:
ง
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1
ARTES
LIBRARY
1837
SCIENTIA
VERITAS
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
PLURIBUS UNUM
TUEBOR
SQUAERIS PENINSULAM AMOENAM
CIRCUMSPIGE
THIS BOOK
FORMS PART OF THE
ORIGINAL LIBRARY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
BOUGHT IN EUROPE
1838 TO 1839
BY
ASA GRAY
1249
DS
446.5
.M24
1826
v. 2
10-30
THE
POLITICAL
4747
HISTORY OF IND I A,
FROM
1784 TO 1823.
BY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN MALCOLM,
G.C.B, K.I.S., F.R.S., &c. &c. &c.
IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOL. II.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.
MDCCCXXVI.
DS
446.5
M24
1826
V. 2
LONDON:
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES,
Northumberland-court.
CONTENTS
OF
THE SECOND VOLUME.
CHAPTER VIII.-POLITICAL HISTORY OF INDIA.
India Company's Progress to Political Power.-Lord
Clive's Services.-His Sentiments on Indian Affairs.-
Scheme of Supervisors.-An Officer of the Navy Am-
bassador to the Nabob of the Carnatic.-Mr. Warren
Hastings Governor-general.-Opposed by Members of his
Council.-Neutral Policy; how far adhered to under the
different Administrations in India: Mr. Hastings's, Lord
Cornwallis's, Lord Teignmouth's, Lord Wellesley's, and
Lord Minto's.-The Wars there ultimately sanctioned in
England
Page
1
CHAPTER IX.
Observations and Reflections on the general Adminis-
tration of the Indian Government in England
·
CHAPTER X.-LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
Power of Governor-general.-Proposed Change in his
Duties. Nomination of Lieutenant-governors to distant.
Parts of our Possessions.-Considerations on the System
of Judicature: of Police: and Revenue.-Civil and Mili-
tary Establishments.
CHAPTER XI.
Observations on the British Community in India: Half-
Castes, or Anglo-Indians.-Propagation of Christianity.-
Free Press in India
64
•
133
246
iv
CONTENTS.
APPENDIX.
No. 1.-Abstract of Conference between the Commis-
sioners of the Honourable East-India Company, the Nizam
(or Soubahdar of the Deckan), and the Paishwah, on one
part; and those of Tippoo Sultaun, on the other, to
negotiate the Treaty of Seringapatam, 1792
No. II.-Sir John Shore's Minute
Page
i
xliv
•
No. III.-Lord Wellesley's Minute
lxvii
No. IV. Letter from Major-General Sir John Malcolm
to the Marquess of Hastings
cxxviii
No. V. Narrative of the Proceedings of Brigadier-
General Malcolm, from the 16th of January till the 20th
of June, 1818, including those connected with the Sub-
mission and Abdication of the Paishwah Badjerow
No. VI.-Speech of Sir John Malcolm, G.C.B., &c. &c.,
delivered at a General Court of Proprietors of East-India
Stock, on Friday, July 9th, 1824
cciii
ccxxxii
No. VII.-Proclamation previous to the Commencement of
Hostilities with the Rajah of Nepaul.
No. VIII.-Instructions by Major-General Sir John Mal-
colm, G.C.B. K.L.S., to Officers acting under his Orders
in Central India, in 1821
ccxlix
. cclxiii
POLITICAL HISTORY OF INDIA.
CHAPTER VIII.
India Company's Progress to Political Power.-Lord Clive's
Services-His Sentiments on Indian Affairs.-Scheme of
Supervisors. An Officer of the Navy Ambassador to the
Nabob of the Carnatic.-Mr. Warren Hastings Governor-
general.-Opposed by Members of his Council.-Neutral
Policy; how far adhered to under the different Administra-
tions in India: Mr. Hastings's, Lord Cornwallis's, Lord
Teignmouth's, Lord Wellesley's, and Lord Minto's.-The
Wars there ultimately sanctioned in England.
BEFORE we proceed to an examination of the
many important points connected with the actual
condition and government of India, it would
appear expedient to take a summary view of the
origin of our political power, giving particular
attention to the characters of those by whom its
foundations were laid, and to the astonishing ra-
pidity of its growth from the days of Clive to the
close of the administration of the Marquess of
Hastings; a period of not more than seventy years,
but which includes events and changes beyond
those that usually occupy centuries in the history
of other states.
VOL. II.
B
2
[1746.
RISE TO POWER
From the time that the India Company first
formed factories, and carried on a commercial
intercourse with the East, a century and a half
elapsed before they attained political power. This
great change in their condition is to be ascribed
to the hostility of the French, more than to all
other causes combined. The scheme of establishing
an eastern empire for his nation was first formed
by Dupleix, the most able and ambitious of the
governors of Pondicherry; and this plan, which
he prosecuted almost to completion, comprehended,
as a certain consequence, the destruction of the
India Company, who, in their struggle to defeat it,
were fighting for existence.
The first great contest between the English and
French, on the coast of Coromandel, which termi-
nated in the complete overthrow of the latter, in-
volved the India Company in all the complexity of
political relations with the native states, whom
they had supported, while it made them just objects
of future apprehension to those whom they had
opposed.
The sudden rise of the Company on the coast
of Coromandel was followed by a still more rapid
and greater stride to power in Bengal. The cap-
ture of Calcutta, the plunder of their factory, the
imprisonment and consequent death of a great
proportion of their servants, were events which
left them only the alternative of abandoning the
shores of that part of India, or the employment
}
"
1757.3
3
IN INDIA.
of all their military means to punish unprovoked
aggression, and to establish themselves in a man-
ner that should prevent its recurrence. They chose
the latter; and the conduct of this great enter-
prise was intrusted to the talents and genius of
Clive, who, aided by the skill and valour of Admirał
Watson, not only recovered their possessions, but
defeated and dethroned the sovereign by whom
they had been attacked, establishing, in his place,
a prince whose condition made him subservient
to the dictates of those by whom he had been
elevated.
Sujah Dowlah was deposed, and Meer Jaffier
created Nabob of Bengal, in 1757. The desire of
sovereignty made the latter promise beyond his
power of performance. This circumstance, and
the protection afforded by the English to natives
of rank, whom he desired to oppress, rendered him
(even before Colonel Clive left Bengal) very impa-
tient under the burdens and restrictions which
had been the price of his throne. From these he
desired to free himself, as far as he could. His
principal objects were to elude the payment of
what was due to the treasury of Calcutta, and to
displace some of the official persons, for whose
continuance in their situations both the British
government and himself were pledged. "He en-
deavoured," a well-informed and intelligent writer*
* Vide Grant's History of the East India Company, p. 172.
B 2
4
[1759.
COLONEL CLIVE.
observes, "to gain the concurrence of Clive in
these points, by individual liberality towards that
chief. But Clive, who had neither asked nor
stipulated for the preserts which he had personally
received, inflexibly demanded a fulfilment of the
treaty and accompanying engagements."
While Colonel Clive opposed the attempts of
Jaffier to evade his obligations, he gave him an
example of his own adherence to faith, in rejecting
the overtures* of the Shah Zada, or heir-apparent
of the emperor of Delhi, who tempted his ambi-
tion by an offer of any terms he chose to dictate
for the advantage of the Company and himself,
provided he would desert Jaffier, whose territories
that prince had invaded.
A short period before he left India, the reputation
of Colonel Clive was greatly increased by his de-
struction of a Dutch armament from Batavia, sent,
as was suspected at the moment, and afterwards
ascertained, in communication with the Nabob, and
with the exclusive object of co-operating with him
in the expulsion of the English from Bengal.
The disinterestedness, promptness, and energy,
which Colonel Clive displayed on this occasion,
places this act amongst the most brilliant of his life.
* A.D. 1759.
†The greater part of Lord Clive's fortune was at this pe-
riod in the hands of the Dutch East India Company, through
whom he had remitted it to England. Vide Parliamentary
Report.
1761.1
5
MR. VANSITTART.
Besides the defeat of a daring attempt of an
European rival, it had the salutary effect of putting
an end, for the moment, to the intrigues of the
Nabob, and of all other native princes, against the
yet unsettled power of the English; but the de-
parture of Clive from India, in 1761, was the signal
for the recommencement of intrigue and the re-
vival of hope in every enemy, secret or avowed,
of the Company.
Mr. Holwell succeeded to the government till the
arrival of Mr. Vansittart. The invasion of Bengal
by the Mahrattas and by the emperor of Delhi,
and several rebellions, spread terror and desolation
throughout the country; and though in all the mi-
litary operations which occurred, the British troops
supported their character, our situation became
every day more critical. Mr. Holwell, in the first
instance, and Mr. Vansittart afterwards, entertained
the strongest suspicions of Jaffier Ali's fidelity, and
were decided as to his personal incapacity for go-
vernment. These impressions were heightened by
the continued collision which took place at this
pe-
riod, in every part of his dominions, between the
Nabob and his officers on one part, and the servants
of the Company on the other. Unfortunately for
the political interests of the government, the latter,
from the commercial spirit which still pervaded all
branches of the administration, were remunerated
for their services by dues, presents, and privileges.
The privilege of trading free of duty with every part
6
[1760.
AFFAIRS IN
of the interior was one of the most baneful. It was
hurtful to the revenue of the Nabob, oppressive
to his subjects, and, from the daily complaints and
recriminations to which it gave rise, subversive of
all harmony between the two states.
Mr. Holwell was decided in his opinion, that it
was not only injurious but dangerous to the in-
terests of the Company to leave Jaffier Ali any
longer the possession of power; and his successor,
Mr. Vansittart, was so strongly impressed with the
same sentiments, that, within a month of his as-
suming charge of the government *, a secret treaty
was concluded with Cossim Ali, the son-in-law
and general of the Nabob, by which he was guaran-
teed in full power as ruler of Bengal, under the
title of Dewan or Minister. He agreed to cede to
the Company, in payment for the troops with which
they aided him, the provinces of Burdwan, Mid-
napore, and Chittagong.
This treaty was carried into execution at Moor-
shedabad by the governor in person. Though
Jaffier acknowledged his deficiencies, and repre-
sented Cossim Ali as the fittest person to introduce
reform, force was necessary to make him resign his
power, and he indignantly rejected the name of
sovereignty when the substance was taken from
him. All that he stipulated for was, to return to
Calcutta and live with his family under the protec-
tion of the English.
* August, 1760.
† September, 1760.
1763.]
7
BENGAL.
1
Cossim Ali knew the violent opposition which
many members of the English government had
made to his elevation. He tried to gain them to
his interests, but in vain: the spirit of party in
Bengal was at this juncture so strong among the
members of council and military commanders, that
it superseded all other considerations. Added to
the apprehensions which these divisions created in
the Nabob's mind, he appears, by his letters and
representations, to have been goaded almost to
desperation by the continual quarrels between his
subjects and the servants of the Company. The
claim of the latter to exemption from duties was
extended to their native agents, who were also
vested with judicial power; and every act of the
Nabob, or of his local officers, that affected the
interests of these privileged traders, was brought
forward as an indirect attack upon the rights of the
Company. The measures taken by the Nabob, to
remedy the evils of which he complained, were
certainly too abrupt and violent: this was felt by
Mr. Vansittart, who repaired to Monghyr, and,
with the aid of Warren Hastings, negotiated a
treaty, by which it was fixed that the dustucks or
passports granted to Company's servants should
be limited to foreign exports and imports, and that
there should be, henceforward, no exclusive privi-
leges in the inland trade. The duties on British
goods were fixed by this treaty at a fair and mode-
rate rate; and it was further stipulated, that the
8
[1763
RUPTURE WITH
1
native agents of the English should cease to exer-
cise any judicial power, or enjoy that privilege of
person which they had assumed, but should prefer
their complaints when aggrieved, and become ame-
nable when they injured others, to the native ma-
gistrates of the country.
This effort to correct existing evils had a directly
contrary effect, owing to the violence of the Nabob
and that of the majority of the council at Calcutta.
The former, without waiting for that confirmation
which he knew this treaty required, proclaimed it,
the moment it was signed, as a triumph over his
enemies. He sent orders for the execution of its
stipulations, and his local officers, outstepping the
imprudence and precipitation of their sovereign,
furnished, by their acts of retaliative oppression,
ample grounds to confirm the majority of the
council in their resolution, to refuse their confir-
mation to the engagement which had been con-
cluded by the governor. The Nabob, irritated at
this proceeding, had immediate recourse to a very
indiscreet and violent measure. He abolished all
customs for two years. This was deemed an indi-
rect breach of faith with the Company, for it de-
stroyed the advantages of the exemption they en-
joyed under former treaties. A deputation of two
of their body, Mr. Amyat and Mr. Hall, was sent
by the majority of the council to the Nabob, to
demand the annulment of this order. The irrita-
tion of the parties was now, however, too much
1763.]
9
COSSIM ALI.
inflamed to admit of a peaceful termination of their
disputes. Every event tended to accelerate a rup-
ture, but above all the violent conduct of Mr. Ellis,
chief of Patna. He had been avowedly averse to
the elevation of Cossim Ali, and all his acts shewed
a very hostile feeling towards that prince, with
whose local officers he was at constant variance.
Unfortunately, when affairs were in this state,
two boats, laden with arms for the troops at
Patna, happened to pass Monghyr; Cossim Ali,
connecting this supply of arms with his belief of
Mr. Ellis's designs, stopped the boats. It was in vain
that the gentlemen who had been deputed to him
remonstrated against this proceedure. He added
to it a demand that the English troops should be
recalled from Patna; or, at all events, that Mr. Ellis
should be relieved by a more temperate person.
The statement of these demands was considered
by the deputies, and the majority in council who
had deputed them, as almost tantamount to a pro-
clamation of war; and the chief of Patna, Mr. Ellis,
was vested with authority to seize upon the fort at
that place, should he deem such a step necessary in
anticipation of actual hostilities.
It was in vain that the Governor and Mr. Warren
Hastings recorded their dissent against such dis-
cretionary power being given to one who had shewn
himself so disposed to extremities. It destroyed,
they stated, all hopes of an amicable settlement.
Their prediction was fully verified. The Nabob,
10
[1763.
MEER JAFFIER RESTORED.
1
when war seemed certain, appears to have taken
alarm, and released the boats laden with arms, and
at the same time invited a renewal of negotiations;
but the accounts he received from Patna made
him withdraw this pacific overture: and the surprise
of the fort at that place by the English troops, be-
fore declaration of war, gave an apparent jus-
tification to all that he had anticipated.
any
The carelessness of the English at Patna allowed
the Nabob's troops to surprise them in their turn,
the day after they had taken the fort; and those
who were not slain, on this occasion, were made
prisoners.
One of the deputies, Mr. Hall, had been de-
tained by the Nabob as a hostage, while the other,
Mr. Amyat, was allowed to return to Calcutta ;
but he had only reached Moorshedabab, when he
was attacked and murdered, by order of the Nabob,
who, from the hour the fort of Patna was surprised,
had declared himself the irreconcilable enemy of
the Company.
The first step taken by the Governor and coun-
cil was, the restoration* of Meer Jaffier to his
dignities as Nabob. An army was pushed forward
against Cossim Ali, who, after his troops had suf-
fered some defeats, fled to Patna, having first put
to death several of the principal
kingdom, whom he suspected of being friendly to
the English.
* 7th July, 1763.
Hindus of his
11
1764.]
COSSIM ALI EXPELLED.
From Patna, Cossim Ali* wrote to the English
commander-" If you advance, I will cut off the
heads of Mr. Ellis and the rest of your chiefs, and
send them to you."
""
There were at this time fifty gentlemen, and one
hundred persons of lower rank, in confinement at
Patna. Major Adams, feeling for their situation,
addressed a letter to them, entreating that they
would, at any price, obtain their release. Messrs.
Ellis and Hay, to whom this letter was addressed,
answered in a spirit that redeemed any errors they
might have committed. "Their escape," they said,
<<
was impossible, but they were resigned, and de-
sired that operations might not be suspended for a
moment on their account." This letter was trans-
mitted to Mr. Vansittart, who wrote to Cossim
Ali, deprecating his intended cruelty. He also ad-
dressed him with menaces of vengeance; but all
was in vain. Every European in the power of this
cruel chief was barbarously murdered †, except one,
Mr. Fullarton, a surgeon, who owed his escape to
the respect entertained for his profession.
Patna was taken by storm, but Cossim Ali fled
to the territories of the Vizier, who was called upon
to surrender him, and the German Sumroo, who
had been the instrument of this horrible massacre.
The Vizier of Oude, Sujah Dowlah, not only refused
* Vide letter from Cossim Ali to Major Adams, dated 9th
September, 1763.
+ In 1763.
12
[1765.
ADMINISTRATION
to comply with these demands, but advanced at
the head of a large force to attack the British
army. He was repulsed near Patna, and soon af-
terwards suffered a signal defeat at Buxar. The
British army, now commanded by Major Munro *,
entered his dominions, and defeated the Mahratta
chief, Malhar Row, whom the Vizier had called to
his aid. In this predicament, Sujah Dowlah acted
a part worthy of his former character. He could
not consent to bring a stain upon his honour by
sacrificing those who had sought his protection.
Cossim Ali and Sumroo were told to depart be-
yond his territory, and he repaired to the British
camp, declaring that he threw himself unreservedly
upon the clemency of that nation.
The state of Bengal, during the last three years,
had caused the greatest anxiety and alarm in Eng-
land; and the consequence was, that Colonel, now
Lord Clive, had been nominated, with a select
council, to re-assume the management of the
public interests in that country.
He arrived at
this period, and to that complete confidence in his
character, which Sujah Dowlah had in common
with every native prince, may be ascribed the step
which he took on this occasion; nor had he any
cause to regret the reliance he placed on British
generosity. A treaty was concluded with him by
Lord Clive, aided by General Carnac, by which
the Vizier, on paying fifty lacs of rupees towards
* Afterwards Sir Hector Munro.
1765.]
13
OF LORD CLIVE.
the expenses of the war, and assigning the pro-
vinces of Corah and Allahabad for the support of
the emperor of Delhi, was restored to all his do-
minions, inclusive of the country of Benares, which
the king had granted to the Company.
Jaffier, the Nabob of Bengal, had died before
Lord Clive's arrival, and his son Nudjum u Dowlah,
a minor, had been raised to the musnud, with
a stipulation that the administration of the country
should be intrusted to certain high officers named
by the British government. Lord Clive, after he
had settled the treaty with the Vizier of Oude,
negotiated an agreement with the emperor of
Delhi, by which the dewannee, or administration
of the countries of Bengal and Bahar, was vested
in perpetuity in the English government, which, by
a subsequent engagement with the Nabob of Bengal,
agreed to pay him and his heirs the annual sum of
fifty lacs of rupees.
Previous to the submission of the Vizier, the
emperor Shah Allum had joined the British camp,
where, though only attended by a few followers,
he had displayed the imperial standard. Major
Munro had transmitted the emperor's propositions
for an alliance with the Company; and the gover-
nor in council had not only entertained them, but
promised him, under certain conditions, the terri-
tories of Oude. Of this agreement Lord Clive
highly disapproved. The emperor had personally
no possessions, and his character was not such as
promised success, either in the attainment or rule of
14
[1757.
ENGLISH POWER
a kingdom. His name, which was still revered
and recognised as the source of power, might have
been used by the English as a pretext for the ex-
tension of dominion, if such had been their object;
but Lord Clive very justly deprecated any such
baseless project, and while he obtained fame to the
Company's government by the generous restora-
tion to power of Sujah Dowlah, a monarch of high
reputation, he laid the foundation of the future
greatness of the British empire in the east by ac-
quiring the direct rule of a compact territory, fertile
in soil, and abundant in all the resources which
could render its future improvement valuable to the
commercial and political strength of his country.
The political power of the English in India,
grounded as it now was upon great territorial pos-
sessions, had risen with all the celerity* of an
Asiatic conquest.
In our endeavour to examine the real character
* By the engagements with the Nabob of Bengal (1757),
the Company had the privilege given them of coining money
in the name of the emperor of Delhi.
In the same year, the lordship of twenty-four districts, ad-
jacent to Calcutta, was granted to them in perpetuity, and
their facilities of trade were greatly extended. In 1760, the
rich provinces of Midnapore, Burdwan, and Chittagong, were
made over to them by Cossim Ali, for the payment of a spe-
cified subsidiary force (a).
In 1763, at the restoration of the Nabob Jaffier Khan, the
above provinces were ceded in perpetuity. In 1764, a grant
from Shah Allum, emperor of Delhi, gave them the coun-
(a) 500 European cavalry, 2000 infantry, and 8000 sepoys.
1765.1
15
IN INDIA.
of this extraordinary power, and to develope the
causes which have since raised it to such magni-
tude, our first attention must be given to the
opinions of Lord Clive, who contributed beyond all
others to its establishment.
He ascribed the great change in our condition
at Madras to the ambition of the French, and he
appears to have deemed our situation in Bengal as
nearly similar; for there, as on the coast of Coro-
mandel, our European were intimately connected
with our Asiatic enemies.
tries of Benares and Gazeepore; and in the following year,
1765, the same authority made them nominal administrators,
but real rulers of the rich and fertile provinces of Bengal,
Bahar, and Orissa.
Considerable cessions of territory were made to the Com-
pany, at this period, on the coast of Coromandel, in addition
to some valuable lands made over in 1763, by the Nabob Ma-
homed Ali Khan. A jagheer, or estate, was granted in 1765,
which included some of the most fertile districts in the Car-
natic. A grant of the northern circars had been obtained
from the Subah of the Deckan, by Bussy; but when Massule-
patam was taken, and the French were expelled from this pos-
session, in 1759, by the English, the circars were transferred
to them, and their right to this territory, as well as to the
lands ceded by the Nabob of the Carnatic, was confirmed in
1765, by a deed from the emperor of Delhi.
Bombay, the most ancient of the territorial possessions of
the Company, was, in 1765, the most limited; but it had im-
portance from its fine harbour, and its numerous dependent
factories, among which it numbered Surat. This town and
island, originally ceded by the Portuguese to King Charles II.,
as a part of the dower of his queen, the Infanta Catherine, was
made over by the king to the Company in 1668.
16
[1765.
LORD CLIVE'S VIEW
"
Referring to this union, and the feelings which
would be produced on the mind of Jaffier Ali by
the attack of the principal settlement of the
French, he expressed his opinion very strongly to
the committee intrusted with the management of
affairs at Calcutta.
66
"If you attack Chandernagore," he observes,
you cannot stop there, you must go further;
having established yourselves by force, and not by
the consent of the Nabob, he, by force, will en-
deavour to drive you out again.
"We have at last arrived," he states in another
letter* “at that critical period which I have long
foreseen; I mean that period which renders it
necessary for us to determine whether we can or
shall take the whole to ourselves.
"I could have wished that our operations had
been carried on upon a plan of more moderation,
and that we had not been obliged to maintain any
other military force than what might be suffi-
cient to preserve and pursue our commercial ad-
vantages; but since our views are extended, and
since commerce alone is not the whole of the Com-
pany's support, we must go forward; to retract is
impossible."
Similar sentiments were afterwards expressed by
* These sentiments of Lord Clive on the progress of our
arms in India, and the ambitious projects to which success had
given birth, are vividly expressed in a letter to a gentleman
high in the Direction, written immediately after his landing in
India.
1765.]
17
OF INDIAN AFFAIRS.
C
Lord Clive and his council, in a letter* to the
court of directors.
"The time now approaches," they observe,
"when we may be able to determine with some
degree of certainty, whether our remaining as
merchants, subjected to the jurisdiction, encroach-
ments, and insults of the country government, or
the supporting your privileges and professions by
the sword, are likely to prove most beneficial to
the Company. Whatever may be the consequence,
certain it is, that after having once begun, and
proceeded to such lengths, we have been forced
to go on from step to step, until
your whole
sessions were put to the risk by every revolution
effected, and every battle fought."
pos-
Lord Clive, though satisfied that we were pro-
pelled in our career of empire by causes which
were unavoidable, wisely endeavoured, by every
effort, to render that progress slow and gradual.
He tried to reconcile, as far as it was possible, the
princes and natives of India to the dominion of
strangers, by making every sacrifice to their habits,
prejudices, and feelings, that could be made, with-
out abandoning that power which had now become
necessary to our existence.
The system of rule he established had too many
serious defects to be permanent, but it displays
in every part the mind of a great practical states-
man, who suited his work to his materials, and
* 30th September, 1765.
VOL. II.
C
18
[1765.
LORD CLIVE'S VIEW
who, while he accommodated himself to circum-
stances which he could not control, was content
to be reproached with having done too little, rather
than hazard the benefits he had secured by at-
tempting too much.
The difficulties he had to encounter were ren-
dered greater by his want of instruments. There
were some individuals of distinguished talent, but
nothing could be more defective than the general
condition of every branch of the civil and military
service at this period. While he laboured to
reform these, he endeavoured to rouse the Com-
pany's government in England to a proper sense of
the extraordinary change that had taken place in
their affairs.
*
"Circumstances are now widely different," he
observes, "from what they were a few years since,
when you confined your whole attention to com-
merce, and were happy in being able to complete
your investments without insult or exaction from
the country governments. You are now become
the sovereigns of a rich and potent kingdom;
your success is beheld with jealousy by the other
European nations, who maintain settlements in
India; and your interests are so extended, so com-
plicated, and so connected with those of the several
surrounding powers, as to form a nice and difficult
system of politics."
Lord Clive, in the same letter, after taking a
* Letter to Court of Directors, 30th Sept. 1765.
1.758-65.]
19
OF INDIAN AFFAIRS.
comprehensive view of the condition of the Com-
pany's affairs in India, and referring to those
feelings and sentiments which recent events had
produced among the native princes, observes, "The
princes of Hindustan will not readily imagine us
capable of moderation, nor can we expect they
will ever be attached to us by any other motive
than fear. Meer Jaffier, Cossim Ali, and the
Nabob of Arcot (the best Mussulman I ever
knew), have afforded instances sufficient of their
inclination to throw off the English superiority.
No opportunity will ever be neglected that seems
to favour an attempt to extirpate us, though the
consequences, while we keep our army* complete,
must be fatal to themselves."
We find in a letter, before noticed, nearly similar
observations :-
"The very Nabobs," he remarks, "whom we
support, would be either covetous of our posses-
sions, or jealous of our power. Ambition, fear,
avarice, would be daily watching to destroy us.
A victory would be but a temporary relief to us ;
for the dethroning of the first Nabob would be
* "Peace," Lord Clive observes, in a letter to Mr. S. Law,
dated 29th December, 1758, "is the most valuable of all
blessings, but it must be made sword in hand in this country,
if we mean to preserve our present possessions. There is no
alternative; either everything in India must be reduced to their
first principles, or such a standing force kept up as may oblige
the Mussulmen literally to execute their treaties."-Clive MSS.
C 2
20
[1768.
LORD CLIVE'S VIEW
followed by the setting up of another, who, from
the same principles, would, when his treasure ad-
mitted of his keeping up an army, pursue the
very path of his predecessor. We must, indeed,
become Nabobs ourselves, in fact if not in name;
perhaps totally so, without disguise."
It is impossible to peruse the history of India,
during the last fifty years, without subscribing to the
truth of every word here written. Events have
verified all Lord Clive's predictions. These were
made from a correct knowledge of human nature,
combined with an intimate acquaintance with the
feelings, sentiments, and passions of the princes of
India, and of the construction of Asiatic society and
governments. His opinions, however, obtained
little attention from men of whom a great part
valued India only as it contributed to their own
profit and that of their friends, or to the loss or
increase of party influence.
Lord Clive, in his celebrated speech in the House
of Commons, in 1772, adverting to the extent of
the dominion which the English possessed when
he left India, and of the light in which it had been
viewed by the administration, observes *; "the Com-
pany acquired an empire more extensive than any
kingdom in Europe, France, and Russia excepted.
They had acquired a revenue of four millions ster-
ling, and a trade in proportion.
"It was natural to suppose that such an object
* Vide Parliamentary Debates.
1772.]
21
OF INDIAN AFFAIRS.
would have merited the most serious attention of
administration; that in concert with the court of
directors they would have considered the nature of
the Company's charter, and have adopted a plan
adequate to such possessions. Did they take it
into consideration? No, they did not. They
treated it rather as a South Sea bubble, than as any-
thing solid and substantial; they thought of nothing
but the present time, regardless of the future: they
said, let us get what we can to-day, let to-morrow
take care of itself: they thought of nothing but
the immediate division of the loaves and fishes
nay, so anxious were they to lay their hands upon
some immediate advantage, that they actually went
so far as to influence a parcel of temporary proprie-
tors to bully the directors into their terms. It was
their duty to have called upon the directors for a
plan; and if a plan, in consequence, had not been
laid before them, it would then have become their
duty, with the aid and assistance of parliament, to
have formed one themselves. If administration had
done their duty, we should not now have heard a
speech from the throne, intimating the necessity of
parliamentary interposition to save our possessions
in India from impending ruin."
It will not be a matter of surprise that with such
sentiments of the mismanagement of the affairs of
the Company, Lord Clive became a strenuous advo-
cate for parliamentary interference in the govern-
ment of India. "If salvation can come to the
22
[1756:
CONDUCT OF
Company, it must come through this house*,” were
his emphatic words when opposing a petition which
the directors had presented, praying against a bill
which went to the limitation of their power.
Great efforts were made at the period in which
he lived to detract from the opinions and authority
of Lord Clive; and more recent writers, when re-
ferring to the various luminous records which he
has left to illustrate the early history and govern-
ment of British India, appear either to have given
undue weight to the testimony of his enemies, or to
have been incapable of appreciating the motives
and views of this great statesman: but his character,
as it tends to increase or diminish the value of his
opinions, is too intimately connected with the
examination of the progress of our political power
to be passed over in silence.
The early part of Lord Clive's career meets from
all parties with unqualified praise. It is, however,
a great mistake to suppose that even during that pe-
riod he displayed no qualities but those of a soldier:
he evinced, from his first efforts in the public ser-
vice, the most complete knowledge of the natives
of India. He viewed, with a liberal and humane
spirit, their weakness and prejudices; he addressed
himself to all their higher qualities; and, by
granting them his confidence, gained as much ad-
miration in the performance of his political and
civil duties as by his heroic achievements.
* Letter from Lord Clive to Mr. Grenville.
1767.]
23
LORD CLIVE.
The revolution and changes which Lord Clive
effected in Bengal opened a new scene to his am-
bition, and raised him to great and sudden wealth.
*
In accordance with the usages of the Com-
pany's service in India, at that period, he received
presents, as commander-in-chief, to a very large
amount. His acceptance of this reward (as it was
termed) of his labours and success was
open and
avowed; and, though subsequently made the subject
of a charge against him, we do not find that at the
time any one arraigned either the amount of the
donation or the principle of receiving it. The fact
was, that, at this epoch of our Indian government,
the public officers of the Company had very limited
salaries. Their perquisites and advantages, when
employed on civil, military, or political stations,
appear to have been such as had been enjoyed by
native functionaries performing the duties to which
they, in times of conquest and revolution, had suc-
* In Lord Clive's letter of the 21st of August, 1757, to
Mr. Mabbot, one of the directors, after giving an account of the
revolution he had effected, he adds-" I have the pleasure to
acquaint you, that the greatest success at Golconda could not
have equalled the present one for advantages, either to the
Company or myself. Indeed," he concludes, "there is nothing
but the good of the service can induce me to stay in this un-
healthy climate.”
In all his letters to his attorneys, to his
friends and relatives, we find the amount of this donation repre-
sented as great; and he distinctly states in one letter, that he
had no desire whatever to conceal the Nabob's liberality, which
he evidently thought was as honourable to that prince as to
himself.
24
CONDUCT OF
[1756.
ceeded. These, on ordinary occasions, were derived
from a per centage on particular branches of reve-
nue, privileges of trade, or presents from inferiors,
and were always considerable: but when such
events occurred as negotiating a peace *, or re-
placing a monarch upon a throne, the money, gifts,
and territorial grants to the chief instruments of
such changes, were limited only by the moderation
of one party and the ability of the other.
When the alarm of the Indian government in
England led to Lord Clive's second appointment
to Bengal, eight years after he had returned home
to the enjoyment of the noble fortune which he
had acquired, every arrangement made, and every
act during his short administration, showed a mind
* A remarkable instance of this mode of paying those con-
cerned in such great transactions is afforded in the treaty of
peace with Tippoo Sultaun, concluded by Lord Cornwallis in
1792. Thirty lacs of rupees were demanded and given, as
Durbar Khurutch, or Durbar expenses, avowedly to be distri-
buted amongst the officers concerned in settling the treaty.
Lord Cornwallis, it may be observed, obtained no share of this
money; but it may be. answered, that, while a commander
in Lord Clive's situation had not 3000l. per annum of direct
salary, and could cherish no expectation of pecuniary reward in
England, Lord Cornwallis had 30,000l. per annum, besides a
doation of 100,000l. from the government he so honourably
served.
The opposite principle, now established for the reward of
services, will be noticed hereafter. It is alluded to here, to
guard against opinions which we are too apt to form of the
superior virtue of our own times, grounded, as that is in the
present instance, upon a totally different state of circumstances.
1767.]
25
LORD CLIVE.
as superior to the sordid * influence of self-interest,
or personal considerations, as it was above the dic-
tates of fear.
His knowledge of the true source of those
growing evils and dangers which, at this period,
shook to its foundation our unsettled power in
´India, led him to propose a plan (which was carried
into execution) for binding himself, his successors,
and all the officers of the Company's civil and mili-
tary government by oaths and covenants, not to
derive emoluments from any sources except those
fixed for their remuneration.
The condition of the public service, when Lord
Clive arrived at Calcutta, is described in his letter
* Lord Clive, in his letter to the committee, dated 7th May,
1765, when he took charge for the second time of the govern-
ment of Bengal, observes :—
“I shall now repeat what you have often heard me declare,
that I totally disclaim any emolument to myself; I will not add
to my fortune one single rupee by the opportunities I might
have as Governor.
"On the other hand, be assured, that every advantage to
others, consistent with my idea of the Company's honour and
interest, shall be promoted to the utmost of my power here,
and my influence at home."
This pledge was faithfully kept, for he returned to England
five thousand pounds poorer than he left it. Of his great
liberality many instances might be adduced, amongst which
none is more prominent than his willingness, and, indeed,
desire, to give up part of his received donation at the elevation
of Meer Jaffier, to make up the share to which he deemed
Admiral Watson so justly entitled. To such an arrangement,
however, the members of the committee refused their assent.
26
[1756.
CONDUCT OF
to the court of directors so often quoted. In this
he gives a forcible picture of the general demorali-
zation of the civil and military servants of the Com-
pany, and of the speedy ruin that must result from
a continuance of that laxity, insubordination, luxury,
and rapacity which pervaded every branch of the
administration, and influenced the conduct of
almost every agent employed.
The situation in which he was placed by this
state of affairs when he arrived in India is eloquently
described in his speech in the House of Commons *.
"Three paths," he says, "were before me,—one
was strewed with abundance of fair advantages-
I might have put myself at the head of the govern-
ment as I found it-I might have encouraged the
resolution which the gentlemen had taken, not to
execute the new covenants, which prohibited the
receipt of presents; and although I had executed
the covenants myself, I might have contrived to
have returned to England with an immense fortune,
infamously added to the one before honourably
obtained: such an increase of wealth might have
added to my weight in this country, but it would
not have added to my peace of mind; because all
men of honour and sentiments would have justly
condemned me.
66
Finding my powers thus disputed, I might, in
despair, have given up the commonwealth, and
have left Bengal, without making any effort to save
* 30th March, 1767.
{
**
1767.]
27
LORD CLIVE.
it-such a conduct would have been deemed the
effect of folly and cowardice.
"The third path was intricate: dangers and
difficulties were on every side, but I resolved to
pursue it.
In short, I was determined to do my
duty to the public, although I should incur the
odium of the whole settlement. The welfare of
the Company required a rigorous exertion, and I
took the resolution of cleansing the Augean stable.
It was that conduct which has occasioned the pub-
lic papers to teem with scurrility and abuse against
me, ever since my return to England. It was that
conduct which occasioned these charges; it was
that conduct which enables me now to lay my
hand upon my heart, and most solemnly to declare
to this house, to the gallery, and to the world at
large, that I never, in a single instance, lost sight
of what I thought the honour and true interest of
my country and the Company; that I was never
guilty of any acts of violence or oppression, unless
the bringing offenders to justice can be deemed so;
that as to extortion, such an idea never entered
into my mind; that I did not suffer those under
me to commit any acts of violence, oppression,
or extortion; that my influence was never em-
ployed for the advantage of any man, contrary to
the strictest principles of honour and justice; and
that so far from reaping any benefit myself from
the expedition, I returned to England many thou-
sand pounds out of pocket."
Lord Clive justly attributes the virulent attack
28
CONDUCT OF
[1756.
which was made upon his character, and the at-
tempt, with which it was associated, to deprive
him of his fortune as well as his fame, to that host
of enemies which his conduct on this memorable
occasion had raised against him, all whom he
had dismissed or superseded, and the list was nume-
rous, and contained high names, both civil and
military. All whom he had checked in their ca-
reer of plunder, or had crossed in their path of
ambition, combined against him; and, through
the means of their fortune, their ability, their ad-
vocates, their friends, and their relations, they
sought his ruin. He was described as a man
wallowing in wealth gained by undue means, who
had turned upon those who were pursuing the
same road to fortune, and who desired, by inform-
ing against them, and by using the power vested in
him for their punishment, to raise his character for
honour and disinterestedness. His talents, both as
a soldier and a statesman," were questioned, and his
success was ascribed to those he had employed,
to the weakness of the enemies he had conquered,
and to a concurrence of fortuitous events.
The acquisition of great dominion by the Com-
pany in India had been so sudden, that we are not
surprised to find the minds of those who directed
their affairs in England did not keep pace with it.
They clung to their commercial views, and looked
with apprehensions at political power, one of the
earliest results of which was to weaken the control
over their servants; while the latter, in their in-
1767.]
29
LORD CLIVE.
trigues and struggles against each other, sought, as
their only means to avert supercession, or obtain
advancement, the support of friends in England.
From such causes, the public interests, even when
comprehended, were often compromised, to raise or
to depress individuals. The most extraordinary of all
the measures to which these combined motives
gave birth was, the nomination, in the year 1757,
of what has been termed a rotation government
for Bengal, in which four of their civil servants
were appointed by the Directors to succeed each
other every three months; and what rendered it
more remarkable was, the omission of the name of
Clive from this favoured list of periodical rulers.
The changes which had taken place, subsequent to
the date of this measure, rendered its execution im-
possible, without the most serious hazard to the
public interests. Impressed with this feeling, the
four gentlemen who had been nominated governors
(acting in a spirit of disinterestedness which does
them high honour), in conjunction with the other
members of the committee* at Bengal, unanimously
solicited Colonel Clive to take charge of the admi-
nistration. 、 He complied with their request, and
their resignation in his favour proved an anticipa-
tion of the resolution which the court of directors
came to on hearing of the victory of Plassey.
Lord Clive's second appointment to India,
* Vide letter from the Committee to Colonel Clive, in the
Parliamentary Report.
30
[1756.
CHARACTER OF
though called for by the proprietors and the public,
was warmly opposed by a considerable party in the
Direction; and his enemies in that body, recruit-
ing their strength from all whom he had disgraced
or punished, subsequently obtained a majority.
Neither their efforts, however, nor the combined
talent which was arrayed against him in Parlia-
ment, could daunt his courage, and he defended his
own character with a manliness and eloquence that
gave him a complete triumph over all his oppo-
nents.
The character of Lord Clive is associated with
the rise of our power in India, and in that view
merits much of our attention. Whether we con-
sider his military or political career; the know-
ledge he displayed of the natives of India, their
institutions, and government; his efforts to intro-
duce order and principle into what was shapele3
and without system; the promptness and courage
with which he quelled a mutinous and insubor-
dinate spirit in the military and civil officers of
government; his use of victory; the efforts he made
and recommended to consolidate the strength, and
to improve the administration of our empire in the
East; we are equally astonished at the extraordi-
nary extent of his powers of mind. Nevertheless,
no man was ever more violently assailed and
calumniated by his cotemporaries. When events,
over which he had no control, disappointed those
hopes which his successes had raised, his opponents
-
31
1767.]
LORD CLIVE.
took advantage of the change in the public mind
to reproach him with results which were chiefly to
be attributed to their own factions and mismanage-
ment. The prejudices excited by their efforts have
been continued by orators and authors, who, treat-
ing Indian subjects without reference to those
local circumstances and considerations which pecu-
liarly embarrass them, have pleased and satisfied
general and uninformed men, by reducing the most
complex points of policy to an easy abstract ques-
tion. The necessity under which those who ex-
ercise power in India act, the comparative dangers
they have to encounter or avoid, the means they
have of executing one plan, or the want of means
for another, the feelings and character of princes,
and of nations, which they may flatter or offend,
are to such persons matters of little conse-
quence. Their conclusions are drawn from simpler
sources, and they reject, as prejudiced and polluted,
that minute information and local experience,
which, if admitted, might destroy their favourite
theories, or cast a doubt upon the validity of those
fixed rules and principles by which they consider
that the wisdom of every measure ought to be tried
and decided.
With these persons the scene of Indian warfare
and policy is degraded to a low level, and the
actors reduced to insignificance, when compared
with those who appear upon the stage in the west-
ern hemisphere. Nothing in India, if we refer to
32
[1767.
CHARACTER OF
such authorities, is upon a great scale, except the
errors and crimes of British rulers, to the actions
of all of whom they apply a standard framed for a
wholly different state of society and government.
According to such self-constituted judges, the claim
of Lord Clive to the admiration of posterity is very
equivocal. But his fame will rise, the more the
particulars* of his eventful life are made known.
These will prove that his qualities as a statesman
almost surpassed those he displayed as a military
commander.
In a letter addressed by Lord Clive to those to
whom he left the government, when impaired
health compelled him to return to England, he
evinced great apprehension of the danger to which
the empire would be exposed by the revival of that
spirit of corruption and insubordination which he
had with so much difficulty subdued.
"It has been too much the custom," he ob-
serves," in this government to make orders and
regulations, and thence to suppose the business
done. To what end and purpose are they made, if
they be not promulgated and enforced? No regu-
*The author has stated in the preface his obligations to
Lord Powis, who has given him free access to all the letters
and papers of his father, the late Lord Clive. These are nu-
merous, and many of them very interesting; they will furnish
excellent materials for a memoir, that will alike serve to
illustrate the character of that great man, and the rise of the
British power in India.
1767.]
33
LORD CLIVE.
lation can be carried into execution, no order
obeyed, if you do not make rigorous examples
of the disobedient. Upon this point I rest the
welfare of the Company in Bengal. The servants
are now brought to a proper sense of their duty;
if you slacken the reins of government, affairs
will soon revert to their former channel; anarchy
and corruption will again prevail, and, elate with
a new victory, be too headstrong for
any future
efforts of government. Recall to your memories
the many attempts that have been made in the
civil and military departments to overcome our
authority, and to set up a kind of independency
against the court of directors. Reflect also on the
resolute measures we have pursued, and their
wholesome effects. Disobedienee to legal power
is the first step of sedition; and palliative measures
effect no cure. Every tender compliance, every
condescension on your parts will only encourage
more flagrant attacks, which will daily increase in
strength, and be at last in vain resisted. Much
of our time has been employed in correcting
abuses. The important work has been prosecuted
with zeal, diligence, and disinterestedness, and we
have had the happiness to see our labours crowned
with success. I leave the country in peace.
leave the civil and military departments under
discipline and subordination: it is incumbent upon
you to keep them so. You have power, you have
abilities, you have integrity: let it not be said
VOL. II.
D
I
34
[1767.
MR. VERELST.
that you are deficient in resolution. I repeat that
you must not fail to exact the most implicit obedi-
ence to your orders. Dismiss or suspend from
the service any man who shall dare to dispute
your authority.
"If you deviate from the principles upon which
we have hitherto acted, and upon which you are
conscious you ought to proceed; or if you do not
make a proper use of that power with which you
are invested, I shall hold myself acquitted, as I do
now protest against the consequences."
Such was the parting advice which Lord Clive
gave to his former colleagues; but the task of
reform which he had commenced could have been
completed by his own commanding talents alone,
aided by the impression of his high personal cha-
It was far too great for the strength of
those on whom it devolved.
racter.
The character of Mr. Verelst leaves no doubt
of his disposition to pursue the path traced out to
him; but he appears to have been too lenient, and
to have early relaxed from that spirit of unyielding
authority which Lord Clive had so forcibly in-
culcated. Had it been otherwise, it is not likely
that he or any person could have long resisted
the desire which the proprietors of East-India
stock evinced at this period to control and para-
lyze the power of the local administration in India.
Disappointment in their hopes of increased divid-
ends, a wish to promote individuals, feelings of
1769.]
35
SUPERVISORS.
resentment for injuries real or supposed to their
friends and relations, combined to render the general
court at this period an arena of discord and vio-
lence, in which different interests alternately pre-
vailed, till the majority agreed in the expedient
of appointing three officers as supervisors, who
were to proceed to India with powers equal to
those exercised by the government at home, and
from whose knowledge, virtue, and moderation,
the greatest benefits were expected.
Some objections were raised to this measure.
They were, however, overruled, and the super-
visors left England. But the vessel in which they
sailed perished at sea, and this event put an end
to a plan which, notwithstanding the high qualities
of the individuals* selected for its execution, was
not likely to realize the sanguine anticipations of
those by whom it was adopted.
In the settlement of the definitive treaty of Paris,
in 1763, an article was introduced to terminate the
disputes, and to define the rights of the two nations
in India.,
By this article, Mahomed Ali Khan was acknow-
ledged as lawful nabob of the Carnatic, and Salabut
Jung, as Subahdar of the Deckan. The former was
the ally of the English, the latter that of the
French. Nothing could be more incongruous or
more liable to error than this mixture of European
with Indian diplomacy. The recognition of their
* Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Scrafton, and Colonel Ford.
D 2
36
[1770.
A NAVAL OFFICER
ally, Mahomed Ali Khan, was sought by the di-
rectors, and it was only at the suggestions of Lord
Clive, who took alarm at the terms of the article,
that it was modified in such a manner as would
probably have rendered it innoxious, had it not been
converted by his Majesty's ministers into a pretext
for one of the most unjustifiable and mischievous
acts of interference with the powers of the Com-
pany that is to be found on the page of Indian
history.
The pretext for investing Sir John Lindsay, the
commander of his Majesty's squadron in India, with
full powers as minister plenipotentiary to Mahomed
Ali Khan, in 1770, was, that the King of Great
Britain, having become party to an article of a
treaty, had a right, without communication with the
directors, to take care that the article was properly
executed. The real fact was, that the Nabob of the
Carnatic had for some years used every endeavour
to free himself from the restraints in which he was
placed by his engagements with the local govern-
ment of Madras; and the English gentlemen by
whom he was surrounded, expecting their own im-
portance and fortune would increase with that of
their patron, stimulated his ambition to an attempt
to cast off his dependance on the Company, through
the establishment of a direct communication, if not
an alliance, with the King of England.
It is not surprising that Mahomed Ali Khan
should have been the dupe of such advisers. His
!
1770.]
37
AMBASSADOR.
object, the attainment of more power and consc-
quence than he enjoyed, was fair and legitimate,
nor can we wonder at the conduct of men, who,
from a desire to raise their fortunes, encouraged
him to such efforts; but where can we look for the
motives, or rather the apology, of those who, by Sir
John Lindsay's appointment, not only gave their
countenance and support, but became principals in
this attack upon the constituted authorities of their
country! An able historian has drawn a true and
forcible picture of this extraordinary transaction,
and the subject has sufficient importance, not only
as a record but as a lesson, to make us insert the
passage:-
"An ambassador, Sir John Lindsay," he ob-
serves*, "with concealed powers, was deputed in
the ostensible character of the commander of a
frigate, and decorated with a ribbon and star of the
order of the Bath, as a representative of the sove-
reign of Great Britain to Mahomed Ally. With
these dignities the ambassador burst at once upon
the governor and council, as if by ambuscade, and
became, from that time, a partisan of this foreign
power, to which he was deputed against the dele-
gated government of his own nation.”
The proceedings of the royal envoy were all
directed to the same point, that of elevating the
prince to whom he was deputed, and depressing, as
far as he had the power, the local government,
* Vide Wilkes's Southern India, vol. ii., p. 16.
38
[1772,
WARREN HASTINGS,
"The honour he sought on this occasion," the
directors remark, "was that of humbling the Com-
pany before the throne of Mahomed Ali Khan."
Those who desire to be informed of the extent to
which this extraordinary effort against our own
power was carried must refer to the pages of the
historians who have recorded the events of the
period. It is mentioned here only to shew the cha-
racter of that interference which his Majesty's
ministers then exercised in Indian affairs. This it
is essential to understand, for it gave rise to
struggles for patronage and power, the effects of
which soon pervaded every part of our eastern
empire.
During the heat of this violent collision of parties,
in 1772, Warren Hastings was nominated Governor-
general. This extraordinary man has recently paid
the debt of nature. He outlived (in the full pos-
session of all the faculties of his rich mind) that
violent spirit of hostility which a combination of
causes had raised against him; and towards the close
of a life marked by singular events, he not only was
honoured by his sovereign, but received an unex-
ampled tribute of personal* respect from the House
of Commons, who, twenty-five years before, had
voted his impeachment.
* In 1814 Mr. Hastings was called before the House of
Commons to give his evidence on points connected with the
renewal of the Company's privileges. All the members rose
as if by one impulse when he entered the house.
1784.1
39
GOVERNOR-GENERAL.
The long period Mr. Hastings passed in India;
the various offices he had filled from the commence-
ment of his career, till he attained the high station
of Governor-general; his acquaintance with the
languages and usages of the natives of that country,
added to the high qualities of his mind, gave him
advantages without which he could hardly have
saved the empire committed to his charge: but he,
as well as Lord Clive, has been harshly judged by
men who have listened to his enemies and accusers,
and who, when drawing their general inferences
from particular facts, have given little, if any, atten-
tion to the extraordinary circumstances in which
he was placed, the necessity under which he acted,
and the obstacles which he had to overcome.
The act of 1773 made the East India Company
more dependant than before upon the king's mi-
nisters. Mr. Hastings was nominated Governor-
general, but in the same commission three gentle-
men* were appointed to council, who had learned
the lessons on Indian government in England, and
whose views were in direct opposition to his upon
almost every point. The consequence was, that
the administration passed into their hands as the
majority in council, and remained with them, till the
death of General Clavering restored the prepon-
derance to the appointed head of the government.
The effect of such a state of affairs may be imagined.
The spirit of discord which prevailed at the council-
* General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis.
40
[1772.
ADMINISTRATION OF
board spread throughout every branch of the ser-
vice, and the natives of India saw in our divisions
a source of weakness from which they argued our
downfal.
The intentions of those who created and main-
tained this evil might have been pure, but they
possessed little knowledge of that tenure by which
we hold India, or they would not have hazarded, as
they did, the very existence of our power by such
an effort to limit and control its local exercise.
Mr. Hastings has drawn a forcible picture of his
own situation. He may be objected to as an un-
fair evidence in his own case; but this only applies
to facts and statements; general reflections, when
drawn from admitted premises, and when grounded
on experience and wisdom, do not alter their cha-
racter, because they proceed from a partial quarter.
. On the contrary, we give opinions more weight,
when the knowledge of those feelings which called
them forth does not impair the impression of their
truth. When describing the effect which the ac-
tual condition of the government had in obstruct-
ing reform, and perpetuating abuse, Mr. Hastings
observes, "To enumerate every case would be end-
less. In a word, while the power of government
is in the hands of many, and the smaller the num-
ber is, the greater is the evil in this case; while
each hand holds an equal share of it; while the
members of government retain their places by suf-
ferance; and the terrors of dismission and disgrace
1781.1
41
MR. HASTINGS.
are held out against them at home; when their
accusers and the expectants of their places are the
judges of their conduct, and preparers of the evi-
dence on which it is to be tried; when the members
of the government themselves are in disagreement,
and that disagreement (with regret and shame I
suppose it) is excited by the voice of authority;
when each member stands in need of support from
home, and owes returns for the support which he
receives; when each claims an indulgence from the
others, and has it in his power to retaliate every
disappointment, which may be easily understood,
but can never be imputed;, and lastly, when the
most meritorious conduct is denied its credit, and
even the sacrifices of interest are branded with
the reproach of venality; from a government so
constituted, what reformation can be expected?"
After these strong observations on the effects of
an administration so constituted as that of which
he was the head, in a subsequent part of the same
memoir, he speculates on what would have been
the result had a different system been adopted.
"If," he observes, "the same act of the legislature
which confirmed me in my station of president
over the Company's settlements in Bengal had in-
vested me with a control as extensive as the new
denomination I received by it indicated; if it had
compelled the assistance of my associates in power,
instead of giving me opponents; if, instead of
creating new expectations which were to be accom-
plished by my dismission from office, it had im-
42
ADMINISTRATION OF
[1772.
posed silence on the interested clamours of faction,
and taught the servants of the Company to place
their dependance upon me, where it constitutionally
rested; if, when it transferred the real control over
the Company's affairs from the direction to the mi-
nisters, instead of extending, it had limited the
claims of patronage, which every man possessing
influence himself, or connected with those who
possessed it, thought he had a right to exert; and
if it had made my continuance in office to depend
upon the rectitude of my intentions, and the vigour
with which they were exerted, instead of annexing
it to a compliance with those claims, I should have
had little occasion, at this period, to claim the pub-
lic indulgence for an avowal of duties undischarged.
But the reverse took place in every instance.
ઠંડ
"If the interests of the nation," he continues,
"are truly consulted, a total change in the system
must take place; for whilst private interests are
allowed to stand in competition with, or in opposi-
tion to arrangements founded on the public good;
whilst those who censure the concessions made to
them, in all instances which have not a reference
to themselves or to their connexions, still persist in
recommending them; and whilst the official exist-
ence, public reputation, and private fame, of the
members of the government in Bengal are main-
tained or sacrificed in proportion to the concessions
made or withheld, the interests of the British na-
tion must in it verge to a decline.
Enough has been said, to shew the pernicious
1784.]
43
MR. HASTINGS.
consequences of this system, which is publicly pro-
scribed, and privately supported; which no man
dares avow, yet many combine to maintain. To
discuss it more minutely would be invidious, and
perhaps entail upon me resentments, which, though
I do not fear, I would wish to avoid. I have made
a sufficient sacrifice to truth: my successors in
office may perhaps benefit by this confession. The
duties and functions of the supreme government in
India will never be well discharged, unless it meets
with the consideration due to it."
Mr. Hastings, justly considering that our political
strength depended chiefly upon the excellence of
our internal administration, laboured against many
local and practical difficulties, to give it some shape
and solidity. He effected as much, perhaps, as any
man could in his situation. A board of revenue
was established-collectors appointed - regula-
tions published-courts of civil and criminal indi-
cature were instituted, and their powers defined.
These measures were a great advance towards
the consolidation of our power. Lord Clive, at the
period of his rule, could go no farther than an en-
deavour to fix the principles of our interference
with dependant states, and to lay down general
rules for the management of our own territories,
correcting, as far as a very limited selection enabled
him, the evils of a loose and corrupt system by the
qualities of the individuals he employed. Mr.
Hastings took the next step towards the introduc-
tion of a better order of affairs, and all persons
44
[1772.
ADMINISTRATION OF
!
minutely versed in Indian history, and who under-
stand our condition and that of the natives of India
at the epochs these changes were made, must be
satisfied that those who effected them did as much
as was practicable, without incurring the most
serious hazard to the safety of the state by attempt-
ing too precipitate reforms.
Mr. Hastings, in a memoir which he published
after his return to England, has given us a forcible
and vivid description of the origin and growth of
our power in India. "The seed of this wonderful
production (he observes) was sown by the hand of
calamity. It was nourished by fortune, and culti-
vated and shaped (if I may venture to change the
figure) by necessity. Its first existence was com-
mercial; it obtained in its growth the sudden ac-
cession of military strength and territorial dominion
to which its political adjunct was inevitable. It is
useless to inquire whether the Company, or the
nation, has derived any substantial benefit from
the change, since it is impossible to retrace the
perilous and wonderful paths by which they
have attained their present elevation, and to
re-descend to the humble and undreaded character
of trading adventurers. Perhaps the term of the
national existence in India may have become sus-
ceptible of a shorter duration by it; but it is that
state which it must henceforth maintain, and it
must, therefore, adopt those principles which are
necessary to its preservation in that state."
No one will doubt the truth of this description
45
1784.]
MR. HASTINGS.
of the rise and actual condition of our Indian
empire. In a subsequent passage in the same
memoir, Mr. Hastings, drawing his deductions from
personal experience of the system by which it
was then governed, makes the following impressive
observations:-
"From the vehemence and perseverance with
which my immediate superiors laboured during the
course of ten years to weaken my authority, to
destroy my influence, and to embarrass all my mea-
sures, at a time when their affairs required the most
powerful exertions to sustain them, which I alone,
by my office, could direct; and from the great im-
portance which they have ascribed to points, some
of which had no relation to their interests, and
others were even repugnant to them; I much fear
that it is not understood as it ought to be, how
near the Company's existence has, on many occa-
sions, vibrated to the edge of perdition, and that it
has been, at all times, suspended by a thread so
fine, that the touch of chance might break, or the
breath of opinion dissolve it; and instantaneous
will be its fall, whenever it shall happen. May
God, in his mercy, long avert it!
cr
"I affirm, as a point incontestable, that the
administration of the British government in Ben-
gal, distant as it is from the reach of more than
general instruction from the source of its au-
thority, and liable to daily contingencies, which
require both instant decision, and a consistency of
46
[1772.
ADMINISTRATION OF
system, cannot be ruled by a body of men variable
in their succession, discordant in opinion, each
jealous of his colleagues, and all united in common
interest against their ostensible leader. Its powers
are such, that, if directed by a firm and steady hand,
they may be rendered equal to any given plan of
operation; but may prove the very instruments of its
destruction if they are left in the loose charge of
unconnected individuals, whose interests, passions,
or caprices may employ them in mutual contests,
and a scramble for superiority.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
"The inference to be drawn from these premises
is, that whatever form of government may yet be
established for these provinces, whether its control
be extended to other presidencies, or confined to
its own demesnes; it is necessary that the Gover-
nor, or first Executive Member, should possess a
power absolute and complete within himself, and
independent of actual control. Though the state
of kingdoms is liable to dissolution, from causes as
mortal as those which intercept the course of
human life, and though my opinion of the dis-
tempers which threaten that of the British empire
in Bengal may obtain credit from all who read it,
yet I fear that few will yield to its impression.
Like the stroke of death, which every man knows
will come, but no man acts as if he felt the con-
viction which he avows and thinks he feels, the
very magnitude of the catastrophe may, in this
\
1784.]
47
MR. HASTINGS.
case, blunt the sense of those to whom it is visibly
apparent.
We cannot be surprised that sentiments recom-
mended by information and experience, and so
enforced by truth and eloquence, should have
carried conviction even to the minds of those who
were hostile to the writer; nor is it to be con-
sidered as the least of the obligations which the
country owes this great man, that his advice point-
ed out the only scheme of rule by which we could
hope to preserve our power in the East. No one
ever better understood the materials of which that
vast fabric is constructed than Warren Hastings,
and no man ever appears to have looked with less
confidence to its durability; but his opinions upon
this subject were expressed at a moment when, from
the constitutional jealousy of the government of
England, he did not anticipate the delegation of
that absolute, but responsible authority to the
Governor-general which he deemed indispensable,
not only for the prosperity, but for the safety of
our Indian possessions.
It is not meant to enter upon the merits of the
political measures adopted by Mr. Hastings; these
were violently opposed by his colleagues. We
collect from a minute* of General Clavering, Mr.
Francis, and Colonel Monson, (which was written
a short period after their arrival in India,) the
grounds on which they acted.
* Dated November 30th, 1779.
48
[1772.
ADMINISTRATION OF
"The general principle," they observe, " on which
we have acted, and which we mean to make the
rule of our future policy and conduct, is no other
than that which your authority and that of the le-
gislature have equally prescribed to us-to main-
tain peace in India. The preservation of peace
necessarily includes the vigorous defence of your
own possessions, with such parts of the dominions
of your allies as are guaranteed by treaty. On
the other hand, it excludes every idea of conquest,
either for yourselves or others. Adhering to this
system, we never can engage your arms in any
offensive operations for the aggrandizement of our
Indian state, at the expense of another; much less
could we have suffered the little states, which at
the same time formed your barrier, and looked up
to you for protection, to be swallowed up by the
great ones."
Mr. Hastings was accused by his colleagues of
making unjust wars, and these accusations were sub-
sequently made articles of parliamentary impeach-
ment. This is not the place to enter into the dis-
cussion of that question, but while the soundness
and justice of the opinions (taking them in their
general sense) given in the minute that has been
quoted are admitted, none can deny the truth and
wisdom of the principle which Mr. Hastings states
as that which governed his conduct on such occa-
sions. It is one applicable to all great states, and
above all to India.
49.
1784.]
66
MR. HASTINGS.
Though I profess," he observes, "the doctrine
of peace, I by no means pretend to have followed
it with so implicit a devotion as to make sacrifices
to it. I have never yielded a substantial right
which I could assert, or submitted to a wrong
which I could repel, with a moral assurance of
success, proportioned to the magnitude of either;
and I can allude to instances in which I should
have deemed it. criminal not to have hazarded both
the public safety and my own, in a crisis of un-
common and adequate emergency, or in an occasion
of dangerous example.
"I have ever deemed it even more unsafe than
dishonourable to sue for peace, and more con-
sistent with the love of peace to be the aggressor
in certain cases, than to see preparations of in-
tended hostility, and wait for their maturity, and
for their open effect, to repel it.”
It appeared difficult to arrive at any correct con-
clusion from the general reasoning of Mr. Hastings,
or his opponents, with respect to those principles
which would best apply to our extended political
relations in India, or to define, by any prescriptive
line, the exact demarcation between acts of defen-
sive and offensive policy; but the general impres-
sion in England was so strong, at this period, re-
garding the ambition of our Indian rulers, and the
consequent necessity of restraining their power of
engaging in war within the narrowest limits, that
the House of Commons voted resolutions to that
VOL. II.
E
50
NEUTRAL POLICY
effect; and in the same act of the legislature
which appointed the Board of Control, and granted
the Governor-general power adequate to his sove-
reign functions, a clause was inserted, declaring,
"that to pursue schemes of conquest and extension
of dominion in India, are measures repugnant to
the wish, the honour, and the policy of Great
Britain." It was further made unlawful, as has
been already stated, for the supreme government
to engage in hostilities with any state that had not
commenced, or made preparations to commence,
war upon them, or upon an ally whom we were
bound by our engagements to protect, unless in
cases where the previous sanction of the govern-
ment in England had been obtained. The local
government was also prohibited by this act from
making any treaty guaranteeing the possessions of
any native prince, except in cases where each party
had engaged to aid the English in a war actually
commenced, or about to commence.
The spirit and object of this law was just and
wise; for the great danger we have had to en-
counter from the first was the too rapid extension
of our empire; but our success in retarding, if we
could not arrest the growth of our greatness, must
evidently depend on the means we employed for
this purpose, and the letter of the act in question
went to fetter our government in the exercise of
the most essential of these means. It forbade the
seasonable use of that power and influence which
CONSIDERED.
51
we possessed, to check combination or to counter-
act, while yet immature, the plans of ambition; and
prescribed to a state situated amongst despotic
princes, who recognised no objects but conquest
and power, a course of policy they could not ap-
preciate, nor even understand. These princes were,
consequently, liable from their ignorance and their
presumption to mistake our motives of action, to
deem moderation and forbearance fear and weak-
ness, and under that delusion to venture on a course
of action which precipitated their ruin, and ren-
dered our cautious and unwise policy productive of
those very ends which it had been framed to
avoid.
The preceding pages of this work have afforded
abundant proofs of this fact; and a concise review
of more recent events will bring it still more
strongly under observation.
Lord Cornwallis had in his character an union
of firmness and moderation, which gave the best
promise of preserving peace with the native states,
had that been possible. The aggression of Tippoo
Sultaun, however, forced him into a war. Success
led to his making a great accession to the Com-
pany's territories, and the alliance with the Nizam
of the Deckan, into which he was compelled to
enter in order to ensure the reduction of Tippoo,
became the fruitful source of political embarrass-
ment to his successor. It was before remarked,
that Lord Cornwallis, by a communication to
E 2
52.
MEASURES OF
Madhajee Sindia, kept "danger at a distance, by
an alacrity to meet it." But it may be safely
asserted that, had that nobleman felt himself at
liberty to adopt measures of preventive policy, he
might, with hardly a hazard of hostilities, have
arrested the growth of a state which, within ten
years of his leaving India, had accumulated means *
* Mr. James Anderson, the able resident at the court of
Madhajee Sindia, gives, in his communications with the acting
Governor-general, Sir John M'Pherson, and with Lord Corn-
wallis, the completest account of the progress and character of
the power of that ambitious chief. After expatiating (a) upon
the just grounds we had to expect that Sindia would better
have appreciated the motives of our conduct in not obstructing,
as we easily might have done, the progress of his ambition,
he adds, "I am sorry, however, to observe, that the behaviour
of Madhajee Sindia has been in many respects very unsuitable
to the delicacy of our conduct towards him: in some instances
he has presumed too much on the moderation of our conduct,
and in all his transactions with the other powers he has laboured
to interpret the delicacy of our behaviour towards him into a
complete submission to his power. In short, it has become
evident, that whatever reliance we may have formerly placed
in his disposition must now be totally transferred to the cir-
cumstances of his situation."
·
After describing Madhajee Sindia's actual condition; his pro-
gressive efforts to make himself master of all Hindustan,
under the name of the powerless emperor Shah Allum; the
difficulties he had still to encounter from the numerous chiefs
who were yet unsubdued; from the constitution and temper of a
great proportion of his army; and from the dissatisfaction ex-
cited amongst his new subjects by his "various acts of trea-
chery, cruelty, and rapacity," Mr. Anderson observes, "From
(a) Vide Mr. Anderson's Letter to Lord Cornwallis, 24th Nov. 1786.
LORD CORNWALLIS.
53
which rendered it one of the most formidable
enemies that the British government in the east
ever had to encounter.
Lord Cornwallis, in abstaining from those mea-
sures which would have prevented the family of
Sindia from obtaining a power which was likely to
be directed eventually against us, acted in con-
this detail your lordship will perceive that Sindia's situation is
yet in some degree precarious, and that at all events much
time must necessarily elapse before he can realize his prospects.
He has, undoubtedly, many advantages in his cunning and
intrigue, and his persevering management, which he often
uses successfully to supply the want of real power and other
defects in his situation; but, on the other hand, he is fre-
quently prompted by his avarice to act with little policy or
foresight. From this latter circumstance, I was for some time
inclined to think that his views in this quarter were rather
of a temporary than permanent nature. It is, indeed, most
likely that the expectation of treasure was at first his princi-
pal object in this undertaking, but that his views opened and
enlarged themselves with the favourable events which after-
wards fell out. It seems now almost as certain as any politi-
cal point can be, that his object is, by connecting his own
provinces of Malwa and Ajmere, with those of Agra and
Delhi, to erect an independent empire of his own, and to
shake off all subjection to the Paishwah." Mr. Anderson
then expresses his opinion, that, after the dangerous ambition
which Sindia has displayed, and the abuse he has made of the
delicacy with which we have acted towards him, it will be
"extremely necessary we should watch him narrowly;" and
he concludes by stating, that," on some occasions, perhaps it
may be necessary for us to check him in his progress, where
we may have favourable opportunities of doing it, without the
actual commission of hostilities against him."
54
LORD TEIGNMOUTH.
formity to the views and sentiments of his supe-
riors in England, and to the provisions of the act
of the legislature already cited; but this nobleman
took advantage of every occasion (as we have
already shewn) to satisfy the princes and chiefs
of India that such conduct proceeded from motives
of moderation, not of apprehension.
Lord Teignmouth acted throughout his adminis-
tration with still more scrupulous conformity to
the prevailing sentiments in England, and to the
letter of parliamentary restrictions. He did this
from a strict sense of duty, and with the full
knowledge of all the evils which were likely to
result from his non-interference; and his minutes.
and letters upon the political state of India at
this period exhibit (like all the other productions
of this virtuous nobleman) an intimate knowledge
both of the condition of the British government,
and that of the native states. The consequences
of the efforts he made to preserve a system of rigid
neutral policy have been fully described in the
former chapters. Tippoo Sultaun wanted no motives
to stimulate him to action, whenever he saw an
opportunity favourable to his cherished designs
against the British nation; but we may question
whether the encouragement he received from our
abandonment of the Nizam had not more weight
in influencing him to the hostile measures he
adopted than the advice of French emissaries, or
the expected aid from the government of the Mau-
ritius.
1
55
LORD WELLESLEY.
The reduction of Tippoo; the restoration of a
Hindu prince to the throne of his ancestors in
Mysore; the alliance with the Nizam, which stipu-
lated for the dismissal of a strong French corps in
his service, and of his aid in the war with the
Sultaun, altered all our relations in the south of
India. These were the first measures of Lord
Wellesley, to the adoption of which he was com-
pelled by a necessity that all admitted. The point
to which success had carried him was one where
he could not remain stationary. He must either
retreat or advance. The first of these courses
offered a temporary exemption from present evils,
at the price of future security. The second led
through difficulty and embarrassment to peace and
prosperity. To enable him to subdue Tippoo and
his French allies, Lord Wellesley had been obliged
to pledge himself to protect the Nizam against
the Mahrattas. This, like every step towards the
establishment of order and tranquillity, was an
attack upon a nation whose armies were not, and
could not, from their numbers and construction, be
supported, except by the annual attack of their
neighbours, and who for nearly a century had
deemed the territories of the Nizam as an inherit-
ance of plunder. Lord Wellesley, satisfied of this
fact, determined to direct all his efforts to the
abolition of a predatory system which, under recent
changes, it was quite evident could not be coexistent
with the British power in India. The view he took
56
POLICY OF
1
of this question has been fully given, as well as
those means through which he carried his great
plans to the very brink of completion; but his
career was arrested in the hour of victory over
the last of those Mahratta princes, who avowedly
fought for the continuance of rapine and desolation.
·
The alarm taken by the authorities in England
at this period was excessive. They arraigned the
principles of the policy that had been pursued sub-
sequent to the conquest of Tippoo Sultaun, the war
with whom they acknowledged to be just and una-
voidable. But in admitting so much, they admit-
ted everything; for if the British faith was to be
preserved, we had very little option as to the mea-
sures consequent to our alliance with the Nizam.
The increase of our subsidiary force with that
prince was the first step: the establishment of a
similar force at Poonah, the second; the great ob-
ject of Lord Wellesley's policy was, to extend such
alliances, and through them, as they afforded an in-
crease of force without increase of expenditure, and
gave us the most commanding military positions,
to secure the general peace of India; which, as was
proved by the fullest experience, could not be even
partially disturbed without involving us in war, or
placing us in a condition which, from its effect on
our reputation and resources, was more embarrass-
ing and dangerous than war itself.
Though there can be no doubt that subsidiary
alliances gave us the means of success in the ac-
INDIAN ALLIANCES.
57
complishment of objects of policy, which we were
compelled by pledges of faith and considerations of
safety to pursue, it is equally a fact, that they in-
volved us in great embarrassments, and that they
had the effect of weakening the protected state,
whose princes either lost their crowns in an effort
to regain their independence, or sunk into a sloth
and luxury which deteriorated every branch of their
government. But this was the consequence of the
establishment and progress of our power in India,
not of those alliances which formed the most mo-
derate of all means by which we could regulate
that march to conquest, on which we were pro-
pelled (as has been before shewn) by causes and
events far beyond our power to control.
Alliances of the same character as those formed
by Lord Wellesley had been entered into by almost
all his predecessors, and, from Lord Clive down-
wards, the chief motive had been to preserve as
long as possible the existence of the native states
with whom they were contracted. The frequency
of the expedient is a proof of its wisdom and neces-
sity. There has seldom been an alternative be-
tween its adoption and measures which must have
terminated in the introduction of our direct rule,
and with it all those sudden changes in society
which, independent of the misery they bring, have
been, from the first hour of our existence in India,
to the present moment, pregnant with the greatest
danger.
58
ADMINISTRATION OF
1
In consequence of the ascendency in England of
those who condemned Lord Wellesley's measures,
the high name of Lord Cornwallis was sought and
obtained to give character to an effort to revive a
system of neutral policy. That venerable nobleman,
worn out more by infirmities than age, dying soon
after his arrival, was succeeded by Sir George
Barlow; who, acting upon the principles which the
authorities in England had prescribed, withdrew
from every interference to which we were not spe-
cifically pledged by treaty. In one case, however,
which has been noticed*, he found himself com-
pelled to a departure from this course; and the ar-
guments by which he justified his conduct on this
occasion are a convincing comment of the imprac-
ticability of that system to promote which a sense
of duty made him give the full aid of his great
knowledge and experience.
The administration of Lord Minto presents us
with a cautious, but gradual, return to the only
principles by which our empire could be maintained.
The tone in which he asserted the rights of the Bri-
tish government, whenever these were threatened,
corrected, as far as was possible, the impressions
daily made by the growing insolence and excesses
of those freebooters to whom we had abandoned
all the central provinces of India as an arena, in
which it was vainly imagined they would continue
to war upon each other.
* Vol. I., page 374.
59
LORD MINTO.
Lord Minto, foreseeing the results to which this
state of affairs must lead, sought, like his prede-
cessors, to strengthen the government he ruled, by
returning to the system of subsidiary alliances, and
it was a matter of regret to him, as well as to the
government in England, that he failed in his efforts
to conclude one with the Rajah of Nagpore. This
moderate and able nobleman, after describing with
much truth and discrimination the nature and effect
of such engagements, and pointing out, in the most
forcible language, all their admitted evils (particu-
larly as illustrated in the case of Hyderabad), con-
cludes by observing * ; "It is not the intention of
these remarks to question the policy of those sub-
sidiary alliances, or their great and beneficial in-
fluence on the condition of the British empire in
India, in time past, present, and to come. They
have added, most materially, to our power and re-
sources, and they have placed for ever at a distance
dangers far greater than any to be apprehended
from the evils above described. But these alliances,
like all other human arrangements, bear within
them the sources of their own decay, and require the
application of corrective measures to obviate their
natural and progressive tendency to dissolution."
Lord Hastings, in every political measure of his
government, evinced his sense of the necessity of
an early return to those principles which had dis-
* Letter from Lord Minto to the resident at Poonah, dated
11th November, 1811.
60
ADMINISTRATION OF
tinguished the administration of Lord Wellesley,
and of resting, as that nobleman had desired to do,
the fame and prosperity of the British empire, upon
the safe and honourable foundation of the general
tranquillity of India, established and maintained by
its commanding influence and power.
These sentiments were, as has been stated, fully
expressed in a most able minute *, in which this
distinguished nobleman, after painting in warm
colours the excessive misery and desolation which
had been the consequence of the neutral system
pursued by us for ten years past, takes a view of
the different results which might be fairly antici-
pated from a contrary policy.
His powerful arguments, enforced as they were
by illustrations drawn from the history of other
countries, as well as of India, might still have failed
of effect, had they not been seconded by the oc-
currence of events which made it impossible for
any person to advocate a system, the further ad-
herence to which twelve years had proved to be
impracticable.
The complete success of the war against the
Pindaries and Mahrattas led Lord Hastings to pro-
claim the paramount power of the British govern-
ment, and constitute it the arbiter of all disputes,
and the conservator of the general peace of India.
Such was the change of opinion in England, that
not a voice was raised against a measure, the
*December, 1815,
very
LORD HASTINGS.
61
contemplation of which, a few years before, had
been denounced as a dream of ambition. Events
and fuller information have convinced the enlight-
ened part of the public, that the opinions long
prevalent in England, regarding the local adminis-
tration in India, were founded in error. That the
system prescribed by the legislature, however de-
sirable, was altogether impracticable; for though
parliament might dictate the course to be pursued
by British rulers, its influence did not extend to the
native states, with whom they were in constant
collision, and whose despotic princes were urged
by jealousy, by avarice, by ambition, by pride, and
by love of independence, to continual efforts, secret
or avowed, to destroy the English government, and
to expel every individual of that nation from India.
If this be the fact, who can doubt but that we
have been impelled to the attainment of supreme
power as the only means of maintaining our ex-
istence, in any shape, in that country.
The most eminent statesmen who have learnt
their lessons in England, and those who have
gained their experience in India, have uniformly
concurred in the opinion, that extension of terri-
tory was not only undesirable, but hurtful. Those
to whom the local government of our Eastern
empire was intrusted, have had every motive to
preserve peace, and to avoid war. Nevertheless,
they have almost all engaged in war, and those
who have avoided doing so, have confessedly left
62
OPINIONS ON
it as an inheritance to their successors; and let us
add to this strong fact, that the different presidents
of the board of control, the very institution of
which was associated with the object of preventing
the pursuit of schemes of aggrandizement, and the
extension of dominion, have almost in every in-
stance concurred* in the wisdom and necessity of
those measures of the local administration which
have been attended with such results. This forces
us to a conclusion, that all the English statesmen
which this observation includes have either been, in
their turns, tainted with that culpable ambition of
which the Indian Governors are accused, or that
their fuller information obliged them to give the
sanction of their approbation to such wars, from
being satisfied that they were just and expedient.
There may
be some cases where it is possible to
* There is one remarkable exception in the case of the late
Lord Londonderry, who differed from Lord Wellesley as to
the principles upon which the treaty of Bassein was concluded.
The arguments on both sides are fully given in the body of
this work but the whole lies in a narrow question. Was it
possible, after the conquest of Mysore, and the treaty of
Hyderabad, for the British government, governed according
to its established principles and usages, to remain without
collision with the Mahrattas, whose system was predatory?
If it was not, the only difference of opinion that could arise
was, as to the measures which could render the existence of
these two great powers compatible with each other. The only
mode of effecting this, with any hope of avoiding war, was
through alliances (of which Bassein was the first) that divided
the interests of the great chiefs of this nation of plunderers.
63
1
WARS IN INDIA.
prove that the temperament, or the judgment of
individuals, has precipitated a contest; but on the
other hand, it is clear that the most moderate have
been compelled to the same course, and that the
orders of superiors, and the enactments of law,
have not only failed in the end proposed, that of
arresting the growth of our power, but have ac-
tually caused it to be more rapid than it otherwise
would have been.
These are the deductions which must be drawn
from the events that have occurred; but the law
which forbade conquest and interference is now a
dead letter. We are the acknowledged lords of
India; and there exists not a sovereign prince, or a
chief, in that vast country, with whom we have
not ties that imply friendship and protection on
our part, and dependance or allegiance on the
other. Such being the case, it becomes important
to consider our actual condition, and those changes
which an altered state of affairs may call for in
the shape and principles of our government, both
at home and abroad.
These important subjects will occupy the next
chapters.
:
64
CHAPTER IX.
Observations and Reflections on the general Administration
of the Indian Government in England.
THE retrospect of the origin and progress of
our political power, in the preceding chapter, has
been offered with no view of reviving useless dis-
cussions regarding the comparative merit of in-
dividuals, or of any measures which they advo-
cated or adopted. Whatever men's sentiments
may be upon these subjects, every one will agree
that the question respecting our power in India
has altogether changed its shape. We are ar-
rived at the summit long 'dreaded by many; and
a knowledge of the paths by which we advanced,
where our march was impeded, and where pro-
pelled with a velocity that we could not regulate,
much less arrest, appears essential to enable us
to understand the nature and character of the
materials from which the fabric of our future
power must be constructed; and we may rest
satisfied that, unless the structure is suited to
its component parts, it will not endure. We
have conquered all our enemies on the con-
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
65
tinent of India, but that very consummation of our
efforts exposes us to greater danger. In the faci-
lities of improvement which our condition presents,
we may find, if we do not use them aright, the
seeds of early destruction.
Those who reflect upon the actual condition of
our power in India will be satisfied, that the task
of conquest was slight in comparison with that
which awaits us, the preservation of the empire
acquired. To the acquisition, men have been encou-
raged and impelled by the strongest of all the im-
pulses of the human mind: fortune and fame have
attended success; the preservation must be effected
by that deep and penetrating wisdom, which, look-
ing far to its objects, will oftener meet reproach
than praise, and the very excellence of which will
consist in the gradual and almost unseen operation
of its measures. It must not only take into con-
sideration the actual state of the English public
servants, and residents in India, and that of the
native population, but, judging from experience
of the past, the general laws of our nature, the
habits, prejudices and institutions of the rulers, as
well as the ruled, it must calculate the various
changes to which these communities are likely to
be exposed, in order that care may be taken to
avert those evils and misfortunes which the too
sudden occurrence of such changes would inevitably
occasion.
Sufficient has been said in the introduction to
VOL. II.
F
66
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
this work regarding the changes that the Indian
administration in England had undergone previous
to the year 1811. The act of parliament passed
in 1813, renewing the Company's privileges for
twenty years, did not directly make any material
alteration in the power of that branch of the Indian
government; but the measure of opening the trade
with India, by creating a large commercial body
with separate interests from those of the Com-
pany, greatly weakened the latter, while it pro-
portionally increased the strength of the ministers.
From the earliest period, the court of directors
had sought influence in the House of Commons,
and on many occasions they had successfully com-
bated the ministers of the king; but the present
act imbodied a powerful party upon whose aid the
latter could depend on all questions that went to
a limitation of the Company's privileges and au-
thority.
The right of nominating to the high offices of
Governor-general, Governors, and Commanders-in-
chief, at the different presidencies, was, by this
act, as by former acts, vested in the court of di-
rectors, subject, however, to the approbation of
the king. If that was withheld, a second person
was to be nominated, and so on till the two au-
thorities concurred: but to obviate the evil of
continued difference of opinion as to a proper per-
son, a clause in the act provided that, on such ap-
pointment not being made by the court of directors
IN ENGLAND.
67
within two months from the date of the vacancy
being known, the right of nominating lapsed to the
king. This act supposes, and almost compels,
agreement between the court of directors and his
majesty's ministers on this most essential of all
points, as connected with the welfare and perma-
nency of our Eastern empire; and though its
provisions may appear calculated to produce em-
barrassment and weakness, by dividing responsi-
bility, they are framed in the true spirit of the
British constitution. They impose a check, and
no slight one, upon the abuse of patronage; and
oblige the parties, when they differ, to come, to a
certain degree, to the bar of public opinion. This
must always do good, for we cannot anticipate
the period when men exercising power in Eng-
land can be indifferent to the sentiments of the
public upon points which their acts force into
discussion.
The court of directors, who, by this act, had the
power* of recalling the Governor-general, Gover-
nor, or Commander-in-chief, as being their officers
* When we consider the nature of this right of recall, and
the constitution of the court of directors, we are not surprised
that it has never been exercised; but though they have, even
when dissatisfied with the high functionaries in India, shrunk
from the responsibility of recalling them in opposition to
ministers, their possessing the power to do so must have in-
fluence on the conduct of ministers.
+ The Company cease to have the right of recalling in cases
where the vacancies to the offices of Governor, Governor-
F 2
68
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
-
or servants, without the concurrence of his ma-
jesty's ministers, were by one of its clauses re-
strained, except with the consent of the commis-
sioners of the India board, from appointing pro-
visionally, or otherwise, to any offices in India,
except members of council, generals on the staff,
and a few other selections specifically left to their
selection and nomination. The same concurrence
and confirmation were rendered necessary to the
exercise of the power, which they before enjoyed,
of restoring civil and military officers who had
been suspended or removed by act of a local
government.
*
Such limitation of the power of the directors
was at once wise and salutary. Nothing could
tend more to lessen the weight and authority
of the local governments, and to discourage the
efforts of those who laboured for their approbation,
than appointments made from England, and the
frequent restoration of persons who had been sus-
pended the service, or removed from office in India.
general, or Commander-in-chief, in India, has been filled by the
ministry, in consequence of the court of directors not nomi-
nating within the prescribed period. Vide 33 Geo. III., cap.
3, sec. 36.
* This Act did not include military officers dismissed by a
court-martial; such cases were provided for by the 51 Geo.
III., cap. 75, sec. 4 and 5. The latter act was passed in con-
sequence of doubts whether the Act of 1793, 33 Geo. III.,
'cap. 52, sec. 69, did not absolutely interdict the restoration of
an officer dismissed by a court-martial.
IN ENGLAND.
69
The present state of the law renders it difficult
for either the court of directors, or the board of
control, to interfere with the local governments
abroad, on any points connected with the conduct
This re-
or employment of public servants.
striction of the authorities in England is equally
beneficial as it checks the operation of private
patronage, and limits undue personal influence,
and as it directs the exclusive attention of public
servants abroad to their local superiors.
The court of directors long owed their chief
consideration to their having the management of
the great commercial concerns of the East India
Company: but these, of late years, have been quite
secondary to their other duties; and it is upon their
competency to the latter, and their importance as
a constituent part of the Indian government, that
it is intended to offer some observations.
The merits of every species of government are
comparative, and it can be no ground for rejecting
any form or substance of rule, that it is incom-
patible with received ideas; that it is contrary to
general opinion, or even inconsistent with com-
mon maxims of rule: all these are good grounds
for not establishing a particular government, but
they are not conclusive for destroying one that is
established. If we had to constitute an adminis-
tration for British India, as it now exists, the man
would justly be deemed insane who should pro-
pose the present system. But the case is widely
TO
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
altered when we recollect, that it has grown with
our empire; that the managing partners of a body
of merchants have gradually risen from the details
of a factory to the charge of kingdoms: that
their departments, in every branch of government,
have kept pace with their enlarged functions; and
that the result of the whole has been success and
prosperity. Those, indeed, who are hostile to the
Company, ascribe this result to the interference
of the legislature, and the institution of a board of
control. Much, no doubt, of the great reform
that has been effected is to be attributed to those
causes; but because the board of control has
proved a good instrument for the purposes for
which it was instituted, we must not conclude that
it is a safe depositary for greater power. In the
exercise of all with which it has hitherto been in-
trusted, it has acted under a restraint as great as it
has imposed. The court of directors, rendered
jealous and vigilant by their reduced condition,
have scrutinized every proceeding of the board, in
a manner that has rendered them a very efficacious
check against the abuse of its influence or authority.
When the pretensions of the East India Com-
pany to have continued to them the share they now
enjoy in the civil, military, and political govern-
ment of India were discussed, previous to the
last renewal of their privileges*, several members
* The charter of the Company is perpetual. The Act of
1813 renewed, to a further term, certain territorial and com-
IN ENGLAND.
71
1
of both houses of parliament were against that
renewal; but the reasons they adduced for the
abolition of the powers of this body were very dif-
ferent from the arguments brought forward thirty
years before. They could no longer charge the
Company, or their servants, with acts of tyranny
or corruption; there was a happy and acknow-
ledged change in the whole system: but the incom-
petency of the court of directors to their enlarged
duties; the anomaly of the whole frame of the
government, and the magnitude of the evils likely
to arise from continuing to rule so great an
empire through such an inadequate body, were
strongly urged. The opponents of the Company
admitted that there was a difficulty in disposing
of the patronage enjoyed by the directors, which
(they were agreed) it would be unwise to give
to the crown; but various expedients were sug-
gested, which, it was believed, would obviate any
injury to the public interests from this cause.
was not difficult to reply to such general reason-
ing. The first admission made, namely, that a
great change had taken place in the Company's
government, proved that the defects of the sys-
tem were not irremediable; and it is a maxim con-
genial to English legislation, not to destroy what
It
mercial privileges of the chartered Company, but the charter
does not expire with that term. This is a distinction not un-
important, in reference to any arrangement that may be con-
templated for altering the system.
72
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
is capable of improvement. With regard to the
anomalous nature of this branch of our Indian
government, it shared that character with all other
parts of our free constitution; and as to its inade-
quacy to its enlarged duties, all that had occurred
within the last twenty years was assuredly encou-
ragement to proceed with ameliorations and re-
forms, instead of rushing upon the work of de-
molition, uncertain whether any authority could be
substituted equally efficient.
Serious changes have taken place in the con-
stitution of the Company, subsequent to the act
of 1784; but none require more of our attention
than those which have affected the court of pro-
prietors. As long as the court of directors acted
independently of the control of ministers, the pro-
prietors interfered on almost all occasions, and fre-
quently influenced nominations to high stations in
India, as well as important political measures. But
when the government became a party in the admi-
nistration of Indian affairs, it was deemed necessary
to prevent their arrangements being embarrassed
by the general court, which was done by clauses in
the enactments* of the legislature very seriously
curtailing its power. Other circumstances have
contributed, in no slight degree, to alter the views
and principles of a great proportion of the pro-
prietors, amongst which we may consider the
*The first of these passed in 1784, 24 Geo. III., cap. 25,
sec. 29. The second in 1793, 33 Geo. III., cap. 25, sec. 23.
>
IN ENGLAND.
73
minent.
opening of the trade with India as the most pro-
The directors used to recommend to the
proprietors a candidate on any vacancy that oc-
curred in the direction; this recommendation, sup-
ported as it was by their individual and collective
efforts, usually succeeded; and the new director
came in with a strong feeling of gratitude towards
the body of which he was a member, and with a
disposition to maintain that principle of unity by
which he had profited. For several years past
the case has been very different; and candidates
who are supported by some members of the direc-
tion, are frequently opposed by others. They
consequently enter upon their duties with party
feelings, which must have a tendency to break that
union which was once the strength of this body.
These changes in England have extended their
effect to India. The nature of those ties which for-
merly subsisted between the Company and their
servants abroad, is greatly altered; and the latter no
longer look exclusively to the court of directors.
A concurrence of events has tended, within the
last thirty years, to bring the civil and military
officers of the Indian service into general and pro-
minent notice in England; and the consequence has
been a very favourable impression of their character
and advancement of their reputation. The army of
India owes great obligations to the late Lord Buck-
inghamshire, for the manner in which he brought
their claims to the notice of their sovereign, on the
74
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
extension of the order of the Bath. To Mr. Canning,
when president of the board of control, the public
are chiefly indebted for the appointment of the two
distinguished men* who have, for several years
past, filled the stations of governors at Madras and
Bombay. Some solicitude was felt, and expressed,
lest these appointments should effect the practice
of the court of directors to look rather to eminent
men in England to fill such stations, than to the
Company's servants; but the result of these selec-
tions must have satisfied all, that when the Indian
service produces men like the individuals men-
tioned, the practice which excludes them from a
fair and equal competition for any honours or em-
ployments that it is in the power of their king and
country to bestow must be as contrary to sound
policy as to justice.
One of the common-place objections made in
England to India candidates for high office abroad
is, the too near connexions which they are supposed
to have with the public servants of that country.
* Sir Thomas Munro and the Honourable Mountstuart El-
phinstone.
† Vide Mr. Canning's letter to the chairman of the court of
directors, under date the 21st of September, 1818.
This history closes with the administration of Lord Hastings,
or it would have been the duty of the author to have noticed
the measures of the late Mr. John Adam, who, while acting
Governor-general, previous to the arrival of Lord Amherst,
evinced a mind every way suited to the discharge of the duties.
of that high station.
IN ENGLAND.
75
There might be some ground for this objection, if
it was probable that men of ordinary pretensions.
would be raised to such stations; but as we can
never expect, considering the disadvantages under
which they labour, that any persons are likely to
be brought forward by the authorities at home
till they have outstripped others in the race abroad,
it may be asked, what friendships or connexions
are such men likely to have in India? Certainly
none but with the ablest and best of their fellow-
servants. They must, no doubt, be personally ac-
quainted with the abilities and deficiencies of those
placed under their orders, and this cannot but give
them incalculable advantages in the performance of
their public duties. Standing distinguished amongst
their compeers, they must be anxious to justify, by
their conduct, the honour which their selection has
conferred on the service to which they belong.
Thus every motive arising out of the India con-
nexions and acquaintances of men of superior cha-
racter will tend to public benefit. Let their con-
dition be contrasted with that of a person who has
no previous knowledge of the scene on which he
is to act, and no personal acquaintance or connexion
whatever with any of those placed under his au-
thority. Such a man, if he has attained any emi-
nence, is likely to belong to a political party, and
to have parliamentary interests; from such ties, in-
dependent of family claims, and of those of per-
sonal friendship, he must be exposed to solicita-
tions in favour of many persons in India. If it is
II.
*
76
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
admitted that examples have been found of men
who had public virtue sufficient to resist the in-
fluence of all such ties and claims, still, even
this rare individual, as a stranger to India, must,
for a period, be dependent upon others for all
information regarding the character and qualifi-
cations of the men to whom his choice is limited,
and upon the judicious selection of whom for the
various duties they have to perform the success of
his administration will chiefly depend.
The power exercised by British rulers in India
has none of that prejudice in its favour which often
supports hereditary monarchies and national go-
vernments, even at a period of decline. It can
obtain respect only by the intrinsic qualities of
the person by whom it is exercised: great talents
and active virtue will always obtain the suffrage of
both the European and native subjects of our Indian
empire, and in all human probability preserve it in
peace, or, at all events, overcome danger; but mo-
derate abilities, even though combined with inform-
ation, will be found unequal to the great task in
any times; and if the government of India ever
passes into weak or inadequate hands, the high
station will fall into disrepute, and all the dangers
that flow from the contempt of a governing autho-
rity will be generated. The only safe view that
Great Britain can take of her empire in India is,
to consider it (as it really is) always in a state of
danger, and to nominate persons to rule it compe-
tent from their knowledge of its interests, and from
77
IN ENGLAND.
superior energy of character, to meet every emer-
gency that can arise; for it appears quite impossible
ever to introduce any system of government into
our possessions in that country which will render
them secure, except under the management of able
and firm rulers. If a succession of men of great
talents and virtues cannot be found, or if the opera-
tion of any influence or party feelings and principles
prevents their being chosen, we must reconcile
ourselves to the serious hazard of the early decline,
if not the loss, of the great power we have founded
in the east.
There has been much speculative opinion on the
subject of such selections: some have conceived
that military men were best qualified for these
stations; others, that they should be exclusively
filled by those who had risen in civil life. It has
been argued, that noblemen, carrying with them the
impression of high rank and birth, should be alone
appointed; while many believe that they would be
best filled by servants of the Company possessing
local knowledge, and a large and detailed ac-
quaintance with the affairs and the people of India.
Any principle which excludes knowledge, talent,
and virtue, in whatever rank or condition of life
these qualities are found, from such fair and legiti-
mate objects of honourable ambition, must destroy
the competition necessary to form men for the
government of British India: whether these be
filled by persons who have risen in civil or military
78.
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
life, provided such be qualified for the duties they
have to perform, appears to be a matter of indiffer-
ence; when talent for civil rule and military com-
mand are found combined, there is an advantage per-
haps in vesting both powers in the same individual.
That the high rank of the person employed, as it
adds to that impression which such stations require,
is of some consequence, cannot be denied; but that
consequence can never be sufficient to supersede
the claims of superior merit, or to remedy the
defects of inefficiency. With regard to the servants
of the Company, their local experience, unless
attended with other qualifications, is but a poor
recommendation to stations which do not so much
require an acquaintance with details as that en-
larged knowledge of human nature, that active
energy of character, and that commanding talent
for rule, which has, in all ages, distinguished those
who have exercised power to the benefit of their
country and mankind.
Whatever person is nominated, either to the high
station of Governor-general, or to the governments
of Madras or Bombay, should receive a full and
liberal confidence from the authority by which he is
appointed; nor should he be continued in his station
one moment after that is withdrawn. The dangers
which assail our empire in India from internal
weakness are much greater than we can ever ap-
prehend from external power; and these dangers
will always increase, in an alarming degree, when
}
79
IN ENGLAND.
the administration abroad has not the decided
support of the government in England.
There is an acknowledged necessity for those
persons who fill the highest offices in India being
vested with a power which is offensive to the
feelings of an Englishman, and hardly in unison
with any part of the character of our free consti-
tution. But we cannot assimilate the rules and
principles of British government with those which
are essential to the maintenance of our sovereignty,
as foreign conquerors, over the vast population of
the continent of India. We may and do cast a
heavy responsibility * on those to whom almost
absolute power is intrusted; but the checks which
are placed on those in authority in England are
incompatible with the condition of a ruler in India.
Under such circumstances, we can contemplate no
improvement of more consequence than one calcu-
lated to form men capable of fulfilling duties of a
nature so peculiarly delicate and important, both as
they respect the peace and happiness of our Indian
subjects, and the rights and privileges of the Euro-
pean community in our eastern dominions; but
before any plan is suggested for the promotion of
this purpose, it will be useful to see how far the
object is impeded or advanced by the existing system.
His majesty's ministers have hitherto been, and
* One of the most effectual of the checks under which a
governor in India acts is that publicity consequent on the
positive necessity of making every act, however unimportant,
a written record to be transmitted to England.
80
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
will continue to be, actuated, in all matters that
relate to high appointments in India, by motives
which must mix in their minds the objects of pa-
tronage and party interest with those of duty to
the country; and it is from this cause that they
will, in general, be found the advocates of a system
which, under various pleas, excludes (as much as
possible) the pretensions of Indian service. To
admit these to a fair and liberal competition would,
in many cases, be fatal to their views of promoting
friends, of rewarding services performed in other
quarters of the globe, and of making arrangements
essential to the continuance of their own power.
These are considerations too intimately connected
with the frame of the English government, and
with the interests of the individuals by whom that
is administered, ever to cease to operate; but that
does not render their operation less baneful to the
Indian empire. Their action is least pernicious
when that empire appears in danger; but better
knowledge would teach that it is, as already re-
marked, every moment in danger, and never more
requires superior ability and energy to govern it,
than when, apparently, in perfect peace; for that is
the moment to take preventive measures to avert
those troubles to which the very nature and mag-
nitude of our possessions in the east renders them
so liable, and of which nothing but the continued
watchfulness and wisdom of those who rule them
can prevent the recurrence.
་
Among the many grounds taken to palliate, if
IN ENGLAND.
81
not excuse the appointment of persons to high
stations in India, who are acknowledged to have
little or no acquaintance with the interests of that
empire, one of the most prominent is, the assumed
information and competence of those servants of
the Company who are in council, or who fill the
subordinate and executive offices of the state: but
those who assume this ground of confidence forget,
that selecting and employing others is one of the
first qualities of a superior mind; while incompe-
tence too often takes alarm at talent, and is much
more likely to rouse its resentment by neglect or
jealousy, than to gain its support in aid of its own
inefficiency.
It has been urged that, if his majesty's ministers
had the sole responsibility of appointments in India,
their fear of public opinion, and of attack in
the House of Commons, would make them more
guarded than when they have only, as at present, a
concurrent or dissentient voice in the nomination
of the court of directors. This might be true, if
the affairs of the Indian government were as well
understood, or excited the same interest as the
affairs of Europe; but as this is likely never to
happen, and as ministers must be expected to con-
tinue treating all that relates to the former as
secondary, there would appear a necessity for a
more constant, as well as a more efficient, check,
and that can alone be found in an improved system,
which would bring forward talent; and, through
VOL. II.
G
82
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
respect for knowledge and weight of character,
limit the improper action of prejudice, influence, or
patronage, on points where the very existence of
our Indian empire is at stake.
These observations refer, exclusively, to general
principles; they have no allusion to any particular
instances in the conduct of the court of directors,
or of any set of ministers. Their choice of persons
to fill the office of Governor-general, as these vo-
lumes have exhibited, has often fallen on men of
great talent, who, aided by the able and well-quali-
fied public officers they found in India, have ad-
vanced our power to that high but dangerous
pinnacle which renders it more essential than ever
to use the greatest caution and judgment in select-
ing those who are to govern it. The field of se-
lection is very limited. The qualities requisite in
the mere English statesman will seldom be found
combined in any one individual; and, under present
circumstances, the fitness of those whose chief
claims rest upon Indian service will every day
become more doubtful. The wars and negotiations
of the last thirty years called into prominent action
all the talent which belonged to that class, and the
notice and applause bestowed upon individuals ex-
cited a high and honourable spirit of ambition; but
this, if not cherished, must subside and perish. In
ordinary times*, men soon fall into a lifeless routine
* The changes that have occurred in the political condition
of India, within the last twenty-five years, have lessened, in a
IN ENGLAND.
83
**
of action, and those who return to England, dis-
couraged by the construction of the Indian govern-
ment at home from all hope of pursuing that
course of life in which they would be most useful,
will either devote themselves to pleasure, lapse into
indolence, or give the whole weight of their opinions
and reputation against a system, which, by almost
destroying their hope of advancement, has generally
the effect of arresting their public career exactly
at the time when its continuance would be most
beneficial to their country.
If this is admitted to be a true picture, the
necessity of changes, opening wider the path of
ambition to the servants of the Company, both
in India and England, cannot be denied. Few
would succeed, but all, by the objects being within
their view, would be stimulated to efforts that
could not fail of being essentially beneficial to the
best interests of our Indian empire. Before, how-
great degree, those opportunities which persons in the ser-
vice had of distinguishing themselves.
Those now employed in the highest stations are seldom
called upon to exercise their discretion regarding measures of
importance. Their duties have almost become those of routine,
and the tendency of the actual system is, to place them as much
under minute check and control as a collector of the revenue
of a small district.
The effect of this system will be remarked upon elsewhere:
it is noticed here, merely to establish the fact, that the civil
and military officers of India have not the same means they
before enjoyed of bringing themselves forward to public notice.
G 2
84
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
ever, such changes as have been alluded to can be
effected, many deep-rooted prejudices must be over-
come. The interests of individuals and of classes
of men must yield to those of the public, and
some parts of our Indian administration, by many
deemed fundamental, must be modified or altered:
but the necessity is paramount; and it may be
asserted that, unless changes are made for en-
couraging and elevating, instead of excluding and
depressing those who acquire experience, know-
ledge, and reputation in India, our administra-
tion of that empire will never preserve the health
and vigour necessary for its permanent prosperity.
According to the established form of the Indian
government in England, the board of control con-
sists of a president, two active members *, a secre-
tary, who is in parliament, and clerks in every de-
partment. We may assume that the four first
stations of this board, to all of which liberal salaries
are attached, are appointments which, generally
speaking, will be given with more attention to the
claims of those who form or support the adminis-
tration, than with any reference to their peculiar qua-
lifications for the situation. The office of president,
though often filled by men of eminence, has not
been considered as among the first in his majesty's
There are several others, inclusive of the principal minis-
ters; but all, except the president and two members, may be
deemed honorary, as they neither receive salary nor perform
any duty.
IN ENGLAND.
85
cabinet. This is unfortunate, for it leads to fre-
quent changes; and few persons have held the
office long enough to attain the knowledge neces-
sary for the fulfillment of its important functions *.
It happened lately at a critical period, (and the oc-
currence was favourable to the public interests) that
a distinguished nobleman, who had filled high
station in India, presided at this board, and that
he was ably aided by a near relative, who had
passed the early part of his life in the Company's
service; but these nominations were to be referred
to other causes than the competence of the indi-
viduals in point of personal knowledge and experi-
Generally speaking, the president of this
board, on entering upon his duty, is compelled to
ence.
* From the passing of the Act 24 Geo. III., 1784, the
following secretaries of state for the Home Department, were
presidents of the India board, ex-officio, and without salary:
Lord Viscount Sydney; Lord (then Mr.) Grenville; Lord
Melville (then Mr. Dundas.)
The system was changed in 1793, when the presidentship
was made a separate appointment, with a salary; since which
it has been filled by Henry Viscount Melville (then Mr. Dun-
das); 1801, Lord Viscount Lewisham (afterwards Earl of
Dartmouth); 1802, Viscount Castlereagh; 1806, Earl Minto;
Mr. Thomas Grenville; Mr. Tierney; 1807, Mr. Robert Dun-
das; 1809, Earl of Harrowby (about three months); Mr.
Robert Dundas (now Viscount Melville); 1812, Earl of Buck-
inghamshire; 1816, Mr. Canning; 1820, Mr. Bathurst (about
a year); 1822, Mr. Williams Wynne.
+ The late Lord Buckinghamshire.
The Right Honourable John Sullivan.
86
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
look to others. The members are usually in the
same situation as the president; they, like him, have
their lesson to learn, and sometimes commence in
complete ignorance of Indian affairs.
The parliamentary secretary* of the board, being
nominated on the same principle as the president
and members, is not likely to be better informed.
It is the clerks at the heads of departments on
whom the board must depend. These are fixed;
their sole attention is given to the duties of their
respective offices, and the affairs under their super-
intendence are understood as well as it is possible
to be by men who have only records to guide
them: but supposing their industry and ability in
their stations to be equal to that of any public
functionaries in England, (and this is supposing no
more than the truth,) still that system must be bad
where the recognised depositaries of information are
subordinate and irresponsible. This, it will be as-
serted, is to a great extent the case in other offices of
the state. But a knowledge of the duties of other
offices is familiar, easily attained, and may be said
* No deduction is to be drawn from the circumstance of
the highly-respectable person now in that office having held it
during a period of thirteen years. His remaining so long in
the situation, where the experience he has gained is so useful,
is solely referrible to the long continuation in office of the
present ministers, and his not being nominated to another
situation. In other words, the knowledge and experience
which this public officer has gained is to be ascribed more to
accident than to system.
IN ENGLAND.
87
to belong to the education of every English states-
man, which is not the case with Indian affairs ;
they are foreign to the common studies of such
persons, and, from their remote interest, can never
be otherwise. It is consequently most desirable
that there should be such a change in the composi-
tion of this board as would ensure to the state
a greater portion of experience, and more accurate
knowledge of Indian affairs. That can be done
only by an arrangement which shall direct the
hopes of those who have served with ability and
distinction in India to the attainment of a share in
this branch of the administration,
It will be urged, that the board of control is as
open to those who have acquired experience and
knowledge in our eastern empire as to any others;
that there is no declared bar to their attainment
of a seat, or even presiding at it, when returned
from service in India, enjoying as they do the same
rights as any other of his majesty's subjects. But
what are the facts?-for it is by these we must
be guided in deciding upon practical questions.
Those who enter the Indian service are seldom
men of high family connexion. Their early life is
devoted to their public duties abroad, and they can
therefore enjoy but few opportunities of forming
those friendships with individuals, or those ties
with parties, which so often help to bring into
useful action men of information and talent. In
former times the servants of the Company exclu-
88
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
sively filled all the high stations* in India, and the
large and rapid fortunes they made in those sta-
tions, or in the exercise of military command,
enabled them to come forward in parliament, and
to establish influence through the means of wealth;
but this is no longer the case. Riches are attained
in India, as elsewhere, by commercial men, by
agents, and by some few of the servants of the
Company, who make that their chief or sole object.
But it is a remarkable fact, that, amongst all who
have been most distinguished during the last forty
years, there is not one who possesses a fortune
which can be deemed more than a competence; and
several of them, after more than thirty years' ser-
vice, have not acquired that. The reasons are
obvious. Men seldom reach high office till after
many years' service, and then their salaries, though
liberal, are not so considerable as to enable
them to accumulate a large fortune, were that to
become their pursuit: but their duties are of a
character which raises the mind above the accumu-
* Lord Macartney, who was nominated governor of Fort
St. George in 1782, was the first appointment of any British
subject, not a Company's servant, to such a station.
† The salary of a political resident of the first class, which
is one of the highest in India, does not exceed 3500l. per
annum, and, though his establishment and expenses are paid to
a certain extent, he cannot calculate on a less disbursement
from it than 1000l., which leaves him an annual saving of
2500l., in a station which he is not likely to have attained
before a service of from twenty to twenty-five years,
IN ENGLAND.
89
lation of money; and this high tone in those who
fill the first stations in India has been wisely che-
rished, for the integrity of the service depends
on their example.
What has been stated will sufficiently account
for persons of local experience and knowledge
being most unlikely to attain any share in that
branch of the administration of India which be-
longs to the crown; but the very circumstances
which place them at a distance from such objects
of ambition are those which, if the public interests
were consulted, ought to approximate these objects.
It is not more necessary to have ǹaval lords at the
Admiralty than to have Indian members of the
board of control, nor indeed so much so; and,
should a sense of its expedience ever introduce such
a usage, its benefits would be very great.
Besides the aid which the minister of Indian
affairs would receive from well-selected Indian
members, the very prospect, however distant, of
attaining such honourable stations at home would
stimulate to action all the best talent in the Indian
service. Those who obtained such distinction
would receive and impart knowledge, and while
*It is difficult to make those who are locally unacquainted
with India understand the vital importance of the preserva-
tion of this high tone in all who fill prominent political situa-
tions in that country; but in no government is the truth of
the Persian adage more applicable, which says, "If the king
takes an egg, there will not be a fowl left in the land.”
II.
90
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
1
they enjoyed an opportunity of bringing themselves
into a notice that might be attended with further
preferment, if they were fit for it, they would be
placed in a situation which would enable them to
preserve and improve the information they had
acquired in India, and to offer useful information
and advice daily to those who are called upon to
decide on the most important questions connected
with our eastern empire.
The president and members of the board of
control may, and no doubt often do, seek informa-
tion and counsel from the most experienced of the
Company's servants in England; but these are only
casually and partially consulted. Their judgment
is asked on insulated points, affected by many cir-
cumstances and events of which they have no know-
ledge. It is also to be recollected that our Indian
empire is, and, from its composition, must be,
always in a state of change. Men who retire from
the service, and do not, either from want of incli-
nation or of means, keep up their information, may
be said to be out of date in a very few years; but
being naturally tenacious of preconceived opinions,
we may assert, with the fullest respect for well-
acquired reputation, that such persons are often the
most misleading advisers; and an appeal to such
may become the more pernicious, from error being
sanctioned by high name and authority.
The adoption of the measure suggested would
IN ENGLAND.
91
do more than remedy this defect. It would pro-
duce a succession of men thoroughly informed,
and with the opportunity as well as the ability of
imparting their information to others. No good
government can wish for mystery or concealment ;
such can be desirable only as veils to weakness
and mismanagement.
There never was a state
to which publicity is calculated to be of more
benefit, both as a check and as an encouragement
to those by whom it is administered, than that we
have established for India; but in order that the
wise and just principles upon which it is conducted
should be understood and appreciated, its real
condition, and the nature of those peculiar cir-
cumstances under which it acts, should be fully
before the public.
With reference to this principle, it is to be
regretted that questions relating to India are so
seldom agitated in parliament, and that the an-
nual budget for the financial affairs of that em-
pire, which it was long the usage to bring before
the house of Commons, has been discontinued.
This practice might have been attended with in-
convenience, and perhaps occasional embarrassment,
to the ministers of the crown; but its disuse, in-
asmuch as it has a tendency to perpetuate igno-
rance and apathy on all that relates to Indian admi-
nistration, is unfavourable to the interests of that
country, and, consequently, to those of Great
Britain.
Without speculating upon the reasons
92
government of India
which have led to past proceedings, it may be as-
sumed, that men in official situations in England,
who added to their practical knowledge of India
the advantage of direct reference to the most au-
thentic information in England concerning that
country, would be able not only to correct errors
and expose mis-statements, but to convey, when re-
quired, the most useful knowledge. Their minute
acquaintance with persons, places, and circum-
stances in India would give them a confidence in
the performance of such a duty far beyond what the
mere study of records can ever impart; and on all
such subjects they would receive an attention pro-
portionate to the impression of their local experi-
ence, information, and judgment.
In
It has been asserted that the directors are more
disposed to nominate, to the first and civil and mi-
litary stations, persons who have acquired cha-
racter at home, in the West Indies, or on the con-
tinent of Europe, than the officers of the Company.
This belief, which is very general among their ser-
vants abroad, is not exactly grounded in fact.
such appointments, the directors alluded to are ge-
nerally overruled by his majesty's ministers, though
there can be no doubt that the victory is in most
cases not very difficult. This arises from their par-
ticipation in the greater admiration which the pub-
lic bestow on services performed on scenes that are
near than on those which are remote; from their
yielding more respect to men whom they have
IN ENGLAND.
93
seen, or met in the highest sphere of society in
England, than they do to persons whom, from their
original nomination and career, they almost deem
beings of their own creation, and in some respects
below them; from their habits and feelings mak-
ing them less attentive to the qualities which fit
individuals for high stations, than to those which
give them a value as subordinate instruments; and
from being restrained, particularly in recommend-
ing for appointments to high military command,
by a consideration of seniority *, which must,
while persevered in, be fatal to the hopes of the
Indian army.
Whatever may be the solid advantages of the
Company's service, and they are neither few in
number nor small in amount, all those who aspire
at distinction must be hostile to a system which
they believe unfavourable to their hopes of future
elevation. Men of high and disinterested minds
may occasionally divest themselves of self, so far
as to advocate on general grounds what they feel
as personally injurious; but such instances will be
rare, and the ordinary motives of human nature
will lead men to desire the abolition of an autho-
* Not one commander-in-chief has been chosen from the
Company's army since Mr. Pitt's Bill. On an occasion when the
court of directors sought to do away with this injustice, they
brought forward the name of one of their oldest officers who
had not served for many years; his character was highly re-
spectable; but the objections taken against such a recommen-
dation were just and unanswerable.
94
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
rity which they deem to be, either from its want of
power or of disposition to support them, unfavour-
able to their advancement.
Mr. Pitt's Bill, though it subjected the court of
directors to ministerial control in every branch of
their administration, except in that which related
to the management of the commercial concerns
of the Company, made no changes either in the
form of their election or the mode of executing
such duties as were left to them: but one of the
most important, the secret and political depart-
ment, was, by this act, and a subsequent one, in a
great degree taken out of their hands. This is
one of the most delicate parts of the machinery of
the present system, and, therefore, requires to be
well understood.
་
In all cases of political negotiation with native
powers, involving questions of peace and war,
and requiring secrecy, the responsibility rests with
the board of control, who, by the law, are empow-
ered to frame despatches upon those subjects;
which despatches the secret committee* are bound
to forward to India under their signature. The com-
mittee may remonstrate verbally, or in writing,
against instructions framed in opposition to their
judgment; but their right to do so is not recog-
*This committee is formed of the chairman and the senior
director, not filling one of the chairs. If the latter, from illness
or other cause, is absent for any period, his place is filled by
the next senior director.
IN ENGLAND.
95
de-
nised by law, as in the case of the public
spatches, and can, therefore, only be deemed one of
courtesy and usage.
The proposed benefit of making the secret com-
mittee the medium for conveying orders in the
secret and political department is, to uphold the
authority of the Company in India, which, it is
thought, would be injured by a direct official cor-
respondence between the board of control and the
government in that country. The signing of such
despatches, when contrary to their judgment is,
however, stated by an act of parliament to be
purely ministerial on the part of the committee;
but though the latter have not a legal right to pro-
pose alterations, or to delay the transmission of
the board's despatches, still their condition as the
head of a branch of the Indian government, and
the means which, as such, they must possess of
aiding or obstructing the minor measures connected
with any important resolution the board of control
may adopt, must always make it a matter of solici-
tude and importance for the board to carry this com-
mittee along with them; and the latter must give
an influence in such affairs proportionate to the in-
* Vide Geo. III. cap. 3, sect. 19, 20, 21.
†The public despatches are framed by the court of directors,
and approved or altered by the India board. If the court
of directors delay, after requisition from the board, to frame
despatches upon any subject connected with their civil or mili-
tary government, the board have the power to frame them;
and they must be forwarded by the directors. Vide Geo. III.
cap. 3, sect. 15.
96
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
formation and talents of those of whom it is com-
posed.
It is to be remarked, however, that the value of
the privilege which courtesy and usage have given
to the committee, of expressing, or even recording,
dissentient opinions must, like many others that be-
long to the different parts of the Indian government,
depend upon its rare and temperate exercise; for
the frequency of that would convert a salutary
restraint into a source of embarrassment; but if
such consideration operates, as it no doubt does,
to make the secret committee, in most cases,
aid and promote, instead of weaken and impede,
the action of that power which is vested in the
superior board; the latter should, on the same
principle, refrain, as much as possible, from inter-
ference in less important affairs. The right of con-
trol is much more exercised at present than it was
for a long period after the Indian board was esta-
blished. This has been occasioned by a variety
of causes, and in many cases may have had a bene-
ficial effect; but we must not overlook the great
evils which may arise out of such gradual encroach-
ment. If the interference of the board descends
into every minute question, and its power of dic-
tation is in frequent exercise, the court of directors
will either sink into a mere channel for its orders,
or the respect for the board will be diminished,
and there will be an end of that feeling and good
understanding which it is essential should subsist
between these two authorities.
IN ENGLAND,
97
In such case, we might apprehend the complete
fulfilment of Mr. Burke's prediction* of the result
of the present form of our Indian administration:
that can alone be averted by the temper, modera-
tion, and knowledge, of those at the head of its
separate branches.
/
When the board of control was first instituted,
the same general letters from the different pre-
sidencies contained every subject. This was
changed. The correspondence was divided into
four departments; the public, the revenue, the
military, and the commercial. The convenience
of this new arrangement was recognised by the
supreme government; and, at its suggestion, a fifth
or political department, which included all the cor-
respondence, not secret, with or regarding Euro-
pean or native powers in India, was added to the
other four.
The court of directors divide themselves, accord-
ing to usage of long standing, into committees,
for the performance of their various duties; those
divisions have reference to seniority of standing in
"The scheme of reconciling a direction really and truly
deliberative," said Mr. Burke, "with an office really and
substantially controlling, is a sort of machinery that can be
kept in order only a short time. Either the directors will
dwindle into clerks, or the secretary of state, as has hitherto
been the case, will leave everything to them; often through
design, and often through neglect. If both should affect ac-
tivity, collision, procrastination, delay, and, in the end, utter
confusion, must ensue."
VOL. II.
H
98
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
the direction, not the qualification and fitness of
the individuals.
The chairmen are almost invariably chosen from
the senior directors. The most important of the
committees for affairs, not secret, is that of the
correspondence, which is formed of eleven of the
senior directors, inclusive of the chairman and
deputy chairman. On this committee devolve
the reading, examining, and answering of all the
despatches from India, except those in the secret
or commercial departments. Almost all measures
of importance originate with them, and their
opinion is, in most cases, a guide for the court.
Generally speaking, a period of at least ten
years must elapse from the election of a director,
before he can become a member of the committee
of correspondence; previous to that, he is attached
to one of the junior committees*, and his time is
chiefly occupied with its duties detail, having no
concern with the larger questions that relate to the
general administration of India, except when those
are agitated in court. It is true that every mem-
ber of the court has a right, not only to call for
papers (not secret), but to originate measures.
This right, however, is rarely exercised; for the
*The inferior committees are divided into classes, and the
directors succeed to them also by seniority, without reference
to qualification: they are numerous, and embrace every de-
partment connected with the commerce and property of the
Company.
1
IN ENGLAND.
99
sense of the inconvenience which must attend tak-
ing subjects out of those departments to which
they belong creates a salutary forbearance from
this course of proceeding.
From the mode in which the duties of the court
of directors are at present allotted, it is obvious
that the election of an individual who, from the
stations he may have filled abroad, possesses full
and valuable information respecting the actual con-
dition and government of that empire is, as far as
the political interests of India are concerned, of
little or no benefit to the public. On entering the
direction, he is almost exclusively employed on
duties of a totally opposite character to those
which have occupied his past life; and when
seniority advances him to a place in the com-
mittee of correspondence, or secret department,
he carries with him, not that fresh and useful
knowledge which he would have done had his
mind gone along with events, but the bias of an
attachment to old opinions, many of which may
have become obsolete.
These facts cannot be controverted, and it fol-
lows as a consequence, that a minute knowledge of
the affairs of India, and of the political interests of
that country, is rarely possessed by any of the
senior directors. It is possessed by the secretaries
and head clerks, many of whom are men distin-
guished by talent, as well as industry; but to them,
as the principle depositaries of knowledge, there
Uorm
H 2
100
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
exists the same objection as that which applies to
the constitution of the board of control.
There are many causes which give a vacillating
character to the proceedings of the court of di-
rectors, and tend, at times, to precipitate, and at
others, to retard, measures of vital importance;
but one of the most prominent is the shortness
of the period that each chairman fills the chair.
His business during that period is overwhelm-
ing, and much of it must be hurried through, or
neglected, or transferred, half done, to his successor;
who, very possibly, has different sentiments upon
several of the points under consideration. We may
add to this cause of frequent and sudden changes
in their views, that of the annual retirement and
re-election of six members of this body. The
ex-directors for the year having no right to see any
papers, or to have access to official documents
during their recess, they return to their duties
i
* Those six ex-directors must be re-elected; they form what
is termed the house list; their re-election, except in extraor-
dinary cases, is almost certain: it is most desirable it should be
so, for where it otherwise, the situation of a director, which it
is politic to raise, would be greatly decreased in value. Many
respectable and highly-qualified individuals are deterred, by
the nature of the first canvass, from seeking a seat in the di-
rection. If this canvass was to be repeated every six years,
some of the most useful members might be lost to this body;
and among those that remained, a greater spirit of conciliation
towards their constituents might be introduced than was con-
sistent with the impartial performance of their public duties.
IN ENGLAND.
101
ignorant of the measures under discussion, or at
least with the disadvantage of having the chain of
information entirely broken.
The government of the court of directors is
marked by strict attention to rule, and alarm at
every measure contrary to usage, or that can
create a precedent for future deviation from it.
These are good general maxims of ordinary admi-
nistration, for limited and unchanging states; but,
in an empire like that of India, their constant and
cold observance must be fatal to that life and ani-
mation which ought to pervade the whole system.
Every latent spark of honourable ambition should
be kindled, and the anxiety should be to promote,
by encouragement and by reward, the efforts of
individuals to attain distinction in the public ser-
vice. No government can be highly respected
which, entrenching itself in forms, is more solicitous
to avoid the reproach of injustice, than to inspire
zealous exertion. Its acts may be just, and even
liberal; but unless they are suited to the character
of the individuals and classes subject to its autho-
rity, and evince complete competence in the rulers
to go along with the rapid changes of the pe-
culiar empire they have to rule, such government
must fall into disrepute with those by whom they
are served.
That this has been the case with the
court of directors, no man acquainted with facts
can deny; and an increase of information and
knowledge is not more necessary in that court to
102
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
enable it to withstand the daily attempts made in
England to lessen and degrade it, than to maintain
its reputation with its servants abroad, many of
whom, under the influence of personal feelings,
contemplate the termination of the power of the
Company with little reflection on the probable
consequences of such an event to India, and to
Great Britain.
This is not the place, nor is it, perhaps, the
period to suggest the details of any plan of reform;
but those who desire the continuance of the Com-
pany may be satisfied, that all who aim at its
destruction will be enemies to any change in the
constitution of the court of directors which shall
tend to raise that body, by making it more efficient
to the performance of its large and increasing
duties. It is to a system of depression they trust -
for ultimate success; but nothing can be more
hazardous to the interests of the Indian empire
than this mode of killing, as it were, by inches,
the body through whom it is governed. The court
of directors should not only be maintained in all
their rights and privileges, but elevated, if it is de-
sired to render it a useful and efficient branch of
the Indian government: if not, the sooner it is
abolished the better. To understand this question,
let us look to its actual condition. The character
of this court has undergone great alterations; the
changes which have taken place in the views and
sentiments of the proprietors have extended to the
:
IN ENGLAND.
103
directors. A separate and extensive commercial
interest has already gained the greater part of the
trade of the Company, and threatens the re-
mainder. That service, which once exclusively
looked to them, no longer does so; the public
press, which is every day becoming a more power-
ful engine of change, is, from many reasons, far
from favourable to them: that all these causes
have combined to lower the court of directors in
public estimation cannot be denied; but there are
others of equal, if not greater force. The acts
of 1793 and 1813, by transferring almost all real
territorial and political powers to the ministers of
the crown, deprived the court of directors of much
of that consequence which they before enjoyed;
and their unpopularity has been recently increased
by the growing dislike of all monopolies, and an
increasing desire for new openings of trade. This
desire, so far from being lessened, has been greatly
augmented by the partial opening of the India
trade; the benefit of which, to the public, is con-
sidered to be much impaired by the command
which the Company still maintain over the foreign
market. The consequence has been, that the Com-
pany, by ceasing to be rulers, and by remaining
monopolists, have lost the consideration which be-
longed to their former character; while the odium
ever attached to the latter has been increased.
No person, possessing a knowledge of the con-
stitution of England, can desire to change the
104
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
composition of the court of directors in any manner
that would more approximate them to his majesty's
ministers. Their separation from the latter, even
in the common intercourse of life, owing to their
different occupation and connexions, has its im-
portance; but the useful check which it constitutes
must be weakened, if not destroyed, unless it is
supported by personal character, and acknow-
ledged information and talent. The deterioration
of the court in public estimation must deteriorate
it as respects the talent and character of its in-
dividual members. The office of director will
every day become less an object of ambition to
men of high feeling, and who have already obtain-
ed distinction.
Under the present circumstances, it appears dif-
ficult for the Company to maintain their ground
as an efficient branch of the administration of In-
dia; perhaps, indeed, impossible, unless changes
take place which shall give to the court of di-
rectors, as a body, more weight and consideration
than they now enjoy with the public: this weight
and consideration, all who are favourable to their
existence must desire to see them attain.
The limitation of the Company's monopoly in
trade has produced considerable changes as to per-
sons chosen for directors; but still no qualifica-
tions are required beyond the possession of a
certain amount of stock; and the condition and
avocation of a great majority of the voters of both
IN ENGLAND.
105
*
sexes offer no security as to the fitness of a can-
didate for the direction. There existed, until
lately, restrictions which barred any person who
continued in the service from being a director,
notwithstanding he had acquired a right, unless
specially called upon to reside in his native country.
Such restrictions, which had their birth in that
spirit of narrow and jealous policy that charac-
terized the early days of the Company, are ill
suited to its present condition, and at variance with
the usage of the government of England. The
latter admits unemployed officers to every office of
the state, wisely obtaining all the`advantage it can
from that increased knowledge and experience
which the duties of their profession enable them to
acquire; and even when these are not publicly em-
ployed, they are often officially called upon to give
* The exclusion of such persons from being directors was con-
tinued by a bye-law, which has been lately expunged, as being
contrary to the provisions of the legislature, from which it
pears there is no restriction against officers so situated as com-
mandants of regiments residing in England entering the di-
rection. The only pretext on which an objection could be
raised is, their liability to be called upon for foreign service ;
but every officer of his majesty's service, in civil or political
employ in England, is in the same situation, and the usage of
the Company's service since 1796, when colonels of corps were
entitled to live in England, establishes, that their return to
India is deemed optional.
† There are several situations in England in which the em-
ployment of officers, who continue in the Indian army, would be
alike honourable to the service and beneficial to government.
106
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
their opinions individually, or collectively in com-
mittees, upon points on which their professional
experience, or recent knowledge, enables them to
judge with accuracy.
Such calls are seldom, if
ever, made upon Indian civil or military officers
who are retired, or on furlough in England; and
yet it would be difficult to point out any govern-
ment in the world, which, from the character of its
duties, stands so much in need of this kind of aid.
But until considerable changes are made in the
construction, both of the India board and the
court of directors, this assistance will never be at-
tained in any degree that can render it beneficial
to the country.
The increasing difficulties of governing such an
empire as that we have established in the east
imperiously call upon us to avail ourselves of all
the means we possess to enable us to overcome
them: but we must not deceive ourselves as to the
real cause of opposition to measures of alteration,
such as have here been suggested. It is the alarm
of individuals and classes of men lest injury
should arise to their own interests; but in this
conclusion they are assuredly deceived. The effect
would be the reverse, for the admixture of men
who have knowledge of India with those who have
a knowledge of England would early destroy those
baneful prejudices which both parties entertain
towards each other; and, while it diffused correct
information and just principles, would give strength
IN ENGLAND.
107
and permanence to a system which cannot much
longer exist on its present foundation.
In the actual condition of our Asiatic possessions,
there is no principle in their administration of such
consequence as that of keeping those who are em-
ployed abroad as much European as possible,
consistent with their attainment of the qualities
essential to fit them for their local duties in India.
We can contemplate no danger equal to their
looking to the latter as the country in which they
are to pass their lives; such a sentiment, if ever it
becomes prevalent amongst the public servants,
must ultimately prove as fatal to the interests of
England as of India. This is fully understood by
the government at home; and whilst they have
very properly done away those means of accumu-
lating wealth which were at variance with our im-
proved system of rule, they have recently made
liberal arrangements to facilitate the return of those
who have served a certain period, either in the
civil or military service; but one effect of this
branch of expenditure will be, to make numbers
(many of whom are in the prime of life) pass
the remainder of their days in an unprofitable
manner, unless objects* are presented to their
ambition both in India and in England. In the
* The liberal measures lately adopted are so far a benefit, as
they prevent men fixing in India, and accelerate promotion;
but their utility stops here; and it will probably be found, that
measures will be hereafter necessary to regain services which
will be lost by the effect of this liberality, unless some objects
108
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
pursuit of these in the latter country, men of in-
formation and talent would soon lose their limited
and local feelings. Their importance with themselves
and others would rise as the sphere of their utility
became enlarged. Their patriotic attachment to
their native land will be strengthened, and the
weight and influence of their character will be the
means of keeping alive such sentiments in others,
who will give more ready assent to the wisdom and
expediency of measures that are associated with
names to which they have long and habitually
given respect and confidence.
Some who admit that the mode proposed is the
best by which prejudices can be removed, and
attachment to their native country revived and
strengthened, will perhaps startle at a plan that
suggests the necessity of facilitating to those who
have served abroad the attainment of employment
in both branches of the Indian administration in
England; but such objection stands on narrow,
indefensible, and most unconstitutional grounds.
Has any officer, political, civil, military, or naval,
are held out to lead men of talent to continue to serve their
country in India after they have attained a title to return on a
competence to England.
* It has been sometimes stated, that men generally return
from India at an age when they are more fit to retire than to
enter on new scenes of public employment. This assertion is
not supported by facts; besides, the employment to which it is
proposed to turn their attention would not be new, but an useful
continuance of the labours of their past lives.
IN ENGLAND.
109
of his majesty's service, when retired upon pension,
half or full pay, ever been considered as less quali-
fied to enter any department of the state, because
he had been in a particular line of service, or might
again be called upon to act in it if his country re-
quired? Do we not meet with persons of this
description in various offices and stations? Do
they not often fulfil dutics which lead them not
merely to differ with, but to control and censure
those very authorities under whom they had fɔr-
merly acted, and may again act? That such is
the case cannot be denied: and who will contend
that there is any principle in the administration
of India which should constitute a difference to
this practice.
Some will argue, that employment in India is re-
served for a privileged few, and that those who
enjoy it should not repine if it, in a great degree,
throws them out of public life in their native
country; and they will perhaps add, that the persons
with whose prospects they might interfere, if such
facilities were given as have been suggested towards
their obtaining office in England, might justly com-
plain unless the India service was opened to their
ambition. Such arguments might have force, if the
English public officers were qualified for stations in
India, or if, in the administration at home, we could
dispense with that information and knowledge which
is alone possessed by India public officers. But we
must not try this important question by a reference
110
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
to the claims or privileges of individuals, or classes
of men.
It is one of state policy, and intimately
connected with the preservation and good govern-
ment of one of the most extraordinary empires that
ever was founded in the universe. With all the
means we can prepare and employ, we shall be too
likely to fail in these objects; but that failure will
be certain, if we allow our efforts for their attain-
ment to be circumscribed by ordinary maxims, and
rules adapted to the routine administration of petty
colonies, or the regulated forms of the most admired
national constitutions, which differ from that in
question either by the temper and genius of the
governed, or the principles and system of the
government.
The education of the youth who enter the service
in India is liberal: their occupations abroad are of
a character to enlarge their minds. The evils and
misfortunes they continually contemplate as arising
from despotic rule must render them more attached
to the free government of their native country; and
no great class of men can be placed under circum-
stances more calculated to give them extended views
of national policy, or to qualify them for different
public duties. Acting in countries remote from
each other, and whose inhabitants differ in language
and customs as much as the nations of Europe,
some members of this class rise to the exercise of
almost kingly rule; others fill political, civil, judicial,
fiscal, and military stations. Such a variety of occu-
IN ENGLAND.
111
pation must in India, as elsewhere, produce an in-
finite variety of character, and qualify men to pursue
the most opposite courses, if such are open to them
in England. It is a sense of injury alone, at the
operation of causes which virtually almost exclude
them from public life, that can unite them in hos-
tility against a system, which, under other circum-
stances, it must be their interest to support: nor
would the prejudices they may have imbibed from
a residence in India long survive their return to
England, unless they found themselves placed
under circumstances discouraging to their am-
bition, and almost compelle into a community of
sentiments and feelings by being considered as a
distinct class. This is, to a great degree, their pre-
sent situation, and no reflecting man can doubt its
injurious effects on the public interests, which re-
quire a mixture of Indian and European knowledge
that can only be effectually obtained, by the union
in public office as well as general society, of those
whose lives, though passed in different hemispheres,
have been directed to one object, the good of their
country. The useful approximation of such per-
sons to each other must, however, depend on a
parity of condition, which, while it promotes inter-
course, gives birth to that respect and attention
which men do not readily entertain for the opinions
of those whom they consider to be their inferiors in
rank or in knowledge.
Amongst those whose industry and talent have
112
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
contributed to the good government of India sub-
sequent to the establishment of the board of control,
the secretaries and clerks at the heads of depart-
ments of that board, as well as those of the India-
House, must not be passed over. It would be
difficult to point out any class of men in similar
situations who have laboured harder, or more to the
benefit of the public, or who have preserved a
higher character for integrity and ability. The in-
formation and minute knowledge of Indian affairs
which some of these have attained from the huge
volumes of the records of our Eastern empire, is
quite surprising; but the good that the public might
derive from their labour and talents is diminished,
not only (as noticed before) from the disadvantages
inseparable from their own want of local knowledge
and experience, but also from their superiors often
but imperfectly understanding the details of the
matter laid before them. The latter, even when
they have the disposition and the leisure, must
wade through a mass of writing on subjects, of
which a minute knowledge is rendered more un-
attainable by the local references, and the very
names of persons, places, and things, as foreign to
the ear as confusing to the sense of the English
reader. Any change of system, giving increase of
knowledge to their superiors, must ultimately prove
most beneficial to the interests of this class. Men
who had confidence in their own competency could
have no reserve as to the resources from which they
IN ENGLAND.
113
derive assistance, and their experience and discrimi-
nating judgment would be favourable to the rise*
of all whose industry and talent rendered them
conspicuous.
Existing establishments must always be liable to
attack, and in a free and enlightened nation like
England we may trace much of their excellence to
this cause. They are kept in a state of vigilance
and activity by their assailants: the public opinion
must go along with them, or they would soon cease
to exist; but that public opinion is not to be taken
from the speeches of members of parliament con-
tending for victory; nor from the daily effusions of
contradictory papers and publications; nor from the
clamour of numbers acting under some momentary
impulse; nor from the pages of philosophers, who
theorize upon institutions that are to give a new
character to the human race: but though no one of
these is the representation of public opinion, they
all influence and help to form it, and as education
*The duties of the subordinate officers at the board of
control and the India-house are quite distinct from those of any
other offices in England. The great application and study ne-
cessary to attain that competent knowledge which it is essential
the heads of departments should possess must withdraw the
persons filling such stations from all other studies and views.
This consideration demands that such functionaries should be
placed on as high a footing as the nature of their situation will
permit. Their elevation, while it rewards their efforts, will
stimulate that of others, and be every way productive of public
benefit.
VOL. II.
I
1
114
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
1
is diffused they will daily gain more strength. Let
us hope, however, that, as knowledge advances, the
sound national sense of an English public will keep
pace with it, and judge all questions that are con-
stitutionally important, free from the party feeling,
the interests, the passions, or the theories of those,
from the active exercise of whose ambition, in-
dustry, talent, and enthusiasm, it derives its best
lights.
Notwithstanding that happy tenacity of usage
and respect, even for the forms of establishments,
which characterizes the majority of Englishmen,
there exists in the present state of society an
expectation of their progressive improvement.
Such improvements, however, must be made with
great caution, lest more be sacrificed than gained;
and we may lay it down as an axiom, that the
true value of all institutions depends upon their
being in unison with the community and govern-
ment to which they belong. If we desire their
stability, we must adapt them to the strength,
the weakness, the prejudices, the virtues, the vices,
all the qualities, in short, of those human beings
for whose benefit they are founded.
That sound public opinion, which it is so essen-
tial to carry along with every branch of our free
government, has been very partially exercised in
respect to the administration of Indian affairs.
The problem of the best mode of governing that
country is so difficult to be solved, the interests
dark
IN ENGLAND.
115
affected by it so remote and complicated, that few
have given it any deep attention. When the
privileges of the Company were last renewed, the
question was considered as being at rest for twenty
years. The expiration of this term is not yet
sufficiently near to excite the activity of those
parties which that event will bring into collision;
but it is most desirable that, before the arrival of
that period, the subject should undergo the fullest
investigation, for it involves questions of great
national importance, the consideration and decision
upon which should not be left to the hurried mo-
ment of a conflict between parties swayed by their
respective interests, and striving to attain their ob-
jects through every means that temporary impres-
sions can make upon minds uninformed of the na-
ture and merits of the question which they are
called to decide.
Viewing the actual establishments with reference
to the facts and principles which have been stated,
it should be calmly examined how far they are, or
can be, rendered efficient to the purposes for which
they were intended; considering that, of all go-
vernments, that is least likely to command respect,
and gain strength, over which a sword is always
suspended, and which holds existence under respite,
it would be better either to abolish the Company
as a medium of governing India, or to give to
that body a broader, more solid, and more perma-
nent foundation. To judge this point, it would be
I 2
116
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
necessary to look minutely to the benefits which
might be anticipated from its preservation; to its
defects as an organ of rule; to the possibility of
remedying these defects; to the practicability of
substituting a better medium; and, lastly, to the
probable consequences of placing our vast territo-
ries in the East under the direct rule of the king's
government. In forming our judgment upon these
important questions, we must never for one
moment lose sight of the peculiar character of
our empire in India, which bears little analogy
to any power that ever existed in the universe.
This compels us to look, almost exclusively, to its
own history for those lessons which are to guide
us through the difficulties we must expect to
encounter in its future administration; and the
experience which that affords is limited, for the
government we have established has hardly one
feature in common with that of former conquerors,
most of whom became inhabitants of the land
they had subdued. It would, however, fill a
volume to treat these subjects in the manner their
importance merits; and it is, perhaps, impossible
at this distance of time to anticipate the changes
in Europe or in India that may influence the
question. It will suffice therefore, for the present,
to offer some general observations on the more
prominent points which have been brought under
notice.
No government has ever evinced a greater dis-
}
IN ENGLAND.
117
position towards a just and humane rule than that
of the East India Company. It has been as prompt
to correct abuses as zealous and liberal in the sup-
port of all acts of the local authorities that pro-
mised benefit to the natives of its vast territories.
An anxious desire to improve the finances has, at
times, given a direction to the zeal of its servants
not favourable to the increasing prosperity of the
country, from many parts of which too large a re-
venue has been exacted; but this desire has never
led to the countenance of any violence or injus-
tice. The same principle has given the authori-
ties in England a strong but salutary prejudice
against all those contests with native princes into
which the governments abroad have been compelled
to enter. This has had a happy operation; for
though neither their instructions nor orders could
prevent our attainment of that power which our
condition in India forced upon us as a law of exist-
ence, the known disposition of the directors and
the legislature certainly impeded the progress of
conquest, and, by doing so, has, in all probability,
given our dominion more solidity than it would
have had if its conquest had been effected, as it
might have been, in half the period.
The court. of directors are in a great degree in-
dependent of the favours of the ministers of the
crown, who find it difficult to bend them to any
purposes which they deem injurious to their repu-
tation, or to the rights or privileges of those whom
118
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
they consider as immediately under their protec-
tion. This renders them an invaluable shield, to
guard from attack and encroachment the rights of
the service abroad; but it is a remarkable fact that
those whose interests, as a body, they are so
prompt to defend, are not so sensible, as might be
expected, of the safety they derive from this inter-
mediate authority. The causes of this are obvious:
the highest and most distinguished of these public
officers, whose opinions and actions have a great
influence over the rest, are too often discontented
at their condition, and hostile to this branch of the
Indian administration. The supposed disposition
of the court to look chiefly to expenditure*, oc-
casions every reduction either to be ascribed to
them, or to a desire of conciliating their favour;
while all acts of grace or liberality are referred
either to the representations of local superiors in
India, or to the interference of his majesty's govern-
These conclusions are often unjust, but
they are always made; and they operate to prevent
ment.
* There is no service in which pay is so good, and the means
of retirement so liberally provided for, as that of the Company.
The nature of this service requires that it should be so. Money
long constituted the only reward to which those who went to
India could look; and it still constitutes the leading object of
the great majority. The desire of attaining this object pro-
duces many ungrounded accusations against the court of direc-
tors, all of whose economical measures are invariably ascribed
to narrowness of commercial feeling, from their being a com-
mercial body.
1
IN ENGLAND.
119
those feelings of respect and attachment which it
is so desirable men should entertain for that autho-
rity under which they are placed: those feelings,
however, never can be maintained in large classes
by a system that employs no means but those of
circumscribed rules and cold, inanimate justice.
There must be parts of the community kindled into
warmer sentiments than such means can ever inspire,
or a government will never acquire the popularity
which it is essential for it to possess. This ingre-
dient of rule is singularly wanting in the Company's
government. It has few if any zealous and active
advocates, to meet those attacks with which it is
continually assailed; and the consequence is, that,
though serious reflection should teach the great
body of those who are in its service that no change
is likely to be for their advantage, all that they are in
the daily habit of hearing and reading is calculated
to make a different impression upon their minds.
The manner in which the directors exercise
their great patronage has satisfied the public that
it could not be in safer or more honourable hands;
but it is to be regretted that this patronage should
form the principal object in seeking the direction,
and the chief reward after having attained it. The
first circumstance induces some to become candi-
dates for the office of director whose views are
limited to the attainment of a provision for their
families, relations, and friends; and the second de-
prives this government of one of the greatest means
120
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
which all other governments possess, that of en-
couraging, rewarding, and attaching those by whom
they are served, by admitting, to a certain extent,
the claims of sons and near connexions of persons
who have been distinguished in the public service.
These are not only rejected by the directors in
their corporate capacity, but their advancement is
considered as an infringement of their most valued
privilege. This is the fault of the system, not of
the directors; they are paid in patronage, and a
deduction from its amount would operate as a de-
duction from the wages of their labour. This
fact clears them of all blame, but it does not render
the evil less. It may, perhaps, be asserted that the
interest and connexions of men in the service, com-
bined with the humanity and consideration of in-
dividual directors, palliates, if it does not remedy,
this defect of the system; but this is a mistake, for
the very mode in which such favour is bestowed,
though it may raise the reputation of him who
confers it, lowers that of the body to which he
belongs: besides, it is not seemly to see the sons of
those who have stood the highest in the civil ser-
vice of the Company, or of officers who have fallen
in some memorable engagement, enter the list of
common soliciters, or carrying their petitions from
door to door of those who preside for the season
over the interests of that empire, the prosperity of
which the parents of the supplicants have laboured
with distinction, or died with glory, to promote,
IN ENGLAND.
121
The court of directors are often very generous
to the widows and families of deceased officers of
distinction left in distress, and they have always
given a most liberal support to the funds insti-
tuted for their relief: but this liberality imparts
little if any of that feeling which would be spread
throughout the service by the son* receiving such
notice and protection on account of the services
of his father. To estimate the value of this
principle, we have only to look to its effects in the
navy or army of England. Notwithstanding that
eagerness for patronage which pervades these
services, hereditary claims are seldom neglected
or rejected, and the attention known to be given
to them stimulates the highest minds to action
in a degree beyond all other motives.
There is no part of the conduct of the directors
in which they merit more praise than the attention
paid of late years to the education of youth for
the different branches of the service abroad. Dif-
ferent opinions may exist as to the modes they
have taken of promoting that important object,
but all are agreed in commending the spirit of libe-
rality in which it has been pursued.
The court of proprietors is necessarily a popular
body, and will always consist principally of that
class which are termed the monied interest; but
* If any part of the patronage of India is ever allotted to
this purpose, care must be taken to make arrangements that
would secure the greatest possible benefit from its exercise.
122
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
with this advantage, that almost all who return
from India with fortunes purchase India stock,
from the interest they take in the affairs of that
country; and we may always look to this class
as favourable to the pretensions of candidates for
the direction whose claims are grounded on ac-
knowledged talents and high reputation in the pub-
lic service. The privilege possessed by the court of
proprietors of investigating every act of the court
of directors, or of those they employ abroad, which
may in any way affect the prosperity of the
corporation, gives a wide and useful range to their
debates. Their confirmation being necessary to
all pecuniary grants, above a small amount, renders
their opinion of importance on all such measures;
and there is a decided benefit in the publicity
which the proceedings of the proprietors give to
such questions. The utility of this body, as a
check upon the abuse of power, should be cal-
culated, like other parts of our free constitution,
less with reference to what they do, than to what
they prevent others from doing. A great majo-
rity of the proprietors stands alike independent of
ministers and the court of directors, and this
position gives them much value as a branch of
Indian legislature.
Many objections have been taken to the com-
position and form of the court of proprietors,
and some of them are no doubt well-grounded.
Every question is discussed in open court, and
123
IN ENGLAND.
decided by the majority of those present; but the
minority may call for a ballot*, at which all pro-
prietors, whatever be their sex or condition, are
entitled to vote.
Sufficient has been said to enable us to judge,
first, whether the government of the Company, as
at present established, is competent to its increasing
civil and political duties; and, secondly, if it is
not, how far its form and constitution will admit
of improvements which will better fit it for its
sovereign functions. If it be determined, as it
probably will be, that some alterations are indis-
pensable, we may assume that the changes which
have lately occurred, and those which are to be
anticipated in its character, are most favourable to
the making of any reforms that may be deemed ex-
pedient, either in the mode of election, the necessary
qualification of candidates, or in the allotment of
their duties after being nominated directors. Suffice
it to say, that any plan for effecting such reforms
will be incomplete, that does not unite the objects
of improving the direction without taking from it
that distinctive character which gives it a particular
value, as part of our Indian legislature.
* The usage of secret ballot, which is that resorted to on
such occasions, is not limited to the court of proprietors. It
continues to be practised by the directors whenever they are
divided in opinion, and must tend to diminish in that body
the personal responsibility which it is desirable to impose
upon every man having such public duties to perform.
124
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
It is presumed that increase of knowledge, and
more competence to the particular duties allotted
to the different members of this body, would give
them more weight and consequence, not only with
all under their authority but with the public, than
they enjoy at present; and it is believed this
might be effected without any changes of a violent
nature. Many motives which at present lead men
to desire a seat in the direction might be lost, but
others would be created, more suited to the altered
condition of the Company and the Indian empire.
Nor is there any part of such a reform that would
materially affect the principles of the actual go-
vernment, though it would gradually introduce
a considerable change in the duties of those by
whom it was administered.
However we may be disposed to think that the
Indian government in England, as now constituted,
is not adequate to its increasing duties, we should
not hurry to the extreme of its abolition, without
calmly considering whether it is not capable of re-
form; but the consequence of preserving it under
an improved system will be best established by a
view of the most prominent of those evils which
must inevitably result from its destruction.
It is not necessary to dwell upon the character
and composition of any intermediate body that
might be established in its place. The ingenuity
of our ablest statesmen has been exhausted to de-
vise plans for such an authority, and we should no
IN ENGLAND.
125
doubt have a repetition of such expedients: but no
rational being can doubt that the ministers who
could desire the annihilation of the Company, and
had strength to carry that measure into effect,
would take care, in whatever manner they might
mould their departments for the rule of India, to
make the whole subservient to their own power.
It is therefore necessary at present to offer some
observations upon the probable consequences that
would result from our vast eastern territories
coming under the direct authority or influence of
the crown.
The first inevitable change on such an event
would be in the different view taken of the Indian
empire by the authority under which it was then
placed. With the Company's government it has
always been, and must remain, a primary considera-
tion; with his majesty's government it must be a
secondary one. This has been too often shown, in
cases where the latter had a right to interfere, to
leave a doubt of the fact; and who can calculate
the injury that would arise in India, when every
measure which regarded that empire should be con-
sidered with reference to other and more imme-
diate questions of expediency?
The urgent desire of satisfying friends, and of
disarming opponents, of conciliating the public, or
of avoiding parliamentary discussions, would often
outweigh all interests connected with our remote
possessions in the minds of the wisest and strongest
126
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
ministers; and at a period of weakness, the most
serious evils might justly be apprehended from this
source: nor could we look to the House of Com-
mons as that check which they form upon other
occasions to any abuse or unwise exercise of power.
Questions of a magnitude to excite the attention
of that body would seldom be brought forward;
and when they were, they would be so enveloped
in details, that few would understand them; for a
general and familiar acquaintance with the affairs
of India can never be anticipated.
Under such circumstances, that great country
might be treated as a colony, without having those
defences against misgovernment which colonies,
in general, possess. The West Indies, for in-
stance, besides their local colonial assemblies, have
an embodied interest, which is strong in parlia-
ment, and can advocate their rights whenever these
are assailed; but we can look to no period when
there can be any representation of the nations of
India. On the contrary, we may look for associ-
ated interests against them, particularly when a
system is adopted that will make every question
connected with that country secondary to numerous
other considerations.
The alarm taken by the public at the transfer of
the patronage now enjoyed by the directors to the
ministers of the crown, has hitherto contributed,
more than all the other reasons, to the preservation
of the Company; and this is a rational and constitu-
127
1
IN ENGLAND.
tional ground of fear, both as to its probable effects
in India and England. The general view that has
been taken of this subject, is, however, very limit-
ed. The actual patronage of the Company has been
taken as that which, in the event of the abolition
of the corporation, would fall to the crown; but
those who have computed in this manner, have
forgotten the weakness of one party, and the
strength of the other. It would not be difficult to
arrange, without much increase of the influence of
the crown, for the disposal of the appointments of
writers and cadets, nor is it of much consequence
by whom, or how, these are selected, provided
means are taken to ensure their possessing the re-
quisite qualifications: but who will pretend to find
a sufficient guard against the encroachments of the
ministers on the rights and interests of the service
abroad; and who, that understands this subject, but
must be satisfied that the very existence of the
empire depends upon every branch of that service
being sufficiently protected? It will be asserted,
that if India was under the direct authority of the
crown, men of superior talent, who distinguished
themselves in the country, would be brought much
more forward, both at home and abroad, than they
are at present, and that such a change would re-
medy this prominent defect in the actual system.
This might be true; but though it is not meant to
deny that his majesty's ministers, as enlightened
statesmen, would seek through such instruments to
128
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
promote the good administration of our Eastern
empire, can there be a doubt that they would
also use this mean in aid of those efforts which
their condition must compel them to make in order
to extend their patronage?
The Indian government, when transferred en-
tirely to the ministers of the crown, would, even in
England, present a much greater number of places
than is at present imagined; and supposing, as no
doubt would be the case, the departments abroad
were defended by regulations and acts of parlia-
ment, numerous inroads nevertheless might, and
would be, made upon them. There are many ap-
pointments, civil and military, which can hardly be
said to belong to any particular branch of the ser-
vice; these are dependant upon events, and the
exigencies of the moment, and must be left, in
a great degree, to the discretion of the local au-
thorities. The latter, supposing such motives to
exist at the fountain-head as those under which
ministers are likely to act, might be multiplied to
almost any extent; sinecures, now unknown, might
be gradually introduced, and pensions multiplied.
It may be asked, why all these abuses do not now
take place: the reason is obvious; the local go-
vernments are checked in the exercise of every power
that tends to the creation of such patronage by the
directors, who, in their turn, are controlled by the
India board, over which they watch with a vigi-
lance that has in it almost a spirit of retaliation,
IN ENGLAND.
129
Besides these checks, the ablest servants of the
Company are forward to take alarm at the slightest
acts of the local governments, or the authorities in
England, which trench, in the most remote degree,
upon what are deemed the exclusive rights of the
different branches of the India service. This forms
a chain of defence against the increase or abuse
of patronage that cannot be broken; but there is no
doubt that the Company is the most important link
in this chain. If that intermediate body did not
exist, there would not be the smallest difficulty in
reconciling those who filled the highest stations
abroad to give their cordial aid to advance a system,
in the benefits of which they would participate, and
which would be favourable to their views of wealth
and ambition; nor would this aid be limited to per-
sons appointed from England. The price of dis-
tinction and high employment to men who had risen
in the service in India, might often be the sanction
of their names, and efforts to promote measures
calculated to depress and injure that body to which
they belonged, but from which their personal in-
terests were separated.
With such aids to protect their patronage in a
distant and ill-understood scene, who can believe
that parliamentary interference would constitute an
efficient check upon the proceedings of the minis-
ters of the day, to defend which they had gained
those who possessed the best talent and the most
authentic sources of information.
VOL. II.
K
130
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
It will not seem unfair to draw a conclusion of
what would happen to our territories in India, if
transferred to the crown, from the history of those
colonies which have been, and are, under its direct
authority. It is believed that an investigation as
to the mode in which patronage has been exercised
in those distant possessions would not be favourable
to the arguments of persons who advocate this
change in our Indian government.
If we desire that our rule over India should be
permanent, we must take care that its constitution
shall suit that of England; and we must view the
operation of the latter, not at any moment when
extraordinary causes produce extraordinary effects,
but as it is in ordinary times. We cannot, for
instance, calculate upon ministers remaining so
long [in office, and being so strongly supported by
public opinion, as the present are. These circum-
stances may render them less dependent on pa-
tronage than any of their predecessors have been,
or any of their successors are likely to be; but
suppose opposing parties nearly balanced, will the
successful party hesitate at any means within their
power to maintain themselves? and when their ad-
versaries prevail, what changes might we not anti-
cipate? Such changes habit has rendered not
merely familiar, but beneficial to England; but if
they extended to India, their frequent occurrence
would sap the very foundations of our power; for
it is not too much to add, that our hopes of pre-
IN ENGLAND.
131
serving that empire must rest chiefly on our being
able to keep its administration free from the certain
injury consequent to its being subject to the in-
fluence of the politics in England.
F
The foregoing arguments are meant to show the
evil effects which we may anticipate to India, and
eventually to England, from the abolishing of the
East India Company as a medium for the govern-
ment of India; but the danger to be apprehended
is not so much from the amount of patronage that
would fall into the hands of the ministers of the
crown, as the manner in which the latter, from
their obligations, and the frequent changes to which
they are subject, would be likely to exercise it.
The patronage of the crown has, of late years,
apparently greatly increased; but the strength gained
by this part of our constitution has been more
than counterbalanced by the increased influence of
public opinion on every measure of the state. We
have seen, however, that the salutary check which
this constitutes neither does nor can apply in any
efficient degree to the administration of India,
that country being too remote, and its interests too
imperfectly understood, to admit a hope of advan-
tage from such influence. On the contrary, there is
cause to fear that the action of public opinion at
home might give rise to measures which, while
they brought partial and doubtful benefit to Great
Britain, would be productive of serious injury to
India.
K 2
133
CHAPTER X.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
Power of Governor-general.-Proposed Change in his Duties.
-Nomination of Lieutenant-governors to distant parts of
our Possessions. Considerations on the System of Judica-
ture, of Police, and Revenue.-Civil and Military Esta-
blishments.
THE next object of attention is the construction
of our government in India. Mr. Pitt's bill, how-
ever defective in other points, remedied a serious
defect of the local administration of our eastern
territories, by giving ample powers to the Governor-
general in council of Bengal over the other presi-
dencies. It has been ascertained from the fullest
experience, that the internal tranquillity of our pos-
sessions in India, as well as their security against
external attack, has been very greatly promoted by
the measure of placing one head over our wide
territories in that quarter, which has put an end to
contentions with subordinate authorities, and given
combination to the resources of our empire.
Since this bill was passed, many circumstances
have occurred to increase the duties of the Gover-
nor-general in an extraordinary degree. They are,
134
DUTIES OF
at present, more than almost any individual can
perform. From this and other causes it would
appear a very desirable improvement of the present
system, to relieve this high public officer from
details connected with the internal administration
of the government of Bengal. His emancipation
from those limited and local proceedings, in which
much of his time is now consumed, would, in every
way, be productive of public benefit, leaving him
more at liberty than he now can be to attend to
duties of higher importance, and to visit the dis-
tant parts of the empire he governs. The nu-
merous occasions, during the last thirty years, in
which the internal administration of Bengal has
devolved upon a vice-president, has proved from
experience that, as far as its internal rule is con-
cerned, the interests of the Company would not
suffer by such a change; indeed, a governor, who
was confined to that duty alone, might be expected
to fulfil it better than one whose attention is con-
tinually demanded by objects of more importance
to the empire at large.
The clause in the Act of Parliament which
vests in the Governor-general the power of acting
upon his own responsibility, without the concur-
rence, or contrary to the opinion of his council, "in
cases of high importance, and essentially affecting
the public interest and welfare," had a particular
* Vide Geo. III. cap. 3, sec. 47; by the same clause a similar
power is vested in the governor of Madras and Bombay.
GOVERNOR-GENERAL.
135
reference to political measures which he may deem
it his duty to adopt. It would, therefore, be neither
contrary to the principle nor to the usage of the
present local government of India to devolve upon
the Governor-general, personally, its complete poli-
tical administration. In all measures of internal
administration, he would act, with respect to Bengal,
as he now does in the cases reported or referred
for his approbation or decision from Madras and
Bombay; and he would, consequently, as far as
these were concerned, be more limited * in the per-
sonal exercise of power than he is at present. With
regard to political affairs, he certainly would be less
restrained; but then his direct responsibility to his
superiors in England would be greater.
By such arrangement, the Governor-general
would lose the benefit he derives from the informa-
tion and experience of his present counsellors;
but that deficiency would be well supplied by an
arrangement that should give him the aid of the
best talents the public service produced, to fill the
highest situations in his establishment. That of
political and foreign secretary, instead of being a
station to which persons rise (as has been the
usage) from labours in an office at Calcutta, should
* It would, for instance, be a much more responsible exercise
of the power committed to him, to disapprove an act of a
governor and council of Bengal, than it is at present to exercise
his prerogative of adopting a measure from which his council
dissent.
136
DUTIES OF
be placed upon a footing, both as to pay and rank,
that would render it an office of ambition to the
first officers in the political department. The same
should be the case regarding the secretaries in
the public, judicial, revenue, and military depart-
ments. If this plan were adopted, those high
officers, and all who aid them, should be selected
from the whole service, and not from any par-
ticular presidency. The benefit of this part of the
arrangement would be incalculable. It would
excite and reward talent, diffuse the best informa-
tion of every part of India, elevate the services
of Madras and Bombay (as far as pretension to
these high employments went) to an equality
with Bengal, remove jealousies, and make im-
pressions favourable to the supreme authority. Its
tendency would be to enlarge men's minds, and
to carry them beyond the local, to a consideration
of the general, interests of the empire; and, in
this view, its effects would infallibly be productive
of great good. There is no disposition to detract
from the merits of those who have filled, or
continue to fill, the high executive offices at Cal-
cutta, some of whom have been distinguished
men; but the constant residence of a great majo-
rity of this class on one spot, their feelings towards
the particular services to which they belong, their
* High and respected names might be here adduced of
persons who have filled these offices; but men like those could
never suffer from the field of competition being enlarged.
GOVERNOR-GENERAL.
137
natural attachment to institutions and establish-
ments, to promote the success of which the best
efforts of their lives have been devoted, must give
them a bias which cannot but in some degree
narrow the judgment on points that relate to the
general administration of India. No objections
could be offered to such a measure, on the ground
of the public functionaries attached to the Governor-
general not having the local knowledge of particular
parts of India. That knowledge would be possessed
by those who held similar offices under the subor-
dinate governments, to whom would belong all the
details. The secretaries of the departments, with
the Governor-general, would be selected from their
high ability and general acquaintance with the va-
rious interests and systems of the whole empire.
There is no cause produces such bad effects in
our government in India as the continued efforts
to apply the same general rules, principles, and
institutions, to every part of our extended and
diversified empire; and no remedy could be ap-
* This is perceptible not only in the measures of govern-
ment; it is to be found in almost all the writings published
from observation of particular provinces, but rendered general
in their application, either by the ignorance or the vanity of
the authors. This spreads to England, where we have printed
accounts of the habits, manners, customs, religious usages,
and character of the inhabitants of India, specifically true, but
which, if taken generally, are as remote from truth as a de-
scription of Europe would be if drawn from an account of
France or Spain.
138
DUTIES OF
plied so likely to obviate this evil as the arrange-
ment now suggested: but it never could be adopted,
unless the Governor-general's duties were separated
from those that belong to the internal affairs of
the presidency at which he resides.
There would be a further advantage in separating
the duties of a Governor-general* from those of
the local government of Bengal, in its withdrawing
his high name from those minor acts which must
always agitate a community composed like that
of Calcutta. This separation would in no material
degree diminish his power, but it would prevent
the necessity of its daily exercise, in any manner
that could lessen or injure those general impres-
sions of respect which are so essential to the
success of his administration. But, in forming
this and other parts of the plan, great care must
be taken that no diminution be made of the Go-
vernor-general's influence and patronage. These
are necessary for the performance of his large
duties, inasmuch as they increase that consideration
and power which it is essential the person filling
this high station should enjoy.
* The expense necessary to form what would be viewed
by many as a new establishment would not be great. It
would include but little beyond the pay of a governor or
vice-president of Bengal, equal probably to that of the other
presidencies. With regard to other parts of the arrangements,
as the same duties would only have to be done in a different
mode, it would be little more than a transfer of offices, with
some increase of pay to those at the head of each department.
GOVERNOR-GENERAL.
139
Under the present system, the Governor-
general, when at Madras or Bombay, has the
right of presiding at the council-board; and the
objects proposed in Bengal might be effected
without any material change of system, by the
nomination of a permanent vice-president, to
whom the details of the presidency would belong;
leaving, however, the Governor-general the option
of presiding on all occasions on which he might
deem his doing so of importance. This arrange-
ment would prevent the collision which, under other
circumstances, might, perhaps, be apprehended from
the constant or frequent residence of the Governor-
general at Calcutta.
Recent events have carried our direct or con-
trolling power to the remotest parts of India, and a
change is imperiously called for in the form of the
administration of these distant possessions. This
subject has been very fully treated in another
work *, in which the appointment of a Lieutenant-
governor for Malwa, and the adjoining countries, is
strongly recommended; suffice it here to say, that,
in the actual state of our empire, it appears not
only expedient to introduce a new system of local
government into Central India, but into other †
parts of our vast possessions. Such a measure
Vide Central India, vol. I. page 271.
† A similar plan to that proposed for Central India, might
be introduced with good effect into the Deckan, inclusive of
140
PLAN OF
would tend, in a very great degree, to inspire con-
fidence in our subjects, promote tranquillity, and
suppress danger when it arose.
It may be added
to these great advantages, that it would enable us
to effect, with much more facility than we can at
present, such improvements in our internal system
as are recommended by experience, and are required
by the difference of character and condition in the
inhabitants of the countries we have to govern from
those of the provinces for whose benefit our esta-
blished institutions were framed. Nor is it unim-
portant to state, that this scheme of rule, while it
gave strength to our power, would ultimately be
attended with economy; for, through it, we might
expect to diminish our most expensive establish-
ments, by arrangements which would be favourable,
not only to the preservation of whatever of rank
or high feeling still remains among the natives of
India subject to our power and control, but to the
desirable object of employing them in our internal
government. Many persons who profess a great
desire to enlighten and improve the natives of India,
exclaim against plans which are calculated to confer
upon these natives high and confidential employ-
ment, on the ground of their being, as a people,
ignorant, corrupt, and immoral. Allowing for a
the Nagpore territories, and north-western parts of Hindustan
Proper. Mr. James Stuart, in a very able paper on the polico,
(vide Fifth Report, page 586) suggests a subordinate govern-
ment for the latter country.
LIEUTENANT-GOVERNORS.
141
moment this melancholy picture to be correct, can
it enter into the mind of any man who has the
slightest knowledge of human nature or of human
communities, that mere instruction, whether moral
or religious, will ever advance men in civilization
while they are excluded* from all that stimulates
the mind to good and great actions? We may teach
them to understand, better than they now do, their
own depressed and degraded condition; but if we
wish that, as they acquire knowledge, they should
maintain their allegiance and attachment to those
by whom it is imparted, we must grant them con-
fidence and respect; and if we succeed in giving
them consequence in their own estimation, they
will soon attain it in that of others.
* Mr. James Stuart, in the report before alluded to, treats
this part of the subject with great ability. "Are the natives of
Hindustan (he asks) a different order of beings, that they are to
be stinted into honesty, and degraded into principle?"-Report
V. page 581. The same able public officer, after remarking on
the importance of gradations in society amongst the natives, and
the necessity, if we mean improvement, for building our plans
on the existing basis of their ancient institutions, and to adopt
them to their habits and manners,-comments upon the
probable result of the existing system, and forcibly observes,
“As we proceed, these provinces will soon present the singular
spectacle of a great empire, the government of which rigidly
excludes its subjects from every object of fair ambition which
in the pursuit could stimulate men to cultivate their faculties,
or, in the possession, enlarge their understanding, and elevate
their minds."-Fifth Report, page 584.
142
EMPLOYMENT OF NATIVES.
It is not to be expected that we can ever com-
pletely succeed in establishing any cordial or social
union with the natives of India. We are, as fo-
reigners differing in manners, language, religion,
and feelings, too much opposed to them to admit
of our ever realizing such hopes; but our efforts
should nevertheless be continually directed to the
object of reconciling them to their condition.
Nothing can tend so much to this as their em-
ployment. The character of our government de-
bars us from intrusting them with military or po-
litical power; but this is the strongest of all reasons
for bringing them forward in every manner that is
unattended with danger. The acquisition of know-
ledge, under a system which almost excludes the
higher classes of our native subjects from any par-
ticipation in the government of their own country,
must either rouse them to efforts against our au-
thority, or sink them into a state of abject submis-
sion, and leave them with few objects in life beyond
indolence and sensual indulgence.
The great evil of our Indian administration,
throughout all its branches, arises out of the en-
deavour to simplify, through the means of uniform
systems, the whole scheme of our government
over the natives. This, by rendering a know-
ledge of its details apparently easy, gives to those
employed at the seat of government a confidence in
their competency to minute superintendence, which
JUDICATURE.
143
renders them adverse to all deviations and changes
from prescribed rules, however such may be recom-
mended by local circumstances. It is to this feeling,
and a natural love of power, that we must ascribe
the dislike evinced to any delegation of authority
which lessens their consequence, by investing an
individual with that rank and station which gives
him a latitude of action beyond their daily check
and control. The period, however, is arrived when
all minor considerations must give way to the great
object of securing the peace and promoting the
prosperity of our extended territories; and full ex-
perience leads us to a conclusion, that no one mea-
sure would contribute more to these ends than that
which has been here suggested.
JUDICIAL SYSTEM.
What has been said naturally leads to observa-
tions upon the system of judicature, which was
first established in Bengal, and afterwards extended
to Madras and Bombay. A minute examination of
the merits of this system would occupy a volume.
It is here meant to limit inquiry to one important
point, which is, not whether the existing courts of
judicature within our former possessions should
undergo a change or reform, but whether they
should be extended to our newly-acquired terri-
tories.
144
JUDICATURE.
The parliament of Great Britain decreed that the
natives of India should be governed by their own
laws and customs. The supreme government of
Bengal established the existing system, on the
ground, no doubt, of its being best suited to the
country of Bengal, where Mahomedan rule had
been for a long time established. They were pro-
bably induced to give the Mahomedan code*, with
all its defects, the preference over that of the Hindus,
from the latter having nothing that can be well
termed a defined and comprehensive system of juris-
prudence upon which any courts of justice under our
authority could act. But the situation of Bengal,
in which this measure was first adopted, was widely
different from other parts of India, which, it cannot
be too often repeated, consist not of one but many
nations, and has not one but many systems of rule
and of law. Almost every province has different
established customs, or, in other words, laws, from
that next to it. These were not written, it is true;
but observance of them from time immemorial has
given them all the sanction and authority of laws,
and their very forms are associated with the most
ancient and revered of the Hindu usages and
institutions. The Mahomedan conquest of India
*This refers to the criminal law: the civil law has regard to
the religion and usages of all classes of our native subjects; the
forms and habits of our courts are borrowed from those of the
Mahomedan rulers of India.
OF INDIA.
145
was never complete. The Hindu princes and chiefs,
though tributary, maintained the internal manage-
ment of a great proportion of India; and even in
other parts of the empire, Hindu usages were seldom
interfered with, except for purposes of extortion or
oppression. It may, therefore, be assumed, that, not-
withstanding that spirit of domination, and that con-
tempt for infidels, which marked the Mahomedan
rulers, their law was never more than formally intro-
duced * among their Hindu subjects, who continued,
inalmost all cases, to be governed by their own usages.
Subsequent to the introduction of the judicial
system, the original law has been almost buried
under volumes of regulations and ordinances, ren-
dered necessary to adapt it to our principles of rule.
The best talents of the civil service of the Company
have been devoted to the judicial department; but
it may be remarked that, although the courts of
justice have been supported by the most libéral ex-
penditure, and although those who preside in them
are, generally speaking, as remarkable for their
laborious application and abilities, as for their in-
tegrity, the establishment has never become popular
among that people, in conformity to whose real or
supposed prejudices it was constituted.
* There was, it is true, a Mahomedan cauzee in almost every
town and village, but where the Hindu population prevailed,
his duties were limited to his own tribe. This, on investiga-
tion, appears to have been the general rule; the exceptions to it
were cases of oppression.
VOL. II.
L
146
JUDICATURE
What has been stated will sufficiently account
for this impression amongst the Hindus; and we
may affirm of the Mahomedans, that the nume-
rous changes necessarily made both in the civil
and criminal code, and the circumstance of a
Christian judge presiding in the court, must have
effaced much of that respect and awe which he
may be conceived to have for a system of law
founded on the Koran. Concluding such to be
the general feeling of all classes, we cannot, con-
sidering the condition of society in which we
found them, be surprised that a considerable pro-
portion of the higher ranks of our native sub-
jects, both Hindu and Mahomedan, should have
felt dissatisfied at the introduction of a system
which, in seeking the ends of rigid and im-
partial justice, give more attention to general
principles and strict forms than to persons and
prejudices.
* A Bengal civil servant of experience and reputation,
remarking on the code of criminal law we have adopted from
the Mahomedans, observes, "As to the Hindus, not one in
a thousand of their pundits (domestic teachers, or learned
men) can read Persian, much less Arabic; and, added to this,
when these persons. would consider it a defilement to peruse
the books wherein alone the law can be found, it is easy
to credit the fact, that the whole Hindu race has been, and
ever will continue, ignorant of those rules which determine
their liberty and existence."-Letter from Mr. Fortescue, offi-
ciating judge at Benares, to Chief Secretary Bayley, dated
Juonpore, 17th Feb. 1816.
OF INDIA.
147
The nature of the present work will not admit
of entering at any length upon a subject on which
the opinions of able men are so divided as that of
our judicial establishments. It is a much easier
task to detect the errors of a system than to point
out a remedy by establishing the superiority of one
that is untried. There are some defects, however,
of our judicature, on which almost all appear
agreed.
The delays and expenses attendant upon the
courts we have instituted form a very constant
subject of complaint; and, while the purity of the
English judges is recognised by all, there is an
universal impression of the insolence and venality
of their subordinate native officers, whose exer-
cise of the authority in which they are clothed
has been rendered more unpopular from their
being often taken from persons in the lowest ranks
of society.
The prejudices which exist against our courts
of judicature in the country of Rohilcund, where
a great proportion of the inhabitants are Maho-
medans, have been already noticed*. The opinion
of the commissioners and of several of the judges
in that country was given in very strong and
decided language; and many other names of the
best-informed and ablest civil servants in Bengal
might be brought forward to establish the fact,
that, in the countries under that government,
* Vol. I., p. 586.
L 2
148
JUDICATURE
>
where alone the system has had a full trial, there
has been considerable disappointment; and that,
notwithstanding the improvements which have
been introduced, much remains to be done before
our judicial institutions can be made to fulfil the
objects contemplated by their benevolent founder.
It is not meant to state that great good has not
resulted from the institution of our courts of
justice with such principles as government has
acted upon; with such industry and talent as
have been applied to promote this system; and
with the blessing of undisturbed tranquillity for
forty years in the provinces of Bengal and Bahar,
it was impossible that any system of judicature
administered during so long a period should not
have been productive of good. It is also admitted
that our present subjects in the countries men-
tioned must now be more reconciled to this
system than they were at first, and that to intro-
duce any change subversive of an institution so
long established, would on every ground be most
unwise and impolitic; but on the other hand, all
must agree that it is our duty to continue our un-
wearied efforts to remedy its defects *.
* The alleged defects of our present system are, that it
excites a spirit of litigation; that its delays are great; that
the expense attending suits is considerable; that the laws,
from their original narrow basis, and from being framed more
as expedients to meet particular cases than on general princi-
ples, have become so voluminous and complicated that a
OF INDIA.
149
The furnishing* of native law officers with the
best means of instruction; the obliging of them to
possess certain qualifications and respectability of
character; and the increased employment and more
extended jurisdiction of the courts of native com-
missioners † and Punchayets, will be found the
complete knowledge of them is hardly attainable; that they
are, consequently, understood by few; and that among the
natives who study them, many have no object but to take
advantage of their complexity to screen guilt, or as the means
of involving or defrauding others with impunity.
* The native law officers should be educated at public
institutions, founded and supported on principles calculated
not merely for the professional, but general improvement; and
no individual should receive a license to practise, who did not
add good character to the necessary acquirements. We should
also create some objects of profit and distinction, to which
men of talent and integrity might aspire: the natives, who
devoted themselves to this branch, would, from their efforts to
obtain such honourable rewards, rise in the estimation of their
countrymen; and, from such a change, we might expect great
benefit to such a system of judicature.
† In 1821, the jurisdiction of the native commissioners was
extended to suits of 500 rupees. The success of this experi-
ment will probably cause a greater extension of their power,
and we may, perhaps, anticipate a period when the English
zillah judge will have few causes but those of appeal from the
native courts.
It is often stated by those that are adverse to the extension
of the judicature of Punchayet, that the records of the go-
vernment of India prove that they are not a popular court,
because they are not so much resorted to by the natives as
the courts of Adawlut. The cause of this has been elsewhere
150
JUDICATURE
best mode of diminishing delays and expense: but
the most essential of all measures would be, a com-
plete revision of the whole of the laws and regula-
tions, and the formation of an almost new code.
To the accomplishment of such a task the very
highest talents in the service should be directed;
and it would not so much require superiority of
stated. “Under a native prince, when complaints were made
or accusations brought forward, and he, instead of a despotic
award, directed, in a spirit of justice or moderation, that a
punchayet should assemble to investigate them, can any man,
acquainted with the principles upon which such states acted,
and the feelings of those subject to their authority, believe
that the defendant or complainant (though each had the privi-
lege of a fair challenge) deemed himself at liberty, whatever
nominal forms might exist, to refuse to submit his case to the
tribunal ordered to investigate it? He could not but know
that such conduct would be deemed contumacy, and subject
him to all the hazard of a summary and violent proceeding.
Under the British government men can have no such appre-
hension, and, unless the rule is made absolute for trial of
certain cases in these courts, it would not be in one out of a
hundred that the two parties would assent. Both the plaintiff
and defendant would calculate whether they had the best
chance of gaining their suit by applying to a punchayet or
zillah; and whenever they did not agree, the latter court, in
which the forms are compulsory, would be that in which the
case was at last tried. But this result must not be brought
forward as a decided proof of its superior popularity. Before
such a fact can be admitted, it must be established whether
the preference to it is given by the honest men or the rogues."
-Vide Central India, vol. ii. p. 296.
OF INDIA.
151
legal skill in those employed * upon it, as that they
should be endowed with minds unfettered by preju-
dice for or against any particular system, and be
disposed to take the fullest advantage of the facts
and experience which late years have accumulated.
No expense would be too great to incur for the
completion of such an object; but it is not likely
this general code could be very large, for unless we
continue a desire to impose, at all hazards, the same
rules and regulations upon the whole of India, each
division of our empire should have a subsidiary
code of its own, framed with attention to the par-
ticular character and usage of its inhabitants.
It is here to be remarked, that we cannot be too
careful how we extend our judicial system. Bengal
Proper, from the character of its submissive inha-
bitants, was the safest part of our dominion upon
which we could make such an experiment. Its intro-
duction into Hindustan became more dangerous;
and the Hindu inhabitants of Malwa and Raj-
pootana, whose habits and customs have never
undergone any great changes, even under the Ma-
homedan government, would ill receive such an
intended benefit: but this subject has been treated
elsewhere, and a plan has been suggested † for ad-
ministering justice, which is believed to be better
suited to the actual condition of those countries.
* Such a commission would, of course, be aided by the
information and opinions of the ablest natives from the different
parts of our dominions.
† Vide " Central India," vol. ii. page 246.
152
JUDICATURE
We cannot better illustrate the principles of this
plan, than by quoting the work to which we have
alluded.
66
Supposing," the author observes, “a local go-
vernment established over Central India every way
efficient for its permanent administration, the
manner in which it should exercise its functions
ought (as far as general principles are concerned)
to be settled. The first question would be, the
mode in which it should administer justice, both in
cases occurring in its own territories, and in those
referred to its arbitration and decision by dependent
states. It will however, before we treat this part
of the subject, be useful to offer some general
observations that have particular application to
countries in the situation of Central India.
"The most serious part of this question, and one
which lies at the very threshold, is, whether we
are, in the shape and substance of our admi-
nistration of justice, to pay most attention to our
own rules, principles, and prejudices, or to those
of the nation, or rather nations, we have to go-
vern? We may lay it down as a first principle,
that no system can be good that is not thoroughly
understood and appreciated by those for whose
benefit it is intended. The minds of men can
never be tranquillized, much less attached, until
they are at repose regarding the intentions of
the authority under which they live, which they
never can be till all classes see and comprehend
its principles of government. If our system is
OF INDIA.
153
in advance of the community, if it is founded
on principles not comprehended by them, and has
forms and usages adverse to their habits and
feelings, we shall experience no adequate return
of confidence and allegiance. To secure these
results, we must associate ourselves with our sub-
jects. We could never have conquered India
without the assistance of the natives of that
country, and by them alone can we preserve it.
Our actual condition makes this necessity more
imperative. We are not called upon to lower
ourselves to their standard, but we must descend
so far from the real or supposed eminence on
which we stand as to induce them to accompany
us in the work of improvement. Great and
beneficial alterations in society, to be complete,
must be produced within the society itself; they
cannot be the mere fabrication of its superiors,
or of a few who deem themselves enlightened.
Every chord of the instrument must be in tune,
or there will be no good harmony. This com-
pels men, who desire real reforms in large com-
munities, to dread what is often termed reason,
because the majority, whom it is desired to be-
nefit, are not rational, in the abstract and refined
acceptation of the word; and because no pro-
jected benefit can be operative till it is under-
stood and recognised as such by those for whose
good it is intended. This reasoning applies to
all the legislative measures that we have adopted,
154
POLICE
or may hereafter adopt, in our eastern empire;
but it is meant in this place to limit the deduc-
tions from it to those which appear expedient
for Central India. The great majority of the in-
habitants of that country are Hindus :-to in-
troduce therefore, a jurisdiction grounded, even
in its forms, on the imperfect code of the Maho-
medans, who do not bear a proportion* to the
whole population of five to the hundred, would be
an innovation almost as great as the introduction
of the English law, and one, from causes which
have already been stated, much more repugnant to
the feelings of the inhabitants. If we desire to
conciliate the latter, or to benefit by their aid, we
must adopt a system that is familiar and intelligible
to them; and, as the groundwork of that, we must
preserve and restore the courts of Punchayet."
POLICE.
The passive character and quiet domestic habits
of a great proportion of our Indian subjects, leads
them to place as much, if not more, value than any
other nation upon an efficient police, to secure them
in the enjoyment of that peaceful routine of life
which they so generally prefer. Their respect for
*The proportion of the Mahomedans to the Hindus, in Cen-
tral India, has been computed as one to twenty-one and a half.
Vide p. 225. It is still less in the neighbouring country of
Rajpootana.
!
OF INDIA.
155
the government under which they live is measured
more by the success with which it protects them
from the thief, the plunderer, and the murderer,
than by any other of its acts. The arrangements
for the duties of police, introduced in Bengal at the
period of the permanent settlement, were far from
successful. At one period, indeed, the failure of this
system was quite alarming: opinions were divided
whether this proceeded from the inactivity or ineffi-
ciency of those intrusted with its execution, or the
radical defects of the system; but one point was
clear, that while we prided ourselves in the liberal
and just general principles upon which our judicial
and revenue systems were grounded, the district all
around Calcutta became infested with robbers and
murderers in a degree that rendered, for many years,
life and property more insecure than they were in
the most barbarous countries. Efficient measures
* Lord Minto, in a despatch dated in May, 1810, states that
the evidences lately adduced, exclusive of a multiplicity of
other proofs, establishes, beyond a question, the commission of
robberies, murders, and the most deliberate cruelties; in a
word, an aggregate of the most atrocious crimes: nor let it
be supposed, he adds, that these offences were of rare occur-
rence, or confined to particular districts; they were committed,
with few exceptions, and with slight modifications of atrocity,
in every part of Bengal.
Mr. Dowdeswell, chief secretary to government, in an able
report on the police, observes, "Were I to enumerate only a
thousandth part of the atrocities of the decoits, and of the
unjust sufferings of the people; and were I to soften that
recital in every mode which language would permit, I should
156
POLICE
were adopted to correct this great evil, and the sub-
ject of police has since received much attention,
both from the government at home and abroad.
A question has been long agitated, whether we
should employ the collector of the revenue as a
magistrate or not. The objections to our doing so
have their foundation on general reasoning, drawn
from analogy of the practice of other states, and in
that jealousy of the misapplication of power which
belongs to the constitution of England, and which
it is good to preserve in our administration of India,
still despair of obtaining credit, solely on my own authority,
for the accuracy of the narrative. * * * * * Volumes
might be filled with the atrocities of the decoits, every line of
which would make the blood run cold with horror."
Mr. Edward Strachey, judge of circuit, whose opportunities.
of observing the extent of this evil were ample, gives his
opinion on this subject very fully in a letter, under date 13th
of June, 1808, to Mr. Bayley, register of the Nizamut Adaw-
lut. "That decoity," he observes, "is very prevalent in
Rajeshahye has been often stated; but if its vast extent were
known,-if the scenes of horror, the murders, the burnings,
the excessive cruelties, which are continually perpetrated here,
were properly represented to government, I am confident that
some measures would be adopted to remedy the evil: certainly
there is not an individual belonging to the government who
does not anxiously wish to save the people from robbery and
massacre; yet the situation of the people is not sufficiently
attended to. It cannot be denied that, in point of fact, there
is no protection for persons or property; and that the present
wretched, mechanical, inefficient, system of police is a mere
mockery.”—Vide Fifth Report, and Collection of Revenue
Papers.
OF INDIA.
157
Į
as far as we can without injury to our means for
its efficient government. It is on the latter ground
that the advocates for employing the collector rest
their chief arguments. They assert that the duties
of the collector must lead to an intercourse with
the inhabitants of his district, which will give him
the means of preventing crime, and of seizing crimi-
nals, beyond what any other can possess. Without
denying that the influence and power which he
possesses as magistrate may be sometimes abused,
they argue, that no evil is likely to arise from such
occasional misconduct which can in any way ba-
lance the benefit to be derived from his agency
in the efficient administration of police.
The above arguments have certainly more of
Asiatic than of English principles, but they are not
on that account less worthy of attention; for, after
all, the question is not, what is most consonant to
our own views and feelings, but what will be pro-
ductive of the greatest good, and tend most to the
happiness and security of our eastern subjects.
The employment of a civil servant having no
other functions, as a magistrate, has this strong ob-
jection; that if his talents render him capable of
efficiently fulfilling the important duties attached
to that office, he must be early promoted to other
stations, and there is no line in which experi-
ence is of so much consequence as in the depart-
ment of police. The best recommendation of this
plan is, that it forms a good education for a person
158
POLICE
who is to rise to the office of judge, but such in-
struction is only necessary when the judicial and
revenue lines are kept distinct. Where the con-
trary is the case, there is no such school for judicial
duties as the office of a collector. It has been
justly observed by a distinguished civil officer,
"that the assistant of the collector comes in daily
colloquial intercourse with the cultivators and pro-
prietors of the soil. In every ministerial act, he
gains an insight into their domestic habits, their
social dependance, and their more public concerns.
He discovers the origin of their individual influence,
of their mutual necessities, of their reciprocal de-
pendance, and of their ultimate connexion with
the government. He thus acquires a notice of the
springs and motives which actuate them, and, by
the nature of his duty, is engaged rather in concili-
ating and arbitrating, than in dictating and en-
forcing his opinions.
"But how widely different," he adds, "is the
situation of an assistant to the magistrate, who
instantly begins by being a judge in every case,
before he has an opportunity of forming even any
very general ideas on the nature of the affairs he
must daily determine. After a course of practice,
he may establish rules for his guidance, founded on
the uniformity of his own decisions, or by other
means; but, at starting, he can have had no ele-
* Vide Letter from Mr. Fortescue to Mr. Secretary Bailey,
18th February, 1816.
159
OF INDIA.
ments to regulate their principles; every thing is
necessarily new and strange to him, from a want
of any previous familiarity with the propensities
and peculiarities of the people. To begin, then,
by first deciding, and afterwards learning the matter,
is surely preposterous.
"The revenue assistant," he concludes, "com-
mences his course by placing himself among the
people in an easy and unreserved manner; the
judicial, by elevating himself above them with a
distant and commanding air. The former is first
employed in learning, from its springs and ties, the
rudiments of a novel species of policy; the latter,
without any lights, in determining its rights and
usages.
""
What has been quoted from this long and able
despatch is merely to establish that, even if a
regard for general principles, and alarm at the pos-
sible abuse of power, may prevent our blending
magisterial duties with those of the collector, we
may rest satisfied that the former will, when in-
trusted to youth, be best performed by those who
have been schooled in the revenue department.
It is in its minute details that a true knowledge of
the art of Indian administration can alone be
learnt; and whenever this branch of the govern-
ment is thoroughly well-administered, and those to
whom the police is committed are every way effi-
cient to their duties, a great burden will be taken
from the higher branches of the judicial department,
160
POLICE
and our subjects will become more satisfied with
our rule when the effects of our system are to re-
press, not to produce litigation; and to prevent
crimes by decreasing the hope of escaping detection
and punishment.
The introduction of a new system of police in
Bengal was contemporaneous with the permanent
settlement of the revenue, and was framed, in a
great degree, to meet the changes which that
measure made in the community. The fluctuating
state of the revenue of the provinces which it was
desired to settle; the great abuses which pre-
vailed among all clothed in authority, from the
highest Zemindar to the lowest officer of a village,
suggested the complete abolition of their power, as
the most effectual remedy of the evils which resulted
from the tyranny and oppression of this host of
petty authorities. The motives that led to this
sweeping act can never be doubted: it was dictated
by a pure spirit of benevolence and justice; but
a better and more minute knowledge of the interior
of the frame of Hindu communities would have
prevented our casting away such means of pre-
serving the internal peace of the country. It would
have led to an effort to reform those, whose place
in the society in which they were born would have
rendered them, if we had succeeded, as efficient
instruments of good as, under a different system,
they had been of bad order; but no such effort
was made, and a police establishment was given to
•
OF INDIA.
161
each magistrate of persons taken indiscriminately
from the population of the country.
The failure of the system in the province of
Bengal has led to great efforts at improving the
police in that part of India; and, to a certain extent,
they have been successful. In Cattack, where the
village establishments have been reformed and re-
novated, and every power, consistent with the prin-
ciples of our rule, delegated to the principal natives,
the effects have been most happy to the peace of
the country*.
An improved and more effective system of police
has been introduced into several of our recently-
acquired possessions. We may, however, lay it
down as a maxim, that our success in this, as in
other branches of our rule, will chiefly depend on
our preserving those institutions and gradations of
society which we found established, and on our
giving to the most respectable of our native subjects
local employment of a description that will raise
instead of lower them in the community to which
they belong; nor are we to expect any health or
efficiency in our internal system, till it thus encou-
rages this class of our subjects to the most active
personal exertions for the preservation of the pub-
lic peace of their native districts.
It has often been proposed to employ a propor-
* Vide Letter from Bengal, dated 11th January, 1822.
† The court of directors, in a letter to Bengal, dated the 8th
November, 1818, desire government to take into "early consi-
VOL. II.
M
162
POLICE
tion of the native officers and men of our army in
the duties of the police, and no plan could be more
calculated to encourage and reward a class of men
on whose fidelity and valour the duration of our
empire must depend. This subject, however, will
be noticed hereafter; suffice it here to state, that
we must not allow ourselves to be deterred from the
adoption of the measure (which is much more im-
portant in a political than a financial view) by any
arguments that do not prove it to be an injustice to
our other subjects, or pregnant with danger instead
of security to the internal peace of the country and
the general interests of the empire.
deration the best mode of employing a certain number of the
native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates
in the Bengal police establishments, to be taken either from
the invalid or pension lists, or such as government might think
proper to allow to be withdrawn from the regular service for
that particular purpose." The court trusted that “ a consi-
derable saving might be made by the employment of native
officers and soldiers in the discharge of police duties; as,
notwithstanding a considerable inducement ought to be held
out to the native police officer and soldier to stimulate him to
exertion in such situations, some deduction might be made,
say one-third, for the allowance he would continue to derive
from his military service."
The court did not enter into any specification of the parti-
cular posts in the police establishments to which they wished.
to see deserving native officers and soldiers appointed; but
they observed, that they "confidently trusted that no minor
objections or particularities would be allowed to frustrate or
obstruct so great a political object as the proposed arrange-
ment had in view."
OF INDIA.
163
European officers are employed at the Tannah *
establishment of Bengal, and would be required
wherever similar institutions are made; but an
important question would arise, how far their ser-
vices might be essential in the event of a change of
system, that should improve the whole police esta-
blishment of India, and convert it into means of
encouraging and rewarding the native soldiery.
There is one fact connected with this question
which must not be omitted. The feelings and
principles imbibed by military habits are distinct
from all others, and it may be asserted that it very
rarely happens that a person educated and employed
in civil life understands how to treat soldiers. This
particularly applies in India, where the change pro-
duced on the natives from entering our army is
very considerable. The nature of the duty de-
volved on native soldiers employed in the police,
would require their being kept under strict order;
and, perhaps, the best mode of securing the success
of such an arrangement would be to select from
the army well-qualified officers, of a certain stand-
ing, as superintendents of police, or as magistrates.
This would not be depriving the civil service of em-
ployments that are or ever can be objects of profit
*This is an establishment for providing for old soldiers by
grants of land.
† Several military officers have been employed in this line,
and particularly at Madras, where the success that has attended
this limited experiment warrants the most sanguine antici-
pations of its success on a more extended scale.
M 2
164
POLICE
or ambition; and they would soon discover the ad-
vantage of relief from a mass of petty and vexatious
duties, which, if sedulously attended to, must inter-
fere with other and higher labours, and which, on
the other hand, cannot be neglected, even for a
moment, without danger to the property and, per-
haps, the life of some member of the community.
Many objections may be made to this plan. It
will be urged that the very rapidity of execution,
which forms the excellence of military officers in
the field, would be a serious fault when they were
acting as civil officers; that from habit they would
be prone in peace to a vigour beyond the law; and
that a clashing with the civil authorities might be
apprehended. It may, perhaps, be added, that in the
event of the European officers of the army ever
forgetting their duty to government, they would find
aid instead of obstruction from those to whom, by
this plan, the charge of the public peace would be
confided.
In this question, as in every other of any magni-
tude connected with the government of India, mea-
sures must be decided by the balance of the advan-
tages against their defects. It is always a choice
of difficulties. If, from a consideration of the pub-
lic safety, it is indispensable to employ any part
of the native soldiery in the police, and if it is ex-
pedient to have this description of persons com-
manded by those who are accustomed to them,
means must be adopted to render the system as
165
OF INDIA.
little hurtful as possible to the other parts of the
administration, and to obviate all apprehension of
its ever being attended with danger to the state.
To effect this, a complete separation perhaps of
those who entered the police department from the
army might be necessary; in such case, they might
be selected for the lower situations of this new line
as soon as qualified for them, and rise by merit and
exertion to the higher gradations of the department.
The army would in fact become an ordeal of cha-
racter, while to a certain extent it formed the habits
of men who would constitute, what is much re-
quired, a second class of civil officers, limited to
specific and subordinate duties. It would perhaps
be better to commence by trying this plan on a
limited scale, and if it succeeded, it could easily
be extended.
REVENUE.
The limits of this work will admit only a few
general observations on the collection of the re-
venue of our Indian empire. This question, which
is of primary consequence to our prosperity in a
financial view, acquires still more importance from
its intimate connexion with the subjects that have
been previously treated; for it may be asserted,
without fear of contradiction, that, as we succeed or
fail in our revenue settlements, we shall increase or
decrease litigation and crime. The real fact is,
that from the character and construction of Indian
communities, the happiness and comfort of nine-
166
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION
tenths of the population depends more upon our
fiscal than our judicial or political arrangements.
From time immemorial the inhabitants of India
have been an agricultural people; thence that extra-
ordinary and minute division of land, and of all the
claims and rights which are connected with it, from
the share of the sovereign of the country, and the
dues of his officers, down to the smaller portions
which belong by hereditary right to the lowest
among those who form part of the village commu-
nity, or who cultivate the soil. The period of such
division of the land cannot be exactly traced, but
it probably existed for many centuries before the Ma-
homedan invasion. These conquerors, if they could
spread their power, appear to have been content,
with few exceptions, not only to leave the Hindu
institutions undisturbed, but to incorporate them
in their own government. It was not however to
be expected, amid the wars and revolutions with
which India has so often been afflicted, that her
provinces would continue under an uniform system,
even if they ever had one. The change in popula-
tion of some, the complete desolation of others,
could not but alter the forms as well as the prin-
ciples of the most ancient and revered institutions ;
but still, from the extremity of Cape Comorin to
the north-western limits of India, a striking simi-
larity of general features may be found in all that
regards the culture of the soil and the rights at-
tached to it.
167
OF INDIA.
Where the sword of the conqueror has not
violated the rights of the proprietor or the culti-
vator, he claims the land of his fathers, (subject to
the land tax, or government share) as well as all
that belongs to his condition in his native district,
as his indefeasible inheritance; and where violence
and usurpation have destroyed these rights, they
have generally been re-created by the tendency of
the inhabitants to return to the ways of their pro-
genitors, or by the policy of their rulers, who saw
in those institutions aids to their own government.
The new head of the village, where such was the
case, and all under him, had claims or rights con-
ferred upon them, more or less, as circumstances
dictated, resembling their former shape; and the
mere fact that his ancestors had, for two or three
generations, tilled certain fields, established the right
of the cultivator in the soil he cultivated, which
nothing but injustice and tyranny could violate.
The local differences in the value and extent of
such rights were numerous; but everywhere they
existed, and were so well understood and sanc-
tioned by usage, that they not only formed the
foundation of every revenue arrangement, but pre-
served, amid wars and changes, amid rapine and
plunder, ties and principles which had an effect in
restoring order and prosperity that could hardly be
credited, except by those by whom it has been
witnessed*.
*The rights of the native hereditary officers of a village
are much respected in Central India; and never did a country
168
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION
The first great and decisive step of the English
government towards establishing a fixed revenue
afford such proofs of the imperishable nature of this admirable.
institution. After the Pindarie war, every encouragement
was held out for the inhabitants to return to their desolate
homes. In several districts, particularly those near the Ner-
budda, many of the villages had been waste for more than
thirty years. The inhabitants, who had been scattered, fol-
lowed all occupations: many poteils, who had been obliged to
leave their lands, had become plunderers, and remained at or
near their ruined villages; some of their relations and friends
followed their example; others cultivated grounds at a dis-
tance of several hundred miles from their homes; while a great
majority went to the large towns, were they found a tempo-
rary asylum, and obtained subsistence by labouring in gardens
or fields. But there is no people in whose hearts the love of
the spot where they were born seems more deeply implanted
than the Hindus; and those of Central India, under all their
miseries and dispersion, appear never for a moment to have
given up the hope of being restored to their homes. The fa-*
milies of each village, though remote from each other, main-
tained a constant communication; inter-marriages were made,
and the links that bound them together were only strengthened
by adversity. When convinced that tranquillity was esta-
blished, they flocked to their roofless houses. Infant poteils
(the second and third in descent from the emigrator) were in
many cases carried at the head of these parties.
When they
reached their villages, every wall of a house, every field, was
taken possession of by the owner or cultivator, without dispute
or litigation amongst themselves, or with government; and in
a few days everything was in progress, as if it had never been
disturbed. There was seldom any difficulty from the claims of
other occupants; for local authorities, which appeared to he-
sitate at no means that promised profit, rejected the most ad-
vantageous offers from new settlers, while a hope remained
that an hereditary officer or cultivator, who had claims to the
OF INDIA.
169
system in India, was the permanent settlement
made of the territories of Bengal, in 1789. This
measure, the merits of which have given rise to
great discussion*, is now admitted, by its warmest
advocates, to have been too much hurried, and to
have been adopted with very incomplete informa-
tion, both as to the extent and resources of the
countries settled, and to the various claims, rights,
and relations of its inhabitants.
It is not meant to enter upon this large ques-
tion further than is necessary to determine, how
far, and in what mode, it may be expedient to ex-
tend the permanent settlement to more recently-
acquired territories.
The fundamental principles of this measure are,
to facilitate the collection of the revenue, to put an
management or cultivation of its lands, was likely to return.
The worst of these rulers are not insensible to the necessity of
preserving from injury this admirable and well-constructed
foundation of their civil government and revenue system.-
Central India, Vol. II., p. 20.
* Colonel Wilks, the able historian of the South of India,
has devoted a chapter to the examination of the nature of land-
ed property in India; his opinions, confirmed and illustrated
as they are by the labour of his research, and the soundness
of his judgment, are entitled to the greatest attention: his
work (a) was the first which treated this subject in a manner
worthy of its importance, and none of the facts it contains, or
the general principles it has laid down, have ever been success-
fully controverted. We are also indebted to the same intelli-
gent author for the first full and clear account of village insti-
tutions, and courts of Punchayet.
(a) Vide vol. i. c. v. ·
170
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION
end to all fluctuations in our receipts from the
land, and to encourage improvements, by giving the
benefit of them to those by whom they are made.
It was assumed by Lord Cornwallis, when he in-
troduced this system, that, supposing the right of
the zemindar * to the soil not to be the best, (which
he believed it to be) it was expedient, for many
reasons connected with the improvement of the
country, to vest it in him, or some other person:
"it being (to use his own words) immaterial to
government what individual possesses the land,
provided he cultivates it, protects the ryut, and
pays the revenue."
*The term zemindar, literally landholder, is sometimes used
in the provinces of India to describe a person holding a small
property in land, but oftener as the head or representative of
the agricultural class in a district. Such persons were in ge-
neral employed by the Mogul governors of provinces as col-
lectors of the revenue; and as such, established fees, and nan-
kar zumeen, or land for their support, was assigned to them.
Of this assigned land, which was proportioned in extent to
their duties, they had only the government share. These offi-
cers become, according to Hindu usage, hereditary; and in the
decline of the Mahomedan empire, they usurped on its weak-
ness, and many of them used the force allowed them for the
purpose of maintaining the police, to defend their zemindaries,
now converted into principalities, from the authority they or
their ancestors had served. But even when their usurpation
succeeded, they had only the right to the government share of
the soil, unless, perhaps, to some small lands of which their
family were original possessors. For the particulars of the
rights and occupations of zemindars, vide "Central India,"
vol. II., page 7.
1
OF INDIA.
171
The above is sufficient to show the character
of that fundamental general principle upon which
Lord Cornwallis acted. Experience, and more in-
timate acquaintance with the usages, the feelings,
and the institutions of the natives of India, led his
colleague, Sir John Shore *, to make every effort
to obtain delay in a measure of which he foresaw
the evils; but the ardent desire of Lord Cornwallis
to confer what he believed would prove a blessing
to our subjects, and a benefit to government, made
him overrule every objection to the immediate ac-
complishment of his favourite plan.
This great measure was confessedly adopted
without a minute or correct notion of the actual
state of property, and the rights of the various
classes of the inhabitants, particularly those of the
lower orders. It seems to have been expected
that certain broad general principles which sim-
plified the revenue system, and combined the
interests of great landholders with the prosperity
of the country, would produce such good as to
make amends for all the minor evils that were
anticipated. How far these expectations have been
confirmed will be judged by those who attentively
peruse the volumes of official documents which have
been published on this important subject.
The zemindars, whom it was the desire of this
system to elevate, became its earliest victims.
Ill suited, from their habits and character, to fulfil
* Now Lord Teignmouth.
172
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION
the duties which their new condition required,
they abused the power it conferred upon them, to
oppress the minor proprietors and cultivators.
The latter were loud in their complaints, and
pleaded prescriptive usages. Their plea was list-
ened to. Regulation upon regulation was brought
forth to defend them. Presuming upon this sup-
port, they fortified themselves with volumes of law,
and, in their turn, resisted the zemindar, who
could only recover by suits, which incurred great
delay and expense, that rent, which, according to
his tenure, he must pay, or, in default of payment,
expose his land to be sold. The government
vested itself with a power it had denied him, to
proceed by a summary process, and without ex-
pense. It is hardly necessary to add, that, in
consequence of this regulation, and their general
character and habits, almost the whole of the
zemindars of Bengal who had been confirmed in
their real or supposed rights were swept away,
and their estates purchased by another class; who
possessed wealth, but had seldom any previous
connexion with the cultivators of the soil. This
unhappy result was chiefly referrible to the pre-
cipitance with which the permanent settlement was
introduced, and to a want of that intimate know¬
ledge of the constitution and rights of the dif-
ferent classes of the society which should have
preceded a change, which, affecting as it did all
the rights of landed property, was, perhaps, the
OF INDIA.
173
greatest ever made in any country by a mere act
of legislation.
The principal motive to the permanent settle-
ment was, to put an end to a very great evil, the
constant fluctuation of our former plans for col-
lecting the revenue. But, in examining the merits
of this system, we must be careful to distinguish
between the object and the means adopted for
its accomplishment. The establishment of a re-
gulated and moderate assessment is one beyond
all others in wisdom and justice; but that might
as easily have been applied to those who had real
property and right in the soil as to the zemindars
or landholders whom we found or created. It is
pleasing to see a rich landlord expending his
wealth in improvements; but the sacrifices made
by government to promote the general prosperity
will not be rewarded, unless the frugal and in-
dustrious of the cultivating class have the path
open to obtain property, as well as to preserve
what they already possess. A government which
precludes itself from any increase of territorial
assessment must look to the general diffusion of
wealth for the future improvement of its resources;
and though a long period may elapse before it can
venture to subject to direct taxation any of the
possessors of that affluence which its liberal policy
has created, it may expect to receive an early and
constantly-increasing return, through the enlarged
demand for the necessary commodities and luxu-
rics of life required for a population advancing
174
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION
in numbers and comfort, and the consequent pro-
gressive improvement of duties and customs.
The experience derived from the errors com-
mitted in the permanent settlement of Bengal, were
useful as lessons in the introduction of a settle-
ment over part of our territories of Madras and
Bombay; but serious doubts* soon arose as to
the policy of a further extension of this revenue
system, and its progress was arrested. The ob-
jections urged were more to the mode than the
principle of it: no one could deny the benefits
that must result both to the state and to its
subjects, from the demands of the former and
the payments of the latter being regulated as early
as complete knowledge would admit of this being
done with justice to all parties. The importance
of moderate assessments was also universally ac-
knowledged as the foundation of all improvement.
The wisdom of recognising long-established ze-
mindary rights was not denied; but it was urged,
that, by the creation of landholders, and the sale
* Lord William Bentinck, governor of Madras, in conse-
quence of those doubts, prepared and circulated a set of
queries, for the purpose of obtaining further information for
his guidance in the settlement of the districts not yet alienated.
The result of this investigation, afterwards recorded on the
proceedings of the government, strengthened the opinions
which he had previously formed, and induced his lordship to
make a journey to Calcutta, for the express purpose of obtain-
ing the sanction of the Governor-general for suspending the
further operation of the zemindary system.-Vide "Wilks's
South of India,” vol. i. p. 176.
175
OF INDIA.
of lands to the highest bidder, we must either
diminish our receipts by the admission of the
purchaser to a part of the government share of
the produce, or vest him with a right of exacting
more than is accordant with usage from minor
proprietors and hereditary cultivators, classes of
men who, it was argued, had the best title to
benefit from any remission we could afford to
make in our demands from the soil. Many of
these arguments were grounded upon local differ-
ences, both as to the tenure of the lands and the
character of the people; and, with reference to
this difference, it was represented to be as incom-
patible with our interests and policy as it was
inconsistent with humanity and good sense to
insist, for the sake of uniformity, in our own
institutions and establishments, upon tribes and
nations so various as those under our dominion in
India being all subject to the same mode of re-
alizing the revenue: and upon this point it may
be observed, that though we cannot retract the
past, nor withdraw the pledges we have given, we
should not deny ourselves the benefit of experi-
ence to regulate our conduct for the future. If
we have found, on minute investigation, that the
inhabitants of one province have been for genera-
tions adverse to the usages of another; that their
rights vary; that they have been accustomed to a
different mode of collecting the revenue, and of
adjusting their disputes; it comes to the plain
176
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION
question, whether we are to accommodate our
rule to the various prejudices, habits, and opinions
of the natives under our sway, or to study our own
convenience by forcing them all into one system.
If it is deemed politic (as no doubt it is) to
make a sacrifice of any part of the revenue to which
we are entitled, for the object of raising a superior
class of natives, from whose rank and respectability
we may look for aid in the internal rule of the
country, we should elevate in his native district
the military officer who has served with distinction
in our army; the meritorious and honest native
law officer, or judge; the respected Mokh, or pre-
sident of a court of Punchayet; the most indus-
trious and deserving of the heads of districts or
villages: we may imitate with advantage the na-
tive governments, which grant certain portions of
waste lands to him who constructs a well, or any
other work beneficial to the community; like them,
we may shape our system to admit the rise of the
frugal and industrious cultivator: all these are legi-
timate modes by which we may reward service,
stimulate to exertion, and strengthen our internal
government. They form indeed our only means of
effecting this object; and we should not improvi-
dently waste them by admitting, on the mere
ground of their ability to advance a small sum, a
set of men without personal respectability or local
ties to occupy this vacant but important niche in
the community.
OF INDIA.
177
In districts that are in the immediate vicinity
of capitals, or large commercial towns in different
parts of our eastern empire, the influx of wealth
will always produce changes in society and in pro-
perty. The waste will become a field, the field a
garden; the cultivator will either part with his
hereditary or prescriptive rights, or, partaking of
the desire of gain that pervades the community in
which he lives, will carry his labour to market, and
be satisfied with changes arising out of circum-
stances which, through the allurements of profit
and luxury, gradually wean him from the ways of
his forefathers. But the measures necessary to
facilitate this progressive alteration of the condi-
tion and relations of such a society must be limited
and local. They are quite unadapted to a great
proportion of our extended territories, and the
attempt to introduce them in some of these must
have consequences directly opposite to what we
desire. They will outrage those whom we wish to
conciliate; they will disturb where our object is to
settle; and, from not being understood, and from
being at variance with cherished feelings and usages,
they will have the effect of rendering unpopular a
government whose great objects are peace, huma-
nity, and justice.
Opposite systems of collecting the revenue have
been pursued by the native governments in differ-
ent parts of India. They have at times employed
Zemindars, and at others, resorted to the Mo-
VOL. II.
N
C
178
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION
zuarree, or village, and the Ryut-warree* settle-
ment. To the latter, which has been lately intro-
duced into some countries under the Madras go-
vernment, many objections have been made. It
has been urged that it enters too much into detail;
that it requires more application and talent in a
collector than can generally be found; and that from
its raising rent in proportion to industry, it is cal-
culated to depress the cultivators, and, in short, tọ
make a population of paupers. It has also been
urged as a strong general ground of objection to
this system, that it necessarily requires that the
revenue officers should be vested with an authority
which they must be prone to abuse, because their
interests and their duties will be in opposition.
To the first of these objections it is answered, that
it is better for the cultivator that the details of his
settlement should be arranged with the European
collector than through a middle man, like the Ze-
mindar. To the second it is stated, that an efficient
revenue officer, when once acquainted with the de-
tails of his district, will find his labours easy, and the
minuteness of his investigations, and the effects of
his constant intercourse with the inhabitants, will
* The Kulwar or Ryut-warree settlement is one made by
government immediately with the Ryuts individually, under
which the government receives its dues in the form of a money-
rent fixed on the land itself in cultivation, and not being a
pecuniary commutation for its share of the produce, varying
as the extent of the produce may vary in each year.
!
f
OF INDIA.
179
Į
in a great degree save the labour of the judge. In
reply to the third objection, it is denied that rent
is raised on industry, though it rises with produce:
and with regard to the objections grounded on mis-
trust of the integrity, and jealousy of the power, of
the revenue officers, it is answered, that such prin-
ciples, however just, are more adapted to the go-
vernment of England than of India, and that, in
our administration of the latter, we are too often
misled by our theories on such points to aim at an
abstract excellence of rule, which is at equal va-
riance with the habits of our subjects and the cha-
racter of our government.
Such is a brief view of the arguments for and
against a system of revenue which has been intro-
duced, or rather continued, in several of our pro-
vinces with eminent success. It would, perhaps,
be as remote from wisdom to extend it over all
India as the permanent settlement. There are
many territories in our possession so situated that
nothing but the liberal efforts of government can
restore them to prosperity and maintain them in it.
To fix their revenues would be a security against
nothing but the possibility of our deriving benefit
from their improvement. Riches must flow into
countries through other sources than agriculture,
before government can be secured against losses
from bad seasons, famine, and war; and until it
has such security, it seems reasonable that it should
have a share of the advantage resulting from in-
N 2
180
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION
They
creased produce. This principle is quite congenial to
the habits and sentiments of the cultivators.
require no more than a just and moderate assess-
ment upon their receipts; generally speaking,
they do not understand our more enlarged views
of fiscal administration, and, consequently, cannot
appreciate them. The governments in India
which preceded ours never made a permanent
settlement of revenue; yet experience proves that
where the rulers were just, their system of col-
lecting the revenues was quite compatible with
the improvement of the country, the diffusion
of wealth, and the creation of landed property *.
The agricultural classes of our subjects are more
than any other attached to their usagés ;
all
changes, even when intended for their benefit,
alarm them. This arises from their having no
power of resistance. They know the extent of
the burden they have been accustomed to bear,
but from ignorance dread that for which it may
be exchanged. From these causes, it is as unwise
to adopt any general system over our various
possessions as it is fallacious to argue that our
subjects may not be as happy and as prosperous,
*That will arise, though more gradually, under a ryut-
warree system, whenever the assessment is moderate, and fixed
upon principles that are understood, and deemed subject to
no variation. But it is the principles upon which the collec-
tion is made that require to be understood and fixed, more
than the land-tax or government share which it regulates.
OF INDIA.
181
under systems to which they are accustomed, as
under those we would introduce to meet our own
convenience, and our ideas of amelioration.
The improvement in the appearance of the
country from extended cultivation is hardly to
be deemed a test of any system. That may, in all
cases, be referred chiefly to the increase of the
portion of the population whose pursuits are exclu-
sively agricultural, consequent to exemption from
war. This last conclusion appears to be proved by
the condition of every part of India that has for
many years enjoyed that exemption; and it is
certain that many provinces, under the most arbi-
trary rule of native governments, are, from the
operation of this cause, as flourishing as any lands
in the possession of the Company.
Many have taken alarm at that spirit of minute
investigation which has lately prevailed, consi-
The province of Guzerat has been surveyed with as much
minuteness as a gentleman's estate; but it never has been
asserted that this has led to any vexatious or oppressive conduct
towards the inhabitants; on the contrary, there is no part of
our dominions where they are more content or prosperous.
The measurement of the land was, with some exceptions,
general throughout India, under the Mogul government. Al-
most every village had a record of its measurement, and where
that is lost, our reviving this usage is more likely to be con-
sidered by the mass of the cultivators as a proof of our dispo-
sition to be just than to become extortionate, It creates dis-
content and alarm amongst zemindars and others, who manage
or rent lands, from which they extort to the last rupee, but of
182
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION
dering that it would prove injurious to our sub-
jects in its operations and results; but the more
perfect the knowledge which is possessed by those
who govern the country, the less exposed its
inhabitants must be to misrule and imposition,
unless we suppose a case where such information
be sought as the means of extortion and oppression.
It may be, and has been, urged that, in some parts
of India where this system has been introduced,
we have used the information we acquired, for
no purpose but to bear harder upon the cultivators,
and that our desire of increase of revenue has
deprived them of every hope of benefit that could
stimulate men to industry and exertion. Allowing,
in order to try the question, that such an assertion
is correct, it would prove no more than that we
have made a bad use of our knowledge, not that
the knowledge was unnecessary. We may, in-
deed, assume, that without it we must continue in
many material points to rule and legislate in the
dark, and that our desire to promote the general
prosperity of our subjects by a moderate assess-
ment, regulated by just principles, will never be
essentially done till the fullest and most detailed
information enables us to effect the object with
the precise value of which they desire we should remain in
ignorance. The measurement of the lands should not be
enforced in countries where it never has been an usage; unless
with consent of the cultivators. The right of resisting it
was claimed and admitted upon this ground by the inhabitants
of some districts in Central India.
OF INDIA.
183
a clear understanding of what is consonant to
the usages, appropriate to the condition, and ac-
cordant with the true interests of every class of
the various inhabitants of our territories. Much
has recently been done by an active spirit of
minute inquiry into revenue, and other matters
connected with the good government of India;
but our knowledge has yet gone little beyond
a discovery* of our ignorance, and a long period
must still elapse before we have accumulated facts
and experience on which we can venture to esta-
blish permanent and unalterable arrangements.
But this period, though comparatively long in
the life of man, is but a short space in that of
an empire.
These general observations upon the judicial,
police, and revenue administration of our Indian
territories are the result of much study of the
details of those branches of our government. The
most important of the lessons we can derive from
past experience is to be slow and cautious in every
procedure which has a tendency to collision with
the habits and prejudices of our native subjects.
We may be compelled by the character of our
government to frame some institutions different
*For the truth of this assertion, let the reader refer to the
voluminous collections of judicial and revenue papers recently
published. He will find that as inquiries proceed, new and
important facts are daily discovered, affecting, from their
relation to usages and rights, every question connected with.
claims to property in the soil.
184
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION,
from those we found established, but we should
adopt all we can of the latter into our system. The
progress of our power has been favourable to the
commercial community, and to some of the poorest
and most defenceless of our subjects; but it has
been the reverse to the higher orders of the natives,
and to the military classes. On the remedying of
these defects, the duration of our dominion will in
a great degree depend. From the success of our
arms in extending it, we have lost the great advan-
tage that we before had in the contrast of the mis-
rule and oppression of former governments. This
loss can be repaired only by that security which we
may obtain through the wisdom of our internal go-
vernment; but that should be administered on a prin-
ciple of humility, not of pride. We must divest our
minds of all arrogant pretensions arising from the
presumed superiority of our own knowledge, and
seek the accomplishment of the great ends we have
in view by the means which are best suited to the
peculiar nature of the objects. By following another
course, we may gratify self love; we may receive the
praise of each other; we may be applauded in Eng-
land for the introduction of plans and institutions
which Englishmen understand and appreciate; but
neither the abstract excellence of our systems, nor
the industry, purity, and talent of those employed in
carrying them into execution, will avert the evils
which must result from every measure that is in
opposition to prejudices so fixed, and habits so
rooted, as those of the natives of India. That time
CIVIL SERVICE.
185
may gradually effect a change, there is no doubt;
but the period is as yet far distant when that can
be expected: and come when it will, to be safe or
beneficial, it must be, as these pages inculcate, the
work of the society itself. All that the government
can do is, by maintaining the internal peace of the
country, and by adapting its principles to the va-
rious feelings, habits, and character of its inha-
bitants, to give time for the slow and silent opera-
tion of the desired improvement, with a constant
impression that every attempt to accelerate this end
will be attended with the danger of its defeat.
CIVIL SERVICE.
These observations upon the various branches of
the internal government of our Indian territories
lead to a consideration of the character of that
body of public officers by whom it is administered.
The civil service of the Company has undergone
many changes, but it has, at all periods, and under
every system, produced men of eminence and dis-
tinction.
The prudence of those who governed India in
the earlier stages of our power did not precipitately
depart from institutions which they found esta-
blished for the administration of the territories of
which they had gained possession. The natives
were continued for a period, associated with the
Europeans, both in fiscal and judicial duties. As
long as this was the case, the European civil servant,
who presided over a district or department, was
186
CIVIL SERVICE
often ignorant of the languages of India*, and little
versed in the details of his office. These were in-
trusted to some of the higher classes of the natives,
who, according to their station, shared in the emo-
luments, which continued the same as had been
customary in the same offices under the Indian
governments. This system had its advantages and
defects; a more abrupt change would, probably,
have raised serious obstacles to the advance of our
power, which was most essentially promoted by the
rank and influence of the natives employed in asso-
ciation with the European servants; but who, as
the latter acquired practice in the duties of detail,
lost the consideration and emolument which they
had previously enjoyed. This change making many
of them retire from employment, their place was
supplied by persons of lower rank and more sub-
servient character, who were less scrupulous as to
the means of enriching themselves, and possessed
little or none of that weight with the inhabitants of
the country which gave value to the services of
their predecessors. This new class, by still grasping
at profits which had been declared illicit, and by
efforts to maintain undue influence and power,
brought obloquy, not only on themselves, but on
all those by whom they were trusted and employed.
* This remark, as far as relates to a knowledge of the na-
tive languages, applies more to Madras and Bombay than
Bengal, in which, from the earliest time, many civil servants
were conversant in the dialect of the country, and some were
accomplished Persian scholars.
OF INDIA.
187
It is a subject of congratulation, that a change
has taken place by which the civil servants of the
Company have become personally better qualified
for the performance of their duties; but we must
not hasten to a conclusion that the former system
had no advantages, and the present no defects.
The severe reflections so frequently made against
the former state of the civil service are far from
being just. This body of functionaries, it has been
admitted, had neither such general acquaintance
with the languages of India, nor with the details of
their several stations, as they now possess. It is true
also, that recompense for their services was derived
from sources more undefined, and more liable to
abuse than those at present established; but a
knowledge of the native languages, though a most
important aid to the personal transaction of busi-
ness, was, from the nature of our first rule, and the
manner in which that was exercised, of compara-
tively small consequence.
Under the reformed
and more exact system of the administration of our
territories, it very properly enters into the educa-
tion of youth, and is made an indispensable qualifi-
cation for office; but in the estimate of character,
it should have no more than its just weight, and
should rank subordinate to industry, strict principle,
general knowledge, and sound judgment, which
must combine to form the able public servant. As
an auxiliary to the developement and useful action
of these qualities, an acquaintance with the lan-
guages of India is most desirable; but unassociated
188
CIVIL SERVICE
with them, it is nothing, and injury has sometimes
resulted to the public from a too exclusive con-
sideration being given to this attainment.
Though the former civil servants of the Com-
pany did not discharge the minuter duties of their
stations as they do at present, the records of the
state fully show that this proceeded from no infe-
riority of general knowledge, or of individual cha-
racter, but was the mere result of the difference of
the mode of government. The same cause pro-
duced a difference in the sources from which they
derived the remuneration of their services. In re-
ceiving, instead of a regulated salary, the fees and
profits which had been enjoyed by the natives to
whose offices they succeeded in newly acquired ter-
ritories, they only followed the usage of the coun-
try; and they were sanctioned in it by their own
government. It suited the character of the Indian
administration in England, and was altogether
adapted to that of our first rule in India. That it
was loose, undefined, and liable to great abuse, is
admitted. The evils of such a system became ma-
nifest, and were remedied; but assuredly, while it
continued, the civil servant who drew his emolu-
ments from open and recognised sources was no
more blamable than some of the first men in Eng-
land who hold offices that continue to be paid by fees,
or fines, in the manner established by our ancestors.
There are some considerations connected with
the actual state of the civil service of the Company
which demand very serious attention. From the
OF INDIA.
189
days of Lord Clive to the present, there have been
the same complaints regarding this class. They
have been represented as being prone to extrava-
gance on their first arrival in India; as very generally
involving themselves deeply in debt, and thereby
contracting habits and obligations adverse to their
own happiness and respectability, as well as to the
interests and good of the public service. The ge-
neral fact is admitted, but the remedy has not yet
been found. An increased liberality of allowances
has tended only to augment that propensity to
thoughtless extravagance, natural to their
age and
prospects in life. Youth is ever sanguine, and its
calculations of the means it will obtain of over-
coming difficulties are too commonly fallacious.
Yet we observe that, in other walks of life, mo-
tives have been discovered of sufficient power
over young minds to check such dispositions, and
to inculcate habits of economy grounded on a ge-
nerous desire of independence, and altogether free
from any mean or sordid spirit of saving. Such
effects, which we observe around us in young men
of the best prospects, while trained to their as-
signed duties in houses of commerce, in the law,
and in public offices, should satisfy us that the end
we seek is attainable even amid scenes of tempta-
tion; for it will not be denied that the capital of
England holds forth more allurements to extrava-
gance than that of India.
It is important to consider whether there is any-
thing in the education and the duties of the young
190
CIVIL SERVICE
civil servant of the Company which can account
for this striking difference. It has been objected
to the former, that it proceeds more upon the
principle of forming the future man for the im-
portant stations to which, from the nature of the
India service, he is liable to be hereafter called,
than to make an unpretending assistant to a col-
lector or judge, who is gradually, through the
means of industry and information, to advance to
higher employment. It is admitted to be indispen-
sable that young men should attain the acquire-
ments suited to their destinations in life; but it is
contended, and with truth, that all that education
can effect, is forming the youth by discipline and
by habits, in a manner that will give him the power
of increasing his knowledge from facts and experi-
ence; and that knowledge, to be useful, must grow
with the man, go hand in hand with the habits
and occupations of his life, and wait upon the gra-
dual developement of his character.
1
The young civil servant of the Company knows
that he cannot fail to be employed in some branch of
the service; his want of acquirements may obstruct
his advance, but irregular habits and being in debt
(which in some cases must lead to deterioration of
feeling and of principle) is no impediment. How
different is the situation of the young men in Eng-
land, with whom any comparison may be drawn!
However liberal their education, their attention is
constantly fixed upon the first step of the ladder:
they know that dissipation and debt will at any
1
OF INDIA.
191
stage arrest their career; and the examples they see
around them operate as a most salutary check, to
keep them regular and steady in their efforts to
ascend to the head of the line in which they are
placed.
No part of this question has undergone more
discussion than that which relates to the colleges
established for the education of the youth of the
Indian civil service. Those of Calcutta * and Hai-
leybury have, like other institutions, their advan-
tages and defects. The former certainly redeemed
youths from some bad habits consequent to their
being sent too early to sequestered stations in the
country. It diffused † more general competence to
their duties among the civil servants; and, from the
opportunity of becoming acquainted with their
* The college at Madras is upon a principle wholly different
from that at Calcutta. It educates and supplies native in-
structors, and the young civilians who study at their homes
are subject to an annual examination. At Bombay, they must
qualify themselves, and pass certain examinations in the lan-
guages, before they can receive any increase of allowance or
employment.
† The college of Fort William is only mentioned here, as a
place for the instruction of civil servants on their arrival in
India. This excellent institution has other and high claims to
distinction, from the numerous works which the combined
labours of the learned Europeans and natives attached to it
have given to the public. This college should always be con-
sidered by government as much, if not more, a seat of learning,
founded and liberally endowed for the purposes of diffusing
useful knowledge over an empire, as a school for youth.
192
CIVIL SERVICE
character, enabled government to allot them to the
various departments of the service for which they
were best qualified. A spirit of emulation was
also excited, and young men, studying under the
immediate observation of those by whom they
were to be employed, made efforts to distinguish
themselves beyond what they would probably have
otherwise done. These were great advantages :
the chief evil was the congregating of so large a
body of youth in a luxurious capital, where it was
difficult, if not impossible, to check extravagance,
to which they had every imaginable temptation
both as to objects of expense and facility of at-
taining them. In such a scene, a more rigid
discipline than has hitherto been deemed com-
patible with the age and condition of these young
men was necessary to a complete or efficient check
over their conduct.
The college in England is upon the most liberal
scale, and the students have every advantage that
the tuition of able and enlightened men can afford
them.
It is not meant to enter upon an examination of
the various arguments which have been recently
brought forward for and against this institution.
One part of the subject, however, upon which
opinions are divided, demands particular attention;
it is the age at which young men should be sent to
India. Those who have minutely watched the
progress of youth in all branches of the public ser-
1
IN INDIA.
193
vice, will probably be of opinion that, taking the
balance of good and evil to be found in different sys-
tems, there is more hope of good from a regulation
which would send the well-instructed youth of seven-
teen, or at farthest eighteen, to that country, than at
a later age. He might, it is true, gain much learning
by staying a year or two more, and some students
might eventually rise to greater fame in conse-
quence of having the advantage of more mature
instruction; but the object is to form, not eminent
individuals, (these will always form themselves,)
but a class of men competent to certain duties;
and it is of great consequence that they should be
of an age when the mind will easily adapt itself
to the condition in which they are first placed.
A very humble sense of their own deficiencies will
be of more benefit, on their entering upon their
subordinate duties in India, than all the know-
ledge they can attain, if accompanied by that pride
and self-sufficiency which in youth are too often
its concomitants. The general argument in favour
of their remaining to a more mature age is, that
besides their education being more complete, their
good principles will be more fixed, and they will
be imbued with a love and knowledge of their
own country. Nothing can be more desirable
thar‍uch results, if they were certain; but though
there may be many exceptions, speaking generally,
we must assume that, from the age of seventeen
to twenty, the habits and principles are oftener
VOL. II.
0
194
CIVIL SERVICE
injured and unsettled than improved and fixed;
particularly when youth are exposed to the in-
creased hazards that will arise from their numbers
in the best-regulated establishment, and that at a
period when they are likely to receive more than
common indulgence from parents and relatives on
the point of losing them for a long term of years,
if not for ever: moreover, a taste for the pleasures
of their own country, which is generally acquired
in the first years of manhood, is not a happy pre-
paration for the life to which they are destined.
They are too often disposed, when so advanced in
age, either to turn with disgust from scenes amid
which they must pass the greater part of their lives,
or to seek, in a course of thoughtless extravagance,
some solace for what they conceive they have
abandoned.
That there are dangers, and some of magnitude,
to the youth who commences his Indian career at
an early age, is not to be denied; but there is a
better prospect for him of being contented and
useful throughout the different stages of the ser-
vice, than for one who enters upon the same career
at a later period.
There are certain qualifications, and, above all,
testimonies of good conduct, without which no
youth ought to be allowed to proceed to India in the
civil service; but if in that country regulations were
rigorously enforced, making their increase of salary,
as well as their promotion, to depend on their attain-
IN INDIA.
195
ments, and rendering the incurring * of debts and
habits of extravagance a serious obstruction, if not
an absolute bar to advancement, we might expect
to create a reform in the greatest defects of the
present system; but to do this effectually many
changes are required. The civil servant is, at pre-
sent, compelled to attain certain acquirements
before he can be employed, and when in office he
must give a great portion of his time to his public
duties; but, unless in extreme cases, improper habits
of life, or large debts, are deemed no disqualification
for office, though these (according to the opinion
of every statesman who has treated the subject)
are not only likely to deaden his best feelings and
to endanger his principles, but to place him under
an influence which may be exercised in a manner
alike injurious to his reputation and the interests
of the state.
The example we have in the conduct of youth in
other departments of life, shows that the object in
view is quite attainable, and points out the only
mode by which an efficient remedy can be applied
to this evil; but care should be taken that this is
* This regulation has repeatedly been made, but never
rigorously enforced: the causes of which are obvious. There is
nothing so adverse to the feelings of an English government
as any measure that wears the appearance of inquisition into
the private conduct or concerns of a public servant; but the
performance of this duty must not be evaded, when called for
by considerations associated with the reputation and interests
of our country.
0 2
196
CIVIL SERVICE
effected in a manner that will elevate, instead of
depress the service. While consideration for the
young men who enter it, for their relatives, and
the public, compels us to establish stricter discipline
than has hitherto existed in India, the education
of youth should be more exclusively directed than
it has hitherto been to qualification for the first
duties they will have to perform; and from these
they should not be kept one instant, after they have
attained the necessary qualifications, and evinced
sufficient steadiness of conduct to enable them to
aid the superiors under whom they will have to act.
The reports made by the latter of the progress
and conduct of those under them should regulate
promotion; and if any young men neglected to
qualify themselves for employment, or continued
idle and irregular, after a limited number of years,
they should be sent to England. This might
appear harsh; but if known to be the inevitable
consequence which attended incompetence or
misconduct, the penalty would be rarely incurred.
Parents would not desire such a trial* for sons of
* It has often been stated as matter of complaint, that in the
college of Haileybury, a student of sixteen, if indisposed to go to
India, has it in his power to cast away all his prospects in life
by an act of boyish mischief, which commits an offence against
its institutions; and it is admitted that there may be some reason
why a government, that is compelled to be so strict regarding
those whom it admits into its service, should relax from its
rules, in consideration of extreme youth: but this lenity
should not extend to the man who is confirmed in habits of
IN INDIA.
197
whose conduct and abilities they had doubts; and
every man of feeling and principle would be
checked in his career of folly, extravagance, or
guilt, by the dread of the shame and misery he
would bring upon himself and others. But, sup-
posing that it should sometimes happen otherwise,
the merited punishment of a few would be most
salutary examples; and, looking to the virtue and
talent of the civil service for the present as well
as the future good government of India, who will
recommend that indulgence to youth, or considera-
tion to their connexions, should interfere with the
adoption or rigid execution of any plan expedient
for that great object?
Many minor arrangements might aid the success
of the measure suggested; but we may be assured,
from the moment those strong steps were decidedly
taken, examples of idleness and extravagance would
become rare. Not only the feelings of the indi-
viduals and their friends would be roused against
them, but the sources of supply would fail; credit*
idleness or dissipation. The objection, that some would seek
that mode of effecting their return to England, supposes a
depraved mind in a maturer age, precluding every hope of
amendment.
* All lesser expedients than those recommended have been
tried, and have failed. A regulation has been often suggested,
rendering debts incurred by young men, under a certain age
and circumstances, not recoverable by law; but while such debts
are no bar to employment, other pledges and securities would
be proffered and accepted. The premium on advances would,
+
198
CIVIL SERVICE
would no longer be given to men whose prodigal
career was certain to deprive them of the means of
repayment.
To carry any plan of this nature into effect, it
would be necessary to increase the number of
young men in India, that the local government,
even at the commencement of their service, might.
have the power of selection; and this principle
should, within the prescribed limits as to periods
of service, continue to regulate every future pro-
motion. Any other system must be unfavourable
to the development of those various and superior
powers of mind which it is essential should be
possessed by all who fill, or aspire to fill, the high
offices in the Indian empire.
A seat in council is now the chief object. to
which a civilian aspires; and the change that oc-
curs every five years has a happy effect in keeping
alive that portion of the ambition of the service
which is directed to this object. There appears
no good reason why others who fill the high offices.
of presidents of the board of trade, and revenue,
and of the court of Sudder Duwanee*, should not
also be periodically changed. The local
The local govern-
no doubt, be increased; but this would be no obstacle to unre-
flecting youth, whose embarrassments would only be augmented
by such insufficient efforts to prevent them.
* The chief civil court of justice, held at the seat of go-
vernment.
† If such a change was ever made, it would be but justice to
IN INDIA.
199
ments, with whom the nomination* to these sta-
tions should rest, might re-appoint where very ex-
traordinary ability demanded an exception from a
practice which would animate the system, by excit-
ing an active spirit of emulation.
The objection that will be offered to such a mea-
sure is, that the salary of a counsellor, if enjoyed
for five years, affords the means of independence,
which not being the case with the other situations
in question, it would, therefore, be hard upon
individuals who had attained such offices to be
compelled to vacate them in five years: but it may
be answered, that one of the most essential prin-
ciples in a government like that of India is, to
combine reward to individuals with the promotion
of the public interests, and that, upon this principle,
it is better to increase the pay attached to those
situations than to lose the advantages which the
arrangement promises to the state. This, and
every other practicable measure, should be adopted,
that can have the effect of directing the views of
the ablest civil servants to objects of distinction
and high employment, both in India and in Eng-
land. The prospect of accumulating great wealth,
allow to persons now filling these stations the full term of five
years, if they chose to remain.
* To the objections which may be made from the probable
abuse of this patronage, there cannot be a better answer than
reference to the list of civil servants who have been recom-
mended by the local governments to seats in council.
200
CIVIL SERVICE
which once stimulated the civil service of India,
no longer exists: the means of living comfortably,
and the attainment of a moderate competence at
rather an advanced stage of life, is all that they can
now expect. The state cannot afford to give them
higher allowances* than they now enjoy; and it is
not desirable that this class, particularly those who
fill the first stations, should have à money-making
disposition, which, even when remote from corrup-
tion, is adverse to the high tone so essential for
them to preserve and to impart, by shewing an ex-
ample of perfect freedom from such propensity; nor
would this by any means preclude attention to just
economy, which is alike essential to independence
of mind, and of action.
Notwithstanding any arrangements that can be
made, or any order that can be given, the success
of every plan for the maintenance or improvement
of this branch of the public service will chiefly de-
pend on the character and talent of those at the
head of the local governments. On their know
ledge, impartiality, and unbending firmness of ac-
tion, will rest this as well as all other points con-
*There is one point which merits special consideration, con-
nected with the condition of this and other classes of public ser-
vants in India-the serious loss on remittance to England:
this, if it continues, may have results, both as to the education
of their children and their own retirement, which are unfavour-
able to the fundamental principle of binding public servants
by every means to their native country.
IN INDIA,
201
nected with the good administration of India. We
can regulate and reduce to a system every other
part of our government in a manner that renders
us, to a certain degree, independent of extraordinary
ability; but we cannot escape from the necessity of
having a succession of enlightened and able men to
preside over the councils of a state, which, from its
singular construction, is almost as much affected by
the personal characters of its rulers as if it were a
despotic monarchy.
}
INDIAN ARMY.
However much the success of our internal govern-
ment may depend upon the civil administration
of our eastern empire, our efforts to improve that
might be given in vain, unless we maintain a com-
manding military power; and this consideration
gives the utmost importance to every question
connected with our military establishment in that
country, as being the only means by which we can
preserve India, and as too likely, if mismanaged,
to prove our ruin. This latter position has been
so fully proved by the evidence of past events, that
any argument in support of it must be superfluous.
As his majesty's troops employed in India are
composed solely of Europeans, and differ in no
respect from the British army, of which they are
a detachment, remarks upon the constitution of
that part of the force there will not be necessary.
We shall, therefore, proceed to examine the orga-
202
ARMY
nization and principles of the Company's army,
which now consists of nearly two hundred and fifty
thousand men*. We shall commence by taking
a glance at the plans which have been formerly
suggested to remedy the defects of the general
system, and then consider the changes which cir-
cumstances would now appear to render expedient.
Lord Cornwallis was requested by Mr. Dundas,
his majesty's minister for India, to give a plan by
which the transfer of the Indian army to the king
should be effected; the chief grounds for which
measure are stated to have been, "To give safety
and security to our Indian empire, and to prevent
the continuance or revival of those discontents or
jealousies which have so often manifested them-
selves between the King's and Company's troops, as
well as the Company's troops belonging to the
different presidencies in that part of the world."
From his lordship's reply, it appears to have been
his deliberate conviction, that no system could be
devised of permanent utility and satisfaction to the
individuals of both services, and for the public
good, unless there was a preliminary measure, by
which the whole force, native as well as European,
in India, should be "transferred to his majesty's
service; and, with a few modifications, be regulated
* The natives alone of the Company's army are now 232,366
rank and file.
† Vide letters from Lord Cornwallis to Mr. Dundas, dated
November 7th, 1794.
OF INDIA.
203
1
and conducted, in future, according to the rules
which have long operated in the king's army."
Lord Cornwallis stated his opinion, that although
the army were transferred to the king, it should
remain perfectly subordinate to the Company; and
that those intrusted with the local government
should have the full power of suspending and
sending to England any officer, from the highest
to the lowest rank, it remaining with the king to
examine into the conduct of the officer so sent
home; but the local government being alone re-
sponsible to the court of directors for such peremp-
tory exercise of power. Lord Cornwallis, in the
letter alluded to, strongly inculcates as a principle,
that measures should be taken to induce Europeans
of all classes, particularly military officers, to return
to England. He recommends leave and retirement
on full pay for officers of each rank, after a certain
period of service*. While he proposes a continuance
of rise by seniority, he is the advocate of the sale
of commissions under certain restrictions; he
suggests an entire separation between the European
and native branches of the army, and is unfriendly
to future interchanges betwixt them, lest it should
* Lieutenant colonels twenty-six years; majors twenty-three;
captains eighteen; and cornets and ensigns six.
† The commander-in-chief he recommends to have the
power, should he think fit to exercise it, of permitting an officer,
not in the regiment in which the vacancy occurs, to purchase;
but this power not to authorise him to introduce any officer who
is not senior to the person in the class who is ready to purchase.
204
ARMY
open a door for abuse of patronage, and the intro-
duction of inefficient officers into the native corps.
He expresses himself very strongly as to the neces-
sity of protecting the latter. "Officers," he observes,
"whose services are so unalterably fixed in so
distant a quarter of the globe, ought to be protected
by established regulations against the hazard of
suffering by the abuse of patronage in any com-
mander-in-chief."
In 1811, when the Company petitioned for a
renewal of their exclusive privileges, the subject
of the transfer of the army was again brought
forward. Those by whom it was advocated rested
their chief argument on the same basis, the
indispensable necessity of putting an end to the
jealousies and divisions which existed between the
officers of the King's and Company's armies in
India. But the principles of the transfer now
proposed differed in some essential points from
those proposed by Lord Cornwallis.
A greater
latitude of power as to promotion, particularly in
the higher ranks, was proposed to be given to the
commander-in-chief. As an incitement and reward
to the native local service, it was suggested that,
on reaching the rank of colonel, they should be
eligible to employment in any quarter of the
globe; and such a measure, it was anticipated,
would not only be an encouragement to this branch,
but render the experience of men of talent and
acquirements available to the general service of
OF INDIA.
205
the country.
It was proposed that exchanges
should take place between the two branches of the
army, restricted only by such regulations as were
indispensable to preserve the efficiency of the local
service, which required in those that entered it
a knowledge of the language, and a certain period
of residence in India. It was not intended to
admit the officers of the native branches of the
army to sell their commissions, but they were to
have the right they now enjoy of retirement on
full pay, after a certain period of service. It was
proposed that, upon this change being made, the
armies of the different presidencies should be
consolidated into one. This was strongly recom-
mended, on the ground of that leading principle
which has been the foundation of every large and
liberal plan suggested for the reform of the Indian
army, that of putting an end to feelings of jealousy
and irritation, which arise out of distinctions as to
allowances and promotion between the armies of
Bengal, Madras, and Bombay.
Strong arguments were brought forward against
any transfer.
The peculiar constitution of the
native army, and the education necessary for the
European officers attached to it, were strenuously
urged; and it was assumed, that recent measures
had given a strength and efficiency to this branch
of the service which did not belong to it when
Lord Cornwallis suggested that transfer; and it
was added, that the principal objects that noble-
206
ARMY
man had in view were attained by the regulations
of 1796, which, by giving equal rank and con-
sideration to the officers of the Company's army,
had approximated them as much to those of his
majesty's service as it was expedient or politic to
do with an army so situated and so constituted.
The danger to the character and efficiency of
the local army of India, from being under the
same authority with that of England, was forcibly
dwelt upon; and it was assumed that, if a transfer
took place, no merit or pretensions of the former,
and no sense of the wisdom of general rules for
their protection, could be expected to resist the
tide of influence and interest which would always
be in favour of the latter. The certain consequences
must be, that the local army, when transferred to
the king, would gradually become inferior and
secondary, a result which, there was every reason
to fear, would be fatal to the existence of our
Indian empire.
The constitutional objection, so often urged, of
transferring to the crown such a great portion of
patronage, as the command of an army of such
magnitude, was repeated; but the strength of all
the arguments brought forward on this occasion
by the chairmen of the directors rested on po-
litical grounds. Their reasons cannot be better
given than in their own words. "The Company's
government," they observe, "has hitherto been
respected, both by its own subjects and foreign
1
OF INDIA.
207
powers, because it possessed a great military force;
organizing this force, enlarging or reducing it at
pleasure, appointing its officers, rewarding merit,
punishing the unworthy, providing for the comfort-
able retirement of the veteran officer and soldier,
and, in short, exercising all the functions of a go-
verning power over a very numerous body of men
of high military spirit, it has possessed all the re-
spectability and the benefit of their attachment and
fidelity. Looking upon the members of civil go-
vernment, and the body of civil servants, as belong-
ing to the same masters with themselves, and as
the first order in the state, they have paid a willing
obedience to their authority, and have thereby up-
held their internal administration, and their conse-
quence abroad. The introduction of certain king's
regiments has been understood, as it was intended,
to be merely in support of the public interest
under the existing system; but if the Company
were to be divested of the whole of their military
force and power, if they were to be no longer mas-
ters of a single regiment, no longer capable of en-
tertaining any soldiers, nor of giving one subaltern's
commission; if the immense body of men who have
so long looked up to them were to be transferred
from them, the people must consider their power
as fallen, and drawing rapidly to a close. Conti-
nuing still to their government a general control
over the employment of the army, and to their
20
ARMY
civil servants the internal administration of their
officers, would give the people no assurance to the
contrary. Those servants, in the discharge of their
different functions, of judges, magistrates, collec-
tors, could not expect the same respect and sup-
port, either from public opinion or the attachment
of the native troops, as when all looked to the
same head for protection, patronage, and reward.
Indeed to make so wide a separation of the military
from the civil power, to take away the organiza-
tion, the interior regulation, and with these the
patronage of the army, from the local government,
to place all these powers in the hands of the com-
mander-in-chief, subject only, in the exercise of
them, to an authority at the distance of half the
globe, would throw the means and temptations of a
dangerous ascendancy into the scale of the military
department, which, constituted by his majesty,
might easily be led to slight the civil servants of a
meaner master, and their chance of distant redress.
Among the natives of India, it has been usual to
consider the military power and those possessing it
as pre-eminent; and they see, in some examples of
the present day, that power, under the idea of as-
sisting the civil and political administration, ac-
tually controlling it. The Company's government,
in short, lowered and overshadowed in this way,
would not, in the opinion of the court, continue to
possess the authority necessary for the proper ad-
OF INDIA.
209
ministration of the affairs of that great empire; and
it might then be conceived that a further change
only could supply what is defective *.”
These arguments were deemed of sufficient
weight to prevent the transfer; and as they may
probably meet with attention when the subject is
again brought under discussion, it becomes of im-
portance to examine how far the defects of the
actual system can be remedied, and the interests of
the different branches of the military service of our
common country be placed upon a permanent
footing, that, by adding to their efficiency, will give
strength to the state.
The opinion of all wise statesmen and able
military commanders has been invariably the same
with regard to the indispensable necessity of putting
an end to the jealousies and divisions which have
so often arisen between the officers of the king's
army and those of the Company's, and between
* Vide Negotiation for the Renewal of the Company's privi-
leges, page 37.
†There is no part of their duty that requires such constant
attention from officers high in command as the employment of
the different branches of the service under their orders in a
manner that shall at once promote their union and add to their
efficiency. The separate employment of King's and Com-
pany's troops, or the corps of the different establishments, when
on the same service, should ever be avoided; it is pregnant with
evil, exciting jealousy and bad temper; while emulation and
harmony are certain to be the result of men sharing the same
hardships and dangers, and being alike associated in failure
and success.
VOL. II.
Р
210
ARMY
the different military establishments of the latter.
Some narrow-minded men have whispered their
belief that there was safety to the state in the
existence of such differences: but such persons
have forgot that the very alarming events which
form the grounds of their dread have been, in
almost every case, the result of those jealousies
and divisions which are deprecated. They are
ignorant also that it is much more easy to create
and maintain a bad spirit amongst a limited body
of men, who are affected by the same local circum-
stances, than it is to spread such a spirit through-
out more extended numbers, and a wider sphere.
But these considerations hardly merit mention, for
we may safely assume that, if ever it is a principle
of our policy to rule by keeping divided the
European officers, to whom we must chiefly trust
for the safety of our empire in India, that empire
will soon verge to its decline. The competency,
the spirit, and the loyalty of this class, constitute
our strength, and it will be increased by their
union, but will be decreased by all causes which
tend to perpetuate or create jealousies, distrac-
tions, or divisions amongst men, who, though
placed in different branches to meet peculiar cir-
cumstances, serve one common country, their
attachment to which can have none of those mo-
tives to shake it which exist where men colonize,
and are almost naturalized, in a distant land.
The truth and force of this fact has never been so
OF INDIA,
211
strongly illustrated as in the course of those tem-
porary aberrations from duty which have occurred
in different parts of the Indian army since the
first establishment of our power in that country.
The supporting and elevating of the Company's
army is a point not more necessary than difficult.
It cannot be done without the cordial co-operation
(arising out of a sense of its necessity) of the crown.
It must enjoy an equal share of the favour and
consideration of the sovereign as that which bears
his name in commands, in honours, in every dis-
tinction, it must be upon a par; and every measure
must be adopted that can counteract the depressing
influence of the circumstances in which it is placed.
If kept, from political reasons, distinct in name, it
should be associated in feeling and interests, and
every arrangement formed that could bring the two
services nearer to each other.
To effect these objects, some concessions, both
on the part of his majesty's government and of the
Company, will be necessary. The boon of em-
ployment on general service to officers of high rank
in the Company's army might be granted. It would
elevate the local service of India; it might eventu-
ally be of benefit to the country, and could never
inflict the slightest injury on his majesty's service.
Exchanges *, under strict regulations, might be
* Such exchanges would require, in the officer entering the
native branch, a competence in knowledge of the languages
and a period of service in India proportionate to his rank.
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212
ARMY
permitted between officers in the King's and Com-
pany's army. These, however seldom they occurred,
would be very beneficial, and tend more than any
measure to raise the feeling of the latter, and to
unite the two branches of the service*.
It has been a constant theme of complaint with
the officers of his majesty's service in India, that
they are debarred by usage from many situations
of honour and emolument which are exclusively
filled by Company's officers. This complaint ap-
pears just, or otherwise, exactly as it is considered
with reference to individuals or the whole service.
That there always have been some few of his
majesty's officers in India qualified for such em-
ployments is certain; and that many have served
in that country a period which fully entitled them
to such situations, is equally so; but general ques-
tions that affect the interests of large bodies of men
must be decided on general principles. Placed in
the condition in which the Company's officers
have hitherto been, they have viewed, with a reason-
able jealousy and apprehension, any approach to
interference with those advantages to which usage
had given them, what they deemed, a prescriptive
right. They had little dread of the few officers of
* Officers with whom the climate of India disagreed, or who
had acquired or succeeded to fortune, but desired to remain in
the army, would exchange into king's corps, and their places.
would be supplied by men willing and able to pass their life
on foreign service.
OF INDIA,
213
the king's army who were competent, and the
justice of whose claims to participation in staff
employments was not deniable; but they feared,
and with justice, that if the path were opened,
another class, with less pretensions as to local qua-
lifications, but with better interest, would step
between them and these hopes, on the fulfilment
of which every prospect of revisiting their native
country was grounded.
Should exchanges between the two services be
established, the door would be opened through
which qualified officers of his majesty's service
might enter and participate in those stations from
which they are now excluded. No other expedient
can be adopted to accomplish this object, that will
not be liable to abuse, and calculated to affect most
seriously the temper and interests of the Indian army.
The proposition for consolidating the forces of
the three presidencies into one army was recom-
mended, fifteen years ago, as a measure of expe-
diency. The events which have since taken place
have rendered it one of necessity. The territories
of our different governments are no longer divided
by seas and continents. Though we do not ac-
tually possess the whole of India, we have military
occupation of every province of that extensive
country; and constantly maintain from twenty to
thirty thousand men in stations, which, as far as
the position of forces is concerned, experience has
proved to be alike convenient to Bengal, Madras,
214
ARMY
or Bombay. Besides this fact, no internal rebel-
lion, much less foreign war, can occur, without the
troops of the different presidencies being called
upon to co-operate. Yet such continues to be
their distinct organization, with regard to the pay
and establishments both of fighting men and fol-
lowers, that they can never be brought together
without danger of serious discontents, if not mu-
tiny. It would be superfluous to expatiate on
causes and effects, the nature and consequences of
which must be obvious to the most superficial ob-
Those whose experience has enabled them
to form a better judgment upon the question must
see, not merely serious inconvenience, but danger in
continuing to leave it unsettled. The remedies are
easy, and the application can be opposed only by
men whose minds are fettered by local prejudices,
or who desire to foster distinctions and divisions
amongst those whose harmony constitutes the true
safeguard of the state.
server.
From the character of the native army, and the
similarity of habits and language of a great pro-
portion of these military classes, of whom it is
composed, no inconvenience or embarrassment
could result from making the three armies of India
three divisions of one army. Each division would
remain as at present; cadets would be nominated
to it, and be appointed as vacancies occurred to its
regiments. On such an organization taking place,
it would be better that officers should rise regi-
OF INDIA.
215
pro-
mentally to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, instead
of that of major, as they now do ; as such an alter-
ation in the actual system would prevent their re-
moval from distant parts of India, except when an
increase was made to the army. On such an occa-
sion, the senior officer of each rank would be
moted, not those of any division. The above plan
would disturb nothing that is established; the staff
would continue as at present, unless it were deemed
expedient to select the generals* employed upon
it from the whole army, instead of the division
where the vacancy occurred. The off-reckonings
to commandants of regiments are at present con-
solidated in one general list; and officers would
succeed, if this plan were adopted, to be colonels of
corps by seniority in the Indian army, not in the
division to which they had as regimental officers
belonged. The pay and allowances of all ranks,
from the general who commanded to the lowest
public follower, would, on this change taking place,
be regulated by clear and understood principles of
equality and justice, so as to leave no ground of
complaint of any one part of the army, from the
comparison of its condition with that of another part
employed on the same service and the same duty.
That there might be petty difficulties in carrying
into execution some of these changes in the consti-
tution of our Indian army, cannot be denied. The
* This discretionary power might safey be intrusted with
the commander-in-chief of India.
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ARMY
chief objections will occur to the minds of men who
have not served in that army during the last ten or
twelve years; and such will be least sensible of the
necessity of making them. Those who know the
military stations we now occupy, and who have had
opportunities of observing the recent intermixed
employment of the troops of the different presi-
dencies, will well understand the absolute necessity
of putting an end to distinctions which have em-
barrassed, and will, if not altered, continue to em-
barrass the public service. The feelings and pre-
judices of individuals may lead them to suggest
doubts as to the wisdom of a plan which proposes,
in some cases, to transfer officers from one division
to another. They may bring forward the difference
of character of the sepoys, and the different treat-
ment they require; and it may be also alleged, that
the removal of an officer from one extreme of
India to another will be a hardship. To the first
of these arguments it may be said, that whatever
was formerly the case, there is at present no essential
difference either in language, habits, or character of
the native troops of our establishments, and that,
whatever may be their usages, they all require to be
treated in the same manner. With respect to the
European officer, it is desirable, on every ground,
that he should never be local. The more he is ex-
posed to the vicissitudes of the service, and to be
employed in different parts of the empire, the more
his experience and knowledge will be enlarged; and
OF INDIA.
217
those qualities, with whatever of inconvenience or
hardship their attainment is attended, must ulti-
mately prove as beneficial to the individual as to
the government.
Many and essential benefits would result from
consolidating the local armies of India into one:
there would then be an end to those discontents
which have so often arisen concerning a difference in
pay and allowances, and from an increase of one
establishment to the real or supposed injury of
another. This was not felt formerly in the manner
it must be at this period, when the third of our mi-
litary stations can be occupied with equal facility
by the troops of any one of the presidencies.
Wherever an increase of corps is required, it be-
comes a question of judgment with the Governor-
general to which army it shall be given; and a
slight previous change in the disposition of the
forces will make it easy to transfer the apparent
expediency of an increase from one presidency to
another. Whatever may be the talent, the justice,
or the impartiality of the Governor-general, he can
never hold the balance in a manner that will prevent
discontent. Bodies of men will always have their
feelings agitated by measures which so seriously
concern their future prospects in life, when these
are so liable to be affected by the decision of an in-
dividual in power; and if that decision is unfavour-
able to them, they will impute to him, however in-
sufficient the grounds, motives of partiality, or weak
.
218
ARMY
submission to the influence of those by whom he is
surrounded. The nature and effect of the feelings
to which the present system must give rise will be
perfectly understood by all acquainted with the
temper and constitution of armies. The remedy
of this evil should not be deferred. If there is a
dislike to direct the immediate adoption of an
arrangement, making the benefit of increase of
corps general; at any rate, all regiments raised
in future might be equally distributed between
Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, commencing with
that of which the officers are most backward
in promotion. What has been before stated will
show that not the slightest difficulty could occur on
the ground of the increase being more wanted at
one presidency than at another, as that would be
obviated by the transfer of the duties of a station,
which, from its position, was equally convenient
to the presidency receiving the benefit of the
augmentation.
A second advantage from amalgamating the
local armies of India would result from the first.
When the nomination of European officers from a
general list to newly-raised corps was adopted, it
would be a matter of indifference to those where
the men were recruited, or where employed. The
consequence would be, that the whole native army
would be more disposable than it is at present
to serve in any quarter of our dominions. Occa-
sions have occurred, and are more likely than ever
OF INDIA.
219
to occur, when our safety may depend on our
power to employ the natives of Bengal in the
territories of Madras or Bombay, or those of the
latter in Bengal or Hindustan. Looking to those
internal commotions from which we cannot expect
exemption, there is no principle of policy likely to
be more conducive to the security of the empire:
but we must in a great degree be deprived of the
advantage it offers, till a plan is adopted which
shall put an end to the separation of interests now
existing among the European officers.
The third advantage of the plan proposed is of
consequence for the same object, that of rendering
our native army more available in every part of
India, and of enabling us to employ them together,
without creating a spirit of discontent which has
often approached to mutiny. This can be done
only by assimilating, on the principles suggested,
the pay and allowances of the native soldiery and
public followers. These should be fixed with
reference to certain general principles, and not be
dependant on the establishment to which this or
that soldier of the same government belonged.
The military equipments and departments* of
the forces of the different presidencies should be
* This particularly applies to that most important of all
military departments, the Commissariat. The difference of
principle in that of Bengal, and those of Madras and Bombay,
is such, that it becomes almost impossible to employ the
troops together during any long period of operations.
220
ARMY
constituted on the same general principles, and be
as little different in practice as local circumstances
would permit; otherwise we shall never have our
Indian armies possessed of that efficiency and
strength which they should have for united opera-
tions.
The rise of European officers in the native
army of India must continue to be by seniority;
but every measure consistent with their interests,
and with those of the public, should be taken,
to accelerate the attainment of rank and command
for those who have gained experience in this
branch of the service. The frequent stagnations
of promotion which have occurred have been
hitherto relieved by expedients that gave an im-
pulse for the moment, but were followed by a
re-action that often left men in a worse situation
than they were before. We must not judge of the
effects of such stagnation of promotion in the
local army in India by what we observe from the
same cause in England. There is hardly any
analogy: the power of exchanging into other corps;
of purchasing and selling their commissions; that
of living with their relations and friends; the
connexions they form, and the different walks
of life open to men in their native country, place
them in a situation totally different from those who
are in a manner banished to a foreign land, where
they may almost be considered aliens from all
family ties and connexions, with their prospects
OF INDIA.
221.
limited to their profession, to which they are in
fact bound, from the day they enter it, as the only
means they have of subsistence. The officers of
his majesty's service, if disappointed or discontented,
have generally the means of escape, and if, in effect-
ing that, their condition becomes worse, their com-
plaints are not heard; they produce no effect on
others; young and more sanguine candidates fill
the niche they occupied: nor does the state suffer
by the change; for the constitution of the army to
which they belong, requires in its inferior officers
no qualifications that may not be easily acquired.
But how different is the situation of those who
enter the Company's service! Their youth must be
devoted to the attainment of acquirements, without
which they are unfit even for the subaltern duties
of a native corps; they have no escape from their
lot in life; discontent and disappointment in it
not only corrode their own minds, but spread a
baneful influence over the minds of others: their
place, after they are in any degree advanced, cannot
be easily supplied, for certain qualifications, which
time and study alone can give, are requisite to
those who succeed them. All these circumstances
(and many more might be adduced) show that the
question of the improvement of the Indian army
should be considered on its own grounds, and not
with the reference which is too often made to the
comparative condition and pretensions of an army
from which its constitution is altogether different.
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ARMY
To give opportunity of acquiring distinction to
the officers of the local army of India, (without
which no military body can ever attain and support
a character, and least of all a body that is in con-
stant comparison with troops of the same nation,
regulated on other principles) high rank ought to
be conferred by local commissions, while the indi-
viduals to whom it is granted are yet efficient for
the duties to which it may call them. The privî-
lege of nominating general officers to the staff
must soon become as useless to any objects of am-
bition in the Indian army as of service to the state,
under the slow progress of brevet rank in England,
consequent to peace in Europe. Every general
belonging to the Indian service must be superan-
nuated before he can be employed. There would
appear no objection to grant local brevets to colo-
nels of the Indian service to serve on the staff of
that country, as the same can be extended to his
majesty's service. The adoption of such a measure
would, of course, prevent officers being permitted
to proceed with regiments to India, whose rank
was above that of officers within the limits of
selection for the general staff; but this would be
attended with no injury to the service, and would
be a slight sacrifice to obtain a great benefit.
The sale of commissions and exchanges between
the English and local branches of the army em-
ployed in India, under regulations which guarded
the efficiency of the local branch, would be most
OF INDIA.
223
beneficial, both from introducing good and effective
officers, and accelerating promotion in the local
army; but there is no measure so requisite for the
latter as the formation of a staff corps, which would
furnish the means of supplying vacancies in regi-
ments occasioned by the removal of their officers
to other duties.
The native corps in India were, perhaps, in as
efficient a state as they have ever since been, when
they had only two or three European officers; but,
at that period of the service, their commandant was
their chief, and they were his followers. The ties
and the feelings from which both acted were alto-
gether different from those which now subsist; and,
under the present system, the deficiency of Euro-
pean officers is felt, particularly on service, as a great
evil. This evil must continue till the regular staff
of the army, and those necessary for distinct de-
partments, are separated from that list which it is
essential to keep complete for regimental duties.
If this measure is determined upon, the formation
of a plan for carrying it into effect will not be
* Various modes have been proposed to effect this object.
The most practicable appears, the formation of corps of officers
without men, from whom vacancies caused by appointments to
the staff could be filled; who might be employed on the staff;
and who could join corps with whom their services might be
required; who should, in short, be disposable in any way, but
should rise in unattached corps. There are fewer objections
to this plan than any other, for it could, in no degree, disturb
the regular rise of other corps, or produce those inequalities of
21
224
ARMY
difficult; but great care must be taken that it com-
bines a due regard for the interests of individuals
with those of the public.
Should the same reasons which prevented the
transfer of the Indian army to the crown, when the
exclusive privileges of the Company were last re-
newed, continue to operate, this will be no reason
why the measures which have been suggested for
the improvement of the condition of the European
officers of the Indian army should not take place.
There is nothing required to give them full effect,
but a cordial and liberal spirit of co-operation in
the different authorities in England. But this
large question must be viewed as one of national
policy, and not as the settlement of the compa-
rative pretensions of individuals. We must con-
tinue dependent on the fidelity and efficiency of
our native army for the preservation of India.
The European officers are the links by which we
must preserve its attachment, and maintain its re-
putation. Their peculiar condition requires favour
and support; and it is not too much to affirm, that
any means which have a tendency to depress this
body of men, or to introduce any claims but those
of Indian service, and complete competence, into a
competition for those objects of reward which this
promotion that must result from filling the vacancies made by
nominations to the staff from the regiments to which they
belonged. These unattached corps would be formed, in the
first instance, as an augmentation.
OF INDIA.
225
branch has hitherto exclusively enjoyed, will be
fatal to our best hopes of preserving our eastern
empire. The constitutional jealousy that will be
called into action, whenever this important subject
is agitated, must not be lulled by a consideration
of the character and influence of the present com-
mander-in-chief of the British forces, which, as long
as that illustrious personage may hold the office,
would, no doubt, afford to the local branch of the
army of India every security for liberal and just
treatment.
NATIVE TROOPS.
Among the many political considerations likely
to affect the future prosperity and security of the
British empire in India, there appears hardly one
of more magnitude than the attachment of the na-
tives of our army.
The great proportion of the inhabitants of India
are devoted to peaceful occupations, and are conse-
quently, to a certain degree, unable, if they were
willing, to defend that government, to which a sense
of benefit may have rendered them well affected.
The object of our laws and institutions is to repress
if not destroy those habits which distinguish the
military tribes subject to our rule: but such changes,
to be safe, must be gradual; we cannot otherwise
expect to escape the dangers and convulsions with
which they are likely to be attended. As long
VOL. II.
Q
226
NATIVE TROOPS
however, as we can repose on the fidelity of our
native army, we are safe from internal danger; but
every disquietude must assume an alarming appear-
ance, when associated with disaffection in that
army; nor can we obtain relief by an accession of
European force, for the very means which would
give us security for the moment, would aggravate
the evil, (from causes which will be noticed here-
after,) as they would tend to lessen the efficiency,
and weaken the attachment of those native troops,
by whose courage and fidelity alone we can pre-
serve India. As the truth of these observations
will hardly admit of dispute, we can contemplate
no measures of more importance than those which
are calculated to incite and confirm the obedience
and allegiance of the native corps employed in our
service. The rigid principles of economy, and the
precise forms of our civil rule, should both yield to
the establishment of this corner-stone of our
strength; as, without it, the vast fabric which has
been raised with such pains must totter to its base
at every tempest with which it is assailed.
The native army has undergone many changes
from its origin* to the present day.
When the British government first established
itself in India, military tactics in Europe were in a
less advanced state than at present, and the caution
* A correct general view of the rise and progress of the
native armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay will be found
in the "Quarterly Review," vol. xviii., p. 385.
OF INDIA.
227
with which a few Europeans, endeavouring to
conciliate the natives of India to fight their
battles on a foreign shore, were obliged to act, pre-
vented the introduction of any part of those tactics
which could in the least interfere with their preju-
dices, habits, or religion. A jacket of English
broad cloth, made up in the shape of his own dress,
the knowledge of his manual exercise, and a few
military evolutions, constituted the original sepoy;
and with this qualification, and his English fire-
arms, he was found to possess an incalculable supe-
riority over the other natives of India, who, igno-
rant of the first principles of discipline (which
enable men to act in a body), were easily defeated,
however great their numbers, by a small corps of
their brothers, armed, disciplined, and directed, by
the art, intelligence, and
and energy of European
leaders.
It was natural that the early sepoy should share
in that feeling of pride which his superiority in dis-
cipline obtained him over his countrymen; and the
native officers in the employment of the Company
were gratified not only by the opportunities which
they had of acquiring military distinction, but of im-
proving their fortunes. There were but few Eu-
ropean officers in the first sepoy battalions. A
captain, an adjutant, with a serjeant to each com-
pany, was the original establishment. Commands
frequently fell to soubahdars and jemadars; and the
comparative laxity of discipline, as well as the
Q 2
228
NATIVE TROOPS
general corruption of the times, enabled the whole
of the native army, from the soubahdar to the sepoy,
to derive pecuniary benefit from the nature of the
services* on which they were occasionally em-
ployed. To this advantage, which rendered the
service of the Company desirable, and often lucra-
tive, was added a still more powerful attraction in
the kind treatment which they generally received
from their European officers, the number of whom,
to every battalion, was so small, that from necessity,
if not from inclination, they acted as much upon
principles of conciliation as coercion, and their au-
thority in their corps rested more on affection than
fear. They were most particular in their conduct
to the native officers, towards whom they behaved
with regard and respect proportionate to the re-
sponsibility of their situations. One of those na-
tive officers, who held the rank of native com-
mandant, often possessed an influence in the corps.
nearly equal to the European commander.
As a
strong and convincing proof of this, it may be men-
tioned, that many of the oldest battalions of the
native army of Madras are respectively known to
this day by the name of some former native com-
mandant.
This system, which had, undoubtedly, many de-
fects, had also much to recommend it: for though
* They were frequently detached in small parties into dif-
ferent parts of the country, from the inhabitants of which they
obtained money on various pretexts.
OF INDIA.
229
the European commanding officer, who acted with-
out check in the exercise of a great trust, generally
made his corps a source of pecuniary advantage, in
which he was aided by the native commandant, who
shared in this indirect emolument; yet both had a
strong interest in the character and conduct of the
corps, to the men of which they were almost always
kind and generous.
An increase of their European officers, a great
alteration in their dress, and an improvement in
their discipline, made material changes in the con-
stitution of the native corps, and these took
place through several causes. The native princes
had trained sepoys in European tactics; and to
maintain a superiority over them it became ne-
cessary that the native army of the Company's go-
vernment should make further advances in the mili-
tary art, which they were enabled to do, not only from
the great improvements which had taken place in
that science in Europe, and from the example
furnished by some of the king's regiments sent to
India, but from the number of officers of liberal
education and respectable character, whom a pro-
spect of advantage had at this period drawn to
the service of the Company. According to the
opinion of many able officers, it was under this
system that the men became most attached to
their officers, and the native army attained as
great a degree of efficiency as it has ever known,
230
NATIVE TROOPS
Captains were selected to the command of corps *,
which was an object of sufficient emolument and
trust to limit the views of officers of that rank
(then one of the highest in the service) to its
attainment. These officers were almost invariably
chosen from their reputation as sepoy officers;
that is, officers who united to all the military
qualifications of a soldier a particular knowledge
of the prejudices, habits, and characters of the
men whom they were appointed to command. It
was observed under this system, that though many
of the corps were brought to a great perfection
of dress and discipline, there was hardly an in-
stance in which this was done at the expense
of the temper of the men; on the contrary, those
corps which were the most remarkable for their
discipline were almost uniformly most attached
to their commanding officers, whom they found as
liberal to their wants, and attentive to their preju-
dices, as they were anxious for that superiority
and excellence in their appearance, discipline, and
attachment, upon which they grounded all their
* These selections were made from the captains in the
regiments of Europeans in the service of the Company; and it'
often happened that officers who had neglected to acquire the
languages of the country, and who, from violence of temper,
were judged unfit to command natives, remained subordinate
in an European corps, till they reached the rank of field
officers. Ten subaltern officers were attached to every bat-
talion under this system.
OF INDIA.
231
hopes of reputation and preferment in the service
to which they belonged.
The native officers continued under this system
to enjoy great respect and regard. This circum-
stance was chiefly owing to the European com-
manding officer, who, from his station, and the
emoluments attached to it, enjoyed a consi-
deration and consequence which enabled him not
only to confer distinction by his, personal favour
and regard, but to keep in complete check and
control the younger officers of the service, and to
direct their minds to a moderate and indulgent
conduct towards all the natives; but particularly
to those who, from their gallantry or long services,
were entitled to respect and attention, and which it
was proper to show them on every ground of policy
as well as of generosity.
The native service underwent another great
change in the year 1796, when new regulations
were introduced, which a train of events, connected
with the comparative rank of the Company's
officers with those of his majesty serving in India,
had rendered indispensably necessary. By these
regulations, two battalions of native infantry were
formed into one regiment; to which the same
number of officers were allowed as to a regiment
in the king's service. Regimental rise to the
rank of major was, at the same time, introduced;
*He had the off-reckonings of his corps, and, in general,
the command of a station, with further emoluments.
232
NATIVE TROOPS
and this, it was hoped, by attaching the officers to
corps, would confirm and strengthen reciprocal
confidence and connexion between the European
officers and the Sepoys, which had ever been
deemed the most essential principle in the consti-
tution of the native army. It was also expected
that the increased number of European officers
would greatly add to the efficiency of the native
corps, as the smallest parties that could be detached
would be commanded by an European officer, and
have the advantage of his knowledge and expe-
rience.
The most unhappy effect of these regulations
was the alteration they produced in the condition
of the commanding officers, whose situation, under
the operation of them, was attended with little of
either advantage or distinction. It was, in fact, no
longer an object of ambition, as it had been for-
merly. It had become a station of trouble, without
influence and consideration: and every officer of
interest or reputation in the service exerted himself
to avoid it, and to obtain a government command,
or a situation on the general staff. The bad con-
sequences of this part of the constitution of a native
corps have been felt and acknowledged; a partial
remedy has been applied; but none will be com-
plete, or give efficiency to this important branch of
our military establishment, that does not make it
an object of more value, both in point of profit and
reputation, for an officer of rank and character tọ
OF INDIA.
233
command a native regiment, than to fill any station
on the staff except the heads of a department.
The condition of the native officers of our sepoy
corps has often been the subject of the most se-
rious attention of government; but though their
allowances have been a little increased, no mea-
sures * have yet been taken which we can consider as
adequate to the object of creating and maintaining
motives for their continued fidelity and attachment.
In an army of nearly two hundred and forty thou-
sand natives, the highest pay which a soubahdar of
infantry can attain is 174 rupees per month, and
after attaining that rank, he enjoys no consideration
which can save him from the harshness of an Eu-
ropean officer, a boy, perhaps, who has just joined
that corps to which he, the native officer, has per-
haps belonged for thirty or forty years. He has in
barracks, and in camp, no other accommodation
than that provided for the sepoys; and although on
his retiring to the invalid list, his pay is continued,
that is become, from habit, necessary for his sup-
port, so that he can make no provision for his
children; and as pride in his own condition, or
alarm at their being subject to corporeal punish-
* The most beneficial measure of this nature recently adopted,
is the appointment of a soubahdar major to each corps.
†The last returns of the native army made that amount to
232,366, rank and file.
This is the pay of a soubahdar of cavalry at Madras. A
soubahdar of cavalry at Bengal has 105 rupees per mensem.
234
NATIVE TROOPS
ment, prevents in most cases his bringing them up
in the army, they are generally a burden on him
while he lives; and when he dies they are left poor
and discontented.
There are, no doubt, a few instances in the army,
where a small pension has been given to a native
officer, and part of it, in some very rare cases, has
been continued to his family; but such instances.
have seldom occurred, except when the person to
whom the reward was granted had an opportunity.
of distinguishing himself beyond all the common
chances of the service; and even then, to obtain
this notice has required the exertion of all the in-
terest and influence of those under whom that for-
tunate native officer acted. It cannot be expected
that the few rewards, so obtained, should have any
general effect as an encouragement to the efforts of
this class of our native army. Under such a com-
plete limitation of their views, can it be a subject
of surprise that in cases of severe trial, particularly
of mutiny, the native officers have seldom displayed
a spirit of activity and zeal? They have in such
cases been almost always objects of suspicion, and
have often evinced a sullen indifference of conduct*,
* The conduct of the native officers at Vellore, in 1806, and
of those in the recent mutiny at Barrackpore, was nearly simi-
lar: they acted in both cases like men who, while desirous of
not forfeiting what they possessed, were without adequate
motives to make them perform with spirit a difficult and dan-
gerous duty.
OF INDIA.
235
which appeared to be produced by the absence of
those motives of action which were necessary to
Placed between
support men in their situation.
officers they were bound to obey, and offenders
with whom they had kindred and national ties,
they had a difficult and dangerous task to perform;
if they have failed, we must blame the system,
not them but when we can infuse life into that
system, and elevate their minds to further objects
of ambition, we shall succeed in animating them
to continued efforts in our service; until then, they
will stop where we do, and be more anxious to
enjoy in repose the small objects they may have
already attained, than to incur hazards dispropor-
tioned to any hopes they have reason to indulge
with regard to the future.
If the nature of our power in India requires, as it
certainly does, the exclusion of the native officers
from the exercise of high military command, and
that gate to distinction is barred by policy, others
should be opened. In the strictest conformity to
those principles upon which the native army is
formed, we might lead the minds of these troops to
expect comfort and distinction in civil life, as the
reward of approved military service; and by direct-
ing their ambition to the natural and seductive ob-
ject of acquiring importance in their own tribe, and
enjoying some privileges, however trivial, which,
under certain regulations, might descend to their
children, we should not only discover a motive suffi-
236
NATIVE TROOPS
ciently powerful to supply the place of that which
a jealous but wise policy obliges us to withhold,
but place their fidelity beyond the power of cor-
ruption. If such measures were adopted, the native
service would become popular and respected; it
would be embraced with eagerness by men of the
first families in the country; and in the course of
years we might expect the attachment of our sub-
jects to be greatly improved by a spirit of active
allegiance, which would be generally diffused by
veterans and their descendants, whose claim to their
rank or land was founded in the gratitude of a state
whom they had served with fidelity and distinctión.
The men who form the native army of the Com-
pany are almost all sober, and of good conduct in
private life. Drunkenness, as a general vice, is,
indeed, unknown; and notorious immorality is rare.
But their virtues are more of a passive than an ac-
tive nature. They consist more in forbearance,
from fear of offending against their civil institutions
and the rigid tenets of their religion, than from any
sense of the beauty of virtue, or the deformity of
vice. These men appear, in many cases, hardly to
consider themselves as free moral agents; they often
blindly resign their judgment to the law of usage,
the dictates of their priest, or the influence of their
superiors in cast or station; and, under such influ-
ence, they change, in an instant, their mild, inoffen-
sive, and pliant character, for that of the most de-
termined obstinacy and savage ferocity.
OF INDIA.
237
All the natives of India, but particularly those of
military classes, are fond of show and of high
titles; and they often seem to prize the semblance,
almost as much as the reality of power. It is in-
deed surprising to see the consequence which they
attach to every mark of outward respect, especially
when bestowed by their superiors: and, partaking
of the character of his countryman, the native sol-
dier of the Company, intelligent and quick in his
conception, full of vanity and a love of pre-emi-
nence, if not of glory, is of all men the most sen-
sible to attention or neglect. Though the climate
disposes him to inertness, and his frame is seldom
very robust *, he may be flattered and encouraged
to make the most extraordinary exertions; while
harshness or cruelty serves only to subdue his
spirit, and sink him into apathy, if it does not
rouse him to resentment.
It may be stated as the result of the fullest ex-
perience, that the native troops of India depend
more than any in the world upon the officers who
command them: when treated by these with notice
and kindness, and when marked consideration is
shewn to their usages, they become attached, and
evince, on all occasions, a zeal and valour that can
hardly be surpassed; but when they have not con-
fidence in those who command them, when they
are made secondary, or treated in any manner in-
dicating a want of reliance on them; much more
* The Bengal native soldier is an exception.
238
NATIVE TROOPS
when any act of their commanders betrays igno-
rance or contempt of their prejudices or religion,
they become spiritless or discontented. This is the
natural consequence of their condition, as merce-
naries of a nation with whom they have no ties
beyond those that compel them to a cold perform-
ance of their duty, and such as they form with
their immediate officers; but able leaders, who un-
derstand how to infuse their own spirit into those
they command, find no difficulty in making what
impressions they desire on the minds of men, whose
education and sentiments predispose them to par-
ticipate in every feeling associated with military
fame and distinction.
An army so constituted, and formed of men of
such tempers, may appear very susceptible of being
corrupted, and made instrumental to the destruc-
tion of that power which it is employed to protect;
but of this there is no danger, unless in the impro-
bable case of our becoming too presumptuous in
what we may deem our intrinsic strength, con-
fiding too exclusively in our European troops, and
undervaluing our native army. From the day of
that fatal error, (should we ever commit it,) we
may date the downfal of our eastern empire. Its
finances would not only sink under the expense of
a greatly-increased European force, but the natives
of India in our ranks would lose the opinion which
they entertain of their own consequence to the go-
vernment they serve, and their whole tone as an
OF INDIA.
239
army would be lowered in a degree that would im-
pair our strength far beyond any addition it could
receive from the superior efficiency and energy of
a few more English regiments.
The employment of native troops associated with
Europeans, is a point that merits the most serious
attention. The ablest of those commanders who
have led them to victory, however impressed with a
just sense of the superior courage and energy of a
British soldier, have carefully abstained from every
act that could show the least want of confidence in
the native part of their force, or convey to the latter
an impression that they were viewed in a secondary
light. By mixing them in every operation with
English troops, they have succeeded* not only in
* Amongst those who have been most happy in exciting such
feelings in the minds of our native troops may be enumerated
the names of Lord Clive, Sir Eyre Coote, Lord Cornwallis,
General Meadows, Lord Lake, and the Duke of Wellington.
In the article of the Review (vol. xviii. p. 392), to which we
have before alluded, we find a just compliment to that excellent
officer, the late General Sir John Floyd, which very fully illus-
trates the effects of attention to this point. "The distin-
guished commander," the reviewer observes, " of that gallant
regiment (the 19th dragoons) had, from the day of its arrival
in India, laboured to establish the ties of mutual and cordial
regard between the European and the native soldiers. His
success was complete; his own fame, while he remained in
India, was promoted by their combined efforts; and the friend-
ship which he established, and which had continued for many
years, was, after his departure, consummated upon the plains
of Assaye. At the most critical moment of a battle, which ranks
240
NATIVE TROOPS
exciting an emulation and pride in the minds of
the native soldiers, which greatly added to their
efficiency, but diffused a spirit of cordiality and
good feeling, not more calculated to promote the
success of their immediate operations than the ge-
neral interests of the empire.
These observations will help to show the peculiar
character of the native army, and the consequence
of all arrangements that relate to the European
officers of every rank who are to command and
lead them, and upon whose disposition, knowledge,
and ability, the fidelity and efficiency of this branch
of our strength must depend.
Viewing the subject in this light, it appears
most important to provide at an early period a re-
medy for the defects of the existing system. This
should be done by measures grounded on sound
principles of liberal policy, suited to the character,
composition, and actual condition of the men of
6
A
amongst the hardest fought of those that have been gained
by the illustrious Wellington, the British dragoons, when
making their extremest efforts, saw their Asiatic fellow-sol-
diers, keep pace for pace, and blow for every blow.'
more arduous task awaited the latter, when the battalions of
native infantry which formed the garrison of Vellore were
led, by the infatuation of the moment, to rise upon and murder
the Europeans of that garrison. The fidelity of the native ca-
valry did not shrink from this severe trial; and after the gates
of the fortress were blown open, their sabres were as deeply
stained as those of the English dragoons with the blood of
their misguided and guilty countrymen."
OF INDIA.
241
our native army. There is every reason to appre-
hend that, if these measures are long neglected,
our local governments may be forced upon ex-
pedients which may remove partial or local cvils,
but which will lay the seeds of more general dis-
content and danger. The difference between a
wise foresight, which prevents demand, and that
weakness, which meets it with concession, is im-
mense: the former is the characteristic of a rising,
the latter of a falling government.
It would occupy too much space to enter into a
fuller detail of the plan best calculated to animate
the zeal and confirm the fidelity of our native
troops; but if the importance of these objects is
acknowledged, there will be no difficulty in de-
vising the means for their accomplishment.
Whatever measures we adopt must provide re-
wards suited to their condition for a certain num-
ber of the most deserving native officers; and these
rewards should be of a character not only to give
life to this class, but to raise the hopes of all who
shall be striving to obtain similar rank and consi-
deration. We have been compelled to cast down
much in India, and almost all whom we found
raised above others in the community have pe-
rished under our levelling rule. The necessity of
creating and maintaining a superior class amongst
the natives is recommended by every consideration
of wise and generous policy; and assuredly there
is no measure more calculated to aid in obtaining
VOL. II.
R
i
242
NATIVE TROOPS
this end than that of conferring on the veteran,
who has gained reputation in the army, rank and
consideration in his native district, so as to render
him an object of respect to his countrymen, who
will see in his services to the state a legitimate
claim to favour and distinction, whatever may have
been his former condition. This mode of reward
is quite accordant with the usage of all Asiatic
states, and its adoption by us would be congenial
to the habits and feelings of the whole population.
The consideration given to distinguished native
officers should, in a greater or less degree, accord-
ing to their claims, be extended to their descend-
ants; and their sons might be permitted to pass
through the grades of our army with a trivial
addition of pay, and exemption from corporal
punishment. The constitution of the army will
never admit of our introducing volunteers, or
native cadets. Every man who enters it must
work his way, by his own efforts, from the station
of a private to that of a soubahdar; but nothing
could be more popular with the sepoys than to
see the sons of their officers mingled in their ranks,
yet enjoying a notice and respect that added to the
value of that station in life to which they all
aspired.
Native commissioned officers, when employed
on the staff, as they frequently are, should receive
a fixed allowance, and not be left, as they have
hitherto been, to look to a future reward, depend-
OF INDIA.
243
ing as much on the influence of the officer under
whom they acted as the services they performed.
The value of their efforts, if judiciously directed in
this line of duty, is very great, and cannot, in some
cases, be supplied by those of any European officer.
They are also frequently required for specific charge
or command, and this employment should come
uuder the head of staff duty. The selection for such
stations, when pay was attached to them, would
constitute both reward and encouragement to the
class to which they belonged.
The above measures would be very beneficial, and
not attended with any large expenditure; but their
operation would be limited to the higher ranks;
and however much the favour and notice extended
to them might influence others, more is required
to cement the union of the interests of the state
with that of the general body of the troops by
whom it is defended. To do this effectually, the
sepoy should be taught to look to meritorious ser-
vices in the army as the road to employment under
the civil administration of his native province. A
certain period of service in the regular army should
be an indispensable qualification in all candidates
for situations suited to persons of military habits;
and there is no doubt that all the duties of police,
which are distinct from the hereditary village es-
tablishment, would be as well performed by men
who had passed through the army, as by any other
class, if not better. The sepoys employed in
R 2
244
NATIVE TROOPS
police duties might have a privilege of getting part
of their pay commuted, if they wished it, for grants
of waste land, provided they possessed the means
of bringing it into cultivation.
The general introduction of such a plan would
be attended with great and manifold advantages.
If well organized, it would encourage recruits and
reward service, and would promote internal order
and prosperity; nor is it a slight recommendation
that, while it gave the best hold upon the conti-
nued attachment of our native army, by multiply-
ing our means of rewarding meritorious individuals,
it would be attended with a saving instead of an
increase of expense. The only difficulty that could
impede its successful accomplishment has been
before noticed, and the necessity of the measure
may be adduced as another argument in favour of
selecting the magistrates and superintendants of
police from a class of men who are accustomed to
command soldiers.
Sudden changes in any system of administration
are unwise, and it would be sufficient, if this plan
were approved, to make its gradual introduction
imperative. The details would be adapted to local
circumstances, but no deviation should be allowed
as to the fundamental principles on which it is
grounded. These are political, and connected with
our very existence in India. Our government of
that country is essentially military, and our means of
preserving and improving our possessions through
OF INDIA.
245
the operation of our civil institutions depend on our
wise and politic exercise of that military power on
which the whole fabric rests. This is a recognised
fact; but, unless a conviction of its truth is conti-
nually impressed on the minds of those placed at
the head of the Indian administration, it will be in
vain to attempt plans which will meet with every
obstacle that partial and local views, a desire of
personal influence and power, or attachment to
established system, can devise or create to impede
and defeat their execution.
*
*The nomination of natives to situations in the police de-
partment appears to be a patronage on which the judge or
magistrate, from the absence of all ties with those who fill
them, can place little value; but these appointments are great
objects to men under such functionaries, and all their influence
with their superiors will be exerted to prevent any change in
the system.
246
CHAPTER XI.
Observations on the British Community in India :-Half Castes,
or Anglo-Indians:-Propagation of Christianity:-State of
the Press.
BRITISH COMMUNITY.
THIS work would be incomplete without some no-
tice of that part of the British community in India
living under the protection of the Company's go-
vernment, but not in their service. This body has
of late years greatly increased *, and is likely to
become much more numerous; and the questions
which relate to its privileges and pretensions will
require very particular attention.
His majesty's courts of justice, established at the
capitals of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, are a
legal defence, to all English subjects within the
limits of their jurisdiction, against any arbitrary
acts of the local government, unless in certain cases
* The total numbers of English in India, not in the public
service, has been computed at three thousand, of which two
thousand are given to Bengal, five hundred to Madras, and
five hundred to Bombay. This calculation is probably beyond
the actual numbers, including even those in the shipping of the
country.
BRITISH COMMUNITY.
247
where the legislature has given to the latter the
power of sending to England any individual
who may be residing in India without licence, or
other lawful authority.
When the judges of the crown were first nomi-
nated to Bengal, their power was extended over all
the provinces subject to the Company; but a very
short trial of this system shewed that it could not be
maintained; and experience has since proved that,
even within the confined limits to which their
jurisdiction is circumscribed, it is liable to come
into such violent collision with the local authorities,
that we can only hope to avert the evils flowing
from this internal source of division and weakness
by a most careful selection of individuals to offices
which require in those who fill them not only
perfect acquaintance with the law, of which they
are the organs, but calm temper, enlarged judg-
ment, and a competent knowledge of the peculiar
scene in which they have to act. Unless men
with such qualities are nominated to the high
stations of judges in India, we must anticipate, un-
der the growing numbers of the population of our
Indian capitals, very serious embarrassment in the
future operation of this the most delicate of all
parts of the frame of our eastern administration.
The jurisdiction of the supreme courts of law is
limited to a few miles beyond the capitals where they
* Vide Act 53 Geo. III. Cap. 155. Sec. 104.
248
BRITISH COMMUNITY
are established, and a long period must elapse, and
great changes take place, before it can be in any
degree extended*. Those whom it protects are
essentially distinct from the great body of our
Indian subjects. The mixed population of Cal-
cutta, Madras and Bombay, made up of Euro-
pean Half Castes, or Anglo-Indians †, and that part
of the natives who are associated by their ties,
their interests, and their occupations with English
laws and usages, and a great proportion of whom
have been born and educated under the influence and
* The idea has often been suggested of extending the juris-
diction of his majesty's courts in India; but it is difficult to
believe that any man of enlarged mind, who understands the
history and present state of English law, and who surveys any
eastern or foreign country, would recommend a transfer of the
one to the other. What all Englishmen adore is the principle
of English law, the freedom and security to person and pro-
perty on which it is bottomed. But the forms of English law,
or its proceedings, are not a necessary part of this principle;
on the contrary, except in England, where they have grown up
accidentally and from peculiar circumstances, they would only
be an evil and an embarrassment; and in an Indian community
they would come into collision with its most ancient usages.
†There has been much discussion regarding the name by
which this race ought to be distinguished, and latterly some
amongst them have thought that of Half Caste, by which they
have been long known, is opprobrious. It certainly is not so,
any more than Creole, or men of colour, when applied to per-
sons of mixed race in the West Indies; amongst names chosen
by themselves, that of Anglo-Indians appears to be the most
descriptive and unexceptionable.
249
IN INDIA.
operation of these laws, form a community as sepa-
rate in habits and sentiments from that which exists
in a town or village at the distance of twenty
miles from these capitals, as if they belonged to
different nations. There are no people so abhor-
rent of change as the inhabitants of India; and if
its progress has been so slow that it has not as yet
travelled beyond the walls of our chief settlements,
we may judge of the period which must elapse
before we can expect to see complete success crown
our efforts for the improvement of our subjects in
what we deem the blessings of civilization, but
which are viewed by those whom we desire to
adopt them as innovations on their cherished habits,
and the religion of their forefathers.
The difference between our capitals and their
surrounding districts, is not greater than that which
exists between the countries that have been long in
our possession and those we have recently acquired.
The various provinces which form our wide em-
pire may not unaptly be compared, as far as relates
to their knowledge of the principles of our rule,
our character, and our institutions, to a family of
children, from the mature man to the infant.
What long acquaintance has made familiar to the
one, scares the other; the diet that nourishes the
adult may poison the child. These considerations
should make us proceed with great caution, other-
wise we shall plunge into difficulties from which
there is no retreat.
250
BRITISH COMMUNITY
An arbitrary government can make experiments
with comparative safety. It can retract a boon
which does not promise advantage. It can abrogate
to-day the rights which it granted yesterday; but
this is not the case with the British government of
India. Its favours and concessions to its subjects,
on any points connected with their rights and pri-
vileges, cannot be recalled without a real or apparent
outrage to the free spirit of the constitution of Eng-
land, and without impairing the confidence of the
natives in its good faith, which is the basis on which
it rests all prospect of permanent improvement. This
consideration renders it essential that no measures
should be adopted creative of such rights and pri-
vileges, unless we have the clearest conviction that
they can be permanently maintained, without in-
jury or danger to our native subjects, and to the
general interests of our empire in India.
The first question regarding the English com-
munity in India is, how far it is wise and safe to
allow the settlement of Englishmen in India, and to
open to their energy of character the paths of agri-
cultural as well as commercial improvement? This
branch of the subject has the more importance, as
it is evident that no extensive colonization can take
place unless men are admitted to have property in
the soil as well as in its produce.
The grounds upon which the impolicy and danger
of admitting Englishmen to follow agricultural pur-
suits in India rest, are, in a great degree, referrible
251
IN INDIA.
to the peculiar nature of our eastern possessions,
which (it cannot be too often repeated) must never
be viewed as a colony, but as a subject empire, to
the inhabitants of which we have guaranteed, by
every pledge that rulers can give to their subjects,
the enjoyment of their property, of their laws, of
their usages, and of their religion. We may and
ought to impart such improvement as will promote
their happiness, and the general prosperity of the
country; but we are bound, by every obligation of
faith (and it would be a principle of imperative
policy, even if we had given no pledge,) not to asso-
ciate with our improvement any measures of which
the operation is likely to interfere with their inte-
rests, to offend their prejudices, or to outrage their
cherished habits and sentiments.
That colonization on any extended scale would
have this effect no man can doubt, who is acquainted
with the nature of the property in the soil, and the
character of the population. The different rights
which are involved in every field of cultivated land
in India have been particularly noticed, and those
who have studied that subject will be satisfied that
in many of our provinces there is no room for the
English proprietor. Such might, no doubt, pur-
chase land where our regulations have made that
saleable, and they might settle in the vicinity of
great cities, where, from causes already stated,
landed property has, in a certain degree, changed its
character.
252
BRITISH COMMUNITY
There are throughout our territories many waste
tracts, but almost all the lands capable of being
occupied have claimants, who can produce strong
title to the eventual occupation of them. This
extends even to jungles and wilds, in which the
right of pasture, and of cutting wood and grass,
usually belongs to the villages in their vicinity.
Besides, as has been before stated, when
peace and
prosperity augment the agricultural population,
those that want employment, compelled as they are
by their usages to follow the occupation of their
fathers, must spread over waste lands, to a share in
the produce of which they assert an hereditary claim.
The government, which makes advances to enable
them to settle in such reclaimed lands, is early re-
paid by increase of revenue; and when, from any
considerations, it is disposed to resign the whole or
part of its proprietary rights in order to benefit in-
dividuals, there are, as has been elsewhere shewn*,
classes amongst its native subjects who have the
first claim to benefit by such grants of the con-
tingent rights that may have devolved
upon it.
If the facts here stated are correct, English
colonists could only be partially admitted into
India, without an interference with the property
in actual possession or just expectation of our
native subjects of the cultivating class, or those
of the higher orders; and whatever might be our
intention, we could not adopt the measures for
* Vide vol. II., p. 165,
IN INDIA.
253
raising these colonists to that consideration which
would be requisite to render them an useful and
contented part of the community, without a cor-
responding depression of the native part of the
population.
The danger of offence to the prejudices, usages,
or religion of the native, from the settlement of
British agricultural colonists, would be great; and
this danger, it is to be remarked, would not spring
so much from the acts of the latter, as from the
apprehensions and the impressions of the former,
who would believe any such settlement to be the
commencement of a system for the subversion of
the existing order of society. They would view
the settlers as invaders of their rights, and no
benefit they could derive from the introduction of
capital, or the example of industry and enterprise,
would reconcile any to such a change, except the
very lowest of the labouring classes; all others
would either shrink from a competition with what
they would deem a higher and more favoured
class, or be irritated to a spirit of personal hos -
tility, which, in whatever way it might shew
itself, would be most injurious to the public in-
terests.
English agricultural colonists in India would,
in a very few generations, degenerate both in body
and mind. This, in spite of every effort to prevent
it, must be the effect of the climate, of the con-
nexion with the ignorant and low females with
.
254
BRITISH COMMUNITY
whom their circumstances would inevitably lead
them to associate, and of those habits and senti-
ments which they would acquire from being sur-
rounded with a distinct population whom they
would look upon as their inferiors. This change,
whenever it came to pass, would bring into dis-
repute that nation to whom they continued to
belong in name, and, instead of adding to its
power, they would become a source of weakness
to it. In the present scale of our Eastern empire,
we can never expect to count numbers with the
natives, and it is upon their continued impression
of the superiority of our character that our
existence must depend. We ought, therefore, to
be most cautious as to the adoption of any mea-
sure having a tendency to lower the opinion they
entertain of their rulers; and that the colonization
of some scattered English families over our pro-
vinces would have this effect, no one can doubt
who knows the country and its inhabitants.
* There is no one regulation of our government that
impresses reflecting natives with so high an opinion of our
public virtue as the self-denying ordinance which prohibits
Europeans from being proprietors of land. Colonel Wilks,
in a communication upon this subject, states that Napoleon
Buonaparte appeared never to have heard of this regulation,
and could scarcely believe the Colonel to be serious when he
assured him that it not only existed but was rigidly observed:
although sufficiently chary of his admiration of any thing
English, Colonel Wilks adds that he did not suppress it on
this occasion.
255
IN INDIA.
The profits attendant on commerce, and on me-
chanical science, have carried many of our country-
men to India; and their numbers are likely to in-
crease, from the changes that have occurred and
are in operation. Our empire there has already
derived, and must continue to derive, the greatest
benefit from the enterprise of British merchants,
which has diffused wealth, encouraged industry,
and promoted the general prosperity of the country,
adding by the increase of its resources to the
strength of the government. English artisans have
also, within a narrower sphere, been most useful;
neither of these classes have, in any way, come
into collision with our native subjects, by trenching
upon their rights and claims: on the contrary, they
have been their benefactors; they have given them
an example of the benefits that accrue to individuals
and nations from large and liberal principles of
trade; they have taught them the useful and
ornamental arts of life, and it is to them that we
must chiefly look, as affording examples for the
natives to follow in every improvement of civilized
society. The civil and military officers of govern-
ment are, from their stations and duties, too dis-
tant from the population to be copied; but in the
merchant with whom he deals, or competes, and
the mechanic for whom he labours, or whom he
tries to rival, our Indian subjects view classes to
which they are near; and notwithstanding the in-
veteracy of habits, many may unconsciously become
256
BRITISH COMMUNITY
imitators of customs which time may satisfy them
are preferable to their own.
These considerations give great importance to
the mercantile and mechanical classes of the com-
munity; and their growth is desirable, provided
it is accompanied with the strict observance of
those covenants and legal restrictions under which
they are placed. From these, a government so
constituted as the English in India cannot relax.
Some of its powers, particularly that of deporting
any British subject from India to England, is at
variance with every principle of our free constitu-
tion, and repugnant to the feelings of Englishmen ;
but it is not at variance with the constitution of
our Indian empire, and it is strictly accordant with
the covenants into which Englishmen enter before
they obtain leave to reside and pursue their several
occupations in that empire. We must, neverthe-
less, expect, from the nature of English society,
that on every exercise of absolute power, however
necessary, there will be a recurrence of struggle
between the government and this part of the popu-
lation of our Indian capitals; and the sympathy
which the latter will meet with in England is
such, that it will require all the wisdom and firm-
ness of the authorities at home and abroad to with-
stand the efforts that will be made to weaken and
degrade the local administration.
The number of English merchants and artisans
who have been allowed to settle at any distance
IN INDIA.
257
from the presidencies * is not considerable: some of
them are fixed at the principal stations, civil and
military, in the interior; and others, who have esta-
blished manufactories, reside in provinces which
have been long under our rule. The number of
the latter is very small, and many reasons concur
to make the increase of it impolitic. At all events,
before we venture to do so, we must make some
changes in the law to which they are subject.
They should be amenable to the local courts of
justice in all but offences of the highest descrip-
tion, and both the judges and magistrates must
have such an extension of power as is necessary to
enable them to check the excesses of Europeans
in their district. That power can be made subject
* No British subject is allowed to reside more than ten
miles from the presidency, unless leave is given by a certificate
signed by the chief secretary of government, which certificate
must specify the place at which he is to reside, and the period
for which such leave is granted. Vide 53 Geo. III., cap. clv.,
sec. cviii.
† These manufactories are usually for indigo or sugar.
+ All Europeans, except British subjects, are amenable to
the provincial criminal courts; but British subjects can, at
present, only be prosecuted on any criminal charge before the
king's court at the presidency, and the same jurisdiction must
be referred to before any penalty beyond a fine of five hundred
rupees, or, in failure of payment, two months' imprisonment, is
awarded. This is often a great hardship upon natives who have
to prefer charges against them, but who cannot afford either
the time or money necessary for a prosecution at such a
distance.
VOL. II.
S
258
BRITISH COMMUNITY
to appcal; but it must be efficient to the object of
saving the natives from those inequalities of justice
(for so they may be termed) which now exist be-
tween them and the English merchant, or artisan,
with whom they have litigation or disputes.
The settlement of Europeans, not in the service
of government, should be limited to those countries
which have been long in our possession, and are
familiar with our rule. If unattended with bad
consequences, it can be gradually extended. The
differences between such provinces and those more
recently acquired has been mentioned. In the
latter, the ignorance of the inhabitants identifies
every European with the government. Many
years must elapse before they can comprehend the
distinctions which exist in our society; and, until
they have attained this knowledge, their peace and
good government are liable to be affected, in a
degree hardly to be believed, by the words and
actions of every individual Englishman who visits
or resides amongst them. Better knowledge will,
in process of time, correct these delusions and
alarms, but until this excited feeling subsides, and
our administration and habits are perfectly under-
stood, it is most hazardous to admit any Europeans
except those who are under the strict restraints of
the civil and military service.
Though a desire to defend their exclusive privi-
leges of trade might, at one period, have led the
Company's government to oppose itself to Euro-
IN INDIA.
259
peans proceeding to India, nothing can be more
groundless than the accusations recently made
against the court of directors, of having, from
an illiberal and short-sighted policy, endeavoured
to prevent, by prohibitions and restraints, the settle-
ment of Englishmen in that country. They have,
on the contrary, permitted their settlement as far
as was compatible with the welfare of the settlers,
the interests of their native subjects, and the peace
and prosperity of the empire. The principles
upon which they have acted are alike essential for
the safety of the state, and of that community of
whom many, from a confined view of their own
condition, adopt erroneous opinions on this im-
portant subject; and it is to be hoped that the
specious representations and popular clamours to
which those opinions give birth may never pre-
vail so far as to make us lose sight of that caution
which has hitherto been our guide and safeguard.
The advantages expected from the concessions
called for by speculative men would, in all proba-
bility, be found visionary. Their tendency would
be to create divisions in the English community in
India, and, by injudiciously yielding to them, we
might inflict irreparable injury on our native sub-
jects, without conferring a benefit on our own
country, that could in any way compensate for the
evil consequences of such a measure.
S 2
260
ANGLO-INDIANS.
ANGLO-INDIANS.
The descendants of Europeans by native mothers,
usually termed half-castes, or Anglo-Indians, if they
do not form a part of the English community in
India, are closely allied to it. Independent of those
relations of blood by which many of them are united
to this community, their common language, educa-
tion, habits, and religion, form ties which must
always connect them; but, on the other hand, dif-
ference of complexion, and situation in life, sepa-
rates a great proportion of this race from the
English society; and, as they are still more distinct
from the native part of the population, they must
be considered as forming a class of themselves.
This body of our subjects in India has of late years
occupied much of the attention of government, both
at home and abroad, and there appears an anxiety
to adopt every measure which can raise it from its
equivocal condition, and render it useful and
respectable.
The numbers of this class are not considerable*;
and many causes combine to prevent their rapid
increase. A great proportion being illegitimate,
they seldom possess much property; and this cir-
cumstance, with the difficulty they have in providing
for their children, prevents their early marriages.
*It is believed that no correct census has ever been taken
of this part of the population.
ANGLO-INDIANS.
261
The male part rarely marry with European women,
and their connexions with their own class, or with
the native females of India, produce a race still
darker than themselves, many of whom, when the
parents are poor, mix with the lower orders of the
native Christian* population, and lose in the next
generation all trace of the distinctive body from
which they sprang; while, on the other hand, the
children of females of this class who have inter-
married with Europeans, from being fairer, and be-
longing to another society, become, in one or two
generations, altogether separated from that race of
natives from whom they are maternally descended.
With the exception of a few, who have acquired
fame and fortune as military adventurers, the
superior as well as the most industrious branches
of this community are found at the capitals of our
different presidencies, and at the principal civil and
military stations; and they may be said almost to
monopolize the situations of clerks and account-
ants, in the offices of government as well as in those
of public servants and private European merchants.
The whole of this class speak English, as well as the
provincial dialect of the country in which they were
born. With a few distinguished exceptions, how-
ever, they have no political influence with the na-
tives. It has not hitherto been their interest to
attain [such influence, and many obstacles would
*This population consists of the descendants of the Portu-
guese and native converts.
262
ANGLO-INDIANS.
oppose their success if they made it their object.
The respect which the natives of India pay to an
Englishman is associated with their allegiance to
the government under which they live. This feeling
does not exist towards a person whom they view as
more approximated to themselves, and yet without
any common interest, or any of those claims from
superiority of Indian tribe or caste to which they
habitually pay deference. The character, conduct,
or achievements of an individual of this class may
gain and fix their attachment, but we can look to
no period when the Anglo-Indians, as a body, are
likely to form any dangerous ties with the Maho-
medan or Hindu part of the community. The
date at which this part of our population can arrivė
at any numerical strength as a separate body is
very remote; but they are almost all well-educated,
and have from this a consequence beyond what
they derive from their numbers. They are natu-
rally connected with a part of the English society,
and politically with the native Christians; and as
associated with those branches they may early
attain importance. A just and generous govern-
ment will not however have recourse to that narrow
principle which apportions benefits by the power
any class of its subjects have of enforcing them,
nor will it withhold any reasonable boons, because
it is offended by the temper in which they are so-
licited. Acting on different grounds, it will give to
this, as to every other class of its subjects, that
I
ANGLO-INDIANS.
263
consideration which is due to their condition, and
which fulfils their reasonable hopes without a sacri-
fice of any essential interest of the empire.
Though placed under circumstances of depres-
sion and discouragement, this body of men has
lost few opportunities of becoming useful and
respected in the different walks of life to which
their pursuits have been directed. We should
continue, therefore, to cultivate their moral and
religious principles, and while we institute and
encourage seminaries for their instruction, upon an
extended scale, we should provide the means of
their future employment in the conditions of life
best suited to their respective situations and quali-
fications. If the justice of this proposition is ad-
mitted, the means of carrying it into execution will
not be difficult, as they require no change in those
salutary restraints in which the principles of both
the civil and military services in India are now
grounded. The execution of it will not impair our
present, but lay the foundations of future strength,
by the care which we bestow on an increasing
class of our population, to render them useful and
attached subjects.
The real consequence of the Anglo-Indians, in
the eyes of the natives and in their own, arises
chiefly from their connexion with Europeans.
They cling to an origin which seems to exalt
them, and are only driven by the rebuffs of slight
or contempt to take measures by themselves as
264
ANGLO-INDIANS.
a detached body, with separate and opposite in-
terests. The very pride they have in placing
themselves in the rank of Europeans, while it
makes them feel with peculiar sensibility every
instance of scornful repulse which, from their
anomalous situation, they must often be doomed
to experience, affords the means of making them
useful allies. In being so, they are in their na-
tural situation: they are adopting the policy most
beneficial to themselves; and, on the other hand,
in treating them with kindness and considera-
tion, we are only acting the part of wise and
benevolent rulers; and the policy of our extending
every consideration we can to this class, is greatly
increased by their recognised rights of holding
lands*, and of sitting upon juries, which latter has
Strong objections have been taken to the measure of al-
lowing the Anglo-Indians to hold lands. It has been represented
as opening an indirect road to colonization, as the fathers would
often be the real proprietors of land bought in the name of
their illegitimate children; and it has been further stated,
that the latter through marriage might become the progenitors
of colonists who would be very proximate to Europeans. It
has been answered to such arguments, that subjecting this
class, as we do, to the same laws as the natives, we could not
easily refuse them the right of attaining property in the soil,
where that could be purchased by the wealth they inherited,
or gained as the fruits of their industry; that, by this boon,
we gave them a valuable stake in the general welfare of the
empire, and one of all others most likely to attach them to
our government ;and that, although they might approximate to
265
CHRISTIANITY.
been given them recently. These privileges must
gradually augment the influence of this class, and,
by giving them importance with the English com-
munity and themselves, will tend to improve their
condition, and confirm their attachment to the state
to which they owe allegiance.
PROPAGATION OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION IN
INDIA.
There is no subject more intimately connected with
the preceding remarks on colonization, and the
attention due to the descendants of Europeans, than
the question that has been so much agitated, as to the
propriety or policy of maintaining and propagating
the Christian religion within the limits of our
Indian territories. The first is the duty of govern-
ment; with the latter its name or authority should
never be associated. It is our duty, as a Christian
nation, and it is politic in us, as rulers of India, to
support our church in that country on the most.
respectable footing. We are bound to give the
their European forefathers in language, manners, and religion,
they were, from complexion, from habits, and from being
excluded from the civil and military branches of the service,
sufficiently distinct to prevent that alarm on the part of the
natives of India which would be produced by European colo-
nization; and it has been assumed, from this last circum-
stance, that they were likely to prove the safest of all mediums.
through which we might gradually introduce knowledge and
improvement into India.
266
CHRISTIANITY
Christian inhabitants of our territories the means
of spiritual instruction; and it is of importance,
even in a worldly sense, that they should improve
in the knowledge and practice of religion. By
decorous attention to the exercise of divine worship,
and the observance of the pure tenets of our faith,
the character of this class of our subjects will be
elevated. They will rise in general estimation, and
their example will be more likely to effect the con-
version of the native population, than any other
means that can be adopted. But in every effort
we permit beyond this, for the propagation of our
faith among a people who are attached to the reli-
gions transmitted to them from their forefathers,
and which, however false, are rendered venerable
in their eyes by their connexion with the great
principles of morality and social duty, we should
be guided by our experience of the past, and know-
ledge of the present, and use that caution which
is alike recommended by regard for the safety of the
state, and for the ultimate accomplishment of our
hopes for the enlightening of our Indian subjects.
*
The Portuguese, who were the first European
settlers in India, hastened their downfal by that
bigoted spirit with which they endeavoured to
introduce their religion. They surrounded them-
selves, in their settlements and towns, with native
*The chief cause of the decline of this nation in India was,
the fall of their power in Europe; but there is no doubt that
it was hastened by their bigotry.
IN INDIA.
267
Christians. By so doing, they drew a line of sepa-
ration between those natives who adhered to them
and all others, and rendered themselves an object
of dread to all out of the pale of their church.
Their advancement in power, therefore, was op-
posed, not merely on a principle of independence,
but of religion.
The French, though not so bigoted and super-
stitious as the Portuguese, adhered, in some de-
gree, to their imprudent policy in this respect; and
the native inhabitants of their settlements, and the
servants in whom the principal officers of govern-
ment reposed trusts, were almost all Christians. It
was remarked when their power was at the highest,
in the days of Dupleix and Lally, that, instead of
scrupulously respecting the prejudices and religious
feelings of the Mahomedans and Hindus, they al-
lowed the most sacred usages of both to be fre-
quently violated. On the other hand, from the
whole career of the British in India, one would
conclude, that in every stage of their progress they
had looked for success in avoiding the great errors
of their rivals. The government and all its servants
have hitherto refused public support and counte-
nance to efforts for converting the natives of India.
The consequences of the impressions made by such
conduct will never be appreciated, perhaps, till the
charm which upholds this great empire is broken.
By the introduction of a judicial system, founded
upon their own laws, which are completely incor-
268
CHRISTIANITY
*
porated with their religious usages and supersti-
tions, we have given a tacit, but most solemn
pledge to withhold all interposition of authority
or influence in their conversion. Should the
dictates of a conscientious, but overheated zeal,
ever lead to a breach of this pledge, the alarm will
be great; the consequences may be fatal to our
power; and a good Christian would regret to see
an effort made to propagate his religion, by means
so unsuited to its character and divine origin. In
the pursuit of that object, he would deprecate the
exercise of an influence which has been obtained
by a confidence studiously inspired of its never
being so employed.
We have recently placed our church-establish-
ment in India on a high and respectable footing.
Let us continue to give it every proper attention;
let the clergymen sent thither be men of exemplary
conduct and character, and their number be suffi-
cient to secure to the European part of the com-
munity the best means of learning and practising
the duties of their religion; but let the clergymen
in the employ of government, whether as ministers
of religion, or professors of colleges, be prohibited
from using their endeavours to make converts.
This task might be left, as it has hitherto been, to
* The laws both of the Mahomedans and Hindus are com-
pletely incorporated with their faith. The Cazee and Pundit
are at once the expounders of their religion and law, both of
which are deemed of divine origin.
IN INDIA.
269
the labours of the humble missionary, whose habits
and zeal give him more prospect of success, and
whose unnoticed efforts will excite less alarm, when
wholly unassociated with the aid and support of
government.
.
The jealousy which numbers of the inhabitants
of India entertain, touching our designs upon their
religion, has naturally increased with our growing
power. The local government, aware of the pro-
gress of this feeling, has taken every opportunity
to counteract it, and to give their native subjects a
continued confidence in the principle which they
have acted upon, by abstaining from all proceedings
that could, in the remotest degree, be construed
into an intention of interfering themselves, or coun-
tenancing those under their authority in interfering,
with their faith and usages.
* The example of the celebrated Swartz has been adduced
as a proof of efforts at conversion being aided, and the confi-
dence of the natives being increased, by the notice and support
which a missionary received from government; but the cha-
racter of that pious and able man was as extraordinary as the
circumstances under which he was placed; his influence with
the natives, from princes to peasants, was established by his
personal conduct, and Swartz may be said to have given more
aid to government than he ever received from it. Besides, the
condition of our power in India, at the period he lived, was so
very different from what it is at present that, supposing the un-
likely occurrence of a man of as rare talents and virtue en-
tering upon the same field of action, we should have no right
to anticipate the same results from his efforts in such altered
circumstances.
270
CHRISTIANITY
In 1804, the subject proposed for a public dispu-
tation at the annual examination in the college at
Fort William, was, "The advantages which the
natives of this country might derive from transla-
tions, in the vernacular tongue, of the books con-
taining the principles of their respective religions,
and those of the Christian faith." The belief that
this discussion would involve topics offensive to
the religious prejudices of the Mahomedans led a
number of the most respectable and learned of that
faith to address a memorial to the Governor-gene-
ral, Lord Wellesley, remonstrating against this
supposed infringement of the unequivocal tolera-
tion which they gratefully acknowledged the go-
vernment had till then afforded to the unmolested
exercise of the religions of its subjects. In reply,
a declaration was addressed to the memorialists, in
the name and by the authority of the Governor-
general, in which, after adverting, as a fundamental
principle of the British government, to the solici-
tude with which it abstained from all interference
with the religions of its Mahomedan and Hindu
subjects, the memorialists were assured, that the
discussion of any subject connected with religion,
or which was degrading to the religions of India,
was quite foreign to the principles of the institution
of the college; and the Governor-general stated that,
although he saw no objection of the nature alleged
in the proposed thesis, yet, in order to remove every
doubt as to that unlimited toleration which the
IN INDIA.
271
British government had always observed, he had
positively prohibited the disputation, the moment
he learned its subject. Copies of this declaration
were circulated to all the principal stations, and to
every foreign court in India.
Nothing can better illustrate than the above
incident the slight cause which will produce alarm
upon any point touching the religion of our native
subjects; and the pains taken by a wise and vigilant
government to diffuse its principles and sentiments
upon an occasion apparently so trifling, shews the
opinion it entertained of the danger of allowing the
least erroneous impression to go forth on such a
subject.
The mutiny and massacre at Vellore, though
owing to a combination of causes, were distinctly
proved to have been occasioned in a great measure
by the success of discontented and designing men
in persuading the mass of their ignorant fellow-
soldiers that a serious design was entertained by
government of changing their religion. The
grounds on which they founded their assertion were
slight and fallacious; but they well knew that such
an impression alone could work upon the minds of
men like the sepoys, in such a manner as to make
them unite to murder their officers, to whom they
were attached, and rebel against the government by
which they were maintained. The spirit* which
* The following remarks were made in a despatch from the
Governor-general in council to the Secret Committee, dated
7th December, 1807:-
272
CIIRISTIANITY
led to these horrid acts spread to other stations ;
but its further progress was arrested by the judi-
cious measures of government, which issued a
proclamation containing the most solemn disavowal
of the intention maliciously ascribed to it by evil
men, and disclaiming every thought of interference
"The practical effect of this sanguinary spirit of bigotry,
as exemplified in the mutiny of Vellore, and in the events
which succeeded it, can hardly escape observation. For, al-
though Mr. Buchannan, on the ground of his personal commu-
nications with some of the natives on the coast, is of opinion
that the insurrection at Vellore had no connexion with the
Christian religion, directly or indirectly, immediately or re-
motely, we are compelled to form a different judgment, from
the mass of authentic evidence and information on that un-
happy event recorded in the public proceedings of govern-
ment; and we are satisfied that a persuasion (a most erroneous
one, indeed, but a firm and sincere persuasion) in the breasts
of a great proportion of the sepoys who were thus betrayed into
the execution of the massacre of Vellore, and of those who
subsequently manifested a spirit of insurrection, that a design
existed on the part of the British government to operate a
general conversion of the inhabitants of India to Christianity,
was one of the most efficient causes of that horrible disaster."
These opinions of the supreme government were in concur-
rence with all whose public duty obliged them to investigate the
causes of that catastrophe. Those who instigated the sepoys
to mutiny, and to murder their officers, could never have found
in the lesser causes which combined to produce this result,
sufficient motives to excite these hitherto faithful men to such
atrocity. They succeeded in persuading them that their reli-
gion was in danger; and they brought forward the removal of
marks of caste and slight alterations of dress as evidence to
the truth of those general and false assertions, which were cir-
culated at this period throughout the coast army.
IN INDIA.
273
with their customs or religion.
The court of
"In
directors, on hearing of these proceedings, declared
their sentiments on the subject in the following
paragraphs of a letter to Fort St. George.
the whole course of our administration of the
Indian territories, it has been our known and
declared principle to maintain a perfect toleration
of the various religious systems which prevailed
in it, to protect the followers of each in the un-
disturbed enjoyment of their respective opinions and
usages, and neither to interfere with them our-
selves, nor to suffer them to be molested by others.
“When we afforded our countenance and sanc-
tion to missionaries who have from time to time
proceeded to India for the purpose of propagating
the Christian religion, it was far from being in
our contemplation to add the influence of our
authority to any attempts they might make; for,
on the contrary, we were perfectly aware that the
progress of real conversion will be slow and
gradual, arising more from a conviction of the
principles of our religion itself, and from the pious
example of its teachers, than from any undue
influence, or from the exertions of authority, which
are never to be resorted to in such cases.
""
About this period the attention of the Governor-
general in council was called to the public preach-
ing of the missionaries, and the issue from the
press (which had been recently established at
VOL. II.
* May 29th, 1807.
† Lord Minto.
T
274
CHRISTIANITY
Serampore) of works in the vernacular language of
the country, the contents* of which were highly
offensive to the religious feelings of the natives.
The supreme government, in consequence of
the latter proceeding, ordered the press at Seram-
pore to be removed to Calcutta. This press,
though established at a Danish settlement, was
recognised both by the missionaries and the Danish
governor to be virtually under English authority†.
The order for its removal was afterwards revoked
on the respectful application of the Rev. Mr. Carey,
who expressed his willingness, and that of the
other missionaries, to submit, for the future, to the
inspection of the officers of government all works
intended for circulation in the British territories.
The Governor-general in council reported this
* According to the statements of the missionaries, the most
violent passages, and those which had given most offence,
were inserted by the zeal of a new convert who had been
employed to translate a tract from the Bengalee into the
Persian language; which translation was stated to have been
printed without examination.
The press of the Baptist missionaries was only placed at
Serampore for their convenience. There was no employment
for it at that small town, though it was useful, as the Danish
governor stated, in publishing advertisements of public and
private sales. All the books it printed were for distribution
in the English territories. The pious and respectable mission-
aries were English subjects. Mr. Carey, the chief member of
the society, held the situation of Sanscrit and Bengalee pro-
fessor in the college of Fort William, and the press was
chiefly supported by the aid of the college.
IN INDIA.-
275
proceeding to the secret committee of the court of
directors, and, when alluding to the memorial* re-
ceived from the missionaries at Serampore, ob-
served, "We have great satisfaction in acknow-
ledging the temperate and respectful spirit of that
memorial, and in expressing our entire conviction
of the correctness of the statement which it con-
tains relative to the motives and objects of the zeal
of the missionaries for the propagation of the
sacred doctrines of Christianity; and our duty as the
guardians of the public welfare, and even a consen-
taneous solicitude for the diffusion of the blessings
of Christianity, merely require us to restrain the
effects of that commendable zeal within those limits,
the transgression of which would, in our decided
judgment, expose to hazard the public safety and
tranquillity, without promoting its intended object,
and would be incompatible with a just adherence
to the obligations of political interest, and of public
faith, in the degree in which both are involved in
the unequivocal toleration of every religious sect
among the inhabitants of these dominions.
"The missionaries have related the progress and
result of labours similar to their own during a long
course of years, and from the negative fact that the
zeal of the propagandeses has not, on any occasion,
produced the dangers which we apprehend, have
inferred that neither the publication of the works
which have attracted our attention, nor the practice
* Vide Lord Minto's Letter, 2nd Nov. 1807.
T2
276
CHRISTIANITY
of public preaching, is calculated to produce them;
but two material circumstances, which have escaped
the observation of the missionaries, appear to in-
validate the force of this conclusion.
"While the British government in India conti-
nued to be a subordinate power, the efforts of the mis-
sionaries in the work of conversion were not likely to
excite among the natives of India
the natives of India any apprehension
either of the disposition or the power of the British
government to impair the stability of the prevailing
systems of religion. Possessing, from the general
system, and even under the specific laws of the
British administration, every degree of security for
the free and undisturbed exercise of their religious
ceremonies and devotions, they had no cause to
connect the proceedings of the missionaries with
the acts of the government; and, deprived of that
connexion, the mere personal labours of the former
on the work of conversion were inadequate to pro-
duce a general sentiment of religious jealousy and
alarm, more especially because the efforts of the
missionaries were almost exclusively directed
towards the class of Hindus, who are free from that
spirit of bigotry and fanaticism which distinguishes
the class of Mahomedans.
"In the present ascendency of the British power
in India, however, the natives may naturally be led
to apprehend that the augmented efforts of the
missionaries, exercised under the immediate pro-
tection of the government, are supported and en-
IN INDIA.
277
couraged by its authority; they may be induced to
imagine that the possession of unrivalled power, in
a dominion extending over a great proportion of the
continent of Hindustan, and of an ascendant influ-
ence or control over all the primary states of India,
may suggest the accomplishment of an object which
the comparative inferiority of our power and influ-
ence had hitherto excluded from the contemplation
of government, the gradual substitution of its reli-
gion for the actual religion of its subjects. Under
these circumstances, therefore, the labours of the
missionaries are calculated in a far greater degree
te excite alarm among our native subjects than
they were at any former period of time.
66
"We shall conclude this discussion," the supreme
government says, in another part of this able letter,
by observing, that it has never been in the
contemplation either of the present or preceding
administrations of this government to control or
impede the pious labours of the missionaries, while
conducted in the manner which prudence dictates,
and which the orders of the honourable Court have
distinctly described; but when the mistaken zeal
of the missionaries exceeded those limits which
consideration to the public safety, and even a soli-
citude for the propagation of Christian knowledge
among the misguided natives of these countries,
have wisely imposed; when publications and public
preachings calculated, not to conciliate, but to
irritate the minds of the people, were brought to
the notice of government, the interposition of the
=
278
CHRISTIANITY
ruling power became necessary, to preclude the
apprehended effects of these dangerous and unpro-
fitable proceedings."
This transaction has been dwelt upon not only as
giving facts that elucidate the subject, but as it ex-
hibits the calm yet firm proceedings which an admi-
nistration characterized by temper and moderation
felt itself compelled to adopt under circumstances of
much delicacy and embarrassment. The lesson it
conveys is important; nor can we reject it without
renouncing those generous and liberal principles of
toleration which have hitherto guided the conduct
of the British government in India, and introducing
the doctrine that, in our conduct to our native
subjects, we may allow ourselves to indulge in
arbitrary exertion of our power over them, for the
purpose of forcing upon their minds opinions which
(however recommended by truth) are most hostile
to all their prejudices, manners, and feelings.
The great increase of our territory within the
last eight years has added force to the just reason-
ing of Lord Minto upon the change which the
feelings of our subjects have undergone from this
cause. They see us without a rival in power; and,
if once persuaded that we have formed the design
of altering their religion and usages, their minds
are too contracted to believe that any pledges we
have given, or any restraining principles we may
proclaim, will divert us from such an object. The
sense of degradation which they must feel as a
conquered people is soothed by the uninterrupted
IN INDIA.
279
enjoyment of religious tenets and ceremonies
handed down from their forefathers. Around these
they will rally, on the slightest apprehension of
attack; and experience has taught us that this
feeling creates an union between Mahomedans and
Hindus which no other cause can produce. It
places the ignorant of both these classes of our
subjects at the mercy of the designing and seditious,
in a degree which none can believe whose duties
have not led them to a long and minute considera-
tion of the various elements of which the popula-
tion of our Indian empire is composed.
We have seen the sedition of Bareilly* in 1816,
though it originated in causes wholly unconnected
with religious feeling, assuming that shape the
moment the latent spirit of jealousy and alarm
was awakened; and perhaps no occurrence in our
history more completely shews the power which
our secret enemies possess of arraying our subjects
against us. This power can be lessened only by
our studiously avoiding all measures that can give
them any means of imposing upon the ignorance,
the credulity, or bigotry of the great mass of the
population.
The provisions in the act of legislature passed in
1812 gave a new impulse to the labours of mission-
aries in India, where many different societies are
now established, connected with those in England
with which their peculiar tenets correspond. The
* Vol. i., page 577.
† Were there no other impediment to the progress of con-
280
CHRISTIANITY
1
efforts of these societies are variously directed to
the object of conversion and education. It appears,
however, to be now generally admitted by the most
able as well as pious of their members, that no
rational hopes can be entertained of success in pro-
pagating Christianity until a foundation has been
first laid by a more general diffusion of knowledge.
This conviction has been acted upon, during the
last twelve years, to a very considerable extent; and
government, while it has been vigilant in repressing
inconsiderate zeal*, has given its liberal aid to
、 measures which it deemed likely to improve and
benefit its subjects without exciting jealousy and
alarm dangerous to the public tranquillity. On the
continuance of such a course will depend, not only
version, the difference in the tenets of the numerous persons
now preaching the gospel in India must of itself be a great
one.
* See a very full account, by Mr. Charles Lushington, of
the institutions for education now existing in Bengal. The
principal of these is the Bishop's College, which chiefly owes
its foundation to the late Bishop Middleton. Its object is "the
"instruction of Christian youth in sacred knowledge and sound
66
learning, and in the principal languages in India, that they
may be qualified to preach among the heathen." Among the
lesser institutions which have the instruction of the natives in
view, that founded by the late Rev. Mr. May, at Chinsurah,
merits particular attention. Its object is not change, but im-
provement; and in making the village schools the medium of
conveying knowledge, and cautiously abstaining from all mix-
ture of religious subjects with his course of instruction, this
pious and sensible man adopted the best and safest course by
which the end in view can be obtained.
IN INDIA.
281
the safety of the empire, but any hope that can be
entertained of ultimate success in the diffusion of
knowledge and true religion.
Those who have to govern our eastern empire
will often have an unpopular task to perform in op-
posing their authority to what may appear, to num-
bers of their countrymen, a clear and direct road
to a great and good object; but if the day ever
arrives when change of sentiment in the authorities
in England, or weakness and mistaken zeal in the
local rulers of India, shall lead to the adoption of
other principles than those which government has
hitherto pursued, the danger will be imminent; and
all those fair hopes of gradual improvement which
we may now entertain will be lost in the vain and
rash attempt to accelerate their accomplishment.
There are only two modes from which any safe
progress can be anticipated in our endeavours to
convert the natives of India. The first is, by means
of unaided and unconnected missionaries :-the
second is by education. The first, to give the
slightest hope of success, must be attempted by
missionaries, who are not only, by their condition,
removed from the suspicion of any connexion
with government, but who stand alone, and trust
solely to their own efforts, and the support of the
Almighty. These pious persons should have no
worldly ties that could embarrass or impede their
efforts. They should cheerfully abandon all the
comforts and pleasures of the community to which
282
CHRISTIANITY
they have been accustomed, and submit, with a
resigned and humble spirit, to all the privations
and dangers to which they may be exposed. They
should neither have, nor desire to have, their names
pronounced beyond the field in which they labour,
and their chance of success would be in exact pro-
portion to the degree in which they were unnoticed
and unknown beyond the limits of their ministry.
This mode of inculcating religious doctrines is
congenial with the sentiments entertained on such
subjects by the greater part of the Indian popu-
lation, who, when they view such instructors as
men entirely dependent on them, and from whom
they might derive benefit, and could fear no evil,
would not connect,, as they often now do, their
mission with the support of government, nor con-
sider them as persons paid for professional labours
by societies and institutions, and as noting down
the errors and crimes of those amongst whom they
sojourn for publication in a distant land. That
these are the sentiments of the people of India
towards many who are now endeavouring to convert
them, there can be no doubt; and it is equally true
that such impressions, whether just or otherwise,
are attended with danger to the state, and will
seriously obstruct all progress to conversion; but,
on the other hand, it must be confessed that the
mode proposed as most likely to propagate the
Christian faith, through the means of missionaries,
appears more suited to the primitive ages of the
1
IN INDIA,
283
church than the present; and that a prospect of
success, through such means, may almost be deemed
visionary. We must, therefore, advert to the
second course, the maintaining and founding of
institutions for the improvement of our Indian
subjects, on principles unassociated with any
efforts for their conversion, trusting that better
knowledge may hereafter dispose their minds to
renounce their own errors and superstitions, and to
embrace the doctrines of the gospel, when capable
of appreciating their real character. That this is
the true path to our object there can be no doubt;
but we must not deceive ourselves; generations
must pass away before it can be accomplished:
it will be liable to rude and violent shocks; and,
perhaps, the greatest of all dangers will occur when
our subjects, taught by us, shall cast off those ex-
cellent moral restraints and maxims with which
their religion, with all its errors and superstitions,
abounds, and yet not adopt that sincerity of faith
in the divine precepts which would fill and elevate
their minds. This is a danger which we may be
compelled to incur; we can only hope to escape
the ruin with which it threatens both us and those
we desire to improve by the extreme of caution,
and being satisfied with a slow and almost imper-
ceptible progress. We must lay it down as a funda-
mental principle, that it is better for our great
purpose to give full knowledge to a few, than
superficial knowledge to numbers. We must strictly
284
CHRISTIANITY
confine our first efforts at such improvements to
those countries* where our views are least likely
to be mistaken, and carefully repress every ex-
uberance of zeal that can hazard our final success.
When we have furnished the means of instruction,
we must leave to our subjects to seek the benefit.
If they desire to drink at the fountain of knowledge,
they will repair to it. To scatter abroad its
waters, and to force them upon those who do not
thirst, is to diminish their value and to injure their
reputation.
The chief obstructions we shall meet in the pur-
suit of the improvement and reform of the natives
of India will be caused by our own passions and pre-
judices. Those who are sanguine in their hopes of
rapid progress will endeavour to obtain aid by ex-
aggerating (perhaps unconsciously) the evils it is
desired to remedy, and diminishing the obstacles
that present themselves. Others, again, will see
dangers beyond those which really exist, and deem
every difficulty insuperable. These two extremes
must produce an angry collision, unfortunate for
the cause.
Those who are employed in the work
of conversion should shun all exaggeration of facts,
* It may be stated generally, that no country in which our
government has not been established fifty years is safe for
such experiments. Beyond these limits, knowledge will slowly
spread itself through channels in which there is no danger;
but its progress will be more likely to be obstructed than
facilitated by our direct and open efforts to promote it.
IN INDIA,
285
1
which must ever verge upon falsehood. Placed in
such situations as they are, it is a crime to speak
positively without full knowledge, and it is a greater
crime to deceive others by drawing general conclu-
sions of the state of tribes and nations in India, de-
rived from observation of superstitious usages in
any one particular district, province, or kingdom.
They should seek, not to inflame, but to calm the
minds of those with whom they correspond in Eng-
land, and who have to form their judgment upon
trust, at such a distance from the scene. The deep
errors of races of men, which arise from their
blindly following the ways of their fathers, should
be painted in colours calculated to excite pity and
commiseration, not horror and detestation. This
theme should be approached with humility, not
pride, by all who venture to treat it.
We
We may and
ought to be grateful that superior knowledge has
removed us far from the ignorance and errors of our
Hindu subjects, but we should be humbled to think
in how many points, in how many duties of life,
great classes of this sober, honest, kind, and in-
offensive people excel us. That they have some
usages revolting to reason and to nature is certain.
At the sacrifice of life in the shocking practice of
suttee and infanticide, all must shudder, except
those whom habit has reconciled to such acts of in-
humanity; but while we feel and express abhorrence
at them, we must not forget that they are compara-
286
CHRISTIANITY
tively local and limited, and that one of them,
infanticide, is held in as great horror by all but
a few families of Hindus as by us. While all
agree in sentiment regarding the sinfulness of the
voluntary sacrifice of widows, a great difference
of opinion exists as to the mode of terminating
the practice. The diffusion of knowledge, the
force of example, the mild and conciliating but
strong remonstrances of superiors, with the undis-
guised feelings of shocked humanity, will, we may
hope, gradually eradicate a barbarous rite which has
already fallen into disusage in many parts of India,
from ceasing to excite that sympathy in the people,
and, consequently, to meet with that encouragement
from their priests and superiors, which it formerly
did. But such sympathy and encouragement will be
maintained where they still exist, and revived where
* Suttees have decreased, and, indeed, are almost un-
known in many of the southern parts of India; and in the
countries of the Deckan, Malwa, and Hindustan, they are of
rare occurrence. In Bengal Proper this shocking usage is
more prevalent than in any part of India. It appears that in
1819, 650 had taken place within the Company's territories in
Bengal; of these, 421 were in the Calcutta division. In 1820,
the number was 597; those in the Calcutta division, 390.
† For an account of infanticide, see "Central India," vol. ii.
p. 208. This cruel practice, which is limited to some Rajpoot
families, has been most unjustly attributed to the whole of this
race of men, of whom there are about 100,000 in the ranks of
our army; and, in the whole of that numerous and gallant
body, there cannot be found one example of this horrid usage.
IN INDIA.
287
they have ceased, if we are so unwise as to at-
tempt to suppress, by the strong arm of power,
this or any other of the superstitious customs of
our native subjects. The merit of resisting what
they will consider intolerance and persecution will
be added to the other motives for such sacrifices;
besides, the impression made by such use of our
authority would be attended with great hazard :
they who argue otherwise, because they perceive
no immediate danger result from particular cases
where there has been partial interference, cannot
have much knowledge of the character of the
Hindu population, or of the nature of the means
which the secret enemies of our power endeavour
to array against us. Every such act of interfer-
ence is an item in their account, and adds to their
hopes of uniting their countrymen in what they
would deem a patriotic and pious cause, that
of subverting the rule of strangers and usurpers,
who, under the plea of humanity and improve-
ment, made an open and violent attack upon
usages respected by the most bigoted and tyran-
nical of their Mahomedan conquerors, and sanc-
tioned by their own practice during thirty cen-
turies*.
These sentiments relative to the propagating
* The following details of a suttee are given by Diodorus
Siculus in his History (lib. xix.), and cited by Rollin, vol. ix.
"After the battle between Antigonus and Eumenes, the
latter obtained permission from the former to bury his dead.
288
CHRISTIANITY
of the Christian religion and the diffusing of
knowledge, which were publicly* expressed by
"During this ceremony a singular dispute occurred. Among
the dead was an Indian officer, who had brought with him his
two wives; one of whom he had but recently espoused. The
law of India permitted no woman to survive her husband; if
she refused to be burned with him on the pile, she was for
ever dishonoured, and obliged to remain a widow during the
rest of her life, not being allowed to be present at sacrifices or
any other religious ceremony. The law mentioned only a
single wife; here were two, each of which claimed the pre-
ference. The eldest alleged her right from antiquity; the
youngest replied, that the law itself excluded her rival from
the pile, because she was pregnant; and so it was decided.
The former retired in grief, bathed in tears, rending her
clothes and tearing her hair, as if some great calamity had
befallen her. The other, on the contrary, in triumph, attended
by a numerous body of relatives and friends, decked in her
richest ornaments, as on her wedding-day, advanced with
firmness to the place of the ceremony: there, after distributing
her jewels and trinkets among her relations and friends, and
bidding them a last farewell, she was placed on the pile by
her own brother, and expired in the midst of the applause
and acclamations of nearly all the spectators!"
This account will be recognized by every one who has wit-
nessed a suttee to be, in every particular, in exact conformity
with the feelings and usages of the Hindus of the present
day-a circumstance not more worthy of attention, as it shews
the deep-rooted prejudice on which this barbarous practice.
rests, than as an example of that strong and almost invincible
tenacity of usage which characterizes this ancient and extraor-
dinary people.
* Vide examination before the House of Lords in 1813, and
Sketch of Political India, page 468.
IN INDIA.
289
the Autnor some time ago, have been confirmed
by his more recent experience*, and are given
* The following extract of a letter, dated Camp Mhow, 7th
November, 1818, to the Reverend Mr. Marshman, who had
requested the author, on the part of the Baptist Missionary
Society of Serampore, to become a patron of their college,
was written amid scenes which gave him a full opportunity of
judging every part of these important questions.
"I am flattered by your letter of the 1st September; any
man must be gratified by possessing so much of the good opi-
nion of a society like yours at Serampore. I should, however,
ill deserve the sentiments you express, if I were to have any
reserve in my reply; I shall be proud to become one of the
patrons of your college, and to add my subscription to its sup-
port, if you think me worthy of the honour, after the follow-
ing explanations. Though most deeply impressed with the
truths of the Christian religion, and satisfied, were that only to
be considered in a moral view, it would be found to have dif-
fused more knowledge and more happiness than any faith man
ever entertained; yet I do think from the construction of our
empire in India, referring both to the manner in which it has
been attained, and that in which it must (according to my
humble judgment) be preserved, that the English government
in this country should never directly or indirectly interfere in
propagating the Christian religion. The pious missionary
must be left unsupported by government, or any of its officers,
to pursue his labours, and I will add that I should not only
deem a contrary conduct a breach of faith to those natives
whom we have conquered, more by our solemn pledges given
in words and acts, to respect their prejudices and maintain
their religion, than by arms, but likely to fail in the object it
sought to accomplish; and to expose us eventually to more
serious dangers than we have ever yet known. The reasons
for this opinion I have more than once had occasion publicly to
state; I shall not therefore trouble you with the repetition.
VOL. II.
U
}
290
CHRISTIANITY
in this place as the result of the most conscientious
conviction.
"I come now to the second part of the subject, and your more
immediate concern, that of spreading knowledge.
"In contemplating the probable future destiny of our extraor-
dinary empire in Asia, it is impossible not to think but that
the knowledge we are so actively introducing may in the
course of time cause great changes, but how these may affect
our power, is a question that the wisest of us will find it diffi-
cult to answer. I must ever think that to impart knowledge
is to impart strength to a community, and that, as that be-
comes enlightened, the love of independence, combined with a
natural pride in self-government, which God appears to have
infused into the spirit of man and of nations, will be too strong
for all the lessons of duty, of meekness, and of gratitude to
their intellectual benefactors, that we can teach our Indian
subjects, but I am not deterred by the possibility (nor should I
be by the probability) of such consequences from being the ad-
vocate for their instruction in all the arts of civil life. We live
in an age which is above such policy, and we belong to a coun-
try which has recently made itself too conspicuous for destroy-
ing the fetters which had for ages enslaved the body, to tole-
rate arguments in support of a system for keeping the human
mind in ignorance of any knowledge that is calculated to pro-
mote its happiness; but the question here assumes its most
difficult shape. It is the nature of the knowledge, and the
mode we pursue in imparting it, that is likely to make the dif-
ference between its proving a curse or a blessing to India-
between its supporting (at least for a long period) our power
over that quarter of the globe, or accelerating its downfal;
enthusiasm or over-zeal is quite competent to effect the latter,
while the former requires for its accomplishment a steadiness
of purpose, a clearness of head, and a soberness of judgment,
that are seldom found united with that intentness on the object
IN INDIA.
291
which is also quite essential. I wish, my dear Sir, I could be
certain, that your successors in the serious task you propose
would have as much experience as you and your fellow-
labourers at Serampore;-that they would walk, not run in
the same path;-I would not then have to state one reserve.
I should be assured that it would be considered as safer to
commence by giving a good deal of knowledge to a few than a
little to many;—that efforts would be limited to countries
where the people are familiar with our government, and would
understand the object;-that men, in short, would be satisfied
with laying the foundation-stone of a good edifice, and not
hazard their own object and incur danger, (for in all precipi-
tate or immature attempts of this nature there is danger) by
desiring to accomplish in a day what must be the work of a
century.
"I have given you my sentiments as fully as I can in this
short letter. I really have not time to enter more into details.
I hope this explanation will be satisfactory, but it is a justice
due to you and to myself to declare, that while I shall be proud
to be a patron, and to support the plan now proposed, I shall
steadfastly and conscientiously oppose (as far as I have the
power) any deviation from the original principles, or any
departure from that moderate spirit of gradual and rational
improvement in which it has originated, and in which I trust it
will be conducted."
The above communication was received and acknowledged in
terms flattering to the feelings of the writer, who was elected
a patron of the college.
U 2
292
FREE PRESS
FREE PRESS.
THE subject of the free press in India, which has
of late occupied much attention in England, is of
such importance as to require the fullest consi-
deration.
It is little more than half a century since the
first newspaper was printed at Calcutta. The
times were favourable for the profit and popularity
of an editor prepared to promulgate the acts,
the misrepresentations, the calumnies, the public
and private scandal, which distracted and disgraced
the period at which his labours commenced. A
contest for power between his majesty's supreme
court of law and the Bengal government was at its
height. The latter was compelled to seek, and it
found, some safety in conciliating the support of
the chief judge of his majesty's court, without
which it must either have perished or have been
forced upon the most extreme and arbitrary acts to
maintain its existence. Amid such scenes, every in-
dividual high in station had his advocates and his
calumniators, and the violence of public and private
feelings was gratified and aggravated by a journal
which gave publicity to every word and deed that
suited the views and sentiments of a party.
open scurrility of its abuse exceeded perhaps that of
any periodical paper now published in England.
The civil government, which was then from its
The
IN INDIA.
293
ار
constitution weak, took what steps it could to re-
medy the serious evil of a paper directed against
its reputation and authority, by confining the cir-
culation as much as possible, by frequent prosecu-
tions for libellous matter, and by establishing
another paper, in opposition. But though these
measures had ultimately the effect of ruining a bold
and indiscreet individual*, there can be no doubt
that the place in the community which he was
forced to abandon would have been soon occupied,
had not the acts of the legislature which immedi-
ately followed altered the frame of the civil govern-
ment, and given it a power completely adequate to
defend itself against insults and attacks.
From the discontinuance of the periodical paper †
to which we have alluded, no publication in India
demanded the serious interposition of the authority
of government, till 1791, when Lord Cornwallis
directed the arrest and transmission to England of
an editor, in consequence of an offensive para-
graph reflecting upon a French public officer and
some of his countrymen then residing at Calcutta.
The editor applied to the supreme court for a
writ of Habeas Corpus, which was granted. The
serving of the writ upon the town-major of Fort
William, who had charge of the prisoner, gave rise
to a long discussion between the government and
the supreme court of judicature; which terminated
of fa
* Mr. Hickey. † Hickey's Bengal Gazette.
Mr. William Duane, Editor of the Bengal Journal.
294
FREE PRESS
in a solemn and unanimous decision of the judges,
recognising the right exercised by the government;
and the editor, on being brought into court, was
remanded to the custody of the town-major, The
intercession of the French agent at Calcutta, how-
ever, saved him from being sent to England on this
occasion; but the publication of a number of im-
proper and intemperate articles subsequently, caused
this penalty to be inflicted on him in 1794; a pro-
ceeding of which the court of directors highly ap-
proved.
In 1796, several paragraphs appeared in the pub-
lic papers which excited the displeasure of govern-
ment; but on the editors expressing regret, and
promising more care for the future, no extreme
measures were resorted to. In 1798, there ap-
peared in the Telegraph, a periodical publication
of Calcutta, a paper signed Mentor, which was
thought to be calculated to excite discontent and
disaffection in the Indian army. On Captain Wil-
liamson of the Bengal establishment being dis-
covered to be the author, he was suspended the ser-
vice. The court of directors afterwards gave this
officer the half pay of his rank, but refused to com-
ply with his petition to be allowed to return to
India. In the same year a letter appeared in the
Telegraph, signed Charles M'Lean, reflecting upon
the judge and magistrate of Ghazepore. The
editor and Mr. M'Lean were called upon by go-
vernment to make an apology to that public officer.
IN INDIA.
295
t
The former complied with the requisition, but the
latter refused; and in consequence of this contu-
macy, and of previous misconduct in quitting the
ship to which he was attached, and remaining
in India without permission, he was sent to Eng-
land. The court of directors fully approved of this
proceeding.
The editor of the Telegraph incurred in the en-
suing year the further displeasure of government,
by the insertion of several offensive paragraphs;
and this incident, together with some of a similar na-
ture in other newspapers, led the Governor-general
in council to establish the following rules for the
regulation of the press at Calcutta :---
1. Every printer of a newspaper to print his
name at the bottom of the paper.
2. Every editor and proprietor of a paper to de-
liver in his name and place of abode to the secretary
of government.
3. No paper to be published on a Sunday.
4. No paper to be published at all, until it shall
have been previously inspected by the secretary to
the government, or by a person authorized by him
for that purpose.
5. The penalty for offending against any of the
above regulations to be, immediate embarkation
for Europe.
The court of directors, on receiving the report of
this regulation, gave it the sanction of their appro-
bation; as they did to further restrictions issued
296
FREE PRESS
under the administration of Lord Wellesley, which
interdicted newspapers from giving any general
orders, or naval intelligence, (such as the arrivals
and departures of ships) unless such articles had
appeared in the Gazette, thereby to ensure the
authority of government to their publication.
The first of these restrictions proceeded from
a desire that the orders of government should not
come before the public before they had an official
and authentic form; and the latter was designed to
protect the commercial interests and those of the
state from our enemies. The Indian seas were at
this period filled with French privateers; and it
was discovered that the shipping intelligence, in-
serted to gratify the curiosity of the readers of
newspapers, was sent to every point where it could
reach the commanders of these vessels, whom it often
enabled to intercept merchantmen, and to avoid
the British cruizers. This last restriction, which
the carelessness or contumacy of editors compelled
government often to repeat, will shew, in the
strongest point of view, the great difference be-
ween the character of the press in India and Eng-
land. At first view, it will certainly appear very
harsh, and almost tyrannical, to prohibit the public
papers from inserting arrivals and departures of
vessels, these being occurrences in which it may be
said many are deeply interested; but we shall be
sensible, on reflection, that the government could
hardly have shewn more negligence of its duty, or
IN INDIA.
297
more injustice to those living under its protection,
than to permit this to be done at the expense of its
commercial subjects, of its own reputation, and that
of his majesty's naval commander. The chief end
to be answered by the articles published would be,
to gratify the curiosity of the English inhabitants
of Calcutta, not amounting in numbers to those of
some large village in England, and to convey to
public servants and residents in the interior of India
information which, if at all interested in it, they
were certain of receiving through private channels.
This case may be deemed an exception; but the
nearer we look at the question of a free press in
India, the more exceptions we shall find, and be
compelled to confess that, as long as the necessity
exists for the maintenance of absolute power, it is
far better, both for the state and individuals, that
it should be exercised to prevent than to punish
such offences, particularly where the punish-
ment is so severe. In the latter case, government
has no option, it has only one course to pursue;
and when its authority is slighted, and its disposi-
tion to moderate measures treated with contumacy,
it is compelled to proceed to the extreme exercise
of its prerogative, or present to its subjects the
spectacle of its authority contemned and defeated.
After the establishment of the office of censor,
there were no cases of offence, except what were
comparatively trivial, and which seem to have origi-
nated more in negligence than design.
298
FREE PRESS
The steps taken in Lord Minto's administration,
to prevent the publication* of religious works
offensive to the nation, has been already detailed.
During the whole of the government of this noble-
* Lord Minto's exercise of his authority npon this occasion
was represented by the Rev. Mr. Buchanan, then a clergyman
at Calcutta, to be contrary to the practice of former Governors-
general; but his lordship, in a despatch to the secret com-
mittee of the court of directors, (7th Nov. 1807,) fully repelled
this attack upon the measures of government. He adverted
to the proceedings, already noticed, of Lord Wellesley relative
to the proposed thesis of disputation at the college of Fort
William. He also adverted to the recent massacre at Vellore,
and to the sentiments which the court of directors had ex-
pressed on hearing of that disaster. With regard to publica-
tions, he observed, "that the existing restrictions upon the
press
in India had been in force many years, and that it could
not be supposed that any former administration would have
deemed it consistent with the public safety, or with the obli-
gations of the public faith, as pledged to the native subjects of
the Company for the unmolested exercise of their religions, to
permit the circulation of such inflammatory works as those
which had been brought to notice."
4
Lord Minto, in reference to the discussions with the mis-
sionaries at Serampore, observes "that no innovation has taken
place in the principles and practice of this government relative
to the control of the productions of the press, that no new and
specific imprimatur has been established for works on theology;
but that the restrictions which virtually existed with regard to
publications in general, were practically applied to theological
works only when works of that class, containing strictures on
the religions of the country in terms the most irritating and
offensive, by being circulated among our native subjects, ex-
posed the public tranquillity to hazard.”
IN INDIA.
299
man there appears to have been a very vigilant
superintendence of the press *. In 1811 the names
of the printers were directed to be affixed to all
works, advertisements, papers, &c.; and two years
afterwards, further regulations directed not only
that the newspapers, notices, handbills, and all ephe-
meral publications, should be sent to the chief
secretary for revision, but that the titles of all works
intended for publication should be transmitted to
the same officer, who had the option of requiring
the work itself to be sent for his examination, if he
deemed it necessary.
These additional restrictions upon the press were
made under the government of a nobleman who,
from his character, was the most unlikely of men
to impose any restraint that he could avoid upon
the liberty of his countrymen. They were a strong
confirmation of the wisdom and foresight of his
predecessor, and evinced the necessity of increased
vigilance to check a growing evil. They had the
effect of preventing his being forced upon any harsh
measures to individuals; and it is worthy of obser-
vation, that from the time the office of censor was
established, though there were never less than five
newspapers published at Calcutta, in which every
*The editors of the newspapers were censured, in 1807,
for publishing intelligence about the distribution of his ma-
jesty's fleet, such articles being contrary to orders; and these
restrictions were directed to be observed at Madras and
Bombay.
300
FREE PRESS
kind of European intelligence, and all matters of
general and local interest, were inserted, there did
not occur, from 1801 till 1820, a period of twenty
years, one occasion on which government was com-
pelled even to threaten to send any individual to
England.
During the first three years of the administration
of Lord Hastings, frequent censures had been
passed on the editor of a paper, called the Asiatic
Mirror, for what was deemed improper conduct.
The editor, for one of his pleas of justification,
remonstrated * upon the varied mode in which dif-
ferent individuals who filled the office of censor
performed its duties, and the consequent difficulty
there was in understanding exactly the course which
an editor was to pursue. No notice was taken of
this remonstrance; but in the subsequent year, the
office of censor was abolished, and as a substitute,
regulations for the conduct of editors of news-
papers were issued.
By this measure the name of an invidious office
* Letter from Dr. Bryen, editor of the Mirror, dated Febru-
ary, 1817.
†These regulations were as follows:-
“The editors of newspapers are prohibited from publishing
any matter coming under the following heads:-
"1. Animadversions on the measures and proceedings of the
honourable court of directors, or other public authorities in
England, connected with the government in India; or disquisi-
tions on political transactions of the local administration; or
offensive remarks levelled at the public conduct of the members
IN INDIA.
301
was abolished, and the responsibility of printing
'offensive matter was removed from a public func-
tionary to the author or editor; but this change, so
far from rescinding any of the restrictions upon the
press, in reality imposed them in as strong, if not
in a stronger degeee, than any measure that had
been before adopted. This conviction would, no
doubt, have been general, but for the misinterpre-
tation of a passage in the answer given by Lord
Hastings to an address from the inhabitants of
Madras. In this address, his lordship was compli-
mented on the adoption of a measure "calculated
to give strength to a liberal and just government,
to which freedom of inquiry and the liberty of dis-
cussion was the best support;" and his lordship's
answer was couched in terms*, which were in some
of council, of the judges of the supreme court, or of the lord-
bishop of Calcutta.
"2. Discussions having a tendency to create alarm or sus-
picion among the native population of any intended interference
with their religious opinions.
"3. The republication, from English or other newspapers,
of passages coming under any of the above heads, or otherwise
calculated to affect the British power or reputation in India.
“4. Private scandal and personal remarks on individuals,
tending to excite dissension in society."
* Lord Hastings, in his reply to the address from the inha-
bitants of Madras, observes, "My removal of restrictions from
the press has been mentioned in laudatory language. I might
easily have adopted that procedure without any length of cau-
302
FREE PRESS
quarters altogether misinterpreted. It was erro-
neously inferred that his lordship was disposed to
give a very great latitude to freedom of publication;
and that the restrictions which had been before im-
posed, if not virtually repealed by this public de-
claration of his opinions, would, at least, not be
enforced by the arbitrary punishment inflicted
by former Governor-generals of sending offenders
to England. The editor* of the Calcutta Jour-
nal was forward to declare this impression and to act
upon it. This paper early evinced a talent and
tious consideration, from my habit of regarding the freedom of
publication as a natural right of my fellow-subjects, to be nar-
rowed only by special and urgent cause assigned. The seeing
no direct necessity for those invidious shackles might have
sufficed to make me break them-I know myself, however, to
have been guided in the step by a positive and well-weighed
policy. If our motives of action are worthy, it must be wise to
render them intelligible throughout an empire, our hold on
which is opinion. Further, it is salutary for supreme authority,
even when its intentions are most pure, to look to the control
of public scrutiny: while conscious of rectitude, that authority
can lose nothing of its strength by its exposure to general
comment. On the contrary, it requires incalculable addition
of force. That government which has nothing to disguise
wields the most powerful instrument that can appertain to
sovereign rule. It carries with it the united reliance and effort
of the whole mass of the governed: and let the triumph of our
beloved country in its awful contest with tyrant-ridden France
speak the value of a spirit to be found only in men accustomed
to indulge and express their honest sentiments.”
*Mr. Buckingham.
IN INDIA.
303
industry that would have given it success under
'any circumstances; and when its pages added, to the
excellent matter with which they were often filled,
attacks upon public measures, with strictures on
the highest official personages in India, its cir-
culation greatly increased. The very disputes of
the editor with individuals and with government
gave a piquancy to his pages, while his display
of attachment to English principles, in the bold
assertion of the liberty of the press, and his
resistance to what was reprobated as arbitrary
power, gained him many and zealous advocates,
who, awakened as it were at his call to feelings
congenial to their native country, forgot for the
moment the vast difference between that and the
land in which they had chosen to reside. Encou-
raged by their approbation, and by the profit and
popularity which for a short period attended his
labours, the editor persisted in his course, which
terminated in his being sent to England. The
legality and justice of this extreme measure were
confirmed by the decision of the court of direc-
tors, and by the king in council, to both of which
authorities he made his appeal against the severity
of his treatment in India.
It would occupy too much space to detail the
measures which Lord Hastings took before he
left Bengal to restrain the licentiousness of the
press, or to give the sentiments he recorded
expressive of the disappointment at the effects
304
FREE PRESS
produced by the latitude which he had desired
to give to this cherished English privilege. The
moderation with which he performed his duty on
this occasion did not save him from the attacks
of those who had a short time before hailed him
as the bestower of that freedom which he was
now represented as anxious to destroy. His suc-
cessors, Mr. Adam and Lord Amherst, were viru-
lently assailed for the acts which the continued
offences of the successive editors of the Calcutta
Journal compelled them to adopt; and the former
incurred more obloquy from a popular party on
account of the regulations established by him, with
the sanction of the supreme court of Calcutta, by
which every printer is obliged to have a license
before he is authorized to print newspaper, pamph-
let, or work of any description whatsoever; which
licenses are to be withdrawn on the transgression
of any of the restrictions under which the press
is placed. This measure applies to all classes, and
is deemed, for that reason, better than the restora-
tion of the office of censor, which, as far as the
arbitrary act of banishing from India operated,
could apply to Europeans only; while the Anglo-
Indians and natives could consequently print and
publish what they pleased, without being amenable
to any punishment but what the ordinary course of
law inflicted.
The history of the press at Madras and Bombay
is, on a small scale, not unlike that of Calcutta.
IN INDIA.
305
At the former presidency one case occurred, thirty
years ago, of an editor* being ordered to England
for publishing a libellous paper; but no similar
act of severity has been required there since,
owing, no doubt, to the office of censor having
been continued in that presidency. It is impor-
tant, however, to state that, when that able and
respectable nobleman, Lord William Bentinck, was
at the head of this government, one of his majesty's
judges* sent to the government a copy of his
charge to the grand jury at the preceding sessions,
with a request that it should be printed; which
request was not complied with, as the charge in
question was considered to contain an attack on
the civil government of the country.
The go-
vernor took this occasion of expressing his senti-
ments in the most decided manner regarding all
such publications.
66
"It is necessary, in my opinion," his lordship
observed, "for the public safety, that the press
in India should be kept under the most rigid con-
trol. It matters not from what pen the dangerous
matter may issue; the higher the authority the
greater the mischief."
This was the just and deliberate opinion of
a nobleman deeply imbued with the true principles
of English freedom, but, at the same time, too
Mr. Humphries. He made his escape from on board
the ship in which he was embarked.
† Sir Henry Gwillim.
VOL. II.
X
306
FREE PRESS
well acquainted with the frame of our Indian
government to admit any part of that to suffer
injury when in his hands, from a desire either to
evade responsibility or to court popularity.
The press at Bombay was placed under the su-
pervision of a government officer in the year 1791;
and the censorship continued until it was done
away at Calcutta, when it was also abolished at
Bombay. Though various discussions had arisen,
no extreme act of authority was resorted to until
lately that the governor in council directed the
editor* of the Bombay Gazette to be sent to Eng-
land, on a complaint from one of his majesty's judges
at that presidency, founded on an alleged mis-state-
ment of the legal proceedings of the court in which
he presided. The quarter from which this appeal
was made to the civil government, unless we impugn
the conduct of the judge who made it, must carry
with it irresistible evidence of the necessity of that
authority whose aid was solicited; and with respect
to the extreme resorted to, in affording this aid,
there is one unanswerable plea to be preferred,
which is, that a government so situated cannot
suffer the commands it has issued to be success-
fully opposed by an individual, without a loss of
that impression of its power which is quite essential
to the fulfilment of its various and important
duties.
The foregoing is a short history of the press in
* Mr. Fair.
IN INDIA.
307
India, from its first establishment till the present
date. It is not necessary to notice the many dis-
cussions and publications to which the more recent
occurrences at Calcutta have given rise in England.
The author's sentiments upon that question, as
given at a debate at the India house, will be found
in the Appendix*; but he must, in this place, offer
some general observations, which, he trusts, will be
perused with that calmness and consideration which
a subject of such vital importance to our Indian
empire demands. It is no easy task to reconcile
Englishmen to any principles which have an ap-
pearance of militating against that freedom, to
which, from their very birth, they are so fondly
attached; but they will not refuse assent to the
reasonableness of some departure from these prin-
ciples, if proved to be alike essential to maintain
the prosperity and glory of their country, and to
promote the good and tranquillity of distant nations,
who, though subject to its power, are, and must
long continue, in a totally different state of society.
The mode in which we can best arrive at a safe
conclusion upon this important point is, to examine
carefully the general character of a free press, and
the effects which its introduction would be likely to
have upon the different classes of our subjects in
India. Throughout the civilized world, a free press
is a powerful engine for good or for evil. When
the knowledge of the people, their institutions and
* Vide Appendix, No. VI.
X 2
308
FREE PRESS
form of government are such as to admit of its
freedom, the good preponderates; when the reversc
is the case, the evil. It is safe to admit the press
to comment freely upon the acts of government
and the conduct of its functionaries, when there is
an independent public to whom its observations
and strictures are addressed, and by whom it is
salutary, for the general welfare, that they should
be canvassed and understood, in order that their
opinion should check misrule; and that the fear of
offending or outraging it, should temper with mode-
ration and justice every act of those intrusted with
the administration of state affairs; but no part of
this description of an independent public applies to
our empire in India. The English part of the po-
pulation is, perhaps, as respectable a community
as any in the world; but they are not what an
Englishman would designate as a public. The
great majority are civil and military servants, of
whom a very considerable proportion hold their
offices at the pleasure of the local government
under which they serve; and the other part, com-
posed of merchants, free-traders, missionaries, shop
keepers, and artisans, not in the service of govern-
ment, enjoy, under the protection of British courts
of law, every privilege of an Englishman, except
such as the interests of the Indian empire would
make it dangerous for them to possess. But the
want of these excepted privileges is rarely felt, for
such is the happy effect of our free constitution,
IN INDIA.
309
that a portion of it attends and guards Englishmen
in whatever soil and situation they are placed. Its
beneficial influence tempers the actions of the most
absolute power with which an English government
over foreign countries can be vested, having for
its support the sympathy of all who are born
Britons; and, in the respectable community now
formed by the English in India, this feeling has
gained, and will continue to gain, a strength that
must rank it among the most powerful of the
checks we can expect to have upon a government
which circumstances require to be strong, and in
some cases almost despotic.
There can be no doubt that, in substance, there
exists in our empire in India as much of personal
liberty as is compatible with our sovereignty of that
country; but if, from a desire to assimilate with the
national government of England the unnational go-
vernment which extraordinary events have given us
in India, any individuals are to be suffered to exer-
cise the same rights there as are exercised in Eng-
land, in commenting upon the acts of local admi-
nistration, animadverting upon its functionaries,
publishing complaints and grievances, discussing
questions of internal and external policy, and ex-
posing as objects of ridicule and detestation the
usages and religion of our native subjects; they
will create insubordination, contention, and dis-
affection. Unless strong and political restrictions
are enforced, neither the grave admonitions of those
1
310
FREE PRESS
in authority, nor an occasional appeal to the law,
will stop men in a career where their profit and
popularity will be so commensurate to the bold-
ness of their attacks as always to indemnify them
for the slight hazard they incur from judges
bound by the letter of the law, or juries, consisting
of men who, from their condition, will look with
no hostile feeling at those who rail at persons in
office, or attack the measures of their superiors in
society. But the
But the evils likely to result in the
European part of the community from the admis-
sion of a free press appear slight to those which
would be produced, and at no distant date, amongst
the natives of India; and it is the consideration of
their good, even more than of our own, which de-
mands attention to this subject. It is impossible
England should desire to withhold from her sub-
jects in India the benefit of knowledge; but on the
manner in which this benefit is imparted, her glory
and their happiness depend. On this point, there-
fore, it is our duty to exert our best judgment; and
what person that has studied the past history of
the natives of India, and fully understands their
* At the courts of most of the native princes, papers of
:news, termed Ackbars, are produced; which are court-gazettes,
giving a statement of occurrences, true or false, as matters of
fact, without comment or opinion. From the situation of
the writers under such governments, it will easily be con-
ceived that these Ackbars bear no affinity to an English
newspaper.
IN INDIA.
311
present character and condition, will venture to re-
commend us to commence this improvement by the
agency of a free press? That may, perhaps, be
the last boon given to a people whom, with a policy
unknown to former ages, we shall have gradually
matured into a state of society fit to receive it;
the gift will be ennobled by the conviction that
the existence of a spirit of national feeling and
independence, which it is calculated to spread and
maintain, is irreconcilable with the continuance of
submission to a foreign rule, however enlarged the
views and just the principles upon which that rule
is founded.
The establishment of a free press in India is con-
genial with the interests and feelings of a number
of that class of Europeans who dwell at the presi-
dencies under English law. It is from their
sup-
port that it has lately derived, and will hereafter
derive, confidence in its attacks upon the local ad-
ministration, and upon the usages and religion of
the natives of India. There is no preventing this
effect if the law is exclusively appealed to, and the
victories which editors obtain over government and
its officers will daily strengthen a cause which has
gained, in a short period, much ground both in
India and in England; for even in the former
country the great majority of English residents are
but little acquainted with the true character of those
ties by which we hold our eastern empire. The
general sentiments of persons connected with the
312
FREE PRESS
courts of English law are, from education and from
habit, favourable to what appears the cause of
liberty. Many members of the European part of
the community are discontented with their condition
and prospects; others continue at the presidencies
with unchanged English ideas and feelings, and
ignorant of the condition of the country and its
native population beyond the limits of the capitals
in which they reside. Such persons often cherish
a hatred (which they flatter themselves is constitu-
tional) to all that, in their opinion, approaches to
oriental despotism. A great number (and this
class increases rapidly) are so ardent for the propa-
gation of education and religion, that they wel-
come, with an inconsiderate zeal, every aid which
they think will accelerate the early attainment
of their objects, and we cannot be surprised that
among those they deem a free press one of the
most essential. Thus professional feeling, igno-
rance, disaffection, prejudice, and enthusiasm, swell
the numbers of the advocates of a free press in
India; and these meet with coinciding sentiments
in England in all who are ignorant or but superfi-
cially acquainted with the history and condition of
India. Better informed men, however, will be
convinced that the good of the latter country needs
a mixture of some principles happily uncongenial
to England; and that not only the interests of
Great Britain, but those of humanity and of know-
ledge, require our firm resistance to this and other
IN INDIA.
313
points similar in their spirit of innovation, and
unseasonable excitement.
The establishment of a free press in India has
been represented as a mean of advancing the know-
ledge and promoting the utility of that class of our
subjects denominated "half-castes," or Anglo-In-
dians. The attention which this class has lately re-
ceived has been already noticed; and it may be
added, that the success of the measures which have
been adopted with a view to their improvement
would be much more likely to be defeated than ad-
vanced by a free press, which might prove a fatal
boon to a society yet in its infancy of knowledge.
That freedom would be more likely to instil prin-
ciples of insubordination, division, and misplaced
ambition, than to convey lessons of virtue and mo-
deration to a community whose rise into respect-
ability and consideration in the state depends on
habits of active industry and solid acquirements.
The press, as at present licensed in India, affords
to this body of our subjects all that can be well
desired of instruction. If its freedom were extended
beyond this point, it might work them evil; it
could render them no good: but a view of the
benefit or injury it might bring to this class, or to
a few Europeans*, sinks into insignificance when
we contemplate its probable effects upon eighty
millions of our native subjects. In treating this
* The estimated numbers of all the Europeans in India, not
in the civil or military service, is about 3000.
!
314
FREE PRESS
part of the subject, we may commence by assuming,
that there never was a government actuated with
more just and liberal views, nor one more anxious
to exercise its sovereign functions in a spirit of
mildness and toleration, than that of the British in
India. Arrived as it now is at a state of unrivalled
power, it may look to an undisturbed progress in
the execution of its plans for a substantial and
gradual improvement of the natives of its vast em-
pire; but this fair prospect must be destroyed, if
we unwisely anticipate the period when the blessings
we intend can be safely imparted. By doing so,
we shall not only hasten our own destruction, but
replunge India into a greater state of anarchy and
misery than that in which we found it. Of all the
means that could be devised to accelerate this de-
plorable crisis, none is so efficient as the admission
of a press restrained only by laws adapted for a
free and independent country, into one where,
before freedom and independence can be under-
stood, the mind of the people must be wholly
changed, and where, before they can be worthy of
these blessings, they must have thrown off the yoke
of foreigners. But to understand the ground of
those opinions, we must examine the character of
the people in question.
The two great divisions of our Asiatic subjects
are Mahomedans and Hindus: the former, who are
the least numerous, have been the greatest sufferers
by our establishment in India; but their means of
1
IN INDIA.
315
subverting our power are slight compared with
those possessed by the Hindus. Though the Ma-
homedans are no longer actuated by that enthu-
siastic spirit of religion which, at one period, gave
them strength and union, their idleness and bad
habits, combined with their courage, render them
dangerous; for they are prone to change, and have
strong passions, with an unrestrained appetite for
sensual pleasures, for the gratification of which
they will incur any hazard.
Such a race have hitherto been, and will continue
to be, apt instruments for the purpose of the de-
signing and disaffected.
The Hindu population of India comprises all
descriptions of human beings, from the most intel-
ligent to the most ignorant, from the most cou-
rageous to the most timid: but, though divided by
their tribes and castes, as well as by their various
dispositions, pursuits, and qualities, there are some
general feelings that will unite them; and of these
the more instructed part of the community under-
stand how to take full advantage whenever it suits
their purpose. The Brahmins and the civil classes
have for ages been the nominal servants and real
masters of the turbulent and bold, but ignorant
and superstitious, military tribes of their country-
men. Their skill in wielding this dangerous power
has become complete by frequent exercise; and
when we consider what they have lost by the in-
troduction and extension of our dominion, it would
316
FREE PRESS
be folly to expect that they should not have a wish
to subvert it.
Contemplating, as we always should, the possi-
bility of such an attempt, we ought to be very
careful that we do not ourselves contribute means
for its success; and it may be asserted that, until
the minds of the natives of India are changed,
their prejudices subdued, and knowledge gradually
diffused, we could give to the Brahmins, and others
of the instructed classes of India, no weapon which
they would know better how to use against us than
a free press. Their efforts would be chiefly directed
to corrupt our native soldiery, who are neither in-
sensible to their own consequence, nor inobservant
of the depressed scale on which they serve. It is our
duty, as it is our interest, to guard these brave and
attached men from insidious attacks upon their
fidelity. A contest with any part of our native
army must commence with a destruction of links
essential to our existence. If we oppose English
to revolted Indian troops, the best result would
give success only for a short period; for, from the
moment that we began to rely upon our physical
strength, the chain by which we hold our eastern
empire would be broken, and we should have to
struggle through recurring difficulties and dangers
to an inglorious termination of our power.
The measures hitherto employed by artful ene-
mies to produce dissatisfaction in our subjects and
native troops, and their partial success, give earnest
IN INDIA.
317
of the dangers to be apprehended from the disse-
mination in the native languages of printed tracts
and papers, such as might be expected from a free
press. It is not necessary to enumerate the in-
stances to which allusions are here made*; suffice
it to say, they are numerous, and all directed to
the same object, the excitement of a feeling hostile
to the existence of our power.
Upon a view of these facts, we can imagine no
precaution of such consequence as a watchful re-
straint of the press. If that is not restricted from
publications tending to lower the respect in which
government and its officers are held, from offending
and weakening princes and chiefs, by lessening their
estimation with their subjects, from alarming and
irritating the natives of India, by attacks on their
usages and religion, and from disseminating prin-
ciples of sedition and rebellion, it will gradually un-
dermine and destroy our power; and it may compass
this without any serious transgression against the
* It may be affirmed, from the most authentic documents,
that, for the last thirty-five years, there has been, in different.
parts of India, a most active circulation of inflammatory papers,
in the form of proclamations, letters, and prophecies, directed
to the subversion of the British power. These have, in almost
all cases, been addressed to the interests and passions of our
native troops. They have too often made deep impressions;
but the difficulty of multiplying copies, and the fear of de-
tection, has limited their circulation to particular parts of the
country, and, in a great degree, prevented the mischiefs which
such efforts of our enemies were calculated to produce.
318
FREE PRESS
law of England, or, indeed, without the slightest
evil intention of some of those who aid in working
the mischief. Their limited knowledge and imper-
fect information, combined with their zeal, may
blind them to the dangers they engender; and
others, who have deeper designs, will court their
names in a cause that must be popular with many,
from its supposed association with the propagating
of freedom, useful knowledge, and true religion.
We must necessarily deduce from what has been
stated, that the existence of a press, free in the same
degree as that of England, is incompatible with a
government such as that we have established in
India. It would accelerate the destruction of our
power long before its dissolution could be a benefit
to the natives of that country: it would impede
instead of promote the progress to improvement
now making by the Anglo-Indians and Europeans
whose curiosity, national prejudices, and personal
feelings, which it might amuse and gratify, would
be thrown by its unlicensed action into parties and
dissensions every way injurious to the happiness
and interests of this small but important part of the
population.
That a spirit of emulation might be excited, and
some latent talent be elicited, by the freedom of
the press, cannot be denied; nor is it meant to
deny that good might arise from its observations
on public men and measures, and that it might
occasionally constitute a check against abuses;
IN INDIA.
319
but, in a government like British India, such good
would be partial and uncertain, whereas the mis-
chief to which a free, unlicensed press would open
the door, would be general and incalculable. The
present press in India is under no restrictions
that can prevent its doing good on as large a
scale as can be rationally wished. It is restricted
from attacking a government so placed and con-
stituted that it would lose by such attacks the
impression which is indispensable to fulfil its
duties; it is interdicted from publishing any ar-
ticles that have a tendency to disturb the society,
and to excite passions and feelings that would lead
through discontent and disaffection to sedition and
revolt. These salutary interdictions excepted, it has
every freedom and every encouragement that a
friend to publicity (which every friend to just go-
vernment must be) could desire. There is no re-
strictions that can prevent the spread of intelli-
gence, and the dissemination of science and in-
struction, in every art and improvement of civilized
life. But it is important to observe that our con-
tinued ability to give the press that latitude which
will make it a great and useful instrument to fur-
ther our plans of improvement, depends on the
strict✶ and vigilant manner in which we check
* No individual in authority can have a right to act upon
his personal feeling or discretion for the toleration of departure
from established regulations. The moment the rule ceases to
be imperative in all cases, its application in particular ones be-
320
FREE PRESS
any trespass upon the limits which have been
scribed to those by whom it is conducted.
pre-
It has been argued that a free press in India
would prove a channel through which complaints
would be heard; that it would be a protection
to the weak and oppressed; that it would convey
wrongs and abuses to the ear of government and
its high functionaries, and would prove in this and
in other ways an efficient check to the abuse
of power: but it is sufficiently obvious that such
benefits could alone result when those that con-
ducted the press had complete information and
perfect knowledge of the languages, the manners,
the character, and concerns of the people; where,
in short, all their feelings were congenial with
those of the society of which they were the advo-
cates; otherwise their representations would be
full of error, and their observations superficial and
inconclusive. No English editor of a paper can
have the means of becoming qualified for an
impartial and useful advocate of our Indian sub-
jects; and with regard to native editors, we cannot
expect them to exercise such a privilege within
limits that could be tolerated by a government
comes invidious or unjust. The temptation to pass the line of
demarcation will always be great. Profit and popularity will
attend the person who outsteps it, and his example will soon
have followers. Checks will be daily more difficult, and the
effects of injudicious forbearance and lenity may even cause an
abridgment of the latitude now given to useful publications.
IN INDIA.
321
whose power is at variance with those principles
of national independence and freedom which it
would be their duty, if worthy of the task they
undertook, to disseminate amongst their country-
men. We are too separated from the great bulk
of the population of India to be enabled to judge
with precision the progress of change in their
feelings and sentiments; but it must be obvious
to all who are acquainted with their character and
the construction of their society, that freedom of
discussion and of action, to be beneficial amongst
such a people, must be a plant of slow growth.
A very long period must elapse before it is natu-
ralized in a land to which its very name is hitherto
unknown; nor can this great gift ever be a blessing
till men's minds are prepared to receive it. Through
the institution and maintenance of well-regulated
colleges and schools, and the circulation of good and
useful compositions, we can alone look with confi-
dence to the accomplishment of our just and liberal
views. By such rational means we shall disse-
minate instruction in process of time amongst
those peaceable classes of our subjects where it
will be most beneficial, and our efforts for their
improvement may increase as their minds expand.
In such a course there is safety and benefit; but
very different would be the effects of the im-
mediate toleration of papers, pamphlets, and tracts
which, without any violation of law, might be
filled with matter that would be too intelligible
VOL. II,
Y
322
FREE PRESS
to the turbulent and military part of our population,
whose passions they would provoke by published
contempt of their religion and usages; while they
excited their ambition, and invited their attack, by
exposing and decrying the authorities to which
they are subject. The very men whom we have
armed for our defence would, in all likelihood,
be among the first whose principles of obedience
and duty such a press would undermine. Through
it, seductive but false lessons would be taught them
by the discontented and designing. They are
already at a stage of knowledge and condition
which renders it (as experience has shewn) too
easy to delude their credulous and ardent minds.
By the aid of an unrestricted press our enemies
would soon make this brave, and hitherto faithful,
body of men believe that their independence and
advancement would be achieved by our downfal
and destruction.
To conclude, it is not from ephemeral publica-
tions, nor from the desultory efforts of talent with-
out experience, and enthusiasm without judgment,
that we are to expect the improvement of the
natives of India. Such may dazzle and attract
individuals, and form a few bands and societies
who, proud of their imagined superiority, separate
themselves from the population to which they be-
long, and thus create a collective body, powerless
to effect good or great ends, but efficient to work
much evil. The change we seek, to be beneficial,
IN INDIA.
323
must be general; it must be wrought by the society
itself, and come as the result, not as the object of
our persevering and unwearied labours. By the
extreme of care in the selection of those who
are to rule over this people, who are to com-
mand our armies, and to distribute justice; by
stimulating the zeal and ambition of those employed
in the public service; by liberal encouragement to
commerce, and to the introduction of the useful
arts of civilized life; by addressing ourselves not
only in the substance but mode * of administration
to the understanding and feelings of those we have
to govern; by useful public works; by a moderate
assessment of revenue from our subjects, and tole-
ration of their religious and superstitious usages;
by institutions founded on sound and solid prin-
-ciples; by raising into consideration and distinction
those of the native population whose services, su-
perior talent and integrity, or weight and influence
with their countrymen, make it wise and politic to
elevate; and above all, by governing our vast territo-
ries in India with more attention to their interests,
and to the character and condition of their inha-
bitants, than to the wishes and prejudices of those
* There is no consideration of more consequence than the
manner as well as conduct of every public servant towards the
natives of all classes and ranks. This subject has been care-
fully treated in the instructions which the author gave to his
assistants before he left India in 1821. These instructions
form Appendix VIII.
*
324
FREE PRESS IN INDIA.
of England, we shall succeed in ultimately accom-
plishing every plan now in progress for the benefit
of this singular and great empire. But the conduct
and direction of all these plans must be left to the
local administration, the members of which, anxious
as they must ever be for their reputation and good
name in their native land, will be found more
desirous to accelerate, than to retard the march of
improvement. We may change the character of the
natives of India in the course of time, but we never
can change the character of our government over
that country. It is one of strangers, and cannot
endure but in the shape in which it now exists, well
regulated, but absolute; acting under the strictest
responsibility in England, but vested with a power
in India efficient to prevent and repress every
danger to which it may be exposed from the in-
temperate zeal, the contumacy, or the opposition of
its subjects, as well as from the machinations or
the aggressions of its enemies.
•
APPENDIX.
No. I.
Abstract of Conferences between the COMMISSIONERS of
the HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY, the NIZAM
(or Subadar of the Deccan), and the PAISHWAH, on one
part, and those of the TIPPOO SULTAUN, on the other,
to negotiate the TREATY of SERINGAPATAM, 1792.
SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, English.
MEER ALLUM, Nizam's.
GHOOLAM ALI, ALI REZA (recently returned from the Em-
bassy to Constantinople), Tippoo's.
GOVIND ROW KISHEN, BHEEKAJEE PUNDHIT,
Paishwah's.
THE commissioners met at a tent, pitched near the Eedgah*.
Feb. 13th.-The first day's conference has been lost-but
little appears to have passed, except ceremony and the
arrangement of future meetings.
Feb. 14th.-The allied deputies stated as a sine qua non
the cession of the half of Tippoo's territories, and also thẹ
* The Eedgah is an open temple, where the sacrifice of Isaac and
other public festivals of the Mahomedan religion are annually cele-
brated.
VOL. II.
a
ii
[APP.
CONFERENCES TO NEGOTIATE
payment of six crores (six millions sterling), towards
defraying the expenses of the war.
Feb. 18th.-Persons and place of meeting the same as
before.
Ali Reza, one of Tippoo's envoys, was willing to cede
one-fourth of his master's country, and to pay three crores
of rupees.
Sir John Kennaway observed that if this was
Tippoo's final answer, the conference must cease, and hosti-
lities be renewed, as the allies could not depart from their
demands. He added to this observation his desire, grounded
on reasons he was not at liberty to divulge, that Tippoo's
vakeels should quit the ground they occupied, and return to
Seringapatam that night. "However irksome," he said,
"it is to my private feelings to insist on this point, with per-
sons whose manner and conversation has so much attached
me to them, my public duty and attention to the injunctions
of the orders which I act requires it of me." This observa-
tion made a serious impression on Tippoo's envoys, who
pleaded, earnestly, their master's inability to pay such a sum,
and remonstrated against the hardness of the terms. They
were answered by Sir John Kennaway, that Tippoo's
aggression had given the allies the right, now they had the
power, to strip him of all his possessions which would not
pay their expenses in the war.
The vakeels reiterated their master's inability to pay more
than two crores and a half (two millions sterling) of rupees:
offered their own oaths on the Koran to this effect; and
requested a reference to the public accounts of the treasury
to prove his inability. They stated Tippoo's expenses in
fortifications, public works, and his disbursements during
the war, to have been enormous: from these and other
considerations, they entreated that their first offer might be
accepted.
I.]
iii
THE TREATY OF SERINGA PATAM.
Sir John Kennaway replied that he could only repeat the
substance of his former demand, which was founded in prin-
ciples of moderation, and finally, that he and his colleagues
were only deputies acting from powers strictly defined and
limited by their respective principals. After a long interval
had elapsed, and after Tippoo's vakeels had consulted apart,
Ghoolam Ali said he would undertake to guarantee the
cession of half the country, with fifty lacs more, in all, three
crores (three millions sterling) of rupees; he added, that
even this could only be given by eight or ten of Tippoo s
sirdars aiding their master's means. Sir John Kennaway
repeated his former answer, and insisted on the vakeels re-
turning to Seringapatam. The vakeels entreated to be per-
mitted to remain, and to have their last offer reported to
Lord Cornwallis. To this Sir John Kennaway at length
assented, cautioning them against the hope of their proposal
being accepted, or their being permitted to remain where they
were longer than to-morrow morning; and as it would be
unpleasant to him to issue harsh orders to them, he re-
quested that if they saw his tent struck next morning,
they would consider it as necessary to remove their own.
In some of the pauses and intervals of the above confer-
ence, Ali Reza, conceiving that Tippoo had been repre-
sented to Lord Cornwallis as a cruel and tyrannical prince,
entered into a laboured defence of his sovereign. As an ex-
ample of his liberality, he instanced his conduct to the gar-
rison of Mangalore: to which Sir John Kennaway replied,
that that garrison had capitulated on terms which had not been
infringed. He also instanced his good behaviour to the
gar-
rison of Bidenore, under General Mathews. Sir John Ken-
naway answered, that the terms of this latter capitulation had
been violated by Tippoo in a shameful manner. Ali Reza
replied, it was true, but the violation of the terms had
commenced with General Mathews, who was discovered
a 2
iv
[Arr.
CONFERENCES TO NEGOTIATË
carrying away treasure from the fort*.
Cruelty to his
prisoners, he said, was often imputed to his master unjustly.
Their hard usage had been caused by the treachery of his
public servants, who had applied to their own use the
money allowed for their support. Sir John Kennaway
allowed that this might, in part, extenuate particular cases,
but the treatment of the prisoners in general had been that
of brutes rather than men. He expressed to the vakeel
the satisfaction Lord Cornwallis felt at the offer which had
been made to release those now in Seringapatam, which,
however, could not at present be accepted; but his Lordship
trusted they would receive the same treatment which
Tippoo's prisoners received from us. The conference then
broke up about nine o'clock.
Feb. 19th.-At five o'clock, p.m., Sir John Kennaway
waited, by Lord Cornwallis's orders, on the Nizam's mi-
nister, and requested his opinion of the answer that should
be given to Tippoo's offer. The minister stated his readi-
ness to agree to whatever was Lord Cornwallis's determina-
tion, and demanded what the determination was likely to be.
Sir John Kennaway told him that his lordship considered
three crores a large sum to be paid down at once, and as
Tippoo's envoys had expressed their readiness to make oath
as to his want of means to pay more, and had offered to shew
the treasury accounts, he doubted whether more could by
possibility be had. The point, therefore, to decide was,
whether they should accept the offer, or protract the war, by
sticking out for another crore. The minister thought it also
a large sum, yet before agreeing to the offer, he was of opinion
we ought to call on Tippoo for the revenue accounts of his
territories, that it might be ascertained what was the value
* He said the hollow part of the pole of the palankeen (bamboo) was
filled with gold lace and jewels.
I.]
V
THE TREATY OF SERINGA PATAM.
of the proposed cessions. Sir John Kennaway answered, that
by calling for papers, the negotiation would be protracted,
which was unadvisable, and moreover, that until Tippoo's
hostages were in our possession, his good faith, and adherence
to one article of the agreement, could not be depended on.
When that took place, papers might be called for at our
leisure. The minister reiterated his wish to be entirely
guided by his lordship's decision. Sir John Kennaway then
took leave, and accompanied by Meer Allum, proceeded to
Hurry Punt's tent.
The conversation with the Mahratta chief commenced in
the same manner as it had done with the Nizam's minister.
On understanding that Sir John had just come from the
latter, he asked what answer or opinion he had given. Meer
Allum replied, that the minister's answer would be Hurry
Punt's.
Hurry Punt then said, he would be happy at Tippoo's
entire extirpation, and he should revel in the spoil and
conquest of his territory; yet that great men, in Lord
Cornwallis's predicament, guided their conduct in two ways.
The first was, when fortune favoured them, and the enemy
was at their feet, to be deaf to prayers and entreaties, and
to destroy him utterly. The other alternative, and, without
doubt, the preferable, was to have compassion on him, when
he was humble and sued for mercy; and to restore him to
power without neglecting their own advancement and security.
Sir John Kennaway said, that Lord Cornwallis preferred the
alternative of mercy, and being also of opinion that it would
be difficult for Tippoo to pay more than he had offered, was
not inclined to protract the war by any more demands.
To this the Mahratta chief assented, using a proverb equi-
valent to taking time by the forelock, or striking while the
iron was hot.
Meer Allum recurred to the minister's plan of declining a
vi
[Arr.
CONFERENCES TO NEGOTIATE
definite answer till we had obtained the accounts necessary
to ascertain the value of the proposed cessions. Hurry Punt
objected to this delay, and said he would be responsible for
Tippoo's territories yielding a net revenue of three crores.
He then desired Sir John Kennaway would suggest to
Lord Cornwallis the propriety of demanding from Tippoo
a sum for Durbar charges, as a gratuity to the officers of
the three states employed in the war: unless a sum of
this nature were obtained, the Nizam's ministers and other
civil officers would not benefit a rupee by the war. Such
demand, he said, was usual on similar occasions, and could
not impede the negotiations, and that sixty lacs might be
demanded, and thirty accepted. Sir John Kennaway then
taking leave of Hurry Punt, waited on Lord Cornwallis,
and from thence repaired to meet Tippoo's envoys at the
conference tent.
Persons, the same as before; time of meeting half-past
eight, p.m.
Sir John Kennaway opened the conference by saying,
that Lord Cornwallis having deeply considered the offer they
had made, and consulted the representatives of the allies;
having also duly considered their solemn averment of the im-
possibility of Tippoo's paying more than he had offered, and
their proposal of showing to competent persons their treasure
and accounts; and being averse to press too severe terms,
he was willing to accept the offer they had made; but in
addition to the three crores now accepted, an additiona]
article must be inserted in the treaty, granting sixty lacs for
Durbar expenses.
Ghoolam Ali Khan, after the expression of his deep sense
of Lord Cornwallis's consideration for the state of his mas-
ter's affairs, requested Sir John Kennaway to state, candidly,
the lowest sum that would be insisted on for Durbar ex-
.I.]
vii
THE TREATY OF SERINGAPATAM.
penses, that the treaty might not be delayed by discussing
that article. Sir John answered, that thirty lacs was the
minimum. They then proceeded to form the draft which
was to form the basis of a treaty, and to discuss it article by
article. This ended, the paper stood as follows:-
Article I.-Preamble as usual, noticing the names and
powers of the envoys, and by whom deputed.
Half of Tippoo's territories to be ceded to allies, adjacent
to their own boundaries, and according to their selection.
Remarks.-Meer Ali Reza objected to the words "at
their selection," as it would leave the allies at liberty to
deprive Tippoo of his hereditary possessions, for instance,
Calicut. He had objected to this in the conference of the
17th.
Article II.—Three crores of ready money shall be de-
livered to the allies.
Remarks.-Ali Reza asked whether bullion, jewels, or
goods, would be taken in payment of this sum. Sir John
Kennaway replied, that ready money being the terms, ru-
pees, pagodas, or gold mohms, could only be accepted.
Article III.-Thirty lacs shall be paid to the allies for
Durbar expenses, or civil contingencies.
Article IV.-All prisoners, whether made during Hyder
Ali's time, or since, to be immediately given up.
Article V.-Until the above four articles are carried into
effect, Tippoo's two eldest sons to be given as hostages,
when hostilities shall cease.
Remarks.-Sir John Kennaway assured the vakeels, from
Lord Cornwallis, that the princes would receive the most
viii
[Arr.
CONFERENCES TO NEGOTIATE
honourable and respectful attentions. Ghoolam Ali said
Tippoo would, from a feeling of shame, object to this article,
and probably propose other persons, but they must dispute
the point with him on the morrow.
Article VI.—When the above articles have been signed
and sealed by Tippoo, a counterpart will be signed, sealed,
and delivered by the Governor-general, the Nizam's mi-
nister, and Hurry Punt.
Before the conference (which lasted till near one o'clock in
the morning) broke up, Sir John Kennaway addressed
Ali Reza, desiring him to reflect seriously on the critical
situation of his master's affairs, as he thought it would be
eminently advisable to accelerate the conclusion of the
treaty. Ghoolam Ali said he would hasten with his col-
league to the fort, and would return as soon as possible.
Feb. 21st.-Meer Allum sent a message to Sir John
Kennaway, saying that Govind Row Kishen and Govind
Row Buswunt, the Mahratta vakeels, were with him, and
wished to wait upon Sir John. Sir John Kennaway
being at table, said he would go to Meer Allum's tent, and
went at five, p.m. The vakeels stated, that it appearing
that there was to be but one treaty, comprising the interests
of all parties, they wished that it should recognise all former
treaties, and stipulate that Tippoo should not circumcise any
more Hindus. Sir John Kennaway asked if they knew the
contents of these former treaties ?-they answered in the
negative, but would inquire. Sir John Kennaway observed,
with regard to circumcision, that if it could be made to
appear that any advantage would result, it should be in-
serted in the treaty, as Europeans had also been sufferers.
Tippoo's vakeels having returned from the fort at five,
1.I.
ix
THE TREATY OF SERINGA PATAM.
]
p.m., the conferences commenced: persons, &c., the same as
before.
After a short conversation, the envoys proceeded, with
the paper of contents in their hands, to a particular dis-
cussion of the proposed articles. They said their master
wished that the preamble should in its terms be binding on
his successors in the government as well as on Lord Corn-
wallis. Sir John Kennaway replied, that hostilities having
ceased, the definitive treaty which must be concluded would
in all respects be conformable to their wishes.
With regard to Article I., they said their master objected
to the alienation of any part of the hereditary depen-
dencies of the rajahship of Seringapatam, which they then
could not specify; among them were Calicut, Bangalore, Se-
vendroog, Oosoor, Roydroog, Bidenore, and Gooty.
In regard to Article II., Tippoo, they said, was ready
to pay one crore fifty lacs immediately, of which fifty
lacs should be ready money, and the remainder in jewels,
goods, horses, elephants, &c. That the remaining crore and
fifty lacs should be paid in instalments within a year or less.
Respecting Article III., they said Tippoo objected to
its being recognised as a formal article of the treaty: that
the avowal of such a charge was not customary, but, without
any public stipulation, it ought to be left to his own option
to increase or decrease.
With regard to Article IV., Tippoo wished its benefits
to be reciprocal.
Article V. The vakeels said their master was willing to
deliver up one of his sons as a hostage, but that family rea-
sons prevented his parting with more, and they hoped Lord
Cornwallis would be prevailed on to relax in his demand.
The vakeels having finished, Sir John Kennaway replied,
that he was happy to perceive the appearance of sincerity in
Tippoo's conduct, indicated by his agreeing to deliver
up even
CONFERENCES TO NEGOTIATE
[Arr.
་
:
one of his sons that he would report their request to Lord
Cornwallis, but gave them no hopes that their request would
be granted: that had it been possible to relax in the security
demanded, Lord Cornwallis's feelings, as a father, would
have operated in Tippoo's favour.
In respect to part payment in jewels, &c., Sir John Ken-
naway reminded them that we had no means of getting rid
of such articles, but he deferred giving a definite answer to
this, as well as to their objections to the other articles, until
he had consulted Lord Cornwallis, Meer Allum, Bheekajee
Pundhit, Azeem ul Omrah, and Hurry Punt, save that in
regard to prisoners, he would take upon himself to guarantee
that the arrangement should be reciprocal. Conference
broke up at eight o'clock, to meet next morning.
Feb. 22nd., 11, a.m.-Persons the same as before.
Sir John Kennaway addressing the envoy, said that Lord
Cornwallis having, on their solemn asseverations of the utter
inadequacy of Tippoo's means, relaxed from the original de-
mand of six crores, might have shewn Tippoo the moderation
and the kind consideration of the allies; he was sorry to per-
ceive that they had not been appreciated by Tippoo, as was
evident from the disposition to cavil and object, evinced the
preceding evening, That Lord Cornwallis having entered
into the war by compulsion, and having formed engagements
with the Rajah or Zamarin of Calicut, it was impossible,
with honour, to allow it again to be surrendered to Tippoo.
That although the acquisition of Bangalore, Sevendroog,
Oosoor, &c., had been arduous, and they were valuable
possessions, yet that Lord Cornwallis having hopes that a
time should arrive when a thorough friendship might subsist
between the two states, and being unwilling to occasion any
jealousy or irritation to Tippoo, by retaining them, had long
ago determined to restore them, thereby to prove to Tippoo
I.]
xi
THE TREATY OF SERINGA PATAM.
that instead of wishing to overturn his family and empire,
he was desirous of upholding both. Ghoolam Ali, in his
reply, dwelt, at some length, on the sentiments of justice and
generosity above expressed, concluding by saying, that “it
was better to have a wise and considerate enemy, than a
short-sighted and time-serving friend."
Regarding Article II., Sir John Kennaway informed
the vakeels, that the Company had never been in the habit
of receiving goods in lieu of cash; that such could not be
disposed of; and that if any great quantity of jewels were
thrown on the market, the price would immediately fall.
To this it was answered, that the loss would be Tippoo's:
upon which Sir John Kennaway replied, that such being
the case, there were bankers in camp, through whose agency
a sale might be effected, but that Lord Cornwallis declined
any concern with them; but that to show his accommodating
disposition, he was willing to take gold or silver bullion.
In regard to Article III., Sir John Kennaway in-
formed them that the thirty lacs of Durbar expenses should
as assuredly be exacted, as that not one rupee further of a
private nature should be taken; that his lordship and the
allies were united on this point, and that it should be added
to the three crores: that out of the total of three crores and
thirty lacs, one crore and sixty-five would only be required
in cash or bullion immediately, and the remainder in in-
stalments within twelve months.
With regard to the sons of Tippoo, to be given as host-
ages for the due fulfilment of the treaty, Sir John Kenna-
way said, that it was in his private capacity very repugnant
to Lord Cornwallis's feelings, to be obliged to exact such
terms, but that his public duty demanded it; that his
lordship had himself but one son, but that Tippoo's
children would be treated with equal kindness and affection
as this only son, and that, to meet the Sultaun's wishes as
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much as he could on this point, he consented to receive any
two out of his three eldest sons.
The vakeels asserted their master's entire confidence in
Lord Cornwallis's kindness to his children, but that out of
the three children specified, the eldest, Hyder Sahib,
fourteen years old, was obnoxious to his father, and he
therefore disliked parting with him. The second, Abdul
Khalick, eight years old, was diseased from his infancy,
and unfit to be removed from the Zenanah (Seraglio), and
that the third son, Moyuz-ood-Deen, the favourite son,
five years old, destined by his father, and considered by
the courts as his successor, would be given up. That Tip-
poo in doing this was actuated by the wish of shewing his
sincerity and good disposition, and at the same time of
making his successor known to the principal persons of the
three allied states.
The three younger sons, the vakeels added, were still at
the breast, and they therefore demanded whether two or
three of Tippoo's sirdars would not be taken in lieu of the
second hostage? Sir John Kennaway replied in the nega-
tive. They urged the point with some pertinacity, and it
appeared that they conceived carrying this article with Tip-
poo involved more difficulty than any other.
Before finishing the conference, Sir John Kennaway
delivered to Ghoolam Ali Khan a copy of the general pre-
liminary treaty of five articles, drawn up according to the
above five answers, and observed that, as Lord Cornwallis
could not relax in the least from their tenor, he hoped
Tippoo would approve of them, and sign them, when
hostilities would immediately cease on delivering of the
hostages. The definitive treaty could then be entered on.
But that if Tippoo started any objections, their return
would be fruitless, and they ought then to order their tents
away. The envoys replied, that they hoped affairs would
1.]
xiii
THE TREATY OF SERINGAPATAM.
not take such a turn, and that they would in all probability
return next day.
Feb. 23rd.-Persons and place of conference the same as
before.
The vakeels began by congratulating all parties that
the business was terminated by Tippoo having signed
the preliminary agreement which they produced, and stated
that the sultaun's sons would be delivered up when re-
quired. Sir John Kennaway directed the paper signed by
Tippoo to be read and compared with the original draft ;
when it appeared that Article I. had been altered, leaving
out the choice of country to be ceded.
Sir John Kennaway remarked on the impropriety of this
alteration, after the long discussion which had taken place;
and having waited on Lord Cornwallis, returned to the con-
ference, and told the vakeels that his lordship would not
conclude a treaty, unless the omission in Article I. was
immediately filled up; that there existed no wish on the
part of his lordship or the allies to take possession of de-
tached or inconvenient portions of the sultaun's territories,
but that the choice remaining with the allies would ob-
viate all future litigation. The vakeels said, the sultaun's
difficulty in allowing the condition, arose from a remark
of Meer Allum that Sera would be required of Tippoo.
Meer Allum replied to this, that his observation merely went
to express his doubt whether Sera formed one of the ancient
possessions of Hyder. The vakeels now stated that this
explanation had fully satisfied them, and they were ready to
insert the condition, without a reference to their principal.
To this Sir John Kennaway objected, observing, that it was
extremely necessary that the sultaun should fully understand
the necessity of the condition; and he demanded from the en-
voys what were the ancient possessions? He was answered,
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Seringapatam, Sera, Gooty, and among others, Coimbetoor.
Sir John Kennaway observed how impossible it was that he
could have given them the satisfaction they demanded, as
Coimbetoor would, probably, be the first country required
from Tippoo. Meer Allum also reminded them of the
circumspection with which Sir John Kennaway had ex-
pressed himself, which they admitted. The vakeels re-
turned with the treaty signed about twelve o'clock. They
requested, as peace was now as good as concluded, the im-
mediate cessation of hostilities, and they promised that the
young princes should be delivered up the succeeding day.
Feb. 24th.-In the afternoon Sir John Kennaway for-
warded to Ghoolam Ali counterparts of the treaty signed
by Lord Cornwallis and the Nizam's minister, and also
intimated his surprise that the tents of the hostages had not
arrived, although the day was far spent.
Feb. 25th.-Sir John Kennaway, Meer Allum, and the
other deputies, removed their tents from the Nizam's camp
to the Eedgah, where the hostages were to pitch. About
one p.m., the vakeels arrived. Sir John Kennaway com-
menced by saying, that Lord Cornwallis, confiding on the
speedy arrival of the hostages, had suspended operations
sooner than stipulated in the preliminary treaty, and
that unless they came out this afternoon, operations would
re-commence. The envoys replied that the distress of the
family in parting with the younger princes had rendered
their previous arrival impossible, and that although this
was an unlucky day, they should, if it were insisted on,
come out this evening. But if excused to-day, they would,
without fail, be ready to-morrow forenoon, when the sul-
taun trusted that suitable persons, on the part of the allies,
would be sent to meet the princes, and conduct them to
THE TREATY OF SERINGA PATAM.
XV
Lord Cornwallis in a manner worthy their birth and rank.
Sir John Kennaway said, it was not Lord Cornwallis's wish
to put the princes to the inconvenience of coming out to
camp at night, but any deviation from the appointment
now made would be followed by very serious consequences,
and that he would, in the course of the night, inform
them of Lord Cornwallis's pleasure with regard to the
persons to be deputed to meet the princes. Sir John also
delivered to them a copy of the preliminary treaty, signed
by Hurry Punt, &c.
Feb. 26th.-It having been determined that the princes
should only visit Lord Cornwallis to-day, and postpone their
visit to Secunder Jah and Hurry Punt until to-morrow,
Sir John Kennaway, attended by Mr. Cherry*, on the
part of the Governor-general, repaired to a tent pitched by
Tippoo's people, about two miles from head-quarters, near
one of the gates of Seringapatam. They arrived about
two p.m., entering by one door, while the princes entered
by the other. After the usual compliments, the party
proceeded to Lord Cornwallis's tents, under a salute of
nineteen guns, and presented arms from part of the line.
From thence they went to their own tents, where Sir John
Kennaway visited them in the evening, and impressed on
the vakeels the necessity of fulfilling the remaining articles
of the treaty. First: Releasing the prisoners. Secondly:
* Persian secretary to the Governor-general and commander-in-
chief. Upon Lord Cornwallis's return to Europe, in 1794, he was
appointed resident at Lucnou, and subsequently agent to the Gover-
nor-general at Benares. On the occasion of announcing to Vizier
Ali, the Ex-Nawaub of Oude, the orders of government for his re-
moval to Calcutta, he was barbarously inurdered by the adherents of
that prince. He was much beloved and esteemed as a valuable and
zealous servant of the East India Company.
xvi
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Producing the accounts of the gross amount of the revenues,
and the net receipts, and sending the stipulated money as
soon as possible. The envoys promised the immediate
fulfilment of these conditions; and requested that Lord
Cornwallis and the allies would take steps for equally
fulfilling theirs.
They inveighed with great bitterness
against Pursram Bhow, for violating the terms of the
capitulation of Darwar. They desired that Assud Ali
Khan should be ordered to cease hostilities near Gurum-
conda, and promised Tippoo's passports for the messengers
sent to Coimbetoor and the Malabar coast, to put a stop to
hostilities.
Feb. 27th.-Lord Cornwallis visited the young princes.
Ali Reza went to the fort, and while there, Sir John Ken-
naway reminded him, by letter, of fulfilling the articles
relative to the prisoners, the cash, and the revenue ac-
counts.
Feb. 28th.-Meer Allum being at the hostages' tents,
Sir John Kennaway wrote to him, to arrange with the
vakeels about sending Tippoo's revenue officers with their
accounts. Meer Allum* returned only a verbal answer,
and instead of visiting Sir John, accompanied the princes to
Secunder Jah's. Sir John, surprised at this, wrote to him
again, requesting him to press on the vakeels the necessity
of proceeding to business. The answer given to this note
was, that the vakeels had assured him they would attend
next day, and that the money would be sent out immediately.
Sir John Kennaway received, on their return, a message
from the vakeels, and repaired to their tents about four p.m.
* After the taking of Seringapatam, in 1799, papers found in the
palace proved that Meer Allum had carried on, all this time, secret
correspondence with Tippoo.
1.]
xvii
THE TREATY OF SERINGA PATAM.
After a preliminary conversation, expressive of their master's
friendship for the Governor-general, and the sense they en-
tertained of Sir John Kennaway's conduct throughout the
negotiation, they spoke of the embarrassment which they
would have to sustain from the cavils of the allies in all
matters of revenue, and said their master trusted to Lord
Cornwallis for protection against such. Sir John replied,
that they might rest confidently on the protection of the
Governor-general, provided they acted with good faith in
giving in the revenue accounts. Ali Reza solemnly as-
sured Sir John Kennaway, that no imposition should be
attempted, and having earnestly expressed his master's
solicitation for the evacuation of the trenches, returned to
the fort.
Feb. 29th.-Sir John Kennaway visited the princes by
desire of the vakeels, and met Ali Reza, who stated that
the treasure was now loading, and the revenue-officers ready
to come out with it and the prisoners, when Tippoo ex-
pected the troops would evacuate the trenches. Sir John
Kennaway replied, that he would ascertain Lord Corn-
wallis's pleasure regarding their request, but that it would
have an ungracious appearance to rest the sending of the
treasure upon such a contingency.
They listened to this hint, and delivered to Sir John a
letter from Tippoo, and also two documents; one containing
an account of Tippoo's old possessions, the other an account
of those which bordered on our frontiers.
The vakeels shortly afterwards accompanied the princes
in their visit to Hurry Punt, whence they returned at four
p.m.; when Sir John Kennaway wrote to them, stating,
that relative to the evacuation of the trenches, Lord Corn-
wallis thought, that considering the friendly relations now
existing between the two states, our occupation of the
b
xviii
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trenches a little longer was a thing of little moment; that
he doubted not of the speedy arrival of the prisoners, the
treasure, and the revenue accountants. The papers they
had delivered, he observed, were useless, as they did not
contain the amount of revenue; and what had excited his
lordships' astonishment, they assumed deductions to be
allowed Tippoo which could not be agreed to; and he
concluded by requesting other accounts to be sent, without
restrictions or assumptions. A copy of this letter, and the
papers referred to in it, was transmitted to the Nizam's and
Mahratta deputies.
March 1st.-Sir John Kennaway received a message
from Tippoo's vakeels, that a crore, nine lacs and a half
of rupees, had arrived from the fort last night and this
morning. Sir John expressed, in answer, the pleasure this
would give the Governor-general; he inquired after the
prisoners, and requested the vakeels and accountants would
repair as soon as possible to his tent.
The vakeels, including Govind Row Kishen, the Paish-
wah's minister, with the Nizam, who was on this occasion
associated with Bheekajee Pundhit, assembled at Sir John
Kennaway's tent. After a conversation on general topics, Sir
John demanded of Ghoolam Ali the accounts of the gross
and net revenues of Tippoo's territories. Ghoolam Ali
evaded an answer, by asking for the papers delivered the
preceding day, and also a copy of the revenues of his master's
country, as extracted from the royal exchequer at Delhi.
Sir John Kennaway denied the use of the production of
any paper on his side, until theirs were ready. Ali Reza
observed, in reply, that in consequence of designing people
having intrigued and disarranged the train into which he had
put matters, all the necessary papers were not ready, but he
would now go to the fort, and after procuring all proper
I:]
xix
THE TREATY OF SERINGA PATAM.
documents, would return early to-morrow. Before his
departure, he earnestly requested that no further depreda-
tions might be committed in the Laul Baugh, and the Ganjam
suburbs, and that General Abercrombie's army might be
forbid to ravage the neighbourhood of the village of
Pauplye.
March 2nd.-Ali Reza, failing to attend his appointment
in the forenoon, Sir John Kennaway wrote to him, to
remind him of it. He came out at four, and sent a mes-
sage of apology, adding, that he had brought out Subarow,
chief financial minister to Tippoo, along with all necessary
papers. Sir John Kennaway wrote, requesting their instant
attendance: the vakeels excused themselves on the plea of
their papers requiring previous arrangement, but promised
faithfully to be ready on the morrow. A party of the
prisoners of the allies were sent in the afternoon.
March 3rd.-Sir John Kennaway attended Lord Corn-
wallis, on a visit to the princes, and communicated to Ali
Reza, that his lordship, on considering his complaint of the
preceding day, had directed General Abercrombie to change
ground to Canimbaddy, and ordered Colonel Stewart, who
commanded in the island, to abstain from cutting any more
trees in the Laul Baugh, or destroying the houses in Ganjam.
Ali Reza, in reply, stated that Tippoo had issued orders to
his troops, not to cut off General Abercrombie's supplies.
At ten, the vakeels of all parties met at Sir John Ken-
naway's tent. Tippoo's deputies then produced a list of
their master's subjects, prisoners with the allies. A warm
altercation took place between the Mahratta and the sul-
taun's vakeels, about the infringement of the solemn terms
granted to the garrison of Darwar. Sir John Kennaway
asked for the papers and accounts: when produced, they
b 2
XX
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were found little better than the insufficient papers formerly
given. After they were recorded, Subarow, to shew the
fairness of the accounts, proposed that if a particular ex-
amination of the revenue of one of the adjacent villages, or
districts, should be instituted, he would stake his character
on their justness. Sir John Kennaway asked to what year
did the accounts refer? Soobarow replied they were made
out for different years, all preceding the war; that the
revenues of some districts, such as Coorg, were for a period
seven years back, no revenue having been received from
them since. Sir John Kennaway observed, that this irre-
gular and improper mode of giving the account of revenue
would render it impossible to compare one year's revenue
with another: that the greater or less quantity of rain, &c.,
would operate to render the revenue of each year different,
and that their mode of giving the accounts would render
the striking of an average impossible. The vakeels said
this should be corrected, but their mode of stating the ac-
counts would make little difference in the grand total,
which would be found to be about two crores, and ten lacs
of rupees, (2,040,000%.)
It was agreed, that comparing the accounts just recorded
with the originals would occupy the remainder of the day;
and after mature consideration, all parties would meet to-
morrow, and discuss them seriatim, and that in the mean-
time the deputies should also communicate them to their
respective principals. Before separating, Sir John Kenna-
way reminded Govind Row Pundhit of the guarantee given
by Hurry Punt, that Tippoo's territories would produce
three crores.
March 4th.-Sir John Kennaway wrote to Tippoo s
vakeels relative to yesterday's discussions. Meer Allum
having returned from the ministers and Hurry Punt, stated
I.]
xxi
THE TREATY OF SERINGAPATAM.
the opinion of the former to be, that Tippoo's revenue ac-
counts, as produced, were fallacious, which he could prove
by a paper from the sultaun's dufter, (exchequer,) relative
to the revenue of the talook of Velanoor, in the division of
Gooty, the cession of which Sir John Kennaway had assured
them would not be required by the allies. This paper
stated the revenue at 26,864/., while Tippoo's valuation
made it only 8,800/.
The minister therefore advised that a bond, with heavy
penalties, should be required of Subarow, or from Tippoo's
vakeels, in case the falsity of the accounts produced could
be proved. Hurry Punt declined giving his opinion until
he had consulted Purseram Bhow, but he had observed
that Tippoo had stated the revenue of the Bidenoor country
at seven lacs of pagodas; now he would, he said, be
content to receive it in part of the Paishwah's share, for
twelve lacs. Sir John Kennaway shewed to Meer Allum
his letter of that morning to the vakeels, which entirely met
his approval. Meer Allum, and Govind Row Buswunt,
waited on Sir John Kennaway with revenue accounts pro-
cured from one of Tippoo's revenue officers of rank, a
prisoner in the Mahratta camp. This paper shewed the
amount of revenue, as now given by Tippoo, the amount
conformable to the knowledge of the officer, and the dif-
ference between both. Govind Row Buswunt further
declared Hurry Punt's readiness to take Bidenoor in any of
three ways. First: At double the amount of Tippoo's
valuation. Secondly: At the same amount, with the pa-
goda valued at four, instead of three rupees. And thirdly :
At the same amount, with the deduction of three or four
talooks, inserted as belonging to it in Tippoo's schedule.
In the evening, Sir John Kennaway wrote to the vakeels in
answer to their note of yesterday, and reminded them
verbally, that the time for delivering the accounts would
xxii
[APP.
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expire to-day. They wrote in reply, that Ali Reza was
setting off for the fort, would be back this night, or to-
morrow, when Tippoo's answer would be sent. Sir John
this evening visited the hostages and deputies in company
with Meer Allum. Ghoolam Ali told him that the Sultaun,
on seeing his note of yesterday, had sent for Subarow,
and the other accountants, and expressed his displeasure
he allowed the accounts delivered were unsatisfactory,
and that those demanded by Lord Cornwallis were fair
and just.
Sir John Kennaway remarked, that he had
at an early period warned them against attempts at imposi-
tion; that the allies had intrusted, in the pending negotiation,
their interests to his lordship's charge, and that nothing in
this world would induce him to neglect them. Goolam
Ali said the difference was a mere matter of account, and
therefore capable of speedy adjustment.
March 6th.-Ali Reza Khaun having returned from the
fort, Sir John Kennaway sent him a message, requesting
written answers to his questions of the 4th instant. Ali
Reza replied, that he would attend in person next day.
Sir John Kennaway again requested that he and his
colleague would come to his tent that evening. After some
difficulty, they consented, and met the deputies of the
allies at his tent at seven p. m.
The conversation commenced about prisoners. Ali Reza
insisted with great warmth that Hurdas, the dewan of
Darwar, included in the capitulation, granted, though after-
wards violated, to Budder-ul-Zeman Khaun, the killadar,
should be given up to Tippoo, as that public officer was
many lacs in arrear to their master. The Mahratta deputies
replied with equal warmth, that as he had claimed and
received their protection, he could not be delivered up. Sir
John Kennaway at length stopped this altercation by requiring
1.]
xxiii
THE TREATY OF SERINGAPATAM.
that the revenue accounts of three years, specified in his note
of 4th March, should be produced. He was referred to
the minister of finance, Subarow, who said that the public
papers and accounts of the provinces of Bidenoor, Coom-
betoor, and Calicut, were lost at the taking of the two
latter by the English; and the accounts of Darwar, Gujen-
derghur and Bangalore, when they also fell; but that the
accounts of the other divisions would be prepared as soon
as possible, and would be ready in three or four days.
Ali Reza remarked that innumerable papers had been lost
on the night of the 6th ultimo, on the storming of Tippoo's
works, when his camp was plundered by his own troops;
and that the revenue accounts had been very loosely kept
since Tippoo had come to the throne. To this it was
answered, that after consulting Lord Cornwallis and the
representatives of the allied powers, a specific reply would
be sent. Hussain Ali, a menial servant of Lord Corn-
wallis, detained in the fort after the liberation of the other
prisoners, was to-day, on compliance with a formal requisi-
tion, delivered up.
March 7th.-Meer Allum and Govind Row Buswunt
met at Sir John Kennaway's tent, when he represented to
them, that as Tippoo had evaded giving accounts, it would
be immediately necessary for each separate power to make
out a schedule of what it conceived itself entitled to, the
aggregate amount of which could then be included in the
definitive treaty, and that the Company would require a
proportion amounting to 37,88,295 rupees. They promised
to submit this to Hurry Punt and Azeem-ul-Omrah.
The succeeding morning Sir John Kennaway wrote twice
to the Sultaun's vakeels: the first about workmen being
again at work on the fort; and the second, regarding
prisoners conceived to be still detained.
xxiv
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Tippoo applied for leave for the religious to officiate as
usual at the tomb of his father Hyder. Instantly granted.
March 8th.-Sir John Kennaway waited, by Lord Corn-
wallis's desire, on the Sultaun's deputies, and expressed in
strong language Lord C.'s astonishment at the treatment he
had received from their master, who had delivered in false
accounts, &c. He stated, that Seringapatam, Tippoo's
family, treasure, in short, his kingdom, being within his
Lordship's grasp, he, consulting nothing but his moderation,
had, against the wishes of his allies, consented to a peace.
In return, every effort was made to deceive him. The
necessity of the English retaining Calicut had been candidly
communicated, and Tippoo had estimated it at five or six lacs
of rupees beyond its real value. The vakeels replied in gene-
ral terms, professing their master's friendship for the Gover-
nor-general, and wishing that he, himself, would deliver in
his plan of partition, when no opposition would be offered to
the interests of the Company, but that the Sultaun indulged
a rooted hatred, which was mutual, to the allies, and could
ill bear to part with his possessions to them; and were it not
for the support of the English, their master, in his present
reduced state, he would soon expel them from his country.
Sir John Kennaway replied, that his government was bound
to the allies by treaties which would never be infringed
to obtain any sinister object; and that he yet hoped to see
their master derive benefit by his good faith and strict ad-
herence to treaties. After leaving the Sultaun's deputies,
Sir John Kennaway requested the attendance of the deputies
of the allies, who produced lists of their share of the parti-
tion; out of these Sir John struck out Soonda, Biswapatam,
Chitteldroog, Raidroog, and Harponelly. The amount of
the country remaining was 88,13,7877., and added to the
Company's share, made a total of 129,59,0821.
I.]
XXV
THE TREATY OF SERINGAPATAM.
March 9th.-Sir John Kennaway, having drawn out a
draft of the definitive treaty, conformable to the preliminary
treaty, and containing a specification of the countries to be
ceded, sent it in the evening to Tippoo's vakeels, with an
official note. The papers referred to in that note were
authenticated by an aumil and sirreshtidar (two revenue
officers), and also an account containing the statement of
Hurdas, the late dewan of Darwar.
Sir John Kennaway requested of Lieutenant Macleod,
charged with the intelligence department, to compare the
accounts sent in by Tippoo with the best information he
could collect. About 9 a. m., Sir John Kennaway received
a message from the Sultaun's vakeels, requesting leave to
wait upon him.
him. In accordance with his request the Sul-
taun's and the Nizam's deputies attended, but the Mahratta
vakeels neglected to attend. The Sultaun's deputies
commenced by expressing their surprise at the tone of
yesterday's note, and the hard terms of the treaty: they
would, they said, proceed to lay it before their master, and
in the mean time proposed to examine some accounts
brought by Soobarow. Sir John Kennaway replied, that
the time for examining accounts was passed; that Lord
Cornwallis had waited patiently nearly twenty days for the
production of Tippoo's revenue accounts, &c., to enable
him to make a fair partition; that their production had
been evaded, and, as time was precious, the Governor-
general felt himself obliged to make the division from the
best data and materials in his power. Lord Cornwallis
would not, therefore, he thought, examine any more
accounts, or relax in the least from the terms of the division
specified in the draft of the treaty before them. His
Lordship's character, they knew, had nothing ambitious or
selfish in it, and the very circumstance of possessing their
master's children, as hostages, had made him more delicate
xxvi
[APP,
CONFERENCES TO NEGOTIATE
and moderate in the terms he had required. The vakeels
demanded of Sir John Kennaway, if he conceived that the
Governor-general had consulted their master's reputation or
interest, by the terms of the treaty? Sir John replied, that
he left the answer of this question to their own sense of
justice, expediency, and moderation.
Subarow then proceeded to read over the list of the
proposed cessions. He began with Coorg, which he termed
one of the doors to Seringapatam, from which it was
distant only ten or twelve coss. Sir John Kennaway replied,
that the distance was greater, and that Lord Cornwallis had
entered into engagements with the Rajah, which would
prevent the possibility of giving it up. He then instanced
Decanicottah as close to Bangalore, and distant from our
frontier.
He was answered, that when the treaty was carried into
execution, it would be exactly on the confines. The an-
swers to the objections urged against Sunkagherry and
Salem, were similar to the above. He then remarked, that
the river, termed Noil, proposed as our southern boundary,
had no existence; that a small rivulet of another name was
in that position.
Sir John Kennaway pointed out the river in the map,
and said the mistake, as to name, would be corrected in the
fair copy.
Subarow next mentioned Bellary and Gooty,
observing, that the allies had, in the partition, taken all the
strong forts. Sir John Kennaway replied, that the forts of
Bangalore and Oosoor, in strength comparable to Calcutta
and Madras, were by the treaty left to their master; and
that retaining the forts was purely defensive, to prevent, by
obtaining a secure frontier, a recurrence of the calamities
suffered by the irruptions of Hyder and Tippoo into the
Carnatic. Sir John concluded by remarking the utter
uselessness of any further discussion, and recommending to
I.]
xxvii
THE TREATY OF SERINGA PATAM,
them to go into the fort, and after laying the treaty before
Tippoo, return speedily with his answer; and that he would
now leave them with Mr. Cherry, to settle the exchange of
the money delivered, and come back when that affair was
finished. As soon as Sir John Kennaway returned, Ali
Reza endeavoured to lead him to the former discussion,
and the dewan (Soobarow) asked on what document he
relied for the assertion that the "ancient possessions" of
Tippoo were undervalued? Sir John replied, that one
proof, among many, was the statement of the talook of
Velanoor, under the hand and seal of their own aumil,
being three times the amount of the revenue assigned to it
in their paper. This staggered them at first, but after a
little time they called in question the genuineness of the
document referred to, and said the balances of former years
must have been added to make up this amount. Sir John
Kennaway observed, that the document was genuine, and
would be produced when necessary: he would in the mean-
time seriously recommend to them to return all to the fort.
Soobarow asked, what they were to do there? Which Sir
John answered, by demanding what they were to do here?
Soobarow explained, that he apprehended his master's
resentment would principally fall upon himself, as nothing
had been settled. They then took leave, promising to
return next morning, or at farthest on the evening. In an
interval of the conference just detailed, Sir John Kennaway,
addressing Ali Reza, said, that the Governor-general, in
consequence of an authentic report of their master continuing
to repair the works opposite the trenches, had ordered
the engineers to resume their work on the fascines and.
gabions. Ali Reza expressed his regret, and said the
works should be immediately discontinued. Sir John Ken-
naway also desired that in case a British foraging party
should have to be sent across the river, means should be
taken to prevent disturbance.
xxviii
[APP.
CONFERENCES TO NEGOTIATE
In the afternoon Sir John Kennaway wrote to the Sul-
taun's vakeels a note, in answer to one of theirs, complaining
of Major Cuppage having ascended the Guzzlehutti pass.
March 11th.-In consequence of the shares of the allies
being unequal, and the Nizam's minister having neglected to
insert the district of Moakah in their share, a new division
became necessary, by which the East India Company
received, in addition, the district of Doopain Kanickgeery,
and part of Doormal, at the back of the Palnaud and
Ongole districts. Notwithstanding the remonstrances of Sir
John, and the promises yesterday of the vakeel, the working
parties continued to-day employed on the fort.
March 12th.-The vakeels failed to come out last night,
and as the working parties were still busy in the fort, Lord
Cornwallis directed Sir John Kennaway to write to the
vakeels at eleven, a. m., to say, that as, contrary to the
agreement, at the cessation of arms, the working parties
continued employed in the fort, his lordship would im-
mediately direct the resumption of operations in the trenches,
unless their labours instantly ceased.
2
The messengers returned at three, p. m., reporting that he
had met the vakeels coming out, and that they, on perusal,
forwarded the letter to Tippoo. Sir John desired the
attendance of the vakeels as soon as possible. They pro-
mised to wait upon him at four, but did not arrive until six,
p. m., accompanied by the deputies of the allies. On com-
mencing the conference, they intimated generally, that Tippoo
had agreed to the terms demanded of him, and that nothing
was now wanting but that the Governor-general and the allies
should relax on some points. Tippoo, they said, was willing
to cede half the territories, according to the valuation in his
own paper, and the other half as valued by the allies, and
also to deliver up some of the districts required for our
I.]
xxix
THE TREATY OF SERINGAPATAM.
boundaries; but that he objected to others, particularly
Coorg, which being close to Seringapatam, might be viewed
as one of its entrances: that he considered, by the treaty, we
were not entitled to require Coorg, which did not lie "adja-
cent" to our boundary. Sir John replied, that he would
not enter into a critical examination of the meaning of the
term 66
adjacent," that, in matters of business, it signified
not far removed: that the allies were only debarred by this
term from taking districts in the centre of Tippoo's domi-
nions; and that Coorg, which they called the door to Sering-
apatam, was distant forty coss*, and within fifteen† of our
settlement of Tellicherry, and certainly "adjacent” to Ca-
licut, which they had agreed to cede. That, finally, en-
gagements had been concluded with the Rajah, which could
not be infringed, otherwise what reliance could Tippoo place
in those engagements about to be entered upon? Both the
vakeels warmly defended their construction of the term
"adjacent," which Sir John Kennaway denied. After a good
deal of argument, the matter was, at the earnest request of
the vakeels, referred to the Governor-general. Sir John
having returned from Lord Cornwallis, informed them that
his lordship having been forced to make the partition treaty
on the best data in his power, was determined, after mature
deliberation, not to relax in the least, or yield up any of the
countries specified; and that the vakeels ought now to re-
turn to the fort, and bring Tippoo's final answer. They
replied, that it was not necessary to make any further refer-
ence to their master, for if Lord Cornwallis did not choose to
accept their offer, they requested their dismission, and left the
future to fate. Sir John Kennaway observed, that there
could be no objection to their departure when they chose;
but they insisted that, before going, Lord Cornwallis should
know what had now passed.
* Eighty miles.
Thirty miles.
XXX
[Apr.
CONFERENCES TO NEGOTIATE
March 13th.-Sir John Kennaway having received the
Governor-general's orders, wrote to the vakeels, that no
reliance could be placed on Tippoo's accounts, which were
formerly declared to be plundered, and now ready to be
produced that our calculation made the amount of country
to be ceded 43,19,694 of pagodas, but that his lordship
would, from an anxiety to avoid extremities, consent to a
deduction of 4,50,000 pagodas; but that the countries
objected to, and particularly Coorg, must be ceded.
The vakeels answered by a note, requesting a more parti-
cular specification of the countries to be ceded. The vakeels
themselves shortly followed their letter, and Sir John having
desired the presence of the deputies of the allies, delivered
to the Sultaun's envoy the list desired in their last note.
Ali Reza began warmly to argue that the preliminary treaty
did not give the right of demanding Coorg. Sir John Ken-
naway referred him to his former arguments, and said that
as nothing new was urged, he declined to argue the matter
further. Ali Reza, with a softened tone, hoped the Go-
vernor-general, actuated by the same motives which had in-
duced him not to insist on the cession of Bangalore and Se-
vendroog, would also refrain from insisting on the cession
of Coorg, which was so much nearer the capital. Sir John
replied, that his lordship's good faith was not involved in
the cession of the two forts mentioned, and that he knew
that nothing would alter the determination of the Go-
vernor-general with regard to Coorg. Ali Reza then de-
manded with warmth what, in the event of breaking off
the negotiations, would be our conduct to the princes?
Sir John replied, they would be detained as hostages for the
violation of the treaty. They asked how and by whom had
it been violated? Sir John replied, that Tippoo had vio-
lated the treaty in three instances: first, in declining to
abide by the selection of countries; secondly, by the cavils
1
THE TREATY OF SERINGA PATAM.
xxxi
I.]
and evasions used in settling the exchange of money; and,
thirdly, in despite of our continued remonstrances, and his
repeated promises, by continuing to this moment, the re-
pairs and works in the fort opposite our trenches. They re-
plied, they conceived Sir John to have formerly told them
that the hostages would not be detained, and that, from the
English having released a person of consequence, deputed
to them by Hyder, they had expected a different line of
conduct. Sir John returned, that Lord Cornwallis would
not have detained the princes from any other cause than the
violation of the preliminary treaty by Tippoo: that on the
faith of the treaty, the works in the trenches, &c., which,
all probability, would have ensured the possession of Se-
ringapatam in ten days, had been relinquished; and if the
princes were delivered up, what equivalent had the British
for the loss of time? That the case quoted of the vakeel was
not in point; and that they themselves, similarly situated,
might depart when they chose. Sir John informed them,
the princes should change ground to-morrow, and that the
Sultaun's guards, now with them, must take their departure.
The vakeels requested permission to accompany the hos-
tages, which was objected to.
in
March 14th.-Sir John Kennaway was awakened by a mes-
sage from Ali Reza, instantly followed by himself. Sir John
sent word he was undressed, which the vakeel said was of no
consequence, and that he would come to the sleeping tent.
On his arrival, he earnestly entreated Sir John to use his in-
fluence with Captain Welsh, commanding the guard of ho-
nour with the hostages, to delay their departure for one day,
when he would engage to bring back Tippoo's answer to
the list of districts by the evening, otherwise the removal of
the princes would, in all probability, cost him and his col-
leagues their lives. Sir John Kennaway replied that Cap-
xxxii
[APP.
CONFERENCES TO NEGOTIATE
tain Welsh was acting under superior orders, and was not
bound to obey him; but that he would write to Lord Corn-
wallis, and request the respite so urgently sought. The
princes had, however, moved, before this note could be de
spatched, but, at the desire of the vakeel, Sir John re-
quested they might not take their final departure until he
returned, at the appointed time, from the fort. Lord
Cornwallis, in consequence, directed the princes to be en-
camped one mile in the rear of head-quarters. In the even-
ing Ali Reza returned, and, with his colleague, waited on
Sir John Kennaway. After adverting in general terms to
the success of their interview with their master, they parti-
cularised his acquiescence in all demanded of him, except
the cession of Coorg, so near to his capital, which he hoped
would be re-considered by the Governor-general, as also the
cession of some few other place, otherwise an inconvenient
intermixture of districts would ensue, and the boundary
wished by his lordship would be destroyed. Sir John
having requested of him to particularize, Shewaness Row
instanced Attoor and Permallee, left to Tippoo, as intervening
between the Company's old boundary of Lallee and Namcul.
Sir John observed that this omission had been provided for
in the remarks made opposite Namcul, Lallee, &c.; that all
districts to the east and north of the Caveri should belong to
the Company. Sir John Kennaway then asked if there
were any more districts than those he had now instanced?
The vakeel could not answer without referring to his papers
and maps in the fort, which Sir John requested of him to
produce next morning. Ghoolam Ali observed that it now
appeared that instead of yielding anything, we were going
to keep more. Sir John denied this, and said equivalents
would be given for all those districts taken to make a secure
boundary. The vakeels then recurred once more to Coorg.
Sir John Kennaway represented to them the uselessness of
I.]
THE TREATY OF SERINCAPATAM.
xxxiii
such discussion, as nothing inserted in the list of the 13th
would be yielded up; and then categorically demanded whe-
ther or not Tippoo would agree to the cession of Coorg.
They answered, that rather than risk the interruption of
peace he was prepared to yield it up, but he hoped, from
Lord Cornwallis's friendship, that the cession of Coorg
would not be insisted on. Sir John agreed once more to
consult the Governor-general on this point. Ali Reza then
presented a paper, containing articles which he wished
should be corrected in the definitive treaty. The greater part
of these alterations had been provided for in the additions
made to the treaty after it had been sent to the vakeels, on
the 9th.
March 15th.—Sir John Kennaway sent, early, a mes-
sage suggesting the despatch of Shewaness Row to the fort,
for the maps and papers necessary for the final adjustment
of the cession of districts and limitation of boundaries, as in
the event of the definitive treaty not being settled this evening,
Lord Cornwallis would not delay the march of the princes
to-morrow. At eight a. m., Sir John desired the attendance
of the allied deputies, who having retired, adjusted a par-
tition of their respective shares. In the mean time, Sir John
was employed in drawing out the definitive treaty, which
having completed by mid-day, he desired the attendance
of the sultaun's vakeels, although Shewaness Row had not
yet arrived from Seringapatam. They arrived about two
p. m., and commenced by demanding Lord Cornwallis's
determination, more especially with regard to Coorg. Sir
John Kennaway replied, that Lord Cornwallis, with every
disposition to gratify Tippoo, could not consent to abandon
the Rajah of Coorg. His lordship, he said, considered the
preservation of faith to his engagements to be of equal im-
portance and sanctity, and as superior to all other considera-
VOL. II.
с
xxxiv
[APP.
CONFERENCES TO NEGOTIATE
tions, as a sincere adherence to the tenets of his religion;
he could, therefore, hear nothing further on this subject.
Sir John then delivered to them the treaty, without the list
of countries to be ceded, which depended on the arrival of
Shewaness Row. The only articles objected to, were those
preventing any claims for outstanding revenue balances, and
the omission of the word ryut in the article providing that
no protection should be given to officers and zemindars
flying from each other's districts. Sir John Kennaway, in
reply to the first, observed that the article was just to the
inhabitants, and would obviate all disagreeable disputes be-
tween the different governments-it could not, therefore,
be altered. The same reasoning could with equal justice
be applied to the demand for the insertion of the word ryut
—that enough had been done in inserting "officers and
zemindars." It being now five p. m., and Shewaness Row
not having arrived, Sir John Kennaway retired to make
qut the list of countries with his own data; but whilst
thus employed, Shewaness Row arrived, and shewed that
the districts of Shadimunglum and Valenoor, to the east of
the Caveri, if left to Tippoo, would occasion an inter-
mixture of boundaries; Sir John included them in the
Company's share, and having given equivalents, the Com-
pany's division stood as follows:-
Calicut, 63 Talooks
8,487,65 51 1
Paulghatcherry
88,000
Dindigul and Palnaveerpackshy
9,000
Salem
24,000
Coorg
8,000
Numkul
Sunkagerry
16,000
40,000
Carried forward
8,672,650 54 1
1.I
XXXV
THE TREATY OF SERINGA PATAM.
]
·
Brought forward
BARAMAHAL.
Baramahal
Caveriputtun
Veerbudidroog
Raicottah
Kangoondy
8,672,650 51
I
4
64,000
10,000
8,000
8,000
6,000
Darampoory
8,000
Dinageer
10,000
Ting ricottah
12,000
Caveripoor
8,000
Attoor, Ancutgeery
18,000
Peermutty
14,000
Shadiming lum
20,000
Vamloor
16,000
Kantery Pagodas
13,16,765 51 4.
An altercation now arose between the sultaun's and the
Nizam's vakeels, regarding the share of the latter; as after
including the whole of Kudapah, Cummum, part of the
Duab, and the talooks about Tangrapilly, twenty thousand
pagodas only remained to be given to the Nizam, out of
which was to be settled the cession of Gooty and Bellary,
which had been insisted on by the allies as absolutely neces-
sary to form a northern boundary. For these forts, and a
few dependant talooks, it was proposed to the sultaun's
vakeels to take the districts of Budwail and Chitoweil in the
Kudapah country; these they positively refused to have, as
they were cut off from Tippoo's remaining territories, and
were bordering on those of the Calistry and Venkatagherry
Rajahs, whose troublesome and litigious disposition might
involve him in disputes similar to those that had brought
on the present war: rather than be burdened with districts
C 2
xxxvi
[APP.
CONFERENCES TO NEGOTIATE
so situated, Tippoo would give them, they said, in addition
to the other cessions.
After much angry discussion between the vakeels, the
Nizam's always refusing to yield up those districts which
Tippoo's were willing to take, Tippoo's vakeels earnestly
besought that the cession of Gooty and Bellary should not
be insisted on. Meer Allum observed, that neither himself
nor the minister would object to this, provided it met with
the wishes of Lord Cornwallis. Sir John Kennaway op-
posed this. It growing late, the conference broke up, with
an understanding that the Governor-general, and Azeem-ul-
Omrah should in the meantime be consulted, and that all the
parties should assemble next morning.
March 16th.-Sir John Kennaway, this morning, in-
formed Meer Allum that Lord Cornwallis had no objection
to relinquishing Gooty to Tippoo. Meer Allum having
waited on the minister, stated it as his intention to be guided
by the wishes of Lord Cornwallis; but that though he con-
sidered keeping Gooty necessary, he would relinquish it, and
keep Budwail and Chittoweil, provided also Tippoo would
give the fort of Gurrumcondah, and such of its dependant
talooks as would complete the share of the Nizam. The
Mahratta vakeels being present, this proposal was fully
discussed; when both they and the Nizam's vakeels agreed
it would be necessary to yield Gooty to Tippoo. Sir John
Kennaway, from a conviction that good policy demanded
that these forts should remain in possession of the allies,
suggested to the Mahratta vakeels the propriety of giving
up Huwanoor, and part of Bankapoor, as an equivalent :
this they directly and positively refused to do.
It was then agreed to propose the remaining alter-
native; taking Gurrumcondah, &c., in lieu of Gooty,
and if this was insuperably objected to, Gooty would
I.
xxxvii
THE TREATY OF SERINGAPATAM.
then be relinquished, provided Lord Cornwallis con-
sented.
The Mahratta vakeels then requested the definitive treaty
might be produced. When read, they stated that Hurry
Punt wished three alterations or additions should be made
to it. First, The omission of the words "heirs and suc-
cessors," in the preamble. Secondly, A clause securing
protection to pilgrims visiting the pagodas in Seringapatam.
Thirdly, That the treaty should recognise and confirm all
former treaties, except those modified by the tenor of this.
In reply to the first, Sir John Kennaway observed, that it
could not be agreed to; that such phraseology was usual,
and if they wished to observe good faith, they ought not to
object to it. They answered it was not their habit to use
these terms. In reply to their second request, Sir John
Kennaway said he had no objections, provided they con-
tained nothing recognising their claim to Choute. This
would form an insuperable objection, as that demand ought
to be abandoned, after the acquisitions obtained by them
under the present treaty. In regard to the third request,
about security to pilgrims, Sir John remarked, that it
would lead to future disputes with Tippoo, if he disliked
their visiting his capital, and if he did not, it was super-
fluous. In short, if they disliked the present treaty, they
might make a seperate one with Tippoo themselves. This
they declined, and to compound with Sir John, they said
they would, in their copy of the treaty, substitute for
"heirs and successors," that the treaty should last as long
as the sun, moon, and stars! and with regard to pilgrims,
Hurry Punt should address a separate letter to Tippoo on
this subject, but they besought Sir John to bespeak
Tippoo's favourable attention towards it.
having now arrived, it was proposed to them to exchange
Gooty, &c., for Gurrumcondah. To this they immediately
1
Tippoo's vakeels
xxxviii
[Apr.
CONFERENCES TO NEGOTIATE
and decidedly objected, for these reasons; that Gurrum-
condah was one of the first acquisitions to the Mysore state,
and because the bones of Meer Sahib, Hyder Ali's brother-
in-law were deposited in a tomb near the fort. Lord Corn-
wallis having now signified his hope that the minister
would relinquish Gooty, it was intimated to the vakeels
that the point would be conceded. All the vakeels now
proceeded to arrange the division of the countries that were
to be exchanged. After much altercation about the ex-
change of Pergunnahs, the different shares stood, at length,
as inserted in the definitive treaty. The Sultaun's vakeels
then took their leave to go to the fort, promising to return
with the treaty, next morning, duly executed. Sir John
warned them against the alteration of a single word, as from
the critical situation of affairs, such might be attended with
the most serious consequences.
March 17th.-Nothing was heard from the vakeels until
adout four p. m., when Mahomed Ali reported they would
soon be out with some more treasure. At six, Sir John
received a note from them, stating that they had laid the de-
finitive treaty before Tippoo; and complaining of excesses
and plunderings by Purseram Bhow's cavalry. Sir John
Kennaway returned an answer, that Purseram Bhow's ex-
cesses had been reported to Lord Cornwallis, and would in
future be prevented. He cautioned the vakeels against any
delay, or the smallest alteration in the treaty, as either would
inevitably lead to a rupture.
March 18th.-The Sultaun's vakeels arrived at three,
and came to Sir John Kennaway's tents, where they found
the Nizam's deputies. The Mahratta vakeels were not in
the way when summoned. The vakeels commenced by
making complaints against Purseram Bhow, and whilst they
I.]
xxxix
THE TREATY OF SERINGA PATAM.
were yet talking, a letter was brought to them from
Tippoo, giving details of the plunderings of Purseram
Bhow on the road to Sera; that he made collections, beat
and imprisoned ryuts, and had taken 63 camels, 3000
bullocks, &c. &c. Sir John Kennaway replied, that the
Governor-general would do all in his power to stop these
enormities, but they were mainly owing to the bad faith of
their master, who had, in spite of all representations and
remonstrances, continued to repair and strengthen the works
in the fort, which had induced Lord Cornwallis to make
Purseram Bhow cross the river. The vakeels attempted
to deny this, but Sir John offered to produce a plan of the
works, shewing the repairs, &c., made up from daily
authentic reports.
They then produced the fair and signed copies of the
treaty, which were collated, corrected, and revised; in the
annexed list of countries, two important omissions had been
made, which could not be rectified without the especial
permission of Tippoo. They also delivered nine orders of
surrender for the forts of Salem, Namkul, &c. The next
day was appointed for the formal delivery of the three
treaties by the princes to Lord Cornwallis, when the
Nizam's and the Mahratta vakeels were requested to
attend.
March 19th.-The Mahratta vakeels sent, this morn-
ing, a copy of the article they wished added to the treaty,
confirming all former treaties with the Mysore govern-
ment. Sir John Kennaway answered, that the treaty was
now signed and executed by Tippoo, that therefore the time
for alterations was past, and that Lord Cornwallis would
not return the treaty for such an addition, and he concluded
by requesting their official attendance at the Governor-
general's tents, to receive their copy of the treaty delivered
xl
[Apr.
CONFERENCES TO NEGOTIATE
1
by the princes in Durbar. They answered they would as-
certain, immediately, the pleasure of Hurry Punt on this
head; without his permission they would not attend. All
Sir John Kennaway's arguments could not induce them to
alter this resolution, and the treaty had been delivered by
the princes, and the company breaking up, before Govind
Row Kishen arrived. When Lord Cornwallis presented
the treaty to him, he desired it might be understood that
Hurry Punt had objections to it which he would state to
the Governor-general in a personal conference, if granted
one, which Lord Cornwallis said he would be happy to
give him. After the Durbar had broken up, Govind Row
Kishen had a conversation with Lord Cornwallis, which
ended in an understanding, that the articles they wished
should be discussed in the conference requested by Hurry
Punt.
March 20th.-Sir John Kennaway received a letter from
Ali Reza, complaining again of the continued depredations
of Purseram Bhow. Sir John wrote in reply, that he had
done his utmost to restrain the Bhow, who had by com-
mand marched to return to his former position to-day, or
would certainly do so to-morrow. It was stated that Tip-
poo's Bedes and Pindarries were quite as active and de-
structive as the troops of the Bhow.
Hurry Punt visited Lord Cornwallis in the evening, and
agreed to the treaty in its present form; but as the counter-
part from him could not be prepared by the next morning,
Lord Cornwallis put off the formal delivery of the counter-
parts from the different allied powers until the 22d instant.
¿
March 21st.-Sir John Kennaway wrote to Meer Allum
and Bheekajec Pundhit, relative to the public delivery of
the counterpart treaties.
1.]
xli
THE TREATY OF SERINGA PATAM.
March 22nd.-In the morning the vakeels of the Ni-
zam and Mahrattas assembled at Sir John Kennaway's
tents, and on the arrival of the Governor-general, accom-
panied him to the tents of the princes, to whom the ratified
counterparts of the definitive treaty were delivered, under
salutes from the different powers. After the interchange of
compliments, Sir John Kennaway informed Ali Reza,
that the orders of delivery of the forts to be restored to
Tippoo were preparing, and demanded the remaining
orders for those forts to be given to the Company, such as
Kishnaghurry, Sunkagerry, &c., which the vakeel stated
to be ready, but that in his hurry he had left them behind.
Ali Reza then requested of Sir John Kennaway to bespeak
Lord Cornwallis's influence with the Mahrattas relative
to the release of prisoners, especially Hurdas, Dewan of
Darwar; also relative to a deduction of ten per cent. on the
money payable to the Nizam and Mahrattas, usual in all
money transactions between such states. The concourse of
people being great, Lord Cornwallis proposed that they
should retire and discuss these matters more privately in
Sir John Kennaway's tent.
Tippoo's vakeels commenced by requiring the delivery
of Hurdas. Lord Cornwallis replied, that great as were the
calamities of the war, they would be much heightened by
delivering up to enraged masters, people in the position of
Hurdas; who had voluntarily claimed the protection of the
Mahrattas, had not been detained by force, and could not
be looked upon as a prisoner, and did not therefore come
within the scope of the operation of the treaty relative to
prisoners.
The vakeels allowed he had entered the Mahratta ser-
vice of his own free will, and would not now return to
Tippoo's, as he was between thirty and forty lacs in ar-
rears, to defraud their master of which was the principal
lii
[Arr.
CONFERENCES TO NEGOTIATE
1
cause of his desertion; but that, forming part of the garri-
son of Darwar, under Budder-ul-Zemaun Khaun, he had,
with the rest, surrendered on terms which Purseram Bhow
had violated by attacking the garrison, after the evacua-
tion, plundering and making them prisoners; that this,
coupled with the severe treatment they subsequently re-
ceived, had given to Hurdas both the cause and opportunity
for deserting. This, they argued, entitled them to class
him among the prisoners. Lord Cornwallis declined enter-
ing into the discussion of the surrender of Darwar, or its
violation; all he considered necessary was, that he was a
deserter by his own free will, and therefore his surrender
was not stipulated for by the treaty. Govind Row Kishen
observed that Hurry Punt was willing that Hurdas be
brought to Lord Cornwallis's tent, and allowed to go to
Tippoo if he chose. In reply to their further discussion on
this point, Lord Cornwallis adhered to his former answer.
They then proceeded to demand the deduction of ten per
cent. Lord Cornwallis said he knew of no such custom,
when the sultaun's vakeels referred the matter to the Ni-
zam's and Mahratta deputies, saying that if they denied
its existence, they would give it up. Lord Cornwallis replied
that he was accountable to his superiors for the due fulfil-
ment of the treaty, wherein no such deduction was provided
for. They answered, that money transactions being new
between their government and the English, they could not
insist on it with regard to them; but they claimed it as usual
and well understood between them and the other powers.
Lord Cornwallis said he would not interfere in such a busi-
ness; if Hurry Punt and the minister allowed it, he had no
objections to offer. Meer Allum appeared to think such cus-
tom usual between the Mysore government and the Mahrat-
tas, but he denied its existence as it regarded his own go-
vernment; and when it was proposed by the Mahratta
I.]
xliii
THE TREATY OF SERINGAPATAM.
vakeels to refer the decision on their part to Hurry Punt,
he said there would be little use in making a reference to
Azeem-ul-Omrah, who would give them a plain denial.
The conversation here terminated, and Tippoo's vakeels
went away in the belief that no deduction would be agreed
to by any party. In the evening Sir John Kennaway wrote
to Tippoo's vakeels, relative to the release of prisoners still
unreleased; among others, there were two officers, named
Fonblanque and Hoare, confined at Mudgeery.
Here the conferences ended: shortly afterwards the allied
armies commenced their march towards their respective
frontiers, and, save general expressions of civility, no further
intercourse passed between the Governor-general and the
Sultaun.
Tippoo gave an ample supply of doolies* and bearers to
assist in removing the sick in hospital, which had increased
in an extraordinary degree during the continuance of the
siege of Seringapatam.
* A species of litter carried by men called bearers.
APPENDIX.
No. II.
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
Dated Calcutta, Feb. 18, 1795.
WHILST hostilities between the Mahrattas and the Nizam are
yet in suspense, the attention of this government is naturally
called forth to the consideration of probable events, which
may fundamentally change the political situation of affairs
in India. It has been already decided, that we are not
bound by any treaty to take part with any of the contending
powers against the other, and, in this case, the acts of the
legislature of Great Britain prohibit an interference that
would necessarily involve us in hostilities.
From this decision I have no reason to apprehend that
we shall be forced to depart, whilst dissensions prevail be-
tween the Mahrattas and Nizam only; but if they should
ultimately end in hostilities, a question may arise on which
our determination ought previously to be formed, viz.,
What part this government is bound to take, if Tippoo
should attack the territories of the Nizam, during hostilities
between that prince and the Paishwah, either as a confederate
of the Mahrattas, or independently.
The only treaties which have a reference to this question,
are those concluded at Paungul and Poonah with the Nizam
and Mahrattas, under the title of Offensive and Defensive
Alliance, in June and July, 1790.
The preamble to the treaty with the Nizam specifies three
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
xlv
parties to it, and that the alliance is against Tippoo Sul-
taun. The first article confirms the friendship subsisting
between the three states by former treaties, and the second
declares that Tippoo having violated his engagements with
the contracting powers, they have united in a league to
punish him to the utmost of their ability, and to deprive
him of the means of disturbing the general tranquillity in
future. The third and subsequent articles, to the ninth
inclusive, relate to the prosecution of the war, and to objects
connected with it, to the distribution of the conquered ter-
ritories, and to the mode of making peace; and the tenth
article of the treaty of Paungul, which is the thirteenth in
that of Poonah, is in the following terms:-
66
If, after the conclusion of peace with Tippoo, he should
attack or molest either of the contracting parties, the other
shall join to punish him, the mode and conditions of effect-
ing which shall be hereafter settled by the contracting
parties."
The treaty, therefore, from this summary recital of it, is
clearly an alliance between three states for a declared spe-
cific object, with a prospective clause for the future security
of all the contracting parties against a common enemy.
To ascertain, with all possible accuracy, the nature of the
obligations of the treaty, I now advert to the negotiations
preceding the formation of it, and to the discussion of the
quoted article, which have taken place subsequent to the war.
Upon receipt of the intelligence that Tippoo had invaded
the territories of the Rajah of Travancore, instructions were
sent from this government to the residents at Hyderabad
and Poonah, to notify its determination to support our ally,
and to propose a co-operation with the Nizam and the Mah-
rattas against Tippoo.
The resident at Poonah, previous to the receipt of these
instructions, had obtained from that court an unrequested
xlvi
[App.
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
declaration of its disposition to take part with the Company
in the war against Tippoo. The first advance to the con-
federacy was therefore made by the Mahrattas, without
solicitation or sacrifice on our part.
To the information communicated to the Nizam, by the
resident at Hyderabad, of unprovoked aggression of Tippoo
against the Rajah of Travancore, and of the determination
of this government to support him, and to the expressed
expectation of the Nizam's co-operation, his Highness re-
plied, without qualificaton, that it was his intention, after
an interview with the Paishwah, and after concerting with
him a plan of attack, to commence hostilities against Tippoo,
and that the Governor-general's resolution very happily
coincided with his own plans,—that it had long been his
intention to attack Tippoo, and that he had communicated
it to the Paishwah.
The Nizam, however, claimed the merit of a ready co-
operation with the English, of a decision in their favour,
without waiting to ascertain the disposition of the Paishwah,
and of an earlier commencement of hostilities than he had
intended.
The Nizam's declaration was soon followed by a ques-
tion from him to the resident, as to the part which the Com-
pany would take if, during the absence of his army while
assisting the Company, the Paishwah invited by Tippoo
should invade the dominions of his Highness; and the reply
of the resident, which he acknowledges to be unguarded,
was, that the Company ought to sacrifice their all in his
Highness's defence. The minister subsequently requested
that Lord Cornwallis would introduce in one of his letters
an expression implying, in general terms, that he should
consider any attempt to disturb the peace of his Highness's
dominions, whilst engaged with us in the war against Tippoo,
in the same light as an attempt to disturb those of the Com-
11.]
xlvii
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
pany. He had previously signified his wish that the defen-
sive alliance should be made general, and both the Nizam
and his minister had evinced a disposition to connect them-
selves by the closest ties with this government.
The following extract from the Governor-general's letter
of the 12th April, 1790, to the resident at Hyderabad, will
furnish the most material information on this subject:
"You may likewise take that opportunity to express
both to himself (the Nizam) and to Azeem-ul-Omrah, how
highly sensible I am of the liberal manner in which they
received my propositions to join with the Company in the
present war, and of the openness and fairness with which
they have discussed the different articles which are to con-
stitute the terms of our alliance; and you may give them
the strongest assurances that they shall have no reason to
repent of their having treated me with so much candour;
but that, in return, I shall have pleasure in embracing
every opportunity that offers to give them convincing proofs
of
my sincerity and friendship.
"I trust that the more that his Highness reflects upon
the nature of his proposition, that I would engage to inter-
fere in case the Mahrattas should at any time make unrea-
sonable demands upon him, he will more clearly see that,
as the Mahrattas have acceded heartily and cordially to the
confederacy, it would be highly improper in me to suppose
that they would be inclined to treat one of their own allies
with injustice; and, consequently, such an assurance must
appear to them in a light highly injurious and offensive.
But, in order to prove to his Highness how anxious I am to
go every justifiable length to show my regard to his interests,
and to gratify him in his wishes, you may inform him that,
provided the Mahrattas do not positively object to it, I
will agree to its becoming an additional article in the present
treaty, that, should differences arise between any two of the
xlviii
[APP.
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
;
may
confederates, the third party shall be bound to interpose his
good offices, and to take every means in his power to bring
those differences to a just and amicable settlement; and you
add to his Highness, to Azeem-ul-Omrah, and to Meer
Abal Kassim, that should an article to that effect be as-
sented to by the Poonah government, and any case should
arise, in which my interference should be called upon in
consequence of it, they will always find me in the best dis-
position to endeavour to save his Highness from the necessity
of submitting to injury."
This is the substance of what preceded the treaty. It
now remains to state what passed subsequent to it at the
period of general pacification at Seringapatam. Hurry
Punt, on the part of the Mahrattas, and Azeem-ul-Omrah,
on that of the Nizam, proposed to Lord Cornwallis to enter
into a guarantee treaty, in fuller explanation of the 13th
and 16th articles of the treaties of Poonah and Paungal,
with a view to render the terms of them more precise, and
to define the operations to be pursued by the three contract-
ing parties, in the event of future molestation, or attack, by
Tippoo, against either of them.
It is unnecessary to detail the negotiations which followed
these propositions; it is sufficient to observe the written de-
claration which the residents were instructed to deliver to
their respective courts, if they manifested evasion or back-
wardness in entering into the proposed explanation, viz.,
"That we consider the three parties to be bound to each
other, to act with their whole force against Tippoo, in
the event of his attacking either of them, without clear and
just provocation, but in no other case whatever." That the
draft of an explanatory treaty was prepared by Lord Corn-
wallis, and transmitted to the residents at Hyderabad and
Poonah, by whom it was explained to the ministers of their
respective courts, that the Mahrattas required time for con-
II.
xlix
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
sidering it, but Azeem-ul-Omrah positively declared his re-
solution not to agree to the guarantee treaty, until his
master's request concerning Kurnool had been complied
with; that he afterwards retracted this declaration, and ex-
pressed his consent to accede to the propositions of Lord
Cornwallis, without waiting for the determination of the
Mahrattas; that another draft of an explanatory treaty was
afterwards prepared by the Mahrattas, and that the discus-
sion has long since been brought to a close, without any
specific agreement, under a satisfactory declaration from the
Mahratta minister, that his state was ready to act agreeably
to existing treaties, and an expressed acquiescence of the
Nizam to the proposed draft of Lord Cornwallis.
I shall now consider the arguments by which the Nizam
may be presumed to urge his claim to our assistance, in the
event of the premised suppositions.
That he is by treaty entitled to the assistance of the Com-
pany, as well as that of the Mahrattas, if Tippoo should
attack his dominions, without just cause or provocation, and
the defection of one party to the treaty cannot exonerate
the other from the obligations which it has contracted to
discharge; that, so far from being justified in refusing him
aid against Tippoo, it is incumbent on us to stand forth and
compel the third party to perform its stipulations.
That the article imposing the obligation of assistance is
clear and positive in its terms, and contains no expression
or condition to justify a secession on our parts; that his
reliance in making the treaty was upon our good faith, as
he not only well knew the treachery of the Mahrattas, but
plainly intimated his suspicions of it during the preliminary
negotiations; that, at the period of making the treaty, our
interest dictated the necessity of entering into an alliance
with him, whether the Mahrattas became parties to it or
not,—and it cannot be doubted, that if he had insisted upon
VOL. II.
d
1
[Apr.
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
an offensive and defensive engagement, in general terms, it
must have been acceded to; that if we are at liberty to
renounce the performance of our stipulations, because the
Mahrattas have violated their engagements, or for other
reasons of convenience or policy, that good faith, which is
the basis and cement of treaties, is subverted, as a pretence
equally valid can never be wanting to authorize a departure
from the most solemn obligations.
That Tippoo's aggression must be with or without the
concert of the Mahrattas, and, in either case, we are bound
to oppose it, but more particularly should he take the field
against the Nizam as the confederate of the Paishwah, as
such a confederacy on his part would be a direct and insult-
ing violation of the treaty, which it would be our indispens-
able duty to resent.
To these arguments the following may be opposed :-
Nothing can be clearer than that the treaty, by the terms
of it, is a tripartite engagement, binding and uniting three
states for their reciprocal security against a declared common
enemy; and supposing the guarantee established by it to
be maintained by the joint efforts and co-operation of the
three allies. Upon this principle, all explanations and acts
originating out of the treaty were to take place by mutual
communication and the concurrence of the three allied
powers. That as the union of the three allies was the basis
of the treaty, the continuance of that union, or friendship, is
essential to the performance of the obligations imposed by
it, and a war between two of the parties totally changes the
relative situation of all.
A junction between Tippoo and one of two parties to the
treaty, whilst at war with each other, is to be considered
with reference to the causes of hostilities between the two
parties engaged in them. The treaty can never be con-
strued with that rigour, as in all cases to preclude any of the
II.]
li
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
parties to it from forming such alliancess as may be neces
sary to his safety; and upon a supposition that the justice
of the war between the Nizam and Paishwah is decidedly on
one side, and that the other has been compelled into it by
unprovoked aggression, self-preservation would justify an
alliance between the aggrieved party and Tippoo. On the
other hand, a confederacy between him and one of the par-
ties to the triple alliance, against any other party, from
ambitious motives, may be pronounced a gross infraction of
that alliance with respect to the state confederating with
Tippoo. The inference from this reasoning, in point of
fact, bears rather against the Nizam, as his advance towards
Bidder, if not an act of aggression against the Mahratta
state, was indisputably with a view to take part in the dis-
sensions between Sindia and the minister, and so far an
indication of hostility. In an early stage of those measures
which have contributed to involve the Nizam in his present
embarrassment, the consequences of them were distinctly
pointed out to Azeem-ul-Omrah; and whilst the impor-
tance of a good understanding with Ballajee Pundhit to the
prosperity of the Nizam's government was urged to him,
he was at the same time apprized of the destructive ten-
dency to his Highness's affairs of a rupture with the Mah-
ratta minister.
To support the Nizam against Tippoo, if he should seize
the opportunity of actual hostility between his Highness and
the Mahrattas, to attack the territories of the former without
provocation, must necessarily involve us in a war with the
Mahrattas, a predicament which the obligations of the
treaty never supposed. I state this as a necessary conse-
quence, for the operations of the field would lead to it: even
though the invasion were not originally concerted or intended
between Tippoo and the Paishwah, we cannot conceive it
possible for us to fight against Tippoo alone, in defence of
d 2
lii
[Aer.
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
the Nizam, and with the co-operation of his forces, whilst
he is engaged with the Mahrattas; and to prosecute the
war with effect against Tippoo, we must commence hostili-
ties at the same time with the Mahrattas. But if a con-
trary supposition were admissible, the whole burthen of
repelling and punishing the aggression of Tippoo would
exclusively fall upon us, contrary to the spirit, meaning,
and terms of the triple alliance.
We are respectively bound by different treaties with the
Nizam and Mahrattas, not to assist their enemies; and we
are bound in a guaranty with both, for the object of recipro-
cal security against Tippoo: the first imposes a neutrality
on our parts with respect to the Nizam and to the Mahrat-
tas; and the second, the obligation of mutual support
against Tippoo. The stipulations of the last imply and
express the continuance of amity between the three con-
tracting parties, as the foundation of that concert which is
the very essence of the treaty, and by which the security
derived from it can alone be maintained. Hostilities be-
tween any two of the parties is in fact, as long as they last,
a subversion of the principles of the treaty.
The primary question, as far as regards the obligations
of the treaty, is reducible to a very narrow compass, and is
resolvable into this statement,-whether the treaty of Paun-
gul is to be deemed a separate independent agreement be-
tween us and the Nizam, or connecting in all its obligations
him and the Mahrattas. The terms of it most clearly prove
it to be a triple alliance, by which three parties are bound
together against a presumed enemy, for their reciprocal
security, which is to be maintained by their joint efforts,
and, if necessary, with their whole power.
To the argu-
ment, that the secession of one party from performing the
obligations of the treaty does not release the other, because
is not so expressed in it, and because such a clause would
II.]
liii
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE,
have been inserted, if this had been the intention of the
contracting parties, it may be replied, that this construction
is inadmissible, for it requires more than was intended by
the treaty itself, as it involves the necessity, or, at all events,
the risk, of a war with one of the parties to it. This is a
case which the treaty never supposed, and all the stipula-
tions in it are formed upon a contrary presumption.
In reply to other arguments it may be observed, that
both the Nizam and the Mahrattas were previously disposed
to war with Tippoo, and that in all probability they would
have carried this intention into effect, if the Company had
not been compelled into hostilities with that prince; that
they embraced with alacrity the favourable opportunity
afforded them by the determination of this government, and
can claim no other merit, than that they were induced by it
to commence their operations at an earlier period than they
had at first proposed. The clause to which Lord Corn-
wallis signified his conditional acquiescence was not inserted
in the treaty, and it is evident that it would have been
objected to by the Mahrattas. The Nizam himself has
afforded a proof of the latitude in which he views the article
of the guarantee treaty under discussion, by his declaration
to withhold his acquiescence to the proposed explanatory
engagement, until our concurrence was obtained to the
object which he had in view.
In discussing the nature and force of the obligations of
the treaty, we are not to be biassed by any considerations
of the weakness of the Nizam, and the probability of an
attack upon him only. Such considerations apply to the
question of expediency, and the point of obligation is to
be argued in the same manner as if the supposition extended
to an attack upon the Mahrattas by Tippoo. If the terms
of the treaty, under the stated circumstances, prescribe the
obligation of assisting the Nizam against Tippoo, they must
liv
[Are.
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
be construed to require our assistance in favour of the
Mahrattas under similar circumstances, if attacked by that
prince, and the probable ruin of the one, with the aggran-
dizement of the other, would be the necessary consequence
of such aid.
Although hostilities between the Mahrattas and Nizam is
a dissolution of all existing treaties between them, yet they
are both still bound to us. I am at the same time aware
that if Tippoo were to attack the possessions of the Company,
whilst the Mahrattas and Nizam are at war with each other,
however they might profess an adherence to the stipulations
of the treaty, they would not be in a situation to execute
them. But with the restoration of peace the power of ful-
filling their stipulations may again ensue, and the contract-
ing parties may again stand in the situation which the
treaty supposed. Upon this principle, if Tippoo were to
attack either the Nizam or Mahrattas, whilst at war with
each other, I should deem it necessary, in the first instance,
to call upon the third party to perform his stipulations. It
might induce the two parties at war to make peace with
each other; and, at all events, would either shew that
Tippoo's attack was by concert with one of the allies, or
prove a direct breach of the treaty against the ally refusing
his aid in defence of the party attacked, and thus leave us at
liberty to act as we might think proper. But I do not hold
this government bound to assist either party against Tippoo,
unless peace were previously established between the Mah-
rattas and the Nizam.
Having discussed the obligations of the treaty, I shall
now consider the question of assisting the Nizam, on the
grounds of political expediency.
In deciding against the Nizam's claim to our assistance
against Tippoo, without the co-operation of the Mahrattas,
I am not to suppose that he will yield his conviction to those
II.]
lv
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
arguments which have satisfied my judgment. On the con-
trary, we are to conclude that he will be inclined to view
our neutrality as a desertion of his cause, which ill repays
his co-operation with us, and his anxiety to unite with us
by the closest ties. We a
We are therefore, in the occurrence of
the supposed event, which I am far from deeming probable,
to look to the indisposition of the Nizam to the British
interests in India, and to the consequences of it. In truth,
the whole tenor of the Nizam's conduct, from the earliest.
period, proves that he has been friendly or inimical to the
British government, as it suited his immediate views; and
that his later union with us has proceeded from a motive of
deriving support from our countenance and power.
The apprehensions and dangers suggested by this consi-
deration are remote, and, at present, the question, the deci-
sion of which presumes them, has not been forced upon our
determination. But whilst they are possible, it is our duty
seriously to weigh the probable consequences of neglecting
the Nizam, or of supporting him against the joint invasion
of the Mahrattas and Tippoo Sultaun.
The destruction of the Nizam's power, and the aggran-
dizement of that of his enemies, must be the consequence of
leaving him without support, and Tippoo and the Mahrattas
will of course become proportionably dangerous.
On the other hand, when we reflect upon the vices and
imbecility of the Nizam's administration, the impossibility of
directing his politics, without usurping his government, and
the dangers of perpetual war, the consequence of such inter-
ference,—when we consider the difficulty of making any
effectual impression in the Mahratta state by our forces, the
comparative facility with which they might injure us,—the
magnitude of the resources and exertions, as well as the
number of troops both native and European, which would
be required to oppose the united efforts of the Mahrattas
lvi
[APP.
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
and Tippoo-and the inevitable ruin of a long protracted
war-the inducement to support the Nizam, at the hazard
of such impending consequences, ought to be much stronger
than the apprehension of future evils from the subversion of
his power.
This event, before it could be effectually opposed by the
assistance of this government, would be the probable con-
sequence of an invasion of his dominions by Tippoo and the
Mahrattas, and it is at least dubious if any efforts on our
part could procure his re-establishment.
But, above all, it is indispensably necessary to advert to
the situation of affairs in Europe, which precludes the ex-
pectation of receiving any considerable reinforcement of
troops during the continuance of the war, and impresses the
necessity of preserving, by every effort, peace with all the
powers in India.
Under the supposition of the annihilation of the power of
the Nizam, by the combination of Tippoo and the Mah-
rattas, the probability is as great that they would attack
each other, as that they would unite to invade the territo-
ries of the Company; and, if it were otherwise, the pro-
gressive accumulation of our resources would enable us
better to resist their confederacy against us. Our political
consequence might lose something of its importance in the
estimate of the native powers, by leaving the Nizam to his
fate; but although I am fully sensible of the value of
opinion in this country, it cannot be placed in competition
with the greater evils attending a war with Tippoo and the
Mahrattas, which I consider the unavoidable consequence
of supporting singly the Nizam against Tippoo, if that
prince should attack him, whilst engaged in hostilities with
the Paishwah.
Independently of the reasons for affording protection to
the Nizam, which are suggested by a consideration of the
2
11.]
lvii
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
consequences following the denial of our assistance, other
motives occur. The conduct of the British government in
resenting the attack upon their ally, the Rajah of Travan-
core, during the war, and in the negotiations for the termi-
nation of it, not only gained us the confidence of our allies,
but established the British reputation throughout India for
good faith, firmness, and moderation; but in weighing these
motives, we must attend to self-preservation, including the
permanency of the British possessions in India.
I have now considered a question which I most sincerely
hope we shall not be compelled to decide, and I shall take
this opportunity of recording some reflections which I have
frequently revolved.
Whether the dissensions between the Paishwah and the
Nizam are terminated in war or by negotiation, there is too
much reason to fear that the Nizam will fall under the
subjection of the Mahrattas, and on this event his power,
under their controul and direction, will become an accumu-
lation of their strength, already exorbitant.
This apprehension cannot have escaped the Nizam, and
it seems natural to conclude that, having no expectation of
our support, he would endeavour to avoid subjection to the
Mahrattas, by forming an union with Tippoo. Whether
he has really ever had this in contemplation I am not
informed, but I have already assigned reasons which I still
think satisfactory for deeming it impracticable.
Surmises have been propagated, on the other hand, of a
meditated confederacy between Tippoo and the Mahrattas ;
this also I deem improbable, unless the latter should be
forced into it by our avowed support of the Nizam against
them. They are, I presume, satisfied on this head;
Tippoo would, I doubt not, be ready to accept overtures
from the Paishwah for such a confederacy, but I think they
will not be made, and I entertain little apprehension that
lviii
[App.
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
he will at present venture to attack the dominions of the
Nizam, without the concert of the Mahrattas. If he should,
the most probable consequences of such an attempt would,
in my opinion, be these, that the Mahrattas, in the first
instance, would make their own terms with the Nizam, and
then unite with us to defend his territories against Tippoo.
The sovereignty of India may be now considered to be
exercised by the Mahrattas, Tippoo, the Nizam, and the
English.
The power of the house of Sindia has become subject to
the control of the Paishwal by means which were foreseen,
without any immediate prospect that his successor will
recover that independence which Sindia himself possessed;
and the paramount government of Poonah enjoys and exer-
cises a most extensive influence and authority over all the
constituent and dependant members of the Mahratta empire.
If, then, there be assignable limitation, it is with respect to
the Berar Rajah, who, from situation and circumstances,
has less interest and concern in the general politics of the
Mahratta state, and carries on his administration indepen-
dently of it. But his dependence is constitutional, and the
present Rajah, as I am informed, received the confirmation
of his succession, with the insignia of his investiture, from
the Paishwah, and although it should be granted that he is
not disposed to enter into any measures inimical to the Bri-
tish interests in India, we may with certainty conclude that
he would take no active part with this government against
the Paishwah.
The power of the Mahratta empire, without the co-ope-
ration of the Berar Rajah, is sufficiently formidable, and the
forces under General De Boigne may perhaps be deemed
equal to that of two English brigades.
The nature of the Mahratta government is well known
to be avaricious, grasping, and ambitious,-that it never
II.]
lix
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
neglects any opportunity of extending its power, or aggran-
dizing its wealth, with little solicitude as to the rectitude of
the means employed in obtaining these objects.
But although the accumulated power of the Mahrattas
is great, it is not collected for enterprise without delay and
difficulty, as we may learn even from recent events. This
difficulty and delay may be imputed to the nature of the
Mahratta constitution, to the separate interests and pursuits
of the dependant members of it, which seldom admit of a
distant or speedy diversion of their forces, and to the great
extent of the empire from which the troops are to be drawn.
In this diversity of interests a principle of discord exists,
which, although it may disappear whenever the safety of the
Mahratta state is endangered by attack, opens an impedi-
ment to the union of the efforts of the empire for the pur-
pose of hostile invasion.
Friendship or alliance now subsists between the British
government and the Mahratta state, and its feudatories, the
Rajah of Berar, Sindia, and Holkar; but though some
advantage may arise from a friendly connexion with the
feudatories, and greater perhaps from the apprehension
which they may entertain of danger to their respective in-
terests in the event of hostilities between the British and
the Mahratta state, it would be unsafe to rely too much
upon this consideration; on the contrary, if that event
should occur, whilst we employed the best means which
policy could suggest to effect a disunion of interests among
the different chieftains, our exertions must be made on an
expectation of the united opposition of all.
With respect to all the powers in India, our actual secu-
rity is our strength, but with regard to the Mahrattas the
alarm of danger is lessened, by a consideration that a wider
and safer career is open to their ambition, in the absolute
subjection of numerous petty states in Hindustan, some of
lx
[Arr.
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
which are independent, whilst others are partially under
their control, than by attacking our possessions, or those of
our allies. Our security may be deemed to be further con-
firmed by our avowed principles, in comparison with those
of Tippoo Sultaun, whose ambition is as notorious as our
disavowal of extending the British territories by arms. But
after all, we are never to forget that a dominion exercised
by foreigners must ever be viewed in a hostile light,—that
an union merely political is, in the highest degree, precarious
-and that if the whole power of the Mahratta state were
directed against us, we should find ourselves very vulnera-
ble in many parts, and in some perhaps at present unsus-
pected.
If Tippoo were at the same time to join the confederacy,
or an European enemy superadd the weight of his power, the
successful termination of the contest would require the
utmost exertions both here and in Europe.
The British territories on the Ganges are open to inva-
sion by Cuttack, by the west, and including the Vizier's
dominions on the north. With respect to the Vizier, I shall
only here say, that, whilst his administration continues on
its present footing, we should derive no effective assistance
from his troops, and that we must rather expect to find
enemies than friends in his dominions, which are inhabited
and surrounded by numerous hardy and needy adventurers,
without attachment or allegiance, and ready to take arms
in any cause that would provide them spoil.
It is unnecessary to expatiate on the character of Tippoo,
the leading principle of which is ambition, and that has no
friendships. We know by experience his abilities-he has
confidants and advisers, but no minister, and inspects,
superintends, and regulates himself all the details of his
government-he maintains dignity without ostentation-the
peasantry of his dominions are protected, and their labours
II.]
lxi
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
encouraged and rewarded. Before the late war, reports
were continually propagated of his cruelty and tyranny,
with respect to his subjects in Malabar,-they were not ill
founded, but that they were greatly exaggerated may be
established by one consideration, that, during the contest
with him, no person of character, rank, or influence, in his
hereditary dominions, deserted his cause. With less bigotry
than is usually imputed to him, we know his zeal for his re-
ligion to be strong, and his ambition acquires new motives of
action from this principle.
Since the termination of hostilities, he has faithfully dis-
charged all the obligations of the treaty of peace, and his
attention appears to have been more immediately directed
to the improvement of his finances by economy, to the
internal administration of his country, and to repair and
strengthen Seringapatam. No part of his conduct has in-
dicated hostility towards us or our allies, but we have infor-
mation that he entertains a particular resentment against the
Nizam, and a contempt for him.
His obvious policy is to wait until events produce a dis-
union amongst the confederates, and to foment it if he can.
The weakness of the Nizam's administration would pro-
bably have an irresistible temptation to his resentment and
ambition, if he were not protected by the triple alliance, but
the subversion of the British power, as opposing the firmest
barrier to his ambition, must naturally be the object which
he has most in view.
Of the three powers, therefore, which I have mentioned,
I shall observe, that the aid of the Nizam can never enable
us to hold the balance of India,-that the ambition of Tip-
poo has more and stronger motives for action than that of
the Mahrattas-and that the consolidation of our alliance
with the latter is an object of the first importance to us.
lxii
[APP.
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
With their aid, which we might expect, we could always
oppose Tippoo and any European power-from Tippoo we
could never hope for assistance, or scarcely neutrality.
In the event of hostilities with the Mahrattas, I think it
probable that an useful alliance might be formed with the
northern Rajahs, and perhaps even with some of the Seik
chiefs. But I should not advise entering into offensive and
defensive alliances with them, as a precautionary security,
on this principle, that the danger attending them would
probably exceed the advantage to be derived from them in
times of necessity. It is safer, in my opinion, to trust to
the formation of alliances when that necessity exists; and
this may certainly be promoted by the moderation and sin-
cerity of our language and conduct at all times. The cor-
respondence between this government and the principal
northern Rajahs is regular-with any of the Seik chiefs
occasional only.
These general reflections may assist the judgment in
forming a determination on the primary question, which has
insensibly led to the introduction of them; and if the Board
concur in the result of my opinion upon it, they will fur-
ther, I imagine, agree with me, that there is no immediate.
probability that we shall be involved in war in India. But
with this conclusion, under the uncertain consequences of
hostilities between the Mahrattas and the Nizam-the
precarious situation of affairs in Europe, and the desperate
exertions of the French, we must admit the necessity of
being prepared to meet any extremity. This, in fact, is an
obligation of primary necessity at all times, although our
preparations must be extended or abridged according to the
impulse of circumstances. With respect to the coast of
Coromandel, I should ve. submitted some propositions
founded on this consideration to the Board, if I had not
L
[I.]
lxiii
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
been informed by the Right Honourable President of Fort
St. George, in a letter of the 18th December, that, for
similar reasons, he had called for a list of stores and provi-
sions on the frontier coast-that he would take care that they
were amply supplied, and that the camp equipage should
be in a state of preparation to admit of our taking the field
upon a short notice. To these measures I expressed my
recollect my
concurrence, and the Board may
my verbal com-
munication of them.
In Bengal, as far as immediate precaution may be ex-
pedient, little remains to be done. The Commander-in-
chief long ago noticed an evil of a very serious tendency,
the dispersion of the regular troops in detachments upon
civil services. Exclusively of the impossibility of enforcing
a proper discipline over troops so divided, it would be diffi-
cult to collect any considerable body at a short warning, in
any part of the provinces, Calcutta, perhaps, excepted; and
whatever reliance we may place on the submission, timi-
dity, or attachment of the subjects of this government,
nothing can be more obvious than the necessity of being
prepared at all times to quell insurrection.
At the verbal or recorded suggestion of the Commander-
in-chief, some information was called for, as preparatory
to an arrangement for correcting the evil noticed by him,
and lately further information has been required. It will
probably be ready by the period of his return to the Presi-
dency, which may be very shortly expected, and we may
then avail ourselves of his advice and assistance in forming
the necessary arrangements.
But after the maturest reflection on our situation in this
country, on the policy, the character, the forces, and am-
bition of the different powers in India, and the dislike
which they must entertain to the manners, religion, and
lxiv
[Arp.
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
dominion of Europeans, it is impossible to suppose that,
with all our caution to avoid war, we shall be always at
peace. Any inability on our parts to oppose the enmity of
our neighbours, would immediately make us sensible of its
effects; and for these reasons our consideration should ex-
tend beyond a provision for immediate exigency. We
know from experience that the natives of India improve in
military tactics, and that every new war with them requires
augmented exertions and forces on our parts; and we are
further to reflect that, exclusively of the protection of these
provinces, we must have it in our power to send assistance
to the other possessions of the Company when attacked.
Our military establishment was formed nine years ago,
and in the interval we have been engaged in a war which
required the united efforts of the three Presidencies, not to
mention the co-operation of the Nizam and the Mahrattas,
under the direction of superior military and political abili-
ties, to bring it to a fortunate conclusion.
In addition to these observations, we may assume it as
an undeniable principle, that to impose peace on our neigh-
bours, by the strength of a military establishment, ready at
all times for active or extensive exertion, is not only the
wisest but the most economical system.
Under the influence of these reflections, I propose there-
fore that the Commander-in-chief should be requested to
take into his consideration the military establishment of this
government, and to communicate his sentiments whether he
deems it sufficient for the security and protection of the
country which it is to defend; adverting at the same time
to the reflections which I have stated; and to suggest any
augmentation, either of the whole or the parts of it, which
he may deem expedient, or any alterations either in the dis-
position of the troops or otherwise, which he may think proper.
II.]
1xv
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
I have ever been disposed to adhere as literally as possible
to the strictest interpretation of the restrictive clause in the
act of parliament against entering into hostilities; but in
the course of my present reflections one question has origi-
nated from it, which I think proper here to state.
To pur-
sue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in
India are declared (in the preamble to the clause) to be
measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy of
the nation; and with this preamble the prohibition against
declaring war or commencing hostilities is connected, except
where hostilities have actually been commenced, or prepara-
tions actually made for the commencement of hostilities
against the British nation in India, or against some of the
states or princes dependent thereon, or whose territories the
United Company shall be at such time engaged by any sub-
sisting treaty to defend or guarantee.
This clause, in literal construction, if any interpretation
of the guarantee treaty with the Nizam and the Mahrattas
against Tippoo be admitted, is decisive against any inter-
ference on our parts in his favour against Tippoo, without
the co-operation of the Mahrattas; and the circumstances
of the case are such, under all the considerations stated, as
to confirm the construction in point of expediency.
But it is possible that, without any view to the extension
of our dominions by conquest, a case might arise in which
the security of the British possessions in India might be
best consulted at the risk and even certainty of hostilities,
by taking part with one state against another; and the
question, upon this supposition, is, whether we should be
justified in such a determination, where we are not bound
by treaty to defend or guarantee the state which it might
be expedient to assist ?-and it should, I think, be referred
to the Honourable the Court of Directors.
e
lxvi
[APP. 11:
SIR JOHN SHORE'S MINUTE.
To their particular notice, also, the question which is the
subject of this minute should be pointed out; repeating
my opinion of the improbability of its being forced upon
our decision, that we may obtain their instructions for our
guidance at any future period, in case it should hereafter
occur.
Feb. 18, 1795.
(Signed)
J. SHORE.
No. III.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
Fort-William, 12th August, 1798.
IN communicating to the Board an authentic copy of the
proclamation issued by the Governor-general of the Isle of
France during the residence of the ambassadors of Tippoo
Sultaun in that island, I informed the Board that I would
prepare the detail of such measures as appeared to me most
advisable, for the purpose of frustrating the united efforts of
Tippoo Sultaun and of France. Accordingly, I have laid
before the Board, for that necessary purpose, a number of
propositions connected in their principle as well as in their
object; and I have endeavoured to carry the proposed
system of measures into execution with every practicable
degree of diligence and despatch. When it is remembered
that I did not take charge of this government until the 18th
of May; that the proclamation did not make its first ap-
pearance at this presidency until the 8th of June, and was
not authenticated here until the 18th of June, I trust it will
appear that I have proceeded with as much expedition as
was compatible with the due consideration of the various
and important questions which demanded my decision.
Although the leading objects of the several propositions
which have been adopted by this government may be col-
lected from my late correspondence with the governments of
Fort St. George and Bombay, and with the residents at
e 2
lxviii
[Apr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
Poonah and Hyderabad, it may be useful to review with
more particularity the circumstances which have suggested
this system of measures to my judgment. My present
intention, therefore, is to explain and illustrate the principles
upon which that system is founded, the means by which I
hope to carry it into effect, and the ends which I expect to
accomplish by its ultimate success and permanent establish-
ment. In this retrospect of my conduct I shall disclose
without hesitation or reserve the whole train of reflections
which has passed in my mind during the agitation of this
intricate and extensive subject; and I shall avow without
disguise every successive variation of my opinion, and every
instance in which I have reluctantly submitted my unaltered
judgment to the pressure of practical difficulties: nor shall
I deny that I have ultimately pursued a course far within
the limits of that to which the course of my own duty and
character, the clearest principles of justice and of policy,
the unquestionable rights and interests of the Company, and
the honour of the British name in India, would have directed
me, if the obstacles to my progress had not appeared abso-
lutely insurmountable.
The various considerations which have successively en-
gaged my attention may be stated in the following order :-
First, the nature and character of the recent proceedings
of Tippoo Sultaun.
Secondly, the rights and interests of the Company, and
the principles of my duty arising out of these proceedings.
Thirdly, the circumstances which might suspend or limit
the actual exercise of these rights, the immediate and com-
plete establishment of those interests, and the satisfactory
discharge of that duty.
Fourthly, the intermediate precautions which might be
adopted during the suspension of more effectual measures ;
III.
lxix
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
and the securities which might now be provided against the
return of our actual danger.
The first consideration required an attentive examination
of the proclamation issued at the Isle of France, together
with all the collateral circumstances accompanying that
extraordinary publication. The proclamation made its first
appearance at Calcutta in a newspaper of the 8th of June.
Upon the first view of the subject, I was much inclined
to doubt the authenticity of the proclamation. It seemed
incredible, that if the French really entertained a design of
furnishing aid to Tippoo, they would publicly declare that
design, when no other apparent end could be answered by
such a declaration excepting that of exposing the project, in
its infancy, to the observation of our governments both at
home and in India, and of preparing both for a timely and
effectual resistance. It did not appear more probable that
Tippoo, whatever might be his secret design, should have
risked so public and unguarded an avowal of his hostility.
However, even under these circumstances, I thought it ad-
visable to transmit a copy of the proclamation to the
governor of Fort St. George, in a private letter of the 9th
of June, apprizing him that if the proclamation should
prove authentic, it must lead to a serious remonstrance from
this government to Tippoo, the result of which remon-
strance must be uncertain. My letter, therefore, directed
him to turn his attention to the means of collecting a force
upon the coast, if necessity should unfortunately require
such a measure.
The first regular authentication of the proclamation which
I received was contained in the letter from Lord Macartney
of the 28th of March, and in that from Sir Hugh Christian
of the same date, received on the 18th of June. It could
now no longer be doubted that the proclamation actually
had been issued by the Governor-general of the Isle of
1xx
[Arr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
France. Still, however, it might have remained a question,
whether this step might not have been taken without the
concurrence of Tippoo Sultaun, and for the promotion of
some separate object of the French government, unconnected
with his interests and unauthorized by his consent. From
the accounts which I had received of the state of the Isle of
France, I was led to believe that the object of M. Malartique
might have been to clear the island of the adherents to the
present government of France, rather than to afford any
effectual assistance to Tippoo.
It appears, however, from a more accurate investigation
of evidence, that the ship which first conveyed to the Isle
of France those accounts of the last revolution in France,
and of the violent measures projected against the Isles of
France and Bourbon, which occasioned the late disturbances
at Port Nord Ouest and the expulsion of the French national
troops from thence, did not reach the Isle of France until
Tippoo's ambassadors had departed from thence on their
return to Mangalore. The assistance afforded to Tippoo
cannot therefore have been connected with the recent com-
motions in the Isle of France.
However, I do not apprehend, unless some new revolu-
tion shall happen in the Isle of France, that Tippoo Sultaun
will be able to derive any considerable aid from that quar-
ter. But whatever may have been the motives of Monsieur
Malartique in this transaction, the object of Tippoo Sultaun
was always plain and clear, although, fortunately for our
interests, his success has not yet been answerable to the
extent of his design. Of the object of that design I soon
possessed ample proof, arising from the best evidence which
the nature of the case could admit. In the first place, it
appeared, from the general tenor of the letters from the Cape,
as well as by every public account which had been given of
the transaction, to be an undisputed fact, that Tippoo
}
III.]
lxxi
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
despatched two ambassadors to the Isle of France, and that
the proclamation in question was published subsequent to
their arrival and during their residence in that island.
These facts would perhaps have been sufficient, without fur-
ther inquiry, to warrant a strong presumption that this pro-
clamation, purporting to declare the objects of the embassy,
must have been framed with the consent and knowledge of
the ambassadors of Tippoo, then on the spot, and must
have corresponded with their instructions from their sove-
reign, whose orders they would scarcely have ventured to
exceed, in a matter of such serious consequence as the con-
clusion of an alliance offensive and defensive with the
French. In order, however, to obtain the most accurate
information with respect to the circumstances attending the
reception of the embassy, the publication of the proclama-
tion, and the conduct of the ambassadors, I examined upon
oath some respectable persons who were present in the Isle
of France during the residence of the ambassadors at Port
Nord Ouest. From the concurrent testimony of these
persons, since corroborated by intelligence from various
quarters, I obtained a corrected account of the whole trans-
action.
Tippoo despatched two ambassadors, who embarked at
Mangalore for the Isle of France, and arrived there at the
close of the month of January, 1798. They hoisted Tip-
poo's colours upon entering the harbour of Port Nord Ouest ;
were received publicly and formally by the French govern-
ment, with every circumstance of distinction and respect;
and were entertained, during their continuance in the island,
at the public expense. Previously to their arrival, no idea
or rumour existed in the island of any aid to be furnished
to Tippoo by the French, or of any prospect of a war be-
tween him and the Company.
The second day after the arrival of the ambassadors, an
lxxii
[Arr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
advertisement was published, of the same purport as the
proclamation, and immediately afterwards the proclamation
was fixed up in the most public places and circulated
through the town. One of the ambassadors was said to be
conversant with the French language. A person accompa-
nied the embassy from Mangalore who was habited in the
Turkish dress, who spoke French and English with uncom-
mon correctness and fluency, and who appeared to possess.
considerable knowledge and talents, and to be well ac-
quainted with most of the country languages of India.
This person had been known at Bussorah by the name of
Abdulah; at Surat, by that of Derwick; and in the Isle
of France passed under that of Talamas: under which last.
name he had also passed in Bengal, where he resided for
some years. The ambassadors (far from protesting against
the matter or style of the proclamation) held, without re-
serve, in the most open and public manner, the same lan-
guage which it contains with respect to the offensive war to
be commenced against the British possessions in India.
They even suffered the proclamation to be publicly distri-
buted. At their own house, Talamas' conversation, though
with more caution and mystery, corresponded in substance
with theirs. In consequence of these circumstances an uni-
versal belief prevailed in the island that Tippoo would make
an immediate attack on the British possessions in India;
which opinion had gained so much force, that the persons
who gave this evidence, and all those who arrived at that
period in India from the Isle of France, expected to find us
at war with Tippoc; but they all concurred in declaring
that the temerity of Tippoo's design had excited general
ridicule in that island. The ambassadors were present in
the island when the French government proceeded to act
under the proclamation in question, and they aided and
assisted the execution of it by making promises in the name
1
III.]
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
lxxiii
of Tippoo, for the purpose of enticing recruits to enlist.
They proposed to levy men to any practicable extent, stating
their powers to be unlimited with respect to the numbers of
the force to be raised.
The ambassadors were aided and assisted in a levy of one
hundred officers and fifty privates, for the service of Tippoo,
under the terms, and for the purposes stated in the procla-
mation. Few of the officers are of any experience or skill,
and the privates are the refuse of the lowest class of the
democratic rabble of the island: some of them are volun-
teers; others were taken from the prisons and compelled to
embark: several of them are Caffrees and people of half-
caste. With such of these troops as were volunteers the
ambassadors entered into several stipulations and engage-
ments in the name of Tippoo.
On the 7th of March, 1798, the ambassadors embarked
on board the French frigate, La Preneuse, together with
the force thus raised; and they publicly declared an inten-
tion of proceeding to the Isle of Bourbon, with the hope of
obtaining more recruits for the same service.
The proclamation, therefore, originated in the arrival of
the ambassadors at the Isle of France, was distributed by
their agents, was avowed in every part by their own public
declaration, and, finally, was executed according to its
tenor by their personal assistance and co-operation.
The proclamation itself furnishes the most powerful in-
ternal evidence of the concurrence of the ambassadors in all
its essential parts. The principal facts stated therein are:—
"That Tippoo Sultaun, through two ambassadors, de-
spatched for the purpose to the Isle of France, had addressed
letters to the colonial assembly of the Isle of France, to all
the generals employed there, and to the executive directory
of France; and had made the following propositions:-
"1st. That he desired to form an alliance offensive and
lxxiv
[APP.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
defensive with France; and offered to maintain, at his ex-
pense, during the continuance of the war in India, whatever
troops should be furnished by the French, and to supply
(with the exception of certain stores) every necessary for
carrying on the war.
"2nd. That he had given assurances that all his prepa-
rations were already completed, and that the generals and
officers would find everything necessary for carrying on a
species of war to which Europeans have not been accus-
tomed in their contests with the native powers in India.
"3rd. That he only waited for the succour of France to
declare war against the English; and that it was his ardent
desire to expel the English from India.”
Upon the ground of these facts the proclamation recom-
mends a general levy of men for the service of Tippoo;
and it concludes by assuring" all the citizens who shall en-
list, that Tippoo will give them an advantageous rate of
pay and allowances, which will be fixed by his ambassadors,
who will also engage, in the name of their sovereign, that
the Frenchmen who shall have enlisted in his army, shall
never be detained there after they shall have expressed a
desire of returning to their native country."
The avowed purport of this proclamation is to acquaint
the inhabitants of the island with the propositions made by
Tippoo Sultaun through his ambassadors then on the spot.
It enumerates those propositions with a particularity of
detail which could never have been hazarded in the presence
of the ambassadors, if the facts stated had not been correctly
true, or if the propositions enumerated had varied in sub-
stance from those communicated by the ambassadors un-
der the orders of their sovereign. But the last paragraph
of the proclamation connected with the conduct of the am-
bassadors, as already described, establishes in the clearest
manner their participation in the whole transaction. That
111.]
lxxv
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
paragraph contains a direct reference to the powers of the
ambassadors, and engages on their behalf that they shall
enter into certain stipulations, in the name of their sove-
reign, with respect to the pay and final discharge of such
French subjects as shall enlist in his army under the condi-
tions of the proclamation. The accounts which I have
received from the Isle of France concur in stating that the
ambassadors openly acted under this part of the proclama-
tion, and in the name of Tippoo entered into engagements
and stipulations with the recruits, according to the assur-
ances specified in the proclamation.
Monsieur de Bruce, now master attendant at Mangalore,
stated to one of the witnesses whom I examined the whole
substance of the engagements which had passed personally
between him and the ambassadors, all of which engage-
ments referred immediately to Tippoo's intention of com-
mencing war upon the Company, with the aid of the French
force then about to be levied. And it is certain that, with-
out some such engagement, not a volunteer could have been
raised in the Isle of France for the service of Tippoo.
It appears, from the evidence which I have collected,
that the ambassadors had not brought to the Isle of France
a supply of treasure sufficient for advancing bounty money
to the recruits. It was stated that an apprehension of the
English cruisers had prevented the embarkation of treasure
for this purpose; and no doubt was entertained, that if the
ambassadors had been better provided with money, they
might have raised a much greater number of men, who
refused to engage on the mere security of promises in the
name of Tippoo.
The ambassadors, together with the force thus col-
lected, during the time of their mission in the Isle of
France, landed from the frigate La Preneuse at Mangalore,
lxxvi
[Arr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
on the 26th of April. Accounts vary with respect to the
exact number of the force landed, the most probable are,
that it did not exceed two hundred persons. Tippoo (far
from manifesting the least symptom of disapprobation of
the conduct of his ambassadors in any part of the trans-
action) formally received them, and the officers, and lead-
ing persons so landed, with public marks of honour and
distinction. One of his ambassadors resided for some time
with the French recruits in a fortress at Mangalore, and the
Sultaun has admitted the whole levy of officers and men
into his service. Referring, therefore, to the conduct of
the ambassadors in the Isle of France, to their arrival at
Mangalore, with the force levied in consequence of their
mission, and, finally, to the reception of the ambassadors
and of the French recruits by Tippoo Sultaun, the follow-
ing conclusions appeared to me to be incontrovertibly esta-
blished:
First. That the ambassadors despatched by Tippoo
Sultaun to the government of the Isle of France, proposed
to that government an alliance offensive and defensive
against the British possessions in India, which alliance was
accepted by that government, and its acceptance formally
notified by a public proclamation.
Secondly. That the ambassadors were charged with
letters from Tippoo Sultaun to the Executive Directory of
France, which letters were stated to contain the same pro-
position, and that the ambassadors delivered those letters to
the Governor of the Isle of France for the purpose of trans-
mission to France.
Thirdly. That the ambassadors, in the name of Tippoo
Sultaun, gave public assurances, that he had actually com-
pleted the necessary preparations for commencing immediate
hostilities, and that he only waited the arrival of succour
}
III.]
lxxvii
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
from the French to declare war against the Company, for
the express purpose of expelling the British nation from
India.
Fourthly. That the ambassadors demand unlimited mi-
litary succour from the French, and levied a military force
in the Isle of France, with the declared object of com-
mencing immediate war against the British nation in India.
Fifthly. That this force has been actually landed in
Tippoo's country, and publicly admitted into his service with
signal marks of approbation; and that the ambassadors
have been received with similar distinction.
Sixthly. That Tippoo Sultaun (by receiving with
public marks of approbation his ambassadors, who had con-
cluded in his name an offensive and defensive alliance with
the French, and by admitting into his service the military
force raised for effecting the objects of that alliance) has
personally ratified the engagements contained in the procla-
mations of the Governor-general of the Isle of France,
and has proceeded to act under these engagements, con-
formably to the tenor of that proclamation.
Seventhly.—That although the succour actually received
by Tippoo Sultaun under his offensive alliance with the
French is inconsiderable, yet the tenor of the proclamation,
the proposition made to the French government for unli-
mited military aid, and the declaration of the ambassadors,
have proved, that it was the intention of Tippoo Sultaun
to receive into his service the largest force which he could
obtain, for the purpose of commencing a war of aggression
against the Company in India.
Having thus entered into offensive and defensive engage-
ments with the enemy, having proceeded to collect, in con-
junction with the enemy, a force openly destined to act
against the possessions of the Company, having avowed
through his public ambassadors, that he has completed his
lxxviii
[Afr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
preparations of war for the express purpose of attempting
the entire subversion of the British empire in India, and
having declared, that he only waits to prosecute offensive
operations, Tippoo Sultaun has violated the treaties of
peace and friendship subsisting between him and the Com→
pany, and has committed an act of direct hostility against
the British government in India.
Before I proceeded to apply the principle of the law of
nations to the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun, it appeared
proper to inquire what had been the conduct of the Com-
pany towards him for some years past, and whether he had
received any provocation to justify or to palliate his late
proceedings.
Since the conclusion of the treaty of Seringapatam the
British governments in India have uniformly conducted
themselves towards Tippoo Sultaun, not only with the most
exact attention to the principle of moderation, justice, and
good faith, but have endeavoured, by every practicable
means, to conciliate his confidence, and to mitigate his vin-
dictive spirit. Some differences have occasionally arisen
with respect to the boundaries of his territory bordering
upon the confines of our possessions on the Coast of Ma-
labar; but the records of all the British governments in
India will shew that they have always manifested the ut-
most anxiety to promote the amicable adjustment of every
doubtful or disputed point; and that Tippoo Sultaun has
received the most unequivocal proofs of the constant disposi-
tion of the Company to acknowledge and confirm all his just
rights, and to remove every cause of jealousy which might
tend to interrupt the continuance of peace.
The servants of the Company in India have not, how-
ever, been ignorant of the implacable sentiments of revenge
which he has presented without abatement since the hour of
his last defeat. It has always been well understood, that
III.]
lxxix
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
Tippoo Sultaun's resentment was not to be appeased by any
conciliatory advances on our part, nor by any other means
than the recovery of his lost power, the disgrace of the
British arms, and the ruin of the British interests in India.
With such views it was expected that he would eagerly em-
brace the first favourable occasion of striking a blow against
our possessions; and his intrigues at the Court of Hyderabad
and Poonah, together with his embassy to Zemaun Shah, al-
though managed with such a degree of caution as to avoid
the appearance of direct acts of aggression, were sufficient in-
dications of an hostile mind. But none of these circumstances
have, in any degree, affected the conduct of the Company's
servants towards him; the correspondence between him and
the late Governor-general, and the letters from Bombay on
the subject of the district of Wynaad, furnish ample proofs
of a sincere desire to bring that question to a fair issue,
" with the consent and knowledge of both parties,” ac-
cording to the tenor of the 7th Article of the Treaty of
Seringapatam; and I can appeal to the letter which I de-
spatched to him soon after my arrival in Bengal, proposing
an amicable adjustment of the same question, as well as of
his recent claims upon certain parts of the district of
Coorg, for a testimony of the pacific spirit which has
marked my first communication with him; although, per-
haps, a less mild representation might have been justified by
his unwarrantable precipitation in stationing a military
force on the frontier of Coorg, before he had made any
trial of the prescribed and regular channels of negotiation.
Tippoo Sultuan cannot, therefore, allege even the pretext
of grievance to palliate the character of his recent acts;
he has, indeed, alleged none, but has constantly professed
the most sincere desire to maintain the relations of amity
and peace with the Company. In his letters to Sir John
Shore, written a short time before the return of his am-
1xxx
[Arr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
bassadors from the Isle of France, and received at Fort
William on the 26th of April, 1798, (the day on which
the French force landed at Mangalore,) Tippoo declares,
"That his friendly heart is disposed to pay every regard
to truth and justice, and to strengthen the foundations of
harmony and concord established between the two states.
And he signifies his desire, that "Sir John Shore would
impress Lord Mornington with a sense of the friendship
and unanimity so firmly subsisting between the two states.”
This is not the language of hostility, nor even of discon-
tent. From what disposition in the friendly heart of Tip-
poo these amicable professions have proceeded, how they
are connected with a regard to truth and justice, or calcu-
lated to strengthen the foundations of harmony and con-
cord, and to impress me with a sense of the Sultaun's
friendship can now admit of no question, since it is now
supposed that these letters were written at the very moment
when Tippoo was in anxious expectations of the hourly
arrival of that military succour which he had solicited from
the enemy, for the express purpose of commencing a war
of aggression against the Company's possessions.
The motive, therefore, of Tippoo Sultaun was no other
than that avowed in his correspondence with the enemy,
and published under the eyes of his own ambassadors,—“ an
ardent desire to expel the British nation from India.”
It appears highly probable that he was instigated by the
promises and exhortations of the government of France
(whose emissaries have reached his councils) to hasten the
execution of a project in which every consideration of inte-
rest, and every sentiment of passion would induce the
French to embark with a degree of zeal, ardour, and ran-
cour not inferior to his own. The importance of these
possessions to all the most valuable interests of Great Bri-
tain has pointed the particular attention of the government
III.]
lxxxi
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
of France to the destruction of our empire in India. The
prosperity of our settlements in India has long been the
primary and undisguised object of the jealousy of France,
avowed by all her ministers in every negotiation, and by all
her rulers in every stage of her innumerable` revolutions.
Tippoo, therefore, might reasonably hope that, if the cessation
of hostilitics on the continent of Europe should at any time.
enable the French Directory to turn their views to the
disturbance of the peace of India, such an adventure would
be among the earliest of their operations.
The conclusion of a peace upon the continent of Europe,
the weak state of the internal governments of Poonah and
Hyderabad, the existing disputes apparently precluding
all co-operation and concert between these two powers,
added to the growing strength of a French faction, every
part of India may have appeared, both to Tippoo and to
the French, to offer a favourable opportunity for the pro-
secution of their joint design.
The premature disclosure of this design may, perhaps, be
imputed rather to the policy of M. Malartique, than to the
imprudence of Tippoo. Whether the scope of that policy
was to involve us in a war with Tippoo, or to expose his
treachery to our view, is yet a matter of doubt; but what-
ever circumstances occasioned the premature disclosure of
the design; whether the design was wisely or rashly con-
ceived, whether it has partially succeeded, or entirely failed,
are questions, the solution of which in no degree affects
the offensive nature of an aggression so unprovoked, and
of a violation of faith so flagrant and unqualified. The
history of the world scarcely furnishes an instance in which
any two powers have united in a confederacy, or alliance,
previously with the same motives. The party proposing
an offensive alliance against the Company cannot be ab-
solved from the consequences of such an act, by any appa-
VOL. II.
f
lxxxii
[Arr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
rent or real indifference in the party accepting such a pro-
posal. The conduct of Tippoo Sultaun, therefore, cannot
be correctly estimated by reference to the supposed motives.
of Monsieur Malartique.
From the application of the acknowledged principles of
the law of nations to the facts of this case, I formed my
judgment of the rights of the Company, and of my own
duties, with reference to the aggression of Tippoo. The
course of reasoning which I pursued may be stated in the
following manner :—
The rights of states, applicable to every case of contest
with foreign powers, are created and limited by the necessity
of preserving the public safety. This necessity is the found-
ation of the reciprocal claim of all nations to explanation
of suspicious or ambiguous conduct, to reparation for inju-
ries done, and to security against injuries intended.
In any of these cases, when just satisfaction has been
denied, or, from the evident nature of circumstances, cannot
otherwise be obtained, it is the undoubted right of the in-
jured party to resort to arms for the vindication of the
public safety; and in such a conjuncture, the right of the
state becomes the duty of the government, unless some ma-
terial consideration of the public interests should forbid the
attempt.
If the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun had been of a nature
which could be termed ambiguous or suspicious; if he had
merely increased his force beyond his ordinary establish-
ment, or had stationed it in some position on our confines,
or on those of our allies, which might justify jealousy or
alarm; if he had renewed his secret intrigues at the courts
of Hyderabad, Poonah, and Cabul; or even if he had en-
tered into any negotiation with France, of which the object
was at all obscure, it might be our duty to resort, in the
first instance, to its construction of proceedings, which, being
III.]
lxxxiii
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
of a doubtful character, might admit of a satisfactory expla-
nation. But where there is no doubt there can be no mat-
ter for explanation. The act of Tippoo's ambassadors,
ratified by himself, and accompanied by the landing of
a French force in his country, is a public, unqualified,
and unambiguous declaration of war, aggravated by an
avowal that the object of the war is neither explanation,
reparation, nor security, but the total destruction of the
British government in India. To affect to misunderstand
an insult and injury of such a complexion, would argue a
consciousness either of weakness or of fear. No state in
India can misconstrue the conduct of Tippoo; the corre-
spondence of our residents at Hyderabad and Poonah suffi-
ciently manifested the construction which it bears at both
those courts, and in so clear and plain a cause our demand
of explanation would be justly attributed either to a defect
of spirit or of power. The result of such a demand would
therefore be the disgrace of our character, and the diminu-
tion of our influence and consideration in the eyes of our
allies, and of every power in India. If the moment should
appear favourable to the execution of Tippoo's declared
design, he would answer such a demand by an immediate
attack; if, on the other hand, his preparations should not
be sufficiently advanced, he would deny the existence of his
engagements with France-would persist in the denial until
he had reaped the full benefit of them; and, finally, after
having completed the improvement of his own army, and
received the necessary assistance of an additional French
force, he would turn the combined strength of both against
our possessions, with an alacrity and vigour inspired by
our inaction, and with advantages redoubled by our delay.
In the present case, the idea, therefore, of demanding ex-
planation must be rejected as being disgraceful in its prin-
ciple, and frivolous in its object. The demand of repara-
f 2
lxxxiv
[Arr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
tion, in the strict sense of the term, cannot properly be
applied to causes of intended injury, excepting in those
instances where the nature of the reparation demanded may
be essentially connected with security against the injurious
intention.
Where a state has unjustly seized the property, or invaded
the territory, or violated the rights of another, reparation
may be made by restoring what has been unjustly taken, or
by a subsequent acknowledgment of the right which has
been infringed. But the cause of our complaint against
Tippoo Sultaun is not that he has seized a portion of our
property which he might restore, or invaded a part of our
territory which he might again cede, or violated a right
which he might hereafter acknowledge: we complain that,
professing the most amicable disposition,-bound by sub-
sisting treaties of peace and friendship, and unprovoked by
any offence on our part, he has manifested a design to effect
our total destruction, he has prepared the means and
instruments of a war of extermination against us, he has
solicited and received the aid of our inveterate enemy, for
the declared purpose of annihilating our empire, and he
only waits the arrival of a more effectual succour to strike
a blow against our existence.
That he has not yet received the effectual succour which
he has solicited, may be ascribed either to the weakness of
the government of Mauritius, or their want of zeal in his
cause, or to the rashness and imbecility of his own councils;
but neither the measure of his hostility, nor of our right to
restrain it, nor of our danger from it, are to be estimated by
the amount of the force which he has actually obtained, for
we know that his demands of military assistance were un-
limited; we know that they were addressed, not merely to
the government of Mauritius, but to that of France; and
we cannot ascertain how soon they may be satisfied to the
III.]
lxxxv
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
full extent of his acknowledged expectations. This, there-
fore, is not merely the case of an injury to be repaired, but
of the public safety to be secured against the present and
future designs of an irreconcileable, desperate, and treacher-
ous enemy. Against an enemy of this description no effec-
tual security can be obtained, otherwise than by such a re-
duction of his power as shall not only defeat his actual pre-
paration, but establish a permanent restraint upon his future
means of offence.
To this species of security our right is unquestionable,
upon the grounds already stated. But it cannot be sup-
posed that Tippoo Sultaun will voluntarily concede to us a
security of this nature against the effects of his own resent-
ment, treachery, and ambition, and against the success of
the most favourite projects of his mind.
Since, therefore, the principles of justice, and of the law
of nations, entitle us to such a security, and since we cannot
possibly obtain it by the voluntary concession of Tippoo
Sultaun, it is the right of the Company to compel him to
yield it, and it is equally my duty to use that compulsion
without delay, provided the interest of the Company com-
mitted to my charge be not more endangered by the attempt,
than by the unrestrained progress of his preparations for
war. In proportion to the continual progress of Tippoo's
preparations, he will acquire more decisively the advantage
of holding in his hands the issues of peace and war, together
with the power of selecting the time and mode of his long-
meditated attack upon our possessions. He has not yet
obtained any formidable accession of strength from his
alliance with France, nor is it probable that any such acces-
sion will reach his country within a short period, certainly
not before the close of the monsoon on the coast of Malabar.
While he shall retain the ready means of intercourse by sea
with the French government, it cannot be doubted that
lxxxvi
[Arr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
they will use every endeavour to assist him with military
aid, and to instigate him to war. The arrival of one of two
French regiments would probably induce Tippoo to com-
mence offensive operations, and the assistance of so small a
body of Frenchmen might become alarming in the actual
state of the native armies of India. The systematic intro-
duction of French officers into the service of all the native
powers, is described by Mr. Wickham as the fixed policy
of France, adopted with a view of establishing the most
certain means of sapping the foundations of our power.
This system has been pursued in the armies of the Nizam,
of Sindia, and of many other inferior powers, with unremit
ting assiduity, and extensive success. If Tippoo should be
allowed to derive from France such succour as would induce
him to act offensively against us, his earliest movements.
would probably be seconded by the general insurrection of
the various bodies of French adventurers who are incorpo-
rated in the service of the several native powers, and who
maintain a concert and correspondence in every quarter of
India. Under such circumstances it would be prudent to
take advantage of the actual crisis, in which the hostile
designs of Tippoo has been clearly manifested, but the
means of accomplishing it have happily disappointed the
ardour of his hopes. In this moment of his comparative
weakness-of his disappointment, and of his probable
dejection, no policy could be more wise than to strike such
an instantaneous blow against his possessions, as should
effectually frustrate his preparations for war, and should
render him unable to avail himself of the aid of France
whenever it may arrive.
The inconsiderable amount of the force which he has
already received from France, while it cannot limit our
right to reduce his power, affords a strong argument of
policy in favour of an immediate attack,
!
111.]
lxxxvii
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
It is, therefore, evident that the rights and interests of
the Company concur to demand from this government every
practicable effort to anticipate the execution of his projects
of vengeance, by attacking him on all sides without delay.
In this train of reasoning I was confirmed, by adverting to
the general tenor of the orders of the Court of Directors,
and of the proceedings of this government with reference to
the contingency of a French force landing at any time in
the territories of Tippoo Sultaun.
The
The orders of the Court of Directors uniformly enjoin,
that the landing of a French force in Tippoo's country
should be "the signal for our attack upon him.”
construction of those orders by the late Governor-general
in Council, in his instructions to the President in Council
of Fort St. George, of 12th September, 1796, appears to
have been, that the number of the French force should be
considerable in order to justify our attack. But I am
persuaded that the real intention of the late Governor-
general in these instructions could not have been to declare
that the justice or policy of attacking Tippoo was here-
after to be measured solely by the magnitude of any French
force landed in his country. It is certainly true, that, on
the one hand, the landing of a considerable French force
in Tippoo's country would be an unquestionable indication
of his hostile intentions against the British power; while,
on the other hand, the landing of a few French officers and
privates, and even their admission into the service of Tippoo,
might, under certain circumstances, be supposed to manifest
nothing more than a disposition to improve the general
discipline of his armies, without implying any formed design
of war against the Company or their allies. This, I am
persuaded, is the only view in which the late Governor-
general in Council could consider the magnitude of the
French force landed in Tippoo's country, as the foundation
lxxxviii
[Arr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
of a rule for limiting the discretion of the Company's
governments in such a contingency. On the present occa-
sion, the hostile intentions of the Sultaun are unequivocally
manifested by the proclamations, by the declarations, and
conduct of his ambassadors-by their demand of French
troops to an unlimited extent; and, connected with these
circumstances, the landing and admission into the Sultaun's
armies, even of a less considerable force than that which he
has received, would be deemed, under the just construction
of the opinions both of the Court of Directors and of this
government," a signal for our attack upon him."
My determination, therefore, was fixed, to attack Tippoo
with every degree of practicable despatch. The objects
which appeared to me the most desirable, as well as the most
easily attainable, were-First, to seize the whole maritime
territory remaining in his possession below the Ghauts, on
the coast of Malabar, in order to preclude him from all
future communications by sea with his French allies.
Secondly. By marching the army from the coast directly
upon his capital, to compel him to purchase peace by a for-
mal cession of the territory seized on the coast of Malabar.
Thirdly. To compel him to defray our whole expense in
the war, and. thus to secure the double advantage of indem-
nifying us for the expense occasioned by his aggression, and
of reducing his resources with a view to our future security.
Fourthly. To compel him to admit permanent residents
at his court from us and from our allies: a measure which
would enable us at all times to check his operations and his
treachery.
Fifthly. That the expulsion of all the natives of France
now in his service, and the perpetual exclusion of all French-
men both from his army and dominions, should be made.
conditions of any treaty of peace with him.
With this plan in view, I directed that the army upon
.III.]
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
lxxxix
the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, and at Bombay,
should be immediately assembled; and I entertained a very
sanguine hope that active operations might have been com-
menced so early as, with the co-operation of his Majesty's
squadron on the coast of Malabar (which Rear-admiral
Rainier had promised), might have secured the effectual
reduction of Tippoo's power before any assistance could
have reached him from France. But I never proposed to
undertake
any attack upon him, of which the success could
be doubtful in the judgment of those whose opinions must
always govern my discretion in every question of military
detail.
The avowed design of Tippoo; the state of his prepara-
tions for war, (which, notwithstanding his late disappoint-
ment, was certainly forward as far as regarded his own
troops); the uncertainty of the motives which might impel
the violence of his temper to action; and my knowledge of
the indiscreet zeal with which he has frequently pursued his
favourite object of revenge against the British power,-all
concurred to urge the necessity of placing ourselves in a
state of preparation for war, at least equal to that of his
army. These measures appeared to me not matters of
choice, but of indispensable duty. I could not suffer the
security of the Carnatic to rest on so precarious a founda-
tion as the forbearance of Tippoo Sultaun and of his French
allies. To resume the power of meeting him in the field,
and to replace in our hands the option which he then pos-
sessed of accommodating the time of attack to circumstances
and events, appeared to me to be the most prudent step
which could be immediately adopted, whatever might here-
after be the service to which our force might be applied.
The orders therefore which I gave for assembling the army,
(although pointed more particularly at the execution of the
plan of operations which I have just now detailed,) werə
XC
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
[Arr.
founded upon principles independent of the practicability of
that plan, and were connected not only with the immediate
defence of the Carnatic, but with other comprehensive mea-
sures of permanent precaution and security, to which my
views have been extended at every period of this. crisis.
When I submitted my ideas of the time and objects of the
proposed attack upon Tippoo to those military authorities
which I shall always consider with respect, it seemed to be
their opinion that the state of our army admitted no doubt
of the ultimate success of the plan which I had proposed.
If its speedy accomplishment had appeared to them as cer-
tain as its ultimate success, I should not have hesitated
moment in directing the commencement of offensive opera-
tions: but I found that, instead of deriving to the interests
of the Company the inestimable advantages of a sudden and
rapid reduction of Tippoo's means of offence, the result of
such an attempt was likely to lead to a tedious, protracted,
and expensive, although ultimately successful war. The
obstacles which arose were of a nature not to be sur-
mounted by any degree of present activity or resolution,
although they originate in causes which I trust may be
removed by future diligence and perseverance.
The result of my earliest inquiries convinced me that
radical defects existed in the military establishments on the
coast of Coromandel, which were afterwards confirmed by
the concurrent testimony of the Governor of Fort St.
George, and of the Adjutant-general of that establishment.
I have entered into a particular consideration of this testi-
mony in a minute recorded in the secret department, of the
20th of July, to which I desire to refer on this part of the
subject. The letter of the government of Fort St. George
of the 10th of July proceeds far beyond the limits of any
opinion which I had ever formed or heard with respect to
the difficulty of restraining the hostility of Tippoo. In that
III.]
xci
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
letter the President in Council even deprecates the ordinary
precautions of defence, lest they should draw down the
resentment of the Sultaun upon our unprotected possessions.
The expense of a protracted war, and the evil effects
which such a calamity must produce upon the trade of the
Company, upon their pecuniary affairs at home, upon the
welfare of their subjects in India, and upon the general state
of the public revenue and credit of Great Britain, now
pressed with great weight upon my mind; and the embar-
rassment of our finances aggravated all the difficulties of
my situation.
The question was now entirely changed;
the plan which I originally had in contemplation was nothing
more than a military expedition, of short duration, of no
heavy expense, and of certain success; with the additional
advantage that success would certainly exonerate
finances, and throw the whole expense of the undertaking
upon the enemy who had provoked it. But it now appeared
that I could not hope to effect any of my proposed objects
without encountering the expense and inconvenience of a
long war.
our
In this state of the question the condition of our allies
occurred as an insuperable obstacle to our progress. Al-
though the assistance of the Paishwah and of the Nizam
might not have been deemed indispensable, in an expedition
of the nature which I have described, I have always been
apprized that an offensive war of any long duration in My-
sore would be difficult if not impracticable, without the
effectual aid of the Paishwah and of the Nizam in facili-
tating the supplies of provision to our army in the field.
The state of the courts of Hyderabad and of Poonah
afforded no hope of their early co-operation with us; and
although I had determined to take the most expeditious
measures for restoring both our allies to the power of ful-
filling their defensive engagements with us, I could not
Uor M
xcii
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
[Apr.
expect to derive any benefit from those measures for a con-
siderable period of time, and it would have been imprudent
to have undertaken offensive operations, with the prospect
of a continued war, until the efficiency of our alliances had
been previously secured. Under the accumulated pressure of
all these difficulties, I felt, with the utmost degree of dis-
appointment and regret, that the moment was unfavourable
to the adoption of the only measure which appeared to me
sufficient to satisfy the rights and interests of the Company
and the exigencies of my own duty; and I was, therefore,
compelled to relinquish the idea of striking an immediate
blow against the possessions of Tippoo Sultaun; but the
circumstances which thus suspended the actual exercise of
the rights and the immediate establishment of the interests.
of the Company, could not absolve me from the duty of
providing, without delay, every degree of intermediate se-
curity which might now be attainable, by adopting such a
system of preparation and defence, as might enable us to
repel any attack which Tippoo may make upon us, or to
support any demand of satisfaction which we may even-
tually deem it advisable, in concert with our allies, to make
to him.
The sense of this duty induced me to propose to the
Board the several orders and instructions, which have been
forwarded to the Government of Fort St. George and Bom-
bay, and to the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad, from
the 8th of July, to the present time.
The principles upon which these instructions and orders
are founded, will be best illustrated by referring to the
nature of our actual danger, as well as to the causes which
have contributed to produce it.
No comprehensive or satisfactory view can be taken of
this subject, without adverting to the whole system of our
defensive alliances with the Native States, and to the various
t
111.]
xciii
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
circumstances which have effected, or which now influence,
the general balance of power in India. į
The primary objects of the treaties of Poonah and Paun-
gul, combined with the treaty of Seringapatam, were to
diminish Tippoo Sultaun's means of future aggression, by
reducing his resources and territory, and to provide an effi-
cient defence against him, by strengthening the Paishwah
and the Nizam, by uniting their interests with ours, and by
securing their co-operation in any future war with Mysore.
On the other hand, a part of the policy of the treaty of
Seringapatam seems to have been to preserve Tippoo Sul-
taun that degree of power which might enable him to
maintain a balance with the Mahrattas and the Nizam, in
such a manner that the interposition of our force might
always turn the scale.
It is evident that the policy of this system has been en-
tirely frustrated by the course of recent events, and that
neither the Paishwah, the Nizam, nor Tippoo Sultaun, now
retain the same relative position which they held at the con-
clusion of the treaty of Seringapatam, either with respect
to one another, or to our interests.
Since the conclusion of the peace of Seringapatam, the
power and resources of the Court of Hyderabad have been
constantly declining, the disgrace which fell upon the
Nizam's arms, in the unfortunate contest with the Mah-
rattas at Kurdelah, reduced the military character of the
Court of Hyderabad to the lowest point of degradation.
The treaty in which that defeat terminated completed the
humiliation of the Nizam; he was compelled to sacrifice a
portion of territory, to engage to pay a fine of three crores
of rupees, and to submit to the captivity of his minister,
Azeem ul Omrah, who was carried a prisoner to Poonah.
Azeem ul Omrah resided at Poonah during the late convul-
sions in the Mahratta government, and, although a prisoner,
xeiv
[AFP.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
bore a very distinguished part in supporting his name
through the various revolutions which followed the sudden
death of the Paishwah, Mahda Row. For these services
Nanah agreed to relinquish all the benefits acquired by the
Paishwah against the Nizam, under the treaty of Kur-
delah.
But the Paishwah, Badjee Row, having called in the as-
sistance of Sindia, to check the overgrown power of
Nanah, Sindia persuaded the Paishwah to violate the en-
gagements concluded with Azeem ul Omrah; and the event
has been, that the Paishwah has insisted upon, and ob-
tained from, the Nizam, a cession of one-fourth part of the
territories, and the payment of one-fourth part of the fine
stipulated by the treaty of Kurdelah.
In addition to so heavy a loss, both of power and honour,
the internal resources of the Nizam's government have not
yet recovered the derangement occasioned by the rebellions
of Ali Jah and the son of Dair Jah, by the unfortunate.
contest with the Mahrattas, and by the detention of Azeem
ul Omrah at Poonah.
The effect of these causes has necessarily been to reduce
the considerations of the Nizam in the scale of the neigh-
bouring states; and in this mean and degraded condition
he has been for some time past menaced by the army of
Sindia, stationed in the neighbourhood of Poonah. But
the most striking feature of change in the state of the
Nizam's affairs, since 1793, is the alteration which has
taken place in his military establishment. The Nizam,
since the peace of Seringapatam, has greatly reduced his
cavalry and other troops, and considerably augmented the
body of infantry, commanded by French officers, and known
by the name of Raymond's corps.
The corps of Raymond had been in the service of the
Nizam before the last war with Tippoo Sultaun, and in
III.]
XCV
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
1792, when it served with Lord Cornwallis's army, its
strength was not greater than one thousand five hundred
men at the highest estimation, and its discipline very de-
fective. At the battle of Kurdelalı, in 1795, its strength
amounted to about eleven thousand men; during the rebel-
lion of Ali Jah, and in a variety of service in which the corps
has since been employed, it has acquired experience and
skill, and it is now composed of thirteen regiments of two
battalions each, amounting in the whole to upwards of
fourteen thousand men. Its discipline, according to every
recent account, is very considerably improved, insomuch,
that although inferior to our native force, it is said to be su-
perior in nearly an equal proportion to the ordinary scale of
the infantry in the service of any of the native powers. Be-
зides field-pieces to each regiment, a park of forty pieces of
ordnance, chiefly brass, from twelve to thirty-six pounders,
with a well-trained body of artillery-men, (including a
number of Europeans,) is attached to the corps;. a founda-
tion has also been laid for raising a body of cavalry, to act
with the corps of infantry. The chief officers of this corps
are all Frenchmen, of the most violent principles of jaco-
binism; many of the privates served originally with the
French native force at Pondicherry; and the whole corps
constitutes an armed French party of great power, zeal,
and activity. The efforts of this party are continually em-
ployed to magnify the power, resources, and success of
France; and to depreciate the character, force, and credit
of Great Britain, in the eyes of the court of Hyderabad;
and it appears by authentic intelligence, that wherever any
detachment of this corps has been stationed for any con-
siderable time, a most unfavourable impression has been
produced against the character of the British nation.
The death of Monsieur Raymond, which happened a
few months past, appeared likely to impair the influence of
xcvi
[Arp.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
this corps at the court of Hyderabad; and, accordingly,
Azeem ul Omrah took that opportunity to resume the large
jaghire, which had been allotted for the pay and mainte-
nance of the corps; but another Frenchman, of the name
of Peron, has succeeded to the command. His disposition
is described to be violent and brutal, and his principles do
not appear to differ essentially from those of Raymond. The
corps as now constituted, forms the considerable and only
efficient part of the Nizam's military establishment, and
retains such a degree of ascendency over the councils of
the Nizam, as to be an object of serious alarm to Azeem ul
Omrah. In addition to the command of this corps, M.
Raymond had the entire conduct of the Nizam's ordnance,
with an allowance of 50,000 rupees monthly. The ord-
nance has since been placed under the command of Monsieur
Peron, and he derives great influence from so important a
charge. This corps has been recruited in the proportion of
one-third of its total numbers, from our territories, and
from those of the Nabob of Arcot, and partly from deserters
abandoning our service.
Distinct proof has been given of the assiduity and suc-
cess of the emissaries employed by Monsieur Baptiste, (the
second in command to Monsieur Peron, and stated to be
of a very designing and artful character,) for the pur-
pose of exciting mutiny and sedition, and of inviting de-
sertion amongst our sepoys stationed on the frontier of the
Nizam's dominions. A considerably desertion of our troops
took place in that quarter some time ago, and nearly five
hundred men, with several native officers, who deserted on
that occasion, are now serving in Monsieur Peron's corps.
The repeated applications of our Resident, for the sur-
render of these deserters, havé hitherto been frustrated by
the prevailing influence of Monsieur Peron and of his army,
and by the weakness of the Nizam's government, which
III.]
xcvii
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
Azeem ul Omrah has declared to be unable to control the
overbearing spirit and formidable power of the French
faction. After a protracted negotiation, Azeem ul Omrah
has at length, with much difficulty, and by an extraordi-
nary effort, obtained the surrender of two subadars, who
were the principal contrivers of the desertion.
Monsieur Perron and his officers maintain a correspondence
with a faction at the Nizam's court, denominated the
Pagah party, being composed principally of the officers of
his Highness's body guard of cavalry.
The Pagah party has long been connected with Tippoo
Sultaun, and is entirely adverse to Azeem ul Omrah, and to all
the friends of the British interests at the court of Hyderabad.
It must not be forgotten that in the year 1796, during
the detention of Azeem ul Omrah at Poonah, the French
faction, with the assistance of the Pagah party, prevailed
upon the Nizam to dismiss the British detachment, and
took such measures in concert with Tippoo (a large body of
whose army marched in this crisis to the frontier of the
Nizam's dominions) as would have enabled them to dispose
of the succession to the Musnud according to their pleasure,
if the Nizam's death had happened in that critical con-
juncture. At this period of time the French contrived to
obtain the grant of the large jaghire since resumed. This
grant was considered as the first step towards the establish-
ment of a territorial revenue; and there can be no doubt
that it would have led to that necessary foundation of
European power in India, if the death of Monsieur Ray-
mond had not enabled Azeem ul Omrah to frustrate the
project. The French officers at Hyderabad maintain a
direct correspondence with their countrymen in the service
of Tippoo Sultaun and of Sindia.
The latest accounts from the resident at Hyderabad, state
that French officers and adventurers arrive continually at
VOL. II.
go
xcviii
[APP.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
Hyderabad: the routes by which they gain access to the
Deccan are as yet unknown.
This French party, connected as it is with the prevailing
factions in the court of the Nizam, corresponding with
Tippoo Sultaun, zealous in the case of France, and actuated
by a spirit of intrigue, which would lead it to mix in every
distraction of the state, if not to originate internal confusion;
must be considered as a circumstance of positive weakness
in the frame of the government of Hyderabad. Azeem-ul
Omrah, is fully aware of the magnitude of this evil, and
dreads the growth of a party which he can no longer
restrain within any bounds of moderation, and which
already threatens to subvert his power, and to disturb the
regular order of succession, if not to destroy the throne
itself. With respect to our interests and to the value of our
defensive alliance, and the treaty of Paungul, the change in
the Nizam's military establishments places him in a con-
dition worse than that of absolute inefficiency, and renders
the court of Hyderabad a source of additional strength
to our enemies, rather than of useful assistance to any branch
of the triple alliance. The dangers to be apprehended from
the existence of Perron's corpsare not to be estimated merely
by the actual state of its discipline, of its numbers, or of its
influence over the councils of the Nizam: our views of this
danger must be extended beyond the present moment.
The French army at Hyderabad must be considered not
only as a powerful aid to the cause of France in the present
crisis, but as the basis of a permanent French faction in
India; on which, according to the opportunities of fortune,
and the variation of circumstances and of events, the activity
of the enemy may establish, a strength of the most for-
midable kind either in peace or war.
It requires no labour of argument to prove the benefits
which must be derived to the cause of France even in time of
III.]
xcix
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
peace from an establishment of an army of 14,000 men, com-
manded by natives of France, in the heart of the dominions of
one of our principal allies, in the vicinity of our most active
enemy among the native powers, and on the borders of a
vulnerable part of our own dominions. In the event of
peace, no more convenient channel could be provided for the
intrigues of France, no more useful point of union for the
numerous adherents to her principles and emissaries of her
designs; and it cannot be doubted that the natural effect of
the unchecked and rapid growth of such an army at the
court of the Nizam, must be to detach that court from our
interests, and to fix it absolutely in those of our enemy.
But, in the event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun, or in the
still more aggravated case of a war with him, aided by a
French force, what assistance can we expect from the Nizam,
the main body of whose army is commanded by the corre-
spondents of Tippoo, natives of France, distinguished by
their zeal in the cause of that country, and united with the
whole body of French adventurers now established in
India.
Under such circumstances, the force of the Nizam would
become useless, and even dangerous to us, 'precisely in pro-
portion to the exigency of the case in which we should
require its services.
If the French troops of the Nizam did not afford Tippoo
open assistance, at least they could not be brought into the
field against him, without the utmost danger to our cause;
nor could they be suffered to remain in the Deckan during
the continuance of the contest, unless checked by the
presence of an equally powerful force, which must, in that
case, be diverted from the objects of the war, and must
operate as a positive diminution of our effective strength in
the field. It appears however nearly certain, that in the
present weak state of the Nizam's government, the French
g 2
с
[Arr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
corps in his service would openly join Tippoo Sultaun, and
by a sudden blow, endeavour to seize the Nizam's terri-
tories, and to secure them to the dominion of France, under
an alliance offensive and defensive with Tippoo Sultaun.
This danger is aggravated by the present position of Sin-
dia's army, and by the disposition and present views of
that chief: he now entertains a large body of infantry in
his service, under the command of a French officer, and it
might be expected that he would readily engage with
Tippoo Sultaun (with whom he is supposed to have
lately opened a negotiation) and with the French, upon
the conditions of a partition of the territories and authority
of the Paishwah and of the Nizam. The junction which
might thus be effected by the French officers in the several
armies of the Nizam of Sindia and of Tippoo, might esta-
blish the power of France in India upon the ruins of the
states of Poonah and of the Deckan. Under all these circum-
stances, therefore, it is evident that the court of Hyderabad,
in its present condition, (whatever may be its disposition to
use every effort for our assistance,) is not only disqualified
from co-operating with us as an ally against Tippoo, but
furnishes him with powerful means of prosecuting his
designs against us, and offers every temptation to the am-
bition of France.
Such being the condition of the Nizam, it will be found
that the Paishwah, who forms another branch of the triple
alliance against Tippoo Sultaun, is not more able to fulfil
his defensive engagements with us.
The precise situation in which the Mahiratta empire stood
after the peace of Seringapatam, was the most favourable
to our interests. The several co-estates were then so equally
balanced, as to prevent any danger of that degree of union
which might concentre the formidable force of the whole
in one consolidated mass, either against the British pos-
III.]
ci
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
sessions, or against any other established power in India;
nor had any one member of the empire attained such a
degree of strength as to be able singly to encounter our
force. On the other hand, the Paishwah, the acknowledged
and constitutional head of this extensive confederation, aided
by the abilities of his minister, Nanah Furnavese, possessed a
sufficient influence over several of the leading chiefs, to render
him a respectable ally, and to furnish him with the means
of bringing a considerable force into the field.
From the period of the peace of Seringapatam, to that of
the death of Madha Row, the danger appears to have been
that the address of Nanah might have drawn too great a
weight into the scale of the Paishwah's power, and have
enabled the government of Poonah to wield the united force
of the whole Mahratta empire. At the battle of Kurdelah, the
Paishwah was assisted against the Nizam by the contingents
of most of the confederate chieftains of the Mahratta empire,
and the power of the Nizam was greatly endangered in that
state of the Paishwah's authority and force. But Nanah's
ambition or jealousy having induced him, upon the sudden
death of Madha Row, to attempt the disturbance of the
regular order of succession, by intruding an adopted child
upon the throne, opened the way to those successive in-
trigues and revolutions which, for some time past, have
distracted the Mahratta empire. Without pursuing the
various changes and convulsions of the government of
Poonah during the period described, it is sufficient to observe
that their progress naturally tended to weaken the sovereign
power, and has terminated in the imprisonment of Nanah,
in the ruin of his influence, and in the suspension of the
power and authority of the reigning Paishwah, under cir-
cumstances which menace the abolition of his office.
Sindia, who, in this changeable scene, has alternately
taken part with the present Paishwah and with Nanah, has
cii
[APP.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
at length overpowered both, and has been for some time
past so far master of the government of Poonah, that the
Paishwah could not, in his present condition, command the
co-operation of any considerable body of the Mahratta
chieftains, nor afford us any assistance against Tippoo
Sultaun.
During the course of the events which have contributed
to weaken and degrade the governments of Poonalı and
Hyderabad, their mutual animosities and opposition of
interests have arisen to such a height, as to render all co-
operation between them utterly impracticable. The effi-
ciency of our system. of defensive alliance against Tippoo
Sultaun has, therefore, been impaired, not only by the
respective weakness of each of our allies, but by the difficulty
of uniting them in any common view, or joint operation.
In the mean while Tippoo Sultaun has enjoyed a state of
internal tranquillity nearly uninterrupted. While our allies
have been distracted and exhausted by faction, rebellion,
revolution, and war, he has been employed in improving the
discipline of his armies, and in repairing the vigour of his
resources. He has alternately endeavoured, but without
success, to gain the Paishwah and the Nizam to his cause;
he, however, possesses a considerable influence at the court
of Hyderabad, in consequence of his connexions with the
corps of Raymond, and with other factions adverse to the
British interests at that court. It is also known that he
despatched an embassy to Zemaun Shah, whose design of
invading Hindustan has been recently announced in a for-
mal manner to this government and to the Nabob Vizier.
That Zemaun Shah really entertains the romantic project
of invading Hindustan cannot admit of a doubt; this was
the opinion of the late Governor-general, in which I entirely
concur.
It has been supposed that Zeman Shah, in his late march
III.]
ciii
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
towards Hindustan, was recalled from Lahore into his own.
dominions, either by some domestic dissension, or by the
apprehension of an attack from some of the states in the
neighbourhood of his kingdom, and it was hoped that the
same causes might for some time obstruct the execution of
his declared project; but the last despatches from the acting
resident at the court of Sindia state a report, that Zemaun
Shah is now relieved from all apprehensions either of internal
rebellion or of foreign invasion; and his inclination, as well
as his ability, to move his army towards the frontier of
Hindustan, on the close of the rainy season, are now uni-
versally credited. It must be recollected that, upon a
recent occasion, Zemaun Shah advanced to Lahore without
meeting any formidable opposition from the Seikhs, although
it had formerly been asserted that the country of the Seikhs
would always prove an insuperable obstacle to his progress.
Between the country of the Seikhs and the frontier of Oude
no barrier exists to check the motions of the Shah, except-
ing the power of Sindia. The dominions of Sindia at pre-
sent are so weakened by internal dissensions, as to be in a
state nearly defenceless; while Sindia continues at Poonah
with the main body of his army, and while his tributary
chiefs, remaining in Hindustan, are most seriously disaffected
to his cause, and are prepared to seize any favourable op-
portunity of annihilating his power.
Żemaun Shah cannot be ignorant of these advantages,
and if they should tempt him to invade Hindustan, the
diversion of our force, which would be occasioned by such
an event, would afford the most favourable opportunity to an
attack from Tippoo upon the Carnatic; it is not improbable
that the object of the intercourse between Tippoo and Ze-
maun Shah was (on the part of the former at least) some
such plan of joint operation.
The present position of Dowlut Row Sindia's army
civ
[APP.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
operates as a double advantage to the cause of Tippoo.
The absence of Sindia from his dominions in Hindustan
invites the invasion of Zemaun Shah, and favours its suc-
cess; while the presence of Sindia's army at Poonah holds
both our allies in check. The weight of Tippoo's power
in the general balance must, therefore, be considered to
have received an augmentation, not only by the declared
projects of Zemaun Shah, and by the possibility of their,
at least, limited success, by the operations of Sindia, in
addition to all the other events which have concurred to
impair the efficiency of our defensive alliance.
In the mean while, the government of Fort St. George,
whose peculiar duty it is to watch the operations of Tippoo
Sultaun, and to communicate to me every circumstance
relating to the growth of his power, have distinctly stated
in their letter of the 10th of July, that "his resources are
more prompt than our own, and that a great part of his
army is supposed to have long been in a state of field
equipment." So sensible, indeed, is the government of
Fort St. George to the terror of Tippoo Sultaun's arms, as
to be apprehensive of making any effort for resisting their
progress, least Tippoo should anticipate the tardiness of our
preparations by the rapidity of his own, and should over-
run the Carnatic before our army could even move for its
defence.
It is difficult to describe the pain and regret which that
letter from the government of Fort St. George occasioned
in my mind, nor can I conceive that it is calculated to raise
any other emotions in the mind of any friend to the pro-
sperity of the British interests, or to the honour of the
British name in India. If the facts and arguments stated
in that letter be correct, it must now be admitted that the
glorious success of the last war in Mysore, the wisdom
which balanced the relative interests and forces of the
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
CV
III.]
belligerent powers on the conclusion of peace, and, finally,
the great expense incurred by the Company in the pro-
gressive increase of their military establishments on the
coast, have terminated in no better result than to render
Tippoo's power absolutely invincible, and to place the dis-
posal of our fate in his hands. For if the sentiments of the
government of Fort St. George be founded upon a just
estimate of the relative conditions of Tippoo Sultaun and
of the Company in India, he possesses the ready means of
attack, while we cannot venture to resort even to those of
defence. But, with a full knowledge of his hostility, of his
offensive alliance publicly concluded with the enemy, and
of his continual and advanced preparations for war, we
must submit to remain unarmed, because any attempt to
counteract his design might possibly accelerate its execution.
This argument against the prudence of preparing for our de-
fence would become stronger every day, in proportion to the
progress of Tippoo's hostile preparations, until at length we
should be reduced to the alternative, either of implicit sub-
mission, or of incurring a much greater risk than any which
can now be apprehended from assembling our defensive force.
Although I am not disposed to adopt the sentiments of
the government of Fort St. George on this subject, I
acknowledge, with great concern, those defects in the
military establishments on the coast, which will not admit
any large proportion of that army to move for several
months. Those defects certainly constitute so many addi-
tional advantages in the scale of Tippoo's power, and in this
view they become objects of the most serious consideration,
and form a principal feature of the danger which it is the
duty of this government to avert, by councils of another
stamp than that of despondency, and by measures of
another character than that of inaction, or of implicit sub-
mission to the will of the enemy.
cvi
[Apr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
I have now examined the principal causes of that danger,
as they are to be traced in the variable course of events since
the peace of Seringapatam. The nature of our actual situa-
tion, arising from the combined effects of these causes, will best
appear by a summary review of the facts which I have already
enumerated in detail. Tippoo Sultaun having manifested the
most hostile intentions towards us, possesses an army, of
which a considerable portion is now in readiness to take the
field for purposes of offence: he has increased the number
of his French officers, and has solicited, and may possibly
receive, further assistance from the French; he may also
receive assistance from the several corps commanded by
French officers in the service of the Nizam, of Sindia, and
of many other native powers. He may be assisted by the
invasion of Zemaun Shah, and by the co-operation of Sindia.
On the other hand, our protecting force upon the coast of
Coromandel cannot be put in motion within a shorter
period than three, or, according to the Adjutant-general,
Lieutenant-colonel Close, than six months, even for the
purpose of defending the Carnatic. Our allies, in the
mean while, are utterly unable to fufil their defensive
engagements with us, the Paishwah being depressed and
kept in check by the intrusion of Sindia and the Nizam,
by the vicinity of that chieftain's army, and by the over-
bearing influence of an army commanded by French officers,
and established in the centre of the Deckan.
While we
remain in this situation, without a soldier prepared to take
the field in the Carnatic, and without an ally to assist our
operations in the event of an attack from Tippoo, we leave
the fate of the Carnatic to his discretion; we suffer the
cause of France to acquire hourly accessions of strength in
every quarter of India; we abandon our allies, the Nizam
and the Paishwah, to the mercy of Tippoo and of Sindia,
in conjunction with the French; and we leave to France the
III.]
cvii
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
ready means of obtaining a large territorial revenue, and a
permanent establishment in the Deckan, founded upon the
destruction of our alliance. Under all these circumstances,
the situation of the British empire in India is, without
doubt, extremely critical, but, in my opinion, by no means
alarming. For, in the very difficulties of our actual situa-
tion are to be found the means, not only of averting the
danger of the present moment, but of procuring permanent
security against the future return of a similar crisis. A
common apprehension of the designs of Sindia has fortu-
nately produced an union of interests between the govern-
ments of Poonah and Hyderabad; and, notwithstanding
some occasional symptoms of that spirit of duplicity and
intrigue which marks the character of every Asiatic court,
Azeem ul Omrah and the minister of the Paishwah seem to
be sincerely convinced that a renewal of amicable engage-
ments between the Paishwah and the Nizam is equally
necessary to the safety of both. On the one hand, ap-
pears that the Paishwah cannot expect to be speedily eman-
cipated, or effectually defended, from the undue influence
of Sindia, without the assistance of the Nizam; and, on
the other hand, it is evident that the restoration of the just
power and authority of the Paishwah would operate as a
constant restraint on the designs of Sindia, of Tippoo, and
of the French, against the independence of the court of
Hyderabad. Under these circumstances, it appeared to
me that neither the Paishwah nor the Nizam would be
likely to view with jealousy any assistance which we might
think it advisable to afford to either, for the purpose of
reviving the triple alliance against Tippoo on its original
basis, and of enabling the contracting parties to fulfil their
respective engagements. This expectation constituted a
fundamental principle of my instructions to the residents at
Poonah and Hyderabad, of the 8th of July. Their subse-
it
cviii
[ Apr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
quent correspondence has furnished abundant proofs that
my view of the disposition of the two courts was not erro-
neous, since it appears that, while I was occupied in framing
a system of measures for uniting the Nizam and the Paish-
wah upon the firm ground of their reciprocal interests, a
treaty was actually concluded between the two powers at
Poonah, with a view to the same object. The ratification
of this treaty on the part of the Nizam has been delayed
by Azeem ul Omrah,but there appears every reason to hope
that the interposition of our arbitration will accommodate
every point of difference. Our arbitration has already been
earnestly solicited by both parties, and I am persuaded that
it will be both acceptable and efficacious, whenever it shall
be interposed. The increasing alarm excited at the court
of Hyderabad, by the intemperate conduct of M. Perron,
and of the French army, would dispose Azeem ul Omrah to
receive with great gratitude any offer of assistance towards
the destruction of so powerful and dangerous a faction, and
the existing jealousies between the French officers would
facilitate the dismission of the corps. Azeem ul Omrah
has recently expressed, in the strongest terms, his wish of
being enabled, by our assistance, to accomplish this most
desirable measure. The only obstacles which appear
likely to occur to a general accommodation, are the impetu-
osity and violence of Dowlut Row Sindia, whose continuance
in his present position would operate as an effectual assist-
ance to Tippoo, and would preclude the possibility of
restoring either the Paishwah or the Nizam to any degree
of efficiency or consideration. But the absence of Sindia.
from his own dominions, and the ungovernable excesses of
his temper, however to be lamented, as having contributed
to those events which have impaired the power of our allies,
have, at the same time, weakened the sources of his own
power, have occasioned a spirit of faction and revolt in his
•
III.]
cix
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
own dominions, and have disgusted all the ancient friends
and connexions of his family, together with every respect-
able adherent to his cause. His violence towards the female
relations of his family has raised a considerable party against
him among his own followers; and his signal treachery in
the imprisonment of Nanah, from which he hoped to derive
free use of Nanah's treasure, has terminated in rendering
that resource inaccessible to him, at the very moment when
it is most indispensable to his necessities. He is therefore
now surrounded by an army clamorous for pay, is desti-
tute of pecuniary resources, and is unsupported by any one
respectable friend. His principal minister, a person of con-
siderable experience, and bearing the highest character of
any of his followers, has expressed to the resident at
Poonah, in the most distinct terms, an entire disapprobation
of Sindia's late conduct, and an earnest wish for an ac-
commodation between Sindia and the Paishwah, through
our mediation, and for the peaceable return of Sindia to
his dominions in Hindustan. Sindia himself has manifested
no disinclination to receive the advice of the resident at
Poonah, whose discretion has hitherto limited the extent of
his interference; but from what has already passed, it is
reasonable to hope that Sindia, in the present distressed
state of his affairs, will give a favourable attention to any
just and moderate proposition, urged with full authority of
this government. In the mean while the threatened inva-
sion of Zemaun Shah offers a new motive to recall Sindia
to the protection of his own dominions; and he must be
sensible, not only that his security, in the event of such an
invasion, must depend in a great measure on the co-opera-
tion of the British troops, but that in the present disturbed
condition of his possessions and of his army, we hold his
fate in our hands.
CX
[APP.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
In this posture of affairs, any opposition to our interference
for the re-establishment of our alliances, would be equally
ineffectual and unjustifiable on the part of Sindia; and
various considerations of policy and interest will concur to
render him cautious of taking any step which might afford
us just cause of offence. The last despatches from Poonah
afford a hope that Nanah Furnavese and the Paishwah may
find it their interest to forget their mutual animosity. Any
accommodation between them would tend greatly to facili-
tate an arrangement, embracing the respective interests of
the Paishwah, of Sindia, and of the Nizam.
Such are the circumstances of the present moment which
appear to me to favour the execution of that comprehensive
system of precaution and defence demanded by the exigency
of our actual situation. The mode in which I have endeavoured
to carry this system into effect has been suggested by the fol-
lowing considerations. The court of Hyderabad has repeatedly
and earnestly solicited an increase of the British detachment
in the service of the Nizam, under an assurance that the
French corps of Perron would be dismissed from his High-
ness's service immediately upon the arrival of the additional
British force. This proposition has hitherto been embar-
rassed by conditions of a nature incompatible with our
engagements at Poonah; and the late dissensions between
the Nizam and the Paishwah have precluded all hope of
any amicable adjustment of this difficulty. It was there-
fore thought advisable, by the late Governor-general in
Council, to resort to the expedient of encouraging the intro-
duction of British adventurers into the service of the Nizam,
for the purpose of counterbalancing in some measure the
influence of the French army at Hyderabad. With this
view, the corps commanded by Mr. Finglass has received
the protection and encouragement of the acting resident,
III.]
cxi
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
and has been augmented to the number of 8000 men. The
policy of this expedient always appeared to me very doubt-
ful, and I have entertained serious apprehensions that the
measure might ultimately furnish additional recruits to the
cause of France, instead of counteracting her influence. In
the most favourable view, however, this expedient could only
be considered as a palliative of the evil: it could not be
expected that such a force as that of Mr. Finglass would
enable the Nizam to disband the corps of Perron; it must
therefore have been evident at all times that nothing less
than a considerable and permanent increase of our regular
subsidiary force at Hyderabad could empower the Nizam
to extricate himself from the hands of the French faction
so solidly established in his dominions.
I have already stated my reasons for thinking that the
increase of the British detachment at Hyderabad would no
longer afford any cause of jealousy to the Paishwah; and
under all these circumstances I have availed myself of the
late conduct of Tippoo and of Sindia, to propose that
measure, subject, in the first instance, to the previous con-
sent of the court of Poonah. I have accompanied this
proposition with a condition, that the arbitration of this
government shall be accepted for the final adjustment of
the points of difference still remaining between the two
courts. These points are now so few, and the requisitions
of the court of Hyderabad of a nature so just and moderate,
that I entertain a confident expectation of effecting an ac-
commodation upon principles equally advantageous to both
parties.
I have already observed that one of the most dangerous
circumstances attending the establishment of the French
party at Hyderabad, is the influence which they are likely
to possess in directing the succession to the throne, when-
ever it shall become vacant by the death of the Nizam
cxii
[Arr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
Secunder Jah, the eldest son of the Nizam, would be the
natural successor, unless the regular order of succession
should be disturbed by domestic faction, foreign intrigue, or
force; for, although priority of birth may not be considered
to give the same absolute and exclusive right to succession
in India as it does in Europe, it is invariably deemed the
strongest title, and is rarely superseded, excepting in cases
of disaffection or of positive disqualification. So far from
these or any other objections being applicable to the title
of Secunder Jah, it is well known that the Nizam has given
the strongest indications of his favourable intentions towards
Secunder Jah, by intrusting that prince with the custody of
the seal, and by empowering him to perform certain acts which
are reserved exclusively for the sovereign. This admission
to the personal exercise of a portion of the sovereign autho-
rity during the life of the Nizam is deemed equivalent to a
virtual nomination to the throne; and there is no reason to
suppose that the Nizam will nominate any of his younger
sons to the exclusion of the heir-apparent, unless his Highness
should be prevailed upon, in the weakness of his last moments,
to commit an act of such flagrant impolicy and injustice.
Secunder Jah is connected by marriage with the family
of Azeem ul Omrah, and his establishment upon the throne
would give great additional security to the British interests
at the court of Hyderabad. On the other hand none of the
younger sons can hope to reach the throne by any other
assistance than that of the French party and of Tippoo
Sultaun. Sufficient proof has been stated of the interest
which Tippoo and the French take in the exclusion of
Secunder Jah, and of the attempts which they have already
made to interfere in governing the succession. These
attempts may be renewed, and their success would neces-
sarily involve the destruction of Azeem ul Omrah and of
Secunder Jah, together with the consequent annihilation of
III.]
cxiii
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
the British influence at Hyderabad. All hope of re-esta-
blishing the balance of power in India, as it existed at the
peace of Seringapatam, would then be precluded; the coun-
tries of the Nizam would, in such an event, become in effect
a dependency of France, and the partisans of that nation in
conjunction with Tippoo, and, with the body of their coun-
trymen lately received into his pay, would have the means
of endangering the British power in India.
Under all these circumstances the same principles which
suggested the necessity of increasing the British detachment
at Hyderabad, demanded that it should be employed to
support the succession of Secunder Jah, as being essentially
connected with the permanency of our influence at Hydera-
bad, and with the effectual exclusion of the interference of
Tippoo and of France.
I have therefore authorized the resident at Hyderabad to
employ the British troops in this service, if their assistance
should hereafter become necessary; but I am persuaded
that the mere presence of our force, accompanied by the
knowledge of my firm determination to support the regular
order of succession, will preclude every movement either of
foreign or domestic oppositions.
The arrangements proposed for the service of the Nizam
will be very incomplete, unless connected with the restora-
tion of the Paishwah to a due degree of authority and
power, and preceded by the cordial approbation of the
court of Poonah. But the great danger to be averted is
the growth of the influence of Tippoo and of France in
India; it is therefore evident, that the failure of the pro-
posed plan at Poonah would increase the necessity of pro-
viding for the safety of the Nizam, and of destroying the
French party at his court. If, therefore, the Paishwah
should either refuse his assent to the propositions to be
VOL. II.
h
cxiv
[APP.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE,
made to him, or if, from the success of Sindia's operations,
or from any other cause, those measures which relate to the
court of Poonah should be frustrated. I have still deemed
it advisable to direct the acting resident at Hyderabad to
carry into effect the increase of the British detachment, and
such other parts of my instructions as may appear practi-
cable, reserving always to the Paishwah the power of acced-
ing hereafter to any treaty which we may conclude with the
Nizam; and continuing with that view the restrictive terms.
of our present subsidiary engagements with the latter, as
far as they relate to the interests of the Paishwah. The
dismission of the French corps at Hyderabad would not
fully answer the views with which I have proposed that
measure, if the officers or European privates were permitted
to enter into the service of any other native power. Al-
though I should think them less dangerous in any service
than in that of the Nizam, I have endeavoured, not only
to secure the expulsion of the French from Hyderabad, but
also their immediate return to their native country. I have,
therefore, required that the French officers and privates
should be delivered up to the government of Fort St.
George, in order that they may be immediately conveyed
to Europe. The Nizam is under no engagements, either
with the government of France or with the French officers,
to continue them in his service, and he possesses the full
right to dismiss them whenever he shall think fit. The ex-
orbitant power which M. Perron and his army have acquired
at Hyderabad, as well as their immoderate abuse of it, will
justify the Nizam in taking whatever measures may appear
most effectual, for the purpose of securing himself against
a faction so formidable, not only to the independence of his
government, but to the safety of his own person, and the
existence of his throne. With the same view, I have made
III.]
CXV
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
it a preliminary condition of the whole plan, that the Nizam,
his heirs, and successors, shall for ever exclude the French
from their armies and dominions.
The corps of Mr. Finglass, after the establishment of a
considerable British force at Hyderabad, will no longer be
liable to the full force of the objections which I have stated
against the policy of encouraging such a body of adventurers
in the service of the Nizam; this question, however, does
not require our immediate decision: we shall possess ample
means of deciding it according to our discretion, if our
propositions to the court of Hyderabad should be attended
with success: the consent of the Nizam to such parts of the
proposed arrangements as relate to the establishment of the
government of Poonah is required as a necessary preli-
minary to the increase of the British detachment at Hy-
derabad.
My intention being to take no step at either court with-
out the full knowledge and concurrence of the other, a
principle, the strict observance of which, to every degree of
practicable extent, appears to me to be the only effectual
mode of removing all causes of jealousy, of uniting the
confidence of both parties, and of bringing them to a dis-
passionate consideration of their mutual interests.
The parts of the proposed arrangement which relate to
the re-establishment of the government of Poonah, were
suggested by Colonel's Palmer's letter of the 1st of June,
in which he states, "That the authority of the Paishwah
would be restored by the appearance of a strong British
force at Poonah, and that Sindia, under the circumstance
of Tippoo's recent aggression, could on no just pretence
object to such a movement of our troops, nor, in his present
condition, be able to oppose it."
The whole tenour of the subsequent advices from Poonah
tended to confirm this opinion; for while it appeared evi-
h 2
cxvi
[Apr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
dently impossible that the authority of the Paishwah could
be restored otherwise than by foreign assistance, there
seemed to be every rational ground of expectation, that the
mere appearance of our troops would induce all the leading
chieftains of the Mahratta empire to unite in support of
the Paishwah, and that such an event would not be unac-
ceptable, even to the followers of Sindia.!
The Paishwah himself has earnestly solicited the aid of a
body of our troops, and has expressed the fullest sense of
the necessity, as well as his reliance on the efficacy of such
a measure, for the restoration of his authority, and for the
protection of his person.
On the other hand, the danger of the Paishwah increased
from day to day: the assistance which he had solicited from
the Nizam was not likely to reach him before his fate had
been decided; and the expectation even of any assistance
from the court of Hyderabad, notwithstanding the conclu-
sion of the late treaty, appeared to rest on a very precarious
foundation. In this situation, the direct interposition of
this government, by moving a detachment of troops to
Poonah, was the only measure on which we could rely with
any degree of certainty, for averting the immediate destruc-
tion of our interest at that court.
The resident at Poonah was, therefore, authorized to
require a detachment of troops from Bombay; but pre-
viously to so decided a step, it was deemed proper that the
resident should require of the Paishwah his consent to the
increase of the British detachment at Hyderabad, his ac-
ceptance of our arbitration between the courts of Poonalı
and Hyderabad, and his exclusion of the French from his
armies and dominions.
With a view of securing the lasting benefit of this ar-
rangement at the court of Poonah, it is intended that a pro-
posal shall be made to the Paishwah, to enter into perma-
III.]
cxvii
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
nent subsidiary engagements with us of a similar nature
and extent with those which shall be concluded at the court
of Hyderabad.
With the same view, the resident at Poonah has been
directed to take such measures as may appear to him most
likely to interest Nanah Furnavese in the success of this
general arrangement of the affairs of the two courts.
The last despatches from Poonah afford every reason to
hope that the abilities and experience of the minister Nanah
may be successfully employed by Colonel Palmer in effecting
the return of Sindia to his own dominions, and the conse-
quent restoration of the Paishwah.
The impediments which Sindia opposes to the success of
this arrangement, will probably disappear, whenever the
union of the two courts, cemented by our interposition, shall
become a matter of public notoriety.
The treasure of Nanah is the only resource in which Sin-
dia can find the means of appeasing the clamours of his dis-
contented army; and Colonel Palmer will avail himself of
any favourable opportunity of connecting the interests of
Nanah with those of Sindia and of the Paishwah, in such a
manner as shall enable Sindia to retire with safety into his
own dominions, without affording him the power of effect-
ing any other military movements. Being desirous of conci-
liating the real interests of all parties, I have instructed
Colonel Palmer to make the most amicable propositions to
Sindia, and to urge the policy of his return to his own do-
minions, by pointing out their actual danger during his ab-
sence, by offering our co-operation against the menaced in-
vasion of Zemaun Shah, and our mediation with the courts
of Poonah and Hyderabad; and I have made the consent
of those courts to our mediation of their respective differ-
ences with Sindia an indispensable preliminary to the ar-
rangements which regard the restoration of their own inde-
cxviii
[APP.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
pendence. Sindia cannot reject our propositions on any
ground that would not immediately place him in the rank
of a declared enemy to us, and of an avowed auxiliary to
Tippoo Sultaun.
In this case, therefore, we must have recourse to compul-
sion; and I have authorized the resident at Poonah to use
it in the last, and I trust improbable, extremity.
Such are the measures which I have proposed, with a view
to restore the efficiency of our alliances, and to check the
growth of the French party in the Deckan.
I have already stated the reasons which convinced me
(against the opinion of the government of Fort St. George)
that the assembling of the army on the coasts of Coromandel
and Malabar, and at Bombay, was absolutely indispensable
to the defence of the Carnatic, under the circumstance of
Tippoo's declared designs and acknowledged preparations
for war.
The fatal policy of neglecting to keep pace with the for-
wardness of the enemy's equipments has been felt more than
once on the coast of Coromandel; and I repeat it, I cannot,
consistently with any sentiment of duty, consent to rest the
security of the Carnatic, in the present crisis, on any other
foundation than a state of active and early preparation for
But if I had looked only to the success of those
measures which are now depending at the courts of Poonah
and Hyderabad (measures essentially involving our present
and future means of checking the implacable enmity of
Tippoo), I should, on that ground alone, have proposed to
assemble the army upon the coast of Coromandel, at Bom-
bay, and upon the coast of Malabar.
war.
It is impossible to suppose that Tippoo would not employ
every effort to prevent the revival of our defensive alliances;
and it would therefore be nearly certain that the advanced
state of preparations for war, and his renewed connexion
III.]
cxix
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTĖ.
with the French, would tempt him to interfere in the affairs.
of the Nizam and of the Paishwah, and to assist the views
of Sindia at Poonah, and of Perron's army at Hyderabad.
It therefore became necessary to check the motions of Tip-
poo Sultaun by assembling our army upon his frontier
during the continuance of our negotiation with our allies.
I have adverted, in the course of this minute, to those
defects in the constitution of the army upon the coast which
have impeded its early movement in the present critical
conjuncture. The measures which I have proposed for the
correction of those defects are absolutely necessary, in my
judgment, to our future security in the Carnatic. The
detail of those measures will appear in my minute, in the
secret department, of the 20th of July, and in the letter to
the government of Fort St. George, of the same date.
I am fully aware of the expense to be incurred in esta-
blishing any improved system which shall enable the army
on the coast to keep pace with the promptitude of Tippoo's
resources, and to move with an alacrity and expedition
equal to his.
If, however, the proposed increase of our subsidiary
engagements at Hyderabad should take place, it is my
intention that the whole detachment, consisting of three
regiments, should be provided from the establishment of
Fort St. George. The force stationed at Hyderabad will
afford an effectual security to the northern Sircars against
Tippoo Sultaun, or against any other foreign enemy. The
duty of the Sircars with them require no larger a proportion
of troops than may be sufficient to maintain the internal
police and good order of the country. It will not therefore
be requisite, in the event of peace, to raise more than one
new regiment at Fort St. George, to replace those serving
with the Nizam. This arrangement will operate as a saving
of the expense of two regiments upon the establishment of
CXX
[Arr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
Fort St. George, and will furnish a fund at least adequate
to the permanent charges of the new establishment of artil-
lery, draught cattle, and grain, which our recent experience
has proved to be indispensab for the purpose of enabling
the army on the coast to take the field expeditiously on any
sudden emergency.
In this view, the restoration of our defensive alliances
against Tippoo, essentially connected with the improvement
of our system of defence in the Carnatic, and the assistance
afforded to the Nizam, will become (without any increase of
expense) the source of additional vigour and activity to our
army upon the coast.
Deeply as I lament the obstacles which have prevented
us from striking an instantaneous blow against the posses-
sions of Tippoo, I expect to derive considerable advantage
from the success of that system of precaution and defence
which I have been compelled to substitute in place of an
immediate war.
The enlargement of our subsidiary engagements at the
court of Hyderabad, combined with the establishment of
similar engagements at the court of Poonah, will become a
great augmentation of our strength, attended by no increase
of charge, and possibly by a diminution of our military
expenses.
The two detachments will form a considerable army, sta-
tioned on the most vulnerable part of Tippoo Sultaun's
frontier, in a position which will at all times facilitate our
approach to his capital, by securing the protection of our
convoys of provisions. A force so stationed will operate as
a perpetual restraint upon any movement which Tippoo
might be disposed to make towards the frontier, either of
the Carnatic, of the Northern Sircars, or of Malabar.
It will also impede any co-operations between the armies
of Sindia and of Tippoo, and will induce the former to
III.]
cxxi
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
remain within his own dominions; where his motions will
again be checked by the vicinity of our army on the frontier
of Oude.
In such circumstances, it must always be the interest of
Sindia to cultivate our friendship, in preference to that of
the French, or of any native power. Thus he may become
a useful ally to us, in the event of Zemaun Shah's approach
to the frontier of Hindustan, and the prospect of that event
must render him anxious to secure our protection. On the
other hand, the success of his present ambitious and unjus-
tifiable views against the Paishwah would fix him in the
interest of Tippoo Sultaun and of France, with the accession
of whatever strength he might be able to collect from the
remnants of the empire which he would have overthrown.
The influence which we shall naturally derive, both at
Hyderabad and Poonah, from the presence of so large a
body of our troops, will enable us to prevent any aggression
on either side, by the constant interposition of our good
offices with both parties, to restrain every symptom of a
revival of their former spirit of jealousy and contention.
Our endeavours may then be successfully directed to the
desirable object of preserving unimpaired the strength and
resources of the two powers on whose co-operation we must
rely for assistance, in the event of any war with the state of
Mysore; and while we prevent our allies from weakening
themselves by repeated contests, we may expect that such
an interference in the disputes of the native powers, so far
from tending to foment divisions, and to occasion war, will
prove the best security for the general tranquillity of India,
as well as the most solid pledge of our disposition to
preserve that blessing from interruption.
However comprehensive and intricate the proposed sys-
tem may appear at the first view, it will soon be evident to
all the powers of India, that the fundamental principle of
cxxii
['Arr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
our policy is invariably repugnant to every scheme of con-
quest, extension of dominion, aggrandizement, or ambition,
either for ourselves, or for our allies. Consistently with
this principle, it is our right and duty to restore the vigour
and deficiency of our defensive alliances, but beyond the
limits of this principle we entertain no project of altering
the condition, of reducing or of raising the power of any
established state in India. On the other hand, the same
principle justifies and demands our firm resistance to the
intrusion of any foreign power, which shall attempt to ac-
quire a preponderant influence in the scale of Indian po-
litics, to the prejudice of our defensive alliances and of our
just interests.
The establishments of our subsidized force at Poonah
and Hyderabad will afford effectual means of guarding, not
only against any such intrusion, but against the undue
growth of any native powers. While we possess so formi-
dable a force in the centre of India, no such event can hap-
pen without our knowledge and consent.
The last question which remains for consideration is what
shall be the nature and extent of that demand of satisfac-
tion which we shall make from Tippoo Sultaun, whenever
we shall have completed the system now depending at the
courts of our allies, and shall have brought our army in the
Carnatic to a state of preparation for the field.
It is evident, from the facts which have come under my
observation in the course of this discussion, that our safety
requires a further reduction of the relative power of Tippoo
Sultaun.
•
The policy of the treaty of Seringapatam certainly was not
to maintain Tippoo's power upon such a scale as should
leave him a constant object of alarm and apprehension to
the Company. That he has been so for some years past
cannot be denied by any person acquainted with the records
III.]
exxiii
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
either of this government, or of that of Fort St. George.
The present is the second crisis within the last two years
in which this government has thought it necessary to as-
semble the army on the coast, for the sole purpose of check-
ing the motions of Tippoo Sultaun.
The vague and inaccurate nature of our intelligence, with
respect to the extent of his force, and to the state of his
preparations, added to the facility which he possesses of
receiving emissaries and succours from France by sea, have
contributed to increase the anxiety of the Company's go-
vernments; and our intercourse with him has been of an
unsettled and ill-defined character, destitute of the advan-
tages either of peace or of war.
Under such circumstances, the continuance of Tippoo's
power, in its actual state, must prove to the Company a
perpetual source of alarm, vexation, and expense.
The reduction of his means of offence might be effected.
either by a positive diminution of his territory and resources,
or by a proportionable increase of power and efficiency on
our side of the balance, accompanied by such additional
securities as might enable us to ascertain at all times the
nature of his intentions, as well as his power of carrying
them into effect, and to restrain, if not wholly to preclude,
his intercourse with France.
The diminution of his territory on the coast of Malabar
would certainly be the most effectual mode of precluding
his intercourse with France, as well as of preventing his
movements towards the Carnatic. But it does not appear
probable that this most desirable security can ever be
obtained by the mere terror of our arms.
It must be pur-
chased at the expense and hazard of war. Any considerable
reduction of his resources must probably be purchased at
the same price.
I have already stated the nature and tendency of those
cxxiv
[Apr.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
steps which have been taken for confining the power of
Tippoo within narrower limits, by the operation of the
proposed system of alliance, of subsidiary engagements, and
of improvement of our defences in the Carnatic.
The success of this system will unquestionably operate as
an effectual restraint upon the power of Tippoo, and will
so strengthen our barriers against him, as to afford a ra-
tional expectation that we may be enabled to obtain from
him, without incurring the hazard of war, a very consider-
able augmentation of security, with respect to all those
points which now form the most alarming features of his power.
I have already stated those points to be, the secrecy of his
operations, his continual intercourse with the French, and
his constant state of equipment for war.
Our demand of satisfaction for his late infraction of
treaty should be so framed as to apply corrections to each
of these evils; and such a demand might be founded on
principles of moderation and justice, so clear and indis-
putable, as would place the refusal of Tippoo in the most
odious light, and in that event prove to all India the ne-
cessity of our resorting to arms.
We might distinctly state to Tippoo, that we entertain
no view of encroaching upon his territory, or of diminishing
his resources; and we might appeal to the late restoration
of the district of Wynaad for an unequivocal proof of this
disposition.
We might declare that after a most unprovoked violation
of treaty on his part, we did not intend to demand any
cession of dominion, or payment of money, but will content
ourselves with obtaining those ordinary pledges of an in-
tention to abstain from hostilities which all civilized nations
in a state of peace are in the established habit of requiring
reciprocally from one another. We might insist upon an
unequivocal and final explanation of the real nature of our
1
に
​III.]
CXXV
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
relation with him, declaring that we will no longer submit
to that ambiguous and anxious state, in which the allies
have been placed by his conduct for some years past.
We might signify our determined resolution either to
establish with him a real and effectual peace, accompanied
by the customary intercourse, by the mutual exchange of
good offices, and by all other securities which maintain the
continuance of that blessing, or to wage war upon him until
we have removed the causes of our apprehension and danger,
by the entire destruction of his power.
This declaration might be made jointly by all the allies, and
it might be followed by requiring Tippoo to receive at his
court an established ambassador from each of the allies,
according to the practice of all civilized nations in a state of
peace, offering, at the same time, to admit ambassadors from
him on equal terms.
The force levied by him under his offensive alliance with
France, having been raised for the express purpose of ag-
gression upon the Company, can be considered in no other
light than that of a signal of hostility, while it shall remain
in his service. He must therefore be required to disband it
without delay, and to remove it from his dominions.
The anxious desire of the French to destroy the British
power in India, the nature of Tippoo's acknowledged con-
nexion with them, and the interest which they must always
feel in instigating him to war, demand the further requisi-
tion, that he should enter into an engagement for himself, his
heirs, and successors, to exclude the French from his terri-
tories and dominions for ever.
The advantages resulting from these concessions on the
part of Tippoo would be very considerable.
The residence of an ambassador at his court would not
only restrain the execution of any hostile designs which he
!
cxxvi
[APP.
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
might hereafter form, but would provide an authentic
source of intelligence, from which we might always derive
timely information of his motions.
This measure might also ultimately lead to the establish-
ment of an amicable intercourse with Mysore, for Tippoo
may perhaps at length be convinced that his wisest policy
would be to rest satisfied with the undisturbed possession of
his present dominions, rather than to risk the loss of what he
still retains, by attempting to regain what he has lost.
The dismission of the French corps raised at Mauritius
would discourage other adventurers of that nation from
attempting to engage in the service of the Sultaun, and,
with a British ambassador on the spot, it would be difficult
for him to evade the engagements by which he would have
bound himself to exclude the French from his army and
dominions.
The combined effect of these two measures would there-
fore be, if not wholly to preclude, at least to embarrass to
a very great degree his intercourse with our enemy.
He may also at length perceive that he never can hope
to make any lasting impression upon the British power,
without the aid of a large French force; and that he never
can admit such a force into his dominions without the
utmost danger to his own independence.
The revival of our alliances, the appearance of our
armies in the field, and the presence of a part of the British
squadron on the coast of Malabar, will probably incline
Tippoo to listen to requisitions of this nature; he will soon
perceive that we possess ample means of annihilating his
military force, and of destroying the state of Mysore, from
among the native powers; and I trust he will also be con-
vinced that we have no object in view beyond our own se-
curity, and that we are really desirous of maintaining the
A
III.]
cxxvii
LORD WELLESLEY'S MINUTE.
relations of amity and peace with him as long as he shall rest
contented with his present dominions, and shall relinquish
his vindictive projects against ours.
If Tippoo should accede to the substance of the requi
sitions which I have suggested, I entertain a sanguine hope
that with the efficiency of the triple alliance, not only re-
stored, but considerably strengthened with a large army at
Hyderabad, and another at Poonah, with a resident es-
tablished at Seringapatam, and with the exclusion of the
French from the dominions of Tippoo Sultaun, of the Nizam,
and of the Paishwah, we may be enabled to look confidently
to a long continuance of tranquillity in India. The growth of
the French power in India would no longer be a matter of
apprehension. Sindia, (or whoever shall succeed to his do-
minions in Hindustan) would become an useful auxiliary
against the threatened irruption of Zemaun Shah. The
military charges on the coast of Coromandel might then
safely admit of reduction; this government would not then be
perpetually alarmed with an apprehension of Tippoo's equip-
ments, and of impending invasions of the Carnatic. We should
no longer complain of suffering, in time of peace, all the so-
licitude, hazard, and much of the expense of war; and the
continuance of tranquillity would be ensured, not more by
the predominance of our power, than by the moderation
manifested in using it for the sole purpose of obtaining per-
manent security and genuine peace.
No. IV.
LETTER FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN MALCOLM
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
MY LORD,
Madras, July 17th, 1817.
I TOLD your lordship, before I left Calcutta, that I
should, at the earliest period I was able, communicate my
sentiments upon the expected operations against the Pin-
daries, and the likelihood there appeared of these involving
us with the principal rulers and chiefs in Malwa. In treat-
ing this subject, I am aware I shall be able to convey no
new information, and to bring forward no facts with which
you are not already acquainted; but my anxiety to shew
the grounds upon which my opinions are founded will never-
theless make me incur the hazard of wearying your lord-
ship's patience. A deliberate examination of this difficult
question has satisfied my mind of the positive necessity of
measures which may involve a departure from the principles
of policy we have hitherto observed towards the states in
Malwa. By a full statement of the course of reasoning
which has led me to form this conclusion, I shall afford your
lordship the best means of appreciating the correctness, or
of detecting the errors of my judgment.
Before I left England I gave a memoir to Mr. Canning
on the subject of the Pindaries, in which I endeavoured to
trace their origin, to exhibit their character and habits, and
IV.]
cxxix
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER.
to suggest those means which appeared best calculated for
their extinction, or rather suppression. Since that paper
was given in, two invasions of the territories of the Com-
pany, the disturbed state of the Poonah government, the
conclusion of a subsidiary treaty with the Rajah of Nag-
pore, the evasive conduct of Dowlet Row Sindia, and many
minor events, (among which the rebellions in Ganjam and
Cuttack, subsequent to the invasion of the former province
by the Pindaries, are the most important,) have given a
very different shape to many parts of this question, which
I shall now proceed to examine under its altered state, and
with reference to the full and luminous correspondence of
the residents at the native courts; which, with other authen-
tic documents furnished by intelligent officers of the political
department, throw light on our condition, both with relation
to these increasing hordes of lawless freebooters, and to the
predatory powers with whom they are naturally and consti-
tionally associated and connected.
The causes of the increase of the Pindaries have been
before fully described *. Though they had long existed as
a separate class of military freebooters, it was no doubt the
destruction of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, the extinction.
of the political independence of the Nizam and Paishwah,
and the reduction within narrower limits of the power of
Sindia and Holkar, that added to their number, and, by
freeing them in a great degree from that control to which
they were before subject, gave them not only a wider sphere
of action, but a character of greater boldness and enterprise.
Those that condemned the policy adopted by the Mar-
quess Wellesley, trace this great evil to the principles which
he introduced of extending either the power or influence of
the British government over all the states of India; while
* Memoir of the Pindaries, delivered to Mr. Canning, Sept. 1816.
VOL. II.
i
CXXX
[APP.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
the defenders of that system contend that all the dangers
that have arisen have their root in that selfish and neutral
policy, which came, according to them, like a mildew to
blight the fruits of our great successes, and to disappoint
that near prospect of general tranquillity which our actual
and acknowledged supremacy enabled us to command,
through the means of our intrinsic power, our allies, and
the active exercise of our influence solely and unremittingly
directed to that great and desirable object.
Before we can propose a remedy for an evil we must
determine its source; and with this view it is of importance
to examine, as far as the experience of twelve years enables
us, those facts which will assist us to judge the comparative
merit of these two systems. That of Lord Wellesley was
first introduced in the southern parts of India. It had a
full, unchecked, and successful operation in the settlement
of Mysore, where the liberal arrangements for the support
of the principal chiefs, of a considerable corps of horse and
infantry, and a large body of Candachar peons,* gave us
possession of the military part of the population, to mould
into what shape we chose, and thereby enabled us to pre-
vent the occurrence of either discontent or rebellion.
Our alliance with the Nizam furnished us with the means
of destroying Tippoo and overcoming a Mahratta confede-
racy; and that with the Paishwah was alike essential for the
latter object. These engagements have no doubt been
attended with many evils; but we must recollect that a
government so constituted as that of our eastern empire,
presents, on all questions, but a choice of difficulties. If
the introduction of our power and influence into the terri-
tories of the Nizam and Paishwah has increased the num-
bers of the Pindaries, as it undoubtedly has done, by
* Vide Col. Wilke's Report, 1806,
IV.]
cxxxi
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
destroying in a very considerable degree the energy of
the internal government of our allies, and consequently
thrown the latter more upon us for protection, the embar-
rassments which these causes produce must be balanced
against the dangers to which we should have been exposed,
had we refrained from cultivating their friendship upon
the only terms that could render it useful. We should,
under any other course of policy, have probably had still to
contend with the Sultaun of Mysore; and supposing his
power to be annihilated, the Nizam and Paishwah would
either be proceeding in a prosperous career of ambition that
might render them dangerous neighbours, or become, through
weakness, a prey to the ambition of some restless military
chief, who desired their resources to further his plans of
conquest. Any one the least acquainted with the history of
the native powers of India, must be sensible that one or
other of these events must have occurred; and assuredly
the embarrassments which now threaten us, taken at their
worst, bear no proportion to the dangers attendant on such
a state of affairs.
If it is admitted that the system of establishing our power
and influence over our allies, as the best means of securing
our own and the general tranquillity, has been found to be
attended with benefit in the south of India, can we deny its
effects, as far as it has been allowed to operate, in other
quarters? May not Bundelcund be adduced as a remark-
able instance of this fact? It was, perhaps, more disturbed,
more distracted by the disputes of petty rulers, and more
overrun by bands of freebooters and banditti of every de-
scription, than any country of equal magnitude in India.
Yet how completely have our arms and policy subdued and
reformed this province; many of the petty rulers of which
continue to enjoy their possessions, and, acknowledging us
as their lords paramount, form w th their armed adherents
i 2
cxxxii
[APP.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
one means of maintaining internal peace and security, and
of repelling foreign invasion.
The exercise of our control over the states of Bhurretpore
and Machery has been attended with one slight embarrass-
ment, caused by the latter forgetting his relations; but the
display of our power instantly brought him to reason: and
the petty chiefs, such as the Nabob of Barraitch, Ahmed
Buksh, Murteza Khan, and others, who were settled in
Jagheers to the west of the Jumnah, not only live peaceably
and prosperously, but have presented an example much
wanted in that and every other quarter of British India-
of natives of rank and respectability in the enjoyment of
estates (which support themselves and military adherents)
that were granted as the reward of their attachment and
faithful services during a period of no common emergency.
The Sheikh chiefs also, between the Jumnah and the Sut-
ledge, have been restored to that protection to which their
services and good faith entitled them, and live after their
own forms, in their principalities, acknowledging and ren-
dering service to the British government.
An attentive consideration of the facts which have been
stated, dispose us to a conclusion, that if the policy pursued
by the Marquess Wellesley had not been checked in its
progress to completion, it would have attained its great
and professed object, the establishment of the general tran-
quillity of India, through the supremacy of the British
government. The measures left unaccomplished had similar
features, and were of a similar character with those that
have proved successful. It was proposed to attach and
employ a portion of the military inhabitants of Hindustan
in the same manner, and upon the same principle, which
had been adopted with the irregular horse and Candachar
peons of Mysore. Treaties had been formed with the
Rajpoot states, and it was meant to cherish to the utmost
t
IV.]
cxxxiii
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
the energies of that warlike, but tranquil race.
Every
practicable effort was to be made to call forth the native
resources of the Paishwah and the Nizam. An intimate
alliance was to be preserved with Sindia, the only object of
which was to effect a change in the principles of his govern-
-ment, and to render this ruler an instrument for the reform
or the destruction of that predatory system of which he had
been the principal support. A subsidiary alliance with the
Rajah of Nagpore was, as it always had been, an object of
anxious interest, as his 'habits were settled and peaceable,
and he promised, from these causes, to become, if we could
conquer his jealousy and fears, an useful ally to the cause
of order and tranquillity. The personal character of Jes-
wunt Row Holkar forbade much hope of his accession to
any confederacy, that had for its object the suppression of
that predatory warfare of which he was the avowed cham-
pion, but it was neither intended to bar the door upon him,
nor any other leader, whom change of sentiments or despair
of success in predatory warfare, might dispose to settle and
to enjoy in peace the revenue of their possessions.
When we consider the means which the British govern-
ment at this moment possessed, the impression that had
been made by the unexampled success of its arms and its
policy; in other words, the complete and recognised supre-
macy of its power, it is not too much to affirm that there is
every reason to conclude it would have been successful in its
object, of introducing comparative order and tranquillity
into countries which it was easy to foresee would, if left to
themselves, not only fall into anarchy and confusion, but
become a nursery for predatory bands, who might, at no
distant day, threaten the peace of all India. It was stated
with truth by those who condemned this system, that the
measures necessary to fulfil the object it had in view were
likely to involve us in all the embarrassments attendant on
cxxxiv
App.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
extended and complicated political relations. But it was
answered with equal justice that this embarrassment was the
natural concomitant of our actual condition; and it was most
evident that all attempts to escape from it would not only
be futile, but be attended with superadded embarrassment,
and with positive danger to the general peace of India, and
ultimately to the prosperity and security of the British
possessions.
To shew how far these apprehensions have been realized,
a very short detail of events since 1806 (the period of the
introduction of this system of neutral policy) will suffice.
To the treaties concluded with Sindia and Holkar in 1805
and 1806, the Governor-general added declaratory articles,
containing gratuitous cessions, which were meant to eman-
cipate us from the care and hazard of defending allies, and
occupying or guaranteeing territory that was supposed to
be inconveniently situated. The moment peace was con-
cluded, an indiscriminate reduction was made of all those
bodies of irregular horse (natives of our newly-conquered
provinces) who had been entertained during the war, or
had come over at our invitation from the enemy. These,
finding themselves without any provision whatever, immedi-
ately left Hindustan, and swelled the ranks of the freebooters
who began at this period to collect in Malwa. Some
of the chiefs who had aided us during the war were
settled, as has been stated, by giving them grants of land;
but it was anxiously desired to prevail upon these, as well
as the Rajahs of Bhurretpore and Macherry, to renounce
their right to our protection, and increased territory was
directed to be proffered as the reward of their assent to this
proposition. The representations of Lord Lake, and the
determination of the chiefs above mentioned not to forego
their claim to the protection of the British government,
prevented the execution of this part of the plan, and the
IV.1
CXXXV
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
result has fully proved that no occurrence could have been
more fortunate for our interests.
In pursuance of this neutral policy, the Rajahs of Jypore
and Bondee had been cast off, so, in fact, were the Sheikh
chiefs between the Jumna and the Sutledge, who had acted
with our army during the war. In our relations subsequent
to the peace, we studiously avoided every interference with
Dowlut Row Sindia, lest we should involve or embarrass
ourselves with that ruler. With Holkar we had hardly
any intercourse, and every effort to negotiate a more inti-
mate alliance with the Rajah of Nagpore was abandoned.
In short, it seemed to be determined that the rise and fall
of all other states and chiefs, except those we were bound
by treaty to defend, was in future to be an object of no
interest to the British government, and it was expected that
the interminable contests in which it was foreseen the native
powers, with whom it had no connexion, would become
involved, would tend to promote its peace and security, and
that of its allies.
A period of two years had not elapsed, when the ambition
of Runjeet Singh, Rajah of Lahore, stimulated by our reced-
ing policy, claimed and coerced the allegiance of the Sheikh
chiefs south of the Sutledge. The whole conduct of this
prince, at the time to which I allude, was calculated to
convey an impression that he cherished hostile designs; but
Lord Minto saw at one view the danger and the remedy.
The march of a corps to Lodiannah, on the left bank of the
Sutledge, the extension of our protection to the chiefs to
the south of that river,—and a warning to Runjeet Singh
not to cross it, brought that ruler to a just sense of the rela-
tion in which he stood. A little more forbearance would
have encouraged him to a war in which he would have been
destroyed, and his territories conquered. A contrary con-
duct rendered him a peaceful neighbour. This occurrence
cxxxvi
[APP.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
has importance, as it shews from experience the tendency
of a neutral system of policy to produce that very conse
quence (extension of territory) which it desires to avoid.
In 1808, the distracted state of Holkar's government led
Mahommed Khan Bungush, with a number of followers, to
rebel against his authority; and having established himself
in the territories belonging to that family in Candeish, he
not only plundered their revenues, but extended his depreda-
tions into the adjoining provinces of our allies, the Paishwah
and Nizam. The consequence was, the employment of our
troops became essential to destroy a rebel of the government
of Holkar.
The extraordinary activity and energy of the officer *
charged with this service, prevented, by the capture of Bun-
gush and the defeat of his party, a protracted warfare, but
the event shewed to what we were likely to become subject,
and how impossible it was to follow the course that had
been prescribed. This was more fully evinced in the en-
suing year, when Ameer Khan, a chief who had risen to
considerable military power in the service of Holkar, asso-
ciating with his natural allies, the Pindaries, threatened, at
the head of a predatory host, amounting to about thirty
thousand men, to overwhelm the country of Nagpore. His
advance towards the accomplishment of this object was
deemed by the Governor-general (Lord Minto) to be
connected with views of ambition, that went to the establish-
ment of a Mahommedan dynasty in his own person, and
ultimately to changes unfavourable to our interests in the
Deckan. These considerations, combined with a desire to
protect the Rajah of Nagpore, with whom negotiations for
a subsidiary alliance had been revived, led the Governor-
general to assemble an army on the Nerbuddah, which
Major-general Sir John Doveton,
IV.]
cxxxvii
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
afterwards advanced as far as Seronje, obliging Ameer
Khan to return to the northward. Lord Minto would
appear, at one period, to have contemplated further opera-
tions for the destruction of Ameer Khan, and seems to have
been fully sensible of the expediency of an improved fron-
tier *, and the actual necessity of some more efficient means
than we possessed, of keeping in check the hordes of free-
booters which were annually augmenting in Malwa; but he
was deterred, according to his own statement, from a pro-
secution of these important objects, and disposed to confine
himself to the protection of Nagpore, by the contemplation
of the complicated military and political arrangements, to
which such extensive operations might lead; the impracti-
cability of limiting the scene of action, or the scope of mea-
sures with references to the numerous interests affected by
them, the heavy burden of expense, and the turn which
affairs had at that period taken in Europe. These com-
bined considerations led to his directing the army that had
entered Malwa to return to the Nizam's territories. The
officer commanding was directed to give up Seronje, the
jagheer of Ameer Khan, to one of the officers of Holkar,
with a condition that it should not be restored to that chief.
This condition, however, the Governor-general expected
might prove abortive, for though he had considered Ameer
Khan as completely distinct from the Holkar government,
and the latter had confirmed this ground by disavowing the
*Lord Minto, in a minute, dated the 12th of December, 1809,
after remarking on the positions of our subsidiary forces in the coun-
tries of the Nizam and Paishwah, and the necessity of having one
within the Nagpore territories, observes-" It is probable that these
three forces might be so stationed as not only to enable two to form a
junction to the eastward, to the westward, or in centre, in a short
space of time, but also to connect with Bombay and Guzerat on one
side, and with Bundelcund on the other."
CXxxviii
[Arr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
actions of that chief, he anticipated that he would soon re-
establish his influence over a weak and distracted court.
The fact was, the ministers of Holkar, though they had
promised to do so, did not send an officer to take posses-
sion of Seronje, which was delivered up to the head inhabi-
tant, or, in other words, to the officer of Ameer Khan.
Thus terminated a campaign, in which an army *, com-
manded by one of the ablest officers India has produced,
was employed for nearly twelve months. It is probable
that the territories of the Rajah of Nagpore were saved
from being plundered by its operations, and possible that
Ameer Khan might have been frustrated for the moment in
his scheme of personal aggrandizement; but though the
ambitious views of an individual might have been checked,
the events of succeeding years proved that this display of
our force (for it amounted to no more) struck no blow at
that predatory system, in which had originated the ne-
cessity of its employment, and which, it was now evident,
constituted our real danger.
In 1811, 1812, and 1813, the Pindaries greatly increased
in numbers, not only invaded and plundered the territories
of our allies, the Nizam and Paishwah, but bad the bold-
ness to pass through Bundelcund, and to extend their ra-
vages to the vicinity of Murzapore, threatening with fire
and sword the rich province of Bahar. The boldness of
these freebooters caused, at this period, a very considerable
addition to our military expenses, both at Bengal and Ma-
dras; and, in 1814, when the former government had a
great proportion of its troops employed in Nepaul, the state
* This army consisted of seventeen thousand regulars, an excellent
train of artillery, and contingents of irregular cavalry, from our allies.
the Nizam and Paishwah. This estimate does no include at large co-
operating force in Bundelcund, under Colonel Martindale.
+ The late Major-general Sir Barry Close, Bart.
IV.]
cxxxix
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
of the predatory powers in Malwa, from Sindia down to
the lowest chieftain, who subsists by plunder, was deemed
so threatening, that it was not only considered prudent to
strengthen the subsidiary corps in the Deckan, but to ad-
vance the whole disposable force of the army of Fort St.
George to the banks of the Tangabuderah.
This precautionary measure, which the state of affairs
rendered necessary for our temporary security, was attended
with as great an expenditure as the most active campaign;
but neither our advanced corps, which were now augmented
to the size of armies, nor the great force we had drawn out
on our frontier, prevented the Pindaries from plundering
the countries of our allies; and during the next year (1815),
as if in derision of our boasted power and great defensive
preparations, a body of these freebooters passed our ad-
vanced corps, and moving rapidly through the territories of
the Nizam, fell upon the unprotected province of Guntoo.
I would not willingly exaggerate the effects which this in-
vasion of our territories has produced. Our subjects had
long relied with implicit faith on our power of protect-
ing them from attack; it was a point on which their
minds were at repose; and I am convinced, that this ex-
emption from a scourge, to which they saw the inhabitants
of neighbouring countries exposed, was what conciliated
them to our rule more than every other consideration. The
distinction of manners, of language, of religion, all were for-
gotten, or at least ceased to be objects of dislike and abhor-
rence, in the contemplation of that comparative security they
enjoyed under our government. Nearly forty years had
elapsed since any of the Company's territories in the south
of India had suffered so dreadful a calamity. The invasion
of the Carnatic by Hyder Ally was a tale which old men
told to incredulous hearers; but the excesses and cruelties
of Hyder were far exceeded by the horrid outrages of
cxl
[Apr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
the Pindaries. The scene of these outrages was limited, but
the impression made extended to far-distant provinces, and
that has been completed by the irruption of another body of
these freebooters into Ganjam, in 1816. I speak with full
knowledge of the state of opinion when I assert, that in the
south of India such has been the consequence of these
events, that the best disposed of our subjects have had their
minds shaken in the opinion they before entertained of the
superiority and permanence of our power, while the disaf-
fected and the turbulent rejoice in this change of sentiment,
and look forward with expectation to the further progress
of a system which revives their subdued hopes of opposing
the British government, every moment of whose forbearance
to avenge the deep insult and injury it has received is natu-
rally construed by this class into inability to meet the danger.
At such a period, to talk of defensive measures as in any
way
calculated to meet this evil, is to betray a total igno-
rance of the character of our rule, and the foundation upon
which the British government in India rests. Besides the
narrow object of this policy, the saving a temporary expen-
diture would soon be disappointed. The employment of
troops occupying posts and lines of defence, and in sup-
pressing rebellion, the inevitable result of such a policy,
added to the serious defalcations of the revenue of our plun-
dered provinces, would amount to more than the expenses
of war; and could we afford the loss of character, and with
it almost all that supports us in our present greatness, and
reduce this question to a mere money account, even in that
view we should be losers by any measures that did not strike
at the root of an evil, which is one that demands for its
suppression all the energies of the British government.
Before I offer an opinion on the mode in which these are
to act, and the legitimate grounds we may assume as the
basis of our proceeding, it will be useful to say a few words
IV.]
cxli
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
on the state of our own power and that of our allies, and on
the conduct and actual condition of the different rulers and
chiefs who are likely to be involved either as friends or as
enemies, from any measures we may adopt.
The state of the British government in India could not
be more favourable for a great exertion than it is at this
moment. The successful termination of the war in Nepaul,
and the reduction of Hatrass, have added greatly to our
reputation, and have given recent exercise to the discipline
and valour of our army in Bengal, which never was in a
condition more fit for service. The raising of a number of
local corps has rendered a large proportion of the effective
force disposable; and the means of prosecuting such a war
as that in which we are likely to be soon engaged have been
considerably increased by the imbodying, under European
officers, corps to an aggregate of upwards of 6000 irregular
horse. The situation of our troops in Bengal is favourable
for their assembling, within a very short period, at the points
where they are likely to be required; and, independent of
its political importance, the conclusion of the subsidiary
alliance with Nagpore has, by giving us a military position
along the banks of the Nerbuddah, that connects Bundel-
cund with Berar, added in an incalculable degree to our
military strength in that quarter.
The armies of Fort St. George and Bombay are in the
most efficient state, and, including the advanced corps in
the territories of the Nizam, the Paishwah, and Gwickar,
and that lately assembled near the Tangabuddra, we may
assume that upwards of thirty thousand troops belonging to
these presidencies are already in full equipment, and have
been so for some years past. The advanced position of a
great part of this force is favourable to the adoption of
offensive operations at the very opening of the season. The
tate of public credit, of the treasury, and of the revenues,
4
cxlii
[Apr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
is every way encouraging, as it promises that no operations
in which we can contemplate being involved are likely to
produce any financial embarrassment.
The actual condition of the territories of the Nizam is not
favourable: the character and conduct of that prince has
compelled us to an interference in his internal administration
(which is managed by a Hindoo minister whom we support)
that is calculated to increase both his discontent and that
of his chief nobles and principal officers. It has also the
effect of impoverishing the country, and of depressing, if not
destroying the energies of the government. Something like
this must always be the consequence of an alliance which,
as it annihilates the political independence of a country,
may with propriety be deemed a half conquest of it; but
peculiar circumstances have aggravated these effects in this
instance; and though the force we maintain in the territo-
ries of the Subah of the Deckan places us beyond the fear of
immediate danger, a crisis is approaching at which we must
either usurp further upon this state, or endeavour, by reviving
its energies, to render it more capable of governing itself.
The last measure, if it were practicable, would be most
for our interests; but of this we may be assured, that we
can attempt nothing, and affairs will grow hourly worse in
this country, until we can subdue the predatory hordes in
its vicinity. These freebooters have, for the last ten years,
annually plundered the Nizam's dominions, and our inabi
lity to defend them, while it has sunk our character in the
estimation of the peaceable part of the population, with
whom our alliance was at first popular, as it promised them
security from foreign attack, has had the effect of reanimat-
ing the hopes of all the discontented, among whom I fear
we may class nearly the whole of the Mahommedan inhabi-
tants of this kingdom, who are almost all military, and who
have been gradually thrown out of employment as our
IV.]
cxliii
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
power has advanced. Fortunately for us, this class of men
are an unprincipled and divided race. The nobles can have
no attachment to a prince who accelerated his own fall by
an eagerness to destroy them, that he might enjoy the
revenue of their estates. They have been compelled to
disband their adherents and embodied troops. The latter
may unite in a sentiment of hatred to us, but they want all
principle of union in action, and are almost incapable of
combination; but their temper and condition render them
dangerous to the internal peace of the country, and they
are admirable materials to swell a band of freebooters. That
many of them have joined the Pindaries, and aided in their
expeditions, there can be no doubt, and we may account it
as certain, that, unless we can destroy or suppress these
plunderers, the contagion of their example will spread over
the Deckan, where every unemployed soldier, with a horse
and a sword, will be against us. Measures of prevention
have already been taken, several corps of regular infantry,
and some Rasselahs of irregular horse, have been, at our
suggestion, raised by the minister. These corps are placed
under the command of European officers, and hopes are
entertained that they may be efficient. Thus far is certain,
that in giving employment to men of the military tribes, we
prevent that total despair which the too sudden introduction
of our system has invariably the effect of producing.
At Poonah we had a right to expect the most favourable
operation of an alliance which placed and supported the
prince with whom it was made upon the throne; but we
had early cause to apprehend embarrassment from the per-
verseness of the personal character of the Paishwah, and his
proneness, like all his tribe, to a crooked course of policy.
Every step was taken to conciliate him; his subjects were
compelled to obedience, his tributaries to render him his
just dues. The interposition of the British government was
cxliv
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
[APP.
employed to mediate the adjustment of his claims upon
other states, and all interference with his internal adminis-
tration was avoided as much as possible. Affairs went on
tolerably smoothly till three years ago, when the elevation
of Trimbuckjee, a menial servant, of a bad and intriguing
character, to the office of prime minister, excited some sus-
picion of the Paishwah's sentiments, and in 1815 the murder
of Gungodhur Shastree, minister of the Gwickar, who had
come to Poonah under the express guarantee of the British
faith, to adjust the accounts between his master and the
Paishwah, obliged the British residents to demand the sur-
render of Trimbuckjee, the perpetrator of this atrocious
deed. The reluctance with which he was given up tended
to confirm the first suspicion, that he was the instrument of
the Paishwah's crime; and after he escaped from Tannah*,
that prince not only made no effort to seize him, but gave
in secret every support to the rebellion which Trimbuckjee
raised in his dominions, expecting no doubt, by this con-
duct, to intimidate the English government into the grant
of a pardon of his favourite. His views, however, have
been disappointed by the experience and firmness of the
resident †. A series of measures of the most spirited and
decided character have reduced him to complete submission.
An arrangement has been made which gives us, at a most
critical period, the greatest advantages, both of impression
and of resources. Throughout the whole of this transac-
tion, aid appears to have been expected from the Pindaries;
the resident with Sindia very early reported a correspond-
ence between these freebooters and Trimbuckjee, and
subsequently stated that orders had been given by the chiefs
+
* Tannah is a small fort in the island of Sallsette, about twenty
miles from Bombay.
+ The Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone.
Captain Close's letter to Mr. Adam, 23 Nov. 1816.
IV.]
cxlv
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
of these freebooters not to plunder the Paishwah's domi-
nions. The fact is that it is natural in the present condi-
tion of India for every prince or chief who cherishes plans
hostile to the English, to court a body of allies, who glory
in proclaiming themselves the open enemies of that nation.
This is in itself a serious and recurring danger, and no
state can have a right to calculate on its being always averted
with that wisdom and energy which has been recently
displayed at Poonah.
The court of Nagpore is very unwarlike; the present
ruler sought our alliance, to fix him on a disputed throne,
and he will value it, as it gives him security in the power
he has attained; but this is a court in which the habits of
intrigue have taken a deep root, for it is more to the efforts
of its policy than of its arms, that it has for many years
past owed its existence. This disposition, and the disputes of
the different factions among its leading nobles, will no doubt,
in the course of the alliance, cause us frequent and serious
embarrassments, but no danger of any consequence is to be
apprehended; and let us suppose all that is likely to hap-
pen at the very worst, and contrast it with what would
have been our situation had the alliance not been formed,
and we shall obtain a pretty fair estimate to enable us to
strike a balance of the benefit of such connexions. Had
the Bhonsela been hostile, or even neutral, in a contest like
that with which we are threatened, the successful applica-
tion of the greater part of our force could not have been
expected to do more in one campaign than to give us what
we now possess, the command of the Nagpore country for
our operations and supplies, and we should have obtained
that under circumstances of violence and irritation, which
would probably have left us no option but that of seizing
upon the government. Every person acquainted with the rela-
tive local position of the territories of Nagpore to the pos-
VOL. II.
k
cxlvi
[Arr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
session and haunts of the Pindaries, and who is aware of the
actual necessity, in every attack we make upon them, of
opening and preserving the communications between our
troops in Bundelcund and the Deckan, must be sensible.
there is no possibility of escaping this conclusion *
As connected with Nagpore, the petty states of Saugur and
Bhopaul become of importance. They may be said to cover
the north-eastern frontier of its territories; and the nature of
these countries, and those of the petty rulers intervening along
the right bank of the Nerbudda, renders their friendship
quite essential to the complete protection of eastern Berar, and
to guard the common road, through which plunderers must
pass to the attack of our provinces in Bundelcund, Bengal, or
the northern Circars. The chief of Saugur, who was until
lately a nominal dependant upon the Paishwah, is disposed,
as well as the ruler of Bhopaul, to enter into any arrange-
ment we can desire, that leaves him the possession of the
country, and emancipates him from the necessity of pur-
chasing the forbearance, or resisting the attack of the free-
booters with whom he is surrounded. The forming of any
treaty with the Nabob of Bhopaul has been prohibited by
the Court of Directors, but the subsequent conclusion of a
subsidiary alliance with the Rajah of Nagpore, and the
necessity we are. now under of attacking the Pindaries,
leave us altogether without option on this point. To pro-
tect the countries of the Bhonsela, and to expel the Pin-
daries from their present haunts, it is alike indispensable
we should either possess by conquest, or through the friend-
ship of its chief, the advantage of the position and resources
of Bhopaul. What was before a question of speculative
policy, has become a measure of positive necessity; and it
is to be remarked, that the treaty with Nagpore has ren-
*This was the opinion of Sir B. Close.
IV.1
cxlvii
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
dered the task of protecting this country easy. It is no
longer an insulated spot in Malwa we shall have to defend,
but a strong point, connected with the military positions
we have formed on the Nerbudda.
Jypore, which, from its local position, is to us the most
important of the Rajpoot states, has, since the peace of
1806, been more than once on the very brink of ruin, and
we have had the alarming prospect of seeing a dangerous
horde of Patan plunderers occupying a country which
would give them increased means of invading our richest
provinces in Hindustan, and of maintaining a direct and
constant intercourse with the most turbulent part of the
populations of our territories in that quarter, who are of
the same tribe, and, indeed, generally speaking, their near
kindred. The apprehension of this danger has led the
Indian government in England to authorize a defensive
treaty being concluded with the ruler of Jypore, and though
some obstacles have interrupted the negotiation, it had the
effect of averting a recent danger from that state. This
negotiation will no doubt be revived, for unless this state is
supported by us, it must fall, and so sensible are its prin-
cipal nobles of this fact, that they evinced great dissatisfac-
tion against their ruler allowing any considerations to pre-
vent the speedy conclusion of the alliance*. Contemplating
the approaching crisis, the necessity of altering our relations†
to Jypore is too imperative to admit of delay. We must
command the territories of this state both for operations
and supplies, or they will furnish our enemies with means
of attacking us in a very vulnerable quarter.
* The present state of Jypore may be imagined, when we are in-
formed that its troops are at this moment employed in plundering that
part of their own country which is in the occupation of Ameer Khan.
The Rajah of Boondec should be included in our arrangements
with the Rajah of Jypore..
k 2
cxlviii
[Arr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
The Rajahs of Odipore and Joudpore have been a prey
to the armies of Sindia and Holkar ever since the peace of
1806, and Ameer Khan would almost appear to have settled
himself and army upon Maun Singh *. We must, from
these circumstances, conclude that the forces of this prince
have been in a great degree subdued, and his resources
exhausted; but should the conduct of the principal preda-
tory powers ever force us to extend our operations in Me-
war or Marwar, or even to the vicinity of these provinces,
I can have no doubt that we should find it easy to rouse
their indolent but brave inhabitants, and that there are
embers still left, which, if kindled into a flame, would aid
essentially in the destruction of those plunderers by whom
these states have been so cruelly oppressed.
Zalim Singh, Rajah of Kottah, has attained a power,
through the influence of his personal character, far exceeding
either his military means or the limits of his possessions:
wise, consistent, and politic, he manages his own affairs and
interferes with those of others with equal prudence: he pays
tribute when protection is necessary, but his character
causes him to be treated with comparative moderation. His
territories are an asylum to distressed princes and offending
subjects; he is a general arbitrator of disputes, and all con-
cur in granting him a respect and confidence which they
refuse to each other. His country, though situated in the
vortex of anarchy and confusion, is usually exempt from
the misery of surrounding districts; but within the last few
years it has suffered from lawless bodies of Pindaries; and
* The Rajah of Joudpore.
Besides the tribute Zalim Singh pays Sindia, he rents several
districts from that prince as well as Holkar, who is paid through his
friend and ally, Ameer Khan; to whose family he gives protection, and
on whose aid and support he can always rely.
IV.]
cxlix
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
he may from this circumstance, as well as his character, be
supposed to be ready to combine (as far as his political
prudence will permit him) in any plan for the extinction of
this class. The local position of his country will probably
bring him within the circle of our first operations; and if
that is the case, he must either act as a friend or an enemy.
If we appear in strength, there can be no doubt which part
he will take; and we may eventually be compelled to ex-
tremes, in which this popular and able ruler might be used
with great advantage as an instrument to restore order and
tranquillity.
There are many petty Hindu chiefs, besides those that
have been mentioned, who, since 1806, have been obliged
to submit to the most powerful freebooters of the moment,
but who are only half subdued, and still possess some means
of asserting and maintaining their independence. If we
enter the approaching contest on the principle of establishing
general tranquillity, and I know no other upon which we
can act with any prospect of success, we shall find those
chieftains our best and most natural allies. A connexion
with them is not exposed to those embarrassments which
attend that with states of a higher rank. Accustomed to
own a superior, they are proud of dependence on a great
government; and though in the habit of improving their
possessions by cultivation and commerce, they maintain, to
the extent of their means, armed adherents, which are taken
from the ranks of freebooters, and are, when it becomes.
their interest, the active defenders of order. Whenever our
policy may lead us to establish a connexion with the prin-
cipals of this class, a moderate tribute, or the service of a
quota of men (if not both) should always be exacted. I
am quite satisfied, from personal experience, that our gene-
rosity on former occasions, in demanding neither, was quite
misunderstood, and instilled suspicions instead of inspiring
!
cl
[Apr
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
confidence. They saw no permanent bond of mutual inte-
rest, and doubted the continuance of such disinterested
protection.
I shall now proceed to take a short view of the condition
and conduct of the predatory powers, or, in other words,
those rulers and chiefs whose habits of government and life
cherish and support that predatory system which constitutes
our present danger, and against which we are at this mo-
ment compelled to direct all the efforts of our policy and of
our arms. The predatory powers may be divided into three
classes: the first, Sindia and Holkar; the second, Ameer
Khan; and the last, the Pindaries. Though the whole of
these are alike promoters of that predatory system which it
is our object to subdue, there is a considerable difference
between the first and the others, and even some shades
between the two last. It is important, therefore, to examine
their conduct separately, both as it relates to their internal
and foreign policy. This will enable us to come to a correct
conclusion on two very important points: first, the right we
have to proceed against each or all of them; and secondly,
the course which appears most likely to obtain success in
those measures which necessity may lead us to adopt.
The empire founded by Madhajee Sindia in Malwa and
Hindustan rested for a long period on no basis but that of
a foreign conquest of a predatory power, which exacted
from the natives a large proportion of the annual revenue of
their country, as a boon for leaving the remainder unplun-
dered. The establishment of a disciplined army (under
French officers) of infantry, with cannon, gave some shape
and solidity to this power. Strong holds were subdued,
petty rebellions suppressed, tribute coerced, new conquests
made, and the mass of the population rendered more obe-
dient to authority. The plans of Madhajee appear to have
been full of wisdom; but the pride of increased strength
IV.]
cli
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
filled the mind of his successor, Dowlut Row, with immea-
surable ambition, and ultimately led him, in 1803, to
provoke a war with the British nation, which terminated, in
a few months, in the destruction of his regular troops, the
capture of his artillery, and the loss of all the countries he
possessed in Hindustan. Though the peace concluded in
1803, the cessions of Gualior in 1806, and the seizure of
Ambajee Ingha's territories about the same period, com-
bined with the destruction, or rather the dissolution of the
Holkar government, left Dowlut Row Sindia with ample
possessions, and with every means of improving at the same
time that he enlarged them, he has deliberately pursued
a contrary course, and from doing so he is justly stated to
be one of the chief causes of all the danger to which we are
now exposed. Every year of the history of this chief since
1806 presents the same uniform and disgusting picture of
rebellion in his government, mutinies in his army, and the
recurring necessitudes of a petty, plundering warfare; all
his hostility has been directed against those weak Hindu
states whom our forbearance left at his mercy, and whose
habits of order and good rule gave their territories a prospe-
rity which he has destroyed. Though Sindia has increased,
by these small conquests, his revenue and his individual
wealth, his country has become every day more impove-
rished, his government more embarrassed, and his nobles.
and his army more disobedient and disorderly. The Pin-
daries alone, whom he has systematically encouraged (in
spite of his occasional professions to us), have flourished,
their numbers are increased, they have grown bold on the
assurance of his protection. He has granted them a home
in his dominions; and when they have returned laden with
the plunder of our provinces, and soiled with the blood of
our subjects, he has not only not refused them an asylum,
but shared in their spoil, and no doubt rejoiced in their
clii
[Apr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
success *. I make the last assertion from the positive con-
viction of its truth. Sindia, who cannot be expected to
forget or forgive the loss of empire, naturally considers us
as his greatest enemies, and contemplates with satisfaction
every attack
upon our power.
It has been, since the conclusion of the war in 1805, a
favourite opinion with the Mahrattas, that we can yet be
opposed by a predatory system of warfare, and that our
power may be reduced like that of the successors of Aurung-
Zebe, by the incessant attacks of plunderers upon our terri-
tories and resources; and the Pindaries have been for some
years past considered as one of the great means of accom-
plishing this object. Sindia, when alarmed by our prepa-
rations, summoned + these freebooters round his standard,
and nothing but the impression of their eventual use in a
contest with us could have induced him to tolerate their
insolence, their occasional plunder of his provinces, and,
above all, the danger of drawing upon his own head, by
persevering in his connexion with them, the vengeance of
the British government.
The conduct of Sindia, on the occasion of a representation
being recently made to him on this subject, must prove the
impossibility of placing the slightest reliance on his profes-
sions. He has lately, it is true, shewn a great desire to
preserve a good understanding with the British government,
but this is the consequence of alarm at its imposing state.
His tone was very different two years ago, and even now,
when goaded by our reproaches to send a force to attack
the Pindaries, a friendly correspondence is opened between
one of the principal officers and the leader of these free-
booters against whom he is to act. In any plan we may
Captain Close's Correspondence, 1816 and 1817.
The minister at the court of Nagpore did not hesitate to stato
this fact to the resident.
IV.]
cliii
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
determine upon for the suppression of a predatory system,
it would, as far as I am able to judge, be as great weakness,
after what has passed, to place any confidence in the pro-
fessions, promises, or engagements of Sindia, without very
adequate security, as it would be waste of time to seek for
more proof than is already on record, of his interests being
identified with those freebooters,-of his being their patron,
and of their considering themselves, however loose the ties,
as his subjects and soldiers. This is proved by the letters
of their leader to his minister, and by a thousand facts; but
that of their continued residence in his country is of itself
sufficient to establish our right to treat him (if it suits our
policy to do so) as an enemy. We must either do this, or
continue to suffer a neutrality, or rather a system by which
Sindia carries on a harassing war against us, without
exposing himself to any of the distresses and dangers of that
condition. His troops, most of which are similar in dress,
in cast, and in habits to the Pindaries, swell the bands of
these freebooters, when they proceed on their plundering
excursions; and the latter, when they desire to elude our
pursuit, take shelter in his country, and melt into his army.
Under such circumstances, it appears almost impossible to
form any plan for the extinction of this evil, which does not
commence by making Dowlut Row Sindia a friend, on
whom we can depend, or an enemy that we have to en-
counter. It has been urged in palliation of the conduct of
this prince, that he does not possess the power, either to
suppress or expel the Pindaries; but this supposition, if a
fact, though it alters his situation, does not alter ours.
The distinction between want of inclination and want of
ability, in such a case, is not easily made; and if our safety
is endangered by the hostile attacks of a military people
living in his provinces, it matters little whether they derive
their power of waging war upon us from his weakness or
cliv
[APP.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
his support. We are bound to treat him as sovereign of
the country. And considering him as such, we must make
him responsible for the conduct of its inhabitants; besides,
if this really be Sindia's condition, he will rejoice in the
opportunity which our policy will afford of co-operating in
the destruction of hordes that are always above his autho-
rity, and who must, if not reduced, make rapid strides to
the subversion of his power.
The possessions of the Holkar family in Malwa and
Candeish, are now in a state of singular confusion and
anarchy. Ever since the insanity of Jeswunt Row Holkar,
this government has been verging to dissolution. It has
been, in fact, a prey to contending chiefs; and their jealousy
of each other, the force of habit, and that devotion to usage
which is characteristical of the natives of India, has alone
preserved it from complete destruction. Though Toolsah
Bhye, the mother of the young prince*, had been acknow-
ledged Regent, the military power of the state was
usurped by Ameer Khan, while Balaram Seit, who was
a favourite of Jeswunt Row, and employed by him to
negotiate with the English government, in 1806 became
the principal minister. Year after year, the weakness and
anarchy of this state increased; Ameer Khan exclusively
employed the means which his influence gave him to pro-
mote his plans of personal aggrandizement. His adherents
(mostly Patans of his own tribe) were distinct from that
force which was commanded by leaders who had an here-
ditary attachment to the family of Holkar; the latter were
however reduced to a small number, not exceeding eight
or ten thousand horse, with a few undisciplined corps of
infantry; and as the government was unable to pay even
*She is not the real mother of the prince, but having adopted
him, was always called so.
IV.]
clv
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
this remnant of his former army, these troops have, for ten
years past, subsisted by plundering their own country,
by joining the Pindaries, or by extorting, through the
means of mutinies, advances from a weak and usual dis-
tracted court. On a late occasion the Regent Toolsah
Bhye, with her son and Gunput Row, a rival of Balaram
Seit, fled from her mutinous army to a fortress, and placed
herself and the young prince under the safeguard of Zalim
Singh, chief of Kottah. She remained in this voluntary
exile four months, when, having obtained the means, by
the seizure and plunder of one of the chief officers of the
government, of satisfying the troops, she returned to the
camp, where one of her first acts was to imprison, plunder,
and put to death Balaram Seit, whose enemy, Gunput
Row, was now declared minister. The next object of
plunder was a widow of the late Jeswunt Row Hol-
kar. Severe torture * made this lady produce a sum
of 50,000 rupees, which only whetted the avarice of her
enemies. Her further torture and death, and the plunder
The nephew of
of all her property was the consequence.
- Jeswunt Row Holkar, and several other chiefs, who were
attached to the late minister, were seized and murdered.
These events, which took place in the beginning of this
year, have excited equal horror and astonishment.
Ameer Khan is still at Joudpore, and the state of his af-
fairs in that quarter, combined with the clamours of his
own troops for pay, have prevented him from repairing to
Malwa, where his representative, Ghuffoor Khan, has hi-
therto, in vain, endeavoured to oppose the measures of
Toolsah Bhye, who, on his placing himself at the head of
her mutinous infantry, made an application for aid to
* She was placed on a plate of heated iron.-Vide Captain Close's
Despatch.
1
[Apr.
clvi
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
Dowlut Row Sindia, which that ruler has granted; and the
struggle for supremacy at the durbar of Holkar, which has
long existed between him and Ameer Khan, would seem
likely to be soon decided; but there are so many interests
involved, and so many intrigues on foot, as to render it im-
possible, at any one stage of the action, to anticipate the
conclusion. We can, in fact, be positive of nothing but the
continuance, which ever way it terminates, of anarchy and
confusion.
The events that have been described would be of no con-
sequence to us, further than as a beacon to warn us from a
scene of trouble, did they not connect, and that most
nearly, with the Pindaries. The ranks of these freebooters
are filled with the soldiers of Holkar, and the state of go-
vernment and possessions of that family, not only afford
them continual supplies of men, of money, and of food,
but of retreat and security. This assertion cannot be con-
troverted by the circumstances of the occasional disputes
between this state and the Pindaries. Such disputes are
ever the fruit of that aid and encouragement which weak
states grant to freebooters of this class. There exists in the
present government of Holkar no tangible authority from
which we can expect any redress of the injuries we suffer
from these causes. The settlement of this state, or ra-
ther of its territories, therefore, in some shape or other,
becomes essential in any plan for the extinction of the evil
which now compels us to arm: whether this is done directly
by ourselves through Sindia or Ameer Khan matters not,
so the object is affected. It is a mere question of expe-
diency. To talk of our faith or our treaties with a govern-
ment which has been virtually extinct, or at all events in-
capable of maintaining any of the relations of friendship
for ten years, appears to me a mockery of terms. I do
not, however, mean to say it would be just to deprive the
IV.]
clvii
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
family of Holkar of their possessions, provided they, or
those that act for them, were disposed to join cordially in
our plans for the suppression of the predatory system; and
under every course I am aware that it would be an outrage
upon opinion, that nothing but an extreme case could jus-
tify, to set aside altogether the pretensions of this family.
The different branches of the Mahratta nations are hasten-
ing by stages sufficiently rapid to decay; their rule beyond
the limits of their native country had never any solid basis.
They are everywhere else but recent conquerors, and their
power, in most instances, has preserved its original shape.
They have, under the denomination of kings, continued to
be leaders of predatory hordes, and when engaged in fo-
reign expeditions, their usual habits have found sufficient
exercise in plundering and chastising those tributaries and
inferior chiefs, whom their intolerable oppression conti-
nually drove into rebellion. To subdue the system under
which this class has flourished is, in part, to subdue them;
but satisfied of this, we should avoid, as much as we
can, any measures which, by exciting their fears, or shocking
their prejudices, might dispose them (from a sense of com-
mon danger) to unite. The dissolution of their authority,
under every course, is certain; but the more gradual, the
less likely it is to be attended with any serious con-
vulsion.
The state of Ameer Khan's power in 1809 has been
already mentioned; he was then at the head of a predatory
force, of between thirty and forty thousand men, and com-
pelled the British government to adopt the expensive mea-
sure of forming (as has been noticed) an army in the
Deckan, and a considerable corps in Bundelcund, to keep
him in check. The Pindaries who had joined this chief,
from the same feeling they would any other, because he
promised to lead them to plunder, fell off from their alle-
clviii
[APP.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
giance as his views became more limited. This certainly
was the zenith of Ameer Khan's greatness, and had he pos-
sessed that genius and ambition which numbers believed he
did, he might have made a great effort for power; but he
showed on this occasion, as he has on many others, that he
is merely a brave partisan chief. The crisis, however, that
gave him the chance of being greater, evinced in a most
forcible manner the danger to which we are hourly exposed,
from the rise of a leader of higher qualities and more
daring enterprise. A Sevajee, or Hyder Ally, would,
with the means which he at that moment possessed, have
carried fire and sword to the furthest regions of our posses-
sions in India. The life of Ameer Khan since this period
has passed between efforts to maintain his authority over
the distracted councils of the family of Holkar, expedients
to satisfy the clamours of his army, attacks on the country
of Jypore, and the establishment of his influence and
power over the court of Maun Singh, Rajah of Joud-
pore. The latter appears to have been throughout his
leading object; and as he not only exacts a considerable tri-
bute from that prince, but has obtained valuable grants of
territory, which he desires to render hereditary in his fa-
mily, the greatest proportion of his troops is generally in
that country; and it is evident from every account, that no-
thing but their presence maintain his oppressive autho-
rity. The utmost jealousy exists between him and the
Rajah, and it has been conjectured that he means to de-
pose Maun Singh, and put his son on the throne; and the
recent murder of one of the principal ministers at Joud-
pore, shews he will hesitate at no measure, however violent,
to maintain his interests in that quarter.
The preservation of his influence over the family of Holkar
is left, as has been stated, to an agent, attended by a small
body of men. The care of the conquests he has made from
IV.]
clix
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
the state of Jypore is committed to one of his leaders; and
his jaghire of Seronge, and other possessions that he holds
of the Holkar family, are in a great degree unprotected.
He reposes great confidence in Zalim Singh, Rajah of Kot-
tah, who pays him*, as has been mentioned, the tribute due
to Holkar, and who grants his family a place of refuge.
Ameer Khan, in return for this friendship, is the avowed
supporter of the Rajah of Kottah, who derives considerable
strength from the reputation of such an ally.
The connexion between Ameer Khan and the Pindaries
was more intimate some years ago than it is at present, but
they still look up to him, and are associated with his fol-
lowers by similarity of condition and habits of life; and in
any contest we may engage in, it will be very difficult to
separate one class of freebooters from another, unless the
followers of Ameer Khan remain engaged, as at this mo-
ment, in a scene distant from that of our first operations.
Even in this case, the Pindaries we expel from Malwa
would find protection in Marwar, and return the moment
our efforts relaxed. This makes it impossible to exclude
from our consideration Ameer Khan and his adherents, as
it is obvious that any settlement will be incomplete that
does not, in some way or other, embrace them. The whole
conduct of this chief since 1806 certainly gives us the right
which Lord Minto assumed, to consider him as distinct from
the family of Holkar, and in this view he stands the leader
of a formidable predatory band, without any legitimate
claims to power, and whom we may in consequence treat as
expediency shall dictate. It may, however, eventually be
for our advantage to recognise him in the character he still
assumes, of a servant of the Holkar family. His actual
force consists of about 12,000 horse, several indifferent corps
* Captain Close's Letter to Lord Moira, 23d April, 1816.
clx
[Arr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
of disciplined infantry, and between two and three hundred
pieces of cannon. His artillery, if my account is correct,
is by far more formidable than that of any other native
power in India, and it has been represented to be in tolerable
order; but this, considering the distracted state of his army,
seems hardly credible.
allies for his sup-
of distinction, his
His army lives by
Ameer Khan is so far different from a Pindarie chief,
that his ascendency has taken a more settled shape; and he
possesses resources that are, in a certain degree, competent
to meet his expenditure, consequently is not forced, as they
are, to make incursions upon us or our
port. But though there is this shade
condition is in other respects the same.
plunder, though that is within a defined sphere, but the
countries on which they now subsist must become exhausted,
and the bands which he commands are in training for a
wider range. We have more than once been compelled to
make preparations against their threatened ravages, and
though circumstances may dictate some delay, there is no
doubt that ultimately the reform or dispersion of this force
is essential to our interests. There is reason to conclude
that the age * and disappointed ambition of this leader have
inclined him to connect himself with the British govern-
ment. His late overtures to the resident at Delhi† upon this
subject, are in a very different strain from any he has ever
before made. He appears anxious for our protection, and
to gain that, he professes himself ready to be an instrument
in forwarding our plans, particularly as these may relate to
the Holkar family. The government have kept this nego-
tiation open, and there is no doubt but Ameer Khan, if
sincere, may be of great use; and as both he and many of
* He is sixty-five years of age.
† Letter from Mr. Metcalf to Mr. Adam.
Letter from Mr. Adam to Mr. Metcalf.
IV.]
clxi
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
his principal followers are natives of our own provinces,
that circumstance may afford us additional means of effect-
ing such an arrangement. I confess that, in the present
state of India, I have no alarm at the increase of a Mahom-
medan power in any regular shape; and all my experience
inclines me to consider that race to be much more manage-
able in intimate connexions with us than the Mahrattas.
They may be more bold and turbulent, but they are neither
so artful nor so restless. Their propensity to dissipation
and to the enjoyment of every luxury within their grasp
incline them to an indolence, a very short indulgence in
which, though it may leave their sentiments the same,
destroys those habits which render them dangerous. The
simplicity of the Mahratta soldier preserves him from such
change; his clothes, his diet, his manners, are fixed by the
rules of the class, or caste, to which he belongs; he yields
like the reed to the storm he cannot resist, but it is only to
resume his shape the moment it is past. On the whole, I
should conclude that, in our future connexion with these
two races of men, we shall complain most of our Mahome-
dan allies; we shall suffer most from the Mahrattas.
It remains, in treating this branch of the subject, to say
a few words on the actual condition of the Pindaries. The
numbers of this class of freebooters in Malwa were, three
years ago, estimated by an intelligent officer at 30,000
horse. In a very sensible paper †, full of information re-
garding this people, I find their numbers stated at 41,000.
Both may be right, for it is evidently impossible, as I have
elsewhere observed‡, to fix any standard for a force that
is daily changing-whose ranks are recruited when there is
a prospect of plunder from those of Sindia, Holkar, and
Captain Sydenham.
+ Memoir of the Pindaries, by Captain Tod.
Memorandum on the Pindaries, dated London, 1818.
VOL. II.
1
}
clxii
[App.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
Ameer Khan, and who dissolve on the occurrence of re-
verses into the armies of these chiefs. There are, however,
a certain number of leaders who have always a body of
attached adherents, who possess territories and forts, and
even some infantry and cannon. Heeroo, Kureem Khan,
and Cheetoo are the principal. Heeroo has long been the
prisoner of Sindia. Kureem Khan at first shared his fate,
but obtained his release by paying a large ransom, imme-
diately after which he summoned his old followers to his
standard, and began to revenge himself, by plundering the
possessions of the prince whose avarice had restored him to
liberty. A junction between Cheetoo and this leader spread
alarm in every quarter*, as their combined force amounted
to 25,000 men; but the policy of the Bhonsela, whose
country first felt their depredations, divided them, and
Cheetoo soon afterwards aided one of Sindia's generals in
an attack upon his late ally, Kureem. The latter was
completely routed, and compelled to throw himself upon the
mercy of Ameer Khan, who delivered him over to the
Regent Toolsah Bhye, by whom he is still kept in con-
finement. These events have thrown the principal com-
mand of the Pindaries into the hands of Cheetoo, whom
Sindia rewarded for his aid against Kureem by a grant of
lands, in addition to those he already possessed, of the
value of five lacs of rupees per annum. But this chief of
freebooters has since abandoned this territory, as inadequate
to his support, and inconsistent with his views, which led
him to desire a place of security for his family and wealth,
and to collect his revenue from fields that others have toiled
to render fruitful. The character of Cheetoo seems well
qualified for the prominent part he has lately had to act.
He is described as a man 'who adds prudence to courage,
enterprising but cautious, and as possessing not only great
* Captain Tod's Memoir.
IV.]
clxiii
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
artifice, but political sagacity. This chief is not without
enemies among his own race: the most prominent are the
near relations of Kureem; though, when there is a prospect of
booty, these quarrels cease. The two great divisions of
Sindia Shahee, and Holkar Shahee, which used to separate
this class, have, we are told, in their late incursions into the
Deckan and our provinces, been quite forgotten: all parties
have joined; but the scene will change when they are at-
tacked, and as their condition alters from that of prosperity
to distress, former differences will revive, and each leader
will find, in the recollection of old grievances and the resent-
ment of past injuries, an excuse for pursuing that course
which suits best with his interest or safety.
The indisputable fact of the number of the Pinda-
ries having considerably increased within the last seven or
eight years, completely confutes the idea that they are
entirely formed of men whom our conquests drove to
despair. Though many of the irregular horse of India
might, on the extinction or reduction of the governments
they had served, have been compelled to join them, it is
very evident that if those had found it (as they must have
done had the rulers in Malwa been inclined to maintain
tranquillity) a life of hardship and danger, their numbers
would have soon lessened; they would have resorted to
another course of life; and as those who had originally
embraced this line left it, died, or lost their horses, the ranks
of these freebooters would have thinned, and recruits would
not have been found to supply their place. Under such
circumstances we might conclude that, as the Pindaries are
not held together by any of those ties which unite nations
of plunderers, but are formed of adventurers and freebooters
of every class and denomination, early dissolution must have
been certain. Yet how different is their condition from that
which has been supposed. The encouragement given to
1 2
clxiv
[APP.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
them by the chiefs of Malwa, the impunity with which they
have hitherto made invasions into other countries, the plun-
der they have obtained with a very moderate share of
enterprise, and with comparatively little danger, added to
their exemption from rigid authority and discipline, and a
license to indulge to excess in the gratification of their pas
sions, must render their life the most attractive that it is
possible to conceive, for all descriptions of the military
classes; but their lawless habits, and their want of those
bonds which preserve union in adversity, though it is a
cause of their increase, will facilitate their reduction. It is
against their resuscitation we have to guard, for we must
never forget that it is worse than profitless to destroy those
vermin, while the substance that produces them is left in its
rotten and corrupt state to engender more.
The Pindaries are not without confidence in the strong
holds in which they have lodged their families and wealth,*
and to which they retire when the season is unfavourable
for their operations, or when they dread attack. These
holds are almost all situated upon or near the great range
of Vindhya mountains, between which and the right bank
of the Nerbudda there intervenes a strip of fertile country,
interspersed with ridges of low hills and forests, in some
places twenty, in others only two miles in breadth, which
they appear to deem of great importance, as it facilitates
their incursions into our country and those of our allies, the
Bhonsela, Nizam, and Paishwah. The near approach of
our troops stationed in the Nagpore country to this tract,
has evidently excited the greatest alarm; and we observe,
that in all their consultations upon the mode of defence
against the expected attack, they are no longer at ease with
regard to the safety of their baggage and families. Cheetoo,
Captain Tod's Memoir.
IV.]
clxv
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
in a late letter to Hindoo Row Ghatkeah, one of Sindia's
chief officers, laments that that prince should not consider the
present time as proper to break with the English, and pro-
mises to do alone (provided he receives secret aid) all that
is possible. "But (the Pindarie chief adds) until a place
of refuge for the families of your slaves is in our hands, we
are helpless; but having this, it will then rest with me to
carry to the garrison of Calcutta rapine and devastation *."
The same leader, in a subsequent letter to Ameer Khan, ex-
presses a fear that Sindia will be deterred, by apprehension
of the British government, from complying with this request.
"To the many petitions (he observes) that I sent to the
Huzoor of Dowlut Row Sindia, the replies have been to
the following purport:-At this time my friendship with
the English is strong and undivided; to break it now is not
advisable, but covertly and in time of need my exertions
shall not be wanting: but to give a place for your families.
would be the cause of immediate rupture with them."-
"There is (Cheetoo continues) no help for this; what is to
be done? Hindu Row, to the extent of his abilities, is
using every effort, and on his exertions lies my expectation :
at present I am looking for a place of strength and difficult
access, and, being unsuccessful elsewhere, have addressed
the Rajah, Maun Singh. I am confident that, on this sub-
ject, you will also address him to this effect,—that the place
which was formerly assigned for the residence of the Maha-
rajah Holkar should be appointed for us; and that you
will soon intimate to me its success, that from it
my heart
* Captain Close's Letter to Mr. Adams, January 23, 1817.
† Huzoor means presence, and is the common term used in speaking
or writing of princes.
† In 1805, when Holkar was pursued into the Punjub by Lord
Lake, he sent his family to Malwa.
elxvi
[APP.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
may be set at case, and that I may face the English with
confidence. Then, for once, by the blessing of God and
the fortune of the exalted, the tumult shall be spread to the
environs of Calcutta, the whole country shall be consigned
to ashes, and to such distress shall they be reduced, that the
accounts will not fail to reach you; but at present this must
be delayed for want of a place of refuge. To whatever
extent you can aid me with a force in horse, do send-this
will be proper and necessary.
".
In an address to Maun Singh, Rajah of Joudpore, Chee-
too observes, "To Maharajah Dowlut Row Sindia, who is
our master, I have sent several successive letters on this
subject; to which the replies have been, that the present
was not a fit season to break the bonds of friendship and
alliance which existed, but by concealed methods, and in
every possible manner, every assistance and exertion should
be made for us. But without a place of refuge and safety
for our families, our minds cannot be at ease. The Maha-
rajah Sindia cannot give the wished-for place, as his inten-
tions towards us would then be obvious to the English; for
this reason, considering our necessity for a place of refuge,
I have hopes that from your favour the place you assigned
for the residence of Jeswunt Row Holkar's family may now
be bestowed for the families of your slaves; then it will
reach your ear to what straits and difficulties I have reduced
the English, for the whole of their country, even to Calcutta,
shall be consigned to devastation and plunder. Let the
Huzoor* have reliance on us, and we your slaves shall
always be at your command. But if this is not to be your
pleasure, recollect this tribe (the English) are wise and full
of penetration, and by slow and imperceptible degrees will
root out every chief of Hindustan. Do not forget these
* Presence.
IV.]
clxvii
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
•
words of your slave: my vakeel *, who resides in the victo-
rious army (Sindia's,) will send you by the hircarrah †
accounts of all that concerns me. I remain in expectation
of a reply, and trust that it will be favourable."
I have quoted these genuine documents, as I am confident
the present condition, feelings, and views of the Pindaries
cannot be better explained than in the words of their prin-
cipal leader. In a recent letter from Hindu Row Ghatkeah
to Cheetoo, which the resident at Sindia's court concludes
to have been written with the knowledge of that ruler, he
bids him "to let his heart rest satisfied;" and after inform-
ing him that the remonstrances of the British resident
have compelled Sindia to detach a force against him, adds
"whatever else is decided on shall be duly and fully com-
municated to you."
Though the Pindaries have been successful in passing
and repassing our strong corps upon a frontier, to a degree
that has exposed most fully the folly of attempting to check
this evil by a defensive system, the activity and great
exertions of our troops have on several occassions reached,
and severely punished these freebooters, but not one of our
successes, however, is ever mentioned in any of the native
Ackbars, or newspapers of Malwa; while the exploits of the
Pindaries in plundering our territories, defeating our troops,
and murdering European officers, are blazoned on every
occasion. These reports, however exaggerated and false,
are believed by the parties for whom they are written, and
prove a sufficient antidote to dispel any impressions that
might arise from an occasional reverse in a distant ex-
pedition.
We may conclude from what has been stated, that though
the Pindaries consider themselves at war with the English,
* Agent.
+ Messenger.
Vide Captain Close's letter to Mr. Adam, 19th March, 1819.
clxviii
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
[APP.
and are disposed to make every exertion they can against
that nation and its allies, they continue to believe that a
similarity of interest and of habits will secure to them the
aid of the predatory powers in Malwa, but the latest
accounts prove that at a moment when unanimity seems so
essential to the safety of this body, they are distracted by
internal disputes, which have been lately aggravated by
their alarm, and the consciousness of how little they can
depend upon each other on the occurrence of any serious
emergency.
From what has been said of the predatory powers in
Malwa, it will be seen that though distinct in other respects,
they are from necessity, from habits, from common motives
of action, and from a communion, or rather confusion of
interests, so connected with each other, and have their pos-
sessions so intersected, and their policy so interwoven, that it
is impossible, while they remain in their present condition,
to separate them from each other; and when we see, as we
have done, for several years past, our provinces and those
of our allies annually plundered, our subjects slaughtered,
and our revenues exhausted, by defensive measures, and a
display of our strength; when the only result of our
forbearance is to make our friends lose confidence in our
protection, and our enemies exult in our anticipated ruin :
what consolation can it afford us to discriminate with nicety
the respective share of the wrongs done us that belongs to
each of the different parties, whose conduct has produced
this effect. There can be no doubt that the course pur-
sued by Dowlut Row Sindia for ten years, has contributed,
and that most materially, to the state of danger in which
we stand. That of the government of Holkar has had the
same effect; Ameer Khan is a declared predatory chief, and
the whole are so blended with the Pindaries, that we must
refrain from offensive operations, or be prepared to en-
IV.]
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
clxix
counter all. Of our right to adopt that proceeding upon
this occasion, which a consideration of our honour, our
interests and our safety, so imperatively demand, there
cannot, I think, be a question. We are fully justified,
if it suits our policy to do so, to declare to both Sindia and
Holkar that their conduct has rendered invalid the peace
of 1806, and that the situation in which they have placed
the British government has absolved it from those ties
which it then contracted, and that their future relations
must be determined by their compliance or otherwise with
the demands which we felt ourselves authorized to make
upon them.
With Ameer Khan we can, as far as matter of right is
concerned, have no difficulty; the question, as far as relates
to him, is one of expediency, and with regard to the
Pindaries, our reputation forbids any negotiation. In the
contests we are engaged in with them, particular chiefs may
by their actions recommend themselves to clemency, and
even reward; but after what has happened, it would, till
they are subdued, be degrading to enter into any parley or
contract with the principal leaders of this tribe.
It is far from satisfactory to be obliged to engage in a
contest in which the enemy is so intangible, and the interests
that may be effected so various, that it is alike impossible
to determine the limits of the scene of action, as the scope
of measures in which we may become involved; but unfor-
tunately we have no option, and to establish the necessity
we are under of proceeding (whether we are disposed or not)
to the remedy of this evil, whatever may be the consequences
that attend the effort, two questions only need be asked—
First, is it possible after the events that have occurred,
for the British government to delay the most active ope-
rations against the Pindaries? Secondly, is it possible to
carry on these operations without being aided by the de-
clxx
[Arr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
cided friendship, or opposed by the open hostility of the
predatory powers in Malwa, with whom the Pindaries have
been shewn to be so connected and so blended, that nothing
but their complete amalgamation or separation can afford
us the means (with all our commanding force) of obtaining
more than a mere temporary exemption from dangers.
There can be only one answer to these questions; there
indeed appears to me to be no longer any ground to argue
(as far at least as this point is concerned,) regarding the two
opposite systems of policy alluded to in the beginning of
this letter. For let us suppose that the one adopted by
Marquess Wellesley was radically wrong, and that the con-
trary course was wise and politic; still that does not alter
the actual state of affairs, which is all that we have to dis-
cuss. Events have occurred that were not, perhaps, to be
anticipated, which have disappointed all the views we had
indulged of remaining at peace; while those powers, from
all connexion with whose affairs we had carefully abstained,
<< were waging war against each other, and wasting their
resources in interminable conquests." The sphere of dis-
order has gradually enlarged; the predatory bands that this
system cherished and encouraged have taken a wider range,
and our territories, and those of our allies, have been made
the scene of their cruel rapine and devastation. Compelled
to punish this aggression, and to prevent its recurrence, we
must be guided more by a consideration of our own situa-
tion, and the actual condition of those whose conduct has
forced us into the field, than by attention to any rules of a
particular system. It is no doubt the duty of the Indian
government to attend not only to the orders but wishes of
the controlling authorities in England; but these can only
at a crisis like the present prescribe generally the line they
wish to be pursued. Their sentiments (as far as relates to
this question) may be anticipated: they will, no doubt, be
IV.]
clxxi
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
the same as they have been on similar occasions: though
averse to any extension of our political relations that can be
avoided, and deprecating war, they never will shrink from
the sacred duty of protecting their subjects, nor hesitate to
approve of measures which have no object but to punish
gross and violent aggression, and to prevent its recurrence.
Though desirous to discourage all plans of ambition, how-
ever likely to be attended with remote and contingent ad-
vantages, and justly apprehensive of financial difficulties
from increasing disbursements, it would be calumny upon
the wisdom of these authorities to suppose that they would
approve of any policy which sacrificed the safety of their
subjects, the peace of their territories, the confidence of
their allies, and the reputation of their government, to ob-
tain a short respite from evils which are inevitable, and of
a nature which entail difficulty, and an expenditure propor-
tioned to the delay incurred in meeting them.
Having thus given my sentiments in the fullest manner,
on the condition of the different states of India, of our ac-
tual relations to each of them, and the right we have ac-
quired, and the necessity we are under of attacking the Pin-
daries, and of settling, in a mode that will secure the peace
of our territories and those of our allies, the predatory
powers in Malwa, I shall proceed, after a few general ob-
servations on the character of the measures we should adopt,
to offer my opinion on the extent of our military prepara-
tions, the positions we should immediately occupy, the de-
mands we should make from Sindia, Holkar, and Ameer
Khan, and conclude by some general observations on the
probable conduct of these chiefs.
In commencing this part of the subject I shall only, in
this place, refer to the opinion I before gave, relative to the
course we should pursue, if compelled to attack the Pinda-
ries, that I may remark on the events which have since
!
clxxii
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
[Arr.
7
occurred. Two successive invasions of our territories by
these freebooters, their open and declared intention to repeat
these invasions, the support they have indirectly received
from Dowlut Row Sindia, the evasions and inattention
with which that prince has treated our repeated remon-
strances; and, above all, the accession of the Rajah of Nag-
pore to the general defensive alliance, have substantially al-
tered this question.
I consider that there are now more im-
perative causes than then existed, for our interfering with a
strong hand in the reduction or settlement, not only of the
Pindaries, but of the predatory powers in general, and that
our prospect of success in effecting this object is much
greater. We may, I conceive, pursue this end by any one
of three causes. First, we may instantly declare war upon
the Pindaries, and those predatory powers whom we con-
sider as their supporters and protectors; and unless the
latter instantly submit to the terms we propose, we may
conquer their country, and add it to our possessions. Se-
condly, we may limit our exertions to the mere expulsion
of the Pindaries from their present haunts, and trust to the
check which the advanced position of our troops will im-
pose on them, to the apprehensions of Sindia, Holkar, and
Ameer Khan, for our future security; and, lastly, we
may, if compelled to war, restore or grant the countries we
subdue to our allies, contenting ourselves with such arrange-
ments as are necessary to defray the charges we incur in
the support of troops, for the establishment of tranquillity.
The first of these plans cannot be entertained, if it is at
variance with the principles of policy which are prescribed
for the government of our Indian empire, and, as far as I
can judge, in opposition to our true interests. Territorial
possession will, in spite of all our efforts to the contrary,
come too fast upon us; and besides the general reasons which
oppose this policy, the present habits of the population of
IV.]
clxxiii
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
Malwa are not favourable to such a change as an immediate
transition to the rule of the British government, which would
be compelled to maintain for some years an army in that
province. It is also no slight objection to this plan, that its
adoption would, in a considerable degree, deprive us of the
means of rewarding those who may aid us in the contest in
which we are about to be engaged. The fact is, should
Sindia or Holkar venture to provoke hostilities, their pos-
sessions present us with the best of all materials for destroy-
ing their power, and raising other native authorities more
calculated to preserve tranquillity. To seize the territory
in Malwa for our own use, therefore, would be every way
impolitic; and though it is probable we should be obliged
to extend our protection to those who obtained it, there is
a wide difference between the exercise of a general controul
through the means of our influence and the direct establish-
ment of our government.
Of the second proposition, which goes to the mere expul-
sion of the Pindaries, and to trust to our advanced positions,
and the apprehensions of Sindia, Holkar, and Ameer Khan,
for our future security, I shall only observe, that it would
be (after what has recently occurred) at once the most
insecure and expensive of all plans of offensive operations
we could pursue; better, indeed, persevere in our useless
lines of defence, or arm our villages, and bid them to
resist the Pindaries, than make a parade of encircling the
weak and divided predatory powers of Malwa with the
British armies, and conclude on driving a few Pindaries
for a season from their petty forts and mountain fastnesses.
This course could have no result but of diminishing our
reputation, encouraging our enemies, and placing us at the
end of one year, or at the utmost two, under the necessity
of renewing our preparations to revenge fresh aggression,
and to recover the impression of an abortive campaign.
clxxiv
[APP.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER.
The last course, which proposes to restore or to grant the
countries we may subdue to our allies, contenting ourselves
with such arrangements as are necessary to defray the
charges we may incur, in the support of troops for the
establishment and maintenance of tranquillity, appears to
me on every ground the best we can adopt. It places our
proceeding upon its true ground. Our conduct will shew all
India that, while we indulge in no schemes of ambition,—
cherish no desire to extend our possessions, we are resolved
not only to resist aggression, but to prevent its recurrence,
and determined to compel those whose bad faith or bad
rule have contributed to produce this state of affairs, to aid
with their resources, both of men and revenue, in its remedy,
or to share in the evils and hazards of that war which this
systematic policy has brought on us; and in the latter
event, this course will furnish us, as I have before stated,
with ample materials for their reduction.
It is quite impossible to propose any plan of operation,
before the conduct of Sindia, Holkar, and Ameer Khan
shall have so far developed their intentions, as to enable us
to discover the quality and number of our enemies. We
can at present only consider ourselves at war with the
Pindaries, and we may perhaps have none else to contend
with; while, on the other hand, it is possible that all the
predatory chiefs may combine to save their brethren from
destruction; and we should be prepared for the worst:
besides, in exact proportion to the force we exhibit, and
the imposing attitude it assumes, will be our chance of
avoiding war with those powers, or if it should occur, of
bringing it to a speedy and honourable issue.
From the troops already in the Deckan, and the corps
which may be added to them, three forces of nearly equal
magnitude might be formed, either of which would be equal
to meet any army that the utmost combination could bring
IV.]
clxxv
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
against us. One of these forces should, as soon as possible,
occupy a position at or near Hindia, on the Nerbudda *
This would advance it to the verge of the scene of intended
operations, and place it in complete communication with
Colonel Adam's corps in the Nagpore country, while it
would be supported by the force at Ellichipore. The latter
would, on the advance corps crossing the Nerbudda, oc-
cupy its position, join, and co-operate with it, in the event
of circumstances rendering such a measure prudent or ad-
visable. The force in the Poonah territory could not ad-
vance to aid in any general plan of operations in Malwa, till
the policy of Sindia and Holkar was decided, as it would
be required to reduce the territories of those chiefs in Can-
deish, if they provoked hostilities. It is of consequence
this point should be decided some months before the Ner-
budda is fordable, in order (should these chiefs be against
us) that this corps might be at liberty, after having reduced
Asseerghur, Chaudore, and Galna, to occupy an advanced
position near Chouly Mohyseer, on the Nerbudda, which
is in every view important, as it covers the left of the corps
at or near Hindia, connects that with the frontier posses-
sion of Guzzerat, and could move on the centre of Malwa.
Corps would be required at the capitals of Hyderabad and
Poonah, and some troops must be left to aid in the pro-
tection of the provinces of our allies, lest parties of free-
booters should pass the advanced line, and ravage them. But
with all the preparations we could make, we should not be
able to guard every danger; and I completely join in the
opinion, that we ought, even at the hazard of petty dis-
•
* Hindia is about sixty miles from Hursingabad, one of the prin-
cipal positions of Colonel Adam's forces, about ninety miles from Elli
chipore, and about one hundred miles from Chouly, Mohyseer, and
about sixty from Bhopaul.
clxxvi
[Arr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
orders in our own territories or those of our allies, to direct
our chief exertion to the immediate settlement of the con-
test in which we are engaged; and I should act in this
manner, from the conviction that our success in that can
alone give permanent security to our subjects. I do not,
however, mean by this to recommend any neglect of prepa-
ration, to guard against an evil which it is likely we may
have to encounter, but only to class it as secondary to the
great object, of striking at the root of the power of our
enemies.
The government of Bombay, after furnishing such fur-
ther aid as may be required for the corps in the territories
of the Paishwah, should, I conceive, equip an efficient field-
force from the remainder of the disposable part of its army,
to occupy an advanced position on the frontier of Guzzerat,
which, while it covers that country, approximates, by a
communication along the banks of the Nerbudda, the corps
near Chouly Mohyseer, and by the Chumbul, with any
force that may advance on that river from Hindustan.
This corps would be also able to grant protection to the
Rajpoot princes of Oudipore and Joudpore, should events
dictate such a course of policy.
I feel some diffidence in extending these general remarks
on the outline of our preparations to those necessary on the
frontier of our territory in Hindustan; but as far as my
experience, and the opinions I have seen in the several do-
cuments I have been furnished with, enable me to judge, I
think that political, as well as military reasons, recommend
that one corps should be stationed on the frontier of the
territory of Jypore, while another should occupy a position
near Saugur: the first corps would have its communication
with Delhi through Rewari, while it was supported by a
strong reserve near Agra; and the latter, in conjunction
IV.]
clxxvii
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
with the reserve in Bundelcund*, would completely keep
Sindia in check, if he remained (which he probably will
unless he is decidedly hostile) in the position which he
has occupied for the last five years, near Gwalior.
The strength and composition of the different corps that
have been proposed, must depend upon circumstances. I
should conceive a force consisting of a regiment of Euro-
peans, six battalions of sepoys, and two regiments of cavalry,
with a proportion of light artillery, and a body of irregular
horse, as quite efficient to protect itself, or to defeat (if it
could bring them to action) any body of troops which our
enemiec, supposing them all combined, could bring against
it. But such a corps would be too deficient in the essential
branch of cavalry, to expect much success against the hordes
of predatory horse to which it might be opposed. It could
reduce forts, occupy posts, and force its way in any direc
tion it chose; but while it toiled after such an enemy as
the Pindaries, or their allies, it would always be liable to
be harassed, and have its supplies cut off. Its sphere of
action, therefore, if it was actually opposed, must be limited
to the circle of its depôts. We may collect, and it will
probably be policy so to do, the principal part of our light
force into one or two corps, and allot to them the more
active operations. But still every effort must be made to
remedy the defect of this branch. If no more regiments of
cavalry are to be raised, the depôts should be increased, and
men should be sent as fast as they are drilled, to supply the
casualties that must be expected to occur. It has been
proposed (and the suggestion is excellent) to mount a pro-
portion of our infantry on tattoos, or small horses, the com-
* Captain Close has recommended a position on the river Sind, near
Chandpore, which is within the territory of our dependent, the Rajah
of Dutteah, and only thirty miles from Gwalior.
VOL. II.
m
clxxviii
[App.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
mon animal of burden in the Deckan (in Hindustan the
camel is better for this purpose); and this plan will no
doubt, in some degree, remedy the defect which has been
stated, by giving to an additional body of our troops the
power of rapid movement. Another mode of palliating
this evil is, an increased proportion of irregular horse. I
have before stated my sentiments fully on the wisdom of
adding to their numbers, and I rejoice to see that this
policy is completely adopted. They may be contemptible
in comparison with our regular cavalry, but they are equal,
and, when well managed, superior, to the enemy; besides,
they are taken from the class with whom we have to war,
and I continue of opinion that every effort should be made,
both before, and during the contest, to add to this branch
of our strength, which is the only one in which we can
expect aid from our allies. It is, I am satisfied, in a great
degree through this species of force that we must expect
complete success, and with the means we possess, and those
we shall obtain, we shall, I trust, be able to compel plun-
derers to subdue plunderers, and to make those who have
hitherto promoted anarchy and confusion, the instruments
of restoring order and peace. But this part of our plan
requires more delicate management than all the rest. These
bands, when attached to our army, or co-operating with it,
must not be judged on mere military principles; we cannot
expect they will emulate our troops in either their courage
or their discipline. The constitution and habits are altoge-
ther opposite, and it is sufficient if we can bring them, by
kindness and encouragement, to perform cheerfully, though
in a very loose and, to us, an unmilitary manner, those duties
for which alone they are fitted. The services of this class,
on any terms, may, politically speaking, be deemed a be-
nefit, for it prevents their being against us, which they
would probably be if unemployed; but from what I have
IV.]
clxxix
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
seen of this description of troops, in every part of India, I
am confident that they may be rendered of the greatest utility
to our operations. But, to effect this, their habits must be
studied and their temper preserved, and every measure
adopted that can encourage them to activity and exertion.
Plunder is their legitimate reward: it is not that of our
soldier; and though he becomes often entitled to it, his
discipline is never in such hazard as when it occupies his
attention.
Before I state my sentiments respecting the policy we
should pursue towards Sindia, Holkar, and Ameer Khan,
it will be necessary to remark that their conduct has been
one of the chief causes which has compelled us to arm; and
as our preparations are from necessity on a scale calculated
to meet their combined hostility, we must consider ourselves
as past that stage at which it would not be either wise or safe
to enter upon any negotiations. Experience indeed shews ·
that such could have no fruit but procrastination, deception,
and disappointment. We must therefore determine upon
our course of proceedings, and, having fixed that, make
such demands as we are in reason, in faith, and in justice
entitled to do; and if they are rejected, the non-concurring
party must be considered in a state of war. Our demands
must be as reasonable as attention to our security and that
of our allies will permit; and they must have upon the face
of them that character of moderation, but firmness, which
makes it alike impossible to mistake our object and our
resolution to effect it.
After all the consideration I have been able to give this
subject, I conceive that such a proceeding is the only one
that can be adopted with the least prospect of avoiding a
war with Dowlut Row Sindia. It is vain to expect we can
pursue our plans against the Pindaries without involving
ourselves with that chief, unless he is pledged too deep to
m 2
clxxx
[Apr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
make it easy for him to forsake our alliance. In a contest
like this, all his habits, his prejudices, his wishes are against
us; we have nothing in our favour but his fears. His faith
and his promises cannot be relied on for a moment.
He
will, if unshackled, be our secret enemy, and probably take
the first opportunity a casual reverse affords him of acting
more openly; but we must not suffer a line of action which
would cramp all our operations, and though it might end
in the destruction of this ruler, would inevitably lead to
increased embarrassments, hazard, and expenditure.
The ground of our proceeding with Dowlut Row Sindia
is already laid; he has been told, "that the Pindaries can
be no longer tolerated; all India demands their suppression,
and all India shall be put in motion to effect it.
"Were
(which God avert)," this public despatch adds, "the Ma-
harajah to afford the Pindaries refuge, or to give shelter to
their families, in order to let the armed body have free
scope, it would amount to an open declaration of war against
every power in India which has suffered from the unpro-
voked and horrible outrages of those wretches."" The
British government," a subsequent paragraph of this letter
adds, "seeks no advantages beyond the security of itself and
its allies against future outrages. The lands possessed by the
Pindaries Jaidad from Dowlut Row Sindia, as usurped by
them from his Highness, would revert to him; any portion
of territory wrested by them from other states would fall
again to those states respectively. The British government
aims not at any aggrandizement, and only desires the sup-
pression of an evil, which would speedily become as dan-
gerous for Dowlut Row Sindia as it has been injurious to
all his neighbours."
This communication appears to have excited some aları
in his mind; but the measures which he proffered to take
against the Pindaries have only furnished further proof of
[V]
clxxxi
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
his continued evasion, and must tend to confirm, if any con-
firmation were wanting, the right we possess to proceed to
any extremes against him. Under such circumstances
Sindia might be called upon, not only to grant. us his cordial
aid in the suppression of the Pindaries, but to give the
British government fair and reasonable security that he
would do so. The grounds upon which this demand was
made should be fully stated: the tone of it should be de-
cided, and a very limited period should be given for an
answer. The security to be demanded is the chief point
for consideration: it should be of a nature that would make
it difficult, if not impossible, for this prince to deviate from
the line he has taken. Nothing but the temporary cession
of some forts or tracts of country to which he attached
great value could bind him in a way that would admit of
our placing implicit confidence in his faith; and it is ob-
vious that, unless we can place such confidence, we should
be compelled to incur more hazards in the war with the
Pindaries, and have less prospect of bringing it to a satis-
factory conclusion than if Sindia was our declared enemy.
Reasoning on such grounds, I feel the positive necessity of
demanding security, but at the same time consider that such
demand should be as moderate as possible, consistent with
the object in view; and I would rather incur some risks,
than drive him to despair by propositions that were calcu-
lated to give him alarm for his future safety and inde-
pendence.
We might require Sindia to make over, till the Pindaries
were subdued, or for a period of three or five years, the
fortress of Asseerghur and the town and district of Bhurram-
pore. It could, however, be settled that his own officers
should collect the revenue everywhere, except in the Pettah,
or suburbs of Asscerghur; but that such revenue was to be
clxxxii
{APP.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
paid to the English government, which, after deducting a
fair sum for the payment of the troops necessary to garrison
the fort and protect the town of Bhurrampore, should dis-
burse the remainder in paying a body of Sindia's horse, to
be employed, under the direction of the British officer com-
manding, in protecting the country and in aiding the general
operations against the Pindaries.
The grounds of this demand are obvious. The posses-
sion of Asseerghur as a depôt * is very essential to the com-
munication with that line of corps which we must form upon
the Nerbudda; and its being in the hands of Sindia,
should he be hostile, or pursue a doubtful line, or secretly
encourage the Killadar of this fortress to act in pretended
opposition to his orders (which would be quite consonant to
Mahratta policy), might prove a very serious obstacle to
our operations, and force us at a very inconvenient season
to detach a corps to take it. We may with justice assert
that this position, though of great importance to us in the
expected campaign, can be of none to Sindia. We may
add that we have the power of taking it before he could
possibly afford it any relief, and that our situation and his
conduct would fully justify such a measure; but that we
consider its voluntary cession for a short period will convey
to other powers an impression of his friendship to the British
government which no professions ever can.
We can urge
that nothing short of his compliance with our demands can
restore that confidence which his repeated evasions have
forfeited; and we may add, that as far as these respect
Asseerghur, we are the more positive, as experience has
shewn that we cannot trust the officer whom he places in
command, the Killadar of that fortress having on a former
occasion openly given protection to the Pindaries.
*The lower fort of Assecrghur is well calculated for a depôt.
IV.]
clxxxiii
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
It has been suggested*, the several other strongholds
should be demanded from Sindia as security for his conduct.
I am not sufficiently acquainted with their local importance
to offer an opinion on this point, which can only be judged
by two considerations-their value to us, and their value to
him. Asseerghur has consequence in both views, and it is
an additional reason for this demand, that should Sindia's
Killadar, in the event of its cession, refuse to comply with
his master's mandate, which he might do either from a view
of his own interests or from secret instructions, we possess
the means of its immediate reduction. If Sindia consent
to add to the temporary cession of Asseerghur that of one,
or at the utmost two more strongholds, we can require no
further security of that description. It remains to speak of
the other demands which policy dictates to be made of this
prince. He should, I conceive, be required to assent to
our taking under our protection the Rajah of Jypore and
Bhondee, and the Nabob of Bhopal, on the plain ground
that, under that state of affairs which his conduct had
chiefly produced, attention to the future security of our
subjects, and those of our allies, compelled us to these
measures. Sindia should be required to employ the most
efficient and obedient part of his irregular horse in co-ope-
ration with our troops, for the reduction and extinction of
the Pindaries. He should engage never to shelter any of
the principal chiefs of those freebooters, and not again to
admit into his service, or to employ troops of that class,
that is, bodies of armed men, who receive no pay, and
avowedly subsist by spoil.
An English officer should be attached to each separate
corps employed by Sindia on this service, whose duty it
should be to communicate with the commander of any Bri-
* Captain Close's Correspondence.
clxxxiv
[Arr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
tish army or detachment whom they might be near, or with
whom they might co-operate, and should any of Sindia's
tributaries, chief officers, commanders of corps, Killadars, or
heads of districts or villages, give aid to the Pindaries, or
neglect to supply with provisions, or support, as far as they
had the power, the conjunct efforts of that prince and the
British government, or of either separately, they should be
treated as rebels and enemies.
The sum of seven lacs and eighty-five thousand rupees,
which the British government is bound by treaty to pay
annually to Sindia, should, during the ensuing contest, be
paid in such portions and such periods as Sindia may desire,
to the commanders of different corps of his horse co-ope-
rating with the British troops, provided the conduct of these
troops shall be such as to merit it.
As Dowlut Row Sindia has resided in his present encamp-
ment near Gwalior for five years, he should engage neither
to leave it without the consent and concurrence of the
Governor-general, nor to assemble any greater portion of
his army than he usually has at that point.
The British government might engage to restore to
Sindia all possessions formerly belonging to him, which they
may recover from the Pindaries; and further, that, if
forced into war with any other state, they will, in the event
of success, and supposing the complete fulfilment of his
engagements, make the most liberal arrangements for the
consolidation and increase of his territories, having them-
selves no view beyond that of security.
In proof of the sincerity of the British government, it
may be proper to engage, that at any period of the war, or
after it is over, it will grant Dowlut Row Sindia the aid
of a corps, for the safety of his person or the settlement of
his territories, on conditions that shall be made as light as
possible upon his resources, and his employment of this
IV.]
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
clxxxv
corps (which shall act under the usual terms of other sub-
sidiary forces) shall, if he object to a permanent arrange-
ment, be limited to a period of three, five, or seven years.
The sole object of the British government being to aid, by
any means, however foreign to its usual principles of policy,
the settlement of his government, on a basis that shall se-
parate an ally from those predatory hordes with whom he is
connected, and a continued association with whom must
tend to the downfal of his family and government.
The above is a sketch of a treaty which, I think, gives
us the only chance we can have of the aid of Dowlut Row
Sindia. If he agree to it, he will soon be too far com-
mitted to retract. Of his agreement it is not easy to form
a conclusion Some of the terms certainly appear harsh
and degrading to a proud and independent prince, but as
they will not be proposed unless we are determined to insist
upon them, what option has he but that of complying with
our demands, or complete ruin, supposing him to refuse.
The fall of his forts and territories in Candeish, Guzerat,
and all he possesses on the left bank of Nerbudda, is cer-
tain, before that river is fordable, and consequently before
he can give them any relief, and the moment the season
admits of operations to the northward, a few months would
see him stript of his strongholds,-of his revenues, sur-
rounded by rebellious tributaries, and a mutinous army.
While the conquest of his country would afford us (as has
been before stated) the ready means of completing his ruin,
Sindia, thus reduced to the condition of a freebooter, might
still possess means of harassing us, and of protracting that
settlement which it is our interest to make, but he could
cherish no hopes of being restored to the height from which
he had fallen; and we may rest satisfied he contemplates
such a reverse of fortune with too great horror to incur
the hazard, if it can possibly be avoided. On these grounds
clxxxvi
[Arr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
I think we may indulge a reasonable expectation that Sindia,
when he sees our troops assembled, and assembling from
every quarter,-when he discovers from that, and our
altered tone, that we are determined to be no longer trifled
with, and when all his attempts at evasion or procrastina-
tion are foiled, by a prompt and energetic policy, will agree
to the terms proposed: and I am quite satisfied that our
coercing him into this agreement, is the only measure that
can save him from ruin. For it is easy to forsee that, under
any other course, we shall be easily involved in a war with
this prince, which must terminate in his destruction.
An offer should be made to the Holkar family to join in
the league against the Pindaries, but the situation of that
family renders a negotiation difficult. Powerless them-
selves, they incline alternately to Ameer Khan, Sindia, and
the Rajah of Kottah, in the hope of maintaining a conse-
quence through the jealousy of those who are rivals, for the
exclusive direction of their councils, or rather for the use of
the name of a minor prince, whose authority is still in some
degree recognised over a great part of his possessions. If, at
the period when the demands of the British government are
made on this family, Sindia has established (as seems at
present not improbable) his influence with Toolsah Bhye,
the regent, or has possession of the person of the young
prince, there can be no objection, provided he agrees to our
terms, to his being made the medium of negotiation. If,
on the other hand, Ameer Khan should have been able to
re-establish his power, we might accept his proffered ser-
vices as negotiator for the Holkar family; and we could
perhaps find no better means of connecting the attachment
of this chief to our interest, with the encouragement of his
ambition, and the support of his military followers. Should
neither of these plans be practicable, we might open a direct
communication with Toolsah Bhye, through the means of
IV.]
clxxxvii
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
a political agent, who might proceed to Kottah, or to her
petty court, which probably will remain in the vicinity of
that city.
The basis of a treaty with the Holkar family should be
similar in principles to that with Sindia, the assent to our
alliance with the Rajah of Jypore, Boondee, and the Nabob
of Bhopaul. The temporary cession of Tonk-Ramporah
as a depôt; of one or two of the fortresses in Candeish *
and the appropriation, under the control of the British
government, of the revenues of the Holkar family in the
latter quarter, to the support of such bodies of horse as the
regent Toolsah Bhye should direct, to act with our armies.
in the prosecution of operations against the Pindaries, and
the re-establishment and maintenance of tranquillity; the
revenues of Tonk-Ramporah, during their temporary alien-
ation, might also be appropriated for the same purpose,
of supporting a body of troops belonging to this family:
but their relative situation to our advanced corps, and the
territories of Jypore, would make it dangerous to leave them
in the possession of a power which might be hostile, and
which, under any circumstances, is too weak to prevent
their falling at any stage of the war into the hands of free-
booters. A reference to the map will shew that the same
consideration will apply, with still more force, to a great
part of Holkar's possessions in Candeish. To expel plun-
derers from which, when the affairs of this government were
not so distracted as at present, we have already had to em-
ploy our troops.
Toolsah Bhye might be invited to place herself and the
young prince under our protection, by proceeding either
* Galna is tolerably well adapted for a depôt, and was used as such
in 1804. It is favourably situated to cover and receive supplies for-
warded to the Deckan from Surat, by Sonaghur and Nunderbar.
CXxxviii
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
[Arr.
to Candeish or Tonk-Ramporah, or she might repair to
Indore, or Chouly Mohyser, when our troops advanced
to the Nerbudda, and act in direct communication with the
commander-in-chief of our army in that quarter. Such a
step on her part might lead to a more intimate alliance. It
is sufficiently evident that this family must either be strongly
supported, or allowed to perish. The settlement of the
disorders and distractions of the Holkar government, is one
which no desire of refraining from the concerns of our neigh-
bours can admit us to evade; for supposing we were con-
tented that those parts of its territories which are situated
in Malwa should become, even more than they have been
for some years past, a source of contention between Ameer
Khan, the Pindaries and Sindia, we are prepared to allow the
the more southern possessions of this family, which are full
of strongholds, and which command, at very vulnerable
points, the entrance to our own rich district of Attavery
and the countries round Surat, as well as some of the most
fertile provinces of the Nizam and Paishwah to share the
same fate? We cannot allow such a condition of affairs, and
I have no hesitation in stating my conviction, that unless
the family of Holkar agree to the demands we make upon
it, and afford us a fair security that its resources will not
be employed against us, we shall be compelled, by military
as well as political considerations, to occupy, or at least to
establish a control over the greatest part of the countries
belonging to it in Candeish.
It has been before stated that Ameer Khan has made over-
tures, which there is some reason to think sincere, to place
himself under the protection of the British government, his
professed object being to obtain its guarantee for his several
jagheers in Marwar and Malwa. Any interference with the
former is impossible, as the English government possesses
no right to mix in the concerns of the Rajah of Joudpore
IV.]
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
clxxxix
but if the guarantee of Seronge, and (in the event of our
forming a connexion with the government of Holkar
through his means) the estates he holds from that family
in Malwa, could procure us the friendship of that chief, it
might be desirable to endeavour to make an arrangement
with him upon that basis.
The negotiation might be opened with Ameer Khan on
the ground that he must either, in the approaching contest,
act the part of a friend or an enemy to the British govern-
ment; and he might be told, that if he chose the former,
Seronge, and such of his actual possessions as lay within the
limits of our operations, should be protected, provided his
officers in charge of them, granted us such aid in supplies,
as might be occasionally required by the British troops in
their vicinity, and refused shelter to the Pindaries, or their
supporters; Ameer Khan might also be requested to send a
body not less than one thousand of his choicest horse,
(natives of the company's provinces,) to co-operate with our
army, and he might be promised their pay should be pro-
vided from the revenue of Tonk-Ramporah. With respect
to any further encouragement, this chief might be informed
the future conduct of the British government towards him,
would depend upon the part he acted during the war, and
that his further recompense would be proportioned to his
services.
There could be no objection to make the son of Ameer
Khan a party in all these engagements. Indeed, this
seems the point on which he is most anxious: it would
however be desirable that the effect of this arrangement
should be to secure us the friendship of Ameer Khan, as
chief of a predatory army, not to detach him from his
followers, and leave them loose to swell the ranks of the
Pindaries, or to elect a younger and more enterprising
leader. No plan (as has been observed) would be more likely
exc
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
[APP.
to answer this end than the one which made him the me-
diator of an agreement with the Holkar family, but this
must depend upon events regarding the occurrence of which
it is at this period useless to speculate.
Whatever proposition it may suit our policy to make to
Ameer Khan, to induce him to join us, we should without
reserve, inform him that we could keep no terms with any
one, who directly or indirectly aided or favoured the Pin-
daries, and that his either joining them, or allowing any
of his troops to do so, or giving them or their families
shelter, would be deemed a direct act of hostility against us,
and expose his possessions to be seized, and his adherents
treated as enemies to the British government.
Ameer Khan must, if this proceeding is adopted, be
called upon to evacuate that part of the territories of Jypore,
which he has seized, and to refrain from any further attacks
or interference with the possessions of the Rajah of
Bhoondee or Nabob of Bhopaul. We may however if sa-
tisfied of this chief's friendly disposition, insist upon the
Rajah of Jypore, making him some indemnity either in
money or land for this cession, and our being a guarantee
to such an arrangement, would be an additional tie upon his
uncertain fidelity.
With the Rajahs of Jypore and of Bhoondee, should our
military operations make it advisable to occupy a position
in their territories, and, consequently, make us in some de-
gree dependant upon them for supplies and aid, we must
conclude a decisive arrangement. We cannot again abandon
these states, and in the relations in which we shall be placed
to them, it is not to be anticipated that there will be much
difficulty in settling the terms of our connexion. They
will naturally fall into a dependance upon our protection
which will put it out of their power, as it ought to be, to
reject any engagement that is formed on liberal and equitable
IV.]
exci
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
principles. It may be generally observed, that we cannot
perhaps leave such states, too much at liberty in their in-
ternal rule, nor limit them too strictly on all subjects of
foreign policy; they must indeed subject their councils on
such points to our control, or there can be no safety in the
connexion.
The death of the Vizier Mahomed*, the actual ruler of
Bhopaul, may be deemed a misfortune; he appears to have
been endowed with singular wisdom and courage, and to
have saved by unparalleled fortitude, that wreck of the
fortunes of his family t, which he was called to protect.
His son Nuzzer Mahommed Khan, who has succeeded to
his power, is said also to be the heir of his good qualities.
This chief has renewed his application to us for protection,
and the actual situation of affairs places us under the necessity
of attending to his solicitations, for it is not to be expected
this petty ruler will grant us any aid, unless secured from
the consequences to which such conduct will expose him, and
our operations at the commencement might be liable to the
most serious obstructions by his hostility, or even by his
neutrality.
The substance of the proposals made by Nuzzer Khan,
through an accredited agent to the English resident at
Nagpoor, were, to deliver up the fort of Nuzzer Ghur, or
Golgoon, to the English as a depôt. To aid in obtaining
supplies of every description for the British troops-to
abstain from all intercourses with the Pindaries, or other
plunderers-to enter into no correspondence with any of the
principal states of India, and only to communicate with the
petty chiefs around him, relative to measures affecting the
internal rule of his possessions.
* Died in March 1816.
+ Vizier Mahommed, though belonging to the family of Bhopaul,
never assumed the name of Nabob.
1
excii
[App.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
Nuzzer Mahommed pleads his extreme poverty as alone
preventing him from making an offer of a pecuniary subsidy,
but stated that with the fort of Nuzzer Ghur, several vil-
lages would be ceded, and that future prosperity, through
the aid of the English government, would, he hoped, enable
him to do more.
The character of these propositions shew that the chief
of Bhopaul is sincere in his desire to obtain our protection.
His object, no doubt, is the recovery of the former posses-
sions of his family; our first operations will put him in
possession of those districts now occupied by the Pindaries,
and in the event of Sindia placing himself in the condition
of an enemy, we may be able to give further scope to his
ambition. The troops of Bhopaul, though few in number,
are reported among the bravest in Malwa, and in any agree-
ment we form with this chief, it may be (as long as the war
continues) more easy for him to furnish us with a small
body of good horse, than to contribute a money-payment,
and it may be of equal if not more benefit for us to receive
his aid this way than in any other.
It would perhaps be sufficient to make at first only a
general engagement with Nuzzer Mahommed, by which he
should agree to place at our command the resources of his
country, and to give us as he has offered, a depôt, should
we require it, and to furnish us with a certain quota of
troops to be increased, or pecuniary payment substituted
in the course of the war if his resources were enlarged. We
should on our part grant him protection, and promise that
our future favour and liberality should be proportioned to his
exertions. With the chief of Saugur and other petty rulers
that may hereafter be similarly situated, I would recom-
mend similar engagements leaving the settlement of more
minute points to a final arrangement. We should by such
means, obtain more complete information of their condition,
IV.]
cxciii
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
before we were too deeply involved in their concerns, but
we should keep alive every motive that will stimulate
them to exertion and promote our views.
With the Rajah of Odipore, Joudpore, and Kottah, we can
enter into no negotiation until Sindia and Holkar have taken
a decided line; but should that be against us, we must leave
no effort untried to obtain the active assistance of these
states. The Rajah of Odipore has recently solicited our
protecting alliance, and the others must prefer it to the
intolerable oppression and continued wrongs to which they
are now subject. The Rajah of Kottah's character has been
described; a fitter instrument for the establishment of good
order could perhaps no where be found, and in the event
of our being compelled to destroy or limit the powers of the
Mahratta chiefs, we cannot do better than extend that of
the Rajpoot princes, but particularly of one whose rule
may comparatively be deemed a blessing in every province
over which it is established. It need hardly be added, that
in the event of any such result to the approaching contest, it
would be but justice to our own interests to make arrange-
ments that would repay our disbursements, and maintain
that force which was necessary to ensure our future tran-
quillity. This could be done as the policy of the moment
dictated, by the pecuniary payments, or the occupation of
territory contiguous to our own.
It has been before stated, that Cheetoo has applied to
Maun Singh, Rajah of Joudpore, for a place of refuge for
the families of his tribe; it may be necessary to inform
that ruler and all others of his condition, that granting pro-
tection or countenance to these freebooters, in any shape,
will make them decided enemies of the British government,
who will consider them as substantively responsible for such
conduct, and punish them without reference to their con-
nexions or dependence upon other states.
VOL. II.
11
cxciv
[App.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
If we are aided by the sincere friendship of Sindia,
Holkar, and Ameer Khan, in the impending contest with
the Pindaries, there can be no doubt of its speedy termina-
tion; but upon this we can hardly calculate. It is there-
fore of more importance to speculate upon the consequences,
if we are attacked by one or all of these predatory powers:
should Sindia be sincere in his co-operation, we should soon
terminate the contest, as our own troops, aided by his irre-
gular horse and those of our allies, would quickly expel the
Pindaries from their present fastnesses, and pursue them
until they were destroyed or dispersed, when arrangements
could be made to prevent their again taking shape as a body
of freebooters, which is throughout to be considered as our
chief object. The aid Ameer Khan might give them would,
in this case, not protract their fate for any long period,
while it would be almost certain to involve his own ruin,
for he could not bring his army to act against us, without
abandoning many of the positions from which he draws
those resources that keep them together; and though,
under such circumstances, they might swell the ranks of
plunderers, they would soon lose that strength and compa-
rative consequence which they at present enjoy from their
union under one chief.
If Sindia was to declare against us, and Ameer Khan,
with the family of Holkar, were to take an opposite point,
the ruin of Sindia would be certain and sudden. The pos-
sessions of this prince would be easily reduced; and past
events, combined with his actual condition, give us a right
to expect that even his own chiefs would soon become as
anxious as others to share in the spoil.
We will now suppose the improbable case of the whole of
the military bands in Malwa being led, by a common interest,
to defend that system by which they are supported, and be-
ing induced by a jealousy of our increasing power, to unite
IV.]
CXCV
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
against us, and examine the danger we would have to en-
counter. The following may be deemed a rough estimate
of their collected forces: Sindia has perhaps 30,000 horse
and 15,000 infantry of all descriptions, with an inconsider-
able artillery. Holkar 10,000 horse and 4000 or 5000
infantry, with a proportion of cannon. Ameer Khan 10,000
horse, with some corps of infantry, and a considerable train
of artillery; and the Pindaries 30,000 horse, with two or
three corps of very indifferent infantry, and a few guns.
There are, besides these, several bodies of infantry, who
can hardly be said to be dependant upon any ruler, but
subsist themselves amid this chaos of authority, by levying
contributions on those parts of the country that are the most
unprotected.
The aggregate of these may be estimated at 80,000 horse,
of which not above 40,000 at the very utmost can be
deemed deserving of that name, the rest being more like
followers mounted on ponies than efficient horsemen. The
whole of the infantry collected would perhaps be 25,000,
and when we consider the change that has taken place in
this class of troops since 1803, and the great deterioration
of their discipline and equipments, it is not too much to
assume that, if they were all assembled at the same spot,
any one of the corps, of the strength which I proposed, would
be capable of defeating them. It would be against a pre-
datory war we would have to guard; and suppose (which
I shall soon shew is quite impossible) that the whole of this
body of 80,000 men were to act in perfect concert, in offensive
operations against us, what would be the consequence? We
should have on the Nerbudda, and in the Deckan, and the
Paishwah's territories, and on the frontier of the Madras
territories, well-equipped corps supporting each other,
amounting, in the aggregate, to upwards of 40,000 troops,
of which 6000 or 7000 are irregular cavalry, besides a body
n 2
cxcvi
[ΑΡΡ.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
&
of from 15,000 to 20,000 irregular horse belonging to our
allies, but attached to our armies. On the frontier of Gu-
zerat there would be assembled a corps of 6000 or 7000
men, with a proportion of cavalry; and in Hindustan we
should, on such an extreme, be able to bring into the field
at least 40,000 regulars, including 6000 or 7000 cavalry,
and a body of irregular horse, that cannot be estimated* at
less than 20,000 men. Can there be a doubt but that these
great armies are quite competent to subdue any force which
could be brought against them. If the enemy acted in large
bodies, the necessity of providing resources for their sup-
port would soon enable us to come up with them, and if
they divided we should divide also, and subdue them in
detail; but it is time to shew the total impossibility of such
a combination.
The country near which the authority of these predatory
powers is spread may be computed to be upwards of six
hundred miles in length, and in some parts nearly four hun-
dred in breadth; it is intersected everywhere with high ranges
of mountains and deep rivers, and the character of the ruler.
under which it has been oppressed has had the effect not only
of multiplying forts, but of making every village a stronghold.
The natives, from the Rajpoot prince, who resides within his
fortified capital, and the Grasiah† lord, who still maintains
*The Mysore horse amount to 4000, those of the Nizam, under
European officers, to 6000, and the Poonah government, under the
recent treaty we have concluded with it, will furnish a still more nu-
merous quota, and these are independent of the force of irregulars
which the nobles of these governments are obliged to furnish, and
which, though not so available, may be calculated as at least double
in number to the corps stated. This calculation is made on the sup-
position that, besides 7000 or S000 irregular horse, under English
officers, we could command the immediate services of at least 12,000
belonging to petty rulers and chiefs under our protection.
+ The Grasiahs are, like the Bheels, original inhabitants, who,
IV.]
cxcvii
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
an independence amid his inaccessible mountains, down to
the Poteil, or head man of a village, pay neither tri-
bute nor revenue to his Mahratta or Mahomedan lord,
except when the latter sends a force powerful enough to
extort it. The consequence is, that the armies of Sindia,
of Holkar, and Ameer Khan, and of the Pindaries, when
not on distant expeditions, are constantly scattered over
this tract, collecting and enforcing their real or pretended
rights. There is a petty war in every district, sometimes
with the chief against his vassal, at others between the
troops of the two chiefs whose claims upon the same person
come in collision, and not unusually between the troops of
the same ruler whose leaders are at variance, and whose
feuds and quarrels he cherishes as a source of his strength.
Precarious as resources collected in this manner must be,
they are all the state has to depend upon for its support;
and the mutinous and disorderly armies which are employed
on these expeditions, look to their success as the only hope
they have of their arrears being liquidated. The conse-
quence of this state of affairs is, that each of the com-
manders of these corps is compelled to form a separate
connexion of his own with every petty ruler or chief; whom
he is either directed to support or subdue and this spreads
through the whole, not only a variety of distinct interests,
but renders systematic the principles of discordance and
insubordination among the higher, as well as the lower
classes of these armies.
We may conclude from this exposition, of the truth of
which I imagine there cannot be the slightest doubt, that
when driven from their lands by Mahomedan and Mahratta invaders,
subsist by plunder, or by exacting, on the ground of their power to
plunder it, a portion of the revenue from each village. Their rights
and sphere of action are usually limited to the countries that once
belonged to them.-Vide Central India, vol. i. p. 50$, &c.
cxcviii
[Apr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
the predatory powers in Malwa, from Sindia down to the
Pindarie chief, are so divided by their constant differences
with each other, not on points of speculative or remote
interest, but regarding their actual subsistence and that
of their adherents, from day to day, that they are quite
incapable of any such combination as has been stated;
besides, let us suppose this combination determined upon,
how will they proceed to carry it into execution, when
every part of those territories which they rule, or from
which they exact plunder, will revolt the moment the pre-
sence of force is removed.
Where troops are withdrawn from countries in such a
state revenue must cease: Should Sindia recall his corps
from the vicinity of Jypore, Kottah, Joudpore, and Odi-
pore, Ameer Khan would, in his own name or Holkar's,
collect all the tribute. Should he also abandon his position,
these Rajpoot princes would pay no one. This rule is
applicable to every other petty state, and indeed to every
head man of a village; and who can contemplate the ele-
ments that have been described, and suppose that they can
ever blend in friendly union, or that chiefs like Sindia,
Holkar, Ameer Khan, and all the host of lesser freebooters,
should stifle their feelings of hostility to each other, and,
sacrificing every personal consideration and interest, incur
the hazard of immediate destruction, in order that they may
combine on the general principle of opposing our aggran-
dizement; or, in other words, that they should abandon all
the substance of their power, for a shadow so unattractive
as that of a contest with the British government. Of a
combination like this they are quite incapable, even if we
were to drive them to despair by declaring our intention to
conquer the whole of their possessions; and, under present
circumstances, when they see us reluctantly brought into
the field, by the most daring and repeated oppressions,→→
IV.]
cxcix
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
when they cannot misunderstand the motives upon which
we proceed, their union, even in profession, cannot be anti-
cipated; in fact it is, I conceive, quite impossible.
Though, from the reasons above stated, I do not expect
we shall ever have to encounter the combined force of the
predatory powers, I by no means intend to state we may
not, before this contest terminates, be partially involved
with each of them. In the last Mahratta war the Rajah of
Nagpore was not displeased at the defeat of Sindia's army
at Assye, and the ministers of the latter prince, from a
sense of this feeling, rejoiced when the Bhonsela suffered
a similar misfortune at Argham. Holkar kept his hordes
of plunderers aloof till he saw the power of his rivals re-
duced, and he then ventured to provoke a war, in which
he sustained a similar fate. Under present circumstances,
should Sindia, in whose territories our operations must
commence, and who from this circumstance alone we are
compelled to force to an early declaration of his intentions,
pursue so desperate a course as to act against us-it is not
improbable that the family of Holkar may endeavour to
avoid mixing in the contest, leaving their territories to be
occupied by the strongest, whilst Ameer Khan may remain
at a distance in Marwar, promising friendship and sup-
port to both, while he remains neuter, but collects around
him such a body of plunderers as would oblige us, after
we had subdued Sindia, and driven the Pindaries from
Malwa, to attack him. This I deem the very worst shape
affairs can take, and even this presents no danger, which,
with the commanding means we possess, we might not con-
quer in one, or, at the farthest, two years.
Though I have expressed myself in a strain of confi-
dence, and though I must believe that our success is cer-
tain, I feel that we should not commence a contest of
this nature without being prepared for reverses. Unfore
cc
Apr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER
seen difficulties may arise, and the pressure upon our
finances may be greater than is at present calculated; but it
is a scene on which we should not enter without a resolu-
tion to persevere till it is brought to an honourable conclu-
sion. It is probably the last war with any native power of
consequence in which we shall be engaged; and to be
foiled, or to have our purpose incompletely executed,
might produce a re-action of no common nature.
I think I may assert, after a careful perusal of the volu-
minous documents written upon this subject, within the
last four or five years, that there is hardly a plan I have
proposed, or a suggestion I have offered, that has not,
within that period, been brought forward in some shape or
other to the notice of the supreme government. The si-
milarity of sentiment of the political residents, whose situa-
tions gave them, beyond all others, the means of judging
this question in a very remarkable fact; and though these
public officers were fully aware of the earnest desire of the
government they served to abstain from all interference
with the predatory powers in Malwa, they have continued
to represent the baneful consequences of such a course, and
to recommend the most active exertion of our policy and our
arms to avert the dangers with which we were threatened.
They have differed slightly as to the mode of interfer-
ence, but they are completely agreed as to the imperative
nature of those circumstances which call for this proceed-
ing; and though these public officers are alike distin-
guished for their intelligence and independence of mind,
the remote stations at which they reside, the difference of
scenes in which they are placed, of their personal cha-
racters, the opposite views which men of talent often
*
* The Honourable Mr. Elphinstone, Mr. Russell, Mr. Jenkins,
Mr. Metcalfe, Mr. Strachey, and Captain Close, are the public officers
here alluded to.
IV.]
cci
TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.
1
take of the same subject, and, above all, when that is one
of speculative policy, renders it impossible to account for
their extraordinary agreement on this point on any ground
but one," its plain and obvious necessity." I certainly
think that the communications which these able officers have
made on this subject, whether we consider the information
they have collected, or the light thrown upon that by their
experience and judgment, form a body of the most conclu-
sive evidence that it is possible any government could re-
quire, to form its decision upon a political question of mag-
nitude.
With respect to myself, I can only say that I brought a
mind to the consideration of this question that had no bias
but that which it had recently imbibed from a knowledge of
the anxious desire of the public authorities in England to
avoid war, and if that, from the outrages of the Pindaries,
should become inevitable, to narrow its sphere as much as
possible, and to bring it to a conclusion as soon as we could,
consistently with our honour and security. I could not but
concur in the general principles which dictated this desire,
as no one was ever more aware than I am of the positive
evil that must result from any measures that produce even
a temporary derangement of our finances. Under such
impressions, nothing could have induced me to recommend
the vigorous course of proceedings I have done, but the
persuasion that it affords the only rational hope we can en-
tertain of avoiding war with those powers who, from the
character of their government, are likely to support the
Pindaries; or, if that proves inevitable, of bringing it to
speedy and honourable conclusion. After all, it is not un-
likely my opinions may be erroneous-I can only say, that
every fact and argument upon which they are grounded
has been freely stated, and that I have communicated my
ccii
[APP.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S LETTER.
sentiments with that sincerity and freedom, which your
Lordship's kindness and confidence, and the nature and im-
portance of the subject demanded.
I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient
humble servant,
Fort St. George,
July 12, 1817.
J. MALCOLM.
A
?
No. V.
NARRATIVE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF BRIGADIER-
General Malcolm,
From the 16th of January till the 20th of June, 1818,
including those connected with the SUBMISSION and
ABDICATION of the PAISHWAH BADJEROW.
To render this narrative more clear, it is necessary to preface
it with some short remarks on the condition of Central
India, which had been recently subdued and occupied by
the British troops.
After the peace with Mulhar Row Holkar, which took
place on the 6th of January, 1818, the Commander-in-
chief, Sir Thomas Hislop, proceeded south, leaving Briga-
dier-general Malcolm in command of all the troops of the
Madras army north of the Taptee. That officer first em-
ployed himself in efforts to promote the tranquillity of the
western frontier of Marwar. Jeswunt Row Bhow, the
rebellious chief of Jowud, submitted to him, when encamped
at Nimahera, upon the 14th of February; and Kurreem
Khan, the celebrated Pindarie leader, gave himself up on
the following day. Brigadier-general Malcolm, on the 23rd
of February, sent the principal part of his force to Mahid-
pore, and proceeded himself with a light detachment to the
court of Mulhar Row Holkar. After the object of his
visit to that court was completed, he marched to Mahidpore,
and joined the division. From that he moved to Oojeen,
cciv
[APP.
NARRATIVE OF
where the Bombay troops, under Major-general Sir William
Kier, were then encamped. On the 12th of March the
latter force moved for Guzerat, leaving Brigadier-general
Malcolm a strong native brigade, and some battering guns.
The Brigadier-general immediately made arrangements for
restoring tranquillity to the country, which continued to be
infested by loose bands of freebooters, and by those here-
ditary bodies of plunderers who, driven from their lands by
the Mahrattas, had taken shelter in forests, mountains, and
strongholds, and for half a century had continually disturbed
the peace of the country by a petty and harassing warfare
upon its inhabitants. The most dreaded of these tribes in
this part of Malwa were the Sondees, or inhabitants of
Sondwarrah, the name given to the tract which stretches
from Aggur to the Chumbul, east and west, and from
near Bampoorah to Oojeen, north and south. The position
of this tract, and the numbers* and fame of these plun-
derers, required that a serious effort should be made to
reduce them. The country they infested belonged to Hol-
kar, Sindia, Zalim Singh, Rajah of Kottah, and Tukojee
Puar Rajah of Dewass. Every arrangement was made to
secure the benefit of a combined and simultaneous attack on
these freebooters. The few troops Holkar could give to
this service were at our disposal. From Sindia, who fortu-
nately had only one province in Sondwarrah, (that of Ag-
gur,) much was not to be expected: but Brigadier-general
Malcolm looked for every assistance from Zalim Singh,
Rajah of Kottah, who possessed several of the finest of those
districts that were to be rescued from the predatory incur-
sions of the Sondees, and who had prepared a most efficient
force, under one of his bravest officers, for co-operation in
* The Sondees could assemble nearly two thousand horse, many of
whom were remarkably well mounted.
V.]
ccv
BADJEROW'S SURRENDER.
this object. The Rajah of Dewass was alike destitute of
power either to obstruct or forward this measure; but his
disposition was quite friendly.
Brigadier-general Malcolm assigned the reduction of Sond-
warrah, and of those chiefs in the vicinity by whom its
plunderers were likely to be assisted, to the Bombay brigade,
with six hundred irregular horse under Lieutenant-colonel
Corsellis, who was directed to move down the Chumbul
from Nolye, and to attack, if they were not given up, the
strongholds on and near the banks of that river; while a
detachment, consisting of a battalion of Madras sepoys,
commanded by Major Moodie, after being joined by some
battering guns, moved from Mahidpore on the 11th of
April, in co-operation with Mehrab Khan, the commander
of the troops of the Kottah Rajah, against those fortresses
which were more in the centre of the province. Lieutenant
Low, first political assistant to Brigadier-general Malcolm,
with a troop of cavalry, one company of Sepoys, and 1000
of Holkar's horse, was sent to aid in these operations, and
to negotiate amicable settlements with such of the chiefs as
were disposed to submit. The principle upon which these
settlements were directed to be made, is distinctly stated, in
the letter from Brigadier-general Malcolm, to the Governor-
general, under date the 10th of May, "The engagement,"
he observes, "entered into through our mediation, by Holkar
and Zalim Singh with the chief of Lalghur, the principal of
the freebooters, I deem the most important, not from its
reducing that formidable leader from a state of dangerous
power, but as it exhibits the consideration with which we
are disposed to treat those, whose habits, however indefen-
sible in an abstract view, are to be in a great measure attri-
buted to the general condition of that lawless society of
which they formed a part. Where the ruler that claimed his
ccvi
[APP.
NARRATIVE OF
obedience drew his resources from acts of violence and ra-
pine, opposition became legitimate, and retaliation could
hardly be condemned. It was the practice of the superior
government, whenever it had the power, to plunder and
destroy all those who had usurped upon its weakness, while
the latter waited a moment of returning imbecility or divi-
sion in its councils to take their revenge. I found, when I
first contemplated the settlement of Sondwarrah, our allies
anxious that we should become the instruments of extirpat-
ing a tribe whom they represented to be (and who actually
were upon the principles they acted towards them) incorri-
gible; but I have endeavoured, and not, I trust, without
success, to instil into their minds the seeds of a better
system, which, while it punishes hardened offenders with
unrelenting rigour, throws wide the door to those who are
disposed to change their habits, and to partake of the be-
nefits which are offered to all, in the prospect of general and
permanent tranquillity."
The various attacks upon the Sondees who refused to
submit were attended with complete success.
In the space
of six weeks thirteen strongholds were taken, and five of
them razed to the ground. The freebooters had no safety
but in flying to a distance, but wherever they went they
found themselves proscribed as enemies to the English go-
vernment, and to protect them was to provoke its vengeance.
This produced such misery, that they came in one after
another, giving up their horses, according to the terms
prescribed, and obtaining leave to cultivate those fields
which they had so long left sterile, to follow what they had
found, in troubled times, the more profitable pursuit of
plunder.
This service, on which the English displayed their usual
discipline and courage, was marked by a most gallant
BADJEROW'S SURRENDER.
ccvii
V.]
achievement of the troops of Zalim Singh, the Rajah of
Kottah, in an attack upon the village and fortress of Nar-
rulla. They had very light artillery*, and the breach was
very imperfect, but their brave and veteran commander,
Mehrab Khan, fearing the garrison might escape during the
night, ordered a storm. The resistance was desperate, the
breach proving almost impracticable; but the attack was
continued for two hours, and all obstacles at length over-
come by the persevering courage of the assailants, more
than two hundred of whom, with several officers of rank,
were killed and wounded. Nearly the whole of the garrison
were put to the sword.
Kauder Buksh, the principal of the Holkar Pindaries,
with several of the other chiefs of that tribe, had given
themselves up to Brigadier-general Malcolm, and had been
şent with Kurreem Khan to Hindustan, to be settled in
Guruckpoor, far from their former haunts and adhe-
rents. Accounts had been received that Cheetoo and
Rajün, the two only remaining leaders of any consequence,
had gone to Bhopaul, to deliver themselves up; but this was
soon followed up by intelligence that, not liking the terms,
they had fled, and returned to the woods and fastnesses on
the banks of the Nerbudda. Brigadier-general Malcolm con-
sidering that their re-assembling any followers would be at-
tended with the worst consequences, moved south, on the
1st of April, with three battalions of sepoys, a regiment of
cavalry, and two thousand irregular horse. He advanced
himself on Banglee, directing Colonel R. Scott, with a
strong detachment, on Indore, from whence, as well as
Banglee, detachments were pushed into the forests in all di-
rections. Rajün gave himself up, while Cheetoo succeeded
* The largest calibre was a four-and-half pounder.
ccviii
[Arr.
NARRATIVE OF
with great difficulty in escaping across the Nerbudda, with
ten or twelve adherents.
The chiefs who rule the tribes, or rather the robbers that
inhabit the banks of the Nerbudda, from Hindea to Mohy-
ser, had long aided the Pindaries, and the army of Sir
Thomas Hislop had been attacked as it passed their hills.
On its march to the southward every pains were taken at
this period by Brigadier-general Malcolm, and the officers
under him, to conciliate their chiefs and these followers; at
the same time they were threatened with exemplary punish-
inent if they continued to protect the Pindaries, or com-
mitted the slightest outrage, either upon the camp fol-
lowers or the inhabitants of the country. The success of
these measures was complete. Many of the Pindaries,
whom they had concealed, were delivered up with their fa-
milies and horses; and though our troops and convoys tra-
versed this country in every direction, and in the smallest
parties, not one instance occurred of attack or even rob-
bery, and every chief came into Brigadier-general Mal-
colm's camp, to endeavour to cultivate his friendship, and
to establish the claim of early submission to the British go-
vernment.
The extinction of the Pindaries, the great success of our
arms, the change made in the predatory government of
Holkar, the expulsion or conversion into peaceable subjects
of the Sondees, and the complete intimidation of the
plunderers on the Nerbudda, had raised the reputation of
the British government in this quarter as high as it was
possible; and the return of the inhabitants to villages which
had been deserted for many years, and the commencement
of cultivation in every quarter, proclaimed the character of
that confidence which had been established.
The dispersed plunderers, and the discontented part of
V.]
ccix
BADJEROW'S SURRENDER.
the military population were at this period (the beginning
of May) gratified by a report, apparently on a good found-
ation, that the Paishwah, aided by Ram Deen, a rebel
chief of the Holkar government, and many others, meant to
enter Malwa. Brigadier-general Malcolm immediately re-
inforced the convoy that was marching to the Deckan from
Hindia with the guns captured at Mahidpore, and the re-
maining sick and wounded of the Commander-in-chief's
army; and, at the same time, sent a battalion of sepoys,
under Lieutenant-colonel Smith, to Mundlesir, a small
fort (belonging to the Paishwah) on the Nerbudda,
within three miles of Chouly Mohyser, directing him
to take possession of it, and place posts at the fords in
its vicinity.
This service was effected without opposi-
tion, and gave strength at an essential point. Though
certain accounts had been received that Badjerow's army
was retreating in a north-westerly direction, Brigadier-
general Malcolm directed the escort with the guns, which
he had strengthened to twelve companies of native infantry,
four field pieces, and sixteen hundred irregular horse, to
He considered
proceed by Burrhampore to Jaulnah.
that in the state the Paishwah's army must be in
after their defeat and flight, they could not venture to
attack such a corps. The event proved that the con-
clusion was correct. Badjerow was within a short dis-
tance of this force on the 6th of May, but evidently
too solicitous for his own safety to think of endangering
that of others; and the distance which in his rapid flight
he had gained upon Brigadier-general Doveton's force,
placed him for the moment at ease, and he encamped
* Badjerow had been routed by Colonel Adams, and obliged to fly
from the territories of Nagpore. He was closely pursued by Brigadier-
general Doveton.
VOL. II.
0
CCX
[APF.
NARRATIVE OF
near Dholkote*, where he began to refresh and to recruit
his broken and dispirited troops. Brigadier-general Mal-
colm received this intelligence on his arrival at Mhow, a
place twelve miles south-west of Indore, which he had fixed
upon for his principal cantonments during the remaining
part of the hot season and the approaching rains. He im-
mediately ordered Lieutenant-colonel Russell, with a regi-
ment of cavalry, to proceed to Hindia, meaning him, af-
ter being joined by eight companies of the battalion in
garrison at that fort, and three hundred Mysore horse, to
form a detachment ready to act as circumstances might di-
Six companies of sepoys were at the same time
moved to Onchode, a commanding spot on the top of the
Ghaut: two sent to reinforce Hindia; one to guard the
pass of Peepulda, about thirty miles to the west of On-
chode; while a detachment of three companies was ordered
to guard the Ghauts in the Dhar country, and a ford at
Chikulda, on the Nerbudda, about fifty-five miles west of
Mohyser.
rect.
These arrangements, and the state of alertness in which
Brigadier-general Malcolm kept the remainder of his force,
made it almost impossible that Badjerow could enter Malwa
in force at any point on this line, without being attacked;
and to secure against his making an attempt to cross the
Nerbudda to the eastward, Brigadier-general Watson was
requested to send what he could spare of his light troops.
The general complied with the requisition, and an efficient
light corps, under Major Cuming, advanced to Kotra,
a place about forty miles west of Hussingabad, completed
the defensive arrangements to cover the southern frontier of
* Dholkote, a place six or seven miles west of Asseerghur, and
twelve or thirteen north of Bhurrampore.
V.]
'cexi
BADJEROW'S SURRENder.
Malwa, from the eastern parts of Bhopaul to the west of
the territories of Dhar.
The revived hopes of the freebooters who, though sub-
dued, were still scattered over Malwa-the discontent
which the late changes had created in numbers—and,
above all, the uncertainty of the line of policy that Sindia
might pursue, and the knowledge that the greater part
of his provincial governors, and almost every Mahratta
officer either in his or Holkar's government, cherished
sentiments hostile to our interests,-rendered it of the
utmost importance that every effort should be made to
prevent the Paishwah entering a country in which his
presence was certain to spread again the flame of discord
and war.
Brigadier-general Malcolm received accounts that va-
keels or envoys from the Paishwah, with overtures for
peace, were within two marches of his camp. He imme-
diately directed that he should be permitted to advance,
and Anund Row Jeswunt, and two other vakeels, charged
with a letter from Badjerow, reached the Brigadier-general's
camp at Mhow, late at night on the 16th of May. This
letter was expressive of the Paishwah's wish for peace, and
requesting particularly that General Malcolm (whom he
styled one of his oldest and best friends) would undertake
the office of re-establishing a good understanding between
him and the British government.
Brigadier-general Malcolm had a long private conference
with the vakeels, in which they chiefly endeavoured to per-
suade him that the Paishwah personally had always been
averse to the war*, and next to urge as much as possible
that the Brigadier-general would comply with Badjerow's
* They carried this argument to the extreme of adducing his cow-
ardice, as a proof of Badjerow's aversion to fight the English.
02
ccxii
[Arr.
NARRATIVE OF
request, by going to see him in his camp. With this the
Brigadier-general refused to comply, because, in the first
place, he thought that his doing so might give an impres-
sion of a solicitude on our part for peace, which would have
an injurious tendency; and, in the second, it would prevent
his being able to direct those dispositions of his troops that
were necessary, either to intimidate Badjerow into submis-
sion, or to pursue his army with success, in the event of
the negotiation being broken off. With the view, however,
of shewing due consideration for this prince's feelings, and of
giving him confidence to act upon the overture, as well as to
gain the best information that could be obtained of the
actual state of his army, he determined on sending Lieu-
tenant Low, his first, and Lieutenant Macdonald, his se-
cond political assistant, to the Paishwah's camp. He had
distinctly informed the vakeels that their master must pre-
pare himself to abandon his throne, and to quit the Deckan,
as what had occurred, and particularly the proclamation which
had recently been issued (and under which we had occupied
his country,) put it out of the power of the English govern-
ment to recede from a measure quite essential to the peace
of India. Brigadier-general Malcolm wrote to the Paish-
wah that he had communicated fully with his vakeels, and
requested him, if he was sincere in his professed wish for
peace, to come forward immediately with Lieutenant Low
towards the Nerbudda, accompanied only by his principal
chiefs, and promising that, on his doing so, the brigadier-
general would meet him unattended, if he required it, and
discuss all matters respecting the terms which the British
government were willing to grant to him.
The chief object of Lieutenant Low's mission was to
ascertain the actual condition of the Paishwah, and the sin-
cerity of his professions, and to endeavour to hasten his
advance to meet Brigadier-general Malcolm; but that
V.]
ccxiii
BADJEROW's SURRENDER.
officer was directed to state in the fullest manner to Badjerow
the principles upon which alone the brigadier-general could
agree to negotiate. These were, first, that Badjerow should
abandon his condition as a sovereign prince: secondly, that
he could not be allowed to reside in the Deckan.
It was also to be stated that he would be expected, as a
proof of his sincerity, to give up (if he had the power to do
so) Trimbuckjee Dinglia, and the murderers of Captain
Vaughan and his brother, two officers who had been inhu-
manly massacred at Telligaum
*
Lieutenant Low proceeded on the 18th of May, accom-
panied by the vakeels. He took the route of Mundlesir,
in order to have an opportunity of taking a small escort
from the battalion of that place, under the command of
Lieutenant-colonel Smith.
On the night of the 18th intelligence reached Brigadier-
general Malcolm of Appah Sahib (the Ex-Rajah of Nag-
pore) having escaped from confinement; and conceiving it
very likely that this event might make some alteration in
the Paishwah's intentions, further instructions were sent on
the 20th instant to Lieutenant Low, directing him to send
Badjerow's vakeels, accompanied by one or two native agents,
in advance, and only to go on to his camp in the event of
the vakeels returning within a short period and inviting
him, on the part of their master, to do so. Lieutenant-
colonel Smith was also directed to cross the Nerbudda with
his battalion and some native horse; and Lieutenant Low
was ordered to accompany that detachment by easy stages,
instead of taking only a few men, as was at first intended.
The object of this change was to enable Lieutenant-colonel
Smith to co-operate with Brigadier-general Doveton and
Lieutenant-colonel Russell, in pursuing and destroying
* Telligaum is a village within fifteen miles of Poonah,
ccxiv
[Arr.
NARRATIVE OF
Badjerow, in the event of his resolving again to try his
fortune in the field. Brigadier-general Malcolm, in the
mean time, having completed some military arrangements
for preventing Badjerow's entering Malwa, moved with a
small detachment to Mundlesir, where he arrived on the
22nd of May.
Sir John Malcolm, in the event of Badjerow's advancing,
proposed to remain near Mundlesir, and keep his other
corps (except Lieutenant-colonel Smith's) in the positions
they then occupied; but he was soon convinced, by the
delays of the vakeels and the evasions of the Paishwah,
that this course must be abandoned. He had heard of
Brigadier-general Doveton's arrival with a considerable
force at Bhurrampore, within fourteen miles of Badje-
row, and of the consequent alarm of that prince; who,
however, instead of moving at once, as was expected, in
the direction of Mundlesir, had only marched a few miles,
to induce Subadar Syed Hussein* (Sir John's native.
aide-de-camp) to forward a letter to Brigadier-general Dove-
ton, requesting that officer, in the event of the Paishwah's
moving towards Brigadier-general Malcolm, to refrain from
attacking him. These circumstances made the latter officer
determine to advance; and he at the same time directed
Lieutenant-colonel Russell to move from Charwah (the
position he first occupied) to Borgham, meaning his corps.
to guard against any attempt of Badjerow at escape to the
north-east.
Early on the morning of the 27th of May Sir John
Malcolm reached Bekungong, by a forced march, the day
after the arrival of Badjerow's vakeels, who had been
sent in advance, and had returned with assurances of
* This gallant and sensible native officer is now Subadar-major of
the body-guard at Madras.
V.]
CCXV
BADJEROW'S SURRENDER.
their master's sincerity, and of his anxiety that Lieutenant
Low should proceed to his camp. This the Brigadier-
general directed that officer to do immediately, and after
repeating what he had before stated to the vakeels, he told
them they might see from his proceeding that there was no
time for delay, and that, as a sincere friend, he warned Bad-
jerow to come to a resolution at once, either to continue the
war, or to throw himself upon the clemency and generosity
of the British government, as, under the circumstances in
which he was placed, any middle course was destruction.
Lieutenant Low, in an interview he had with Badjerow
on the 29th of May, the day of his arrival in that prince's
camp, found he continued to expect much better terms than
it was possible to grant to him. He was still, to all ap-
pearance, confident of being permitted to retain the name
at least of Paishwah, and of being allowed (though with very
circumscribed power) to reside at Poonah. He appeared in
a state of great alarm about his own personal safety in the
proposed meeting with Brigadier-general Malcolm, and
entreated most earnestly that the troops of the latter might
all be withdrawn to a considerable distance; but finding
the Brigadier-general's resolution to refuse compliance with
these demands was not to be shaken, he at last consented to
come to Khairee (about half a mile on the plain to the
north of the mountain-pass of that name) on the 1st of
June*, on the following conditions:-
That he was to bring two thousand men; that Brigadier-
general Malcolm was only to bring a small escort, leaving
his force at Metawul, about ten miles off; and that he (Bad-
jerow) should be permitted to retire again in safety to his
own camp after the meeting, if he should wish to do so.
* This meeting was first fixed for the 31st of May, but afterwards
put off by mutual consent.
ccxvi
[Arr.
NARRATIVE OF
These conditions were acceded to, and Badjerow reached
his tents at the place appointed about five o'clock in the
evening. Brigadier-general Malcolm arrived soon after-
wards, accompanied by the officers of his family, and an
escort of two companies of Sepoys.
The party were received in open Durbar, where little
passed beyond the complimentary inquiries usual on such
occasions. After a few minutes Badjerow requested Briga-
dier-general Malcolm would retire with him to another tent.
This conference lasted between two and three hours, during
which the Paishwah dwelt upon his misfortunes, and
the situation to which he was reduced, and used all his
eloquence (which is considerable) to excite pity in the
mind of Sir John Malcolm, by appealing to their former
friendship. “He alone (he observed) remained of his three
oldest and best friends: Colonel Close was dead, and Gene-
ral Wellesley in a distant land. In this hour of difficulty
and distress, flatterers (he said) fled, and old adherents even
were quitting him: a real friend was, therefore, his only
stay. He believed (he added) he possessed that treasure
in General Malcolm, and that he had sought a meeting
with him on the present occasion with an anxiety propor-
tioned to the importance that it had in his mind!" General
Malcolm's reply to his address went, in the first place, to
explain to him personally (as he had done before through
others) the only terms which could be granted, using every
argument to satisfy his judgment that his acceptance of
these terms was the wisest course he could pursue. He at
the same time stated that the decision of the British govern-
ment, as to his abandoning all claims to sovereignty, was
irrevocable; and that it would be completely inconsistent
with the character of a true friend, if he was to flatter Bad-
jerow's hopes with prospects which could never be realized.
Brigadier-general Malcolm, after remarking "that this was
V.]
ccxvii
BADJEROW'S SURRENDER.
a crisis in his life when Badjerow must shew to what degree
he possessed the courage and virtues of a man, by resigning
himself to the situation to which he had reduced himself,"
concluded by distinctly informing him that no further delay
whatever could be admitted.
The limits of this narrative do not admit of a full detail
of this conference; suffice it to say that every point was
discussed, and it ended in Badjerow's entreating that they
might meet again next day. This was resisted by Brigadier-
general Malcolm, who perceived from it and other expres-
sions that the Paishwah's mind was not yet made up to sub-
mission; and this circumstance, added to the fact of his
having the day before sent the whole of his property into
Asseerghur *, satisfied the Brigadier-general that not a mo-
ment was to be lost in bringing matters to a close.
Brigadier-general Malcolm returned to his tent about ten
o'clock p.m., and the Paishwah immediately re-ascended the
ghaut, where he had some guns placed to protect his retreat.
So strong were his fears of an attack, notwithstanding all
the endeavours that had been made to set his mind at rest
on that point.
Brigadier-general Malcolm immediately sent to Badjerow
the following schedule of an agreement for his signature:
"1st. That Badjerow shall resign, for himself and suc-
cessors, all right, title, and claim over the government of
Poonah, or to any sovereign power whatever.
"2nd. That Badjerow shall immediately come with his
family, and a small number of his adherents and attendants,
to the camp of Brigadier-general Malcolm, where he shall
be received with honour and respect, and escorted safe to the
* Jeswunt Row Bhow, the governor of Asseerghur, had aided the
Paishwah throughout, and evinced at this period a very forward zeal
in his cause.
.ccxviii
NARRATIVE OF
[Apr.
city of Benares, or any other sacred place in Hindustan that
the Governor-general may, at his request, fix for his residence.
"3rd. On account of the peace of the Deckan, and the
advanced state of the season, Badjerow must proceed to
Hindustan without one day's delay; but General Malcolm
engages that any part of his family that may be left behind
shall be sent to him as early as possible, and every facility
given to render their journey speedy and convenient.
"4th. That Badjerow shall, on his voluntarily agreeing to
this
arrangement, receive a liberal pension from the Com-
pany's government, for the support of himself and family.
The amount of this pension will be fixed by the Governor-
general; but Brigadier-general Malcolm takes upon himself
to engage that it shall not be less than eight lacs of rupees
per annum.
"5th. If Badjerow, by a ready and complete fulfilment of
this agreement, shews that he reposes entire confidence in
the British government, his requests in favour of principal
jageerdars and old adherents, who have been ruined by
their attachment to him, will meet with liberal attention.
His representations, also, in favour of Brahmins of remark-
able character, and of religious establishments founded or
supported by his family, shall be treated with regard.
"6th. The above propositions must not only be accepted
by Badjerow, but he must personally come into Brigadier-
general Malcolm's camp within twenty-four hours of this
period, or else hostilities will be recommenced, and no fur-
ther negotiation will be entered into with him.”
These propositions were forwarded to Badjerow early on
the morning of the first of June, with a message that no
alteration could take place, and not the slightest delay could
be permitted.
As twenty-four hours only were granted to Badjerow to
come to a final resolution, every arrangement was made to
V.]
ccxix
BADJEROW's SURREnder.
attack him at the expiration of that period, in the event of
his breaking off the negotiation.
This day (the 2d of June) passed in constant messengers
from the Paishwah, and from his principal officer. The
latter, as the crisis approached, became anxious about their
individual interests, attention to which, Sir John Malcolm
informed them, could alone be given on their promoting
the great object, the submission of the Paishwah, and the
termination of the war.
The state of affairs at this period is described in Briga-
dier-general Malcolm's despatch to Mr. Secretary Adam,
of the 4th of June, in which he also gives an account of
Badjerow's submission. "It would fill a volume," he ob-
serves, "to detail the particulars of all the intrigues which
occurred. I have never, in the course of my experience,
witnessed a scene in which every shade of the Indian cha-
racter was more strongly displayed. It is honourable to
the Vinchoor Jageerdar, to the Purrender chief, and the ma-
nager of the interests of the Gokla family, that, though they
professed themselves hopeless of every success, and were
convinced by my arguments that Badjerow had no choice
but submission, they took care to make me distinctly
understand (when I informed them that their only claim
rested on the success of their influence in promoting this
measure,) that though they would use every means of
persuasion and remonstrance to effect the end, harshness
or coercion they would never resort to *. I told them such
conduct was not required of them; I respected, I added,
their spirit of allegiance, but the moment was come when
* The vakeel of the Vinchoor chief said, that his master's family had
served that of the Paishwah for five generations, and had always
spoken boldly to him and his ancestors, but now, he added, that fate
(bukht) is upon him, "we must be silent, unmerited reproaches even
have remained and must remain unanswered."
CCXX
[APP.
NARRATIVE OF
1
their interests and those of their prince alike required that
an end should be put to a ruinous and ineffectual struggle,
and that if their passiveness allowed the counsels of those
worthless and wicked men, who had brought Badjerow to
his present state, to complete his destruction, their delicacy
would be termed imbecility, and that they could hencefor-
ward neither expect gratitude from their prince, nor consi-
deration from us; and, to conclude, I told them plainly,
that unless he came to my camp next day, I desired never
to know more of them or their claims. As individuals they
were nothing, as attached adherents to a fallen prince, who
might by their firmness save him and themselves from total
ruin, they had importance for a moment, but that, if
lost, would never return. As the vakeels of the Vinchoor
chief and Abba Purrender were leaving me at eleven
o'clock, on the night of the 2nd, I told them I knew Badje-
row had sent some of his most valuable property into
Asseerghur the day after I arrived at Metawul, which was
no proof of confidence. Report said he meant to take refuge
there. If he did it was his last stake, and if they permitted
him to adopt such a course, they and their families would
merit all the ruin that would fall upon their heads. When
these vakeels left camp, I permitted one of my writers to
give them, secretly and as from himself, a copy of my letter
of the day before to Badjerow, and of the propositions I
had offered for his acceptance. They perused them, he
told me, with eagerness, and the knowledge of the conside-
ration meant to be given to them, in the event of a settle-
ment, appeared to quicken their zeal in no slight degree.
When I dismissed these vakeels, I sent for an agent of
Badjerow, whom I had on my first arrival at Metawul
invited to my camp, and permitted to lay dawks* and send
hirkarrahs† in every direction, in order to allay the fears and
† Messengers.
* Posts.
BADJEROW'S SURRENDER.
ccxxi
V:]
suspicions of Badjerow, with regard to my intended move-
ments and attacks, for there was no ground on which I had
from the first more fear of failure than his excessive timidity.
I now told this man that he must return to his master,
he could no longer remain in my camp, but that he might
write or say that I did not mean to move till six o'clock
next morning. I should them niarch to near Khairee, and
Badjerow, if he intended to accept the terms, must leave
the hills, and encamp near my force by twelve o'clock. I
at the same time told him to inform Badjerow, that Colonel
Russell had moved to Borgham, to attack any of Trim-
buckjee's followers in that quarter, and that Brigadier-
general Doveton, whom I had informed of Badjerow's wish
for that freebooter being destroyed, would no doubt march
against him to-morrow.
"I had just heard from my assistant, Lieutenant Low,
whom I had, to facilitate my communication, kept a few
miles in advance, that the messengers he had sent with the
letter and propositions had returned and represented Badjerow
as full of professions, but in a very vacillating state of mind,
and anxious beyond all description for another day's delay,
as the 3rd of June was, he said, an unlucky day, and he
had religious ceremonies to perform of the most indis-
pensible nature, before he could come to my camp. I
affected to be very indignant at this conduct; I desired
Lieutenant Low not only to send away, but turn back any
person desiring to communicate with him from Badjerow's
camp. I at the same ordered parties of horse to occupy the
roads to my camp, to prevent the approach of any messenger
whatever. Having adopted these steps, about two o'clock
of the morning of the 3rd, in a manner so public that I
knew they would reach Badjerow through many channels, I
marched at six o'clock, and reached this ground * about nine.
* Near Kairee.
ccxxii
NARRATIVE OF
C
6
•
[APP.
• You
"Soon after Anund Row Jeswunt came near me, in a
state of much trepidation; I asked him where were his pro-
mises of sincerity, and bade him return. He said 'This is an
unlucky day.' I replied, it would prove a most unlucky
one for his master, if he did not come in. I mean every-
thing kind,' I added, to Badjerow, but he forces me to
these extremities, and from his character, nothing short of
them will bring him to a resolution that is so obviously for
the interest of him, and all that are personally dependant
upon him.' He begged me to send some person to assure his
mind, for he is at this moment,' he added, ' in the greatest
alarm.' At what is he alarmed,' I asked, at the
• at the pro-
positions?' He replied he would consent to them. Does
he suspect me of treachery ?' I demanded, with some degree
of anger.
'No!' he said, but the orders of the Gover-
nor-general might compel you to put guards and sentries
over him, and then he would be disgraced for ever.'
may return,' I replied, to Badjerow, and tell him from
me, that I have no such orders; that the settlement I had
ventured to make, in anticipation of the Governor-general's
approbation, was too liberal to make me think it possible
any human being, in Badjerow's situation, would ever at-
tempt to escape from it, and if he did, he would forfeit all
future claims whatever, and the English government would
be freed from a large disbursement which it has agreed to
increase, more from a feeling of what was due to its own
dignity, than to any claims which he had to its considera-
tion.' Anund Row seemed pleased with this answer, and
galloped off. I sent a respectable Brahmin to hasten Badje-
row; and, at the same time, to desire that the Mahratta
sirdars alone should accompany him to the ground near my
camp. This was complied with, and Ram Dun and a
body of infantry were directed to encamp in the rear. The
firing of some guns in the quarter of Asseer (probably
VI.]
ccxxiii
BADJEROW'S SURRENDER.
from Brigadier-general Doveton's attack of Trimbuckjee *)
served not a little to quicken the march; and at eleven
o'clock Badjerow came near my camp. Lieutenant Low
went to meet him, and reported him in better spirits than
he had yet seen him. I meant to pay my respects in the
evening, but was prevented by a very violent storm."
The force that accompanied Badjerow to Brigadier-gene-
ral Malcolm's camp was between four and five thousand
horse, and about three thousand infantry; of these twelve
hundred were Arabs, whose numbers were increased two
days afterwards to nearly two thousand, by the junction of
parties that had been left to guard the passes in the hills.
Sir John Malcolm was determined, as he wrote to the Go-
vernor-general †, "not to disturb by harsh interference the
last moments of intercourse between a fallen prince and his
remaining adherents." His experience led him to expect
that this force would gradually dissolve, and he knew in its
actual state it possessed no means of combined action.
Badjerow proceeded towards the Nerbudda with Ge-
neral Malcolm's force for several marches, without any-
thing very particular having occurred, beyond that of some
of his followers leaving him, to return to their homes in the
Deckan. A large body, however, still remained, in spite
of the friendly remonstrances of Sir John Malcolm, who
pointed out the imprudence of keeping together such a
number of armed men; the great proportion of whom must,
from their situation, be discontented. He particularly ad-
verted to the Arabs, from whose violence and desperation
the worst consequences were to be dreaded. The Paishwah
and those about him, to whom this advice was addressed at
different times, always admitted its truth, but little
The detachment sent to intervene between Badjerow and Asser
was fired upon by the fort, but no one hurt.
Letter to the Governor-general, June 19, 1811.
ccxxiv
[APP.
NARRATIVE OF
attention was paid to it; Badjerow seemed to cling to
the shadow of that power he once possessed. He appeared
as if afraid to own to himself, or to others, his actual con-
dition; and this conduct was still further influenced by
that suspicion and timidity which marks his character, and
which Sir John Malcolm knew he could alone overcome by
an absence of solicitude, and a conduct that shewed that no
apprehensions were entertained of his acting contrary to his
engagements. If Badjerow had real fears of treachery,
such a course was the only way to remove them. If he
cherished plans of deceit, his pursuit of them was not likely
to be encouraged by an indifference which he could alone
refer to a consciousness of strength. Acting upon these
considerations Brigadier-general Malcolm indulged Badjerow
in his hours of marching, and in his desire to encamp at some
distance from the English force, always giving his opinion,
as a friend, of the dangers to which he exposed himself, by
continuing to repose in the mercenaries by whom he was
accompanied. An occasion soon occurred that made the
Paishwah sensible to all the value of the councils he had
neglected, and threw him completely upon the protection
of the Brigadier-general.
The Arabs, amounting to about two thousand, who
had been hired some months before by Trimbuckjee
Dinglia, demanded their arrears from Badjerow. That
prince was willing to pay them for the period during
which they had been actually with his camp, but the
Arabs insisted upon pay from the date they were hired
by Trimbuckjee; and on his refusing compliance with
this demand, they surrounded his tent, and would not
allow him to move. This occurred on the 9th of June,
on which day a march had been ordered, and a consider-
able part of Sir John Malcolm's force, with the whole
of the baggage, had gone on to the next stage. The
V.]
CCXXV
BADJEROW'S SURRENDER.
Brigadier-general himself had, as usual, remained behind to
see Badjerow off the ground; and he had this day, in the
apprehension that something might occur, kept with him a
regiment of cavalry, two gallopers, and six companies of
infantry. From the first accounts of this mutiny he was
led to expect Badjerow would be able to settle the matter
himself. The whole day, however, passed without any
prospect of affairs being brought to a conclusion. The
Arabs seemed determined to insist upon their original de-
mands, nor was it certain they would be satisfied with them;
and to make affairs worse, their example had excited mu-
tiny among some Rohillas, and, indeed, all the infantry
in camp. Badjerow's alarm for his life was excessive, but
while he continued to call on Brigadier-general Malcolm for
relief, he sent message after message to entreat that not a
man should be moved, as he thought that the least stir in
the English camp would be the signal for his murder.
He
Under these circumstances, Sir John Malcolm directed
that part of his force which had marched, to return to
Sconee. He had some communications, in the course of the
evening, with the chiefs of the mutineers. These appeared
reasonable, but said they could not control their men.
sent to Badjerow to entreat he would compose himself during
the night, assuring him that he should be relieved early in
the morning. Brigadier-general Malcolm also sent mes-
sages to the Arabs and Rohillas, warning them, as they
dreaded extirpation, from proceeding to violence; and at
the same time stating that he would guarantee that those
promises which had been voluntarily made to them by the
Paishwah should be faithfully performed. These measures
kept all quiet for the night.
At daylight Brigadier-general Malcolm had intelligence
of the troops which had proceeded in advance being on the
VOL. II.
Р
ccxxvi
[APP.
NARRATIVE OF
coerce.
return, and within a very short distance. He had already
personally reconnoitred Badjerow's camp, which was irregu-
larly pitched along a nullah (or ravine), the banks of which
were very uneven, and covered with trees and bushes that
were favourable for the irregular infantry that he had to
The country to the west, however, rose gradually
from the ravine, and he found on that side a commanding
ground, upon which he drew up his force, within three hun-
dred yards of the front of Badjerow's camp. He had only,
when all were assembled, four hundred native cavalry, seven
hundred sepoys, three brigades of six-pounders, and six
hundred irregular horse; but his confidence in the tried
courage and discipline of this small body of men was too
complete to leave a doubt upon his mind as to the result,
should matters have come to an extremity. He was, how-
ever, very desirous to avoid such a result.
The troops
were ordered to take the most open distance, and the cavalry.
to form in single rank, that the extended appearance of the
line might intimidate into submission those to whom they
were opposed.
The moment was one of great anxiety: the object was to
reduce the mutineers to order, without coming to action;
for if that took place, it seemed next to certain that Badje-
row, whose tent their position encircled, must have lost his
life, either by accident or from their violence. The latter,
from the character of the Arabs, was the most probable: it
was, besides, obvious that almost all his family, and a great
number of defenceless persons (including women and chil-
dren), would have been killed. The mutineers calculated
on the strength they derived from this circumstance, and
would not allow a single person to move from their camp.
Though the guns were loaded with grape, and matches
lighted, the strictest commands were given not to fire till
V.]
ccxxvii
BADJEROW'S SURRENDER.
ordered. The Arabs, who advanced near to the right of.
the line, opened a fire and wounded* some sepoys. The
troops, though eager to attack, remained steady and obe-
dient to their orders, which were repeated by the Brigadier-,
general in person when the casualties were reported. At.
this moment Syed Zeyn, the principal Arab chief, who was
evidently alarmed at the formidable appearance of the line,
came in advance to request a parley. Sir John Malcolm,
before he would listen to him, commanded him to stop the
fire, at the hazard of an instant assault. He despatched one
of his attendants to do so, and came forward himself with
an earnest entreaty that matters should be settled. Badje-
row had, he said, paid the greater part of their demands:
there were remaining but a few trifling points, which if Bri-
gadier-general Malcolm would only inquire into, all parties
would agree to abide by the award of his justice. The
required promise was given, and Syed Zeyn galloped back
to his men to remove them from Badjerow's tent. He
returned, without effecting this purpose, accompanied by
all the leaders of the Arabs. "These men," he said to the
General," must have each your hand given to them that
you will not attack them after they have released the Paish-
wah." Sir John Malcolm gave his hand to every Jemidar,
and the assurance they asked. They returned, and the
Arab flags were immediately seen moving towards their own
tents. A few minutes afterwards, Badjerow, attended by
some horse, came in front of the English line; Brigadier-
* Two or three of the grenadiers of the 14th native infantry were
wounded. A native officer of the company asked General Malcolm,
as he was riding past, whether he would allow his sepoys to be
shot, without returning the fire? If I permit you to fire," said the
General, "the Company's good name may suffer injury."
twenty grenadiers die," said the fine fellow, in an animated tone; “it is
for you, General, to take care of the Company's good name."
"Let
p 2
ccxxviii
[Arr.
NARRATIVE OF
general Malcolm complimented him with a general salute.
This was done to increase the effect which it was hoped
what had passed would have upon his mind, and to strike
deeper the contrast between the disgrace and danger of the
situation from which he had escaped, and that safety and
honourable treatment which he secured by relying solely on
the protection of the British government.
Never was a result more happy than that which attended
the events of the day. Badjerow was profuse in his ex-
pressions to Brigadier-general Malcolm, who was, he said,
the friend decreed to save his honour and his life. He had
erred, he added, for the last time, and would now do anything
the General wished. He was desired to move on immediately
ten miles on the route to the Nerbudda, with those adherents
that were to accompany him, while Brigadier-general Mal-
colm stayed behind to grant passports to the remainder, and
to see that the Arabs, Rohillas, and others, fulfilled their
engagements of departing towards their respective homes.
All this was effected with the most perfect good temper in
a few hours, and the chiefs of the mutineers were hardly
less grateful than Badjerow for the manner in which they
had been treated. Their astonishment was greatly excited
by the forbearance of the English troops, who, indeed,
behaved admirably.
66
Sir John Malcolm, in the Division Order which he after-
wards issued, thus expressed the sense he entertained of
the conduct of the force under his command, on this try-
ing occasion: Brigadier-general Malcolm congratulates
the force under his command upon their recrossing the
Nerbudda, and the termination of a campaign rendered
glorious by great political events and splendid military
achievements. The corps which compose this force ob-
tained in the beginning of this war the highest applause for
their distinguished gallantry, and during the last six months
V.]
ccxxix
BADJEROW'S SURRENDER.
that they have been incessantly employed in restoring order
and tranquillity to countries long subject to anarchy and
oppression, they have shewn all the qualities of good soldiers.
Fortune has given them a part in the last operations of the
campaign, and they have had the gratification of witnessing
the submission of the Paishwah Badjerow, the only enemy
that remained to the British government. The course of
this service has afforded no opportunity for signalizing their
courage, but in all the measures which Brigadier-general
Malcolm thought it his duty to adopt, and particularly in
those of the 10th instant, when he had to quell a dangerous
mutiny in Badjerow's camp, he proceeded with a confidence
that nothing but complete reliance upon those under his
command could have inspired. The awe with which their
order and appearance struck a lawless soldiery, was increased
by that coolness which ever accompanies determined intre-
pidity. The moment was critical-a body of insubordinate
men whom they could easily have destroyed, opened a fire,
which, had it been returned, might have involved conse-
quences injurious to the British fame, and distressing to
humanity. The troops saw their comrades wounded and
remained unmoved-they attended only to orders. The
result was all that could be wished, and on this occasion
discipline obtained a triumph far beyond the reach of
valour !"
Badjerow, subsequent to this event, complied with every
wish expressed by Brigadier-general Malcolm, with respect
to his marching, place of encampment, and indeed on all
other points. His attendants were reduced to between six
and seven hundred horse, and two hundred infantry, and
he himself became daily more reconciled to his condition.
There was indeed every reason why he should be so. The
provision made for him was most princely, and far beyond
CCXXX
[App.
NARRATIVE OF
what he had, from his treacherous conduct, any right to
expect, but the considerations which led to this arrangement
had little reference to his personal character or merits; it
was grounded, first, on the policy of terminating the war,
which included the necessity of paying an adequate price
for the submission of a sovereign, who, while he continued
in opposition, kept all India agitated and unsettled. The
second consideration referred to what was due to the dignity
of the British government, whose conduct on all similar
occasions had been marked by the utmost liberality; and,
lastly, it appeared an important object to make an impres-
sion, that while it reconciled all ranks to the great change
that had occurred, left a sentiment of grateful feeling, in the
minds of the Paishwah's former adherents, towards a go_
vernment which, in the hour of victory, forgot its own
wrongs, and respected their prejudices in its treatment of
their fallen prince.
With respect to the effect this liberality is likely to have
upon Badjerow himself, though gratitude cannot be looked
for from a prince towards the power which has dethroned
him; yet he must be expected to act even in his reduced
statė from motives that are influenced by the treatment he
receives, and the better his condition, the less he will be
inclined to hazard a change. The annual sum granted to
Badjerow, though princely for the support of an individual,
is nothing for the purposes of ambition; but supposing his
habits of intrigue so inveterate, and his ambition so uncon-
querable, that he should make another attempt at sovereignty
what hopes can he entertain of success? He has, by
becoming a voluntary exile, emancipated his subjects from
their allegiance. His former and oldest adherents, released
from their duty to him, have been left to form new ties, and
to pursue the path of their individual interests. Were he
V.J
ccxxxi
BADJEROW's SURRENDER.
even of a different character, success in such an effort would
be impossible; as it is, there can be no hesitation in con-
cluding with Brigadier-general Malcolm, "That Badjerow
has unstrung a bow which he never can re-bend *."
*Letter to Mr. Adam, 19th June, 1818.
No. VI.
SPEECH OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM, G.C.B., &c. &c.
Delivered at a General Court of Proprietors of East-
India Stock, on Friday, July 9th, 1824.
SIR J. MALCOLM rose and said-" It certainly was not
my intention to have spoken, unless personally alluded to in
the course of the debate. What the honourable proprietor
(Mr. Kinnaird) has said regarding my sentiments on publi-
cation in England, would not have made me depart from
the resolution I had taken; but I cannot sit patiently and
hear the abuse (I must call it so) that has been lavished
upon Mr. Adam. The honourable proprietor has given
high eulogiums to Mr. Buckingham, and he has closed
them with a profession, that all he thought of that gentle-
man's character from his writings and actions, had been con-
firmed by his personal acquaintance since his arrival in
England. I can speak of Mr. Adam on an intimate knowledge
of thirty years: he is as remarkable for mildness and hu-
manity as for firmness and judgment; he is from birth and
education a lover of the free constitution of his country,
and all he has done in the case now before us has, I am
assured, proceeded solely from an imperious sense of public
duty. It is, however, trifling with the great subject before
us, to waste our time in discussing the respective merits of
Mr. Adam and Mr. Buckingham; but even to understand
this small part of the question, we must first consider the
scene in which they acted. Let us commence by looking at
}
SPEECH OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM.
Ccxxxiii
the character of our Indian government, and then deter-
mine how far such a free press, as that which is the boast
of England, can be transplanted to that distant possession.
This is the real question, and it should be met openly and
decidedly. The facts appear to me only to require to be
fairly and boldly brought forward, to convince every rea-
sonable man of the nature of the measure proposed. To en-
able us to judge of the probable operation of this measure,
we must take a near view of the component parts of that
body called the Public, in England, whose character makes
the good outweigh the evil of a free press. Will the ho-
nourable proprietor (Mr. Kinnaird) who has made the mo-
tion, or him by whom it was seconded, (Mr. Hume,) admit
that officers of his Majesty's army and navy, that secreta-
ries, under secretaries, and clerks in public offices, or men
immediately dependent on the favour of government, or
upon that of the paid servants of the state, are essential
parts of that body? Certainly not: but I will go further;
I assert that those noblemen who form the House of Peers,
and the gentry of England who sit in the House of Com-
mons, though they are a part, are not the most essential
one, of the public of whom I speak. They must, in some
degree, be swayed by their connexions, their interests, and
their political parties. Far less can we number, as men who
ought to have superior weight in this body, the lowest or-
ders of this community, who are too uninstructed to judge
political questions, or the demagogues who lead them, or
those daily periodical writers who gain popularity and profit
by flattering the self-love and the passions of the lower or-
ders, as well as that of the party feelings and pride of the
higher. All these mix with, and are parts of, what I un-
derstand by a British public: but the essential component
part of that body, that which gives gravity and steadiness
to the whole, lies, as the ballast of the vessel ought, in the
ccxxxiv
SPEECH OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM.
centre.
[Arr.
It is that numerous class who occupy the middle
ranks of life, whose education and knowledge places them
above being misled like the lower order, and who are, from
their occupation, free from many of those motives which
influence the servants of the state, and all who can be be-
nefited by its favour, or injured by its displeasure; and who
are also in a great degree removed from the passions and
feelings which gives so strong a bias to the lowest and
highest orders of society. It is the minds, and the charac-
ter of this middle class, which give them that decided
weight they have in a British public. Though less forward
and much less heard than the other classes, they govern
them: it is their moderation and good sense, combined with
their habits of thinking and of forming a judgment, on all
points connected with the constitution and the prosperity of
their country, that enables it to have a press free, in a de-
gree unknown to other nations! Without this class, it
would be a curse instead of a blessing. Now, I will ask,
have we one of the class I have described in India? (I
speak now of the English in that country :) there is not an
individual. The English community, I will not call them
a public (in the sense that term has been used,) are almost
all in the employ of government, and the few that are not,
are persons who reside there for a period by license, under
the covenants and legal restrictions which we have just heard
read, and the value of which was well explained by an able
proprietor, (Mr. Impey.) If it is wrong, from considera-
tions of state policy, to deprive these persons of any of the
privileges which they would have enjoyed had they remained
in their native land, why, it is assuredly the law that it is
wrong, not those who act under its authority. Let, there-
fore, this subject be taken up on its true grounds; let an
effort be made to alter the law; but this is not the place.
There are present those who have the power to bring it be-
{
VI.]
SPEECH OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM.
сех
CCXXXV
fore the parliament of the country, where it will be fully
discussed; and, in my opinion, the more discussion it re-
ceives the better. The good sense of the people of Eng-
land will not be slow to decide, whether a free press, such
as they enjoy, can be established and exist in a country go-
verned, as British India, by absolute power. But there are
parts of this subject on which I must not be mistaken; I
have stated that the English community in India neither
are, nor ever can be, a body resembling the public in Eng-
land: but it is a happy effect of our constitution, that a
portion of that spirit of liberty and independence, which
gives life and vigour to the mother-country, is spread to
her most distant colonies; and all, even to her armies, par-
take so much of the blessing as is consistent with their con-
dition, and with the safety of the state. Though such
communities may be so situated as to render a free press
dangerous both to themselves and government, they have a
right to expect from the latter as much of information and
of free communication as is consistent with the public
safety: the tone and temper of an English society can be
preserved in no other mode. I am, and ever have been,
the advocate of publicity in all affairs of government; I
hate concealment and mystification: good and wise mea-
sures will ever gain strength from daylight. For such rea-
sons, though a decided opponent to a free press in India, by
which I mean one, that, being restrained only by the laws
made for the press in England, could publish a series of such
articles as we have heard read from the Calcutta Journal;
which, though not punishable by law, must, if permitted,
prove deeply injurious to the reputation and strength of the
local government. Though I am, I say, an enemy to such
a press, I am friendly to any publication that refrains from
those subjects that have been properly prohibited. We
have had these prohibitions read, and the honourable mover
ccxxxvi
Arr.
SPEECH OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM.
of the question has depicted them as calculated to degrado
all to whom they apply; but this is not their operation.
There have been no complaints but those found in the pages
of Mr. Buckingham's paper, which it has suited the case
of the honourable proprietor to represent as the exclusive
organ of the public. This gentleman, from the moment
he landed in India, became, according to him, the solitary
upholder of English liberty in that enslaved country, and
this arduous task he is represented to have undertaken and
performed from the most pure and disinterested motives!
He found the office of censor removed, and the restrictions
which were imposed when it was done away he considered
as waste paper. These restrictions, however, which were
orders of government, were, in my mind, more severe on
the press than the censorship. I decidedly prefer the latter;
for where it is established, its responsibility rests where it
ought, with those who have the actual power to restrain
and to punish; while, in the other case, it is left to those
who may have less knowledge and discretion, and who are
more likely, through indiscretion, inadvertence, or from
motives of feeling, or of interest, to offend against the go-
vernment. There is something, no doubt, odious in the
name of censor; but it signifies not, if it is necessary; and
if the law authorizes such a check upon publication, it can-
not, for the good of all parties, be too openly and too de-
cidedly exercised. As for myself, I have, from all the
knowledge I have of the scene and of the society, no fear of
any harsh or unwise exertion of this power: but to be sa-
tisfied that we are safe upon this and all other matters af-
fecting the rights and privileges of our countrymen abroad,
let us pause to look at the actual condition of those tyrants
and despots (as they have been termed) under whose au-
thority they live. The Governor-general of India, and go-
vernors of the different settlements are either noblemen or
VI.]
ccxxxvii
SPEECH OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM.
gentlemen sent from England, or persons who have raised
themselves by their services in India, and the latter fill all
the high offices under government. The race of nabobs
who are said to have once existed (I never knew any of
them) are extinct. Those who fill the highest situations
in India are seldom, if ever, elevated to any forgetfulness
of their character as English gentlemen. They proceed to
the execution of their important duties, as men go in this
country to those of an office; their minds are neither cor-
rupted by intrigues, nor disturbed by dreams of irrational
ambition. They enjoy, it is true, great, and in some cases,
as I have said, absolute power: the situation of the country
they govern requires it, and the law of England sanctions
it: but there never were men who exercised power under
such checks. Leaving out of the question that natural
desire to stand well with the community of their country-
men, over whom they are temporarily placed, and not ad-
verting to their views of returning as early as they can to
their native land, and of enjoying that fair esteem and con-
sideration in England to which any cruel or unnecessary
exercise of arbitrary powers would be fatal; leaving, I say,
these motives (powerful as they must be in the breast of
every Englishman) out of the question, let us examine
what are the other checks under which they exercise power:
first, their measures in detail are submitted to the Court of
Directors; we all know the composition of that court; as-
suredly it is not probable it will support despotic acts; but
suppose it was to do so, its proceedings, whenever called
for, must be laid before the Court of Proprietors, and,
judging from the two last meetings of that body, those who
exercise power in India must expect rough handling in it.
Their next ordeal is the Board of Control, which, though
associated with the Court of Directors in the administration
of our eastern empire, is, by one of those happy anomalies
ccxxxviii
[APP.
SPEECH OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM.
which characterize every part of our constitution, composed
of persons whose situations and views must lead them to
judge questions on very different grounds from the Direc-
tors; but their confirmation even of the measures adopted
by the Indian governments is not final; the vigilance of
Parliament, the unbending severity of the law (should they
have offended against its letter), and the freedom of the
English press, all hang over them, and form a combination
of checks that could exist in no other country. I do not
enumerate these checks to complain of them ; on the con-
trary, I recognise their utility, even when carried to an
extreme, they may pain, and sometimes inflict temporary
injury on an individual, but their tendency is to benefit the
public. Power is always intoxicating, and though I will
not allow that those who exercise it in India are like sultans
of the east, who require the flappers (which an honourable
proprietor mentioned) to remind them they are men, I will
readily admit that the oftener they are reminded they are
Englishmen the better. But while I admit this, it is with
a full conviction, that if those appointed to your govern-
ments abroad should ever permit these checks to have an
undue influence on the performance of their public duties,
if they act under dread of responsibility, or seek popularity,
your danger from their measures will be greater than any
that could result even from tyranny; the latter can be
checked and punished, but that weakness which, in con-
sidering its own safety or gratification, forgets the interests
of the state, evades all remedy, and the mischievous effect
is produced before the cause can be removed. It is useful,
nay, most essential, that the checks I have noticed should
remain in full vigour; but they must dwell in England-
they cannot be co-existent with absolute power in India.
We have heard much of the press in that country being
first restricted by Lord Wellesley establishing the office of
VI.]
ccxxxix
SPEECH OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM.
censor. To understand whether this is the fact or not, it is
only necessary to take a short retrospect of the history of
its newspapers.
These have been known in India little
more than half a century. About forty-five years ago,
when his Majesty's courts of law had an extended jurisdic-
tion in Bengal (which it was soon found indispensable to
limit), some of the judges came in violent collision with the
local government, and the free press, as it is termed, which
in such a society is exactly suited to create and support such
divisions of authority, became very licentious.
A paper
edited by a Mr. Hickey was put down, as that of Mr.
Buckingham has now been; and its editor, like him, declined
to go to law. Many years afterwards, when Secretary to
the Marquess Wellesley, it became my duty to peruse
and abstract a petition from this individual, who represented
himself as a martyr in the cause of liberty, and he com-
plained, as Mr. Buckingham has done, of Englishmen being
ruined by oppression and tyranny. Amongst others he
charged with having denied him justice, was that wise,
moderate, and great man, the late Lord Cornwallis. "I
applied to the Noble Marquess for redress," said Mr. Hic-
key in his petition, "but he only advised me, if I thought
myself aggrieved, to go to law. The Noble Marquess,” he
added, "might, in his condescension, have as well advised.
me to fight one of the Company's elephants, as to go to law
with their government." The fact probably was in that
case as in the present,-Mr. Hickey published what com-
pelled the local government to suppress his paper, and as
he could prove no malice or illegal exercise of authority,
he could obtain no redress at law. After this period I never
heard of their existing anything like a free press. Articles
were occasionally published, more, I imagine, through in-
advertence than design, which called for censure on the
publishers; and it was an imprudence or inadvertence of
ccxl
[Apr.
SPEECH OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM.
this character which led to Lord Wellesley's orders, that
the proofs of the newspapers should be submitted to the
secretary of government. But though opinions might
differ, as to whether that was the best mode of attaining the
desired end or not, it is only of very late years that it has
been supposed a free press could exist, to any good or useful
purpose, in the European community of India. I do not
say that, so far as that society alone is concerned, its exist-
ence would immediately endanger the safety of our empire.
I am satisfied it would excite dissensions, cherish insubor-
dination, and weaken authority, and produce evils a hun-
dred times greater than any good it could effect. But its
effects on the European part of the community is a very
small part of this question. Amongst that increasing part
of the population called half-caste, the sons of European
fathers and native mothers, it would do infinite harm. This
class must be viewed and treated as an infant society, and
all the hopes we entertain of their advancement, through
the adoption of gradual measures for their instruction, will
be disappointed, if we adopt the free press as the means of
effecting that object. I have for many years given all the
consideration I could to the unfavourable and depressed.
condition of this class. I entertain opinions (which this is
not the moment to state) regarding the policy of their
introduction to particular branches of the service, but I
entertain no doubt as to that of every effort being made for
their improvement,-of every avenue that can be opened
being opened, for the encouragement of that industry and
talent which many of them possess in a very eminent degree.
There are men in this class of society, whom I hold as dear
as any friends I possess amongst those, many in this court
share the regard I have for Colonel Skinner, who has so
long commanded a large body of native horse, with honour
to himself and advantage to government. But with every
VI.]
ccxli
SPEECH OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM.
desire to see this part of the population encouraged and
advanced, I deem it essential for their good that their pro-
gress should be gradual, in order that they may be fitted
for the place they are destined to occupy in our empire in
the east. Much has been of late done for them, and par-
ticularly by those regulations which entitle them to possess
land in every part of our territories. There are many of
this class, however, who are prone to impatience and dis-
content at their condition; and these, who naturally seek
to make converts to their opinion, will be found amongst
the loudest of the advocates for a free press. But both
these classes of the European inhabitants of India sink into
comparative insignificance, when we contemplate the effect
of such a press upon a native population of eighty millions,
to whom the blessings or the evils that it may carry in its
train are to be imparted. Passing over the impossibility of
establishing, or at least maintaining for a short period, a
press really free, in an empire governed by foreigners who
have conquered, and who have not, and cannot, from the
difference of language, habits, and religion, amalgamate
with the natives,-let us examine the character and con-
dition of the latter, that we may discover what would be
the effect of the boon it is proposed to grant them. They
are divided into two great classes, Mahomedans and Hin-
dus; the higher ranks of the former, who possessed almost
all India before our rule was introduced, are naturally dis-
contented with our power. They bear, however, a small pro-
portion to the Hindus, whose condition and character it is of
more consequence to examine. From the most remote period
till the present day, we find the history of this unchanged
people the same; and there is one striking feature in it—all
the religious and civil classes are educated, and as prompt and
skilful in intrigue as they are in business. From their intellec-
tual superiority they have ever influenced and directed the
VOL. II.
1
q
ccxlii
[Apr.
SPEECH OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM.
more numerous, ignorant, and superstitious classes of their
countrymen. These instructed classes (particularly the Brah-
mins), who have already lost consideration, wealth, and power,
by the introduction of our power, fear, and justly, that its
progress will still more degrade them. They must, from such
causes, have a hostile feeling towards us, and this is not likely
to decrease from the necessity they are under of concealing it.
They will seize every opportunity of injuring our power, and
many must be afforded them. They are, to my knowledge,
adepts in spreading discontent, and exciting sedition and re-
bellion. They know well how to awaken the fears, to alarm
the superstition, or to rouse the pride of those they address.
My attention has been, during the last twenty-five years,
particularly directed to this dangerous species of secret war
against our authority, which is always carrying on, by
numerous, though unseen hands. The spirit is kept up by
letters, by exaggerated reports, and by pretended prophe-
cies. When the time appears favourable, from the occur-
rence of misfortune to our arms, from rebellion in our pro-
vinces, or from mutiny in our troops, circular letters and
proclamations are dispersed over the country with a celerity
that is incredible. Such documents are read with avidity.
The contents are in most cases the same. The English are
depicted as usurpers of low caste, and as tyrants, who have
sought India with no view but that of degrading the inha-
bitants, and of robbing them of their wealth, while they
seek to subvert their usages and their religion. The native
soldiery are always appealed to, and the advice to them is,
in all instances I have met with, the same-" Your Euro-
pean tyrants are few in number, murder them!"
The efforts made by the part of the Indian population I
have mentioned, and their success in keeping up a spirit
which places us always in danger, are facts that will not be
denied by any man acquainted with the subject. Now I
VI.]
ccxliii
SPEECH OF SIR JOHIN MALCOLM.
will ask, if we can rationally indulge a hope, that a dislike
and hostility to our rule would not be cherished and inflamed
by men, whose consideration, wealth, and power, must be
ruined by our success? Is it likely to abate? and if not,
is it politic, is it wise, to put such means as a free press (such
as has been described) into their hands? It could only be
used towards one object, that of our destruction; but that,
when effected, would be but a prelude to a greater evil→
the destruction of themselves. Every fair hope that can be
formed of rendering this vast population worthy of the
blessings that may be gradually imparted, would perish, and
they would be replunged into a worse state of anarchy than
that from which we have relieved them. That this will be
the result, if we give them, in their present stage of society,
the baneful present that has been proposed, I conscientiously
believe. But it is here necessary to ask, for what are we to
increase such hazards, both to the European and native
community of India? The object, we are told, is to pro
mote knowledge. Do we mistrust our local governments?
do we mistrust those under whose orders they act, and those
by whom they are controlled, that we are to take from their
hands the accomplishment of that great object, that we
should place it in the hands of editors of papers and of
periodical publications? Are we to confide almost exclu-
sively to the latter, and to their 'anonymous correspondents,
the reform of abuses and the improvement of our eastern
subjects? The eloquence of the honourable mover has been
powerfully exerted to make us do so. The general ten-
dency of his arguments has gone to express a belief, that
those who are educated for public duties in India, and who
have superadded, to the early instruction they received, long
and approved service, are not the fittest instruments for this
great and good purpose. To bring their knowledge and
local experience to a level with the comparative ignorance or
g 2
ccxliv
{APP.
SPEECH OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM.
others, who have not the same advantages, the make-weight
of prejudice has been thrown into the scale, and they have
been represented as having forgotten all the lessons of their
youth, and having become dead to the feelings of British
liberty', in order to furnish arguments to prove their incom-
petence to the higher stations of government. This is a
convenient doctrine; it exalts ignorance to a par with know-
ledge: it has been urged, in the present instance, to suit
the case.
That high and respectable body of men, the civil
servants of India (with whom, I am proud to say, the prin-
cipal duties of my life have associated me), have been held
light and depreciated, that a most distinguished member of
their service might be proved unfit for the station of Gover-
nor-general. The prejudices Mr. Adam had imbibed by his
long residence in India, were alluded to as the cause of his
maltreatment of Mr. Buckingham. But what comes next?
Lord Amherst, a nobleman who is admitted to be as amia-
ble as he is sensible and just, and whom all acknowledge to
be deeply imbued with the feelings and sentiments of an
Englishman, hardly arrives in India before he finds himself
compelled to adopt the same principle upon which his pre-
decessor had acted, and to send to England Mr. Arnott,
who had succeeded Mr. Buckingham as editor of the Cal-
cutta Journal. For this act of authority Lord Amherst is,
we are told, worse than a tyrant; he has allowed himself to
become the tool of tyrants, who have taken the advantage of
his want of experience. What does all this mean? one Go-
vernor-general is declared unfitted for his office because he
has local knowledge, and the other because he wants it.
It appears to me that it is the abstract name of Governor-
general, or rather the person who exercises, to the best of his
judgment and conscience, an absolute power which the law
has vested in him, that is the object of the attack which we
have heard this day. If so, let this system be arraigned,
VI.]
ccxlv
SPEECH OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM.
not the individuals.
I have shewn the checks under which
they act; their probable motives, and their means of know-
ledge: but these are not, we are told, to be relied upon, to
prevent evil or to promote good purposes. No; for such
we must look to men like Mr. Buckingham. They are, on
their first touch of the soil of India, to start, as if by inspi-
ration, into a virtue and knowledge, which is to control, to
reform, and to improve the society, white and black, of
India!
Let us inquire the means of the individual who has
been brought forward as an example of what has and may
be done by such characters. When he came first to India,
and published the prospectus of his Travels in Palestine,
and at the same time commenced a newspaper on an im-
proved plan to any then existing, I deemed him, as many
others did, a man of enterprise and talent: but in a very
short period, several paragraphs appeared in his paper which
satisfied me of the course he meant to pursue; and I early
gave an opinion on the probable termination of his career,
which has been verified by the result. I shall not go into
the detail of the offences he committed, his apologies,
and his promises of amendment; nor shall I inquire into
the exact character of that offence which compelled Mr.
Adam to withdraw his license. It was the aggregate of his
offences, and the principle upon which he continued to act,
that caused the severe but necessary measure of which he
complains. He knew Mr. Adam's sentiments, he knew his
resolution; but instead of benefiting by such knowledge, to
avoid that ruin in which we are told he is involved, he per-
severed in the same bold and contumacious course he had
so long followed. He chose, no doubt, for the first trial of
strength with the new Governor-general, a popular subject.
He judged that Mr. Adam, though pledged to arrest his
career on the first departure from the restrictions, would
ccxlvi
[Arr.
SPEECH OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM.
;
hesitate before he acted, in a case where he was or might be
thought to be personally interested; but he shewed little
discernment in his appreciation of the character with whom
he had to deal, or he would have known that no personal
consideration would induce him to evade a public duty.
Mr. Adam, vested with the highest authority in India, was
forced, by this course of conduct, to appear in contest with
Mr. Buckingham, the self-created champion of British
liberty, while not only the English community, but the
natives, were lookers on at this trial of strength. Was the
issue of such a contest to be left doubtful for a moment?
It has often been said, and it has been repeated to-day,
that your empire in India is one of opinion. It is so, but
it is not an opinion of your right, but of your power. The
inhabitants of India see that limited by law and regulations,
and the spectacle increases their confidence; but shew them
the person, who exercises an authority they deem supreme,
braved and defeated by those under him, and the impression
which creates the charm will be broken. This, at least, is
my view of the subject; I am, however, I confess, rendered
timid by experience. It has made me humble, and I look
with awe and trembling at questions which the defenders of
a free press in India treat as mere bugbears, calculated to
alarm none but the weak and the prejudiced. The honour-
able mover of the resolution now before Court has asked,
if the press is restricted in the manner it is at present, how
we are to obtain information of the merits and character of
our servants. I had before thought that might be found
on the records of the governments—in the opinion of those
under whom officers acted; but these are, it would seem,
imperfect sources, as are all papers of documents published
under the restrictions now placed upon the Indian press.
It is from the pages of the Calcutta Journal, and the com
ments of an editor who has been three or four years in India,
VI.]
ccxlvii
SPEECH OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM.
and never beyond the precincts of a presidency—it is from
his able and disinterested view of men and measures, and
from that of his anonymous correspondents, that we can
alone derive full and impartial information on this important
point. But enough on this part of the subject.
We have heard a petition, said to be written, and I have
no doubt it is, by that respectable native, Ram Mohun Roy,
whom I know and regard. I was one of those who earnestly
wished his mind could have been withdrawn from useless
schemes of speculative policy, and devoted to giving us his
useful aid in illustrating the past and present history of his
countrymen; for that knowledge (of which we are yet im-
perfectly possessed) must form the basis of every rational
plan of improvement. We have had comments from the
honourable mover of the question, on those parts of the
regulations by Mr. Adam that relate to native newspapers,
which might lead to a belief that he had robbed the natives
of a freedom they had long enjoyed, of a free press; but
there never was, until very lately, any native newspaper
printed in India, and they are now only subject to the same
license and regulations as those in the English language.
I could say much more upon this subject, but feel I have
already intruded too long upon your indulgence. Allow
me, however, to repeat my sentiments of Mr. Adam, who
is an individual not more distinguished by his temper and
virtue in private life, than by his zeal, integrity, and talent
as a public servant. He is incapable of malignity to any
human being. On the present occasion he has come for-
ward to expose himself to obloquy, to save the public. The
best testimonies to the wisdom and necessity of his conduct
will be found in the corresponding sentiments of those he is
associated with; in the measure of the same character which
Lord Amherst has found himself compelled to adopt; in the
approbation of the Court of Directors; in that of the Board
ccxlviii
[Arr. VI.
SPEECH OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM.
of Control. It only remains that he should receive, as I am
assured he will, the support of this Court, who, I can have
no doubt, will shew, by their vote on the present occasion,
that they will never give up to clamour, or abandon, in any
shape, a public officer, who has performed his duty in an
able, faithful, and conscientious manner.
No. VII.
PROCLAMATION PREVIOUS TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF
HOSTILITIES WITH THE RAJAH OF NEPAUL.
THE British government having been compelled to take up
arms against the Nepaulese, his Excellency the Right Ho-
nourable the Governor-general has judged it proper to make
known to the powers in alliance and friendship with the
Honourable Company, the origin and progress of the trans.
actions which have terminated in this crisis, in the full
conviction that the exposition will establish beyond dispute
the extraordinary moderation and forbearance of the British
government, and the injustice, violence, and aggression of
the state of Nepaul.
The course of the Gorkah conquests having approximated
their frontier to that of the Honourable Company, and of
its ally the Nawaub Vizier, and the protected Seikh chief-
tains, throughout an extent of country stretching from the
eastern border of Morung to the banks of the Sutlege, it
was scarcely to be expected that differences should not
occasionally arise between the inhabitants of the contiguous
districts belonging to the two states, and even among the
local public officers of each government; but a just and
firm line of conduct on the part of the two governments,
combined with a sincere disposition to maintain uninter-
rupted the relations of amity, and to respect the rights of
each other, could not have failed to arrest the progress of
those unhappy disputes, which have terminated in war.
While the conduct of the British government has been
ccl
[Arr.
PROCLAMATION PREVIOUS TO
uniformly regulated in its relations with the Nepaulese by
the most scrupulous adherence to the principles of justice
and moderation, there is scarcely a single district within the
British frontier, throughout the whole of the extensive line
above described, in which the Gorkhas have not usurped
and appropriated lands forming the ascertained dominions
of the Honourable Company.
Questions originating in the usurpations of the Nepaulese
have arisen in Purnea, Tirhoot, Sarun, Goruckpore, and
Bareilly, as well as in the protected territory between the
Sutlege and the Jumna; and each case might be appealed
to in proof of the moderation and forbearance of the British
government, and the aggressive and insolent spirit of the
Nepaulese. It will be enough, however, to advert in detail
to two instances only, namely, those which have occurred in
Sarun and in Goruckpore, which more particularly demon-
strate the systematic design of the Nepaulese to encroach
on the acknowledged possessions of the Honourable Company,
and have, in fact, been the proximate causes of the war.
In the former district, they have at different times esta-
blished their authority over portions of the territory of
Betteah; but the British government, abiding by those.
principles of moderation and forbearance so conspicuous in
all its transactions with the Nepaulese, contented itself for
à considerable period with remonstrances and representa-
tions, trusting that the justice of its cause would become
apparent to the Nepaulese government, and produce its
proper effect on the mind of the Rajah and his ministers.
The repeated complaints of its subjects, and the occurrence
of a new instance of encroachment in the Tuppah of Nun-
noar, forming a portion of Betteah, which led to an affray,
in which Subah Luchingir, an officer of the Nepaulese
government, was slain, at last induced the British govern-
ment to députe one of its civil officers to the spot, where he
THE NEPAULESE WAR.
ccli
VII.]
was met by deputies from the state of Nepaul, in concert
with whom proceedings were held and evidence taken, for
the purpose of ascertaining the claims of the parties. The
result left no doubt of the right of the British government,
and of the unjust and violent procedure of the Nepaulese.
A more striking proof of the spirit of rapacity and unjust
aggression by which the Nepaulese were actuated cannot be
adduced, than the fact that, after having agreed to the
investigation referred to above, and after the actual deputa-
tion of officers by each government, the Nepaulese suddenly
seized an additional tract of country belonging to the Com-
pany, at a very short distance from the scene of their former
aggressions.
an
This violent and unjust procedure would have warranted
immediate demand for restitution, or even the actual re-
occupation of the lands by force; and it may now be a
subject of regret to the British government, that this course
was not pursued. Far, however, from resenting or punish-
ing this daring outrage as it deserved, the British govern-
ment resolved to persevere in the amicable course which it
had pursued in other cases, and permitted Mr. Young,
the gentleman deputed to meet the Nepaulese commissioners,
to extend his inquiries to the lands newly seized, as above
stated, as well as to those which formed the original object
of his deputation.
The pretext by which the Nepaulese attempted to justify
their occupation of the lands in Nunnore, which consisted of
no less than twenty-two villages, was, that they were included
in the Tuppah of Rotehut, forming a division of Purgunnah
Sunnown, which Tuppah was restored to the Nepaulese in
the year 1783, with the rest of the Terraiee of Muckwan-
pore, which had been conquered by the British arms under
Major Kinloch. The utter groundlessness of this pretext
was proved by the evidence taken by Mr. Young, which
çelii
(Arr.
PROCLAMATION PREVIOUS TO
clearly established that the disputed lands were situated in
the Tuppah of Nunnore, a portion of Purgunnah Simru-
wun, which had been reserved by the Company at the time.
of the restitution of Rotehut, and the remainder of Muck-
wanpore. But had it been otherwise, the tacit acquiescence
by the Nepaulese in our possession of those lands for a
period of thirty years, would have amounted to a derelic-
tion of their claim, however well founded it might originally
have been. The abrupt and violent manner in which the
Nepaulese have invariably possessed themselves of those
portions of the Honourable Company's territory to which
they have at any time pretended a right, will not allow the
supposition that they would have refrained, during so long
a period, from doing themselves justice in the present case,
if they had felt conscious of the validity of the claim. It is
evident, from the whole tenour of their proceedings, that
they acted on that premeditated system of gradual encroach-
ment, which, owing to the unexampled forbearance and
moderation of the British government, they had already
found to be successful; and that the assertion of the twenty-
two villages having been included in the Tuppah of Rote-
hut, was merely brought forward to give colour to the
unwarrantable act which they had committed, when it
became necessary to assign a reason for their conduct.
The Nepaulese have attempted to fix on the subjects of
the Honourable Company the guilt of the murder of Subah
Luchingir, and have stated as matter of complaint against
the British government, that the Rajah of Betteah and his
followers have not been punished for that act; and they
have endeavoured to found on this charge a justification of
their own subsequent proceedings. It has been ascertained,
however, by incontestable evidence, that Luchingir had,
previously to the occurrence of the affray in which he died,
possessed himself of some villages in Betteah, and was pre-
-VII.]
ccliii
THE NEPAULESE WAR.
paring to extend his encroachments. Whatever degree of
culpability therefore may attach to the subjects of the Honour-
able Company, for forcibly opposing his proceedings, their
offence was towards their own government alone; and the
Nepaulese could not, with any colour of justice, demand
the punishment of those persons, for an act produced solely
by the misconduct of their own officers, or charge the Bri-
tish government with a culpable omission of what would
have been, under different circumstances, due to a state
professedly on friendly terms with it; still less can they
found on this transaction any justification of their own con-
duct in other instances.
As the final resolution of the British government, with
respect to the usurped lands in Betteah, was in part influ-
enced by the conduct of the Nepaulese, relative to the dis-
puted territory of Bootwul and Sheoraj in Goruckpore, it
will be proper to advert to the circumstances of that trans-
action in this place.
It is notorious, and has also been proved by reference to
authentic records, and by the unimpeached testimony of
living witnesses, that the whole of Bootwul, to the very foot
of the hills, with the exception of the town of Bootwul
alone, was held by the Rajahs of Palpah, from the Nawaub
Vizier, for a considerable period antecedent to the Treaty
of Cession in 1801; and that it was transferred to the Com-
pany by the terms of that treaty, being specifically included
in the schedule thereunto annexed. It is no less matter of
notoriety, that the district of Bootwul actually came into
the possession of the British government by virtue of the
cession, and that a settlement was made by the collector of
Goruckpore with the agent of the late Rajah of Palpah, at
that time a prisoner at Catmandhoo, for an annual rent of
thirty-two thousand rupees, without the semblance of an
objection on the part of the Rajah of Nepaul. So it re-
ccliv
[Arp.
PROCLAMATION PREVIOUS TO
mained until the year 1804, when the Nepaulese com-
menced that system of gradual encroachment below the
hills, which terminated in their occupation of nearly the
whole district of Bootwul. The Tuppah of Sheoraj was
occupied by the Nepaulese antecedently to the cession; but
it is no less certain that it was a part of the territory of the
Vizier, and, together with the rest of the lowlands skirting
the hills in the district of Goruckpore, included in the
cession.
The Nepaulese pretended to found their claim to Boot-
wul and Sheoraj, and to the other portions of the lands
below the hills, on the circumstance of their having formed
the terraiee, or lowlands, of the hill countries of Palpah,
Goolmee, Pentaneh, Kamchee, &c., which the Nepaulese
have conquered. Admitting that the lowlands were pos-
sessed by the chiefs of the neighbouring hill-principalities,
the admission does not affect the question, since it is perfectly
ascertained that, for a considerable period before the Goor-
kah conquest, they formed a part of the dominions of Oude;
and the conquest therefore of the independent hill-princi
palities cannot give to the conquering power any just claim
to other lands, which, though in the occupation of the same
chiefs, were held on dependent tenures from another state.
To show the little confidence that the Nepaulese had in
their claim of sovereignty over these lands, it is sufficient to
observe, that soon after their usurpation of them, they
actually made an offer to hold Bootwul in farm from the
British government, on the same terms as the Rajah of
Palpah, a proposition to which this government did not
think proper to accede.
The system of gradual, and at times almost imperceptible
encroachment pursued by the Nepaulese, was calculated to
deceive the British government with respect to their ultimate
views, and, combined with the just and moderate course
THE NEPAULESE WAR.
cclv
VII.]
of proceedings which the British government has pursued
in all its intercourse with the Nepaulese, prevented it from
resorting to those means which would at once have repressed
the outrage of the Nepaulese, and re-established its own
authority in the usurped lands. The remonstrances and
discussions which followed the first usurpation of the Ne-
paulese in this quarter, continued, with frequent interrup-
tion, for a period of some years, during which the Nepaulese
continued to avail themselves of every favourable occasion
of extending their encroachments. At length a proposition
was made by the Rajah of Nepaul, that commissioners
should be appointed to meet on the spot, and investigate
and decide the respective claims of the parties, under the
express condition that, whatever might be the issue of the
inquiry, both governments would abide by it. Notwith,
standing its perfect conviction of the justice of its own
claims, the British government did not hesitate to submit
to the delay and expense necessarily attending the proposed
investigation, confiding in the ultimate, though tardy,
admission of its rights by the Nepaulese, and anxious to
afford an unequivocal proof of the moderation of its conduct
and the justice of its cause. The proposition of the Rajah
of Nepaul was accordingly acceded to, and Major Bradshaw
was directed to proceed to Bootwul, and enter on the
investigation, in concert with commissioners to be ap
pointed by the Nepaulese government.
The commissioners of the two governments met, and,
after much delay and procrastination on the part of the Ne-
paulese agents, the proceedings were brought to a close, and
the right of the British government to the whole of the
lowlands confirmed by the most irrefragable proofs, both
oral and documentary.
The Nepaulese commissioners, unable to resist the force
of this evidence, and clearly restrained by the orders of their
cclvi
[Arr.
PROCLAMATION PREVIOUS TO
court from admitting the right of the British government,
pretended that they were not authorized to come to a deci-
sion, and referred the case to the Rajah's government for
orders.
The advanced period of the season when the commis-
sioners closed their proceedings, rendered it impracticable
to take any steps founded on them, until the ensuing year.
The immediate procedure of the British government was
therefore confined to a communication to the Rajah, stating
in general terms the conclusions necessarily resulting from
the proceedings of the commissioners, and requiring the
Rajah to give up the lands, according to the condition on
which the investigation was acceded to, on the grounds of
the conclusive proof of its right, established by those pro-
ceedings. To this just and fair demand the Rajah of Ne-
paul replied, by repeating all those arguments in favour of
his own claim, which had been entirely overthrown by the
evidence adduced to the commissioners, and refused to
restore the lands. In this state the affair necessarily re-
mained until the ensuing season, 1813-14.
In the meanwhile Major Bradshaw proceeded, as soon as
the state of the country admitted of his marching, to the
frontier of Betteah, where he was to be met by commissioners
from Nepaul, empowered to adjust in concert with him the
depending claims in that quarter; no practical measures
having yet resulted from the inquiry conducted by Mr.
Young.
Major Bradshaw, soon after his arrival, renewed a de-
mand which had been made by the British government, but
not enforced at the time, for the restoration of the twenty-
two villages of Nunnore, previously to any examination of
the question of right. This demand was acceded to by
the Nepaulese, and the villages were re-occupied by the
officers of the Honourable Company, subject to the ulti-
1
VII.J
cclvii
THE NEPAULESE WAR.
mate disposal of them according to the issue of the intended
inquiry.
The refusal of the Nepaulese government to abide by
the result of an inquiry sought by itself in the case of the
encroachments in Gorruckpore, notwithstanding the full and
complete establishment of the rights of the British govern-
ment to the disputed lands in that quarter, now led the Go-
vernor-general in council to pause before he consented to
incur the loss, inconvenience, and anxiety, attendant on a
new investigation of the claims of the respective govern-
ments to the usurped lands in Sarun. On duly reflecting
on all that had passed; on the actual proof of the claim of
the British government established by Mr. Young's in-
quiry, conducted in concert with Nepaulese commissioners,
an inquiry, which embraced the testimony on oath of all
those persons who could be supposed to possess the best
local knowledge, and which had, moreover, this advantage
over every subsequent investigation, that it was held at
a period so much nearer to the time of the transaction, and
on the presumptive proof of our right, arising out of the
fact acknowledged by the Nepaulese themselves, of our
uninterrupted possession during thirty years; the mind
of the Governor-general in council was perfectly satisfied
that a further investigation de novo would be an unprofit-
able waste of time, and that the utmost that the Nepaulese
government could in fairness expect, was, that the commis-
sioners of both governments should meet for the purpose of
discussing the question on the basis of the investigation
actually closed, and of supplying any defects which might
be discovered in that investigation by further inquiry on the
spot.
When this result of the deliberations of the Governor-
general in council was notified to the Nepaulese commis-
sioners by Major Bradshaw, with an offer to meet them for
1
cclviii
[Apr.
PROCLAMATION PREVIOUS TO
the purpose stated, and to produce documents which he had
obtained, confirming the correctness of the conclusions
drawn from the evidence formerly taken, the Commissioners
declared, that they would not meet him, nor hold any com-
munication with him; and, revoking the conditional trans-
fer of the usurped lands, demanded that Major Bradshaw
should instantly leave the frontier. They immediately af-
terwards returned to Nepaul.
This insulting and unprovoked declaration could be re-
ferred to no other cause than a previous determination not
to fulfil the obligations of justice towards the British go-
vernment, and left to it no course, but to do itself that
right which was refused by the government of Nepaul.
Acting on this principle, the Governor-general addressed a
letter to the Rajah of Nepaul, reviewing the conduct of his
commissioners, and claiming the full renunciation of the
disputed lands; adding, that if it were not made within a
given time, the portions of these lands still in the hands of
the Nepaulese would be reoccupied, and the twenty-two
villages, which had been conditionally transferred to the
British government, declared to be finally reannexed to
the dominions of the honourable Company. This demand
not having been complied with, the resumption of the lands
was carried into effect, and the authority of the British go-
vernment re-established throughout the tract in dispute.
While these occurrences were passing in Sarun, the
British government, perceiving from the tenour of the whole
conduct of the state of Nepaul, and from the answer to its
demand for the restitution of Bootwul and Sheoraj, that no
intention existed on the part of the Rajah to restore those
lands, was compelled to prepare to take possession of them
by force, if that necessity should arise. Previously, how-
ever, to ordering the troops to advance into the disputed
territory, the Governor-general in council made one more
VII.]
cclix
THE NEPAULESE WAR.
effort to induce the Rajah to restore them, by renewing the
demand, founded on the result of the investigation, and de-
clared at the same time, that if the orders of surrender
were not received within a limited time (which was speci-
fied) the British troops would proceed to occupy the lands.
The specified period having expired without the adoption
of any measure on the part of the Nepaulese government
towards a compliance with the just requisition of the British
government, the troops were ordered to march; and the
Nepaulese forces, and the public officers of that govern-
ment, retiring on the advance of the British troops, the civil
officers of the honourable Company were enabled to establish
their authority in the disputed lands.
The commencement of the rainy season shortly rendered
it necessary to withdraw the regular troops, in order that
they might not be exposed to the periodical fevers which
reign throughout the tract in that part of the year. The
defence of the recovered lands was, of course, unavoidably
intrusted to the police establishments. The apparent ac-
quiescence, however, of the Nepaulese, in what had taken
place, left no room for apprehension; especially as no
real violence had been used in obliging the Nepaulese to
retire from the district. On the morning of the 29th of
May last, the principal police station in Bootwul was at-
tacked by a large body of the Nepaulese troops, headed by
an officer of that government, named Munraj Foujdar *, and
driven out of Bootwul, with the loss of eighteen men killed
and six wounded. Among the former was the Darogah,
or principal police-officer, who was murdered in cold blood,
with circumstances of peculiar barbarity, in the presence of
Munraj Foujdar, after surrendering himself a prisoner.
Another police tannah † was subsequently attacked by the
* Commander of the army.
* Post.
1 2
cclx
[Arr.
PROCLAMATION PREVIOUS TO
Nepaulese troops, and driven out, with the loss of several
persons killed and wounded. In consequence of the im-
practicability of supporting the police tannahs by sending
troops into the country at that unhealthy season, it became
necessary to withdraw them; and the Nepaulese were thus
enabled to reoccupy the whole of the 'disputed territory,
which they have since retained. The British government
had not ceased to hope that an amicable adjustment of its
differences with the state of Nepaul might still be accom-
plished, when the perpetration of this sanguinary and atro-
cious outrage, by which the state of Nepaul at once placed
itself in the condition of a public enemy of the British go-
vernment, put an end to the possibility of any accommoda-
tion, except on the basis of unqualified submission and
atonement.
Still the Governor-general would not proceed to actual
hostilities, without giving to the Rajah of Nepaul one other
opening for avoiding so serious an issue. Therefore his ex-
cellency wrote to the Rajah of Nepaul, to apprize him of
what must be the consequence of the insolent outrage which
had taken place, unless the government of Nepaul should
exonerate itself from the act, by disavowal and punish-
ment of the perpetrators. This letter received an answer
wholly evasive, and even implying menace.
The requisite submission and atonement having thus
been withheld, the British government had no choice left
but an appeal to arms, in order to avenge its innocent sub-
jects, and vindicate its insulted dignity and honour. The
unfavourable season of the year alone prevented it from
having instant recourse to the measures necessary for chas-
tising the insolence, violence, and barbarity of the Nepau-
lese, whose whole conduct, not only in the particular cases
above detailed, but in every part of their proceedings
towards the British government, for a series of years, has
VII.]
cclxi
THE NEPAULESE WAR.
been marked by an entire disregard of the principles of ho-
nour, justice, and good faith, aggravated by the most fla-
grant insolence, presumption, and audacity, and has mani-
fested the existence of a long-determined resolution on the
part of the court of Catmandhoo to reject all the just de-
mands of the British government, and to refer the decision
of the questions depending between the two states to the
issue of a war.
Ever since the murder of the police-officers in Bootwul,
and during the unavoidable interval of inaction which fol-
lowed, the Nepaulese, with a baseness and barbarity peculiar
to themselves, have endeavoured to destroy the troops and
the subjects of the Company on the frontier of Sarun, by
poisoning the water of the wells and tanks in a tract of con-
siderable extent. The fortunate discovery of this attempt
baffled the infamous design, and placed incontrovertible
proof of it in the hands of the British government.
The impediment to military operations, arising from the
season of the year, is now removed, and the British govern-
ment is prepared, by the active and vigorous employment
of its resources, to compel the state of Nepaul to make that
atonement which it is so justly entitled to demand. The
British government has long borne the conduct of the Ne-
paulese with unexampled patience, opposing to their vio-
lence, insolence, and rapacity, a course of procedure uni-
formly just and moderate. But forbearance and modera-
tion must have their limits; and the British government
having been compelled to take up arms in defence of its
rights, its interests, and its honour, will never lay them
down, until its enemy shall be forced to make ample submis-
sion and atonement for his outrageous conduct, to indem-
nify it for the expense of the war, and to afford full security
for the future maintenance of those relations which he has
so shamefully violated.
cclxii
PROCLAMATION, &c.
If the misguided councils of the state of Nepaul shall
lead it obstinately to persist in rejecting these just demands,
it will itself be responsible for the consequences. The
British government has studiously endeavoured, by every
effort of conciliation, to avert the extremity of war, but it
can have no apprehension of the result; and it relies with
confidence on the justness of its cause, and on the skill,
discipline, and valour of its armies, for a speedy, honour-
able, and decisive termination of the contest in which it is
engaged.
By command of his Excellency the Governor-
General,
(Signed)
Lucknow,
November 1st, 1814.
J. ADAM,
Secretary to Government.
No. VIII.
INSTRUCTIONS * BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN MALCOLM,
G.C.B., K.L.S., TO OFFICERS ACTING UNDER HIS OR-
DERS IN CENTRAL INDIA, IN 1821.
THESE instructions are grounded upon principles which it
has been my constant effort to inculcate upon all officers
acting under my orders; and, at a period when I am leav-
ing Central India (perhaps not to return), I feel it a duty
I owe to them, to myself, and to the public service, to en-
ter into a more full explanation of my sentiments upon the
subject of our general and local rule, than could have been
necessary under any other circumstances.
Almost all who, from knowledge and experience, have
been capable of forming any judgment upon the question,
are agreed that our power in India rests on the general
opinion of the natives of our comparative superiority in
good faith, wisdom, and strength, to their own rulers.
This important impression will be improved by the consi-
deration we show to their habits, institutions, and religion,
*These Instructions were published in the Appendix of "Central
India." They are republished from a belief of their utility, in which
the author is confirmed by the extract of a minute in the Revenue De-
partment, under date the 29th of March, 1825, of the Governor of
Madras, Sir Thomas Munro, directing their circulation, and express-
ing a hope that every public officer, for whose use they are intended,
will be guided by the spirit which pervades them.
+ Central India, so denominated from its comprising those provinces
which, lying in the centre of India, may be said to extend from
seventy-one to seventy-five degrees north latitude, and seventy-three
to eighty east longitude. It comprehends all that extent of country
which was known in the time of the emperors of Delhi, under the de-
nomination of the Subah or government of Malwa.-Vide "Memoir
of Central India," vol. I., page 1.
cclxiv
Arr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
-by the moderation, temper, and kindness, with which we
conduct ourselves towards them; and injured by every act
that offends their belief or superstition, that shows disregard
or neglect of individuals or communities, or that evinces
our having, with the arrogance of conquerors, forgotten
those maxims by which this great empire has been esta-
blished, and by which alone it can be preserved.
The want of union of the natives appears one of the
strongest foundations of our power; it has certainly con-
tributed, beyond all others, to its establishment. But,
when we trace this cause, we find it to have originated in
the condition in which we found India, and the line we
adopted towards its inhabitants: that it will continue to
operate when the condition of that country is changed, and
under any alteration in our course of proceedings, is more
than can be assumed. The similarity of the situation of
the great proportion of the people of this continent now
subject to our rule, will assuredly make them more accessi-
ble to common motives of action, which is the foundation of
all union; and the absence of that necessity for conciliation,
which changes have effected, will make us more likely to
forget its importance. Our power has hitherto owed much
to a contrast with misrule and oppression; but this strength
we are daily loosing: we have also been indebted to an in-
definite impression of our resources, originating in igno-
rance of their real extent; knowledge will bring this feeling
to a reduced standard. We are supported by the good
opinion of the lower and middling classes, to whom our
government is indulgent; but it has received the rudest
shocks from an impression that our system of rule is at
variance with the permanent continuance of rank, authority,
and distinction in any native of India. This belief, which
is not without foundation, is general to every class, and its
action leaves but an anxious and feverish existence to all
who enjoy station and high name;—the feeling which their
VIII.]
cclxv
INSTRUCTIONS.
condition excites, exposes those, who have any portion of
power and independence, to the arts of the discontented, the
turbulent, and the ambitious: this is a danger to our
power, which must increase in the ratio of its extent, unless
we can counteract its operation by a commensurate im-
provement of our administration.
Our greatest strength, perhaps, and that which gives the
fairest hopes of the duration of our rule over India, arises
out of the singular construction of the frame of both the
controlling and the executive government. Patronage in
all the branches of the local government of India is ex-
ercised under much limitation and check: favour effects
less in this country, and competency more, than in any other
scene of equal magnitude. There is an interminable field
for individual exertion; and, though men high in station
are almost absolute, (and the character of our rule requires
they should be so,) there is, in that jealousy of such power
which belongs to our native country, a very efficient shield
against its abuse. This keeps men from being intoxicated
with their short-lived authority; and the fundamental prin-
ciples which discourage colonisation, prevent public servants
taking root in the soil, and make them proceed to the duties
of government, as they would in other countries to the
routine of an office, which employs their talents, without
agitating their personal feelings and interests, in any degree
that can disturb or bias their judgment. This absence of
baneful passions, and of all the arts of intrigue and ambi-
tion which destroy empires, produces a calmness of mind
that can belong alone to the rulers of a country situated as
the English employed in India now are, and gives them an
advantage which almost balances the bad effects of their
want of those national ties that usually constitute the
strength of governments.
Our successes and moderation, contrasted with the misrule
and violence to which a great part of the population of India
cclxvi
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
[Arr.
have for more than a century been exposed, have at this
moment raised the reputation of the British nation so high,
that men have forgotten, in the contemplation of the security
and prosperity they enjoy under strangers, their feelings of
patriotism; but these are feelings which that very know-
ledge that it is our duty to impart must gradually revive
and bring into action. The people of India must, by a re-
curring sense of benefits, have amends made them for the
degradation of continuing subject to foreign masters; and
this can alone be done by the combined efforts of every in-
dividual employed in a station of trust and responsibility, to
render popular a government which, though not national,
has its foundations laid deep in the principles of toleration,
justice, and wisdom. Every agent of government should
study and understand the above facts. He should not con-
tent himself with having acquired a knowledge of the lan-
guages, and of the customs, of those with whom he has
intercourse. All his particular acts (even to the manner of
them) should be regulated by recurrence to the foundation
of our rule, and a careful observation of those principles
by which it has been established, and can alone be main-
tained. Of the importance of this I cannot better state my
opinion, than by expressing my full conviction, that, inde-
pendent of the prescribed duties which every qualified
officer performs, there is no person in a situation of any
consequence who does not, both in the substance and man-
ner of his conduct, do something every day in his life, which,
as it operates on the general interests of the empire through
the feelings of the circle he controls or rules, has an unseen
effect in strengthening or weakening the government by
which he is employed. My belief that what I have assum-
ed is correct, will be my excuse for going into some minute-
ness in my general instructions to those under
my orders.
The first, and one of the most important points, is the
manner of European superiors towards the natives.
It
INSTRUCTIONS.
cclxvii
VIII.]
would be quite out of place, in this paper, to speak of the
necessity of kindness, and of an absence of all violence; this
must be a matter of course with those to whom it is ad-
dressed: there is much more required from them than that
conciliation which is a duty, but which, when it appears as
such, loses half its effect. It must, to make an impression,
be a habit of the mind, grounded on a favourable consi-
deration of the qualities and merits of those to whom it ex-
tends; and this impression, I am satisfied, every person will
have, who, after attaining a thorough knowledge of the
real character of those with whom he has intercourse, shall
judge them, without prejudice or self-conceit, by a standard
which is suited to their belief, their usages, their habits,
their occupations, their rank in life, the ideas they have im-
bibed from infancy, and the stage of civilization to which
the community as a whole are advanced. If he does so
with that knowledge and that temper of mind which are
essential to render him competent to form an opinion, he
will find enough of virtue, enough of docility and disposi-
tion to improvement, enough of regard and observance of all
the best and most sacred ties of society, to create an esteem
for individuals, and an interest in the community, which,
when grounded on a sincere conviction of its being deserved,
will render his kindness natural and conciliating. All hu-
man beings, down to the lowest links of the chain, inclusive
of children, are quick in tracing the source of the manners
of others, and, above all, of their superiors;-when that is
regulated by the head, not the heart-when it proceeds
from reason, not from feeling, it cannot please; for it has
in it, if at all artificial, a show of design which repels, as it
generates suspicion. When this manner takes another
shape, when kindness and consideration appear as acts of
condescension, it must be felt as offensive.
Men may
dread, but can never love or regard, those who are
cclxviii
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
་
[Arr.
continually humiliating them by the parade of supe-
riority.
I have recommended those foundations of manner, to-
wards the natives of India, upon which I feel my own to be
grounded. I can recollect (and I do it with shame) the
period when I thought I was very superior to those with
whom my duty made me associate; but as my knowledge
of them and of myself improved, the distance between us
gradually lessened. I have seen and heard much of our
boasted advantages over them, but cannot think that, if all
the ranks of the different communities of Europe and India
are comparatively viewed, there is just ground for any very
arrogant feeling on the part of the inhabitants of the for-
mer: nor can I join in that common-place opinion, which
condemns, in a sweeping way, the natives of this country as
men, taking the best of them, not only unworthy of trust
and devoid of principle, but of too limited intelligence and
reach of thought, to allow of Europeans, with large and
liberal minds and education, having rational or satisfac-
tory intercourse with them. Such impressions, if admitted,
must prove vital as to the manner of treating the natives of
India: I shall therefore say a few words upon the justice of
the grounds upon which they rest. The man who considers
no credit to the high
them in this light can grant little or
characters, and the eulogies which are given to individuals
and great bodies of men, in their own histories, traditions,
and records. He must then judge them by his own obser-
vations and knowledge, and his opinion will, in all probabi-
lity, be formed, not comparatively with Europeans of their
own class of life, but with the public servants of govern-
ment —a class of men who are carefully educated, whose am-
bition is stimulated by the highest prospects of preferment,
and whose integrity is preserved by adequate salaries
through every grade of their service. Before this last prin-
VIII.]
cclxix
INSTRUCTIONS.
ciple was introduced (which is little more than thirty years),
the European servants of government were in the habit of
making money in modes not dissimilar to those we now re-
proach the natives in our employ with doing; and it may
here be asked, "If the same endeavours have been made to
alter the habits of the latter as the former ?" I believe the
exact contrary to be the fact, and that the system since in-
troduced has not operated more to elevate the European,
than to sink and depress the native character: but this is
not the place for the discussion of this large question.
Many of the moral defects of the natives of India are to
be referred to that misrule and oppression from which they
are now, in a great degree, emancipated. I do not know the
example of any great population, in similar circumstances,
preserving, through such a period of change and tyrannical
rule, so much of virtue and so many good qualities as are to
be found in a great proportion of the inhabitants of this
country. This is to be accounted for, in some degree, by
the Hindu institutions, particularly that of Caste, which
appear to have raised them to their present rank in human
society, at a very remote period; but these have certainly
tended to keep them stationary at that point of civil order
to which they were thus early advanced. With a just ad-
miration of the effects of many of their institutions, particu-
larly those parts of them which cause in vast classes, not
merely an absence of the common vices of theft, drunken-
ness, and violence, but preserve the virtuous ties of family
and kindred relations, we must all deplore some of their
usages and weak superstitions; but what individuals, or
what races of men, are without great and manifold errors
and imperfections? and what mind, that is not fortified with
ignorance or pride, can, on such grounds, come to a severe
judgment against a people like that of India?
I must here, however, remark, that I have invariably
cclxx
[Arr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
found, unless in a few cases where knowledge had not over-
come self-sufficiency and arrogance, that in proportion as
European officers, civil and military, advanced in their
acquaintance with the language and customs of the natives
of India, they became more sincerely kind to them; and, on
the contrary, ignorance always accompanied that selfish
pride and want of consideration which held them light, or
treated them with harshness.
I am quite satisfied in my own mind, that, if there is one
cause more than another that will impede our progress to
the general improvement of India, it is a belief formed by
its population, from the manner of their English superiors,
that they are viewed by them as an inferior and degraded
race: but, on the contrary, if the persons employed in every
branch of the administration of this great country, while
their conduct marks those rigid principles of virtue and
justice, under the check of which they act, comport them-
selves towards the people whom it is their duty to make
happy, with that sincere humility of heart which always
belongs to real knowledge, and which attaches while it ele-
vates, they will contribute by such manner, more than any
measures of boasted wisdom ever can, to the strength and
duration of their government.
It is of importance, before I conclude this part of the
subject, to state my opinion, that in our manner to the
natives, though it is our duty to understand and to pay
every proper deference to their customs and usages, and to
conform with these as far as we can with propriety, particu-
larly on points where the religious prejudices or the rank of
those with whom we have intercourse require it, yet we
should always preserve the European; for, to adopt their
manners is a departure from the very principle on which
every impression of our superiority that rests upon good
foundation is grounded. We should take a lesson on such
VIII.]
cclxxi
INSTRUCTIONS.
points from what we see occur to native princes and others,
who ape English habits and modes: they lose ground with
one class, that to which they belong, without gaining with
the other, that to which they wish to approximate. The
fact is, they ultimately lose with the latter; for even their
attachment is useless, when they cease to have influence
with their own tribe. The European officer, who assumes
native manners and usages, may please a few individuals,
who are flattered or profited by his departure from the
habits of his country; but even with these, familiarity will
not be found to increase respect; and the adoption of such
a course will be sure to sink him in the estimation of the
mass of the community, both European and Native, among
whom he resides.
The intercourse to be maintained with the Natives within
your circle is of two kinds,-private and official. The first
should extend as much as possible to all ranks and classes,
and be as familiar, as kind, and as frequent, as the difference
of habits and pursuits will admit.
There is a veil between the Natives of India and their
European superiors, which leaves the latter ignorant, in an
extraordinary degree, of the real character of the former.
He can only judge his own domestics by what he sees of
their conduct in his presence; of the manner in which they
perform their other duties in life, he is, if not ignorant, but
imperfectly informed: so many minute obstacles, grounded
upon caste, usages, and religion, oppose an approach to
closer acquaintance, that it can never be generally attained;
but in private intercourse much may be learned that will
facilitate the performance of public duty, and give that
knowledge of the usages and feelings of the various classes
of the Natives, which will enable its possessors to touch every
chord with effect. In joining with them in field-sports, in
an unceremonious interchange of visits with the most re-
cclxxii
[App.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
spectable, and in seeking the society of the most learned,
the European public officer will not only gain much in-
formation, but impart complete confidence, and lay the
grounds of that personal attachment which will ever be
found of the greatest aid to his public labours. He will
also obtain, by such habits of private intercourse, the means
of elevating those he esteems by marks of notice and regard;
but, in pursuing this course, he must beware lest he lose his
object, by falling into the weaknesses or indulgences of the
persons with whom he thus associates. It is in the per-
formance of this part of his duty, when all the pride of
station is laid aside, that he must most carefully guard that
real superiority which he derives from better knowledge and
truer principles of morality and religion; for it is from the
impression made by the possession without the ostentation
of those higher qualities, that he must expect the benefits I
have described as likely to result from a familiar and private
intercourse with the natives under his direction and control.
In all official intercourse with the natives, one of the first
points of importance is, that these, whatever be their rank,
class, or business, should have complete and easy access to
personal communication with their European superior. The
necessity of this arises out of the character of our rule, and
of those over whom it is established. It is sufficiently galling
for the people of India to have foreign masters: the im-
pression this feeling must continually excite, can only be
mitigated or removed by a recurring sense of the advantages
they derive from the wisdom and justice of their European
superiors; and this can alone be effected by direct commu-
nication with them. Though native servants must be em-
ployed and trusted, and though it is quite essential to behave
to all with kindness, and to raise the higher classes of them
by a treatment which combines consideration and respect,
yet they can never without hazard be used as exclusive
VIII.]
INSTRUCTIONS AND ORDERS.
cclxxiii
mediums of communication: their real or supposed influence
will, under whatever circumstances they are allowed frequent
approach to an European officer in the exercise of authority,
give them opportunities of abusing his confidence, if they
desire it; and as our servants, who are seldom selected from
the higher classes, cannot be supposed to have even the
same motives with native rulers for good conduct, much less
the same title to regard, men under our power will have, in
aggravation of the feeling arising out of subjection to foreign
rule, that of being, to a certain extent, at the mercy of
persons of their own nation, whom they neither trust nor
respect. There is no remedy for such an evil, except being
completely easy of access; but this, however much the
superior may desire it, is not to be established without
difficulty and perseverance. It affects the interest and con-
sequence of every man in' his employ, from the highest to
the lowest; but, in proportion to their efforts to counteract
it, so must his be to carry this important point, on which,
more than all others, the integrity of his personal adminis-
tration and the good of the country depend. No native
servant, high or low, must be allowed the privilege of either
introducing or stopping an applicant or a complainant: all
such must come with confidence to the European superior,
or to such assistant as he may specifically direct to receive or
hear them. It requires much temper and patience, constant
activity, and no slight sacrifice of personal comfort, to main-
tain an intercourse with the natives upon this footing; but,
unless it be done, (I speak here from the fullest experience,)
the government of control now established in Central
* In consequence of the success of the Pindarie war in 1818
and 1819, our power was established over almost all the country called
Central India; but, with the exception of a few districts, its provinces
remained with the native princes and chiefs who before possessed them.
VOL. II.
S
cclxxiv
[APP.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
India cannot be carried on for any period, and the changes
which must ensue from relaxation in this particular will be
brought about in the manner most unfavourable to our
character and reputation.
In establishing this direct personal intercourse, it is per-
haps better, when the habits are so formed as to admit of it,
that the natives of all classes and ranks should have admis-
sion and be heard, at whatever hour of the day they come,
except those of meals; but, where such constant intrusion is
found to interrupt other business, as it may with many,
certain portions of every day must be set aside to hear re-
presentations and complaints, and to see those who desire to
be seen.
The establishment of direct intercourse is, in my
opinion, a primary and indispensable duty,-one no more
dependent upon the inclination or judgment of the indivi-
duals to whom the charge of managing or controlling these
countries is intrusted, than it is to an officer whether he
shall attend his parade, or to a judge whether he shall sit a
certain number of hours in his court: indeed, I consider
that late events have so completely altered our condition in
India, that the duties of almost every officer in the political
department have become, in a great degree, magisterial,
and, as such, must be more defined, and subject to more
exact rules, than they formerly were.
Our right of interference (as will be shown hereafter) is
so limited, that it is not in one case in a hundred of those
that are brought forward, that an officer can do more than
state calmly and clearly, to the party who seeks redress, the
reasons and principles which prevent him from attending to
his representation or complaint. He will have to repeat
These, with hardly what can be called an exception, became, under
different treaties and engagements, dependent on the protection and
subject to the control of the British government.
VIII.]
cclxxv
INSTRUCTIONS AND ORDERS.
So.
this perhaps fifty times in one day; but he must, in con-
templating the good that will be ultimately produced, be
content to take this trouble. The natives of India cannot
persuade themselves that, possessing as we do the means of
establishing our direct rule, we shall long refrain from doing
This impression weakens those princes, chiefs, and
ministers, whom it is our policy to support, in a degree that
almost unfits them for being instruments of government.
We can only counteract its bad effects by making ourselves
understood by all, even to the lowest, upon this point: it is
one on which they will never trust to a communication from
any native agent or servant, nor indeed will they be con-
vinced of our sincerity till they observe for years that our
words and actions are in unison; and they must, to satisfy
them that there is no prospect of those fluctuations to which
they have been so habituated, see that everything originates
with and is known to the superior. This knowledge, added
to the right of approaching him at all moments, will gradu-
ally tranquillize their minds, and place them, as far as they
can be placed, beyond the power of being made the dupes
of artful or interested men.
It has been before said, that native servants of all classes
should be treated with that attention and respect to which
they were from their station and character entitled. These
will, of course, have at all times the freest intercourse with
the superior, but they should never have the privilege of
coming to any conference between him and other natives,
to which they were not specifically called. But these ser-
vants (whatever might be their inclination) will have little
power of doing harm when a direct intercourse (such as has
been described) is well established, and its principles and
objects generally understood. Indeed, one of the best effects
of that intercourse is the check it constitutes on all nefarious
proceedings of subordinate agents, and persons of every de-
S 2
cclxxvi
[Arp.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
scription; as such must act in hourly dread of discovery,
when every man can tell his own story to the principal at
any moment he pleases.
The next important point to be observed in official inter-
course with the natives, is "publicity." There can be no
occasion to expatiate, here, upon the utility of this principle.
It is the happy privilege of a state so constituted as that of
the English in India, to gain strength in the ratio that its
measures, and the grounds on which they are adopted, are
made public; and this is above all essential in a quarter
of India where we are as yet but imperfectly understood.
There are, and can be, no secrets in our ordinary proceed-
ings, and every agent will find his means of doing good
advanced, his toil lessened, and the power of the designing
and corrupt to misrepresent his actions or intentions de-
creased, in the proportion that he transacts affairs in public.
He should avoid, as much as he possibly can, private con-
ferences with those in his employ or others. These will be
eagerly sought for; they give the individual thus admitted
the appearance of favour and influence; and there is no
science in which the more artful among the natives are
greater adepts, than that of turning to account the real or
supposed confidence of their superiors. I know no mode of
preventing the mischief which this impression, if it becomes
general, gives men the power of effecting, but habitual pub-
licity in transacting business. This will, no doubt, be found
to have inconveniences, which will be purposely increased
by those who have their game to play, and indeed others;
for natives of rank and station, even when they have no
corrupt views, are from habit and self-importance attached
to a secret and mysterious way of conducting both great and
small affairs.
A public officer, placed in your situation, must always be
vigilant and watchful of events likely to affect the peace of
VIII.]
crlxxvii
INSTRUCTIONS AND ORDERS.
the country under his charge; but no part of his duty re-
quires such care and wisdom in its performance. He cannot
rest in blind confidence, nor refuse attention to obvious and
well-authenticated facts; but he must be slow in giving his
ear, or in admitting to private and confidential intercourse,
secret agents and informers, lest they make an impression
(which will be their object) upon his mind; for there is
no failing of human nature to which the worst part of the
natives of India have learned (from the shape of their own
government) so well to address themselves, as any disposition
to suspicion in their superiors. From the condition of Cen-
tral India, abounding as it must with discontented and
desperate characters, intrigues, treasonable conversations and
papers, and immature plots, must, for some time, be matters
of frequent occurrence and growth; but such will, in general,
be best left to perish of neglect. Established as our power
now is, men cannot collect any means capable of shaking it,
without being discovered; and it is, I am convinced, under
all ordinary circumstances, wiser and safer to incur petty
hazard, than to place individuals and communities at the
mercy of artful and avaricious agents and spies, or to goad
unfortunate men to a state of hostility by continually view-
ing them with an eye of torturing and degrading suspicion.
In the intercourse with the natives of your circle, it is
hardly necessary to advert to the subject of giving and re-
ceiving presents. The recent orders upon this subject, which
have been communicated to you, are very defined and strict;
but there is a necessity, in this government of control, for
every agent to maintain, on a high ground, not only the
purity, but the disinterestedness of the English character; and
you will avoid, as much as you possibly can, incurring any
obligation to local authorities. These will sedulously en-
deavour to promote your convenience and comfort, and will
cclxxviii
[Arr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
press favours upon you, both from design and good feelings;
but there is a strength in preserving complete independence
on all such points, that must not be abandoned. Our poli-
tical superiority, to be efficient, must be unmixed with any
motives or concerns, either connected with our personal
interest or that of others, that can soil or weaken that im-
pression on which its successful exercise depends.
The forms of the official intercourse between European
agents and natives of rank were, before we obtained para-
mount power, a matter of more moment, and one on which
we could less relax than at present, because our motives
were at that period more liable to be mistaken. Though it
is essential, in our intercourse with nations who are attached
to and give value to ceremonies, to understand such per-
fectly, and to claim from all what is due to our station, that
we may not sink the rank of the European superior in the
estimation of those subject to his control; it is now the
duty of the former to be much more attentive to the respect
which he gives than what he receives, particularly in his
intercourse with men of high rank. The princes and chiefs
of India may, in different degrees, be said to be all de-
pendent on the British government: many have little more
than the name of that power they before enjoyed; but they
seem, as they lose the substance, to cling to the forms of
station. The pride of reason may smile at such a feeling;
but it exists, and it would be alike opposite to the principles
of humanity and policy to deny it gratification.
In official intercourse with the lower classes, the latter
should be treated according to the usages of the country,
as practised by the most indulgent of their native superiors.
It will be found that they require personal notice and con-
sideration in proportion as their state is removed from that
knowledge which belongs to civilization; and it is on this
VIII.]
cclxxix
INSTRUCTIONS AND ORDERs.
ground that the Bheel* must have more attention paid him
than the Ryot. It is more difficult to give confidence to his
mind, and to make him believe in the sincerity and perma-
nence of the kindness with which he is treated, because he is
in a condition more remote from the party with whom he
communicates; and, before he can be reclaimed, he must be
approximated.
The interference of agents employed in this country with
native princes, or courts, or their local officers, cannot
be exactly defined, for there will be shades of distinction in
every case, that will require attention; but all must be
subject, and that in the strictest degree, to certain general
and well-understood principles, founded on the nature of
our power, our objects, our political relations with the
different states, the personal conduct of their rulers, their
necessity for our aid and support, and their disposition
to require or reject it in the conduct of their internal
administration. The leading principle, and the one which
must be continually referred to, is grounded on the cha-
racter of our controlling power and its objects. It is the
avowed, and I am satisfied it is the true, policy of the
British state, while it maintains the general peace of the
country, to keep, not only in the enjoyment of their high
rank, but in the active exercise of their sovereign functions,
the different princes and chiefs who are virtually or de-
claredly dependent on its protection. The principal object
(setting aside the obligations of faith) is to keep at a distance
that crisis to which, in spite of our efforts, we are gradually
approaching-of having the whole of India subject to our
direct rule. There is no intention of discussing here the
*The Bheels are mountain-robbers. For a particular account of
this remarkable race, vide Memoir on Central India, vol. i. pp. 116,
550, and vol. ii. p. 179.
cclxxx
[Apr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM's
consequences likely to result from such an event. It is
sufficient for executive and subordinate officers to know,
that it is the desire of the government they serve, to keep
it at a distance, to render it their duty to contribute their
whole efforts to promote the accomplishment of that object;
and on the manner and substance of their interference the
local success of this policy will greatly depend.
On all points where we are pledged by treaty to support
states, or to mediate or interfere between them and others,
we must of course act agreeably to the obligations con-
tracted; and, in such case, no instructions can be required.
It may not, however, be unuseful to remark, that, on all
occasions where they are referred to, treaties and engage-
ments should be interpreted with consideration to the
prince or chief with whom they are made. There is often,
from opposite education and habits, much difference between
their construction and ours of such engagements; but no
loose observation, or even casual departure from the letter
of them, ought to lead to serious consequences, when it
appeared there was no intention of violating the spirit of
the deed, or of acting contrary to pledged faith. When
any article of an engagement is doubtful, I think it should
be invariably explained with more leaning to the expec-
tations originally raised in the weaker than to the interests
of the stronger power. It belongs to superior authority
to give ultimate judgment upon all points of this nature
which come under discussion; but that judgment must
always be much influenced by the colour of the information
and opinion of the local agent. My desire is to convey
how important every subject is that connects in the re-
motest degree with that reputation for good faith, which
can only be considered our strength while it exists unim-
paired in the minds of the natives: in this view the most
scrupulous attention should be paid to their understanding
VIII.]
cclxxxi
INSTRUCTIONS AND ORDEers.
of every article of the agreements we make with them;
for no local advantage, nor the promotion of any pecuniary
interest, can compensate for the slightest injury to "this
corner-stone of our power in India.”
With the government of Dowlut Row Sindia * (a great
part of whose possessions are intermixed with those of our
dependent allies in this quarter) we have only general
relations of amity; and, however virtually dependent events
may have rendered that prince, we can (except insisting
upon the exact performance of those settlements which we
have mediated between him or his delegated officers and
some of his tributaries) claim no right of interference in any
part of his internal administration; nor should there, unless
in cases of unexpected emergency which threatened the
general peace of the country, be any disposition shown to
interference, except on specific requisition from the resident
at Gwalior t. Without interfering, however, we have
hitherto, and shall continue to exercise a very salutary
control both over Dowlut Row Sindia and his local officers,
by the terms on which we communicate and act with the
latter. When these are men of good character, and study
the happiness of the inhabitants and the improvement of
the country, we can, by the cordiality and consideration
with which we treat them, and the ready attention we give
to the settlement of every petty dispute they have with the
subjects of our allies, as well as other friendly acts, grant
them a countenance and aid which will promote the success
* This Mahratta prince (for a particular account of whose family
and possessions, vide Memoir on Central India, vol. i. p. 116) is the
only one who maintains a nominal independence of the British govern-
ment; but he, in fact, now relies as much on that power as those chiefs
who can claim its protection by treaty.
† Gwalior is the capital of Dowlut Row Sindia, with whom a repres
sentative of the British governinent resides.
cclxxxii
[APP.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
of their local administration.
The same principle leads
to abstinence from all communication, and to our keeping
aloof (except where the general peace is at hazard) from all
intercourse with those of Sindia's managers who are noted
for misrule or bad faith. This line of conduct towards the
latter, grounded, as it publicly should be, on the avowed
principle of keeping our character free of soil from their
proceedings, will increase our local reputation, while it has
the effect of rendering the employment of such men incon-
venient and unprofitable to the state, and thus constitutes
one of the chief means we have of working a reform in its
internal administration: nor is it a slight one; for the im-
pression of our power is so great, that the belief of a local
officer possessing our good opinion and friendship, is of
itself sufficient to repress opposition to his authority, while
his forfeiting our favour is sure to raise him enemies, both
in his district and at Gwalior.
With the courts of Holkar*, Dhar, Dewass, and almost
all the petty Rajpoot states west of the Chumbul, our re-
lations are different. These have been raised from a weak
and fallen condition, to one of efficiency, through our efforts.
But, though compelled, at first, to aid them in almost every
settlement, we have, as they attained the power of acting
for themselves, gradually withdrawn from minute interfer-
ence on points connected with their internal administration,
limiting ourselves to what is necessary for the maintenance
of the public tranquillity.
There is so strong a feeling in the minds of the princes
and chiefs above alluded to, and in those of all their officers
(from their prime minister down to the lowest agent), of
*For an account of the Mahratta families of Holkar, Dhar, and
Dewass, vide Memoir on Central India, vol. i. pp. 142, 97, and 112.
A detailed account of the Rajpoot chiefs here alluded to is given in
p. 463 of the same volume.
VIII.]
cclxxxiii
INSTRUCTIONS AND ORDERS.
their actual dependence upon the British government, that
it is almost impossible to make them understand that they
are, in the conduct of their internal administration, desired
and expected to act independently of it. Their difficulty
of comprehending and trusting the policy which dictates
our conduct in this particular, arises out of its being opposite
to all their habits and knowledge. Time alone, and the
most minute care of every European agent employed, can
impart to them that confidence which is essential to their
becoming competent functionaries of rule. To effect this
object, the principles hitherto inculcated and acted upon
must be steadily pursued, and we must decline all interfer-
ence, except in cases where Grassiahs*, Bheels, or other
plunderers are concerned. These, from their situation and
strength, can only be kept in order by the power of the
British government; but we must, in such cases even, have
the limits of our interference exactly defined, that no belief
may exist of our possessing the power of departing from
the restrictions we have imposed upon ourselves; for on
such impressions being general, and being confirmed by
scrupulous consistency of action, depends our success in
giving that efficiency to the various native authorities
subject to our control, which is necessary to enable them
to perform the different duties allotted to them.
In cases of interference with lesser rulers, such as the
reformed Rajpoot plunderers and Bheel chiefs, we may be
compelled to enter more minutely into their affairs; but the
principles observed should be the same; and while we take
care to repress every disposition to a return to predatory
The Grassiahs are Rajpoot chiefs, who subsist by extorting,
through force or intimidation, a part of the produce of those districts
they once possessed, but from which they have been expelled by Mah-
ratta invaders. For a particular account of these chiefs, vide Memoir
on Central India, vol. i. p. 508, and vol. ii. p. 244.
cclxxxiv
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
[Arr.
habits, and see that men who have long cherished such.
possess themselves of honest means of livelihood, we must
respect their prejudices, and not hastily break in upon the
rude frame of their internal rule; but leave (down to the
Turwee, or head of the Bheel Parah or cluster of hamlets)
the full exercise of his authority over those under him,
according as that is grounded on the ancient prejudices and
usages of the tribe to which he and his family or followers
belong.
The feelings of irritation and hatred with which almost
all the princes and chiefs of this quarter regard the Gras-
siahs and Bheels, and the total want of confidence of the
latter in their nominal superiors, have and will continue to
render calls for our interference very frequent but how-
ever high the character and condition of the one party,
and however bad and low that of the other may be, we
must never grant our name or support to measures of
coercion or violence, without fully understanding the merits.
of the case, nor without having had direct communication.
with the party or parties inculpated; otherwise we may be
involved in embarrassment, and become unconsciously the
instruments of injustice and oppression.
Many questions will occur, deeply connected with our
reputation for good faith, which cannot be decided by any
exact rules; but whenever that is concerned, the tone of
our feeling should be very high. It is the point upon
which the moral part of our government of this great
empire hinges; and in these countries, where our rule and
control are new, and in which the inhabitants cannot yet
understand any explanations that do not rest upon broad
and obvious grounds, the subject requires much attention.
There are many cases in which our faith, though not
specifically, is virtually pledged to individuals: ministers,
for instance, of minor or incompetent princes or chiefs,
VIIL]
cclxxxv
INSTRUCTIONS AND ORDERS.
who have been brought forward or recognised by us in the
exercise of authority, have a claim upon our support and
consideration, which nothing but bad conduct on their part
can forfeit. We should, no doubt, be most careful of any
interference that leads to such obligations. They are only
to be incurred when a necessity that involves the peace and
prosperity of the country calls for them: but they must be
sacredly observed; for, with a people who look, in all
questions of government, more to persons than systems,
the abandonment, except from gross misconduct, of any
individual who had been raised or openly protected by us,
would excite stronger feelings than the breach of an article
of a treaty, and locally prove more injurious, as it weakens
that reliance upon our faith which is the very foundation of
our strength.
We may rest satisfied, while we pursue the course I have
stated (and it is the one to which our faith is almost in
every case, either directly or by implication, pledged), that
we have, from our paramount power, a very efficient check
over states and tribes, whose rulers, officers, and chiefs will
soon discover that they can only gain our favour and sup-
port by good conduct, or forfeit it by bad. With such
knowledge and with means comparatively limited, we can-
not expect they will be disposed to incur displeasure, when
the terms on which they can gain approbation are so easy;
at least no men possessed of common sense and discernment
(qualities in which the natives of India are seldom deficient)
can be expected to act in such a manner; but we must not
conceal from ourselves, that their conduct in this, as in
all other particulars, will rest chiefly on the value of that
condition in which they are placed, or rather left; and in
proportion as we render it one of comfort and dignity, so
will their care be to preserve our good opinion and to
merit our confidence. It is, indeed, upon our success in
cclxxxvi
[Arr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
supporting their respectability, that the permanence of a
system of control over great and small native states, such as
we have established in this quarter of India, will depend.
We have no choice of means in the performance of this de-
licate and arduous part of our duty. Though the check
must be efficient, it should be almost unseen: the effect
ought to be produced more by the impression than the ex-
ercise of superior power. Our principal object must be to
elevate the authorities to whom we have left the administra-
tion of their respective territories; we must, in all cases of
interference, bring them forward to their own subjects, as
the prominent objects of respect and obedience; so far from
the agent attracting notice to himself, he should purposely
repel it, that it may be given to the quarter where it is
wanted, and to which it belongs.
When we aid any prince or chief against his own subjects,
his name should be exclusively used; and we should be
most careful in making our native agents and servants pay
the full measure of respect to every branch of his adminis-
tration, and continually be on the watch to check that dis-
position which is inherent in them, to slight local authori-
ties, that they may, in the name of their master, draw that
attention to themselves, which it is quite essential should be-
long to the officers of the native government. It is evident.
that our control can only be supportable, to any human
being who has the name and appearance of power, so long
as it is exercised in a general manner, and regulated by the
principles above stated. When it descends to minute checks
and interference in the collection of revenue, the administra-
tion of justice listens to the complaints of discontented, or
even aggrieved individuals, and allows, upon system, its own
native agents to interfere and act in the name of the para-
mount state; the continuance of independent power, in any
shape, to either prince or chief, is not only impolitic but
VIII.]
cclxxxvii
INSTRUCTIONS AND ORDERS.
dangerous, as his condition must be felt by himself, and by
all attached to his person or family, as a mockery and de-
gradation; and the least effect of such feelings will be the
extermination of all motive to good or great actions. For
when control is divested of its large and liberal character,
and takes a more minute shape, whatever merit belongs to
the administration becomes the due of the person by whom
it is exercised, or his agents, and the nominal prince and his
officers are degraded into suspected and incompetent instru-
ments of rule.
In this general outline of our interference with the rulers,
great and small, of this part of India, I have dwelt much
upon the political considerations upon which it is grounded;
because I am convinced, that there is no part of the subject
that requires to be so deeply studied and so fully understood,
as this should be, by every subordinate agent; for there is
no point of his duty which is at once so delicate and arduous,
or in which success or failure so much depends upon indivi-
dual exertion. He will be prompted to deviate from the
course prescribed, by the action of his best feelings, and by
hopes of increasing his personal reputation; but he will be
kept steady in that course by a knowledge of the importance
of those general principles on which the present system rests.
It is in the performance of this part of his duty, that all
which has been said regarding manner and intercourse must
be in his memory; for men in the situation in which those
are, with whom he must in all cases of interference come in
contact, are not to be conciliated to their condition, nor kept
in that temper with the paramount authority which it is
necessary for its interests they should be, by mere correct-
ness or strict attention to justice. The native governments
must be courted and encouraged to good conduct, and the
earnest endeavour of the British agent must be, to give their
rulers a pride in their administration: to effect this object, he
cclxxxviii
(APP.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
must win to his side, not only the rulers themselves, but the
principal and most respectable men of the country. In his
efforts to gain the latter, however, he must beware of de-
priving the local authority of that public opinion which is
so essential both as a check to misrule and a reward to good
government, but which would cease to be felt as either, the
moment the ties between prince and subject were seriously
injured or broken.
Where the public peace, of which we are the avowed pro-
tectors, has been violated, or where murders or robberies
have been committed, we have a right to urge the local au-
thorities (whom we aid with the means both for the pre-
vention and punishment of such crimes) to pursue, accord-
ing to their own usages, the course best calculated to pre-
serve the safety of persons and of property. In other cases
connected with the administration of justice, though there
is no right of interference, it will be for their interest, and
for our reputation, to lose no opportunity of impressing
generally the benefit and good name that will result from
attention to ancient institutions, particularly to that of the
popular courts of Punchayet, which have never been discon-
tinued, but in periods marked by anarchy and oppression.
The practice of Suttee* is not frequent in Malwa, and
that of infanticide is, I believe, less so. The first is a usage,
which, however shocking to humanity, has defenders among
every class of the Hindu community. The latter is held in
abhorrence by all but the Rajpoot families, by whom it is
practised, and to whom it is confined; yet many of the most
respectable chiefs of that tribe speak of this crime with all
the horror it merits. You cannot interfere in the prevention
of either of these sacrifices, beyond the exercise of that in-
fluence which you possess from personal character: indeed,
* Suttee is a Hindu term for the self-sacrifice of a female at the
funeral-pile of her husband.
VIII.]
cclxxxix
INSTRUCTIONS AND ORDERS.
to attempt more, would be at the hazard of making wrong
impressions, and of defeating the end you desired to attain.
Praise of those who abstain from such acts, and neglect of
those who approve or perpetrate them, is the best remedy
that can be applied. It is the course I have pursued, and
has certainly been attended with success.
That the line of interference which has been described is
difficult will not be denied; but what course can we dis-
cover for the future rule and control of the different native
states in India, which does not present a choice of difficulties?
Men are too apt, at the first view of this great subject, to
be deluded by a desire to render easy, and to simplify, what
is of necessity difficult and complicated. Moral considera-
tions come in aid of the warmest and best sentiments of the
human mind to entice us to innovation; we feel ourselves
almost the sharers of that crime and misrule which we think
our interference could mitigate or amend; and, in the fer-
vour of our virtue, we are too apt to forget, that temporary
or partial benefit often entails lasting and general evil,—
that every plan, however theoretically good, must be prac-
tically bad, that is imperfectly executed. We forget, in the
pride of our superior knowledge, the condition of others;
and self-gratification makes almost every man desire to crowd
into the few years of his official career the work of half a
century. Thus measures have been, and continue to be,
brought forward "in advance of the community" for whose
benefit they are intended. Of what has passed, it is not ne-
cessary to speak: the future is in our power, and I cannot
conclude this part of the subject, which relates to an inter-
ference that is calculated, according as it is managed, to
hasten or retard the introduction of our direct rule, without
impressing upon every officer employed under my orders
the importance of a conduct calculated to preserve, while it
improves, the established governments and native autho-
VOL. II.
t
CCXC
[Arr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
rities of the country. To these it is his duty to give such
impulse as he can, without injuring their frame, towards an
amendment suited to their situation, to the character of the
rulers, and to that of the various classes under their rule.
I consider, and the opinion is the result of both experience
and reflection, that all dangers to our power in India are
slight in comparison with those which are likely to ensue
from our too zealous efforts to change the condition of its
inhabitants, with whom we are yet, in my opinion, but very
imperfectly acquainted. A person who entertains such senti-
ments as I do on this question, must appear the advocate of
very slow reform; but if I am so, it is from a full conviction
that anything like precipitation in our endeavours at im-
provement is likely to terminate in casting back those we
desire to advance: on the contrary, if instead of overmarch-
ing, we are content to go along with this immense population,
and to be in good temper with their prejudices, their religion,
and usages, we must gradually win them to better ways of
thinking and of acting. The latter process, no doubt, must
be one of great time; but its success will be retarded by
every hasty step.
There are few points on which more care is required than
the selection and employment of native servants for the
public service. The higher classes of these, such as Moon-
shees*, Mootsuddies†, and Writers, should be men of re-
gular habits of life, intelligent, and of good characters in
their own tribes. There is no objection to an officer con-
tinuing to keep in service a person he has brought from a
distant province, who has been long with him, and on whose
fidelity and competence he can repose; but, generally speak-
ing, it is much better to entertain respectable natives or old
residents of the country in which he is employed; such may
* Moonshee-Mahomedan secretary or writer.
† Mootsuddie-Hindu writer.
VIII.]
ccxci
INSTRUCTIONS AND ORDERS.
have looser habits and be less attached, but the former his
vigilance will check and correct, and attachment will scon
be created by kindness and consideration. Their advantages
over foreigners are very numerous. The principal are, their
acquaintance with the petty interests of the country, and
their knowledge of all the prejudices and the jealousies of
the different classes of the community to which they belong.
On all these points the superior should be minutely informed,
and, if he employs men not personally acquainted with
the disposition and condition of those under his charge or
control, his information on such subjects must come through
multiplied mediums, which is in itself a serious evil. But,
independent of this, the employment of the natives of a
distant province is always unpopular, and they are generally
viewed with dislike and suspicion by the higher and more
respectable classes of the country into which they are intro-
duced. This excites a feeling in the minds of the former,
which either makes them keep aloof from all connexion with
the inhabitants, or seek the society of, and use as instruments,
men who are discontented or of indifferent character. It is
difficult to say which of these causes has the worst effect.
The one gives an impression of pride, if not contempt, and
the other of design and an inclination to intrigue; and both
operate unfavourably to the local reputation of the master.
I have observed, that the natives who are least informed
of the principles of our rule, are ready to grant respect and
confidence to an English officer, which they refuse to persons
of their own tribe; but they are apt to form an unfavour-
able opinion of his disposition and character from any bad
conduct of his native servants, if foreigners: on the con-
trary, when the latter are members of their own community,
the exposure of their errors or crimes, while it brings shame
and conveys a salutary lesson to the class to which they
belong, is attended with the effect of raising, instead of de-
t 2
сехсіі
[APP,
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
pressing, the European in their estimation. To all these
general reasons might be added many, grounded on the
particular condition of Central India. The oppression the
inhabitants of this quarter have recently suffered, both from
Hindu and Mahomedan Natives of the Deckan * and Hin-
dustan makes them naturally alarmed at these classes.
There is also, in the impoverished state of many of the best
families of the country, a strong additional reason for our
giving them, in preference to strangers, what little we can
of salary as public servants.
In the above observations there is no desire to exclude
any member of Deckan or Hindustan families, who have
settled for life, or for several generations, in Malwa; such
objection would proscribe from our employ some of the
most intelligent and respectable inhabitants of that province.
It has been before mentioned, that "publicity" in our
transaction of business is most essential, chiefly as it puts at
repose an alarmed and agitated population, and, beyond all,
their princes and chiefs. We may greatly promote this
object by the selection of servants. I early observed a very
serious uneasiness, if not alarm, in Holkar's ministers, re-
garding the course I meant to pursue towards that court;
and as one means of removing it, I chose as a principal
native writer an intelligent Brahmin, whose family was at-
tached to that of Holkar, in whose employ I found him ;
and who could, I knew, from his connexions, have no per-
* The term Deckan means South, and is given to the southern
parts of India; but, in a limited sense, is now applied to the territories
of the Nizam or Prince of Hyderabad, and to those above the mountains
which formerly belonged to the Paishwah or head of the Poonah
government.
+ Hindustan, in its local and limited sense, comprehends the large
and rich provinces which form the western parts of India, from Luck-
now to the Punjab, and from the country of Rajpootana to the
Himalaya mountains.
VIII.]
ccxciii
INSTRUCTIONS AND ORDERS.
manent interests separate from his duty to that state. I was
conscious of having nothing to conceal, but I knew the im-
portance of Tantia Jogh* and others being satisfied that
this was the case. No measure I have adopted has tended
more to tranquillize their minds; and I state the fact,
because its application may be suited to cases of daily
occurrence.
In the employment of the higher classes of native servants,
they should, as much as possible, be restricted to their spe-
cific duties, and no one should be allowed to take a lead,
or mix (unless when directed) in the occupation of another.
The keeping of these persons in their exact places will be
found difficult, from the habits of the natives being opposite
to such rules; but it is essential; for errors, if not guilt,
will be the certain consequence of a confusion of duties,
which destroys that pride which good men feel from pos-
sessing confidence, and enables bad to evade that personal
responsibility which constitutes the chief check upon their
conduct.
The employment of the lower classes of public servants
requires much attention. These should be selected on the
same principles that have already been stated, with reference
to the duties they are to perform, which ought always to be
exactly defined, and their conduct vigilantly watched. It
will indeed be found useful to render as public as possible
the nature of their employment, and to call upon all local
authorities to aid us in the prevention of those unauthorized
and odious acts of injustice and oppression towards the in-
habitants of the country which this class will, in spite of all
our efforts, find opportunities of committing.
I speak from the fullest experience when I state, that,
though the natives of India may do full justice to the purity
* Tantia Jogh, the minister of the minor prince Mulhar Row
Holkar,
ccxciv
[Arr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
of our intentions, and the excellence of the principles of our
rule, they are undisguised in their sentiments regarding
those parts of our administration in which the very dregs of
their own community are employed. They cannot, indeed,
but see with feelings of detestation and resentment a man
raised from the lowest of their own ranks, and decorated
with the official badge or stick of a civil or political English
officer, become the very next moment insolent to persons to
whom he and his family have been for ages submissive, or
turn the extortioner of money from those tribes, among
which he has before lived as an humble individual.
The power of this class of servants to injure our reputa-
tation is everywhere great, but more so in proportion as
the natives of the country are ignorant of our real cha-
racter, and where their dread of our power is excessive. Of
the mischief they have done, or rather tried to do, in Malwa,
I can speak from a perfect knowledge. I have endeavoured
with unremitting solicitude to counteract their impositions
and oppressions, by publishing proclamations, and giving
high rewards to all who informed against or seized any of
my servants, when attempting the slightest interference in
the country, or affecting to have any business beyond that
of carrying a letter, or some specified or limited duty; but
I have, nevertheless, been compelled within three years to
punish publicly and discharge one Moonshee, two Moot-
suddies or writers, three Jemadars*, and upwards of fifty
Hircarrahs†; and almost an equal number of the same class
belonging to other public officers have been taken and
punished, or banished the country.
* A Jemadar is the head or principal of the Hircarrahs.
+ Hircarrah means literally "a man of all work," but is commonly
applied, as in the text, to messengers who are distinguished by parti-
cular dresses, by bearing a stick or pike, and by wearing badges which
denote the names of those by whom they are employed.
VIII.]
CCXCV
INSTRUCTIONS AND ORDERS.
These examples will shew the danger of being tempted,
by any convenience of service, or a desire to accelerate the
accomplishment of our objects, to employ such instruments
with any latitude of action.
The importance of encouraging the dependent states of
India to do their own work, and to lean, on points of internal
administration, as little as possible upon us, has been before
noticed; and as long as we manage to keep clear of that
species of interference which weakens and unsettles, without
any proportionate good to balance its evil effects, we shall
have credit in general opinion for all the good measures
which the state under our protection adopts, and our repu-
tation will be benefited (from the comparisons that are
drawn) even by its acts of folly and injustice. But the
latter advantage will be lost by any half and impolitic mix-
ture in its concerns, and there is no mode in which this will
be found so injurious as that of granting it the aid of native
servants in our employ. Allowing the higher classes of
these to enter into the affairs of such governments in any
shape, would be destructive of every principle that has been
inculcated; but the giving their rulers, ministers, or local
officers, the aid of lower servants, would be still more to the
injury of our reputation; for among the higher classes we
might find men of virtue and firmness of character beyond
what could be expected from the others, when exposed, as
they would be, to such temptation. They would be used
for purposes of coercion, if not oppression; and there would
be sufficient art in those who thus employed them, to throw,
when that was their object, the odium of what these instru-
ments did upon the English government. But, in general,
their desire would be limited to have the aid of the British
name to alarm into compliance with their demands, indivi-
duals or communities. They would be aware that the Hir-
carrah or servant sent to assist their authority was a check
ccxcvi
[APP.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
J
upon their proceedings, and this would lead to his being
bribed; and, if he did not become an instrument of violence,
it would only be because he received higher wages from the
party he was sent to oppress. I have seen such manifold
instances of the bad effects resulting from the employment
of this class in the manner described, that I have for more
than three years peremptorily refused any such aid to native
chiefs, and must require all those under my orders to do the
same. The best answer to all applications upon this subject
is, that compliance is at variance with the system ordered
to be pursued; and that the usage of granting such aid,
though it might be found convenient, and in some cases ac-
celerate the accomplishment of good measures, must in the
end produce much evil, and be attended with loss of re-
putation to the British government, whose good name could
not be intrusted to low agents and menials acting beyond
the strict and vigilant observation of the European officer.
The right we have to act, when the public peace is threat-
ened or disturbed, has been generally noticed under the
head of interference; but it will be useful to say a few words.
on the mode of exercising that right, particularly as it re-
lates to points which are connected with the internal admi-
nistration of police and criminal justice.
In countries which have been long in the condition of
Central India, there is a connexion formed between the most
powerful and those who are apparently the most insignificant
of the disturbers of the public peace, which will for some
time require a vigilant attention to every act of the latter to
prevent the revival of a disorderly or predatory spirit. In
common cases we shall only have to prompt the local au-
thority to exertions. But when our aid is required, and
troops or any persons acting under our orders apprehend
delinquents, they should invariably be given over to the
ruler or chief in whose countries the crimes were committed,
VIII.]
ccxcvii
INSTRUCTIONS AND ORDERS.
by whom they will be examined, and punished according to
established custom. I have usually limited my interference
in this part of the administration of the native states of
Malwa to two points. The first is, that in cases of robbery,
but particularly cattle (the common booty of Bheels and other
plunderers), there should be restitution to the owners the
moment the property was proved; leaving those persons
through whose hands it has passed, by real or pretended
sales, to have their disputes and recriminations settled, and
to recover from each other, according to usage. This prac-
tice is now general, and its enforcement for the last two
years has done more to put an end to Bheel and other rob-
beries than all the other measures that have been taken.
The second point on which I have endeavoured to make a
change in the practice of the administration of justice in the
native states of Malwa, is that of preventing the crime of
wilful murder being commuted for the payment of a pecu-
niary fine; but in all cases of this nature, where circum-
stances compel us to interfere, it is desirable that no execu-
tion should take place till guilt has been clearly proved.
The observance of this rule is more necessary, as in cases
where the criminals are of a plundering tribe, such as
Bheels and Baugries *, the native ruler or chief will be dis-
posed to deem the mere accusation enough to warrant the
punishment; whereas, it is exactly with such classes that it
is of importance to us to be more particular, lest we lose the
impression we desire to make upon them, by becoming in
any way accessaries to acts of violence or injury.
On all occasions when the local power is sufficient, it is
most desirable to bring it into action, that it may cease to
be dependent upon us for the maintenance of the internal
peace. This is particularly advisable where excesses are
*Baugries, a tribe of robbers.-Vide Memoir on Central India,
vol. ii. p. 182,
ccxcviii
[Arr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
committed, that have, either as their real or professed
causes, superstitious or religious feelings. In such cases,
except where the mixture of political motives is manifest
and avowed, or the danger imminent, we should call upon
the native government, by its duty and allegiance to the
paramount state, to put down all disturbers of the peace,
particularly when fanatics, like those at Pertaubgurh *,
combine with their atrocities the avowal of sentiments hos-
tile to our rule. The actual condition of Central India
makes it likely that such efforts as those above alluded to
may be repeated, and they will always (however contempt-
ible they may seem) require to be treated with much deli-
cacy. It should be deemed a guiding principle not to act,
if we can avoid it; and when absolutely compelled to do so,
it is essential that we should appear, not as principals, but
in support of the local government: for the spirit that en-
genders such excesses, whether they proceed from intrigue
or fanaticism, will only attain strength by opposition; and
any violent measures on our part, however justified by crime
or outrage, might make the most unfavourable impressions
upon an ignorant and bigoted population, who, while they
confess all the benefits of our general rule and control, are
easily excited to a dread of our success ultimately leading
to attempts at changing the religion and institutions of their
forefathers.
In cases of rebels or plunderers collecting in such force as
to require British troops to suppress them, you will (if the
emergency prevents reference to superior authority) make a
*The name of a town, which is the capital of a small principality.
The fanatics here alluded to, under the direction of a female who de-
clared herself an incarnation of one of the gods, committed several
murders; and while these were perpetrating, she exhibited to her su-
perstitious followers a mirror, in which was reflected the triumph of the
Rajpoots and the defeat of the English.
VIII.]
ccxcix
INSTRUCTIONS AND ORDERS.
requisition for aid from the nearest commanding officer that
can furnish it.
The rules for such requisitions have been generally noti-
fied: the political agent will give the fullest information of
the service to be performed, the nature of the country, the
character of the enemy and his resources, leaving the mili-
tary officer, when possessed of such knowledge, the selection
of the force, both as to number and equipment, that is to be
placed at his disposal. But it is to be strongly impressed
upon both, that in a country like Central India, the means
employed should always be above the object to be accom-
plished, as failure or defeat in any enterprise or action
would be attended with very bad consequences.
It is almost superfluous to repeat what has been sedu-
lously inculcated upon you as a primary duty during the
last three years, the adoption of every preventive measure
to avert the nécessity of the employment of force. Its ap-
pearance has hitherto been almost in all cases sufficient to
produce the required effect; and in the few instances where
it has been employed, the moment of success has been suc-
ceeded by that of conciliation. To act differently, and to
pursue those wild tribes who are the common disturbers of
the peace with retaliation of outrages beyond what is neces-
sary to evince our power, is to confirm them in their habits,
and to add to their other motives of hostility those of resent-
ment and despair. When engaged in warfare with such
classes, we should be cautious how we inflict summary pu-
nishment on the individuals who fall into our power. These
are often the mere instruments of crime, and act in its com-
mission under as strong an impulse of duty to their supe-
riors as the soldier in our ranks; and it is as unreasonable
to expect their habits can be changed by making examples
of such men, as it would that we could subdue the spirit of
a nation by putting to death every soldier belonging to it
CCC
[Arr.
SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S
that we found fighting against us in action. The in-
creased danger in which this placed individuals would only
strengthen that powerful feeling by which they were at-
tached to their leaders, while it added that of revenge
against those who treated them with what they deemed
cruelty and injustice. It is the duty of all agents of the
British gove nment to direct their efforts to effect a change
in the frame of these savage communities; instead of com-
mencing, in imitation of unprincipled and despotic native
rulers, an unprofitable and interminable warfare upon indi-
viduals, who can hardly be termed guilty when they act by
the express order of chiefs to whom and their predecessors
they and their fathers have given implicit obedience for
centuries. The nature and strength of the ties which sub-
sist in these societies were fully discovered in the trial of
Nadir Singh, the celebrated Bheelalah chief of the Vin-
dhya range. No one has questioned the justice of his pu-
nishment; but that of the persons who committed by his
order the barbarous crime for which he was exiled, would
have been deemed an act of oppression.
One of the most effectual means that you have to main-
tain the peace, is that of exerting yourself to render all
(even the poorest and wildest classes) sensible of the
benefits they derive from your protection. There is no
point in which this is more required than against the
excesses of our troops, camp-followers, merchants who have
passes, and, in short, all who on any ground use the Bri-
tish name. The governments of the different presidencies
have been long sensible of this evil, and have endeavoured,
by, the strictest orders and proclamations, to correct it.
The pressing of begaries* and hackeries† has been posi-
For a particnlar account of this remarkable chief of robbers, vide
Memoir of Central India, vol. i. p. 550.
* Begaries are a class of natives of low tribe, whose occupation is
labour.
↑ Hackeries are a species of carts.
VIII.]
ccci
INSTRUCTIONS AND ORDERS.
tively forbidden; but these orders must be enforced with a
rigorous and uncompromising spirit by the civil and politi-
cal authorities, otherwise they will prove unavailing. This
is a point of duty in which I consider those under my
orders to have no option or latitude. In the present condi-
tion of Central India, it is one of too much importance,
both as it relates to the temper of the inhabitants and the
reviving prosperity of the country, to warrant any devia-
tion, either for the accommodation of individuals or the
public service. The former, when no longer encouraged by
improper or unwise indulgence to trust in any way to the
country, will soon learn to be independent of its aid;
public departments will in like degree become, from pro-
viding for their own wants, more efficient; and when the
inhabitants are satisfied that it is not in the power of any
person, whatever be his rank, to press them or their cattle,
they will be inspired with a confidence that will lead to
their furnishing more resources to troops and travellers,
from a desire of profit, than has ever yet been extorted by
an oppressive system; which, according to all natives I
have heard speak upon the subject, has been carried to as
great, if not greater lengths, in countries subject to our rule
and control, than in the worst of their own governments.
There are, I fear, many omissions in these notes of
Instructions; but an anxiety to render them complete has
already made them far longer than was at first intended. One
of my chief objects has been to impress, in the most forcible
manner, the great benefits which are to be expected from a
kind and conciliating manner, and a constant friendly inter-
course with those under your direction and control. It is
the feelings and knowledge which such habits on your part
will inspire, that can alone give effect to the principles of
action that have been prescribed for your observance. You
are called upon to perform no easy task: to possess power,
K
ccccii SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S INSTRUCTIONS. [APP. VIII.
but seldom to exercise it; to witness abuses which you
think you could correct; to see the errors, if not crimes, of
superstitious bigotry, and the miseries of misrule, and yet
forbear, lest you injure interests far greater than any
within the sphere of your limited duties, and impede and
embarrass, by a rash change and innovation that may bring
local benefit, the slow but certain march of general improve-
ment. Nothing can keep you right on all these points but
constant efforts to add to your knowledge, and accustoming
your mind (as I have before urged you) to dwell upon the
character of the British power in India, and that of the
empire over which it is established. The latter, compre-
hending numerous tribes and nations, with all their various
institutions and governments, may truly, though metaphori-
cally, be viewed as a vast and ancient fabric, neither without
shape nor beauty, but of which many parts are in a dilapi-
dated state, and all more or less soiled or decayed; still it
is a whole, and connected in all its parts; the foundations
are deep-laid, and to the very summit arch rests upon arch.
We are now its possessors; and if we desire to preserve,
while we improve it, we must make ourselves completely
masters of the frame of the structure to its minutest orna-
ments and defects: nor must we remove the smallest stone
till another is ready, suited to fill the vacant niche, other-
wise we may inadvertently bring a ruin on our own heads,
and those of others, on the spot where we too eagerly
sought to erect a monument of glory.
Camp Dhooliah, 28th June, 1821.
JOHN MALCOLM.
THE END.
LONDON:
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES,
Northumberland.court.
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Political history......
of India
2741
Margge dalla
1212 Hill
If Trow (Faculty) OST
Canton Hills 9680
DEC
1946
13
4097 3-33 20M-S
1945
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