great defensive functions: (1) that of keeping
the enemy in his own ports ; (2) that of keeping open the great sea
routes to and from the heart of the empire. He considers that this
duty can only be performed by seagoing vessels, and that the building
of powerful ships which are not fully seagoing, and which are more
or less incapable of maintaining the ocean communications of the
VOL. IV.
Z
338
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Australian
dockyard.
empire can only be justified on the assumption that the chief danger
to be apprehended lies in a successful attack on our harbours.
If our enemies are to career at will across our lines of communica-
tion, while we guard their terminations at head-quarters, what, he
asks, will be left us to guard ? He puts much faith in the seagoing
fleet resting on the naval station as a protective force, and condemns
with steady design the idea of the harbour defence ship. Such
vessels are every whit as likely to be withdrawn as the seagoing
ship, when they are wanted; and the only result is that you build a
bad seagoing ship, when, had you never considered harbour defence,
you would have built a good one.
Captain Colomb throws the local home and colonial harbour de-
fence entirely on forts, and the stationary and locomotive torpedoes.
The supplemental local harbour defence corps is to consist of Volun-
teer torpedo men, whose functions will be of a nature peculiarly
adapted to the superior education and undoubted skill and daring of
the men, who would be enrolled in such bodies.
The Imperial and Colonial Governments should combine to create
a fleet of seagoing ships, which should be kept in reserve in the
harbours on the Australian station.
It has been suggested by Captain Colomb, R.M.A., that a dock-
yard in the Australian colonies has become almost as essential as
the dockyards at home. He suggests that such an establishment
should be formed at Sydney or Melbourne. Captain Colomb urges
that, with our remaining dockyards, and the boundless resources of
our private trade, we should be abundantly able to provide for the
construction of new ships, and for the repairs of the Navy, even in
times of the most pressing emergency: while, on the other hand,
the growing importance of the Russian Navy in the Pacific, the
extension of British trade over most of the islands in the vast
ocean, and the great distance which separates our Australian terri-
tories from the mother-country, make it highly desirable to establish
a dockyard in that part of the world. It is to be presumed that
some contribution would be obtained from the local governments
towards the expenses of such a dockyard, if established in their
midst. The valuable resources it would afford to the mercantile
marine would present an additional inducement to the colonies to
make a contribution towards its maintenance.
Lieutenant Wilmot, in his essay, points out the necessity of having
a dock capable of taking in a large ironclad on every station. We
continually feel this want at the present time. How much more should
we do so in the time of war ?
+
**
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
339
Torpedoes and torpedo boats should be provided for harbour
defence. The colonial governments should man the seagoing ships
stationed in their own harbours with their Naval Reserves, and they
should provide the personnel necessary for harbour defence by the
organisation of corps of Naval Artillery Volunteers, after the model
of those which have been successfully established in London and
Liverpool.
The number of seagoing ships and torpedo boats and the forces The
of Naval Reserves and Naval Artillery Volunteers which would be for the
necessary to man them, is a subject worthy of mature examination defence of
the empire
by a Royal Commission. Such a commission should include, not only must be
officers of acknowledged capability to deal with technical questions, by a Royal
but representatives, who should be authorised to express the views of sion.
the colonists, with reference to the proportions in which they would
be prepared to contribute to the expense.
I wish to insist emphatically on the importance of the work that
would devolve on such a commission. We cannot conceal from the
world the wealth accumulated in the colonial capitals, all of which lie
on the seaboard. The inhabitants possess the courage and the resources
necessary to repeal an attack. But these places are at present defence-
less. Floating and stationary defences cannot be designed, a Naval
Reserve or Militia cannot be created, without naval and military
advice. The colonies have no body of officers to assist them in such
a task. It is for the mother-country to take the initiative, in the
discharge of the urgent Imperial duty of preparing a scheme for
the mutual self-defence of all the dependencies of the empire.
The defensive preparations already made in certain colonies will
be appreciated as evidences of a gallant and patriotic spirit; but it
is obviously impossible that merely local forces can be equal in point efficient
of efficiency to the Imperial Navy. Of their difficulties in this regard forces
the colonial governments are fully sensible. Mr. Baden-Powell, who assistance
from Royal
has lately returned from a prolonged visit to the Australian colonies, Nawy.
in the article in Fraser's Magazine, to which I have already alluded,
refers to the difficulty of organising a Colonial Navy. He tells us
that-
When Sir W. Jervois recommended the men of Sydney to insti-
tute an ironclad, the wise men among them saw that the true course
was for them to pay the imperial authorities to supply them with an
ironclad and crew inspired with the discipline, trained with the skill,
and equipped by the progressing knowledge, which is attainable only
large establishments.” It is a fresh acknowledgment of the
Colonies
cannot
create
naval
in 66
Z 2
340
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
old truth “ division of labour.” The question was ably represented in
the colony at the time, in the leading Sydney newspaper:
66 A spasmodic alliance of colonial navies, cach navy consisting
of one ship, each commander equal in rank to the others, and each
colony jealous of the rest, would not be a very formidable combination
for a bold, decisive, and dashing enemy to deal with. It would cost
the colonies no more to have their naval defence under imperial than
under local control, while they would get much more for their money
in the shape of security; and if such an arrangement would be really
the best in the interest of colonial defence, would it not also be
best in the interest of the Empire, which is not unconcerned in
having its colonies well defended ? The question is deserving of very
serious consideration, because behind it lies the application of the
same principle to our land forces. What is true of ships is true of
forts; what is true of blue-jackets is true of red-jackets."
“The colony of Victoria has already given practical proof of
these assertions. The colonel in command of her land forces has
remarked officially on the inevitable inefficiency of the arms and
equipments, and the difficulties of teaching new drills with a force
so small in numbers. And with regard to the powerful turret-ship
“Cerberus," the officers of the Royal Navy, called in from time to time
to inspect her, bave pointed out the danger of entrusting so elaborate
an engine to any but skilled hands. Her efficiency, for instance,
would be greatly marred in the present day, had she no officer on
board trained in the latest developments of torpedo warfare.'
I am not competent to enter into the details of such a scheme
as the Royal Commission which I recommend would be enabled to
prepare. A degree of local and professional knowledge, to which I
make no pretensions, and which, indeed, cannot be combined in any
individual, would be required in order to prepare a satisfactory plan.
As an example of what might be done, I will, however, venture to
refer to some notes on the formation of a Naval Reserve in Canada,
put together after visiting the ports in the Gulf of St. Lawreace in
1872.
It is believed that in the Canadian Dominion there are not less
than 87,000 seafaring men. In 1872, about 1,000 decked vessels
and 17,000 open boats, manned by 42,000 mer, were employed in
the fisheries alone. The recently published tables give the most
recent information as to their actual condition :
Proposed
organisa-
tiou of a
Canadian
Naval
Reserve
an illustra-
liou of
what
might be
done in
other
Colonies.
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
341
Statistics of the Fisheries of the Dominion of Canada in the year 1875.
Vessels
employed
Men
Boats
employed
Men
Ontario
Quebec
New Brunswick :
Nova Scotia
11
134
235
615
46
550
1,475
5,813
828
4,625
3,661
8,619
2,322
9,090
6,369
17,906
995
7,884
17,733
35,687
Total number of men, 43,571.
The value of the produce of the fisheries of the Dominion is
given as follows:--
0
+
.
Ontario
Quebec
New Brunswick
Nova Scotia
Prince Edward's Tsland
Newfoundland ,
£
94,415
332,137
505,761
1,161,220
62,276
1,325,035
1
The statistics of the fisheries as to boats and men employed are
not given for Prince Edward's Island and Newfoundland. The rela-
tive value, however, of the produce justifies the assumption that the
number of fishermen cannot fall short of the figures quoted for Nova
Scotia and Ontario. It is stated in the Annual Report of Governor
Hill for 1872, that about 10,000 men were engaged in the seal
fishery of Newfoundland. We may therefore add to the pumbers
already given not less than 25,000 men employed in fishing on the
coasts of Newfoundland and Labrador, which will bring up the
number of hardy fishermen in our North American possessions to a
total of not less than 68,000 men.
In a lecture delivered at the Royal Colonial Institute, on Feb-
ruary 4, 1873, M. Bourniot, a member of the Canadian Senate,
remarked that, “In the men that sail the fishing fleets of Canada we
see the elements of a very powerful marine, which will be found
invaluable in times of national danger. It may be estimated that the
total strength which the fisheries employ throughout all British
North America is composed of some 70,000 men.' M. Bourniot was
of opinion that there was no reason why training ships, supported
by the local governments, should not be started in the colonies if
the system were found to work well in the United Kingdom.
If we have done something to prove how manifold are the re-
sources of an empire on which the sun never sets, by transporting
342
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
7,000 natives of India to our island fortress in the Mediterranean,
should we not achieve a far greater thing if a force of 70,000 seamen
of our own race and language were enrolled as an Imperial Naval
Reserve in our North American dependencies ? To use a telling
motto attached to a noble picture by a gifted modern English painter,
“It might be done, and England ought to do it.'
To return, however, to the details of organisation.
The climate of Canada and Newfoundland, throughout their
long winter season, is so severe that it is impossible for fishermen to
follow their regular vocation. The long interval of enforced idleness
during winter would afford an admirable opportunity for regular
attendance at drill, without interfering with other lucrative employ-
ment. A vigorous effort should be made to enrol these colonial
fishermen in the Naval Reserve of the British Empire. They are
thoroughly inured to the hardships of the sea by the severe weather
which frequently prevails on their native shore. They are among
the most loyal and devoted subjects of the British Crown. There
would be no difficulty in giving to the fishermen of Newfoundland
and the maritime provinces of the Canadian Dominion an opportunity
of embarking for their annual drill at a port easily accessible from
their own homes. A vessel should be commissioned specially for
the purpose of training seamen, who have joined the Naval Reserve
from Newfoundland, from the ports in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and
from Quebec, Montreal, and other places on the great river. The
vessel should be of the corvette class, having a covered deck, in
which the battery of guns would be placed. In such a vessel the
drills might be carried on with regularity in the most severe weather.
The drill ship would be stationed, during midwinter, at St. John's.
The harbour is admirably sheltered, and a large population of fisher-
men is congregated in the town and its vicinity. During a portion
of the winter the drill ship should be moved to other points on the
coast, where the fishermen are settled in large numbers. Thus the
members of the Colonial Naval Reserve would have an opportunity
of going through the annual course of drill, without being exposed
to the hardship of a long sea voyage to St. John's in their small
fishing boats in midwinter. Along the coasts of Newfoundland there
are numerous admirably sheltered harbours, which are rarely frozen
up. An anchorage might be selected for the training ship both in
Placentia Bay and in Trinity Bay, perfectly secure, and easily ac-
cessible to the large numbers of British seafaring men dispersed
along those distant shores. As the spring approached, and the
navigation was opened in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the ship could
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
343
sources.
proceed from harbour to harbour along the southern shores of the
Gulf. At Sydney, Charlottetown, and Gaspé, many seamen could
be enrolled for the national Reserve. It should be arranged that the
drill ship should visit the harbours mentioned sufficiently early in
the season to enable the seamen sailing from those ports to go
through their annual drills before the navigation of the St. Law-
rence was fully open. The Reserve men might thus have the oppor-
· tunity of attending on board the training ship, without suffering the
serious inconvenience, which would be felt, if they were taken from
their employment afloat in the season of open navigation. Another
similar training ship should be stationed at Halifax, which should
visit the numerous harbours on the coast of Nova Scotia and in the
Bay of Fundy, in the winter season, when multitudes of fishermen
are compelled to remain on shore in consequence of the inclemency
of the weather.
We have not neglected to avail ourselves of the services of our
colonial population for the purpose of increasing our military re-
. We have enrolled large bodies of men belonging to races
distinct from our own. There can be no sufficient reason for neglect-
ing to recruit for the Navy among the vast numbers of loyal English-
men, whose splendid spirit of enterprise and adventure have carried
them far away from their native shore to settle on the coasts of our
Canadian Dominion.
This was the policy recommended by Lord Elgin, when, as
Governor-General of Canada, he argued with so much force on the
advantages to England and her colonies of an intimate union between
them. 'Is the Queen of England,' he wrote, “to be the sovereign
of an empire, growing, expanding, strengthening itself from age to
age, striking its roots into fresh earth, and drawing new supplies of
vitality from virgin soils ? Or is she to be, for all essential pur-
poses of might and power, monarch of Great Britain and Ireland
merely?
The establishment of a Naval Reserve in our North American Necessity
colonies is not only to be desired as a means of adding to our naval
for prelimi-
strength for imperial purposes, but also for defending the colonies ganisation.
themselves. All our colonies, including India, should have a de-
fensive force of their own. Organisation beforehand is essential to
success in war. By the bestowal of infinite pains on her military
system, Prussia, which seemed for ever fallen after the battle of
Jena, turned the tide of fortune in 1815, and, after the campaigns
of 1866 and 1870, has become the greatest power of Central Europe.
It is one of the main recommendations of the scheme which I
nary or-
344
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Great
expendi-
ture not
required.
have advocated on this occasion, that it need not involve the country
in a lavish expenditure. It is well to prepare in advance plans of
earthworks, to be thrown up when required, and to organise corps
of Naval Volunteers. It does not follow that we should undertake
the construction of the extravagant fortresses that surround our
arsenals at home, or withdraw a single man from the well-rewarded
labour market of the colonies. To build fleets and forts, and to
maintain armies in every dependency of the Crown, would be an
exhausting and an unnecessary effort. I approve the language held
by Sir Robert Peel in 1850, when he said: 'I believe that in time
of peace we must by our retrenchment consent to incur some risk.
I venture to say that if you choose to have all the garrisons of all
your colonial possessions in a complete state, and to have all your
fortifications secure from attack, no amount of annual expenditure
will be sufficient to accomplish your object.
Since the date of Sir Robert Peel's speech, the noble Volunteer
inovement, one of the most honourable features in the recent history
of this country, has been originated A quarter of a century ago,
the voluntary submission to drill and discipline of large masses of
men, in numbers far exceeding those enrolled in the regular army,
was not anticipated by British statesmen. By the extension of the
Volunteer movement, garrisons can be maintained in the largest
fortresses and in the most distant outposts, without adding in any
appreciable degree to the charges on the imperial and colonial
revenues.
England The mother-country could readily furnish a staff of officers and
oficer pply instructors for the purpose of training the Colonial Naval Reserves.
The number of officers required must depend on the strength of the
force which it is deemed expedient to raise. In wbatever numbers
they may be wanted, they can be supplied from the ranks of those
who have retired from the active list, or who are for the time being
on half-pay.
The presence of a body of naval officers in our colonies will form
a valuable link with the United Kingdom. They will carry with
them the spirit of discipline and devotion to their country, which
they have acquired from service in the Navy, and they will help to
keep alive its illustrious traditions in those young communities, in
which it is so important to create a high tone of morality and con-
duct. The example of her great men is the most valuable inheri-
tance of a nation, and in the career of many of our sea officers the
highest moral excellence has been combined with dauntless bravery
and skilful seamanship.
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
345
mother-
colonies.
That the Navy of our own time contains many brave men, pre-
pared to serve their Queen and country in the spirit which animated
Lord Nelson, we cannot doubt. It will be remembered how the
gallant Burgoyne refused to enter the boat in which the sole survi-
vors of the crew of the Captain' were saved. Humanity to the
savage and fortitude in death were conspicuously illustrated in the
closing hours of Captain Goodenough. But the occasions which
brought out the high qualities of Lord Nelson are happily rare. The
annals of a nation must be long, in order to furnish many examples
equally illustrious. Our share in the honour, which belongs to the
descendants of such men, is a privilege of high value; and it will
surely be one of the strongest inducements to the formation of
a Colonial Naval Reserve, that a link will thus be created with a
Navy possessing the splendid traditions which belong to the British
service.
In considering a project for a Colonial Naval Reserve, it is essen- Relative
contribu-
tial to determine to what extent the direct intervention of the tions of the
Imperial Government will be required. Among a certain school of country
politicians it will be considered that local defence is a task which and
inust be left entirely to the colonial governments. They think that
the colonies are quite able to take care of themselves; that, man for
man, the colonists are better off than the population of the mother-
country; that it is the duty of our statesmen to rear up young and
vigorous communities in habits of self-dependence, and to bring
home to their people a sense of their obligation to make sacrifices
for public objects, and to share with the mother-country the burdens
of military preparations. They think that the influence of the
Anglo-Saxon race upon the progress and civilisation of the world will
be equally beneficial, whether we live under separate governments
or remain united in our allegiance to the throne of these realms. In
either event, Mr. Bright once said: 'It would be the greatest pride
and the highest renown of England that from her loins have sprung
a hundred--it may be two hundred-millions of men, who dwell
and prosper on that continent which the grand old Genoese gave to
Europe.'
Arguments not less convincing have been urged on the other side. Earl
The policy of a federal union between the mother-country and the
colonies had a warm advocate in the eminent statesman, Earl
Russell, who has lately been taken to his rest. In his Recollec-
tions and Suggestions, he says: “It may be a matter of doubt
whether or no to build up a colonial empire. But it is evident that
if Great Britain gives up her supremacy from a niggardly spirit of
Russel).
346
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Views of
Mr.
Froude.
parsimony, or from a craven feeling of helplessness, other Powers
will soon look upon the Empire, not with the regard due to an equal,
as she once was, but with jealousy of the height she once held, and
without the fear she once inspired. To build up an empire ex-
tending over every sea, swaying many diverse races, and combining
many forms of religion, requires courage and capacity; to allow such
an empire to fall to pieces is a task which may be performed by the
poor in intellect, the pusillaninous in conduct.'
The advantages of a Pan-Anglican Confederation were forcibly
stated by Mr. Froude in the second series of Short Studies on Great
Subjects.
No portion of Mr. Froude's argument is more telling than ihat
in which he insists on the fatal influences which must ensue, when
an excessive proportion of the population become inhabitants of
enormous cities.
• Athens,' he reminds us, “lost her dependencies, and in two
generations the sun of Athens set. The armies which made the
strength of the Roman Republic were composed of small freeholders
of Latium, and afterwards of Italy. When Rome became an empire,
the freeholder disappeared, the great families bought up the soil
and cultivated it with slaves, and the decline and fall followed by
inevitable consequence. Tyre, Carthage, or, if these antiquated
precedents are to pass for nothing, Venice, Genoa, Florence, and
afterwards the Low Countries, had their periods of commercial
splendour. But their greatness was founded on sand. They had
wealth, but they had no rank and file of country-bred men to fall
back upon, and they sank as they had risen. In the American civil
war, the enthusiastic clerks and shopboys from the Eastern cities were
blown in pieces by the Virginian riflemen. Had there been no
Western farmers to fight the South with men of their own sort, and
better than themselves, the star banner of the Confederacy would
still be flying over Richmond.'
Mr. Froude cannot contemplate the confinement of the English
nation within these islands, with her increasing manufacturing popu-
lation, and not feel a misgiving that we shall fail in securing even
those material objects to which our prospects are to be sacrificed.
With the assistance of the State he would send our unemployed
multitudes to cultivate the virgin soil of our colonies.
If the policy advocated by Mr. Froude be right, the vast tracts of
unsettled land within the limits of our colonies afford an ample field
for future emigration from our shores. Mr. Giffen remarks that the
productive area of the colonies has much increased during the five
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
347
federation,
Russell.
years 1871-5, but is still very insignificant as compared with their
enormous acreage.
The area under cultivation (including sown
grasses) amounts in Australia to about 10,000 square miles out of a
total of more than three millions, and in the Cape of Good Hope to
less than 1,000 square miles out of a total area of nearly a quarter of
a million.
Mr. Froude, in the passages quoted, gives expression to views Policy of
very generally shared by a school of politicians who are in favour of
a closer connection with the colonies. They are anxious to promote
a federal union of all the members of the British Empire. They
wish to arrive at a mutual agreement on all questions of tariffs; and,
with a view to concerted action in imperial questions, they are in
favour of giving to the colonies representatives who should sit in the
great council of the Empire at its seat of Government. In con-
sideration of the protection afforded by the fleet, they are prepared
to recommend a contribution from the colonies to the naval ex-
penditure of the country.
In his volume of Recollections and Suggestions, Earl Russell Earl
gives a sketch of the arrangements which might be made for .carry-
ing into effect a policy of confederation. A congress, representing
Great Britain and her dependencies, should be convoked from time to
time. The metropolitan State might promise protection to the
colonies; and, on the other hand, a contribution of three or four mil-
lions to our army and navy estimates might be granted by the colonial
parliaments, and an engagement might be taken not to charge more
than 10 per cent. ad valorem on British produce and manufactures ;
or they might defray the expense of the aid afforded, and not inter-
fere with the discretion of the British commanders.
In the views of those able advocates of confederation, from Colonial
which I have thus freely quoted, I generally concur, and I see policy
additional evidences of their truth in the most recent incidents in our
political experience. As Mr. Grant Duff has truly said, it is almost foreign
policy.
impossible for this country, under a popular representative Govern-
ment, to pursue a satisfactory course in its relations with foreign
countries. The greater number of those who take a lively interest
in public business concern themselves rather with domestic questions
than with foreign policy. Being without knowledge, they arrive at
hasty conclusions, and every new incident that occurs produces a
corresponding change in their opinions. Hence it is that our foreign
policy is inconsistent and uncertain; that we disappoint allies in
whom we have raised expectations, and make sacrifices for unattain-
able or unworthy objects.
more con-
sistent
than our
348
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
men
The Eastern Question once disposed of, it is my earnest hope
that the attention of British statesmen may be directed rather to
the object of drawing the colonies and the mother-country more
closely together than to continental affairs.
In our relations with other nationalities we excite jealousy by
our prosperity. Although singularly unselfish and unaggressive,
our country is not greatly loved abroad. On the other hand, Old
England, as their mother-country, still retains the warm affection of
her colonies. Our Government may show a chilly indifference to
their concerns, but England is still the 'home' of all English-speak-
ing people; and the identity of religion, history, laws, and literature
unites together every member of the family by bonds more enduring
than the protocols and treaties, however valuable they may be, which
are negotiated with foreign nations.
The arguments in favour of a cordial co-operation of the United
Kingdom with the colonies in measures of mutual self-defence have
been repeated by several able writers in recent publications. I may
specially refer to Captain Colomb, Sir Julius Vogel, and the author
of a paper on England and her Colonies, which appeared in
Fraser's Magazine in January. We are reminded of the value of
the colonies to the mother-country for the inevitable development of
the British population, and as the main source of our maritime
prosperity. While foreign countries are steadily determined to
exclude British industries from the markets over which they exercise
control, the value of the colonial trade becomes increasingly mani-
fest; and, while we derive these advantages from our vast colonial
connection, it is obvious that, in proportion to their own prosperity,
the colonies are bound to take their share in defending the Empire.
It is to be regretted that these obligations were not more strictly
defined at the time when the privilege of self-government was
conceded.
In his speech at the Crystal Palace, in 1872, Lord Beaconsfield
said: "Self-government, when it was conceded, ought, in my opinion,
to have been conceded as part of a great policy of imperial consolida-
tion. It ought to have been accompanied by a military code, which
should have previously defined the means and responsibilities by
which the colonies should have been defended, and by which, if
necessary, this country should call for aid from the colonies them-
selves. In my opinion, no Minister in this country will do his duty
who neglects an opportunity of resuscitating as much as possible our
Colonial Empire, and of responding to those distant sympathies
which may become the source of incalculable strength and happiness
to this land.
Earl of
Beacons-
field.
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
349
In conclusion, I revert once more to the importance of an
inquiry by a Royal Commission as a necessary preliminary and pre-
parative to the adoption of a complete and practicable scheme for the
defence of the British Empire. The nature and distribution of the
forces required, whether consisting of matériel or personnel, whether
naval or military, the amount of the expenditure which would be
involved, and the fair appropriation of charges as between the
mother-country and the colonies, are questions which can only be
determined after careful inquiry and deliberation on the spot, and
with a fulness of knowledge which can only be secured by the com-
bined labours of a Royal Commission. We have but recently been
relieved from the apprehensions of war. Public attention has been
drawn to the importance of securing our commerce from interruption.
If the Government can be induced to institute the proposed inquiry,
they will render a service, which will be appreciated, both at home
and on the furthest confines of the wide dominions of the Crown.
Our fellow-countrymen, who have gone forth as the pioneers of civi-
lisation, will pursue their arduous labours with more vigour, when
they feel that their lives and property are protected under the shield
of a united empire.
The following discussion took place at the United Service Insti-
tution on a paper on the same subject, on May 17, 1873, Admiral
A. P. Ryder in the chair :-
Captain CYPRIAN BRIDGE, R.N.: Lest it should be supposed that
I have risen too soon, and not waited for other officers of greater
experience, and who have given more attention to this subject than
myself
, I will, with your permission, just mention in a few words why
I take such an interest in this question. In the first place, I take
an interest that I believe every naval officer must take; in the second
place, I take an interest that I think every colonist (I myself having
been born and lived in a colony for some years) ought to take in it;
and, in the next place, I take special interest in it as having taken
some part in trying to direct the attention of my brother officers and
the public at large to the great question of raising a Volunteer force
which might be to the Navy what the great Rifle and Artillery
Volunteer force has been to the Army. For these three reasons I
have, perhaps, been induced to pay more attention to this subject
than many people are inclined to think it deserves. In my opinion,
no subject that could be brought before any assembly of Englishmen,
whether in the mother-country or the colonies, is more worthy of
attention than this. As Mr. Brassey has very well told us, in the
able and interesting paper which he has just finished, the very life of
350
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
the Empire depends upon those relations which have been maintained
with many of our great colonial dependencies. It has been my good
fortune to visit every great group of colonies, with the exception of
those in South Africa, beginning at Vancouver's Island and ending
in Australia, so that I have a somewhat intimate personal knowledge
of the condition of many of them. Of the great colony of Canada I
am only acquainted with the maritime provinces ; of Canada proper,
the only places I have ever visted are Gaspé and Paspebiac; as to
Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and New Brunswick, almost every part
of their coasts I know well. To show how feasible it has been
thought in the Dominion of Canada, even some years before the
Confederation, to establish a naval force of their own, there was in
existence at Halifax, certainly as far back as 1865, a Naval Volunteer
force. When I became aware that it was in existence, my stay at
Halifax was too short, and my occupations too numerous, to enable me
to make many inquiries concerning it. I did see some of the officers
and men in uniform, but I understood it was more upon a land basis
than a sea basis. The officers had military titles, and it was intended
that they should be employed in time of war chiefly in defending
batteries on shore. This is not, of course, what has been aimed at
in the proposals Mr. Brassey has made this afternoon; but still I
think it does show that, even at that period they were willing to take
some steps towards forming such a force as has been proposed. With
regard to the docking facilities in Australia, there must be many
officers who have served in Australia much later than I have; but as
far back as 1859, the ship to which I belonged, of over 1,400 or
1,500 tons, as we then counted them, was docked at a very large
dock at Cockatoo Island, above Sydney, which even at that time was
very much larger than was necessary to take in a ship of her size,
and had previously taken in an Austrian frigate. The island was
entirely given up to workshops and such places as are required in a
naval yard; and I should imagine, with a very small expenditure of
money, and in a very short time, it would have been made, and pro-
bably is now made, a very suitable and useful naval arsenal. I should,
therefore, be very sorry to see the proposal carried out which Captain
Colomb has made, and Mr. Brassey approved, to close one of our
dockyards to open up others, because I do not think it is necessary.
There was one point to which Mr. Brassey did not allude, which he
mentioned as supplernenting his proposal, and that is, he did not
draw our attention-it could not have escaped his notice, because he
has recently been to those parts himself—but he did not consider it
necessary to draw attention to the fact, that in the Indian Empire
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
351
we have a very large nautical population. I do not mean to put
them upon anything like the same footing as the colonists; but that
they are good seamen, and fit to go anywhere, has been shown by
the manner in which they have altogether taken the place of Euro-
pean seamen on the splendid Peninsular and Oriental steamers, not to
mention others. It would be possible to so organise a force of these
men, that they might set free a very large number of the seamen
belonging to Her Majesty's Service at present engaged in special
employment, which, during war, could be performed by men of the
description of which I have spoken, and would enable the Europeans
who now are employed in them to take part in the more important
operations of war. There are also, I believe, considerable naval
establishments there; at Bombay, I understand, the dockyard is a
very large one. Mentioning that, reminds me of the unfortunate
fact, that the Indian Navy was abolished; we are now feeling the
want of it. In Mr. Brassey's paper; he of course alluded to a subject
,
which, if not obviously, is very intimately connected with oue to
which he was virtually addressing himself, and that is the defence of
our ocean commerce. Of course, this question of raising a Volunteer
naval force in the colonies is solely with a view to defending our
commerce. It seems to me there is a great amount of unnecessary
alarm. No country has ever had so great an ocean commerce as we
have, and no country has ever been in a position so thoroughly well
able to defend it. All the arguments drawn from the case of the
* Alabama,' or the history of the war between the Northern and
Southern States, when the American flag was driven from the ocean
by one or two fast cruisers, are absolutely inapplicable to the condi-
tion of affairs at present. The American flag flew on sailing ships
almost exclusively, and the cruisers which went against those ships,
and eventually swept them off the seas, were steamers. A glance at
the chart (on the wall) will show that it is marked with numerous
lines, which lines, going from port to port, mark out the great highways
upon which the ocean commerce of the world chiefly passes. Almost
without an exception, every one of the most important of those
lines begins and ends at or passes through some British possession.
There is one great gap, I admit, in the system of defence supplied
by our foreign possessions; that is the line which, we will say, begins
at Vancouver's Island and ends at the south of South America and
the Straits of Magellan. It is true that that line is flanked entirely
by foreign countries, and we have no stations within those limits,
which must be some 6,000 or 7,000 miles apart, where we can post a
defensive squadron, or, what is still more important for a defensive
352
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
squadron, obtain supplies. But we ought to recollect we hold both
ends of the line in our own hands. We hold Vancouver's Island,
and we hold almost entire command of the Straits of Magellan in the
Falkland Islands. If, therefore, we maintain the position we have
got, and hy so doing prevent the only cruisers than can be sent abroad
by any enemy, Russia, for instance, obtaining supplies of coal, I do
not see what we have to fear from vessels employed as the 'Alabama'
was employed. Our commerce at present is carried on to a much
greater extent than ever before by steam vessels. Those steam
vessels would find almost along the whole of their route friendly
coaling stations where they could obtain supplies of fuel. But no
other country would be in the same position, or scarcely any other
country. Consequently, I do not think there is much danger, except
perhaps at the very outset of war, when cruisers would start with full
supplies on board, which they would afterwards find very great diffi-
culty in replenishing. I do not think, except at the outset of war,
much danger need be anticipated; and probably the increased risk,
in case of war with Russia at that moment, would be no more than a
very small addition to the insurance already paid. It therefore shows
how extremely necessary it is that we should defend and hold these
places, and keep them entirely secure against attack. Therefore I
say it would be more advisable to turn our attention to establishing
a Naval Volunteer force which should be upon the spot, and should
keep those places in our hands, and prevent them falling into the
hands of the enemy, than to drawing upon it to man cruisers and
keep open highways, a service which I think would be thoroughly
well performed by the Royal Navy. In common with many
others, I have read the very able paper in the Nineteenth Century,
written by Sir Garnet Wolseley, and I am one of the few people
who do not agree with it in the least. I think an examination
of it-it has been submitted apparently to no examination in any
other periodical—would show that the career of that Russian squad-
ron which Sir Garnet Wolseley has painted, has had no parallel in
literature, except perhaps the cruise of the · Flying Dutchman.'
Captain P. H. COLOMB, R.N.: After Mr. Brassey's splendid
peroration it is rather difficult to get one's mind back to the facts of
the case before us, but the remarks of Captain Bridge and Captain
Field have brought us into a more proper frame of mind for dis-
cussing the question. Wherever Mr. Brassey comes I observe that
he brings with him an enormous number of those things which I
always express myself as being very fond of, namely, facts. He has
given us splendid facts in the paper, as in everything he has written
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
353
on sea matters: the collection of facts is magnificent. His state- Captain
Colomb,
ment of the growth of the colonies, I am quite sure, puts a new face R.N.
upon these questions to most of our minds; for my own part, though
I have been considering this question to a certain extent, I never
thought before of the enormous growth which has taken place since
1845. It never struck me in that light, but it shows we have in
that time altered our position altogether in the world, that whereas
we were then a country contained in the British Islands, with some
little outlying dependencies, we have now become simply the centre
of a great English-speaking Empire. I was very near bringing a
book with me, and I am glad I did not, because if I had I should
have been tempted to have quoted from it too largely—a book which
my brother has drawn up, which is a simple collection of articles
from colonial newspapers on this question of Imperial defence, and it
is something quite surprising to anybody who will run his eye over
those articles to see how ready the colonies are to meet us if we will
only go to work to meet them. They seem to say, 'You have only
to say the word ; let us talk it over ; admit that you will not give us
up; admit that we are brothers; admit that the English Empire
is not the British Islands, but is scattered all over the world, and we
on our side will stand by you shoulder to shoulder as long as you
choose to call upon us. That seems to be the general tone of the
colonial press, and that seems to me to answer Captain Field's
question; and I am very sure of this fact, that every friendly word
uttered towards the colonies in any public assembly in England
penetrates to the colonies, and is read there, and produces a corre-
sponding friendly feeling towards the mother-country, and I am
quite certain that that will be the effect of Mr. Brassey's paper here
to-day. I recollect reading in some of the debates in the New
South Wales House of Parliament I think, but I am not sure where-
a very strong opinion was expressed in favour of trusting to the
Royal Navy, and if necessary paying it, for the outer line of defence
of their colonies. They seemed to say that they would wish them-
selves to confine their own efforts, out of the control of the Imperial
Government, to the local defence, but they did not seem at all in-
disposed to bear charges for a force which should not be colonial,
but should be used for the defence of their colony, as well as of any
other, of course bearing a proportion according to the number of
Her Majesty's ships wbich were present. I did not myself gather
that Mr. Brassey meant this: that England was to build the ships,
and that the colonies were to find the men. I rather gathered that
he wished that a Royal Commission, drawn from England and the
VOL. IV.
A A
354
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Captain
Colomb,
R.N.
colonies, should meet together for the discussion of the question of
defence. So soon as any colony had expressed its willingness to
contribute its quota, that then the disposition of that quota, and
how the money was to be spent, would be decided by a joint Royal
Commission. That was what I understood. If it were to be said
that an ironclad was to be built by England, and sent out to a colony,
to lie there in the harbour to be only manned in time of war, I think
I should be rather against that policy. I should rather say that a colony
like Australia should provide a quota for the purpose of keeping up
a sufficient Imperial naval force for the outward defence, and that
then the local arrangements of the colonies themselves should be
entirely devoted to the defence of their harbours against blockade or
sudden attacks. Mr. Brassey has very truly represented me in
saying I put great faith in a colonial system of Naval Volunteers,
who shall rest the defence of their ports mainly on the use of tor-
pedoes. It is the cheapest mode of defence, especially the spar-
torpedo-Mr. Thornycroft's model. It is cheap, and it requires for
its use men of great intelligence. The class from which the Volun-
teers would be drawn would be the people to manage such vessels
they would have the necessary resolution and daring to make the
attack, and, at any rate, if they did nothing else, I believe they
would keep them off by simple fear. But when they had done that,
they would leave the Imperial naval force free. We should always
know the ports were safe behind us, and we should take care that
ships bound to those ports were unmolested on their way towards
them. But I should not draw the line so closely as to torpedoes ;
I would extend it, I think, to the 'Gamma' and 'Staunch 'class of
gunboat, a class of ship quite capable of attacking an ironclad, but
not capable of keeping the sea, and which seems to be a weapon
costing a small suin, and exceedingly available for the defence of
ports. I was very much struck with Mr. Brassey's statement of the
number of seafaring men available on the coast of Canada and New-
foundland, and with the facilities which are given for the drill of
those men at small inconvenience to themselves on account of the
long winter. I cannot help thinking if they, as a small branch of
the great matter, were taken in hand, we might be able on occasion
to draw on Canada if we wanted it, for I should not be prepared to
go to Australia for our seamen. I think the difficulty of the question
is this : that up to quite recent years the colonies have been told
by us always that, 'In point of fact, we do not much care about you,
for you can go
if
you like. You are of no very great service to us :
we can get on very well without you. If you give us trouble, we
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
355
To get
shall say, “ Go."' It has been the policy of the country for a certain Captain
time.
Colomb,
That policy, I am quite certain, is reversed, and I hope will R.N.
never come forward again. I am quite sure as long as the English-
speaking nations spread over the face of the earth hold together, it
will be impossible for anybody else to make head against us.
Admiral SCOTT, R.N.: Captain Bridge has touched upon a point Admiral
which is no doubt very important--that is, the success of the Ala- Scott, R.N.
bama' during the American War. We must, however, remember in
regard to the United States losing their trade, that at that time
sailing ships were becoming obsolete, and their trade from being
principally carried in such vessels was also going down the incline;
hence, it only needed a slight push, viz., the additional war insurance,
to make the Americans sell their vessels, and their trade to pass
with the ships sold to neutrals. This, therefore, is not a parallel
case to ours at the present time. With respect to Mr. Brassey's
very able paper, I wish again to refer to a point that has been more
than once brought forward in this Institution. It is not enough to
get weapons stored in readiness, but you must have them put into
their right place for use in order to be prepared for war.
guns ready to be put on board ship when war breaks out, is not the
way to be prepared for a sudden outbreak of hostilities. We have
long been training, and at a considerable cost, our Reserve seamen :
these men are consequently always learning, but for want of practice
are, I fear, never getting perfect. What the sailors want is, that
when they go on board their own merchant vessels they should carry
out what they have been taught. Each merchant vessel should, I
think, be armed so as to be in herself formidable. Such a vessel, if
commanded by a Reserve captain, and manned in part by Reserve
men who had been keeping up their drill, would be far more formid-
able than any privateer that could be hastily fitted out to attack her.
It should be remembered that these merchant vessels would be
handled by men second to none in skill; in fact, many of their
captains are first-rate fellows, and I need not point out to you that
their ships carry a splendid weapon which is ready at all times, viz.,
a straight, powerful, knife-edge iron stem. No wooden vessel struck
by such a weapon would have any chance of escape. Given an iron
merchant vessel going at enormous speed, and with a powerful stem,
and you only want to add two or three light guns—not 64- or 32-
pounders, which would overstrain her, but 12-pounders; and she
would then obtain the character of an armed vessel, and thus give
the men confidence in protecting themselves. Besides the light
gun and the knife-stem, there is the spar-torpedo, a weapon which
AA 2
356
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Admiral
Scott, R.N.
our Reserve seamen can easily handle; and as most of our merchant
steamers carry whale boats they could be at once provided with an
additional means of efficient defence. Then, as to Canada, the mer-
chant ships belonging to that country—manned by their splendid
seamen—would be really a very powerful supplement to our force of
regular men-of-war if proper arrangements were made in time of
peace. We have now got into a habit of considering the ironclad
only as a man-of-war, but these merchant vessels are, at least for all
points of defence, equal to most of our wooden vessels in their speed,
in their power of ramming, in their sustained steaming, and in their
sea-keeping powers. Turning to what Mr. Brassey has said about
the armament for our colonies, I think it is necessary to commence
on a small scale of expenditure, and that what is most wanted is first
to enrol the seafaring men that are on their coasts for coast defence ;
likewise to enrol all the traders and their seamen as a Naval Reserve,
and not to incur the expense of building special war vessels, but
rather to utilise all existing means of defence. Let the men be
enrolled and also the vessels and boats in which they are accustomed
to go to sea, and then what more simple than to drill and afterwards
to put torpedoes on board them ? In addition to the torpedo arma-
ment, which I look upon as mainly serviceable for the purposes of
defence, you have in your colonies an energetic seafaring people that
could be easily organised for defence; and I believe it could be done
at a very small cost. My own idea is, that from the instant the
Reserve men are called out for drill they should be taken to practical
work; let them be put to fortify those positions which are most
important, and to make roads to and from them along the coast line.
There are no fortifications so cheap or more efficient than sand banks
and earthworks. Therefore, your shore drill should commence with
erecting such defences, and your naval drill with firing torpedoes,
which should be kept at all times ready for use. The colonists, as
we hear on all sides, are quite ready to do their part, and I do be-
lieve that if that part were pointed out by a Royal Commission, it
would have most important results. It would certainly show to
other nationalities the latent force and power which this country
really possesses. We have seen some newspaper articles lately which
tend to give foreigners a very imperfect notion of the actual resources
of this country; these affirm that our empire is so scattered that it
has an inherent source of weakness. I venture to maintain, on the
contrary, that its extension is an inherent source of strength, for our
colonies, settlements, and coaling stations now girdle the earth, and
would enable us to keep the seas in time of war. I again affirm
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
357
that all our ironclads should be sea-going, and that a coast defence Admiral
ironclad is an anomaly; and I believe that this paper is likely to be
of very great service, and I for one think that our hearty thanks are
due to Mr. Brassey for coming forward and reading it on the present
occasion.
Mr. BRASSEY, in reply, said : I am very much obliged to those The Com-
piler.
officers who have spoken, for the too kind manner in which they
have referred to my paper. I was much flattered by the invitation I
received from the Council of this Institution inviting me to prepare
a paper on the Colonial Naval Reserve; and if what I have written
has any effect in setting in motion a scheme for organising our re-
sources for colonial self-defence, I shall feel thankful that I have been
engaged in such a useful task. The point has been referred to by
several speakers as to the mode in which the expenditure necessary
in carrying out such a scheme was to be dealt with. Captain Field
very truly said, after all this is a matter which cannot be undertaken
without an expenditure of money; and speaking as a member of the
Legislature, I fully appreciate that aspect of the case, and consider
that it will require very delicate handling to settle it satisfactorily.
Now the foundation of a practical scheme must be, as I have en-
deavoured to point out, an inquiry by some competent and fully
representative body, and I cannot conceive how a more effective mode
of inquiry could be devised than that which would be provided by a
Royal Commission. As everybody has said, the initiative must be
taken by the mother-country, and the best mode by which the mother-
country can point out what is required to be done, and bring home
to the appreciation of the colonists the necessity for doing what is
necessary, will be provided by giving them the full report on the
subject from a Royal Commission composed of naval and military
authorities and representatives of the colonists, who would be able to
speak on behalf of the Colonial Government as to the ability and
willingness of the taxpayers in those colonies to contribute their
share. I do not think one can speak definitely on this point until
we have had this essential preliminary investigation. No doubt the
Commission would begin, as individual writers on this subject have
begun, by laying down what are the important strategical points
which you have to defend.
have to defend. Some of these strategical points being
ports of very flourishing trade, we may fairly look to the mercantile
community to contribute what is necessary. In other cases you have
an important strategic point which has not a flourishing trade, which
is important in a naval point of view, but not in a commercial point
of view; such, for instance, as the Falkland Islands, or perhaps
358
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
The Com- Vancouver. You could not reasonably expect, in such a case as that,
piler.
that the expense would be met from any other source than the
national exchequer. Gibraltar and Malta are important strategical
points and defended, and I think very properly so, at the expense of
the mother-country. I now turn to the question very properly raised
by Captain Field with reference to the ships. Those ships which
may be considered necessary for the local defence of a flourishing
commercial colony would, I think, belong to and be paid for by the
colonies. Those ships which you might think it necessary to build
for the local defence of places like the Falkland Islands would neces-
sarily be paid for by the Home Government. Each case would have
to be settled with reference to its local and special circumstances,
which would be no doubt properly appreciated by the Royal Com-
mission. I am glad that what I have said with reference to Canada
and Newfoundland has been approved by those naval gentlemen who
have spoken. In Canada there is a most admirable field for the
organisation of a Naval Reserve. There is a large seafaring popula-
tion, hardy and loyal, and valuable in every way for naval purposes,
and from the necessity of the case unemployed during a considerable
portion of the year. And when we come to consider how near the
proximity of Canada and Newfoundland is, the facilities for communi-
cation by telegraph, the means you have of bringing to this country, if
required, a very considerable force, so that in a fortnight you might
have your Canadian reserves in your home ports, ready to man your
ships ; when you come, I say, to consider all these things, it must be
acknowledged that we have too long neglected a very valuable source
of naval power, and one which I trust will be developed by such an
organisation as the Admiralty with small expense might easily esta-
blish on those coasts. I am glad to be reminded by my friend Captain
Bridge of the resources we have in India. India I look upon as a
precious jewel in the national diadem, but it involves the country in
immense responsibilities. I will not enter into the question now,
but the day may come when it may be to some extent a financial
burden to this country. In any case it is satisfactory to know that
we not only have responsibilities and burdens to bear in connection
with India, but that our Navy may be strengthened from our Indian
connection. I was glad to hear from the observations which fell
from Captain Colomb that there has been an expression of opinion
officially and in Parliament in the colony of New South Wales to the
effect that the colony would be willing to contribute its proportion
to the maintenance of such vessels of the Royal Navy as might be
permanently stationed in the colonial waters. I think we might
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
359
reasonably expect such a view to be entertained in a wealthy and The Com-
piler.
increasing colony.
The CHAIRMAN (Admiral Ryder): Hong Kong is a most important Admiral
Ryder.
British colony, and yet a man might walk for days about it without
finding a fort. It is absolutely undefended, except by a few insignifi-
cant guns. Singapore is also absolutely undefended. We have in the
China and Japan Seas not exactly colonies, but settlements very much
of the nature of colonies, viz., settlements on the main land in the
treaty ports. It is difficult to persuade the English inhabitants to
move in this matter of creating a Volunteer force. Englishmen in
those distant parts may fight well enough when driven into a corner,
but they for various reasons will rarely combine together to form
Volunteer forces and submit to drill. You may find at one port some
one or more enthusiasts who take the question up, and I do not know
what we should do without our enthusiasts, as they form a nucleus.
Thus we have, at Shanghai, a very respectable Volunteer infantry force
—there is a small force of cavalry and Gatling guns very much the
kind of force that Mr. Brassey has spoken of; that is what we want
in all our colonies, as I understand from his paper, and I entirely
agree with him. The only difficulty is to start them. I see no reason
why the Act authorising the enrolment of Volunteers should not be
extended to the colonies and to the treaty ports of China and Japan,
and that promptly.
.
360
OUR NAVAL RESERVES,
OUR COLONIAL EMPIRE.
Address delivered before the Bradford Chamber of Commerce, Wednesday,
January 21, 1880.
Colonies
visited
in the
Sunbeam.
$
You have asked me to address you this evening on the subject of
our Colonial Empire. It is indeed a noble theme. Would that it
were in my power to treat it worthily! In the course of many wan-
derings upon the seas I have visited Newfoundland; I have seen the
magnificent scenery of the St. Lawrence, and the thriving cities of
Montreal, Quebec, and Toronto. In a recent voyage round the world
we touched at Hong Kong, Singapore, Aden, Malta, and Gibraltar.
Within the memory of the present generation Hong Kong was a
barren rock, from which a band of 600 pirates set forth on their law-
less expeditions. It has now 124,000 inhabitants, including a civil
European population of 3,000 persons, and the annual imports of
English merchandise alone are not less than 3 millions sterling.
At Singapore, where the English population numbers not more than
1,400, we have established a trade of collection and distribution not
inferior in importance to that carried on from Hong Kong. The
native vessels from every creek and harbour of the Eastern Archi-
pelago collect together at the Straits Settlements, and are supplied
from our well-managed counting-houses with European manufactures.
Aden, which may be compared to a huge cinder lying on the arid
coasts of thirsty Arabia, has become, under the beneficent influence
of British administration, another great emporium of trade. Its
commerce extends on the east to the shores of the Persian Gulf, and
southwards to Zanzibar, and far down the eastern shores of Africa.
Mocha has been deserted by the Arab merchants since we have esta-
blished ourselves at Aden. An average number of 800 laden camels
daily enter the gates, and the total exports and imports are nearly
three millions sterling a year. Of the importance of Malta and
Gibraltar as links in the chain of communication with the East, it
is not necessary that I should speak.
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
361
states.
of colonial
I must not dwell further on personal recollections. I have spoken Colonies
founded by
only of places which I have myself had the privilege of visiting; but maritime
it is not necessary to draw upon personal recollections in order to
appreciate the fact that, without our colonies and our foreign posses-
sions, England would fall to the second rank in the family of nations.
Maritime states have in all ages of the world exhibited the same
desire to establish colonies. Phoenicia, Carthage, and Greece were
great colonising states in ancient times. In the Middle Ages the
lion of St. Mark exhibited the symbol of Venetian power over the
whole coasts of the Mediterranean. The discoveries of Vasco de
Gama opened an era of incredible prosperity for Portugal; and Spain
was not less indebted to the discoveries of Columbus. We have fol-
lowed those illustrious pioneers of colonisation ; but we have known
better how to use our new sources of wealth, and our conquests have
been more enduring.
Trade, as we know, tends to follow the flag; and, during the Importance
period of commercial depression through which we have lately passed, trade.
and from which we are now very gradually emerging, it has been in
the British possessions alone that the export trade has displayed any
growth and elasticity. British India now takes a larger quantity of
our produce than any other country. In 1869 it only occupied the
third place. In a paper by Dr. Forbes Watson, read at the Colonial
Institute in February 1878, a comparison is made of our export trade
in 1876 and 1869. I propose to bring the figures down to 1878, the
last year included in the Statistical Abstract. The figures disclose a
significant change in the direction of our external trade. While the
exports to foreign countries had risen from 141,900,0001. in 1869 to
195,700,0001. in 1872, and had fallen again in 1878 to 126,611,000l.,
our colonial trade has steadily grown in the same interval from
48,000,0001. to 66,237,0001., or from 25.3 per cent. to 34:4 per cent. .
of our total commerce.
When we pass from the aggregate figures to examine our colonial
trade in detail, we discover additional evidences of its great import-
ance to the industrial prosperity of our country. The populations of
the British Empire in the parts beyond the seas are, in proportion to
their numbers, by far the most extensive consumers of our manufac-
tures. It appears, from a table prepared by Mr. Frederick Young,
that the annual consumption of our merchandise per head is repre-
sented by the following figures :-United States, 78.; Germany,
98. 2d.; France, 78. 8d.; North American Colonies, 21. 2s. 9d.;
Australia, 81. 10s. 8d. A more elaborate analysis, by Dr. Forbes
Watson, brings out this striking result, that Australia actually con-
362
OUR NAVAL RESERVES,
Supplies of
food from
colonies.
sumes, in proportion to its population, a larger quantity of English
manufactures than we require ourselves.
Our colonial trade is the more valuable because, as Dr. Forbes
Watson points out, it is largely composed of articles in an advanced
stage of manufacture. Of our exportations of apparel, blankets,
flannels, books, cutlery, and other articles of domestic consumption,
the colonies take 16,800,000l., or about 70 per cent. of the total ex-
portation. The proportion in 1869 did not exceed 58 per cent. Of
the cotton trade, which forms about one-third of our total exports,
two-fifths were taken by the British possessions. Between 1869 and
1876 they increased their consumption of our goods by 6,300,0001. ;
while our exportations to foreign countries diminished by 4,500,0001.
Not only was the aggregate quantity increased, but the goods were
more highly finished than those we supply to many foreign countries.
The colonies take 40 per cent. of finished cotton manufactures; they
take only 21.9 per cent. of cotton yarns. They take 23•4 per cent.
of our woollen and worsted manufactures, and only 3 per cent. of
yarn. They take 40•4 per cent. of manufactured, and only 3•6 per
cent. of pig, iron. They take 17.7 per cent. of wrought and unwrought
steel, and 40:6 per cent. of our exportations of hardware and cutlery,
and 53.2 per cent. of our exports of implements.
We have seen the importance of the colonies as the consumers of
our manufactured products; they are not less essential to us for the
supplies of food which they furnish to the teeming population of
these islands. Mr. Bourne has shown that we cannot expect a
material increase in the life-sustaining abilities of the land. Half of
our food already consists of foreign importations. It has been estimated
by Mr. Bourne that the demand for imported food and raw material
will increase every year by considerably more than six millions
sterling. We must proportionately increase our exports in order to
pay for these ever-growing importations. We have seen the stagna-
tion in the Continental demand, and the growth in the consumption
of our goods in our own possessions. If some of that capital so
recklessly squandered in mushroom States had been carefully and
gradually expended in our own colonies, the investors would have
obtained a steadier return, and the commerce of this country would
have received a more lasting benefit. The colonies offer an inviting
field both for the industrious labourer and the small capitalist. In
our own country there is already an ample population, and the
openings are few for men of moderate resources. Men without
capital, even when gifted with abilities beyond the average, experi-
ence a delay of years before they can cover the ordinary cost of
living from a professional or a commercial income.
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
363
colonisa-
resources
of colonies,
Mr. Bourne, in his recent paper, has urged the duty of colonisa-Duty of
tion, both on economic and on still higher grounds. By conquest, tion.
by discovery, and from motives of philanthropy, we have appropriated
a wide space upon the earth. We cannot evade the responsibilities
of our acquisitions. We must give to these countries the freedom
that we enjoy, the commerce and the agriculture that we have
organised, the civilisation under which we live, and the religion with
which we ourselves are blessed. It is only by emigration that this
beneficent mission can be accomplished.
We have now passed in review some of the salient facts of our
colonial development. We have just reason to be proud of our wide
and growing empire beyond the seas. It may not always be possible
to preserve a common centre for such an empire, although we have
simplified our task to the utmost by yielding to the colonies an abso-
lute independence in their internal affairs; but in this we shall
all
agree that our noble confederation shall not be broken up for the
sake of a paltry reduction in the Navy or the Army Estimates.
The cost to the British Exchequer of the most valuable colonies has Defensive
been brought down to a nominal charge. There is no reluctance on
the part of the wealthier colonies to bear the cost of local defence.
Sydney already possesses a turret ship, the Cerberus.' Melbourne
has a small navy. At Adelaide an ironclad has been proposed. At
Sydney a force of 300 regular artillerymen, a torpedo corps, and a
naval brigade of 100 men has been organised. New Zealand
possesses an efficient militia as a protection against the Maories.
Tasinania has a corps of 800 volunteers, described to me by
Lieutenant Bower, of the Wolverine,' from whose correspondence
these details have been derived, as badly organised, but full of zeal.
Both Sydney and Melbourne have been partially fortified. It has
lately been determined by each of the Governments of Victoria
and New South Wales to expend 350,0001., besides an additional
annual outlay of 73,0001., in providing a force of ships, guns, and
torpedoes.
The resources of our colonies are, indeed, ample for every purpose
of self-defence. The fisheries of the Dominion of Canada, according
to a statement of Mr. Frederick Young, give employment to 1,000
ships, 17,000 smacks manned by 7,000 sailors, and 26,000 fishermen.
I am, however, informed by Sir Bryan Robinson, for twenty years
Judge of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland, that these figures are
inadequate. Speaking of the colony with which he has been himself
connected, he says that the male population in 1874 numbered 82,693.
Deducting, one-half for old men, young children, and a few persons
who do not follow a seafaring life, there would remain 41,347 sailors
364
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Necessity
for organ-
isation of
colonial
forces.
familiar with square-rigged vessels. The Dominion stands fifth in
the maritime tonnage of nations, ranking after Great Britain, the
United States, Norway, and Italy, but before Germany and France.
Turning from Canada to the Antipodes, their naval resources
may be appreciated when we consider the immense seaboard of New
Zealand, and the distance of a thousand miles which separates it
from the Australian continent, and which must inevitably lead to a
great development of maritime enterprise and power.
In a paper published in 1872 in the Annual of the School of
Naval Architecture, Mr. Barnaby rightly urged that the British
Empire, if effectively organised as a maritime confederacy, would be
enabled, not only to maintain itself in security from attack, but that
it would be a guarantee of maritime peace to all the wayfarers on
the seas. Organisation, however, was then wanting, as it still is, and
it is a work which essentially belongs to a time of peace. The initia-
tive must come from the mother-country—from our experienced
statesmen and our numerous body of highly-trained officers, who
have leisure for the consideration of these things.
The task before us is difficult, because it has been too long
neglected. In a speech at the Crystal Palace in 1872, Lord
Beaconsfield expressed his regret that the means and responsibilities
by which the colonies should be defended, and by which, if neces-
sary, this country should call for aid from the colonies themselves,
had not been considered and defined at a time when self-government
was conceded. I find an identical expression of opinion in the
Telegraph, a Brisbane journal, in an article on a pamphlet on A
Colonial Naval Volunteer Force, which I published in 1878. The
question still demands solution. When presiding at a meeting
of the Royal United Service Institution, during a discussion on
Captain Colomb's paper on the Naval and Maritime Resources of
the Colonies, I remember to have heard Mr. Strangways, late
Premier of South Australia, declare that the first and most important
subject for consideration was that of Imperial unity. He asked
whether, if they called upon the colonies to join with England in a
general advance of the whole empire, they were prepared to give to
those Colonies a voice in the question of peace or war. That was the
very essence of the question. If England became involved in a
great war, it would have one of two effects in connection with her
relation to the colonies. It would either bind England and her
colonies into one vast empire such as the world had never seen, or
it would entirely separate her from those Colonies. Which was the
end that they should seek after ? Was it not that of uniting
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
365
together, into one vast whole, the enormous resources of the whole
English Empire? Mr. Strangways recommended a Federal Council,
which should be consulted on questions of external policy. Sir
Julius Vogel, another ex-Colonial Minister, expresses the opinion
that there is nothing impracticable in this proposal, because there is
a complete identity of thought in the British people.
The colonies are sensible of the weakness of isolated action.
They know that each colony is too jealous of the rest to admit of a
formidable combination under any other supremacy than that of the
mother-country. They know, to use the words of the leading
Sydney journal, quoted by Mr. Baden Powell, that it would cost the
colonies no more to have their naval defence under Imperial than
under local control, while they would get much more for their
money in the shape of security. The proposal of Mr. Barnaby that
each member of the British Confederation should contribute towards
the national fleet in proportion to the volume of their exports, may
be made the basis of an equitable arrangement. It may be that
some more independent plan in the nature of a perpetual and
friendly alliance may be adopted. Whatever may be the final settle-
ment, the indefinite adjournment of this question, simply because
it does not happen to be pressed forward by agitation out of doors,
is most earnestly to be deprecated. Bitter, indeed, will be the
reproaches heaped upon the statesmen or the party which should be
held responsible for having, from mere neglect, brought about the
disintegration of the Empire.
The apportionment of responsibility, as between England and her Defence of
wealthiest and most populous colonies, is the only difficulty with coaling
which we have to grapple. With regard to the points to be de-
fended and the methods of defence, there are no differences of
opinion. Few words can be necessary in order to establish the import-
ance of providing for the defence of our coaling stations or the lines
of communication with our Australian colonies and with India and
China. Since the introduction of propulsion by steam, of iron ships
and iron armour, foreign naval stations are more than ever requisite
for supplies of coal and for repairs, which can only be effected in
port. A steam navy, and more especially an ironclad navy, if
deprived of its coaling stations, is practically helpless. The
* Alexandra,' our flagship in the Mediterranean, at her maximum
speed, does not carry coal enough for three days; while at the slower
speed of thirteen knots, she burns 200 tons a day. The limit of her
range at full speed does not exceed the distance from Plymouth to
Lisbon or, perhaps, Gibraltar.
.
366
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
bases for
The recent detention of transports at St. Vincent, at a time when
the early arrival of reinforcements at the Cape was a matter of most
momentous importance, is another illustration of the necessity that
exists for a sufficient number of well-supplied and properly-defended
coaliug stations. The importance of securing the British coaling
stations against attack is the more urgent because all our coaling
stations in America, the Brazils, in the North Atlantic, the Cape de
Verds, Madeira, and Lisbon, and those in the Pacific and Japan,
would no longer be accessible. Coal is contraband of war, and, as
our cruisers would be unable to obtain supplies at the ports to which
they usually resort in time of peace, the replenishment of coal
would be one of the great difficulties with which the Navy would
have to contend.
Strategical The bases on which the Navy would mainly depend in the event
our foreign of war were enumerated by Sir William Jervoise in a paper read
squadrons. before the United Service Institution in 1871: Malta and Gibraltar
for the Mediterranean; Halifax and Bermuda for the Atlantic; Port
Royal, Jamaica, from its position with reference to the West Indies
and the Gulf of Mexico; Bombay and Aden, Simon's Bay at the
Cape of Good Hope, Port Louis, Mauritius, a harbour in Ceylon,
Singapore, Hong Kong, and some other ports are, in military
language, the strategical bases for our foreign squadrons.
Existing Vigorous efforts were lately made, under the apprehension of a
war with Russia, to extemporise defences; but until a recent period
Galle, Singapore, and Hong Kong on the line to India and China,
and St. Helena, the Cape, and the Falkland Islands on the Aus-
tralian route, were practically undefended. I have already stated
that steps had been taken by the Colonial Legislatures to erect
defences for Sydney and Melbourne ; but I am not aware what
progress has hitherto been made, and a letter lately received from a
naval correspondent gives a somewhat humiliating picture of the
state of affairs so recently as 1878. At that time, he writes, there
one never-failing topic that would excite and interest a colonial
community. It was necessary merely to mention the words “Rus-
sian privateer, and anywhere in the towns of Sydney, Melbourne,
or Auckland the audience would start an animated discussion. Bank
managers would explain that there was constantly a reserve of three
millions in the Sydney banks, and in other towns a proportionate
amount. Others would dilate on the useless expense of inadequate
defensive works. A strong patriotic feeling existed ; and, as a con-
sequence, torpedo corps were extemporised, torpedoes ordered, guns
mounted, and every preparation made for a passive defence; but,
means of
defence.
was
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
367
from first to last, in these English communities, amongst the most
enterprising people in the world, nowhere, except in Melbourne, was
a single preparation made for active offensive warfare. If we have
been remiss in not providing for the defence of our colonies and
coaling stations, we have been equally supine on the scarcely less
important question of dock accommodation. In the last session of
Parliament, the First Lord of the Admiralty was perseveringly
questioned by Colonel Arbuthnot, who succeeded in eliciting the
admission that none of the colonies have availed themselves of the
Colonial Docks Loan Act of 1865, and that, in point of fact, except
at Malta and at Hong Kong, and perhaps Australia, we have no dock
accommodation for large ironclads away from England.
Returning to the unprotected condition of our foreign naval sta- Method of
tions, it may be asked : 'By what means is the defence to be secured ?' defence.
Not, it may be answered, by the sea.going fleet. The main object of
our naval policy, says Captain Colomb, should be to maintain our
communications by sea, by means of seagoing ships, which should be
employed, not in the defence of the coaling stations which are their
base of operations, but in cruising on the great sea route to and from
the heart of the Empire, and in blockading the enemy in his own
seaports. Fortification, as it has been said by Major Parnell, is
merely a form of economy. It secures our ports, and allows our
ships to be used more advantageously in offensive fighting. It is
as a fence round a field. The farmer could keep off intruders by
employing watchmen. A fence is the cheaper method. Fortifica-
tions need not be costly. Booms, torpedo boats, earthworks, a few
guns judiciously placed, will protect a port from isolated cruisers. In
America, where, in the long struggle with the Southern States, naval
operations for the attack and defence of harbours were carried out on
a scale of unprecedented magnitude, it is considered that large iron-
clads are unnecessary, and that heavy guns, rams, and torpedoes are
sufficient to make a good defence against a modern fleet. Where a
military force is required to man works, the Colonial Governments
will doubtless be prepared to raise a local militia, or to organise
volunteers. Where a naval force is required to man a flotilla of rams
or torpedo boats, it should be organised upon the model of the Royal
Naval Artillery Volunteers, a corps which has been so successfully
developed, both in London and Liverpool, and lately in Bristol.
A force like our Naval Reserve would also be required to man the
crews of seagoing vessels. Mr. Marshall Smith, an experienced master
in the colonial merchant service, reports to the Nautical Magazine of
May last that the crews of the merchant shipping of Australia number
368
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
.
Mercantile
5,300, of whom he anticipates that 2,000 would be ready to enrol in
the Naval Reserve. If the colonial seamen could be induced to join,
the mother-country could readily furnish the officers and instructors.
These are proposals which require forethought rather than money.
In a harbour of great commercial importance such as Singapore or Hong
Kong, a small charge upon the tonnage would provide the necessary
funds. Where the trade is small, as in the Falkland Islands, the Home
Government must pay just as it now does for Gibraltar and Malta.
For the harbour defence of India, the Indian Government has
hitherto relied mainly on the torpedo. Two ironclads, the “Magdala
and the Abyssinia,' have been provided, in addition, for the defence
of the harbour of Bombay. Each of these ships cost 150,0001. It has
been urged in a professional journal of authority, the Broad Arrow,
that with ten more such vessels we might effectually defend the
Indian coast from the Indus to the Ganges.
Passing from harbour defence to the protection of our commerce
auxiliaries. on the high seas, I cannot express the opinion too strongly that it
should be the policy of the British Government to make that com-
merce as far as possible self-defending. The rapid steamers owned by
private shipowners, as both Mr. Burns and Mr. Donald Currie and
other equally high authorities have pointed out, would supply an
enormous additional power of offence as well as of defence. The
Admiralty have issued circulars inviting the owners of ships, satisfying
certain conditions as to bulkheads, to register their vessels on a list
of reserve cruisers of the Navy; but no further action has been taken.
In order to carry out this policy it would be necessary to offer induce-
ments to shipowners, who contemplate the construction of ships of a
suitable character in point of speed and other qualities, to communi-
cate with the Admiralty at the time when the designs are being
prepared. It would then be easy for the Constructor's Department
to point out what special modifications were necessary in order to
adapt such vessels for war service, and the expense of those special
modifications should be defrayed by the Government. The terms
upon which the vessels would be taken up by the Admiralty, when
required in time of war, could not be determined beforehand, but
would form the subject of an equitable arrangement when the
emergency arose. This suggestion is one which, I fear, will never
be adopted, unless it be forced upon the Admiralty by public opinion.
Naval Officers naturally desire to spend all the money voted for the
naval services upon ships built specially for war.
I regret that I have occupied so large a share of your time with
topics which may appear irrelevant in addressing a Chamber of Com-
merce. I plead the importance of the subjects I have brought before
COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE.
369
at stake
trade.
you, and the necessity of arousing the Government to action. The Property
annual value of the foreign commerce of this country, as shown by in British
foreign
the Board of Trade Returns, exceeds 600 millions sterling. To
this should be added for the shipping a sum which would bring
the total amount at stake, in the event of war, to more than
650 millions sterling. Now, if it could be shown that, with an ex-
penditure of less than a million, our coaling stations could be made
secure, could any Government stand excused before the country
which would hesitate to apply to Parliament for the funds required for
such a purpose ? Under our popular system of government nothing
is done except in deference to external pressure. Agitation is too
often the necessary preliminary to all administrative or legislative
action. In appealing to the Chamber of Commerce of Bradford, I
seek to make use of my present opportunity for a patriotic and a
practical purpose. We are here to-day on a neutral platform in the
centre of a great hive of industry. We acknowledge our dependence
on our foreign commerce, and we think it our duty to arouse the
Government to a sense of responsibility for the security of our trade.
We stand here to-day to discharge a still higher duty—to proclaim to
our sons and our brethren, who have gone forth from our shores to
settle in the distant dependencies of the Crown, that we admire and
are thankful for the energy they have displayed in turning wilder-
nesses into gardens, and in spreading their flocks and herds over the
prairies of North America and the boundless plains of the Antipodes.
They are rapidly forming themselves into new nations; but we trust
that they may be long content to live together with us beneath the
mild and equal sway of our beloved and constitutional Sovereign.
Let us send it forth as a message from Bradford that, so far as it
depends on us, we claim no right of interference with their concerns,
while, on the other hand, we are ever ready to obey their call for help.
We think that the union of the Anglo-Saxon race is a mutual benefit
to all the members of the family. Within a period of time so recent
that it seems but the yesterday of history, we have seen the Italians
and the Germans united under one Government. We recognise the
accession of influence which these nationalities have gained. More
lately still, we have felt the pressure of Sclavonic ambition. We
have watched the progress of these events without apprehension for
ourselves, because we have had confidence in one another. Our
communities may be scattered over all the earth. It is our pride and
glory that they are ; because while we remain united by one deep
national sentiment, and England is still a home to all her sons, there
is not weakness, but strength, in the wide extent of our Colonial Empire.
VOL. IV.
BB
SECTION XI.
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE. .
PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES
APRIL 3, 1873, APRIL 17, 1874.
1
In these speeches the suggestions more fully described in the preceding papers are
repeated. The sters taken by the Admiralty are explained in the replies from the
Treasury Bench
13 11 2
372
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
MOTION AND DEBATE.
HOUSE OF COMMONS, April 3, 1873.
Speech on Moving for the Appointment of a Select Committee on
the Naval Reserve.
MR. BRASSEY, in rising to move that a Select Committee be appointed
to inquire into the condition of the Naval Reserves, expressed his
regret, in which they would all share, at the death of Mr. Graves, in
whoin the British seaman had lost a sincere friend and an able
advocate.
History conclusively proved the essential importance of a merchant
navy to any naval power, and the situation of this country was pre-
eminently satisfactory. The tonnage of the mercantile fleet of
England was 7,142,000 tons; that of the United States, 1,500,000
tons; Germany, 1,305,000 tons; France, 1,077,000 tons; and that
of Russia, 250,000 tons. It might be assumed that the number of
seamen was proportionate to the relative tonnage. With such advan-
tages we ought to be absolutely secure against attack, and able to
exercise a decisive influence in all questions of foreign policy, and
especially the Eastern question, in which our interests were inti-
mately involved. But, owing to the substitution of steam for sail
power, our maritime population no longer showed any tendency to
increase, and our Naval Reserve exhibited a proportionate diminution
of strength.
The Royal Commission of 1859 recommended that the standard of
strength for the Naval Reserve should be maintained at 20,000 men
and for the Naval Coast Volunteers at 10,000 men. The actual
strength of the Reserve had fallen from 17,000 in 1866 to 12,000 men
in 1873. The Naval Coast Volunteers scarcely exceeded 600. The
reduction in the number of the Naval Reserve was much to be regretted.
As to the efficiency of the Reserve, we had received repeated
assurances of a satisfactory character from Admirals Cooper Key,
t
Strength
of Reserve.
Appliances
for drill.
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
373
.
Warren, Elliot, and others, by whom the Reserve had been officially
inspected. The Reserve might be inade still more effective if greater
liberality were displayed in providing the necessary facilities for naval
gun drill. The guns on board the training ships of the Reserve were
generally 32-pounder smooth-bores. Of 63-ton guns there were only
two on board the training-ship, at which the whole of the Reserve
men residing in the London district, some 1,200 in number, were
trained. He might add that the cost of the ammunition was not an
element for consideration in this case, as the guns on board the
* President' were never fired. He had of late attended frequently at
drill on board the President.' Pulling the same ropes and manning
the same winch-handles with the men, he had opportunities of form-
ing an opinion of their personal qualities, and he could testify that
the men belonging to the Reserve, as a rule, took a deep interest in
their work.
The Reserve suffered in point of efficiency; not only from the in- Gunnery
adequate appliances for drill, but also from the want of any pecuniary pay.
encouragement to attain the highest possible degree of efficiency.
Under the rules, which until very lately were in force, a uniformn rate
of pay was given to every seaman in the Reserve, irrespective of his
conduct or proficiency in drill. In the Navy, the system of rewarding
good discipline and efficiency by pecuniary advantages had been de-
veloped to the greatest possible extent. In the gunncry line, more
especially, the various classes of pecuniary rewards had been conceived
in the most liberal spirit. If this system were found necessary in the
Navy, where they had the means of preserving discipline and creating
another and higher stimulus to exertion through the influence of an
admirable esprit de corps, how inuch inore necessary must it be in
the Reserve, where the men were never assembled together long
enough to afford their officers an opportunity of establishing a per-
sonal influence over the men ? The revised rules contained a pro-
vision for giving a badge, with an allowance of id. a day, for every
Royal Naval Reserve man passed out from the drill-ships as a trained
The pay was the same as in the Navy; but in the Navy the
seamen had an opportunity of earning 365 pence in the year ;
whereas, in the 28 days during which the Naval Reserve men were
at drill they could not earn more than 2s. 4d. Again, the seaman
in the Navy, on becoming a trained man in gunnery, was merely
on the bottom round of the ladder. Numerous rewards were held out
for proficiency in gunnery ; whereas the ultimate reward of the Naval
Reserve man was limited to the paltry sum which he bad named.
He would recommend that a trained man in the Reserve should
man.
374
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Moderate
scale of
naval ex-
receive a gratuity of 1l. The additional expense to the country would
be slight, and they would at least have the satisfaction of knowing
that the men who earned the gratuity possessed a respectable know-
ledge of the most essential part of a man-of-war's-man's duties.
Within the last week a revised code of rules had been promulgated
for the Reserve, containing amendments on the old rules, all of
penditure which he heartily approved. Almost every improvement which could
be carried out without spending more money had been effected. The
Government might object to the proposals which he had to make, be-
cause they involved some additional expense. He sympathised with
the Admiralty in their anxiety to keep down expenditure. The in-
crease that had taken place in the price of materials and in wages,
and the altered conditions of naval architecture, had raised the old
estimate of 1,000l. per gun for a ship of war to about 100,0001. per
gun. Compared, however, with the tremendous outlay on our iron-
clad ships, the cost of carrying out his suggestions would be an insig-
nificant item. The present scale of naval expenditure, if set down
at an average of 10,000,0001. a year, constituted a very moderate
premium of insurance against the dangers of invasion or the anxiety
and disgrace of a sudden panic. In 1858 the total value of our im-
ports and exports was 234,000,0001., and the tonnage of our merchant
vessels was 4,211,000 tons. The value of our trade in 1870 was
547,000,0001., and the tonnage of our shipping was 5,633,000 tons;
while the expenditure on the Navy had been reduced, in the interval,
from 10,590,0001. in 1858, to 9,900,0001. in 1872.
Regula- He would now point out those other improvements which he re-
garded as essentially necessary. Why, he asked, were the numbers
of the Reserve so considerably reduced ? To soine extent that reduc-
tion was due to the greater care exercised in the admission of candi-
dates for enrolment, and to the dismissal of ill-conducted and
inefficient men. The rules formerly in force excluded a considerable
number of seamen in every way qualified for the Reserve. Seamen
could not be re-entered unless they were actually serving at sea.
Under this rule many experienced seamen were ineligible. Again,
the qualifications excluded all but bonâ-fide seamen from the Second-
class Reserve. Fishermen and boatmen were ineligible. Under the
revised code, an acquaintance with square-rigged vessels, and resi-
dence on board a training-ship while at drill, were no longer neces-
sary.
Under the regulations originally drawn up, the seaman enrolled
in the Second-class Reserve in the port of London was compelled to
attend drill on board the ‘Penelope' at Harwich, while the seaman
tions as to
entry.
Drill of
Sccond-
class
Rescrve.
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
375
in the
on board the First-class Reserve was allowed to remain at home and
drill on board the ‘President' in the West India Dock. The young
seamen who, under the rules as to qualifications, were drawn from
the same class as the First Reserves, valued just as much as their
older shipmates the privilege of remaining at home in the short
intervals between their long foreign voyages, and the enforced absence
was naturally distasteful. All that it was desirable to alter in the
regulations as to qualification had been altered in the revised rules;
but he much regretted that the allowance for travelling expenses was
not more liberal.
He would now proceed to direct the attention of the House to the Drill bat-
teries, port
desirability of multiplying the places of drill for the First-class of London.
Reserve. For seamen residing in London, there was only one ship
or battery at which they could be drilled-namely, the ‘President'
in the West India Docks. Another drill ship should be established
on the Surrey side of the river. If an additional ship could not be
provided, the seamen's expenses in travelling to and fro should be
paid when residing beyond a certain distance from the drill ship.
The removal of the restrictions on enrolment for the Reserve Reduction
of sailing
would, he hoped, have the effect of adding considerably to their ships, and
numbers. But the severity of the restrictions was not the only comple-
reason why it had been found impracticable to keep up the number ments of
to the standard recommended by the Royal Commission. There ships.
were two other causes at work : first, the tendency in our maritime
population to decrease, owing to the immense increase in the number
of steamers, which did not require so large a proportion of sailors as
sailing vessels. The second cause of diminution was found in the
material reduction that had taken place in the proportion of sailors
required in comparison to the tonnage of vessels. Since the opening
of the Suez Canal, shipbuilders had been employed almost exclu-
sively in the construction of steamers. In 1864 the total tonnage of
the mercantile marine was 7,103,000 tons. In 1871 it was 7,142,000
tons. But while the tonnage of steam vessels in 1864 was 770,000
tons, it had increased to 1,412,000 tons in 1871. In 1868, 237,687
tons of sailing vessels were built, and 78,508 tons of steam vessels.
In 1871 only 56,545 tons of sailing vessels were built, while the
construction of steamers had increased to 297,810 tons. Mechanical
appliances had been multiplied. Patent blocks, steam winches, and
other substitutes for manual labour had been introduced ; and
whereas, in 1854, the proportion of seamen to every 100 tons wag
4:7, it had been reduced to 3.25 in 1870. It had been erroneously
stated that the number of British seamen had diminished by the in-
merchant
376
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
deteriora-
tion of
seanen.
for traiu-
troduction of foreigners. In 1864 the number of foreigners in British
ships constituted 12:6 per cent. of the whole number of seamen em-
ployed. The percentage had been reduced in 1870 to 10.1.
Alleged An impression very generally prevailed that the seamen had not
only diminished in number, but that they were inferior, both in
character and skill, to their predecessors. It was difficult to reconcile
this opinion with the fact that our ships were manned by a smaller
number of hands, made more rapid passages, and were never laid up
in winter.
The inferiority of our seamen, so far as it might fairly be admitted,
might partly be attributed to the increase in the number of steamers.
In the mercantile marine, where speedy transit was all-important,
the substitution of steamers for sailing vessels was, in many branches
of the shipping trade, inevitable.
Argument The increase in the number of steamers, and the repeal of the
ing ships. Navigation Laws, had led to a great reduction in the number of
apprentices enrolled. The number had fallen from 15,704 in 1845
to 10,370 in 1846, and 4,111 in 1871. While the apprentices had
been reduced to less than half their former number, the annual waste
of British seamen was computed at 10,000, of whom, unhappily,
3,000 were lost by drowning. In the interests of the Navy, it was
necessary to do something to increase the supply and improve the
quality of seamen in the merchant service. The shipowners were
perfectly able to take care of themselves. There was no difficulty in
obtaining men for steamers, because men on steamers were paid
higher wages. The wages of ordinary seamen had not been increased
for twenty years, and it could scarcely be a matter of surprise if many
of them sought employment on shore in better paid and less arduous
occupations. It was entirely in the interests of the Navy that he
would recoinmend that some steps should be taken by the State to
improve the training of boys for the mercantile marine. It was not
practicable to raise the number of boys in the training ships under
the Admiralty. The training in the Navy was more complete, but it
cost 55l. per head for every boy under training, as against 251. per
head for boys trained in the ships maintained by philanthropic
societies. The ships of the philanthropic societies rendered excellent
service. The Marine Society of London supplied 167 boys to the
Navy in 1871, and since its foundation, in 1756, the Society had sent
26,754 lads into the service. But more instructors and better
appliances were necessary in these ships, and, above all, brigs should
be attached to the stationary vessels, in which the more efficient lads
could be sent for a cruise at sea. The training-ship maintained by
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
377
1
the city of New York was constantly cruising in Long Island Sound.
The expense of giving this more complete instruction was beyond the
scope of private philanthropy, and it was a question whether the
Government should not be called upon to render some assistance.
The Royal Commission of 1859, at whose suggestion the Naval
Reserve was established, strongly recommended that twelve school
ships should be established at the principal ports, each capable of
receiving 200 boarders, of whom 100 should be nominated by the
State. After an apprenticeship of four years the young seamen
entered in these vessels would be eligible for the Reserve. A some-
what similar plan had been proposed by Sir Frederick Grey; and
Mr. Thomas Gray, of the Board of Trade, had suggested that the
Government should take over one of the ships now maintained as a
philanthropic institution on the Thames, and one of those on the
Mersey, and that all boys entered on either of the ships taken over
by the Government should, in consideration of the superior training
which they would receive, and which would probably enable them to
command superior wages in the merchant service, agree to serve for
a year in the Navy on the completion of their apprenticeship, and
afterwards to join the Reserve.
He ventured to make another proposition which he most earnestly Bonus for
commended to the consideration of the House. The Government ment ap-
should encourage owners of ships of an approved class to take prentices.
apprentices, by giving a bonus for every apprentice on board their
ships who had been duly indentured to the Registrar-General as a
Government apprentice, and had agreed, on the completion of his
apprenticeship, to serve in the Navy for a year, and afterwards to
join the Reserve. The number of apprentices should be limited-
say one for every 100 tons—and the ships should be of an approved
class. A bounty of 5l. might be paid to an apprentice on joining the
Navy for his year of service. As compared with training-ships such
a plan would be both more practicable and less expensive.
He would now turn to the officers of the Reserve. No well-con- Officers of
sidered plan had been prepared for the command of the Naval
Reserve, either during their annual drills, or when called out for
active service. The half-pay and retired lists contained many
officers who would eagerly accept permanent employment in the
Reserve with a trifling addition to their retired pay. The officers
of the mercantile marine, who received commissions in the Reserve,
should be systematically trained. Young gentlemen, socially quali-
fied for service in the Navy, were. being educated on board the
Conway,' in the Mersey, and the Worcester,' in the Thames.
Govern-
Reserve.
378
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Coast
Volunteers.
If the Admiralty were to afford to these officers a competent
knowledge of gunnery, we should have in them an invaluable reserve
of officers. For this purpose a short practical course of gunnery and
naval tactics should be arranged, in connection with the • Excellent,
analogous to the course of military instruction for Volunteer officers
at Aldershot. Eligible young officers of the mercantile marine
should be encouraged to go through the course by the offer of a
premium, to be paid to them on their passing a satisfactory examina-
tion. The premium should be sufficient in amount to cover the
expense of their residence in Portsmouth, and also to compensate
them for their loss of income while remaining on shore for the pur-
pose of study. The Board of Trade would do much to promote the
success of this scheme by raising the standard of examination for the
extra master's certificate, so as to include both modern languages and
the more important elements of commercial science. The privilege
of going through the course on board the “Excellent' might be con-
fined to officers who had passed this higher examination. The
creation of the Naval Academy at Greenwich would doubtless do
much to facilitate the fusion between the officers of the Reserve and
the Navy, which, from every point of view, was much to be desired.
From the Royal Naval Reserve he would turn to the Coast
Volunteers. Recent naval administrators had unaccountably neglected
this branch of the Reserves. The Committee of 1852 recommended
a force of 6,000 Coast Volunteers, and the Royal Commission of 1859
advised that the number should be fixed at 10,000 men. According
to the latest estimates, the number had been reduced to 600. It
could not be said that eligible men were wanting. The latest Return
showed that 153,000 men and 14,000 boys were employed in the
fisheries of the United Kingdom. In point of physical power the
fishermen were superior to the seamen in foreign trades. Their local
knowledge would be of immense value in coast defence, and the fact
that they had fixed places of residence, and never sailed under a foreign
flag, made it certain they would always be found when required. Of
their moral character he could speak with the greatest confidence.
The Coast Volunteer was not popular in the Navy, because the
men originally enrolled were admitted into the service for political
purposes with discreditable laxity; but it would not be difficult to
raise from among our fishermen a Reserve equal to the standard
recommended by the Royal Commission. From a perusal of the
revised rules he was encouraged to believe that there was a disposi-
tion to induce the fishermen to join, not the Naval Coast Volunteers,
but the Second-class Naval Reserve. The means, however, which
Additional
batteries.
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
379
were proposed for carrying out this policy were inadequate. The
fishermen were congregated in isolated communities on various points
of the coast. They were men of domestic habits, and it would be
difficult to induce them to join the Reserve, if they were drilled
far from home. The list of ships and batteries at which the Naval
Reserve might take their drill, though imposing enough in point of
numbers, did not include some of the most important fishing commu-
nities. There were batteries at Poole, where the number employed
in fishing vessels was only 214; at Maryport, where there were only
69; and at Lynn, where there were only 266; but there were no
establishments at Sligo, which had 4,800 men and boys in the fishing
vessels of the port; none at Skibbereen, which had 5,500 ; none at
Banff, which had 5,600; nor at Stornoway, which had 8,000; nor at
Wick, which had 8,400; nor at Inverness, which had 9,000 fisher-
men. The Manning Committee of 1852 strongly recommended that
the Scotch naval station should be re-established. Where the Navy
was best known, there the flower of the population were ready to
enter it. In 1852 there were more men in the Navy from the vil-
lage of Cawsand, near Plymouth, than from the port of Liverpool.
The Return of the counties in which the boys in training ships in
1871 were born showed that, out of 2,888 boys, only 90 came from
the whole of Scotland, only 112 from Lancashire, including the Isle
of Man as well as Liverpool, only 23 from Suffolk, 11 from Norfolk,
and 18 from Wales. Could it be supposed that the great seafaring.
populations on those coasts bad ever been made thoroughly ac-
quainted with the advantages of service in the Navy and the
Reserve? The fluctuating nature of their occupation would enable
the fishermen to attend drill with little inconvenience. The drill
could be taught in the most effective manner, and with the least
expense to the Government, by sending a gunboat to visit the
fishing ports at the slack season. These periodical visits of a smart,
well-organised gunboat would do much to create a favourable impres-
sion of the Navy among the fishermen. The expense of keeping a
few gunboats in commission for this purpose would be nominal ; for
we had more seamen at present in the home ports than it was
possible to employ in seagoing ships. Some of these men might be
attached to gunboats instead of remaining in stationary flagships.
In addition to the various descriptions of forces already enume- Volanteer
rated, an attempt had been made to extend the Volunteer movement
to the coast defence service. A corps composed at present of one
hundred gentlemen employed in banks and private offices in the City
had been provisionally enrolled, and several bundred additional appli-
movement.
380
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
one.
cations for admission had been received. The Volunteers actually
entered had attended drill on board the President, and he was enabled
to state that, in the opinion of the instructors, they were the most
intelligent gunners who had ever been drilled on board the ship.
The movement had extended itself to Liverpool, where the First
Lord of the Admiralty did so much to initiate it by an encouraging
speech. It remained to be proved whether the idea was a practical
Not until the Volunteers had been afloat in a gunboat for a
few days, and had shown their ability and readiness to perform all
the duties which devolved on a seaman in a gunboat, should be ven-
ture to regard the experiment, with which he had the honour to be
associated, as an accomplished fact. Much of the success of the
Naval Volunteer movement must depend on the readiness of the
Admiralty to afford the necessary facilities. The most immediately
pressing matter was the appointment of a commanding or inspecting
officer. Until the Admiralty placed a naval man of rank and experi-
ence at the head of the Volunteers, an invaluable aid to efficiency
would be wanting, and the formation of a contingent at many of the
ports round the coast would be indefinitely delayed. The formation
of an able staff of inspecting officers for the Reserve was essentially
necessary to secure their efficiency. The Reserves, including the
Coastguard, now numbered not less tban 20,000 men. Surely the
supreme command of such a force was a task worthy of the most
distinguished admiral in the service. The Commander-in-Chief
should be supported by a sufficient staff of naval officers, to whom
should be assigned the supervision of the Reserves in the St. George's
Channel and on the east coast of Erigland. While hitherto there
had been no inspecting staff for the Naval Reserve, a very different
policy had prevailed at the War Office in providing a staff for the
inspection of the land Volunteers. An admiral sent on an occasional
tour of inspection was not a sufficient substitute for an officer spe-
cially devoted to the duty. In urging the appointment of a staff
officer, he did not undervalue for a moment the services of that
admirable body of men, the seamen instructors in gunnery in the
drill ships of the Reserve. It was impossible to speak too highly of
their zeal, their intelligence, their discipline, and their consummate
knowledge of the subject on which it was their duty to give instruc-
tion. But naval officers, judiciously selected, would exercise a higher
influence over the morale of the Naval Reserve. The merchant
seamen would feel themselves, in a larger sense than heretofore, an
integral part of the Navy of England. They would be inspired by
its great traditions, and the confidence which they would acquire in
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
381
+
their officers would be an invaluable guarantee for their conduct and
discipline should they ever be called upon to join Her Majesty's
service. The hon. gentleman concluded by moving the appointment
of the Committee.
Lefevre.
Mr. SHAW LEFEVRE said, in reply, that his right hon. friend the Mr. Shaw
First Lord of the Admiralty would have to speak on some other
important questions which stood next on the Notice Paper; he
would, therefore, ask permission of the House to deal with the motion
of the hon. member for Hastings. He concurred in the remarks of
his hon. friend on the loss of the late Mr. Graves, who had made this
subject almost his own, and whose mercantile experience, sense of
public duty, and freedom from party spirit rendered his advice most
valuable. His hon. friend, however, had shown that the task had
not fallen into unworthy hands.
He began his speech by remarking that though the question of Importance
of personnel
the matériel was one of great importance in relation to the Navy, of the
that of the personnel was of still greater importance. In this he Navy.
entirely agreed with his hon. friend. The country had enormous
resources in the way of shipbuilding : a Return before him showed
that 391,000 tons were added to our merchant service in 1871, as
compared with 212,000 tons in 1861, so that were it necessary to
renew our fleet within a short time our private shipyards could do
so; but if by any mischance a large proportion of the personnel
were lost, it would be a difficult task to supply their places. The
question of Reserves was, therefore, a very important one; but even
here our resources as regarded merchant seamen were great, and he
doubted whether, including our Colonial Empire, they did not exceed
those of almost all the rest of the world put together.
It was often said that the increase of steamers had greatly re- Number of
duced the number of seamen in sailing vessels ; but a Return showed seamen in
sailing
that in 1854 there were 146,500 sailors in sailing vessels in the ships main-
foreign and coasting trades, and in 1871 the number was 141,000,
showing a reduction of only 5,000 men. In our steamers in 1854
there were 15,800 men employed, and in 1871, 58,706, so that while
there had been an enormous increase in the number of men em-
ployed in the steamers of the merchant service, there had been only
a slight decrease in the number employed in sailing vessels. This
showed that the increase of steam vessels had not operated so preju-
dicially, as was believed by some, on the sailing vessels.
He was sorry to hear his hon. friend give the weight of his great Deteriora.
authority to the statement that our seamen were deteriorating. He
tainer.
tion of
Scanlieu.
382
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
(Mr. Shaw Lefevre) hesitated to express an opinion counter to the
authorities quoted by his hon. friend, particularly Mr. Graves; but
when at the Board of Trade he had given great attention to this
subject, and had visited all the ports and collected all the facts he
could from the mercantile marine officers, and he could not find that
our seamen had deteriorated. Considering that the proportion of
seamen to tonnage had greatly diminished, a given number of men
doing more work than formerly, and considering also the enormous
number of yachts and of seamen employed in them, he could not
think there had been any falling off in quality. Steamers did not
train men themselves. On the contrary, they paid high wages and
wanted the best men. The question of seamen was a question of
wages. Those who gave good wages and good accommodation, and
sent their men to sea in well-found ships, would have no reason to
complain of any lack of good men.
There were two ways by wbich a Naval Reserve could be obtained:
the one was by passing men more rapidly through the service; the
other by enlisting men from the merchant service into a special
Reserve. The former was more analogous to what among military
men was called the Army Reserve, the latter, to the Militia. If be
understood rightly, his hon. and gallant friend Admiral Erskine
rather advocated the first of these two methods, that of passing them
through after their ten years' service. He would point out that we
had reserves of both kinds—the Coastguard and the Naval Pensioners
were of the first kind, and the Naval Reserve men of the second
kind.
He would now answer the question put by the hon. Member for
Northumberland (Mr. Liddell) and others, as to whether the Reserves
we had already got were sufficient to man all our vessels. That was,
no doubt, an exceedingly important point. He was glad to state
that there was every reason to believe from the calculations which
had been made that, taking the men in the service, the super-
numeraries in our ports, the Coastguard and the Naval Pensioners,
we had considerably more than would be required to man the twenty-
three ironclads which had been spoken of, and every other vessel
which we could possibly send to sea within any reasonable period,
and a margin of something like 6,000 men would be left besides.
How was that possible? The House did not, perhaps, fully under-
stand the great change which had occurred in our requirements as
regarded blue-jackets. Every year the number of blue-jackets re-
quired in proportion to other men was diminishing. By way of
illustration he would take the old three-decker, the Victoria,' which
Means of
manning
the Vavr.
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
383
auxiliaries.
had been the flagship in the Mediterranean a very few years ago,
and compare it with the 'Lord Warden,' which was now the flagship
there, and also with the 'Devastation, probably the fighting ship of
the future. For the · Victoria' 1,100 men were required, of whom
600 were blue-jackets. For the “Lord Warden' 600 were sufficient,
of whom 230 were blue-jackets. For the Devastation 300 men
would suffice, of whom only 100 would be pure blue-jackets. There-
fore, supposing we had a fleet of ten three-deckers like the Vic-
toria,' we should require 6,000 blue-jackets, while for ten 'Devastations'
only 1,000 would be required. That showed how much farther the
force we now had would go than in former years, and it had a very
important bearing on the recommendations of the Royal Commission
of 1859. If these recommendations were now applied, our resources
were not such as we could wish; but with reference to the change
which the fleet had been undergoing since that year, our resources
were by no means deficient, and at the outbreak of a war we should
be in a very good position indeed.
If, however, a war were to arise we should have not only to man Mercantile
all the vessels we possess, but to take up vessels from the private
trade, fit them out as cruisers, and send them to distant parts of the
world. During the war between the Northern and Southern States
of America, the United States Government fitted out no fewer than
750 steamers, and manned them with 50,000 men for the purpose of
cruising, blockading the ports of the South and for other purposes.
That would be the case with us should war break out. We should
have to fit out an enormous number of vessels for various purposes ;
and though, as he had said, we had sufficient men to supply all our
vessels of war, yet we should find employment for all the Reserves
we could get. At the same time it should be borne in mind, that all
these Reserves would not be employed in the same important work
as would be required of the men in the regular fleet; they would not
all be employed at the guns.
A good deal was to be said in favour of passing men through the Objections
Navy into the Reserve; and if we could see our way to do so rapidly, service in
the Navy.
it, no doubt, would be the preferable course. We already educated
no fewer than 3,000 boys for the Navy, and that number was suffi-
cient, but not much more than sufficient, to keep up the supply of
18,000 men for our fleet. There was much to be said for increasing
the number of boys and passing the men through the fleet. But
there was this difficulty. It was alleged by naval men that we had
not room in our seagoing cruisers for more boys and young seamen
than we had at present. If we were to increase the number of our
to shorter
384
OUR NAVAL RESERVES,
tions for
Reserve.
boys we should be reducing the average age of all the men in the
Navy, which naval men said could not be done with advantage. The
average age was sufficiently low already. But as the proportion of
seamen required.for ships of war was greatly reduced, it was of infinite
importance that they should be thoroughly trained in every respect.
It was necessary, therefore, to maintain the training ships. There-
fore, he could not hold out the prospect that we could pass any large
number of men rapidly from our fleet into the Reserve. That being
so, we must look to the merchant service for our Naval Reserve.
Regula- The hon. Member for Hastings (Mr. Brassey) and others had
entry into pointed out that of late years there had been a tendency in the
Naval Reserve to diminish in number. That was due, in a great
measure, to the stringency of the Regulations of 1869, which were
intended to increase the efficiency of the force by weeding it of in-
ferior men.
But he could assure the House that subject during the
last year had received the most earnest attention. His hon. and
gallant friend (Admiral Erskine) appeared to think that no scheme
had been suficiently considered. But if his hon. and gallant friend
had been at the Admiralty, and seen the mass of papers on the sub-
ject and the attention which had been given it, he would have been
of a different opinion.
The hon. member for Hastings had alluded to the changes which
training.
had taken place with respect to the First and Second Reserve, and
seemed to have given his hearty approval to all that had been done
in the matter. In the first place, as regarded the First-class Naval
Reserve, the Admiralty had greatly increased the number of places
where they could be enrolled. Formerly they could be enrolled only
at a few places, but now they could at any Coastguard station. The
restriction which before prevailed had kept men not only from en-
rolling, but from re-enrolling themselves after passing through the
first five years of service. Twenty-eight days' consecutive drill were
formerly required in the First Naval Reserve, and that was found
to diminish the number who enrolled; but according to the new
Regulations which have been framed, the men during the first year
were only trained fourteen days consecutively, and after the first year
they might be drilled not less than seven days at a time. Again,
they had provided that the trained men should receive the ld. a day
which was now given to the trained men in the fleet, though of course
the former received the payment for a month only, while the latter
had it throughout the year. His hon. friend the member for Hastings
appeared to think that was hardly sufficient; but there was consider-
able difficulty in giving to these trained men a larger amount than
New regu-
lations for
- -
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
385.
1
class Re-
selve.
ܪ
the trained men in the fleet. At the same time he recognised the
fact that the Naval Reserve were not underpaid. Their pay was
good and amply sufficient. The difficulty did not lie in the direction
of pay. They had done one other thing for the trained men—they
had offered them a certain proportion-five per cent. of their entries
-of appointments in the Coastguard. Hopes to that effect had been
held out from the early days of the Naval Reserve, but it was not
till now that these hopes had been realised.
He now came to the Second-class Naval Reserve, where the Second-
changes had been so considerable as almost to amount to re-consti-
tuting the force. The Second-class Reserve up to the present time
had been almost a total failure from the restrictions imposed by the
regulations. Instead of confining it to seamen who had served in
square-rigged vessels, they had opened it to all ordinary seamen and
fishermen, who constituted so very large a force in this country,
which they hoped would prove a mine of wealth to the Naval Reserve.
There had also been an alteration as to the age at which meu were
to be entered. Instead of the limit as stated by the Regulations of
1869, of eighteen to twenty years, the ages at which the men might
enter were now to be from eighteen to thirty; and they had also
provided that the Second Class might be enrolled, drilled, and paid
at the same time as the First-class Naval Reserve. His hon. friend
the member for Hastings appeared to think that if, as they hoped,
the Second-class Reserve increased very largely, the batteries and
drill ships would not be sufficient for training purposes. Of course,
if they found that fishermen were entering the Second-class Naval
Reserve, it would be matter for consideration whether they should
not increase the number of batteries or facilitate their being drilled
in gunboats or drill ships, as proposed by the hon. member; but it
would be time enough to consider that point when the Second-class
Reserve had considerably increased. The new Regulations of which
he had spoken had only been completed within the last month. They
had been most carefully considered, and had now been issued. There
had not been time to ascertain what would be their effect; but he
had reason to believe that the number of both Reserves would be
considerably increased. He had consulted the Registrar-General of
Seamen, who was confident in his opinion that when the new Regu-
lations were well known along the coast there would be a large
accession of numbers to both First- and Second-class Reserve.
The hon. Member for Hastings (Mr. Brassey) had alluded to the Appliances
want of 64-ton guns in the Reserve ships ; but every one of the for drill.
Reserve ships had two of these guns, besides others of smaller
CC
VOL. IV.
1
386
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Inspection
reports on
Reserye.
calibre. His hon. friend spoke of 1,200 men taking their drill on
board the President;' but he very much doubted whether there
would be more than 250 as an average at one time drilling on board
that ship, and there would be nothing like that number in some of
the drill ships--not more, perhaps, than 100 being drilled at one
time. Spreading their drill over the time allowed, he believed all
the men could be trained with the larger guns, and in the first
instance they would be trained with guns of smaller calibre. With
regard to batteries, they were nearly all formed before the 63-ton
gun was introduced into the service, and the general introduction of
the 63-ton gun would necessitate the complete change of the
batteries. At the same time it would be the duty of the Admiralty
to supply proper and sufficient guns and batteries as occasion
required.
While he was on that point he should like to read to the House
the Reports recently received from Admiral Elliot and Sir Henry
Keppel on the subject of the Naval Reserve. They were most satis-
factory, and could not fail to give confidence to members as to the
present state of the force. Admiral Elliot said :-
“The inspection was entirely satisfactory in regard to the men of
the Naval Reserve. Those I saw were, as a rule, fine active seamen,
working the guns with much spirit and goodwill, and showed a
creditable knowledge for the amount of teaching they had respec-
tively undergone. In every ship without exception, the behaviour of
the Naval Reserve was reported to be entirely satisfactory.'
Sir Henry Keppel, an officer of great experience, and one who was
certain to speak what he thought, said of the men of the “ Dædalus:'
As individuals they were fine able-bodied men, in the prime of
life, and certainly superior in physique to the average of our own
able seamen. Their rifle, cutlass, and great gun exercises were very
creditably executed, without any noise whatever, and the men appear
to have been carefully and well trained. On consulting with Com-
mander Parsons, the gunner, and boatswain, they reported the men to
be well-behaved and tractable. The gunner views the badge-men
as equal to our own trained men; twenty-three of the forty-two on
board are so qualified. The boatswain considers them more full of
resources than our men. They are not equal to our men as leads-
men, nor would they be so smart aloft. The gunner states that,
notwithstanding the intervals of absence from drill, the men appear
to forget little of it.'
Of the men in the · Eagle,' he said
They were scarcely so fine a body of men as those in the
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE,
387
Volunteers.
“Dædalus," but still contrast favourably with a similar number of
able seamen from our service.'
With respect to the Naval Coast Volunteers, it was intended to Coast
allow those who now composed that corps gradually to die out, in
order that men qualified for that corps might enter for the Second-
class Naval Reserve, so that, in point of fact, there would then be
only two corps--namely, First- and Second-class Reserves. The
Admiralty hoped the effect of this arrangement would be that the
number of men passing from the Second to the First Reserve would
greatly increase.
As to the new force, the Naval Volunteers, being an extension to Naval
Artillery
the Navy of the movement which had proved so beneficial to the Volunteers
Army, already two of these corps had been established: one at London,
and the other at Liverpool, and the formation of one at Bristol was
now talked of. The Admiralty had cheerfully allowed the drilling of
these Volunteers on board the ‘President;' and it would be a matter
for further consideration what arrangements should be made with
regard to future enrolment which could not take place under the
existing law. The law relating to the Naval Coast Volunteers was
not suitable; and it would, therefore, be necessary to pass a measure
to regulate enrolment in the new force. The Admiralty approached
the subject with every desire to avail themselves of the proffered aid,
and it was intended to nominate an officer who should put himself
in communication with the gentlemen who were forming these
Volunteer corps, to render them what assistance he could in the
matter of organisation, and advise the Admiralty on all points con-
nected with them. It would be necessary to determine in what
way the new force could be assisted with gunboats, and to consider
various other questions; and his right hon. friend the First Lord
of the Admiralty would, no doubt, have to submit a measure to Par-
liament for the purpose of organising the Naval Volunteers.
The expediency of Government assisting the training ships of the Training
ships.
merchant service was discussed last Session, on the motion of Mr.
Graves; and on that occasion the First Lord deprecated the Navy
undertaking to train seamen for the merchant service, but expressed
his readiness to contribute towards any scheme devised by the ship-
owners in proportion to the benefit which the Navy derived; while
the President of the Board of Trade pointed out how a fund could be
obtained from the contributions made by shipowners to the Mercan-
tile Marine Fund, and invited the co-operation of the shipowners in
the organisation of a scheme; his right hon. friend, however, the
President of the Board of Trade, had taken means to ascertain the
сс 2
388
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
views of the country, but he had not found a disposition on their
part to contribute to the establishment of training ships for the
merchant service. Of course the House would not expect the
Admiralty to put a vote on the Estimates to meet the cost of
training boys for the merchant service. When the hon. member
for Northumberland (Mr. Liddell) spoke of the demand there was on
the part of the shipowners for trained apprentices, he could not help
inquiring where were the shipowners, members of the House, while
the discussion was going on. One who had been present (Mr. Alder-
man Lusk) had objected to the scheme of the hon, member for
Northumberland, and he now noticed but one other shipowner in
his seat (Mr. Bates). The Admiralty had done what they could
towards improving the First and Second Classes of the Naval Reserve,
and he hoped the hon. member for Hastings (Mr. Brassey) would be
satisfied with what they had done and were now doing, and with
what they indicated as their policy for the future, and would not
therefore press his Amendment.
Mr. BRASSEY said, after the explanations and promises which had
been given, he would not press his Motion.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE. .
389
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE. OBSERVATIONS.
1
HOUSE OF COMMONS, April 17, 1874.
Reprinted from ' Hansard.'
Reserves
MR. T. BRASSEY, in rising to call attention to the organisation of Naval
the Royal Naval Reserve, and the importance of establishing a close of the chief
connection between the Royal Navy and the mercantile marine, Powers.
said the House need not approach the subject with any misgiving as
to the naval resources of the country. The number of seamen and
seafaring persons employed on board ships entering and leaving the
ports in the United Kingdom was not less than 407,000, and in that
estimate he did not include the vast number of ships flying the
British flag in colonial and foreign waters. He believed he was
correct in saying that if we had a maritime conscription such as ex-
isted in France, we should be able to muster a force of not less than
700,000 men to man our fleet. Our available Naval Reserve was of
enormous extent as compared with that of other nations, and it would
be unreasonable to expect that the First Lord of the Admiralty, who
had so recently taken office, would be prepared to declare his adhesion
to any definite policy on the subject.
As a means of comparison, he would quote a few figures from an
interesting speech delivered last year by Commodore Goodenough at
the United Service Institution. It appeared that the maritime con-
scription in France comprised a force of 172,000 men; but the
whole of those men were not fit for active service at sea.
For some
years before the Franco-German War the number serving on board
the French fleet was about 15,000, while 7,000 men were in reserve
in barracks. The men of the Reserve were double the number of
those in active service, and would constitute a force of 65,000 men,
from twenty to thirty-six years of age.
Commodore Goodenough estimated the strength of the Naval
Reserves of the North German Empire at 80,000 men, of whom only
390
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
a small proportion had actually served in the North German Navy.
At the present time about 5,000 seamen were serving in ships in
commission and in barracks, and the Reserves might be taken at
15,000 men.
The United States had no Naval Reserve whatever, and the ab-
sence of such a Reserve had been frequently deplored by the Secre-
tary of the United States Navy in his Report to Congress. In Russia,
the number of ships of the Imperial Navy engaged in active cruising
was too limited to afford the means of giving an effective training to
a large number of men as sailors. The mercantile marine was com-
paratively insignificant. From this review we might safely conclude
that we had only to organise with the completeness which marks the
preparations of other Powers, in order to make ourselves perfectly
secure.
Require-
mients for
manning
? Var
flcet.
1
Sir Frederick Grey had expressed an opinion that for our War
Navy we should require 84,000 officers and men. Admiral Sherard
Osborn, in his recent pamphlet, had recommended approximately the
same numbers, and those estimates would not seem exaggerated
when we took into view the extent of our commerce and the demands
which might be made on our resources for the protection of our
colonial possessions. The recent changes in naval warfare afforded
no justification for departing from the recommendations of the Royal
Commission, of which Lord Cardwell was the chairman. An effort
should be made to enrol 20,000 seamen in our Naval Reserve, and
to establish a force of 12,000 fishermen for coast defence.
It had been urged that the Naval Reserve was a force on which
they could not rely, and that our seamen were deteriorating. Those
opinions were not shared by the officers, who had had the best oppor-
tunities of forming a judgment. Sir Cooper Key's report of the
1,700 men of the Reserve, embarked in the fleet for a month's cruise
at Whitsuntide 1869, was decidedly favourable. It was much to be
regretted that such cruises were not more frequently repeated. They
would create a greater confidence in the Reserve on the part of naval
officers. The Naval Reserve men would realise more fully that they
belong to the Navy; and young officers would derive much advantage
from the opportunity afforded of becoming familiar with the man-
cuyres of a fleet.
When, however, we were hearing so much of the deterioration of
the seamen in the merchant service, there might be a doubt in some
minds as to the possibility of obtaining recruits for the Reserve; and
it was essential to know how far these allegations rest on facts. The
complaints we heard were not now made for the first time. Before
Alleged
deteriora-
tion
of mer-
chant
seanien.
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
391
the repeal of the Navigation Laws in 1849 the incompetency of the
officers, and the want of discipline among seamen, were the theme of
constant complaints among shipowners. The present alleged dete-
rioration was denied by Messrs. Gray and Hamilton. They gave
their opinion unhesitatingly that the general condition of our seamen
is not so bad as it had been represented; and they said that it had
greatly improved since the consular reports were presented to Parlia-
ment in 1848. There were black sheep in the merchant service;
and, since the introduction of steamers, the best men had been
attracted to the steam service, leaving an inferior class to man the
sailing vessels. Thus there had been a separation of the experienced
and well-conducted men from the inferior hands; and it was pro-
bable that in the present day many ships' companies contained a
lamentably small proportion of well-disciplined and properly qualified
seamen.
steamers
The inferior scale of wages in sailing vessels, as compared with Wages in
steamers, was the cause of the difficulty. No general complaint was and sailing
heard among the owners of steam ships. At the meeting of the ships.
shipowners at Liverpool, lately called for the purpose of receiving the
deputation from the Board of Trade, Mr. Inman said that be be-
lieved a good wage would secure good men.
The Inman Company
made it a rule to give no advance note, and to take only married
men, if they could get them. That had proved to be an excellent
rule. They never wanted men; and they had many men in the ser-
vice who had been with them fifteen years. His opinion was that if
men were well treated in the forecastle, and well paid, shipowners
did not want any assistance to get excellent men.
Steamers not only offered higher wages, but also the great boon
of shorter absences from home; and the employment was, in many
cases, a continuous service. The practice of paying off the crews as
soon as vessels arrive in port, and delaying the engagement of another
crew until the last moment, was not calculated to ensure the services
of efficient men. In the Royal Navy it was found necessary to intro-
duce the continuous service system; and shipowners should endeavour
to find employment for their seamen in the intervals between their
long voyages. A certain period of leave on full pay would be a well-
merited indulgence after faithful service during a lengthened absence
from home. It might be said that all these concessions would be
gladly made, but that they would involve considerable expense, and
that the profits of the trade were too small to allow of additional
charges being placed upon the employers of seamen.
In that case
the public must bear the charge by paying higher freights; and he
392
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Confidence
in British
seamen.
was confident that the improvement in the seamen, which would
gradually follow from the payment of better wages in sailing ships,
together with the boon conferred by giving continuous employment,
would have the happy effect of diminishing the loss of life and pro-
perty at sea. The reduction in the premiums of insurance would
compensate for the expenditure upon wages.
Shipowners would derive no benefit from the intervention of the
State in encouraging apprenticeships to the sea and subsidising
training ships, so long as the wages of skilled workmen on shore re-
mained so much higher than the wages of seamen. It was a well-
known fact that at the present time a large number of seamen who
had been carefully trained were serving, not as seamen but as fire-
men. They were induced to undertake that disagreeable task by
the somewhat superior wages which they received in that capacity,
while many left the sea altogether because their experience as sailors
had given them an aptitude for many employments on shore, in
which they earned better wages than they could command either in
steamers or sailing vessels. Having made these observations, it was
only fair to add that higher wages were paid in our own merchant
service than in any other, excepting that of the United States.
Hitherto the nations which had been builders of ships had fur-
nished seamen to man them; and, as the United Kingdom enjoyed
an undisputed pre-eininence as a shipbuilding country, we might be
confident that our sailors could hold their own with the sailors of
other nations. He desired that the question should be looked upon
as a national question. It was quite clear that if there was anything
in the state of the law prejudicial to the interests of the sailor, it
should be at once considered with a view to its amendment.
There was one point of considerable public importance to which
he would invite the attention of the House. He referred to the
practice of issuing to seamen advance notes upon their being shipped
for service on board vessels of the mercantile marine. That point
had been repeatedly brought under the consideration of the Commis-
sion on Unseaworthy Ships, and it had been argued that the practice
was a serious cause of deterioration among our seamen. The seaman
could not cash his advance note, except at a heavy discount. The
inoney raised by the transaction was too often squandered in de-
bauchery, and in many cases not a farthing was laid out in providing
an outfit of clothes for the intended voyage. Seainen, it was further
to be observed, were the only class of labourers who received an
advance of wages before any work was done. The allotment note,
on the other hand, was most advantageous to seamen and their
Allotment
notes,
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
393
families, and should receive all possible encouragement from ship-
owners.
notes.
6
should be
The Commission has reported that it was exceedingly desirable Seamen's
that sailors' boarding-houses should be licensed and under inspection, houses.
and that no such boarding-houses should be allowed in connection
with beer-houses and public-houses. He hoped that the Government
might feel justified in adopting the suggestion. It was further
urged that we should come to some understanding with foreign
Powers as to the restraint of crimping in seaports abroad, and that it
might be feasible to make crimping by a British subject in a foreign
port penal. It might be possible, by consular convention, to insure
to shipowners that agreement made by the seamen in this country
should continue binding upon them in a foreign country.
Shipmasters, again, scarcely did their duty to each other in the Discharge
mutual endeavour to obtain good crews. In the discharge note it was
a practice to endorse the seaman in the conventional words as
very
good,' when, in truth, he deserved a different character. Even in
the Reserve some very bad bargains for the country might be found,
and there should be no hesitation on the part of the responsible
officers in weeding them out. The retainers were so liberal that Retainers
pone but efficient and well-conducted men should be allowed to
depen-
remain in the service. The expense of 121. per man was far too dent on
efficiency.
large to admit of inefficient men being retained, and he suggested
that a different arrangement should be made in regard to seamen
entering the Reserve for the first time. The uniform retainer was
61. for every man, irrespective of attendance at drill or proficiency in
drill. By a recent regulation, an addition of id. per day was given,
but as the men served for only 28 days, it did not involve a large
extra expenditure, or offer any great stimulus to improvement. If,
however, they had fixed the minimum sum at 51. with an addi-
tional scale of pay up to 61. for efficiency in drill and good conduct,
a greater stimulus would be given to the men to acquire a know-
ledge of their duties. The expense would not be much greater than
at present, and it would not be grudged by the country.
Recruiting for the Reserve had been checked by the increase in Training
steamers, and especially by their extended employment in the the Re-
coasting trade. Coasting steamers were so short a time in port that serve.
the crews could not attend drill without losing their regular employ-
ment. Steamers were a bad school of seamanship, but there was
still an ample fleet of sailing vessels to form a nursery for the Naval
Reserve.
It was much to be regretted that we had failed to keep up the
394
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
Reserve to the standard recommended by the Royal Commission, or
even to the number it reached only a few years ago. The Royal Com-
mission on Manning recommended that the force should be composed
of trained seamen, and it was to be recruited in the first instance from
adults. As a temporary measure 20,000 men were to be enrolled
from the merchant service, but the future supply was to be drawn
from school ships which were to be established, capable of accom-
modating from 100 to 200 boarders in each ship, of whom 100 were
to be supported by the State. Two thousand four hundred boys
would thus be supplied annually to the mercantile marine and the
Reserve. It was recommended that 40,0001. should be voted
annually for the maintenance of the ships. No vote had ever been
taken to carry into effect this recommendation, nor had any vote
been taken to supply the place of the Naval Coast Volunteers.
There were at present, it was true, eleven training ships at different
ports; but, in so far as they were to be regarded as training vessels
for the Reserve, the Warspite' alone was entirely satisfactory.
Seven of the training ships were intended to receive street Arabs, and,
under the Industrial Schools Act, they had received a total subsidy
of 11,8701. These ships could accommodate 1,900 boys, and the
actual number on board was 1,250. There were also three reforma-
tory ships, capable of receiving 750 buys, the actual number being
647. For the maintenance of these ships 8,9061. had been contributed
by the State.
The Government aid was confined to industrial schools or
reformatories afloat. Nothing had been done to help poor but
l'espectable parents to train their sons for the sea. He would
suggest as an experiment that they should take over one of the ships
stationed in the Thames and one in the Mersey; that the boys
should be of the same class as those admitted into the training ships
of the Navy; and that the expense of the ships should be met by a
contribution in equal thirds from a special vote to be taken, as for
educational purposes, by a contribution from the Mercantile Marine
Fund, and by a grant from the Admiralty, from the vote taken for
their general training establishment. The contribution from the
Admiralty should be payable only on the completion of the training
and upon the boy's qualifications being tested by examination. It
should be a further condition of the Admiralty grant that the boy
should consent to serve in the Navy for one year. The special vote
in aid of training ships might be defended upon the ground that the
State is bound to provide for the education of the people. The cost
of maintaining boys in the existing training ships was on an average
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.
395
ment ap-
201.; but assuming that the instruction was made more perfect than
at present it would probably be safe to take the expenditure at 301.
a head. In each of the ships in the Thames and the Mersey ac-
commodation should be provided for 250 boys. He assumed that the
outlay proposed might be justified only on the ground that it was to
furnish a reserve for the Navy; and, therefore, the number of boys,
in respect of whom a grant should be paid, must be settled by the
authorities responsible for our naval defence.
It had been proposed by several local marine boards that the Govern-
Government should encourage apprenticeship to the sea, by offering prentices
a premium of 101. to every boy on completing an apprenticeship of serve in
four years, on production of a certificate of character, and passing the Navy.
an examination in seamanship. It should be stipulated that all
apprentices receiving premiums should serve a year in the Navy as
ordinaries, receiving a further gratuity of 101. on leaving the Navy,
and passing into the Reserve. If they remained in the Reserve
until 50 years of age, they should be entitled to the same pensions
as seamen in the Navy. If a full Reserve could be formed from the
boys thus trained, the necessity for the Reserve paid by annual
retainers would, as Mr. W. S. Lindsay had pointed out, no longer
exist.
He need not again enlarge on the importance of forming a Rescrve of
Reserve for coast defence among our 150,000 fishermen. It would
be worth while to commission a few more gunboats, to be employed
in visiting the fishing stations in the slack season of the fisheries;
thus affording the fishermen the opportunity of learning their gun-
drill, without travelling to an impossible distance from their homes,
and avoiding the necessity of keeping up several permanent batteries
on shore, where there was often a most scanty attendance. The
employment of a few gunboats on that service would be useful, if
only to increase the opportunities, so rare at present in the experi-
ence of naval officers, of becoming acquainted with our coasts.
Our pleasure fleet is now manned by 6,000 of the most eligible of Honorary
our fishermen. It was most important to secure these men for the
Reserve. No more honorary commissions in the Naval Reserve should
be given, except to owners of yachts who had done good service in
recruiting for the Reserve. The privilege of flying the white ensign
should be reserved to owners who could bring fifty men, being bonâ
fide yachtsmen, into the Reserve, and who kept up the number by pro-
viding substitutes for any of the original recruits who withdrew from
the Reserve. Cadetships in the Naval Reserve had been given to
young gentlemen from the Conway' and Worcester,' and that
fishermen.
commis-
sions.
396
OUR NAVAL RESERVES,
Inspecting
stall,
Mr. Gos-
chen,
should be followed up by giving them a short course on board the
'Excellent.' Officers of the Volunteers were invited to go to Alder-
shot, and no more commissions should be given in the Naval Reserve
except to officers of the mercantile marine who had duly qualified.
The value of the Naval University at Greenwich would be immensely
increased as a national institution, when the officers of the merchant
service were allowed to participate in all the advantages it afforded.
Lastly, he urged the appointment to the Reserve, at an early
date, of a competent staff of officers with an Admiral at their
head. Until a recent date the Controller of the Coastguard devoted
a portion of his time to the Reserves ; but the work would demand
a considerable staff of officers, if the duty of increasing the numbers
and efficiency of the force was properly done. An officer of high
rank and considerable influence should be placed at the head of
the Reserve, who would be in a position to claim the attention of
the Admiralty to any representations he might deem it his duty to
make on behalf of that important element of our naval force.
Mr. GOSCHEN said he was as glad as the noble Lord who had
just sat down (Lord Eslington), that his hon. friend the member for
Hastings (Mr. T. Brassey) had taken an early opportunity of bringing
the subject of the Naval Reserve of the country under the conside-
ration of the new House of Commons, and he trusted that the new
House would look with favour on that most important force, and that
when hon, members brought the subject forward with the industry,
accuracy, and talent of the hon. member for Hastings the House
would always receive them with the attention they deserved. . .
He was aware how important it was that our Naval Reserve Force
should be kept up, but at the same time he did not think that the
fears that had been expressed with regard to it were in any way
justified; and the comparison instituted by the hon. member for
Hastings between our naval force and those of foreign countries
should not have too great weight attached to it, because it was
impossible for us to ascertain how much of their naval force consisted
of real sailors, and how much of the other classes to which he had
referred. ... He ought not to sit down without thanking the hon.
member for Hastings, not only for raising so interesting a discussion
upon the question, and for the interest he had taken in that House
in the Naval Reserves, but for the great service he had done out of
the House in initiating in a great measure the Royal Naval Artillery
Volunteers, which he hoped would become a large force, which
certainly would prove most useful in case of necessity.. There were
great difficulties to be overcome in organising such a force, because
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVÉ.
397
wood.
for men to go to sea was much more difficult than to go to drill in
Hyde Park, the personal sacrifice and inconvenience being greater,
and more time being required. So great, however, had been the
energy displayed by the hon. member and others in the matter, that
these difficulties had been, in a large measure, overcome, and it was
hoped that the movement had now obtained a fair start. He there-
fore trusted that the right hon. gentleman opposite would see in
the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers an important although a small
force, and that the movement would continue to receive the assistance
and attention of the Admiralty.
Mr. NORWOOD. He regretted that he did not share the Mr. Nor-
sanguine views which the hon. member for Hastings (Mr. T. Brassey)
took of the state of the mercantile marine, which, from careful inguiry
as well as from personal experience, he believed to have greatly
deteriorated of late years. The physique, the stature, and the health
of the men were by no means so satisfactory as formerly, whilst in
seamanlike qualities and in subordination there was a decided falling
off. . . He had come to the conclusion that there ought to be in
every large town an endeavour made to obtain youths at an early
age to be trained as sailors. The shipowners would be most happy
to support a movement of this kind.
Sir CHARLES ADDERLEY said the tenor of the last few speeches Sir
rendered it necessary for him, as being connected with the Board of Charles
Adderley
Trade, to say a few words before the debate closed. He thought the
hon. member for Hull (Mr. Norwood), who introduced what he might
call the second part of the debate, exercised a wise discretion in
bringing his subject forward in the discussion raised by the hon.
member for Hastings (Mr. T. Brassey), rather than separately by
itself, for it was germane to the subject of that hon. member's speech,
and inadmissible as a distinct proposition. ... Some means might,
he hoped, be adopted which would enable us to apprentice boys taken
from our training ships, not compulsorily, but by premiums, and the
proposition of the hon. member for Hastings on that subject was a
most important one.
SECTION XII.
STRENGTH OF THE NAVAL RESERVE
IN 1882.
DISCUSSION IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,
AUGUST 1, 1882.
Reprinted from ' Hansard.'
400
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
THE NAVAL RESERVE.
Mr. Gour-
ley.
On the motion for going into Committee of Supply,
Mr. GOURLEY rose to call attention to the report of Admiral
Phillimore on the Naval Reserve. His main object, he explained,
was to ascertain how far the Admiralty were advancing in shipbuilding,
and what improvements that department had effected as compared
with the improvements introduced into their ships by the owners of
our mercantile marine. In order to obtain the information which
he desired to have, he would put a series of questions to the official
representatives of the Admiralty in that House and, in the first place,
he would ask how many ships had been furnished with breech-loading
guns, and whether the Admiralty intended to furnish the whole or
some of the ships composing the Reserve Squadron with guns of that
kind, they being much superior to muzzle-loaders. Secondly, he
wished to know whether any improvements had recently been made
in the fuel-carrying capacity of our ships. In 1878, the Reserve
Squadron, on the way to the Mediterranean, ran short of fuel before
reaching Gibraltar. That, he contended, was a mischance which
should be guarded agairst in the future. He should like to know
whether the Admiralty had got rid of the old machinery in order
that our war vessels might be able to compete with war vessels
supplied with modern machinery. Also whether all our war vessels
were furnished with torpedoes, and whether the officers and men
were being educated in the use of torpedoes. We had a large
number of young officers who had to retire against their will on half
pay. Being without employment, they would in course of time
become exceedingly rusty. He saw no reason why they should not
be engaged in piloting our ships of war. As to the Coastguard ser-
vice, he thought they ought to be exercised in the use of torpedoes
and other submarine instruments of war, so that in the event of war
they might be of good service in the defence of our harbours and
coasts. Referring to the Naval Reserves, the hon. gentleman said
we had never had more than about 12,000, although 30,000 was the
t
STRENGTH OF THE NAVAL RESERVE IN 1882.
401
Balfour.
number that had been recommended as being expedient for that
service.
Sir G. BALFOUR said there were in his constituency a considerable Sir G.
number of fishermen whose services might be obtained for the defence
of the country if they could have an opportunity of being properly
trained on board a vessel of war.
Sir T. BRASSEY, in replying on behalf of the Admiralty to the Sir Thomas
member for Sunderland, desired to express his great satisfaction that
the condition of the Reserves had engaged the attention of his hon.
friend. The hon. gentleman represented a seaport, at which upwards
of 500 men in the Naval Reserve were annually drilled. He was
closely connected with a district remarkable for its maritime enter-
prise. The hon. gentleman had, therefore, great opportunities of
making himself acquainted with the requirements of the Naval
Reserves, and any suggestions that he might offer with reference to
the organisation of the force would receive the attentive consideration
of the Admiralty. The terms of the notice being of a general cha-
racter, it would not be expected that he should follow in detail the
various interesting questions which had been raised. On some points
however, he was prepared to offer explanations, which he hoped
would be entirely satisfactory to the House. His hon. friend had Training of
particularly urged that the Coastguard should be sent to sea in small
guard.
vessels, for the purpose of keeping up their seamanship. That
suggestion could not be carried out without serious expense; and
the limited training which would be given in a gunboat was not con-
sidered essential for the purpose of maintaining the efficiency of the
force. The fleet men in the Coastguard were most carefully selected.
The number of candidates had for some time past been in excess of,
and now were at least sufficient to fill, the vacancies, and he was
assured by Lord John Hay, who was specially charged with the
supervision of the Reserves, that men were never admitted unless
they had had sufficient service in seagoing ships to make them
thoroughly efficient in their duties afloat. The well-trained men-of-
war's men in the Coastguard would learn nothing in a gunboat that
would tend to make them more effective when embarked in an iron-
clad. The drill at the great guns was perhaps the most important
feature in their training, and great care was taken to maintain a high
state of efficiency in gunnery. The Coastguard went through a com-
plete course of gun-drill every year, and the rule was that in alternate
years they were embarked in an ironclad squadrop for an extended
cruise. The testimony of Admiral Phillimore as to the condition of Epiriency
the Coastguard was in the highest degree satisfactory. The fleet guard.
Coast-
of Coast-
VOL. IV.
D D
402
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
1
Reserves.
men on shore formed, as he said, the main reserve of the Navy, and
they were a force of which any country might be proud. As an
instance of their general conduct, he mentioned that in 1878 they
completed the crews of eight district ships and nine turret ships, and
though they were embarked for 98 days in those 17 ships, not a
single case occurred in which any one of their names appeared in
the defaulters' book. The same favourable report could be given
on every occasion when the Coastguard are embarked. His hon.
Reserve friend had condemned the district ships as obsolete. It was, how-
squadron.
ever, impossible that the fleet in commission should consist ex-
clusively of ships of very recent construction. The district ships
were well adapted for the work which they had to do, and the Admi-
ralty were well advised in keeping the latest and most powerful ships
in reserve in the dockyards, where they could be carefully preserved
from deterioration, and where they could be commissioned at short
notice in a perfect state of repair. Turning to the general condition
Strength of of the Reserves for the Navy, at no previous period since the close of
the Great War had we been so well prepared with the means of
manning the fleet. The masted ships of former days had been re-
placed in the line of battle by mastless ships, armed with a few heavy
guns, worked by mechanical appliances. The three-decker, with 130
guns, had a complement of 900 men and boys; the “Inflexible'
carried 400. Notwithstanding the large reduction in the comple-
ments the force of seamen available for manning the fleet showed a
slight increase. The total number was 18,624 in 1871, and 18,991
in 1881; in the same interval the non-seamen class comprising the
stokers and artificers had grown from 10,956 to 12,221. Thus, the
total number of fleet men, exclusive of the Coastguard, was 29,580
in 1871, and 31,212 at the date of our latest returns. We had in
1871 6,421 men in excess of the total complements authorised
for ships in commission. The corresponding number had since been
raised to more than 8,000 men. In addition to the supernumeraries
we had the crews of the flag-ships and receiving ships in the home
ports. We had thus, at least, 10,000 in the fleet available for imme-
diate disposal. On shore we had 4,000 seamen in the Coastguard,
and, prior to the recent operations in the East, we had in the ports
and in Ireland a splendid force of 6,000 marines. He fully agreed
with his hon. friend as to the importance of a strong reserve of
stokers. On June 25 the total number at the home ports, excluding
First Reserve ships and the Channel Fleet, was 1,272. Even under
the pressure which had recently been felt, it had not been necessary
to stop the usual leave, or to break up the Reserves and take men
STRENGTH OF THE NAVAL RESERVE IN 1882.
403
i
Reserve
batteries.
from the harbour ships. It had, however, been arranged to increase
the proportion of stokers in the Coastguard from 200 to 250, and to
make additional entries, and to employ a few stoker pensioners at
each of the naval ports. To enter stokers for the Naval Reserve is
not considered necessary. In an emergency men can be obtained
from the mercantile marine in sufficient numbers, and instruction in
gunnery is not required as in the case of seamen. The Reserves,
properly so-called, included Pensioner Reserve, 1,560; First-class
Royal Naval Reserve, 11,800; Second-class, 5,600; Third-class,
150; and Naval Artillery Volunteers, 1,400. The total reserve for
manning a war navy was not less than 40,000 men. With such a Additional
force the country should be well content, and the Admiralty would
neglect no opportunity of adding to the strength and efficiency of our
Naval Reserve. They had, at the date of Admiral Phillimore's reports,
thirty batteries for the drill of the Coastguard and Naval Reserve.
They had since ordered a battery at Barrow. They were rebuilding
the batteries at Carnarvon, Fowey, and Hartlepool. Batteries had
been ordered also at the Isle of Man and Kirkwall. The batteries
at the Isle of Man and Kirkwall would be capable of drilling 1,000
men every year, and they had reason to believe that number
would be forthcoming. It was equally interesting and gratify-
ing to observe the marked success which had attended the efforts
of the Admiralty to raise a force of Naval Reserve men in the Naval
western islands of Scotland and in the Shetlands. It was an ad- Scotland.
ditional evidence of our vast and varied resources as a naval power.
On the occasion of bis recent inspection the Duke of Edinburgh saw
no less than 1,004 men on parade at Lerwick and 1,100 at Stornoway.
He was much impressed with the seamanlike appearance of the men,
and the admirable manner in which they went through their drills.
Both divisions of the Naval Reserve were thoroughly efficient, and
the Naval Reserve men would be the first to acknowledge that their
efficiency was especially due to the admirable manner in which they
were trained by the gunnery instructors from the “Excellent' and
Cambridge.' The Second-class Reserve, though not possessing the
high qualifications required for the first class, were a most valuable
body, thoroughly inured to the sea, and always within hail. They
could be increased to any number which the Admiralty might con-
sider necessary. With regard to the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, Royal
the Admiralty, while fully appreciating the patriotic feeling exhibited Artillery
by large numbers who had applied for enrolment, was still unable to
announce any final decision as to the organisation of the force.
They awaited the report of the committee on the defence of the
Reserve in
Naval
Volunteers,
DD 2
404
OUR NAVAL RESERVES.
commercial harbours before taking up the question. On the whole,
he trusted that the House would be satisfied with the statement
which he had made. As to numbers, the statistics were conclu-
sive, and as to the quality of our seamen he was confident that the
fine spirit of former days still lived, and would survive through every
change which might take place in the ships and the armaments of
the Navy. In the recent operations at Alexandria, both officers and
men had proved themselves worthy of the great traditions of the
British Navy. He could not conclude these observations on the
Naval Reserve without paying a warm tribute of praise to Lord
Cardwell and the other members of the Manning Commission of
1859. The scheme which had been adopted with such excellent
results for the Royal Naval Reserve was originated by the Manning
Commission. The creation of that force had secured us from future
difficulties in manning the fleet in time of war, and had added
materially to our naval power while imposing a comparatively
moderate charge on the Estimates.
Captain PRICE thought the statement to which the House had
just listened, very reassuring and satisfactory. He wished, however,
to ask how it happened that the number of candidates for the Coast-
guard service exceeded the number of vacancies. No doubt the hon.
baronet was correct, but he had always understood from the report of
Sir W. Tarleton that the reverse was the case. He quite agreed with
Admiral Phillimore that the present Reserve of Coastguards was as
low as it ought to be, and, indeed it might be said of our Naval
Reserves generally, having regard to the great numbers of seamen
who would be at the disposal of France in case of emergency, that
their strength might very advantageously be increased.
Captain
Price.
**
I
PART VI.
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
1
SECTION I.
TRAINING OF ENGINEER OFFICERS.
SPEECH DELIVERED IN PARLIAMENT,
MARCH 15, 1878.
.
408
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
ON THE TRAINING OF ENGINEER OFFICERS.
House of Conumons. March 15, 1878.
rience of
The kernel of the bulky volume presented to the House by the
Admiralty Committee on Boilers is to be found in the Appendix.
The tables presented to that Committee by the great Steam Com-
panies are indeed most suggestive. It was impossible that the
Committee could devise a more efficacious system for the preserva-
tion of the boilers than that which has been adopted with such
admirable results by the Inman, Cunard, and other Companies.
Inexpe- It is the great defect of the present system that young engineers
are appointed to seagoing ships, with no previous experience in the
junior
engineers. management of machinery at sea. In time of peace, when ships are
only occasionally under way, and usually steam at a low speed, the
chief engineer can give special attention to the instruction of junior
engineers. He could not do so in time of war. In the dockyards
many young engineers are attached to ships undergoing repairs,
rather in the capacity of watchmen, for the prevention of fire, than
as mechanical officers. The necessity for more practical experience
in seagoing ships has been recognised by the Committees, which have
been lately engaged in the reorganisation of the mechanical depart-
ment of the Navy. While wisely advising that the engineer officers
in commissioned ships should be reduced in number, and replaced
by artificers, Sir Cooper Key's Committee proposed that junior
assistant engineers, on leaving college, should be appointed to troop
and store ships, in addition to the complement, for six months or
longer.
Harbour
From the nature of the duties it is impossible to give to the
Navy in time of peace that practical experience in driving powerful
machinery at a high speed in all weathers, which is obtained in the
merchant service. Many engineers spend years attached to har-
bour ships, or in ships which are seldom under steam, and are still
service.
TRAINING OF ENGINEER OFFICERS.
409
Instruction
of engi-
mercantile
more rarely driven at full speed. It should be the policy of the
Admiralty to keep down the number of engineers, so that it should
not exceed the strict requirements of the service, looking to the mer-
cantile marine to supply the additional engineers, who would be
required in the event of war.
An effort should be made to obtain for engineers further oppor-
tunities of acquiring practical experience, as supernumeraries, with rieers in the
some of the leading services in the mercantile marine. We should marine.
not allow ourselves to be deterred by the prejudices of the service
from making an attempt to pass our naval engineers, for a limited
period, through the mercantile marine. The plan has in point of
fact been suggested by some authorities of great practical experience.
In a paper by Mr. Ravenhill, read at the meeting of the Institution of
Naval Architects, held at Glasgow in 1877, the following remarks
occur :- All those who are in any way conversant with the Royal
Navy must admit that such experience as the commercial marine
affords cannot easily be obtained in Her Majesty's ships. The trans-
port service is limited, and the hours named for departure are not
always adhered to. The mail steamers are timed to leave at a certain
hour, and even if all is not in perfect order the chief engineer must
be ready. Such a school can alone afford the training a seagoing
engineer should receive, and I am sanguine enough to hope that the
day is not far distant when some arrangement will be made between
the Admiralty and our large Steam Companies, for a junior Royal
Naval engineer to have an opportunity afforded him, if only for a
period of twelve months, of obtaining experience with machinery,
at times pressed to the utmost, in all seasons and in all weathers.'
Mr. Reed warmly supported Mr. Ravenhill's proposition, saying
that he thought it most desirable that the officers of the Royal Navy
should be made - familiar with the practice of the mercantile marine.
He refused to admit that the suggestion was beset with insuperable
practical difficulties. In time of peace naval engineers can never
have an opportunity of witnessing such performances as those of the
mail steamers, making regular passages throughout the year between
Liverpool and New York, at an average speed sometimes exceeding 16
knots, or those of the ships which now accomplish the voyage between
St. Vincent and Australia without easing the engines.
The Servia' and City of Rome,' now building for the Cunard
and Inman Companies, will be driven across the Atlantic at 17 knots
by engines of 8,000 indicated horse-power. No such duty was ever
got out of engines. In no ship in the Navy can the engineer have
410
:
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Expedition
in execu-
tion of
repairs.
the same opportunity of mastering his art as in the engine-rooms of
those noble steamers.
The engineers employed in the great mail services are required
not only to maintain the highest speeds at sea, but to examine and
repair the machinery under their charge with the utmost possible
expedition. In the Atlantic trade, large steamships run for years
with intervals of a week, and sometimes less than a week, between
their repeated voyages. Expedition in the repair of machinery is
not required in the Navy in time of peace. It might be of vital
importance in war. The young engineers of the Navy have much to
learn, not only in developing the capabilities of machinery, but also
in the management of boilers. Whatever may be the result of the
scientific researches of the Admiralty, it would be an important step
in advance, if only the practice of the Royal Navy were assimilated
to that of the most successful services in the mercantile marine.
>
:
1
i
SECTION H.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE TRAINING
OF SEAMEN.
f
412
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
I.
Xavier
Baron
Grivel.
que le
Admiral
Jurien de
la Gravière.
Importance THE training of the officers and seamen of the Navy for their
of a good
system.
difficult and responsible duties is one of the most important ques-
tions with which the Admiralty has to deal. In bis work entitled
Les Marines de la France et de l'Angleterre, 1818-63, M. Xavier
Raymond.
Raymond most justly says:--Quoi qu'on fasse, la puissance des
navires sera toujours en raison des qualités et des talents que pos-
séderont comme gens de mer les hommes qui les montent.'
Another French authority, an officer of great distinction in the
Navy, Baron Grivel, makes a similar observation. De tout temps,
comme dans tous les pays, comment douter de cette vérité
personnel sera toujours l'âme du matériel ? '
It may be admitted that we are better prepared in the personnel
than in the matériel of our fleet, but naval officers will, nevertheless,
agree with Admiral Jurien de la Gravière when he said :
-Chaque
fois que l'arsenal et la flotte seront en présence, qu'il faudra néces-
sairement immoler l'une ou l'autre, l'arsenal, je le déclare, aura tort
à mes yeux.
The following observations occur in a letter from Rear-Admiral
Rodgers. Rodgers, of the United States Navy, written during his residence as
Naval Attaché in London :-“There is nothing in naval matters so
important as the subject of manning. Fleets may easily be built,
hosts of swift steamers may be quickly taken from commerce and
converted into tolerably efficient cruisers, but an efficient man-of-
war's man cannot be improvised. Such hearts of oak are of slow
growth and need much care. It is unsafe to look back to former
days for anything to guide us in the future. Naval warfare of the
olden time was rude and simple. The guns and the gunnery prac-
tice, the whole training of our seamen, the whole machinery of
battle, were very different from what we see to-day. All nations
Rear-
Admiral
f
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
413
were much alike, and glorious deeds were done by the rough system
then in vogue, when the skilful handling of the ship was the one
thing needful. Steam, new ordnance, armour, torpedoes, earthworks,
obstructive channels, all complicate the naval problem now. We
need seamen--thorough seamen—as of old, but they must be sea
soldiers also.'
The American Army and Navy Journal, in an article on modern Army and
Navy
naval warfare, published on November 10, 1877, concludes with the Journal.
following observations:-
"The time is coming when the engineer and machinist, with
their costly appliances, must stand aside to give room for the typical
val officer of all time, the daring sailor whose wits are never at
fault, whose resources are endless. Armour and guns, machinery
and machinists, can be had to order by paying for them, but the
qualities of heart and brain that make up the ideal sailor can never
be purchased, and will win their way to the front under any and all
circumstances of naval warfare. That the battle of guns and armour
has lasted so long as it has, proves little but the absence of the
opportunity which makes a Blake, Nelson, Paul Jones, Decatur, or
Farragut. They may all be lying hid to-day in the form of a rosy-
cheeked lad at Annapolis, but when they come they will conquer as
they used to do, whether their ships be of wood or iron, so long as
they are swift, handy and heavily armed.'
The novelty and the variety of types introduced into modern Pill
Mall,
navies tend materially to increase the difficulty of training. An June 7,
able article on this subject, suggested by the loss of the 'Grosser Logs of
Kurfürst,' appeared in the Pall Mall Gazette of June 7, 1878:-
Kurfürst.
The long peace of the seas, and the restless progress of modern
naval invention, have combined together to reduce the supply of
practical experience in the handling of ships of war to the lowest
point, at the very time when the need of that skill, which only prac-
tical experience can give, is the most strongly felt. One can hardly
reflect upon the conditions under which a modern ironclad is com-
manded, officered, and manned without feeling the magnitude of the
contrast between the guarantees for the efficiency of our fleets in the
old time and the guarantees for their efficiency at the present day.
In bygone days, a. ship’s company was a body of practical men,
commanded by a practical man; the crew-man and boy, from the
highest to the lowest—had learned their business, either by actual
practice on board their vessel or under exactly similar conditions
elsewhere. Each man, in proportion to his proficiency in his calling,
approached to the model of his commander; the best as capable as
1878.
Grosser
414
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
he of sailing, and, if need were, of fighting, the ship in which he
served, and even the worst possessing his share of that “ handiness”
which was the salient quality of the best. But what is an ironclad,
and what its company now? It is a floating. theory, manned by
experiments, for the old captain who finds himself on board a new
model ironclad must be conscious that he is an experimental com-
mander. From the captain to the cabin boy there is probably not a
hand on board who knows by actual trial how the vessel will comport
itself under this, that, or the other set of circumstances. As for the
men, how, when, and where are they to acquire any such knowledge?
Their early training, such as it is, has been begun, in all likelihood,
on board a wooden ship; and, if their more recent experience is of
the vigation of an ironclad, of what sort of ironclad, and after what
type and model, and how long since did this experience begin ?
The difference in material, weight, and bulk is hardly greater
between an old wooden frigate and the modern ironclad than is the
difference of shape and structure between one ironclad and another.
While the race of invention is continually going on, and masted and
mastless, long and short, turreted and turretless vessels succeed each
other, each claiming to be the “ironclad of the future,” what is to
become of the seaman of the future? There is little uniformity in
the conditions under which seamanship now-a-days is to be learned,
and if there were more, the rare and brief periods of practice, the
chary and gingerly use (necessarily so, no doubt) of our ships of war,
afford the sailor little of his former opportunities of learning his
profession.
The recent mysterious disappearance of the “Atalanta' gives
especial importance at the present time to the subject of training.
The loss of two training ships manned by six hundred brave young
seamen within the short period of two years gives occasion for grave
reflection.
2
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
415
II.
in British
The system of training which has been established in the British Training
Navy was carefully described in a paper read by Lieutenant-Com- Navy.
mander Chadwick at the New York Branch of the United States Naval Lieutenant-
Institute, on February 19, 1880:-
Chadwick,
Com-
mander
U.S.N.
• The English Training Ships.
· About 3,000 boys are kept in the English training ships, who
undergo a course of training extending through fourteen or sixteen
months. The ships employed are fine line-of-battle ships, two of
which are at Devonport, one at Portsmouth, one at Portland, and one
at Falmouth in Cornwall. The entries of this last year were 2,400,
the number varying with the exigencies of the service. This number,
however, is about the usual waste in the blue-jacket force of the
British Navy, which amounts to between eighteen and nineteen
thousand, out of a total of forty thousand, men in the service. Each
of these ships has attached to it a brig of about 400 tons, and a hulk,
used for storerooms and as a receptacle for newly entered boys, where
they stay a week and are gotten into shape before going on board
the parent ship. No difficulty is experienced in obtaining boys, the
Navy being extremely popular in England, so that the supply always
exceeds the demand. The qualifications for entry are that the boy
must be between 15 and 161 years of age, must be of good physique,
and must know how to read and write. Stress is laid upon character;
no persons from reformatories, or who have been committed by a
magistrate, being admitted.
* The schooling is limited in extent, but within the limits is
thorough. Nearly all the boys are excellent penmen, good readers
and cipherers. The practical training consists in learning all the
work and duties of the sailors. Daily exercises of spars and
sails take place, except in the winter months; handling boats under
sails and oars is frequent; cutlass drill, infantry gymnastics (which is
416
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
taught by a non-commissioned officer of marines), truck gun exercise,
and swimming are all thoroughly well taught.
All these exercises, excepting those of sails and spars, are
under the immediate direction of the trained men or petty officers,
who are detailed as instructors in seamanship. Each of the lieu-
tenants on board has charge of certain subjects, but the men who do
the instruction work under them are a class absolutely unknown in
our service, and whose existence in that of England is one of the
greatest evidences of the benefits of their system.
“The scholastic and practical training on board the parent ship
lasts about a twelvemonth, after which is given a six weeks' sea
training in the brigs, and finally a ten weeks' course in gunnery on
board the gunnery ship, after which the boy is ready for service. ...
Great care is taken to amuse and instruct outside the regular routine,
a large sum being allowed, which is mainly used for the purchase of
games, bats, balls, &c., and for such books and papers as boyish taste
demands. ... Fifty-three days' leave are allowed during the year,
divided into two periods of sixteen days each and one of twenty-one.
One afternoon a week is set aside for general liberty, and all whose
relatives live near enough to the ship are allowed to go home on
Sunday. ... The whole method of discipline is humanitarian: there
are as few restraints and punishments as possible, and, altogether,
I cannot imagine a better school in which to bring up young men of
this class.
The ten weeks' course on board the gunnery ships is thought
by many to be too long; it would be better, too, if this were made a
part of the course on board the training ship proper, or in a vessel
which was entirely under the control of the commander of this
ship.
“Much more attention is given to small arms than with us, and
the British sailor is turned cut a very respectable soldier. For one,
I am a strong advocate of much infantry drill, if it is properly given.
I cannot see how it can injure the boy or man in any way as a sailor,
and it affords a convenient and pleasant variety from sail drill. It
need never be so much used as to conflict with the latter; there
is no better means of discipline; it affords a good setting up, makes
a handier and more capable man, and I regard it as altogether an
indispensable adjunct of modern training. There is no reason why
a ship's company of 500 men should not be able to land at any time
a battalion of 300 perfectly equipped and ready to take the field. .
The universal praise accorded the blue-jackets in the late Zulu cam-
paign says more than any argument on the subject. Where the
Gunnery.
Small
aims.
A
!
1
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
417
enlistment.
6
soldier was helpless, the sailor was full of expedients. He was always
sheltered, always had food, and was always in good fighting trim. I
think it would be far wiser, instead of decrying efforts to extend our
usefulness by saying that this and that does not lie in our way, we
should take pride in being able to do so much.
* The long enlistment customary in the English service gives a Terms of
great advantage. The boy is entered to serve until 28 years of age,
and if he then re-enlists and serves until he is 38, he may retire with
a pension of a shilling or more a day. Nor do they retain the boy in
his rating as boy any longer than possible. At eighteen all are rated
ordinary seamen or ordinary seamen second class, and assume a man's
position on board ship.
The homogeneousness of the British service, arising from the
fact that all their blue-jackets are passed through their training ships,
and from the fact that the training given in each ship is exactly the
same, cannot be too much commended. The captain of the “Impreg-
nable" is the commodore of the squadron, having under the Admiralty
entire control.
Everything pertaining to the system is referable to him. .
There can be no real success in such a scheme without such a sub-
ordination to one head. It is better to have one method with some
faults than to have the conflicting schemes of individuals, though
each in itself may be more perfect than the one general scheme.'
It will be apparent from these lengthened extracts that our system British
has received the highest commendation from those most qualified to
judge. In the letter, from which I have already quoted, Admiral mended
Rodgers says:
Rodgers.
“You have met the difficulty manfully in your training ships, your
gunnery ships, and your system of continuous service. There is no body
of men in the world to-day comparable with your continuous service
men. I wish with all my heart that my countrymen would follow your
example. To inscribe the fishermen, the boatmen, and the whole mari-
time population, to give them a certain naval organisation and naval
training, would be an enormous addition to your maritime strength.
The Secretary of the United States Navy, in his Report for 1879,
confirms the testimony of Admiral Rodgers. The British Navy has
the reputation of being unsurpassed in its personnel, and it has
acquired this distinction mainly by means of its training system.
The course of instruction in the German Navy was described in Training
a letter published in the United Service Army and Navy Journal, Navy.
of New York, on July 18, 1877:-
Army
'The corvette “Nymphe," Captain von Kall, which was at and Navy
system
Admiral
in German
Letter to
VOL. IV.
EE
418
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
6
Hampton Roads during the month of June, is one of the ships of the
German Navy used in training apprentices for the regular service.
Having made the acquaintance of her officers, and from them learned
some of the principal features of their system of instruction, your
correspondent asks a place in your columns that those interested in
training boys for our own Navy may know the course pursued by the
German authorities.
Origin of the German Apprentice System.-About three or four
years ago, Captain Schering, of the Navy, succeeded in establishing a
system of training boys for the regular naval service, which has so
many excellent points that it is not surprising to know it has thus far
worked well. Captain Schering's plan is to enlist 140 boys every year.
As the system is just entering its fourth year, there are now some-
thing less than 560 boys in course of training. The active list of the
German Navy numbers about 6,000 men. The boys are selected by the
recruiting officers with great care. Not less than 500 boys annually
present themselves as applicants, and from this number the selection
is made. Applicants must be able to read and write, must not be
more than seventeen nor less than fourteen years of age, and must
bind themselves to serve twelve years, if necessary.
The first Six Months. When 140 boys have been enlisted, they are
divided into two parties and sent into two cruising brigs to the Baltic,
where they spend the summer. Each brig has the necessary petty
officers and about twenty seamen. These men are carefully selected—
the object being not only to secure competent seamen, but also men
of good morals----men who shall not teach boys the vices of the sailor
before they have had an opportunity to learn something of his virtues.
They are taught seamanship and gunnery, and they are also in-
structed in reading, writing, arithmetic, and geography. Each
officer instructs his own division and takes as much pride in their
progress with their books as in their advancement in the use of small
arms or their skill in handling great guns. The idea is not lost sight
of that the qualification for good sailors includes not only a thorough
knowledge of ropes and sails, but an intelligent understanding of the
elementary principles of a common school education.
The second Sic Months. After a six months' cruise in the Baltic
both crews are sent ashore in company, and spend the winter in
barracks prepared for them. With them are four officers of the line,
a chaplain, and a few petty officers. During the winter more especial
attention is given to the military part of their education—for they are
not only to be sailors but fighting sailors as well. At the same time
their studies are continued under the direction of a chaplain, and,
t
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
419
besides the branches taught in summer, they have history. Good
readers among the boys are encouraged to read aloud to the others
from some work on German history; the idea being to teach them
pride in their profession and pride in their national character as well.
They are also instructed in singing. In this way the time spent at
the barracks passes pleasantly and profitably. This completes the
first year.
$
• The Long Cruise.—The next eighteen months are spent in
a cruising ship at sea. Vessels of the “Nymphe" class are selected,
and the same officers who instructed the boys up to this time are
sent to cruise with them. Now the work of making sailors com-
mences in earnest. A training ship means a working ship. The
boys are drilled frequently, examined regularly, and constantly kept
busy. They must learn all parts of the ship equally well, and in
order to ensure this a new quarter and station bill is made out every
three months. During the last three months the boys must depend
on themselves, instruction being given to the petty officers at this time
to assist in all manquvres but not to direct. A healthy competition
is encouraged, but not to make one part of the ship or one division
of the ship more active than another. Indeed this is prevented in a
great measure by the frequent changes of stations before alluded to.
There is a practical examination every three months, and a more
thorough one every six months. Thus passes a year and a half; the
boys have now been in the service two years and a half.
The last Six Months.-The last six months of their three years'
course is spent at Kiel, the great naval station of the Germans. The
boys are sent to the gunnery ships, where they are instructed in
working those guns which they have not seen on their cruising ships.
At the expiration of this time they pass their final examination, and
are rated as seamen of the first class, or as able seamen. This
completes the three years' course, and they are now ready for the
general service.
On Probation.--As much as possible the boys are kept together
when drafts are made, so that, though they have ceased to be
apprentice boys in one sense, they may not lose their identity. At
the end of one year they are examined again, and, if competent,
morally and professionally, they are rated petty officers. It is
expected that they will make the best petty officers in the service.
As soon as enough have been graduated, it is designed that the
training ships shall take their necessary petty officers and seamen
from the graduated apprentice boys. If boys display an aptitude for
study they are taught English and such other branches as they elect,
E E 2
420
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
up to a reasonable point. No fear is entertained of educating them
out of the service, for if they leave it they are still citizens, and
Germany believes in education for all classes. Other boys, fond of
machinery, are encouraged to become machinists; if handy with
tools, they are encouraged to become carpenters or sailmakers; they
are also eligible for appointments as boatswains and gunners, but are
not eligible for any commissioned office either in time of peace or
war.
· Prominent Features of the System. One marked feature is in
the selection of officers. Only those are selected who believe in the
system, who have faith in the boys and will take an interest in them,
Once assigned to a class of boys the officers are not changed until
that class has graduated. All officers are equally interested in the
entire class, the frequent changes preventing favouritism almost
entirely.
Another prominent feature is in the selection of the petty officers
and seamen, and in the marked attempt to keep the boys from bad
men and bad influence. At first boys spent their third year at sea,
indiscriminately assigned to vessels actually cruising. The hazardous
experiment failed entirely; the moral stamina of the boys was not
strong enough to withstand the unwholesome influence of the
average ship's company, and the project was abandoned. · All
possible helps to morality are afforded. After the first six months
they are never without a chaplain. The Protestants are all obliged
to attend church, the Catholics are excused if they wish, and whole-
some restrictions are thrown around them.
“A third feature, and a most excellent one in the opinion of your
correspondent, is that, during the first two years no boy is allowed to
use tobacco in any form. Boys are permitted to smoke during the
third year, but not to chew tobacco. Even then the tobacco is
served out by the first lieutenant, who takes care that no boy shall
use too much, and regular smoking hours are fixed as on all men-of-
The too commonly received opinion that to chew tobacco,
swear, and be tattooed with Indian ink are the first qualifications of a
sailor, is not entertained on board training ships in the German
Navy.The fresh, bright looking faces of the German apprentice
boys, when contrasted with the pale, sallow faces of too many of our
own apprentice boys, is a powerful argument that something ought
to be done to suppress the use of this powerful narcotic among our
young seamen.
"A fourth feature is the system of rewards and punishments.
For rewards recourse is had to honourable distinctions. Boys of
-
war.
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
421
be
marked good conduct are given badges, which they wear so long as
they maintain their good standing. If in addition to this they show
themselves efficient they are rated boy petty officers. The punish-
ment is light, but it should be remembered that the boys are selected
with much care, and that boys who show a marked disposition to be
bad are sent home in disgrace for dismissal—the idea of training
ships being educational and not reformatory. There is no solitary
confinement, no deprivation of liberty on shore, except perhaps for a
single week, no irons, single or double. But there is flogging! Yes ;
for specific crimes, such as lying and petty theft, a boy may
flogged. The boys of the “ Nymphe," though they have been in the
service more than two years, have never incurred the punishment.
The simpler punishment, such as standing on deck, extra duty, and
temporary deprivation of liberty on shore, have been found sufficient.
The most severe punishment is sending them to Coventry. During
the time a boy is in Coventry, he wears a different uniform from the
rest, eats alone, sleeps by himself, no one is permitted to speak to
him, nor is he allowed to speak to anyone.
The boys are given day liberty twice a week; under no ordinary
circumstances are they allowed to spend the night on shore. They
are sent always under the charge of one of their own petty officers,
who is answerable for their conduct and for their safe return.
· Practical working of the System. -Such is the design and such
the leading features of the system. The only point remaining is its
practical working. Of this I can only judge from this one vessel, but
if the “ Nymphe " be a fair specimen of the German training ship,
then the Germans have succeeded admirably. The work of the boys
on board is remarkable. Certainly it is all that can be wished.
Their sail drills were pronounced by our own naval officers as
admirable in every respect. The best-informed army officers pro-
nounced their duties in gunnery and small arms “exceptionally fine.”
Visitors at the Roads spoke in the highest terms of the “ Nymphe
and the fine-looking lads on board.'
The 'Nymphe,' to which the writer refers as having lately visited Nymphe,?
.
the coasts of the United States, was launched in 1863. She is a corvette.
corvette of 985 tons, and 800 indicated horse-power, capable of
steaming ten knots, and manned by a crew of 190. It may here be Pay, Ger-
man Navy.
mentioned that, in the German Navy, pay at the rate of ll. per
month is granted to a seaman on being rated, and that, after three
years' service, an additional payment of 21. is made for each con-
secutive twelve months served, until the maximum monthly pay of
Il. 88. is reached. Before a seaman is advanced to the lowest petty
422
NAVAL, TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
German
officer's grade, which is that of quartermaster, he must have served
afloat for four years, and hold a certificate of superior knowledge of
every branch of a seaman's duty on board a man-of-war. To become
à second-class petty officer, a man must have served six years at sea,
during one of which he must have held the rating of quartermaster,
and have been captain of a gun. He then is given the grade of
boatsmanns-maat, or second master of maneuvres of the second class.
And if he obtains a special certificate at the gunnery school, he may
be rated fenerwerks-maat, a kind of gunner's mate. Non-com-
missioned officers of marines are also enabled to reach this grade, if
they have been embarked for two years, and can pass the examina-
tion required. There are also higher grades, which can be reached
after longer service, but pay in every case is much lower than that
of similar grades in the British Navy.
Training in
Having regard to the present strength of the German Navy, a
Nary. large proportion of the fleet in commission is detailed for training
purposes. Under recent arrangements two brigs are employed in
training young seamen in the Baltic on first joining the service. In
their second
year
the
young seamen are sent afloat as we have seen
in the corvette · Nymphe’ for a more extended cruise. Two corvettes
cruise with apprentices in the Baltic and the North Sea respectively.
The frigate ‘Niobe' is employed as a training vessel for cadets, and
our ironclads are formed into a squadron for evolutionary exercises.
Lieutenant-Commander Chadwick, in the same paper which has
already been quoted, makes the following observations on the training
Chadwick, systems established in the French and German Navies. With regard
to the former, he says :- The French methods are essentially
Training in
different from those of the English. They have schools for each of
Navy:
the branches of their service, the young men selected from the
divisions (barracks) being first passed through the “ Bretagne," a
large line-of-battle ship, in which were 1,378 under instruction last
summer. The course here lasts from four to six months, after which
further instruction is undergone at other ports. There is also a large
liner, the “ Austerlitz," in which are 800 boys, who are entered at
thirteen or fourteen, and are kept until sixteen, and who then enter
the “Bretagne" as part of the recruits. Both these ships are at
Brest. There is here likewise a school similar to the Greenwich
Hospital School, in which 400 sons of sailors, taken in some cases as
early as seven, are educated for the Navy. The schools for specialists,
to which the novices are finally distributed, are the gunnery
school
at Toulon, the school of musketry at Lorient, and the two cruising
frigates for the instruction of topmen and quartermasters.
Lieu-
tenauta
Com-
mander
U.S.N.
French
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
423
Enlistnient
There is also a torpedo school at which men are instructed, a
school for coast pilots, a normal school for naval schoolmasters,
a school for firemen and machinists, for dockyard apprentices, and a
school for gymnastic instructions. The system of promotion in the
French Navy, amongst the men, is most excellent. In all the corps
of specialists, brevets or certificates are given after passing an
established examination, which entitle the holders to precedence of
selection for petty officers' positions in their especial branches.
These examinations are held by regularly constituted boards of
officers, five officers usually being upon each ; in most cases there is
a fixed schedule of questions published by the Ministry of Marine,
covering the entire subject, and certain percentages of marks are
necessary to establish the claim of the applicant to a first, second, or
third class certificate.'
The report of the Secretary of the United States Navy for the Secretary,
year 1877 refers in some detail to the measures which had recently States
been adopted by the Department for the improvement of the train- Navy.
Report
ing of seamen for the American Navy. A law had been passed, for 1877.
authorising the enlistment of boys between sixteen and eighteen and train-
ing of
years of age, to serve in the Navy until the age of twenty-one. At boys.
the date of the report in question there were 458 boys under training,
and 324 had passed through the training ships into the general
service. The system had worked satisfactorily, and a strong re-
commendation was made to Congress to authorise the enlistment of
750 boys, over and above the complement of the Navy, which, under
an Act of Congress, had been fixed at 7,500 men. The recommenda-
tion was adopted by Congress, and an Act was passed authorising
the enlistment of boys, and raising the total strength of the Navy to
8,250 men and boys. The limits of age for enlistment have been
fixed by the Department at from sixteen to seventeen years. Each
boy is required to be able to read and write, and must be physically
adapted for the work of a seaman. An outfit is provided, and wages
are paid at the rate of 104 dollars per month. The year is divided
into two parts. During the winter, the training ships are moored
at some naval station, where there are facilities for work in the
rigging and sail lofts, and for drilling on shore and under cover.
The boys can then be instructed in company movements, and in
battalion drill. It is found, also, that in the light and airy rooms
such as are available at almost every Navy-yard, the instruction in
broad-sword and boxing can be carried on much better than on the
decks of the ship. The occasional change from the ship to places on
shore is often very grateful to boys naturally restive under the con-
424
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Report,
Secretary,
United
States
Yavy, 1879.
finement of ship life. Experience shows, too, that it is better to
accustom young lads to this radical change of life gradually. Hence
it has been found very desirable to give at least one hour each day
to the playground, whenever the weather and other circumstances
permit, and encourage the boys to engage in pastimes and field
sports generally. The long evenings of winter are generally devoted
to amusement and popular lectures, and philanthropic gentlemen
are often invited to address the boys. Two evenings in the week
are given to singing.
The training ships, as it has already been said, undertake ex-
tended cruises in the summer months. The school shipJames-
town,' stationed at San Francisco, has a complement of one
commander, seven officers, twenty men, and 200 boys. The summer
cruise extends as far as the Sandwich Islands.
The last report of the Secretary of the United States Navy
contains a detailed report of the practice cruise of the sailing ship
Constellation' in 1879. The cruise extended over a period of
three months. Between the Chesapeake and Halifax, the Con-
stellation visited a considerable number of the intermediate
harbours, weighing and coming to an anchor under sail, and ex-
periencing every variety of weather, including a considerable amount
of fog. Every midshipman of the first class had tacked ship once.
Boxhauling and wearing, both in a light breeze, a fresh breeze, and
gales, had been practised. Captain McNair justly remarks, that the
varied cruise of the year 1879 had been far more agreeable than the
monotonous repetition of evolutions in the same dull dreary cruising
ground, while the best instructions in pilotage, navigation, and
seamanship had been obtained in working a ship under sail in narrow
passages, surrounded with dangers.
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
425
III.
British
Having described the course of training in the British and the Defects in
principal foreign navies, our attention may appropriately be directed ing for the
to certain defects in our system, which have been criticised by high
Navy.
authorities.
Captain Wilson, formerly superintending officer of the training
establishments, called attention to this subject in several lectures at
the United Service Institution.
The facts, with reference to the sea service of the boys under
training for the Navy, were brought together in his paper read on
July 2, 1875.
. With the establishment of a permanent force, the conditions of Paper by
service became totally changed; and, to meet such an altered state modore
Wilson,
of affairs, other radical changes were, and still are, necessary to make July 2,
the whole system work harmoniously and efficiently. To begin with 1875.
the boys: there are five stationary training ships under commanders,
with an “inspecting captain," who has the general supervision of the
whole. In these vessels, three thousand youths are supposed to be
trained annually, but as the supply has never yet equalled the
demand, the number has hitherto been from two to three hundred
short of the vote. The boys, if their parents consent, are taken at
from fifteen to sixteen and a half years of age, after having undergone
a most stringent physical examination. These requirements being
satisfied, if they can read, write, and cipher fairly, and have never been
committed by a magistrate, they are allowed to engage for ten years
from the age of eighteen. On completing one year's training, and
after passing an examination, they are rated “first-class boys," when
a certain proportion are put through an advanced course of gunnery,
either in the “ Boscawen " or in the gunnery ships, and about one half
of them are also sent on a six weeks' cruise in one of the five training
brigs. A roster is kept on board the “inspecting captain's "ship;
and, as far as circumstances will admit, they are drafted in rotation by
him. Taking one with another, boys are two years from entry until
426
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
rated as men, or, in other words, their average age on entry is sixteen;
and, taken throughout, they have about two months' sea service in
the fleet as boys. Though our seagoing ships carry as many boys as
they can stow, there are still from 1,500 to 1,700 constantly on depôt,
waiting their turn for draft. This delay is much to be regretted,
and can only be avoided by keeping sufficient training ships at sea to
provide for that proportion of boys (about 1,400) which are due to
the men kept in our home ports. Whilst thus waiting, a considerable
number of them reach their eighteenth year, and are by order rated
men ; thus the 1,200 ordinary second class may be taken to repre-
sent a body of sailors who have never been at sea at all.'
Army
Captain Wilson's recommendations were warmly supported in the
and Navy
Gazette.
service journals. The Army and Navy Gazette described the
receiving hulks, flag ships though they are, as simple abominations.
Boys from the training ships, clean, healthy lads, full of devotion to
a sailor's life, and burning to go to sea, are sent into these hulks to
await their turn for drafting into a man-of-war, and in six months'
time these young ordinaries are lucky if they have escaped degrada-
tion, both moral and physical; yet these ships are generally com-
manded by experienced officers. There would almost appear to be
something intrinsically fatal in a hulk, and there we must leave
it. Stories in proof of this we might relate, but we refrain. It is
enough to say that the riot and license which, undoubtedly, existed
in the hulks in the old revolutionary war, still leave their traces
behind.'
Proportion Passing from the boys to the seamen of the fleet, Captain Wilson
in harbour proceeded to show that the proportion of time at sea was not suffi-
ships.
cient to maintain the Navy in a thorough state of efficiency:-
· The combatants consist of seamen and marines, but I will at first
confine myself to the former. It will be seen from figures I have
already given that we have but 12,000 able-bodied men, which is
surely as low a number as the most rigid economist would dare to
advocate for the first naval Power of Europe.” I contend that they,
and they alone, are the seamen of our fleet. The custom of speaking
of our men as "pure blue-jackets" in Parliament is misleading, for
all naval men know how anyone, from a cab-driver to a crossing-
sweeper, may be included under that designation, whereas, for a man
to be rated an A.B., he must be a sailor of some experience and
knowledge of his profession. However good and useful ordinary
seamen may be, they are at least but learners, and should, therefore,
always be as much distinguished from the finished sailor as boys are
from them.
of seamen
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
427
'I will now proceed to analyse the services of our seamen. The Analysis
of employ-
fleet consists of seagoing and harbour ships, which may be roughly ment of
divided as follows:
sean.en.
Com.
niodore
Wilson.
Regular men-of-war, from sloops to ironclads
Small class gunboats, yachts, tugs, brigs, and surveying vessels
Turret ships
Troop and store ships
Stationary and coastguard ships
72
82
1
16
49
Frederick
'In seagoing vessels we have only 10,500 blue-jackets of man's
rate, the remaining 8,000 are in the harbour ships. Such being the
ordinary state of the service, it follows that our men cannot have
more than eleven and a half years at sea, such as it is, out of their
twenty. Dividing the twenty years into four periods of five each, I
find the standing of our men to be,--10,000 of under five years'
service, with an average of eighteen months at sea and twenty and a
half years of age; 4,270 of between five and ten years' service, with
an average of four and a half years at sea; 2,603 of from ten to
fifteen years' service, and seven and a half years at sea; and 1,816
of between fifteen and twenty years' service, and ten and a half
years at sea. This calculation is based on the supposition that each
man has exactly the same amount of sea service, which is practically
not the case.'
An opinion to the same effect was expressed by Admiral the Sir
Honourable Sir Frederick Grey, in the discussion which took place Grey.
at the Institute of Naval Architects in . 1875, on a paper on
unarmoured vessels by the present writer. It was pointed out by
that gallant officer, whose long experience at the Admiralty made
his opinions the more valuable, that the Navy comprised only about
18,000 continuous service blue-jackets, and yet, small as that force
was, we had not cruisers enough to give them the practice afloat
which was necessary to keep them efficient.
The opinion of Sir Frederick Grey was confirmed by Admiral Adiniral
Ryder.
Ryder in the discussions at the United Service Institution on the
Naval Prize Essays of 1878. While approving of the training in the
training ships, he pointed out that a difficulty was experienced in
sending the young seamen out to the ships on foreign stations, after
their course of instruction in the harbour ships had been completed.
There seemed to be a difficulty in connecting the training ships at
home with the seagoing ships on foreign stations; the result being
that when their training was completed, the boys were frequently
kept waiting for many months in the receiving ships at Portsmouth
and Plymouth.
428
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Tenders to
flagships.
The same observations apply to the young officers of the Navy.
A large number are always appointed to harbour ships in the home
ports. Others who are nominally at sea are attached to ironclads and
flagships which are frequently detained for extended periods in port.
It is a subject of general complaint amongst captains in the Navy that
the young lieutenants are too often without the experience which they
ought to have before they are allowed to take charge of a watch. As
they go on in the service they learn their work; and probably no Navy
has ever possessed a more competent body of officers than the senior
lieutenants of the present day. I venture to suggest the expediency
of attaching to the receiving ships at Devonport and Portsmouth, and
to the barracks at Sheerness, a certain number of cruisers, capable
of being handled under sail in the Channel. The employment of
such vessels would not merely increase the efficiency of the Navy, but
might lead to great economy in the maintenance of the Fleet. If
seamen were sent to cruise in training vessels, costing comparatively
little for maintenance, it would not then be necessary to have so many
ironclads in commission. A certain number of ironclads would be
required to form an evolutionary squadron and to protect British
interests in distant waters to which reinforcements cannot be de-
spatched on an emergency. The remainder of the ironclads should
be kept in the First-class Reserve in the home ports, and in such
centres of naval power as it might be necessary to establish abroad.
Those ships should be in perfect readiness for immediate service.
The crews of the cruising vessels should go through a complete course
of
gun
drill on board the ironclads in reserve every year. They
should also have their quarterly firing exercise in an ironclad, which
should be commissioned as a gunnery ship and which should visit
each of the home ports at stated intervals. A similar plan might be
adopted in the Mediterranean.
Objections may be urged to the system of training here proposed,
on the ground that it will deprive officers of the opportunity of serving
in ironclads. To this it may be replied that under the plan actually
adopted the necessary experience is very slowly acquired. Ironclads
which can only make voyages under steam are naturally kept very
much in harbour. The experience of a three years' commission, as
regards the handling and mancuvring of the ship, might have been
gained in six months, if the time had been devoted mainly to such
instruction, and the ship had been constantly at sea. By appointing
officers in more rapid rotation to the evolutionary squadron, and
keeping the ships more actively employed, it might be possible,
while reducing the number of ships in commission, to give officers
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
429
the · Van-
serving for a short time in the evolutionary squadron the experience
they at present derive from a longer commission in ships less actively
employed.
The loss of the 'Vanguard' was a striking illustration of the Loss of
serious consequences which must result to the Navy if no steps be guard.
taken to secure more seagoing experience for our younger officers.
In the debate in the House of Commons, on February 25, 1876,
on the loss of the Vanguard,' the compiler spoke as follows:
He had long been convinced that the Admiralty kept too large
a proportion of our young officers and seamen in harbour ships, and, in
his view, the necessity for increasing the number of seagoing ships in
commission was conspicuously brought out in the course of the pro-
ceedings at the court-martial at Devonport. In order to show the
urgent need for more experienced seamen in the Navy he would refer
to some details of the evidence given by various witnesses. Was it
not unsatisfactory that the men who were placed in the most respon-
sible positions, such as look-out men and signal men, were only
ordinary seamen ? An ordinary seaman was stationed as look-out
man at the top-masthead of the “Vanguard " who had been only
eight months in a seagoing ship. At the top-masthead of the “ Iron
Duke” there was also an ordinary seanian who, when asked how
many cables' length the “ Vanguard” was distant from the “Iron
Duke" when last seen, replied that he did not know the meaning of
the word cable. The entire management and maneuvring of a ship
by the officers in command might depend on the experience and
judgment of the men on the look-out aloft, and if they were not
efficient the gravest consequences might ensue. The case of Lieu-
tenant Evans had repeatedly been mentioned, and it must be a source
of great regret to find that a lieutenant placed in charge of one of
our most costly sbips on a critical occasion was an officer who, although
he had held a lieutenant's commission for three years, had only been
three months in a seagoing ship. The seaman placed as a look-out
on board the “ Vanguard” was an ordinary seaman, and it was in
consequence of his reporting a ship ahead that the 6 Vanguard
stopped and the collision followed. It turned out that this seaman
had been treated twice for blindness in the right eye, which was the
organ directed to the supposed ship. The state of the signal depart-
ment in the Iron Duke” was most unsatisfactory. Not only was
the officer of signals imperfectly acquainted with his duty, but the
signalman whose duty it was to report signals, and whose efficiency
depended on the full possession of the faculty of hearing, was stone
deaf in one ear. The stoking department in the Iron Duke” was
430
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
also in an inefficient state. In short, the results of the inquiry as
to the loss of the “Vanguard” had revealed the fact that there were a
great many inefficient seamen in the fleet, and we had not been
without a warning on the subject from other sources. Within the
last twelve months two very able lectures on the condition and
training of the fleet had been delivered by Captain Wilson, who had
just completed a term of three years' service as captain in charge of
the training establishments of the Royal Navy. It had been shown
that they only trained enough boys to keep up the number of seamen
voted for service in the fleet, and yet while the number of boys was
kept at the minimum the seagoing ships in commission could only
take three-fifths of those youths to sea who left the training ships,
so that the remaining two-fifths, instead of being sent to sea, were
sent to barbour ships. Having shown some of the evils of the present
system, he might be asked what remedies could be applied. The
initiation of the Flying Squadron by the right hon. gentleman the
member for Pontefract, and the annual cruise of the Channel Squadron,
which he was delighted to hear it was in contemplation to extend in
future years, were steps in the right direction. It was however to be
regretted that so many fine seamen were detained in harbour ships.
Something should be done with the view to give more training
at sea to the young seamen of the fleet. He trusted that the Ad-
miralty would feel justified in building vessels of a class well adapted
for instructing men in seamanship, and which could be attached as
tenders to our present training ships at Portsmouth and Plymouth.
It might be said that to send officers and men to sea in sailing ships
would be an imperfect preparation for service in ironclads; but many
of the qualifications that were necessary for the management of an
ironclad could be acquired in vessels that would be built, equipped,
and maintained at much less cost to the country. It had been pointed
out by the Secretary to the United States Navy, in his report in
1869, that an ironclad, which was always under steam, was a bad
school of seamanship, and that promptitude and nerve were not so
constantly brought into play as they were on board a large sailing
ship. In conclusion, he would remind the House that our Navy
presented an illusory appearance of strength, unless the seamen
voted for the service were thoroughly trained in their duties at sea.'
It will be our duty to take every precaution which science and
a thorough experience can suggest, but no naval administration can be deterred
training
by the apprehension of danger from sending young seamen afloat to
learn the duties of their calling in the school of practical experience,
and in perpetual confict with the winds and waves.
The great
Seamen
at sea,
(
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
431
.
.
commanders of past times attained to the highest degree of excel-
lence, as seamen and naval tacticians, by incessant cruising.
When Nelson landed at Gibraltar in June 1805, on his return from Lord
the famous pursuit of Villeneuve, from the Mediterranean to the Nelson.
West Indies, and from the West Indies back to the shores of
Europe, he made the following entry in his diary:—I went on shore
to-day for the first time since June 1803, and from having my foot
out of the “Victory” two years wanting ten days.' Out of fifty
years' service Lord Collingwood was actively employed forty-four Colling-
years, and was on one occasion twenty-two months at sea without drop-
ping anchor. It was by their constant practice at sea, stimulated
by the perpetual anticipation of battle, that the illustrious officers of
the great era in our Navy became such incomparable seamen.
The loss of the - Atalanta' and 'Eurydice' has shown that the Type of
ships were of a type not suited for the service for which they were ships must
selected. It does not point to the conclusion that our officers and fully consi-
seamen should be preserved from the perils of the sea by remaining
in harbour.
wood.
be care.
dered.
432
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
IV .
Mr. Gos-
chen.
• Aurora'
fitted out.
Mr. Ward
llunt.
to Lisbon.
Mr. Goschen was fully impressed by the representations that were
made to him of the necessity for providing training frigates. The
steps which were taken were described by Admiral Willes in the
discussion on Captain Wilson's paper at the United Service Institu-
tion in 1875. Mr. Goschen determined to commence a training
system, and the 'Aurora' was fitted out. There were strong preju-
dices against the system in the Navy. The 'Aurora' was paid off,
and no other ship was commissioned to take her place, although it
had originally been intended to employ two ships in the training
service, which would have taken about 600 or 800 ordinary seamen
and boys.
Mr. Ward Hunt and Mr. Smith were equally convinced of the
necessity for providing ships for the training of the large number of
boys whom it is necessary to enter to fill up the complement of
Brigs sent seamen in the Navy. It was determined, not only to send out the
training brigs in the winter to join the Channel Fleet at Lisbon, but
to provide another ship to supplement the accommodation furnished
"Eurydice,! by the brigs. The 'Eurydice' was brought forward for the service.
No risk was apprehended from the employment of that vessel.
The following extract from the Broad Arrow, of March 23, 1878,
gives expression to the general sentiment of approval with which
the course pursued by the Admiralty was regarded throughout the
Navy: Every one in the service will be glad to notice that Mr. Smith
March 23, has fully recognised the desirability, if not, the absolute necessity, for
establishing such a system of seagoing training as will be the means
of making our lads good sailors and good men. There cannot be a
doubt that much of the trouble we meet with on the part of our young
seamen is attributable to a faulty system, which keeps them loafing
about at the home ports, waiting for draft to a seagoing ship after
passing out of the training ships. That it should be possible to have
young men rated as ordinary seamen, who have never been outside
our principal ports, except for a summer cruise in a brig, is a direct
Broad
Arrow,
1878.
t
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
433
condemnation of the existing state of affairs. To establish a more
extensive training system, including such ships as the “Eurydice”
and“ Atalanta,” may cause an immediate outlay, but it will be repaid
to the country by increased efficiency in that service to which she has
to look as her first line of defence, and will be the means of retaining
many who otherwise become demoralised at the ports, and develope
into habitual leave-breakers, unable to drag themselves away from
the associations of the pothouse. Such characters are most decidedly
in the minority, but yet they do much to bring discredit upon the
service and find their way to gaol, and are often dismissed as incor-
rigible for their constant offences against naval discipline.'
VOL. IV.
F F
434
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
V.
Sailing
ships for
training.
Causes of
the loss
of the
'Eurydice.'
Atalanta'
had more
stability
thian
'Eurydice.'
In selecting sailing ships as the most suitable for the purpose of
training seamen, the Admiralty were adopting the course which had
been recommended by the finest seamen of our day both in the Royal
Navy and in the mercantile marine, and were carrying out for our
own Navy the system generally pursued by other naval Powers.
We know the cause of the loss of the “Eurydice.' She was
struck by a squall of unusual violence, and was carrying a heavy
press of canvas; but several measures might have been adopted,
which would probably have ensured the safety of the ship. If the
Eurydice' had been kept before the wind, when the squall struck
her, it is probable she might have escaped. If the lower deck ports
had been closed, she would not have capsized, even when exposed to
the full force of the squall, with the wind on the beam, and with all
sails set.
Such being the causes of the loss of the 'Eurydice,' the
Admiralty cannot be blamed for selecting for the training service
another vessel of the same class, but with much greater stability,
and which had inspired her officers, after the experience of several
commissions, with the utmost confidence. The 'Atalanta' compared
favourably with the “Eurydice' in all the elements which go to
make a ship stable and seaworthy. She measured 131 feet between
perpendiculars, 107 ft. 2 in. in length for tonnage, 40 ft. 3 in. in
breadth, 10 ft. 10 in. depth in hold, and was of 923 tons, builders'
measurement. The 'Eurydice,' on the other hand, was 141 ft. 3 in.
between perpendiculars, 117 ft. 10 in. in length for tonnage,
38 ft. 4 in. in breadth, 8 ft. 9 in. in hold, and of 921 tons, builders'
measurement.
Commenting on these figures the Times correspondent at Ports-
mouth remarked : It will thus be seen that, while the tonnage of the
ships is substantially the same, the “ Atalanta " is shorter, broader,
and deeper than her sister ship, the difference being all in her
favour.
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
435
of able
6
It has been said that the crew of trained seamen on board the Proportion
Atalanta' was not sufficient. to handle the ship in tempestuous seamen.
weather. That statement will not be confirmed by comparing the
crew of the "Atalanta' with the number of able seamen who would
be carried in a merchant ship of corresponding tonnage. This will
appear very plainly on a comparison of the complements usually
carried in large merchant ships with the crew of the · Atalanta.'
The following figures have been supplied by Mr. Heape, the
managing owner of eight iron sailing ships of 1,500 tons register,
five of which have been running for the last thirteen years, and the
other three for the last five years, from England to Australia, and
India. These ships have performed their voyages with the greatest
punctuality, and without any disaster of moment to hull, spars, or
sails. Each ship carries four officers, six apprentices, sixteen able-
sèamen, and six tradesmen, making a total of thirty-two men all
told. The area of plain sail carried by the “ Atalanta 'would probably
not amount to two-thirds of the area of plain sail carried in either of
the eight ships in question.
Mr. W. J. Williamson, the well-known shipowner of Liverpool,
gives the corresponding statistics of the dimensions and crew of the
ship ‘Lammermoor,' 1,710 tons register, belonging to Williamson,
Milligan, & Co.:-
Length
Beam
Depth
Area of canvas
4,075
.
260 feet
40
23
.
.
9
36,675 square feet
Total crew 32 all told.
In considering the causes of our recent disasters, it is impossible
to put aside altogether the fact that the 'Atalanta' and the
Eurydice' belonged to a class which had been disused in the Navy
for many years. It may, therefore, reasonably be presumed that the
younger officers do not possess the art of handling them in tem-
pestuous weather in the same perfection' as the officers of a past
generation, who were brought up in vessels of the same class. It was
stated by Mr. Blackett, an old shipmate of Sir George Elliot and Mr.
Sir Walter Tarleton, who had been four times round the Horn in a
man-of-war, and four times in merchant vessels, that his nephew,
who was the first lieutenant of the “ Atalanta,' had never been in a
sailing ship. After leaving England he had reported to his father,
Sir Edmund Blackett, that he had not taken his clothes off for
Blackett.
FF 2
436
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
a sea life.
tional
violence
of weather
in West
India
hurricanes.
Sir Allen
1881.
fifteen days, and that most of the crew had lain down on deck
suffering from sea sickness.
Dangers of There may have been some extra risk, from the circumstance
that the officers had not had experience in vessels of the same type,
but a sea life is exposed to perils which no human skill or foresight
Excep- can avert. Storms of a violence not surpassed in any part of the
world are experienced on the route, which the 'Atalanta' would
follow, on her passage from Bermuda to England. On October 17,
1780, a whole squadron, including the “Thunderer,' 74, Stirling
Castle,' 64, ' Defiance,' 64, ' Phenix,' 44, 'La Blanche,' 32, ' Laurel,
28, Shark,' 28, Andromeda, 28, Deal Castle,' 24, Penelope,' 24,
Scarborough,' 20, 'Barbadoes,' 14, Chameleon, 14, ‘Endeavour,
14, and · Victor,' 10 guns, were lost in the same storm in the West
Indies.
The extreme violence of the weather experienced by the
Young.
* Atalanta' is conclusively established in the letters addressed to
the Times by Admiral Richards and Sir Allen Young, and by the
investigations of the Hydrographer.
Speech of The loss of the 6 Atalanta' was discussed in the House of
compiler,
August
Commons on August 14, 1881, on a motion by Mr. Jenkins. In
replying, on behalf of the Admiralty, the compiler spoke as
follows:-
He had been asked to reply on behalf of the Admiralty to the
observations which had been addressed to the House by the hon.
member for Penryn (Mr. Jenkins), and he trusted that it would
not be thought that the important statement which had been made
was treated with disrespect, because the task of replying to it had
been entrusted to a subordinate member of the administration. With
reference to the speech which had fallen from his right hon. and
gallant friend (Sir John Hay), he should leave the main points
which he had raised to be dealt with by his hon. friend the Secre-
tary to the Admiralty, in the observations which he was about to
Eficiency make on the shipbuilding policy of the Government. He would,
of personnel however, say a word or two with reference to the personnel of the
Navy. Navy. His right hon. and gallant friend had not expressed all the
confidence which he had hoped every officer entertained in the
naval service of the present day. He quoted Captain Shaw, the
Superintendent of the London Fire Brigade, as his authority for
saying that the seamen of the Navy had deteriorated. In answer to
Captain Shaw he (Sir Thomas Brassey) would rely on the opinions of
Admiral Hood. That gallant officer, speaking with the experience
acquired in his command of the Channel Fleet, had, in a recent inter-
of the
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
437
view with Lord Northbrook, commended in the highest terms the
seamen of the Fleet. With reference to the Royal Naval Reserve,
the right hon. and gallant gentleman opposite seemed to question
its efficiency; but, from reliable information in the possession of the
Admiralty, he (Sir Thomas Brassey) was in a position to state that
the Royal Naval Reserve was never in a more efficient condition than
at the present time. He believed there had never been so little
difficulty in keeping up the number of the Force. So far from there
being any difficulty in this respect, they had recently had applica-
tions for the enrolment of men of exceptional qualifications in excess
of the number provided for in the votes. The Liverpool Committee
of Shipowners and Masters, who for many years had been engaged in
considering measures for the improvement of the merchant seamen,
had recently dissolved. In their final report they had placed on
record a gratifying conviction that a great improvement had taken
place in the crews of our merchant ships. He would remind the
House that the facilities for training seamen were now brought to a
degree of development and efficiency which had never been reached
in former years. At the principal ports training ships had been
established, from which a large number of boys were supplied to the
mercantile marine. They had heard on a recent occasion of the
prosperous condition of the shipping enterprise of the country. Those
who were anxious for the maintenance of seamanship in the merchant
service must learn with satisfaction that the investment of money in
sailing ships was at least as remunerative as in steam vessels.
In turning to the motion of the hon. member for Penryn (Mr. Sailing
Jenkins), it was not necessary to trouble the House with any lengthy commended
observations. It was not for him (Sir Thomas Brassey) to vindicate
ing.
the conduct of the late Board of Admiralty in selecting the 'Atalanta'
as a training ship. In all that they did they were acting under the
most competent naval advice, and naval opinion was strongly in favour
of sailing ships for making seamen. The officers of the Navy were not
. singular in their views. In the mercantile marine the experience in
sailing ships was held in equal estimation. The principles of training
in sailing ships having been accepted, it might be asked whether the
• Atalanta 'was suitable for the service. On this point it was suffi-
cient to observe that, in former commissions, embracing a vast extent
of ocean navigation, she had been highly commended as a stable,
lively, and buoyant vessel in heavy weather.
Passing on to that which concerned the present Admiralty, the Committee
of inquiry.
duty which devolved on them was that of appointing a committee
of inquiry. They had nothing to conceal. They were resolved that
vessels re-
for train-
438
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
the inquiry should be searching and impartial, and they confidently
maintained that the committee they appointed was fairly consti-
tuted, and that it combined with the naval element an able and
independent representation of outside opinion. The inquiry was
exhaustive. The report was signed by every member of the com-
mittee, and it pronounced the 'Atalanta' to have been sound, stable,
well manned, and well commanded. With such a report before
them the Admiralty were not called upon to punish or to censure any
officers, whether executive or professional, who were responsible for
the selection or equipment of the ship.
Cost of
The heavy expenditure on repairs had been sharply criticised,
repairs of
Atalanta.'
and it must be admitted that if such an outlay could have been
anticipated it would have been preferable to have built a new
ship. The first estimate for the repair of the 'Atalanta’ was
11,0001.; the revised estimate was 16,0001. The actual cost of
the first repair was 19,0001., and subsequent alterations brought up
the total amount to 28,0001. The increase on the original estimate
was lamentable, but it was stated on behalf of the Controller's
department that a new ship of the same type would have cost
36,0001. The liability to great and unforeseen expenses was doubt-
less an objection to fitting out any old wooden ship for renewed
service at sea.
In the case of the Atalanta'the expenditure was
distributed over a lengthened period. It was divided between three
dockyards, and no single individual was responsible for what had oc-
curred.
He would not hazard a conjecture as to the cause of the loss
of the · Atalanta.' It was certain that the vessel had encountered a
hurricane of extraordinary severity; and seamen well knew how
fearfully the ordinary phenomena of bad weather are intensified in
those great tempests which are encountered only at intervals of years.
He need not pursue further the painful subject of the loss of the
* Atalanta.' Before passing to other topics he would take the oppor-
tunity of expressing on behalf of the Admiralty and the nation their
sincere and heartfelt sympathy with the widows and the orphans who
had been left desolate by the disaster.
Gcncral He now turned to the general subject of the training of sea-
subject of
training.
No member was more entitled than his hon. friend to ad-
dress the House on the subject. He spoke with the experience
of a successful shipowner and a former commander of merchant
ships. The Navy would value the opinion of a seaman who had
received his training in what he might call the sister service. His
hon. friend had said that he shared the general opinion that the
Extreme
severity of
weather.
men.
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
439
art of handling a ship under canvas was a valuable, if not essen-
tial, part of a naval education. At the same time, he recognised the
importance of steam in combination with canvas as an additional
guarantee for safety. Such being the views of his hon. friend, he
claimed his general approval for the ships in which the majority of
our seamen are now serying. We had at present in commission one
large frigate, the "Inconstant,' and nineteen corvettes, some of which
far exceeded in size and power the frigates of former days. We had
thirteen sloops and one sailing sloop, the. Cruiser,' which was doing
excellent work in the Mediterranean. He was giving expression to
his personal opinion when he said that he hoped that another vessel
like the Cruiser' might hereafter be added to the Mediterranean
squadron. We had also five brigs, which were most useful for
training purposes, attached to the home ports. On the last occasion
when the Board visited the dockyards they saw the squadron of brigs
weigh anchor in Plymouth Sound, and execute in admirable style a
series of intricate evolutions under sail. The present Board were
determined to keep up the seanianship of the British Navy in a
manner worthy of its ancient reputation. They had fitted out a flying
squadron, and transferred large numbers of seamen from the barracks
at Sheerness and the receiving ships at the home ports to seagoing
ships. They would take care to supply the Navy with ships which
would be efficient under steam and sail. They would spare no
pains to improve not only the ships but the system of training.
They knew that they were watched by competent critics, and he
thanked his hon. friends the members for Banff and Penryn for
their interesting and suggestive speeches.
The following communications, addressed to the editor of the Admiral
Times, by Admiral Rous, in December 1875 and February 1876, will
be read with interest in connection with the questions raised by the
loss of the Eurydice and the 'Atalanta':-.
“When I was midshipman of His Majesty's ship “ Bacchante,” in Letter,
December 1812, I took a trabaccolo of 80 tons, deeply laden with December
rice and planks, from off Ancona to Malta. Off the coast of Manfre- 1876.
donia I was caught in an easterly gale; heavy seas washed away part
of the bulwarks, all the planks off her deck, my cask of water, and
my only binnacle and compass. Our hatches were well battened
down, the sea breaking over us. I got her before the wind with a storm
forestaysail, and having only 40 miles to run on a lee shore, where
we should have been knocked into toothpicks, I towed a heavy
grapnel with 70 fathoms of hawser to deaden her way and prolong
our lives. Getting near the high land the gale broke, and I groped
Rous.
440
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
February
1876.
my way to Malta in three days. I had four seamen, one of whom fell
overboard and was drowned, and four prisoners of war. If I had been
brought up by steam I should have been food for dogfishes in 1812.
Three years ago I recommended the Admiralty to attach sailing
tenders to every flagship, brig, or corvette, without steam power,
that young men might be taught to be seamen, not sailors. They
prefer an establishment at. Greenwich where they may be taught
gunnery and mathematics, but neither of these sciences will teach
them to save their ships in a gale of wind on a lee shore, or will
make them fit to command a sailing ship.'
Admiral Rous returned to the same subject in a letter addressed
to the Times in the following year :-
'You did me the honour to publish three letters in 1871 on the
state of Her Majesty's Navy. They foreshadowed the numerous
catastrophes, which have since occurred, singularly remarkable for
the ignorant indifference to avoid danger and an apathy and want of
energy to attempt to save the ship. These accidents will occur again
and again, owing to the want of seamanship, which cannot be in a
worse state, and to the faulty education of the young officers.
* To illustrate this assertion, take a fine intelligent lad, well versed
in navigation and mathematics, who has passed a brilliant examina-
tion. Appoint him to a ship of the Gladiator "class, without masts.
What can he learn afloat? He serves his time ; passes for seaman-
ship (Heaven only knows how !), probably because both parties have
crude notions on the subject, and he is made lieutenant, knowing no
more of the art of handling a ship than a lady’s-maid who has
crossed half-a-dozen times between Dover and Calais. He is ap-
pointed to a ship, and, as the officer of the watch on a squally night
under canvas, 500 lives are at his mercy-for instance, the “ Captain
was capsized; because the .lieutenant did not know how to lower his
topsails, or even to let go a lee topsail sheet.
* As a naval Power is not estimated by the size and number of its
ships, but by the superior skill of its officers and by the pluck and
courage of its seamen and marines, let us examine our resources. We
have lost a great source of recruiting the Navy from the mercantile
marine, owing to the abolition of the Navigation Laws introduced by
Oliver Cromwell, to whom we are most indebted for our naval supe-
riority. These laws compelled British merchant ships to be manned
by British subjects, and to employ apprentices according to the
amount of tonnage. If this law could be revived, it would in a few
years add 40,000 men to our list of seamen.
• English merchantmen employ foreigners to the amount of three-
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
441
Seaman.
fifths, and I observe that in an English merchantman, when the
captain and two mates were murdered, there was only one English-
man among the crew. We may congratulate ourselves that the
seamen on board Her Majesty's ships are better educated, more
amenable to firm and steady discipline, because tbey are not addicted
to drunkenness. They are the men, above all others, to make first-
class seamen, and when well commanded they will fight against all
perils and dangers to the last gasp ; and here I must remark that
the training establishments for boys deserve national encouragement.
Double the number of ships of instruction should be added ; that is,
working in the right groove. The conduct of the boys, when the
“ Blenheim" was in flames, proves that the breed is as plucky as
ever.
Howard
* To regenerate the Navy, and to make young officers seamen, a
flying squadron of small sailing ships should be constructed. They
should be kept always on the move, visiting every port on both sides
of the Atlantic. If they can work and manæuvre well under canvas
they will have no difficulty under steam. In this squadron midship-
men should serve their first three years, and work with the mizen-top
men so as to be taught the duties of
“My old captain, Sir W. Hoste, told us, “Never order a man to
perform a duty aloft which you can't do yourself," I know no better
advice to midshipmen.'
Another high authority may be quoted in support of the same Sir
view. Sir Howard Douglas was a contemporary of Admiral Rous. Douglas
.
Like him, he had had an opportunity of comparing the sailing navy
with the steam navy. He knew the limited capability of the sailing
ship, and the new power and resources which steam had given to the
seamen;
he knew with what excellent effect sail could be used as an
auxiliary to the steam power; and he knew the enervating tendencies
of habitual dependence on steam. In his volume on Naval Warfare
quith Steam, Sir Howard Douglas paid the following well-merited
tribute to a fine feat of seamanship performed by the fleet under Sir
Sidney Dacres :-
'No more striking illustration of the importance of good seaman-
ship can be offered than that which recently appeared in the columns
of the Times, where the passage of the Channel Fleet from Queens-
town to Portland, during that fearful storm in which the “Royal
Charter” was wrecked (October, 1859) is graphically described. This
appears to have been one of the most violent tornadoes that has
been experienced on our coasts; but, by sail and steam, through the
nautical skill of the officers, nobly seconded by the devoted exertions
442
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
1858.
Cunard
and
Orieutal.
of the seamen, during showers of hail and sleet, the fleet, preserving
the order of battle, happily arrived at the destined port. Professional
skill alone carried the fleet safely through those 24 hours of peril.'
Admiralty Still, looking to the opinions of officers, who had gained their
Committee,
early experience in the Navy before the introduction of steam, the
Committee appointed by the Admiralty in 1853 to inquire into the
manning of the Navy recommended in their report, - that a portion of
the inexperienced first-class boys, who will, probably, in future be
more numerous at the ports than at present, should, when convenient,
form a part of the crews of the school brigs; and that, for this
purpose, an additional brig be fitted out, to be attached to the Scotch
station, which, in a further part of our report, we submit should be
re-established.'
As a proof that experience in a sailing ship is the best preparation
Company.
for the command of ships of the largest class, I may mention that it
is a rule of the Cunard service that no officer can be promoted from
the grade of second mate to that of chief mate, until he has been
during two years the master of a sailing ship. With the same
Peninsular object in view, the Peninsular and 'Oriental Company employed one
of their largest steamers, which had been converted into a sailing
ship, to send out stores and coals to their depôts at Aden and Bombay,
for the express purpose of giving an opportunity of training a number
of young officers as seamen in the best and only complete school of
training, namely, a sailing ship.
The importance of training seamen in sailing ships has been
frequently insisted upon in eloquent but not exaggerated terms in
the columns of the Pall Mall Gazette. The following passage
occurred in an article on the lessons to be learned from the loss of
the Vanguard':-“The frigate of old was the least mechanical thing
that ever proceeded from the hands of man. She was almost a thing
of life, and was studied, and humoured, and talked of, and thought
of as an animated being. It was easier to idealise her than to
idealise one's native land. The language of poetry was not strained
when a man called his ship his bride, and we know how much it was
his bome. Human nature being the compound that it is, a creature
which inspired that kind of interest must also have inspired a more
jealous, prompt, and eager care than the edifice that has replaced her.
The feelings she evoked and sustained can no more be transferred to
the mechanical steam-pots of our day, than the helpful goodfellow-
ship of man and horse can flourish on a bicycle. You cannot look
upon a hawk, so beautifully made to swoop, and fight, and fly, with-
out feeling the stir of its animation in your own spirit. The oyster,
Pall Mull
Guzette.
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
443
beautifully constructed for defence, excites no sympathetic emotion
whatever; and though our ships of war are not all like oysters, they
are all too much like that animal for sentimental purposes, and too
little like the winged and seemingly sentient ship of old. In short,
the steam-pot (in the first place) gives far fewer opportunities for the
development and exercise of the great sea qualities before mentioned;
and not only so, but it is incapable of inspiring the attachment that
would instantly call them out in its behalf in time of peril.
But ships are not stocking factories, and however they are built, they
must live and fight amidst constantly varying conditions of danger,
and must rely at last upon the watchfulness, the alacrity, the instant
resource, that seem to be disappearing from amongst the most intel-
lectual and highly-trained body of naval officers in the world.'
Sailing ships are used, as it has been said, by all foreign navies French
Navy.
for the training of seamen. In the French Navy, since 1875, two
sailing ships have been employed for the training of top-men and
quartermasters. It has long been the practice in the French Navy
to send out the young aspirants on voyages of instruction in a vessel,
or rather, in vessels, which have successively borne the time-honoured
name of ‘Jean Bart.' Two years since, it was proposed to discontinue
this practice, but the suggestion was overruled, and the present
Government has continued the old practice. The 'Jean Bart'starts
every year from Brest, with its complement of young aspirants. The
route ordinarily selected is by the Canary Islands to Teneriffe, thence
to Dakar, in Senegal, Bahia, Rio Janeiro, and the Cape of Good
Hope, returning to Lisbon; thus the future officers of the Navy make
a voyage of six months' duration, and visit some of the most remark-
able points of the globe. In the German Navy the boys, on their German
Navy.
first enlistment, spend the summer months on board training brigs,
which cruise in the Baltic.
No nation perhaps is so little wedded to worn-out traditions of the Sailing
past as the people of the United States, and nowhere have they training.
shown their readiness to accept innovations, which seem to be United
required by the peculiar exigencies of the hour, so freely as in the Navy.
sphere of maritime enterprise. Towards the close of the great war
they produced a new class of frigates, with which our own vessels,
with the glorious exception of the duel between the Shannon' and
Chesapeake,' were unable to contend. They introduced the
clipper ship into their mercantile marine. They constructed for the
navigation of their estuaries and rivers side-wheel steamers of an
original type, and exceeding both in speed and dimensions the
largest constructions of the old world. For the fierce struggle, which
ther
444
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
1
was waged on their coasts and rivers with the Southern States, the
Northerners produced a flotilla of double-enders and monitors; and
both sides employed for harbour defence the stationary torpedo and
the torpedo boat. All these inventions were more or less unknown,
and certainly untried before. But the people of the United States
did not hesitate to throw aside the old matériel of naval war, and to
use the weapons that were best adapted to the service required.
When the war was ended, and the naval forces were once more
employed in the duties which belonged to a time of peace, the train-
ing of officers and men being by far the most important of those
duties, what classes and types of ships were fitted out in the United
States ? Not the monitors, which had been found so effective during
the war, but fully rigged unarmoured frigates and sloops, presenting
a closer resemblance to the merchant clippers than the men-of-war of
any other naval Power,--vessels capable of being handled readily
without the aid of steam, and constituting for that reason the best
school of training for inexperienced officers and men. The American
officers are as strongly convinced as Admiral Rous himself, that the
habit of relying on steam power tends to the deterioration of seamen.
The Secretary to the United States Navy, in his report for 1869,
expressed a strong opinion that an ironclad which was always under
steam was a bad school of seamanship, and that promptitude and
nerve, qualities so essential in naval battle, were not so constantly
brought into play as they were on board a large sailing ship. In his
annual report to the Secretary of the United States Navy in 1870,
Admiral Porter declared that since 1846 the quality of their seamen
had fallen off, as well as the quantity; and he reminded the Adminis-
tration that it was in 1846 that steam was first introduced into the
American Navy, Admiral Porter recommended vessels of from 1,400
to 1,600 tons as more desirable for foreign service in time of peace
than unwieldy ironclads. In time of war the same vessels may be
very destructive to an enemy's commerce.
The same opinions are shared by the younger officers of the
United States. In a paper on Naval Education, which appeared in
October, 1879, in The United Service, an American monthly pro-
fessional journal, Lieutenant Frederic Collier, of the United States
Navy, says: 'Seamanship is now just what it always has been, and
always must be. There is only one school in which it can be acquired,
and that is afloat under canvas. The officer, skilful in handling
his ship under sail, can make no failure with her under steam, while
the “steam seaman,” when his engines are disabled, will be helpless
and hopeless. Neither the differential calculus nor dynamical
Lieu-
tenant
Collier,
U.S.A.
*
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
445
States
study will enable an officer to manage his ship in a gale of wind, or
in action. He must neither overlook nor undervalue plain duties
while studying mathematics and philosophy."
In the United States Navy, a new and complete system of train- United
ing, framed after the English model, has been established. In his Navy.
report for 1878–79, the Secretary of the United States Navy recom-
mended that the sailing ships Constitution,' • Saratoga,' and
• Portsmouth 'should be retained for the purpose of training. These
vessels,' he says, “are among the last of our sailing vessels, and are
peculiarly adapted to the purpose of training the boys in the
handling of sails, and bringing them to a knowledge of seamanship.
I would recommend that during the winter the “Constitution” be
stationed at New York, the “Portsmouth” at Philadelphia, and the
“Saratoga" at Baltimore, or at such other ports as the Department
may direct, and that, during the summer, these vessels should com-
bine for a cruise, and exercise in our own waters, under the command
of the senior officers.'
446
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION,
VI.
Previous
to the
loss of
'Eurydice:
our train-
ing ships
successful.
Broad
Arrow,
1874, on
Having shown that the opinions of our own officers have been
unanimous in favour of sailing ships, and that it bas been the general
practice of foreign navies to employ them for the training of seamen,
it is further to be observed that, until the unhappy loss of the ‘Eury-
dice' occurred, our training vessels had been eminently successful.
In September, 1874, the Broad Arrow gave the following highly
September satisfactory report of the training, as carried out in the squadron of
brigs under the personal supervision of Captain Wilson :--
training
ships.
"At the present time, the five vessels so employed consist of the
“ Seaflower," the “Martin," the “Sealark," the “Liberty," and
the “Squirrel." These brigs average about 400 tons. They are
sailing vessels without any steam aid, and depend, therefore, entirely
on their sails for their motive power.
According to the size of the brig so her complement of boys
varies, but about one hundred are usually sent on board the larger
vessels. A dozen able seamen are on board each vessel, whose duty
is to instruct the boys in various details, and to aid in the navigation
of the brigs.
. During about seven months each year, these brigs are at sea
usually cruising about the Channel, and making trips from one part
of Great Britain to another. Lately, all the brigs under the command
of Captain Wilson, R.N., of the “Impregnable," have made a trip
to the east coast of Scotland, and have had their mettle tried in the
North Sea. The boys remain on board the vessels at sea about two
months, during which time they gain a very fair practical knowledge
of seamanship, but, considering the importance of the knowledge and
training imparted to them, we believe four months instead of two
would be a much more suitable period for their sea service.
- About
fifteen hundred boys are thus each year trained on board the brigs,
and form, to a great extent, the future seamen of the Navy."?
Brigs in When the squadron, composed of four brigs, visited the port of
Liverpool,
Liverpool, the manner in which they were handled by their crews,
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
447
Wilson in
command
ments
mainly composed of hoys, elicited the warm admiration of the sea-
faring community. The brigs went out of the Mersey under sail,
affording a spectacle rarely witnessed, now that tugs are almost in-
variably employed.
The example afforded by Captain Wilson, while in charge of the Captain
training service of the Navy, in taking the brigs under his personal personal
command for an extended cruise on the coast of the United Kingdom, of brig
might be followed with great advantage by the captains, who may saptains in
from time to time be appointed to superintend the training estab- charge of
lishments of the Navy. I would venture to suggest for consideration establish-
that instructions to that effect should be issued by the Admiralty. should
Periodical inspections by the Port Admirals would also be of great cruise with
advantage, in keeping all concerned thoroughly up to their work.
Admiral Farquhar, when Commander-in-Chief at Devonport, on one
occasion took the brig squadron, consisting of the “Sealark,'' Liberty,'
Martin,' and 'Nautilus' under his orders, and hoisting his flag on
the Sealark,' went into the Channel to see for himself how the boys
went through their practical seamanship, and how the brigs were
handled in a stiff breeze.
The inspiring influence of emulation should be brought to bear
as far as possible on the training service. For this purpose the brigs
should be brought together and formed into a squadron under the
personal command of the Captain Superintendent. The best cruising
ground would probably be in Torbay. Sailing matches between the
brigs should also be encouraged under proper regulations. In 1872,
a most interesting sailing match took place in Torbay, between the
'Martin,'' Racer, Squirrel,' and 'Sealark.'
While the brigs have met with general approval for the training Cruiser
of seamen on our own coasts, we have been equally successful in the
training vessel for ordinary seamen attached to the Mediterranean
Fleet. A naval correspondent of the Times, in a letter dated
Prinkipo, August 26, 1878, speaks of the Cruiser' in the highest
terms:— The little “ Cruiser" has come and gone, having success-
fully passed the Dardanelles under sail, the only man-of-war probably
that has done so since the Crimean war. She is the training ship for
òrdinary seamen, and is a most valuable adjunct to the fleet. Never
more than aday or so in harbour, always at sea cruising about under sail,
exercising the men aloft, her officers and permanent crew are, per-
haps, the hardest worked people in the fleet. She is barque-rigged,
and with her taunt and raking masts, neat rigging, and white sails,
formed a graceful contrast to that ugly duckling, the “ Devastation,"
near which she lay at anchor, while with the squadron at Prinkipo.
in Mediter-
ranean.
448
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
The “Cruiser” is deservedly a favourite with the Commander-in-
Chief, for she does a great deal of valuable work, and is justly con-
sidered to have as smart a set of officers as any in the service.
Sailing
ships give
the best
training
for searnan-
ship.
“The “Cruiser” was originally a steam corvette ; but, as men-of-
war at the time she was built were intended to make as much use of
their sails as their engines, her hull differs in no respect from that
of a ship built for sailing alone. The screw-well being filled up and
an increased grip given to the cutwater, all traces of her former
character as a steam ship have been completely removed. The
removal of the engines and boilers has given a great increase of
accommodation, and she is altogether a very comfortable little craft.'
It cannot be questioned that sailing ships of moderate dimensions,
such as those employed by the United States Navy, give an excellent
preparatory training for the many responsible duties to be performed
in an ironclad. Sea habits, a knowledge of navigation and pilotage,
vigilance on the watch at night, and other qualifications, can be much
more thoroughly mastered in a handy ship, which is always under
way, than in an ironclad, which is generally at anchor.
In the naval profession the utmost vigilance and fertility of re-
source will from time to time be required, even in the most power-
ful steam ship. The emergencies must, however, be rare in such a
vessel when these high qualities will be required, and the normal
condition of dependence on machinery, the management of which is
not under the direct control of the deck officer, is probably the worst
preparation for a situation of grave and sudden peril. In a sailing
ship, where the force of the breeze is ever varying, ceaseless watchful-
ness is required in order to make good progress under sail; while
the prompt preparations for every threatening squall will cultivate in
the seaman all those moral qualities, which will enable him to grapple
with storm and tempest, or to face the dangers of battle.
It has been well said by Admiral Jurien de la Gravière in La
Marine d'autrefois : En vain l'art se transforme; quel que soit le
moteur, l'énergie morale qui en fera l'emploi n'en gardera pas moins
toute son importance. La Marine a son côté technique ; elle a aussi,
qu'on me passe cette expression, son côté humain. Le premier se
modifie sans cesse, le second ne saurait vieillir.'
Jurien
de la
Gravière.
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
449
VII.
Frederick
It was with a view of giving to the Navy the most complete and Flying
practical training, that Mr. Childers despatched a flying squadron squadror.s.
under Admiral Hornby on a voyage round the world. It was an
innovation on the long-established practice of the Navy of which
many officers disapproved. The views of the older officers are repre-
sented in the following extract from a letter received from Sir
Frederick Grey
Mr. Childers, on his accession to office, announced, as part of Sir
his policy, the reduction of the squadrons on foreign stations, and Grey.
the employment of a flying squadron, giving as a reason that officers
and men would thus have increased practice at sea. On this point I
venture to differ from him. I have the best reason for knowing that
even under the present popular commander of the flying squadron,
the service is disliked by both officers and men, while the result of
the last cruise was in every way bad. The health of the men was
impaired, desertion occurred to an unprecedented extent, and, at the
breaking out of the war on the Continent, the services of the ships
were not available, and, if required, would have been lost for a long
period.
‘But, even admitting that some experience was gained in fleet
sailing, I cannot think that, as a school for young officers, it was half
as good a one as that offered by ships on foreign stations. In them
officers have to act much more frequently on their own responsibility,
to take their ships in and out of harbour, and to show their skill in
making passages, often through intricate channels and difficult navi-
gation. Small vessels on foreign stations also supplied the means of
employing and training for command many more young commanding
officers than can now be employed. I hold it to be essential that our
force in peace time should be on such a scale, and so employed, as to
give to a sufficient number of officers and men that practice and that
education in seamanship, which are necessary for securing to us
skilled seamen in time of war, and this object is best attained by the
VOL. IV.
G G
450
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Admiral
Willes.
Admiral
Lalande.
employment of small vessels on foreign stations, and of squadrons
of large ships in the Channel and Mediterranean for evolutions.
That the flying squadron was not a particularly agreeable service
may be readily understood. The task of training young seamen is,
as Admiral Willes remarked, a very disagreeable work for the com-
mander and officers, but, as be truly said, what are they for in peace
time but to train men so as to be ready in case of war ? This view
of the duty of the Navy and Army in time of peace is, we know,
generally accepted in the military organisation of the great Conti-
nental Powers.
The efficient system of training, now established in the French
Navy, was initiated by Admiral Lalande, to whom must be attributed
the merit of having been the first to restore the efficiency of the
French Navy after the prostration of the great war.
When in com-
mand he kept his crews so constantly at drill, that M. Xavier
Raymond remarks that the English, who could not have got so much
work out of their crews, made cutting observations on the eternal
repetition of those monotonous drills. They used to ask when these
scholars would have finished their education. One day Sir Charles
Napier answered, “Que ces écoliers étaient passés maîtres.' Admiral
Lalande was one of those zealous, considerate, and popular officers,
for whom subordinates are willing to perform acts of self-denial and
devotion, which would be refused to a leader less capable of inspiring
the same enthusiasm. To use the happy phrase of M. Xavier
Raymond, 'Il savait rendre aimable l'austérité du devoir.' The same
vigorous system of training is still continued in the French Navy.
Examples are not wanting in our own service of the same zealous
training of devotion to the irksome task of drilling and training the Navy. The
hard work done in the Mediterranean fleet during the Eastern crisis
is thus described in the Broad Arrow:-
Hornby.
Admiral Hornby has always been known as one of the smartest
officers in the service, and if amongst some of his men he has not
always been the most popular, it is because he keeps them so hard
at work. With untiring energy himself, he abominates idlers and
skulkers, and accordingly we learn that in every branch of their pro-
fessional duties the crews of the ships under his command are being
constantly exercised. Drill-drill-drill-sail drill, cutlass drill,
small arms drill, great gun drill, torpedo drill-everything that it
befits a man-of-war's man to know and to be proficient in, Admiral
Hornby requires his officers to be unremitting in their exertions to
teach ; and it is not too much to say that should his squadron be
called into action, it will be equal, if not superior, in efficiency to any
Broad
the feet
under
Admiral
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
451
feet that has ever sailed under the British flag. It is well formed,
wellmanned, well officered, and superbly commanded.'
English crews will probably be most effectually stimulated to Training in
squadrons.
exertion by the spirit of emulation. Training-ships should not be
employed as single ships, but should be forined into squadrons.
Admiral Porter, of the United States Navy, recommends to the
American Naval Administration more sailing in squadrons. Nothing,
he says, 'improves a fleet so much as the ships acting together. By
comparison they are brought to perfection, and each ship in the fleet
can adopt whatever is good in another. In his report for 1870, he
said that the practice squadron on the American coast would serve
the twofold purpose of a school for officers and men. With a practice
squadron under an energetic command a fine class of seamen could
be brought forward for the Navy. The importance of the officers
becoming familiarised with their own coasts could not be over-esti-
mated.
The general opinion in the French Navy is certainly strongly in Jurien
favour of the system of cruising initiated in our own Navy by Mr. Gravière.
Childers. Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, in La Marine d'Aujourd'hui,
makes the following observations on this question
“Si limités que puissent être les crédits qu'on nous accordera, je
voudrais toujours en consacrer la majeure partie à l'instruction de nos
officiers et à celle de nos équipages. On a imaginé bien des besoins
maritimes factices, des stations destinées à protéger un commerce
qui souvent n'existe pas, des surveillances diplomatiques qui ne ré-
solvent pas la plupart du temps les complications qu'elles font naître.
Ce qu'il y a de plus sérieux dans les armements de paix, c'est, à mon
sens, ce qui peut préparer de bons armements pour la guerre. Les
stations navales ne sont pas seulement inutiles, elles sont cruelles.
Dans la vie d'un officier, au coeur de sa jeunesse, elles prennent
parfois trois ou quatre années pour le vouer, sous un climat insalubre,
à l'absence. On a proposé de remplacer la station par la circulation.
C'est le voeu général de la marine, j'y adhère sans réserve.
This passage is followed by some observations, which, although of
a general character, will not be out of place in any section of this
Memorandum.
If a cadet, on leaving the school ship, were entrusted to his care,
this is the course of training through which Admiral de la Gravière
recommends that he should pass. He should begin with two or three
voyages round the world. This would make him a sailor, but he
would still have something to learn. There should be a school of
pilotage, as of artillery and seamanship. In cruising between Bayonne
* G G 2
VOL. IV.
452
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Objections
to extended
voyages.
Flying
squadron,
and Dunkirk, the difficulties are sufficient to afford the means of
acquiring a thorough knowledge of the art of pilotage. Having
reached the rank of lieutenant, the young officer would be ready for
the great school, in which every kind of knowledge is applied, and
the squadron of evolutions is the source in which the martial spirit
of officers and crews of the French Navy has always been stimulated
and revived.
It would probably be admitted that the liability to desertion in
the Australian colonies, and the prolonged absence of a large body of
men, who may be possibly required for service in the fleet, through
some sudden and unforeseen political complication, constitute objec-
tions to the plan of sending away a large flying squadron on a voyage
of circumnavigation. In a more limited voyage, to Madeira, Rio, and
the Cape, and back to England, ample experiences for the purpose of
training may be gained. At the ports visited, few temptations would
be offered to desertion, and the extension of the submarine telegraph
would bring the fleet into frequent communication with the Admiralty.
A flying squadron affords by far the best practical training for
the young officers and seamen of the Navy. Such a squadron should
be fitted out every year, and the ships should be sufficiently numer-
ous to take to sea all the seamen whose training is not completed,
and for whom employment cannot be found in ships commissioned
for the ordinary duties of the Navy. The 'Inconstant,'‘Shah,' and
Raleigh 'would form a noble flying squadron.
These ships carry large crews, are heavily rigged, and sail well.
They are admirably adapted for ocean cruising, and for training sea-
men. They cannot be regarded as battle-ships, and they are too large
for the protection of commerce. In a flying squadron they would find
their appropriate place. A flying squadron should consist of ships of
similar type, and they should be as nearly as may be equal in their
sailing qualities. A frigate of the Inconstant' type is heavily
handicapped when sailing in company with a corvette of the 'Gem'
class. In the recent cruise under the Earl of Clanwilliam the
Inconstant' went round the world under her topsails, while the
corvettes with every stitch of canvas set could with difficulty keep
their station. It is wearisome to the crews of fast ships to be held
back by the dull sailers of the squadron.
With proper arrangements the training of our young seamen
may be sufficiently provided for in the flying squadron. The pro-
posal therefore to attach tenders to the barracks and receiving ships
is supplementary and subordinate in importance.
The training-ships, which I should propose to attach to the home
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
453
class.
to officers.
ports, should be vessels of the Cruiser' class, from which the Tenders to
machinery might be removed when the boilers are condemned as Cruiser »
unfit for further service. In case no such vessels should be at present
available in the Navy, sailing ships of the best types could be pur-
chased from the mercantile marine at from 151. to 201. a ton. It is
true that such vessels would not be available for war service; but the
same criticism may be equally applied to the brigs, which we are now
building for the training service.
It may be thought that the experience gained in a small sailing
ship would be an imperfect preparation for the command of an iron-
clad; but it will be admitted by naval Officers that the sea habits
acquired in the vessels proposed would be a pure gain, as compared
with the long detention in a harbour ship. The younger officers of Advantage
the Navy would derive as much benefit as the seamen under their
command from the additional opportunities of cruising thus afforded.
The views of Sir Beauchamp Seymour on this subject are explained Sir Beau-
in the following letter, dated Her Majesty's ship Minotaur,' Vigo, Seymour.
December 12, 1875 :
'I have just read your letter in the Times of the 4th. I so
entirely agree in much which you say that I cannot resist the
temptation of writing to you. Especially do I go with you as to the
last paragraph of your letter. Seamanship can only be kept up by
constant practice, and it cannot be kept up at all if only acquired
theoretically. It would, therefore, be everything, if we had the means
of sending the sub-lieutenants and ordinary seamen, who are now
deteriorating in every way in the home ports, to sea to learn their
profession; and the Admiralty have taken the initiative in this
respect by sending out five brigs manned by ordinary seamen, which
will come under my orders next week; but these brigs have to return
to England in February or March, in order to revert to their ordinary
duties of training boys. We have got rid of all the sailing craft
which formerly filled our seaports. If, therefore, we are to carry out
the system you and I advocate, we must go into the market and buy
vessels, as we have none of our own available. I would have them
of about seven hundred or eight hundred tons (old register), ship
rigged, and to carry only eight or ten six-pounders on deck. Five
or six of these vessels would do our work; and if the sub-lieute-
nants, instead of being crowded at Greenwich, were to be avail-
able for service in these and other sea-going vessels, it would be
much better for them and for the Navy in general. Not that I would
do away with the Greenwich course, far from it, but instead of
going through it as sub-lieutenants, every officer on being promoted
454
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Numbers
in harbour
ships.
to lieutenant should in peace time be compelled to go to the college
for a year.'
The figures, quoted by Commodore Wilson, may be compared
with the returns for June 1, 1880. At that date we had in harbour
ships and first reserve ships-
Harbour and
First Reserye
Ships
Sca-going Ships
and Foreigu
Service
Total
Petty officers
Leading and able seamen
Ordinary seamen
1,774
5,190
1,496
2,390
5,032
4,118
4,164
10,222
5,614
Total
8,460
11,540
20,000
Number of
boys on
depôt.
In July 1875, the date of the paper read by Commodore Wilson,
we had, “in sea-going vessels 10,500, in harbour ships 8,000 blue-
jackets of man's rate, and we learn from the same source that the
average age of entry of the boys is sixteen years, that they are two
years from the date of entry until they are rated as men, and that
they have only two months' sea service in the fleet as boys. Though
the sea-going ships carried as many boys as they could stow, there
were still from 1,500 to 1,700 constantly on depôt, and a considerable
number of boys reached their eighteenth year, while still waiting in
harbour ships, and thus became entitled to a man's rating, without
having been to sea.'
‘At the present time the number of boys in training is 2,200.
The number on depôt, awaiting their turn to be drafted to sea-going
ships during the two years ending July 1, 1880, was 1,390, and the
number on the latest date to which returns have been received was
1,082.
If 1,000 more boys were drafted to sea-going ships, it would be
necessary to send to sea at least 2,000 more seamen. It has already
been shown that we have in our harbour and first reserve ships
8,460 men of the seamen class, of whom 1,496 are ordinaries. A
larger proportion of the seamen class should be employed in sea-going
ships. The difficulty lies, not in providing the personnel, but in
furnishing the matériel for the sea-going training of the Navy. Brigs
and sloops will not answer the purpose. On the other hand, it is
essential that a training-ship be capable of being handled efficiently
under sail. In 1877, Sir Thomas Symonds and Sir Hastings
Yelverton recommended for this service a screw-frigate with satis-
factory sailing qualities.
If we search the Navy List for vessels adapted for training sea-
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
455
men, we still find the eight frigates of the 'Ariadne,'' Bristol,' and Vessels on
list adapted
'Endymion’types, commended by Captain Noel as being, without for train-
exception, magnificent cruisers, perfect in symmetry of form, swift ing, 1879.
as possible under sail, and carrying an efficient armament; their
only fault being that they lack both steam power and space for fuel.
The Aurora,' 'Duncan,' and 'Newcastle' were very recently in
the first division of the Steam Reserve, and the 'Ariadne,' Anson,'
‘Donegal,' “ Diadem, “Doris, "Narcissus, Melpomene, Scylla,
· Immortalité,' and Undaunted,' could be repaired and fitted for
light armaments. All the ships mentioned would make excellent
training-vessels; but the majority must be practically recon-
structed to fit them for further service. It may be argued that Argument
for special
as we may have many wooden ships at our disposal, of a suitable ships for
type, though in a bad state of repair, it is better to repair them, so ing service.
long as the repairs cost less than a new ship. If our view were
limited to the estimates of the current year, this suggestion might
be accepted; but when we look forward to the expenditure on
maintenance over a series of years, it will be apparent that, in bring-
ing forward old wooden ships for training, we shall be adopting a
course which must in the end prove far more expensive. The wiser
course, therefore, would seem to be to design special vessels for
training; and we have to consider the type and dimensions which
should be adopted.
If the country were content to entrust the seamen of the Navy Sailing
ships for
to sailing ships of a greatly improved type, as compared with the training.
two vessels which have lately been lost, the training-ships could be
built at a considerably reduced cost. The finest sailing ships in the
merchant service (and nobler vessels could not be designed) may be
obtained for 141. per ton register. It is probable, however, that
auxiliary steam-power will be regarded as essential for ships em-
ployed on an extended ocean voyage. Vessels of the Cruiser ' class Proposal to
would be admirably adapted to serve as sea-going tenders to the training-
flag-ships at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Sheerness, their cruises not ships.
extending beyond the chops of the Channel, or perhaps the coast of
Portugal. For more extended cruising we possess a considerable
number of suitable vessels. A marked improvement may be observed
in the more recent sloops.
build four
456
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
VIII.
may be
to Reserve.
Adam.
Admiral
Denman,
Seamen There remains the alternative of transferring the seamen whom
transferred we cannot train in the Navy to the Naval Reserve. A memorandum
on the training of seamen in Greenwich School was submitted to
Sir Charles the Admiralty in 1852, by Admiral Sir Charles Adam. It contains a
strong opinion as to the value of the mercantile marine as a nursery
for seamen :— It surely must always be of the utmost importance to
encourage the instruction of seamen in the long voyages by merchant
ships, especially as the coasting trade is now very much carried on
in steam vessels, and diminished by railway carriage of goods. If
there are seamen in the country, some will always be found to enter
the naval service; and in the case of extreme emergency, large num-
bers may be called upon to do so. It must be admitted in peace
there is little opportunity of making good seamen in the Royal
Navy, as the ships are so much in harbour.'
The late Admiral Denman, in his well-known pamphlet on
Admiralty Administration, recommended that the Navy should
undertake the training of seamen in numbers beyond the strict
requirements of the service in time of peace :-
“The most recent effort,' he said, 'of the Admiralty, to provide
the country with seamen to man the Navy, took its origin from the
Royal Commission of 1858, which wound up its inquiry with an
elaborate report in 1859. ..
By far the most important part of the report was this sugges-
tion, that boys should be trained on a large scale by the country,
with a view of providing seamen qualified alike for merchant ships
or ships of war. . .
• By such means alone can the class of thoroughbred seamen be
maintained, since no man can be made a thorough seaman who has
not been brought up to the caliing from boyhood, and, owing to the
repeal of the Navigation Laws, few boys are now carried by mer-
chant ships, while the Navy breeds up only a sufficient number to
fill its own vacancies as they occur.
• It is most earnestly to be hoped that there may be a large in-
6
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
457
trained
1
crease in the number of training cruisers, commanded by the ablest Boys
officers, for no duty can possibly exceed the importance of training in Navy
boys by thousands, who may in a short time be made good seamen, transferred
might be
and those not required for the Navy would be readily taken by ship- to Naval
owners. Supposing such a system to be organised with talent, and
carried out with consistency, the most important results would follow
in aid of measures for manning the Navy, for these lads would carry
with them the most favourable evidence of the treatment in ships of
war and would themselves entertain feelings of attachment, which
would operate with great force upon all occasions when men were
required for the service.
Objections may be urged to a proposal by which the shipowners
would be relieved of the expense of rearing their own apprentices.
On the other hand, it must be admitted that the reserve of seamen
which we possess in the mercantile marine is a distinct and per-
manent element of our naval resources for war. We have recognised
its importance by the creation of a paid Naval Reserve, as the
appropriate substitute in a free country for the French inscription
maritime. By transferring to the Naval Reserve the seamen pri-
marily trained in the Navy, the country would be relieved of the
cost of maintaining them in peace in numbers beyond the ordinary
requirements of the service, while at the same time we should
secure their service for the Navy in time of war.
Officers of the British Navy might be encouraged, as they are in Officers
the Norwegian and French Navies, to seek employment, to soine employed
extent, in the mercantile marine.
might be
in mercall-
tile marine.
458
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
IX.
As to the
number of
Some officers have raised a question as to whether we require so
large a number of seamen as we have at present. Captain Noel is
quired. of opinion that 12,000 able seamen and petty officers would be suf-
ficient, and that it is impossible to train more. The number at the
present time is 14,386. It is urged that no revision of the personnel
of the Navy has taken place since the 'Devastation,' carrying a crew
of 300 men, of whom less than a third are seamen, has taken the
place in the line of battle of the 'Marlborough, carrying a com-
plement of 1,300 men, of whom more than two-thirds were seamen ;
and that our force should be reduced rather than be allowed to
remain so long in harbour as to lose its seaman-like character.
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
459
X.
service.
The surveying service may be mentioned as an additional means Surveying
of employing and training officers. In 1854, when we were engaged
in war with Russia, 19 captains, 10 commanders, 16 lieutenants,
and eight ships were employed on surveys in different portions of
the globe. In 1873 only one ship was so employed. In 1879 we
had two captains, one commander, and 24 lieutenants, besides 20
navigating officers employed in six surveying vessels, and on survey-
ing duty in other ships. Naval officers, if afforded opportunities of
practising afloat what they learned at Greenwich, would be enabled
more efficiently to protect the trade they would be helping to
extend.
The abolition of a separate class of officers for navigating duties
makes it important to provide increased facilities for executive officers
to acquire a practical knowledge of the pilotage of the Channel and
the coasts of the United Kingdom. A few schooners might be
attached to the flag-ships at the home ports, or the Naval College at
Greenwich, to which officers could be appointed for the purpose of
cruising for three months on the English coast, after passing their
examination at Greenwich. The school of pilotage would be of value
in affording employment at sea for a certain number of officers who
might otherwise be detained in harbour ships, or on half-pay.
460
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
XI.
Training in
gumcry.
Scott.
Howard
Douglas.
In connection with the general question of the training of seamen
it may not be superfluous to refer to the observations of Admiral
Scott, one of our most distinguished gunnery officers, with reference
to the necessity for additional training in gunnery in the Navy, or
in taking aim, as distinguished from the routine gun drill. Speaking
in 1875 at the United Service Institution on Captain Wilson's paper,
he said: “We require inore skill among our seamen gunners. The
low standard of skill is not creditable, We have only four large
guns in some of our biggest ironclads, and hence the men firing them
ought to be highly educated marksmen.
Siinilar recommendations have been repeatedly urged upon the
Admiralty. Sir Howard Douglas, in his treatise on Naval Gunnery,
pointed out that it would be advantageous to have one or two cruising
ships for gunnery exercise on the ocean. This important measure
was adopted by the Board of Admiralty, but very imperfectly, by
appointing a gunboat as a tender to each of the two gunnery ships
for the purpose intended. But these are not cruising ships, and very
insufficient for the purpose.
Frigates of instruction for seamen gunners in the French Navy
are appropriated to that important purpose, and occasionally ac-
company their squadrons and fleets on sea-going service. Thus the
Amazone, frégate d'instruction," formed part of Admiral Lalande's
fleet in the Mediterranean, in 1840. The “Minerve," first-class
frigate, was specially commissioned for “ L'Ecole des Matelots Canon-
niers," in 1848.
In another passage of the same treatise, Sir Howard Douglas
points out the increased difficulty of accurate practice in a stearn
fleet as compared with a sailing fleet.
· The direction and force of the wind, and thereby the setting
and amount of the swell, though immaterial to the progress of steam-
ships, are important disturbances to the practice of gunnery. With
the swell abeam, or a cross swell, the rolling motion of a heavily-
masted steam ship with the sails furled, will be far greater and more
French
Navy.
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
461
mander
rapid than it would be when those motions are checked by sails. The
gunnery of a steam fleet will not, therefore, excepting in a smooth
sea, be so efficient as that of a fleet of sailing ships; and it will
require all the skill and tact of well-trained seainen gunners to
watch the roll and catch the proper moment of pulling the trigger
line.?
The same opinions are expressed by the younger officers of the Com-
Navy. Commander McHardy, in his essay on The Heavy Gun, the
McHardy.
Rani, and the Torpedo, written in competition for the prize offered
by the Junior Naval Professional Association, made the following
criticisms and suggestions with reference to this subject :- The
Navy does not possess sufficient skill in firing at objects in rapid
motion to ensure either accuracy or rapidity. There are no men
specially taught by intelligent eye-training to attain these results.
Our naval gun sights are ill adapted for adjusting rapidly to suit the
ever-changing distances. There are no officers or others specially
trained and distinguished for their skill in directing the fire of the
guns simultaneously on fixed bearings. Why not at once recognise
the qualification of marksman as the one essential test for the
rating of seaman gunner, as it also is the one and only purpose of a
gun to hit the mark? Is ability as a marksman sufficiently con-
sidered in awarding the various rates of gunnery pay under existing
regulations ?
The success of the Americans in the frigate actions of the war of
1812 was won partly by the superior power of the vessels, but also by
the decided superiority in artillery practice. In the reverse cases,
when the Chesapeake' was vanquished in fifteen minutes by the
Shannon,' it was the training of weeks and months which secured
for Captain Brooke a decisive victory over the untrained crew of his
antagonist.
SECTION III.
ENGLISH AND FOREIGN OPINIONS ON .
THE INSTRUCTION OF THE NATY
IN STEAM TAOTICS.
464
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
ENGLISH AND FOREIGN OPINIONS ON THE INSTRUC-
TION OF THE NAVY IN STEAM TACTICS.
in tactics.
Instruction HAVING examined the system of training for the seamen, a few
observations with reference to the officers seem necessary to com-
plete the subject. A large number are always in the home ports.
Others are attached to ironclads and flagships, which are frequently
detained in harbour for extended periods, and rarely cruise enough
to give to the younger officers, who are learning their profession,
sufficient opportunities of adding to their practical experience.
In the United States Navy, where a system of training has been
established similar to that in our own service, a considerable doubt is
entertained by the older officers as to the value of a course of in-
struction on shore in combination with cruises at sea for a limited
period in the summer months. Ironclads, and especially mastless
ironclads, are well adapted for the instruction of the Navy in gun-
nery and steam evolutions, but there are other duties of the naval
profession which can only be learned by constant cruising, and that
in vessels which can be handled under sail. The theoretical training
of our officers is thoroughly well considered, but theory without
practice will not make a seaman even in the case of men who have
an intuitive faculty for seamanship.
In the present memorandum it is not proposed to deal with the
general subject, the object being to direct attention to the desire
expressed in the Navy for further opportunities of practice in steam
evolutions.
Admiral Jurien de la Gravière has described in graphic language
la Gravière. the sort of training which is necessary in order to prepare officers for
the rapid and desperate manoeuvres of a battle with the ram :-
“Quand deux flottes se rencontreront, quand les lignes après avoir
fondu l'une sur l'autre se seront pénétrées, la lutte ne pourra se con-
tinuer que par un brusque renversement de la route primitivement
suivie. Cette manæuvre, presque inévitable, est de nature à causer
entre les bâtiments d'une même armée plus d'un choc involontaire ;
Jurien de
INSTRUCTION OF THE NAVY IN STEAM TACTICS.
465
il faut s'habituer à marcher de nuit aussi bien que de jour en ordre
serré, savoir se grouper, savoir se répandre, présenter tantôt une
masse compacte, tantôt des échelons successifs ; il faut surtout pos-
séder la science indispensable, celle qui consiste à comprendre le
chef à demi-mot, à surveiller les déviations de sa route, à s'inspirer
de son exemple et à se passer de ses signaux. Toute la compositioni
homogène de la flotte, la symétrie des courbes de giration, atténue-
ront ces risques ; l'habitude des mouvements d'ensemble les fera
disparaître. Ce n'est pas dans la pratique des évolutions régulières,
des passes géométriques, qu'il importe le plus de faire preuve d'un
coup d'ail exercé ; l'habitude est bien autrement nécessaire, quand on
veut acquérir l'aplomb qu'exigeront la plupart des mouvements de
combat. Ni les navigations isolées, ni les simulacres d'escadres
composés d'avisos ou de canonnières, ne constituent pour cet art
difficile une école suffisante. Il faut apprendre à faire mouvoir dans
un espace restreint des masses de 6,000 ou 7,000 tonneaux, qui ne
peuvent venir en contact sans se broyer mutuellement.'
The brilliant and dashing inspirations of the inoment will pro- Comte de
bably decide the naval battles of the future, and the best preparation Gueydon.
will be found in the constant practice of steam evolutions. Admiral
Le Comte de Gueydon, in his treatise on La Tactique Navale,
says:
On ne saurait formuler de tactique absolue, et aucun système
n'inspire les résolutions suprêmes qui font gagner les batailles.
Mais si la tactique ne supplée pas au génie du chef et à ses illumina-
tions soudaines, elle n'en est pas moins le docile et indispensable
instrument qu'il a dès longtemps façonné à -son usage et dont il doit
être sûr. C'est elle qui lui donne le moyen pratique de disposer,
suivant les exigences du moment, des forces qu'il a dans sa main;
c'est elle surtout qui lui rend ses forces souples, maniables et en
état de se prêter à l'intelligente exécution de ses volontés. Sa
pensée, dès lors, dégagée de la dangereuse préoccupation de ne se
voir qu'imparfaitement comprise ou obéie, peut planer en toute liberté
sur la lutte et, ce qui est l'objectif principal, se concentrer sur les
mouvements et les maneuvres de l'ennemi pour déjouer ses projets
ou le frapper à l'improviste à la première occasion qui s'en présente.
... La tactique systématique doit être d'ailleurs modeste, et son
unique mission d'incontestable et réelle utilité est remplie quand elle
a libellé tout ce que la méthode peut produire pour alléger la tâche
des capitaines dans la tenue de leurs postes et les grouper, à un
moment donné et dans une disposition voulue, autour de leur chef.
6
VOL. IV.
H H
►
466
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Admiral
Touchard.
Admiral
Bourgois.
Elle ne peut s'affirmer d'avance au delà de cette limite, et c'est des
événements seuls qu'elle reçoit plus tard sa consécration. ...
The Comte de Gueydon's recommendations are supported by the
advice of many officers of the French Navy of great experience and
distinction. Among the most eminent of these I may refer to
Admiral Touchard. In an article contributed to the Revile Mari-
time of February 1877 he wrote as follows :-
Quelles sont avant tout les conditions d'un bon emploi pour les
armes nouvelles comme l'éperon et la torpille ? C'est, avec un cøur
ferme, un coup d'oeil sûr, et une main sûre. Or la science ne sera
jamais qu'inhabile à développer ces facultés naturelles, tandis que la
pratique, si elle ne les donne pas, saura toujours les développer et
les affermir.'
Admiral Bourgois, the author of some admirable lectures on
naval tactics and evolutions, in urging the necessity for constant
practice, makes the following observations :-
· Les circonstances variées du combat d'escadre donnent aux capi..
taines des occasions encore plus nombreuses de tirer parti de leur
coup d'ail et de leur habileté de manæuvre, lorsque, par exemple, il
s'agit de donner le coup d'éperon par un brusque mouvement de
flanc, à un navire ennemi obligé de présenter la pointe à un autre
adversaire qui le menace. Dès que l'action est engagée, les incidents
causés
par
le feu de l'artillerie et le choc des navires ne tardent pas à
détruire la régularité de la première passe. Les bâtiments désemparés
laissent leurs adversaires libres de se porter sur d'autres points et
d'accabler d'autres ennemis. Il faut apprécier promptement ce qu'on
doit craindre d'un second adversaire qui surgit, ce qu'on peut espérer
en attaquant brusquement un navire avec lequel on n'était pas
d'abord engagé et qui vient lui-même s'offrir au coup d'éperon.
Aucun signal, aucun ordre, aucune règle ne peut, dans ces circon-
stances, suppléer chez un capitaine le coup d’æil, la résolution et le
sang-froid. C'est donc à faire acquérir ces précieuses qualités à ses
capitaines qu’une puissance maritime doit tendre dans l'emploi de
ses escadres d'évolutions pendant la paix, si elle veut se ménager des
chances de succès pendant la guerre.
* Les évolutions habituelles de la tactique et les circonstances
ordinaires de la navigation, même en escadre, sont notoirement
insuffisantes pour atteindre ce but. C'est à créer sur mer l'image
du combat, comme on l'a fait sur terre par les maneuvres des corps
d'armée; qu'il faut s'attacher aujourd'hui pour être certain qu'au
jour de l'épreuve aucun capitaine ne sera surpris par la nouveauté
de sa tâche et des obligations qui lui seront imposées.'
!
INSTRUCTION OF THE NAVY IN STEAM TACTICS,
467
de Penfen-
lenyo.
The following observations are taken from the Projet de Tac- Lieutenant
tique Navale, by Lieutenant de Penfentenyo:--
'Le combat naval contemporain aura ce caractère spécial, que les
mouvements qui l'auront précédé joueront le rôle le plus important et
auront, dans tous les cas, une influence catégorique sur le succès ou
l'échec final. Donc, des plans stratégiques bien conçus, et leur
développement complet avant d'entamer l'action, sont un des buts
que doivent chercher à atteindre tous les officiers de marine, et
auxquels ils ne sauraient consacrer trop de travaux et d'efforts.
Ces deux questions posées, nous pouvons mesurer l'importance
des évolutions et limiter leur cercle d'action. Par leur nature
mêrne, elles ne sont qu'un moyen entre les mains de l'amiral pour
placer d'abord sa flotte dans une position avantageuse, puis attaquer
avec les plus de chances de succès possible. Pendant l'engagement,
elles cessent d'être utiles, et cèdent la place à la bravoure, à l'au-
dace, à l'initiative individuelle. C'est là leur rôle naturel et nul n'a
le droit de leur demander davantage.
Mais, néanmoins, il ne faut pas croire, parce que les évolutions
navales ont un cercle d'action limité au point de vae du combat, que
leur importance en soit amoindrie. Au contraire, leur importance
grandit, car dans l'intervalle de temps où leur rôle est prépondérant,
se concentre, comme les rayons au foyer d'une lentille, tout l'intérêt
de l'action qui va s'engager, et se prépare le gain ou la perte d'une
bataille. Si les évolutions sont mal conçues ou mal comprises,
l'amiral n'a plus le moyen, en manoeuvrant avec agilité, de tromper
l'ennemi sur ses intentions et de profiter de ses fautes pour s'assurer
la victoire. Il ne peut choisir le moment d'engager le combat et
doit attendre passivement l'ennemi, comme l'amiral Persano en fit
l'épreuve amère à Lissa. L'intervalle pendant lequel les évolutions
ont de l'importance est court, mais, pendant ce temps, nous pouvons,
avec leur aide, tenir l'ennemi en échec, et nous élancer sur lui au
moment qui lui sera le moins avantageux. Voilà le but des évolu-
tions navales, et voilà pourquoi elles ont une immense impor-
tance.
Dès le début de l'action un amiral ne pourra presque plus inter-
venir. Son rôle sera de donner à tous l'exemple du courage et de
l'intrépidité ; il sera sûr du succès, si, profitant des loisirs de la paix
pour instruire ses capitaines il les a fréquemment exercés aux ma-
næuvres les plus propres à former leur coup d'oeil et leur habileté
personnelle, et s'il a su au dernier moment leur communiquer le feu
qui doit l'animer lui-même.'
These extracts from French writers may be concluded with a
11 H 2
468
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
fare with
steam.
Sir
Howard
Naval war- quotation inserted by Sir Howard Douglas in his Naval Warfare
with Steam. It contains an indisputable proposition.
It may be said of well-commanded fleets, mutato nomine, as was
Douglas. said by an eminent tactician respecting maneuvring armies directed
by generals of talent, that -. . Entre deux armées pareilles, ce sera
enfin à qui l'emportera de génie et de célérité dans les manæuvres.'
(Guibert, vol. ii. p. 187.)
Admiral Turning to English authorities, we have the same views not less
Randolph.
forcibly stated by Admiral Randolph, in his paper on End-on Fire
from Ships of War, tactically considered :-
There is no position that history assists me to conceive, in which
so much comparatively will depend upon the personal qualification of
one officer, as that of a captain in such combats as these we have
been discussing and must look forward to; and does it not forcibly
show the supreme importance of each officer, who aspires to such a
position, studying thoroughly the subject and being prepared to act
instantly and unhesitatingly, by having at his fingers' ends the
moves of sound tactics and their consequences, with reference to
those which are, under the circumstances, possible to the enemy?
Theory may point out and even decide what these moves should
be, but practice alone can make experts in their execution. As our
officers were formerly thus perfected in seamanship, so may our
young ones in future in increasing numbers, and by unremitting
pains and constant practice in innumerable small vessels, be rendered
equally masters in handling their ships, not only singly, but in
squadrons; and by a due appreciation of the vast responsibilities
which may devolve upon them, nothing less than the guardianship
of the very destinies of our country, be urged to strain every nerve
to qualify themselves for so important, so noble a position.'
In his remarks on Captain Colomb's paper on the Naval War
Game the same gallant officer said :--
'I believe all your material put together without good naval
tactics will be absolutely worthless. Notwithstanding this, I am
sorry to say I feel that although it is so important a subject, it is
precisely the one that is least attended to and practised of any, and
certainly not through any want of zeal or fault of the officers them-
selves. I hold that at the present day naval officers, as a body,
hunger and thirst after knowledge and practice, to a degree utterly
unequalled at any former period; I impute no blame or fault to
anybody.
'I am persuaded that if you sent the “ Alexandra” and
“ Téméraire" to fight it out at sea, the victory would be not to the
INSTRUCTION OF THE NAVY IN STEAM TACTICS.
469
strongest in material power, but to the one best handled. I must
say, therefore, I wish to draw the attention of the meeting and the
profession generally to the extreme importance of this point of
practical skill in tactics. I think under many circumstances ships
being fairly well handled might suffice, but in the circumstance of
meeting at sea, you should not be content with equality with other
nations, but we should go in for superiority. I do not think we are
taking steps to attain that superiority. If I am correctly informed
foreign nations are paying much more attention to this subject than
we are, and I think a great lesson can be drawn from those simple
manæuvres practised in Russia some time ago, for which this
Institution is greatly indebted to our gallant chairman.
'Far be it from me to insinuate that our ships are not as efficiently
commanded as we could desire. As far as I know they are most ably
and admirably cominanded--speaking from my own experience,
excellently commanded. But I cannot but fear that there are a
large number of officers on the list who have not had that practice
and experience at sea, and who would be found to be deficient and
failing in proficiency if they were called upon to serve. I therefore
feel the greatest possible anxiety that further steps should be taken
towards the establishment of a systematic method of training our
younger officers in the practical work of handling their ships at sea.
I do not think it is necessary to expend any great amount of money.
The gunboat trials in the Russian squadron are full of information ;
a vast deal of information is got out of a very little experience in
that way, and it could easily be carried a little further than steam
launches and gunboats by larger vessels who need not ram each
other, but spars or rafts towed astern,
In course of the discussion at the United Service Institution on
April 3, 1871, on Captain Colomb's paper on The Attack and Defence
of Fleets, Captain Goodenough said :-
* Directly one vessel turns the least away from the other, she at Captain
once places herself in a position of disadvantage, unless she has enough,
something to make up for it, either speed or turning power, or better R.N.
stomach or eye in the body of the man who commands her. That is
a point, that of meeting straight end on, which I think requires to
be very well looked into, and about which everybody who has to
command a ship should thoroughly make up his mind ; because that
seems to me a position in which ships wilt again and again find
themselves, pointing directly to their adversaries, and the first com-
mander who flinches, no matter from what cause, either from want of
stomach or from want of eye, will put himself at a disadvantage.'
470
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Captain The following remarks are from a paper on Fleet Evolutions
Cyprian
Bridge, and Naval Tactics read by Commander Cyprian A. G. Bridge before
R.N.
the Royal United Service Institution, February 17, 1873:
‘Both will approach one another at a greater or less speed; that
of about eight knots, I am inclined to believe, will be the most usual:
As they approach every gun will most likely be fired. As they arrive
in closer proximity this bow-fire will become at length ineffectual,
and the respective captains will be disinclined to keep the fore-parts
of their ships enveloped in clouds of smoke, so it will cease. Now
will come the doubly anxious moment of seeking to ram one's
antagonist; to avoid being rammed by her; to steer clear of the
towed torpedo; and to plant one's own torpedo conveniently under
her water-line. In the early stage of an action, I venture to think
no great damage will be done on either side. The two I expect will
pass through one another to a great extent intact, till there shall
arrive the time which shall be the crucial test of the value of the
evolutionary practice of peaceful times. The two fleets will have to
reform. Picture to yourself the effect, moral as well as material, of
a well-ordered column of fresh ships bearing down at superior speed
upon a group of vessels endeavouring to reform. This strictly tactical
movement (that of bringing overwhelming force upon some portion
of the enemy's fleet) should not be left to chance or signal.'
In the discussions on a paper on Naval Tactics, read by Admiral
Inglefield, Inglefield at the Royal United Service Institution on June 29, 1868,
repeated exercises in steam evolutions were most strongly urged by
many speakers. Admiral Inglefield referred in his paper to the pains
taken by Lord Clarence Paget and Admiral Warden to instruct the
officers under their command in the manoeuvring of ironclads under
steam. " Lord Clarence Paget was in the habit of assembling the
Clarence
Paget.
captains of his squadron on board his flagship before evolutions, and
after they returned to port, and sometimes when the weather was
suitable at sea, to receive suggestions from them, and remarks upon
the exercises they had been performing. I think that considerable
benefit to the service accrued from this interchange of expe-
riences.'
In the Channel Fleet, Admiral Warden adopted a plan of ex-
ercising with the steam launches, a very useful and economical way
of instructing the junior officers in naval tactics.
Should the opportunity ever occur for assembling a flotilla of
gunboats in the Channel for similar exercise, I believe much instruc-
tion might thereby be gained, and if officers on half-pay might be
allowed to take that opportunity of keeping pace with the times
Admiral
Lord
Admiral
Warden.
INSTRUCTION OF THE NAVY IN STEAM TACTICS.
471
Sir
Houston
Stewart.
there would be numbers who would doubtless gladly avail themselves
of the occasion.
In the discussion which followed, Sir Houston Stewart said :
Many of us remember the time when our Navy had no universal
system of gunnery, when every ship in the fleet had her own system
of gunnery, and it was a question whether we should have a universal
system of gunnery. That is all over now: every ship in the service
has the same system of gunnery. And why should we not have a
universal system of steam tactics ? We have our experimental
squadrons, why cannot there be a day in the week when our officers
can be assembled in the cabin with the captain, and put through all
the tactics, so that every officer in the ship may learn every signal
and every manæuvre ? The thing is as simple as possible, if we had
a well-devised system of tactics. It is a most important and vital
point, that every officer in the Navy should be thoroughly instructed
in the theory of steam tactics.
Admiral Inglefield said :
—The practice of naval tactics ought Admiral
Inglefield.
to be carried out whenever an opportunity occurs. Having been on
one or two occasions desired by the Admiral in the Tagus to take out
the steam launches, and go through evolutions in the open waters
below Lisbon, I found it was an admirable way, and at a cheap rate,
of teaching the younger officers to practise in naval tactics. It was
with that experience that I suggested how convenient it would be to
allow officers on half-pay to assemble on board gunboats at Sheerness
or Spithead, and give them that experience in evolutions which had
been gained by those who were in the Channel Squadron.'
The chairman, Sir H. F. J. Codrington, wound up the discussion Sir Henry
Codring-
with the following observations :-'Ị feel convinced that the fleet ton.
that is most practised in evolutions will be the one that will be best
in position to fight its battle, It is coming back, as we must come
back, to original ideas; we must remember the Roman word for
“army” signified "exercise;" so it is with the “fleet,” our word for
a “naval army;” we ought to be exercised and drilled continually;
and the fleet which is most thoroughly drilled will, in the day of
battle, be the best.'
In the essay on The Gun, the Ram, and the Torpedo, to which Comman-
the prize offered by the United Service Institution was awarded in
1874, Captain Noel, who may be taken as a representative of the
younger officers in the service, most strongly urged the more frequent
drilling of the fleet in steam evolutions :- What we require is such
admirable management, such thorough ability and foresight in the
manager as will ensure the destruction of an enemy exposing himself
der Noel.
472
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Mr.
Laughten.
to attack (if only for a moment) with the least possible risk of damage
to the ship which rams. At present our heavy ironclads are strangers
to many of the officers who may be called upon to command them in
time of war.
“The ships of our steam fleet, therefore, we cannot expect to be
handled in their way so perfectly as those in the fleets of Sir John
Jervis and Nelson. In these days very much more actual man-
ouvring will be required, every movement will be of more import-
ance, and changes will succeed each other with much greater rapidity
than in any action fought between sailing ships. Officers well
experienced and thoroughly competent to take command of any
heavy ironclad in an action are more than ever required. A great
drawback will be found in the immense variety there exists in our
ships_hardly two being exactly similar. A captain changing from
one ship to another finds difficulty in learning the different merits
and vices of his new command.'
The two succeeding extracts are taken from two essays on Naval
Tactics, written in competition for the medal of the United Service
Institution. The first quotation is from Mr. Laughton's essay :-
“From a free fight, such as, after this passage, Lissa became,
where all was in confusion, where the obscurity caused by the smoke
was so great that, all pretence of order heing lost, nothing could be
made out, where the maxim Tegethoff acted on was simply'Go at
everything grey'-not very unlike the old Donnybrook maxim,
"Wherever you see a head hit it'-little is to be learned in the way
of tactical evolution; though important lessons may be derived as to
the moral conduct of a fleet, and the value of that practical yet
delicate essence of tactics, which, apart from all technical skill or
theoretical considerations, must originate with, must emanate from
the Commander-in-Chief. There can be no doubt that with very
inferior ships and guns, and with newly-raised ships' companies, the
Austrians won the victory because their Admiral knew how to inspire
his officers and men with a certain portion of his own courage and
energy; whilst the Italian Admiral imparted to those under his
command nothing but fear of responsibility and timid vacillation.
The Affondatore'is said to have had several distinct opportunities
of ramming the “ Kaiser,' and to have refrained from doing so out of
misplaced compassion for the weakness of the enemy. No such
feeling held back the “Ferdinand Max;' going at everything grey,
she charged three or four Italian ships before she finally succeeded
in sinking the “ Rè d'Italia.' The battle was gallantly fought out by
the Austrians, but must be recorded as a victory won rather by
INSTRUCTION OF THE NAVY IN STEAM TACTICS.
473
2
R.N.
personal gallantry and dash than by any superiority of tactics or
evolutionary skill.
'When evolutionary squadrons and fleets of gunboats or steam
cutters are exercised systematically and regularly; when an evolu-
tionary fleet of ironclads is got together each summer, and worked as
such for a month or six weeks, regardless of petty economy of coal
and stores, unworthy of a great nation, and of a service with ten
thousand glorious traditions to maintain ; when it is understood that
the summer gathering of our ships is for severe drill, and the practice
of evolutions ; not merely as an occasion for joyous festivities, for
the establishment of a raree-show, and the entertainment of our
gaping countrymen in the several towns along our coast: then the
practical and professional study of tactics will have been really begun;
then, we may hope that much that now seems hopelessly dark as to
the tactics of the future, will shine out, illumined by the lamp of
knowledge.
The second quotation is from the essay by Lieutenant Charles Lieutenant
Campbell,
Campbell, R.N.:-
"As there is at present no special training for officers in signals
or in the tactical maneuvres of a large fleet at sea, unless a young
officer happens to be stationed in the signals when the ship to which
he belongs is with a fleet, he grows up knowing little or nothing
about it. I sincerely hope, when the value of the knowledge of
tactical evolutions has become more recognised,
that
6 short course
will be opened for officers who wish to become acquainted with that
important branch of their profession, somewhat similar to the
“ Gunnery short course," which all officers may now attend.'
Sir Cooper Key, in the course of the discussion on Mr. Laughton's Sir Cooper
Key.
paper, said :-
'I have heard people quote a remark of Nelson's in his order of
the day before the battle of the Nile, that “in naval battles much
must be left to chance," the meaning of which is, no doubt, that we
cannot command the wind, or know with certainty what will happen
when once ships get into action. It is said by many that this is a
true description of what will happen in the future, and that when
once a fleet has got into action, there is an end of all signals and all
manæuvring—each ship must continue the action in the best way
she can.
I am satisfied, however, that whichever Admiral can best
keep his fleet together and under command after the action has
commenced, will win the day.'
In the discussion on a paper on The Attack and Defence of
Fleets, read by Captain Colomb at the United Service Institution
a
--
474
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
1
Comman-
der Daw-
son.
Captain
Fremantle,
R.N.
on January 15, 1872, the following observations were made by
Captain Dawson, an officer whose able speeches on matters connected
with his profession are well known to all students of naval subjects :-
* There is,' he said, 'not a single fact brought forward showing that
the British fleet, which costs so much, has done anything to elucidate
any of the questions which arise in determining the best way of
using the various novel ships and weapons with which it is furnished
for purposes of war. I do not mean to say that the fleet has made
no experiments, practised no warlike manæuvres, or gathered no
useful experience, but I merely draw attention to this circumstance,
that if any portion of the fleet bas elaborated experimentally any
facts bearing upon future wars, they have not been brought forward
now.'
The following strong recommendations in favour of a more
systematic instruction in Steam Tactics are taken from the naval
prize essay by Captain the Hon. Edmund R. Fremantle :--
'In modern steam fleets,' says Jurien de la Gravière, to whose
writings we have all learnt to look for clear philosophical views of
the changes in naval warfare, the good manoeuvrers have not been
less rare ; those who are fairly good (mundwriers suffisants) are
become more common.' We might even go farther and say that in
the Royal Navy at least the officers who are really capable of perfect
management of an ironclad under steam are less numerous than
those who had made a name for themselves as brilliant seamen for
their skill in handling a ship under sail in former days.
"There are good reasons for this. The inherent difficulty in manag-
ing a ship under sail, in crowded harbours of narrow waters, almost
forced upon any naval officer, who wished to be considered a com-
petent seaman, a serious study of seamanship. The kettle has emascu-
lated seamanship we are told, and in some senses it is true ; it is
certainly easier to manage a sbip under ordinary circumstances under
steam ; and partly from this cause, partly from prejudice, it has come
to be supposed that no study, and but little experience, is required for
the inanceuvres of an ironclad, The result has been pointed out by
Jurien de la Gravière. When a new and improved weapon has
displaced a less perfect one, this has been invariably the effect of
the change. Thus, when the long bow was replaced by firearms in
the days of Henry VIII., we have great regrets expressed at the
discontinuance of the national practice with the favourite weapon;
but it has been reserved to the present century to appreciate the
necessity for perfecting our men in small-arm firing. No doubt it
was considered that anyone could hold a shooting-iron straight, it
INSTRUCTION OF THE NAVY IN STEAM TACTICS,
475
was so much easier than practising with the bow. This is, or rather
has been our case, with regard to the management of steam ships,
but we are beginning to awake from our delusion.
• Modern naval warfare has so changed, and is in such a state of
transition, that failing a direct order from higher authority to deal
with tactics, modern signal-book committees have agreed to ignore
them, except so far as an occasional verbal change in an old signal
might adapt it to modern warfare.
We are not surprised at the result. It is only of recent years
that it has come to be acknowledged that some attempts at least
of a solution of the problems of naval tactics may be made.' But
what a change from the days when the signal book was substantially
a code of “Fighting Instructions," too precise and rigid it may be,
but which showed the goal at which fleets must necessarily aim! If
we turn to the sister service, we shall find in the Field Exercise
Book, under the heading “ Application of Drill in Field Mancuvres,"
tolerably clear general principles for attack and defence. Cannot
something be done in the same direction for the Navy? Are there
no broad principles which might be shadowed forth in the signal
book ? At present it must be admitted that we are groping in the
dark. Our evolutions and maneuvres have no direct bearing on
battle formations. The signal book is a useful drill book, but that
is all, and it is not unreasonable if, in all earnestness and simplicity,
we ask for something more than “a halfpenny worth of bread” for
this 6 intolerable amount of sack."
“We have put the want plainly, and we believe strongly; but we
make no pretension to being original in making the complaint
against the code of signals and evolutions now in force, that it is a
mere drill book, and that nothing higher is attempted. We propose
to conclude this chapter by showing that we are not alone in making
this charge.
'In 1872, in an article on “ Naval Autumn Mancuvres," in Naval
Science, the author points out many ways in which our evolutions
might be made to resemble more closely the tactics of active warfare,
and he complains with reason of the “great loss of power in employ-
ing a gigantic and expensive fleet to teach the rudiments of
drill.” The article was written seven years ago, but we fear that
nothing has occurred since to make it less applicable in the present
day.
• If it should be thought that the article we have referred to
is too theoretical, or its demands obsolete, we again quote Vice-
Admiral Randolph, a distinguished officer of large and varied experi-
476
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Gazette.
ence, whose high qualifications as an officer and a seaman cannot be
disputed. The Admiral, writing in the present year, says :-
'No doubt fag officers and others have formed their own
opinions and determinations, but these are confined to their own
breasts, and where are the younger officers to turn for guidance, or
so much as a hint as to the best way to engage either a single ship
or a squadron? ... The army systematically practise operations
as nearly as possible resembling those of real battle. Can we do
nothing in the same direction ?” Something can and will be done if
once the want is felt by naval officers, but in the words of the motto
at the head of this essay, “Nil sine magno vita labore dedit morta-
libus."
Army and
Turning from the speeches and essays of naval officers to the
Navy
columns of the service newspapers, we find the same views put for-
ward in the Army and Navy Gazette of February 21, 1880. It is
said in the article in question that there is no established mode of
instructing the British Navy in naval tactics, the nearest approach
beiug a series of lectures in naval history at the College at Green-
wich. It is recommended that a special course of instruction in
naval tactics should be established at the College. The employment
of a few days only in the year in fleet evolutions, with occasional
exercises in the steam launches of the squadron, is very reasonably
criticised as a poor means of imparting instruction in a subject of
such momentous importance to the efficiency of a fleet.
In an article on naval tactics in the Nautical Magazine for July
Magazine. 1879, the following remarks occur :-“In most particulars we have
enormously raised the standard of efficiency in the Navy. We have
introduced system where pone existed before, and organisation where
chaos reigned hitherto. Taken as units of our force it would be,
perhaps, difficult to surpass the efficient state of our individual ships
even in the future; in the past it has certainly never been equalled.
“There is, however, one blot in this bright picture which
seriously detracts from its excellence as a whole. To use the phrase-
ology of a service better understood and more widely known-even
by this maritime nation
than the Navy, it may be said, that the sea
service at present resembles an army composed of an aggregate of
splendidly organised and highly trained regiments, all glorious in
their equipment, which are quite without any knowledge of the
methods to be employed in encountering an enemy in battle. Mere
perfection in drill, and intelligence in the performance of certain formal
peace manoeuvres, are very inadequate qualifications for engaging in
actual combat, if all knowledge of tactics be absent; yet this is very
Nautical
t
INSTRUCTION OF TILE NAVY IN STEAM TACTICS.
477
much the case of the British Navy at the present time. The officers
readily admit it, and complain of the obstacles in the way of their
remedying of their own accord, as they are quite prepared to do,
this very serious defect. They make no secret of the ignorance of
even the most rudimentary principles of naval tactics which is so wide-
spread in the service. No naval officer disputes the fact: some think
that this state of things can hardly be altered; some, perhaps, that it
is not important that it should be; others, the majority fortunately,
that it is both capable of being changed for the better, and that such
change is urgently wanted. The public, it need hardly be said, are
deeply interested in this matter. It may well be asked, why should
we pay so heavily for a naval protection, which, excellent as it may
be in many particulars, has this fatal defect? Can it not be remedied ?
Does the history of our Navy in former days give us any reason for
hoping that it can be ?
"To the last question it may be answered, that the history of not
only our own Navy, but that of all other navies which attained any
importance in the world, from the most ancient times downwards, has
shown that tactical efficiency and naval success went hand in hand,
and that the absence of the former led assuredly to the want of the
latter.
In support of these opinions of the writer in the Nautical
Magazine the conduct of our fleets at the outbreak of the great war
may be appropriately compared with the incomparable achievements
with which the illustrious career of Nelson was brought to a close.
The naval historian, James, in describing Lord Howe's victory of Battle of
June 1, 1794, points out that that victory was less complete than it 1794.
ought to have been, owing to the want of vigour and professional James's
ability in several commanders in the British fleet. “At the close of History.
the action,' he says, “there were twelve or fourteen English line-of-
battle ships without even a topgallant-mast shot away, and some of
these ought certainly to have secured two if not four of the more or
less dismasted French ships, but although many of the British ships
were in a condition for service those very ships had attained their
effective state by tardinegs in engaging.' Captain Brenton, in his Captain
Naval Battles, confirms the opiniun expressed by James in his
Naval History. Captain Brenton says : “The British Aeets were
remarkably well manned, but the officers were generally deficient
from want of practice, the natural consequence of ten years of retire-
ment. Some of them had little idea of keeping a ship in her station,
either in line of battle or in order of sailing, during the night and in
blowing weather.'
June 1,
Naval
Brenton.
478
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Black-
wood's
The following remarks on steam tactics are taken from Black-
Mugazine. wood of February 1878 :
-Nelson's genius had made all the
necessary dispositions for battle both at the Nile and Trafalgar long
before the action commenced; the captains had only to steer their
ships for their allotted adversary and the rest was done by the crew.
Had Nelson been killed by the first shot fired at Trafalgar, the issue
of the battle would have been the same. But how different now !
From the beginning to the end of an action rapid and constant
manoeuvring will be required; the ships must be kept firmly in hand
and skilfully guided ; all the best experience of the Admiral will be
in continual request, and should he be killed or disabled at a critical
moment, the consequences would probably be most serious. It is not
too much to say that the result of a naval engagement in these days
will depend entirely upon the skill of the superior officers, in default
of which the courage and discipline of the crews will avail little.'
The extracts already given sufficiently show that the younger
officers are deeply impressed with the necessity of more constant
practice in the management of ironclads under steam. Soon after
Mr. Childers became First Lord of the Admiralty he made known to
Parliament the views of his naval advisers with unaccustomed frank-
ness in more than one Parliamentary paper on this subject. A
Minute,
minute was published in 1870, reporting on the cruise of the Channel
and Mediterranean fleets, in August and September 1869. It contains
the following observations:-- Passing from these considerations,
which refer to questions of shipbuilding, my Lords wish to place on
record their opinions on some matters of no little interest brought
under notice in connexion with these reports. The first is the
absolute necessity of keeping Her Majesty's fleets and ships more at
sea, and especially out of the home ports. The evident inexperience
in fleet sailing, and of other professional duties at sea, exhibited by
many officers, has impressed itself strongly on their Lordships, and
on all whom they have consulted, and they trust by a system of
frequently exchanging officers and men between sea-going and
reserve ships; by the formations of squadrons of evolution, one of
which they hope to detach annually; by the constant cruising of the
Channel and Mediterranean fleets; and with respect to officers, by so
reducing their present redundant numbers as to enable my Lords to
keep them more constantly at sea on full-pay, to effect much im-
provement in this respect. The emulation generally observed was a
convincing proof to their Lordships that giving officers an opportunity
of being more constantly employed would ensure the efficiency for
which the Navy has always been distinguished.
1870.
INSTRUCTION OF THE NAVY IN STEAM TACTICS.
479
The following remarks are from a letter addressed to the editor Captain
Long, R.N.
of the Broad Arrow by Captain Long, who had lately returned
from a command in the Pacific :
“At this moment, when the Chilian and Peruvian navies are
sinking each other, no naval officer can peruse your article on Naval
Tactics without acknowledging the paramount importance of the
subject.
One of the most ancient of naval weapons has again been placed
at our disposal, but supplemented by motive powers, which render
its effectual use far more difficult than of old.
"The importance of the ram is variously estimated; but, while
opinions differ as to the probable frequency of opportunities for its
employment, all agree that its effectual use will be decisive.
Under these circumstances, other nations practise their officers
in ramming encounters, but although England has spared no expense
to ensure her officers and men being instructed in gunnery and
torpedo warfare, she seems unaccountably apathetic as regards the
most decisive weapon that has ever been placed at their disposal.
• Is it supposed that the ordinary experience of peace service is
sufficient to train the eye and judgment for the critical occasions
that must occur in real warfare? It is possible that it may be so in
the case of those officers who are constantly serving in steam fleets,
but a glance at the Navy List shows that a naval war would
inevitably call out many who have not had those advantages, and it
would be well if naval tactics could be practically studied by a
far larger number of our officers.'
We see the results of want of practice in foreign navies, where
disasters are far more numerous than in our own service. In its
issue of August 29, 1879, the Army and Navy Gazette gave the Accidents
following melancholy report of the recent experiences of the Russian Navy.
Navy. It is described as "suffering from a plethora of misfortunes,
and many fresh additions have been made to the list with which the
Baltic fleet commenced its summer manæuvres a month ago. The
latest instance is the disablement of the frigate “Svetlana," which
last week grounded on a reef off Biorka, receiving such injuries that
she will have to be put out of commission. In the case of the
- Peter the Great” and the yacht “ Derjava," both vessels were run
upon the sands within sight of Cronstadt. The channel is well
marked out with buoys, but the pilots do not seem to have been
acquainted with the strength of the current. The “Popoffka,"
Vice-Admiral Popoff, ran aground near Nicolaieff, and was only
removed from her dangerous position by the united exertions of
in Russian
480
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION,
German
Steam tac-
half-a-dozen powerful steamers, despatched from Odessa. The
monitor “ Koldown” and two of its confrères belonging to the
Sveaborg squadron broke down from sheer infirmity, the engines and
boilers of the Russian monitors being in an extremely dilapidated
condition. The collision of the cruiser
The collision of the cruiser 6 Zabiaka" and the corvette
“ Vsadnik” occurred near our own shores, and in one case at least the
commander has been exonerated from blame in the matter. Collec-
tively, however, these misfortunes, running so rapidly one upon
another, have broken down the patience of the Russian people, and
on every side censure is being heaped upon the Navy.
The German squadron of evolutions was nearly lost on the
Navy.
Galloper' on the passage to Salonica in May 1876, and the loss of
the Grosser Kurfürst' occurred undoubtedly from the want of prac-
tice in fleet sailing among the officers of the German Navy. On the
last-named occasion the squadron of four ships was reduced to one
ship, in 48 hours after leaving Wilhelmshafen. On the first night
one of the ships grounded on a sand bank. On the following day
the collision occurred between the “König Wilhelm' and 'Grosser
Kurfürst.'
Instances have been quoted of the want of experience in naviga-
tics, Rus-
sian Navy. tion in the Russian Navy, and their misfortunes may deter us from
following them in any part of the system which they have adopted.
In one particular, however, the example of the Russian Navy seems
worthy of imitation. For years the officers of that service have
devoted the closest attention to steam tactics. Their system is
thus described by Admiral Ryder. The Russians,' he says, have
for many years, by exercise at ramming, been working out practically
for themselves the great problems, (1) what are the best tactics
when two similar ships or more are engaged; and its corollary, (2)
how best to distribute any given number of guns in an ironclad
design. Both these problems are studied for several months every
year in the squadron of instruction in Russia. Several gunboats are
fitted with fascines to prevent injury from ramming, and tourna-
ments are repeatedly held in the presence of the superior officers of
the fleet. Each gunboat is manoeuvred by the captain of an ironclad,
assisted by one of his officers and his chief engineer. In this way,
every captain in his turn has practical lessons in ramming, and being
rammed or avoiding it, which they could not with safety attempt in
their ironclads, and all day long and every day one or other of the
ironclads, taking it in turn, is under way threading her way back-
wards and forwards through the anchored fleet; the captain who
makes the closest shaves without touching is highly commended,
INSTRUCTION OF THE NAVY IN STEAM TACTICS.
481
Admiral
and if he is unfortunate enough to touch one of the anchored iron-
clads, he may be blamed as a matter of form, but I was told he was
generally to be found dining with the Admiral that evening. The
Russians are a very practical people, and Admiral Boutakov, who has
commanded that squadron of evolution for the last fifteen years, has
brought the science of teaching his young officers what they ought to
know, and creating a hearty esprit de corps and an élan to perfection.
It is to be hoped that a naval “ Kriegsspiel ” will soon be perfected,
but it will not be very useful practically, if it is not supplemented
by naval tournaments at sea, as in the Russian Navy, in their pro-
tected gunboats. These sea tournaments would also throw much
light on disputed points in the rule of the road, and settle in a week
what the most experienced and practical seamen may go on disputing
about for years.
Rear-Admiral Boutakov, the author of the system of tactical Letter of
instruction established in the Russian Navy, commends its great Boutakov.
importance in the following letter, in which, after commenting upon
other subjects which had been discussed in Captain Colomb's paper
on Naval Tactics, he writes as follows:
-As regards what we have
heard on February 20 about the question of drilling a squadron, I
can only say that in sailing times squadrons were well drilled during
their cruises, and if we have now more expensive tools we must have
more expensive drills for maintaining the requisite efficiency. The
difference in this respect of present armaments from the former ones
mainly consists in this, that while we went to sea in sailing ships
perfectly prepared from boyhood for what we had to do in a
squadron, we now come to sea without that preliminary schooling.
Let it be provided for and the difficulty will vanish. Let it be
provided, if preferred, by cheap training squadrons of gunboats and
despatch boats, which could easily work out and simplify any code
of evolutions and signals; but let us not think that any system is
bad because we have not studied it, that it is complicated because it
looks so at a first glance, and because we do not know that it may
be very simple in application when once understood.'
Lieutenant Semechkin, the author of a course of lectures on Lieutenant
* Steam Tactics,' delivered at Cronstadt, strongly insisted on the Semechkin.
essential importance of frequeni exercise in evolutions :-
· Le sort des combats futurs dépendra moins de la supériorité des
forces que de l'habileté de l'amiral à engager le combat, de la science
des commandants dans les combats singuliers, de leur habileté à se
soutenir réciproquement pendant l'attaque ou la défense, de leur
agilité à se réunir en masse pendant le combat contre les points
VOL. IV.
II
482
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
faibles de l'ennemi. Pour obtenir tout cela il ne faut pas compter
sur les seuls moyens que nous avons actuellement-signaux, télé-
graphes--parce qu'ils sont insuffisants pour permettre à l'amiral de
conduire la lutte. Il faut que les cominandants connaissent à l'avance
le plan du combat; les résultats obtenus par ce moyen ont toujours
été magnifiques. Mais cela même ne suffit pas; l'amiral ne donnera
qu’un plan général d'action, il restera beaucoup de détails qui
devront être étudiés et réglés en conseil par les commandants, et
c'est là également que devront être fixées les règles générales du
combat et qu'on préparera des décisions pour certains cas éventuels,
décisions qui, par la suite, dans l'ardeur de la lutte, seront d'une
grande utilité et aideront puissamment au succès.
. Chaque navire doit avoir surtout en vue deux choses : première-
ment, utiliser son éperon dans toute occasion favorable ; et deux-
ièrement, aussitôt après avoir dépassé l'ennemi, de prendre son poste
le plus vite possible pour recommencer une attaque.
. On peut dire, sans crainte de se tromper, que la pratique des
mancuvres d'escadre, au point de vue du combat, est plus nécessaire
que les exercices d'artillerie. Pendant le combat entre des forces
considérables, l'éperon est plus à craindre que l'artillerie. Par con-
séquent, dans l'instruction d'une escadre, la manière de se servir du
premier doit nécessairement être étudiée dans tous ses détails.
We have already quoted from Admiral Ryder a description of the
system of tactical instruction in the Russian Navy. In a recent
speech on Captain Colomb's paper on The Naval War Game, he
described as follows the practice in the French Navy :- 'In France,
young officers are almost forced to attend on certain evenings at
lecture rooms specially provided in each dockyard to discuss im-
portant questions of naval tactics. Captain Colomb's game will be
introduced immediately. When I was at Brest I asked what the
discussion for the night was, and was told that it was what Villeneuve
ought to have done at Trafalgar instead of what he did do, and that
on the previous day the subject was what ought to have been done
by Admiral Brueys, when Nelson attacked at the Nile and destroyed
the French fleet, and could anything have been done to prevent or
diminish Nelson's success. Young officers who joined in such dis-
cussions and war games were likely to form much better tacticians
hereafter than those who did not, and they should be encouraged.
Secondly, I never could understand why we do not hear the results
of the important experiments going on constantly in our large
squadrons, the Channel fleet, and the Mediterranean fleet, in the
matter of evolutions. We have had, I do not know how many,
French
Navy.
1
INSTRUCTION OF THE NAVY IN STEAM TACTICS.
483
squadrons of evolution during the last ten years. Admiral Randolph
commanded one of them, and was second in command of another.
I have no doubt his mind and his memorandum books are full of
important information which he collected. The drawers of some
rooms at the Admiralty are full of reports from our best officers on
such subjects as “ groups," how best to handle them in action. I
have no doubt that Admirals Hornby, Beauchamp Seymour, Com-
merell, and numerous others have arrived at conclusions having the
force of axioms. Those officers who have not had the good fortune
to belong to these squadrons know absolutely nothing about what
has been done, what conclusions have been arrived at. There are
officers on shore on half-pay who would be delighted to be allowed to
witness these evolutions in a vessel attached to the feet for the
purpose, and I think they ought to be encouraged to do so, for by
that means and by that alone can they obtain that amount of know-
ledge which is so absolutely necessary and would be so much prized.
I am not speaking for my own advantage, my naral career is well-
nigh ended. I speak in the interest of the country and of the junior
flag officers and senior captains.
In confirmation of Admiral Ryder's remarks on the tactical Observa-
instruction in the French Navy, I may perhaps appropriately mention
that, while at Hyères last year, I had an opportunity of observing
the system adopted in the French squadron of evolutions. The fleet
at Hyères consisted of eight ironclads. They weighed anchor every
morning while I was in the roadstead, four days in succession, at
8 o'clock, and remained under steam several hours performing steam
evolutions. It would appear that much more frequent practice is
considered necessary in the French service than in our own Navy.
It seems desirable that something should be done to satisfy that
desire for knowledge, which does so much honour to the service.
When the Channel and Reserve fleets are brought together for
tactical instruction, would it not be well to provide facilities for
a certain number of officers to accompany the fleet during the
cruises? Would not the appointment of a committee to revise
the signal book at frequent intervals be attended with advan-
tage? Is it desirable that officers, on whom we rely to take our
ironclads into action, should be allowed to remain six years on
shore, without any means of keeping their hand in for the difficult
art of manquvring at close quarters with other ships of equally
formidable dimensions in rapid motion, or for the far graver
emergency of an actual engagement? If this long interval be
detrimental to the full efficiency of the Navy in its higher ranks, is
tions and
sugges-
tions,
[ I 2
1
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
484
it impracticable to give to captains short appointments in an evolu-
tionary squadron ? Under present arrangements officers can go
through a short course in gunnery and at the torpedo school. It
may be suggested for consideration that there should be a short
course of practical instruction in tactics, and that the flotilla of
gunboats at Portsmouth might be usefully employed in exercises
similar to those now practised at Cronstadt.
Hall-pay. The long periods for which officers are compelled to remain on
half-pay, after their promotion to the rank of captain, is a very
serious question. It is fortunate that the lieutenants are, as a
general rule, efficient, before their advancement to the rank of com-
mander ; because as commanders they usually spend a considerable
time on half-pay. So again, on promotion to the rank of post-
captain, an officer usually passes six years on shore before he is again
employed. This long interval covers a most important period in the
very prime of life, and that in a profession in which an enforced
suspension of activity prevents an officer from keeping pace with the
rapid and indeed revolutionary changes in the material and in the
methods of naval war. Officers, who have been suddenly called away
from their clubs in London, or their farms in the country, to the
command of large ships, must sometimes be ill at ease in their
unaccustomed situations, and fail to handle a monster ironclad with
liarity
with dan precision and confidence. It was truly said by Admiral Jurien de
ger gives
la Gravière in La Marine d’Autrefois :-Dans la marine, on ne
commence à soupçonner le danger que lorsqu'on commande. De
soudaines conversions s'opèrent bien souvent alors. On voit des
officiers que rien n'intimidait devenir des capitaines d'une prudence
outrée. Le manque de résolution a perdu presque autant de navires
que l'imprévoyance. D'hésitations en hésitations on peut être con-
duit sur les rochers tout aussi bien que si on les eût été chercher
tête baissée."
Fraser.
In an able article, which appeared in March 1877, in Fraser's
Magazine, the evil result to the Navy of long periods of half-pay is
very emphatically siated. An ironclad, as it is truly remarked by
the writer, is a complex puzzle to an officer, who may be a good
disciplinarian of seamen of the old school, but who is quite ignorant
of steam. Who can wonder, it is asked, that such a man is nervous
under a responsibility to which he must feel that he is unequal ?
Many who would be our best officers are married men with small
means, who cannot afford to devote their time when on half-pay
to study at Portsmouth and Greenwich. As a post-captain half-pay
ranges from 2281. to 3011. a year. Many of these men are buried
Fami-
confidence.
INSTRUCTION OF THE NAVY IN STEAM TACTICS. . 485
should be incurred in keeping
in some out of the way part of the country where they seldom even
see a paper, yet after some five or six years of half-pay they are
called upon to go to sea, probably to command a small vessel on a
distant station. After this apprenticeship and another year on half-
pay they may be intrusted with ironclads costing nearly half a
million. That this ensures efficiency can scarcely be seriously argued,
yet it is the natural outcome of the half-pay system, which only
exists in the Navy of England, and which foreign navies have been
much too wise to adopt.
It reflects no small credit on the British Navy that our officers
under such disadvantages attain to such a high degree of proficiency
in their profession. It is necessary to have a large reserve of offi- Plan for
cers, and it is unreasonable to propose that an immense expense in steam
giving employment to the captains in command. Some plan should,
however, be devised by which captains may be enabled to keep up
their professional knowledge, at a time when the Navy is undergoing
perpetual transformation.
instruction
tactics.
ee
SECTION IV
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
SPEECHES IN PARLIAMENT,
JUNE 7, 1872. APRIL 25, 1876
488
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
SPEECHES IN FAVOUR OF ABOLISHING A SEPARATE
AND DISTINCT BRANCH OF OFFICERS FOR NAVI-
GATING DUTIES,
By Lord Sudeley and the Compiler, in the House of Commons,
June 7, 1872.
Extracted from Hansard's ' Parliamentary Debates.'
Skill in
pilotage
essential to
captains
and com-
manders.
MR. HANBURY-TRACY: The question which I am desirous of bringing
before the House is the present system under which our ships and
vessels are navigated; and, although I much fear that the discus-
sion must, to a great extent, prove uninteresting and technical, yet,
as I believe it is a matter of the very gravest importance, I trust
the House will allow me to go somewhat fully into the subject.
Under the existing arrangement, it is well known that a separate
class of officers formerly termed masters, now called navigating
officers, is maintained for the distinct duty of what is termed naviga-
tion and pilotage, whereby it is supposed that a more competent set
of navigators and pilots are obtained than could be procured if these
duties were undertaken generally by the executive branch. I am
anxious to show to the House, that even if it were necessary to have
the duties restricted to one branch, the present system has of late
utterly broken down, and must be entirely remodelled ; and, secondly,
I wish to prove that the only true alteration and satisfactory solution
must lie in the entire abolition of a separate grade, and in throwing
these duties to a far greater extent than at present upon the captain
and commander of a ship. I maintain, Sir, the knowledge of practical
navigation has of late been neglected very much by our executive
officers, and it has come to be considered a totally secondary considera-
tion, instead of being, as it certainly ought to be, of primary impor-
tance. Officers seem to forget that unless a ship is skilfully and
safely navigated any other qualifications they may possess are of little
avail, and they do not consider that unless a ship is properly handled
t
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
489
and piloted, not only are the lives of all on board endangered, but
she is rendered utterly and entirely useless. It seems to me per-
fectly absurd and ruinous in the highest degree to allow our officers
to look upon these duties as trivial; and yet, Sir, unhappily the
long list of vessels which have got ashore during the past ten years
seems to prove conclusively that this state of feeling is spreading,
and that there is something radically wrong in the system under
which our vessels are navigated. In the present day, the handling
of one of our large ironclads is no easy task, and is a very different
thing to what it was in the days of sailing vessels. You go now at
terrific rates of speed-18 and 20, knots an hour; you have huge
and clumsy vessels to deal with, and the difficulties are increased
tenfold. At no period of our history was it ever so essential to
guard with the most scrupulous jealousy, that the safe pavigation of
ships was in fit and proper hands; and yet, notwithstanding this,
you still retain the old anomaly of having sea nurses for your cap-
tains with divided responsibility, and actually prevent your com-
manders and captains from acquiring that intimate knowledge of
practical navigation and pilotage, and that confidence in themselves,
which it is impossible for any impartial man to deny must render a
captain infinitely more competent to command. You admit that
in all the great passenger fleets--in the Cunard, in the Peninsular
and Oriental Company, and in the whole mercantile marine of the
world, and in every foreign navy—the captain is not only responsible
in name, but in deed. It is considered in all those fleets that the
captain, with proper assistance, is the only man who can do the
work properly. He alone can alter the course, make and reduce
sail, ease and increase speed, being the only person on board who
is perfectly free and uncontrolled. He it is who is entrusted with
the lives of all on board. But, Sir, in the English Navy --which you
pride yourselves is the finest in the world, where you have vessels
worth half a million of money, wbere you have interests committed
to its charge of the greatest and most vital importance, second to
none other—you entrust this great duty of navigating your ship
to another officer, and that officer one whom you take no trouble
to render competent-an officer who, from the time he enters the
service, seems to have no friend, is looked down upon, and is made a
drudge of. You give this officer no authority-he cannot make the
slightest alteration in the course without leave of the officer of the
watch--you give him no social status equal to his brother officers;
and, to crown all, you take away all prospect of promotion, and every
inducement to become zealous and energetic.
490
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
No special
Is it to be wondered at that high-spirited officers placed in this
training
for navi- extraordinary position become discontented; and is it surprising
gating
officers.
that the other officers look upon the duties performed by the navi-
gating branch as of secondary importance, and that your captains
arrive at that rank without having paid any attention to what they
consider the navigating officers' work--a duty of a separate branch ?
It is very easy to understand the theory which is sometimes ad-
vanced that pilotage and navigation are such peculiar duties, requir-
ing such delicate and careful manipulation, such experience, such
confidence, and such intimate acquaintance with harbours and
vessels, that it is necessary to have picked officers for this particular
duty, who, by devoting their lives to this one subject, become
most able and skilful navigators, and that in this manner a superior
race of pilots and navigators can be trained up. But, Sir, without
going into the question for the moment as to whether or not it is
beneficial to have this trained body of men, it is an actual fact-
which I defy anyone to disprove—that at this present moment you
have not got them, and that your navigating class, separate though
they may be, actually receive no special training, and are not
selected. If we look back two centuries, and even up to fifty years
ago, we find to some extent that this theory of having a trained
body of officers was carried out.
Origin of
In Henry VIII.'s time, when war ships were first built, no
branch for attempt was made to organise a professional race of naval officers,
navigation. and in lieu thereof masters of merchant ships were specially selected
as good navigators, and were put in charge of the equipment,
stowage, and navigation ; and the fighting of the ships was entrusted
to military admirals and captains quite innocent of all knowledge of
seamanship; and thus soldiers fought the ship, and a few seamen
were engaged to take the fighting machine about. As far as I can
discover, the French first commenced to organise a naval profession
in 1672, and we quickly followed suit, though retaining the masters
of the merchant navy to assist.
Now, Sir, comes this extraordinary fact. I find that as the race
of our naval officers grew up well trained in nautical knowledge,
that when Lord Pembroke was first Lord of the Admiralty, in the
year 1692, the evil of confining the professional knowledge of navi-
.
gation to one man was found so great that an order was actually
issued that all commanders of ships were to pass the Trinity House
and be examined as master; and five years after, in 1697, we find
another order was issued by Lord Orford that the race of masters
were gradually to be abolished, and the captains of sixth rates were
Masters
abolished
in 1697..
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
491
French
ordered to do the navigation duties themselves, and to be called
Commander and Master.' This state of things appears to have re- Revived in
mained in force until the breaking out of the French War, when, War.
unfortunately, it was found necessary to expand the Navy enormously,
and for this purpose a large number of masters were once more
introduced into the service from the merchant navy. At the close
of the French War the service had got so accustomed to trust to the
master for the navigation, that no one liked to abolish them; and
as time went on they became indispensable, as officers neglected
navigation more and more, and in many cases captains, when
appointed to their ships, had been so long unemployed, that they
clung with the greatest tenacity to the master class. These old
masters who were introduced were generally of a mature age; they
brought with them experience, great practical ability, and their
superior seamanship commanded respect. They also had great
incentives to zealous work, and looked forward cheerfully to lucrative
appointments, which were then open to them. In those days there
was one special reason which prevented the line getting as strongly
marked as it now is-namely, that a large number of midshipmen
and mates were continually being sent away in prizes, and who thus
at an early age acquired confidence and experience as navigators.
We thus see that up to the close of the French War the theory
of having selected officers was carried out by introducing picked
men from the merchant service who were thorough seamen, thorough
navigators and pilots. But, Sir, from the year 1824 to this date
this selection has, I fear, been entirely swept away.
Who are now our specially trained and picked officers ? Where do Want of
our officers obtain that knowledge which so peculiarly fits them as selection of
pilots, and which gives them such an intimate acquaintance with all navigating
the harbours and channels of the world ? I fear that the answer to
these questions cannot but show up the hollow farce which has been
enacted since 1824. In that year you ceased to select from the
merchant service, and commenced to rear up a special branch of
navigators from lads of about sixteen who were entered as masters'
assistants. Unfortunately, Sir, this special training has been a
perfect myth. You commenced by giving these nominations in
many cases to boys who were very much inferior in general ability
to your cadets in the other branch. Admiral Sulivan and Admiral
Fanshawe gave rather strong evidence on the point before the Com-
mittee on Masters in 1862. Admiral Sulivan said :-
“I have known those appointments given in succession to second-
rate tradesmen's sons of a naval borough; so that I heard once a
492
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Want of
special
training
for navi-
gating
officers.
man who examined them say, that out of a long batch there was
hardly one who had ever the appearance of being a gentleman's son.
I think that has not been so for many years now; I think that they
are generally much of the same class as the executive rank.'
Admiral Fanshawe said :-
“In the last ship that I was in, the masters' assistants were
immeasurably inferior to the naval cadets in all the subjects of
which tabulated forms came in to me, and in their studies under
the naval instructor they were always the worst, and it was the same
in other things. They were dull; they were not easily stirred up
to compete, and there was not much emulation amongst them.'
Of course there have been bright exceptions, and several sons of
old and distinguished officers have entered under these nominations;
but still far too large a number of lads without ability or position
have been considered sufficiently qualified to train up as navigators.
Well, Sir, from the day these lads enter, instead of attempting to
repair the damage of defective early education, every obstacle is
thrown in their way against obtaining knowledge as seamen and
navigators. You station your young navigating officers in the store
rooms, holds, and tiers, instead of obliging them to be constantly on
deck, where alone they can obtain an insight into their peculiar
calling. I am well aware that of late years a slight improvement
has been made in this respect, especially in the Mediterranean
Station; but, practically, it is still in force generally throughout
the service; and, as a matter of fact, I apprehend it cannot be
denied that hardly any training is given to the navigating officers
before they are placed in charge of vessels. Even when these
officers are passing their examination, you do not allow them to go
to the Naval College. Nobody seems to care for them; and it is a
perfect marvel to me how they are able to get on at all. It is
generally admitted that, in nine cases out of ten, these young officers
gain their experience after they become navigating lieutenants. In
the Baltic some very curious instances of this kind occurred.
Admiral Sulivan, in his examination on this point, said:
"In the Baltic the second master of a flag-ship, when offered a
death vacancy, went to the master of his own ship and said—“I am
afraid to take it, I know nothing of pilotage and navigation, and I
should be afraid to pilot the ship; what had I better do?” The
master argued with him, and said—“You will soon pick it up, I
daresay, and you will do as well as the others.” He took the post,
feeling his incompetency. . . . Some of the young masters in the
Baltic were really so incompetent, that the things done there were
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
493
.
almost incredible, and several captains complained to me of the
utter uselessness of the masters, that, for the first time, they had
been obliged to take the navigation and pilotage upon themselves,
and learn it as it were, because the masters were utterly useless;
therefore it is clear that they had not had the training before they
undertook the duties.
Admiral Key, who is well known as one of our most distinguished
officers, alluded strongly to this point. He was asked by Captain
Richards ::-
• Do you think, as a general rule, that the practical part of a
navigating officer's duty is learnt after he becomes a navigating
officer by experience afloat ?--After he has become a master. Just
so ?–In the early part of my service, masters' assistants and second
masters were educated in the holds of ships; and I have known a
great many instances in which they have been suddenly brought on
deck to be put into the position of masters of ships.'
I do not mean to imply that you have not some very competent
navigating officers; but the result of this curious system is that you
have frequently many of your ships in the greatest possible danger
during the time that the navigating officer is acquiring experience.
I can perfectly understand that some men should have such a high
opinion of the difficulties of navigation as to think it necessary to
train up a special class selected for that duty; but I cannot com-
prehend on what possible ground you can defend a special class
without special qualifications. Can any reasonable man deny that
if you have a navigating class they ought to be selected for their
peculiar fitness for that office ?
Now, Sir, I hope it will not be thought that I wish to disparage Concession
or cast a slur on the navigating officers as a whole. I am well aware rank to
that you have among them some very clever and distinguished men.
navigating
After these officers have acquired experience, many of them become
very clever pilots and navigators, notwithstanding the continuous
slight and annoyance they are daily subject to, and notwithstanding
the fact that they are an isolated body without promotion to look
forward to, or any real inducement being held out to them to work.
Some nine years ago, when discontent had reached a point which
could not be ignored, the Admiralty attempted to make the position
of what was then called masters somewhat more tolerable ; but like
most half measures, the remedy has completely failed in giving
satisfaction. The name of master was then abolished, and the
cognomen of navigating lieutenant and staff commander were
introduced, making them retain, however, their old position as
of relative
branch.
494
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Recent
inquiries
by Com-
niittoes.
junior to the lieutenant of the watch. The result of this change
has, I fear, rendered matters much worse. It has had the effect of
drawing the line of a navigating class much sharper and clearer.
Even the additional rank, which was given as a sop, with the extra
amount of gold lace, has proved a matter of heartburning and sore-
ness. You have not, and cannot do away with the peculiar inferior
social status they are placed in. Unfortunately, there is still existing
throughout the service an amount of grumbling and discontent
which has the effect of making officers indifferent to their work, and
must prove a source of weakness in time of danger. Navigating
officers find themselves hampered at every turn in carrying out their
duty-constant irritation must beget slovenly work. You may
depend upon it that officers will not do their work efficiently when
they are discontented.
I will not, Sir, dwell further on this part of my motion. What-
ever course it may be found necessary to take, I am confident that
matters cannot remain as they are, and I think I have proved that
even if you continue a separate class the present system is so un-
satisfactory that it must be entirely remodelled. But, Sir, let us
examine my second proposition—that the only sound remedy is total
abolition and to throw these duties on the executive officers. During
the last ten years there have been three Committees which have
inore or less examined into this subject, and have brought together
a mass of most valuable evidence, a portion of which I will quote
from. We have the report of the Committee on Naval Promotion
and Retirement; secondly, the report of a Departmental Committee;
and, thirdly, we have the report of the Committee which inquired
into the question of the Higher Education of Naval Officers.
Captain Washington, the late Hydrographer of the Navy, drew up
a very carefully expressed memorandum, which he laid before the
Committee of 1862. In this paper he shows very clearly the pre-
judicial effect this separate branch has on the other officers :-
"I think it cannot be denied that the system of entrusting the
pilotage and navigation of Her Majesty's ships to a single class, as
masters, must have a tendency to beget indifference or inattention
to those particular duties in the lieutenants and other officers of the
main executive branch. It can hardly be expected that a young
officer, who knows that when once he has passed his examination at the
Naval College, he will probably never be called upon to navigate a
ship, should keep up his knowledge of navigation or astronomy. The
master is specially appointed to attend to such duties, and why should
an executive officer give himself any trouble about navigation, unless
Memorau.
dum by
Captain
Washing-
ton.
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
495
Sulivan.
he has a special taste for the subject ? On the other hand, by throwing
the work and responsibility of navigating and piloting and conning
the ship on the lieutenants and other officers of the executive branch,
a more general acquaintance with those duties would be cultivated
and diffused throughout the service; emulation would be encouraged,
and those who might subsequently be called upon to command Her
Majesty's ships, even if they had not performed the special duties of
a navigating officer, could not fail to have a more general knowledge
of those subjects, and thus prove far more efficient commanders and
captains.'
Then, again, Sir, we have the strong testimony of Admiral Admiral
Sulivan, and it must be remembered that both of these officers have
been surveying captains, and therefore having studied the question
in a practical form are most competent to form a true and un-
prejudiced opinion. Admiral Sulivan was asked :-
• Do you think it would be beneficial to Her Majesty's naval
service in general if the class of masters, second masters, and
masters' assistants, were done away with as a separate branch of the
service ? —Most decidedly. I think that the present system is
merely the result of the old custom, when sailors only navigated
ships, and soldiers fought them; and that has been handed down by
degrees until the service is totally altered, and yet the anomaly of
the separate class is retained ; that is the only reason that I have
ever been able to see in the slightest way for having two classes of
executive officers in a ship.'
I know, Sir, that some officers think that these opinions are only
shared by surveying officers. Indeed, I was gravely informed the
other day, that no captains or admirals who had sailed with a fleet
were in favour of the change.
Now, Sir, it so happens that we have unmistakable proof to the Witnesses
contrary. We have the recorded evidence before the Committees of of abolition
seven admirals and eleven captains in favour of abolishing the
gating
separate grade as at present constituted. These names include some
of our most distinguished officers, and they cannot fail to carry great
weight in solving the question. We find amongst them Admirals
Sir Spencer Robinson, Sir William Hall, Sir Frederick Nicholson, Sir
B. Sulivan, Hon. J. Denman, Fanshawe, Cooper Key ; Captains
Goodenough, Corbett, Arthur, Moorman, Bradshaw,
, Chatfield,
Shortland, Field, Rice, Rolland, and Nares. But, Sir, these are only
names of officers who have given official evidence. I could, if it were
required, quote a long list of other distinguished and gallant officers
who are in favour of the change; but I have thought it best to
of navi-
brancb.
496
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Sir F.
Nicholsın.
confine myself exclusively to the evidence which is now on the table
of the House. The evidence of some of these officers is so much to
the point that I hope the House will allow me to read a few extracts.
I find that Admiral Fanshawe, who is now Commander-in-Chief ou
the North American Station, stated in evidence :
'I should propose that the regular paval service should do the
masters' duty altogether, and that the masters should cease to exist
as a separate class. I think now, taking the service as it is, that
they are what might be called an unnecessary excrescence upon the
service; it was not the case in olden times, but it is so now.
I
feel very strongly now that the circumstances under which the
masters were beneficial to the service as a separate class have passed
away, and that, being no longer beneficial to the service, it is very
desirable to get rid of them as a separate class. . . . I think it
stands to reason that a man who has had those duties to perform, and
has navigated a ship, and had the responsibility attaching to it as
lieutenant, would have perfect confidence in himself as a captain.'
Then Admiral Sir Frederick Nicholson, who was a commodore,
and was some years in China, stated :-
"Many young officers work up their navigation so as to be able to
pass their examinations, and then it dies away entirely out of their
minds. But I do not see any difficulty in making captains entirely
responsible for the navigation. I think that the divided responsi-
bility between the captains and masters has always been a drawback,
both with respect to the navigation and pilotage. I dare say, if the
thing could be traced out, ships have got on shore, and may even
have been wrecked, owing to that divided responsibility.'
Admiral Denman, who has only lately been in command of the
Pacific Station, when asked if he would do away entirely with the
masters as a class, said:-
'I would. I think great advantage would accrue from it, as
introducing more harmony into the service.'
And then he was asked :-
Would not the frequent change of the navigating officer on his
promotion or otherwise deprive him of the experience necessary for
the safe conducting of our large ships ?'—'I do not think so at all. I
think that the attention of some of our ablest officers would be con-
stantly given to the subject, and all officers would give more attention
to it than they do now. I think you will find that at the present
moment that ohjection would apply to the masters of one half of our
large ships-namely, that they are very young masters-masters of
six or seven years' standing. I consider that the special duties of a
Admiral
Denman.
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
4.97
William
master are not in any degree more difficult to learn than the duties
of seamanship in general; and that any man who is a thoroughly
good seaman, and an educated man, could, in a very short time,
acquire all the special knowledge which is required of a master.'
Admiral Sir Astley Cooper Key, who has been appointed to Sir Cooper
Key.
superintend the College at Greenwich, and is most deservedly
regarded as one of the most scientific officers in the service and one
who probably knows more about the requirements of young officers
than anyone else, was asked:
“You are aware that the question of the abolition of navigating
officers as a separate class has frequently been urged upon the
Admiralty. Supposing that measure should ever be adopted, do you
think there would be any difficulty in inducing sub-lieutenants and
lieutenants to qualify themselves for the performance of navigating
duties on board ship, including, of course, pilotage ? — No; I do not
think that there would be any difficulty whatever in finding a suffi-
cient number of sub-lieutenants and lieutenants to qualify for those
duties.'
The evidence of Admiral Sir W. Hall, well known as Nemesis Sir
Hall, is also very important. This officer was at one time a master, Hall.
and was promoted for gallant conduct in China. There is, perhaps,
no one who from actual experience, first as master and then as cap-
tain of a ship, has a better right to be heard. He stated, before the
Committee :
'I have long been of opinion that the line of masters, from their
not having sufficient rank, and not receiving that encouragement
to which from their services they were entitled, ought to be done
away with altogether, and that well-qualified lieutenants ought to be
selected to navigate the ship, under the captain, and that the
navigating lieutenant should undertake all the duties that the
master has now to perform, with better pay, and the same chances
of promotion as the other lieutenants. I have known during my
long service many ships nearly lost by running on shore and foul
of other vessels, for want of the authority which, as masters, they
ought to have possessed. I have known the leadsman taken out of
the chains, the mastheadman called down to wash decks, and a
request to just lower the peak, or hoist the jib, to clear danger, to
have no attention paid to it by the lieutenant of the watch. In
fact, there has always been a sort of jealousy and rivalry existing
between the master and the other officers, and I have found that the
public service suffers by it.'
Then, Sir, we have also the testimony of Mr. Pullen, a master of Mr. Pullen.
:
VOL. IV.
KK
498
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION,
Existence
of a navi-
gating
branch
creates in
difference
to navi.
gating
duties in
executive
officers.
considerable standing, in favour of the change, and being in com-
mand of a vessel, he speaks from his experience, not only as a navi-
gating officer, but also as a captain, thoroughly versed in these
duties. He says:
‘My opinion is that you would add considerably to the efficiency
of the officers in the service if the masters, as a class, as they are at
present, could be done away with. I am speaking now as a master
in command of a ship; I think that the entire navigation of the
ship, and all the responsibilities attached to it, ought solely to be
entrusted to one person. I think that that is the duty of the cap-
tain of the ship. My ideas may be peculiar upon that point.
I am in command of a ship myself, and in the position that I
occupy, I feel that I could not tolerate anyone in her to navigate
under me—in fact, I do it all myself. I take the sole responsibility
of whatever happens in that ship, and I am ready to abide by it
myself. I could not leave it in the hands of another man to do this
work for me. Moreover, when the captain of a ship has this respon-
sibility, he will take care, whenever he is in pilot waters, that all
the energies of the officers and the crew of the ship shall be devoted
to looking after her safety.'
There is a great deal more of similar evidence; but what I have
already quoted appears to me to prove that however badly the
system may work, so far as it relates to the navigating branch, it is
the source of far greater evil, of far greater mischief to the service
generally. It is impossible to deny that lieutenants, commanders,
and captains are lulled into a state of apparent security in all that
- relates to the navigation of the ship, owing to the presence on board
of this special branch. They naturally reason that it is not their
cluty to look after the navigation, as that is in the hands of one man
who has it under his peculiar guardianship. Directly a sub-lieu-
tenant passes an examination at college be throws aside his books,
being well aware that nearly all the subjects he has qualified in will
never be required of him again. He may have gone through a
brilliant examination in nautical astronomy, and may have, after an
infinity of labour, come out the first or second on the list as an
accomplished navigator, and yet from that very moment he is well
aware that until the end of his career all incentive to continue his
studies is gone. He knows that in future all he will have to do will
be to send in a few formal days' work to the captain, take a few
sights during his watch, but that no practical work or real responsi-
bility will be required of him, and that he will be for ever debarred
from following out or calling into use that knowledge which he
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
499
:
has taken such pains to acquire--and which he may be peculiarly
fitted for. Can it be wondered at that the result is so deplorable
that to the great majority of officers nautical astronomy and the
theory and practice of navigation soon become forgotten, and that
on all these subjects which your naval officers ought to be so accom-
plished in, the mind becomes a blank ? Surely, Sir, it is melan-
choly to reflect how entirely this process has the effect of alienating
the watchful care of all the executive officers of the ship. If any-
thing were wanted to show this more conclusively, perbaps nothing
could prove it better than the late catastrophe which occurred to
the ‘Minotaur' and 'Lord Clyde. In the first case you find the
admirals and captains resting with the blindest possible faith on the
staff-commander's knowledge. It was apparently the general feeling
that it was nobody else's business to attend to the navigation, and
the result was that one of your finest ironclads drifted on to a well-
known rock in broad daylight. In the second instance—that of the
Lord Clyde '-you had on board a very superior and able navigating
officer, but notwithstanding this, and clearly owing to the want of a
general knowledge of practical navigation on the part of the other
officers, and the absence of all precautions, this ship was allowed
to drift helplessly ashore. The captain and officers of the watch seem
to have been in a state of helpless apathy as regarded the true posi-
tion of the ship. We see in this instance, as in many others I could
quote, no care taken when the officers relieved watch that the
position of the ship was accurately placed on the chart. In some
ships you have chart-houses on deck supplied, and yet in too many
cases, instead of the officer of the watch being able to consult the
chart, as he is able to do in nearly every foreign navy, no facilities
whatever are afforded. I have alluded to these two cases as being
the most prominent as pointing out with the most fatal precision
the defects of the existing system. Now, Sir, I am well aware that
although I have quoted the names of several most distinguished
officers who are in favour of a change in the present system, my
right hon. friend at the head of the Admiralty will undoubtedly be
able to bring forward an equally long list who are opposed to the
alteration. I am free to confess that amongst the senior officers-
the admirals and captains—there may be even a majority against
me, and I do not think it is to be wondered at that officers who
have been brought up under the old system should cling to it; but,
Sir, if you were to poll the junior officers, the lieutenants and com-
manders, I am confident there would be found an overwhelming
preponderance in my favour. Whatever importance the House may
+
кк 2
500
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Statistics
of losses in
the Navy
from bad
navigation.
attach to these opinions, there is one argument in favour of improv-
ing the navigation of our ships which I know cannot be gainsaid and
must carry with it immense weight.
I have spoken of two catastrophes—those which happened to the
Minotaur' and 'Lord Clyde '--but these are a very small fraction
of what have occurred. Thanks to the courtesy of my hon. friend
the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Baxter) I have been permitted
to see an epitome of all the courts-martial and courts of inquiry
which have been held during the past eleven years, and from this
data I have arrived at this astounding result. During the last
eleven years—from 1860 to 1871—no less than 106 ships have been
stranded. In forty-one of these cases no blame was actually attached;
but of the remainder sixty-five the courts of inquiry clearly showed
that they had got ashore from bad navigation. In thirteen of these
cases the vessels were never got off. Can it be denied that with
these figures before us great improvements ought to be made in the
navigation of our ships ? Now, Sir, I have gone carefully into the
value of these ships which have been stranded, and although I have
taken the accounts considerably under what I should have been
perfectly justified in putting them at, yet, after allowing a fair
depreciation for the time they had been employed, I think the
House will agree that the figures are rather startling. Of the 106
vessels, twenty-six were small, some of them gunboats, which at
20,0001. were worth 520,0001. ; seven ironclads, which at 250,0001.
were worth 1,750,0001; and seventy-three were various vessels,
which, at 70,0001. each, were worth 5,110,0001. ; so that the value
of the vessels stranded was 7,380,0001. No blame was attached in
the cases of thirteen gunboats estimated to be worth 260,0001., and
twenty-eight other vessels, worth 1,960,0001., making a total of
2,220,000l. ; which, deducted from 7,380,000l., left a value of
5,160,0001., endangered from careless navigation. The approximate
value of ships lost from stranding through bad navigation was
as follows :-one line-of-battle ship, 150,0001.; three gunboats,
60,0001.; and nine other vessels, 630,0001.-making the total
approximate value 840,0001. To this must be added the cost of
repairing the sixty-five vessels that were got off, which might be
put down at 250,0001.—so that the total value lost was 1,090,0001.
I am quite confident that I have very much understated the value,
and yet we have this astounding fact—that in eleven years no less
than 5,160,0001. worth of property has been run ashore and placed
in jeopardy from careless navigation, and 1,090,0001. worth actually
lost. In the reports of many of these courts of inquiry it is only
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
501
too evident that if full and entire responsibility had rested on the
captain, and he had been the duly qualified and competent navi-
gator of the ship, with a skilful assistant under him, many of these
accidents would have been avoided. It is true that a certain dual
responsibility rests with the captain, and that of late years, since
the loss of the Conqueror,' an attempt has been made to draw the
reins tighter and to make the captain more so. The recent courts-
martial have endeavoured to drive home this responsibility more
and more.
I rejoice to see it, as pointing clearly the direction you
must take of making the captain absolutely responsible. What you
do is this--you place the navigating officer to do the duty, being
well aware that the captain has had no experience in the practical.
work, and yet, if the ship gets ashore, you make the captain liable.
I ask the House, can anything be more absurd ? What I urge is to
make the captain capable, make him a good navigator and pilot,
and then by all means make him responsible, giving him a compe-
tent assistant. It is true some captains do even now navigate their
own ships, and will not allow this duty to be thrown entirely on the
navigating officers; but I fear these instances are rare.
The strong action which my right bon. friend took after the
court-martial on the 'Agincourt'in dismissing those gallant officers
who were in command, showed that he thoroughly appreciated the
principle that the ship ought to be in charge of the captain abso-
lutely, giving him whatever assistance may be necessary; but that
on him, and on him alone, must lie the onus of her safe-conduct.
The strong reprimand which was then administered most certainly
had a very beneficial effect; but, still, every impartial man must
allow that these gallant officers were very harshly dealt with, as it
was the baneful effect of the system which was really at fault, and
they only acted in blind adherence to the old tradition of leaving all
to the navigating officer. Sir, the abolition of the navigating branch Abolition
approved
is no new idea advanced by me: it has for a number of years by Sir
attracted great attention by the different Boards of Admiralty. I John
Pakington.
understand that when the right hon. baronet the member for
Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) was at the head of the Admiralty, in
1859, he determined to try the experiment, and in one noted case
he sent for a young commander, and asked him if he would take the
vessel without a master. The reply was, that he was not fit to
command unless he could also navigate. The ship sailed, and was
very well navigated. When the Duke of Somerset came to the
Admiralty he was opposed to the change; but, after having been at
the head of affairs for some years, and having seen how badly the
502
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Duke of
Somerset,
system worked, he came to a very different conclusion. After long
and anxious consultation, he deliberately determined to abolish the
navigating class. Lord Clarence Paget, in 1865, when Secretary to
the Admiralty, announced this policy. He said :-
“The result to which we have arrived is that, upon the whole, it
would be better to let the class die out. We propose to appoint
lieutenants who would do the work quite as well as the masters,
whom, however, I would not at all disparage, for many a time have I
had to thank my stars for having a good master. I believe, however,
under the extremely difficult circumstances of the case, brought
about, I am bound to say, by the masters themselves, the lieutenants
will replace the masters with advantage to the service.?
The Duke of Somerset, assisted by my right bon. friend the
member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers), who was then at the Admiralty,
had the foresight to see in what a dangerous condition we should be
placed during war time if this canker worm were not rooted out;
and, cutting aside all the deep-rooted prejudices which clung round
the question, he stopped the entries, and thus paved the way
for
gradual abolition. Unfortunately, the Duke did not reinain long
enough in office to carry this alteration out, and he was succeeded by
the right hon. Baronet the member for Droitwich? Sir John Pakington),
who at once reversed the important step which had been taken, and
commenced re-entering navigating cadets, and which was continued
by the right hon. member for Tyrone (Mr. Corry). When my right
hon. friend the member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) came into
office, notwithstanding the enormous amount of work which he found
thrust upon him, he seems to have determined to carry out the
Duke of Somerset's policy of gradual abolition, and for this purpose
he placed the entry of navigating cadets on exactly the same footing
as naval cadets, and I am sure that if he had remained at the
Admiralty the class would have been allowed to die out. Some
officers, I know, think that you can retain a separate class, making
an immense change for the better, by giving special training, special
inducements, and, above all, having selected men; but, Sir, I much
fear that whilst you may improve the status of this class, whilst you
may
also lessen the number of disasters by these alterations, the one
evil you will not remedy is the very one I attach the greatest
importance to-namely, the absence of all inducement on the part
of the other officers--your lieutenant, commander, and captain-to
attend to this great branch of a seaman's duty, and the natural
consequence is that the captains of your ships will still be deprived
of that confidence in their own ability to navigate, which I hope to
and Mr.
Childers.
.
NAVIGATION OF HI.M, SHIPS.
503
Sherard
see absolutely essential as a qualification in a captain. It is absurd
to believe that any expedition could be fitted out by private enter-
prise where the captains were not made the actual navigators and
solely responsible. When Captain Sherard Osborn fitted out his Captain
China squadron, what did he do? Why, Sir, he made the captains Osborn.
navigate their own ships. He stated before the Committee:
“When, in 1863, I had to organise a naval force for the Chinese
Government, I consulted Captains Burgoyne, Charles Stewart,
Nicholas, Noel, Osborn, Captain Allen Young and others, and I
deliberately made each of them responsible for the navigation of
their ships, and their logs and work books were admirably kept.
The ships were most successfully piloted, and many of those naval
officers have expressed subsequently their obligation to me for having
compelled them to acquire a knowledge of a branch of their profes-
sion which they had hitherto much neglected.'
He was then asked:
‘Have you in the course of your service found that a want on the
part of executive officers of a practical acquaintance with navigation
has resulted disadvantageously for ships on expeditions ? — Yes; I
was first struck with it in the Arctic service, where I felt my own
shortcomings, and I remarked to what a lamentable extent it existed,
even among a picked body of officers that were sent out on two
expeditions to those seas.'
The scheme which I would propose is this—I. Gradually to
abolish the navigating class, making ample compensation in doing so.
2. Make all your captains, as soon as qualified, the actual navigators
of their ships, absolutely responsible, giving them a lieutenant to
assist them. Ini carrying this out I would venture to suggest that-
1. Captains should be given (say) 1001. a-year extra pay for the
additional work. 2. Lieutenants' list increased by 150. 3. An
extra lieutenant be appointed in all the large ships. 4. All
lieutenants, after having served two years as officers of the watch,
should be made to pass an examination similar in all respects to that
which the navigating lieutenants now go through, in pilotage and
practical navigation, and according to the examination passed so
they should have preference in being selected to assist the captain,
giving a small increase of pay. 5. Commanders, during the first
two years after their promotion, should be made to go through a
course of pilotage and practical navigation in the Channel in two
vessels to be specially appointed for that duty; and, in order to give
proper inducement to officers to qualify, I would give to those who
came up to a certain standard full pay, and sea time, and so on in
504
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
:
branch.
proportion to their merit. 6. No lieutenant should be allowed to
hold the duty of assistant navigating officer to the captain longer
than five years. 7. In every ship, without exception, there should
always be a survey in progress, so that all officers might have the
opportunity of acquiring an intimate knowledge of surveying. There
may be many other plans which might be suggested, and I offer
these with considerable diffidence; but, at the same time, after
considering the matter very carefully, I believe this would answer
the purpose and give complete satisfaction. As to expense, the
present system costs 125,0001. a-year, while the plan I suggest,
including extra pay to captains, would cost only about 90,0001.
Objections Now, Sir, what are the main objections which are urged to this
to abolition plan ? I am well aware that it will be stated that it would be impos-
gating
sible to give the captain the additional burden. My strong belief is,
that with a competent assistant, it would really give a captain less
anxiety, and therefore less work, as he would have thorough confi-
dence in himself, whereas now he seldom feels it. If captains have
too much correspondence, by all means curtail it. If the captain of
every other foreign navy in the world is able to do this work, surely
the argument falls to the ground. Then, secondly, I know I shall be
told that it is quite true that foreign navies have no such separate
grades; but their vessels are not navigated with the same boldness as
ours, and that French officers are continually praising our system. Sir,
I should be very sorry, indeed, if any change were effected which
would militate against our ships being navigated with the utmost
boldness consistent with safety. Undoubtedly every consideration
must be subsidiary to this one point; and it is only because I
believe that ships would be navigated with far greater boldness, and
with far greater security, if the captains had practical acquaintance
with these duties and felt themselves thoroughly responsible, that I
thought it my duty to bring this motion forward. As regards the
opinion of foreign officers I am quite .certain that amongst thought-
ful and working officers a feeling of the opposite nature is prevalent.
Admiral Suliyan gave strong testimony on this point.
asked :-
· Have you been informed by French officers that they lament
that they have not got the rank of master, as we have ? - Never ; I
believe that I have served more with French officers and with French
ships than any man in our service. I am the only officer in
our service, I believe, who has lived in them, has piloted them, and
been in charge of them. I had upon one occasion nine or ten months'
daily experience with them, and doing piloting and surveying work
He was
1
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
505
for them in consequence of their not having any surveying officers,
just the same as I have done for our owu squadron or fleet, and in no
case do I ever recollect them lamenting the want of masters; but
they have frequently expressed to me their regret that they had not
a class of surveying officers as we had ; therefore, they have felt the
want of that very class that I have alluded to; but I never heard
them say that they were in want of officers for the ordinary pilotage
or navigation of their fleet.'
Then Sir Spencer Robinson was asked :-
Have you had any opportunities of hearing the opinion of Sir
superior French officers with regard to their navigating system as Robinson.
Spencer
compared with ours ? '-'Yes; I have spoken to many French naval
officers, who thought it a very excellent thing to have a master, and
on talking to them about it, I found that the general view of the
greater part of them was a desire to discharge themselves from that
labour and responsibility. That motive, of course, ought not to
influence any officer, and therefore I do not consider that opinion of
any great value.
Surely, Sir, however, there is one satisfactory answer which can- General
not be got over-namely, that if our system was really considered so for aboli-
very satisfactory it would very soon be introduced into not only the tion of
navigating
French but every other foreign navy. The very reverse is, however, the line.
case ; and in the Russian Navy, where a similar system is now in
force, I understand that it is intended to abolish it. In the German
Navy, whilst copying every other institution, they have most care-
fully avoided this. Then, Sir, I shall probably be told that if this
navigating class is abolished you will deprive many naval officers of
the boon they now have of getting their sons into the Navy which
they could not afford to do as naval cadets; but surely, Sir, this may
be an argument in favour of giving scholarships or of increasing the
pay of cadets, but certainly is no reason in favour of retaining a bad
system of navigating your ships. I may be told that five years is
too short a time for lieutenants to act as assistant navigators; but it
must be remembered my fundamental principle is that they shall
only be assistants to the captains, who are themselves to be the
thoroughly experienced navigators and pilots. I will not detain the
House any longer, Sir; but before I sit down I am anxious to say
that I hope my hon. and gallant friends who sit in this House, and
who, I understand, are nearly all opposed to my motion, will not
think it presumption on iny part to have raised this question, having
only been a lieutenant in the Navy when I left the service. I
assure them I have done so in all humility, being well aware of the
506
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
favour-
able for a
great authorities which are opposed to me; but I have felt the latë
disasters to be so serious, and having a very strong opinion on the
subject, I did not think I should be justified in not expressing it.
Oppor-
I will only further add that on no former occasion have you ever
tunity
had such an opportunity to make this alteration. You have a large
number of sub-lieutenants ready to increase your lieutenant list.
change of
system.
You have a great scheme of naval education which you are about
to set on foot, which you have the evidence of all your naval
professors cannot be complete until this change is effected. The late
disasters have drawn the eyes of all foreign navies upon us, and
such navigation, if repeated, cannot fail to become a scandal. The
whole service is looking forward to the change-sooner or later
it must come. Clinging to a system of more than two centuries
old, and not in harmony with the age, will not avail us in time of
need. I entreat my right hon. friend to make the alteration soon,
before he has a fresh roll of disasters to mar still further the prestige
of the British Navy. I beg to move :-
* That, in the opinion of this House, the time has arrived when
the maintenance of a separate and distinct branch of officers for
navigating duties is no longer desirable in the interests of the naval
service.'
MR. BRASSEY : Sir, I rise for the purpose of seconding the motion
piler.
of my hon. friend, with an intimate conviction that the change which
he has advocated will prove beneficial to our naval service. It
would, indeed, be presumptuous in a civilian to entertain a view on
a subject so strictly professional, which was not based on the clearly-
expressed opinions of naval officers of high reputation. That this
essential foundation is not wanting in the present instance, will be
clearly demonstrated by reference to the most recent Parliamentary
literature on the subject. The evidence taken by the Committee on
the Education of Naval Officers comprised much weighty testimony
in favour of the abolition of a special class of officers for navigating
duties. The change was advocated by Admiral Cooper Key, as an
inducement to officers to study; and the Committee in their report
gave it as their opinion that, in a purely educational point of view,
the employment of volunteers from the executive branch, for the
performance of navigating duties, vould tend materially to improve
the general knowledge of navigation and pilotage among the officers.
Tvidence of
To show how valuable the abolition of the special class of
navigating officers may be as an incentive to the general study of
navigation and pilotage in the Navy, I will quote from the evidence
of the naval instructors-gentlemen who possess unique opportuni-
The Com-
Naval In-
structors.
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
507
ties of judging whether we may safely rely on selected officers of the
executive branch for the effective performance of navigating duties
in the Navy. Professor Main has well explained the distinction
between encouragement to study by the hope of reward, and the
attempt to enforce a high standard in compulsory examinations. In
his memorandum, presented to the Committee on Naval Education,
he says:
Main.
Mr. Har-
All compulsory education should end with the examination for Professor
sub-lieutenant. It should be the province of the Admiralty from
this point to stimulate talent and zeal in special branches, by
creating special classes of officers. This has been already most
successfully done in the case of the gunnery lieutenants. If it be
thought desirable to do away with the navigating officers, as a
distinct class, it will be attended with the greatest, benefit to naval
education generally. The increase of pay for performing these
duties should be such as to afford a sufficient inducement to volun-
teer for the appointment; and it should be always looked on as a
stepping-stone to promotion, and as a claim for employment. I
have no doubt this would give an opening for many young officers,
who have a natural liking for astronomical work, and at present have
no useful way of employing themselves in it.'
The evidence given by Mr. Harbord was to the same effect.
. Under the present system,' he said, 'you enter a number of bord.
youths of inferior education, and they must be transformed into
accomplished navigators, in many cases in spite of their natural taste
being adverse to their calling, while for many midshipmen with a
natural leaning to the science there is no opening. With the
exception of the boys from Greenwich, I have as a rule found the
masters' assistants inferior to the midshipmen; and I am sure that
the navigation of our ships would be in safer hands, if the officers in
charge of this department were chosen from the whole body of
young officers, especially from those who prove themselves good
seamen as well as navigators.'
Another naval instructor, Mr. Buckley, of the 'Duke of Welling- Mr. Buck-
ton, and formerly instructor of navigating cadets in the St. ley.
George, gave the following answers to the following questions :-
• Did any among the navigating cadets passed out of the “St.
George” give promise of being first-rate navigating officers ?'
* Certainly,' he replied. "Many?' was the next question. The
answer was- '
About a quarter of the number. He was then asked :
--Do you think that the other three-quarters would be either indif-
ferent or bad navigating officers ?' He replied—' I think so.' He
508
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Captain
Powell.
Sir Cooper
Key.
was then asked Whether he thought that, if the navigating
officers were chosen from the lieutenants generally, and if they
qualified themselves specially, that you would get upon the whole a
better class than those you were likely to have under the present
system ?' His reply was—Certainly you would.' Captain Powell,
who had formerly commanded the · Britannia,' abundantly confirmed
the opinion of the instructors. He recommended that the navi-
gating duties should be performed by lieutenants, and he predicted
that by this means you would often have officers in command of
singular ability in mancuvring and navigating ships.
It has been stated repeatedly by those naval officers of the
executive branch who have given their attention to navigation, that
the notion that there is some insuperable difficulty in mastering the
science is an illusion. Admiral Cooper Key told the Committee on
Education that he did not think that the practice of navigation was
so very difficult as to require a life-time to get a thorough know-
ledge of it. Some of the best navigators he had ever known were
quite young men. Again, alluding to the practice of pilotage, as
distinguished from navigation. Admiral Cooper Key declared that
wherever he had served-in any part of the globe--the best pilots
he had come across, and the best pilots we have had in our service,
have not been navigating officers, although, as a class, they are
admirable.
From these forcible arguments of a naval officer, I turn to a
distinguished authority connected with the mercantile marine, Mr.
W. S. Lindsay, and I ask the attention of the House to the view
which he has expressed on this subject, in his memorandum pre-
sented to Parliament in 1870:-
"In my remarks on manning the Navy, appended to the report
of the Commission of 1859, of which I had the honour to be a mem-
ber, I recommended that the grade of master should be altogether
abolished. I did so, because I thought that the most essential part
of a seaman's duty, the navigation of his ship, should be thoroughly
understood by every officer before he was placed in command ; and I
thought that the best way to accomplish this desirable object would
be to have a navigating lieutenant to assist the captain in the navi-
gation of his ship. The captain should alone be held responsible for
accidents through improper navigation. The ten years which have
since elapsed, while they have changed my opinion on some other of
my recommendations, have only tended to confirm what I then said
in regard to masters in the Navy.'
A commentary on Mr. W. S. Lindsay's paper, by Adiniral Sulivan,
Mr. W. S.
Lindsay.
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
509
tholomew
was laid before Parliament at the same time with his memorandum. Sir Bar-
In that commentary many of Mr. W. S. Lindsay's suggestions were Sulivan.
freely criticised, but in the abolition of the master class the gallant
admiral thoroughly concurred.
This is,' he says, 'the most important point to be considered, if
we look to the real advantage to the service and the thorough
efficiency of the officers in command of our ships. I have, through-
out my service in the Navy, seen so much of the evils resulting from
our present system, and have so often felt ashamed of the ignorance
of officers in command, of some of the most important duties of their
positions, that I advocated the abolition of the class as far back as
1846.
Again, 'I went fully into the question with Sir John Pakington,
when he first went to the Admiralty, and he asked a young commander,
to whom he offered a ship, if he had any objection to take a young
sub-lieutenant in lieu of a master, and take charge of the navigation
and pilotage himself. “If I could not do that, Sir, I should not be
fit to command her," was the reply. I believe he served his com-
mission without a master or second-mate, and I am quite sure that
if this had been followed up and made the rule, we should have all
our young commanders far more efficient for command, in every
respect, than many of thern are under the present system.'
These opinions ought to satisfy the most doubtful minds as to Existence
the possibility of obtaining competent navigating officers from the line disa
executive branch. If that be so, the other arguments in favour of courages
the abolition of a special class of navigating officers deserve the most efficers
from study
favourable consideration. The tendency of our present system must of navi-
inevitably be to divert the attention of the executive officers of the gation.
Navy from the study of navigation and pilotage. If this branch of
duty were no longer reserved for a special class, we should not, says
Admiral Sulivan, see such a disgraceful occurrence as a commander
of a sloop at Spithead-otherwise a good officer and sailor---refusing
to obey a signal to proceed to the assistance of a ship on shore
outside the Isle of Wight, and twice repeating the signal of in-
ability to weigh, because the master was on shore. Again, to quote
from a pamphlet recently published by a staff-commander in the
Navy :-
“A certain flag-ship was recently required to proceed from
Portland to Portsmouth; but she bad no master. The Admiralty
telegraphed that the navigating officer of the ship remaining behind
was to be sent on board. With a captain, a commander, and six
lieutenants, does not this appear lamentable ?. Can the system be
510
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
essential
to a naval
com-
mander.
career.
correct, if the absence of one man reduces a ship to a comparative
state of inefficiency ? '
The present system seems, in the highest degree, anomalous.
Admirals and captains are held responsible for disaster, if any should
occur, from improper navigation, and are liable to suffer the most
severe penalties which can be imposed on officers in the Navy; yet,
from the time when they pass their examination as lieutenants, until
they actually hold a command, they have but little, if any, opportu-
nity of acquiring a practical knowledge of an art, proficiency in
which can only be attained by practical training.
Knowledge It is quite impossible to understand how an officer can effec-
of pilotage
tually conduct a paval operation without being well acquainted with
navigation and pilotage. Lord Nelson, in his interesting autobio-
graphy, written on board his flag-ship, in Port Mahon, in 1799, twice
alludes to the opportunities which he had enjoyed, and of which
he had eagerly availed himself, to become acquainted with the art
of pilotage, as having been of much service to him in his subsequent
In the first passage, speaking of the year 1772, when he
was only 14 years of age, he says that, when on board the “ Triumph,'
at Chatham,-
“As his ambition was to be a seaman, it was always held out as a
reward that, if he attended well to bis navigation, he should go in
the cutter and decked longboat which was attached to the com-
manding officer's ship at Chatham.
Thus by degrees he became a good pilot for vessels of that
description from Chatham to the Tower of London, down the Swin
and the North Foreland, and confident of himself amongst rocks and
shoals, which had many times since been of great comfort to him.
Again, somewhat later in his career, Lord Nelson says that when he
was second lieutenant of the 'Lowestoffe' frigate of 32 guns he went
to Jamaica.
‘But even a frigate,' he says, was not sufficiently active for my
mind, and I got into a schooner, tender to the “Lowestoffe.” In this
vessel I made myself a complete pilot for all the passages through
the Keys Islands, situated on the north side of Hispaniola.'
These passages from the autobiography of Lord Nelson appear to
me to suggest the importance to the naval profession not merely of
a knowledge of navigation and pilotage generally, but especially of an
instruction acquaintance with our own coasts, the navigation of which is in some
in pilotage.
parts exceptionally difficult. The Channel Fleet, so called, is too
little seen in the Channel, and rarely appears on the East coast, in
the St. George's Channel, or in Scotland. But even if the Channel
Small
vessels
should be
commis-
sioned for
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
511
Fleet were to remain more constantly at home, it would not be pos-
sible for our young officers to study the intricate navigation of the
estuaries of the Thames, the Mersey, or the Humber, in vessels of
the prodigious dimensions of our modern ironclads. For this
purpose smaller vessels should be commissioned, more capable of
being handled under sail, and able from their moderate draught to
enter many ports which our large ironclads cannot visit. I believe
that the reserves of seamen in our home ports are at the present
time sufficiently large to provide crews for the vessels commissioned
for the relief of ships on foreign stations, and also to man, at least in
the summer season, a few small corvettes and sloops, which would
afford to the officers appointed to serve in them opportunities of
becoming acquainted with our home waters. We have not a single
vessel in commission on the home station which can be regarded as
an available cruising vessel for the instruction of officers in the
entire pilotage of the English coast; and when we take into view
the increasing number and enormously increasing value of Her
Majest:y's ships, designed especially for coast defence, the necessity
of giving to naval officers more opportunity of becoming familiar
with our home waters will be generally recognised.
In the United States Navy, the importance of instructing officers,
in the earlier stages of their career, in sailing ships has been fully
recognised. Attached to the establishment at Annapolis, there are
three sea-going cruisers—a frigate and two corvettes-all without
steam, which make voyages in the summer months.
I will not enlarge on one of the objections to the special class of the social
officers for navigating duties--I mean the social difficulty. In spite the ques-
aspect of
of many changes and concessions of higher nominal rank to masters,
this difficulty still remains and will ever continue, so long as they
are retained as a distinct class in the service. A stronger sentiment
of jealousy of all class privileges prevails at the present time than
was evinced sixty years ago. The pathetic appeals of Sir Charles
Napier are not yet forgotten in this House, in which he described
the discouragement of the neglected and unknown men in the
subordinate ranks of the Navy, with no friends at court. If such
disappointment were felt by one class of officers, is it not fair to
presume that it is as strongly felt by the other?
But my desire is not simply to satisfy the aspirations of the pre- Abolition
sent class of navigating officers. If that were all, a concession of of navi.
gating line
full participation in the chances of promotion would be enough. I recom-
desire to see the class abolished altogether, and their duties per-
formed by selected and duly-qualified officers of the executive
tion.
mended,
512
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
officers
Committee
of 1862.
branch. I am convinced by the arguments of those distinguished
naval men who affirm that the present system tends to check the
acquisition of the knowledge and experience of navigation which all
officers ought to possess. These younger officers are on their way
to high commands, in which they will be responsible for the safety of
the immensely valuable ships which our armoured fleet now contains.
Younger Navigation requires close attention; and the time of the navigating
favourable. officers appointed to the staff for those special duties will always be
fully employed when at sea. But there is no difficulty, either
theoretical or practical, in the art of navigation, in comparison with
the acquirement of the technical knowledge necessary in any other
profession. In conclusion, I may add that while the majority of the
senior officers of the Navy are opposed to the abolition of the master
class, the majority of the younger officers of the Navy are, so far as I
have been able to ascertain, in favour of the change. I am therefore con-
fident that sooner or later an alteration of system, so desirable for the
improvement of the service, will be carried out. Meanwhile, I trust
that the First Lord of the Admiralty inay be able to hold out hopes
of an early movement in this direction.
The recommendations of the Committee of 1862 in favour of a
trial of lieutenants of the executive line was, there is reason to believe,
cordially welcomed by the then Board of Admiralty; and in moving
the Navy Estimates of 1866, Lord Clarence Paget stated that, while
ever desirous of improving the condition of the masters, the conclusion
at which they had arrived was that it would be better to let the class
die out. We propose,' he said, 'to appoint lieutenants who would
do the work quite as well as the masters.' The Committee of 1862
recommended that, as an experiment, ten lieutenants should be ap-
pointed in ten of the smaller vessels to take charge of the navigation.
Let the Admiralty adopt this suggestion. Let an additional lieu-
tenant be appointed, instead of a master, to the first ten corvettes,
commanded by officers who will gladly accept them as substitutes for
the navigating officers, and let the merits of the new system be tested
by results. I am convinced that the result will be favourable; but
as many officers, whose opinions deserve the most attentive con-
sideration, object to a change, in deference to them it would be
prudent to wait until we have acquired experience of the new sys-
tem before we do away with the old. Whatever the issue of the
controversy may be, the House will appreciate the importance of
securing the highest attainable perfection in the navigation of the
costly vessels of our modern Navy, and will examine with interest a
proposal designed to improve a system which has acknowledged
defects.
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
513
SPEECHES ON MOVING AND SECONDING A RESO-
LUTION ON THE NAVIGATION OF
HER MAJESTY'S SHIPS,
By Lord Sudeley and the Compiler; delivered in the House of
Commons, Tuesday, April 25, 1876.
(Extracted from Hansard's' Parliamentary Debates.')
the navi-
Mr. HANBURY-TRACY, in rising to call attention to the alteration Lord
Sudeley.
which is gradually being effected in the system under which Her
Majesty's ships are navigated; and to move :-
That, in the opinion of this House, it having been determined
gradually to abolish the system of employing a separate and distinct
branch of officers for navigating duties, it is desirable that greater
encouragement and a more extended training than at present adopted
should be given to the officers of the fleet to obtain practical experi-
ence in surveying, pilotage, and navigation; and that in carrying
out the intended change due regard should be paid to the position
and prospects of existing class of navigating officers,' said :--The
subject cannot fail to be somewhat dry and uninteresting, as it History of
is purely a professional matter ; but, at the same time, when it is gating
remembered how large an amount we spend annually on our iron-
clad Navy, I trust I may claim the kind indulgence of the House
whilst I endeavour to state the case as briefly as possible. When I
last brought this subject before the House the question then in dispute
was whether the old system of retaining a separate class for navigating
duties should be continued, or whether it should be relegated to
the main executive branch and a general knowledge diffused through-
out all branches of the service. Since then I am happy to say this
point has practically been conceded, and I do not propose to re-open
it. To render the existing state of things intelligible to the House
I ought perhaps to explain that for a number of years we have main-
tained a separate branch, and I ought to use the expression a separate
branch.
VOL. IV.
L L
514
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
class of officers for navigating duties, under the general idea that by
this means we obtained men with far greater experience as pilots and
navigators than we otherwise could. This system originated many
years ago, in the time of Henry VIII., when it was necessary to
have sea nurses for our captains, and was resuscitated at the begin-
ning of the old French War, when it was found necessary to expand
our fleet very largely; we then brought in a large number of old
trained mates and merchant captains from the merchant navy, and
as they had not been brought up trained in gunnery and the disci-
pline of a man-of-war we utilised their services by entrusting them
with the navigation of the ships. These officers were first-rate
seamen, and in most cases good pilots, and were well satisfied with
their position, which was subordinate to the executive officers of the
ship. As these men died out the Navy had got go accustomed to
lean on the old masters that instead of rearing up the pick of our
young lieutenants to take their place we unfortunately allowed the
distinct and subordinate class to exist, and we entered year after
year a mixed set of lads, many of whom were of a very inferior
social status, to become our special navigators, without any selection
or special qualification. Of late years a much better class of boys
were entered, who, as they grew up, felt their anomalous and sub-
ordinate position most acutely. The general result was, as might be
expected, pilotage and navigation got to be regarded as a secondary
consideration, the executive class looked down upon it and took little
or no heed of it; whilst, at the same time, the special navigating
class grew more and more discontented. At last matters arrived at
such a point that the question could no longer be disregarded. In
1865 the Duke of Somerset, after carefully considering the question
with the assistance of the right hon. gentleman the member for
Pontefract (Mr. Childers), determined that the only real solution of
the difficulty was gradually to let the old class die out and to rear
up officers to take their place from the main line.. Thus, to obtain
selection and special qualification whilst, at the same time, diffusing
the knowledge through all ranks of the service. This policy was
announced by Lord Clarence Paget in June, 1865. Unfortunately
before this policy could be fully carried out the Duke of Somerset
went out of office and was succeeded by the right hon. gentleman
the member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington), now Lord Hampton,
who at once proceeded to reverse this policy and to enter again a
large number of navigating cadets. I am told, on high authority,
that this reversal of policy was not so much due to any very strong
opinion on the merits of the question as it was to the fact that the
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
515
right hon. gentleman desired to bestow his patronage on a consider-
able number of lads who were over the age of naval cadets, and by
this means they were got into the service. Whether this was so or
not must remain a secret in the archives of the Admiralty; but the fact
is undoubtedly true that the policy was reversed, and an attempt
was made to bolster up the old navigating class. The right hon.
gentleman the member for Tyrone (the late Mr. Corry), who succeeded
Lord Hampton, continued in the same course. In 1870 the right
hon. gentleman the member for Pontefract, on becoming First Lord,
determined that amongst the many reforms he would carry out, the
abolition of a separate class for navigating duties should be one of
them. He at once placed the entry of navigating cadets on the
same footing as the other cadets. The enormous amount of work
which was then thrust upon him, and his subsequent illness, pre-
vented further steps being then taken. Although my motion was
opposed in 1872 by the right hon. gentleman the member for the
City of London (Mr. Goschen), I am happy to say that within one
year the long-delayed step was taken, and a circular was issued in
August, 1873, inviting five lieutenants and twenty sub-lieutenants
to volunteer for navigating duties; whilst at the same time it was
made clear that the old class were gradually to be allowed to die out.
I confess that when the present Government came into office I was
much afraid that they might again take a retrograde step. I am
thankful, however, to say that the right hon. gentleman the present
First Lord has been able to withstand all inducements, and has not
only adhered to the policy of his predecessor, but has taken another
step in a similar direction. If there were any doubts as to his
intention in this respect, they were removed by the announcement
he made a few weeks ago, that he proposed at once to amalgamate
the navigating midshipmen with the executive line. Starting, then,
from this point, let us see whether the policy is being carried out as
vigorously as it ought to be, and in a manner likely to render the
new system a success. The question appears to divide itself into
three subjects--First: Whether the alteration which has been made
will speedily diffuse a knowledge of practical navigation and pilotage
amongst our captains and commanders, and enable them to handle
their ships with greater confidence ? Secondly: Whether the officers
being trained up to navigating duties in the executive line, to assist
the captain, have facilities given them to enable them to become tho-
roughly experienced and efficient in their duties? Thirdly: Whether
proper steps have been taken to meet the grievances complained of
by the existing navigating class, and to effect a just settlement of the
1. L2
516
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
.
Abolition
of navi-
gating
line will
encourage
executive
branch to
study
pilotage.
whole question ? And now let us examine the first part of the
subject.
The main advantage to be gained from the abolition of a separate
branch undoubtedly is the diffusion of a greater amount of practical
navigation and pilotage amongst our executive officers; and it is of
the greatest importance that our captains and commanders should
obtain this knowledge at the earliest possible moment. It is with
this view I and many others have always urged forward this
question, and we are therefore most anxious, now that the general
system is agreed to, that no time should be lost in obtaining this
result. The grievances of the navigating class, whilst most impor-
tant, must nevertheless stand second to the primary consideration.
Captain Washington, a late Hydrographer of the Admiralty, stated
these views very clearly in an able memorandum in 1862. He then
said:
“But apart from rendering justice to masters, it appears to me
that there is a higher motive for doing away with the class namely,
the general benefit of the service, by breaking up the monopoly of a
· large share of professional knowledge, reserved apparently for one
branch, and that not the principal executive branch of the service.
The master, by the Admiralty instructions, is entrusted with the
care of the rigging, and expenditure of stores, the stowage of the
holds, the charge of the anchors and cables, the custody of chrono-
meters and compasses, the navigation of the ship on the ocean, the
pilotage in narrow waters, and the steering and conning of the ship
in time of battle.' My great desire would be to see the knowledge,
experience, and skill which may be obtained in the performance of
such duties absorbed among the lieutenants, commanders, and cap-
tains, all of whom would become more efficient in their respective
positions by the addition to their professional qualifications, which
would be the sure and certain result of abolishing the separate
class.'
I am well aware that there are many officers in command of
ships who are good navigators and pilots, and I know several cap-
tains, who, although they may have neglected this duty during the
greater part of their service, have found the responsibility so serious
when they became captains, that they have at once set to work to
render themselves thoroughly competent. It is, however, only too
true that as a general rule, owing to the severance of the navigating
duties from the main body of the profession, lieutenants, after
having passed at the college, throw their books aside and think no
more of astronomy, or the theory of navigation-in which, in many
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
517
cases, they have passed brilliant examinations-knowing very well
that owing to there being a distinct class for these duties their
knowledge will never be required. The result is, that lieutenants
become commanders and commanders become captains without, in
nine cases out of ten, ever having taken a moderate sized ship from
one port to another by themselves. It is true that formal observa-
tion and a few days' work' are occasionally required in some
ships; but there is no reality in it; there is no responsibility about
it. I remember, in 1872, the right hon. and gallant gentleman
the member for Stamford (Sir John Hay), in replying to me, stating
that it was new to him that captains did not know how to navigate
and pilot their vessels, and he seemed to imply that I had very
much exaggerated the case. Now, Sir, I can well understand the
right hon. and gallant gentleman's feelings in the matter. He
happened himself to be one of those captains who took an interest
in this part of that duty, and it is well known that in one or two
ships he had no navigating officer on board, and the ships were navi-
gated with great success, He was well known in the service to be
a very good officer, and I have no doubt in most matters he was
thoroughly competent. To show, Sir, however, that I am borne
out in the opinion I have expressed by others, I will, with the per-
mission of the House, read a letter by a staff-commander of con-
siderable standing, one out of many sent to me:-
Speaking as a navigating officer, and feeling acutely the injus-
tice under which we suffer, I am nevertheless convinced that this is
nothing compared to the wrong done to the service and to the
country by the continuance of the present system under which the
practical knowledge of navigation is confined to a mere handful,
when the whole executive class is only waiting for proper induce-
ments to qualify for, aud undertake, this first and most important
of a naval officer's duty. . . . It is often said, both in and out
of Parliament, that captains can and do navigate their own ships.
I have had nineteen years' experience in navigating in charge of all
classes of ships from a gunboat to the largest ironclads, and have
served under nearly a score of captains, and this is my experience of
their knowledge and practice of navigation. Of the whole number
only one took astronomical observations with any regularity, another
did so occasionally; and of the remainder, I never saw one take a
sextant in hand, whilst as to deviation and variation of the compass,
&c., &c., such things were merely details of the navigating officer's
duty with which they did not concern themselves, and of which
they mostly knew nothing; yet the majority were really good officers,
518
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
The posi-
but had simply paid no' attention to a duty which the service had
brought them up to think would be done for them. ...
tion of navigating officers is so depressing that it is no wonder
executive officers are not very anxious to adopt their line, and the
neglect of that duty very naturally leads to the neglect of the
handling of the ship under other circumstances ; so that I have seen
the Channel Fleet of nine ironclads practically in the hands of the
staff-commanders when performing steam evolutions, the flagship
and one other being the only ships where the captains took charge
of their own ships. Lately some improvement has taken place
in this respect; but still the chief knowledge and practice of
handling the ship lies with the navigating officer, and what I dread
is this—that in case of an engagement between two fleets a high-
spirited captain would possibly feel himself bound, when about to
ram an enemy, to take the direction of the helm out of the navi-
gating officer's hands; when it is not too much to say that in three
cases out of four proficiency would be giving way to inefficiency, and
failure would be the result. The only way out of the difficulty is to
abolish the present class of navigating officers, and diffuse their
knowledge throughout the executives ; but do us jristice in their
aholition.'
I think no one can deny that this letter gives a very decided
opinion. The name of the writer of this letter I shall be very
happy to give to any hon. member, and the officer has given me
permission to give his name to the Admiralty if they require it, or
wish to test the accuracy of his statement. He is a distinguished
and able officer, and speaks with considerable authority. Sir, in the
present day, with the great alterations in naval warfare, I maintain
it is incumbent on our captains that they shall no longer be depen-
dent on a navigating officer. The old days when the master sailed
and conned the ship into action are past. We have arrived at a
time phen rams and torpedoes will be the deadly weapons of the
future, and when the captain who handles his ram the most skil-
fuļly must win the day. It is difficult to picture to oneself a more
unpleasant position for a captain to be placed in than to have com-
mand of one of our great ironclad rams, and to have to leave the
handling of his ship to another officer. Captain Noel, in his prize
essay, states the necessity of careful handling of a ram so well that
I feel I cannot do better than quote his words :-
• What iron nerves, what cool-headed determination, what almost
instinctive guidance will be required to steer one of our largest
ironclads, moving at the rate of eight or ten knots, against one of
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
519
,
another fleet approaching at the same rate, with the firm resolution
of ramming her should opportunity offer! There will be po prompt-
ing, no time to ask advice, no opportunity for further calculation
than the eye and senses can command at the moment; the decision
must be instantaneous, and immediately carried into effect, the only.
encouragement being in the knowledge that the enemy's ship is
commanded and guided by a man undergoing the same fearful test,
and that the most determined man of the two, if sufficiently skilful,
must secure his object.'
I know the old worn-out argument that the captain has so much Pilotage
to do in a man-of-war of the present, date, that she is such a com- to a cap-
plex machine that it is impossible for him to attend to the naviga- tain.
tion of the ship. My answer is simply this—that I should be the
last to desire that he should have the whole of the detail work of
navigation and piloting thrown on his shoulders, and that he must
have as his assistant the most qualified man it is possible to obtain ;
but I maintain it is one of the first qualifications of a seaman and
a captain that he should have thorough acquaintance with the
handling of his vessel, and a practical acquaintance with navigation
and piloting, so as when necessary to take charge himself, and to
have confidence in himself as he has in every other of his duties.
In order to give this practical knowledge to our captains, I am con-
vinced that you must take additional steps to those now in foroe.
Do not let us forget that until our new system has had time to
develop itself we shall remain the only Navy in the world in which
pilotage, navigation, and the handling of his vessel, are not con-
sidered the most essential duties of every captain, In Germany
they have copied every other institution, but they have taken great
care to make all their captains serve an apprenticeship in navigating
their ship. By the system inaugurated by tbe right hon. gentle-
man the member for the City of London (Mr. Goschen) you have
obtained four lieutenants and twenty-three sub-lieutenants who
have qualified ; and assuming that the Admiralty select annually
some fifteen or twenty for these navigating duties, you will in the
course of fifteen years have several of your captains officers who
have been navigating officers, and you will gradually arrive at the
proportion of one-fifth of your captains being experienced navigators,
But, Sir, I apprehend we cannot wait fifteen years, and the problem
seems to be what steps can you take to infuse an immediate
acquaintance with these duties? With the certainty that rams will be
very largely used in any great naval war, the handling of our ships
will form a most important part of the chances of success. I fear
520
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
that unless some great alteration is made, some fearful catastrophe
will one day occur, and with ironclads costing over 500,0001. the
Admiralty incur a fearful responsibility if they allow the present
want of practice to continue. It is fourteen years since Captain
Washington warned the Admiralty of the danger they would be
placed in, and yet no change had been made. His remarkable
words, read now, after this lapse of time, are curiously prophetic :-
"It is not impossible that the introduction of armour-plated ships
and steam rams may have an important bearing on this question.
If a steam ram were about to give her stem to an opponent, is it
conceivable that the captain of the ram should delegate his authority
to a master at that critical moment? Would he not rather, at all
hazards, be bound to take the responsibility on himself? If this be
so, should he not have a training for handling and steering his ship
promptly under any emergency?
Would he not feel far more
confidence in himself had he passed through the grades of navigating
officer, and had for some years had charge of the steering and
conning of the ship? Very recent events point to this mode of .
warfare as likely to play a prominent part in any future naval action;
and would it be wise, then, to wait until the time of need before
training our younger executive officers to acquire that self-reliance
and confidence which can only be gained by continual practice ?'
The remedy I would venture to suggest for this state of things
appears to me very simple. You have torpedo schools, you have
gunnery schools; why not at once institute a school for practical
navigation and pilotage and allow your officers to go through a
course? It is no abstruse science, but one easily learnt-only
requiring practice. There would be no difficulty whatever in getting
your captains and commanders to go through it voluntarily. We
have thirty-nine captains who have not yet been appointed to a ship
since their promotion, and unfortunately it is still four and a-half
years before a man obtains a command. It is the greatest blot in
the profession that this should be so. Officers in the prime of life,
with a full knowledge of their profession, are condemned to hopeless
inactivity for four long years on a miserable pittance called half-pay.
In these days, when even one year makes a vast difference in our
knowledge of naval architecture and science of naval warfare, it is
suicidal to keep the officers--so much depends upon rusting-in some
inland village. Surely every endeavour and every inducement ought
to be held out to them, not only to keep up their knowledge, but to
increase their attainments. If you cannot give them ships, attach
them to dockyards, to committees, give them the opportunity
School of
pilotage
should be
estab-
lished.
t
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
521
of studying at college and in the various schools. If you were to
offer full-pay and harbour-service time to officers passing a certain
standard for, say, six months' course, you would have nearly all the
captains coming forward; and if, in addition to this, you were to
make it generally known that a good examination would be a stepping
stone to a command, all difficulty would be removed, and you would
soon have captains possessing thorough confidence in themselves as
practical navigators. In creating a school such as I have suggested,
it would be necessary to have two or three steamers attached for
practical pilotage in the Channel. To carry out the same object in
other grades, I would also suggest that no lieutenant should be
promoted to commander until he had passed through this practical
course. As regards the second part of the subject, whether the
young lieutenants and sub-lieutenants who are being trained to
navigating duties have facilities given them to enable them to
become thoroughly experienced and efficient, I have not much to
say. As far as I can judge from inquiries, those who have come
forward and been selected are likely to prove valuable officers, The
same suggestion which I have made as regards captains, I would also
apply to these officers, and that they should obtain their knowledge
of pilotage from actual experience in the Channel, and not, as at
present, obtain their practical knowledge after they have passed. It A steamer
is another proof how little is thought of pilotage and navigation, that
employed
although a strong recommendation was made, as long ago as 1862, for instruc-
by the committee which sat on the subject, that steamers should be pilotage.
set apart to teach officers training for pilotage duties the practical
part of their duties, no attempt whatever has been made to carry it
out. The report states :
A thorough knowledge of the pilotage of the Channel and of the
coasts of the British Isles is at all times desirable, and in the event
of a war might be of vital importance to the country. We therefore
recommend that at least one vessel should be appropriated for this
service, and that before staff-lieutenants are confirmed in that rank
they should serve not less than three months in that or some other
vessel in the Channel and around the coasts of the United Kingdom.'
It can hardly be credited that navigating officers pass their ex-
amination in pilotage at the Admiralty without any such assistance,
and take charge of navigating and pilot duties without having had
any experience of the different harbours. There are many plans, in
addition to this, which might be thought of. We have a large
number of revenue cruisers round our coasts, which might all be
commanded by lieutenants, and four or five sub-lieutenants attached
should be
tion in
522
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
The sur-
veying
service
should be
to each, so as to acquire an intimate acquaintance with our various
harbours. Then, Sir, why should not our young officers attach
themselves to pilot boats to acquire experience? If some such steps
are taken, I bave every confidence that the lieutenants and sub-
lieutenants now coming forward will prove experienced pilots and
able navigators, The Admiralty have the pick of the whole pro-
fession, and ought therefore to have no difficulty in rearing up well-
qualified officers.
There is one school for our officers in these duties and also in
seamanship which I fear has been much neglected, I mean the
increased surveying school. It is only necessary to go back a very few years
to see how many officers of the main executive branch were em-
ployed on surveying service in comparison to the number now.
I believe every naval officer wiļl agree with me that the sur-
veying service ought to be welį kept up; not only for the great
national advantages we derive from careful surveys, enabling our
merchant fleets to be safely guided in difficult channels, but from
the splendid school it which affords for training our surveyors, navi-
gators, and pilots. In time of war when buoys are taken up, and
charts of little use, the men who have been trained in distant surveys
are invaluable. It is these men who, in all our wars, have conducted
our feet in safety in difficult ohannels, and seem to have acquired a
natural power of smelling out rocks and shoals. I regret to find
that the number of our bonâ-fide surveyors has of late years much
dwindled down. There were--captains and commanders--in 1849,
28; in 1855, 24; in 1865, 18; in 1876, only 4. It is perfectly
true that several lieutenants have lately been brought into this
service, and will eventually become bonâ-fide surveyors. I am also
aware that the surveying requirements in one respect are not so
great as they used to be, owing to several foreign nations having
come forward to take their share in the work; but, as a school for
the Navy, the requirements are even greater than ever. In 1849
we had 12 surveying ships in commission ; in 1875 we had only
three, showing a great reduction.
Navigating In addition to these modes of training our officers, the Admi-
should give ralty ought to enforce the suggestion made, I think, by Admiral
in naviga- Ryder, that as the gunnery lieutenants instruct officers in gunnery,
so the navigating officers should instruct them in practical sur-
veying, navigation, pilotage, and meteorology, and thus enable them
to make useful surveys of reefs, running surveys of coast lines and
harbours; that in every ship, unless good reason could be shown
to the contrary, a survey for exercise and experience should always
officers
instruction
tion.
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
523
of navi-
be on hand in every ship. By these means you would very soon
diffuse a general knowledge, and you would raise these important
duties to the primary position they ought to hold in the mind of
every seaman.
I now come to the third and last portion of my subject-namely, Grievances
the grievances of navigating officers. Although I treat this last, it
gating
is a most important matter and cannot be neglected. Your navi- officers.
gating officers have for years been in a most anomalous and sub-
ordinate position, galling to every man of any spirit, and in many
cases almost unbearable. They have, notwithstanding this, done
their work very well, and I apprehend that now you are altering
the whole system you must meet their just complaints, and deal
with the matter in a broad and comprehensive spirit. I know
that it is a difficult question, and as the Duke of Somerset stated
before the Committee of 1862, great care must be taken that in
trying to do justice to the navigating class you do not do in-
justice to the main executive line. But it is much easier to
deal with this class of officers now than it ever was, the numbers
having been very greatly reduced since 1865. In that year there
were 696 navigating officers of all ranks; in 1875 there are only
367, and the number will soon be further reduced, as the First Lord
of the Admiralty has signified his intention of amalgamating the
navigating midshipmen with the main line. Year after year
promises of special promotion have been made, but with one or two
rare exceptions they have never been carried out. Only so late as
1870 my right hon. friend (Mr. Childers) made a regulation that
the Admiralty right promote three in each year, but instead of up
to this time eighteen having been promoted, only one has received
the benefit of the regulation. A few years ago you gave them
relative rank according to their seniority with their brother officers
in the main line, but prevented it taking effect on board ship, so
that a staff-commander with twenty years' service is junior to the
lieutenant of a day's standing. In cases where staff-commanders
have command of store ships it is most irritating to find themselves
placed under a junior lieutenant in command of a gunboat. On the
other hand, officers in the main linę say that is perfectly true, but
they have not been brought up to a knowledge of discipline and
gunnery, and why should they interfere with us? Giving every
allowance to this argument, I am bound to say that the time seems
to have come when, with a class gradually dying out, and with a
new race of officers training up for navigating duties, you must take
a somewhat determined step, and put an end once and for all to the
524
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
constant irritation and discontent which one so constantly hears of.
I would, with all due deference, solve the questions of retirement,
pay, and widows' pensions by at once placing them on a similar
footing as the main line. With respect to the question of rank, I
would withdraw the stipulation which prevents their holding relative
rank on board ship; but I would make this proviso—that in no case
should the navigating officer (if of the separate class) take seniority
over the commanding officer, giving him, if necessary, brevet rank.
If, therefore, in a large ship, the commander and captain were both
away, the first lieutenant would be acting commander, and senior to
the staff-commander. By this means all difficulty as to the position
of navigating officers would be removed, and, I believe, the main
executive line would have no objection to the relative rank holding
good when it was once made clear that the navigating officers would
not interfere with the discipline of the ship. It is quite evident
that some such plan must be adopted; for if the First Lord of the
Admiralty carries out his proposal of amalgamating the navigating
midshipmen, you will, under present arrangements, have this
peculiar result—that the navigating midshipman amalgamated with
the main line may, in three or four years, become a lieutenant, and
then be senior to the staff-commander who had served all his life in
the navigating class, and has put up during many years with his
subordinate position. As the lieutenants and sub-lieutenants now
being trained take the duties of navigating officers, all question of
rank will subside, as these officers will be kept well versed in
gunnery knowledge and the discipline of a man-of-war. The old
class must now gradually die out, and I do sincerely trust the First
Lord will take this to be a fitting opportunity for doing a long-
deferred measure of justice to a hody of men well deserving the
thanks of their country. I will not detain the House any longer,
and I thank them very much for the kind manner in which they
have heard me. I will only say this, that I am quite at a loss to
understand the amendment of my hon. and gallant friend, as he
appears to concur with me as to the necessity of increased means of
instruction, and ought therefore to agree with my motion. If, how-
ever, he conceals a wicked desire to bring back the old system of a
separate class for navigating duties he may rest assured that it is
already a thing of the past, and that no First Lord dare incur the
responsibility of what could not fail to prove a most disastrous
policy. The hon. gentleman concluded by moving his resolution.
Mr. BRASSEY said, on a former occasion he had seconded a
motion by his hon. friend the member for the Montgomery .
The Com-
riler.
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
525
Boroughs for the abolition of a separate class of officers for the
navigating duties in Her Majesty's ships. Although that motion
was opposed at the time by the First Lord of the Admiralty, in the
following year it was announced that the Government had recon-
sidered the subject. He was convinced that the Admiralty were
wise in their final decision. It could not be consistent that an
officer should be appointed to a command, unless he possessed a
competent knowledge of navigation and pilotage. The perpetuation
of the old arrangement for the navigating duties of the fleet must
tend inevitably to make executive officers indifferent to their
nautical work ; and if, as lieutenants, they were in the habit of
neglecting navigation, when they came to occupy more responsible
positions, in command of ships, they would run the risk of finding
themselves, at a critical moment, mainly dependent on the judgment
of a subordinate. When contending against a gale, on a lee shore,
or in battle, when all might depend on giving or avoiding the blow
of a ram, how could an officer, imperfectly acquainted with the art
of steering or navigation, be regarded as competent to command ?
Again, as regards the pilotage of a ship in narrow waters, Captain
Washing-
Captain Washington asserts that the recent losses, to which in his ton.
memorandum he referred, pointed to a want of efficiency in the masters
in that respect. “And, indeed,' he asks, 'how should they be good
pilots ? They have no opportunity of acquiring a knowledge of the
Channel pilotage. They cram from an epitome. What pilotage
they know, then, must be learnt after they take charge as master, or
second-master, of a sloop, and so far at the risk of Her Majesty's
ship, although the master's commission is as master and pilot.'
The last point to which Captain Washington refers is the duty of
the master in steering and conning a line-of-battle ship or heavy
frigate in the day of battle. "Good judgment,' he says, 'united with
the requisite professional knowledge, is, after all, the most valuable
qualification that an officer should possess, when placed in this
responsible position; but there is no reason why this rare quality
should be confined to the master class.
** Apart,' he observes, from 'rendering justice to masters, it
appears to me that there is a higher motive for doing away with the
class, namely, the general benefit of the service, by breaking up the
monopoly of a large 'share of professional knowledge, reserved appa-
rently for one branch, and that not the principal executive branch
of the service.
"I think it cannot be denied that the system of entrusting the
pilotage and navigation of Her Majesty's ships to a single class, as
526
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Executive
officers
masters, must have a tendency to beget indifference or inattention
to those particular duties in the lieutenants and other officers of the
main executive branch.'
Captain Washington, in another portion of his able memorandum,
contests the assumption, so generally taken for granted, that the
masters are more competent as navigators than officers selected from
the general ranks of the service. “It is well known,' he says, “to
those who have inquired into it, and to no one better than their own
brother-officers, that, with the exception of the seniors and some few
picked men, there are on this head strong symptoms of deterioration,
possibly, from circumstances in some degree beyond their own control,
and the number of ships that have been on shore on the African,
and China, and West Indian stations goes far to confirm the fact.'
The enumeration of losses, contained in Captain Washington's
memorandum, is long. Unhappily, in very recent times it could be
considerably extended.
It could not be said that the duties of a navigating officer were
Well quali- too difficult for an intelligent officer, belonging to the general line
fied for the of the service. The practice of navigation was so simple, that
study of
pilotage. nothing more was required than accuracy in elementary arithmetic.
Pilotage required more experience; but it was experience of a kind
which every naval officer ought to possess. Nerve and quickness of
eye were necessary to carry a vessel through' a narrow and tortuous
channel, between rocks and shoals--but these were just the qualities
which would enable an officer to select a happy opportunity for
giving the stem to an enemy. He had already expressed his satis-
faction at the decision of the Admiralty to abolish the navigating
class. As, however, there were to be no more navigating officers, it
was necessary that executive officers should be encouraged to qualify
themselves for navigating duties. For this purpose adequate induce-
ments should be held out, and officers should be made to believe
that proficiency in navigation would be as highly appreciated at the
Admiralty, and would be as sure a road to promotion, as knowledge
of gurnery. Once let this conviction be established generally
throughout the profession, and there would be no lack of captains,
commanders, and lieutenants, ready to avail themselves of any
opportunity which might be accorded to them, of acquiring the
requisite amount of practical knowledge. For this purpose, a special
course of instruction in the pilotage of our own coasts might be
established, on the same footing sa the torpedo school, which had
already proved so valuable to the Navy. In addition to the school
of pilotage, surveys might be prosecuted with increased energy.
NAVIGATION OF H.M. SHIPS.
527
In an able lecture, Captain Hull, the Keeper of the Charts at the Instruction
Admiralty, recently called attention to the great extent of coast of surveys.
which was as yet unsurveyed. Even seas which were constantly
resorted to by traders, were imperfectly known. He might mention
particularly the River Plate, the West Coast of South America, the
Pacific, Java, and Red Seas. Surveys offered an admirable school
for naval officers. Some of the most distinguished men in the Navy
had spent several years in surveying ships. His practical knowledge
of pilotage was of signal service to Lord Nelson. It had been stated
by Sir R. Collinson that the battle of the Nile would not have been
fought at the hour it was, if Nelson had not himself been a pilot.
At Copenhagen, soundings were taken under the personal super-
intendence of Lord Nelson, and by that means his ships were enabled
to take up positions within close range of the Danish batteries.
Surveying was now taught at Greenwich ; but not much could be
done at a college in a subject so essentially practical. The teaching
of the College would be thrown away, unless followed up afloat. A
surveying ship could be kept in commission, according to Captain
Hull, for 14,0001. a-year; and a larger sum was often wasted in
doubtful experiments in shipbuilding. He begged to second the
motion of his hon. friend.
SECTION V.
EDUCATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
SPEECHES IN PARLIAMENT,
JUNE 13, 1871. JULY 6, 1877.
(Reprinted from Hansard's' Parliamentary Debates.')
VOL. IV.
мм
530
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
NAVAL CADETS. -RESOLUTION.
June 13, 1871.
Cadets
Age of
entry
MR. BRASSEY rose to call attention to the Report of a Cominittee on
the Education of Naval Officers, recently presented to Parliament,
and to move :-
* That it is expedient to adopt the recommendations of the
Committee appointed by the Admiralty as to the training of Naval
Cadets.
He said the House had been engaged last week in a discussion
with reference to the manning of the Navy, and he would venture
to hope that the motion which stood in his name, referring to the
education of our naval officers, might be regarded as having some
interest in connection with the same subject. If it was necessary
to create reserves of seamen, we must have officers to command
them on active service. During the last twenty years all the
circumstances of sea life in the Navy had changed, through the
application of steam as a motive power to vessels of war. Naval
gunnery had become more complicated. The science of naval
architecture had undergone a complete revolution. Again, the ad-
vance in the standard of education made it necessary that the Navy,
as a great national service, should participate in the general pro-
gress, in order to hold its own with other professions. The circum-
stances to which he had alluded seemed to point to an extension of
the time for the admission of naval cadets into the service; and he
suggested that the age of sixteen was not too advanced.
An extension of the age of admission would enable the cadet to
participate in the advantages of a public school education. The
following remarks were taken from a pamphlet by Admiral Fanshawe
on the entry and education of naval officers :-
'No person is more fit to enter the naval profession than a
public-school boy of sixteen, of good health and abilities. He is of
an age to form a rational choice of the profession he would adopt.
Admiral
Fanshawe.
EDUCATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
531
He has passed a sufficient number of years as a schoolboy, private
and public, to possess in some degree those advantages which we
attribute to English school-life in the foundation of the English
gentleman's character. He has sufficient knowledge of classics to
derive some benefit from their historical lessons, and to encourage
him to revert to them at any future time, should his tastes lead
him in that direction.
Mends.
R.N.
Hamilton.
'I should altogether abolish the gun-room mess, and also the
Naval Instructor class. The officer of eighteen should at once join
the ward-room mess, where he would associate with all the principal
officers in the ship, from the second in command to those of his own
rank.'
In the evidence given before the Naval Commission of 1859 Sir W.
Admiral Mends gave strong testimony in favour of such training;
Captain
and Captain Harris, who had been in command of the 'St. Vincent,' Harris
,
the principal training-ship for boys at Portsmouth, had stated that
the age of seventeen was the best age at which to admit lads into
the Navy to be trained as men-of-war's men.
In the discussion on the Naval Essays of 1878 at the Royal
United Service Institution, Admiral Hamilton said :-
Then comes the question as to the age of the entry and the Admiral
training of officers and men. And on that point I think Captain
Noel's paper is very good indeed. I have had opportunities of com-
paring boys from the training-ships at Portland, Plymouth, and
Falmouth, entered at the early age, with boys entered in the
Coastguard ship between 161 or 18 years of age, under pre-
cisely the same system as the younger boys in training-ships.
On one occasion going on board I saw some boys on the gangway
who drilled so admirably that I asked the officer which of the
training-ships they came from (we then had boys from Boscawen,
Implacable,' Impregnable,' and Ganges,' on board, besides the
older boys): he said (to my surprise), “ They are our own first-class
boys that we have raised, they have been about three months in the
ship.' Those boys were one and a half to two years older than the
boys coming from the training-ships. The captains of the sea-going
ships to whom these boys were sent were ordered to report upon
them, and the report was that these older boys, although they had
not been brought up in the training-ships, were superior to the
younger boys. Their instructor from the training-ships also con-
sidered them more attentive and zealous. This I think will raise
6
M M 2
532
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION,
sion on
the question whether it will not be better to enter naval cadets at
fifteen rather than at thirteen.'
Admiral Admiral Ryder concurred in this opinion :-
Ryder:
* Then as to the entry and training of officers and men. This is
a very large question. Someone spoke just now of the age for
entering young officers. I agree with Admiral Hamilton that, pro-
vided we drew our supply from the best public schools at, say four-
teen, the age for joining sea-going ships might with proper pre-
cautions be advanced.'
Commis- He might add that the Commission on Military Education had
military
recently reported that seventeen was the age at which professional
education. aptitude was most readily acquired. If the agility aloft and the
seamanlike qualities required in the blue-jackets of the Navy could
be best acquired by lads entering the service at the age of seventeen, ,
that age would not be too advanced for the admission of young
men who were to be educated as naval officers.
Sir Charles By the present system midshipmen were expected to do duty as
Napier.
officers before their education was complete. Sir Charles Napier
pointed out to the Commission of 1859 that, under the existing
system it was often necessary to send away a very young officer in
charge of a boat, manned by seamen much more experienced than
himself; and this he had always felt to be an objection, as it often
led to the young officer finding fault with the men, and led to
punishments; which were very injurious to the efficiency of the
service.
The recent Committee on the Education of Officers had reported
that there was a general incompatibility between the positions of
an officer and a schoolboy, which were attempted to be combined
by our present system. This double duty made the progress of the
naval cadet extremely unsatisfactory. The duties as midshipmen
prevented them from giving up the necessary time to general and
professional instruction. In the Channel Fleet, as it was shown by
a recent return, the maximum instruction to cadets was eight hours,
and the minimum two hours a week. With such limited oppor-
tunities of study, it was impossible for a boy to obtain much instruc-
tion on board ship.
While in favour of admitting cadets at a more advanced age,
cadets should still be admissible at the ages fixed by the existing
Foreign regulations. In foreign navies the age of admission was fixed at a
much more advanced age. In the United States Navy the age was
from fourteen to eighteen years ; in the French, it was from four-
teen to seventeen years; in the Russian it was from fifteen to
Committee
oli educa-
tion of
naval
officers:
Davies.
EDUCATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
533
eighteen years; while in our own service, under the existing regula-
tions, the age was from twelve to thirteen.
The majority of our own officers, and many officers in foreign Comte de
Gueydon,
navies, are in favour of commencing the training for the sea at an
early age. An instance in point may be interpolated here. In a
speech delivered in 1877 at the meeting of the Société des Études
Maritimes et Coloniales, Vice-Admiral the Comte de Gueydon ex-
pressed in strong terms his disapproval of the more advanced age of
entry for naval cadets ::
Dans un autre ordre de faits, c'est encore la méconnaissanoe de
notre organisme qui nous entraîne à adopter, pour l'admission à
l'École navale, une limite d'âge de deux ou trois ans supérieure à
celle fixée pour l'entrée à l'École des mousses ; et même, à ouvrir
l'accès du corps des officiers de vaisseau à des élèves sortant de
l'École polytechnique dont la constitution physique a cessé d'être
assez flexible pour être façonnée à la rude existence de la vie dų
marin.
· Pour n'éprouver aucun malaise quand la mer est agitée; pour
résister, sans défaillance, à des fatigues, à des privations incessantes;
pour conserver, en un mot, la plénitude de ses facultés dans toutes
les circonstances critiques de la navigation, il faut (qu'on porte
l'épaulette ou non) avoir pratiqué la mer dès la plus tendre jeunesse.
• Ainsi pensions-nous aux époques les plus glorieuses de notre
histoire; ainsi pensent toujours les Anglais et les Américains.
“A leurs yeux, la mer n'est pas plus douce pour les officiers que
pour les matelots.
On aurait de la peine à leur persuader que les chefs ne peuvent
pas posséder, au même degré que leurs subordonnés, les qualités
essentielles de l'homme de mer.'
Returning to the education of English cadets, the preliminary Course of
course of instruction was carried on in the “Britannia' for two
study for
years, with one year's training in a sea-going training-ship. At
the age of sixteen the midshipman began to do duty as a young
officer. The Committee had reviewed the whole subject very care-
fully, and recommended that the period of special training in the
stationary ship should be extended by one year, giving three
years' special training in the stationary ship, to be followed by a
year at sea in a sea-going training-ship. Assuming that no change
could be made in the age of admission, the recommendations of the
Committee were wise and judicious; but he regretted that they had
not seen fit to recommend boys should be entered at more advanced
age.
cadets,
534
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Modern
languages.
Steam.
With regard to the general course of education, it seemed to be
limited too exclusively to mathematical subjects, to the neglect of
modern languages. In the American Navy it had been found that
modern languages were not inferior to mathematics as a means of
mental culture. He might refer to Professor Mayne, of the Naval Col-
lege at Portsmouth, as an authority in favour of the more careful and
complete study of the French language. Captain Goodenough had
also adverted to the regrettable ignorance of the French language
when the French and English squadrons were brought together in
1865 for the purpose of exchanging international courtesies.
Other practical studies shared the same neglect, and he might
instance particularly the study of Steam. In the United States
service, they had found in the protracted war with the Southern
States, that great disadvantage arose in the service from the in-
efficiency of the numerous engineers who were taken into the
employment in the Navy, and from the inability of the executive
officer to correct the mistakes of the engineering staff. Profiting
by that experience the American naval authorities had introduced a
practical course of steam for young officers. Provision had been
made for a systematic course of instruction in steam at the Naval
College at Portsmouth, A similar course should be arranged for
cadets.
The recommendation of the Committee on the Education of
Officers, in favour of fitting out two brigs to be attached to the vessels
of instruction, merited the special consideration of the Admiralty.
They would prove to be most valuable schools of practical instruction.
Admiral Sulivan in an able memorandum on the subject specially
adverted to the failure to teach seamanship on board the “Bristol,
and expressed a hope that by employing small vessels in which the
young gentlemen themselves could carry out nautical evolutions,
they would thereby become better practical seamen. Another great
advantage would be secured by attaching brigs to the stationary
vessels. The young officers would learn the pilotage of our own
waters, to which these vessels would be necessarily confined. Our
ironclad vessels had tended materially to diminish the cruising
experience of the young officers of the fleet, and he hoped that it
might be found practicable to employ a greater number of vessels in
the Mediterranean of a class that could be navigated under sail. In
the American Navy such vessels were always employed on foreign
stations in time of peace. The necessity for these practice ships had
been shown in the evidence of Captain Goodenough, who quoted the
case of a midshipman who, having served four years on board one
Brigs.
EDUCATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
535
In a paper
line.
ship, had never seen that ship tacked under canvas.
recently read at the United Service Institution the deficiency of the
education of naval officers in the present day in practical seamanship
was clearly shown. The necessity for such experience was fully
recognised in the Canard and other steam services, no officer being
allowed to take the rank of master or chief officer without the
qualification of previous service in a sailing vessel. If there were
objections to the substitution of sailing frigates, with auxiliary steam
power, like the steam clipper frigate of the United States Navy, for
the ships now stationed in the Mediterranean, brigs might be
attached to the squadrons to give the young officers experience in
cruising under sail.
Many eminent witnesses who had given evidence before the Abolition
Committee on the Education of Naval Officers expressed an opinion navigating
in favour of the abolition of the special class of navigating officers.
The change was advocated on the ground that it was calculated to
exert a beneficial influence upon the general knowledge of navigation
in the Navy.
The Report of the Committee of 1862 might be quoted against
the abolition of a separate class of officers for navigating duties, but
it was suggested that a few lieutenants should be allowed to volunteer
for these duties. The experiment recommended should be tried by
appointing ten officers to do navigating duties. Many eminent men
in the service had given opinions in favour of abolishing the special
navigating class, and Mr. Lindsay had on two occasions in able memo-
randa expressed a similar opinion. He would strongly urge upon the
Admiralty that all the officers who had given opinions in favour of
the retention of the special navigating class had also most strongly
recommended that a steam vessel should be employed specially to
give instructions in pilotage to young officers, who were qualifying
to take charge of Her Majesty's ships. Officers should be masters
of their profession before they were placed in charge of Her Majesty's
ships. The recent loss of the “Psyche,' despatch boat, on the coast
of Sicily, waſ due to the inexperience of the navigating officer in
command of the watch.
With a view to the higher education of naval officers, he invited Naval
University.
the approval of the House to a suggestion he desired strongly to
urge, for the expansion of the Naval College at Portsmouth into a
great Naval University for the naval service and the mercantile
marine, with power to confer degrees in all branches of science
connected with the nautical profession. This proposal was originally
made by some eminent Liverpool merchants and shipowners, and
536
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION,
was favourably received by the Duke of Somerset. Such a uni-
versity would seem to afford the best means of bringing the mer-
cantile marine and the Navy more closely togetber, and preparing
the merchant service to afford material aid in a naval war.. Examin-
ations could be held in the various ports, like those conducted by
the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, for candidates for the
degree of Associate in Arts. It might be thought that a sufficient
number of mercantile officers would not be found to undergo an
expensive course of education, but there were already two vessels-
one in the Thames, and another in the Mersey—for the instruction
of mercantile officers, and both were well filled with students.
In conclusion he would make an urgent appeal to the First Lord
of the Admiralty, whose early career at Rugby and Oxford had been
one of more than ordinary distinction, to signalise his tenure of office
at the Admiralty by the creation of a comprehensive system of
education for the Navy. He begged leave to move the resolution of
which he had given notice.
EDUCATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
537
MOTION MADE, AND QUESTION PROPOSED.
chen.
Mr. GOSCHEN said the hon. member for Hastings (Mr. T. Brassey) Mr. Gos-
had apologised to the House for having made an unnecessary speech;
but he (Mr. Goschen) could assure him that it was quite of a contrary
character, and that the naval service would not complain of the
tone of his remarks. They might not agree with all his observations,
or all the conclusions at which he arrived, but they would concur
with him in thinking that the subject was one the importance of
which could not be overrated. A week ago the House was engaged
in discussing the subject of the manning of the Navy, and great as
was the importance of that subject, it was almost equalled in impor-
tance by the subject of to-night-namely, the education of the
officers who were to take command of the ships. The hon. member
had spoken of the great changes which had taken place in the
· Navy during the last fifty years. No doubt these changes had been
exceedingly great, but the changes which had been made in the educa-
tion of the naval officers, though they might not yet have been so
great as was necessary, had followed the course of events, so that
more attention was now paid to the education of the officers than
was paid to it ten or twenty or thirty years ago.
A most
important change had taken place in this way-that the time
during which naval cadets received instruction had almost doubled.
A short time ago, a year and three months was all the time that
was devoted to the cadets; now they were instructed for two years
before they were sent to sea, after which they went for a year to
sea to learn their seamanship and navigation.
The hon. member had also spoken of the early age at which cadets Age of
entered the service. This was a moot point in the Navy; and while paval
the hon. member was able to cite opinions in favour of the later age,
a very large number of officers still adhered to the idea that the cadets
should be entered very young. From the strictly educational point
of view, he believed that the hon, member was right, and that the
nation would have a more highly educated set of officers the later
entry for
cadets.
538
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION,
they entered the service. It was very important to secure as much
school training for cadets as possible, before they entered the Navy;
and, if it could be shown that by the entry at sixteen years of age,
they would be as able to secure as many and as good officers as when
they entered at thirteen, a very strong case would have been made
out in favour of the latter age. He would be unwilling, considering
the short time he had been in the Admiralty, to make any declara-
tion of opinion as to the age at which cadets should enter the Navy.
The analogy drawn by the hon. member between the Army and Navy
upon that point was not conclusive, because the life which the naval
cadet had to follow differed so much more from ordinary life, than the
change which took place in regard to the military cadet, that he did
not think they could reason from one to the other. He was informed
that the boys who took to the sea very young were more likely to
stick to it, and make it a profession, than those who entered later in life.
And further, he would ask his hon. friend would he propose that they
should have no boys who were under sixteen, or would he admit boys
between thirteen and sixteen ? (Mr. T. Brassey: Between twelve and
sixteen.) He certainly thought that would be the preferable mode of
the two. Butif so, there would be a difficulty, which would be consider-
able--that those entered at thirteen might become seniors in time in
the Navy to those who entered at sixteen, and the boys coming from the
schools, and being placed under their juniors might have much to
suffer, and be alienated from the service at a very early age. He
would not, however, express any definite opinion upon the subject at
present, but promised that it should be fully investigated, and would
say that any arguments in favour of admitting cadets of greater age
would receive full consideration by himself and his colleagues at the
Admiralty. Great difference of opinion existed among naval men
on the subject, but it was a fact that difficulty was experienced in
advancing cadets in intellectual pursuits after leaving the training
ship, so that it would evidently be a gain if their studies could be
prolonged before they entered the Navy. When they once went to
sea they ceased to make any real progress in study. The Committee
which sat on this subject recommended that the naval instructors
should be abolished altogether, because the number of hours of
instruction was so small as to be scarcely adequate to the cost.
This brought him to another point—that the time should be
extended during which cadets should be trained. Theoretically,
there was a great deal to be said in favour of this plan; but on
whom would the expense of an extra year's education fall? On the
state, or on the parents? The naval cadets paid 701. a-year for the
Period of
scholastic
training.
EDUCATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
539
two years on board the Britannia,' and the expense was considerable
on the officers who sent their sons to training. While agreeing that
an additioral year's schooling would be a serious thing for the officers
and for the parents of the boys generally, it was deserving of con-
sideration whether the time of training should not be lengthened. He
agreed in the suggestion regarding training brigs, for they had been
found to work very successfully in the case of seamen, and he did not
see why it should not be equally successful in the case of naval cadets.
On the whole, he was inclined to think that if the naval instructors
were really not causing that progress in education that might have
been wished, it might be necessary to reconsider the whole of that
portion of education and see whether it could be possible to give a
longer education before going to sea. But he must say that in
settling that point, it was a practical consideration that boys should
not go to sea at a later age than was likely to give them a taste for
the sea.
of navi-
The next point was this—would it be desirable to substitute Subjects
of study.
French to a certain extent for the higher branches of mathematics?
Nothing could be more important than to increase the knowledge of
French in our officers; but he did not think it would be desirable
to give up mathematics-in fact, the Committee complained that
mathematics were too much neglected by our naval officers already.
He thought, in fact, that the time on hand was sufficient for the
study of French and modern languages, and the study of mathe-
matics also.
The hon. member next expressed a wish that after the naval Retention
cadets had become midshipmen there should not be a want of
gating
training in navigation, and seamanship, and pilotage. It was quite officers.
desirable in every way to stimulate those studies; but he could not
agree with the hon. member's recommendation to abolish the navi-
gating officers. There were officers in favour of their abolition, and
there were officers opposed to it. His own view was that it was
obviously desirable that every lieutenant should be able to navigate
a ship; but that was a very different thing from abolishing the class
of navigating officers. The general view of the matter was that the
navigating officers should be replaced in time of war by merchant
seamen, so as to liberate the fighting force; but if this were done
men would be introduced on occasions of great moment to navigate
ships with which they were almost wholly unacquainted.
desirable that those who had charge of these ships in time of war
should be men who were thoroughly acquainted with all their
eccentricities and who had complete knowledge of ships of novel
It was
540
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
construction-such as our ships of war: but such knowledge could not
be gained in a day. It was desirable that a navigating officer should
be thoroughly well acquainted with his ship, just as it was advisable
for a rider to know the character of his horse. But he this as it
might, he was told that there was no more valuable class of officers
than the navigating officers; and as a curious illustration of how
what was undervalued in one country was valued in another, he would
mention that a distinguished French officer had stated that there
were two points of the English system which were most admirable,
and that these were our navigating officers and our marines. Our
navigating officers constituted a class of officers whom of all others in
our Navy foreigners most admired; and there was this further consider-
ation—that while the mercantile marine were exceedingly valuable
upon all the beaten tracks, they would not be able to compete with
the navigating officers in unknown waters and under exceptional cir-
cumstances. As to training, he entirely concurred in the observations
which had fallen from the hon. member, who said it was desirable
to give to these navigating officers a special training for their
profession. Now, no naval subject interested the Admiralty more
than the education of that class of officers, and already the idea had
been partly carried out; for those ships which had been employed
around the coast, the "Fox,' Buzzard,' “Medina,' "Medusa,' and
· Dee,' which were continually moving about the Channel, had been
almost entirely officered from that class, the object, of course, being
to afford to them an opportunity of acquiring the requisite experi-
ence. The Admiralty would keep an eye on the education of navi-
gating officers, and if he attached great importance to their existence,
it must not be supposed on that account he did not think progress
ought to be made in the education of the active lieutenants and
sub-lieutenants; on the contrary, he felt everything should be done
that could be done to qualify them for the performance of their
functions with greater efficiency than at present. At present,
however, he was not prepared to say it would be wise to amalgamate
the two classes, and do away with the class of navigating officers.
With regard to the question of age he was open to conviction,
but did not think the hon. member had adduced sufficient evidence
to show that any change ought to be made in that particular. As
to attaching a training brig to the “Britannia,' and lengthening the
time of training, he thought the hon. member had made out a
stronger case, and it was a subject worthy of much consideration.
He also admitted that great force existed in the remarks respecting
the abolition of naval instructors on board the ships of the Navy.
EDUCATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
541
He could assure the hon. member that all the points he had urged
would receive the careful attention of the Admiralty, and he there-
fore hoped the motion would not be pressed to a division.
Sir JOHN Hay said he must congratulate the hon. member for Sir John
Hay.
Hastings (Mr. T. Brassey) upon the excellent statement he had
made to the House, and at the same time was glad to find the right
hon. gentleman the First Lord giving a prudent answer to the
speech. For several years he had been in favour of admitting officers Age of
entry.
into the Navy at a later age than that now fixed. He thought the
age should be sixteen. No doubt it was held by high authorities that
youths took to the sea more readily and became more amphibious
animals if admitted at an earlier age, and that later on they were
apt to become disgusted with their profession. On the other hand,
it was of great importance that they should be able to go to Eton or
Harrow, and enjoy the benefits of a public school education up to fifteen
or sixteen instead of being taken from private educational training at
twelve. A distinguished relative of his own, Lord Dundonald, one of
the most conspicuous examples of a naval officer who ever flew a flag,
never went to sea till he was eighteen; and though one instance of
that kind was not sufficient to prove the rule, it showed that a late
age for entering the Navy was no disadvantage.
As to naval instructors, he could not quite agree with the right Naval In-
hon. gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty, when he intimated
that iö might be advantageous that there should no longer be in-
structors on board the ships of the Navy, for he did not gather from
the report of the Committee that they made an absolute recommen-
dation for the discontinuance of this class of officers, and, for his
part, he was entirely adverse to any such proposal. He was well
aware that many naval officers had been trained without the advan-
tage of naval instructors on board the ships in which they served; in
fact, he was himself for three years on board a ship in which there
was no such instructor; but in those days, the young naval officers
were the protégés of the captains, and he personally had the good
fortune to serve under a commander of great ability, who, taking
an interest in the youngsters, devoted much of his time to their
instruction.
That was, however, no part of the commander's duty, and as it
was impossible to calculate upon circumstances of exceptional good
fortune in every case, it would be unfair to young naval officers in
the present day to expect them to become efficient unless they had
the assistance of competent instructors.
He had heard with pleasure the statement of the right hon.
structors.
542
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
officers.
R.N.
Navigating gentleman in reference to the navigating officers. It was a question
upon which, in his opinion, it would be desirable to leave well alone.
The lieutenant on board a ship might be equally skilful and
competent as a navigator, but the navigating officer ought in addition
to be sufficiently familiar with our coast to be able to take his ship
safely into harbour without the assistance of a pilot in the darkest
night of winter. It would, therefore, be a pity to abolish this class
of officers.
Captain Captain EGERTON said he thought it almost impossible to fix
Egerton,
too early an age for boys to commence their training as naval officers,
so long as it was not fixed lower than twelve years ; but, at the same
time, he thought no impediment should be put in the way of officers
entering up to the age of fifteen or sixteen years. With regard to
the education of naval officers, he feared there was a tendency in the
present day to give that education too theoretical a character, to the
neglect of the practical branches of their profession. For instance, out
of -400 lieutenants on the active list he found that only three or four
had obtained first-class certificates at the Naval College. Agreeing
with the hon. and gallant baronet who had last spoken (Sir John
Hay) as to the advisability of continuing the services of navigating
officers in the Navy, he thought greater opportunities than they now
enjoy should be afforded to these meritorious officers of obtaining the
prizes of the profession. On behalf of the service, he begged to
thank the hon. member for Hastings for having so ably called atten-
tion to this naval question.
Mr. T. BRASSEY said, that after the promise of the First Lord of
the Admiralty that the matter under discussion should receive con-
sideration, he would not press his motion to a division.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
:
EDUCATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
543
ADMIRALTY MINUTE ON THE FORMATION OF THE
ROYAL NAVAL COLLEGE.
In January, 1873, an Admiralty Minute was issued, sanctioning the
formation of the present Royal Naval College at Greenwich. It may
be desirable to quote the earlier section of the Minute, giving a
general outline of the studies which it was designed to encourage at
the College.
'Her Majesty by Her Order in Council, dated January 16, 1873,
having sanctioned the founding of a Royal Naval College at Green-
wich, my Lords have determined to open the said College on February
1 next, at which date the instruction of the gunnery lieutenants and
the sub-lieutenants will commence. The arrangements for the
higher courses of study will not be complete till the beginning of
the ensuing term on October 1, but special provisions have been
made to prevent any interruption or disarrangement in the studies
of any class of students who will hereafter be admitted to the
College.
“The College, subject to the subjoined regulations, will be open
to officers of the following ranks :--
1. Captains and commanders.
2. Lieutenants.
3. Navigating officers.
4. Naval instructors.
5. Acting sub-lieutenants and acting navigating sub-lieutenants.
6. Officers Royal Marine Artillery.
Ditto Royal Marine Light Infantry.
7. Officers of the Engineer branch, viz. :-
Chief engineers.
Engineers.
First-class assistant engineers.
Acting second-class assistant engineers.
8. A limited number of dockyard apprentices will be annually
selected by competitive examination for admission to the College.
544
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
'A course of instruction at the College will also be open to a
limited number of-
9. Private students of naval architecture or marine engineering.
10. Officers of the mercantile marine.
'It is not intended to provide at Greenwich for the education of
the naval cadets.
"My Lords intend that the Royal Naval College at Greenwich
shall be so organised as to provide for the education of naval officers
of all ranks above that of midshipman, in all branches of theoretical
and scientific study bearing upon their profession; buč my Lords will
continue the instruction given in the “Excellent” gunnery ship as
heretofore, and arrangements for instruction in practical surveying
will also be continued at Portsmouth.
My Lords desire, by the establishment of the College, to give to
the executive officers of the Navy generally, every possible advantage
in respect of scientific education ; but no arrangements will be made
at all prejudicing the all-important practical training in the active
duties of their profession.
· The object of securing, in the interest of the naval service, the
highest possible scientific instruction is, in the opinion of my Lords,
most effectually to be attained by bringing together in one establish-
ment all the necessary means for the higher education of naval
officers and of others connected with the Navy.
“The number of students at the College will render it possible not
only to carry out instruction by individual tuition, as hitherto, but
to secure a staff of eminent professors, to arrange lectures and classes,
and to provide chemical and physical laboratories, on a scale which
has hitherto not been possible in any naval establishment.
Complete courses of study suitable for the different classes of
students admitted will be organised, and will be carried out by
professors, lecturers, and instructors. Officers and others admitted
as students will have the advantage of these courses of study,
whether they reside or not. But officers and others who may not
become students will, under certain regulations, have free access to
separate courses of lectures, the benefit of which it is desired to
extend as far as possible.
* The following are the proposed courses of study »
Subjects.
1. Pure mathematics, including co-ordinate and higher pure
geometry, differential and integral calculus, finite differences, and
the calculus of variations.
t
EDUCATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
545
2. Applied mathematics, viz., kinematics, mechanics, optics, and
the theories of sound, light, heat, electricity, and magnetism.
3. Applied mechanics, including the theory of structures, the
principles of mechanism, and the theory of machines.
4. Nautical astronomy, surveying, hydrography, with maritime
geography, meteorology, and chart drawing.
5. Experimental sciences :
a. Physics, viz., sound, heat, light, electricity, and mag-
netism.
b. Chemistry.
c. Metallurgy.
6. Marine engineering in all its branches.
7. Naval architecture in all its branches.
8. Fortification, Military Drawing, and Naval Artillery.
9. International and Maritime Law; Law of Evidence and Naval
Courts-Martial.
10. Naval History and Tactics, including Naval Signals and
Steam Evolutions.
11. Modern Languages.
12. Drawing
13. Hygiene-Naval and Climatic.
'A certain latitude in selecting such courses of study as they
may prefer will be allowed to officers voluntarily attending the
College. Officers and others required to attend by the regulations
will follow such courses of study as may from time to time be
prescribed.
'The general organization of the College will be as follows :--
A flag officer will be President; he will be assisted by a captain
in the Royal Navy in matters affecting discipline, and in the internal
arrangements of the College unconnected with study.
"A Director of Studies will, under the President, organise and
superintend the whole system of instruction, and the various courses
of study.
There will further be-
A Professor of Mathematics.
A Professor of Physical Science.
A Professor of Chemistry.
A Professor of Applied Mechanics.
A Professor of Fortification.
Such instructors in mathematics and the other branches specified
as may be necessary to assist the professors will be added to the
staff. Lecturers will be appointed to deliver courses of lectures in
VOL. IV.
N N
5446
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Naval Architecture, Metallurgy, Civil and Hydraulic Engineering,
Maritime Law, Naval History and Tactics, and Hygiene.
A naval officer will conduct instruction in Nautical Astronomy
and Surveying, and there will be two instructors in Steam.
*Such provisions will be made for instruction in French and
German and in Drawing, as the numbers of students desirous of
following courses in these branches may render necessary.
Arrangements have been made for the admission of naval
engineer officers to the College, which will prevent time spent at
the College from entailing any pecuniary loss upon them.
“The School of Naval Architecture at South Kensington will be
absorbed in the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. The regulations
for the admission of engineer students and of dockyard apprentices
have been so framed as to provide as nearly as possible the same
aggregate time for their instruction as that which is now afforded at
South Kensington. Further regulations will be issued by their
Lordships in regard to the admission of private students to the
course of study at the College on similar conditions to those now
existing at South Kensington.
My Lords have further determined to admit a limited number
of officers of the mercantile marine as students of the College,
enjoying the full advantages of the whole course of instruction and
tuition by the educational staff, while officers of the mercantile
marine generally will, on application, be allowed to attend courses of
lectures.
“The paramount object which my Lords have pursued in the
organisation of the College has been to provide the most efficient
means for the higher education of naval officers adequate to the
constantly-increasing requirements of the service ; but my Lords
also anticipate great advantages from the results likely to accrue
from the connection which will be established through the College
between men distinguished in the various departments of mathe-
matical, physical, and chemical science, and those practical problems
which so vitally interest the navigator, the naval architect, and the
naval engineer.
‘My Lords expect the College to become, not only an educational
establishment affording the means of the highest training in theo-
retical subjects to naval officers of all classes, but also a nucleus of
mathematical and mechanical science specially devoted to those
branches of scientific investigation which have most interest for the
Navy.'
EDUCATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
547
NAVAL UNIVERSITY AT GREENWICH. SPEECH OF
THE COMPILER ON THE EDUCATION OF NAVAL
OFFICERS.
Delivered in the House of Commons, Friday, July 6, 1877.
(Extracted from Hansard's 'Parliamentary Debates.)
Mr. BRASSEY, in rising to call attention to the course of study The Com-
pursued at the Naval University at Greenwich, said, that the piler.
education of naval officers, although a less sensational topic than
other controversies connected with the Navy, was a question of the
utmost importance. Some years ago he had invited the attention
of the House to the report of the Committee on the higher education
of naval officers, and he had never ceased to watch the Naval
University at Greenwich with the deepest interest. While admitting
that the resources of that University had in the main been well
applied, the recent report of the Committee, appointed by the
Admiralty to inquire into the organization of the College, suggested
some doubts as to whether the studies of half-pay officers, who were
voluntary students, had been in all cases judiciously chosen. There
was reason to apprehend that the Naval University had failed to
remove one most serious defect in naval education. He referred to Subjects
that essentially important subject for naval officers, a knowledge of tion at tho
foreign languages. There was a twofold object in the establishment
College.
of the College-first, to increase the technical knowledge and skill
of officers; and, secondly, to cultivate their general intelligence.
Such being the objects, the question was whether there was not
some reason to apprehend, from the report of the Committee, that
the study of mathematics had been too rigorously insisted upon.
In the words of the Committee of Inquiry— The back-bone of the
· instruction at the Naval College consists of mathematics. The
Committee did not depreciate the importance of mathematics as the
foundation of many branches of study essential to a naval officer,
but they were of opinion that only a limited knowledge was necessary
of instruca
Naval
NN 2
548
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Professor
Faraday.
for the effective performance of the technical duties of a seaman,
and for the practical application of those branches of physics and
applied mechanics, which most immediately concerned his profession.
Few books could be more useful to a naval officer than Arnott's
· Physics, and it was a work which could be mastered without mathe-
matics. To the scientific artillerist and shipbuilder, or to under-
stand the theory as distinguished from the practice of navigation,
mathematics were essential, but they would do nothing to supply
quickness of eye to the pilot, or fertility of resource to the seaman.
He would like to refer to some remarks on this subject made by
Professor Faraday in giving evidence before the Public Schools
Commission:
The following question was put by Lord Clarendon : You are
probably aware that what our great schools aim at most is to give a
good training to the mind, and it is there considered that that is
done most effectually by the study of the classics and of pure
mathematics ?'
Professor FARADAY :--I should like a profound scholar to indicate
to me what he understands by the training of the mind in a literary
sense, including mathematics. What is their effect on the mind ?
What is the kind of result that is called the training of the mind ?
or what does the mind learn by that training? It learns many
things I have no doubt. By the very act of study it learns to be
attentive, to be persevering, to be logical according to the word
logic. But does it learn that training of the mind which enables a
man to give a reason in natural things for an effect which happens
from certain causes; or why in any emergency or event he does or
should do this, that, or the other? It does not suggest the least
thing in these matters. It is the highly educated man that we
find coming to us again and again, and asking the most simple
question in chemistry or mechanics.
Dr. Carpenter, in his evidence, spoke of mathematics as a subject
entirely apart from an experimental knowledge of the facts of the
physical sciences. He had seen striking instances of the want of
scientific habits of mind in men of high mathematical attainments.
Professor OWEn gave evidence on the same subject. Grammar,'
he said, and classics, arithmetic and geometry, may be the most
important disciplinary studies; we know the faculties of the mind
they are chiefly calculated to educe; but they fail in bringing out
those which natural history science more especially tends to improve.
I allude now to the faculty of accurate observation, of the classifica-
tion of facts, of the co-ordination of classes or groups; the arrange-
Dr. Car-
penter.
Professor
Owen.
EDUCATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
549
Committee
Naval
ment of topics, for example, in their various orders of importance in
the mind, giving to a writer or public speaker improved powers of
classifying all kinds of subjects. Order and method are the faculties
which the elements and principles of the science are best adapted to
improve and to educe.'
Professor CARPENTER, in the course of his examination, said :-
Mathematical training exercises the mind most strenuously in
a very narrow groove. It starts with axioms which have nothing to
do with external phenomena, but which the mind finds in itself;
and the whole science of mathematics may be evolved out of the
original axioms which the mind finds in itself. Now, it is the essence
of scientific training that the mind finds the objects of its study in
the external world. As Bacon says, 'Homo minister et interpres
naturæ.'
The Commissioners, in their report, rightlyinsisted on the necessity Report of
of combining modern languages and general knowledge with studies on Royal
of a more severely disciplinary character.
College.
· It is the office of education, not only to discipline some of the
faculties, but to awaken tastes that may be developed in after life,
to impart early habits of reading, and to furnish the mind with
knowledge.
* To train and discipline is not the only office of education. And
we cannot but remark that whilst in the busy world too great a value,
perhaps, is sometimes set upon the actual acquisition of knowledge,
and too little upon that mental discipline which enables men to
acquire and turn it to the best account, there is also a tendency
which is exactly the reverse of this, and which is among the besetting
temptations of the ablest schoolmasters; and that if very superficial
men may be produced by one of these influences, very ignorant men
are sometimes produced by the other.'
The Commissioners recommended the study of history in combi-
nation with modern languages, and rightly observed that an intelligent
student could hardly fail to form a new estimate of the French
language after he had been introduced to the pages of Guizot or de
Tocqueville.
This exaggeration of the importance of mathematics to a naval
officer recalls the description given by Dean Swift in his account of
Gulliver's voyage to Laputa, of the modus operandi adopted by the
tailors in that extraordinary country. The operator,' he says did
his office after a different manner from those of his trade in Europe.
He first took my altitude by a quadrant, and then, with rule and
compasses, described the dimensions and outlines of my whole body,
550
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Time at
for com-
of studies.
all which he entered upon paper. Now, it is important to note the
result. Were Gulliver's clothes more accurately adjusted to the
figure, than garments cut out by less scientific methods ? Nothing
of the sort. We are told that in six days the tailor brought my
clothes, very ill-made, and quite out of shape, by happening to
mistake a figure in the calculation.' Applying the lesson taught in
this amusing fable to the subject immediately before us, it may be
affirmed that men whose knowledge does not extend beyond plain
arithmetic, are quite as well qualified as men of the very highest
mathematical attainments for the practice of navigation, as dis-
tinguished from the comprehension of the theoretical and scientific
basis on which the practical application depends.
He need not pursue the subject further. No doubt mathematics
college in
sufficient were of special value to naval officers, and would form the groundwork
of
plete course
any complete course of naval education; but in the case of half-
pay officers, the time at their disposal at Greenwich was not sufficient
for a complete course of training, and if their limited time were too
largely occupied with mathematics, it was only too probable that
subjects of more practical importance would be neglected. The
students at the College were not idle. Captain Curme informed
the Committee that he studied ten hours a day. Yet, notwithstand-
ing their assiduity, the officers had no time at their disposal for
many valuable subjects. One lieutenant stated in evidence that:-
'The lectures on physics were so few that he could not possibly
have got his first-class certificate in them, or in winds and currents, if
he had not availed himself of private tuition. For the last month
there was an extra lecture on steam, from four to-five o'clock, twice
a-week. If he had had the same in physics it would have made a
great deal of difference. Moreover, on winds and currents, there
was no lecture during the last two months he was there.'
Subjects Experimental physics, practical mechanics, modern languages,
mended by and international law were recommended by the Committee as
alternative subjects of equal value with the higher mathematics.
In making this recommendation the Committee had said :--
College.
• We wish to guard ourselves against approving a course of study
which should be chosen simply because it was easier.'
Whatever the subject selected by the candidate, they recom-
mended that the standard of examination should be such as implied
in the student both diligence and aptitude.
The reasons why so much importance-he might say undue
importance-was given to the mathematical studies of the senior
officers at Greenwich were not far to seek. Prior to the establish-
recom-
Committee
on the
Naval
EDUCATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
551
:
ment of the Naval College, mathematics was the only subject, not
strictly of a professional character, which was systematically taught
in the Navy. The consequence was that the majority of the superior
officers, who distinguished themselves by their scholastic attainments,
were mathematicians, and they naturally attached special value to
the subject in which they were themselves most proficient. There
was a tendency generally, in educational matters, to fall into a
groove. This tendency was specially pointed out in the report of
the Public Schools Commission. As they justly observed, a master
could only teach those branches of knowledge in which he had him-
self been instructed ; and it was only natural that he should attach
the highest importance to those studies in which he was himself
proficient.
Following the opinion of the recent Greenwich Committee, he
would urge that the course of study for commanders and captains
should be varied, and that they should be allowed to make their own
choice of studies from among the numerous subjects which were re-
cognised at the College. They should be examined periodically, and
as a further guarantee for their diligence and discipline they should
be placed on full pay so long as they were permitted to reside at the
College.
The Committee on Higher Education were of opinion that the Modern
. .
study of French was of particular importance, and they further languages.
recommended that opportunities should be afforded for learning
German. The attention of the Committee had been specially
directed to this subject by several most competent witnesses. They
examined Colonel Williams, who had been for five years instructor
in fortification at the Royal Naval College, and who told them that
ignorance of French and German was the thing from which our naval
service suffered more than anything else. Commander Wharton,
who had obtained the Beaufort testimonial, went so far as to say that
French was a far more useful subject for the average naval officer to
study than mechanics. Passing to the evidence collected by the
recent Committee on the Naval College, he might refer to the
evidence of Captain Curme, an officer who had passed successfully Captain
through a course at Greenwich, and who expressed himself as
follows:
* There is no one thing in which most of us feel our deficiency
more than in the fact that so few of us are linguists. I am sorry to
say that frequently a foreign officer comes on board one of our ships
and it is rare to find anybody that can talk to him.'
If he were allowed to refer to information obtained from private
Curme.
552
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
naval
officers
ments to
modern
Modern sources, the House would be surprised to know how deficient naval
languages
essential in officers were in the knowledge of languages. In time of war the
diplomatic knowledge of languages was, as a matter of course, still more essen-
tions by tial. As it was well said by Admiral Jurien de la Gravière :- Petite
ou grande, la politique est dans la destinée de tout officier de marine.'
The advantages of a knowledge of languages to a naval officer in
a high command were never more conspicuously illustrated than in
the operations of the combined fleets off Carthagena. The consulta-
tions with the Admirals in command of the combined squadron, and
the negotiations with the leaders of the Intransigentes required the
constant use of many languages. The success achieved by Sir
Hastings Yelverton in sustaining the honour and authority of
England, without resorting to open hostilities, was due not only to
the tact which he displayed, but to his rare facilities for carrying on
a personal intercourse in many languages. Was it not reasonable to
infer that many little wars might have been prevented by a timely
Encourage explanation in the language understood by the enemy? In short,
study of
the study of languages was obviously so essential to the efficiency of
the Navy that the sole question was as to how it could be most effec-
languages.
tually encouraged. The only direct step which had hitherto been
taken by the Admiralty had been the issue of a circular, in July,
1874, inviting candidates to offer themselves for examination in
French, Spanish, German, Italian, and Portuguese. The names of
successful candidates were to be noted for employment in flag and
senior officers' ships, as Interpreters of the first or second class.
When so appointed, those of the first-class were to receive an allow-
ance of 2s. 6d. a-day, and those of the second-class an allowance of
ls. 6d., in addition to their pay. A reference to the Navy List
showed that only three commanders and ten lieutenants had passed
the examination. This was a number obviously too small for the
requirements of the Navy, and the inference might reasonably be
drawn that further inducements were necessary. Admiral Shadwell's
Committee had reported that it would be advantageous to the public
service if, under suitable regulations, officers could be permitted to
visit foreign countries for the purpose of studying the languages.
They were to be placed on full pay and allowed harbour-service time
if on their return they could pass the prescribed examination. As a
further inducement to officers to qualify as interpreters, the Com-
mittee recommended that all officers who had successfully passed the
required examinations should receive the extra allowance whenever
they were placed on full pay. The Committee concluded their re-
commendations on the subject of foreign languages with a reference
EDUCATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
553
.
to the suggestions of Admiral Milne, who advised that on foreign
stations, when in harbour, captains should be directed to obtain the
services of French and drawing masters; and that a moderate grant
should be given by the Admiralty to young officers to enable them
to pay such masters. He (Mr. Brassey) most earnestly recommended
to the present Admiralty the adoption of these suggestions. The
English Navy was behind the navies of all the other European
Powers, except, perhaps, the French, in this most valuable attain-
ment; and while the French were improving very much in this
respect, and specially in their knowledge of English, he was assured
that among the younger officers of our own service there was even
less disposition than formerly existed to apply themselves to this
study. In the opinion of the responsible authorities at Greenwich,
it was impossible to impart the requisite knowledge at the Naval
University. It was in foreign countries that it could be most
effectually acquired. Every naval officer ought to spend a portion of
his half-pay abroad, until he had mastered at least one foreign
language thoroughly. The strongest recommendations on this behalf
had been made by the Committee on Naval Education, and by
individual officers of the highest distinction. He ventured, there-
fore, to hope that the Admiralty would no longer hesitate to adopt
the remedial measures required to supply the most serious educa-
tional deficiency of our naval service.
In urging the subject of the revision of the course of study at
Greenwich on the attention of the Admiralty, he wished to guard
himself against being misunderstood. He was not an opponent, but,
on the contrary, an advocate of a special mathematical training for
the Navy. His remarks applied exclusively to the case of senior
officers of the rank of captain or commander, who went to Greenwich
for short periods as voluntary students, and who, he ventured to
maintain, should be allowed a reasonable discretion in the choice of
any branches of study, recognised and taught at the College, which
they might desire to follow.
554
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
REPORT OF THE ROYAL NAVAL COLLEGE COMMITTEE.
The views which the Compiler ventured to put forward in Parlia-
ment with reference to the inexpediency of requiring that every officer
at the Royal Naval College should devote the larger share of his time
and labour to mathematical study, were derived from the report of
the Committee of Inquiry, appointed in 1876. The Committee
consisted of Sir Ralph Lingen, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury,
the Rev. H. A. Morgan, of Jesus College, Cambridge, and Major
Donnelly, R.E., with the Rev. Osborne Gordon as Chairman.
The seventh chapter of their report is here inserted, as con-
taining a strong recommendation, on the highest authority, in
favour of allowing officers who have no natural aptitude for mathe-
matics to apply themselves to other subjects of study, of great value
to the naval profession.
CHAPTER VII.
· As to Subjects of Study other than purely Mathematical.
- 134. From the nature of our instructions, we have not, as
already stated, thought it our duty to comment in our report on
the course of study laid down for the various classes of officers. But
we believe it may be useful to the Admiralty to append the fol-
lowing brief summary of opinions we have formed during our
inquiry on the general scope and direction of the instruction afforded
at Greenwich. We have taken no evidence directly on this ques-
tion. It must, therefore, be understood that our remarks are only
such as are dictated by the casual observations and references which
were inevitable from the intimate relation of our inquiry to the
wider question of the character of instruction best fitted for the
object in view.
• 135. The instruction at the Naval College for all branches of
the service, while it embraces many subjects, is nevertheless un-
doubtedly essentially mathematical; that is to say, the backbone of
EDUCATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
555
the course consists of mathematics. To success in that study is
awarded the largest proportion of marks; and other subjects, not
purely professional, must therefore be looked upon rather in the
light of accomplishments.
• 136. We take it that the object of the College is twofold,-
primarily to increase the technical knowledge and skill of naval
officers; and secondarily, by cultivating their general intelligence,
to improve their aptitude for the various duties which a naval officer
is called upon to perform under the most diverse circumstances and
in most difficult positions.
6137. We have already quoted Dr. Hirst's opinion on the subject
of the study of mathematics, with which we fully agree ; and it is
scarcely necessary for us to say that we in no way desire to depre-
ciate the importance, or undervalue the direct bearing, of mathe-
matics on the professional acquirements of naval officers. But it
must be remembered that to a large class of minds mathematical or
analytical reasoning is entirely foreign. The use of the higher
mathematics, especially, as a tool is never thoroughly grasped by
them-never grasped in a form to be afterwards applied. Such
minds are deficient in that power of abstract reasoning which the
use of mathematical symbols implies, or they cannot attain any
facility in their manipulation. The want of this power is undoubt-
edly, per se, a great drawback. The more complex a problem, which
is stateable in terms of number or form, the more valuable, if not
necessary, becomes the application of mathematical analysis. And
when the facts or data are very numerous or interdependent it
becomes impossible to deal with them to any purpose without its
aid. Our argument goes only to this extent, that faculties which
are forthcoming should be made the best of, and not be wasted in
the endeavour to confine them to uncongenial uses.
138. Now, it must be admitted that the technical duties of a
seaman and of a naval officer-if we leave out of consideration the
more abstruse problems connected with nautical astronomy, naviga-
tion, shipbuilding, and gunnery, with which comparatively few
naval officers can ever be called upon to deal—necessitate but a
limited knowledge of mathematics, and that an intelligent apprehen-
sion of the principles on which the technical rules of the profession
are founded may be obtained with a good knowledge of arithmetic,
and the elements of algebra, geometry, and trigonometry.
“139. The branches of science with which in his professional
duties a naval officer is most likely to have to deal are physics and
applied mechanics.
C
556
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
“As regards physics, it cannot be said that a knowledge of mathe-
matics, beyond the elementary branches we have specified, is
necessary in order to understand those parts of essentially experi-
mental sciences, which are in practice the most valuable.
“As regards applied mechanics we may quote the opinion of
Professor Goodeve, himself an able mathematician:
“ Granted that those who in recent years have invented and
developed the machinery of our workshops, that such men as Whit-
worth, Clement, and Roberts have laboured without any assistance
from abstract theoretical knowledge, and with the help only of their
own natural genius in reasoning logically upon what they have
observed; granted that the creative minds of Watt, Telford, and
Stephenson, although never trained to the study of mathematics,
have given us our steam-engines, our canals, and our railways; and
it must surely be conceded that there is an enormous field of useful
mechanical knowledge in which a man may work successfully for
the good of others without being competent to follow the symbolical
reasoning of a mathematical treatise. Can it be denied that the
principles of mechanics have been understood by those who have
shaped and fashioned with their own hands the very subject-matter
which gives the science a real existence? And are we not com-
pelled to admit that the path which these men have opened out so
successfully may be safely trod by hundreds of the mechanics of
our workshops, who will be enabled, when properly guided, to un-
derstand and master the solution of many a problem of engineering,
and to comprehend many a complicated piece of mechanism, with
no further aid than that derived from patient thought upon the
principles involved, and a careful comparison of the successive steps
which have led previous inventors to the complete and final
result?»
• 140. Again, there is no acquirement which is more likely to be
of practical use to a naval officer than a knowledge of modern
languages, modern history, political geography, and the outlines of
international law. In dealing with foreigners in all parts of the
globe, whether it be the natives of the ports visited, or the officers of
foreign navies with whom he is brought in contact, a knowledge of
modern languages must be of immense importance. That an officer
who often has to act on his own judgment in delicate questions of
international law, of vital importance, not only to himself but to his
country, should have every assistance which a knowledge of the broad
principles of that law can afford him, is evident.
“141. Is it, then, advisable to make the instruction in what may
EDUCATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
557
be termed the Staff College—the instruction, that is, of half-pay
officers---so exclusively mathematical ? It will, for the reasons
already stated, we believe, be admitted by all mathematical teachers
that on a large proportion of men, however intelligent in other lines
of thought, higher mathematics are practically thrown away. They
may afford a kind of mental discipline, but they are never assimilated
in a form to be applied.
' 142. As it is very soon discovered who can and who cannot be
trained mathematically to any good purpose, we would suggest for
the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty,
whether it would not be of advantage to the service and to the
country to afford an opportunity for those officers who are found to
have no aptitude for mathematical reasoning, but still are anxious
study and improve themselves in the intelligent exercise of their
profession, to turn their attention to experimental physics,—a subject
which, when taught systematically and practically, is so well calculated
to increase the powers of observation, and to practical mechanics,
as well as to modern languages and international law, so as, while
requiring from all officers strict proof that they have acquired the
indispensable minimum of mathematical knowledge, to give to those
other subjects an alternative and equal value to that which is now
assigned to higher mathematics.
143. Our observations, which, as we have said, must only be
regarded in the light of suggestions for further consideration, are
not intended to apply to the course for sub-lieutenants, so long as
the minimum therein required is restricted to such a knowledge of
mathematics as is absolutely essential for an intelligent carrying on
of the simple professional duties of a naval officer.
* 144. We wish also to guard ourselves against recommending a
course of study which should be chosen simply because it was easier.
It is part of our recommendation that the standard of examination
in physics, mechanics, languages, and law, should be such as implies
in the student who passes it successfully both diligence and aptitude
for the study selected.
‘145. We cannot help also suggesting, with regard to the exami-
nations afloat, how much might be made of questions which obliged
the young officers to study closely and intelligently not only books,
but the mechanism itself (structure and engines) of the vessels in
which they were serving.'
.
553
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
FLEET CIRCULAR, No. 48.-N.
Admiralty, December 9, 1880.
ROYAL NAVAL COLLEGE PRIZES.
:
With a view to the encouragement of scientific study at the
Royal Naval College, my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are
pleased to issue the following regulations :-
1. The arrangement under Circular No. 8 C., of January 30,
1873, by which prizes of 1001., 80., and 501. are paid for three years,
is cancelled, except as regards the present holders.
2. Prizes of the same total value will be awarded, as stated below,
so soon as the new arrangements come fully into operation, and the
entire amount of each prize will in future be paid in one sum.
(Class a.) Three prizes of 1001., 801., and 501., respectively
In order of merit for general proficiency.
(Class b.) Two prizes of 80l. each :
For the Gunnery and Torpedo Lieutenant gaining the highest
marks in their respective courses.
(Class c.) Six prizes of 501. each.
For the officers gaining the highest marks in the following
subjects, viz. :-
I. Pure and Applied Mathematics.
II. Physics and Chemistry.
III. Navigation and Nautical Astronomy, including Marine
Surveying.
IV. Marine Engineering and Naval Architecture.
V. Fortification and other military subjects.
VI. Foreign Languages.
3. The prizes specified above will be open to Executive and
Navigating Officers above the rank of Sub-Lieutenant, and to Marine
Officers either above the rank of Subaltern, or of eight years' standing
in that rank who have served three years at sea, subject to the
following provisions :-
EDUCATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS559
.
,
I. Officers undergoing the Gunnery and Torpedo courses will only
be allowed to compete for the prizes specially appropriated to them.
(Class b. in Article 2.)
II. An officer will not be allowed to take more than one prize at
the conclusion of any one session, and will not be eligible for a prize
identical in description with one which he may have already re-
ceived.
III. The award of prizes will be dependent on the attainment of
a certain standard of proficiency, to be hereafter determined.
· VI. Officers will not be eligible to coinpete for the prizes of Class
C., Article 2, unless they have attended the College lectures on the
particular subject in which they compete.
Temporary Arrangement.
4. As, owing to the three years' duration of prizes already granted,
a part only of the amount annually provided for the purpose will be
available for new prizes until June 1883, their Lordships have been
pleased to sanction the grant of the following prizes at the close of
the sessions 1880-81 and 1881–82, viz. :
1880-81.
One prize of 801. (Class b. in Article 2.)
For the Gunnery or Torpedo Lieutenant gaining the highest
number of marks in their special courses.
Three prizes of 50l. each (Class c. in Article 2.)
For proficiency in subjects I. to III.
1881-82.
Two prizes of 801. each (Class b. in Article 2.)
For the Gunnery and Torpedo Lieutenant gaining the highest
number of marks in their special courses.
Six prizes of 501. each (Class c. in Article 2.)
For proficiency in subjects I. to VI.
By command of their Lordships,
ROBERT HALL.
To all Commanders-in-Chief, &c.
SECTION VI.
EDUCATION OF OFFICERS FOR THE
MERCANTILE MARINE.
SPEECH IN PARLIAMENT,
MAY 16, 1876.
}
too
VOL. IV.
Oo
562
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
EDUCATION OF OFFICERS FOR THE MERCANTILE
MARINE.
House of Commons, Tuesday, May 16, 1876.
of masters
of mer-
chant
MR. BRASSEY, in rising to move-
"That it is expedient that voluntary examinations should be held
under the Board of Trade in modern languages and commercial law,
and that further inducements should be given to mercbant officers
to study at the Naval University at Greenwich,
İnadequate said, that, amid the long debate on the causes of shipwreck in which
education
they had lately been engaged, the efficiency of the officers of the
merchant service had never been called in question. While it was
ships. generally acknowledged that the examinations for masters and mates
conducted under the Board of Trade had produced excellent results,
it was obvious, from the consular reports, to which he would
shortly refer, that the condition of the merchant service as to
officers still left much to be desired. It would be his duty to insist
chiefly on the defects of the inferior class of shipmasters. He
desired, however, not to be misunderstood, as intending to draw a
general indictment against our merchant officers. The state of the
profession might still be accurately described in the language of
Lord Ellenborough, in the report of the Committee on Pensions :
‘Masters of merchant vessels differ widely in their qualifications
and character, and are of many various grades in society. While
some may be little superior to seamen, there are others not only
distinguished by the highest acquirements in the practice and
science of navigation, but as gentlemen of the best education and
manners.'
Lossés His object on the present occasion was to induce the Govern-
ment to make further efforts to raise the standard of professional
navigation.
knowledge among the merchant officers of the inferior class; and, in
order to show how necessary it was that something should be done,
he would refer, in the first place, to the report of the Commission
on Unseaworthy Ships, wherein it was stated that while from 1856
to 1872, inclusive, only sixty ships were known to have been lost
from bad
EDUCATION OF OFFICERS FOR MERCANTILE MARINE. 563
from defects in the vessels, 711 were lost from neglect and bad
navigation. As a commentary on these melancholy statistics, the
Mercantile Marine Association of Liverpool had lately re-published
the following observations from the Shipping Gazette :-
Great as is the improvement in the status and condition of
merchant captains and officers, which has resulted from the Board of
Trade examinations, the system has not by any means completed its
work, or produced all the results of which, properly administered, it
is capable.
He would now refer to the replies of Her Majesty's Consuls to Consúlar
the letter of the hon. member for Reading (Mr. Shaw-Lefevre),
reports.
calling for their opinion as to the condition of the merchant ser-
vice. Similar inquiries had been made in 1843 and 1847, and a
comparison of the earlier reports with those of 1872 showed a
marked improvement. As a rule, steamers and first-class sailing
ships were well commanded. Good ships generally attracted good
crews; but, in inferior ships, many even of the latest reports indi-
cated a state of things which was far from satisfactory. It would be
necessary to give a few quotations, in order to convince the House of
the necessity for reform. Mr. Mark, British Consul at Marseilles, Mr. Mark.
had written as follows:-
· England is not fairly represented by the men who command
her ships on the ocean. The grossest ignorance is seen, and drunk-
enness largely prevails among them.'
In those branches of trade, in which British ships competed with Sir S. R.
foreign vessels commanded by a superior class of officers, shippers
naturally gave a preference to the foreign flag. Sir S. R. Crowe,
our Consul-General at Christiania, said:-
* In cases of competition between British and Norwegian ships,
when the master of the latter accepts the same rate of freight as his
British competitor, he will generally be preferred ; as the British
sailing ships visiting Norway are commanded by third and fourth
class masters, who frequently have neither education nor sobriety to
recommend them.'
Mr. Ward, Vice-Consul at Memel, had made a similar report:-
"It is only too true that the German seamen, and more especially
the masters of ships, are, as a rule, a very superior class of men in
point of ability, education, and manners, in comparison with British
seamen and masters employed in the Baltic trade.'
We had a similar opinion from Mr. Doyle, Consul at Pernam- Mr. Doyle.
buco :
The masters of British sailing ships are, as a rule, à proverbial
Crowe.
Mr. Ward.
0 0 2
564
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Mr. Goula.
Insufficient
salaries in
mercantile
marine.
contrast to the masters of ships of most other nations; and it is a
wonder, considering the disproportion between the remuneration for
which British masters work, and the valuable property entrusted to
them, that the navigation of these vessels and the trade through
them is carried on with so much honesty and regularity.'
He would next refer to the report of Mr. Gould, our Secretary
of Legation at Stockholm, on the British shipping trade with the
Baltic :-
· In 1872, 1,714,000 tons of shipping were employed in the
direct trade between Sweden and Great Britain. Only 25 per cent.
of this tonnage was British.'
The Swedish shipowners had no advantages in the cost of build-
ing and sailing their ships. Mr. Gould attributed the success of
the Swedish shipowners solely to the superior education of the
masters they employed. Our shipmasters were totally ignorant
of the Swedish language, while the Swedish and Norwegian masters
were as much at home in England as in their own country.
It had not been a difficult task to show that, in the inferior class
of British merchant vessels, many officers were to be found who were
ill-conducted and badly educated. It was not equally easy to pro-
vide a legislative remedy for the evils which had been described.
As a rule, only the ill-paid were ill-conducted ; and it was imprac-
ticable for the Legislature to regulate the private bargains between
needy shipmasters and parsimonious shipowners. His statement,
however, would be incomplete without some reference to this aspect
of the question. Mr. Mark, our Consul at Marseilles, said that
British shipowners should give better remuneration to their captains
and oblige them to hold a share in their vessels. Captain Toynbee,
in a speech delivered last year at the Society of Arts, pointed out
that there were masters of ships of 800 tons, in the East Indian
trade, whose salaries were only 101. a month. The institutions set
up by the benevolent for the relief of merchant seamen were chiefly
used for the benefit of the officers under whom they serve. Of the
1,200 orphans, who had been inmates of the Merchant Seamen's
Orphan Asylum át Snaresbrook, the children of captains number 637,
those of mates 330, while the children of seamen were only 77 in
number. There were at present 254 orphans at Snaresbrook; but, of
these, only sixteen were the children of seamen. While he admitted
that the question of remuneration must be left in the hands of the
shipowners, he ventured to hope that an expression of opinion in that
House might have the effect of establishing a more just view of the.
responsibilities which belonged, and of the reward which was due, to
EDUCATION OF OFFICERS FOR MERCANTILE MARINE. 565
Trade ex-
education
abroad.
the masters of merchant ships freighted with valuable cargoes, and
often carrying hundreds of human beings.
Turning from the remuneration to the professional education of Board of
merchant officers, the examinations already established had done
aminations.
great good; and the Board of Trade would do well to proceed further
in the same direction by encouraging a broader education for the
merchant service. Modern languages, as suggested by Mr. Gould,
and the elements of a commercial education, should be added to the
subjects included in the present examinations. The new subjects
might at first be offered voluntarily by candidates, to whom an
honorary certificate might be given, like that already granted for
superior proficiency in mathematics. In the merchant service a
knowledge of languages was, at least, as essential as a high standard
of mathematical attainments. You might make a good landfall
without trigonometry; you could not trade with people whose lan-
guage you did not understand.
In offering these suggestions to the Government, he might refer Naval
to the long-established regulations of the principal maritime nations.
Mr. Lindsay, in his History of Merchant Shipping, said that, in
Norway and Sweden, masters of ships had to undergo a general ex-
amination in shipping affairs, in the customs and navigation laws,
and in the foreign exchanges. In Russia and Prussia, they had to
show some knowledge both of French and English. In France, a
professor, paid by the Government, resided at each of the principal
ports, and afforded to all, seeking to be masters in the merchant
service, instruction, free of charge, on the different subjects connected
with their profession. He claimed the example of. France as an
argument which, he hoped, would prevail with the First Lord of the
Admiralty, and induce him to consider favourably bis second proposal.
We had organised a considerable force of seamen as a Naval Reserve;
but we had not formed a corresponding body of thoroughly trained
officers for that Reserve. In the debate on the Manning of the Navy,
in 1860, Sir Charles Napier said truly :-
Suppose you have obtained your Naval Reserve, where would
you get officers to command them? You would find it absolutely
necessary to come to the merchant service.'
He would not enter, on that occasion, into the question of the Increased
general organisation of the Naval Reserve; but he would urge the facilities to
importance of making the University at Greenwich a connecting link mercantile
between the Royal Navy and the mercantile marine. Not until its desiring to
benefits were extended to officers of the merchant service could the study at
College at Greenwich claim to be regarded as a truly national institu- Colege.
6
Naval
566
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
tion. The lectures were already accessible to merchant officers; but
that was not enough. The majority of masters and mates were too
poor to be able to give up a year's income for the purposes of study.
He would, therefore, propose, that studentships for a certain number
of officers of the Naval Reserve should be established at Greenwich.
Students should be admitted to residence at the Naval College for
twelve months, free of charge, and should receive a sum of not less
than 601. a-year. These privileges would enable an officer, who
had served in the merchant service in the capacity of mate, to study
at the College without pecuniary loss. The studentships should be
open for competition to all midshipmen of the Naval Reserve, who
could show a sufficient length of actual service at sea. The gradual
introduotion into the merchant service of officers of higher attain-
ments, who had had associations with the Royal Navy, must be a
mutual benefit to the two services, and therefore a public advantage.
We might look to the Greenwich students as men well qualified
to serve in the Navy in time of war, while their example and in-
fluence in their own service, in time of peace, would tend to raise
the general tone of their profession,
SECTION VII.
CRUISES IN THE SUNBEAM.
INTRODUCED AS EXAMPLES OF USEFUL EXPERIENCES IN
NAVIGATION ACQUIRED IN A SMALL VESSEL.
568
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
CRUISES IN THE SUNBEAM.'
The following letters to the Times and the Field are appended to the
present volume, as examples of instructive cruising, in which it is
extremely desirable that all officers volunteering for navigating duties
should gain experience, and which could be carried out at a moderate
cost in small vessels with auxiliary steam power.
Outline of
round the
world.
From the · Times' of June 2, 1877.
SIR, Believing it possible that some interest may attach to the
Sunbeam: voyage completed on May 27, by the arrival of the Sunbeam at
Cowes, I venture to offer to your readers a short narrative of our
proceedings. The expedition is in some respects unprecedented; a
circumnavigation of 35,400 miles has never before been made in the
short period of 46 weeks, from which must be deducted 112 days of
well-earned repose in harbour. We bad, it is true, the advantage of
steam, without which such a performance would have been an im-
possibility; but we travelled 20,517 miles under sail alone, and the
consumption of coal has not exceeded 350 tons. The Sunbeam '
sailed from Cowes on July 6, called at Torbay, Madeira, Teneriffe,
and the Cape Verde, crossed the Line on August 8, and, carrying a
favourable breeze in the south-east trades, without even a momentary
lull, a distance of 2,500 miles, arrived at Rio Janeiro on August 17.
Following the coasts of South America, we visited Monte Video,
Buenos Ayres, and Ensenada, steamed through the Straits of Ma-
gellan and Smyth's Channel, and reached Valparaiso on October 21.
While on the coast of Patagonia it was our privilege to rescue a
crew of fifteen hands from the barque ‘Monksbaven,' laden with an
inflammable cargo of smelting coals, which had been on fire six days
when we most providentially descried her signals of distress.
On October 30, we commenced our long and lonely voyage of
12,330 miles across the Pacific. We touched at Bow Island in the
>
t
CRUISES IN THE SUNBEAM.'
569
Low Archipelago, Maitea and Tahiti in the Society Islands, and
Hawaii and Oahu in the Sandwich group. On January 21 we sighted
Assumption in the Ladrones, and on the 29th arrived at Yokohama.
While in Japan we were present at the opening of the railway from
Osaka to Kioto by the Mikado, and subsequently cruised in the
Inland Sea in severe winterly weather. At Simonoseki we found
the people much agitated by the recent outbreak of the Satsuma
clan. On February 19, we bade a reluctant farewell to Japan, and,
following the most direct route to England, visited in succession
Hongkong, Canton, Macao, Singapore, Johore, Malacca, Penang,
Galle, Colomho, Aden, Alexandria, Malta, Gibraltar, and Lisbon.
Having given the principal dates, the story of the voyage will be
most rapidly completed by entering our successive passages in a
tabular statement:
Steam
Sail
Total
Miles
193
353
164
Miles
205
874
72
Miles
398
1,227
236
35
689
509
886
2,617
712
921
3,336
1,221
816
524
1,340
565
634
565
1,134
500
Thames and English Channel :
Torbay to Madeira
Madeira to Orotava (Teneriffe).
Orotava to Tarafal Bay (San Antonio,
Cape Verde)
Tarafel Bay to Rio Janeiro
Rio to Monte Video and Buenos Ayres
Buenos Ayres to Possession Bay (Straits
of Magellan)
In Straits of Magellan and Smyth's
Channel
To Lota and Valparaiso
Valparaiso to Yokohama, calling at Hao
in the Paumotu Group, Maitea and
Tahiti in the Society Islands, and
Hawaii and Oahu in the Sandwich
group
Yokohama to Kobé and Simonoseki,
through the Inland Sea
Simoneseki to Hongkong
Hongkong to Singapore.
Singapore to Point de Galle, calling at
the Straits Settlements
Galle to Colombo and Aden
Aden to Suez.
Suez to Alexandria
Alexandria to Cowes, touching at Malta,
Gibraltar, and Lisbon
2,108
10,225
12,333
653
395
312
1,015
1,251
653
1,410
1,563
1,668
2,202
807
436
.
1,668
2,202
1,358
436
551
2,440
934
2,374
Total
14,979
20,396
35,375
Having sketched the voyage in outline, the following details
may not be devoid of interest to readers with nautical tastes.
Every yachtsman should be a lover of sailing. In the cruise of
570
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Speed
under
steam
and sail.
the “Sunbeam,' although expedition was an essential consideration,
steam has been used almost exclusively in calms or in narrow waters,
or when, as it has often happened, we have sailed at sunset after a
hard day's work on board, intending to make an offing during the
night and set sails in the morning.
Of the total distance of 15,000 knots under steam, 12,000 were
traversed under those special circumstances which seem to justify
even a yachtsman in availing himself of the unromantic but invalu-
able engine.
The best run in twenty-four hours under steam alone was 230
knots, and the most successful continuous performance was on the
passage from Penang to Galle, in the week ending April 15, when the
“Sunbeam 'steamed 1,451 knots, with a daily consumption of 44 tons
of coal.
The best runs under sail from noon to noon were 298 and 299
knots respectively. The first was on the passage from Honolulu to
Yokohama, sailing along the 16th parallel of north latitude, and
between 163 deg. and 168 deg. 15 min. east. The second was in
the Formosa Channel.
The highest speed ever attained under sail was 15 knots in a
squall in the North Pacific.
On 28 days the distance under sail alone has exceeded, and often
considerably exceeded, 200 knots.
The best consecutive runs under sail only were :-
I. Week ending August 13, South Atlantic. In the south-east
trades, wind a-beam, force 5—1,456 knots.
II. Week ending November 19, South Pacific, south-east trades,
wind aft, force 5–1,360 knots.
III. Four days, January 15 to 18, North Pacific, north-east
trades, wind on the quarter, force 5 to 9—1,027 knots. The average
speed in this case was 10.7 knots an hour.
The following were the average speeds of the longer passages :
Days at
Sea
Total
Distance
Distance
under
steam
Daily
average
1. Cape Verde to Rio
2. Valparaiso and Yokohama
3. Simonoseki and Aden
18
72
37
Miles
3,336
12,333
6,931
Miles
689
2,108
4,577
Miles
185
171
187
The vessel which has carried us so rapidly and safely round the
globe merits a brief description. She was designed by Mr. St. Clare
Byrne, of Liverpool, and may be technically defined as a composite
1
CRUISES IN THE
6
571
SUNBEAM.
expe-
three-masted topsail-yard screw schooner. The engines, by Messrs.
Laird, are of 70 nominal or 350 indicated horse-power, and developed
a speed of 10.13 knots on the measured mile. The bunkers contain
80 tons of coal. The average daily consumption is four tons, and the
speed eight knots in fine weather. The principal dimensions of the
hull are :-Length for tonnage, 157ft. ; beam, extreme, 27ft. 6in.;
displacement tonnage, 531 tons; area of midship section, 202 sq. feet.
With an addition of 20ft. to the length, and more engine power,
the ‘Sunbeam' presents a type which might be found efficient for
naval services in distant waters, where good sailing qualities are
essential, and large ships are not required.
On looking back, and contrasting the anticipated difficulties with Weather
the actual experiences of the voyage, the ease and certainty with rienced.
which every passage has been made are truly surprising. Our track
has been for the most part within the Tropics. The storms off the
Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn have been avoided in the inland
passages of the Straits of Magellan and the Suez Canal. We have
encountered no continuous stormy weather, except during the four
days preceding our arrival at Yokohama. We have suffered discom-
fort from heat and detention in calms, but storms have disturbed us
seldom, and they have not lasted long.
Our experience of gales include a north-east gale off Cape
Finisterre, on the outward voyage; a northerly gale between Rio
and the River Plate, a westerly gale off the east coast of Patagonia,
short but severe gales on each of the four days preceding our arrival
at Yokohama, a severe gale from the north-west in the Inland Sea, a
north-east gale in the Formosa Channel, a northerly gale in the
Straits of Jubal, a westerly gale off Port Said, and an easterly gale
on the south coast of Candia. On the passage homewards from
Gibraltar we met strong northerly winds on the coast of Portugal,
and a north-east gale off Cape Finisterre.
The navigation has presented few difficulties. All the coasts that Facilities
we have visited have been surveyed. Lighthouses are now as gation.
numerous and efficient on the coasts of China and Japan as on the
shores of Europe. Such is the perfection of the modern chronometer,
that lunar observations, the only difficult work in ocean navigation,
are no longer necessary; and the wind charts published by the
Admiralty supply to the amateur navigator accumulated information
and valuable hints for every stage of his voyage.
How infinitely easy is the task of the modern circumnavigator
compared with the hazardous explorations of Magelhaens and Cap-
tain Cook, when the chronometer was an instrument of rude and
1
for navi-
572
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
untrustworthy quality, when there were no charts, and the roaring
of the breakers in the dead of night was the mariner's first warning
that a coral reef was near!
Our comprehensive and varied cruise has strengthened my former
convictions that the disasters due to negligence bear a large pro-
portion to the number of inevitable losses. Every coast is dangerous
to the careless commander ; but there are no frequented seas where,
with the exercise of caution and reasonable skill, the dangers cannot
be avoided. These remarks do not, of course, apply to cases of
disaster from stress of weather. In fogs there must be delay, though
not necessarily danger.
In these days of lamentation over the degeneracy of the British
seaman, my experience may be accepted as a contribution to the
mass of evidence on this vexed question. I have not been surrounded
by such smart seamen as can only be found on a man-of-war, but I
have no ground for general or serious complaint. Many of my crew
have done their duty most faithfully. In emergencies everybody
has risen to the occasion, and has done best when his skill or en-
durance was most severely tried-
Conduct
of crew.
My mariners,
Souls that have toiled and wrought and thought with me, i
That ever with a frolic welcome took
The thunder and the sunshine.
It is always in stormy weather that the good qualities of the
British seaman are displayed to the greatest advantage. The
difficulty is to keep up his interest and energies in long intervals of
fine weather, when nothing occurs to rouse him to an effort, and the
faculties of the seaman before the mast, no less than those of his
officer, are benumbed by the monotony and isolation from mankind,
which are the gravest drawbacks of a sailor's life. It is in these dull
moments that men are tempted to drink and quarrel, that officers
become tyrannical, and their crews insubordinate, or even mutinous.
Lest it should be thought that my impressions of the average sailor
are derived from an exceptional crew of picked men, I have only to
add that the manning of the Sunbeam 'was a family job. The
sailing master was related by blood or marriage to the majority of
his subordinates-fishermen from the coast of Essex, who had
received their early training among the banks and shoals at the
mouth of the Thames.
In this connection I tender my sincere tribute of praise to the
officers of the Navy for their success in maintaining the efficiency
Efficiency
of Navy:
CRUISES IN THE 'SUNBEAM.
573
adminis-
and spirit of their crews through long commissions on foreign
stations, much time being necessarily spent in harbour, in many
cases in the most enervating climates. The discipline of the service
seems to be admirable, and the seamen are reconciled to it by
tradition, by early training, and perhaps by an instinctive perception
of its necessity.
I am equally bound to commend the efficiency of our consular Colonial
service in the remotest outposts of civilisation which we have visited; tration.
and evidences of good colonial administration are abundantly manifest
at Hongkong, Singapore, Penang, Ceylon, and Aden, in the prosperity
and contentment of the people.
It is scarcely necessary to observe, in conclusion, that experiences Lessons
may be gathered in a voyage of circumnavigation which are not to
be gleaned from Blue-books or from shorter cruises in European
waters. A more vivid impression is formed of the sailor's daily life,
of his privations at sea, and his temptations on shore. The services
required of the Navy are more clearly appreciated after a visit to
distant foreign stations.
Such a voyage is, indeed, a serious effort. It demands many
laborious days and anxious nights of watching. For my safe return
to those pale, those white-faced shores,' so welcome to the homeward-
bound, accompanied, happily, by the adventurous little family who
have taken part in the expedition, I am truly thankful.
I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
THOMAS BRASSEY.
Cowes.
from
voyage.
From the Field, February 5, 1881.
THE SUNBEAM' IN THE BAY OF BISCAY.
Sing-A gale of wind is an incident of such ordinary occurrence Gale of
in a passage across the Bay of Biscay in the month of January, that wind in
I cannot venture to attribute an exceptional degree of interest to our Biscay.
latest experiences in the “Sunbeam.' To the yachtsman, however,
there are valuable lessons in every tempest; and, as the north-east
gale which swept across the bay on the 22nd of this month was the
most severe that I have witnessed in numerous and extended cruises
during the last nine years, I offer to my brethren in the pleasure
navy a short epitome of my log.
We weighed in Portsmouth Harbour on January 20, at 3 P.M.
Our decks were covered with frozen snow, and as we steamed out to
574
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
1
Spithead, the Isle of Wight was dimly visible through a thick fog.
The weather cleared as we reached the Needles ; and the green
downs of Freshwater and the red cliffs of Alum Bay-scenes so
familiar to yachtsmen in the balmy months of summer-presented a
novel aspect of beauty in their winter robe of snow, enriched by the
opal tints of sunset.
Having gained a good offing in the Channel, we made- sail to
favourable breezes from the south-east. In the afternoon of the
21st, as we were nearing the north coast of Brittany, the sea was
smooth, the sky wore a settled appearance, and the barometer was
steady at 29.97. At 7 P.M., or twenty-seven hours after leaving
Portsmouth, the north-west light on Ushant bore south-east, distant
four miles.
After rounding the island the wind freshened rapidly, and at
11 P.M. a fierce gale had commenced from the east-north-east, with
little warning from the slight fall of the barometer to 29.93. We
proceeded promptly with the usual preparations for bad weather.
Heavy boats were secured on deck, flying kites were taken in, lower
sails were reefed, skylights were protected with canvas.
At midnight, in a thick squall of rain, the look-out man reported
a green light on the port bow, and in a few moments more, cried
Hard a-starboard !' The helm was put down, while I rushed for-
ward to reconnoitre, and the "Sunbeam,' coming suddenly to the
wind under a press of sail, plunged into a heavy sea, and the jib-boom
was carried away. In a few moments more the light was made out
to be the masthead light of a steamer, and we bore away on our
course, steering to the south-west.
The broken spar was secured, and as the night advanced, top
masts were housed, and all fore-and-aft sails, except the mainsail,
were close reefed. At daylight we were scudding under mizen
trysail, whole mainsail, double-reefed foresail, and storm squaresail.
In the forenoon the gale was at its height, and we were running at
from thirteen to fifteen knots, rolling deeply, and taking in large
quantities of broken water in the waist. The Sunbeam' carries
75 tons of lead ballast, which lowers the centre of gravity, and aggra-
vates the tendency to roll.
As the gale continued the seas became more threatening, and I
thought of a conversation I had had at the last dinner of the Navy
Club with Admiral Blake, in which he repeated to me the statement he
had made to the Committee of Inquiry into the loss of the 'Atalanta.
When in command of that vessel, in heavy weather, he followed the
advice which he had received from Sir Thomas Hardy, and steered
CRUISES IN THE SUNBEAM.'
575
.
so as to keep the wind and sea about four points on the quarter. The
result was that the ship rolled deeply, but quickly recovered herself,
always flying before the wind with the fleetness and buoyancy of a
bird. We found the Sunbeam' behaved best when steered with the
wind two points on the quarter, so as to keep the fore-and-aft sails
full and drawing. The press of sail steadied the vessel and increased
the speed. When a heavy sea was seen rushing upon the quarter or
the beam, we bore away for an instant straight before the wind and
came to, after the wave had passed ahead.
With skilful steering, nothing went wrong for several hours,
until shortly before noon, when the sea became more ugly than ever.
About this time the crests of some mountainous waves broke over
the lee quarter, and two helmsmen in rapid succession were knocked
down at the wheel and washed into the lee scuppers. Once, and
once only, the vessel broached to, bringing the wind nearly on the
beam. It was the work of a few moments, but it was attended with
à disastrous consequence; the squaresail was taken aback and torn
from the bolt ropes, thus depriving us of a most important sail. No
time was lost in setting the double-reefed square foretopsail. It was
a good piece of seamanship, which had been delayed too long. The
lofty sail had a telling effect in increasing both speed and steadiness.
We shipped much less water and steered more easily.
At noon we passed close to a large screw steamer, forcing her way
slowly through the waves, head to wind. The bow was constantly
buried in volumes of broken water, which were discharged from the
scuppers in copious cascades. In the afternoon the gale had begun
to break, the barometer was rising, and the seas were longer. The
gradual abatement of the storm was a welcome relief, after the strain
and tension of many hours of arduous conflict with the elements. It
left us free to contemplate and admire the sublime and noble aspect
of the storm-tossed ocean. At 8 P.M. we had logged 312 knots, or
360 statute iniles, in twenty-four hours after rounding Ushant,
giving an average of thirteen knots, or fifteen statute miles an hour.
The remainder of the voyage presented no special features. We
gave a wide berth to Cape Finisterre, and ran down the coast of
Portugal in two days, making the Burlings exactly three days after
rounding Ushant. We met the usual heavy swell from the west-
ward, but the weather was otherwise favourable.
After rounding St. Vincent, we encountered a gale from the
south-west. We made the entrance to the Straits with some difficulty
in thick weather, and at 8 P.M. on the 26th anchored off Algeciras, in
six days and four hours from Portsmouth.
576
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
In conclusion, a few words of praise are due to my sailing master,
Mr. Kindred, whose duties under an amateur commander are neces-
sarily far more comprehensive and responsible than those of an officer
subordinate to a professional seaman. Of my crew it is just to say
that no mariners could have worked better. In these days we hear
much depreciation of the British seaman. My experiences, renewed
year by year, and extending over more than a quarter of a century,
have given me a more cheering impression of the brave and skilful
men, who have done me excellent service,
My last word shall be a tribute of praise to my little company of
passengers. They had many sufferings to endure. The nursery, so
called, was deluged with water, but not a murmur rose from its
plucky young occupants and their attendants. The ladies, who were
more conscious that a great storm was raging, never lost heart. Indeed,
it may be recorded with truth that all on board made a worthy effort
to do their duty.
I add, in a tabular form, the main details from our log.
THOMAS BRASSEY.
'Sunbeam,' R.Y.S., Gibraltar, Jan. 28.
Portsmouth to Gibraltar.
Date
Sail
Steam
Total
129
Rounded Ushant
0
II
Jan. 21
22
23
24
25
26
27
268
240
144
85
106
15
185
268
240
144
145
214
80
60
108
65
Made the Burlings
Rounded St. Vincent
Anchored off Algeciras
Moored inside New Mole, Gibralt
914
362
1,276
The Field,' October 22, 1881.
THE SUNBEAM'IN A GALE OFF FLAMBOROUGH HEAD.
SIR,—The columns of the press have been filled with tales of
disaster by sea and land, caused by the recent hurricane. As a relief
to these melancholy narratives, I offer a description of our experience
in the Sunbeam.'
After attending a public meeting at Middlesborough, I embarked
in the Sunbeam' on the evening of Thursday, the 13th inst.,
Gale of
October
14, 1881.
t
CRUISES IN THE SUNBEAM.
577
intending to sail for Portsmouth on the following morning.
called at 5 A.M. ; but, finding the wind from the south and the
barometer depressed, I determined to defer our departure. At 9 A.M.
the barometer had fallen to 28.87, but as the wind had changed to
W.N.W., and was off-shore from a favourable quarter, I determined
to proceed to sea. We were towed down the Tees, and as we
descended the river I conferred with the pilot as to what we might
anticipate from the remarkable depression in the barometer. He
was of opinion that a severe gale was at hand, but that it would
blow from the north-west, and that there was no reason for remaining
in port. The tug was accordingly cast off at the mouth of the Tees,
and we made sail. Foreseeing a storm, topmasts were housed, boats
were secured on deck, and we proceeded under close-reefed canvas,
setting the main and mizen jib-headed trysails, double-reefed foresail,
and forestaysail, and reefed standing-jib.
As the day advanced no change took place in the weather. The
wind blew strongly, but not with the force of a gale, and the sea was
comparatively smooth. Meanwhile, the barometer continued to
descend rapidly, and at 2 P.m. had fallen to 28.45. As nothing had
yet occurred to account for this depression, the navigating officer
remarked that the fall must have been caused by the heavy showers
of rain which had fallen in the course of the morning. I knew from
my former experiences that it was not the rain, but the coming
storm, that was indicated by the barometer. It had needed some
resolution to quit the mouth of the Tees in the morning, and at mid-
day, when we were off Whitby, a still greater effort was required to
resist the temptation to make for a harbour.
No further incidents occurred until 3 P.M., when we were nearing
Flamborough Head. Here we were at last overtaken by the long-
impending storm. Looking back to the north-west, over the star-
board quarter, we saw the sea lashed and torn by a furious wind into
a mass of white foam. The hurricane was rushing forward with a
velocity and a force which must have seemed terrible to the fleet of
coasting vessels around us. Before the gale struck the "Sunbeam'
our canvas had been reduced to main and mizen trysails and reefed
standing-jib; but even with this small spread of sail, and luffed up
close to the wind, our powerful little vessel careened over under the
crushing weight of the blast until the lee-rail completely disappeared
under water--an incident which had never previously occurred during
all the extensive voyages we have undertaken. Such was the force
of the wind that every sailing vessel near us lost all her sails, and our
large gig was stove-in from the tremendous pressure of the gunwale
VOL. IV.
PP
578
NAVAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
against the davits. We took in the jib and the mizen trysail, and,
with our canvas reduced to a jib-headed main trysail, we were soon
relieved of water on deck.
For an hour and a half we lay-to on the starboard tack, standing
in for the land below Burlington Bay. We were battened down,
and felt ourselves secure from all risks except collision. The fury of
the wind so filled the air with spoon-drift that we could not see a
ship's length ahead, and in such crowded waters a collision was a far
from impossible contingency. At 6 P.M. we thought it prudent to
wear, so as to gain an offing during the night, and gradually drew
out of the line of traffic along the coast. At 9 P.M. the extreme
violence of the hurricane had abated, and we could see, through
occasional openings in the mist, the masthead lights of several
steamers, standing, like ourselves, off the land for the night. At
midnight we saw the blue sky and starlight overhead ; the barometer
was rising rapidly, and the wind gradually settled down into a clear
hard gale. It was accompanied by a heavy sea, running down the
coast from the north ; but we shipped no water, and passed the
remainder of the night quite as comfortably as the circumstances of
the case permitted. We were uncertain as to our position, and the
state of the atmosphere was such that we could not venture to scud
until daylight.
At 6 A.M. we carefully examined the dead reckoning, and, having
fixed on an approximate position, we determined to bear away,
steering to pass in mid-channel between the Outer Dowsing and the
Dudgeon, through a passage about ten miles in width. We were
under easy sail, but, under the main trysail, double-reefed foresail,
staysail, fore topsail, and reefed jib, we scudded at the rate of
eleven knots. A constant look-out had been kept from aloft, and at
10 A.M., having nearly run the distance down from our assumed
position when we bore away to the northward of the Outer Dowsing,
I established myself in the cross-trees until we should succeed in
making something. After a short interval we saw broken water
nearly ahead on the port bow. We at once hauled to the wind,
steering to the south-west, and set the mizen trysail. The lead
showed a depth of ten fathoms, and we were therefore assured that
we had been standing too near to the Outer Dowsing. The indica-
tions afforded by the lead were confirmed by sights, somewhat
roughly taken, and by the circumstance of our having shortly before
passed through a fleet of trawlers, evidently making for the Spurn.
In less than an hour after we had hauled to the wind we found
ourselves in the track of several steamers. At 3 P.M. we made the
CRUISES IN THE SUNBEAM.'
579
loss at sea.
land near Cromer, and at 5.30 we brought up in Yarmouth Roads,
thankful to have gained a secure shelter from the gale.
As we stood away into safety we saw, with a shudder, a small
schooner on the further side of the Outer Dowsing steering directly
towards the breakers which we had avoided by keeping a good look-
out. We had no means of reaching the vessel, or giving a warning;
and I can only hope that those on board were aware of their danger
before it was too late to avoid it.
I have since heard with regret of the extensive damage to vessels Causes of
less able to contend with such a hurricane than we ourselves had
been. Overloading, worn-out sails, insufficient crews, dilapidated
hulls, want of care in navigation these are preventable causes of
disaster; and, in spite of our recent legislation, they still extensively
prevail. In the present case the losses would have been far more
serious had the wind shifted to the north-east, and blown on shore
with the same fury as it actually did off the land. The day is not
far distant when the coasting trade of this country will have passed
almost entirely into steam vessels. The change will certainly tend
to diminish the loss of life at sea.
To my brother yachtsmen I venture to offer in a few words the Over-
masting.
result of a gradually accumulated experience of heavy weather at
sea.
As a general rule, our pleasure fleet is overmasted. We are
advised in these matters by sail-makers, who have little personal
experience of the sea ; and who look to the Solent and its sheltered
waters as the normal condition with which we have to deal. When
we venture forth from that smooth and too-much frequented arm of
the sea into open waters, our vessels have to pass a far more severe
ordeal, and they do not always come out of it to our satisfaction.
Many are compelled to stay in harbour when a passage might have
been made in a snugly-rigged yacht. In threatening weather
constant observation of the barometer cannot be too strongly insisted
upon. It will always give warning in time to take in canvas, secure
boats on deck, and batten-down dangerous hatchways, before the
storm has reached its height.
THOMAS BRASSEY.
Normanhurst Court, Battle, Oct. 20.
P P 2
PART VII.
RETIREMENTS AND PENSIONS.
NAVAL OFFICERS IN THE CONSULAR
SERVICE.
HOUSE OF COMMONS,
JUNE 10, 1873.
584
RETIREMENTS AND PENSIONS.
SPEECH ON MOVING AN AMENDMENT TO SIR JOHN
HAY'S MOTION ON PROMOTION AND RETIREMENT
IN THE NAVY.
In the House of Commons, Tuesday, June 10, 1873.
(Extracted from Hansard's' Parliamentary Debates,' vol. ccxvi.)
Evils of
half pay.
MOTION made, and question proposed,
• That a select committee be appointed to consider the present
system of promotion and retirement in the Royal Navy, and to report
their opinion thereon to this House.'--(Sir John Hay.)
Mr. T. BRASSEY : Before I proceed to speak to the amendment
which I have placed on the paper, I desire to explain that if the
forms of the House had permitted, I should have preferred to present
my amendment as an instruction to the committee for which the
hon. and gallant baronet (Sir John Hay) has moved. My object,
however, will have been sufficiently attained if I can succeed in
calling the attention of the House to the proposals which I am about
to make. The efficiency of the Navy cannot be maintained if discon-
tent prevails throughout the service. The enforced idleness to which
so many naval officers have hitherto been condemned, would, under
any circumstances, be a fruitful cause of discontent, and from every
point of view it is a great evil. The origin of the difficulty is not far
to seek. It has been our policy to train up, in time of peace, a
number of officers sufficient to command our fleets in time of war ;
but, having trained these officers, it is impossible to find employment
for them in a peace Navy. It has long been an accepted axiom that
the number of lieutenants must be taken as the datum line upon
which the lists of officers in the other ranks of the service must, to a
great extent, be determined. As to the number at which the list of
lieutenants should be maintained, the Select Committee on Naval
Promotion and Retirement of 1863 expressed an opinion that, includ-
ing lieutenants in the Coast Guard and other services, 1,000 is the
NAVAL OFFICERS IN THE CONSULAR SERVICE.
585
lowest number to which the active list of lieutenants can be pru-
dently limited. While insisting on the necessity for so large a
number, they fully recognised that the promotion of all the lieu-
tenants on the list was impracticable. By the recent Order in Council,
the number of lieutenants has been fixed at 600; but without offering
an opinion as to the wisdom of that reduction, it is sufficient for my
present purpose to observe that the importance of finding employment
is equally great, whatever be the actual numbers with which we
have to deal, so long as a large proportion of the officers of the Navy
are pining away in poverty or idleness on a miserable half-pay.
For the purpose of maintaining the list of lieutenants at a number
sufficient to meet the emergencies of war, it has been the practice of
successive administrations to enter a far greater number of cadets
than it has been possible to promote to the higher ranks of the
service. When 200 cadets were entered in every year, and only
seven officers were promoted to the flag list, it is clear that a con-
siderable number of cadets were doomed to disappointment. As
they rose in the service it became more difficult to obtain employ-
ment. But, discouraging as are the prospects of the majority of the
cadets who enter the Navy, the Admiralty is always beset with
urgent solicitations from parents and friends for nominations to
cadetships. This demand must be attributed to the desire of parents
to obtain for their sons the advantage of the gratuitous education
which is given to all-comers who aspire to become officers in the
Navy. I strongly object to the principle of of tempting parents in
narrow circumstances, by the offer of this gratuitous education, to
send their sons into a profession which is so ill adapted for those
who have not the advantage of some independent resources.
It has been urged by the most eminent officers that our naval
cadets should be educated at a college ashore. But such an institu-
tion should be self-supporting, and the boys should be required to
pay for their education in the same way as those who are trained for
the Army at Sandhurst, and for every other profession. In support
of this view, I may quote the opinions of Admiral Cooper Key, the
Duke of Somerset, and many high authorities on naval subjects. If
any exception be allowed to the rule requiring payment for the edu-
cation of a cadet at a naval college, it should be limited to the sons
of naval officers.
Passing from the nomination and the education of cadets, we Employ-
have now to deal with the more difficult problem of finding the ment and
promotion
means of employing and promoting a body of lieutenants whose of lieu-
numbers, even under the reduced scale laid down in the Order in
tenants.
586
RETIREMENTS AND PENSIONS.
.
Council prepared by my right hon. friend (Mr. Childers), are con-
siderably in excess of the ordinary requirements of a time of peace.
Nearly one-third of the lieutenants are now on half-pay. Various
means can doubtless be suggested for dealing with the case of these
officers. The propriety of allowing lieutenants more leave on half-
pay than they at present enjoy deserves consideration. Naval officers
after a long commission abroad, or when invalided home from a foreign
station, are as much entitled to the privilege as the officers of the
Army. After an absence of four years, a year's leave on full-pay
cannot be considered an over liberal allowance. Under the existing
regulations, an officer does not enjoy more than six months' leave on
full-pay in the first ten or fifteen years of his service. But an
adequate promotion, as well as employment, is required for deserving
lieutenants; and in order to secure a sufficient flow of promotion,
the number of officers in the superior ranks of the Navy is maintained
at a standard considerably in excess of the ordinary requirements of
the service. This plan of rewarding good service in the Navy is of
old date. In 1816, at the conclusion of the war, lieutenants' commis-
sions were given to all mates of above two years' standing. More
than 1,000 lieutenants were then made. In the French Navy, no
officers on the active flag list are without employment. In the
United States Navy, all the officers of lower grade, and almost all
the admirals, are employed. But with us, in consequence of the
disproportion between their numbers and the amount of employment
during peace, the commanders and captains are not employed at sea
on an average more than one-third of their time; and in the case of
the flag officers, the proportion of time on half-pay is infinitely
greater. It is unnecessary to dwell on the insufficiency of the half-pay.
A naval officer without private means cannot maintain a social
position commensurate with his rank in Her Majesty's service. On
the other hand, the total amount of the non-effective Naval Vote is
already so portentous, that no considerable permanent addition to
that vote could be entertained. Something might be done for the
commanders and captains, both to improve their position in a pecu-
niary sense, and to give them more frequent opportunities of
serving at sea, by employing commanders in lieu of first-lieutenants
and captains in commanders' commands. But there is another
means of relieving the overcrowded lists, to which I desire more
especially on the present occasion to call attention. My proposal is
that civil employment, of a kind for which naval experience is a fitting
preparation, should be offered to officers for whom it is impossible to
provide occupation afloat.
NAVAL OFFICERS IN THE CONSULAR SERVICE.
587
officers
should be
in the con-
vice.
There are two branches of the public service for which naval Naval
officers are thoroughly adapted. I mean the consular service at
foreign ports, and the surveyorships of shipping, under the Board of employed
Trade, at home ports. The post of consul at a foreign port can sular ser-
scarcely be regarded as a diplomatic appointment, though, if it were,
I should be prepared to maintain that a well-selected naval officer
would be as fit as most other men who would be available for the
service. For the general business of a consular office, nautical
experience is an excellent preparation. The most important trans-
actions with which our consuls at ports abroad are accustomed to
deal are connected with ships or sailors. When a British ship is
wrecked abroad, and an application is made to the consul for assist-
ance, it is obvious that he would be better prepared to act in
such an emergency, if he were himself an experienced sailor. The
other class of civil employment to which I have referred is that
of the surveyors of shipping under the Board of Trade. Some
considerable technical knowledge of shipbuilding would be required
in order to perform these duties; but it is a knowledge which
à sailor would readily acquire. Character, indeed, is at least as
essential as technical knowledge; and at present the salaries are
so inadequate that it is difficult to induce men to enter the public
service in this department, whose social position makes them inde-
pendent of every kind of influence. If naval officers were appointed,
their professional associations would make them superior to tempta-
tion; and with their half-pay in addition to their salary under the
Board of Trade, their positions would, without additional expense to
the country, be made more satisfactory than those held by the
majority of the existing body of surveyors. These surveyorships and
consular appointments would offer a wide field for naval officers
unable to find employment in their own profession. The surveyors
under the Board of Trade are not a numerous body, but their number
may probably be increased in order to provide for that more active
supervision of our shipping, which, whatever be the form which it
may ultimately take, seems to be impatiently demanded by public
opinion. The withdrawal of so many officers on half-pay from the
active lists would have the effect of giving increased employment to
those officers who continued to serve exclusively in the Navy, thus
adding materially to their efficiency. The advantage of this more fre-
quent employment has been strongly insisted on by our best officers.
In conclusion, I would refer to a field of employment in which Officers
naval officers judiciously selected would find it in their power for the
required
to render services of great value. For the Royal Naval Reserve a
Naval
Reserve.
588
RETIREMENTS AND PENSIONS.
staff of naval officers is absolutely essential. The discipline, the
drill, the organisation, the appliances for instruction, of the Royal
Naval Reserve have hitherto suffered from not being placed under
the close and constant supervision of a sufficient naval staff. An
admiral at the head of the Reserve is required at Whitehall; a
lieutenant should be present during the drills on the gup-deck ;
captains should be appointed to superintend the general organisation
in their several districts, and to combine the varied resources of the
mercantile marine in an effective manner for the local coast defence.
The value of the Naval Reserve has been sometimes called in ques-
tion. If the Reserve is not all that it ought to be, it is because we
have hitherto neglected to supply the means by which the force may
be more perfectly organised. A very different spirit has prevailed
in the organisation of our Reserves for the land service. Distin-
guished general officers were appointed as inspectors, supported by a
vast array of colonels and adjutants. But hitherto the entire burden
of organising the Naval Reserves has been cast upon a member of
the Board of Admiralty already overtasked by his other duties.
The hon. gentleman concluded by moving the amendment of which
he had given notice.
Amendment proposed, to leave out from the word 'consider' to
the end of the Question, in order to add the words how far naval
officers on half-pay can be more generally employed in the consular
service, and in the numerous appointments under the Marine
Department of the Board of Trade,'—(Mr. Thomas Brassey,)-
instead thereof.
Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out
stand part of the Question.'
Mr. GOSCHEN said that the Government were so anxious to find
increased employment for the officers, if possible, and also to give
further inducements to retire, that they would accept the amendment
of the hon. member for Hastings (Mr. Brassey), and there being no
difference of opinion as to the necessity of dealing with the case of the
unemployed officers, he trusted the hon. baronet would not divide.
Sir John HAY offered to withdraw his motion provided the
committee would have the power to inquire why the necessity for
finding additional employment for officers had arisen.
Mr. GOSCHEN declined to agree to such an understanding.
Question put.
The House divided :-Ayes 64; Noes 81. Majority 17.
Ordered, that a Select Committee be appointed to consider how
far naval officers, &c,
APPENDIX.
ARMY REORGANISATION COMMITTEE.
EVIDENCE BY THE COMPILER.
590
APPENDIX
ARMY REORGANISATION COMMITTEE.
The main principles upon which the Reserves should be organised
must be in many essential points the same, whether for the Army or
the Navy.
The Compiler having been examined by the Horse Guards Com-
mittee on Army Reorganisation, it is thought that the evidence
given may be appropriately introduced, in connection with the
pre-
ceding Parliamentary speeches on the Naval Reserve.
Wednesday, July 23, 1879.
Present:--General LORD AIREY, G.C.B., President; General Lord
Napier of Magdala, G.C.B., G.S.C.I. ; General Sir J. L. A. Simmons,
G.C.B., Inspector-General of Fortifications; Lieutenant-General the
Earl of Longford, K.C.B. ; Lieutenant-General Sir P. L. MacDougall,
K.C.M.G.; Lieutenant-General J. W. Armstrong, C.B., I.G.A.F.;
Lieutenant-General Sir H. W. Norman, K.C.B., C.I.E.; Major-
General Sir A. Alison, Bart., K.C.B.; Colonel W. B. Saunders, R.A.;
Colonel H. P. Hutton, 30th Regiment; Colonel T. S. Bigge, 5th
Fusiliers ; Colonel E. H. Clive, Secretary.
i
and H.
Harrison,
1879.
T. Brassey', THOMAS BRASSEY, Esq., M.P., and HENRY HARRISON, Esq., examined.
,
Esq., M.P.,
(Chairman to Mr. Brassey.) As you have shown great interest
Esq.
in the affairs of the Army, amongst other subjects I should like to
July 23,
know if you have any suggestion to make or any memorandum pre-
pared with regard to your opinion upon the state of the Army now?-
I take an interest in the Army as every Englishman ought to do, but
I cannot claim to have studied the conditions of the service specially.
I have, as your lordship is aware, devoted considerable attention to
naval administration ; but to military administration I have not
given any special attention. There were two points which I thought I
might venture to submit as suggestions; the first was a suggestion
ARMY REORGANISATION COMMITTEE.
591
under
arrange-
similar
for Volun-
as to the possibility of creating a Reserve without involving the neces- Proposal
for drilling
sity of short service with the colours. I have had considerable ex- Militia
perience in former years as a Volunteer officer, and it has occurred
to me that it might be possible to create a Reserve for the Army ments
upon the Volunteer system. There are certain corps of Volunteers to those
which fully meet the original conception of a Volunteer Force, corps teers.
which are quite independent of any grant or subsidy from the Govern-
ment, and which could only be retained in connection with the Army
upon that voluntary basis; for example, the Barristers', the Artists”,
and the Post Office corps. With regard to corps of that kind I think
you could hardly change their constitution. But there are large
bodies of Volunteers who, I think, might possibly be made more
efficient than they are, with further assistance from the Government;
and I believe that, in consideration of that assistance being given,
you might anticipate greater efficiency in drill, and also induce the
Volunteers to undertake a more direct and distinct engagement to
serve in case of need. I will give what has occurred in my own experi-
ence. I was for several years connected with the Cinque Ports Artillery
Volunteers, and in my own village we raised a body of 70 men for
the artillery branch of the Volunteer Service; they were fairly efficient;
they were, in fact, good Volunteers; but I often used to ask myself
whether these men could not be made more efficient for the Reserve
if the Government were to undertake to pay them for their Volun-
teer service? I throw that out for discussion. Supposing it had been
required that instead of the minimum drills to constitute an efficient
being 30 or 35, it should be 100 drills per annum; and supposing
that the Government, in consideration of the Volunteer undertaking
a more distinct engagement of service than he now undertakes, had
offered to give him a shilling a drill for every attendance, subject to
efficiency, I think you would have secured the full number of atten-
dances that you required, and that you would have had a greater hold
over the men, and better guarantees than we now possess of efficiency.
These results would be attained at a comparatively small increase
upon the cost of the Volunteer Force, and a very small cost indeed
per man, as .compared with the cost of men actually with the colours.
I believe that, in consideration of a payment, such as I suggest, of a
shilling a drill, not only would the men have undertaken to attend
the number of drills and to become efficient to the satisfaction of the
military authorities, but that they would have undertaken an engage-
ment as onerous as that undertaken by the men who now serve for two
years with the colours and afterwards go into the Army Reserve. It
occurs to me that men who are the cream and flower, you may
592
APPENDIX.
say, of the working class are deterred from joining the Army by
the nature of a soldier's life in time of peace. You cannot make
the barrack-room other than it is, and there is the separation from
home, and there are a number of privations to be endured. Now
supposing the idea that I indicate could be carried out, the soldier
would have the military instruction which you wish him to have to
qualify for the Reserve, and he would not have to face the separation
from home, and the barrack life, and enforced intimacy with un-
desirable companions, or with people whom he may consider un-
desirable companions. Under the arrangements I propose none of
those numerous difficulties would present themselves to deter a
man from joining. On the other hand, the taxpayer would have
advantage of only paying 100s. a year instead of the much
larger sum he has to pay to a man who serves in the regular way
with the forces. There is one other suggestion that I would ven-
ture to make; it is in a different line, but I will mention it now
if you wish.
Payment
Will you please do so ?—The cardinal principle of my father's
by results. successful administration of the labour question was the principle of
piecework, or payment by results. No labour was so expensive as that
which was paid irrespective of results, and that would apply to all
countries. Now, one is struck at once with the immense difficulty
of applying the principle of piecework to the service in the Army, and
that difficulty almost destroys any possible analogy between civil
labour and military labour. I have been thinking how far there
might be any possibility of establishing motives to action in military
service similar to those you create in civil labour by the principle of
piecework. The idea at once presents itself that you encourage zeal
and efficiency in the ranks of the Army most effectively by the
opportunities that you give to men of obtaining advancement to
the grade of corporal or sergeant. That is, to a certain extent, pay-
ment by results; and so too the good-conduct stripe, with the little
honorarium which it carries with it, is another development of the
same idea. I do not know what the conclusions of this Committee
may be with reference to the pay of the Army generally, but I ven-
ture to think that if it should be proposed in any way to improve
the position of the soldier it would be desirable to retain the present
conditions with regard to men first joining, and to propose improve-
ments only to men upon their re-enlistment for a second term with
certificates of good conduct and efficiency in drill. You might intro-
duce the principle of payment by results by saying that upon ful-
filling a certain term of service and re-engagement there should be
1
ARAIY REORGANISATION COMMITTEE.
593
a prospect of improvement; and if a man is worth more on engaging
for a second term, because he has in his first term of service shown
good conduct and efficiency in drill, à fortiori he would be worth
more on re-engaging for a third term, always assuming that re-
engagement would only be permitted to efficient and well-conducted
men.
I am sure that in military administration the principle of
payment by results is a valuable principle, quite as valuable as it
is in civil life; the only question is how to apply it in the best way.
There is another matter that occurs to me that I venture to Relief to
mention. I am pretty well acquainted (though not so well ac- in Mediter-
quainted as his lordship near you) with the condition of a soldier's ranean.
life at Gibraltar and Malta. We know that garrison life, extend-
ing over some years subject to the heat of a southern climate
in the summer, is trying to an English constitution, and we know
that in the case of the officer he is enabled to bear with the exigen-
cies of the service by a period of leave of six months every other year,
and that he has opportunities of enjoying himself with the Calpe
hounds and in other ways, all of which are denied to the private
soldier. I have been told that to the men in the ranks long resi-
dence in those garrisons is a life of great monotony, and that the
climate is trying. The question, therefore, has occurred to me, long
before I was summoned to this Committee, whether you might in
any way, without putting great expense on the country, mitigate the
conditions of the private soldier's life in those garrisons. We see an
enormous amount of British steam tonnage calling at those ports
every day coming from and going to the mother-country, and it has
often occurred to me, as a matter well worthy of consideration by
those who have to administer to the Army, how far it might be pos-
sible to make use of that resource, at a comparatively small cost, for
the purpose of making a more frequent interchange of men as between
the healthy region of Aldershot and the more trying climate of
Gibraltar and Malta. I cannot help thinking that without imposing the
immense cost of special transport ships upon the Estimates something
might be done in that direction, of course the details require very
.careful consideration.
Have you formed any idea in your own mind of what the value Pay.
of a soldier's condition is, taking into account his pay, his accommo-
dation, his fuel and light, and his schooling and medical attendance
when not well ?—No, I have not valued that. I think that the result
of the labours of the recruiting sergeant are a very good criterion
upon that point. If recruiting goes on briskly I think we may be
quite satisfied that the terms which are offered compare favourably
VOL. IV.
QQ
594
APPENDIX.
Pensions.
with what is open to the individual in other branches of employment.
If, on the other hand, recruiting goes on slowly, we may be quite sure
that it is because the terms appear less advantageous. There is always
this to be borne in mind, that men in civil life, men of a desirable
class, would be deterred from joining the Army by circumstances
which are inseparable from a soldier's life, and circumstances which
would not be in the least mitigated by any increase of pay. The
monotony of the life under certain conditions, the enforced com-
panionship in the barrack-room with men with whom you do not want
to associate so intimately, and other circumstances inseparable from a
soldier's life in time of peace, would remain whatever pay you gave.
Those circumstances disappear upon active service, and when I ven-
tured to throw out in the early part of our conversation the idea of
creating a Reserve upon the basis of the Volunteer Force I had this
circumstance in mind, that the reservist would be instructed in his
drill and have military instruction without having to bear any of the
disadvantages which I think would weigh with many men and deter
them from entering the ranks.
Do you think, with regard to that class of men, that the expecta-
tion of a future retirement at a more advanced pay in the shape of a
pension does not make an impression upon them ?-It makes an
impression upon the man as he advances in life. With the young
fellow of sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen, whatever the age at which
he enters as a recruit, I think it weighs very little. Upon that point
I would venture to remind the Committee that there has been some
very interesting evidence in the Blue Books bearing upon the pen-
sion question for the Navy. The general effect of the evidence was
that the pension becaine more and more a thing valued and appre-
ciated in proportion as you approach the time when you would begin
to enjoy it.
If we can, by the adoption of any measure, encourage in any way
men prolonging their service, of course it would be combined with
the idea of a pension ?-Yes. I suppose if you want to recruit
briskly, the country would make a inore advantageous bargain by
giving the whole benefit in the shape of a weekly wage, rather than
by saying that the soldier shall have a certain weekly wage with the
prospect of a pension. If a man is debating whether he shall yield
to the recruiting sergeant's solicitation or not, he probably attaches
very little value to the pension; but when he has served in the Army
and become more serious and is considering whether he shall remain
for a longer period of service in the Army or not, and has acquired
military ideas 'and military habits, I cannot doubt that in that case
.
ARMY REORGANISATION COMMITTEE.
595
cf non-
commiis-
sioned
the pension would be of value. I think it would weigh very much
more with the sergeant in debating whether or no he should leave
the Army and enter into civil life than it would with the recruit on
first joining
That is very much in accordance with other evidence that we Position
have received that at that early age the recruit does not take into
great consideration the question of his after life?-I am aware
officers
that in the case of those joining the Navy it is not considered
that the pension is very much esteemed. Mr. Lucas, who will follow
me, will I think speak to your lordship with reference to the great
importance in the administration of civil labour of having good fore-
men; he will tell you that to have good foremen is a matter of the
utmost importance in carrying out large civil undertakings. The
analogy of the good foreman to the good sergeant is complete, and
Mr. Lucas will tell you that a good foreman is worth a very handsome
wage; and by analogy I should say that the position of the non-
commissioned officers in the Army ought to be made as desirable as
possible. Of course it must be a much less costly thing to offer
considerable improvements of position to a comparatively limited
body of inen, such as the non-commissioned officers, than it would be
to make a very small advance in the rate of wages of the rank and
file. · Hope springs eternal in the human breast,' and every man in
the ranks who is of value would of course entertain the hope of,
sooner or later, arriving at the grade of a petty officer, so that it
would influence beneficially the conduct of a great number of men if
a comparatively limited number of petty officers found their position
improved.
What do you consider is the longest service that a man can Service
in
the Army.
remain what we call with the colours, without doing him harm with
reference to civil life afterwards, in finding employment? At present
you know it is six years with the colours and six with the Reserve.
The great object with us is to expand the Army as much as possible,
and at the same time not to injure the man with regard to finding
occupation in civil life; and I should like to know what you think Occupa-
as to the effect upon getting employment in civil life of remaining Civil life.
with the colours ?-I think that any period of service with the Army
sufficiently long to qualify the recruit as a soldier does interfere with
his prospects in civil life in a great number of employments, especially
in those employments which require a long apprenticeship. In all
those skilled trades where an apprenticeship of five or six years is
required, during which period the emolument or pay must be small,
a man is more or less disqualified by service, however short, with the
QQ 2
596
APPENDIX.
Army, and that is the reason why I think it would be so desirable, if
possible, to create a Reserve from men who would not be disqualified
from serving their apprenticeship in a trade by their drills and
instruction in military duties. The Naval Reserve has been created
from a body of men who receive their instruction without interfering
with their ordinary employment. The Naval Reserve man is, I
believe, perfectly efficient as a reservist for the Navy with twenty-eight
days' drill a year, which amount of drill he is able to put in without
interfering with his ordinary employment. No doubt there is this
difference between the seaman and the man employed on shore, that
the seaman comes home periodically, he is paid off, and he waits a
certain interval of time before he joins his next ship. During that
interval the alternative is between drill for a limited number of hours
on board the drill ship, and idleness, and debauchery it may be, on
shore. He is therefore able to put in this number of days of drill
in the year without interfering with his ordinary employment. It
would obviously be more difficult for the carpenter or navvy or any
man of that class to put in his drill for the whole days to the number
of twenty-eight, but if it could be arranged that he should be
instructed, as the Volunteers are, during hours which interfere as little
as possible with ordinary employment, it seems to me that you could
then work to a certain extent upon the same system which has
been adopted in the case of the Navy for the purpose of creating a
Reserve.
But as regards the mere recruits and young soldiers, what is your
opinion as to the best division of the twelve years; would you have it
six and six as it is now, or nine and three, or three and nine, or eight
and four; which do you think is best ?-I really have not sufficiently
considered the subject to be able to offer to the Committee an
opinion which would be of value. I cannot help thinking that what-
ever the nature of the civil labour which the man is designed to
follow in after life, his period of service in the Army is to a certain
extent a disqualification. It depends of course very much upon the
employment which the individual is to take up in later life. Now,
for example, take the case of the railway service; there are a vast
body of men employed as porters in the goods department, and in
fact in the whole railway service other than that which is technical,
such as the locomotive service, and so on; I consider that a couple
of years in the Army is positively a good training for that kind of
employment. And I may tell you in order to establish that point
that the Coastguard on the coast of Sussex, the neighbourhood in
which I live, after having been in the Navy as boys, and afterwards
Period of
service.
ARMY REORGANISATION COMMITTEE.
597
for a period of ten years as able seamen, looked to the alternative of
railway employment as a sure resource on retirement from the Navy.
I know as a matter of fact that in the division within the limits of
which I live at Hastings, they proceed with wonderful regularity on
the completion of their term of service in the Coastguard to Ashford
station and there procure engagements as railway porters. It is, I
think, where you want manual skill, as in the case of the carpenter
or the mason, that service in the Army is a disqualification. And
again, I should say that, although it is not a skilled trade, the hard
physical labour of the railway navvy, heavy digging, and so on,
would be a kind of life that would not come very gratefully to a man
after a term of service in the Army. But there are, no doubt, very
large spheres of employment for which service in the Army is not
only not a disqualification, but positively a qualification and a pre-
paration. I remember that when I went to read in chambers after
preparing for the bar, two or three of the copying clerks in the
service of the barrister with whom I was reading had served as
non-commissioned officers in the Crimea.
What length of period is in your opinion the best for a man to spend
with the colours ?--In the case of such an employment as the one I
spoke of, the railway service, I would venture to say it is a matter of
indifference whether a man has been three or six years with the colours.
Provided he does not remain in the Army till he is a worn-out man,
I think every month he spends under discipline is a preparation.
Upon that point I think that if Mr. Findlay should attend from the
London and North-Western Railway Company his opinion would be
a valuable one. I should rather suggest to the Committee to inter-
rogate him on this subject than to discuss it with me.
The Committee are anxious to ascertain whether the fact of a
man being employed for a certain number of the best years of his
life with the Army prejudices him much in civil life either as a
skilled or unskilled labourer?-I think what I have said before
answers that question. I think it depends upon the nature of the
employment. I think that where you want technical skill, to have
spent a period in the Army, which otherwise would have been passed
in apprenticeship to the trade, is a disadvantage: where you do not
want technical or manual dexterity, but discipline and character and
general qualification, there I think that the period spent in the Army
is not a disqualification and not an interruption to the future career.
And is it your opinion that a soldier joining the Reserve pre-
judices his life's career?—It certainly ought not to do so;
employer ought to feel that the call of the country is one which
an
598
APPENDIX.
Service in
should not
make it
difficult to
obtain
employ-
ment.
must be obeyed, and instead of being prejudiced against a man
for having subjected himself to that responsibility, he ought to
be inclined, I think, to give encouragement to men to join the
Reserve by being the more ready to afford that class employment. I
hope that if I were still a large employer that consideration would
animate me; but as a matter of fact I believe that there are differ-
ences of view upon that subject. There are employers who take a
large and patriotic view of the question, and there are others who
would dislike to think that their business was liable to be inter-
rupted and inconvenienced by men absenting themselves from their
employer's service when they might be wanted, and who would
therefore be prejudiced against men joining the Reserve; but it
ought not to be so.
Do you think that this tie of being in the Reserve acts more
prejudicially against the skilled or the unskilled labourer ?–I do
not think that makes a material difference; it depends upon whether
the employment which the individual occupies is one for which a
substitute could be readily found or not. In certain classes of skilled
labour, though the labour is skilled, still it is easy to find a substi-
tute; as, for instance, in the case of a carpenter, a bricklayer, or a
mason; there are other carpenters, and other bricklayers, and other
masons available. But when a man is put into a position requiring
some special individual aptitude or knowledge, no doubt to take
that individual away and to introduce a stranger who has to be
initiated with some difficulty occasions inconvenience. I think one
cannot answer that question generally.
Is it not an advantage to a man to be known to have served in
the Army and to bear a good character with regard to being employed
in civil life?-I should say so—a very great advantage ; and if you
had to take a new man into the signal department of the railway,
I should certainly say that a man who had been in the Royal
Engineers or the Artillery, or any branch of the service where the
mind was habituated to exactitude and precision, would be very
much more advantageous than a man without any training in babits
of exactitude.
You alluded just now to circumstances of military life which
made it unpleasant to particular men ?-I was speaking of men of
quiet domestic habits.
You spoke of the barrack life and the ennui, and so on; can you
suggest any improvement of administration that might remove that
objection ?—No, I think it is inseparable from the nature of the
service. If married men's quarters were to be largely multiplied it
would involve great barrack difficulties.
ARMY REORGANISATION COMMITTEE.
599
And do you think that these objections to which you have
referred extend to men in the Militia too?-A man in the Militia
only serves for a short period. It is a different thing serving for
three or four or five weeks in the year and serving continuously.
Then
you
do not think it affects the Militia men prejudicially ?-
I should say not.
You are speaking of the Militia, not of the Militia Reserve ?
-I refer to their service with the colours before they enter the
Reserve.
At what age do you think a man can join the Army with least
prejudice to his future prospects----before, or after 20 ?—The earlier
the better I should say ; but that answer must be governed by what
I have said before, with reference to the nature of the future em-
ployment. I do not want to detain the Committee with speculations,
but if the railways were the property of the State it is perfectly
obvious that you might work the railway service in connection with
the Army to the mutual advantage of both. It is perfectly obvious
that a man disciplined in the Army is the better prepared for a large
proportion of the employments in connection with the railway service;
but as at present constituted, you cannot claim from the railways
that they shall accept your men when they enter the Reserve.
(Lord Napier.) Heretofore the Reserves were liable to recall Questions
only on great emergencies; but if they are to be of use in the man- apiers
ner that the country requires, they must be liable to more frequent
recall ?-Certainly.
What effect do you think that more frequent liability to recall
would have upon their prospects in civil life ?–It would inevitably
have a prejudicial effect in certain employments and with certain
employers; and the only way in which I think the reservist can be
compensated for the difficulty which he might perhaps experience in
obtaining employment, subject to the contingency of his being more
frequently summoned to the Reserve, is by increasing his pay as a
reserve soldier.
Would you add or permit him, if he desired it, once recalled to
the ranks to remain there'?--Yes, if the military authorities were
prepared to grant that alternative. I can see no objection to it.
Beyond, of course, its being detrimental to the formation of a
reserve ? —Yes; that is a military question.
From your knowledge of the men who, according to your belief,
could have been trained for a sufficient number of days to make them
efficient for the Army, do you consider that they would have been
prepared to enter the Reserve without some further inducement than
that of pay for the extra days when they were being trained ?-I am
600
APPENDIX.
+
of opinion that they would not have been deterred from entering into
an engagement by the prospect of being occasionally called upon in
time of war.
Do you think that that would have been the result of their judg-
ments or the result of a temporary excitement at finding themselves
getting skilled in military exercises and associated with soldiers ?-I
think it would have been a distinct advantage to them to add to their
present pay as agricultural labourers so many shillings a year for
attendance at drills at times which did not interfere with their other
employments. Perhaps the full weight of the burden which they
took upon themselves by engaging to serve with the colours upon
the issue of the Queen's proclamation might not have been thoroughly
considered by them, but still I feel confident that they would have
responded to the wall and would have accepted the engagement,
and that they would have been a type of men that one would have
been glad to add to the Army in case of a national emergency.
I would ask, with regard to the system of having a reserve
amongst the people, do you consider that in Great Britain it involves
a very great and pressing strain upon civil life to be recalled to the
colours for actual war ?--At a time of great activity in productive
industry, to withdraw any proportion of your population engaged in.
that productive industry involves a certain strain upon the national
resources; but in ordinary times I believe that there is a surplus of
labour seeking employment, and that to withdraw a certain number
of individuals from the labour market would not involve any great.
disturbance of the industrial arrangements of the nation. There are
times, for instance, in railway construction, when great activity pre-
vails, and it is a difficult thing to procure labour; and there are other
times when there are large masses of men out of employment. At
the present time, for instance, to call upon the country to part with
its Reserve men from civil employ to join the Army would, I think,
involve no disturbance at all, no national disturbance, at least.
My question has more reference to the domestic relations of the
citizen and his connection with his friends ?—A man who has settled
down in life cannot possibly go into the field without involving him-
self in very considerable inconvenience; but that is one of the
inevitable incidents of war.
(Sir J. L. A. Simmons.) As drills alone will not form soldiers,
but it is necessary to give them the cohesion due to their being disci-
plined in masses, do you think that your Volunteers whom you were
speaking of would consent to enrol themselves with the understanding
that they might be called out for a month every year, or every other
Questions
by Sir
Lintorn
Simmons.
ARMY REORGANISATION COMMITTEE.
601
year, for the purpose of being drilled in masses ?-I am quite sure
that the class of men I contemplate would be glad to go out for a
period for the purpose of military exercise, assuming of course that
they were paid for doing so. I am encouraged in this belief by
the fact that there are every year some 1,800 men assembled at
Shoeburyness. They come from all parts of the country, from
Scotland, from the furthest north, and the furthest west, and they
pass a fortnight under canvas at Shoeburyness, busily engaged the
whole time in drills and exercises; and if such an effort as that can
be made by Volunteers, whose expenses are very imperfectly met by
contributions from the National Exchequer, I feel quite sure that
you might muster the Volunteers by brigades and in larger numbers
at some places where no difficulty of access would present itself, and
that they would be very glad to vary the monotony (for after all
there is a great monotony) in an agricultural labourer's life by an
occasional period of service of that kind.
I should also like to ask you if you could give us your opinion
upon this point: as it will always be necessary to maintain a certain
standing army for service in the colonies and in India, and also as a
nucleus even if a Volunteer system of Reserve should be established,
and as it is found that the present conditions which are published to
the labour market for the purpose of drawing recruits for the most
part only yield lads and immature men and the waifs and strays of
society, could you suggest any improvement in those conditions, either
by simplifying the contract or in any other way which would tená to
produce what we require, mature men above twenty years of age
capable of enduring the fatigues of war ?-I cannot make any sug-
gestion with that view. The experience of the Committee will tell
them better than I can tell thein what was the condition of the Army
under the old terms of service, and whether or not when the period
of service was longer you then secured a sufficient proportion of ma-
mature men in your Army to satisfy all the requirements of military
life. I cannot help thinking that if you want to get these mature
men you must train them yourself; that you must be content to
take the recruit very much as he presents himself now, and you must
make him a better man, and bring him up to the type and standard
which you desire in the ranks of the Army. In short, it points to this,
that the period of service must be extended, and I would encourage
the better men to remain with the colours or in the Reserve
whose characters have been established by actual service and whose
efficiency you have tested by actual service. I would rather encourage
those men to remain, by giving them an improved position for their
602
APPENDIX.
second or third term of service, than raise the pay all round ab initio,
making it quite a speculation whether after all you have got the
better man you desire to get. I would test him as to quality during
his first term of service, paying him at his present scale of pay; and
then secure him for a longer period by granting an improved position
on re-engagement, endeavouring as far as may be to make the
improved pay a payment for results.
The difficulty of that would appear to be that, as the Army
must be of a certain strength of efficient soldiers, you should
have to keep attached to it a large number of immature lads who
were not fit for the duty of soldiers and who would cost a very large
sum of money ?—I do not see how you are to evade that. You
require a longer service, during a part of which you know that the
man will be preparing himself for more effective service in a later
stage. I do not see how you are to avoid the responsibility of
military apprenticeship, if I may use the term ; you cannot expect
to get matured men fully trained in civil employ.to come into the
Army unless they are offered such terms and conditions as I am
sure the legislature would hesitate to sanction.
(Chairman.) Do you find that there is any difficulty in getting
efficient labourers now ?—No, none at all.
And do they stay with their employer?--There is no difficulty
at all in that respect. The recruiting men for civil employment
and maintaining discipline among them when you have engaged
their services is really very much a question of the general
condition of trade throughout the country at the time; it depends
upon the relations between the demand for labour and the supply of
it. When the demand for labour is very great, and the supply of
the labour is moderate or insufficient in comparison with the de-
mand, then the terms exacted by labour for its service of course
becomes dearer; and that dearness expresses itself in various ways,
either you have to pay more by the day or by the piece, or you have
to submit to regulations in restriction of the native energy of men ;
in fact, you have to surrender to a certain extent to the Trades Unions.
But when, on the other hand, the conditions are reversed, and the
supply of labour is great in proportion to the demand, when in fact
there are two men seeking employment for every position which is
vacant, then docility and discipline prevail.
(Sir J. L. A. Simmons to Mr. Harrison.) What is the wage
at the present time of the ordinary labourer of the country ?--About
3s. 6d. to 4s. for the ordinary type of navvy, but piecework runs it
up to 4s. 6d. and even 58. 6d.
ARMY REORGANISATION COMMITTEE.
603
(Mr. Brassey.) The fluctuations, it is obvious, are very great,
depending upon those general conditions of demand and supply. Of
course when comparing the position of a soldier with that of a man
engaged in civil life, the fact that in the case of the Army the
conditions are permanent and irrespective of these commercial fluctu-
ations ought to be borne in mind in estimating the relative pecuniary
advantages of civil and inilitary service.
(Lord Napier.) I would venture to remind you of one particular
condition in the case of the soldier, which does not hold good in
civil life, which is, that we do not want the soldier to have any more
money in his pocket; you would pay him according to results, but you
do not want immediately to put any more money in his pocket; he has
food and clothes, and sufficient for his immediate wants, anything more
at the moment is a temptation, but you would like to pay him for
results in the shape of deferred pay or pension ?-Yes. The diffi-
culty which your lordship has alluded to, namely, that to put any
increased sum of money into a man's pocket constitutes a temptation
to irregularity, has presented itself in the railway service, and Mr.
Harrison reminds me of this, that many years ago, when from the
state of the labour market very exceptionally high wages had to be
given to the navvies, in order to avoid the disastrous consequences
of paying an excessive lump sum at one given moment into the
hands of the navvy, the pay was broken up into daily amounts and
he was paid so much every evening, in order that he might not be
paid an undue amount at one time.
And was the result advantageous ?-Yes.
(The witnesses withdrew.)
INDEX.
ABE
BAR
A
BETHELL, Mr., on the selection of
dockyard officers, 43
Abyssinia, the, 368
Accounts, shipbuilding, audit of, 13
Achilles, 103
- cost of, 4
Adam, Sir Charles, on the mercantile
marine as a nursery for seamen, 457
Aden, commerce of, 360
Admiral Superintendent of Dockyards, 9
duties of, 27
Admiralty, Board of. See Board
First Lord of, power of, 162
additions to staff of officials at the, 18
correspondence at, 19, 23
expenditure, returns of, 15
Mr. Childers' administration of, 66
Mr. Goschen's administration of, 70
organisation, 54
reform in the, 83
subdivision of labour at the, 21
Agamemnon, cost of altering, 112
Agincourt, 72
cost of repairing, 110
court-martial on the navigation of,
501
grounding of, on Pearl Rock, 75
Ajax, cost of altering, 112
Alcester, Lord, on training in cruisers,
4:53
Alexandra, 190
coal capacity of, 365
cost of altering, 112
Allotment notes, 392
America. Sce United States
Apprentices, Government, 377, 395
German Naval, 415
Architecture, naval, schools of, 47
Armada, Spanish, services of the mcrcan-
tile marine against the, 205
Armour, future application of, 192
limit to employment of, 96, 168
value of, for fighting ships, 82
Army and Navy Journal (N. Y.), on the
naval officer, 413
Army reorganisation, 590
Army and Navy Gazette on instruction
in tactics, 476
on the receiving ships, 426
Artificers, engine-room, increase in em-
ployment of, 129
Artillery Volunteers, Royal Naval, 232,
387, 403
appointment of Captain Codrington
to, 275
distribution of prizes in 1880 to Liver-
pool Brigade, 312
first conceptions of pioneers of the
movement, 276
- formation of, 272
organisation of, explained, 281
regulations for, 294
reports upon, 308
Atalanta, 176
cost of repairing, 438
crew of, 435
dimensions of, 434
loss of, 436
Audacious, boiler repairs to, 119, 124
management of, in the China Sea, 106
Audit of accounts in the royal dockyards,
13
Aurora training ship, 432
Australasian colonies, growth and re-
sources of, 331
efforts at defence in, 363
Australia, necessity of a dockyard in,
338, 350
Australian station, British squadron at,
107
Auxiliaries, mercantile. See Mercantile
Aveyron, French ship, 101
BADEN-POWELL, Mr., on the British
on the difficulty of organising a co-
lonial navy, 339
Balloting for the Navy, 207
Barbette system of mounting, 173
Barnaby, Mr., on the advantage of a
maritime confederacy, 356
606
INDEX.
BAR
BRA
Barnes, Mr., on the position of master
shipwright, 43
Beaconsfield, Lord, on our policy towards
the colonies, 348
Belleisle, cost of alteration of, 111
Berkeley, Sir Maurice, on the constitution
of the Board of Admiralty, 56
on the maoning of the Navy, 218
Bethmont, M., on the annual cost of
construction in England, France, Ger-
many, and Russia, 105
Bird class, cost of repairing, ill
Biscay, Bay of, 573
Black Prince, boilers of, 121
Blackwood's Magazine on tactics, 478
Board of Admiralty, utility of, 31,
56
- qualifications of naval officers ap-
pointed to serve on, 57
reasons for excluding the Controller
from the, 58, 69
Boilers, deterioration of, 118
its causes, 121
endurance of, in the mercantile ma-
rine, 120
inspection of, 131, 150
management of, 128
new regulations for, 179
materials of, 121.
premature decay of, in British ships,
37, 81
surface-condensing, 121
Bombay, defence of, 368
Bourayne, French ship, 102
Bourchier, Captain, on the Third-class
Naval Reserve, 266
Bourgois, Admiral, on practical instruc-
tion in tactics; 466
Bourniot, M., on the Canadian fishermen,
341
Boutakov, Admiral, on instruction in
tactics, 481
Boys, enrolment of, in Third-class Naval
Reserve, 266
State aid in training for mercantile
marine, 376, 387
- training of, in British Navy, 415, 425
Brent, Commander, on the efficiency of
the Royal Naval Reserve, 245
on the qualifications of Naval Reserve
Brown, Mr., on time of service on foreign
stations, 117
Brassey, Sir T., address to Bradford
Chamber of Commerce on our Colonial
empire, 360
addresses to constituents:
recent naval admipistration (1875),
79
naval affairs, &c. (1881), 191
- evidence of, before Army Reorgani-
sation Committee, 590
- lecture at Royal Colonial Institute on
colonial Naval Volunteer Force, 331
letter to Mr. Goschen on the forma-
tion of a corps of Naval Volunteers,
276
Letter to the field on the Sun-
beam's passage of the Bay of Biscay,
573
Letters to the Times :
subdivision of labour at the Admi-
ralty, 21
dockyard reductions, 153
voyage of the Sunbeam round the
world, 568
memorandum on the policy of the
Administration as exbibited in the
Navy Estimates for 1881-2, 173
- pamphlets :
review of recent naval administra-
tion in 1872, 66
organisation of Royal Naval Artil-
lery Volunteers, 281
- papers :
our naval strength and policy, S8
maintenance and repairs of the
Navy, 100
manning the Navy, with reference
to the Reserve forces, 218
Parliamentary speeches :
Controllership of the Navy, 4, 18
dockyard administration, 26, 33
professional officers of the Navy, 40
Admiralty organisation, 54
naval policy of the Government
(1881), 166
Royal Naval Reserve, 372, 389, 400
training of engineer officers, 408
loss of the Vanguard, 429
loss of the Atalanta, 436
condition of the Naval Reserves in
1882, 461
abolition of navigating officers, 506,
524
paval cadets, 530
Royal Naval College, Greenwich, 547
education of officers for the mercan-
tile marine, 562
employment and promotion of naval
officers, 584
extra-parliamentary speeches :
expenditure of England and France
upon armoured construction, 186
British shipbuilding, past and pre-
sent, 189
men, 251
Brenton, Captain, on the victory of Lord
Howe, 477
Bridge, Captain, on the efficiency of the
Royal Naval Reserve, 243
- on a colonial Naval Reserve, 349
on tactics, 470
Brigs, training, 446, 534
Britannia, instruction of cadets on board,
533
Broad Arrow on the sea-going training
system, 432
on the training of the fleet under
Admiral Hornby, 450
on training ships, 446
INDEX.
607
BRA
CON
Brassey, Sir T., prospects of Naval Volun-
teer movement, 313
Brassey, the late T., decentralisation
principle of, 21
Buckley, Mr., on navigating officers, 507
,
537, 541
course of study for, 533, 539
period of scholastic training for, 538
studies pursued by, at Greenwich,
547
gratuitous education of, 585
navigating, 507, 515
Caiman, French ship, time occupied in
building, 114
Campbell, Lieutenant Charles, on instruc-
tion in tactics, 473
Canada, fishermen of, 341, 363
naval volunteers in, 278
- local defence of, 336
proposed organisation of a Naval
Reserve in, 310
Capitation grant for naval volunteer ar-
tillery, 314
Captain, the, loss of, 72
Captains, necessity of skill in pilotage
to, 488, 510, 519
Carpenter, Professor, on the study of
mathematics, 548
Cellular compartments, 192
Chadwick, Lieutenant-Commander, on
the system of training in the British
Navy, 415
on the system of training in the French
Navy, 422
Chamberlain, Admiral, on the occupations
of the chief constructor, 45
Charleston, blockade of, 219
Chesapeake, capture of the, 462
Childers, Mr., on dockyard promotions, 12
on dockyard reductions, 36
on the Controller's department, 64
on the salary of the Engineer, 62
- naval administration of, 66
- dockyard policy of, 153
shipbuilding policy of, 138
his endeavour to aboļish the navi-
gating class, 502
China station, British and foreign squad-
rons at, compared. 106
Cinque Ports Artillery Volunteers, 279,
591
Clyde, inspection of Naval Reserve on
board the, 239
Coaling stations, importance of defend-
ing, 352, 365
Coast, defence of the, 230
Coastguard, 253
efficiency of, 401.
- services of, in saving life, 171
- training of, 401
Coast Volunteers. See Volunteers
Cobden, Mr., on the naval strength of the
British Empire, 182
iolin
Cochrane, Lord, on time of service on
foreign stations, 117
Cockatoo Island, dock at, 350
Codrington, Captain, appointment of, to
supervise the Naval Artillery Volun.
t.eers, 275
Codrington, Sir Henry, on tactics, 471
Collier, Lieutenant, on the value of sea-
manship, 444
Collingwood, Lord, 431
Collingwood type, 192
speed of, 169
Colomb, Captain J. C. R., on the Naval
Reserve, 226
on the need of an Australian dock-
yard, 338
Captain P. H., on the Naval Réserve,
225
- on harbour defence, 337
- on the local defence of the colonies,
352
Colonial Naval Volunteers, 331
Colonies, difficulty of organising a Navy
in the, 339
-share of mother-country in defence of,
345
- trade of the, 361
defensive resources of the, 363
method of defence of, 367
Colossus, speed of, 169
Commerce, British, defence of, 351
value of, 369
Commissions, Royal, Dockyardls, 6, 10
French Navy Estimates (1879), 114
Imperial Defence, suggested, 339
Manning, 207, 218, 254, 261, 377, 404
Megæra, 42
Unseaworthy Ships, 85, 562
service duration of, 116
Committees, Parliamentary Admiralty
(1860), 55
Admiralty, Moneys and Accounts, 14
Board of Admiralty, 13, 55, 57, 58,
262
- Army Reorganisation, 590
- Boilers, 119
Dockyard Economy (1860), 42, 59
Dockyard Management, 20
Dockyard Manufactures, 13
Dockyard Manufacturing and Expense
Accounts, 14
Incidental Charges, 180
- Manning, 258
Masters, 491, 494, 512
Mechanical Officers, 126
Naval Officers' Education, 532
Royal Naval College, their report,
554
Composite ships, superior durability of,
180
Confederation, 346, 364
Conseil d'Amirauté, 57
Constellation, United States training
ship, cruise of, 424
Constructor, Chief, position of, 43
+
608
INDEX.
CON
DUN
Constructor, Chief, salary of, 44
personal supervision of work by, 44
Consular service, employment of naval
officers in the, 587
Contract shipbuilding, cost of, compared
with dockyard work, 4
Controller of the Navy, memorandum of
instructions for the, 6
- necessity of his being a naval officer,
10
inspection of dockyards by, 17
correspondence of, 19
duties of, 22, 58
abolition of office of, 51
reasons for excluding, from the Board
of Admiralty, 58, 69
power of, 162
Corry, Mr., naval policy of, 153, 159
Crimping in foreign ports, 393
Crowe, Sir R. S., on the masters of
British sailing ships, 563
Cruiser training ship, 177
performances of, in Mediterranean,
447
Cruisers, advantages of length in, 169
new armoured, 168, 191
training, 428
Cunard steamers, duration of boilers of,
37
efficiency of officers of, 442
Curme, Captain, on the linguistic defici-
encies of naval officers, 551
Cyclops, the, 71
Discharge notes, 393
Discipline, importance of, 226
Dislère, M., on the cost of French ships,
102
on the cost of maintaining ships in
commission in England and France,
105
- on the strength of the British and
French navies, atloat and in construc-
tion, 108
Dockyard, Australian, 338, 350
Dockyard craft, 182
Dockyards, Admiralty control of, 23
audit of accounts in, 13
boiler manufacture at, 121
commission on, 6, 10
cheapness of labour in, 35
estimates for work at, 45
extravagance in, 43, 67
cost of shipbuilding in, compared with
private yards, 4
cost of articles manufactured in, 13
dismissals of workmen from, 36
incidental expenditure in, 181
independent estimates from, 11
inspection of, 17, 59
management of, 26
on the decentralisation principle,
21, 61
- naval constructor in, 11
officers of, their pay and position, 28
their responsibility, 9
their status, 83
civil, 42
- professional, 40
overtime in, 166
pay and pensions in, 167
piece-work in, 35, 181
promotions in, 11, 23, 30, 60
reduction in, Mr. Childers', 153
retrenchment in, its direction, 108
rewards for workmen in, 31
superintendent of, their duties, 40
necessity of their being naval
officers, 41
surveyor of, 18
French, designs of ships furnished by,
51
- time occupied in building ships in,
compared with private yards, 114
French and English compared, 100
Mr. Goschen's administration of, 140
Douglas, Sir Howard, on the necessity o
seamanship, 441
on gunnery training of seamen, 461
Doyle, Consul, on the masters of British
sailing ships, 563
Dreadnought, 190
cost of altering, 112
Druid, cost of repairing, 110
Dryade, French slip, 101
Duguay-Trouin, French ship, 102
Duilio, Italian ship, armour protection
of, 168
Dundonald, Lord, 541
DACRES, Sir Sydney, Channel fleet of,
, ,
441
Dædalus, inspection of Naval Reserve on
board, 386
Danaë class, cost of repairing, 111
causes of decay of, 111
Dandolo, Italian ship, armour protection
of, 168
Daphne, duration of boilers in, 125
Dawson, Commander, on the study of
tactics in the British fleet, 474
Decentralisation, principle of, in dock-
yard management, 13, 21, 61
Denman, Admiral, on the office of
Admiral Superintendent of Dockyards,
9
on time of service on foreign stations,
117
on the training of seamen, 457
on navigating officers, 496
on the question of maintaining an
Admiralty Board, 56
Desertions under the system of impress-
ment, 213
Devastation, 71, 190
complement of, 383
cost of repairing, 110
cost of altering, 112
Dimensions of ironclads, 72, $1
INDEX,
609
DUP
TRA
on
FANSHAWE, Admiral
, on navigating
Duperré, French ship, time occupied in Estimates, naval, for 1881, 166
building, 114
Euphrates, engines of, compared with
Duquesue, French ship, 102
those of the Iris, 123
time occupied in building, 114
Eurydice, the, 176
causes of the loss of, 434
Expenditure, naval, of England and
EAGLE, inspection of Naval Reserve other countries compared, 79, 103
in relation to trade, 177
- prize distribution on board, 312
determined by Prime Minister, 162
Eardley-Wilmot, Lieutenant,
the
defence of the colonies, 334
East India station, English and French
squadrons ar, compared, 107
Eclipse, duration of boilers in, 125
on the education of naval officers, 530
Edmonstone, Sir W., on the office of Fantôme, cost of repairing, 111
master shipwright, 29
Faraday, Professor, on the value
Edye, Mr., on the selection of dockyard mathematics in education, 548
officers, 43
Farcy, M., on the mistakes of the French
Egerton, Captain, on the education of naval administration with regard to
naval officers, 542
certain ships, 101
Ellenborough, Lord, on shipmasters, 562 Fellowes, Admiral, on the duties of the
Elliot, Admiral, on the qualifications of Chief Constructor, 45
Admiralty officers, 57
Fiolaison, Mr. G., return relating to
on the exclusion of the Controller employment of engineer officers, 130
from the Board of Adiniralty, 58
Fishermen, enrolment of, in the Reserves,
on the eficiency of the Royal Naval 258, 378, 395
Reserve, 237, 386
Flagships, tenders to, 428, 452
Enchantress, boiler repairs to, 120
Flamborough Head, the Sunbeam wear
Encounter, 102
thering a gale off, 576
cost of repairing, 110
Flying squadron, the, 171, 449
Engine-room, cramped, and cause of Foreign languages as a part of naval
boiler deterioration and loss of speed, education, 534, 551
122
squadrons, strategical bases for, 366
Engineers, 38
stations, British and other fleets on,
appointment of, without experience,
116
126
employment of gunboats on, 178
complaints of, against executive offi- inspection of ships serving on, 131
time of service on, 116
injudicious changes of, 121
Foudroyant, French ship, time occupied
neglect of, a cause of boiler deteriora- in building, 114
tion, 125
France, annual cost of construction in, 105
position of, 167
armour construction in, between 1874
reserve corps of, 129
and 1879, 157
salary of, 62
connection between the Navy and
- social claims and practical duties of, mercantile marine in, 326
128
cost of maintaining ships in commis-
suggested training of, in merchant sion in, 105
service, 127
dependence of British naval policy
training of, 126, 408
in the United States, 128
dockyard competitions for designs in,
England, annual cost of construction in, 51
105
fishermen of, 261
- cost of maintaining ships in commis- inscription maritime of, 207, 209
sion in, 105
instruction of the mercantile marine
- naval expenditure in, 79, 103
in, 565
naval strength of, relatively to other
naval estimates and shipbuilding pro-
Powers, 80, 88
grainme of, 108
shipbuilding policy of, 81, 91
naval expenditure and trade of, 178
English Navy, foreign squadrons of, 105 Naval Reserve of, 227, 389
ironclad, 71, 90
relative rank of shipbuilding officers
unarmoured, 82
in, 11
Essex, fishermen of, 259
shipbuilding policy of, 91
Estimates, dockyard, preparation of, 45 war expenditure of, 136
naval, 103
Fraser's Magazine, on the half-pay sys-
stationary character of, 194
tem, 484
VOL. IV.
RR
cers, 123
on, 186
:
610
INDEX.
IRE
HAM
Fremantle, Captain, on instruction in
tactics, 474
French language, study of, 534, 539
Navy, ironclad, 71, 89
unarmoured, 82
cost of repairs in, 100
cruisers of, 173
government of, 57
gunnery instruction of, 461
navigation of, 504
pay of seamen in, 217
professional staff of, 46
squadron of, on the China station,
106
in the East Indies, 107
tactical instruction in, 482
training of, 422, 443, 450
Froude, Mr., on a Pan-Anglican confede-
ration, 346
Goschen, Mr., on the Naval Reserve
question, 396
on Reserve midshipmen, 325
on the education of naval otficers, 537
on navigating officers, 539
naval administration of, 70
naval policy of, 159
Gould, Mr., on the British shipping trade
with the Baltic, 564
Graham, Sir James, on the audit of ship-
building accounts, 13
on the old Navy Board, 58
on the question of a Naval Reserve, 296
Greenwich Naval College, Admiralty
minute relating to, 543
- curriculum of, 86, 547
- prizes at, 558
report of committee of inquiry on,
554
- studentships for Naval Reserve officers
at, 567
success of, 190
Grey, Sir Frederick, on the office of Con-
troller, 51
on the manning of the Navy, 218
on the training of seanien, 427 ·
on the flying squadron, 449
Grivel, Baron, on the sbipbuilding policy
of France, 92
on a scheme of naval coastguards for
France, 261
Grosser Kurfürst, loss of, 480
Gueydon, Comte de, on French merchant
captains, 3
on tactics, 465
on the age of entry for naval cadets,
533
Gunboats, utility of, 71
- employment of, on foreign stations,
178
Gunnery, training in, 461
GA ,
AMMA class, 354
Gardner, Captain, on the efficiency
of the Royal Naval. Reserve, 236
on the Second-class Naval Reserve,
260
General Admiral, Russian ship, armour
protection of, 169
German Navy, ironclad, 71, 82, 90
unarmoured, 82
accidents in, 480
cost of maintaining, 102
professional staff of, 47
squadron of, on the China station, 106
– training of, 417, 443
Germany, annual cost of construction in,
105
- armoured construction in, between
1874 and 1879, 157
fleet of, on foreign stations, 178
merchant seamen of, 563
- naval expenditure and shipbuilding
programme of, 108
naval expenditure and trace of, 178
- Naval Reserve of, 228, 389
shipbuilding policy of, 55
war expenditure of, 136
Gladstone, Mr. W. E., 199
on dockyard reductions, 36
Glatton, cost of repairing, 110
cost of altering, 112
Globo newspaper,
the Admiralty
returns of shipbuilding expenditure, 15
Goldsborough, Admiral, on coast-defence
ships, 220
Goodenough, Captain, on the Naval
Reserve, 227
on tactics, 469
Gordon, Mr., on qualifications of engi.
neers with respect to boiler manage-
ment, 128
Goschen, Mr, on public criticism of
naval matters, 33
on the office of Controller, 62
on his own dockyard policy, 140
2
on
ALF-PAY officers, employment of, in
the merchant
in Naval Reserve, 322
system, evils of, 484, 584
Halifax, Lord, on the Naval Coast Volun-
teers, 262
Hall, Sir William, on professional officers
in dockyards, 41
on the necessity for naval superinten-
dents, 41
on navigating officers, 497
Hamilton, Mr., Accountant-General, his
tables of expenditure on repairs and
construction, 109
on the expense of alterations to certain
ironclads, 111
return of number of engine-room
artificers, 130
Hamilton, Admiral, on the age of entry
of naval cadets, 531 ·
Hampton, Lord, policy of, with respect
to navigating class, 514
INDEX.
611
HAN
LEN
Hanbury-Tracy, Mr. See Sudeley, Lord. Ironclads, wood-built, speedy decay of,
Harbord, Mr., on navigating officers, 507 114
Harbour ships, number of seamen in, 426 Iron Duke, cost of, 45
Harbours, defence of, 33
cost of repairing, 110
by the Naval Artillery Volunteers, cost of altering, 112
282
boiler repairs to, 119
Harcourt, Colonel, Volunteer Artillery Italia, Italian ship, armour protection of,
Brigade of, 279
168
Hay, Sir John, his return of boiler re- Italy, ironclad fleet of, in 1872, 71
pairs, 119
naval reserve force of, 228
on the education of naval officers, 541
Helicon, boiler repairs to, 119
Himalaya, boiler repairs to, 120
A
Hong Kong, defenceless state of, 359
MES, W., on the victory of Lord
condition of, 360
Howe, 477
Horizontal engines, 122
Jervoise, Sir W., on our strategical naval
Hornby, Admiral, 450
bases, 366
Howe, Lord, victory of, 205, 477
Joinville, Prince de, on shipbuilding
Hunt, Mr. Ward, naval policy of, 158
policy, 97
Hurricanes, West Indian, 436
on the French fishing population, 261
Hydrographic surveys, 171
Jurien de la Gravière, Admiral, on the
Hyères, the evolutions at, 493
inspection of dockyards, 17
on the shipbuilding policy of France,
93
MPÉRIEUSE, 167
on service on foreign stations; 117
Impressment, naval, 207, 212
on the results of the inscription mari.
Inconstant, 102
time in the Franco-German war, 210
cost of, 45
on naval training, 451
India, naval resources of, 350
on tactics, 464
harbour defence of, 368
Inflexible, complement of, 402
cost of altering, 112
K
EPPEL, Sir Henry, on the efficiency
Inglefield, Admiral, on instruction in tac- of the Naval Reserve, 386
tics, 470, 471
Kessock Ferry, inspection of Naval
Ingram, Mr. T., on the piece-work system, Reserve at, 239
35
Key, Sir Cooper, on the efficiency of the
Inman, Lieutenant, on the Royal Naval Royal Naval Reserve, 237
Artillery Volunteers, 312
on tactics, 473
Inman's school of paval architecture, 48 on navigating officers, 493, 497
Inman steamships, boiler endurance of, on navigation and pilotage, 508
120
cruise of the Reserve squadron under,
Inspection of boilers, 180
223
and machinery of ships abroad, 131 King, Chief Engineer, on the shipbuilding
of dockyards, 131
policy of England, France, and Germany
Inspector-in-Chief of Naval Reserves, 229 compared, 54
Invincible, cost of repairing, 110
on British dockyard administration,
boiler repairs to, 119
103
Ireland, state of, 195
Iris, engines of, compared with those of
Euphrates, 123
LAIRD: Mricon the maintenance of the
Iron, employment of, attended by re-
, 5
duced expenditure on repairs, 114, 180 on the cheapness of labour in dock-
Ironclads, building of, in 1874–79, 144 yards, 35
dimensions of, 72, 81
Lalande, Admiral, 450
examples of cost of repairs to, 110 Lamy, M., on the English Admiralty
examples of cost of alterations of, 111. accounts, 16
inexperience in handling, 413
- on Mr. Childers's administration, 78
modern, complements of, 383
on slowness of construction, 113
necessity of, 94
Lang, Mr. O., on the status of dockyard
number of, possessed by the chief officers, 42
maritime powers, 71
Languages, modern, study of, by naval
in commission in British and French officers, 534, 551
navies, 104
Laughton, Mr. J. K., on tactics, 472
- principles of design for, 192
Leander class, speed of, 173
return relating to construction of, 107 Length as an element of speed, 169
R R 2
612
INDEX.
LER
Lerwick, inspection of Naval Reserve at,
239
Liberal party, the, 198
Lily, Irish mail steamer, 119
Lieutenants, employment and promotion
of, 585
Lindsay, Mr. W. S., on the creation of a
war fund during peace, 217
on officers of the Reserve, 324
on navigating officers, 508
on naval educa'ion abroad, 565
Line-of-battle ship, type of, 96
Lissa, the action at, 472
Lively, boiler repairs to, 119
Liverpool Naval Artillery Volunteers,
distribution of prizes in 1880 to,
312
Long, Captain, on the kind of ships
required for service in the Pacific, 106
on instruction in tactics, 479
Lord Clyde, stranding of, 499
Lord Warden, complement of, 220, 383
NAT
Mercantile marine, employment of half-
pay naval officers in, 85
instruction of engineers in, 409
condition of seamen in, 390
officers of, their fitness for Reserve
commands, 325
salaries of officers in, 564
State aid in training boys for, 376,
387
training naval engineers in, 127
value of, to the Navy, 205
as an element of naval strength,
187
as a nursery for seamen, 457
steamers, utility of, for war purposes,
355
Merchant seamen, condition of, 229, 563
Midshipmen, Reserve, 325
Military service, effects of, on the civil
life of the individual, 595
Milne, Admiral, on time of service on
foreign stations, 117
Minotaur class, 95
renewal of boilers of, 37
stranding of, 499
Monarch, 72
cost of repairing, 110
Monitors, value of, 95
N
MT
*HARDY, Commander, on gunnery
instruction of seamen, 462
Machinery, inspection of, 131
Magdala, 368
Mail service, suggested transfer of, to the
Royal Navy, 76
Main, Professor, on navigating officers,
507
Majestic, speed of, 169
Manning a navy, 204
systems of, 207
Maritime populations of principal naval
Powers, 209
Mark, Consul, on the crews of British
merchant ships, 563
Martin, Sir Byam, on the value of the
merchant service to the Navy, 205
Masters. See Navigating Officers.
Master Shipwright, title of, 11
relations of, with the Admiralty, 27
desirability of secretaries to, 29
status of, 83
See Constructor, Chief.
Mathematics, study of, by naval officers,
547
Mediterranean garrisons, relief of, 593
squadron, 74
Megæra, lessons from the loss of the, 27
Commission, 42
Mends, Sir W., on the need of a naval
reserve, 218
Mercantile auxiliaries, 83, 93, 368, 383
marine, advantage to owners of, by
precautions during peace, 208
British, number of seamen engaged
in, 209
Board of Trade examinations for,
565
:consular reports on condition of,
563
education of officers for the, 562
APIER, Sir Charles, on time of service
on
on the contributions of the merchant
service to the Baltic fleet, 209
on the too early ernployment of mid-
shipmen, 532
Napoleon, defeat of his design to invade
England, 66
Nautical Magazine on tactics, 476
Naval architecture, schools of, 47
- Artillery and Coast Volunteers. See
Volunteers.
College. See Greenwich, Portsmouth.
constructor in dockyards, 11
expenditure, uniformity in, necessary
to economy, 34
in relation to trade, 177, 193
instructors, question of retaining, 541
Reserve. Sce Reserve.
University Sec Greenwich Naval
College.
Navigating officers, 488
- origin of, 490
reintroduction of, in French war, 491
how selected, 491
want of special training for, 492
status of, 493
evidence before committees on, 494
existence of, a cause of neglect of
navigating duties in executive officers,
498, 509
-scheme for abolition of, 503
abolition of, 515
- grievances of, 523
Navigation, duty of, 75
INDEX.
613
NAV
POR
Navigation, bad, losses in Navy from, | OFFL employment and training of, in
FFICERS, education of, 76, 530
surveying service, 460
sea training of, 428
Naval Reserve, 322
non-commissioned, 595
Orontes, boiler repairs to, 120
Osborn, Captain Sherard, China squadron
of, navigated by captains, 503
Overtime in dockyards, 166
Owen, Professor, on the value of mathe-
matics in education, 548
1
500
in mercantile marine from, 562
Navy, Controllership of the. See Con-
troller.
cost of victualling and clothing the,
under different administrations, 67
distribution of seamen in thc (1880),
454
expense accounts of the, 179
feeling of merchant seamen towards,
205
government of, by a board, 31
importance of, to the Empire, 66
local surveyors of the, 23
losses from bad navigation in, 500
maintenance of the personnel of the,
84
maintenance and repairs of the, 100
manning the, 204
systems of, 207
mercantile auxiliaries to the, 83
number of seamen required in, 459
voted for, in 1881, 174
- party feeling in discussions relating to
the, 33, 54, 140
pay of seamen in, 217
- personnel of, in 1881-82, 170, 174, 193
its strength, as compared with
foreign navies, 216
promotion and retirement in, 584
reduced complements in, 220
system of training in, 415
its defects, 425
regulations for admission of boys into,
267
representation of, in Parliament, 222
service afloat in, its limited amount,
427
state of, in 1880, 134
training of engineer officers in, 408
of seamen in, 171, 176, 412, 415
war complement of, 390
colonial, difficulty of organising a,
339
Nelson, Lord, as a tactician, 478
long cruises of, 431
on the impressment system, 212, 213
piloting knowledge of, 510
Neptune, cost of alteration of, 111
Netley gunboat, inspection of Naval Re-
serve on board the, 239
New South Wales, local defence of, 336
Nicholson, Sir Frederick, on navigating
officers, 496
Niobe, duration of boilers in, 125
Noel, Captain, on tactics, 471
Non-commissioned officers, 595
Non-effective vote, 182, 193
Northumberland, cost of, 4
cost of repairs to, 110
Norwood, Mr., on the condition of mer-
chant seamen, 397
Nymph, duration of boilers in the, 125
Nymphe, German training ship, 417, 421
PACIFIC squadrons,
French, English,
Paget, Lord Clarence, on dockyard pro-
motions, 11, 12
- on dockyard management, 28
on the impressment system, 213
his mode of practising officers in
manoeuvring, 470
on navigating officers, 502
Pakington, Sir John, on the ncedlessness
of a Board of Admiralty, 56
See Hampton, Lord.
Pall Mall Gazette, on the inefficient
handling of modern ironclads, 413
on seamanship in ironclads, 442
Parliament, representation of the Navy
in, 222
Parsons, Commander, on the efficiency of
the Royal Naval Reserve, 244
Party feeling in discussions of naval
affairs, 33, 54
Pearl Rock, accident to the Agincourt at,
75
Pembroke dockyard, economical results
at, 41, 44
Penelope, cost of, 44
Penfentenyo, Lieutenant de, on tactics,
467
Peninsular and Oriental Company, eiti-
ciency of officers of, 442
engineer service of the, 121
the subsidy to, 83
Pennell, Mr., on the impressment system,
212
Pensions as inducements to service, 591
Naval Reserve, 249
Peter the Great, Russian ship, 101
Peterhead Battery, inspection of Naval
Reserve at, 239
Phillimore,. Admiral, report of, on the
Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, 308
Piece-work system in dockyards, 35
- difficulty of introducing, in the dock-
yards, 181
Pilotage, knowledge of, an essential of
naval command, 488, 510, 519
instruction in, on the British coasts,
510
establishment of a school of, 521
Porter, Admiral, on the state of the
British Navy, 54
614
INDEX.
!
POR
Porter, Admiral, on the condition of the
British Navy, 89
on the shipbuilding policy of the
United States, 92
Portsmouth, Naval College at, 535
Powell, Captain, on navigating officers,
508
President, drill of the Naval Reserve on
board the, 245
Pressgang. See Impressment.
Prince Alfred, drill of naval volunteers
on board the, 279
Professional officers, 40
French, 46
German, 47
Promotion, dockyard, 11, 23, 30
Psycho, loss of the, 536
Pullen, Mr., on navigating officers, 497
RAIN
AINBOW drill vessel, 28.1
Rams, 95
bandling of, in relation to navigating
officers, 519
Randolph, Admiral, on tactics, 468
on tactics, 475
Ravenhill, Mr., on training naval engi-
neers in merchant ships, 127, 409
Raymond, M. Xavier, on the administra-
tion of the British Navy, 47
on the inscription maritime, 211
Receiving ships, 4:26
Reed, Sir E. J., on dockyard manage-
ment, 27, 28
on the construction of essential parts
of ships in time of peace, 112
on the decay of wood-built ironclads,
114
-- on the efficiency of naval engineers,
124
on training naval engineers in mer-
chant ships, 127
on Mr. Smith's return on the state of
the Navy in 1880, 149
on the possibility of giving naval
engineers experience in the mercantile
marine, 409
designs of, 72
Repairs, absorption of naval resources by
expenditure on, 107
cost of, importance of curtailing, 108
reduced by substituting iron for
wood, 114
in France and England compared,
100
Repulse, cost of repairing, 110
Requin, French ship, time occupied in
building, 114
Reserve forces, officering of, 322
necessary strength of, 216
of principal maritime Powers, 389
naval, modes of obtaining a, 382
Royal Navy, 171, 176, 371
batteries of, 103
condition of, in 1873, 372
RUS
Reserve forces, drill appliances of, 372,
385
- drill batteries for, in port of
London, 375
efficiency of the, 236, 437
employment of naval officers in,
587
honorary commissions in, 395
gunnery pay in, 373
need of inspecting officers for, 380,
396
Inspector-in-chief of, 229
limited number of drilling places
for, 253
officers for, 323, 377
necessity of, 204
qualifications for enrolment in, 374
recruitment of, 248
from fishermen and seamen in
the coasting trade, 258
regulations of, 248
retainers in, 393
Scotch division of, 403
strength of, in 1882, 399
studentships for officers of, at
Greenwich Naval College, 565
sufficiency of, to man the Navy,
382
training in, regulations for, 384
training boys for, 376, 394
transfer of seamen to, 457
Second-class, 253, 260, 385
Third-class, regulations relating
to, 266
Colonial, 331
- steam, 129, 318
Reserves, calling out the, 599
Robeson, Secretary, on the use of sail, 74
Robinson, Sir Spencer, on the relation of
the Controller to the Board of Ad-
miralty, 58
on audit of dockyard accounts, 14
advice of, on the dockyards, 154
on the dockyard reductions, 162
on the French navigating system, 505
Rodgers, Admiral, on the qualifications
of the modern seaman, 412
on the system of training in the
British Navy, 417
Rogers, Commodore, on the manning of a
Navy, 204
Rous, Admiral, on the necessity of sea-
manship, 439
Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, 272,
387, 403
Royal Naval Reserve. See Reserve.
Royal United Service Institution, paper
and discussion at, on the Navy Reserve
question, 218
Rupert, cost of alteration of, 112
Russell, Earl, on the maintenance of our
colonial empire, 345
on the confederation scheme, 347
Russia, annual cost of construction in,
105
INDEX.
615
RUS
STA
.
Russia, construction of cruisers in,
173
war expenditure of, 136
Russian Navy, ironclad, 71, 90
accidents in, 479
pay of seamen in, 217
squadron of, on the China station, 106
study of steam tactics in, 480
Russia, Cunard steamship, duration of
boilers of, 37
Ryder, Admiral, on the efficiency of the
Royal Naval Reserve, 236
on the colonial volunteer question, 359
on the training of seamen, 427
on the study of steam tactics in the
Russian Navy, 480
in the French Navy, 182
on the age of entry of naval cadets,
532
SACH
1
ACHSEN, German ship, armament and
armour of, 169
Sail, use of, 73
Sailing ships, value of training in, 430,
434, 437, 448
Salamis, boiler repairs to, 119
Samuda, Mr., on Admiralty organisation,
61
Saunders, Mr., on duties of professional
officers in dockyards, 40
Scale, boiler, 123
Schools of naval architecture, 47
Scotch fishermen, 259
Scotia, Cunard steamship, duration of
boilers of, 38
Scotland, Naval Reserve of, 403
Scott, Admiral, on the utility of mer-
cantile steamers for war purposes,
355
on a Colonial Naval Reserve, 356
on gunnery training of seamen, 461
Sea Gull, temperature of stoke-hole in,
122
Seamen, British, decrease in number of,
375
alleged deficiency of, 84
alleged deterioration of, 376, 381, 390,
436
- reduced cemplement of, in modern
ships, 220
- distribution of, in 1880, 454
- condition of, 229
necessity of thorough training at sea
for, 430
number of, required, 459
number of, voted for 1881-2, 174
limited sea service of, 427
training of, 171, 176, 412, 415
in German Navy, 417, 443
in French Navy, 422, 443, 450
in United States Navy, 423, 443
transfer of, to the Reserve, 457
wages of, in British and foreign
navies, 217
Semechkin, Lieutenant, on the practice
of evolutions, 481
Seymour, Sir Beauchamp. See Alcester,
Lord.
Seymour, Sir Michael, on the exclusion
of the Controller from the Board of
Admiralty, 58
Shanghai, Volunteers at, 359
Shannon class, 93
cost of altering, 112
Shaw-Lefevre, Mr., on the shipbuilding
work of the Conservative Administra-
tion, 142
on the Naval Reserve, 381
his return of armoured construction,
107
Shetland Islands, Royal Naval Reserve
in, 239
Shipbuilding in public and private yards,
comparative cost of, 4
annual cost of, 109
- progress of, in England, 191
slowness in completion of, 113
in England and France, compared, 186
- policy, American, 73, 91
British, 81, 91
French, 93
German, 55
Shipmasters, British, 562
Ships, construction of essential parts of,
in time of peace, 112
cost of altering, 111
cost of maintaining, in commission,
103
in reserve, supervision of, 23
- small, fighting value of, 71
Signal book, 475
Singapore, commercial importance of,
360
Sirius, duration of boilers in, 125
Smart, Admiral, Committees of, 20, 41, 44
Smith, Mr., on time of service at foreign
stations, 117
Mr. W. H., on the state of the Navy,
134
shipbuilding policy of, 138, 142, 145,
158
Somerset, Duke of, on the Controllership
of the Navy, 5, 10
on the inspection of dockyards by the
Controller, 17
on tbe office of First Lord of the
Admiralty, 55
- desirous of abolishing navigating
class, 502
South Atlantic squadrons, French and
* English compared, 105
Spanish Armada, services of the mercan-
tile marine against, 205
Speed, influence of length upon, 169
Spencer, Herbert, on dockyard extrava-
gance, 43
Squadrons, training in, 107
Stansfeld, Mr., on audit of dockyard
accounts, 15
616
INDEX
STA
WAG'
Star.sfeld, Mr., on dockyard labour, 35 Torpedoes, employment of, 95
Staunch class, 354
Touchard, Admiral, on practical instruc-
Steam, combination of, with sails, 439 tion in tactics, 466
instruction in, for cadets, 534
Tourville, French ship, time occupied in
Naval Reserve, 318
building, 114
tactics, instruction of the Navy in, Trade, progress of, in relation to naval
464
expenditure, 177, 193
*Steam Manual,' the, 180
Training, system of, 216
Steamers, influence of, on the maritime boys for mercantile marine, State aid
population, 375, 381
in, 376, 387
Stewart, Sir Houston, 190
ships, 176
on instruction in tactics, 471
Naval Reserve, 393
Stokers, formation of a reserve of, 129,
number of vessels available for,
318
455
withdrawal of, for drill, 123
Training ships for the Naval Reserve,
Stornoway, inspection of Naval Reserve 85
in, 240
Triumpb, cost of repairing, 110
Sudeley, Lord, Parliamentary speeches boiler repairs to, 119
on the navigation question, 488, 513 Troopships, boiler endurance in, 120
Suez Canal, effect of, on the Naval Turret system, 173
Reserve, 223
Sulivan, Sir B., on navigating officers,
491, 492, 495, 504, 509
UNA
VARMOURED fleet, expense of, 82
Sultan,.cost of repairing, 110
ships, examples of cost of repairs
cost of altering, 112
to, 110
Sunbeam, voyage of, round the world,
designs of, 193
568
Unicorn, inspection of Naval Reserve on
in a gale in the Bay of Biscay, 573
board the, 238
in a gale off Flamborough Head, 576 United States, British relations with,
Superb, cost of alteration of, 111
187
Superheaters, influence of, on the dura- - hostility to England of Irish settlers
tion of boilers, 121
in, 197
Surface condensers, influence of, on the shipbuilding policy of, 73, 91
duration of boilers, 121
Navy, 71
Surveying service, 522, 527
during the civil war, 219
as a means of employing and training official reports on the, 89
officers, 460
squadron of, on the China station,
Surveyor of dockyards, 18 -
106
of the Navy, 60
steam instruction in, 534
local, 23
training in, 423, 443
Surveys, hydrographic, 171
training of constructors for, 50
Swiftsure, cost of repairs to, 110
of engineers in, 128
University, Naval. See Greenwich Naval
College.
TACTICS, instruction in, 464
Tamar, boiler repairs to, 120
ALIANT, renewal of boilers of, 37
231
on the efficiency of the Royal Naval Vestal, duration of boilers in, 125
Reserve, 236, 238
Vice-Admiral Popoff, Russian ship, 102
report of, on the Royal Naval Artillery Victoria, complement of, 383
Volunteers, 308
local defence of, 336
Taureau, French ship, 101
Victorieuse, French ship, 101
Tegethoff, Austrian ship, armour protec- Violet, Irish mail steamer, 119
tion of, 169
Volage, 102
Téméraire, cost of alteration of, 112 Volunteers, nava), colonial, 331
Tenders to flagships, 428, 452
Volunteers, Royal coast, 225, 231, 232,
Thetis, cost of repairing, 110
262, 374, 387
Thornycroft torpedo, 354
Royal Naval Artillery, 232, 272, 387,
Thunderer, 190
403
cost of altering, 112
State payment of, 591
Times on the administration of tbe Navy
under successive Governments, 145,
158
AGES of seamen in British and
Tonnerre, French ship, 101
foreign navies, 217
TAC
Tarleton, Sir W., on the Naval Reserve, | VATVanguard, loss of, 429
f
INDEX.
617
WAG
Wages, tendency of steady employment to
reduce, 34
Walker, Sir Baldwin, on dockyard officers,
12
Ward, Mr., on German compared with
British merchant seamen, 563
Warden, Admiral, his mode of instruct-
ing officers in tactics, 470
War fund, creation of, 217
Warren, Admiral, on the efficiency of the
Royal Naval Reserve, 237, 238
Warrior, 72
cost of repairs to, 110
Warspite, 167
Washington, Captain, on navigating
officers, 75, 494, 516, 520, 526
West India hurricanes, 436
White, Mr. W. H., on the difference in
YEL
cost of maintenance of wood and iron
ships, 115
Willes, Captain, on the Naval Reserve,
221
Wilson, Commodore, on defects in British
naval training, 425
Wolverine, cost of repairs to, 110
Wood, Sir C., on the old Navy Board, 58
Wood, reasons for ceasing to build in,
114
Woolley's school of naval architecture,
48
Wright, Mr., on deterioration of boilers,
125
YELVE
ELVERTON, Sir Hastings, 552
LOYDOY : PRINTED BY
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VOL. IV.
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THE BRITISH NAVY:
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By Sir THOMAS BRASSEY, K.O.B. M.P. M.A.
In Five Volumes.
1
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[In the press.
Previous Works by the same Author :-
WORK AND WAGES.
8yo.
1876.
FOREIGN WORK AND ENGLISH WAGES. 8vo. 1879.
1878.
LECTURES ON THE LABOUR QUESTION. 8vo.
BRITISH SEAMEN AS DESCRIBED IN RECENT PARLIA-
MENTARY AND OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. 8vo. 1877.
London, LONGMANS & CO.
WORKS BY LADY BRASSEY.
A VOYAGE in
in the "SUNBEAM’; our
Home on the OCEAN for ELEVEN MONTHS. Library Edition,
with 8 Coloured Maps and Charts, 9 full-page Illustrations engraved
on Wood, and 109 Woodcuts in the Text, chiefly from Drawings
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POPULAR EDITION, in Quarto, price 6d. sewed, or 1s. cloth.
Few recent books of travel have had sixpenny edition of Lady BRASSEY's book
a wider or better deserved popularity than puts those publications to shamo. In size
Lady Brassuy's Voyage in the Sunbeam, and general appearance it is not unlike
Everybody read it and everybody was them; but although the price is lower, the
delighted with the spirited and unaffectod typography is greatly superior. The print
style in which the details of the adven- is wonderfully clear, and neither too small
turous cruise round the world were nor too close. But the great foature is the
recorded from day to day by the Lady who illustrations. The woodcuts of the original
presided on board Sir THOMAS BRASSEY'S edition, to the number of about sixty, are
yacht. But el happy thought of the publisher's reproduced with the happiest efl'ect. The pages
or the Author's, for the execution of which both teom with them. Views of picturesque or out-
alike descrvo praise, this delightful journal bus landislı places, portraits of members of the cruising
now been republished at & price which puts it party, representations of unfamiliar creatures, of
well within the reach of the working classes, in foreign customs and costumes, of humorous or
whose welfare the owner of the Sunbeam is well exciting incidents of tlie voyage, are placed before
known to be greatly interested. Thoso wlio lave the render in quick succession by the pencil of
crossed the Atlantic or travellcd much upon the the friendly artist who accompanied the expodi-
Continent are familiar with the cheap pamplilet tion; and the result is a publication which, for ex-
form in which pirationl American publishers re- cellence, attractiveness, and cbeapness combined.
produce the works of English novelists. But the is perhaps without parallel in this country.'
The TIMES.
SUNSHINE and STORM in the EAST;
or Cruises to CYPRUS and CONSTANTINOPLE. With 2 Maps
and 114. Illustrations (including 9 full-page) engraved on Wood by
G. Pearson, chiefly from Drawings by the Hon. A. Y. Bingham.
LIBRARY EDITION, in 8vo. price 21s. cloth.
CABINET EDITION, in crown 8vo. price 78. 6d. cloth extra, gilt odges.
Very little comment is needed to
recommend Lady BRASSEY's genial and
delightful diaries to English leaders.
They are written with suclı evident enjoyment
that the feeling becomes infectious, and we ex-
perience the pleasure of visiting in imagination
most interesting places in the best company.'
DAILY CHRONICLE.
It is native actirity, buoyancy of
spirits, and, to use the word, brightness,
which enable Lady Brassey to undergo
fatigues in her great love of adventure calculated
to scare the majority of women, not to say
men, and which render her books of travel so
exceedingly entertaining.'
MONXING POST.
London, LONGMANS & CO.
3901507346 4078
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