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WAR DEPARTMENT, - - ADJUTANT GENERAL's OFFICE.
No. XXVII.
^T H E.
AUTUMN MANEUVERS
OF
1899.
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN,
ITALY, AND NORWAY.
JANUARY, 1900.
WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1900.


waR DEPARTMENT, - 49ADJUTANT GENERAL's office. M &
2 * . - —r * 3. *. f t
. . . . . . . . . . . ºlu-U-v2.04-. S. '
* , " sº ºwn
º º
AUTUMN MANEUVERS


I 8 O O.
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN,
ITALY, AND NORWAY.
JANUARY, 1900.
WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1900.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
ADJUTANT GENERAL's OFFICE.
Document No. 109.
M. I. D.
N. O. T E .
In compiling the reports on the Autumn. Maneuvers of
1899, data from sources both official and unofficial have been
made use of. Such matter as would seem to furnish the
most interesting and instructive accounts of the operations
in the various countries has been selected from official reports,
military periodicals, and other publications. The translation
of Fredrik L. Knudsen, first lieutenant, Eighth Infantry, has
been of assistance in making up the report on the Norwegian
Maneuvers. Although a delay of over two months was made
to obtain suitable accounts of the Russian Maneuvers, those
finally received were too incomplete and meager to justify
publication.
There were no fall maneuvers in France this year.
(3)
AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ARMY MANEUVERS.
[August 20 to September 2, inclusive.]
M.A.NEU VER. A.R.E.A.
These maneuvers covered ground rendered historic by the
events of Reichstadt involving the young King of Rome in
Napoleonic times, but more recently by the short struggle
between Prussia and Austria in 1866. Two Prussian corps,
by crossing the Lausitzer, Iser, and Jeschken mountains,
covered part of the maneuver ground in their march upon
Reichenberg. The towns of Hühnerwasser and Weisswasser,
known from the stubborn fighting there in the same cam-
paign, also fall within the southern part of the theater of
operations. The famous battlefields of Sadowa and König-
grätz are just south of Josephstadt. The territory in ques-
tion is in the extreme north of Bohemia, and is between the
Iser River, the Elbe River, and the mountains which separate
it from Prussia. If the marches and exercises preceding the
Kaiser maneuvers be considered, the area invo'-ed is more
than twice as great as above mentioned; for the permanent
headquarters of the ninth corps is at Josephstadt on the
Upper Elbe at a right-line distance of 66 miles from Reich-
‘stadt, the center of operations, while the headquarters of the
eighth corps, Prague, is about 45 miles distant from Reich-
stadt. To each of these corps a landwehr division was
added, thereby giving the actual opposing forces three divi-
sions each.
STRENGTH OF THE EIGHTH CORPS.
This corps has a total of 43 battalions, 12% squadrons, 64
guns (16 of these belong to the corps artillery), 2 pioneer
companies, and a half corps bridge equipage, or a total of
about 26,500 men.
STRENGTH OF THE NINTH CORPS.
This corps has a total of 41 battalions, 124 Squadrons
(6+ squadrons belonging to the corps cavalry), 64 guns (16
belonging to the corps artillery), 2 pioneer companies, and a
half corps bridge equipage, or a total of about 25,500 men.
(5)

3
O F D E F O F E A TTL E 3 T H CO R P.S.
Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
Chief of Staff: Colonel Boroevic.
Chief of Artillery: Venus von Elbringen.
43 Bats, –12% Squads, – 64 Guns, –
2 Comp, Pioneers, –% Corps Bridge Equipage,
1. 2. 3. 4. 1. 2. 4.
mº miniºn ºn 88th Regt. mºm mim ºn 73d Regt.
1. 2. 3. 4. 1. 2. 3. 4.
nº miniºn ºn 91st Regt. munisms ºn 102d Regt.,
1, 2. 3. 4. 1. 2. 3. 4.
him win ºn mim 35th Regt. mln wºmmºn mim 11th Regt.
2d Bat 28th Regt, 6th Jäger, 22d Jäger, 1. 3, 4,
mºn º mºn ºn mu ºn 75th Ikegt.
1. 2. 3. . . . 1. 2. 3. 4.
mim ºn ºn 6th Regt. mann was a 8th Regt.
1. 2. 3. 4. j. 2. 3.
sis ºn nº win 7th Regt. ºn an ºn 14th Regt.
Pi()ll Plat.
Ea
2 Squads. 14th Dragoons.
ta La
2 Squads. 14th Dragoons.
Pa Ea
[i][7][i][7] 23d Artillery Regt.
[i][7][i][7] 22d Artillery.
[f][f][f][7] 24th Artillery.
9th Sanitary Section.
19th Sanitary Section.
21st Sanitary Section.
Dº! 22(l Train.
Dº! 24th Train.
9th Division.
Lieut. Gen. Count Orsini und Rosenberg.
- 15. 244. 16.
19th Division.
Lieut. Gen. Hofman v. Donnersberg.
14. 2. 16.
21st (Landwehr) Division.
Lieut. Gen. V. Romansbrück.
14. 2. 16.
18th Brigade.
Col. Höpler.
17th Brigade.
Maj. Gen. Wojnovich.
38th Brigade.
Maj. Gen. Hallada.
37th Brigade.
Maj. Gen. v. Chavanne.
4-2 d Brigade.
Maj. Gen. v. Mras.
41st Brigade.
Col. V. ISIranichshain.
2 Squads. 14th Dragoons.
ta ta
Dºs! 2301 Train.
7th Dragoons.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
LaBarataſara
Pion. Plat.
2 Comp. 3d Pion. Bat.
miums
8th Corps. Art’y Regt.,
[i][7][i][i]]
12. 8th Teleph. Div.
% Bridge Equipage.
&|

3
O R D E R O F BATTLE 9TH CO F. P.S.
Lieut. General v. Klobus.
Chief of Staff: Colonel Gangl.
Chief of Artillery: Maj. General Kotwa.
41 Bats, –12% Squads. –64 Guns,—
2 Comp, Pioneers, –% Corps Bridge Equipage.
2. 3. 4. 1. 2. 4.
mim ºn ºn 74th Regt. mºm mim ºn 21st Regt.
1. 2. 3. 4. j. 2. 3.
summ mim ºn 92d Regt. ºn munis 42d Regt.
1. 2.
3. 4. 1. 3. 4.
numis ºn in 18th Regt. numa ºn 36th Regt.
1st Bat. 98th Regt. 1st Jäger, 2d Jäger.
2. 3. 4.
nuns ºn 94th Regt. mºm mºu mim
1. 2. 3.
mºn mºm ºn 11th Regt.
O gº
1. 2. 3.
sumn ºn 12th Regt.
1. 2, 3.
mºn mumm 30th Regt.
1. 2. 3.
mim ºn ºn 9th Regt.
1. 2. 3.
misus ºn 10th Regt.
2 Squads. 2d Landwehr Uhlans.
Ea La
2 Squads 2d Landwehr Uhlans.
2 Squads. 2d Landwehr Uhlans.
Ea Ea Ba Pion. Plat.
[i][i][7][i] 25th Artillery Regt.
[ſ][ſ][ſ][iſ] 26th Artillery.
[i][i][ſ][7] 27th Artillery.
10th Sanitary Section.
29th Sanitary Section.
26th Sanitary Section.
DX125th Train.
DX125th Train.
DK127th Train.
1Oth Division.
Lieut. Gen. von Siebert.
13. 2. 16.
29th Division.
Lieut. Gen. Dessovic.
13. 2. 16.
26th. (Landwehr) Division.
Maj. Gen. Mayer.
15. 24. 16.
Col. v. Rummershof.
19th Brigade.
2Oth Brigade.
Maj. Gen. v. Chizzola.
58th Brigade.
Maj. Gen. Leveling.
57th Brigade.
Maj. Gen. v. Gaizler.
52d Brigade.
Col. Gerba.
51st Brigade.
Maj. Gen. Rostoczil.
8th Dragoons.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Patata Patara
PiOn. Plat.
2 Comp. 8th Pion. Bat.
mium
9th Corps Art’y Regt.
9th Telegraph Div.
% Bridge Equipage. 32.
[…]
8 AUTUMIN MANEUVERS.
TROOPS ENGAGED.
The total maneuvering force on both sides—84 battalions,
25 squadrons, 128 guns, 1 pioneer battalion bridge equipage,
and trains—amounted to about 52,300 men and 6,670 horses,
or to a fighting strength of 41,700 rifles, 2,754 carbines, and
128 guns.
Not the least interesting feature of these ordres de bataille
is the appearance of the landwehr divisions on an equal
numerical footing with the regular divisions. The Austrian
and Hungarian landwehr occupy, partly at least, a dual posi-
tion as belonging to both the first and second lines. Part of
the yearly recruit contingent is drafted directly and serves
two years in the active service. Austria and Hungary have
each a landwehr war ministry in addition to the imperial war
ministry at Vienna. Just as each military territorial district
has a corps which is recruited within its limits, so each land-
wehr territorial district has its cadre corps.
As significant of the great difference between the Austro-
Hungarian army in peace and the same in war, it may be
mentioned that at the head of each corps district in peace is
a “corps commando,” while in war it is a “militär com-
mando.”
The extensive cadre and landwehr systems are doubtless
economical, but they are not conducive to quick mobilization
or the most effective fighting machine. -
The limited amount of cavalry and the relatively few guns
may be accounted for by the nature of the terrain, or it may
be due entirely to economic or service reasons. In any event
the time has passed when the allowance of 64 guns for a corps
of three divisions would suffice in a normal campaign, or when
such a body would attempt to Screen or escort its columns
with so little cavalry. Each division had with it its train
and sanitary establishments. The latter were provided with
Berkefeld filters. There were no balloons, nor did bicycles
act as a distinct unit. Each corps telephone division had a
capacity of constructing 60 kilometers (96% miles) of line.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS.
DISTRIBUTION OF TIME.
The following general instructions were issued by the supe-
rior direction of the maneuvers.
AUSTRIA—HUNGARY. 9
The distribution of the time was as follows:
August 30, war marches.
August 31, maneuver day.
September 1, maneuver day.
September 2, maneuver day.
September 3, critique.
RULES GOVERNING THE MANEUVERS.
War conditions on both sides begin at 7 a. m., August 30.
At this hour information detachments and patrols are to begin
operations, which are to continue to the end of the maneuvers.
During this time the information and security service will
not be broken.
On making contact the Opposing sides must not approach
nearer than the regulation 100 steps. -
The designation of lines of limitation by the superior direc-
tion of the maneuvers is equivalent to an order to halt. On
August 30 the advanced cavalry troops are not bound by the
delimiting line.
The line of limitation will serve as the line of advanced posts
or of outposts. With the exception of information detach-
ments and patrols, the line of Outposts can not be crossed
toward the enemy before morning without the special permis-
sion of the superior direction.
COMMUNICATION.—Coming and going between the opposing
forces is not allowed. Necessary communications must be
sent by flags of truce. While the superior direction of the
maneuvers is free to use the railways and telegraph lines,
they are forbidden to the opposing sides, except so far as they
lie within their lines. For all other purposes they are con-
sidered as destroyed.
REPORTs.—All reports and matters of importance must be
communicated direct to the Superior direction. Beginning
August 29, officers charged with dispositions must report them
daily to the superior direction. Duplicates of the dispositions
must be made by the commanders of the opposing forces, by
commanders of the detached groups, and of the screening cav-
alry. They must be delivered by 6 p.m. on the day before they
are intended to be effective. One of these is for His Majesty.
Any subsequent changes must be reported by telegraph.
The night dispositions must be reported as determined upon
and they should include the outposts, the location of the
10 AUTUMN MANEUVERS.
cantonment, headquarters, and, as far as possible, the security
service of the cavalry. -
Beginning August 29 early reports marked “special com-
munication ” should be made daily, setting forth the charac-
ter of the provisions, why certain troops were late in cooking,
the condition of the trains, etc. In compliance with regula-
tions, sketches showing the location of troops and short
reports of the engagements must be turned in. Full reports
and complete sketches of the operations of the enemy must
be turned in to the chief of the general staff not later than
November 1. -
MEMORANDA BY UMPIRES.–Memoranda or sketches of the
day’s operations must be turned in daily by the umpires
immediately after the cessation of hostilities. -
OFFICIAL REPORTERs.—Each corps and division is author-
ized to have, in accordance with instructions, an official
reporter who is a field officer or captain of the general staff.
CRITIQUE.--Corps, division, and brigade commanders, chiefs
of staff of same, umpires, assistant umpires, and official
reporters are to be assembled with their respective notebooks
for the general discussion and criticism. On September 3.
UMPIRES.—There are employed as umpires and assistant
umpires, 7 lieutenant generals, 5 major generals, 8 colonels, 1
lieutenant colonel, 4 majors, and 6 captains. All but two of
the field officers so employed belong to the general staff.
THEATER OF OPERATIONS.
During rainy weather, such as was experienced during
these manuevers, all the country, except upon the roads, is
difficult for artillery and cavalry. The soil of this part of
Bohemia is especially soft and therefore trying for military
purposes. The main macadamized roads are excellent, the
ordinary stone roads good; but the mud roads are difficult.
Even the high ground and slopes were nearly impassable in
places for cavalry purposes. In going from one part of the
lines to another one could never be sure that he would not
find ground that would stop him by reason of its softness.
The most active part of the theater of operations is traversed
by the Polzen River (tributary to the Elbe) flowing nearly
due west, and by its tributaries flowing southward. •
The valley of this stream has an elevation at Niemes of
272 meters, at Böhm. Leipa, 250 meters. Frequent high
AUSTRIA—HTJN GARY. 11
points (always covered with timber and often crowned with
castles) dot the terrain, varying from 550 to 440 meters in
height. There are also numbers of other elevations less
marked, some of which are wooded while others are culti-
vated. The average height of these secondary points, which
are much more practicable for military purposes by reason of
having less dense woods and slopes, is about 200 meters lower
than the former. The general aspect of the ground is mam-
millary rather than ridgelike, and is therefore more difficult
for the selection of good positions. The field of operations
is restricted in the north by abrupt hills and mountains.
GENERAL HYPOTHESIS FOR THE EIGHTH CORPS (BLUE).
A hostile army in northeastern Bohemia is retreating north-
ward via Reichenberg–Zittau. Parts of the same reached
Münchengrätz and Böhm. Aicha on August 29.
The Blue army assembled on the Middle Elbe is in the act
of taking the offensive in order to free northeastern Bohemia
from the enemy. It has received orders to advance toward
Gabel via Böhm. Leipa-Reichstadt to interfere as far as
possible with the retreat of the enemy. -
GENERAL HYPOTHESIS FOR THE NINTH CORPs (RED).
The army is retreating from northeastern Bohemia to the
north, via Reichenberg–Zittau.
The enemy has assembled his main forces on the Middle
Elbe. These have not yet been set in motion. He has,
however, crossed the Elbe River with part of his strength,
amounting to a corps, at Raudnitz and Melnik, and on Au-
gust 29 he had reached the region of Auscha. The ninth
corps, acting as a cover to the Red army, has been Ordered to
prevent the advance of the Blue forces over the Polzen River
and to secure for a few days the columns directed toward
Reichenberg and Zittau via Reichstadt and Gabel.
DISTRIBUTION OF THE FORCES.
On the evening of August 29 the Blue corps was distributed
as follows: The nineteenth division and twenty-first land-
wehr division, in quarters around Auscha; the ninth divi-
sion, in quarters near Tudpadl, on the stream Liboch; the
dragoon regiment No. 7 (corps cavalry), about 3 miles south
of Böhm. Leipa, near Neugarten.
12 AUTUMN MANEUVERS.
On the same evening the Red Corps was in quarters as fol-
lows: The tenth and twenty-ninth divisions in and around
Münchengrätz; the twenty-sixth landwehr division at Böhm.
Aicha; the dragoon regiment No. 8 (corps cavalry) at Höf-
litz, about 3 miles southeast of Niemes.
The outpost lines were limited to about 2 miles in front of
the respective forces, the main parts of which were separated
by about 20 miles, while the respective corps cavalry forces
were separated by about 14 miles.
DETAILS OF THE DAILY OPERATIONS.
OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 30.
The orders issued to the two armies for the marches on
August 30 were as follows:
EIGHTH ARMY CORPS (BLUE ARMY).
Following the general idea of the problem, the commander
of the eighth corps (Blue), Archduke Franz Ferdinand,
ordered an advance in three columns at 7 a.m., as follows:
The ninth division to advance via Dauba, in the direction
of Habstein-Neugarten—Rehdārfel, while a detachment of the
same (consisting of the eighteenth brigade, 1 squadron, and
1 battery), under the division commander, to proceed to Brenn
The twenty-first landwehr division, with the corps artillery,
to advance via Graber–Kosel toward Böhm. Leipa-Schwora–
Kl. Aicha.
The nineteenth division, from Graber, via Neustadtl,
toward Liebich–Schasslowitz—Böhm. Leipa.
The divisional cavalry to hasten forward and to hold the
Polzen crossings at Brenn, Wolfsthal, Schiessnig, and Böhm.
Leipa, also the crossings to the east near Schönborn, Straus-
nitz, and Sandau; and likewise to reconnoiter the zones into
which the infantry columns are ordered.
The ninth division to send out dispersed advanced troops
as a means of security. -
In case of contact with the enemy, the advance to be con-
tinued.
Dragoon regiment No. 7 to set out from Rehdórfel at 7 a. m.
for Niemes, via Brenn, and to send an information patrol
from Neugarten, via Hirschberg, toward Bakow. From
Niemes, two information detachments to be sent out—the
first, via Hühnerwasser, toward Münchengrätz; the second,
via Wartenberg–Oschitz, toward Böhm. Aicha. The regi-
ment will prevent the reconnoitering of the enemy and will
#. his advance. Corps headquarters will be at Böhm.
elpa.
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. . 13
NINTH ARMY CORPs (RED ARMY).
The commander of the ninth corps (Red), Lieutenant Gen-
eral von Klobus, Ordered his forces to proceed in three
columns, as follows: p -
The twenty-sixth landwehr division, via Oschitz-Warten-
berg, toward Joachimsdorf-Wellnitz–Kamnitz.
The tenth division, via Gablong-Woken–Höflitz, toward
Barzdorf–Neuland–Grünau. At 10 a. m. it will send one
battalion forward as a support to the cavalry observation
post at Niemes.
The twenty-ninth division, with the corps artillery, via
Hühnerwasser, toward Höflitz–Haidedórfel–Niemes.
The start will be such that the long halt at Wartenberg,
Woken, Hühnerwasser will be broken at 10.30 a. m.
Dragoon regiment No. 8 is charged with reconnoitering to
the north as far as the line Wartenberg–Lindenau–Haida and
to the south in the direction Dauba–Auscha—Wernstadt. It
will send one squadron toward Böhm. Leipa to prepare for
the destruction of the bridges from Wolfsthal to Straussnitz,
inclusive. This squadron will defend the crossing to the
utmost, and will send patrols to the heights north of Kosel
(596) and toward Karsch. One-half squadron will be sent to
hold the crossings from Wolfsthal east to Brenn. A patrol
will be sent via Habstein—Klum to Heights 513. The regi-
ment itself will advance at 6 a.m. from Höflitz, via Niemes,
toward Reichstadt, and will take position on Height 296.
Corps headquarters will march with the twenty-ninth divi-
sion, and will pass the night at Grünau.
These orders have been given in detail to show the scope of
the security and information service attending the move-
ments of both sides. How far these duties could have been
carried out in actual warfare is problematic.
EXECUTION OF THE MANEUVERS. &
In carrying out the orders of the eighth corps, the seventh
dragoons seized the bridge at Brenn after a small fight on
foot, and that at Kummer without any resistance. The regi-
ment itself had reached the heights west of Niemes by 8 a.m.
The eighth dragoons of the ninth corps reached its desig-
nated place west of Reichstadt at 8 a. m., but learning
through its patrols of strong cavalry detachments on the left
bank of the Polzen, it moved to the heights north of Wolfs-
thal. Here it learned that two hostile squadrons sent in the
direction of Böhm. Leipa to aid in holding back the enemy,
but was driven back by the advancing infantry about noon
and took position at Lindenau, on the right flank of its corps.
14 * AUTUMN MANEUVERS.
The only contact made during the day was with the ad-
vanced posts of the two cavalry forces. This was according
to the schedule, which records August 30 as a day of strategic
marching and not a maneuver day. ... •
At the end of the day’s marching, August 30, the opposing
forces went into cantonment as follows:
The eighth corps was disposed as follows: The ninth divi-
sion in the region Habstein-Neugarten—Rehdārfel; the Rosen-
berg brigade at Brenn; the twenty-first landwehr division
with corps artillery in the region Böhm. Leipa-Schwora–Kl.
Aicha; the nineteenth division at Nd. Liebich–Schasslowitz—
Böhm. Leipa; corps headquarters and the eighth dragoons at
the latter place. In a word, the general advance had been
about 15 miles in a right line. -
The ninth corps, on the same day, went into cantonment as
follows: The twenty-ninth division and corps artillery in
the region Höflitz–Haidedórfel–Niemes; the tenth division,
Grünau–Barzdorf–Neuland; the twenty-sixth landwehr divi-
sion, Wellnitz–Kamnitz-Joachimsdorf; corps headquarters
and the ninth dragoons at Grünau. The general advance of
this corps was a right-line distance of about 16 miles.
opBRATIONs of AUGUST 31.
The orders for the two armies on this day were as follows:
EIGHTH CORPS (BLUE ARMY).
The dispositions for the first maneuver day, August 31,
were for the eighth corps as follows: .
To advance in four columns with the object of securing the
district Neuhäusel and the heights west of Reichstadt. -
The thirty-seventh brigade of the nineteenth division via
Pihl–Bokwen to the north end of Schwojka–Neuhäusel. The
headquarters of the nineteenth division, thirty-eighth brigade
of the same, and divisional artillery via Bokwen to the south
end of Schwojka and the north end of Alt Scheidel.
The seventeenth brigade of the ninth division, with the corps
artillery and one squadron, all under Major General Woino-
vitch, via middle of Dobern over Heights, 367, northwest of
Reichstadt. This column must first of all seize the heights
northeast of Dobern. .
The twenty-first landwehr division via Piessnig–Neu
Scheid]. Upon making contact with the enemy the twenty-
first landwehr division will designate one brigade as corps
reserve. The detachment of General Rosenberg (eighteenth
brigade, seventh dragoons, one divisional squadron, and the
ATUSTRIA—HUN GARY. 15
divisional artillery regiment) will advance from Brenn toward
Reichstadt and will endeavor to draw the hostile forces to-
ward it. -
All columns (except that of General Woinovitch, which
starts at 8 a. m.) will set out at 7.30 a. m.
The nineteenth division will send its divisional cavalry via
Zwitte and Lindenau to secure its left flank. .."
Corps headquarters will be with the twenty-first division.
NINTH CORPs (RED ARMY).
The ninth corps was to advance with the object of driving
|back the hostile forces that had crossed the Polzen River
near Böhm. Leipa before additional forces could reach them
via Brenn. The dispositions for such were as follows:
All columns should be in marching order with their heads
on the line of Outposts by 7.30 a. m.
The twenty-sixth landwehr division: One regiment on the
road from Laufberg (489) to Zwitte; division headquarters,
one brigade, and divisional artillery on the road Joachims-
dorf–Wellnitz–Zwitte; one brigade on the road Wellnitz–Neu
Scheidl. The tenth division, with corps artillery, on the road
Grünau–Kamnitz-Neu Reichstadt, thence on the road Klem-
ensdorf; the corps artillery between the two brigades.
The twenty-ninth division'. One brigade and three batteries
On the road Niemes—Reichstadt; one brigade and one battery
detached toward Brenn. The eighth dragoons in a secure
place near Schwojka.
Corps headquarters will, at 6.30 a. m., be on the heights
about 1,500 paces northeast of Kamnitz, where further Orders
will be given.
Information and security: The eighth dragoons will recon-
noiter in the direction of Böhm. Leipa and will secure the
right flank. The divisions must make reconnoissances in the
direction of Zwitte, Bürgstein, Pihl, Strausnitz, Neu Scheidl,
and Schiessnig, then Dobern and Wolfsthal, finally Brenn,
Habstein, and Dauba.
EXECUTION OF THE MANEUVERS.
Eollowing these dispositions it was clear that the first en-
counter would take place near and east of Dobern, whither
the superior headquarters and suite proceeded at 7 a. m.
The brigade detachment of General Rosenberg (6 battalions,
7% squadrons, 4 batteries of the eighth corps) moved out in
haste from Brenn to draw the enemy in that direction and to
prevent a decisive combat with the principal forces farther
north. The other five brigades were directed against the right
16 AUTUMN MANEUVERS.
flank of the ninth corps between Dobern and Neuhäusel in
order to drive it toward the southeast. This detachment suc-
ceeded in engaging the twenty-ninth hostile division, while
the nineteenth division of the eighth corps became engaged
on the heights near Plesse with the twenty-sixth landwehr
division of the ninth corps.
Gradually the twenty-first division (Blue) was being brought
up in the center on Heights 367, northwest of Reichstadt.
The commander of the ninth corps, realizing the real
strength of the flank attack, began expediting his battalions
toward the north, where the key of the struggles lay. The
highway from Reichstadt northwest through Schwojka was
the dividing line at the north of the opposing forces, which
were gradually developing firing lines parallel to it. The
principal engagement was that between the twenty-sixth
division (Red), north of and parallel to said highway at Plesse,
and the attacking nineteenth division (Blue).
From the firing of the first artillery shot, at about 7.15
a. m., to the time of this engagement, about four hours had
elapsed. In this engagement, which lasted fully twenty min-
utes, a large amount of both artillery and infantry ammuni-
tion was expended. -
Without a vastly superior force the attacking party, owing
to the advantage of position of the defense, could never have
succeeded. The recall was sounded about noon and the
lines of demarcation determined by the superior maneuver
direction.
In spite of the theoretical advantage claimed by many mili-
tary writers (among them Austrians) of the advantage against
hostile fire of moving troops in groups instead of in lines, the
latter was more frequently used than the former when once
in the danger Zone.
Empirical tests made in Germany with groups and lines in
the fire Zone have not so far given any conclusive results.
The group (column) certainly possesses a tactical advantage
over the line in that men are held in hand better and longer.
The cantonment followed. The eighth corps: Corps head-
Quarters, corps artillery, and nineteenth division at Böhm.
Leipa; twenty-first division at Dobern; the ninth division and
seventh dragoons at Reichstadt–Götzdorf–Wolfsthal–Brenn.
The ninth corps: Twenty-sixth division and eighth dra-
goons at Lindenau–Zwitte—Wellnitz; the corps headquarters,
AUSTRIA—HUN GARY. 17
corps artillery, and tenth division at Joachimsdorf–Brims;
the twenty-ninth division at Grünau.
The opposing outposts were separated by from 1 to 3 miles.
The fronts of the respective corps cantonments, not including
line of outposts, were 6 to 7 miles long.
OPERATIONS OF SEPTEMBER. I.
The orders for the two armies on this day were as follows:
EIGHTH CORPS (BLUE ARMY).
The disposition of the eighth corps for September 1 showed
that its objective was to attack and drive the enemy to the
east. To accomplish this, the ninth division was to hold
Reichstadt and at the same time to send as strong forces as
possible via Neu and Alt Scheidl toward Zwitte. In order to
accomplish this, the commander of the eighth corps directed:
The nineteenth division, with the corps artillery, will
advance against the west flank of the enemy via Jägersdorf–
|Kommt—Bürgstein. The rear brigade of this division will con-
stitute the corps reserve. The heads of the columns will pass
the line of outposts at 8 a. m. ; the seventh dragoons will
report to the ninth division. Corps headquarters will be with
the nineteenth division.
NINTH CORPs (RED).
The ninth corps prepared to renew the offensive as follows:
The twenty-sixth landwehr division to send one regiment
from Lindenau to Bürgstein at 7 a. m., while the division
itself will proceed from Zwitte via Neu Häusel toward
Schwojka and hold itself in readiness on both sides of the
town at 7 a. m. The regiment must maintain communication
with the division.
The tenth division: One brigade and the divisional artillery
will proceed along the Zwitte-Piessnig road, reaching the
Reichstadt-Schwojka highway at 7 a. m. ; one brigade and
the corps artillery will form the corps reserve between Zwitte
and Neu Häusel.
The twenty-ninth division: One brigade and the divisional
artillery will advance via Kamnitz–Neu Reichstadt toward
Heights 367; one brigade on the Reichstadt highway toward
the heights north of the same.
The heads of columns will pass the line of outposts at 8
a. m. The eighth dragoons will proceed toward Bürgstein,
covering the right flank. Corps headquarters will march
with the tenth division.
12883–2
18 AUTUMN MANEUVERS.
ExECUTION OF THE MANEUVERs.
By 8.30 a.m. the artillery fire of the eighth corps was heard
from the heights near Bokwen, while at the same time infantry
columns were advancing toward Schwojka–Neu Scheid]. This
developed the artillery fire of the twenty-sixth and tenth
divisions, as well as the ninth corps artillery. The ninth
corps was ordered to advance (to this firing line of forty-eight
guns, which were preparing the attack) by 8.45 a. m. The
fire of the eighth corps and its advance upon Schwojka proved
too strong for the ninth corps, which Lieutenant General von
Rlobus at 9.30 ordered to retire via Scheidl toward the heights
south of Lindenau in order to make a new stand.
In compliance with this, the corps reserve with the ninth
corps artillery regiment went back via Zwitte to Wellnitz and
the Kranzelberg heights, north of Laufberg. The two divi-
sions engaged were successively withdrawn and directed to
the right flank of this position. By 12.30 the retreat was
effected and corps headquarters established on Kranzelberg.
The eighth corps followed up the retreat with its principal
forces, and east of Zwitte renewed the attack, with but slight
success, on account of the three Opposing artillery regiments
already in position. Finally the fire became intense on the
part of both infantry and artillery. What would have been
the result in actual warfare would have been difficult to say,
inasmuch as the forces engaged were practically two divisions
on each side. The superior control, however, informed Li i-
tenant General von Klobus of the failure of part of the army
to which his corps belonged (supposititious) and therefore
Ordered him to retire to the Brims—Joachimsdorf region until
September 2, when he should begin the retreat toward Zittau
via Gabel-Luckendorf. * º
The Archduke received instructions to vigorously pursue
with the eighth corps the retreating enemy on the following
day. The lines of demarcation were then designated and a
state of war was succeeded by a peaceful quartering.
While these engagements toward the north were taking
place some very interesting incidents were being enacted near
Reichstadt. - -
The ninth division of the eighth corps, which had been
Ordered to hold Reichstadt against the advance of the enemy
and then to detach as much strength as possible for action in
the region of Scheidl, reached the heights of Kamnitz, east of
Reichstadt, about 8 a. m. -
AUSTRIA—HUN GARY. 19
At this moment the eastern brigade of the division was
attacked by superior hostile forces from the Kamnitz woods
and driven back to Reichstadt, which was held by the other
brigade. The enemy (Reds) did not attempt to follow farther.
The commander of the ninth division, with a view of holding
the opposing forces in check, sent the seventeenth brigade to
the height east of Reichstadt. To comply with the other part
of his instructions, he directed the rest of his division toward
Schwojka. In the course of this latter movement the division
received orders from the corps commanderto change its course
toward the heights east of Wellnitz, where at noon a vigorous
engagement with the twenty-ninth division took place.
The ninth corps continued its retreat in a northeasterly
direction until it reached Gabel, where the tenth division went
into quarters. The twenty-sixth division held Joachimsdorf–
Brims–Rosenthal, while the twenty-ninth division held Luh–
POstrum.
The headquarters of the eighth corps halted at Böhm. Leipa;
the nineteenth division at Scheidl; the twenty-first and ninth
divisions were established at Wellnitz and Reichstadt; the
seventh dragoons halted at Reichstadt.
The corps cavalry of the eighth corps was on its right flank,
that of the ninth corps on its left flank. The fronts of the two
forces were no longer parallel.
OPERATIONS OF SEPTENIBER. 2.
The orders for the two armies on this day were as follows:
EIGHTH CORPS (BLUE ARMY).
The eighth corps is to attack the enemy in the shortest
direction and drive him beyond Gabel. To accomplish this,
the nineteenth division and corps artillery are to advance via
Lindenau-Rosenthal–Kl. Walten; the twenty-first division
via Brims—Gr. Walten—Gabel; the ninth division via Scheck-
endorf–Joachimsdorf–Postrum; the seventh dragoons via Luh–
Postrum highway against Gabel, with the object of interfering
with the retreat of the enemy. The outposts are to be passed
by the nineteenth division and seventh dragoons at 9 a. m.,
and by the other two divisions at 9.45.
The corps headquarters will be with the twenty-first divi-
sion.
- NINTH CORPS (RED ARMY).
The ninth corps is to delay the hostile advance on the
line Kapellenberg-Vogelberg. To follow out this plan, the
twenty-sixth division will occupy Heights 345, east of Brims,
20 AUTUMN MANEUVERs.
as far as Jungferbach (creek), and one brigade of the twenty-
ninth division will occupy the line Tolzberg-Vogelberg includ-
ing highway to Gabel; the other brigade and the divisional
artillery regiment will Occupy the edge of the forest west of
Postrum; the tenth division and corps artillery will hold itself
in readiness south of the Schloss Walten–Rosenthal road in
fortified places. The fortified places must be prepared by 8
a. Iſl.
The tenth division, corps artillery, and troops of the twenty-
ninth division near Postrum must be ready at 8.30 a. m. The
eighth dragoons will go over the heights east of Lindenau–
Zwitte and reconnoiter toward Bürgstein and Piessnig, at
the same time covering the flank of the corps.
The corps headquarters will be at Kapellenberg at 8 a. m.
EXECUTION OF THE MANEUVERS.
It is evident that the defending force of the Red army must
either hold the fortified position and check the advance of the
Blue army, or it must follow the main army (supposititious) by
retreating Over the mountains. Considering the nature of the
terrain, the defensive position was not only well selected, but,
in addition, it was intrenched by both infantry and artillery.
Some of the pits of the latter did not, apparently, have suffi-
cient thickness of earth to be thoroughly effective. From
Kapellenberg a large portion of the theater of operations
could be seen and the development of the advance followed.
The terrain was such as to prevent any very long continuous
lines and the defense was, therefore, arranged in irregular
echelon to conform to the rounded hills. The same arrange-
ment was made of the reserves. The presence of woods lim-
ited not only the artillery position, but interfered with its
field of fire. When the corps artillery was brought up to
strengthen the line it was put on the forward slope of Kapel-
lenberg so that it was fired over by the divisional batteries.
Moreover, its line of fire was nearly at right angles to the
normal front. Naturally such a disposition would have offered
great advantages to an enemy possessing strong artillery, and
corresponding disadvantages to its own lines. The tenth
division and its artillery were farther to the north and east.
As the eighth corps (Blue) crossed the line of outposts at
9 and 9.45 a. m., the nineteenth and twenty-first divisions
appeared in front of the Brims–Kapellenberg line of the ninth
corps about 10 a. m. The corps were so near each other that
the marches were practically all of a tactical character. All
the artillery of the eighth corps was directed toward the
AUSTRIA—HUN GARY. 21
heights west of Kapellenberg, at about 3,000 meters distant.
The opposing artillery of the ninth corps was weaker by one
regiment (16 guns) in the artillery duel which followed and
which had lasted nearly one and one-half hours. At this time
Lieutenant General von Klobus directed the tenth division,
kept well back thus far, toward Rosenthal, to make a counter
attack against the left flank of the eighth corps. He also
ordered up behind the Kapellen position a brigade of the
twenty-ninth division.
A brigade detached from the twenty-first division supported
the nineteenth division of the eighth corps in its turning
movement by the left flank. The collision between the oppos-
ing wings took place south of Heights 251 and 353, and was
in all respects a military spectacle, rendered doubly interesting
by the interspersed woods and considerable slopes. In one
case a battalion of Blues, climbing a steep woody ascent, found,
upon reaching the crest, a large force of Reds within less than
100 yards advancing in the open fields. As both sides were
but elements of long attacking lines, no retreat was possible.
The same relative surprises took place with regard to larger
units.
With the collision of the northern flanks, and a general
advance of the lines of both sides, a halt was sounded and the
maneuvers declared ended.
The landwehr divisions, including landwehr cavalry, had
given such a good account of themselves that it was not always
easy to distinguish them, by the military behavior in the field,
from the regular line troops.
The horses of the landwehr cavalry belong to that category
which, after being trained in regiments, are given over to
private persons, who are obliged to maintain them in good
order and to deliver them at appointed times for military ends.
At the expiration of six years they become the property of the
whilom keepers.
OBSERVATIONS.
In general appearance, in vigor of action, and in precision
of movement, quite a difference is noticed between the troops
of the Dual Monarchy and those of the German Empire.
Among well-informed military students there are those who
oppose any tendency toward the so-called automatonism of
Prussia. There is, however, an important question touching
the peace organization that can well be mentioned. This ques-
tion is the relation of the effective peace strength to that of
22 AUTUMN MANEUVERS.
the mobilized state. Such a question must be determined by
each country by its political reasons or its financial condition.
Other things being equal, the less the difference between the
peace and the mobilized states the greater will be the efficiency
of the army when its services are required for war conditions.
All armies in time of peace resort to cadres; but it is the
degree of their weakness that may cause apprehension when
the development or mobilization becomes imperative.
In general, landwehr belongs to the second line of an army,
and is intended to be used to reenforce the first line; but in
Austria-Hungary a large portion of it is evidently intended to
constitute an important part of the active army in war. As
its cadres are weak (3 officers and 54 men per company, 3
Officers and 33 men per squadron, and no artillery in the land-
wehr), filling them will require more difficulty than with the
regular line troops.
Thus far, then, the landwehr system is less effective than
the line. Moreover, its administration is in different hands.
The landwehr of Austria is under a different administration
from that of Hungary. These facts inevitably lead to an
absence of a direct logical military administration. The
peace strength of the field (regular) army, as far as infantry
and cavalry are concerned, is about equal to that of other
European armies. For example, the company has 4 officers
and 97 to 133 men, and the squadron practically the war
strength. But the artillery is weak; the battery has four
guns and eight ammunition and three supply wagons.
The full strength of a company is 250 men; the full strength
of a squadron is 5 officers and 145 mounted men, and that of
a battery of artillery is eight guns, eight ammunition wagons,
and five supply wagons. The fact that in the time of peace
the battery has only 25 per cent of its ammunition wagons
and no horses for them, and horses for only half its guns,
shows the degree of weakness of the artillery cadres.
The infantry regiment, like that of Russia and the prospec-
tive French one, has four battalions of four companies each.
It seems significant that three great military powers should
adopt the four-battalion regiment. In addition to the four
field batteries, each regiment has a depot battalion of four
companies commanded by a field officer who is, at the same
time, district recruiting commandant. The companies have
from 2 to 3 officers and from 11 to 19 men.
ATUSTRIA—HUNGARY. 23
If the lessons of history and the practice of modern military
methods are to be considered, a regiment in the field should
consist of not less than three battalions. To make these
effective, there must be, in addition, a depot battalion, or some
other device, for its completion. The latter is doubly essen-
tial when the conditions surrounding the fighting force are
unfavorable through climatic or other causes. Modern mili-
tary art fixes the strength of a battalion of four companies at
about 1,000 men. Its fire strength under peace conditions in
the temperate zone would be about 10 to 20 per cent less; that
is, the companies would have from 200 to 225 men each. This
strength would be again diminished by not less than the same
percentage in tropical countries at times when there is no
fighting. The advantages claimed for a four-battalion organ-
ization are: Economy, diminution of administrational (regi-
mental) units, and the convenience with which one battalion
may be detached.
Each cavalry regiment of six squadrons has a mounted
pioneer platoon (1 officer and 24 men) and a depot cadre of 4
officers and 19 men.
Each pioneer battalion has five companies, a technical re-
serve (which consists of four bridge equipages) and a depot
Company.
The telephone division employed had 40 miles of line ma-
terial and apparatus for four stations. In peace the Organ-
ization of railway and telegraph regiments is analogous to
those of the infantry. The use of sanitary detachments was
limited to the actual necessities of the case, and was not what
would have been needed had the maneuvers been warfare.
The same may be said of the trains throughout.
The trains most in evidence were the five ammunition wagons
per division and an occasional hospital wagon (about one to
two for each). The local trains of the principal dressing
stations were indicated by large flags. .
In each company four men are equipped as sick bearers; in
each battalion two men as bandage carriers. The sick bearers
carry firearms and each wears a black and yellow arm band.
They are united under each battalion or regiment under a non-
commissioned officer.
A herd of cattle was driven along to supply fresh beef for
the troops.
24 ALJTUMN MANEU VERS.
The field printing press deserves mention as being practical
and expeditious. Dispositions were turned in for publication
by the commander at 6 p. m. and the corresponding printed
situations were discussed two hours later in the mess tent.
Although the artillery material (with bronze guns) seems
unduly heavy, official data show that its actual weight is but
little above that of the more modern guns of other European
nations.
The question of language offers the greatest inconveniences
in the Austro-Hungarian army, there being not less than ten
tongues and dialects spoken. This makes such a demand
upon the officers that very few of them speak either English
or French. The languages of the Bohemian troops are Czech
and German.
The rapid advancement of the general staff officers in recent
years must make a disagreeable impression upon the line, but
it is said that these fast promotions will soon end.
The drill regulations provide for four platoons to the com-
pany; therefore, with a strength of 200 men, a column of
platoons would occupy a quadrilateral of 15 by 20 meters. A
general principle announced for all company commanders is:
“The company must always be kept in the hand of the com-
mander, ready at any time to assume that formation required
by the circumstances.” The regulations also declare: “Each
battalion should be able to execute the simple formations re-
quired by war with order and safety under all conditions.
Uniform movements of companies are not warlike and there-
fore should not be demanded at drills.” In spite of this dec-
laration for simplicity and practicability the battalion has
more normal formations than in Germany and Russia, but
less than in France and Italy.
European cavalry regiments have either four (England,
Germany, France) or six (Austria, Russia, Italy) squadrons
and no squadron is larger than the Austrian. It is estimated
that a regiment of four squadrons will form line from a
route column in four minutes; one of six squadrons in six
minutes. Italy considers two squadrons sufficient for divi-
sional cavalry; other countries think from three to four nec-
essary. * -
During the maneuvers one regiment was divided among
three divisions; the remaining mounted troops were used as
corps cavalry.
ALJSTRIA—HUNGARY. 25
In general, there was little gala effect during the maneuvers.
Every evening, with the coffee, the dispositions of the follow-
ing day were brought in the headquarters mess tent and dis-
cussed. Officers present whose actions might be influenced
thereby were requested to retire.
The umpires were changed daily. The regulations govern-
ing their actions are very similar to those in existence in
Germany.
GERMAN KAISER MANEUVERS.
[Septembel, 1899.]
It is a mistake to suppose that there is annually but one
series of large maneuvers in Germany. As a matter of fact,
practically all the troops are maneuvered every year. As a
rule, they begin field exercises with the smallest units and end
with brigades, divisions, army corps, and sometimes armies.
The Emperor may attend any of the brigade, division, or
corps maneuvers; but he always attends the operations of the
largest units, as do also the headquarters' officers of the im-
perial forces, the minister of war, the chief of the general staff,
various other high officers and officials, and foreign military
representatives. It is these operations that are termed “Kaiser
maneuvers.”
The chief garrison points of the troops involved in this
year's operations are Karlsruhe, Strassburg, Colmar, Freiburg,
Ulm, and Stuttgart. Strassburg (Elsass) is the headquarters
of the fifteenth corps, as well as of both its divisions, while
Stuttgart (Kingdom of Würtemberg) and Karlsruhe (Grand
Duchy of Baden) are headquarters, respectively, of the thir-
teenth and fourteenth corps, and also of a division each.
Colmar, Freiburg, and Ulm are each the headquarters of a
division.
MANEUVER AREA.
The territory involved, beginning with the earliest stages
of the operations, comprises Baden and Würtemberg north of
the Upper Danube, west of the Neckar and east of the Rhine,
also a good portion of Elsass along the latter river. As the
maneuver area became smaller, the operations centered on
the Enz, the principal tributary to the Neckar. The general
course of the Enz is northeast from the Black Forest, and
almost all of its waters are in Würtemberg.
The entire country is rich in events that have illumined
some of the most interesting pages of history. It was at
Nördlingen that Marlborough and Prince Eugene won the
decisive victory over Prince Charles Theodore of Bavaria and
the French; and it was at Ulm that Napoleon, in his wonder-
fully conceived campaign of 1805, directed against Vienna,
(27)
28 AUTUMN MANEUVERS.
compelled General Mack to lay down his arms. Napoleon's
army of 200,000 men, divided into six corps, was directly com-
manded by him in spite of the absence of railways and telegraph
lines. In its general plan the 1805 campaign resembles the
problem of this year’s maneuvers. In 1805 the forces were,
however, sent around the Black Forest, instead of through
it, while most of the Western army this year crossed these
mountains through three passes.
Ney’s corps passed through Karlsruhe, Pforzheim, and Stutt-
gart; Lannes's corps through Rastatt and Ludwigsburg; the
other corps passed north of these lines of march in their
advance.
CONCENTRATION.
The methods used in the concentration of the several corps
on the occasion of these maneuvers did not differ from the
means generally adopted. The point of concentration is
usually the headquarters of the corps. A number of weeks
in advance the general staff informed the fifteenth, thirteenth,
and fourteenth corps that they would be paraded respectively
at Strassburg, September 4; at Stuttgart, September 7, and
at Karlsruhe, September 8. The field work and maneuvering
of the smaller units were carried out prior to these dates
while executing the respective concentrations. In the case
of the fifteenth corps the distances for the most part were
small; while in the fourteenth corps of three divisions, the
one at Freiburg was at an air-line distance of 80 miles from
corps headquarters, the one at Colmar 84 miles from the same;
the twenty-seventh division at Ulm of the thirteenth corps
was in a right line 50 miles from corps headquarters.
While these marches of concentration are not usually
witnessed by spectators and are not included in the so-called
maneuvers, they are none the less such, and are both inter-
esting and instructive to the troops. On the day a corps was
inspected and paraded it sent the parade uniforms, for the
most part by rail, to its garrisons, and began the march for
position. The problem being known in advance by the great
general staff, and the work of each corps having been planned,
the date of parade was then fixed. The fifteenth corps, having
to march through the Black Forest, was paraded three days
before the thirteenth and four days before the fourteenth
corps. While marching to position it happened this year
that the advanced forces of the opposing sides came in contact
GERMANY. 29
on the 9th, though the scheduled first maneuver day was set
for the 11th, it having been understood that the 10th would
be a rest day. - -
The allotment and distribution of forces, as well as the
selection of commanders, are made by the great general staff
under directions from the Emperor, who is de facto the com-
manding general of the army. Once having received his
forces, the commander may dispose of them as he sees fit
within the limits of the field-service regulations. In this
connection it is specially noteworthy that in spite of the fact
that the new law relating to field artillery, to take effect
October 1, 1899, abolished corps artillery, the commander of
each side allotted a certain portion to each corps. The min-
ister of war explained it by saying that the commanders could
still do what they pleased with their forces. -
Before moving his corps out for maneuvers its commanding
general issues an order covering the field service of his com-
mand during the period involved. It gives instructions in
regard to quartering, orders, and reports, service at the bri-
gade, division, and corps headquarters, uniform, ammunition,
wagons, sanitary regulations, post and telegraph lines, gen-
darme patrols, railway return transport, payment of damages
to crops, signals, war diary, designation of Orderly Officers
and couriers. And above all he determines upon his ordre
de bataille. *
In order to render the communication of information as
independent as possible of existing telegraphic and telephonic
lines, their use was forbidden. Specially constructed field
lines, the use of mounted men, bicyclists, and carrier pigeons
were alone permitted for transmitting information and orders.
Instead of distinguishing the opposing forces as usual by
compass designations, such as the east army or the west army,
one was called the Blue, the other the Red army, to avoid any
confusion due to relative compass changes of the opposing
sides. Besides the usual allowance of divisional cavalry (two
to five squadrons per division), each army had a cavalry divi-
sion consisting of three brigades, six regiments, thirty squad-
I’OIlS.
GENERAL SUPPOSITION.
A Blue army has set out toward the Pfalz Mountains, north
and west of the line Germershein-Lindau. The thirteenth
and fourteenth corps composing this army are being mobilized
30 AUTUMN MANEUVERs.
respectively at Stuttgart and Ulm, and at Mannheim and
Heidelberg. -
A Red army is being assembled in Elsass. The fifteenth
corps, which is garrisoning that country, is ready at Strass-
burg to march. The fifteenth corps, though provided for the
Occasion with four divisions, was handled as a single corps,
and is all of the Red army that appeared except as a suppo-
sition.
The ordre de bataille of the fifteenth corps is shown in dia-
gram marked “Red Army.”
An examination of this army reveals the fact that the normal
corps of two divisions at Strassburg was large enough to create
a third division of the forty-first and yet leave the other two
divisions of the corps with normal organizations.
The thirty-ninth division was borrowed from the Karlsruhe
corps, which was, nevertheless, left with the usual corps
allowance of two divisions.
It is noticed that the corps artillery is very limited in quan-
tity, and, strange to say, is entirely horse artillery.
The thirtieth division has 12 battalions, 3 squadrons, 6 bat-
teries; the thirty-first division, 12 battalions, 4 squadrons, 6
batteries; the thirty-ninth division, 8% battalions, 5 squadrons,
6 batteries; the forty-first division, 10 battalions, 3 squadrons,
6 batteries; cavalry division B, 30 Squadrons, 2 horse batteries.
The Red army has therefore a total of 42% battalions, 45
squadrons, and 30 batteries (4 of these are corps artillery
batteries).
The battalions average 550 men, the Squadrons 140, and the
batteries about 5% guns and 120 men.
There would therefore be in this so-called army about
30,000 combatants.
The ordre de bataille of the Blue army is shown in diagram
marked “Blue Army.”
The thirty-ninth division of the fourteenth corps was trans-
ferred to the fifteenth corps in order to equalize the opposing
forces. This army shows a superiority in battalions and bat-
teries over the Red army. Like the latter, it has a cavalry
division, with two horse batteries, and a pioneer detachment.
Each army has also a Meldereiter (courier) squadron, a bicycle
company, a balloon division, a bridge train, and from seven
to nine pioneer companies. In the Red army the telegraph
troops are divisional; in the Blue they are assigned to corps.
45 Squadrons.
37 Batteries.
IE IT, TUTIE A- IR, TN/T TY -
General of Cavalry v. Bülow.
Chief of Staff: CO 1. v. Wittken.
49 Battalions,
X I I IT H CO FPS.
2
5. 10. 18.
X I V TH CO FPS.
LIEUT. GENERAL BARON V. B ISS IN G.
Chief of Staff : Lieut. Col. v. Schickfus U1. Neudorff.
Commander of Artillery : Maj. Gen. v. Beck.
Commander of Pioneers: Lieut. Col. Baron v. Gagern.
24, 5, 17.
12. 2. 6.
LIEUT. GENERAL BARON V. F A L K E N H A U S E N.
Chief of Staff: Lieut. Col. Sixt V. Armin.
Commander of Artillery : Maj. Gen. v. Epplen.
Commander of Pioneers: Maj. Heiber.
27th Division.
13. 5. 6.
26th Division. 12.
Lieut. Gen. v. Cae m me rer.
2
5.
6
12. 3. 6. 28th Division.
29th Division.
Lieut. Gen. v. Oertzen.
Maj. Gen. v. Fall O is .
Lieut. Gen. V. Hill e l’.
53d Brigade.
52d Brigade.
51st Brigade.
56th Brigade. 55th Er
57th Brigade.
Maj. Gen. v. Holbach.
58th Brigade.
Col. Emmich.
Maj. Gen. v. Voigt.
Maj. Gen. Lölhöffel
v. Löwensprung.
igade.
54th Brigade.
Maj. Gen. v. Brietzke.
Maj. Gen. Schnürlen.
123d Regiment.
Maj. Gen. v. Freudenberg.
121st Regiment.
Maj. Gen. v. Hiller.
119th Regiment.
25th Regiment. 1 O9th Re
Col. Augustin.
113th Regiment.
Col. v. Stuckrad.
114th Reginnert.
Col. Fähndrich. Lieut. Col. v. Krane.
112th Regiment.
Col. Crotogino.
142d Regiment.
º &
11 Oth Re
Col. v.
111th Reginnert.
Col. v. Ferno.
* . . . ſº as... . . .
ginnent.
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girment.
Safft.
127th Regt. º
12Oth Regt, Col. v. Schempp.
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5 * *
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180th Regt, Col. v. Dresky.
iſ ſº * - ºs * * *
v. Berrer.
7th Dragoons.
Col. v. Flot() W.
. . . .
. . º. " ' ". .
124th Regiment.
Col. Miiser.
: * * * : *.
“. . . . . º. º.
Col. v. Knoerzer.
| | | | ºf
122d Feginnert.
Col. Kretzschmer.
º . . . . *
sº
. . . . . .
Lieut. Col. v. G. Örne.
Col. v. Normann.
125th Regiment.
Col. v. Monsterberg.
* -- ~ ºr . . . . . . . E-3
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .” -º- ºr "
-- , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . º Bº ...- : -
3 Squads. 22d Dragoons. 2 Squads. 22d Dragoons.
Maj. T Organy.
Lieut. Col. Wagener.
PPPPP
C O R P S A R T I L L E R Y .
IV.
I
8
Maj. Weish b r O (lt.
2 Divisions 3Oth Artiilery. 6 Batteries 14th Artillery. 2 Divisions 13th Artillery. 2 Divisions 29th Artillery.
Col. Rich ter. Col. Keh rer. Col. v. Wilm O w ski. Col. v. Münzen m aier.
IV. II. III. II. I. II. I. III. I.
12, 11. 10. 6, 5. 4. 9, 8, 7. 4. 3. 2. 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. 9. 8. 7. 3 2. 1
|| || || || || || || || || | || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||
% Plat. Div. Bridge Train. 2. 14th Pion. g Plat. Div. Bridge Train. 1. 14th Pion. 13 Plat. Div. Bridge Train. 4. 3. 13th Pion. 16 Plat. Div. Bridge Train. 2. 1. 13th Pion.
- sº - | ºss- - . . . . . . .
C O R P S A R T I L L E R Y .
2 Divisions 13th Artillery, Col. R O e h ne.
2 Divisions 29th Artillery, Lieut. Col. Lang.
IV. II.
11, 10. 6. 5. 4. i | 10. 9. ſ
|| || || || || | || || || || ||
-*. sº- Corps Tel. Division. sº Balloon Division. == Corps. Tel. Division.
Cavalry Division A. (). 30. 2.
Maj.
G en e l’ a l B a r O n V.
S C he le.
26th Brigade.
3Oth Brigade.
Col. v. Benzinger.
27th Brigade.
Maj. General Baron v. Röder.
Maj. Gen. Heinrich XIX. Prince Reuss.
25th Dragoons.
11th Uhlans.
Lieut. COl. COmrad.
15th Uhlans.
Col. v. Koblinski.
19th Uhlans.
Col. v. Worder.
PPPPP,
2Oth Uhlans.
Maj. Bal’On V. Falkenstein.
PPPPP)
Lieut. Col. v. Bredow.
26th Dragoons.
Lieut. ('Ol. v.
Starkloff.
2 Batteries 15th Artillery.
2. H. 1.
Det.
15th Pion.



















IER, IE I'D AL TE, TN/T TY -
42% Battalions. 45 Squadrons. 30 Batteries.
1 5 T H A R MY CO F P S .
41st Division.
10. 3. (5.
Maj. Gen. v. Perbandt.
9 Oth Brigade.
85th Brigade.
Col. Baron v. Salmuth.
Maj. Gen. v. Weiher.
84th Brigade.
39th Division.
Lt. Gen. Sommer.
Chief of Staff: Col. v. Diest.
Lieut. General Baron Meerscheidt-Hüllessem.
Commander of Artillery : Maj. General Kämper.
Commander of Pioneers: Col. Geppert.
8! 3. 5. 6.
31st Division.
172d Regiment.
Col. Heckert.
171st Regiment.
Col. Rahtz.
Maj. Gen. v. Kehler.
82d Brigade. (Jäg, Brig.)
Lieut. General v. Hugo.
3Oth Division.
62d Brigade.
MajGen. Baron v.Thermo
169th Regiment.
Col. v. Krogh.
17Oth Regiment.
Col. v. Wartenberg.
8th Jager.
61st Brigade.
Maj. Gen. v. Twardowski.
Lieut. General Stoetzer.
6Oth Brigade.
Maj. Gen. Baron v. Gall.
59th Brigade.
Maj Gen. Kohlhoff.
126th Regiment.
Col. v. Muff.
| | | | | |
1O5th Regiment.
Col. v. Criegern.
Maj. v. Hertzberg (9th Hussars.)
15th Dragoons. 9th HussarS.
PP. B. l. P. 4.
Col. Hoffman.
NOn. COm. Officer
School Ettlingen.
14th Dragoons.
Col. Baron v. R. Ö de r.
PPPPP!
4th Jäger.
Pºłº, 6Oth Regiment.
V. UeGhtritz Tieut. Col. &
u. Steinkirch. v. Sanden. Col. Hoffmeister.
14th Jäger. 1 Oth Jäger.
{º §: §: Col. Baron 1 37th Reginnert.
Yi." §: "| Col. Baron Eynatten.
132d Regiment.
Lieut. Col. Geppert.
| | | |
138th Regiment.
Col. v. Hartmann.
9th Hussars.
99th Regiment.
97th Regiment.
Col. Tecklenburg.
Col. Ritter.
| | | | | | | |
143d Regiment. 136th Regiment.
Col Kuehne Col. v. Tward OWSki.
. . . . .
15th Dragoons.
Col. v. Mühlberg. Lieut. Col. v. H. Orn.
5, 3. 2. 1. PPP 3. 2. 1.
ſº * { 3Oth Artillery. 31st Artillery. 15th Artillery. ---sºng
Lieut. Col. Mueller. &
eut. C e Col. v. S.C. h. Oen her r. Col. Ben n in. Col. KOrw a n.
IIId Div. 31st Art’y. IIId Div. 15th Art’y. III. I. II. I. II. I.
9. 8. '7. 9. 8, 7. 9. 8. 7. 3. 2. 1. 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1.
| | | | | | || || | ||| || | | | | || || | | | | | | |
1 Plat. Corps Tel. Div. 3% Plat. Liv. Br. Tr. 19th Pion. % Plat. Div. Br. Tr. 4. 3. 14th Pion. 1 Plat. Corps Tel. Div. 3% Plat. Div. Br. Tr. 4. 3. 15 Pion. 1 Plat. Corps Tel. Div. 1 Plat. Div. Br. Tr. 2. 1. 15 Pion.
= - - | | | | F = - - L_
C O R P S A R T I L L E R Y .
Maj. Im h off.
31st Reg. 14th Reg.
H
ñi i i
B A I, L O O N DIVIS I O N.
33d Brigade.
Cavalry Division B.
Lieut. Gen. v. Engelbrecht.
Maj. Gen. v. Encke vort.
28th Brigade.
9th Dragoons.
Lieut. Col. Rau.
Maj. Gen. Count v. Klinckowstroem
2Oth Dragoons.
16th Brigade.
Col. v. Wallenberg.
PPPPP
13th Dragoons.
Maj. v. Schack.
Lieut. Col. v. Unger.
PPPPP
21st Dragoons.
Maj. Kühne
8th Artillery.
7th Uhlans.
Lieut. Col. Schultz v. Dratzig.
Pººl
13th Uhlans.
Maj. v. Heyden-Linden.
PPPPP
T T
Det.
smºs 14th Pion.

GERMANY. 31
The twenty-sixth division has 12 battalions, 5 squadrons, 6
batteries; the twenty-seventh division, 13 battalions, 5 squad-
rons, 6 batteries; the twenty-eighth division, 12 battalions, 2
squadrons, 6 batteries; the twenty-ninth division, 12 bat-
talions, 3 squadrons, 6 batteries; cavalry division A, 30
squadrons, 2 horse batteries.
The Blue army has a total of 49 battalions, 45 squadrons,
37 batteries* (11 of these batteries belong to the corps artil-
lery). This gives the Blue army about 4,000 more than the
Red.
The total number of combatants engaged is, in round num-
bers, 64,000.
Like the general supposition, the special Ones are prepared
at Berlin.
SPECIAL SUPPOSITION FOR THE RED ARMY.
On the 4th of September the fifteenth corps (thirtieth,
thirty-first, and forty-first infantry divisions), supported by
cavalry division B (less the twenty-eighth brigade), received
orders to cross the Rhine and prevent the junction of the
troops who are being mobilized south of the Main River, with
their army.
On the 5th of September the commander of the fifteenth
corps, which had already crossed to the right bank of the
Rhine, received a communication, dated September 4, stating
that the mobilized troops of the thirteenth corps had set out
on the morning of that date toward Geislingen, and that reen-
forcements were expected from Munich via Ulm, Canstatt,
Bietigheim, toward Germersheim.
The Red army is therefore but a part of the offensive
forces directed toward the west.
SPECIAL SUPPOSITION FOR THE BLUE ARMY.
The following information was received at the headquarters
thirteenth corps, Stuttgart:
On September 5 the enemy crossed the Rhine in considera-
ble strength at Kehl and Neufreistett. His cavalry was
pressing down the Rhine Valley, and patrols had appeared at
Rastatt.
On September 6 a part of the enemy, comprising all arms,
was far up the Rench and Archer valleys; another part was
*With the Jäger brigade of the fourteenth corps were three batteries of
Maxims, each of four guns.
32 AlJTU MN MANEUVERS.
holding the villages on the right bank of the Rhine as far as
Oos. Strong cavalry was seen at Gernsbach, Herrenhalb,
and Freiolsheim. &
On September 7 all arms were descending from the Kniebis
Pass and reaching Freudenstatt and Dornstetten. Forces of
the enemy were also reported from the Upper Murg Valley,
from Baden, and from Gernsbach. Strong cavalry had
reached Birkenfeld, Liebenzell, and Calw.
The cavalry had therefore marched from the Rhine to the
Nagold, Over the mountain passes, a distance by the road
followed of more than 60 miles, in three days.
During the 7th of September the thirteenth corps was
assembled at Stuttgart, and in the evening of the same day
it received the following telegram from the commander of
the Blue army: “The enemy appears to have divided his
forces. One part is marching down the Rhine Valley, the
other is crossing the Black Forest in two or three columns.
The twenty-ninth infantry division, having completed its
mobilization at Heidelberg, has been directed against the first
part and to-day it reached Mingolsheim. The thirteenth
corps will prevent the advance of the enemy from the Black
Forest. It is necessary to hold the railway Ulm–Canstatt-
Bietigheim–Germersheim; otherwise the concentration and
disposition of the army would be seriously interfered with.
The landsturm troops will protect the line against patrols.
As a further guarantee for the same purpose the command-
ing general may use the cavalry division A, which has been
ordered to halt at Canstatt; it will be available this evening.
It is known from the enemy’s ordre de bataille that the fif-
teenth corps is superior to the thirteenth in infantry, but is
weaker in artillery. The separate columns of the enemy
should therefore be attacked in full force as they emerge from
the mountains.”
PREPARATIONS, ARRANGEMENTS FOR QUARTERING, SYSTEM
OF BALLOON SIGNALING, ETC.
As the fourteenth corps was not paraded till the 8th of
September, and since one-third of it was to be added to the
fifteenth corps, which was already in the Nagold Valley, it
became necessary to make certain suppositions not in accord
with the actual location of the troops. This is, however,
a measure that must be frequently resorted to in the best
planned maneuvers.
GERMANY. 33
The Strassburg troops crossed the Black Forest in three
columns; the thirty-first division at an altitude (Kniebis Pass)
of 966 meters; the thirtieth and forty-first divisions at lesser
altitudes. From the nature of the country the task assigned
to the fifteenth corps was very difficult. -
As Strassburg is but 200 meters above sea level, the climb
and descent were not less than 2,560 feet for the thirty-first
division. The other divisions, as well as the cavalry, crossed
farther north, where the difficulties were somewhat less.
(Napoleon did not dare trust his battalions in the Black Forest
passes, but marched them around to the north, as is mentioned
above.) . The right-line distance from Strassburg to the
Nagold River is 45 miles; by the winding roads it is about
one-third farther. The use of railways was not allowed.
All the tributaries of the Enz, Würm, Nagold, Little Enz,
and Big Enz, have narrow valleys with high bordering hills
from 300 to 1,000 feet high. Between these streams, none of
which would be impassable for infantry, the high ground is
in places rolling, but, in general, very hilly. Forests and
cultivated fields alternate. The villages are numerous and
the roads hard. There are, however, many places where it
is impossible to get down into the bottoms owing to the very
steep declivity of the inclosing sides. These valleys west of
the Nagold might well be called canyons, while to the east
of the same the valleys are less deep and the country is hilly
but cultivated. A skillful strategist would be pleased with
the terrain; an ordinary general would find difficulty in the
disposition of his troops upon it.
Since neither side was compelled to transport from its
respective base all necessary supplies, the logistic problems
were very much simplified. The corps intendants established
stores and field bakeries at convenient points near the theater
of operations. In the case of the bakeries it is noticeable
that the Grove field oven” is not used, though each corps has
its full war supply in store. The field bakery at Alt Heng-
stett consisted of three sections, each of five ovens. It had
twelve large tents and sixty bakers and turned out 11,000 to
12,000 loaves of bread (each of one and one-half kilograms)
every twenty-four hours. The ovens were of sheet iron, well
covered with earth. The fuel used was wood.
*This field oven, which is capable of baking on the march, was used in
Silesia in the maneuvers of the sixth corps.
12883—3
34 ALJTUMN MANETUVERS.
For convenience of location the superior direction of the
maneuvers should have been at Pforzheim or Calw, instead
of being divided between Stuttgart and Karlsruhe. The
presence of typhoid fever at the first-named place and the
absence of sufficient accommodation at the second, prevented
the occupation of either of these towns as headquarters.
Excepting the advanced posts, the troops were habitually
quartered; and in some cases the towns were filled to over-
flowing. The absence of either small or large houses on the
farms is everywhere noticeable, the entire population being
segregated in the towns and villages, whence they come out
to cultivate the land. This condition is most favorable for
housing the troops, and full advantage is taken of it when the
weather is rainy.
A very simple system of balloon signaling was used. It is
simply a dragon balloon, from which may be suspended a
flag, a small round balloon, and two small cylindrical ones.
The relative positions of the minor balloons and flags distin-
guished the signals. The balloon is kept near the superior
maneuver direction, is sufficiently large to be seen by both
sides even when the distances are considerable, and by it the
operations can be begun or suspended simultaneously.
Signal balloons
with
Signals.
|
%
%
%








GERMANY. 35
OPERATIONS OF SIEEPTEMBER. S.
The events of September 8 for the Red army may be sum-
marized as follows: In the first place a supposition relative
to the thirty-ninth division was necessary. It, with the
twenty-eighth cavalry brigade and a horse-artillery division
(two batteries), was considered to be following the left wing
of the army at a distance of one day’s march. The main
body of the army was still in the Black Forest, though the
heads of the three columns had reached the Nagold River at
Calw, Hirsau, and Liebenzell. -
The cavalry division B (less the twenty-eighth brigade)
had passed Pforzheim and had gone toward Friolzheim–
Tiefenbronn, while the corps artillery had passed Alt Heng-
stett and was marching toward Heimsheim. This division
found such strong cavalry in its front that it was compelled to
retire to the left bank of the Würm, where, with comparatively
weak forces, it held Hausen–Steinegg, while with the main
forces it went farther south. As the enemy then crossed the
Würm at Hausen, cavalry division B withdrew to Weil der
Stadt–Simmozheim. These events took place in the morn-
ing. In the afternoon the cavalry division was forced far-
ther back toward Gechingen through Alt Hengstett.
The actual operations of the Blue army on September 8
were limited to the movements of the thirteenth corps. It
moved out of the region of Stuttgart in two columns toward
the Würm River, one column directed on Vaihingen, the
other on Leonberg. The advanced posts were pushed beyond
the forest zone to Malmsheim-Renningen–Sindelfingen.
The cavalry division. A moved out at 7 a. m. toward
|Heimsheim–Weil der Stadt, and forced strong hostile cav-
alry back over the Würm and took possession of the Würm
crossings from Steinegg to Hausen. The infantry took pos-
session of Merklingen and Weil der Stadt, driving the enemy
to the south, toward Gechingen.
In addition to having excellent maps of the country em-
braced in the operations, generals and staff officers incognito
are reported to have personally studied the country two
months before the maneuvers began.
OPERATIONS OF SEPTEMBER 9.
On September 9 the Red army continued its march over
the Nagold as follows:
Thirty-first division via Calw—Alt Hengstett.
36 - - ATUTTUMN MANEUVERS.
Thirtieth division via Hirsau–Ottenbronn.
Forty-first division via Liebenzell-Unter Hengstett.
Cavalry division B (less the twenty-eighth brigade) accom-
panied the advance, passing through Ostelheim. The com-
bined cavalry brigade covered the left flank.
On arriving at the Würm River, in the region of Weil der
Stadt, the Red forces encountered the enemy in considerable
strength, and an engagement of the advance troops followed.
The twenty-eighth cavalry brigade, with the horse artillery
division, passed through Etlingen and reached the Zone east
of Pforzheim, where it was united with cavalry division B.
The head of the thirty-ninth division passed through Neuen-
burg and reached Pforzheim. - -
The thirteenth corps of the Blue army continued its march
toward the Würm as follows:
Twenty-sixth division, via Leonberg, towards Weil der
Stadt. -
Twenty-seventh division and corps artillery in two columns
toward Aidlingen. -
Cavalry division. A remained on the right wing.
The corps upon reaching the Würm found its bank strongly
occupied by the enemy.
The twenty-ninth division had reached Mühlacker and
Rosswag by marching, while the twenty-eighth division had
been transported by rail from Mannheim (supposititious), via
Heilbronn, to Gross Sachsenheim. The thirteenth and four-
teenth corps and cavalry division. A were therefore united as
an army commanded by General von Bülow.
In the unexpected encounter this morning the maneuver
operations were advanced by one day. The advanced troops
of the thirtieth and thirty-first divisions (Red) met the
advanced troops of the twenty-sixth division (Blue) west of
Weil der Stadt. The artillery of cavalry division B took
position on the heights north of Alt Hengstett (500 meters),
while the artillery of the Blue cavalry division occupied the
heights opposite and to the east (486 meters). Only a few
battalions were engaged on either side, and a general halt
was signaled by balloon at 10 a. m. from superior headquar-
ters within twenty minutes after the firing of the first shot.
There was a special reason for sounding the general halt.
It will be remembered that the principal strategic feature of
the Blue army was to concentrate its two wings, the thir-
teenth and fourteenth corps. It was also of vital importance
GERMANY. 37
for the Red army to prevent the junction. The latter was
accomplished to the injury of the reputation of the Blue com-
mander and to the dismay of the general plan of the maneu-
vers in the following way: Trusting to the advantage of the
high ground west of the Würm, the Blue commander con-
ceived the idea of enveloping the right flank of the Reds.
This necessitated marches from Vaihingen and Solitude
amounting to about 15 miles, while the corps artillery from
Stuttgart had yet a greater distance to cover and therefore
had to break camp at 2 a. m. Instead of marching his corps
as far as feasible toward the fourteenth corps, the commander
of the thirteenth corps marched it away from its principal
strategic goal and gradually had the greater part of it on the
left bank of the upper Würm. While this was taking place
the commander of the Red army was concentrating his army
between the two wings of the enemy, and had crossed the
Würm at Weil der Stadt, Merklingen, and Hausen. The Blue
army was therefore cut in two and the problem at an end
with almost no fighting. Doubtless General Falkenhausen
had his reasons for the policy he pursued; but in the judg-
ment of the superior control they were not satisfactory. The
country drained by these small rivers, Enz and Würm, is a
very difficult one on which to dispose troops, and, as is
already observed, one that requires generalship of no mean
order. In this connection it must be remarked that General
TMeerscheidt–Hüllesem had demanded very trying marches
of his command, and had therefore advanced farther than
was anticipated.
September 10, Sunday, was called a day of rest for all the
forces, but as a matter of fact some of the troops were under
way. *
OPERATIONS OF SEPTEMBER 11.
Early hours characterized the maneuvers. Frequently the
troops were on the march at 3.30 in the morning. After the
rest of the 10th many of the troops were marching as early
as 2 a.m., adjusting their positions so as to make the problem
still possible, in spite of the events of the 9th.
The continuous rain Sunday night caused the Orders for the
11th, as far as related to maneuvers, to be countermanded.
Strategic marches, involving an advance of the Reds and a
withdrawal of the Blues, occupied nearly all of the 11th, and
they were executed in an incessant downpour.
38 ATJTUMN MANEU VERS.
DISPOSITIONS MADE BY THE COMMANDER OF THE RED ARMY.
On the 11th at 4 a. m. the commanding general of the Red
forces received information that during the night the enemy
had been seen near Leonberg and had moved off. He received
instructions at the same time from superior headquarters for
his army to cross the Lauter and attack the hostile army. He
accordingly gave orders that his forces should leave the line
Hausen-Pforzheim and occupy the line Heimerdingen–Eber-
dingen–Vaihingen, while the cavalry division B should pro-
ceed still farther north. To accomplish this the thirty-
first division proceeded via Merklingen–Malmsheim–Perouse;
the thirtieth division via Hausen–Heimsheim-Eberdingen;
the forty-first division via Hausen–Mönsheim–Nussdorf; the
thirty-ninth division from Wiernsheim toward Vaihingen.
The cavalry division B moved out on the left flank of the
army, and crossed the Enz at Vaihingen. The retreating
enemy offered very little resistance to this advance.
DISPOSITIONS MADE BY THE COMMANDER OF THE BLUE ARMY.
On the evening of September 10 the commander of the Blue
army received orders from the superior headquarters to unite
his army behind the Glems River on the line Schwieberdingen–
Leonberg. To accomplish this the movement was begun at
an early hour as follows: -
Fourteenth corps: The twenty-eighth division via Enzwei-
hingen toward Schwieberdingen; the twenty-ninth division
from Nussdorf-Hemmingen. º,
Thirteenth corps: The twenty-sixth division, with corps
artillery, from Malmsheim toward Ditzingen; the twenty-
seventh division from Renningen toward Leonberg.
. The cavalry division. A covered the march past Heimsheim .
and then returned toward Markgróningen.
ENGAGEMENTS.
The engagements were of a light character. There were,
however, some early and vigorous marches. For example,
some of the Red troops in the Nagold Valley left their quar-
ters at 1.30 a. m., and went as far as Weissach, a distance of
16 to 18 miles. All these marches for position were prelimi-
nary to the engagement of the 12th.
The marches this year, however, were not in the same class
as some made during the maneuvers near Homburg, two years
GERMANY. 39
since, when some of the troops under similar rainy weather
and with very heavy going averaged 30 to 32 miles during
three consecutive days.
CANTONMENT.
The Red army, exclusive of its cavalry, was cantoned be-
tween Vaihingen and Perouse, along the streams Enz and
Strudelbach, with a front of 13 miles.
The Blue army, exclusive of its cavalry, was cantoned
between Schwieberdingen and Etlingen, beyond the Glems,
along a front of 11 miles. Cavalry division A was on its right
flank, in close touch. The outposts of the two armies were
separated by only 1 to 2 miles, and the respective forces were
well concentrated.
OPERATIONS OF SEPTEMIBTER, 12.
For this day, September 12, General Meerscheidt-Hüllesem,
commanding the Red army, received orders to attack the
enemy behind the Glems River and drive him back to Stutt-
gart. Cavalry division B was given special instructions to
make an offensive detour around the right flank of the enemy.
The Blue army, the same evening, was ordered to attack the
advancing enemy the following day without delay and then
to retire on his reenforcements.
These Orders and the concentrated positions of the opposing
forces—the one behind the Strudelbach, the other, the Glems—
left no doubt as to serious engagements on the 12th. The
high ground between these streams, extending from north to
south, with occasional large tracts of forest, made a fine bat-
tlefield. Each army had selected advantageous points for its
artillery, under which the reenforcements were brought for-
ward. The Red infantry was concentrated in the woods in
front of the Strudelbach, especially in the Pulverdingen forest,
between Enzweihingen and Markgröningen, while south of
the same was a long line of artillery emplacements. The Blue
army emerged from the Glems valley in several columns and
was commanded this day by the Emperor. The Blue forces
were brought up into line continuously and steadily until the
umpires decided that the twenty-eighth division had been
shaken by the opposing artillery. The center of the engage-
ment was evidently to be in the vicinity of Hochdorf, where
the fate of the campaign was to be decided. South of this
village is a long stretch of high ground called Hochscheid, the
40 A U. TU MN MANEUVERS.
crest between the two small rivers. The fight for the posses-
sion of Hochdorf and this crest was long and stubborn, and it
involved both artillery and infantry in such away as to strongly
recall accounts of real battles. The cavalry division A on the
right flank of the Blues developed the fire of the Red infantry
in the Pulverdingen Forest, but the Blues were unable to
drive them out or hold Hochdorf, which they had once taken.
At this stage, doubtless due to some military supposition, the
Blue army began a most theatrical general advance toward
the strongholds of the enemy. In the hottest part of the bat-
tle front, that between the Hochdorf positions and the eastern
advance, the commander of the Blue forces marched in the
firing lines to the attack. The opposing forces were driven
from position to position, while the Blue lines became so thick
that they would have stopped the projectiles of the best field
artillery. To render this advance more reasonable the oppos-
ing forces were required to conceal themselves in the woods,
for surely with the advantage of position they could not have
been considered killed.
Having reached the woody summit of the Hochscheid, the
signal “Halt all” was sounded, and the battle that had raged
from 6.30 to 10.30 was ended in favor of the Blue army.
While the center of the engagement was Hochdorf, there
was a series of encounters both north and south of it where
the umpires were required to make decisions. Comparatively
little use was made of the cavalry this day. Presumably it
was to be spared for the serious work that fell to it the fol-
lowing day.
BATTLE OF SEPTEMBER. 13.
Since the continuity of the operations reached a climax and
an end in the decisive engagement of the 12th, an entirely
new problem, involving larger commands, was given for the
13th. -
To accomplish this, a rearrangement of the forces was
made. A new Ordre de bataille was arranged.
The Blue army consisted of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth corps (less two divisions), and was commanded by
the King of Würtemberg.
The Red army consisted of the twentieth corps, which was
marked by two divisions taken from the fifteenth corps for
this purpose. Each of the divisions of the twentieth corps
was marked by a brigade. The remainder of the Red army
Was Supposititious.
GTERMANY. 41
Every advantage was taken of the disposition of the forces
at the end of the preceding day's Operations. In the new
arrangement the King of Würtemberg was the commander of
the Western or Blue army, while the Emperor commanded
the cavalry corps of the same army. The Eastern or Red
army, in which regiments represented brigades, was com-
manded by General of Infantry v. Plessen.
ORDERS ISSUED TO BLUE ARMY.
The following orders were issued from headquarters of the
Western army:
Army Order 1.
VAIHINGEN, September 12, 1899, 1 p. m.
1. Strong hostile cavalry was to-day marching toward Ditz-
ingen. The Glems Valley from Ditzingen to Markgróningen
is held by hostile infantry. - -
2. The army is to halt west of the line Gebersheim–Enz-
weihingen; advance posts are to be established along the
line Heimerdingen–Hochdorf–Pulverdingen and the crossing
of the Enz at Ober Riexingen.
The limit of security and information service will be the
chaussee Mönsheim–Weissach–Heimerdingen-Hemmingen,
which falls to the thirteenth corps. The latter is specially
instructed with the information service over the line Münch-
ingen–Bothnang toward Stuttgart, and is to maintain com-
munication with the left flank of the right wing.
The fourteenth corps is to advance into the region of Vai-
hingen, Gross Sachsenheim; the Enz crossings at Unter Riex-
ingen, Bissingen, and Bietigheim are to be held.
The cavalry corps is to remain between the Neckar and the
Murr rivers, and is to reconnoiter on the right flank and rear
of the enemy.
3. The headquarters of the three corps are to maintain
telegraphic communications with army headquarters. The
extension of telegraphic communication from Vaihingen via
Enzweihingen to Hochdorf, and from Gross Sachsenheim to
Bissingen, is to be conducted respectively by the fifteenth and
fourteenth corps.
4. Army headquarters: Vaihingen.
WILLIAM, KING OF WüRTEMBERG.
Army Order 2.
VAIHINGEN, September 12, 1899, 5 p. m.
1. The hostile right flank, the twentieth corps of four
divisions, is marching with its northern column via Neckar-
weihingen–Ludwigsburg toward Schwieberdingen, while the
42 AUTUMN MANEUVERS.
Southern column has received orders to advance via Waib-
lingen–Canstatt toward Feuerbach.
2. The left wing will to-morrow attack the enemy on the
line Ditzingen–Markgröningen and envelop his right flank
via Bissingen and Bietigheim. The right wing will advance
from the line Renningen-Herrenburg against the enemy
reported on the line Bothnang–Tübingen.
3. The thirteenth corps is to advance via Ditzingen-Nippen-
berg (between Ditzingen and Schwieberdingen). The defiles.
of the Glems will be cleared by the main forces sent over
Ditzingen. .
An infantry regiment from Heimerdingen will be put at my
disposition. Communication with the left division of the
right flank of the army which is advancing from Renningen
via Etlingen will be maintained. The outposts will be passed
at 7 a. m.
4. The fifteenth corps is to advance along the line Schwie-
berdingen–Markgróningen. Advance over the outposts at 7
a. m. The balloon will be put up near Hardthof; communi-
cations will be made directly to me.
5. The fourteenth corps will cross the Enz in two columns,
One near Bissingen at 7.15 a. m., the other at Bietigheim at
7 a. m. -
A bridge must be constructed in due time at Bissingen to
permit the crossing of the Enz in safety at the fixed hour.
6. The cavalry corps will support the advance of the four-
teenth corps and will later operate against the flank and rear
of the enemy.
7. At 6 a. m. I will proceed from Vaihingen via Enzwei-
hingen to the vicinity of Hardthof.
WILLIAM, KING OF WüRTEMBERG.
To be delivered by officers to the thirteenth, fourteenth,
fifteenth corps, and the cavalry corps.
GENERAL PROBLEM.
These orders give the special problem of the Blue army.
The general problem upon which they are based is as follows:
A Blue army has crossed to the right bank of the Rhine
near Selz, and is pressing into South Germany. A Red army
assembled in Northeastern Bavaria is advancing to meet it.
Of the Eastern or Red army, only its right flank—twentieth
corps—is actively considered; the rest is supposititious.
SPECIAL PROBLEM FOR THE RED ARMY.
On the 12th of September the heads of the four divisions of
the twentieth corps, which had crossed the Neckar between
Neckarweihingen and Canstatt, were at Möglingen, Münchin-
gen, Kornthal, and Feuerbach. The head of the right march
GERMANY. 43
column of the adjoining left corps (supposititious) which has
advanced via Canstatt and Stuttgart, has reached Bothnang.
The cavalry division D, sent in advance of the twentieth corps
in the direction of Pforzheim, came upon the heads of four to
five hostile march columns advancing from the line Niefern—
Tiefenbronn, and was gradually driven back. The enemy
has advanced but a short distance beyond the Strudelbach
(creek), and has established outposts on the line Heimerdingen–
Hochdorf and the Enz crossing at Ober–Riexingen.
Cavalry division D has withdrawn behind the line Ditzingen–
Gerlingen. North of it are the advanced posts of the twen-
tieth corps along the Glems River as far as Markgröningen.
At 10 p.m. the commander of the twentieth corps received
the following telegram from the commanding general of the
Red army at Stuttgart: “South of the twentieth corps the
army has reached the line Bothnang–Tübingen. The right
hostile flank has been halted at Herrenberg. Will advance
to the attack in the morning, and will endeavor to envelop the
enemy with my flank as he makes his turning movement to
the right. The twentieth corps will form the pivot in this
movement.”
OPERATIONS.
The more disagreeable the weather the more easy to quit
the bivouac, and on this cold, drizzling morning, following
two days of rain, the outposts were active before daylight.
It is well to mention here that the German army in bivouac
in the field bears little resemblance to ours, which depends
almost entirely upon canvas. In unfavorable weather here
it is rare that any but the Outposts bivouac, and then they are
generally sure of a liberal allowance of straw.
The Glems Valley, with its steep sides, and the high ground
extending from the castle-like plateau of Hohen Asperg south
through Möglingen and Münchingen at fair artillery range
from the Glems, constituted the principal features of the battle
ground this day.
The Blue cavalry corps was in motion at 5 a. m. Its com-
mander had passed the night at Heutingsheim. The artillery
of the right flank of the Red army was the first to open fire
with its battery from the Asperg Hill. Why several, batter-
ies were not put on this position, which overlooks all the sur-
rounding country, is not known. The artillery of the Red
army, as well as its infantry, was intrenched along the high
44 AUTUMN MANEU VERS.
grounds mentioned above and practically parallel with the
Glems.
The fifty-seventh division, with cavalry division D, was held
in reserve near Kornwestheim. The high ridge to the west
of the Glems was bristling with Red artillery at various points
on a front of about 8 kilometers. The fire of the earliest bat-
teries at very long range facilitated the placing of subsequent
ones nearer the enemy. The early positions were not less than
4,500 meters from the hostile batteries, which is in marked
contrast to the instructions of General Negrier for the French
maneuvers of 1898, wherein it was forbidden to open artillery
fire at a greater distance than 2,500 meters.
By 8 o’clock the eastern artillery exposed red flags, show-
ing that it was firing on infantry. The artillery duel contin-
ued long and was at times violent. The turning movement
was noticeable at 9:30, when the right flank artillery of the
Reds became engaged in a strong battle with the batteries of
the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth divisions west of Thamm.
While the fight was becoming general along the front of the
two lines, the cavalry corps joined the left flank of the two
divisions just mentioned and advanced in the direction of
Ludwigsburg.
Although the general problem was a logical One and its
development full of interest, the disposition of the forces and
the selection of the ground were determined upon with refer-
ence to operating a large cavalry force. South of Ludwigs-
burg are many square miles beautifully adapted to cavalry
use by reason of their freedom from ravines, and on account
of having sufficient undulations to afford cover.
The cavalry corps was to operate on the right and rear of
the Red army in this specially selected country as soon as the
latter had been shaken by the Blue army, whose batteries
were now pushed across the Glems. In their new positions
they were relatively as near as they were far in their previous
ones. The losses would have been tremendous. It may not
be amiss here to speak of the new artillery, a branch of the
service to which so much importance is attached in this coun-
try. These maneuvers offered ample occasion to test the
mobility of the new artillery system, which apparently
answered every demand made upon it. The trail certainly
strikes one as being too low for deep roads such as are com-
mon in Russia, and the pole flops a good deal; but all-in-all
the system seems light and business-like.
GERMANY. 45
The Blue infantry was continually advancing under cover
of its guns, and the envelopment of the right flank of the Red
army was being effected by the three branches. The cavalry
corps appeared just east of the Pflugfelden and charged every-
thing in sight—battery after battery and various bodies of
infantry. The four brigades constituting the corps were
handled with the least noise and confusion, and the assem-
bling after the charges was made in a most quiet and orderly
manner. The cavalry division of the Reds was quickly driven
from the battlefield. It is specially noteworthy that the com-
manders ride well away from their commands and give nearly
all orders by signals.
After the first charges on the right flank against artillery
and cavalry, the cavalry corps was re-formed and its guns
again put to work against the troops south of Möglingen.
This was followed by another general charge by the cavalry,
which ended the battle of the 13th. The battery of four
Maxim machine guns operated with the cavalry in the hands
of a Jäger battalion. The guns were lifted off the carriages
and placed on the firing lines. Ammunition was dragged
upon a kind of sled by an extra horse having a breast strap
and light traces, as well as the ordinary artillery saddle.
These guns average 60 shots per minute, and as they offered
a very small target for the enemy and require a small per-
sonnel, their usefulness, barring sensibility to disorder, ought
to be recognized.
OBSERVATIONS.
There can be no doubt that peace maneuvers are in certain
respects far from being satisfactory or decisive as regards dis-
puted military questions; still it is doubtful if anyone who
has carefully considered them will deny the enormous advan-
tages obtained through them for war preparations. What
should be the disposition of troops exposed to fire in a given
case or what losses would actually occur can only be surmised;
how far cavalry would be successful in attack can not be told;
whether a given battery or line of artillery is making effective
firing at a distant enemy is only problematic. The real profit
comes from the handling and supplying of troops while
traversing long stretches, in adapting troops to the terrain,
in estimating the strength of military forces and their dis-
tances, in judging the endurance of men, horses, and material,
46 AUTUMN MANEUVFRS.
in studying woodcraft, and in learning how to live in the field
under conditions often warlike. -
On the principle that theory alone is not sufficient to make
a musician, or an artist, or even a sharpshooter, an Officer
who has never handled a large command will find himself in
straits when he undertakes it. The handling of divisions and
corps is quite as easy to those who have during a term of
years passed through all the lower stages as are the battalions
to their commanders. Without previous systematic work
with large cavalry units, the cavalry corps of two divisions
could not possibly have been maneuvered so silently, rapidly,
orderly, and effectively as it was on the 13th. Without much
hard work the infantry columns could never have been
brought to that compact marching status, nor could brigades
have been brought to the firing lines over rough ground so
steadily and with such freedom from straggling. If the
artillery can give as good an account in marksmanship as it
did in its mobility and general field qualities, the opposing
side will have cause to regret the encounter—this in spite of
the fact that the gun carriage seems too low for bad roads,
such as exist in Russia.
Possibly more important than mere fighting qualities is the
capacity of the army to keep its stomach filled. Unquestion-
ably an army advances on its stomach, and it will not go far
unless the latter be kept more or less filled. Railways and
frequent depots of supplies go far toward simplifying this all-
important subject. Besides the depots established at Calw,
Weil der Stadt, and other places, there was formed the so-
called flying depots, which consisted of cars loaded at the
regular depots and transported by ordinary trains to different
points, as required. From these places the regular train wag-
ons distributed the contents. The establishment of slaughter-
houses at suitable points was intended to give the men fresh
meat once per day between the 11th and 14th. Up to that
time they had subsisted largely upon bread and canned food,
the iron ration, which consists of meat and vegetables.
The bridge trains were required to construct a number of
bridges over the several streams crossed. -
The bicyclists rendered service both as couriers and patrols.
A line of bicycle relays was established for purposes of com-
munication between Stuttgart and Karlsruhe. For outpost
Service where there are good roads, the bicyclists make excel-
lent Scouts and vedettes. They find shelter much more easily
GERMANY. 47
than cavalry scouts, and cover distances also with more ease.
There is no reason, however, to believe that they will be used
in large numbers in actual campaigns.
Several types of automobiles were furnished by German
firms for experimental purposes. They were used chiefly by
officers of different headquarters in collecting and dissemi-
nating information. The frequent macadamized roads favored
their use.
The field telegraph played an important rôle throughout
all stages of the maneuvers.
The most novel feature of the maneuvers was the use of the
three Maxim machine-gun batteries, each of four guns, in the
hands of the Jäger battalions.
Little was seen or heard of the carrier-pigeon service.
The sanitary condition of the various towns in the region
of the operations was well ascertained in advance. For
example, Asperg and Bondorf had scarlet fever, Birkenfeld
and Gechingen diphtheria, Schomberg and Pforzheim typhoid
fever. Some of the towns were not to be used at all for quar-
tering troops; in others certain infected houses were designated
and exempted from occupation. In nearly all the towns and
villages the number of available beds in the local hospitals was
ascertained in advance. The smallest accommodation, two
beds, was at Altensteig; the largest, thirty beds, each at Cann-
statt and Vaihingen. The local hospitals of twenty-five towns
on and east of the Nagold were thus made available for the
troops. For this reason it is unnecessary to have a large san-
itary force or much hospital material follow the troops in
peace times in Germany.
An interesting question inseparably connected with the
maneuvers is the reparation of damage to lands and crops.
As a rule a field officer or captain is given a certain district—
probably five such officers to the corps—which he carefully
looks after during the stay of the troops within it. At the
end of the maneuvers he reports the amount of the damage,
the particular troops that crossed it, and the occasion therefor.
The corps intendant details his officers to accompany the com-
mission and pay the assessments.
Nowhere in Germany is there any tendency to depreciate
the value of any one branch of the service. The importance
of each, the interdependence of all, is fully recognized. The
recent enormous increase of artillery, whereby each infantry
division will have a brigade of artillery of 72 to 96 guns, has
48 Al JTUMN MANEUVERS.
added a large percentage to the fighting value of the army.
It means a great saving to the infantry on the field of battle.
Without strong cavalry well in front and out from the flanks
an army’s progress is uncertain and slow, its rest continually
broken. Had the thirteenth corps used cavalry division A,
or part of it, on its right flank on the 8th and 9th of Septem-
ber, the Strassburg army would never have been able to force
itself between the two corps of the Blue army.
In the earlier stages of the advance from the Rhine the
cavalry was at a whole day’s march in front of the infantry
columns. Throughout the maneuvers its principal rôle was
to conduct and screen the advance of different columns.
A few words regarding tactical formations may be fittingly
added. It is a principle of the German drill that the soldier
should be kept well within range of the voice, that is, held in
close order as long as possible. This is carried so far that in
the attack the drums begin to beat and the men take step.
The severe drill and excellent discipline to which the soldiers
have been accustomed will perhaps permit this in the early
stages of the attack, but it can not exist under hot fire. The
greatest latitude is granted troop and battalion commanders
in bringing up their units, and in adapting them to the
ground when within the zone of fire. This year it seemed
that company fronts were more used than two years since,
when the normal formation of the company, a column of three
platoons, called a company column, was practiced. The bat-
talion has three normal formations—broad column, double
column, and deep column, in each of which the company is
in its normal formation.
Regimental drill as such does not exist, nor is there any
drill regulations pertaining to it. What there is of regimental
drill is merely a matter of direction to the three battalion
commanders. Since the day of corps artillery is practically
ended in Germany, and with it the disappearance of reserve
artillery, park formations are of little importance except for
bivouacking. A battery of six guns is divided into three
platoons and has four normal formations—line at full inter-
val, line at close interval, column of sections, and column of
platoons.
The cavalry regiment in peace has five squadrons (troops),
but in war the fifth squadron goes toward filling up the others
and remains a depot cadre for the regiment. The squadron
has three normal formations besides the march columns—line,
GERMANY. 49
columns of four platoons called Squadron column, and half
column. The latter corresponds to our formation obtained
from column of platoons by turning the platoons half left or
right. *
The regiment has four normal formations—line, line of
squadron columns, the same with closed intervals, and column
of platoons. The charge was habitually in Squadron front,
in close order, even when charging artillery.
The return of the foot troops by rail to their respective gar-
risons was worked out to that refinement where a graphic
representation was made showing the hour and minutes of .
departure for each unit. It is estimated by this schedule
that 54,000 men would be started by rail from various stations
between Stuttgart and Ludwigsburg on the 14th of September.
The mounted troops, of all categories, after two days’ rest
were to proceed by marching to their stations.
Last and by far one of the most important elements of the
maneuvers is the umpire question. Upon the umpires rests
an important duty involving military judgment and tact.
When not leading troops the superior umpire was the Em-
peror; after him was Field Marshal Albert of Prussia, Prince
Regent of Brunswick; then came Count Waldersee and
numerous generals, besides fifty Officers of the general staff.
Next to leading troops the umpire service is the best peacetrain-
ing for future commanders, because they must not only study
the organization and relative strength of the opposing sides,
but it must be done in relation to time, distance, and terrain.
It may be of interest to mention a new mode of crossing
streams by military wagons and artillery, employed by the
fifth regiment of artillery, last July, in crossing the Oder
near Glogau. To each of the wheels three empty casks were
attached and one to the tongue. The vehicles were then put
afloat and were drawn across the stream by ropes in a very
short time.
12883—4
&
MANEUVERS OF THE BRITISH ARMY.
The ground at Aldershot had been maneuvered over for
years, and every feature was known to the officers. The prob-
lems were made to conform to the terrain, but were varied
so as to instruct them in different phases of active warfare
and included many of the general rules to be observed in an
active campaign. The maneuvers this year were on a small
scale, and were really field exercises by the regular garrison
at Aldershot. The actual force represented only the advance
guards of imaginary armies. After the exercises each day the
various commanders collected around Lord Wolseley and Sir
Redvers Buller, to explain their orders and movements in turn.
Criticisms of the day’s work were then made by the command-
ing general.
The general movement of the troops took place as outlined
in the instructions—the details, manner of advance, disposi-
tion and management of cavalry, positions selected for artil-
lery, etc., forming the subject for the commanding general’s
criticism. t
Instruction of this character has been adopted by all mod-
ern armies, and the benefit derived is invaluable, but there
is a phase of the matter that is worth special consideration.
The absence of all danger changes the whole situation, and it
is possible for a commander and those under him to become so
imbued with theory that actual war and its attendant fatali-
ties and accidents may develop uncertainty and perhaps de-
moralization. This seems to have been recognized in the
maneuvers this year and the instructions were so arranged as
to give all the latitude possible to the several commanders.
PREPARATIONS FOR THE MANEUVERS.
[Army and Navy Gazette, August 19, 1899.]
Gen. Sir Redvers Buller, V. C., has prepared a nine days'
campaign for the troops of the Aldershot District, to com-
mence, on Thursday next. Two field columns and a detached
force will be engaged and the operations will extend over the
(51)
52 AUTUMN MANEUVERs.
northern part of Hampshire, including Woolmer Forest, and
portions of Surrey and Berkshire. The general idea which is
to govern the whole of the work is: “A Northern army
assembling at Windsor is operating against a Southern army
based on Portsmouth.” Maj. Gen. A. FitzRoy Hart, C. B.,
will command the first of the moving columns, and Maj. Gen.
H. J. T. Hildyard, C. B., the second. These will each consist
of troops of all arms—cavalry, artillery, engineers, infantry,
cyclists, and departmental troops. A detached force of cav-
alry, artillery, mounted infantry, and cyclists, under the
command of Maj. A. Bannatine-Allason, R. H. A., will also
take the field, to be used as occasion may require, to balance
the weight of opposing bodies, and a fourth body of all arms,
which is to include a brigade of infantry, will remain in bar-
racks at Aldershot to still further alter the balance of forces
and render the work more realistic on occasions when the
moving colums during the week happen to get within touch
of the military center.
Maj. Gen. J. D. P. French has been appointed senior
umpire. The umpires will be Cols. B. M. Hamilton, T. C.
Orde-Powlett, W. W. N. Smith, Lieut. Cols. C. A. Rochfort-
Boyd, and J. R. P. Gordon, and as the work of the troops
will be of a highly technical character a large staff of assist-
ant umpires has been also appointed. The troops will be in
marching order; but directions have been issued that full
head-dress is not to be worn, neither are field intrenching
tools to be carried by the infantry soldiers. The work of
cyclists in the field will be closely watched, and on this occa-
sion government machines are to be solely employed, no
extra pay whatever being granted to the cyclists. Every
article of experimental equipment in possession of the various
units who will take part in this campaign are to be made
use of and reported upon, with the exception of the canvas
sentry boxes. The troops are to be under strict campaigning
conditions, and stringent regulations regarding canteens have
been drawn up. These canteens are to be considered as an
indulgence, each man being allowed by regulation no more
than three pints a day of malt liquor. In other respects field-
service conditions will generally prevail.
G|REAT BRIT AIN. 53
FORCES ENGAGED. .
NORTHERN ARMY.
Commander, Maj. Gen. FitzRoy Hart, C. B.
Thirteenth hussars; one squadron New South Wales Lan-
cers; one company mounted infantry. *
One battery royal horse artillery; seventh, fourteenth, and
sixty-sixth batteries royal field artillery.
One section seventeenth field company royal engineers;
one section first telegraph battalion royal engineers.
Second Somersetshire light infantry, first royal Sussex
regiment, first Welsh regiment, second royal Highlanders,
second Northamptonshire regiment.
Two cyclist sections.
souTHERN ARMY.
Commander, Major General Hildyard, C. B.
Twelfth lancers.
P and R batteries royal horse artillery; eighteenth and
sixty-second batteries royal field artillery. -
One section seventeenth field company royal engineers;
one section first telegraph battalion royal engineers.
Second royal fusiliers, second Scottish rifles, first Durham
light infantry, second Cameron Highlanders, second royal
West Surrey regiment, second Devonshire regiment, second
West Yorkshire regiment, second East Surrey regiment.
One cyclist section. -
GENERAL IDEA FOR THE MAN EU VERS.
A Northern army assembling at Windsor is operating
against a Southern army based on Portsmouth.
DETALILS OF THE OPERATIONS.
[Official Report and Broad Arrow, September 2, 1899.]
OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 24.
On the opening day of the operations, in addition to the
two columns and detached force, the remainder of the troops
in Aldershot took part. Between the 20th and the 23d
August an advanced force from the Northern army was
assumed to have been collecting supplies round Aldershot.
The Southern army had reached Petersfield on the 23d
August, and had, it was reported, pushed forward some
troops toward Farnham.
54 Al JTUMN MANETUVERS.
The following was the special idea for the Northern force:
The advanced force is near Jubilee Hill, covered by outposts
on the line Heath Ho.—Hungry Hill. The supplies are stored
at Eelmoor Hill. The commander receives the following:
From chief of the staff, Northern army, to officer com-
manding, Jubilee Hill. No. 7.
WINDSOR, 2 a. m., 24th August, 1899.
Enemy reported to be advancing in force. Bring all sup-
plies to Camberley to-day through York Town. You should
be north of the Basingstoke Canal by 10.30 a. m.
The special idea for the Southern force was as follows:
The advanced troops of the Southern army halted at Farn-
ham Common on the 23d August, with outposts at Farnham
and on the Roman intrenchment north of Bentley. The
commander receives this dispatch :
From chief of the staff to officer commanding, Farnham
Common. No. 9.
PETERSFIELD, 11 p. m., 33d August, 1899.
The enemy has collected supplies about Eelmoor Hill;
endeavor to capture them.
At 7.15 a. m., when Operations commenced, the Northern
force, commanded by Maj. Gen. FitzRoy Hart, consisting of
No. 1 field column, the detached force, and One cavalry regi-
ment, were disposed as the advanced force referred to, while
the Southern force, commanded by Major General Hildyard,
consisting of No. 2 field column, two squadrons of cavalry,
two batteries field artillery, and a brigade of infantry, were
disposed south of the line Hale–Crondall. The Northern
'infantry had an outpost line from Heath House on the right
to Hungry Hill on the left, found by two battalions. The
remaining battalions were in reserve on Beacon Hill–Hungry
Hill, and near the Royal Pavilion; the cavalry regiment at
Lawday House, two squadrons at Eelmoor Bridge, One com-
pany mounted infantry and horse artillery on Miles Hill, the
field artillery near Queens Hotel. The Southern infantry
right brigade was in column of route moving northward at
Hale Church, the left brigade was at The Folly. The cav-
alry and artillery advanced with this column, the whole
force moving on Lawday House. At 7.20 a. m. the cavalry
met on the road south of Lawday House and engaged each
other dismounted. The Northern cavalry had to withdraw
GREAT BRITAIN. 55
on the approach of the Southern infantry. This infantry
was in its turn checked by the outposts of the Northern force,
and was unable to deploy until 8 a. m. Meanwhile the right
brigade had also reached the southern edge of Hungry Hill
and engaged the Outposts, who, at 8.15 a. m., commenced the
retirement, the ground being occupied by the Southern force
at 8.30 a. m. Two batteries Southern artillery at once came
into action west of Caesars Camp on the reserve battalion on
Beacon Hill. On vacating the outpost line the Northern,
force withdrew the left defense over Wharf Bridge, the right
defense via Beacon Hill and Tweseldown Hill, toward Norris
Bridge, but the retirement on this flank was somewhat
delayed. The right brigade Southern force moved west from
Hungry Hill, and arrived at Caesars Camp at 9 a. m., and
when the “cease fire * sounded at 9.32 a. m. was near the
Bourley Water Works. The left brigade was still in the
Bourley Wogds, moving on Tweseldown, the horse artillery
on Firs Hill; the remainder of the artillery had not left their
original position on the plateau west of Caesars Camp. Three
battalions of the Northern force were north of the canal, hav-
ing crossed Wharf Bridge; two batteries were on Farnborough
Common. The remaining two battalions were retiring from
Tweseldown and the Foresters P. H. on Norris Bridge. Three
squadrons of cavalry were at Miles Hill, horse artillery and
mounted infantry close to Norris Bridge.
REMARKS BY THE UMPIRE IN CHIEF.
Sir Redvers Buller, in his remarks, says he thought the
commander of the Northern force was right in dividing his
convoy to march by two roads to Camberley, but not so
sound in breaking up his force into two parts with two miles
interval. The Northern force at 7.15 a. m. was not disposed
in accordance with the special idea. No doubt the commander
was much and rightly influenced by the fear of possible artil-
lery attack from the high ground upon troops exposed in the
valley below; but it seemed that he would have made a more
effective defense had he kept his horse artillery, mounted
infantry, and cavalry more forward, and his infantry farther
back. The defense of the Outpost line was too protracted,
and it seemed doubtful if the infantry from either Hungry or
Beacon hills could have got away. The dispositions of the
Southern force were good, but the attack was not pushed
with sufficient energy, and having gained the high ground
56 AlJTUMN MIANEUVERS.
the infantry did not cross the plateau quickly enough to reap
the advantage of their fire against the Opposing infantry with-
drawing by the slopes to Bourley Bottom. Caesars Camp
should have been occupied directly the plain was cleared.
Leaving a few men to contain the enemy on Hungry and
Beacon hills, the Southern infantry could have pushed down
the slopes under cover of their artillery direct on Eelmoor
Hill. Had they not arrived in time to take the convoy they
would have captured most of the enemy’s infantry. It is of
great importance in war that every commander should remem-
ber his real objective. In this case the Southern force were
fighting a desultory skirmish on the upper plateau when
they might have been pressing forward on their real objective.
After the engagement of the 24th August the Northern
force retired across the Blackwater River. Part of the South-
ern force encamped near Yately Common.
OPERATIONS OF AU GUST 25.
On the 25th the special idea of the Northern force was:
This force encamped at Barossa with a detachment on Frith
Hill. The commander receives the following:
From the chief of the staff, to officer commanding advanced
force, Barossa. No. 25.
WINDSOR, 9 p. m., 24th August, 1899.
Part of the force you were engaged with to-day is reported
to be intrenching itself in the vicinity of Hartford Bridge
Flats and Yately Common. Attack it early to-morrow, and
endeavor to drive it back toward Cove. A reenforcement of
two squadrons of cavalry and a battery of field artillery will
await your orders at York Town at 7.30 a. m. to-morrow.
The forces at the disposal of Maj. Gen. FitzRoy Hart were
No. 1 field column at Barossa, the detached force on Frith
Hill, two squadrons of cavalry, and a battery of field artillery
from Aldershot. - *
The following was the special idea for the Southern force:
From the chief of the staff, to the officer commanding South-
ern force, Yately Common. No. 30.
PETERSFIELD, 2 p. m., 24th August, 1899.
Reenforcements are being dispatched to the front from
Windsor. Take up a position on the line Yately Common—
Hartford Bridge Flats and hold it as long as possible. If
forced back, retire in a southeasterly direction.
GREAT BRITAIN. - 57
The Southern force was represented by No. 2 field column,
commanded by Major General Hildyard.
At 7.30 a. m. the cavalry of the Southern force was watch-
ing from Hawley to Eversley. The infantry took up a
defensive position on Hartford Bridge Flats, covering the
line of retirement, which was through lower Minley and Cove.
Two battalions were in the front line, two in the reserve. The
outpost line was strengthened by shelter trenches on the north-
ern crest of the plateau, and advantage was also taken of the
gravel pits. Maj. Gen. FitzRoy Hart divided his force into
a right flank attack via Blackwater and Yately village, and a
direct attack via Blackwater and Yately Common. The flank
attack was composed of one squadron, one battery horse artil-
lery, one company mounted infantry, One cyclist Section, and
one-and-a-half battalions. The direct attack was composed of
three squadrons, three batteries, One cyclist section, and three
battalions. At 7.40 a. m. the Northern cavalry came into
contact with dismounted cyclists at Blackwater Bridge; the
latter were driven back and the passage of the bridge was
forced. The troops detailed for the flank attack cleared Black-
water Bridge at 8.20 a. m. The direct attack followed in the
direction of Yately Common, with the advanced-guard bat-
talion thrown a considerable distance to the front. Meanwhile
the flank column had moved to Yately, and at 9.47 a. m. the
combined attack commenced. The Northern artillery opened
fire from Yately Common on the Southern infantry. The
flank attack debouched from the Anchor P. H. Road. The
cavalry, followed by the mounted infantry and horse artillery
in succession, came under fire of two companies intrenched
within 700 yards. The battalion and a half which followed
attacked this infantry, which was falling back on the second
line of defense when “cease fire” sounded. The main attack
from Blackwater had at the same time been delivered, cul-
minating in an assault by two battalions, with one in a third
line, against one battalion and two companies. Lord Wolseley
and Maj. Gen. Sir C. F. Clery were present on Hartford Bridge
Flats during the operations.
REMARKS BY THE UMPIRE IN CHIEF.
Sir Redvers Buller, in his remarks, says the ground on
which to-day’s operations were conducted offered great diffi-
culties, both to the attack and defense. It admitted of the
58 - ATUTTUMN MANEUVERS.
close approach unseen of infantry and offered no good artil-
lery positions. When the Northern force had driven in the
defender’s Outposts, the leading infantry battalion debouched
at the crossroads north of Hawley Hill Ho., advanced with-
out support, and, becoming hotly engaged with the enemy's
advanced line, was brought to a standstill. The umpire in
chief suggests that this battalion was allowed to advance too
far. As soon as they had secured the hills near Starve Acre
Farm, the brigade division of artillery might at once have
moved there, and a reconnoissance by the general officer com-
manding would have shown a better position than that
eventually selected, where they came into action under a
heavy infantry fire at ‘‘medium” ranges. Immediately the
attack developed, the infantry masked their guns, so that at
a most critical stage in the advance they were unsupported
by artillery. In regard to the defense, a position was care-
fully prepared, but most of the troops allotted to its defense
were sent forward to reenforce a position in front, where they
stood to be attacked. When forced to withdraw, their retire-
ment jeopardized the few troops left in the intrenched posi-
tion. The trace of the position intrenched was liable to
enfilade fire, the most serious form of attack that hasty in-
trenchments are exposed to. The umpires thought that for
virgin ground the amount of work supposed to have been
executed was excessive.
OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 26.
On Saturday the following special idea was issued to the
Northern force:
From the chief of the staff to officer commanding, Barossa.
NO. 27. -
WINDSOR, 9 p. m., 25th August, 1899.
Hostile cavalry has been seen near Woking. Move to-
morrow by the Jolly Farmer and Chobham Ridges and seize
the passages over the Basingstoke Canal and main line
(L. and S. W. Railway) between Frimhurst and Nags Head,
by 10 a. m. .
You will be reenforced by a regiment of cavalry, two bat-
teries of artillery, and two battalions of infantry. The place
and time of their arrival will be communicated to you by the
officer who hands you this dispatch.
The force consisted of No. 1 field column, a regiment of
cavalry, two batteries of field artillery, and two battalions
of infantry. The troops from Aldershot at Frimley, at 8
GREAT BRIT AIN. 59
a. m., were also placed under the Orders of the Northern com-
mander. The baggage column was ordered to move by Chob-
ham Ridges and Deep Cut Bridge.
Two special ideas were issued to the Southern force:
Special Idea, No. 1.
From chief of the staff to officer commanding, Normandy.
PETERSFIELD, 10 p.m., 25th August, 1899.
Advance to-morrow by the Chobham Ridges, and secure the
line of the Bagshot—Camberley main road by 10 a. m. You
may expect opposition north of the Basingstoke Canal. A
force of cavalry, artillery, mounted infantry, and cyclists will
be at Knaphill at 8 a.m. to-morrow. The officer in command
will receive the following orders:
The advanced guard has orders to secure by 10 a.m. to-mor-
row the line of the Bagshot—Camberley main road. Informa-
tion has been received that it will be opposed on the Chobham
Ridges. Cover its right and endeavor to capture the enemy’s
baggage.
The Southern force consisted of No. 2 field column, the
detached force, two squadrons of cavalry, two battalions of
infantry, one bearer company, and one field hospital.
Special Idea, No. 3.
From chief of the staff to officer commanding troops, Frith -
Hill. No. 56.
PETERSFIELD, 11 p. m., 25th August, 1899.
The advanced guard has orders to secure by 10 a.m. to-mor-
row the line of the Bagshot—Camberley main road. Informa-
tion has been received that it will be opposed on the Chobham
Ridges. Cover its right and endeavor to capture the enemy’s
baggage.
The detached force concentrated at Knaphill Common by
7.30 a. m.
At 7 a.m. a bicycle section of the Northern force was sent to
Nags Head Bridge to seize and hold it; at the same time the
remainder of the force advanced by the Jolly Farmer toward
the southern end of the Chobham Ridges, the object being to
capture the Frimhurst bridges first, and then successively the
bridges eastward. The baggage was parked and guarded in
the rear. At 8 a.m. the cavalry regiment at Frimley advanced
to assist the cyclists at Nags Head, and also to endeavor to
seize and hold the Brookwood and Cowshot bridges, while
the two batteries and two battalions started for Colony Gate.
The Southern force advanced to Tunnel Hill, which was
60 ATUTTUMN MANEUVERS.
reached at 7.15 a. m., the left of the advanced guard being on
the main Chobham Ridges Road; the objective being to seize
the high ground immediately north of the Bagshot—Camberley
main road, between the Jolly Farmer and Camberley. The
cavalry regiment acted independently. The cyclists advanced
by Frimley Green and Frimley to act on the left flank. The
Southern cavalry crossed the canal by Deep Cut and Curzon
bridges. Meanwhile the Northern cavalry moved by Colony
Gate to Nags Head, passing to the south of the detached
force from Knaphill, and between that force and the Southern
cavalry. The result of this was that the Nags Head, Pir-
bright, and Cowshot Manor bridges were in the hands of the
Northern force; the passages to the west in possession of the
Southern force. Immediately south of Mainstone Gate the
opposing cavalry passed within 300 yards of each other with-
out knowing it. After crossing Deep Cut Bridge the Southern
vanguard turned eastward toward Windmill Hill, uncovered
the advance, and their main guard met the Northern van-
guard, without warning, near Colony Gate. At 8.35 a.m. the
reenforcements from Frimley arrived and came into action
against the left flank of the Southern force. After severe
fighting the Southern force was ordered to retire. A fresh
position behind a turf wall was then taken up. At 9.35 a.m.
the Northern force advanced against this position, and when
the “cease fire” sounded the Southern force was retiring to
the high ground covering Deep Cut Bridge, where the artil-
lery had come into action. A weak demonstration was made
against the baggage of the Northern force by the detached
force from Knaphill without result. The Northern cavalry
were still holding the bridges, and the Southern cavalry were
in the low ground waiting events.
REMARKS BY THE UMPIRE IN CHIEF.
Sir Redvers Buller in his remarks says: “Two faults were
particularly noticeable to-day, and they were made by both
sides. First, the want of preparation for fight; second, the
neglect to make the best use of ground. The infantry of the
advanced guard of the Southern force came up to Colony Gate
in column, and the head of the main body of the Northern
force advanced in a similar formation along the Chobham
Ridges road. There were no scouts, and neither force appeared
to be aware of the advance of the other until actual collision
occurred. The deployment of the Northern force was then
G|REAT BRIT AIN. 61
promptly carried out, the extension of the units composing the
first line being well executed; but not before the Southern artil-
lery from Lovelands Hill had made them pay the penalty of their
close formation. The advantage gained by the guns of the
Southern force was only temporary, for their infantry being
unsupported were driven back and the guns had also to with-
draw. This need not have been the case, for had the second
brigade of the Southern force, near Overdale Ho., moved
along the eastern slopes to attack the enemy’s left flank in
Chobham Ridges, and thus given effectual support to the
troops in action, the chances are the Northern force would
have had to give way; but the attack of this brigade as
delivered could have had but little military value.
“In the second phase of the operations the Southern force
retired to a strong position from which the Northern force
made fruitless attempts to drive them by purely frontal
attacks ; reenforcement after reenforcement was sent for-
ward without any effect; had even one Northern battalion
moved by their left from Lovelands Hill under cover toward
Mainstone Gate, it would have compelled the defenders to
retire at once, as it would have enfiladed their whole position.
No use was made by either side of the spurs and under fea-
tures of the Chobham Ridges, which render this piece of
ground so particularly valuable for battle training. The
Southern cavalry did not join hands with the detached force
when they could have done so, and lost the opportunity for
driving back the Northern cavalry, which such a junction
would have given.”
Lord Wolseley, who was present throughout the operations,
pointed out that the scouting on both sides was indifferent,
and in consequence the commanders advanced without a suf-
ficient knowledge of what they had to encounter. It was a
risky proceeding on the part of the Northern commander at
the commencement of operations to endeavor to seize bridges
four miles apart; it would have been better had he confined his
attention to one point only as an initial undertaking. Frontal
attacks against troops behind a parapet are hopeless. The
Northern force would have fared better had they turned the
enemy's right.
The Northernforce advanced on the 26th August to Cowshot
Manor, and the Southern force encamped south of the Fox
Hills. During the night of the 26–27th August a reconnois-
sance of the outposts of the Northern force was made by an
62 ALJTUMN MANETUVERS.
officer's patrol of the Southern force. The patrol discovered
the force unprotected by outposts and passed through the
camp, where they were challenged by sentries on the quarter
guards, but no countersign demanded. A useful sketch, show-
ing the distribution of the force in camp, was furnished by
the officer in command of the patrol. A similar reconnois-
sance was made by an officer's patrol of the Northern force to
locate the outposts of the Southern force. This patrol en-
deavored to penetrate the line of outposts, but found Heath
Vale Bridge and Ash Vale Bridge occupied, and was stopped
by sentries on the roads south of the line Ash-Normandy.
The Officer commanding was unable to do more than locate
the positions of the outposts. He sent a useful sketch of these
and a good report.
OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 2S.
On Monday the following special idea was issued to the
Northern force. The outposts of the force are on the Basing-
stoke Canal from Frimhurst to Woking. The commander
receives this order, dated Windsor, 6 p.m., 27th August, from
the chief of the staff:
A cavalry regiment and two battalions of infantry have
been directed to reenforce you. Clear the Fox Hills before 9
a.m. to-morrow as far south as the line Ash Vale Bridge—Nor-
mandy.
The force under Maj. Gen. FitzRoy Hart consisted of No.
1 field column, the sixth dragoon guards and the second bat-
talion royal fusiliers, and the first battalion Durham light
infantry.
The special idea for the Southern force was as follows: The
Outposts of the advanced force extend from Pirbright to Mit-
chet Fm. Br., watching those of the enemy on the line of the
Basingstoke Canal. Orders are received as follows:
From chief of the staff, to the general officer commanding
advanced force, Wyke. No. 53.
PETERSFIELD, 3 p. m., 27th August, 1899.
Retire to-morrow upon Frensham, but do not withdraw
south of Normandy Hill until 9 a. m.
The force under Major General Hildyard consisted of No. 2
field column, two squadrons of cavalry, one company mounted
infantry, the second battalion Scottish rifles, the second bat-
talion Cameron Highlanders, and one section of cyclists. The
baggage columns were considered neutral.
GREAT BRITAIN. 63
The Northern force advanced in three columns on Tunnel
Hill: The right column, two battalions by Frimly Green; the
center, one battalion by Deep Cut Bridge; the left, four bat-
talions by Curzon Bridges. The sixth dragoon guards covered
the right and center columns, and a squadron of the thirteenth
Hussars the left. The artillery supported the advance from
a position west of Windmill Hill. At 7 a.m. the Southern
force was disposed as follows: One brigade and two batteries
of horse artillery as a rear guard. The horse artillery took
up a position on Scragley Hill; two companies were in shelter
trenches to the west of them. Four companies were also in
shelter trenches in a strong position near Lookout Hill, oppos-
ing the advance from the direction of Crown Prince Wood.
The woods about Dukes Hill were entangled; two battalions
were strongly intrenched on the north edge of the woods on
Ricochet Hill. The remainder of the force held the line Wyke
Common—Normandy Hill–Stony Hill. The Northern artillery
opened fire on the Southern artillery, and there was a cavalry
collision south of Tunnel Hill, in which the Northern cavalry
suffered loss, and finally retired north of the railway. At 7.35
a. m. the Northern infantry scouts came in view of the South-
ern outpost intrenched, and the defenders and the artillery
retired. The leading battalion of the right column arrived at
Crown Prince Wood at 8 a. m. The advance was then delayed
until 8.35 a. m., to enable the artillery from Windmill Hill to
cooperate; at the same time the position near Lookout Hill
was evacuated. The Northern artillery came into action near
Spur Hill under artillery, infantry, and machine-gun fire.
The Northern infantry then advanced in succession of lines
and reached Dukes Hill at 8.47 a. m., where it was checked
from the intrenched position on Ricochet Hill. At 9 a. m. a
general advance was made, followed by a charge on the in-
trenched position. During this attack the horse artillery were
able to bring very heavy fire upon it from Normandy Hill.
“Cease fire” sounded at 9.30 a. m., when the Southern force
had just commenced to retire upon Frensham.
REMARKS BY THE UMPIRE IN CHIEF.
Sir Redvers Buller in his remarks says: “The dispositions
of the Southern rear guard were good. It carried out its
duties most effectually by taking up positions in succession
which obliged the Northern force at each stage to develop
considerable strength, and so delayed their advance; while
64 ALTUMN MANEUVERS.
the rear guard retired from each position before they had sus-
tained loss. The preliminary distribution of the Northern
force was evidently based on the preconceived idea that the
enemy would hold strongly Longmoor Hill and Tunnel Hill.
Such did not prove to be the case, and by sending his guns to
Old Windmill Hill before any of the Southern troops had been
discovered the commander was deprived of their services when
his infantry were checked first at Tunnel Hill and then on the
line Play Hill–Crown Prince Wood. It is doubtful if the
artillery from the Windmill Hill position when they opened
fire could really have discriminated between friend and foe, so
closely were the opposing troops engaged on the Tunnel Hill–
Scragley Hill plateau and in the adjacent wooded slopes. The
position taken up by the Southern force near Ricochet Hill was
a strong One. Against it the direct attack made by the North-
ern force could scarcely have been successful. The umpire in
chief is of opinion that a turning movement by Wyke Common
would have given better chance of success. The successive
positions of the Southern artillery were very well selected.”
OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 29.
On Tuesday the special idea issued to the Northern force
was as follows: The leading troops of the advanced guard are
on the 29th August awaiting orders on the Farnham-Guildford
Road between the third and sixth milestones, when its com-
mander receives the following dispatch:
From the chief of the staff to officer commanding advanced
guard No. 79.
WINDSOR, 5.30 a. m., 29th August, 1899.
According to reliable news a hostile force of all arms, esti-
mated at 4,000 men, is on Hankley Common. March at once
and try to secure Kettlebury Hill and the crossroads at The
Devils Jumps.
The Northern force consisted of No. 1 field column, two
squadrons of cavalry, and two batteries field artillery.
The special idea of the Southern force was as follows: The
brigade of this army which was engaged on the 28th August
reaches Hankley Common early on the 29th August. The
following orders are received at 7 a. m. :
From the chief of the staff to officer commanding, Hankley
Common. No. 66.
PETERSFIELD, 5 a. m., 29th August, 1899.
Hold Hankley Common, and prevent the enemy, if possible,
from crossing the line level 217–The Grange.
GREAT BRIT AIN. 65
The Southern force consisted of No. 2 field column, one
squadron of cavalry, one battery horse artillery, and one sec-
tion of cyclists.
The northern force was concentrated at Cutmill Common,
and advanced by Elstead toward Hankley Common. At 7.30
a. m. the cavalry were checked close to Hankley Farm by
two companies and a machine gun, but these soon fell back
toward the defender's main position. Meanwhile the advanced
infantry deployed in the vicinity of Hankley Farm, where
they came under the fire of one battery from the hill north-
east of Abbotts Lodge. The main position of the Southern
force was on the high ground south of The Grange. Eight
companies as advanced posts were thrown forward on both
flanks, as far as Hankley Farm on the right and Tilford on
the left. One battery was northeast of Abbotts Lodge and
two batteries in position on the crest in rear of the intrench-
ments on the northern slopes of Kettlebury Hill, which were
occupied by two battalions. The fourth battalion was in
reserve. The cavalry were on both flanks, and cyclists were
pushed forward on the Tilford Road, watching the left flank.
At 9 a.m. the Northern infantry seized Tadmore Farm Hill,
and pushing on in a Southerly direction unsupported, suffered
considerable loss. The Northern artillery came into action
at 9.15 a.m. on the crest and western slopes of Tadmore Farm
Hill. At this time the main advance of the Northern infan-
try developed, two battalions by the valley toward the left of
the position, three battalions (including the advanced guard)
moving along the ridge toward the right of the position.
During the early part of the advance they came under infan-
try enfilade fire from the direction of Abbotts Lodge. The
battalions in the valley, on arriving within 1,000 yards of
the intrenchments, were held to be unable to continue their
advance; but those on the ridge pushed forward to the assault,
which was met by a strong counter attack of two fresh bat-
talions just as the “cease fire” sounded at 9.54 a. m.
REMARKS BY THE UMPIRE IN CHIEF.
Sir Redvers Buller in his remarks says: “The ground to-day
was strange to most of the troops and afforded a good lesson
of the importance of a careful preliminary reconnoissance, not
only of the positions taken up by the enemy, but of how best
12883—5
66 - AUTUMN MANEUVERs.
to attack them. The advanced guard of the Northern force,
after debouching from Westbrook Farm, moved too directly
and on too narrow a front upon Tadmore Farm Hill; had they
extended more, and delivered their fire on the flanks as well
as the front, they would probably have compelled the defend-
ers to withdraw sooner than they did. It is a question whether
at any of our maneuvers officers attach sufficient importance
to the concentration of fire from scattered bodies of troops, or
whether the umpire staff as a rule give sufficient credit when
such concentrated fire is delivered. Having driven the defend-
ers from their advanced position on Tadmore Farm Hill, the
Northern advanced guard commander should have been sat-
isfied to remain there and await orders instead of moving on
to Hankley Common. The umpire in chief excepts from this
remark a section of cyclists, which he thought cleverly han-
dled as they moved from Hankley Farm toward Stockbridge
Pond; they were the first to bring any flank fire to bear on
the Tadmore Farm Hill position, and subsequently did good
service in enfilading the defenders as they withdrew. The
pity was that half the advanced guard were not with them.
Tadmore Farm Hill offered peculiar advantage as a recon-
noitering position, and had the commander made use of it he
would no doubt from the first have decided to direct his attack
against One flank or the other of the enemy’s position, and
have directed his force accordingly. As it was, some of his
battalions were in the open valley, where they were domi-
nated from the defender's intrenchments, and being brought
to a stand were of no assistance to the final assault. As a
consequence, the assault when delivered was not made in
sufficient strength. As to the defense, the umpire in chief
considered the line taken up good, and the distribution of the
force well arranged.” -
On the 29th August the Northern force crossed the River
Wey and encamped near Frensham; the Southern force with-
drew to Woolmer Forest.
OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 30.
On Wednesday the special idea issued to the Northern force
Wa/S :
The commander receives orders to continue his advance,
and on the morning of the 30th August to march on Lyss.
GREAT BRITAIN. - 67
The following was the special idea issued to the Southern
force: -
Hearing on good authority that the Northern force is mak-
ing preparations to advance on Lyss on the morning of the
30th August, the commander, feeling scarcely strong enough
to oppose him in front, determines to take up a position on
the flank of his line of advance.
Maj. Gen. FitzRoy Hart elected to march by the Sleaford
Road, while Major General Hildyard assembled his force in
the Forked pond Inclosure, facing west. At 7.30 a. m. cav-
alry patrols of the opposing forces met, and the Northern
cavalry were able to push back the Southern at Whitehill;
but although a Northern patrol succeeded in discovering some
of the enemy’s infantry, this fact was not reported to the
Northern commander. The Southern commander received
full information. He heard from his observation post in
Woolmer Forest that troops were on the road 2 miles to the
northwest. About 9 a. m. two battalions were reported at
Whitehill in column of route moving southward. Orders
were then given for an advance, and the leading companies
with a machine gun, having moved west through Brimstone
Inclosure, opened fire on the main body of the Northern
infantry on the Sleaford–Lyss Road. This column hurried
forward and became separated by about 2 miles from its rear
guard. A battery and the flank guard were also left behind.
The Northern guns opened fire from Longmoor Down on the
Southern infantry on Woolmer Down, and at the same time
the Northern infantry formed up under cover and moved
on Woolmer Down. Two batteries Southern force came into
action on Weavers Down against infantry, but without effect,
on account of the bad position. Meanwhile the Northern bat-
tery, and later on the rear and flank guards, attempted to
close up with their main body, but in doing so they suffered
heavily, owing to the infantry fire from the west fence of
Brimstone Inclosure. The main body of the Southern infan-
try retired from Woolmer Down under cover of a rear guard,
and at 10.35 a. m., when operations ceased, they were falling
back on a prepared position at Forked pond Inclosure.
REMARKS BY THE UMPIRE IN CHIEF.
Sir Redvers Buller in his remarks says: “As the relative
position of the camps of the Northern and Southern forces
placed the woods of Woolmer Forest between them, a good
68 *. AUTUMN MANEUVERS.
Opportunity was given of testing the capabilities of the cav-
alry to find their way through a wooded country in search of
an enemy. In this the Northern cavalry can not be said to
have succeeded, for although the whole of the Southern force
were within a mile and three-quarters of the road by which
the Northern force were marching in column of route, the
cavalry failed to ascertain the enemy’s whereabouts, or to
communicate to their commander any information of impor-
tance. The Scouting was not good; some ground was passed
over several times, while the country in other directions
remained unexplored. The arrangements for the transmis-
siol, of messages were not satisfactory. The umpire staff
remarked upon the frequency with which infantry moved to
a flank under fire. Troops moved up to the firing line and
then took ground to a flank, instead of extending in rear and
then advancing to their front. The Northern commander
stated at the conference, that having shaken off the enemy
from his flank he was preparing to march on Lyss, in accord-
ance with the orders contained in his special idea. The umpire
in chief was unable to agree that he would have been justified
in thus leaving a hostile force in his rear. His instructions
were to march “on Lyss;' but such an order could only imply
an advance in that direction so far as the enemy’s strength
and movements would permit, and with due regard for his
own line of communication. The Southern commander lost
the advantage of his flank position by not having sufficiently
reconnoitered the ground in front of it. His artillery were
looking for a position after he had engaged the enemy. If a
position had been selected beforehand, it would have saved
much delay.”
$ OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 31.
After the engagement on the 30th August the Northern
force fell back to Bordon. The Southern force remained on
the southern outskirts of Woolmer Forest. The special idea
for the Northern force was:
Defend the northern boundary of Woolmer Forest from
Whitehill to the road junction south of Hollywater.
Maj. Gen. FitzRoy Hart made his dispositions accordingly,
connecting Blackmore, Stanford, and Whitehill by telegraph.
At 6 a. m. the Southern force was at Weavers Down, with
outposts and scouts thrown forward on the line Heifers Down—
Todmore Farm Road. From Weavers Down Major General
GREAT BRIT AIN. 69
Hildyard advanced through the Brimstone Inclosure and
seized the ground between the Deadwater Stream and Wall
Down, his infantry occupying Longmoor Down without oppo-
sition. The Northern artillery having opened fire on the
opposing infantry, the Southern artillery came into action,
and an artillery duel followed. One battery was detached,
and moved forward by the Brimstone Inclosure, and the
Northern batteries to meet this attack trained their guns to
cover a hill in front of their position, where a small body of
infantry had been seen. The Southern artillery came into
action on this position, but were ruled out of action. The
main body of the Southern force in the meantime had moved
through the Brimstone Inclosure, when information having
been received of the exact position of the enemy, Major Gen-
eral Hildyard diverted his attack on Fir Hill. Maj. Gen.
FitzRoy Hart pushed forward the second battalion black
watch to support his left, and had made a counter-attack on
the right flank of the enemy when the “cease fire” sounded.
At the close of the operations No. 1 field column returned
to Aldershot by route march, about 16 miles, camp being
reached by midday. No. 2 field columni encamped at Bordon,
and returned to Aldershot yesterday.
REMARKS ON THE MANEUVERS.
BY GEN. SIR. REDVERS Blſ LLER.
Gen. Sir Redvers Buller has issued the following memo-
randum, dealing with points noticed during the field training
at Aldershot, which was recently concluded:
COMMANDERS.–Speaking generally, defensive dispositions
were better than offensive. Perhaps this was due to the value
of the preliminary reconnoissance being overlooked, and to
the fact that the dispositions of attacking commanders were
sometimes unduly influenced by the action of their advanced
guards. It seems doubtful if attacks on a marked enemy are
sufficiently practiced in preliminary training; commanders
want that practice as much as their men do. An attack is
like a team of horses—it requires a coachman, and if not
carefully driven it soon gets out of hand. In premature exten-
sions and advances—that is to say, extensions and advances
made by troops before they have received particulars of the
attack intended, the leaders run away with the team, and in
the end the commander has lost control and finds himself
70 AUTUMN MANEUVERS.
Without the troops in hand he requires for a successful assault.
If a commander allows his troops to start in the wrong direc-
tion, or with the wrong objective, it is almost impossible for
him to regain control; he must first make his plan, and then
give his troops the instructions that plan requires. Attacks
Sometimes are made half-heartedly and insufficiently sup-
ported. Commanders often have too many objects in view at
Once, and consequently their troops are unduly divided. The
importance of thorough cooperation between all the units of
a command is apt to be overlooked; reconnoitering patrols
are allowed to be stopped when they could be supported by
cyclists or infantry; artillery is allowed to occupy positions
which either do not afford the best assistance to the infantry
or are too soon masked by their advance.
ARTILLERY.—The artillery has the inestimable advantage
of being able at Okehampton to practice under service con-
ditions, and it is, as would be expected, in a higher state of
tactical training than the other arms, who have not that
advantage. The officers, though, should devote more time to
the study of the tactics of the other arms; by that alone can
they hope to learn how to select quickly the “paramount
target.” There is no rule that artillery should always com-
mence an action on an artillery target; other targets will
occasionally give better results. Artillery should avoid posi-
tions which are likely to be masked by the movements of their
Own side. It is doubtful if artillery commanders always
obtain sufficient information from the supreme commander
as to his intentions before they place their guns. An artillery
commander directs a powerful force; it is his duty to use it
to the best advantage. He can only do this if he thoroughly
understands his commander's plans.
CAVALRY.—Cavalry experiences great disadvantages from
the want of suitable training ground, but more can be done
than is done. At present the cavalry seems to know how to
do it, but not what to do. This is owing to insufficient knowl-
edge of the tactics of other arms; systematic lectures to officers
and noncommissioned officers during the winter should remedy
this. Reconnoissance wants study, especially in the transmis-
sion of information, in the selection of the points where care
is essential, and, above all, in the recognition of the fact that
the mission of troops on reconnoissance duty is not to fight,
but to obtain information. There are only certain positions
G|REAT BRIT AIN. 71
where the enemy can be; these must be examined; when cav-
alry can not force its way through, infantry or artillery must
be sent for to help it. More use should be made of maps.
The supports should move at an easy pace, from tactical point
to tactical point, the Scouts and flanking parties moving
quicker, and communicating posts should be established.
Great care should be taken about information; it may be of
ephemeral, immediate, or of permanent value; of use, that is,
to the advanced cavalry alone, to the Officer commanding
advanced troops, or to the commander of the force, and should
be dealt with accordingly. Cavalry Scouting in front of a
force advancing will often do well to attach a couple of order-
lies to the advanced guard, and to send all information to its
commander; he will know how to use it, and what portion to
send back to the commander. It is useless sending back as
information news which, from its nature, must be stale news,
or false news, by the time it is received. -
ENGINEERS.–Commanders are apt to forget their field
companies. We maneuver Over good roads, and Owing to
circumstances beyond our control our water supplies are
usually prepared in advance. But commanders must accus-
tom themselves to include their field company in their battle
dispositions.
INFANTRY. —The remark, It knows how to do it, but not what
to do, is as true of the infantry as of the cavalry. In order
to learn to read, a child is taught his alphabet; then words of
one syllable; them to read; and when he has learned to read
well he forgets that he ever had to learn either the alphabet
or to spell. Substitute drill, musketry, and battle training
for alphabet, spelling, and reading, and the lesson is the same.
Troops at drill are taught to form line, that is to say, to get
into the position in which their fire will have the greatest
effect; but a line at drill and a line in the battlefield are
distinct things. In the battlefield the lessons of drill have
to be regulated by the surface of the ground. As the earth
is not laid out in parallel lines, a line in the language of the
battlefield is merely a series of bodies of troops deployed at
irregular intervals with a common front; there is no question
of alignment. So long as one unit does not impede the fire
or endanger the safety of another it may be 100 yards behind
or 100 yards in front of it without any inconvenience. In-
fantry commanders look too much to preserving a stereotyped
line. too little to the study of ground and general direction.
72 AUTUMN MANEU VERS.
Again, the containing power of the modern rifle is very great;
a few men well placed and firing rapidly can offer considera-
ble resistance and inflict considerable damage. There is a
tendency to extend men too soon; troops in compact bodies
move more easily over broken ground, and until the men are
intended to fire there is no need for more than Scouts in front.
At company training commanders should devote more time
to practice skirmishing. As with the formations so with the
fire. There is too rigid an adherence to the details of range
practice; on the ranges troops are taught systematically;
every shot is fired by order, and extreme regularity is insisted
upon. This is the spelling. Once thoroughly taught, the
soldier should be permitted to use his individual intelligence;
to read at sight; to fire directly he sees an enemy. He is
under control; he has been trained to obey his fire commander,
who can order him to change his target or to cease fire at will;
but his mission is to do the most damage he can, and he will
be most successful in this if he can surprise his foe. The fire
of five rifles unexpectedly will often shake a body of troops
more than the fire of fifty if they are prepared to receive it.
Great importance should be attached to training men to select
their target and fire upon it without delay. Infantry com-
manders should be careful not to expose or to exhaust their men
unnecessarily; battalions, companies, and fire units are moved
too frequently. With the present long-range rifles frequent
changes of position are needless; select the best positions, and
only leave them for the next best position in advance; do not
move forward a few yards simply because the troops on the right
or left do so. There is too much doubling; infantry in action
should only double to anticipate an enemy; to give aid to
comrades who are pressed; to pass over exposed ground. How
often at field days does one hear the order, “Double up there
into line those men on the right;” how seldom the order,
“Step short on the left and let the right get up.” The stereo-
typed line is an evil; it is not necessary that a company when
extended should move in an exact line. The formation should
conform to the ground; common front and general direction
are alone of importance. Men can be dribbled singly or in
twos and threes over exposed ground with far less danger
than if moved in mass. With bullet-swept ground in front
of them commanders should practice this form of advance,
training their men to rally in dead ground. Above all, let
them train their men to open fire directly the enemy offers a
GREAT BRITAIN. 73
warget. This is a matter for the individual soldier, the
intensity of the fire being regulated by the fire commander.
MACHINE GUNS.—Their use is improving; but there is
still a tendency to use them too constantly; to push them
into the infantry firing line, and to put them in places whence
they can not be easily extricated. ' Their tactics are too much
subordinated to those of their battalions; they would be of
greater use if used more independently.
REFLECTIONS ON THE ACTION AT BRIMSTONE, AUGUST 30.
BY A. FIELD OFFICER.
[Army and Navy Gazette, September 16, 1899.]
Throughout the recent maneuvers of the Aldershot field
columns the schemes were nominally based upon the general
idea that “a Northern army assembling at Windsor is oper-
ating against a Southern army based on Portsmouth.” Until
August 29 the movements executed were dictated by imaginary
chiefs of the staff at Windsor and Petersfield, respectively;
but for the operations of August 30 it was probably considered
that further interference upon the part of those ghostly insti-
gators of strife would involve too preposterous an absurdity,
and anonymous instructions, equally calculated to provoke
combats, were accordingly substituted. The Northern com-
mander was directed to “continue his advance and on the
morning of August 30 to march. On Lyss.” The Southern
commander was made aware of the objective chosen for his
adversary and of his own assumed inability to oppose him in
front and consequent determination to “take up a position on
the flank of his line of advance.” The situation (at 7 a. m.)
produced by the special ideas placed the Northern force on the
march southwards from its Overnight camp near Frensham,
“no one of the force being south of an east-and-west line
through Headley.” At the hour named the column was on
the Sleaford–Lyss road passing over Broxhead Common. The
Southern force was, according to its instructions, “assembled”
in the Forked pond Inclosure, and its liberty of action west-
wards limited up to 7 a. m. by the line Conford–Heifers
Down. As the result of the action which subsequently ensued
the Northern commander claimed to have “shaken off the
enemy from his flank,” and to have been “preparing to march
to Lyss in accordance with the orders contained in his special
idea.” The umpire in chief declined concurrence with this
74 Al JTUMN MANEUVERS.
view upon the grounds that the Northern commander would
not have been justified in leaving a hostile force in his rear,
and that the orders did not imply an advance on Lyss with-
out regard to his communication and the enemy’s strength
and movements.
Considered in a general sense the decision given is obviously
indisputable. The very fact that no particular object was
named for the march on Lyss should indicate that the occu-
pation of that place was not specially aimed at, but that in
“continuing his advance” thereon the Northern force should
drive its opponent before it. When desperate enterprises are
to be undertaken by subordinates, regardless of danger, it is
the duty of the superior who issues the orders to state explic-
itly that such is the intention. No commander is justified in
hazarding the destruction or capture of the troops under his
command without sufficient reason, and in default of definite
orders to do so the sufficiency of the reasons upon which he
elects to act upon his own responsibility will need to be
unmistakable in order to secure his justification. In the
present case, even supposing that by making use of the
“imagination,” which commanders of opposing forces have
recently been exhorted to employ, the Northern general had
considered that the order to “march on Lyss” was equivalent
to “seize and hold Lyss.” He would nevertheless have been
wrong in adopting that interpretation without first referring
the question to his superior, whose indorsement of his pro-
posals could alone justify him in leaving his rear at the mercy
of a hostile force that had merely been checked, not crushed.
But upon the other hand, if vent be given to the “imagi-
nation,” it would have been but reasonable for the Northern
commander to assume that a forward movement of the army
from Windsor must be taking place, and that his communi-
cations would, therefore, be protected by other troops. Cer-
tainly it is difficult to account for the continued advance of
the detached force represented by No. 1 field column, except
upon the assumption that at least some part of the advanced
.guard of the main army was following fairly close behind it.
As a set-off to this excuse it must, however, be conceded that
the inaction of the Southern main body, which appears to
have taken root at Petersfield, is as difficult to account for as
the isolated presence at Woolmer of the field column detached
from Windsor. The strategic puzzle seems impossible of
GREAT BRITAIN. 75
*
solution and we give it up. The tactical schemes issued dur-
ing the maneuver period are, upon the contrary, easy to
understand, so far, at least, as regards the purpose in view,
which was, apparently, to bring the opposing forces into daily
collision at so early an hour that operations should be con-
cluded before the sun rose high enough to render the heat
dangerous. Connection with the condition of affairs sug-
gested by the general idea there was practically none, except
as regarded the not always justifiable instructions furnished
by the apparently omniscient and clearly officious chief of the
staff. Lack of reality is unfortunately inseparable from
peace exercises in this country, and the scheme for August 30
enjoyed no special immunity. Yet, though from an academic
point of view this scheme was a very bad one, it nevertheless
produced a situation which is quite worth considering.
The Northern commander elected to regard himself as under
a distinct obligation to march on Lyss, irrespective of his
enemy’s movements, and the fact that the high ground in
Brimstone Inclosure was not occupied by his opponent quite so
early as might have been the case, worked in his favor; so
that he actually did “shake off the enemy from his flank,”
and his further advance—apart from the risk that it en-
tailed—was certainly feasible when the “cease fire” sounded.
Whether this would have been so had the Southern troops
come earlier into action and in greater strength it is impossi-
ble to say; but the contrary is more than probable under all
the circumstances. The possession of the Brimstone Hill
position, by one side or the other, represented the key to the
question of whether the Northern force could or could not
march along the Sleaford–Lyss road from Waldown Smithy
to Todmore Farm, a distance of 2 miles, throughout which
the route is within from 800 yards to 1,500 yards of the Brim-
stone Inclosure. But the effective occupation of Brimstone
by the Southern force at the commencement would have been
against the spirit of the special idea under which it was as-
sumed that the enemy was too strong to be directly opposed
or challenged in front, and consequently the idea of sustaining
an assault was not entertained. Upon the other hand, had
the force employed been a few minutes sooner upon the ground
it would have added thereby much interest to the maneuvers.
The Northern commander did not, as might, we venture to say,
have been expected, make a rush with a strong force at the
northwestern extremity of Brimstone so as to secure at once
76 AUTUMN MANEUVERs.
a footing upon it. He should, we think, have sent at least an
entire battalion against the hill upon the instant of his arrival
at Waldown Smithy, from whence he could see at a glance
that Brimstone runs parallel to the road which he was about
to follow. With Brimstone used against him his march could
not be continued without great risk.
The effective occupation of Brimstone was essential, and if
the whole of his force were required in order to obtain posses-
Sion of it the whole force should have been used, as the only
alternative to abandoning the march altogether. That, in
real war, a screened route by Blackmoor would have been
available does not affect the question. That which is “out
of bounds” at maneuvers is supposed to represent the “impos-
sible” in war. It certainly seems as if the Northern com-
mander, by sending only a weak detachment against Brim-
stone, placed himself in danger of becoming involved in a
difficult contest having very doubtful results. From this the
slight delay upon the part of his adversary appears to have
preserved him, under the actual circumstances, yet, had not
the Southern commander been hampered by the orders that
tied him to Forked pond Inclosure, it is probable that events
would in any case have proved unfavorable to the Northerners.
Finally, as regards the justification or otherwise of the
intention to leave behind a practically unbeaten enemy on his
communications, it should not be overlooked that although by .
so doing the Northern force launched itself em l’air, yet that
at the same time when it resigned its own communications it
severed those of the opposing column from Petersfield. Hav-
1ng thus changed places, temporarily, we may assume that an
anxiety to regain normal conditions would be common to both
parties, and that the weaker force would feel the greater per-
plexity. Hence the veritable danger to be incurred by the
Northern force would not actually be excessive, unless the
Southern main body should have at last advanced from Peters-
field. Against the latter contingency, however, must be set
the at least equal probability that the Northern main body
would also have been at hand and thus exercised similar pres-
sure upon the Southern field column. It does not seem that
the Northern general would have been justified in marching
past his adversary, because no adequate reason can be assigned
to furnish the motive; but had he done so, with or without
justification, there is no proof that he would have exposed
himself to danger greater than that into which his action
GREAT BRITAIN. 77
would have thrown the hostile column. Few would contend
that the Northern commander can justly claim to have been
right upon any grounds that have yet been stated; but it
would be going too far to declare that no circumstances are
conceivable under which his views would have been correct.
SOME UNREALITIES OF MANEUVERS.
[The Broad Arrow, September 16, 1899.]
If Napoleon had known or cared anything about autumn
maneuvers, he would probably have laid it down that the best
were those which contained the fewest absurdities. The most
carefully thought-out instructional tactics can not be any-
thing but the merest shadows of the genuine article. There
are no bullets, and consequently no danger of that loss of
morale which, even in its mildest form, means loss of cohesion
and direction. Men are rarely fatigued, still more rarely
excited, and as a rule are only fairly interested in the issue of
the day’s work, all of which are, of course, immense factors
in the minor tactics of the battlefield. The success or failure
of friends at distant points of the combat, which in war might
mean a total and unexpected change in the whole conduct of
the attack or defense, is often unnoticed from the impossi-
bility of actually feeling the effects of chances. In short,
there have probably not been five consecutive minutes of any-
thing approaching reality in the most stirring conflict that
ever woke the echoes of Woolmer Downs or Bourley Woods.
The same remarks apply to the higher tactics of our home
maneuvers; that is to say, the movements of the various col-
umns when not actually engaged with the enemy, though in
this case the evils of unreality are hardly so injurious, inso-
much as they are only perceived by people of sufficient educa-
tion to discount them. Camping grounds are not to be found
everywhere; fighting ground is still harder to come by, entail-
ing a forced adjournment of friends and foes after each day’s
battle, for the next round, to the nearest patch of war depart-
ment land. All this is, as we say, inevitable—though none
the less regrettable—and as far as one can see will continue to
ruin the vraisemblance of our annual training until the crack
of doom.
But there are many misleading things to be seen at maneu-
vers which are not inevitable, the existence of which is almost
78 AUTUMN MANEUVERS.
entirely responsible for the undoubtedly false idea of cam-
paigning in civilized countries possessed by the average sol-
dier. Prominent among these is the invariable neutrality
of the baggage train. How many of the men, we wonder,
who, after packing the wagons in the early morning, march
away with a light heart to aid in the solution of yet another
tactical problem, with the certainty of a comfortable camp
and dinner to crown the labors of the day, ever give a thought
to the ad interim active-service history of those same wagons?
They leave them at dawn and find them again in the evening,
and that is the extent of the knowledge at present vouchsafed
to the combatants; but would it not be of infinite value if the
harassing reality of the safe conduct of these cumbrous trains
were occasionally brought home to them 2 Campaigns do not
so much guide supply trains as they are guided by them. We
once, but once only, witnessed maneuvers in which the bag-
gage was not neutral, and every action but one of a fortnight’s
evolution centered round, or was prompted by, that slow-
moving half mile of precious carts; a fact of some significance
to an army which will probably never take the field in a big
war blessed with the possession of base railways.
Again, it is the commonest thing in the world for troops
just placed in position to be told that they are manning a
shelter trench; further, that in case of accidents, they will
find another and a stronger one so many hundred yards in the
rear, and behind that again perhaps a couple of redoubts of
formidable profile. Now it is not too much to say that not
One per cent of the private soldiers who so complacently
receive this information, ever realizes the fact that it is the
men who are restfully awaiting the onslaught of the foe at
the “Pigmoor Inclosure" who on active service would have
to doff coats and belts to slave for hours at these trenches and
redoubts. There is a notion abroad among our rank and
file that the royal engineers were solely created for this nec-
essary and disagreeable work, an idea possibly originating
from the visible connection between the gallant sappers and
the screens which do duty as parapets. Is it out of the ques-
tion to put this error straight? Our men sadly need training
in trench digging and its preliminary covering operations,
and it would be better to thus utilize the hours of waiting
behind crest lines or at the edges of woods, which at present
merely suggest the thought that reveille might happily have
Sounded three hours later. tº
GREAT BRITAIN. 79
The great umpire question is another which requires a deal
of study before that wearying expression “a farce ’’ can be
banished from the mimic battlefield. Umpires have, of course,
a difficult, if not an impossible, task to perform. No man can
have an eye so prophetic -as to enable him to say with cer-
tainty which ten of twenty sections volley-firing at each other
have established a superiority over the opposition. No man,
on the other hand, dare allow a “wave” to advance across the
Open against artillery in position, though the gunners on the
ridge know full well that, in their eagerness to come into
action Smartly, they utterly neglect to align their pieces on
the approaching lines at all. But umpires can do much.
They can, for instance, utterly deny the efficacy of a cavalry
charge executed by a squadron which at an earlier and quite
forgotten stage of the contest trotted flankwise to the fire of
a deployed brigade. They can forbid the transmission of
information by scouts who have been taking notes within 30
yards of hostile rifles. They can recognize and rule accord-
ingly upon the superiority of converging fire by a minority
over the diverging fire of a majority. They may even, if of
extra mental caliber, extinguish a general officer and his staff,
when that august body have been Sunning themselves all the
morning upon a knoll in full sight of the whole of the enemy’s
forces, from skirmishers to reserves. But these things they do
not do. Apart from the paucity of their numbers, their educa-
tion and powers are alike inadequate, as is also their estimate
of the importance of their duties.
The formation of an umpire corps, recruited as occasion
demands from officers of known aptitude, and a system of
frequent consultations during the fight, instead of at its con-
clusion only, might prevent spectacles so ridiculous as the
triumphant progress of one section of an interdependent
movement in spite of the utter annihilation of all its com-
plementary parts. Space forbids anything more than a pass-
ing reference to a few other unrealities; magazine fire, for
instance, is too often unrealistic, though this, it is true, is
more a matter of want of drill in fire discipline than from
any defect of system. In a certain battle of recent maneu-
vers we noticed a half company deliver nineteen rounds from
its magazines, utterly ignoring the impossibility of the feat
without an interval for recharging under cover. Our next
big war will certainly witness a vast deal of confusion, owing to
80 AUTUMN MANEUVERs.
the lack of practice in rallying during the attack for this abso-
lutely necessary operation. Boundaries, again, are allowed
to demand very much more from the imagination than there
is any need for. For example: In August, No. 2 field column,
in accordance with its “special idea,” was to march from
Bordon to Lyss, an operation it elected to carry out along
the Whitehill-Lyssroad—i.e., its boundary. It was, of course,
strongly attacked from Longmoor Down and the woods north
of it, and its rear guard obviously “smashed.” But the com-
plete loss of interest and instruction to the attackers may be
imagined when they were subsequently informed that in real
warfare no enemy would have appeared on that road at all,
but would have been safely progressing through the woods
over the boundary. Thereafter the lessons of what was cer-
tainly the briskest day’s fighting of an abnormally dull week
were practically useless. They would have had no counter-
part in war, ergo, they would have been better unlearnt. The
moral being that at maneuvers no commander should utilize
his boundaries as lines of advance, unless, under service con-
ditions, such lines should be the only ones available.
TJ MPIRING AT FIELD MANEUVERS.
[Army and Navy Gazette, September 2, 1899.]
The war office has issued new rules for the conduct of field
maneuvers. The new regulations contain alterations and
improvements upon those issued in 1896. The rules for the
guidance of the umpire staff have been revised and amended.
GENERAL RULES.
(1) ORGANIZATION.—The umpire staff consists of: The
director or umpire in chief, umpires, and when necessary,
assistant umpires, and reporting officers. They are to study
the general principles for the working of the other arms of
the service as well as their own, and are to be thoroughly
conversant with Parts V and X, Infantry Drill. The duty
of umpires is to see that these rules are followed; they should
consider only the actual situation of the moment, and not
the intentional idea of the maneuver.
(2) OBJECT OF APPOINTING UMPIREs.-They should by
their decisions produce the effects which would in war result
from the shock of action and the effect of bullets. It is
above all things important that umpires should strive to
GREAT BRIT AIN. S1
produce the delays which are inseparable from war, thus: A
column coming down a narrow lane comes suddenly under
artillery fire; it can not proceed; it has to be extricated from
the lane to find ground sheltered from the fire, or to pass
the exposed ground in open formation. All this takes time,
and how much time the umpire must decide. Again, a com-
pany is holding a bridge; a battalion arrives to force the
passage; that battalion must deploy and effectively place
superior forces before it can force the passage. The umpire
will decide how long this takes, will inform the defenders,
who will have that time at their disposal in which to obtain
reenforcements or otherwise.
(3) SELECTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF UMPIRES.—At every
maneuver the director of the whole will act as umpire in
chief. The umpire in chief is alone empowered to interfere
with the progress of events. It may be desirable at times for
the umpire in chief to suspend the operations temporarily, and
to review the situation. His position is indicated by a union
jack carried by an orderly; and he should be provided with
such a staff of assistant umpires, orderlies, and mounted sig-
malers as the nature of the operations require. He should,
if possible, be one grade higher in rank than the commanders
of the opposing forces. He is responsible for the distribution
of the other umpires, superintends the umpire service, and
gives decisions on broad general questions. If the umpire
in chief is not satisfied that the orders issued will bring about
the situation intended by the special idea, he may require
them to be rectified before any movement is made to the
front. The rank of umpires will vary with the importance
of the maneuver, but they should not be under the rank
of field officer. Before being appointed they should have
previously acted as assistant umpires, and they should be
changed as seldom as possible. The number of umpires
should be sufficient to insure a decision being given before a
situation becomes unnatural. Before the commencement of
operations umpires should, when practicable, meet the umpire
in chief, so that they may be informed of the situation of,
and the orders given on both sides. They will be assigned to
units of the forces or to areas of ground, as may be found
convenient, and will join those units or proceed to those areas
at the commencement of operations each day. They will give
decisions for both sides, and for all arms of both sides within
12883—6 .
82 AUTUMN MANEU VERS.
their sphere of action, and by constant communication with
one another they should endeavor to bring uniformity into
their decisions, and to prevent the occurrence of situations
impossible in actual warfare. At large maneuvers an umpire
will be attached to the corps artillery of each force for the
supervision of artillery combats, and his duties will extend
to the artillery acting in concert with the corps artillery, and
to any troops operating near him. The conduct of the artil-
lery acting with divisions, and of the artillery acting with the
cavalry brigade, will be specially supervised by the umpires
attached to the divisions and cavalry brigade respectively and
by any others at hand. As the decisions of these cavalry and
artillery umpires will influence the engagement of the other
arms, they must make them known, not only to the artillery
and to the umpire in chief, but also as far as possible to the
other umpires employed within the artillery sphere of action
and to the troops. They are empowered to call upon the
artillery to furnish mounted orderlies as required with a view
to communicating their decisions. These Orderlies must wear
umpire badges, of which a small supply is to be carried with
each brigade division. The umpire with the corps artillery of
each force is to be provided with a signaling party to Open
communication with the artillery umpire on the other side.
Assistant umpires are to be appointed in such numbers as
may be required to assist the umpires in their duties. At
large maneuvers the umpires with cavalry brigades or the
corps artillery will usually have four, and those with infantry
divisions three assistants. They will generally be employed
in collecting information as to the strength, position, and
intentions of the officer commanding troops within the sphere
of influence of their umpire, and in conveying his orders.
They will, however, when an umpire is not present, give
decisions in cases that are quite clear, and when not clear, they
may direct the cessation of proceedings until the decision of
an umpire can be obtained.
(4) REPORTING OFFICERS.—At large maneuvers a reporting
officer will be attached to the headquarters of each army corps,
to each division, to each cavalry brigade, and to each corps
artillery. This officer is not under the umpire attached to the
unit. His duties are to keep a note of all information received
and all movements ordered by the officer commanding the
troops to which he is attached; he will keep an accurate record
of the hour at which he notes each occurrence. He will be
GREAT BRITAIN. 83
prepared to give the director of maneuvers, before the confer-
ence, a full history of the action of the unit to which he has
been attached. •
(5) DREss.--In the absence of special orders officers of the
umpire staff will be in drill order, and will wear a white band
6 inches broad on the right arm above the elbow. All other
neutrals in uniform will wear a white band 2 inches broad. On
the left arm, and will not wear swords.
(6) DECISIONS.—The chief care of an umpire should be to be
present at the right time in the right place, and he must there-
fore keep himself informed, by his assistant umpires and by
inquiry from the reporting officers, of all important moves, so
as to choose the point whence he can best exert his influence.
Troops should never, if possible, be obliged to halt awaiting
an umpire's decision. The main point is to come to quick
decision; and this is better than a long examination of the cir-
cumstances, which can only lead to waste of time. The rules
laid down for umpires are to be regarded only in the light of
general principles for assisting them in giving decisions.
Even at maneuvers circumstances will arise that can not be
met by definite rules. In all decisions special importance
must be attached to moral influences so far as they obtain in
peace, as shown by the order and steadiness of the men and
the efficient exercise of command. At large maneuvers um-
pires’ decisions should be directed more to producing delay
than to placing troops out of action. The power of putting
troops out of action should not be exercised except where it is
necessary to show the combatants the effect of their actions.
Umpires may, acting within these regulations, rule troops Or
guns out of action. To encourage independent action on the
part of subordinate commanders, and avoid situations impos-
sible in war, they should, when opportunities offer, inform
commanders of the effect of their fire upon the enemy as well
as that of the enemy upon them. It is undesirable to lose time
in estimating small losses. Umpires when declaring troops
incapable of advancing, or when enforcing a retirement, should
briefly state to the commander the reason for such order, reserv-
ing full explanations for the conference. Umpires placing
troops out of action will give the officer in command a mem-
orandum, showing the time that his men are to remain out of
action. Troops should never be placed out of action for more
than half an hour. Troops so placed out of action must retire
84 ATJTUMIN MANEUVERS.
(infantry with butts reversed) at Once out of the fighting force,
and, at the expiration of their allotted time, join the reserve.
At maneuvers on a large scale decisions must be given upon
a broad view of the situation, and the discussion of details,
which tend to divert attention from larger tactical questions,
is to be deprecated. Umpires are to be careful that troops
avoiding forbidden ground or changing their formation under
these instructions are not put at a disadvantage thereby.
When the umpire in chief is at hand other umpires should
obtain his approval before giving important decisions. They
will report any hesitation to comply with their orders. They
will inform any officer who expresses himself dissatisfied with
their decision that he must accept it now, but he can raise
the question at the conference. Umpires should at once inform
the umpire in chief of decisions which materially affect the
day’s operations.
(7) PRINCIPLES GUIDING DECISIONS.–In forming their deci-
sions umpires must be guided by the following considerations:
(a) The relative force engaged on each side and in immediate
support or reserve; (b) in the attack—the strength of a posi-
tion, the nature of the ground to be passed over, the plan of
attack and its preparation by artillery fire; (c) on the defen-
sive—the dispositions of the troops, and arrangements for
counter-attack; (d) the handling and fire discipline of the
troops on either side, the number of rounds that could be
fired, the accuracy of the sighting, and the manner in which
the fire was delivered. Umpires must be careful to observe
whether troops under artillery fire, as indicated by the screen,
alter their formations or seek cover.
(8) ACTION ON A COLLISION BECOMING IMMINENT.--When
there is a prospect of collision, umpires should draw between
the forces. After discussing the tactical situation, based on
the strength and situation of the two sides, they must decide
which side, if either, is to retire. The decision need not neces-
sarily be given by an umpire; if one is not present the com-
manders on either side should confer together and agree which
is to go back.
(9) TIME OF PROMINENT EVENTS TO BE NOTED BY UM-
PIRES.—Before the commencement of operations, the watches
of umpires should be compared, or set in agreement. Umpires
are to note down the exact time when each prominent event
in the day’s proceedings takes place.
GREAT BRIT AIN. 85
(10) ESTIMATES OF LOSs.-Losses are to be estimated by
squadrons of troops, sections or guns, half-battalions, com-
panies, half-companies, or sections, and not by their actual
effectives. Where a case admits of any doubt it will gener-
ally be desirable for the umpire to decide in favor of the force
acting on the Offensive.
(11) UMPIRES DISMOUNTING.—To enable umpires and assist-
ant umpires to judge of the fire discipline of infantry and
artillery, they should frequently dismount and note by per-
sonal inspection the ranges, the adjustment of the sights, the
aim, the steadiness of fire, and the protection given by the
formation of the ground. This is especially essential when
an attack by cavalry on infantry or artillery appears immi-
ment. They may call on the officer commanding the troops to
furnish men to lead their horses.
(12) SUMMARY OF EVENTs AT ConCLUSION OF THE DAY. —
At the conclusion of each day’s proceedings, commanders and
umpires will give the umpire in chief a brief verbal account of
the day’s events, as seen by or reported to them. Umpires will
note the exact positions of troops at the close of operations.
(13) CONFERENCE. –When the umpire in chief thinks proper
to do so, or as soon as the situation becomes unreal, a confer-
ence will be held at which the director will give his decision,
and inform both commanders whether either has gained any
decided advantage over the other. At large maneuvers, the
director will if possible indicate to each commander the camp
or camps he is to occupy. It will often be found that one, if
not both, of the commanders can proceed to their camps in
formations and under conditions resembling those they would
have to adopt in a parallel case On actual service. It is to be
noted that the condition of the troops, the situation of the
camping grounds, the position of baggage columns and Sup-
ply depots would probably affect the decision as well as the
day’s operations. An immediate armistice, or a rear-guard
action or a simple movement of cavalry to keep touch, would
then, according to circumstances, close the day’s proceedings,
and the Opposing forces would occupy their camps under the
conditions dictated by the decisions of the director. In re-
stricted areas and in the neighborhood of garrisons, it may
sometimes be undesirable to lay down authoritatively the
exact solution of any tactical problem, as the decision may
prevent initiative in future.
86 AUTUMN MANEUVERS.
(14) WRITTEN REPORTS.–If the operations have been ex-
tensive, the umpire in chief will arrange for a written report
being prepared as soon as possible after the termination of
the day’s maneuvers. This report will be based on his own
observations, and on the notes of his umpires and reporting
officers, and should be as short and concise as possible. In
the case of less important operations, a written report will not
be required, but immediately before the conference the senior
umpire present will collect the notes made during the day, and
hand them, together with his own, to the umpire in chief.
The umpire in chief will collate the results, and will publish,
as soon afterwards as practicable, a summary of events and his
criticism upon them, for the future instruction of all concerned.
GRAND MANEUVERS IN ITALY.
TROOPS ENGAGED.
[Extracts from the final report to the minister of war, made by Lieut.
- Gen. L. Pelloux, director of the grand maneuvers.]
On the 19th of March of the present year, in dispatch No.
1843, your excellency intrusted me with the direction of the
grand maneuvers, tracing out the general plan. They were
to be carried on from August 27 to September 8 in the general
direction of Bra—Turin and to close with the final review
to take place in Turin for His Majesty the King. In their
organic formation, were to take part the first and second army
corps, a division of mobile militia (4 regiments of infantry,
2 battalions of bersaglieri, a brigade of batteries, and a com-
pany of sappers of the engineers), and a division of cavalry
(4 regiments and 2 horse batteries); the division of mobile
militia and that of cavalry were not to take part till the second
period (the grand maneuvers where army corps were to oppose
each other), while during the first period they were to exercise
separately at the camps of S. Maurizio and Gallarate, respec-
tively. , Later your excellency determined, or rather approved
at my suggestion, that a cyclist company should be assigned
to the cavalry division and a balloon park to each army corps.
Upon the basis of these instructions and within the limits
of space and time indicated, I traced out, and your excellency
approved, the general programme of the grand maneuvers.
From Bra to Turin there were to be executed between the
2d and 6th of September (second period) two maneuvers of two
opposing army corps and One maneuver of an army against a
marked enemy, and for the first maneuver the troops were to
be assigned to their positions on September 1 in the environs
of Bra and Sommariva Bosco. In consequence, the first period
of the maneuvers was to be limited to the time between the
27th and the 31st of August, and during this time were to take
place two exercises of opposing divisions by the first army
corps, one brigade exercise, and two exercises of opposing
divisions by the second army corps, the first corps maneuver-
ing between Poirino, Carmagnola, and Sommariva Bosco, and
(87)
88 AlJTUMIN MANEUVERS.
the second corps in the triangle comprised between Cuneo,
Mondovi, and Cherasco, the troops finally taking up their
positions as aforesaid at Sommariva BOSCO and Bra, since,
owing to the limits of ground and time assigned for the grand
maneuvers and to the consequent short distance between the
two armies at the beginning of the second period, it would not
have been practicable to include in such a programme a
maneuver of an advanced guard in front of the armies them-
selves. Such a maneuver was to take place, based on a special
idea properly coordinated with the general idea, on the days
of August 31 and September 1 from Chivasso to Bra. On the
first day the division of cavalry coming from Gallarate was to
operate from Chivasso toward Carignano against an assumed
enemy, and on the second day it was to operate from Carignano
southward against a brigade represented in full and composed
of the two cavalry regiments of the supplementary troops of
the two maneuvering army corps.
As it was possible to foresee the daily location of the troops
with considerable exactness, the matter of lodgings was
studied; the water at the various places was examined, and
wherever necessary a Calandra pump was set up with the
consent of the municipal authorities, and Northon wells were
established by the engineers; the composition and functions
of the various services were determined; the assignments and
functions of the field referees during each period of the
maneuvers were decided upon; and the committees were
appointed for the settlement of damages, under the super-
vision of the commander of engineers of each of the maneu-
vering army corps.
THE GRAND MANTEU VERS.
(September 2-6.)
Previous to the grand maneuvers, there took place maneu-
vers of opposing divisions and brigades. The grand ma-
neuvers on a large scale were confined to the second period.
The general situation was indicated as follows:
A Southern army is marching between the Tanaro and the
Stura, upon Turin; the head of its column has arrived at Bra.
The Northern army, which has had to retire as far back as
Sommariva Bosco, receives reenforcements and is preparing
to resume the offensive.
ITALY. S9
MANEUVER OF opposiNG ARMY CORPS ON SEPTEMBER. 2.
Having received information concerning the intentions of
the enemy, the Southern army intrusted the mission of stand-
ing firmly on the Bra plateau, in Order to give the divisions
still on the right side of the Stura time to enter in line, to an
army corps concentrated at Bra and reenforced by a cavalry
division which had arrived at Savigliano (south of Cavaller-
maggiore and just off the map). -
Rinowing the position of the enemy, the commander of the
Northern army intended to drive him back beyond the Stura
before he could unite his forces on the plateau. The accom-
plishment of this result was assigned to an army corps
assembled at Sommariva, reenforced by a division of mobile
militia stationed at Camaragna.
The commander of the Northern army (General Besozzi)
decided to make a firm stand on the heights of Sanfrè and
Bric Cecchina for any event, and thence to proceed resolutely
with the main body of his forces against the enemy over the
heights north of Bra, possibly pursuing his line of retreat as
far as the bridges over the Tamaro. This advance was to be
made in three columns, as follows: On the left, over the
heights of Accate and Bric Cecchina, the second division
(Prielli), reenforced by the seventh regiment of bersaglieri,
the artillery of the first division, two 7-cm. batteries of corps
artillery, and by one squadron of cavalry; in the center, via
the spur of Tarlapini, the first (Lahalle) division, without
artillery and with one squadron; on the right, over the plain,
a mixed column (General Sismondo), composed of a brigade
of mobile militia, with two 7-cm. batteries of the corps artil-
lery, of two battalions of bersaglieri of the mobile militia,
and of four squadrons. A general reserve, composed of a
brigade of mobile militia and of two batteries of the division
of mobile militia, followed toward Sanfrè, while the remain-
ing two batteries of the same division were to move upon
C. Abrate, whence they were to cooperate with the artillery
of the left column in bombarding the slopes of the spur of
Tarlapini.
The commander of the Southern army (General Rugiu)
decided to occupy and defend the heights of Tarlapini (fourth
division, General Di Cossato) and of Tetti Bona (third divi-
sion, General Malacria). The sixth regiment of bersaglieri
was ordered to oppose the enemy’s advance on the ridge of
90 AUTUMN MANETUVERS.
Bric Cecchina; the cavalry division, reenforced by one regi-
ment of the army corps, to protect, on the plain, the left of
the army corps, and also to protect on that side the advancing
of the troops as they came from the right bank of the Stura.
The corps artillery at Mad. dei Fiori was held in readiness.
The Lahalle division, proceeding in two columns against
the heights of C. Viano (spur of Tarlapini), came in contact
with the Di Cossato division, arrayed with four battalions in
the first line, to the north of Tarlapini, five with the second
line, the artillery in position northwest of Tarlapini, and One
regiment in reserve at C. Gota. The Lahalle division, sup-
ported by the fire of the two batteries of mobile militia at
C. Abrate and soon after by the two batteries of the reserve,
engaged the enemy with vigor.
In the meanwhile the Prielli column, having arrived near
Accate, located on the southern ridge of Bric Cecchina all of
its artillery, which opened a lively fire against Tarlapini and
Tetti Bona, while the seventh regiment of bersaglieri pushed
a little farther south along the heights and came in contact
with the sixth bersaglieri.
The entire divisional artillery of the enemy directed its fire
against the artillery of the Prielli column, while the corps
artillery was called from Mad. dei Fiori to take position on
the western slopes of Tarlapini against the artillery of the
Lahalle column. The Malacria division placed a regiment on
the heights to the northwest of Tetti Bona, keeping another
in reserve, and the entire Pistoia brigade still massed behind
Tetti Bona.
The attack of the first army corps, very well supported and
protected by the strong force of artillery at Bric Cecchina,
proceeded very steadily, especially in the center. The Lahalle
division, behind which the reserve was advancing, successfully
attacked the spur of Tarlapini. The Prielli column, while
the seventh bersaglieri continued its Offensive along the slope,
formed in wings its two infantry brigades. These, descend-
ing into the valley of the Pocapaglia River, attacked in the
direction of Tetti Bona. The Sismondo column, after
having sent the two battalions of bersaglieri, with the two
batteries and four squadrons, toward La Motta for the pro-
tection of its flank, advanced as far as Tetti dei Milanesi,
whence, changing front to the left, it attacked Tarlapini from
the west. - -
ITALY. 91
The Southern army was obliged to bring all its forces to
meet these attacks. The Malacria division stationed a regi-
ment to the left and the second brigade to the right of the
regiment which had entered first into battle in front of Tetti
Bona. The Di Cossato division reenforced the first line with
two battalions and afterwards with a third regiment, while
the fourth deployed behind the extreme left.
But the Di Cossato division, under the unceasing pressure
of the enemy’s infantry and the exceedingly effectual fire of
the batteries of Bric Cecchina, could not prolong the defense.
It executed a counter attack with three regiments for the
purpose of freeing itself, for a moment, from the pressure
of the enemy, and then began a retreat by echelons. The
Malacria division slightly withdrew its left wing, left stand-
ing alone by the withdrawal of the Di Cossato division, and
sent the last battalions into the first line in Order to retard
the advance of the enemy’s left.
While the main bodies were struggling on the heights, the
flanking column of the Northern army (two battalions of ber-
saglieri, two batteries, and four squadrons) was engaged on
the plain near La Motta with the cavalry division of the
Southern army. There resulted around this locality, until
the end of the engagement, a series of disconnected encoun-
ters, with various outcomes.
September 3, being Sunday, was a day of rest.
MANEUVER OF OPFOSING ARMY CORPS, SEPTEMBER. 4.
The general situation was indicated as follows:
The outcome of the first day was indecisive. The Southern
army, still in possession of the Bra plateau, has been reen-
forced by a part of the troops remaining behind. The
Northern army, which has been obliged to detach one divi-
sion to strengthen its left flank, has escaped from too close
a contact by retiring beyond the Ricciardo River. Conse-
quently the Southern army has occupied Sommariva Bosco.
The Southern army, profiting by the arrival of reenforce-
ments, ordered the army corps of Sommariva, reenforced by
a division of mobile militia that had arrived at Caramagua,
to strike resolutely in the direction of Carignano and attempt
to force the enemy away from the Po.
The Northern army, while gathering new forces and pre-
paring the line of the Sangone for the defense in order to
92 AUTUMN MANEUVERS.
protect Turin, reenforced the army corps which had with-
drawn from Sommariva with a cavalry division collected at
Racconigi, and ordered it to retard and obstruct the march of
the enemy, without, however, injuring the chances of falling
back, if necessary, upon the left bank of the Po.
The commander of the Northern army (General Besozzi)
decided to take position with the main body on the slight ele-
vation on the right bank of the Ricciardo River. He arranged
his forces in the shape of a hammer from C. Alfiere (Prielli
division and one squadron), via C. Pugnatta, toward C. Braida
(Lahalle division, with two corps batteries and one squadron);
protected himself on the plain to the west by a regiment of
bersaglieri, two corps batteries, and four squadrons at C. Capo-
rali; and spread the cavalry division out a little more from
Madonna della Bussola toward the south and southwest, in
order to hinder the march of the enemy should he advance
from that direction. It was his intention to make the enemy
deploy his forces, and then to retire by echelons from the left
under the protection of the cavalry division.
The commander of the Southern army, having learned of
the stand taken by the enemy, determined to attack him vig-
orously from the south with two columns (the Di Cossato
division and a squadron by the Sommariva–Ceresole road, the
Malacria division and a squadron by the Sommariva Bosco—
Carmagnola road), while the division of mobile militia (Sis-
mondo), reenforced by four squadrons, was to cooperate from
the left, via Gangaglieti, in the general attack, and, in case
of success, to strike vigorously toward Carmagnola and Car-
ignano in order to Occupy strongly the bridge across the Po.
The sixth bersaglieri and the corps artillery were held in
general reserve to the north of Sommariva Bosco.
The Malacria division came in contact with the right and
the center of the enemy on the Gangaglietti River and at
C. Pugnatta, and formed in line on Ricciardo height, with the
Pistoia brigade on the right of the Casale brigade on the left
of the road. Against this road entered into line the three
battalions of bersaglieri on the Gangaglietti River, with their
two batteries a little farther north on the Carmagnola road,
and three battalions of the Lahalle division. The artillery of
this division took position on the ridge south of C. Pugnatta,
and opened fire on the artillery of the enemy and on the
columns which were advancing and deploying toward the
Gangaglietti and the Ricciardo rivers.
ITALY. 93
Meanwhile the Di Cossato division advanced in two columns
upon C. Alfiere over the roads leading there from the Som-
mariva–Ceresole road. The artillery of the Prielli division
opened fire on these columns from the ridge south of C. Alfi-
ere, compelling them to line up under the protection of their
artillery, which had taken position south of the Gorgo River.
The Prielli division then placed on the brow of the Ricciardo
River the Reggio brigade, with four battalions in the first
line, making the Basilicata brigade advance in the third line
from Boretti to Cantarelli. -
In this situation, all the columns of the Southern army
having now broken the marching order to assume the battle
order, the commander of the Northern army considered that
he had accomplished his purpose, and decided to disengage
himself and begin a retreat in the manner indicated. How-
ever, taking note of this decision, he was ordered, by the
director of the grand maneuvers, to continue his resistance,
as it was desired to give the Southern army an opportunity
to complete its full formation and give a better exhibition of
the realization of its idea of maneuvers.
OPERATIONS OF SEPTEMBER, 5.
The Southern army continued its advance. The Di Cossato
division, seeing the Malacria division deploy itself to the
north of S. Andrea pier, prepared to cross the Ricciardo
River, into the valley of which, covered with dense woods
and situated in a dead angle with regard to the enemy's bat-
teries, it sent forth its infantry. The Malacria division, sup-
ported by the corps artillery called into position to the east of
S. Andrea pier, and, afterwards, by its own artillery, which
had advanced to the right of the corps artillery, advanced
with the Pistoia brigade, in union with the Di Cossato divi-
sion, against C. Pugnatta, while the Casale brigade extended
to the left upon the Gangaglietti River in the hope of joining
at any moment the Sismondo division, which was now
expected to debouch from the Gangaglietti bridges.
As this did not happen, however, the commander of the
army corps consolidated the somewhat disconnected attacks
of the Pistoia and Casale brigades with those of the regiment
of bersaglieri of the reserve. The Sismondo division had
been in contact with the division of hostile cavalry ever since
the beginning of its movement, with the result that there had
been several encounters, in which the said cavalry division
94. AUTUMN MANEUVERS.
had with varying success sought to retard its march. The
Sismondo division had, however, succeeded in continuing its
advance, and had arrived with its main body to occupy the
bridge over the Meletta River toward Madonna della Bossola,
where it faced the cavalry division, while its own Ivrea bri-
gade advanced toward the Gangaglietti bridges with the order
to head toward C. Braida or S. Giovanni, as the situation
might require. This brigade had first moved toward Cro-
cetta, but not having found the enemy in that direction, it
had again inclined to the north toward S. Giovanni, where
it later on joined the remainder of its division against the
enemy’s cavalry. -
Being at the Ricciardo River, the regiment of bersaglieri of
the Northern army was obliged to fall back upon Caporali,
thus enabling the Malacria division to converge to the right
and to form from the southwest against the right wing of the
Lahalle division, which, while continuing to resist the enemy
with the Modena brigade and the corps artillery, sent the
Como brigade and, a little later, also the divisional artil-
lery, to take a second position at C. Patirai in order to support
the retreat. On the other wing, the Prielli division brought
into line all its forces against the pursuit by the Cossato divi-
sion, and with an energetic counter attack of one brigade suc-
ceeded in checking the enemy for a moment, after which the
Reggio brigade began to retreat by echelons.
The Southern army declared a general assault. On the
right the Cuneo brigade broke the enemy’s left; on the left
the Casale brigade, flanking the enemy at Patirai, presented
its own flank to the seventh regiment of bersaglieri, which
counter attacked it from C. Caporali, forcing the battalions of
its extreme left to face said regiment. The Northern army was
in full retreat, while the Sismondo division of the Southern
army was in the direction of S. Giovanni, on the flank of the
enemy’s line of retreat.
MANEUVER OF AN ARMY AGAINST A MARKED ENEMY ON
SEPTEMIBFIR 6. *
By order of the directors of the maneuvers, the marked
army, under the orders of General Sismondo, was constituted
as follows: One division represented in full by the mobile
militia; one division marked by the sixth regiment of berság-
lieri and a battery furnished by the first division; one division
ITALY. 95
marked by the seventh regiment of bersaglieri and by a bat-
tery furnished by the second division; one cavalry brigade
represented in full by the brigade of lancers of the cavalry
division and by a 7-cm. battery furnished by the second army
corps. The place of the brigade of lancers in the cavalry
division was taken by the cavalry regiments of the various
army corps (each with four squadrons) formed into a brigade
under the orders of Colonel Semminiatelli. -
The Northern army, after having recalled the division pre-
viously detailed for the protection of its left flank, was able to
cross the Po and take position behind the line of the Sangone,
which its left flank intended to defend, with a strength of
three divisions and one cavalry brigade, in Order to protect
Turin without allowing itself to be separated from the Po.
The Southern army, greatly strengthened, now had at its
disposal two army corps and a cavalry division and continued
the offensive on the left bank of the Po.
The commander of the Northern army, General Sismondo,
intended to furnish the Sangone line from Drosso to the Po
with two divisions (first division, marked, from Drosso to
Mirafiori for the defense of the Stupinigi road, with advanced
post at Stupinigi; second division, also marked, from Mirafiori
to the lower Sangone for the defense of the Nizza road, with
advanced posts at Nichelino and Mercato), to cover its right
by the cavalry brigade at Beinasco and exploring toward the
south and west, and to keep a strong reserve (division of
mobile militia) astride the Stupinigi road.
The command of the Southern army was assumed by Lieu-
tenant General Pelloux (director of the grand maneuvers)
personally. It was his intention to attack the enemy in Order
to drive him back to Turin, making demonstrations between
Mercato and Mirafiori and taking determined action between
Mirafiori and Beinasco, trying to turn the enemy’s right.
For this reason the first army corps (Besozzi) had to attack
demonstratively the Mercato–Mirafiori front with the Prielli
division, keeping at first in reserve to the south of the C. Tor-
retta crossroads the Lahalle division, coming from Vinovo.
The second corps (Rugiu), advancing from Candiolo and
Piobesi, had to attack the Mirafiori-Beinasco front, harmon-
izing at first the action of the Malacria division opposite
the Stupinigi bridge with the demonstrative action of the first
corps, and then, when the Di Cossato division had arrived oppo-
site Beinasco, making a determined flanking movement against
96 ATTUMN MANEUVERS.
Drosso and Beinasco. The cavalry division (Majnoni), from
None, was to head via Orbassano toward Beinasco in order to
reconnoiter the western limit of the grounds occupied by the
enemy and then Operate against the latter's flank so as to
facilitate the operations of the second army corps. The
beginning of the attack was to be made from the left, and
the action of each unit was to facilitate the task of the unit
Operating On its right. .
The Prielli division of the first corps and the Malacria divi-
sion of the second corps were the first to come in contact with
the advanced posts of the enemy. The Prielli division easily
repulsed the hostile posts of Mercato and Nichelino, and with
one brigade and the divisional artillery it formed between
those two localities, while with the other brigade and the corps
artillery it formed to the west of Nichelino. The Malacria
division, having repulsed the advanced post of Stupinigi,
occupied Borgaretto and formed with a brigade and the divi-
sional artillery against the Stupinigi bridge, and with the
other brigade and the divisional artillery against Drosso.
These two divisions, having brought into action all the bat-
teries and keeping a large infantry reserve, maintained their
demonstrative action all along the front of the enemy, in
order to give time to enter into line to the Di Cossato division,
which, having turned from Probosi to the south of the Stu-
pinigi forest, was proceeding upon Beinasco.
The Northern army was resisting on the ridge of the San-
gone with the troops which it had arrayed there since the
beginning. Its cavalry brigade, in front of the advance of
the Majnoni division upon Orbassano, had assembled to the
north of the Sangone for the protection of the right flank of
its army, avoiding the engagement.
As the moment was approaching when the Di Cossato divi-
sion would be able to advance upon Beinasco, the Lahalle
division advanced from its reserve position between the Prielli
and Malacria divisions. Then, while the Prielli division was
accentuating its action by a violent infantry and artillery fire,
the Malacria division rallied all its forces against Drosso, with
one brigade in the first line and the other behind, and the
Lahalle division sent one brigade and the artillery against the
Stupinigi bridge, keeping the other brigade behind and in
union with the division on the left. On the extreme left the
cavalry division had crossed the Sangone after ascertaining
that Rivalta was clear of the enemy and was now proceeding
ITALY. . 97
from the west toward Beinasco. The ground, being greatly
cut up by canals, with few bridges over them, rendered the
division’s movements slow and delayed its cooperation in the
action of the Di Cossato division; but the latter, having found
Beinasco defenceless, was also able to cross the Sangone and
began to form its vanguard and its artillery to the north of
the village, opposite C. Manta.
The Malacria division then sent forth to the attack its head
brigade, which succeeded in gaining a foothold on the ridge
and formed obliquely toward the east, opposite C. Gioberti.
In view of these actions on the part of the enemy, the
Northern army, which had been induced by the energetic
demonstrations of the Prielli division to reenforce its left
wing with the two battalions of bersaglieri of the reserve,
drew up the whole reserve division upon the line C. Manta–
C. Mestiatis–Mirafiori, and began to assemble there the troops
of its right wing, which were retiring from the ridge.
Against this second position of the enemy the Di Cossato
division, which had placed all its forces in line, was advancing
from the west, and the Malacria division, busy assembling a
brigade of the Lahalle division with its own battalions and
batteries, was advancing from the front, while the Prielli
division and the other brigade of the Lahalle division served
as a pivot for the movement.
After a most lively preparation of fire and while the general
attack was about to take place, the signal to stop the maneu-
vers was given. º
The various considerations to which single maneuvers may
give rise, and which constitute the greatest profit to be derived
from them—the ideas, the dispositions of the commanders of
the sides, the execution of the exercises, the acts accomplished,
the action of the various arms, etc.—were the object of special
conferences.
OPERATIONS OF THE VARIOUS HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICES.
[Extract from the report of Lieut. Gen. L. Pelloux, director of the grand
* maneuvers.]
HEADQUARTERS OF THE LARGE UNITS AND THE GENERAL-STAFF SERVICE.
The headquarters of the large units operated exceedingly
well during the period of, preparation for the grand maneu-
vers as well as during the maneuvers themselves, notwith-
standing that during the former they had at their disposal
12883—7
98 AUTUMN MANEUVERS.
only the personnel composing the territorial headquarters,
and that in the latter they consisted of part of the officers and
nearly all the enlisted men who were new to the headquarters
themselves. -
The general-staff service left nothing to be desired; in the
selection and arrangement of quarters, in the formation into
columns, on the march, in the dispositions relating to the
wagons and to the operations of the various troop services, in
the preparation and transmission of orders, and finally, in the
service on the maneuver grounds, the officers of the general
staff and those detailed to it showed continuous, calm, and
intelligent zeal, and proved themselves to be valuable aids to
the commanders.
MEDICAL SERVICE.
This service had been previously studied, and at the begin-
ning of the grand maneuvers hospitals had been established
at Cherasco, Fossano, Sommariva Bosco, Carmagnola, and
Carignano, with a total of 240 beds. The civil hospitals of
Carmagnola, Racconigi, Villastellone, Poirino, and Moncalieri
kept altogether 118 beds ready for use. The first army corps
had assigned to it a movable field hospital of 50 beds, and the
second army corps a Red Cross hospital of 50 beds. The ter-
ritorial establishments of Cuneo, Savigliano, Fossano, Ales-
sandria, and Turin, connected with the zone of the grand
'maneuvers by numerous railroads and tramways which could
be freely used for transporting the sick, completed the means
at command for a strength which did not reach 40,000 men.
The abundance of the means provided, the healthful season,
the absence of excessive fatigue, the strict observance of the
rules of hygiene, the improvements in diet in proportion to
increase of work, and the richness of the region in habitations
and resources, rendered the operations of the medical service
much less difficult, the sick rate having remained between 1.3
and 3.5 per cent for all the forces during the whole period of
maneuvers.
The service of the medical sections, which took part in the
maneuvers in a reduced formation, had naturally a limited
field of operations. -
The establishments and sections performed their duties
exceedingly well, and from this it may be concluded that the
service will work well in war, both as regards personnel and
matériel.
ITALY. 99
COMMISSARY SERVICE.
The same may be said of the commissary service, which also
gave excellent results.
The service of food supply was discharged by the subsist-
ence sections from the commodities which the contractors
sent to designated and well-known places. The subsistence
sections worked from distribution depots and showed them-
selves capable in this service, even when the conditions with
regard to locality were by no means favorable.
The bread supply was attended to in a generally satisfactory
manner by the bakeries of Turin and Savigliano by means of
regularly made deliveries. An advance bakery was tried in
the second army corps. -
The services of forage, straw, and wood were also carried
out without any difficulties arising.
ARTILLERY SERVICE.
On account of the many duties which the artillery regiments
were called upon to discharge, the service of the artillery met
with considerable difficulties, which, however, the zeal and
ability of the personnel succeeded in surmounting in a praise-
worthy manner. -
In the train service the only thing to be noticed was a slight
deficiency in the training of the horses. •
The matériel gave satisfactory proof of its strength.
ENGINEER SERVICE.
The conditions under which peace maneuvers take place
rarely require and often do not admit of the technico-tactical
employment of the companies of sappers of the engineers.
A single bridge of 14 meters made of extemporized material
was thrown over the Chisola between La Loggia and Rolle, a
few other small bridges were constructed of extemporized
material, and a few roadbeds were constructed here and there
for the passage of troops. The preparation of places for
defense and demolitions naturally Only gave opportunity for
theoretical studies. Owing to the fact that the camps had
been chosen in advance, the work of the engineer sappers was
hardly ever required in works of castrametation, either. The
sapper companies were consequently employed as fighting
troops most of the time. -
The service of the telegraph troops was considerably more
active and always discharged in a praiseworthy manner. The
100 AUTUIMN MANEUVERS.
extension and winding about of the lines and the operation of
the stations connected with every position taken up by the
large units to which telegraphers were detailed put to a severe
test the endurance and activity of these troops and the quality
of the matériel, which test was stood in an excellent manner.
However, on some occasions the need was felt of better means
of illumination for night work and of more rapid means, such
as bicycles and small vehicles like those of the visual telegra-
phy section, for the hurried transportation of small articles
from one station to another or for the transmission of infor-
mation, etc.
The visual telegraph service did not have any occasion to
Operate. - - &
The balloon service operated with each of the army corps
and gave good results when the atmospheric conditions were
favorable, but the fogs in the mornings prevented at times
any advantage being derived from this service during the
first hours of the maneuvers. Difficulties were also sometimes
met in the transmission of the results of observations. It is,
moreover, obvious that the ascent of a balloon always betrays
to the enemy the position of the headquarters using it—an
inconvenience which can be avoided only by having the ascen-
sion take place at a distance, and this considerably reduces
the efficiency of the service by rendering slower and less
secure the communications between the observer and the
headquarters. *
The cyclist, telegrapher, and sapper sections detailed to the
army corps and employed with the cavalry had, just as had
been said of the sapper companies, but limited technical
employment. They, however, rendered most useful service in
reconnoissances and the transmission of orders, and when a
greater harmony of action shall have been obtained with the
cavalry, it may be presumed that they will be of real
advantage.
The service of water supply with Northon wells was
intrusted to a detachment of 20 men for each army corps.
The Northon wells showed themselves this time also to be
practically useful only on loose, uncompact ground. The
tubular wells of the Calandra system, owing to the ease with
which they are established and operated and because they
were more adapted to the ground of the maneuver zone,
proved to be preferable.
ITALY. 101
THE VETERINARY AND POSTAL SERVICES AND THE ROYAL CARBINEERS.
The veterinary service was intrusted to the veterinary offi-
cers of the various corps. The condition of the animals during
the maneuvers was kept satisfactory, arºd at the close of the
maneuvers all that was noticeable was the deterioration usu-
ally resultant from a period of intense work.
The service of the royal carbineers was excellent, as usual,
being considerably facilitated, in matters relating to the
service of correspondence, by the use of the telegraph and
cyclists. - •
The postal service operated regularly and gave rise to no
observations whatever. -
SETTLEMENT OF THE DAMAGES.
The settlement of the damages has devolved a long and
patient work on the committees of settlement of the two
army Corps. -
The total amount of damages claimed was 121,227 lire, of
which 37,980 lire were allowed.
For this flattering result a special word of praise has been
addressed to the two colonels of engineers presiding over the
above-named committee. * * ‘.
THE AUTUMN MANEUVERS IN NORWAY.
[From the 24th to the 30th of August, 1899.]
Very nearly 12,000 men participated in these maneuvers,
which took place in the county of the Smaalenene. They
promised to be very interesting to a strategist, and it was
hoped that the experience gained from them would teach the
best means to be adopted for the repulsion of an attack made
through that section of the country.
COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES.
The enemy, or Southern force, was composed of the Smaa-
lenene, Hedemarken, Oesterdalen, Gudbrandsdalen, and Kris-
tiania battalions of the line, the guards, the cadet company,
the company of cadet aspirants, and the school detachment
of the first Akerhus brigade, one squadron of the Akerhus
cavalry corps of the line, three landwehr batteries of the sec-
ond field artillery corps, and one bicycle company of the line,
besides engineer and sanitary troops. This force, consisting
of 6,000 men, was commanded by Major General Oevergaard.
The defenders, or Northern force, were composed of the
Smaalenene, Hedemarken, Gudbrandsdalen, and Kristiania
battalions of the landwehr, besides the school detachments of
the Kristianianssand and Throndhjem brigades, or a total of
3,000 infantry. To this number were added two squadrons of
the Akerhus cavalry corps of the line, two landwehr batteries
of the first field artillery corps with a park detachment, and
one bicycle company of the line, besides engineer and sanitary
troops. This force, consisting of 5,000 men, was commanded
|by Major General Mellbye.
This was the first time that the recently organized bicycle
companies had been tried.
Each force represented a part of an army corps, and was
organized into two brigades of three battalions each. It was
forbidden to take any prisoners during the maneuvers, neither
was it permitted for civilians or military persons in civilian
clothing to act as spies.
(103)
104 AUTUMIN MANEUVERS.
THEATER OF OPERATIONS.
The theater of operations embraced the southern part of
Skjeberg, through Vartejg, and extended partly up into Rak-
kestad. It had an extent of from 4 to 5 miles. (One Norwe-
gian mile equals 7 English miles.) The choice of ground for
the maneuvers was well made, and was especially interesting
to a strategist.
Sarpsborg was selected as the place of concentration for the
Northern force, and Ulleröd, on the Skjeberg Inlet, as the
place of concentration for the Southern force. The latter
represented a disembarked enemy who had been repulsed in
the attempt to reach the capital through the Kristianiafjord,
and who was therefore compelled to try to force his way
Overland.
THE CONCENTRATION OF THE FORCES ON AUGUST 24.
On the 23d of August all the troops assigned to the South-
ern force, with the exception of the cavalry, concentrated at
Kristiania. Here they embarked on board the warships
lying in the harbor at 4 o’clock in the morning of August
24. The Northern force was concentrating at Hafslund, near
Sarpsborg, and at about 2 o’clock in the afternoon the whole
force, consisting of 5,000 men, was in camp. The debarka-
tion of the troops composing the Southern force took place in
the Skjeberg Inlet, and occupied only a couple of hours.
GENERAL IDEA.
A Southern fleet has compelled the Norwegian fleet to seek
shelter under the protection of the coast fortifications, and
thus the landing of the Southern force is protected. As soon
as it is known that the enemy’s troops have been disembarked
in the Skjeberg Inlet, it will be the duty of the defense to try
to stop or retard their forward movement northward.
Hostilities are to commence at 1.30 o'clock in the afternoon
of August 25.
OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 25.
SPECIAL IDEA FOR THE NORTHERN FORCE,
A brigade of the landwehr is supposed to have pushed for-
ward on the west side of the Glommen River to the region
around Vestby to observe the coast and cover the line of
NORWAY. 105
retreat from the south toward Ski. The different organiza-
tions of the landsturm have occupied the coast between Moss
and Svinesund. The entrances to Fredrikshald have been
closed with miſhes. The batteries of Sarpsborg have been
manned and preparations have been made to blow up the
Sarpsborg Bridge. One army corps of the Northern force
has been so disposed on the east side of the Glommen as to
cover the adjacent country and keep up communication with
the sea. The headquarters of the corps is, on the 25th of
August, at Hafslund and its line of Outposts has been pushed
forward on a line with Skjeberg.
A hostile (Southern) force, disembarked in the Skjeberg
Inlet, has forced back the landsturm troops of the defense in
the direction of Fredriksstad and Sarpsborg. During the
forenoon of the 25th it has pushed its outposts forward to a
line through northern Salberg and southern Heia, with a
detachment in the direction of Ingedal and Borge. The road
from Rokke past Degernaes is under observation and is cov-
ered by a detached force.
SPECIAL IDEA FOR THE SOUTHERN FORCE.
In order to cover the rear and flanks during its advance,
and also to divide the defender's forces and cut its line of com-
munication with the sea east of the Glommen, an army corps
had been disembarked in the Skjeberg Inlet during the even-
ing of the 24th of August, and has forced the hostile land-
sturm to fall back in the direction of Fredriksstad and Sarps-
borg. In the forenoon of the 25th of August, the headquarters
of the corps is between Ulleröd and Helgeröd, with its outpost
line through Salberg and southern Heia.
The enemy’s outposts have been encountered in the direc-
tion of Skjeberg. In order to cover its flanks and rear dur-
ing a continued forward movement, the corps has detached a
battalion of infantry with some cavalry toward Ingedal and
a similar force toward Borge.
The distance between Hafslund and Ulleröd is about one
mile (Norwegian). The ground rises gradually toward Hafs-
lund. The extreme points are connected by a series of roads,
all of which converge toward the center of the theater of
operations at Skjeberg. This lies on a height from which a
splendid view is obtained, and is surrounded by cultivated
ground. It is bounded toward the north and the south by
106 - AUTUMIN MANETUVERS.
Small wooded heights, over which the different detachments
were compelled to move.
operations.
The Southern force at once sent out a force of cavalry to
reconnoiter the ground toward the north and to ascertain the
position of the enemy. It pushed forward so energetically
that, shortly after the opening of the hostilities, it had reached
the position of the staff of the defender's advance guard over
an unguarded path through the wood. It was, however, soon
discovered, and was compelled to retreat by a couple of well
directed volleys. -
While the bicyclists of the Northern force wereriding around
looking for the enemy on all roads toward the east and far
South of the Ise Lake, its advance guard, consisting of the
Gudbransdalen and Kristiania landwehr and school battalions,
was pushed forward clear to the edge of the open plain and
Occupied here a position from the Skjeberg church in the east
to Hauge in the west. The artillery was brought into posi-
tion farthest east on a height northeast of the Skjeberg church
from which it commanded a part of the Skjeberg Inlet and the
whole plain in front of the church, while the rest of the force
occupied a position farther to the rear near Bukkesten.
During the afternoon the artillery of the Northern force
had reached a commanding position from which a very severe
fire could be directed on the enemy’s columns in case they
should try to advance Over the open plain. The first troops suc-
ceeded in advancing quite a distance without being observed,
but after that the guns opened fire whenever new figures
showed themselves at the edge of the wood.
Notwithstanding the intense fire the artillery of the South-
ern force galloped forward and unlimbered in the middle of
the plain, from which position it tried its best to answer the
artillery fire of the Northern force. This duel seemed too
one-sided. The Northern force occupied too strong a position,
and the combat was undecided when “cease firing” sounded
at 5 o'clock p. m. The result of the day’s fighting was that
the Southern force pushed back the outposts of the Northern
force near the Skjeberg church. The main force of the
Northern army, however, maintained its position at all points.
The King and his party followed the fighting with the
greatest interest all day long from the Skjeberg parsonage.
From this point the whole theater of operations could be
NORWAY. 107
seen. He afterwards rode around to the different organiza-
tions. He was especially satisfied with the excellent artillery
position of the Northern force.
OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 26.
Hostilities commenced about 7 o'clock in the morning.
Notwithstanding the favorable position of the Northern force,
and especially their excellent artillery position, the commander
of the Southern force succeeded this day in driving back the
defenders by rapidly and skillfully taking advantage of unfa-
vorable dispositions made by his skillful adversary, General
Mellbye. General Oevergaard, who carried off the honors of
the day, had decided to continue his advance toward Sarps-
borg and, when the fighting opened, had disposed his force
as follows: The bicycle company and the school detachment,
which were farthest toward the east on the right flank, were
to push forward from Rönild against Kamperhaug. The
Hedemarken battalion occupied the height at the Skjeberg
church, taken from the enemy yesterday. The artillery
occupied, in the beginning, yesterday’s position, a little to
the west of Naalum farm, where the platoon of sappers had
dug gun-pits during the night. Farther to the west was the
guard battalion at the Fladberg farm, while the Smaalenene
and the Oesterdalen battalion of the line were held in readi-
ness at Bö, between Naalum and Fladberg; and the Gud-
brandsdalen and Kristiania battalions of the line were held
in reserve farther in rear at the crossroads at the Solberg
farm. The school Squadron was at Fladberg, while the Eids-
berg squadron was at the Ulleröd church, from which it was
to reconnoiter toward Sarpsborg.
As long as the artillery of the Northern force was in posi-
tion at Kamperhaug it could sweep the whole plain in front,
and it would have been impossible for the attacking force to
have pushed forward large masses of infantry without sub-
jecting them to great losses.
For this reason it was generally supposed that General
Oevergaard would advance as far west as possible along a
water course situated there.
But the situation was suddenly changed during the fore-
noon. This fatal change resulted from a wrong report con-
cerning the enemy’s artillery being sent to General Mellbye.
It was reported that this artillery had come into position at
|Fladberg, but such was not the case.
108 Al JTUMIN MANEUVERS.
*
The result was that General Mellbye, in order to secure
his line of retreat, ordered his artillery to abandon its threat-
ened position at Kamperhaug. When it was reported that
the artillery of the Northern force had retreated from its
commanding position at Kamperhaug, and that nothing was
to be feared from that direction, General Oevergaard decided
to throw three battalions forward over the open plain and
make an attack on the position of the Northern force on both
sides of the Vik farm. At the same time the artillery of the
Southern force came into position on a wooded ridge farthest
to the west at Kolstad–Bö. From this position it was able to
participate in the day’s fight with an effect very dangerous
to the defenders, while the artillery of the latter, which had
been drawn back to the Berg farm, could render no assist-
ance whatever. -
The commander of the Northern force, General Mellbye,
also tried to threaten the line of retreat of the attacking
force; but his own artillery was helpless, and the attack was
not made in sufficient force, while the forward movement of
the Southern force was very much facilitated.
The umpires decided that General Mellbye’s plan had
failed, although if carried out in another manner this plan
would have justified even great sacrifices if such were neces-
sary. This disastrous result caused the Kristiania and the
Smaalenene landwehr battalions, which were to hold the
enemy with a feint against his right flank, to make a real
attack, during which they suffered severely from the artil-
lery of the Southern force and from the guard battalion,
whose orders also were to carry on a demonstrative combat.
The result of this defeat was that the two battalions were
unable to participate in the real attack, which was unsuccess-
ful for this reason. Infantry columns passed over the open
plain almost without loss, since only a couple of companies
from the Northern force had come into position at the edge
of the woods and were able to fire upon them. The other
two battalions arrived after the attacking infantry had passed
the most difficult point.
The King delivered a long criticism when the fighting had
ceased, after which the troops went into bivouac. The cessa-
tion of hostilities, however, did not go into effect until 4 a.m.,
Sunday morning (August 27).
Sunday was a day of rest.
NORWAY. 109
OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 28.
The result of this day was awaited with special interest in
military circles. Everybody was prepared for a surprise on
the part of General Mellbye, to recover from Saturday’s defeat.
Although he had on the whole held the position at Skjeberg,
he had decided to retreat while waiting for reenforcements, as
he found it better to resume fighting in the narrow defile of
the railroad station at Ise. The Southern commander had at
the same time decided to continue his forward movement.
During its retreat the Northern force had detailed a rear guard
consisting of the first brigade, the cavalry corps, and one bat-
tery.
The advance guard of the Southern force consisted of two
battalions of the first brigade, one Squadron, one battery, and
Sappers. Early this morning a sharp engagement took place
between the rear guard of the defense and the advance guard
of the attack during the retreat of the former.
The main body of the Northern force successfully retreated
to a position between the Nipen, a branch of the Glommen
River, and the Ise Lake.
The position of the Northern force extended in a semicircle
from the Bergsland farm and the Nipen through the Gabriel-
hytten, Spytevald, and to a mountain situated farthest east
called the Björnaas. It occupied here a very strong defensive
position, as on three sides it was covered by the Glommen, the
Ise River, and the Ise Lake. The ground is higher than that
over which the attacking force had to advance, and the
defenders had an excellent field of fire with regard to the
enemy.
This position was occupied in the following manner: The
second brigade occupied the ground from Bergsland on the
Nipen to Gabrielhytten; the reserve of the brigade was at
Havnen; and the main reserve of the army, consisting of the
first brigade, at Saekkeland, farther north.
The defenders had found a still better position for the artil-
lery than that on the first day. It was generally admired and
the officers called it the Ramstad position, after Captain Ram-
stad, who had discovered it the evening before. It was on top
of a high, wooded ridge north of Spytevald. Furthermore,
the position was so masked that it was difficult to discover.
To non-military persons it seemed impossible to drag the
heavy guns up the mountain ; but this was accomplished
110 AUTUMN MANEU VERS.
without great difficulty. A good road ran in rear from the
position to the main road, thus affording a secure line of
retreat. While the batteries were being brought up, the engi-
neer troops built a completely new bridge on this road.
To the left and in front of the artillery position is situated
a high mountain, the Björnaas, which was used as a lookout
and signal station because an excellent view was afforded
from this position. -
A force had been detached to the eastern bank of the Ise
Lake during the retreat. This detachment took position at
Öby in order to guard the left flank. To further secure this
flank, where there was danger of the enemy attempting an
attack, another detachment was posted on top of the Björnaas,
from which position it could effectively fire on the enemy on
both the east and the west sides of the Ise Lake.
During the advance of the Southern force a sharp engage-
ment took place between the cavalry of the opposing forces.
The cavalry of the Northern force made a charge which, while
it called forth applause from the spectators, was stopped by
infantry fire and resulted in considerable loss to the attacking
cavalry. But the fight first commenced in real earnest when
the advance guard of the Southern force, with the Oester-
dalen battalion as the advance party, approached the narrow
defile at the Ise railroad station about 10 a. m. As soon as
the enemy showed himself on the Open road he was subjected
to an uninterrupted fire from the firing line of the defenders
on the other side of the river. The two nearest bridges were
blown up, while mountains and ridges resounded with steady
volleys and the roar of artillery.
The attacking force took up a position on the ridge along
the river to the north, toward the Ise mill, but suffered con-
siderable losses. The enemy’s advance guard battery could
not get into position, but was compelled to withdraw after
several unsuccessful attempts. Not until about 10.30 a. m.
did the artillery of the Southern force come into position at
Kreppe and Kampenaes. While moving into position and
unlimbering, it was subjected to heavy fire at short range
from the artillery of the Northern force and the Kristiania
landwehr battalion. *
The umpire ordered the flag indicating defeat to be raised.
A third battery suffered the same fate. The commander of
the Southern force intended to send his main body forward
NORWAY. 111
past the Naes farm in the east through the woods in front
against Spytevald.
General Mellbye, who had held his position very success-
fully, tried at this point a stratagem which was only partly
successful. He had destroyed all bridges across the river but
one, and he tried to lure the enemy to cross on this. By mis-
take an infantry detachment of the Southern force charged
across. General Mellbye’s plan was to throw three battal-
ions forward to make a countercharge at this moment.
The enemy, however, happened to discover his mistake and
commenced to withdraw. General Mellbye was therefore
compelled to hasten the execution of his plan, and three bat-
talions of the Northern force were sent against the enemy’s
Smaalenene battalion of the line, which was soon reenforced
by the Hedemarken battalion of the line and the guard bat-
talion. During its advance the latter suffered so much from
the incessant fire of the Northern artillery that the counter-
attack of the Northern force would probably have been suc-
cessful had not “cease firing” sounded. -
The day’s fight showed that the Ise position was unusually
strong in every particular.
The King, who had all day long followed the operations
very closely, again delivered a long criticism. In this he.
expressed his appreciation of the dispositions of the Northern
force and its conduct during the battle.
The splendid artillery position attracted especially the atten-
tion of the King as well as that of the foreign officers present.
OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 29.
The weather continued fine, but the heat was somewhat
oppressive. The operations, considered as a whole, were on
this day no less interesting than those of the preceding days.
This day’s operations consisted in the retreat of the North-
ern force from the Ise position to Rakkestad, and the pursuit
by the enemy. The position at Ise had been very success-
fully defended by the Northern force on the preceding day,
while the enemy had suffered heavily. Notwithstanding this,
General Mellbye decided to retreat toward Rakkestad to meet
expected reenforcements. When these arrived he confidently
expected to drive the enemy back to the Skjeberg Inlet.
General Mellbye had early in the night deceived the enemy
by withdrawing his outposts from their position far to the
front, and had drawn his troops back without arousing the
112 AUTUMIN MANETUVERS.
enemy’s suspicion. When the latter came up to the Northern
Outpost line, the main body was already far on its way toward
Rakkestad. The Northern force had for the retreat detailed
a rear guard, consisting of two battalions of the first brigade
and two batteries, besides other troops.
The rear guard later in the day took position at Gautestad,
with the left flank resting on Grimstad and Kaldaker. The
artillery had also to-day found a splendid position on a high
ridge on the east side of the railroad cut, from which the
whole ground in front could be swept. The cavalry was
posted at the line Overby-Degernaes, to secure the left flank
of the position. The position at Gautestad is a very narrow
defile, which offers the greatest advantage for a strong defense.
It was occupied by the order of General Mellbye, and the
defenders were ordered to delay the enemy until the Northern
forces had occupied the position at Rakkestad.
At Gautestad an exciting infantry and artillery engage-
ment took place. The artillery of the Northern force fired
with great effect on the advancing enemy. In addition, the
latter was also subjected to a heavy fire from the infantry.
The volleys sounded incessantly along the ridge and caused
the belief that a considerable part of the Northern force was
participating in the fight. This seemed to be the opinion of
the enemy, whose reconnoissance was rendered very difficult
On account of the ground. The enemy was even compelled
to bring forward his whole force toward the latter part of the
engagement. The intense fire was, however, kept up by only
a small force, and finally but a single platoon remained, which
mystified the enemy with its incessant firing. Finally this
also disappeared, well covered by the woods in the rear.
When the enemy attacked in earnest, almost the whole
force of the defenders had reached Rakkestad. It was fatal
to the attacking party that it took so long a time for the artil-
lery to get into position, thus affording so much time for the
defenders to successfully retreat and take position.
The advance guard of the Southern force consisted of two
battalions, one battery, and the cavalry. The latter was
stopped by the defender’s infantry at the Rud woods and was
of little use in the difficult terrain. In the meantime the
infantry continued its advance through the woods on both
sides. The Smaalenene battalion of the line, the half bat-
talion, and the guard battalion upon its relief as advance
guard, had received orders to advance over Gautestad and
NORWAY. 113
Kaldaker against the right flank of the defenders. The
Hedemarken, Oesterdalen, aud Gudbrandsdalen battalions
of the line were kept in reserve. As the guard battalion
alone reached the enemy’s right flank, the Smaalenene battal-
ions of the line advanced against Sörby in connection with
the Kristiania battalion of the line against the front of the
defenders. w
The chief of the artillery of the Southern force commenced
his reconnoissance at 10.30 a. m., to find a position for his
artillery; but the ground was so difficult that the artillery
was unable to open fire until two hours later. It was discov-
ered shortly afterwards that the artillery of the Northern
force was maneuvering on ground upon which it seemed
impossible to get the guns up into position. The guns of the
Southern force upset several times while being brought into
position, and both men and horses were in danger of life, but
all escaped injury. • .
In the most excellent order, and almost unmolested, the
whole Northern force withdrew to the position behind the
Rakkestad River, and blew up the bridge. Here the North-
ern force prepared to resist to the last. The work of strength-
ening the position was commenced at once. The engineer
troops dug excellent shelter trenches in front of the bridge,
while others were only marked. - *
“Cease firing” sounded at 3.30 p. m.
This day’s maneuver had in the greatest degree strength-
ened the position of the Northern force. According to the
opinion of experts General Mellbye had, by this day’s dispo-
sitions, performed his task splendidly, and the manner in
which the troops were maneuvered had been specially satis-
factory. The artillery position was excellent.
The King expressed his appreciation of the excellent achieve-
ments, which also called forth commendation from the foreign
attachés.
The condition of the troops was surprisingly good, consid-
ering their very fatiguing marches, without water, over the
dusty country roads, and partly through woods and over rough
ground. There were some complaints on account of the cold
mights, but there were very few sick. Many were affected by
minor stomach troubles or sore feet.
12883–8
114 AlJTUMN MANEUVERS.
OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 30.
The decisive battle was fought at Rakkestad on this day.
It was certainly the most interesting part of the whole
maneuvers, but the day was an exceedingly fatiguing one for
the troops. * •
Although the rather wide Rakkestad River, which cuts
through the plain in front of the Rakkestad church before it
joins the Glommen, is a formidable obstacle to an enemy, the
Rakkestad position can not, in the opinion of military men,
be defended by a small force, because it is too extended. The
river is fordable in several places, and it was impossible to
determine from which direction the real attack might be made.
The ground in front is very hilly, so that the enemy’s troops
could advance under cover and unseen by the defenders.
The commander of the Southern force utilized these con-
ditions to the greatest advantage, and it is the opinion among
military men that the plans employed by him were very skill-
ful indeed. He advanced his troops over the somewhat dif-
ficult terrain without their being discovered until just before
the assault was to be made. -
General Mellbye had caused most of the bridges to be blown
up while the remaining ones had been prepared for demoli-
tion. The cavalry of the Northern force had been sent out
at 6 o'clock in the morning to make a reconnoissance of the
enemy’s position. Toward the west the bicycle company was
given the task to secure the passage over the river at the Buer
and Brekkefarms as far to the west as the Glommen. It was at
the same time directed to reconnoiter the enemy’s left flank. On
account of the extended front General Mellbye was compelled
to dispose the rest of his force in such a manner as to be able
at any moment to meet the attack of the enemy on the right
as well as on the left flank, for the river was fordable in
both places. The very place for this disposition was at the
Rakkestad church; the first brigade occupied a position at
Bergenhus, the second brigade at the church. Close to the
church was the Kristiania landwehr battalion, and in a shelter
trench in front of a demolished bridge was one-half of the
Gudbrandsdalen landwehr battalion.
The first brigade could, from Bergenhus, be directed against
the bathing place at Stemme, over a path or past the Berget
farm' toward the east, according to the direction of the attack.
General Mellbye had posted his artillery on a lower ridge
Southeast of a railroad station; but this position was not so
NORWAY. 115
good as that of the preceding day. As the attack developed,
this fact became more and more apparent. Had the enemy
attacked from the east, the artillery would have been unable
to come into action. Several officers were of the opinion that
another position, as for instance at the church, would have
been better.
General Mellbye, however, took it for granted that the
enemy would attack on the right flank. This, moreover,
proved to be the case. He thought he could fire on the
enemy from this point. The position was, however, too
cramped for the two batteries, and the enemy's shells would,
therefore, have had a very destructive effect. The enemy’s
advance was so unexpected that the artillery could do nothing.
After a careful reconnoissance of the position of the North-
ern force, the commander of the Southern force, General
Oevergaard, decided to make a feint against the front, and
thus, if possible, deceive his adversary, while the real attack
was to be made against the flank at the ford of the Stemme.
The Southern artillery had found an excellent location. To
get into this position was even more of a difficulty than had
previously been encountered during the maneuvers. But
from this position the artillery could command all the ground
in front and could effectively prepare for the attack against
both flanks of the enemy. The 'sappers had to cut a road
through the woods before one of the batteries could come up.
The feint against the Northern front was made by the Kris-
tiania and Gudbrandsdalen battalions of the line. One part
of the second brigade was sent through the woods, another
over the small road past Engedal to the Stemme bathing
place. The soldiers waded into the water and crossed in the
best order, although this was in places waist deep. The
Smaalenene battalion of the line advanced through ravines
and woods to the main road without being seen. From this
point it immediately assaulted the Northern artillery on the
ridge. As the escort was rather weak, one company under
Captain Mamen and First Lieutenant Johansen, of Nansen
expedition fame, succeeded in capturing four guns of the
Northern force. The defender’s artillery had earlier been
much damaged by the artillery fire of the Southern force,
and was taken completely by surprise. It had tried to evac-
uate the position, but was delayed because two guns stuck
fast and One turned completely over.
116 AUTUMN MANEUVERS.
In the meantime General Mellbye had sent his whole
reserve, consisting of three battalions, past the Lien farm
against the enemy, while simultaneously Colonel Nissen with
four companies joined the advance on the right flank.
Scarcely had the Southern force emerged from the woods
and charged up the steep height, when it was received with
a very heavy fire from the longer and superior line of defend-
ers, who awaited its coming along the ridge of the opposing
height.
The engagement which followed was very severe, and had
it been in earnest, the casualties would have been many.
The King and his party observed the fight at close range and
did not conceal their enthusiasm.
Several of the detachments of the Southern force were
already under a severe fire, some of them having been com-
pelled to raise the flag indicating defeat before the rest could
come up on account of the heavy fire to which they were
subjected. For this reason the defenders would in all proba-
bility have repulsed the enemy, but with great losses to
themselves. It must, however, be taken into consideration
that the artillery of the Northern force had not come into
a good position, while that of the Southern force could sup-
port its infantry wherever it was necessary.
The umpires decided that the defenders had held their
position and that the enemy must retreat across the river.
The King, in his criticism, emphasized the splendid manner
in which the attack had been made, and especially the skill
displayed in the capture of the guns
OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 31.
The fight was renewed early this morning. The expected
reenforcements for the Northern force, consisting of the
guard battalion, the school detachment, and One battery, had
arrived. These had been detached from the Southern and
added to that of the Northern force. -
This was the last day’s fight and ended rather early. A
long expected rain finally came. The hostilities commenced
very early, but the result had been decided in yesterday’s
battle. -
The reenforcements gave the Northern force a superiority
over its enemy, and it was therefore comparatively easy to
drive him back. General Oevergaard had, for his retreat,
detailed two battalions as a rear guard. These were to delay
NORWAY. 117
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the Northern army, while the main body retreated through
the already mentioned narrow defile at Gautestad.
The battalions of the rear guard took position behind the
Rakkestad River, while the artillery of the Southern force
kept the position it had occupied during the day before.
General Mellbye directed two battalions to make a demon-
stration at the Stemme ford. At the same time, he made an
attack with four battalions past the bathing places at Björ-
nestad against Nordby. Several detachments forded the river
after a spirited engagement. The Northern force had, dur-
ing this day’s fight, one battery in position at the Kasa farm
and two batteries at the Rakkestad church.
The artillery of the Southern force was withdrawn after a
while, and the rear guard succeeded in holding the enemy
long enough for the main body to make good its retreat.
After “cease firing” had sounded the whole force was formed
in two columns on the large open plain in front of the church,
and an address from the King was read to the troops before
they were dismissed. -
The maneuvers were thus concluded, and the troops started
for their several destinations.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.
Both officers and men manifested, on the whole, more sat-
isfaction with this year’s maneuvers than they probably ever
had before. It was a pleasure to notice how the same thought
and feeling inspired all during this concentration of 11,900
men from the different parts of the country. The restoration
of the defensive forces of Norway had been the purpose to
which one and all wanted to contribute, and the maneuvers
showed that they are on the road toward obtaining a landwehr
that is really useful.
A foreign officer, who was also present during the maneu-
vers at Voss in 1892, and who afterwards wrote some articles
that attracted considerable attention among Norwegian offi-
cers, has strongly emphasized the great progress which has
been made since then. “It is easy to see,” he says, “that a
new spirit animates the whole. I shall never forget that ‘yes’
with which the soldiers, during the presentation of the colors,
promised to offer their lives and blood for the defense of the
flag.” -
118 AUTUMN MANEUVERs.
The chiefs of the different arms of the service expressed
their satisfaction with the maneuvers and the experience they
had gained from them.
The condition of the troops was surprisingly good. There
were only one hundred and sixteen cases on the sick report
during the maneuvers, and of these only six were serious.
Only sixteen horses were rendered unserviceable. This result
is certainly marvelous, when the oppressive heat and the
great exertion demanded of the soldiers is considered. All
foreign military attachés present during the maneuvers ex-
pressed their admiration of the power of endurance of both
the men and the horses. - .
An opportunity was afforded to make instructive experi-
ments with the new equipments of the sanitary corps. These
fulfilled every expectation. The foreign military attachés
paid special attention to this part of the military equipment.
They made a critical examination of it and thoroughly
informed themselves concerning the same.
The artillery also attracted special attention. The Norwe-
gian horses seemed to understand how to overcome the very
worst obstacles, and since the matériel was still uninjured
after the rough usages it had been subjected to during the
last few days of the maneuvers, it certainly must be con-
sidered excellent.
The new bicycle companies demonstrated their great utility,
although there may still exist in military circles a difference
of opinion as to what particular duty they are best adapted.
And, finally, the commissary department, which had diffi-
culties enough to overcome, worked admirably, and satisfac-
tory results were obtained with samples of new articles of
food prepared especially for use in the field.
*
.* #
IVERSITY O
Illuli.
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