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MOSES
SOLON
CONFUCIUS
LIVNIN
BRVTVS
DICURGIUS
ITOLANDVS
M.DCC.
LIBERTATI
NUMA
VLIELMYS
SACRIANIT
M.Vander Gucht. Scul:
THE
Cargofort.
OCEANA
AND
OTHER WORKS
OF
James Harrington Efq;
Collected, Methodiz'd, and Review'd,
WITH
An Exact Account of his LIFE
PREFIX'D,
By JOHN TO LAND.
To which is added,
An APPENDIX, containing all the Political
Tracts wrote by this AUTHO R,
Omitted in Mr. T o LAN D's Edition.
RESPUBLICA Res eft Populi cum benè ac juftè geritur, five ab uno Rege, five a paucis
Optimatibus, five ab univerfo Populo. Cum vero injuftus eft Rex (quem Tyrannum voco)
aut injufti Optimates (quorum Confenfus Factio eft) aut injuftus ipfe Populus (cui nomen
ufitatum nullum reperio, nifi ut ipfum Tyrannum appellem) non jam vitiofa fed omnino nulla
Refpublica eft, quoniam non RES eft POPULI cum Tyrannus eam Factióve capeffat;
nec ipfe Populus jam Populus eft fi fit injuſtus, quoniam non eft Multitudo Juris confenfu &
Utilitatis communione ſociata.
Fragmentum Ciceronis ex lib. 3. de Republica, apud Auguftin.
de Civ, Dei, 1. 2. c. 21.
THE THIRD EDITION:
With an ALPHABETICAL INDEX of the Principal Matters.
LONDON:
Printed for A. MILLAR, oppofite to Catharine-street, in the Strand.
M.DCC. XLVII
A
:
ResRegent.
. R. R. Hubbard
"11-16-1925
( i )
:)
TO THE
LORD MAYOR,
ALDERMEN,
SHERIF S
AND
COMMON COUNCIL
I
O F
LONDON
T is not better known to you, moftworthy Magiſtrats,
that Government is the preſerving Cauſe of all Societys,
than that every Society is in a languiſhing or flouriſhing
condition, anſwerable to the particular Conſtitution
of its Government: And if the Goodnefs of the Laws in
any place be thus diſtinguiſhable by the Happineſs of the
People, fo the Wiſdom of the People is beft difcern'd by
the Laws they have made, or by which they have choſen to
be govern'd. The truth of thefe Obfervations is no where
more confpicuous than in the preſent State of that moſt
Antient and Famous Society you have the honor to rule, and
which reciprocally injoys the chearful influence of yourAd-
miniſtration. 'Tis folely to its Government that London
ows being univerfally acknowleg'd the largeft, faireſt,
richeft, and moſt populous City in the World; all which
glorious Attributes could have no Foundation in Hiftory
or Nature, if it were not likewife the moft Free. 'Tis
confeft indeed that it derives infinite Advantages above other
A
places
11
The Dedication.
places from its incomparable Situation, as being an inland
City, feated in the middle of a Vale no leſs delicious than
healthy, and on the Banks of a Noble River, in reſpect of
which (if we regard how many ſcore Miles it is navigable,
the clearneſs and depth of its Channel, or its ſmooth and
even Courſe) the Seine is but a Brook, and the celebrated
Tyber it ſelf a Rivulet: Yet all this could never raiſe it to any
confiderable pitch without the ineſtimable Bleffings of Li-
BERTY, which has choſen her peculiar Reſidence, and more
eminently fixt her Throne in this place. LIBERTY is the true
Spring of its prodigious Trade and Commerce with all the
known parts of theUniverſe, and is the original Planter of its
many fruitful Colonys in America, with its numberless Factorys
in Europe, Afia, and Africa : hence it is that every Sea is co-
ver'd with our Ships, that the very Air is fcarce exemted from
our Inventions, and that all the Productions of Art or Na-
ture are imported to this common Storehouſe of Mankind;
or rather as if the whole Variety of things wherwith the
Earth is ſtockt had bin principally defign'd for our profit or
delight, and no more of 'em allow'd to the reft of Men,
than what they muſt neceffarily uſe as our Purveyors or La-
borers. As LIBERTY has elevated the native Citizens of Lon-
don to fo high a degree of Riches and Politeneſs, that for
their ſtately Houſes, fine Equipages, and fumtuous
Tables, they excede the Port of fom Foren Princes; fo is
it naturally becom every Man's Country, and the happy
Refuge of thoſe in all Nations, who prefer the ſecure injoy-
ment of Life and Property to the glittering pomp and
flavery, as well as to the arbitrary luft and rapine of their
ſeveral Tyrants. To the fame Cauſe is owing the Splen-
dor and Magnificence of the public Structures, as Palaces,
Temples, Halls, Colleges, Hofpitals, Schools, Courts of
Judicature, and a great many others of all kinds, which,
tho fingly excel'd where the Wealth or State of any Town
cannot reach further than one Building, yet, taking them
all together, they are to be equal'd no where befides. The
delicat Country Seats, and the large Villages crouded on
all hands around it, are manifeſt Indications how happily
the Citizens live, and makes a Stranger apt to believe him-
felf in the City before he approaches it by fom miles. Nor
is it to the felicity of the preſent times that London is only in-
debted :
J
·
The Dedication.
debted : for in all Ages, and under all Changes, it ever
fhew'd a moft paffionat love of LIBERTY, which it has not
more bravely preferv'd than wifely manag'd, infufing the
fame Genius into all quarters of the Land, which are in-
fluenc'd from hence as the feveral parts of the Animal Body
are duly ſupply'd with Blood and Nouriſhment from the
Heart. Whenever therfore the execrable defign was hatcht
to inflave the Inhabitants of this Country, the firſt At-
temts were ſtill made on the Government of the City,
as there alſo the ſtrongeſt and moſt fuccefsful Efforts were
firft us'd to reſtore Freedom: for we may remember (to
name one inſtance for all) when the late King was fled,
and every thing in confufion, that then the chief Nobility
and Gentry reforted to Guildhall for protection, and to con-
cert proper methods for fettling the Nation hereafter on a
Bafis of Liberty never to be fhaken. But what greater
Demonſtration can the World require concerning the Ex-
cellency of our National Government, or the particular
Power and Freedom of this City, than the BANK of England,
which, like the Temple of SATURN among the Romans,
is eſteem'd ſo facred a Repofitory, that even Foreners think
their Treaſure more fafely lodg'd there than with them-
felves at home; and this not only don by the Subjects of
Abfolute Princes, where there can be no room for any
Public Credit, but likewiſe by the Inhabitants of thofe Com-
monwealths where alone fuch Banks were hitherto reputed
fecure. I am the more willing to make this Remark, be-
cauſe the Conſtitution of our Bank is both preferable to that
of all others, and comes the neareſt of any Government to
HARRINGTON'S Model. In this reſpect a particular Com-
mendation is due to the City which produc'd fuch Perfons
to whoſe wiſdom we owe fo beneficial an Eſtabliſhment:
and therfore from my own fmall obfervation on Men or
Things I fear not to prophefy, that, before the term of years
be expir'd to which the Bank is now limited, the defires of
all people will gladly concur to have it render'd perpetual.
Neither is it one of the laſt things on which you ought to va-
lue your felves, moft worthy Citizens, that there is ſcarce away
of honoring the Deity known any where, but is either already
allow'd, or may be fafely exercis'd among you; Toleration
being only deny'd to immoral Practices, and the Opi-
A 2
nions
111
iv
The Dedication.
nions of Men being left as free to them as their Poffeffions,
excepting only POPERY, and fuch other Rites and Notions as
directly tend to diſturb or diffolve Society. Befides the poli-
tical Advantages of Union, Wealth, and numbers of Peo-
ple, which are the certain Confequents of this impartial Liber-
ty, 'tis alfo highly congruous to the nature of true Religion;
and if any thing on Earth can be imagin'd to ingage the In-
tereſt of Heaven, it muſt be fpecially that which procures
it the fincere and voluntary reſpect of Mankind. I might
here difplay the Renown of the City for Military Glory,
and recite thoſe former valiant Atchievments which our Hi-
ftorians carefully record; but I ſhould never finiſh if I in-
larg'd on thoſe things which I only hint, or if I would men-
tion the extraordinary Privileges which London now injoys,
and may likely poffefs hereafter, for which ſhe well deferves
the name of a New Rome in the Weft, and, like the old
one, to becom the Soverain Miſtreſs of the Univerſe.
THE Government of the City is fo wifely and com-
pletely contriv'd, that HARRINGTON made very few Al-
terations in it, tho in all the other parts of our National
Conſtitution he ſcarce left any thing as he found it. And
without queſtion it is a moft excellent Model. The Lord
Mayor, as to the Solemnity of his Election, the Magnificence
of his State, or the Extent of his Authority, tho inferior to a
Roman Conful (to whom in many reſpects he may be fitly
compar'd) yet he far outſhines the figure made by an Athe-
nian Archon, or the grandeur of any Magiftrat prefiding
over the beſt Citys now in the World. During a vacan-
cy of the Throne he is the chief Perſon in the Nation, and
is at all times veſted with a very extraordinary Truft, which
is the reaſon that this Dignity is not often confer❜d on un-
deferving Perſons; of which we need not go further for
an Inſtance than the Right Honorable Sir RICHARD Levet,
who now fo worthily fills that eminent Poft, into which
he was not more freely chofen by the Suffrages of his
Fellowcitizens, than he continues to diſcharge the Func-
tions of it with approv'd Moderation and Juſtice. But of
the great Caution generally us'd in the choice of Magiftrats,
we may give a true judgment by the preſent Worſhipful She-
rifs, Sir CHARLES DUNCOMB and Sir JEFFERY JEFFERIES,
who are not the Creatures of petty Factions and Cabals,
nor
3.
The Dedication.
V
nor (as in the late Reigns) illegally obtruded on the City to
ſerve a Turn for the Court, but unanimouſly elected for
thoſe good Qualitys which alone fhould be the proper Re-
commendations to Magiftracy; that as having the greateſt
Stakes to loſe they will be the more concern'd for fecuring
the Property of others, fo their willingneſs to ferve their
Country is known not to be inferior to their Zeal for King
WILLIAM; and while they are, for the Credit of the
City, generouſly equalling the Expences of the Roman
Prætors, fuch at the fame time is their tender care of the
Diſtreſt, as if to be Overfeers of the Poor were their fole
and immediat Charge. As the Common Council is the
Popular Repreſentative, fo the Court of Aldermen is the
Ariftocratical Senat of the City. To enter on the parti-
cular Merits of thoſe Names who compofe this illuftri-
ous Affembly, as it muſt be own'd by all to be a labor
no leſs arduous than extremely nice and invidious, yet to
paſs it quite over in fuch a manner as not to give at leaſt a
Specimen of fo much Worth, would argue a pufillanimity
inconfiftent with LIBERTY, and a difreſpect to thoſe I
wou'd be always underſtood to honor. In regard therfore
that the eldeſt Alderman is the fame at London with what
the Prince of the Senat was at Rome, I fhall only preſume
to mention the Honorable Sir ROBERT CLAYTON as well
in that capacity,. as by reaſon he univerfally paffes for the per-
fect pattern of a good Citizen. That this Character is not
exaggerated will be evident to all thoſe who confider him,
either as raiſing a plentiful Fortune by his Induſtry and Me-
rit, or as difpofing his Eftate with no leſs liberality and judg-
ment than he got it with honefty and care: For as to his
public and privat Donations, and the proviſion he has made
for his Relations or Friends, I will not ſay that he is un-
equal'd by any, but that he deſerves to be imitated by all.
Yet theſe are ſmall Commendations if compar'd to his
fteddy Conduct when he fupply'd the higheſt Stations of
this Great City. The danger of defending the Liberty of the
Subject in thoſe calamitous times is not better remember'd
than the courage with which he acted, particularly in bringing
in the Bill for excluding a Popifh Succeffor from the Crown,
his brave appearance on the behalf of your Charter, and
the general applauſe with which he diſcharg'd his Truſt
in
vi
The Dedication.
in all other relpects; nor ought the Gratitude of the Peo-
ple be forgot, who on this occafion firſt ſtil'd him the Father
of the City, as CICERO for the like reaſon was the firſt of all
Romans call'd the Father of his Country. That heftill affifts in
the Government of London as eldeſt Alderman, and in that
of the whole Nation as a member of the high Court of
Parlament, is not fo great an honor as that he deferves it;
while the Poſterity of thoſe Familys he ſupports, and the
memory of his other laudable Actions, will be the living
and eternal Monuments of his Virtue, when time has
confum'd the moſt durable Brafs or Marble.
To whom therfore fhou'd I infcribe a Book contain-
ing the Rules of good Polity, but to a Society fo admi-
rably conſtituted, and producing fuch Great and Excellent
Men? That elſewhere there may be found who under-
ſtand Government better, diſtribute Juftice wifer, or love
Liberty more, I could never perfuade myſelf to imagin :
nor can the Perſon wiſh for a nobler Addreſs, or the Sub-
ject be made happy in a more futable Patronage than
THE SENAT AND PEOPLE OF LONDON;
to whoſe uninterrupted increaſe of Wealth and Dignity,
none can be a heartier Welwiſher, than the greateſt admi-
rer of their Conſtitution and their moſt humble Servant,
·
1
JOHN TOLAND.
THE
( vii)
1
THE
PREFACE
H
OW allowable it is for any man to write the Hiftory of another,
without intitling himself to his Opinions, or becoming anfwera-
ble for his Actions, I have exprefly treated in the Life of
JOHN MILTON, and in the just defence of the fame under
the Title of A MYNTOR. The Reaſons there alleg'd are Excufe and
Authority enough for the Task I have fince impos'd on my felf, which is,
to tranfmit to Pofterity the worthy Memory of JAMES HARRINGTON,
a bright Ornament to uſeful Learning, a hearty Lover of his Native
Country, and a generous Benefactor to the whole World; a Perfon who
obfcur'd the falfe Luftre of our Modern Politicians, and that equal'd (if
not exceded) all the Antient Legislators.
BUT there are ſom People more formidable for their Noife than Num-
ber, and for their Number more confiderable than their Power, who will
not fail with open mouths to proclaim that this is a feditious Attemt a-
gainst the very being of Monarchy, and that there's a pernicious defign on
foot of speedily introducing a Republican Form of Government into the
Britannic lands; in order to which the Perfon (continue they) whom
we have for ſom time diftinguiſht as a zealous promoter of this Cauſe, has
now publifht the Life and Works of HARRINGTON, who was the greatest
Commonwealthfman in the World. This is the fubftance of what theſe
roaring and boarfe Trumpeters of Detraction will found; for what's
likely to be faid by men, who talk all by rote, is as eafy to guess as to answer,
tho 'tis commonly fo filly as to deferve no Animadverfion. Those who in
the late Reigns were invidiously nicknam'd Commonwealthfmen, are by
this time fufficiently clear'd of that Imputation by their Actions, a much
better Apology than any Words: for they valiantly refcu'd our antient Go-
vernment from the devouring Jaws of Arbitrary Power, and did not only
unanimously concur to fix the Imperial Crown of England on the moſt de-
Serving Head in the Univerſe, but alſo fettl'd the Monarchy for the fu-
ture, not as if they intended to bring it foon to a period, but under fuch
wife Regulations as are most likely to continue it for ever, confifting of
fuch excellent Laws as indeed fet bounds to the Will of the King, but that
render him thereby the more fafe, equally binding up his and the Subjects
hands from unjustly feizing one another's prefcrib'd Rights or Privileges.
de-
'TIS confeft, that in every Society there will be always found fom Per-
fons prepar'd to enterprize any thing (tho never fo flagitious) grown
Sperat by their Villanies, their Profufeness, their Ambition, or the more
raging madness of Superftition; and this Evil is not within the compaſs of
Art or Nature to remedy. But that a whole People, or any confiderable
number of them, ſhou'd rebel againſt a King that well and wifely admini-
fters his Government, as it cannot be inftanc'd out of any History, fo it is
a thing in it felf impoffible. An infallible Expedient therfore to exclude
a Commonwealth, is for the King to be the Man of his People, and, ac-
cording
Viii
The PREFACE.
cording to his prefent Majefty's glorious Example, to find out the Secret of
fo happily uniting two feemingly incompatible things, Principality and
Liberty.
'TÍS ftrange that men fou'd be cheated by mere Names! yet how fre-
quently are they feen to admire under one denomination, what going
under another they wou'd undoubtedly deteft; which Obfervation made
TACITUS lay down for a Maxim, That the fecret of ſetting up a new
State confiſts in retaining the Image of the old. Now if a Common-
wealth be a Government of Laws enacted for the common Good of all the
People, not without their own Confent or Approbation; and that they are not
wholly excluded, as in abfolute Monarchy, which is a Government of Men
who forcibly rule over others for their own private Interest: Then it is un-
deniably manifeft that the English Government is already a Commonwealth,
the most free and beft conftituted in all the world. This was frankly ac-
knowleg'd by King JAMES the First, who ftiled himself the Great Ser-
vant of the Commonwealth. It is the Language of our beft Lawyers,
and allow'd by our Author, who only makes it a less perfect and more inequal
Form than that of his Oceana, wherin, he thinks, better proviſion is
made against external Violence or internal Difeafes. Nor dos it at all import
by what names either Perfons, or Places, or Things are call'd, fince the
Commonwealthfman finds he injoys Liberty under the fecurity of equal
Laws, and that the rest of the Subjects are fully fatisfy'd they live under
a Government which is a Monarchy in effect as well as in name. There's not
a man alive that excedes my affection to a mixt Form of Government by
the Antients counted the most perfect; yet I am not fo blinded with admir-
ing the good Conftitution of our own, but that every day I can difcern in
it many things deficient, fom things redundant, and others that require e-
mendation or change. And of this the fupreme Legislative Powers are fo
fenfible, that we fee nothing more frequent with them than the enacting, ab-
rogating, explaining, and altering of Laws, with regard to the very Form
of the Adminiftration. Nevertheless I hope the King and both Houses of
Parlament will not be counted Republicans; or, if they be, I am the rea-
dieft in the world to run the fame good or bad Fortune with them in this
as well as in all other refpects.
BUT, what HARRINGTON was oblig'd to ſay on the like occafion, I
must now produce for my felf. It was in the time of ALEXANDER, the
greatest Prince and Commander of his Age, that ARISTOTLE (with fcarce
inferior Applauſe, and equal Fame) wrote that excellent piece of Prudence
in his Clofet which is call'd his Politics, going upon far other Principles
than ALEXANDER's Government which it has long outliv'd. The like
did Livy without diſturbance in the time of AUGUSTUS, Sir THOMAS
MORE in that of HENRY the Eighth, and MACHIAVEL when Italy
was under Princes that afforded him not the ear. If theſe and many o-
ther celebrated Men wrote not only with honor and fafety, but even of
Commonwealths under Defpotic or Tyrannical Princes, who can be fo
notoriouſly ſtupid as to wonder that in a free Government, and under a
King that is both the reflorer and ſupporter of the Liberty of Europe, I
fhou'd do juſtice to an Author who far outdos all that went before him, in
his exquifit knowlege of the Politics?
THIS Liberty of writing freely, fully, and impartially, is a part of thoſe
Rights which in the last Reigns were fo barbarously invaded by fuch as
had no inclination to hear of their own enormous violations of the Laws
of God and Man; nor is it undefervi ng Obfervation, that Juch as raiſe
3
the
The PREFACE.
going
the loudest Clamors against it now, are the known Enemys of King
WILLIAM'S Title and Perfon, being fure that the Abdicated King
JAMES can never be reinthron'd fo long as the Prefs is open for brave
and free Spirits to display the Mischiefs of Tyranny in their true Colors,
and to fhew the infinit Advantages of Liberty. But not to diſmiſs even
fuch unreasonable People without perfect fatisfaction, let'em know that I
don't recommend a Commonwealth, but write the Hiftory of a Common-
wealthfman, fairly divulging the Principles and Pretences of that Party,
and leaving every body to approve or dislike what he pleafes, without impo-
fing on his Judgment by the deluding Arts of Sophiftry, Eloquence, or any
other specious but unfair methods of perfuafion. Men, to the best of their
ability, ought to be ignorant of nothing; and while they talk fo much for
and against a Commonwealth, 'tis fit they fhou'd at least understand the
Subject of their Difcourfe, which is not every body's cafe. Now as HAR-
RINGTON'S Oceana is, in my opinion, the most perfect Form of Popular
Government that ever was: fo this, with his other Writings, contain the
Hiftory, Reafons, Nature, and Effects of all forts of Government, with
fo much Learning and Perfpicuity, that nothing can be more preferably
read on fuch occafions.
✓
LET not thoſe therfore, who make no oppofition to the reprinting or
reading of PLATO's Heathen Commonwealth, ridiculously declaim against
the better and Chriflian Model of HARRINGTON; but perufe both of
'em with as little_prejudice, paffion, or concern, as they would a Book of
Travels into the Indys for their improvement and diverfion. Yet fo con-
trary are the Tempers of many to this equitable difpofition, that DIONY-
SIUS the Sicilian Tyrant, and fuch Beafts of Prey, are the worthy Exam-
ples they wou'd recommend to the imitation of our Governors, tho, if they
cou'd be able to perfuade 'em, they wou'd ſtill miſs of their foolish aim: for
it is ever with all Books, as formerly with thofe of CREMUTIUS COR-
DUS, who was condemn'd by that Monster TIBERIUS for ſpeaking bono-
rably of the immortal Tyrannicides BRUTUS and CASSIUS. TACITUS
records the laft words of this Hiftorian, and fubjoins this judicious Re-
mark: The Senat, fays he, order'd his Books to be burnt by the E-
diles; but fom Copys were conceal'd, and afterwards publiſh'd;
whence we may take occafion to laugh at the ſottiſhneſs of thoſe who
imagin that their prefent Power can alſo aboliſh the memory of fuc-
ceding time: for on the contrary, Authors acquire additional Repu-
tation by their Puniſhment; nor have Foren Kings, and fuch others
as have us'd the like feverity, got any thing by it, except to them-
felves Difgrace, and Glory to the Writers. But the Works of HAR-
RINGTON were neither fuppreft at their firft Publication under the U-
furper, nor ever fince call'd in by lawful Authority, but as inestimable Trea-
fures preferv'd by all that had the happiness to poffefs 'em intire ; ſo that
what was a precious rarity before, is now becom a Public Good, with
extraordinary advantages of Correctness, Paper, and Print. What I
bave perform'd in the Hiftory of his Life, I leave the Readers to judg for
themſelves; but in that and all my other studys, I conftantly aim'd as
much at least at the benefit of Mankind, and especially of my fellow Citi-
zens, as at my own particular Entertainment or Reputation.
THE Politics, no less than Arms, are the proper ftudy of a Gentle-
man, tho he fhou'd confine himself to nothing, but carefully adorn his
Mind and Body with all ufeful and becoming Accomplishments; and not
imitat the fervile drudgery of thofe mean Spirits, who, for the fake of
Som
1
The PREFACE.
fom one Science, neglect the knowlege of all other matters, and in the end
are many times neither masters of what they profefs, nor vers'd enough in
any thing else to speak of it agreably or pertinently: which renders 'em un-
tractable in Converſation, as in Difpute they are opinionative and paffio-
nat, envious of their Fame who eclipfe their littleness, and the fworn Ene-
mys of what they do not understand.
BUT Heaven be duly prais'd, Learning begins to flourish again
in its proper Soil among our Gentlemen, in imitation of the Roman
Patricians, who did not love to walk in Leading ftrings, and to be guided
blindfold, nor lazily to abandon the care of their proper Business to the
management of Men having a diftinct Profeffion and Intereſt: for the
greatest part of their beſt Authors were Perfons of Confular Dignity, the
ableft Statefmen, and the most gallant Commanders. Wherfore the ampleft
fatisfaction I can injoy of this fort will be, to find thofe delighted with read-
ing this work, for whofe fervice it was intended by the Author; and which
with the study of other good Books, but especially a careful perufal of the
Greec and Roman Hiftorians, will make 'em in reality deferve the Title
and Respect of Gentlemen, help 'em to make an advantageous Figure in
their own time, and perpetuat their illuftrious Fame and folid Worth
to be admir'd by future Generations.
AS for my felf, tho no imployment or condition of Life fhall make me
difrelish the laſting entertainment which Books afford; yet I have refolu'd
not to write the Life of any modern Perfon again, except that only of one
Man ftill alive, and whom in the ordinary courfe of Nature I am like to
furvive a long while, he being already far advanc'd in his declining time;
and I but this prefent day beginning the thirtieth year of my Age.
Canon near Banftead, Novemb. 30. 1699.
L
THE
(xiii)
THE
LIFE
OF
James Harrington.
1
"J
RINGTON;
*
AMES HARRINGTON (who was born in Janua
ry 1611) was defcended of an Antient and Noble Family
in Rutlandshire, being Great Grandfon to Sir JAMES HAR-
of whom it is obferv'd by the * Hiftorian Wright's
of that County, that there were fprung in his time eight Dukes, Antiquitys of
the County of
three Marquiffes, feventy Earls, twenty feven Viſcounts, and Rutland
thirty fix Barons; of which number fixteen were Knights of p. 52.
the Garter to confirm which account, we fhall annex a Copy
of the Infcription on his Monument and that of his three Sons at
Exton, with Notes on the fame by an uncertain hand. As for our
Author, he was the eldeſt Son of Sir SAPCOTES HARRINGTON,
and JANE the Daughter of Sir WILLIAM SAMUEL of Upton in
Northamtonshire. His Father had Children befides him, WILLIAM
a Merchant in London; ELIZABETH marry'd to Sir RALPH
ASHTON in Lancashire, Baronet; ANN marry'd to ARTHUR
EVELYN Efq. And by a fecond Wife he had JOHN kill'd at Sea;
EDWARD a Captain in the Army, yet living; FRANCES marry'd
to JOHN BAGSHAW of Culworth in Northamtonshire Efq; and Do-
ROTHY marry'd to ALLAN BELLINGHAM of Levens in Weftmor-
land Efq. This Lady is ſtill alive, and, when the underſtood my
Defign, was pleas'd to put me in poffeffion of all the remaining Let-
ters, and other Manufcript Papers of her Brother, with the Collections
and Obfervations relating to him, made by his other Sifter the Lady
ASHTON, a Woman of very extraordinary Parts and Accompliſh-
ments. Thefe, with the Account given of him by ANTHONY
Wood in the ſecond Volum of his Athena Oxonienfes, and what I
cou'd learn from the Mouths of his furviving Acquaintance, are the
Materials wherof I compos'd this infuing Hiſtory of his Life,
•
2. IN his very Childhood he gave fure hopes of his future Abi-
litys, as well by his Inclination and Capacity to learn whatever
was
xiv
The LIFE of
was propos'd to him, as by a kind of natural gravity; whence his Paş
rents and Maſters were wont to fay, That he rather kept them in aw,
than needed their correction: yet when grown a Man, none could ea
fily ſurpaſs him for quickneſs of Wit, and a moft facetious Temper,
He was enter'd a Gentleman Commoner of Trinity College in Oxford
in the year 1629, and became a Pupil to that great Maſter of Reaſon
Dr. CHILLINGWORTH, who difcovering the Errors, Impoftures, and
Tyranny of the Popish Church (wherof he was for fome time a Mem
ber) attackt it with more proper and fucceſsful Arms than all before,
or perhaps any fince have don. After confiderably improving his
Knowlege in the Univerfity, he was more particularly fitting himſelf
for his intended Travels, by learning feveral Foren Languages, when
his Father dy'd, leaving him under Age. Tho the Court of Wards
was ſtill in being, yet by the Soccage Tenure of his Eftate he was at
liberty to chufe his own Guardian; and accordingly pitch'd upon his
Grandmother the Lady SAMUEL, a Woman eminent for her Wif-
dom and Virtue. Of her and the reft of his Governors, he foon ob-
tain'd a permiffion to fatisfy his eager defire of feeing ſom other parts
of the World, where he could make fuch Obfervations on Men and
Manners, as might beſt fit him in due time to ſerve and adorn his Na-
tive Country,
3: HIS firſt ſtep was into Holland, then the principal School of Mar-
tial Difciplin, and (what toucht him more fenfibly) a place wonderfully
flouriſhing under the influence of their Liberty which they had fo
lately afferted, by breaking the Yoke of a ſevere Maſter, the Spanish
Tyrant. And here, no doubt, it was that he begun to make Govern-
ment the Subject of his Meditations: for he was often heard to ſay,
that, before he left England, he knew no more of Monarchy, Anarchy,
Ariftocracy, Democracy, Oligarchy, or the like, than as hard words
wherof he learnt the fignification in his Dictionary. For fome months he
lifted himſelf in my Lord CRAVEN'S Regiment and Sir ROBERT
STONE'S; during which time being much at the Hague, he had the
opportunity of further accompliſhing himſelf in two Courts, namely
thofe of the Prince of Orange, and the Queen of Bohemia, the Daugh-
ter of our K. JAMES I. then a Fugitive in Holland, her Huſband hav-
ing bin abandon'd by his Father in Law, betray'd by the King of
Spain, and ftript of all his Territorys by the Emperor. This excel-
lent Princeſs entertain'd him with extraordinary favor and civility on
the account of his Uncle the Lord HARRINGTON, who had bin
her Governor; but particularly for the fake of his own Merit. The
Prince Elector alfo courted him into his Service, ingag'd him to attend
him in a Journy he made to the Court of Denmark, and, after his re-
turn from travelling, committed the chief management of all his Af-
fairs in England to his care. Nor were the young Princeffes lefs de-
lighted with his Company, his Converfation being always extremely
pleaſant, as well as learned and polite; to which good qualitys thofe
unfortunat Ladys were far from being ſtrangers, as appears by the
Letters of the great Philofopher CARTESIUS, and by the other Wri
ters of thofe times.
4. THO he found many Charms inviting his longer ftay in this
place, yet none were ftrong enough to keep him from purfuing his
main defign of travelling; and therfore he went next thro Flanders into
France, where having perfected himſelf in the Language, feen what
deferv'd

PLely pinxit
M.Vander Gucht, Sout
NODO FIRMO
IAMES HARRINGTON
JAMES HARRINGTON.
XV
deferv'd his curiofity, and made fuch Remarks on their Government
as will beſt appear in his Works, he remov'd thence into Italy. It
happen'd to be then (as it is now) the Year of Jubilee. He always
us'd to admire the great dexterity wherwith the Popish Clergy could
maintain their ſevere Government over fo great a part of the World,
and that Men otherwiſe reaſonable enough fhould be inchanted out of
their Senfes, as well as cheated out of their Mony, by theſe ridiculous
Tricks of Religious Pageantry. Except the fmall reſpect he fhew'd
to the Miracles they daily told him were perform'd in their Churches,
he did in all other things behave himſelf very prudently and inoffen-
fively. But going on a Candlemas day with feveral other Proteftants,
to fee the Pope perform the Ceremony of confecrating Wax Lights;
and perceiving that none could obtain any of thoſe Torches, except
fuch as kift the Pope's To (which he expos'd to 'em for that purpoſe)
tho he had a great mind to one of the Lights, yet he would not accept
it on ſo hard a condition. The reſt of his Companions were not fo
fcrupulous, and after their return complain'd of his fqueamiſhneſs to the
King; who telling him he might have don it only as a refpect to a tem-
poral Prince, he prefently reply'd, that fince he had the honor to kiſs
his Majeſty's hand, he thought it beneath him to kifs any other Prince's
foot. The King was pleaſed with his Anſwer, and did afterwards ad-
mit him to be one of his Privy Chamber extraordinary, in which
lity he attended him in his first Expedition against the Scots.
qua-
5. HE prefer'd Venice to all other places in Italy, as he did its Gɔ-
vernment to all thoſe of the whole World, it being in his Opinion im-
mutable by any external or internal Cauſes, and to finish only with
Mankind; of which Affertion you may find various proofs alleg'd in
his Works. Here he furniſh'd himſelf with a Collection of all the
valuable Books in the Italian Language, eſpecially treating of Politics,
and contracted acquaintance with every one of whom he might re-
ceive any
benefit by inſtruction or otherwiſe.
6. AFTER having thus feen Italy, France, the Low Countrys, Den-
mark, and fom parts of Germany, he return'd home into England, to
the great joy of all his Friends and Acquaintance. But he was in a
ſpecial manner the Darling of his Relations, of whom he acknowleg'd
to receive reciprocal fatisfaction. His Brothers and Sifters were now
pretty well grown, which made it his next care fo to provide for each
of 'em as might render 'em independent of others, and eafy to them-
felves. His Brother WILLIAM he bred to be a Merchant, in which
calling he became a confiderable Man; he was a good Architect, and
was fo much notic'd for his ingenious Contrivances, that he was re-
ceiv'd a Fellow of the Royal Society. How his other Brothers were
difpos'd, we mention'd in the beginning of this Difcourfe. He took
all the care of a Parent in the Education of his Sifters, and wou'd him-
felf make large Difcourfes to 'em concerning the Reverence that was
due to Almighty God; the benevolence they were oblig'd to fhew all
mankind; how they ought to furnish their minds with knowlege
by reading of uſeful Books, and to fhew the goodneſs of their difpofi-
tion by a conſtant practice of Virtue: In a word, he taught 'em the
true Rules of humanity and decency, always inculcating to 'em that
good Manners did not fo much confiſt in a faſhionable carriage (which
ought not to be neglected) as in becoming words and actions, an ob-
liging addreſs, and a modeſt behavior. He treated his Mother in Law
as
xvi
The LIFE of
}
as if ſhe were his own, and made no diſtinction between her Children
and the reſt of his Brothers and Sifters; which good Example had
fuch effects on 'em all, that no Family has bin more remarkable for
their mutual friendſhip.
7. HE was of a very liberal and compaffionat nature, nor could he
indure to ſee a Friend want any thing he might fpare; and when the
Relief that was neceffary exceded the bounds of his Eftate, he per-
fuaded his Sifters not only to contribute themſelves, but likewife to go
about to the reſt of their Relations to complete what was wanting.
And if at any time they alleg'd that this Bounty had been thrown away
on ungrateful Perfons, he would anfwer with a ſmile that he faw they
were mercenary, and that they plainly fold their Gifts fince they ex-
pected fo great a return as Gratitude.
8. HIS natural inclinations to ftudy kept him from ſeeking after
any public Imployments. But in the year 1646, attending out of
curiofity the Commiffioners appointed by Parlament to bring King
CHARLES the Firft from Newcastle nearer to London, he was by fom
of 'em nam'd to wait on his Majefty, as a Perfon known to him be-
fore, and ingag'd to no Party or Faction. The King approv'd the
Propoſal, yet our Author would never prefume to come into his pre-
fence except in public, till he was particularly commanded by the
King; and that he, with THOMAS HERBERT (created a Baronet
after the Reſtoration of the Monarchy) were made Grooms of the
Bedchamber at Holmby, together with JAMES MAXWELL and PA-
TRICK MAULE (afterwards Earl of Penmoore in Scotland) which
two only remain'd of his old Servants in that Station.
9. HE had the good luck to grow very acceptable to the King,
who much convers'd with him about Books and Foren Countrys. In
his Sifter's Papers I find it expreft, that at the King's command he
tranſlated into English Dr. SANDERSON's Book concerning the Obliga-
tion of Oaths: but ANTHONY WOOD fays it was the King's own
doing, and that he fhew'd it at different times to HARRINGTON,
HERBERT, Dr. JuxON, Dr. HAMMOND, and Dr. SHELDON,
for their approbation. However that be, 'tis certain he ferv'd his
Mafter with untainted fidelity, without doing any thing inconfiftent
with the Liberty of his Country; and that he made uſe of his Intereſt
with his Friends in Parlament to have Matters accommodated for the
fatisfaction of all Partys. During the Treaty in the Isle of Wight, he
frequently warn'd the Divines of his acquaintance to take heed how
far they preft the King to infift upon any thing which, however it con-
cern'd their Dignity, was no effential point of Religion; and that fuch
matters driven too far wou'd infallibly ruin all the indeavours us'd for a
Peace, which Prophecy was prov'd too true by the Event. His Ma-
jefty lov'd his company, fays ANTHONY WOOD, and, finding him to
be an ingenious Man, chofe rather to converſe with him than with others
of his Chamber: They had often difcourfes concerning Government; but
when they happen'd to talk of a Commonwealth, the King feem'd not to
indure it. Here I know not which moſt to commend, the King for
truſting a Man of Republican Principles, or HARRINGTON for
owning his Principles while he ferv'd a King.
10. AFTER the King was remov'd out of the Ile of Wight to
Hurftcaftle in Hampshire, HARRINGTON was forcibly turn'd out
of ſervice, becauſe he vindicated fom of his Majeſty's Arguments
againſt
JAMES HARRINGTON.
xvii
↑
againſt the Parlament Commiffioners at Newport, and thought his
Conceffions not fo unfatisfactory as did fom others. As they were ta-
king the King to Windfor, he beg'd admittance to the Boot of the
Coach that he might bid his Mafter farewel; which being granted, and
he preparing to kneel, the King took him by the hand and pull'd him
in to him. He was for three or four days permitted to ſtay; but becauſe
he would not take an Oath againſt affifting or concealing the King's
Eſcape, he was not only diſcharg'd from his Office, but alſo for fom
time detain'd in cuftody, till Major General IRETON obtain'd his Li-
berty. He afterwards found means to fee the King at St. James's,
and accompany'd him on the Scaffold, where, or a little before, he
receiv'd a Token of his Majeſty's Affection.
11. AFTER the King's Death he was obſerv'd to keep much in
his Library, and more retir'd than ufually, which was by his Friends a
long time attributed to Melancholy or Difcontent. At length when they
weary'd him with their importunitys to change this fort of Life, he
thought fit to fhew 'em at the fame time their miſtake and a
Copy of his Oceana, which he was privatly writing all that
while telling 'em withal, that ever fince he began to examin
things feriouſly, he had principally addicted himſelf to the ſtudy
of Čivil Government, as being of the higheſt importance to the
Peace and Felicity of mankind; and that he fucceded at leaſt to his
own fatisfaction, being now convinc'd that no Government is of fo
accidental or arbitrary an Inſtitution as People are wont to imagin,
there being in Societys natural caufes producing their neceffary effects,
as well as in the Earth or the Air. Hence he frequently argu'd that the
Troubles of his time were not to be wholly attributed to wilfulneſs or
faction, neither to the mifgovernment of the Prince, nor the ſtubborneſs
of the People; but to change in the Balance of Property, which
ever fince HENRY the Seventh's time was daily falling into the Scale
of the Commons from that of the King and the Lords, as in his Book
he evidently demonftrats and explains. Not that hereby he approv'd
either the Breaches which the King had made on the Laws, or excus'd
the Severity which fom of the Subjects exercis'd on the King; but to
fhew that as long as the Caufes of theſe Diſorders remain'd, fo long
would the like Effects unavoidably follow: while on the one hand a King
would be always indeavoring to govern according to the example of his
Predeceffors when the beſt part of the National Property was in their
own hands, and confequently the greateſt Command of Mony and Men,
as one of a thouſand pounds a year can entertain more Servants, or in-
fluence more Tenants than another that has but one hundred, out of
which he cannot allow one Valet; and on the other hand he faid, the
People would be ſure to ſtruggle for preferving the Property wherof
they were in poffeffion, never failing to obtain more Privileges, and
to inlarge the Bafis of their Liberty, as often as they met with any fuc-
cefs (which they generally did) in quarrels of this kind. His chief
aim therfore was to find out a method of preventing fuch Diftempers,
or to apply the beſt Remedys when they happen'd to break out. But
as long as the Balance remain'd in this unequal ſtate, he affirm'd that
no King whatſoever could keep himſelf eaſy, let him never fo much in-
deavor to pleaſe his People; and that tho a good King might manage
Affairs tolerably well during his life, yet this did not prove the Go-
vernment to be good, fince under a lefs prudent Prince it would fall to
pieces
b
1
xviii
The LIFE of
pieces again, while the Orders of a well conſtituted State make wick-
ed men virtuous, and fools to act wiſely.
12. THAT Empire follows the Balance of Property, whether
lodg'd in one, in a few, or in many hands, he was the first that ever
made out; and is a noble Diſcovery, wherof the Honor folely be-
longs to him, as much as thofe of the Circulation of the Blood, of
Printing, of Guns, of the Compafs, or of optic Glaffes, to the feveral
Authors. 'Tis incredible to think what grofs and numberlefs Errors
were committed by all the Writers before him, even by the beſt of
them, for want of underſtanding this plain Truth, which is the foun-
dation of all Politics. He no fooner diſcours'd publicly of this new
Doctrin, being a man of univerſal acquaintance, but it ingag'd all forts
of people to bufy themſelves about it as they were varioully affected.
Som, becauſe they underſtood him, defpis'd it, alleging it was plain to
every man's capacity, as if his higheſt merit did not confift in making
it fo. Others, and thoſe in number the feweft, diſputed with him a-
bout it, merely to be better inform'd; with which he was well pleas'd,
as reckoning a pertinent Objection of greater advantage to the diſcovery
of Truth (which was his aim) than a complaifant applaufe or ap-
probation. But a third fort, of which there never wants in all places
a numerous company, did out of pure envy ftrive all they could to
leffen or defame him; and one of 'em (fince they could not find any
precedent Writer out of whofe Works they might make him a Plagia-
ry) did endeavor, after a very fingular manner, to rob him of the
Glory of this Invention: for our Author having friendly lent him a
part of his Papers, he publifh'd a fmall piece to the fame purpoſe,
intitled, A Letter from an Officer of the Army in Ireland, &c. Major
WILDMAN was then reputed the Author by fom, and HENRY
NEVIL by others ; which latter, by reafon of this thing, and his
great intimacy with HARRINGTON, was by his detractors re-
ported to be the Author of his Works, or that at leaft he had a
principal hand in compofing of them. Notwithſtanding which
provocations, fo true was he to the Friendſhip he profeft to NE-
VIL and WILDMAN, that he avoided all harſh Expreffions or pub-
lic Cenfures on this occafion, contenting himſelf with the Juſtice
which the World was foon oblig'd to yield to him by reaſon of his o-
ther Writings, where no fuch clubbing of Brains could be reaſonably
fufpected.
13. BUT the publication of his Book met with greater difficultys
from the oppofition of the ſeveral Partys then fet againſt one another,
and all againſt him; but none more than fom of thoſe who pretended
to be for a Commonwealth, which was the fpecious name under
which they cover'd the rankeſt Tyranny of OLIVER CROMWEL,
while HARRINGTON, like PAUL at Athens, indeavor'd to make
known to the People what they ignorantly ador'd. By fhewing that
a Commonwealth was a Government of Laws, and not of the Sword,
he could not but detect the violent adminiſtration of the Protector by
his Baſhaws, Intendants, or Majors General, which created him no ſmall
danger: while the Cavaliers on the other fide tax'd him with Ingrati-
tude to the memory of the late King, and prefer'd the Monarchy e-
ven of a Ufurper to the beſt order'd Commonwealth. To theſe he an-
fwer'd, that it was enough for him to forbear publiſhing his Sentiments
during
JAMES HARRINGTON.
xix
during that King's life; but the Monarchy being now quite difiolv'd,
and the Nation in a ſtate of Anarchy, or (what was worse) groaning
under a horrid Ufurpation, he was not only at liberty, but even ob-
lig'd as a good Citizen to offer a helping hand to his Countrymen, and
to fhew 'em fucha Model of Government as he thought moft conducing
to their Tranquillity, Wealth and Power: That the Cavaliers ought of
all People to be beft pleas'd with him, ſince if his Model fucceded,
they were fure to enjoy equal Privileges with others, and fo be de-
liver'd from their prefent Oppreffion; for in a well-conſtituted Com-
monwealth there can be no diftinction of Partys, the paffage to Pre-
ferment is open to Merit in all perfons, and no honeft man can be uneafy:
but that if the Prince ſhould happen to be reſtor'd, his Doctrin of the
Balance would be a light to fhew him what and with whom he had
to do, and fo either to amend or avoid the Miſcarriages of his Father;
fince all that is faid of this doctrin may as well be accommodated to a
Monarchy regulated by Laws, as to a Democracy or more popular
form of a Commonwealth. He us'd to add on fuch occafions another
reaſon of writing this Model, which was, That if it fhould ever be
the fate of this nation to be, like Italy of old, overrun by any barbarous
People, or to have its Government and Records deſtroy'd by the rage
of fom mercileſs Conqueror, they might not be then left to their own
Invention in framing a new Government; for few People can be ex-
pected to fuccede ſo happily as the Venetians have don in ſuch a caſe.
14. IN the mean time it was known to fom of the Courtiers, that
the Book was a printing; wherupon, after hunting it from one Preſs
to another, they ſeiz'd their Prey at laſt, and convey'd it to Whitehall.
All the follicitations he could make were not able to relieve his Papers,
till he remember'd that OLIVER's favorit Daughter, the Lady CLAY-
POLE, acted the part of a Princeſs very naturally, obliging all per-
fons with her civility, and frequently interceding for the unhappy.
To this Lady, tho an abfolute ftranger to him, he thought fit to
make his application; and being led into her Antichamber, he ſent
in his Name, with his humble requeſt that ſhe would admit him to
her prefence. While he attended, fom of her Women coming into
the room were follow'd by her little Daughter about three years old,
who ſtaid behind them. He entertain'd the Child fo divertingly, that
fhe fuffer'd him to take her up in his arms till her Mother came;
wherupon he ſtepping towards her, and ſetting the Child down at her
feet, faid, Madam, 'tis well you are com at this nick of time, or I
had certainly ſtolen this pretty little Lady. Stolen her, reply'd the
Mother! pray, what to do with her? for fhe is yet too young to be-
com your Miſtreſs. Madam, faid he, tho her Charms affure her of a
more confiderable Conqueſt, yet I muſt confeſs it is not love but re-
venge that promted me to commit this theft. Lord, anſwer'd the Lady
again, what injury have I don you that you ſhould ſteal my Child?
None at all, reply'd he, but that you might be induc'd to prevail with
your Father to do me juſtice, by reſtoring my Child that he has fto-
len. But the urging it was impoffible, becauſe her Father had Children
enough of his own; he told her at laſt it was the iffue of his brain
which was miſrepreſented to the Protector, and taken out of the Preſs
by his order. She immediatly promis'd to procure it for him, if it
contain'd nothing prejudicial to her Father's Government; and he af-
fur'd her it was only a kind of a Political Romance, fo far from any
Treafon
b 2
XX
The LIFE of
Treaſon againſt her Father, that he hop'd he would acquaint him
that he defign'd to dedicat it to him, and promis'd that the her felf
fhould be prefented with one of the firft Copys. The Lady was fo
well pleas'd with his manner of Addreſs, that he had his Book ſpeedi-
ly reftor'd to him; and he did accordingly infcribe it to OLIVER
CROMWEL, who, after the perufal of it, faid, the Gentleman had
like to trapan him out of his Power, but that what he got by the
Sword he would not quit for a little paper Shot: adding in his uſual
cant, that he approv'd the Government of a fingle Perfon as little as
any of 'em, but that he was forc'd to take upon him the Office of a
High Conſtable, to preferve the Peace among the feveral Partys in the
Nation, fince he faw that being left to themſelves, they would never
agree to any certain form of Government, and would only ſpend their
whole Power in defeating the Defigns, or deftroying the Perfons of
one another.
15.
BUT nothing in the world could better diſcover CROM-
WEL'S Diffimulation than this Speech, fince HARRINGTON had
demonſtrated in his Book, that no Commonwealth could be ſo ea-
fily or perfectly eſtabliſh'd as one by a fole Legiflator, it being in
his power (if he were a man of good Invention himſelf, or had a
good Model propos'd to him by others) to fet up a Government in the
whole piece at once, and in perfection; but an Affembly, being of
better Judgment than Invention, generally make patching work in
forming a Government, and are whole Ages about that which is fel-
dom or never brought by 'em to any perfection; but is commonly ru-
in'd by the way, leaving the nobleſt Attemts under reproach, and the
Authors of 'em expos'd to the greateſt dangers while they live,
and to a certain infamy when dead. Wherfore the wifeft Affem-
blys, in mending or making a Government, have pitch'd upon a fole
Legiſlator, whofe Model they could rightly approve, tho not fo well
digeft; as Muficians can play in confort, and judg of an Air that
is laid before them, tho to invent a part of Mufic they could never a-
gree, nor fuccede fo happily as one Perfon. If CROMWEL therfore
had meant as he ſpoke, no man had ever ſuch an opportunity of refor-
ming what was amifs in the old Government, or ſetting up one
wholly new, either according to the Plan of Oceana, or any other.
This would have made him indeed a Hero fuperior in lafting fame
to SOLON, LYCURGUS, ZALEUCUS, and CHARONDAS; and render
his Glory far more refplendent, his Security greater, and his Re-
nown more durable than all the Pomp of his ill acquir'd Greatneſs
could afford: wheras on the contrary he liv'd in continual fears of
thoſe he had inflav'd, dy'd abhor'd as a monftrous betrayer of thoſe
Libertys with which he was intruſted by his Country, and his Pofteri-
ty not poffeffing a foot of what for their only fakes he was generally
thoughtto ufurp. But this laſt is a miſtaken Notion, for fom of the moſt
notorious Tyrants liv'd and dy'd without any hopes of Children; which
is a good reaſon why no mortal ought to be truſted with too much
Power on that fcore. LYCURGUS and ANDREW DORIA, who,
when it was in their power to continue Princes, chofe rather to be the
founders of their Countrys Liberty, will be celebrated for their Vir-
tue thro the courfe of all Ages, and their very Names convey the
higheſt Ideas of Godlike Generofity; while JULIUS CAESAR,
OLIVER CROMWEL, and fuch others as at any time inflav'd
their
JAMES HARRINGTON.
xxi
1
their fellow Citizens, will be for ever remember'd with deteftation,
and cited as the most execrable Examples of the vileft Treachery and
Ingratitude. It is only a refin'd and excellent Genius, a noble Soul
ambitious of folid Praiſe, a fincere lover of Virtue and the good of
all Mankind, that is capable of executing fo glorious an Undertaking as
making a People free. 'Tis my fix'd opinion, that if the Protector's mind
had the leaſt tincture of true greatnefs, he could not be proof againſt the
incomparable Rewards propos'd by HARRINGTON in the Corollary of
his Oceana; as no Prince truly generous, whether with or without
Heirs, is able to refift their Charms, provided he has opportunity to
advance the happineſs of his People. 'Twas this Difpofition that
brought the Prince of ORANGE to head us when we lately contend-
ed for our Liberty; to this we ow thoſe ineſtimable Laws we have
obtain❜d, fince out of a grateful confidence we made him our King ; and
how great things, or after what manner, we may expect from him in
time to com, is as hard to be truly conceiv'd as worthily exprefs'd.
16. I SHALL now give fom account of the Book itſelf, inti-
tl'd by the Author, The Commonwealth of Oceana, a name by which
he defign'd England, as being the nobleft Iland of the Northern Ocean.
But before I procede further, I muſt explain fom other words occur-
ring in this Book, which is written after the manner of a Romance,
in imitation of PLATO's Atlantic Story, and is a method ordinarily
follow'd by Lawgivers.
Adoxus
Alma
Convallium
Coraunus
Dicotome
كر
King JOHN.
The Palace of St. JAMES..
Hamton Court.
HENRY VIII.
RICHARD II.
Emporium
Halcionia
Halo
Hemifua
Hiera
Leviathan
Marpefia
Morpheus
Mount Celia
Neuftrians
Olphaus Megaletor
Panoрæa
Pantheon
Panurgus
Parthenia
Scandians
Teutons
Turbo
Verulamius-
London.
The Thames.
Whitehall.
The River Trent.
Westminster.
HOBBES.
Scotland.
JAMES I.
Windfor.
Normans.
OLIVER CROMWEL.
Ireland.
Westminster Hall.
HENRY VII.
Queen ELIZABETH.
Danes.
Saxons.
WILLIAM the Conqueror.
Lord Chancellor BACON.
17. THE Book confifts of Preliminarys divided into two parts,
and a third Section called the Council of Legislators; then follows the
Model of the Commonwealth, or the body of the Book; and laftly coms
the Corollary or Conclufion. The Preliminary Diſcourſes contain the
Principles, Generation, and Effects of all Governments, whether Mo-
narchical, Ariſtocratical, or Popular, and their ſeveral Corruptions, as
Tyranny,
xxii
The LIFE of
Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Anarchy, with all the good or bad mixtures
that naturally refult from them. But the firſt part dos in a more par-
ticular manner treat of antient Prudence, or that genius of Government
which moſt prevail'd in the world till the time of JULIUS CAESAR.
None can confult a more certain Oracle that would conceive the nature
of Foren or Domeſtic Empire; the Balance of Land or Mony; Arms
or Contracts; Magiftracy and Judicatures; Agrarian Laws; Elections
by the Ballot; Rotation of Officers, with a great many fuch heads, e-
ſpecially the inconveniences and preeminences of each kind of Govern-
ment, or the true compariſon of 'em all together. Theſe Subjects
have bin generally treated diftinctly, and every one of them ſeems to
require a Volum; yet I am of opinion that in this fhort Diſcourſe there
is a more full and clearer account of them, that can be eaſily found
elſewhere: at leaſt I must own to have receiv'd greater fatisfaction here
than in all my reading before, and the fame thing has bin frankly
own'd to me by others.
18. THE fecond part of the Preliminarys treats of modern Pru-
dence, or that genius of Government which has moſt obtain'd in the
world fince the expiration of the Roman Liberty, particularly the Go-
thic Conftitution, beginning with the inundation of the barbarous Nor-
thern Nations over the Roman Empire. In this Difcourſe there is a ve-
ry clear account of the English Government under the Romans, Saxons,
Danes, and Normans, till the foundations of it were cunningly under-
min'd by HENRY VII. terribly fhaken by HENRY VIII. and utterly
ruin'd under CHARLES I. Here he muſt read, who in a little compafs
would completely underſtand the antient Feuds and Tenures, the ori-
ginal and degrees of our Nobility, with the inferior Orders of the reft
of the People: under the Saxons, what was meant by Ealdorman, or
Earls; King's.Thane; middle Thane or Vavafors; their Shiremoots,
Sherifs, and Viſcounts; their Halymoots, Weidenagemoots, and fuch
others. Here likewife one may learn to underſtand the Baronage
of the Normans, as the Barons by their Poffeffions, by Writ, or by
Letters Patent; with many other particulars which give an infight into
the ſprings and management of the Barons Wars, fo frequent and fa-
mous in our Annals. The reft of this Diſcourſe is ſpent in fhewing
the natural Cauſes of the diffolution of the Norman Monarchy under
CHARLES the Firſt, and the generation of the Commonwealth, or ra-
ther the Anarchy that fucceded.
19. NEXT follows the Council of Legiſlators: for HARRING-
TON being about to give the most perfect Model of Government,
he made himſelf maſter of all the Antient and Modern Politicians, that
he might as well imitat whatever was excellent or practicable in
them, as his care was to avoid all things which were impracticable or
inconvenient. Theſe were the jufteſt meaſures that could poffibly be
taken by any body, whether he defign'd to be rightly inform'd, and
fufficiently furnish'd with the beſt materials; or whether he would
have his Model meet with an eaſy reception: for fince his own Senti-
ments (tho' never fo true) were fure to be rejected as privat Specula-
tions or impracticable Chimeras, this was the readieſt way to make
'em pafs currently, as both authoriz'd by the wifeft men in all Nati-
ons, and as what in all times and places had bin practis'd with fucceſs.
To this end therfore he introduces, under feign'd names, nine Legif-
lators, who perfectly underſtood the ſeveral Governments, they were
appointed
JAMES HARRINGTON.
xxiii
appointed to repreſent. The Province of the firft was the Common-
wealth of Ifrael; that of the fecond, Athens; of the third, Sparta;
of the fourth, Carthage; of the fifth, the Achæans, Etolians, and Ly-
cians; of the fixth, Rome; of the feventh, Venice; of the eighth,
Switzerland; and of the ninth, Holland. Out of the Excellencys of all
thefe, fupply'd with the Fruits of his own invention, he fram'd the
Model of his Oceana; and indeed he fhews himſelf in that work fo
throly vers'd in their feveral Hiſtorys and Conftitutions, that to any
man who would rightly underſtand them, I could not eafily recom-
mend a more proper Teacher: for here they are diffected and laid open
to all Capacitys, their Perfections applauded, their Inconveniencys ex-
pos'd, and parallels frequently made between 'em no lefs entertaining
than ufual. Nor are the Antient and Modern Eaftern or European
Monarchys forgot, but exhibited with all their Advantages and Cor-
ruptions, without the leaft diffimulation or partiality.
20. AS for the Model, I fhall fay nothing of it in particular, as
well becauſe I would not foreftal the pleaſure of the Reader, as by rea-
fon an Abridgment of it is once or twice made by himſelf, and inferted
among his Works. The Method he obferves is to lay down his Orders
or Laws in fo many poſitive Propofitions, to each of which he ſubjoins
an explanatory Diſcourſe; and if there be occafion, adds a Speech fup-
pos'd to be deliver'd by the Lord ARCHON, or fom of the Legifla-
tors. Theſe Speeches are extraordinary fine, contain a world of good
Learning and Obfervation, and are perpetual Commentarys on his
Laws. In the Corollary, which is the conclufion of the whole Work,
he ſhews how the laft hand was put to his Commonwealth; which we
muſt not imagin to treat only of the Form of the Senat and Affemblys
of the People, or the manner of waging War and governing in Peace.
It contains befides, the Difciplin of a National Religion, and the
fecurity of a Liberty of Confcience: a Form of Government for
Scotland, for Ireland, and the other Provinces of the Commonwealth ;
Governments for London and Westminster, proportionably to which the
other Corporations of the Nation are to be model'd; Directions for
the incouraging of Trade; Laws for regulating Academys; and moſt
excellent Rules for the Education of our Youth, as well to the Wars
or the Sea, to Manufactures or Huſbandry, as to Law, Phyfic, or Di-
vinity, and chiefly to the breeding and true figure of accomplish'd
Gentlemen: There are admirable Orders for reforming the Stage; the
number, choice and bufinefs of the Officers of State and the Reve-
nue, with all forts of Officers; and an exact account both of their
Salarys, and the ordinary yearly charge of the whole Commonwealth,
which for two rarely confiftent things, the grandeur of its State, and
the frugal management of its Revenues, excedes all the Governments
that ever were. I ought not to omit telling here, that this Model gives
a full anſwer to thoſe who imagin that there can be no Diſtinctions or
Degrees, neither Nobility nor Gentry in a Democracy, being led into
this miſtake, becauſe they ignorantly think all Commonwealths to be
conſtituted alike; when, if they were but never fo little vers'd in Hi-
ſtory, they might know that no Order of men now in the world can
com near the Figure that was made by the Noblemen and Gentlemen
of the Roman State: nor in this reſpect dos the Commonwealth of
Oceana com any thing behind them; for, as HARRINGTON fays ve-
ry truly, an Army may as well confift of Soldiers without Officers, or of
Officers
XXIV
The LIFE of
Officers without Soldiers, as a Commonwealth (efpecially fuch an one as is
capable of Greatness) confift of a People without a Gentry, or of a Gentry
without a People. So much may fuffice for underſtanding the ſcope
of this Book: I fhall only add, that none ought to be offended with
a few odd terms in it, fuch as the Prime Magnitude, the Pillar of Ni-
lus, the Galaxy, and the Tropic of Magiftrats, fince the Author ex-
plains what he means by 'em, and that any other may call 'em by
what more fignificative names he pleaſes; for the things themſelves
are abfolutely neceffary.
21. NO fooner did this Treatife appear in public, but it was gree-
dily bought up, and becom the ſubject of all mens Difcourfe. The
firſt that made exceptions to it was Dr. HENRY FERNE, afterwards
Biſhop of Chester. The Lady ASHTON prefented him with one of
the Books, and defir'd his opinion of it, which he quickly fent in fuch
a manner as ſhew'd he did not approve of the Doctrin, tho he treated
the Perfon and his Learning with due refpect. To this Letter a
reply was made, and fom Querys fent along with it by HAR-
RINGTON, to every one of which a diſtinct Anfwer was return'd
by the Doctor; which being again confuted by HARRINGTON, he
publiſh'd the whole in the year 1656, under the title of Pian Piano, or
an Intercourfe between H. FERNE Doctor in Divinity, and JAMES
HARRINGTON Efq; upon occafion of the Doctor's Cenfure of the Com-
monwealth of Oceana. 'Tis a Treatife of little importance, and con-
tains nothing but what he has much better diſcours'd in his anſwers to
other Antagoniſts, which is the reaſon that I give the Reader no more
trouble about it.
22. THE next that wrote againſt Oceana was MATTHEW
WREN, eldeſt Son to the Biſhop of Ely. His Book was intitl'd
Confiderations, and reftrain'd only to the first part of the Preliminarys.
To this our Author publish'd an anſwer in the firft Book of his Prero-
gative of Popular Government, where he inlarges, explains, and vindi-
cats his Affertions. How inequal this Combat was, and after what
manner he treated his Adverfary, I leave the Reader to judg; only
minding him that as WREN was one of the Virtuofi who met at
Dr. WILKINS'S (the Seminary of the now Royal Society) HAR-
RINGTON jokingly faid, That they had an excellent faculty of magni-
fying a Loufe, and diminifing a Commonwealth. But the Subjects he
handles on this occafion are very curious, and reduc'd to the twelve
following Queſtions.
(1.) WHETHER Prudence (or the Politics) be well diſtinguiſh'd
into Antient and Modern?
(2.) WHETHER a Commonwealth be rightly defin'd to be a Go-
vernment of Laws and not of men; and Monarchy to be a Govern-
ment of fom men or a few men, and not of Laws?
(3.) WHETHER the Balance of Dominion in Land be the na-
tural cauſe of Empire?
(4.) WHETHER the Balance of Empire be well divided into
National and Provincial? and whether theſe two, or any Nations that
are of a diftinct Balance, coming to depend on one and the fame head,
fuch a mixture creates a new Balance?
(5.) WHETHER there be any common Right or Intereft of
Mankind diſtinct from the Intereſt of the parts taken feverally? and
how by the orders of a Commonwealth this may beſt be diſtinguiſh'd
from privat Intereſt?
(6.) WHE-
3
1
JAMES HARRINGTON.
XXV
(6.) WHETHER the Senatufconfulta, or Decrees of the Roman
Senat, had the power of Laws?
(7.) WHETHER the Ten Commandments, propos'd by God or
MOSES, were voted and paſt into Laws by the People of Ifrael?
(8.) WHETHER a Commonwealth, coming up to the perfection
of the Kind, coms not up to the perfection of Government, and has
no flaw in it? that is, whether the beſt Commonwealth be not the
beſt Government?
(9.) WHETHER Monarchy, coming up to the perfection of
the Kind, coms not fhort of the perfection of Government, and has
not fom flaw in it? that is, whether the beft Monarchy be not the
worſt Government? Under this head are alfo explain'd the Balance
of France, the Original of a Landed Clergy, Arms, and their feveral
kinds.
(10.) WHETHER any Commonwealth, that was not firft bro-
ken or divided by it felf, was ever conquer'd by any Monarch? where
he fhews that none ever were, and that the greateſt Monarchys have
bin broken by very fmall Commonwealths.
(11.) WHETHER there be not an Agrarian, or fom Law or
Laws to fupply the defects of it, in every Commonwealth? Whether
the Agrarian, as it is ftated in Oceana, be not equally fatisfactory to
all Interefts or Partys?
(12.) WHETHER a Rotation, or Courſes and Turns, be ne-
ceffary to a well-order'd Commonwealth? In which is contain'd the
Parembole of Courſes of Ifrael before the Captivity, together with an
Epitome of the Commonwealth of Athens, as alfo another of the
Commonwealth of Venice,
23. THE fecond Book of the Prerogative of Popular Government
chiefly concerns Ordination in the Chriftian Church, and the Orders of
the Commonwealth of Ifrael, againſt the opinions of Dr. HAMMOND,
Dr. SEAMAN, and the Authors they follow. His Diſpute with thefe
learned Perfons (the one of the Epifcopal, and the other of the Presby-
terian Communion) is comprehended in five Chapters.
(1.) THE firſt, explaining the words Chirotonia and Chirothefia,
paraphraftically relates the Story of the Perambulation made by the
Apoſtles PAUL and BARNABAS thro' the Citys of Lycaonia, Pifi-
dia, &c.
(2.) THE ſecond ſhews that thoſe Citys, or moſt of 'em were at
the time of this Perambulation under Popular Government; in which
is alfo contain'd the whole Adminiſtration of a Roman Province.
(3.) THE third fhews the deduction of the Chirotonia; or holding
up of hands, from Popular Government, and that the original of Or-
dination is from this cuftom: in which is alfo contain'd the Inftitution
of the Sanhedrim or Senat of Ifrael by Moses, and of that of Rome
by ROMULUS.
(4.) THE fourth fhews the deduction of the Chirothefia, or the
laying on of hands, from Monarchical or Ariftocratical Government,
and fo the ſecond way of Ordination proceeds from this cuftom: here
is alfo declar'd how the Commonwealth of the Jews ſtood after the
Captivity.
(5.) THE fifth debates whether the Chirotonia us'd in the Citys
mention'd was (as is pretended by Dr. HAMMOND, Dr. SEAMAN,
and the Authors they follow) the fame with the Chirothefia, or a far
different
C
XXVI
The LIFE of
different thing. In which are contain'd the divers kinds of Church
Government introduc'd and exercis'd in the age of the Apoſtles. By
thefe heads we may perceive that a great deal of uſeful Learning is
contain❜d in this Book; and queſtionleſs he makes thofe Subjects more
plain and intelligible than any Writer I ever yet confulted.
24. AGAINST Oceana chiefly did RICHARD BAXTER write
his Holy Commonwealth, of which our Author made fo flight that
he vouchfaf'd no other anfwer to it but half a fheet of Cant and Ri-
dicule. It dos not appear that he rail'd at all the Minifters as a parcel
of Fools and Knaves. But the rest of BAXTER's complaint feems
better grounded, as that HARRINGTON maintain'd neither he nor
any Minifters underflood at all what Polity was, but prated against they
knew not what, &c. This made him publifh his Holy Commonwealth in
answer to HARRINGTON's Heathenish Commonwealth; in which, adds
he, Iplead the Caufe of Monarchy as better than Democracy or Ariftocra-
cy; an odd way of modelling a Commonwealth. And yet the Roya-
lifts were fo far from thinking his Book for their fervice, that in the
year 1683 it was by a Decree of the University of Oxford, condemn'd
to be publicly burnt; which Sentence was accordingly executed upon
it, in company with fom of the Books of HOBBES, MILTON, and
others; wheras no cenfure paft on HARRINGTON's Oceana, or the
reſt of his Works. As for Divines meddling with Politics, he has in the
former part of the Preliminarys to Oceana deliver'd his Opinion, That
there is fomthing firft in the making of a Commonwealth, then in the go
verning of it, and last of all in the leading of its Armys, which (tho there
be great Divines, great Lawyers, great Men in all Profeffions) feems to
be peculiar only to the genius of a Gentleman: for it is plain in the uni-
verfal ſeries of story, that if any man founded a Commonwealth, he was
first a Gentleman; the truth of which Affertion he proves from Mo-
SES downwards.
25. BEING much importun'd from all hands to publiſh an A-
bridgment of his Oceana, he confented at length; and fo, in the year
1659, was printed his Art of Lawgiving (or of Legiflation) in three
Books. The firſt, which treats of the Foundation, and Superstructures of
all kinds of Government, is an abftract of his Preliminarys to the Oceana:
and the third Book, fhewing a Model of Popular Government fitted to the
prefent State or Balance of this Nation, is an exact Epitome of his Oceana,
with fhort Difcourfes explaining the Propofitions. By the way, the
Pamphlet called the Rota is nothing else but thefe Propofitions without
the Diſcourſes, and therfore to avoid a needlefs repetition, not printed
among his Works. The fecond Book between theſe two, is a full Ac-
count of the Commonwealth of Ifrael, with all the variations it underwent.
Without this Book it is plainly impoffible to underſtand that admirable
Government concerning which no Author wrote common fenfe before
HARRINGTON, who was perfuaded to complete this Treatife by fuch
as obferv'd his judicious Remarks on the fame. Subject in his other
Writings. To the Art of Lawgiving is annex'da fmall Differtation, or ai
Word concerning a Houfe of Peers, which to abridg, were to tranfcribe.
26. IN the fame year, 1659, WREN coms out with another
Book call'd Monarchy afferted, in vindication of his Confiderations. If
he could not prefs hard on our Author's Reafonings, he was refolv'd
to overbear him with impertinence and calumny, treating him neither
with the reſpect due to a Gentleman, nor the fair dealing becoming an
inge-
JAMES HARRINGTON.
xxvii
ingenuous Adverfary, but on the contrary with the utmoſt Chicanery
and Infolence. The leaſt thing to be admir'd is, that he would needs
make the Univerſity a Party againſt him, and bring the heavy weight
of the Church's diſpleaſure on his fhoulders: for as corrupt Minifters
ſtile themſelves the Government, by which Artifice they oblige better
men to ſuppreſs their Complaints, for fear of having their Loyalty
fufpected; fo every ignorant Pedant that affronts a Gentleman, is pre-
ſently a Learned Univerſity; or if he is but in Deacon's Orders, he's
forthwith transform'd into the Catholic Church, and it becoms Sacri-
lege to touch him. But as great Bodys no leſs than privat Perſons,
grow wifer by Experience, and com to a clearer difcernment of their
true Intereſt: ſo I believe that neither the Church nor Univerſitys will
be now fo ready to efpoufe the Quarrels of thofe, who, under pre-
tence of ferving them, ingage in Diſputes they no ways underſtand,
wherby all the diſcredit redounds to their Patrons, themſelves being
too mean to ſuffer any diminution of Honor. HARRINGTON Was
not likewiſe leſs blamable in being provok'd to fuch a degree by this
pitiful Libel, as made him forget his natural character of gravity and
greatneſs of mind. Were not the beſt of men ſubject to their pecu-
liar weakneffes, he had never written fuch a Farce as his Politicafter,
or Comical Difcourfe in answer to Mr. WREN. It relates little or no-
thing to the Argument, which was not ſo much amifs, confidering the
ignorance of his Antagonist: but it is of fo very ſmall merit, that I
would not infert it among his other Works, as a piece not capable to
inftruct or pleaſe any man now alive. I have not omitted his Anfwer
to Dr. STUBBE concerning a felect Senat, as being fo little worth; but
as being only a repetition of what he has much better and more am-
ply treated in fom of his other pieces. Now we muſt note that upon
the first appearance of his Oceana this STUBBE was fo great an admi-
rer of him, that, in his Preface to the Good Old Caufe, he fays he would
inlarge in his praife, did he not think himself too inconfiderable to add any
thing to thofe Applaufes which the understanding part of the World must be-
Stow upon him, and which, tho Eloquence fhould turn Panegyrift, he not
only merits but tranfcends.
27. OTHER Treatifes of his, which are omitted for the fame
reaſon, are, 1. A Difcourfe upon this Saying: The Spirit of the Nation
is not yet to be trusted with Liberty, left it introduce Monarchy, or invade
the Liberty of Confcience; which Propofition he difapprov'd. 2. A Dif-
courfe fhewing that the Spirit of Parlaments, with a Council in the inter-
vals, is not to be trusted for a Settlement, left it introduce Monarchy, and
Perfecution for Confcience. 3. A Parallel of the spirit of the People with
the Spirit of Mr. ROGERS, with an Appeal to the Reader whether the
Spirit of the People, or the spirit of men like Mr. ROGERS be the fitter
to be trufted with the Government. This ROGERS was an Anabap-
tift, a feditious Enthuſiaſt, or fifthmonarchy man. 4. Pour enclouer le
canon, or the nailing of the Enemys Artillery. 5. The ftumbling block of
Difobedience and Rebellion, cunningly imputed by PETER HEYLIN to
CALVIN, remov'd in a Letter to the faid P. H. who wrote a long
Anſwer to it in the third part of his Letter combat. 'Tis obvious by
the bare perufal of the Titles, that theſe are but Pamphlets folely cal-
culated for that time; and it certainly argues a mighty want of Judg-
ment in thoſe Editors who make no diftinction between the elaborat
Works which an Author intended for univerfal benefit, and his more
C 2
flight
xxviii
The LIFE of
flight or temporary Compofitions, which were written to ferve a pre-
fent turn, and becom afterwards not only uſeleſs, but many times not
intelligible. Of this nature are the Pieces I now mention'd: all their
good things are much better treated in his other Books, and the perfo-
nal Reflections are (as I faid before) neither inftructive nor divert-
ing. On this occafion I muſt fignify, that tho the Hiftory I wrote of
MILTON'S Life be prefix'd to his Works, yet I had no hand in the
Edition of thofe Volumes; or otherwife his Logic, his Grammar, and
the like, had not increas'd the bulk or price of his other uſeful Pieces.
Our Author tranflated into English Verſe fom of Virgil's Eclogs, and
about fix Books of his Eneids; which, with his Epigrams, and other
Poetical Conceits, are neither worthy of him nor the light.
3.
may
28. SOM other fmall Books he wrote which are more deferv-
ing, and therfore tranfmitted to Pofterity with his greater Works;
namely, 1. Valerius and Publicola, or, the true form of a Popular
Commonwealth, a Dialog. 2. Political Aphorifms, in number 120.
Seven Models of a Commonwealth, Antient and Modern; or brief Di-
rections ſhewing how a fit and perfect Model of Popular Government
be made, found, or understood. Thefe are all the Commonwealths in
the World for their kinds, tho not for their number. 4. The Ways
and Means wherby an equal and lafting Commonwealth may be fuddenly in-
troduc'd, and perfectly founded, with the free confent and actual confir-
mation of the whole People of England. 5. There is added, The Peti-
tion of divers well affected Perfons, drawn up by HARRINGTON,
and containing the Abftract of his Oceana; but prefented to the
Houſe of Commons by HENRY NEVIL the 6th of July 1659,
to which a fatisfactory anfwer was return'd, but nothing don, 6. Be-
fides all theſe, finding his Doctrin of Elections by Balloting not fo
well underſtood as could be defir'd, he publish'd on one fide of a large
ſheet of Paper, his uſe and manner of the Ballot, with a copper Cut in
the middle reprefenting fuch an Election in the great Affembly of the
Commonwealth: but 'tis now inferted in its proper place in the body
of Oceana. Moſt of theſe contain Abridgments of his Model, adap-
ted to the various Circumftances and Occurrences of thoſe times; but
containing likewife fom Materials peculiar to themſelves, and for that
reaſon thought fit to be printed a fecond time. He did not write the
Grounds and Reafons of Monarchy exemplify'd in the Scotifh Line.
(which Book is prefix'd to his Works) but one JoHN HALL, born
in the City of Durham, educated at Cambridg, and a Student of Gray's
Inn. Being commanded by the Counfil of State (of whom he had a
yearly Penfion) to attend OLIVER into Scotland, it occafion'd him
to publiſh that Piece. He wrote feveral other things in Profe and
Verfe, and dy'd before he was full thirty, lamented as a Prodigy of
his Age.
·
29. HARRINGTON having thus exhaufted all that could be
written on this Subject, he likewife indeavor'd to promote his Caufe by
public difcourfes at a nightly meeting of feveral curious Gentlemen in
the New Palace Yard at Westminster. This Club was call'd the Rota, of
which I ſhall give a fhort account from ANTHONY WOOD, who
mortally hated all Republicans, and was as much prejudic'd in favor of
the Royaliſts, tho, to his honor be it fpoken, he never deny'd juſtice to
either fide. "Their Difcourfes about Government, fays he, and of or
"dering a Commonwealth, were the moft ingenious and fmart that
" ever
1
JAMES HARRINGTON.
xxix
re
CC
¡
re
t
cr
ever were heard; for the Arguments in the Parlament houſe were
"but flat to thoſe. This Gang had a balloting Box, and balloted how
things ſhould be carry'd by way of Effay; which not being us'd or
known in England before on this account, the room was every even-
"s ing very
full. Beſides our Author and H. NEVIL, who were the
prime men of this Club, were CYRIAC SKINNER, Major
WILDMAN, Major VENNER, CHARLES WOLSLEY after-
"wards knighted, ROGER COKE the Author of the Detection of
"the four laft Reigns, WILLIAM POULTNEY afterwards made
a Knight, JOHN AUBRY, MAXIMILIAN PETTY, and Dr.
"PETTY, who was afterwards Sir WILLIAM, Sir JOHN Hos-
KYNS, and a great many others, fom wherof are ſtill living.
"The Doctrin was very taking, and the more becauſe, as to human
"forefight, there was no poffibility of the King's return. The great-
"eft of the Parlamentmen hated this Rotation and Balloting, as be-
ing againſt their Power. Eight or ten were for it, of which number
"H. NEVIL was one, who propos'd it to the Houſe, and made it
out to the Members, that, except they imbrac'd that ſort of Govern-
ment, they muſt be ruin'd. The Model of it was, that the third
<< part of the Senat or Houſe fhould rote out by Ballot every year
(not capable of being elected again for three Years to com) fo that
every ninth year the Senat would be wholly alter'd. No Magi-
"ftrat was to continue above three years, and all to be chofen by the
Ballot, than which nothing could be invented more fair and impar-
tial, as 'twas then thought, tho oppos'd by many for feveral rea-
"fons. This Club of Commonwealthſmen lafted till about the 21st
"of Febr. 1659, at which time the fecluded Members being reftor'd
by General GEORGE MONK, all their Models vaniſh'd."
<c
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ec
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30. WHEN the whole matter is duly confider'd, it's impoffible a
Commonwealth fhould have fucceded in England at that time, fince
CROMWEL, who alone had the Power, yet wanted the Will to
fet it up. They were comparatively but very few that entertain'd
fuch a Deſign from the beginning of the Troubles; and, as it ufually
happens, a great part of thefe did afterwards defert their Principles,
being feduc'd by the Honors and Preferments wherby they were re-
tain'd in the ſervice of the reigning Powers. The body of the Pco-
ple were either exaſperated on a religious account, only to obtain that
Liberty which they afterwards mutually deny'd each other, or by the
change of the Balance they grew weary of Monarchy, and did not
know it. The Republicans indeed made an advantage of their Dif-
contents to deſtroy the eſtabliſh'd Government, without acquainting
em with their real Defigns; and when this was effectually don, the
People (who had no fettl'd Form in their view, and thought all things
fafe by the Victory they had gain'd over the King and the Church)
fell in with what was firft offer'd by thofe in whom they confided, and
would as well have accepted a better Government if they had been ma-
nag'd by men of honeft and publie Defigns. But the Multitude can
feel, tho they cannot fee. Inftead of injoying their defir'd Liberty,
they foon found themſelves under a moft heavy Yoke, which they na-
turally labor'd to fhake off; and yet in all the changes then made, two
things were remarkable, that every one of 'em would be ſtil'd' a
Commonwealth, and yet none of 'em would mend or take warning
by the Errors of thofe that preceded, but ftill continu'd to abuſe the
Nation,
XXX
The LIFE of
1
Nation, and unnaturally to ingrofs the Government into a few hands.
The People being all this while told they were under a Cornmon-
wealth, and not being able to fee thro the deceit, begun to think them-
felves miſtaken in the choice they had made, ſince their fufferings under
theſe pretended Commonwealths were infinitly greater than what in-
duc'd 'em to diffolve the former Monarchy. In this condition the feve-
ral Partys might (as HARRINGTON us'd to fay) be fitly compar'd to
a company of Puppydogs in a bag, where finding themſelves uneafy
for want of room, every one of 'em bites the tail or foot of the next,
fuppofing that to be the cauſe of his mifery. By this means whatever
was faid againſt a Commonwealth obtain'd ready belief, as, that it is
the moſt feditious fort of Government, and that inftead of one Ty-
rant there are a great many who inrich themſelves by laying intolera-
ble Taxes on others. All this and much more the People in England
then experienc'd, and therfore detefting their new Commonwealth,
they reſtor❜d the old Monarchy. But to do all Governments the Ju-
ftice due from an impartial Hiſtorian, they never had a Common-
wealth, but were interchangeably under Anarchy, Tyranny, and Oli-
garchy, to which Commonwealths have ever bin the greateſt ene-
mys, and have frequently lent their voluntary affiftance to deliver
other Nations from the like oppreffions. Thus the People of Eng-
land came to hate the name of a Commonwealth, without loving
their Liberty the leſs.
31. BUT to return whence we digrefs'd: Our Author, not con-
cern'd in the exceffive fears and hopes of thofe that favor'd or oppos'd
the Reſtoration of CHARLES the fecond, continu'd to live in a peace-
able manner at his own houſe, demeaning himſelf as became a perfon
blindly ingag'd to no Party or Factions. But tho his Life was retir'd,
it was not folitary, being frequented with people of all forts, fom with
a malicious defign to fiſh fomthing to his prejudice, and others to gain
advantage to themſelves by his learned Converfation, or to put him
upon fomthing towards the better fettlement of the Kingdom. Among
theſe there was an eminent Royaliſt who prevail'd with him to draw
up fom Inſtructions for the King's ſervice, wherby he might be inabl'd
to govern with fatisfaction to the People and fafety to himself: which
being perform'd and fign'd with his own hand, his Friend after fhewing
it to ſeveral of the Courtiers, found they did not approve a Scheme that
was not likely to further their ſelfiſh Deſigns. At laft he put his Paper
into the hands of a great Miniſter about the King; and how well our
Author was rewarded for his good Intentions, we are now going to
relate. About this time he was bufy in reducing his Politics into ſhort
and eaſy Aphoriſms, yet methodically digeſted in their natural order,
and futed to the moſt vulgar capacitys. Of this he made no fecret,
and freely communicated his Papers to all that vifited him. While he was
putting the laſt hand to this Syftem, and as an innocent man apprehen-
five of no danger, he was by an Order from the King, on the 28th of
December 1661, feiz'd by Sir WILLIAM POULTNEY and others,
and committed to the Tower of London for treaſonable Deſigns and
Practices. He had the written ſheets of his Aphorifms then lying looſe
on the table before him, and underſtanding they intended to carry 'em
to the Council, he beg'd the favor that he might ſtitch 'em together;
which was granted, and fo remov'd with fom other Papers to White-
ball. I have that Manufcript now in my hands, and another Copy
of
#
JAMES HARRINGTON.
xxxi
}
of the fame which was given me by one of his acquaintance, from
both which I have printed it among the reſt of his Works. It is a
complete System of Politics, and diſcovers the true Springs of the rife,.
temper, and diffolution of all forts of Governments, in a very brief
and perfpicuous manner.
32. HE had no time given him to take leave of any body, but was
ftraight convey'd to the Tower, where none were allow'd to com to
his fight or ſpeech. His Sifters were inconfolable, and the more ſo, the
lefs they knew what was laid to their Brother's charge. One of them,
who on another occafion had experienc'd the King's favor, threw her ſelf
now at his Feet, and petition'd him to have compaffion on her Brother,
who thro a great miſtake was fallen under his Majeſty's diſpleaſure :
for as ſhe was ſure that none of his Subjects exceded his Loyalty, fo his
Majeſty might ſee he was not the man they defign'd, fince the Warrant
was for Sir JAMES HARRINGTON, wheras her Brother was never ho-
nor'd with ſuch a Title by his Majeſty's Anceſtors, and he would not
have accepted it from OLIVER. To this the King made anſwer, that
tho they might be miſtaken in his Title, he doubted he might be found
more guilty of the Crimes alleg'd against him, than he with'd any
Brother of hers to be. Then the prefs'd he might be examin'd before
his Majefty, or be brought to a ſpeedy trial. Shortly after my Lord
LAUDERDALE, Sir GEORGE CARTERET, and Sir EDWARD
WALKER were fent to the Tower to question him about a Plot which,
they faid, he had contriv'd against his Majefty's Perfon and Govern-
ment. At this he was extraordinarily reviv'd, not being able to di-
vine before the caufe of his Confinement, and knowing himſelf
wholly innocent of this Charge. He found means to tranfmit a Copy
of his Examination to his Sifters, giving 'em leave to publiſh it,
which was never hitherto don, and is as follows.
33. THE Examination of JAMES HARRINGTON, ta-
ken in the Tower of London by the Earl of LAUDE R-
Sir GEORGE CARTERET, and Sir EDWARD
DALE,
WALKER.
L
1
ORD LAUDERDALE.
Sir, I have heretofore accounted it an
honor to be your Kinſman, but am now forry to fee you upon
this occafion; very forry I affure you.
HARRINGTON. My Lord, feeing: this is an occafion, I am
glad to fee you upon this occafion. Which faid, the Commiffioners
fat down; and Mr. HARRINGTON ftanding before my Lord, he be-
gan in this manner.
Lord. SIR, the King thinks it ſtrange that you, who have ſo emi-
nently appear'd in Principles contrary to his Majefty's Government,
and the Laws of this Nation, fhould ever fince he came over live fo
quiet and unmoleſted, and yet ſhould be fo ungrateful. Were you
diſturb'd? were you fo much as affronted, that you should enter into
fuch defperat practices?
:
Hur. "MY "Lord, when I know why this is faid, I fhall know
what to ſay.
Lord.
เ
xxxii
The LIFE of
Lord. WELL then, without any longer preamble, will you an-
fwer me ingenuously, and as you are a Gentleman, to what I have to
propoſe ?
Har. MY Lord, I value the affeveration (as I am a Gentleman)
as high as any man, but think it an affeveration too low upon this oc-
cafion; wherfore, with your leave, I fhall make uſe of fom greater
affeveration.
Lord. FOR that do as you fee good: do you know Mr. WILD-
MAN?
Har. MY Lord, I have fom acquaintance with him.
Lord. WHEN did you fee him?
Har. MY Lord, he and I have not bin in one houſe together theſe
two years.
Lord. WILL you ſay ſo?
Har. YES, my Lord.
Lord. WHERE did you fee him laft ?
Har. ABOUT a year ago I met him in a ſtreet that gos to Drury-
lane.
Lord. DID you go into no houſe ?
Har. NO, my Lord.
Sir G. Carteret. THAT's ftrange!
Lord. COM, this will do you no good: Had not you, in March
laft, meetings with him in Bowstreet in Coventgarden? where there
were about twenty more of you; where you made a Speech about
half an hour long, that they ſhould lay by diſtinguiſhing Names, and
betake themſelves together into one Work, which was to diffolve this
Parlament, and bring in a new one, or the old one again. Was not
this meeting adjourn'd from thence to the Mill Bank? were not you
there alfo ?
Har. MY Lord, you may think, if theſe things be true, I have
no refuge but to the mercy of God and of the King.
Lord. TRUE.
Har. WELL then, my Lord, folemnly and deliberately, with
my eys to Heaven, I renounce the mercy of God and the King, if
any of this be true, or if ever I thought or heard of this till now that
you tell it me.
Sir G. C. THIS is ftrange!
Lord. DO you know BAREBONES?
Har. YES, my Lord.
Lord. WHEN did you fee him?
Har. I THINK that I have call'd at his houſe or ſhop thrice in
my Life.
Lord. HAD you never any meetings with him fince the King
came over?
Har. NO, my Lord.
Sir G. C. THIS is ſtrange!
Lord. DO you know Mr. NEVIL?
Har. VERY well, my Lord.
Lord. WHEN did you fee him?
Har. MY Lord, I feldom us'd to vifit him; but when he was
Town, he us'd to ſee me at my houſe every evening, as duly almoſt
as the day went over his head.
•
Lord.
JAMES HARRINGTON.
xxxiii
•
1
Lord. WERE you not with him at fom public meeting?
Har. MY Lord, the publickeſt meeting I have bin with him at,
was at dinner at his own lodging, where I met Sir BERNARD Gas-
COIN, and I think Col. LEG.
Sir Edw. Walker. THEY were good fafe company.
Lord. WHAT time was it?
Har. IN Veniſon time I am fure, for we had a good Veniſon paſty.
Lord. DO you know one PORTMAN?
Har. NO, my Lord, I never heard of his name before.
Sir G. C. THIS is ftrange!
Lord. COM, deal ingenuouſly, you had better confefs the things.
Har. MY Lord, you do not look upon me (for I faw he did not
firmly) I pray look upon me. Do you not know an innocent face
from a guilty one? com, you do, my Lord, every one dos: My Lord,
you are great Men, you com from the King, you are the Meffengers
of Death.
Lord. IS that a ſmall matter? (at which my Lord gave a ſhrug.)
Har. IF I be a Malefactor, I am no old Malefactor: why am not
I pale? why do not I tremble? why dos not my tongue falter? why
have you not taken me tripping? My Lord, thefe are unavoidable
fymtoms of guilt. Do you find any fuch thing in me?
Lord. NO (which he ſpoke with a kind of amazement) and then
added, I have faid all that I think I have to ſay.
Har. MY Lord, but I have not.
Lord, COM then.
Har. THIS plainly is a practice, a wicked practice, a practice
for innocent Blood; and as weak a one as it is wicked. Ah, my Lord,
if you had taken half the pains to examin the Guilty that have
you
don to examin the Innocent, you had found it; it could not have
efcap'd you. Now, my Lord, confider if this be a practice, what
kind of perfons you are that are thus far made inftrumental in the hands
of wicked men. Nay, whither will wickedneſs go? Is not the King's
Authority (which fhould be facred) made inftrumental? My Lord,
for your own fake, the King's fake, for the Lord's fake, let fuch Vil-
lanys be found out and puniſh'd. At this my Lord LAUDERDALE,
as was thought fomwhat out of countenance, rofe up; and fumbling
with his hand upon the Table, faid:
Lord. WHY if it be as you fay, they deſerve puniſhment enough,
but otherwiſe look it will com feverely upon you.
Har. MY Lord, I accepted of that condition before.
Lord. COM, Mr. Vice-Chamberlain, it is late.
Har. MY Lord, now if I might I could anſwer the Preamble.
Lord. COM, fay; and fo he fat down again.
Har. MY Lord, in the Preamble you charge me with being emi-
nent in Principles contrary to the King's Government, and the Laws of
this Nation. Som, my Lord, have aggravated this, faying, that I being
a privat man have bin fo mad as to meddle with Politics: what had a
privat man to do with Government? My Lord, there is not any public
Perfon, not any Magiftrat, that has written in the Politics worth a
button. All they that have bin excellent in this way, have bin privat
men, as privat men, my Lord, as my felf. There is PLATO, there
is ARISTOTLE, there is LIvy, there is MACHIAVEL. My
Lord, I can fum up ARISTOTLE's Politics in a very few words;
d
he
1:
1
xxxiv
The LIFE of
he fays there is the barbarous Monarchy (fuch a one where the Peo-
ple have no Votes in making the Laws) he fays there is the Heroic
Monarchy (fuch a one where the People have their Votes in making
the Laws) and then he fays there is Democracy; and affirms that a
man cannot be faid to have Liberty, but in a Democracy only.
MY Lord LAUDERDALE, who thus far had bin very attentive,
at this fhew'd fome impatience.
Har. I SAY, ARISTOTLE fays fo; I have not faid fo much.
And under what Prince was it? Was it not under ALEXANDER, the
greateſt Prince then in the World? I beseech you, my Lord, did
ALEXANDER hang up ARISTOTLE, did he moleft him? LIVY
for a Commonwealth is one of the fulleft Authors; did not he
write under AUGUSTUS CÆSAR? did CESAR hang up LIVY, did
he moleft him? MACHIAVEL what a Commonwealthfman was
he? but he wrote under the Medici when they were Princes in Flo-
rence; did they hang up MACHIAVEL, or did they moleft him? I
have don no otherwife than as the greateft Politicians, the King will
do no otherwife than as the greateſt Princes. But, my Lord, theſe
Authors had not that to fay for themſelves that I have; I did not write
under a Prince, I wrote under a Ufurper, OLIVER. He having
ftarted up into the Throne, his Officers (as pretending to be for a
Commonwealth) kept a murmuring, at which he told them that he
knew not what they meant, nor themfelves; but let any of them fhew
him what they meant by a Commonwealth (or that there was any
fuch thing) they fhould fee that he fought not himfelf: the Lord
knew he fought not himſelf, but to make good the Caufe. Upon this
fom fober men came to me and told me, if any man in England could
fhew what a Commonwealth was, it was my felf. Upon this
per-
fuafion I wrote; and after I had written, OLIVER never anfwer'd his
Officers as he had don before, therfore I wrote not againſt the King's
Government. And for the Law, if the Law could have puniſh'd
me, OLIVER had don it; therfore my Writing was not obnoxious
to the Law. After OLIVER the Parlament faid they were a Com-
monwealth; I faid they were not, and prov'd it: infomuch that the
Parlament accounted me a Cavalier, and one that had no other defign
in my writing, than to bring in the King; and now the King first of
any man makes me a Roundhead.
Lord. THESE things are out of doors; if you be no Plotter, the
King dos not reflect upon your Writings.
AND fo rifing up, they went out; my Lord being at the head of
the ſtairs, I faid to him, My Lord, there is one thing more; you tax
me with Ingratitude to the King, who had fuffer'd me to live undi-
fturb'd: truly, my Lord, had I bin taken right by the King, it had
(by this Example already given) bin no more than my due. But I
know well enough I have bin miſtaken by the King; the King ther-
fore taking me for no Friend, and yet uſing me not as an Enemy, is
fuch a thing as I have mention'd to all I have convers'd with, as a high
Character of Ingenuity and Honor in the King's Nature.
Lord. I AM glad you have had a ſenſe of it; and fo went down.
Har. MY Lord, it is my duty to wait on you no farther.
34. NOTWITHSTANDING the apparent Innocence of
our Author, he was ftill detain'd a cloſe Priſoner; and Chancellor
HIDE,
!
JAMES HARRINGTON.
HIDE, at a Conference of the Lords and Commons, charg'd him
with being concern'd in the Plot, wherof one and thirty perfons were
the chief managers after this manner: That they met in Bowstreet
Coventgarden, in St. Martin's-le-grand, at the Mill-Bank, and in other
places; and that they were of feven different Partys or Interefts, as
three for the Commonwealth, three for the Long Parlament, three
for the City, three for the Purchaſers, three for the Disbanded Army,
three for the Independents, and three for the Fifthmonarchy men.
That their firft Confideration was how to agree on the choice of Par-
lamentmen againſt the infuing Seffion: and that a fpecial care ought
to be had about Members for the City of London, as a precedent for
the rest of the Kingdom to follow, wherupon they nominated the
four Members after chofen, and now fitting in Parlament: but three of
theſe, being then preſent, ſtood up, and clear'd themſelves of this Afper-
fion. Their next care was to frame a Petition to the Parlament for a
preaching Miniſtry, and Liberty of Confcience. Then they were to di-
vide and fubdivide themſelves into feveral Councils and Committees, for
the better carrying on their buſineſs by themfelves or their Agents and
Accomplices all over the Kingdom. In thefe Meetings HARRING-
TON was faid to be often in the Chair; that they had taken an Oath
of Secrefy, and concerted meaſures for levying Men and Mony.
35. THE Chancellor added, that tho he had certain Information of
the times and places of their meetings, and particularly thoſe of HAR-
RINGTON and WILDMAN, they were nevertheleſs ſo fixt in their
nefarious defign, that none of thoſe they had taken would confeſs any
thing, not fo much as that they had feen or ſpoken to one another at
thoſe times or places; which obftinacy, he thought, muft needs procede
from a faithfulneſs to their Oath. But a Committee of Lords and
Commons, after ſeveral fittings, could make nothing of this imagi-
nary Plot, and did not ever name our Author in all their Reports.
36. HIS Sifters in the mean time being impatient to fee him, and
to know his Condition, after ſeveral fruitleſs Petitions, obtain'd an order
of Council at laſt to be admitted into the Tower, where they found him
barbarously treated by the Lieutenant, whom they foften'd into more
humanity with a prefent of fifty pounds under the notion of Fees. By
them he deliver'd a Petition to the King, importing that in the late times
he was no public Perfon, nor acted to any man's detriment in his Life,
Body, or Eftate, but on the contrary had don his endeavors to help all
perfons in diftrefs; that he had oppos'd the Ufurper in fuch a manner
as was judg'd even by the Royalifts themſelves to be very much to his
difadvantage; and that it was not probable that he, who had liv'd fo
peaceably before, would attemt any Novelty after his Majefty's Re-
ftoration wherfore he beg'd the favor of a public Trial, or a more
eafy Confinement. But tho he had bin now a priſoner during the ſpace
of five months, neither he nor any on his behalf could receive an An-
fwer to their Petitions; which made him fomwhat impatient, not fo
much to injoy his Liberty, as to vindicat himſelf from the baſe Aſperfi-
ons of his Enemys. He therfore continually urg'd his fifter ASHTON
to procure him a Trial, which the not being able to effect, he petition'd
the Parlament, fhewing that he had lain a cloſe Priſoner in the Tower
for five months upon a bare fufpicion of fom difaffection to the Govern-
ment, which in all his Examinations did not in the leaft
appear; and
that he hop'd e'er that time ſo to have clear'd his innocence by a public
d 2
Trial,
XXXV
xxxvi
The LIFE of
<c
Trial, as to deferve his Liberty. But becauſe he underſtood thefe
matters were in fom meaſure repreſented to their Houſe, he would not
prefume, without first making his application to them, to fue for his
freedom by other legal means. " May it therefore pleaſe this honorable
"Houſe, fays he, to take tender confideration of the fufferings of an
Engliſhman hitherto innocent; and that the long continuance of him
"in prifon without trial may be hereafter the cafe of others, and a pre-
"cedent for the like cafe: and that this honorable Houſe would pleaſe
to move his Majefty that your Petitioner may be proceded againft
by a legal way of Trial, or that he may have his freedom; that fo
"he may no longer languiſh in Prifon to the ruin of his Health and
"Eftate. Theſe are not the words of a man confcious of Guilt, or
afraid of Power.
rr
<<
37. HIS Siſter could get no Member to deliver this Petition, or to
give her any incouragement; fom alleging that ſhe was more likely
to deſtroy than ſerve her Brother, and others that by unfeaſonable pref-
fing ſhe might precipitat his danger; wheras if he would be patient
under his fufferings, he might be fafe in his reftraint. Then he advis'd
her to move for his Habeas Corpus; which at firſt was flatly deny'd, but
afterwards when it was granted and duly ferv'd, his Warder came one
day to his Sifters at Westminster, and acquainted them that between one
and two a clock that morning their Brother was put on board a Ship
to be tranſported he knew not whither, without any time given him
either to ſee his Friends, or to make proviſion of Mony, Linen, or
other neceffarys. Nor could his Relations for a whole fortnight, ei-
ther at the Tower or in the Secretarys Office, learn what was becom of
him, till they receiv'd a note from himſelf on board one of the King's
Ships then lying under Hurſt Caſtle, informing them that he believ'd
he was bound for Plymouth. About a month after he ſent 'em word
by another Letter that he was landed on a kind of Rock oppofite to Ply-
mouth, call'd St. Nicholas's Ifland, whence he afterwards had fre-
quent opportunitys of writing to 'em many pious and moral Admoni-
tions, as well as Letters of bufinefs and entertainment.
1.
38. BUT his clofe reftraint to this fmall fpot of Earth, where
there was no freſh Water, and ſcarce any room to move his Body,
quickly chang'd the ſtate of his Health; this occafion'd him to peti-
tion he might be remov'd to Plymouth, which was granted, his Bro-
ther WILLIAM, and his Uncle ANTHONY SAMUEL, obliging them-
felves in a Bond of 5000 for his fafe Impriſonment. Here he had
not only the liberty of walking on the Hoe, but was alſo us'd with
extraordinary Reſpect by the Deputy Governor of the Fort Sir JOHN
SKELTON, who frequently invited him to his Table, and much
lov'd his Converfation. Among the other Acquaintance he made at
Plymouth, one was Dr. DUNSTAN, who advis'd him to take a pre-
paration of Guaiacum in Coffee, as a certain cure for the Scurvy, with
which he was then troubled. He drank of this Liquor in great quan-
titys, every morning and evening. But after ufing it for fom time,
his Sifters, to their no finall amazement, receiv'd no more anſwers to
their Letters. At length Advice was brought 'em from his Landlady,
that his Fancy was much diforder'd, and defiring fom body might
com to look after him. Immediatly one of them addreis'd her
ſelf to the Earl of Bath, then chief Governor of Plymouth, and in-
form'd him of his Prifoner's fad condition. This noble Lord, who
laid
AMES HARRINGTON,
xxxvii
1
laid many Obligations on him before, and gave frequent orders for
his good Ufage, went hereupon to intercede for him with the King,
repreſenting the danger of his Life if he were not remov'd from that
unwholfom place to London, where he might have the Advice of able
Phyficians: and the King was accordingly pleas'd to grant a Warrant
for his Releaſe, fince nothing appear'd against him fupported by good
Proof or probable Prefumtions.
39. THE next day the Lady ASHTON, with another of his Sif-
ters, took their Journey towards Plymouth, where they found their
poor Brother ſo transform'd in Body and Mind, that they ſcarce could
perfuade themſelves it was the fame perfon. He was reduc'd to a Ske-
leton, not able to walk alone, flept very little, his Imagination dif-
turb'd, often fainted when he took his drink, and yet fo fond of it
that he would by no means be advis'd to forbear it. Dr. PRUJEAN,
and other eminent Phyficians, greatly blam'd Dr. DUNSTAN'S pre-
fcriptions, giving their Opinion under their hands that Guaiacum and
the other drying things, which he adminiſter'd to his Patient in Coffee,
were enough of themſelves to beget Melancholy or Phrenzy, where
there was no previous difpofition to it. A rumor at Plymouth, that
HARRINGTON had taken fom drink which would make any man
mad in a month; the furliness of his Doctor, and fomthing blab'd
by a Maid that was put againſt his Will to attend him, made his Sifter
fuſpect he had foul play left he ſhould write any more Oceanas.
'Tis certain, that (tho his Recovery was never perfect) he mended
finely as foon as he was perfuaded to abstain from this Liquor. In leſs
than a month he was able to bear the Journey to London in a Coach,
where he was no fooner arriv'd but Sir JOHN SKELTON, who
was then in Town, paid him a vifit. My Lady ASHTON com-
plaining to him that fhe had not timely notice of her Brother's
Distemper, he proteſted he would have fent her word of it, had
not his Doctor affur'd him that he only counterfeited; and yet at the
fame time he made him take ſtrong dofes of Hellebor, and God knows
what befides.
40. HE paft fom time at Afhted in Surrey, to drink the Epfom-
waters, by which he found no benefit. At London he was put wholly
under the care of Doctor PRUJEAN, who with all his Art could afford
little help to the weakneſs of his Body, and none at all to the diſorder
of his Mind, to his dying day. He was allow'd to diſcourſe of moſt
other things as rationally as any man, except his own Diftemper, fan-
cying ſtrange things in the operation of his animal Spirits, which he
thought to tranſpire from him in the ſhape of Birds, of Flys, of Bees,
or the like. And thoſe about him reported that he talk'd much of good
and evil Spirits, which made them have frightful apprehenfions. But
he us'd, they ſaid, fomtimes to argue fo ftrenuously that this was
no deprav'd imagination, that his Doctor was often put to his fhifts for
an Anſwer. He would on fuch occafions compare himſelf to DEMO-
CRITUS, who for his admirable diſcoverys in Anatomy was rec-
kon'd diſtracted by his fellow Citizens, till HIPPOCRATES cur'd
'em of their mistake. I confefs I did not know at firſt what to make
of theſe things from the informations of his Acqua intance, till I met
with a Letter of Dr. BURTHOGGE to his Sifter, wherin are con-
tain'd certain Querys propos'd to him by HARRINGTON, with a
ftate of his Cafe written by the Doctor, who was his intimat Friend,
and
xxxviii
The LIFE of
and a very good judg, whether confider'd as a Phyſician or a Philofo-
pher, as appears by his late Treatife of the Soul of the World, &c.
and as I have particular reafon to affirm from his Letters to my La-
dy ASHTON, which are all now before me. Among other things
the Doctor fays, that he ever expreft the higheſt fatisfaction in think-
ing of what he had at any time written, as the beſt Service he was
capable to do his Country, and fincerely intended by him to the glory
of God, which he thought in fom meaſure to be the good of man-
kind: fo far was he from being under any remorfe of Conſcience on
that ſcore, as his ill wifhers maliciously reported. Now, tho I was
fomwhat ſtagger'd concerning the nature of his Diftemper by Dr.
BURTHOGGE'S Letter, I grew perfectly amaz'd when I found
among his Papers the beginning of a little Treatife written by him-
felf, wherin (without raillery) he proves 'em to be all mad that
thought him fo with respect to what he difcours'd of Nature, which
he maintain❜d to work mechanically or mathematically, as BELLINI,
BORELLI, Dr. PITCAIRNE, and other eminent men have fince evi-
dently fhewn. It appears there that his pretended Vifions of Angels and
Devils were nothing elſe but good or bad animal Spirits, and that his
Flys and Bees were only Similitudes wherby he us'd to exprefs the va-
rious figures and forms of thoſe Particles. I own that he might pro-
bably enough be much decay'd in his underſtanding, by reafon of his
great and long weakneſs of body; but I fhall never be convinc'd that
he was delirious in that only inftance which they alleges and to fa-
tisfy the Learned in this point (which, in my opinion, is a memora-
ble Story that concerns 'em all) I fhall fubjoin his own diſcourſe to
this Hiftory.
•
1 41. WERE he really out of order, it had bin his misfortune, not his
fault, and was the cafe of fom of the beſt men that ever liv'd. An action
that will better perfuade the world he was not truly himſelf, was his
marrying in this Condition. The Lady was a very agreeable woman,
whofe Perſon and Converfation he always admir'd; he was the
Daughter of Sir MARMADUKE DORREL of Buckinghamshire, fam'd
for wit more than became her pretenfions to good fenfe, had long
liv'd among his Relations with the refpect of a Friend and a Sifter; but
now would needs change the office of a voluntary Attendant for the
name of a Wife. It foon appear'd that this match was not fo much difin-
tereſted as ſhe would pretend, which occafion'd fom difference between
'em; but they were quickly reconcil'd, and fhe was always treated by
him afterwards with the higheſt Generofity, tho fhe did not uſe him fo
handfomly when they were both young and healthy, and might have
made a more feaſonable match than at this time. Towards his latter
end he was ſubject to the Gout, and enjoy'd little eafe, but languiſhing
and drooping a good while, he fell at laſt into a Palfy, and departed this
Life at Westminster, the 11th of September, in the Year 1677 (leaving his
Eſtate to his Brother's Children) and lys bury'd there in S. Margaret's
Church, on the South fide of the Altar, next to the Grave of Sir WAL-
TER RALEIGH, with this Infcription over him: Hic jacet JACOBUS
HARRINGTON Armiger (filius maximus natu SAPCOTIS HARRING-
TON de Rand, in Com. Linc. Equitis aurati, & JANE uxoris ejus,
filia GULIELMI SAMUEL de Upton in Com. Northamton. Militis) qui
obiit Septimo die Septembris, ætatis fuæ fexagefimo fexto, anno Dom.
1677. Nec virtus, nec animi dotes (arrha licet æterni in animam amo-
ris Dei) corruptione eximere queant corpus.
42. THUS
JAMES HARRINGTON.
xxxix
42. THUS dy'd JAMES HARRINGTON, whofe Name is fure
to live fo long as Learning and Liberty bear any Reputation in Eng-
land. But tho he did not think fo highly of himſelf, yet he was
ftrongly perfuaded that his Oceana was the Model of an equal Com-
monwealth, or a Government wherin no Party can be at variance
with or gain ground upon another, and never to be conquer'd by
any foren Power; whence he concluded it muſt needs be likewife im-
mortal for as the People, who are the materials, never dy; ſo the
Form, which is the Motion, muft (without fom oppofition) be end-
lefs. The Immortality of a Commonwealth is fuch a new and curious
Problem, that I could not affure my felf of the Reader's pardon, with-
out giving him fom brief account of the Arguments for it, and they
run much after this manner. The perfection of Government is ſuch a
Libration in the frame of it, that no Man or Men under it can have
the intereſt, or (having the intereft) can have the power to diſturb it
with Sedition. This will be granted at firſt fight, and HARRING-
TON appeals to all Mankind, whether his Oceana (examin'd by this
principle) be not fuch an equal Government, completely and intirely
fram'd in all its neceffary Orders or fundamental Laws, without any
contradiction to it felf, to Reaſon, or Truth. If this be fo (as the
contrary dos not yet appear) then it has no internal caufe of Diffolu-
tion, and confequently fuch a Government can never be ruin'd any
way; for he farther fhews (what all Hiſtory cannot contradict) that
a Commonwealth, if not firſt broken or divided by Factions at home,
was never conquer'd by the Arms of any Monarch from the beginning
of the World to this day but the Commonwealth of Oceana having
no Factions within, and fo not to be conquer'd from without, is ther-
fore an equal, perfect, and immortal Government. For want of this
equality in the frame he clearly demonftrats how the Common-
wealths of Rome, Athens, and others, came to be deftroy'd by their
contending and overtopping partys; wheras that of Venice can never
change or finiſh. He proves that this Equality is yet more wanting in
Monarchys, for an abfolute Monarchy (as that of the Turk, for ex-
ample) the Janizarys have frequent intereft, and perpetual power to
raife Sedition to the ruin of the Emperor, and, when they pleafe, of
the Empire: This cannot be faid of the Armys of Oceana, and ther-
fore an abfolute Monarchy is no perfect Government. In what they
improperly call a mix'd Monarchy the Nobility are fomtimes putting
Chains on the King, at other times domineering over the People; the
King is either oppreffing the People without control, or contending
with the Nobility as their Protectors; and the People are frequently
in arms againſt both King and Nobility, till at laſt one of the three
Eſtates becoms maſter of the other two, or till they fo mutually weak-
en one another that either they fall a prey to fom more potent Govern-
ment, or naturally grow into a Commonwealth: therfore mix'd Mo-
narchy is not a perfect Government; and if no fuch Partys or Conten-
tions can poffibly exiſt in Oceana, then on the contrary is it a moft equal,
perfect, and immortal Commonwealth, Quod erat demonftrandum.
43. IT will not be objected to the difparagement of this Model, that
it was no better receiv'd by OLIVER CROMWEL; nor is it fair to judg
of things at any time by their Succeſs. If it ſhould be faid, that, af
ter the expiration of his Tyranny, the People did not think fit to ef
tabliſh it; I ſhall only anſwer, that all the attemts which have bin us'd
for introducing Arbitrary Power have prov'd as unfortunat, wher-
by
xl
The LIFE of
•
by it appears at leaſt that the Character which TACITUS gave the Ro-
mans of his time, may as well agree to the People of England: and it is,
that They are able to bear neither abfolute Liberty, nor abfolute Slavery.
CONCLUSIO N.
I AM difpos'd to believe that my Lady ASHTON'S memory
fail'd her, when ſhe ſaid that her Brother was at Rome during the
Jubilee; for as Chronology feems to contradict it, fo fhe might eafily
miſtake the Jubilee for the Ceremony of confecrating Candles, or any
other folemnity; his remarks being equally applicable to all thoſe of
the Popish Church. But as to the whole of this Hiftory, tho it be ma-
nag'd with due moderation, and contains nothing but bare matters of
fact, or fuch obfervations as they naturally fuggeft; yet I was fenfible
before I wrote it, that I could not eſcape the diſpleaſure of three forts
of perfons: fuch as have refolv'd to be angry at whatever I do; fuch as
neither rightly underſtand what is written by me nor any body elſe; and
thofe who, without any particular fpite againſt an Author, yet to get a
penny will pretend to anfwer any book that makes a confiderable figure.
Therfore I find my felf oblig'd beforehand to diſclaim all explanations
made of my meaning, beyond what is warranted by the exprefs words
of my Book; having conftantly indeavour'd not only to write intelli-
gibly, but fo as that none can poffibly miſunderſtand me. I renounce
all the defigns that may be imputed to me by fuch as are ſo far from
being admitted into my fecret, that they were never in my company;
but I eſpecially difown whatever is faid by thoſe who firft prefume to
divine my thoughts, and then to vent their own rafh conjectures as my
undoubted opinions. I flight their artifice who, when unable to object
againſt the point in queſtion, labor to ingage their Adverſary in matters
wholly befides the purpoſe; and when their Evafions have no better for-
tune than their Attacks, fall to railing againſt his Perfon, becauſe they
cannot confute his Arguments. I am as much above the malice of fom,
as they are below my refentments; and I wou'd at any time chufe to
be rather the object of their Envy than of their Favor: but as I am far
from thinking my ſelf exemt from all the indifcretions of Youth, or the
frailtys of human Nature; fo I am not confcious of entertaining higher
thoughts of my own performances than are becoming, or meaner of other
mens than they deſerve. I know that to enterprize any thing out of the
common road is to undergo undoubted envy or peril; and that he, who is
not beforehand refolv'd to bear oppofition, will never do any great or be-
neficial exploit: yet 'tis no ſmall incouragement to me, that from the be-
ginning of the world to this time not a fingle inftance can be produc'd of
one who either was or would be eminent, but he met with Enemys to
his perſon and fame. Notwithſtanding this confideration be juft, yet if I
write any thing hereafter (either as oblig'd by Duty, or to amuze idle
time) I have determin'd it ſhall not concern perfonal difputes, or the
narrow interefts of jarring Factions, but fomthing of univerfal benefit,
and which all fides may indifferently read. Without fuch provocations
as no man ought to indure, this is my fix'd refolution; and I particular-
ly defire that none may blame me for acting otherwiſe, who force me
to do fo themſelves. I fhall never be wanting to my own defence,
when either the Caufe or the Aggreffor deferves it: for as to thofe
Authors who conceal their names, if they write matters of fact 'tis a
fign they cannot make them good; and all men are agreed to reject
their Teſtimony, except fuch as refolve to deny others common juſtice :
but the ill opinion of theſe prejudic'd perfons can no more injure any
man,
JAMES HARRINGTON.
xli
י
man, than their good opinion will do him honor. Beſides other reaſons
of mentioning my fuppos'd defigns, one is to difabuſe feveral people
who (as I am told) are made to believe that in the Hiſtory of SOCRA-
TES I draw a Parallel between that Philofopher and JESUS CHRIST.
This is a moft fcandalous and unchriftian calumny, as will more fully
appear to the world whenever the Book it ſelf is publiſh'd: for that I
have bin ſome time about it, I freely avow; yet not in the manner thoſe
officious Informers report, but as becoms a difintereſted Hiſtorian, and
a friend to all mankind.
The Infcription on the Monument of Sir JAMES HARRING-
TON and his three Sons, at Exton in Rutlandfhire.
H'
'ERE lieth Sir James Harrington of
Exton Kt. with (a) Lucy his Wife,
Daughter to Sir William Sidney Kt. by
whom he had 18 Children, wherof three
Sons and 8 Daughters marry'd as follows.
THE eldeſt Son, Sir (b) John, marry'd
the Heireſs of Robert Keylwoy Surveyor of
the Court of Wards and Liverys. The 2d
Son, Sir (c) Henry took to Wife one of the
Coheirs of Francis Agar, one of his Majefty's
Privy Council in Ireland. The 3d Son,
James (d) Harrington Efq; had to Wife
one of the Coheirs of Robert Sapcotes Efq;
The eldest Daughter, Elizabeth, was mar-
ried to Sir Edward (e) Montague Kt. The
2d, Frances, to Sir William (f) Lee Kt. The
3d, Margaret, to Don (g) Bonitto de Sifnores
of Spain, of the Family of the Dukes of
Frantafquo. The 4th, Katherine, to Sir
Edward (b) Dimmock Kt. The 5th, Mary,
to Sir Edward (i) Wing field Kt. The 6th,
Maball, to Sir Andrew (k) Noell Kt. The
7th, Sarah, was marry'd to the Lord Haft-
ings, Heir to the Earl of Huntingdon. The
8th, Theodofia, (1) to the Lord Dudley of
Dudley Caftle.
THE fame Sir James and Lucy were
marry'd fifty years: She died firſt, in the
72d year of her Age; he ſhortly after yielded
to Nature, being 80 years old, in the year
of our Lord 1591, and of Queen Eliza-
beth's Reign 34. their Son James being
made fole Executor to them both; who,
that he might as well perform to his Parents
their Rites, as leave a Teftimony of his
own Piety to Pofterity, hath erected and
dedicated this Monument to their eternal
Memory.
e
(a) And Sifter to Sir Philip Sidney Kt.
rington, and his Lady was Governeſs to the
(b) Who was afterwards created Ĺd Har-
Queen of Bohemia. His Family is extinct as
to Heirs Male: One of his Daughters was
marry'd to the Earl of Bedford, and was
Groom of the Stole to Q. Anne. The other
was marry'd to a Scotch Lord whofe name
was Lord Bruce Earl of Elgin; his Grand-
fon now Lord Ailsbury.
(c) Who happen'd to be Prefident of Ire-
land; and from him defcended my Lady
Fretchavil's Father, my Lady Moriſon, and
my Lord Falkland's Lady.
(d) Afterwards Baronet: To him were
born Sir Edward Harrington, Sir Sapcotes
had Iffue both Sons and Daughters.
Harrington, and Mr. John Harrington; who
(e) Who was Father to the Lord Monta-
gue, the Earl of Mancheſter, and Lord Privy
Seal; and Sir Sidney Montague, who was
the Earl of Rutland's Lady, and Judg Mon-
tague.
afterwards created Earl of Sandwich; and to
(f) Who was afterwards created Lord
ry'd one of his Daughters to the Earl of
Chichester and Earl of Dunfmore; and mar-
Southamton, by whom he had the prefent
Lady Northumberland. And his other
Daughter marry'd her felf to Col. Villers,
and is now Governefs to the Lady Mary
the Duke of York's eldeft Daughter.
(g) Which Dukedom afterwards fell to
him; and by this Lady he had one fole
Daughter and Heir, who is faid to have
have had one Daughter, who is marry'd to
marry'd the Duke of Ferio, and by him to
a King of Portugal.
(b( Of Lincolnshire, the King's Standard-
bearer.
(i) An antient noble Family in Kent.
(k) Now Lord Cambden, Owner of the
place where this Monument is.
Earl of Hume in Scotland, and had by him
(1) One of whofe Daughters marry'd the
two Daughters; one married my Lord Mor-
rice, and the other my Lord Maitland now
Duke of Lauderdale. The other Daughter
of Dudley Castle; of whofe Iffue by the
of my Lady Dudley was Heir to the Honour
Mother's fide is the prefent Lord Dudley.
The
4
xlii
The LIFE of
The Mechanics of Nature:
O R
An Imperfect Treatife written by JAMES HARRINGTON
during his ſickneſs, to prove againſt his Doctors that the
Notions he had of his own Distemper were not, as they
alleg'd, Hypochondriac Whimſys or Delirious Fancys.
H
CC
<<
The PREFACE.
AVING bin about nine months, fom fay in a Difeafe, I in a
Cure, I have bin the wonder of Phyficians, and they mine; not but
that we might have bin reconcil'd, for Books (I grant) if they keep clofe
to Nature must be good ones, but I deny that Nature is bound to Books. I
am no ftudy'd Naturalift, having long fince given over that Philofophy as
infcrutable and incertain: for thus I thought with myself; "Nature, to
"whom it is given to work as it were under a Veil or behind the Curtain,
"is the Art of God: now if there be Arts of Men who have wrought open-
ly enough to the understanding (for example that of TITIAN) ne-
vertheless whofe excellency I fhall never reach; How shall I thus, flicking
" in the Bark at the Arts of Men, be able to look thence to the Rcots, or
"dive into the Abyss of things in the Art of God? And nevertheless, Si
placidum caput undis extulerit, Should Nature afford me a fight of her,
I do not think fo meanly of myself but that I would know her as foon as ano-
ther, tho more learned man. Laying therfore Arts wholly, and Books almost
all afide, Ifball truly deliver to the world how I felt and faw Nature; that
is, how she came first into my fenfes, and by the fenfes into the underſtand-
ing. Yet for the fake of my Readers, and alfo for my own, I must invert the
order of my Difcourfe; For theirs, becaufe, till I can fpeak to men that have
had the fame Senfations with myſelf, I must speak to fuch as have a like
underſtanding with others: For my own, becaufe, being like in this Dif-
courfe to be the Monky that play'd at Chefs with his Mafter, I have need of fom
Cushion on my head, that being in all I have spoken hitherto more laid at
than my Reafon. My Difcourfe then is to confift of two parts: the first, in
which I appeal to his understanding who will ufe his Reafon, is a Platform of
Nature drawn out into certain Aphorifms; and the ſecond, in which I ſhall
appeal to his fenfes who in a Difeafe very common will make farther trial,
is a Narrative of my Cafe.
I.
•NA
A Platform or Scheme of Nature.
ATURE is the Fiat, the Breath, and in the whole Sphère
of her activity is the very Word of God.
2. SHE is a Spirit, that fame Spirit of God which in the begin-
ning mov'd upon the Waters, his plaftic Virtue, the Auvaus daλα-
σική, Ενεργεία ξωτική.
n διαπλα
3. SHE is the Providence of God in his Government of the things
of this world, even that Providence of which it is faid, that without
it a Sparrow cannot fall to the Ground, Mat. 10. 29.
4. SHE
JAMES HARRINGTON.
xliii
4.
SHE is the Anima Mundi, or Soul of the World;
Principio Cælum, ac Terras, campofque liquentes,
Lucentemque globum Luna, Titaniaque aftra
SPIRITUS intus alit, totamque effufa per artus
Mens agitat molem, & magno fe corpore mifcet.
Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitaque volantum,
Et quæ marmoreo fert monftra fub æquore pontus.
Igneus eft ollis vigor, & cæleftis Origo
Seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant,
Terrenique bebetant artus, moribundaque membra.
Hinc metuunt, cupiuntque, dolent, gaudentque, neque auràs
Difpiciunt claufæ tenebris & carcere cæco.
Virgil. Æn. 1. 6.
5. SHE is infallible: for the Law of an infallible Lawgiver muſt
needs be infallible, and Nature is the Law as well as the Art of God.
6. THO Nature be not fallible, yet fhe is limited, and can do no-
thing above her matter; therfore no Miracles are to be expected from
her.
7. AS Defects, Redundancys, or fuch other rude qualitys of mat-
ter, ought not to be attributed to the Artificer or his Art; fo nei-
ther is Nature, or the Art of God, to be charg'd with Monſters or
imperfections, the things fo reputed being the regular Effects both of
the Matter and the Art that forms it.
•
8. NATURE is not only a Spirit, but is furniſh'd, or rather fur-
niſhes her ſelf with innumerable minifterial Spirits, by which fhe ope-
rats on her whole matter, as the Univerfe; or on the feparat parts, as
man's Body.
-9. THESE minifterial Spirits are certain Ethereal Particles in-
vifibly mix'd with elementary Matter; they work ordinarily unſeen
or unfelt, and may be call'd Animal Spirits.
10. AS in found Bodys there muſt needs be GOOD SPIRITS
managing the Oeconomy of Health; fo in unfound Bodies, as in chro-
nical Difeafes, there muft needs be EVIL SPIRITS managing the
Oeconomy of Diftempers.
11. ANIMAL Spirits, whether in the Univerſe, or in man's Bo-
dy, are good or evil Spirits, according to the Matter wherin and
wherof they are generated.
น
12. WHAT is a good Spirit to one Creature, is evil to another,
as the food of fom Beafts is poifon to man; whence the gentleness of
the Dove, and the fierceness of the Hauk.
13. BETWEEN the Animal Spirits of the whole or Univerſe,
and of the parts, as of man's Body, there is an intercourfe or coopera-
tion which preſerves the common order of Nature unfeen; and in fom
things often foretels or diſcovers it, which is what we call Prefages,
Signs, and Prodigys.
14. THE work of good Spirits, as Health for example, is felici-
tous, and as it were angelical; and that of evil Spirits, as in diſeaſes,
is noxious, and as it were diabolical, a fort of faſcination or witchcraft.
15. ALL Fermentation is caus'd by unlocking, unbinding, or let-
ting loqfe of Spirits; as all Attenuation is occafion'd by ftirring, work-
ing, or provoking of Spirits; and all Tranſpiration by the emiffion or
fending abroad of Spirits.
16. NOTHING in Nature is annihilated or loft, and therfore
whatever is tranſpir'd, is receiv'd and put to fom ufe by the Spirits of
the Univerſe.
17. SCARCE.
1
xliv
The LIFE, &c.
1
17. SCARCE any man but at fom time or other has felt fuch a
motion as Country people call the Lifeblood; if in his Ey, perhaps
there has flown out fomthing like a dufky cloud, which is a tranfpira-
tion or emiffion of Spirits, perhaps as it were a flaſh of Fire, which
alſo was an emiffion of Spirits; but differenc'd according to the matter
wherin and wherof they were wrought, as Choler, &c.
18. ANIMAL Spirits are ordinarily emitted ftreaking them-
felves into various figures, anfwerable to little arms or hands, by which
they work out the matter by Tranſpiration, no otherwiſe than they
unlock'd it, and wrought it up in the body by attenuation, that is, by
manufacture: for thefe operations are perfectly mechanical, and down-
right handy work as any in our ſhops or workhouſes.
19. IF we find Nature in her operations not only ufing hands, but
likewiſe fomthing analogous to any Art, Tool, Engin, or Inftrument
which we have or uſe, it cannot be faid that Nature had theſe things of
men, becauſe we know that men muſt have theſe things of Nature.
20. IN Attenuation and Tranſpiration, where the matter of the
Diſeaſe is not only copious but inveterat, the Work will not as I may
ſay be inarticulat, as in the trembling call'd the Lifeblood: but articu-
lat, and obviouſly fo to the fenfe of the Patient by immediat ftrokes of
the Humor upon his Organs, which ſometimes may be ſtrong enough
(tho not ordinarily) to reach another's.
21. NATURE can work no otherwife than as God taught her,
nor any man than as fhe taught him.
22. WHEN I fee a curious piece from the hands of an Appren-
tice, I cannot imagin that his Mafter was a bungler, or that he wrought
not after the fame manner as his Servant learn'd of him: which I
ply to God and Nature.
ap-
PHYSICIANS fomtimes take the PRUDENCE of Nature
for the PHRENSY of the Patient.
23.
24. IF any man can fhew why theſe things are not thus, or that
they may be otherwife, then I have don, and there is faid in this part
already more than enough; but if they can neither fhew that theſe
things are not thus, nor know how they ſhould be otherwiſe, then fo
far I ſtand my ground, and am now arm'd for my Narrative Cap a pè.
TIS a thousand pitys that we have not this Narrative, to which no
doubt he apply'd thefe Principles, and thence form'd the ftate of his
Diftemper. But the Manufcript containing no more, we may
however evidently conclude that the Writer of it was not fo greatly
diſorder'd in his thoughts, which are for the most part very just,
and all as close and coherent as any man's
THE
xlv
I.'
THE
CONTENTS.
1.T
O LAND's Dedication to the Lord-Mayor, Aldermen, Sheriffs
and Common-Council of the City of London.
2. His Preface.
3. The Life of JAMES HARRINGTON.
Page i
vii
xiii
I. The Grounds and Reafons of Monarchy confider'd, and exemplify'd
in the Scotifh Line, out of their own beft Authors and Records.
(Written by JOHN HALL of Gray's Inn Efq;)
I
II. The Commonwealth of Oceana. (Firſt printed in London in the
Year 1656 in fol.)
33
III. The Prerogative of popular Government. (Firſt printed at Lon-
don in 1658, in 4to.)
229
IV. The Art of Lawgiving. (Firſt printed at London 1659, in 8vo.)
383
(Firft printed at London
468
475
V. A Word concerning a House of Peers.
Houfe of Peers.
1659, in 8vo.)
VI. VALERIUS and PUBLICOLA, or the true Form of a Popular
Commonwealth extracted è puris Naturalibus. (Firſt printed in
1659, in 4to.)
VII. A System of Politics delineated in fhort and eafy Aphorifms. (First
publiſhed from the Author's own Manufcript by Mr. TOLAND,
with his Oceana and other Works, at London in 1700, in fol.) 496
VIII. Political Aphorifms. (Firſt printed at London 1659, in 4to.) 515
IX. Seven Models of a Commonwealth, or brief Directions fhewing how
a fit and perfect Model of popular Government may be made, found,
or understood. (Firſt printed at London 1659, in 4to.)
524
X. The Ways and Means whereby an equal and lafting Commonwealth
may be fuddenly introduced, and perfectly founded, with the free Con-
fent and actual Confirmation of the whole People of England. (Firſt
printed at London 1660, in 4to.)
539
XI. The humble Petition of divers well-affected Perfons deliver'd the
6th of July 1659, with the Parliament's Anfwer thereto. 541
APPENDIX, containing all the political Tracts of
JAMES HARRINGTON Efq; omitted in Mr. TOLAND'S
Edition of his Works.
XII. Pian Piano, or, Intercourſe between H. FERNE, D. D. and J.
HARRINGTON Efq; upon occafion of the Doctor's Cenfure of the Com-
monwealth of Oceana. (Firſt printed at London 1656, in 12m0.)
549
XIII. The Stumbling-Block of Difobedience and Rebellion, cunningly
imputed by P. H. unto CALVIN, removed in a Letter to the ſaid P. H.
from J. H. (Firſt printed at London 1659, in 4to.)
f
567
XIV.
}
}
xlvi
The CONTENTS.
575
XIV. A Letter unto Mr. STUBS, in anfwer to his Oceana weighed,
&c. (Firſt printed at London 1659, in 4to.)
XV. Politicafter, or a comical Difcourfe, in answer to Mr. WREN's
Book, intitled, Monarchy afferted againſt Mr. HARRINGTON'S
Oceana. (Firſt printed at London 1659, in 12mo.)-
579
XVI. Pour enclouer le Canon. (Firſt printed at London 1659, in 4to.)
595
601
XVII. A Difcourfe upon this Saying, The Spirit of the Nation is
not yet to be trufted with Liberty, left it introduce Monarchy,
or invade the Liberty of Confcience. (Firft printed at London
1659, in 4to.)
XVIII. A Difcourfe fhewing, that the Spirit of Parlaments, with a
Council in the Intervals, is not to be trufied for a Settlement, left it
introduce Monarchy and Perfecution for Confcience. (Firſt printed
at London 1659, in 4ť6)
609
XIX, A Parallèl of the Spirit of the People, with the Spirit of Mr.
ROGERS; and an Appeal thereupon unto the Reader, whether the
Spirit of the People, or the Spirit of Men like Mr. ROGERS, be the
fitter to be trufted with the Government. (Firſt printed at London
1659, in 4to.)
614
XX. A fufficient Anfwer to Mr. STUBS. (Firft printed at London
1659, in 4to.)
62.0
618
XXI. A Propofition in order to the propofing of a Commonwealth or
Democracy. (First printed at London 1659, in fol.)
XXII. The Rota, or a Model of a free State or equal Commonwealth,
once propofed and debated in brief, and to be again more at large
propofed to, and debated by a free and open Society of ingenious
Gentlemen. (First printed at London 1660, in 4to.)
621
THE
Advertiſement to the READER.
HE Reputation of Mr. HARRINGTON's Writings is fo well
eſtabliſh'd, that nothing more is neceffary than to acquaint the
Reader, that no Expence nor Care have been ſpared to make the former
and prefent Edition as compleat as poffible. They contain the whole of
Mr. TOLAND's Edition, which was become extremely fcarce, and
fold at a very high price. To theſe are added the ſeveral political
Pieces of our Author, which Mr. TOLAND thought proper to omit
in his Edition; a Liberty, which few Readers will excufe. Moft
of thefe Pieces were republifh'd by Mr. HARRINGTON at London,
in one Volume in Quarto, in 1660, under the general Title of Poli-
tical Difcourfes, tending to the Introduction of a free and equal Com-
monwealth in England.
I take this opportunity of acknowledging my Obligation to the
Rev. Mr. THOMAS BIRCH F. R. S. for obliging the Publick with
the Political Diſcourſes above-mentioned.
*
:
THE
GROUNDS and REASONS
OF
MONARCHY
CONSIDER'D:
}
And Exemplify'd in the SCOTISH Line, out
of their own best Authors and Records.
B
3
THE
PREFACE.
T
HERE is nothing that has more confounded Knowlege among
men, than the reciprocal violences of the Understanding and
the Will; or, to fpeak plainly, the Paffion of the one and
Blindness of the other: Since fom by chance or intereft take up Princi-
ples which they force the Understanding by ftrain'd Arguments to main-
tain; others by the habit of fom Opinion fo bewitch the Will into con
federacy, that they can never quit it, even after confutation. To remedy
this Disorder, fince I had refolv'd with my felf to say fomthing to this
Point (which tho it be but as a fmallWyre, yet the great weight of civil Fe-
licity lys upon it) I know no better Method than to take the Scales from the
Eys of the Understanding, and fhew the Will how better to bring about
her great Defign of Good. And in the profecution of this, I would not
fkirmish with every Argument, which had bin a thing of immenfe flavery,
and not for every Ey; but I chofe rather to ftrike at the Foundations, that
the Understanding might lofe its Paffion, and more freely confider upon
what Quickfands they lay. And in this I needed not to be pofitive, because
I undertake a Taſk in which moft Men are commonly fuccessful, that is, to
Support Error rather than to affert Truth. Hence I confider Kingship
fimply, not troubling my ſelf to maintain any other Form, or to confider
Oaths, Ends, Changes of Government, or the particular Neceffity or Rea-
fons of Safety: they being diftinct Confiderations and Subjects by them-
felves. Now if this negative Method fatisfys not, I fee no fuch great caufe
to be difcourag'd; for, I confefs, I do not perceive it fo eafy a thing to.
difcover an Error; and I had rather tell a Man he was out of the
way, than by endeavoring to bring him to the end of his Journy,
lead him further about. And it is my opinion, that as Scepticism is not
only uſeleſs, but dangerous; if in ſetting our Thoughts in a pofture of
Defence, it makes us abfolutely wavering and incredulous: yet had I
rather be fceptical in my Opinion, than maintain it upon grounds taken
upon trust, and not demonftrated.
THE Second Part is merely an inftance accommodated to the Argu-
ments of the First, wherin I would not be understood to be a Writer of
an Epitome (for I have other Imployments for my Time and Thoughts,
and thoſe nobler too) but to fet down a true Series by way of Example;
and therfore I was only to note Acceſſes to Government, and Receſſes from
it, with the Effects proceding from the Perfons of Governors. And
here as I needed not much trouble Chronology: So left it might be a bare
Sceleton, I fprinkled fom Obfervations that came to hand, and feem to
afford either Pleaſure or Ufe. Thus much, left I might be miſunder-
flood, I thought neceſſary to premiſe.
THE
}
THE
GROUNDS and REASONS
I
OF
MONARCHY.
The First Part.
HAVE often thought it ſtrange, that among all the Govern-
ments, either paſt or prefent, the Monarchical fhould fo far in
Extent and Number excede the Popular, as that they could never
yet come into compariſon. I could never be perfuaded but it
was more happy for a People to be difpos'd of by a number of Perfons
jointly intereſted and concern'd with them, than to be number'd as the
Herd and Inheritance of One, to whoſe Luft and Madneſs they were
abfolutely fubject; and that any Man of the weakeft Reafon and
Generofity would not rather chufe for his Habitation that Spot of Earth
where there was Acceſs to Honour by Virtue, and no Worth could be
excluded, rather than that where all Advancement fhould procede
from the Will of one ſcarcely hearing and feeing with his own Organs,
and gain'd for the moſt part by means leud and indirect: and all this
in the end to amount to nothing elſe but a more ſplendid and dange-
rous Slavery. To clear this Point, I confider'd how infcrutably Pro-
vidence carrys on the turns and ſtops of all Governments, fo that moſt
People rather found than made them. The Conftitutions of Men,
fom not fit to be Maſters of their Liberty, fom not capable, fom
not willing; the Ambition of fettled Tyrants, who breaking their
own Bonds have brought in violent Alterations; and laſtly, civil Dif-
cord have either corrupted or altered better Settlements.
BUT theſe are Obfervations rather than Arguments, and relate to
Fact rather than Reaſon. That which aftoniſh'd me moft was to fee
thoſe of this heroic and learned Age, not only not riſing to Thoughts
of Liberty, but inſtead thereof fooliſhly turning their Wits and Swords
againſt themſelves in the maintenance of them whofe Slaves they are:
and indeed they can be no weak Cauſes that produce fo long and fet-
tled a Distemper; tho' fome of thoſe I mention'd, if not moſt of
them, are the true ones.
HE knows nothing that knows not how fuperftitiouſly the genera-
lity of Mankind is given to retain Traditions, and how pertinacious
they are in the maintenance of their firſt Prejudices, infomuch that a
Diſcovery or more refin'd Reaſon is as infupportable to them, as the
Sun is to an Ey newly brought out of Darkneſs. Hence Opiniativė-
neſs (which is commonly proportion'd to their Ignorance) and a ge-
nerous Obſtinacy fomtimes to Death and Ruin. So that it is no won-
der if we ſee many Gentlemen, whoſe Education inabled them only
B 2
to
3
4
The Grounds and
to uſe their Senſes and firft Thoughts, fo dazled with the Splendor
of a Court, prepoffeft with the Affection of a Prince, or bewitch'd
with ſom ſubdolous Favor, that they chuſe rather any hazard than
the Inchantment fhould be diffolv'd. Others, perhaps a degree a-
bove theſe, yet in refpect of fome Title ſtuck upon the Family (which
has bin as fortunat a Myſtery of Kingcraft as any other) or in reve-
rence to fom glorious former Atchievements (minding not that in all
theſe caſes the People are the only effective means, and the King only
imaginary) think they fhould degenerat from Bravery in bringing
on a Change. Others are witheld by Sloth and Timorouſneſs, either
not daring, or unwilling to be happy: fom looking no further than
their privat Welfare, indifferent at the multiplication of public Evils;
others (and theſe the worst of all) out of a pravity of Nature fa-
crificing to their Ambition and Avarice, and in order to that, fol-
lowing any Power, concurring with any Machinations, and ſupport-
ing their Authors: while Princes themſelves (train'd up in theſe
Arts, or receiving them by Tradition) know how to wind all their
humours to their own advantage, now foifting the Divinity of their
Titles into Pulpits, now amuzing the People with Pomps and Shews,
now diverting their hot Spirits to fom unprofitable foren War (mak-
ing way to their accurs'd ends of Revenge or Glory, with the effufion
of that Blood which fhould be as dear to them as their own) now
ſtroking the People with fom feeble but inforc'd Law, for which not-
withſtanding they will be paid (and 'tis obferv'd, the moſt notorious
Tyrants have taken this Courfe) now giving up the eminenteſt of
their Miniſters (which they part with as indifferently as their Robes)
to the Rage and Fury of the People; fo that they are commanded and
condemn'd by the fame Mouth, and the credulous and ignorant, be-
lieving their King divinely fet over them, fit ftill, and by degrees
grow into Quiet and Admiration, eſpecially if lull'd afleep with fom
ſmall continuance of Peace (be it never fo injuft, unfound, or dange-
rous) as if the Body Politic could not languiſh of an internal Difeafe,
tho its Complexion be freſh and chearful.
THOSE are the Reaſons which (if I conceive aright) have ftu-
pify'd the leſs knowing part of Mankind. Now, how the more
fearching part have fo odly mifcarry'd, will fall under confideration.
FIRST then, we need not take the pains to demonftrat how eafy
a thing it is for men of Acutenefs, not converfant in Civil Affairs, not
only to miſcarry in the Apprehenfion, but even in their Judgment of
them for they, inſtead of bringing the Series and Reaſon of things
into Rule and Method, ufe on the contrary to mealure them by their
own prefuppos'd Speculation; and by that means becom incapable of
weighing rightly the various Incidences and Circumftances of Buſineſs.
For it is to be obſerv'd, that the Theorems of no Art or Profeffion are
either more eafily found, or of more difficult practice than thoſe of
Policy; fo that it is no wonder if Men merely contemplative, fail fo
oft in the very laying of Grounds, as we ſhall anon inftance. Now
how fruitful Daintys Error and Abfurdity are, we all know. But
more eſpecially the Contentions of contemplative Men are moſt nu-
merous, various, and endleſs; for wrangling is with them an Art, and
they are indu'd with that ungenerous Shame, never to acknowledge
their Miſtakes. Moreover, their Principles are moſt times ill-grounded,
and it is to be fear'd that in their Superſtructures they as often call in
their
い
​1
Reafons of Monarchy.
5
their Įmaginations as their Judgment to frame Arguments. Befides,
theſe men fighting only with Pen, Ink and Paper, feldom arrive at a
means to decide the Quarrel, by which he that gains the laſt word is
fuppos'd Conqueror; or the other leaves almoſt as inglorious a Con-
queft to the Victor, as if he had bin overthrown.
THAT which I would infer from all this, is, that the Generality
of fpeculative Men, for the moſt part guiding their Underſtandings by
thofe Notions which they find in Books, fall not feldom by this means
into confiderable Errors. For all Books, thoſe I mean that are human,
and fall directly under our Confideration, either lay down practical
Things and Obfervations of Kingfhip, or fom general and univerfal
Notions, or elſe controverfially affert Monarchy against fom Oppofers.
Now in the two latter there are generally found two grand and infup-
portable Fallacys, the firft whereof is, that they fraudulently converfe
in Generals, and (to borrow the School-terms) fpeak of that in the
Abstract which they ſhould do in the Concrete: As for example, where
they ſhould affert the particular right of this or that Prince, they cun-
ningly or ignorantly lay out moft of their Difcourfe about Monarchy in
general, and often weary and amaze the Diſpute before they com to
the true ground and ſtating of the Quarrel, whereby the Readers (di-
verted by fuch Prepoffeffion, and entangled by general Notions of Au-
thority, Power and Government) feldom deſcend into the confidera-
tion of Particulars, where the great Scruple and Difficulty for the moſt
part lys. So that any King (be his Acceſs to the Government never
fo fraudulent and unjuſtifiable) coms to be look'd on as facred, authori-
tative, and by degrees begins not to bluſh at the Attributes of Sacred
Majeſty, Grace, and Highneſs, or any other Terms that the fervil Flat-
tery and witty Barbarity of Courtiers can give to them: nay, fom
even of the wickedeft of the Roman Emperors could be content to be
faluted with Perennitys and Divinitys; whereas if Men would call
their Reaſon into counfel, they might find that theſe blazing Stars
were opac Bodys, and did ſhine only by Reflection: Thefe Men having
no more Lufter than either the Cabal of their own ftate and diſtance,
or the wretched Impofition upon the People, cafts on them. For did
Man deveſt the Authority from the Perfon, they would then common-
ly find it inconfiderable, if not pofitively evil. And again, confider
Authority in itſelf as a thing fixt, real, immutable, and (when juftly
adminiſter'd) facred, they might find, that granting a Prince to be the
moſt regular, juſt Perſon in all the world, yet many Men as good join'd
with him, intruſted, and concurring to the fame end, might do much
more good; and that to deny this, were to be as irrational as to deny
that one Perfon could do any good at all. But however, this I take to
be certain and demonftrable out of their own Principles, that Kings be-
ing only to be confider'd in refpect of the Trust and Power lodg'd in
them, a number of Men by as juft means (not to ſay better) inveft-
ed with the fame Truft and Power, are every jot as facred, and of as
`much divine Right as any Monarch is, the Power being as effentially
the fame, united or divided, as if a Commiffion be to one or three. It
will follow then, that Republics may be as juſt and authoritative as
Kingſhips; and then their radical Argument of the Jure Divino of
Kingſhip is wholly enervated, and the other render'd equally as Sove-
rain. And I am to note (but this is only tranfiently) the Poornefs, or,
to ſay better, the Blafphemy of that Argument which flouriſhes out
!
Kings
6
The Grounds and
Kings as the Types of Divinity, and vainly laviſhes fome Metaphyfics,
to prove that all things have a natural tendency to Oneness; nay, the
itch of fome merry Wits has carry'd them to run over moſt of the di-
vine Attributes (as fome English Lawyers have talk'd of the legal, I
muſt ſay phantaſtical Ubiquity and Omniſcience of our Kings, tho' we
fee the contrary; and fom Civilians have faid much about the Empe-
ror before them) whereas they ſhould confider, that the immenfe Sim-
plicity of God flows out in its feveral Operations with ineffable variety,
God being every where and the fame, or, as the Platonifts fay, a Cen-
ter in every part of its Circle, a Spirit without Quantity, Diſtance, and
Comprehenfion; whereas Man is a determinate narrow Being, who do-
ing one thing, ceaſes to do another, and thinking of one thing is forc'd
to quit his former thought. Now how fit he is to be a Shadow of
this Archetype, let any judg, unleſs he could be refin'd from his Corpo-
reity, and inlarg'd into a proportionable Immenſity. Befides, I know
not whether it be ſafe to think or no, That as God, who, for the moſt
part, induesMen with Gifts futable to the places to which he calls them,
would in fom meaſure pour out his Spirit proportionate to theſe Men,
wheras moſt commonly we find them, notwithſtanding their extra-
ordinary advantages of Society, Education, and Buſineſs as weak Men
as any other: and good Princes being fway'd by the Advice of Men,
good and wife, and the bad ſeduc'd by Men of their own Inclinations,
what are all Monarchys but in reality Optimacys? for a few only ef
fentially govern under the name of one, who is utterly as unable as
the meanest of thoſe over whom he claims Superiority.
THE fecond Fallacy is this, That Men, while they labor thus to
fupport Monarchy, tell us not what kind of Monarchy it is, and con-
ſequently gain nothing, tho' we ſhould grant them the former Propo-
fition be true. For what does it avail to tell me of the Title of fuch
a Prince, if I know not by what Title he holds? Grant it were vifible
to me that ſuch a Man was mark'd out by Providence to be my Go-
vernor, yet if I cannot tell what kind of one, whether abfolute, mixt,
imited, merely executive, or only firſt in order, how fhall I know to
direct my Obedience? If he be abfolute, my very natural Liberty is
taken away from me; nor do I know any Power that can make any
Man ſuch, the Scripture fetting juſt limitations and reſtrictions to all
Governors. If mixt and limited, I muſt know the due Temper and
Bounds whereby he is to rule, or elſe he may ufurp or be miſtaken, and
I oppreft or injur'd. If executive, the Power fundamentally refides
not in him, but in the Great Council, or them intruſted by the People;
then I adore only a Shadow. Now if any Prince of Europe can really
clear up
theſe Miſts, and fhew the Lines of his Government drawn fair-
ly, and his Charter whole and authentic, like that of Venice and anti-
ent Rome, for my part, I'll be the firſt Man ſhall ſwear him Allegiance,
and the laſt that will preferve him. But you will find that they will
tell you in general about their Office, and in particular of their Claims
of Succeffion, Inheritance, and Anceſtors; when look but three or four
Storys back, and you will meet either fom favage unnatural Intrufion,
diſguiz'd under fom forc'd Title or chimerical Cognation, or elſe ſom
'violent Alteration, or poffibly ſom flender Oath or Articles, hardly ex-
torted and imperfectly kept. Now if any man that will but run over
thefe Rules, and apply them to any Hiſtory whatever (as we ſhall ex-
emplify in that of Scotland, upon which for the prefent we have pitcht)
and
Reafons of Monarchy.
fo
and not find moſt Title's ambiguous, the Effects of former Monarchys
(for where, in a Catalogue of forty Kings, can you almoft fhew me
three good ones, but things merely ftrugling to maintain their Titles
and domeſtic Intereft?) ruinous to the People, who for the moſt part
confider them no otherwiſe than as to be refcu'd from violent Confufi-
on, not as they conduce to the pofitive Happineſs of a civil Life; I fay,
all this will be found to be true, or my ſmall Converſation in Books is
extremely falſe. And truly I conceive reading of Hiſtory to be the
moſt rational Courſe to ſet any Judgment right, becauſe it inſtructs by
Experience and Effects, and grounds the Judgment upon material Ob-
ſervations, and not blindly gropes after Notions and Cauſes, which to
him are tantum non infcrutabile; but of that anon. A vain Miſtake
under this Topic has bin an erroneous compariſon and application of
matters Civil and Military; for Men obferving that mixt Councils a-
bout Generals, Plurality, Equality of Commands, frequent and fud-
den Military Alterations, have brought no fmall Diftempers and Dan-
gers to feveral Governments and Attemts; therefore they preſently
conclude, that in Civils alfo it is the ſafeſt to continue a Command in one
hand for preventing the like Diſturbances. But here they are deceiv'd;
Civil matters confiſt in long debate, great confideration, patient ex-
pectation, and wary forefight, which is better to be found in a number
of choice experienc'd Heads, than in one fingle Perfon, whoſe Youth
and Vigor of Spirit inables him rather to Action, and fills him with
that noble Temerity which is commonly ſo happy in Martial Affairs
that muſt be guided always to improve Occafions, which are ſeldom to
be found again, and, which miſtaken, are to be ſcarcely amended.
Befides, the Ferocity of daring Spirits can hardly be bounded while
they ſtand level; fo that it is no wonder if they extinguiſh all Emu-
lations by putting the Power into the hands of one, wheras in a Com-
monwealth it is quite otherwiſe: and Factions (unleſs they be cruelly
exorbitant) do but poife and balance one another; and many times,
like the difcord of Humors upon the natural Body, produce real good
to the Government. That flender conceit, that Nature feems to dreſs
out a Principality in moſt of her works, as among Birds, Bees, &c. is
ſo ſlender indeed (in regard they are no more Chiefs than what they
fancy them, but all their Prepotency is merely predatory or oppreffive;
and even Lions, Elephants, Crocodils and Eagles, have ſmall incon
fiderable Enemys, of which they ſtand in fear, and by which they are
often ruin'd) that the Recital confutes it; and if it were fo, yet unleſs
they cou'd prove their One Man to be as much more excellent than
the reſt as thoſe are, and that ſolely too, I fee not what it would ad-
vantage them, fince to comply with the deſign of Nature in one, they
would contradict it in others, where ſhe is equally concern'd. But
theſe Philological and Rhetorical Arguments have not a little hinder'd
the feverer Difquifition of Reaſon, and prepoffefs'd the more eaſy
minds with Notions fo much harder to be laid afide, as they are
more erroneous and pleafing.
;
THESE are the fundamental Errors that have mifled the Judg-
ment; now thoſe which have miſguided the Conſcience, have princi-
pally proceded from the Mifinterpretation of Scripture; and therfore
feeming Sacred, have bin lefs examin'd and doubted, as carrying the
moſt Authority. Thus in the Old Teftament, there being fuch fre-
quent mention of Kings, which notwithstanding were given inWrath,
they
8
The Grounds and
they fuperftitiouſly maintain not only the neceffity, but even the im
punity of Kings; wheras we know not their Powers and Limita-
tions, and it is inconfequent to argue, That becaufe Judea was fo go-
vern'd, we ſhould follow the fame Pattern, when we find neither
Precept, Confequence, nor Neceffity convincing us. And it is mad-
nefs to think that while the Divine Spirit fo freely and vehemently.
exclaims againſt the Iniquity of men, God would authorize it ſo far
as to leave it in them only unpuniſhable who ſhould exterminat and re-
form it. As for the Antiquity from ADAM, it is true, before his Fall
his Dominion was large and wide, but it was over the Beaſts that after
his Fall learn'd to rebel against him; and economically, not defpo-
tically, over his Wife and Children. But what is this to Civil Ĝo-
vernment? In the New Teftament (for I the brieflier pafs over this
head, in regard it has bin ſo copiouſly treated upon by thofe under
whofe Profeffion it falls, and that it does not immediately conduce to
my Deſign) the principal Argument has been the meekness of CHRIST
and his compliance with Civil Powers, which certainly, if he had bin
difpos'd to have refifted, fay they, he could as eafily have overthrown,
as with a few Cords whip the Buyers and Sellers out of the Temple.
But he, that was the Wiſdom of his Father, rather thought fit to build
up his Kingdom (which is not earthly, nor known of earthly men)
in Meeknefs and Obedience to Civil Powers, which are perpetually
chang'd and hurry'd at the Will of the firft Mover, otherwife he
would never have concern'd himſelf fo much in giving Dues to CÆ-
SAR, and to God what is God's; intimating the diſtinct Obedience
owing by all men, as Chriftians, and Citizens. When, granting Mo-
narchy the moſt and only lawful Government, yet every one knows,
that knows any thing of the Roman Story, that AUGUSTUS had no
more Title to that Government, than to any of thoſe over whom he
ufurp'd, and that his Acceſs to the Government was as fraudulent and
violent as could be. Another Error is the miſtaking of the word
* Auάues. * Powers, when it's clear the Scripture fpeaks of it in a Latitude, as
extending it to all forts of eſtabliſhed Governments. Now men have
falfly pretended, that thoſe Powers were only meant of Kings; and
what by an indifcrete collation of the places of the Old, and violent
wreftings of others of the New Teftament, they perfected the other
grand Miſtake; which fince it has bin already clear'd up, and as we faid
is but collateral with us for the prefent, we ſhall no further mention it.
AS for the alleg'd Examples and Speeches of the primitive Times,
I fee not much in them confiderable: for tho Infurrections againſt
Princes cannot be produc'd, or rather much is faid againſt them, yet
we are to confider, that the Goſpel of CHRIST (which was at that
time not much defil'd by the World) engages not to any Domina-
tion, but (wholly taken up with its own Extacys, fpiritual Delights
and Expectations) neglects all other Affairs as ftrange and dangerous.
And moreover (tho I know what has bin faid to the contrary) I
cannot find, after well confidering thoſe Ages, any probable ground
how, if they would have rebel'd, they could have made any Head.
They were indeed numerous, but then they had Legionarys among
them; and who knows not what an ineffectual thing a People is (be
it never fo defirous) when overaw'd by the Soldiery? And they were
a People (as Greatnefs to God and Man is different) not confiderable
for their worldly Power (for how few eminent Commanders were
Δυνάμεις.
Rom. 13.
converted
}
Reaſons of Monarchy.
}
converted in the firſt Ages?) but out of his own mere choice, fo that
it was not ſtrange if they could not do much. For God, as he chofe
the weakest means in planting the Goſpel, even Fiſhermen; ſo in the
primitive Propagation he call'd the weaker Men, tho Chriſtianity af-
terwards grew ample and auguſt, and Kings were proud to give their
Names to it.
AS for the Fathers (fuppofing them free of their many Adultera-
tions, Interpolations, and all thoſe Errors and Incertaintys which the
proceſs of time and fraud of men has foifted into them) they are to be
accepted only as Witneffes, not as Judges: that is to fay, they may
prove matter of Fact, but none of their words matter of Right; eſpe-
cially if we confider their Writings, either Homilys, Commentarys,
or Controverfys, which are ever directed to another end than this is,
and they themſelves (men fecluded from Buſineſs) are fo much more
unable to judg and refolve civil Controverfys, in regard the unhappi-
nefs of the latter times has produc'd many Controverfys not known or
thought of in thoſe Days, which not falling directly under their Pro-
feffion, cannot receive any Light or Authority from them.
HAVING thus confider'd Kingſhip, and how well it has appear'd
thro the falfe Lights of the Underſtanding, we ſhall now confider,
whether, taking it by it felf, its Foundations be laid upon a Cylinder
or upon a Cube: and this, I think, we are the likelieft to do, if we
confider them in their Rights and Ufes, or, to ſpeak plainer, in their
Legality and Policy; fo that if we find that none of the ways of re-
taining their Crowns can be authentic except one, and that one makes
againſt them, we ſhall fee we have no juſt cauſes of blind Adoration
or implicit Obligation to truckle under any of their Commands. And
if again we diſcover that fort of Government it felf is not fo profitable
to the end of civil Happineſs, but rather diametrically oppofit to it;
we may ſuppoſe that men are either ſtrangely obftinat, or elſe they
might eradicat an Error which not only offers fo many Prejudices to
their Underſtanding, but that has fuch an evil Influence upon their
external Welbeing.
WE have then to confider, that for One man to rule over Many,
there muſt neceffarily be pretended fome Right, tho it be but colora-
ble; for either he muſt be chofen by the People as their Arbitrator
and fupreme Judg, or elſe he muſt by force of Arms invade them, and
bring them to Obedience, which he by force preferving for his Sons
or Succeffors, makes way for a third Claim, which is Inheritance. A
fourth ſome have invented, tho were it real, it is but a difference of
the laſt, and I therefore ſhall mention it under that Head. But to the
Confideration.
FIRST therfore Election, fuppofing the People, either finding
themſelves unable to weild their own Happineſs, or for preventing of
Diſorder, make choice of one Man to be fet over them, it here in-
ſtantly follows, that the Authority is in the People, and flowing from
them; for Choice argues a Power, and being elected a Subordination
to it; in the end, I mean, tho not in every act. Now there is none
choſen but for ſom End, or for fom Intentions reciprocal betwixt both
Partys; for otherwiſe ſuch a choice were but Dotage, and confequent-
ly invalid: Wherefor thus it will follow, that thoſe who pretend to
King it upon this Topic, muft either fhew a formal Election (which
I think many Kings are not able to do) or if he can fhew one, pro-
duce
C
io
The Grounds and
duce alfo the Conditions and Ends for which he was chofen. Now all
parts being either implicit or explain'd, let him exhibit the Covenant,
that it may be known whether he governs according to it or not; for
if he tranfgreffes, he forfeits, and the others are abfolv'd from their
promis'd Obedience. If the Agreement be unwritten or intentional,
either Party is relatively ty'd; and then if he dos any thing againſt the
welfare of the People (that foveraign Law and end of all Governments)
the People may not only juftly fuppofe the former Capitulation broken,
but even endeavor, by what poffible means they can, to reſtore them-
ſelves to their former Rights: for why ſhould the making of a compact
prejudice any when it is once broken? And here comes in another Fal-
lacy, with which the Affertors of Royalty have fo flouriſh'd, that an
Agreement between a People and one Man fhould defcend to his Pofte-
rity; wheras it is to be confider'd, that the People chufing one man is
commonly in confideration of his Perſon and perfonal Merit; which not
being the fame in his Son (as commonly Familys in the Horizon are in
the Meridian, the Founders being braver than any that follow after
them) that very intent is fruftrated and ceaſes; and the People provid-
ing for the Happineſs of a few years, which are determinable with in-
certainty of the latter part of the Life of one man, run themſelves and
their Poſterity into an eternal Inconvenience (for any thing they know)
of bad Governors. And if the People would never fo formally agree
with him, that in regard of his Merits or felicity of Actions, his Son
ſhould be receiv'd in that place, yet would they not ſtand to it, that ve-
ry Pact expiring with the life of either. For my Father may leave me
notionally a Slave in a Tenure (a thing frequent with our Anceſtors)
or as Civilians term it, a Feodary, with which I am content, in reſpect
of the Advantage it brings me, or becauſe my own Eſtate is too little
to be independent, and therefore I think it good prudence to be ſhelter'd
under the protection of the greater; but my natural Liberty, that is to
fay, to make my Life as juftly happy and advantageous to me as I may,
he can no more give away from me than my Underſtanding or Eyfight:
for theſe are Privileges with which God and Nature have indu'd me,
and theſe I cannot be deny'd but by him that will alſo deny me a Being.
But to go on, Suppofe a fecond Generation ſhould accept the Son, and a
third a Grandfon, yet this confirms not a fourth; and the People very
impoliticly ſtrengthen and confirm the Power by continuance, and in a
manner with their own hands lay the Foundation of Abfoluteneſs;
their Governors themſelves growing in Interefts, increaſing in Allian-
ces and Forces: fo it is very improbable but that within a little they
grow too big and formidable, and leave nothing of Liberty except the
Name, and (if they be leſs cunning) not that. A pertinent Example
of this, and fo near us that I cannot paſs it, we ſee in young ORANGE
and the Low Countrys at this day, who continuing his Progenitors for
their fignal Services, and him for theirs, are now puniſh'd for their ge-
nerous and indiſcrete rewarding of virtue, that their Liberty was lately
alinoft blown up before they well perceiv'd it to be undermin'd, and they
are now at charge to maintain their own Oppreffion. As for that formal
Election and Stipulation, who fees not what a vain and ridiculous cheat
it is, they coming with Swords in their hands to demand the Scepter of
a weak and ftupid multitude that appears only to gaze upon the Cere-
monys, and whoſe refuſal were ineffectual? but it is a gracious piece of
the Cabal of Tyranny to deceive the People with Shadows, Fantaſms,
and names of Liberty.
A S
Reafons of Monarchy.
I I
}
AS for thoſe that intrude by Force, they cannot certainly have the
Forhead to infer any Right, they being but, as the Pirate faid to ALEX-
ANDER, public and more magnificent Robbers. Certainly thefe are
the NIMRODS, the great Hunters, God's Scourges, and the Burdens
of the Earth; and whether they be Founders of Empires, or great
Captains (as BOCCALIN diftinguiſhes them) they ought rather to
be remember'd with horror and deteftation, than have that undue Re-
verence with which they commonly meet.
YET theſe are they that lay the Foundations of Succeffion, and
from theſe do the Succeffors claim, and enjoy with the leſs reluctance,
becauſe the regret of the Violences, and hate of the first daily wears
out; whether it be by the continuance of Peace that charms men into
a love of cafe, or the continuance of Slavery enfeebles their Minds,
that they rather chufe to look at their prefent Enjoyment than real
Happineſs; fo that it is not ſtrange if the Perfon of their Oppreffor be-
comes in time adorable, and he himſelf thinks that confirm'd and ju-
ſtify'd to him in proceſs of time, to which in the beginning he had no
right. But if we confider the buſineſs a little higher, we might find
that fince neither the People (as we have prov'd before) have power
to make themſelves Vaffals, and the Intruders themſelves cannot pre-
tend any juft Title; their Domination is merely illegal, and apt to be
fhaken off with the first conveniency, it being every whit as equitable,
that theſe men fhould be judg'd Enemys of Mankind, and condemn'd
to die the Death of Parricids for ufurping a power, as NERO for a-
bufing it. But I would fain afk the Regious Defenders, by what Law
they can maintain Governments to be inherent in one, and to be tranf-
mitted to his Ofspring? If they fay by the Law of God, I would de-
mand again how they can make this Law appear to me? If they fay
that the Scripture contains the Right and facredness of Kings, I afk
them again, How they know that God extends that Privilege and Au-
thority to this King? If they fay, that he is involv'd in the general
Right, they do but run into a Circle; unless they can fhow me, that
all his Approches to the Government were regular, and fuch as God
was pleas'd with, or elfe God had by fom Sign and Wonder declar'd
his approbation of him; for without theſe two, they muſt make God
the Author of Evil, which is impious, and pretend his commiffion
for an unlawful Act; and by the fame right, any other (as a Tyrant,
for example) may pretend it to an Action never fo unjuft, it being not
inuſual thing to borrow the face of Divinity, even upon fome foul Im-
poftures, as (to forbear further Inftances) NUMA's Conference with
ÆGERIA, SCIPIO's Retirement into the Capitol, and SERTORIUS's
white Hart.
Now if they pretend the Law of Nature, they muſt demonſtrat to
us, both that ſhe endow'd men with inequal Freedom, and that fhe
ſhap'd out ſuch a Man to rule; whereas it appears on the contrary, that
all men naturally are equal: for tho Nature with a noble Variety has
made different the Features and Lineaments of Men, yet as to Free-
dom, till it be loft by fome external means, ſhe has made every one a-
like, and given them the fame Defires. But fuppofe ſhe had intended
fuch a Family for Government, and had given them fom illuftrious
Marks, as we read of fom that had, whether by the imagination of
their Mothers, or by Deceit; yet then would Nature fall into a double
Irregularity, firſt in deferting her Method of making all free, and fe-
C 2
condly
I 2
The Grounds and
condly in making her general Work merely fubfervient, and feconda-
ry to her particular; which how contrary it is to that beautiful Har-
mony of hers, I need not much infit. Now if they fay, they are Fa-
thers of the People, and for that reaſon they call themſelves the Heads,
inferring the People to be no more than a Trunk, it's only metaphori-
cal, and proves nothing: for they muft remember, that fince Father
has a relation upon which it depends, and upon whofe removal it va-,
niſhes, they themſelves cannot bring any fuch: for by phyfical pro-
creation they will not offer it; and for metaphorical dependence, it
will com to nothing, we feeing People languiſh when their Princes are
fulleft, and, like Leeches, rather willing to burst than to fall off; and
on the contrary, the People upon the removal of a Prince cheerful and
reliev'd. Now if there were ſo ſtrict a Union between theſe two, fuch
a Contrariety and Antipathy could never appear; for certainly when
any two Perſons endeavour to gain ground one upon another, there is
an enmity, whatever is pretended. Befides, if theſe men would be
Fathers, it were then their duty to do like Fathers, which is to pro-
vide for, defend and cheriſh; wheras on the contrary, it is they them-
felves that eat the bread out of the mouths of their Children, and
thro the groans of the Poor. And wheras Flattery has faid, that what
they draw up in Vapours they ſend down in fhowers, yet are we fure
that fuch rains are for the moſt part unfruitful, if not ominous and in-
fectious. If they pretend the Law of Nations, it were well they would
declare to us firſt what this Law is, and whether generally agreed on or
no by Nations. If they fay, yes, they muſt refolve whether explicit-
ly or implicitly: if they fay the former, let them produce them; if the
latter, they must demonftrat, that all Nations are agreed in fuch and
fuch Notions, and all men of theſe Nations, fince every one muſt be
of equal capacity: When on the contrary, tho the Underſtandings
of moſt men, whom we know or have convers'd with, feem to agree
in fom general maxims, but unpoliſh'd, unnumbred, and unmethodiz'd,
yet we ſee many Nations differing from us in many things, which
we think clearly, fundamentally, and naturally true; neither do Cli-
mats and Education only ſo diverſify the Minds of men, but even their
Underſtandings, and the different ways of thinking ſo diſtinguiſh
even thoſe of one Country, that tho we may pleaſe our ſelves in think-
ing that all mens thoughts follow the fantaſtical method of ours, yet we
might find, if we were perfectly converfant with all men of the
World, and well read in their Authors (as we are not with half of
them, no, nor any one man with the twentieth part) that there are
ſcarce four or five Axioms, excepting as they make a part of the Law
of nature, would be univerfally receiv'd. Now (for I have bin the
longer by reaſon that this imaginary Law has been fo held up by the Ci-
vilians, and made the fubterfuge of fo many confiderable Diſputes) if
it be ſo weak as that we can ſcarce tell whether it has a being or no, for
even that which we account the moſt facred piece of it, the violation
of publick Meffengers, the Tartar and Mufcovite, unleſs reſtrain'd by
fear, break it every day. What then are the Arguments deduc'd from
it? or if there was fuch a Law, what would it avail ſuch a particular
man? for why ſhould other Nations impofe a Governor where they
are not concern'd? And if they pretend this Law as to the preferva-
tion and impunity of their Perfons, the fame Anſwer will ferve again,
with this addition, That they make an Offender incapable of puniſh-
I
ment,
เ
Reafons of Monarchy.
13
ሩ
ment, which is but to give them a Commiffion to offend. Now if
they run upon that diftinction of fufpending only, and not puniſhing
(as if forfooth this kind of People must be preferv'd, tho by the ruin
of Mankind, to immediat Vengeance) then I fay, That Sufpenfion
is really a Puniſhment; and if his Demerits can deferve that, I fee not
but that upon a proportionable Increaſe, they may deſerve Dethroni-
zation or Death, as clearly as two and two make four, and four more
make eight. If they allege pofitive or municipal Laws, and number
Homages, they are not much the nearer, fince that all fuch Laws are
but Rivulets and Branches of them we before examin'd; and fince we
found that thoſe ſpeak fo little in their favor, that which thefe do can-
not fignify much, efpecially fince Princes, who are ever watchful to
improve all occafions of this nature, can either by terror or artifice
draw Affemblys, or the major part of them, to their own Lure; nay,
even the worst of them have not forgot to be folicitous in this cafe.
But it muſt be remark'd, That whatever pofitive Laws are repugnant
to thoſe general ones, they are injurious, and ought to be repeal'd.
And truly it is a fad Obſervation, that as Monarchs grow, either out of
the weakneſs of Government, and (as I may fay) its Pupilage, as
ROMULUS and THESE US did at Rome and Athens, or elſe out of
the diſeaſe or depravation of it, as CESAR again invaded Rome: fo
have the People bin never more fond of them, than when Manners
were at the higheſt corruption, which ever gave acceſs of ſtrength to
them; nor have they more diftafted them, than when their Spirits and
Diſciplin were the moſt brave and healthful: fo fatally difagreeing are
true Liberty, which is the very fource of Virtue and Generofity, and
the impotent Domination of a fingle Tyrant, who commonly reigns
by no other means than the Diſcords of braver Citizens, who can nei-
ther indure Equality or Superiority among themſelves, and rather ad-
mit a general Vaffalage, than juft Equality; or by the Vices of the
bafer fort, which naturally reconcile them and Kings, and concern
them both in a bad Example. But fuppofe Succeffion a thing facred
and inviolable, yet once break and interrupt it, it is little worth, either
the Ufurper being to be acknowleg'd regular, or the whole Series
daſh'd out of order. Nay, we fee Afpirers themſelves either ſo blinded
with their Pretences, or with Animofity, and fo crying up their own
Titles, that it is almoſt impoffible for any privat Judgment to do right
in this caſe, themſelves thwarting one another; and it cannot be in the
power of Nature that both ſhould be right. But who can inſtance one
Monarch whofe Crown is come to him by untainted Succeffion? and
what Hiſtory will not confirm the Example I fhall anon bring? Cer-
tainly tho Succeflion were a thing that had not fo little reaſon and reali-
ty, yet I fee not why men fhould with ſuch a ſtrange pertinacy defend
it. Matters of Government ought to be manag'd by Prudence; but
Succeffion puts them into the hands of Fortune, when a Child incapa-
ble or infirm, under the regiment of a Nurſe, muft (poffibly) be
Supreme Governor, and thoſe whom either their Abilitys or Virtues
fit for it, fubordinat or laid afide. But what if the Perfon whom ne-
ceffity has fet at the ftern be incapable, lunatic, weak, or vitious, is
not this a good way to prevent Controverfys? yet this plainly ener-
vats all good Council, when a King fhould have need of Tutors, and
that a multitude of People ſhould be commanded by one who com-
mands not himſelf; and, when we ſcarce obey even excellent Princes,
to adore Shadows and weak ones.
AS
14
The Grounds and
A S for BOXHORNIUS's diftinction of Succeffion, wherin the next
Heir muſt neceſſarily fuccede by the original Right of the former, I
would aſk him, whether the Predeceffor were a Poffeffor or Ufu-
fructuary? If the firſt, all our former Arguments fall on him; if the
latter, it makes not for his Succeffor, the People being Owners: and
beſides, the diſtinction is one of his own coining, never pretended be-
fore; upon the first controverfy it is invalid, altho the firft Founder
had a Right, as we have prov'd the contrary.
HAVING, with what brevity I could, brought to an end my firſt
Intention, I ſhall now fall upon the fecond, which is the intrinfic value
and expediency of this Government, and fom little compariſon with
others; but herein we ſhall be ſhort, and only fo far as concerns this.
And indeed it is a buſineſs ſo tickliſh, that even Mr. Hoвs in his piece
de Cive, tho he affur'd himſelf that the reft of his Book (which is
principally calculated for the affertion of Monarchy) is demonftrated,
yet he douts whether the Arguments which he brings to this bufinefs
be fo firm or not; and MALVEZZI Contrarily remonftrats (in his
Difcourfes upon TACITUS) that Optimacys are clearly better than
Monarchys, as to all advantages. And indeed if we look on the Argu-
ments for Monarchy, they are either Flouriſhes, or merely Notions;
fuch are the reference and perfection of Unity, which, fay they, muft
needs work better and more naturally as one fimple caufe (befides
that it ſtills and reſtrains all other claims) than many coordinat: wher-
as they never confider that tho among many joint Caufes there may be
fome jarring, yet like croſs Wheels in an Engine, they tend to the regu
lation of the whole. What violent Miſchiefs are brought in by the
Contentions of Pretenders in Monarchys, the Ambiguitys of Titles,
and lawleſs Ambition of Afpirers? wheras in a fettled Republic all this
is clear and unperplex'd; and in cafe any particular man aſpires, they
know againſt whom to join, and puniſh as a common enemy. As for
that reaſon which alleges the advantage of Secrefy in buſineſs, it carries
not much with it, in regard that under that even moft pernicious de-
figns may be carried on; and for wholfom Councils (bating fom more
nice Tranfactions) it matters not how much they be toft among thoſe
who are ſo much intrufted and concern'd in them, all bad defigns be-
ing never in probability fo feeble and ineffectual, as when there are ma-
ny eyes to overlook them, and voices to decry them. As for that ex-
pedition in which they fay Monarchs are ſo happy, it may as well fur-
ther a bad intention, as give effect to a juft Council, it depending on
the Judgment of a fingle man, to whofe will and ends all muft refer
wheras a felect number of intrufted Perfons may haften every oppor-
tunity with a juſt flowneſs as well as they, tho indeed (unleſs it be in
fom Military critical Minutes) I fee not fuch an Excellency in the ſwift-
nefs of heady Diſpatch, precipitation in Councils being fo dangerous
and ominous. As for what concerns privat Suitors, they may as fpee-
dily and effectually (if not more) be anfwer'd in ſtaid Republics, as
in the Court of a King, where Bribery and unworthy Favorits do not
what is juft, but what is defir'd.
;
WITH theſe and many others as confiderable (which partly wil-
lingly, and partly in this penury of Books, forgettingly I pafs) do
they intend to ftrengthen this fantaftical and airy Building; but as fly
Controverters many times leave out the principal Text or Argument,
becauſe ſhould it be produc'd, it could not be ſo eaſily anſwer'd: fo
theſe
Reafons of Monarchy.
15
t
theſe men tell us all the Advantages of Monarchy, fuppofing them ſtill
well fettled, and under virtuous men; but you fhall never hear them
talk of it in its corrupt ftate under leud Kings and unfettled Laws;
they never let fall a word of the dangers of Interreigns, the Minoritys
and Vices of Princes, Mifgovernments, evil Councils, Ambitions, Am-
biguitys of Titles, and the Animofitys and Calamities that follow them,
the neceffary Injuftices and Oppreffions by which Monarchs (ufing
the Peoples Wealth and Blood againſt themſelves) hold them faſt
in their Seats, and by fome fufpenfion of Divine Juftice, dy not vio-
lently.
WHEREAS other Governments, eſtabliſh'd againſt all theſe E-
vils, being ever of Vigor and juft Age, fettled in their own Right,
freed from pretences, ferv'd by experienc'd and engag'd Councils, and
(as nothing under the Moon is perfect) fometimes gaining and advan-
tag'd in their Controverfys, which have not ſeldom (as we may fee
in Old Rome) brought forth good Laws and Augmentations of Free-
dom; wheras once declining from their Purity and Vigor, and (which
is the effect of that) raviſh'd by an Invader, they languiſh in a brutiſh
Servitude, (Monarchy being truly a Diſeaſe of Government) and like
Slaves, ftupid with harſhneſs and continuance of the laſh, wax old
under it, till they either arrive at that Period which God preſcribes to
all People and Governments, or elſe better Stars and Pofterity awaken
them out of that Lethargy, and reſtore them to their priftin Liberty,
and its daughter Happineſs.
BUT this is but to converfe in Notions, wandring, and ill abſtract-
ed from things; let us now defcend to practical Obfervation, and
clearly manifeft out the whole Series of Time and Actions, what
Circumſtances and Events have either ufher'd or follow'd one Race of
Kings, That if there were all the Juftice in the world that the Go-
vernment of a Nation fhould be intail'd upon one Family, yet cer-
tainly we could not grant it to ſuch a one whofe criminal Lives and
formidable Deaths have bin Evidences of God's Wrath upon it for fo
many Generations.
AND fince no Country that I know yields fuch an illuftrious Ex-
ample of this as Scotland dos, and it may be charity to bring into the
way fuch as are miſled, I have pitch'd upon the Scotish Hiftory, wher-
in as I have only confulted their own Authors, as my fitteft Witneffes
in this cafe; fo have I (not as a juſt Hiſtory, but as far as concerns
this purpoſe) faithfully, and as much as the thing would permit, with-
out gloffes repreſented it: ſo that any calm Underſtanding may con-
clude that the Vengeance which now is level'd againſt that Nation, is
but an attendant of this new introduc'd Perfon; and that he himſelf,
tho for the prefent he ſeems a Log among his Frogs, and fuffers them
to play about him, yet God will fuffer him (if the English Army pre-
vents not) to turn Stork and devour them, while their Crys fhall not
be heard, as thoſe that (in ſpite of the warning of Providence, and the
light of their own Reaſons, for their own corrupt Intereſt and greedy
Ambition) brought thefe Miferys upon themſelves.
•
An
16
I.
2.
لحب
4.
சம்ம்
5.
6.
7.
Noo
8.
9. 10.
II.
12.
An Inftance of the preceding REASONS out
of the SCOTISH HISTORY.
A
The Second Part.
ND now we com to our main buſineſs, which is the review of
Story, wherin we may find fuch a direct and uninterrupted
Series, fuch mutual Endearments between Prince and People,
and ſo many of them crown'd with happy Reigns and quiet Deaths
(two fucceffively ſcarce dying naturally) that we may conclude, they
have not only the moſt reaſon, but a great deal of excellent Intereſt
who eſpouſe the Perfon and Quarrel of the hopeful Deſcendent of ſuch
a Family nor fhall we be fo injurious to the Glory of a Nation,
proud with a Catalogue of Names and Kings, as to expunge a great
part of their number; tho fom, who have done it, affirm there can be
no probability that they had any other being than what HECTOR
BOYES, and the black book of Pafley (out of which BUCHANAN
had moſt of his Materials) are pleas'd to beſtow on them, there being
no mention of the name of Scot in any Authentic Writer, till four
hundred years after CHRIST. No, we ſhall no more envy theſe
old Heroes to them, than their placing the Red Lion in the dexter Point
of their Efcucheon. But tho we might in juftice reject them as fa-
bulous and monkiſh, yet fince they themſelves acknowlege them, and
they equally make againſt them, we ſhall run them over like genuin
Hiſtory. The firſt of this bleffed Race was FERGUS; firft General,
and afterwards got himſelf made King: but no fooner caft away on the
Coaft of Ireland, but a Contention arifes about the validity of their
Oath to him, and Uncles are appointed to. fuccede, which argues it
Elective fo FERITHARIS Brother to FERGUS is King, but his
Nephew forms a Conſpiracy againſt him, forces him to refign and fly
to the Iles, where he dy'd. FERITHARIS dying foon after, was-
fufpected to be poifon'd. After him coms in MAIN (FERGUS'S
fecond Son) who with his Son DORNADILLA, reign'd quietly fifty
ſeven years. But REUTHER his Son not being of age, the People
make his Uncle NOTHAT take the Government; but he mifruling,
REUTHER, by the help of one DOUAL, rais'd a party againſt him,
and beheads him, makes himſelf King with the indignation of the Peo-
ple that he was not elected: fo that by the Kindred of NOTHAT he
is fought, taken, and difplac'd; but afterwards makes a Party, and
regains. His Son THEREUS was too young, fo that his Brother RHEU-
THA fucceeded, but after ſeventeen years was glad to refign. Well,
THEREUS reigns, but after fix years declines to fuch Leudnefs that
they force him to.fly, and govern by a Prorex. After his Death
JOSINA his Brother, and his Son FINAN are Kings, and quietly dy
fo.
BUT then coms DURST, one who flays all the Nobility at a
Banquet, and is by the People flain. After his Death the validity of
the Oath to FERGUS is call'd in queſtion, and the elective Power vin-
dicated; but at length EVEN his Brother is admitted, who tho he
rul'd
}
Reafons of Monarchy.
17
rul'd valiantly and well, yet he had GILLUS a Baftard Son, Vafer &
Regni cupidus. The next of the Line are Twins, DOCHAM and
DORGAL, Sons of DURST: they while they difputed about pri-
ority of Age, are, by the artifice of GILLUS, flain in a Tumult;
who makes a ſtrong Party, and feizing of a Hold, fays he was made
Superviſor by his Father, and fo becoms King, cuts off all the Race
of DURST: but is after forc'd out of the Kingdom, and taken by
EVEN the Second his Succeffor (who was chofen by the People) and
by him put to death in Ireland. After EVEN coms EDER: after
EDER his Son EVEN the Third, who for making a Law, that the
Nobility ſhould have the enjoyment of all new marry'd Women before
they were touch'd by their Hufbands, was doom'd to Prifon during
his Life, and there ftrangl'd. His Succeffor was his Kinfman ME-
TELLAN after whom was elected CARAT AC, whom his Brother
CORBRET fucceded. But then came DARDAN (whom the Lords
made to take on him the Government, by reafon of the Nonage of
CORBRET'S Son) who for his Leudneſs was taken by the People, and
beheaded.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19. 20.
AFTER him CORBRET the Second, whofe Son LUCTAT for 21. 22.
his Leudneſs was by the People put to death; then was elected
MOGALD, who following his vitious Predeceffors fteps, found his
Death like theirs violent.
HIS Son CONAR, one of the Confpirators againſt him, fucceded,
but mifgoverning, was clapt in Priſon, and there dy’d.
ETHODIUS his Sifter's Son fucceded, who was flain in the
night in his Chamber by his Piper.
23.
24.
25-
HIS Son being a Minor, SATRAEL his Brother was accepted, 26.
who ſeeking to place the Succeffion in his own Line, grew fo hateful
to the people, that, not daring to come abroad, he was ſtrangl'd in
the night by his own Servants, which made way for the youngeſt
Brother
DONALD, who outdid the others Vices by contrary Virtues,
and had a happy Reign of one and twenty years.
ETHODIUS the Second, Son of the firft of that name, was
next, a dull inactive Prince, Familiarium tumultu occifus.
HIS Son ATHIRCO promis'd fair, but deceiv'd their expecta-
tions with moſt horrid Leudneſs, and at length vitiated the Daughters
of NATHALOCK a Nobleman, and caus'd them to be whipt be-
fore his eys; but feeing himſelf furrounded by Confpirators, eluded
their Fury with his own Sword; his Brother and Children being
forc'd to fly to the Picts. NATHALOCK, turning his Injury into Am-
bition, made himſelf King, and govern'd anfwerably; for he made
moſt of the Nobility to be ſtrangl'd, under pretence of calling them
to Council, and was after flain by his own Servants.
AFTER his Death ATHIRCO's Children were call'd back, and
FINDOC his Son, being of excellent hopes, accepted, who made
good what his Youth promis'd: he beat in fundry Battles DONALD
the Ilander; who feeing he could not prevail by force, fent two as
Renegados to the King, who (being not accepted) confpire with his
Brother, by whofe means one of them flew him with a Spear when he
was hunting.
HIS Brother DONALD fuccedes (the youngeſt of the three) who,
about to revenge his Brother's Death, hears the Ilander is enter'd Mur-
ray;
D
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
1.
18
The Grounds and
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
ray; whom he incountring with inequal Forces, is taken Prifoner
with thirty of the Nobility, and whether of Grief, or his Wounds,
dy's in Prifon.
THE Ilander that had before ufurp'd the Name, now affum'd the
Power (the Nobles, by reafon of their kindred Prifoners, being over-
aw'd) This man wanting nothing of an exquifit Tyrant, was, after
twelve years Butcherys, flain by CRATHLINTH Son of FINDoc,
who under a difguife found Addrefs and Opportunity. The brave
Tyrannicid was univerfally accepted, and gave no caufe of Repen→
tance; his Reign is famous for a War begun between the Scots and
Picts about a Dog (as that between the Trojans and Italians for a white
Hart) and the defection of CARAUSIUS from DIOCLESIAN, which
happen'd in his time.
HIS Kinfman FINCORMAC fucceded, worthy of memory for
little but the Piety of the Culdys (an Order of religious Men of that
time overborn by others fucceding) He being dead, three Sons of his
three Brothers contended for the Crown: ROMACH, as the eldeft,
ftrengthen'd by his Alliance with the Picts, with their affiftance feiz'd
on it, forcing others to fly; but proving cruel, the Nobility confpir'd
and flew him.
ANGUSIAN, another Pretender, fuccedes, who being affail'd
by NECTHAM King of the Picts, who came to revenge ROMACH,.
routed his Army in a pitcht Battel; but NECTHAM coming again,
he was routed, and both he and NECTHAM flain.
FETHELMAC, the third Pretender, came next, who beating
the Picts, and wafting their Fields, HERGUST, when he faw there
could be no advantage by the Sword, fuborn'd two Picts to murder
him, who drawing to confpiracy the Piper that lay in his Chamber
(as the manner was then) he at the appointed time admitted them,
and there flew him.
THE next was EVGEN Son of FINCOR MAC, who was flain
in a Battel with the Picts to the almoft extirpation and banishment of
the Scots; but at laft the Pits, taking diftaft at the Romans, en-
ter'd into a ſecret League with the Scots, and agreed that FERGUS
(whoſe Uncle the laft King was) being then in banishment, and of a
military breeding and inclination, fhould be chofen King. With him
the Danes maintain'd a long War againſt the Romans, and pull'd down
the Pits wall at last he and the King of Picts were in one day flain
in a Battel against them. This Man's accefs to Government was
ftrange, ignotus Rex ab ignoto populo accerfitus, and may be thought
temerarious; he having no Land for his People, and the Roman Name
inimical; yet founded he a Monarchy, there having been Kings ever
fince; and we are to note, this is the first man that the founder Wri-
ters will allow to be real and not fabulous. Him fucceded his Son
EUGENIUS (whofe Grandfather GRAHAM, had all the power) a
warlike Prince, whom fome fay flain, fome dead of a difeafe. After
him his Brother DONGARD, who after the fpending of five fuper-
ftitious years, left the Crown (as they call it) to his youngeſt Bro-
ther CONSTANTIN; who from a good privat Man turn'd a leud
Prince, and was flain by a Nobleman, whofe Daughter he had raviſh'd.
He was fucceded by CONGAL, CONSTANTIN'S Son, who came
a tolerable good Prince to a loofe People; and having ſpent fom two
and twenty years in flight excurfions againſt the Saxons, left the rule
to
1
Reaſons of Monarchy.
19
7
to his Brother GORAN, who notwithſtanding he made a good League
againſt the Britans, which much conduc'd to his and the Peoples
fettlement, yet in requital, after thirty four years, they made away
with him; which brought in EUGENIUS, the Third of that name,
the Son of CONGAL, who was ſtrongly ſuſpected to have a hand
in his Death, infomuch that GORAN'S Widow was forc'd to fly into
Ireland with her Children. This man in thirty three years time did
nothing but reign, and make ſhort Incurfions, upon the Borders; he
left the Rule to his Brother CONGAL, a monaftical, fuperftitious, and
inactive Prince, who reign'd ten years. KINNATEL his Brother
was defign'd for Succeffor; yet AIDAN the Son of GORAN laid
his claim, but was content to fufpend, in refpect of the Age and Dif-
eaſes of KINNATEL, which after fourteen Months took him out of
the World, and clear'd the controverfy, and AIDAN by the conſent
of COLUMBA (a Prieſt that govern'd all in thoſe days) came to be
King; a Man that, after thirty four years turbulently fpent, being
beaten by the Saxons, and ftruck with the Death of COLUMBA, dy'd
of Grief.
AFTER him was chofen KENNETH, who has left nothing
behind him but his Name. Then came EUGENIUS the Fourth,
the Son of AIDAN (fo irregular is the Scots Succeffion, that we fee
it inverted by Ufurpation or crofs Elections in every two or three Ge-
nerations) This man left an ambiguous Fame; for HECTOR BOE-
Tius fays he was peaceable; the Manufcript, implacably fevere: He
reign'd fixteen years, and left his Son FERCHARD Succeffor, who,
endeavoring to heighten the Prerogative by the Diffenfions of the
Nobility, was on the contrary impeach'd by them, and call'd to an ac-
count, which he denying, was clapt in Priſon, where he himſelf fav'd the
Executioner a labor. So that his Brother DONALD fucceded, who
being taken up with the Piety of thoſe days, left nothing memorable,
except that he in perfon interpreted Scots Sermons to the Saxons. He
was follow'd by his Nephew FERCHARD, Son to the firft of that
Name, a thing like a King in nothing but his Exorbitancys, who in
hunting was wounded by a Wolf, which caft him into a Fever, wher-
in he not obferving the impos'd Temperance, brought on himſelf the
loufy Diſeaſe; upon which diſcomforted, he was by the perfuafion of
COLMAN (a religious man) brought out in his Bed cover'd with
Hair-Cloth, where he made a public Acknowlegement to the People,
and foon after dy'd. MALDWIN, DONALD'S Son, follow'd, who
after twenty years ignoble Reign was ftrangled by his Wife.
EUGENIUS the Fifth fucceded, Son (they fay) of King DoN-
GARD, tho Chronology feems to refute it. This man fpent five
years in flight Incurfions, and was fucceded by EUGENIUS the
Sixth, Son of FERCHARD. This man is famous for a little Learn-
ing, as the times went, and the Prodigy of raining Blood feven days,
all Milkmeats turning into blood. AMBERKELLETH, Nephew to
EUGENIUS the Fifth, who fucceded this rude Prince, while he
was diſcharging the burthen of Nature, was flain by an Arrow from
an unknown hand, EUGENIUS the Seventh follow'd, who being
attemted by Confpirators, had his new marry'd Wife flain in bed be-
fide him; for which he being accus'd, produc'd the Murderers before
his Trial, and was acquitted, and fo ended the rest of his 17 years in
Peace, recommending to the People MORDAC, fon of AMBER-
D 2
KELLETH,
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50:
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
20
The Grounds and
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
KELLETH, who continuing a blank Reign, or it may be a happy
one, in regard it was peaceable, left it to ETFYN Son of EUGE-
NIUS the Seventh: the first part of his Reign was peaceable; but
Age obliging him to put the Government into the hands of four of his
Servants, it happen'd to him, as it dos to other Princes, whoſe For-
tunes decay commonly with their Strength, that it was very unhappy
and turbulent: Which Miferys EUGENIUS the Eighth, Son of
MORDAC, reſtrain'd. But he, it feems, having a Nature fitter to
appeaſe Tumults than to enjoy Reft, at the firſt enjoyment of Peace
broke into fuch Leudneſs, that the Nobility at a meeting ſtab'd him,
and made way for FERGUS the Son of ETFYN, one like his Pre-
deceffor in manner, death, and continuance of Reign, which was three
years; the only diffimilitude was, that the latter's Wife brought his
Death; for which others being impeach'd, ſhe ſtept in and confeſt it;
and to avoid puniſhment, puniſh'd her ſelf with a knife. SOLUATH,
Son of EUGENIUS the Eighth, follow'd him, who tho his Gout
made him of lefs Action, yet it made his Prudence more viſible, and
himſelf not illaudable: His Death brought in ACHAIUS the Son of
ETFYN, whofe Reign was innobled with an Irish War, and many
learned Men; befides the Affiftance lent HUNGUS to fight againſt
the Northumbrians, whom he beat in a famous Battel, which (if I
may mention the matter) was prefignify'd to HUNGUS in a Dream,
St. Andrew appearing to him, and affuring him of it; and in the time
of Battel a white Crofs (that which the Heralds call a Saltier, and we
fee commonly in the Scots Banners) appear'd in the Sky; and this I
think to have bin the occafion of that bearing, and an Order of Knights
of St. Andrew, fometimes in reputation in Scotland, but extinguiſh'd,
for aught I can perceive, before the time of JAMES the Sixth, tho
the Collar and Pendant of it are at this day worn about the Scots
Arms. To this man CONGAL his Coufin fucceded, who left no-
thing behind him but five years to ſtretch out the account of time.
DONGAL the Son of SOLUATH came next, who being of a Na-
ture fierce and inſupportable, there was an endeavour to fet up ALPIN
ſon of ACHAIUS, which Defign by ALPIN himſelf was fruftrat-
ed, which made the King willinger to affift ALPIN in his pretenſion
to the Kingdom of Picts; in which Attemt he was drown'd, and
left to ALPIN that which he before had fo nobly refus'd, who mak-
ing uſe of the former, rais'd an Army, beat the Picts in many fignal
Victorys; but at laſt was flain by them, leaving his name to the Place
of his Death, and the Kingdom to his Son KENNETH. This man
ſeeing the People broken with the late War, and unwilling to fight,
drew them on by this Subtilty; he invites the Nobility to dinner, and
after plying them with drink till midnight, leaves them fleeping on
the floor (as the manner was) and then hanging Fiſhſkins about the
Walls of the Chamber, and making one ſpeak thro a Tube, and call
them to war; they waking, and half afleep, fuppos'd fomthing of
Divinity to be in it, and the next morning not only confented to War,
but (fo ftrange is deluded imagination) with unfpeakable Courage
fell
upon the Enemy and put them to the rout; which being confirm'd
by other great Victorys, utterly ruin'd the Pictish Name. This man
may be added to the two FERGUSES, and truly may be faid to be
the Founder of the Scots Empire, not only in making that the middle
of his Dominion, which was once the bounds, but in confirming his
Acqui-
Reafons of Monarchy.
21
•
70.
71.
726
736
Acquifitions with good Laws, having the opportunity of a long Peace,
which was fixteen years, his whole time of Government being twen-
ty. This was he that plac'd that Stone, famous for that illufory Pro-
phecy, Ni fallat fatum, &c. (which firft was brought out of Spain
into Ireland, and from thence into Argyle) at Scoon; where he put it
in a Chair, in which all his Succeffors (till EDWARD the firft brought
it away) were crown'd, and fince that all the Kings of England, till
the happineſs of our Commonwealth made it uſeleſs. His Brother
DONALD was his Succeffor, a man made up of extremitys of Vir-
tues and Vices; no man had more bravery in the Field, nor more
Vice at home, which increafing with his years, the Nobility put him
in priſon, where either for fear or fcorn he put an end to his days,
leaving behind him his Brother CONSTANTIN, a Man wanting no-
thing of him but his Vices, who ftrugling with a potent Enemy (for
the Picts had call'd in the Danes) and driving them much into deſpair
(a Bravery that has not ſeldom rain'd many excellent Captains) was
taken by them, put into a little Cave, and there flain. He was fuc-
ceded by ETHUS his Brother, who had all his eldeſt Brother's Vices,
and none of his fecond's Virtues; Nature, it ſeems, making two ex-
tremes and a middle in the three Brethren. This man voluptuous and
cowardly, was forc'd to refign; or, as others fay, dy'd of Wounds
receiv'd in a Duel from his Succeffor, who was GREGORY Son of
DONGAL, who was not only an excellent Man, but an excellent
Prince, that both recover'd what the others had loft, and victoriouſly
travers'd the northern Countys of England, and a great part of Ire-
land; of whofe King a Minor, aud in his power, he generoufly made
no advantage, but fettled his Country, and provided faithful and
able Guardians for him. Theſe things justly yield him the name of
Great, DONALD Son of CONSTANTIN the Second, by his re-
commendation, fucceded in his Power and Virtues, notwithſtanding
fome fay he was remov'd by Poiſon. Next was CONSTANTIN
the Third, Son of ETHUS, an unftable perfon, who affifted the
Danes, which none of his Predeceffors would do; and after they had
deferted him baſely, yet yielded them Succors, confifting of the chief
of the Scots Nobility, which with the whole Danish Army were rout-
ed by the Saxons. This ftruck him ſo, that he retir'd among the Cul-
dys (which were as the Greec Caloyers, or Romiſh Monks at this day)
and there bury'd himſelf alive. After him was MILCOM, Son of 76.
DONALD the Third, who tho a good Prince, and well ſkill'd in the
Arts of Peace, was flain by a Confpiracy of thoſe to whom his Virtue
was burdenfom. His Succeffor was INDULF (by what Title I find
not) who fighting with the Danes that with a Navy unexpectedly came
into the Frith, was flain. DuF his Son fuccedes, famous for an Accident,
which if it be true, feems nearly diftant from a Fable. He was fud-
denly afflicted by a fweating Diſeaſe, by which he painfully lan-
guifh'd, yet nobody could find the caufe, till at laſt à Girl that had
fcattered fom words, after torments, confeſt that her Mother and ſom
other women had made an Image of Wax, which, as it wafted, the
King ſhould waſt, by ſweating much: the place being diligently
fearch'd, it was found accordingly; fo the Image being broke, he in-
ftantly recover'd. That which diſturb'd his five years Reign was the
turbulency of the Northern People, whom when he had reduc'd and
taken, with intent to make exemplary Puniſhment, DONALD the
Commander
I
74:
75.
77:
78.
3.2
The Grounds and
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
Commander of the Caftle of Forres, where he then lay, interceded
for ſom of them; but being repuls'd, and exaſperated by his Wife,
after he had made all his Servants drunk, flew him in his Bed, and
buried him under a little Bridg (left the cutting of Turfs might dif-
cover a Grave) near Kilros Abby; tho others fay, he turn'd afide a
River, and after he had bury'd him, fuffer'd it to take its former
Chanel. CULEN the Son of INDULF, by the Election of Par-
lament, or Convention of the People, fucceded, good only in this one
Action, of inquiring and puniſhing his Predeceffor's Death; but after,
by the neglect of Difcipline, and the exquifiteneſs of his Vices, became
a Monſter, and fo continued three years, till being weakned and ex-
hauſted in his Body, and vext with perpetual Diſeaſes, he was fum-
mon'd by the Parlament, and in the way was flain by a Thane (fo
they then call'd Lieutenants of Counties) whofe Daughter he had
raviſh'd.
THEN came KENETH, Brother to DUF (tho the forepart of
his Reign was totally unlike his) who being invaded by the Danes,
beat them in that famous Battle, which was won by the three HAYS,
Huſbandmen (from whom all the HAYS now give three Shields.
Gules) who with their Sythes reinforc'd the loft Battle; but in his lat-
ter time he loft his reputation, by poiſoning MILCOLM Son of
DUF, to preſerve the Crown for a Son of his Name, tho of lefs
merit (for fays BUCHANAN, They use to chufe the fittest, not the
nearest) which being don, he got ordain'd in a Parlament, that the
Succeffion fhould be lineal, the Son fhould inherit, and be call'd Prince
of Scots; and if he were a Minor, be govern'd by fom wife Man (here
coms the pretence of Succeffion, wheras before it was clearly Elective)
and at fifteen he ſhould chuſe his Guardian himſelf. But the Divine
Vengeance, which feldom, even in this life, paffes by Murder, over-
took him; for he was enfnar'd by a Lady, whofe Son he had caus'd
to be executed, and ſlain by an Arrow out of an Ambuſh ſhe had laid.
CONSTANTIN the Son of CULEN, notwithstanding all the Ar-
tifice of KENNETH, by his reaſoning againſt the Act, perfwaded
moſt of the Nobility to make him King, fo that MILCOLM the
Son of KENNETH and he made up two Factions, which tore the
Kingdom; till at length MILCOLM's Baſtard Brother (himſelf be-
ing in England affifting the Danes) fought him, routed his Army, and
with the lofs of his own Life took away his, they dying of mutual
Wounds. GRIME, of whofe birth they do not certainly agree, was
chofen by the Conftantinians, who made a good Party; but at the In-
terceffion of FORARD (an accounted Rabbi of the times) they at
laft agreed, GRIME being to enjoy the Kingdom for his Life, after
which MILCOLUMB fhould fuccede, his Father's Law ftanding in
force. But he, after declining into Leudnefs, Cruelty and Spoil (as
Princes drunk with Greatnefs and Profperity ufe to do) the People
call'd back MILCOLUMB, who rather receiving Battle than giving
it (for it was upon Afcenfion-day, his principal Holy-day) routed
his Forces, wounded himſelf, took him, pull'd out his Eyes, which
altogether made an end of his Life, all Factions and Humors being
reconcil❜d.
MILCOLUMB, who with various Fortune fought many fignal
Battles with the Danes, that under their King SUENO had invaded Scot-
land, in his latter time grew to fuch Covetouſneſs and Oppreffion, that
I
all
}
23
Reafons of Monarchy.
↑
all Authors agree he was murder'd, tho they diſagree about the man-
ner; fome fay by Confederacy with his Servants; fom by his Kinfmen
and Competitors; fom by the friends of a Maid whom he had ra-
vish'd. DONALD his Grandchild fucceded, a good-natur'd and in-
active Prince, who with a Stratagem of fleepy Drink deſtroy'd a
Danish Army that had invaded and diftreft him; but at laſt being in-
fnar'd by his Kinſman MACKBETH (who was prick'd forward by
Ambition, and a former Vifion of three Women of a four human
ſhape, whereof one faluted him Thane of Angus, another Earl of
Murray, the third King) he was beheaded.
THE Severity and Cruelty of MACKBETH was ſo known, that
both the Sons of the murder'd King were forc'd to retire, and
yield to the times, while he courted the Nobility with Largeffes. The
firft ten years he ſpent virtuously, but the remainder was ſo favage
and tyrannical, that MACDUF Thane of Fife fled into England to
MILCOLM Son of DONALD, who by his perfuafions, and the affif-
tance of the King of England, enter'd Scotland, where he found
fuch great acceffions to his Party, that MACKBETH was forc'd to
fly; his Death is hid in ſuch a miſt of Fables, that it is not certainly
known.
84-
85.
MILCOLUMB, the third of that name, now being quietly 86.
feated, was the firſt that brought in thoſe gay inventions and diftinc-
tions of Honors, as Dukes, Marqueffes (that now are become ſo airy,
that fom carry them from places to which they have as little relation
as to any Iland in America, and others from Cottages and Dovecotes.)
His firſt trouble was FORFAR, MACKBETH's Son, who claim'd
the Crown, but was foon after cut off. Some War he had with that
WILLIAM Whom we call falfly the Conqueror, fom with his own
People, which by the interceffion of the Biſhops were ended. At
length quarrelling with our WILLIAM the Second, he laid fiege
to Alnwick Castle, which being forc'd to extremity, a Knight came
out with the Keys on a Spear, as if it were to preſent them to him,
and to yield the Caftle; but he not with due heed receiving them,
was run thro the Ey and flain. Som from hence derive the name
of PIERCY (how truly I know not.) His Son and Succeffor ED-
WARD following his Revenge too hotly, receiv'd fom Wounds; of
which within a few days he dy'd.
•
DONALD BANE (that is in Irish, White) who had fled in-
to the Iles for fear of MACKBETH, promis'd them to the King of
Norway, if he would procure him to be King, which was don with
eaſe, as the times then ftood; but this Ufurper being hated by the
People, who generally lov'd the memory of MILCOLM, they ſet
DUNCAN, MILCOLM's Baſtard, againſt him, who forc'd him to
retire to his Iles. DUNCAN a military Man fhew'd himſelf unfit
for Civil Government; fo that DONALD, waiting all advantages,
caus'd him to be beheaded, and reſtor'd himſelf: But his Reign was
fo turbulent, the Ilanders and English invading on both fides, that
they call'd in EDGAR Son of MILCOLM, then in England, who
with fmall Affiftances poffeft himſelf, all Men deſerting DONALD,
who being taken and brought to the King, dy'd in Prifon. EDGAR
fecure by his good Qualitys, and ſtrengthen'd by the English Alliance,
ſpent nine years virtuously and peaceably; and gave the People leave to
breathe and reft, after ſo much trouble and bloodshed. His Brother
87.
88.
89.
ALEX-
24
The Grounds and
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
;
ALEXANDER, firnam'd ACER, or the Fierce, fucceded the be-
ginning of whofe Reign being difturb'd by a Rebellion, he ſpeedi-
ly met them at the Spey, which being a ſwift River, and the Enemy
on the other fide, he offer'd himſelf to ford it on Horfeback: but
ALEXANDER CAR taking the Imployment from him, forded the
River with fuch Courage, that the Enemy fled, and were quiet the
reſt of his Reign. Som fay he had the name of ACER, becauſe ſom
Confpirators being by the fraud of the Chamberlain admitted into his
Chamber, he caſually waking, firſt flew the Chamberlain, and after
him fix of the Confpirators, not ceafing to purſue the reft, till he had
flain moſt of them with his own hand; this with the building of fom
Abbys, and ſeventeen years Reign, is all we know of him.
HIS Brother DAVID fucceded, one whofe profufe Prodigality upon
the Abbys brought the Revenue of the Crown (fo prevalent was the Su-
perftition of thoſe days) almoſt to nothing. He had many Battels with
our STEPHEN about the Title of MAUD the Emprefs; and having
loft his excellent Wife and hopeful Son in the flower of their days, he
left the Kingdom to his Grandchildren, the eldeſt wherof was MIL-
COLUMB a fimple King, baffl'd and led up and down into France by
our HENRY the Second; which brought him to fuch contemt, that
he was vex'd by frequent Infurrections, eſpecially them of Murray,
whom he almoſt extirpated. The latter part of his Reign was fpent
in building Monaſterys; he himſelf ty'd by a Vow of Chaſtity, would
never marry, but left for his Succeffor his Brother WILLIAM, who
expoftulating for the Earldom of Northumberland, gave occaſion for a
War, in which he was furpriſed and taken, but afterwards releas'd up-
on his doing Homage for the Kingdom of Scotland to King HENRY,
of whom he acknowledg'd to hold it, and putting in caution the
Caſtles of Roxboro (once ftrong, now nothing but Ruins) Barwic,
Edinburg, Sterling, all which notwithſtanding was after releas'd by
RICHARD Cœur de Lyon, who was then upon an Expedition to the
Holy War; from whence returning, both he and DAVID Earl of
Huntingdon, Brother to the King of Scots, were taken Prifoners. The
reft of his Reign (except the rebuilding of St. Johnston, which had bin
deſtroy'd by Waters, wherby he loft his eldeſt Son, and fom Treatys
with our King JOHN) was little worth memory; only you will
wonder that a Scotifh King could reign forty-nine years, and yet die
in peace.
ALEXANDER his Son fucceded, famous for little, except fom
Expeditions againft our King JOHN, fom Infurrections, and a Reign
two years longer than his Father's. His Son was the third of that
name, a Boy of eight years old, whofe Minority was infefted with the
turbulent CUMMINS; who when he was of age, being call'd to ac-
count, not only refus'd to appear, but furpris'd him at Sterling, go-
verning him at their pleaſure. But foon after he was awak'd by a fu-
rious Invafion of Acno King of Norway (under the pretence of
fom Ilands given him by MACKBETH) whom he forc'd to accept
a Peace, and ſpent the latter part amidſt the Turbulencys of the Priefts
(drunk at that time with their Wealth and Eaſe) and at laſt having
feen the continu'd Funerals of his Sons DAVID, ALEXANDER,
his Wife, and his Daughter, he himſelf with a fall from his Horſe
broke his neck, leaving of all his Race only a Grandchild by his
Daughter, which dy'd foon after.
THIS
Reafons of Monarchy.
25
THIS Man's Family being extinguiſh'd, they were forc'd to run to
another Line, which, that we may ſee how happy an expedient imme-
diat Succeffion is for the Peace of the Kingdom, and what Miſeries it
prevents, I fhall, as briefly and as pertinently as I can, fet down.
DAVID, Brother to K. WILLIAM, had three Daughters, MAR-
GARET married to ALLAN Lord of Galloway, ISABEL married to
ROBERT BRUCE Lord of Annandale and Cleveland, ADA married
to HENRY HASTINGS Earl of Huntingdon. Now ALLAN be-
got on his Wife DORNADILLA, married to JOHN BALIOL af-
terwards King of Scotland, and two other Daughters. BRUCE on
his Wife got ROBERT BRUCE Earl of Carick, having married the
Heretrix therof. As for HUNTINGDON he defifted his claim.
The queſtion is, whether BALIOL in right of the eldeft Daughter,
or BRUCE being com of the ſecond (but a man) fhould have the
Crown, he being in the fame degree, and of the more worthy Sex.
The Controverfy being toft up and down, at laſt was refer'd to ED-
WARD, the Firſt of that name, King of England. He thinking to fifſh in
theſe troubled waters, ftirs up eight other Competitors, the more to en-
tangle the buſineſs, and with twenty-four Counſellors, half English,
half Scots, and abundance of Lawyers fit enough to perplex the matter,
fo handled the buſineſs, after cunning delays, that at length he fecretly
tampers with BRUCE (who was then conceiv'd to have the better
right of the bufinefs) that if he would acknowlege the Crown of him,
he would adjudg it for him; but he generouſly anſwering, that he va-
lu'd a Crown at a lefs rate, than for it to put his Country under a foren
Yoke : He made the fame motion to BALIOL, who accepted it; and
fo we have a King again, by what Right we all fee: but it is good rea-
fon to think that Kings, com they by their Power never fo unjustly,
may justly keep it.
BALIOL having thus got a Crown, as unhappily kept it; for no
fooner was he crown'd, and had don. homage to EDWARD, but the
ABERNETHYS having flain MACDUF Earl of Fife, he not only
pardon'd them, but gave them a piece of Land in controverfy wher-
upon MACDUF's Brother complains against him to EDWARD, who
makes him riſe from his Seat in Parlament, and go to the Bar: He
hereupon enrag'd, denies EDWARD affiftance againſt the French, and
renounces his Homage. EDWARD immediatly coms to Berwic,
takes and kills ſeven thouſand, most of the Nobility of Fife and Low-
thian, and afterwards gave them a great Defeat at Dunbar, whoſe
Caſtle inftantly furrender'd. After this he march'd to Montrofe, where
BALIOL refign'd himfelf and Crown, all the Nobility giving ho-
mage to EDWARD. BALIOL is fent prifoner to London, and from
thence, after a year's detention, into France. While EDWARD was pof-
feft of all Scotland, one WILLIAM WALLACE arofe, who being
a privat man, beſtir'd himſelf in the Calamity of his Country, and
gave the Engliſh ſeveral notable foils. EDWARD coming again with
an Army, beat him that was already overcom with Envy and Emula-
tion as well as Power; upon which he laid by his Command, and never
acted more, but only in flight Incurfions. But the English being beat-
en at Rollin, EDWARD Comes in again, takes Sterling, and makes them
all render Homage; but at length BRUCE feeing all his Promiſes no-
thing but fmoke, enters into League with CUMMIN to get the King-
dom: but being betray'd by him to EDWARD, he ftab'd CUMMIN
E
at
96.
26
The Grounds and
97.
98.
99.
100.
ΙΟΙ,
at Drumfreis, and made himſelf King. This man, tho he came with
diſadvantage, yet wanted neither Patience, Courage, nor Conduct; fo
that after he had miferably lurk'd in the mountains, he came down, and
gathering together fom Force, gave our EDWARD the Second fuch a de-
feat near Sterling, as Scotland never gave the like to our Nation: and
continu'd the War with various fortune with the Third, till at laft Age
and Leprofy brought him to his Grave. His Son DAVID, a Boy of
eight years, inherited that which he with ſo much danger obtain'd,
and wiſdom kept. In his Minority he was govern'd by THOMAS
RANDOLF Earl of Murray, whofe feverity in punishing was no leſs
dreaded than his Valor had bin honor'd. But he foon after dying of
poifon; and EDWARD BALIOL, Son of JOHN, coming with a Fleet
and ſtrengthen'd with the affiſtance of the Engliſh, and fom Robbers,
the Governor the Earl of Mar was routed, fo that BALIOL makes
himſelf King, and DAVID was glad to retire into France. Amidſt
thefe Parties (EDWARD the Third backing BALIOL) was Scotland mi-
ferably torn, and the BRUCES in a manner extinguiſh'd, till Ro-
BERT (after King) with them of Argile and his own Family and
Friends, began to renew the claim, and bring it into a War again;
which was carry'd on by ANDREW MURRAY the Governor, and
afterwards by himself: So that DAVID, after nine years baniſhment,
durft return, where making frequent Incurfions, he at length in the
fourth year of his return march'd into England, and in the Bishoprick
of Durham was routed, and fled to an obfcure Bridg, fhew'd to this:
day by the inhabitants. There he was by JOHN COPLAND taken
prifoner, where he continu'd nine years, and in the thirty-ninth year
of his Reign he dy'd.
ROBERT his Sifter's Son, whom he had intended to put by, fuc-
cedes, and firſt brought the STUARTS (which at this day are a plague:
to the Nation) into play. This man after he was King, whether it
were Age or Sloth, did little; but his Lieutenants and the English were
perpetually in action. He left his Kingdom to JOHN his Baftard Son
by the Lady MORE his Concubin, whom he marry'd, either to legi-
timat the three Children (as the manner was then) he had by her, or
elfe for old Acquaintance, his Wife and her Huſband dying much about
a time. This JOHN would be crown'd by the name of ROBERT
(his own, they fay, being unhappy for Kings) a wretched inactive
Prince, lame, and only govern'd by his brother WALTER, who
having DAVID the Prince upon complaint of fom Exorbitancys deli-
ver'd to his care, caus'd him to be ftarv'd; upon which the King in-
tending to ſend his Son JAMES into France, the Boy was taken at
Flamburg, and kept by our HENRY the Fourth: upon the hearing of
which his Father fwounded, and foon after dy'd. His Reign was me-
morable for nothing but his breaking with GEORGE Earl of March
(to whofe Daughter, upon the payment of a great part of her Portion
which he never would repay, he had promis'd his Son DAVID
for a Huſband) to take the Daughter of DOUGLAS who had a
greater; which occafion'd the Earl of March to make many inrodes
with our HENRY HOTSPUR ; and a famous Duel of three hun-
dred men apiece, wherof on the one fide ten remain'd, and on the o-
ther one, which was the only way to appease the deadly Feuds of
theſe two Familys. The Interreign was govern'd by ROBERT,
who enjoying the Power he had too much coveted, little minded the
Liberty
Reaſons of Monarchy.
27
Liberty of his Nephew, only he fent fóm Auxiliarys into France,
who, they fay, behav'd themſelves worthily; and his flothful Son
MORDAC, who making his Sons fo bold with Indulgence, that one
of them kill'd a Falcon on his fift, which he deny'd to give him: he in
revenge procur'd the Parlament to ranfom the King, who had bin
eighteen years a Prifoner. This JAMES was the Firſt of that name,
-and tho he was an excellent Prince, yet had a troubleſom Reign; firſt,
in regard of a great Penfion rais'd for his ranſom; next, for domeſtic
Commotions; and laſtly, for raifing of Mony; which, tho the Re-
venue was exhaufted, was call'd Covetoufnefs. This having offended
ROBERT GRAHAM, he confpir'd with the Earl of Athol, flew
him in his Chamber, his Wife receiving two wounds, endeavoring
to defend him.
THIS JAMES left the Second, a Boy of fix years, whofe Infan-
cy, by the miſguidance of the Governor, made a miferable People,
and betray'd the Earl DOUGLAS to death, and almoſt all that great
Family to ruin; but being fupplanted by another Earl DOUGLAS,
the King in his juft age fuffer'd Minority under him, who upon dif-
pleaſure rebel'd, and was kill'd by the King's own hand. Afterwards
having his middle years perpetually molefted with civil Broils, yet
going to affift the Duke of York against HENRY the Sixth, he was
diverted by an English Gentleman that counterfeited himſelf a Nuncio
(which I mention out of a Manufcript, becauſe I do not remember
it in our Storys) and broke up his Army. Soon after befieging Rox-
burg, he was flain by the bursting of a Cannon in the twenty-ninth
year of his Age.
JAMES the Second left a Boy of feven Years, govern'd by his Mo-
ther, and afterwards by the BOYDS; thro the perfuafions of Aſtrolo-
gers and Witches, to whom he was ftrongly addicted, he declin'd to
Cruelty; which fo inrag'd the Nobility, that, headed by his Son, they
confpir'd againſt him, routing his Forces near Sterling, where he flying
to a Mill, and afking for a Confeffor, a Prieft came, who told him,
that tho he was no good Prieft, yet he was a good Leech, and with that
ſtab'd him to the heart. A Parlament approv'd his death, and order'd
Indemnitys to all that had fought againſt him.
JAMES the Fourth, a Boy of fifteen Years, is made King, go-
vern'd by the Murderers of his Father; a prodigal, vainglorious Prince,
flain at Floddon Field, or, as fom fuppofe, at Kelly by the HUMES,
which (as the Manufcript alleges) feems more probable, in regard
that the Iron Belt (to which he added a Ring every Year) which he
wore in repentance for the death of his Father, was never found, and
there were many, the day of Battle, habited like him. His Succeffor
was his Son JAMES, the Fifth of that name, a Boy of not above two
years of age; under whofe Minority, what by the mifgovernment of
Tutors, and what by the Factions of the Nobility, Scotland was waft-
ed almoſt into Famin and Solitude: however in his juft Age he prov'd
an induſtrious Prince, yet could not fo fatisfy the Nobility, but that he
and they continued in a mutual hate, till that barbarous execution of
young HAMILTON fo fill'd him with Remorfe, that he dream'd he
came and cut off his two Arms, and threaten'd after to cut off his
Head. And he difpleas'd the People fo much, that he could not make
his Army fight with the Engliſh then in Scotland; whereupon he dy'd
of grief, having first heard the death of his two Sons, who dy'd at the
E 2
inftant
102,
103.
104.
105.
106.
28
The Grounds and
107.
inftant of his Dream, and leaving a Daughter of five days old, whom
he never faw.
THIS was that MARY under whofe Minority (by the weak
neſs of the Governor, and ambition of the Cardinal) the Kingdom
felt all thofe Woes that are threaten'd to them whofe King is a
Child; till at length the prevalency of the English Arms (awak'd for
her cauſe) brought the great defign of fending her into France to per-
fection: So that at five years old ſhe was tranſported, and at fifteen mar-
ry'd to the Dolphin FRANCIS, after King; while her Mother, a
Daughter of the GUISE, in her Regency, exercis'd all Rage againſt
the Profeffors of the pure Religion then in the dawn. FRANCIS af-
ter two Years left her a childless Widow, ſo that at eighteen fhe re-
turn'd into Scotland to fucceed her Mother (then newly dead) in her
Exorbitancys.
I HAD almoſt forgot to tell, that this young Couple in the
tranſport of their nuptial Solemnitys took the Arms and Title of Eng-
land; which indifcrete Ambition we may fuppofe firft quicken'd the
jealouſy of ELIZABETH againſt her, which after kindl'd fo great
a flame.
IN Scotland the fhew'd what a ftrange influence loofe Education
has upon Youth, and the weaker Sex. All the French Effeminacys
came over with her, and the Court loft that little Severity which was
left. DAVID RIZIO, an Italian Fidler, was the only Favorit, and
it is too much fear'd, had thofe enjoyments which no Woman can give
but ſhe that gives away her Honor and Chaſtity.
BUT a little after, HENRY Lord Darnly coming with MAT-
THEW Earl of Lenox, his Father, into Scotland, the caft an ey upon
him, and marry'd him. Whether it were to ftrengthen her preten-
fion to England, he being com of HENRY the Seventh's Daughter,
as we ſhall tell anon, or to color her Adulterys, and hide the ſhame of
an Impregnation (tho ſome have whiſper'd, that ſhe never conceiv'd,
and that the Son was fuppofititious) or fom Phrenzy of Affection
drew her that way; certain it is ſhe foon declin'd her Affection to her
Huſband, and increas'd it to DAVID (he being her perpetual Com-
panion at board, and managing all Affairs, while the King with a con-
temtible Train was fent away) infomuch that ſom of the Nobility
that could not digeft this, enter'd a into Confpiracy, which the King
headed, and flew him in her Chamber.
THIS turn'd all her neglect of the King into rage, fo that her
chiefeſt buſineſs was to appease her Favorit's Ghoſt with the flaughter
of her Huſband; poifon was firft attemted, but it being (it feems)
too weak, or his Youth overcoming it, that expectation fail'd. But
the Devil and BOTHWEL furnish'd her with another that fucceeded
ſhe ſo intices him, being fo fick that they were forc'd to bring him in a
Horſlitter to Edinburg, where the cheriſh'd him extremely, till the
credulous young man began to lay afide fufpicion, and to hope better:
So ſhe puts him into a ruinous houſe near the Palace, from whence no
news can be had, brings in her own bed, and lys in the houſe with
him; and at length when the defign was ripe, caufes him one Sunday
night, with his Servant, to be ftrangl'd, thrown out of the Window,
and the houſe to be blown up with Gunpowder, her own rich Bed
having bin before fecretly convey'd away. This and other perfor-
mances made her favor upon BOTHWEL fo hot, that ſhe muſt marry
I
him;
Reaſons of Monarchy.
29
him; the only obſtacle was, he had a wife already; but ſhe was
compel'd to fue for a divorce, which (fo great Perſons being con-
cern'd) it was a wonder it ſhould be granting fo long as ten days.
Well, fhe marrys; but the more honeft Nobility amaz'd at thofe Ex-
orbitancys, affemble together, and with Arms in their hands begin to
expoftulat. The newmarry'd Couple are forc'd to make back South-
wards; where finding but flender affiſtance, and the Queen foolishly
coming from Dunbar to Leith, was glad at laſt to delay a parly till her
Dear was eſcap'd; and then (clad in an old tatter'd coat) to yield her
felf a Priſoner.
BEING brought to Edinburg, and us'd rather with hate of her
former Enormitys, than pity of her prefent Fortune, ſhe receiv'd a
Meffage, that the muft either refign the Crown to her Son JAMES
(that was born in the time of her marriage with DARNLY) or elſe
they would procede to another Election, and was forc'd to obey. So
the Child then in his cradle was acknowleg'd JAMES the Sixth, bet- 108.
ter known afterwards by the Title of Great Britain.
THE wretched Mother flying after into England, was entertain'd
(tho with a Guard) by Queen ELIZABETH; but after that being
fuborn'd by the Papiſts, and exaſperated by the GUIZES, the enter'd
into Plots and Machinations, fo inconfiftent with the Safety of Eng-
land, that by an Act of Parlament ſhe was condemn'd to death, which
The receiv'd by a Hatchet at Fotheringay Caſtle.
THE Infancy of her Son was attended with thoſe domeſtic Evils
that accompany the Minority of Kings. In his youth he took to Wife
the Daughter of Denmark (a Woman I hear little of, faving the Cha-
racter SALUST gives SEMPRONIA, that he could dance better than
became a virtuous Woman) with whom he fuppofing the Earl GoWRY
too much in League, caus'd him and his Brother to be flain at their
own houſe whither he was invited; he giving out, that they had an
intent to murder him; and that by miracle and the affiftance of fom
men (whom he had inftructed for that purpoſe, and taught their
tale) he eſcap'd. For this Deliverance (or to ſay better, Affaffination)
he blafphem'd God with a folemn Thankſgiving once a Year all the
remainder of his Life.
WELL had it bin. for us, if our Forefathers had laid hold of that
happy opportunity of ELIZABETH's Death (in which the TEU-
THORS took a period) to have perform'd that which, perhaps in due
puniſhment, has coft us fo much blood and ſweat; and not have bow'd
under the ſway of a ſtranger, difdain'd by the moſt generous and wiſe
at that time, and only fupported by the Faction of fom, and the Sloth
of others; who brought but a flender Title, and (however the flat-
tery of the times cry'd him up for a SOLOMON) weak Commenda-
tions for fuch an advancement.
HIS Title ſtood thus, MARGARET, eldeſt Daughter to HEN-
RY the Seventh, was marry'd to JAMES the Fourth, whofe Son
JAMES the Fifth had MARY the Mother of JAMES the Sixth. MAR-
GARET after her firft Huſband's death, marrys ARCHIBALD DOU-
GLAS Earl of Angus, who upon her begot MARGARET Wife
of MATTHEW Earl of Lenox, and Mother of that HENRY
DARNLY, whofe tragical End we just now mention'd. Now upon
this flender Title, and our internal Diffenfions (for the Cecilians
and Effexians, for feveral ends, made perpetual Applications) got
JAMMY
The Grounds and
JAMMY from a revenue of 30000 to one of almoſt two Millions,
tho there were others that had as fair pretences (and what elſe can any
of them make?) the Statute of 25 Edw. 3. exprefly excluding Foren-
ers from the Crown: and fo the Children of CHARLES BRAN-
DON by MARY the fecond Daughter, Dowager of France, being
next to com in. And the Lady ARABELLA being fprung from a
third Huſband (the Lord STUART) of the faid MARGARET, and
by a Male Line, carry'd furely fo formidable a pretenfion (it ſhould
feem) that even that Iniquity which was perfonally inherent to her,
made her days very unhappy, and for moft part captive, and her
death ('tis thought) fomwhat too early; fo cruel are the Perfecutions
of cowardly minds, even againſt the weakest and most unprotected
Innocence.
AND indeed his Right to the Crown was fo unfatisfactory even
to the moſt judicious of thofe days, that TOBY MATTHEWS
having fuit about fom Privileges which he claim'd to his Biſhoprick
(which was then Durham) wherin the King oppos'd him; and having
one day ſtated the Cafe before fom of his Friends, who feem'd to ap-
prove of it; yes, fays he, I could wish he had but half ſo good a Ti-
tle to the Crown. And 'tis known that fome Speeches of Sir WAL-
TER RAWLEY, too generous and Engliſh for the times, was that
which brought him to Trial and Condemnation for a feign'd Crime
and afterwards fo facilitated that barbarous Deſign of GUNDAMar,
to cut off his Head for a Crime, for which he was condemn'd fourteen
years before, and which by the Commiffions he after receiv'd (ac-
cording to the opinion of the then Lord Chancellor, and the greateſt
Lawyers) was in Law pardon'd.
;
THIS may appear befides our purpoſe, but we could not ſever
this confideration, unlefs we would draw him with a half-face, and
leave as much in umbrage as we expreft. That which moft folem-
niz'd his Perſon was, firft the confideration of his adhering to the Pro-
teſtant Religion; wheras we are to confider that thofe flight Velita-
tions he had with BELLARMIN and the Romanifts, tended rather to
make his own Authority more intrinſically intenſe and venerable, than
to confute any thing they faid: for he had before fhak'd them off as
to foren Jurifdiction; and for matter of Popery, it appear'd in his lat-
ter time that he was no fuch enemy to it, both by his own compliances
with the Spaniſh Embaffadors, the defign of the Spanish Match (in
which his Son was perfonally imbarkt) and the flow affiftances fent to
his Daughter, in whoſe ſafety and protection Proteſtantiſm was at that
time fo much concern'd.
FOR his Knowlege, he had fome glancings and niblings, which
the Severity of the excellent BUCHANAN forc'd into him in his
younger time, and after converfation fomwhat poliſh'd. But tho I
bear not fo great a contemt to his other Works, as BEN JOHNSON
did to his poetry, yet if they among many others were going to the
fire, they would not be one of the firſt I ſhould reſcue, as poffiby ex-
pecting a more ſevere and refin'd Judgment in many others; and know-
ing that he that had fo many able Wits at command, might eafily give
their Oracles thro his mouth. But fuppofe the things generous and fit
to live (as I am not yet convinc'd) yet what condemnation is this to
a King, who ſhould have other buſineſs than ſpinning and weaving fine
Theorys, and engaging in School Chiquaneries? which was well un
I
derſtood
Reaſons of Monarchy.
31
derſtood by HENRY the Fourth, who hearing fom men celebrat him
with thefe Attributes; yes (anfwer'd he, very tartly) He is a fine King,
and writes little Books.
'TIS true, he was a good Drol, and poffibly after Greec Wine
fomwhat factious: But of his fubftantial and heroic Wiſdom I have
not heard any great Inftances. He himself us'd to brag of his King-
craft, which was not to render his People happy, and to profecute the
ends of a good King, but to fcrue up the Prerogative, divert Parla-
ments from the due difquifition and proſecution of their Freedoms, and
to break them up at pleaſure; and indeed his parting with the Cautio-
nary Towns of the Low Countrys, and that for ſo ſmall a Sum, fhew'd
him a Perſon not fo quickfighted, or unfit to be overreach'd.
FOR his peaceable Reign, honourable and juſt Quarrels he wanted
not; but floth and cowardice witheld him and indeed the eaſe and
luxury of thoſe times fomented and nouriſh'd thoſe lurking and pef-
tilent humours, which afterwards fo dangerouſly broke out in his Son's
Reign.
WE ſhall not trouble his Aſhes with the mention of his perfonal
Faults; only, if we may compare God's Judgments with apparent
Sins, we may find the latter end of his Life neither fortunat nor com-
fortable to him. His Wife diftafted by him, and fom fay, languifhing
of a foul diſeaſe; his eldeſt Son dying with too violent fymtoms of
Poiſon, and that, as is fear'd, by a hand too much ally'd; his fecond
(against whom he ever had a fecret antipathy) fcarce return'd from a
mad and dangerous Voyage; his Daughter (all that was left of that
Sex) baniſh'd, with her numerous Iffue, out of her Hufband's Do-
minion, and living in miferable Exile; and laftly, himſelf dying of a
violent death by poiſon, in which his Son was more than fufpected to
have a hand, as may be infer'd from BUCKINGHAM'S Plea, that
he did it by the Command of the Prince, and CHARLES's diffolu-
tion of the Parlament that took in hand to examin it; and laſtly his
indifferency at Buckingham's death (tho he pretended all love to him
alive) as glad to be rid of ſo dangerous and fo confiderable a Partner
of his Guilt. Yet the miter'd Parafits of thoſe times could fay, that
one went to Heaven in Noah's Ark, the other in Elifba's Chariot, he
dying of a pretended Fever, fhe (as they faid) of a Dropfy.
CHARLES having now obtain'd his Brother's Inheritance, car-
ry'd himſelf in managing of it like one that gain'd it as he did. The
firſt of his Acts was that glorious attemt upon the Ile of Rhee. The
next, that Noble and Chriftian betraying of Rochel, and confequently
in a manner the whole Proteftant Intereſt in France. The middle of
the Reign was heightening of Prerogative and Prelacy, and conform-
ing our Churches to the pattern of Rome; till at laſt juſt Indignation
brought his Subjects of Scotland into England, and fo forc'd him to
call a Parlament: which tho he fhameleſly ſays in the firſt line of the
Book, call'd his, was out of his own inclination to Parlaments, yet how
well he lik'd them, may appear by his firſt tampering with his own
Army in the North, to furprize and diffolve them; then with the
Scots, who at that time were Court proof; then raifing up the Irish
Rebellion, which has wafted millions of Lives; and laftly, his open
feceffion from Westminster, and hoftility againſt the two Houſes, which
maintain❜d a firſt and ſecond ſharp War, that had almoſt ruin'd the
Nation, had not Providence in a manner immediatly interpos'd and
2
refcu'd
1Q9.
32
The Grounds, &c.
II0.
reſcu'd us to Liberty, and made us ſuch ſignal Inſtruments of his Ven-
geance, that all wicked Kings may tremble at the example.
IN a word, never was Man ſo reſolute and obftinat in a Tyranny;
never People more ftrangely befotted with it. To paint the Image of
DAVID with his face, and blafphemously to parallel him with
CHRIST, would make one at firſt thought think him a Saint: But
to compare his Proteftations and Actions; his Actions of the Day, his
Actions of the Night; his Proteftant Religion, and his courting of
the Pope; and obedience to his Wife; we may juftly fay, he was one
of the moſt confummat in the Arts of Tyranny that ever was.
And
it could be no other than God's hand that arreſted him in the height of
his Defigns and Greatnefs, and cut off him and his Family, making
good his own Imprecations on his own Head.
OUR Scene is again in Scotland, which has accepted his Son, whom
for diftinction fake we will be content to call CHARLES the Second,
Certainly theſe People were ſtrangely blind as to God's Judgments per-
petually pour'd out upon a Family; or elfe wonderfully addicted to
their own Intereft, to admit the ſpray of ſuch a ſtock; one that has
fo little to commend him, and fo great improbability to further their
Defigns and Happineſs; a Popiſh Education, if not Religion too,
however for the prefent he may ſeem to diffemble it; France, the Je-
fuits, and his Mother, good means of fuch an improvement; the dan-
gerous Maxims of his Father, befides the Revenge he ows his Death,
of which he will never totally acquit the Scots; his Hate to the whole
Nation; his Senfe of MONTROSE'S Death; his backwardneſs to
com to them till all other means fail'd (both his foren beg'd Affiftan-
ces, his Propofitions to the Pope, and Commiffions to MONTROSE)
and laftly, his late running away to his old Friends in the North: fo
that any man may fee his prefent compliance to be but hiftrionical and
forc'd, and that as foon as he has led them into the Snare, and got
power into his own hands, fo as that he may appear once more bare-
fac'd, be will be a fcourge upon them for their grofs Hypocrify, and
leave them a fad Inftance to all Nations, how dangerous it is to efpouſe
ſuch an Intereſt, againſt which God with ſo viſible and ſevere a hand
dos fight, carry'd on by and for the ſupport of a tyrannizing Nobility
and Clergy, and wherin the poor People are blindly led on by thoſe
afrighting (but falfe and ungrounded) pretenfions of Perfidy and Per-
jury, and made inftrumental with their own Eftates and Blood to-
wards inflaving and ruining themſelves.
THE
1
THE
COMMONWEALTH
O F
OCEAN A.
To his HIGHNESS
The Lord Protector of the Common-
wealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland.
1
Quid rides? mutato nomine, de te
Fabula narratur.
HORAT.
F
34
Pliny's De-
fcription of
Oceana.
The Nature of
the People.
The Introduction, or Order of the Work.
O
CEANA is faluted by the Panegyrift after this manner; O
the most bleft and fortunat of all Countrys, OCEANA!
How defervedly has Nature with the bountys of Heaven and
Earth indu'd thee? Thy ever-fruitful Womb not clos'd with
Ice, nor diffolv'd by the raging Star; where CERES and BACCHUS
are perpetual Twins. Thy Woods are not the harbor of devouring Beafts,
nor thy continual Verdure the ambush of Serpents, but the food of innu-
merable Herds and Flocks preſenting thee their Shepherdefs with diftended
Dugs, or golden Fleeces. The wings of thy Night involve thee not in
the horror of darkness, but have still fom white feather; and thy day is
(that for which we efteem Life) the longeft. But this Extafy of PLINY
as is obferv'd by BERTIUS) feems to allude as well to Marpefia and
Panopea, now Provinces of this Commonwealth, as to Oceana it ſelf.
TO ſpeak of the People in each of thefe Countrys, this of Oceana, for
fo foft a one, is the moſt martial in the whole world. Let States that
aim at Greatness (fays VERULAMIUS) take heed how their Nobility
and Gentlemen multiply too fast, for that makes the common Subject grow to
be a Peaſant and bafe Swain driven out of heart, and in effect but a Gentle-
man's Laborer; just as you may fee in Coppice Woods, if you leave the
Staddels too thick, you fhall never have clean Underwood, but Shrubs and
Bushes: So in Countrys, if the Gentlemen be too many, the Commons will
be baſe; and you will bring it to that at last, that not the hundredth Poll
will be fit for a Helmet, fpecially as to the Infantry, which is the nerve of
an Army, and fo there will be great Population and little Strength. This
of which I speak has bin no where better feen than by comparing of Oceana
and France, wherof Oceana, tho far lefs in Territory and Population,
has bin nevertheless an overmatch, in regard the middle People of Oceana
make good Soldiers, which the Peasants in France do not. In which words
VERULAMIUS (as MACHIAVEL has don before him) harps much
upon a ftring which he has not perfectly tun'd, and that is the
balance of Dominion or Property: as it follows more plainly in his praiſe
of the profound and admirable device of PANURGUS King of Oceana,
in making Farms and Houſes of Huſbandry of a Standard; that is, main-
tain'd with fuch a proportion of Land to them, as may breed a Subject to
live in convenient plenty, and no fervil condition, and to keep the Plow in
the hand of the owners, and not mere hirelings. And thus indeed (fays
he) you shall attain to VIRGIL's Character which he gives of antient
Italy.
BUT the Tillage bringing up a good Soldiery, brings up a good
Commonwealth; which the Author in the praife of PANURGUS did
not mind, nor PANURGUS in deferving that praiſe: for where the
owner of the Plow coms to have the Sword too, he will ufe it in de-
fence of his own; whence it has happen'd that the People of Oceana in
proportion to their property have bin always free. And the Genius of
$
Terra potens armis atque ubere gleba,
this
The Introduction.
35
this Nation has ever had fom reſemblance with that of antient Italy,`
which was wholly addicted to Commonwealths, and where Rome
came to make the greateſt account of her ruftic Tribes, and to call
her Confuls from the Plow; for in the way of Parlaments, which
was the Government of this Realm, men of Country-lives have bin ſtill
intruſted with the greateſt Affairs, and the People have conſtantly had
an averfion to the ways of the Court. Ambition loving to be gay,
and to fawn, has bin a Gallantry look'd upon as having fomthing in it
of the Livery; and Huſbandry, or the country way of Life, tho of a
groffer fpinning, as the beſt ſtuf of a Commonwealth, according to
ARISTOTLE, fuch a one being the moſt obftinat Affertreſs of her
Liberty, and the leaft fubject to Innovation or Turbulency. Wher-
fore till the Foundations (as will be hereafter fhew'd) were re-
mov'd, this People was obſerv'd to be the leaſt ſubject to Shakings and
Turbulency of any: Wheras Commonwealths, upon which the City
Life has had the ftronger influence, as Athens, have feldom or never
bin quiet; but at the beſt are found to have injur'd their own buſineſs
by over-doing it. Whence the Urban Tribes of Rome, confifting of
the Turba forenfis, and Libertins that had receiv'd their Freedom by
manumiffion, were of no reputation in compariſon of the Ruftics. It
is true, that with Venice it may ſeem to be otherwiſe, in regard the
Gentlemen (for fo are all fuch call'd as have a right to that Govern-
ment) are wholly addicted to the City Life: but then the Turba foren-
fis, the Secretarys, Cittadini, with the reft of the Populace, are whol-
ly excluded. Otherwiſe a Commonwealth, confifting but of one
City, would doubtlefs be ftormy, in regard that Ambition would be
every man's trade: but where it confifts of a Country, the Plow in
the hands of the owner finds him a better calling, and produces the
moſt innocent and fteddy Genius of a Commonwealth, fuch as is that
of Oceana.
MARPESIA, being the Northern part of the fame Iland, is The Nature of
the Marpes
the dry Nurſe of a populous and hardy Nation, but where the Stad- fans.
dels have bin formerly too thick: whence their Courage anfwer'd not
their hardineſs, except in the Nobility, who govern'd that Country
much after the manner of Poland; but that the King was not elective
till the People receiv'd their Liberty, the yoke of the Nobility being
broke by the Commonwealth of Oceana, which in grateful return is
therby provided with an inexhaustible Magazin of Auxiliarys.
;
PAÑOPEA, the foft Mother of a flothful and pufillanimous Peo-The Nature of
ple, is a neighbor Iland, antiently fubjected by the Arms of Oceana ; the Panopeans:
fince almoſt depopulated for fhaking the Yoke, and at length replant-
ed with a new Race. But (thro what virtues of the Soil, or vice
of the Air foever it be) they com ſtill to degenerat. Wherfore feeing
it is neither likely to yield men fit for Arms, nor neceffary it ſhould
it had bin the Intereft of Oceana ſo to have difpos'd of this Province,
being both rich in the nature of the Soil, and full of commodious
Ports for Trade, that it might have bin order'd for the beſt in rela-
tion to her Purſe: which in my opinion (if it had bin thought upon
in time) might have bin beft don by planting it with Jews, allowing
them their own Rites and Laws; for that would have brought them
fuddenly from all parts of the World, and in fufficient numbers.
And tho the Jews be now altogether for Merchandize, yet in the Land
of Canaan (except fince their exile from whence they have not bin
F 2
Land-
36
The Introduction.
Landlords) they were altogether for Agriculture and there is no
cauſe why a man fhould doubt, but having a fruitful Country, and
excellent Ports too, they would be good at both. Panopea well peo-
pled, would be worth a matter of four millions dry rents; that is, be-
fides the advantage of the Agriculture and Trade, which, with a Na-
tion of that Induftry, coms at leaſt to as much more. Wherfore
Panopea being farm'd out to the Jews and their Heirs for ever, for the
pay of a provincial Army to protect them during the term of feven
years, and for two Millions annual Revenue from that time forward,
befides the Cuſtoms which would pay the provincial Army, would
have bin a bargain of fuch advantage, both to them and this Com-
monwealth, as is not to be found otherwiſe by either. To receive.
the Jews after any other manner intò a Commonwealth, were to maim
it for they of all Nations never incorporat, but taking up the room
of a Limb, are of no uſe or office to the body, while they fuck the
nouriſhment which would ſuſtain a natural and uſeful Member.
IF Panopea had bin fo difpos'd of, that Knapfack, with the Marpe-
fian Auxiliary, had bin an ineſtimable Treaſure; the Situation of theſe
Countrys being Ilands (as appears by Venice how advantageous fuch a
one is to the like Government) ſeems to have bin defign'd by God for a
Commonwealth. And yet that, thro the ftreitnefs of the place and
The Situation defect of proper Arms, can be no more than a Commonwealth for
of the Common- Prefervation: wheras this, reduc'd to the like Government, is a
awealth of
Commonwealth for increaſe, and upon the mightieft foundation that
any has bin laid from the beginning of the World to this day.
Oceana.
Illam ar&tâ capiens Neptunus compede ftringit :
Hanc autem glaucis captus complectitur ulnis.
THE Sea gives law to the growth of Venice, but the growth of
Oceana gives law to the Sea.
THESE Countrys having bin antiently diftinct and hoftil King-
doms, came by MORPHEUS the Marpefian (who fucceded by heredi-
tary right to the Crown of Oceana) not only to be join'd under one
head; but to be caft, as it were by a charm, into that profound fleep,
which, broken at length by the Trumpet of Civil War, has produc'd
thoſe effects, that have given occafion to the infuing Diſcourſe, divi-
ded into four parts.
•
4
37
1. The Preliminarys, fhewing the Principles
of Government.
2. The Council of Legiſlators, fhewing the Art
of making a Commonwealth.
3. The Model of the Commonwealth of Oceana,
Shewing the effect of ſuch an Art.
4. The Corollary, fhewing fom Confequences of
Such a Government.
The Preliminarys, ſhewing the Principles of
Government.
J
ANOTTI, the moſt excellent Deſcriber of the Commonwealth
of Venice, divides the whole Series of Government into two Times
or Periods. The one ending with the Liberty of Rome, which
was the Courſe or Empire, as I may call it, of Antient Prudence,
firſt diſcover'd to mankind by GoD himſelf in the Fabric of the
Commonwealth of Ifrael, and afterwards pick'd out of his Footſteps in
Nature, and unanimouſly follow'd by the Greecs and Romans. The
other beginning with the Arms of CESAR, which, extinguiſhing
Liberty, were the Tranfition of Antient into Modern Prudence, intro-
duc'd by thoſe Inundations of Huns, Goths, Vandals, Lombards, Sax-
ons, which, breaking the Roman Empire, deform'd the whole face of
the World with thofe ill features of Government, which at this time
are becom far worfe in theſe weſtern parts, except Venice, which e-
fcaping the hands of the Barbarians, by virtue of its impregnable
Situation, has had its ey fix'd upon antient Prudence, and is attain'd to
a perfection even beyond the Copy.
RELATION being had to theſe two times, Government (to Definitions of
define it de jure, or according to antient Prudence) is an Art wherby Government.
a Civil Society of Men is inftituted and preferv'd upon the Foundation
of common Right or Intereft; or (to follow ARISTOTLE and
LIVY) It is the Empire of Laws, and not of Men.
AND Government (to define it de facto, or according to modern
Prudence) is an Art wherby fom man, or fom few men, ſubject a
City or a Nation, and rule it according to his or their privat Intereſt:
which, becauſe the Laws in fuch cafes are made according to the in-
tereſt of a man, or of fom few Familys, may be faid to be the Em
pire of Men, and not of Laws:
THE
33
OCEAN A.
THE former kind is that which MACHIAVEL (whofe Books
are neglected) is the only Politician that has gon about to retrieve; and
Pag. 180.
that LEVIATHAN (who would have his Book impos'd upon the
Pag. 377. Univerſitys) gos about to deftroy. For, It is (fays he) another Er-
ror of ARISTOTLE'S Politics, that in a well-order'd Commonwealth not
Men fhould govern, but the Laws. What man that has his natural fenfes,
tho he can neither write nor read, dos not find himfelf govern'd by them he
fears, and believes can kill or hurt him when he obeys not? Or, who believes
that the Law can hurt him, which is but Words and Paper, without the
Hands and Swords of men? I confefs, that * the Magiftrat upon his Bench
is that to the Law, which a Gunner upon his Platform is to his Can-
non.. Nevertheleſs, I ſhould not dare to argue with a man of any In-
genuity after this manner. A whole Army, tho they can neither
write nor read, are not afraid of a Platform, which they know is but
Earth or Stone; nor of a Cannon, which without a hand to give fire
to it, is but cold Iron; therfore a whole Army is afraid of one man.
But of this kind is the Ratiocination of LEVIATHAN (as I fhall
fhew in divers places that com in my way) throout his whole Politics,
or worſe; as where he fays of ARISTOTLE and of CICERO, of the
Greecs, and of the Romans, who liv'd under popular States, that they de-
riv'd thoſe Rights not from the Principles of Nature, but tranfcrib'd them
into their Books, out of the practice of their own Commonwealths, as Gram-
marians deſcribe the Rules of Language out of Poets. Which is as if a
man ſhould tell famous HERVY, that he tranſcrib'd his Circulation of
the Blood not out of the Principles of Nature, but out of the Anatomy
of this or that Body.
Pag. 111.
Divifion of
Government.
TO go on therefore with his preliminary Diſcourſe, I ſhall divide it
(according to the two definitions of Government relating to JANOT-
TI's two times) into two parts. The Firft treating of the Principles
of Government in general, and according to the Antients: The Second
treating of the late Governments of Oceana in particular, and in that
of modern Prudence.
go-
GOVERNMENT, according to the Antients, and their
learn'd Diſciple MACHIAVEL, the only Politician of later Ages,
is of three kinds; The Government of One Man, or of the Better
fort, or of the whole People: which by their more learn'd Names are
call'd Monarchy, Ariftocracy, and Democracy. Thefe they hold, thro
their proneness to degenerat, to be all evil. For wheras they that
vern ſhould
govern according to Reaſon, if they govern according to
Paffion, they do that which they ſhould not do. Wherfore as Reaſon
and Paffion are two things, fo Government by Reaſon is one thing,
and the corruption of Government by Paffion is another thing, but
not always another Government: as a Body that is alive is one
thing, and a Body that is dead is another thing, but not always ano-
ther Creature, tho the Corruption of one coms at length to be the
Generation of another. The Corruption then of Monarchy is call'd
Tyranny; that of Ariftocracy, Oligarchy; and that of Democracy,
Anarchy. But Legiſlators having found theſe three Governments at
the beſt to be naught, have invented another confifting of a mix-
ture of them all, which only is good. This is the Doctrin of the
Antients.
Magiſtratus eft lex armata.
BUT
OCEAN A.
39
BUT LEVIATHAN is pofitive, that they are all deceiv'd, and
that there is no other Government in Nature than one of the three; as
alſo that the Fleſh of them cannot ftink, the names of their Corrup-
tions being but the names of mens Phanfies, which will be understood
when we are ſhown which of them was Senatus Populufque Romanus.
Fortune
TO go my own way, and yet to follow the Ancients, the Principles
of Government are twofold; Internal, or the goods of the Mind;
and External, or the goods of Fortune. The goods of the Mind are Goods of the
natural or acquir'd Virtues, as Wiſdom, Prudence, and Courage, &c. Mind and of
The goods of Fortune are Riches. There be goods alſo of the Body,
as Health, Beauty, Strength; but theſe are not to be brought into ac-
count, upon this ſcore, becauſe if a Man or an Army acquires Victory
or Empire, it is more from their Diſciplin, Arms, and Courage, than
from their natural Health, Beauty, or Strength, in regard that a Peo-
ple conquer'd may have more of natural Strength, Beauty and Health,
and yet find little remedy. The Principles of Government then are in
the goods of the Mind, or in the goods of Fortune. To the goods of Empire and
the Mind anſwers authority; to the goods of Fortune, Power or Em-
Author:ty
pire. Wherfore LEVIATHAN, tho he be right where he fays that
Riches are Power, is miſtaken where he fays that Prudence, or the repu-
tation of Prudence, is Power: for the Learning or Prudence of a Man
is no more Power than the Learning or Prudence of a Book or Author,
which is properly Authority. A learned Writer may have Authority
tho he has no Power; and a fooliſh Magiftrat may have Power, tho
he has otherwiſe no Efteem or Authority. The difference of theſe
two is obferv'd by LIvy in EVANDER, of whom he fays, * that
he govern'd rather by the Authority of others, than by his own
Power.
TO begin with Riches, in regard that Men are hung upon theſe, Empire.
not of choice as upon the other, but of neceffity and by the teeth :
for as much as he who wants Bread, is his Servant that will feed him;
if a Man thus feeds a whole People, they are under his Empire.
EMPIRE is of two kinds, Domeſtic and National, or Foren and Divifion of
Provincial.
DOMESTIC Empire is founded upon Dominion.
Empire.
Domestic Em-
Dominion.
DOMINION is Property real or perfonal, that is to fay, in pie.
Lands, or in Mony and Goods.
LANDS, or the parts and parcels of a Territory, are held by Balance in
the Proprietor or Proprietors, Lord or Lords of it, in fom proportion; Lands.
and fuch (except it be in a City that has little or no Land, and whoſe
Revenue is in Trade) as is the proportion or balance of Dominion or
Property in Land, fuch is the nature of the Empire,
narchy.
IF one Man be fole Landlord of a Territory, or overbalance Abfolute Mo-
the People, for example three parts in four, he is Grand Signior: for
fo the Turk is call'd from his Property; and his Empire is abſolute
Monarchy.
IF the Few or a Nobility, or a Nobility with the Clergy be Land- Mix'd Mo
lords, or overbalance the People to the like proportion, it makes the
narchy.
Gothic balance (to be fhewn at large in the ſecond part of this Dif-
courfe) and the Empire is mix'd Monarchy, as that of Spain, Poland,
and late of Oceana.
*Regebat magis Autoritate quam Imperio.
!
AND
40
OCEAN A.
Popular Go-
vernment.
Tyranny.
Oligarchy.
Anarchy.
Balanı in
Mony.
AND if the whole People be Landlords, or hold the Lands fo
divided among them, that no one Man, or number of Men, within
the compaſs of the Few or Ariftocracy, overbalance them, the Empire
(without the interpofition of Force) is a Commonwealth.
IF Force be interpos'd in any of theſe three cafes, it muſt either
frame the Government to the Foundation, or the Foundation to the
Government; or holding the Government not according to the balance,
it is not natural, but violent: and therfore if it be at the devotion of
a Prince, it is Tyranny; if at the devotion of the Few, Oligarchy; or
if in the power of the People Anarchy. Each of which Confufions,
the balance ſtanding otherwife, is but of fhort continuance, becauſe
againſt the nature of the balance, which, not deſtroy'd, deſtroys that
which oppoſes it.
BUT there be certain other Confufions, which, being rooted in
the balance, are of longer continuance, and of worfe confequence; as
firſt, where a Nobility holds half the Property, or about that pro-
portion, and the People the other half; in which cafe, without altering
the balance, there is no remedy but the one muſt eat out the other: as
the People did the Nobility in Athens, and the Nobility the People in
Rome. Secondly, when a Prince holds about half the Dominion, and
the People the other half (which was the cafe of the Roman Empe-
rors, planted partly upon their military Colonies, and partly upon the
Senat and the People) the Government becoms a very ſhambles both
of the Princes and the People. Somwhat of this nature are certain
Governments at this day, which are ſaid to fubfift by confuſion. In
this cafe, to fix the balance, is to entail miſery: but in the three for-
mer, not to fix it, is to lofe the Government. Wherfore it being un-
lawful in Turky, that any ſhould poffefs Land but the Grand Signior,
the balance is fix'd by the Law, and that Empire firm. Nor, tho the
Kings often fell, was the Throne of Oceana known to ſhake, until
the Statute of Alienations broke the Pillars, by giving way to the No-
bility to fell their Eſtates. * While Lacedemon held to the divifion of
Land made by LYCURGUS, it was immoveable, but, breaking that,
could ſtand no longer. This kind of Law fixing the balance in Lands
is call'd Agrarian, and was firft introduc'd by God himſelf, who di-
vided the Land of Canaan to his People by Lots, and is of fuch virtue,
that wherever it has held, that Government has not alter'd, except by
confent; as in that unparallel'd example of the People of Ifrael, when
being in liberty they would needs chufe a King. But without an
Agrarian, Government, whether Monarchical, Ariftocratical, or Popu-
lar, has no long Leaſe.
AS for Dominion perfonal or in Mony, it may now and then ſtir
up a MELIUS or a MANLIUS, which, if the Commonwealth be
not provided with fom kind of Dictatorian Power, may be dangerous,
tho it has bin feldom or never fuccefsful: becauſe to Property produ-
cing Empire, it is requir'd that it should have fom certain root or
foot-hold, which, except in Land, it cannot have, being otherwiſe as
it were upon the Wing.
NEVERTHELESS, in fuch Cities as fubfift moſtly by Trade,
and have little or no Land, as Holland and Genoa, the balance of Trea-
fure may be equal to that of Land in the cafes mention'd.
* Si terra recedat, Icnium Egeo frangit mare.
BUT
3
OCEAN A.
41
}
龌
​BUT LEVIATHAN, tho he feems to fcew at Antiquity, follow-
ing his furious Mafter CARNEADES, has caught hold of the public
Sword, to which he reduces all manner and matter of Government;
as, where he affirms this opinion [that any Monarch receives his Power Pag. 89.
by Covenant, that is to fay, upon conditions] to procede from the not un-
derstanding this eaſy truth, That Covenants being but Words and Breath,
have no power to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any Man, but what
they have from the public Sword. But as he ſaid of the Law, that with-
out this Sword it is but Paper; fo he might have thought of this
Sword, that without a Hand it is but cold Iron. The Hand which
holds this Sword is the Militia of a Nation; and the Militia of a Na-
tion is either an Army in the field, or ready for the field upon occafion.
But an Army is a Beaft that has a great belly, and muft be fed;
wherfore this will com to what Paſtures you have, and what Paſtures
you have will com to the balance of Property, without which the pub-
lic Sword is but a name or mere fpitfrog. Wherfore to fet that which
LEVIATHAN fays of Arms and of Contracts a little ftreighter; he Arms and
that can graze this Beaft with the great belly, as the Turk does his Contracts.
Timariots, may
well deride him that imagines he receiv'd his Power by
Covenant, or is oblig'd to any fuch toy: it being in this caſe only that
Covenants are but Words and Breath. But if the Property of the
Nobility, ſtock'd with their Tenants and Retainers, be the paſture of
that Beaſt, the Ox knows his Maſter's Crib; and it is impoffible for a
King in fuch a Conſtitution to reign otherwiſe than by Covenant; or
if he breaks it, it is words that com to blows.
BUT fays he, when an Affembly of Men is made Soverain, then no Pag. 90.
Man imagins any fuch Covenant to have paft in the Inftitution. But what
was that by PUBLICOLA of appeal to the People, or that wher-
by the People had their Tribuns? Fy, fays he, no body is fo dull as to
Say, that the People of Rome made a Covenant with the Romans, to bold
the Soverainty on fuch or fuch conditions; which not perform'd, the Ro-
mans might depofe the Roman People. In which there be ſeveral re-
markable things; for he holds the Commonwealth of Rome to have
confifted of one Affembly, wheras it confifted of the Senat and the
People; That they were not upon Covenant, wheras every Law en-
acted by them was a Covenant between them; That the one Affembly
was made Soverain, wheras the People who only were Soverain, were
fuch from the beginning, as appears by the antient ftile of their Co-
venants or Laws, * The Senat has refolv'd, the People have decreed ;
That a Council being made Soverain, cannot be made fuch upon con-
ditions, whereas the Decemvirs being a Council that was made Sove-
rain, was made fuch upon conditions; That all Conditions or Cove-
nants making a Soverain, the Soverain being made, are void; whence Pag. 89
it muſt follow that, the Decemviri being made, were ever after the
lawful Government of Rome, and that it was unlawful for the Com-
monwealth of Rome to depofe the Decemvirs; as alſo that CICERO,
if he wrote otherwiſe out of his Commonwealth, did not write out
of Nature. But to com to others that ſee more of this balance.
YOU have ARISTOTLE full of it in divers places, eſpecially B.5, 3. 3, 9.
where he ſays, that immoderat Wealth,as where One Man or the Few have
greater Poffeffions than the Equality or the Frame of the Commonwealth
*Cenfuere patres, juffit populus.
G
will
42
OCEAN A.
1
D.B. 1. c. 55.
The right of
the Militia
fated.
will bear, is an occafion of Sedition, which ends for the greater part in
Monarchy; and that for this cauſe the Oftracism has bin receiv'd in divers
places, as in Argos and Athens. But that it were better to prevent the
growth in the beginning, than, when it has got head, to feek the remedy of
fuch an evil.
The Balance of
MACHIAVEL has mifs'd it very narrowly and more danger-
ouſly; for not fully perceiving that if a Commonwealth be gall'd by the
Gentry, it is by their overbalance, he fpeaks of the Gentry as hoftil
to popular Governments, and of popular Governments as hoftil to the
Gentry; and makes us believe that the People in fuch are fo inrag'd
againſt them, that where they meet a Gentleman they kill him: which
can never be prov'd by any one example, unlefs in civil War; fecing
that even in Switzerland the Gentry are not only fafe, but in honor.
But the Balance, as I have laid it down, tho unfeen by MACHI-
AVEL, is that which interprets him, and that which he confirms by his
Judgment in many others as well as in this place, where he concludes,
That he who will go about to make a Commonwealth where there be many
Gentlemen, unless he first deftroys them, undertakes an Impoffibility. And
that he who goes about to introduce Monarchy where the condition of the
People is equal, fhall never bring it to pass, unless he cull out fuch of them
as are the most turbulent and ambitious, and make them Gentlemen or No-
blemen, not in name but in effect; that is, by inriching them with Lands,
Caftles, and Treafures, that may gain them Power among the rest, and
bring in the rest to dependence upon themselves, to the end that they main-
taining their Ambition by the Prince, the Prince may maintain his Power
by them.
WHERFORE as in this place I agree with MACHIAVEL,
that a Nobility or Gentry, overbalancing a popular Government, is
the utter bane and deftruction of it; fo I fhall fhew in another, that a
Nobility or Gentry, in a popular Government, not overbalancing it,
is the very life and foul of it.
BY what has bin faid, it ſhould ſeem that we may lay afide further
diſputes of the public Sword, or of the right of the Militia; which,
be the Government what it will, or let it change how it can, is infepa-
rable from the overbalance in Dominion: nor, if otherwiſe ſtated by
the Law or Cuſtom (as in the Commonwealth of Rome*, where the
People having the Sword, the Nobility came to have the overbalance)
avails it to any other end than deftruction. For as a Building fwaying
from the Foundation muſt fall, fo it fares with the Law fwaying from
Reaſon, and the Militia from the balance of Dominion. And thus
much for the balance of National or Domeſtic Empire, which is in
Dominion,
THE balance of Foren or Provincial Empire is of a contrary na-
foren Empire. ture. A man may as well fay, that it is unlawful for him who has
made a fair and honeſt purchaſe to have Tenants, as for a Government
that has made a juft progrefs, and inlargement of it felf, to have Pro-
vinces. But how a Province may be justly acquir'd, appertains to ano-
ther place. In this I am to fhew no more than how or upon what
kind of balance it is to be held; in order wherto I fhall firſt ſhew upon
what kind of balance it is not to be held. It has bin faid, that nati-
onal or independent Empire, of what kind foever, is to be exercis'd
* Confules fine lege Curiata rem militarem attingere non potuerunt.
by
OCEAN A.
43
;
by them that have the proper balance of Dominion in the Nation
wherfore provincial or dependent Empire is not to be exercis'd by them
that have the balance of Dominion in the Province, becaufe that would
bring the Government from Provincial and Dependent, to National
and Independent. Abfolute Monarchy, as that of the Turks, neither
plants its People at home nor abroad, otherwiſe than as Tenants for
life or at will; wherfore its National and Provincial Government is all
one. But in Governments that admit the Citizen or Subject to Domi-
nion in Lands, the richest are they that ſhare moſt of the Power at
home; wheras the richest among the Provincials, tho native Subjects,
or Citizens that have bin tranſplanted, are leaft admitted to the Go-
vernment abroad; for men, like flowers or roots being tranſplanted,
take after the Soil wherin they grow. Wherfore the Commonwealth
of Rome, by planting Colonys of its Citizens within the bounds of
Italy, took the beſt way of propagating itſelf, and naturalizing the
Country; whereas if it had planted fuch Colonys without the bounds
of Italy, it would have alienated the Citizens, and given a root to Li-
berty abroad, that might have fprung up foren, or favage, and hoftil
to her wherfore it never made any fuch difperfion of itſelf and its
ftrength, till it was under the yoke of the Emperors, who diſburden-
ing themſelves of the People, as having lefs apprehenfion of what they
could do abroad than at home, took a contrary courſe.
THE Mamalucs (which till any man fhew me the contrary, I fhall
prefume to have bin a Commonwealth confifting of an Army, wherof
the common Soldier was the People, the Commiffion Officer the Senat,
and the General the Prince) were Foreners, and by Nation Circaffians,
that govern'd Egypt; wherfore theſe never durft plant themſelves up-
on Dominion, which growing naturally up into the National Intereft,
muſt have diffolv'd the foren yoke in that Province.
THE like in fome fort may be faid of Venice,the Government wherof
is uſually miſtaken: for Venice, tho it dos not take in the People, ne-
ver excluded them. This Commonwealth, the Orders wherof are the
moſt Democratical or Popular of all others, in regard of the exquifit
Rotation of the Senat, at the firſt inſtitution took in the whole People;
they that now live under the Government without participation of it,
are fuch as have fince either voluntarily chofen fo to do, or were fub-
du'd by Arms. Wherfore the Subject of Venice is govern'd by Pro-
vinces; and the balance of Dominion not ſtanding, as has bin faid,
with Provincial Government: As the Mamalucs durft not caft their
Government upon this balance in their Provinces, left the National In-
tereſt ſhould have rooted out the Foren; ſo neither dare the Venetians
take in their Subjects upon this balance, left the foren Intereft ſhould
root out the National (which is that of the 3000 now governing) and
by diffuſing the Commonwealth throout her Territorys, lofe the ad-
vantage of her Situation, by which in great part it fubfifts. And fuch
alſo is the Government of the Spaniard in the Indies, to which he de-
putes Natives of his own Country, not admitting the Creolios to the
Government of thofe Provinces, tho defcended from Spaniards.
BUT if a Prince or a Commonwealth may hold a Territory that is
foren in this, it may be afk'd, why he may not hold one that is native
in the like manner? To which I anfwer, becaufe he can hold a foren
by a native Territory, but not a native by a foren: and as hitherto I
have fhewn what is not the provincial Balance, fo by this anfwer it
G 2
may
44
OCEAN A.
Authority.
Tacit.
Grot.
may appear what it is, namely the Overbalance of a native Territory
to a foren; for as one Country balances itſelf by the diftribution of
Property according to the proportion of the fame, fo one Country over-
balances another by advantage of divers kinds. For example, the
Commonwealth of Rome overbalanc'd her Provinces by the vigor of a
more excellent Government oppos'd to a crazier, or by a more exqui-
fit Militia oppos'd to one inferior in Courage or Difciplin. The like
was that of the Mamalucs, being a hardy People, to the Egyptians that
were a foft one. And the balance of Situation is in this kind of won-
derful effect; feeing the King of Denmark, being none of the moſt
potent Princes, is able at the Sound to take Toll of the greateſt: and as
this King by the advantage of the Land can make the Sea tributary;
fo Venice, by the advantage of the Sea, in whofe arms fhe is impreg-
nable, can make the Land to feed her Gulf. For the Colonys in the
Indies, they are yet Babes that cannot live without fucking the breafts
of their Mother Citys, but fuch as I miſtake if when they com of
age they do not wean themſelves: which cauſes me to wonder at Prin-
ces that delight to be exhauſted in that way. And ſo much for the
principles of Power, whether National or Provincial, Domeſtic or Fo-
ren; being ſuch as are external, and founded in the goods of Fortune.
I COM to the principles of Authority, which are internal, and
founded upon the goods of the Mind. Theſe the Legiſlator that can
unite in his Government with thofe of Fortune, coms neareſt to the
work of God, whofe Government confifts of Heaven and Earth :
which was faid by PLATO, tho' in different words, as, when Princes
fhould be Philofophers, or Philofophers Princes, the World would be
Ecclef.10.15. happy. And fays SOLOMON, There is an evil which I have feen un-
der the Sun, which procedes from the Ruler (enimvero neque nobilem, ne-
que ingenuum, nec libertinum quidem armis præponere, regia utilitas eft)
Folly is fet in great Dignity, and the Rich (either in Virtue and Wiſdom,
in the goods of the Mind, or thofe of Fortune upon that balance which
gives them a ſenſe of the National Intereft) fit in low places. I have
Jeen Servants upon borfes, and Princes walking as Servants upon the earth.
Sad complaints, that the principles of Power and of Authority, the
goods of the Mind and of Fortune, do not meet and twine in the Wreath
or Crown of Empire! Wherfore, if we have any thing of Piety or of
Prudence, let us raiſe our ſelves out of the mire of privat Intereft to
the contemplation of Virtue, and put a hand to the removal of this
evil from under the Sun; this evil againſt which no Government that
is not fecur'd, can be good; this evil from which no Government that
is fecure muſt be perfect. SOLOMON tells us, that the cauſe of it is
from the Ruler, from thofe principles of power, which, balanc'd up-
on earthly traſh, exclude the heavenly treaſures of Virtue, and that
influence of it upon Government, which is Authority. We have
wander'd the Earth to find out the balance of power: but to find out
that of Authority, we muft afcend, as I faid, nearer Heaven, or to
the Image of God, which is the Soul of Man.
THE Soul of Man (whoſe life or motion is perpetual Contempla-
tion or Thought) is the Miſtreſs of two potent Rivals, the one Reaſon,
the other Paffion, that are in continual fuit; and, according as the
gives up her will to thefe or either of them, is the felicity or miſery
which Man partakes in this mortal life.
FOR
OCEAN A
45
FOR as whatever was Paffion in the contemplation of a man, be-
ing brought forth by his will into action, is Vice and the bondage of
Sin; fo whatever was Reafon in the contemplation of a man, being
brought forth by his will into action, is virtue and the freedom of
Soul.
AGAIN, as thofe actions of a man that were Sin acquire to him-
felf Repentance or Shame, and affect others with Scorn or Pity; fo
thoſe actions of a man that are Virtue acquire to himſelf Honor, and
upon others Authority.
NOW Government is no other than the Soul of a Nation or City:
wherfore that which was Reafon in the debate of a Commonwealth
being brought forth by the reſult, muſt be Virtue; and forafmuch as
the Soul of a City or Nation is the Soverain Power, her Virtue muſt
be Law. But the Government whofe Law is Virtue, and whofe
Virtue is Law, is the fame whofe Empire is Authority, and whofe
Authority is Empire.
AGAIN, If the Liberty of a man confifts in the Empire of his
Reaſon, the abfence wherof would betray him to the bondage of his
Paffions; then the Liberty of a Commonwealth confifts in the Em-
pire of her Laws, the abfence wherof would betray her to the Luft of
Tyrants. And thefe I conceive to be the Principles upon which ARI-
STOTLE and LIVY (injuriously accus'd by LEVIATHAN for not
writing out of nature) have grounded their Affertion, That a Com-
monwealth is an Empire of Laws, and not of Men. But they muſt not
carry it fo. For, fays he, the Liberty, wherof there is fo frequent and Pag. 110.
honourable mention in the Hifiorys and Philofophy of the ancient Greecs and
Romans, and the Writings and Difcourfes of thofe that from them have
receiv'd all their Learning in the Politics, is not the Liberty of particular
Men, but the Liberty of the Commonwealth. He might as well have
faid, that the Eftates of particular Men in a Commonwealth are not
the Riches of particular Men, but the Riches of the Commonwealth;
for equality of Eftates caufes equality of Power, and equality of Power
is the Liberty not only of the Commonwealth, but of every Man.
But fure a Man would never be thus irreverent with the greateſt Au-
thors, and pofitive against all Antiquity, without fom certain demon-
ſtration of Truth: and, what is it? Why, there is written on the Tur-
rets of the City of Lucca in great Characters at this Day the word LI-
BERTAS; yet no Man can thence infer, that a particular Man has
more Liberty or Immunity from the Service of the Commonwealth there,
than in Conftantinople. Whether a Commonwealth be Monarchical or
Popular, the Freedom is the fame. The Mountain has brought forth,
and we have a little Equivocation! For to fay, that a Lucchese has no
more Liberty or Immunity from the Laws of Lucca, than a Turk has
from thoſe of Conftantinople; and to ſay that a Lucckefe has no more
Liberty or Immunity by the Laws of Lucca, than a Turk has by thofe
of Conftantinople, are pretty different Speeches. The firſt be faid
of all Governments alike; the ſecond ſcarce of any two; much lefs of
theſe, ſeeing it is known, that wheras the greateſt Baba is a Tenant,
as well of his Head as of his Eftate, at the Will of his Lord, the
meanest Lucchefe that has Land, is a Freeholder of both, and not to
be control'd but by the Law, and that fram'd by every privat Man to
no other end (or they may thank themſelves) than to protect the Li-
berty of every privat Man, which by that means coms to be the Li-
berty of the Commonwealth.
may
BUT
415
OCEAN A.
Hobs.
BUT feeing they that make the Laws in Commonwealths are but
Men, the main Queſtion ſeems to be, how a Commonwealth comes to
be an Empire of Laws, and not of Men? or how the Debate or Re-
fult of a Commonwealth is fo fure to be according to reafon; feeing
they who debate, and they who refolve, be but Men? And as often
as Reaſon is against a Man, fo often will a Man be against Reaſon.
THIS is thought to be a fhrewd faying, but will do no harm; for
be it ſo that Reaſon is nothing but Intereft, there be divers Intereſts,
and fo divers Reaſons.
AS firſt, there is privat Reaſon, which is the Intereft of a privat
Man.
SECONDLY, There is Reaſon of State, which is the Intereſt
(or Error, as was faid by SOLOMON) of the Ruler or Rulers, that is
to fay, of the Prince, of the Nobility, or of the People.
THIRDLY, There is that Reaſon, which is the Intereſt of Man-
Hooker. B.1. kind, or of the whole. Now if we fee even in thoſe natural Agents
that want fenfe,that as in themſelves they have aLaw which directs them in
the means wherby they tend to their own perfection, fo likewife that another
Law there is, which touches them as they are fociable parts united into one
Body, a Law which binds them each to ferve to others good, and all to pre-
fer the good of the whole, before whatſoever their own particular; as when
flones, or heavy things for fake their ordinary wont or center, and fly up-
wards, as if they heard themfelves commanded to let go the good they pri-
vately wish, and to relieve the prefent diftrefs of Nature in common.
There is a common Right, Law of Nature, or Intereft of the whole;
which is more excellent, and fo acknowleg'd to be by the Agents
themſelves, than the Right or Intereft of the Parts only. Wherfore
tho it may be truly faid that the Creatures are naturally carry'd forth to
their proper utility or profit, that ought not to be taken in too general a
fenfe; feeing divers of them abstain from their own profit, either in re-
gard of thofe of the fame kind, or at least of their
Grot.
young.
MANKIND then muſt either be leſs juſt than the Creature, or ac-
knowlege alfo his common Intereft to be common Right. And if
Reaſon be nothing elſe but Intereſt, and the Intereft of Mankind be
the right Intereft, then the Reaſon of Mankind muſt be right Reaſon.
Now compute well; for if the Intereft of popular Government com
the nearest to the Intereſt of Mankind, then the Reaſon of popular Go-
vernment muſt com the neareſt to right Reaſon.
BUT it may be faid, that the difficulty remains yet; for be the Intereſt
of popular Government right Reaſon, a man does not look upon Reafon
as it is right or wrong in itſelf, but as it makes for him or against him.
Wherfore unleſs you can fhew fuch Orders of a Government, as, like
thoſe of God in Nature, ſhall be able to conſtrain this or that Creature
to ſhake off that Inclination which is more peculiar to it, and take up
that which regards the common Good or Intereft; all this is to no more
end, than to perſuade every man in a popular Government not to carve
himſelf of that which he defires moft, but to be mannerly at the public
Table, and give the beſt from himſelf to Decency and the common
Intereſt. But that fuch Orders may be eſtabliſh'd, as may, nay muſt
give the upper hand in all cafes to common Right or Intereft, notwith-
ſtanding the nearneſs of that which ſticks to every man in privat, and
this in a way of equal certainty and facility, is known even to Girls,
being no other than thofe that are of common practice with them in
1
divers
OCEAN A.
47
divers cafes. For example, two of them have a Cake yet undivided,
which was given between them: that each of them therfore might
have that which is due, Divide, fays one to the other, and I will chufe;
or let me divide, and you fhall chufe. If this be but once agreed up-
on, it is enough: for the divident, dividing unequally, loſes, in regard
that the other takes the better half; wherfore the divides equally, and
fo both have right. O the depth of the Wisdom of God! and yet by the
mouths of Babes and Sucklings has he fet forth his ftrength; that which
great Philofophers are difputing upon in vain, is brought to light by
two harmless Girls, even the whole Mystery of a Commonwealth,
which lys only in dividing and chufing. Nor has God (if his Works
in Nature be underſtood) left fo much to Mankind to diſpute upon,
as who fhall divide, and who chufe, but diftributed them for ever in-
to two Orders, wherof the one has the natural right of dividing, and
the other of chufing. For Example :
popular Go.
vernment in
A COMMONWEALTH is but a civil Society of Men: let The Ord rs of
us take
number of Men (as twenty) and immediatly make a
any
Commonwealth. Twenty Men (if they be not all Idiots, perhaps Nature.
if they be) can never com fo together, but there will be fuch a dif-
ference in them, that about a third will be wifer, or at leaſt lefs fooliſh
than all the reft; theſe upon acquaintance, tho it be but ſmall, will be
diſcover'd, and (as Stags that have the largeſt heads) lead the herd:
for while the fix difcourfing and arguing one with another, fhew the
eminence of their parts, the fourteen diſcover things that they never
thought on; or are clear'd in divers Truths which had formerly
perplex'd them. Wherfore in matter of common concernment, diffi-
culty, or danger, they hang upon their lips as Children upon their
Fathers; and the influence thus acquir'd by the fix, the eminence of
whofe parts are found to be a ſtay and comfort to the fourteen, is * the
Authority of the Fathers. Wherfore this can be no other than a na-
tural Ariftocracy diffus'd by God throout the whole Body of Man-
kind to this end and purpoſe; and therfore fuch as the People have
not only a natural, but a poſitive Obligation to make uſe of as their
Guides; as where the People of Ifrael are commanded to take wife men, Deut. 1. 13.
and underſtanding, and known among their Tribes, to be made Rulers over
them. The fix then approv'd of, as in the preſent cafe, are the Senat,
not by hereditary Right, or in regard of the greatneſs of their Eftates
only (which would tend to fuch Power as might force or draw the
People) but by election for their excellent Parts, which tends to the
advancement of the influence of their Virtue or Authority that leads
the People. Wherfore the Office of the Senat is not to be Com-
manders, but Counſellors of the People; and that which is proper to
Counſellors is firſt to debate, and afterward to give advice in the bu-
fineſs wherupon they have debated; whence the Decrees of the Senat
are never Laws, nor fo† call'd: and theſe being maturely fram'd, it
is their duty to propofe in the cafe to the People. Wherfore the
Senat is no more than the debate of the Commonwealth. But to de-
bate, is to diſcern or put a difference between things that, being alike,
are not the fame; or it is feparating and weighing this reafon againſt
that, and that reafon againſt this, which is dividing.
* Authoritas Patrum. + Senatufconfulta.
Ferre ad Populum.
THE
48
OCEAN Å.
The People.. THE Senat then having divided, who fhall chufe? Afk the Girls:
for if fhe that divided muſt have choſen alſo, it had bin little worſe for
the other in caſe ſhe had not divided at all, but kept the whole Cake to
her felf, in regard that being to chufe too, fhe divided accordingly.
Wherfore if the Senat have any farther power than to divide, the Com-
monwealth can never be equal. But in a Commonwealth confifting
of a fingle Council, there is no other to chufe than that which di-
vided; whence it is, that fuch a Council fails not to ſcramble, that is,
to be factious, there being no other dividing of the Cake in that cafe
but among themſelves.
The Magi-
Aracy.
NOR is there any remedy but to have another Council to chufe.
The Wiſdom of the Few may be the Light of Mankind; but the In-
tereft of the Few is not the Profit of Mankind, nor of a Common-
wealth. Wherfore feeing we have granted Intereft to be Reaſon, they
muſt not chuſe, left it put out their Light. But as the Council divi-
ding conſiſts of the Wiſdom of the Commonwealth, fo the Affembly
or Council chufing fhould confift of the Intereft of the Common-
wealth as the Wiſdom of the Commonwealth is in the Ariftocracy,
fo the Intereft of the Commonwealth is in the whole Body of the Peo-
ple. And wheras this, in cafe the Commonwealth confift of a whole
Nation, is too unweildy a body to be affembled, this Council is to confift
of fuch a Repreſentative as may be equal, and fo conftituted, as can
never contract any other Intereft than that of the whole People; the
manner whereof, being fuch as is beft fhewn by Exemplification, I re-
mit to the Model. But in the prefent cafe, the fix dividing, and the
fourteen chufing, muft of neceffity take in the whole intereft of the
twenty.
DIVIDING and chufing in the language of a Commonwealth
is debating and refolving; and whatſoever upon debate of the Senat
is propos'd to the People, and refolv'd by them, is enacted by the
authority of the Fathers, and by the power of the People, which con-
curring, make a Law.
BUT the Law being made, fays LEVIATHAN, is but Words
and Paper without the Hands and Swords of Men; wherfore as theſe
two Orders of a Commonwealth, namely the Senat and the People,
are Legiſlative, fo of neceffity there muſt be a third to be executive of
the Laws made, and this is the Magiftracy; in which order, with the
reft being wrought up by art, the Commonwealth confifts of the Senat
propofing, the People refolving, and the Magistracy executing: wherby
partaking of the Ariftocracy as in the Senat, of the Democracy as in the
People, and of Monarchy as in the Magiſtracy, it is complete. Now
there being no other Commonwealth but this in Art or Nature, it is
no wonder if MACHIAVEL has fhew'd us that the Ancients held
this only to be good; but it ſeems ſtrange to me, that they ſhould hold
that there could be any other: for if there be fuch a thing as pure Mo
narchy, yet that there fhould be fuch a one as pure Ariftocracy, or pure
Democracy, is not in my underſtanding. But the Magiftracy both
in number and function is different in different Commonwealths. Ne-
vertheleſs there is one Condition of it that muſt be the fame in every
one, or it diffolves the Commonwealth where it is wanting. And
this is no less than that as the Hand of the Magiftrat is the executive
* Authoritate Patrum & juffu Populi.
Power
+
OCEAN A
49
Power of the Law, fo the head of the Magiftrat is anſwerable to the
People, that his execution be according to the Law; by which LEVI-
ATHAN may fee that the hand or fword that executes the Law is in
it, and not above it.
wealth in ese
that
NOW whether I have rightly tranfcrib'd theſe Principles of a The Orders of
Commonwealth out of Nature, I fhall appeal to God, and to the a Common-
World. To God in the Fabric of the Commonwealth of Ifrael: and perience, as
to the World in the univerfal Series of antient Prudence. But in
regard the fame Commonwealths will be open'd at large in the Coun-
cil of Legiſlators, I fhall touch them for the preſent but flightly, be-
ginning with that of Ifrael.
THE Commonwealth of Ifrael confifted of the Senat, the People, of Ifrael.
and the Magiftracy.
Numb. 1.
THE People by their firft divifion, which was genealogical, were
contain❜d under their thirteen Tribes, Houfes, or Familys; wherof the
firſtborn in each was Prince of his Tribe, and had the leading of it :
the Tribe of LEVI only being fet apart to ſerve at the Altar, had no
other Prince but the High Prieft. In their fecond divifion they were
divided locally by their Agrarian, or the diftribution of the Land of Jo. ch. 13,
Canaan to them by lot, the Tithe of all remaining to LEVI; whence
according to their local divifion, the Tribes are reckon'd but twelve.
to ck. 42.
THE Affemblys of the People thus divided were methodically ga- The People.
ther'd by Trumpets to the Congregation; which was, it fhould feem, Numb.to.
0.7.
of two forts. For if it were call'd with one Trumpet only, the Princes
Ats 19 23.
of the Tribes and the Elders only affembl'd; but if it were call'd Numb.10. 4.
with two, the whole People gather'd themſelves to the Congregation, Numb Ic. 3.
for fo it is render'd by the English; but in the Greec it is call'd Ecclefia,
or the Church of God, and by the Talmudist, the great Synagog. Judg. 20. 2.
The word Ecclefia was alfo anciently and properly us'd for the Civil
Congregations or Affemblys of the People in Athens, Lacedemon, and
Ephefus, where it is fo call'd in Scripture, tho it be otherwiſe render'd
by the Tranſlators, not much as I conceive to their commendation,
feeing by that means they have loft us a good Leffon, the Apoftles bor-
rowing that name for their ſpiritual Congregations, to the end that we
might fee they intended the Government of the Church to be Demo-
cratical or Popular, as is alſo.plain in the reſt of their Conſtitutions.
Exod. 19.
THE Church or Congregation of the People of Ifrael affembl'd
in a military manner, and had the refult of the Commonwealth, or
the Power of confirming all their Laws, tho propos'd even by God
himſelf; as where they make him King; and where they reject or Julg. 20. 2.
depofe him as Civil Magiftrat, and elect SAUL. It is manifeft, that
he gives no fuch example to a Legiflator in a popular Government
as to deny or evade the power of the People, which were a contra-
diction: but tho' he defervedly blames the ingratitude of the People 1 Sam. S. 7.
in that action, he commands SAMUEL, being next under himfelf
Supreme Magiftrat, to hearken to their Voice (for where the fuffrage
of the People goes for nothing, it is no Commonwealth) and com-
forts him faying, They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected
me that I ſhould not reign over them. But to reject him that he ſhould
not reign over them, was as Civil Magiftrat to depofe him. The
Power therfore which the People had to depofe even God himſelf
as he was Civil Magiftrat, leaves little doubt but that they had power
to have rejected any of thofe Laws confirmed by them throout the
H
Scrip-
50
OCEAN A.
Dut. 22.
Scripture, which (to omit the feveral parcels) are generally contain'd
under two heads, thoſe that were made by Covenant with the People
in the Land of Mcab, and thoſe which were made by Covenant with
the People in Horeb; which two, I think, amount to the whole body
of the Ifraelitifh Laws. But if all and every one of the Laws of Ifrael
being propos'd by God, were no otherwiſe enacted than by Covenant
with the People, then that only which was refolv'd by the People of
Ifrael was their Law; and fo the refult of that Commonwealth was
Joh. 7. 16. in the People. Nor had the People the refult only in matter of Law,
Judg.20.8,9, but the Power in fom cafes of Judicature; as alfo the right of levying
1 Sam.7.6.7, War; cognizance in matter of Religion; and the election of their
Magiftrats, as the Judg or Dictator, the King, the Prince: which
1 Chron. 13.2. functions were exercifed by the Synagoga magna or Congregation of
Judg. 11. 11. Ifrael, not always in one manner; for fometimes they were perform'd
1 Sim.10.17. by the fuffrage of the People, viva voce; fometimes by the Lot only;
and at others by the Ballot, or by a mixture of the Lot with the Suf-
frage, as in the cafe of ELDAD and MEDAD, which I fhall open with
the Senat.
10.
8
2C.ron.30.4.
I Mac. 14.
Exod 9. 3.4,
5.
Josh. 7.
Sam. 10.
The Senat.
Deut. 1.
Numb. 11.
THE Senat of Ifrael call'd in the Old Teſtament the Seventy Elders,
and in the New the Sanhedrim (which word is uſually tranſlated the
Numb.11. Council) was appointed by God, and confifted of Seventy Elders be-
fides MOSES, which were at firſt elected by the People; but in what
manner is rather intimated than fhewn. Nevertheless, becauſe I can-
not otherwiſe underſtand the paffage concerning ELDAD and ME-
DAD, of whom it is faid, that they were of them that were written,
but went not up to the Tabernacle, then with the Talmudifts, I conceive
that ELDAD and MEDAD had the fuffrage of the Tribes, and fo were
written as Competitors for Magiftracy; but coming afterwards to the
lot, fail'd of it, and therefore went not up to the Tabernacle, or place
of Confirmation by God, or to the Seffionhouſe of the Senat with the
Seventy upon whom the lot fell to be Senators: for the Seffionhouſe of
the Sanhedrim was first in the Court of the Tabernacle, and afterwards
in that of the Temple, where it came to be call'd the fione Chamber
or Pavement. If this were the Ballot of Ifrael, that of Venice is the
fame tranfpos'd: for in Venice the Competitor is chofen as it were by
the lot, in regard that the Electors are fo made, and the Magiftrat is
chofen by the Suffrage of the great Council or Aſſembly of the People. But
the Sanhedrim of Ifrael being thus conftituted, Moses for his time, and
after him his Succeffor, fat in the midſt of it as Prince or Archon, and
at his left hand the Orator or Father of the Senat; the reſt or the
bench coming round with either horn like a Crefcent, had a Scribe
attending upon the tip of it.
John.
THIS Senat, in regard the Legiſlator of Ifrael was infallible, and
the Laws given by God fuch as were not fit to be altered by men, is
much different in the exerciſe of their Power from all other Senats, ex-
cept that of the Areopagits in Athens, which alfo was little more than a
Supreme Judicatory; for it will hardly, as I conceive, be found that
the Sanhedrim propos'd to the People till the return of the Children of
Ifrael out of Captivity under Efdras, at which time there was a new
Law made, namely, for a kind of Excommunication, or rather Ba-
niſhment, which had never bin before in Ifrael. Nevertheleſs it is
not to be thought that the Sanhedrim had not always that right, which
from the time of Efdras is more frequently exercis'd, of propofing to
the
O CE A NA
AN
SI
Deut 17.9,
the People, but that they forbore it in regard of the fulneſs and infalli-
bility of the Law already made, wherby it was needleſs. Wherfore
the function of this Council, which is very rare in a Senat, was exe- The Mogi-
cutive, and confiſted in the adminiſtration of the Law made; and ſtracy.
wheras the Council it ſelf is often underſtood in Scripture by the Prieſt
and the Levit, there is no more in that fave only that the Priefts and 16, 11.
the Levits, who otherwiſe had no Power at all, being in the younger
years of this Commonwealth, thoſe that were beft ſtudy'd in the
Laws were the most frequently elected into the Sanhedrim. For the
Courts confifting of three and twenty Elders fitting in the Gates of
every City, and the Triumvirats of Judges conftituted almoſt in every
Village, which were parts of the executive Magiſtracy ſubordinat to
the Sanhedrim, I fhall take them at better leifure, and in the larger
Diſcourſe; but theſe being that part of this Commonwealth which
was inftituted by Moses upon the advice of JETHRO the Prieft of Exod. 18.
Midian (as I conceive a Heathen) are to me a fufficient warrant even
from God himſelf who confirm'd them, to make farther uſe of hu-
man Prudence, wherever I find it bearing a Teftimony to it felf,
whether in Heathen Commonwealths or others: And the rather, be-
cauſe ſo it is, that we who have the holy Scriptures, and in them the
Original of a Commonwealth, made by the fame hand that made the
World, are either altogether blind or negligent of it, while the Hea-
thens have all written theirs, as if they had had no other Copy: As,
to be more brief in the prefent account of that which you ſhall have
more at large hereafter:
ATHENS confifted of the Senat of the Bean propofing, of the
Church or Affembly of the People refolving, and too often debating,
which was the ruin of it; as alſo of the Senat of the Areopagits, the
nine Archons, with divers other Magiftrats executing.
Of Athers,
Of Lacede
LACEDEMON confifted of the Senat propofing; of the Church
or Congregation of the People refolving only and never debating, mon.
which was the long Life of it; and of the two Kings, the Court of
the Ephors, with divers other Magiftrats executing.
Of Carthage,
CARTHAGE confifted of the Senat propofing and fometimes
refolving too; of the People refolving and fomtimes debating too, for
which fault ſhe was reprehended by ARISTOTLE; and ſhe had her
Suffetes, and her hundred Men, with other Magiftrats executing.
ROME confifted of the Senat propofing, the Concio or People of Rome.
refolving, and too often debating, which cauſed her ſtorms; as alfo
of the Confuls, Cenfors, Ædils, Tribuns, Pretors, Queſtors, and other
Magiftrats executing.
VENICE confifts of the Senat or Pregati propofing, and fom- of Venice.
times refolving too; of the great Council or Affembly of the People, in
whom the reſult is conftitutively; as alfo of the Doge, the Signory, the
Cenfors, the Dieci, the Quazancies, and other Magiftrats executing.
land.
THE proceding of the Commonwealths of Switzerland and of Switzer-
Holland is of a like nature, tho' after a more obfcure manner; for the land and Hol
Soveraintys, whether Cantons, Provinces, or Citys, which are the
People, fend their Deputies commiffion'd and inftructed by themſelves
(wherin they reſerve the Reſult in their own power) to the Provincial
or general Convention, or Senat, where the Deputies debate, but have
no other power of Refult than what was confer'd upon them by the
People, or is farther confer'd by the fame upon farther occafion.
H 2
And
for
52
OCEAN A.
Page 170.
for the executive part they have Magiftrats or Judges in every Canton,'
Province or City, befides thoſe which are more public, and relate to
the League, as for adjuſting Controverfies between one Canton, Pro-
vince or City, and another; or the like between fuch perfons as are
not of the fame Canton, Province or City.
BUT that we may obſerve a little farther how the Heathen Po-
liticians have written, not only out of Nature, but as it were out of
Scripture: As in the Commonwealth of Ifrael God is faid to have bin
King; fo the Commonwealth where the Law is King, is faid by
ARISTOTLE to be the Kingdom of God. And where by the Lufts
or Paffions of Men a Power is fet above that of the Law deriving
from Reaſon, which is the dictat of God, God in that fenfe is rejected
or depos'd that he ſhould not reign over them, as he was in Ifrael.
And yet LEVIATHAN will have it, that by reading of thefe Greec
and Latin (he might as well in this fenfe have faid Hebrew) Authors,
young Men, and all others that are unprovided of the antidot of folid Rea-
fon, receiving a strong and delightful impreffion of the great Exploits of
War, atchiev'd by the Conductors of their Armys, receive withal a
pleafing Idea of all they have don befides; and imagin their great profperity
not to have proceded from the emulation of particular Men, but from the
virtue of their popular form of Government, not confidering the frequent
Seditions and Civil Wars produc'd by the imperfection of their Polity.
Where, firſt, the blame he lays to the Heathen Authors, is in his ſenſe
laid to the Scripture; and wheras he holds them to be young Men, or
Men of no antidot that are of like opinions, it fhould feem that
MACHIAVEL, the fole retriever of this antient Prudence, is to
his folid Reaſon, a beardleſs Boy that has newly read Livy. And
how folid his Reaſon is, may appear, where he grants the great profpe-
rity of antient Commonwealths, which is to give up the Controverfy.
For fuch an effect muſt have ſom adequat caufe; which to evade he
infinuats that it was nothing elſe but the emulation of particular Men :
as if ſo great an Emulation could have bin generated without as great
Virtue; fo great Virtue without the beſt Education; and beſt Educa-
tion without the beſt Law; or the beſt Laws any otherwiſe than by
the excellency of their Polity.
BUT if fom of theſe Commonwealths, as being lefs perfect in
their Polity than others, have bin more feditious, it is not more an ar➡
gument of the infirmity of this or that Commonwealth in particular,
than of the excellency of that kind of Polity in general; which if
they, that have not altogether reach'd, have nevertheleſs had greater
proſperity, what would befal them that ſhould reach?
IN anſwer to which Queſtion let me invite LEVIATHAN, who
of all other Governments gives the advantage to Monarchy for per-
fection, to a better difquifition of it by theſe three affertions.
THE firſt, That the perfection of Government lys upon fuch a
libration in the frame of it, that no Man or Men in or under it can
have the intereſt; or having the intereſt, can have the power to di-
furb it with Sedition.
THE fecond, That Monarchy, reaching the perfection of the
kind, reaches not to the perfection of Government; but muſt have
fom dangerous flaw in it.
THE third, That popular Government, reaching the perfection of
the kind, reaches the perfection of Government, and has no flaw in it.
..THE firſt affertion requires no proof.
FOR
OCEAN A.
53
FOR the proof of the fecond; Monarchy, as has bin fhewn, is
of two kinds, the one by Arms, the other by a Nobility, and there is
no other kind in Art or Nature: for if there have been antiently fom
Governments call'd Kingdoms, as one of the Goths in Spain, and ano-
ther of the Vandals in Africa, where the King rul'd without a Nobi-
lity, and by a Council of the People only; it is exprefly faid by the
Authors that mention them, that the Kings were but the Captains,
and that the People not only gave them Laws, but depos'd them as
often as they pleas'd. Nor is it poffible in reaſon that it ſhould be other-
wife in like cafes; wherfore theſe were either no Monarchys, or had
greater flaws in them than any other.
BUT for a Monarchy by Arms, as that of the Turc (which of
all models that ever were coms up to the perfection of the kind) it is
not in the wit or power of Man to cure it of this dangerous flaw,
That the Janizarys have frequent intereft and perpetual power to raiſe
Sedition, and to tear the Magiftrat, even the Prince himfelf, in pieces.
Therfore the Monarchy of Turky is no perfect Government.
AND for a Monarchy by Nobility, as of late in Oceana (which
of all other models before the declination of it came up to the per-
fection in that kind) it was not in the power or wit of Man to cure it
of that dangerous flaw, That the Nobility had frequent intereft and
perpetual power by their Retainers and Tenants to raiſe Sedition; and
(wheras the fanizarys occafion this kind of Calamity no fooner than
they make an end of it) to levy a laſting War, to the vaſt effufion of
Blood, and that even upon occafions wherin the People, but for their
dependence upon their Lords, had no concernment, as in the feud of
the Red and White. The like has bin freqent in Spain, France, Ger-
many, and other Monarchys of this kind; wherfore Monarchy by a
Nobility is no perfect Government.
FOR the proof of the third affertion; LEVIATHAN yields it to
me, that there is no other Commonwealth but Monarchical or Popular:.
wherfore if no Monarchy be a perfect Government, then either there
is no perfect Government, or it muſt be popular; for which kind of
Conſtitution I have fomething more to fay, than LEVIATHAN has
faid or ever will be able to fay for Monarchy. As,
FIRST, That it is the Government that was never conquer'd by
any Monarch, from the beginning of the World to this day: for if the
Commonwealths of Greece came under the yoke of the Kings of Ma-
cedon, they were firft broken by themſelves.
SECONDLY, That it is the Government that has frequently
led mighty Monarchs in Triumph.
THIRDLY, That it is the Government, which, if it has bin
feditious, it has not bin fo from any imperfection in the kind, but in
the particular Conftitution; which, wherever the like has happen'd,
muſt have bin inequal.
FOURTHLY, That it is the Government, which, if it has bin
any thing near equal, was never feditious; or let him fhew me what
Sedition has happen'd in Lacedemon or Venice.
FIFTHLY, That it is the Government, which, attaining to
perfect equality, has fuch a libration in the frame of it, that no Man
living can fhew which way any Man or Men, in or under it can con-
tract any fuch Intereft or Power as ſhould be able to diſturb the Com-
monwealth with Sedition; wherfore an equal Commonwealth is that
only
54
OCEAN A.
1
Divifion of
Common-
rwealths.
Equal Agra-
rian.
Rotation.
Prolongation
only which is without flaw, and contains in it the full perfection of
Government. But to return.
BY what has bin fhewn in Reaſon and Experience it may appear,
that tho Commonwealths in general be Governments of the Senat pro-
pofing, the People refolving, and the Magiftracy executing; yet fom
are not fo good at theſe Orders as others, thro fom impediment or de-
fect in the frame, balance, or capacity of them, according to which
they are of divers kinds.
THE first divifion of them is into fuch as are fingle, as Ifrael,
Athens, Lacedemon, &c. and fuch as are by Leagues, as thofe of the
Acheans, Etolians, Lycians, Switz, and Hollanders.
THE fecond (being MACHIAVEL's) is into fuch as are for
preſervation, as Lacedemon and Venice, and fuch as are for increaſe, as
Athens and Rome; in which I can fee no more than that the former
takes in no more Citizens than are neceffary for defence, and the lat-
ter ſo many as are capable of increaſe.
THE third divifion (unfeen hitherto) is into equal and inequal,
and this is the main point, eſpecially as to domeftic Peace and Tranquil-
lity; for to make a Commonwealth inequal, is to divide it into partys,
which fets them at perpetual variance, the one party endeavouring to
preſerve their Eminence and Inequality, and the other to attain to
Equality whence the People of Rome deriv'd their perpetual ſtrife
with the Nobility and Senat. But in an equal Commonwealth there
can be no more ftrife than there can be overbalance in equal weights;
wherfore the Commonwealth of Venice, being that which of all others
is the moſt equal in the Conftitution, is that wherin there never hap-
pen'd any ftrife between the Senat and the People.
:
AN equal Commonwealth is fuch a one as is equal both in the
balance or foundation, and in the ſuperſtructure; that is to ſay, in
her Agrarian Law, and in her Rotation.
A Ñ equal Agrarian is a perpetual Law eſtabliſhing and preferving
the balance of Dominion by fuch a diftribution, that no one Man or
number of Men, within the compaſs of the Few or Aristocracy, can
com to overpower the whole People by their poffeffions in Lands.
AS the Agrarian anfwers to the Foundation, fo dos Rotation tọ
the Superstructures.
EQUAL Rotation is equal viciffitude in Government, or fuccef-
fion to Magiftracy confer'd for fuch convenient terms, enjoying equal
vacations, as take in the whole body by parts, fucceding others, thro
the free election or fuffrage of the People.
THE contrary wherunto is prolongation of Magiftracy, which,
of Magistracy. trashing the wheel of Rotation, deſtroys the life or natural motion of
a Commonwealth.
Ballot.
THE election or fuffrage of the People is moft free, where it is
made or given in fuch a manner, that it can neither oblige * nor dif-
oblige another; nor thro fear of an Enemy, or baſhfulneſs towards
a Friend, impair a Man's liberty.
WHERFORE, fays CICERO, + the Tablet or Ballot of the
People of Rome (who gave their Votes by throwing Tablets or little
pieces of Wood fecretly into Urns mark'd for the negative or affirma-
• Qui beneficium accepit, libertatem vendidit. + Grata populo eft tabella quæ frontes aperit
hominum, mentes tegit, datque eam libertatem ut quod velint faciant.
tive)
OCEAN A.
55
tive) was a welcom Conſtitution to the People, as that which, not im-
pairing the affurance of their brows, increas'd the freedom of their
Judgment. I have not ſtood upon a more particular defcriprion of this
Ballot, becauſe that of Venice exemplify'd in the Model is of all others
the moſt perfect.
monwealth.
AN equal Commonwealth (by that which has bin faid) is a Govern- Definition of
ment establish'd upon an equal Agrarian, arifing into the Superftructures an equal Cori-
or three Orders, the Senat debating and propofing, the People refolving,
and the Magistracy executing by an equal Rotation thro the fuffrage of
the People given by the Ballot. For tho Rotation may be without the
Ballot, and the Ballot without Rotation, yet the Ballot not only as to
the infuing Model includes both, but is by far the moſt equal way;
for which caufe under the name of the Ballot I fhall hereafter under-
ſtand both that and Rotation too.
NOW having reafon'd the Principles of an equal Commonwealth,
I ſhould com to give an inſtance of fuch a one in experience, if I could
find it; but if this work be of any value, it lys in that it is the firſt
example of a Commonwealth that is perfectly equal. For Venice tho
it coms the neareſt, yet is a Commonwealth for prefervation; and fuch
a one, confidering the paucity of Citizens taken in, and the number
not taken in, is externally unequal: and tho every Commonwealth
that holds Provinces muſt in that regard be fuch, yet not to that degree.
Nevertheleſs Venice internally, and for her capacity, is by far the moſt
equal, tho it has not in my judgment arriv'd at the full perfection of
equality; both becauſe her Laws fupplying the defect of an Agrarian,
are not fo clear nor effectual at the Foundation, nor her Superftructures
by the virtue of her Ballot or Rotation exactly librated; in regard that
thro the paucity of her Citizens, her greater Magiftracys are conti-
nually wheel'd thro a few hands, as is confeft by JANOTTI where
he ſays, that if a Gentleman coms once to be Savio di terra ferma, it
feldom happens that he fails from thenceforward to be adorn'd with
fom one of the greater Magiftracys, as Savi di mare, Savi di terra fer-
ma, Savi Grandi, Counfellors, thofe of the Decemvirat or Dictatorian
Council, the Aurogatori or Cenfors which require no vacation or in-
terval. Wherfore if this in Venice, or that in Lacedemon, where
the Kings were hereditary, and the Senators (tho elected by the Peo-
ple) for life, cauſe no inequality (which is hard to be conceiv'd) in a
Commonwealth for preſervation, or ſuch a one as conſiſts of a few Ci-
tizens;
; yet is it manifeft, that it would cause a verry great one in a
Commonwealth for increaſe, or confifting of the Many, which by in-
groffing the Magiftracys in a few hands, would be obſtructed in their
Rotation.
BUT there be who ſay (and think it a ſtrong Objection) that let a
Commonwealth be as equal as you can imagin, two or three Men when
all is don will govern it; and there is that in it, which, notwithſtand-
ing the pretended fufficiency of a popular ſtate, amounts to a plain
confeffion of the imbecility of that Policy, and of the Prerogative of
Monarchy for as much as popular Governments in difficult cafes
have had recourſe to Dictatorian Power, as in Rome.
TO which I anfwer, That as Truth is a fpark to which Objecti
ons are like bellows, fo in this reſpect our Commonwealth ſhines; for
the Eminence acquir'd by fuffrage of the People in a Commonwealth,
eſpecially if it be popular and equal, can be afcended by no other ſteps
than
1
56
OCEAN A.
than the univerſal acknowlegement of Virtue: and where men excel
in Virtue, the Commonwealth is ftupid and injuft, if accordingly they
do not excel in Authority. Wherfore this is both the advantage of
Virtue, which has her due incouragement, and of the Commonwealth
which has her due fervices. Theſe are the Philofophers which PLATO
would have to be Princes, the Princes which SOLOMON would have
to be mounted, and their Steeds are thofe of Authority, not Empire:
or, if they be buckl'd to the Chariot of Empire, as that of the Dicta-
torian Power, like the Chariot of the Sun, it is glorious for terms and
vacations, or intervals. And as a Commonwealth is a Government of
Laws and not of Men, fo is this the Principality of Virtue, and not of
Man; if that fail or fet in one, it rifes in another * who is created his
immediat Succeffor. And this takes away that vanity from under the
Sun, which is an Error proceding more or lefs from all other Rulers
under Heaven but an equal Commonwealth.
THESE things confider'd, it will be convenient in this place to
ſpeak a word to fuch as go about to infinuat to the Nobility or Gentry
a fear of the People, or to the People a fear of the Nobility or Gentry,
as if their interefts were deftructive to each other; when indeed an
Army may as well confift of Soldiers without Officers, or of Officers
without Soldiers, as a Commonwealth (eſpecially fuch a one as is ca-
pable of Greatnefs) of a People without a Gentry, or of a Gentry
without a People. Wherfore this (tho not always fo intended as may
appear by MACHIAVEL, who elfe would be guilty) is a pernicious
error. There is fomthing firft in the making of a Commonwealth,
then in the governing of it, and laſt of all in the leading of its Armys;
which (tho there be great Divines, great Lawyers, great men in all
profeffions) ſeems to be peculiar only to the Genius of a Gentleman.
For fo it is in the univerfal ſeries of Story, that if any man has found-
ed a Commonwealth, he was firſt a Gentleman. Moses had his
Education by the Daughter of PHARAOH; THESEUS and So-
LON, of noble Birth, were held by the Athenians worthy to be Kings;
LYCURGUS was of the Royal Blood; ROMULUS and NUMA Prin-
ces; BRUTUS and PUBLICOLA Patricians; the GRACCHI, that loft
their lives for the People of Rome and the reftitution of that Com-
monwealth, were the Sons of a Father adorn'd with two Triumphs,
and of CORNELIA the Daughter of SCIPIO, who being demand-
ed in marriage by King PTOLEMY, difdain'd to becom the Queen of
Egypt. And the most renown'd OLPHAUS MEGALETOR,
fole Legiflator (as you will fee anon) of the Commonwealth of Oceana,
was deriv'd from a noble Family: nor will it be any occafion of fcru-
ple in this cafe, that LEVIATHAN affirms the Politics to be no anti-
enter than his Book de Cive. Such alſo as have got any fame in the Ci-
vil Government of a Commonwealth, or by the leading of its Armys,
have bin Gentlemen; for fo in all other refpects were thofe plebeian
Magiſtrates elected by the People of Rome, being of known Deſcents,
and of equal Virtues, except only that they were excluded from the name
by the Ufurpation of the Patricians. Holland, thro this defect at home,
has borrow'd Princes for Generals, and Gentlemen of divers Nations.
for Commanders: And the Switzers, if they have any defect in this
* Uno avulfo, non deficit alter
Aureus, & fimili frondefcit virga metallo.
}
kind,
OCEAN A.
57
kind, rather lend their People to the Colors of other Princes, than
make that noble uſe of them at home, which ſhould affert the Liberty
of Mankind. For where there is not a Nobility to hearten the People,
they are flothful, regardleſs of the World, and of the public intereft
of Liberty, as even thoſe of Rome had bin without their Gentry :
wherfore let the People embrace the Gentry in peace, as the light
of their eys; and in war, as the trophy of their arms; and if COR-
NELIA diſdain'd to be Queen of Egypt, if a Roman Conful look'd
down from his Tribunal upon the greateſt King; let the Nobility love
and cheriſh the People that afford them a Throne fo much higher in
a Commonwealth in the acknowlegement of their Virtue, than the
Crowns of Monarchs.
Common-
BUT if the equality of a Commonwealth confift in the equality firſt 4 inequal
of the Agrarian, and next of the Rotation, then the inequality of a wealth.
Commonwealth muſt confiſt in the abfence or inequality of the Agra-
rian, or of the Rotation, or of both.
ISRAEL and Lacedemon, which Commonwealths (as the People
of this, in JOSEPHUS, claims kindred of that) have great refemblance,
were each of them equal in their Agrarian, and inequal in their Rota-
tion; eſpecially Ifrael, where the Sanhedrim or Senat, firft elected
by the People, as appears by the words of Moses, took upon them Deut. 1.
ever after, without any Precept of God, to fubftitute their Succeffors
by Ordination; which having bin there of civil uſe, as Excommunica-
tion, Community of Goods, and other Cuftoms of the Effcans, who
were many of them converted, came afterward to be introduced into
the Chriſtian Church. And the election of the Judg, Suffes or Dicta-
tor, was irregular, both for the occafion, the term, and the vacation
of that Magiſtracy; as you find in the Book of Judges, where it is of-
ten repeated, That in thoſe days there was no King in Ifrael, that is,
no Judg and in the firft of SAMUEL, where ELY judg'd Ifrael forty
years, and SAMUEL, all his life. In Lacedemon the election of the
Senat being by fuffrage of the People, tho for life, was not altogether
fo inequal; yet the hereditary Right of Kings, were it not for the
Agrarian, had ruin'd her.
ATHENS and Rome were inequal as to their Agrarian, that of
Athens being infirm, and this of Rome none at all; for if it were more
antiently carry'd, it was never obferv'd. Whence by the time of T1-
BERIUS GRACCHUS the Nobility had almoſt eaten the People quite
out of their Lands, which they held in the occupation of Tenants and
Servants: Wherupon the Remedy being too late, and too vehemently
apply'd, that Commonwealth was ruin'd.
THESE alfo were inequal in their Rotation, but in a contrary
manner. Athens, in regard that the Senat (choſen at once by lot, not
by fuffrage, and chang'd every year, not in part, but in the whole)
confifted not of the natural Ariftocracy; nor fitting long enough to un-
derſtand, or to be perfect in their office, had no fufficient Authority to
reftrain the People from that perpetual Turbulence in the end, which
was their ruin, notwithſtanding the efforts of NICIAS, who did all
a man could do to help it. But as Athens by the headineſs of the Peo-
ple, ſo Rome fell by the Ambition of the Nobility, thro the want of
an equal Rotation; which if the People had got into the Senat, and
timely into the Magiftracys (whereof the former was always ufurp'd
I
by
58
OCEAN A.
Of Laws.
Deut. 17.
Deut. 18. 10.
by the Patricians, and the latter for the moſt part) they had both
carry'd and held their Agrariarn, and that had render'd that Common-
wealth immovable.
BUT let a Commonwealth be equal or inequal, it muſt confiſt, as
has bin fhewn by Reaſon and all Experience, of the three general Or-
ders; that is to fay, of the Senat debating and propofing, of the Peo-
ple refoving, and of the Magiftracy executing. Wherfore I can never
wonder enough at LEVIATHAN, who, without any reafon or ex-
ample, will have it that a Commonwealth confifts of a ſingle Perfon,
or of a ſingle Affembly; nor can I fufficiently pity thoſe thouſand Gen-
tlemen, whofe Minds, which otherwife would have waver'd, he has fram'd
(as is affirm'd by himſelf) into a confcientious obedience (for ſo he is
pleas'd to call it) of fuch a Government.
BUT to finiſh this part of the Diſcourſe, which I intend for as com-
plete an Epitome of antient Prudence, and in that of the whole Art
of Politics, as I am able to frame in ſo ſhort a time ;
THE two firft Orders, that is to ſay, the Senat and the People, are
Legiſlative, wherunto anſwers that part of this Science which by Poli-
ticians is intitl❜d* of Laws; and the third Order is executive, to
which anſwers that part of the fame Science which is ftil'd† of the
Frame and Courſe of Courts or Judicatorys. A word to each of theſe
will be neceffary.
AND firſt for Laws, they are either Ecclefiaftical or Civil, ſuch as
concern Religion or Government.
LAWS Ecclefiaftical, or fuch as concern Religion, according to the
univerſal courſe of antient Prudence, are in the power of the Magi-
ftrat; but according to the common practice of modern Prudence,
fince the Papacy, torn out of his hands.
BUT, as a Government pretending to Liberty, and yet fuppreffing
Liberty of Confcience (which, becauſe Religion not according to a
man's Conſcience can to him be none at all, is the main) muſt be a
contradiction; fo, a man that, pleading for the Liberty of privat Con-
fcience, refuſes Liberty to the National Confcience, muſt be abfurd.
A COMMONWEALTH is nothing elfe but the National
Conſcience. And if the conviction of a man's privat Confcence pro-
duces his privat Religion, the conviction of the national Confcience
muſt produce a national Religion. Whether this be well reafon'd, as
alſo whether theſe two may ſtand together, will beſt be fhewn by the
examples of the antient Commonwealths taken in their order.
IN that of Ifrael the Government of the National Religion apper-
tain'd not to the Prieſts and Levites, otherwiſe than as they happen'd to
be of the Sanhedrim or Senat, to which they had no right at all but by
election. It is in this capacity therfore that the People are commanded
under pain of death to hearken to them, and to do according to the fen-
tence of the Law which they should teach; but in Ifrael the Law Ecclefia-
ftical and Civil was the fame, therfore the Sanhedrim having the ·pow-
er of one, had the power of both. But as the national Religion ap-
pertain❜d to the Jurifdiction of the Sanhedrim, fo the Liberty of Con
ſcience appertain'd, from the fame date, and by the fame right, to the
Prophets and their Difciples; as where it is faid, I will raife up a Pro-
* De Legibus.
+ De Judiciis.
phet
3
59
OCEAN A.
phet -and whoever will not hearken to my words which he fhall Speak in
my name, I will require it of him. The words relate to prophetic
Right, which was above all the Orders of this Commonwealth;
whence ELIJAH not only refus'd to obey the King, but deftroy'd his 2 Kings 1.
Meffengers with fire. And wheras it was not lawful by the Natio-
nal Religion to facrifice in any other place than the Temple, a Prophet
was his own Temple, and might facrifice where he would, as ELI-
JAH did in Mount Carmel. By this right JOHN the Baptift and our
Saviour, to whom it more particularly related, had their Diſciples, and 19.
taught the people; whence is deriv'd our preſent right of GATHER'D
CONGREGATIONS: Wherfore the Chriftian Religion grew up
according to the Orders of the Commonwealth of Ifrael, and not a-
gainst them. Nor was Liberty of Confcience infring'd by this Go-
vernment, till the civil Liberty of the fame was loft, as under HE-
ROD, PILAT, and TIBERIUS, a threepil'd Tyranny.
To procede, Athens preferv'd her Religion, by the teftimony of
PAUL, with great Superftition: If ALCIBIADES, that Atheiſtical
fellow, had not ſhew'd them a pair of heels, they had ſhaven off his head
for ſhaving their MERCURYS, and making their Gods look ridicu-
louſly upon them without beards. Nevertheless, if PAUL reafon'd
with them, they lov'd news, for which he was the more welcom; and
if he converted DIONYSIUS the Areopagit, that is, one of the Sena-
tors, there follow'd neither any hurt to him, nor lofs of honor to
DIONYSIUS. And for Rome, if CICERO, in his moſt excellent
Book de natura Deorum, overthrew the National Religion of that
Commonwealth, he was never the farther from being Conful. But
there is a meanneſs and poorneſs in modern Prudence, not only to the
damage of Civil Government, but of Religion it felf: for to make a
man in matter of Religion, which admits not of fenfible demonftrati-
on (jurare in verba Magiftri) engage to believe no otherwiſe than is
believ'd by my Lord Biſhop, or Goodman Prefbyter, is a Pedantiſm,
that has made the Sword to be a Rod in the hands of Schoolmasters;
by which means, wheras the Chriſtian Religion is the fartheft of any
from countenancing War, there never was a War of Religion but
fince Chriſtianity: For which we are beholden to the Pope; for the
Pope not giving liberty of Confcience to Princes and Commonwealths,
they cannot give that to their Subjects which they have not themſelves:
whence both Princes and Subjects either thro his inſtigation, or their
own difputes, have introduc'd that execrable cuſtom, never known in
the world before, of fighting for Religion, and denying the Magiftrat
to have any juriſdiction concerning it; wheras the Magiftrat's lofing the
power of Religion loſes the Liberty of Confcience, which in that cafe
has nothing to protect it. But if the People be otherwiſe taught, it
concerns them to look about them, and to diſtinguiſh between the
fhrieking of the Lapwing, and the voice of the Turtle.
TO com to Civil Laws, if they ſtand one way and the balance a-
nother, it is the caſe of a Government which of neceffity muſt be new
model'd; wherefore your Lawyers adviſing you upon the like occafions
to fit your Government to their Laws, are no more to be regarded,
than your Taylor if he ſhould defire you to fit your body to his dou-
blet. There is alfo danger in the plaufible pretence of reforming the
Law, except the Government be firſt good, in which caſe it is a good
I 2
Tree,
1 Kings 18.
1
60
OCEAN A.
1
Of Courts.
Tree, and (trouble not your felves overmuch) brings not forth evil
fruit; otherwiſe, if the Tree be evil, you can never reform the fruit :
or if a Root that is naught bring forth fruit of this kind that ſeems to
be good, take the more heed, for it is the ranker poiſon. It was no
wife probable, if AUGUSTUS had not made excellent Laws, that the
bowels of Rome could have com to be fo miferably eaten out by the
Tyranny of TIBERIUS and his Succeffors. The beſt Rule as to
your Laws in general is, that they be few. Rome by the teſtimony of
CICERO was beft govern'd under thofe of the twelve Tables; and
by that of TACITUS, Plurima leges, corruptiffima refpublica. You
will be told, That where the Laws be few, they leave much to Arbi-
trary Power; but where they be many, they leave more: The Laws
in this cafe, according to JUSTINIAN and the beft Lawyers, being
as litigious as the Suitors. SOLON made few; LYCURGUS fewer
Laws: and Commonwealths have the feweſt at this day of all other
Governments.
NOW to conclude this part with a word de Judiciis, or of
the Conftitution or Courfe of Courts; it is a Difcourfe not otherwiſe
capable of being well manag'd but by particular examples, both the
Conſtitution and Courſe of Courts being divers in different Govern-
ments, but beſt beyond compare in Venice, where they regard not ſo
much the Arbitrary Power of their Courts, as the Conftitution of them;
wherby that Arbitrary Power being altogether unable to retard or do
hurt to bufinefs, produces and muft produce the quickeſt diſpatch, and
the moſt righteous dictats of Juftice that are perhaps in human nature.
The manner I ſhall not ftand in this place to defcribe, becauſe it is
exemplify'd at large in the Judicature of the People of Oceana. And
thus much of antient Prudence, and the firft branch of this prelimi-
nary Diſcourſe.
The
OCEAN A.
61
I
The Second Part of the Preliminarys.
N the fecond Part I fhall endeavor to fhew the Rife, Progrefs,
and Declination of modern Prudence.
THE date of this kind of Policy is to be computed, as was
ſhewn, from thoſe Inundations of Goths, Vandals, Huns, and Lom-
bards, that overwhelm'd the Roman Empire. But as there is no ap-
pearance in the Bulk or Conftitution of modern Prudence, that it
fhould ever have bin able to com up and grapple with the Antient,
fo fomthing of neceffity muſt have interpos'd, whereby this came to
be enervated, and that to receive ftrength and incouragement. And
this was the execrable Reign of the Roman Emperors taking rife from
(that fælix fcelus) the Arms of CAESAR, in which ftorm the Ship of
the Roman Commonwealth was forc'd to difburden itſelf of that pre-
cious Fraight, which never fince could emerge or raiſe its head but in
the Gulf of Venice.
Modern Pru-
IT is faid in Scripture, Thy evil is of thy felf, O Ifrael! To which TheTransition
anſwers that of the Moralifts,* None is hurt but by himself, as alfo the Antient into
whole matter of the Politics; at preſent this Example of the Romans, dence.
who, thro a negligence committed in their Agrarian Laws, let in the
fink of Luxury, and forfeited the ineftimable Treaſure of Liberty for
themſelves and their Pofterity.
Romans.
THEIR Agrarian Laws were fuch, wherby their Lands ought to The Agrarian
have bin divided among the People, either without mention of a Co- Laws of the
lony, in which caſe they were not oblig'd to change their abode; or
with mention and upon condition of a Colony, in which cafe they
were to change their abode; and leaving the City, to plant themſelves Sigonius de
upon the Lands fo affign'd. The Lands affign'd, or that ought to Ant. Ro.
have bin affign'd in either of theſe ways, were of three kinds : Such
as were taken from the Enemy and diftributed to the People; or fuch
as were taken from the Enemy, and under color of being referv'd to
the Public uſe, were thro ftealth poffeft by the Nobility; or fuch as
were bought with the Public Money to be diftributed. Of the Laws
offer'd in theſe cafes, thoſe which divided the Lands taken from the
Enemy, or purchas'd with the Public Money, never occafion'd any
difpute; but fuch as drove at difpoffeffing the Nobility of their Ufur-
pations, and dividing the common purchase of the Sword among the Peo-
ple, were never touch'd but they caus'd Earthquakes, nor could they
ever be obtain'd by the People; or being obtain'd, be obſerv'd by
the Nobility, who not only preferv'd their prey, but growing vaftly
rich upon it, bought the People by degrees quite out of thofe Shares
that had been confer'd upon them. This the GRACCHI Coming too
late to perceive, found the Balance of the Commonwealth to be loft
but putting the People (when they had leaft force) by forcible means
upon the recovery of it, did ill, feeing it neither could nor did tend to
any more than to fhew them by worſe effects, that what the Wiſdom
of their Leaders had diſcover'd was true. For (quite contrary to
what has happen'd in Oceana, where, the Balance falling to the Peo-
Nemo nocetur nifi ex fe.
ple,
;
62
OCEAN A.
t
ple, they have overthrown the Nobility) that Nobility of Rome, under
the conduct of SYLLA, overthrew the People and the Common-
wealth: feeing SYLLA first introduc'd that new Balance, which was
Military Colo- the Foundation of the fucceding Monarchy, in the plantation of Mi-
litary Colonys, inftituted by his diftribution of the conquer'd Lands,
not now of Enemys, but of Citizens, to forty-feven Legions of his
Soldiers; fo that how he came to be PERPETUAL DIC-
TATOR, or other Magiftrats to fuccede him in like Power, is no
Miracle.
"¡y.
The Balance of
the Roman
Empire.
Dine,
THESE Military Colonys (in which manner fucceding Empe-
rors continu'd, as AUGUSTUS by the diftribution of the Veterans,
wherby he had overcom BRUTUS and CASSIUS, to plant their
Soldiery) confifted of fuch as I conceive were they that are called Mi-
lites beneficiarii; in regard that the Tenure of their Lands was by way
of Benefices, that is for Life, and upon condition of Duty or Service
in the War upon their own Charge. Thefe Benefices ALEXANDER
SEVERUS granted to the Heirs of the Incumbents, but upon the
fame conditions. And fuch was the Dominion by which the Roman
Emperors gave their Balance. But to the Beneficiarys, as was no lefs
than neceffary for the fafety of the Prince, a matter of eight thoufand
by the Example of AUGUSTUS were added, which departed not
from his fides, but were his perpetual Guard, call'd Pretorian Bands;
tho theſe, according to the incurable flaw already obferv'd in this
kind of Government, became the most frequent Butchers of their
Lords that are to be found in Story. Thus far the Roman Monarchy
is much the fame with that at this day in Turky, confifting of a Camp,
and a Horſequarter; a Camp in regard of the Spabys and Janizarys,
the perpetual Guard of the Prince, except they alfo chance to be li-
quoriſh after his Blood; and a Horfequarter in regard of the diftribu-
tion of his whole Land to Tenants for Life, upon condition of continual
Service, or as often as they ſhall be commanded at their own charge by
Timars, being a word which they fay fignifys Benefices, that it fhall
fave me a labor of opening the Government.
BUT the Fame of MAHOMET and his Prudence, is efpecially
founded in this, That wheras the Roman Monarchy, except that of
Ifrael, was the moſt imperfect, the Turkish is the most perfect that
ever was. Which happen'd in that the Roman (as the Ifraelitiſh of
the Sanhedrim and the Congregation) had a mixture of the Senat and
the People; and the Turkish is pure. And that this was pure, and
the other mix'd, happen'd not thro the Wiſdom of the Legiſlators,
but the different Genius of the Nations; the People of the Eaſtern
Parts, except the Ifraelits, which is to be attributed to their Agrarian,
having bin fuch as fcarce ever knew any other Condition than that of
Slavery; and theſe of the Weſtern having ever had fuch a reliſh of
Liberty, as thro what defpair foever could never be brought to ſtand
ſtill while the Yoke was putting on their Necks, but by being fed with
fom hopes of referving to themſelves fom part of their Freedom.
WHERFORE JULIUS CAESAR (faith* SUETONIUS) Con-
tented himſelf in naming half the Magiftrats, to leave the reft to
the fuffrage of the People. And MACENAS, tho he would not have
AUGUSTUS to give the People their Liberty, would not have him
★ Comitia cum populo fortitus eft.
take
OCEAN A.
63
1
take it quite away t. Whence this Empire being neither Hawk nor
Buzzard, made a flight accordingly; and the Prince being perpetually
toft (having the Avarice of the Soldiery on this hand to fatisfy upon
the People, and the Senat and the People on the other to be defended
from the Soldiery) feldom dy'd any other death than by one Horn of
this Dilemma, as is noted more at large by MACHIAVEL. But P. cap. 19.
the Pretorian Bands, thofe beftial executioners of their Captain's Ty-
ranny upon others, and of their own upon him, having continued
from the time of AUGUSTUS, were by CONSTANTIN the Great
(incens'd againſt them for taking part with his Adverfary MAXEN-
TIUS) remov'd from their ſtrong Garifon which they held in Rome,
and diſtributed into divers Provinces. The Benefices of the Soldiers
that were hitherto held for Life and upon Duty, were by this Prince
made Hereditary: fo that the whole Foundation wherup on this Em-
pire was firſt built being now remov'd, fhews plainly, that the Em-
perors muſt long before this have found out fom other way of fupport;
and this was by ftipendiating the Goths, a People that, deriving their
Roots from the Northern parts of Germany, or out of Sweden, had
(thro their Victorys obtain'd against DOMITIAN) long fince fpred
their Branches to fo near a Neighbourhood with the Roman Territorys,
that they began to overſhadow them. For the Emperors making uſe
of them in their Armys (as the French do at this day of the Switz)
gave them that under the Notion of a Stipend, which they receiv'd as
Tribute, coming (if there were any default in the payment) ſo often
to diſtrein for it, that in the time of HONORIUS they fack'd Rome,
and poſſeſt themſelves of Italy. And fuch was the tranſition of an-
tient into modern Prudence; or that breach which being follow'd in
every part of the Roman Empire with Inundations of Vandals, Huns,
Lombards, Franks, Saxons, overwhelm'd antient Languages, Learn-
ing, Prudence, Manners, Citys, changing the names of Rivers, Machiavel.
Countrys, Seas, Mountains, and Men; CAMILLUS, CESAR, and
POMPEY, being com to EDMUND, RICHARD, and GEOFFREY.
Balance
TO open the Groundwork or Balance of thefe new Politicians: The Gothic
Feudum, fays CALVIN the Lawyer, is a Gothic word of divers figni-
fications; for it is taken either for War, or for a poſſeſſion of conquer'd
Lands, diftributed by the Victor to fuch of his Captains and Soldiers as
bad merited in his Wars, upon condition to acknowledge him to be their
perpetual Lord, and themſelves to be his Subjects.
OF theſe there were three Kinds or Orders: The firft of Nobi- Inftitution of
Feudatory
lity, diftinguiſh'd by the Titles of Dukes, Marquiffes, Earls; and Principalitys.
theſe being gratified with the Citys, Caſtles, and Villages of the con-
quer'd Italians, their Feuds participated of Royal Dignity, and were
call'd Regalia, by which they had right to coin Mony, create Magi-
ftrats, take Toll, Cuftoms, Confifcations, and the like.
FEUDS of the ſecond Order were fuch as, with the conſent of
the King, were beftow'd by theſe Feudatory Princes upon men of in-
ferior Quality, call'd their Barons, on condition that next to the King
they ſhould defend the Dignitys and Fortunes of their Lords in
Arms.
+ Neque id exiftimare debes autorem me tibi effe, ut tyrannidem in S. P. Q. R. in fervitu
tem reda&um teneas: quod neque dicere meum, neque facere tuum eft,
THE
+
1
64
OCEAN A.
For the proof
Difcourfe out
of Records
THE loweſt Order of Feuds were fuch as being confer'd by thoſe
of the ſecond Order upon privat men, whether Noble or not Noble,
oblig'd them in the like Duty to their Superiors; theſe were call'd Va-
vafors. And this is the Gothic Balance, by which all the Kingdoms
this day in Chriſtendom were at firft erected; for which cauſe, if I had
time, I ſhould open in this place the Empire of Germany, and the
Kingdoms of France, Spain, and Poland: But fo much as has bin faid
being fufficient for the diſcovery of the Principles of modern Prudence
in general, I fhall divide the remainder of my Difcourfe, which is
more particular, into three parts.
THE firſt ſhewing the Conftitution of the late Monarchy of
Oceana.
THE fecond, the Diffolution of the fame. And
THE third, the Generation of the prefent Commonwealth.
THE Conſtitution of the late Monarchy of Oceana is to be confi-
der'd in relation to the different Nations by whom it has bin fuccef-
fively fubdu'd and govern'd. The firſt of theſe were the Romans,
the ſecond the Teutons, the third the Scandians, and the fourth the
Neuftrians.
THE Government of the Romans, who held it as a Province, I
fhall omit, becauſe I am to ſpeak of their Provincial Government in
another place; only it is to be remember'd here, that if we have given
over running up and down naked, and with dappl'd hides, learn'd to
write and read, and to be inftructed with good Arts, for all theſe we
are beholden to the Romans, either immediatly, or mediatly by the
Teutons for that the Teutons had the Arts from no other hand, is
plain enough by their Language, which has yet no word to fignify
either writing or reading, but what is deriv'd from the Latin. Fur-
thermore, by the help of thefe Arts fo learn'd, we have bin capable of
that Religion which we have long fince receiv'd; wherfore it ſeems
to me, that we ought not to detract from the memory of the Romans,
by whoſe means we are, as it were, of Beafts becom Men, and by
whoſe means we might yet of obfcure and ignorant Men (if we
thought not too well of our felves) becom a wife and a great Peo-
ple.
THE Romans having govern'd Oceana provincially, the Teutons
of the ensuing were the firſt that introduc'd the Form of the late Monarchy. To
thefe fucceded the Scandians, of whom, (becauſe their Reign was
and Antiqui- fhort, as alſo becauſe they made little alteration in the Government as
tys freSelden's
Titles of Ho- to the Form) I ſhall take no notice. But the Teutons going to work
upon the Gothic Balance, divided the whole Nation into three forts of
Feuds, that of Ealdorman, that of Kings Thane, and that of Middle
Thane.
nor, from
pag. 593, to
pag 837.
The Teuton
Monarchy.
WHEN the Kingdom was firſt divided into Precincts will be as
hard to fhew, as when it began firft to be govern'd; it being im-
poffible that there ſhould be any Government without fom Divifion.
The Divifion that was in ufe with the Teutons, was by Countys, and
every County had either its Ealdorman, or High Reeve. The title of
Ealdorman came in time to Eorl, or Erl, and that of High Reeve to
High Sheriff.
EARL
OCEAN A.
65
}
EARL of the Shire or County denoted the King's Thane, or Te- Earls.
nant by Grand Serjeantry or Knights Service, in chief or in capite; his
Poffeffions were fomtimes the whole Territory from whence he had his
denomination, that is, the whole County, fomtimes more than one
County, and fomtimes lefs, the remaining part being in the Crown.
He had alfo fomtimes a third, or fom other cuſtomary part of the
profits of certain Citys, Boroughs, or other places within his Earl-
dom. For an example of the Poffeffions of Earls in antient times,
ETHELRED had to him and his Heirs the whole Kingdom of Mercia,
containing three or four Countys; and there were others that had
little lefs.
KING's Thane was alfo an honorary Title, to which he was King'sThane
qualify'd that had five Hides of Land held immediatly of the King
by ſervice of perfonal attendance; infomuch that if a Churl or Coun-
tryman had thriven to this proportion, having a Church, a Kitchen, a
Belhouſe (that is, a Hall with a Bell in it to call his Family to dinner)
a Boroughgate with a feat (that is, a Porch) of his own, and any
diftinct Office in the King's Court, then was he the King's Thane. But
the proportion of a Hide Land, otherwife call'd Caruca, or a Plow
Land, is difficult to be understood, becauſe it was not certain; never-
theleſs it is generally conceiv'd to be ſo much as may be manag'd with
one Plow, and would yield the maintenance of the fame, with the
appurtenances in all kinds.
THE Middle Thane was feudal, but not honorary; he was alfo MiddleThane.
call'd a Vavafor, and his Lands a Vavafory, which held of fom Meſn
Lord, and not immediatly of the King.
POSSESSIONS and their Tenures, being of this nature, fhew
the Balance of the Teuton Monarchy; wherin the Riches of Earls were
fo vaft, that to arife from the Balance of their Dominion to their
Power, they were not only call'd Reguli or little Kings, but were
fuch indeed; their Jurifdiction being of two forts, either that which
was exercis'd by them in the Court of their Countrys, or in the High
Court of the Kingdom.
IN the Territory denominating an Earl, if it were all his own, Shiremoot.
the Courts held, and the Profits of that Jurifdiction were to his own
uſe and benefit. But if he had but fom part of his County, then his
Jurifdiction and Courts (faving perhaps in thofe poffeffions that were
his own) were held by him to the King's uſe and benefit; that is, he
commonly ſupply'd the Office which the Sheriffs regularly executed in
Countys that had no Earls, and whence they came to be call'd Vif_ Viſcounts.
counts. The Court of the County that had an Earl was held by the
Earl and the Biſhop of the Diocefs, after the manner of the Sheriffs
Turns to this day; by which means both the Ecclefiaftical and Tem-
poral Laws were given in charge together to the Country. The Cau-
fes of Vavafors or Vavaforys appertain❜d to the cognizance of this Court,
where Wills were prov'd, Judgment and Execution given, Caſes cri-
minal and civil determin'd.
THE King's Thanes had the like Jurifdiction in their Thane Lands, Halymoot.
as Lords in their Manors, where they alſo kept Courts.
BESIDES theſe in particular, both the Earls and King's Thanes,
together with the Bishops, Abbots, and Vavafors, or Middle Thanes,
had in the High Court or Parlament in the Kingdom, a more public Weidenage-
Jurifdiction, confifting Firſt of deliberative Power for advifing upon, moots.
K
and
1
OCEAN A.
and affenting to new Laws: Secondly, of giving counfil in matters of
State and Thirdly, of Judicature upon Suits and Complaints. I fhall
not omit to inlighten the obfcurity of theſe times (in which there is
little to be found of a methodical Conftitution of this High Court) by
the addition of an Argument, which I conceive to bear a ſtrong tefti-
mony to it felf, tho taken out of a late Writing that conceals the Au-
thor. "It is well known, fays he, that in every quarter of the Realm
a great many Boroughs do yet fend Burgeffes to the Parlament,
"which nevertheleſs be fo antiently and fo long fince decay'd and gon
to nought, that they cannot be fhew'd to have bin of any Reputa-
<tion fince the Conqueft, much leſs to have obtain❜d any fuch Privi-
lege by the grant of any fucceding King: wherfore theſe muſt have
"had this right by more antient ufage, and before the Conqueft, they
being inable now to ſhew whence they derived it.”
<<
re
se
(x
THIS Argument (tho there be more) I fhall pitch upon as fuf-
ficient to prove; First, that the lower fort of the People had right to
Seffion in Parlament during the time of the Teutons. Secondly, that
they were qualify'd to the fame by election in their Boroughs, and, if
Knights of the fhire (as no doubt they are) be as antient in the Coun-
trys. Thirdly, If it be a good Argument to fay, that the Commons
during the reign of the Teutons were elected into Parlament, becauſe
they are ſo now, and no man can fhew when this cuftom began; I fee
not which way it ſhould be an ill one to ſay, that the Commons du-
ring the reign of the Teutons conftituted alſo a diſtinct Houſe, becauſe
they do fo now; unless any man can fhew that they did ever fit in the
fame Houſe with the Lords. Wherfore to conclude this part, I con-
ceive for thefe, and other reafons to be mention'd hereafter, that the
Parlament of the Teutons confifted of the King, the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and the Commons of the Nation, notwithſtanding
25 Edw. 3. the ſtile of divers Acts of Parlament, which runs as that of Magna
Charta in the King's name only, feeing the fame was nevertheleſs enact-
ed by the King, Peers, and Commons of the Land, as is teftify'd in
thoſe words by a ſubſequent Act,
C. I.
Monarchy of
the Neu-
ftrians.
Their Earls.
27 H. 8.
THE Monarchy of the Teutons had ftood in this poſture about
two hundred and twenty years; when TURBO Duke of Neuftria
making his claim to the Crown of one of their Kings that dy'd child-
lefs, follow'd it with fucceſsful Arms; and being poffeft of the King-
dom, us'd it as conquer'd, diftributing the Earldoms, Thane Lands,
Biſhoprics and Prelacys of the whole Realm among his Neuftrians.
From this time the Earl came to be call'd Comes, Conful, and Dux (tho
Conful and Dux grew afterward out of ufé) the King's Thanes came to
be call'd Barons, and their Lands Baronys; the Middle Thane holding
ftill of a mean Lord, retain'd the name of Vavafor.
THE Earl or Comes continu'd to have the third part of the Pleas of
the County paid to him by the Sheriff or Vice-comes, now a diftinct Of
ficer in every County depending upon the King; faving that fuch Earls
as had their Countys to their own ufe, were now Counts Palatin, and
had under the King Regal Juriſdiction; infomuch that they conftitu-
ted their own Sheriffs, granted Pardons, and iffu'd Writs in their
own names; nor did the King's Writ of ordinary Juſtice run in their
Dominions till a late Statute, wherby much of this privilege was taken
away.
FOR
OCEAN A.
67
1
fions.
FOR Barons, they came from henceforth to be in different times of Their Barons
three kinds; Barons by their Eftates and Tenures, Barons by Writ,
and Barons created by Letters Patent. From TURBO the firſt to
ADOXUS the ſeventh King from the Conqueft, Barons had their de-
nomination from their Poffeffions and Tenures. And theſe were ei-
ther Spiritual or Temporal; for not only the. Thane Lands, but the Barons by
their Poffef-
poffeffions of Biſhops, as alfo of fom twenty-fix Abbats, and two
Priors, were now erected into Baronys, whence the Lords Spiritual
that had suffrage in the Teuton Parlament as Spiritual Lords, came to
have it in the Neuftrian Parlament as Barons, and were made fubject
(which they had not formerly bin) to Knights fervice in chief. Baro-
ny coming henceforth to fignify all honorary poffeffions as well of Earls
as Barons, and Baronage to denote all kinds of Lords as well Spiritual
as Temporal having right to fit in Parlament, the Baronys in this ſenſe
were fomtimes more, and fomtimes fewer, but commonly about 200
or 250, containing in them a matter of fixty thouſand feuda militum,
or Knights Fees, wherof fom twenty-eight thouſand were in the Cler-
gy.
It is ill luck that no man can tell what the Land of a Knight's Fee
(reckon'd in fom Writs at 40 l. a year, and in others at 10) was cer-
tainly worth; for by fuch a help we might have exactly demonſtrated
Neuftrian
the Balance of this Government. But, fays COKE, it contain'd Coke 11 Inft.
twelve Plow Lands, and that was thought to be the most certain ac- pag. 596.
count. But this again is extremely uncertain; for one Plow out of fom
Land that was fruitful, might work more than ten out of fom other
that was barren. Nevertheleſs, ſeeing it appears by BRACTON, Balance of the
that of Earldoms and Baronys it was wont to be faid, that the whole Monarchy.
Kingdom was compos'd; as alſo, that theſe conſiſting of 60000 Knights
Fees, furniſh'd 60000 men for the King's fervice, being the whole Mi-
litia of this Monarchy, it cannot be imagin'd that the Vavaforys or
Freeholds in the People amounted to any confiderable proportion.
Wherfore the Balance and Foundation of this Government was in the
60000 Knights Fees, and theſe being poffeft by the 250 Lords, it was
a Government of the Few, or of the Nobility; wherin the People
might alſo affemble, but could have no more than a mere name. And
the Clergy holding a third of the whole Nation, as is plain by the
Parlament Roll; it is an abfurdity (feeing the Clergy of France came
firſt thro their Riches to be a State of that Kingdom) to acknowlege
the People to have bin a State of this Realm, and not to allow it to the
Clergy, who were ſo much more weighty in the Balance, which is 4 Rich. 2.
that of all other whence a State or Order in a Government is denomi-
nated. Wherfore this Monarchy confifted of the King, and of the
thrée (ordines Regni, or) Eftates, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal,
and the Commons: It confifted of theſe I fay as to the balance, tho
during the Reign of fom of thefe Kings, not as to the adminiftra-
tion.
Numb. 13.
reign of the
FOR the ambition of TURBO, and fom of thoſe that more im- Adminiftra-
tion of the
mediatly fucceded him, to be abfolute Princes, ftrove againſt the na- Neultrian
ture of their Foundation, and, inafmuch as he had divided almoft the Monarchy
whole Realm among his Neuftrians, with fom incouragement for a during the
while. But the Neuftrians while they were but foren plants, having firt Kings.
no ſecurity againſt the Natives, but in growing up by their Princes
fides, were no fooner well rooted in their vaft Dominions, than they
came up according to the infallible confequence of the Balance domeſtic,
K 2
and,
68
OCEAN A.
Barons by
Writ.
and, contracting the National intereft of the B aronage, grew as fierce
in the vindication of the antient Rights and Liberties of the fame, as:
if they had bin always Natives: Whence, the Kings being as obftinat
on the one fide for their abfolute Power, as thefe on the other for their
Immunitys, grew certain Wars which took their denomination from
the Barons.
THIS fire about the middle of the Reign of ADOXUS began to
break out. And wheras the Predeceffors of this King had divers timeș
bin forc'd to fummon Councils refembling thofe of the Teutons, to
which the Lords only that were Barons by Dominion and Tenure had
hitherto repair'd, ADOXUS feeing the effects of fuch Dominion, be-
gan firſt not to call fuch as were Barons by Writ (for that was accord-
ing to the practice of antient times) but to call fuch by Writs as were
otherwife no Barons; by which means ſtriving to avoid the Conſequence
of the Balance, in coming unwillingly to fet the Government ftreight,
he was the firſt that fet it awry. For the Barons in his Reign, and
his Succeffors, having vindicated their antient Authority, reftor'd the
Parlament with all the Rights and Privileges of the fame, faving that
from thenceforth the Kings had found out a way wherby to help them-
ſelves againſt the mighty, by Creatures of their own, and ſuch as had
no other fupport but by their favor. By which means this Govern-
ment, being indeed the Maſterpiece of modern Prudence, has bin cry'd
up to the Skys, as the only invention wherby at once to maintain the
Soverainty of a Prince, and the Liberty of the People. Wheras in-
deed it has bin no other than a wreſtling match, wherin the Nobility,
as they have bin ftronger, have thrown the King; or the King, if he
has bin ſtronger, has thrown the Nobility; or the King, where he has
had a Nobility, and could bring them to his party, has thrown the
People, as in France and Spain; or the People where they have had no
Nobility, or could get them to be of their party, have thrown the
King, as in Holland, and of later times in Oceana. But they came not
to this ftrength but by fuch approaches and degrees, as remain to be
further open'd. For wheras the Barons by Writ (as the fixty-four
Abbats, and thirty-fix Priors that were fo call'd) were but pro tempore,
DICOTOME being the twelfth King from the Conqueft, began to
Barons by Let- make Barons by Letters Patent, with the addition of honorary Pen-
ters Patent. fions for the maintenance of their Dignitys to them and their Heirs
ſo that they were hands in the King's Purfe, and had no fhoulders for
his Throne. Of theſe when the Houſe of Peers came once to be full,
as will be ſeen hereafter, there was nothing more emty. But for the
prefent, the Throne having other fupports, they did not hurt that fo
much as they did the King: For the old Barons taking DICOTOME'S
Prodigality to fuch Creatures fo ill, that they depos'd him, got the
trick of it, and never gave over fetting up and pulling down their
Kings according to their various interefts, and that faction of the White
Diffolution of and Red, into which they have bin thenceforth divided, till PANURGUS
the late Mo the eighteenth King from the Conqueft, was more by their Favor than
his Right advanc'd to the Crown. This King thro his natural fubtilty
reflecting at once upon the greatnefs of their Power, and the inconftan-
cy of their favor, began to find another Flaw in this kind of Govern-
ment, which is alfo noted by MACHIAVEL, namely that a Throne
fupported by a Nobility, is not fo hard to be afcended, as kept warm.
Wherfore his fecret Jealouſy, left the diffenfion of the Nobility, as it
49 H. 3.
narchy of
Oceana.
;
brought
OCEAN A.
69
1
1
;
brought him in, might throw him out, made him travel in ways un-
diſcover'd by thern, to ends as little foreſeen by himſelf: while to eſta-
bliſh his own fafety, he by mixing Water with their Wine, firſt began
to open thoſe Sluces that have fince overwhelm'd not the King only, but
the Throne. For wheras a Nobility ftrikes not at the Throne with-
out which they cannot fubfift, but at fom King that they do not like
popular Power ſtrikes thro the King at the Throne, as that which is
incompatible with it. Now that PANURGUS in abating the Power
of the Nobility, was the cauſe whence it came to fall into the hands of
the People, appears by thoſe ſeveral Statutes that were made in his
Reign, as that for Population, thofe againſt Retainers, and that for
Alienations.
BY the Statute of Population, all houſes of Huſbandry that were
us'd with twenty Acres of Ground and upwards, were to be main-
tain'd, and kept up for ever with a competent proportion of Land
laid to them, and in no wife, as appears by a ſubſequent Statute, to
be fever'd. By which means the houſes being kept up, did of neceffi-
ty inforce Dwellers; and the proportion of Land to be till'd being kept
up, did of neceffity inforce the Dweller not to be a Begger or Cot-
tager, but a Man of fom fubftance, that might keep Hinds and Ser-
vants, and fet the Plow a going. This did mightily concern (fays the
Hiſtorian of that Prince) the might and manhood of the Kingdom,
and in effect amortize a great part of the Lands to the hold and pof-
feffion of the Yeomanry or middle People, who living not in a fervil
or indigent faſhion, were much unlink'd from dependence upon their
Lords, and living in a free and plentiful manner, became a more excel-
lent infantry; but fuch a one upon which the Lords had fo little Power,
that from henceforth they may be computed to have bin difarm'd.
:
AND as they loft their infantry after this manner, ſo their Ca-
valry and Commanders were cut off by the Statute of Retainers for
wheras it was the cuſtom of the Nobility to have younger Brothers of
good houſes, metal'd fellows, and fuch as were knowing in the feats
of Arms about them; they who were longer follow'd with fo dange-
rous a train, eſcap'd not fuch Puniſhments, as made them take up.
HENCEFORTH the Country-lives, and great Tables of the
Nobility, which no longer nouriſh'd veins that would bleed for them,
were fruitleſs and loathfom till they chang'd the Air, and of Princes
became Courtiers; where their Revenues, never to have bin exhauſted
by Beef and Mutton, were found narrow, whence follow'd racking
of Rents, and at length fale of Lands: the riddance thro the Statute
of Alienations being render'd far more quick and facil than formerly
it had bin thro the new invention of Intails.
TO this it happen'd, that CORAUNUS the Succeffor of that
King diffolving the Abbys, brought with the declining ftate of the
Nobility fo vaſt a prey to the Induſtry of the People, that the Balance
of the Commonwealth was too apparently in the popular Party, to
be unfeen by the wife Council of Queen PARTHENIA, who con-
verting her reign thro the perpetual Lovetricks that paft between her
and her People into a kind of Romance, wholly neglected the Nobi-
lity. And by theſe degrees came the Houſe of Commons to raiſe
that head, which fince has bin fo high and formidable to their Princes,
that they have look'd pale upon thoſe Affemblys. Nor was there
any thing now wanting to the deftruction of the Throne, but that the
People,
OCEAN A.
People, not apt to fee their own ftrength, fhould be put to feel it;
when a Prince, as ftiff in difputes as the nerve of Monarchy was
grown flack, receiv'd that unhappy incouragement from his Clergy
which became his utter ruin, while truſting more to their Logic than
the rough Philoſophy of his Parlament, it came to an irreparable
breach; for the Houfe of Peers, which alone had ſtood in this gap,
now finking down between the King and the Commons, fhew'd that
CRASSUS was dead, and the Ifthmus broken. But a Monarchy de-
vefted of its Nobility, has no refuge under Heaven but an Army.
Wherfore the diffolution of this Government caus'd the War, not the
War the diffolution of this Government.
OF the King's fuccefs with his Arms it is not neceffary to give any
further account, than that they prov'd as ineffectual as his Nobility;
but without a Nobility or an Army (as has bin fhew'd) there can be
no Monarchy. Wherfore what is there in nature that can ariſe out of
theſe Aſhes, but a popular Government, or a new Monarchy to be
erected by the victorious Army?
TO erect a Monarchy, be it never fo new, unleſs like LEVIA-
THAN you can hang it, as the Country-fellow fpeaks, by Geometry,
(for what elfe is it to fay, that every other Man muft give up his will
to the will of this one Man without any other foundation?) it muſt
ftand upon old Principles, that is, upon a Nobility or an Army planted
on a due balance of Dominion. Aut viam inveniam aut faciam, was an
Adage of CÆSAR; and there is no ſtanding for a Monarchy unleſs
it finds this Balance, or makes it. If it finds it, the work's don to its
hand: for, where there is inequality of Eſtates, there muſt be inequa-
lity of Power; and where there is inequality of Power, there can be
no Commonwealth. To make it, the Sword muft extirpat out of
Dominion all other roots of Power, and plant an Army upon that
ground. An Army may be planted Nationally or Provincially. To
plant it Nationally, it muſt be in one of the four ways mention'd, that
is, either Monarchically in part, as the Roman Beneficiarii; or Mo-
narchically, in the whole, as the Turkish Timariots; Ariſtocratically,
that is, by Earls and Barons, as the Neuftrians were planted by
TURBO; or Democratically, that is, by equal lots, as the Ifraelitiſh
Army in the Land of Canaan by JOSHUA. In every one of theſe
ways there muſt not only be Confifcations, but Confiſcations to fuch a
proportion as may anfwer to the work intended.
:
CONFISCATION of a People that never fought againſt you,
but whoſe Arms you have born, and in which you have bin victo-
rious, and this upon premeditation, and in cold blood, I fhould have
thought to be againſt any example in human Nature, but for thofe
alleg'd by MACHIAVEL of AGATHOCLES, and OLIVERETTO
di Fermo the former wherof being Captain General of the Syra
cufans, upon a day affembl'd the Senat and the People, as if he had
fomthing to communicat with them, when at a fign given he cut the
Senators in pieces to a man, and all the richest of the People, by which
means he came to be King. The proceedings of OLIVERETTO in
making himſelf Prince of Fermo, were fomwhat different in circum-
ſtances, but of the fame nature. Nevertheleſs CATILIN, who had
a fpirit equal to any of theſe in his intended mifchief, could never
bring the like to pafs in Rome. The head of a fmall Commonwealth,
fuch a one as was that of Syracufa or Fermo, is eafily brought to the
block }
OCEAN A.
71
block; but that a Populous Nation, fuch as Rome, had not ſuch a one,
was the grief of NERO. If SYLVIA or CÆSAR attain'd to be Princes,
it was by Civil War, and fuch Civil War as yielded rich ſpoils, there
being a vaſt Nobility to be confiſcated, which alfo was the caſe in
Oceana, when it yielded earth by Earldoms and Baronys to the
Neuftrian, for the plantation of his new Potentates. Where a Con-
queror finds the Riches of a Land in the hands of the Few, the For-
feitures are eaſy, and amount to vaſt advantage; but where the People
have equal fhares, the Confifcation of many coms to little, and is not
only dangerous, but fruitless.
THE Romans in one of their defeats of the Volfci found among
the Captives certain Tufculans, who, upon examination, confeſt that
the Arms they bore were by command of their State; wherupon in-
formation being given to the Senat by the General CAMILLUS, he
was forthwith commanded to march againſt Tufculum; which doing
accordingly, he found the Tufculan Fields full of Huſbandmen, that
ftir'd not otherwiſe from the Plow, than to furniſh his Army with all
kind of Accommodations and Victuals: drawing near to the City, he
faw the Gates wide open, the Magiftrats coming out in their Gowns
to falute and bid him welcom : entring, the Shops were all at work, and
open; the Streets founded with the noife of Schoolboys at their Books;
there was no face of War. Wherupon CAMILLUS caufing the Se-
nat to affemble, told them, That tho the Art was underſtood, yet
had they at length found out the true Arms wherby the Romans were
moſt undoubtedly to be conquer'd, for which cauſe he would not an-
ticipat the Senat, to which he defir'd them forthwith to fend, which
they did accordingly; and their Dictator with the reft of their Em-
baffadors being found by the Roman Senators as they went into the
houſe ſtanding fadly at the door, were fent for in as Friends, and not
as Enemys: Where the Dictator having faid, If we have offended, the
fault was not ſo great as is our Penitence and your Virtue; the Senat
gave them peace forthwith, and ſoon after made the Tufculans Ci-
tizens of Rome.
BUT putting the cafe, of which the World is not able to fhew
an example, That the forfeiture of a populous Nation, not conquer'd,
but Friends, and in cool blood, might be taken; your Army muſt be
planted in one of the ways mention'd. To plant it in the way of ab-
folute Monarchy, that is, upon feuds for life, fuch as the Timars, a Coun-
try as large and fruitful as that of Greece, would afford you but fix-
teen thouſand Timariots, for that is the moſt the Turc (being the beſt
huſband that ever was of this kind) makes of it at this day: and if
Oceana, which is leſs in fruitfulneſs by one half, and in extent by three
parts, ſhould have no greater a force, whoever breaks her in one bat-
tel, may be ſure the ſhall never riſe; for fuch (as was noted by
MACHIAVEL) is the nature of the Turkish Monarchy, if you
break it in two battels, you have deſtroy'd its whole Militia; and the
reft being all flaves, you hold it without any further refiftance. Wher-
fore the erection of an abfolute Monarchy in Oceana, or in any other
Country that is no larger, without making it a certain prey to the firſt
Invader, is altogether impoffible.
TO plant by halves, as the Roman Emperors did their Beneficiarys,
or military Colonys, it muſt be either for life; and this an Army of
Oceaners in their own Country (eſpecially having Eſtates of Inheri-
tance)
7 2
OCEAN A.
tance) will never bear; becauſe fuch an Army fo planted is as well
confifcated as the People; nor had the Mamalucs bin contented with
fuch ufage in Egypt, but that they were Foreners, and daring not to
mix with the Natives, it was of abfolute neceffity to their being.
The generation
of the Com-
monwealth.
OR planting them upon Inheritance, whether Ariftocratically as
the Neuftrians, or Democratically as the Ifraelits, they grow up by
certain confequence into the national Intereſt: and this, if they be
planted popularly, coms to a Commonwealth; if by way of Nobi-
lity, to a mix'd Monarchy, which of all other will be found to be the
only kind of Monarchy, wherof this Nation, or any other that is of
no greater extent, has bin or can be capable: for if the Ifraelits (tho
their Democratical Balance, being fix'd by their Agrarian, ftood firm)
be yet found to have elected Kings, it was becauſe, their Territory lying
open, they were perpetually invaded, and being perpetually invaded,
turn'd themſelves to any thing which thro the want of experience
they thought might be a remedy; whence their miſtake in election of
their Kings (under whom they gain'd nothing, but on the contrary loſt
all they had acquir'd by their Commonwealth, both Eſtates and Li-
bertys) is not only apparent, but without parallel. And if there have
bin (as was fhewn) a Kingdom of the Goths in Spain, and of the
Vandals in Afia, confifting of a fingle Perſon and a Parlament (taking a
Parlament to be a Council of the People only, without a Nobility)
it is exprefly faid of thoſe Councils, that they depos'd their Kings as
often as they pleas'd: nor can there be any other confequence of fuch
a Government, ſeeing where there is a Council of the People, they do
never receive Laws, but give them; and a Council giving Laws to a
fingle Perſon, he has no means in the World wherby to be any more
than a fubordinat Magiftrat, but force: in which caſe he is not a fingle
Perſon and a Parlament, but a fingle Perſon and an Army, which Ar-
my again must be planted as has bin fhewn, or can be of no long con-
tinuance.
IT is true, that the Provincial Balance being in nature quite contra-
ry to the National, you are no way to plant a Provincial Army upon
Dominion. But then you muſt have a native Territory in Strength,
Situation, or Government, able to overbalance the foren, or you can
never hold it. That an Army ſhould in any other caſe be long ſup-
ported by a mere Tax, is a mere Phanfy as void of all reafon and ex-
perience, as if a Man ſhould think to maintain fuch a one by robbing
of Orchards for a mere Tax is but pulling of Plumtrees, the roots
wherof are in others Mens grounds, who fuffering perpetual Violence,
com to hate the Author of it: And it is a Maxim, that no Prince that
is hated by his People can be fafe. Arms planted upon Dominion extir-
pat Enemys, and make Friends: but maintain'd by a mere Tax, have
Enemys that have roots, and Friends that have none.
:
TO conclude, Oceana, or any other Nation of no greater extent,
muſt have a competent Nobility, or is altogether incapable of Mo-
narchy for where there is equality of Eftates, there muſt be equality
of Power; and where there is equality of Power, there can be no
Monarchy.
TO com then to the generation of the Commonwealth; it has bin
fhewn how thro the ways and means us'd by PANURGUS to abaſe
the Nobility, and fo to mend that flaw which we have afferted to be
incurable in this kind of Conſtitution, he fuffer'd the Balance to fall
3
into
O CE A N A.
73
*
into the power of the People, and fo broke the Government: but the
Balance being in the People, the Commonwealth (tho they do not
fee it) is already in the nature of them. There wants nothing elſe
but Time (which is flow and dangerous) or Art (which would be
more quick and fecure) for the bringing thofe native Arms (wher-
withal they are found already) to refift they know not how every
thing that oppoſes them, to fuch maturity as may fix them upon their
own ſtrength and bottom.
BUT wheras this Art is Prudence; and that part of Prudence What Pru-
which regards the prefent Work, is nothing elfe but the ſkill of rai- dence is.
fing ſuch ſuperſtructures of Government, as are natural to the known
Foundations: they never mind the Foundation, but thro certain ani-
mofities (wherwith by ftriving one againſt another they are infected)
or thro freaks, by which, not regarding the courſe of things, nor how
they conduce to their purpoſe, they are given to building in the Air, com
to be divided and fubdivided into endlefs Partys and Factions, both
Civil and Ecclefiaftical: which briefly to open, I fhall firſt ſpeak of
the People in general, and then of their Divifions.
A PEOPLE (fays MACHIAVEL) that is corrupt, is not
capable of a Commonwealth. But in fhewing what a corrupt Peo-
ple is, he has either involv'd himſelf, or me; nor can I otherwife com
out of the Labyrinth, than by ſaying, the Balance altering a Peo-
ple, as to the foregoing Government, muft of neceffity be corrupt:
but Corruption in this fenfe fignifys no more than that the Corruption
of one Government (as in natural Bodys) is the Generation of
another. Wherfore if the Balance alters from Monarchy, the Corrup-
tion of the People in this cafe is that which makes them capable of a
Commonwealth. But wheras I am not ignorant, that the Corruption
which he means is in Manners, this alfo is from the Balance. For the
Balance leading from Monarchical into Popular, abates the Luxury of
the Nobility, and, inriching the People, brings the Government from
a more privat to a more public Intereft; which coming nearer, as has
bin fhewn, to Juſtice and right Reaſon, the People upon a like alteration
is fo far from fuch a Corruption of Manners, as fhould render them
incapable of a Commonwealth, that of neceffity they must therby
contract fuch a Reformation of Manners as will bear no other kind of
Government. On the other fide, where the Balance changes from
Popular to Oligarchical or Monarchical, the public Intereft, with the
Reaſon and Juſtice included in the fame, becoms more privat; Luxury
is introduc'd in the room of Temperance, and Servitude in that of
Freedom; which caufes fuch a corruption of Manners both in the
Nobility and People, as, by the Example of Rome in the time of the
Triumvirs, is more at large diſcover'd by the Author to have bin al-
together incapable of a Commonwealth.
BUT the Balance of Oceana changing quite contrary to that of
Rome, the Manners of the People were not therby corrupted, but on
the contrary adapted to a Commonwealth. For differences of Opi-
nion in a People not rightly inform'd of their Balance, or a divifion
into Partys (while there is not any common Ligament of Power fuffi-
* Cornua nota prius vitulo, quàm frontibus extant.
L
cient
7+
OCEAN A.
cient to reconcile or hold them) is no fufficient proof of Corruption.
Nevertheleſs, ſeeing this muſt needs be matter of fcandal and dan-
ger, it will not be amifs, in fhewing what were the Partys, to fhew
what were their Errors.
THE Partys into which this Nation was divided, were Tempo-
ral, or Spiritual: and the Temporal Partys were eſpecially two, the
one Royalifts, the other Republicans: each of which afferted their dif
ferent Cauſes, either out of Prudence or Ignorance, out of Intereft or
Confcience.
FOR Prudence, either that of the Antients is inferior to the Mo-
dern (which we have hitherto bin fetting face to face, that any one
The Royalist, may judg) or that of the Royaliſt muſt be inferior to that of the
Commonwealthſman. And for Intereſt, taking the Commonwealthf-
man to have really intended the Public (for otherwiſe he is a Hypo-
crit and the worſt of Men) that of the Royalift muft of neceffity
have bin more privat. Wherfore the whole difpute will com upon
matter of Conſcience: and this, whether it be urg'd by the Right of
Kings, the Obligation of former Laws, or of the Oath of Allegiance,
is abfolv'd by the Balance.
The Common-
FOR if the Right of Kings were as immediatly deriv'd from the
Breath of God as the Life of Man, yet this excludes not Death and
Diffolution. But, that the diffolution of the late Monarchy was as
natural as the Death of a Man, has bin already fhewn. Wherfore it
remains with the Royalifts to diſcover by what Reaſon or Experi-
ence it is poffible for a Monarchy to ftand upon a popular Balance;
or, the Balance being popular, as well the Oath of Allegiance, as
all other Monarchical Laws imply an impoffibility, and are therfore
void.
TO the Commonwealthſman I have no more to ſay, but that if
wealthfman. he excludes any Party, he is not truly fuch; nor fhall ever found a
Commonwealth upon the natural principle of the fame, which is Ju-
ftice. And the Royaliſt for having not oppos'd a Commonwealth in
Oceana (where the Laws were fo ambiguous that they might be eter-
nally difputed, and never reconcil'd) can neither be justly for that
cauſe excluded from his full and equal ſhare in the Government; nor
prudently, for this reafon, that a Commonwealth confifting of a Party
will be in perpetual labor of her own deftruction: Whence it was that
the Romans having conquer'd the Albans, incorporated them with
equal Right into the Commonwealth. And if the Royalists be flesh of
of your flesh, and nearer of Blood than were the Albans to the Romans,
you being alfo both Chriftians, the Argument's the ftronger. Never-
theleſs there is no reaſon that a Commonwealth ſhould any more favor
a Party remaining in fix'd oppofition againſt it, than BRUTUS did his
own Sons. But if it fixes them upon that oppofition, it is its own
fault not theirs; and this is done by excluding them. Men that
have equal Poffeffions, and the fame fecurity for their Eſtates and their
Libertys that you have the fame caufe with you to defend both:
But if you will be trampling, they fight for Liberty, tho for Monar-
chy; and you for Tyranny, tho under the name of a Common-
wealth: The Nature of Orders in a Government rightly inſtituted be-
ing void of all jealouſy, becauſe, let the Partys which it imbraces be
what they will, its Orders are ſuch as they neither would refift if they
could,
OCEAN A.
could, nor could if they would, as has bin partly already fhewn; and
will appear more at large by the following Model.
THE Partys that are Spiritual are of more kinds than I need men-
Religious
tion; fome for a National Religion, and others for Liberty of Con- Partys.
ſcience, with ſuch animofity on both fides, as if theſe two could not
confiſt together, and of which I have already fufficiently ſpoken, to
fhew, that indeed the one cannot well ſubſiſt without the other. But
they of all the reft are the moſt dangerous, who, holding that the
Saints muſt govern, go about to reduce the Commonwealth to a Party,
as well for the Reaſons already fhewn, as that their Pretences are a-
gainſt Scripture, where the Saints are commanded to fubmit to the
Higher Powers, and to be ſubject to the Ordinance of Man. And
that men, pretending under the notion of Saints or Religion to Civil
Power, have hitherto never fail'd to difhonor that Profeffion, the
World is full of Examples, wherof I fhall confine myſelf at prefent
only to a couple, the one of Old, the other of New Rome.
IN Old Rome the Patricians or Nobility pretending to be the godly Saint,
Party, were queſtion'd by the People for ingroffing all the Magiftracys
of that Commonwealth, and had nothing to fay why they did fo,
but * that Magiſtracy requir'd a kind of Holinefs which was not in
the People + at which the People were fill'd with ſuch Indignation
as had com to cutting of Throats, if the Nobility had not immediat-
ly laid by the Infolency of that Plea; which nevertheleſs when they
had don, the People for a long time after continu'd to elect no other
but Patrician Magiſtrats.
THE Example of new Rome in the rife and practiſe of the Hie-
rarchy (too well known to require any further illuftration) is far more
immodeft.
THIS has bin the courfe of Nature: and when it has pleas'd, or
fhall pleaſe God to introduce any thing that is above the courfe of Na-
ture, he will, as he has always don, confirm it by Miracle; for fo
in his Prophecy of the Reign of CHRIST upon Earth, he expreffly
promiſes: feeing that the Souls of them that were beheaded for JESUS,
ſhall be ſeen to live and reign with him; which will be an object of
Senfe, the rather, becauſe the rest of the Dead are not to live again
till the Thouſand Years be finiſh'd. And it is not lawful for men to
perfuade us that a thing already is, tho there be no fuch object of our
Senfe, which God has told us fhall not be till it be an object of our
Senſe.
THE Saintſhip of a People as to Government, confifts in the elec-
tion of Magiftrats fearing God, and hating Covetoufnefs, and not
in their confining themſelves, or being confin'd to men of this or that
Party or Profeffion. It confifts in making the moſt prudent and reli-
gious choice they can; yet not in trufting to Men, but, next God, to
their own Orders. Give us good Men, and they will make us good Laws,
is the Maxim of a Demagog, and is (thro the alteration which is
commonly perceivable in men, when they have power to work their
own Wills) exceeding fallible. But give us good Orders, and they
* Quòd nemo plebeius aufpicia haberet. + Plebs ad id maximâ indignatione exarfit, quod
aufpicari, tanquam invifi Diis immortalibus, negarentur poffe. T. Liv. 4. 8.
L 2
will
1
76
OCEAN A.
will make us good Men, is the Maxim of a Legiflator, and the moſt in-
fallible in the Politics.
BUT theſe Diviſions (however there be fome good Men that look
fadly on them) are trivial things; firft as to the Civil concern, becauſe
the Government, wherof this Nation is capable, being once feen,
takes in all Interefts. And, fecondly, as to the Spiritual; becauſe as
the pretence of Religion has always bin turbulent in broken Govern-
ments, fo where the Government has bin found and fteddy, Religion
has never fhew'd it ſelf with any other face than that of the natural
Sweetneſs, and Tranquillity: nor is there any reaſon why it ſhould;
The Errors of wherfore the Errors of the People are occafion'd by their Governors.
the People are If they be doubtful of the way, or wander from it, it is becauſe their
Guides miſled them; and the Guides of the People are never fo well
qualify'd for leading by any Virtue of their own, as by that of the Go-
from their
Governors.
Lib. 8.
vernment.
any
THE Government of Oceana (as it ſtood at the time wherof we
diſcourſe, confifting of one fingle Council of the People, exclufively
of the King and the Lords) was call'd a Parlament: Nevertheleſs the
Parlaments of the Teutons and of the Neuftrians confifted, as has bin
ſhewn, of the King, Lords and Commons; wherfore this under an
old Name was a new thing: A Parlament confifting of a fingle Af-
ſembly elected by the People, and inveſted with the whole Power of
the Government, without any Covenants, Conditions, or Orders what-
foever. So new a thing, that neither antient nor modern Prudence
can fhew any avow'd Example of the like. And there is ſcarce
thing that ſeems to me fo ftrange as that (wheras there was nothing
more familiar with theſe Counfillors, than to bring the Scripture to
the Houſe) there ſhould not be a Man of them that fo much as of-
fer'd to bring the Houſe to the Scripture, wherin, as has bin fhewn,
is contain'd that Original, wherof all the reft of the Commonwealths
ſeem to be Copys.
be Copys. Certainly if LEVIATHAN (who is furer of
nothing than that a popular Commonwealth confifts but of one Coun-
cil) tranfcrib'd his Doctrin out of this Affembly, for him to except a-
gainst ARISTOTLE and CICERO for writing out of their own
Commonwealths, was not fo fair play; or if the Parlament tranfcrib'd
out of him, it had been an honor better due to Moses. But where
one of them ſhould have an Example but from the other, I cannot
imagin, there being nothing of this kind that I can find in ſtory, but
the Oligarchy of Athens, the thirty Tyrants of the fame, and the Ro-
man Decemvirs.
FOR the Oligarchy, THUCYDIDES tells us, that it was a Senat
or Council of Four hundred, pretending to a Balancing Council of the
People confifting of Five thoufand, but not producing them; wherin
you have the definition of an Oligarchy, which is a fingle Council both
debating and refolving, dividing and chufing; and what that muſt
com to, was fhewn by the Example of the Girls, and is apparent by
the experience of all times: wherfore the Thirty fet up by the Lacede-
monians (when they had conquer'd Athens) are call'd Tyrants by all
Authors, LEVIATHAN only excepted, who will have them a-
gainſt all the World to have bin an Aristocracy; but for what reaſon I
cannot imagin, theſe alfo, as void of any Balance, having been void of that
which is effential to every Commonwealth, whether Ariſtocratical or
Popular;
OCEAN A.
77
Popular; except he be pleas'd with them, becauſe that, according to
the Teſtimony of XENOPHON, they kill'd more men in eight months,
than the Lacedemonians had don in ten years; oppreffing the People
(to ufe Sir WALTER RALEIGH'S words) with all bafe and intoler-
able Slavery.
THE ufurp'd Government of the Decemvirs in Rome was of the
fame kind. Wherfore in the fear of God let Chriftian Legiſlators
(ſetting the Pattern given in the Mount on the one fide, and theſe
execrable Examples on the other) know the right hand from the left;
and fo much the rather, becauſe thoſe things which do not conduce to
the good of the Govern'd, are fallacious, if they appear to be good for
the Governors. God in chaſtiſing a People, is accuftom'd to burn his
Rod. The Empire of theſe Oligarchys was not fo violent as ſhort,
nor did they fall upon the People, but in their own immediat ruin.
Council without a Balance is not a Commonwealth, but an Oligarchy;
and every Oligarchy, except it be put to the defence of its Wicked-
neſs or Power againſt ſom outward danger, is factious. Wherfore the
Errors of the People being from their Governors (which Maxim in
the Politics bearing a fufficient teftimony to it felf, is alfo prov'd by
MACHIAVEL) if the People of Oceana have bin factious, the Cauſe
is apparent But what Remedy?
:
A
IN anſwer to this Queſtion, I com now to the Army; of which The General.
the moſt victorious Captain, and incomparable Patriot OLPHAUS
MEGALETOR was now General: who being a much greater mafter
of that Art wherof I have made a rough draught in theſe Prelimina-
rys, had fuch fad reflections upon the ways and
and procedings of the Par-
<<
<<
ર
lament, as caft him upon Books, and all other means of diverfion,
among which he happen'd on this place of MACHIAVEL: "Thrice
happy is that People which chances to have a Man able to give
"them fuch a Government at once, as without alteration may fe-
cure them of their Libertys; feeing it was certain that Lacedemon, in
obferving the Laws of LYCURGUS, continu'd about eight hundred
years without any dangerous Tumult or Corruption." My Lord
General (as it is faid of THEMISTOCLES, that he could not fleep
for the Glory obtain'd by MILTIADES at the Battel of Maratho)
took fo new and deep an Impreffion at theſe words of the much greater
Glory of LYCURGUS, that, being on this fide affaulted with the
emulation of his illuftrious Object, and on the other with the Miſery
of the Nation, which feem'd (as it were ruin'd by his Victory) to
caft itſelf at his feet, he was almoſt wholly depriv'd of his natural
reft, till the debate he had within himſelf came to a firm refolution,
that the greateſt Advantages of a Commonwealth are, firft, that the
Legiſlator fhould be one Man: And, fecondly, that the Government
ſhould be made all together, or at once. For the first, It is certain, fays Def. B.1 c 9.
MACHIAVEL, that a Commonwealth is feldom or never well turn'd
or conftituted, except it has bin the Work of one Man; for which That a Legif-
cauſe a wife Legiſlator, and one whofe mind is firmly fet, not upon lator is to be
privat but the public Intereſt, not upon his Pofterity but upon his
Country, may juſtly endeavour to get the foverain Power into his own
hands; nor fhall any man that is Maſter of Reaſon blame fuch extra-
ordinary means as in that cafe will be neceffary, the end proving no
other than the Conſtitution of a well-order'd Commonwealth. The
reafon
01.C.
6
78
OCEAN A.
That a Com-
reafon of this is demonftrable: for the ordinary means not failing, the
Commonwealth has no need of a Legiflator; but the ordinary means
failing, there is no recourſe to be had but to fuch as are extraordinary.
And, wheras a Book or a Building has not bin known to attain to its
perfection, if it has not had a fole Author or Architect; a Common-
wealth as to the Fabric of it, is of the like nature. And thus it may be
monwealth is made at once; in which there be great advantages: for a Common-
to be mdae at wealth made at once, takes Security at the fame time it lends Mony;
and trufts not itſelf to the Faith of Men, but lanches immediatly
forth into the Empire of Laws: and being fet ftreight, brings the
Manners of its Citizens to its rule; whence follow'd that uprightneſs
which was in Lacedemon. But Manners that are rooted in men, bow
the tenderneſs of a Commonwealth coming up by twigs to their bent;
whence follow'd the obliquity that was in Rome, and thofe perpetual
Repairs by the Confuls Axes, and Tribuns Hammers, which could ne-
ver finish that Commonwealth but in deftruction.
once.
MY Lord General being clear in theſe Points, and of the neceffity
of fom other courfe than would be thought upon by the Parlament,
appointed a meeting of the Army, where he spoke his ſenſe agreable
to theſe Preliminarys with fuch fuccefs to the Soldiery, that the Parla-
ment was ſoon after depos'd; and he himſelf (in the great Hall of
the Pantheon or Palace of Juftice, fituated in Emporium the capital
City) was created by the univerfal Suffrage of the Army, Lord AR- `
CHON, or fole Legiflator of Oceana: upon which Theatre you have,
to conclude this piece, a Perfon introduc'd, whofe fame ſhall never
draw its Curtain.
THE Lord ARCHON being created, fifty felect Perfons to affift
him (by laboring in the Mines of antient Prudence, and bringing its
hidden Treaſures to new light) were added, with the ſtile alſo of Le~
giflators, and fat as a Council, wherof he was the fole Director and Pre-
fident.
氰
​The
•
OCEAN A.
79
O
The Council of Legiflators.
F this piece, being the greater half of the whole work, I fhall
be able at this time to give no farther account, than very briefly
to fhew at what it aims.
MY Lord ARCHON in opening the Council of Legiſlators, made
it appear how unfafe a thing it is to follow Phanfy in the Fabric of a
Commonwealth; and how neceffary that the Archives of antient Pru-
dence ſhould be ranfack'd before any Counfillor fhould prefume to offer
any other matter in order to the work in hand, or towards the confi-
deration to be had by the Council upon a Model of Government.
Wherfore he caus'd an Urn to be brought, and every one of the Coun-
fillors to draw a Lot. By the Lots as they were drawn,
The Commonwealth of
ISRAEL
ATHENS
LACEDEMON
CARTHAGE
the ACHEANS
ÆTOLIANS, and
LYCIANS
the SWITZ
HOLLAND, and the
UNITED PRO-
VINCES
ROME
VENICE
fell to
PHOSPHORUS DE AUGE.
NAVARCHUS DE PARALO.
LACO DE SCYTALE.
MAGO DE SYRTIBUS.
ARATUS DE ISTHMO.
ALPESTER DE FULMINE.
GLAUCUS DE ULNA.
J
DOLABELLA DE ENYO.
LYNCEUS DE STELLA.
THESE contain'd in them all thofe Excellencys wherof a Common-
wealth is capable; fo that to have added more, had bin to no purpoſe.
Upon time given to the Counfillors, by their own Studys and thofe of
their Friends, to prepare themſelves, they were open'd in the Order, and
by the Perfons mention'd at the Council of Legiſlators, and afterwards
by order of the fame were repeated at the Council of the Prytans to
the People: for in drawing of the Lots, there were about a dozen of
them infcrib'd with the letter P. wherby the Counfillors that drew
them became Prytans.
THE Prytans were a Committee or Council fitting in the great Hall
of Pantheon, to whom it was lawful for any Man to offer any thing in
order to the Fabrick of the Commonwealth: for which caufe, that they
might not be oppreft by the throng, there was a Rail about the Table
where they fat, and on each fide of the fame a Pulpit; that on the
right hand for any man that would propoſe any thing, and that on the
left for any other that would oppofe him. And all Partys (being indem-
nify'd by Proclamation of the ARCHON) were invited to difpute their
own Intereſts, or propoſe whatever they thought fit (in order to the
future Government) to the Council of the Prytans, (who having a
Guard of about two or three hundred men, left the heat of difpute
might break the peace) had the Right of Moderators, and were to
report
80.
OCEAN A
?
report from time to time fuch Propofitions or Occurrences as they
thought fit, to the Council of Legiflators fitting more privatly in the
Palace call'd Alma.
THIS was that which made the People (who were neither fafely
to be admitted, nor conveniently to be excluded in the framing of the
Commonwealth) verily believe when it came forth, that it was no o-
ther than that wherof they themſelves had bin the makers.
MOREOVER, this Council fat divers months after the publiſhing,
and during the promulgation of the Model to the People, by which
means there is fcarce any thing was faid or written for or againſt the
faid Model, but you ſhall have it with the next impreffion of this work
by way of Oration addreft to, and moderated by the Prytans.
BY this means the Council of Legiſlators had their neceffary Solitude
and due aim in their greater work, as being acquainted from time to
time with the pulfe of the People, and yet without any manner of
interruption or diſturbance.
WHERFORE every Commonwealth in its place having bin
open'd by due Method; that is, Firft, by the People; Secondly, by the.
Senat; And, Thirdly, by the Magiftracy; the Council upon maturé
debate took fuch refults or orders out of each, and out of every part of
each of them, as upon opening the fame they thought fit; which be-
ing put from time to time in writing by the Clerc or Secretary, there
remain❜d no more in the conclufion, than putting the Orders fo taken
together, to view and examin them with a diligent ey, that it might
be clearly difcover'd whether they did interfere, or could any wife com
to interfere or joftle one with the other. For as fuch Orders joftling,
or coming to joftle one another, are the certain diffolution of the Com-
monwealth; fo taken upon the proof of like experience, and neither
joſtling, nor fhewing which way they can poffibly come to joftle one
another, they make a perfect, and (for aught that in human Prudence
can be foreſeen) an immortal Commonwealth.
AND fuch was the Art wherby my Lord ARCHON (taking
Council of the Commonwealth of Ifrael, as of MOSES; and of the
reft of the Commonwealths, as of JETHRO) fram'd the Model of
the Commonwealth of Oceana.
"
J
THE
}
OCEAN A.
8L
1
THE
MODEL
OF THE
Commonwealth of OCEANA.
W
HERAS my Lord ARCHON being from MOSES and
LYCURGUS the firft Legiflator that hitherto is found in
Hiſtory to have introduc'd or erected an intire Common-
wealth at once, happen'd, like them alſo, to be more intent upon put-
ting the fame into execution or action, than into writing; by which
means the Model came to be promulgated or publiſh'd with more bre-
vity and lefs illuftration than is neceffary for their underſtanding who
have not bin acquainted with the whole Procedings of the Council of
Legiflators, and of the Prytans, where it was afferted and clear'd from
all objections and doubts: To the end that I may fupply what was
wanting in the promulgated Epitome to a more full and perfect Nar-
rative of the whole, I fhall rather take the Commonwealth practically,
and as it has now given an account of it felf in fom years Revolutions
(as DICEARCHUS is faid to have don that of Lacedemon, firft tran- Suidas.
fcrib'd by his hand fom three or four hundred years after the Inftitu-
tion) yet not omitting to add for proof to every Order fuch Debates and
Speeches of the Legiflators in their Council, or at leaſt ſuch parts of
them as may beſt diſcover the reafon of the Government; nor fuch
ways and means as were us'd in the inſtitution or rife of the Build-
ing, not to be fo well conceiv'd, without fom knowlege given of the
Engins wherwithal the mighty Weight was mov'd. But thro the in-
tire omiffion of the Council of Legiflators or Workmen that fquar'd
every ſtone to this ftructure in the Quarrys of antient Prudence, the
proof of the first part of this Difcourfe will be lame, except I infert,
as well for illuſtration as to avoid frequent repetition, three remarkable
Teſtimonys in this place.
Numb.1.16.
THE firft is taken out of the Commonwealth of Ifrael: So Mo- Exod. 18. 24.
SES hearken'd to the Voice of (JETHRO) his Father-in-law, and did all
that he had faid. And Moses chofe able men out of all Ifrael, and
made them heads over the People; Tribuns, as it is in the vulgar Latin;
or Phylarchs, that is, Princes of the Tribes, fitting upon twelve Matth.
* Thrones, and judging the twelve Tribes of Ifrael: and next to theſe
he choſe Rulers of Thouſands, Rulers of Hundreds, Rulers of Fiftys,
and Rulers of Tens, which were the fteps and rife of this Common-
wealth from its foundation or root to its proper elevation or accom-
pliſhment in the Sanhedrim, and the Congregation, already open'd in
the Preliminarys.
Sellis Curulibus, Grot.
M
THE
8 2
O CE A NA.
Lac. lib. 1.
c. 6.
C
C
C
THE Second is taken out of Lacedemon, as LYCURGUS (for the
greater impreffion of his Inftitutions upon the minds of his Citizens)
pretended to have receiv'd the Model of that Commonwealth from the
Oracle of APOLLO at Delphos, the words wherof are thus recorded
Crag. de Rep. by PLUTARCH in the Life of that famous Legiſlator: When thou
fhalt have divided the People into Tribes (which were fix) and Obas
(which were five in every Tribe) thou shalt conftitute the Senat, con-
fifting, with the two Kings, of thirty Counſellors, who, according as
occafion requires, fhall caufe the Congregation to be affembled be-
tween the Bridg and the River Gnacion, where the Senat fhall propoſe
to the People, and diſmiſs them without fuffering them to debate.'
The Oba were Linages into which every Tribe was divided, and in
each Tribe there was another Divifion containing all thoſe of the fame
that were of military Age; which being call'd the Mora, was fubdi-
vided into Troops and Companys that were kept in perpetual Difci-
plin under the Command of a Magiftrat call'd the Polemarch.
Halicar.
THE Third is taken out of the Commonwealth of Rome, or thoſe
parts of it which are compris'd in the first and fecond Books of LIvy,
where the People, according to the inftitution by ROMULUS, are firſt
divided into thirty Curias or Parishes, wherof he elected (by three out
of each Curia) the Senat, which from his Reign to that of SERVIUS
TULLUS propofed to the Parishes or Parochial Congregations; and
thefe being call'd the Comitia Curiata, had the election of the * Kings,
the Confirmation of their † Laws, and the laſt appeal in matters of
Judicature, as appears in the cafe of HORATIUS that kill'd his Sifter;
till in the Reign of SERVIUS (for the other Kings kept not to the
inſtitution of ROMULUS) the People being grown fomwhat, the
Power of the Curiata was for the greater part tranflated to the Centu-
riata Comitia inftituted by this King, which diſtributed the People ac-
cording to the cenfe or valuation of their Eftates into fix Claffes, every
one containing about forty Centurys, divided into Youth and Elders;
the Youth for field-fervice, the Elders for the defence of their Territo-
ry, all arm'd and under continual Difciplin, in which they affembl'd
both upon military and civil occafions. But when the Senat propos'd
to the People, the Horfe only, wherof there were twelve Centurys
confifting of the richeſt fort over and above thoſe of the Foot enume-
rated, were call'd with the firſt Claffis of the Foot to the fuffrage; or
if theſe accorded not, then the fecond Claffis was call'd to them, but
feldom or never any of the reft. Wherfore the People after the ex-
pulfion of the Kings, growing impatient of this inequality, refted not
till they had reduc'd the fuffrage as it had bin in the Comitia Curiata to
the whole People again: But in another way, that is to fay, by the
Comitia Tributa, which therupon were inftituted, being a Council
where the People in exigencys made Laws without the Senat; which
Laws were call'd Plebifcita. This Council is that in regard wherof
CICERO and other great Wits fo frequently inveigh againſt the Peo-
ple, and fomtimes even Livy, as at the firſt inftitution of it. To
fay the truth, it was a kind of Anarchy, wherof the People could not
+
*Quirites, Regem create ; ita patribus vifum eft: Tullum Hoftilium Regem Populus juffit. Pa-
tres authores facti. + Ut ab Romulo traditum, fuffragium viritim eadem vi, eodemque jure om-
nibus datum eft. Hunc annum infignem maximè Comitia Tributa efficiunt; res major victoriâ
fufcepti certaminis quam ufu, plus enim dignitatis Comitiis ipfis detractum eft, patribus ex Con-
cilio fubmovendis, quam virium aut plebi additum aut demtum patribus.
be
OCEAN A.
83
+
be excufable, if there had not, thro the Courſes taken by the Senat,
bin otherwiſe a neceffity that they muſt have ſeen the Common-
wealth run into Oligarchy.
THE manner how the Comitia Curiata, Centuriata or Tributa Sigonius.
were call'd, during the time of the Commonwealth, to the fuffrage,
was by lot: the Curia, Century, or Tribe, whereon the first lot fell,
being ſtil'd Principium, or the Prerogative; and the other Curiæ,
Centurys, or Tribes, wheron the fecond, third, and fourth Lots, &c.
fell, the Jure vocata: From henceforth not the firft Claffis, as in the
times of SERVIUS, but the Prerogative, whether Curia, Century, or
Tribe, came firſt to the Suffrage, whofe Vote was call'd Omen Pra-
rogativum, and feldom fail'd to be leading to the reft of the Tribes.
The Jure vocata in the order of their Lots came next: the manner
of giving fuffrage was, by cafting wooden Tablets, mark'd for the Af-
firmative or the Negative, into certain Urns ftanding upon a Scaffold,
as they march'd over it in files; which for the refemblance it bore,
was call'd the Bridg. The Candidat or Competitor, who had moſt
Suffrages in a Curia, Century, or Tribe, was faid to have that Curia,
Century, or Tribe; and he who had moſt of the Curia, Centurys, or
Tribes, carry'd the Magiftracy.
THESE three places being premis'd, as fuch upon which there
will be frequent reflection, I com to the Narrative, divided into two
parts, the firſt containing the Inftitution, the ſecond the Conftitution
of the Commonwealth; in each wherof I fhall diſtinguiſh the Orders,
as thoſe which contain the whole Model, from the reft of the Dif
courſe, which tends only to the explanation or proof of them.
IN the inſtitution or building of a Commonwealth, the first work Infitution of
(as that of Builders) can be no other than fitting and diſtributing the the Common-
Materials.
calth.
THE Materials of a Commonwealth are the People; and the Peo- Diviſions of
ple of Oceana were diftributed by cafting them into certain Divifions, the People.
regarding their Quality, their Age, their Wealth, and the places of
their refidence or habitation, which was don by the infuing Orders.
Into Freemen
THE first ORDER diftributes the People into Freemen or Citi- 1. Order.
zens, and Servants, while fuch; for if they attain to Liberty, that is, And Servants.
to live of themfelves, they are Freemen or Citizens.
THIS Order needs no proof, in regard of the nature of Servitude,
which is inconfiftent with Freedom, or participation of Government
in a Commonwealth.
2. Order.
THE fecond ORDER diftributes Citizens into Youth and Elders
(fuch as are from 18 years of age to 30, being accounted Youth; and Into Youth
fuch as are of 30 and upwards, Elders) and establishes that the Youth and Elders.
Shall be the marching Armys, and the Elders the ſtanding Garifons of
this Nation.
A COMMONWEALTH whofe Arms are in the hands of
her Servants, had need be fituated (as is elegantly faid of Venice by
* CONTARINI) out of the reach of their clutches; witneſs the
* Lontana della fede degli huomini,
M 2
danger
8+
OCEAN ·A.
3. Order.
and Foot.
danger run by that of Carthage in the Rebellion of SPENDIUS and
MATHO. But tho a City (if one Swallow makes a Summer) may
thus chance to be fafe, yet hall it never be great; for if Carthage
or Venice acquir'd any Fame in their Arms, it is known to have hap-
pen'd thro the mere virtue of their Captains, and not of their Orders;
wherfore Ifrael, Lacedemon, and Rome intail'd their Arms upon the
prime of their Citizens, divided (at least in Lacedemon and Rome)
into Youth and Elders; the Youth for the Field, and the Elders for
defence of the Territory.
THE third ORDER diftributes the Citizens into Horfe and Foot
Into Horfe by the cenfe or valuation of their Eftates; they who have above one hun-
dred pounds a year in Lands, Goods, or Monys, being oblig'd to be of
the Horfe; and they who have under that Sum, to be of the Foot. But
if a man has prodigally wafted and spent his Patrimony, he is neither
capable of Magiftracy, Office, or Suffrage in the Commonwealth.
4. Order.
CITIZENS are not only to defend the Commonwealth, but
according to their abilitys, as the Romans under SERVIUS TULLUS
(regard had to their Eftates) were fom inrol'd in the Horfe Centurys,
and others of the Foot, with Arms injoin'd accordingly; nor could it
be otherwiſe in the reſt of the Commonwealths, tho out of Hiſtorical
Remains, that are ſo much darker, it be not fo clearly probable. And the
neceffary Prerogative to be given by a Commonwealth to Eftates, is in
fom meaſure in the nature of Induſtry, and the uſe of it to the Pub-
lic. * The Roman People, fays JULIUS EXUPERANTIUS, were di-
vided into Claffes, and tax'd according to the value of their Eftates. All
that were worth the Sums appointed were imploy'd in the Wars; for they
most eagerly contend for the Victory, who fight for Liberty in defence of
their Country and Poffeffions. But the poorer fort were pol'd only for their
Heads (which was all they had) and kept in Garifon at home in time of
War: For thefe might betray the Armys for Bread, by reafon of their
Poverty; which is the reafon that MARIUS, to whom the care of the Go-
vernment ought not to have bin committed, was the first that led'em into the
field; and his Succefs was accordingly. There is a mean in things; as
exorbitant Riches overthrow the Balance of a Commonwealth, fo ex-
treme Poverty cannot hold it, nor is by any means to be trufted with it.
The clauſe in the Order concerning the Prodigal is Athenian, and a very
laudable one; for he that could not live upon his Patrimony, if he coms
to touch the public Mony, makes a Commonwealth Bankrupt.
THE fourth ORDER diftributes the People according to the places
Into Parishes, of their Habitation, into Parishes, Hundreds, and Tribes.
Hundreds,
and Tribes.
FOR except the People be methodically diftributed, they cannot
be methodically collected; but the being of a Commonwealth con-
fiſts in the methodical Collection of the People: wherfore you have the
* Populus Romanus per Claſſes divifus erat, & pro Patrimonii facultate cenfebantur; ex iis,
omnes quibus res erat, ad militiam ducebantur; diligenter enim pro victoria laborabant, qui ex
libertate bona patriam defendebant: Illi autem quibus nullæ opes erant, caput fuum, quod fo-
lum poffidebant, cenfebantur, & belli tempore in moenibus refidebant; facile enim poterant
exiftere proditores, quia egeftas haud facile habetur fine damno. Hos igitur Marius, quibus non
fuerat Refp. committenda, duxit ad bellum.
J
Ifraelitish
OCEAN A.
85
4
Ifraelitish Divifions into Rulers of Thoufands, of Hundreds, of Fiftys,
and of Tens; and of the whole Commonwealth into Tribes: The
Laconic into Obas, Moras, and Tribes; the Roman into Tribes, Cen-
turys, and Claffes and fomething there muft of neceffity be in every
Government of the like nature; as that in the late Monarchy, by
Countys. But this being the only Inftitution in Oceana (except that
of the Agrarian) which requir'd any charge or included any difficul-
ty, engages me to a more particular Defcription of the manner how
it was perform'd, as follows.
Surveyors.
A THOUSAND Surveyors commiffionated and inftructed by The use and
the Lord ARCHON and the Council, being divided into two equal method of the
numbers, each under the inſpection of two Surveyors General, were di-
ftributed into the Northern and Southern parts of the Territory, di-
vided by the River Hemifua, the whole wherof contains about ten
thouſand Pariſhes, fom ten of thoſe being affign'd to each Surveyor:
For as to this matter there needed no great exactneſs, it tending only
(by fhewing whither every one was to repair, and wherabout to begin)
to the more orderly carrying on of the work; the nature of their In-
ftructions otherwife regarding rather the number of the Inhabitants,
than of the Pariſhes. The Surveyors therfore being every one furniſh'd
with a convenient proportion of Urns, Balls and balloting Boxes (in
the uſe wherof they had bin formerly exercis'd) and now arriving
each at his refpective Pariſhes, began with the People, by teaching
them their firft leffon, which was the Ballot; and tho they found
them in the beginning fomewhat froward as at toys, with which
(while they were in expectation of greater matters from a Council of
Legiſlators) they conceiv'd themſelves to be abus'd, they came within
a little while to think them pretty ſport, and at length ſuch as might
very foberly be us'd in good earneft: wherupon the Surveyors began
the Inftitution included in
•
5. Order.
the Parishes,
Deputys.
THE ffLOR DER, requiring, That upon the first Monday next
infuing the last of December, the bigger Bell in every Parish throout the Inflitution of
Nation be rung at eight of the Clock in the morning, and continue ringing of the Ballot,
for the space of one hour; and that all the Elders of the Parish respectively and of the
repair to the Church, before the Bell has don ringing; where dividing
themſelves into two equal Numbers, or as near equal as may be, they ſhall
take their places according to their Dignitys (if they be of divers qualitys)
and according to their Seniority (if they be of the fame) the one half on
the one fide, and the other half on the other, in the body of the Church:
which don, they shall make Oath to the Overseers of the Parish for the
time being (instead of theſe the Surveyors were to officiat at the Inftitu-
tion or firſt Aſſembly) by holding up their hands, to make a fair Election
according to the Laws of the Ballot, as they are hereafter explain'd, of fuch
Perfons, amounting to a fifth part of their whole number, to be their Depu-
tys, and to exercife their Power in manner hereafter explain'd, as they fhall
think in their Confciences to be fittest for that trust, and will acquit them-
felves of it to the best advantage of the Commonwealth. And Oath be-
ing thus made, they shall procede to Election, if the Elders of the Parish
amount to one thousand by the Ballot of the Tribe (as it is in due place ex-
plain'd) and if the Elders of the Parish amount to fifty or upwards, but
within the number of one thousand, by the Ballot of the hundred (as it is
in due place explain'd). But if the Elders amount not to fifty, then they
Shall
86
OCEAN A.
1
Jhall procede to the Ballot of the Pariſh, as it is in this place, and after
this manner explain'd. The two Overfeers for the time being fall feat
themſelves at the upper end of the middle Ally, with a Table before them,
their faces being towards the Congregation: And the Conftable for the
time being fhall fet an Urn before the Table, into which he shall put fo
many Balls as there be Elders prefent, wherof there fhall be one that is
gilded, the reft being white; and when the Constable has ſhaken the Urn,
fufficiently to mix the Balls, the Overſeers ſhall call the Elders to the Urn,
who from each fide of the Church hall com up the middle Ally in two
files, every man paffing by the Urn, and drawing out one Ball; which if it
be Silver, he fhall caft into a Bowl ftanding at the foot of the Urn, and
return by the outward Ally on his fide to his place. But he who draws the
golden Ball is the Propofer, and fhall be feated between the Overfeers, where
be fhall begin in what order be pleafes, and name fuch as (upon his Oath
already taken) be conceives fittest to be chofen, one by one, to the Elders;
and the Party nam'd fhall withdraw while the Congregation is balloting
his name by the double Box or Boxes appointed and mark'd on the outward
part, to ſhew which fide is Affirmative and which Negative,being carry'd
by a Boy or Boys appointed by the Overfeers, to every one of the Elders, who
fhall hold up a pellet made of linen Rags, between his Finger and his Thumb,
and put it after fuch a manner into the Box, as tho no man can fee into
which fide he puts it, yet any man may fee that he puts in but one pellet or
fuffrage. And the fuffrage of the Congregation being thus given, ſhall be
return'd with the Box or Boxes to the Overfeers, who opening the fame,
ſhall pour the affirmative Balls into a white Bowl ftanding upon the Table
on the right hand, to be number'd by the firft Overfeer; and the Negative
into a green Bowl ftanding on the left hand, to be number'd by the ſecond
Overfeer: and the fuffrages being number'd, he who has the major part
in the Affirmative is one of the Deputys of the Parish: and when fo
many Deputys are chofen as amount to a full fifth part of the whole num-
ber of the Elders, the Ballot for that time fhall ceafe. The Deputys being
chofen are to be lifted by the Overfeers in order as they were chofen, except
only that fuch as are Horfe must be lifted in the first place with the rest,
proportionable to the number of the Congregation, after this manner:
Anno Dom.
The Lift of the first Mover.
છે
į
A.A. Ord. Eq. 1 Dep.
of the Parish of
in the Hundred
B. B.
2 Dep.
of and the Tribe of
which
C. C.
3 Dep.
Parish at the prefent Election con-
D.D.
4 Dep.
E. E.
5 Dep.
tains 20 Elders, wherof one is of the
Horfe or Equeſtrian Order.
the
THE first and fecond in the Lift are Overfeers by confequence: the
third is the Conftable, and the fourth and fifth are Churchwardens;
Perfons fo chofen are Deputys of the Parish for the space of one year from
their Election, and no longer; nor may they be elected two years together.
This Lift being the Primum Mobile, or firft Mover of the Commonwealth,
is to be regiſter'd in a Book diligently kept and preferv'd by the Overfeers,
who are refponfible in their places for thefe and other Dutys to be hereafter
mentioned, to the Cenfors of the Tribe: and the Congregation is to obferve
the
1
OCEAN A.
87
เ
the prefent Order, as they will answer the contrary to the Phylarch, or
Prerogative Troop of the Tribe; which, in cafe of failure in the whole or
any part of it, have power to fine them or any of them at diſcretion, but
under an Appeal to the Parliament.
FOR proof of this Order; Firſt, in Reaſon: It is with all Politi-
cians paſt diſpute, that paternal Power is in the right of Nature; and
this is no other than the derivation of Power from Fathers of Familys,
as the natural root of a Commonwealth. And for Experience, if it be
otherwiſe in that of Holland, I know no other example of the like
kind. In Ifrael, the foverain Power came clearly from the natural Jof. 24. 1.
Root, the Elders of the whole People; and Rome was born (Comitiis
Curiatis) in her Parochial Congregations, out of which ROMULUS firſt
rais'd her Senat, then all the reft of the Orders of that Commonwealth,
which roſe ſo high: For the depth of a Commonwealth is the juſt
height of it.
* She raiſes up her Head unto the Skys,
Near as her Root unto the Center lys.
AND if the Commonwealth of Rome was born of thirty Pariſhes,
this of Oceana was born of ten thoufand. But wheras mention in the
birth of this is made of an Equeftrian Order, it may ſtartle fuch as know
that the divifion of the People of Rome, at the Inftitution of that Com-
monwealth into Orders, was the occafion of its ruin. The diſtinction
of the Patrician as a hereditary Order from the very Inftitution, ingrof-
fing all the Magiftracys, was indeed the deftruction of Rome; but to a
Knight or one of the Equeftrian Order, fays HORACE,
Si quadringentis fex feptem millia defunt,
Plebs eris.
By which it ſhould ſeem that this Order was not otherwiſe hereditary
than a man's Eftate, nor did it give any claim to Magiftracy; wher-
fore you ſhall never find that it difquieted the Commonwealth; nor
dos the name denote any more in Oceana, than the Duty of ſuch a
man's Eſtate to the Public.
BUT the Surveyors both in this place and in others, forafmuch as
they could not obſerve all the Circumſtances of this Order, eſpecially
that of the time of Election, did for the firft as well as they could; and,
the Elections being made and regifter'd, took each of them Copys of
thoſe Liſts which were within their Allotments; which don they pro-
duc'd
4.
Order.
Of Ordina
tion, a Natio-
THE fixth ORDER, directing, in cafe a Parfon or Vicar of a Pa-
riſh coms to be remov'd by Death or by the Cenfors, that the Congregation of
the Parish affemble and depute one or two Elders by the Ballot, who upon the wal Religion,
charge of the Pariſh ſhall repair to one of the Univerſitys of this Nation with and Liberty
a Certificat fign'd by the Overfeers, and addreft to the Vice-Chancellor :
which Certificat giving notice of the Death or Removal of the Parfon or
Vicar, of the value of the Parfonage or Vicarage, and of the defire of the
*
Ipfa hæret Scopulis, & tantum vertice ad Auras
Ethereas, quantum radice ad Tartara, tendit.
of Conference.
Congre-
88
OCEAN A.
Congregation to receive a Probationer from that Univerfity, the Vice-Chan
cellor upon the receit therof fhall call a Convocation, and having made choice
of a fit Perfon, fhall return him in due time to the Parish, where the Perfon
fo return'd fall return the full fruits of the Benefice or Vicarage, and do the
duty of the Parfon or Vicar, for the space of one year, as Probationer: and
that being expir'd, the Congregation of the Elders fhall put their Probation-
er to the Ballot : and if he attains not to two parts in three of the Suffrage
affirmative, he ſhall take his leave of the Parish, and they fhall fend in like
manner as before for another Probationer; but if their Probationer obtains
two parts in three of the Suffrage affirmative, he is then Paftor of that Pa-
rifh. And the Paftor of the Parish fhall pray with the Congregation, preach
the Word, and adminifter the Sacraments to the fame, according to the Di-
rectory to be hereafter appointed by the Parliament. Nevertheless fuch as
are of gather'd Congregations, or from time to time fhall join with
any of
them, are in no wife oblig'd to this way of electing their Teachers, or to give
their Votes in this cafe, but wholly left to the liberty of their own Confciences;
and to that way of Worship which they shall chufe, being not Popish, Jew-
iſh, or Idolatrous. And to the end they may be the better protected by
the State in the exerciſe of the fame, they are defir'd to make choice, in
fuch manner as they beft like, of certain Magiftrats in every one of their
Congregations, which we could wish might be four in each of them, to be
Auditors in cafes of differences or diftaft, if any thro variety of opinions,
that may be grievous or injurious to them, fhall fall out. And fuch Au-
ditors or Magiftrats shall have power to examin the matter, and inform
themselves, to the end that if they think it of fufficient weight, they may ac-
quaint the Phylarch with it, or introduce it into the Council of Religion;
where all fuch Caufes as thofe Magiftrats introduce, fhall from time to time
be heard and determin'd according to fuch Laws as are or fhall hereafter be
provided by the Parlament for the just defence of the Liberty of Confcience.
THIS Order confifts of three parts, the firſt reſtoring the power
of Ordination to the People, which, that it originally belongs to them,
is clear, tho' not in Engliſh yet in Scripture, where the Apoſtles or-
A&ts 14 23. dain'd Elders by the holding up of hands in every Congregation, that is,
by the fuffrage of the People, which was alſo given in ſom of thoſe
Citys by the Ballot. And tho it may be fhewn that the Apoſtles or-
dain'd fome by the laying on of hands, it will not be ſhewn that they
did fo in every Congregation.
EXCOMMUNICATION, as not clearly provable out of
the Scripture, being omitted, the fecond part of the Order implys
and eſtabliſhes a National Religion: for there be degrees of Knowlege
in divine things; true Religion is not to be learnt without fearching
the Scripture; the Scriptures cannot be fearch'd by us unleſs we have
them to ſearch and if we have nothing elfe, or (which is all one) un-
derſtand nothing elſe but a Tranflation, we may be (as in the place
alleg'd we have bin) beguil'd or miſled by the Tranſlation, while we
ſhould be ſearching the true ſenſe of the Scripture, which cannot be
attain'd in a natural way( and a Commonwealth is not to prefume up-
on that which is fupernatural) but by the knowlege of the Original
and of Antiquity, acquir'd by our own ftudys, or thoſe of fom o-
thers, for even Faith coms by hearing. Wherfore a Commonwealth not
making proviſion of men from time to time, knowing in the original
Languages wherin the Scriptures were written, and vers'd in thofe An-
tiquitys
OCEAN A.
89
tiquitys to which they fo frequently relate, that the true ſenſe of them
depends in great part upon that Knowlege, can never be fecure that
ſhe ſhall not lofe the Scripture, and by confequence her Religion ;
which to preſerve the muft inftitute fom method of this Knowlege,
and fom uſe of ſuch as have acquir'd it, which amounts to a National
Religion.
THE Commonwealth having thus perform'd her duty towards
God, as a rational Creature, by the beft application of her Reaſon to
Scripture, and for the prefervation of Religion in the purity of the
fame, yet pretends not to Infallibility, but coms in the third part of
the Order, eſtabliſhing Liberty of Confcience according to the In-
ſtructions given to her Council of Religion, to raiſe up her hands to
Heaven for further light; in which proceding the follows that (as was
ſhewn in the Preliminarys) of Ifrael, who tho her National Religion
was always a part of her Civil Law, gave to her Prophets the upper
hand of all her Orders.
BUT the Surveyors having now don with the Pariſhes, took their Definition of
leaves; ſo a Pariſh is the firſt divifion of Land occafion'd by the firſt a Parish.
Collection of the People of Oceana, whoſe Function proper to that
place is compriz'd in the fix preceding Orders.
the firi C
THE next ſtep in the progreſs of the Surveyors was to a meeting of Inflitution of
the neareſt of them, as their work lay, by twentys; where conferring
their Liſts, and computing the Deputys contain'd therin, as the number
of them in Pariſhes, being neareſt Neighbors, amounted to one hun-
dred, or as even as might conveniently be brought with that account,
they caft them and thoſe Pariſhes into the Precinct which (be the De-
putys ever fince more or fewer) is ftill call'd the Hundred: and to every
one of thefe Precincts they appointed a certain place, being the moſt
convenient Town within the fame, for the annual Rendevouz; which
don, each Surveyor returning to his Hundred, and fummoning the
Deputys contain'd in his Lifts to the Rendevouz, they appear'd and
receiv'd
;
THE feventh ORDER, requiring, That upon the first Monday 7. Order.
next infuing the last of January, the Deputys of every Parish annually af
femble in Arms at the Rendevoux of the Hundred, and there elect out of
their number one Justice of the Peace, one furyman, one Captain, one
Enfign of their Troop or Century, each of these out of the Horfe; and
one Juryman, one Crowner, one High Conftable, out of the Foot the
Election to be made by the Ballot in this manner. The Jurymen for the
time being are to be Overfeers of the Ballot (inftead of thefe, the Survey-
ors are to officiat at the firſt Affembly) and to look to the performance of
the fame according to what was directed in the Ballot of the Pariſhes, fav-
ing that the High Conftable fetting forth the Urn, ſhall have five feveral
futes of Gold Balls, and one dozen of every fute; wherof the first fall be
mark'd with the Letter A, the fecond with the letter B, the third with C,
the fourth with D, and the fifth with E: and of each of thefe futes he fhall
caft one Ball into his Hat, or into a little Urn, and ſhaking the Balls toge-
ther prefent them to the firft Overfeer, who fhall draw one, and the fute
which is fo drawn by the Överfeer, ſhall be of uſe for that day, and no
other: for example, if the Overfeer drew an A, the High Constable fhall
put feven Gold Balls mark'd with the letter A into the Urn, with fo many
Silver ones as ſhall bring them even with the number of the Deputys, who
N
being
1
១០
OCEAN A.
being fworn, as before, at the Ballot of the Parish to make a fair Election;
fhall be call'd to the Urn; and every man coming in manner as was there
fhew'd, fhall draw one Ball, which if it be Silver, he ſhall caft it into a Bowl
Standing at the foot of the Urn, and return to his place; but the first that
draws a Gold Ball (ſhewing it to the Overfeers, who if it has not the let-
ter of the prefent Ballot, have power to apprehend and puniſh him) is the
first Elector, the fecond the fecand Elector, and fo to the feventh; which
Order they are to obferve in their function. The Electors as they are drawn
hall be plac'd upon the Bench by the Overſeers, till the whole number be
complete, and then be conducted, with the Lift of the Officers to be chofen,
into a Place apart, where being privat, the first Elector shall name a
Perfon to the firft Office in the Lift; and if the Perfon fo nam'd, being bal-
loted by the rest of the Electors, attains not to the better half of the Suffra-
ges in the Affirmative, the first Elector shall continue nominating others,
till one of them fo nominated by him attains to the plurality of the Suffra-
ges in the Affirmative, and be written firft Competitor to the firft Office.
This don,the fecond Elector fall obferve in his turn the like order; andĵo the
reft of the Electors naming Competitors each to his refpective Office in the Lift,
tillone Competitor be chofen to every Office: and when one Competitor is chofen
to every Office, the first Elector fhall begin again to name a fecond Competitor
to the firft Office, and the rest fucceffively ſhall name to the rest of the Offices
till two Competitors be chofen to every Office; the like fhall be repeated till
three Competitors be chofen to every Office. And when three Competitors are
chofen to every Office, the Lift fhall be return'd to the Overfeers, or fuch as
the Overfeers, in cafe they or either of them happen'd to be Electors, have
fubftituted in his or their place or places: and the Overfeers or Subftitutes
having caus'd the Lift to be read to the Congregation, fhall put the Compe-
titors, in order as they are written, to the Ballot of the Congregation: and
the rest of the Proceedings being carry'd on in the manner directed in the
Fifth Order, that Competitor, of the three written to each Office, who
has most of the Suffrages above half in the Affirmative, is the Officer. The
Lift being after this manner completed, ſhall be entred into a Regiſter, to
be kept at the Rendevouz of the Hundred, under infpection of the Magi-
ftrats of the fame, after the manner following :
Anno Domini.
The Lift of the Nebulofa.
A. A. Ord. Eq.
Juftice of the Peace
B. B. Ord. Eq.
First Juryman
C. C. Ord. Eq.
D. D. Ord. Eq.
E. E.
F. F.
G.G.
Captain of the Hundred
Enfign
Second Juryman
High Conſtable
Crowner
ך
-in
of the Hundred of .
the Tribe of which
Hundred confifts at this
Election of 105 De-
putys.
THE Lift being enter'd, the High Conftable fhall take three Copys of the
fame, wherof hefball prefently return one to the Lord High Sheriff of the
Tribe, a fecond to the Lord Cuftos Rotulorum, and a third to the Cen-
fors; or thefe, thro the want of fuch Magiftrats at the first mufter, may
be return'd to the Orator, to be appointed for that Tribe. To the obferva-
tion of all and every part of this Order, the Officers and Deputys of the
Hundred are all and every of them oblig'd,as they will answer it to the Phy-
larch,
1
OCEAN A.
91
larch, who has power in cafe of failure in the whole or any part, to fine
all or any of them fo failing at difcretion, or according to fuch Laws as
Shall hereafter be provided in that cafe; but under an Appeal to the
Parlament.
THERE is little in this Order worthy of any further account,
but that it anſwers to the Rulers of Hundreds in Ifrael, to the Mora or
Military part of the Tribe in Lacedemon, and to the Century in Rome.
The Jurymen, being two in a Hundred, and ſo forty in a Tribe, give
the Latitude allow'd by the Law for exceptions. And wheras the
Golden Balls at this Ballot begin to be mark'd with Letters, wherof
one is to be drawn immediatly before it begins; this is to the end that
the Letter being unknown, Men may be fruftrated of tricks or foul
play, wheras otherwiſe a Man may bring a Golden Ball with him,
and make as if he had drawn it out of the Urn. The Surveyors, when
they had taken Copys of theſe Lifts, had accompliſh'd their work in
the Hundreds.
SO a Hundred is the fecond Divifion of Land occafion'd by the Definition of
fecond Collection of the People, whofe Civil and Military Functions the Hundred.
proper to this place are compriz'd in the foregoing Order.
HAVING ſtated the Hundreds, they met once again by Twen-
tys, where there was nothing more eafy than to caft every twenty
Hundreds, as they lay moft conveniently together, into one Tribe;
fo the whole Territory of Oceana, confifting of about ten thouſand Inftitution of
Pariſhes, came to be caft into one thouſand Hundreds, and into fifty the Tribe.
Tribes. In every Tribe at the place appointed for the annual Rende-
vouz of the fame, were then, or foon after, begun thofe Buildings
which are now call'd Pavilions; each of them ftanding with one of the Pavi-
open fide upon fair Columns, like the porch of fom antient Temple, lion.
and looking into a Field, capable of the muſter of ſom four thoufand
Men: Before each Pavilion ſtand three Pillars fuſtaining Urns for the
Ballot, that on the right-hand equal in height to the brow of a Horſ-
man, being call'd the Horfe Urn; that on the left-hand, with Bridges
on either fide to bring it equal in height with the brow of a Footman,
being call'd the Foot Urn; and the middle Urn with a Bridg on the
fide towards the Foot Urn, the other fide, as left for the Horſe, be-
ing without one: and here ended the whole work of the Surveyors,
who return'd to the Lord ARCHON with this
Account of the charge.
1.
S.
The rubole
20000
OO
Charge of the
Inftitution.
IMPRIMIS, Urns, Balls, and Balloting Boxes for?
ten thouſand Pariſhes, the fame being wooden Ware,
ITEM,Provifions of the like kind for a thouſand Hundreds, 3000
ITEM, Urns and Balls of Metal, with Balloting?
2000
OO
60000
Oo
ITEM, For erecting of fifty Pavilions,
IT EM,Wages for four Surveyors General at 10000 la man, 4000
ITEM, Wages for the reft of the Surveyors, being
1000 at 250 l. a man,
N 2
ng}
Oo
250000 00
Sum Total, 339000
339000 00
THIS
!
92
OCEAN A.
1
8 Order:
THIS is no great matter of charge for the building of a Common-
wealth, in regard that it has coft (which was pleaded by the Survey-
Lors) as much to rig a few Ships. Nevertheleſs that proves not them
to be honeſt, nor their account to be juſt; but they had their Mony
for once, tho their reckoning be plainly guilty of a Crime, to coft him
his Neck that commits it another time, it being impoffible for a Com-
monwealth (without an exact provifion that it be not abus'd in this
kind) to fubfift: for if no regard fhould be had of the Charge (tho
that may go deep) yet the Debauchery and Corruption, wherto, by
negligence in Accounts, it infallibly expofes its Citizens, and therby
leffens the public Faith, which is the Nerve and Ligament of Govern-
ment, ought to be prevented. But the Surveyors being diſpatch'd, the
Lord ARCHON was very curious in giving names to his Tribes,
which having caus'd to be written in Scrols caft into an Urn, and pre-
fented to the Counfillors, each of them drew one, and was according-
ly fent to the Tribe in his lot, as Orators of the fame, a Magiſtracy
no otherwiſe inſtituted, than for once and pro tempore, to the end that
the Council upon fo great an occafion might both congratulat with the
Tribes, and affift at the firft mufter in fom things of neceflity to be
differently carry'd from the eſtabliſh'd Adminiſtration, and future
Courſe of the Commonwealth.
THE Orators being arriv'd, every one as foon as might be, at the
Rendevouz of his Tribe, gave notice to the Hundreds, and ſummon'd
the Muſter, which appear'd for the moſt part upon good Horfes, and
already indifferently well arm'd; as to inftance in one for all, the Tribe
of Nubia, where HERMES DE CADUCEO, Lord Orator of the fame,
after a ſhort falutation and a hearty welcom, apply'd himſelf to his
bufinefs, which began with
THE eighth ORDER, requiring, That the Lord High Sheriff as
Commander in Chief, and the Lord Cuftos Rotulorum as Muftermafter
of the Tribe (or the Orator for the firſt Muſter) upon reception of the
Lifts of their Hundreds, return'd to them by the High Conftables of the
fame, prefently cauſe them to be caft up, dividing the Horfe from the Foot,
and lifting the Horfe by their names in Troops, each Troop containing a-
bout a hundred in number, to be infcrib'd, firſt, ſecond or third Troop,
&c. according to the Order agreed upon by the faid Magiftrats: Which
don, they shall lift the Foot in like manner, and infcribe the Companys in
like order. Thefe Lifts upon the Eve of the Mufter fhall be deliver'd
to certain Trumpeters and Drummers, wherof there ſhall be fifteen of
each fort (as well for the prefent as otherwife to be hereafter mentioned)
ftipendiated by the Tribe. And the Trumpeters and Drummers fhall be
in the Field before the Pavilion, upon the day of the Mufter, fo foon as it
is light, where they ſtall fland every one with his Lift in his band, at a
due diftance, placed according to the Order of the Lift; the Trumpeters
with the Lifts of the Horfe on the right hand, and the Drummers with
the Lifts of the Foot on the left hand: where having founded a while,
each of them shall begin to call, and continue calling the names of the
Deputys, as they com into the field, till both the Horse and Foot be ga-
ther'd by that means into their due Order. The Horfe and Foot being
in order, the Lord Lieutenant of the Tribe shall caft fo many Gold Balls
mark'd with the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, &c. as there be Troops of Horfe in
the Field, together with fo many Silver Balls as there be Companys,
mark'd in the fame manner, into a little Urn, to which he shall
call
OCEAN A.
93
*
call the Captains; and the Captains drawing the Gold Balls fhall com-
mand the Horfe, and thofe that draw the Silver the Foot, each in the
order of his Lot. The like fhall be don by the Conductor at the fame time
for the Enfigns at another Urn; and they that draw the Gold Balls fall
be Cornets, the reft Enfigns.
THIS Order may puzzle the Reader, but tends to a wonderful
ſpeed of the Mufter, to which it would be a great matter to loſe a
day in ranging and martialling, wheras by virtue of this the Tribe is
no fooner in the field than in Battalia, nor fooner in Battalia than
call'd to the Urns or the Ballot by virtue of
THE ninth ORDER, wherby the Cenfors (or the Orator for the
first Mufter) upon reception of the Lifts of the Hundreds from the High
Conftables, according as is directed by the feventh Order, are to make their
Notes for the Urns beforehand, with regard had to the Lifts of the Magi-
ftrats, to be elected by the enfuing Orders, that is to fay, by the first Lift
call'd the prime Magnitude, fix; and by the fecond call'd the Galaxy,
nine. Wherfore the Cenfors are to put into the middle Urn for the Election
of the first Lift twenty four Gold Balls, with twenty fix Blanks or Silver
Balls, in all fixty; and into the fide Urns fixty Gold Balls divided into
each according to the different number of the Horſe and Foot: that is to
fay, if the Horfe and the Foot be equal, equally; and if the Horfe and the
Foot be inequal, inequally, by an Arithmetical Proportion. The like fall
be don the fecond day of the Mufter, for the fecond Lift, except that the
Cenfors fhall put into the middle Urn 36 Gold Balls with 24 Blanks, in
all fixty; and fixty Gold Balls into the fide Urns, divided refpectively in-
to the number of the Horfe and the Foot: and the Gold Balls in the fide
Urns at either Ballot are by the addition of Blanks to be brought even
with the number of the Ballotants at either Urn refpectively. The Gen-
fors having prepar'd their Notes, as has bin ſhewn, and being com at the
day appointed into the Field, fhall preſent a little Urn to the Lord High
Sheriff, who is to draw twice for the Letters to be us'd that day, the one
at the fide Urns, and the other at the middle. And the Cenfors having
fitted the Urns accordingly, ſhall place themſelves in certain movable Seats
or Pulpits (to be kept for that uſe in the Pavilion) the first Cenfor before
the Horfe Urn, the fecond before the Foot Urn, the Lord Lieutenant do-
ing the Office of Cenfor pro tempore at the middle Urn; where all and
every one of them shall caufe the Laws of the Ballot to be diligently ob-
Serv'd, taking a special care that no Man be fuffer'd to com above once to
the Urn, (wherof it more particularly concerns the Subcenfors, that is
to fay, the Overfeers of every Parish, to be careful; they being each in
this regard refponfible for their respective Parishes) or to draw above one
Ball, which if it be Gold, he is to prefent to the Cenfor, who shall look
upon the Letter ; and if it be not that of the day, and of the respective Urn,
apprehend the Party, who for this or any other like diforder, is obnoxious
to the Phylarch.
THIS Order being obferv'd by the Cenfors, it is not poffible for
the People, if they can but draw the Balls, tho they underſtand no-
thing at all of the Ballot, to be out. To philofophize further upon
this Art, tho there be nothing more rational, were not worth the
while; becauſe in writing it will be perplex'd, and the firſt practice of
it gives the demonftration: whence it came to pass, that the Orator,
after
9 Order.
94
OCEAN A.
10. Order.
after fom needlefs pains in the explanation of the two foregoing Or
ders, betaking himſelf to exemplify the fame, found the work don to
his hand; for the Tribe, as eager upon a buſineſs of this nature, had
retain'd one of the Surveyors, out of whom (before the Orator ar-
riv'd) they had got the whole Mystery by a ftoln Muſter, at which
in order to the Ballot they had made certain Magiftrats pro tempore.
Wherfore he found not only the Pavilion (for this time a Tent) erect-
ed with three Poſts, ſupplying the place of Pillars to the Urns; but the
Urns being prepar'd with a juft number of Balls for the firſt Ballot, to
becom the Field, and the occafion very gallantly, with their Covers
made in the manner of Helmets, open at either ear to give paffage to
the hands of the Ballotants, and flanting with noble Plumes to direct
the March of the People. Wherfore he proceded to
THE tenth ORDER, requiring of the Deputys of the Parishes,
That upon every Monday next enfuing the last of February, they make
their perfonal appearance, Horfe and Foot in Arms accordingly, at the Ren-
devouz of the Tribe; where being in Difciplin, the Horfe upon the right,
and the Foot upon the left, before the Pavilion, and having made Oath by
holding up their hands upon the tender of it by the Lord High Sheriff, to
make Election without favour, and of fuch only as they shall judg fittest for
the Commonwealth: The Conductor fhall take three Balls, the one infcrib'd
with thefe words [outward Files] another with these words [inward Files]
and the third with theſe [middle Files] which Balls he shall caft into a little
Urn, and preſent it to the Lord High Sheriff, who drawing one, fhall give
the words of Command, as they are therupon infcrib'd, and the Ballot ſhall
begin accordingly. For example, if the Ball be infcrib'd middle Files, the
Ballot fhall begin by the middle; that is, the two Files that are middle to
the Horfe, fhall draw out firft to the Horfe Urn, and the two Files that are
middle to the Foot, ſhall draw out firſt to the Foot Urn, and be follow'd by
all the rest of the Files as they are next to them in order. The like fall be
don by the inward, or by the outward Files, in cafe they be first call'd. And
the Files, as every Man has drawn his Ball, if it be Silver, ſhall begin at
the Urn to countermarch to their places; but he that has drawn, a Gold Ball
at a fide Urn, fhall procede to the middle Urn, where if the Ball he draws
be Silver, he ſhall alſo countermarch: But if it be Gold, he ſhall take his
place upon a form fet cross the Pavilion, with his face toward the Lord
High Sheriff, who shall be feated in the middle of the Pavilion, with cer-
tain Clercs by him, one of which shall write down the names of every E-
lector, that is, of every one that drew a Gold Ball at the middle Urn, and
in the Order his Ball was drawn, till the Electors amount to fix in number.
And the first fix Electors, Horfe and Foot promifcuously, are the firft Order
of Electors; the fecond fix (fill accounting them as they are drawn) the
Second Order; the third fix, the third Order; and the fourth fix, the fourth
Order of Electors: every Elector having place in his order, according ta
the order wherein he was drawn. But fo foon as the first Order of Electors
is complete, the Lord High Sheriff shall fend them with a Copy of the
following Lift, and a Clerc that understands the Ballot, immediatly to a
little Tent ftanding before the Pavilion in his ey, to which no other Perfon
but themſelves, during the Election, shall approach. The Lift fhall be
written in this manner :
Anno
}
95
OCEAN Á.
Anno Domini.
The Lift of the Prime Magnitude or first day's Election of Magiftrats:
1. The Lord High Sheriff, Commander in Chief
2. Lord Lieutenant
3. Lord Cuftos Rotulorum, Muftermafter General
4. The Conductor, being Quartermaster General
5. The firſt Cenfor
6. The fecond Cenfor
the Prime
of the Tribe of Nubia, Inflitution of
containing at this Magnitude.
prefent Mufter 700
Horfe, and 1500
Foot, in all 2200
Deputys.
AND the Electers of the first band or order, being fix, ſkall each of
them name to his respective Magistracy in the left fuch as are not already
elected in the Hundreds, till one Competitor be chofen to every Magiftracy
in the Lift by the Ballot of the Electors of the first Order; which don, the
Lift with the Competitors therunto annex'd ſhall be return'd to the Lord
High Sheriff by the Clerc attending that Order, but the Electors fhall keep
their places: for they have already given their Suffrage, and may not enter
into the Ballot of the Tribe. If there arifes any Difpute in an Order of
Electors, one of the Cenfors or Subcenfors appointed by them in cafe they be
Electors, ſhall enter into the Tent of that Order; and that Order fall ftand
to his Judgment in the decifion of the Controversy. The like fhall be don
exactly by each other Order of Electors, being fent as they are drawn,each
with another Copy of the fame Lift, into a diftinct Tent, till there be re-
turn'd to the Lord High Sheriff four Competitors to every Magistracy in
the Lift; that is to fay, one Competitor elected to every Office in every one
of the four Orders: which Competitors the Lord High Sheriff fall caufe
to be pronounc'd or read by a Cryer to the Congregation; and the Congre-
gation having heard the whole Lifts repeated, the Names fhall be put by the
Lord High Sheriff to the Tribe, one by one, beginning with the first Com-
petitor in the first Order, thence proceding to the first Competitor in the
Second Order, and fo to the first in the third and fourth Orders. And the
Suffrages being taken in boxes by boys (as has bin already fhewn) fhall
be pour'd into the Bowls ftanding before the Cenfors, who ſhall be feated
at each end of the Table in the Pavilion, the one numbring the Affirma-
tives, and the other the Negatives; and be, of the four Competitors to the
firft Magiftracy, that has most above half the Suffrages of the Tribe in the
Affirmative, is the first Magiftrat. The like is to be don fucceffively by
the rest of the Competitors in their order. But becauſe foon after the
Boxes are fent out for the first name, there be others fent cut for the fecond,
and fo for the third, &c. by which means divers names are fucceffively at
one and the fame time in ballotting; the Boy that carrys a Box fhall fing
or repeat continually the name of the Competitor for whom that Box is
carrying, with that alfo of the Magiftracy to which he is propos'd. A
Magiftrat of the Tribe happening to be an Elector, may fubftitute any
one of his own Order to execute his other Function. The Magiftrats of
the Prime Magnitude being thus elected, ſhall receive the prefent Charge
of the Tribe.
IF it be objected againſt this Order, that the Magiftrats to be
elected by it, will be Men of more inferior rank than thoſe of the
Hundreds, in regard that thofe are choſen firſt; it
it may be remem-
ber'd,
2
96
O CE AN A
21. Order.
ber'd, that fo were the Burgeffes in the former Government, never
theleſs the Knights of the Shire were Men of greater quality: And
the Election at the Hundred is made by a Council of Electors, of
whrom lefs cannot be expected than the diſcretion of naming Perfons
fitteſt for thoſe Capacitys, with an ey upon theſe to be elected at
the Tribe. As for what may be objected in point of Difficulty, it is
demonftrable by the foregoing Orders, that a Man might bring ten
thouſand Men (if there were occafion) with as much eafe, and as
fuddenly to perform the Ballot, as he can make five thoufand Men
(drawing them out by double Files) to march a quarter of a mile.
But becauſe at this Ballot, to go up and down the Field, diftributing
the linen Pellets to every Man, with which he is to ballot or give
fuffrage, would lofe a great deal of time, therfore a Man's Wife, his
Daughters, or others, make him his provifion of Pellets before the
Ballot; and he coms into the field with a matter of a ſcore of them
in his pocket. And now I have as good as don with the fport. The
next is
THE eleventh ORDER, explaining the Dutys and Functions of
Functions of the Magiftrats contain'd in the Lift of the Prime Magnitude: And thofe
the Magifrats
of the Prime of the Hundreds, beginning with the Lord High Sheriff, who, over and
Magnitude above his more antient Offices, and thofe added by the former Order, is
Functions of
the first Magiftrat of the Phylarch, or Prerogative Troop. The Lord
Lieutenant, over and above his Duty mention'd, is Commander in Chief
of the Mufters of the Youth, and fecond Magiftrat of the Phylarch.
The Cuftos Rotulorum is to return the yearly Mufter-rolls of the Tribe,
as well that of the Youth as of the Elders, to the Rolls in Emporium,
and is the third Magiftrat of the Phylarch. The Cenfors by themselves,
and their Subcenfors, that is, the Overfeers of the Parishes, are to fee
that the respective Laws of the Ballot be obferv'd in all the popular Affem-
blys of the Tribe. They have power alfo to put fuch National Minifters,
as in Preaching fhall intermeddle with matters of Government, out of their
Livings: except the Party appeals to the Phylarch, or to the Council
of Religion, where in that cafe the Cenfors fhall profecute. All and every
one of thefe Magiftrats, together with the Justices of Peace, and the
Jurymen of the Hundreds, amounting in the whole number to threeſcore
and fix, are the Prerogative Troop or Phylarch of the Tribe.
THE Function of the Phylarch or Prerogative Troop is fivefold.
FIRST, They are the Council of the Tribe, and as fuch to govern
the Phylaich, the Mufters of the fame according to the foregoing Orders, having cogni-
zance of what has past in the Congregation or Elections made in the
Parishes or the Hundreds, with power to punish any undue practices, or
variation from their respective Rules and Orders, under an Appeal to the
Parlament. A Marriage legitimatly is to be pronounc'd by the Paro-
chial Congregation, the Mufter of the Hundred, or the Phylarch.
if a Tribe have a defire (which they are to express at the Mufter by their
Captains, every Troop by his own) to petition the Parlament, the Phy-
larch, as the Counfil, fhall frame the Petition in the Pavilion, and pro-
pofe it by Claufes to the Ballot of the whole Tribe; and the Claufes that
fhall be affirm'd by the Ballot of the Tribe, and fign'd by the hands of the
fix Magiftrats of the Prime Magnitude, fhall be receiv'd and efteem'd by
the Parlament as the Petition of the Tribe, and no other.
And
SECOND-
1
OCEAN A.
97
·
SECONDLY, The Phylarch has power to call to their affiftance
what other Troops of the Tribe they pleaſe (be they elders or youth, whofe
Difciplin will be hereafter directed) and with thefe to receive the Judges
Itinerant in their Circuits, whom the Magiftrats of the Phylarch ſhall af-
fift upon the Bench, and the furys elfwhere in their proper functions accor-
ding to the more antient Laws and Customs of this Nation.
THIRDLY, The Phylarch ſhall hold the Court call'd the Quarter
Seffions according to the antient Cuſtom, and therin fhall also hear Caufes
in order to the protection of Liberty of Confcience, by fuch Rules as are or
Shall hereafter be appointed by the Parlament.
FOURTHLY, All Commiffions, iffu'd into the Tribes by the Par-
lament, or by the Chancery, are to be directed to the Phylarch, or fom of
that Troop, and executed by the fame respectively.
1
FIFTHLY, In the cafe of Levys of Mony the Parlament ſhall tax
the Phylarchs, the Phylarchs fhall tax the Hundreds, the Hundreds the
Parishes, and the Parishes fhall levy it upon themſelves. The Parishes
having levy'd the Tax-mony, accordingly fhall return it to the Officers of
the Hundreds, the Hundreds to the Phylarchs, and the Phylarchs to the
Exchequer. But if a man has ten Children living, he ſhall pay no Taxes ;
if he has five living, he shall pay but half Taxes; if he has bin marry'd
three years, or be above twenty-five years of Age, and has no Child or
Children lawfully begotten, he ſhall pay double Taxes. And if there hap-
pen to grow any difpute upon thefe or fuch other Orders as fhall or may bere-
to be added hereafter, the Phylarchs ſhall judge the Tribes, and the Parla-
ment ſhall judg the Phylarchs. For the reft, if any man ſhall go about
to introduce the right or power of Debate into any popular Council or
Congregation of this Nation, the Phylarch or any Magiftrat of the Hun-
dred, or of the Tribe, fhall caufe him prefently to be fent in cuftody to the
Council of War.
the Pillar of
THE part of the Order relating to the Rolls in Emporium being of Inftitution of
fingular ufe, is not unworthy to be fomwhat better open'd. In what the Roll call d
manner the Lifts of the Pariſhes, Hundreds, and Tribes are made, has Nilus.
bin fhewn in their reſpective Orders, where after the Partys are elected,
they give an account of the whole number of the Elders or Deputys in
their refpective Affemblys or Mufters; the like for this part exactly is
don by the Youth in their Difciplin (to be hereafter fhewn) wherfore
the Lifts of the Pariſhes, Youth and Elders, being fum'd up, give the
whole number of the People able to bear Arms; and the Lifts of the
Tribes, Youth and Elders, being fum'd up, give the whole number of
the People bearing Arms. This account, being annually recorded by
the Maſter of the Rolls, is call'd the Pillar of Nilus, becauſe the Peo-
ple being the Riches of the Commonwealth, as they are found to riſe
or fall by the degrees of this Pillar, like that River, give an account
of the public Harveſt.
THUS much for the Deſcription of the firſt day's work at the
Mufter, which happen'd as has bin fhewn, to be done as foon as faid:
for as in practice it is of ſmall difficulty, fo requires it not much time,
feeing the great Council of Venice, confifting of a like number, begins
at twelve of the Clock, and elects nine Magiftrats in one Afternoon.
But the Tribe being diſmiſt for this night, repair'd to their Quarters,
under the conduct of their new Magiftrats. The next morning re-
turning to the field very early, the Orator proceded to
O
THE
98
OCEAN A.
12. Order.
Inflitution of
The twelfth ORDER, directing the Mufter of the Tribe in the
the Galaxy. fecond day's Election, being that of the Lift call'd the Galaxy; in which
the Cenfors fhall prepare the Urns according to the Directions given in
the ninth Order for the fecond Ballot; that is to fay, with 36 Gold Balls
in the middle Urn, making four Orders, and nine Electors in every Or-
der, according to the number of the Magiftrats in the Lift of the Galaxys
which is as follows:
i. Knight
2. Knight S
} to be chofen out of the Horſe.
3. Deputy
4. Deputy
5. Deputy
6. Deputy
}
to be choſen out of the Horfe.
7. Deputy
to be chofen out of the Foot.
8. Deputy
9. Deputy
THE reft of the Ballot ſhall procede exactly according to that of the firſt
day. But forafmuch as the Commonwealth demands as well the fruits of a
man's body as of his mind, he that has not bin marry'd ſhall not be capable of
thefe Magiftracys till he be marry'd. If a Deputy, already chofen to be an
Officer in the Parish, in the Hundred, or in the Tribe, be afterwards chofen
of the Galaxy, it shall be lawful for him to delegat his Office in the Parish,
in the Hundred, or in the Tribe, toany one of bis oien Order, being not already
chofen into Office. The Knights and Deputys being chofen, ſhall be brought
to the head of the Tribe by the Lord high Sheriff, who shall adminiſter to them
this Oath; Ye fhall well and truly obſerve and keep the Orders and
Cuſtoms of this Commonwealth which the People have chofen. And
if any of them ſhall refuſe the Oath, he shall be rejected, and that Competi-
tor which had the most voices next ſhall be call'd, in his place; who if he
takes the Oath ſhall be entered in the Lift; but if he also refufes the Oath,
he who had most voices next ſhall be call'd, and fo till the number of nine
out of thofe Competitors which had moft voices be fworn Knights and Depu-
tys of the Galaxy. [This Claufe, in regard of the late Divifions, and
to the end that no violence be offer'd to any man's Confcience, to be of
force but for the first three years only.] The Knights of the Galaxy being
elected and fworn, are to repair, by the Monday next inſuing the laſt of
March, to the Pantheon or Palace of Justice, fituated in the Metropolis of
this Commonwealth (except the Parlament, by reafon of a contagious Sick-
nefs, or fom other occafion, has adjourn'd to another part of the Nation)
where they are to take their places in the Senat, and continue in full Power
and Commiffion as Senators for the full term of three years next infuing
the date of their Election. The Deputys of the Galaxy are to repair by
the fame day (except as before excepted) to the Halo fituated in Empori-
um, where they are to be lifted of the Prerogative Tribe, or equal Repre-
fentative of the People; and to continue in full Power and Commiffion as
their Deputys for the full term of three years next infuing their Elec-
tion. But forafmuch as the term of every Magistracy or Office in this
Commonwealth requires an equal vacation, a Knight or Deputy of the
į
Galaxy,
OCEAN A.
99
Galaxy, having fulfil'd his term of three years, ſhall not be reelected
into the fame Galaxy, or any other, till he has alſo fulfil'd his three
years vacation.
WHOEVER fhall rightly confider the foregoing Orders, will be
as little able to find how it is poffible, that a worshipful Knight ſhould
declare himſelf in Ale and Beef worthy to ferve his Country, as how
my Lord High Sheriff's Honour, in cafe he were protected from the Law,
could play the knave. But tho the foregoing Orders, fo far as they re-
gard the Conftitution of the Senat and the People, requiring no more
as to an ordinary Election than is therin explain'd, that is but one third
part of their Knights and Deputys, are perfect; yet muſt we in this
place, and as to the Inftitution, of neceffity erect a Scaffold. For the
Commonwealth to the firſt creation of her Councils in full number,
requir'd thrice as many as are eligible by the foregoing Orders. Wher-
fore the Orator, whofe aid in this place was moft neceffary, rightly in-
forming the People of the reaſon, ſtaid them two days longer at the
Muſter, and took this courfe. One Lift containing two Knights and
feven Deputys, he caus'd to be choſen upon the ſecond day; which
Lift being call'd the first Galaxy, qualify'd the Partys elected of it
with power for the term of one year and no longer: another Lift con-
taining two Knights and ſeven Deputys more, he caus'd to be choſen
the third day, which Lift being call'd the fecond Galaxy, qualify'd
the Partys elected of it with Power for the term of two years and no
longer. And upon the fourth day he chofe the third Galaxy, accor-
ing as it is directed by the Order, impower'd for three years; which
Lifts fucceffively falling (like the Signs or Conſtellations of one He-
miſphere, which ſetting, cauſe thoſe of the other to rife) caft the great
Orbs of this Commonwealth into an annual, triennial, and perpetual
Revolution.
THE bufinefs of the Mufter being thus happily finish'd, HER-
MES DE CADUCEO, Lord Orator of the Tribe of Nubia, being now
put
into her firſt Rapture, caus'd one of the Cenfors Pulpits to be
planted in front of the Squadron, and aſcending into the fame, fpake
after this manner.
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My Lords, the Magiftrates and the People of the Tribe
W
of Nubia.
E have this day folemniz'd the happy Nuptials of the two
greateſt Princes that are upon the Earth or in Nature, ARMS
"and COUNCILS: in the mutual Embraces wherof confifts your
"whole COMMONWEALTH; whofe Councils upon their perpe-
"tual Wheelings, Marches, and Countermarches, create her Armys;
"and whoſe Armys with the golden Vollys of the BALLOT at once
"create and falute her Councils. There be thoſe (fuch is the World
at preſent) that think it ridiculous to fee a Nation exerciſing its Ci-
"vil Functions in Military Difciplin; while they, committing their
"Buff to their Servants, com themſelves to hold Trenchards. For
"what avails it ſuch as are unarm'd, or (which is all one) whofe
Education acquaints them not with the proper ufe of their Swords,
"to be call'd Citizens? What were two or three thouſand of you, tho
never ſo well affected to your Country, but naked, to one Troop of
"Merce-
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OCEAN A.
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Mercenary Soldiers? If they ſhould com upon the Field and fay,
Gentlemen, It is thought fit that fuch and fuch Men Thould be chofen
by you; where were your Liberty; Or, Gentlemen, Parlaments
"are exceding good, but you are to have a little patience, thefe times
are not fo fit for them; where were your Commonwealth? What
"caufes the Monarchy of the Turcs but Servants in Arms? What was
"it that begot the glorious Commonwealth of Rome, but the Sword
"in the hands of her Citizens? Wherfore my glad eys falute the Se-
renity and Brightnefs of this day with a fhowr that ſhall not cloud
"it. Behold the Army of Ifrael becom a Commonwealth, and the
"Commonwealth of Ifrael remaining an Army, with her Rulers of Tens
"and of Fiftys, her Rulers of Hundreds and Thouſands, drawing near (as
this day throout our happy Fields) to the Lot by her Tribes, increas'd
"above threefold, and led up by her Phylarchs or Princes, to fit upon
* fifty Thrones, judging the fifty Tribes of Oceana! Or, Is it A-
thens, breaking from her Iron Sepulcher, where fhe has bin fo long
trampled by Hofts of Janizarys? For certainly that is the voice of
"THESEUS, having gather'd his fcatter'd Athenians into one City.
+ This freeborn Nation lives not upon the Dole or Bounty of one
man, but diftributing her annual Magiftracys and Honours with her
"own hand, is herſelf King PEOPLE-(at which the Orator was a
while interrupted with fhouts, but at length proceded)-Is it grave
"Lacedemon in her arm'd Tribe divided by her Obe and her Mora,
es which appears to chide me that I teach the People to talk, or conceive
"fuch Language as is dreft like a Woman, to be a fit Ufher of the
Joys of Liberty into the hearts of men? Is it Rome in her victorious
"Arms (for fo fhe held her Concio or Congregation) that congratu
zc
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lats with us, for finding out that which ſhe could not hit on, and
binding up her Comitia Curiata, Centuriata, and Tributa, in one in-
"violable League of Union? Or is it the Great Council of incompa-
"rable Venice, bowling forth by the felf-fame Ballot her immortal
"Commonwealth? For, neither by Reafon nor by Experience is it
હું
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<<
C.
impoffible that a Commonwealth fhould be immortal; ſeeing the
People being the Materials, never dy; and the Form, which is
"Motion, muft, without oppofition, be endleſs. The Bowl which
"is thrown from your hand, if there be no rub, no impediment, ſhall
never ceaſe: for which cauſe the glorious Luminarys that are the
Bowls of God, were once thrown for ever; and next theſe, thoſe
"of Venice. But certainly, my Lords, whatever theſe great Ex-
"amples may have fhewn us, we are the firft that have fhewn to the
"World a Commonwealth eſtabliſh'd in her rife upon fifty fuch
"Towers, and fo garnizon'd as are the Tribes of Oceana, containing
a hundred thouſand Elders upon the annual Lift, and yet but an
Outguard; befides her marching Armys to be equal in the Diſciplin,
" and in the number of her Youth.
<<
"And forafmuch as Soverain Power is a neceffary but a for-
"midable Creature, not unlike the Pouder which (as you are Soldiers)
is at once your Safety and your Danger, being fubject to take fire
* Sellis Curulibus.
+
Hæc juris fui
Parere Domino Çivitas uni negat :
Rex ipfa Populus annuas mandat vices
Honoris huic illive
"againſt
1
1
OCEAN´´A.
101
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"againſt you as well as for you; how well and fecurely is the by your
Galaxys fo collected as to be in full force and vigor, and yet fo diftri-
"buted that it is impoffible you ſhould be blown up by your own Ma--
"gazine? Let them who will have it, that Power if it be confin'd
"cannot be Soverain, tell us, whether our Rivers do not enjoy a more
"ſecure and fruitful reign within their proper banks, than if it were
"lawful for them, in ravaging our Harvefts, to fpill themselves?
"Whether Souls, not confin'd to their peculiar Bodys, do govern them
any more than thoſe of Witches in their Trances? Whether Power,
"not confin'd to the bounds of Reaſon and Virtue, has any other
"bounds than thoſe of Vice and Paffion? Or if Vice and Paffion be
boundleſs, and Reaſon and Virtue have certain Limits, on which of
"theſe Thrones holy men fhould anoint their Soverain? But to blow
away this duft, The Soverain Power of a Commonwealth is no more
bounded, that is to ſay ſtraitned, than that of a Monarch; but is
"balanc'd. The Eagle mounts not to her proper pitch, if the be
bounded; nor is free, if fhe be not balanc'd. And left a Monarch
"ſhould think he can reach further with his Scepter, the Roman Eagle
upon fuch a Balance ſpread her Wings from the Ocean to Euphrates.
"Receive the Soverain Power; you have received it, hold it faſt, im-
"brace it for ever in your fhining Arms. The virtue of the Load-
"ftone is not impair'd or limited, but receives ftrength and nouriſh-
"ment by being bound in Iron. And fo giving your Lordships
"much Joy, I take my leave of this Tribe."
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THE Orator defcending, had the period of his Speech made with a
vaft applauſe and exultation of the whole Tribe, attending him for
that night to his quarter, as the Phylarch with fome commanded
Troops did the next day to the Frontiers of the Tribe, where leave
was taken on both fides with more Tears than Grief.
Definition of
SO, a Tribe is the third Diviſion of Land occafion'd by the third the Tribe.
Collection of the People, whofe Functions proper to that place are
contain❜d in the five foregoing Orders.
The Inftitution of the Commonwealth was fuch as needed thoſe
Props and Scaffolds which may have troubled the Reader; but I fhall
here take them away, and com to the Conſtitution which ſtands by
it felf, and yields a clearer profpect.
Conftitution of
THE motions, by what has bin already ſhown, are Spherical; and the Common-
Spherical Motions have their proper Center: for which caufe (e'er I cath.
procede further) it will be neceffary, for the better underſtanding of
the whole, that I difcover the Center wherupon the Motions of this
Commonwealth are form'd.
THE Center, or Bafis of every Government, is no other than the
Fundamental Laws of the fame.
FUNDAMENTAL Laws are fuch as ftate what it is that a
Man
may call his own, that is to fay, Property; and what the Means
be wherby a Man may enjoy his own, that is to fay, Protection. The
firft is alfo call'd Dominion, and the fecond Empire or Soverain Power,
wherof this (as has been fhewn) is the natural product of the former:
for fuch as is the Balance of Dominion in a Nation, fuch is the nature
of its Empire.
WHER FORE the Fundamental Laws of Oceana, or the Center
of this Commonwealth, are the Agrarian and the Ballot: The Agra-
rian
IC 2
OCEAN A.
1
t
rian by the Balance of Dominion preferving Equality in the Root,
and the Ballot by an equal Rotation conveying it into the Branch,
or Exercife of Soverain Power: As, to begin with the former, ap-
pears by
THE thirteenth ORDER conftituting the Agrarian Laws of
Oceana, Marpefia, and Panopea, wherby it is ordain'd, Firſt, for all fuch
Lands as are lying and being within the proper Territorys of Oceana, that
every Man who is at prefent poffeft, or ſhall hereafter be poſſeſt of an E-
ftate in Land exceeding the Revenue of two thouſand Pounds a year, and
having more than one Son, fhall leave his Lands either equally divided a-
mong them, in cafe the Lands amount to above 2000l. a year to each; or
fo near equally in cafe they com under, that the greater part or portion
of the fame remaining to the eldeft, excede not the value of two thouſand
Pounds Revenue. And no man, not in prefent poſſeſſion of Lands above
the value of two thouſand Pounds by the year, fhall receive, enjoy (except
by lawful Inheritance) acquire, or purchaſe to himſelf Lands within the
faid Territorys, amounting, with thofe already in his poffeffion, above the
faid Revenue. And if a man has a Daughter, or Daughters, except fhe
be an Heiress, or they be Heireffes, he shall not leave or give to any one of
them in Marriage, or otherwife, for her Portion, above the value of one
thousand five hundred Pounds in Lands, Goods, and Monys. Nor hall
any Friend, Kinfman, or Kinfwoman, add to her or their Portion or Por-
tions that are jo provided for, to make any one of them greater. Nor
Shall any man demand, or have more in marriage with any Woman. Ne-
vertheless an Heiress fhallenjoy her lawful Inheritance, and a Widow, what-
foever the Bounty or Affection of her Husband fhall bequeath to her, to be
divided in the first Generation, wherin it is divifible according
bin fhewn.
as has
SECONDLY, For Lands lying and being within the Territorys of
Marpefia, the Agrarian ſhall hold in all parts as it is eſtabliſh'd in Ő-
ceana, except only in the Standard or Proportion of Eftates in Land,
which shall be fet for Marpefia at five hundred Pounds. And,
THIRDLY, For Panopea, the Agrarian fhall hold in all parts,
as in Oceana. And whosoever poſſeſſing above the proportion allow'd by
thefe Laws, fhall be lawfully convicted of the fame, fhall forfeit the Over-
plus to the ufe of the State.
AGRARIAN Laws of all others have ever bin the greateſt Bug-
bears, and ſo in the Inftitution were theſe, at which time it was ridi-
culous to ſee how ftrange a fear appear'd in every body of that which,
being good for all, could hurt no body. But instead of the proof
of this Order, I fhall out of thofe many Debates that happen'd e'er it
could be paſt, infert two Speeches that were made at the Council of
Legiflators, the first by the Right Honorable PHILAUTUS DE GARBO,
a young Man, being Heir apparent to a very Noble Family, and one
of the Counfillors, who expreft himſelf as follows.
May
OCEAN A.
103
1
May it pleafe your Highness, my Lord ARCHON of Oceana.
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FI did not, to my capacity, know from how profound a
Counfillor I diffent, it would certainly be no hard taſk to make
it as light as the day: Firft, That an Agrarian is altogether un-
neceffary. Secondly, that it is dangerous to a Commonwealth.
Thirdly, That it is infufficient to keep out Monarchy. Fourthly,
"That it ruins Familys. Fifthly, That it deftroys Induſtry. And
"laft of all, that tho it were indeed of any good ufe, it will be a
matter of ſuch difficulty to introduce in this Nation, and ſo to ſet-
"tle that it may be lafting, as is altogether invincible.
<<
FIRST, that an Agrarian is unneceffary to a Commonwealth,
"what clearer Teſtimony can there be, than that the Commonwealths
"which are our Cotemporarys (Venice, to which your Highneſs
gives the upperhand of all Antiquity, being one) have no fuch
thing? And there can be no reaſon why they have it not, feeing it
"is in the Soverain Power at any time to eſtabliſh fuch an Order, but
"that they need it not; wherfore no wonder if ARISTOTLE, who
"pretends to be a good Commonwealthfman has long fince derided
PHALEAS, to whom it was attributed by the Greecs, for his in-
k
<< vention.
"SECONDLY, That an Agrarian is dangerous to a Common-
"wealth is affirm'd upon no flight Authority, feeing MACHIAVEL
"is pofitive, that it was the Diffenfion which happen'd about the A-
grarian that caus'd the Deftruction of Rome; nor do I think that
"it did much better in Lacedemon, as I fhall fhew anon.
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THIRDLY, That it is infufficient to keep out Monarchy can-
"not without impiety be deny'd, the holy Scriptures bearing witneſs,
"that the Commonwealth of Ifrael, notwithſtanding her Agrarian,
"fubmitted her neck to the arbitrary Yoke of her Princes.
<<
CC
"FOURTHLY, Therfore to com to my next Affertion, That
"it is deſtructive to Familys; this alſo is fo apparent, that it needs
pity rather than proof. Why, alas, do you bind a Nobility (which
no Generation fhall deny to have bin the firſt that freely facrific'd
"their Blood to the antient Libertys of this People) on an unholy
"Altar? Why are the People taught, That their Liberty, which,
except our noble Anceſtors had bin born, muſt have long fince bin
bury'd, cannot now be born except we be bury'd? A Common-
"wealth fhould have the innocence of the Dove. Let us leave this
purchaſe of her Birth to the Serpent, which eats itſelf out of the
" womb of its Mother.
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<<
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"FIFTHLY, But it may be faid, perhaps, that we are fallen
" from our firſt Love, becom proud and idle. It is certain, my
"Lords, that the hand of God is not upon us for nothing. But take
"heed how you admit of fuch affaults and fallys upon Mens Eſtates,
as may flacken the Nerve of Labor, and give others alſo reaſon to
"believe that their Sweat is vain; or elfe, whatſoever be pretended,
your Agrarian (which is my Fifth Affertion) muft indeed deſtroy
Induſtry. For, that fo it did in Lacedemon is moſt apparent, as alfo
"that it could do no otherwife, where every Man having his 40
Quarters of Barly, with Wine proportionable, ſupply'd him out of
<<
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"his
104
OCEAN A.
<<
"his own Lot by his Laborer or Helot; and being confin'd in that
to the fcantling above which he might not live, there was not any
fuch thing as a Trade, or other Art, except that of War, in ex-
ercife. Wherfore a Spartan, if he were not in Arms, muft fit and
play with his fingers, whence infu'd perpetual War, and, the Eſtate
"of the City being as little capable of increaſe as that of the Citizens,
her inevitable Ruin. Now what better ends you can propofe to
your felves in the like ways, I do not fo well fee as I perceive that
"there may be worfe: For Lacedemon yet was free from Civil War:
"But if you employ your Citizens no better than fhe did, I cannot
promife you that you ſhall fare fo well, becauſe they are ftill defi-
rous of War that hope it may be profitable to them; and the ftrong-
"eft Security you can give of Peace, is to make it gainful. Otherwife
"Men will rather chufe that wherby they may break your Laws,
"than that wherby your Laws may break them. Which I fpeak not
“ſo much in relation to the Nobility or fuch as would be holding, as
"to the People or them that would be getting; the paffion in theſe
being fo much the ftronger, as a Man's felicity is weaker in the
"fruition of things, than in their profecution and increaſe.
<c
"TRULY, my Lords, it is my fear, that by taking of more
hands, and the beſt from Induſtry, you will farther indamage it,
"than can be repair'd by laying on a few, and the worft; while the
"Nobility muſt be forc'd to fend their Sons to the Plow, and, as if
"this were not enough, to marry their Daughters alfo to Farmers.
"SIXTHLY, But I do not fee (to come to the laſt point) how it
"is poffible that this thing fhould be brought about, to your good I
"mean, tho it may to the deftruction of many. For that the Agra-
"rian of Ifrael, or that of Lacedemon might ſtand, is no fuch mi-
"racle; the Lands, without any confideration of the former Pro-
prietor, being furvey'd and caft into equal Lots, which could nei-
"ther be bought, nor fold, nor multiply'd: fo that they knew wher-
"about to have a Man. But in this Nation no fuch Divifion can be
"introduc'd, the Lands being already in the hands of Proprietors,
"and fuch whofe Eſtates ly very rarely together, but mix'd one with
"another; being alfo of Tenures in nature fo different, that as there
"is no experience that an Agrarian was ever introduc'd in fuch a cafe,
fo there is no appearance how, or reaſon why it ſhould: but that
"which is againſt Reaſon and Experience is impoffible."
:
THE cafe of my Lord PHILAUTUS was the most concern'd in
the whole Nation; for he had four younger Brothers, his Father be-
ing yet living to whom he was Heir of ten thouſand Pounds a year.
Wherfore being a Man both of good Parts and Eſteem, his Words
wrought both upon Mens Reafon and Paffions, and had born a itroke
at the head of the buſineſs, if my Lord ARCHON had not interpos'd
the Buckler in this Oration.
<<
<<
M
My Lords, the Legiflators of Oceana.
Y Lord PHILAUTUS has made a thing which is eaïy to
feem hard; if the Thanks were due to his Eloquence, it
"would be worthy of leſs praiſe, than that he ows it to his Merit,
"and
OCEAN A
105
tr
and the Love he has moſt deſervedly purchas'd of all Men; nor is
"it rationally to be fear'd, that he who is ſo much beforehand in his
privat, fhould be in arrear in his public Capacity. Wherfore my
"Lord's tenderneſs throout his Speech arifing from no other Prin-
ciple than his Solicitude left the Agrarian fhould be hurtful to his
"Country; it is no leſs than my duty to give the beſt Satisfaction I
am able to ſo good a Patriot, taking every one of his Doubts in the
"Order propos'd. And,
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"FIRST, Wheras my Lord, upon obfervation of the modern
"Commonwealths, is of opinion, that an Agrarian is not neceffary:
"It muſt be confeft, that at the firft fight of them there is fom
appearance favoring his Affertion, but upon Accidents of no prece-
"dent to us.
For the Commonwealths of Switzerland and Holland, I
"mean of thoſe Leagues, being fituated in Countrys not alluring the
"Inhabitants to Wantonnefs, but obliging them to univerſal Induf-
try, have an implicit Agrarian in the nature of them: and being not
"obnoxious to a growing Nobility (which, as long as their former
Monarchys had ſpread the wing over them, could either not at all
"be hatch'd, or was foon broken) are of no example to us, whoſe
"Experience in this point has bin to the contrary. But what if even
"in theſe Governments there be indeed an explicit Agrarian? For
"when the Law commands an equal or near equal diſtribution of a
"Man's Eftate in Land among his Children, as it is don in thoſe
Countrys, a Nobility cannot grow; and fo there needs no Agra-
"rian, or rather there is one. And for the growth of the Nobility
"in Venice (if fo it be, for MACHIAVEL obferves in that Re-
public, as a cauſe of it, a great mediocrity of Eftates) it is not a
point that ſhe is to fear, but might ſtudy, feeing the confifts of no-
thing elſe but Nobility; by which, whatever their Eſtates fuck from
"the People, eſpecially, if it coms equally, is digefted into the better
"Blood of that Commonwealth, which is all, or the greateſt benefit
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they can have by accumulation. For how inequal foever you will
"have them to be in their Incoms, they have Officers of the Pomp,
" to bring them equal in expences, or at leaſt in the oftentation or fhew
"of them. And fo unleſs the advantage of an Eſtate confifts more
"in the meaſure than in the uſe of it, the Authority of Venice dos
"but inforce our Agrarian; nor ſhall a Man evade or elude the Pru-
"dence of it, by the Authority of any other Commonwealth. For
"if a Commonwealth has bin introduc'd at once, as thofe of Ifrael
"and Lacedemon, you are certain to find her underlaid with this as the
"main Foundation; nor, if ſhe is oblig'd more to Fortune than Pru-
dence, has the rais'd her head without muſing upon this matter, as
"appears by that of Athens, which thro her defect in this point, fays
ARISTOTLE, introduc'd her Oftracism, as most of the Demo- Polit. 1.3.c.9.
cracys of Grece. But, not to reſtrain a Fundamental of fuch la-
"titude to any one kind of Government, do we not yet fee, that if
"there be a fole Landlord of a vaft Territory, he is the Turc? That
" if a few Landlords overbalance a populous Country, they have ſtore
"of Servants? That if a People be in an equal balance, they can have
"no Lords? That no Government can otherwife be erected, than
upon fom one of theſe Foundations? That no one of theſe Foun-
"dations (each being elſe apt to change into fom other) can give
any fecurity to the Government, unleſs it be fix'd: That thro the
"want
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OCEAN A.
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<<
"want of this fixation, potent Monarchy and Commonwealths have
"faln upon the heads of the People, and accompany'd their own fad
"Ruins with vaft effufions of innocent Blood? Let the Fame, as was
"the merit of the antient Nobility of this Nation, be equal to, or
"above what has bin already faid, or can be ſpoken; yet have we
feen not only their Glory, but that of a Throne, the moſt indulgent
to, and leaſt invafive for fo many Ages upon the Liberty of a Prople
"that the World has known, thro the mere want of fixing her foot
by a proportionable Agrarian upon her proper Foundation, to have
"faln with fuch horror, as has bin a Spectacle of aftoniſhment to the
"whole Earth. And were it well argu'd from one Calamity, that
"we ought not to prevent another? Nor is ARISTOTLE fo good
a Commonwealthfman for deriding the invention of PHALEAS, as
Polit.1.5.c.3. in recollecting himſelf, where he fays, That Democracys, when a
"leſs part of their Citizens overtop the reft in Wealth, degenerat
"into Oligarchys and Principalitys; and, which coms nearer to the
prefent purpoſe, that the greater part of the Nobility of Tarentum
coming accidentally to be ruin'd, the Government of the Few came
by confequence to be chang'd into that of the Many.
<<
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THESE things confider'd, I cannot ſee how an Agrarian, as
"to the fixation or fecurity of a Government, can be lefs than neceffa-
ry. And if a Cure be neceffary, it excufes not the Patient, his
"Diſeaſe being otherwiſe deſperat, that it is dangerous; which was
"the caſe of Rome, not ſo ſtated by MACHIAVEL, where he
fays, That the ftrife about the Agrarian caus'd the Destruction of that
"Commonwealth. As if when a Senator was not rich (as CRASSUS
held) except he could pay an Army, that Commonwealth could
expect nothing but Ruin whether in ftrife about the Agrarian, or
"without it. * Of late, fays LIVY, Riches have introduc'd Ava-
rice; and voluptuous Pleafures abounding, have thro Luft and Luxury
"begot a defire of blafting and deftroying all good Orders. If the greateſt
<<
'
<<
Security of a Commonwealth confifts in being provided with the
"proper Antidote againſt this Poiſon, her greateſt danger muft be
"from the abſence of an Agrarian, which is the whole truth of the
"Roman example. For the Laconic, I fhall referve the farther expli-
"cation of it, as my Lord alfo did, to another place: and firft fee
"whether an Agrarian proportion'd to a popular Government be
"fufficient to keep out Monarchy. My Lord is, for the Negative,
" and fortify'd by the People of Ifrael electing a King. To which I
"fay, That the Action of the People therin expreft is a full Anſwer to
"the Objection of that Example: For the Monarchy neither grew
upon them, nor could, by reafon of the Agrarian, poffibly have
"invaded them, if they had not pull'd it upon themſelves by the
"election of a King. Which being an Accident, the like wherof is
"not to be found in any other People fo planted, nor in this, till, as it
"is manifeft, they were given up by God to infatuation (for fays he
to SAMUEL, They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected Me,
"that I should not reign over them) has fomthing in it which is appa-
rent, by what went before, to have bin befides the courſe of Ña-
ture, and by what follow'd. For the King having no other Foun-
<<
<<
<<
Nuper divitiæ avaritiam, & abundantes voluptates defiderium, per luxum atque libidinem,
percundi perdendique omnia invexcre. Liv. in Præf.
"dation
OCEAN A.
107
ર
'
'
"dation than the Calamitys of the People, fo often beaten by their E-
nemys, that deſpairing of themſelves, they were contented with any
change; if he had Peace as in the days of SOLOMON, left but
a flippery Throne to his Succeffor, as appear'd by REHOBOAM.
"And the Agrarian, notwithſtanding the Monarchy thus introduc'd,
"fo faithfully preferv'd the Root of that Commonwealth, that it
than any
"fhot forth oftner, and by intervals continu'd longer than other
“Government, as may be computed from the Inftitution of the fame
" by JOSHUA, 1465 years before CHRIST, to the total diffolution
"of it, which happen'd in the Reign of the Emperor ADRIAN,
135 years after the Incarnation. A People planted upon an equal
Agrarian, and holding to it, if they part with their Liberty, muft
"do it upon good-will, and make but a bad title of their Bounty.
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As
to inftance yet further in that which is propos'd by the preſent Or-
"der to this Nation, the Standard wherof is at 2000l. a year: The
"whole Territory of Oceana being divided by this proportion, a-
"mounts to 5000 Lots. So the Lands of Oceana being thus diftribut-
"ed, and bound to this Diftribution, can never fall to fewer than five
"thouſand Proprietors. But five thoufand Proprietors fo feiz'd will
not agree to break the Agrarian, for that were to agree to rob one
another; nor to bring in a King, becauſe they muſt maintain him,
" and can have no benefit by him; nor to exclude the People, becauſe
they can have as little by that, and muſt ſpoil their Militia. So the
"Commonwealth continuing upon the balance propos'd, tho it fhould
come into five thouſand hands, can never alter; and that it ſhould
ever come into five thouſand hands, is as improbable as any thing in
"the World that is not altogether impoffible.
<<
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<<
"MY Lord's other Confiderations are more privat: As that this
"Order deſtroys Familys; which is as if one ſhould lay the ruin of
"fome antient Caftle to the Herbs which uſually grow out of them;
"the deſtruction of thofe Familys being that indeed which naturally
produc'd this Order. For we do not now argue for that which
"we would have, but for that which we are already poffeft of;
as would appear, if a note were but taken of all fuch as have at
"this day above two thouſand Pounds a year in Oceana. If my Lord
"fhould grant (and I will put it with the moft) that they who are
"Proprietors in Land, exceeding this proportion, exceed not three
"hundred; with what brow can the intereſt of ſo few be balanc'd
"with that of the whole Nation? or rather, what Intereſt have
they to put in fuch a Balance? They would live as they had bin ac-
"cuſtom'd to do; Who hinders them? They would enjoy their E-
"ſtates; who touches them? They would difpofe of what they have
<<
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according to the Intereft of their Familys: It is that which we de-
"fire. A Man has one Son; let him be call'd: Would he enjoy his
"Father's Eſtate? It is his, his Son's, and his Son's Son's after him.
"A Man has five Sons; let them be call'd: Would they enjoy their
"Father's Eftate? It is divided among them: for we have four Votes
"for one in the fame Family, and therfore this muſt be the Intereſt of
"the Family, or the Family knows not its own Intereft. If a Man
"ſhall diſpute otherwiſe, he muft draw his Arguments from Cuſtom,
"and from Greatnefs, which was the Intereft of the Monarchy, not
"of the Family: and we are now a Commonwealth. If the Mo-
"narchy could not bear with fuch Divifions becauſe they tended to a
P 2
"Com-
103
OCEAN A
іс
<<
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Commonwealth; neither can a Commonwealth connive at fuch Ac-
"cumulations, becauſe they tend to a Monarchy.
If the Monarchy
might make bold with fo many for the good of one, we may make
bold with one for the good of fo many; nay, for the good of all.
My Lords, it coms into my mind, that which upon occafion of the
variety of Partys enumerated in our late Civil Wars, was faid by a
"Friend of mine coming home from his Travels, about the latter
"end of theſe Troubles; That he admir'd how it came to pafs, that
younger Brothers, efpecially being fo many more in number than
"their Elder, did not unite as one man againſt a Tyranny, the like
"wherof has not bin exercis'd in any other Nation. And truly,
"when I confider that our Countrymen are none of the worst natur'd,
"I muſt confeſs I marvel much how it coms to paſs, that we ſhould
"uſe cur Children as we do our Puppys; take one, lay it in the lap,
<<
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feed it with every good bit, and drown five: nay yet worse;
"forafmuch as the Puppys are once drown'd, wheras the Children are
"left perpetually drowning. Really, my Lords, it is a flinty Cu-
"ftom! And all this for his cruel Ambition, that would raiſe himſelf
a Pillar, a golden Pillar for his Monument, tho he has Children, his
own reviving Fleſh, and a kind of Immortality. And this is that
"intereft of a Family, for which we are to think ill of a Govern-
"ment that will not indure it. But quiet ourſelves: The Land thro
" which the River Nilus wanders in one ſtream, is barren; but where
"it parts into ſeven, it multiplys its fertil fhores by diſtributing, yet
"keeping and improving fuch a Propriety and Nutrition, as is a pru-
"dent Agrarian to a well-order'd Commonwealth.
<<
<<
<<
"NOŘ (to com to the fifth Affertion) is a political Body render'd
any fitter for Induſtry, by having one gouty and another wither'd
Leg, than a natural. It tends not to the improvement of Mer-
"chandize that there be fom who have no need of their Trading, and
"others that are not able to follow it. If Confinement diſcourages
Induſtry, an Eftate in Mony is not confin'd; and left Induftry
"fhould want wherupon to work, Land is not ingroft or intail'd
upon any man, but remains at its devotion. I wonder whence the
computation can arife, that this ſhould difcourage Induſtry. Two
"thouſand Pounds a year a man may enjoy in Oceana, as much in
"Panopea, five hundred in Marpefia: There be other Plantations, and
"the Commonwealth will have more. Who knows how far the
"Arms of our Agrarian may extend themſelves? and whether he
"that might have left a Pillar, may not leave a Temple of many
"Pillars to his more pious Memory? Where there is fom meaſure. in
Riches, a man may be rich; but if you will have them to be in-
finit, there will be no end of ſtarving himſelf, and wanting what he
has and what pains dos fuch a one take to be poor! Furthermore,
"if a man fhall think that there may be an Induſtry leſs greaſy, or
more noble, and fo caft his thoughts upon the Commonwealth,
"he will have leiſure for her, and the Riches and Honors for him
"his Sweat ſhall ſmell like ALEXANDER'S. My Lord PHILAU-
TUS is a young Man, who enjoying his ten thouſand Pounds a
year, may keep a noble Houſe in the old way, and have homely
"Gueſts; and having but two, by the means propos'd, may take the
upper
hand of his great Anceſtors; with reverence to whom, I
may fay, there has not bin one of them would have difputed, his
place
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OCEAN A.
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place with a Roman Conful. My Lord, do not break my heart;
"the Nobility fhall go to no other Plows than thofe which we
❝call our Confuls. But, fays he, it having bin fo with Lacedemon,
"that neither the City nor the Citizens were capable of increaſe, a
"blow was given by that Agrarian, which ruin'd both. And what
are we concern'd with that Agrarian, or that blow, while our Citi-
zens and our City (and that by our Agrarian) are both capable of
increaſe? The Spartan, if he made a Conqueft, had no Citizens to
"hold it; the Oceaner will have enow: the Spartan could have no
Trade, the Oceaner may have all. The Agrarian in Laconia, that
"it might bind on Knapfacs, forbidding all other Arts but that of
War, could not make an Army of above 30000 Citizens. The Agra-
"rian in Oceana without interruption of Traffic, provides us in the
"fifth part of the Youth an annual fource or freſh ſpring of 100000,
" befides our Provincial Auxiliarys, out of which to draw marching
Armys; and as many Elders, not feeble, but men moſt of them in
"the flower of their Age, and in Arms for the defence of our Ter-
ritorys. The Agrarian in Laconia baniſh'd Mony, this multiplys it:
"That allow'd a matter of twenty or thirty Acres to a man; this
two or three thouſand: There is no compariſon between them.
"And yet I differ fo much from my Lord, or his Opinion that the
Agrarian was the ruin of Lacedemon, that I hold it no lefs than de-
"monftrable to have bin her main fupport. For if, baniſhing all
"other diverfions, it could not make an Army of above 30000; then
letting in all other diverfions, it muſt have broken that Army.
"Wherfore LYSANDER bringing in the golden ſpoils of Athens, ir-
recoverably ruin'd that Commonwealth; and is a warning to us,
that in giving incouragement to Induſtry, we alſo remember, that
"Covetouſneſs is the root of all Evil. And our Agrarian can never be
"the cauſe of thoſe Seditions threaten'd by my Lord, but is the
<<
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pro-
per cure of them, as *LUCAN notes well in the ftate of Rome be-
fore the Civil Wars, which happen'd thro the want of fuch an
"Antidote.
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Why then are we miſtaken, as if we intended not equal advan-
tages in our Commonwealth to either Sex, becaufe we would not
have Womens Fortunes confift in that metal, which expoſes them
to Cutpurſes? If a man cuts my Purſe, I may have him by the heels
or by the neck for it; wheras a man may cut a woman's purſe,
"and have her for his pains in fetters. How brutiſh, and much more
than brutiſh, is that Commonwealth, which prefers the Earth be
"fore the fruits of the Womb? If the people be her Treafure, the
"ſtaff by which ſhe is ſuſtain❜d and comforted, with what Juftice can
"ſhe ſuffer them, by whom ſhe is moſt inrich'd, to be for that cauſe
"the moſt impoverish'd? And yet we ſee the gifts of God, and the
Bountys of Heaven in fruitful Familys, thro this wretched cuſtom
"of marrying for Mony, becom their infupportable grief and pover-
<<
ર
ty. Nor falls this fo heavy upon the lower fort, being better able
"to ſhift for themſelves, as upon the Nobility or Gentry. For what
"avails it in this cafe, from whence their Veins have deriv'd their
★ Hinc uſura vorax, rapidumque in tempore Fœnus;
Hinc concuffa fides, & multis utile bellum.
« Blood;
IIO
OCEAN A
Blood; while they fhall fee the Tallow of a Chandler fooner convert-
ed into that Beauty which is requir'd in a Bride? I appeal, whether
my Lord PHILAUTUS or my felf be the Advocat of Nobility;
againſt which in the cafe propos'd by me, there would be nothing
"to hold the balance. And why is a Woman, if ſhe may have but
"fifteen hundred pounds, undon? If fhe be unmarry'd, what Noble-
<<
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;
man allows his Daughter in that cafe a greater Revenu, than fo
"much Money may command? And if ſhe marry, no Nobleman can
give his Daughter a greater portion than fhe has. Who is hurt in
this cafe? nay, who is not benefited? If the Agrarian gives us the
"fweat of our brows without diminution; if it prepares our Ta-
ble, if it makes our Cup to overflow; and above all this, in pro-
viding for our Children, anoints our Heads with that Oil which
"takes away the greateſt of worldly cares; what man, that is not be-
"fotted with a Covetoufneſs as vain as endleſs, can imagin ſuch a
"Conſtitution to be his Poverty? feeing where no woman can be con-
"fiderable for her portion, no portion will be confiderable with a wo-
man and fo his Children will not only find better preferments with-
"out his Brokage, but more freedom of their own Affections. We
" are wonderful fevere in Laws, that they ſhall not marry without our
"confent; as if it were care and tenderneſs over them: But is it not
" left we ſhould not have the other thouſand Pounds with this Son, or
"the other hundred Pounds a year more in Jointure for that Daugh-
"ter? Thefe, when we are croft in them, are the Sins for which we
"water our couch with tears, but not of Penitence; feeing wheras it
"is a miſchief beyond any that we can do to our Enemys, we perfift
"to make nothing of breaking the affection of our Children. But
"there is in this Agrarian a Homage to pure and ſpotlefs Love, the con-
fequence wherof I will not give for all your Romances. An Alder-
"man makes not his Daughter a Countess till he has given her 20000 /,
nor a Romance a confiderable Miftrifs till fhe be a Princefs; theſe
are Characters of baſtard Love. But if our Agrarian excludes Am-
"bition and Covetoufnefs, we ſhall at length have the care of our
"own breed, in which we have bin curious as to our Dogs and Hor-
" fes. The Marriage-Bed will be truly legitimat, and the Race of
"the Commonwealth not ſpurious.
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"BUT (impar magnanimis aufis, imparque dolori) I am hurl'd from
"all my hopes by my Lord's laft affertion of Impoffibility, that the
Root from whence we imagin theſe Fruits, ſhould be planted or
"thrive in this Soil. And why? becauſe of the Mixture of Eftates,
"and variety of Tenures. Nevertheleſs, there is yet extant in the Ex-
chequer an old Survey of the whole Nation; wherfore fuch a thing
" is not impoffible. Now if a new Survey were taken at the preſent
rates, and the Law made, that no man fhould hold hereafter above
"fo much Land as is valu'd therein at 2000 l. a year, it would amount
"to a good and fufficient Agrarian. It is true, that there would remain
"fom difficulty in the different kind of Rents, and that it is a matter
(c
<<
requiring not only more leifure than we have, but an Authority
"which may be better able to bow men to a more general Confent,
"than is to be wrought out of them by ſuch as are in our capacity.
"Wherfore, as to the manner, it is neceffary that we refer it to the
"Parlament; but as to the matter, they cannot otherwiſe fix their
"Government upon the right Balance.
" I
OCEAN A.
III
(
!
<6
"ISHALL conclude with a few words to form parts of the
Order, which my Lord has omitted. As firft to the Confequences
"of the Agrarian to be fettled in Marpefia, which irreparably breaks
"the Ariftocracy of that Nation; being of fuch a nature, as ftanding,
"it is not poffible that you ſhould govern. For while the People of
"that Country are little better than the Cattel of the Nobility, you muſt
"not wonder if according as theſe can make their Markets with foren
« Princes, you find thoſe to be driven upon your Grounds. And if you
"be fo tender, now you have it in your power, as not to hold a hand
<< upon them that may prevent the flaughter which muft otherwiſe in-
"fue in like cafes, the Blood will lie at your door. But in holding fuch
<< a hand upon them, you may ſettle the Agrarian; and in fettling the
Agrarian, you give that People not only Liberty, but Lands; which
makes your Protection neceffary to their Security; and their Contri-
"bution due to your Protection, as to their own Safety.
<<
ર
"FOR the Agrarian of Panopea, it allowing fuch Proportions of ſo
good Land, men that conceive themſelves ftraiten'd by this in Oceana,
"will begin there to let themſelves forth, where every Citizen will in
"time have his Villa. And there is no queftion, but the improvement
"of that Country by this means muſt be far greater than it has bin in
"the beft of former times.
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"I HAVE no more to ſay, but that in thoſe antient and heroic
Ages (when men thought that to be neceffary which was virtuous)
"the Nobility of Athens having the People fo much ingag'd in their
debt, that there remain'd no other queftion among thefe, than
"which of thoſe ſhould be King, no fooner heard SOLON fpeak
"than they quitted their Debts, and reſtor'd the Commonwealth ;
" which ever after held a folemn and annual Feaſt call'd the Sifacthia,
or Recifion, in memory of that Action. Nor is this example the
"Phenix; for at the inftitution by LYCURGUS, the Nobility having
"Eftates (as ours here) in the Lands of Laconia, upon no other va-
"luable confideration than the Commonwealth propos'd by him,
"threw them up to be parcel'd by his Agrarian. But now when no
man is defir'd to throw up a farthing of his Mony, or a ſhovel full
"of his Earth, and that all we can do is but to make a virtue of ne-
"ceffity; we are difputing whether we ſhould have Peace or War:
"For Peace you cannot have without fom Government, nor any Go-
"vernment without the proper Balance. Wherfore if you will not
"fix this which you have, the reſt is Blood, for without Blood you
can bring in no other."
BY theſe Speeches made at the Inftitution of the Agrarian, you may
perceive what were the Grounds of it. The next is
THE fourteenth ORDER, conftituting the Ballot of Venice, as
it is fitted by feveral Alterations, and appointed to every Affembly, to be
the conftant and only way of giving fuffrage in this Commonwealth ac-
cording to the following Scheme.
14.
Order.
I
P: 113
1
The Manner and use of the Ballot.
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OCEAN Â.
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113
I SHALL indeavour by the preceding Figure to demonſtrat the
Manner of the VENETIAN BALLOT (a thing as difficult
in diſcourſe or writing, as facil in practice) according to the ufe
of it in Oceana. The whole Figure repreſents the Senat, containing,
as to the Houſe or form of fitting, a fquare and a half; the Tri-
bunal at the upper end being aſcended by four ſteps. On the up-
permoſt of theſe fit the Magiftrats that conftitute the Signory of the
Commonwealth, that is to fay, A the Strategus; B the Orator; C
the three Commiffioners of the Great Seal; D the three Commif-
fioners of the Treafury, wherof one, E, exerciſes for the preſent
the Office of a Cenfor at the middle Urn F.
TO the two upper fteps of the Tribunal anſwer G G. GG. the two
long Benches next the Wall on each fide of the Houſe; the outward-
moſt of which are equal in height to the uppermoft ftep, and the in-
nermoft equal in height to the next. Of theſe four Benches confifts
the firſt Seat; as the fecond Seat confifts in like manner of thoſe four
Benches HH. H H. which being next the Floor, are equal in height
to the two nethermoft fteps of the Throne. So the whole Houfe is
diftributed into two Seats, each confifling of four Benches.
THIS diftribution cauſes not only the greater conveniency, as will
be fhewn, to the Senators in the exerciſe of their Function at the Bal-
lot, but a greater grace to the afpect of the Senat. In the middle
of the outward benches ftand I. I. the chairs of the Cenfors, thofe
being their ordinary places, tho upon occafion of the Ballot they de-
fcend, and fit where they are fhewn by K. K. at each of the outward
Urns L. L. Thoſe M. M. that fit with their Tables, and the Bowls
N. N. before them, upon the half ſpace or ſecond ſtep of the Tribunal
from the floor, are the Clercs or Secretarys of the Houfe. Upon the
fhort Seats O. O. on the floor (which ſhould have bin repreſented by
Woolfacks) fit P the two Tribuns of the Horfe; Q the two Tribuns
of the Foot; and RR. RR. the Judges: all which Magiftrats are Af-
fiftants, but have no fuffrage. This poſture of the Senat conſider'd,
the Ballot is perform'd as follows.
FIRST, wheras the gold Balls are of feveral futes, and according-
ly mark'd with feveral Letters of the Alphabet, a Secretary prefents
a little Urn (wherin there is one Ball of every fute or mark) to the
Strategus and the Orator; and look what Letter the Strategus draws,
the fame and no other is to be us'd for that time in the middle Urn F
the like for the Letter drawn by the Orator is to be obferv'd for the
fide Urns L. L. that is to fay, if the Strategus drew a Ball with an A,
all the gold Balls in the middle Urn for that day are mark'd with the
Letter A; and if the Orator drew a B, all the gold Balls in the fide
Urn for that day are mark'd with the Letter B: which don immediat-
ly before the Ballot, and fo the Letter unknown to the Ballotants,
they can uſe no fraud or jugling; otherwiſe. a man might carry a
gold Ball in his hand, and feem to have drawn it out of an Urn.
He that draws a gold Ball at any Urn, delivers it to the Cenfor or
Affeffor of that Urn, who views the Character, and allows accord-
ingly of his Lot.
THE Strategus and the Orator having drawn for the Letters, the
Urns are prepar'd accordingly by one of the Commiffioners and the
Q
two
114
OCEAN A.
two Cenfors. The preparation of the Urns is after this manner. If
the Senat be to elect, for example, the Lift call'd the Tropic of Magi-
ftrats, which is this;
1. The Lord STRATEGUS;
2. The Lord ORATOR;
3.
The third COMMISSIONER of the Great Seal;
The third COMMISSIONER of the Treasury;
5. The first CENSOR;
4.
6. The fecond CENSOR;
1
This Lift or Schedule confifts of fix Magiftracys, and to every
Magiſtracy there are to be four Competitors, that is, in all four and
twenty Competitors propos'd to the Houſe. They that are to propoſe
the Competitors are call'd Electors, and no Elector can propoſe above
one Competitor: wherfore for the propofing of four and twenty Com-
petitors you muſt have four and twenty Electors; and wheras the
Ballot confifts of a Lot and of a Suffrage, the Lot is for no other
uſe than for the defignation of Electors; and he that draws a gold
Ball at the middle Urn is an Elector. Now, as to have four and
twenty Competitors propos'd, you muſt have four and twenty Elec-
tors made; fo to have four and twenty Electors made by lot, you
muſt have four and twenty gold Balls in the middle Urn; and theſe
(becauſe otherwiſe it would be no Lot) mix'd with a competent num-
ber of Blanks, or filver Balls. Wherfore to the four and twenty gold
Balls caft fix and twenty filver ones, and thoſe (reckoning the Blanks
with the Prizes) make fifty Balls in the middle Urn. This don
(becaufe no man can com to the middle Urn that has not firſt drawn
a gold Ball at one of the fide Urns) and to be fure that the Prizes
or gold Balls in this Urn be all drawn, there muſt com to it fifty
perfons: therfore there muſt be in each of the fide Urns five and twen-
ty gold Balls, which in both com to fifty; and to the end that every
Senator may have his Lot, the gold Balls in the fide Urns are to be
made up with Blanks equal to the number of the Ballotants at either
Urn: for example, the Houfe confifting of 300 Senators, there muſt
be in each of the fide Urns 125 Blanks and 25 Prizes, which com in
both the fide Urns to 300 Balls. This is the whole Myſtery of pre-
paring the Urns, which the Cenfors having ſkill to do accordingly,
the reft of the Ballot, whether the partys balloting underſtand it or
no, muſt of neceffary confequence com right; and they can neither
be out, nor fall into any confufion in the exerciſe of this Art.
BUT the Ballot, as I faid, is of two parts, Lot and Suffrage, or
the Propofition and Refult. The Lot determins who fhall propofe the
Competitors; and the Reſult of the Senat, which of the Competitors.
fhall be the Magiftrats. The whole, to begin with the Lot, pro-
cedes in this manner.
THE firft Secretary with an audible Voice reads firft the Lift of
the Magiſtrats to be chofen for the day; then the Oath for fair Electi-
on, at which the Senators hold up their hands; which don, another
Secretary preſents a little Urn to the Strategus, in which are four Balls,
each of them having one of theſe four Infcriptions: FIRST SEAT
AT THE UPPER END. FIRST SEAT AT THE
LOWER END. SECOND SEAT AT THE UPPER
END.
OCEAN A.
115
END. SECOND SEAT AT THE LOWER END.
And look which of them the Strategus draws, the Secretary pronoun-
cing the Infcription with a loud Voice, the Seat fo call'd coms accord-
ingly to the Urns: this in the Figure is the SECOND SEAT
AT THE UPPER END. The manner of their coming to the
fide Urns is in double Files, there being two holes in the cover of each
fide Urn, by which means two may draw at once. The Senators ther-
fore SS. SS. are coming from the upper end of their Seats HH. HH.
to the fide Urns L. L. The Senators TT. T. are drawing. The
Senator V has drawn a gold Ball at his fide Urn, and is going to the
middle Urn F, where the Senator W having don the like at the other
fide Urn, is already drawing. But the Senators XX. XX. having
drawn Blanks at their fide Urns, and thrown them into the Bowls
Y.Y. ſtanding at the feet of the Urns, are marching by the lower end
into their Seats again; the Senator a having don the like at the middle
Urn, is alſo throwing his blank into the Bowl b, and marching to his
Seat again for a man by a prize at a fide Urn gains no more than
right to com to the middle Urn, where if he draws a Blank, his For-
tune at the fide Urn comes to nothing at all; wherfore he alſo returns
to his place. But the Senator c has had a Prize at the middle Urn,
where the Commiffioner having viewed his Ball, and found the mark
to be right, he marches up the fteps to the Seat of the Electors, which
is the form d fet croſs the Tribunal, where he places himſelf according
as he was drawn with the other Electors e e e drawn before him.
Theſe are not to look back, but fit with their Faces towards the Signo-
ry or State, till their number amount to that of the Magiftrats to be
that day chofen, which for the preſent, as was fhewn, are fix; wher
fore fix Electors being made, they are reckon'd according as they were
drawn: Firſt, fecond, third, fourth, fifth, fixth, in their Order
and the firſt fix that are choſen are the FIRST ORDER OF
ELECTORS.
;
THE firft Order of Electors being made, are conducted by a Se-
cretary with a copy of the Lift to be chofen, out of the Senat, and
into a Committee or Council-Chamber, being neither fuffered by the
way, nor in their room (till the Ballot be ended) to have conference
with any but themſelves; wherfore the Secretary, having given them
their Oath that they ſhall make Election according to the Law and
their Conſcience, delivers them the Lift, and feats himſelf at the
lower end of the Table with his Pen and Paper, while another Se-
cretary keeps the Door.
BY fuch time as the firft Order of Electors are thus feated, the
fecond Order of Electors is drawn, who with a fecond Copy of the
fame Lift are conducted into another Committee-chamber, by other
Secretarys performing the fame Office with the former.
THE like exactly is don by the third and by the fourth Orders
(or Hands, as the Venetians call them) of Electors, by which
means you have the four and twenty Electors divided according to
the four Copys of the fame Lift, by fix, into four Hands or Or-
ders; and every one of thefe Orders names one Competitor to every
Magiſtracy in the Lift; that is to fay, the firft Elector names
to the firſt Magiftracy, the fecond Elector to the ſecond Magi-
ftracy, and fo forth. But tho the Electors, as has bin fhewn, are
chofen by mere lot, yet the Competitors by them nam'd are not cho-
Q 2
fen
116
OCEAN A.
.
fen by any Lot, but by the Suffrage of the whole Order: For exam→
ple; The firſt Elector in the firſt Order propofes a Name to be Strate-
gus, which Name is balloted by himſelf and the other five Electors:
and if the Name fo balloted attain not to above half the Suffrages, it is
laid afide, and the first Elector names another to the fame Magiftracy;
and fo in cafe this alfo fails, another, till one he has nam'd, whe-
ther it be himſelf, or fom other, has attained to above half the Suf-
frages in the affirmative; and the name fo attaining to above half
the Suffrages in the Affirmative is written to the firſt Magiſtracy in
the Lift by the Secretary; which being don, the fecond Elector of
the firſt Order names to the fecond Magiftracy till one of his nomi-
nation be choſen to the fame. The like is don by the rest of the E-
lectors of the firſt Order, till one Competitor be chofen, and written
to every Magiftracy in their Lift. Now the fecond, third, and fourth
Orders of Electors doing exactly after the fame manner, it coms to
paſs that one Competitor to every Magiftracy being choſen in each
Order, there be in all four Competitors chofen to every Magiftracy.
IF any Controverſy ariſes in an Order of Electors, one of the Cen-
fors (thefe being at this game the Groomporters) is advertis'd by the
Secretary, who brings him in, and the Electors, difputing are bound to
acquiefce in his Sentence. For which cauſe it is that the Cenfors do
not ballot at the Urns; the Signory alſo abſtains, left it ſhould deform
the Houſe: wherfore the Blanks in the fide Urns are by fo many the
fewer. And ſo much for the Lot, which is of the greater Art but lefs
Conſequence, becauſe it concerns Propofition only: But all, (except
the Tribuns and the Judges, which being but Affiftants have no Suf-
frage) are to ballot at the Refult, to which I now com.
THE four Orders of Electors having perfected their Liſts, the face
of the Houſe is chang'd: for the Urns are taken
for the Urns are taken away, and every Se-
nator and Magiſtrat is feated in his proper place, faving the Electors,
who, having given their Suffrages already, may not ftir out of their
chambers till the Houſe have given theirs, and the reft of the Ballot
be perform'd; which follows in this manner.
THE four Lifts being preſented by the Secretarys of each Coun-
cil of Electors to the Signory, are firft read, according to their
Order, to the Houſe with an audible Voice; and then the Com-
petitors are put to the Ballot or Suffrage of the whole Senat in
this manner: A. A. nam'd to be Strategus in the firſt Order; wher-
upon eight Ballotins or Pages, fuch as are expreís'd by the Figures
f.f. take eight of the Boxes repreſented, tho rudely, by the Figures,
g.g. and go four on the one, and four on the other fide of the
Houſe, that is, one to every Bench, fignifying A. A. nam'd to be the
Strategus in the first Order: and every Magiftrat or Senator (begin-
ning by the Strategus and the Orator firft) holds up a little Pellet of
Linen, as the Box paffes, between his Finger and his Thumb, that
men may ſee he has but one, and then puts it into the fame. The Box
confiſting in the inner part of two Boxes, being painted on the outfide
white and green, to diftinguiſh the Affirmative from the Negative
fide, is ſo made, that when your Hand is in it, no man can ſee to which
of the fides you put the Suffrage, nor hear to which it falls, becauſe
the Pellet being Linen, makes no noife. The Strategus and the Ora-
tor having begun, all the reft do the like.
THE Ballotins having thus gather'd the Suffrages, bring them
before
ОСЕА
OCEAN Á.
117
I
1
before the Signory, in whoſe preſence the outward Boxes being open'd,
they take out the inner Boxes, wherof the Affirmative is white, and the
Negative green, and pour the white in the Bowl N on the right
hand, which is white alſo, and the green into the Bowl N on the left,
which is alſo green. Thefe Bowls or Bafons (better repreſented at the
lower end of the Figure by b. i.) being upon this occaſion ſet before
the Tables of the Secretarys at the upper end N. N. the white on the
right hand, and the green on the left, the Secretarys on each fide num-
ber the Balls: by which if they find that the Affirmatives amount not
to above one half, they write not the Name that was balloted; but if
they amount to above one half, they write it, adding the number of
above half the Suffrages to which it attain'd. The firſt Name being
written, or laid aſide, the next that is put is B.B. nam'd to be Strategus
in the fecond Order; the third C. C. nam'd to be Strategus in the third
Order; the fourth D.D. nam'd to be Strategus in the fourth Order: and
he of thefe four Competitors that has moſt above half in the Affirma-
tive, is the Magiſtrat; or if none of them attain to above half, the no-
mination for that Magiftracy is to be repeated by fuch new Electors as
ſhall be chofen at the next Ballot. And fo, as is exemplify'd in the firſt
Magiftracy, proceeds the Ballot of the reft; firft in the firft, then in
the ſecond, and fo in the third and fourth Orders.
NOW wheras it may happen that A. A. (for example) being nam'd
Strategus in the firſt Order, may alſo be nam'd to the fame or fom one
or more other Magiftracys in one or more of the other Orders; his name
is firſt balloted where it is firft written, that is to the more worthy Ma-
giftracy, wherof if he miffes, he is balloted as it coms in courſe for the
next, and ſo for the reſt, if he miſſes of that, as often as he is nam'd.
AND becauſe to be nam'd twice, or oftner, whether to the famie
or fom other Magiſtracy, is the ſtronger recommendation; the note
muſt not fail to be given upon the name, at the propofition in this man-
ner; A.A. nam'd to be Strategus in the firft, and in the fecond Order: or
A.A. nam'd to be Strategus in the first and the third; in the first and the
fourth, &c. But if he be nam'd to the fame Magiftracy in the firft, fe-
cond, third, and fourth Orders, he can have no Competitor; wherfore
attaining to above half the Suffrages, he is the Magiftrat. Or thus:
A.A. nam'd to be Strategus in the first, to be Cenfor in the fecond, to be
Orator in the third, and to be Commiſſioner of the Seal in the fourth Order,
or the like in more or fewer Orders: In which cafes if he miffes of the
firſt Magiſtracy, he is balloted to the fecond; if he miffes of the ſecond,
to the third; and if he miffes of the third, to the fourth.
THE Ballot not finish'd before Sunfet, tho the Election of the Ma-
giftrats already choſen be good, voids the Election of fuch Competi-
tors as being chofen are not yet furnish'd with Magiftracys, as if they
had never bin nam'd (for this is no Jugling Box, but an Art that
muſt ſee the Sun) and the Ballot for the remaining Magiftracys is
to be repeated the next day by new Orders of Electors, and fuch Com-
petitors as by them fhall be elected. And fo in the like manner, if of
all the names propos'd to the fame Magiftracy, no one of them attains
to above half the Suffrages in the Affirmative.
THE Senatorian Ballot of Oceana being thus defcrib'd, thofe of the
Pariſh, of the Hundred, and of the Tribe, being fo little different,
that in this they are all contain'd, and by this may be eaſily underſtood,
are
4
1
118
OCEAN A.
are yet fully defcrib'd, and made plain enough before in the 5th, 6th,
7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Orders.
THIS therfore is the general Order, whence thoſe branches of the
Ballot, fom wherof you have already ſeen, are deriv'd; which, with
thoſe that follow were all read and debated in this place at the Inſti-
tution. When
When my Lord EPIMONUS DE GARRULA, being one of
the Counſellors, and having no farther patience (tho the Rulers were
compos'd by the Agent of this Commonwealth, refiding for that pur-
pofe at Venice) than to hear the direction for the Pariſhes, ſtood up
and made way for himſelf in this manner.
<<
<<
May it pleaſe your Highness, my Lord ARCHON,
UNI
NDER correction of Mr. PEREGRIN SPY, our very learn'd
Agent and Intelligencer, I have ſeen the World´a little,
Venice, and (as Gentlemen are permitted to do) the Great Coun-
"cil balloting. And truly I muft needs fay, that it is for a dumb fhew
"the goodlieſt that I ever beheld with my eys. You ſhould have ſom
"would take it ill, as if the noble Venetians thought themſelves too
<c
<c
good to ſpeak to ſtrangers, but they obferv'd them not fo narrowly.
"The truth is, they have nothing to fay to their Acquaintance; or
"Men that are in Council fure would have Tongues: For a Council,
"and not a word ſpoken in it, is a contradiction. But there is ſuch a
pudder with their marching and countermarching, as, tho never a
one of them draw a Sword, you would think they were training;
" which till I found that they did it only to entertain ſtrangers, I came
"from among them as wife as I went thither. But in the Parlament
" of Oceana you had no Balls nor Dancing, but fober Converſation
*C
<<
;
a man might know and be known, fhew his parts, and improve
"'em. And now if you take the advice of this fame fellow, you will
"ſpoil all with his whimfys. Mr. Speaker,-Cry you mercy, my
"Lord ARCHON, I mean; Set the wifeft man of your Houfe in
"the Great Council of Venice, and you will not know him from a
"fool. Wheras nothing is more certain, than that flat and dull. fel-
"lows in the judgment of all fuch as us'd to keep company with them
"before, upon election into our Houſe, have immediatly chitted like
"Barley in the fat, where it acquires a new Spirit, and flow'd forth in-
"to Language, that I am as confident as I am here, if there were not
"fuch as delight to abuſe us, is far better than TULLY'S; Or, let any
body but tranflate one of his Orations, and ſpeak it in the Houſe,
"and fee if every body do not laugh at him. This is a great matter,
"Mr. Speaker; they do not cant it with your Booklearning, your Orbs,
your Centers, your prime Magnitudes, and your Nebulones, things
"I profeſs that would make a fober man run ſtark mad to hear 'em;
"while we, who ſhould be confidering the Honor of our Country,
" and that it gos now or never upon our hand, whether it ſhall be ri-
"diculous to all the World, are going to Nineholes, or trow Madam
"for our bufinefs, like your dumb Venetian, whom this fame Sir
"POLITIC your Refident, that never faw him do any thing but
"make faces, would infinuat into you, at this diſtance, to have the
only knack of State. Wheras if you ſhould take the pains, as I have
don, to look a little nearer, you would find theſe fame wonderful
<c
<<
46
things
O CE AN A
I 19
tc
rr
<c
cr
things to be nothing elfe but mere natural Fopperys, or Capricios, as
they call them in Italian, even of the meaneft of that Nation. For,
put the caſe you be travelling in Italy, ask
be travelling in Italy, ask your Contadino, that is,
"the next Country-fellow you meet, fom queftion, and preſently he
"ballots you an anfwer with a nod, which is affirmative; or a fhake
"with his head, which is the negative box; or a fhrug with his
"ſhoulder, which is the Boffolo di non finceri.-Good! You will
"admire SANDS for telling you, that Grotta di Cane is a Miracle:
" and I fhall be laugh'd at for affuring you, that it is nothing elfe but
"fuch a damp (continu'd by the neighborhood of certain Sulphur
"Mines) as thro accidental heat dos fomtimes happen in our Coalpits.
"But Ingratitude muft not difcorage an honeſt man from doing good.
"There is not, I fay, fuch a tongue-ty'd Generation under Heaven
as your Italian; that you ſhould not wonder if he make figns. But
"our People muſt have fomthing in their Diurnals, we muſt ever
"and anon be telling 'em our minds; or if we be at it when we raiſe
"Taxes, like thoſe Gentlemen with the finger and the thumb, they
"will fwear that we are Cutpurfes.-Com, I know what I have heard
"'em fay, when fom men had mony that wrought hard enough for
"it; and do you conceive they will be better pleas'd when they fhall
"be told, that upon like occafions you are at mumchance or ftoolball?
"I do not ſpeak for my felf; for tho I fhall always acknowlege, that
"I got more by one year's fitting in the Houſe, than by my three years
"Travels, it was not of that kind. But I hate that this fame SPY,
"for pretending to have play'd at Billiards with the moſt Serene Com-
"monwealth of Venice, fhould make fuch fools of us here, when I
"know that he muſt have had his intelligence from fom Corncutter
<c upon the Rialta; for a noble Venetian would be hang'd if he ſhould
keep fuch a fellow company. And yet if I do not think he has made
you all dote, never truft me, my Lord ARCHON is fomtimes in
"fuch ſtrange Raptures. Why, good my Lord, let me be heard as
"well as your Apple Squire; Venice has fresh blood in her Cheeks, I
"must confefs, yet fhe is but an old Lady. Nor has he pick'd her Ca-
"binet; theſe he fends you are none of her Receits I can affure you,
" he bought them for a Julio at St. Marc's of a Mountebank. She has
"no other waſh, upon my knowlege, for that fame envy'd Complexion
"of hers but her Marshes, being a little better fcented, faving your
prefence, than a Chamberpot. My Lords, I know what I fay, but
you will never have don with it, That neither the great Turc, nor
any of thoſe little Turcs her Neighbors, have bin able to ſpoil her!
Why you may as well wonder that Weefels do not fuck egs in
"Swans nefts. Do you think that it has lain in the devotion of her
"Beads; which you that have puk'd fo much at Popery, are now
"at length refolv'd fhall confecrat M. Parfon, and be drop'd by every
one of his Congregation, while thofe fame whimfical Intelligen-
ces your Surveyors (you will break my heart) give the turn to
your primum mobile ? and fo I think they will; for you will find,
"that Mony is the primum mobile, and they will turn you thus out of
"fom three or four hundred thouſand Pounds: a pretty Sum for
"Urns and Balls, for Boxes and Pills, which theſe fame Quackfalvers
"are to adminifter to the Pariſhes; and for what Diſeaſe I marvel!
"Or how dos it work? Out coms a Conftable, an Overfeer, and a
"Churchwarden1 Mr. Speaker, I am amaz'd!
<c
re
<<
<<
EC
<c
cc
NEVER
120
OCEAN A.
NEVER was there Goofe fo ftuck with Lard as my Lord Ept
MONUS's Speech with Laughter; the ARCHON having much ado
to recover himſelf, in fuch manner as might inable him to return
theſe thanks.
*
<<
EC
c
6C
tr
6c
..
<<
•
IN your whole lives, my Lords, were you never entertain'd
with fo much Ingenuity; my Lord EPIMON US having at
once mended all the faults of Travellers. For, firft, wheras
they are abominable lyars, he has not told you (except fom mali-
"cious body has miſinform'd him concerning poor SPY) one fyllable
"of falfhood. And, fecondly, wheras they never fail to give the
"upper hand in all their Diſcourſes to foren Nations, ftill juftling their
"own into the kennel; he bears an Honor to his Country that
"will not diffolve in Cephalonia, nor be corrupted with Figs
"and Melons, which I can affure you is no ordinary obligation:
"And therfore hold it a matter of public concern, that we be no
"occafion of quenching my Lord's Affections; nor is there any
"fuch great matter between us, but in my opinion might be eaſily.
"reconcil'd: for tho that which my Lord gain'd by fitting in the
Houſe, I ftedfaftly believe, as he can affirm, was got fairly;
yet dare I not, nor do I think, that upon confideration he will
promiſe fo much for other Gamefters, eſpecially when they were
" at it fo high, as he intimats not only to have bin in ufe, but to
"be like enough to com about again. Wherfore, fay I, let them
"throw with boxes; for unless we will be below the Politics of
an ordinary, there is no fuch bar to cogging. It is known to
"his Lordſhip, that our Game is most at a throw, and that every
"caft of our Dice is in our Suffrages; nor will he deny, that partiality
"in a Suffrage is downright cogging. Now if the Venetian Boxes be
"the moſt foverain of all Remedys againſt this fame cogging, is it not
a ftrange thing that they ſhould be thrown first into the fire by
a fair Gamefter? Men are naturally fubject to all kinds of Paf-
"fions: Som you have that are not able to withſtand the brow
"of an Enemy; and others that make nothing of this, are leſs
proof againſt that of a Friend. So that if your Suffrage be bare-
"fac'd, I dare fay you fhall not have one fair caft in twenty. But
whatever a man's fortune be at the box, he neither knows whom
to thank, nor whom to challenge. Wherfore (that my Lord may
"have a charitable opinion of the choice Affection which I confefs
to have, above all other Beautys, for that of incomparable Venice)
"there is in this way of Suffrage no lefs than a demonftration that
"it is the moſt pure: and the purity of the Suffrage in a popular Go-
"vernment is the Health, if not the Life of it; feeing the Soul is no
"otherwiſe breath'd into the Soverain Power, than by the Suffrage
"of the People. Wherfore no wonder if POSTELLUS be of
opinion, that this ufe of the Ball is the very fame with that
"of the Bean in Athens; or, that others, by the Text concerning
“ELDAD and MEDAD, derive it from the Commonwealth of I-
"rael. There is another thing, tho not fo material to us, that my
"Lord will excuſe me if I be not willing to yield, which is, that Ve-
"nice fubfifts only by her Situation. It is true, that a man in time of
"War may be more fecure from his Enemys by being in a Citadel,
"but not from his Diſeaſes: wherfore the firſt caufe, if he lives long,
<<
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C
« is
OCEAN A.
121
"is his good Conſtitution, without which his Citadel were to little
purpoſe; and it is not otherwiſe with Venice.
WITH this Speech of the ARCHON I conclude the proof of the
Agrarian, and the Ballot, being the Fundamental Laws of this
Commonwealth; and com now from the Center to the Circumfe-
rences or Orbs, wherof fom have bin already fhewn: As how the
Pariſhes annually pour themfelves into the Hundreds, the Hundreds
into the Tribes, and the Tribes into the Galaxys; the Annual Galaxy
of every Tribe confifting of two Knights and feven Deputys, wherof
the Knights conftitute the Senat; the Deputys, the Prerogative Tribe,
commonly call'd the People; and the Senat and People conftitute the So-
verain Power or Parlament of Oceana. Wherof to fhew what the
Parlament is, I muſt firſt open the Senat, and then the Prerogative Tribe.
TO begin with the Senat, of which (as a Man is differently re- The Face of the
preſented by a Picturedrawer, and by an Anatomift) I fhall firft dif- Senat.
cover the Face or Aſpect, and then the Parts, with the uſe of them.
Every Monday morning in the Summer at feven, and in the Winter
at eight, the great Bell in the Clockhouſe at the Pantheon begins, and
continues ringing for the ſpace of one hour: in which time the Ma-
giftrats of the Senat, being attended according to their Quality, with
a reſpective number of the Ballotins, Doorkeepers, and Meffengers;
and having the Enfigns of their Magiftracys born before them, as the
Sword before the Strategus, the Mace before the Orator, a Mace with
the Seal before the Commiffioners of the Chancery, the like with the
Purſe before the Commiffioners of the Treaſury; and a Silver Wand,
like thoſe in uſe with the Univerſitys, before each of the Cenfors, be-
ing Chancellors of the fame. Theſe with the Knights, in all three
hundred, affemble in the Houſe or Hall of the Senat.
THE Houſe or Hall of the Senat, being fituated in the Pantheon
or Palace of Juftice, is a Room confifting of a Square and a half. In
the middle of the lower end is the Door; at the upper end hangs a
rich State overſhadowing the greater part of a large Throne, or half
pace of two Stages; the firft afcended by two fteps from the floor,
and the fecond about the middle rifing two fteps higher. Upon this
ſtand two Chairs, in that on the right hand fits the Strategus, in the
other the Orator, adorn'd with Scarlet Robes, after the faſhion that
was us'd by the Dukes in the Ariftocracy. At the right end of the
upper Stage ſtand three Chairs, in which the three Commiflioners of
the Seal are plac'd; and at the other end fit the three Commiffioners of
the Treaſury, every one in a Robe or Habit like that of the Earls. Of
theſe Magiſtrats of this upper Stage confifts the Signory. At either
end of the lower Stage ftands a little Table, to which the Secretarys of
the Senat are ſet with their tufted Sleeves in the habit of civil Lawyers.
To the four ſteps, wherby the two Stages of the Throne are afcend-
ed, anfwer four long Benches, which fucceffively deriving from every
one of the ſteps, continue their reſpective height, and extend them-
felves by the fide Walls towards the lower end of the Houfe, every
Bench being divided by numeral Characters into the thirty feven parts
or places. Upon the upper benches fit the Cenfors in the Robes of Ba-
rons; the firſt in the middle of the right hand bench, and the fecond
directly oppofit to him on the other fide. Upon the rest of the Ben-
ches fit the Knights, who if they be call'd to the Urns, diftributing
R
them.
I 22
OCEAN À.
Conflitution
of the Senat.
15. Order.
Magiftrats.
themſelves by the Figures, com in equal files, either by the firft Seat,
which conſiſts of the two upper Benches on either fide; or by the ſe-
cond Seat, confifting of the two lower Benches on either fide: begin-
ning alſo at the upper, or at the lower ends of the fame, according to
the Lot wherby they are call'd; for which end the Benches are open,
and aſcended at either end with eaſy ſtairs and large paffages. The
reft of the Ballot is conformable to that of the Tribe; the Cenfors of
the Houſe fitting at the fide Urn, and the youngeſt Magiftrat of the
Signory at the middle: the Urns being plac'd before the Throne, and
prepar'd according to the number of the Magiftrats to be at that time
chofen by the Rules already given to the Cenfors of the Tribes. But
before the Benches of the Knights on either fide ftands one being
fhorter; and at the upper end of this fit the two Tribuns of the Horfe.
At the upper end of the other, the two Tribuns of the Foot in their
Arms; the reft of the Benches being cover'd by the Judges of the
Land in their Robes. But thefe Magiftrats have no Suffrage, nor the
Tribuns, tho they derive their preſence in the Senat from the Romans
nor the Judges, tho they derive theirs from the antient Senat of Oceana.
Every Monday this Affembly fits of courſe; at other times, if there
be occafion, any Magiftrat of the Houſe by giving order for the Bell,
or by his Lictor or Enfignbearer, calls a Senat. And every Magiftrat
or Knight during his Seffion has the Title, Place and Honor, of a
Duke, Earl, Baron, or Knight, refpectively. And every one that
has born the fame Magiftracy by his third Seffion, has his refpective
Place and Title during the term of his Life, which is all the Honor
confer'd by this Commonwealth, except upon the Mafter of the Ce-
remonys, the Mafter of the Horfe, and the King of the Heralds,
who are Knights by their places. And thus you have the face of the
Senat, in which there is fcarce any Feature that is not Roman or Vene-·
tian ; nor do the Horns of the Creſcent extend themſelves much un-
like thoſe of the Sanhedrim, on either hand of the Prince, and of the
Father of that Senat. But upon Beauty, in which every Man has his
phanfy, we will not otherwiſe philofophize than to remember that
there is fomthing more than decency in the Robe of a Judg, that
would not be well fpar'd from the Bench; and that the graveft Magi-
ftrat, to whom you can commit the Sword of Juſtice, will find a quick-
nefs in the Spurs of Honor, which if they be not laid to Virtue, will
lay themſelves to that which may rout a Commonwealth.
TO com from the Face of the Senat, to the Conftitution and Uſe
of the Parts; It is contain'd in the peculiar Orders. And the Orders
which are peculiar to the Senat, are either of Election or Instruction.
ELECTIONS in the Senat are of three forts, Annual, Biennial,
and Extraordinary.
ANNUAL Elections are performed by the Schedule call'd the
Tropic: And the Tropic confifts of two parts; the one containing
the Magiftrats, and the other the Councils to be yearly elected. The
Schedule or Tropic of the Magiftrats is as follows in
THE fifteenth ORDER, requiring, That upon every Monday next
Tropic of the infuing the last of March, the Knights of the Annual Galaxys taking
their places in the Senat, be call'd the third Region of the fame; and that
the Houfe having difmifs'd the firft Region, and receiv'd the third, procede
to election of the Magistrats contain'd in the first part of the Tropic, by
the infuing Schedule:
The
OCEAN A.
123
The Lord Strategus,
The Lord Orator,
1
The firſt Cenfor,
Annual Magiftrats.
The fecond Cenfor,
The third Commiffioner of
the Seal,
The third Commiflioner of
the Treaſury,
Triennial Magiftrats,
THE Annual Magiftrats (provided that no one Man bears above one
of thofe Honors during the term of one Seffion) may be elected out of any
Region. But the Triennial Magiftrats may not be elected out of any
other than the third Region only, left the term of their Seffion expire before
that of their Honor; and (it being unlawful for a Man to bear Magi-
Stracy any longer than he is therto qualify'd by the Election of the Peo-
ple) caufe a Fraction in the Rotation of this Commonwealth.
>
THE Strategus is first Prefident of the Senat, and General of the Of the Stra-
Army, if it be commanded to march; in which cafe there fhall be a fe- tegus.
cond Strategus elected to be firft Prefident of the Senat, and General of
the fecond Army: and if this alfo be commanded to march, a third Stra-
tegus ſhall be chofen; and fo on, as long as the Commonwealth fends forth
Armys.
THE Lord Orator is the fecond and more peculiar Prefident of the Of the Ora◄
Senat to whom it appertains to keep the Houfe to Orders.
tor.
THE Cenfors, wherof the first by confequence of his Election is Chan Of the Cens
cellor of the Univerfity of Clio, and the fecond of that of Calliope, are fors.
Prefidents of the Council for Religion and Magiftrats, to whom it belongs
to keep the Houſe to the Order of the Ballot. They are alfo Inquifitors into
ways and means of acquiring Magiftracy; and have power to punish
indirect procedings in the fame, by removing a Knight or Magiftrat out
of the Houſe, under appeal to the Senat.
the
Of
the Com-
miffioners of
the Seal.
Of
the Com-
miffioners of
THE Commiffioners of the Seal being three, wherof the third is an-
nually chofen out of the third Region, are Judges in Chancery.
THE Commiffioners of the Treafury being three, wherof the third is
annually chofen out of the third Region, are Judges in the Exchequer the Treaſury.
and every Magiftrat of this Schedule has right to propofe to the Senat.
BUT the Strategus with the fix Commiffioners, are the Signory of of the Sig-
this Commonwealth, having right of Seffion and Suffrage in every Council nory.
of the Senat, and Power either jointly or feverally to propofe in all or
any of them.
I HAVE little in this Order to obferve and prove, but that the
Strategus is the fame Honor both in name and thing that was born,
among others, by PHILOPEMEN and ARATUS in the Common-
wealth of the Achaeans; the like having bin in uſe alfo with the Eto-
lians. The Orator, call'd otherwiſe the Speaker, is with fmall altera-
tion the fame that had bin of former uſe in this Nation. Theſe two,
you will, may be compar'd to the Confuls in Rome, or the Suffetes
in Carthage; for their Magiftracy is ſcarce different.
if
THE Cenfors derive their power of removing a Senator from thofe
of Rome; the Government of the Ballot, from thofe of Fenice; and
that
R 2
124
OCEAN A.
}
1
16. Order,
cil of State.
Of the Coun-
that of Animadverfion upon the Ambitus, or canvafs for Magiſtracy
from both.
THE Signory, with the whole Right and Ufe of that Magiftracy,
to be hereafter more fully explain'd, is almoſt purely Venetian.
THE fecond part of the Tropic is directed by
THE fixteenth ORDER, wherby the Conflitution of the Councils,
Constitution being four, that is to ſay, the Council of State, the Council of War, the
of the Councils. Council of Religion, and the Council of Trade, is render'd conformable in
Of the Coun- their Revolutions to that of the Senat. As, first, by the annual Elec-
tion of five Knights out of the first Region of the Senat into the Coun-
cil of State, confifting of fifteen Knights, five in every Region. Secondly,
cil of War. By the annual Election of three Knights out of the third Region of the
Council of State, to be propos'd by the Provofts, and elected by that Coun-
cil, into the Council of War, confifting of nine Knights, three in every
Region, not excluded by this Election from remaining Members alſo of the
Council of State. The four Tribuns of the People have right of Seffion
Of the Coun- and Suffrage in the Council of War. Thirdly, By the annual Election of
cil of Reli- four Knights out of the third Region of the Senat into the Council of Reli-
gion, confifting of twelve Knights, four in every Region: Of this Coun-
Of the Council the Cenfors are Prefidents. Fourthly, By the annual Election of four
Knights out of the third Region of the Senat into the Council of Trade,
Of the Pro- confifting of twelve Knights, four in every Region. And each Region, in
every one of theſe Councils thus conftituted, fhall weekly and interchangeably
elect one Provost, whofe Magiftracy ſhall continue for one Week; nor shall
be he reelected into the fame, till every Knight of that Region in the fame
Of the Coun- Council has once born the fame Magiftracy. And the Provosts being one in
every Region, three in every Council, and twelve in all, befide their other
Capacitys, fhall affemble and be a Council, or rather an Academy apart,
to certain ends and purpoſes to be hereafter further explain'd with thoſe
of the rest of the Councils.
gion.
cil of Trade.
volts.
cil of the
Provosts,
THIS Order is of no other Ufe than the frame and turn of the
Councils, and yet of no fmall one: for in Motion confifts Life; and
the Motion of a Commonwealth will never be current, unleſs it be
circular. Men that, like my Lord EPIMON Us, not enduring the
reſemblance of this kind of Government to Orbs and Spheres, fall on
phyficing and purging it, do no more than is neceffary; for if it be
not in Rotation both as to Perſons and Things, it will be very fick.
The People of Rome, as to Perfons, if they had not bin taken up by
the Wheel of Magiftracy, had overturn'd the Chariot of the Senat.
And thoſe of Lacedemon, as to Things, had not bin fo quiet when the
Senat traſh'd their Bufinefs, by incroaching upon the Reſult, if by the
Inſtitution of the Ephors they had not brought it about again. So
that if you allow not a Commonwealth her Rotation, in which con--
fifts her Equality, you reduce her to a Party, and then it is neceffary
that you be Phyſicians indeed, or rather Farriers; for you will have
ftrong Patients, and ſuch as muſt be halter'd and caft, or your felves
may need Bonefetters. Wherfore the Councils of this Common-
wealth, both in regard of their Elections, and, as will be fhewn, of
their Affairs, are uniform with the Senat in their Revolutions; not as
Whirlpits to ſwallow, but to bite, and with the Scrues of their Ro-
tation to hold and turn a Buſineſs (like the Vice of a Smith) to the
Hand
OCEAN A.
125
Hand of the Workman. Without Engins of which nature it is
not poffible for the Senat, much leſs for the People, to be perfect
Artificers in a political Capacity. But I fhall not hold you longer
from
Conftitution of.
bafadors in
THE ſeventeenth ORDER, directing biennial Elections, or the 17. Order.
Conftitution of the Orb of Ambaffadors in ordinary, confifting of four Re- the biennial
fidences, the Revolution wherof is perform'd in eight years, and preferv'd Election or
thro the Election of one Ambaſſador in two years by the Ballot of the Senat Orb of Am-
to repair to the Court of France, and refide there for the term of two ordinary.
years; and the term of two years being expir'd, to remove from thence to
the Court of Spain, there to continue for the space of two years, and
thence to remove to the State of Venice; and after two years refidence in
that City, to conclude with his refidence at Conftantinople for a like
term of time, and fo to return. A Knight of the Senat, or a Deputy of
the Prerogative, may not be elected Ambaſſador in Ordinary, becauſe a
Knight or Deputy fo chofen, muft either lofe his Seffion, which would
cauſe an unevenness in the motion of this Commonwealth, or accumulat
Magiftracy, which agrees not with the equality of the fame. Nor may
any Man be elected into this Capacity that is above five and thirty years of
Age, left the Commonwealth lose the charge of his Education, by being de-
priv'd at his return of the Fruit of it, or elſe injoy it not long thro the de-
fects of Nature.
THIS Order is the Perfpective of the Commonwealth, wherby
fhe forefees; Danger or the Traffic, wherby fhe receives every two
years the return of a Stateſman inrich'd with eight years experience,
from the prime Marts of Negotiation in Europe. And fo much for
the Elections in the Senat that are ordinary; fuch as are extraordinary
follow in
18. Order.
Election Ex-
THE eighteenth ORDER, appointing all Elections upon emergent
occafions, except that of the Dictator, to be made by the Scrutiny, or that Conflitution of
kind of Election, wherby a Council coms to be a fifth Order of Electors. traordinary,
For Example, if there be occafion of an Ambajador Extraordinary, the or by the Scru
Provosts of the Council of State, or any two of them shall propoſe to the tiny.
fame, till one Competitor be chofen by that Council: and the Council having
chofen a Competitor, fhall bring his name into the Senat, which in the
ufual way shall chufe four more Competitors to the fame Magiftracy; and
put them, with the Competitor of the Council, to the Ballot of the Houfe,
by which he of the five that is chofen is faid to be elected by the Scrutiny
of the Council of State. A Vice-Admiral, a Polemarch, or Field Officer,
Jhall be elected after the fame manner, by the Scrutiny of the Council of
War. A Judg or Serjeant at Law, by the Scrutiny of the Commiffioners
of the Seal. A Baron, or confiderable Officer of the Exchequer, by the
Scrutiny of the Commiffioners of the Treafury. Men in Magiftracy, or
out of it, are equally capable of Election by the Scrutiny; but a Magi-
Strat or Officer elected by the Scrutiny to a military Imployment, if he be
neither a Knight of the Senat, nor a Deputy of the Prerogative, ought
to have his Office confirm'd by the Prerogative, because the Militia in a
Commonwealth, where the People are Soverain, is not lawful to be touch'd
injuffu Populi.
THE
126
OCEAN A.
19. Order.
THE Romans were fo curious, that tho their Confuls were elected
in the *Centuriat Aſſemblys, they might not touch the Militia, except
they were confirm'd in the + Parochial Affemblys: for a Magiftrat not
receiving his Power from the People, takes it from them; and to take
away their Power, is to take away their Liberty. As to the Election
by the Scrutiny, it is eafily perceiv'd to be Venetian, there being no
fuch way to take in the Knowlege, which in all reaſon muſt be beſt
in every Council of fuch men as are moft fit for their turns, and yet to
keep them from the biafs of particular Affection or Intereſt under that
pretence: For the cauſe why the Great Council in Venice ſcarce ever
elects any other than the Name that is brought in by the Scrutiny, is
very probable to be, that they may. . ... This Election is the laft of
thofe appertaining to the Senat. The Councils being choſen by the
Orders already fhewn, it remains that we come to thofe wherby they
are inftructed and the Orders of Inftruction to the Councils are two,
the firſt for the Matter wherupon they are to procede and the ſecond
for the Manner of their proceding. The Matter of the Councils is
diſtributed to them by
THE nineteenth ORDER, diftributing to every Council fuch
Inftructions Bufineſſes as are properly to belong to their Cognizance, wherof fom they
fhall receive and determin; and others they shall receive, prepare, and
their Matter. introduce into the Houfe: As, first,
for the Coun-
cils as to
For theCoun-
sil of State.
For the Coun-
THE Council of State is to receive all Addreſſes, Intelligences, and
Letters of Negotiation; to give audience to Ambaffadors fent to, and to
draw up Inftructions for fuch as fhall be fent by, this Commonwealth; to
receive Propofitions from, and hold Intelligence with the Provincial Coun-
cils, to confider upon all Laws to be enacted, amended, or repeal'd; and
upon all Levys of Men or Money, War or Peace, Leagues or Affociations
to be made by this Commonwealth, fo far forth as is conducible to the orderly
preparation of the fame to be introduc'd by them into the Senat. Provid-
ed that all fuch Affairs, as otherwiſe appertaining to the Council of State,
sil of War. are, for the good of the Commonwealth, to be carry'd with greater fecrecy,
be manag'd by the Council of War, with Power to receive and fend forth
Agents, Spys, Emiffarys, Intelligencers, Frigots; and to manage Affairs
of that nature, if it be neceſſary, without communication to the Senat,
till fuch time as it may be had without detriment to the Buſineſs. But
they shall have no Power to engage the Commonwealth in a War without the
confent of the Senat and the People. It appertains also to this Council to take
charge of the Fleet as Admiral; and of all Storehouſes, Armorys, Arfenals,
and Magazins appertaining to this Commonwealth. They shall keep a di-
ligent Record of the military Expeditions from time to time reported by
bim that was Strategus or General, or one of the Polemarchs in that Alti-
on; or at least fo far as the Experience of fuch Commanders may tend to
the improvement of the military Difciplin, which they fhall digeft and in-
troduce into the Senat: and if the Senat fhall therupon frame any Arti-
cle, they fhall fee that it be obferv'd in the Mufters or Education of the
Youth. And wheras the Council of War is the Sentinel or Scout of thisCom-
monwealth, if any Perfon or Perfons fhall go about to introduce Debate into
any popular Aſſembly of the fame, or otherwife to alter the prefent Govern-
Centuriatis.
+ Curiatis Comitiis.
·ment
OCEAN A.
127
ment, or ſtrike at the root of it, they shall apprehend, or caufe to be ap-
prehended, feiz'd, imprifon'd; and examin, arraign, acquit, or condemn,
and caufe to be executed any fuch Perfon or Perfons, by their proper Pow-
er and Authority, and without appeal.
For theCoun-
THE Council of Religion, as the Arbiter of this Commonwealth in cil of Reli-
cafes of Confcience more peculiarly appertaining to Religion, Chriftian gion.
Charity, and a pious Life, fhall have the care of the National Religion,
and the protection of the Liberty of Confcience, with the cognizance of all
Caufes relating to either of them. And first as to the National Religion;
They shall cause all Places or Preferments of the best Revenue in either of
the Univerfitys to be confer'd upon no other than fuch of the most learn'd
and pious Men, as have dedicated themſelves to the study of Theology. They
fhall also take a special Care that by fuch Augmentations as be or ſhall here-
after be appointed by the Senat, every Benefice in this Nation be im-
prov'd at least to the value of one hundred pounds a year. And to the
end that there be no intereſt at all, wherby the Divines or Teachers of the
National Religion may be corrupted, or corrupt Religion, they shall be ca-
pable of no other kind of Imployment or Preferment in this Commonwealth.
And wheras a Directory for the Administration of the National Religion
is to be prepar'd by this Council, they shall in this and other Debates of this
nature procede in manner following: A Question ariſing in matter of Reli-
gion fhall be put and stated by the Council in writing; which Writing the
Cenfors fhall fend by their Beadles (being Proctors chofen to attend them)
each to the University wherof he is Chancellor ; and the Vice-Chancellor of
the fame receiving the Writing, fhall call a Convocation of all the Divines
of that Univerſity, being above forty years of Age. And the University's
upon a point ſo propos'd, fhall have no manner of Intelligence or Correfpon-
dence one with another, till their Debates be ended, and they have made
return of their Anſwers to the Council of Religion by two or three of their
own Members, that may clear their fenfe, if any doubt should arife, to the
Council; which don, they ſhall return, and the Council having receiv'd
fuch information, fhall procede according to their own Judgments, in the
preparation of the whole matter for the Senat: That fo the Interest of the
Learned being remov'd, there may be a right application of Reafon to
Scripture, which is the Foundation of the National Religion.
SECONDLY, This Council, as to the protection of the Liberty of
Confcience, fhall fuffer no coercive Power in the matter of Religion to be
exercis'd in this Nation: The Teachers of the Natural Religion being
no other than fuch as voluntarily undertake that calling; and their Audi-
tors or Hearers, no other than are alfo voluntary. Nor fhall any gather'd
Congregation be molefted or interrupted in their way of worship (being nei-
ther Jewish or Idolatrous) but vigilantly and vigorously protected and de-
fended in the Injoyment, Practice, and Profeffion of the fame. And if there
be Officers or Auditors appointed by any fuch Congregation for the intro-
duction of Caufes into the Council of Religion, all fuch Caufes fo introduc'd
fhall be receiv'd, heard, and determin'd by the fame, with recourfe had,
if need be, to the Senat.
THIRDLY, Every Petition addreft to the Senat, except that of a
Tribe, fhall be receiv'd, examin'd, and debated by this Council; and fuch
only as they, upon fuch examination and debate had, ſhall think fit, may
be introduc'd into the Senat.
THE Council of Trade being the Vena Porta of this Nation, fhall For the Coun-
bereafter receive Inſtructions more at large. For the prefent, their Ex- cil of Trade.
perience
128
OCEAN A.
For the Aca-
Provolts.
perience attaining to a right understanding of thofe Trades and Mysterys
that feed the Veins of this Commonwealth, and a true diftinction of them
from those that fuck or exhaust the fame, they fhall acquaint the Senat with
the Conveniences and Inconveniences, to the end that Incouragement may
be apply'd to the one, and remedy to the other.
THE Academy of the Provofts, being the Affability of the Common-
demy of the wealth, ſhall aſſemble every day towards the Evening in a fair Room, hav-
ing certain withdrawing Rooms therto belonging. And all forts of Com-
pany that will repair thither for Converſation or Difcourſe, ſo it be upon
matters of Government, News, or Intelligence, or to propofe any thing to
the Councils, fhall be freely and affably receiv'd in the outer Chamber, and
heard in the way of civil Converfation, which is to be manag'd without any
other Aw or Ceremony than is therto ufually appertaining; to the end that
every Man may be free, and that what is propos'd by one, may be argu'd or
difcours'd by the rest, except the matter be of fecrecy, in which cafe the Pro-
voſts, or fom of them, jhall take fuch as defire Audience into one of the
withdrawing Rooms. And the Provoſts are to give their minds, that this
Academy be fo govern'd, adorn'd, and preferv'd, as may be most attractive.
to Men of Parts and good Affections to the Commonwealth, for the excel-
lency of the Converfation.
For the At-
the Councils.
FURTHERMORE, If any Man, not being able or willing to com
in perfon, has any advice to give which he judges may be for the good of the
Commonwealth, he may write his mind to the Academy of the Provofts, in a
Letter fign'd or not fign'd; which Letter fhall be left with the Doorkeeper
of the Academy. Nor fall any Perfon delivering fuch a Letter be feiz'd,
molefted, or detain'd, tho it should prove to be a Libel. But the Letters
fo deliver'd ſhall be prefented to the Provofts; and in cafe they be fo many
that they cannot well be perus'd by the Provosts themselves, they shall diftri-
bute them as they pleaſe to be read by the Gentlemen of the Academy, who
finding any thing in them material, will find matter of Difcourfe: Or if
they happen upon a buſineſs that requires privacy,return it with a Note upon
it to a Provost. And the Provofts by the Secretarys attending ſhall cauſe
fuch Notes out of Difcourfes or Letters to be taken as they pleafe, to the
end that they may propofe, as occafion ferves, what any two of them fhall
think fit out of their Notes fo taken to their respective Councils: to the end
that not only the Ear of the Commonwealth be open to all, but that Men of
fuch Education being in her ey, he may upon emergent Elections or Occa-
fions be always provided of her choice of fit Perfons.
EVERY Council being adorn'd with a State for the Signory, ſhall be
sendance of attended by two Secretarys, two Doorkeepers, and two Meſſengers in ordi-
nary, and have power to command more upon Emergencys, as occafion re-
quires. And the Academy ſhall be attended with two Secretarys, two
Meffengers, and two Doorkeepers; this with the other Councils being pro-
vided with their farther Conveniences at the charge of the State.
For the Dic-
tator.
BUT wheras it is incident to Commonwealths, upon Emergencys re-
quiring extraordinary speed or fecrecy, either thro their natural delays
or unnatural haft, to incur equal danger, while holding to the flow pace of
their Orders, they com not in time to defend themselves from fom fudden
blow; or breaking them for the greater speed, they hut haft to their own de-
Atruction: If the Senat fhall at any time make Election of nine Knights
extraordinary, to be added to the Council of War, as a Juncta for the term
of three Months, the Council of War, with the Juncta fo added, is for
the term of the fame Dictator of Oceana, having power to levy Men and
Mony,
OCEAN A.
129
Mony, to make War and Peace, as alfo to enact Laws, which shall be good
for the space of one year (if they be not fooner repeal'd by the Senat and the
People) and for no longer time, except they be confirm'd by the Senat and
the People. And the whole Adminiftration of the Commonwealth for the
term of the faid three Months ſhall be in the Dictator; provided, that the
Dictator shall have no Power to do any thing that tends not to his proper
end and inftitution, but all to the prefervation of the Commonwealth as it
is eſtabliſh'd, and for the fudden reftitution of the fame to the natural
Channel and common courfe of Government. And all Acts, Orders, De-
crees, or Laws of the Council of War with the Juncta, being thus created,
fhall be fign'd,
DICTATOR OCEANE.
THIS Order of Inftructions to the Councils being (as in a mat-
ter of that nature is requifit) very large, I have us'd my beſt ſkill to
abbreviat it in fuch manner as might fhew no more of it than is ne-
ceffary to the underſtanding of the whole; tho as to the parts, or fur-
ther dutys of the Councils, I have omitted many things of fingular
ufe in a Commonwealth. But it was difcours'd at the Council by
the ARCHON in this manner.
<c
r
My Lords, the Legiſlators;
You
OUR Councils, except the Dictator only, are proper and
native Springs and Sources, you fee, which (hanging a few
"fticks and ftraws, that, as lefs confiderable, would otherwiſe be
more troubleſom, upon the banks of their peculiar Channels) de-
"rive the full ſtream of bufinefs into the Senat, fo pure, and fo far
"from the poffibility of being troubl'd or ftain'd (as will undenia-
bly appear by the Courfe contain'd in the infuing Order) with
any kind of privat Intereft or Partiality, that it ſhall never be poffi-
"ble for any Affembly hearkning to the advice or information of this
" or that worthy Member (either inftructed upon his Pillow, or
"while he was making himſelf ready, or by the Petition or Ticket
"which he receiv'd at the door) to have half the Security in his
<<
<<
<c
cc
Faith, or Advantage by his Wifdom; fuch a Senat or Council being,
"thro the incertainty of the Winds, like a Wave of the Sea. Nor
"fhall it otherwife mend the matter by flowing up into dry ditches,
or referring buſineffes to be better examin'd by Committees, than to
go farther about with it to lefs purpoſe; if it dos not ebb back again
"with the more mud in it. For in a cafe refer'd to an occafional
"Committee, of which any Member that is defirous may get himſelf
ટ
<<
nam'd, and to which nobody will com, but either for the fake of
"his Friend, or his own Intereft; it fares little better as to the Infor-
"mation of the Senat, than if it had bin refer'd to the Partys. Wher-
"fore the Athenians being diftributed into four Tribes, out of which
by equal numbers they annually chofe four hundred Men, call'd
"the Senat of the Bean (becauſe the Ballot at their Election was per-
"form'd by the uſe of Beans) divided them by Fiftys into eight
parts. And every Fifty in their turn, for one eighth part of the
year, was a Council apart call'd the Prytans. The Prytans in
their diftinct Council receiving all Comers, and giving ear to every
"Man that had any thing to propofe concerning the Commonwealth,
c
S.
"had
130
OCEAN A.
"had power to debate and prepare all the bufineffes that were to be
"introduc'd into the Senat. The Achæans had ten felected Magiftrats
"call'd the Demiurgs, conftituting a Council apart call'd the Synarchy,
"which with the Strategus prepar'd all the bufinefs that was intro-
"duc'd into their Senat. But both the Senat of the Athenians, and
"that of the Achæans, would have wonder'd if a Man had told them,
"that they were to receive all Comers and Diſcourſes, to the end that
they might refer them afterwards, to the Prytans or the Synarchy;
"much leſs to an occafional Committee, expos'd to the catch that
CA catch may of the partys interefted. And yet Venice, in this, as in
"moſt of her Orders, excels them all by the Conſtitution of her
"Councils, that of the College, and the other of the Dieci, or Coun-
<s
CC
cc
cil of Ten. The courfe of the College is exactly defcrib'd in the
infuing Order: And for that of the Dieci, it fo little differs from
"what it has beſtow'd upon our Dictator, that I need not make any
particular defcription of it. But to Dictatorian Power in general,
"and the ufe of it, becauſe it muſt needs be of difficult digeftion to
"fuch as, puking ftill at antient Prudence, fhew themſelves to be in
"the Nurſery of Motherwit; it is no less than neceffary to fay fom-
thing. And, Firſt, in a Commonwealth that is not wrought up,
or perfected, this power will be of very frequent, if not continual
"ufe; wherfore it is faid more than once, upon defects of the Govern-
ment, in the Book of Judges, That in thofe days there was no King in
"Ifrael. Nor has the Tranflator, tho for no King he fhould have
"faid no fudg, abus'd you fo much; feeing that the Dictator (and
"fuch was the Judg of Ifrael) or the Dictatorian Power being in a
fingle Perfon, fo little differs from Monarchy, which follow'd in
"that, that from the fame cauſe there has bin no other effect in
66
<<
<<
any
Commonwealth; as in Rome was manifeft by SYLLA and CESAR,
"who to make themſelves Abfolute or Soverain, had no more to do
"than to prolong their Magiftracy; for the Dictatorian Power was
reputed Divine, and therfore irrefiftible. Nevertheleſs, ſo it is,
"that without this Power, which is fo dangerous, and fubject to in-
"troduce Monarchy, a Commonwealth cannot be fafe from falling
"into the like diffolution; unleſs you have an Expedient in this cafe
" of
your own, and bound up by your Providence from recoiling.
Expedients in fom cafes you muſt not only have, but be beholden
"for them to fuch whom you muſt truſt at a pinch, when you have
"not leiſure to ſtand with them for fecurity; which will be a thou-
"fand times more dangerous. And there can never be a Common-
"wealth otherwife than by the Order in debate wrought up to that
(c
<<
ઃઃ
perfection; but this neceffity muft fomtimes happen in regard of
"her natural flowneſs and openness, and the fuddennefs of Affaults
"that may be made upon her, as alfo the Secrefy which in ſom caſes
may be of abfolute neceffity to her Affairs. Whence MACHIA-
VEL concludes it pofitively, that a Commonwealth unprovided of
"fuch a Refuge, muſt fall to ruin: for her courfe is either broken
by the blow in one of thoſe cafes, or by herfelf, while it ſtartles
"her out of her Orders. And indeed a Commonwealth is like a
Greyhound, which having once coafted, will never after run fair,
"but grow flothful; and when it coms to make a common practice
<<
*Dictatoris imperium quafi Numen, Liv.
" of
OCEAN A
131
"of taking nearer ways than its Orders, it is diffolv'd: for the being
of a Commonwealth confifts in its Orders. Wherfore at this lift
<<
you will be expos'd to danger, if you have not provided before-
"hand for the fafety of your Refort in the like cafes: nor is it fuffi-
"cient that your Refort be ſafe, unleſs it be as fecret and quick; for
"if it be flow or open, your former Inconveniences are not re-
«medy'd. Now for our imitation in this part, there is nothing in
"experience like that of the Council of Ten in Venice; the benefit
"wherof would be too long to be fhewn in the whole piece, and
" therfore I ſhall take but a pattern out of JANOTTI. In the War,
fays he, which the Venetians had with Florence in Cafentin, the
"Florentins finding a neceflity in their affairs far from any other incli-
"nation in themſelves to aſk their Peace, fent Ambaſſadors about it
"to Venice, where they were no fooner heard, than the bargain was
"ftruck up by the Council of Ten: and every body admiring (fee-
<ing this Commonwealth ftood upon the higher ground) what
"fhould be the reaſon of ſuch haft; the Council upon the return of
<c
the Ambaffadors imparted Letters to the Senat, wherby it appear'd,
"that the Turc had newly lanch'd a formidable Fleet againſt their
"State; which had it bin underſtood by the Florentins, it was well
" enough known they would have made no Peace. Wherfore the
"ſervice of the Ten was highly applauded by the Senat, and cele-
«brated by the Venetians. Wherby may appear, not only in part
ἐσ
what ufe there is of Dictatorian Power in that Government, but
"that it is affum'd at the diſcretion of that Council; wheras in this
"of Oceana it is not otherwiſe intruſted than when the Senat, in the
'
Election of nine Knights extraordinary, gives at once the Com-
"miffion, and takes fecurity in a balance, added to the Council of
« War, tho fecurer before by the Tribuns of the People than that
"of Venice, which yet never incur'd Jealoufy: For if the younger
Nobility have bin often girding at it, that happen'd not fo much
"thro the apprehenfion of danger in it to the Commonwealth, as
"thro the aw of it upon themſelves. Wherfore the Graver have
"doubtlefly fhewn their Prudence in the Law; wherby the Ma-
" giftracy of theſe Counfillors being to laft till their Succeffors be
"created, the Council is eſtabliſh'd.
THE Inftructions of the Councils for their matter being fhewn,
It remains that I fhew the Inftructions for the manner of their pro-
ceding, as they follow in
a Inftructions
for the Coun-
cils as to their
Proceding:
THE twentieth ORDER, containing the Method of Debates to 20. Order.
be obferv'd by the Magiftrats and the Councils fucceffively in order to
Decree of the Senat.
THE Magiftrats of the Signory, as Counfillors of this Commonwealth, manner of
fhall take into their confideration all matters of State, or of Government;
and, having right to propofe in any Council, may any one or more of them
propofe what business he or they pleaſe in that Council to which it moſt pro-
perly belongs. And, that the Councils may be held to their duty, the faid
Magiftrats are fuperintendants and inſpectors of the fame, with right to
propoſe to the Senat.
THE Cenfors have equal Power with theſe Magiftrats, but in re-
lation to the Council of Religion only.
S 2
ANY
132
OCEAN A.
ANY two of the three Provosts in every Council may propose to, and
are the more peculiar Propofers of, the fame Council; to the end that there
be not only an inspection and fuperintendency of business in general, but
that every work be alfo committed to a peculiar band.
ANY one or more of the Magiftrats, or any two of the Provofts
reſpectively having propos'd, the Council fhall debate the bufinefs fo propos'd,
to which they of the third Region that are willing fhall ſpeak first in their
order; they of the fecond, next; and they of the first, last: and the opi-
nions of those that propos'd or spoke, as they shall be thought the most con-
fiderable by the Council, fhall be taken by the Secretary of the fame in
writing, and each of them fign'd with the name of the Author.
THE Opinions being thus prepar'd, any Magiftrat of the Signory, the
Cenfors, or any two of the Provofts of that Council, upon this occafion
may aſſemble the Senat.
THE Senat being affembled, the Opinions (for example, if they be
four) fhall be read in their Order, that is, according to the Order or Dig-
nity of the Magiftrats or Counfillors by which they were fign'd. And being
read, if any of the Council introducing them will speak, they, as best ac-
quainted with the buſineſs, ſhall have precedence; and after them the Se-
nators shall speak according to their Regions, beginning by the third firft,
and fo continuing till every man that will has spoken: and when the Opi-
nions have bin fufficiently debated, they ſhall be put all together to the
Ballot after this manner.
FOUR Secretarys carrying each of them one of the Opinions in one
hand, with a white Box in the other, and each following the other, accord-
ing to the order of the Opinions, ſhall preſent his Box, naming the Author
of his Opinion to every Senator; and one Secretary or Ballotin with a green
Box fhall follow the four white ones; and one Secretary or Ballotin with a
red Box fhall follow the green one: and every Senator ſhall put one Ball into
fom one of these fix boxes. The Suffrage being gather'd and open'd before the
Signory, if the red Box or Nonfincere had above half the Suffrages, the
Opinions shall be all cast out, for the major part of the Houfe is not clear
in the business. If no one of the four Opinions had above half the Suf-
frages in the Affirmative, that which had feweft fhall be caft out, and the
other three fhall be balloted again. If no one of the three had above half, that
which had fewest ſhall be caft out, and the other two ſhall ballot again. If nei-
ther of the two bad above half, that which had feweft ſhall be cast out, and the
remaining Opinion ſhall be balloted again. And if the remaining Opinion has
not above half, it shall also be caft out. But the first of the Opinions that ar-
rives at most above half in the Affirmative, is the Decree of the Senat. The
Opinions being all of them caft out by the Nonfincere, may be review'd, if oc-
cafion permits, by the Council, and brought in again. If they be caft out by the
Negative, the cafe being of advice only, the Houfe approves not, and there is
an end of it: the cafe being neceffary, and admitting delay, the Council
is to think again upon the business, and to bring in new Opinions; but the
Cafe being neceffary, and not admitting delay, the Senat immediatly electing
the Juncta, shall create the Dictator. * And let the Dictator, as the
Roman faying is, take care that the Commonwealth receives no harm.
THIS in cafe the Debate concludes not in a Decrec. But if a Decree
be past, it is either in matter of State or Government according to Law
enacted already, and then it is good without going any further: or it is in
*Et videat Dictator ne quid Refpub. detrimenti capiat.
matter
OCEAN A.
133
matter of Law to be enacted, repeal'd or amended; and then the Decree
of the Senat, efpecially if it be for a War, or for a Levy of Men or Mony,
is invalid, without the refult of the Commonwealth, which is in the Pre-
rogative Tribe, or Reprefentative of the People.
THE Senat having prepar'd a Decree to be propos'd to the People,
Shall appoint their Propofers; and no other may propofe for the Senat to the
People but the Magiftrats of the Houfe: that is to fay, the three Com-
miſſioners of the Seal, or any two of them; the three of the Treaſury, or
any two of them; or the two Cenfors.
THE Senat having appointed their propofers, ſhall require of the
Tribuns a Muster of the People at a fet time and place: and the Tribuns
or any two of them having mufter'd the People accordingly, the Propofers
Shall propofe the Senfe or Decree of the Senat by clauſes to the People. And
that which is propos'd by the Authority of the Senat, and refolv'd by the
Command of the People, is the Law of Oceana.
TO this Order, implicitly containing the fum very near of the
whole Civil part of the Commonwealth, my Lord ARCHON fpoke
thus in Council.
cc
<c
My Dear Lords;
T
HERE is a Saying, That a man muſt cut his Coat accord-
ing to his Cloth. When I confider what God has allow'd or
"furniſh'd to our preſent work, I am amaz'd. You would have a
"popular Government, he has weigh'd it to you in the preſent ba-
"lance, as I may fay, to a dram; you have no more to do, but to fix
"it. For the Superftructures of fuch a Government, they require a
"good Ariftocracy: and you have, or have had a Nobility or Gentry
"the beſt ſtudy'd, and the beſt Writers, at leaſt next that of Italy,
" in the whole World; nor have they bin inferior, when fo exercis'd,
" in the leading of Armys. But the People are the main body of a
"Commonwealth; fhew me from the Treafurys of the Snow (as it
"is in JOB) to the burning Zone, à People whoſe ſhoulder ſo uni-
verfally and fo exactly fit the Corflet. Nevertheleſs it were conve-
"nient to be well provided with Auxiliaries. There is Marpefia thro
"her fruitfulneſs inexhauftible of Men, and men thro her barrenneſs
not only inur'd to hardſhip, but in your Arms. It may be faid,
"that Venice, excepting only that ſhe takes not in the People, is the
"moſt incomparable Situation of a Commonwealth. You are Venice
cr
'
CC
taking in your People and your Auxiliarys too. My Lords, the
"Children of Ifrael were makers of Brick, before they were builders
"of a Commonwealth: But our Brick is made, our Mortert emper'd,
"the Cedars of Lebanon are hew'd and fquar'd to our hands. Has
"this bin the work of man? or is it in man to withſtand this work?
"Shall be that contends with the Almighty, inftruct him? He that re-
proves God, let him anfwer it. For our parts, every thing is fo laid,
"that when we come to have uſe of it, it is the next at hand; and un-
"lefs we can conceive that God and Nature do any thing in vain,
"there is no more for us to do but to diſpatch. The Piece, which we
have reach'd to us in the foregoing Orders, is the Ariftocracy. A-
thens, as has bin fhewn, was plainly loft thro the want of a good
Ariftocracy. But the fufficiency of an Ariftocracy gos demonftra-
bly upon the hand of the Nobility or Gentry: for that the Politics
<<
<c
<<
<c
CC can
3
134
OCEAN A
(C
<<
can be maſter'd without ftudy, or that the People can have leiſure to
ſtudy, is a vain imagination; and what kind of Ariftocracy Divines
"and Lawyers would make, let their incurable running upon their
own narrow biafs, and their perpetual invectives againſt MACHI-
AVEL (tho in fom places juftly reprovable, yet the only Politician,
"and incomparable Patron of the People) ferve for inftruction. I
CC
Co
will ſtand no more to the Judgment of Lawyers and Divines in this
"work, than to that of fo many other Tradefmen; but if this Mo-
"del chances to wander abroad, I recommend it to the Roman Specu
"lativi (the moſt complete Gentlemen of this age) for their cenfure:
Co or with my
Lord EPIMONUS his leave, fend three or four hun-
"dred Copys to your Agent at Venice to be prefented to the Magi-
"ftrats there; and when they have confider'd them, to be propos'd to
"the debate of the Senat, the moft competent Judges under Heaven,
"who, tho they have great Affairs, will not refufe to return you the O-
"racle of their Ballot. The Counfillors of Princes I will not truft; they
"are but Journymen. The Wisdom of thefe later times in Princes Affairs
(fays VERULAMIUS) is rather fine deliverys and ſhiftings of dangers
"when they be near, than folid and grounded courfes to keep them off. Their
"Counfillors do not derive their procedings from any found root of
"Government that may contain the demonftration, and affure the
"fuccefs of them, but are expedient-mongers, givers of themſelves
"to help a lame dog over a ſtile; elfe how coms it to paſs, that the
"fame of Cardinal RICHLIEU has bin like Thunder, wherof we
"hear the noiſe, but can make no demonſtration of the reafon? But
"to return, if neither the People, nor Divines, and Lawyers, can be
"the Ariftocracy of a Nation, there remains only the Nobility; in
"which ſtile, to avoid farther repetition, I fhall underſtand the
Gentry alſo, as the French do by the word Nobleffe.
re
NOW to treat of the Nobility in fuch fort as may be leſs obnoxi-
"ous to miſtake, it will be convenient, and anſwerable to the preſent
“occafion, that I divide my Diſcourſe into four parts.
"THE Firſt treating of Nobility, and the kinds of it.
"THE Second, of their capacity of the Senat.
"THE Third, of the divers kinds of Senats.
"THE Fourth, of the Senat, according to the foregoing Orders.
“NOBILITY may be defin'd divers ways, for it is either an-
"tient Riches, or antient Virtue, or a Title confer'd by a Prince or
"a Commonwealth.
<<
"NOBILITY of the first kind may be fubdivided into two o-
"thers, ſuch as hold an overbalance in Dominion or Property to the
"whole People, or fuch as hold not an overbalance. In the former
"cafe, a Nobility (fuch was the Gothic, of which ſufficient has bin
ſpoken) is incompatible with popular Government; for to popular
"Government it is effential that power fhould be in the People, but
"the overbalance of a Nobility in Dominion draws the Power to
"themſelves. Wherfore in this fenfe it is that MACHIAVEL is
to be underſtood, where he fays, * That theſe are pernicious in a
"Commonwealth; and of France, Spain, and Italy, that they are
fc
Quefti tali fono pernitiofi in ogni Republica, & in ogni Provincia.
"Nations
OCEAN A.
135
t
CC
C
"Nations which for this cauſe are the corruption of the World: for
"otherwife Nobility may according to his definition (which is, That
they are fuch as live upon their own Revenues in plenty, without in-
"gagement either to the tilling of their Lands, or other work for their
"livelihood) hold an underbalance to the People; in which cafe they
"are not only fafe, but neceffary to the natural mixture of a well-
"order'd Commonwealth. For how elfe can you have a Common-
"wealth that is not altogether mechanic? or what compariſon is there
" of fuch Commonwealths as are, or com neareſt to mechanic, for exam-
ple, Athens, Switzerland, Holland, to Lacedemon, Rome, and Venice,
plum'd with their Ariftocracys? Your Mechanics, till they have firſt
"feather'd their nefts, like the Fowls of the Air, whofe whole imploy-
"ment is to feek their food, are fo bufy'd in their private concernments,
"that they have neither leiſure to ſtudy the public, nor are fafely to be
"trufted with it, || becauſe a Man is not faithfully imbark'd in this
"kind of ſhip, if he has no ſhare in the freight. But if his fhare be
"fuch as gives him leifure by his privat advantage to reflect upon that
"of the public, what other name is there for this fort of Men, being
"a leur aife, but (as MACHIAVEL you fee calls them) NOBI-
"LITY? efpecially when their Familys com to be fuch as are
"noted for their Services don to the Commonwealth, and fo take into
"their antient Riches antient Virtue, which is the ſecond definition
"cf Nobility, but fuch a one as is fcarce poffible in nature without
"the former. For as the Baggage, fays VERULAMIUS, is to an
"Army, fo are Riches to Virtue; they cannot be fpar'd nor left behind,
"tho they be impediments, fuch as not only hinder the march, but fometimes
"thro the care of them lofe or disturb the Victory. Of this latter fort is
"the Nobility of Oceana; the best of all others, becauſe they, having
no ftamp whence to derive their price, can have it no otherwife
"than by their intrinfic value. The third definition of Nobility,
" is a Title, Honor, or Diftinction from the People, confer'd or al-
"low'd by the Prince or the Commonwealth. And this may be two
ways, either without any ſtamp or privilege, as in Oceana; or with
"fuch privileges as are inconfiderable, as in Athens after the battel of
"Platea, whence the Nobility had no right, as fuch, but to religious
"Offices, or inſpection of the public Games, to which they were alſo
"to be elected by the People: or with privileges, and thofe confide-
"rable ones, as the Nobility in Athens before the battel of Platea,
"and the Patricians in Rome, each of which had right, or clai:n'd it,
"to the Senat and all the Magiftracys; wherin for fom time they
"only by their ſtamp were current.
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Numb. 1. 16.
"BUT to begin higher, and to fpeak more at large of Nobility
"in their feveral capacitys of the Senat. The Phylarchs or Princes of
"the Tribes of Ifrael were the most renown'd, or, as the Latin, the
"moſt noble of the Congregation, wherof by hereditary right they
“had the leading and judging. The Patriarchs, or Princes of Familys, Ver. 18.
"according as they declar'd their Pedigrees, had the like right as to their
Familys; but neither in thefe nor the former, was there any hereditary
right to the Sanhedrim: tho there be little queſtion but the wife men,
"and underſtanding, and known among their Tribes, which the Peo-·
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OCEAN A.
Deut. 1. 13.
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ple, took or elected into thoſe or other Magiftracys, and whom
"MOSES made Rulers over them, muſt have bin of thefe; feeing
they could not chufe but be the moſt known among the Tribes, and
were likelieft by the advantages of Education to be the moſt wiſe
" and underſtanding.
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"SOLON having found the Athenians neither locally nor genealo-
gically, but by their different ways of Life, divided into four Tribes,
"that is, into the Soldiery, the Tradefmen, the Huſbandmen, and
"the Goatherds, inftituted a new diftribution of them, according to
"the cenſe or valuation of their Eftates, into four Claffes: the first,
fecond, and third, confifting of fuch as were Proprietors in Land,
diſtinguiſh'd by the rate of their Freeholds, with that ſtamp upon
them, which making them capable of adding Honor to their
Riches, that is to fay, of the Senat and all the Magiftracys, exclud-
"ed the fourth, being the Body of the People, and far greater in num-
"ber than the former three, from all other right, as to thofe Capaci-
tys, except the election of thefe, who by this means became a here-
ditary Ariftocracy or Senatorian Order of Nobility. This was that
"courfe which came afterwards to be the deftruction of Rome, and
"had now ruin'd Athens. The Nobility, according to the inevitable
"Nature of fuch a one, having laid the Plot how to deveft the Peo-
ple of the Reſult, and ſo to draw the whole Power of the Com-
"monwealth to themſelves; which in all likelihood they had don, if
"the People, coming by mere chance to be victorious in the battel of
Platea, and famous for defending Greece againſt the Perfians, had
"not return'd with fuch Courage as irreſiſtibly broke the Claffes, to
which of old they had born a white Tooth, brought the Nobility
to equal Terms, and the Senat with the Magiſtracys to be common.
"to both; the Magiftracys by Suffrage, and the Senat (which was the
"miſchief of it, as I ſhall ſhew anon in that Conſtitution) by Lot only.
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“THE Lacedemonians were in the manner, and for the fame cauſe
"with the Venetians at this day, no other than a Nobility, even ac-
cording to the definition given of Nobility by MACHIAVEL;
"for they neither exercis'd any Trade, nor labor'd their Lands or
Lots, which was don by their Helots: wherfore fom Nobility may
"be far from pernicious in a Commonwealth by MACHIAVEL'S
own Teſtimony, who is an admirer of this, tho the Servants ther-
"of were more in number than the Citizens. To thefe Servants I
"hold the anſwer of LYCURGUS, when he bad him who afk'd why
" he did not admit the People to the Government of his Common-
wealth, to go home and admit his Servants to the Government of
his Family, to relate: for neither were the Lacedemonians Servants,
"nor farther capable of the Government, unleſs, wheras the Congre-
gation had the Reſult, he ſhould have given them the Debate alſo;
every one of theſe that attain'd to fixty years of Age, and the major
"Vote of the Congregation, being equally capable of the Senat.
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"THE Nobility of Rome, and their capacity of the Senat, I have
already deſcrib'd by that of Athens before the battel of Platea; fa-
ving only that the Athenian was never eligible into the Senat with-
out the fuffrage of the People, till the introduction of the Lot, but
"the Roman Nobility ever: for the Patricians were elected into the
"Senat by the Kings, by the Confuls, or the Cenfors; or if a Ple-
"beian happen'd to be confcrib'd, he and his Pofterity became Patri-
❝cians.
"
OCEAN A.
137
«cians. Nor, tho the People had many difputes with the Nobili-
cr ty, did this ever com in controverfy, which, if there had bin no-
thing elſe, might in my judgment have bin enough to overturn that
"Commonwealth.
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"THE Venetian Nobility, but that they are richer, and not mi-
litary, reſemble at all other points the Lacedemonian, as I have al-
ready fhewn. Thefe MACHIAVEL excepts from his rule, by
faying, that their Eftates are rather perſonal than real, or of any
great revenue in Land; which coms to our account, and fhews, that
a Nobility or party of the Nobility, not overbalancing in Domini-
on, is not dangerous, but of neceffary uſe in every Commonwealth,
provided it be rightly order'd; for if it be fo order'd as was that
"of Rome, tho they do not overbalance at the beginning, as they
"did not there, it will not be long e'er they do, as is clear both in
"reafon and experience towards the latter end. That the Nobility
"only be capable of the Senat, is there only not dangerous, where
"there be no other Citizens, as in this Government and that of La-
"cedemon.
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"THE Nobility of Holland and Switzerland, tho but few, have
Privileges not only diſtinct from the People, but fo great, that in ſom
Soveraintys they have a negative voice; an example which I am far
"from commending, being fuch as (if thoſe Governments were not
"cantoniz'd, divided, and fubdivided into many petty Soveraintys
"that balance one another, and in which the Nobility, except they
"had a Prince at the head of them, can never join to make work)
"would be the moſt dangerous that ever was but the Gothic, of which
"it favors. For in antient Commonwealths you ſhall never find a
"Nobility to have had a negative but by the Poll, which, the People
being far more in number, came to nothing; wheras theſe have it,
"be they never fo few, by their ftamp or order.
"C
"OURS of Oceana have nothing elſe but their education and their
"leifure for the public, furniſh'd by their Eafe and competent Riches:
"and their intrinfic value, which, according as it coms to hold weight
"in the judgment or fuffrage of the People, is their only way to honor
" and preferment. Wherfore I would have your Lordships to look
upon your Children as fuch, who if they com to ſhake off ſom
part
" of their baggage, fhall make the more quick and glorious march :
"for it was nothing elſe but the baggage fordidly plunder'd by the
Nobility of Rome, that loft the Victory of the whole World in the
"midſt of her Triumph.
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"HAVING follow'd the Nobility thus clofe, they bring us, ac-
cording to their natural courſe and divers kinds, to the divers Con-
"ftitutions of the Senat.
'ce
"THAT of Ifrael (as was fhew'd by my Right Noble Lord
"PHOSPHORUS DE AUGE, in the opening of the Commonwealth)
"confifted of ſeventy Elders, elected at firft by the People. But
"wheras they were for life, they ever after (tho without any divine
precept for it) fubftituted their Succeffors by Ordination, which Ce-
remony was moft ufually perform'd by impofition of hands; and
by this means a Commonwealth of as popular inftitution as can be
found, became, as it is accounted by JOSEPHUS, Ariftocratical.
"From this Ordination derives that which was introduc'd by the A-
poſtles into the Chriſtian Church; for which cauſe I think it is, that
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138
OCEAN A.
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"the Prefbyterians would have the Government of the Church to be
"Ariftocratical: Tho the Apoſtles, to the end, as I conceive, that
they might give no occafion to fuch a mistake, but fhew that they
"intended the Government of the Church to be popular, ordain'd El-
"ders, as has bin fhewn, by the holding up of hands (or free Suffrage of
"the People) in every Congregation or Ecclefia: for that is the word in
"the Original, being borrow'd from the civil Congregations of the
People in Athens and Lacedemon, which were fo call'd; and the
"word for holding up of bands in the Text, is alfo the very fame,
"which fignify'd the Suffrage of the People in Athens, xsigorcunτautes;
"for the Suffrage of the Athenians was given per Chirotonian, fays
"EMMIUS.
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"THE Council of the Bean (as was fhewn by my Lord Na-
VARCHUS DE PARALO in his full Difcourfe) being the propo-
fing Senat of Athens (for that of the Arcopagits was a Judicatory)
"confifted of four, fom fay five hundred Senators, elected annually,
"all at once, and by a mere lot without fuffrage. Wherfore tho the
Senat, to correct the temerity of the Lot, had power to caſt out
"fuch as they fhould judg unworthy of that honor; this related to
manners only, and was not fufficient to repair the Commonwealth,
"which by fuch means became impotent: and forafmuch as her Senat
"confifted not of the natural Ariftocracy, which in a Commonwealth
"is the only fpur and rein of the People, it was caft headlong by the
raſhneſs of her Demagogs or Grandees into ruin; while her Senat,
like the Roman Tribuns (*who almost always, infiead of governing,
were rather govern'd by the multitude) propos'd not to the Refult
only, but to the Debate alſo of the People, who were therfore call'd
to the Pulpits, where fom vomited, and others drank poiſon.
"THE Senat of Lacedemon, moft truly diſcover'd by my Lord
"LACO DE SCYTALE, confifted but of 30 for life, wherof the
two Kings having but fingle Votes, were hereditary, the reft elect-
"ed by the free Suffrage of the People, but out of fuch as were fixty
years of age. Theſe had the whole debate of the Commonwealth
in themſelves, and propos'd to the Refult only of the People. And
now the riddle which I have heretofore found troublefom to unfold,
"is out; that is to fay, why Athens and Lacedemon, confifting each of
"the Senat and the People, the one ſhould be held a Democracy, and
"the other an Ariftocracy, or laudable Oligarchy, as it is term'd by
"ISOCRATES; for that word is not, wherever you meet it, to be
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branded, feeing it is us'd alfo by ARISTOTLE, PLUTARCH, and
"others, fomtimes in a good fenfe. The main difference was, that
"the People in this had the Refult only, and in that the Debate
"and Refult too. But for my part, where the People have the elec-
"tion of the Senat, not bound to a diftinct order, and the Reſult, which
"is the Soverain Power, I hold them to have that ſhare in the Govern-
"ment (the Senat being not for life) wherof, with the fafety of the
"Commonwealth, they are capable in nature; and fuch a Govern-
ment, for that cauſe, to be Democracy: tho I do not deny, but in
Lacedemon, the paucity of the Senators confider'd, it might be call'd
Oligarchy, in compariſon of Athens; or, if we look on their conti-
nuance for life, tho they had bin more, Aristocracy.
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OCEAN NA
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139
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"THE Senat of Rome (whofe Fame has bin heard to thunder in
"the Eloquence of my Lord DOLABELLA D'ENYO) confifting of
300, was, in regard of the number, lefs Oligarchical than that of
« Lacedemon; but more in regard of the Patrician, who, having a
hereditary Capacity of the fame, were not elected to that Honor
by the People; but, being confcrib'd by the Cenfors, injoy'd it for
"life. Wherfore thefe, if they had their wills, would have reſolv'd
as well as debated; which fet the People at fuch variance with them,
"as diffolv'd the Commonwealth; wheras if the People had injoy'd
"the Relult, that about the Agrarian, as well as all other ftrife, muft
"of neceffity have ceas'd.
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"THE Senats of Switzerland and Holland (as I have learnt of
my Lords ALPESTER and GLAUCUS) being bound up (like the
"fheaf of Arrows which the latter gives) by Leagues, ly like thoſe
" in their Quivers: But Arrows, when they com to be drawn, fly
"fom this way, and fom that; and I am contented that theſe con-
"cern'd us not.
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"THAT of Venice (by the faithful Teftimony of my moft ex-
"cellent Lord LINCEUS DE STELLA) has oblig'd a World, fuf-
ficiently punish'd by its own blindnefs and ingratitude, to repent
" and be wiſer: for wheras a Commonwealth in which there is no
"Senat, or where the Senat is corrupt, cannot ſtand; the Great
"Council of Venice, like the Statue of Nilus, leans upon an Urn or
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Waterpot, which pours forth the Senat in fo pure and perpetual a
ftream, as being inabled to ſtagnat, is for ever incapable of Cor-
ruption. The fuller Deſcription of this Senat is contain'd in that
"of Oceana; and that of Oceana in the foregoing Orders. To every one
"of which, becauſe fomthing has bin already faid, I fhall not fpeak
"in particular. But in general, your Senat, and the other Affembly,
or the Prerogative, as I fhall fhew in due place, are perpetual, not
as Lakes or Puddles, but as the Rivers of Eden; and are beds made,
as you have ſeen, to receive the whole People, by a due and faithful
viciffitude, into their current. They. are not, as in the late way, al-
Alternat Life in Government is the alternat* Death of it.
"THIS was the Gothic work, wherby the former Government
(which was not only a ſhip, but a guft too) could never open her
fails, but in danger to overfet herſelf; neither could make any voy-
age, nor ly fafe in her own harbor. The Wars of later ages, fays
" VERULAMIUs, ſeem to be made in the dark, in refpect of the
glory and honor which reflected on men from the Wars in antient
"times. Their fhipping of this fort was for Voyages, ours dare not
"lanch; nor lys it fafe at home. Your Gothic Politicians ſeem to me
" rather to have invented fom new Ammunition or Gunpowder, in
"their King and Parlament, than Government. For what is becom
"of the Princes (a kind of People) in Germany? blown up. Where
are the Eſtates, or the Power of the People in France ? blown up.
"Where is that of the People in Arragon, and the rest of the Spanish
Kingdoms ? blown up. On the other fide, where is the King of
Spain's Power in Holland? blown up. Where is that of the Au-
firian Princes in Switzerland? blown up. This perpetual peeviſhneſs
"and jealouſy, under the alternat Empire of the Prince, and of the
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140
OCEAN A
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People, is obnoxious to every Spark. Nor fhall any man flew a
"reafon that will be holding in prudence, why the People of
"Oceana have blown up their King, but that their Kings did not
"first blow up them. The reft is diſcourſe for Ladys. Wherfore
your Parlaments are not henceforth to com out of the Bag of Ao-
Lus, but by your Galaxys, to be the perpetual food of the Fire of
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"YOUR Galaxys, which divide the Houſe into fo many Regi-
ons, are three; one of which conftituting the third Region is an-
"nually chofen, but for the term of three years; which caufes the
"Houſe (having at once Bloffoms, Fruit half ripe, and others drop-
ping off in full maturity) to reſemble an Orange-tree, fuch as is at
the fame time an Education or Spring, and a Harveſt too: for the
People have made a very ill choice in the Man, who is not eaſily ca-
"pable of the perfect knowlege in one year of the Senatorian Orders;
"which knowlege, allowing him for the firft to have bin a Novice,
brings him the fecond year to practice, and time enough. For at
this rate you muſt always have two hundred knowing Men in the
Government. And thus the Viciffitude of your Senators is not per-
ceivable in the ſteadineſs and perpetuity of your Senat; which, like
that of Venice, being always changing, is for ever the fame. And
tho other Politicians have not fo well imitated their Pattern, there is
nothing more obvious in Nature, ſeeing a man who wears the fame
"Fleſh but a ſhort time, is nevertheleſs the fame Man, and of the
"fame genius; and whence is this but from the Conftancy of Nature,
in holding a Man to her Orders? Wherfore keep alfo to your Or-
"ders. But this is a mean Requeſt, your Orders will be worth little, if
they do not hold you to them; wherfore imbark. They are like a
Ship, if you be once aboard, you do not carry them, but they you;
and fee how Venice ſtands to her tackling: you will no more for-
"fake them, than you will leap into the Sea.
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"BUT they are very many, and difficult. O, my Lords, what
Seaman cafts away his Card, becauſe it has four and twenty Points
"of the Compaſs ? and yet thoſe are very near as many, and as dif-
ficult as the Orders in the whole Circumference of your Common-
"wealth. Confider, how have we bin toft with every wind of Doc-
"trin, loft by the glib Tongues of your Demagogs and Grandees in
our own Havens? A company of Fidlers that have diſturb'd your
"reft for your Groat; two to one, three thouſand pounds a year to
"another, has bin nothing. And for what? Is there one of them
"that yet knows what a Commonwealth is? And are you yet afraid
"of fuch a Government in which theſe ſhall not dare to fcrape, for
"fear of the Statute? THEMISTOCLES Could not fiddle, but could
"make of a ſmall City a great Commonwealth: theſe have fiddel'd,
"and for your Mony, till they have brought a great Commonwealth
❝to a ſmall City.
"IT grieves me, while I confider how, and from what caufes
imaginary Difficultys will be aggravated, that the foregoing Orders
are not capable of any greater clearness in difcourfe or writing:
"But if a man ſhould make a Book, defcribing every trick and paf-
fage, it would fare no otherwife with a game at Cards; and this is
sc
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no more, if a man plays upon the fquare. There is a great diffe-
rence, fays VERULAMIUS, between a cunning Man and a wife
"Man
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OCEAN A
141
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"Man (between a Demagog and a Legiflator) not only in point of
honeſty, but in point of ability: As there be that can pack the Cards,
"and yet cannot play well; fo there be fom that are good in Canvaffes
"and Factions, that are otherwife weak men. Allow me but theſe Ör-
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"ders, and let them com with their Cards in their fleeves, or pack
"if they can. Again, fays he, it is one thing to understand Perfons,
"and another to understand Matters; for many are perfect in men's hu-
mors, that are not greatly capable of the real part of Business: which
is the Conftitutian of one that has ftudy'd Men more than Books. But
"there is nothing more hurtful in a State, than that cunning men fhould
pass for wife. His words are an Oracle. AS DIONYSIUS, when
"
" he could no longer exerciſe his Tyranny among men, turn'd School-
"mafter, that he might exercife it among Boys. Allow me but theſe
"Orders, and your Grandees fo well fkill'd in the Baits and Palats of
Men, fhall turn Ratcatchers.
"AND wheras Councils (as is difcretely obferv'd by the fame
"Author in his time) are at this day, in moſt places, but familiar meet-
"ings (fomwhat like the Academy of our Provofts) where matters
are rather talk'd on than debated, and run too fwift to order an Act of
Council; give me my Orders, and fee if I have not puzzel'd your
Demagogs.
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"IT is not fo much my defire to return upon hants, as theirs that
"will not be fatisfy'd; wherfore if, notwithſtanding what was faid
of dividing and chufing in our preliminary Difcourfes, men will yet
"be returning to the Queſtion, Why the Senat muſt be a Council a-
part (tho even in Athens, where it was of no other Conftitution
"than the popular Affembly, the diftinction of it from the other was
never held leſs than neceffary) this may be added to the former
Reaſons, that if the Ariftocracy be not for the Debate, it is for no-
thing; but if it be for debate, it muſt have convenience for it: And
"what convenience is there for debate in a croud, where there is no-
thing but jostling, treading upon one another, and ftirring of
Blood, than which in this cafe there is nothing more dangerous?
Truly, it was not ill faid of my Lord EPIMON US, That Venice
plays her game, as it were, at Billiards or Nineholes; and fo
may your Lordships, unleſs your Ribs be ſo ſtrong, that think
"better of Footbal: for fuch ſport is Debate in a popular Affembly,
as, notwithſtanding the diftinction of the Senat, was the deftruc-
"tion of Athens.
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THIS Speech concluded the Debate which happen'd at the Infti-
tution of the Senat. The next Affembly is that of the People or Pre-
rogative Tribe.
tive Tribe.
THE face, or mien of the Prerogative Tribe for the Arms, the The Face of
Horſes, and the Diſciplin, but more efpecially for the felect men, is the Preroga
that of a very noble Regiment, or rather of two; the one of Horſe,
divided into three Troops, (befides that of the Provinces, which will
be fhewn hereafter) with their Captains, Cornets, and two Tribuns
of the Horfe at the head of them; the other of Foot in three Com-
panys (befides that of the Provinces) with their Captains, Enfigns,
and two Tribuns of the Foot at the head of them. The firft Troop
is call'd the Phenix; the fecond the Pelican; and the third the Swallow.
The firſt Company the Cyprefs; the fecond the Myrtle; and the third
the
1 42
OCEAN A.
21. Order.
The Change or
Prerogative.
the Spray. Of thefe again (not without a near refemblance of the
Roman divifion of a Tribe) the Phenix and the Cypress conftitute the
firit clafs; the Pelican and the Myrtle the fecond; and the Swallow
with the Spray the third, renew'd every Spring by
THE one and twentieth ORDER, directing, that upon every
Election of the Monday next infuing the last of March, the Deputys of the annual Ge-
Tianial Of lazy arriving at the Pavilion in the Halo, and electing one Captain and
ficers of the cne Cornet of the Swallow (triennial Officers) by and out of the Cavalry
at the Horfe Urn, according to the Rules contain'd in the Ballot of the
Hundred, and one Captain with one Enfign of the Spray (triennial Offi-
cers) by and out of the Infantry at the Foot Urn, after the fame
way of ballotting; conflitute and becom the third Claffes of the Preroga
tive Tribe.
22. Order.
Election of the
SEVEN Deputys are annually return'd by every Tribe, wherof
three are Horfe, and four are Foot; and there be fifty Tribes: fo the
Swallow muſt conſiſt of 150 Horſe, the Spray of 200 Foot. And the
reft of the Claffes being two, each of them in number equal; the whole
Prerogative (befides the Provinces, that is, the Knights and Deputys
of Marpefia and Panopea) must confift of 1050 Deputys. And thefe
Troops and Companys may as well be call'd Centurys as thofe of the
Romans; for the Romans related not, in fo naming theirs, to the num-
ber. And wheras they were diftributed according to the valuation of
their Eftates, fo are thefe; which by virtue of the laft Order, are now
accommodated with their triennial Officers. But there be others ap-
pertaining to this Tribe, whofe Election, being of far greater impor-
tance, is annual, as follows in
way
THE twenty-ſecond ORDER; wherby the firſt Claſs having
The Charge or elected their triennial Officers, and made Oath to the Old Tribuns, that
Annual Magi- they will neither introduce, caufe, nor to their power fuffer Debate to be
Jirats of the introduc'd into any popular Affembly of this Government, but to their utmoſt
Prerogative.
be aiding and affifting to feize and deliver any Perfon or Perſons in that
offending, and ftriking at the Root of this Commonwealth, to the Coun
cil of War; are to procede with the other two Claffes of the Prerogative
Tribe to election of the new Tribuns, being four annual Magiftrats, wherof
two are to be elected out of the Cavalry at the Horfe Urn, and two out of
the Infantry at the Foot Urn, according to the common Ballot of the Tribes.
And they may be promifcuously chofen out of any Claffis, provided that the
fame Perfon fhall not be capable of bearing the Tribunitian Honor twice in
the term of one Galaxy. The Tribuns thus choſen ſhall receive the Tribe
(in reference to the Power of mustering and difciplining the fame) as Com-
manders in chief; and for the reft as Magiftrats, whofe proper Function
is preſcrib'd by the next Order. The Tribuns may give leave to any num-
ber of the Prerogative, not exceeding one hundred at a time, to be abfent,
So they be not Magiftrats, nor Officers, and return within three months.
If a Magiftrat or Officer has a neceffary occafion, he may also be abfent
for the space of one month; provided, that there be not above three Cornets
or Enfigns, two Captains, or one Tribun fo abfent at one time.
TO this the ARCHON fpoke at the Inftitution after this manner.
My
OCEAN A.
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My Lords;
T is affirm'd by CICERO in his Cration for FLACCUS, that
the Commonwealths of Greece were all fhaken or ruin'd by
"the intemperance of their Comitia, or Affemblys of the People.
"The truth is, if good heed in this point be not taken, a Common-
"wealth will have bad legs. But all the world knows he ſhould have
excepted Lacedemon, where the People, as has bin fhewn by the
Oracle, had no power at all of Debate, nor (till after LYSAN-
DER, whofe Avarice open'd a gulf, that was not long e'er it fwal-
low'd up
his Country) came it ever to be exercis'd by them.
Whence that Commonwealth ftoed longeſt and firmeft of any
other, but this, in our days, of Venice: which having underlaid
her felf with the like Inftitution, ows a great, if not the greateſt
part of her fteddinefs to the fame principle; the great Council,
"which is with her the People, by the Authority of my Lord
"EPIMONUS, never ſpeaking a word. Nor fhall
word. Nor fhall any Common-
"wealth, where the People in their political capacity is talkative, ever
fee half the days of one of theſe : But being carry'd away by vain-
glorious Men (that, as OVERBURY fays, pifs more than they
drink) ſwim down the ſtream; as did Athens, the moſt prating of
"theſe Dames, when that fame ranting fellow ALCIBIADES fell
a demagoging for the Sicilian War. But wheras Debate by the
authority and experience of Lacedemon and Venice, is not to be com-
mitted to the People in a well-order'd Government, it may be faid,
"That the Order fpecify'd is but a flight bar in a matter of like dan-
ger; for fo much as an Oath, if there be no recourſe upon the
"breach of it, is a weak ty for fuch hands as have the Sword in
"them wherfore what ſhould hinder the People of Oceana, if they
happen not to regard an Oath, from affuming Debate, and making
"themſelves as much an Anarchy as thofe of Athens ? To which I
"anfwer, Take the common fort in a privat capacity, and, except
they be injur'd, you fhall find them to have a bathfulnefs in the
prefence of the better fort, or wifer Men; acknowleging their
Abilitys by attention, and accounting it no mean honor to receive
refpect from them: But if they be injur'd by them, they hate them,
"and the more for being wife or great, becauſe that makes it the
greater injury. Nor refrain they in this cafe from any kind of im-
temperance of Speech, if of Action. It is no otherwife with a
People in their political capacity; you fhall never find that they have
affum'd Debate for it felf, but for fomthing elſe. Wherfore in La-
"cedemon where there was, and in Venice where there is nothing
"elfe for which they should affumne it, they have never fhewn fo
much as an inclination to it. Nor was there any appearance of fuch
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defire in the People of Rome (who from the time of ROMULUS
"had bin very well contented with the power of Refult either in the
"Parochial Affemblys, as it was fettled upon them by him; or in
"the meetings of the + Hundreds, as it was alter'd in their regard for
"the worfe by SERVIUS TULLIUS) till news was brought fom
"fifteen years after the exile of TARQUIN their late King (during
*Comitiis Curiatis.
+ Centuriatis.
which
3
144
OCEAN A.
"which time the Senat had govern'd pretty well) that he was dead
"at the Court of ARISTODEMUS the Tyrant of Cuma. * Wher-
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upon the Patricians, or Nobility, began to let out the hitherto-
diffembl'd Verom, which is inherent in the root of Oligarchy,
" and fell immediatly upon injuring the People beyond all modera-
"tion. For wheras the People had ferv'd both gallantly and con-
"tentedly in Arms upon their own charges, and, tho joint Purchafers
"by their Swords of the Conquer'd Lands, had not participated in
"the fame to above two Acres a man (the reft being fecretly
ufurp'd by the Patricians) they thro the meanhefs of their fupport,
"and the greatneſs of their expence, being generally indebted, no
"fooner return'd home with Victory to lay down their Arms, than
"they were fnatch'd up by their Creditors, the Nobility, to cram
Goals. Wherupon, but with the greatest modefty that was ever
"known in the like cafe, they firft fell upon debate, affirming,
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that
they were oppreft and captivated at home, while abroad they fought for
Liberty and Empire; and that the Freedom of the common People was
Jafer in time of War than Peace, among their Enemys than their Fellow-
citizens. It is true, that when they could not get the Senat, thro
fear, as was pretended by the Patricians, to affemble and take their
grievances into confideration, they grew fo much the warmer, that
it was glad to meet; where APPIUS CLAUDIUS, a fierce fpirit,
was of opinion, that recourfe fhould be had to Confular power,
wherby fom of the brands of Sedition being taken off, the flame
might be extinguifh'd. SERVILIUS being of another temper, thought
it better and fafer to try if the People might be bow'd than broken.
But this debate was interrupted by tumultuous news of the near
approach of the Volfci, a cafe in which the Senat had no recourſe
but to the People, who contrary to their former cuſtom upon the
like occafions would not ftir a foot, but fell a laughing, and faying,
|| Let them fight that have fomthing to fight for. The Senat that
had purfes, and could not fing fo well before the Thief, being
in a great perplexity, found no poffible way out of it, but to be-
feech SERVILIUS, one of a Genius well known to be popular,
That he would accept of the Confulfhip, and make fom fuch uſe of
it as might be helpful to the Patrician Intereft. SERVILIUS ac-
cepting of the Offer, and making uſe of his Intereft with the Peo-
ple, perfuaded them to hope well of the good intention of the Fa-
thers, whom it would little befeem to be forc'd to thoſe things which
would loſe their Grace, and that in view of the Enemy, if they
came not freely; and withal publiſh'd an Edict, that no Man
"fhould withhold a Citizen of Rome by impriſonment from giving
"his name (for that was the way, as I fhall have opportunity here-
after to fhew more at large, wherby they drew out their Armys)
nor to ſeize or fell any man's Goods or Children that was in the
Camp. Wherupon the People with a mighty concourſe immediat-
"ly took Arms, march'd forth, and (which to them was as eafy as
to be put into the humor, and that, as appears in this place, was not
er
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* Eo nuncio erecti patres, erecta plebs. Sed patribus nimis luxuriofa ea fuit lætitia; plebi,
cui ad eam diem fummâ ope infervitum erat, injuriæ à primoribus fieri cœpêre. Liv 1. 2.
+ Se foris pro libertate & imperio dimicantes, domi a civibus captos & oppreffos effe: tutiorem-
que
in bello quam in pace, inter hoftes quam inter cives, libertatem plebis effe. Patres milita-
fent, patres arma caperent, ut penes eofdem pericula belli, penes quos præmia, effent.
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OCEAN A.
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"hard) totally defeated the Volfci firft, then the Sabins (for the
neighbor Nations, hoping to have had a good bargain of the Dif
"cord in Rome, were up in arms on all fides) and after the Sabins,
"the Aurunci. Whence returning victorious in three Battels, they
expected no less than that the Senat would have made good their
"words: when APPIUS CLAUDIUS, the other Conful, of his in-
nate Pride, and that he might fruftrat the Faith of his Collegue,
"caus'd the Soldiers (who being fet at liberty, had behav'd them-
"ſelves with ſuch valor) to be reſtor'd at their return to their Credi-
tors and their Goals. Great refort upon this was made by the Peo-
ple to SERVILIUS, fhewing him their Wounds, calling him to
"witneſs how they had behav'd themſelves, and minding him of
"his promife. Poor SERVILIUS was forry, but fo overaw'd with
"the headineſs of his Collegue, and the obftinacy of the whole
"faction of the Nobility, that not daring to do any thing either way,
"he loft both Partys: the Fathers conceiving that he was ambitious,
" and the People that he was falfe; while the Conful CLAUDIUS
"continuing to countenance fuch as daily feiz'd and impriſon'd fom of
"the indebted People, had ftill new and dangerous Controverfys with
"them, infomuch that the Commonwealth was torn with horrid
"Diviſion, and the People (becauſe they found it not fo fafe, or fo
"effectual in public) minded nothing but laying their heads toge-
"ther in privat Conventicles. For this AULUS VIRGINIUS, and
"TITUS VETUSIUS, the new Confuls, were reprov'd by the
"Senat as flothful, and upbraided with the Virtue of APPIUS
"CLAUDIUS. Wherupon the Confuls having defir'd the Senat,
"that they might know their pleaſure, fhew'd afterwards their
"readiness to obey it, by fummoning the People according to com-
mand, and requiring names wherby to draw forth an Army for di-
" verfion, but no man would anſwer. Report hereof being made to
"the Senat, the younger fort of the Fathers grew fo hot with the
Confuls, that they defir'd them to abdicat the Magiſtracy, which
they had not the courage to defend.
..
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"THE Confuls, tho they conceiv'd themſelves to be roughly
"handled, made this foft Anſwer: Fathers Confcript, that you may
pleaſe to take notice it was foretold fom horrid Sedition is at hand,
"we ſhall only defire, that they whofe valor in this place is fo great,
may ſtand by us to fee how we behave our felves, and then be as
"refolute in your Commands as you will: your Fatherhoods may
"know if we be wanting in the performance.
<<
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"AT this fom of the hot young Noblemen return'd with the
"Confuls to the Tribunal, before which the People were yet ftand-
ing; and the Confuls having generally requir'd names in vain, to
put it to fomething, requir'd the name of one that was in their ey
particularly; on whom, when he mov'd not, they commanded a
"Lictor to lay hands: but the People thronging about the Party
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fummon'd, forbad the Lictor, who durft not touch him; at which
"the Hotſpurs that came with the Confuls, inrag'd by the affront,
"defcended from the Throne to the aid of the Lictor; from whom
"in fo doing they turn'd the indignation of the People upon them-
"ſelves with fuch heat, that the Confuls interpofing, thought fit, by
remitting the Affembly, to appeaſe the Tumult; in which never-
“theleſs there had bin nothing but noife. Nor was there leſs in the
Senat,
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OCEAN A.
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"Senat, being fuddenly rally'd upon this occafion, where they that
"receiv'd the repulfe, with others whofe heads were as addle as their
own, fell upon the bufinefs as if it had bin to be determin'd by cla-
mor, till the Confuls, upbraiding the Senat that it differ'd not from
"the Marketplace, reduc'd the Houſe to Orders. And the Fathers
having bin confulted accordingly, there were three Opinions; PUB-
LIUS VIRGINIUS conceiv'd, that the confideration to be had up-
on the matter in queſtion, or aid of the indebted and impriſon'd
People, was not to be further extended than to fuch as had in-
gag'd upon the promiſe made by SERVILIUS: TITUS LAR-
GIUS, that it was no time to think it enough, if mens Merits were
acknowleg'd, while the whole People, funk under the weight of
"their debts, could not emerge without fom common aid; which to
"reſtrain, by putting fom into a better condition than others, would
"rather more inflame the Diſcord than extinguish it. APPIUS
"CLAUDIUS (ftill upon the old hant) would have it, that the
People were rather wanton than fierce: It was not oppreffion that
neceffitated, but their power that invited them to theſe freaks; the
Empire of the Confuls fince the appeal to the People (wherby a
"Plebeian might afk his fellows if he were a Thief) being but a
"mere fcarecrow. Go to, fays he, let us create the Dictator, from
"whom there is no appeal, and then let me fee more of this work,
"or him that fhall forbid my Lictor. The advice of APPIUS was
" abhor'd by many; and to introduce a general recifion of Debts with
"LARGIUS, was to violat all Faith: That of VIRGINIUS, as
"the moſt moderat, would have paft beft, but that there were privat
Interefts, that conftant bane of the Public, which withſtood it.
"So they concluded with APPIUS, who alſo had \bin Dictator, if
"the Confuls and fom of the graver fort had not thought it altoge-
"ther unſeaſonable, at a time when the Volfci and the Sabins were up
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again, to venture fo far upon alienation of the People: for which
"caufe VALERIUS, being defcended from the PUBLICOLAS, the
"moſt popular Family, as alfo in his own perſon of a mild nature,
"was rather trufted with fo rigid a Magiftracy. Whence it hap-
pen'd, that the People, tho they knew well enough againſt whom
"the Dictator was created, fear'd nothing from VALERIUS; but
upon a new promife made to the fame effect with that of SERVI-
LIUS, hop'd better another time, and throwing away all diſputes,
gave their names roundly, went out, and to be brief, came home
again as victorious as in the former Action, the Dictator entring the
City in Triumph. Nevertheleſs when he came to prefs the Senat
to make good his promife, and do fomthing for the eaſe of the Peo-
ple, they regarded him no more as to that point than they had don
"SERVILIUS. Wherupon the Dictator, in difdain to be made a
ftale, abdicated his Magiftracy, and went home. Here then was
a victorious Army, without a Captain, and a Senat pulling it by the
"beard in their Gowns. What is it (if you have read the Story, for
"there is not fuch another) that muft follow? Can any man imagin,
"that fuch only fhould be the opportunity upon which this People
"could run away? Alas, poor men, the Æqui and the Volfci, and the
"Sabins were nothing, but the Fathers invincible! There they fat
"fome three hundred of them arm'd all in Robes, and thundering with
"their Tongues, without any hopes in the earth to reduce them to
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OCEAN A.
147
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any tolerable conditions. Wherfore, not thinking it convenient to
"abide long fo near them, away marches the Army, and incamps in
"the fields. This Retreat of the People is call'd the Seceffion of Mount
Aventin, where they lodg'd very fad at their condition; but not let-
"ting fall fo much as a word of murmur againſt the Fathers. The
"Senat by this time were great Lords, had the whole City to them-
felves; but certain Neighbours were upon the way that might com
to ſpeak with them, not afking leave of the Porter. Wherfore
"their minds became troubl'd, and an Orator was pofted to the Peo-
ple to make as good conditions with them as he could; but, what-
ever the terms were, to bring them home, and with all ſpeed.
"And here it was covenanted between the Senat and the People, that
"theſe ſhould have Magiftrats of their own Election, call'd the Tri-
"buns; upon which they return'd.
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"TO hold you no longer, the Senat having don this upon ne-
"ceffity, made frequent attempts to retract it again; while the Tri-
"buns on the other fide, to defend what they had got, inſtituted their
"Tributa Comitia,or Council of the People; where they came in time,
" and, as Diſputes increas'd, to make Laws without the Authority of
"the Senat, call'd Plebiscita. Now to conclude in the point at which
"I drive; fuch were the fteps wherby the People of Rome came to
"affume Debate: nor is it in Art or Nature to debar a People of the
"like effect, where there is the like cauſe. For ROMULUS having
"in the Election of his Senat fquar'd out a Nobility for the fupport
"of a Throne, by making that of the Patricians a diftinct and here-
ditary Order, planted the Commonwealth upon two contrary In-
" terefts or Roots, which ſhooting forth in time produc'd two Com-
"monwealths, the one Oligarchical in the Nobility, the other a mere
Anarchy of the People, and ever after caus'd a perpetual feud and
" enmity between the Senat and the People; even to death.
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"THERE is not a more noble or uſeful queſtion in the Politics
" than that which is ſtarted by MACHIAVEL, Whether means
"were to be found wherby the Enmity that was between the Senat
"and the People of Rome could have bin remov'd? Nor is there
any other in which we, or the preſent occafion, are fo much con-
"cern'd, particularly in relation to this Author; forafmuch as his
Judgment in the determination of the queſtion ſtanding, our Com-
"monwealth falls. And he that will erect a Commonwealth againſt
"the Judgment of MACHIAVEL, is oblig'd to give ſuch reaſons
"for his enterprize as must not go a begging. Wherfore to repeat
"the Politician very honeftly, but fomwhat more briefly, he difputes
<< thus.
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"THERE be two forts of Commonwealths, the one for preferva- Mach. Diſc.
tion, as Lacedemon and Venice; the other for increafe, as Rome.
LACEDEMON being govern'd by a King and a Small Senat,
"could maintain it felf a long time in that condition, because the Inha-
"bitants, being few, having put a bar upon the reception of Strangers,
"and living in a frict obfervation of the Laws of LYCURGUS, which
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now had got reputation, and taken away all occafion of Tumults, might
"well continue long in Tranquillity. For the Laws of LYCURGUS in-
"troduc'd a greater equality in Eftates, and a lefs equality in Honours,
"whence there was equal Poverty; and the Plebeians were lefs ambitious,
becauſe the Honors or Magiftracys of the City could extend but to a few,
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B. 1. c. 6.
4
148
OCEAN A.
"and were not communicable to the People: nor did the Nobility by ufing
"them ill, ever give them a defire to participat of the fame. This pro-
"ceded from the Kings, whofe Principality being plac'd in the midst of the
Nobility, had no greater means wherby to fupport it felf, than to fhield
"the People from all injury; whence the People not fearing Empire, defir'd
"it not: And ſo all occafion of enmity between the Senat and the People
"was taken away. But this Union happen'd efpecially from two caufes;
"the one, that the Inhabitants of Lacedemon being few, could be govern'd
by the Few: the other, that, not receiving Strangers into their Com-
monwealth, they did not corrupt it, nor increase it to fuch a proportion
"as was not governable by the Few.
<<
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"For
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VENIČE has not divided with her Plebeians, but all are call' dGen-
"tlemen that be in administration of the Government; for which Govern-
«ment ſhe is more beholden to Chance than the Wisdom of her Lawmakers:
many retiring to thoſe Iſlands, where that City is now built, from the
« inundations of Barbarians that overwhelm'd the Roman Empire, when
they were increas'd to fuch a number, that to live together it wasneceffary
"to have Laws; they ordain'd a form of Government, wherby affembling
often in Council upon Affairs, and finding their number fufficient for Go-
"vernment, they put a bar upon all fuch as repairing afterwards to their City
Should becom Inhabitants, excluding them from participation of Power.
Whence they that were included in the Adminiftration had right; andthey
“that were excluded, coming afterwards, and being receiv'd upon no other
"conditions to be Inhabitants,had no wrong; and therfore hadno occafion,nor
(being never trufted with Arms) any means to be tumultuous. Wher-
fore this Commonwealth might very well maintain it felf in Tranquillity.
"THESE things confider'd, it is plain that the Roman Legislators,
«to have introduc'd a quiet State, muſt have don one of these two things;
"either ſhut out Strangers, as the Lacedemonians; or, as the Venetians,
"not allow'd the People to bear Arms. But they did neither. By which
<<
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means the People having power and increase, were in perpetual tumult.
"Nor is this to be help'd in a Commonwealth for increaſe, ſeeing if Rome
"had cut off the occafion of her Tumults, she must have cut off the means
of her Increafe, and by confequence of her Greatness.
<<
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Wherfore let a Legiflator confider with himself, whether he would make
"bis Commonwealth for prefervation, in which cafe fhe may be free from
"Tumults; or for increafe, in which cafe fhe must be infefted with them.
IF he makes her for prefervation, ſhe may be quiet at home; but will
“be in danger abroad. First, Because her Foundation muſt be narrow,
"and therfore weak, as that of Lacedemon, which lay but upon 30000
Citizens; or that of Venice, which lys but upon 3000. Secondly,
"Such a Commonwealth muft either be in Peace, or War: If he be in
Peace, the Few are fooneft effeminated and corrupted, and fo obnoxious
alfo to Faction. If in War, fucceding ill, fhe is an eafy prey; or fuc-
ceding well, ruin'd by increaſe: a weight which ber Foundation is not a-
"ble to bear. For Lacedemon, when she had made her felf Miftrifs, upon
the matter, of all Greece, thro a flight accident, the Rebellion of Thebes,
occafion'd by the Confpiracy of PELOPIDAS difcovering this infirmity
of her nature, the rest of her conquer'd Citys immediatly fell off, and
“in the turn as it were of a hand reduc'd her from the fullest tide to the
loweſt eb of her fortune. And Venice having poffeft her felf of a great
part of Italy by her purfe, was no fooner in defence of it put to the trial
of Arms, than fhe loft all in one Battel.
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O CE A N A.
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“ WHENCE I conclude, That in the Ordination of a Common-
"wealth a Legiflator is to think upon that which is moſt honourable; and
laying afide Models for Prefervation, to follow the example of Rome
conniving at, and temporizing with the enmity between the Senat and
"the People, as a neceſſary ſtep to the Roman Greatness. For that any
"Man fhould find out a balance that may take in the Conveniences, and
Shut out the Inconveniences of both, I do not think it poſſible. Theſe
are the words of the Author, tho the method be fomewhat alter'd,
to the end that I may the better turn them to my purpoſe.
"MY LORDS, I, do not know how you hearken to this found;
"but to hear the greateſt Artiſt in the modern World, giving fentence
againſt our Commonwealth, is that with which I am nearly con-
"cern'd. Wherfore, with all honor due to the Prince of Politicians,
"let us examin his reaſoning with the fame liberty which he has affert-
"ed to be the right of a free People. But we ſhall never com up to
"him, except by taking the buſineſs a little lower, we defcend from
"effects to their caufes. The caufes of Commotion in a Common-
"wealth are either external or internal. External are from Enemys,
" from Subjects, or from Servants. To diſpute then what was the cauſe
why Rome was infeſted by the Italian, or by the Servil Wars; why
"the Slaves took the Capitol; why the Lacedemonians were near as
frequently troubl'd with their Helots, as Rome with all thofe; or
why Venice, whofe Situation is not truſted to the faith of Men, has
"as good or better quarter with them whom ſhe governs, than Rome
"had with the Latins; were to diſpute upon external caufes. The
queſtion put by MACHIAVEL is of internal cauſes; Whether
"the enmity that was between the Senat and the People of Rome
might have bin remov'd. And to determin otherwife of this quef-
"tion than he dos, I muft lay down other Principles than he has don.
"To which end I affirm, that a Commonwealth internally con-
"fider'd, is either equal or inequal. A Commonwealth that is inter-
nally equal, has no internal cauſe of Commotion, and therfore can
"have no fuch effect but from without. A Commonwealth inter-
nally inequal has no internal cauſe of quiet, and therefore can have
no fuch effect but by diverfion.
(c
<<
"C
(c
(C
<<
(c
<<
"TO prove my Affertions, I fhall at this time make ufe of no
"other than his examples. Lacedemon was externally unquiet, be-
"cauſe ſhe was externally inequal, that is as to her Helots; and ſhe
<<
was internally at reft, becauſe ſhe was equal in her ſelf, both in
root and branch: In the root by her Agrarian, and in branch by
"the Senat, inaſmuch as no Man was therto qualify'd, but by election
"of the People. Which Inſtitution of LYCURGUS is mention'd Arift. Polit
by ARISTOTLE, where he fays, that rendering his Citizens B. 2.
"emulous (not careless) of that honor, he affign'd to the People
"the election of the Senat. Wherfore MACHIAVEL. in this, as
in other places, having his ey upon the divifion of Patrician and
"Plebeian Familys as they were in Rome, has quite miſtaken the Or-
"ders of this Commonwealth, where there was no fuch thing. Nor
"did the quiet of it derive from the Power of the Kings, who were
"fo far from ſhielding the People from the injury of the Nobility, of
"which there was none in his fenfe but the Senat, that one declar'd
"end of the Senat at the inſtitution was to fhield the People from the
Kings, who from that time had but fingle Votes. Neither did it
<c
" pro-
150
OCEAN A.
•
CC
<<
<<
*૮ procede from the ftraitneſs of the Senat, or their keeping the People
"excluded from the Government, that they were quiet, but from
"the equality of their adminiſtration, feeing the Senat (as is plain
by the Oracle, their fundamental Law) had no more than the De-
bate, and the Refult of the Commonwealth belong'd to the People.
"Wherfore when TH EOPOMPUS and POLY DORUS Kings of La-
cedemon, would have kept the People excluded from the Govern-
ment, by adding to the antient Law this Claufe, If the determina-
"tion of the People be faulty, it shall be lawful for the Senat to reſume
"the Debate; the People immediatly became unquiet, and reſum'd
"that Debate, which ended not till they had fet up their Ephors, and
"caus'd that Magiftracy to be confirm'd by their Kings. * For when
"THEOPOM PUS first ordain'd that the Ephori or Overſeers ſhould be
"created at Lacedemon, to be fuch a refraint upon the Kings there as the
« Tribuns were upon the Confuls at Rome, the Queen complain'd to him,
"that by this means be tranfmitted the Royal Authority greatly dimi-
<c
niſh'd to his Children: Ileave indeed lefs, anfwer'd he, but more lafting.
“And this was excellently faid; for that Power only is fafe which is li-
"mited from doing hurt. THEOPO MPUS therfore, by confining the
"Kingly Power within the bounds of the Laws, did recommend it by ſo
"much to the People's Affection, as he remov'd it from being Arbitrary.
By which it may appear, that a Commonwealth for prefervation, if
"The coms to be inequal, is as obnoxious to enmity between the
"Senat and the People, as a Commonwealth for increaſe; and that
"the Tranquillity of Lacedemon was deriv'd from no other cauſe than
"her Equality.
"(
rr
<.
<<
<c
But
"FOR Venice, to fay that he is quiet becauſe the difarms her
Subjects, is to forget that Lacedemon difarm'd her Helots, and yet
"could not in their regard be quiet; wherfore if Venice be defended
from external cauſes of Commotion, it is firſt thro her Situation, in
" which reſpect her Subjects have no hope (and this indeed may be
"attributed to her fortune) and, fecondly, thro her exquifit Juſtice,
"whence they have no will to invade her. But this can be attributed
to no other cauſe than her Prudence; which will appear to be grea-
ter, as we look nearer; for the effects that procede from Fortune, if
"there be any fuch thing, are like their caufe, inconſtant.
"there never happen'd to any other Commonwealth fo undiſturb'd
"and conftant a Tranquillity and Peace in her ſelf, as is in that of
"Venice; wherfore this muſt procede from fom other cauſe than
"Chance. And we fee that as he is of all others the moſt
quiet, ſo the moſt equal Commonwealth. Her Body confifts of
"one Order, and her Senat is like a rolling ftone, as was faid, which
"never did, nor, while it continues upon that rotation, never fhall
gather the mofs of a divided or ambitious intereft; much leſs fuch a
one as that which grafp'd the People of Rome in the talons of their
"own Eagles. And if MACHIAVEL, averfe from doing this
"Commonwealth right, had confider'd her Orders, as his Reader
cc
<<
<<
* Nam cum primus inftituiffet Theopompus ut Ephori Lacedæmone crearentur, ita futuri regiæ
poteftati oppofiti quemadmodum Romæ Tribuni plebis confulari imperio funt objecti; atque illi
uxor dixiffet, id egiffe illum ut filiis minorem poteftatem relinqueret: Relinquam, inquit, fed
diuturniorem. Optimè quidem: Ea enim demum tuta eft potentia, quæ viribus fuis modum
imponit. Theopompus igitur legitimis regnum vinculis conftringendo, quo longius à licentia
retraxit, hoc propius ad benevolentiam civium admovit. Val. Max. 1. 4. c. 1. de externis, § 8.
"hall
1
OCEAN A.
151
1
<<
"ſhall eaſily perceive he never did, he muſt have bin ſo far from at-
tributing the Prudence of them to Chance, that he would have
"touch'd up his admirable work to that perfection, which, as to the
"civil part, has no pattern in the univerfal World but this of Venice.
"ROME, fecure by her potent and victorious Arms from all ex-
"ternal caufes of Commotion, was either beholden for her Peace at
"home to her Enemys abroad, or could never reft her head. My
"LORDS, you that are Parents of a Commonwealth, and fo freer
Agents than fuch as are merely natural, have a care. For, as no man
"fhall fhew me a Commonwealth born ftreight, that ever became
"crooked; fo, no man ſhall ſhew me a Commonwealth born crooked,
"that ever became ftreight. Rome was crooked in her birth, or ra-
"ther prodigious. Her twins the Patricians and Plebeian Orders
"came, as was fhewn by the foregoing ftory, into the World, one
"body but two heads, or rather two bellys: for, notwithſtanding
"the Fable out of Esop, wherby MENENIUS AGRIPPA the Ora-
"tor that was fent from the Senat to the People at Mount Aven-
tin, fhew'd the Fathers to be the Belly, and the People to be the
"Arms and the Legs (which except that, how flothful foever it
might feem, they were nourish'd, not theſe only, but the whole
Body muſt languiſh and be diffolv'd) it is plain, that the Fathers
"were a diftinct Belly; fuch a one as took the meat indeed out of
"the People's mouths, but abhorring the Agrarian, return'd it not
" in the due and neceffary nutrition of a Commonwealth. Never-
"theleſs, as the People that live about the Cataracts of Nilus are
"faid not to hear the noife, fo neither the Roman Writers, nor
"MACHIAVEL the moſt converfant with them, feem among fo
cr many of the Tribunitian ftorms, to hear their natural voice: for
"tho they could not miſs of it ſo far as to attribute them to the ſtrife
"of the People for participation in Magiftracy, or, in which MA-
CHIAVEL more particularly joins, to that about the Agrarian; this
was to take the bufinefs fhort, and the remedy for the diſeaſe.
·
<<
<<
<<
<<
<c
cc
"A PEOPLE, when they are reduc'd to mifery and deſpair, be-
com their own Politicians, as certain Beaſts when they are fick be-
"com their own Phyficians, and are carry'd by a natural inſtinct to
"the defire of fuch Herbs as are their proper cure; but the People,
"for the greater part, are beneath the Beaſts in the uſe of them.
"Thus the People of Rome, tho in their mifery they had recourſe
"by inſtinct, as it were, to the two main Fundamentals of a Com-
<c
66
monwealth, participation of Magiftracy, and the Agrarian, did
"but taft and fpit at them, not (which is neceffary in Phyfic)
"drink down the potion, and in that their healths. For when they
"had obtain❜d participation of Magiftracy, it was but lamely, not to
"a full and equal Rotation in all Elections; nor did they greatly re-
"gard it in what they had got. And when they had attain'd to the
Agrarian, they neglected it fo far as to fuffer the Law to grow ob-
folete but if you do not take the due dofe of your Medicins (as
"there be flight tafts which a man may have of Philofophy that in-
"cline to Atheiſm) it may chance to be poifon, there being a like
"taft of the Politics that inclines to Confufion, as appears in the
"Inftitution of the Roman Tribuns, by which Magiftracy and no
more, the People were fo far from attaining to Peace, that they in
getting but fo much, got but heads for an eternal feud; wheras if
(C
<<
46
they
152
OCEAN A.
1
<c
6c
cc
they had attain'd in perfection either to the Agrarian, they had in-
"troduc'd the equality and calm of Lacedemon, or to Rotation, and
they had introduc'd that of Venice: And fo there could have bin no
more enmity between the Senat and the People of Rome, than there
" was between thoſe Orders in Lacedemon, or is now in Venice. Wher-
"fore MACHIAVEL feems to me, in attributing the Peace of Ve-
"nice more to her luck than her prudence, of the whole ftable to have
"faddled the wrong Horfe; for tho Rome* in her military part could
"beat it better, beyond all compariſon, upon the founding hoof,
"Venice for the civil part has plainly had the wings of Pegafus.
<c
<<
cr
"THE whole Queſtion then will com upon this point, Whether
"the People of Rome could have obtain❜d theſe Orders? And firft, to
fay, that they could not have obtain'd them without altering the
"Commonwealth, is no argument; feeing neither could they, with-
" out altering the Commonwealth, have obtain❜d their Tribuns, which
"nevertheleſs were obtain'd. And if a man confiders the pofture
"that the People were in when they obtain'd their Tribuns, they
might as well, and with as great eaſe (forafmuch as the reaſon why
"the Nobility yielded to the Tribuns was no other, than that there
was no remedy) have obtain❜d any thing elfe. And for experience,
"it was in the like cafe that the Lacedemonians did fet up their Ephors,
" and the Athenians after the battel of Platea bow'd the Senat (fo hard
"a thing it is for a Commonwealth that was born crooked to becom
ftreight) as much the other way. Nor, if it be objected, that this
"muſt have ruin'd the Nobility (and in that depriv'd the Common-
"wealth of the Greatneſs which the acquir'd by them) is this opinion
"holding; but confuted by the fequel of the ftory, fhewing plainly,
"that the Nobility thro' the defect of fuch Orders, that is to ſay, of
"Rotation and the Agrarian, came to eat up the People: and batten-
ing themſelves in Luxury, to be, as SALUST fpeaks of them, † a
moft fluggish and lazy Nobility, in whom, befides the name, there was
"no more than in a ftatue; and to bring fo mighty a Commonwealth,
"and of fo huge a Glory, to fo deplorable an end. Wherfore means
"might have bin found to remove the enmity that was between the
"Senat and the People of Rome.
<c
..
cc
<<
"MY LORDS, If I have argu'd well, I have given you the com-
“fort and aſſurance, that notwithſtanding the judgment of Ma-
CHIAVEL, your Commonwealth is both fafe and found: but if I
"have not argu'd well, then take the comfort and affurance which he
gives you while he is firm, That a Legiſlator is to lay afide all other
"examples, and follow that of Rome only, conniving and temporizing
"with the enmity between the Senat and the People, as a neceffary
ſtep to the Roman Greatneſs. Whence it follows, that your Com-
"monwealth, at the worſt, is that which he has given you his word
"is the beſt.
re
"I HAVE held your Lordships long, but upon an account of no
"ſmall importance, which I can now fum up in thefe few words:
"Where there is a liquoriſhneſs in a popular Affembly to debate, it
"proceeds not from the Conftitution of the People, but of the Com-
*
Qui nimbos & non imitabile fulmen
Ære, & cornipedum curfu fimularat equorum.
+ Inertiffimi nobiles, in quibus, ficut in ftatua, præter nomen nihil erat additamenti.
"monwealth,
OCEAN A.
153
1
"monwealth. Now that your Commonwealth is of ſuch a Confti-
"tution as is naturally free from this kind of intemperance, is that
" which to make good, I muſt divide the remainder of my Difcourfe
"into two parts.
ર
"THE Firſt, fhewing the feveral Conftitutions of the Affem-
blys of the People in other Commonwealths.
<<
"THE Second, comparing our Affembly of the People with
theirs; and fhewing how it excludes the Inconveniences,
CC
" and embraces the Conveniences of them all.
"IN the beginning of the firſt Part I muſt take notice, that among
"the popular Errors of our days it is no fmall one, that men imagin
the antient Governments of this kind to have confifted for the moſt
part of one City, that is, of one Town; wheras by what we have
"learnt of my Lords that open'd them, it appears that there was not
.. any confiderable one of ſuch a Conſtitution but Carthage, till this in
our days of Venice.
<c
cr
cc
cc
"FOR to begin with Ifrael, it confifted of the twelve Tribes, lo-
cally fpread or quarter'd throout the whole Territory; and theſe be-
ing call'd together by Trumpets, conſtituted the Church or Affembly
of the People. The vaftneſs of this weight, as alſo the flowneſs
"thence inavoidable, became a great cauſe (as has bin fhewn at large
by my Lord PHOSPHORUS) of the breaking that Commonwealth;
notwithſtanding that the Temple, and thoſe religious Ceremonys
"for which the People were at leaſt annually oblig'd to repair thither,
were no fmall Ligament of the Tribes, otherwife but flightly tack'd
together.
<<
ઃઃ
ર
"c
<<
<c
CC
(c
"ATHENS confifted of four Tribes, taking in the whole People
"both of the City and of the Territory; not fo gather'd by THE-
SEUS into one Town, as to exclude the Country, but to the end
"that there might be fom Capital of the Commonwealth: tho true it
be, that the Congregation confifting of the Inhabitants within the
"Walls, was fufficient to all intents and purpoſes, without thoſe of
"the Country. Theſe alfo being exceding numerous, became bur-
"denfom to themſelves, and dangerous to the Commonwealth; the
more for their ill education, as is obferv'd by XENOPHON and
"POLYBIUS, who compare them to Mariners that in a calm are
perpetually difputing and fwaggering one with another, and never
lay their hands to the common tackling or fafety, till they be all in-
danger'd by fom ſtorm. Which caus'd THUCYDIDES, when he
"faw this People thro the purchaſe of their miſery becom ſo much
wifer, as to reduce their Comitia or Affemblys to five thousand, to
ſay in his eighth Book; And now, at least in my time, the Athenians
feem to have order'd their State aright, confifting of a moderat temper
"both of the Few (by which he means the Senat of the Bean) and of the
Many, or the five thoufand. And he does not only give you his judg-
ment, but the beſt proof of it; for this, fays he, was the first thing
that, after ſo many misfortunes past, made the City again to raise her
"head. The place I would defire your Lordships to note, as the firſt
example that I find, or think is to be found, of a popular Affembly
by way of Repreſentative.
<c
ર
c
..
<<
cr
X
"LACE-
154
OCEAN A.
+
*
<<
"LACEDEMON confifted of thirty thouſand Citizens difpers'd
"throout Laconia, one of the greateſt Provinces in all Greece, and di-
vided, as by fom Authors is probable. into fix Tribes. Of the
"whole Body of thefe, being gather'd, confifted the great Church or
Affembly, which had the Legiſlative Power; the little Church, ga-
"ther'd fomtimes for Matters of concern within the City, confifted of
"the Spartans only. Thefe happen'd, like that of Venice, to be good
"Conftitutions of a Congregation, but from an ill cauſe the infirmity
"of a Commonwealth, which thro' her paucity was Oligarchical.
«Ε
"WHERFORE, go which way you will, it ſhould feem, that
"without a Reprefentative of the People, your Commonwealth
confifting of a whole Nation, can never avoid falling either into
Oligarchy or Confufion.
<<
<<
"THIS was feen by the Romans, whofe ruftic Tribes extending
"themſelves from the River Arno to the Vulturnus, that is, from Fe-
fulæ or Florence to Capua, invented a way of Repreſentative by Lots:
"the Tribe upon which the first fell, being the Prerogative; and fom
two or three more that had the reft, the Jure vocata. Theſe gave
"the Suffrage of the Commonwealth in * two meetings; the Prero-
gative at the firſt Affembly, and the Jure vocata at a fecond.
((
"C
ર
..
26
..
८८
66
pau-
NOW to make the parallel, all the Inconveniences that you have
"obferv'd in theſe Affemblys are 'fhut out, and all the Conveniences
"taken into your Prerogative. For firſt it is that for which Athens,
fhaking off the blame of XENOPHON and POLYBIUS, came to
"deſerve the praife of THUCYDIDES, a Reprefentative. And, ſe-
condly, not as I fufpect in that of Athens, and is paft fufpicion in
"this of Rome, by lot, but by fuffrage, as was alfo the late Houſe of
"Commons, by which means in your Prerogatives all the Tribes of
Oceana are fure vocata; and if a man fhall except againſt the
city of the ſtanding number, it is a wheel, which in the revolution
"of a few years turns every hand that is fit, or fits every hand that it
turns to the public work. Moreover, I am deceiv'd if upon due
"confideration it dos not fetch your Tribes, with greater equality and
"eaſe to themſelves and to the Government, from the Frontiers of
Marpefia, than Rome ever brought any one of hers out of her Pomaria,
Or the neareſt parts of her adjoining Territorys. To this you may
add, That wheras a Commonwealth, which in regard of the Peo-
ple is not of facility in execution, were fure enough in this Nation to
"be caft off thro' impatience; your Mufters and Galaxys are given to
"the People, as milk to Babes, wherby when they are brought up
"thro four days election in a whole year (one at the Parish, one at the
"Hundred, and two at the Tribe) to their ſtrongeſt meat, it is of no
"harder digeſtion, than to give their Negative or Affirmative as they
"fee caufe. There be gallant men among us that laugh at fuch an
Appeal or Umpire; but I refer it whether you be more inclining to
pardon them or me, who I confefs have bin this day laughing at a
"fober man, but without meaning him any harm, and that is PE-
TRUS CUNÆUS, where fpeaking of the nature of the People, he
fays, that taking them apart, they are very fimple, but yet in their Aſ-
Semblys they fee and know fomthing: and fo runs away without trou-
bling himſelf with what that fomthing is. Wheras the People,
<<
<<
<<
<<
<<
r
."
<6
*Binis Comitiis.
"taken
3
OCEAN Á.
155
८८
<<
"taken apart, are but ſo many privat Intereſts; but if you take them
together, they are the public Intereft. The public Intereſt of a
"Commonwealth, as has bin fhewn, is neareft that of mankind, and
"that of mankind is right reaſon; but with Ariſtocracy (whoſe Rea-
"fon or Intereft, when they are all together, as appear'd by the Patri-
cians, is but that of a Party) it is quite contrary: for as, taken apart,
they are far wiſer than the People confider'd in that manner; ſo be-
ing put together, they are fuch fools, who by depofing the People,
as did thofe of Rome, will faw off the Branch wherupon they fit,
or rather deſtroy the root of their own Greatnefs. Wherfore
"MACHIAVEL following ARISTOTLE, and yet going before him,
re may well affert, * That the People are wifer and more conftant in
"their Refolutions than a Prince: which is the Prerogative of popular
"Government for Wiſdom. And hence it is that the Prerogative of
your Commonwealth, as for Wiſdom fo for Power, is in the People:
" which (tho' I am not ignorant that the Roman Prerogative was fo
"call'd à Prærogando, becauſe their Suffrage was firſt afk'd) gives the
"denomination to your Prerogative Tribe.
<<
<<
THE Elections, whether Annual or Triennial, being ſhewn by the
twenty-ſecond, that which coms in the next place to be confider'd is
THE twenty-third ORDER, fhewing the Power, Function, and
manner of Proceding of the Prerogative Tribe.
THE Power or Function of the Prerogative is of two parts, the one of
Refult, in which it is the Legislative Power; the other of Judicature, in which
regard it is the highest Court, and the last appeal in this Commonwealth.
FOR the former part (the People by this Conftitution being not oblig'd
by any Law that is not of their own making or confirmation, by the refult of
the Prerogative, their equal Repreſentative) it ſhall not be lawful for the
Senat to require obedience from the People, nor for the People to give obe-
dience to the Senat in or by any Law that has not bin promulgated, or print-
ed and publish'd for the space of fix weeks; and afterwards propos'd by the
Authority of the Senat to the Prerogative Tribe, and refolv'd by the major
Vote of the fame in the Affirmative. Nor fhall the Senat have any power
to levy War, Men, or Mony, otherwife than by the confent of the People
fo given, or by a Law fo enacted, except in cafes of Exigence, in which it
is agreed, that the Power both of the Senat and the People fhall be in the
Dictator, fo qualify'd, and for fuch a term of time, as is according to that
Conftitution already prefcribd. While a law is in promulgation, the Cen-
fors fhall animadvert upon the Senat, and the Tribuns upon the People, that
there be no laying of heads together, no Conventicles or canvaſſing to carry
on or oppofe any thing; but that all may be don in a free and open way.
23. Order.
236
The Conftitu-
tion, Function,
and manner of
the Preroga
Proceding of
tive.
FOR the latter part of the Power of the Prerogative, or that wherby
they are the Supreme Judicatory of this Nation, and of the Provinces of
the fame, the cognizances of Crimes against the Majefty of the People, fuch
as High Treafon, as alſo of Peculat, that is, robbery of the Treasury, or
defraudation of the Commonwealth, appertains to this Tribe. And if any
Perfon or Perfons, Provincials or Citizens, fhall appeal to the People, it
belongs to the Prerogative to judg and determin the cafe; provided that if
the Appeal be from any Court of Justice in this Nation or the Provinces,
* Che la multitudine è piu favia & piu conftante che un Prencipe.
X 2
the
156
OCEAN A.
the Appellant ſhall first depofit a hundred Pounds in the Court from which
he appeals, to be forfeited to the fame, if he be caft in his Suit by the Peo-
ple. But the Power of the Council of War being the expedition of this
Commonwealth, and the martial Law of the Strategus in the Field, are
thofe only from which there ſhall ly no Appeal to the People.
THE Proceding of the Prerogative in cafe of a Propofition, is to be
thus order'd. The Magiftrats, propofing by Authority of the Senat, fhall
rebearfe the whole matter, and expound it to the People: which don, they
ſhall put the whole together to the Suffrage, with three Boxes, the
Negative, the Affirmative, and the Nonfincere and the Suffrage be-
ing return'd to the Tribuns, and number'd in the prefence of the Pro-
pofers, if the major Vote be in the Nonfincere, the Propofers Shall de-
fift, and the Senat ſhall reſume the Debate. If the major Vote be in the
Negative, the Propofers fhall defift, and the Senat too. But if the major
Vote be in the Affirmative, then the Tribe is clear, and the Propofers fhall
begin and put the whole matter, with the Negative and the Affirmative
(leaving out the Nonfincere) by Claufes; and the Suffrages being taken and
number'd by the Tribuns in the prefence of the Propofers, fhall be written and
reported by the Tribuns to the Senat. And that which is propos'd by the
Authority of the Senat, and confirm'd by the Command of the People, is
the Law of Oceana.
THE Proceding of the Prerogative in a cafe of Judicature is to be thus
order'd. The Tribuns being Auditors of all Caufes appertaining to the cog-
nizance of the People, ſhall have notice of the Suit or Trial, whether of
Appeal or otherwife, that is to be commenc'd; and if any one of them ſhall
accept of the fame, it appertains to him to introduce it. A Caufe being
introduc'd, and the People mufter'd or affembl'd for the decifion of the fame,
the Tribuns are Presidents of the Court, having power to keep it to Orders,
and ſhall be feated upon a Scaffold erected in the middle of the Tribe. Up-
on the right hand ſhall ſtand a Seat, or large Pulpit affign'd to the Plaintiff,
or the Accufer; and, upon the left, another for the Defendant, each if they
pleafe with his Council. And the Tribuns (being attended upon fuch occa-
fions with fo many Ballotins, Secretarys, Doorkeepers, and Meffengers of
the Senat as fhall be requifit) one of them ſhall turn up a Glafs of the na-
ture of an Hourglass, but fuch a one as is to be of an hour and a half's run-
ning; which being turn'd up, the Party or Council on the right hand may
begin to speak to the People. If there be Papers to be read, or Witneſſes
tobe examin'd, the Officer fhall lay the Glafs fideways till the Papers be read,
and the Witneſſes examin'd, and then turn it up again; and fo long as the
Glafs is running, the Party on the right hand has liberty to speak, and no
longer. The Party on the right hand having had his time, the like fhall be
don in every respect for the Party on the left. And the Caufe being thus
heard, the Tribuns fhall put the question to the Tribe with a white, a black,
and a red Box (or Nonfincere) whether Guilty, or not Guilty. And if
the Suffrage being taken, the major Vote be in the Nonfincere, the Caufe
Shall be reheard upon the next juridical day following, and put to the question
in the fame manner. If the major Vote coms the fecond time in the Non-
fincere, the Caufe fhall be heard again upon the third day; but at the third
bearing the question fhall be put without the Nonfincere. Upon the first
of the three days in which the major Vote coms in the white Box, the Par-
ty accus'd is abfolv'd; and upon the first of them in which it coms in the
black Box, the Party accus'd is condemn'd. The Party accus'd being con-
demn'd, the Tribuns (if the cafe be criminal) fhall put with the white and
the
O CE AN A
157
the black Box thefe Questions, or fuch of them, as, regard had to the cafe,
they fhall conceive moft proper.
1. WHETHER he shall have a Writ of eafe.
2. WHETHER he ſhall be fin'd ſo much, or ſo much.
3.
WHETHER he shall be confifcated.
4. WHETHER be fhall be render'd incapable of magiftracy.
5. WHETHER he ſhall be banish'd.
6. WHETHER. he ſhall be put to death.
THESE, or any three of thefe Questions, whether fimple or fuch as
Shall be thought fitly mix'd, being put by the Tribuns, that which has moft
above half the Votes in the black Box is the Sentence of the People, which
the Troop of the Third Claffis is to fee executed accordingly.
BUT wheras by the Constitution of this Commonwealth it may appear
that neither the Propofitions of the Senat, nor the Judicature of the Peo-
ple, will be fo frequent as to hold the Prerogative in continual imploy-
ment; the Senat, a main part of whofe Office it is to teach and inftruct the
People, fhall duly (if they have no greater Affairs to divert them) caufe
an Oration to be made to the Prerogative by fom Knight or Magiftrat of
the Senat, to be chofen out of the ablest men, and from time to time ap-
pointed by the Orator of the Houſe, in the great Hall of the Pantheon,
while the Parlament refides in the Town; or in fom Grove or fweet place in
the field, while the Parlament for the heat of the year ſhall refide in the
Country; upon every Tueſday, morning or afternoon.
AND the Orator appointed for the time to this Office, ſhall first repeat
the Orders of the Commonwealth with all poffible brevity; and then making
choice of one or fom part of it, difcourfe therof to the People. An Ora-
tion or Difcourfe of this nature, being afterward perus'd by the Council of
State, may as they fee caufe be printed and publish'd
THE ARCHON's Comment upon the Order I find to have bin
of this fenfe.
}
<<
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My Lords,
T
O
10 crave pardon for a word or two in farther explanation of
what was read, I fhall briefly fhew how the Conſtitution of
"this Tribe or Affembly anſwers to their Function; and how their
Function, which is of two parts, the former in the Refult or Legif-
"lative Power, the latter in the fupreme Judicature of the Common-
"wealth, anſwers to their Conftitution. MACHIAVEL has a Dif-
courſe, where he puts the queftion, Whether the guard of Liberty
may with more fecurity be committed to the Nobility, or to the People.
Which doubt of his arifes thro the want of explaining his terms;
"for the guard of Liberty can fignify nothing elſe but the Refult of the
"Commonwealth: fo that to ſay, that the guard of Liberty may be
"committed to the Nobility, is to fay, that the Refult may be com-
"mitted to the Senat, in which cafe the People fignify nothing. Now
"to fhew it was a miſtake to affirm it to have bin thus in Lacedemon,
“ſufficient has bin ſpoken; and wheras he will have it to be fo
<<
..
" in
1
158
OCEAN A.
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<<
"in Venice alfo, * They, fays CONTARINI, in whom refides the Su-
preme Power of the whole Commonwealth, and of the Laws, and upon
whofe Orders depends the Authority as well of the Senat as of all the
"other Magiftrats, is the GREAT COUNCIL. It is inftitutively
"in the Great Council, by the judgment of all that know that Com-
monwealth; tho for the Reaſons fhewn, it be fomtimes exercis'd
by the Senat. Nor need I run over the Commonwealths in this
place for the proof of a thing fo doubtlefs, and ſuch as has
"bin already made fo apparent, as that the Reſult of each was in
"the popular part of it. The popular part of yours, or the Prero-
gative Tribe, confifts of feven Deputys (wherof three are of the
Horſe) annually elected out of every Tribe of Oceana; which be-
ing fifty, amounts to one hundred and fifty Horfe, and two hundred
"Foot. And the Prerogative confifting of three of theſe Liſts, con-
"fifts of four hundred and fifty Horſe, and fix hundred Foot, befides
"thoſe of the Provinces to be hereafter mention'd; by which means
"the overbalance in the Suffrage remaining to the Foot by one hun-
"dred and fifty Votes, you have to the fupport of a true and natural
"Ariftocracy, the deepeſt root of a Democracy that has bin ever
planted. Wherfore there is nothing in Art or Nature better qua-
"lify'd for the Reſult than this Affembly. It is noted out of CICERO
by MACHIAVEL, That the People, tho they are not ſo prone
to find out Truth of themſelves, as to follow Cuftom, or run into
"Error; yet if they be fhewn Truth, they not only acknowlege and
"imbrace it very fuddenly, but are the moſt conftant and faithful
"Guardians and Confervators of it. It is your Duty and Office,
"wherto
you are alſo qualify'd by the Orders of this Commonwealth,
to have the People as you have your Hauks and Greyhounds, in
"Leaſes and Slips, to range the Fields, and beat the Buſhes for them;
"for they are of a nature that is never good at this fport, but when
you ſpring or ſtart their proper quarry. Think not that they will
"ftand to ask you what it is, or lefs know it than your Hauks and
Greyhounds do theirs; but preſently make fuch a flight or courſe,
"that a Huntſman may as well undertake to run with his Dogs, or a
"Falconer to fly with his Hauk, as an Ariftocracy at this game to
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<<
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<<
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compare with the People. The People of Rome were poffeft of no
"lefs a prey than the Empire of the World, when the Nobility turn'd
"tails, and perch'd among Daws upon the Tower of Monarchy.
"For tho they did not all of them intend the thing, they would none
"of them indure the Remedy, which was the Agrarian.
any
"BUT the Prerogative Tribe has not only the Reſult, but is the
"Supreme Judicature, and the Ultimat Appeal in this Commonwealth.
"For the popular Government that makes account to be of
"ſtanding, muſt make ſure in the firſt place of the + Appeal to the
People. As an Eſtate in truft becoms a man's own, if he be not
"anſwerable for it, fo the Power of a Magiftracy not accountable to
"the People, from whom it was receiv'd, becoming of privat uſe,
"the Commonwealth lofes her Liberty. Wherfore the Right of Su-
<<
Quello appreffo il quale e la fomma autorita di tutta la città, e delle leggi & decreti, de i
quali pende l'autorità cofi del Senato come ancora di tutti i Magiſtrati, e il Configlio Grande.
+ Ante omnes de provocatione adverfus Magiftratus ad Populum, facrandoque cum bonis capite
ejus, qui regni occupandi confilia inüiffet.
"preme
O CE A N A.
159
1
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preme Judicature in the People (without which there can be no
"fuch thing as popular Government) is confirm'd by the conftant
practice of all Commonwealths; as that of Ifrael in the caſes of
ACHAN, and of the Tribe of BENJAMIN, adjudg'd by the Con-
gregation. The Dicafterion or Court call'd the Heliaia in Athens,
which (the Comitia of that Commonwealth confifting of the whole
People, and fo being too numerous to be a Judicatory) was conſti-
"tuted fomtimes of five hundred, at others of one thoufand, or, ac-
cording to the greatneſs of the cauſe, of fifteen hundred, elected by
"the Lot out of the whole Body of the People, had with the nine
"ARCHONS that were Prefidents, the cognizance of fuch Caufes
"as were of higheſt importance in that State. The five Ephors in
"Lacedemon, which were popular Magiftrats, might queftion their
Kings, as appears by the cafes of PAUSANIAS, and of AGIS,
"who being upon his Trial in this Court, was cry'd to by his Mo-
"ther to appeal to the People, as PLUTARCH has it in his Life. The
"Tribuns of the People of Rome (like, in the nature of their Magi-
ſtracy, and for fom time in number, to the Ephors, as being, ac-
cording to HALICARNASSEUS and PLUTARCH, inftituted in
"imitation of them) had power † to fummon any man, his Magi-
ſtracy at leaſt being expir'd (for from the Dictator there lay no Ap-
peal) to anſwer for himſelf to the People. As in the cafe of CORI-
"OLANUS, who was going about to force the People, by withhold-
ing Corn from them in a Famin, to relinquish the Magiftracy of the
"Tribuns; in that of SPURIUS CASSIUS for affecting Tyranny ;
"of MARCUS SERGIUS for running away at Veii; of CAIUS
"LUCRETIUS for fpoiling his Province; of JUNIUS SILANUS
"for making War, without a Command from the People, againſt the
"Cimbri; with divers others. And the Crimes of this nature were
"call'd Lafa Majeftatis, or High Treafon. Examples of fuch as were
"arrain'd or try'd for Peculat, or Defraudation of the Common-
"wealth, were MARCUS CURIUS, for intercepting the Mony of
"the Samnits; SALINATOR, for the inequal divifion of Spoils to
"his Soldiers; MARCUS POSTHUMIUS, for cheating the Com-
"monwealth by a feign'd Shipwreck. Caufes of theſe two kinds
were of a more public nature; but the like Power upon Appeals
was alfo exercis'd by the People in privat matters, even during the
"time of the Kings; as in the cafe of HORATIUS. Nor is it
"otherwife with Venice, where the Doge LOREDANO was fentenc'd
by the Great Council; and ANTONIO GRIMANI, afterwards Doge,
queftion'd, for that he being Admiral had fuffer'd the Turc to
"take Lepanto in view of his Fleet.
tr
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NEVERTHELESS, there lay no appeal from the Roman
"Dictator to the People; which if there had, might have coft the
"Commonwealth dear, when SPURIUS MELIUs affecting Empire,
"circumvented and debauch'd the Tribuns: wherupon TITUS
QUINTUS CINCINNATUS Was
was created Dictator; who hav-
ing chofen SERVILIUS AHALA to be his Lieutenant, or Magif-
“ter Equitum, fent him to apprehend MELIUS, whom, while he
"difputed the Commands of the Dictator, and implor'd the aid of
"the People, АHALA cut off upon the place. By which example
CC
+ Diem dicere.
you
160
OCEAN A.
&C
you may fee in what cafes the Dictator may prevent the Blow which
is ready fomtimes to fall e'er the People be aware of the Danger.
"Wherfore there lys no Appeal from the Dieci, or the Council of Ten,
"in Venice, to the Great Council, nor from our Council of War to
"the People. For the way of proceding of this Tribe, or the Bal-
lot, it is, as was once faid for all, Venetian.
<<
"C
<<
24. Order.
"THIS Difcourfe of Judicatorys wherupon we' are faln, brings
us rather naturally than of defign from the two general Orders of
every Commonwealth, that is to fay, from the debating part or the
"Senat, and the refolving part or the People, to the third, which is
"the executive part or the Magiftracy, wherupon I ſhall have no need
to dwell: For the executive Magiftrats of this Commonwealth are
"the Strategus in Arms; the Signory in their feveral Courts, as the
"Chancery, the Exchequer ; as alfo the Councils in divers cafes with-
in their Inftructions; the Cenfors as well in their proper Magiftra-
cy, as in the Council of Religion; the Tribuns in the Government
"of the Prerogative, and that Judicatory; and the Judges with their
"Courts: Of all which fo much is already faid or known as may
"fuffice.
re
<<
"THE Tueſday Lectures or Orations to the People will be of
great benefit to the Senat, the Prerogative, and the whole Nation.
"To the Senat, becauſe they will not only teach your Senators Elocu-
tion, but keep the Syftem of the Government in their memorys.
"Elocution is of great ufe to your Senators; for if they do not un-
"derſtand Rhetoric (giving it at this time for granted, that the Art
..
•
were not otherwiſe good) and com to treat with, or vindicat the
"cauſe of the Commonwealth againſt fom other Nation that is good
"at it, the advantage will be fubject to remain upon the merit of the
Art, and not upon the merit of the Caufe. Furthermore, the Ge-
"nius or Soul of this Government being in the whole and in every
"part, they will never be of ability in determination upon any par-
<<
<<
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ticular, unleſs at the fame time they have an Idea of the whole.
"That this therfore must be, in that regard, of equal benefit to the
Prerogative, is plain; tho theſe have a greater concernment in it.
"For this Commonwealth is the Eſtate of the People: and a man,
you know, tho he be virtuous, yet if he dos not underſtand his
"Eftate, may run out or be cheated of it. Laft of all, the Trea-
"fures of the Politics will by this means be fo open'd, rifled, and di-
is ſpers'd, that this Nation will as foon dote, like the Indians, upon
glafs Beads, as difturb your Government with Whimſys and Freaks
" of Motherwit; or fuffer themſelves to be ftutter'd out of their Li-
bertys. There is not any reafon why your Grandees, your wife
men of this Age, that laugh out and openly at a Commonwealth as
"the moſt ridiculous thing, do not appear to be, as in this regard they
are, mere Idiots, but that the People have not eys.
<<
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<<
re
THERE remains no more relating to the Senat and the People
than
THE twenty fourth ORDER, wherby it is lawful for the Pro-
Confitution of vince of Marpefia to have 30 Knights of their own election continually
the provincial
part of the Se-prefent in the Senat of Oceana, together with 60 Deputys of Horfe, and
nat and the 120 of Foot in the Prerogative Tribe, indu'd with equal Power (respect
People.
bad
1
7
1
•
OCEAN A.
had to their quality and number) in the Debate and Refult of this Com-
monwealth: provided that they obferve the Courfe or Rotation of the fame
by the annual Return of 10 Knights, 20 Deputys of the Horfe, and 40 of
the Foot. The like in all respects is lawful for Panopea; and the Horfe of
both the Provinces amounting to one Troop, and the Foot to one Company,
one Captain and one Cornet of the Horfe fhall be annually chofen by Mar-
pefia, and one Captain and one Enfign of the Foot fhall be annually chofen
by Panopea.
ment.
161
THE Orb of the Prerogative being thus complete, is not unna-
turally compar'd to that of the Moon, either in confideration of the
Light borrow'd from the Senat, as from the Sun; or of the ebs and
floods of the People, which are mark'd by the Negative or Affirmative
of this Tribe. And the Conſtitution of the Senat and the People be-
Conflitution of
ing fhewn, you have that of the Parlament of Oceana, confifting of the Parla-
the Senat propofing, and of the People refolving; which amounts to
an Act of Parlament. So the Parlament is the Heart, which, confift-
ing of two Ventricles, the one greater and repleniſh'd with a groffer
matter, the other leſs and full of a purer, fucks in, and ſpouts forth
the vital Blood of Oceana by a perpetual Circulation. Wherfore the
life of this Government is no more unnatural or obnoxious
upon this
ſcore to diffolution, than that of a Man; nor to giddineſs than the
World: feeing the Earth, whether it be it ſelf or the Heavens that are
in rotation, is fo far from being giddy, that it could not fubfift without
motion. But why ſhould not this Government be much rather capable
of duration and ſteddineſs by motion? than which God has ordain'd no
other to the univerſal Commonwealth of Mankind: ſeeing one Genera-
tion coms, and another gos, but the Earth remains firm for ever
that is,
in her proper Situation or Place, whether ſhe be mov'd or not mov'dup-
on her proper Center.
Center. The Senat, the People, and the Magiftracy, or
the Parlament fo conftituted, as you have ſeen, is the Guardian of this
Commonwealth, and the Huſband of fuch a Wife as is elegantly de-
fcrib'd by SOLOMON. She is like the Merchant's Ships; he brings her Prov. 31.
Food from far. She confiders a Field, and buys it: With the fruit of her
hands fhe plants a Vineyard. She perceives that her Merchandize is
good. She ftretches forth her hands to the Poor. She is not afraid of the
Snow for her Houfbold; for all her Houfhold are cloth'd with Scarlet. She
makes her felf Coverings of Tapestry; her Clothing is Silk and Purple.
Her Husband is known (by his Robes) in the Gates, when he fits among
the Senators of the Land. The Gates, or inferior Courts, were branches
as it were of the Sanhedrim or Senat of Ifrael. Nor is our Common-
wealth a worſe Houſwife, or ſhe has lefs regard to her Magiftrats; as
may appear by
;
THE twenty-fifth ORDER: That, wheras the public Revenue 25. Order.
is thro the late Civil Wars dilapidated, the Excife, being improv'd or im-
provable to the Revenue of one Million, be apply'd for the ſpace of eleven
years to com, to the reparation of the fame, and for the prefent mainte-
nance of the Magiftrats, Knights, Deputys, and other Officers, who ac-
cording to their feveral Dignitys and Functions, fhall annually receive
towards the Support of the fame, as follows.
Y
THE
162
OCEANÁ.
THE Lord Strategus Marching, is, upon another account, to have
Field Pay as General.
THE Lord Strategus fitting
THE Lord Orator
THE three Commiſſioners of the Seal
THE three Commiffioners of the Treasury
THE two Cenfors-
THE 290 Knights, at 500 1. a man
THE 4 Embaffadors in Ordinary-
THE Council of War for Intelligence-
THE Mafter of the Ceremonys
THE Mafter of the Horfe
HIS Subftitute
THE 12 Ballotins for their Winter Liverys
FOR their Summer Liverys
FOR their Board-wages
lib. per ann.
2000
2000
4500
4500
3000
145000
FOR the keeping of three Coaches of State, 24 Coach-horſes,
with Coachmen and Poftilions
FOR the Grooms, and keeping of 16 great Horfes for the
Master of the Horfe, and for the Ballotins whom he is to
govern and inftruct in the Art of Riding
THE 20 Secretarys of the Parlament
THE 20 Doorkeepers, who are to attend with Poleaxes; for
their Coats
FOR their Board-wages
THE 20 Meſſengers, which are Trumpeters, for their Coats
FOR thir Board-wages
FOR Ornament of the Mufters of the Youth
I 2000
3000
500
500
150
240
120
480
1500
480
2000
200
1000
200
1000
5000
Sum- 189370
ཟ
OUT of the perfonal Eftates of every man, who at his Death bequeaths
not above forty fhillings to the Muster of that hundred wherin it lys, ſhall
be levy'd one per cent, till the folid Revenue of the Muster of the Hun-
dred amounts to 50 1. per annum for the Prizes of the Youth.
THE twelve Ballotins are to be divided into three Regions, according
to the course of the Senat; the four of the first Region to be elected at the
Tropic out of fuch Children as the Knights of the ſame ſhall offer, not be-
ing under eleven Years of Age, nor above thirteen. And their Election
Shall be made by the Lot at an Urn fet by the Serjeant of the Houfe for
that purpofe in the Hall of the Pantheon. The Livery of the Common-
wealth for the fashion or the color may be chang'd at the Election of the
Strategus according to his phanfy. But every Knight during his Seffion
Shall be bound to give to his Footman, or fome one of his Footmen, the Li-
very of the Commonwealth.
THE Prerogative Tribe ſhall receive as follows.
THE 2 Tribuns of the Horfe
THE 2 Tribuns of the Foot
THE 3 Captains of Horfe-
}
lib. by the week.
14
12
15
THE
OCEAN A.
163
1
THE 3 Cornets
THE 3 Captains of Foot
THE 3 Enfigns -
9
I2
7
THE 442 Horfe, at 21. a man
884
THE 592 Foot, at 1 l. 10 s. a man
888
THE 6 Trumpeters
7
IO S.
THE 3 Drummers
2
5 S.
SUM by the Week
1850
15 S
SUM by the Year- 96239
1
:
THE Total of the Senat,the People,and the Magiftracy, 287459
15 S.
THE Dignity of the Commonwealth, and Aids of the feveral Magiftra-
cys and Offices therto belonging, being provided for as aforefaid, the Over-
plus of the Excife, with the Product of the Sum rifing, fhall be carefully
manag'd by the Senat and the People thro the diligence of the Officers of the
Exchequer, till it amount to eight Millions, or to the purchaſe of about four
hundred thouſand Pounds folid Revenue. At which time, the term of
eleven years being expir'd, the Excife, except it be otherwife order'd by
the Senat and the People, fhall be totally remitted and abolish'd for ever.
AT this Inſtitution the Taxes, as will better appear in the Corolla-
ry, were abated about one half, which made the Order when it came
to be tafted, to be of good relifh with the People in the very begin-
ning; tho the Advantages then were no ways comparable to the Con-
fequences to be hereafter fhewn. Nevertheless, my Lord EPIMO-
NUS, who with much ado had bin held till now, found it midfum-
mer Moon, and broke out of Bedlam in this manner.
'
<<
I
My Lord ARCHON,
HAVE a finging in my head like that of a Cartwheel, my
Brains are upon a Rotation; and fom are ſo merry, that a man
"cannot ſpeak his griefs, but if your highſhod Prerogative, and thoſe
"fame flouching fellows your Tribuns, do not take my Lord Strate-
gus's, and my Lord Orator's heads, and jole them together under
"the Canopy, then let me be ridiculous to all Pofterity. For here is
a Commonwealth, to which if a man fhould take that of the Pren-
"tices in their ancient Adminiſtration of Juftice at Shrovetide, it were
an Ariftocracy. You have fet the very Rabble with Troncheons
"in their hands, and the Gentry of this Nation, like Cocks with Scar-
"let Gills, and the Golden Combs of their Salarys to boot, left they
"fhould not be thrown at.
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'
;
"NOT a Night can I fleep for fom horrid Apparition or other
one while theſe Myrmidons are meaſuring Silks by their Quarter-
ftaves; another ftuffing their greafy Pouches with my Lord High
"Treaſurer's Jacobuses. For they are above a thouſand in Arms to
"three hundred, which, their Gowns being pull'd over their ears,
" are but in their Doublets and Hofe. But what do I fpeak of a thou-
"fand? there be two thoufand in every Tribe, that is, a hundred
"thouſand in the whole Nation, not only in the pofture of an Army,
Y 2
" but
1
164
OCEAN A.
"but in a civil Capacity fufficient to give us what Laws they pleaſe.
"Now every body knows, that the lower fort of People regard no-
thing but Mony; and you fay it is the Duty of a Legiflator to pre-
"fume all men to be wicked: wherfore they must fall upon the
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cr
richer, as they are an Army; or, left their minds ſhould miſgive them
"in ſuch a villany, you have given them incouragement that they
"have a nearer way, feeing it may be don every whit as well as by
"the overbalancing Power which they have in Elections. There is
a Fair which is annually kept in the Center of thefe Territorys at
Kiberton, a Town famous for Ale, and frequented by good Fel-
"lows; where there is a Solemnity of the Pipers and Fidlers of this
"Nation (I know not whether Lacedemon, where the Senat kept ac-
"count of the ſtops of the Flutes and of the Fiddleſtrings of that
Commonwealth, had any fuch Cuftom) call'd the Bulrunning;
" and he that catches and holds the Bull, is the annual and fupreme
Magiftrat of that Comitia or Congregation, call'd King Piper;
" without whofe Licence it is not lawful for any of thoſe Citizens to
injoy the liberty of his Calling; nor is he otherwiſe legitimatly
qualify'd (or civitate donatus) to lead Apes or Bears in any Per-
"ambulation of the fame. Mine Hoft of the Bear, in Kiberton, the
"Father of Ale, and Patron of good Footbal and Cudgelplayers, has
any time fince I can remember, bin Grand Chancellor of this Order.
Now, fay I, feeing great things arife from fmall beginnings, what
"fhould hinder the People, prone to their own Advantage, and lov-
ing Mony, from having Intelligence convey'd to them by this fame
King Piper and his Chancellor, with their Loyal Subjects the Min-
"ftrils and Bearwards, Maſters of Ceremonys, to which there is
great recourſe in their reſpective Perambulations, and which they
"will commiffion and inſtruct, with Directions to all the Tribes,
willing and commanding them, that as they wiſh their own good,
"they chufe no other into the next primum Mobile, but of the ableſt
Cudgel and Footbalplayers? Which don as foon as ſaid, your
primum Mobile confifting of no other ftuff, muft of neceffity be
"drawn forth into your Nebulones, and your Galimofrys; and fo the
"filken Purſes of your Senat and Prerogative being made of Sows
ears, moſt of them Blackſmiths, they will ftrike while the Iron' is
hot, and beat your Eſtates into Hobnails; mine Hoſt of the Bear
being Strategus, and King Piper Lord Orator. Well, my Lords, it
might have bin otherwife expreft, but this is well enough a con-
"fcience. In your way, the Wit of man fhall not prevent this or the
"like Inconvenience; but if this (for I have confer'd with Artiſts)
"be a mathematical Demonftration, I could kneel to you, that e'er
"it be too late we might return to fom kind of Sobriety.
'
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"IF we empty our Purſes with thefe Pomps, Salarys, Coaches,
"Lacquys, and Pages, what can the People fay lefs, than that we
"have dreft a Senat and a Prerogative for nothing, but to go to the
"Park with the Ladys?
MY Lord ARCHON, whofe Meeknefs reſembl'd that of MOSES,
vouchfaf'd this Anſwer.
1
{
My
OCEAN A.
165
[
/
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My Lords
F
;
OR all this, I can fee my Lord EPIMONUS every night in.
the Park, and with Ladys; nor do I blame this in a young
"Man, or the Reſpect which is and ought to be given to a Sex that is
one half of the Commonwealth of Mankind, and without which
"the other would be none: But our Magiftrats, I doubt, may be fom-
"what of the oldeft to perform this part with much acceptation;
and, as the Italian Proverb fays, * Servire & non gradire è cofa da
far morire. Wherfore we will lay no certain Obligation upon them
"in this Point, but leave them, if it pleaſe you, to their own fate or
"difcretion. But this (for I know my Lord EPIMON US loves me,
"tho I can never get his eſteem) I will fay, if he had a Miſtreſs
"ſhould uſe him fo, he would find it a fad Life; or I appeal to your
"Lordſhips, how I can refent it from fuch a Friend, that he puts
King Piper's Politics in the Balance with mine. King Piper, I deny
" not, may
teach his Bears to dance, but they have the worſt ear of
"all Creatures. Now how he ſhould make them keep time in fifty
"feveral Tribes, and that two years together, for elſe it will be to
"no purpoſe, may be a ſmall matter with my Lord to promife; but
"it feems to me of impoffible performance. Firſt, Thro the nature
" of the Bean; and, Secondly, thro that of the Ballot; or how what
" he has hitherto thought fo hard, is now com to be eafy but he
may think, that for expedition they will eat up thefe Balls like Ap-
ples. However, there is fo much more in their way by the Confti-
"tution of this, than is to be found in that of any other Common-
wealth, that I am reconcil'd; it now appearing plainly, that the
"Points of my Lord's Arrows are directed at no other White, than
"to fhew the excellency of our Government above others; which, as
"he procedes further, is yet plainer; while he makes it appear, that
"there can be no other elected by the People but Smiths,
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Brontefque Steropefque & nudus membra Pyracmon :
"OTHONIEL, AOD, GIDEON, JEPHTHA, SAMSON, as in Ifrael:
"MILTIADES, ARISTIDES, THE MISTOCLES, CI MON, PERI-
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<<
CLES, as in Athens: PAPYRIUS, CINCINNATUS, CAMILLU S,
"FABIUS SCIPIO, as in Rome: Smiths of the fortune of the
"Commonwealth; not fuch as forg'd Hob-nails, but Thunder-
"bolts. Popular Elections are of that kind, that all the reſt of
"the World is not able, either in number or glory, to equal thoſe
of theſe three Commonwealths. Thefe indeed were the ableft
"Cudgel and Footbal-players; bright Arms were their Cudgels,
" and the World was the Ball that lay at their feet. Wherfore
we are not ſo to underſtand the Maxim of Legiſlators, which
"holds all men to be wicked, as if it related to Mankind or a Com-
"monwealth, the Interefts wherof are the only ftrait lines they
CC
have wherby to reform the crooked; but as it relates to every Man
or Party, under what color foever he or they pretend to be trufted
* To love and not injoy, is the way to break one's heart.
re apart,
i
166
OCEAN A.
.
"not
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"
apart, with or by the whole. Hence then it is deriv'd, which is
"made good in all experience, that the Ariftocracy is ravenous, and
not the People. Your Highwaymen are not ſuch as have Trades,
"or have bin brought up to Induſtry; but fuch commonly whofe
"Education has pretended to that of Gentlemen. My Lord is fo ho-
neft, he does not know the Maxims that are of abfolute neceffity to
"the Arts of Wickedness'; for it is most certain, if there be not more
"Purſes than Thieves, that the Thieves themſelves muſt be forc'd to
"turn honeft, becauſe they cannot thrive by their Trade: But now
"if the People fhould turn Thieves, who fees not that there would
"be more Thieves than Purfes? Wherfore that a whole People
"fhould turn Robbers or Levellers, is as impoffible in the end as in
"the means.
But that I do not think your Artift which you men-
"tion'd, whether Aftronomer or Arithmetician, can tell me how
many Barlycorns would reach to the Sun; I could be content he
"were call'd to the account, with which I fhall conclude this Point:
when by the way I have chid my Lords the Legiflators, who, as
"if they doubted my Tackling could not hold, would leave me to flag
"in a perpetual Calm, but for my Lord EPIMONUS, who breaths
now and then into my Sails, and ftirs the Waters. A Ship makes not
her way fo brifkly, as when ſhe is handſomly bruſh'd by the Waves,
"and tumbles over thoſe that ſeem to tumble againſt her; in which
"cafe I have perceiv'd in the dark, that Light has bin ftruck even out
"of the Sea, as in this place, where my Lord EPIMONUS feigning
"to give us a demonftration of one thing, has given it of another,
"and of a better. For the People of this Nation, if they amount
"in each Tribe to two thouſand Elders, and two thoufand Youths,
upon the annual Roll, holding a fifth to the whole Tribe; then the
"whole of a Tribe, not accounting Women and Children, muſt
"mount to twenty thouſand; and fo the whole of all the Tribes, be-
ing fifty, to one Million. Now you have ten thouſand Pariſhes,
"and reckoning thefe one with another, each at one thousand pounds
a Year dry Rent, the Rent or Revenue of the Nation, as it is or
might be let to Farm, amounts to ten Millions; and ten Millions
"in Revenue divided equally to one Million of men, coms but to
"ten pounds a year to each wherwith to maintain himſelf, his Wife
"and Children. But he that has a Cow upon the Common, and
earns his Shilling by the day at his labor, has twice as much already
as this would com to for his fhare; becauſe if the Land were thus
"divided, there would be no body to fet him on work. So my Lord
"EPIMON US's Footman, who cofts him thrice as much as one of
"theſe could thus get, would certainly loſe by his bargain. What
"ſhould we ſpeak of thoſe innumerable Trades wherupon men live,
"not only better than others upon good ſhares of Lands, but becom
"alfo purchaſers of greater Eftates? Is not this the demonftration
"which my Lord meant, that the Revenue of Induſtry in a Nation,
at leaſt in this, is three or fourfold greater than that of the mere
"Rent? If the People then obftruct Induſtry, they obftruct their
own livelihood; but if they make a War, they obftruct Induſtry.
"Take the Bread out of the Peoples mouths, as did the Roman Patri-
cians, and you are fure enough of a War, in which cafe they may
"be Levellers; but our Agrarian cauſes their Induſtry to flow with
"Milk and Hony. It will be own'd, that this is true, if the People
tr
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OCEAN A.
167
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"were given to underſtand their own happineſs; But where is it
they do that? Let me reply with the like queftion, Where do they
"not? They do not know their happineſs it ſhould ſeem in France,
Spain and Italy: but teach them what it is, and try whofe Senſe is
"the truer.
As to the late Wars in Germany, it has bin affirm'd to
me there, that the Princes could never make the People to take
"Arms while they had Bread, and have therfore ſuffer'd Countrys
now and then to be wafted, that they might get Soldiers. This
you will find to be the certain pulfe and temper of the People; and
"if they have bin already prov'd to be the moſt wife and conſtant
Order of a Government, why ſhould we think (when no man can
produce one Example of the common Soldiery in an Army muti-
nying becauſe they had not Captains pay) that the Prerogative
"fhould jole the heads of the Senat together, becauſe theſe have the
better Salarys; when it muſt be as evident to the People in a Nation
as to the Soldiery in an Army, that it is no more poffible their Emo-
"luments of this kind fhould be afforded by any Commonwealth in
the World to be made equal with thoſe of the Senat, than that the
"common Soldiers fhould be equal with the Captains? It is enough
"for the common Soldier, that his Virtue may bring him to be a
"Captain, and more to the Prerogative, that each of them is nearer
to be a Senator.
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"IF my Lord thinks our Salarys too great, and that the Com-
"monwealth is not Houfwife enough; whether is it better Houf-
wifery that ſhe ſhould keep her Family from the Snow, or fuffer
"them to burn her Houſe that they may warm themſelves? for one
"of theſe muſt be. Do you think that he came off at a cheaper
rate, when men had their Rewards by a thouſand, two thouſand
"pounds a Year in Land of Inheritance? If you fay, that they will
" be more godly than they have bin, it may be ill taken; and if you
cannot promiſe that, it is time we find out fom way of ſtinting at
"leaft, if not curing them of that fame facra Fames. On the other
"fide, if a poor man (as fuch a one may fave a City) gives his
"fweat to the Public, with what confcience can you fuffer his Family
" in the mean time to ftarve? But he that lays his hand to this Plow,
"ſhall not loſe by taking it off from his own: and a Commonwealth
"that will mend this, fhall be penny wife. The Sanhedrim of Ifrael
being the Supreme, and a conftant Court of Judicature, could not
"chufe but be exceding gainful. The Senat of the Bean in Athens,
becauſe it was but annual, was moderatly falariated; but that of
"the Areopagits being for Life, bountifully: and what advantages
"the Senators of Lacedemon had, where there was little Mony or
"ufe of it, were in Honors for life. The Patricians having no profit,
"took all. Venice being a Situation, where a man goes but to the
"door for his Imployment, the Honor is great, and the Reward very
"little but in Holland a Counfillor of State has fifteen hundred Fle-
mish Pounds a Year, befides other Accommodations. The States
General have more. And that Commonwealth looks nearer her
Penny than ours needs to do.
«Ε
r
* O fortunati nimium, bona fifua nôrint,
Agricola !
:
:
"FOR
168
OCEAN A.
!
"FOR the Revenue of this Nation, befides that of her Induftry,
"it amounts, as has bin fhewn, to ten Millions; and the Salarys in
"the whole com not to three hundred thoufand Pounds a Year. The
<<
<<
rr
Beauty they will add to the Commonwealth will be exccding great,
" and the People will delight in this Beauty of their Commonwealth;
"the Incouragement they will give to the ftudy of the Public being
very profitable, the Accommodation they will afford to your Magi-
"ftrats very
honorable and eafy. And the Sum, when it or twice as
"much was ſpent in Hunting and Houſekeeping, was never any grie-
vance to the People. I am afham'd to ſtand huckling upon this
"Point; it is fordid. Your Magiftrats are rather to be provided with
"further Accommodations. For what if there fhould be Sicknefs?
"whither will you have them to remove? And this City in the
"foundeſt Times, for the heat of the Year, is no wholfom abode :
"have a care of their Healths to whom you commit your own. I
"would have the Senat and the People, except they fee caufe to the
"contrary, every firft of June to remove into the Country Air for
"the fpace of three months. You are better fitted with Summer-
"houſes for them, than if you had built them to that purpoſe. There
"is fom twelve miles diftant the Convallium upon the River Halcio-
"nia, for the Tribuns and the Prerogative, a Palace capable of a
"thouſand Men: and twenty miles diftant you have Mount Celia,
"reverend as well for the Antiquity as State of a Caftle completely
capable of the Senat: the Propofers having Lodgings in the Conval-
«lium, and the Tribuns in Celia, it holds the Correfpondency be-
tween the Senat and the People exactly. And it is a finall matter
"for the Propofers, being attended with the Coaches and Officers of
State, befides other Conveniences of their own, to go a matter of
"five or ten miles (thoſe Seats are not much further diftant) to
"meet the People upon any Heath or Field that ſhall be appointed:
..
<<
where, having diſpatch'd their buſineſs, they may hunt their own
"Venizon (for I would have the great wall'd Park upon the Hal-
"cionia to belong to the Signory, and thoſe about the Convallium to
the Tribuns) and fo go to fupper. Pray, my Lords, fee that they
"do not pull down theſe Houſes to fell the Lead of them; for when
cc you have confider'd on't, they cannot be fpar'd. The Founders of
"the School in Hiera provided that the Boys fhould have a Summer
"Seat. You ſhould have as much care of theſe Magiftrats. But
"there is fuch a felling, fuch a Jewish humor in our Republicans, that
"I cannot tell what to ſay to it; only this, any man that knows what
belongs to a Commonwealth, or how diligent every Nation in that
"cafe has bin to preſerve her Ornaments, and ſhall ſee the waft late-
"ly made (the Woods adjoining to this City, which ferv'd for the
cc
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delight and health of it, being cut down to be fold for three pence)
"will tell you, that they who did fuch things would never have made
"a Commonwealth. The like may be faid of the Ruin or Damage
"don upon our Cathedrals, Ornaments in which this Nation excels
"all others. Nor fhall this ever be excus'd upon the fcore of Reli-
gion;
for tho it be true, that God dwells not in Houſes made with
hands, yet you cannot hold your Affemblys but in fuch Houſes, and
"theſe are of the beſt that have bin made with hands. Nor is it well
argu'd that they are pompous, and therefore profane, or lefs proper
"for Divine Service; feeing the Chriftians in the Primitive Church
<<
<<
"chofe
OCEAN A.
169
"choſe to meet with one accord in the Temple; fo far were they from
any inclination to pull it down.
Co
*
THE Orders of this Commonwealth, fo far, or near fo far as they
concern the Elders, together with the feveral Speeches. at the Inftitu-
tion, which may ſerve for the better underſtanding of them as fo ma-
ny Commentaries, being fhewn ;. I fhould now com from the Elders
to the Youth, or from the Civil Conftitution of this Government to
the Military, but that 1 judg this the fittest place, wherinto, by the
way, to infert the Government of the City, tho for the prefent but
perfunctorily.
porium.
THE Metropolis or Capital City of Oceana is commonly call'd Empo- The Govern-
rium, tho it confifts of two Citys diftinct, as well in Name as in Government of Em-
ment, wherof the other is call'd Hiera: For which cauſe I ſhall treat of
each apart, beginning with Emporium.
Wards.
EMPORIUM with the Libertys is under a twofold Divifion, the The City-
one regarding the National, and the other the Urban or City Government. Tribes and
It is divided, in regard of the National Government, into three Tribes,
and in respect of the Urban into twenty-fix, which for distincti n jake
are call'd Wards, being contain'd under three Tribes but inequally :
Wherfore the first Tribe containing ten Wards is call'd Scazon, the fecond
containing eight Metoche, and the third containing as many Telicouta;
the bearing of which names in mind concerns the better understanding of
the Government.
EVERY Ward has her Wardmote, Court, or Inqueft, confifling Wardmote.
of all that are of the Clothing or Liverys of Companys refiding within
the fame.
SUCH are of the Livery or Clothing as have attain'd to the dignity The Liverys
to wear Gowns and particolor'd Hoods or Tippets, according to the Rules
and ancient Customs of their refpective Companys.
A COMPANY is a Brotherhood of Tradesmen profeffing the fame The Com-
Art, govern'd according to their Charter by a Mafter and Wardens. Of panys.
theſe there be about fixty; wherof twelve are of greater dignity than the
reft, that is to fay, the Mercers, Grocers, Drapers, Fillmongers; Gold-
Smiths, Skinners, Merchant-Taylors, Haberdashers, Salters, Ironmon-
gers, Vintners, Clothworkers; which, with most of the reft, have common Commen
Halls, divers of them being of antient and magnificent Structure, wherin Halls.
they have frequent meetings at the Summons of their Mafter or, Wardens.
for the managing and regulation of their respective Trades and Myſterys.
Thefe Companys, as I shall fhew, are the Roots of the whole Government
of the City. For the Liverys that refide in the fame Ward, meeting at
the Wardmote Inquest (to which it belongs to take cognizance of all forts
of Nufances, and violations of the Customs and Orders of the City, and
to prefent them to the Coart of Aldermen) have alfo power to make elec-
tion of two forts of Magiftrats or Officers; the first of Elders or Aldermen
the Ward, the fecond of Deputys of the fame, otherwife call'd Com-
mon-Council men.
and of the
THE Wards in thefe Elections, becauſe they do not clect all at once, Election of
but fom one year, and fom another, obferve the diftinction of the three Aldermen,
Tribes; for example, the Scazon confifting of ten Wards, makes e- Common-
lection the first Year of ten Aldermen, one in each Ward, and of one Council.nen.
hundred and fifty Deputys, fifteen in each Ward: all which are Triennial
Z
Magiftrats
170
OCEAN A
The Court of
Aldermen.
The Com-
Magiſtrats or Officers, that is to ſay, are to bear their dignity for the
Space of three Years.
THE Second Year the Metoche, confifiing of eight Wards, elects
eight Aldermen, one in each Ward, and a hundred and twenty Deputys,
fifteen. in each Ward; being alfo Triennial Magiftrats:
THE third Year Telicouta, confifting of a like number of Wards,
elects an equal number of like Magiftrats for a like term. So that the
whole number of the Aldermen, according to that of the Wards, amounts
to twenty-fix; and the whole number of the Deputys, to three hundred
and ninety.
THE Aldermen thus elected have divers Capacities: for, first, they
are Juftices of the Peace for the term, and in confequence of their E-
lection. Secondly, They are Prefidents of the Wardmote, and Governors
each of that Ward wherby he was elected. And last of all, thefe Magiftrats
being affembled together, con/itute the Senat of the City, otherwife call'd
the Court of Aldermen: but no man is capable of this Election that is not
worth ten thousand Pounds. This Court upon every new Election, makes
choice of nine Cenfors out of their own number.
THE Deputys in like manner being aſſembled together, confiitute the
non Council. Prerogative Tribe of the City, otherwife call'd the Common Council: by
which means the Senat and the People of the City were comprehended, as it
were, by the motion of the National Government, into the fame Wheel of
annual, triennial, and perpetual Revolution.
The Com.
BUT the Liverys, over and above the right of thefe Elections by their
mon Hall. Divifions mention'd, being affembled all together at the Guild of the City,
conftitute another Aflembly call'd the Common Hall.
The Election
Mayor aud
Sherifs.
THE Common Hall has the right of two other Elections; the one
one of
of the Loid the Lord Mayor, and the other of the two Sherifs, being annual Magi
ftrats. The Lord Mayor can be elected out of no other than one of the
twelve Companys of the first Ranks; and the Common Hall agrees by the
plurality of Suffrages upon two Names: which being prefented to the
Lord Mayor for the time being, and the Court of Aldermen, they elect one
by their Scrutiny; for fo they call it, tho it differs from that of the Com-
monwealth. The Orator or Affiftant to the Lord Mayor in holding of his
Courts, is fom able Lawyer elected by the Court of Adermen, and call'd
the Recorder of Emporium.
Some Conve-
3
THE Lord Mayor being thus elected, has two Capacitys; one regard-
ing the Nation, and the other the City. In that which regards the City,
he is Prefident of the Court of Aldermen, having power to affemble the
fame, or any other Council of the City, as the Common Council or Common
Hall, at his will and pleasure: and in that which regards the Nation, he
is Commander in Chief of the three Tribes wherinto the City is divided
one of which he is to bring up in Perfon at the National Muſter to the Bal-
lot, as his Vicecomites, or High Sherifs, are to do by the other two, each
at their diftinct Pavilion, where the nine Aldermen, elected Cenfors,
are to officiat by three in each Tribe, according to the Rules and Orders
already given to the Cenfors of the ruftic Tribes. And the Tribes of the
City have no other than one common Phylarch, which is the Court of Al-
dermen and the Common Council; for which caufe they elect not at their
Mufter the first Lift call'd the Prime Magnitude.
THE Conveniences of this Alteration of the City Government, befides
niences in this the bent of it to a conformity with that of the Nation, were many, wherof
Alteration. I ſhall mention but a few: As first, wheras men under the former admi-
niftration,
}
OCEAN A.
171
niſtration, when the burden of fom of thefe Magistracys lay for life, were
oftentimes choſen not for their fitness, but rather unfitness, or at least un-
willingness to undergo fuch a weight, wherby they were put at great Rates
to fine for their eafe; a man might now take his fhare in Magistracy with
that equity which is due to the Public, and without any inconvenience to his
privat Affairs. Secondly, Wheras the City (inafmuch as the Acts of the
Ariftocracy, or Court of Aldermen, in their former way of proceding, were
rather Impofitions than Propofitions) was frequently difquieted with the
inevitable confequence of diforder in the power of Debate exercis'd by the
popular Part, or Common Council; the right of Debate being henceforth
eftablish'd in the Court of Aldermen, and that of Refult in the Common
Council, kill'd the branches of Divifion in the Root. Which for the pre-
fent may fuffice to have bin faid of the City of Emporium.
The Govern
ment of
THAT of HIERA confifts as to the National Government of two
Tribes, the first call'd Agoræa, the fecond Propola : But as to the pecu- Hiera.
liar Policy of twelve Manipuls, or Wards divided into three Cohorts, each
Cohort containing four Wards; wherof the Wards of the first Cobort elect
for the first Year four Burgeffes, one in each Ward; the Wards of the fecond
Cobort for the fecond year four Burgeffes, one in each Ward; and the Wards
of the third Cohort for the third Year four Burgeffes, one in eachWard; all
triennial Magiftrats: by which the twelve Burgeffes, making one Court for
the Government of this City, according to their Inftructions by Act of Par-
lament, fall likewife into an Annual, Triennial, and perpetual Revolution.
THIS Court being thus conftituted, makes election of divers Magi- Steward.
ftrats; As firft of a High Steward, who is commonly fom Perfon of Quality,
and this Magiftracy is elected in the Senat by the Scrutiny of this Court;
with him they chufe fom able Lawyer to be his Deputy, and to hold the
Court; and laft of all they elect out of their own Number fix Cenfors.
THE High Steward is Commander in Chief of the two Tribes, wher-
of be in Perfon brings up the one at the National Mufter to the Ballot,
and his Deputy the other at a diftinct Pavilion; the fix Cenfors chofen by
the Court, officiating by three in each Tribe at the Urns; and theſe Tribes
have no other Phylarch but this Court.
AS for the manner of Elections and Suffrage, both in Emporium and
Hiera, it may be faid once for all, that they are perform'd by Ballot,
and according to the respective Rules already given.
THERE be other Citys and Corporations throout the Territory,
whofe Policy being much of this kind, would be tedious and not worth the
labor to infert, nor dare Iftay. Juvenum manus emicat ardens.
I RETURN, according to the method of the Commonwealth,
to the remaining parts of her Orbs, which are Military and Provincial;
the Military, except the Strategus, and the Polemarchs or Field Offi-
cers, confifting of the Youth only, and the Provincial conſiſting of a
mixture both of Elders and of the Youth.
TO begin with the Youth, or the military Orbs, they are Circles
to which the Commonwealth muſt have a care to keep clofe. A Man
is a Spirit rais'd by the Magic of Nature; if ſhe dos not ftand fafe, and
ſo that ſhe may fet him to fom good and uſeful work, he fpits fire, and
blows up
Caftles for where there is life, there must be motion or
work; and the work of idleneſs is miſchief, but the work of induſtry
is health. To fet Men to this, the Commonwealth muft begin betimes
with them, or it will be too late: and the means whereby fhe fets them
Z 2
to
The Court
The High
172
OCEAN A.
to it, is EDUCATION, the plaſtic art of Government. But it is
as frequent as fad in experience (whether thro negligence, or, which
in the confequence is all one or worſe, overfondneſs in the domeſtic
performance of this Duty) that innumerable Children com to ow
their utter Perdition to their own Parents; in each of which the Com-
monwealth lofes a Citizen. Wherfore the Laws of a Government,
how wholfom foever in themſelves, are fuch as, if Men by a con-
gruity in their Education be not bred to find a reliſh in them, they will
be fure to loath and deteft. The Education therfore of a Man's own
Children is not wholly to be committed or trufted to himſelf. You
find in * LIvy the Children of BRUTUS having bin bred under
Monarchy, and us'd to a Court life, making faces at the Common-
wealth of Rome : A King (ſay they) is a Man with whom you may pre-
vail when you have need there fhould be Law, or when you have need there
Should be no Law; he has Favors in the right, and he frowns not in the
wrong place; he knows his Friends from his Enemys. But Laws are deaf
inexorable things, fuch as make no difference between a Gentleman and an
ordinary fellow; a Man can never be merry for them, for to trust altogether
to his own innocence is a fad life. Unhappy wantons! SCIPIO on the
other fide, when he was but a Boy (about two or three and twenty)
being inform'd that certain Patricians of Roman Gentlemen, thro a
qualm upon the defeat which HANNIBAL had given them at Can-
na, were laying their heads together and contriving their Flight with
the tranſportation of their Goods out of Rome, drew his Sword,
and fetting himſelf at the door of the Chamber where they were
at Council, proteſted, That who did not immediatly fwear not to defert
the Commonwealth, he would make his Soul to defert his Body. Let Men
argue as they pleaſe for Monarchy, or against a Commonwealth, the
world fhall never fee any Man fo fottifh or wicked as in cool blood
to prefer the Education of the Sons of BRUTUS before that of
SCIPIO; and of this mould, except a MELIUS or a MANLIUS, was
the whole youth of that Commonwealth, tho not ordinarily fo well
caft. Now the health of a Government, and the education of the
Youth being of the fame pulfe, no wonder if it has bin the conſtant
practice of well-order'd Commonwealths to commit the care and feeling
of it to public Magiftrats. A duty that was perform'd in ſuch a man-
ner by the Areopagits, as is elegantly prais'd by ISOCRATE s.
The Athenians, fays he, write not their Laws upon dead Walls, nor con-
tent themſelves with having ordain'd Puniſhments for Crimes, but pro-
vide in fuch a way by the Education of their Youth, that there be no Crimes
for Punishment. He fpeaks of thofe Laws which regarded Manners,
not of thofe Orders which concerned the Adminiſtration of the Com-
monwealth, left you ſhould think he contradicts XENOPHON and
POLYBIUS. The Children of Lacedemon, at the feventh year of
their age, were delivered to the Padonomi, or Schoolmaſters, not mer-
cenary, but Magiftrats of the Commonwealth, to which they were
accountable for their charge: and by theſe at the age of fourteen they
were prefented to other Magiftrats call'd the Beidiai, having the in-
* Affeti more regio vivere- inter fe conquerebantur. Regem hominem effe à quo
impetres ubi jus, ubi injuria opus fit; effe gratis locum, effe beneficio; & irafci & ignofcere
poffe; inter amicum & inimicum difcrimen nofle. Leges rem furdam, inexorabilem effe; falu
briorem, melioremque inopi quam potenti; nihil laxamenti nec venix habere, fi modum ex-
cefferis; periculofurn effe in tot humanis erroribus fola innocentia vivere. Liv. 1. 2.
fpection
OCEAN A.
173
-
ſpection of the Games and Exerciſes, among which that of the Plas
tanifta was famous, a kind of Fight in Squadrons, but fomwhat too
fierce. When they came to be of military age, they were lifted of the
Mora, and fo continu'd in readineſs for public Service under the Diſci-
plin of the Polemarchs. But the Roman Education and Difciplin by
the Centurys and Claffes is that to which the Commonwealth of O-
ceana has had a more particular regard in her three Effays, being cer-
tain degrees by which the Youth commence as it were in Arms for
Magiſtracy, as appears by
THE twenty fixth ORDER, inftituting, That if a Parent has 26. Order.
but one Son, the Education of that one Son fhall be wholly at the difpofition
of that Parent. But wheras there be Free Schools erected andendow'd, or
to be erected and endow'd in every Tribe of this Nation, to a fufficient pro-
portion for the Education of the Children of the fame (which Schools, to
the end there be no detriment or hindrance to the Scholars upon cafe of
removing from one to anotber, are every of them to be govern'd by the ſtrict
inspection of the Cenfors of the Tribes, both upon the Schoolmasters man-
ner of Life and Teaching, and the proficiency of the Children, after the
rules and method of that in Hiera) if a Parent has more Sons than one,
the Cenfors of the Tribe shall animadvert upon and puniſh him that ſends
not his Sons within the ninth year of their age to fom one of the Schools of
a Tribe, there to be kept and taught if he be able at his own charges; and if
he be not able, gratis, till they arrive at the age of fifteen years. And a
Parent may expect of his Sons at the fifteenth year of their age according
to his choice or ability, whether it be to Service in the way of Apprentices
to fom Trade or otherwife, or to further study, as by fending them to the
Ins of Court, of Chancery, or to one of the Universitys of this Nation.
But he that takes not upon him one of the Profeflions proper to fom of thoſe
places, fhall not continue longer in any of them than till he has attain'd to
the age of eighteen years; and every Man having not at the age of eigh-
teen years taken upon him, or addicted himself to the profeffion of the
Law, Theology, or Phyfic, and being no Servant, fhall be capable of the
Effays of the Youth, and no other perfon whatſoever: except a Man, having
taken upon him ſuch a profeſſion, happens to lay it by, e'er he arrives at three
or four and twenty years of age, and be admitted to this Capacity by the
respective Phylarch, being fatisfy'd that he kept not out fo long with any
defign to evade the Service of the Commonwealth; but, that being no fooner
at his own difpofal, it was no fooner in his choice to com in. And if any
Youth or other Perfon of this Nation have a defire to travel into foren
Countrys upon occafion of business, delight, or further improvement of his
Education; the fame ſhall be lawful for him upon a Pafs obtain'd from the
Cenfors in Parlament, putting a convenient limit to the time, and recom-
mending him to the Embajadors by whom he shall be affifted, and to whom
he fhall yield Honor and Obedience in their respective Refidences. Every
Youth at his return from his Travel is to preſent the Cenfors with a Paper of
his own writing, containing the Intereft of State or Form of Government
of the Countrys, or fom one of the Countrys where he has bin; and if it
be good, the Cenfors fhall caufe it to be printed and publish'd, prefixing
Line in commendation of the Author.
EVERY Wedneſday next infuing the last of December, the whole
Youth of every Parish, that is to fay every Man (not excepted by the fore-
going part of the Order) being from eighteen years of age to thirty, fhall
repair
174
OCEAN A.
repair at the found of the Bell to their respective Church, and being there
affembled in prefence of the Overfeers, who are to govern the Ballot, and
the Conftable who is to officiat at the Urn, fhall, after the manner of the
Elders, elect every fifth Man of their whole number (provided that they
chufe not above one of two Brothers at one Election, nor above half if they
be four or upward) to be a Stratiot or Deputy of the Youth; and the Lift
of the Stratiots fo elected being taken by the Overfeers, fhall be enter'd in
the Parish Book, and diligently preferv'd as a Record, call'd the firſt Eſſay.
They whofe Eftates by the Law are able, or whofe Friends are willing to
mount them, fhall be of the Horfe, the rest are of the Foot. And he who
has bin one year of this Lift, is not capable of being reelected till after an-
other year's interval.
EVERY Wedneſday next infuing the last of January, the Stratiots
being muster'd at the Rendevouz of their respective Hundred, fhall in the
prefence of the Furymen, who are Överfeers of that Ballot, and of the High
Conftable who is to officiat at the Urn, elect out of the Horfe of their Troop
or Company one Captain, and one Enfign or Cornet, to the command of the
Same. And the Jurymen having enter'd the Lift of the Hundred into a
Record to be diligently kept at the Rendevoux of the fame; the first public
Game of this Commonwealth shall begin and be perform'd in this manner.
Wheras there is to be at every Rendevouz of a Hundred one Cannon,
Culverin, or Saker; the prize Arms being forg'd by fæorn Armorers of
this Commonwealth, and for their proof, befides their Beauty, view'd and
try'd at the Tower of Emporium, fhall be expos'd by the Justice of Peace
appertaining to that Hundred (the faid Juſtice with the Jurymen being
Fudges of the Game) and the Judges shall deliver to the Horfeman that
gains the Prize at the Career, one fute of Arms being of the value of twen-
ty Pounds; to the Pikeman that gains the Prize at throwing the Bullet, one
Jute of Arms of the value of ten Pounds; to the Musketeer that gains
the Prize at the Mark with his Muſket, one fute of Arms of the value of
ten Pounds; and to the Cannoneer that gains the Prize at the mark with
the Cannon, Culverin, or Saker, a Chain of Silver being the value of
ten Pounds; provided, that no one Man at the fame Mufter plays above
one of the Prizes. Whosoever gains a Prize is bound to wear it (if it be
his lot) upon Service; and no man ſhall fell or give away any Armor
thus won, except he has lawfully attain'd to two or more of them at the
Games.
THE Games being ended, and the Mufter difmift, the Captain of the
Troop or Company shall repair with a Copy of the Liſt to the Lord Lieu-
tenant of the Tribe, and the High Conftable with a Duplicat of the fame
to the Cuftos Rotulorum, or Muftermafter General, to be alfo commu-
nicated to the Cenfors; in each of which the Jurymen giving a note upon
every name of an only Son, fhall certify that the Lift is without fubterfuge
or evafion: or, if it be not, an account of thefe upon whom the Evafion
or Subterfuge lys, to the end that the Phylarch or the Cenfors may animad-
vert accordingly.
AND every Wedneſday next infuing the laft of February, the Lord
Lieutenant, Cuftos Rotulorum, the Cenfors, and the Conductor, fhall
receive the whole Mufter of the Youth of that Tribe at the Rendevoux of
the fame, diftributing the Horfe and Foot with their Officers, according
to the Directions given in the like cafe for the diftribution of the Elders
and the whole Squadron being put by that means in Battalia, the fecond
Game of this Commonwealth shall begin by the exercife of the Youth in all
the
;
OCEAN A.
175
the parts of their military Difciplin according to the Orders of Parlament,
or direction of the Council of War in that cafe. And the hundred Pounds
allow'd by the Parlament for the Ornament of the Mufler in every Tribe,
fhall be expended by the Phylarch upon fuch artificial Caftles, Citadels, or
the like Devices, as may make the best and most profitable Sport for the
Youth and their Spectators. Which being ended, the Cenfors having pre-
par'd the Urns by putting into the Horfe-Urn 220 Gold Balls, wherof ten
are to be mark'd with the letter M, and other ten with the letter P; into
the Foot-Urn 700 Gold Balls, wherof 50 are to be mark'd with the letter
M, and 50 with the letter P: and after they have made the Gold Balls in
each Urn, by the addition of Silver Balls to the fame, in number equal with
the Horfe and Foot of the Stratiots, the Lord Lieutenant shall call the
Stratiots to the Urns, where they that draw the Silver Balls fhall return to
their places, and they that draw the Gold Balls fhall fall off to the Pavi-
lion, where, for the space of one hour, they may chop and change their Balls
according as one can agree with another, whofe Lot he likes better. But the
hour being out, the Conductor feparating them whose Gold Balls have no
letter, from those whofe Balls are mark'd, ſhall cauſe the Cryer to call the
Alphabet, as firſt A; wherupon all they whofe Gold Balls are not mark'd,
and whofe firnames begin with the letter A, fhall repair to a Clerc appertain-
ing to the Cuftos Rotulorum, who shall first take the names of that letter
then thofe of B, and ſo on, till all the names be alphabetically inrol'd. And
the Youth of this Lift being fix hundred Foot in a Tribe, that is, 30000
Foot in all the Tribes; and two hundred Horfe in a Tribe, that is, 10000
Horfe in all the Tribes, are the fecond Effay of the Stratiots, and the ftand-
ing Army of this Commonwealth to be always ready upon command to march.
They whofe Balls are mark'd with M, amounting, by 20 Horfe and 50 Foot
in a Tribe, to 2500 Foot, and 500 Horfe in all the Tribes; and they whofe
Balls are mark'd with P, in every point correfpondent, are parts of the
third Eſſay: they in M being straight to march for Marpefia, and they of
P for Panopea, to the ends, and according to the further directions follow-
ing in the Order for the provincial Orbs.
;
IF the Polemarchs or Field Officers be elected by the fcrutiny of the Coun-
cil of War, and the Strategus commanded by the Parlament or the Dictator
to march, the Lord Lieutenants (who have power to muſter and diſciplin
the Youth fo often as they receive Orders for the fame from the Council of
War) are to deliver the fecond Effay, or ſo many of them as shall be com-
manded, to the Conductors, who shall prefent them to the Lord Strategus
at the time and place appointed by his Excellency to be the general Rendevou
of Oceana, where the Council of War fhall have the accommodation of
Horfes and Arms for his men in readiness: and the Lord Strategus having
arm'd, mounted and diftributed them, whether according to the recommen-
dation of their Prize Arms, or otherwife fhall lead them away to his Ship-
ping, being also ready and provided with Victuals, Ammunition, Artille-
ry, and all other neceſſarys; commanding them, and difpofing of the whole
Conduct of the War by his fole Power and Authority. And this is the third
Effay of the Stratiots, which being ship'd, or march'd out of their Tribes,
the Lord Lieutenants shall reelect the fecond Effay out of the remaining
part of the first; and the Senat another Strategus.
IF any Veteran or Veterans of this Nation, the term of whofe Youth or
Militia is expir'd, having a defire to be entertain'd in the further fervice
of the Commonwealth, fhall prefent him or themselves at the Rendevou of
Oceana to the Strategus, it is in his power to take on fuch and fo many of
them
176
OCEAN A.
27. Order.
them as fall be agreed by the Polemarchs, and to fend back an equal num-
ber of the Stratiots.
AND for the better managing of the proper Forces of this Nation, the
Lord Strategus, by appointment of the Council of War, and out of fuch
Levys as they shall have made in either or both of the Provinces to that
end, ſhall receive Auxiliaries by Sea or elsewhere at fom certain place, not
exceeding his proper Arms in number.
AND whosoever shall refufe any one of his three Effays, except upon
caufe fhewn he be difpens'd withal by the Phylarch; or, if the Phylarch be
not aſſembled, by the Cenfors of his Tribe, fhall be deem'd a Helot or pub-
lic Servant, fhall pay a fifth part of his yearly Revenue, befides all other
Taxes; to the Commonwealth for his Protection, and be incapable of bear-
ing any Magistracy except fuch as is proper to the Law. Nevertheless if a
man has but two Sons, the Lord Lieutenant ſhall not fuffer above one of
them to come to the Urn at one Election of the fecond Effay: and tho he has
above two Sons; there ſhall not com above half the Brothers at one Election:
and if a Man has but one Son, he shall not com to the Urn at all without the
confent of his Parents, or his Guardians; nor shall it be any reproach to
bim, or impediment to his bearing of Magifiracy.
THIS Order, with relation to foren Expeditions, will be prov'd
and explain'd together with
THE twenty-feventh ORDER, providing, in cafe of Invafion ap-
prehended, that the Lords High Sherifs of the Tribes upon Commands re-
ceiv'd from the Parlament, or the Dictator, diftribute the Bands of the
Elders into divifions after the nature of the Eſſays of the Youth; and that
the fecond Divifion or Effay of the Elders, being made and confifting of
30000 Foot, and 10000 Horfe, be ready to march with the fecond Effay
of the Youth, and be brought also by the Conductors to the Strategus.
THE fecond Effay of the Elders and Youth being march'd out of their
Tribes, the Lords High Sherifs and Lieutenants fhall have the remaining
part of the annual Bands both of Elders and Youth in readineſs, which, if
the Beacons be fir'd, ſkall march to the Rendevou to be in that cafe appoint-
ed by the Parlament, or the Dictator. And the Beacons being fir'd, the
Curiata Comitia, or Parochial Congregations, ſhall elect a fourth both of
Elders and Youth to be immediatly upon the Guard of the Tribes, and di-
viding themſelves as aforefaid, to march alfo in their Divifions according
to Orders: which method in cafe of extremity fhall procede to the election of
a third, or the levy of a fecond, or of the last man in the Nation, by the
Power of the Lords High Sherifs; to the end that the Commonwealth in
ber utmoſt preſſure may fhew her trust that God in his Justice will remember
Mercy; by humbling her felf, and yet preferving her Courage, Diſciplin and
Conftancy, even to the last drop of her blood, and the utmoſt farthing.
THE Services perform'd by the Youth, or by the Elders, in cafe of In-
vafion, and according to this Order fall be at their proper coft and charges
that are any ways able to endure its but if there be fuch as are known in
their Parifkes to be fo indigent that they cannot march out of their Tribes,
nor undergo the burden in this cafe incumbent, then the Congregations of
their Parishes fhall furnish them with fufficient fums of Mony to be repaid
upon the Certificat of the fame by the Parlament when the Action fhall be
over. And of that which is refpectively injoin'd by this Order, any Tribe,
Parish, Magiftrat, or Perfon that shall fail, is to answer for it at the
Council of War, as a Deferter of his Country.
THE
OCEAN A.
ОСЕ
177
if not
THE ARCHON, being the greateſt Captain of his own,
of any age, added much to the Glory of this Commonwealth, by in-
terweaving the Militia with more Art and Lufter than any Legiſlator
from or before the time of SERVIUS TULLIUS, who conftituted the
Roman Militia. But as the Bones or Skeleton of a man, tho the great-
eft
part of his Beauty be contain'd in their Proportion or Symmetry,
yet fhewn without Fleſh, are a fpectacle that is rather horrid than en-
tertaining; fo without Diſcourſes are the Orders of a Commonwealth :
which, if the gos forth in that manner, may complain of her Friends
that they ſtand mute, and ſtaring upon her. Wherfore this Order was
thus fleſh'd by the Lord ARCHON.
<<
<<
My Lords
D
;
IOGENES ſeeing a young Fellow drunk, told him that his
Father was drunk when he begot him. For this, in natural
"Generation I muft confefs I fee no reafon; but in the Political it is
" right. The Vices of the People are from their Governors; thofe of
" their Governors from their Laws or Orders; and thoſe of their Laws
"or Orders from their Legiflators. * Whatever was in the Womb
imperfect, as to her proper work, coms very rarely, or never at all
to perfection afterwards: and the formation of a Citizen in the
"Womb of the Commonwealth is his Education.
e
“EDUCATION by the firſt of the foregoing Orders is of fix
"kinds: At the School, in the Mechanics, at the Univerſitys, at the
"Ins of Court or Chancery, in Travels, and in military Difci-
plin: fom of which I fhall but touch, and fom I fhall handle more
"at large.
ce
cr
"THAT which is propos'd for the erecting and indowing of Schools.
"Schools throout the Tribes, capable of all the Children of the fame,
" and able to give to the Poor the Education of theirs gratis, is only
matter of direction in cafe of very great Charity, as eafing the needy
"of the charge of their Children from the ninth to the fifteenth year
"of their Age, during which time their work cannot be profitable;
"and reftoring them when they may be of uſe, furniſhed with tools
"wherof there are advantages to be made in every work, feeing he
"that can read and uſe his Pen has fom convenience by it in the mean-
"eft Vocation. And it cannot be conceiv'd, but that which coms,
"tho in ſmall parcels, to the advantage of every man in his Vocati-
on, muſt amount to the advantage of every Vocation, and ſo to that
"of the whole Commonwealth. Wherfore this is commended to
"the Charity of every wiſehearted and welminded man, to be don in
"time, and as God fhall ftir him up or inable him; there being fuch
"provifion already in the cafe, as may give us leave to procede with-
out obftruction.
<<
•
PARENTS, under animadverfion of the Cenfors, are to dif- Mechanics in
"poſe of their Children at the fifteenth year of their age to fomething; general.
"but what, is left, according to their abilitys or inclination, at their
"own choice. This, with the multitude, muſt be to the Mechanics,
"that is to fay, to Agriculture or Huſbandry; to Manufactures, or to
"Merchandize.
* Ut male pofuimus initia, fic cætera fequuntur Cic.
A a
"AGRI-
178
O CE A N A.
Husbandry,
Manufactures
and Merchan-
dize.
Univerfitys.
(i
C.C
"C
cc
"AGRICULTURE is the Bread of the Nation; we are hung
upon it by the teeth; it is a mighty Nurſery of Strength, the beſt
Army, and the moſt affur'd Knapfac; it is manag'd with the leaft
turbulent or ambitious, and the most innocent hands of all other
"Arts. Wherfore I am of ARISTOTLE'S opinion, that a Com-
"monwealth of Huſbandmen, and fuch is ours, muſt be the beſt of
"all others. Certainly, my Lords, you have no meaſure of what
ought to be, but what can be don for the incouragement of this
Profeffion. I could wish I were Hufband good enough to direct
fomthing to this end; but racking of Rents is a vile thing in the
"richer fort, an uncharitable one to the poorer, a perfect mark of
Slavery, and nips your Commonwealth in the faireft Bloffom. On
"the other fide, if there fhould be too much eafe given in this kind,
"it would occafion Sloth, and fo deftroy Induftry, the principal
<< nerve of a Commonwealth. But if ought might be don to hold
"the Balance even between theſe two, it would be a work in this
Nation equal to that for which FABIUS was firnam'd MAXIMUS
by the Romans.
.
"IN Manufactures and Merchandize the Hollander has gotten the
"ſtart of us; but at the long run it will be found, that a People work-
ing upon a foren Commodity dos but farm the Manufacture, and
"that it is really intail'd upon them only, where the growth of it is
"native: as alſo that it is one thing to have the carriage of other mens
cc
<c
Goods, and another for a man to bring his own to the beſt market.
"Wherfore (Nature having provided incouragement for thefe Arts in
"this Nation above all others, where, the People growing, they of
neceffity muſt alſo increaſe) it cannot but eſtabliſh them upon a far
more fure and effectual Foundation than that of the Hollanders. But
"theſe Educations are in order to the firſt things, or neceffitys of Na-
ture; as Huſbandry to the Food, Manufacture to the Clothing, and
"Merchandize to the Purſe of the Commonwealth.
66
66
"THERE be other things in Nature, which being ſecond as to
"their Order, for their Dignity and Value are firſt, and fuch to which
"the other are but Accommodations; of this fort are eſpecially thefe,
Religion, Juſtice, Courage, and Wiſdom.
TC
cc
"THE Education that anfwers to Religion in our Government is
"that of the Univerfitys. MOSES the Divine Legiſlator was not
only ſkilful in all the Learning of the Egyptians, but took alſo into
"the Fabric of his Commonwealth the Learning of the Midianites in
"the advice of JETHRO: and his Foundation of a Univerſity laid
" in the Tabernacle, and finiſh'd in the Temple, became that Pinacle
"from whence (according to many Jewish and Chriftian Authors)
"all the Learning in the world has taken wing; as the Philofophy of
"the Stoics from the Pharifees; that of the Epicureans from the Sad-
«duces; and from the Learning of the Jews fo often quoted by our
Acts. 17. 18. “SAVIOR, and fulfilled in Him, the Chriftian Religion. Athens
was the most famous Univerſity in her days; and her Senators, that
" is to ſay, the Areopagits, were all Philofophers. Lacedemon, to
ſpeak truth, tho fhe could write and read, was not very bookiſh.
"But he that diſputes hence againſt Univerſitys, difputes by the fame
Argument againſt Agriculture, Manufacture, and Merchandize ;
every one of theſe having bin equally forbid by LYCURGUS, not
"for itſelf (for if he had not bin learn'd in all the Learning of Crete,
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OCEAN A
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" and well travell'd in the knowlege of other Governments, he had
never made his Commonwealth) but for the diverfion which they
"muſt have given his Citizens from their Arms, who, being but few,
"if they had minded any thing elſe, muſt have deferted the Com-
"monwealth. For Rome, fhe had ingenium par ingenio, was as learned
"as great, and held her College of Augurs in much reverence. Ve-
"nice has taken her Religion upon truft. Holland cannot attend it to
"be very ftudious. Nor dos Switzerland mind it much; yet are they
"all addicted to their Univerfitys. We cut down Trees to build
"Houſes; but I would have fom body fhew me, by what reafon or
experience the cutting down of a Univerfity ſhould tend to the fet-
ting up
of a Commonwealth. Of this I am fure, that the perfec-
"tion of a Commonwealth is not to be attain'd without the knowlege
"of antient Prudence; nor the knowlege of antient Prudence with-
out Learning; nor Learning without Schools of good Literature :
"and theſe are fuch as we call Univerſitys. Now tho mere Univerſity
learning of itſelf be that which (to fpeak the words of VERU-
LAMIUS) crafty men contemn, and fimple men only admire, yet is it
fuch as wife men have use of; for Studys do not teach their own ufe,
"but that is a Wisdom without and above them, won by obfervation.
Expert men may execute, and perhaps judge of Particulars one by one;
"but the general Counfils and the Plots, and the marshalling of Affairs,
com beſt from those that are learned. Wherfore if you would
have your Children to be Stateſmen, let them drink by all means of
"theſe Fountains, where perhaps there were never any. But what
"tho the Water a man drinks be not nouriſhment; it is the Vehicle
"without which he cannot be nouriſh'd. Nor is Religion leſs con-
"cern'd in this point than Government; for take away your Univer-
fitys, and in a few years you lofe it.
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"THE Holy Scriptures are written in Hebrew and Greec: they
"that have neither of thefe Languages may think light of both; but
"find me a man that has one in perfection, the ſtudy of whoſe whole
"Life it has not bin. Again, this is apparent to us in daily Conver-
(c
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.
«Ε man.
fation, that if four or five Perfons that have liv'd together be talk-
ing, another ſpeaking the fame Language may com in, and yet un-
"derſtand very little of their Difcourfe, in that it relates to Circum-
ftances, Perfons, Things, Times and Places, which he knows not. -
"It is no otherwiſe with a man, having no infight of the times in
"which they were written, and the Circumſtances to which they re-
late, in the reading of antient Books, whether they be divine or hu-
For example, when we fall upon the Diſcourſe about Bap-
"tiſm and Regeneration that was between our SAVIOR and NICO-
"DEMUS, where CHRIST reproaches him with his ignorance in
"this matter: Art thou a Docter in Ifrael, and underſtandeft not thefe
things? What fhall we think of it? or wherfore ſhould a Doctor in
"Ifrael have underſtood theſe things more than another, but that both
Baptifm and Regeneration, as was fhew'd at large by my Lord.
"PHOSPHORUS, were Doctrins held in Ifrael? I inſtance in one placė
"of a hundred, which he, that has not mafter'd the Circumſtances to
"which they relate, cannot underſtand. Wherfore to the underſtand-
"ing of the Scripture, it is neceffary to have antient Languages, and
"the knowlege of antient times, or the aid of them who have fuch
"knowlege; and to have fuch as may be always able and ready to
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"give
180
OCEAN A.
.
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give fuch aid (unleſs you would borrow it of another Nation,
"which would not only be bafe, but deceitful) it is neceffary to a
"Commonwealth that the have Schools of good Literature, or Uni-
verfitys of her own. We are commanded, as has been faid more
“than once, to ſearch the Scripturés; and which of 'em ſearch the
Scriptures, they that take this pains in antient Languages and Learn-
ing, or they that will not, but truft to Tranflations only, and to
"words as they found to prefent Circumftances? than which no-
thing is more fallible, or certain to lofe the true fenfe of Scriptures,
pretended to be above human Underſtanding, for no other cauſe
"than that they are below it. But in fearching the Scriptures by the
proper uſe of our Univerfitys, we have bin heretofore bleft with
greater Victorys and Trophys againſt the purple Hoſts and golden
"Standards of the Romish Hierarchy, than any Nation; and ther-
"fore why we ſhould relinquish this upon the prefumption of fom,
"that becauſe there is a greater Light which they have, I do not know.
"There is a greater Light than the Sun, but it does not extinguiſh the
Sun, nor does any Light of God's giving extinguiſh that of Nature,
"but increaſe and fanctify it. Wherfore, neither the Honor born by
"the Ifraelitish, Roman, or any other Commonwealth that I have
fhewn, to their Ecclefiaftics, confifted in being govern'd by them,
"but in confulting them in matters of Religion; upon whofe Refpon-
"ſes or Oracles they did afterwards as they thought fit. Nor would
"I be here miſtaken, as if, by affirming the Univerſitys to be, in or-
"der both to Religion and Government, of abſolute neceffity, I de-
"clar'd them or the Miniftry in any wife fit to be trufted, fo far as to
"exerciſe any power not deriv'd from the Civil Magiftrat in the ad-
"miniſtration of either. If the Jewish Religion were directed
"and eſtabliſhed by MOSES, it was directed and eſtabliſh'd by
"the Civil Magiftrat; or if MOSES exercis'd this Adminiſtration
as a Prophet, the fame Prophet did inveft with the fame Admi-
niftration the Sanhedrim, and not the Prieſts; and fo dos our Com-
monwealth the Senat, and not the Clergy. They who had the
"fupreme Adminiſtration or Government of the National Religion
"in Athens, were the firft ARCHON, the Rex Sacrificus, or High
Prieſt, and a Polemarch; which Magiftrats were ordain'd or elected
"* by the holding up of hands in the Church, Congregation or Co-
"mitia of the People. The Religion of Lacedemon was govern'd by
"the Kings, who were alfo High Priefts, and officiated at the Sacri-
"fice; theſe had power to fubftitute their Pythii, Embaffadors, or
"Nuncios, by which, not without concurrence of the Senat, they
"held intelligence with the Oracle of APOLLO at Delphos. And the
SC
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"
Ecclefiaftical part of the Commonwealth of Rome was govern'd by
"the Pontifex maximus, the Rex Sacrificulus, and the Flamins, all or-
"dain'd or elected by the People, the Pontifex by the Tribes, the
"King by the | Centurys, and the Flamins by the || Parishes. I do
not mind you of theſe things, as if, for the matter, there were any
parallel to be drawn out of their Superftitions to our Religion; but
"to fhew that for the manner, antient Prudence is as well a rule in di-
“ vine as human things; nay, and fuch a one as the Apoſtles them-
felves, ordaining Elders by the holding up of hands in every Con-
ર
""
* Per χειροτονίαν. + Tributis. || Centuriatis.
Curiatis Comitiis.
“gregation,
OCEAN À.
181
દ
gregation, have exactly follow'd: for fom of the Congregations
"where they thus ordain'd Elders were thofe of Antioch, Iconium,
Lyftra, Derbe, the Countrys of Lycaonia, Pifidia, Pamphilia, Perga,
"with Attalia. Now that thefe Citys and Countrys, when the Ro-
<<
<<
mans propagated their Empire into Afia, were found moſt of them
"Commonwealths, and that many of the reft were indu'd with like
power, ſo that the People living under the protection of the Roman
Emperors, continu'd to elect their own Magiftrats, is fo known a
thing, that I wonder whence it is that men, quite contrary to the
"univerfal proof of thefe examples, will have Ecclefiaftical Govern-
"ment to be neceffarily diftinct from Civil Power, when the Right
" of the Elders ordain'd by the holding up of hands in every Congre-
"gation to teach the People, was plainly deriv'd from the fame Civil
"Power by which they ordain'd the reft of their Magiftrats. And it
" is not otherwife in our Commonwealth, where the Parochial Con-
gregation elects or ordains its Paftor. To object the Common-
"wealth of Venice in this place, were to fhew us that it has bin no
"otherwife but where the Civil Power has loft the liberty of her
"Confcience by imbracing Popery; as alfo that to take away the
Liberty of Confcience in this Adminiſtration from the Civil Power,
"were a proceding which has no other precedent than ſuch as is Po-
piſh. Wherfore your Religion is fettled after the following man-
ner: the Univerſitys are the Seminarys of that part which is natio-
nal, by which means others with all fafety may be permitted to follow
"the Liberty of their own Confciences, in regard that, however
<<
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they behave themſelves, the ignorance of the unlearned in this cafe
"cannot lofe your Religion nor difturb your Government, which
"otherwiſe it would moſt certainly do; and the Univerfitys with their
"Emoluments, as alfo the Benefices of the whole Nation, are to be
(6
improv'd by fuch Augmentations as may make a very decent and
"comfortable fubfiftence for the Miniftry, which is neither to be al-
"low'd Synods nor Affemblys, except upon the occafion fhewn in
"the Univerſitys, when they are confulted by the Council of State,
«and ſuffer'd to meddle with Affairs of Religion, nor to be capable
"of any other public Preferment whatſoever; by which means the
"Intereft of the Learned can never come to corrupt your Religion, nor
« diſturb your Government, which otherwiſe it would moft certainly
"do. Venice, tho ſhe dos not fee, or cannot help the corruption of
"her Religion, is yet fo circumfpect to avoid diſturbance of her Go-
"vernment in this kind, that her Council procedes not to election of
"Magiftrates, till it be proclaim'd, Fora Papalini, by which words
"fuch as have confanguinity with red Hats, or relation to the Court
"of Rome, are warm'd to withdraw. If a Minifter in Holland meddles
with matter of State, the Magiftrat fends him a pair of Shoes;
wherupon, if he dos not go, he is driven away from his charge.
"I wonder why Minifters, of all men, fhould be perpetually tamper-
ing with Government; firft becaufe they, as well as others, have it
"in expreſs charge to fubmit themſelves to the Ordinances of men;
"and fecondly, becauſe theſe Ordinances of men must go upon fuch
political Principles, as they of all others, by any thing that can be
"found in their Writings or Actions, leaft underſtand: whence you
"have the fuffrage of all Nations to this ſenſe, that an ounce of Wiſ-
"dom is worth a pound of Clergy. Your greateſt Clercs are not
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183
OCEAN A.
The Ins of
Court and
Chancery.
((
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your wifeft men
and when fom foul Abfurdity in State is com-
mitted, it is common with the French, and even the Italians, to call
"it Pas de Clerc, or, Governo de Prete. They may bear with men
that will be preaching without ftudy, while they will be govern-
ing without Prudence. My Lords, if you know not how to rule
σε your Clergy, you will most certainly, like a man that cannot rule
"his Wife, have neither quiet at home, nor honor abroad. Their
"honeſt Vocation is to teach your Children at the Schools and the
Univerſitys, and the People in the Parishes; and yours is concern'd
to fee that they do not play the fhrews: of which parts dos con-
"fift the Education of your Commonwealth, fo far as it regards Re-
έσ ligion.
<<
"
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CC
"TO JUSTICE, or that part of it which is commonly executive,
"anfwers the Education of the Ins of Court and Chancery. Upon
" which to philofophize requires a public kind of Learning that I have
"not. But they who take upon them any Profeffion proper to the E-
"ducations mention'd, that is, Theology, Phyfic, or Law, are not
at leiſure for the Effays. Wherfore the Effays being Degrees wher-
by the Youth commence for all Magiftracys, Offices, and Honors in
"the Parish, Hundred, Tribe, Senat or Prerogative; Divines, Phy-
ficians, and Lawyers, not taking theſe Degrees, exclude themſelves
"from all fuch Magiftracys, Offices, and Honors. And wheras.
Lawyers are likeft to exact further reaſon for this, they (growing
"up from the moſt gainful Art at the Bar to thofe Magiftracys upon
the Bench, which are continually appropriated to themſelves, and
not only indow'd with the greateſt Revenues, but alſo held for
life) have the leaſt reafon of all the reft to pretend to any other;
efpecially in an equal Commonwealth, where Accumulation of Ma-
"giftracy, or to take a Perſon ingag'd by his Profit to the Laws, as
they ftand, into the Power which is Legiſlative, and which ſhould
keep them to what they were, or ought to be, were a Solæcifm in
"Prudence. It is true, that the Legiſlative Power may have need of
"Advice and Affiftance from the executive Magiftracy, or fuch as are
"learned in the Law; for which caufe the Judges are, as they have
" heretofore bin, Affiftants in the Senat. Nor, however it came about,
can I ſee any reaſon why a Judg, being but an Affiſtant or Lawyer,
"ſhould be Member of a Legiſlative Council.
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7
"I DENY not, that the Roman Patricians were all Patrons, and
"that the whole People were Clients, fom to one Family, and fom to
another, by which means they had their Cauſes pleaded and defend-
"ed in fom appearance gratis; for the Patron took no Mony, tho if
" he had a Daughter to marry, his Clients were to pay her Portion:
nor was this fo great a grievance. But if the Client accus'd his
Patron, gave teftimony or fuffrage againſt him, it was a crime of
"fuch a nature, that any man might lawfully kill him as a Traitor
"and this, as being the nerve of the Optimacy, was a great cauſe of
ruin to that Commonwealth: for when the People would carry
any thing that pleas'd not the Senat, the Senators were ill provided
"if they could not intercede, that is, oppofe it by their Clients
"with whom, to vote otherwiſe than they pleas'd, was the higheſt
Crime. The obſervation of this Bond till the time of the GRAC-
CHI, that is to ſay, till it was too late, or to no purpoſe to break it,
"was the cauſe, why in all the former heats and diſputes that had
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"happen'd
}
OCEAN A
183
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"happen'd between the Senat and the People, it never came to blows;
"which indeed was good: but withal, the People could have no re-
medy, which was certainly evil. Wherfore I am of opinion, that
a Senator ought not to be a Patron or Advocat, nor a Patron or Ad-
"vocat to be a Senator: for if his Practice be gratis, it debauches the
People; and if it be mercenary, it debauches himfelf: take it which
way you will, when he ſhould be making of Laws, he will be
knitting of Nets.
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LYCURGUS, as I faid, by being a Traveller became a Le-
giflator, but in times when Prudence was another thing. Neverthe-
"leſs we may not ſhut out this part of Education in a Commonwealth,
" which will be herſelf a Traveller; for thoſe of this make have
"feen the World, efpecially becauſe this is certain (tho it be not re-
garded in our times, when things being left to take their chance, it
"fares with us accordingly) that no man can be a Politician, except he
"be firft a Hiftorian or a Traveller; for except he can fee what muſt
be, or what may be, he is no Politician. Now if he has no know-
lege in Story, he cannot tell what has bin; and if he has not bin a
"Traveller, he cannot tell what is: but he that neither knows what
"has bin, nor what is, can never tell what muſt be, or what may be.
"Furthermore, the Embaſſys in ordinary by our Conftitution are the
"Prizes of young men, more eſpecially fuch as have bin Travellers.
"Wherfore they of theſe Inclinations having leave of the Cenfors,
"ow them an account of their time, and cannot chufe but lay it out.
"with fom ambition of Praife or Reward, where both are open:
"whence you will have eys abroad, and better choice of public Mini-
fters; your Gallants fhewing themſelves not more to the Ladys at
"their Balls, than to your Commonwealth at her Academy, when
they return from their Travels.
"
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" BUT this Commonwealth being conſtituted more eſpecially of
two Elements, Arms and Councils, drives by a natural instinct at
Courage and Wiſdom; which he who has attain'd, is arriv'd at the
perfection of human nature. It is true, that theſe Virtues muſt have
"fome natural root in him that is capable of them; but this amounts
"not to fo great a matter as fome will have it. For if Poverty makes
an induſtrious, a moderate Eſtate a temperat, and a lavish Fortune a
"wanton man, and this be the common courfe of things; Wiſdom
"then is rather of neceffity than inclination. And that an Ariny
" which was meditating upon flight, has bin brought by deſpair to
"win the Field, is fo far from being ſtrange, that like caufes will e-
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""
vermore produce like effects. Wherfore this Commonwealth drives
"her Citizens like Wedges; there is no way with them but thorow,
"nor end but that Glory whereof Man is capable by Art or Nature.
"That the Genius of the Roman Familys commonly preferv'd it felf
"throout the line (as to inftance in fom, the MANLII were ftill
"fevere, the PUBLICOLA lovers, and the APPII haters of the
People) is attributed by MACHIAVEL to their Education: nor,
"if Intereft might add to the reaſon why the Genius of a Patrician
"was one thing, and that of a Plebeian another, is the like fo appa-
"rent between different Nations, who, according to their different
Educations, have yet as different manners. It was antiently noted,
"and long confirm'd by the actions of the French, that in their firſt aſ-
"faults their Courage was more than that of Men; and for the reft lefs
cr
than
184
OCEAN A.
"than that of Women: which nevertheless, thro the amendment of
"their Diſciplin, we fee now to be otherwife. I will not fay, but
"that fom Man or Nation upon an equal improvement of this kind
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may be lighter than fom other; but certainly, Education is the
"fcale without which no Man or Nation can truly know his or her
own weight or value. By our Hiftorys we can tell when one
Marpefian would have beaten ten Oceaners, and when one Occaner
"would have beaten ten Marpefians. MARC ANTHONY was a
Roman, but how did that appear in the imbraces of CLEOPATRA ?
"You muſt have fom other Education for your Youth; or they, like
"that paffage, will fhew better in Romance than true Story.
cc
"THE Cuſtom of the Commonwealth of Rome in diftributing
"her Magiftracys without reſpect of age, happen'd to do well in
"CORVINUS and SCIPIO; for which caufe MACHIAVEL (with
"whom that which was don by Rome, and that which is well don,
"is for the most part all one) commends this courſe. Yet how
"much it did worfe at other times, is obvious in POMPY and CA-
"SAR; Examples by which BOCCALINI illuftrats the Prudence of
"Venice in her contrary practice, affirming it to have bin no finall ſtep
"to the ruin of the Roman Liberty, that theſe (having tafted in
"their Youth of the fupreme Honors) had no greater in their
cc
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age to
hope for, but by perpetuating of the fame in themſelves; which
"came to Blood, and ended in Tyranny. The opinion of VERU-
LAMIUS is fafe: The Errors, fays he, of young men are the ruin of
bufinefs; wheras the Errors of old Men amount but to this, that more
might have bin don, or fooner. But tho their Wiſdom be little, their
Courage is great: Wherfore (to com to the main Education of
"this Commonwealth) the Militia of Oceana is the Province of
"Youth.
૮૬
"THE diftribution of this Province by the Effays is fo fully de-
"fcrib'd in the Order, that I need repeat nothing: the Order itſelf
being but a Repetition or Copy of that Original, which in antient
"Prudence is of all others the faireft; as that from whence the Com-
(C
<<
monwealth of Rome more particularly deriv'd the Empire of the
"World. And there is much more reafon in this age, when Govern-
"ments are univerfally broken, or fwerv'd from their Foundations,
" and the People groan under Tyranny, that the fame caufes (which
"could not be withſtood when the World was full of popular Go-
"vernments) fhould have the like effects.
&C
"6
*C
"THE Cauſes in the Commonwealth of Rome, wherof the Em-
pire of the World was not any miraculous, but a natural (nay I may
fafely fay a neceffary) confequence, are contain'd in that part of her
Diſciplin which was domeftic, and in that which ſhe exercis'd in her
"Provinces or Conqueft. Of the latter I fhall have better occa-
"fion to ſpeak when we com to our provincial Orbs; the former
"divided the whole People by Tribes, amounting, as LIVY and
"CICERO fhew, at their full growth to thirty five, and every
"Tribe by the Cenfe or Valuation of Eftates into five Claffes: for the
"fixth being Proletary, that is the Nurſery, or fuch as thro their po-
verty contributed nothing to the Commonwealth but Children, was
not reckon❜d nor us'd in Arms. And this is the first point of the
"Militia, in which modern Prudence is quite contrary to the antient
"for wheras we, excufing the rich, and arming the poor, becom the
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"Vaffals
OCEAN Á.
185
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"Vaffals of our Servants, they, by excufing the poor, and arming
"fuch as were rich enough to be Freemen, became Lords of the Earth.
"The Nobility and Gentry of this Nation, who underſtand fo little
"what it is to be the Lords of the Earth, that they have not bin able to
keep their own Lands, will think it a ftrange Education for their
"Children to be common Soldiers, and oblig'd to all the Dutys of
"Arms: nevertheleſs it is not for 4s. a week, but to be capable of
being the beſt man in the Field or in the City; the latter part of
"which confideration makes the common Soldier herin a better man
"than the General of any monarchical Army. And wheras it may
"be thought, that this would drink deep of noble Blood, I dare
boldly fay, take the Roman Nobility in the heat of their fierceſt
"Wars, and you fhall not find fuch a fhambles of them as has bin
"made of ours by mere Luxury and Slothfulneſs; which, killing the
Body, kill the Soul alfo; Animafque in vulnere ponunt. Wheras
common Right is that which he who ftands in the vindication of, has
us'd that Sword of Juſtice for which he receives the purple of
Magiftracy. The Glory of a man on Earth can go no higher, and
"if he falls he rifes again, and comes fooner to that reward which is
"fo much higher as Heaven is above the Earth. To return to the
"Roman Example: Every Claffis was divided, as has bin more than
once fhewn, into Centurys, and every Century was equally divi-
"ded into Youth and Elders; the Youth for foren Service, and the
"Elders for the guard of the Territory. In the firft Claffis were a-
"bout eighteen Centurys of Horſe, being thoſe which by the Inſti-
"tution of SERVIUS were firft call'd to the Suffrage in the Cen-
"turial Affemblys. But the Delectus, or Levy of an Army, which
"is the preſent bufinefs, proceded, according to POLYBIUS, in this
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manner.
"UPON a War decreed, the Confuls elected four and twenty mi-
litary Tribuns or Colonels; wherof ten, being fuch as had merited
"their tenth Stipend, were younger Officers. The Tribuns being
"chofen, the Confuls appointed a day to the Tribes, when thoſe in
"them of military age were to appear at the Capitol; the day being
"com, and the Youth affembl'd accordingly, the Confuls afcended
"their Tribunal, and the younger Tribuns were ſtraight divided into
"four parts after this manner: four were affign'd to the firſt Legion
e (a Legion at the moſt confifted of 6000 Foot, and
300 Horſe)
"three to the fecond, four to the third, and three to the fourth. The
younger Tribuns being thus diftributed, two of the elder were
affign'd to the firft Legion, three to the fecond, two to the third,
"and three to the fourth. And the Officers of each Legion thus af-
"fign'd, having drawn the Tribes by Lot, and being feated accord-
τε
<<
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ing to their divifions at a convenient diftance from each other,
"the Tribe of the firft Lot was call'd: wherupon they that were of
"it knowing the bufinefs, and being prepar'd, prefently bolted out four
"of their number, in the choice wherof fuch care was taken, that
they offer'd none that was not a Citizen; no Citizen that was not
of the Youth, no Youth that was not of fom one of the five
Claffes; nor any one of the five Claffes that was not expert at his
"Exercifes. Moreover, they uſed fuch diligence in matching them
८८
"C
r
4
1
* Centuriatis.
B b
" for
186
OCEAN A
<<
<<
CC
..
"for Age and Stature, that the Officers of the Legions, except they
happen'd to be acquainted with the Youth fo bolted, were forc'd to
put themſelves
upon fortune, while they of the firſt Legion choſe
one; they of the fecond, the next; they of the third another ;
"and the fourth Youth fell to the laft Legion: and thus was the
"Election (the Legions and the Tribes varying according to their
Lots) carry'd on till the Foot were complete. The like courfe with
"little alteration was taken by the Horfe Officers till the Horfe alfo
were complete. This was call'd giving of Names, which the
Judg 20. 9. "Children of Ifrael did alfo by Lot; and if any man refus'd to give
"his Name, he was fold for a Slave, or his eftate confiſcated to the
"Commonwealth. When * MARCUS CURIUS the Conful was forc'd
“to make a fudden Levy, and none of the Youth would give in their
"Names, all the Tribes being put to the Lot, be commanded the first
"Name drawn out of the Urn of the Pollian Tribe (which happen'd to
com firſt) to be call'd; but the Youth not anſwering, he order'd his Goods
"to be fold: which was conformable to the Law in Ifrael, according
to which SAUL took a yoke of Oxen, and hew'd them in pieces,
"and fent them throout the Tribes, faying, Whofoever coms not forth
to battel after SAUL and SAMUEL, fo fhall it be done to his Oxen.
By which you may obferve alfo, that they who had no Cattel
were not of the Militia in Ifrael. But the age of the Roman Youth
by the Tullian Law determin'd at 30; and by the Law (tho it
fhould feem by MACHIAVEL and others, that this was
"well obferv'd) a Man could not ftand for Magiftracy till he was
"Miles emeritus, or had fulfil'd the full term of his Miiitia, which
■ Sam. 11.7.
(C
re
66
(c
.
6C
re
.
“
not.
was complete in his tenth Stipend or Service: nor was he after-
"wards oblig'd under any penalty to give his name, except the
"Commonwealth were invaded, in which cafe the Elders were as
"well oblig'd as the Youth. + The Conful might alſo levy Milites
evocatos, or Soldiers, commanded Men out of fuch as had ferv'd
"their turn, and this at his diſcretion. The Legionsbeing thus com-
plete, were divided by two to each Conful; and in thefe no Man
"had right to ferve but a Roman Citizen: now becauſe two Le-
gions made but a ſmall Army, the Romans added to every one of
"their Armys an equal number of Foot, and a double number of
"Horſe levy'd among their Latin or Italian Affociats; fo a Confular
ct
..
cr
Army, with the Legions and Auxiliarys, amounted to about thirty
"thoufand: and wheras they commonly levy'd two fuch Armys to-
gether, thefe being join'd made about fixty thoufand.
<<
<<
"THE Steps wherby our Militia follows the greateſt Captain,
are the three Effays; the firft, elected by a fifth man in the | Pa-
riſhes, and amounting in the whole to one hundred thouſand, chuſe
"their Officers at the ** Hundreds, where they fall alſo to their
"Games or Exerciſes, invited by handſom Prizes, fuch as for them-
<<
felves and the honor of them will be coveted; fuch as will render
"the Hundred a place of Sports, and exerciſe of Arms all the year
long; fuch as in the fpace of ten years will equip 30000 Men
<<
*
Marcus Curius Conful cum fubitum delectum edicere coactus effet, & juniorum nemo re-
fpondiffet, conjectis in fortem omnibus, Polliæ quæ proxima exierat, primum nomen, urnâ ex-
traclum citari juſſit, neque eo refpondente, bona adolefcentis haftâ fubjecit. Val. + Quod
per magnos tumultus fieri folitum erat, juftitio indicto, delectus fine vacationibus habitus eft. Liv.
A Curiatis. ** Centuriatis.
"Horfe
OCEAN A.
187
<<
cc
"Horſe and Foot, with fuch Arms for their Forge, Proof, and Beau-
ty, as (notwithſtanding the Argyrafpides, or filver Shields of
"ALEXANDER'S Guards) were never worn by fo many; fuch
as will preſent marks of Virtue and Direction to your General or
Strategus in the diftribution of his Army, which doubles the va-
"lue of them to the Proprietors, who are bound to wear them, and
"eaſes the Commonwealth of ſo much Charge, fo many being arm'd
already.
(c
<<
cr
<<
re
"BUT here will be the Objection now. How ſhall ſuch a Revenue
"be compaſs'd? Fifty pounds a year in every Hundred is a great deal,
"not ſo eaſily rais'd: Men will not part with their Mony; nor would
"the fum as it is propos'd by the Order of Pompey, rife in many years.
"Theſe are difficulties that fit our Genius exactly: And yet a thou-
"fand pounds in each Hundred once levy'd, eſtabliſhes the Revenue for
<c ever. Now the Hundreds one with another are worth ten thouſand
pounds a year dry Rent, over and above perfonal Eftates, which
bring it to twice the value: So that a twentieth part of one year's
"Revenue of the Hundred dos it. If you cannot afford this while
you pay Taxes, tho from henceforth they will be but ſmall ones, do
"it when you pay none. If it be then too much for one year, do it
"in two: If it be too much for two years, do it in four. What
"Huſbands have we hitherto bin? What is becom of greater Sums?
My Lords, if you ſhould thus caft your Bread upon the Waters,
"after many days you fhall find it: ftand not huckling when you
are offer'd Corn and your Mony again in the mouth of the Sack.
"BUT to proceed: The firft Effay being officer'd at the Hundreds,
" and muſter'd at the *Tribes (where they are entertain'd with other
Sports, which will be very fine ones) procedes to the Election of the
"fecond Effay, or ſtanding Army of this Nation, confifting of thirty
"thouſand Foot, and ten thouſand Horfe; and thefe, upon a War
"decreed, being deliver'd at the Rendevous of Oceana to the Stra-
<<
<c
r
<<
<<
..
cc
tegus, are the third Effay, which anfwers to the Roman Legions.
"But you may obſerve, that wheras the Confuls elected the military
"Tribuns, and rais'd commanded Men out of the Veterans at their
r own diſcretion: our Polemarchs or Field Officers are elected by the
Scrutiny of the Council of War: and our Veterans not otherwife
"taken on than as Volunteers, and with the conſent of the Pole-
marchs; which may ferve for the removal of certain fcruples which
might otherwiſe be incident in this place, tho without incourage-
"ment by the Roman way of proceding, much leſs by that which
"is propos'd. But wheras the Roman Legions in all amounted not
"in one Army to above 30000 Men, or little more, you have here
forty thouſand; and wheras they added Auxiliarys, it is in this
"regard that Marpefia will be a greater Revenue to you, than if you
"had the Indys; for wheras heretofore fhe has yielded you nothing
"but her native Thiſtles, in plowing out the rankneſs of her Ariſto-
cracy by your Agrarian, you will find her an inexhauſtible Magazin
"of Men, and to her own advantage, who will make a far better
"account by the Arms, than by the Pins of Poland. Wherfore as a '
"Confular Army confifted of about an equal number of Auxiliarys
"added to their Legions by their Latin or Italian Affociats, you may
<<
<<
1
* Tributis.
B b 2
"add
188
OCEAN A.
CC
"add to a Parlamentary Army an equal number of Marpefians or Pa-
nopeans, as that Colony fhall hereafter be able to fupply you: By
"which means the Commonwealth will be able to go forth to Battel
"with fourfcore thoufand Men. To make Wars with fmall Forces
હું
6C
*r
<<
CC
<c
<<
is no Huſbandry, but a waft, a diſeaſe, a lingring and painful con-
"fumtion of Men and Mony; the Romans making theirs thick, made
"them ſhort, and had little regard to Mony, as that which they who
"have Men enow, can command where it is fitteft that it fhould be
levy'd. All the antient Monarchys by this means got on wing, and
attain'd to vaft Riches. Wheras your modern Princes being dear
purchaſers of ſmall parcels, have but emty pockets. But it may.
"be fom will accufe the Order of rafhnefs, in that it commits the fole
Conduct of the War to the General; and the Cuſtom of Venice by
"her Proveditori, or checks upon her Commanders in chief, may
ſeem to be of greater Prudence: but in this part of our Government
"neither Venice nor any Nation that makes ufe of Mercenary Forces
" is for our inftruction. A mercenary Army, with a ſtanding Gene-
ral, is like the fatal Sifter that fpins; but proper Forces, with an
"annual Magiftrat, are like her that cuts the thred. Their Intereſts
are quite contrary, and yet you have a better Proveditor than the
Venetian, another Strategus fitting with an Army ſtanding by him;
wherupon that which is marching, if there were any probability it
ſhould, would find as little poffibility that it could recoil, as a
"foren Enemy to invade you. Theſe things confider'd, a War will
appear to be of a contrary nature to that of all other reckonings,
"inafmuch as of this you muſt never look to have a good account if
you be ftrict in impofing checks. Let a Council of Huntfmen
"affembled beforehand, tell you which way the Stag fhall run, where
you ſhall caſt about at the fault, and how you fhall ride to be in at
"the chaſe all the day: but theſe may as well do that, as a Council
"of War direct a General. The hours that have painted wings, and
"of different colors, are his Council: he muſt be like the Ey that
"makes not the Scene, but has it fo foon as it changes. That in many
"Counfillors there is ftrength, is fpoken of Civil Adminiſtrations:
as to thoſe that are military, there is nothing more certain, than
"that in many Counfillors there is weakneſs. Joint Commiffions in
military affairs, are like hunting your Hounds in their Couples. In
"the Attic War CLEOMENES and DEMARATUS, Kings of Lace-
"demon, being thus coupl'd, tug'd one againſt another; and while
they ſhould have join'd againſt the Perfian, were the cauſe of the
common calamity: wherupon that Commonwealth took better
Counfil, and made a Law, wherby from thenceforth there went
at once but one of her Kings to Battel.
'
rr
<<
<<
<<
CC
<<
<<
&c
<<
"THE Fidenati being in rebellion, and having flain the Colony of
"the Romans, four Tribuns with Confular Power were created by the Peo-
ple of Rome, wherof one being left for the guard of the City, the other
"three were fent against the Fidenati, who, thro the divifion that happen'd
among them, brought nothing home but Dishonor: wheṛupon the Ro-
mans created the Dictator, and LIvy gives his Judgment in theſe
"words: * The three Tribuns with Confular Power were a leffon how ufelefs
<C
<<
*Tres Tribuni, poteftate Confulari, documento fuêre, quàm plurium imperium bello inutile
effet; tendendo ad fua quifque confilia, cum alii aliud videretur, aperuerunt ad occafionem,
locum hofti.
" in
O CE A N À.
189
1
<<
<<
cc
[C
in War is the joint Command of feveral Generals; for each following
"his own Counfils, while they all differ'd in their opinions, gave by this
opportunity an advantage to the Enemy. When the Confuls, QUINTIUS
" and AGRIPPA were fent against the ÆQUI, AGRIPPA for this
reafon refus'd to go with his Colleague, faying, * That in the admini-
ftration of great Actions it was most fafe that the chief Command
fhould be lodg'd in one Perfon. And if the Ruin of modern Armys
"were well confider'd, most of it would be found to have faln upon this
point: it being in this cafe far fafer to trust to any one Man of common
Prudence, than to any two or more together of the greateſt Parts. The
"Confuls indeed being equal in Power, while one was prefent with
"the Senat, and the other in the Field with the Army, made a good
"Balance; and this with us is exactly follow'd by the Election of a
new Strategus upon the march of the old one.
rr
cr
<c
C.C
(6
"THE feven and twentieth Order, wherby the Elders in cafe
" of Invaſion are oblig'd to equal duty with the Youth, and each
upon their own charge, is fuitable to Reafon (for every Man de-
fends his own Eſtate) and to our Copy, as in the War with the
"Samnits and Tufcans. The Senat order'd a Vacation to be proclaim'd,
"and a Levy to be made of all forts of Perfons: And not only the Free-
men and Youths were lifted, but Cohorts of the old Men were likewife
form'd. This Nation of all others is the leaft obnoxious to Invafion.
"Oceana, fays a French Politician, is a Beaft that cannot be devour'd
"but by herſelf; nevertheleſs, that Government is not perfect which
" is not provided at all points; and in this (ad Triarios res rediit)
"the Elders being fuch as in a martial State muſt be Veterans, the
"Commonwealth invaded gathers ftrength like ANTEUS by her
fall, while the whole number of the Elders confifting of five hun-
"dred thouſand, and the Youth of as many, being brought up ac-
cording to the Order, give twelve fucceffive Battels, each Battel
"confifting of eighty thouſand Men, half Elders and half Youth.
"And the Commonwealth whofe Conftitution can be no ftranger to
<c any
of thoſe Virtues which are to be acquir'd in human life, grows
familiar with Death ere the dys. If the hand of God be upon her
"for her Tranfgreffions, fhe fhall mourn for her Sins, and ly in the
duft for her Iniquitys, without lofing her Manhood.
<<
(c
•
Si fractus illabatur orbis,
Impavidam ferient ruina.
THE remaining part, being the Conftitution of the Provincial
Orb, is partly Civil, or confifting of the Elders; and partly Military,
or confifting of the Youth. The Civil part of the Provincial Orb is
directed by
THE twenty eighth ORDER, wherby the Council of a Province 28. Order.
being conftituted of twelve Knights, divided by four into three Regions of the Civil
Conftitution
(for their term and revolution conformable to the Parlament) is perpetuated part of the
by the annual election at the Tropic of four Knights (being triennial Provincial
*Saluberrimum in adminiftratione magnarum rerum, fummam imperii apud unum effe.
+ Senatus juftitium indici, delectum omnis generis hominum haberi juffit: nec ingenui modo, &
juniores Sacramento adacti funt, fed ſeniorum etiam cohortes factæ.
Orb.
Magi-
£90
OCEAN A.
Magiftrats) out of the Region of the Senat whofe term expires; and of
one Knight out of the fame Region to be Strategus or General of the Pro-
vince, which Magiftracy is annual. The Strategus or Magiftrat thus
chofen, fhall be as well Prefident of the Provincial Council with power to
propofe to the fame, as General of the Army. The Council for the reft
Shall elect weekly Provofts, having any two of them alfo right to propofe
after the manner of the Senatorian Councils of Oceana. And wheras
all Provincial Councils are Members of the Council of State, they may and
ought to keep diligent correfpondence with the fame, which is to be don
after this manner: Any Opinion or Opinions legitimately propos'd and
debated at a Provincial Council, being therupon fign'd by the Strategus,
or any two of the Provofts, may be tranfmitted to the Council of State
in Oceana; and the Council of State proceeding upon the fame in their
natural course (whether by their own Power, if it be a matter within their
Inftructions, or by Authority of the Senat therupon confulted, if it be a
matter of State which is not in their Inftructions; or by Authority of the
Senat and Command of the People, if it be a matter of Law, as for the
Levys of Men or Mony upon common uſe and ſafety) fhall return fuch
Anfwers, Advice, or Orders, as in any of the ways mention'd fhall be de-
termin'd upon the cafe. The Provincial Councils of Marpeſia and Pa-
nopea respectivly ſhall take ſpecial care that the Agrarian Laws, as alfo
all other Laws that be or ſhall from time to time be enacted by the Parlament
of Oceana, for either of them, be duly put in execution: they fhall ma-
nage and receive the Customs of either Nation for the Shipping of Oceana,
being the common Guard: they shall have a care that moderat and fufficient
pay upon the respective Province be duly rais'd for the fupport and mainte-
nance of the Officers and Soldiers, or Army of the fame, in the most effectu-
al, conftant and convenient way: they shall receive the Regalia, or public
Revenues of thofe Nations, out of which every Counfiller fhall have for
his term, and to his proper ufe, the Sum of 500 1. per annum. and the
Strategus 500 1. as Prefident, befides his pay as General, which shall be
1000 Pounds; the remainder to go to the use of the Knights and De-
putys of the respective Provinces, to be paid, if it will reach, according to
the rates of Oceana; if not, by an equal diftribution, respectively; or
the overplus, if there be any, to be return'd to the Treafury of Oceana.
They shall manage the Lands (if there be any fuch held in either of the
Provinces by the Commonwealth of Oceana, in Dominion) and return
the Rents into the Exchequer. If the Commonwealth coms to be poffeft
of richer Provinces, the Pay of the General or Strategus, and of the
Councils, may be refpectively increas'd. The People for the reft fhall elect
their own Magiftrats, and be govern'd by their own Laws, having Power
alfo to appeal from their native or provincial Magiftrats, if they pleafe,
to the People of Oceana. And wheras there may be fuch as receiving In-
jury, are not able to profecute their Appeals at fo great a distance, eight
Serjeants at Law being fworn by the Commiffioners of the Seal, fhall be fent
by four into each Province once in two Years; who, dividing the fame by
Circuits, fhall bear fuch Caufes; and having gather'd and introduc'd them,
Shall return to the feveral Appellants, gratis, the Determinations and De-
crees of the People in their feveral cafes.
THE term of a Knight in a Provincial Orb, as to domeftic Magi-
fracys, fhall be efteemed a Vacation, and no bar to prefent Election to any
other Honor, his provincial Magiftracy being expir'd.
THE
OCEAN A
191
THE Quorum of a Provincial Council, as alfo of every other Coun-
cil or Aſſembly in Oceana, ſhall in time of health confift of two parts in
three of the whole number proper to that Council or Affembly; and in a
time of fickness, of one part in three: But of the Senat there can be no Quʊ-
rum without three of the Signory; nor of a Council without two of the
Provofts.
THE Civil part of the Provincial Orb being declar'd by the fore-
going Order; the Military part of the fame is conftituted by
29 Order.
vincial Orb.
THE twenty ninth ORDER; wherby the Stratiots of the third
Conftitution of
Effay having drawn the Gold Balls mark'd with the Letter M, and being the Military
ten Horfe and fifty Foot in a Tribe, that is to fay, five hundred Horse, partofthe Pro-
and two thouſand five hundred foot in all, the Tribes fhall be deliver'd
the refpective Conductors to the provincial Strategus or General, at fuch
a time and place, or Rendevous, as he fhall appoint by Order and Certificat
of his Election: and the Strategus having receiv'd the Horfe and Foot men-
tion'd, which are the third Claffis of his provincial Guard or Army, Shall
forthwith lead them away to Marpefia, where the Army confijts of three
Claffes, each Claffis containing three thousand men, wherof five hundred
are Horfe; and receiving the new Strategus with the third Claffis, the old
Strategus with the firft Claffis fhall be difmift by the Provincial Council.
The fame method with the Stratiots of the letter P, is to be obferv'd for
the provincial Orb of Panopea: and the Commonwealth coming to acquire
new Provinces, the Senat and the People may erect new Orbs in like manner,
confifting of greater or lefs numbers, according as is requir'd by the re-
Spective occafion. If a Stratiot has once ferv'd his term in a Provincial
Orb, and happens afterwards to draw the Letter of a Province at the Elec-
tion of the fecond Effay, he may refufe his Lot; and if he refuses it, the
Cenfor of that Urn fhall caufe the Files ballotting at the fame to make a
halt; and if the Stratiot produces the Certificat of his Strategus or Gene-
ral, that he has ferv'd his time accordingly, the Cenfor throwing the Ball
that he drew into the Urn again, and taking out a Blank, fhall difmifs the
Youth, and cauſe the Ballot to procede.
TO perfect the whole Structure of this Commonwealth, fom Di-
rections are given to the third Effay, or Army marching, in
THE thirtieth ORDER. When thou goeſt to battel againſt thy 30. Order.
Enemys, and ſeeſt Horfes and Chariots, and a People more than thou;
be not afraid of them, for the Lord thy God is he that gos with thee Deat. 20. 1.
to fight for thee againſt thy Enemys. And when thou divideft the
Spoil, it ſhall be as a Statute and an Ordinance to thee, that as his 1 Sam. 30.24.
part is that gos down to the battel, fo fhall his part be that tarrys by
the Stuff: that is, (as to the Commonwealth of Oceana) The Spoil taken
of the Enemy (except Clothes, Arms, Horfes, Ammunition and Victuals,
to be divided to the Soldiery by the Strategus and the Polemarchs upon the
place according to their diſcretion) shall be deliver'd to four Commiffarys
of the Spoils elected and fworn by the Council of War; which Commiſſa-
rys fhall be allow'd Shipping by the State, and Convoys according as occa-
fion fhall require by the Strategus; to the end that having a Bill of Lading
fign'd by three or more of the Polemarchs, they may ſhip and bring, or caufe
fuch Spoils to be brought to the Prize-Office in Oceana, where they shall
be
192
OCEAN A.
be fold, and the Profit arifing by fuch Spoils fhall be divided into three
parts, wherof one shall go to the Treafury, another ſhall be paid to the
Soldiery of this Nation, and a third to the Auxiliarys at their return
from their Service, provided that the faid Auxiliarys be equal in number
to the proper Forces of this Nation, otherwise their Share ſhall be ſo much
lefs as they themselves are fewer in number: the rest of the two thirds to go
to the Officers and Soldiers of the proper Forces. And the Spoils fo di-
vided to the proper Forces, fhall be fubdivided into three equal parts,
wherof one fhall go to the Officers, and two to the common Soldiers: The
like for the Auxiliarys. And the Share allotted to the Officers ſhall be di-
vided into four equal parts, wherof one ſhall go to the Strategus, another
to the Polemarchs, a third to the Colonels, and a fourth to the Captains,
Cornets, Enfigns, and under Officers, receiving their share of the Spoil as
common Soldiers: The like for the Auxiliarys. And this upon pain, in
the cafe of failure, of what the People of Oceana (to whom the Cogni-
zance of Peculat or Crimes of this nature is properly appertaining) fhall
adjudg or decree.
UPON theſe three laft Orders the ARCHON feem'd to be ha-
ranguing at the head of his Army in this manner.
<c
<<
My Dear Lords and Excellent Patriots;
A
GOVERNMENT of this make is a Commonwealth for
Increaſe. Of thoſe for Preſervation, the Inconveniences and
Frailtys have bin fhewn: Their Roots are narrow, fuch as do not
run, have no Fibers, their tops weak and dangerouſly expos'd to
"the weather; except you chance to find one, as Venice, planted in
a Flowerpot; and if the grows, the grows top-heavy, and falls too.
"But you cannot plant an Oak in a Flowerpot; fhe muſt have Earth
"for her Root, and Heaven for her Branches.
66
ἐσ
..
*C
Imperium Oceano, famam quæ terminet aftris.
"ROME was faid to be broken by her own weight, but poeti-
"cally: For that Weight by which fhe was pretended to be ruin'd,
was fupported in her Emperors by a far flighter Foundation. And
" in the common experience of good Architecture, there is nothing
more known, than that Buildings ftand the firmer and the longer
"for their own weight; nor ever fwerve thro any other internal
cauſe, than that their Materials are corruptible: But the People ne-
ver dy; nor, as a political Body, are fubject to any other Corrup-
❝tion than that which derives from their Government. Unless a
"Man will: deny the Chain of Cauſes, in which he denys God, he
"muſt alſo acknowledge the Chain of Effects; wherfore there can be
no effect in Nature, that is not from the firſt Caufe, and thoſe fuc-
"ceffive Links of the Chain, without which it could not have bin.
"Now except a Man can fhew the contrary in a Commonwealth; if
"there be no caufe of Corruption in the firſt make of it, there can
<c
<<
never be any fuch Effect. Let no Man's Superſtition impoſe Pro-
❝ faneneſs upon this Affertion; for as Man is finful, but yet the U-
"niverſe is perfect, fo may the Citizen be finful, and yet the Com-
"monwealth be perfect. And as Man, feeing the World is perfect,
can never commit any fuch Sin as ſhall render it imperfect, or bring
66
"it
OCEAN A.
193
cr
"it to a natural diffolution; fo the Citizen, where the Common-
"wealth is perfect, can never commit any ſuch Crime as will render
"it imperfect, or bring it to a natural diffolution. To com to ex-
"perience; Venice, notwithſtanding we have found fome flaws in
it, is the only Commonwealth in the make wherof no man can
"find a cauſe of diffolution; for which reaſon we behold her (tho
"fhe confifts of men that are not without fin) at this day with one
"thouſand Years upon her back, yet for any internal caufe, as young,
as freſh, and free from decay, or any appearance of it, as ſhe was
born: but whatever in nature is not fenfible of decay by the courſe
"of a thouſand Years, is capable of the whole Age of Nature; by
"which Calculation, for any check that I am able to give my ſelf, a
•
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Commonwealth, rightly order'd, may, for any internal caufes, be
"as immortal or longliv'd as the World. But if this be true, thoſe
"Commonwealths that are naturally fall'n, muſt have deriv'd their
"Ruin from the Rife of them. Ifrael and Athens dy'd not natural but
"violent deaths; in which manner the World itſelf is to dy. We
are ſpeaking of thoſe cauſes of Diffolution which are natural to
"Government; and they are but two, either Contradiction or In-
equality: If a Commonwealth be a Contradiction, ſhe muſt needs
deſtroy her ſelf; and if ſhe be inequal, it tends to ſtrife, and ſtrife
to ruin. By the former of theſe fell Lacedemon, by the latter Rome.
"Lacedemon being made altogether for War, and yet not for Increaſe,
"her natural Progrefs became her natural Diffolution, and the build-
ing of her own victorious Hand too heavy for her Foundation; ſo
"that ſhe fell indeed by her own weight. But Rome perifh'd thro
"her native Inequality, which how it inveterated the Boſoms of the
"Senat and the People each againſt other, and even to death, has bin
"fhewn at large.
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"LOOK well to it, my Lords, for if there be a contradiction or
inequality in your Commonwealth, it muſt fall; but if it has neither
"of
of theſe, it has no principle of Mortality. Do not think me impu-
"dent; if this be truth, I fhall commit a grofs indifcretion in con-
cealing it. Sure I am that MACHIAVEL is for the immorta-
lity of a Commonwealth upon far weaker Principles. If a Com- Dif B.3.c.22.
monwealth, fays he, were fo happy as to be provided often with men,
"that, when she is fwerving from her principles, fhould reduce her to
"her Inftitution, she would be immortal. But a Commonwealth, as
we have demonftrated, fwerves not from her Principles, but by
" and thro her Inſtitution; if ſhe brought no Biafs into the world
"with her, her courfe for any internal Cauſe muſt be ftreight for-
tr
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ward, as we fee is that of Venice. She cannot turn to the right
"hand, nor to the left, but by fom rub, which is not an internal but
"external caufe; againſt fuch fhe can be no way fortify'd, but
"thro her Situation, as is Venice; or thro her Militia, as was Rome :
by which Examples a Commonwealth may be fecure of thoſe alfo.
"Think me not vain, for I cannot conceal my opinion here; a Com-
"monwealth that is rightly inſtituted can never fwerve, nor one that
"is not rightly inſtituted be fecur'd from fwerving by reduction to her
"firſt Principles: Wherfore it is no lefs apparent in this place, that
"MACHIAVEL underſtood not a Commonwealth as to the whole
"piece, than where having told you, That a Tribun, or any other Ci- Dil.B.1.c.IS.
“tizen of Rome, might propofe a Law to the People, and debate it with
“ them;
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194
ОСЕ
OCEAN A.
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"them; he adds, this Order was good, while the People were good; but
"when the People became evil, it became most pernicious. As if this Or-
"der (thro which, with the like, the People moſt apparently became
evil) could ever have bin good; or that the People, or the Common-
"wealth could ever have becom good, by being reduc'd to fuch Princi-
ples as were the Original of their Evil. The Diſeaſe of Rome was,
as has bin fhewn, from the native inequality of her Balance, and no
"otherwife from the Empire of the World, than as, this falling into
one Scale, that of the Nobility (an evil in fuch a Fabric inevitable)
"kick'd out the People. Wherfore a man that could have made her
to throw away the Empire of the World, might in that have re-
"duc'd her to her Principles; and yet have bin fo far from rendring
"her immortal, that going no further, he ſhould never have cur'd
her. But your Commonwealth is founded upon an equal Agra-
rian; and if the Earth be given to the Sons of men, this Balance is the
"Balance of Juſtice, fuch a one as in having due regard to the diffe-
rent Induſtry of different men, yet faithfully judges the Poor. And
Prov. 29. 14." the King that faithfully judges the Poor, his Throne fhall be establish'd
for ever; much more the Commonwealth, feeing that equality
"which is the neceffary diffolution of Monarchy, is the Generation,
"the
very Life and Soul of a Commonwealth. And now, if ever,
"I may be excufable, feeing my affertion, that the Throne of a Com-
monwealth may be establish'd for ever, is. confonant to the holy
Scriptures.
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"THE Balance of a Commonwealth that is equal, is of fuch a
nature, that whatever falls into her Empire, muft fall equally; and
if the whole Earth falls into your Scales, it muſt fall equally; and
"fo you may be a greater People, and yet not fwerve from your Prin-
ciples one hair. Nay, you will be fo far from that, that you muft
"bring the world in fuch a cafe to your Balance, even to the Balance
"of Juftice. But hearken, my Lords; are we on Earth? do we fee
the Sun ? or are we viſiting thoſe ſhady places which are feign'd by
"the Poets?
<<
Continuò audita voces, vagitus & ingens.
"Thefe Gothic Empires that are yet in the world, were at the firſt,
"tho they had legs of their own, but a heavy and unweildy burden.;
"but their Foundations being now broken, the Iron of them enters
even into the Souls of the Oppreft; and hear the voice of their Com
"forters: My Father bath chastised you with Whips, but I will chaftife
you
with
Scorpions. Hearken, I fay; if thy Brother crys to thee in
"affliction, wilt thou not hear him? This is a Commonwealth of the
Fabric, that has an open ear and a public concern; ſhe is not made
"for her felf only, but given as a Magiftrat of God to Mankind, for
"the vindication of common Right, and the Law of Nature. Wher-
"fore fays CICERO of the like, that of the Romans, * We have ra-
"ther undertaken the Patronage, than the Empire of the World. If you,
"not regarding this Example, like fom other Nations that are upon
"the point to ſmart for it, fhall, having attain'd to your own Liberty,
bear the Sword of your common Magiftracy in vain, fit ſtill, and
..
• Nos magis Patronatum orbis terrarum fufcepimus, quam Imperium.
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OCEAN A.
195
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"fold your Arms, or, which is worſe, let out the Blood of your Peo-
ple to Tyrants, to be fhed in the defence of their Yokes like Water,
"and fo not only turn the Grace of God into wantonness, but his Justice
"into Wormwood: I fay if you do thus, you are not now making a Com-
"monwealth, but heaping Coals of fire upon your own heads. A Com-
"monwealth of this make is a Miniſter of God upon Earth, to the end
"that the World may be govern'd with Righteousness. For which cauſe
(that I may com at length to our prefent bufinefs) the Orders laft
"rehears'd are buds of Empire, ſuch as with the bleffing of God may
fpread the Arms of your Commonwealth, like a holy Afylum, to the
"diftrefs'd World, and give the Earth her Sabbath of years, or reſt
"from her Labors, under the ſhadow of your Wings. It is upon this
point where the Writings of MACHIAVEL, having for the reſt
"excel'd all other Authors, com as far to excel themſelves.
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“COMMONWEALTHS, ſays he, have had three ways of pro- DiſB.2.C.4,
pagating themselves, one after the manner of Monarchys, by impo-
fing the Yoke, which was the way of Athens, and towards the latter
"times of Lacedemon; another by equal Leagues, which is the way of
Switzerland; (I ſhall add of Holland, tho fince his time) a third by
inequal Leagues, which, to the fhame of the World, was never prac-
tis'd, nay nor fo much as ſeen or minded, by any other Common-
"wealth but that only of Rome. They will each of them, either for
"caution or imitation, be worthy to be well weigh'd, which is the
(C
proper work of this place. Athens and Lacedemon have bin the
"occafion of great ſcandal to the world, in two, or at leaſt one
"of two regards: the firſt their Emulation, which involv'd Greece
"in
in perpetual Wars; the ſecond their way of Propagation, which by
impofing Yokes upon others, was plainly contradictory to their own
"Principles.
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"FOR the firft: Governments, be they of what kind foever, if
they be planted too cloſe, are like Trees, that impatient in their
growth to have it hinder'd, eat out one another. It was not un-
"known to theſe in fpeculation, or, if you read the ftory of Age-
SILAUS, in action, that either of them with thirty thoufand men
might have maſter'd the Eaſt; and certainly, if the one had not
"ſtood in the other's light, ALEXANDER had com too late to that
end, which was the means (and wou'd be if they were to live a-
gain) of ruin, at leaſt to one of them: wherfore with any man
"that underſtands the nature of Government this is excufable. So it
was between Oceana and Marpefia; ſo it is between France and
t Spain, tho lefs excufable; and fo it ever will be in the like cafes. But
"to com to the ſecond occafion of Scandal by them given, which was
"in the way of their propagation, it is not excufable: for they
brought their Confederats under bondage; by which means Athens
gave occafion of the Peloponnefian War, the wound of which fhe
«dy'd ſtinking, when Lacedemon, taking the fame Infection from
"her Carcafe, foon follow'd.
<<
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"WHERFORE, my Lords, let theſe be warnings to you, not
"to make that Liberty which God has given you a fnare to others in
"practifing this kind of inlargement to your felves.
"THE ſecond way of Propagation or Inlargement us'd by Com-
"monwealths, is that of Switzerland and Holland, equal Leagues :
“This, tho it be not otherwiſe miſchievous, is uſeleſs to the World,
Cc 2
" and
195
OCEAN A.
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"and dangerous to them felves: uſeleſs to the World; for as the for-
mer Governments were Storks, thefe are Blocks, have no fenſe of
"Honor, or concern in the Sufferings of others. But as the Etolians,
"a State of the like Fabric, were reproach'd by PHILIP of Mace-
don, to proftitute themſelves, by letting out their Arms to the Lufts
"of others, while they leave their own Liberty barren, and without
legitimat iffue; fo I do not defame thefe People: the Switzer for
"Valor has no Superior, the Hollander for Induſtry no Equal; but
"themſelves in the mean time fhall fo much the leſs excuſe their Go-
vernments, ſeeing that to the Switz it is well enough known that the
Enfigns of his Commonwealth have no other Motto than in te con-
"verte manus and that of the Hollander, tho he fweats more Gold
"than the Spaniard digs, lets him languiſh in debt; for ſhe herſelf
"lives upon charity. Theſe are dangerous to themſelves, precarious
"Governments, fuch as do not command, but beg their Bread from
"Province to Province, in Coats that being patch'd up of all colors
are in effect of none. That their Cantons and Provinces are fo
many Arrows, is good; but they are ſo many Bows too, which is
naught.
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"LIKE to theſe was the Commonwealth of the antient Tuſcans,
hung together like Bobbins, without a hand to weave with them:
"therfore eafily overcom by the Romans, tho at that time, for number,
a far lefs confiderable People. If your Liberty be not a Root that
grows, it will be a Branch that withers; which confideration brings
me to the Paragon, the Commonwealth of Rome.
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"THE ways and means wherby the Romans acquir❜d the Patro-
nage, and in that the Empire of the World, were different, ac-
cording to the different condition of their Commonwealth in her riſe,
"and in her growth: in her rife the proceeded rather by Colonys; in
"her growth by inequal Leagues. Colonys without the bounds of
Italy the planted none (fuch difperfion of the Roman Citizen as to
plant him in foren Parts, till the contrary Intereft of the Emperors
brought in that practiſe, was unlawful) nor did fhe ever demoliſh
any City within that compafs, or deveft it of Liberty; but wheras
"the moſt of them were Commonwealths, ftir'd up by emulation of
"her great felicity to war againſt her, if the overcame any, the con-
"fifcated fom part of their Lands that were the greateſt Incendiarys,
or cauſes of the Trouble, upon which the planted Colonys of her
own People, preſerving the rest of their Lands and Libertys for
the Natives or Inhabitants. By this way of proceding, that I
may be as brief as poffible, fhe did many and great things. For
"in confirming of Liberty, the propagated her Empire; in holding
"the Inhabitants from Rebellion, the put a curb upon the Incurfion of
Enemys; in exonerating her ſelf of the poorer fort, ſhe multiply'd
"her Citizens; in rewarding her Veterans, fhe render'd the reft lefs
"feditious; and in acquiring to her felf the reverence of a common
"Parent, fhe from time to time became the Mother of newborn
"Citys.
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"ÍN her farther growth the way of her Propagation went
more upon Leagues, which for the firſt divifion were of two kinds,
"Social and Provincial.
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"AGAIN, Social Leagues, or Leagues of Society, were of two
"kinds.
"THE
མམ
OCEAN A.
197
.
« THE firſt call'd Latinity or Latin, the ſecond Italian Right.
"THE League between the Romans and the Latins, or Latin
Right, approach'd neareſt to Jus Quiritium, or the Right of a na-
"tive Roman. The Man or the City that was honor'd with this
Right, was Civitate donatus cum fuffragio, adopted a Citizen of Rome,
with the Right of giving Suffrage with the People in fom cafes, as
"thoſe of Confirmation of Law, or Determination in Judicature, if
"both the Confuls were agreed, not otherwiſe; wherfore that com-
"ing to little, the greateſt and moſt peculiar part of this Privilege
"was, that who had born Magiftracy (at leaſt that of Edil or Qua-
Stor) in any Latin City, was by conſequence of the fame, a Citizen
"of Rome at all points.
26
<<
" ITALIAN Right was alſo a donation of the City, but with-
"out Suffrage they who were in either of theſe Leagues, were go-
"vern'd by their own Laws and Magiftrats, having all the Rights, as
to Liberty, of Citizens of Rome, yielding and paying to the Com-
"monwealth as head of the League, and having in the conduct of all
"Affairs appertaining to the common Caufe, fuch aid of Men and
"Mony as was particularly agreed to upon the merit of the Caufe, and
fpecify'd in their refpective Leagues, whence fuch Leagues came to
"be call'd equal or inequal accordingly.
"
"(
"PROVINCIAL Leagues were of different extenfion, accord-
"ing to the Merit and Capacity of a conquer'd People; but they were
"all of one kind: for every Province was govern'd by Roman Ma-
giftrats, as a Prætor or a Proconful, according to the dignity of the
"Province, for the Civil Adminiſtration and Conduct of the Provin-
"cial Army; and a Quæftor for the gathering of the Public Revenue,
"from which Magiſtrats a Province might appeal to Rome.
<<
"FOR the better underſtanding of theſe Particulars, I ſhall exem-
plify in as many of them as is needful: and firſt in Macedon.
" THE Macedonians were thrice conquer'd by the Romans, firſt un-
"der the Conduct of TITUS QUINTUS FLAMINIUS; fecond-
ly, under that of LUCIUS EMILIUS PAULUS; and, thirdly,
"under that of QUINTUS CECILIUS METELLUS, thence call'd
"MACEDONICUS.
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"FOR the firſt time PHILIP of Macedon, who (poffeſt of Acro-
"corinthus) boaſted no leſs than was true, that he had Greece in fetters,
being overcom by FLAMINIUS, had his Kingdom reftor'd to him,
upon condition that he ſhould immediatly fet all the Citys which he
held in Greece and in Afia at liberty; and that he ſhould not make
"war out of Macedon, but by leave of the Senat of Rome; which
«PHILIP (having no other way to fave any thing) agreed ſhould be
"don accordingly.
το
"THE Grecians being at this time affembl'd at the Ifthmian Games,
"where the Concourfe was mighty great, a Crier, appointed to the
"office by FLAMINIUS, was heard among them proclaiming all
"Greece to be free; to which the People being amaz'd at ſo hopeleſs a
thing, gave little credit, till they receiv'd fuch teſtimony of the
"truth as put it paſt all doubt, wherupon they fell immediatly on run-
ning to the Proconful with Flowers and Garlands, and fuch violent
expreffions of their Admiration and Joy, as, if FLAMINIUS, a
young man, about thirty three, had not alſo bin very ſtrong, he
"muſt have dy'd of no other death than their kindneſs, while every
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«Κ one
198
OCEAN A.
r
one ftriving to touch his hand, they bore him up and down the field
"with an unruly throng, full of fuch Ejaculations as thefe: How !
"Is there a People in the world, that at their own charge, at their own
peril, will fight for the Liberty of another? Did they live at the
next door to this fire? Or what kind of men are thefe, whofe bufi-
"nefs it is to pafs the Seas, that the World may be govern'd with
Righteousness? The Citys of Greece and of Afia ſhake off their Iron
"Fetters at the voice of a Cryer! Was it madnefs to imagin fuch a
thing, and is it don? O Virtue! O Felicity! O Fame!
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"IN this example your Lordships have a donation of Liberty, or
"of Italian Right to a People, by reftitution to what they had for-
merly injoy'd; and fom particular Men, Familys or Citys, accor-
ding to their merit of the Romans, if not upon this, yet upon the like
occafions, were gratify'd with Latinity.
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ર
"BUT PHILIP's fhare by this means did not pleaſe him, wher-
"fore the League was broken by his Son PERSEUS; and the Mace-
donians therupon for the fecond time conquer'd by EMILIUS
"PAULUS, their King taken, and they fom time after the Victory
fummon'd to the Tribunal of the General; where remembring how
"little hope they ought to have of Pardon, they expected fom dread-
"ful Sentence: When ÆMILIUS in the first place declar'd the Ma-
"cedonians to be free, in the full poffeffion of their Lands, Goods, and
Laws, with right to elect annual Magiftrats, yielding and paying
to the People of Rome one half of the Tribute which they were
"accuſtom'd to pay to their own Kings. This don he went on,
making ſo ſkilful a divifion of the Country in order to the metho-
dizing of the People, and cafting them into the form of popular Go-
vernment, that the Macedonians, being firſt ſurpriz'd with the Vir-
tue of the Romans, began now to alter the ſcene of their Admira-
"tion, that a Stranger fhould do fuch things for them in their own
Country, and with fuch facility, as they had never ſo much as once
imagin'd to be poffible. Nor was this all, for ÆMILIUS, as if not
"dictating to conquer'd Enemys, but to fom well-deferving Friends,
gave them in the laft place Laws fo fuitable, and contriv'd with fuch
care and prudence, that long uſe and experience (the only Correctreſs
"of works of this nature) could never find a fault in them.
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"IN this example you have a Donation of Liberty, or of Italian
Right, to a People that had not tafted of it before, but were now
taught how to uſe it.
"MY LORDS, the Royaliſts ſhould compare what we are do-
ing, and we what hitherto we have don for them, with this example.
It is a fhame that while we are boafting up our felves above all o-
thers, we fhould yet be fo far from imitating fuch examples as thefe,
"that we do not fo much as underſtand that if Government be the Pa-
rent of Manners, where there are no Heroic Virtues, there is no He-
"roic Government.
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"BUT the Macedonians rebelling, at the name of a falfe PHILIP,
"the third time againſt the Romans were by them judg'd incapable of
Liberty, and reduc'd by METELLUS to a Province.
66
"NOW wheras it remains, that I explain the nature of a Province,
"I ſhall rather chufe that of Sicily, becauſe having bin the firſt which
"the Romans made, the defcriptions of the reft relate to it.
"WE
OCEAN A.
199
}
66
"WE have fo receiv'd the Sicilian Citys into Amity, fays CICERO,
"that they injoy their antient Laws; and upon no other condition than of
the fame obedience to the People of Rome, which they formerly yielded
"to their own Princes or Superiors. So the Sicilians, wheras they had
"bin parcel'd out to divers Princes, and into divers States (the cauſe
"of perpetual Wars, wherby, hewing one another down, they be-
came Sacrifices to the Ambition of their Neighbors, or of fom In-
"vader) were now receiv'd at the old rate into a new Protection
"which could hold them, and in which no Enemy durft touch them ;
nor was it poffible, as the cafe then ftood, for the Sicilians to receive,
or for the Romans to give more.
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"A ROMAN Province is defin'd by SIGONIUS, a Region ha-
"ving Provincial Right. Provincial Right in general was to be go-
"vern'd by a Roman Prætor, or Conful, in matters at leaſt of State,
"and of the Militia: and by a Quaeftor, whofe Office it was to re-
ceive the Public Revenue. Provincial Right in particular was dif-
"ferent, according to the different Leagues or Agreements between
"the Commonwealth, and the People reduc'd into a Province. Si-
"culi boc jure funt, ut quod civis cum cive agat, domi certet fuis legi-
"bus; quod Siculus cum Siculo non ejufdem Civitatis, ut de eo Prætor
Judices, ex P. Rupilii Decreto, fortiatur. Quod privatus a Populo
petit, aut populus a privato, Senatus ex aliqua Civitate, qui judicet,
"datur, cui alternæ Civitates rejecta funt. Quod civis Romanus a Si-
"culo petit, Siculus Judex datur; quod Siculus a cive Romano, civis
"Romanus datur. Cæterarum rerum felecti Judices ex civium Roma-
<<
<<
<<
norum conventu proponi folent. Inter aratores & decumanos lege fru-
"mentaria, quam Hieronicam appellant, judicia fiunt. Becauſe the reft
"would oblige me to a diſcourſe too large for this place, it ſhall ſuf-
"fice that I have fhew'd you how it was in Sicily.
“ MY LORDS, Upon the Fabric of your Provincial Orb I ſhall
not hold you; becauſe it is fufficiently defcrib'd in the Order, and I
"cannot believe that you think it inferior to the way of a Prætor and
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a Quaflor. But wheras the Provincial way of the Roman Common-
"wealth was that wherby it held the Empire of the World, and your
"Orbs are intended to be capable at leaſt of the like ufe; there may
arife many Controverfys: As whether fuch a Courſe be lawful; whe-
"ther it be feizible; and, feeing that the Romans were ruin'd upon
"that point, whether it would not be to the deſtruction of the Com-
"monwealth.
"FOR the firſt, If the Empire of a Commonwealth be an occa-
"ſion to aſk whether it be lawful for a Commonwealth to aſpire to
"the Empire of the World, it is to aſk whether it be lawful for it to
"do its duty, or to put the World into a better Condition than it was
.." before.
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"AND to aſk whether this be feizible, is to afk why the Oceaner,
being under the like Adminiſtration of Government, may not do as
"much with two hundred men as the Roman did with one hundred;
"for comparing their Commonwealths in their rife, the difference is
yet greater: Now that Rome (feris Avaritia Luxuriaque) thro the na-
"tural thirſt of her conftitution, came at length with the fulneſs of her
"Provinces to burft herſelf, this is no otherwife to be underſtood, than
as when a man that from his own evil Conftitution had contracted
"the Dropfy, dys with drinking: It being apparent that in cafe her
.sc
Agrarian
200
OCEAN A.
66.
Agrarian had held, fhe could never have bin thus ruin'd: and I have
already demonſtrated that your Agrarian being once pois'd, can ne-
"ver break or fwerve.
s(
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"WHERFORE to draw towards fome conclufion of this Dif
courſe, let me inculcat the ufe, by felecting a few Confiderations
out of many. The regard had in this place to the Empire of the
"World appertains to a well-order'd Commonwealth, more efpe-
cially for two reaſons.
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"1. THE facility of this great Enterprize, by a Government of the
"Model propos'd.
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''
"2. THE danger that you would run in the omiffion of fuch a
Government.
"THE facility of this Enterprize, upon the grounds already laid,
"muft needs be great, forafmuch as the Empire of the World has bin,
"both in Reaſon and Experience, the neceffary confequence of a Com-
monwealth of this nature only for tho it has bin given to all kinds
"to drive at it, fince that of Athens or Lacedemon, if the one had not
hung in the other's light might have gain'd it; yet could neither of
"them have held it: not Athens, thro the manner of her
propaga-
6C
tion, which, being by downright Tyranny, could not preferve what
"ſhe had; nor Lacedemon, becauſe ſhe was overthrown by the weight
"of a lefs Conqueft. The facility then of this great Enterprize be-
ing peculiar to popular Government, I fhall confider it, firſt, In
gaining; and ſecondly, In holding.
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"FOR the former, Volenti non fit injuria; it is ſaid of the Peo-
"ple under EUMENES, that they would not have chang'd their
ſubjection for Liberty; wherfore the Romans gave them no diftur-
"bance. If a People be contented with their Government, it is a
"certain fign that it is good, and much good do them with it. The
"Sword of your Magiftracy is for a terror to them that do evil.
"EUMENES had the fear of God, or of the Romans before his eys;
concerning fuch he has given you no Commiffion.
""
<<
"BUT till we can ſay here are the Romans, where is EUMENES?
"Do not think that the late appearances of God to you have bin alto-
gether for your felves; ke has furely feen the Affliction of your Bre-
thren, and heard their cry by reafon of their Taskmasters. For to be-
"lieve otherwiſe, is not only to be mindlefs of his ways, but altoge-
"ther deaf. If you have ears to hear, this is the way in which you
"will certainly be call'd upon: For if, while there is no ftock of Li-
"berty, no fanctuary of the afflicted, it be a common object to be-
"hold a People cafting themſelves out of the Pan of one Prince into
"the Fire of another; what can you think, but if the World ſhould
"fee the Roman Eagle again, fhe would renew her age, and her flight?
" Nor did ever ſhe ſpread her Wings with better Omen, than will be
"read in your Enfigns; which if, call'd in by an opprefs'd People,
they interpofe between them and their Yoke, the People them-
"ſelves muſt either do nothing in the mean time, or have no morę
pains to take for their wiſh'd Fruit than to gather it, if that be not
"likewiſe don for them. Wherfore this muſt needs be eaſy, and yet
you have a greater facility than is in the arm of fleſh; for if the
"Cauſe of Mankind be the Caufe of God, the Lord of Hofts will bẹ
your Captain, and you ſhall be a Praiſe to the whole Earth.
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"
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• THE
OCEAN A
201
tc
"THE facility of Holding is in the way of your Propagation; if
you take that of Athens and Lacedemon, you fhall rain Snares; but
"either catch, or hold nothing. Lying lips are an abomination to the
"Lord: if fetting up for Liberty, you impofe Yokes, he will infallibly
deſtroy you. On the other fide, to go about a work of this nature
by a League without a Head, is to abdicat that Magiftracy, wher-
"with he has not only indu'd you, but wherof he will require an
account of you; for, curfed is he that dos the work of the Lord neg-
ligently. Wherfore you are to take the courſe of Rome: if you have
"fubdu'd a Nation that is capable of Liberty, you ſhall make them a
prefent of it, as did FLAMINIUS to Greece, and ŒMILIUS
to Macedon, referving to your felves fome part of that Revenue
"which was legally paid to the former Government, together with
"the right of being Head of the League, which includes fuch Levys of
"Men and Mony as fhall be neceffary for the carrying on of the Pub-
"lic Work. For if a People have by your means attain'd to freedom,
they ow both to the Cauſe and you, fuch Aid as may propagat the
"like Fruit to the rest of the World. But wheras every Nation is
"not capable of her Liberty to this degree, left you be put to doing
"and undoing of things, as the Romans were in Macedon, you fhall
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<<
<<
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diligently obſerve what Nation is fit for her Liberty to this degree,
"and what not: Which is to be don by two Marks, the firſt if the be
willing to help the Lord against the Mighty; for if ſhe has no care of
"the Liberty of Mankind, fhe deſerves not her own. But becauſe
"in this you may be deceiv'd by Pretences, which, continuing for a
"while fpecious, may afterwards vaniſh; the other is more certain,
"and that is if ſhe be capable of an equal Agrarian; which that it
was not obſerv'd by excellent ÆMILIUS in his donation of Li-
berty, and introduction of a Popular State among the Macedonians,
I am more than mov'd to believe for two reafons: the firft, becauſe
at the ſame time the Agrarian was odious to the Roman Patricians;
"the fecond, that the PSEUDO-PHILIP could afterwards fo eafily
recover Macedon, which could not have happen'd but by the Nobi-
lity, and their impatience, having great Eftates, to be equal'd with
"the People; for that the People ſhould otherwiſe, at the mere found
"of a Name, have thrown away their Liberty, is incredible. Wher-
"fore be affur'd, that the Nation where you cannot eſtabliſh an equal
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<<
Agrarian, is incapable of its Liberty as to this kind of Donation.
"For example, except the Ariftocracy in Marpefia be diffolv'd, nei-
"ther can that People have their Liberty there, nor you govern at
"home; for they continuing ftill liable to be fold by their Lords to fo-
ren Princes, there will never (efpecially in a Country of which there
" is no other profit to be made) be want of fuch Merchants and Dro-
vers, while you muſt be the Market where they are to receive their
"fecond Payment.
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<<
"NOR can the Ariftocracy there be diffolv'd but by your means,
"in relation wherto you are provided with your Provincial Orb;
"which being proportion'd to the meaſure of the Nation that you
"have vindicated or conquer'd, will eafily hold it for there is not a
People in the World more difficult to be held than the Marpefians,
"which tho by themſelves it be afcrib'd to their own nature, is truly
to be attributed to that of their Country. Nevertheleſs you hav-
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ing nine thousand men upon the continual guard of it, that, threa-
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202
OCEAN A.
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"ten'd by any fudden infurrection, have places of retreat; and an
Army of forty thouſand men upon a day's warning ready to march
"to their reſcue; it is not to be rationally fhewn which way they can
"poffibly flip out of your hands. And if a man ſhould think that
GC
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up-
on a Province more remote and divided by the Sea, you have not
"the like hold, he has not fo well confider'd your Wings as your
Talons, your ſhipping being of fuch a nature, as makes the defcent
"of your Armys almoft of equal facility in any Country: fo that
"what you take you hold, both becauſe your Militia, being already
populous, will be of great growth in it felf; and alfo thro your
"Confederats, by whom in taking and holding you are ftill more in-
"abled to do both.
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"NOR ſhall you eafilier hold, than the People under your Em-
pire or Patronage may be held. My Lords, I would not go to the
"door to fee whether it be cloſe ſhut; this is no underhand dealing,
nor a game at which he ſhall have any advantage againſt you who
"fees your Cards, but on the contrary the Advantage fhall be your
"own: for with eighteen thousand men (which number I put, be-
"cauſe it circulats your Orb by the annual change of fix thouſand)
having eſtabliſh'd your matters in the order fhewn, you will be able
"to hold the greateſt Province; and eighteen thousand men, allow-
"ing them greater pay than any Prince ever gave, will not ſtand
**This by the "the Province in one million Revenue; * in confideration wherof,
pay of a Par- they fhall have their own Eftates free to themſelves, and be govern'd
my, is demon." by their own Laws and Magiftrats; which, if the Revenue of the
ſtrated in the "Province be in dry Reut (as there may be fom that are four times
Corollary.
as big as Oceana) forty millions, will bring it with that of Indu-
lamentary Ar-
Pfal. 110. 3.
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<<
•
ſtry to ſpeak with the leaft, to twice the value: So that the Peo-
ple there, who at this day are fo oppreft that they have nothing at
"all wheron to live, fhall for one Million paid to you, receive at
"leaſt ſeventy nine to their proper ufe: in which place I appeal to any
man, whether the Empire defcrib'd can be other than the Patronage
"of the World.
<<
"NOW if you add to the propagation of Civil Liberty (fo na-
"tural to this Commonwealth that it cannot be omitted) the propa-
gation of the Liberty of Confcience, this Empire, this Patronage of
"the World is the Kingdom of Chriſt: For as the Kingdom of God
"the Father was a Commonwealth, fo fhall the Kingdom of God
"the Son; The People fhall be willing in the day of his power.
CC
"HAVING fhew'd you in this and other places, fom of thoſe
«ineſtimable Benefits of this kind of Government, together with the
"natural and facil Emanation of them from their Fountain, I com
(left God, who has appear'd to you, for he is the God of Nature,
"in the glorious Conftellation of theſe ſubordinat Cauſes, wherof we
"have hitherto bin taking the true Elevation, ſhould ſhake off the
"duft of his Feet againſt you) to warn you of the Dangers which
you, not taking the opportunity, will incur by omiffion.
་་
"MACHIAVEL fpeaking of the defect of Venice, thro her
"want of proper Arms, crys out, This cut her Wings, and fpoil'd her
"mount to Heaven. If you lay your Commonwealth upon any other
+ Queſto taglioli le gambe da montar in cielo.
"Foundation
!
OCEAN 203
A.
À.
Foundation than the People; you fruftrat your felf of proper Arms,
and fo lofe the Empire of the World; nor is this all, but fom other
"Nation will have it.
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"COLUMBUS offer'd Gold to one of your Kings, thro whoſe
"happy incredulity another Prince has drunk the Poiſon, even to the
"confumtion of his People; but I do not offer you a Nerve of War
"that is made of Purfeftrings, fuch a one as has drawn the face of the
"Earth into Convulfions, but fuch as is natural to her Health and
"Beauty. Look you to it, where there is tumbling and toffing upon
"the bed of ficknefs, it muft end in death or recovery. Tho the
People of the World, in the dregs of the Gothic Empire, be yet
"tumbling and toffing upon the bed of fickneſs, they cannot dy;
nor is there any means of recovery for them but by antient pru-
dence, whence of neceffity it muſt com to paſs, that this Drug be
"better known. If France, Italy, and Spain, were not all fick, all
"corrupted together, there would be none of them fo; for the fick
"would not be able to withſtand the found, nor the found to preferve
their health without curing of the fick. The firſt of theſe Nations
(which, if you ſtay her leifure, will in my mind be France) that
"recovers the health of antient Prudence, fhall certainly govern the
"World; for what did Italy when fhe had it? And as you were in
"that, fo fhall you in the like cafe be reduced to a Province; I do not
ſpeak at random. Italy, in the Confulfhip of LUCIUS EMI-
LIUS PAPUS, and CAIUS ATILIUS REGULUS, arm'd upon the
"Gallic Tumult that then happen'd of her felf, and without the Aid
"of foren Auxiliarys, feventy thoufand Horfe, and feven hundred
"thouſand Foot: But as Italy is the leaft of thoſe three Countrys in
extent, fo is France now the most populous.
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<<
re
I, decus, I, noftrum, melioribus utere fatis.
"MY dear Lords, Oceana is as the Rofe of Sharon, and the Lilly of
"the Vally. As the Lilly among Thorns, fuch is my Love among the
Daughters. She is comly as the Tents of Kedar, and terrible as an
Army with Banners. Her Neck is as the tower of David, builded for
an Armory, whereon there hang a thouſand Bucklers and Shields of migh-
ty
Men. Let me hear thy Voice in the morning, whom my Soul loves.
«The South has drop'd, and the Weft is breathing upon thy Garden of
Spices. Arife, Queen of the Earth, Arife, holy Spouse of Jesus; for
lo the Winter is paft, the Rain is over and gon; the Flowers appear
on the Earth, the time for the finging of Birds is com, and the Voice of
"the Turtle is heard in our Land. Arife, I fay, com forth, and do not
¿ tarry: Ab! wherfore ſhould my eys behold thee by the Rivers of Ba-
bylon, hanging thy Harps upon the Willows, thou fairest among Wo-
" men?
is
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<<
"EXCELLENT PATRIOTS; If the People be Soverain,
"here is that which eſtabliſhes their Prerogative: If we be fincere,
here is that which difburdens our Souls, and makes good all our In-
gagements: If we be charitable, here is that which imbraces all
is Partys If we would be fettl'd, here is that which will ſtand, and
laft for ever.
ર
ર
"IF our Religion be any thing elſe but a vain boaſt, ſcratching and
defacing humán Nature or Reaſon, which, being the Image of
Dd 2
"God,
204
OCEAN A.
Amos;.
65
God, makes it a kind of Murder; here is that Empire whence Justice
ſhall run down like a River, and Judgment like a mighty Stream. Who
is it then that calls us? or what is in our way? a Lion! is it not the
Dragon that old Serpent? for what wretched ſhifts are theſe? Here
" is a great deal, might we not have ſom of this at one time, and for
،، at another?
Co
"MY LORDS, permit me to give you the Sum, or brief
Epitome of the whole Commonwealth.
Tportion at top
a Tear in Land, lying
HE Center or Fundamental Laws are, firft, the Agrarian, pro-
portion'd at two thouſand Pounds a Year in Land, lying and being
within the proper Territory of Oceana, and flating Property in Land at
fuch a balance, that the Power can never fwerve out of the bands of the
Many.
SECONDLY, The Ballot conveying this equal Sap from the Root,
by an equal Election or Rotation, into the Branches of Magistracy or So-
verain Power.
THE Orbs of this Commonwealth being Civil, Military or Provincial,
are, as it were, caft upon this Mold or Center by the Divifions of the Peo-
ple; First into Citizens and Servants: Secondly, into Youth and Elders:
Thirdly, into fuch as have one hundred Pounds a year in Lands, Goods or
Monys, who are of the Horfe; and fuch as have under, who are of the
Foot: Fourthly, they are divided by their uſual refidence, into Parishes,
Hundreds, and Tribes.
THE Civil Orbs confift of the Elders, and are thus created; every
Monday next infuing the last of December, the Elders in every Pariſh elect
the fifth man to be a Deputy; which is but half a day's work: every Mon
day next infuing the last of January, the Deputys meet at their respec-
tive Hundred, and elect out of their number one Justice of the Peace,
one Juryman, one Coroner, and one High Conftable of the Foot; one day's
work.
EVERY Monday next infuing the last of February, the Hundreds
meet at their respective Tribe, and there elect the Lords High Sherif, Lieu-
tenant, Cuftos Rotulorum, the Conductor, the two Cenfors out of the
Horfe, the Magiftrats of the Tribe and of the Hundreds, with the fury-
men conftituting the Phylarch, and who affift in their respective Offices at the
Affixes, bold the Quarter-Seſſions, &c. The day following the Tribe elects
the annual Galaxy, confifting of two Knights, and three Deputys out of
the Horfe, with four Deputys out of the Foot, therby indu'd with Power
as Magiftrats of the whole Nation, for the term of three years. An Officer
chofen at the Hundred may not be elected a Magiftrat of the Tribe; but a
Magiftrat or Officer either of the Hundred or of the Tribe, being elected
into the Galaxy, may fubftitute any one of his own Order to his Magi-
fracy or Office in the Hundred, or in the Tribe. This of the Mufter is
two days work. So the body of the People is annually, at the charge of
three days work and a half, in their own Tribes, for the perpetuation of
their Power, receiving over and above the Magiftracys fo divided among
them.
EVERY Monday next infuing the laft of March, the Knights, being
a Hundred in all the Tribes, take their places in the Senat; the Knights,
having
OCEAN A.
205
baving taken their places in the Senat, make the third Region of the fame;
and the Houfe procedes to the Senatorian Elections. Senatorian Elections
are annual, biennial, or emergent.
THE annual are perform'd by the Tropic.
THE Tropic is a Schedule confifting of two parts; the first by which the
Senatorian Magiftrats are elected, and the fecond, by which the Senatorian
Councils are perpetuated.
THE first part is of this Tenor.
THE Lord Strategus,
THE Lord Orator,
THE first Cenfor,
THE Second Cenfor,
Annual Magiftrats, and therefore fuch as
may be elected out of any Region; the term
of every Region having at the Tropic one
year at the leaft unexpir'd
THE third Commiffi-Triennial Magiftrats, and therefore fuch as
oner of the Seal,
THE third Commiffi
oner of the Treaſury,
can be choſen out of the third Region
only, as that alone which has the term of
three years unexpir’d.
THE Strategus and the Orator fitting, are Confuls, or Prefidents of
the Senat.
THE Srategus marching is General of the Army, in which cafe a
new Strategus is to be elected in his room.
•
THE Strategus fitting with fix Commiſſioners, being Counfillors of
the Nation, are the Signory of the Commonwealth.
THE Cenfors are Magiftrats of the Ballot, Prefidents of the Council
for Religion, and Chancellors of the Univerfitys.
THE fecond part of the Tropic perpetuats the Council of State, by the
election of five Knights out of the first Region of the Senat, to be the firſt
Region of that Council confifting of fifteen Knights, five in every Region.
THE like is don by the election of four into the Council of Religion,
and four into the Council of Trade, out of the fame Region in the Senat
each of thefe Councils confifting of twelve Knights, four in every Region.
But the Council of War confifting of nine Knights, three in every
Region, is elected by and out of the Council of State, as the other Councils
are elected by and out of the Senat. And if the Senat add a Juncta of nine
Knights more, elected out of their own number, for the term of three
months, the Council of War by virtue of that addition, is Dictator of
Oceana for the faid term.
THE Signory jointly or ſeverally has right of Seffion and Suffrage in
every Senatorial Council, and to propofe either to the Senat, or any of them.
And every Region in a Council electing one weekly Provost, any two of
thofe Provosts have Power alfo to propofe to their respective Council, as the
proper and peculiar Propofersof the fame : for which cause they hold an Aca-
demy, where any man either by word of mouth, or writing, may propoſe to
the Propofers.
NEXT to the Elections of the Tropic is the biennial Election of one
Embaſſador in ordinary, by the Ballot of the Houfe, to the Refidence of
France; at which time the Refident of France removes to Spain, he of
Spain to Venice, he of Venice to Conftantinople, and he of Conftanti-
nople returns. So the Orb of the Refidents is wheel'd about in eight years,
by the biennial Election of one Embaſſador in Ordinary.
THE
206
OCEAN A.
THE laft kind of Election is emergent. Emergent Elections are made
by the Scrutiny. Election by Scrutiny is when a Competitor being made
by a Council, and brought into the Senat, the Senat chufes four more Com-
petitors to him, and putting all five to the Ballot, he who has most above
half the Suffrages, is the Magiftrat. The Polemarchs or Field Officers
are chofen by the Scrutiny of the Council of War; an Embaſſador Extra-
ordinary by the Scrutiny of the Council of State; the fudges and Ser-
jeants at Law by the Scrutiny of the Seal; and the Barons and prime
Officers of the Exchequer, by the Scrutiny of the Treafury.
Council
THE Opinion or Opinions that are legitimatly propos'd to any
must be debated by the fame, and ſo many as are refolv'd upon the Debate
are introduc'd into the Senat, where they are debated and refolved, or re-
jected by the whole Houfe: that which is refolv'd by the Senat is a Decree
which is good in matters of State, but no Law, except it be propos'd to and
refolv'd by the Prerogative.
THE Deputys of the Galaxy being three Horfe and four Foot in a
Tribe, amount in all the Tribes to one hundred and fifty Horfe, and two
hundred Foot; which, having enter'd the Prerogative, and chofen their
Captains, Cornet and Enfign (triennial Officers) make the third Claffis,
confifting of one Troop, and one Company; and fo joining with the whole
Prerogative, elect four annual Magiftrats, call'd Tribuns, wherof two are
of the Horfe, and two of the Foot. Theſe have the command of the Pre-
rogative Seffions, and Suffrage in the Council of War, and Seffions without
Suffrage in the Senat.
THE Senat having paft a Decree which they would propofe to the Peo-
ple, caufe it to be printed and publish'd, or promulgated for the space of fix
weeks; which being order'd, they chufe their Propofers. The Propofers
must be Magiftrats, that is, the Commiffioners of the Seal, thofe of the
Treafury, or the Cenfors. Thefe being chofen, defire the Muster of the
Tribuns, and appoint the day. The People being affembl'd at the day ap-
pointed, and the Decree propos'd, that which is propos'd by authority of the
Senat, and commanded by the People, is the Law of Oceana, or an Act of
Parlament.
SO the Parlament of Oceana confifts of the: Senat propofing, and the
People refolving.
THE People or Prerogative are also the Supreme Judicatory of this Na-
tion, having Power of hearing and determining all Causes of Appeal from
all Magiftrats, or Courts Provincial, or Domeftic; as alfo to question any
Magiftrat, the term of his Magiftracy being expir'd, if the cafe be in-
troduc'd by the Tribuns, or any one of them.
THE Military Orbs confift of the Youth, that is, fuch as are from
eighteen to thirty years of age; and are created in the following manner.
EVERY Wednesday next enfuing the last of December, the Youth of
every Parish affembling, elect the fifth of their number to be their Deputys;
the Deputys of the Youth are call'd Stratiots, and this is the first Efay.
EVERY Wedneſday next infuing the laft of January the Stratiots
affembling at the Hundred, elect their Captain and their Enfign, and fall to
their Games and Sports.
EVERY Wednesday next infuing the last of February, the Stratiots
are receiv'd by the Lord Lieutenant their Commander in Chief, with the
Conductors and the Cenfors; and, having bin difciplin' dand entertain'd with
other Games, are call'd to the Urns, where they elect the fecond Effay, con-
fifting of two hundred Horſe and fix hundred Foot in a Tribe; that is, of
ten
O CE A N À.
207
:
1
1.
ten thousand Horfe, and thirty thousand Foot in all the Tribes, which is
the Standing Army of this Nation, to march at any warning. They alfo
elect at the fame time a part of the third Eſſay, by the mixture of Balls
mark'd with the letter M, and the letter P; for Marpefia and Panopea;
they of either mark being ten Horſe and fifty Foot in a Tribe, that is, five
hundred Horfe and two thousand five hundred Foot in all the Tribes, which
are forthwith to march to their respective Provinces.
BUT the third Effay of this Nation more properly fo call'd, is when
the Strategus with the Polemarchs (the Senat and the People, or the Dicta-
tor having decreed a War) receive in return of his Warrants the fecond
Effay from the hands of the Conductors at the Rendevous of Oceana;
which Army marching with all Accommodations provided by the Council of
War, the Senat elects a new Strategus, and the Lords Lieutenants a new
Second Effay.
A YÖUTH, except he be an only Son, refufing any one of his three
Effays, without fufficient caufe fhewn to the Phylarch or the Cenfors, is in-
capable of Magiftracy, and is fin'd a fifth part of his yearly Rent, or of
his Eftate, for Protection. In cafe of Invafion the Elders are oblig'd to
like duty with the Youth, and upon their own charge.
THE Provincial Orb confifting in part of the Elders, and in part of
the Youth, is thus created.
FOUR Knights out of the first Region falling, are elected in the Se-
nat to be the first Region of the Provincial Orb of Marpeſia; theſe being
triennial Magiftrats, take their places in the Provincial Council, confifting
of twelve Knights, four in every Region, each Region chufing their weekly
Provofts of the Council thus conftituted. One Knight more chofen out of
the fame Region in the Senat, being an annual Magiftrat, is Prefident,
with Power to propofe; and the Opinions propos'd by the Prefident, or any
two of the Provofts, are debated by the Council, and, if there be occafion of
farther Power or Inftruction than they yet have, tranfmitted to the Council
of State, with which the Provincial is to hold Intelligence.
THE Prefident of this Council is alſo Strategus, or General of the
Provincial Army; wherfore the Conductors upon notice of his Election, and
appointment of his Rendevous, deliver to him the Stratiots of his Letter,
which he takes with him into his Province: and the Provincial Army
having receiv'd the new Strategus with the third Claffis, the Council dif-
mifles the old Strategus with the firft Claffis. The like is don for Panopea,
or any other Province.
BUT wheras the term of every other Magiftracy or Election in this
Commonwealth, whether annual or triennial, requires an equal Vacation,
the term of a Provincial Counfillor or Magiftrat requires no Vacation at
all. The Quorum of a Provincial, as alſo that of every other Council
and Affembly, requires two thirds in a time of health, and one third in
a time of fickness.
cc
"I THINK I have omitted nothing but the Props and Scaffolds,
"which are not of ufe but in building. And how much is here?
"Shew me another Commonwealth in this compafs? How many
things? Shew me another intire Government confifting but of thirty
"Orders. If
If you now go to Law with any body, there ly to fom
"of our Courts two hundred Original Writs: If you ftir your hand.
"there go more Nerves and Bones to that motion: If you play, you
"have more Cards in the pack; nay you could not fit with your
eaſe
208
OCEAN A.
ria 1. Rag-
"
eaſe in that Chair, if it confifted not of more parts. Will you not
"then allow to your Legiſlator, what you can afford your Upholſter;
se or to the Throne, what is neceffary to a Chair?
પ
"MY LORDS, If you will have fewer Orders in a Common-
wealth, you will have more; for where ſhe is not perfect at firſt,
every day, every hour will produce a new Order, the end wherof is
to have no Order at all, but to grind with the clack of fom Dema-
gog. Is he providing already for his golden Thum? Lift up your
"heads; away with Ambition, that fulfom complexion of a Stateſ-
man, temper'd, like SYLLA's, with blood and muck. And the
"Lord give to his Senators Wisdom; and make our faces to fhine, that
ἐσ we may
be a Light to them that fit in darkness and the ſhadow of death,
to guide their feet in the way of Peace. In the name of God,
"what's the matter!
<<
<<
PHILADELPHUS the Secretary of the Council having per-
form'd his task in reading the feveral Orders as you have feen, upon the
receipt of a Packet from his Correfpondent BOCCALINI, Secretary
of Parnaffus, in reading one of the Letters, burſt forth into ſuch a
violent paffion of weeping and downright howling, that the Legiſla-
tors being ſtartled with the apprehenfion of fom horrid news; one of
them had no fooner fnatch'd the Letter out of his hand, than the reſt
crying, Read, Read, he obey'd in this manner.
THE 38 inftant his Phoebean Majefty having taken the nature of Free
States into his Royal confideration, and being fleadily perfuaded that the
Laws in fuch Governments are incomparably better and more furely directed
to the good of Mankind than in any other; that the Courage of fuch a
Trajano Boc- People is the apteft tinder to noble fire; that the Genius of fuch a Soil is
calini, Centu- that wherin the roots of good Literature are leaft worm-eaten with Pedan-
gual. 21. tifm, and where their Fruits have ever com to the greateſt maturity and
highest relish; conceiv'd fuch a loathing of their Ambition and Tyranny,
who, ufurping the liberty of their native Countrys, becom flaves to them-
felves, inasmuch as (be it never fo contrary to their own Ñature or Con-
Sciences) they have taken the earnest of Sin, and are ingag'd to perfecute
all Men that are good with the fame or greater rigor than is ordain'd by
Laws for the wicked: For * none ever adminiſter'd that Power by
good, which he purchas'd by ill Arts: PHOEBUS, Ifay, having con-
fider'd this, affembr'd all the Senators refiding in the learned Court at the
Theater of MELPOMENE, where he caus'd CASAR the Dictator to
com upon the stage, and his Sifter ACTIA, his Nephew AUGUSTUS,
JULIA bis Daughter, with the Children which she bad by MARCUS
AGRIPPA, LUCIUS and CAIUS CAESARS, AGRIPPA POSTHUMUS,
JULIA, and AGRIPPINA, with the numerous Progeny which she bore
to her renown'd Hufband GERMANICUS, to enter. A miferable Scene
in any, but most deplorable in the eys of CESAR, thus beholding
what havock his prodigious Ambition, not fatisfy'd with his own bloody
Ghost, had made upon his more innocent Remains, even to the total ex-
tinction of his Family. For it is (feeing where there is any humanity,
there must be fom compaffion) not to be spoken without tears, that of the
* Nemo unquam imperium flagitio quæfitum bonis artibus exercuit,
full
OCEAN A.
209
J
full branches deriving from OCTAVIA the elder Sifter, and JULIA
the Daughter of AUGUSTUS, there should not be one fruit or bloſſom
that was not cut off or blasted by the Sword, Famin, or Poison. Now
might the great Soul of CESAR have bin full; and yet that which pour'd
in as much or more, was to behold that execrable race of the CLAUDII,
having hunted and fuck'd his Blood with the thirst of Tigers, to be re-
warded with the Roman Empire, and remain in full poffeflion of that fa-
mous Patrimony: a Spectacle to pollute the Light of Heaven! Neverthe-
lefs as if CESAR had not yet enough, his Phoebean Majefty caus'd to be
"introduc'd on the other fide of the Theatre, the most illuftrious and happy
Prince ANDREA DORIA, with his dear Pofterity, imbrac'd by the
Soft and conftant Arms of the City of Genoa, into whofe bofom, ever fruitful
in her gratitude, he had dropt her fair LIBERTY like the dew of Hea-
ven; which when the Roman Tyrant beheld, and how much more frefis
that Laurel was worn with a firm root in the Hearts of the People, than
that which he had torn off, he fell into fuch a horrid diflortion of limbs and
countenance, that the Senators who had thought themselves feel and flint at
fuch an object, having hitherto flood in their reverend fnowlike thawing
Alps, now cover'd their faces with their large fleeves.
!
}
MY Lords, faid the ARCHON rifing, witty PHILADELPHUS
has given us grave admonition in dreadful Tragedy. Difcite
"juftitiam moniti, & non temnere Divos. Great and glorious Cæfar
the higheſt Character of flesh, yet could not rule but by that part
"of Man which is the beaft: but a Commonwealth is a Monarchy;
to her God is King, in as much as Reafon, his dictat, is her Sove-
rain Power.
"
WHICH faid, he adjourn'd the Council. And the Model was
foon after promulgated. Quod bonum, fælix, fauftumque fit buic Rei-
publica. Agite Quirites, cenfuere Patres, jubeat Populus: The Seà rçar'd,
and the Floods clapt their hands.
i
↑
1
!
7
'
}
...
LIBERTAS.
The Proclamation of his Highnefs the Lord ARCHON of
OCEANA upon Promulgation of the Model.
W
}
!
wis in the
ten of their
Heras his Highnels and the Council, in the framing See the courſe
of the Model promulgated, have not had any private of the Decem-
intereft, or ambition, but the fear of God, and the good promulgation
of this People before their eps; and it remains their desire that of the first
this great Work may be carry'd on accordingly : This present twelve Tables
greeting is to inform the good People of this Land, that as the in LIV r.
Council of Prytans fat during the framing of the Model, to re-
ceive from time to time fuch Propofitions as ſhould be offer'd by
any wifchearted or public spirited man, towards the inftitution
of a well-ozder'd Comwonwealth, fo the faid Council is to ft
as formerly in the great Hall of the Pantheon During Promul-
gation
. Ee
210
OCEAN A.
gation (which is to continue for the space of three months)
to receive, weigh, and, as there ſhall be occafion, tranfmit to the
Council of Legiflatozs, all fuch Objections as ſhall be made a-
gainst the laid Model, whether in the whole, or in any part.
Wherfoze that nothing be don rafhly, oz without the confent
of the People, fuch, of what party foever, with whom there
may remain any doubts o2 difficultys, are defir'd with all
convenient ſpeed to addrefs themſelves to the laid Prytans; where,
if fuch objections, doubts, or difficultys, receive folution to the
fatisfaction of the Auditory, they shall have public thanks :
but if the laid objections, doubts, or difficultys, receive no fo-
lution to the fatisfaction of the Auditory, then the Model pro-
mulgated shall be reviewed, and the party that was the occa-
fion of the review, shall receive public thanks, together with
the belt Hozle in his Highnets's Stable, and be one of the Coun-
cil of Legislators. And fo God have you in his keeping.
I SHOULD now write the fame Council of the Prytans, but for
two reafons; the one, that having had but a ſmall time for that which
is already don, I am overlabour'd; the other, that there may be new
Objections. Wherfore, if my Reader has any fuch as to the Model,
I intreat him to addreſs himſelf by way of Oration, as it were, to the
Prytans, that when this rough draught coms to be a work, his Speech
being faithfully inſerted in this place, may give, or receive correction
to amendment: For what is written will be weigh'd. But Converſa-
tion, in theſe days, is a game, at which they are beſt provided that have
light Gold: It is like the fport of Women that make Flowers of ftraws,
which muſt be ftuck up, but may not be touch'd. Nor, which is
worſe, is this the fault of Converfation only: But to the Examiner,
Arift. Rhet. I fay, If to invent method, and teach an art be all one, let him fhew
that this Method is not truly invented, or this Art is faithfully taught.
I CANNOT conclude a Circle (and fuch is this Common-
wealth) without turning the end into the beginning. The time of
Promulgation being expir'd, the Surveyors were fent down, who
having in due feafon made report that their work was perfect, the
Orators follow'd; under the adminiftration of which Officers and
Magiftrats the Commonwealth was ratify'd and eſtabliſh'd by the
whole body of the People, in their * Parochial, Hundred, and
County Affemblys. And the Orators being, by virtue of their Scrols
or Lots, Members of their refpective Tribes, were elected each the
firſt Knight of the third Lift, or Galaxy; wherfore having at their
return affifted the ARCHON in putting the Senat, and the People
or Prerogative into motion, they abdicated the Magiftracy both of
Orators and Legiſlators.
>
E
Puristic Costumiali. 8. **
The
!
OCEAN A.
211
The COROLLAR Y.
FCURGUS)
OR the reft (fays PLUTARCH, clofing up the Story of Ly-
CURGUS) when he faw that his Government had taken root,
and was in the very Plantation ſtrong enough to ſtand by it ſelf,
he conceiv'd fuch a delight within him, as GOD is defcrib'd by
PLATO to have don when he had finifh'd the Creation of the
World, and faw his own Orbs move below him: For in the Art of
Man (being the imitation of Nature, which is the Art of GOD) || Hobbí.
there is nothing fo like the firſt call of beautiful Order out of Chaos
and Confufion, as the Architecture of a well-order'd Commonwealth.
Wherfore LYCURGUS ſeeing in effect, that his Orders were good,
fell into deep Contemplation how he might render them, ſo far as
could be effected by human Providence, inalterable and immortal.
To which end he affembl'd the People, and remonſtrated to them,
That for ought he could perceive, their Policy was already fuch, and
ſo well eſtabliſh'd, as was fufficient to intail upon them and theirs
all that Virtue and Felicity wherof human Life is capable: Never-
theleſs that there being another thing of greater concern than all
the reft, wherof he was not yet provided to give them a perfect
account, nor could till he had confulted the Oracle of APOLLO,
he defired that they would obferve his Laws without any change
or alteration whatſoever, till his return from Delphos ; to which
all the People chearfully and unanimouſly ingag'd themſelves by pro-
miſe, defiring him that he would make as much hafte as he could.
But LYCURGUS before he went, began with the Kings and the Se-
nators, and thence taking the whole People in order, made them all
fwear to that which they had promis'd, and then took his Journy.
Being arriv'd at Delphos, he facrific'd to APOLLO, and afterwards
inquir'd if the Policy which he had eſtabliſh'd, was good and fuffi-
cient for a virtuous and happy Life? By the way it has bin a Maxim
with Legiflators not to give checks to the prefent Superftition, but to
make the beſt uſe of it, as that which is always the moft powerful
with the People; otherwiſe tho PLUTARCH being a Prieft, was
intereſted in the cauſe, there is nothing plainer than CICERO in his
Book De Divinatione has made it, that there was never any fuch thing
as an Oracle, except in the cunning of the Prieſts. But to be civil to
the Author, The God anfwer'd to LYCURGUS, that his Policy was
exquifit, and that his City, holding to the ſtrict obfervation of his form
of Government, ſhould attain to the height of fame and glory. Which
Oracle LYCURGUS caufing to be written, fail'd not of tranfmitting
to his Lacedemon. This don, that his Citizens might be for ever invi-
olably bound by their Oath, that they would alter nothing till his re-
turn, he took fo firm a reſolution to dy in the place, that from thence-
forward receiving no manner of Food, he foon after perform'd it ac-
cordingly. Nor was he deceiv'd in the confequence; for his City be-
came the first in glory and excellency of Government in the whole
World. And fo much for LYCURGUS according to PLUTARCH,
E e 2
MY
212
OCEAN A.
MY Lord ARCHON when he beheld not only the rapture of
motion, but of joy and harmony, into which his Spheres (without
any manner of obſtruction or interfering, but as if it had been naturally)
were caft, conceiv'd not lefs of exultation in his Spirit; but faw no
more neceffity or reaſon why he ſhould adminifter an Oath to the Senat
and the People that they would obferve his Inftitutions, than to a
Man in perfect health and felicity of Conftitution, that he would not
kill himſelf. Nevertheless wheras Chriftianity, tho' it forbids violent
hands, confiſts no lefs in felfdenial than any other Religion, he re-
folv'd that all unreaſonable Defires fhould dy upon the ſpot; to which
end that no manner of food might be left to Ambition, he enter'd into
the Senat with a unanimous Applauſe, and having ſpoken of his Go-
vernment as LYCURGUS did when he affembl'd the People, he abdi-
cated the Magiſtracy of ARCHON. The Senat, as ftruck with aſto-
niſhment, continu'd filent; Men upon fo fudden an Accident being al-
together unprovided of what to fay; till the ARCHON withdraw-
ing, and being almoft at the door, divers of the Knights flew from
their Places, offering as it were to lay violent hands on him, while he
eſcaping left the Senat with the tears in their Eyes, of Children that
had loft their Father; and to rid himself of all farther importunity,
retir'd to a Country Houfe of his, being remote, and very privat, in
fo much that no man could tell for fome time what was becom of him.
Thus the Lawmaker happen'd to be the first object and reflection of the
Law made for as Liberty of all things is the most welcom to a Peo-
Newer Ingra- ple, fo is there nothing more abhorrent from their nature than Ingra-
titude, but too titude. We accufing the Roman People of this Crime against fom
much Love, of their greateſt Benefactors, as CAMILLUs, heap miftake upon
fault of the miſtake; for being not fo competent Judges of what belongs to Li-
berty as they were, we take upon us to be more competent Judges of
Virtue. And wheras Virtue, for being a vulgar thing among them,
was of no leſs rate than Jewels are with fuch as wear the moft; we
are felling this precious Stone, which we have ignorantly rak'd out
of the Roman ruins at fuch a rate as the Switzers did that which
they took in the Baggage of CHARLES of Burgundy. For that
CAMILLUS had ſtood more firm againſt the ruin of Rome than her
Capitol, was acknowleg'd; but on the other fide that he ftood as
firm for the Patricians against the Liberty of the People, was as plain :
wherfore he never wanted thoſe of the People that would dy at his
foot in the field, nor that would withſtand him to his beard in
the City. An example in which they that think CAMILLUS had
wrong, neither do themſelves right, nor the People of Rome; who in
this fignify no less than that they had a fcorn of Slavery beyond the
fear of Ruin, which is the height of Magnanimity. The like might
be ſhewn by other examples objected againſt this, and other Popular
Governments, as in the Banifhment of ARISTIDES the Just from
Athers, by the Oftracifm, which, firft, was no puniſhment, nor ever
underſtood for fo much as a diſparagement; but tended only to the
Security of the Commonwealth, thro the removal of a Citizen
(whofe Riches or Power with a Party was fufpected) out of harm's
way for the ſpace of ten years, neither to the diminution of his Eſtate
or Honor. And next, tho the virtue of ARISTIDES might in it ſelf
be unqueftion'd, yet for him under the name of the Just to becom
Univerſal Umpire of the People in all cafes, even to the neglect of the
the conftant
People
legal
OCEAN A
213
+
legal ways and orders of the Commonwealth, approach'd fo much
to the Prince, that the Athenians, doing ARISTIDES no wrong,
did their Government no more than right in removing him; which
therfore is not fo probable to have com to pafs, as PLUTARCH
prefumes, thro the envy of THEMISTOCLES, feeing ARISTIDES
was far more popular than THEMIST OCLES, who foon after took
the fame walk upon a worfe occafion. Wherfore as MACHIAVEL,
for any thing fince alledg'd, has irrefragably prov'd that Popular
Governments are of all others the leaft ingrateful; fo the obfcurity,
I fay, into which my Lord ARCHON had now withdrawn himſelf,
caus'd a univerfal ſadneſs and clouds in the minds of Men upon the
glory of his rifing Commonwealth.
MUCH had bin ventilated in privat diſcourſe, and the People
(for the Nation was yet divided into Partys that had not loft their
animofitys) being troubl'd, bent their eys upon the Senat, when, after
fome time ſpent in devotion, and the folemn action of Thankſgiving,
his Excellency NAVARCHUS DE PARALO in the Tribe of Dorean,
Lord Strategus of Oceana (tho in a new Commonwealth a very
prudent Magiſtrat) propos'd his part or opinion in fuch a manner to
the Council of State, that paffing the Ballot of the fame with great
unanimity and applaufe, it was introduc'd into the Senat, where it
paſt with greater. Wherfore the Decree being forthwith printed
and publish'd, Copys were return'd by the Secretarys to the Phylarchs
(which is the manner of Promulgation) and the Commiffioners of the
Seal, that is to fay, the Right Honourable PHOSPHORUS DE AUGE
in the Tribe of Eudia, DOLABELLA D'EN Yo in the Tribe of Tur-
ma, and LINCEUS DE STELLA in the Tribe of Nubia, being elected
Propoſers pro tempore, beſpoke of the Tribuns a Mufter of the People
to be held that day fix weeks, which was the time allow'd for Pro-
mulgation at the Halo.
THE Satisfaction which the People throout the Tribes receiv'd
upon promulgation of the Decree, loaded the Carriers with weekly
Letters between Friend and Friend, whether Magiftrats or privat
Perfons. But the day for Propofition being com, and the Prerogative
upon the place appointed in Difcipline, SANGUINE DE RINGWOOD
in the Tribe of Saltum, Captain of the Phenix, march'd by order
of the Tribuns with his Troop to the Piazza of the Pantheon, where
his Trumpets entering into the great Hall by their Blazon gave no-
tice of his Arrival; at which the Serjeant of the Houfe came down,
and returning inform'd the Propofers, who defcending were receiv'd
at the foot of the Stairs by the Captain, and attended to the Coaches
of State with which CALCAR DE GILVO in the Tribe of Phalera
Maſter of the Horfe, and the Ballotins upon their great Horfes, ftood
waiting at the Gate.
THE Propoſers being in their Coaches, the Train for the Pomp,
the fame that is us'd at the reception of Ambaffadors, proceeded in
this order. In the Front march'd the Troop with the Cornet in
the Van, and the Captain in the Rear: next the Troop came the
twenty Meffengers or Trumpets; the Ballotins upon the Curvet with
their Ufher in the Van, and the Mafter of the Horfe in the Rear:
Next the Ballotins, BRONCHUS DE RAUCO in the Tribe of Beſtia
King of the Heralds, with his Fraternity in their Coats of Arms;
and next to Sir BRONCHUS, BORISTHENES DE HOLIWATER in
the
214
OCEAN A.
the Tribe of Ave, Mafter of the Ceremonys: The Mace and the
Seal of the Chancery went immediately before the Coaches; and on
either fide, the Doorkeepers or Guard of the Senat, with their Pole-
axes, accompany'd with fom three or four hundred Footmen belonging
to the Knights or Senators; the Trumpeters, Ballotins, Guards, Po-
ftilions, Coachmen and Footmen, being very gallant in the Liverys
of the Commonwealth; but all, except the Ballotins, without Hats,
in lieu wherof they wore black velvet Calots, being pointed with a lit-
tle peak at the forehead. After the Propofers came a long file of
Coaches full of fuch Gentlemen as ufe to grace the Commonwealth
upon the like occafions. In this Pofture they mov'd flowly thro the
ftreets (affording in the gravity of the Pomp, and the welcomneſs of
the end, a moft reverend and acceptable Profpect to the People all the
way from the Pantheon, being about half a mile) and arriv'd at the
Halo, where they found the Prerogative in a cloſe body inviron'd with
Scaffolds that were cover'd with Spectators. The Tribuns receiv'd the
Propofers, and conducted them into a Seat plac'd in the front of the
Tribe, like a Pulpit, but that it was of fom length, and well adorn'd
by the Heralds with all manner of Birds and Beafts, except that they
were ill painted, and never a one of his natural color. The Tribuns
were plac'd at a Table that ſtood below the long Seat, thoſe of the
Horſe in the middle, and thoſe of the Foot at either end, with each
of them a Boul or Bafon before him, that on the right hand being
white, and the other green: In the middle of the Table ſtood a third
which was red. And the Houfekeepers of the Pavilion, who had al-
ready deliver'd a proportion of linen Balls or Pellets to every one of the
Tribe, now prefented Boxes to the Ballotins. But the Propofers as
they enter'd the Gallery, or long Seat, having put off their Hats by
way of Salutation, were anfwer'd by the People with a fhout; wher-
upon the
younger Commiffioners feated themſelves at either end } and
the firſt ſtanding in the middle, fpoke after this manner,
..
"c
r
My Lords, the People of Oceana,
WH
1
HILE I find in myſelf what a Felicity it is to falute you
by this Name, and in every Face, anointed as it were with
"the Oil of Gladneſs, a full and fufficient teftimony of the like ſenſe,
<c to go
about to feaſt you with words, who are already fill'd with
"that Food of the mind, which being of pleafing and wholfom di-
geſtion, takes in the definition of true Joy, were a needleſs Enter-
prize. I fhall rather put you in mind of that thankfulneſs which
" is due, than puff you up with any thing that might ſeem vain. Is
"it from the arms of fleſh that we derive theſe Bleffings? Behold the
"Commonwealth of Rome falling upon her own victorious Sword.
"Or is it from our own Wiſdom, whofe Counfils had brought it even
"to that paſs, that we began to repent our felves of Victory? Far be
"it from us, my Lords, to facrifice to our own Nets, which we our
felves have fo narrowly eſcap'd! Let us rather lay our mouths in
"the duſt, and look up (as was taught the other day when we were
"better inſtructed in this Leffon) to the Hills with our Gratitude.
"Nevertheleſs ſeeing we read how God upon the neglect of his Pro-
phets has bin provok'd to wrath, it muſt needs follow that he ex-
pects Honor ſhould be given to them by whom he has chofen to
<
<<
"" work
OCEAN A.
215
*C
"work as his Inftruments. For which caufe, nothing doubting of
my Warrant, I fhall proceed to that which more particularly con-
cerns the preſent occafion, the diſcovery of my Lord ARCHON'S
"Virtues and Merit, to be ever plac'd by this Nation in their true Me-
"ridian,
re
My Lords;
"I AM not upon a Subject which perfuades me to balk, but ne
"ceffitats me to feek out the greateſt Examples. To begin with
"ALEXANDER erecting Trophys common to his Sword and the
"Peftilence; To what good of Mankind did he infect the Air with
"his heap of Carcaffes? The Sword of War, if it be any otherwiſe
"us'd than as the Sword of Magiftracy, for the fear and puniſhment
"of thoſe that do evil, is as guilty in the fight of God, as the Sword
«of a Murderer, nay more, for if the Blood of ABEL, of one in-
"nocent Man, cry'd in the ears of the Lord for Vengeance, what
"ſhall the Blood of an innocent Nation? Of this kind of Empire, the
"Throne of Ambition, and the Quarry of a mighty Hunter, it has
"bin truly faid, that it is but a great Robbery. But if ALEXAN-
"DER had reftor'd the Liberty of Greece, and propagated it to
"mankind, he had don like my Lord ARCHON, and might have
"bin truly call'd the Great. ALEXANDER car'd not to ſteal
<<
a
*
#
Victory that would be given: But my Lord ARCHON has torn
away a Victory which had bin ſtolen, while we went tamely yield-
ing up Obedience to a* Nation reaping in our Fields, whofe Fields The Scotilh
" he has ſubjected to our Empire, and nail'd them with his victorious Royal Lint.
"Sword to their native Caucafus.
<<
“MACHIAVE L gives a handſom caution, Let no Man, fays
"he, be circumvented with the Glory of CESAR, from the falſe re-
"flection of their Pens, who thro the longer continuance of his Em-
"pire in the Name than in the Family, chang'd their Freedom for
Flattery. But if a man would know truly what the Romans
thought of CÆSAR, let them obſerve what they faid of CATI-
<<
<<
«Ε
LIN.
1
!
"AND yet by how much he who has perpetrated ſom heinous
"Crime, is more execrable than he who did but attemt it; by fo
"much is CESAR more execrable than CATILIN. On the con-
trary, let him that would know what antient and heroic Times,
"what the Greecs and Romans would both have thought and faid of
my Lord ARCHON, obferve what they thought and faid of So-
LON, LYCURGUS, BRUTUS, and PUBLICOLA. And yet by
"how much his Virtue, that is crown'd with the perfection of his
"Work, is beyond theirs, who were either inferior in their aim,
"or in their performance; by fo much is my Lord ARCHON to be
prefer'd before SOLON, LYCURGUS, BRUTUS, and PUBLICO-
<<
LA.
"NOR will we fhun the moſt illuſtrious Example of SCIPIO:
"This Hero, tho never fo little leſs, yet was he not the founder of a
"Commonwealth; and for the reft, allowing his Virtue to have bin
"of the moſt untainted Ray, in what did it outfhine this of my
"Lord ARCHON? But if dazling the Eys of the Magiftrats it over-
“aw'd Liberty, Rome might be allow'd fom excuſe that ſhe did not
:
}
"like
216
OCEAN A
1
ર
"like it, and I, if I admit not of this compariſon for where is
:
my
"Lord ARCHON? Is there a Genius, how free foever, which in his
preſence would not find it ſelf to be under power? He is fhrunk in-
to Clouds, he feeks Obſcurity in a Nation that fees by his Light.
"He is impatient of his own Glory, left it ſhould ſtand between you
"and your Liberty.
66
<c
“LIBERTY! What is even that, if we may not be grateful ?
"And if we may, we have none: For who has any thing that he dos
not ow? My Lords, there be fom hard conditions of Virtue: If
"this Debt were exacted, it were not due; wheras being cancel'd,
"we are all enter'd into Bonds. On the other fide, if we make fuch
a payment as will not ftand with a free People, we do not inrich
<c my Lord ARCHON, but rob him of his whole Eftate, and his
"immenfe Glory.
<<
}
A
"THESE Particulars had in due deliberation and mature debate,
"according to the Order of this Commonwealth, It is propos'd by Au-
thority of the Senat, to you my Lords the People of Oceana.
..
"L THAT the Dignity and Office of ARCHON, or Protector
"of the Commonwealth of Oceana, be, and is hereby conferr'd by
"the Senat and the People of Oceana, upon the moſt Illuftrious Prince,
"and fole Legiſlator of this Commonwealth, OLPHAUS MEGA-
LETOR Pater Patria, whom God preſerve, for the term of his
"natural Life.
<<
<c
1
•
་
" II. THAT three hundred and fifty thousand pounds per annum
yet remaining of the antient Revenue, be eſtated upon the faid Il-
luftrious Prince, or Lord ARCHON, for the faid term, and to the
proper and peculiar ufe of his Highneſs.
"III. THAT the Lord ARCHON have the reception of all foren
"Embaffadors, by and with the Council of State, according to the
"Orders of this Commonwealth.
"IV. THAT the Lord ARCHON have a ftanding Army of
"twelve thouſand Men, defray'd upon a monthly Tax, during the
"term of three years, for the protection of this Commonwealth' a-
gainſt diffenting Partys; to be governed, directed, and commanded
"by and with the advice of the Council of war, according to the Or-
"ders of this Commonwealth.
rr
"V. THAT this Commonwealth make no diftinction of Perfons
or Partys, but every man being elected and fworn, according to the
"Orders of the fame, be equally capable of Magiftracy; or not elected,
"be equally capable of Liberty, and the injoyment of his Eftate free
" from all other than common Taxes."
}: ) ..
"VI THAT a man putting a diſtinction upon himſelf, re-
"fufing the Oath upon Election, or declaring himſelf of a Party
not conformable to the Civil Government, may within any time.
"of the three years. ftanding of the Army, tranfport himſelf and
"his Eftate, without moleftation or impediment, into any other Na
“tion.
}
« VII. THAT in caſe there remains any diſtinction of Partys not
"conforming to the Civil Government of this Commonwealth, af-
ter the three years of the ftanding army being expir'd, and the Com
"monwealth be therby forc'd to prolong the term of the faid Ar-
my, the pay from thenceforth of the faid Army be levy'd upon the
"Eftates
·
1
OCEAN A
* Eſtates of fuch Partys fo remaining unconformable to the Civil Go-
re
vernment.
THE propofer having ended his Oration, the Trumpets founded;
and the Tribuns of the Horſe being mounted to view the Ballot, caus'd
the Tribe (which thronging up to the Speech, came almoſt round
the Gallery) to retreat about twenty paces, when LINCEUS DE
STELLA receiving the Propofitions, repair'd with BRONCHUS
DE RAUCO the Herald, to a little Scaffold erected in the middle of
the Tribe, where he ſeated himſelf, the Herald ſtanding bare upon
his right hand. The Ballotins having their Boxes ready, ſtood before
the Gallery, and at the command of the Tribuns march'd, one to eve-
ry Troop on Horſeback, and one to every Company on Foot; each of
them being follow'd by other Children that bore red Boxes: now this
is putting the Queſtion whether the Queſtion ſhould be put. And
the Suffrage being very ſuddenly return'd to the Tribuns at the Table,
and number'd in the view of the Propofers, the Votes were all in the
Affirmative: wherupon the red or doubtful Boxes were laid afide, it
appearing that the Tribe, whether for the Negative or Affirmative,
was clear in the matter. Wherfore the Herald began from the Scaf-
fold in the middle of the Tribe, to pronounce the firft Propofition,
and the Ballotins marching with the Negative or Affirmative only,
BRONCHUS with his Voice like Thunder, continu'd to repeat the
Propofition over and over again, fo long as it was in Balloting. The
like was don for every Claufe, till the Ballot was finish'd, and the
Tribuns affembling, had fign'd the Points, that is to ſay, the number
of every Suffrage, as it was taken by the Secretary upon the tale of
the Tribuns, and in the fight of the Propofers; for this may not be
omitted, it is the pulfe of the People. Now wheras it appertains to
the Tribuns to report the Suffrage of the People to the Senat, they caft
the Lot for this Office with three filver Balls, and one gold one; and
it fell upon the Right Worſhipful ARGUS DE CROOKHORN in
the Tribe of Pascua, firſt Tribun of the Foot. ARGUS being a good
fufficient man in his own Country, was yet of the mind that he ſhould
make but a bad Spokefman; and therfore became fomthing blank at
his luck, till his Collegues perfwaded him that it was no fuch great
matter, if he could but read, having his Paper before him. The Pro-
pofers taking Coach, receiv'd a Volly upon the Field, and return'd
in the fame order, fave that being accompany'd with the Tribuns,
they were alſo attended by the whole Prerogative to the Piazza of the
Pantheon, where with another Volly they took their Leaves. ARGUS,
who had not thought upon his Wife and Children all the way, went
very gravely up and every one being feated, the Senat by their fi-
lence feem'd to call for the Report; which ARGUs ftanding up, deli-
ver'd in this wife,
::
८८
<<
S
•
Right Honorable Lords and Fathers aſſembl'd in Parlament
;
O it is, that it has fal'n to my Lot to report to your Excellencys
the Votes of the People, taken upon the third inftant, in the
"first year of this Commonwealth, at the Halo; the Right Hono-
"rable PHOSPHORUS DE AUGE in the Tribe of Eudia, DOLA-
BELLA DE ENYO in the Tribe of Turma, and LINCEUS DE
Ff
STELLA
217
218
OCEAN A.
"STELLA in the Tribe of Nubia, Lords Commiffioners of the
"Great Seal of Oceana, and Propofers pro temporibus-together
"with my Brethren the Tribuns, and my ſelf being preſent. Wher-
"fore theſe are to certify to your Fatherhoods, that the faid Votes
"of the People were as follows; that is to fay:
"TO the firſt Propofition, Nemine contradicante-
"TO the ſecond, Nemine contradictante-
"TO the third, the like.
"TO the fourth 211, above half.
"TO the fifth 201, above half.
"TO the fixth 150, above half, in the Affirmative.
"TO the feventh, Nomine again, and fo forth
:
"MY LORDS, It is a Language that is out of my Prayers, and
"if I be out at it, no harm--
<c
<<
•
66
"BUT as concerning my Lord ARCHON (as I was ſaying)
"theſe are to fignify to you the true-heartedneſs and good-will which
"is in the People, feeing by joining with you, as one man, they confefs
"that all they have to give, is too little for his Highnefs. For truly,
Fathers, if he who is able to do harm, and dos none, may well be
"call'd honeft; What fhall we fay to my Lord ARCHON'S High-
nefs, who having had it in his power to have don us the greateſt
"miſchief that ever befel a poor Nation, fo willing to truft fuch as
they thought well of, has don us fo much good, as we ſhould never
"have known how to do ourſelves? which was fo fweetly deliver'd
by my Lord Chancellor PHOSPORUS to the People, that I dare
fay there was never a one of them could forbear to do as I do-
"An't pleaſe your Fatherhoods, they be tears of Joy. Ay, my Lord
"ARCHON fhall walk the Streets (if it be for his eafe I mean)
"with a ſwitch, while the People run after him and pray for him:
"he fhall not wet his foot; they will ftrew flowers in his way: he
"fhall fit higher in their hearts, and in the Judgment of all good men,
" than the Kings that go up ſtairs to their Seats; and one of theſe had
as good pull two or three of his fellows out of their great Chairs,
as wrong him, or meddle with him; he has two or three hundred
"thouſand men, that when you fay the word, fhall fell themſelves
"to their ſhirts for him, and dy at his foot. His Pillow is of Down,
"and his Grave ſhall be as foft, over which they that are alive ſhall
wring their hands. And to com to your Fatherhoods, moſt truly
"fo call'd, as being the loving Parents of the People, truly you do
not know what a feeling they have of your Kindnefs, feeing you
"are fo bound up, that if there coms any harm, they may thank
"themſelves. And, alas! poor Souls, they fee that they are given
"to be of fo many minds, that tho they always mean well, yet if
"there coms any good, they may thank them that teach them better.
"Wherfore there was never fuch a thing as this invented, they do ve-
rily believe that it is no other than the fame which they always
"had in their very heads, if they could have but told how to bring
"it out. As now for a fample; My Lords the Propofers had no
"fooner faid your minds, than they found it to be that which heart
"could wiſh. And your Fatherhoods may comfort yourſelves, that
"there is not a People in the world more willing to learn what is for
LE
(c
<c
(c
"their
ОСЕ
OCEAN .
NĂÀ
219
"their own good, nor more apt to fee it, when you have fhew'd it
"them. Wherfore they do love you as they do their own felves;
"honour you as Fathers; refolve to give you as it were Obedience
"for ever: and fo thanking you for your moft good and excellent
"Laws, they do pray for you as the very Worthys of the Land,
Right Honorable Lords and Fathers affembl'd in Parlament.
ARGUS came off beyond his own expectation; for thinking right,
and fpeaking as he thought, it was apparent by the Houſe, and the
thanks they gave him, that they efteem'd him to be abfolutely of the
beſt fort of Orators; upon which having a mind that till then mif-
gave him, he became very crounfe, and much delighted with that which
might go down the next week in print to his Wife and Neighbors.
LIVY makes the Roman Tribuns to ſpeak in the fame ftile with the
Confuls, which could not be, and therfore for ought in him to the
contrary, VOLERO and CANULEIUS might have ſpoken in no
better ſtile than ARGUS. However, they were not created the firſt
year of the Commonwealth; and the Tribuns of Oceana are fince
becom better Orators than were needful. But the Laws being enacted,
had the Preamble annex'd, and were deliver'd to BRONCHUS, who
lov'd nothing in the Earth ſo much as to go ſtaring and bellowing up
and down the Town, like a ftag in a Foreſt, as he now did, with
his fraternity in their Coats of Arms, and I know not how many
Trumpets, proclaiming the Act of Parlament; when meeting my
Lord ARCHON, who from a retreat that was without Affectation,
as being for Devotion only, and to implore a Bleffing by Prayer and
Fafting upon his Labors, now newly arriv'd in Town, the Herald of
the Tribe of Beftia fet up his throat, and having chanted out his
Leffon, paft as haughtily by him, as if his own had bin the better
Office; which in this place was very well taken, tho BRONCHUS
for his high mind happen'd afterward upon ſom diſaſters, too long to
tell, that ſpoil'd much of his Imbroidery.
MY Lord ARCHON'S Arrival being known, the Signory, ac-
company'd by the Tribuns, repair'd to him, with the news he had
already heard by the Herald; to which my Lord Strategus added,
That his Highnefs could not doubt upon the Demonftrations given,
but the minds of men were firm in the opinion, that he could be no
ſeeker of himſelf in the way of earthly Pomp and Glory; and that
the Gratitude of the Senat, and the People, could not therfore be un-
derſtood to have any fuch reflection upon him. But fo it was, that in
regard of Dangers abroad, and Partys at home, they durft not truſt
themſelves without a ſtanding Army, nor a ſtanding Army in any
man's hands but thofe of his Highnefs.
THE ARCHON made anfwer, that he ever expected this would
be the ſenſe of the Senat and the People; and this being their ſenſe,
he ſhould have bin forry they had made choice of any other than him-
ſelf for a ſtanding General: Firſt, Becauſe it could not have bin more
to their own ſafety: And, Secondly, Becauſe ſo long as they ſhould
have need of a ſtanding Army, his work was not done: That he would
not diſpute againſt the Judgment of the Senat and the People, nor ought
that to be. Nevertheleſs, he made little doubt but experience would
fhew every Party their own Intereft in this Government, and that bet-
ter improv'd than they could expect from any other; that Mens ani-
Ff2
mofitys
220
OCEAN A.
mofitys ſhould overbalance their Intereft for any time, was impoffi
ble; that humour could never be lafting, nor thro the Conftitution of
the Government, of any effect at the firft charge. For fuppofing
the worſt, and that the People had chofen no other into the Senat
and the Prerogative than Royaliſts, a matter of fourteen hundred
men muſt have taken their Oaths at their Election, with an intention
to go quite contrary, not only to their Oaths fo taken, but to their
own Intereft; for being eftated in the Soverain Power, they muſt
have decreed it from themſelves (fuch an example for which there
was never any experience, nor can there be any reaſon) or holding it,
it muſt have don in their hands as well every whit as in any other.
Furthermore, they muſt have remov'd the Government from a Foun-
dation that apparently would hold, to fet it upon another which арт
parently would not hold; which things if they could not com to pafs,
the Senat and the People confifting wholly of Royaliſts, much leſs
by a parcel of them elected. But if the fear of the Senat and of the Peo-
ple deriv'd from a Party without, fuch a one as would not be elected,
nor ingage themſelves to the Commonwealth by an Oath; this again
muſt be ſo large, as would go quite contrary to their own Intereſt,
they being as free and as fully eftated in their Liberty as any other,
or fo narrow that they could do no hurt, while the People being in
Arms, and at the beck of the Strategus, every Tribe would at any
time make a better Army than fuch a Party: and there being no
Partys at home, fears from abroad would vaniſh. But feeing it was
otherwiſe determin'd by the Senat and the People, the beſt courſe
was to take that which they held the ſafeſt, in which with his humble
thanks for their great bounty, he was refolv'd to ferve them with all
Duty and Obedience.
A VERY fhort time after the Royalifts, now equal Citizens,
made good the ARCHON'S Judgment, there being no other that
found any thing near fo great a fweet in the Government. For he
who has not bin acquainted with Affliction, fays SENECA, knows
but half the things of this world.
MOREOVER they faw plainly, that to restore the antient Go-
vernment they muſt caft up their Eftates into the hands of three
hundred men; wherfore in cafe the Senat and the Prerogative, confifting
of thirteen hundred men, had bin all Royaliſts, there muft of ne-
ceffity have bin, and be for ever, one thouſand againſt this or any
fuch Vote. But the Senat being inform'd by the Signory, that the
ARCHON had accepted of his Dignity and Office, caus'd a third
Chair to be fet for his Highneſs, between thofe of the Strategus and
the Orator in the Houſe, the like at every Council; to which he re-
pair'd, not of neceffity, but at his pleaſure, being the beſt, and, as
ARGUS not vainly faid, the greateſt Prince in the World for in the
Pomp of his Court he was not inferior to any, and in the Field he was
follow'd with a Force that was formidable to all. Nor was there a
cauſe in the nature of this Conſtitution to put him to the charge of
Guards, to ſpoil his ſtomach or his fleep: Infomuch, as being hand-
fomly diſputed by the Wits of the Academy, whether my Lord
ARCHON, if he had bin ambitious, could have made himſelf fo
great, it was carry'd clear in the Negative; not only for the Reaſons
drawn from the prefent balance, which was Popular; but putting the
caſe the balance had bin Monarchical. For there be fom Nations,
wherof
OCEAN A.
22 I
wherof this is one, that will bear a Prince in a Commonwealth far
higher than it is poffible for them to bear a Monarch. Spain look'd
upon the Prince of Orange as her moſt formidable Enemy; but if ever
there be a Monarch in Holland, he will be the Spaniards beſt friend.
For wheras a Prince in a Commonwealth derives his Greatneſs from
the root of the People, a Monarch derives his from one of thoſe ba-
lances which nip them in the root; by which means the Low Countrys
under a Monarch were poor and inconfiderable, but in bearing a
Prince could grow to a miraculous height, and give the Glory of his
Actions by far the upper hand of the greateſt King in Christendom.
There are Kings in Europe, to whom a King of Oceana would be but
a petit Companion. But the Prince of this Commonwealth is the Ter-
ror and Judg of them all.
THAT which my Lord ARCHON now minded moft, was the
Agrarian, upon which Debate he inceffantly thruft the Senat and the
Council of State; to the end it might be planted upon ſom firm root,
as the main point and baſis of perpetuity to the Commonwealth.
AND theſe are ſom of the moſt remarkable Paffages that happen'd
in the firſt year of this Government. About the latter end of the fe-
cond, the Army was disbanded, but the Taxes continu'd at thirty
thouſand Pounds a month, for three years and a half. By which
means a piece of Artillery was planted, and a portion of Land to the
value of 50 l. a year purchas'd for the maintenance of the Games, and
of the Prize arms for ever, in each Hundred.
WITH the eleventh year of the Commonwealth, the term of
the Exciſe, allotted for the maintenance of the Senat and the People
and for the raiſing of a public Revenue expir'd. By which time
the Exchequer, over and above the annual Salarys, amounting to
three hundred thouſand Pounds, accumulating every year out of one
Million incom feven hundred thouſand Pounds in Banco, brought it
with a product of the Sum, riſing to about eight Millions in the whole :
wherby at feveral times they had purchas'd to the Senat and the Peo-
ple four hundred thouſand Pounds per annum folid Revenue; which,
befides the Lands held in Panopea, together with the Perquifits of ei-
ther Province, was held fufficient for a public Revenue. Nevertheleſs,
Taxes being now wholly taken off, the Excife of no great burden
(and many fpecious advantages not vainly propos'd in the heightning
of the public Revenue) was very chearfully eſtabliſh'd by the Senat
and the People, for the term of ten years longer; and the fame courſe
being taken, the public Revenue was found in the one and twentieth
of the Commonwealth, to be worth one Million in good Land. Wher-
upon the Excife was fo abolish'd for the prefent, as withal refolv'd
to be the beſt, the moſt fruitful and eafy way of raifing Taxes, ac-
cording to future Exigences. But the Revenue being now fuch as was
able to be a yearly Purchafer, gave a jealouſy that by this means the
balance of the Commonwealth, confifting in privat Fortunes, might
be eaten out; whence this year is famous for that Law wherby the
Senat and the People forbidding any further purchaſe of Lands to the
Public within the Dominions of Oceana and the adjacent Provinces,
put the Agrarian upon the Commonwealth herſelf. Thefe Increaſes
are Things which Men, addicted to Monarchy, deride as impoffible,
wherby they unwarily urge a ftrong Argument againſt that which
they would defend. For having their eys fix'd upon the Pomp and
Expence,
1
2:22
O ĆE AN A.
Expence, by which not only every Child of a King being a Prince,
exhauſts his Father's Coffers; but Favorits and fervil Spirits, devoted
to the flattery of thofe Princes, grow infolent and profufe, returning
a fit Gratitude to their Maſters, whom while they hold it honorable
to deceive, they fuck and keep eternally poor: It follows that they
do not fee how it fhould be poffible for a Commonwealth to clothe
her ſelf in Purple, and thrive fo ftrangely upon that which would
make a Prince's hair grow thro his hood, and not afford him bread.
As if it were a Miracle that a careleſs and prodigal Man fhould bring
ten thouſand Pounds a year to nothing, or that an induftrious and frugal
Man brings a little to ten thouſand Pounds a year. But the fruit of
one man's induſtry and frugality can never be like that of a Common-
wealth; Firſt, becauſe the greatneſs of the Increaſe follows the great-
nefs of the Stock or Principal: And, Secondly, becauſe a frugal Father
is for the most part fucceded by a laviſh Son; wheras a Commonwealth
is her own Heir,
THIS year a part was propos'd by the Right Honorable Au-
REUS DE WOOLSACK in the Tribe of Pecus, firft Commiffioner
of the Treaſury, to the Council of State, which foon after paſt the
Ballot of the Senat and the People: by which the Lands of the Public
Revenue, amounting to one Million, were equally divided into five
thouſand Lots, enter'd by their names and parcels into a Lotbook pre-
ferv'd in the Exchequer. And if any Orphan, being a Maid, ſhould
caft her Eftate into the Exchequer for fourteen hundred Pounds, the
Treaſury was bound by the Law to pay her quarterly two hundred
Pounds a year, free from Taxes, for her Life, and to affign her a Lot
for her Security if ſhe marry'd, her Huſband was neither to take
out the Principal without her confent (acknowleg'd by her felf to
one of the Commiffioners of the Treafury, who according as he found
it to be free, or forc'd, was to allow or difallow of it) nor any other
way ingage it, than to her proper ufe. But if the Principal were
taken out, the Treaſury was not bound to repay any more of it than
one thouſand Pounds; nor might that be repaid at any time, fave
within the first year of her Marriage: the like was to be don by a half
or quarter Lot reſpectively.
THIS was found to be a great Charity to the weaker Sex, and as
ſom ſay, who are more ſkilful in the like Affairs than my ſelf, of good
Profit to the Commonwealth.
NOW began the Native Spleen of Oceana to be much purg'd, and
Men not to affect Sullenneſs and Pedantifm. The Elders could re-
member that they had bin Youth. Wit and Gallantry were fo far
from being thought Crimes in themſelves, that care was taken to pre-
ferve their innocence. For which caufe it was propos'd to the Coun-
cil for Religion by the Right Honorable CADISCUS DE CLERO,
in the Tribe of Stamnum, firft Cenfor, That fuch Women as living
in Gallantry and View about the Town, were of evil fame, and could
not ſhew that they were maintain'd by their own Eſtates or Induſtry;
or fuch as having Eſtates of their own, were yet waftful in their way
of life, and of ill example to others, fhould be obnoxious to the
animadverfion of the Council of Religion, or of the Cenfors: In
which the proceeding ſhould be after this manner. Notice ſhould be
firft given of the ſcandal to the Party offending, in privat: if there
were no amendment within the ſpace of fix months, ſhe ſhould be
fummon'd
OCEAN A
223
fummon'd and rebuk'd before the faid Council or Cenfors; and, if af-
ter other fix months it were found that neither this avail'd, ſhe ſhould
be cenfured not to appear at any public Meetings, Games, or Recrea-
tions, upon penalty of being taken up by the Doorkeepers, or Guards
of the Senat, and by them to be detain'd, till for every fuch Offence,
five Pounds were duly paid for her inlargement.
FURTHERMORE, if any common Strumpet fhould be found
or any fcurrility or profaneneſs reprefented at, either of the Theaters,
the Prelats for every fuch Offence ſhould be fin'dtwenty Pounds by the
faid Council, and the Poet, for every fuch offence on his part, ſhould be
whipt. This Law relates to another, which was alſo enacted the fame
year upon this occafion.
THE Youth and Wits of the Academy having put the Bufinefs
ſo home in the defence of Comedys, that the Provoſts had nothing but
the Confequences provided againſt by the foregoing Law to object,'
prevail'd fo far, that two of the Provoſts of the Council of State
join'd in a Propofition, which after much ado came to a Law, wher-
by one hundred thouſand pounds was allotted for the building of two
Theaters on each fide of the Piazza of the Halo: and two annual Ma-
giftrats called Prelats, chofen out of the Knights, were added to the
Tropic, the one call'd the Prelat of the Bufkin, for inſpection of the
Tragic Scene call'd Melpomene; and the other the Prelat of the Sock,
for the Comic call'd Thalia, which Magiftrats had each five hundred
pounds a year allow'd out of the Profits of the Theaters; the reſt,
except eight hundred a year to four Poets, payable into the Exchequer.
A Poet Laureat created in one of thefe Theaters, by the Strategus re-
ceives a Wreath of five hundred pounds in Gold, paid out of the faid
Profits. But no man is capable of this Creation, that had not two
parts in three of the Suffrages at the Academy, affembl'd after fix
weeks warning, and upon that occafion.
THESE things among us are fure enough to be cenfur'd, but by
fuch only as do not know the nature of a Commonwealth : for to tell
men that they are free, and yet to curb the genius of a People in a
lawful Recreation, to which they are naturally inclin'd, is to tell a tale
of a Tub. I have heard the Proteſtant Minifters in France, by men
that were wife, and of their own profeffion, much blam'd in that
they forbad Dancing, a Recreation to which the Genius of that Air is
fo inclining, that they loft many who would not lofe that: Nor do
they leſs than blame the former determination of rafhnefs, who now
gently connive at that which they had fo roughly forbidden. Thefe
Sports in Oceana are fo govern'd, that they are pleafing for privat di-
verfion, and profitable to the Public: For the Theaters foon defray'd
their own charge, and now bring in a good Revenue. All this is fo
far from the detriment of Virtue, that it is to the improvement of it,
ſeeing Women that heretofore made havock of their Honors that they
might have their Pleafures, are now incapable of their Pleafures, if
they loſe their Honors.
ABOUT the one and fortieth year of the Commonwealth, the
Cenfors, according to their annual Cuſtom, reported the Pillar of Ni-
lus, by which it was found that the People were increas'd very near
one third. Wherupon the Council of War was appointed by the Se-
nat to bring in a State of War, and the Treaſurers the State of the Trea-
fury. The State of War, or the Pay and Charge of an Army, was foon
after exhibited by the Council in this Account.
The
224
OCEAN A.
General
The Field Pay of a Parlamentary Army.
THE Lord Strategus, Marching
Polemarchs.
General of the Horſe-
Lieutenant General
General of the Artillery-
Commiffary General
Major General
Quartermafter
1. per. ann.
-10000.
-2000.
2000.
1000.
1000.
1000.
1000.
Two Adjutants to the Major General
∙1000.
Forty Colonels
40000.
100 Captains of Horfe, at 500 l. a Man
50000.
300 Captains of Foot, at 300 l. a Man
-90000.
100 Cornets, at 100, a Man-
-10000.
300 Enfigns, at 50 1. a Man
15000.
Quartermasters
800
Serjeants
Trumpeters
20000
Drummers
10000 Horſe, at 2s. 6d. per day each
470000.
30000 Foot, at I s. per day each.
500000.
Chirurgeons-
400:
Sum-II14400:
40000 Auxiliarys, amounting to within a little as much-1100000.
THE Charge of mounting 20000 Horſe-
THE Train of Artillery, holding a 3d to the whole-
-300000.
900000.
Summa totalis-1414400.
ARMS and Ammunition are not reckon'd, as thofe which are
furniſht out of the Store or Arfenal of Emporium: Nor waftage, as
that which gos upon the account of the Fleet, maintain'd by the Cu-
ftoms; which Cuſtoms, thro the care of the Council for Trade, and
growth of Traffic, were long fince improv'd to about a Million Reve-
nue. The Houſe being thus inform'd of a State of War, the Com-
miffioners brought in
THE ftate of the Treaſury this preſent year, being the one
and fortieth of the Commonwealth.
R
1.
ECEIVED from the one and twentieth of this
Commonwealth, by 700000l. a year in bank, with 16000000
the Product of the Sum rifing-
EX-
O CÈ A N A.
225
+
I
EXPENDED from the one and twentieth of this
Commonwealth.
IMP
MPRIMIS, For the Addition of Arms for 100000
Men to the Arfenal, or Tower of Emporium.
FOR the ſtoring of the fame with Artillery-
FOR the ftoring of the fame with Ammunition
FOR beautifying the Citys, Parks, Gardens, Publick
Walks, and Places for Recreation of Emporium and
Hiera, with Public Buildings, Aquæducts, Sta-
tues, and Fountains, &c.
EXTRAORDINARY Embaffys
41
1.
1000000.
၁ဝဝဝဖ
300000.
200000.
1500000.
I 50000.
Sum-3150000.
REMAINING in the Treafury, the Salarys of the 12000000.
Exchequer being defalk'd.
BY compariſon of which Accounts if a War with an Army of 80000
Men were to be made by the Penny, yet was the Commonwealth able
to maintain ſuch a one above three years, without levying a Tax. But
it is againſt all Experience, Senfe and Reaſon, that fuch an Army ſhould
not be foon broken, or make a great progrefs; in either of which
cafes, the Charge ceafes; or rather if a right courſe be taken in the lat-
ter, Profit coms in: for the Romans had no other confiderable way
but Victory wherby to fill their Treaſury, which nevertheleſs was
feldom emty. ALEXANDER did not confult his Purſe
upon his De-
fign for Perfia: It is obferv'd by MACHIAVEL, that LIVY ar-
guing what the event in reafon muſt have bin had that king invaded
Rome, and diligently meaſuring what on each fide was neceflary to
fuch a War, never fpeaks a word of Mony. No man imagins that
the Gauls, Goths, Vandals, Huns, Lombards, Saxons, Normans, made
their Inroads or Conquefts, by the ftrength of the Purfe; and if it be
thought enough, according to the dialect of our Age, to ſay in anſwer
to theſe things, that thofe times are paft and gòn: what Mony did the
late GUSTAVUS, the most victorious of modern Princes, bring out
of Sweden with him into Germany? An Army that gos upon a golden
Leg, will be as lame as if it were a wooden one; but proper Forces
have Nerves and Muſcles in them, fuch for which, having four or five
Millions, a Sum eafy enough, with a Revenue like this of Oceana, to
be had at any time in readinefs, you need never, or very rarely charge.
the People with Taxes. What influence the Commonwealth by fuch
Arms has had upon the World, I leave to Hiftorians, whoſe cuſtom it
has bin of old, to be as diligent obfervers of foren Actions, as careleſs
of thoſe domeftic Revolutions which (lefs pleaſant it may be, as not
partaking fo`much of the Romance) are to Stateſmen of far greater
profit; and this Fault, if it be not mine, is fo much more fre-
quent with modern Writers, as has caus'd me to undertake this
Work; on which to give my own Judgment, it is perform'd as much.
above the time I have bin about it, as below the dignity of the
matter.
Gg
BUT
226
OCEAN A
Plutarch in
moleon.
<
BUT I cannot depart out of this Country, till I have taken leave
of my Lord ARCHON, a Prince of immenfe Felicity, who having
built as high with his Counfils, as he dig'd deep with his Sword, had
now ſeen fifty years meaſur'd with his own inerring Orbs.
TIMO LEON (fuch a hater of Tyrants that not able to perfuade
the life of Ti- his Brother TIMOPHANES to relinquish the Tyranny of Corinth, he
flew him) was afterwards elected by the People (the Sicilians groaning
to them from under the like burden) to be fent to their relief: Wherupon
TELECLIDES the Man at that time of moft Authority in the Common-
wealth of Corinth, ſtood up, and giving an Exhortation to TIMOLEON,
how he ſhould behave himſelf in this Expedition, told him, that if he
reſtor❜d the Sicilians to Liberty, it would be acknowledg'd that he
deftroy'd a Tyrant; if otherwife, he muſt expect to hear he had
murder'd a King. TIMOLEON taking his leave, with a very ſmall
Provifion for fo great a Defign, purfu'd it with a Courage not infe-
rior to, and a Felicity beyond any that had bin known to that day
in mortal. Fleſh, having in the ſpace of eight years utterly rooted
out of all Sicily thofe Weeds of Tyranny, thro the deteftation
wherof men fled in fuch abundance from their Native Country, that
whole Citys were left defolat; and brought it to fuch a pafs, that o-
thers thro the Fame of his Virtues, and the excellency of the Soil,
flock'd as faſt from all quarters to it, as to the Garden of the World:
While he, being prefented by the People of Syracufa with his Town-
houfe, and his Country Retreat, the ſweeteſt Places in either, liv'd
with his Wife and Children a moft quiet, happy, and holy Life
for he attributed no part of his Succefs to himſelf, but all to the Bleſ-
fing and Providence of the Gods. As he paſt his time in this man-
ner, admir'd and honour'd by Mankind, LAPHISTIUS an envious
Demagog, going to fummon him upon fom pretence or other to an-
ſwer for himſelf before the Affembly, the People fell into fuch a Mu-
tiny, as could not be appeas'd but by TIMOLEON, who under-
ftanding the matter, reprov'd them, by repeating the pains and travel
which he had gone thro, to no other end than that every Man might
have the free uſe of the Laws. Wherfore when DEMENETUS ano-
ther Demagog, had brought the fame Deſign about again, and blam'd
him impertinently to the People for things which he did when he was
General, TIMOLEON anfwer'd nothing, but raifing up his hands,
gave the Gods thanks for their return to his frequent Prayers, that he
might but live to fee the Syracufians fo free, that they could queſtion
whom they pleas'd.
;
NOT long after, being old, thro fom natural imperfection, he fell
blind; but the Syracufans by their perpetual vifits held him, tho he
could not fee, their greateft Object: if there arriv'd Strangers,
they brought him to fee this fight. Whatever came in debate at the
Affembly, if it were of fmall confequence, they determin'd it them-
felves; but if of importance, they always fent for TIMOLEON;
who being brought by his Servants in a Chair, and fet in the middle
of the Theater, there ever followed a great fhout, after which fom
time was allow'd for the Benedictions of the People; and then the
matter propos'd, when TIMOLEON had fpoken to it, was put to
the Suffrage; which given, his Servants bore him back in his Chair,
accompany'd by the People clapping their hands, and making all ex-
preffions of Joy and Applaufe, till leaving him at his Houfe, they re-
turn'd
OCEAN A.
227
turn'd to the diſpatch of their Buſineſs. And this was the Life of
TIMOLEON, till he dy'd of Age, and drop'd like a mature Fruit
while the Eys of the People were as the Showers of Autumn.
THE Life and Death of my Lord ARCHON (but that he had
his Senſes to the laft, and that his Character, as not the Reftorer, but
the Founder of a Commonwealth, was greater) is fo exactly the
fame, that (feeing by Men wholly ignorant of Antiquity, I am ac-
cus'd of writing Romance) I fhall repeat nothing: but tell you that
this year the whole Nation of Oceana, even to the Women and Chil-
dren, were in mourning, where fo great or fad a Funeral Pomp had
never bin ſeen or known. Somtime after the performance of the
Exequys, a Colofus, mounted on a brazen Horſe of excellent Fabric,
was erected in the Piazza of the Pantheon, ingrav'd with this Infcrip-
tion on the Eaſtern fide of the Pedeſtal:
HIS
NAME
IS AS
Precious Ointment.
And on the Weſtern with the Following:
*
:
G'g 2
{
GRATA
228
GRATA PATRIA
Piæ & Perpetuæ Memoria
D. D.
Olphaus Megaletor
Lord ARCHON, and fole LEGISLATOR
OF
OCEAN A.
Pater Patriæ.
Invincible in the Field.
Inviolable in his Faith.
Unfained in his Zeal.
Immortal in his Fame.
The Greatest of Captains.
The Best of Princes.
The Happiest of Legislators.
The Most Sincere of Chriftians.
Who fetting the Kingdoms of Earth at Liberty,
Took the Kingdom of the Heavens by Violence;
Ætat. fuæ 116.
Anno
Hujus Reipub. 50.
THE
PREROGATIVE
OF
POPULAR GOVERNMENT.
BEING A
POLITICAL DISCOURSE
In Two Books.
The former
Concerning the firſt Preliminary of Oceana, in-
larg'd, interpreted, and vindicated from all
fuch Miſtakes or Slanders as have bin alleg’d
againſt it under the Notion of Objections.
The Second
Concerning Ordination, againſt Dr. H. HAMMOnd,
Dr. L. SEAMAN, and the Authors they follow.
In which two Books is contain'd the whole Commonwealth of the
Hebrews, or of Ifrael, Senat, People, and Magiſtracy, both as it
ftood in the Inftitution by MOSES, and as it came to be form'd af-
ter the Captivity.
As alſo the different Policys introduc'd into the Church of CHRIST,
during the time of the Apoſtles.
Without Council Purpoſes are diſappointed; but in the Multitude of Counfillors
they are establish'd. SOLOMON.
La multitudine è piu Savia è piu coſtante ch'un Principe. MACHIAVEL.
1
:
230
EPISTLE to the READ E R.
DE
W
HOSOEVER fheds man's blood, by man ſhall his
blood be ſhed, for in the Image of God made he
Man. If this Rule holds as well in Shedding the blood
of a Turk as of a Chriftian, then that wherin Man
is the Image of God is REASON. Of all Controverfys thofe of the
Pen are the most honorable: for in thoſe of Force, there is more of the
Image of the Beast, but in thoſe of the Pen there is more of the
Image of God. In the Controverfys of the Sword, there is but too often
no other Reafon than Force; but the Controverfy of the Pen has never
any Force but Reafor. Of all Controverfys of the Pen next thofe of Re-
ligion, thofe of Government are the most honorable, and the most useful;
the true end of each, tho in a different way, being that the Will of God
may be don in Earth as it is in Heaven. Of all Controverfys of Govern-
ment, thofe in the vindication of Popular Government are the most noble,
as being that Conftitution alone, from whence all we have that is good is de-
fcended to us; and which, if it had not exifted, Mankind at this day had
bin but a Herd of Beafts. The Prerogative of Popular Government must
either be in an ill hand, or elfe it is a game against which there is not a
Card in the whole pack; for we have the Books of MOSES, thofe of the
Greecs and of the Romans, not to omit MACHIAVEL, all for it.
What have the Afferters of Monarchy; what can they have against us?
A Sword; but that rufts, or must have a Scabbard; and the Scabbard
of this kind of Sword is a good frame of Government.
A MAN may be poffeft of a piece of Ground by force, but to make uſe
or profit of it, he must build upon it, and till it by Reaſon; for whatever
is not founded upon Reaſon, cannot be permanent. In Reafon there
are two parts, Invention and Judgment: As to the latter, In a multitude
of Counfillors (fay both SOLOMON and MACHIAVEL) there is
ftrength. Nay as for Judgment, there is not that Order in Art or Na-
ture that can compare with a popular Affembly. THE VOICE OF
THE PEOPLE IS THE VOICE OF GOD. Hence it is
that in all well-order'd Policys the People have the ultimat refult: but unleſs
there be fom other to invent, a Popular Aſſembly can be of no effect at all
but Confufion. Invention is a folitary thing. All the Phyficians in the
world put together, invented not the Circulation of the Blood, nor can in-
vent any fuch thing, tho in their own Art; yet this was invented by one
alone, and being invented is unanimoufly voted and embrac'd by the gene-
rality of Phyſicians. The Plow and Wheels were at first, you must think,
the invention of fom rare Artiſts; but who or what ſhall ever be able to tear
the use of them from the People? Hence, where Government is at a loss,
a fole Legiflator is of abfolute neceffity; nay where it is not at a loss, if
well model'd, as in Venice, the Propofers, tho frequently change-
able, as in that cafe is neceſſary, are very few, as the Counfillors, the
Savi, the Provoſts. Wherever a Commonwealth is thus propos'd to, the
Balance or Popular Aſſembly will do her duty to admiration, but till then
Yet jo it has bin with us of late years, that altho in Royal Au-
never.
thority
To the Reader.
231
thority there was no more than the right of Propofing, and the King him-
Self was to stand (legibus & confuetudinibus quas vulgus elegerit) to
the refult of the People, yet the Popular Council has bin put upon In-
vention, and they that have bin the prevailing Party have us'd means to
keep the Refult to themselves, quite contrary to the nature of Popular Ad-
miniftration. Let one ſpeak, and the reft judg. Of whatever any one
man can ſay or do, Mankind is the natural and competent Judg, in which
is contain'd the very reafon of Parlaments; thro the want of understand-
ing this came in confufion. Man that is in Honor, and has no under-
ftanding, is like the Beafts that Perish. Nor can we poffibly return to
Order, but by mending the Hedg where it was broken. Aprudent, intire
and fit Propofition made to a free Parlament, recovers all. To them who
are of the greatest Eminency or Authority in a Commonwealth, belongs na-
turally that Part of Reafon which is Invention; and uſing this, they are
to propofe: but what did our Grandees ever invent or propofe, that might
Shew ſo much as that themſelves knew what they would be at? and yet how
confidently do they lay the fault upon the People, and their unfitneſs, for-
footh, for Government : in which they are wondrous wife! For, this I will
boldly fay, Where there was an Aristocracy that perform'd their duty, there
never was, nor ever can be a People unfit for Government; but on the con-
trary, where the Ariftocracy have fail'd, the People being once under Or-
ders, have held very often. But while they are not under Orders, if they
fail it is not their fault, but the fault of the Aristocracy; for who else
Should model a Government but men of Experience? There is not in Eng-
land, I fpeak it to their ſhame, one GRANDEE that has any perfect
knowledge of the Orders of any one Commonwealth that ever was in the
World. Away with this fame grave complexion, this huff of Wisdom
maintain'd by making faces. The People cannot do their duty confifting in
Judgment, but by virtue of fuch Orders as may bring them together, and
direct them; but the duty of the Aristocracy confifting in Invention, may
be don by any one man, and in his ſtudy; and where is that one man among
all the Grandees that studys? They are fo far from knowing their own
duty, that a man for propofing that in which none can find a flaw, has don
enough to be ridiculous to them, who are themſelves ridiculous to the whole
World, in that they could never yet propoſe any thing that would hold.
BUT if this amounts to a Demonftration, it amounts to a clear de-
tection of your profound Grandees, and a full proof that they are Phana-
tical Perfons, State Jefuits, fuch as have reduc'd the Politics to mental
Refervation and implicit Faith in their nods or nightcaps.
GOD, to propofe his Commandments to the People of Ifrael, wrote
them on two Tables; the Decemviri to propofe their Commandments
to the People of Rome, wrote them on twelve Tables; the Athenians
propos'd in writing, fign'd with the name of the particular Inventor; after
this pattern do the Venetians, as was faid, the fame at this day. But
no Goofquil, no Scribling: Your Grandees are above this.
MOSES, who was the first Writer in this kind, ſhall be pardon'd; but
MACHIAVEL, the first in later times that has reviv'd his Principles,
or trod in his ſteps, is defervedly pelted for it by Sermons. They are not
for the Scripture, but the Cabala.
I WILL tell you a story out of BOCCALINI ;
Story out of BoCCALINI; APOLLO hav-
ing spy'd the Philofopher and great Master of Silence HARPOCRATES
in the Court of Parnaffus, us'd fuch importunity with him, that for
once he was perfuaded to speak; upon which fuch apparent discovery was
made
1
1
232
To the Reader.
made of the Hypocrite, and the grofs ignorance he had fo long harbor'd un-
der a deceitful filence, that he was immediately banish'd the Court. Were
there caufe, I could be modeft; but this Virtue, to the diminution of found
and wholfom Principles, would be none: wherfore let a Grandee write,
and I will fhew you HARPOCRATES.
THUS having fufficiently defy'd Sir Guy, I may with the less im-
peachment of reputation defcend to TOM THUM. Not that I hold my
Self a fit Perfon to be exercis'd with Boys play, but that fom, who ſhould
have more wit, have fo little as to think this fomthing. A good Rat-
catcher is not fo great a bleffing to any City, as a good Jugglercatcher would
be to this Nation. Now because I want an Office, Ifhall fhew my Parts
to my Country, and how fit I am for the white Staff, or long Pole of fo
worshipful a Preferment.
Ridiculus ne fis, efto.
}
:
1
THE
蓄
​1
THE
FIRST BOOK,
CONTAINING
The firſt Preliminary of OCEANA, inlarg'd, in-
terpreted, and vindicated from all fuch Mif-
takes or Slanders as have bin alleg'd againſt it
under the notion of Objections.
Ει μή κρατίσοις ἤρησας γελοίων
Φιγών σ' ἐμῶς μὲν ἐκ ἄν πολ᾽ ἐμίανον χείρας.
αν
1
Hh
;
་
A full Anſwer to all fuch OBJECTIONS as
have hitherto bin made against OCEANA.
N
EITHER the Author or Authors of the Confiderations upon
OCEANA, nor any other, have yet fo much as once pretended
one Contradiction or one Inequality to be in the whole Common-
wealth. Now this is certain, That Frame of Government which is void
of any contradiction, or any inequality, is void of all internal caufes of Dif
Jolution, and muft, for fo much as it imbraces, have attain'd to full per-
fection. This by wholeſale is a full Anſwer to the Confiderations,
with all other objections hitherto; and will be (with any man that
comprehends the nature of Government) to thouſands of fuch Books,
or Myriads of fuch tittle tattle. Nevertheleſs, becauſe every man is
not provided with a Sum, in the following Diſcourſe I ſhall comply
with them that muſt have things by Retail, or fomwhat for their
Farthing.
The
235
I
The PREFACE.
Tis commonly faid, and not without incouragement by fom who think
they have Parnaffus by the horns, that the Univerſity has laſh'd
me: So it feems I have to do with the University, and laſhing is
lawful; with both which I am contented. In Moorfields, while the
People are bufy at their ſports, they often and ridiculously lofe their Buttons,
their Ribbands, and their Purfes, where if they light, as fomtimes they
do, upon the Masters of that Art, they fall a kicking them a while (which
one may call a rude charge) and then to their work again. I know not
whether I invite you to Moorfields, but (difficile eft Satiram non fcri-
bere) all the favor I defire at your hands is but this, that you would not
fo condemn one man for kicking, as in the fame Act to pardon another
for cutting of Purfes. A Gentleman that commits a fallacious Argument
to writing, or gos about to fatisfy others with fuch Reafons as he is not
fatisfy'd with himself, is no more a Gentleman but a Pickpocket; with this
in my mind, I betake my felf to my work, or rather to draw open the
Gurtain, and begin the Play.
ONE that has written Confiderations upon OCEANA, fpeaks the
Prolog in this manner: I beseech you Gentlemen, are not we the Wri- Epift.
ters of Politics fomwhat a ridiculous fort of People? Is it not a fine
piece of Folly for private men fitting in their Cabinets to rack their
brains about Models of Government? Certainly our Labors make a
very pleaſant recreation for thoſe great Perfonages, who, fitting at the
Helm of Affairs, have by their large Experience not only acquir'd the
perfect Art of Ruling, but have attain'd alſo to the comprehenfion of the
Nature and Foundation of Government. In which egregious Comple-
ment the Confiderer has loft his confidering Cap.
IT was in the time of ALEXANDER, the greatest Prince and Com-
mander of his age, that ARISTOTLE, with scarce inferior Applauſe and
equal Fame, being a private man, wrote that excellent piece of Prudence
in his Cabinet, which is call'd his Politics, going upon far other Principles
than thofe of ALEXANDER's Government, which it has long outliv'd.
The like did TITUS LIVIUS in the time of AUGUSTUS, Sir TнO-
MAS MOOR in the time of HENRY the Eighth, and MACHIAVEL
when Italy was under Princes that afforded him not the ear. Thefe
Works nevertheless are all of the most esteemed and applauded in this kind;
nor have I found any man, whofe like Indeavours have bin perfecuted fince
PLATO by DIONYSIUS. Iftudy not without great Examples, nor out
of my Calling; either Arms or this Art being the proper Trade of a Gen-
tleman. A man may be intrusted with a ship, and a good Pilot too,
yet not understand how to make Sea-charts. To ſay that a man may not
write of Government except he be a Magiftrat, is as abfurd as to say,
that a man may not make a Sea-chart, unless he be a Pilot. It is known that
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS made a Chart in his Cabinet, that found
out the Indys. The Magiftrat that was good at his fteerage never took
it ill of him that brought him a Chart, feeing whether he would uſe it or
no, was at his own choice; and if Flatterers, being the worst fort of Crows,
did not pick out the eys of the living, the Ship of Government at this day
Hh 2
throout
236
The Preface.
throout Christendom had not ftruck ſo often as ſhe has don. To treat of
Affairs, fays MACHIAVEL, which as to the conduct of 'em appertain
Guer. Proem. to others, may be thought a great boldness; but if I commit Errors in
Arte della
writing, theſe may be known without danger, wheras if they
com-
mit Errors in acting, fuch com not otherwiſe to be known, than in the
ruin of the Commonwealth. For which caufe I prefume to open the
Scene of my Difcourfe, which is to change according to the variety of
thefe following Questions.
1. WHETHER Prudence will be well diſtinguiſh'd into Antient
and Modern ?
2. WHETHER a Commonwealth be rightly defin'd to be a Go-
vernment of Laws, and not of Men: and Monarchy to be a Govern-
ment of fom Man, or a few Men, and not of Laws?
3. WHETHER the Balance of Dominion in Land be the na-
tural cauſe of Empire?
4. WHETHER the Balance of Empire be well divided into Na-
tional and Provincial? and whether theſe two, or any Nations that are
of diftinct Balance, coming to depend upon one and the fame head, fuch
a mixture creates a new Balance ?
5. WHETHER there be any common Right or Intereft, of Man-
kind diſtinct from the parts taken feverally? and how by the Orders of
a Commonwealth this may beſt be diftinguiſh'd from privat Intereft?
6. WHETHER the Senatufconfulta, or Decrees of the Roman
Senat, had the power of Laws?
7.
WHETHER the ten Commandments propos'd by GOD
or Moses were voted by the People of Ifrael?
8. WHETHER a Commonwealth coming up to the perfection
of the kind, coms not up to the perfection of Government, and has
no flaw in it?
9. WHETHER Monarchy, coming up to the perfection of the
kind, coms not fhort of the perfection of Government, and has not
fom flaw in it? in which is alfo treated of the Balance of France, of
the Original of a landed Clergy, of Arms, and their kinds.
10. WHETHER a Commonwealth that was not firſt broken
by it ſelf was ever conquer'd by any Monarch?
II. WHETHER there be not an Agrarian, or fom Law or
Laws of that nature to fupply the defect of it, in every Common-
wealth? and whether the Agrarian, as it is ſtated in Oceana, be not
equal and fatisfactory to all Intereſts or Partys?
12. WHETHER Courſes or a Rotation be neceffary to a well-
order'd Commonwealth? In which is contain'd the Parembole or
Courſes of Ifrael before the Captivity; together with an Epitome of
the whole Commonwealth of Athens, as alfo another of the Common-
wealth of Venice.
1
•
Antient
237
Chap. 1.
Antient and Modern Prudence.
CHAP. I.
Whether Prudence be well diftinguiſh'd into Antient
and Modern.
T
P. 4.
5.
6.
78
7.
8.
9.
HE Confiderer (where by Antient Prudence I underſtand
the Policy of a Commonwealth, and by modern Prudence
that of King, Lords, and Commons, which introduc'd by
the Goths and Vandals upon the ruin of the Roman Empire,
has fince reign'd in theſe Weſtern Countrys, till by the predominating
of fom one of the three parts, it be now almoft univerfally extin-
guiſh'd) thinks it enough for the confutation of this diſtinction, to
Thew out of THUCYDIDES that of Monarchy to be a more an-
tient Policy than that of a Commonwealth. Upon which occafion,
I muſt begin here to diſcover that which, the further I go, will be the
more manifeft; namely, that there is a difference between quoting
Authors, and ſaying ſome part of them without book: this may be
don by their words, but the former no otherwiſe than by keeping to
their fenfe. Now the fenfe of THUCYDIDES, as he is tranflated by
Mr. HOBBS in the place alleg'd, is thus: The manner, fays he, Thu. B. 1.
of living in the most antient times of Greece was Thieving; the stronger
going abroad under the conduct of their moft puissant Men, both to inrich
themfelves, and fetch home maintenance for the weak: for there was nei-
ther Traffic, property of Lands, nor conftant Abode, till MINOS built
a Navy, and expelling the Malefactors out of the Ilands, planted Colonys
of his own, by which means they who inhaited the Seacoafts, becoming
more addicted to Riches, grew more conftant to their dwellings of whom
fom, grown now rich, compass'd their Towns about with Walls. For out
of a defire of Gain, the meaner fort underwent Servitude with the Mighty;
and the Mighty (thus overbalancing at home) with their Wealth,
brought the leffer Citys (abroad) into fubjection. Thus PELOPS, tho
he was a stranger, obtain'd fuch Power in Peloponnefus, that the Coun-
try was call'd after his name. Thus ATREUS obtain'd the Kingdom of
Mycenæ; and thus Kingdoms with Honors limited came to be hereditary;
and rifing to Power, proceeded afterwards to the War againſt Troy.
After the War with Troy, tho with much ado, and in a long time
Greece had conftant reft (and Land without doubt came to property) for
Shifting their feats no longer, at length they fent Colonys abroad; the Athe-
nians into Ionia with the Iſlands, the Peloponnefians into Italy, Sicily,
and other parts. The Power of Greece thus improv'd, and the defire of
Mony withal, their Revenues (in what? not in Mony, if yet there
was no Ufury: therfore except a man can fhew that there was Ufury
in Land) being inlarg'd, in most of the Citys there were erected Tyrannys.
Let us lay this place to the former, when out of a defire of Gain the
meaner Sort underwent Servitude with the Mighty, it caus'd hereditary
Kingdoms with Honors limited, as happen'd alfo with us fince the time
of the Goths and Vandals. But when the People came to Property in
Land, and their Revenues were inlarg'd, ſuch as affum'd Power over
them,
238
The Prerogative
Book I. them, not according to the nature of their Property or Balance, were
Tyrants: well, and what remedy? why, then it was, fays the Con-
fiderer, that the Grecians out of an extreme averfion to that which was
Confid. p. 4. the cause of their prefent Sufferings flipt into Popular Government, not that
upon calm and mature Debates they found it beft, but that they might put
themſelves at the greatest distance (which Spirit ufually accompanys all Re-
formations) from that with which they were grown into diflike. Wherby
he agrees exactly with his Author in making out the true Force and
Nature of the Balance, working even without deliberation, and whe-
ther men will or no. For the Government that is natural and eaſy,
being in no other direction than that of the refpective Balance, is not
of choice but of neceffity. The Policy of King, Lords and Com-
mons, was not fo much from the Prudence of our Anceſtors, as from
their neceffity. If three hundred men held at this day the like over-
balance to the whole People, it was not in the power of Prudence to
inſtitute any other than the fame kind of Government, thro the fame
neceffity. Thus the meaner fort with THUCYDIDES fubmitting
to the Mighty, it came to Kingdoms with hereditary Honors: but the
People coming to be wealthy, call'd their Kings, tho they knew not
why, Tyrants; nay, and ufing them accordingly, found out means,
with as little deliberation it may be as a Bull takes to tofs a Dog, or a
Hern to fplit a Hawk (that is, rather, as at the long-run they will
ever do in the like cafes, by Inftinct, than Prudence or Debate) to
throw down that, which by the mere information of fenſe they could
no longer bear; and which being thrown down, they found them-
felves eas'd. But the question yet remains, and that is, forfooth,
whether of thefe is to be call'd Antient Prudence. To this end, ne-
ver man made a more unlucky choice than the Confiderer has don for
himſelf of this Author, who in the very beginning of his Book,
fpeaking of the Peloponnefian War, or that between the Common-
wealths of Athens and Lacedemon, fays, that the Actions which prece
ded this, and thofe again that were more antient, tho the truth of them
thro length of time cannot by any means be clearly diſcover'd; yet for any
Argument that (looking into times far paft) he had yet lighted on to
perfuade him, he dos not think they have bin very great either for matter
of War, or otherwife; that is, for matter of Peace or Government.
And left this ſhould not be plain enough, he calls the Prudence of the
Mr. Hobbs in three Periods, obferv'd by Mr. HOBBS, viz. that from the beginning
the Magire. of the Grecian Memory to the Trojan War, that of the Trojan War it
ſelf, and that from thence to the preſent Commonwealths and Wars,
Thu.B.1.p.3. wherof he treats, The Imbecillity of antient Times. Wherfore certainly
this Prevaricator, to give him his own fees, has lefs difcretion than a
Confid. p. 34. common Attorny, who will be fure to examin only thofe Witneſſes that feem
to make for the Cauſe in which he is entertain'd. Seeing that which he
affirms to be antient Prudence is depos'd by his own witneſs to have
bin the Imbecillity of antient Times, for which I could have ſo many
more than I have leifure to examin, that, (to take only of the moſt
Authentic) as you have heard one Greec, I ſhall add no more than
one Roman, and that is FLORUS in his Prolog, where (computing
the ages of the Romans, in the fame manner as THUCYDIDES did
thoſe of the Greecs) he affirms the time while he liv'd under their
Kings, to have bin their Infancy; that from the Confuls till they conquer'd
Italy, their Youth; that from hence to their Emperors, their manly age;
and
1
of Popular Government.
239
and the reft (with a Complement or SALVO to TRAJAN his prefent Chap. 1.
Lord) their Dotage.
THESE things, tho originally all Government amongst the Greecs
and the Romans was Regal, are no more than they who have not yet paſt
their Novitiat in story, might have known. Yet fays the Confiderer,
It ſeems to be a defect of experience to think that the Greec and the Roman
Actions are only confiderable in Antiquity. But is it fuch a defect of Ex-
perience to think them only confiderable, as not to think them chiefly
confiderable in Antiquity, or that the name of Antient Prudence dos
not belong to that Prudence which was chiefeft in Antiquity? True,
fays he, it is very frequent with fuch as have bin converfant with Greec
and Roman Authors, to be led by them into a belief that the rest of the
World was a rude inconfiderable People, and, which is a term they very
much delight in, altogether Barbarous. This fhould be fom fine Gen-
tleman that would have Univerſitys pull'd down; for the Office of a
Univerſity is no more than to preſerve ſo much of Antiquity as may
keep a Nation from ftinking, or being barbarous; which Salt
grew
not in Monarchys, but in Commonwealths: or whence has the
Chriſtian World that Religion and thoſe Laws which are now com-
mon, but from the Hebrews and Romans? or from whence have we
Arts but from theſe or the Greecs? That we have a Doctor of Divi-
nity, or a Maſter of Arts, we may thank Popular Government; or
with what Languages, with what things are Scholars converfant that
are otherwiſe defcended? will they fo plead their own Cauſe as to tell
us it is poffible there ſhould be a nation at this day in the world with-
out Univerſitys, or Univerfitys without Hebrew, Greec and Latin,
and not be Barbarous, that is to fay, rude, unlearn'd, and inconfide-
rable? Yes, this humour even among the Greecs and Romans themſelves
was a fervil addiction to narrow Principles, and a piece of very pedantical
Pride. What, man! the Greecs and the Romans that of all other
would not ſerve, fervil! their Principles, their Learning, with whoſe
ſcraps we ſet up for Batchelors, Mafters, and Doctors of fine things,
narrow! their inimitable Eloquence a piece of very pedantical Pride!
The World can never make ſenſe of this any otherwife than that fince
Heads and Fellows of Colleges became the only Greecs and Romans,
the Greecs and Romans are become fervily addicted, of narrow Princi-
ples, very Pedants, and prouder of thoſe things they do not under-
ftand, than the other were of thoſe they did: For, fay they, in this
Question, the Examples of the Babylonians, Perfians and Egyptians
(not to omit the antient and like modern Diſcoverys of the Queen of
the Amazons, and of the King of China) cannot without grofs partiality
be neglected. This is pretty; they who fay nothing at all to the Policy
of theſe Governments, accufe me, who have fully open'd it, of neg-
ligence. The Babylonian, Perfian, and, for ought appears to the
contrary, the Chineſe Policy, is fumm'd up, and far excell❜d by that at
this day of Turky; and in opening this latter, I have open'd them all,
ſo far from neglect, that I every where give the Turc his due, whoſe
Policy I affert to be the beſt of this kind, tho not of the beſt kind.
But they will bear me down, and but with one Argument, which I
befeech you mark, that it is abfolutely of the beſt kind; for fay they,
it is of a more abfolute form (has more of the Man and lefs of the Law
in it) than is to be met with in any Kingdom of Europe.
Confid.p.2,3.
1
I
2.40
The Prerogative
Book I.
I AM amaz'd! This is that kind of Government which to hold
Barbarous, was in the Greecs and Romans Pedantical Pride, but would
be in us, who have not the fame Temtation of Intereft, downright Folly.
The Intereſt of a People is not their Guide but their Temtation! We
that hold our Land divided among us, have not the fame Temtation
of Intereft that had the fervil Hebrews, Greecs and Romans; but the
fame that had the free People of Babylon, Perfia and Egypt, where not
the People but the Prince was fole Landlord! O the Arts in which
theſe men are Mafters! To follow the pedantical Pride of Moses,
LYCURGUS, SOLON, ROMULUS, were with us downright Fol-
ly; but to follow humble and learned MAHUMET or OTTOMAN,
in whofe only Model the Perfection of the Babylonian, Perfian,
Egyptian Policy is confummated, is Antient Prudence! Exquifit Poli-
ticians! egregious Divines, for the leading of a People into Egypt or
Babylon! Thefe things confider'd, whether Antient Prudence, as I
have ſtated it be downright Folly, or as they have ſtated it, be not
downright Knavery, I appeal to any Court of Claims in the world,
where the Judges, I mean, have not more in their Caps than in their
Heads, and in their Sleeves than the Scarlet. And wheras Men love
compendious works, if I gain my Cauſe, the Reader, for an anſwer
to the Oxford Book, needs look no further than this Chapter. For if
Riches and Freedom be the end of Government; and theſe Men
propofe nothing but Slavery, Beggery, and Turcifm, what need more
words?
CHAP. II.
Whether a Commonwealth be rightly defin'd to be a Govern-
ment of Laws and not of Men, and a Monarchy to be the Go-
vernment of fom Man, or a few Men, and not of Laws?
TH
HAT part of the Preliminarys which the Prevaricator, as is
ufual with him, recites in this place falfly and fraudulently, is
thus: Relation had to theſe two times (that of Antient and that of
Modern Prudence) the one, as is computed by JANOTTI, ending
with the Liberty of Rome, the other beginning with the Arms of
CASAR (which extinguiſhing Liberty, became the Tranflation of
Antient into Modern Prudence, introduc'd in the Ruin of the Roman
Empire by the Goths and Vandals) GOVERNMENT (to define
it de jure, or according to Antient Prudence) is an Art wherby a civil
Society of Men is inftituted and preferv'd, upon the Foundation of Com-
mon Right or Interest; or (to follow ARISTOTLE and LIvy) it is an
Empire of Laws, and not of Men.
AND Government, to define it de facto, or according to Modern.
Prudence, is an Art wherby fom Man, or fom few Men, fubject a City
or a Nation, and rule it according to his or their privat Interest; which,
becaufe Laws in fuch cafes are made according to the Intereft of a Man, or
Som few Familys, may be faid to be an Empire of Men, and not of Laws,
HEREBY it is plain, whether in an Empire of Laws, and not of
Men, as a Commonwealth; or in an Empire of Men, and not of
Laws, as Monarchy: Firſt, That Law muft equally procede from
Will,
of Popular Government.
241
4
Will, that is either from the Will of the whole People, as in a Com- Chap. 2.
monwealth; from the Will of one Man, as in an Abfolute, or from
the Will of a few Men, as in a regulated Monarchy.
SECONDLY, That Will, whether of one or more, or all, is
not prefum'd to be, much lefs to act without a Mover.
THIRDLY, That the Mover of the Will is Intereſt.
FOURTHLY, That Interefts alfo being of one, or more, or of
all; thoſe of one Man, or of a few Men, where Laws are made ac-
cordingly, being more privat than coms duly up to the Law, the na-
ture wherof lys not in Partiality but in Juftice, may be call'd the Em-
pire of Men, and not of Laws: and that of the whole People com-
ing up to the Public Intereſt (which is no other than common Right
and Juftice, excluding all Partiality or privat Intereft) may be call'd
the Empire of Laws, and not of Men. By all which put together,
wheras it is demonftrable that in this divifion of Government I do not
ſtay at the Will, which muſt have ſom Motive or Mover, but go to
the first and remoteft Notion of Government, in the Foundation and Ori-
gination of it, in which lys the Credit of this Divifion, and the Definition
of the feveral Members, that is to fay, of Intereft, whether privat or
public; the Prevaricator tells me, That this divifion of Government Confid. p. 6.
having (he knows not how) loft its Credit, the definitions of the feve-
ral Members of it need not be confider'd further, than that they com not at
all up to the first and remotest Notion of Government in the Foundation
and Origination of it, in which lys all the difficulty; and being here neg-
lected, there is little hope the fubfequent Difcourfe can have in it the light
of probable Satisfaction, much less the Force of infallible Demonftra-
tion.
VERY good! Intereſt it ſhould ſeem then is not the first and re-
moteft Notion of Government, but that which he will outthrow; and
at this caft, by faying, that the Declaration of the Will of the Soverain
Power is call'd Law: which if it outlives the Perfon whofe Will it was, it
is only becauſe the Perfons who fuccede in Power are prefum'd to have the
fame Will, unless they manifeft the contrary, and that is the Abrogation of
the Law; fo that fill the Government is not in the Law, but in the Per-
fon whofe Will gave a being to that Law. I might as well fay, the De-
claration to all men by theſe preſents that a man ows mony is call'd a
Bond; which if it outlives the Perfon that enter'd into that Bond, it
is only becauſe the Perfons that fuccede him in his Eftate, are prefum'd
to have the fame Will, unless they manifeft the contrary, and that is
the abrogation or cancelling of the Bond; fo that ſtill the debt is not
in the Bond, but in his Will who gave a being to that Bond. If it be
alleg'd againſt this example, that it is a privat one, the cafe may be
put between ſeveral Princes, States or Governments, or between fe-
veral States of the fame Principality or Government, whether it be a
Regulated Monarchy or a Commonwealth; for in the like Obligation
of the States (as of the King, the Lords, and Commons) or Partys
agreeing, Authoritate Patrum & juffu Populi, till the Partys that fo
agreed to the Obligation, fhall agree to repeal or cancel it, lys all Law
that is not merely in the Will of one Man, or of one State, or Party,
as the Oligarchy. But not to diſpute theſe things further in this Place,
let the Government be what it will, for the Prevaricator to fetch the
Origination of Law no further than the Will (while he knows very
well that I fetch'd it from Intereft, the Antecedent of Will) and yet
I i
to
Confid p 8,
2.
242
The Prerogative
Book I. to boat that he has outthrown me, I fay he is neither an honeft Man,
nor a good Bowler. No matter, he will be a better Gunner; for
where I faid that the Magiftrat upon the Bench is that to the Law,
which a Gunner upon his Platform is to his Cannon, he gos about to
take better aim, and fays, If the Proportion of things be accurately con-
fider'd, it will appear that the laden Cannon anfwers not to the Lars, but to
the Power of the Perfon whofe Will created thofe Laws: Which if fom of
them that the Power of the Perfon whofe Will created them, in-
tended fhould be of as good Stuff or Carriage as the reſt, do neverthe-
lefs according to the nature of their Matter or of their Charge, com
ſhort or over, and others break or recoil; fure this Report of the Pre-
varicator is not according to the bore of my Gun, but according to the
bore of fuch a Gunner. Yet again, if he be not fo good a Gunner,
he will be a better Anatomift: for wheras I affirm, that to fay, ARI-
STOTLE and CICERO wrote not the Rights or Rules of their Po-
litics from the Principles of Nature, but tranfcrib'd them into their
Books out of the practice of their own Commonwealths, is as if a
man ſhould ſay of famous HARVEY, that he tranfcrib'd his Circula-
tion of the Blood, not out of the Principles of Nature, but out of the
Anatomy of this or that Body: He anſwers, that the whole force of this
Objection amounts but to this, that because HARVEY in his Circulation
has follow'd the Principles of Nature, therfore ARISTOTLE and CICE-
Ro have don fo in their Difcourfes of Government.
PRETTY! It is faid in Scripture, Thy Word is fweet as Hony:
Amounts that but to this, Becaufe Hony is fweet, therfore the Word
of God is ſweet? To fay that my Lord Protector has not conquer'd
many Nations, were as if one fhould fay, CÆSAR had not con-
quer'd many Nations: Amounts that but to this, that becaufe CÆ-
SAR Conquer'd many Nations, therfore my Lord Protector has con-
quer'd many Nations? What I produce as a Similitude, he calls an
Objection; where I fay, as, he fays, becaufe: what ingenious man
dos not deteſt ſuch a cheat! A Similitude is brought to fhew how a
thing is or may be, not to prove that it is fo; it is us'd for Illuftration,
not as an Argument: The Candle I held did not fet up the Poft, but
fhew where the Poft was fet, and yet this blind Buzzard has run his
head against it. Nor has he yet enough; if he be not the better Na-
turalift, he will be the better Divine, tho he fhould make the worfe
Sermon. My Doctrin and Ufe upon that of SOLOMON, I have feen
Servants upon Horfes, and Princes walking as Servants upon the Ground,
diſcovers the true means wherby the Principles of Power and Autho-
rity, the Goods of the Mind and of Fortune, may fo meet and twine
in the Wreath or Crown of Empire, that the Government ftanding
upon Earth like a holy Altar, and breathing perpetual Incenfe to
Heaven in Juſtice and Piety, may be fomthing, as it were between
Heaven and Earth; while that only which is propos'd by the beſt,
and refolv'd by the moft, becoms Law, and fo the whole Govern-
ment an Empire of Laws, and not of Men. This he fays is a good-
ly Sermon; it is honeft, and fenfe. But let any man make fenfe or ho-
Confid. p. 7. nefty of this Doctrin, which is his own; To fay that Laws do or
can govern, is to amufe ourselves with a Form of Speech, as when
we fay Time, or Age, or Death, dos fuch a thing; to which indeed
the Phanfy of Poets, and Superftition of Women, may adapt a Per-
fon, and give a Power of Action; but wife men know they are only Ex-
preffions
of Popular Government.
243
· preffions of fuch Actions or Qualifications as belong to Things or Per- Chap. 3.
fons.
SPEAK out; Is it the Word of God, or the Knavery and Non-
ſenſe of ſuch Preachers that ought to govern? Are we to hearken to
that of the Talmud, There is more in the word of a Scribe, than in the
words of the Law; or that which Chrift therupon fays to the Phari-
fees; You have made the Word of God of no effect by your Traditions? Mat. 15. 6.
Say, is the Commonwealth to be govern'd in the Word of a Prieſt
or a Pharifee, or by the Vote of the People, and the Intereft of
Mankind?
CHA P. III.
Whether the Balance of Dominion in Land be the natural
Caufe of Empire?
T
HE Doctrin of the Balance is that, tho he ftrains at it, which
choaks the Prevaricator; for this of all others is that Principle
which makes the Politics, not fo before the invention of the fame, to
be undeniable throout, and (not to meddle with the Mathematics, an
Art I underſtand as little as Mathematicians do this) the moſt de-
monftrable of any whatſoever.
FOR this cauſe I ſhall rather take pleaſure than pains to look back,
or tread the fame path with other, and perhaps plainer fteps: as thus;
If a man having one hundred pounds a year may keep one Servant,
or have one man at his command, then having one hundred times fo
much, he
may keep one hundred Servants; and this multiply'd by a
thouſand, he may have one hundred thouſand men at his command.
Now that the fingle Perfon, or Nobility of any Country in Europe,
that had but half fo many men at command, would be King or.
Prince, is that which I think no man will doubt. But no Mony, no
Switzers, as the French fpeak: If the Mony be flown, ſo are the Men
alfo. Tho Riches in general have Wings, and be apt to bate; yet
thoſe in Land are the moſt hooded, and ty'd to the Perch, wheras
thoſe in Mony have the leaft hold, and are the ſwifteft of flight.
A Bank where the Mony takes not wing, but to come home feiz'd,
or like a Coyduck, may well be great; but the Treaſure of the
Indys going out, and not upon returns, makes no Bank, Whence
a Bank never paid an Army; or paying an Army, foon became
no Bank. But where a Prince or a Nobility has an Eſtate in Land,
the Revenue wherof will defray this Charge, there their Men are
planted, have Toes that are Roots, and Arms that bring forth what
Fruit you pleaſe.
THUS a fingle Perfon is made, or à Nobility makes a King, not
with difficulty, or any great prudence, but with eafe, the reſt coming
home, as the Ox that only knows his Mafter's Crib, but muft ftarve
or repair to it. Nor for the fame reafon is Government acquir'd with
more eaſe than it is preferv'd; that is, if the Foundation of Property
1
*Point de Argent, point de Suiffe.
I i 2
L
be
244
The Prerogative
Book I. be in Land: but if in Mony, lightly com, lightly go. The reafon
why a fingle Perfon, or the Nobility that has one hundred thouſand
men, or half fo many at command, will have the Govenment, is
that the Eſtate in Land, wherby they are able to maintain fo many, in
any European Territory, muft overbalance the reft that remains to the
People, at least three parts in four, by which means they are no more
able to diſpute the Government with him or them, than your Servant
is with you. Now for the fame reafon, if the People hold three
parts in four of the Territory, it is plain there can neither be any
fingle Perfon nor Nobility able to difpute the Government with
them; in this cafe therfore, except Force be interpos'd, they govern
themſelves. So by this Computation of the Balance of Property or
Dominion in the Land, you have according to the threefold Founda-
tion of Property, the Root or Generation of the threefold kind of Go-
vernment or Empire.
Oceana, p 39.
IF one man be fole Landlord of a Territory, or overbalance the
whole People, three parts in four, or therabouts, he is Grand Signior;
for ſo the Turc, not from his Empire, but his Property is call'd; and
the Empire in this cafe is abfolute Monarchy.
IF the Few, or a Nobility, or a Nobility with a Clergy, be Land-
lords to fuch a proportion as overbalances the People in the like man
ner, they may make whom they pleaſe King;, or if they be not pleas'd
with their King, down with him and fet up whom they like better;
a HENRY the Fourth, or the Seventh, a GunSE, a MONTFORT, a
NEVIL, or a PORTER, fhould they find that beft for their own
ends and purpoſes: For as not the Balance of the King, but that of
the Nobility in this cafe is the cauſe of the Government, fo not the
Eſtate or Riches of the Prince or Captain, but his Virtue or Ability, or
fitneſs for the ends of the Nobility, acquires that Command or Office.
This for Ariftocracy, or mix'd Monarchy. But if the whale People
be Landlords, or hold the Land fo divided among them, that no one
man or number of men within the compafs of the Few, or Ariftocra
overbalance them, it is a Commonwealth. Such is the Branch in
the Root, or the Balance of Property naturally producing Empire;
which not confuted, no man fhall be able to batter my Superftructures,
and which confuted, I lay down my Arms. Till then, if the cauſe
neceffarily precede the effect, Property must have a being before Em
pire, or beginning with it, muſt be ftill firth in order.
cy
PROPERTY coms to have a being before Empire or Govern-
ment two ways, either by a natural or violent Revolution. Natural
Revolution happens from within, or by Commerce, as when a Go-
vernment erected upon one Balance, that for example of a Nobility
or a Clergy, thro the Decay of their Eftates: coms to alter to another
Balance; which alteration in the Root of Property, leaves: all to con
fufion, or produces a new Branch or Government, according to the
kind or nature of the Root. Violent Revolution happens from with-
out, or by Arms, as when upon Conqueft there follows. Confifcation
Confifcation again is of three kinds, when the Captain taking all to
himſelf, plants his Army by way of military Colonys, Benefices, or
Timars, which was the Policy of MAHOмET; or when the. Captaim,
has fom Shares, or a Nobility that divides with him, which was
the Policy introduc'd by the Goths and Vandals; or when the Captain
divides the Inheritance by Lots, or otherwife, to the whole People;
which
*
of Popular Government.
245
which Policy was inftituted by GoD or MOSES in the Common- Chap. 3.
wealth of Ifrael. This triple diftribution, whether from natural or
violent Revolution, returns as to the generation of Empire to the
fame thing, that is to the nature of the Balance already ſtated and
demonftrated. Now let us fee what the Prevaricator will fay, which
firft is this.
Deut. 15. 6.
& 23. 19.
THE Affertion, that Property producing Empire confifts only in Land Confid. p. 14.
appears too pofitive. A Pig of my own Sow; this is no more than I
told him, only there is more imply'd in what I told him, than he will
fee; which therfore I fhall now further explain. The balance in Mony
may be as good or better than that of Land in three cafes. First,
where there is no Property of Land yet introduc'd, as in Greece during
the time of her antient Imbecillity; whence, as is noted by THU-
CYDIDES, the meaner fort thro a defire of Gain underwent the Servi-
tude of the Mighty. Secondly, in Citys of fmall Territory and great
Trade, as Holland and Genoa, the Land not being able to feed the Peo-
ple, who must live upon Traffic, is overbalanc'd by the means of that
Traffic, which is Mony. Thirdly, in a narrow Country, where the
Edts are at a low fcantling, as among the Ifraelits, if care be not had
of Mony in the regulation of the fame, it will eat out the balance of
Land. For which caufe tho an Ifraelit might both have Mony, and
put it to Ufury (Thou shalt lend [upon uſury] to many Nations) yet
might he not lend it upon Ufury to a Citizen or Brother: whence two
things are manifeft: First, that Ufury in itfelf is not unlawful: And
next, that Ufury in Ifrael was no otherwiſe forbidden, than as it might
com to overthrow the Balance or Foundation of the Government : for
where a Lot as to the general amounted not perhaps to four Acres, a
man that ſhould have had a thouſand Pounds in his Purſe, would not
have regarded fuch a Lot in compariſon of his Mony; and he that
ſhould have bin half fo much in debt, would have bin quite eaten out.
Ufury is of fuch a nature, as, not forbidden in the like cafes, muft de-
vour the Government. The Roman People, while their Territory
was no bigger, and their Lots, which exceeded not two Acres a man,
were yet feantier, were flead alive with it; and if they had not help'd
themfelves by their Tumults, and the Inftitution of their Tribuns, it
had totally ruin'd both them and their Government. In a Common-
wealth, whofe Territory is very fmall, the Balance of the Government
being laid upon the Land, as in Lacedemon, it will not be fufficient to for-
bid Ufury, but Mony itſelf muſt be forbidden. Whence LYCURGUS al-
low'd of none, or of fuch only as being of old, or otherwiſe uſeleſs Iron,
was little better, or if you will, little worſe than none. The Pru-
dence of which Law appear'd in the neglect of it, as when LYSAN-
DER, General for the Lacedemontans in the Peloponnesian War, hav-
ing taken Athens, and brought home the fpoil of it, occafion'd the.
Ruin of that Commonwealth in her Victory. The Land of Canaan
compar'd with Spain or England, was at the moſt but a Yorkſhire, and
Latonia was lefe than Canaan. Now if we imagin Yorkshire divided,
as was Cahuan, into fix hundred thouſand Lots, or as was Laconia,
into thirty thoufand; a Yorkſhire man having one thouſand Pounds in
his Purfe; would, I believe, have a better Eftate in Mony than in
Land; wherfore in this cafe, to make the Land hold the Balance,
there is no way but either that of Ifrael by forbidding Ufury, or that
of Have demam by forbidding Mony. Where a fmall Sum may com to
•
over-
246
The Prerogative
:
;
Book I. overbalance a man's Eftate in Land, there I fay Ufury or Mony fo
the prefervation of the Balance in Land, muft of ncceffity be forbid-
den, or the Government will rather reft upon the Balance of Mony, than-
upon that of Land, as in Holland and Genoa. But in a Territory of fuch
extent as Spain, or England, the Land being not to be overbalanc'd by:
Mony, there needs no forbidding of Mony or Ufury. In Lacedemon.
Merchandize was forbidden, in Ifrael and Rome it was not exercis'd
wherfore to theſe Ufury muſt have bin the more deftructive: but in
a Country where Merchandize is exercis'd, it is fo far from being de-
ftructive, that it is neceffary; elfe that which might be of profit to
the Commonwealth would ruft unprofitably in private purſes, there
being no man that will venture his Mony but thro hope of fom Gain;
which if it be fo regulated that the Eorrower may gain more by it
than the Lender, as at four in the hundred, or therabouts, Ufury becoms
a mighty Profit to the Public, and a Charity to privat men; in which
fenfe we may not be perfuaded by them that do not obſerve theſe
different cauſes, that it is against Scripture. Had Ufury to a Brother
bin permitted in Ifrael, that Government had bin overthrown: but
that ſuch a Territory as England or Spain cannot be overbalanc'd by.
Mony, whether it be a ſcarce or plentiful Commodity, whether it
be accumulated by Parfimony as in the purfe of HNRY the 7th,
or preſented by Fortune, as in the Revenue of the Indys, is fuffi-
ciently demonftated, or fhall be.
FIRST, by an Argument ad hominem, one good enough for the
Conf.d. p. 12. Prevaricator, who argues thus; The Wisdom or the Riches of another man
can never give him a Title to my Obedience, nor oblige Mr. HARRING-
TON to give his Clothes or Mony to the next man he meets, wifer or
richer than himſelf.
IF he had faid ftronger, he had ſpoil'd all; for the parting with a
man's Clothes or Mony in that cafe, cannot be help'd: now the richer,
as to the cafe in debate, is the ftronger, that is, the advantage of
Strength remains to the Balance. But well; he prefumes me to have
Clothes and Mony of my own, let him put the fame cafe in the Peo-
ple, or the fimilitude does not hold. But if the People have Clothes
and Mony of their own, theſe muſt either rife (for the bulk) out of
Property in Lond, or at leaſt out of the cultivation of the Land, or
the Revenue of Induſtry; which if it be dependent, they muſt give
fuch a part of their Clothes and Mony to preferve that dependence
out of which the rest arifes to him or them on whom they depend, as
he or they ſhall think fit, or parting with nothing to this end, muft
lofe all; that is, if they be Tenants, they must pay their Rent, or turn
out. So if they have Clothes or Mony dependently, the Balance of
Land is in the Landlord or Landlords of the People: but if they have
Clothes and Mony independently, then the Balance of Land muſt of
neceffity be in the People themſelves, in which cafe they neither would,
if there were any fuch, nor can, becauſe there be no fuch, give their
Mony or Clothes to fuch as are wiſer, or richer, or ſtronger than them-
felves. So it is not a man's Clothes and Mony or Riches, that oblige
him to acknowledge the Title of his Obedience to him that is wifer
or richer, but a man's no Clothes or Mony, or his Poverty, with which,
if the Prevaricator fhould come to want, he could not fo finely pre-
varicat but he muft ferve fom body, fo he were rich, no matter if
lefs wife than himſelf. Wherfore feeing the People cannot be faid to
have
of Popular Government.
24-7
have Clothes and Mony of their own without the balance in Land, Chap. 3.
and having the balance in Land, will never give their Clothes, or
Mony, or Obedience to a fingle Perfon, or a Nobility, tho theſe
ſhould be the richer in Mony; the Prevaricator by his own Argument
has evinc'd that in fuch a Territory as England or Spain, Mony can
never com to overbalance Land.
FOR a ſecond demonſtration of this Truth, HENRY the Se-
venth, tho he miſs'd of the Indys, in which for my part I think him
happy, was the richeſt in Mony of English Princes. Nevertheleſs this
acceffion of Revenue did not at all preponderat on the King's part,
nor change the balance. But while making Farms of a Standard he
increas'd the Yeomanry, and cutting off Retainers he abas'd the
Nobility, began that Breach in the balance of Land, which proceding
has ruin'd the Nobility, and in them that Government.
FOR a third, the Monarchy of Spain fince the Silver of Potofi
fail' d up the Guadalquivir, which in English is, fince that King had the
Indys, ftands upon the fame balance in the Lands of the Nobility on
which it always ftood.
AND fo the learned Conclufion of the Prevaricator (That it is Confid. p. 16.
not to be doubted but a Revenue fufficient to maintain a Force able [to cry
ware horns] or beat down all oppofition, dos equally conduce to Empire,
whether it arifes from Rents, Lands, Profits of ready Mony, Dutys,
Cuftams, &c.) afks you no more than where you faw her Premifes.
For unleſs they aſcended his Monti, and his Banks, it is not to be
imagin'd which way they went; and with theſe, becauſe he is a pro-
feft Zealot for Monarchy, I would wiſh him by no means to be mon-
tebanking or meddling: for the Purfe of a Prince never yet made
a Bank, nor, till ſpending and trading Mony be all one, ever ſhall.
The Genoefe, which the King of Spain could never do with the Indys,
can make you a Bank out of Letters of Exchange, and the Hollander
with Herrings. Let him com no more here: where there is a Bank,
ten to one there is a Commonwealth. A King is a Soldier, or a Lover,
neither of which makes a good Merchant, and without Merchandize
you will have a lean Bank. It is true, the Family of the MEDICI
were both Merchants and made a Bank into a Throne: but it was in
Commonwealth of Merchants, in a ſmall Territory, by great purchaſes
in Land, and rather in a mere confufion than under any fettl'd Go-
vernment; which Cauſes, if he can give them all fuch another meet-
ing, may do as much for another man. Otherwiſe let it be agreed
and refolv'd, that in a Territory of any extent, the balance of Empire
confifts in Land and not in Mony; always provided that in cafe a
Prince has occafion to run away, as HENRY the Third of France
did out of Poland, his Balance in ready Mony is abfolutely the moſt proper
for the carrying on of fo great and fudden an Enterprize.
IT is an excellent way of difputing, when a man has alleg'd no
experience, no example, no reafon, to conclude with no doubt. Cer-
tainly upon fuch occafions it is not unlawful nor unreaſonable to be
merry. Reaſons, fays one Comedian, are not fo common as Blackberrys.
For all that, fays another Comedian, no doubt but a Revenue in Taxes
is as good as a Revenue in Feefimple; for this, in brief, is the ſenſe of
his former particular, or that part of it, which, the Monti and the
Banks being already diſcharg'd, remains to be anfwer'd. Yet that
the Rents and Profits of a man's Land in Feefimple or Property, com
in
248
The Prerogative
Book I. in naturally and eafily, by common confent or concernment, that is
by virtue of the Law founded upon the public Intereft, and therfore
voluntarily eſtabliſh'd by the whole People, is an apparent thing. So
a man that will receive the Rents and Profits of other mens Land,
muſt either take them by inere force, or bring the People to make a
Law diveſting themfelves of fo much of their Property; which upon
the matter is all one, becaufe a People poffeft of the Balance, cannot
be brought to make fuch a Law, further than they fee neceffary for
their common defence, but by force, nor to keep it any longer than
that Force continues. It is true, there is not only fuch a thing in na-
ture as health, but fickneſs too: nor do I deny that there is fuch a
thing as a Government againſt the Balance. But look about, feek, find
where it ftood, how it was nam'd, how lik'd, or how long it lafted.
Otherwiſe the comical Propofition coms to this, It is not to be doubted
but that Violence may be permanent or durable, and the Blackberry, for it
is becauſe Nature is permanent or durable! What other conftruction
can be made of thefe Words? It is not to be doubted but a Revenue fuffi-
cient to maintain a Force able to beat down all oppofition (that is, a Force
able to raiſe ſuch a Revenue) dos equally (on which word grows the
Blackberry) conduce to Empire; that is, as much as could any natural
Balance of the fame! He may ftain mouths, as he has done fom, but
he ſhall never make a Politician. The Earth yields her natural increaſe
without lofing her heart; but if you com once to force her, look
your Force continue, or the yields you nothing: and the balance of
Empire confifting of Earth, is of the nature of her Element.
DIVINES are given to ſpeak much of things which the Confi-
derer balks in this place that wou'd check them, to the end he may
fly out with them in others, wherto they do not belong, as where he
Confid. p. 23. fays, that Government is founded either upon Paternity, and the natural
Advantage the firft Father had over all the rest of Mankind, who were his
Sons; or elſe from the increase of Strength or Power in ſom Man or Men,
to whofe Will the reft fubmit, that by their fubmiffion they may avoid fuch
miſchief as otherwife would be brought upon them. Which two Vagarys
are to be fetch'd home to this place.
:
FOR the former; if ADAM had liv'd till now, he could have ſeen
no other than his own Children; and ſo that he muſt have bin King by
the right of Nature, was his peculiar Prerogative. But whether the
eldeſt Son of his Houfe, if the Prevaricator can find him at this time
of day, has the fame right, is fomwhat difputable; becauſe it was
early when ABRAHAM and LOT divided Territorys, became ſe-
veral Kings and not long after when the Sons of JACOB being all
Patriarchs, by the appointment of God, whofe Right fure was not
inferior to that of ADAM, tho he had liv'd, came under Popular Go-
vernment. Wherfore the advantage of a firft Father is for grave
men a pleaſant fancy; nevertheleſs if he had liv'd till now, I hope
they underſtand that the whole Earth would have bin his Demeans,
and fo the Balance of his Property muſt have anſwer'd to his Empire,
as did that alfo of ABRAHAM and LoT to theirs. Wherfore this way
of Deduction coms directly home again to the Balance. Paterfamilias
De jure belli, Latifundia poffidens, & neminem alia lege in fuas terras recipiens quam
ut ditioni fuæ, qui recipiuntur, fe fubjiciant, eft Rex, fays GROTIUS.
Fathers of Familys are of three forts, either a fole Landlord, as
ADAM, and then he is an abfolute Monarch; or a few Landlords,
1. 1.
1. C. 3.
a8
of Popular Government.
249
as Lor and ABRAHAM, with the Patriarchs of thoſe days; who if Chap. 3.
they join'd not together, were fo many Princes; or if they join'd
made a mix'd Monarchy; or, as GROTIUS believes, a kind of Com-
monwealth adminiſter'd in the Land of Canaan by MELCHISEDEC,
to whom as King and Prieſt ABRAHAM paid Tithes of all that he
had. Such a Magiftracy was alfo that of JETHRO, King and Prieſt
in the Commonwealth of Midian. Father of Familys for the third
fort, as when the Multitude are Landlords (which happen'd in the di-
vifion of the Land of Canaan) mike a Commonwealth. And thus
much, however it was out of the Prevaricator's head in the place now
deduc'd, he, excepting no further against the Balance than that it
might conſiſt as well in Mony as in Land, had confeſt before.
HIS fecond Vagary is in his deduction of Empire from increaſe of
Strength, for which we must once more round about our Coalfire. The
ftrength wherby this effect can be expected, conifts not in a pair of
Fifts, but in an Army; and an Army is a Beaft with a great Belly,
which fubfifts not without very large paſtures: fo if one man was
fufficient pafture, he may feed fuch a Beaft; if a few have the paſture,
they muſt feed the Beaſt, and the Beaſt is theirs that feed it. But if
the People be the Sheep of their own paftures, they are not only a
flock of Sheep, but an Army of Lions, tho by fom accidents, as I
confeft before, they be for a ſeaſon confinable to their dens. So the
advantage or increaſe of Strength depends alfo upon the Balance.
There is nothing in the World to fwear this Principle out of counte-
nance, but the fame of PHALARIS, GELON, DIONYSIUS, AGA-
THOCLES, NABIS, &c. with which much good do them that like
it. It is proper to a Government upon the Balance to take root at
home, and ſpread outwards; and to a Government againſt the Ba-
lance to feek a root abroad, and to fpread inwards. The former is
ſure, but the latter never ſucceſsful. AGATHOCLES for having con-
quer'd Africa, took not the better root in Syracufa. Parvi funt
arma foras, nifi fit confilium domi.
To conclude this Chapter; the Prevaricator gives me this thanks for
finding out the Balance of Dominion being as antient in Nature as her
felf, and yet as new in Art as my Writing) that I have given the world
caufe to complain of a great disappointment, who, while at my hand that
Satisfaction in the Principles of Government was expected, which feveral
great Wits had in vain ftudy'd, have in diverfifying Riches in words only,
as Property, Dominion, Agrarian, Balance, made up no more than a new
Lexicon, expreffing the fame thing that was known before; feeing the opi-
nion that Riches are Power is (as antient as the firft Book of THU-
CYDIDES, or the Politics of ARISTOTLE, and) not omitted by Mr.
HOBBS, or any other Politician. Which is as if he had told Dr.
HARVEY, that wheras the Blood is the Life was an Opinion as an-
tient as Moses, and no Girl ever prick'd her finger, but knew it muſt
have a courſe; he had given the world cauſe to complain of great
diſappointment in not fhewing a Man to be made of Gingerbread,
and his Veins to run Malmſy.
K k
CHAP.
250
The Prerogative
Book I.
17.
CHA P. IV.
Whether the Balance of Empire be well divided into Natio
nal and Provincial; And whether thefe two, or any Na-
tions that are of diftin&t Balance,coming to depend upon one
and the fame Head, fuch a mixture creates a new Balance.
T
HE Balance of Empire that is National, as it is ſtated in the
former Chapter, ftands in a regulated or mix'd Monarchy upon
the Property or native Intereft of the Nobility; in a Commonwealth,
upon the Property or native Intereft of the People; fo theſe are very
natural. But the Balance of abfolute Monarchy, partaking of Force
as well as Nature, is a mix'd thing, and not much different from the
Balance of Provincial Empire, or the manner of holding a Province
or conquer'd Country. In a Province, if the Native that is rich be
admitted to Power, the Power grows up native, and overtops the
foren: therfore you muſt either not plant your Citizens in your Pro-
vinces, where in time they will become native; or, fo planting them,
neither truft them with power nor with arms.
Thus the provincial
Balance comes to be contrary to the National. And as where Empire
is native or national, the adminiftration of it can be no otherwiſe than
according to the national Balance; fo where Empire is foren or
provincial, the adminiſtration of it can be no otherwiſe than con-
trary to the national Balance. That this may be admitted without
oppofition the Confiderer is inclining to allow, always provided he be
Confid. p. 16, fatisfy'd in this demand, Whether diftinct Balances under the fame Head or
Governor, as thofe of Caftile and Arragon, the Power of the King (I
prefume he means by the Balance of a Nobility) being greater in the
one, and that of the People in the other, may not fo poife one the other, as
to produce a new Balance. To which I anfwer, That no one Govern-
ment whatſoever has any more than one of two Balances; that ex-
cept in the caſes excepted, of Land which is national, or that of Arms
which is provincial. Wherfore if the king of Spain by his War a-
gainſt the Commons altered the balance of Arragon, it muſt have bin
one of two ways, either by ftrengthning the Balance of the Nobility,
and governing the Arragonian People by them, in which cafe their
Balance, tho altered, remained yet National; or by holding both No-
bility and People by a provincial Governor and an Army, in which
cafe his Empire in that Kingdom is provincial. There is no third way;
nor, putting the cafe that the balance of Caftile be national, and that
of Arragon provincial, does this any more create in the monarchy of
Spain a third Balance of Empire, than did the multiplication of Affoci-
ations and Provinces, divers for their Balances, in the Commonwealth
of Rome. England and Scotland being united in one Prince, made,
if it had bin rightly us'd, an increaſe of Strength, but not a third
Balance; nor do the kingdoms in Spain. Whether a Soverainty has
many Territorys and Provinces in fubjection, or in League, it is all one
as to this point; the ſtronger Union or League will give the ſtronger
Balance: and the cafe of the prefent Soveraintys in Europe being no
other, the more nice than wife Speculation of the Confiderer, who has
not bin able to difcern the Balance of a League from that of Empire,
is a Mare's neft.
CHAP.
of Popular Government.
251
1
CHAP. V.
Whether there be any common Right or Intereft of Man-
kind diftinct from the parts taken feverally; and how by
the Orders of a Commonwealth it may be beft diftin-
guifh'd from privat Intereft.
IN
Chap. 5.
N the next place the Prevaricator dos not go about to play the man,
but the unlucky boy. Where I fay that the Soul of Manis Miſtreſs
of two potent Rivals, Reafon and Paffion; he dos not ftand to weigh
the truth of the thing, or the fitneſs of the compariſon, either of
which had been fair; but tumbles Dick upon Sis, the Logic upon the
Rhetoric, the Senſe upon the Figure, and fcuds away in this manner :
If I could be perfuaded Mr. HARRINGTON was fo far in earneſt, as
to expect any man Jhou'd be convinc'd by the metaphorical ufe of two or three Confid. p.19,
words, fom farther confideration might be propos'd. This is to uſe his 20.
Readers as the Fox dos the Dogs, when having pift upon his Tail, and
flapt it in their Eys, he gets away. Dos not his Book deſerve to be
gilded and carry'd in Statefmen's Pokes? Alas! mine are nothing?
Quis leget hac? vel duo, vel nemo: they break the Stationer. And yet
let me comfort myſelf, Whoſe are better? the Prevaricator feems to
fet every whit as light by thofe of HOOKER and GROTIUS, at
leaft where they favor me. The Opinions of GROTIUS, fays he, can-
not oblige us beyond the Reasons wheron they are founded; and what are
thofe? he will diſpute againſt that which he dares not repeat: that his
Comment may take you by the Nofe, he has left out the Text. The
words of GROTIUS are of this Senfe: Tho it be truly faid that the In Proleg. de
Creatures are naturally carry'd to their proper Utility, this ought not to be jure B. ac P.
taken in too general a fenfe, feeing divers of them abstain from their own
Profit, either in regard of thofe of the fame kind, or at least of their
Young. Which words, fays the Prevaricator, carry a great restriction
in them, and the way of producing Actions in Beasts is fo different from
the emanation of human Reafon (mark the Impoftor! the Author is
fpeaking of natural Affection, and he wipes out that, and puts in
human Reaſon) that the Inferences from (the natural Affection of) the
one, to the (degree of Reafon which is in the) other, must needs be very
weak. Excellent! dos it therfore follow that the eminent degree of
Reaſon, wherwithal God has indu'd Man, muft in him deface that
natural Affection, and deſertion in fome cafes of privat for common
good, which is apparent even in Beaſts? What do reverend Divines
mean to cry up this Infidel? Nay, is not he worse than an Infidel that
provides not for his own Family? A Commonwealth is but a great Fa-
mily; and a Family is a little Commonwealth. Even Beafts, in
Iparing out of their own mouths, and expofing themſelves to danger
for their young, provide for their Familys; and in providing for their
Familys, provide for their whole Commonwealth; that is, forfake in
fom things their privat good and fafety, for the good of the public, or
of the kind. In this cafe it is that even Stones or heavy things, fays
HOOKER, forfake their ordinary wont or centre, and fly upwards to Book 1.
relieve the distress of Nature in common. Wretch that he is, fhall a
Stone upon this occafion fly upwards, and will he have a Man to go
Kk 2
down-
252
The Prerogative
Book I. downwards! Yes, Mr. HOOKER'S Expreffion, fays he, is altogether
figurative; and it is easier to prove from thence that things wanting Senfe
make Difcourfes, and act by Election, than that there is fuch a thing as a
common Interest of Mankind. This is like the reft, HOOKER fpeaks
of the neceffity that is in Nature, and this Gentleman tranflates that
Senſe into the word Election. So becaufe a Stone is neceffitated to
comply with the common intereft of Nature, without Difcourfe or
Election; therfore it rather follows from hence, that things wanting
Senfe make Difcourfes, and act by Election, than that there is fuch a thing
as a common Interest of Mankind. His old Trick. I do not fay, that
becauſe it is ſo with the other Creatures, therfore it muſt be fo with
Man: but as we ſee it is with the Creatures in this part, fo we find
it to be with Man. And that ſo, and more than fo, we find it to be
with Man (who tho he be evil, gives good things to his Children, will
work hard, lay up, deny himſelf, venture his Life for his little Com-
monwealth) is thus further demonftrated. All civil Laws acknow-
lege that there is a common Intereft of Mankind, and all civil Laws
procede from the Nature of Man; therfore it is in the Nature of Man
to acknowlege that there is a common Intereft of Mankind. Upon this
acknowlegement of Mankind, a Man that fteals is put to death, which
certainly is none of his privat Intereft: nor is a Man put to death for
any other Man's privat Intereft: therfore there is a common Intereſt
of Mankind diftinct from the parts taken feverally. But this, tho
acknowleg'd in part by all Governments, yet thro their natural frailty
is nothing fo well provided for in fom as in others: for if the Power
be in one or a few Men, one or a few Men, we know, may be
Thieves, and the rather, becauſe applying Mony that is public, with-
out a confideration that is public, to ufes that are privat, is thieving.
But fuch Thieves will not be hang'd; in this cafe therfore the Govern-
ment goes not upon public but privat Intereſt. In the frame of ſuch a
Government as can go upon no other than the public Intereft, conſiſts
that whole Philofophy of the Soul which concerns Policy: and this whole
Philofophy of the Soul being throout the Commonwealth of Oceana
demonftrated; for the Prevaricator to infinuat that I have omitted it,
is to fhew what it is that he loves more than Truth. The main of
this Philoſophy confifts in depofing Paflion, and advancing Reaſon to
the Throne of Empire. I expected news in this place, that this were
to promiſe more for the Magiftrat or the People than has bin per-
form'd by the Stoics; but two Girls, meaning no body any harm, have
provok'd his Wrath, for footh, to fuch extravagancy by the way, that
tho in all modefty it were forbid, as he confeffes, by their cheeks,
which diſcovering the Green-fickneſs, fhew'd that they were paft the
rod, he has taken them up! Tantane animis cœleftibus ira! What he
may have in School-Divinity for fo rude a charge, I do not know;
but he ſhall never be able to fhew any Maxims for this kind of Difci-
plin or Philofophy of the Soul, either in Chevalry or the Politics. The
offence of the Girls was no more, than that having a Cake (by the
gift of an Uncle or Aunt, or by purchaſe, or fuch a one perhaps as was
of their own making) in common, or between them, the one had moft
accuratly divided, and the other was about to chufe; when in coms
this rude fellow: How now, Gentlemen, fays he, What dividing and
chufing! Will no lefs ferve your turn than the whole Mystery of au ll-order'd
Commonwealth? Who has taught you to caft away Paffion, an't pleaſe you,
Confid. p. 22,
23.
like
of Popular Government.
253
}
1
Say; will you vy that green in your
like the Bran, and work up Reaſon as pure as the Flower of your Cake? Chap. 5.
Are you acquainted with the Author of Oceana, that has feen foren
Countrys, convers'd with the Speculativi, learn'd of the most ferene Lady
VENETIA to work with Bobbins, makes you a Magiftracy like a Pippin
Py, and fells Butterprints with S. P. Q.R.? Have don,
Have don, as you dread
Ballads, fufty Pamphlets, or the Oftracifm of Billingfgate. Have don, I
Cheeks with the purple of the State?
muft your Mother, who was never there her felf, feek you in the Oven?
Com, when I live to fee MACHIAVEL in pufpafte, a Commonwealth
com out of a Bakehoufe, where Smocks were the Boulters, let me be a Mill-
borſe But now you muſt know coms the beſt Jeft of all, and I
need not ſay that it coms from Oxford; he tells them that their Cake is
Dow (let it not be loft I beseech you) and fo fnatching it away, eats
it, for all the world as Jackpudding eats the Cuſtard. Did
fee fuch a Beſtia?
f
you ever
BUT wheras either office, that of dividing or chufing, was com-
municable to either of the Girls, it is not indifferent in the diftribution
of a Commonwealth, becauſe dividing is feparating one thing, one
reaſon, one intereft, or confideration from another, which they that
can ſo diſcern in privat affairs are call'd difcrete, but they that can do it
in public are prudent; and the way of this kind of dividing in the
language of a Commonwealth is Debating. But they that are capa-
ble of this kind of dividing or debating are few among many, that
when things are thus divided and debated, are able enough to chufe,
which in the language of a Commonwealth is to refolve. Hence it
is that the Debate of the Few, becauſe there be but few that can de-
bate, is the wifeft Debate; and the Reſult of the Many (becaule
every man has an Intereft what to chufe, and that choice which futes
'with every man's Intereft, excludes the diftinct or privat Intereft or
Paffion of any man, and fo coms up to the common and public Inte-
reft or Reaſon) is the wifeſt Reſult. To this end, God, who dos no-
thing in vain, has fo divided Mankind into the Few or the natural
Ariftocracy, and the Many or the natural Democracy, that there can
hardly be upon any occafion a meeting of twenty men, wherin it
will not be apparent, or in which you may not fee all thoſe Lines
which are requifite to the face of a beautiful Commonwealth. For
example, among any twenty men oecafionally met, there will be
fom few, perhaps fix, excelling the fourteen in greatnefs of Parts.
Thefe fix falling into difcourfe of bufinefs, or giving their judgment
upon Perfons or Things, tho but by way of mere Converfation, will
diſcover their Abilitys; wherupon they fhall be liften'd to and re-
garded by the Fourteen; that is, the Six will acquire an Authority
with, and imprint a Reverence upon the Fourteen: which Action and
Paffion in the Roman Commonwealth were call'd Authoritas Patrum,
& Verecundia Plebis. Nevertheleſs if the Six indeavor to extend the
Authority which they find thus acquir'd, to Power, that is, to bring
the Fourteen to terms or conditions of Obedience, or fuch as would be
advantageous to the Few, but prejudicial to the Many; the Fourteen
will foon find, that confenting, they hurt not only themſelves by in-
damaging their own Intereſts, but hurt the Six alfo who by this means
com to loſe their Virtue, and fo fpoil their Debate, which, while fuch
advantages are procurable to themſelves, will go no further upon the
common Good, but their privat Benefit. Wherfore in this cafe they
will
254
The Prerogative
Book I. will not confent, and not confenting, they preferve not only their own
Liberty, but the Integrity of the Six alfo, who perceiving that they
cannot impair the common Intereft, have no other intereft left but to
improve it. And neither any Converſation, nor any People, how dull
foever and fubject by fits to be deluded, but will foon fee thus much,
which is enough, becauſe what is thus propos'd by the Authority of
the Six or of the Senat, and refolv'd by the Fourteen, or by the Peo-
ple, is enacted by the Whole, and becoms that Law, than which,
tho Mankind be not infallible, there can be nothing lefs fallible in Man-
kind. Art is the imitation of Nature; by obſervation of fuch Lines
as theſe in the face of Nature, a Politician limns his Commonwealth.
Confid. p.26. But ſays the Prevaricator, the Paralogifm lys in this, that the twenty
men are first fuppos'd to be a Commonwealth, and then it is confider'd how
they would difpofe of the Government. What is this? Art is the imita-
tion of Nature; therfore Art prefumes Nature to be Art. A Picture is
the repreſentation of a Face; therfore the Picture-drawer prefum'd
the Face to be a Picture; and in this fame, there is lying, being, or
fquatting, a thing call'd a Paralogiſm. Did you ever hear fuch a Pa-
raketiſm? for to ſpeak a word without underſtanding the ſenſe of it,
is like a Parrat. And yet I wrong the Parrat in this compariſon; for
fhe, tho ſhe do not underſtand her felf, is underſtood by others,
wheras neither can this Prevaricator tell what he means, nor any man
elfe. Or riddle me, riddle me what is this? The fenfe of want among
Confid. p.27. men that are in equality of Power may beget a defire of exchange; as let
me have your Horfe, and you shall have my Cow, which is the fountain of
privat Contracts: but it is not to be with reafon imagin'd, that this should
"be enough to make a man part with a natural Freedom, and put himſelf
into the hands of a Power from which he can afterwards have no Shield,
tho it fhould be us'd to his own deftruction.
MOST victorious Nonfenfe! for he that fays nothing, cannot be
anfwer'd. It fhould feem, if the twenty men were indeed a Com-
monwealth, or in equality of Power, for fo he puts the cafe, they
might truck Horfes and Cows, but not by any means confider, or once
let it enter into their heads, how by Art to make good their natural
Freedom: That (unless they fet up a Prince, as you fhall fee anon)
were to part with their natural Freedom, and put themſelves into the
bands of a Power from which (there being no other Power but them-
felves) they can afterwards have no ſhield. To read it throughly for the
underſtanding, as is intimated in his Epiſtle, will be more, I doubt, than
his Book will obtain of any Reader. Yet is he, in his own conceit, as
furefooted as any Mule, and knows the Road. But Mr. HARRING-
TON has not loft his way without company; his Brother GROTIUS com-
plains, that they who treat of Jus Gentium, do commonly miſtake fom part
of the Roman Jus Civile for it: and even fo he laments (an't pleaſe
you) that while men profefs to confider the Principles of Government,
they fall upon Notions which are the mere effects of Government.
But as an Ape is the more ugly for being like a Man; fo this
Prevaricator, for making Faces like GROTIUS. I, who am com-
plain'd of, deriving Government from the true Principle of the fame,
in the Balance or Foundation, fet the Superſtructures accordingly; and
he who complains forfooth, never fo much as propoſes any thing like a
Principle or Superftructure, but runs altogether upon mere Notions:
Confid. p 28. As where he afks me, What Security will you give, that the Six in their
Conful-
of Popular Government.
255
Confultations ſhall not rather aim at their own advantage, than that of Chap. 5:
the Fourteen, and fo make use of the eminence of their Parts to circum-
vent the rest? In another place he can anfwer himſelf and fay, that
the Fourteen, or the People in this Conftitution, have the Vote and the
Sword too. How then fhould the Six circumvent them? What Secu-
rity has a Prince, that his People will not pull him out of his Throne?
why, a Nobility or an Army: And are not the People in a Common-
wealth their own Army? Is this to mind Principles? On the other fide,
How, fays he, fhall we be fatisfied that the Fourteen will not foon begin
to think themſelves wife enough to confult too, and making uſe of their ex-
cefs in Power, pull the Six off their Cushions? As if there were any ex-
perience public or privat, any ſenſe or reaſon, that men having the
whole Power in their own hands, would deprive themſelves of Coun-
fillors; or that ever a Commonwealth depos'd the Senat, or can de-
poſe the Senat, and remain a Commonwealth. The People of Capua
being inrag'd to the full height, refolv'd and affembl'd together (the
Senat, if the People will, being always in their power) on purpoſe
to cut the throats of the Senators, when PACUVIUS CALAVIUS
exhorted them that e'er they went upon the defign, they would firſt
make election among themſelves of a new Senat, which, the throats
of the old being cut, might for the ſafety of the Commonwealth im-
mediately take their places; for, faid he, * You must either have a King,
which is to be abhorr'd; or whatever becoms of this, you must have fom
other Senat: for the Senat is a Council of fuch a nature as without it no
free City can fubfift. By which Speech of PACUVIUS, the People,
who thought themſelves, as the Confiderer has it, wife enough to con-
fult, being convinc'd, fell to work for the Election of a fucceding Se-
nat out of themſelves (the Prevaricator fhould not tell me of Notions,
but learn that in a Commonwealth there must be a Senat, is a Principle)
while the People of Capua were intent upon chufing this new Senat,
the Partys propos'd feem'd to them to be fo ridiculously unfit for fuch
an Office, that by this means coming to a nearer fight of themſelves,
they were fecretly fo fill'd with the ſhame of their Enterprize, that
flinking away, they would never after be known fo much as to have
thought upon fuch a thing. Nor ever went any other people fo far,
not the Florentins themfelves, tho addicted to innovation or changing
of the Scnat beyond all other examples. Sons of the Univerſity, Bro-
thers of the College, Heads and Points; you love fine words. Whe-
ther tends to bring all things into fervitude, my Hypothefis, or his
Hypothytes? For fays he, I am willing to gratify Mr. HARRING- † Arochet.
TON with his partition of the twenty men into fix and fourteen; but
if I had been in a humor of Contradiction, it had been as free for me to
have ſaid that ſom one of the twenty would have excel'd all the rest in fudg-
ment, Experience, Courage and height of Genius, and then told him,
that this had bin a natural Monarchy, eftablished by God himself over
Mankind: As if the twenty would give their Clothes or Money to the
next man they met wifer or richer than themſelves, which before he de-
ny'd; Oportet mendacem effe memorem. God eſtabliſh'd Kings no other-
wife than by election of the People; and the twenty will neither give
their Clothes nor Money: How then? why in coms a Gallant with a file
}
★ Senatum omninò non habere non vultis: Quippe aut Rex, quod abominandum; aut, quod
unum liberæ civitatis Concilium eft, Senatus habendus eft. Liv.
of
256
The Prerogative
Book I. of Muſketeers; What, fays he, are you dividing and chufing here?
Go to, I will have no dividing, give me all. Down go the pots, and
up go their heels: What is this? why a King! What more? by Di-
vine Right! As he took the Cake from the Girls?
31.
CHAP. VI.
Whether the Senatufconfulta, or Decrees of the Roman
Senat, had the Power of Laws?
A
MONG divers and weighty Reafons why I would have that
Prince look well to his file of Muſketeers, this is no fmall one,
that he being upon no balance, will be able never to give Law without
them. For to think that he fuccedes to the Senat, or that the
power
of the Senat may ſerve his turn, is a prefumption that will fail him.
The Senat, as fuch, has no power at all, but mere Authority of pro-
pofing to the People, who are the makers of their own Laws; whence
the decrees of the Senat of Rome are never Laws, nor fo call'd, but
Senatufconfulta. It is true that a King coming in, the Senat, as there it
did, may remain to his aid and advantage; and then they propoſe not as
formerly to the People, but to him, who comes not in upon the right of
the Senat, but upon that of the People: whence fays JUSTINIAN:
*The Prince's Pleaſure has the force of Law, fince the People have by the
Lex Regia, concerning his Power, made over to him all their own Em-
Confid. p. 30, pire and Authority. Thus the Senatufconfultum Macedonicum, with the
reft that had place allow'd by JUSTINIAN in compilement of the Roman
Laws, were not Laws in that they were Senatufconfulta, or propos'd
by the Senat, but in that they were allow'd by JUSTINIAN or the
Prince, in whom was now the right of the People. Wherfore the
Zealot for Monarchy has made a pas de clerc, or foul ſtep in his
ceffion, where he argues thus out of CUJACIUS: It was foon agreed
that the diftinct Decrees of the Senat and People ſhould be extended to
the nature of Laws; therfore the diftinct Decrees of the Senat are
Laws, whether it be fo agreed by the People, or by the Prince, or no.
For thus he has no fooner made his Prince, than he kicks him heels
over head; feeing whether the Decrees of the Senat are Laws without
the King, that fame is as much a King as the Prevaricator a Politi-
cian. A Law is that which was paſt by the Power of the People, or
of the King. But out of the Light; in this place he takes a Welsh
Confid. p.32. Bait, and looking back, makes a mufter of his victory, like the buf
fing Gafcon, who to fhew what he had thrown out of the windows
in his Debauchery, made a formal repetition of the whole Inventory
of the Houſe.
pro-
$
**
★ Quod Principi placuit legis habet vigorem, quum lege Regia quæ de ejus imperio lata eft,
Populus ei, & in eum omne imperium fuum & poteftatem concedat.
CHAP.
of Popular Government.
257
1
CHA P. VII.
Whether the Ten Commandments were propos'd by God or
MOSES, and voted by the People of Ifrael.
O
1
NE would think the Gafcon had don well; Is he ſatisfy'd? No,
Chap. 7.
35.
he will now throw the Houfe out of the windows. The principal Confid. p. 33,
ftones being already taken from the Foundation, he has a bag of certain
Winds wherwithal to reverſe the Superstructures. The firft Wind he
lets go is but a Puff, where he tells me, that I bring Switzerland and
Holland into the enumeration of the Heathen Commonwealths: which if
I had don, their Libertys in many parts and places being more antient
than the Chriſtian Religion in thoſe Countrys (as is plain by Ta-
CITUS, where he fpeaks of CIVILIS, and of the Cuftoms of the
Germans) I had neither wrong'd them nor my felf; but I do no ſuch
matter, for having enumerated the Heathen Commonwealths, I add
that the Proceedings of Holland and Switzerland, tho after a more ob- Oceana, p.51.
fcure manner, are of the like nature. The next is a Storm, while re-
proaching me with Rudeness, he brings in Dr. FERN and the Cler-
gy by head and ſhoulders, who till they undertake the quarrel of Mo-
narchy, to the confuſion of the Commonwealth of Iſrael, at leaſt ſo
far that there be no weight or obligation in fuch an Example, are
pofted. As if for a Chriſtian Commonwealth to make ſo much uſe of
Ifrael, as the Roman did of Athens, whofe Laws the tranfcrib'd, were
againſt the Intereft of the Clergy, which, it ſeems, is fo hoftil to po-
pular Power, that to fay the Laws of Nature, tho they be the Foun-
tains of all Civil Law, are not the Civil Law, till they be the Civil
Law ; or thus, that thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not ſteal, tho they be
in natural Equity, yet were not the Laws of Ifrael or of England, till
voted by the People of Ifrael, or the Parlament of England, is to affert Confid. p 35,
the People into the mighty Liberty of being free from the whole moral
Law; and, inaſmuch as to be the Adviſer or Perfuader of a thing, is lefs
than to be the Author or Commander of it, to put an Indignity upon
God himself. In which Fopperys the Prevaricator, boafting of
Principles, but minding none, firft confounds Authority and Com-
mand or Power; and next forgets that the dignity of the Legiflator,
or, which is all one, of the Senat fucceeding to his Office, as the San-
hedrim to MOSES, is the greateſt dignity in a Commonwealth and
yet that the Laws or Orders of a Commonwealth derive no other-
wife, whether from the Legillator, as Moses, LYCURGUS, So-
LON, &c. or the Senat, as thofe of Ifrael, Lacedemon, or Athens, than
from their Authority receiv'd and confirm'd by the Vote or Command
of the People. It is true, that with Almighty God it is otherwiſe than
with a mortal Legiflator, but thro another Nature which to him is
peculiar, from whom as he is the cauſe of being, or the Creator of
Mankind, Omnipotent Power is infeparable; yet fo equal is the good-
nefs of this Nature to the greatneſs therof, that as he is the caufe of
welbeing by way of Election, for example in his chofen People Ifrael,
or of Redemption, as in the Chriftian Church, himſelf has prefer'd
his Authority or Propofition before his Empire. What elfe is the
L1
meaning
40.
258
The Prerogative
Book I. meaning of theſe words, or of this proceding of his ? Now therfore
if ye will obey my Voice indeed, and keep my Covenant, ye shall be to me a
Exod. 19. 5. Kingdom, or I will be your King; which Propofition being voted by
Deut. 4. 44.
the People in the Affirmative, God procedes to propoſe to them the ten
Commandments in fo dreadful a manner, that the People being ex-
Exod. 20. 19. ceedingly affrighted, fay to Moses, Speak thou with us, and we will
hear thee: that is, be thou henceforth our Legiſlator or Propoſer, and
we will refolve accordingly; but let not God Speak with us, left we dy.
From whenceforth God propofs to the People no otherwife than by
MOSES, whom he inftructs his manner; Thefe are the Judgments
which thou shalt propofeu before them. Wherfore it is faid of the
Book of Deuteronomy, containing the Covenant which the Lord com-
Deut. 29. 1manded Muses to make with the Children of Ifrael in the Land of
Moab, befides the Covenant which be made with them in Horeb; This is
the Law which Moses et core the Children of Ifrael. Neither did
GOD in this cafe make ufe of his Omnipotent Power, nor CHRIST
in the like, who alfo is King after the fame manner in his Church, and
would have bin in Ifrael, where when to this end he might have
mufter'd up Legions of Angels, and bin victorious with fuch Armys,
or Argyrafpides, as never Prince could fhew the like, he fays no more
Matt. 23. 37. than, O Jerufalem, Jerulùiem, kw often would I have gather'd thee and
thy Children, as a Hen gathers her Chickens under her wings, and ye would
not? where it is plain that the Jews rejecting CHRIST, that be
Should not reign over them, the Law of the Gofpel came not to be the
Law of the Jews; and fo if the ten Commandments came to be the
Law of Ifrael, it was not only becauſe God propos'd them, feeing
Chriſt alſo propos'd his Law, which nevertheleſs came not to be the Law
of the Jews; but becauſe the People receiv'd the one, and rejected the
other. It is not in the nature of Religion that it ſhould be thought a
profane faying, that if the Bible be in England, or in any other Go-
vernment, the Law or Religion of the Land, it is not only becauſe
God has propos'd it, but alſo becauſe the People or Magiftrat has re-
ceiv'd it, or refolv'd upon it; otherwife we muſt fet lighter by a
Nation or Government than by a privat Perſon, who can have no part
nor portion in this Law, unless he vote it to himſelf in his own Con-
ſcience, without which he remains in the condition he was before, and
as the Heathen, who are a Law to themfelves. Thus wheras in a Co-
venant there muſt be two Partys, the Old and New Teſtament being
in fum the Old and New Covenant; thefe are that Anthority and
Propofition of GOD and CHRIST, to which they that refufe their
Vote or Reſult may be under the Empire of a Clergy, but are none
of his Commonwealth. Nor, feeing I am gone fo far, dos this at
all imply Freewill, but, as is admirably obferv'd by Mr. HOBBS, the
freedom of that which naturally precedes Will, namely, Delibe-
ration or Debate, in which, as the Scale by the Weight of Reafon or
Paffion coms to be turn'd one way or other, the Will is caus'd, and
being caus'd is neceffitated. When God coms in thus upon the Soul
of Man, he gives both the Will and the Deed; from which like Office
of the Senat in a Commonwealth, that is, from the excellency of their
Deliberation and Debate, which prudently and faithfully unfolded to
the People, dos alfo frequently caufe and neceffitat both the Will and
the Deed. GOD himſelf has faid of the Senat, that they are Gods :
an expreffion, tho divine, yet not unknown to the Heathens; Homo
bomini
of Popular Government.
259
komini Deus, one man, for the excellency of his Aid, may be a God to Chap. 8.
another. But let the Prevaricator look to it; for he that leads the
blind out of his way, is his Devil.
πε
FOR the things I have of this kind, as alfo for what I have ſaid
upon the words Chirotonia and Ecclefia, the Prevaricator is delighted to
make me beholden underhand to Mr. HOBBS, notwithstanding the open
enmity which be fays I profefs to his Politics. As if JOSEPHUS upon
that of SAMUEL, They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me
that I fhould not reign over them, had not faid of the People (rov aπE-
•XELPOTENED THE CαGhelas) that they unchirotonix'd or unvoted God of the
Kingdom. Now if they unchirotoniz'd or unvoted God of the King-
dom, then they had chirotoniz'd or voted him to the Kingdom; and fo
not only the Doctrin that God was King in, Ifrael by Compact or
Covenant, but the uſe of the word Chirotonia alfo in the ſenſe I un-
derſtand it, is more antient than Mr. HOBBS. I might add that of
CAPELLUS, * God was a Political King and Civil Legiflator of the
Jews. And for the ufe I have made of the word Ecclefia, as no man
can read fuch as have written of the Grecian Commonwealths, and
mifs it, fo I do not remember that Mr. HоввS has spoken of it.
To theſe things fuller fatisfaction will be given in the ſecond Book 10
which nevertheleſs I do not ſpeak, to the end I might wave Obliga-
tion to fo excellent an Author in his way. It is true, I have op-
pos'd the Politics of Mr. HOBBS, to fhew him what he taught me,
with as much difdain as he oppos'd thofe of the greateſt Authors, in
whoſe wholfom Fame and Doctrin the good of Mankind being con-
cern'd, my Confcience bears me witneſs that I have don my duty.
Nevertheleſs in most other things I firmly believe that Mr. HOBBS
is and will in future Ages be accounted the beft Writer, at this day,
in the world. And for his Treatifes of Human Nature, and of Li-
berty and Neceffity, they are the greateſt of new Lights, and thoſe
which I have follow'd, and fhall follow.
CHA P. VIII.
;
Whether a Commonwealth coming up to the perfection of
the kind, coms not up to the perfection of Government,
and has no flaw in it.
W
HAT a Commonwealth coming up to the perfection of the
kind is, I have fhewn both by the definition of an equal
Commonwealth, and the Exemplification of it in all the parts.
THE Definition is contain'd in the first of my Preliminarys; which,
becauſe it is fhort, I fhall repeat.
AN equal Commonwealth is a Government eſtabliſh'd upon an equal ¿-
grarian, arifing into the Superftructures or three Orders, the Senat debat-
ing and propofing, the People refolving, and the Magiftracy executing, by
an equal Rotation, or interchangeable Election, thro the fuffrage of the
People given by the Ballot. The Exemplification is the whole Common-
Deus Populi Judaici Rex erat veluti politicus, & civilis Legiflator. In Diatriba de Voto
Tophthe.
L12
wealth
1 Sam. 8. 7.
260
The Prerogative
Book I. wealth of Oceana. Each of which by him, who, if his Doctrin of
pure and abfolute Monarchy be obſerv'd, can be no Engliſhman, is call'd
an Irish Bog; as in fom fenfe it is, feeing the Prevaricator has fet never
Confid.p 43. a foot in it that will ſtand, nor has more to fay, than that Where there
is one ambitious poor man, or one vicious rich man, it is impoffible there
fhould be any fuch Government as can be fecure from Sedition.
WHICH, Firſt, is rather to make all Governments ineffectual,
or to make all Governments alike, than to object againſt any, feeing
That there ſhould not be one ambitious poor man, or one vitious rich
man, is equally, if not more, improbable in a Monarchy than in a
Commonwealth.
•
SECONDLY, That one man alone, whether he be rich or poor,
ſhould without a Party be able to diſturb a Commonwealth with Se-
dition, is an abſurdity; nor is ſuch a party, as may be able in ſom fort
to diſturb the Peace by robbing upon the Highway, or fom fuch dif-
order, always able to diſturb a Government with Sedition. Wherfore
this feat goes not fo much upon the ability of any one man, rich
or poor, as the Power of the Party he is able to make; and this
ſtrength of the Party gos upon the nature of the Government, and
the content or diſcontents thence deriving to the Few, or the Many.
The Diſcontents, whether of the Few or the Many, derive from that
which is, or by them is thought to be fom bar to their Intereft; and
thoſe Intereſts which are the cauſes of Sedition are three, the defire of
Liberty, the defire of Power, and the defire of Riches; nor be there
any more for where the People thro want of Bread, thro Vio-
lence offer'd to their Women, or Oppreffion, rife up againſt their
Governors, it relates to the defire of Liberty; thofe alfo under the
name of Religion make not a fourth, but come to one of the three.
·
NOW to ſpeak in the first place of the Many, and anon of the
Few; the People in an equal Commonwealth have none of theſe three
Intereſts: Not the defire of Liberty, becauſe the whole Frame of an
equal Commonwealth is nothing elſe but fuch a method wherby the
Liberty of the People is fecur'd to them: Not of Power, becauſe the
Power which otherwiſe they could not exerciſe, is thus eftated in
them: Nor of Riches, becauſe where the Rich are ſo bounded by an
Agrarian that they cannot overbalance (and therfore neither opprefs
the People, nor exclude their Induſtry or merit from attaining to the
like Eſtate, Power, or Honor) the whole People have the whole
Riches of the Nation already equally divided among them; for that
the Riches of a Commonwealth fhould not go according to the diffe-
rence of mens Induſtry, but be diſtributed by the Poll, were inequal.
Wherfore the People in an equal Commonwealth having none of
thoſe Intereſts which are the caufes of Sedition, can be fubject to no
fuch effect.
TO affirm then with the Confiderer, that the whole of this Libra-
tion is reduc'd to the want of Power to disturb the Commonwealth, muſt
needs be a miſtake, feeing in the Commonwealth propos'd the People
have the Power, but can have no fuch Intereft; and the People having
no fuch Intereſt, no Party can have any fuch power, it being impoffi-
ble that a Party ſhould com to overbalance the People, having their
Arms in their own hands. The whole matter being thus reduc'd to the
want of Power to disturb the Government: this, according to his own
Argument, will appear to be the Libration in which the Power, wherof
the
of Popular Government.
261
the Governor is poſſeſt, ſo vastly exceeds the Power remaining with thofe Chap. 8.
who are to obey (which in cafe of conteſt muſt be fo fmall a Party)
that it would be defperately unreasonable for them to hope to maintain their
Caufe. If the true method then of attaining to perfection in Govern-
ment be to make the Governor abfolute, and the People in an equal Com-
monwealth be abfolute, then there can be none in this Government,
that upon probable terms can diſpute the Power with the Governor, and
fo this State by his own Argument must be free from Sedition. Thus
far upon occafion of the ambitious poor Man objected. I have
fpoken of the Many; and in fpeaking of the Many, implicitly of the
Few: for as in an equal Commonwealth, for example in England
during the Peerage or Ariftocracy, the Many depended upon or were
included in the Few; fo in an equal Commonwealth the Few depend
upon or are included in the Many, as the Senat of Venice depends upon,
or is included in the Great Council, by which it is annually elected in
the whole or in fom part. So what was faid in an equal Common-
wealth of the Many or the poorer fort, is alſo faid of the Few or of
the Richer; who, thro the virtue of the Agrarian, as in Oceana, or
of other Orders fupplying the defect of an Agrarian, as in Venice,
not able to overbalance the People, can never have any Power to diſturb
the Commonwealth in cafe they had fuch an Intereft, nor can have
any fuch Intereſt in caſe they had fuch Power. For example in O-
ceana, putting the cafe that the Few were as powerful as it is poffible
they ſhould be; that is, that the whole Land was fallen into five thou-
fand hands: The five thoufand, excluding the People, could get no
more Riches by it, becauſe they have the whole Land already; no
more Liberty by it, becauſe they were in perfect Liberty before; nor
any more Power by it, becauſe thro the equality of the Balance, or of
their Eſtates, they can be no more by themſelves than an equal Com-
monwealth, and that they were already with the People: but would
be much leſs, the Power or Commonwealth, in which there be five
thouſand Equals, being not greater, but much leſs than the Power or
Commonwealth wherin the whole People are equal; becauſe the
Power or Effect of a greater People is proportionably greater than the
Power or Effect of a leffer People, and the Few by this means would
get no more than to be the leffer People. So the People being no bar
to the Riches, Liberty, nor Power of the five thoufand, and the de-
fire of Liberty, Riches, and Power, being the only caufes of Sedi-
tion; there could ariſe no Sedition in this Commonwealth by reaſon
of the Nobility, who have no fuch Intereft if they had the Power,
nor have any fuch Power if they had the Intereft, the People be-
ing equally poffeft of the Government, of the Arms, and far fuperior
in number. In fum, an equal Commonwealth confiſts but of one
hereditary Order, the People, which is by election divided into two
Orders, as the Senat and the Congregation in Lacedemon, or the Senat
and the Great Council in Venice; for the Gentlemen of Venice, as has
bin often faid, are the People of Venice, the reft are Subjects. And
an inequal Commonwealth confifts of two Hereditary Orders, as the
Patricians and Plebeians in Rome, wherof the former only had a he-
reditary Capacity of the Senat: whence it coms to paſs that the Senat
and the People in an equal Commonwealth having but one and the
fame Intereft, never were nor can be at variance; and that the Senat
and the People in an inequal Commonwealth having two diſtinct In-
terefts,
262
The Prerogative
Book I. terefts, never did nor can agree. So an equal Commonwealth cannot
be feditious, and an inequal Commonwealth can be no other than ſe-
ditious.
Confid. p. 60.
$.60.
Paufan.
Lacon.
Plut. Alcib.
IF a man be refolv'd, as the Confiderer is, to huddle theſe things
together, there is no making any thing of this kind of Policy; of
which therfore it will be a folly to talk. For example, Lacedemon is
either to be confider'd as not taking in the Helots; and then in her
ſelf ſhe was an equal Commonwealth void of any Sedition, or caufe
of it, how much foever fhe were troubl'd with the Helots: So the
Objection made by him, of her Troubles by the Helots, is imperti-
nently urg'd, to fhew that fhe was a feditious Commonwealth: Or
if he will needs have it, that ſhe took in the Helots, it is undeniable
that ſhe took them in inequally, and fo was inequal; whence the
Troubles by the Helots muſt needs be impertinently urg'd againſt an
equal Commonwealth.
<
AGAIN, when I allege Venice from PIERO GRADENIGO,
that is, for the ſpace of about four hundred years from the prefent
date, at which time the Reformation, yet in force, began, as an Ex-
ample of an equal Commonwealth; for him to inftance in the times
before, when tho the Commonwealth, according to the intention, was
as equal as now, yet being not bound by fufficient Orders to give her
felf Security of her native Liberty, her Dukes on the one fide did
what they pleas'd, and the inrag'd People on the other fide baniſh'd,
condemn'd to death, or murder'd them; who fees not the Impoſture?
Indeed he bluſhes at it himſelf. Wherfore my Affertion being not yet
knock'd on the head, he promiſes to kill it better, firſt by the ex-
ample of Lacedemon leaving out the Helots, and next by that of Venice
fince the time of PIERO GRADEnigo.
FOR the first you muſt know that once upon a time there was a
quarrel between CLEOMENES and DEMARATUS Kings of Lacedemon
about Succeffion, which was determin'd by the Ephori, that is, by
a Court of Juſtice, and not by the Sword; the like happen'd in
LEOTYCHIDES the known Baftard of ALCIBIADES, or fo confeft
to be by his Mother to divers of her Maids. Now this is a Maxim
in the Politics, Where the differences of Kings can go no further than
a Court of Justice, there the Government is feditious. Moft ridicu
lous! Is there a ſtronger Argument that fuch a Government is not
feditious? No matter, give him room; Much more fatal was the
conteft between CLEONYMUS and his Brother AREUS the Son of
ACROTATUS, by whofe War ZARAX was ruin'd, and PYRRHUS
came into the game, who befieg'd the Capital City: the Reign of Acrs
and CLEOMENES was fo full of turbulency, as would put a man out of
breath to relate. Fair and foftly: was not all this after LYSANDER,
and the Spoils of Athens had broken the Agrarian, and fo ruin'd La-
cedemon? I affirm there can be no Sedition in an equal Common-
wealth; and he to oppofe me, fhews that there was Sedition in an
inequal one; whether dos this affirm his Affertion or mine?
BUT for better luck in Venice. This City by Mr. HARRING-
TON's own Confeffion is poffeft of feveral Advantages. Yes, I fay that
the Commonwealth of Venice, thus feated, is like a man in a Citadel,
who therby may be the fafer from his Enemys, but ne'er a whit the
fafer from diſeaſes. What conclufion would you expect he ſhould in-
fer from hence? Why among theſe therfore there is good caufe to reckon ber
Immi
of Popular Government
263
Immunity from Seditions: Dos not our Logician repeat faithfully, and Chap. 8.
diſpute honeſtly? Again, Sir, he is like a ſhip ready to be boarded by ►
Pirats, has the Turc on this Frontier, the Pope on that, the King of
Spain on another. As if this were an Argument every Government
muſt not be void of Sedition, ſeeing there is none except they be Ilands,
whoſe Frontiers are not bounded by the Territorys of other Princes.
Well, but fince the last Reglement (in English, Reformation) in the
time of GRADENIGO, you have had three Seditions in Venice, that
of MARINO BOCCONI, that of BAIAMONTE TIEPOLO, and that of
MARINO FALERIO.
1
BODIN has bin long fince beaten for this like a Stockfish, and
yet our Author will be ferving it up for a Courtly difh. BoccoNI would
have kill'd the Duke, but was hang'd before he could do it. FEL-
TON kill'd a Duke that had greater power here than the other in
Venice, and was hang'd afterwards, therefore England was a feditious
Government; for this muft either be undeniable for FELTON's fake,
or why muſt the other be fo for BOCCONI's? Again, FALERIO and
his Complices would have deftroy'd the great Council, but were
hang'd before they could do it. VAUX and his Accomplices would
have blown up the Parlament, but were hang'd before they could do
it; therefore England was in this relation a feditious Government, elſe
why was Venice? There paffes not a month but there dy Rogues at
Tyburn, is the Government therfore feditious? or is this one regard
in which it is not? Where all that fo invade the Government are by
virtue of the fame brought to that end, there the Commonwealth,
or the Orders of it, are not the caufe but the cure of Sedition; and
ſo theſe are undeniable Arguments that Venice is not feditious, where,
fince the Reformation, there has not been a cut finger upon this fcore,
ſave only thro the confpiracy of BAIAMONTE, which indeed came
to blows. Nor for this yet can Venice be call'd a feditious Common-
wealth. You find no man accufing Rome of Sedition, in that ſhe had
a MANLIUS or a MELIUS that dangerously affected Monarchy, be-
cauſe to theſe her Orders, by which they fuffer'd Death, as foon ap-
ply'd the Remedy. But Rome was a feditious Commonwealth, be-
cauſe the perpetual feud that was between the Senat and the People
ſprung out of her Orders, and was that to which there was no Re-
medy to apply. England was not a feditious Government becauſe it
had a VAUX or a FELTON, but becauſe the Power antiently of
the Nobility, and late of the People, was ſuch by the Orders of the
fame as might at any time occafion Civil War. Put the cafe a Slave
or fome defperat Fellow has kill'd the Great Turc, the Govern-
ment for that cannot be faid to be feditious, but in this, that thro the
very nature of the Policy, the Janizarys at any time may do as much,
it is undeniably feditious. BAIAMONTE'S Confpiracy he will not
ſay was of this nature. It was not a Diſeaſe in the Bònes of the Com-
monwealth, but a thing that no fooner appeared, or broke out (tho
it be true, there happen'd a little ſcratching firſt) than it fell off like a
Scab; fuch an accident might befal the beft Conſtitution, and Venice
never had the like but once: if he could fay as much of a Monarchy,
he gains no advantage; yet let him fay it, and prove it, I give him
all. I omit many Falfhoods and Abfurditys in the proceding of the
Prevaricator, as where he intimats the Power of the Dukes to have
bin that wherby Venice gain'd I know not what, and yet to have
bin
264
The Prerogative
Book I. bin that alfo by which FALERIO had lik'd to have ſpoil'd all: each
of which, the Duke of Venice having no power at all, is known to
be falfe. Why ſhould I ſtay to put you in mind that having affirm'ð
Venice to derive her Immunity from inteftin Diſcord no otherwife
than a Ship that is ready to be boarded by Pirats, he inſtances in fuch
examples to the contrary, as took occafion by the hair of a foren
fcalp, while in thofe of BOCCONI and TIE POLO the Common-
weaith by her Wars with the Genoefe and Ferrara, was put to her
plunges, and in that of FALERIO reduc'd to the laſt Extremity? I fhall
only note, that if fuch fudden flaſhes as thefe may com under the name
of Sedition, he has done a fine Office for Monarchy, ſeeing no Senat
is fo much expos'd to like blows as any Prince.
WELL; but for all this it is confeft that there may be ſuch a thing
as a feditious Commonwealth, in that the feud between the Senat and
Confid. p. 48. the People of Rome cou'd not be cur'd; What Security, fays he, will
you give us, that the like may not happen in Oceana, or that the whole
body of the People being intrujted with giving a Vote, and keeping a Sword,
may not by way of Council or Arms, fall to fuch work as levelling the five
thousand, or bringing the Agrarian from two to one thousand pounds a
year, or less, as iber fancy.
TO which I antwer by a like queftion, What fecurity will he give
me that the People of any Commonwealth fhall not caft themſelves
into the Sea? A Prince may be mad, and do fo, but the People are
naturally incapable of ſuch madnefs. If men will boaſt of their know-
lege in Principles, and yet talk of nothing but effects, why may not a
Man fly as well as a Bird? But if Caufes may be regarded, let him
once flew how the Will, feeing it is not free, nor mov'd without fom
Object, fhould move the People in ſuch a manner; or for what, they
having all the Liberty and all the Power that can be had, fhould it
ftrive? Well, that is foon don, for the Land may com into the bands of
five thousand, and fo the Booty may be great, and the Refiftance fmall.
Good: The Romans being the wifeft of all People, went no further
towards the remedy of their Grievances, than to ftrive for the intro-
duction of an Agrarian, in which they fainted too, even to the de-
ftruction of that Government. Except thefe, none have bin ſo wife;
fo
and if there be any fuch thing familiar with the nature of the People,
why appear'd it but once, and then vaniſh'd without effect? why did
not the People for example under the late Monarchy (when the Domi-
nion or Freehold of the Nation, by greater (hares, was in a fmaller
Party, ard they had not only Riches, but Liberty and Power too, to
whet them on) ever fo much as think of levelling three hundred Men ?
for the Nobility and Clergy, in whom was the Balance, were no more.
If it be reply'd that the People were not arm'd; by whom did the
Barons make War with the Kings? If they were not trufted with
a Vote; what was that of the Houſe of Commons? Let Domi-
nion or Freehold ftand upon what Balance you will, inequal or equal,
from the beginning of the world you ſhall never find a People turning
Levellers. And as Reafon is Experience in the Root, fo Experience is
Reaſon in the branch, which might therfore be fufficient in the cafe.
Nevertheleſs for clearer fatisfaction in a point of fuch concernment,
I ſhall endeavour to dig up and diſcover the root of this branch, or
the reafon of this Experience. That which in Beafts is Inftinct,
wherof they can give no account, is in it felf that Wiſdom of God
wherby
1
1
of Popular Government.
This
265
wherby he provides for them; fo it was with the People, they are not Chap. 8.
Levellers, nor know they why, and yet it is, becauſe to be Levellers
were to deftroy themſelves. For, feeing I muft repeat, to repeat
briefly, There is no Territory of any Extent and Populouſneſs where
the Revenue of Induſtry is not twice as much as the dry Rent.
has bin demonſtrated in Oceana. The Revenue of Induſtry is in
thoſe that work, that is, the People: Wherfore the Revenue of the
People, where their Induſtry is not obftructed, is twofold to that of
the Nobility, holding the whole Territory in Freehold. But where
their Induſtry is obftructed, their Revenue is nothing. Civil War
being of all other the greateſt Obftruction of Industry, the People in
taking Arms muft venture all they have, for that, which if they ob-
tain they loſe two for one; and if they obtain not, all for nothing.
Wherfore a People never will, nor ever can; never did, nor ever ſhall
take Arms for Levelling. But they are intrufted with a Vote; and ther-
fore taking away the Lands of the five thoufand, or diminiſhing the
Agrarian by way of Counfil, they need not obſtruct their Induſtry:
but, preferving the Revenue of that, may bring themſelves into the
poffeffion of the Land too. This will they, this can they lefs do, be-
cauſe being in Counfil they muſt propofe fomthing for the advantage
of the Commonwealth, or of themſelves, as their end in fuch an
Action. But the Land coming to be in the poffeffion of five thouſand,
falls not into a number that is within the compafs of the Few, or ſuch
a one as can be Princes, either in regard of their Number, or of their
Eftates; but to fuch a one as cannot confent to abolish the Agrarian,
becauſe that were to confent to rob one another: nor can they have
any Party among them, or againſt their common Intereft, ftrong
enough to force them, or to break it; which remaining, the five
thouſand neither are nor can be any more than a popular State, and
the Balance remains every whit as equal, as if the Land were in never
ſo many more hands. Wherfore the Commonwealth being not to be
better'd by this means, the People by Counfil can never go about
to level, nor diminiſh the Agrarian for the good of the Common-
wealth. Nor can they undertake it for the inrichment of them-
felves, becauſe the Land of Oceana, as has bin demonftrated, being
level'd or divided equally among the Fathers of Families only, coms
not to above ten pounds a year to each of them, wheras every Foot-
man coſts his Mafter twenty pounds a year; and there is not a Cot-
tager having a Cow upon the Common, but with his own Labour, at
one fhilling a day, gets twenty pounds a year; which, the Land being
level'd, were impoffible, becaufe there would be nobody able to ſet
a Labourer on work, or to keep a Servant: wherfore neither would,
nor could the People by Counfil go about any fuch bufinefs. So
there being no poffible caufe of Difagreement between the Few and
the Many, the Senat and the People, there can be no fuch effect;
whence this is the Government, which being perfectly equal, has fuch
Libration in the frame of it, that no man in or under it can contract
Such an Intereft or Power, as ſhould be able to disturb the Common-
wealth with Sedition. Yet after all this, the Prevaricator will only tell Confid p. Új-
Mr. HARRINGTON (for to deny the Conclufion is a fair way of dif-
puting) that thi: Libration is of the fame Nature with a perpetual Motion
in the Mechanics. But let me tell him, that in the Politics there is
nothing mechanic, or like it. This is but an Idiotiſm of fom Mathe-
matician
M m
67.
266
The Prerogative
Book I. matician reſembling his, who imagin'd the Stream of a River to be
like that of his Spiggot.
Rufticus expectat dum defluat amnis, at ille
Labitur & labetur in omne volubilis avum.
The filly Swain upon a River ftood,
In hope the rolling Bottom of the Flood
Would once unwind it felf, whofe liquid Clew
The filver thread for ever shall renew.
THE Mathematician muſt not take God to be fuch a one as he is.
Is that of the Sun, of the Stars, of a River, a perpetual Motion?
Galen. de ufu Even ſo one Generation gos and another coms. Nature, fays GALEN,
partium, l. 4. has a tendency to make her Creature immortal, if it were in the capacity
of the matter on which she has to work; but the People never dys. This
motion of theirs is from the hand of a perpetual Mover, even God
himſelf, in whom we live, and move, and have our being; and to this
Current the Politician adds nothing but the Banks, to which end, or
none, the fame God has alfo created human Prudence. Wherfore
there is not any thing that raiſes it ſelf againſt God or right Reaſon,
if I fay that it is in human Prudence fo to apply thefe Banks, that
they may ſtand as long as the River runs; or let this Confiderer
confider again, and tell me out of Scripture or Reaſon, why not.
Mathematicians, it is true, pretended to be the Monopolifts of Demon-
ftration; but ſpeak ingenuouſly, have they, as to the Politics, hi-
therto given any other Demonftration, than that there is a difference be-
tween Seeing, and making of Spectacles? Much more is that compariſon
of the Politics, going upon certain and demonftrable Principles, to
Aftrologers and Fortunetellers, who have none at all, vain and inju-
rious. For as in relation to what DAVID has faid, and Experience
confirm'd, of the Age of Man, that it is threescore years and ten; I
may fay, that if a Man lys bed-rid, or dys before threefcore years and
ten, of any natural Infirmity or Diſeaſe, it was not thro any imper-
fection of Mankind, but of his particular Conftitution: So in rela-
tion to the Principles and Definition of an equal Commonwealth
yet unſhaken, nay untouch'd by this Prevaricator, I may fafely affirm,
that a Commonwealth is a Government, which if it has bin feditious,
it has not been from any imperfection in the kind, but in the particular
Conſtitution, which where the like has happen'd, muſt have bin in-
equal. My Retreat to thefe Principles is call'd running into a Bog; as
if fuch as have no Principles were not Bogs, Informis limus, Stygiæque
paludes.
CHAP.
of Popular Government.
267
CHA P. IX.
Whether Monarchy coming up to the perfection of the kind,
coms not ſhort of the perfection of Government, and has
not fom flaw in it. In which is alſo treated of the Ba-
lance of France; of the Original of a landed Clergy;
of Arms, and their kinds.
O
N Monarchy I have faid, that wheras it is of two kinds, the one
by Arms, the other by a Nobility; for that by Arms, as (to
take the moſt perfect model) in Turky, it is not in Art or Nature to
cure it of this dangerous flaw, that the Janizarys have frequent Inte-
reft, and perpetual Power to raiſe Sedition, or tear the Magiftrat in
pieces. For that by a Nobility, as (to take the moft perfect Model) of
late in Oceana, it was not in Art or Nature to cure it of that dangerous
flaw, that the Nobility had frequent Intereſt and perpetual Power by
their Retainers and Tenants to raiſe Sedition, and levy War: whence
I conclude that Monarchy reaching the perfection of the kind, reaches
not the perfection of Government, but muſt ſtill have ſome dangerous
flaw in it.
Chap. 9.
THIS place (tho I did not intend by it to make work for a Tinker)
could not be of lefs concernment, than it proves to the Prevaricator,
who, as if he were oblig'd to mend all, falls firft to patching with a
Monarchy by Arms, then with a Monarchy by a Nobility: at length
defpairing, throws away each, and betakes himſelf with egregious
confidence, to make out of both a new Monarchy, which is neither.
By obfervation of theſe three flourishes, the prefent Chapter may be
brought into fome method. The first blow of his hammer, or that
wherby he intends the flaw or hole in Monarchy by Arms ſhall
henceforth be mended and tite, is this: That the Guards of the King's
Perfon be not increas'd beyond the neceffity of fecurity; that they be not
Suffer'd to ſtagnat at Court, but be by a perpetual circulation drawn out
upon fervice; and chiefly that they confift not of one entire Body united
under the fame Head, but be divided into diftinct Partys and Commands;
as we may fee in France, where tho (in proportion to the extent of their
Dominions) the King's Guards be more numerous than thofe of the Ro-
man or Turkiſh Emperors, yet being divided into diftinct Bodys of French,
Scots and Switzers, under their feveral Colonels and Captains, they have
never bin the Authors of any the leaft Sedition. And in Turky of late
years they begin to learn the Art of poifing the Janizarys by the Spahys,
and fo have frequently evaded the danger of their Mutinys. Which fine
work at firſt view goes upon this falfe ground, that the Foundation of
Monarchy by Arms is laid upon the Prince's Guards or the Court Militia,
wheras Monarchy by Arms confifts in no other Balance than the Prince's
being fole Landlord, which, where imperfect, as it was in that of the
Roman Emperors, the Empire is the most troubl'd; and where perfect,
as in Turky, the Empire is lefs feditious. For that which he fays of
France, it relates to Monarchy by a Nobility; and therfore is not to
be confounded, according to this method, with this, but refer'd to the
next branch.
M m 2
AS
Confid. p. 46.
268
The Prerogative
Book I.
As to Monarchy by Arms, tho it be true that the balance of Do-
minion in any of the three kinds may be faid to be natural, in regard
of the effect; yet feeing God has given the Earth to the Sons of Men,
that of a fole Landlord, as Turky, is not fo natural in the cauſe or
foundation, as the Timars, and therfore requires the application of
fom kind of force, as the Janizarys, who are not the root of the Go-
vernment, that being planted in the Earth of the Timars, or military
Farms and Colonys (for that the Janizarys are not the Foundation of
this Empire, which was founded long before, is plain, in that this
Order was not introduc'd till AMURATH the Second) but the Dra-
gon that lys at that root, and without which the Fruit would fall
into the mouths of the Timariots by way of Property (as when the
Knights Fees granted firft for life, became afterwards hereditary in
Oceana) which would cauſe fuch a fall from Monarchy, that it would
becom, as we have ſeen, the rife of popular Power (the Lots, in
cafe this fhould happen, of the Timariots, little differing from thoſe
divided by JOSHUA to the Children of Ifrael) wherfore when this.
happens in the Turkish Monarchy, it is at an end. And that this dos
not happen, tho there be divers other concurrent Policys, I would have
any man fhew me, how it could be but for the Janizarys. Otherwiſe
it is plain that the Janizarys being a flying Army, on wing at all games,
and
upon all occafions, are not fo much the Guard of the Prince, as of
the Empire; which ruin'd, the Prey falls to the Timariots, as thofe
that are in poffeffion, except thefe be ruin'd too, who being all Horſe,
and far greater in number than the Janizarys that are Foot, would
(in cafe the aw of the Prince, and the Policy of the Government
which holds them divided, were broken) be invincible by the Ja-
nizarys, who nevertheleſs by theſe aids can eaſily contain them.
Whence the Sedition of the Janizarys, like that of a Nobility, may be
dangerous to the Prince, but never threatens the Throne; wheras the Se-
dition of the Timariots, like that of a People, would be more against the
Throne than the Prince. Theſe things confider'd, and in them the
Nature, Conftitution, or Diſeaſe of Monarchy by Arms, we may
confult the more rationally with the Confiderer upon the Applications
or Remedys by him offer'd, which are three.
FIRST, That the Guards of the King's Perfon be not increas'd be-
yond the neceffity of Security. But of what Security, that of his Per-
fon, or of his Empire, or of both? for fpeaking of a Monarchy by
Arms, in this latter fenfe only it is true: and if fo, then this fingular
Maxim of State (Fruftra fit per plura, quod fieri poteft per pauciora)
might have bin fpar'd (Cela s'en va fans le dire, comme les heures de
noftre curè.)
SECONDLY, That they be not ſuffer'd to flagnat at Court, but be
by a perpetual circulation drawn out upon fervice; for if there be not per-
petual fervice, it ſhould feem, men might be apt to think that Govern-
ment was inſtituted for Peace as well as War. I add no more than is
imply'd in his words, which as to this of Turky have chanc'd well;
where not the Stagnation of the Janizarys only, but of the Court it
ſelf (which by the inſtitution fhould always be in exerciſe of Arms)
is the cauſe of that preſent decay, fo perceivable in this Empire. But
the Prince fitting ftill or ſtagnating, to what the Circulation of the
Janizarys (whofe Alienation from the Government, or Intelligence
with the Timariots, muft needs be of dangerous confequence) could
tend,
of Popular Government.
269
tend, ſhould have bin thought on: otherwife to expoſe the Empire to Chap. 9.
danger for the fafety of the Prince, is no cure of the Government.
BUT his chief Remedy remains: This Court Militia must not con-
fift of one intire body united under the fame head, but be divided under feve-
ral Colonels, Captains, Partys, Brigades, and diftributed to feveral
Quarters. As if this were a cure, there were any Army that could
be mutinous: but where he fays, not united under the fame Head, he
intimats perhaps divers Generals, and divers Armys; now ſuch are
the Turkish Beglerbegs, and the Provinces under their Governments.
That theſe therfore be kept divided, fo that not any two of them can
lay their heads together without having them cut off, nor any Son
fuccede the Father in Government, requires that there be always a
fufficient force (diftinct from the Intereft of the Timariots and Begler-
begs) united, and ftill ready upon occafion of this fervice; and the
Fanizarys with the Spabys or Court-Horfe being united, are no more
than fufficient for this fervice. Wherfore if theſe alfo were fo di-
vided as therby to be weaken'd, they could not be fufficient for this
fervice; and their divifion, except fuch as might weaken them, would
be of no fecurity to the Prince. That the Provinces, under this aw,
are leſs apt to rebel, than the Court-Guards to mutiny, is no wonder;
but the Court-Guards being cur'd by the preſcription of this Phyfician,
of the poffibility of Mutiny, which without weakening them is im-
poffible, the Provinces, if Liberty, or Riches, or Power be defirable,
would never indure the yoke of this Government. Wherfore it being
inavoidable in the Turkish Empire, that either the Janizarys, or the
Timariots may do what they lift (in regard that whether of them be
able to give Law to the other, muſt at the fame time be able to give
Law to the Prince; and to bring thern to an equal Balance, were to
make a Civil War, or at leaſt to fow the Seed of it) the native
Wound of Monarchy by Arms remains incur'd and incurable. What
more may be don for Monarchy, founded upon a Nobility, coms next
to be try'd. In this the Confiderer gives his word, that there never
rifes any danger to the Crown, but when either a great part of the Sove-
rain Power is put into the hands of the Nobility, as in Germany and Po- Confid. p. 47.
land (where it ſhould ſeem by him, that the Electors and the Gentry
do not put Power into the hands of the Emperor, or King, but the
Emperor or King puts Power into the hands of the Electors or Gen-
try) or when fom Perfon or Family is fuffer'd to overtop the rest in Riches,
Commands, and Dependance, as the Princes of the Blood and Lorrain, not
long fince, in France; and of old the MONTFORTS and NEVILS in
England. The firſt of theſe he declares to be a vicious Government,
and a Monarchy only in name: The ſecond he undertakes ſhall eaſily ad-
mit of this Remedy; That the great ones be reduc'd (decimo fexto) to a
leffer Volum, and level'd into an Equality with the rest of their Order.
HIS Putpin is pretty: The Emperor puts Power into the hands of the
Electors; and the King of Poland puts Power into the hands of the Gen-
tlemen: Which Governments therfore (and all fuch like, as when the
King of England did put power into the hands of the Barons, at ſuch a
time as he was no longer able to keep it out of their fingers, by which
means the antient and late Government of King, Lords and Commons,
was reftor'd) are vicious Conftitutions, and Monarchys only in name;
fuch as he will not meddle with, and therfore let them go. Well 4.
but where is the Patient then? if thefe be not Monarchys by Nobility,
what
270
The Prerogative
1
Book I. what do we mean by that thing? or what Government is it that we
are to cure? Why fuch a one, where fom Perfon or Family is fuffer'd to
overtop the rest in Riches, Commands, and Dependence, as the Princes
of the Blood and Lorrain, not long fince, in France; and of old the
MONTFORTS and the NEVILS in England. So then the fame again
(for theſe are no other) upon recollection, are thofe that admit
of this eafy cure. Let the Great Ones be reduc'd to a leffer Volum, and
level'd with the rest of their Order. But how? if they be the weaker
Party, they are not the Great Ones; and if they be the ſtronger Par-
ty, how will he reduce them? Put the cafe a man has the Gout, his
Phyſician dos not bid him reduce his overtopping Toes to the Volum
of the other Foot, nor to level them to equality with the reſt of their
Order, but preſcribes his Remedys, and infitutes the Method that
fhould do this feat. What is the Method of our ESCULAPIUS?
Point de Novelle, or where are we to find it? e'en where you pleafe.
The Princes of the Blood, and of Lorrain in France; the MoNt-
FORTS and the NEVILS in England, overtop'd not their Order by
their own Riches or Power, but by that of the Party, which for
their Fidelity, Courage, or Conduct, intrufted them with the ma-
naging of their Arins or Affairs. So the Prince that would have level'd
them, muſt have level'd their Party; which in cafe the Controverfy
be upon the Right, or pretended Right of the Nobility in the Govern-
ment, which commonly makes them hang together, may com to the
Confid. p. 49. whole Order: what then? Why then, fays he, the Prince muſt pre-
Serve his Nobility weighty enough to keep the People under, and yet not tall
enough in any particular Perfon to measure with himself: which, abating
the figure, is the fame again; and fo I have nothing to anfwer but the
figure. Now for this, the Prince himſelf is no otherwife tall, than
by being fet upon the ſhoulders of the Nobility; and ſo if they fet
another upon the fame fhoulders (as in HENRY the 4th or the 7th,
who had no Titles to the Crown, nor could otherwiſe have meaſur'd
with the Prince) be he never fo low, he coms to be tall enough in his
particular perſon to meaſure with the Prince, and to be taller too, not
only by thofe old examples, but others that are younger than our
felves, tho fuch (the Nobility having not of late bin weighty enough
to keep the People under) as derive from another Principle, that of
popular Balance. A Prince therfore preferving his Nobility weighty
enough to keep the People under, muſt preſerve in them the balance
of that kind of Empire: and the balance containing the Riches,
which are the Power, and fo the Arms of the Nation; this being
in the Nobility, the Nobility, when willing, muſt be able to difpofe
of the King, or of the Government. Nor under a lefs weight is a
Nobility qualify'd to keep down the People, as by an Argument from
the contrary. HENRY the 7th having found the frength of his
Nobility, that fet him in a Throne to which he had no right, and
fearing that the Tide of their Favour turning, they might do as much
for another, abated the dependence of their Tenants, and cut off their
Train of Retainers; which diminution of their weight, relcafing the
People by degrees, has caus'd that Plain or Level into which we live
to ſee the Mountain of that Monarchy now funk and fwallow'd :
wherfore the Balance of the Nobility being fuch as failing, that kind
of Monarchy coms to ruin; and not failing, the Nobility, if they
join, may give Law to the King, the inherent diſeaſe of a Monar-
chy
of Popular Government.
271
chy by a Nobility remains alfo uncur'd and incurable.
Chap. 9.
of France.
THESE are points to which I had ſpoken before; but fomthing
concerning France and foren Guards was mumbled by the Prevaricator The Balance
in a wrong place, while he was ſpeaking of Turky, where there is no
fuch thing. This, left I be thought to have courted oppofition for
nothing, fhall open a new Scene; while I take occafion in this place
to ſpeak firſt of the Balance of the French Monarchy, and next of the
Nature and Uſe of Foren Guards.
?
THE whole Territory of France except the Crown Lands,
which on this account are not confiderable, confifts of three ſhares or
parts, wherof the Church holds one, the Nobility another; and the
Preſidents, Advocats, other Officers of the Parlaments, Courts of
Juftice, the Citizens, Merchants, Tradefmen, the Treaſurers, Re-
ceivers of the Cuſtoms, Aids, Taxes, Impofitions, Gabels, all which
together make a vaft body, hold a third: by how equal Portions I am
forry that I do not know, nor where to learn: but this is the Ba-
lance of the French Monarchy, to which the Peaſant holding nothing,
but living (tho in one of the beſt Countrys of the World) in the
meaneſt and moſt miſerable Condition of a Laborer, or Hynd, is of
no account at all.
Grotius de
Pot. circa
S. 4.
THE Partys that hold the Balance in a Territory are thoſe of
whom the Government does naturally confift, wherfore theſe are call'd
Eftates; fo the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commons, are the
three Eſtates of France. Tho the third, becauſe the Peafant partaking
not of the Balance can (in relation to Government) be of no account,
is not call'd the Commons, but only the third Eftate: wheras the
Yeomanry and Gentry in England having weigh'd as well in the Ba-
lance as the Church and the Nobility, the three Eſtates of England
(while the Monarchy was in vigor) were the Clergy, the Nobility,
and the Commons. The Confent of Nations evinces that the Function
of the Clergy, or Priest, except where otherwife determin'd by Law, apper- Imp. Sum.
tains to the Magiftrat. By this right NOAH, ABRAHAM, JOB,
? facra. C. 2.
with the rest of the Patriarchs, inftructed their Familys, or facrific'd.
There Jeems to have bin a kind of Commonwealth in Canaan, while
MELCHIZEDEC was both King and Priest. Such alfo was MOSES,
till be confecrated AARON, and confer'd the Priesthood upon the Levits,
who are exprefly faid to fuccede to the firstborn, that is to the Patriarchs,
who till then exercis'd that Function. Nor was it otherwife with the
Gentils, where they, who had the Soverain Power, or were in eminent Ma-
giftracy, did alfo the Priestly Office (omnino apud veteres qui rerum
potiebantur, iidem Auguria tenebant: ut enim fapere, fic divinare,
regale ducebant, fays CICERO; and VIRGIL, REX ANIUS, Rex
idem hominum, PHOEBIQUE Sacerdos.) You find the Heros, that
is Princes, in Poets, facrificing. The Ethiopian, Egyptian, Lacedemo-
nian Kings did the like. In Athens conftantly and in Rome, when they
had no Kings, occafionally they elected a Rex facrorum, or King Prieſt.
So that a free People had thus far Power of electing their Priefts, is
not deny'd by any man. This came, it ſhould feem, to be otherwife
eftablish'd by the Law in Egypt, where the Prieſts (whofe Lands Land.d
JOSEPH when he bought thoſe of the People did not buy) being Clergy.
great Landlords, it may be to the Third of the whole Territory, Gen. 47. 22.
were one of the three Eſtates of the Realm. And it is clear in Scrip-
ture that the People, till they fold their Lands, became not Servants to
PHA-
Original of a
272
The Prerogative
Xenoph. in
Orat. de Agef.
L. 1.
Book I. PHARAOH. While AGESILAUS was in Egypt they depos'd their
King, which implys the recovery of their Balance; but fo, feeing they
fet up another, as withal fhews the Balance of the Nobility to have
bin predominant. Thefe Particulars feem to com near to the account
of DIODORUS SICULUS, by whom the Balance of Egypt ſhould
have ſtood thus: The whole Revenue was divided into three Parts,
wherof the Priest had the first, the King had the ſecond, and the Nobility
had the third. It ſeems to me that the Prieſts had theirs by their an-
tient Right and Title, untouch'd by JOSEPH; that the Kings had
all the reft by the purchaſe of JOSEPH; and that in time, as is uſual
in like cafes, a Nobility came thro the bounty of fucceeding Kings to
ſhare with them in one half. But however it came about, Egypt by
this means is the first example of a Monarchy upon a Nobility, at
leaft diftributed into three Eſtates by means of a Landed Clergy,
which by confequence came to be the greateſt Counfillors of State,
and, fitting Religion to their uſes, to bring the People to be the moſt
fuperftitious in the whole World.
WERE it not for this Example, I fhould have faid, that the
Indowment of a Clergy or religious Order with Lands, and the erect-
ing of them into an Eſtate of the Realm or Government, were no an-
tienter than the Goths and Vandals, who introducing a like Policy,
which to this day takes place throout the Chriſtian World, have bin
the Cauſe;
FIRST, Why the Clergy have bin generally great Counfillors to
Kings, while the People are led into Superftition.
SECONDLY, By planting a religious order in the Earth, why
Religion has bin brought to ferve worldly ends.
AND, Thirdly, by rendring the Miter able to make War; why
of latter Ages we have had ſuch a thing as War for Religion, which
till the Clergy came to be a third State or Landlords, was never known
in the World: For that ſome Citys of Greece, taking Arms upon the
Thucyd. 1. 1. Ufurpation or Violation of fom Temple, have call'd it the Holy War;
fuch Difputes having bin put upon matter of Fact, and not of Faith,
in which every man was free, came not to this account. Moses was
learn'd in all the Learning of the Egyptians; but a Landed Clergy in-
troduced he not in Ifrael: nor went the Apoftles about to lay any fuch
Foundation of a Church. Abating this one example of Egypt, till
the Goths and Vandals, who brought in the third Eftate, a Govern-
ment, if it were inequal, confifted but of two Eftates; as that of
Rome, whether under the Kings or the Commonwealth, confifted of
the Patricians and Plebeians, or of the Nobility and the People. And
an equal Commonwealth confiſts but of one, which is the People:
for example of this you have Lacedemon and Venice, where the Peo-
ple being few, and having many Subjects or Servants, might alſo
be call'd a Nobility, as in regard of their Subjects they are in Venice,
and in regard of their Helots or Servants, they might have bin in
Lacedemon. That, I fay, which, introducing two Eftates, caufes
Divifion, or makes a Commonwealth inequal, is not that ſhe has a
Nobility, without which ſhe is depriv'd of her moſt ſpecial Orna-
ment, and weaken'd in her Conduct, but when the Nobility only is
capable of Magiftracy, or of the Senat; and where this is fo order'd,
fhe is inequal, as Rome. But where the Nobility is no otherwiſe ca-
pable of Magiftracy, nor of the Senat, than by Election of the
People,
of Popular Government.
273
People, the Commonwealth confifts but of one Order, and is equal, Chap. 9.
as Lacedemon or Venice.
·
69.
70.
BUT for a Politician commend me to the Confiderer, he will have
Rome to have bin an equal Commonwealth, and Venice to be an ine-
qual one, which muſt be evinc'd by wiredrawing. For having elf-
where, as has bin fhewn, admitted without oppofition that the Balance
of Empire is well divided into natural and provincial, the humor now Confid. p. 16.
takes him to ſpin that wedg into fuch a thred, as by entangling of
theſe two, may make them both eafy to be broken. Hereto he be-
takes himſelf in this manner. As Mr. HARRINGTON has well ob-
ferv'd (p. 40.) where there are two Partys in a Republic with equal
Power (as in that of Rome, the People had one half, and the Nobility
had the other half) Confufion and Miſery are there intail'd.
For remedy
wherof, or to avoid this, there can be no way but to make the Common-
wealth very inequal.
;
IN anſwer to this, there will need no more than to repeat the fame
things honeftly. Mr. HARRINGTON fpeaks of the national Balancé
of Empire (p. 40.) to this fenſe: Where the Nobility holds half the
Property, or about that proportion, and the People the other half (the
fhares of the Land may be equal; but in regard the Nobility have
much among Few, and the People little among Many, the Few will
not be contented to have Authority, which is all their proper ſhare
in a Commonwealth, but will be bringing the People under Power,
which is not their proper fhare in a Commonwealth; wherfore this
Commonwealth muſt needs be inequal. And except by altering the
Balance, as the Athenians did by the Sifacthia, or recifion of Debts
or as the Romans went about to do by an Agrarian, it be brought
to fuch an equality, that the whole Power be in the People, and there
remain no more than authority to the Nobility) there is no remedy
but the one (with perpetual feud) will eat out the other, as the People did
the Nobility in Athens, and the Nobility the People in Rome. Where
the Carcafe is, there will be the Eagles alfo ; where the Riches are,
there will be the Power. So if a few be as rich as all the reft, a few
will have as much Power as all the reft; in which caſe the Common-
wealth is inequal, and there can be no end of ſtaving and tailing, till
it be brought to equality. Thus much for the national Balance ;
For the Provincial, there Power dos not follow Property, but the
contrary: This the Prevaricator having acknowleg'd, lets flip, to
the end he may take a gripe of Venice, which (becauſe the three
or four thousand of which originally confifted, and now confifts
that whole Government, having acquir'd Provinces, and increaſe of
their City by later comers, do not admit theſe to participation of
Power) he fays is an inequal Commonwealth. He will be a Mill-
horſe, whether the Cake be dow or not; for this is to draw in a circle :
and Rome, which by his former Arguments should have bin equal,
by this again muſt be inequal, ſeeing Rome as little admitted her
Provinces into the body of the Commonwealth, as dos Venice. This
claſh is but by way of Parentheſis; to return therfore to the Buſineſs
in preſent agitation.
THE Eſtates be they one, or two, or three, are fuch (as was
faid by Virtue of the Balance,) upon which the Government muſt
naturally depend. Wherfore conftitutively the Government of France ·
(and all other Monarchys of like Balance) was adminiſter'd by an
N n
Affembly
274
The Prerogative
Book I. Affembly of the three Eftates; and thus continu'd till that Nation
being vanquish'd by the English, CHARLES the 7th was put to
fuch ſhifts as, for the recovery of himſelf in the greateft diftrefs, he
could make. To which recovery, while the Eftates could not be le-
gally call'd, he happening to attain without them, fo order'd his
affairs, that his Succeffors, by adding to his Inventions, came to rule
without this Affembly; a way not futing with the nature of their
Balance, which therfore requir'd fom Affiftance by force, and other
concurring Policys of the like nature, wherof the foren Guards of that
Monarchy are one; the great baits alluring the Nobility another; and
the emergent Intereft of the Church a third.
To begin with the laſt of theſe; the Church (except it be in a
War for Religion, as when they join'd with the Princes of Lorrain,
and what Party of the French Nobility were made, or they could
make againſt the King of Navar) are not of themſelves fo hot at
hand, or promt to Arms: but the King being (to uſe their word)
no Heretic, thro their great apprehenfion of the third Eſtate, as that
which is moſt addicted to the Proteftant Religion, may be confident
they will never fide with the People. So by this emergent Intereſt or
Accident he has the Church fure enough.
FOR the Nobility, which is exceeding gallant, this Change has
the greateſt baits; for wheras the Church being not fpar'd, the third
Eftate is laden, and the Peafant overladen with Taxes, the Nobility
is not only at better eafe in this regard, but for the greater or inorė
confiderable part, receives advantage by it: the King having always,
whether in Peace or War, a great Cavalry, than which there is no
better in the world for the Exerciſe, Entertainment, and Profit of the
Nobility: Governments of Citys, Caſtles, Provinces in abundance,
which he rarely diftributes to any other. The greater Nobility are
Marechals, Generals; the lefs Officers in the Armys, fpecially of the
Horſe, the Emoluments wherof they receive alfo in time of Peace ;
and many of this Order being Penfioners, taſte of the King's Libera-
lity, without taking pains, or having any Imployment at all. By
which both that France is a Monarchy by a Nobility, and how fhe
holds her Nobility, is apparent.
NOW the Church and the Nobility ftanding thus ingag'd to the
King, by which means he has two parts of the Balance to one, it is
demonftrable that the Government must be quiet. Nor, feeing the
Church for the reaſon fhewn is fure enough, coms the Government
(fince the Proteftant Citys and Holds were demolish'd) to be otherwiſe
diſquieted than by the flying out of the Nobility, which, whenever it
happens in any party confiderable, either for the Number, or the In-
tereft, cauſes the Crown to fhake; for it ſeldom coms to pass upon
this occafion, but the third Eſtate, or fom part of it, takes Arms im-
mediately. In which place it is worthy to be obferv'd, that Wealth,
according to the diftribution of the Balance, has contrary motions.
The third Eſtate in France having Riches, and thoſe laden with
Taxes, com to have fomthing to lofe, and fomthing to fave: which
keeps them in continual fear or hope. The Nobility holding to the
King, the third Eftate has fomthing to lofe, which withholds them
from Arms thro fear; but the Nobility flying out, the third Estate
has fomthing to fave, which precipitats them into Arms thro hope:
wheras the Peaſant having nothing to fave or to lofe, to hope or to fear,
never
of Popular Government.
275
never ftirs. The caſe ſtanding thus, the fufficiency of the French Chap. 9.
Politician (fince the Maſterpiece of Cardinal RICHLIEU, in de-
moliſhing thoſe Walls of the Proteftants, which had otherwiſe by
this time bin a Refuge for the third Eſtate, and perhaps overturn'd the
Monarchy) lys altogether in finding for the Nobility work abroad,
or balancing them in fuch fort at home, that if a party flys out, there
may be a ſtronger within to reduce it, or at leaſt to be oppos'd to it.
In this cafe, left the native Intereſt of the Nobility, fince the Affem-
blys of the three Eftates were abolish'd, might cool the remaining
Party, or make them flower in the redreſs of ſuch Diſorder or Dif-
contents than were requifit, the King is wifely provided of Foren
Guards; which being always in readineſs, and not obnoxious to the
native Intereſt, may upon like occafions be of more Expedition and
Truft. Being com thus to foren Arms, which is the point I more
eſpecially propos'd to myſelf in the preſent Difcourfe, one Objection
in relation to what has bin already faid, feems to interpofe it ſelf.
Seeing France, while it is not govern'd by the Affembly of States, is
yet of the fame Balance it was when govern'd by the Affembly of
States; it may be faid that a Government of the fame Balance may
admit of divers Adminiſtrations.
TO which I need make no other anfwer, than to put you in mind
that while this Government was natural, or adminiſter'd by the Affem-
bly of States, it is celebrated by MACHIAVEL to have bin the beſt
order'd of any Monarchy in the world; and that what it is, or has bin
of later times, you may believe your own eys or ears.
THERE be yet, before I can com to foren Guards, fom previous of Arms, and
Confiderations. All Government, as is imply'd by what has bin already their kind,
fhewn, is of theſe three kinds: A Government of Servants: A Go-
vernment of Subjects; or, a Government of Citizens. The firft is ab-
folute Monarchy, as that of Turky: The fecond Ariftocratical Mo-
narchy, as that of France: The third a Commonwealth, as thoſe of
Ifrael, of Rome, of Holland. Now (to follow MACHIAVEL
in part) of theſe, the Government of Servants is the harder to be
conquer'd, and the eaſier to be held: The Government of Subjects is
the eaſier to be conquer'd, and the harder to be held. To which I
fhall preſume to add, that the Government of Citizens is both the
hardeſt to be conquer'd, and the hardeft to be held.
•
MY Author's Reaſons, why a Government of Servants is the hardeſt
to be conquer'd, com to this, that they are under perpetual Difciplin
and Command, void of fuch Interefts and Factions, as have Hands or
Power to lay hold upon Advantages or Innovation; whence he that
invades the Turk muſt truſt to his own ftrength, and not rely upon
Diſorders in the Government, or Forces which he ſhall be fure enough
to find united.
HIS Reaſons why this Government being once broken, is eaſily
held, are, that the Armys once paft hope of rallying, there being no
fuch thing as Familys hanging together, or Nobility to ftir up their
Dependents to further Reluctancy for the prefent, or to preferve
themſelves by complacence with the Conquerors for future Diſcontents
or Advantages, he that has won the Garland has no more to do but to
extinguish the Royal Line, and wear it ever after in fecurity. For
the People having bin always Slaves, are fuch whofe condition he may
better, in which cafe they are Gainers by their Conqueror; but can
Nn 2
never
276
The Prerogative
Book I.
never make worfe, and therfore they lofe nothing by him. Hence
ALEXANDER having conquer'd the Perfian Empire, he and his Cap-
tains after him could hold it without the leaft difpute, except it arofe
among themſelves. Hence MAHOMET the Second having taken
Conftantinople, and put PALEOLOGUS the Greec Emperor (whofe
Government was of like nature with the Perfian) together with his
whole Family, to the Sword, the Turk has held that Empire without
reluctancy.
ON the other fide, the Reaſons why a Government of Subjects is
eafilier conquer'd, are thefe: That it is fupported by a Nobility fo an-
tient, fo powerful, and of ſuch hold and influence upon the People,
that the King without danger, if not ruin to himſelf or the Throne
(an example wherof was given in HEN. 7th of England) can nei-
ther invade their Privileges, nor level their Eſtates; which remaining,
they have power upon every difcontent to call in an Enemy, as
ROBERT Count of Artois did the English, and the Duke of Guife
the Spaniard into France.
THE Reaſons why a Government of Subjects being fo eafily con-
quer'd, is nevertheleſs the harder to be held, are thefe: That the No-
bility being foon out of countenance in fuch a cafe, and repenting
themſelves of fuch a bargain, have the fame means in their hands
wherby they brought in the Enemy, to drive him out, as thoſe of
France did both the English and the Spaniard.
FOR the Government of Citizens, as it is of two kinds, an equal
or an inequal Commonwealth, the Reaſons why it is the hardeſt to be
conquer'd, are alſo of two kinds; as firft, the Reaſons why a Go-
vernment of Citizens, where the Commonwealth is equal, is hardeſt to
be conquer'd, are, that the Invader of fuch a Society must not only truſt
to his own ftrength, inasmuch as the Commonwealth being equal,
he muſt needs find them united, but in regard that fuch Citizens, be-
ing all Soldiers or train'd up to their Arms, which they uſe not for
the defence of Slavery, but of Liberty (a condition not in this world
to be better'd) they have more fpecially upon this occaſion the higheſt
Soul of Courage, and (if their Territory be of any extent) the vaſteſt
Body of a well difciplin'd Militia that is poffible in nature: wher-
fore an example of fuch a one overcom by the Arms of a Monarch, is not
to be found in the World. And if fom fmall City of this Frame has
happen'd to be vanquish'd by a potent Commonwealth, this is her
Prerogative, her Towers are her Funeral Pile, and fhe expires in her own
flame, leaving nothing to the Conqueror but her Afbes, as Saguntum o-
verwhelm'd by Carthage, and Numantia by Rome.
THE Reaſons why a Government of Citizens, where the Com-
monwealth is inequal, is, next the former, the hardest to be conquer'd,
are the fame, with this difference, that tho her Peace be not perfect
within, her condition is not to be better'd by any thing without.
Wherfore Rome in all her ftrife never call'd in an Enemy; and if an
Enemy upon occafion of her ftrife, and hopes of advantage by it,
came without calling, he prefented her with her moft Soverain Cure,
who had no leiſure to deftroy her felf, till having no Enemy to find
her work, the became her own.
Nondum tibi defuit hoftis,
In te vertė manus
Nor
>
of Popular Government.
277
Nor is there any example that a Government of this kind was ever Chap. 9.
fubdu'd by the Arms of a Monarch; tho fom indeed may be found
that have call'd or fuffer'd foren Princes or Force to com in, as Holland
by Marriages of their Prince, and Genoa thro her Factions, as thofe
of the FIESCI and ADORNI.
TO conclude this part as to the Reaſons why a Government of Ci-
tizens fo acquir'd or poffeft, as thro Marriage, or Faction, is the
hardeſt to be held, there needs no more than that men accuſtom❜d to
their Arms and their Liberties will never indure the Yoke. Wherfore
the Spaniard, tho a mighty King, no fooner began in Holland, a ſmall
Commonwealth, to innovat or break her Orders, than fhe threw him.
off with fuch Courage and Difdain, as is admirable to the World.
And fomwhat of the like kind did Genoa by the help of her DORIA
in the vindication of her Liberty from France.
Guic. 1. 11.
TO com by this fartheft way about as I think the neareſt way
home: Arms are of two forts, Proper or Improper; that is, Native Proper and
or Foren.
PROPER and Native Arms are, according to the triple nature
of Government, of three kinds; Servants in Arms, as the Helots in
Lacedemon, the Timariots and Janizarys in Turky; Subjects in Arms,
as the Horſe in France, and the Seaguards or Forces in Venice; or Ci-
tizens in Arms, as thofe upon the Lexiarcha in Athens, of the Mora
in Lacedemon, and the Legions in Rome.
IMPROPER or Foren Arms are of two forts; Auxiliarys, and
Mercenarys.
AUXILIARYS are fuch as are fupply'd by virtue of fom
League, as were thofe of the Latins and Italians to the Romans; and
thofe of the Cantons of Swifs (except Zuric) to the King of France:
or they may be fuch as are occafionally lent freely, or let forth for
Mony by one State to another, the latter wherof differ not much from
Mercenarys.
MERCENARYS are Soldiers of Fortune that have no other
Trade than their Arms, and let out themſelves for Mony; of ſuch
confifted the greateſt part of the Carthaginian Strength, fuch is the
Land Force of Venice, and, notwithſtanding the Antient League of
France with thoſe Nations, fuch at this day are the Swifs and Scotif
Guards (and fomtimes a good part of the Foot) in France.
MACHIAVEL difcourfes upon theſe Particulars in his Art of
War, to admiration by whom I fhall therfore ſteer.
Improper
Arms.
WHERE the Arms in bulk are proper, and confifting of Citizens,
they have other Trades, and therfore are no Soldiers of Fortune; and
yet becauſe the Commonwealth has Arms for her Trade (in regard
The is a Magiftrat given for the good of Mankind, and bears not her Sword
in vain) they are all educated as well in Military as Civil Diſciplin,
taking their turns in fervice of either nature according to the occafion,
and the Orders of the Commonwealth, as in Ifrael, Athens, Lacedemon,
and Rome, which had (if their Territorys permitted, and fomtimes,
as I may fay, whether their Territorys permitted or no, as in Ifrael)
the vaſteft, the higheſt temper'd, and the beſt difciplin'd Militia,
that is to be found in the whole compafs of Story. Som Armys of
Ifrael have confifted of three or four hundred thouſand men: Rome
upon the rumor of a Gallic Tumult, arm'd in Italy only, without Plin. L Æmi-
foren Aid, ſeventy thouſand Horſe and ſeven hundred thouſand Foot; tibio Regulo
lioPapo, C. A
things Coss.
278
The Prerogative
Book I. things in our days (when the Turk can hardly arm half ſo many) noť
un to be credited.
Arte della
HENCE that a Commonwealth, which had not first broken her felf,
or bin broken by fom other Commonwealth, ſhould not be found to have bin
conquer'd by the Arms of any Monarch, is not miraculous, but a natural
effect of an apparent Caufe. In this place, or upon this Text, Divines
whom I would defire not to be Enemys of popular Power, but to give
MACHIAVEL his due, fhall, if they pleaſe, hear him make a
goodly Sermon, in theſe words: If antient Commonwealths and Govern-
Guer. Proem. ments us'd Diligence in any other Order to make their People lovers of
Peace, faithful to their Country, and to have the fear of God before their
eys, they doubl'd it in this of their Militia: for of whom Should your
Country expect greater Faith, than of fuch as have offer'd themselves to
dy for her? Whom should fhe indeavour to make greater Lovers of Peace,
than them who only can inflave her by force? In whom ſhould there be
greater Fear of God, than in fuch as carry their Lives in their hands?
This, when Lawgivers and Captains rightly confider'd, was the cauſe why
Soldiers were eſteem'd, honor'd, follow'd and imitated above all men in the
World; wheras fince fuch Orders are broken, and Custom is altogether de-
viated from the courfe of antient Prudence, men are com to deteft the Ini-
quity of the Camp, and fly the Converfation of fuch as are in Arms, as the
Peftilence. Where the Arms in bulk are proper, but confift of Sub-
jects, they are the beſt next; and but the beſt next, as appears by all
Examples antient and modern. The Arms with which PYRRHUS
Prince of Epirus invaded the Romans, were of Subjects; yet that
Prince, tho he was not vanquish'd by the Romans, confeft their ad-
vantage, and gave them over. The Spaniard being a far more po-
tent King than was PYRRHUS, has acknowleg'd as much to the
Hollanders, tho a far lefs Commonwealth than Rome: So have the
Princes of Auftria, and of Burgundy, to the Switzers. That the Arms
of Subjects are nevertheleſs as much fuperior to the Arms of Servants,
as inferior to the Arms of Citizens, is as plain; feeing as ALEXAN-
DER, with thirty thouſand Subjects, vanquish'd DARIUS, having
innumerable Slaves; fo thirty thouſand Chriftians are at this day a
match for any Army of Turks: and we fee Venice, whofe Force by
Sea confifts of Subjects, to have made him quit that Element near as
fully to her Dominion or Empire, as did the Perfian to Athens.
TO Arms that are proper, but confift of Servants, all the pre-
eminence that can be given is, that they are better than foren Arms
a proof wherof we have in thofe of SELIMUS, wherby he con-
quer'd the Mamalucs; who being but a foren Force that held Egypt
in ſubjection, the Country was irrecoverably loft, and, for the rea-
fons already ſhewn, as eaſily kept.
IMPROPER Arms, whether Auxiliary or Mercenary, where the
Force of a Prince or of a Commonwealth confifts, for the bulk or
greater part, of no other, are the leaft effectual, and the most dange-
rous of all. For Auxiliarys, or what effect has bin found of them by
Princes or Commonwealths, it was feen in France during the League
by the Spaniard; and in Holland during the Reign of Queen ELIZA-
BETH by the English; but eſpecially in the Goths and Vandals, who
having been Auxiliarys or Mercenarys, rely'd upon by the later Em-
perors, came therby to ruin the Roman Empire.
MERCE-
7
of Popular Government.
279
MERCENARYS who make their Arms their Trade, muft of Chap. 9'
all others be the moſt pernicious; for what can we expect leſs of ſuch
whoſe Art is not otherwiſe fo profitable, than that they ſhould (as
MACHIAVEL ſhews) be breakers of their Faith, given up to Rapin,
Enemys of Peace and Government.
TO inftance in fom Commonwealths, that of Carthage after her firſt
War with the Romans, fell thro the Rebellion of SPENDIUS and
MATHO, Ringleaders of her Mercenarys, into another that was far
more dangerous. Of fuch a dilemma were the Arms of this State,
that if HANNIBAL had conquer'd Rome, he muſt have bin King of
Carthage; and not conquering Rome, Carthage was ruin'd. The
Commonwealth of Milan, trufting herself to F. SFORZA and his Mer-
cenarys, became the Subject of her Servant, and he her Duke. Nor
is Venice, whofe Land-Forces are of the fame kind, otherwife in fafe-
ty as to theſe, than by her Situation. To give fome inftances of the
fame nature in Princes: The Father of F. SFORZA being Captain of
a like mercenary Army, forc'd JoAN Queen of Naples, whom he left
difarm'd in the midſt of her Enemys, to lay herſelf at the feet of
the King of Arragon; and BRACCIO by fuch another Treachery had
plainly poffeft himſelf of the Kingdom of Naples, had he not bin
broken at Aquila, where Death intercepted his defign. From what has
bin faid (firſt of Government, and then of Arms) if a Government
of Servants be harder to be conquer'd, and eaſier to be held, then
in this foren Arms muſt needs be leaſt neceffary, and moſt dangerous,
1
IF a Government of Subjects be eaſier to be conquer'd, and harder
to be held, then in this foren Arms may be more neceffary, but muſt
be leſs dangerous.
BUT tho a Government of Citizens be both hardeſt to be con-
quer'd, and hardeſt to be held, yet as it is again in this regard of
two kinds, this cannot be faid of each kind alike; wherfore I muſt
diſtinguiſh.
IN a Government of Citizens, if the Commonwealth be not for
increaſe, but preſervation only, as Lacedemon, Carthage, Venice, foren
Arms are both neceffary and dangerous; but in a Government of Ci-
tizens, where the Commonwealth is both for increaſe and prefervation,
as Rome, foren arms are neither neceffary nor dangerous.
W
TO repeat the parts of this Conclufion, which being brief is obfcure,
more fully and particularly.
!
THE Empire of Turky is of the harder kind to be conquer'd, wher-
fore the Turk needs not foren Guards to defend him, but it is of the
eaſier to be held; wherfore let him take heed of intrufting his Perfon
with foren Guards, who having a foren Intereft, may have a foren
Nation to affiſt them: and fo the Perfon of the Prince being in their
hands they have no more to do than to extinguish the Royal Line;
and the Empire being eafily held, is their own thenceforth with fecu-
rity. Thus the Mamalucs which were at firft foren Guards, extinguiſh-
ing the Royal Line of the Kings of Egypt, came to poffefs and hold
that Realm without oppofition. Who well confiders this point, will
never enough admire the Policy of the Turc in the creation (as it
were) of his Janizarys, free from any national Intereft that might
make them dream of, or defire Liberty, and yet fo void of all foren
Intereft or Knowledge, that they know not what, or who were their
Country or Parents. Hence tho they have Intereft to murder the
Turc,
280
The Prerogative s..
Book I. Turk, and fomtimes do accordingly, they have no further Interest in
the world but what depends upon the Government; and fo the Em-
pire is fafe, tho the Prince be in danger: wheras if they were foreh
Guards, or had any native intereſt, not only the Prince, but the Em
pire too would be in danger, the reft being Servants, and ſuch whofe
condition might be better'd by a change, but could be no worfe.
Wherfore a Government of Servants muſt by no means admit of
foren Guards or Mamalucs.
BUT the Empire of France, where the Nobility are not only fubject
to fly out, but to call in Strangers, may have uſe of foren Guards, which
not obnoxious to native Intereft and Factions, as thofe of the Nobili
ty, are the readieſt and beſt help at this lift; yet not dangerous, tho
having the Prince in their power, becauſe by him they are fafe from
the Nobility, who, were it not for the Prince, would be ſo far from
bearing or brooking foren Guards, that in cafe a Forener came in up-
on their call, having the fame means to help themſelves wherby they
brought him in, they would ſhake the Yoke, and the ends why they
call'd him in, being fatisfy'd or repented of, drive him out again as
they did the Spaniards and the English. But if this Government being
invaded or conquer'd, be fo hard to be kept, how much harder being
furpriz'd? Wherfore in a Government by Subjects, foren Arms may
be more neceffary, but must be lefs dangerous.
IN a Commonwealth for preſervation, as Lacedemon, Carthage, Ve
nice, foren Arms are neceffary: So Lacedemon, tho able to defend her
ſelf by her proper Forces againſt any one City, yet the Wars in Greece
going much upon Leagues and Confederats, were forced alſo to make
uſe of her Confederats, and ſomtimes of her Helots.
BUT as antiently to Carthage, fo now to Venice, foren or merce-
nary Forces are effential, becauſe for Land-Service ſuch a Conſtitution
can have no other: Yet is this courfe extremely dangerous, as appear'd
by Lacedemon, who (being ever in fear of her Helots) when ſhe had
acquir'd upon the matter the whole Empire of Greece, came, by the
Rebellion of her Confederats, not only to lofe all, but likewife to ru
in. For Carthage, upon the Mutiny of SPENDIUS and MATHO, fhe
eſcap'd, as at other times upon like occafions, very narrowly. That
fuch an Accident neither has befaln Venice, nor can befal her, is to be
attributed to her Situation, by which, in this regard, fhe is fecure?
Nevertheleſs, her Progrefs or Increaſe, which by this means either
cannot be great, or being great, muft render her but the more infirm,
is fully barr'd.
TO a Commonwealth for increaſe, which always takes in the
whole body of the People, foren Arms, (ſeeing the abounds above all
other kinds of Policy, with fuch as are proper) muſt needs be the
leaft neceffary; and they are the moſt fafe, becauſe never admitting
them, but for her mere convenience and frugality in expence of native
Blood, fhe receives no fuch charge of them as can recoil, but muſt car-
ry point blank, and as vigorously at her proper Intereft, very near as
her
proper Arms. Thus did the Latin and Italian Auxiliarys, of which,
join'd with the Roman Legions, confifted a Confular Army.
BY thus much it jeems that an inference from the fuccefs of Arms to
the perfection of Government, and from the perfection of Government to
the fuccefs of Arms, ſhould be no fallacious way of difputing.
BUT
of Popular Government.
281
1
;
BUT this being ſweaty work with the Confiderer, who loves his Chap. 9.
eaſe, it is enough to argue thus: The Switz, Scotifh, and French
Guards, have never bin the Authors of any Sedition, therfore the Sedi-
tioufnefs of a Nobility may be mended by foren Guards: which is, as if
one ſhould ſay, fuch a Phyſician has never bin the cauſe of the Gout;
therfore the Gout may be cur'd by fuch a Phyfician. That foren
Arms may be well enough apply'd in the cafe of a feditious Nobi-
lity, and have fom good effects, is not deny'd: but is France ther-
fore cur'd of her Sedition, or remains ſhe, notwithſtanding her foren
Guards, the moſt feditious Example in the world? If thus fhe has
not bin, nor be, what has he read of the Princes of the Blood in for-
mer times, or heard of late from them? But if thus fhe has bin, and
be, is it not a fine way of Cure, to give us an example of the Diſeaſe
for the Remedy? Nor are her Guards fo void of Sedition neither
but the Switzer, if he wants his pay, dares threaten Paris: the Scot,
at leaſt of late years, has not bin fo bold; but if a Prince flys out, the
Enfigns of the French Guards will one way or other be Captains,
while Soldier and Officer too follows his Affections or Intereſts, which
way foever they frame. I fhould be glad to know when a Dragon
fell from that Court, that did not bear down Stars with his Train.
But the Prevaricator is fet upon it: wheras of late years, the Janizarys
are known to have bin far more imbru'd in the Blood of their Princes
than ever;
he gives us his honeft word, that of late years in Turky
they begin to learn the Art of poifing the Janizarys (who are the Foot
of the Prince's Guard) by the Spahys (who are the Horfe of the
fame) and fo have frequently evaded the danger of their Mutinys. At
which rate, feeing every Army confifts of Horfe and Foot, no Army
could be mutinous. If theſe had not bin mere flights, and fo intended,
he might have don well to have ſhewn us one Mutiny of the Janizarys
appeas'd by the Spahys. But all the parts of his Politics, as was faid
of thoſe in Rhetoric, confiſt of Pronunciation.
49.
THUS the Wounds of Monarchy, notwithſtanding the former,
or this laſt Remedy of foren Guards, are ſtill bleeding or feftering.
BUT his Courage is undaunted (aut viam inveniet aut faciet) he
will either mend a Government, or make one, by afferting without
any example, but with egregious confidence, That the perfection of Confid. p.48,
Monarchy is free from thofe flaws which are charg'd upon it, and that it
confifts in governing by a Nobility, weighty enough to keep the People un-
der, and yet not tall enough in any particular Perfon to measure with the
Prince; and by a moderat Army kept under the notion of Guards and
Garifons, which may be fufficient to ftrangle all Sedition in the Cradle :
from which mixture or counterpoife of a Nobility and an Army, arifes the
most excellent form of Monarchical Government.
THERE's for your learning now, A Model which is a fhort
Horſe, and a Legiſlator that has foon curry'd him. To the parts of it,
conſiſting of a Nobility, and in force, I have already ſpoken feverally. I
ſhall now ſpeak to the whole together; that is, to the imagin'd mixture
or counterpoife of a Nobility and an Army; and becauſe there is no-
thing in Nature that has not had a natural effect by fom example.
THE fcale of Arms, or of Iron, continu'd in the Line of WIL-
LIAM the Conqueror; and the Scale of Property, or Gold, con-
tinu'd in the Barons of England, and their Succeffors. But in this be-
fore the Barons Wars confifted not the perfection of the Monarchy,
Oo
becauſe
282
The Prerogative
Book I. becauſe it preponderated too much on the fide of Arms; nor after
the Barons Wars, becauſe the King, putting Power (which he
could not keep out of their fingers) into the hands of the Nobility,
it became a vicious Conftitution, and a Monarchy only in name (fo
fays the Confiderer) therfore the Balance being then only even,
when neither the King could overbalance or get the better of the
Barons, nor the Barons overbalance or get the better of the King; the
perfection of Monarchy confifted in the Barons Wars? LYCURGUS
the Second!
MARK; the King by all means must have a Nobility weighty
enough to keep down the People; and then he muſt have an Army to
hold Gold weight with his Nobility: as if the Nobility in that cafe
would keep down the People, and not fetch them up (as did the Ba-
tons) into their Scale, that fo together they might weigh down the
Army; which fooner or later is the infallible confequence of this
Phanly, or let it be fhewn where it was ever otherwiſe. To inftance
in France is quite contrary, where all the confiderable Officers and
Commands being in the Nobility, or the richer fort of that Nation,
the Balance of Arms and of Property are not two, but one and the
fame. There is no way for Monarchy, but to have no Army, or no
other than the Nobility, which makes the regulated Monarchy, as in
France, Spain, &c. or to have an Army that may weigh down Nobi-
lity and People too; that is, deſtroy them both, which makes the ab-
folute way of Monarchy, as in Turky: the wit of man never found
nor ſhall find a third, there being no fuch thing in Nature.
THIS Chapter is already with the longeſt, and yet I muſt give you
a Corollary, pouce de roy, or a piece above meaſure; relating to a Que-
ftion on which the greeneſt Politician that ever brought his Verjuice
to the Preſs has ſpur'd me.
WHERE he defires to know my opinion of the way of governing by
Councils, which he confeſſes he has always thought admirable; he dos not
Cónfid. p, 49, mean fuch as are coordinat with the Prince (which have been feen in the
50 World) but fuch as thofe of Spain, purely of Advice and Dispatch, with
power only to inform and perfuade, but not limit the Prince's Will. For
almost all the Weakneſſes which have bin thought incident to Monarchy
are by this courfe prevented; and if there be any steadiness and maturity
in the Senat of a Commonwealth, this takes it all in.
Confid. p.68
TO give my Counfil without a Fee, and deal fincerely with a Pre-
varicator: Let the Prince (that is, fuch a one as his) hold himſelf
contented with his Divan, or Cabinet. If this be that he means, we
are agreed; but if he would have more, I can make no lefs of his
words than a hankering after fuch Councils as I have propos'd, and
that theſe are fuch as he always thought admirable, fuch as prevent al-
most all the Weakneſſes incident to Monarchy, and take in the fteadiness
and maturity of a Commonwealth.
HOW may we make this agree with that the place, where he
fays, that there is no frame of Laws, or Conftitution of Government,
which will not decay and com to ruin, unleſs repair'd by the Prudence and
Dexterity of them that govern? Now that this may not be expected from
a Monarch, as well as from a Senat or Affembly of Men, he has not yet
met with any conviction, but rather finds it reasonable to think that where
Debates are clearest, the refult of them most fecret, and the execution fud-
den (which are the advantages of Monarchy) there the diforders of d
State
་
1
of Popular Government.
283
1
State will foonest be diſcover'd, and the neceſſary Remedys best apply'd. Chap. 9.
In that former place he bethought himſelf that the Debates of Rome
were as clear as thofe of ANTIOCH US, that her Reſults were as
fecret as thofe of PHILIP or PERSEUS, and of more fudden exe-
cution than either of theirs. He doubted it might be true, which is
affirm'd by good Authors, and commonly enough known, that for
the clearness of Debate, and fecrefy of Refult, the world never faw
any thing like the Senat of Venice; and that in all appearance they are
for execution as quick with the Divan, as the Divan can be with them.
Now when all this is don, to baniſh ſuch generous Thoughts without
Thewing us for what caufe, and knock under the table, is fad news.
But he ſhall find me, in any thing that is reaſonable, moſt ready to
ferve him. To the Queſtion then, how fuch Councils as I have pro-
pos'd would do with a Prince; I anſwer, truly the beſt of them, I
doubt, but untowardly. One, that is the popular Affembly, has no
mean, but is either the wifeft in Nature, or has no brains at all.
When affairs go upon no other than the public Intereft, this having no
other Intereft to follow, nor eys to fee withal, is the wifeft Council:
but fuch ways are deftructive to a Prince, and they will have no Nay.
The Congregation of Ifrael, when REHOBOAM Would not hearken
to their advice, depos'd him: and we know what popular Councils,
fo foon as they came to fufficient Power, did in England. If a Prince
put a popular Council from this Ward, he dos a great matter, and
to little purpofe; for they underſtand nothing elſe but themſelves.
Wherfore the Kings of France and of Spain have diffolv'd all ſuch
Affemblys. It is true, where a Prince is not ſtrong enough to get
Mony out of them but by their Confent, they are neceffary: yet then
they are not purely of Advice and Diſpatch, but ſhare in the Govern-
ment, and he cannot be medling with their Purfes, but they will be
medling with his Laws. The Senat is of fitter ufe for a Prince, and
yet, except he has the way of TIBERIUS, but a tickliſh piece, as
appears by MAXIMINUS, who was deftroy'd by PUPIENUS and
BALBINUS, Captains fet up againſt him by this Örder. To
To go to
the root: Theſe things are not otherwiſe in Prudence or Choice than
by direction of the Balance; where this is popular, no Remedy but the
Prince muſt be advis'd by the People, which if the late King would
have indur'd, the Monarchy might have fubfifted fomwhat longer:
but while the Balance was Ariftocratical, as during the great Eſtates
of the Nobility and the Clergy, we find not the People to have bin
great or wife Counfillors. In fum, if a King governs by a popular
Council, or Houſe of Commons, the Throne will not ftand long:
If he governs by a Senat, or a Houfe of Lords, let him never fear the
Throne, but have a care of himſelf: there is no third, as I have faid
often enough, but the Divan.
CHAP.
002
284
The Prerogative
Book I.
Pa . Meffen.
CHA P. X.
Whether a Commonwealth that was not firſt broken by her
Self, was ever conquer'd by the Arms of any Monarch?
I
COM in this Chapter to reſume the Diſcourſe, where I broke off
in the former, making good my Affertion, That a Commonwealth
is the Government, which from the beginning of the world to this
day was never conquer'd by any Monarch; for if the Commonwealths
of Greece came under the yoke of the Kings of Macedon, they were
first broken by themſelves.
WHEN I fpeak of a Commonwealth, in relation to this point,
I am no more to be argu'd against out of the little Citys in Afia, or
thoſe of Ragufa, and San Marino, which cannot be fhewn to have had
the command of any confiderable Army, than I argue againſt the Pre-
varicator, where he afferts Monarchy to confift of a mixture of Arms
and of a Nobility, from the King of Yuetot, who had neither.
The
THIS Affertion in the judgment of any rational man ought not
to be incounter'd, but where there was a natural poffibility of de-
fence, in regard that a City which has no Army at all, as Geneva
(which yet being invaded by the Duke of Savoy, found means to
defend her felf) or fuch a one as is not confiderable, ſhould be ſub-
du'd by ſome potent Monarch (if we could find the example) con-
cerns the Government no more, than if it had been overwhelm'd by
ſome Inundation, or fwallow'd up by fom Earthquake. And yet all
that is oppos'd by the Confiderer, amounts not to thus much.
Teſtimony he brings out of PAUSANIAS Coms far fhort; for it is
Confid. p. 53. recorded (fays the Author ſpeaking of the Lacedemonians) that being
corrupted by the Bounty of CESAR, they were the first that contracted
Amity with the Barbarians at the time when that King added the Terri-
torys inhabited by the Dorians upon the border of Caria, with other Com-
monwealths in Afia, to his Empire. So that CRSUS corrupted the
Lacedemonians with Gifts, PAUSANIAS is exprefs; but whether he
obtain'd the Afiatic Citys (likely in this cafe to have bin eafilier cor-
rupted than the Lacedemonians) by Arms or by Purchaſe, he is not
exprefs and the prefumtion of the latter, as in other regards, fo in
this, is the ftronger, that CRASUS by the teftimony of SOLON, was
more potent in Gold than in Iron. Now if it were fo (and if o-
therwife, let the Confiderer fhew) that thefe Commonwealths in-
veigl'd by the Treaſure of CRASUS, came firft under the Lydian,
and fell with that under the Perfian Empire, when CRASUS was
fubdu'd by CYRUS; all I can learn by this example is no more than
that CRESUS, for ought that is perceivable, might have brought
thofe Commonwealths as COSIMO of MEDICIS did Florence; from
whom it is affirm'd by MACHIAVEL, that there was not a confider-
able Man in the whole City that had not receiv'd fom confiderable Sum.
So this example prefumes; but in the next, which is of Sicily, there
is not fo much as a Prefumption in favor of the Affertor: the State of
Sicily, before that which the Romans call the firft Carthaginian War,
being clear in Story againft his defign. For that Africa for the gene-
ration
1
•
285
of Popular Government.
Fazello Hift.
ration of Monſters is not more famous than Sicily for that of Tyrants, Chap. 10.
they who have pass'd their Novitiat in Story are not ignorant; nor how
when TIMOLEON had freed her of this Vermin, and with Liberty decl
ſhe had recover'd fom ftrength and virtue, fhe relaps'd under AGA- Polyb. 1. 1.
THOCLES and his horrid violation of Faith, while he was trufted
with the Arms of her Citizens; how after him PYRRHUS was
call'd in from Epirus; after PYRRHUS, HIERO ufurp'd; all by the
fame Arts, getting firſt into truft or charge, and then recoiling upon
them that would take no warning: by which it is apparent that the
Commonwealths of Sicily, like thofe of Greece, were ruin'd by them-
felves, and their own Diſorders; and no more fubdu'd
and no more fubdu'd upon theſe
changes by foren Arms, than was Ifrael by the Canaanites, or Rome by
the Gauls or Decemvirs.
States of Hol-
ISRAEL, having broken her Orders, was indeed fometimes op-
'preft by the Canaanites; Rome was fack'd by the Gauls, and ufurp'd
by the Decemvirs. But as the man that having got a fall in a Duel,
throws off his Adverfary, recovers himſelf and his Sword, is not con-
quer'd, fo neither the Commonwealth: wherfore neither Holland nor
Genoa, tho they have bin under, being yet ſtanding, can be faid to be Decree of the
conquer'd by the Arms of Spain or France, but rather the contrary; land apud
feeing the Liberty of Holland (in many Citys more ancient than any Grot. Hift. 4.
Records or other Monuments there can witneſs, and in it felf than
that of Tacitus, wherby CIVILIS, born of Princely Blood, is af-
firm'd to have vindicated the Batavian Freedom) is ftill the fame;
and Genoa, tho happy in her DORIA, remains as ſhe was before he was
born. Nor did the Family of the MEDICIS baniſh'd out of Flo-
rence (where, by virtue of their prodigious Wealth, and the inevita-
ble confequence of the Balance, their Anceſtors had bin Princes many
years before CHARLES the Fifth was a Soldier) any more by the
help of his Arms, thofe of the Pope (at that time of the fame Fa-
mily) and their Party at home, than get into their known faddle.
To infift a little more at large upon the Storys of Genoa and Florence
(becauſe upon theſe the Prevaricator fets up his reft that Mr. HAR-
RINGTON must needs be afflicted) Genoa was and is an Oligarchy
confifting of twenty-eight Familys, making the great Council, or Ag-
gregation, as they call it, none of thefe being capable of the Senat
or of Magiftracy; and if it could ever be faid of a Commonwealth,
that the had broken her felf, it might be faid, at the time related to,
of Genoa, where not only the Faction of the Guelphs and Gibelins,
which had deſtroy'd many Citys in Italy, then reign'd; but the feud
between the People included, and the Subject excluded, was as great
as ever had bin between the Nobility and the People in Rome.
fides the quarrel of the FIESCHI and the ADORNI, two Familys,
like CÆSAR and POMPEY, which having many years together as
it were ingroft the Magiftracy of Duke, were nevertheleſs perpetual-
ly ftriving each with other, which ſhould have it; and if one of theſe
(as it did) brought in the King of France, there is nothing plainer than
that this Commonwealth was fubdu'd by her own Sedition, nor is
there a man knowing any thing of her affairs, that makes any doubt
of it. That of Florence indeed, if the Prevaricator could fhew it had
bin ever up, I ſhould grant were down; but to relate the Story of
this City, I muft relate that of the Houfe of MEDICIS. From
Cosmo, a Citizen famous throout Europe, both for his Wifdom and
Be-
1
3
his
286
The Prerogative
Comines.
P Jovius.
Book I. his Riches, this Family for the ſpace of fixty years exercis'd, under
the pretext of fome Magiftracy, very great Power in Florence. To
COSIMO fucceded PETER, to PETER LAURENCE, a man in Pru-
Machiavel. dence and Liberality refembling his Grandfather, fave that he us'd
more abfolute Power in managing the Commonwealth; yet with
gentleness, and not altogether to the fuppreffion of Liberty. Never-
theless he obtain'd of the Signory (which did for the moſt part as
he would have them) fom fmall Guard for his Perſon; he was a man
renown'd thro Italy, and look'd upon by foren Princes with much
refpect. To him fucceded his Son, another PETER, who thro Youth
and Raflineſs conceiving the Power exercis'd by his Predeceffors to be
no more than his due, took upon him the Government as abfolute
Lord of all; and ſtanding molt formidably upon his Guard, grew
fottiſhly profuſe of the public Mony, and committed many Abfurditys
and Violences: By which means having incurr'd the hatred of the
Citizens, he was banifh'd by the Signory, with Cardinal JOHN and
JULIAN his Brothers. This JOHN coming after to be Pope LEO
the Tenth, requir'd the revocation of his Brother's Banishment, and
the reftitution of the Houfe of MEDICIS; to which finding the
prevailing Party of the Florentins to be refractory, he ſtir'd up the
Arms of the Emperor CHARLES the Fifth againſt them, by whoſe
joint aid the City, after a long fiege, was reduc'd to her old Ward,
and ALEXANDER of MEDICIS, Nephew to the Pope and Son
in law to the Emperor, fet in the known Saddle of his Anceſtors.
This is the Action for which the Prevaricator will have a Common-
wealth to have bin conquer'd by the Arms of a Monarch, tho whoever
reads the Story may very fafely affirm, Firſt, That Florence never at-
tain'd to any fuch Orders as could deferve the name of a Common-
wealth; and next, That the Purſe of Cosimo had don that long be-
fore, which is here attributed to the Arms of the Pope and the Empe-
ror. Reafon and Experience, as I faid, are like the Roots and the
Branches of Plants and Trees: As of Branches, Fruits, and Flowers,
being open and obvious to the eye, the fmell, the touch, and taſte,
every Girl can judg; fo examples to vulgar capacitys are the beſt Ar-
guments. Let him that fays a Commonwealth has bin at any time
conquer'd by a Monarch, to it again, and fhew us the example. But
tho Fruits and Flowers be eafily known each from other, their Roots
are latent, and not only fo, but of fuch reſemblance, that to diftin-
guiſh of theſe a man muſt be a Gardener or a Herbalift. In this man-
ner, the reaſon why a Commonwealth has not bin overcom by a
Monarch, has bin fhewn in the diftribution of Arms, thofe of a
Prince confifting of Subjects or Servants, and thoſe of a Common-
wealth rightly order'd of Citizens, which difference plainly relates to
the perfection or imperfection of the Government.
Confid. p. 51.
BUT, fays the Prevaricator, this feems intended for a trial of our
Nofes, whether they will ferve us to difcover the fallacy of an inference
from the profperous fuccefs of Arms to the perfection of Government. If
the Univerfity, who ſhould have fom care of the Vineyard of Truth,
ſhall ly pigging of wild Boars, to grunt in this manner and tear with
their tufks, and I happen to ring fom of them (as I have done this
Marcaffin for Footing) there is nothing in my faith why ſuch trial of
their Noſes ſhould be Sin; but for fallacious Inferences, fuch I leave
to them whofe Caps are fquarer than their Play.
FOR
of Popular Government.
287
FOR all that, Great and well policy'd Empires, fays he, have bin Chap. 10:
fubverted by People fo cloign'd from the Perfection of Government, that
we fcarce know of any thing to ty them together, but the defire of Booty.
Where, or how came he to know this? What Reafon or Experience
dos he allege for the proof of it? May we not ſay of this, it is for the
trial of our Nofes, whether they will ferve us to difcover that a Conclufion
Should have fome Premifes? He gives us leave to go look, and all the
Premifes that I can find are quite contrary.
& 2.
THE Arms of Ifrael were always victorious till the death of Judg. ch. 1.
JOSHUA, wherupon the Orders of that Commonwealth being neg-
lected, they came afterwards to be feldom profperous, ISOCRA-
TES in his Oration to the Areopagits, ſpeaks thus of Athens: The La-
cedemonians, who when we were under Oligarchy, every day commanded
us fomthing; now while we are under popular Adminiſtration, are our
Petitioners that we would not fee them utterly ruin'd by the Thebans.
Nor did Lacedemon fall to ruin till her Agrarian, the Foundation of
her Government was firſt broken. The Arms of Rome (ever noted by
Hiftorians, and clearly evinc'd by MACHIAVEL to have bin the
reſult of her Policy) during the popular Government were at fuch Arte della
a pitch, as if Victory had known no other wings than thoſe of her Guerra.
Eagles nor feeing the Goths and Vandals are the Legiſlators, from
whom we derive the Government of King, Lords, and Commons,
were theſe when they overcame the Roman Empire, a People fo
eloign'd from the perfection of Government, but their Policy was then
far better than that of the Emperors, which having bin at firſt founded
upon a broken Senat, and a few military Colonys, was now com to
a Cabinet and a mercenary Army. The Judgment of all Ages and
Writers upon the Policy of the Roman Emperors, is in this place
worthy, and thro the pains already taken by ERASMUS and SLEI-
DAN, eafy to be inferted. O miferable and deplorable State, ſays
ERASMUS, the Authority of the Senat, the Power of the Law, the
Liberty of the People being trod under foot! to a Prince that got up in In his Preface
this manner, the whole World was a Servant, while he himself was a Ser-
vant to fuch, as no honeft man would have indur'd the like Servants in
his Houfe: the Senat dreaded the Emperor, the Emperor dreaded his ex-
ecrable Militia: the Emperor gave Laws to Kings, and receiv'd them
from his Mercenarys. To this is added by SLEIDAN, That the con- Dequat.Imp.
dition of thefe Princes was fo defperat, it was a wonderful thing Ambition
it felf could have the Courage to run fuch a hazard; feeing from CAIUS
CAESAR flain in the Senat to CHARLES the Great, there had bin
above thirty of them murder'd, and four that had laid violent hands upon
themſelves: For there was always fomthing in them that offended the Sol-
diery, which whether they were good or bad, was equally fubject to pick
Quarrels, upon the leaft occafion rais'd Tumults, and diſpatch'd even fuch
them as they had forc'd to accept of that Dignity, for example, ÆLI-
US PERTINAX. But if this be true, that of the Goths and Vandals,
when they fubdu'd this Empire, muſt have bin the better Govern-
ment; for fo ill as this never was there any, except that only of the
Kings of Ifrael, which certainly was much worſe. Thoſe of the Bri-
tains and the Gauls were but the dregs of this of Rome, when they
were overcome by the Saxons and Franks, who brought in the Policy
of the Goths and Vandals.
WHEN
to Suetonius.
288
The Prerogative
Book I.
Confid. p.51.
WHEN TAMERLAN overcame BAJAZET, the Turkish Po-
licy had not attain'd to that ancient Territory, which is plainly
neceffary to the nature of it, nor was the Order of the Janizarys yet
inftituted. The Hollander, who under a potent Prince was but a Fish-
erman, with the reftitution of a popular Government, is becom the
better Soldier; nor has he bin match'd but by a rifing Common-
wealth, whofe Policy you will fay was yet worſe, but then her Ba-
lance (being that eſpecially which produces men) was far better. For
Vaftneſs, for Fruitfulneſs of Territory, for Bodys of Men, for Num-
ber, for Courage, Nature never made a Country more potent than
Germany: yet this Nation, antiently the Seminary of Nations, has of
late years, merely thro the defect of her Policy (which intending
one Commonwealth, has made a hundred Monarchys in her Bowels,
whoſe croſs intereſts twiſt her guts) bin the Theater of the faddeft
Tragedys under the Sun; nor is fhe curable, unleſs fom Prince falling
to work with the Hammer of War, be able totally to deftroy the old,
and forge her a Government intirely new. But if this coms to paſs,
neither ſhall it be faid, that a well-policy'd Empire was fubverted, nor
by a People fo eloign'd from perfection of Government, but theirs must be
much better than the other. Let me be as ridiculous as you will, the
World is (in face Romuli) ripe for great Changes which muſt com.
And look to it, whether it be Germany, Spain, France, Italy, or Eng-
land, that coms firſt to fix her ſelf upon a firm Foundation of Policy,
fhe fhall give Law to, and be obey'd by the reft. There was never
fo much fighting as of late days to fo little purpoſe; Arms, except
they have a root in Policy, are altogether fruitlefs. In the War
between the King and the Parlament, not the Nation only, but the
Policy of it was divided; and which part of it was upon the better
Foundation?
Confid. p.52.
Effay 29.
BUT, fays he, Ragufa and San Marino are commended for their up-
right and equal Frame of Government, and yet have hardly extended
their Dominion beyond the fize of a handfom Mannor.
HAVE Ragufa or San Marino bin conquer'd by the Arms of any
Monarch? For this (I take it) is the queftion; tho, if they had, thefe
being Commonwealths unarm'd, it were nothing to the purpoſe. The
queſtion of Increaſe is another point. Lacedemon could not increaſe
(becauſe her frame was of another nature) without ruin; yet was ſhe
not conquer'd by any Monarch.
COM, com, fays he, for all this; It is not the perfection of Govern-
ment, but the populoufnefs of a Nation, the natural Valor of the Inba-
bitants, the abundance of Horfes, Arms, and other things neceſſary for
equipping of an Army, affifted with a good military Difciplin, that qualify
a People for Conquest; and where thefe concur, Victory is intail'd upon
them. Very fine!
too many,
AS if theſe could concur any otherwife than by virtue of the Po-
licy. For Example, there is no Nation under Heaven more populous
than France: Yet, fays Sir FRANCIS BACON, If the Gentlemen be
the Commons will be bafe, and not the hundredth Poll fit for a
Helmet, as may be feen by comparison of England with France, wherof
the former, tho far lefs in Territory and Populoufness, has bin neverthe-
lefs the overmatch; in regard the middle People in England make good
Soldiers, which the Peaſants in France do not. This therfore was from
the Policy, by which the one has bin the freeft, and the other the
moſt
}
of Popular Government.
289
1
•
moſt inflav'd Subject in the World; and not from Populoufnefs, in Chap. 10°
which cafe France muft have bin the Overmatch.
THE like is obfervable in the natural valor of the People, there
being no greater courage of an Infantry, than that of the middle
People in England, wheras the Peafant having none at all, is never
us'd in Arms. Again, France has one of the beſt Cavalrys in the
World, which the English never had, yet it avail'd her not. Victory
is more eſpecially intail'd upon Courage, and Courage upon Liberty,
which grows not without a Root planted in the Policy or Foundation
of the Government.
ALEXANDER with a handful of Freemen overcame the
greatest abundance of Horfes, Arms, and other things neceſſary for the
equipping of an Army, the hugeft Armys, the moſt vaft and populous
Empire in the World; and when he had don, could not by all theſe
fubdue that handful of freer men (tho he kill'd CLYTUS with his
own hand in the quarrel) to the fervil Cuſtoms of that Empire.
And that the beſt military Diſciplin deriv'd from the Policy of the
Romans, I intimated before, and have fhewn at large in other places.
BUT the Prevaricator neither minds what is faid, nor cares what
he fays; to affirm that a Commonwealth was never conquer'd by
any Monarch, and that a Commonwealth has conquer'd many Mon-
archs, or frequently led mighty Kings in Triumph, is to run upon
the foil, the fecond Propofition being with him no more than only
the converfion of the firft. As if that Rome was not conquer'd by Confid. p 55,
the World, and that the World was conquer'd by Rome, were but a
fimple converfion. So the World having not conquer'd Venice, it
muſt follow, that Venice has conquer'd the World. Do we take, or
are we taken? Nor is he thus fatisfy'd to burn his fingers, but he will
blifter his tongue.
WHERE I faid that the Commonwealth of Venice, confifting of
all them that firſt fled from the main Land to thoſe Ilands where the
City is now planted, at the Inftitution took in the whole People, he
would make you believe I had faid that the Senat of Venice, at the firſt
inſtitution, took in the whole People: It is matter of fact, and that in Confid p. 7c.
which his Integrity will be apparent to every man's Judgment: I Oceana, p.43.
pray fee the places. And yet when he has put this trick upon me, he
tells me, perhaps it is not true; and this only I grant him paſt perad-
venture is falfe, whether that I faid it, or that the thing is poffible.
For how is it poffible, that the Senat, which is no otherwife fuch
than as it confifts of the Ariftocracy, or felect part of the People,
ſhould take in the whole People? It is true, that good Authors, both
antient and modern, when they ſpeak of the Senat of Rome, or of
Venice hiftorically, imply the People. MACHIAVEL fpeaks of
the Magistracy of PUBLILIUS PHILO, as prolong'd by the Senat
of Rome, without making any mention of the People, by whom
nevertheleſs it was granted: the like is ufual with other Authors.
THUANUS feldom mentions the Commonwealth of Venice, but by
the name of the Senat; which not underſtood by the Learned Confi-
derer, where CONTARINI fpeaks in the fame manner of the
Courſes taken by the Commonwealth of Venice, for withholding the
Subject in the City from Sedition, he takes him to be fpeaking of
the means wherby the Senat (an't pleaſe you) keeps the People
under: and ſo having put one trick upon me, and another upon
PP
CON-
290
The Prerogative
Book I. CONTARINI, theſe two are his Premifes, whence he draws this Con-
clufion; That Venice is as much as any in the World an inequal Com-
monwealth. Now the Conclufion you know nobody can deny.
CHA P. XI.
Whether there be not an Agrarian, or fom Law of Laws
of that nature, to supply the defect of it in every Common→
wealth: and whether the Agrarian, as it is ftated in
Oceana, be not equal and fatisfactory to all Interefts.
I
N this Chapter the Prevaricator's Devices are the moſt welfavor'd:
for wheras the Agrarian of Oceana dos no more than pin the baſket,
which is already fill'd, he gets up into the Tree where the Birds have
long fince eaten all the Cherrys, and with what Clouts he can rake up,
makes a moſt ridiculous Scarcrow. This pains he needed not to have
taken, if he had not flighted overmuch the Lexicon, of which he allows
me to be the Author; yet will have it, that he underſtood the words
before, fom of which nevertheleſs his ill underſtanding requires fhould
be further interpreted in this place, as Property, Balance, Agrarian,
and Levelling.
PROPERTY is that which is every man's own by the Law of the
Land; and of this there is nothing ſtirr'd, but all intirely left as it was
found by the Agrarian of Oceana.
PROPERTY in Mony (except, as has bin fhewn, in Citys that
have little or no Territory) coms not to the prefent account. But Pro-
perty in Land, according to the diftribution that happens to be of the
fame, caufes the political Balance producing Empire of the like nature:
that is, if the Property in Lands be fo diffus'd thro the whole People
that neither one Landlord, nor a few Landlords overbalance them, the
Empire is popular. If the Property in Lands be fo ingroft by the Few,
that they overbalance the whole People, the Empire is Ariftocratical,
or mix'd Monarchy; but if Property in Lands be in one Landlord,
to fuch a proportion as overbalances the whole People, the Empire is
abfolute Monarchy. So the political Balance is threefold, Democra-
tical, Ariftocratical, and Monarchical.
EACH of theſe balances may be introduc'd either by the Legiſla-
tor at the inſtitution of the Government, or by civil Viciffitude, Alie-
nation, or Alteration of Property under Government.
EXAMPLES of the Balance introduc'd at the Inftitution, and
by the Legiflator, are first thoſe in Ifrael, and Lacedemon, introduc'd
by GOD or MOSES, and LYCURGUS, which were Democratical or
Popular. Secondly, Thofe in England, France, and Spain, intro-
duc'd by the Goths, Vandals, Saxons, and Franks, which were Arifto-
cratical, or fuch as produc'd the Government of King, Lords, and
Commons. Thirdly, Thoſe in the Eaft and Turky, introduc'd by
NIMROD and MAHOMET or OTTOMAN, which were purely Mo-
harchical.
EXAMPLES of the Balance introduc'd by civil Viciffitude, Alie-
nation, or Alteration of Property under Government, are in Florence,
where
of Popular Government.
291
where the MEDICI attaining to exceffive wealth, the Balance alter'd Chap. 11.
from Popular to Monarchical: In Greece, where the Argives being lov Paufin.
ers of Equality and Liberty, reduc'd the Power of their Kings to fo fmall Corinth,
a matter, that there remain'd to the Children and Succeffors of CISUS
little more than the Title, where the Balance alter'd from Monarchical
to Popular. In Rome, about the time of CRASSUS, the Nobility
having eaten the People out of their Lands, the Balance alter'd from
Popular, firſt to Ariftocratical, as in the Triumvirs, CESAR, POм-
PEY and CRASSUS; and then to Monarchical, as when CRASSUS be-
ing dead, and POMPEY conquer'd, the whole came to CESAR. In
Tarentum, not long after the War with the Medes, the Nobility being Arift. Pol.
wafted and overcom by Iapyges, the Balance, and with that the Com-
monwealth, chang'd from Ariftocratical to Popular: The like of late
has difcover'd itſelf in Oceana. When a Balance coms fo thro civil
Viciffitude to be chang'd, that the change cannot be attributed to hu-
man Providence, it is more peculiarly to be afcrib'd to the hand of
God; and fo when there happens to be an irreſiſtible change of the
Balance, not the old Government which God has repeal'd, but the
new Government which he dictats as prefent Legiflator, is of Divine
Right.
THIS Volubility of the Balance being apparent, it belongs to Le-
giflators to have eys, and to occur with fom prudential or legal Rc-
medy or Prevention: and the Laws that are made in this cafe are call'd
Agrarian. So An Agrarian is a Law fixing the Balance of a Govern-
ment in fuch a manner that it cannot alter.
THIS may be don divers ways, as by intailing the Lands upon
certain Familys, without Power of Alienation in any cafe, as in Ifrael
and Lacedemon; or, except with leave of the Magiftrat, as in Spain:
But this, by making fom Familys too fecure, as thofe in poffeffion,
and others too deſpairing, as thoſe not in poffeffion, may make the
whole People leſs induſtrious.
WHERFORE the other way, which by the regulation of Pur-
chaſes ordains only that a man's Land ſhall not excede fom certain pro-
portion; for example, two thouſand Pounds a year; or, exceding
fuch a proportion, ſhall divide in defcending to the Children, fo foon
as being more than one they ſhall be capable of fuch a divifion, or
ſubdiviſion, till the greater ſhare excedes not two thouſand pounds a
year in Land, lying and being within the native Territory, is that
which is receiv'd and eſtabliſh'd by the Commonwealth of Oceana.
BY Levelling, they who uſe the word feem to underſtand, when
a People rifing invades the Lands and Eſtates of the richer fort, and
divides them equally among themſelves; as for example,—No where'
in the World; this being that, both in the way and in the end, which
I have already demonſtrated to be impoffible. Now the words of this
Lexicon being thus interpreted, let us hearken what the Prevaricator
will fay, and out it coms in this manner.
1.. 5. c. 3.
TO him that makes Property, and that in Lands, the Foundation of Confid. p. 73.
Empire, the eſtabliſhing of an Agrarian is of abfolute neceffity, that by it
the Power may be fix'd in thofe hands to whom it was at first committed.
WHAT need we then procede any further, while he, having no
where difprov'd the Balance in theſe words, gives up the whole Caufe?
For as to that which he ſays of Mony, feeing neither the vaſt Treaſure
of HENRY the 7th alter'd the Balance of England, nor the Revenue of
Pp 2
the
292
The Prerogative
Book I. the Indys alters that of Spain, this Retrait (except in the Cafes excepted)
is long fince barricado'd. But he is on and off, and, any thing to
the contrary notwithſtanding, gives you this for certain.
THE Examples of an Agrarian are fo infrequent, that Mr. HAR-
RINGTON is constrain'd to wave all but two Commonwealths; and can
find in the whole extent of History only Ifrael and Lacedemon to fasten
upon.
A MAN that has read my Writings, or is fkill'd in Hiſtory, can-
not chufe but fee how he flurs his Dice; nevertheleſs to make this a
Pol. L.2.C.5. little more apparent, It has feem'd to fom (fays ARISTOTLE) the
main point of Inflitution in Government, to order Riches right; whence
otherwife derives all civil Difcord. Upon this ground PHALEAS the Chal-
cedonian Legiſlator made it his firft work to introduce equality of Goods;
and PLATO in his Laws allows not increase to a poffeffion beyond cer-
tain bounds. The Argives and the Meffenians bad each their Agrarian
after the manner of Lacedemon. If a man fhall tranflate the words
Plut. Lycurg. (pern, dívaμis TORITIù, virtus & facultas civilis) Political Virtue or
Faculty, where he finds them in ARISTOTLE'S Politics (as I make
bold, and appeal to the Reader whether too bold to do) by the
words Political Balance, underftood as I have ftated the thing, it will
give fuch a light to the Author, as will go nearer than any thing
alleg'd (as before by this Prevaricator) to deprive me of the honor
Pol.L.3.C.9, of that invention. For example, where ARISTOTLE fays, If one
man, or fuch a number of men, as to the capacity of Government com with-
in the compass of the Few, excel all the rest (xar' aperv) in Balance, or in
fuch a manner, that the (dovas TOMITI) Political Faculties or Eftates
of all the reft be not able to hold weight with him or them, they will never
condefcend to fhare equally with the rest in power, whom they excel in Balance;
nor is it to any purpoſe to give them Laws, who will be as the Gods, their
own Laws, and will answer the People as the Lions are faid by ANTIS-
THENES to have anfwered the Hares, when they had concluded, that
every one ought to have an equal Portion. For this caufe (he adds) Citys
that live under Popular Power, have inftituted the Ostracism for the
prefervation of Equality; by which, if a man increase in Riches, Reti-
nue, or Popularity, above what is fafe, they can remove him (without
lofs of Honor or Eſtate) for a time.
1
κατ
IF the Confiderer thinks that I have ſtrain'd courteſy with ARIS-
TOTLE (who indeed is not always of one mind) further than is war-
rantable, in relation to the Balance, be it as he pleafes; I who must either
have the more of Authority, or the lefs of Competition in the point, ſhall
loſe neither way. However, it is in this place enough that the Oftraciſm
being of like nature, was that which fupply'd the defect, in the Grecian
Citys, of an Agrarian. To procede then to Rome, that the People there,
by ftriving for an Agrarian, ftrove to fave their Liberty, is apparent,
in that thro the want of fuch a Law, or the nonobſervance of it, the
Commonwealth came plainly to ruin. If a Venetian ſhould keep a
Table, or have his Houſe furniſh'd with Retainers, he would be obnoxi-
ous to the Council of Ten; and if the beſt of them appear with other
State or Equipage than is allow'd to the meaneft, he is obnoxious to the
Officers of the Pomp: which two Orders in a Commonwealth, where
the Gentry have but ſmall Eſtates in Land, are as much as needs be in
lieu of an Agrarian. But the German Republics have no more to fup-
ply the place of this Law, than that Eſtates defcending are divided
among
of Popular Government.
293
among the Children; which fure no man but will fay muſt needs be Chap. 1 1.
both juſt and pious: and we afk you no more in Oceana, where grant
this, and you grant the whole Agrarian. Thus had I fet him all the
Commonwealths in the World before; and ſo it is no fault of mine,
that he will throw but at three of them: Theſe are Ifrael, Lacedemon,
and Oceana.
FIRST at Ifrael: Mr. HARRINGTON (fays he) thinks not upon Confid. p. 77.
the Promife of GOD to ABRAHAM (whence the Ifraelites derived their
Right to the Land of Canaan) but confiders the divifion of the Lands as
a Politic Conftitution upon which the Government was founded, tho in the
whole Hiftory of the Bible there be not the least footstep of fuch a defign.
WHAT means the man! the Right of an Ifraelite to his Land de-
riv'd from the Promife of GOD to ABRAHAM, therfore the Right of
an Oceaner to his Land muft derive from the Promife of GOD to
ABRAHAM? Or, why elfe fhould I in fpeaking of Oceana (where
Property is taken as it was found, and not ſtirr'd a hair) think on the
Promiſe to ABRAHAM? Nor matters it for the manner of divifion,
ſeeing, that was made, and this was found made, each according to the
Law of the Government. But in the whole Bible (fays he) there is not
the least footstep that the end of the Ifraelitiſh Agrarian was Political, or
that it was intended to be the Foundation of the Government.
THE Footsteps of God, by the Teftimony of DAVID, may be feen
in the deep Waters, much more, by the confent of the whole Bible, in
Land, or in the foundation of Empire; unleſs we make the Footſteps
of God to be one thing, and his ways another, which as to Govern-
ment are theſe.
GOD by the Ballot of Ifrael (more fully defcrib'd in the next Book) Grot. ad
divided the Land (fom refpect had to the Princes and Patriarchs for Num. 26.53.
the reſt) to every one his inheritance, according to the number of names,
which were drawn out of one Urn firſt, and the Lots of Land (the
meaſure with the goodneſs of the fame confider'd) drawn afterwards
out of the other Urn to thoſe names. Wherfore God ordaining the
Cauſe, and the Caufe of neceffity producing the Effect, God in or-
daining this Balance intended Popular Government. But when the
People admitting of no Nay, would have a King, God therupon com-
manding SAMUEL to fhew them the manner of the King, SAMUEL
declar'd to the People concerning the manner or Policy of the King, fay-
ing, He will take your Fields and your Vinyards, and your Oliveyards, even 1 Sam. 8.
the best of them, and give to his Servants (which kind of proceding
muſt needs create the Balance of a Nobility;) over and above this, he
will take the tenth of your Seed, and of your Vinyards, and of your fheep
(by way of Tax, for the maintenance of his Armys) and thus your
Daughters fhall com to be his Cooks and Confectioners, and your Sons to
run before his Chariot. There is not from the Balance to the Super-
ſtructures a more perfect defcription of a Monarchy by a Nobility.
For the third Branch, the People of Egypt in time of the Famin,
which was very fore, com to JOSEPH, faying, Buy us and our Land Gen. 47.19,
for Bread, and we and our Land will be Servants to PHARAOH. And 20.
JOSEPH bought all the Land of Egypt (except thoſe of the Priests) for
PHARAOH. So the Land became PHARAOH's, who left the re-
membrance of their former Property by lively marks and continual re-
membrancers ſhould ſtir them up (as the Vandals in Africa, ftript in Grot. ad
like manner of their Property, and yet remaining in their antient Gen. 47-
Dwellings,
1
294
The Prerogative
Book I. Dwellings, were ftirr'd up by their Women) to Sedition, remov'd the
People thus fold, or drave them like Cattel even from one end of the bor-
ders of Egypt to the other end therof. In which you have the Balance
of a fole Landlord or abfolute Prince, with the miferable, and yet ne-
ceffary confequence of an inflav'd People. Now the Balance of Go-
vernments throout the Scriptures being of theſe kinds, and no other,
the Balance of Oceana is exactly calculated to the most approv'd way,
and the cleareſt Footsteps of God in the whole Hiftory of the Bible: and
wheras the Jubile was a Law inftituted for prefervation of the popular
Balance from alteration, fo is the Agrarian in Oceana.
BUT fays the Prevaricator, Hocus Pocus, or in the name of Wonder,
how can this Agrarian be the Foundation of that Government which had
fubfifted more than forty five years without it? For they were fo long after
the giving of this Law for the divifion of the Land, before they had the
Land to divide.
WHICH is as if one fhould fay upon that other Law of the like
date, Fudges and Officers fhalt thou make thee in all thy gates; Hocus
Pocus, or in the name of Wonder, how ſhould the Children of Ifrael
make them Judges and Officers in their gates, before they had any
gates to make them in? fine fport to be play'd by an Attorny for the
Clergy with Scripture, where it is plain enough that the Laws of a
Commonwealth were given by MOSES to an Army, to be put in ex-
ecution when that Army fhould becom a Commonwealth, as hap--
pen'd under JOSHUA.
BUT no faying will ferve his turn. If this Agrarian were meant as
fundamental to the Government, the Provifion (he will have it) was
weak, and not proper for attaining the end propos'd, there being nothing in
the nature of the Agrarian to hinder, but that the whole Country might
for the space of near fifty years, that is, the time between the two Jubiles,
bave com into the bands of one man, and fo have deftroy'd Balance, Agra-
rian, Government and all.
THIS they that boaſt of their Mathematics might have taken the
pains (before they had bin ſo confident) to have demonſtrated poffible;
as how or by what means one Lot could com in fifty years to be multi-
ply'd fix hundred thousand times, and that without Ufury, which
bar (the Ifraelits being no Merchants) was thought fufficient to be
given or thus to call the Prudence of God by their impracticable
Phanfys in queſtion, is abominable.
I WOULD have Divines (as this Prevaricator perfuades, and it
ſhould ſeem has perfuaded fom of them) to overthrow the Com-
monwealth of Ifrael; for otherwiſe I will give them my word'they
ſhall never be able to touch that of Oceana, which, except in the here-
ditary Succeffion and Dignity of the Princes of the Tribes, and the
Patriarchs, and that the Senat was for life, differs not from the former :
for as to the divers working up of the Superftructures in divers Com-
monwealths, according to the diverfity of occafions, it coms to no ac-
countable difference; and much, I conceive, of this carving or finiſh-
ing in Ifrael; (which had it bin extant, would perhaps have ſhewn a
greater reſemblance) is loft. For the Senats, as to their numbers, that
of the 300 in Oceana, confidering the bulk of the People, excedes not that
of the Seventy in Ifrael; the Succeffion and Dignity of the Princes of
the Tribes and of the Patriarchs was ordain'd for the prefervation of the
Pedigrees, which (CHRIST being born) are not any more to be of
like
of Popular Government.
295
like confequence; and that the Senators were for life, deriv'd from a Chap. 11.
former Cuſtom of ſuch a number of Elders exercifing fom Authority
in Egypt (tho not that of the Senat till it was inftituted by God)
from the deſcent of the Patriarchs into that Land, who being at their
deſcent ſeventy Perſons, and governing their Familys by the right of
Paternity, as the People increas'd, and they came to dy, had their
Succeffors appointed in fuch a manner, that the number of Seventy,
in remembrance of thoſe Patriarchs, was diligently preferv'd. And
for as much as the Patriarchs governing their own Familys (which at
firſt were all) in their own right, were confequently for life, this alfo
pleas'd in the ſubſtitution of others. Theſe things rightly confider'd,
I have not vary'd from the Authority of Ifrael in a tittle, there being
neither any fuch neceffary uſe of Pedigrees, nor uninterrupted Suc-
ceffion of Elders for life in Oceana; and unleſs a man will fay, That
we ought to have the like Effect where there is not the like Caufe
(which were abfurd) the Authority of a Commonwealth holds no
otherwife than from the Caufe to the Effect.
OCEANA, I fay, cannot be wounded but by piercing the Au-
thority of Ifrael, with which the is arm'd Cap a Pe. It is true, as
the Prevaricator fays in another place, that Law can oblige only thofe Confid. p 36.
to whom it was given; and that the Laws of Ifrael were given, as to the
Power or Obligation of them, only to the Children of Ifrael. But the
Power; as has bin fhewn, of a Commonwealth, and her Authori-
ty, are different things; her Power extends no further than her own
People, but her Authority may govern others, as that of Athens did
Rome, when the latter wrote her twelve Tables by the Copy of the
former. In this manner, tho a Man, or a Commonwealth, writing
out of antient Governments, have liberty to chufe that which futes
beſt with the occafion, out of any; yet (whether we confider the
Wiſdom and Juſtice of the Legiſlator fupremely good, or the excel-
lency of the Laws) the Prerogative of Authority, where the nature
of the thing admits it, muft needs belong to Ifrael. That this opi-
nion ſhould go fore with Divines, is ftrange; and yet if there be any
feeling of their pulſe by this their Advocate or Attorny, it is as true.
FOR while he finds me writing out of Venice, he tells me, I have In his Epift.
wifely put myself under Protection or Authority, against whom he dares
not make War, left he ſhould take part with the Turk.
BUT when he finds me writing out of Ifrael, he tells me, that he Confid. p. 39.
is not aware of any Prerogative of Authority belonging to the Ifraelitiſh
more than any other Republic: which is to take part with the Devil.
SO much for Ifrael. Now for Lacedemon; but
Now for Lacedemon'; but you will permit
me to ſhake a Friend or two by the hand, as I go.
THE first is ARISTOTLE, in theſe words:
INEQUALITY is the Source of all Sedition, as when the Riches Pol. L.5. c 3.
of one or the few com to caufe fuch an Overbalance as draws the Common-
wealth into Monarchy or Oligarchy; for prevention wherof the Oftracism
has bin of ufe in divers places; as at Argos and Athens. But it were
better to provide in the beginning, that there be no fuch Difeafe in the
Commonwealth, than to com afterwards to her Cure.
THE
296
The Prerogative
+
Book I.
Plut. Lycur.
Confid. p. 78.
Plut. Lycur.
THE fecond is PLUTARCH, in thefe words:
LYCURGUS judging that there ought to be no other inequality
among Citizens of the fame Commonwealth than what derives from their
Virtues, divided the Land fo equally among the Lacedemonians, that on a
day beholding the Harvest of their Lots lying by Cocks or Ricks in the
field, he laughing faid, that it ſeem'd to him they were all Brothers.
THE third ſhould have bin the Confiderer, but he is at feud
with us all.
THE Defign of LYCURGUS, he profeffes, was not ſo much to
attain an Equality in the frame of his Government, as to drive into exile
Riches, and the effects of them, Luxury and Debauchery.
GENTLEMEN, What do you fay? you have the Judgment
of three great Philofophers, and may make your own choice; only
except he that has but one hundred pounds a year, can have Wine and
Women at as full command, and Retainers in as great plenty, as he that
has ten thouſand, I ſhould think theſe advantages accru'd from Ine-
quality, and that LYCURGUS had ſkill enough in a Commonwealth
to fee as much. No, fays the Prevaricator, it appears far otherwiſe,
in that he admitted of no Mony but old Iron, a Cartload of which was
worth little. Well, but in Ifrael, where Silver and Gold was worth
enough, my Gentleman would have it, that one man in the compafs of
fifty years might purchaſe the whole Land, tho that Country was much
larger than this and yet where, if the People had us'd Mony, they
would have us'd Trade, and uſing both, fuch a thing, thro the ſtrait-
neſs of the Territory, might have happen'd, he will not conceive the
like to have bin poffible. No, tho he has an example of it in Ly-
SANDER, who by the ſpoil of Athens ruin'd the Agrarian, firſt by
the overbalance that a man's Mony came to hold to his Lot; then by
eating out the Lots themſelves, and in thofe the Equality of the
Commonwealth. But theſe things he interprets pleaſantly, as if the
Vow of voluntary Poverty (fo he calls it) being broken, the Common-
wealth, like a forfworn Wretch, had gon and hang'd ber felf: a
Phanfy too rank, I doubt, of the Cloyster, to be good at this
work.
BUT wheras PLUTARCH, upon the narrowness of thefe Lots
(which had they bin larger, muſt have made the Citizens fewer than
thirty thouſand, and fo unable to defend the Commonwealth) and
uſe of this fame old and rufty Iron inſtead of Mony, obferves
it came by this means to pafs that there was neither a fine Orator,
Fortuneteller, Baud, nor Goldsmith to be found in Lacedemon; our
Confiderer profeffes,
THAT it is to him as ftrange as any thing in Hiftory, that LYCUR-
GUS fhould find credit enough to ſettle a Government, which carry'd along
with it ſo much want and hardſhip to particular men, that the total ab-
Sence of Government could fcarce have put them into a worfe condition;
the Laws that he made prohibiting the uſe of those things, which to injoy
with fecurity, is that only to other men that makes the Yoke of Laws
Supportable.
HERE
of Popular Government.
207
HERE he is no Monk again; I would aſk him no more, than that Chap. 11.
he would hold to fomthing, be it to any thing. It is true, we, who
have bin us'd to our Plumpottage, are like enough to make faces (as
did the King of Pontus) at the Lacedemonian black broth: But who
has open'd his mouth againſt Plumpottage, gilded Coaches, Pages,
Lacquys, fair Mannorhoufes, good Tables, rich Furniture, full Purfes,
Univerfities, good Benefices, Scarlet Robes, fquare Caps, rich Jewels,
or faid any thing that would not multiply all this? Why, fays he, you
are fo far right, that the Voice of LYCURGUS's Agrarian was, Every
man ſhall be thus poor; and that of yours is, that no man ſhall be more
than thus rich. This is an Argument (an't pleaſe you) by which he
thinks he has prov'd, that there is no difference between the Agra-
rian that was in Lacedemon, and that which is in Oceana: For, Sir,
whatſoever is thus and thus, is like: But the Agrarian of Lacedemon
was thus, A man could have no Mony, or none that deferv'd that
name; and the Agrarian of Oceana is thus, A man's Mony is not con-
fin'd: Therfore the Agrarian of the one, and of the other, are like.
Was it not a great grievance in Lacedemon, think you, that they had
no fuch Logic or Logician? Be this as it will, It had bin impoffible,
fays he, for LYCURGUS to have fettl'd his Government, had he not
wifely obtain'd a refponſe from the oracle at Delphos, magnifying and re-
commending it: After which all refiftance would have bin downright Im-
piety and Difobedience, which concerns Mr. HARRINGTON very little.
The Bible then is not fo good an Oracle as was that at Delphos. But
this Reflection has a tang with it, that makes me think it relates to
that where he fays, I know not how, but Mr. HARRINGTON has Confid. p 18.
taken up a very great unkindness for the Clergy. He will know no-
thing; neither that the Oracle of the Scripture is of all other the clear-
eft for a Commonwealth, nor that the Clergy being generally a-
gainſt a Commonwealth, are in this below the Priefts of Delphos, who
were more for LYCURGUs than theſe are for Mosts. But hav'at
the Agrarian of, Oceana with the whole bail of Dice, and at five
throws.
THE firſt Throw is, That it is unjust: For,
IF it be truly afferted (in Oceana, Page the 39th) that Government Confid. p. 81.
is founded on Property, then Property confifts in Nature before Govern-
ment, and Government is to be fitted to Property, not Property to Govern-
ment. How great a Sin then would it be against the first and pureft notion
of fuftice, to bring in a Government not only different from but directly
deftructive to the fettl'd Property of Oceana, where (in the 107th Page)
there are confeft to be three hundred Perfons, whofe Eftates in Land excede
the Standard of two thousand pounds a year. Let me not be chok'd with
the Example of Lacedemon, till Mr. HARRINGTON has fhewn us
the Power of his Perfuafion with the Nobility of Oceana, as LYCUR-
GUS with them of Lacedemon, to throw up their Lands to be parcel'd by
his Agrarian (as Page 111.) and when that is don, I fhall ceafe to com-
plain of the Injustice of it. Nor need any one of theſe three hundred be
put to own a fhame, for preferring his own Intereft before that of a whole
Nation; for tho when Government is once fix'd, it may be fit to ſubmit
privat to public Utility, yet when the question is of chufing a Government,
every particular man is left to his own native Right, which cannot be
preſcrib'd againſt by the Interest of all the rest of Mankind.
HOW
298
The Prerogative
Book I.
HOW many falfe Dice there are in this throw (becauſe you fee
I have little to do) will be worth counting.
WHERASI no where deny Property to derive her being from
Law; he infinuats that I prefume Property to be in Nature. There's
One.
WHERAS in natural and domeftic Viciffitude, I affert, That
Empire is to follow the Legal State of Property; he impofès, as r
I had afferted, that Empire muſt follow the natural State of Property.
Two.
WHERAS in violent or foren Viciffitude (as when the Ifraclits
poffeft themſelves of the Land of Canaan, the Goths and Vandals of
Italy, the Franks of France, the Saxons of England) Property, in or-
der to the Government to be introduc'd, is alterable; he infinuats as
if I had faid, that Empire must always follow the ftate of Property,
not as it may be alter'd in that relation, but as it is found. Three.
WHERAS the Government of Oceana is exactly fitted to Pro-
perty, as it was fettl'd before; he infinuats it to be deftructive to the
fettl'd Property. Four.
WHERASI fay, that to put it with the moft, they that are
Proprietors of Land in Oceana, exceding two thouſand pounds a year,
do not excede three hundred Perfons; he fays, that I have confeft
they be three hundred. Five.
WHERASI fhew that the Nobility of Lacedemon, upon the
perfuafion of LYCURGUS, threw up their Eſtates to be parcel'd by
his Agrarian; but that in Oceana, it is not needful or requir'd that
any man ſhould part with a Farthing, or throw up one fhovelful of
his Earth: he impofes, as if I went about to perfuade the Nobility to
throw up their Lands. Six.
WHERAS I have fhewn that no one of thoſe within the three
hundred can have any Intereſt againſt the Agrarian; he, without
fhewing what fuch an Intereft can be, infinuats that they have an In-
tereſt againſt it. Seven.
WHERAS the Government of Oceana gos altogether upon con-
fent, and happens not only to fit privat to public, but even public to
privat Utility, by which means it is void of all Objection; he infinuats,
that it is againſt privat Utility. Eight.
WHERE he fays, that in chufing a Government every man is
left to his own native Right; he infinuats that the Agrarian (which
dos no more than fix Property, as fſhe found it) is againſt native Right.
Nine.
WHERAS God has given the Earth to the Sons of men, which
native Right (as in cafe a man for hunger takes fo much as will feed him,
and no more, of any other man's meat or herd) preſcribes againſt legal
Property, and is the cauſe why the Law efteems not fuch an Action
to be Theft; he infinuats that there is a native Right in legal Proper-
ty, which cannot be preſcrib'd against by the Intereft of all the rest of
Mankind. Ten.
WHILE he pleaded the cafe of Monarchy, Levelling was con-
cluded lawful; in the cafe of a Commonwealth, which aſks no ſuch
favor, Levelling is concluded unlawful. Eleven.
IN the Reformation or Level as to Monarchy, tho Property fub-
fifted before that Level, yet Property was to be fitted to the Govern-
ment, and not the Government to Property; but in the caſe of a Com-
monwealth
of Popular Government.
299
monwealth the Government is to be fitted to Property, and not Pro- Chap. ii:
perty to the Government. Twelve.
IN that, any man was bound to relinquiſh his native Right, elſe
how could a Prince level his Nobility? In this, no man is bound to
relinquish his native Right. Thirteen.
IN that, the fame native Right might be preſcrib'd againſt by the
Prince; in this, it cannot be prefcrib'd againſt by the Intereſt of Man-
kind. Fourteen.
IN that, no Nobleman but ought to own a fhame if he preferr'd
his Intereft before that of the Prince; in this, no Nobleman ought to
own a shame for preferring his own Intereft before that of a whole Nation.
Fifteen.
WOULD you have any more? theſe fifteen majors and minors,
or falfe Dice, are foop'd up again, and put all into this Conclufion
or Box, like themſelves.
THUS the Intereft of the three hundred is not balanc'd with that of
a whale Nation, but that of fom few extravagant Spirits; who, by
making Dams in the Current of other mens Eftates, hope to derive fom
Water to their own parch'd Fortunes.
CALUMNIARE fortiter, nihil adhærebit. If a River has but
one natural Bed or Channel, what Dam is made in it by this Agrarian?
but if a River has had many natural Beds or Channels, to which ſhe
has forgot to reach her Breaft, and whofe mouths are dry'd up or ob-
ftructed; thefe are Dams which the Agrarian dos not make, but re-
move: and what parch'd Fortunes can hereby hope to be water'd, but
theirs only, whofe Veins having drunk of the fame Blood, have a
right in nature to drink of the fame Milk? The Law of Moses
allow'd the firstborn but a double portion: was his an extravagant
Spirit ?
HIS fecond throw is, That the nature of the Agrarian is fuch as,
cannot be fix'd, in regard that the People being intrufted with a Vote and
a Sword, may alter it for the lefs, or com to downright Levelling. But as
to this, in the 8th Chapter I have bar'd his Dice, that being the
place in which I thought moſt proper to give a full Anſwer to this
Objection.
AT the third throw; he is extreme aukward. For wheras the
Ifraelites (notwithstanding the Voyages of SOLOMON, and what is
faid of the Ships of Tharfis) during their Agrarian, or while they had
Land, were a Commonwealth of Huſbandmen, and not of Merchants,
nor came to the exerciſe of this Trade, till they had no Land, or after
their difperfion by the Emperor ADRIAN; he fcrues it in, after this
manner As the Jews who have no Lands, are every where great Tra- Confid. p.85.
ders; fo the poffeffion of Lands being limited by this Agrarian, men who
are either covetous or ambitious (as if Eftates were not got by Induftry,
but by Covetouſneſs and Ambition) will employ themfelves and their
Eftates in foren Traffic, which being in a manner wholly ingroft by the Ca-
pital City of Oceana, that City, already too great, will immediatly grow
into an excess of Power and Riches, very dangerous to the Commonwealth;
Amfterdam being com by fuch means to exercife of late a Tyranny in the
diſpoſal of fom public Affairs, much to the prejudice both of the Liberty
and Intereft of the rest of the Union. An equal, if not greater Incom-'
modity to Oceana, would be created by the Agrarian, which making Em-
porium a City of Princes, would render the Country a Commonwealth of
Q4 2
Cotta-
300
The Prerogative
Book I. Cottagers, able to difpute Precedence with the Beggers Bush.
NEWS, not from Tripoli, nor any other corner of the whole
World but one. Bate me this, and fhew me in what other City.
increaſe of Houfes or new. Foundations was ever held a Nufance.
This fure is a Phanfy that regards not the old Folks, or antient Pru-
dence.
ONE of the Bleffings that God promis'd to ABRAHAM, was,
that bis Seed fhould be multiply'd as the Stars of Heaven: And the Com-
monwealth of Rome, by multiplying her Seed, came to bound her
Territory with the Ocean, and her Fame with the Stars of Heaven.
That fuch a Populouſneſs is that without which there can be no
great Commonwealth, both Reaſon and good Authors are clear; but
whether it ought to begin in the Country, or in the City, is a fcruple
I have not known them make. That of Ifrael began in the Country,
that of Rome in the City. Except there be obftruction or impedi-
ment by the Law, as in Turky where the Country, and in England
where the City is forbid to increafe; wherever there is a populous
Country, for example France, it makes a populous City, as Paris;
and wherever there is a populous City, as Rome after the ruin of
Alba, and Amfterdam after the ruin (as to Trade) of Antwerp, it
makes a populous Territory, as was that of the Ruftic Tribes, and is
that of Holland.
BUT the ways how a populous City coms to make a populous
Country, and how a populous Country coms to make a populous
City, are contrary; the one happening thro fucking, as that of the
City, and the other thro weaning, as that of the Country.
;
FOR proof of the former: the more mouths there be in a City,
the more meat of neceffity muſt be vented by the Country, and fo
there will be more Corn, more Cattel, and better Markets
which
breeding more Laborers, more Huſbandmen, and richer Farmers,
bring the Country fo far from a Commonwealth of Cottagers, that
where the Bleffings of God, thro the fruitfulneſs of late years with
us, render'd the Huſbandman unable to diſpute Precedence with the
Beggers Buſh, his Trade thus uninterrupted, in that his Markets are
certain, gos on with increaſe of Children, of Servants, of Corn, and
of Cattel: for there is no reaſon why the Fields adjoining to Emporium,
being but of a hard foil, fhould annually produce two Crops, but the
Populouſneſs of the City.
THE Country then growing more populous, and better ſtock'd
with Cattel, which alſo increaſes Manure for the Land, muft propor-
tionably increaſe in fruitfulneſs. Hence it is that (as the Romans alfo
were good at fuch work) in Holland there is fcarce a puddle un-
drain'd, nor a bank of Sand caft up by the Sea, that is not cover'd
with Earth, and made fruitful by the People; theſe being ſo ſtrangely,
with the growth of Amfterdam, increas'd, as coms perhaps to two
parts in three nor, the Agrarian taking place in Oceana, would it be
longer difputed, whether the might not deftroy Fiſhes to plant Men.
Thus a populous City makes a Country milch, or populous by fuck-
ing; and wheras fom may ſay, that ſuch a City may fuck from foren
parts, it is true enough, and no where more apparent than in Amfter-
dam. But a City that has recourſe to a foren Dug, e'er ſhe had firſt
fuck'd that of her proper Nurfe or Territory dry, you fhall hardly
find; or finding (as in fom Plantation not yet wean'd) will hardly
be
of Popular Government.
301
be able to make that objection hold, feeing it will not ly fo much a- Chap. 11.
gainſt the Populouſneſs of the place, as the contrary.
BUT a populous Country makes a populous City by weaning;
for when the People increaſe ſo much, that the dug of Earth can do
no more, the overplus muſt ſeek fom other way of Livelihood: which
is either Arms, fuch were thoſe of the Goths and Vandals; or Mer-
chandize and Manufacture, for which ends it being neceffary that
they lay their Heads and their Stock together, this makes populous
Citys. Thus Holland being a ſmall Territory, and fuck'd dry, has
upon the matter wean'd the whole People, and is therby become as it
were one City that fucks all the World.
BUT by this means, fays the Confiderer, Emporium being already
too great (while indeed Amfterdam, confidering the narrownefs of the
Territory, or the ſmallneſs of Holland, is much more populous) would
immediatly grow into an excess of Power and Riches, very dangerous to
Liberty, an example wherof was feen in the late Tyranny of that City:
As if it were not fufficiently known that Amfterdam contributes and
has contributed more to the defence of the Commonwealth, or United
Provinces, than all the reft of the League, and had in thoſe late Acti-
ons which have bin fcandaliz'd, refifted not the intereft of Liberty,
but of a Lord. That the increaſe of Rome, which was always ftudy'd
by her beſt Citizens, ſhould make her Head too great for her Body, or
her Power dangerous to the Tribes, was never fo much as imagin'd;
and tho fhe were a City of Princes, her ruftic Tribes were ever had in
greateſt Eſteem and Honor; infomuch, that a Patrician would be of
no other.
BUT the Authority of antient Commonwealths is needlefs; the
Prevaricator by his own Argumentation or Might, lays himſelf neck
and heels.
FOR, fays he, Were this Agrarian once fettl'd, Emporium would Confid. p. 93.
be a City of Princes, and the Nobility fo throly plum'd, that they would be
just as strong of wing, as wild Fowl in moulting time. There would
be a City of Princes, and yet no Nobility. He is fo faft that I have
pity on him, if I knew but which way to let him looſe. He means
perhaps, that the Merchants growing rich, would be the Nobility;
and the Nobility growing poor, would be Grafiers.
4
BUT fo for ought I know it was always, or worſe, that is, men
attain'd to Riches and Honors by fuch or worfe Arts, and in Poverty
made not always fo honeſt Retreats. To all which Infirmitys of the
State, I am deceiv'd if this Agrarian dos not apply the proper Reme-
dys. For fuch an Agrarian makes a Commonwealth for increaſe :
the Trade of a Commonwealth for increaſe, is Arms; Arms are not
born by Merchants, but by Noblemen and Gentlemen. The No-
bility therfore having theſe Arms in their hands, by which Provinces
are to be acquir'd, new Provinces yield new Eftates; fo wheras the
Merchant has his returns in Silk or Canvas, the Soldier will have his
return in Land. He that reprefents me as an Enemy to the Nobility,
is the man he ſpeaks of; for if ever the Commonwealth attains to
five new Provinces (and fuch a Commonwealth will have Provinces
enow) it is certain, that (befides Honors, Magiftracys, and the Reve-
nues annex'd) there will be more Eftates in the Nobility of Oceana,
of fourteen thousand pounds Land a year, than ever were, or can
otherwiſe be of four; and that without any the leaft danger to the
Common-
302
The Prerogative
Book I. Commonwealth: for if Rome had but look'd ſo far to it, as to have
made good her Agrarian in Italy, tho fhe had neglected the reft, the
Wealth of her Nobility might have fuck'd her Provinces, but muſt
have inrich'd the People; and fo rather have water'd her Roots, than
ftarv'd and deſtroy'd them, as it did. In this cafe therfore the Nobi-
lity of Oceana would not moulter like wild Fowl, but be ſtrong of wing
as the Eagle.
Confid. p.87.
Confid. p.89.
Efay 24.
ONE Argument more I have heard urg'd againſt the Populouſneſs
of the Capital City, which is, That the Rich in time of fick nefs for-
faking the place, by which means the Markets com to fail, the Poor,
left they ſhould ſtarve, will run abroad, and infect the whole Coun-
try. But fhould a man tell them at Paris, or Grand Cairo (in the
latter wherof the Plague is more frequent and furious than happens
with us) that they are not to build Houſes, nor increaſe fo much,
left they ſhould have the Plague; or that Children are not to be born
fo faft, left they dy, they would think it ſtrange news. A Com-
monwealth is furnish'd with Laws, and Power to add fuch as fhe
ſhall find needful. In cafe a City be in that manner vifited, it is the
duty of the Country, and of the Government, to provide for them
by contribution.
THE difficulty in making the Agrarian equal and fteddy thro the rife
or fall that may happen in Mony, which is the fourth throw of the Pre-
varicator, is that which might have bin for his eafe to have taken
notice was long fince fufficiently bar'd, where it is faid, That if a
new Survey at the prefent Rent was taken, an Agrarian ordaining
that no man fhould thenceforth hold above fo much Land as is there
valu'd at the rate, however Mony might alter, would be equal and
fteddy enough.
HIS laft caft is, That the Agrarian would make War againſt uni-
verfal and immemorial Cuſtom; which being without doubt more preva-
lent than that of Reason, there is nothing of fuch difficulty as to perfuade
men at once, and crudely, that they and their Forefathers have bin in
an Error.
WISE men, I fee, may differ in Judgment or Counfil; for, fays
Sir FRANCIS BACON, Surely every Medicin is an Innovation, and be
that will not apply new Remedys must expect new Evils; for Time is the
greatest Innovator; and if Time of courſe alters things to the worſe, and
Wiſdom and Counfil may not alter them to the better, what must be the
end?
BUT the cafe of the Agrarian receives equal ftrength from each
of theſe Counfillors or Opinions: from the latter, in that it gos upon
grounds which Time has not innovated for the worfe, but for the better;
and fo according to the former coms not to have bin at once, and crude-
ly perfuaded, but introduc'd by Cuftom, now grown univerfal and
immemorial. For who remembers the Gentry of this Nation to have
worn the blue Coats of the Nobility, or the lower fort of People to
have liv'd upon the ſmoak of their Kitchins? On the contrary, Is it
not now an univerfal Cuftom for men to rely upon their own For-
tunes or Induſtry, and not to put their Truſt in Princes, ſeeking in
their Liberality or Dependence the means of living? The Prevarica-
tor might as well jump into his great Grandfather's old Breeches, and
perfuade us that he is a la mode, or in the new cut, as that the ways of
our Forefathers would agree with our Cuftoms. Dos not every man
now
of Popular Government.
303
now fee, that if the Kings in thoſe days had fettl'd the Eftates of the Chap. 12.
Nobility by a Law, reftraining them from felling their Land fuch
a Law had bin an Agrarian, and yet not warring against their an-
tient Cuſtoms, but preferving them? Wherfore neither dos the Agra-
rian propos'd, taking the Balance of Eſtates as fhe now finds them,
make War againft, but confirm the prefent Cuſtoms. The only Ob-
jection that can ſeem in this place to ly, is, that wheras it has bin the
Cuftom of Oceana that the bulk of the Eſtate ſhould defcend to the
eldeſt Son, by the Agrarian he cannot, in cafe he has more Brothers,
inherit above two thousand pounds a year in Land, or an equal share.
But neither dos this, whether you regard the Parents or the Children,
make War with Cuftom. For putting the cafe the Father has twenty
thousand pounds a year in Land, he gos not the lefs in his cuftom or
way of Life for the Agrarian, becaufe for this he has no lefs: and if he
has more or fewer Sons to whom his Eftate defcends by equal or in-
equal portions, neither do they go lefs in their ways or cuſtoms of Life
for the Agrarian, becauſe they never had more.
But, fays ARIS- Pol. L. 3. c.g
TOTLE (fpeaking of the Oftracifm as it fupplys the defect of an
Agrarian) this courfe is as neceffary to Kings as to Commonwealths. By
this means the Monarchys of Turky and of Spain preferve their Ba-
lance; thro the neglect of this has that of the Nobility of Oceana bin
broken and this is it which the Prevaricator, in advifing that the No-
bility be no further level'd than will ferve to keep the People under,
requires of his Prince. So, That an Agrarian is neceffary to Govern-
ment, be it what it will, is on all hands concluded.
CHA P.
XII.
Whether Courſes or a Rotation be neceſſary to a well-
order'd Commonwealth. In which is contain'd the Cour-
fes or Parembole of Ifrael before the Captivity, together
with the Epitome of Athens and Venice.
O
NE bout more and we have don: This (as reafon good) will Oceana, 1.54.
be upon Wheels or Rotation: For,
AS the Agrarian anfwers to the equality of the Foundation or
Root, fo dos Rotation to the equality of the Superftructures or Bran-
ches of a Commonwealth.
EQUAL Rotation is equal Viciflitude in, or Succeffion to Ma-
giftracy confer'd for equal terms, injoining fuch equal Vacations, as
caufe the Government to take in the Body of the People, by parts fuc-
ceeding others, thro the free Election or Suffrage of the whole.
THE contrary wherto is prolongation of Magiftracy, which,
traſhing the wheel of Rotation, deftroys the Life or natural Motion
of a Commonwealth.
THE Prevaricator, whatever he has don for himſelf, has don this
for me, that it will be out of doubt whether my Principles be capable
of greater Obligation or Confirmation, than by having Objections made
against them. Nor have I bin altogether ingrateful, or nice of my
Labor, but gon far (much farther than I needed) about, that I might
return with the more valuable Preſent to him that fent me on the
errand:
304
The Prerogative
Book I. errand: I fhall not be ſhort of like proceding upon the prefent Sub-
ject, but rather over.
Grot.
ROTATION in a Commonwealth is of the Magiftracy, of the
Senat, of the People; of the Magiſtracy and the People; of the Ma-
giftracy and the Senat; or of the Magiftracy, of the Senat, and of the
People: which in all com to fix kinds.
FOR example of Rotation in the Magiſtracy, you have the Judg
of Ifrael, call'd in Hebrew Shophet. The like Magiftracy after the Kings
ITHOBAL and BAAL came in ufe with the Tyrians; from theſe, with
their Pofterity the Carthaginians, who alfo call'd their fupreme Ma-
giftrats, being in number two, and for their Term Annual," Shophetim,
which the Latins by a fofter pronunciation render Suffetes.
THE Shophet or Judg of Ifrael was a Magiftrat, not, that I can
find, oblig'd to any certain term, throout the Book of Judges; never-
thelefs, it is plain, that his election was occafional, and but for a time,
after the manner of a Dictator.
TRUE it is, that ELI and SAMUEL rul'd all their lives; but
but upon
this ſuch impatience in the People follow'd, thro the Corruption of their
Sons, as was the main cauſe of the fucceding Monarchy.
THE Magiftrats in Athens (except the Areopagits, being a Judica-
tory) were all upon Rotation. The like for Lacedemon and Rome,
except the Kings in the former, who were indeed hereditary, but had
no more Power than the Duke in Venice, where all the reft of the Ma-
giftrats (except the Procuratori, whofe Magiftracy is but mere Orna-
ment) are alſo upon Rotation.
FOR the Rotation of the Senat you have Athens, the Achæans,
Etolians, Lycians, the Amphictionium; and the Senat of Lacedemon
reprov'd, in that it was for life, by ARISTOTLE: Modern Examples
Pol. 1. 2.c. 7. of like kind are the Diet of Switzerland, but especially the Senat of
■ Chron.}
27.1.
Grot. ad loc.
Venice.
FOR the Rotation of the People, you have firft Ifrael, where the
Congregation (which the Greecs call Ecclefia; the Latins, Comitia, or
Concio) having a twofold capacity; firft, that of an Army, in which
they were the conftant Guard of the Country; and, fecondly, that
of a Repreſentative, in which they gave the Vote of the People, at the
creation of their Laws, or election of their Magiſtrats, was Monthly.
Now the Children of Ifrael after their Number, to wit, the chief Fathers
and Captains of thлufands and hundreds, and their Officers that ferv'd the
King in any matter of the Courfes, which came in, and went out month by
month, throout all the months of the year, of every Courfe were twenty
and four thousand.
SUCH a multitude there was of military Age, that without incon-
venience, four and twenty thoufand were every month in Arms, whofe
term expiring, others fucceded, and fo others; by which means the Ro-
tation of the whole People came about in the ſpace of one year. The
Tribuns, or Commanders of the Tribes in Arms, or of the Prerogative
for the month, are nam'd in the following part of the Chapter, to the
fixteenth Verfe; where begins the enumeration of the Princes (tho
GAD and ASHUR, for what reafon I know not, be omitted) of the
Tribes, remaining in their Provinces, where they judg'd the People,
and as they receiv'd Orders, were to bring or fend fuch farther Inforce-
ment or Recruits as occafion requir'd to the Army: after thefe, fome
other
3
of Popular Government.
305
other Officers are mention'd. There is no queftion to be made but this Chap. 12.
Rotation of the People, together with their Prerogative or Congregati-
on, was preferv'd by the monthly Election of two thouſand Deputys
in each of the twelve Tribes, which in all came to four and twenty
thouſand; or let any man fhew how otherwiſe it was likely to be don,
the nature of their Office being to give the Vote of the People, who
therfore fure muſt have choſen them. By theſe the Vote of the Peo-
ple was given to their Laws, and at Elections of their Magiſtrats.
TO their Laws, as where DAVID propoſes the reduction of the
Ark: And DAVID confulted with the Captains of thousands and hun- 1 Chron. 13.
dreds, and with every Leader. And DAVID faid to all the Congregation
of Ifrael, If it ſeems good to you, and it be of the Lord God, let us fend
abroad to our Brethren every where (the Princes of Tribes in their Pro-
vinces) that are left in the Land of Ifrael, and with them alfo to the Prieſts
and Levites, which are in the Citys and Suburbs,that they may gather them-
Selves to us; and let us bring again the Ark of our God to us, for we in-
quir'd not at it in the days of SAUL. And all the Congregation (gave their
Suffrage in the Affirmative) faid that they would do fo; for the thing
was right in the eys of the People. Nulla lex fibi foli confcientiam Juftitia Grot. e Ter-
fuæ debet, fed eis a quibus obfequium expectat. Now that the fame Con- tul.
gregation or Reprefentative gave the Vote of the People alſo in the
Election of Prieſts, Officers and Magiftrats; Moreover DAVID and 1 Chron. 25.
the Captains of the Hoft feparated to the Service of the Sons of ASAPH,
and of HEMAN, and of JEDUTHUN, who should prophefy with Harps,
with Pfalterys, and with Cymbals. But upon the occafion to which we
are more eſpecially beholden for the prefervation and diſcovery of this
admirable Order (DAVID having propos'd the buſineſs in a long and 1 Chron. 28.
pious fpeech) the Congregation made SOLOMON the Son of DAVID 2.
King the fecond time, and anointed him to the Lord to be chief Governor, 1 Chron. 29.
and ZADOK to be Priest. For as to the first time that SOLOMON 22.
was made King, it happen'd, thro the Sedition of ADONIJAH, to Kings 1.
have been don in haft and tumultuouſly by thofe only of Jerufalem ;
and the reaſon why ZADOK is here made Prieft, is, that ABIATHAR
was put out for being of the Confpiracy with ADONIJAH.
I
I
1
I MAY expect (by fuch Objections as they afford me) it ſhould
be alleg'd, that to prove an Order in a Commonwealth, I inftance in
a Monarchy; as if there were any thing in this Order monarchical, or
that it could, if it had not bin fo receiv'd from the Commonwealth,
have bin introduc'd by the Kings, to whom in the judgment of any fo-
ber man (the Prevaricator only excepted, who has bin huckling about
fom fuch Council for his Prince) no lefs could have follow'd upon the
firft frown of the People, than did in REHOBOHAM, who having us'd 1 Kings 12.
them roughly, was depos'd by the Congregation, or the major part.
It is true, that while Ifrael was an Army, the Congregation, as it
needed not to affemble by way of Election or Reprefentative, fo I be-
lieve it did not; but that by all Ifrael affembl'd to this end, fhould be
meant the whole People after they were planted upon their Lots, and
hot their Repreſentative, which in a political fenfe is as properly fo call'd,
were abfurd and impoffible. Nor need I go upon prefumtion only,
be the fame never fo ftrong, feeing it is faid in Scripture of the Kora-
thites, that they were keepers of the Gates of the Tabernacle, and their Fa- 1 Chron. 9.
thers being over the Hoft of the Lord, were keepers of the Entry: That is,
(according to the Interpretation of GROTIUS) the Korathites were
Rr
now
29.
306
The Prerogative
Nunib. 4.
1
επ
Book I. now keepers of the Gates, as it appears in the Book of Numbers, their
Anceſtors the Kohathites had bin in the Camp, or while Ifrael was yet
an Army. But our Tranflation is lame in the right foot, as to the true
diſcovery of the antient manner of this fervice, which according to the
Septuagint and the vulgar Latin was thus, they were keepers of the Gates
of the Tabernacle () TαTÉρes duтwu iπì rus пapeμBoxus, & familiæ eorum
per vices) and their Fathers by turns, or Rotation. So that Offices
and Services by Courfes, Turns, or Rotation, are plainly more anti-
ent than Kings in the Commonwealth of Ifrael, tho it be true that
when the Courſes or Rotation of the Congregation or Reprefentative
of the People were first introduc'd, is as hard to fhew, as it would be
how, after the People were once planted upon their Lots, they could
be otherwiſe affembl'd. If writers argue well and lawfully from
what the Sanhedrim was in the inftitution by JEHOSAPHAT, to what
it had more antiently bin; to argue from what the Congregation was
in the inftitution by DAVID, to what it had more antiently bin, is
fufficiently warranted.
THESE things rightly confider'd, there remains little doubt but
we have the courfes of Ifrael for the firft example of Rotation in a
popular Affembly. Now to com from the Hebrew to the Grecian Pru-
dence, the fame is approv'd by ARISTOTLE, which he exemplifys
in the Commonwealth of THALES MILESIUS, where the People,
Pol. 1.4.c.14. he ſays, affembl'd (rò xarà µép©, árλà µù távтas álpóovs) by turns or Ro-
κατὰ μέρΘ, ἀλλὰ πάντας αθρόους)
tation. Nor is the Roman Prudence without fom fhadow of the like
Proceding, where the Prerogative (pro tempore) with the jure vocata
being made by Lot, gave frequently the Suffrage of the whole People.
But the Gothic Prudence in the Policy of the third State, runs alto-
gether upon the Collection of a Repreſentative by the Suffrage of the
People (tho not fo diligently regulated, by Terms and Vacations, as
to a ſtanding Affembly were neceffary, by Turns, Rotation, Parem-
bole or Courſes) as in the election of the late Houſe of Commons, and
the conftitutive Viciffitude of the Knights and Burgeffes, is known
by fufficient experience.
Epitome of the
Athenian
Common-
wealth.
WHEN the Rotation of a Commonwealth is both in the Magi-
ſtracy and the People, I reckon it to be of a fourth kind, as in Ifrael,
where both the Judg and the Congregation were ſo elected.
THE fifth kind is when the Rotation of a Commonwealth is in the
Magiſtracy and the Senat, as in thoſe of Athens, of the Achæans, of the
Etolians, of the Lycians, and of Venice; upon which examples, ra-
ther for the influence each of them, at leaſt Athens, may have upon
the following Book, than any great neceffity from the prefent occafion,
I fhall inlarge in this place.
THE Commonwealth of Athens, was thus adminifter'd.
THE Senat of the Bean being the propofing Affembly (for that of
the Areopagits, call'd alfo a Senat, was a Judicatory) confifted of four
hundred Citizens chofen by Lot, which was perform'd with Beans.
Theſe were annually remov'd all at once: By which means Athens became
fruſtrated of the natural and neceffary uſe of an Ariftocracy, while nei-
ther her Senators were chofen for their parts, nor remain'd long e
nough in this Function to acquire the right underſtanding of their pro-
per Office. Theſe thus elected, were fubdivided by Lot into four e-
qual parts, call'd Prytanys, each of which for one quarter of the year
was
of Popular Government.
307
Petit. de Leg.
was in Office. The Prytany, or Prytans in office, elected ten Prefi- Chap. 12.
dents, call'd Proedri, out of which Proedri or Prefidents they weekly
choſe one Provoſt of the Council, who was call'd the Epiftata. The
Epiftata and the Proedri were the more peculiar Propofers to the Pry-
tans, and to the Prytans it belong'd eſpecially to prepare buſineſs
(wpò rūs Brañs ny wporns xxAnoias) for the Senat. They gave alfo au- Att.
καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας)
dience to any that would propoſe any thing concerning the Common-
wealth, which if, when reported by the Prytans, it were approv'd by
the Senat, the Party that propos'd might promulgat the buſineſs; and
Promulgation being made, the Congregation affembl'd, and deter-
min'd of it. Sic data concio Lalio eft, proceffit ille, & Græcus apud Cic. pro Flac.
Græcos non de culpa fua dixit, fed de pæna queftus eft; porrexerunt ma-
nus, Pfephifma natum eft.
Phil. I.
THE Prytans and their Magiftrats had right to affemble the Senat,
and propoſe to them; and what the Senat determin'd upon fuch a Pro-
pofition, if forthwith to be offer'd to the People, as in privat caſes,
was call'd Proboulema; but if not to be propos'd till the People had a
year's trial of it, as was the ordinary way in order to Laws to be enact-
ed, it was call'd Pfephifma; each of which words, with that difference,
fignifys a Decree. A Decree of the Senat in the latter ſenſe had for
one year the Power of a Law, after which trial it belong'd to the Thef-
mothetæ (πpoɣpáþε) to hang it in writing upon the Statues of the He-
ros, and affemble the Congregation. Thefe Magiftrats were of the Ulpian ad
number of the Archons, which in all were nine; the chief, more pecu-
liarly fo call'd, was ARCHON EPONYMUS, he by whofe name the Poll. 1. 8. c.8.
year was reckon'd or denominated (his Magiftracy being of a Civil
concernment) the next was the King (a Magiftrat of a Spiritual con-
cernment) the third the Polemarch (whofe Magiftracy was of a Mili-
tary concernment) the other fix were the Thefmotheta, whỏ had ſe-
veral Functions common with the nine; others peculiar or proper to
themfelves, as (poygae) to give the People (by Placarts) notice
when the Judicatorys were to affemble, that is, when the People were
to affemble in that capacity, and to judg according to the Law made;
er; when the Senat or the People were to affemble upon an calyeλía,
a Crime that was not provided againſt by the Law, as that of ALCI-
BIADES (the Wits about that time in Athens being moſt of them
Atheiſts) for laughing at CERES, diſcovering her Secrets, and fhav-
ing of the MERCURYS. If an Archon or Demagog was guilty of fuch
a Crime, it belong'd to the cognizance of the Senat, otherwiſe to that
of the People whom the Thefmotheta were alſo in like manner to warn, L. 8. c. 16.
when they were to com to the Suffrage.
THESE fix, like the Electors in Venice, prefided at all Elections
of Magiftrats, whether made by the Lot as the Judges, or by Suffrage
as the new Archons, the Strategus or General, and moſt of the reft.
They alſo had the hearing and introducing of all Cauſes into the Ju-
dicatorys.
BUT the right of affembling the Ecclefia or Congregation belong'd
to the Prytans, by whom the Senat propos'd to the People.
THE Congregation confifted of all them that were upon the Roll of
the Lexiarcha, that is to fay, of the whole People having right to the
City. The Prytans feated upon a Tribunal, were Preſidents of this
Affembly; the Affembly having facrific'd and made Oath of Fideli-
ty to the Commonwealth, the Proedri or Prefidents of the Prytans
Rr 2
propos'd
308
The Prerogative
1
Book I. propos'd by Authority of the Senat to the People in this manner: July
the 16th POLICLES being Archon, and the Tribe of Pandion in the
Prytaneat, DEMOSTHENES PANEUS thought thus, or was of this
opinion. The fame Cuſtom wherby the firſt Propoſer ſubſcribes his
Opinion or Part with his Name, is at this day in Venice. Propofi
tion being made, fuch of the People as would ſpeak were call'd to the
Pulpit; they that were fifty years of Age, or upwards, were to com
firft, and the younger afterwards; which cuftom of prating in this
manner made excellent Orators or Demagogs, but a bad Common
wealth.
Dem. Phil. i
FROM this, that the People had not only the Reſult of the Com-
monwealth, but the Debate alſo, Athens is call'd a Democracy; and
this kind of Government is oppos'd to that of Lacedemon, which, be-
cauſe the People there had not the power of Debate, but of Refult
only, was call'd an Aristocracy, fomtimes an Oligarchy: thus the Greecs
commonly are to be understood, to diſtinguiſh theſe two; while ac-
cording to my Principles, if you like them, Debate in the People
makes Anarchy; and where they have the Reſult and no more, the
reft being manag'd by a good Ariftocracy it makes that which is pro-
perly and truly to be call'd Democracy, or Popular Government. Nei-
ther is this Opinion of mine new, but according to the Judgment of
fom of the Athenians themſelves; for fays ISOCRATES in his Ora-
tion to the Areopagits for Reformation of the Athenian Government,
I know the main reason why the Lacedemonians flouriſh to be, that their
Commonwealth is popular. But to return. As many of the People as
would, having fhew'd their Eloquence, and with theſe the Demagogs,
who were frequently brib'd, conceal'd their Knavery; the Epiftata,
or Provoſt of the Proedri, put the Decree or Queſtion to the Vote,
and the People gave the Reſult of the Commonwealth by their Chi-
rotonia, that is, by holding up their hands: the Refult thus given,
was the Law or Pfephifma of the People.
NOW for the Functions of the Congregation, they were divers;
as firft, Election of Magiftrats (ουκ ἐχειροτονεῖτε δὲ ἐξ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν δέκα
Ταξιάρχους και Στρατηγοὺς καὶ Φυλάρχους, καὶ Ἱππάρχους δύο ;) namely, the Ar-
chons, the Strategus or General, the Field Officers, the Admirals,
with divers others, all, or the chief of them annual, and com-
monly upon Terms and Vacations; tho it be true, as PLUTARCH
has it, that PHOCION was Strategus four years together, having that
Honor ftill put upon him by the Congregation, without his feek-
ing. The next Office of this Affembly was to elect Judges into five
Courts or Judicatorys; for the People being in the Bulk too unwieldy
a Body for the performance of this duty, they exercis'd the fupreme
Judicature by way of Reprefentative, into which Election was made
by Lottery, in fuch a manner that five hundred, one thouſand, or
1500 of them (according to the importance of the occafion) being
above thirty years of Age, and within the reft of the Qualifications in
that cafe provided by the Law, became the Soverain Judicatory,
call'd the Heliæa. In all Elections, whether by Lot or Suffrage, the
Thefmotheta were Preſidents, and order'd the Congregation. Fur-
thermore, if they would amend, alter, repeal, or make a Law, this
alfo was don by a Reprefentative, of which no man was capable
that had not bin of the Heliaa, for the reft elected out of the whole
People: this amounting to one thoufand, was call'd the Nomotheta or
Legiſla-
1
of Popular Government.
309
Legiflators. No Law receiv'd by the People could be abrogated but Chap. 12:
by the Nomotheta; by theſe any Athenian, having obtain'd leave of
the Senat, might abrogat a Law, provided withal he put another in
the Place of it. Thefe Laws the Proedri of the Prytans were to put
to the Suffrage.
FIRST, the old, whether it agreed with the Athenian People, or
not? then the new; and whether of theſe happen'd to be chirotoniz'd
or voted by the Nomothete, was ratify'd, according to that piece of
the Athenian Law cited by DEMOSTHENES againft TIMOCRA-
TES, ὁπότερον δ᾽ ἂν τῶν νόμων χειροτονήσωσιν δι νομοθέται, τότου κύριου εἶναι.
What has bin faid of the Commonwealth of Athens, in relation to
the preſent purpoſe, amounts to thus much, That not only the Senat
and the Magiſtracy in this Policy was upon Rotation, but even the
People alſo, at leaſt as to the Nomotheta, or their Legiſlative Power,
and the fupreme Judicatory of the Heliaa, each of theſe being a
Repreſentative, conftituted of one thouſand, or fifteen hundred Či-
tizens,
BUT for what follows in the fecond Book, it is neceffary that I
obferve in this place the proceding of certain Divines, who indeavour
to make ufe of this Commonwealth for ends of their own, as parti-
cularly Dr. SEAMAN; who in his Book call'd Four Propofitions, ar-
gues after this manner.
CHIROTONIA (as SUIDAS has it) fignifys both Plebiſcitum,
a Law made by the People, and Pfephifma. Now, fay he, Pfephifma
is the ordinary word us'd in the Attic Laws, and in DEMOSTHENES
for Senatufconfultum, a Law made by the Senat: whence he draws this
Conclufion; As, when the People make a Law, they are faid to Chiroto-
nize; fo may the Rulers, in like manner, in thofe Laws that are made
by themfelves alone.
THESE ways with Divines are too bad. The words of Sui-
DAs are thefe (χειροτονία, έκλογη, πάντων κύρωσις) Chirotonia is Ele&tion
or Ratification by the Many: which exprefly excludes the Few or the
Senat from being otherwife contain'd by the word Chirotonia, than a
part is by the whole. Nor has the Author the word Pfephifma, or
Plebiscitum in the place. I would fain know what other word there
is in Greec for Plebifcitum but Pfephifma, and yet the Doctor puts it
upon SUIDAS, that he diftinguishes between theſe two, and taking
that for granted where he finds Pfephifma in DEMOSTHENES and
the Attic Laws, will have it to fignify no more than a Decree of the
Senat. It is true that fom Decrees of the Senat were fo call'd, but
thoſe of the People had no other name; and whenever you find Pfe
phifina in DEMOSTHENES or the Attic Laws, for a Law, there is
nothing more certain than that it is to be underſtood of the People:
for to ſay that a Law in a Popular Commonwealth can be made with-
out the People, is a Contradiction.
THE fecond Paffage is a What think you of theſe words of Poll. lib. 8.
POLLUX, ἰδία δὲ ὅι μὲν θεσμοθέται προγράφεσι, πότε δεν δικάζειν τὰ δικασ. c. 9.
τήρια. καὶ τὰς εἰσαγγελίας εισαι γέλλεσιν εἰς τὸν δῆμον καὶ τὰς χειροτονίας. Which
the Doctor having english'd in this manner, The Thefmothetæ do pri-
vatly prescribe when Judgment is to be given, and promulge public Accufa-
tions and Suffrages to the People, afks you whofe Suffrages were theſe,
if not the Rulers ? By which ftrange Conftruction, where POLLUX
having
310
The Prerogative
Book I. having firſt related in what part the function of the Thefmotheta was
common with that of the nine Archons, coms (idía di) to fhew you
what was peculiar to themſelves, namely, to give notice when the
Heliaa or other Judicatorys were to affemble, the Doctor renders it,
they do privatly preſcribe: as if the Seffion of a Court of Juſtice, and fuch
a one as contain❜d a thouſand Judges, being the Repreſentative of the
whole People, were to be privatly prefcrib'd. Then to this privat
preſcribing of Justice, he adds, that they do publicly promulge (eirałyexías)
Citations upon Crimes not within the written Law; as if privat Pre-
fcription and public Promulgation could ftand together. Next,
wheras Promulgation in the very nature of the word fignifys an A&t
before a Law made, he prefumes the Law to be first made by the
Rulers, and then promulgated by the Thefmotheta to the People, kim
kam to the experience of all Commonwealths, the nature of Promul-
gation, and the fenfe of his Author, whofe words, as I fhew'd before,
declare it to have bin the proper or peculiar office of the Theſmothete
to give the People notice when they were to affemble for Judicature, or
when for giving their Chirotonia or Suffrage, by Promulgation of the
Cauſe (eis Tov dnμov) upon which they were to determin.
FOR the fourth paffage, the Doctor quoting a wrong place for
there words, χειροτονήσωσιν οι νομοθέται, that the Nomotheta being a
Repreſentative, as I fhew'd, of the whole People, choſen by Lot,
and in number one thouſand) chirotoniz'd, or gave the Legislative
Suffrage; thence infers, that the Rulers chirotoniz'd, voted or made
Laws by themselves without the People: which is as if one ſhould ſay,
that the Prerogative Tribe in Rome, or the Houſe of Commons in
England, gave their Vote to fuch or fuch a Law, therfore it was
made by the Rulers alone, and not by the People of Rome or of
England.
FOR the fourth Paffage, STEPHANUS quotes DEMOSTHÉ-
NES at large in there words, ὄντε βολῆς, ἔντε δήμε χειροτονήσαντος αυτόν.
This the Doctor interprets of an Officer; to which I fhall fay more,
when he ſhews me where the Sentence is, or what went before: for
as yet I do not know of an Officer in any Commonwealth, whoſe
Election was indifferently made, either by the Senat or by the Peo-
ple; nor do I think the Doctor has look'd further for this than ST E-
PHENS, who has not interpreted it.
THE fifth paffage is, That a Decree of the Senat in Athens had the
force of a Law for one year, without the People. So had the Edicts of
the Prætors in Rome: but I would fain know, whence the Senat in
Athens, or the Prætors in Rome, originally deriv'd this Right (which
was no more than that fuch Laws might be Probationers, and fo bet-
ter underſtood when they came to the vote) but from the Chirotonia,
or Suffrage of the People.
THE fixth paffage ftops the mouths of fuch as having nothing to
fay to the matter of my writing, pick quarrels with the manner or
freedom of it, the Liberty I take in the defence of Truth; ſeeing the
Doctor takes a greater liberty upon other terms, while he bids his
Antagoniſt (one that defended the Caufe now in my hand) go and
confult his Authors, namely, STEPHENS and BUDEUS again: for,
fays he, you wrong thofe learned Men, while you would have us believe that
they were as ignorant of the Greec Story as yourſelf, or that things are
to be found in them which are not. To which Confidence I have better
leave
of Popular Government.
31 I
leave to ſay, that the Doctor ſhould do well to take no worſe Counfil Chap. 12.
than he gives.
BUT what is becom of my Prevaricator? I have quite loft him,
elſe I ſhould have intreated him to compare his notes out of my
Sermon, with theſe out of the Doctor's; or retract that fame affecta-
tion, in ſaying, I know not how, but Mr. HARRINGTON has con-
ceiv'd a great unkindness for the Clergy. As if thefe their Stratagems,
with which they make perpetual War againſt the unwary People, did not
concern a man that has undertaken the cauſe of Popular Government.
THE Policy of the Achæans confifted of divers Commonwealths
under one, which was thus adminifter'd. The Citys fent their De-
putys twice every year of courſe, and oftner if they were fummon'd
by their Strategus, or their Demiurges, to the place appointed. The
Strategus was the Supreme Magiftrat both Military and Civil, and
the Demiurges being ten, were his Council, all Annual Magiftrats e-
lected by the People. This Council thus conftituted, was call'd the
Synarchy, and perform'd like Dutys, in relation to the Senat, con-
fifting of the Deputys fent by their peculiar Soveraintys or Citys, as
the Prytans to that in Athens. The Policys of the Ætolians and Ly-
cians are fo near the fame again, that in one you have all. So both
the Senats and the Magiftracy of theſe Commonwealths were upon
Rotation. To conclude with Venice.
THE Commonwealth of Venice confifts of four parts; the Great Epitome of the
Council, the Senat, the College, and the Signory.
wealth of
Common-
Council.
THE Great Council is the aggregat Body of the whole People, Venice.
or Citizens of Venice, which, for the paucity of their number, and The Great
the Antiquity of their Extraction, are call'd Gentlemen, or Noble Ve-
netians. Every one of them at five and twenty years of age has right
of Seffion and Suffrage in this Council; which right of Suffrage, be-
cauſe throout this Commonwealth, in all Debates and Elections, it is
given by the Ballot, is call'd the right of Balloting, wherby this Coun-
cil being the Soverain Power, creates all the rest of the Orders, Coun-
cils, or Magiftracys; and has conftitutively the ultimat Reſult, both
in cafes of Judicature, and the Conftitution of Laws.
THE Senat, call'd alſo the Pregati, confifts of fixty Senators pro- The Senat.
perly fo ftil'd, wherof the Great Council elects fix on a day, begin-
ning fo long before the month of October, that theſe being all choſen
by that time, then receive their Magiftracy: it conſiſts alſo of fixty
more, call'd the Junta, which are elected by the Scrutiny of the Old
Senat, that is, by the Senat propofing, and the Great Council re-
folving; the rest of their Creation is after the fame manner with the
former. In the Sixty of the Senat, there cannot be above three of
any one Kindred or Family, nor in the Junta fo many, unleſs there
be fewer in the former. Theſe Magiftracys are all annual, but with-
out interval, fo that it is at the pleaſure of the Great Council, whe-
ther a Senator having finiſh'd his year, they will elect him again.
THE College is a Council confifting more efpecially of three Or- The College.
ders of Magiftrats call'd in their Language Savi; as the Savi grandi,
to whofe cognizance or care belong the whole affairs of Sea and Land;
the Savi di Terra ferma, to whofe care and cognizance belong the
affairs of the Land; and the Savi di Mare, to whofe cognizance ap-
pertain
312
The Prerogative
Book I. pertain the affairs of the Sea, and of the Ilands. Theſe are elected
by the Senat, not all at once, but for the Savi grandi, who are fix,
by three at a time, with the interpofition of three months; and for
the Savi di Terra ferma, and the Savi di Mare, who are each five,
after the fame manner, fave only that the firft Election confifts of
three, and the ſecond of two. Each Order of the Savi elects week-
ly one Provoſt, each of which Provoſts has Right in any affair belong-
ing to the cognizance of his Order, to propofe to the College. Au-
dience of Embaffadors, and matters of foren Negotiation, belong
properly to this Council.
The Signory.
Certain
Councils.
THE Signory confifts of the Duke and of his Counfillors. The
Duke is a Magiftrat created by the Great Council for Life, to whom
the Commonwealth acknowleges the Reverence due to a Prince, and
all her Acts run in his name; tho without the Counfillors he has no
Power at all, while they can perform any Function of the Signory
without him. The Counfillors, whoſe Magiftracy is annual, are e-
lected by the Scrutiny of the Senat, naming one out of each Tribe
(for the City is locally divided into fix Tribes) and the Great Council
approving; fo the Counfillors are fix, whofe Function in part is of
the nature of Mafters of Requeſts, having withal power to grant cer-
tain Privileges: but their greateſt preeminence is, that all, or any one
of them may propofe to any Council in the Commonwealth.
THE Signory has Seffion and Suffrage in the College, the College
Rights of the has Seffion and Suffrage in the Senat, and the Senat has Seffion and
Suffrage in the Great Council. The Signory, or the Provofts of the
Savi, have power to affemble the College, the College has power to
affemble the Senat, and the Senat has power to affemble the Great
Council; the Signiori, but more peculiarly the Provofts of the Savi,
in their own Offices and Functions, have power to propoſe to the
College, the College has power to propofe to the Senat, and the Senat
has power to propoſe to the Great Council. Whatever is thus pro-
pos'd and refolv'd, either by the Senat (for fomtimes thro the fecu-
rity of this Order, a Propofition gos no further) or by the Great
Council, is ratify'd, or becoms the Law of the Commonwealth. Over
and above theſe Orders, they have three Judicatorys, two Civil and
one Criminal, in each of which forty Gentlemen elected by the Great
Council are Judges for the term of eight months; to theſe Judicatorys
belong the Avogadori and the Auditori, who are Magiftrats, having
power to hear Caufes apart, and, as they judge fitting, to introduce
them into the Courts,
IF a man tells me, that I omit many things, he may perceive I
write an Epitome, in which no more fhould be comprehended, than
that which underſtood may make a man underſtand the reft. But of
theſe principal parts confifts the whole body of admirable Venice.
THE Configlio de' Dieci, or Council of Ten, being that which
partakes of Dictatorian Power, is not a limb of her, but as it were a
Sword in her hand. This Council (in which the Signory has alſo
Seffion and Suffrage) confifts more peculiarly of ten annual Magiſtrats,
created by the Great Council, who afterwards elect three of their
own number by Lot, which fo elected are call'd Capi de' Dieci, their
Magiſtracy being monthly: Again, out of the three Capi, one is taken
by Lot, whofe Magiftracy is weekly: this is he, who over againſt the
Tribunal in the Great Council fits like another Duke, and is call'd the
Provoft
of Popular Government.
313
Provoſt of the Dieci. It belongs to theſe three Magiftrats to affemble Chap. 12.
the Council of Ten, which they are oblig'd to do weekly of courſe,
and oftner as they fee occafion. The Council being affembled, any
one of the Signory, or two of the Capi may propofe to it: the power
which they now exerciſe (and wherin for their affiſtance they create
three Magiſtrats call'd the Grand Inquifitors) confifts in the puniſh-
ment of certain heinous Crimes, eſpecially that of Treafon; in rela-
tion wherto they are as it were Sentinels, ftanding upon the guard of
the Commonwealth: But conftitutively (with the addition of a
Junta, confifting of other fifteen, together with fome of the chief
Magiftrats having Right in cafes of important ſpeed or fecrecy to this
Council) they have the full and abfolute Power of the whole Com-
monwealth as Dictator.
THAT Venice either tranfcrib'd the whole and every part of her
Conſtitution out of Athens and Lacedemon, or happens to be fram'd as
if ſhe had ſo don, is moſt apparent. The Reſult of this Common-
wealth is in the Great Council, and the Debate in the Senat; fo was
it in Lacedemon. A Decree made by the Senat of Athens had the
power of a Law for one year without the People, at the end wherof
the People might revoke it: A Decree of the Senat of Venice ftands
good without the Great Council, unleſs theſe fee reaſon to revoke it.
The Prytans were a Council preparing buſineſs for the Senat; fo is the
Collegio in Venice: the Preſidents of the Prytans were the ten Proedri;
thofe of the Collegio are the three Provoſts of the Savi. The Archons
or Princes of Athens being nine, had a kind of Soverain Inſpection
upon all the Orders of the Commonwealth; fo has the Signory of
Venice, confifting of nine befides the Duke. The Quarancys in Venice
are Judicatorys of the nature of the Helica in Athens; and as the
Thefmotheta heard and introduc'd the cauſes into that Judicatory, ſo do
the Avogadori and the Auditori into theſe. The Configlio de' Dieci in
Venice is not of the Body, but an Appendix of the Commonwealth
fo was the Court of the Ephori in Lacedemon: and as theſe had power
to put a King, a Magiſtrat, or any Delinquent of what degree foever
to death, fo has the Configlio de' Dieci. This again is wrought up
with the Capi de' Dieci, and the weekly Provoft, as were the Prytans
with the Proedri, and the weekly Epiftata; and the Ballot is lineally
defcended from the Bean: yet is Venice in the whole, and in every part,
a far more exquifit Policy than either Athens or Lacedemon.
;
A POLITICAL is like a natural Body. Commonwealths re-
femble and differ, as Men refemble and differ; among whom you fhall
not fee two Faces, or two Difpofitions, that are alike. PETER and
THOMAS in all their parts are equally Men, and yet PETER and
THOMAS of all Men may be the moſt unlike; one may have his
greater ftrength in his Arms, the other in his Legs; one his greater
Beauty in his Soul, the other in his Body; one may be a fool, the
other wife; one valiant, the other cowardly. Theſe two, which
at a diſtance you will not know one from the other, when you look
nearer, or com to be better acquainted with, you will never miſtake.
Our Confiderer (who in his Epiſtle would make you believe that
Oceana is but a mere Tranfcription out of Venice) has Companions
like himſelf; and how near they look into matters of this nature
is plain, while one knows not JETHRO from MOSES, and the
S f
other
314
The Prerogative
Book I. other takes a ſtate of Civil War to be the beſt model of a Civil Go-
→ vernment.
LET a Man look near, and he fhall not find any one Order in
Oceana (the Ballot only excepted) that has not as much difference
from, or reſemblance to any one Order in Rome or Venice, as any one
Order in Rome or Venice has from, or to any one Order in Athens or
Lacedemon: Which different temper of the parts muft of neceffity in
the whole yield a Reſult, a Soul or Genius, altogether new in the
World, as imbracing both the Arms of Rome, and the Counfils of
Venice; and yet neither obnoxious to the Turbulency of the one, nor
the Narrownefs of the other.
BUT the fum of what has bin faid of Venice, as to the buſineſs in
hand, coms to no more than that the Senat and the Magiftracy of this
Commonwealth are upon Rotation. No more: nay I am well if it
coms to ſo much. For the Prevaricator catching me up, where I fay,
that for all this the greater Magiftracys in Venice are continually
Confid. p.93. wheel'd thro a few hands, tells me, that I have confeft it to be otherwife.
I have indeed confeft, that tho the Magiftracys are all confer'd for
certain terms, yet thoſe terms do not neceffitat Vacations; that is, the
term of a Magiſtracy being expir'd, the Party that bore it is capable
upon a new Election of bearing it again without interval or vacation:
which does not altogether fruſtrat the Rotation of the Commonwealth,
tho it renders the fame very imperfect. This infirmity of Venice
derives from a complication of Cauſes, none of which is incident to
a Commonwealth confifting of the Many wherfore there lys no
obligation upon me to diſcover the reafon in this place. But on the
contrary, ſeeing, let me fhew things never fo new, they are flighted
as old, I have an obligation in this place, to try whether I may get
eſteem by concealing fomething. What is ſaid, every body knew.be-
fore; this is not faid, who knows it?
A Riddle.
RIDDLE me, Riddle me, what is this? The Magiftracys in Venice
(except fuch as are rather of Ornament than of Power) are all annual, or
at most biennial. No man whofe term is expir'd, can hold his Magiftracy
longer, but by a new Election. The Elections are most of them made in
the Great Council, and all by the Ballot, which is the moſt equal and im-
partial way of Suffrage. And yet the greater Magistracys are perpe-
tually wheel'd thro a few hands.
IF I be worthy to give advice to a man that would ſtudy the Po-
litics, let him underſtand Venice; he that underſtands Venice right,
fhall go neareſt to judg (notwithſtanding the difference that is in eve-
ry Policy) right of any Government in the World. Now the affault
of the Confiderer deriving but from fom Pique or Emulation which of
us fhould be the abler Politician, if the Council of State had the cu-
rioſity to know either that, or who underſtands Venice, this Riddle
would make the diſcovery; for he that cannot eaſily unfold this Rid-
dle, dos not underſtand her.
THE fixth kind of Rotation is when a Commonwealth gos upon
it in all her Orders, Senat, People, and Magiftracy. Such a one
taking in the Many, and being fix'd upon the foot of a ſteady Agra-
rian, has attain'd to perfect Equality. But of this an example there is
none, or you must accept of Oceana.
3
THE
of Popular Government.
315
THE Rotation of Oceana is of two parts, the one of the Electors Chap. 12.
which is annual, and the other of the Elected which is triennial.
Rotation of
SPEAKING of Electors in this fenfe, I mean as the great Oceana.
Council in Venice are Electors of all other Orders, Councils or Magi-
ftrats, But the Commonwealth of Oceana taking in the whole People,
cannot, as dos the Great Council of Venice (wherin they that have
right are but a few) attain to this capacity at one ftep: for which
cauſe ſhe takes three fteps; one at the Parishes, where every fifth
Elder is annually elected by the whole People. There is no doubt but
there was fom fuch Order in Ifrael wherby the monthly Rotation of
her Congregation or Prerogative, by election of two thouſand in each
Tribe, was preferv'd. The next ſtep ſhe takes is at the Hundred,
where by election of Officers and Magiftrats, the Troops chofen at
the Pariſhes, are very near form'd. Her third ftep is at the Tribe,
where the whole Body of her Deputys are in an exact Form, Diſciplin
and Function, headed by proper Officers and Magiftrats, theſe all to-
gether confifting of one fifth part of the whole People. This Rotation
being in itſelf annual, coms in regard of the body of the People
to be quinquennial, or fuch as in the ſpace of five years give every man
his turn in the power of Election.
BUT tho every man be fo capable of being an Elector, that he
muſt have his turn; yet every man is not ſo capable of being elected
into thoſe Magiſtracys that are Soverain, or have the leading of the
whole Commonwealth, that it can be fafe to lay a neceflity that eve-
ry man muſt take his turn in theſe alſo; but it is enough that every
man, who in the Judgment and Confcience of his Country is fit, may
take his turn. Wherfore upon the Confcience of the Electors, fo
conftituted as has bin fhewn, it gos to determin who fhall partake of
Soverain Magiftracy, or be at the Affembly of a Tribe elected into the
Senat or Prerogative; which Aſſemblys are fo triennial, that one third
part of each falling every year, and another being elected, the Parla-
ment is therby perpetuated.
SUCH was the Conftitution of thoſe Councils which the Prevarica-
tor has confeſt he always thought admirable, but now the toy takes him
to be quite of another mind; for, fays he, That antient Republics have Confid. p.9ɔ.
thro a malicious Jealousy (let them take it among them) made it un-
lawful even for Perfons of the clearest merit to continue long in command,
but have by perpetual viciffitude fubftituted new men in the Government,
is manifeft enough; but with what fuccefs they did this, will beft appear
by VETURIUS, VARRO, and MANCINUS. He is ftill admirable:
Óne would wonder what he means; if it be that there were but
three weak or unfortunat Generals in the whole Courſe of Rome, how
ftrange is it to urge this as an Argument againſt Rotation, which is as
ſtrong a one as can be urg'd for Rotation? If the Romans by this way
of Election having experience of an able General, knew ever after
where to have him; or lighting upon one they found not fo fit for
their purpoſe, could in the compafs of one year be rid of him of
courſe, without diſhonor or reproach to him, taking therby a warn-
ing to come no more there; was this a proceeding to favor malice? or
fuch a one as, removing the cauſe of malice, left no root for fuch a
branch or poffibility of like effect? Certainly by this affertion the
Prevaricator has jolted his prefumptuous Head not only againſt the
prudence of antient Commonwealths, but of God himſelf in that of
Sf 2
Ifrael.
316
The Prerogative
Liv. 1. 9.
1
Book I. Ifrael. VETURIUS, VARRO, and MANCINUS (tho fom of them
cannot be at all points excus'd) by this mark upon them, may be
thought hardlier of than is needful; for which cauſe there being that
alfo in their Storys, which is neither unpleaſant nor unprofitable, I
ſhall indeavor to make the Reader fomwhat better acquainted with
them. One of the greateſt blows Rome ever receiv'd was by
PONTIUS, Captain General of the Samnits, who having drawn
her Confuls, POSTHUMIUS and VETURIUS, by Stratagem into
the Straits of Caudium, a Vally of narrow entrance, and fhut up
the mouth of it by poffeffing himſelf of the only paffage, the reſt
being inviron'd with infuperable Rocks, the Samnit came to have both
the Armys, and fo upon the matter the whole ftrength (in thoſe days)
of Rome inevitably at his diſcretion. Hereupon, having leiſure, and
being defirous (in a matter of fuch moment) of good advice, he diſ-
patch'd a Meffenger to his Father HERENNIUS, the ableft Coun-
fillor in Samnium, to know what might be his beſt courſe with the
Romans now inavoidably at his mercy, who anfwer'd, that he ſhould
open the Pafs and let them return untouch'd. The young General amaz'd
at this Counfil, defir'd farther direction: wherupon HERENNIUS for
the ſecond time made anfwer, that he should cut them off to a man.
But the General, upon the ſtrange difagreement of fuch opinions,
having his Father's Age (for he was very old) in fufpicion, took a
third courſe, which neither (according to the firft advice of wife
HERENNIUS) making Friends, nor, according to the fecond, de-
ftroying Enemys, became as he prophefy'd the utter Ruin of the Com-
monwealth of Samnium. For the Romans being diſmiſt ſafe, but ig-
nominiouſly, the Senat upon their return fell into the greateſt ſtrait
and confternation that had bin known among them. On the one fide,
to live and not revenge fuch an affront was intolerable; on the other,
to revenge it was againſt the Faith of the Confuls, whofe neceffity
(the loſs of two Armys depending upon it) had in truth forc'd them to
accept of a diſhonorable League with the Samnits. Now not the
Armys, but the Senat it felf was in Caudium, not a man of them
could find the way out of this Vale inviron'd with Rocks, but he
only that could not find it out of the other; POSTHUMIUS, who
having firſt ſhew'd, that neither War nor Peace could be fo made, as
to ingage the Commonwealth (injuffu Populi) without the Com-
mand of the People, declar'd that the Senat returning the Confuls,
with fuch others as had confented to fo wicked and diſhonorable a
Peace, naked, and bound to the Samnits; were free: nor ceas'd he till
the Senat (therto preft by the neceffity of the Commonwealth) re-
folving accordingly, He, VETURIUS, and fom of the Tribuns were
deliver'd to the Samnits; who, nevertheleſs, to hold the Romans to
their League, diſmiſt them with fafety. The Difputes on either
fide that aroſe hereupon, and, coming to Arms, ended with the de-
ſtruction of Samnium, I omit. That which as to the preſent occafion
is material, is the Reputation of the Confuls; and VETURIUS,
tho he were not the leading man, being for the reſt as deep in the
Action as PosTHUMIUS, the People were fo far from thinking
themſelves deceiv'd in this choice, that the Confuls were more honour'd
in Rome for having loft, than PONTIUS in Samnium for having won
the day at Caudium.
I
:
of Popular Government.
317
!
I DO not rob Graves, nor fteal Windingfheets; my Controver- Chap. 12.
fys are not but with the Living, with none of theſe that have not
fhew'd themſelves beft able for their own defence; nor yet with fuch,
but in the proſecution of Truths oppos'd by them to the damage of
Mankind yet the Prevaricator accufes me of rude charges. What
are his then in defence of Falfhood, and againſt ſuch as cannot bite ?
or whether of theſe is the more noble?
FOR VARRO, who being Conful of Rome, loft the Battel of
Canna to HANNIBAL, Captain General for the Carthaginians, tho
without Cowardice, yet by Rafhnefs, he is not fo excufable.
BUT for MANCINUS, brought (as was POSTHUMIUS by the Florus, 1. 2.
Samnits) to difhonorable conditions by MEGERA, Captain General c. 18.
of the Numantins, there be excufes: As firft, the Numantins, for
their number not exceeding four thousand fighting men, were the
gallanteft of fo many, on which the Sun ever fhone.
FOURTEEN years had their Commonwealth held tack with
the Romans, in Courage, Conduct, and Virtue, having worfted Poм-
PEY the Great, and made a League with him, when the might have
made an end of him, e'er ever MANCINUS (of whom CICERO gives
a fair Character) came in play: So his Misfortunes, having great ex-
amples, cannot want fom excufe. But fuppofe none of them deferv'd
any excufe, what is it at which thefe examples drive? againſt a Com-
monwealth? Sure the Samnits, the Carthaginians, the Numantins
were as well Commonwealths as the Romans; and fo wherever the
advantage gos, it muſt ſtay upon a Commonwealth: or if it be Ro-
tation that he would be at (for we muſt gueſs) granting PONTIUS
the Samnit, and MEGERA the Numantin, to have bin no more up-
on Rotation, than HANNIBAL the Carthaginian; yet it is plain
that Rome upon her Rotation overcame not only PONTIUS, HAN-
NIBAL and MEGERA, but Samnium, Carthage, and Numantia. So
much for Rome; but, fays he, No lefs appears by the Rabble of Ge- Confid. p. 91.
nerals often made use of by the Athenians, while Men of Valor and Con-
duct have lain by the walls.
A RABBLE of Generals did I never hear of before; but not to
meddle with his Rhetoric, wheras each of his Objections has at leaſt
fom one Contradiction in it, this has two (one à priori, another à
pofteriori) one in the fnout, another in the tail of it. For had there
bin formerly no Rotation in Athens, how ſhould there have bin
men of Valor and Conduct to ly by the Walls? And if Rotation thence-
forth ſhould have ceas'd, how could thofe men of Valor and Conduct have
don otherwiſe than ly by the Walls? So this inavoidably confeffes, that
Rotation was the means wherby Athens came to be ftor'd with Perfons
of Valor and Conduct, they to be capable of Imployment, and the
Commonwealth to imploy the whole Virtue of her Citizens: And it
being, in his own words, an Argument of much imperfection in a Go-
vernment not to dare to employ the whole Virtue of the Citizens, this
wholly routs a ſtanding General; for the Government that dares im-
ploy but the Virtue of one, dares not imploy the Virtue of all. Yet
he jogs one.
THOSE Orders muſt needs be against Nature, which excluding Per- Confid. p. 91.
fons of the best Qualifications, give admiffion to others, who have nothing
to commend them but their Art in canvaffing for the fuffrage of the People.
He never takes notice that the Ballot bars Canvaffing beyond all poffi-
bility
318
The Prerogative
Book I. bility of any fuch thing; but we will let that go. Canvaffing, it is
confeft, was more frequent in Rome and Athens than is laudable,
where nevertheleſs it is the ſtronger Argument for the integrity of po-
pular Suffrage, which, being free from any aid of Art, produc'd in
thofe Commonwealths more illuftrious examples (if a man gos no
further than PLUTARCH'S Lives) than are to be found in all the reſt
of Story.
Confid. p. 91.
Mach. Dif-
YET, fays he, this Law has bin as often broken as a Commonwealth
has bin brought into any exigence; for the hazard of trusting Affairs in
weak hands then appearing, no fcruple has been made to trample upon this
Order, for giving the Power to fome able man at that time render'd incapa-
ble by the Vacation this Law requires. The continuation of the Conful-
Ship of MARIUS is fufficient to be alleg'd for the proof of this, tho' if
occafion were, it might be back'd by plenty of examples. His choice con-
futes his pretended variety, who jefts with edg'd tools: this example
above all will cut his fingers; for by this prolongation of Magiftracy,
or, to fpeak more properly, of Empire (for the Magiftracy of the
Conful was Civil, and confer'd by the People Centuriatis Comitiis, but
his Empire was Military, and confer'd Curiatis) Rome began to drive
thoſe wheels of her Rotation heavily in MARIUS, which were quite
taken off in CÆSAR.
I HAVE heretofore in vain perfuaded them upon this occafion,
to take notice of a Chapter in MACHIAVEL, fo worthy of regard,
that I have now inferted it at length, as follows:
THE Procedings of the Roman Commonwealth being well confider'd,
cor.B 3.c.24. two things will be found to have bin the causes of her diffolution. The
Contention that happen'd thro the indeavor of the People (always oppos'd
or eluded by the Nobility) to introduce an Agrarian, and the damage that
accru'd from the prolongation of Empire, which Mischiefs, had they bin
forefeen in due time, the Government by application of fit Remedys might
have bin of longer life and better health. The Difeafes which this Com-
monwealth, from contention about the Agrarian, contracted, were acute and
tumultuous; but those being flower and without tumult which ſhe got by
promulgation of Empire, were Chronical, and went home with her, giving
a warning by her example, how dangerous it is to States that would injoy
their Liberty, to fuffer Magiftracy (how defervedly foever confer'd) to
remain long in the poffeffion of the fame Man. Certainly if the rest of the
Romans, whofe Empire happen'd to be prolong'd, had bin as virtuous
and provident as LUCIUS QUINTIUS, they had never run into this
inconvenience. Of fuch wholfom example was the goodneſs of this man,
that the Senat and the People, after one of their ordinary Difputes being
com to fom accord, wheras the People had prolong'd the Magiftracy of their
preſent Tribuns, in regard they were Perfons more fitly oppos'd to the Am-
bition of the Nobility, than by a new Election they could readily have
found; when hereupon the Senat (to fhew they needed not be worfe at this
game) would have prolong'd the Confulat to QUINTIUS, he refus'd his
confent, faying, that ill examples were to be corrected by good ones, and
not incourag'd by others like themſelves; nor could they ftir his Refolution,
by which means they were neceffiated to make new Confuls. Had this Wif-
dom and Virtue, Ifay, bin duly regarded, or rightly understood, it might
have fav'd Rome, which thro this neglect came to ruin. The first whofe
Empire happen'd to be prolong'd was PUBLILIUS PHILO, his Confu-
lat expiring at the Camp before Palapolis, while it feem'd to the Senat that
be
of Popular Government.
319
he had the Victory in his hand (actum cum Tribunis Plebis eft, ad Popu- Chap. 12.
lum ferrent ut cum Philo Confulatu abiiffet, Proconful rem gereret)
they fent him no Succeffor, but prolong'd his Empire, by which means he Liv. 1. 8.
came to the first Proconful. An Expedient (tho introduc'd for the pub-
lic good) that came in time to be the public bane: For by how much the
Roman Armys march'd further off, by fo much the like courſe ſeeming to
be the more neceſſary, became the more customary; whence infu'd two per-
nicious confequences: The one, that there being fewer Generals, and Men
of known Ability for Conduct, the Art with the reputation of the fame
came to be more ingroft, and obnoxious to Ambition: the other, that a Ge-
neral flanding long, got fuch hold upon his Army, as could take them off from
the Senat, and hang them on himself. Thus MARIUS and SYLLA could
be follow'd by the Soldiery to the detriment of the Commonwealth, and
CESAR to her perdition. Wheras had Rome never prolong'd Empire,
She might perhaps not fo foon have arriv'd at Greatness or Acquifition,
but would have made less hafte to deftruction.
ALL the Dilemma that MACHIAVEL´obſerves in theſe words, is,
that if a Commonwealth will not be fo flow in her acquifition as is
requir'd by Rotation, ſhe will be leſs fure than is requifit to her pre-
fervation. But the Prevaricator (not vouchfafing to fhew us upon
what reaſons or experience he grounds this Maxim) is pofitive, That Confid. p. 92.
the Dilemma into which a Commonwealth is in this cafe brought, is very
dangerous; for either she must give her felf a mortal blow by gaining the
habit of infringing fuch Orders as are neceſſary for her preſervation, or
receive one from without.
THIS fame is another Parakeetifm: theſe words are ſpoken by
me, after MACHIAVEL, in relation to Dictatorian Power, in which
they are ſo far from concluding againſt Rotation, that this in caſe
of a Dictator is more eſpecially neceffary (maxima libertatis cuftodia Mamercus a-
eft, ut magna imperia diuturna non fint, & temporis modus imponatur,
pud Liv. 1. 4.
quibus juris imponi non poteft) which could not be more confirm'd
than by him, who in the example of MARIUS fhews that the con-
trary courſe ſpoil'd all.
THE Romans, if they had fent a Succeffor to PUBLIUS PHILO
at Palapolis, it may be might have let the Victory flip out of his
hands, it may be not; however this had bin no greater wound to
the Commonwealth, than that her Acquifition would have bin flower,
which ought not to com in competition with the ſafety of a Go-
vernment, and therfore amounts not to a Dilemma, this being a
kind of Argument that ſhould not be ſtub'd of one horn, but have
each of equal length and danger. Nor is it fo certain that increaſe
is flower for Rotation, feeing neither was this interrupted by that,
nor that by this, as the greateſt Actions of Rome, the Conqueft
of Carthage by SCIPIO AFRICANUS, of Macedon by FLAMI-
NIUS, and of ANTIOCHUS by ASIATICUS, are irrefragable Tefti-
monys.
I WOULD be loth to fpoil the Confiderer's preferment; but he
is not a fafe Counfillor for a Prince, whofe Providence not fupplying
the defect of Rotation, whether in civil or military affairs, with fom-
thing of like nature, expofes himſelf if not his Empire as much to
danger as a Commonwealth. Thus the Sons of ZERVIAH, JOAB 2 Sam. 3. 39.
Captain of the Hoft, and ABISHAI his Brother, were too ftrong
for
320
The Prerogative
Book I. for DAVID; thus the Kings of Ifrael and of Juda fell most of them
by their Captains or Favorits, as I have elſewhere obferv'd more par-
ticularly. Thus BRUTUS being ftanding Captain of the Guards,
could caft out TARQUIN; thus SEJANUS had means to attemt a-
gainſt TIBERIUS; OTHо to be the Rival of GALBA, CASPERIUS
ELIANUS of NERVA, CASSIUS of ANTONINUS, PERENNIS of
COMMODUS, MAXIMINUS of ALEXANDER, PHILIPPUS of GOR-
DIAN, EMILIANUS of GALLUS; INGEBUS LOLLIANUS, AUREO-
LUS, of GALLIENUS; MAGNESIUS of CONSTANTIUS, MAXIMUS
of GRATIAN, ARBOGASTES of VALENTINIAN, RUFFINUS of AR-
CADIUS, STILICO of HONORIUS. Go from the Weft into the Eaft:
upon the death of MARCIANUS, ASPARIS alone, having the com-
mand of the Arms, could prefer LEO to the Empire; PHOCAS de-
prive MAURITIUS of the fame; HERACLIUS depofe PHOCAS ; LEO
ISAURIUS do as much to THEODOSIUS ADR AMYTTENUS; NICE-
PHORUS to IRENE, LEO ARMENIUS to MICHAEL CUROPALATES,
ROMANUS LAGAPENUS to CONSTANTIN, NICEPHORUS PHOCAS
to ROMANUS PUER, JOHANNES ZISMISCES to NICEPHORUS PHO-
CAS, ISAAC COMNENUS to MICHAEL STRATIOTICUS, BOтo-
Вото-
NIATES to MICHAEL the Son of DUCAS, ALEXIUS COMNENUS
to BOTONIATES: which work continu'd in fuch manner till the de-
ſtruction of that Empire. Go from the Eaſt to the North: GUSTA-
vus attain❜d to the Kingdom of Sweden, by his Power and Command
of an Army; and thus SE CECHUS came near to fupplant BOLESLAUS
the Third of Poland. If WALLESTEIN had liv'd, what had becom
of his Mafter? In France the Race of PHARAMOND was extinguifh'd
by PIPIN; and that of PIPIN in like manner, each by the Major of
the Palace, a ſtanding Magiftracy of exorbitant Truft. Go to the
Indys: You fhall find a King of Pegu to have bin thruſt out of the
Realm of Tangu by his Captain General. Nay go where you will,
tho this be pretty well, you fhall add more than one example. But
as to the Prevaricator, if he was not given to make fuch mouths, as
eat up nothing elſe but his own words, I needed not have brought
any other Teſtimony to abfolve a Commonwealth of Malice in this
Confid. p. 47, order than his own, where he ſays, That when fom Perfon overtops the
48. rest in Commands, it is a Difeafe of Monarchy which eafily admits of
this cure, that he be reduc'd to a lefs Volum, and level'd to an equality
with the rest of his Order. Now a Prince can no otherwiſe level a
Nobleman, that excels the reſt thro Command, to equality with his
Order, than by cauſing thoſe of the fame Order to take their turns in
Confid. p. 93. like Command. Good Wits have ill Memorys. But, fays he, I know
not what advantage Mr. HARRINGTON may forefee from the Orders of
this Rotation, for my part I can difcover no other effect of it than this,
that in a Commonwealth like that of Oceana, taking in the Many (for
in Venice he confefes it to be otherwife) where every man will prefs for-
ward towards Magiftracy, this Law by taking off at the end of one year
fom Officers, and all at the end of three, will keep the Republic in a per-
petual Minority
Minority: No man having time allow'd him to gain that Ex-
perience, which may ferve to lead the Commonwealth to the underſtanding
of her true Intereft either at home or abroad.
WHAT I have confeft to be otherwiſe in Venice, I have ſhewn
already at leaſt ſo far as concerns the preſent occafion, the cauſes of
that
}
1
of Popular Government.
321
that defect being incompatible with a Commonwealth confifting of Chap. 12°
the Many; otherwiſe why was not the like found in Athens or Rome?
where tho every man preft forward towards Magiftracy, yet the Ma-
giftrats were, for illuftrious examples, more in weight and number
than are to be found in all the reft of the world.
IF where Elections were the moſt expos'd to the Ambition of the
Competitor, and the humors of the People, they yet fail'd not to ex-
cel all others that were not popular, what greater Vindication can
there be of the natural integrity of popular Suffrage even at the worſt?
But this, where it is given by the Ballot, is at the beſt, and free from
all that preffing for Magiftracy in the Competitor, or Faction of the
People that can any ways be laid to the former: or let the Confiderer
confider again, and tell me by what means either of theſe in ſuch a
State can be dangerous or troublefom; or if at worst the Orders for
Election in Oceana muft not perform that part, better than a Croud
and a Sherif. Well; but putting the cafe the Elections which were
not quarrel'd much withal be rightly ſtated, yet this Law for Terms
and Vacations, by taking off at the end of one year fom Officers, and all
at the end of three, will keep the Republic in perpetual Minority, no
man having time allow'd him to gain that Experience, which may ferve
to lead the Commonwealth to the understanding of her true Intereft at home
or abroad. Becauſe every man will prefs forward for Magiftracy,
therfore there ought not to be Terms and Vacations, left theſe ſhould
keep the Commonwealth in perpetual Minority. I would once fee an
Argument that might be reduc'd to Mode and Figure. The next
Objection is, that theſe Orders take off at the end of one year fome Officers,
which is true, and that at the end of three years they take off all,
which is falfe; for wheras the Leaders of the Commonwealth are
all triennial, the Orders every year take off no more than fuch only
as have finiſh'd their three years term, which is not all, but a third
part. Wherfore let him fpeak out; three years is too ſhort a term
for acquiring that knowlege which is neceffary to the leading of a
Commonwealth. To let the courfes of Ifrael which were monthly,
and the annual Magiftracys of Athens and Rome go; if three years be
too ſhort a term for this purpoſe, what was three months? A Parla-
ment in the late Government was rarely longer liv'd than three
months, nor more frequent than once in a year; fo that a man having
bin twelve years a Parlament-man in England, could not have born
his Magiftracy above three years, tho he were not neceffarily fub-
ject to any Vacation. Wheras a Parlament in Oceana may in twelve
years have born his Magiftracy fix, notwithſtanding the neceffity of his
Vacations. Now which of theſe two are moſt ſtraiten'd in the time
neceffary to the gaining of due experience or knowlege for the leading
of a Commonwealth? Nevertheleſs the Parlament of England was
feldom or never without men of fufficient Skill and Ability; tho the
Orders there were more in number, lefs in method, not written, and
of greater difficulty than they be in Oceana. There, if not the Parla-
ment man, the Parlament itſelf was upon Terms and Vacations, which
to a Council of fuch a nature is the most dangerous thing in the
world, feeing Diffolution, whether to a body natural or political, is
Death. For if Parlaments happen'd to riſe again and again, this was
not ſo much coming to themſelves (feeing a Council of fo different
Genius
T t
322
The Prerogative
Book I. Genius has not bin known) as a new Birth; and a Council that is
every year new born indeed muſt keep a Commonwealth in perpetual
Minority, or rather infancy, always in danger of being overlaid by
her Nurſe, or ſtrangl'd by her Guardian: wheras an Affembly con-
tinu'd by Succeffion, or due Rotation regulated by Terms, giving
fufficient time for digeftion, grows up, and is like a man, who tho
he changes his Fleſh, neither changes his Body nor his Soul. Thus
the Senat of Venice changing Fleſh, tho not ſo often as in a Common-
wealth confifting of the Many were requifit, yet ofteneſt of
any other
in the world, is, both in Body and Soul, or Genius, the moft unchange-
able Council under Heaven. Fleſh muſt be chang'd, or it will ſtink
of it ſelf; there is a Term neceffary to make a man able to lead the
Commonwealth to her Intereft, and there is a Term that may inable
a man to lead the Commonwealth to his Intereft. In this regard it is,
that, according to MAMERCUS, the Vacations are (maxima liber-
tatis cuftodia) the Keepers of the Libertys of Oceana.
THE three Regions into which each of the leading Councils is
divided, are three Forms, as I may fay, in the School of State: for
them of the third, tho there be care in the choice, it is no fuch great
matter what be their fkill; the Ballot which they practis'd in the
Tribe being that in the performance wherof no man can be out: and
this is all that is neceffary to their Novitiat or firſt year, during which
time they may be Auditors. By the fecond, they will have feen all
the Scenes, or the whole Rotation of the Orders, fo facil, and ſo in-
telligible, that at one reading a man underſtands them as a Book, but
at once acting as a Play; and fo methodical, that he will remember
them better. Tell me then what it is that can hinder him for the fe-
cond year from being a Speaker; or why for the third, ſhould he not
be a very able Leader.
THÉ Senat and the Prerogative, or Reprefentative of the People,
being each of like conftitution, drop annually four hundred, which in
a matter of ten years amount to four thouſand experienc'd Leaders,
ready upon new Elections to refume their leading.
ANOTHER thing which I would have confider'd is, whether
our moſt eminent men found their Parts in Parlament, or brought
them thither. For if they brought them, think you not the military
Orders of the Youth, the Diſciplin of the Tribes, the eight years
Orbs of the Embaffadors, the provincial Armys of Oceana, likely to
breed men of as good Parts, as to fuch matters? Nor have Aftrono-
mers that familiarity with the Stars, which men without thefe Orbs
will have with fuch as are in them. He is very dull, who cannot per-
ceive that in a Government of this frame the Education must be uni-
verſal, or diffus'd throout the whole Body. Another thing which is
as certain as comfortable, is, that the pretended depth and difficulty in
matters of State is a mere cheat. From the beginning of the World
to this day, you never found a Commonwealth where the Leaders
having honefty enough, wanted ſkill enough to lead her to her true
Intereſt at home or abroad: that which is neceffary to this end, is not
fo much Skill as Honefty; and let the Leaders of Oceana be difhoneſt
if they can. In the leading of a Commonwealth aright, this is cer-
tain, Wiſdom and Honefty are all one: and tho you fhall find de-
fects in their Virtue, thoſe that have had the feweſt, have ever bin
and for ever ſhall be, the wifeſt,
ROME
of Popular Government.
323
ROME was never ruin'd, till her Balance being broken, the Nobility Chap. 12.
forfaking their antient Virtue, abandon'd themſelves to their Lufts;
and the Senators, who, as in the cafe of JUGURTHA, were all brib'd,
turn'd Knaves; at which Turn all their Skill in Government (and in
this never men had bin better ſkill'd) could not keep the Common-
wealth from overturning. CICERO, an honeft man, labor'd might
and main; POMPONIUS ATTICUs, another, deſpair'd; CATO tore
out his own Bowels; the Poignards of BRUTUS and CASSIUS nei-
ther confider'd Prince nor Father: But the Commonwealth had fprung
her Planks, and fpilt her Ballaft; the world could not fave her.
FOR the clofe, the Prevaricator, who had judg'd before, that
there was much reaſon to expect fom of the Clergy (against all of whom
Mr. HARRINGTON has declar'd War) would undertake the Quarrel,
tells me in the laſt line, that there be to whom he has recommended the
Difquifition of the Jewish Commonwealth.
IT is a miferable thing to be condemn'd to the perpetual Budget;
once turn an honeft man to me. In the mean time, that it may be fur-
ther feen, how much I am delighted in fair play, fince fome Divines,
it may be, are already at work with me, and I have not fo fully
explain'd my felf upon that Point, which with them is of the greateſt
concernment, that they can yet fay, they have peep'd into my hand,
or feen my game; as I have won this trick, Gentlemen, or ſpeak, fo
I play them out the laft Card in the next Book for Up.
Confid. p. 36.
P. 94.
An Advertisment to the Reader, or a Direction
contain❜d in certain Querys, how the Common-
wealth of Oceana may be examin❜d or anſwer'd
by divers forts of men, without fpoiling their
high Dance, or cutting off any part of their
Elegance, or freenefs of Expreffion.
Ï.
To the Scholar that has paſs'd his Novitiat in Story.
W
1
HETHER the Balance of Property in Land coming thro
Civil Viciffitude by flow and undifcern'd degrees, to alter as
it did, and to ftand as it dos in Oceana, any other Government could
have bin introduc'd, otherwife than by the interpofition of foren Arms,
that could have fubfifted naturally without Violence or Reluctancy, or
fteddily without frequent Changes, Alterations, and Plunges, except
that only of the Commonwealth propos'd?
II. WHETHER the Balance in Land fo ftanding, as has bin fhewn,
the Commonwealth propos'd, being once establish'd, were without the
immediat hand of God, as by Peftilence, Famin, or Inundation,
to be alter'd or broken; and which way?
Tt 2
To
324
I.
W
To the Godly Man.
HETHER Human Prudence be not a Creature of God, and
to what end God made this Creature?
II. WHETHER the Commonwealth of Ifrael in her main Orders, that
is to fay, the Senat, the People, and the Magiftracy, was not erected by
the fame Rules of human Prudence with other Commonwealths?
III. WHETHER JETHRO were not a Heathen?
IV. WHETHER God did not approve of the Advice of JETHRO,
in the Fabric of the Commonwealth of Ifrael?
V. WHETHER the natural Body of a Godly Man can any otherwiſe
be ſaid to ſupport and nourish it felf in the Air, or between Heaven
and Earth, than by a figurative Speech? or whether it be
foffible for the Political Body of a People fo to do, than for the natural
Body of a Godly Man?
I.
any more
To the Grandee, or Learned Commonwealthfman.
W
HETHER a noble Housekeeper has a Horfekeeper, that is as
well to live as himself; and whether the Housekeeper, fhould be
lofe his Eftate, would not be a Horfekeeper rather than want Bread?
II. WHETHER Riches and Poverty, more or less, do not introduce
Command or Obedience, more or less, as well in a public as in a pri-
vat Eftate?
III. WHETHER the Introduction of Command or Obedience, more or
lefs, either in a public or private Eſtate, dos not form or change the
Genius of a Man, or of a People accordingly? Or what is the reafon
why the Peaſant of France is bafe, and the lower People in England
of a bigh Courage?
IV. WHETHER the Genius of the People of Oceana, bas bin of late
years, or be devoted or addicted to the Nobility and Clergy as in for-
mer times?
V. WHETHER the Genius of the People of Oceana, not being ad-
dicted to the Nobility and Clergy as fornerly, can be faid to be for
Monarchy, or against it?
VI. WHETHER the People be not frequently miſtaken in Names,
while as to Things they mean otherwise; or whether the People of O-
ceana defiring Monarchy in Name, do not in Truth defire à Govern-
ment of Laws, and not of Men?
VII. WHETHER for theſe Reaſons, not to know how to hold the Ba-
lance or Foundation of a Government fteddy, nor yet to reform, or vary
the Orders of the fame (as the Foundation coms to vary) be not to de-
liver a Nation to certain Ruin and Destruction?
I.
1.W
To the Rational Man.
HETHER there be any thing in this Fabric or Model that
is contradictory to itſelf, to Reafon, or to Truth?
II. WHETHER a Commonwealth that is fram'd intire or complete
in all her neceffary Orders, without any manner of contradiction to
her felf, to Reaſon, or to Truth, can yet be falſe or infufficient?
THE
•
:
1
THE
SECOND BOOK;
OR, A
Political Difcourfe
CONCERNING
ORDINATION:
Againſt
Dr. H. HAMMOND,
Dr. L. SE AMAN,
And the Authors they follow.
ร
Optat Aprum aut fulvum defcendere monte Leonem.
E. W.
Advertisment to the READER.
B
00 KS, efpecially whofe Authors have got themselves
Names, are Leaders; wherfore in cafe any of thefe err
in Leading, it is not only lawful, but matter of Confcience
to a man that perceives it, as far as he is able, to warn o-
thers. This were Apology enough for my writing against
Dr. HAMMOND and Dr. SEAMAN; and yet I have happen'd
to be brought under a farther Obligation to this enterprife,
their Books have bin fent me by way of Objection against
what I have formerly faid of Ordination, and am daily
more and more confirm'd I shall make good. However, there
can be no great hurt in this Eſſay, Truth being, like Venison,
not only the best Quarry, but the best Game.
T
Order of the Diſcourſe.
manage the preſent Controverfy with the more Clearnefs, I
have divided my difcourfe into five Parts or Chapters.
THE Firft, explaining the words Chirotonia and Chirothefia, para-
phraftically relates the Story of the Perambulation made by the Apofles
PAUL and BARNABAS thro the Citys of Lycaonia, Pifidia, &c. by
way of Introduction.
THE Second fhews thofe Citys, or most of them, at the time of this Per-
ambulation, to have bin under popular Government. In which is contain'd
the whole Administration of a Roman Province.
THE Third fhews the Deduction of the Chirotonia from Popular Go-
vernment, and of the Original Right of Ordination from the Chirotonia.
In which is contain' d the Inftitution of the Sanhedrim or Senat of Ifrael by
MOSES, and of that at Rome by ROMULUS.
THE Fourth fhews the Deduction of the Chirothefia from Monarchi-
cal or Ariftocratical Government, and the fecond way of Ordination from
the Chirothefia. In which is contain'd the Commonwealth of the Jews as
it flood after the Captivity.
THE Fifth debates whether the Chirotonia, us'd in the Citys mention'd,
was (as is pretended by Dr. HAMMOND, Dr. SEAMAN, and the Au-
thors they follow) the fame with the Chirothefia, or a far different thing.
In which are contain'd the divers kinds of Churcb-Government introduc'd
and exercis'd in the age of the Apostles.
I AM entring into a Difcourfe to run much, for the Words, upon a
Language not vulgar, which therfore I fhall ufe no otherwife than by
way of Parenthefis, not obſtructing the Senſe; and for the Things, upon
Cuſtoms that are foren, which therfore I ſhall interpret as well as I can.
Now fo to make my way into the parts of this difcourfe, that (wheras
they who have hitherto manag'd it in English, might in regard of
their Readers have near as well written it in Greec) I may not be above
the vulgar capacity, I fhall open both the Names wherof, and the Things
wherupon we are about to difpute, by way of Introduction.
A.
327
1
A
Political Difcourfe
CONCERNING
ORDINATION
T
The INTRODUCTION,
OR
Firſt Chapter.
HE Names or Words wherof we are about to diſpute are
Greec, the one Chirotonia, the otehr Chirothefia. The firſt
fignification of the word Chirotonia, in SUIDAS, imports
a certain leud action of the hand, which feems alfo by the Greec that
renders it by the fame word, to have bin intimated in Ifa. 5. 9. In
the fecond fignification with SUIDAS, it is ἐκλογὴ, πάντων κύρωσις,
Election (that is to fay of Magiftrats) or Ratification (that is to fay of
Laws) by the Many which amounts both by his Teftimony, and
that generally of antient Authors, to this, that the moſt uſual and na-
tural fignification of the word Chirotonia is Popular Suffrage, whether
given, as when they ſpeak of Athens, by the holding up of hands; or
as when they ſpeak (as dos SUIDAS in the place mention'd) of Rome,
and other Commonwealths (whofe Suffrage was not given with this
Ceremony) without holding up of hands.
π εσ
CHIROTHESIA (σis g) is a word that in the ftrict fig-
nification imports laying on of hands, and no more: but the Jews ufing to
confer their Ordination moft commonly by laying on of hands, and yet
fomtimes by word of mouth, or by letter, the word both as it relates to
the cuſtom of the Jewish Commonwealth, and Ordination thence tranf-
planted into the Church of CHRIST, fignifys Ordination confer'd by
one man, or a few men, that is to fay, by fom diftinct Order from
the People, whether with impofition of hands, or without it.
THESE words thus interpreted, I fhall throout my difcourfe
(which elſe muſt have run altogether upon the Greec) prefume, as al-
ready I have don, to take for good English, and fo procede to the
things wherof we are to difpute; firft, by opening the Scene of this
Perambulation, which will be don beft by the help of ERASMUS, a
man as for his Learning not inferior to any, fo for his freedom not ad-
dicted to Intereſts or Partys. For the remainder then of this Intro-
duction, 'I fhall begin with the nineteenth Verfe of the eleventh, and
continue my diſcourſe to the end of the fourteenth Chapter of the Acts;
interweaving the Text where it is darker with the Paraphrafe of that
excellent Author, for light, and his Paraphrafe with the Text, where
it is clearer, for brevity, in manner following.
THEY
Chap. 1.
328
The Prerogative
Book II.
THEY whom the heat of Perfecution from the Death of STEPHEN
~ had difpers'd, travel'd thro the Citys and Villages as far as Phenice, and
Acts 11. 19. the adjacent Iland of Cyprus, as alfo thro Antiochia, which lies between
Phenice and Cilicia, preaching the Gospel receiv'd from the Apoftles, which
nevertheless they dar'd not to communicat but to fuch only as were of the
Jewish Nation, not out of Envy, but a kind of Superftition, they be-
lieving that to do otherwife were to give the Childrens Bread to Dogs,
which Chrift had forbid.
BUT fom of them that believ'd, being of Cyprus and Cyrene, when
they came to Antioch, had the boldness to speak of CHRIST to the Greecs,
preaching the Lord Jesus, in which they made fuch progress thro the
Bleffing of God upon them and their Labors, that a great number of thefe
also believing the Gospel, were turn'd to the Lord. The tidings of these
things coming to the ears of the Church which was at Jerufalem, a man of
Apoftolical Sincerity, BARNABAS the Levite, a Cyprian born, was fent
by the Apostles to take a view of what was don upon the places; and if be
found it to be according to the will of God, to approve of it, by authority of
the Apostles. So great caution in receiving the Gentils to the Gospel was
not, that the thing was not greatly defir'd by the Apoſtles; but left it should
afterwards be repeal' d or made void by the Jews, as don rafhly, or that the
Gentils fhould rely less upon what was done, as conceiving it needed ratifi-
cation by the Law. Wherfore BARNABAS fo foon as he came to Antioch,
and found the Greecs by Faith, and without profeffion of the Law, to have
receiv'd the fame Grace of God with the Jews, was very much joy'd that
the number of Believers increas'd, and exhorted them to remain conftant in
their Enterprize of adhering to the Lord. For he was a good man, and
full of the Holy Spirit, and of Faith. Wherfore thro his miniftry it came
to pass, that a multitude of other Believers were added to the former. Now,
Antioch being not far from Cilicia, the Neighborhood of the place invited
him to ſeek PAUL, the fittest helper in this work, as chofen by CHRIST
to preach his name to the Gentils and Kings of the Earth. For when
PAUL fled from Jerufalem, the Diſciples had conducted him to Cefarca
of Phenice, whence he went to Tarfus; whom therfore when BARNABAS
had found there, he brought to Antioch, hoping in a City both famous and
populous (but with a confus'd mixture of Jews and Greecs) to receive the
better fruit thro the aid of an Apoftle more peculiarly defign'd to this work.
Theſe two being converfant a whole year in the Church of Antioch, which by
the confluence both of Jews and Greecs became very numerous, fo many
were added by their preaching, that wheras hitherto, not expofing the name
of CHRIST to envy, they had bin call'd Difciples, they now began first at
Antioch from the name of their Founder to be call'd Chriftians. In theſe
times certain Prophets came from the City of Jerufalem to Antioch, wher-
of one nam'd AGABUS ftanding up in the Congregation, ſignify'd by in-
Spiration, that there should be a great Dearth thro the whole world;
which came to pass under CLAUDIUS CAESAR, the Succeffor of CALIGU
LA. At this time they at Jerufalem, partly because they were poor at their
converfion to the Gospel, partly because they had depofited their Goods in
common, and partly because they had bin fpoil'd by the Priests for their pro-
feſſion of CHRIST, ordain'd that by the contribution of fuch as bad wher-
withal, efpecially among the believing Gentils, Mony fhould be fent to the
relief of the Chriftians dwelling in Judea; but fo that this Contribution
was not to be forc'd but free, and according to every man's ability. This
Mony thus gather'd was fent by PAUL and BARNABAS to the Elders
at
r
of Popular Government.
329
at Jerufalem, to be diſtributed at their difcretion to fuch as were in need. Chap. 1.
While PAUL and BARNABAS were thus imploy'd, King HEROD, the
Same that beheaded JOHN, and return'd CHRIST cloth'd, thro derifion,
in white, to PILAT, being griev'd to fee this kind of People increafe, and
the Name of Jesus King of the Jews to grow famous in divers Nations,
became concern'd to root out fuch a Faction, and fo fpreading; wherfore be
Atretch'd forth his hand to vex certain of the Church, kill'd JAMES the
Brother of JOHN with the Sword; and because he faw it pleas'd the Jews
proceded further to take PETER also, who being impriſon'd, was after-
ward miraculously deliver'd. But PAUL and BARNABAS having per-
form'd the Truft committed to them by the Brethren, and deliver'd the Con-
tribution for relief of the Poor to the Apostles, return'd from Jerufalem to
Antioch, taking with them JOHN, whofe Sirname was MARC.
NOW the Church of Antioch flourish'd in fuch manner, that she
had ſom fill'd with the gift of Prophecy, and others with that of Teaching;
among whom was BARNABAS and SIMEON, alias NIGER, together
with LUCIAS a Cirenian, and MANAEN who had bin brought up with
HEROD the Tetrarch, whom he left to com to CHRIST: but the chief
of them was SAUL, indow'd with all the Gifts and Graces Apofiolical.
While all these were intent upon the Miniftry of the Church, imploying their
feveral Gifts to the Glory of God, and in his most acceptable Service, the
Salvation of Souls, with fafting and prayer, the Holy Ghoft being stir'd
up by their Zeal, fignified his Will by the Prophets, faying, Separat me
BARNABAS and PAUL for the Work wherto I have call'd them, namely,
to be Doctors of the Gentils, that by them I may propagat the Gospel.
The command of the Spirit was obey'd, and BARNABAS with PAUL,
to the end that every one might fee who are chofen, were separated from the
reft; and when the Congregation had unanimously implor'd the favor of
God by prayer and fasting, the most eminent in Authority among them laid
their hands upon the Perfons fo feparated, and fent them wherever the Spi-
rit of God fhould direct them. By this impulfe therfore BARNABAS
and PAUL went to Seleucia, being a Promontory of Antiochia, and
thence fail' d into the Iland of Cyprus, where they landed at Salamis, a famous
City upon the Eastern part of the Iland; they preach'd not human Inven-
tions, but the Word of God, nor that by ftealth, but in the Synagogs of the
Jews, wherof thro the Neighbourhood of Syria there was flore. This Ho-
nor by the Commandment of CHRIST was always defer'd to the Jews,
that the Gospel fhould be first offer'd to them, left they being a querulous
and repining Nation, fhould complain that they were defpis'd. Thus travel'd
thefe Apostles thro the whole Iland, till they came to Paphos, a City confe-
crated to VENUS upon the Western Coaft of Cyprus. Here they found a
certain Magician call'd BARJESUS, that is, the Son of JESUS a Jew,, both
by Nation and Religion, under which color he falfly pretended to the gift
of Prophefy. This man follow'd the Court of SERGIUS PAULUS, Pro-
conful or Governor of the Iland for the Romans, otherwife a prudent
man; but this fort of Vermin infinuats it felf into the best to chufe, that
fotheir Corruption may do the greater and more compendious miſchief toman-
kind. The Proconful nevertheless having understood the Gospel to be plant-
ing throout Cyprus, not only forbore to stop the ears of others, but by
fending for BARNABAS and PAUL feem'd defirous to open his own.
Wherfore BARJESUs indeavoring to refift the growth of the Word, as
an Enemy to CHRIST, and refifting the Truth with Falfhood, a ftrife
arofe between the true Prophets and a falfe one (for fuch is the Interpreta-
U ü
tion
330
The Prerogative
Chap. 14.
Book II. tion of the Syriac word ELYMAS) whom PAUL at length confuted of fpi-
ritual blindness, by taking away the Eys of his body, miraculously firuck in
the prefence of the Proconful, who at the fame time receiving the light of
the Gospel, imbrac'd the Chriftian Faith. This being don at Paphos,
PAUL imbark'd there with his Affociats for the leffer Afia, and came to
Perga, being a City of Pamphylia; here JOHN, whofe Sirname was
MARC, left them, and return'd to Jerufalem, while they, when they bad
vifited Pamphylia, travel'd to Antiochia, a City of Pifidia, where having
enter'd a Synagog, they fat after the ufual manner with the reft, attentive
to the Law and the Prophets; wherof when the Parts appointed were read,
and no man ſtood up, the Rulers of the Synagog perceiving that the Stran-
gers by their habit were Jews, and fuch as by their afpe&t promis'd more than
ordinary, fent to them, defiring that if they had any word of exhortation
for the People, they would speak. Wheruton PAUL ftanding up, preach'd
to them CHRIST; whence came the Word of the Lord to be "diale d
throout that Region, tho the Jews out of envy to the Centiis, firing
the devouteft Matrons (an Art not unknown in thefe times)
them the chief of the City, rais'd fuch Sedition in it, and Tumult agai
the Apostles, that PAUL and BARNABAS being caft out, fbook off the d
from their feet against them, and went thence to Iconium a City of Lyca-
onia. When they were com to Iconium, entring with the Jews after the
cuſtom into the Synagog, they preach'd, as they had at Antioch, the Gospel of
Jefus Christ, and with fuch efficacy, that multitudes both of the Jews and
Greecs believ'd. Here again the Envy of the Jews became in Hathor of
Sedition, by which means the City was divided into two Parts or Factions,
wherof one stood for the unbelieving Jews, and the other for the Apolles.
At length when fuch of the Gentils as were join'd with the Jews, and the
Rulers of the City, made an affault upon the Apofiles, to offer violence
and ftone them; they being aware of it, fled to Lyftra (a City of Lycaonia,
which is a part of Pamphylia) and Derbe. At Lyftra there was a man
lame of his feet from the Womb, who having liften'd to PAUL with great
Attention and Zeal, was miraculously cur'd by the Apoftle; when the People
feeing what PAUL had don, cry'd out, The Gods were defcended in the like-
nefs of men: a perfuafion that might gain the more easily upon the minds of
the Lycaonians for the Fable of JUPITER and MERCURY, faid to
have defcended in human ſhape, and bin entertain'd by LYCAON, from
whom the Lycaonians receiv'd their name. Wherfore they call' dBARNA-
BAS, for the gravity of his afpect, JUPITER; PAUL for his Eloquence,
MERCURY and the Priest of JUPITER, who dwelt in the Suburbs,
brought Bulls and Garlands to the Gates of the Houfe wherethe Apoftles were,
to have offer'd Sacrifice with the People, which the Apoſtles abborring, vi-
gorously diffuaded. In the mean time certain Jews by Nation that were
Unbelievers, coming from Antioch of Pifidia, and Iconium, drew the
People to the other extreme, who from facrificing to the Apostles fell on
ftoning them; a work which was brought fo near to an end, that Paul
being drawn by them out of the City, was left for dead, tho he foon after
recover'd, and went thence with BARNABAS to Derbe: when they bad
propagated the Gospel there alfo, they return'd to Lyftra, Iconium, and
Antiochia, confirming the Difciples whom they had converted. Now becauſe
the propagation of the Gospel requir'd that the Apostles fhould be moving
thro divers Nations, they chirotonizing them Elders in every Congrega-
tion or Church, that is, ordaining them Elders by the Votes of the
People in every City, left them to perform the Dutys of the abfent Apofles,
and
of Popular Government.
331
and when they had fafted and pray'd, commended them to the Lord. Thefe Chap. 2.
things being brought to a conclufion, or finish'd at Antioch in Pifidia, when
they had perambulated this Country, they alfo vifited Pamphylia; ſowing the
Goſpel where it was not yet fown, and confirm. g those who already believ'd,
till they came to Perga: where having order'd weir affairs, they proceded to
Attalia, being a maritim City of Pamphylia; and from thence they fail'd
back to Antioch of Syria, whence they first fet out, with Commiſſion from
the Elders, to preach the Gospel to the Gentils, and where by the Chiro-
thefia, or Impofition of hands, Prayer and Fafting, they had bin re-
commended to the Grace of God, and defign'd to the Work now finish'd.
IN this Narrative you have mention both of the Chirotonia and of
the Chirothefia, or Impofition of hands, but of the former as of Ordi-
nation; for by that fuch were made Presbyters or Church-Officers
as were not fo before: of the latter not, I think, as of Ordination, at
leaſt in the ſenſe we now take it; but as of defignation of Perſons to
an occafional and temporary imployment, that had bin ordain'd before,
for fo fure had PAUL at leaſt. However, that which is offer'd by this
Narrative to preſent confideration, is no more than the bare Story.
CHA P. II.
That the Citys, or most of them nam'd in the Perambula-
tion of the Apostles PAUL and BARNABAS, were at
that time under popular Government.
In which is con-
tain'd the Adminiftration of a Roman Province.
T
HE Romans of all Nations under Heaven were indow'd, as
with the higheſt Virtues, fo with the greateſt human Glory;
which proceded from this eſpecially, that they were in love with ſuch
as were in love with their Liberty. To begin with their dawn, the
Privernates (a free People inhabiting the City and Parts adjoining,
which at this day is call'd Piperno, fom fifty miles from Rome, and five
from Seffe) being the fecond time conquer'd by the Romans, it was
confulted in the Senat what courfe fhould be taken with them: where
while fom, according to the different temper of men, fhew'd them-
felves hotter, and others cooler, one of the Privernates more mind- Liv.1.8. c.21.
ful of the condition wherin he was born, than of that wherin he
was faln, happen'd to render all more doubtful: for being afk'd by
a Senator of the feverer judgment, what Puniſhment he thought
the Privernates might deferve, Such (fays he) as they deferve who
believe themselves worthy of Liberty. At the courage of which an-
fwer, the Conful (perceiving in them that had bin vehement e-
nough before against the Privernates but the greater animofity, to
the end that by a gentler Interrogatory he might draw fom fofter
anſwer from him) reply'd, And what if we inflict no puniſhment at all,
but pardon you; what Peace may we expect of you? Why if you give us
a good one (faid the other) a steady and perpetual Peace, but if an ill one,
not long. At which a certain Senator falling openly upon ruffling and
threatning the Privernat, as if thoſe words of his tended to fom prac-
tice or intention to ftir up the Citys in Peace to Sedition, the better
part of the Fathers being quite of another mind, declar'd, That they
had heard the voice of a Man, and of a Freeman. For why, faid they,
U u 2
Should
}
332
The Prerogative
Book II. fhould it be thought that any Man or People will remain longer under fuck
a Burden as they are not able to bear, than till they can throw it down?
There a Peace is faithful, where it is voluntary; if you will have Slaves,
you are not to trust them but their Fetters. To this opinion the Conful
efpecially inclining, inclin'd others, while he openly profeft, That they
who had no thought but upon their Liberty, could not but be thought worthy
to be Romans: wherupon the Decree paft by Authority of the Fathers,
which was afterwards propos'd to the Congregation, and ratify'd by
the Command of the People, wherby the Privernates were made Citi-
zens of Rome. Such was the Genius of the Roman Commonwealth;
where by the way you may alſo obſerve the manner of her Debate
and Reſult (Authoritate Patrum & Juu Populi) by the Advice of the
Senat, and the Chirotonia of the People.
BUT that which in this place is more particularly offer'd to confi-
deration, is her ufual way of proceding in cafe of Conqueft with other
Nations for tho bearing a haughty brow towards fuch as, not content-
ed to injoy their Liberty at home, would be her Rivals abroad, ſhe
dealt far otherwife, as with Carthage; this cafe excepted, and the
pilling and polling of her Provinces, which happen'd thro the Avarice
and Luxury of her Nobility, when the Balance of popular Power
being broken, her Empire began towards the latter end to languifh and
decline; the way which fhe took with the Privernates was that which
ſhe uſually obferv'd with others throout the courſe of her Victorys, and
was after the Change of Government made good at leaſt in fom part
by the Roman Emperors, under whom were now thofe Citys men-
tion'd in the prefent Perambulation of the Apoſtles PAUL and BAR-
NABAS. STRABO for his credit among human Authors is equal to
any; he liv'd about the time of this Perambulation, and being a Greec,
is less likely to be partial: Of that therfore which I have affirm'd to
have bin the courfe of the Romans in their Victorys, I fhall make choice
of this Author for a witnefs; firſt where he epitomizes the Story of
Strab. 1.9. Athens after this manner: When the Carians by Sea, and the Boeotians by
Land wafted Attica, CECROPS the Prince, to bring the People under
Shelter, planted them in twelve Citys, Cecropia, Tetrapolis, Epacrea,
Decelea, Eleufis, Aphydna, Thoricus, Brauron, Cytherus, Sphettus,
Cephiffia, Phalerus; which THESEUS is faid to have contracted into one
call'd Athens. The Government of this City had many changes; at firſt it
was Monarchical, then Popular: This again was ufurp'd by the Tyrants
PISISTRATUS and his Sons, whence recover'd, it fell afterwards into
the hands of the Few, as when the four hundred once, and again the thirty
Tyrants were impos'd by the Lacedemonians, in the War of Peloponnefus:
which Yoke the Athenians (by means of their faithful Army) ſhaking off,
reftored their popular Government, and held it till the Romans attain'd to
the Dominion of Greece. Now tho it be true that they were not a little dif
turb'd by the Kings of Macedon, to whom they were forc'd to yield fom
kind of obedience; they nevertheless preferv'd the form of their Common-
wealth fo intire, that there be who affirm it never to have bin better admi-
niftred, than at fuch time as Macedon was govern'd by CASSANDER :
for this Prince, tho in other things more inclining towards the Tyrant,
having taken Athens by Surrender, us'd not the People ill, but made
DEMETRIUS PHALEREUS the Difciple of THEOPHRASTUS the
Philofopher, chief Magiftrat among them; a man fo far from ruining
their popular State (as in the Commentarys he wrote upon this kind of Go-
vernment
}
of Popular Government.
333
vernment is atteſted) that he repair'd it. Nevertheless, whether fufpected Chap. 2.
or envy'd for his greatness without fupport by the Macedonians, after the
death of CASSANDER he fled into Egypt, while his Enemys breaking
down his Statues (as fom fay) made homely Veffels of them. But the
Romans having receiv'd the Athenians under their popular form, left them
their Laws and Libertys untouch'd, till in the war with MITHRIDA-
TES they were forc'd to receive fuch Tyrants as that King was pleas'd to
give them; wherof ARISTON the greatest, when the Romans had re-
taken the City from him, being found trampling upon the People, was put
to death by SYLLA, and the City pardon'd, which to this day (he wrote
about the reign of TIBERIUS) not only enjoys her Libertys, but is high
in honor with the Romans. This is the Teftimony of STRABO agree-
ing with that of CICERO, where difputing of Divine Providence, he
fays that to affirm the World to be govern'd by Chance, or without God,
is as if one should fay that Athens were not govern'd by the Areopagits.
Nor did the Romans by the depofition of the fame Author (or indeed
of any other) behave themſelves worſe in Afia (the ſcene of our pre-
fent difcourfe, where the fame PAUL, of whom we are fpeaking, being
born at Tarfus, a City of Cilicia, that had acquir'd like or greater Pri-
vilege by the fame bounty, was alfo a Citizen of Rome) than in Greece.
Afia is underſtood in three fignifications: Firſt, for the third part of
the World anfwering to Europe and Africa. Secondly, for that part of
Afia which is now call'd Natolia. Thirdly, for that part of it which
ATTALUS King of Pergamum, dying without Heirs, bequeath'd and
left to the People of Rome: this contain'd Myfia, Phrygia, Æolis, Io-
nia, Caria, Doris, Lydia, Lycaonia, Pifidia, and by confequence the
Citys wherof we are fpeaking. To all theſe Countrys the Romans gave
their Liberty, till in favor of ARISTONICUS, the Baftard of Eu-
MENES, many of them taking Arms, they were recover'd, brought
into fubjection, and fram'd into a Province.
WHEN a Conful had conquer'd a Country, and the Romans in-
tended to form it into a Province, it was the cuftom of the Senat to
fend (decem Legatos) ten of their Members, who with the Conful had
power to introduce and eſtabliſh their provincial way of Government.
In this manner Afia was form'd by MARCUS AQUILIUS Conful;
afterwards fo excellently reform'd by SCAVOLA, that the Senat in
their Edicts us'd to propofe his example to fucceding Magiftrats, and
the Inhabitants to celebrat a Feaft to his Name. Nevertheleſs MITH-
RIDATES King of Pontus (all the Romans in this province being maf-
facred in one day) came to poffefs himſelf of it, till it was recover'd
at feveral times by SYLLA, MURENA, LUCULLUS and Ром-
The Romans, in framing a Country into a Province, were not
accuftom'd to deal with all the Inhabitants of the fame in a like man-
ner, but differently according to their different merit. Thus divers
Citys in this were left free by SYLLA, as thofe of the Ilienfes, the
Chians, Rhodians, Lycians and Magnefians, with the Cyzicens, tho
the laſt of theſe afterwards for their practices against the Romans for-
feited their Liberty to TIBERIUS, in whofe Reign they were for this
reaſon depriv'd of the fame.
PEY.
TAKING Afia in the first fenfe, that is, for one third part of the
World, the next Province of the Romans in this Country was Cilicia,
containing Pamphylia, Ifauria, and Cilicia more peculiarly fo call'd.
Here CICERO was fomtimes Proconful, in honor to whom part of
Phrygia,
$
$
334
The Prerogative
Epift.
Book II. Phrygia, with Pifidia, and Lycaonia, were taken from the former, and
added to this Jurifdiction, by which means the Citys wherof we are
fpeaking came to be of this Province. Adjoining hereto was the Com-
monwealth of the Lycians, which the Romans left free: into this alfo
the City of Attalia by fom is computed, but Iconium both by STRA-
BO and CICERO; the latter wherof being Proconful, in his Journy
from Laodicea, was receiv'd by the Magiftrats and Deputys of this
City. Lyftra and Derbe, being Citys of Lycaonia, muſt alío have bin of
the fame Province. Next to the Province of Cilicia was that of Syria,
containing Comagene, Seleucis, Phænicia, Calofyria, and Judea or Pa-
leftin. In Seleucis were the four famous Citys, Seleucia, Antiochia,
Apamea (the laſt intire in her Liberty) and Laodicea. Comagene and
Judea were under Kings, and not fram'd into Provinces, till in the
time of the Emperors.
THE fourth Province of the Romans in Afia was that of Bithynia
with Pontus: theſe were all acquir'd or confirm'd by the Victorys of
POMPEY the Great. STRABO, who was a Cappadocian born at
Amafia, relates a story worthy to be remember'd in this place. From
the time, fays he, that the Romans, having conquer'd ANTIOCHUS,
became Moderators of Afia, they contracted Leagues of Amity with divers
Nations; where there were Kings, the honor of address was defer'd to them,
with whom the Treatys that concern'd their Countrys were concluded. But
as concerning the Cappadocians, they treated with the whole Nation, for
which cauſe the Royal Line of this Realm coming afterwards to fail, the
Romans gave the People their freedom or leave to live under their own
Laws: and when the People hereupon fending Embaſſadors to Rome, re-
nounc'd their Liberty, being that to them which they faid was intolerable,
and demanded a King; the Romans amaz'd there fhould be men that could
fo far defpair, permitted them to chufe, of their Nation, whom they pleas'd;
So ARIOBARZANES was chofen, whofe Line again in the third Genera-
tion coming to fail, ARCHELAUS was made King by ANTONY
(where you may obferve, in paffing, that the Romans impos'd not
Monarchical Government, but for that matter us'd to leave a People as
they found them) Thus at the fame time they left PONTUS under "King
MITHRIDATES, who not containing himself within his bounds, but ex-
tending them afterwards as far as Colchis and Armenia the Lefs, was re-
duc'd to his terms by POMPEY; who divefting him of thofe Countrys
which he had ufurp'd, diftributed fom part of them to fuch Princes as had
affifted the Romans in that War, and divided the reſt into twelve Common-
wealths, of which, added to Bithynia, he made one Province. When the
Roman Emperors became Monarchs, they alſo upon like occafions made other
diftributions, conftituting Kings, Princes, and Citys, fom more, fom lefs,
fom wholly free, and others in fubjection to themſelves. Thus came a
good, if not the greater part of the Citys in the Leffer Afia, and the
other adjoining Provinces, to be fom more, fom lefs free; but the moſt
of them to remain Commonwealths, or to be erected into popular Go-
vernments, as appears yet clearer by the intercourfe of PLINY, while
he was Pretor or Governor of Bithynia, with his Mafter the Emperor
TRAJAN; a piece of which I have inſerted in the Letters following.
3
PLINY
of Popular Government.
335
'
<<
<<
SIR;
PLINY to TRAJAN.
Chap. 2.
T is provided by POMPEY's Laws for the Bithynians, that no Plin Epist.
or
man under thirty years of Age be capable of Magiftracy, or of 1. 10.
"the Senat: by the fame it is alfo eſtabliſh'd, that they who have
"born Magiſtracy may be Senators. Now becauſe by a latter Edict
"of AUGUSTUS, the leffer Magiftracys may be born by ſuch as are
"above one and twenty; there remains with me theſe doubts, whe-
"ther he that being under thirty, has born Magiſtracy, may be elect-
"ed by the Cenfors into the Senat; and if he may, whether of thoſe
"alfo that have not born Magiſtracy, a man being above one and
twenty, ſeeing at that Age he may bear Magiftracy, may not by the
"fame interpretation be elected into the Senat, tho he has not born it:
"which is here practis'd and pretended to be neceffary, becauſe it is
"fomwhat better, they fay, that the Senat be fill'd with the Children
"of good Familys, than with the lower fort. My opinion being
"afk'd upon theſe points by the new Cenfors, I thought fuch as being
"under thirty have born Magiftracy, both by POMPEY's Laws, and
"the Edict of AUGUSTUS, to be capable of the Senat; feeing the
"Edict allows a man under thirty to bear Magiftracy, and the Law,
a man that has born Magiftracy, to be a Senator. But as to thoſe
"that have not born Magiftracy, tho at the age in which they may
bear it, I demur till I may underftand your Majefty's pleafure, to
"whom I have fent the Heads both of the Law and of the Edict.
<c
<<
<<
CC
<<
Yo
T
RAJAN to PLIN Y.
OU and I, deareft PLINY, are of one mind. POMPEY'S
Laws are fo far qualify'd by the Edict of AUGUSTUS, that
they who are not under one and twenty may bear Magiftracy, and
they who have born Magiſtracy may be Senators in their reſpective
Citys: but for fuch as have not born Magiftracy, tho they might
"have born it, I conceive them not eligible into the Senat till they be
"thirty years of age.
<c
cr
ce
SIR;
Pi
PLINY to TRAJAN.
OWER is granted to the Bithynian Citys by POMPEY'S
Law, to adopt to themſelves what Citizens they pleaſe, ſo they
"be not Foreners, but of the fame Province; by the fame Law it is
"fhewn in what cafes the Cenfors may remove a man from the Senat:
Among which nevertheleſs it is not provided what is to be don in
"cafe a foren Citizen be a Senator. Wherfore certain of the Cenfors
"have thought fit to confult me, whether they ought to remove a man
"that is of a foren City for that caufe out of the Senat. Now be-
"cauſe the Law, tho it forbids the adoption of a Forener, commands
not that a Forener for that caufe fhould be remov'd out of the Senat,
" and I am inform'd there be foren Citizens almoft in every Senat; fo
"that many, not only Men, but Citys might fuffer Concuffion by the
<<
cr
" refti-
336
The Prerogative
4
Book II. "reſtitution of the Law in that part, which thro a kind of conſent
"feems to be now grown obfolete; I conceive it neceffary to have
XC
your Majesty's Refolution in the cafe, to which end I have fent a
"Breviat of the Law annex'd.
ર
W
TRAJAN to PLIN Y.
ITH good caufe, deareft PLINY, have you doubted what
anſwer to return to the Cenfors, inquiring whether they
"ought to elect a man into the Senat that is of another City, tho of
"the fame Province; ſeeing on the one fide the Authority of the Law,
"and of Cuſtom on the other to the contrary, might well diſorder
you. To innovat nothing for the time paſt, I think well of this
expedient: they who are already elected Senators, tho not accord-
ing to the Law, of what City foever they be, may remain for the
prefent; but for the future POMPEY's Laws fhould return to their
"full virtue, which if we fhould caufe to look back, might create
" trouble.
(C
હર
cc
ર
THIS might ferve, but there will be no hurt in being a little fuller
in the diſcovery of Provincial Government.
1
THE Provinces fo fram'd, as has bin fhewn, were fubdivided in-
to certain Circuits call'd Diocefes; that of Afia had fix, Alabanda, Sar-
des (antiently the Senat of CRASUS) Smyrna, Ephefus, Adramytis,
Pergamum. That of Cilicia had alfo fix, the Pamphylian, Ifaurian,
and Cilician, the Metropolis wherof was Tarfus, a free City; to thefe
were taken out of the Province of Afia, Cibyra, Sinnade, Apamea:
what were the Diocefes of the other two SIGONIUS, whom I fol-
low, does not fhew. At theſe in the Winter (for the Summer was
ſpent commonly with the Army) the People of the Province affembl'd
at fet times, as at our Affizes, where the Roman Governors did them
Juftice.
THE Governors or Magiftrats, to whofe care a Province was com-
mitted, were of two kinds: the firſt and chief was Conful or Pretor,
which appellations differ'd not in Power, but in Dignity, that of Con-
ful being more honorable, who had twelve Lictors, wheras the Pretor
had but fix; if the annual Magiſtracy of either of theſe came to be
prorogu'd, he was call'd Proconful or Propretor.
THE fecond kind of Magiftrat in a province was the Queftor,
Receiver or Treaſurer, who being alfo annual, was attended by Lictors
of his own; if he dy'd within his year, the Conful, Proconful, or
Pretor might appoint one for that time in his place, who was call'd
Proqueftor. The Power of the Conful, Proconful, or Pretor, was of
two kinds, the one Civil, the other Military; the former call'd Ma-
giftracy, the latter Empire.
THE Pomp of theſe affuming and exerciſing their Magiftracy was
reverend; the Conful or Proconful had Legats, fomtimes more but
never under three, appointed him by the Senat: theſe were in the na-
ture of Counfillors to affift him in all Affairs of his Province; he had
Tribuns, Colonels, or Field Officers, for the military part of his Ad-
miniſtration; he had alfo Secretarys, Serjeants, Heralds or Criers,
Lictors or Infignbearers, Interpreters, Meffengers, Divines, Chamber-
lains, Phyſicians; and befides theſe his Companions, which for the
moft
of Popular Government.
337
moft part were of the younger fort of Gentlemen or Gallants that ac-Chap. 2.
company'd him for his Ornament, and their own Education. Into
this the fom what like Train of the Queftor (who by the Law was in
place of a Son to the Proconful, and to whom the Proconful was to
give the regard of a Father) being caft, it made the Pretorian Co-
hort or Guard always about the Perfon of the Proconful, who in this
Equipage having don his Devotions at the Capitol, departed the City,
Paludatus, that is in his Royal Mantle of Gold and Purple, follow'd
for fom part of the way with the whole Train of his Friends, wifh-
ing him much joy and good ſpeed.
IN his Province he executed his twofold Office, the one of Captain
General, the other of the fupreme Magiftrat. In the former relation
he had an army either receiv'd from his Predeceffor, or new levy'd in
the City; this confifted in the one half of the Legions (as I have elfe-
where fhewn) and in the other of Affociats : for the greatnefs of the
fame, it was proportion'd to the Province, or the occafion; to an or-
dinary Province in times of Peace, I believe an Army amounted not
to above one Legion with as many Auxiliarys, that is, to a matter of
twelve thouſand Foot, and twelve hundred Horſe. The Magiftracy
or Jurifdiction of the Proconful, or Pretor, was executed at the Me-
tropolitan City of each Diacis, which upon this occafion was to fur-
niſh the Pretorian Cohort with Lodging, Salt, Wood, Hay, and Stable-
room at the charge of the Country. Thefe, tho CICERO would
hardly receive any of them, were, towards the latter time of the Com-
monwealth, extended by the Provincial Magiſtrats to ſo great a bur-
den to the People, that it caus'd divers Laws to be pafs'd in Rome
(de repetundis) for reftitution to be made to the Provinces, by fuch as
had injur'd them. Upon fuch Laws was the profecution of VEr-
RES by CICERO. When and where this kind of Court was to be
held, the Conful, Proconful, or Pretor, by Proclamation gave timely
notice. Being affembl'd at the time, and the City appointed, in the
Townhall ſtood a Tribunal; upon this the Sella Curulis, or a Chair of
State, in which fat the Cónful, Proconful, or Pretor, with his Preto-
rian Cohort or Band about him, furnish'd with all manner of Pomp,
and Officers requifit to the Ornament or Adminiſtration of fo high a
Magiftracy. The Jurifdiction of this Court was according to the
Laws made for the adminiftration of the Province; but becauſe they
could not foreſee all things (as appear'd by the Queſtions which PLI-
NY put upon the Laws of POMPEY, to TRAJAN) it came to paſs,
that much was permitted to the Edicts of the Provincial Pretors, as
was alſo in uſe at Rome with the Pretors of the City: and if any man
had judg'd otherwife in his Province, than he ought to have don in
the City, made an Edict contrary to the Law of his Province, or
judg'd any thing otherwife than according to his own Edict, he was
held guilty of, and queſtionable for a heinous Crime. But what the
Law of this or that Province (which differ'd in each) was, would be
hard particularly to fay; only in general it was for the main very
much refembling that of Sicily, call'd Rupilia.
LEGE Rupilia, or by the Law of RUPILIUS, a Cauſe between one
Citizen and another being of the fame City, was to be try'd at home by their
own Laws. ACaufe between one Provincial and another being of divers
Citys, was to be try'd by Judges whom the Pretor ſhould appoint by lot.
What a privat man claim'd of a People, or a People of a privat man,
}
X x
Was
338
The Prerogative
}
Book II, was to be refer'd to the Senat of fom third City. Upon what a Roman
claim'd of a Provincial, a Provincial was to be appointed Judg. Upon
what a Provincial claim'd of a Roman, a Roman was to be appointed Judg.
For decifion of other Controverfys, felect Judges from among the Romans
(not out of the Pretorian Cohort, but out of fuch Romans, or other Citi-
zens free of Rome, as were prefent in the fame Court) were to be given.
In criminal Caufes, as Violence, Peculat, or Treaſon, the Law, and the
manner of proceding was the fame in the Provinces, as in Rome.
A&. 19.
!
FOR the Tributs, Cuſtoms, Taxes, Levys of Men, Mony, Ship-
ping, ordinary or extraordinary, for the common defence of the Ro-
man Republic, and her Provinces, the Confuls, Proconfuls, or Pretors
proceding according to fuch Decrees of the Senat as were in that cafe
ſtanding or renew'd upon emergent occafions; in gathering theſe lay
the Magiſtracy or office of the Queftor: if the Proconful were indif
pos'd, or had more bufinefs than he could well turn his hand to,
Courts of this nature might be held by one or more of his Legats.
With matter of Religion they meddl'd not; every Nation being fo
far left to the liberty of Confcience, that no violence for this caufe was
offer'd to any man: by which means both Jews and Chriftians, at
leaft till the time of the perfecuting Emperors, had the free exerciſe of
their Religion throout the Roman Provinces. This the Jews lik'd
well for themſelves, nor were they troubl'd for the Heathens; but to
the Chriſtians they always grudg'd the like privilege. Thus when they
could no otherwife induce PILAT to put Chrift to death, they
accus'd CHRIST of affecting Monarchy, and fo affrighted PILAT,
being a mean condition'd fellow, while they threaten'd to let TIBE-
RIUS know he was not CAESAR's Friend, that he comply'd with their
ends. But when at Corinth, where GALLIO (a man of another tem-
per) was Proconful of Achaia, they would have bin at this fport
again, and with a great deal of Tumult had brought PAUL before
the Tribunal, GALLIO took it not well, that they fhould think
he had nothing elſe to do than to judg of Words, and Names, and
Questions of their Law; for he car'd no more for the Difputes be-
tween the Chriftians and the Jews, than for thoſe between the Epi-
cureans and the Stoics. Wherfore his Lictors drave them from the
Tribunal, and the officious Corinthians, to fhew their Love to the Pro-
conful, fell on knocking them out of the way of other bufinefs.
NOW tho the Commonwealth of the Achæans, being at this time
a Roman Province under the Proconful GALLIO, injoy'd no longer
her common Senat, Strategus and Demiurges, according to the model
fhewn in the former Book; yet remain'd each particular City under
her antient form of Popular Government, fo that in thefe, efpecially
at Corinth, many of the Greecs being of the fame judgment, the Jews
could not diſpute with the Chriſtians without Tumult. Of this kind
was that which happen'd at Ephefus, where Chriſtianity growing ſo
faft, that the Silverfmiths of DIANA'S Temple began to fear they
fhould loſe their Trade; the Jews liking better of Heathenifm than
Chriſtianity, fet ALEXANDER, one of their pack, againſt PAUL.
THIS place (in times when men will underſtand no otherwiſe
of human ſtory than makes for their ends) is fallen happily unto my
hand; feeing that which I have faid of a Roman Province, will be
thus no leſs than prov'd out of Scripture. For the Chancellor of
Ephefus perceiving the Ecclefia (fo it is in the Original) or Affembly
(as
of Popular Government.
339
(as in our Tranflation) uncall'd by the Senat, or the Magiftracy to Chap. 2.
be tumultuouſly gather'd in the Theater (their ufual place, as in
Syracufa and other Citys, of meeting) betakes himſelf to appeaſe the
People with divers arguments: among which he has theſe. Firſt, as
to matter of Religion, You have brought hither, ſays he, theſe men
which are neither robbers of Temples, (Churches our Bible has it before
there was any Church to be robb'd) nor yet blafphemers of the Goddeſs:
In which words (feeing that they offering no fcandal, but only pro-
pagating that which was according to their own judgment, were not
obnoxious to Puniſhment) he fhews that every man had liberty of
Confcience. Secondly, as to Law: If DEMETRIUS and the Craftsmen
which are with him have a matter against any man, the Law, fays he,
is open. Thirdly, as to the matter of Government, which
appears to
be of two parts, the one Provincial, the other Domeſtic: For the for-
mer, fays he, there are (avara) Proconfuls (he ſpeaks in the plu-
ral number with relation to the Legats, by whom the Proconful
fomtimes held his Courts; otherwife this Magiftrat was but one in a
Province, as at this time for Afia PUBLIUS SUILIUS) and to the
latter, fays he, if you defire any thing concerning other matters, that is,
Yuch as appertain to the Government of the City (in which the care
of the Temple was included) it ſhall be determin'd in a lawful Ecclefia,
or Affembly of the People. By which you may fee that notwithſtand-
ing the Provincial Government, Ephefus, tho fhe was no free City,
(for with a free City the Proconful had nothing of this kind to do)
had (avlovouíav) the Government of her felf (as thofe other Citys
mention'd in PLINY's Epiftles) by the Senat, and the People; for
wherever one of thefe is nam'd, as the Senat by PLINY, or the Peo-
ple by LUKE, the other is underſtood. When the Chancellor had
thus fpoken, he difmifs'd the Ecclefia. It is LUKE's own word, and
fo often as I have now repeated it, fo often has he us'd it, upon the
fame occafion. Wherfore I might henceforth expect two things of
Divines ; first, that it might be acknowleg'd that I have good Au-
thors, LUKE and the Chancellor of Ephefus, for the word Ecclefia
in this ſenſe; and fecondly, that they would not perfuade us, the
word Ecclefia has loft its fignification, left they condemn this place of
Scripture to be no more understood. The manner of Provincial Go-
vernment being thus prov'd, not only out of profane Authors, but
out of Scripture it felf; and the Citys that were leaſt free having had
fuch power over themſelves, and their Territorys; why, if the Ro-
mans took no more of them for this protection, than was paid to their
former Lords, did they not rather undertake the patronage of the World
than the Empire; feeing Venice, and Dantzic, while the one was tri-
butary to the Turk, the other to the King of Poland, were neverthe-
lefs fo free Eſtates, that of a King, or a Commonwealth that ſhould
have put the rest of the world into the like condition, no lefs in our day
could have bin faid? And yet that the Romans, when the nature of the
Eaſtern Monarchys ſhall be rightly confider'd, took far leſs of theſe
Citys than their old Mafters, will admit of little doubt. CICERO
furely would not ly; he, when Proconful of Cilicia, wrote in this
manner concerning his Circuit, to his friend SERVILIUS: Two days I
Staid at Laodicea, at Apamea five, at Sinnade three, at Pilomelis five,
at Iconium ten; than which Jurifdiction or Government there is nothing
more just or equal. Why then had not thoſe Citys their Senats and their
Ecclefia,
X x 2
•
340
The Prerogative
Book II. Ecclefiæ, or Congregations of the People, as well as that of Ephesus;
and thoſe wherof PLINY gives an account to TRAJAN?
CORINTH was in Achaia; Perga of Pamphylia, Antioch of Pi-
fidia, Iconium, Lyftra, Derbe of Lycaonia, were in Cilicia; and with
theſe, as fom reckon, Attalia. Ephefus and the other Antioch were in
Syria. Achaia, Cilicia, and Syria, were Roman Provinces at the time
of this Perambulation of the Apoftles: The Citys under Provincial
Adminiſtration, whether free or not free, were under Popular Govern-
ment; whence it follows, that Corinth, Ephefus, Antioch of Syria,
Antioch of Pifidia, Perga, Iconium, Lyftra, Derbe, Attalia, being at this
time under Provincial Adminiſtration, were at the fame time under Po-
pular Government. There has been no hurt in going about, for the proof
of this; tho indeed to fhew that thefe Citys (had quandam dvTorquía)
were under Popular Government, we needed have gone no further
than the Text, as where the Chancellor of Ephefus, to get rid of a
tumultuous Ecclefia or Affembly of the People, promiſes them a law-
In Iconium, Lyftra, Derbe, and the reft, you hear not of any
King (as where HEROD ftretch'd out his hand to pleaſe the Jews,
and vex the Church) but of the People, of their Rulers, of their Af-
ſemblys, and of their Tumults. The People at Lyftra are now a-,
greed to give the Apoftles divine Honors; and anon, both at Iconium.
and Lyftra, to ſtone them. Now to determin of divine Honor or of
Life and Death, are acts of Soverain Power. It is true, theſe never-
theleſs may happen to be ufurp'd by a mere Tumult; but that cannot
be faid of thefe Congregations, which confifted as well of the Magi-
ftrats and Rulers, as of the People, and where the Magiftrats fhew
that they had no diftinct Power wherby to reftrain the People, nor o-
ther means to prevail againſt them, than by making of Partys: Which
Paffages, as they prove theſe Commonwealths on the one fide to have
bin ill conftituted, evince on the other, that theſe Citys were under
Popular Government.
ful one.
CHA P. III.
The Deduction of the
vernment, and of the
from the Chirotonia.
Chirotonia from Popular Go-
Original Right of Ordination
In which is contain'd the Infti-
tution of the Sanhedrim or Senat of Ifrael by Moses,
and that of Rome by ROMULUS.
D¹
IVINES generally in their way of difputing have a bias that
runs more upon Words than upon Things; fo that in this
place it will be neceffary to give the Interpretation of fom other Words,
wherof they pretend to take a ſtrong hold in their Controverſys.
The chief of theſe has bin ſpoken to already: Chirotonia being a word
that properly fignifys the Suffrage of the People, wherever it is pro-
perly us'd, implys Power; wherfore tho the Senat decrees by Suffrage
as well as the People, yet there being no more in a Decree of the Se-
nat than Authority, the Senat is never faid to Chirotonize, or very
feldom and improperly, this word being peculiar to the People. And
thus much is imply'd in what went before.
THE
}
of Popular Government.
341
THE next word in Controverſy is Pfephifma, which fignifies a De Chap. 3.
tree or Law; and this always implying Power, always implys the
Suffrage of the People, that is, where it is fpoken of Popular Govern-
ment: for tho a Pfephifma or Decree of the Athenian Senat was a Law
for a year before it came to the Suffrage or Chirotonia of the People,
yet the Law or Conftitution of SOLON, wherby the Senat had this
Power, originally deriv'd from the Chirotonia of the People.
THE third Word (xava) fignifys to conftitute or ordain
this in the political Senfe of the fame implys not Power, but Authority :
for a man that writes or propofes a Decree or Form of Government,
may be faid (xisávas) to propoſe or conftitute it, whether it be con-
firm'd by the Chirotonia of the People or not; nay with HALICAR-
NASSEUS the word fignifys no more than barely to call or affemble
a Senat, βουλήν ὑπερ τινὸς καθιστάναι.
;
NOW if theſe Words be fomtimes otherwife taken, what Words
be there in any Language that are not often us'd improperly? But that
underſtood politically, they muft of neceffity be underſtood as I have
fhewn, or will ſo intangle and diſorder Government, that no man
ſhall either make head or foot of it, is that which I make little quef-
tion to evince in the fureft way, that is, by opening the nature of the
Things whence they derive, and wherof they are ſpoken by the beſt
Authors.
AND becauſe the Words (tho the things they fignify were much
more antient) derive all from Athens, I fhall begin by this Conftitu-
tion to fhew the proper uſe of them. Chirotonia in Athens, as has bin
fhewn out of SUIDAS (who fpeaking of Rome refers to this) was
Election of Magiftrats, or enacting Laws by the Suffrage of the Peo-
ple; which, becauſe they gave by holding up their hands, came
thence to be call'd Chirotonia, which fignifys holding up of hands.
The Legiſlative Affembly, or Repreſentative of the People, call'd the
Nomotheta, upon occafion of repealing an old Law, and enacting a
new one, gave the Chirotonia of the People: And yet fays the Athe- Demoft. con-
nian Law (διαχειροτονίαν δεῖ ποιεῖν τις προεδρος περί τέτων τῶν νόμων) Let tr Timocr.
the Proedri give or make the Chirotonia to either Law. The Pro-
edri, as was fhewn in the former Book, were the ten Preſidents of the
Prytans; which Prytans upon this occafion were Prefidents of the
Nomotheta. Again, wheras it was the undoubted Right and Practice
기
​of the People to elect their Magiftrats by their Chirotonia (xv úμeis Eva,
기
​και
του ειν
L. S. c. Sa
κἄν πλείες, κἂν τὸν δεῖνα, κἄν ὁντινᾶν χειροτονήσητε σρατηγὸν) it is nevertheleís Phil. 1.
fhewn by POLLUX to have bin the peculiar Office of the Thefmo-
theta, (5 paτnyos XEIPOTOVEN) to chirotonize the Magiftrats. For as
the Proedri were Prefidents of the People in their Legiſlative Capacity,
fo were the Thefmothetæ, upon occaſion of Elections: thus the Chiroto-
nia of the Proedri or of the Thefmothetæ fignifys nothing elſe but the
Chirotonia of the People, by which they had enacted all their Laws, and
elected all their Civil or Ecclefiaftical Magiftrats or Priefts, as the Rex
Sacrificus, and the Orgeones, except fom by the Lot; which Ordina-
tion, as is obferv'd by ARISTOTLE, is equally popular. This whe-
ther ignorantly or wilfully unregarded, has bin, as will be ſeen here-
after, the cauſe of great abfurdity; for who fees not that to put the
Chirotonia, or Soverain Power of Athens upon the Proedri or the
Thefmotheta, is to make fuch a thing of that Government as can no
wife be underſtood?
WHAT
342
The Prerogative
Book II.
Lib. 2.
WHAT the People had paſt by their Chirotonia, was call'd Pfe
phifma, an Act or Law. And becauſe in the Nomotheta there were
always two Laws put together to the Vote, that is to fay, the old
one, and that which was offer'd in the room of it, they that were
for the old Law were faid (nonpí) to pronounce in the Negative;
and they that were for the new (xarani) to prononce for the
Affirmative.
THESE Laws, thefe Propofitions, or this frame of Government,
having bin propos'd firft by SOLON, and then ratify'd or eſtabliſh'd
by the Chirotonia of the Athenian People; ARISTOTLE fays of him
(τὴν δὲ δημοκρατίαν κατασῆσαι) that he inftituted or conftituted the
popu-
lar Government; which Conftitution implys not any Power in So-
LON, who abfolutely refus'd to be a King, and therfore the word
xaтsσα as to him implys no more than Authority. I have ſhew'd
you the Words in controverfy, and the things together in the Mint ;
now whether they that as to Athens introduc'd them both, under-
ſtood either, I leave my Reader by comparing them to judg.
IT is true that the Things expreſt by theſe Words have bin in fom
Commonwealths more, in others lefs antient than the Greec Lan-
guage; but this hinders not the Greecs to apply the Words to the
like Conſtitutions or Things, wherever they find them, as, by follow-
ing HALICARNASSUS, I fhall exemplify in Rome.
Ὁ ΔΕ Ρώμυλο, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα διεκόσμησε, βελευτὰς ἐυθὺς ἔγνω καταςήσασθαι.
ROMULUS, when he had diftributed the People into Tribes and Parishes,
proceded to ordain the Senat: in this manner the Tribes were three,
and the Pariſhes thirty; out of every Tribe he elected three Sena-
tors, and out of every Pariſh three more, all by the Suffrage of the
People. Theſe therfore came to ninety ninc chofen by the Chiroto-
nia; to which he added one more, not choſen by the Chirotonia, but,
by himſelf only: Which Election we may therefore fay was made by,
the Chirothefia; for as in this Chapter I am fhewing that the Chirotonia
is Election by the Many, fo in the next I ſhall ſhew that the Chirothefia
is Election by One, or by the Few. But to keep to the matter in hand;
the Magiftrat thus chofen by ROMULUS was (præfectus urbi) the
Protector of the Commonwealth, or he who, when the King was out
of the Nation or the City, as upon occafion of war, had the exerciſe
of Royal Power at home. In like manner with the Civil Magiftracy
were the Priests created (tho fom of them not ſo antiently) for the
Pontifex Maximus, the Rex Sacrificus, and the Flamens, were all or-
dain'd by the Suffrage of the People (Pontifex Tributis, Rex. Centuri-
atis, Flamines Curiatis) the latter of which, being no more than Pa-
riſh Prieſts, had no other Ordination than by their Pariſhes. All the
Laws, and all the Magiftrats in Rome, even the Kings themselves,
were according to the Orders of this Commonwealth to be created by
the Chirotonia of the People; which nevertheleſs is by APPIAN fom-
times call'd deμápxwv XEgorovía, the Chirotonia of the Tribuns, whether
thefe Magiftrats were Preſidents of the Affemblys of the People, or
elected by them. Sic Romani Hiftorici non raro loquuntur, Confulein
L. 4. cap. 3. qui comitia babuerit creaffe novos Magiftratus, non aliam ob caufam
nifi quia fuffragia receperit, & Populum moderatus eft in eligendo.
WHAT paft the Chirotonia of the People, by the Greecs is call'd
Pfephifma : μελλούσης δὲ διαλύεθαι τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ἀναστὰς ὁ Μάρκιον ἔφη.
μὲν εψήφισαν τὸ κοινὸν ὑμῶν ἔχει καλῶς· When the Congregation of the Peos
ple
Calv. Inft.
§. 15.
Dion. Hal.
1, 8,
et
α
of Popular Government.
343
ple was to be difmift, MARCUS standing up, faid, Your Pfephiſma, Chap. 3.
that is your Act, is exceding good, &c.
THIS Policy, for the greater part, is that which ROMULUS (as
was fhewn) is faid (xarasoda) to have inftituted or ordain'd, tho
it be plain that he ordain'd it no otherwiſe than by the Chirotonia of
the People.
yt
THUS you have another example of the three words in contro-
verfy (Chirotonia, nadısávaι, Pſephiſma) ſtill apply'd in the ſame ſenſe,
and to the fame things. Have I not alfo difcover'd already the origi-
nal right of Ordination, whether in civil or religious Orders? This
will be fcandalous. How! derive Ordination as it is in the Church
of CHRIST, or as it was in the Church of the Jews, from the Re-
ligion, or rather Superſtition of the Heathens! I meddle not with their
Religion, nor yet with their Superſtition, but with their Ordination
which was neither, but a part of their Policy. And why is not Or-
dination in the Church or Commonwealth of CHRIST, as well a
political thing as it was in the Churches or Commonwealths of the
Jews, or of the Heathens? Why is not Election of Officers in the
Church as well a political thing, as Election of Officers in the State?
and why may not this be as lawfully perform'd by the Chirotonia in
the one, as in the other?
Princ.
THAT MOSES introduc'd the Chirotonia, is exprefly faid by Philo de Inft.
PHILO; tho he oppofes it to the Ballot, in which I believe he is mif
taken, as not ſeeing that the Ballot including the Suffrage of the Peo-
ple, by that means came as properly under the denomination of the
Chirotonia, as the Suffrage of the Roman People; which tho it were
given by the Tablet, is fo called by Greec Authors. All Ordination of
Magiftrats, or of the Senators or Elders of the Sanhedrim, of the
Judges or Elders of inferior Courts, of the Judg or Suffes of Ifrael,
of the King, of the Priefts, of the Levits, whether with the Ballot or
viva voce, was perform'd by the Chirotonia or Suffrage of the People.
In this (eſpecially if you admit the Authority of the Jewish Lawyers,
and Divines call'd the Talmudifts) the Scripture will be clear, but
their Names are hard; wherfore not to make any Difcourfe more rough
than I need, I ſhall here fet them together. The Authors or Writings
I uſe, by way of Paraphraſe upon the Scripture, are the Gemara, Babylo-
nia, Midbar Rabba, Sepher Siphri, Sepher Tanchuma, Solomon Jarchius,
Chiskuny, Abarbanel, Ajin Ifrael, Pefiktha Zotertha. Theſe and many
more being for the Election of the Sanhedrim by the Ballot, I might have
ſpoken them more briefly; for the truth is, in all that is Talmudical I
am affifted by SELDEN, GROTIUS, and their Quotations out of the
Rabbys, having in this Learning fo little Skill, that if I mifcall'd none
of them, I fhew'd a good part of my Acquaintance with them.
NOR am I wedded to GROTIUS OF SELDEN, whom fomtimes
I follow, and fometimes I leave, making uſe of their Learning, but of
my own Reaſon. As to the things in this preſent Controverfy, they
were no other in Athens and Rome than they had been in the Common-
wealth of Ifrael.
WHEN MOSES came to inftitute the Senat he afk'd counfil of Numb. 11.
God. And the Lord faid, Gather to me feventy men of the Elders of v. 16, 24.
Ifrael; and MOSES went out and told the People the words of the Lord:
that is, propos'd the Dictat of the fupreme Legiflator to the Chirotonia
of the Congregation. What elfe can we make of these words of Mo-
SES
344
The Prerogative
Deut. I. v.
13, 14. 15.
XXTE
Book II. SES to the People? Take ye wife men, and understanding, and knowi
among your Tribes (x) xaтas how duтes ¿Q' iµwv nyourévous Sμv) and I will
αυτος ἐφ' ὑμῶν ηγουμένους ὑμῶν)
conftitute them Rulers over you. Now how the People could otherwife
take or chuſe theſe Rulers or Magiftrats thus propos'd, than by their
Chirotonia, let Divines-ſhew; or notwithſtanding the Conſtitution
of Moses, both the Senat of Ifrael, and the inferior Courts, were
decreed by the Chirotonia of the People. For the People upon this
Propofition refolv'd in the Affirmative, or anfwer'd and faid, The thing
which thou haft spoken is good for us to do. This then was the Pfephif-
ma or Decree of the People of Ifrael, whereupon fays MOSES (xxré-
snox dutos nɣsïodai) I conftituted or ordain'd them Governors. In which
example you have the three words, or the three things again; nor as
to the things, is it, or ever was it, otherwife in any Commonwealth.
Whence it is admirable in our Divines, who will have xxrés-noa, confti-
tuted, to be the word of Power; that they do not fee by this means
they muſt make two Powers in the fame Government; the xarés-noα
or Conſtitution of the Legiſlator, and the Chirotonia or Suffrage of the
People: or elſe fay that the Commonwealth of Ifrael was inftituted by
the Power of the Legiflator, and the Authority of the People, than
which there is nothing more abfurd. But the People ftaid not upon
their firſt Pfephifma, or Reſult, that the thing was good for them to do,
but did accordingly. The manner of their proceding at different times
was ſomewhat different; for it was fometimes viva voce, fometimes by
the Lot, without the Suffrage; and fometimes by the Ballot, which con-
fifted not of the Lot only, but of the Suffrage. Each of theſe are
equally popular (for neither of them gives an advantage to any
Perfon or Party) but not equally prudent ways of proceding; the
Lot committing too much to Fortune, except in fom kinds of bufinef-
fes, as firft in the divifion of Lands, whence the Suffrage was pro-
perly excluded: for the Divifions being made by three Deputys out of
each Tribe, if there happen'd to fall fom advantage or difadvantage
to any man by the Lot, it was equal or impartial; wheras if it had
fallen by the Suffrage, it muſt have bin inequal, or partial. Such was
the cauſe why the Lot in the Divifion of the Land of Canaan was us’d
without the Suffrage. In cafe of a Crime committed by an unknown
Author, but among many of whom fom one or more muſt have bin
guilty, as in the cafes of ACHAN and JONATHAN, the Lot was alfo
us'd without the Suffrage, fomwhat after the manner of Decimation in
an Army, when many that are guilty throw the Dice, and he on whom
the Lot falls is puniſh'd; yet with confiderable difference, for wheras
Decimation is not us'd but for puniſhment, where the Perfons are as
well known as the Guilt; this uſe of the Lot in Ifrael was for the
diſcovery of the unknown Author of fom known Crime, that fom one
of many being put to the queftion (who if either by his own confef-
fion, or other proof he were found guilty, was puniſh'd accordingly,
otherwiſe not) Men might have lefs incouragement that their Crimes
would be the more hidden, or leſs puniſhable for company, or the ſha-
dow of it.
WHEN the People were fet upon the introduction of a new
Magistracy, and car'd not at all who ſhould be the man, as in the
Election of SAUL, at which time the Philistins lay hard upon them,
and they look'd upon the Eafe they hop'd from a King, without co-
veting the trouble which he was like to have; it feems to me there
was a third uſe of the Lot without the Suffrage.
BUT
1
of Popular Government.
345
BUT that the common uſe of the Lot in Ifrael imply'd alfo the Chap. 3:
Suffrage, and was of the nature of the Ballot at this day in Venice, is
little to be doubted; or you may fatisfy your felf, when you have con-
fider'd the manner how the Senat or Sanhedrim was firft elected
(xxdisaµévn) or conftituted by Moses.
UPON the Pfephifma, or decree of the Legiſlator and the People,
The thing which thou haft spoken is good for us to do, they proceded to
election of Competitors in this manner. Each of the twelve Tribes
(to be hereafter as well locally, as they were yet but genealogically di-
vided) were to make the Election, not excluding the Thirteenth, nor
yet nominally taking it in; for LEVI, tho genealogically as diftinct a
Tribe as any of them, yet was not defign'd locally fo to be, but to
have the right of promifcuous Inhabiting, Cohabiting, or Marriage
with all or any of the reft, and with right of Suffrage accordingly;
for this cauſe the Tribes being Thirteen, are reckon'd but Twelve. So
each of the twelve Tribes elected among themſelves by their Suffrages,
fix wife men, and underſtanding, and known among them; who
being elected, were written; and being written, were deliver'd each
in a feveral Scrol to MOSES. MOSES having receiv'd all the Scrols
had ſeventy two Competitors, which caus'd a Fraction; for the
Senat, as is plain by the Text (gather me feventy men, that they may
ftand with thee) was to confift but of Seventy with MOSES, that is, in
all, of feventy one. So MOSES having two Competitors more than
he needed; caus'd two Urns to be brought, into one of which he caſt
the ſeventy two Competitors, or Names written in the Scrols; and in-
to the other feventy two Scrols, of which two were blanks, and fe-
venty were infcrib'd with the word Presbyter. This being don, the
whole Congregation pray'd, and when they had pray'd gave forth
their Lots.
THE Lots were given forth after this manner. Firſt a Lot was
drawn out of the Urn of the Magiftracys, then another out of the
Urn of the Competitors. The Competitor to whofe name a Blank was
drawn, departed: but he to whofe name a Prize was drawn, or gi
ven forth, became a Magiſtrat.
14
THEY who had thus gain'd Magiftracy were συνκαταψηφιζομένοι,
by this Pfephifma decreed to be together of the number of the feventy
Elders. But whereas in the Urn of Magiſtracy there were two Blanks,
two that had bin written Competitors muſt of neceffity have fail'd
of Magiftracy. So ELDAD and MEDAD being of them that were Numb. 1½
written Competitors by the Tribes, yet went not up to the Tabernacle ; 26.
that is, attain'd not to be (ruvaтa&Coμévoi) numbred among the
feventy, who were to fit in the Court of the Tabernacle; as afterwards
they did in the Pavement, or ftone-Chamber, in the Court of the
Temple.
τα
IN this place I fhall mind you but once more of the three Words
in controverſy. MOSES the Legiſlator (xarésre) conftituted the
People chirotoniz'd; and that which they had chirotoniz'd, was Pfe
phifma, their Decree.
THERE be in thefe times that are coif'd with fuch Opinions,
that to fhew Scripture to be Reaſon, is to make it loſe weight with
them; and to talk of the Talmudifts, is to profane it: Of theſe I fhall
only defire to know how they underſtand that place of ELDAD
and MEDAD; for if they can no otherwiſe make ſenſe of it than as
Y y
I
346
The Prerogative
Book II. I have don, it is a fufficient proof (letting the Talmudifts go) of all
that I have faid. What therfore has the Hierarchy, and the Preſby-
tery for their opinion that the Sanhedrim was inſtituted by the Chiro-
thefia, or Impofition of Hands?
Numb. 11.
24, 25.
Deut. 34. 9.
THERE is in the Old Teftament no mention of laying on of
Hands by way of Ordination, or Election, but only by MOSES in
the defignation of JOSHUA for his Succeffor: and in this MOSES
did firft as ROMULUS afterwards in the Election of the Prefect or
Protector of Rome, but upon a far greater exigence; for the Common-
wealth of Rome, when ROMULUS did the like, was feated or plan-
ted, but the Commonwealth of Ifrael, when Moses did this, was
neither feated nor planted, nor indeed a Commonwealth, but an Army
defign'd to be a Commonwealth. Now between the Government
that is neceffary to an Army, and that which is neceffary to a Common-
wealth, there is a vaft difference. The Government even of the Ar-
mys of Rome, when fhe was a Commonwealth, was nevertheleſs
Monarchical in this regard MOSES himſelf exercis'd a kind of Dic-
tatorian Power for his life; and the Commonwealth being not yet
planted, nor having any Balance wherupon to weigh her felf, muſt
either have bin left at his death to the care of fom Man whom he
knew beft able to lay her Foundation, or to extreme hazard. Wher-
fore this Ordination, which was but accidental, regarding the prefent
military condition of the People, Moses moft prudently diftinguiſhes
from the other; in that he fhew'd them how they fhould manage
their Commonwealth, in this he bequeaths them the Man whom he
thinks the moſt likely to bring them to be a Commonwealth of
which judgment and undertaking of MOSES, JOSHUA the next il-
luftrious Example, moft worthily acquitted himſelf.
:
THERE is in theſe Elections another remarkable paffage, but
fuch a one as, being fo far from political that it is fupernatural, dos
not properly appertain to this diſcourſe, and ſo I ſhall but point at
it. When the Elders, thus chofen, were fet round about the Taberna-
cle, the Lord came down in a cloud, and took of the spirit of MOSES,
and gave it to the feventy Elders; and it came to pass, that when the
Spirit refted upon them, they prophesy'd and did not ceafe. So JOSHUA
was full of the Spirit of Wisdom, for Moses had laid his hands upon
1 Tim. 1.6. him. And PAUL minds TIMOTHY, Stir up the Gift of God which
is in thee by the laying on of my hands. But the Talmudists themſelves
do not pretend that their Ordination was further accompany'd with
fupernatural indowments than the firſt Inſtitution; and if Divines
were as ingenuous, no lefs might be acknowleg'd of theirs. MOSES
was a Prophet, the like to whom has not bin in Ifrael; and has there
bin an Apoſtle like PAUL in the Chriftian Church? Every body can-
not do Miracles, we fee they can't. Take heed how you deny Senſe,
for then bread may be fleſh. If we be not to make choice of a poli-
tical Inſtitution without a miraculous teft or recommendation; either
Ordination was at first accompany'd with fupernatural Gifts, and from
thenceforth, as I conceive, neither. Divines methinks as fuch ſhould
not be fo much concern'd in the Ordination of the Sanhedrim, or of
JOSHUA, who were Magiftrats, as the People or the Magiftrat: yet
if theſe ſhould hence infer that their Election, Ordination, or Defigna-
tion of perfons confer'd fupernatural Gifts, Divines would hardly
allow of it; and why are the People, or the Magiftrat oblig'd to
allow
of Popular Government.
347
allow more to that of a Clergy? To return.
SUCH as I have fhewn was the Ordination of the Senat, or great
Sanhedrim, that of the leffer Sanhedrim, or inferior Courts, was of
α
Chap. 3
like nature, for it follows; I took the chief of your Tribes, wife men and Deut. 1. 15.
known (xxxrés-noa) and made them Heads over you, Captains of thou-
fands, and Captains of hundreds, &c. which were other Magiftrats
than according to our cuftom, we ſhould readily expect to be inti-
mated by fuch words, for they were the Judges of the inferior Courts,
thoſe that fat in the gates of each City, and others that appertain❜d to
the Villages, as in the next Verfe: And I charg'd your fudges at that
time, faying, Hear the Caufes, and judg righteously.
THE next Magiftrat whofe Election coms to be confider'd is the
Dictator, or Judg of Ifrael. Where it is faid of this People, that
Ver. 10.
the Lord rais'd them up Judges, which deliver'd them out of the hands of Judg. 2. 16.
thoſe that ſpoil'd them, it is to be underftood, fays SIGONIUS, that God De Rep.Heb.
put it into the mind of the People to elect fuch Magiftrats, or Captains
over them. For example, when the Children of Ammon made war
againſt Ifrael, God rais'd up JEPHTHA, whofe Election was after
this manner: The Elders went to fetch JEPHTHA, out of the Land of Judges 11.
Tob, and when they had brought him to Mizpeh (which in thoſe days
was the place, where xxix, the Congregation of Ifrael uſually
affembled) the People made him Head and Captain over them. Now
that the Election of the King was as much in the Chirotonia of the
People, as that of the Judg, is paſt all Controverſy, feeing the Law
fpeaking of the People fays thus: One from among thy Brethren ſhalt Deut. 17. 15-
thou fet King over thee; and accordingly when the Government was
chang'd to Monarchy, it was not SAMUEL, but the People that
would have it ſo; thus SAUL was chofen King by the Lot. Where the
contradiction of GROTIUS is remarkable, who in this place to fhew
that the Lot is of Popular Inftitution, quotes ARISTOTLE; and yet
when he coms to fpeak of the Lots that were caft at the Election of Arift. Pol.
MATTHIAS, fays it was that it might appear not whom the Multitude, B. 6. c. 2.1
but whom God had ordain'd; as if the Magiftrat lawfully elected by De Imp. S.P.
the People, were not elected by God, or that the Lot which thus falls c. 10.
into the Lap were not at the difpofing of the Lord. But if the League by
which the People receiv'd DAVID into the Throne, or the Votes
by which firſt the People of Jerufalem, and afterwards the Congre-
gation of Ifrael (as was fhewn in the former Book) made SOLOMON
King, were of the Lord; then Election by the People was of the
Lord and the Magiftrat that was elected by the Chirotonia of the
People, was elected by the Chirotonia of God: for as the Congrega-
tion of Ifrael is call'd in Scripture (Exxλnia ) the Ecclefia or Con-
gregation of God; fo the Chirotonia of this Congregation is call'd by Judges 20.
JOSEPHUS (ε Xespotovía) the Chirotonia of God, who, as I noted be-
fore out of CAPELLUS, was in this Commonwealth Political King, Jof. 1. 4.
or Civil Legiſlator (fans comparaison) as SOLON in Athens, and Ro-
MULUS in Rome; that is to propofe to the People (Hæc eft lex quam
Moses propofuit) and whatever was propos'd, by God, or the lawful
Magiftrat under him, and chirotoniz'd or voted by the People, was
Law in Ifrael, and no other. Nay, and the People had not only
power to reject any Law that was thus propos'd, but to repeal any
Law that was thus enacted: for if God intending Popular Govern-
ment ſhould have ordain'd it otherwiſe, he muſt have contradicted
himſelf;
Y y 2
348
The Prerogative
c. 5.
σε
Book II. himſelf; wherfore he plainly acknowleges to them this power, where
~ (EOV & WOXESPOTOVEEL THE CαothεTas) they rejected him (whom they had for-
Jofephus, 1.6. merly chirotoniz'd or chofen King) that he ſhould not reign over them;
and elected SAUL. This if God had withſtood by his Power, he
muſt have introduc'd that kind of Monarchy which he had declar'd
againſt; wherfore he chofe rather to abandon this fottiſh and ingrate-
ful People to the moſt inextricable yoke of deferv'd ſlavery, telling
them, when he had warn'd them and they would not hear him, that
they should cry to him and he would not hear them, one tittle of whoſe
words paffed not unfulfill'd.
BY this time I have fhewn that all the Civil Magiſtrats in Ifrael
were choſen by the Chirotonia of the People, or, to follow JOSEPHUS,
by the Chirotonia of God, which is all one; for the Chirotonia of the
Preſident of the Congregation, as I have inftanc'd in that of the
Proedri, of the Thefmotheta, of the Confuls, of the Tribuns, and the
Chirotonia of the Congregation is the fame thing; and of the Con-
gregation of Ifrael God, except only at the voting of a King, was
Prefident.
TO com then from the Civil Magiftrats to the Priests and Levits,
theſe were choſen in two ways, either by the Lot, or by the Chiro-
tonia.
THE office and dignity of the High Prieſt being the greateſt in
Ifrael, and by the inftitution to be hereditary, caus'd great diſputes in
the Election to this MOSES by the command of God had defign'd
AARON his Brother; which Defignation, the Command of God be-
ing at first either not fo obvious as that relation, or the ambition of
others fo blind that they could not or would not fee it, caus'd great
combuſtion. First, thro the confpiracy of KORAH, DATHAN,
and ABIRAM; and next by the murmuring of the Princes of the
Tribes, all emulous of this Honor. KORAH being not only a great
Numb. 16. man, but of the Tribe of Levi, could not fee why he was not as
Jofephus 1. 4.
worthy of the Priesthood, confideration had of his Tribe, as AARON;
and if any other Tribe might pretend to it, DATHAN and ABI-
RAM being deſcended from REUBEN were not only of the elder
Houſe, but troubl'd to fee a younger prefer'd before them. Wher-
fore theſe having gain'd to their Party three hundred of the moſt
powerful men of the Congregation, accus'd Moses of affecting Ty-
ranny, and doing thofe things which threaten'd the Liberty of the
Commonwealth; as under pretence of Divination to blind the Eyes of
the People, preferring his Brother to the Priesthood without the Suf-
frage of the Congregation: of which charge MOSES acquitting him-
felf in the Congregation, tells the People that AARON was chofen
both by God, and (κατὰ τὴν ὑμετεραν γνώμην αυτό τυγχάνων) by their
Suffrages, which (KORAH being upon this occafion miraculouſly
deſtroy'd) were therupon once more given by the People. Never-
theleſs the Princes of the Tribes continuing ftill difcontented, and full
of murmur, God decided the Controverfy by a fecond miracle, the
budding of AARON's Rod: (and fox • μED THIS AUTOV TO DEX XεSPOTOVÝ
σατος βεβαίως ἔἶχε τὴν τιμὴν) being thrice confirm'd by the Chirotonia of
God, he was confirm'd in that honor. Now that the Chirotonia of
God in this place of JOSEPHUS fignifys the Chirotonia of the
1 Chron. 29. People, is plain by that in Scripture, where they made SoLo-
MON King, and ZADOC to be Prieft. After the Captivity, as
22.
in
of Popular Government.
349
de Bel.
•
Hal. Cele
I.
in other things, fo in this power the Sanhedrim came, as I conceive, Chap. 3.
to overreach the People: JOSHUA the Son of JOSEDECH being thus
elected high Prieft by the Sanhedrim, and this Honor thenceforth Grot. ad
(as appears by MAIMONIDES) being at the difpofing of this Court. Hag. 1.
Nor cou'd any inferior Prieſt ſerve at the Altar, except he had ac- Jofeph.
quir'd that right by the Lot, as is not only deliver'd by the fame Au- Jud. 1. 4.
thor and by JOSEPHUS, but in Scripture. Now the Lot, as was Maimon.
fhewn, giving no Prerogative either to any perfon or party, is as popular Hamik-
an Inftitution as the Chirotonia. So in election of Priefts, the Orders dafch, cap. 4.
of Ifrael differ'd not from human Prudence, nor thoſe of other Com- & 5;
monwealths, the Priests of JUPITER having bin elected after the
5. & 25.8.&
fame manner in the Commonwealth of Syracufa; the Auguftales, and 26. 13.
the Vestals in that of Rome: and if the right of bearing holy Ma-
giftracy, being in Ifrael confin'd to one Tribe or Order, may feem to
make any difference, it was for fome time no otherwiſe in Athens, nor in
Rome, where the Patricians or Nobility affum'd thefe Offices, or the
greateſt of them to themſelves, till the People in thoſe Citys difputed
that Cuſtom, as introduc'd without their confent, which the People
of Ifrael could not fairly do, becauſe it was introduc'd by their con-
fent.
con.
2 Chron. 24.
Exod. 29.
TO com to the Levits in their original Ordination, God com-
manded MOSES faying, Thou shalt bring the Levits before the Taber- Numb. 8. 9,
nacle of the Congregation, and thou shalt gather the whole affembly of the 10.
Children of Ifrael, and they ſhall put their hands upon the Levits. This
in the found of the words may feem to imply the Chirothefia, or Im-
pofition of Hands, but take heed of that; Divines will not allow the
Chirothefia to be an Act of the People: but in this proceding the whole
people acted in the Ordination of the Levits, wherfore the Levits
alfo were ordain'd by the Chirotonia, Confent, Vote, or Suffrage of
the whole People imply'd in this action. But for the Ordination of
Prieſts and Levits, whatever it was, it is not to the prefent purpoſe;
Divines deriving not theirs from Priefts and Levits, but from Dukes,
Generals and Magiftrats, from that of JOSHUA and of the Sanhe-
drim, always provided, that this were of the fame nature with the
former, that is, by the Chirothefia, or Impofition of Hands, and not
by the Chirotonia of the People. However the Ordination of the
Magistracy was certainly Political; and fo in this deduction they them-
felves confefs that their Ordination alfo is a Political Conftitution: yet
wheras MOSES is commanded by God to bring AARON and his
Sons to the door of the Tabernacle of the Congregation, and having
waſh'd them there, to adorn them with the Prieftly Robes, with the
Miter, and to anoint them; wheras he is commanded (the Children
of Ifrael having first laid their hands upon the Levits) to cleanſe them,
and offer them for an Offering: Divines of the Hierarchy and the
Prefbytery (tho it be otherwife with WALLEUS and fuch as ac-
knowlege Popular Government) give the Congregation, or Conſent
of the People for nothing, and put the whole Ordination of the Prieſts
and Levits upon the wathing and cleanfing, or other Ceremonys of
Confecration: as if to put the Ordination of SAUL upon the Cere-
mony of anointing by SAMUEL, tho perform'd by the immediat
Command of God, were not abfolutely contradictory to Scripture,
and to the known Law of Ifrael, which ſpeaking of the People, ex-
prefly fays, One from among thy Brethren ſhalt thou fet King over thee;
upon
Numb. 8.
350
The Prerogative
Book II. upon which place fays PHILO, Moft wife MOSES never intended that
the Royal Dignity ſhould be acquir'd by Lot, but chofe rather that the King
Philo de inft. Should be elected by the Chirotonia, or fuffrage of the whole People. The
principiis.
Congregations of the People affembled upon this as upon other public affairs,
and requir'd a fign or confirmation from God: forafmuch as by his will
Man is to the rest of Nature, what the Face is to the Body. Wherto a-
grees that of the Heathens, Os homini fublime dedit, Calumque tueri
juffit, and their Divinations upon the like occafions by Intrals, none of
which were ever underſtood as deſtructive of the liberty of the Peo-
ple, or of the freedom of their Chirotonia.
WHERE SOLOMON is made King, and ZADOC Prieft by
the People, tho the Ceremony of anointing was doubtless perform'd,
and perhaps by the Prophet NATHAN, it is wholly omitted in the
place as not worth the fpeaking of. The opinion that the Ordination
of the Priefts and Levits lay in the Ceremonys of their Confecration,
is every whit as fober and agreeable to reafon, as if a Man fhould
hold the Kings of England to have bin made by the Unction of the
Biſhops. Ifrael from the Inftitution of Moses to the Monarchy,
was a Democracy, or Popular Government; in Popular Government
the Confent of the People is the Power of the People, and both the
Prieſts and Levits were ordain'd by the Confent of the People of
Ifrael.
TO bring theſe things to the Citys in the perambulation of the
Apoftles, which by the former Chapter I have prov'd to have bin
Ditm. c. 10. Popular Governments; it is acknowleg'd by GROTIUS to the Citys
of Afia, not only that they us'd the Chirotonia, but in the ftricteſt
fenſe of the word, that is, to give their Suffrage by the holding up
of Hands. And that they had the liberty of their Religion, the choice
of their Magiſtrats, both Civil and Ecclefiaftical in their Ecclefiæ, or
Congregations, has bin alfo undeniably evidenc'd; whence it must
needs follow that there were Citys in Afia (χειροτονήσαντες αυτοῖς πρεσβυτέ
gus xar' Exxλncíav) chirotonizing or ordaining them Elders, that is, Ma-
giftrats and Priefts in every Congregation (with Reverence be it
ſpoken) long before CHRIST was in the flesh, or the Apoſtles any
of them were born. Wherfore to fum up what in this Chapter I
conceive to be fufficiently prov'd, I may boldly conclude, That the
Chirotonia derives from popular Conftitution, and that there was a way
of Ordination by the Chirotonia.
κατ'
CHA P. IV.
The deduction of the Chirothefia from Monarchical or Arifto-
cratical Government, and of the fecond way of Ordina-
tion from the Chirothefia. In which is contain'd the
Commonwealth of the Jews as it flood after the Captivity.
W
HAT pleaſes the Prince, fays JUSTINIAN, has the force of
a Law, feeing the People in his Creation have devolv'd their whole
Power upon his Perfon; which is with the moft. But when Popular
Government is chang'd into Monarchical, either the whole Power of
the People, or a great part of it muſt of neceffity accrue to the King.
Hence
of Popular Government.
İ
૬)
In
1
Hence fays SAMUEL, he will appoint him Captains over Thousands, Chap. 4.
and Captains over Fiftys: in which words perhaps is intimated the
Judges of the inferior Courts, or Jethronian Prefectures; fo that hereby Sam. 8. 12.
SAMUEL tells the People they fhall no more have the Election of
their Rulers, but the King will have it; who, it may be, chang'd
the nature of fom of theſe Magiftracys, or added others: for when
DAVID came to reign over all Ifrael, JOAB was over the Hoft (his 2 Sam. 8. 15.
Strategus or General) JEHOSH APHAT was Recorder, ZADOK and
ABIMELEC were the Priests, SERAIAH was the Scribe, and BE-
NAIAH was over the Pelethits, and the Cherethits; that is, was Cap-
tain of his Regiments of Guard, call'd perhaps by thefe names, as
thofe of ROMULUS were call'd Celeres. But it ſhould ſeem that
few or none of theſe Officers were elected by the Chirotonia, that is
by the People, but by the Prince, which kind of Election, as will be
fhewn anon, may be call'd Chirothefia. For the deduction of this
kind of Ordination, or Election, we fhall do well to hearken firſt to
Dr. HAMMOND; who in his Query, or Diſcourſe concerning Ordi-
nation by the Impofition of Hands, puts it thus. To lift up the Hands
was a Ceremony in Prayer, and accordingly to lay hands on any (differing Exod. 17. 11.
no otherwife from lifting up, than by the determining that Action to a pecu-
liar Object, the Perfon that was pray'd for) was generally among the Jews
a Ceremony of benediction us'd firft by the Father to the Children, in be-
ftowing the Bleſſing upon them (and with that a fucceffion to fom part of
§. 10.
bis Eftate or Inheritance) as appears in JACOB's blessing the Children of Jo- Gen. 48. 14.
SEPH he ftretch'd out his right hand, and laid it upon EPHRAIM's
head, and his left hand on MANASSES, and fo he blefs'd, &c.
From thence it was accommodated among them to the communicating of any
part of Power to others as affiftants, or to the deriving of any fucceffive
Office from one to another. Thus when MOSES had from Heaven re-
ceiv'd, and long us'd his Commiffion to be under God the Ruler of the
People, the feventy Elders were by God's appointment affum'd to affift him: Numb. 11,
it being certain from the Jewish Writings, tho the facred Scripture has no ¹7•
occafion to mention it, that the fucceffion of the feventy Elders under the
name of Sanhedrim or Council was continu'd thro all Ages by their
creating others in the place of thoſe that dy'd, by this Ceremony of Impofition
of Hands. To this purpoſe are the clear words of MAIMONIDES: Mo- Tit. Sanhed.
SES Our Maſter created the feventy Elders by Impofition of Hands, c. 4•
and the Divine Majefty reſted on them; and thofe Elders impos'd
Hands on others, and others on others, &c. So a little before the depar-
ture of Moses out of this life, when a Succeffor was to be provided for
him, God commands him to take JOSHUA, and lay his hands upon Numb. 27.
him. And MOSES laid his hands upon him, and gave him a Charge 18, 23.
as the Lord commanded by the hand of MOSES: that is, deriv'd to
him by this Ceremony the Authority which himself had, and conftituted
bim his Succeffor in that Government. And fo it is repeated, JOSHUA Deut. 34. 9.
was full of the ſpirit of Wiſdom, for MOSES had laid his hands upon
him.
THIS is the Doctor's deduction of the Chirothefia, or Ordination
by the laying on of Hands, from the Commonwealth of Ifrael: and,
Yays he, from the three Ufes of this Ceremony there, that is, firft in praying
for another; fecondly, in paternal benediction; thirdly, in creating Suc-
cefors in power, either in whole, or in part, derive three forts of things
in the New Teftament, to which this Ceremony of laying on of Hands is
accom-
352
The Prerogative
|
Mar. 16. 18.
Book II. accommodated. That of Prayer fimply taken was of two forts, either for
the cure of Difeafes, or pardoning of Sins. For Difeafes: They fhall
lay hands on the fick, and they fhall recover. For Sins they were don
away also by this Ceremony in the abfolution of Penitents, to which belongs
1 Tim. 5.22. that Exhortation of PAUL to TIMOTHY, Lay hands fuddenly on no
man, that is, not without due examination and proof of his Penitence,
left thou be partaker of other men's Sins. From the ſecond, that of Pa-
ternal Benediction, was borrow'd, first that of bleſſing Infants with the
Mar. 10. 16. Ceremony of Impofition of Hands, as it differ'd from Baptifm. And fe-
condly, that of confirming thofe of fuller age, that had bin formerly baptiz'd.
Laftly, to the creating Succellors in any Power, or communicating any
part of Power to others, as to Affiftants, is answerable that Impofition of
Hands in Ordination fo often mention'd in the New Testament, fomtimes in
the lower degree, as in the ordaining of Deacons, elsewhere in the highest
degree, fetting Governors over particular Churches, as generally when by
that laying on of Hands it is faid, they receiv'd the Holy Ghoft;
wheras the Holy Ghost contains all the xagiopara requir'd to the paftoral
Function, and fo fignifys Power from on high: the Authority and Function
itfelf, fo it be given by Impofition of Hands, makes the parallel exact be-
tween this of Chriflian Ordination, and that obferv'd in the creating Suc-
ceffors in the Jewish Sanhedrim. So far the Doctor.
Acts 6. 6.
Luke 24.49.
Deut. I.
•
NOW fay I, if the Scripture be filent as to the Ordination of the
Elders in Ifrael, what means that place; Take ye wife men, and under-
Standing, and known among your Tribes, and I will make them Rulers over
you? Once in their lives let them give us the fenſe of it, or of that
other, where ELDAD and MEDAD were of thofe that were written, and
Numb. 11. yet went not up to the Tabernacle: Otherwife that we hear no more of
thefe, is from the filence of Divines, and not of the Scripture. But
if the Scripture be not filent in this point, is there not a great deal of
fancy in going on to cure the Sick, to pardon Sins, to bleſs Infants, con-
firm the Baptiz'd, ordain Minifters, nay, give the Holy Ghoft, and all
the Graces belonging to the paſtoral Function, from a place that has no ſuch
thing in it? for if the Sanhedrim according to Scripture were not or-
dain'd by the Chirothefia, there is no fuch thing to be deriv'd by the Chi-
rothefia from the Sanhedrim. The first Chirotonia indeed of the Sanhe-
drim was accompany'd with miraculous indowments; wherfore if they
will derive thefe Gifts and Graces from the Sanhedrim, why are
they fworn Enemies to the Chirotonia? Again, the Sanhedrim was a
Civil Court or Senat; wherfore then by this Title ſhould not theſe
Gifts and Graces be rather pretended to by the Civil Magiftrat, than
by Divines? What becoms of the Prieft AARON and his Lots? is he
left to the Civil Magiftrat, while Divines derive themſelves from Ge-
neral JOSHUA and his Chirothefia? But if the Sanhedrim and infe-
rior Judicatorys were otherwite ordain'd originally; then no Magi-
ftrat in Ifrael was originally ordain'd by the Chirotheſia, but only
JOSHUA. It is admirable that Divines fhould look upon God, as if in
the inſtitution of a Commonwealth he had no regard at all to human
Prudence, but was altogether fix'd upon their vain advantages. Who
made human Prudence? or to what end was it made? Any man that
underſtands the Politics, and confiders that God was now proceding
according to this Art (as in his conftitution of the Senat, and of the
People or Congregation, is moſt obvious) muſt needs fee that this
Power he indulg'd to Moses of making his own choice of one
2
man,
of Popular Government.
353
man; could not poffibly be intended as a permanent Conftitution; Chap. 4.
for wheras he intended Popular Government, nothing is plainer than
that a People not electing their own Magiftrats can have no Popular"
Government. How abfurd is it to conceive that God having already
made an expreſs Law, that the People if at any time they came under
Monarchy, fhould yet have the election of their King, would now
make a Law that the People being under a Commonwealth, ſhould no
longer have the election of their Magiftrats? For who fees not that to
introduce the Chirothefia as a ſtanding Ordinance, had bin to bar the
People of this power? Ifrael at this time, tho defign'd for a Common-
wealth, had no Land, no foundation to balance her felf upon, but
was an Army in a Wilderneſs, incompafs'd about with Enemys.
To permit to the People in this cafe, the choice of all their Civil Ma-
giftrats, was nevertheleſs fafe enough, nay beft of all: for at the
election of wife men, and understanding, and known among their Tribes,
fo far as was needful to civil adminiftration, their ſkill muft needs
have bin at any time ſufficient; but the Commonwealth was yet in
abfolute neceffity of a Protector, and of Dictatorian Power. Now
to know who was fitteft in this cafe to fuccede Moses, requir'd the
Wiſdom of God, or of Moses; and therfore was not yet fafe to be
ventur'd upon a People fo new in their Government. For thefe rea-
fons, I fay, MOSES us'd the Chirothefia for once, and no more; or let
them fhew me among all the Dictators, Judges, or Kings, that fuc-
ceded JOSHUA, any one that was chofen by the Chirothefia, and be
all Dictators. It is now above three thouſand years fince the inftitu-
tion of the Sanhedrim, from which time the ambitious Elders firſt,
then the Talmudifts, and of latter ages Divines have bin perpetually
ſtriving for, or poffeffing themſelves of this fame Oligarchical Invention
of the Chirothefia pretended to be deriv'd from MOSES; tho there be
neither any fuch Precept of God or Chrift in the Old or New Teſta-
ment, nor any unanimous refult upon the point, either by the Talmu-
diſts or Divines themſelves. And for the clear words quoted by the
Doctor out of MAIMONIDES, they are fuch to which I fhall in due
time fhew MAIMONIDES to be elſewhere of a clear contrary opi-
nion. But in this Controverfy, without fom clearer deduction of the
Chirothefia, we ſhall make no happy progrefs; in this therfore I fhall
follow SELDEN the ableft Talmudiſt of our age, or of any.
THE Commonwealth of Lacedemon (if I could ftand to fhew it
has ſtrange reſemblances to that of Ifrael, not only in the Agrarian,
which is nothing to the preſent purpoſe, but in the Senat, which to pre-
vent catching another time, I do not fay was a Judicatory only, but
not only a Senat, but a Judicatory alfo. For LYCURGUS of all
other Legiflators was in this the likeft to God, or to Moses, that
his work was fo exquifitly perfected at once, and his Laws fo com-
prehenfive, that if the Senat had had no other function than to make
or propofe new Laws, there being little or nothing of that wanting,
they would have had little or nothing to do. Now it being thus, and
much more than thus in Ifrael, the Sanhedrim was not only the Senat,
but the fupreme Judicatory. And becauſe one Court in a Territory of
any Extent is no where fufficient to this end; therfore the Sanhedrim
had divers branches diftended not only to the Citys of Judea, but even
to the Villages; theſe were call'd the Leffer Sanhedrim, or the Jethro-
nian Prefectures.
Z z
THE
354
The Prerogative
Book II.
THE Great Sanhedrim confifting, as has bin fhewn, of 70 El-
ders, fat firft in the Tabernacle, and afterwards in the Court of the
SeldendeSyn. Temple.
THE Jethronian Prefectures confifted fom of three and twenty
Elders, and others but of three. Of the former kind there were two
in the gates of the Temple, and one fitting in the gates of every City;
of the latter there was one almoſt in every Village.
THE power of the Jethronian Court, confifting of twenty three
Elders, was in matter of Judicature equal with that of the great San-
Vid. Grot. ad hedrim, only in cafes of difficulty they obferv'd this Precept. If
Deut. 17. 8. there arife a matter too hard for thee in judgment between Blood and Blood,
between Plea and Plea, between Stroke and Stroke, being matter of Con-
troverfy within thy gates; then shalt thou arife, and get thee up into the
place which the Lord thy God fhall chufe (in the future, for the Common-
wealth was yet but defign'd, not planted) and thou shalt com to the
Priests and the Levits, and to the Judg that ſhall be in thoſe days, and in-
quire, and they fhall fhew thee the fentence of Judgment: That is, thou
Thalt confult the Sanhedrim, or if there be no Sanhedrim, the Suffes
or Judg of Ifrael. The reafon why the Sanhedrim in this Text is
mention'd under the name of the Priests and Levits is, that theſe about
the beginning of this Commonwealth having (as were also the Egyp-
tian Priefts at the fame time) bin the learnedſt Men, whether for
Lawyers, or Phyſicians, there were ſcarce any other chofen into the
Sanhedrim, tho towards the latter end it happen'd to be far otherwife.
For wheras facrificing was feaſting, the Prieſts injoying a fat Idleneſs,
became in latter times fo heavy, that as to the Election of the Sanhe-
drim not only the Levits of inferior rank were upon the matter
wholly laid by, but the High-Prieſt himſelf ſometimes omitted, the
reſt of the Tribes far excelling this in Learning.
THE power of the Triumvirats, or three Judges in the Villages,
extended no farther than to inflict ftripes to a certain number, and pe-
cuniary mulcts to a certain fum. Theſe poffibly had the ſame recourfe
upon occafion of difficulty to the Judges in the Gates, as the Judges in
the Gates had to the Sanhedrim: but their power is not fo much to
the preſent purpoſe, which regards only their manner of Election.
This having bin inftitutively exercis'd, as has bin fhewn by the Chiroto-
nia, or Ballot of the People, came fooner or later (I find no man that
can refolve upon the certain time) to the Chirothefia. For tho when
a Judg in the gates was dead, that Court elected his Succeffor out of
their Diſciples (each Court in the Gates had 99 Difciples that were
their conftant Auditors) or out of the Triumvirats; and when an
Elder of the Sanhedrim dy'd, the Sanhedrim elected his Succeffor out
of the Courts in the Gates, more particularly thofe in the Gates of the
Temple by Suffrages; yet no man was capable of being elected into
any of theſe Courts that was not a Prefbyter, nor was any man a
Prefbyter that had not receiv'd the Chirothefia: nor could any man con-
Mikotzi Mif- fer the Chirothefia that had not firſt receiv'd it, or bin fo ordain'd a Preſ-
na Gemara. byter himſelf: nor tho he were fo ordain'd, could he confer the like Or-
dination, but in the preſence of two others, whether ordain'd or not
ordain'd: and no Ordination could be confer'd but either this way, or
Abr. Zacuth, by fom one of the Judicatorys. The manner how this Ordination was
Maimonides. confer'd, if the party were prefent, was either by laying on of Hands,
or by ſaying a Verfe or Charm; or if he were abfent, by a Letter, or
Patent.
AN
of Popular Government.
355
{
Rab. Jonah.
AN Elder thus ordain'd was call'd Rabbi, might have Difciples, Chap. 4.
teach, practife, or expound the Law, declare what was therby free
or forbidden (which with them was call'd binding and loofing) ordain Rab.Nathan.
others with the affiftance mention'd, or be capable of Election into
fom one, or any Court of Juftice, according to the nature of his Or-
dination, the Conditions mention'd at the conferring of the fame, or the
gift that was in him by the laying on of the hands of the Prefbytery: which
in fom extended no farther than to fhew how Meat ſhould be kill'd and
dreſs'd, how Uncleannefs fhould be purify'd, what were Vices of the
body, what might be eaten or drunk, and what not; in others it ex-
tended to fom one or more, or all the Facultys exprefs'd; but I am
inclining to believe that a plenary Ordination us'd not to be confer'd but
by the great Sanhedrim, or at leaft fom one of the Jethronian Courts.
THEY us'd alſo to confer this Ordination fom time occafionally,
and for a ſeaſon in this manner. Receive the gift of judiciary Ordina- Maimon. Tit.
tion, or the right of binding and loofing, till fuch time as you return to San. cap. 4.
us in the City. Where the Chriftian Jews ftill following their former
Cuſtoms in higher matters, as the obfervation of the Sabbath, and of
Circumcifion, even to fuch a degree, that PAUL not to difpleaſe them
took TIMOTHY and circumcis'd him, feem to me to have follow'd
this cuſtom, who when the Prophets at Antioch had inform'd them
that PAUL and BARNABAS were to be feparated to an extraordi-
nary work, laid their hands upon them, and fent them away: for other- A&ts. 13. 3.
wife as to Ordination PAUL and BARNABAS had that before; at leaſt
PAUL by ANANIAS, and for any fuch Precept in the Chriſtian Re- Acts. 9. 17.
ligion there was none,
yet
JOSEPHUS, PHILO, and other Authors that tell us the Com-
monwealth of Ifrael was an Ariftocracy, look no farther than the in-
troduction of the Chirothefia by the Prefbyterian Party, which muſt
have taken date fom time after the Captivity, or the reſtitution of the
Commonwealth by EZRA, there being not one fyllable for it in
Scripture, but enough to the contrary, feeing God introduc'd the Chi-
rotonia. By which it is demonftrable that a Preſbyterian Party may
bring a Popular Government to Oligarchy, and deface even the work
of God himſelf, ſo that it fhall not be known to after-ages; as alſo
that Eccleſiaſtical Writers (for fuch are the Talmudists) may pretend
that for many hundred years together, as Divines alfo have don, to be
in Scripture, which neither is, nor ever was there. But have I
faid enough to fhew that Ordination, eſpecially as in this Example,
not of a Clergy, but of a Magiftracy, whether by the Chirotonia, or
Chirothefia, is a Political Inftitution? or muft I rack my brains for Ar-
guments to prove that an Order or a Law having fuch influence upon
the Commonwealth, that being introduc'd or repeal'd, it quite alters
the whole frame of the Government, muft needs be of a political nature,
and therfore not appertain to Divines, or to a Clergy, but to the M1-
giftrat, unless their Traditions may be of force to alter the Govern-
ment as they pleaſe? All is one, they can abate nothing of it, let what
will com of the Government, the Chirothefia they muft and will have.
Then let them have Monarchy too, or Tyranny; for one of thefe,
according as the balance happens to ftand with or against their Chiro-
thefia, is the certain confequence; either Tyranny as in Ifrael, or Mɔ-
narchy as in the Papacy; and, from that or the like Principle, in all
ZZ 2
Gothic
356
The Prerogative
Book II. Gethic Empires: which Examples, to begin with Ifrael, well deferve
the pains to be fomwhat more diligently unfolded.
San. cap. 4.
ALL Elections in Ifrael, fave thofe of the Prieſts who were eligible
by the Lot, being thus ufurp'd by the Prefbyterian Party, and the Peo-
ple by that means divefted of their Chirotonia; fom three hundred
years before CHRIST, HILLEL Senior High Prieft, and Archon or
Prince of the Sanhedrim, found means to draw this Power of Ordi-
nation, in fhew fomwhat otherwife, but in effect to himſelf, and his
Maimon.Tit. Chirothefia for by his influence upon the Sanhedrim it was brought
to pals, that wheras formerly any man ordain'd miglit, in the manner
fhewn, have ordain'd his Difciples; it was now agreed that no man
fhould be ordain'd without the Licence of the Prince, and that this
Power ſhould not be in the Prince, but in the prefence of the Father
of the Sanhedrim, or Speaker of the Ifoufe. Thus the Ariftocracy
of Ifrael becoming firft Oligarchical, took (according to the nature of
all fuch Governments) long fteps towards Monarchy, which fucceed-
ing in the Afmonean Family, commonly call'd the Maccabees, was for
their great merit, in vindicating the Jews from the Tyranny of AN-
TIOCHUS, Confirm'd to them by the univerfal confent and Chirotonia
of the People. Nevertheleſs to him that underſtands the Orders of a
Commonwealth, or has read the Athenian, Lacedemonian, or Roman
Story, it will be plain enough that but for their Ariftocracy they
needed not to have bin ſo much beholden to, or to have ſtood ſo much
in need of one Family. It is true, both the merit of theſe Princes,
and the manner of their free Election by the People, feem to forbid
the name of Tyranny to this Inftitution: but ſo it is, that let there
be never fo much Merit in a Man, or Inclination of the People to
the Prince, or the Government that is not founded upon the due ba-
lance, the Prince, in that cafe muft either govern in the nature of a
Commonwealth, as did thoſe of this Family, reforming the policy
after the Lacedemonian Model, or turn Tyrant, as from their time,
who liv'd in the Age of the Grecian Monarchy, did all their Succeffors,
till under the Romans this Nation became a Province: From which
time fuch Indeavors and Infurrections they us'd for the recovery of
their antient Policy, that under the Emperor ADRIAN (who per-
ceiv'd at what their Ordination, being not of Prieſts, but of Magiftrats,
and of a Senat pretending to Soverain Judicature and Authority, feem'd
to aim) there came, fays the Talmud, against the Ifraelits an Edict out
of the Kingdom of the Wicked (meaning the Roman Empire) wherby
whofoever should ordain, or be ordain'd, was to be put to death, and the
School or City in which fuch an Act ſhould be done, to be deſtroy'd: wher-
upon Rabbi JEHUDA BEN BABA (left Ordination fhould fail in If-
rael) went forth, and flanding between two great Mountains, and two
great Citys, and between two Sabbathdays journys from Ofa and Sephara,
ordain'd five Prefbyters. For this Feat the Rabbi is remember'd by the
Talmudifts under the Name of Ordinator; but the fame, as it follows,
being diſcover'd by the Roman Guards, they shot his Body thro with
So many Darts, as made it like a Sieve: Yet ftaid not the buſineſs here,
but fo obftinat continu'd the Jews in the Superftition to which this
kind of Ordination was now grown, that wheras by the fame it was
unlawful for them to ordain in a foren Land, and at home they could
not be brrought to abftain, the Emperor baniſh'd them all out of their
own
of Popular Government.
357
C. 4. S. 11.
own Country; whence happen'd their total Difperfion. That of a Chap. 4.
thing which at the firft was a mere delufion, fuch Religion ſhould
com in time, and with education to be made that not only they who
had receiv'd advantage could fuffer Martyrdom, but they that had loft
by it, would be utterly loft for it, were admirable in the cafe of this
People, if it were not common in the caſe of moft in the World at this
day: Cuſtom may bring that to be receiv'd as an Ordinance of God, for
which there is no color in Scripture. For to confult MAIMONIDIS
a little better upon this point: Wheras, fays he, they grant, in cafe it Halac Sam.
ſhould happen that in all the Holy Land there remain'd but one Prefbyter,
that Prefbyter, affifted by two other Ifraelits, might ordain the feventy, or
great Sanhedrin, and the Sanhedrim fo conftituted might conftitute and
ordain the leffer Courts, I am of opinion that were there no Prefbyter in the
Land, yet if all the Wife Men of Ifrael ſhould agree to confiitute or ordain
Judges, they might do it lawfully enough. But if so, then how coms it to
pass that our Ancestors have bin fo folicitous, left Judicature should fail
in Ifrael? Surely for no other cauſe than that from the time of the Cap-
tivity the Ifraelits were fo difpers'd that they could not upon like occafions
be brought together. Now I appeal whether the clear Words of MAI-
MONIDES, where he fays, that our Mafter MOSES ordain'd the San-
hedrim by the Chirothefia, be not more clearly and ſtrongly contra-
dicted in this place, than affirm'd in the other; fince acknowleging that
if the People could affemble, they might ordain the Sanhedrim, he
gives it for granted, that when they did affemble, they had power to
ordain it; and that Moses did affemble them upon this occafion, is
plain in Scripture. Again, if the power of Ordination falls ultimatly
to the People, there is not a ftronger argument in Nature that it is
thence primarily deriv'd. To conclude, the Chirothefia of the Pref-
byterian Party in Ifrael is thus confefs'd by the Author no otherwiſe
neceffary, than thro the defect of the Chirotonia of the People: which
Ingenuity of the Talmudist, for any thing that has yet paſt, might be
worthy the Imitation of Divines.
IN tracking the Jews from the reftitution of their Commonwealth
after the Captivity to their difperfion, it feems that the later Monarchy
in Ifrael was occafion'd by the Oligarchy, the Oligarchy by the Ari-
ſtocracy, and the Ariftocracy by the Chirothefia; but that this Monar-
chy, tho erected by magnanimous and popular Princes, could be no lefs
than Tyranny deriv'd from another Principle, that is, the infufficiency of
the balance: For tho from the time of the Captivity, the Jubile was
no more in uſe, yet the Virgin MARY as an Heiress, is affirm'd by fom
to have bin marry'd to JOSEPH by virtue of this Law: Every Daugh- Numb 27. 8.
ter that poſſeſſes an Inheritance in any Tribe of the Children of Iſrael, fl:all
be Wife to one of the Family of the Tribe of her Fathers, &c. By which
the Popular Agrarian may be more than fufpected to have bin of great-
er vigor than would admit of a well-balanc'd Monarchy.
THE fecond Prefbytery, which is now attain'd to a well-balanc'd
Empire in the Papacy, has infinitly excell'd the pattern, the Lands of
Italy being moſt of them in the Church. This, if I had leifure,
might be track'd by the very fame ſteps: At first it confifted of the
feventy Pariſh Prieſts, or Prefbyters of Rome; now feventy Cardi-
nals creating to themſelves a High Prieft, or Prince of their Sanhae-
drim, the Pope, but for the Superftition wherto he has brought Re-
ligion,
358
The Prerogative
Book II. ligion, and continues by his Chirothefia to hold it, a great and a Re-
verend Monarch, eſtabliſh'd upon a folid Foundation, and governing
by an exquifit Policy, not only well-balanc'd at home, but deeply root-
ed in the greateft Monarchys of Chriftendom, where the Clergy by
virtue of their Lands are one of the three States.
THE Maxims of Rome are profound; for there is no making uſe
of Princes without being neceffary to them, nor have they any regard
to that Religion which dos not regard Empire. All Monarchys of the
Gothic Model, that is to fay, where the Clergy by virtue of their
Lands are a third eſtate, ſubſiſt by the Pope, whofe Religion creating
a reverence in the People, and bearing an aw upon the Prince, preferves
the Clergy, that elfe being unarm'd, becom a certain Prey to the
King or the People; and where this happens (as in HENRY the
Eighth) down gos the Throne; for fo much as the Clergy lofes,
falls out of the Monarchical into the Popular Scale. Where a Clergy
is a third Eftate, Popular Government wants Earth, and can never
grow but where they dy at the root, a Prince may fit a while, but is
not fafe: nor is it in nature (except he has a Nobility or Gentry able
without a Clergy to give balance to the People) that he ſhould fubfift
long or peaceably: For wherever a Government is founded on an
Army, as in the Kings of Ifrael or Emperors of Rome, there the fad-
deft Tragedys under Heaven are either on the Stage, or in the Tiring-
houſe. Theſe things confider'd, the Chirothefia being originally no-
thing elſe but a way of Policy excluding the People, where it attains
not to a balance that is fufficient for this purpoſe, brings forth Oli-
garchy or Tyranny, as among the Jews: And where it attains to a
balance fufficient to this end, produces Monarchy, as in the Papacy,
and in all Gothic Kingdoms.
THE Prieſts of Egypt, where, (as it is defcrib'd by SICULUS) their
Revenue came to the third part of the Realm, would no queftion
have bin exactly well fitted with the Chirothefia pretended to by mo-
dern Divines. Suppoſe the Apoſtles had planted the Chriftian Re-
ligion in thoſe Parts, and the Prieſts had been all converted, I do not
think that Divines will fay, that having alter'd their Religion they
needed to have deſerted their being a third Eſtate, their overbalance
to the People, their Lands, their Preeminence in the Government, or
any Part of their Policy for that: and I am as far from faying fo as
themſelves.
ON the other fide, as PAUL was a Citizen of Rome, let us fuppofe
him to have bin a Citizen of Athens, and about (xadisáva) to con-
ſtitute the Chriſtian Religion in this Commonwealth, where any Citi-
zen might ſpeak to the People: Imagin then he ſhould have ſaid thus:
Men of Athens, that which you ignorantly feek I bring to you, the true
Religion; but to receive this, you must not alter your former Belief only,
but your antient Customs. Your Political Affemblys have bin hitherto call'd
Ecclefiæ; this word must lose the antient fenfe, and be no more underſtood
but of Spiritual Confiftorys; and fo wheras it has bin of a Popular, it must
henceforth be of an Ariftocratical, or Prefbyterian fignification. For
your Chirotonia, that also must follow the fame rule; infomuch as on
whomsoever one or more of the Ariftocracy or Prefbytery fhall lay their hands,
the fame is understood by virtue of that Action to be chirotoniz'd. How
well would this have founded in Egypt, and how ill in Athens? Cer-
tainly
of Popular Government.
359
tainly the Policy of the Church of CHRIST admits of more Pru- Chap. 5.
dence and Temperament in theſe things: Tho the Apostles being Jews
themſelves, fatisfy'd the converted Jews that were us'd to Aristocracy,
by retaining ſomewhat of their Conſtitutions, as the Chirothefia; yet
when PAUL and BARNABAS com to conſtitute in Popular Com-
monwealths, they are (χειροτονήσαντες αυτοις πρεσβυτέρες κατ' ἐκκλησίαν)
Chirotonizing them Elders in every Congregation.
CHA P. V.
Whether the Chirotonia mention'd in the fourteenth of the
Acts be indeed, as is pretended by Dr. HAMMOND, Dr.
SEAMAN, and the Authors they follow, the fame with the
Chirothefia, or a far different thing.
far different thing. In which are
contain'd the divers kinds of Church-Government intro-
duc'd and exercis'd in the age of the Apoftles.
E'
ITHER I have impertinently intruded upon the Politics, or
cannot be faid fo much to meddle in Church-matters, as
Churchmen may be faid to have meddled in State-matters: For if the
Chirotonia be Election by the many, and the Chirothefia be Election
by one, or by the Few, the whole difference between Popular and
Monarchical Government falls upon theſe two words; and fo the
queſtion will be, Whether the Scriptures were intended more
for the advantage of a Prince, of a Hierarchy or Prefbytery, than
of the People. But that God in the Old Teſtament inftituted the
Chirotonia, not only in the Commonwealth, as by the Election of
the Sanhedrim, but in the Monarchy, as in the Election of the Kings,
is plain: So if there remains any advantage in Scripture to Kings,
to the Hierarchy or Prefbytery, it muſt be in the New Teftament.
Ifrael was God's chofen People, and God was Ifrael's chofen King :
That God was pleas'd to bow the Heavens, and come down to them,
was his choice, not theirs; but in that upon his Propofition, and thoſe
of his Servant MOSES, they refolv'd to obey his Voice, and keep his
Covenant, they choſe him their King. In like manner, the Church is
CHRIST'S chofen People, and CHRIST is the Church's chofen
King. That CHRIST taking fleſh was pleas'd to bow the Heavens,
and com down in a more familiar capacity of propofing himſelf to
Mankind, was his own choice, not theirs: but in that the Church up-
on his Propofition, or thoſe of his Apoſtles fent by him, as he was
fent by the Father, refolv'd to obey his Voice, and keep his Cove-
nant, he has chofen him her King. Whatever in Nature or in
Grace, in Church or in State, is chofen by Man according to the
Will of God, is chofen by God, of whom is both the Will and the
Deed. Which things confider'd, I wonder at Dr. HAMMond,
who fays, Sure the Jewish and Heathen Citys, to whom the Gospel by §. 36.
CHRIST's Command was to be preach'd, were not to chufe their Guides
or Teachers. CHRIST was not chofen by them to whom he preach'd; for
fays he, ye have not chofen me. He came from Heaven, fent by his Father
on that Errand; and happy they whom he was thus pleas'd to chuſe, to call,
and
360
The Prerogative
Book II. and preach to. And when his Apoftles, after his example, go and preach
to all Nations, and actually gather Difciples, they chofe their Auditors,
and not their Auditors them. To make ſhort work, I ſhall anſwer by
explaining his Words as they fall.
§. 107.
A&ts 20. 28.
A ROMAN chufing whether he would ſpeak to the Senat or the
People, chofe his Auditors, and not they him: Nevertheleſs if it were
the Conful, they choſe him, and not he them. It is one thing to be a
Speaker to a People, that have the liberty, when that's don, to do as
they think fit; and another thing to be a Guide, whom the People
have confented, or oblig'd themſelves to follow: which diftinction
not regarded, makes the reft of his Argumentation recoil upon himſelf;
while he procedes thus: And they that give up their Names to the Obe-
dience of the Gospel (chofe the Preachers, as I fhould think, of that
Goſpel their Guides) one branch of this Obedience obliges them (by their
own confent it ſeems, becauſe before they gave up their Names) to
obferve thofe that (being thus plac'd over them by their conſent) are
plac'd over them by God: fuch not only are their Civil Magiftrats (who
fuccede to their places by, and govern according to the Laws which
the People have chofen) but alſo their Paftors, whom the Holy Ghoft
either mediatly (according to the Rules of Church Difciplin in Scrip-
ture) or immediatly (upon for fuch miraculous Call, as the People
fhall judg to be no impofture) has fet over them. From which
words the Doctor, not confidering thoſe Qualifications I have fhewn
all along to be naturally inherent in them, concludes that a Bishop is
made by the Holy Ghost, and not by the People.
IF he would ſtand to this yet it were fomthing; for if the Holy
Ghoſt makes a Biſhop, then I ſhould think that the Holy Ghoſt or-
dain'd a Biſhop, and ſo that the Election and Ordination of a Biſhop
were all one. But this hereafter will appear to be a more dangerous
Conceffion than perhaps you may yet apprehend. Wherfore when all
is don, you will not find Divines, at leaſt Dr. HAMMOND, to grant
that the Holy Ghoſt can ordain: he may elect indeed, and that is all;
but there is no Ordination without the Chirothefia of the Biſhops, or
of the Preſbytery. Take the Doctor's word for it.
WHEN St. PAUL fays of the Biſhops of Afia, that the Holy Ghost
had fet them Overfeers, I fuppofe that it is to be underflood of their E-
lection or Nomination to thofe Dignitys: for fo CLEMENT fpeaks of
St. JOHN, who conftituted Bishops of those that were fignify'd by the
Spirit; where the Spirit's Signification notes the Election or Nomination
of the Perfons, but the conftituting them was the Ordination of St. JOHN.
GOD may propofe, as the Electors do to the great Council of
Venice; but the Power of the Council, that is to refolve or ordain,
is in the Biſhop, fays Dr. HAMMOND, and in the Prefbytery, fays
Dr. SEAMAN. Indeed that Election and Ordination be diftinct
things, is to Divines of fo great Importance, that lofing this hold, they
lofe all: For, as I faid before, whatever is choſen by Man according
to the Will of God, that is, according to Divine Law, whether na-
tural or pofitive, the fame, whether in State or Church, is chofen by
God, or by the Holy Ghoft, of whom is both the Will and the Deed.
To evade this, and keep all in their own hands, or Chirothefia, Di-
vines have invented this diſtinction, that Election is one thing, and
Ordination another: God may elect, but they muſt conſtitute; that
is, God may propofe, but they must refolve. And yet GROTIUS,
who
of Popular Government.
361
j
Pot. c. 10.
§. 31.
§ 104.
who in theſe things is a great Champion for the Clergy, has little Chap. 5.
more to ſay upon this Point than this. Whether we confider antient or
modern Times, we ſhall find the manner of election very different not only De Imp.fum.
in different Ages and Countrys, but in different years of the fame age, and
places of the fame Country, fo uncertain it is to determin of that which
the Scripture has left uncertain. And while men difpute not of Right,
but of Convenience, it is wonderful to ſee what probable Arguments are
brought on all fides. Give me CYPRIAN and his times, there is no
danger in popular Election. Give me the Nicene Fathers, and let the
Bishops take it willingly. Give me THEODOSIUS, VALENTINIAN,
and CHARLES the Great, than Royal Election there is nothing ſafer.
Upon the heels of thefe Words treads Dr. HAMMOND in this man-
ner: That Election and Ordination are ſeveral things, is fufficiently
known to every man that meaſures the nature of Words either by uſage or
Dictionarys; only for the convincing of fuch as think not themſelves ob-
lig'd to the obfervation of fo vulgar Laws, I ſhall propoſe theſe evidences.
In the Story of the Creation of the Deacons of Jerufalem, there are two
things diftinctly fet down, one propos'd to the multitude of Difciples to be
don by them, another referv'd to the Apoftles; that which was propos'd to
the Multitude was to elect, &c. Election of the Perfons was by the
Apoftles permitted to them, but fill the (xarashooμev) conftituting is re-
ferv'd to the Apostles. Then coms Dr. SEAMAN: Be it granted, as it Of Ordinat.
is by Proteftants generally, that PAUL and BARNABAS made Elders P. 13.
with the conſent of the People, their Confent is one thing, and their Power
another.
κατι
WHERE in the first place I for my particular, who have had
the Books of Dr. HAMMOND and Dr. SEAMAN fent to me by
way of Objection, need not go a step further. All that I have infert-
ed in my Oceana concerning Ordination, is in theſe three Votes ac-
knowleg'd and confirm'd: For the Probationer to be there fent by
a Univerſity to a Cure that is vacant, may by a Doctor, or the Doctors
of the fame Univerfity already ordain'd, receive Impofition of Hands,
if that be thought fit to be added, and then the Election of the fame
Probationer by the People dos no hurt, nay, fays GROTIUS, is of the
right of Nature; for it is naturally permitted to every Congregation to
procure those things which are neceſſary to their confervation, of which num-
ber is the Application of Function. So Merchants have the right of elect-
ing of a Master of their Ship; Travellers of a Guide in their way, and a
free People of their King. The Merchant, it ſeems, dos not make the
Mafter of his Ship, the Traveller his Guide, nor the free People their
King, but elect them. As if VAN TRUMP had bin Admiral, a
Robber upon the Highway had bin a Scout, or the Guide of an Army,
or SAUL a King before they were elected. The point is very nice,
which inftead of proving, he illuftrats in the beginning of the fame
Chapter by theſe three fimilitudes.
THE firſt is this, The Power of the Hufband is from God, the Appli-
cation of this Power to a certain Perfon is from confent, by which never-
theless the right is not given; for if this were by confent, the Matrimony
might be diffolv'd by confent; which cannot be. As if an apparent retra-
ction of Matrimonial Confent, as when a Wife confents to another
than her own Hufband, or commits Adultery, did not deliver a man
from the bond of Marriage by the Judgments of CHRIST. There
is an imperfection or cruelty in thofe Laws, which make Marriage to
A a a
laft
Acts 6.
De Imp.c.10.
362
The Prerogative
Book II. laſt longer than a man in humanity may be judg'd to be a Huſband,
or a woman a Wife: To think that Religion deftroys Humanity, or
to think that there is any defending of that by Religion which will
not hold in Juftice, or natural Equity, is a vaft error.
1 Pet. 2. 13.
Livy.
THE fecond Similitude is this: Imperial Power is not in the Prin-
ces that are Electors of the Empire; wherfore it is not given by them,
but applied by them to a certain Perfon.
THIS is anſwer'd by PETER, where he commands Obedience
to every Ordinance of Man (or, as fom nearer the Original, every
Power created by men) whether it be to the Roman Emperor, as Su-
preme, or to the Proconfuls of Afia and Phrygia, as fent by him; for
this is the fenfe of the Greec, and thus it is interpreted by GROTIUS.
Now if the then Roman Emperor were a Creature of Man, why not
the now Roman Emperor?
THE laft Similitude runs thus: The Power of Life and Death is
not in the Multitude before they be a Commonwealth; for no privat Man
has the right of Revenge ; yet it is apply'd by them to fom Man, or Political
Body of Men. But if a Man invades the Life of another, that other,
whether under Laws or not under Laws, has the right to defend his
own Life, even by taking away that (if there be no other probable
Remedy) of the Invader. So that men are ſo far from having bin
void of the power of Life and Death before they came under Laws,
that Laws can never be fo made as wholly to deprive them of it after
they com under them: wherfore the Power of Life and Death is
deriv'd by the Magiftrat from, and confer'd upon him by the confent
or Chirotonia of the People, wherof he is but a mere Creature; that
is to fay, an Ordinance of Man.
THUS theſe Candles being fo far from lighting the Houſe, that
they dy in the Socket, GROTIUS has bin no leſs bountiful than to
grant us that the People have as much right (where there is no hu-
man Creature or Law to the contrary) to elect their Churchmen, as
Merchants have to elect their Seamen, Travellers their Guides, or a
free People their King; which is enough a confcience. Nor is
Dr. HAMMOND ftraiter handed: Election, fays he, was permit-
ted by the Apoſtles to the Multitude, and therfore the fame may
be allow'd, always provided the (xaraso) conftituting be re-
ferv'd to the Paftors, or ordain'd Doctors and Preachers. And
Dr. SEAMAN, upon condition the People will not fay that it was
don by their power, but think it fair that it was don by their confent,
is alſo very well contented. So all ftands ftreight with what I have
heretofore propos'd. Let no man then fay, whatever follows, that I
drive at any Ends or Interefts, theſe being already fully obtain❜d and
granted; nevertheleſs for truth fake I cannot leave this Difcourfe im-
perfect. If a Politician ſhould ſay that the Election and the Ordina-
tion of a Roman Conful or Pontifex were not of like nature; that the
тshгoμ, Contract of the Senat of Rome with the People in the
Election of NUMA (ut cum populus regem juffiffent, id fic ratum effet,
fi patres autores fierent) included or imply'd the Soverain power to be
in the Fathers; that the Confent of this People was one thing, and
their Power another: If, I fay, he ſhould affirm theſe or the like in
Athens, Lacedemon, or any other Commonwealth that is or has bin
under the Sun, there would be nothing under the Sun more ridiculous
than that Politician. But ſhould men pretending to Government of
any
of Popular Government.
363
any kind be not oblig'd to fom confideration of theſe Rules in Nature Chap. 5.
and univerfal Experience; yet I wonder how the word (xatıráv) to
conftitute, with which they make fuch a flouriſh, did not lead them,
otherwiſe than they follow; this, as it was faid of SOLON by ARIS-
TOTLE, being that which I have already fhewn to be us'd both in
the Greec of the Scripture, for the conftitution of the Sanhedrim by
Moss, and in other Authors for that of the Senat by ROMULUS,
each of which was then elected by the People: whence it may appear
plainly that this is no word, as they pretend, to exclude popular Suffrage,
but rather to imply it. And indeed that it is of no fuch nature as ne-
ceffarily to include Power, could not have bin overfeen in the New
Teftament, but voluntarily where (oidè xxis-wules tou Пa) they are A&ts 17. 15.
fignify'd by it that conducted PAUL. But they have Miracles: fuch
indeed as have neither words nor reafon for them, had need of Miracles.
And where are theſe fame Miracles? why the Apoftles by the Chiro-
thefia or laying on of hands confer'd the Holy Ghoſt. So they did not
only when they us'd that Ceremony in reference to Ordination, but
when they us'd it not in that relation, as to thoſe that were newly
baptiz'd in Samaria, Men and Women: now it is not probable, that A&ts 8.
thefe, who fhould feem to have been numerous, were all ordain'd,
at leaſt the Women; and fo the Miracle is to be attributed to the Hands
of the Apoftles, and not to Ordination in general. JOSHUA was full
of the Spirit (not becauſe he had been ordain'd by the Chirothefia, for
fo had many of them that crucify'd CHRIST and perſecuted the
Apoſtles, but) becauſe Moses had laid his hands upon bim.
WOULD Divines be contented that we ſhould argue thus; The
Chirotonia or Suffrage of the People of Ifrael at the firſt inſtitution was
follow'd with miraculous Indowments, therfore whoever is elected by
the People ſhall have the like? Or what have they to fhew why the
Argument is more holding as to their Chirothefia, feeing for above one
thousand years all the Hierarchy and Preſbytery laid together have don
no more Miracles than a Parish Clerc ?
A CONTINU'D Miracle, as that the Sea ebbs and flows, the
Sun always runs his admirable courfe, is Nature. Intermitted Nature,
as that the waters of the Red Sea were mountains, that the Sun ftood
ſtill in the Dial of АHAZ, is a Miracle. To continue the latter kind
of Miracle were to deftroy the former, that is, to diffolve Nature.
Wherfore this is a certain rule, that no continu'd external Act can be in
the latter ſenſe miraculous. Now Government, whether in Church or
State, is equally a continu'd external Act. An internal continu'd Act
may indeed be natural, or fupernatural, as Faith.
Á NATURAL Man, being even in his own natural apprehen-
fion fearfully and wonderfully made, is by the continu'd Miracle of Na-
ture convinc'd that the World had a Creator, and fo coms to believe
in that which is fupernatural; whence it is that all Nations have had
fom Religion: and a Spiritual Man being convinc'd by the purity of
CHRIST'S Doctrine, and the Miracles wherby it was firft planted, is
brought to the Chriftian Faith. However CHRIST may require
fuch continu'd Faith or Spiritual exercife of his Church as is fuper-
natural, he requires not any fuch continu'd At or bodily exerciſe of
his Church as is fupernatural. But the Government of the Church is
a continu'd Act, or bodily exercife. It ſhould be heeded that to delude
the fenfe is not to do Miracles, but to uſe Impofture. Now to per-
fuade
Aaa 2
364
The Prerogative
Book II. fuade us, That Monarchical, Ariftocratical, Popular, or mixt Gover-
ment have not always bin in Nature, or that there has ever bin any
other in the Church, were to delude fenfe. Wherfore give me leave
(in which I am confident I fhall ufe no manner of Irreverence to the
Scripture, but on the contrary make the right uſe of it) to difcourfe
upon Church-Government according to the Rules of Prudence.
THE Goſpel was intended by Chrift to be preach'd to all Na-
tions, which (Princes and States being above all things exceding te-
nacious of their Power) is to me a certain Argument that the Policy
of the Church muſt be fo provided for, as not to give any of them just
cauſe of Jealoufy, there being nothing more likely to obftruct the
growth of Religion and truly the nearer I look to the Scripture, the
more I am confirm'd in this opinion.
First way of
CHRIST being taken up into Heaven, the firft Ordination that
Ordination in we find was that of the Apoftle MATTHIAS after this manner.
the Church of
Chrift.
Acts 1.
THE Ariftocracy of the Church, that is the Apoſtles, affembl'd
the whole Congregation of Diſciples or Believers at Jeruſalem, being
in number one hundred and twenty, where PETER (it having as it
ſhould ſeem bin fo agreed by the Apoſtles) was Propofer; who ſtand-
ing up in the midft of the Difciples, acquainted them, that wheras
JUDAS was gone to his Place, the occafion of their preſent meeting
was to elect another Apoſtle in his room wherupon proceding to
the Suffrage, they appointed two Competitors, JOSEPH and MAT-
THIAS, whoſe Names being written each in a feveral Scrol, were put
into one Urn, and at the fame time two other Lots, wherof one was a
blank, and the other infcrib'd with the word Apoftle, were put into ano-
ther Urn; which don, they pray'd and faid, Thou Lord which knowest
the hearts of all men, fhew whether of theſe two thou hast chofen. The
Prayer being ended, they gave forth their Lots, and the Lot fell
upon MATTHIAS (και συνκατεψηφίσθη μετα τῶν ἕνδεκα αποστόλων) and by this
Pfephifma (the very popular word, and not only fo, but being apply'd
to the Ballot, is the very literal and original fignification) he was ad-
ded to the eleven Apoftles. So you have the firſt way of Ordination
in the Church, after Chrift was taken up into Heaven, perform'd by the
Election or Chirotonia of the whole Church.
NOW except any man can fhew that MATTHIAS ever receiv'd
the impofition of hands, theſe ſeveral things are already demonftrated.
Firſt, that the Chirotonia is not only the more antient way of Ordina-
tion in the Commonwealth of Ifrael, but in the Church of CHRIST.
Secondly, that the Chirothefia or impofition of Hands is no way ne-
ceffary to Ordination in the Chriſtian Church. Thirdly, that the
Diſciplin of the Chriftian Church was primitively Popular; for to
fay that in regard of the Apoſtles it was Ariftocratical, is to forget that
there is no fuch thing, without a mixture of Ariftocracy, that is
without the Senat, as a Popular Government in Nature. Fourthly,
that Ordination in the Commonwealth of Oceana being exactly after
this pattern, is exactly according to the Difciplin of the Church of
CHRIST. And fifthly, that Ordination and Election in this example
are not two, but one and the fame thing.
THE laſt of theſe Propofitions having bin affirm'd by Mr. HOBBS,
Dr. HAMMOND tells him plainly, that his affertion is far from all
truth: Let us therfore confider the Doctor's Reaſons, which are theſe ;
Seeing the Congregation, fays he, is affirm'd by the Gentleman to have or→
dain'd,
of Popular Government.
365
+
dain'd, and it is plain by the words of St. LUKE that God elected, Electi- Chap. 5.
on and Ordination by this Example must be diſtinct things: which in
another place going about to fortify with this Argument, That it was
don by Lottery, and SOLOMON fays, The Lot is at the difpofing of the
Lord, he utterly overthrows without and beyond help; for in this
SOLOMON not denying, but rather affirming that he was chofen
King by the People, plainly fhews that Election by the People is
Election by God. Where it is affirm'd, that God rais'd up Judges in
Ifrael, it is not deny'd that the People elected them. The Doctor is
at it in MAIMONIDES more than once, that the Divine Majeſty
refted upon fuch as were ordain'd by Impofition of Hands. But wheras
it is affirm'd by MAIMONIDES more often, that when the People
(Ecclefia Dei) or Congregation of Ifrael affembl'd, then the Divine Ma-
jefty, or the Holy Ghost refted upon them; of this he never takes any
notice. The People, whether in Ifrael, Athens, Lacedemon, or Rome,
never affembl❜d for enacting of Laws, or Election of Magiftrats, with-
out Sacrifice and imploring the affiſtance of God, to whom when
their work was perform'd, they always attributed the whole Reſult or
Election: and would the Doctor have Chriftians to allow him but a
Piece? For wheras God electing there had, in the fenfe both of Jews
and Heathens, his choice of all, God electing here had in the fenfe
of Divines, but his choice of two, which were next this or none, but
that indeed where he has not the whole he has none at all. Is that
then far from all truth, which the Gentleman, or that which the Di-
vine has faid, either in this part, or where he adds, that the hundred
and twenty in the Text are never mention'd but once, and then it is in pofition.
a Parentheſis? I will but tranſcribe the place.
Dr. H. of im-
§ 115.
AND in thoſe Days PETER ftood up in the midst of the Disciples, Acts 1. 15.
and faid (the number of the Names together were about an hundred and
twenty) &c. Are the Diſciples in the Parenthefis, or out of it? Are
they but once mention'd, and that is in a Parentheſis? Or are they but
once number'd, and that is in a Parentheſis? If a Gentleman ſhould do
thus, what would they fay? Or, what were ill enough to be faid?
But to mend the Text, and bring the Difciples into the Parenthefis,
they have more ways than one; wheras the Heathen People, while
the Prieſts were willing, mix'd theſe Dutys with Devotions, Divines
will not ſuffer a Chriſtian People upon like occafions to pray for where
it is faid, They pray'd, it went before, they appointed two, and it follows,
They gave out their Lots; which antecedent and confequent, if the
People pray'd, muſt be equally underſtood of them, and fo they could
be no Parentheſis. Therfore pray they muſt not, or Divines are loſt.
But how will they filence them? To fhew you this art I muſt tran-
ſcribe the Heads of the Chapter.
THE Apoſtles being return'd from Mount Olivet to Jerufalem,
went up into an upper room, where abode both PETER and JAMES, Verfe 13
and JOHN, and ANDREW, JAMES the Son of ALPHEUS, and SIMON
ZELOTES, and JUDAS the Brother of JAMES.
AND in thofe days PETER ftood up in the midst of the Difciples,
and faid (the number of Names together were about one hundred and
twenty)
MEN and Brethren,
OF thefe men which accompany'd with us all the time that the Lord
Jefus went in and out amongst us,
MUST
15.
$6.
21.
366
The Prerogative
Book II.
22.
~ ~ ~ ~
23.
24.
26.
Grotius.
Demonftrati-
on that God
never ordain'd
Civil, but up-
on the Princi
Prudence.
Joſh. 9. 11.
MUST one be ordain'd to be a Witness with us of his Refurrection.
AND they appointed two, JOSEPH and MATTHIAS.
AND they pray'd, and faid, Thou Lord which knowest the hearts of
all men, fhew whether of these two thou hast chofen.
AND they gave forth their Lots, and the Lot fell upon MATTHIAS,
και συνκατεψηφίσθη μετὰ τῶν ἕνδεκα άπος όλων.
THEY whom PETER acquainted that one must be ordain'd,
one would verily believe were the hundred and twenty Diſciples, in
the midſt of whom he ftood up, and made the Propofition; and ſo
much the rather, becauſe this was no more than the Apoftles knew be-
fore, and (in all right underſtanding of Government and Senfe) were
already agreed upon, it being the office of the Ariftocracy or Senat in
a Commonwealth (and fuch exactly were the Apoftles in the Church)
upon all new Orders or Elections to be made; firft, to debate and de-
termin by themſelves, and then to propofe to the Chirotonia or ultimat
reſult of the People. But Divines fay abfolutely no, which word to
make good, They appointed two, and they pray'd, and they gave forth their
Lots, being fentences that ſtand plainly together, or hunt in couples,
muſt leap ſheer over nine Verfes, PETER'S whole Oration (which
by this means is no more than a Parentheſis neither) and over the
hundred and twenty Difciples, without touching a hair of their heads,
to light plum upon the thirteenth Verfe, and the eleven Apoſtles!
Never man us'd his Grammar fo fince he threw it at a Pear tree! Yet
that CHRYSOSTOM (who underſtood Greec) allows of no fuch con-
ftruction, is confefs'd by the learnedft of this opinion; and wheras
they fly to the Latin Fathers, that retreat is wholly cut off by DAVID
BLUNDEL in his very learned Treatiſe of the right of the People in the
Church-Government.
BUT what do we ftand upon words? Are theſe fuch wherof the
things to which they relate may be Interpreters? Or to what things can
they relate but the Inftitution of the Sanhedrim by Moses? That at
the Inſtitution of the Sanhedrim the Competitors were elected by the
Suffrage of the People, and frorn thence that the Ballot of Ifrael con-
fifted not only of a Lot but of a Suffrage too, has bin already demon-
ftrated out of Scripture; and that the Election of MATTHIAS was
by the Ballot of Ifrael is no lefs apparent in itſelf, than fully confefs'd
upon the place by GROTIUS.
*
"C
CC
"THEY that under color of Religion in matter of Government,
flight Prudence, are miſtaken, or do not mean honeftly. Neither
any Policy Ec- "GOD nor CHRIST ever inftituted any Policy whatſoever upon
clefiaftical or c other Principles than thoſe of Human Prudence.
any
The Em-
"baffadors fent from the Gibeonites to JOSHUA deliver their Meffage
ples of Human" in this manner; The Elders and all the Inhabitants of our Country
fpake to us, faying, Go meet them, and fay to them, We are your Ser-
vants; therfore now make ye a League with us. They that had
power
to fend Embaffadors and to make a League with a foren Nation,
"had foverain Power; this foverain power was in the Elders, or Se-
nat, and in the People of Gibeon: wherfore God conſtituting his
"Commonwealth for the main Orders (that is to fay, the Senat and
"the People) upon the fame Principles on which the Gibeonites had
long before built theirs, laid his Foundations upon no other than
"human Prudence. So for the inferior Courts they were tranfcrib'd
by Moses out of the Commonwealth of Midian, upon advice
(C
<<
<<
" of
of Popular Government.
367
"of
<<
of JETHRO his Father in Law. According to fuch patterns was Chap. 5.
Ifrael fram'd, and by that of Ifrael this firft Policy of the Church of
"CHRIST fo exactly, as (fans comparaison) any man fhall fhew
"the Commonwealth of Oceana to have bin tranfcrib'd out of Rome
or Venice. Let them that would have the Government be fomwhat
"between Earth and Heaven, confider this place.
NOR is the Ecclefiaftical Policy only fubject to Human Prudence,
but to the fame viciffitudes alfo wherto Human Prudence is fubject,
both in her own nature, and as ſhe is obnoxious to the State wherin
fhe is planted, and that inavoidably; as I com now to demonftrat
by the Alterations which happen'd even in the Age of the Apoftles
themſelves for this at the Election of MATTHIAS being alter'd,
the next form of Ecclefiaftical Policy introduc'd in their times, is re-
fembl'd by GROTIUS to that of Athens, of which, for the better
clearing of what follows, it is neceffary that I firſt ſay ſomthing by
way of Introduction.
κατα
C. 10.
Pol. lib.8.c.9.
THE Thefmotheta, being in number fix, were Magiftrats of the
higheſt dignity, power, and rank in Athens. Thefe, fays ARISTO- Arift.2. lib.2.
TLE, were elected by the Chirotonia or Suffrage of the People; and
fays POLLUX, being elected underwent the Inquifition of the Senat,
where they were to anſwer to thoſe Interrogatorys, Whether they wor-
Ship'd the God of their Countrys? Whether they had bin dutiful to their
Parents? born Arms for the Commonwealth? paid Dutys or Taxes?
In which Particulars the Senat being fatisfy'd, They were fworn and
crown'd with Myrtle: which coms to this, that the (xxтashou) or
Conſtitution being referv'd to the Senat, the Thefmotheta were elected
by the Chirotonia of the People. Now tho' the Government of Athens
throout the Citys of Afia (being moſt of them of the like Model) was
moſt known, I will not fay that the Apoſtles wrote their Orders out
of Athens, but ſeeing all Political Inſtitutions muſt needs be according
to Human Prudence, and there is nothing to be written out of this but
what will fall even with fom other Government that is or has bin,
I may fay, as GROTIUS has faid before me, that the frame of
Church Government in the infuing Example was after the manner of
Athens.
Ord nation in
WHEN the number of the Difciples, or Believers, was multiply'd, Second way of
there aroſe a murmuring among fuch of the Jews as having bin bred in the Church of
Alexandria or other parts, were for their Language (which was Greec) Chriſt.
partly ſtrangers, againſt the Hebrews or converted Jews, that spoke
their own Language, as if theſe indeed us'd them like ftrangers, their
Widows being neglected, or not dealt fo liberally withal, as thofe of
the Hebrews in the Contributions due for their conftant maintenance.
HEREUPON the twelve Apoſtles, after the manner of the Se-
nat, having without all queftion debated the bufinefs among them-
felves, as appears by the fpeech upon which they were agreed, af-
ſembl❜d the People, which is ftill Senatorian, or call'd the multitude
of the Diſciples to them, and faid, It is not reaſon that we ſhould leave
preaching, or the Word of God, to be taken up with this, tho chari-
table, nay, ſeeing we have introduc'd Community of goods, moſt juſt
and neceffary imployment of providing Food and Cloathing for every
one of our Fellowſhip or Community (the Chriſtians in theſe times,
much after the manner of the Lacedemonian Convives, us'd to eat in
publick and together) to do this as it ought to be don, were to becom
Caterers,
368
The Prerogative
Book II. Caterers, and be taken up in ferving Tables, Wherfore, Brethren,
(take the wiſe men and underſtanding, and known among you) look
out feven men of boneſt report, full of the Holy Ghost, and of Wisdom
(8's
ὃς κατασήσομεν ἐπι τῆς χρείας ταύτης, whom we may appcint over this
buſineſs.
A&S 13.
THIS Saying, that is, this Propofition of the Senat or Apostles,
pleas'd the whole Multitude, (like that of Moses, the thing which thou
haft faid is good for us to do) So they chofe STEPHEN, PHILIP,
PROCHORUS, NICANOR, TIMON, PARMENAS, and NICOLAS, whom
being elected, they ſet before the Apostles, who when they had pray'd, laid
their hands upon them.
WHAT fuller demonftration can be given of any thing, than
that in this example Ordination and Election are one and the
fame, that this was confer'd by the Chirotonia of the People?
If there be any poffible way of making this clearer, it muſt be by
oppofition wherfore let us fee what Divines have to ſay to the con-
trary.
:
GROTIUS gives us all we aſk from this place, which he gives for
nothing, becauſe it concerns not the Election of Paſtors, but of Dea-
cons. As if STEPHEN and PHILIP had not only bin Preachers of
the Goſpel, but don Miracles. What Dr. SEAMAN denys or grants
in relation to the fame, I have indeavor'd to underſtand, but it will
not do. Dr. HAMMOND is fo plain, that his Objections may be of
uſe. He, to prove that the Ordination of theſe Deacons was not in
the Chirotonia of their Difciples, but in the Chirothefia of the Apoftles,
has theſe Arguments.
THERE be two things diftinctly fet down, Election, permitted to
the People, and the (naras hooμev) conftituting referv'd to the Apoftles.
TO which I anfwer, that there were two things fet down by the
Athenian Law, Election of the Thefmotheta by the People, and the
(κατο
(xarasńσoµev) conſtituting of them by the Senat; yet that the Ordi-
nation was in the Power, and that the Power was in the People of
Athens: he that makes a doubt, is not refolv'd whether the moſt po-
pular Commonwealth that ever was, were a Democracy.
BUT, fays he, this looking out of men, or chufing, was permitted to
the multitude by the Apostles with thefe three bounds: First, to take feven,
neither more nor fewer: Secondly, thofe men generally known and well re-
puted of: And thirdly, full of the Spirit, and of Difcretion or parts fit for
Government. To which I anſwer, That the Election of the Thefmothetæ
was permitted by the Law to the People of Athens with theſe three
bounds; Firſt to take fix, neither more nor fewer: Secondly, thoſe
generally known and reputed of: Thirdly, in fuch eſtimation for their
honeſty and ability for Government, as in their conſciences (to which
alſo they made Oath) they fhould judg fitteſt for the Commonwealth.
Yet is all this fo far from any proof that Athens was no Democracy, or
that the Soverain Power, whether in enacting of Laws, or election of
Magiftrats by the Lot or the Suffrage (inftitutions equally popular)
was not in the People, that it amounts to the ſtrongeſt argument that
the People were Soverain, and the Commonwealth was Democratical.
Could Truth defire greater advantage than redounds from fuch oppo-
fition? We have another example of the fame Model, in which be-
cauſe it has bin paraphras'd upon already in the Introduction, I ſhall be
briefer here. In the Church of Antioch, where the Diſciples were
now
of Popular Government.
369
now becom ſo numerous, that they began to be call'd Chriſtians, Chap. 5.
there were among them Prophets: fo being affembl'd on occafion, as
I conceive, of giving an extraordinary Commiffion after the manner
of the people of Athens when they elected Ambaffadors, or (that I
may avoid ftrife upon a point fo indifferent) to chufe two new Apoſtles,
The Holy Ghoft faid, Separat me BARNABAS and SAUL for the Work
wherto I have appointed them: that is (for ſo it is render'd by all Inter-
preters) the Holy Ghoft fpake thoſe words by the mouths of the Pro-
phets. Now the Prophets being well known for fuch, this Suffrage of
theirs was no fooner given, than (as one that can allow Prophets to
be leading men may eafily think) follow'd by all the reſt of the Con-
gregation: So the whole multitude having faſted and pray'd, the moſt
eminent among them, or the Senatorian Order in that Church, laid
their hands upon PAUL and BARNABAS, who being thus fent forth
by the Holy Ghoft, departed to Seleucia.
TO evade this apparent Election, or Chirotonia of the whole Con-
gregation, wherby theſe Apoſtles or Ambaffadors to the Churches of
the Gentils were ordain'd, Divines have nothing to fay, but that they
were elected by the Holy Ghost: As if the Chirotonia of the People were
more exclufive to election by the Holy Ghoſt, than the Chirothefia of
the Ariftocracy, for which in the mean time they contend. But if nei-
ther of theſe were indeed exclufive of the Holy Ghoft, how is it
poffible in this frame (where tho' of natural neceffity an Ariftocracy
muſt have bin included, yet the Ariftocracy is not in the Text fo much
as diſtinguiſh'd from the People, or once nam'd) that the Power, and ſo
the Ordination ſhould not have bin in the People? The Council of the
Apoſtles, of the Elders, and of the whole Church at Jerufalem, and
other Councils, not of Apoſtles, nor of the whole Church, in other
times or places, us'd this form in their Acts; It ſeems good to the Holy Acts 15. 22:
Ghoſt, and to us: But dos this, whether a true or a pretended ftile,
exclude that Act from being an Act of that whole Council? Or how
coms it to paſs that becauſe PAUL and BARNABAS were feparated by
the Holy Ghoſt, they were not ordain'd by the Chirotonia of the
whole Chriſtian People at Antioch?
THE Chirothefia can be no otherwiſe underſtood in nature, nor
ever was in the Commonwealth of the Jews, than Election by the
few: And fo even under the mere Chirothefia, Ordination and Election
were not two, but one and the fame thing. If MOSES ordain'd
JOSHUA his Succeffor by the Chirothefia, he elected JOSHUA his Suc-
ceffor by the Chirothefia; and for what reafon muſt it be otherwiſe
with the Chirotonia? That a Pharifee could do more with one hand,
or a pair of hands, than a Chriftian Church or Congregation can do
with all their hands, is a Doctrin very much for the honor of the true
Religion, and a foverain Maxim of Eccleſiaſtical Policy.
the Church of
THE third Conftitution of Church-Government in Scripture Third way of
(whether confifting of Biſhops or Presbyters, between which at this Ordination in
time a man ſhall hardly find a difference) runs wholly upon the Arifto- Chriſt.
cracy, without mention of the People, and is therfore compar'd by
GROTIUS to the Sanhedrim of Ifrael, as that came to be in thefe Grot, ad
days; from whence Divines alfo generally and truly confefs that it was 1 Tim. 4. 14-
taken up to which I ſhall need to add no more, than that it is an Order
for which there is no Precept, either in the Old Teſtament of God, or
in the New Teſtament of Chrift. This therfore thus taken
This therfore thus taken up by the
Bb b
Apoſtles
370
The Prerogative
Book II. Apoſtles from the Jews, is a clear demonſtration that the Government
→ of the Church, in what purity foever of the Times, nay tho' under
the inſpection of the Apoftles themſelves, has bin obnoxious to that
of the State wherin it was planted. The Sanhedrim, from the infti-
tution of the Chirothefia, for a conftant Order, confifted of no other
Senators than fuch only as had bin ordain'd by the Impofition of
Hands; which came now to be confer'd by the Prince, in the pre-
fence, or with the affiftance of the Sanhedrim. The fame Order was
Grot. ad Mat. obferv'd by the Jewish Synagogues, of which each had her Archon
nor would the Jews converted to the Chriftian Faith, relinquish the Law
of MOSES, wherto this way of Ordination, among other things,
tho' erroneouſly, was vulgarly attributed whence in the Church,
where it confifted of converted Jews, Ordination was confer'd by the
Archon, or firſt in order of the Prefbytery, with the affiftance of the
1 Tim. 4. 14. reft. Hence PAUL, in one place, exhorts TIMOTHY thus: Neglect
not the Gift that is in thee, which was given thee by Prophecy, with the
2 Tim. 1. 6. laying on of the hands of the Prefbytery. And in another thus: Wher-
fore I put thee in remembrance, that thou ftir up the Gift of God which
is in thee by the putting on of my hands.
19. 13.
§. 106.
§. 134.
§. III.
I GRANT Divines, that Ordination by this time was wholly in
the Prefbytery; what fay they then to the diſtinction of Ordina-
tion and Election? Are thefe ftill two diftinct things, or may we
hence, at leaſt, compute them to be one and the fame? If they fay
Yes, why then might they not have bin ſo before? If they ſay No,
who in this place, but the Prefbytery, elected? Why, fays Dr. HAм-
MOND, it is plain that the Spirit of Prophecy elected. But to give ac-
count of no more than is already perform'd, were the ſpirit of Hiſtory
rather than of Prophecy, to which it appertains to tell things before
they be don; as did the Prophets now living in this Church, that T1-
MOTHY fhould com to be ordain'd: So the place is interpreted by
GROTIUS and how it ſhould be otherwife underſtood I cannot fee.
But putting the cafe fom Act preceded, as SAUL and DAVID were
elected Kings by Prophecy; yet did ever man ſay that for this SAUI.
or DAVID were any whit the lefs elected Kings by the People? To
the contrary in every well-order'd Commonwealth (a Jove principium)
the difpofing of the Lot, and of the Suffrage too, has univerfally bin
attributed to God.
THE Piety of Divines in perfuading the People that God elects
for them, and therfore they need not trouble themſelves to vote, is as if
they ſhould perfuade them that God provides their daily Bread, and
therfore they need not trouble themſelves to work. To conclude this
point with Dr. HAMMOND'S Own words upon the fame occafion ;
this diftinction of Ordination and Election is in Divines the procreative
Miftake, or Ignorance producing all the reft.
THE reaſon why PAUL ordain'd now after this manner among
the Jews, is to me an irrefragable argument that he ordain'd not after
this manner among the Gentils: for wheras the firſt Ordination in the
Chriſtian Church, namely that of MATTHIAS, was perform'd
by the Chirotonia, which by degrees came now in complacence with
the Jews to the Chirothefia; it ſeems he was contented not to alter the
worſt of political Inftitutions or Cuſtoms, where he found them con-
firm'd by long and univerfal Practice: and if fo, why ſhould any man
think that he would go about to alter, or weed out the beft, where
1
they
of Popular Government.
371
they had taken like root? That this Adminiſtration of the Jews was Chap. 5.
of the very worst, is clear in the nature of the Politics, there being no
example of a pure Ariftocracy or of a Senat, fuch as was now the
Sanhedrim, without a popular balance, that ever govern'd with Juf-
tice, or was of any continuance. Nor was the Chirothefia, by which
means this work came to effect in Ifrael, introduc'd by the prudence
of God, but by the corrupt arts of Men. Now that the Governments
at the fame time of the Gentils, all balanc'd by the Chirotonia of the
People, were in their nature more excellent, and indeed more accommo-
dated to antient Prudence, as it was introduc'd by God himſelf in the
Commonwealth of Ifrael, has bin already fufficiently prov'd: never-
theless, to refreſh your memory with one example more,
wealth of
Crete.
CRETE having bin (as is affirm'd by the Confent of Authors)
the moſt ancient, and the most excellent Commonwealth in human
Story, was founded by RHADAMANTHUS and MINOS, an Age
before the Trojan War: Theſe were held to have learnt their Arts by
familiar Difcourfe with JUPITER, and from point to point to have
fram'd their Model according to his direction. Nor, tho' all acknowlege
MINOS to have bin a King, did he found his Government upon any
other than a popular Balance, or a fundamental regard to the Liberty
of the People: For the whole Commonwealth was made up of these three Epitome of
parts, the College, the Senat, and the People. The College confifted of the Common-
the annual Magiftrats call'd the Coſmi: theſe had the whole extentive
Power, fom in leading forth the Armies, and others in judging the People;
which Functions were accordinglyaffign'd by the Orders to each in particular.
That which was cómmon to them all, was to propofe fuch things as they had
debated or prepar'd in their College or Council, to the Senat. The Senat
being elective for life, was the Council, to which appertain'd the Debate of
whatever was to be propos'd to the Congregation. The Congregation, or
Aſſembly of the People of Crete, had not the right of Debate; but in
enacting of Laws, and election of Magiftrats, had the ultimate Refult of the
Commonwealth. Such was the Copy after which LYCURGUS wrote
himſelf fo famous a Legiflator. And thus ftood this Frame to the
fix hundred and eighth year of Rome; when this People, having bin too
favourable to Pirates then infefting thofe Seas, turn'd the Arms of the
Romans upon themſelves; and by thefe, under the conduct of QUIN-
CTUS METELLUS, thence call'd CRETICUS, Crete was made a
Province: tho' the chief Cities being firft freed, it fhould feem (by
CICERO'S fecond Oration againſt Antony) that the whole Iſland was
at length reftor'd to her ancient Liberty. However by the manner
obferv'd by the Romans, as was fhewn, in Provincial Government,
the Cities under their Magiftrats (who while the Commonwealth
was a Province perhaps might have exercis'd the Office of the
Cofmi) were not yet depriv'd of their Popular Affemblies, at leaft in
their diftinct Cities, electing all Magiftrates for their (avlovía) pecu-
liar or domeftic Government. Such was the State of Crete, when
PAUL having appeal'd from the Jews to CÆSAR; and being there-
upon conducted by Sea towards Rome, touch'd in his way upon this
Inland, where he left TITUS to conſtitute Elders of every City. The
word (xaτasions) conftitute, our Divines will have to fignify ordain by
Impofition of Hands, and Impofition of Hands to fignify an Act of Power
excluding the People. But why PAUL, who among the Jews had com-
ply'd with their Cuftoms, fhould injoin; or how TITUS, had it bin fo
κατα
Bbb 2
injoin'd,
372
The Prerogative
Book II. injoin'd, fhould accompliſh this where the Power was Popular, they have
not fhewn nor confider'd. To introduce Religion or Government
there be but two ways, either by perfuafion, or by force. To per-
fuade the people of Crete, in whom was the Power, to this new way
of Ordination, TITUS muſt have ſpoken to this effect: Men of Crete,
MINOS being a King, could not chufe but have a natural incli-
nation to popular Power; wherfore his pretence that JUPITER told him,
Power was to be in the People, may be fufpected to have bin imagin'd
merely for his own ends or this is a certain fign that JUPITER is no true,
but a feign'd God; feeing the true God will have it that the People ſhould
have no Power at all, but that fuch, upon whom his Ambaffadors fhall
confer power, be without all difpute obey'd. How! are you starting at this!
are you folicitous for your Commonwealth! It is true, that upon carnal
principles or human prudence, without Power in the People there can be
no Commonwealth: but Ifrael was a Commonwealth without power in the
People; where MOSES made all the Laws by the power invested in him by
God, and created all the Magiftrats, not by popular fuffrage, but by his
Chirothefia. Wherfore, Men of Crete, know ye, that on whomfoever
I lay my hands, the fame is in all ſpiritual Affairs, or matters of Church-
Government, to be obey'd by you, after the fame manner that you have hi-
therto obey'd fuch Magiftrats or Priefts as have bin ordain'd by your
own Election, or Chirotonia. Of what other nature the Arguments of
TITUS to the pretended purpoſe could have bin, I am not able to ima-
gine; nor how this fhould have done leſs than provoke the People
to a dangerous jealouſy of fuch a Doctrine. But Divines, to ſet all
ftreight, think it enough to repeat the words of PAUL to TITUS in
Greec: For this caufe left I thee in Crete (iva xaτashons wód wpeoCutégus)
that thou shouldft ordain Elders in every City. It is true that DEMOS-
THENES fpeaks fomwhat like words concerning the Expedition of
PHILIP of Macedon in Peloponnefus (ἐπειδὴ τυράννες ἐχεῖνος ἐν ταύταις ταις πόλεσι
xares noe) when he had ordain'd Tyrants in every City: but then PHI-
LIP had an Army; what Army did PAUL leave with TITUS? Or if
he ordain'd his Elders neither of theſe two ways, I fee no other than
that only by the known and legal Chirotonia or Suffrage of the People.
But if this be clear, the Clergy com from Crete, not upon the Wings of
TITUS, but of ICARUS, whofe ambitious Wax is diffolv'd by the Sun.
Tit. 1. 5.
De Corona,
εν
SO much, I conceive, is now difcover'd concerning Church-Go-
vernment, as may fhew that it was not of one, but of three kinds,
each obnoxious to the nature of the Civil Government under which it
was planted; in as much as the Chirotonia, or Ballot of Ifrael, being
first introduc'd pure, and without any mixture, as at the Ordination of
MATTHIAS, came afterwards to receive fome mixture of the Chiro-
thefia, as in the Ordination of STEPHEN; and laſt of all by exclu-
ding the People, to degenerat wholly into the Chirothefia of the Pref-
bytery, as in the Ordination of TIMOTHY: all this by the teftimony
of Scripture, and in the pureft times, even the age of the Apoftles.
Whence my Undertaking, to fhew that as CHRIST intended his Doc-
trin fhould be preach'd to all Nations, fo he intended his Diſciplin
ſhould be fuch as might fute with any Government (as indeed, if the
choice of any of theſe three be lawful, it dos exactly) is, I hope, per-
form'd. For where the Government is Popular, it is the fame with
the firſt; where it is Ariftocratical or Monarchical, it agrees with the
laſt; and where it is mix'd, it is between both, and reſponſible to the
fecond.
of Popular Government.
373
fecond. Of theſe three in the farther exerciſe of their natural and in- Chap. 5.
tended compliance with Human Prudence, it may be convenient to
give fome fuller Exemplification.
THAT any other Ordination than that of the firft kind for the
original Authority or Practice of it, whether in the Commonwealth
of Ifrael or in the Church of Chrift, and indeed for the Prerogative
of the fame in nature, ſhould have bin introduc'd by the Apoſtles,
where it might, much lefs where the nature of the civil Policy would
admit of no other, is neither probable by Scripture nor Reaſon; whence
it is that in the Citys of Lycaonia and Pifidia, the Government of
theſe being then Popular, we do not find any mention at all of the
Chirothelia, the Apoftles in thefe places (χειροτονήσαντες πρεσβυτέρας κατ' ἐκκλη-
Gíav) chirotonizing Elders in every Congregation.
αν
TO evade this place, our Adverfarys turn tail to the things, and
make their whole flight at the words. In taking one of them into the
Difputation, I fhall take in all, for they run all upon the fame Quota-
tions, or with little addition.
νειτο
THAT the word chirotonizing, fays Dr. HAMMOND, in this §. 3.
place fignifies no more than ordaining by the Impofition of Hands, is
not fo generally acknowleg'd by late Writers, but that it may be
useful to give fom few Teftimonies out of thofe Writers which were
nearest the times of the Scripture. Thus PHILO JUDEUS of
JOSEPH (βασιλέως ὕπαρχος εχειροτονειτο he was ordain'd Governor
of all Egypt under the King. So again of MOSES (йɣεμ EXELPOTC-
VELTO) he was conftituted their Ruler. So of AARON'S Sons (PETS
EXELPOTÓVER) God conftituted them Priefts. ALEXANDER Son of
ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES writes to JONATHAN (XEsporov Jofeph. An.L.
μέν σε apxiepéα) We (in the regal file) conftitute thee High Prieft. 13. c. 5.
LUCIAN fays of HEPHESTION (Θεὸν χειροτονῆσαι τὸν τετελευτηκότα)
that ALEXANDER made him a God when he was dead. APPIAN
(which is added out of GROTIUS, whence moft of the reft is taken)
to fignify Election of Magiftrats made by the Roman Emperors,
ufes no other word; and later Writers fpeak of fom that were
chirotoniz'd Emperors by their Fathers. For the use of the word
among Chriftian Writers, take one place in the Author of the Conftitutions
for many;
CLEMENT after the death of LINUS (expoτónTas) L. 7. c. 45.
was ordain'd Bishop of Rome by PETER. But what need any more?
CHRIST'S Diſciples are faid (@goxExESPOTONμÉVOL STO TOE) defign'd
προκεχειροτονημένοι τὸ Θεῖ)
or foreconstituted by God the witnesses of his Refurrection: by all which
that of PAUL and BARNABAS (XELPOTONGαTES TрEσCUTÉρYS XAT Ex- Acts 10. 41.
λnoía) is but conftituting or creating Elders in every Church. Wher-
fore they that have look'd fo far back to the Original, as to think it ne-
ceffary to render the word create by Suffrages, are fure guilty of a very
impertinent nicety. I promiſe you had this bin againſt one of our
Doctors, it might have bin a rude Charge; but it is only againſt
ERASMUS, BEZA, DIODATI, and fuch as took upon them to tranf-
late the Switz, French, Italian, Belgic, and (till the Epiſcopal cor-
rection) the English Bibles. And what apparent caufe is there of
fuch confidence? What neceffity is there even in the places alleg'd
why the word Chirotonia ſhould be underſtood in the fenſe impos'd ?
The People of Egypt, till having fold their Lands they came to lofe
their popular Balance, were not Servants to PHARAOH; wherfore
when JOSEPH was made Governor over all Egypt they were free:
κατ'
3
now
374
The Prerogative
"
De Cor.
*
•
Book II. now that a King ſhould make a Governor of a free People without
their confent, or fome advice as we fay of his Parlament, is altogether
improbable, the rather becauſe a Protector, in the abfence or minority
of the King, has bin no otherwiſe made in England, nor pretends the
prefent Protector to any other title than the like Chirotonia. But
that Moses is faid by the fame Author (who affirm'd that he intro-
duc'd the Chirotonia in Ifrael) to have bin chirotoniz'd Ruler of the
People, can in my judgment be no otherwife than originally and lite-
rally taken, feeing God himfelf was no otherwife made King in Ifrael
than by the Suffrage of the People. That the like muft.be underſtood
of the Sons of AARON has been already fhewn. The Doctor is the
firſt has told me, that the plural number for the Royal Stile is fo an-
cient as EPIPHANES: Sure I am it was not deriv'd from his Mace-
donian Predeceffors, for in the Letters to the Athenians and the Thebans
recited by DEMOSTHENES, PHILIP of Macedon writes in the
fingular number. But the Letters of EPIPHANES to JONATHAN
muft it ſeems import that he at fingle hand (tho' the words carry
double) had chirotoniz'd a High Prieſt of the Jews: Who can
help it? Some Princes have not only given out that their Prieſts
have been chirotoniz'd when they were not, but that themſelves
have bin chirotoniz'd when there was no fuch matter. When a
Prince fays that he was chirotoniz'd or elected by the People, to talk
of Rhetoric is to have none. Divines in this cafe commonly under-
ſtand it to be proper, or literally meant; for to impofe a new fenſe is to
fpoil the word; and fpoil the word, fpoil the Prince. LUCIAN is a
Drol, and intends a Jeft, but not fo good a one, as that he of all others
ſhould come neareſt to help up with a Hierarchy. For the Chirotonia,
or Election of the Roman Magiftrats by the Suffrage of the People or
of the Army, every man knows that it is literal: SUIDAS himſelf
interpreting the word by this very example; where he affirms it to
fignify Election or Ratification by the Many. The Quotation out of
the Conftitutions, with thoſe of Bishop BILSON, and others out of
the Greek Fathers, and out of Councils, do not only imply the word
Chirotonia, but the thing, while they all relate to that kind of Ordina-
tion, which being in thofe Churches yet adminifter'd as at the Ordi-
nation of STEPHEN, was not conferr'd without the confent of the
People. But it is above all, that labouring to prove the Chirotonia and
the Chirothefia to be the fame thing, they ſhould rely moſt upon the
place where the Apoſtles are faid (gonexeigolovnμévor two 15 ) to have
bin forechirotoniz'd by God; as if it were clear in this, that God or-
dain'd the Apoſtles by the laying on of Hands, for fo it muſt be un
derſtood, or it makes no more for them than for us. Or if they mean
it only to ſhew that the word Chirotonia or Suffrage is us'd for fome Or-
dination that cannot be taken in our ſenſe; fo the word Chirothefia
(ET) leois x) or laying on of Hands, where ANANIAS being neither
Biſhop nor Prefbyter, but only a Difciple, that is, a Chriftian,
lays his hands upon PAUL, is us'd for fome Ordination that cannot be
taken in their ſenſe; or a man not ordain'd may ordain as well as they :
for to ſay that the Call was extraordinary, where the like is, or is pre-
tended, will avail little. But there is no need that we ſhould go fo
near the wind; wherfore to give them all theſe Places in their own
ſenſe, even till we come to the Cities in queftion. What word in any
Language is not fomtimes, nay frequently, us'd in fome other than the
proper
•
2
1
of Popular Government.
375
•
}
终
​proper fenfe? With what elegance, if this be forbidden, can anyChap. 5.
man write or ſpeak? Is a word like a Woman that being taken with
a Metaphor, it can never be reftor'd to the Original Virtue ? If Chiro-
tonia has, as Divines pretend, loft all other but their fignification,
how ſhall we underſtand it in Ifaiah, or where PAUL fpeaks it of
རྗ
the Brother (polonté la vwo Twv exxλnov) chirotonix'd, or chofen by 2 Cor. 8. 19.
the Churches? Certainly in this one place at leaſt it is of our fenfe,
and in the word wgonexepolovnμévo it is but once yet in all the New
Teſtament of any other; fo that if we gain the place in controverſy,
we have it twice of our fenfe in Scripture for once not in theirs,
but in any other and in human Authors, they will not fo much as
pretend to have it once for them for a hundred times for us; which
is pretty well for the vindication of the property of one word, and
fomwhat more perhaps than can be don for another. But in the
fenfe of words that are fomtimes properly and fomtimes improperly
taken, may we admit of the things wherof they are ſpoken for In-
terpreters? Or if Lillys and Rofes have bin almoſt as often faid of
Ladys Cheeks, muſt we underſtand them no otherwife when we are
ſpeaking of Gardens ?
YES, fays Dr. HAMMOND, and therfore to fay of the Apoſtles
PAUL and BARNABAS, that they created Elders by their own Suf-
frages, is no more than to say that they jointly did create, and indeed
being but two, there could be no place for Suffrages; and to affirm they
did it by the Suffrages of others, is not agreeable to the pretended ufe of
the word; for where it is us'd of chufing by Suffrages, as when the Peo-
ple are faid to chirotonize, it is certain that their own, and not others
Suffrages are meant by it.
Hobbs.
IT were hardly poſſible to have contriv'd a greater number of Affirma- His own
tions in fo fmall a compass, nor to have gone farther in them from all truth. words to Mr.
Phraſes, as words, are to be underſtood according to the Rule and §. 118.
Law of Speech, which is Uſe: and thus that the Apoſtles created El-
ders by their own Suffrages, is not faid; that they did it by the Suf-
frage of others, is neceffarily imply'd; as alſo that the People are un-
derſtood to chirotonize as well when it is faid of the Preſidents of their
Affemblys, as of themſelves.
Diruit, ædificat, mutat quadrata rotundis.
WHEN a man is faid to build a Houfe, or marry a Daughter,
he is not underſtood to be the Mafon, or the Bridegroom: but the
Apoftles built Churches in thefe Citys; therfore the People were not
the Mafons. The Apoftles marry'd CHRIST to thefe Nations;
therfore the People gave not their confent or fuffrage; what a Con-
Atruction were this in ordinary difcourfe or writing, and yet in the
Language, as I may fay, of a Commonwealth the Phrafe is more uſual.
How often dos DEMOSTHENES fpeak of his Laws (fee my Pfe- De Coron.
phifma, perufe my Law) and thofe of other privat men? after which
Copy the Parté, or Laws in the Commonwealth of Venice, are call'd
by the names of the Propofers as were thoſe of Rome, Rupilia, Cor-
nelia, Trebonia; in which manner we have POYNING's Law, and
fom Statutes bearing no other Stile than Enacted by the King's moſt
Excellent Majefty, which nevertheleſs are known to have bin all enacted
by the Parlament. Thus the Laws of MOSES, RHADAMANTHUS,
MINOS,
376
The Prerogative
Book II. MINOS, LYCURGUS, SOLON, ROMULUS, King EDWARD, were
(leges & confuetudines quas vulgus elegerit) fuch as the People had con-
firm'd or chofen by their Chirotonia. But they may fay, granting
you this ufe of fpeech in relation to Laws, what have you of this kind
for Elections? The exception is nice, but to leave none:
Timccrat.
Ant. 1. 6. c.4.
THE High Sherifs in England propofing to their Countys the
Names of fuch as ſtand, are ſaid to elect Parlament-men. They that
thus propoſe Competitors to the great Council in Venice are call'd
Electors, and faid to elect the Magiftrats. The Proedri, certain Ma-
giftrats to whom it belong'd to put the Queſtion in the Repreſentative
of the People of Athens, confifting of one thoufand, were faid
Demoft cont. (diaxespotovían woeй) to give or make the Suffrage. The Thefmothetæ,
who were Preſidents at the creation of Magiftrats were faid (palezös
Pol. 1. 8. c. 8. Xεipolovε) to chirotonize the Generals. JOSEPHUS renders thofe
words of God to SAMUEL, Hearken to the Voice of the People (xeλEÚ W
δή σε χειροτονείν αυτοίς βασιλέα) I command thee to chirotonize them a
King; which Author vindicating LUKE for his underſtanding both
of the Grecian Cuftoms, and property of Speech, at each of which
he was expert, com up to the full and genuin interpretation of
the place in controverfy, where PAUL and BARNABAS (Xpolo-
νήσαντες αυτοῖς πρεσβυτέρας κατ' εκκλησίαν) chirotonizing them Elders in
every Congregation, can be no otherwiſe underſtood than that they here,
as MOSES at the inftitution of the Sanhedrim, SAMUEL at the
Election of the King, the Proedri at the paffing of Laws, the Thefmo-
theta at the creation of Magiftrats, the Electors in the great Council
of Venice, and the High Sherifs in the Countys of England, were no
more than Preſidents of that Chirotonia, which was given or made
by the Suffrage of the People.
WHERFORE the Greec is thus render'd by theſe ſeveral
Tranflations of the Bible.
That of Zurich,
WHEN they had created them Elders by Suffrages in every Con-
gregation.
That of Beza,
WHEN they had created them Elders by Suffrages in every Con-
gregation.
The French,
WHEN by the advice of the Aſſemblys they had establish'd Elders.
The Italian,
WHEN by the advice of the Congregation they had conftituted them
Elders.
That of Diodati,
WHEN they had ordain'd them in every Church by the common
votes of the Elders.
That appointed by the Synod of Dort,
WHEN in each Church, by the holding up of Hands, they had
elected Prefbyters.
That us'd in England from the time of the Reformation
till the Epiſcopal correction of the fame,
WHEN they had ordain'd them Elders by Election in every Con-
gregation.
INDEED
$
of Popular Government.
377
1
INDEED the circumſtance of the Place forbids any other con- Chap. 5.
ftruction of the words; for if the Suffrage or Chirotonia (which were
ſcarce ſenſe) related to the Apoſtles only, what needed they have don
that in every Congregation or Church, which they might have don
in any Chamber or Clofet? The circumftance of the Action forbids
any
other conſtruction; for the People were affembl'd upon occafion
of Election or Creation of Officers, which thing dos not uſe to be
don in Affemblys gather'd for Divine Service: befides, theſe Congre-
gations were not always of one mind, but fomtimes for facrificing to
the Apoftles, fomtimes for ftoning them, which are Acts of Power;
wherfore they were Political Affemblys. Now theſe confifting alſo of
a People, that had in their Citys (quandam avlovoμíav) the govern-
ment of themſelves, hence arifes the ſtrongeſt circumftance of all, for-
bidding any interpretation of the Text that might exclude them from
election of their own Magiftrats, Priefts, or Ecclefiaftical Elders, ſuch
as had bin the Afiarchs, tho' Heathen Prelats, yet remember'd by the
Scripture as affectionat Friends to PAUL; or fuch as were thoſe, tho' Acts 19. 31.
to a better end, now ordain'd by the Apoſtles. Wherfore GROTIUS,
notwithſtanding all the arts he ufes in other places to avoid this ſenſe,
giving this note upon the Text, yields, Tho chirotonizing may be faid of a-
ny Election made by one, or by the few; yet to the Election in this place
it is probable that the confent of the People was given, no lefs being imply'd
in the beginning of the Chapter, where the Multitude believ'd, where they
were ſtir'd up, where they were evil affected, and where part held with the
Jews, and part with the Apoftles: Which fhews that the People were
active in the buſineſs. But fays Dr. SEAMAN, There is difference
between the Confent of the People, and the Power of the People: which is
not to underſtand the cafe in controverſy, nor to take notice that the
People wherof we are fpeaking were under Popular Government;
for wherever the People are under Popular Government, between that
which is don by their confent, and that which is don (juſſu populi) by
their power, there is no difference. How fhould the People give their
confent, but by their Suffrage? or what difference, where they have
Power, can there be between the Suffrage, and the Power of the
People.
§.
Dr. HAMMOND upon this point is far more quaint: where
the Scripture fays, that the Multitude were evil affected; and where
part held with the Jews, and part with the Apoſtles, he thinks it e'en like
enough: But where it is faid that a great Multitude of the Jews, and
alfo of the Greecs believ'd, he ſeems to have no opinion of it: for, fays
he, It is evident that Believers were at first but few in every Town or City; 134:
they were not whole Corporations at once converted, nor confequently could
they act in a common capacity: but as CLEMENS ROMANUS fays, they
that were by the Apostles conftituted Bishops and Deacons in feveral Citys
and Regions, were conftituted over thoſe that ſhould after believe, there
were oft fo few at the prefent. And then, as fast as any did com into
the Faith, they readily fubmitted themselves to those by and under whom
they did com in, and were not at all troubled (honeft men) with the con--
fultation or deliberation about the way of electing their Teachers and
Guides.
COM away, to leave the Scripture a while, and follow CLEMENS;
be it ſo for diſcourſe fake, that in thoſe days there was no where any
fuch thing as a great Multitude believing, much lefs whole States or
Ccc
Common-
378
The Prerogative
}
§. 125.
§. 135.
Book II. Commonwealths at once converted, wherby they might ſtill act in a com-
mon capacity, but only fom privat or gather'd Congregations or Church-
es; and that in fuch it was the Apoftles PAUL and BARNABAS chi-
rotoniz'd: yet theſe, as they were found, or as afterwards they came
to be made, muft of neceffity have bin Corporations; for what can
a number of Men coming into a Society regulated by certain Laws,
Conſtitutions, or Form, be but a Corporation? Som Ecclefiaftical Po-
licy or Difciplin they muſt have had; and that probably, ſeeing the
greateſt Legiſlators, even Moses himſelf, have written after Copys, ac-
cording to fom Pattern: what was this Pattern, and whence came it?
WHY, fays he, not from their Heathen Cuftoms, but from the Metro-
polis; for it must be remember'd, that wherfoever the Gospel was preach'd
it came originally from Jerufalem; and then, as AGRIPPA in PHILO
fays of that City, it was the Metropolis, not only of Judea, but many
other Regions, becaufe of the Colonys thence fent into Egypt, Phenice,
and both the Syria's; nay, to Pamphylia, Cilicia, and a great part of
Afia, as far as Bithynia, and Pontus. So in reafon the Churches in Ly-
ftra, Iconium, and Antioch, where PAUL and BARNABAS ordain'd
Elders, were to follow the pattern at Jeruſalem; and there, we know, it
was not by the Suffrage of the People, that an Elder was affum'd into the
Sanhedrim, but the Prince or Head of the Sanhedrim receiv'd him in by
Impofition of Hands. It will be much more reasonable to reduce the cir-
cumftances of ordaining Elders from the Customs familiar to them that
preach'd the Faith to them, than from the former ufages of them to whom
it was preach'd, who were not to dispute, but to believe, and receive the
Infiitutions as well as Doctrins which were brought them.
Philo de le-
gatione ad
Caium.
A&is 14. 4.
THESE, methinks, are ſtrange Arguments: The Goſpel came to
us from Rome, is Rome therfore the Metropolis of England? It is
true AGRIPPA being a few, and writing to CALIGULA in the be-
half of the Jews, not of the Chriftians, tells him, That Jerufalem is
the Metropolis of the Jews, and of all their colonys; fo is London of the
English, and of all their Colonys: but dos it follow from hence that
either Jerufalem or London is the Metropolis of Chriftendom? But the
Jews had many Colonys in Afia; and therfore the Churches of Lyftra,
Iconium, and Antioch were to follow the pattern at Jerufalem. The
Jews indeed had Synagogs in Iconium and Lyftra, as the French have
Churches in England; but is this a good argument, The French have
Churches in England, therfore the English are to follow the Orders of
the French Church? The Jews withſtood the Goſpel at Iconium; for,
fays the Text, the multitude of the City was divided, and part held with
the Jews, and part with the Apostles: therfore the believing Iconians
muſt have aknowleg'd Jerufalem to be their Metropolis, and were
to follow the pattern of that City: And what was that? Why there
we know it was not by the Suffrages of the People that an Elder was affum'd
into the Sanhedrim, but the Prince or Head of the Sanhedrim receiv'd
him in by Impofition of Hands. The Government of the Iconians was
Popular, that of the Jews was Ariftocratical; therfore the Iconians
receiving the Chriftian Faith, were bound to change their Democracy
into Ariftocracy. The Apoſtles, to comply with an Oligarchy, had
alter'd that Ordination, which originally (as at the Election of MAT-
THIAS) was popular, to Ariftocracy; therfore being now to plant
the Goſpel in a free State, they might not alter it from Ariftocracy to
Democracy: To pleaſe the Jews they might change for the worfe;
therfore
of Popular Government.
379
ther fore to pleaſe the Iconians they might not change for the better, Chap. 5.
but muſt tell the People plainly, That they were not to dispute, but to
believe, and receive the Inftitutions as well as Doctrins that were brought
them from the Metropolis. How would this found to a People that
underſtood themſelves?
Sic volo, fic jubeo, ftat pro ratione voluntas.
THE right temper of a Metropolitan, to whom Popular Power
is a Heathen Cuftom, and with whom nothing will agree but Prince-
ing of it in the Senat: But with the Apoftles it was otherwife, who
making no words of the Chirothefia where it was needlefs, were glad
of this occafion to chirotonize, or elect them Elders in every Congre-
gation by Popular Suffrage. But this they will fay, is not to come off
from the haunt, but to run ftill upon the People in a common or public
capacity. Tho' the Scripture fpeaks of great Multitudes believing,
believe it there is no fuch thing: CLEMENS fays they were very few,
their Affemblys privat, and very fcanty things. As privat as they were
by the judgment of Divines, they were, it ſeems, to receive from their
Pattern (if that were the Sanhedrim) a Form that was public
nough; and why might not they have receiv'd this from that public
Form wherto they were accuftom'd, rather than from a foren Policy,
and one contrary to their Cuſtoms? Why ſhould they ſuffer fuch Power
in new and privat, as they would not indure in their old and public
Magiftrats? Or, if they receiv'd the Scriptures, why ſhould they
chufe that Ordination which would fit them worst, rather than that
which would fit them beft, that of TIMOTHY rather than that of
MATTHIAS? Or, let their Affemblys have bin never fo privat or
fcanty, yet if the Apostles chirotonix'd them Elders in every Congrega-
tion, is it not demonftrable that they did receive that of MATTHI
As, and not that of TIMOTHY.
e-
THUS much for the Propagation of the pure, or firft kind of Ec-
cleſiaſtical Policy to the Citys of Lycaonia. The mix'd or fecond kind
into which (the Chriſtan Preſbytery delighting to follow the ſteps of
the Jewish) the former might foon degenerat, continu'd in the primi-
tive Church, to ſpeak with the leaft (for WALLEUS brings it down
to CHARLES the Great) three hundred years after CHRIST:
which affertion in Mr. HOBBS, prov'd out of AMMIANUS Mar-
CELLINUS, Dr. HAMMOND has either willingly overfeen, or in-
cludes in this Anfwer, it is maft vifibly void of all appearance of Truth. §. 138.
Wherfore to the Quotation mention'd I fhall add the words of PLA-
TINA: DAMASUS the fecond, by Nation a Bavarian, firnam'd BAG-
NIARIUS, or as fom will Poro, poffefs'd himself of the Papacy by force,
and without confent of the Clergy and of the People. Now what can be
clearer than that by this place the Clergy and the People had hitherto a
right to elect the Pope? The Doctor coms near the word of defiance
to Mr. HOBBS, in a matter of fact fo apparent to any judgment, that
I need not add what gos before in the Life of CLEMENT the fecond
where the Emperor engages the People of Rome not to meddle with the
Election of the Pope without his exprefs Command: Nor what follows
after in LEO the Ninth, where the whole power of Election was now
confer'd by the Emperor upon the Clergy. Again, VICTOR the Second,
fays the fame Author, obtain'd the Papacy rather by favor of the Em-
peror, than by free Suffrages of the Clergy and the People of Rome, who
apprehended the power of the Emperor, whofe difpleasure they had fomtime
incurr'd by creating Popes. So then the People, it is clear, had hitherto
Ccc 2
;
created
380
The Prerogative
Book II. created the Popes. The power of Election thus in the whole Clergy
came afterwards, as at this day, to be reftrain'd to the Cardinals only;
and fo to devolve into the third kind of Ordination exactly correfpon-
dent to the Sanhedrim, and their Chirothefia, as it was exercis'd among
the converted Jews, when TIMOTHY was ordain'd by the laying on
of the Hands of the Prefbytery.
His own
NOW this is that with which, of all others, Divines are fo in-
amor'd, that they will not indure it ſhould be faid there is any other:
It is alſo propitious above all the reſt to Monarchy, as that which ac-
cording to the inherent nature or impotence of Oligarchy, muſt have a
Prince at home or abroad to reſt upon, or becom the inevitable Prey
of the People. Herein lys the Arcanum or Secret of that Antipathy
which is between a Clergy and a Popular Government, and of that
Sympathy which is between the Miter and the Crown. A Prince re-
ceiving a Clergy with the Monopoly of their Chirothefia, has no more
to do than to make a Metropolitan, by whom he governs them, and
by them the People, eſpecially if he indows them with good Reve-
nues; for fo they becom an Eftate of his Realm, and a more fteddy
Pillar of his Throne than his Nobility themſelves, who as their depen-
dence is not fo ftrong, are of a more ſtirring nature. This is the
Gothic Model, from which we had our Pattern, and in which No
Bishop, no King.
THUS for the dignity of Ecclefiaftical Policy, whether in Scrip-
ture or Human Prudence, Popular Government you fee is naturally in-
clin'd to the very beft, and the ſpiritual Ariftocracy to the very worst.
It is alfo remarkable that the Political Balance extends itſelf to the
decifion of the question about Ordination: For as a People never
offer'd to difpute with a well-balanc'd Clergy, fo a Clergy difmounted
never gain'd any thing by difputing with the People. As to the
que-
ftion of Empire or Government (I propheti diſarmati Rovivano) the
Apoftles became all things to all.
THUS beyond all meaſure improfperous are this Divine's Undertakings
words to Mr. againſt Mr. HOBBS, and the Undertakings of Divines upon this Subject.
Holbs.
§. 122.
T
Advertiſement to the Reader, or Direction to the Anfwerer.
HE Anſwer of this Book muft ly in proving that the Apoſtles at the
feveral times and places mention'd, introduc'd but one way of Ordi-
nation, and that the fame to which Divines now pretend: or if the Apoftles
divided, that is to fay, introduc'd divers ways of Ordination, then the
People, or Magiftrat may chufe.
I HAVE taken the more leifure and pains to ftate, I think, all the Cafes
of Controverſy that can arife out of the Commonwealth of Oceana, as you
have ſeen in thefe two Books, to the end I may be no more oblig'd to write,
and yet not omit writing on any occafion that fhall be offer'd; for if my
Principles be overthrown (which when I fee, I fhall moft ingenuouſly confefs
with thanks to the Author) fuch an acknowlegement will ly in a little room;
and this failing, I am deceiv'd if I fhall not now be able to fhew any Writer
againſt me that his Anfwer is none, within the compafs of three or four
fheets.
THIS alfo will be the fitteft way for Boys-play, with which I am ſure
enough to be entertain'd by the quibling Univerfity-men; I mean a certain
Gang of 'em, who having publicly vanted that they would bring 40 exam-
ples againſt the Balance, and fince laid their Caps together about it, have not
produc'd one. Thefe vants of theirs offering prejudice to truth and good
Principles, were the cauſe why they were indeed prefs'd to fhew fom of their
fkill; not that they were thought fit Judges of theſe things, but firſt that
they had declar'd themſelves fo, and next that they may know they are not.
An
of Popular Government.
381
An Anſwer to three Objections against Popular
Government, that were given me after thefe
two Books were printed.
M
ONARCHICAL Government is more natural, becauſe we Object. 1,
fee even in Commonwealths that they have recourfe to this, as
Lacedemon in her Kings; Rome both in her Confuls and
Dictators; and Venice in her Dukes.
GOVERNMENT, whether Popular or Monarchical, is e- Anſwer.
qually artificial; wherfore to know which is more natural, we muſt
confider what piece of Art coms neareſt to Nature: as for example,
whether a Ship or a Houſe be the more natural; and then it will be
eaſy to refolve that a Ship is the more natural at Sea, and a Houſe at
Land. In like manner where one man or a few men are the Landlords,
a Monarchy muft doubtless be the more natural; and where the whole
People are the Landlords, a Commonwealth: for how can we under-
ftand that it ſhould be natural to a People, that can live of themſelves,
to give away the means of their livelihood to one or a few men that
they may ferve or obey? Each Government is equally artificial in
effect, or in it felf; and equally natural in the cauſe, or the matter
upon which it is founded.
A COMMONWEALTH confifts of the Senat propofing,
the People refolving, and the Magiftracy executing; fo the Power of
the Magiftrats (whether Kings as in Lacedemon, Confuls as in Rome,
or Dukes as in Venice) is but barely executive: but to a Monarch be-
longs both the Reſult, and Execution too; wherfore that there have
bin Dukes, Confuls, or Kings in Commonwealths (which were quite
of another nature) is no Argument that Monarchical Government is
for this caufe the more natural.
AND if a man fhall inftance in a mix'd Government, as King
and Parlament; to fay, that the King in this was more natural than
the Parlament, muſt be a ſtrange Affirmation.
TO argue from the Roman Dictator (an Imperfection which ruin'd
that Commonwealth, and was not to be found in any other) that all
Commonwealths have had the like recourfe in exigences to the like
remedy, is quite contrary to the univerfal Teftimony of Prudence or
Story.
A MAN who confiders that the Commonwealth of Venice has
ſtood one thousand years (which never any Monarchy did) and yet
fhall affirm that Monarchical Government is more natural than Popu-
lar, muſt affirm that a thing which is lefs natural may be more dura-
ble and permanent than a thing that is more natural.
WHETHER is a Government of Laws lefs natural than a Go-
vernment of Men; or is it more natural to a Prince to govern by
Laws or by Will? Compare the Violences and bloody Rapes perpe-
tually made upon't
the Crown, or Royal dignity in the Monarchys of
the Hebrews and the Romans, with the State of the Government
under
:
7
382
The Prerogative
Book II. under either Commonwealth, and tell me which was lefs violent, or
whether that which is more violent muft therfore be more natural.
Object. 2.
Anfwer.
Object. 3.
Anfwer.
>
THE Government of Heaven is a Monarchy, fo is the Government
of Hell.
IN this, fays MACHIAVEL, Princes lose themselves and their
Empire, that they neither know how to be perfectly good, nor intirely wicked.
He might as well have faid, that a Prince is always fubject to Error
and Miſgovernment, becauſe he is a Man, and not a God, nor a Devil.
A Shepherd to his Flock, a Plowman to his Team, is a better Na-
ture; and fo not only an abfolute Prince, but as it were a God. The
Government of a better or of a fuperior Nature, is to a worfe or in-
ferior as the Government of God. The Creator is another and a better
Nature than the Creature; the Government in Heaven is of the Cre-
ator over his Creatures, that have their whole dependence upon him,
and fubfiftence in him. Where the Prince or the Few have the whole
Lands, there is fomwhat of dependence reſembling this; fo the Go-
vernment there muft of neceffity be Monarchical or Ariftocratical:
But where the People have no fuch dependence, the cauſes of that
Government which is in Heaven are not in Earth; for neither is the
Prince a diſtinct or better Nature than the People, nor have they
their fubfiftence in him, and therfore there can be no fuch effect.
If a Man were good as God, there is no queftion but he would be not
only a Prince but a God; would govern by Love, and be not only obey'd
but worſhip'd: or if he were ill as the Devil, and had as much power
to do miſchief, he would be dreaded as much, and fo govern by Fear.
To which latter, the Nature of man has ſo much nearer approaches,
that tho we never faw upon Earth a Monarchy like that of Heaven,
yet it is certain the perfection of the Turkish Policy lys in this, that
it coms neareſt to that of Hell.
GOD inftituted a Monarchy, namely in MELCHIZEDEC, before he
inftituted a Commonwealth.
寡
​IF MELCHIZEDEC was a King, fo was ABRAHAM too; tho'
one that paid him Tithes, or was his Subject: for ABRAHAM made
War, or had the power of the Sword, as the reft of the Fathers of
Familys he fought againft. So if CANAAN was a Monarchy in thoſe
days, it was ſuch a one as Germany is in thefe; where the Princes al-
ſo have as much the right of the Sword as the Emperor, which coms
rather (as has bin ſhewn already) to a Commonwealth. But whether
it were a Monarchy or a Commonwealth, we may fee by the preſent
ftate of Germany that it was of no very good Example; nor was
MELCHIZEDEC otherwife made a King by God than the Emperor,
that is, as an Ordinance of Man.
THE
1.
THE
ART
O F
LAWGIVING:
In Three BOOKS.
The firft, fhewing the Foundations and Super-
ftructures of all kinds of Government.
The Second, fhewing the Frames of the Com-
monwealths of Ifrael, and of the Jews.
The Third, fhewing a Model fitted to the pre-
fent State, or Balance of this Nation.
**
}
1
The Order of the Work.
The First Book.
HE Preface, confidering the Principles, or Nature of Family
TH
Governments.
CHAP. I. Confidering the Principles, or Balance of National Go-
vernments: with the different kinds of the fame.
CHAP. II. Shewing the variation of the English Balance.
CHAP. III. Of the fixation of the Balance, or of Agrarian Laws.
CHAP. IV. Shewing the Superstructures of Governments.
THE Conclufion, obferving that the Principles of Human Prudence
being good without proof out of Scripture, are nevertheless fuch as are
provable out of Scripture.
The Second Book.
HE Preface, shewing that there were Commonwealths before that
of Ifrael.
TH
CHAP. I. Shewing that Ifrael was a Commonwealth.
CHAP. II. Shewing what Commonwealth Ifrael was.
CHAP. III. Shewing the Anarchy, or ftate of the Ifraelits under their
Judges.
CHAP. IV. Shewing the ftate of the Ifraelits under their Kings to the
Captivity.
CHAP. V. Shewing the State of the Jews in Captivity, and after their
return from Captivity; or the frame of the Jewish Commonwealth:
and in that the Original of Ordination.
CHAP. VI. Shewing how Ordination was brought into the Chriftian
Church, and the divers ways of the fame at divers times in ufe with
the Apostles.
THE Conclufion, Shewing that neither God, nor Chriſt, or the Apo-
files ever inftituted any Government Ecclefiaftical or Civil, upon any
other Principles than thofe only of Human Prudence.
The Third Book.
HE Preface, containing a Model of Popular Government, pro-
pos'd notionally.
THE
CHAP. I. Containing the Civil part of the Model, propos'd practicably.
CHAP. II. Containing the Religious part of the Model, propos'd prac-
ticably.
CHAP. III. Containing the Military part of the Model, propos'd prac-
ticably.
CHAP. IV. Containing the Provincial part of the Model, propos'd
practicably.
THE Conclufion, Shewing how the Model may be prov'd or examin'd ;
and giving a brief Anfwer to Mr. WREN's last Book, intitul'd,
Monarchy afferted, &c.
385
THE
FIRST BOOK,
SHEWING THE
FOUNDATIONS
AND
SUPERSTRUCTURES
Of all kinds of
GOVERNMENT
If this Age fails me, the next will do me Justice.
The PREFACE,
Confidering the Principles or Nature of
Family Government.
D
IVINES, and the like ftudious Affertors of Monarchy, have
not laid their Principles fo fairly, while they have conceal'd one
part from the right of Paternity, or from the Government of
Familys, which may be of two kinds; wheras they have taken
notice but of one: For Family Government may be as necessarily Popular
in fom cafes, as Monarchical in others.
Family.
TO fhew now the nature of the Monarchical Family. Put the cafe a Monarchical
man has one thouſand Pounds a year, or therabouts; be màrrys a Wife,
has Children and Servants depending upon him (at his good will) in the di-
ftribution of his Eftate for their livelihood. Suppofe then that this Eftate
coms to be spent or loft, where is the Monarchy of this Family? But if the
Mafter was no otherwife Monarchical than by virtue of his Eftate, then the
foundation or balance of his Empire confifted in the thousand pounds a year.
THAT from thefe Principles there may also be a Popular Family, is ap- Popular Fa
parent: For fuppofe fix or ten, having each three hundred pounds a year,
or fo, fhall agree to dwell together as one Family; can any one of theſe pretend
to be Lord and Master of the fame, or to difpofe of the Eftates of all the
reft? Or do they not agree together upon fuch Orders, to which they confent
equally to fubmit? But if fo, then certainly muft the Government of this
Ddd
Family
mily.
386
The Preface.
Book I. Family be a Government of Laws or Orders, and not the Government of
one, or of fom three or four of thefe men.
Government
Government
of Men.
YET the one Man in the Monarchical Family giving Laws, and the
of Laws, and Many in the Popular Family doing no more, it may in this fenfe be indiffe-
rently faid, That all Laws are made by Men. But it is plain that there
the Law is made by one Man, there it may be unmade by one Man; fo that
the Man is not govern'd by the Law, but the Law by the Man; which a-
mounts to the Government of the Man, and not of the Law: Wheras the
Law being not to be made but by the Many, no Man is govern'd by another
man, but by that only which is the common intereft by which means this
amounts to a Government of Laws, and not of Men.
The facility
that is in true
Politics.
The diffe-
rence be-
rain Lord,
and a Magi-
preme.
THAT the Politics may not be thought an unneceffary or difficult Art,
if thefe Principles be less than obvious and undeniable, even to
any Woman
that knows what belongs to houſekeeping, I confefs I have no more to say.
But in cafe what has bin faid be to all forts and capacitys evident, it is moft
humbly fubmitted to Princes and Parlaments, whether, without violence
or removing of Property, they can make a Popular Family of the Monar-
chical, or a Monarchical Family of the Popular? Or, whether that be
practicable or poſſible in a Nation, upon the like balance or foundation in
Property, which is not in a Family? A Family being but a ſmaller So-
ciety or Nation, and a Nation but a greater Society or Family.
THAT which is ufually anfwer'd to this point, is, That the fix or ten,
thus agreeing to make one Family, must have fom Steward; and to make
tween a Sove- fuch a Steward in a Nation, is to make a King. But this is to imagin
that the Steward of a Family is not answerable to the Mafters of it, or to
ftrat, tho fu- them upon whofe Eftates (and not upon his own) he defrays the whole
Charge: For otherwife this Stewardship cannot amount to Dominion, but
muſt com only to the true nature of Magiftracy, and indeed of annual Ma-
giftracy in a Commonwealth; feeing that fuch Accounts in the year's end,
at fartheft, ufe to be calculated, and that the Steward, Body and Eftate,
is anfwerable for the fame to the Proprietors or Maſters; who alſo have
the undoubted right of conftituting fuch another Steward or Stewards as
to them ſhall ſeem good, or of prolonging the Office of the fame.
Where the
art of Law-
giving is ne-
ceffary.
The art of
Lawgiving is
NOW, where a Nation is caft, by the unfeen ways of Providence, into
a diforder of Government, the duty of fuch particularly as are elected by
the People, is not ſo much to regard what has bin, as to provide for the
Supreme Law, or for the fafety of the People, which confifts in the true
Art of Lawgiving.
THE Art of Lawgiving is of two kinds; the one (as I may fay)
of two kinds. falfe, the other true. The first confifts in the reduction of the Balance to
Arbitrary Superftructures; which requires violence, as being contrary to
Nature: The other in erecting neceſſary Superftructures, that is, fuch as
are conformable to the Balance or Foundation; which, being purely na-
tural, requires that all interpofition of Force be remov'd.
•
СНАР.
辈
​The Art of Lawgiving.
387
CHA P. I.
Confidering the Principles or Balance of National Govern-
ments; with the different kinds of the fame.
T
Chap. 1.
Pfal. 115. 16.
HE Heaven, fays DAVID, even the Heavens are the Lord's;
but the Earth has he given to the Children of Men: Yet, fays The Original
of Property.
God to the Father of thefe Children, In the fweat of thy Face Gen. 3. 19.
fhalt thou eat thy Bread. Dii laborantibus fua munera vendunt. This
Donation of the Earth to Man coms to a kind of felling it for I N-
DUSTRY, a Treaſure which feems to purchaſe of God himſelf.
From the different kinds and fucceffes of this Induſtry, whether in
Arms, or in other Exerciſes of the Mind or Body, derives the natural
equity of Dominion or Property; and from the legal Eſtabliſhment or
diſtribution of this Property (be it more or leſs approaching towards
the natural equity of the fame) procedes all Government.
fifts in Pro-
THE diftribution of Property, fo far as it regards the nature or Thebalance of
Empire con-
procreation of Government, lys in the overbalance of the fame:
Juſt as a man, who has two thouſand pounds a year, may have a Re-perty.
tinue, and confequently a Sength, that is three times greater than
his who enjoys but five hundred pounds a year. Not to ſpeak at this
time of Mony, which in ſmall Territorys may be of a like effect: but
to infift upon the main, which is Property in Land, the overbalance
of this, as it was at firſt conſtituted, or coms infenfibly to be chang'd
in a Nation, may be efpecially of three kinds; that is, in One, in
the Few, or in the Many.
THE overbalance of Land, three to one or therabouts, in one The genera-
Man againſt the whole People, creates Abfolute Monarchy; as when tion of Abse-
JOSEPH had purchas'd all the Lands of the Egyptians for PHA- lute Monar-
The Conftitution of a People in this and fuch cafes, is ca-
pable of intire fervitude. Buy us and our Land for Bread, and we Gen. 47.19.
RAOH.
and our Land will be Servants to PHARAOH.
chy.
THE overbalance of Land to the fame proportion, in the Few a- The genera-
gainſt the whole People, creates Ariftocracy, or Regulated Monarchy, lated Monar-
tion of Regu-
as of late in England: And hereupon fays SAMUEL to the People of chy.
Ifrael, when they would have a King, He will take your Fields, even 1 Sam, 8.
the best of them, and give them to his Servants. The conſtitution of a
People in this and the like cafes, is neither capable of intire Liberty,
nor of intire Servitude.
THE overbalance of Land to the fame proportion in the People, The genera-
or where neither one nor the few overbalance the whole People, creates lar Govern-
tion of Popu-"
Popular Government; as in the divifion of the Land of Canaan to the ment.
whole People of Ifrael by lot. The conftitution of a People in this
and the like cafes, is capable of intire Freedom, nay, not capable of a-
ny other fettlement; it being certain, that if a Monarch, or fingle
Perfon in fuch a State, thro the corruption or improvidence of their
Councils, might carry it; yet by the irreſiſtible force of Nature, or
the reafon alleg'd by MOSES (I am not able to bear all this People a- Numb. 11.
* Nec totam libertatem nec totam fervitutem pati poffunt. Tacit.
D dd 2
lone,
14.
388
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book I. lone, because it is too heavy for me) he could not keep it; but out of the
deep Waters would cry to them, whofe feet he had ſtuck in the mire.
WHEREVER the Balance of a Government lys, there natu-
Of the Mili-
tia, and of rally is the Militia of the fame; and againſt him or them wherin the
the Negative Militia is naturally lodg'd, there can be no negative Vote.
Voice.
Judg. 20.
Imperfect Go-
vernment.
IF a Prince holds the overbalance, as in Turky, in him is the Mi-
litia, as the Janizarys and Timariots. If a Nobility has the over-
balance, the Militia is in them, as among us was feen in the Barons
Wars, and thofe of York and Lancaster; and in France is feen, when
any confiderable part of that Nobility rebelling, they are not to be
reduc'd, but by the major part of their Order adhering to the King.
IF the People has the overbalance, which they had in Ifrael, the
Militia is in them; as in the four hundred thoufand firft decreeing,
and then waging War againſt Benjamin: Where it may be inquir'd,
what Power there was on earth having a Negative Voice to this Af-
fembly? This always holds where there is Settlement, or where a
Government is natural. Where there is no Settlement, or where the
Government is unnatural, it procedes from one of theſe two cauſes
either an imperfection in the Balance, or elſe fuch a Corruption in the
Lawgivers, wherby a Government is inftituted contrary to the Balance.
;
IMPERFECTIONS of the Balance, that is, where it is not
good or down weight, cauſe imperfect Governments; as thofe of the
Roman and of the Florentin People, and thofe of the Hebrew Kings and
Roman Emperors, being each exceeding bloody, or at leaſt turbulent.
GOVERNMENT againſt the balance in One, is Tyranny, as
Oligarchy, that of the Athenian PISISTRATUS: in the Few it is Oligarchy, as
Anarchy. that of the Roman DECEMVIRS; in the Many Anarchy, as that under
the Neapolitan MAZINELLO.
Tyranny,
The Divine
vernment.
WHEREVER, thro Caufes unforeseen by Human Providence,
right of Go- the Balance coms to be intirely chang'd, it is the more immediatly to be
attributed to Divine Providence: And fince God cannot will the necef-
fary cauſe, but he muſt alſo will the neceffary effect or confequence,
what Government foever is in the neceffary direction of the Balance,
the fame is of Divine Right. Wherfore, tho of the Ifraelits God fays,
Hof. 8. 4. They have fet up Kings, but not by me; they have made Princes, and I
knew it not; yet, to the fmall Countries adjoining to the Affyrian Em-
Jer 27.6,17. pire, he ſays, Now have I given all thefe Lands into the hand of the King
of Babylon my Servant Serve the King of Babylon, and live.
T
CHA P. II.
Shewing the variation of the Engliſh Balance.
HE Land in poffeffion of the Nobility and Clergy of England,
till HENRY 7th, cannot be efteem'd to have overbalanc'd
thofe held by the People less than four to one.
Wheras in our days,
the Clergy being deftroy'd, the Lands in poffeffion of the People
overbalance thoſe held by the Nobility, at leaſt, nine in ten. In fhew-
ing how this change came about, fom would have it that I affume to
my felf more than my fhare; tho they do not find me delivering that
which must rely upon Authority, and not vouching my Authors. But
HENRY the Seventh being conscious of infirmity in his Title, yet
finding
The Art of Lawgiving.
389
"
finding with what ſtrength and vigor he was brought in by the Nobi- Chap. 2.
lity, conceiv'd jealoufys of the like Power in cafe of a decay or change
of Affections. Nondum orbis adoraverat Romam: The Lords
yet led
Country lives, their houfes were open to retainers, Men experienc'd
in Military Affairs, and capable of commanding; their Hoſpitality was
the delight of their Tenants, who by their Tenures or Dependence
were oblig'd to follow their Lords in Arms. So that, this being the
Militia of the Nation, a few Noblemen diſcontented could at any time
levy a great Army; the effect wherof, both in the Barons Wars, and
thoſe of York and Lancaſter, had been well know to divers Kings.
This ftate of affairs was that which inabl'd HENRY the Seventh to
make his advantage of troubleſom times, and the frequent unruliness
of Retainers; while, under the pretence of curbing Riots, he obtain'd
the paffing of ſuch Laws as did cut off theſe Retainers, wherby the
Nobility wholly loſt their Officers. Then, wheras the dependence of
the People upon their Lords was of a ftrict ty or nature, he found
means to loosen this alfo by Laws, which he obtain'd upon as fair a
pretence, even that of Population. Thus Farms were fo brought to a Verularr
jtandard, that the Houfes being kept up, each of them did of neceffity in- H. 7.
force a Dweller; and the proportion of Land laid to each Houfe, did of
neceffity inforce that Dweller not to be a Begger or Cottager, but a man
able to keep Servants, and fet the Plow on going. By which means a great
part of the Lands of this Nation came in effect to be amortiz'd to the hold
the Yeomanry, or middle People, wherof confifted the main body of
the Militia, hereby incredibly advanc'd; and which henceforth, like
cleaner underwood lefs choak'd by their ftaddles, began to grow exceding-
ly. But the Nobility, who by the former Laws had loft their Offices,
by this loft their Soldiery. Yet remain'd to them their Eftates, till
the fame Prince introducing the Statutes for Alienations, theſe alſo be-
came loofe; and the Lords lefs taken (for the reaſons fhewn) with
their Country lives, where their Trains were clip'd, by degrees be-
came more refident at Court, where greater pomp and expence by the
Statutes of Alienations began to plume them of their Eftates. The
Court was yet at Bridewel, nor reach'd London any farther than Temple-
Bar. The latter growth of this City, and in that, the declining of
the Balance to Popularity, derives from the decay of the Nobility and
of the Clergy. In the Reign of the fucceding King were Abbys
(than which nothing more dwarfs a People) demolish'd. I did not,
Ì do not attribute the effects of theſe things thus far to my own parti-
cular obſervation; but always did, and do attribute a ſenſe therof to
the Reign of Queen ELIZABETH, and the Wiſdom of her Council.
There is yet living Teftimony, that the ruin of the English Monar-
chy, thro the caufes mention'd, was frequently attributed to HENRY
the Seventh by Sir HENRY WOTTON; which Tradition is not
unlike to have deſcended to him from the Queen's Council. But there
is a difference between having the fenfe of a thing, and making a right
ufe of that fenfe. Let a man read PLUTARCH in the lives of
AGIS, and of the GRACCHI, there can be no plainer demonftra-
tion of the Lacedemonian or Roman Balance; yet read his Difcourfe of
Government in his Morals, and he has forgot it: he makes no uſe,
no mention at all of any fuch thing. Who could have bin plainer upon
this point than Sir WALTER RALEIGH, where, to prove that the
Kings of Egypt were not elective but hereditary, he alleges that if the
Kings
390
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book I.
Hift. of the
World, part
1. p. 200.
10.
; or
Kings of Egypt had bin elective, the Children of PHARAOH muſt have
bin more mighty than the King, as Landlords of all Egypt, and the
King himself their Tenant? Yet when he coms to fpeak of Govern-
ment, he has no regard to, no remembrance of any fuch Principle.
In Mr. SELDEN's Titles of Honor, he has demonftrated the Eng-
life Balance of the Peerage, without making any application of it,
or indeed perceiving it there, or in times when the defect of the fame
came to give fo full a ſenſe of it. The like might be made apparent in
ARISTOTLE, in MACHIAVEL, in my Lord VERULAM, in all,
in any Politician: there is not one of them in whom may not be
found as right a ſenſe of this Principle as in this prefent Narrative
in whom may be found a righter uſe of it than was made by any of
the Partys thus far concern'd in this ſtory, or by Queen ELIZA-
M. D.1.1.b. BETH and her Council. If a Prince, fays a great Author, to reform
a Government were oblig'd to depofe himself, he might, in neglecting of it,
be capable of fom excufe; but reformation of Government being that with
which a Principality may ftand, he deferves no excufe at all. It is not in-
deed obferv'd by this Author that where by reaſon of the declination
of the Balance to Popularity, the State requires Reformation in the
Superftructures, there the Prince cannot rightly reform, unleſs from So-
verain Power he defcends to a Principality in a Commonwealth: ne-
vertheleſs upon the like occafions this fails not to be found fo in Nature
and Experience. The growth of the People of England, fince the
ruins mention'd of the Nobility and the Clergy came in the Reign
of Queen ELIZABETH to more than ftood with the Intereft, or
indeed the nature or poffibility of a well founded or durable Monar-
chy; as was prudently perceiv'd, but withal temporiz'd by her
Council, who (if the truth of her Government be rightly weigh'd)
feem rather to have put her upon the exercife of Principality in a
Commonwealth, than of Soverain Power in a Monarchy. Certain it
is that the courted not her Nobility, nor gave her mind (as do Mo-
narchs feated upon the like foundation) to balance her great Men,
or reflect upon their Power now inconfiderable; but rul'd wholly,
with an art ſhe had to high perfection, by humoring and bleffing her
People. For this mere fhadow of a Commonwealth is fhe yet famous,
and ſhall ever be fo; tho had ſhe introduc'd the full perfection of the
Orders requifit to Popular Government, her fame had bin greater.
Firſt, She had eſtabliſh'd fuch a Principality to her Succeffors, as they
might have retain'd. Secondly, This Principality (the Common-
The great
wealth, as Rome of ROMULUS, being born of fuch a Parent) might
Council of have retain'd the Royal Dignity and Revenue to the full, both im-
the Soverain prov'd and difcharg'd of all Envy. Thirdly, It had fav'd all the Blood
Power, and and Confufion, which thro this neglect in her and her Succeffors, has
the Duke the fince iffu'd. Fourthly, It had bequeath'd to the People a Light not
Dignity fo natural by them to be diſcover'd, which is a great pity. For
M. D.1. 1. c. even as the Many, thro the difference of opinions that must needs abound
among them, are not apt to introduce a Government, as not understand-
ing the good of it: fo the Many, having by trial or experience once at-
tain'd to this underſtanding, agree not to quit fuch a Government. And
laftly, It had plac'd this Nation in that perfect felicity, which, ſo far
as concerns mere Prudence, is in the power of human nature to enjoy.
To this Queen fucceded King JAMES, who likewife regardleſs of
this point (into which nevertheleſs he faw fo far as not ſeldom to
Venice bas
Soverain
9.
prophefy
The Art of Lawgiving.
391
prophefy fad things to his Succeffors) neither his new Peerage, which Chap. 3.
in abundance he created, nor the old avail'd him any thing againſt
that dread wherin, more freely than prudently, he diſcover'd him-
felf to ſtand of Parlaments, as now mere Popular Councils, and run-
ning to popularity of Government like a Bowl down a hill; not fo
much, I may fay, of Malice prepens'd, as by natural inſtinct, wher-
of the Petition of Right, well confider'd, is a fufficient Teſtimony. All
perfuafion of Court Eloquence, all patience for fuch, as but look'd
that way, was now loft. There remain'd nothing to the deftruction
of a Monarchy, retaining but the name, more than a Prince who by
contending ſhould make the People to feel thofe advantages which
they could not fee. And this happen'd in the next King, who too fe-
cure in that undoubted right wherby he was advanc'd to a Throne
which had no foundation, dar'd to put this to an unfeaſonable trial;
on whom therfore fell the Tower in Silo. Nor may we think that
they upon whom this Tower fell, were Sinners above all men; but
that we, unleſs we repent, and look better to the true foundations,
muſt likewiſe perifh. We have had latter Princes, latter Parlaments.
In what have they excel'd, or where are they? The Balance not
confider'd, no effectual work can be made as to fettlement; and
confider'd, as it now ftands in England, requires to fettlement no leſs
than the Superftructures natural to Popular Government: and the Su-
perftructures natural to Popular Government require no less than the
higheft fkill or art that is in Political Architecture. The fum of which
Particulars amounts to this, That the fafety of the People of England
is now plainly caft upon ſkill or ſufficiency in Political Architecture :
it is not enough therfore, that there are honeft men addicted to all the
good ends of a Commonwealth, unless there be ſkill alſo in the forma→
tion of thoſe proper means wherby fuch Ends may be attain'd.
Which is a fad, but a true account; this being in all experience, and in
the judgment of all Politicians, that wherof the Many are incapable.
And tho the meaneſt Citizen, not informing the Commonwealth of
what he knows, or conceives to concern its fafety, commits a hainous
Crime againſt God and his Country; yet fuch is the temper of later
times, that a man, having offer'd any light in this particular, has fcap'd
well enough, if he be defpis'd and not ruin'd.
BUT to procede: if the Balance, or ftate of Property in a
Nation, be the efficient caufe of Government, and, the Balance
being not fix'd, the Government (as by the preſent Narrative is
evinc'd) muſt remain inconftant or floting; then the procefs in the
formation of a Government must be firft by a fixation of the Balance,
and next by erecting fuch Superftructures as to the nature therof are
neceffary.
CHA P. III.
Of Fixation of the Balance, or of Agrarian Laws.
FIX
IXATION of the Balance of Property is not to be provided
for but by Laws; and the Laws, wherby fuch a Proviſion is
made, are commonly call'd Agrarian Laws. Now as Governments,
thro the divers Balance of Property, are of divers or contrary na-
tures,
392
;
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book I.
It is at pre-
fent in more
bands; but
without fixa-
tion may com
into fewer.
tures, that is Monarchical or Popular; fo are fuch Laws. Monarchy
requires of the ſtandard of Property, that it be vaft and great; and of
Agrarian Laws, that they hinder recefs or diminution, at leaft in fo
much as is therby intail'd upon Honor: But Popular Government re-
quires, that the ſtandard be moderat, and that its Agrarian prevent
accumulation. In a Territory not exceding England in Revenue, if the
Balance be in more hands than three hundred, it is declining from
Monarchy; and if it be in fewer than five thoufand hands, it is fwerv-
ing from a Commonwealth: which as to this point may fuffice at
preſent.
The Super-
Structures of
Abfolute Mo-
T
CHA P. IV.
Shewing the Superftructures of Governments.
HAT the Policy or Superftructures of all abfolute Monarchs,
more particularly of the Eaftern Empires, are not only
narchy. contain❜d, but meliorated in the Turkish Government, requires no far-
ther proof than to compare them: but becaufe fuch a work would
not ly in a ſmall compafs, it fhall fuffice for this time to ſay, that
fuch Superftructures of Government as are natural to an abfolute
Prince, or the fole. Landlord of a large Territory, require for the first
ftory of the Building, that, what Demeans he fhall think fit to re-
ferve being fet apart, the reft be divided into Horfe quarters or Mili-
tary Farms, for life or at will, and not otherwife: And that every
Tenant for every hundred pounds a year fo held, be, by Condition
of his Tenure, oblig'd to attend his Soverain Lord in Perfon, in Arms,
and at his proper coft and charges, with one Horſe, ſo often, and
fo long as he ſhall be commanded upon fervice. Theſe among the
Turks are call'd Timariots.
Thmariots.
Beglerbegs.
Janizarys
THE fecond Story requires, that theſe Horfe quarters, or Mili-
tary Farms, be divided by convenient Precincts or Proportions into
diſtinct Provinces; and that each Province have one Governor or
Commander in chief of the fame, at the will and pleaſure of his
Grand Signior, or for three years and no longer. Such among the
Turks (unleſs by additional honors they be call'd Bashaws or Viziers)
are the Beglerbegs.
FOR the third Story, there muft of neceffity be a Mercenary
and Spahys. Army confifting both of Horſe and Foot, for the Guard of the Prince's
Perſon, and for the Guard of his Empire; by keeping the Governors
of Provinces fo divided, that they be not fuffer'd to lay their arms
or heads together, or to hold correfpondence or intelligence with
one another. Which Mercenary Army ought not to be conftituted
of fuch as have already contracted fom other intereſt: but to conſiſt
of Men fo educated from their very childhood, as not to know that
they have any other Parent, or native Country, than the Prince and
his Empire. Such among the Turks are the Foot call'd Janizarys,
and the Horſe call'd Spahys.
The Divan
and the
THE Prince accommodated with a Privy Council, confifting of
fuch as have bin Governors of Provinces, is the Topftone: This Coun-
Grand Sig- cil among the Turks is call'd the Divan, and this Prince the Grand
Signior.
THE
The Art of Lawgiving.
393
THE Superftructures proper to a regulated Monarchy, or to the Chap. 4.
Government of a Prince (three or four hundred of whofe Nobility,
The Super-
or of whofe Nobility and Clergy hold three parts in four of the Ter- frudures of
ritory) muſt either be by his perſonal influence upon the Balance, or Regulated
by virtue of Orders.
IF a Prince, by eafing his Nobility of Taxes, and feeding them
with ſuch as are extorted from the People, can fo accommodat their
Ambition and Avarice with great Offices and Commands, that a Party
rebelling, he can overbalance and reduce them by a greater part of their
own Order, he may have greater Power and lefs Security, as at pre-
fent in France.
THE fafer way of this Government is by Orders; and the Orders
proper to it fpecially confift of a Hereditary Senat of the Nobility,
admitting alfo of the Clergy, and of a Repreſentative of the People
made up of the Lords menial Servants, or ſuch as by Tenure and for
Livelihood have immediat dependence upon them, as formerly in
England.
Monarchy.
AN Ariftocracy, or State of Nobility, to exclude the People muft No fuch thing
as pure Arific-
govern by a King; or to exclude a King, muſt govern by the People:
cracy, or pure
Nor is there, without a Senat or mixture of Ariftocracy, any Popular Democracy.
Government. Whence, tho for diſcourſe fake Politicians fpeak of
pure Ariftocracy, and pure Democracy, there is no fuch thing as either
of theſe in Nature, or Example.
WHERE the People are not overbalanc'd by one Man, or by the The Super-
Few, they are not capable of any other Superftructures of Govern- Aructures of
Popular Go-
ment, or of any other juft and quiet Settlement whatſoever, than of vernment.
fuch only as confifts of a Senat as their Counfillors, of themſelves or their
Repreſentatives as Soverain Lords, and of a Magiſtracy anſwerable to
the People, as diftributers and executioners of the Laws made by the
People. And thus much is of abfolute neceffity to any or every Govern-
ment, that is or can be properly call'd a Commonwealth, whether
it be well or ill order'd.
well-order'd
BUT the neceffary definition of a Commonwealth, any thing well Definition of a
order'd, is, That it is a Government confifting of the Senat propofing, Common-
the People refolving, and the Magiftracy executing.
wealth.
MAGISTRAČY is a ftile proper to the executive part: yet be- Diſtinction of
cauſe in a Diſcourſe of this kind it is hardly avoidable, but that fuch as Magistracy.
are of the propofing or refolving Affemblys, will be fometimes compriz'd
under this name or ftile, it fhall be enough for excufe to fay, that Ma-
giftracy may be eſteem'd of two kinds; the one proper or Executive,
the other improper or Legiſlative.
A SENAT may confift of a Hereditary Order, elective for life
by it felf, or by fom Magiftrat or Magiftrats of the fame; as the Se-
nat of Rome confifted of the Patrician Order therinto eligible, firſt by
the Confuls, and then by the Cenfors. A Senat may confift of Sena-
tors elected by the People for life, as that of Lacedemon: It may con-
fift of Senators eligible by the People for terms, without any vacation
or interval, as the Senat of Venice; or with intervals, as the Senat of
Athens, which alſo for another difference was elected by lot.
Senats, and
their kinds.
their kinds,
A POPULAR Affembly may confift of the whole People, as the Popular Af
great Council of Venice (for the Venetians, tho call'd, in refpect of their eys, and
fem¹lys,
Subjects, Nobility, are all that free People which is compriz'd in that
Commonwealth) or of a Repreſentative, as in Ifrael.
Eee
Again, a Re-
prefentative
394
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book I.
Supreme Ma-
giflrats, and
their kinds.
Other diffe-
rences in Com-
monwealths.
Rotation, or
Courſes.
Popular E-
lection.
The Ballot.
The different
Genius of
Common-
wealths.
preſentative of the People may be for life, as in the particular Citys or
Soveraintys of Holland, improperly call'd Senats; or it may be upon
Rotation, that is to fay, by changes or courfes, as that of Ifrael, and
the preſent Repreſentative in England; it may alfo be by lot, as the
Roman Tribes call'd the Prerogative, and the Jure vocata.
The cause of
Common-
TO ſpeak of Magiftrats in a Commonwealth, and all their kinds,
were to begin an endleſs difcourfe; the prefent I fhall therfore confine
to fuch only as may be call'd Supreme Magiftrats. The Supreme
Magiftracy of a Commonwealth may be in one or more; and it may
be for life, or for terms and vacations. In one elective by the People
for life; as in the Duke of Venice, whofe Function is Civil and not
Military. In two Hereditarily; as in the two Kings of Lacedemon,
whofe Function was rather Military than Civil. In nine annually e-
lective by the People; as in the nine Princes or Archons of Athens.
In two annually elected by the People; as the Roman Confuls, whoſe
Power was both Military and Civil. In a word, it may be in one or
more, for life, or for terms and vacations, as fhall beft fute with the
occafion.
SOM Commonwealths confift of diftinct Soveraintys, as Switzer-
land and Holland; others are collected into one and the fame Sove-
rainty, as moſt of the reft. Again, fom Commonwealths have bin
upon Rotation or Courfes in the Reprefentative only, as Ifrael: Others
in the Magiſtracy only, as Rome. Som in the Senat and in the Ma-
giftracy, as Athens and Venice: Others in fom part of the Magiſtracy,
and in others not; as Lacedemon in the Ephori, and not in the Kings;
and Venice not in the Duke, nor in the Procuratori, but in all the reft.
Holland, except in the Election of States Provincial (which is emer-
gent) admits not of any rotation or courfes. There may be a Com-
monwealth admitting of Rotation throout, as in the Senat, in the Re-
preſentative, and in the Magiftracy; as that propos'd in Oceana.
ROTATION, if it be perfect, is equal election by, and fuc-
ceffion of the whole People to the Magiftracy by terms and vaca-
tions.
EQUAL Election may be by Lot, as that of the Senat of Athens;
by Suffrage, as that of Lacedemon; or by Ballot, as that of Venice, which
of all others is the most equal.
THE Ballot, as it is us'd in Venice, confifts of a Lot; whence
procedes the right of propofing, and of an unfeen way of fuffrage, or
of refolving.
FROM the wonderful variety of parts, and the difference of mix-
ture (hitherto ſcarce touch'd by any) refult thofe admirable diffe-
rences that are in the Conftitution and Genius of Popular Govern-
ments; fom being for defence, fom for increafe; fom more equal,
others inequal; fom turbulent and feditious, others, like foft ftreams,
in a perpetual tranquillity.
THAT which caufes innat Sedition in a Commonwealth, is Ine-
Sedition in a quality; as in Rome, where the Senat oppreft the People. But if a
wealth. Commonwealth be perfectly equal, it is void of Sedition, and has
attain'd to perfection, as being void of all internal caufes of diffo-
lution.
Definition of
A N equal Commonwealth is a Government founded upon a ba-
an equal Com-lance which is perfectly Popular, being well fix'd by a futable Agra-
rian; and which from the balance, thro the free fuffrage of the People
monwealth.
given
The Art of Lawgiving.
395
given by the Ballot, amounts in the Superftructures to a Senat debating Chap. 4.
and propofing, a Reprefentative of the People refolving, and a Ma-
giftracy executing: each of theſe three Orders being upon Courſes or
Rotation; that is, elected for certain terms, injoining like Intervals.
SUCH Conftitutions in a Government as regard the Frame or The difference
between Laws
Model of it, are call'd Orders; and fuch things as are enacted by the
Legiſlative Orders, are called Laws.
TO undertake the binding of a Prince from invading Liberty,
and yet not to introduce the whole Orders neceffary to Popular
Government, is to undertake a flat contradiction, or a plain impoffi-
bility.
the wont of
A PEOPLE or Affembly not underſtanding true Principles, give Hazard thre
leaft credit to the beſt Orders, and fo com to caft themſelves upon par-
upon par- Principles.
ticular perfons: for where orders are not credited, there Men must be
truſted; and where Men are trufted, they find themfelves fo well in
their power, that they are either for bringing in a Commonwealth by
degrees, or more probably not at all. The defire of bringing in a
Commonwealth by degrees, arifes from want of confidering that the
whole of a Commonwealth, as to charge or trouble, is leſs than the
half. He who has a Journey to go, dos not chuſe to have but half a
Bridle, or but one Boot or Stirrup, tho theſe be fewer things, and com
but to half the charge; becauſe this would but neceffitat him to pro-
cure more things, and perhaps more chargeable or dangerous.
Optimus ille animi vindex, lædentia pectus
Vincula qui rupit, dedolu tque femel.
The Conclufion:
Obferving that the Principles of Human Prudence being
good without proof of Scripture, are nevertheless fuch
as are provable out of Scripture.
W
HO imagins that the Romans govern'd by proof out of Scrip-
ture? Yet fays PETER, Submit yourſelves to (Human Pru-1 Pet. 2. 13.
dence, or) every Ordinance of Man; which relates more particularly
to the Government of the Romans. The most frequent compariſon of
a Commonwealth is to a Ship; but who imagins that a Ship ought not
to be built according to the Art of the Shipwright, or govern'd accord-
ing to the Compafs, unleſs theſe be prov'd out of Scripture? Never-
theleſs, as hitherto I have prov'd the principles of Human Prudence in
the ſeveral parts out of Holy Scripture; fo I undertake to vindicat
them in the whole, as to the intire frame of Popular Government, in
the infuing Book, by the fame Authority and undeniable Evidence.
Eee 2
THE
396
Book II.
THE
SECOND BOOK,
Containing the
COMMONWEALTHS
OF THE
HEBREW S:
Namely,
ELOHIM, or the Commonwealth of Ifrael;
AND
CABALA, or the Commonwealth of the Jews.
The PREFACE,
Shewing that there were Commonwealths before
that of Ifrael.
H
UMAN Prudence is originally a Creature of God, and, with
respect to its exiſtence, as antient as human Nature; nor is it fo
much younger in any of thofe Effects or Ends for which it was
ordain'd by God, that we should think Ifrael to have bin the first
Commonwealth, or the first Popular Government that ever was, or that
was planted at leaft in Canaan: for the like Governments, in the Coun-
trys therabout, there were both before and at the fame time. It was
in Canaan, that MELCHIZEDEC, King and Priest of Salem, had
reign'd during the time of ABRAHAM, who paid him Tithes of all that
Tithes origi- be had. Now Tithes before Ifrael and the inftitution of the Levits, be-
nally belong- long'd not to any fort of Clergy, but to the Prince or State. Whence
1 Sam. 8. 15, SAMUEL in the defcription of a King, tells the People that he will take
17. the tenth of their Goods. Thus ABRAHAM, in paying Tithes to MEL-
CHIZEDEC, acknowleg'd him for his Prince. Yet had ABRAHAM
The Com- the right of the Sword, and made War with Kings, as thofe of Sodom,
at his own difcretion; whence Canaan may feem to have bin a Common-
3
ing to Kings.
monwealth
S Salem.
wealth
1
The Art of Lawgiving.
397
monwealth
of Midian.
wealth in thoſe days, much after the manner of Germany in ours. The Chap. 1.
five Lords (perhaps five Tribuns) of the Philiftins must needs have bin
fom Ariftocracy at least of Princes joining in one Body or Commonwealth. The Com-
So Venice in her first Age was under Lords or Tribuns. It is little to be of the Phi-
doubted, but the Government of JETHRO, King and Priest of Midian, liftins.
was of a like nature with that of MELCHIZEDEC, or of the Lace- The Com-
demonian Kings, who were alfo Priefts; or that the Counfil he gave to monwealth
MOSES (being for the inftitution of fuch Judicatorys as are not proper in
a Monarchy) was any other than according to the Orders of his own Com-
monwealth. And left thefe Governments fhould feem less popular, the Em-
baſſadors of the Gibeonits coming to JOSHUA, fay thus; Our Elders The Com-
(or our Senat) and all the Inhabitants of our Country (or the popular monwealth
Affembly of the fame) fpoke to us faying, Go meet them, and fay to mites.
them, We are your Servants: therfore now make a League with us. Joſhua 9. 11.
To make a League with a foren Nation evinces Soverain Power; and that
this League was made by the Senat and the People, evinces Gibeon to
have bin a Popular Government. Such a thing then as Popular Govern-
ment most undeniably there was before Ifrael. Now whether Ifrael were
Popular Government or no, I shall refer to trial by the enfuing Chapter,
of the Gibrc-
Ita
CHA P. I.
Shewing that Ifrael was a Commonwealth.
Ifraelits Go-
vernment.
Tribes, and
1
Tis faid of the Ifraelits that went first into Egypt, All the Souls that
Sect. I.
came out of the loins of Jacob were feventy Souls. Theſe becoming Exod. 1. 5.
fo many Fathers of Familys, and governing their own Familys by The rife of the
Paternal Right, it follows that at firft they fo govern'd the whole
People; yet not with any foverain Power (as may be eafily thought of the Prin-
in a Country that had a Prince of its own) but by way only of di- ces of the
rection and advice. The People being thus accuftom'd to this way, Princes of
as any of theſe ſeventy came to dy, fupply'd his place with another of Families.
their Election; at leaſt for the probability of this opinion, we find
mention of MOSES, NADAB, ABIHU, and feventy of the Elders, Exod. 24. 9.
before the inſtitution of the Ifraelitish Senat or Sanhedrim. To theſe
and to the People Moses propos'd his Laws. So I am fure in the
* Latin it is exprefly faid, where by our English Tranſlation it is thus
render'd, This is the Law (and by the Law here is meant no lefs
than the whole Book of Deuteronomy) which Moses fet before the
Children of Ifrael, whofe Affemblys were not always without faction.
For KORAH, DATHAN, and ABIRAM, with two hundred Princes
of the Affembly, famous in the Congregation, Men of Renown, bandy'd
themſelves againſt MOSES, and his intended Election of his Brother
AARON to the hereditary Priesthood, reproaching him (fays Jo- Antiq. ↓ 4.6
SEPHUS) that he went about to difpofe of this Honor without the 2.
Suffrage of the Congregation, therby affecting Tyranny, and a fly
* Hæc eft lex quam Mofes propofuit, Deut. 4. 44. and wheras betwixt a Precept and a Com-
mand there is a large difference; in places more than I can ftand to number, where the Latin has it,
præcepit Mofes, the English has it, Mofes commanded.
ufurpa-
398
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book II. ufurpation of the Liberty of the People: which fenfe alfo is imply'd
by their upbraiding him in Scripture; Is it a ſmall thing that thoù haft
Num. 16. 13. brought us up out of the Land that flows with Milk and Honey, to kill us in
the Wilderness? except thou makeft thyself altogether a Prince over us.
But wheras the Scripture in all this prefumes thefe Incendiarys to have
was no King, bely'd MOSES, fom will have all they thus laid to his charge, to be
no more, but lefs than truth; in as much as they will needs have
MOSES not only to have bin a King, but to have bin a King exercifing
Arbitrary Power, and fuch Arbitrary Power as, being without any
bounds, fully amounts to Tyranny.
That Mofes
Sect. 2.
That Mofes
propos'd his
Laws to the
People and
THE word King is not a fufficient definition of the Magiftrat fo
ftil'd: Between a Lacedemonian King and a Perfian King, or between
either of theſe and a King of England, there was a vaft difference.
Both the Kings of Lacedemon were but as one Duke in Venice. The
their Suffrage. Venetians therfore, if it had fo pleas'd them, might as well have call'd
their Duke a King. Certain it is, that he is not fo much in the
Commonwealth, as are a few of his Counfillors; and yet all Acts
of the Government run in his name, as if there were no Common- '
wealth.
Deut. 34. 4.
In what ſenſe
Ver. 5.
Acts 13.
IT is faid (according to our Tranflation) MOSES commanded us
Mofes may be a Law, &c, according to the Original, MOSES (propos'd, or) gave
call'd a King. us a Law, which is an Inheritance to the Congregation of JACOB. The
Duke of Venice has a right to propofe or give Law in the Congrega-
tion or great Council of Venice; where he, who fees him fitting,
would believe he were a King. And if MOSES were King in Jefu-
run (or Ifrael) it was when the Heads of the People and the Tribes of
Ifrael were gather'd togther. PAUL, epitomizing the ftory of the
People of Ifrael in his sermon to the Antiochian Jews, fhews how God
chofe their Fathers, exalted the People, deftroy'd (for their fake) ſeven
Nations in the Land of Canaan, and divided their Lands to them by Lots:
but ſpeaks not a word of any King given to them, till exprefly after
their Judges. But if Moses were a King, yet that he did not pro-
pofe, but command by his power the Laws which he gave to Ifrael,
dos not follow. For DAVID was a King, who nevertheleſs did no
otherways make any Law than by Propofition to the People, and their
1 Chron. 13. free Suffrage upon it. DAVID confulted with the Captains of thou-
fands, and hundreds, and with every Leader (of which Military Di'ci-
plin of the Congregation of Ifrael more in due place will be fhewn)
and DAVID faid to all the Congregation, if it feems good to you, and
that if it be of the Lord our God (tho he was a King, and a man after
God's own heart, he makes the People Judges what was of God)
let us ſend abroad to our Brethren every where that are left in all the Land
of Ifrael, and with them alſo to the Priests and Levits that are in their
Citys and Suburbs, that they (to the end this thing may be perform'd
with the greateſt folemnity) may gather themſelves to us, and let us bring
the Ark of God to us: for we inquir'd not at it in the days of SAUL.
In the days of ELI the Ark was taken by the Philiftins, who being
ſmitten till there was a deadly deſtruction throout all the City, and
their Divines attributing the cauſe therof to the detention of the Ark,
after ſeven months fent it to Bethfhemesh; whence it was brought to
Kirjath-jearim, and there lodg'd in the houſe of AMINADAB, be-
fore SAUL was King, where it remain'd till fuch time as DAVID
propos'd (in the manner fhewn) to the People the reduction of the
1 Sam. 4.
fame.
The Art of Lawgiving.
399
4.
fame. Upon this Propofition, the People giving Suffrage are unani- Chap. i.
mous in their refult; All the Congregation faid, that they would do fo (not
that they could do no otherwiſe by a King, for they did not the like Chron. 13.
by REHOBOAM, but that) the thing was right in the eys of all the
People. Moreover, DAVID and the Captains of the Hoft feparated to Chap. 25.
the Service fom of the Sons of ASAPH, and of HEMAN, and of JE-
DUTHUN, who should prophefy with Harps, with Pfalterys and with
Cymbals; that is, propos'd thefe Laws for Church Difciplin, or Offices
of the Prieſts and Levits, to the fame Repreſentative of the People:
of which more in other places. Thus much in this, to fhew, that if
MOSES were a King, it dos not follow that he propos'd not his
Laws to a Congregation of the People having the power of Refult.
To fay that the Laws propos'd by MOSES were the Dictat of God,
is not to evade, but to confirm the neceffity of propofing them to the
People, feeing the Laws or Dictats of GOD or of CHRIST, can no
otherwiſe be effectually receiv'd or imbrac'd by a People, or by a
privat man, than by the free fuffrage of the Soul or Confcience; and
not by Force or Rewards, which may as well eſtabliſh the Laws of
the Devil.
fes.
no
BUT for another way, fuch a one as it is, of crowning MOSES, Sect. 3.
fom are poſitive that there lay an appeal from the feventy Elders to That there
Him. Now the Command of God to Moses for the inftitution of lay 20 appeal
from the 70
the Seventy, is this: Gather to me feventy men of the Elders of Ifrael- Elders to Mo-
that they may ftand with thee. Upon which words let me ask, whether Num. 11.
had MOSES thenceforth a diſtinct or a joint political Capacity? If 16.
the Seventy ſtood with Moses, or it were a joint Capacity, then
MOSES was no King in their ſenſe; and if it were diſtinct, then lay
there to MOSES no appeal, even by his own Law: for thus in the
cafe of Appeals it is by him directed. If there arifes a Controverfy too Deut. 17, 8,
hard for thee in Judgment thou shalt com to the Priests and Levits
(that is, to the feventy Elders) According to the Sentence of the
Law which they-fball tell thee, thou shalt do-And the man that will
do prefumtuously, and will not hearken-even that man fhall dy. In which
words all color of appeal from the feventy Elders is excluded.
BUT whether MUSES were a King or no King, either his Sect. 4.
Power was more than that of King DAVID; or without propofition
to, and reſult of the People it is plain that he could paſs no Law.
Now the Senat, Sanhedrim, or feventy Elders, came in the place of
MOSES, or ſtood with him; therfore their Power could be no more
than was that of MOSES. So that if the Power of Moses were
never more in the point of Lawgiving, than to propofe to the People;
then the power of the Sanhedrim could be no more in the point of
Lawgiving, than to propofe to the People. Nor will it be found in Scrip-
ture that the Sanhedrim ever made any Law without the People, yet
it is found in Scripture that the People made a Law without the San-
hedrim, or levy'd War without them, which is all one: for where
there is a power to levy War, there will be the power of making
Law. And the occafion upon which this is found, is the War levy'd
againſt BENJAMIN by the Congregation confifting of four hun- Judg. 20,
dred thouſand. Again, if the Sanhedrim inherited the whole
power
of Moses, and yet had no larger power in Lawmaking than to pro-
pofe to the People, then had MOSES never any larger power in Law-
making than to propofe to the People. Now where there is no King,
or
400
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book II. or no King in a diſtinct capacity from the Senat; and where the Se-
nat has no farther power in Lawmaking than to propofe to the free
fuffrage of the People; the Government there is a Commonwealth.
Thus having fhewn that Ifrael was a Commonwealth, I come next to
fhew what Commonwealth Ifrael was.
Sect. I.
Divifion of
the Children
of Ifrael;
gical.
Exod. 1.
51, 52.
1
A
CHA P. II.
Shewing what Commonwealth Ifrael was.
LL Political Methods that are collective of the People, muſt ne-
ceffarily begin with a diftribution or divifion of the People.
FOR the divifion of the People of Ifrael, it was firſt Genealogical,
firſt Genealo- and then local. Now thefe are the Names (of the Anceſtors of the
Tribes, or) of the Children of Ifrael which came into Egypt, every
man and his Houfhold came with JACOB: REUBEN, SIMEON,
LEVI, and JUDAH, ISSACHAR, ZEBULUN, and BENJAMIN, DAN,
and NAPHTALI, GAD, and ASHER. Theſe being eleven in
number, were the Sons of JACOB, who had alfo one more, name-
Gen. 41. 50, ly JOSEPH. And to JOSEPH were born two Sons before the
before the years
of Famin came, which ASENAH, the Daughter of POTIPHERAH
Prieſt of On, bore to him. And JOSEPH call'd the Name of the first-
born MANASSEH-and the name of the fecond call'd be EPHRAIM.
Which two (tho but Grandchildren) were adopted by JACOв for
Gen. 48. 16. his Sons, in theſe words: Let my name be nam'd on them, and the name
of my Fathers ABRAHAM and ISAAC; and let them grow into a mul-
titude in the midst of the Earth. From which addition to the former
came the Tribes of Ifrael, genealogically reckon'd, to be in number
thirteen. In the genealogical diftribution of the Tribes there were alſo
obſerv'd certain Ranks, Qualitys, or Degrees, as appears by the Poll
made of Ifrael in the Wilderness of Sinai, and in the Tabernacle of the
Congregation by MOSES. Thefe Degrees were of two forts: firſt,
Phylarchs, or Princes of Tribes; and fecondly, Patriarchs, or Prin-
ces of Familys: all hereditary Honors, and pertaining to the Firstborn
of the Tribe or of the Family reſpectively. That this Poll be more
perfectly underſtood, will be uſeful for which caufe I fhall be fom-
what more particular. Firſt, for the Phylarchs, or Princes of the
Tribes; and then for the Patriarchs, or Princes of Familys. To be-
gin with the Princes of the Tribes.
Num. 1.
Sect. 2.
18.
Of the Prin-
MOSES and AARON-affembl'd the Congregation (or political
Num. 1. 17, Convention of the People) together on the first day of the fecond month,
after their Familys, by the houſe of their Fathers, according to the num-
ber of the names, from twenty years old and upwards, by the poll. Where
or the Mufter- every Phylarch or Prince of a Tribe, with the number of men at the
age mention'd and upward, throout his Tribe, are lifted much after
this manner.
ces of Tribes;
Roll in Sinai.
1. OF the Trice of REUBEN, ELIZUR, Prince. The men of mi-
litary age in his Tribe, forty fix thouſand five hundred.
2. OF the Tribe of SIMEON, SHELAMIEL, Prince. The men of
military age in his Tribe, fifty nine thoufand three hundred.
3. OF
The Art of Lawgiving.
401
4.
ry age
3. OF the Tribe of JUDAH, NASHON, Prince. The men of milita-
in his Tribe, threeſcore and fourteen thouſand fix hundred.
OF the Tribe of ISSACHAR, NETHANIEL, Prince. The men
of military age in his Tribe, fifty four thouſand four hundred.
5. OF the Tribe of ZEBULUN, ELIAB, Prince. The men of mi-
litary age in his Tribe, fifty feven thouſand four hundred.
6. OF the Tribe of EPHRAIM, ELISHAMA, Prince. The men of
military age in his Tribe, forty thouſand five hundred.
7. OF the Tribe of MANASSEH, GEMALIEL, Prince. The men
of military age in his Tribe, thirty two thouſand two hundred.
8. OF the Tribe of BENJAMIN, ABIDAN, Prince, The men of mi-
litary age in his Tribe, thirty five thoufand four hundred.
9.
OF the Tribe of DAN, AHIEZER, Prince. The men of milita-
ry age in his Tribe, threefcore and two thouſand ſeven hundred.
10. OF the Tribe of ASHER, PAGIEL, Prince. The men of mili-
tary age in his Tribe, forty one thouſand five hundred.
11. OF the Tribe of GAD, ELIASA PH, Prince. The men of mili-
tary age in his Tribe, forty five thoufand fix hundred and fifty.
12. OF the Tribe of NAPHTALI, AHIRA, Prince. The men of
military age in his Tribe, fifty three thouſand four hundred.
THE total fum of which Muſterroll in the twelve Tribes, amounts
to Princes twelve; and men of military age fix hundred three thou-
fand five hundred and fifty, befides the Levits.
Chap. 2.
or Tribe.
ALL the firstborn, fays God, are mine. In which words is im- Sect. 3.
ply'd that the Priesthood, or right of preaching, inftructing, or ad- The Levits
miniftring divine things, belong'd, as it were, of natural right, to Call, Order,
Fathers of Familys, or the Firstborn; till the Lord took the Levits Num. 3, 12,
from among the Children of Ifrael, instead of the Firstborn. Theſe being 13.
thus taken, were fet apart, and fo lifted by themſelves (to omit their
feveral Familys, Functions, and Orders in the fervice of the Taber-
nacle, and afterwards of the Temple, which would require a Volum)
much after this manner.
v. 39.
OF the Tribe of LEVI, AARON High Prieft. The number of
all the Males of this Tribe, from a month old and upwards, twenty and
two thouſand. The manner how God took the Levits, is thus exprefs'd.
Thou shalt bring the Levits before the Tabernacle of the Congregation, Num. 8. 9,
and thou shalt gather the whole Affembly together and the Children of 10, 11, 12.
Ifrael (after the manner that the Levits lay their hands upon the
Bullocks, or Sacrifice) fhall put their Hands upon the Levits, in token
that they are facrific'd or feparated by the free fuffrage of the People to
the Lord. For left the fuffrage of the People be thought hereby to
have bin excluded, fo DAVID and the Captains of the Hoft or Army 1 Chr. 25.
(which Army was the Repreſentative of the People) feparated to the
Service fom of the Sons of ASAPH, of HEMAN, and of JEDUTHUN
·who ſhall prophesy with Harps. But of the Congregations of the
People more in due place.
Grot. ad
THE hereditary Right more ſpecially belonging to the Phylarchs, Sect. 4.
or Princes of the Tribes, confifted (as that of the Kings of Lacedemon, The Military
of Athens, and of Rome) in the leading of the Armys of the Com- Orders.
monwealth; which was diſtributed to them in this manner. The Num. 10.
twelve Tribes were divided into four Brigades, every Brigade confiſt-
ing of three Tribes. The leading of the firſt Brigade pertain'd to
JUDAH,
Fff
•
402
The Art of Lawgiving.
Num. 10.
23.
Book II. JUDAH, who in his Standard bore a Lion. The leading of the fe-
cond Brigade belong'd to REUBEN, who in his Standard bore a Man.
The leading of the third Brigade belong'd to EPHRAIM, who in his
Standard bore an Ox. The leading of the fourth Brigade belong'd to
DAN, who in his Standard bore an Eagle. Theſe four by the text
are term'd Standards of the Camp, which were as the Roman Eagles.
14, 18, 22, Furthermore, as the fubdivifions of the Roman Legions had their pro-
per Infigns, fo had the Tribes here, which had not the leading of a
Brigade of the Camp. The Infigns of thefe Tribes were call'd Staves:
as the Staff of the Children of ISSACHAR, the Staff of the Tribe of
ZEBULUN, Which follow'd the Standard of JUDAH: The Staff of
the Tribe of SIMEON, the Staff of the Tribe of GAD, which fol-
low'd the Standard of REUBEN: The Staff of the Tribe of Ma-
NASSEH, the Staff of the Tribe of BENJAMIN, which follow'd
the Standard of EPHRAIM: The Staff of the Tribe of ASHER, the
Staff of the Tribe of NAPHTALI, which follow'd the Standard of
DAN. All which Infigns or Staves in our English Tranflation are
render'd Hofts, or Armys.
Num. 3.
IN the midſt of theſe four Squadrons or Brigades ftood the Ta-
bernacle, with the Levits divided, and diftributed by their diſtinct
Familys to the ſeveral uſes and carriages of the fame, and lodg'd upon
the four quarters.
WHEN the Ark fet forward, or the Camp remov'd, theſe words
were with folemnity pronounc'd by the General, or by the High
Num. 10. 35. Prieft; Rife up Lord, and let thy Enemys be fcatter'd, and let them that
bate thee fly before thee.
of the Fathers,
OF the Martial Difciplin in which the Youth in Ifrael were edu-
cated to theſe ends, there was certainly more than is remaining in ſtory.
But that their Popular Affemblys were all held in Military Order and
Difciplin, and that the deferters of the Militia were anathematiz'd,
confifcated, or put to the fword, will in due time be made fufficiently
apparent. For the prefent, you have the Ifraelitish Mufterroll, being
of a like nature with that of Athens call'd Lexiarcha, and that in Rome
call'd Cenfus. Nor has any Commonwealth bin well order'd in its
Militia, which has not bin diligent in the inftitution and prefervation
of the like Military Rolls or Regifters. Hitherto of the Phylarchs,
or Princes of the Tribes; the next rank or quality in this Government
was that of the Patriarchs or Princes of Familys.
Sect. 5.
THE word Family in many places of Scripture, is not to be taken
The Pa- for a fingle Houfhold; but as we take the word in Heraldry, that is,
triarchs, chief for a Lineage or Kindred. The Patriarchs in Ifrael, taken in this
or Princes ef fenfe, were fuch as, till of late years in Scotland, were they that could
Families; lead the whole Name or Kindred, and be follow'd by them. The Fa-
milys in Ifrael of this kind, that were greateft about the plantation
of the Commonwealth, were of REUBEN, the Henochits, the Phal-
luits, the Hefronits, and the Charmits.
with a Cata-
Log of the
jame
Num. 26.
OF SIMEON, the Namuelits, the Jamnits, the Jachenits, the Za-
nits, and the Shaulits.
OF GAD, the Zephronits, the Haggits, the Shunits, the Oznits,
the Erits, the Arodits, and the Arelits.
OF JUDAH, the Shelanits, the Pharzits, the Zarbits, the Hef-
romits, and the Hamulits.
OF ISSACHAR, the Tholaits, the Punits, the Shubits, and the
Shimranits.
OF
The Art of Lawgiving.
403
OF ZABULUN, the Sardits, the Elonits, and the fableelits.
OF MANASSEH, the Machirits, the Galeadits, the Jeezrits, the
Helekits, the Afrielits, the Sechemits, the Shemidaits, and the Hepherits.
OF EPHRAIM, the Shuthalaits, the Bachtits, the Tabanits, and
the Eranits.
OF BENJAMIN, the Belaits, the Afbbelits, the Abiramits, the Shu-
phamits, the Huphamits, the Ardits, the Heredits, and the Naamits."
OF DAN, the Subamits.
OF ASHER, the fimnits, the Jesuits, the Briits, the Heberits,
and the Melchielits.
OF NAPHTALI, the Jazrielits, the Gunits, the Feferits, and the
Shillemits.
OF LEVI, the Gerfonits, the Cabarits, and the Merarits. The
heads of theſe were fuch as are call'd Patriarchs, Princes, heads of
Familys, or chief of the Fathers.
FAMILYS, tho far leſs fubject than in other Governments to de-
cay or increaſe, might at divers times be different in Ifrael; as after
BENJAMIN was deftroy'd, or after DAVID had rais'd his own and
many other: But thus were the Familys at this time fixty; the Tribes
being, as was fhewn before, thirteen.
IN the firſt inftitution of the Tribes of Rome, that is, Ramnenfes,
Titienfes, and the Luceri, they were alſo genealogical, but long it held
not fo; genealogical divifions in a Commonwealth being for the moſt
part of greater danger than ufe: but whether Genealogys be obſerv'd
or not, the local way of divifion is of abfolute neceffity.
Chap. 1.
"
rael.
TO infert the Geography of the Ifraelitish Tribes, would be as Sect. 6.
burdenfom both to the Reader and my felf, as needlefs to either. Of the Lot or
But the manner how the Tribes became local, was thro the diftribu- Ballot of If-
tion of the Land of Canaan by Lot, and intailing the Lands ſo diſtribut-
ed upon the Proprietors and their Heads for ever, without
power of
alienation, in any fuch manner as to deprive their Pofterity. The
Lot or Ballot in Ifrael was fpecially of three ufes; one for election of
Magiftrats, another for the diſcovery of fom fecret Malefactor, and a
third for the divifion of Lands. To which three heads I hope to re-
duce the whole Hiſtory of their Government: and this work once
perform'd, it will be eafy to repreſent the Commonwealth in its Po-
litical method.
TO begin with the election of Magiſtrats, it was perform'd fom-
times by the Lot, without Suffrage; and fomtimes by the Ballot, that
is, by a mixture of Lot and Suffrage. For the clearer diſcovery of the
Order in Elections, I muſt invert the Order of the Magiftrats elected,
and begin with the King; then procede to the Judg, and com laſt of
all to the Sanhedrim, and the inferior Courts.
THE Inftruments us'd upon theſe occafions, were firft Lots, fom
Blanks and fom Prizes; then Urns (that is, Pots) into which theſe
Lots were caft, and out of which they were afterwards drawn, or
given forth; by what Officers, or with what farther Solemnity, dos
not appear.
WHEN the People would needs have a King, SAMUEL, being Sec&t. 7.
their Judg, did that, tho againſt his will, which nevertheleſs was no Manner of
more than his duty: that is, firft, hearken'd to the voice of the People; King.
electing the
or obey'd their Vote. Secondly, Call'd the People together to the Lord 1 Sam. 8. 7,
to Mizpeh. The political Affembly, or Congregation of the People Sam, 10,
Fff 2
I
22.
1
of 17:
404
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book II.
Judg. 20.
Deut. 23.
gregation at
& II. II.
& 20. 1.
& 21. I.
16.
19.
gations in If-
rael, jee
Chap. 3.
of Ifrael was call'd Ecclefia Dei, the Congregation of the Lord, as it
ought to have bin expreft in the Trial of BENJAMIN, and is in fom
places by our Tranflation; as where an Eunuch (or one unfit for
marriage with a Daughter of Ifrael, which Capacity was neceffary
to the being inrol'd of a Tribe) a Baftard (as difhonorable) an Am-
monite or Moabite (as defcended of perfidious Nations) shall not en-
ter into the Congregation of the Lord: that is, fhall not have right of
fuffrage with the People of Ifrael. So SAMUEL, by calling the Con-
For the Affem- gregation of the Lord, or the People together to the Lord in Mizpeh
bly of the Con-
(the place, before the taking of Jerufalem, where they always held
Mizpeh, Jee their Parlaments or political Affemblys) did the office of the like Ma-
Judg. 10. 17. giftrats in Commonwealths. The People being thus affembl'd (for
to be brief, I muft procede with conjectures, which at firft fight will
ſeem bolder than really they are) SAMUEL caufing the Urns to be
1 Sam. 7. 6, ſet forth, pronounc'd the folemn form of words in ufe upon the like
1 Sam. 10. occafion, which were thefe: Prefent your felves before the Lord by your
The Military
Tribes, and by your thousands. The political Affemblys of the Children
Order of Poli- of Ifrael were held, or gather'd (as we fay) with Drums beating,
tical Congre- and Colors flying; and if it were an extraordinary Congregation, that
is, a Congregation confifting of the whole People, as this, and
that for the trial of BENJAMIN, the Princes of the Tribes with
their Staves, and the Standards of the Camp (in the order fhewn)
led up the People to the Urns, or Ballots. Wherfore upon theſe
words of SAMUEL, the Princes march'd in their known difciplin
to the Urns. The Urns were two: in the one were twelve Lots
infcrib'd with the names of the twelve Tribes; in the other were
alſo twelve other Lots, wherof eleven were Blanks, and the twelfth
infcrib'd with fom word. What the Ifraelitish word was, dos not
appear; the Roman word upon the like occafion was Prerogative:
wherfore feeing that which is loft muſt have bin of a like nature,
we may, for difcourfe fake, prefume it to have bin the fame in Ifrael
as in Rome. And when SAMUEL had caus'd all the Tribes of Ifrael to
The Preroga- com near, the Tribe of BENJAMIN was taken: That is, the name
of this Tribe being drawn out of the one Urn, to it was drawn the
word Prerogative out of the other Urn; which being don, the Urns
were chang'd, or at leaſt the Lots. And wheras in the enumeration of
the Patriarchs, I fhew'd by a catalog of their names, that the whole
Tribe of BENJAMIN confifted of feven Familys; feven names by that
account ſhould have bin caft into the one Urn, and as many Lots into.
the other; one of them being infcrib'd with the word Prerogative, and
the other fix being Blanks. But both the names, and the number of
Familys at this Ballot, are moſt likely to have bin quite otherwiſe than
in the Catalog; becaufe fince that time the Tribe of BENJAMIN had
Judg. 20. 2. in the far greater part bin deſtroy'd, and piec'd up again out of a Rem-
nant: fo for the number of the Familys, or the names of them, I can
fay nothing. But the Urns being thus prepar'd, came BENJAMIN, as
now the Prerogative Tribe, to the Urns by Familys. And when SA-
MUEL had caus'd the Tribe of BENJAMIN to com near by their Fa-
milys, the Family of MATRI (which is a new one) was taken: that
is, lighting, in the manner fhewn, upon the Prize, became the Pre-
rogative Family. This don, the Lots were again chang'd, and fo
many others as there were Houfholds in the Family of MATRI (for
Joſh. 7. 14, fo. you will find it in the trial of ACHAN) were caft into the Urns.
Thus
Ver. 20.
tive Tribe.
16, 17, 18:
The Art of Lawgiving.
405
Thus the Houfhold of KISH coming to be the Prerogative Houfhold, Chap. 1.
and fo many Lots as there were men of that Houſhold, being caft into
the Urns, wherof the Prize was infcrib'd King, came the Houfhold of
KISH, man by man, and SAUL the Son of KISH was taken.
That miracu
Common-
21, 22.
WE find it recorded by LIVY, of TARQUINIUS PRISCUS, Sect. 8.
and of SERVIUS TULLIUS, that before either of them was King, lous defigna-
the one had his hat taken off, and carry'd up by an Eagle; the other tion of Magi-
had a flame refting upon his forehead, by which it was firmly be- rats in a
liev'd, that each of them was defign'd of the Gods to be King: yet wealth, was
was this never fo underſtood by themſelves, or any other, as to ex- never under-
food to ex-
clude the right of popular Suffrage in their Election, by which
clude the free
PRISCUS reign'd; or to create an opinion that any man ought to be Suffrage of the
King of Rome, whom the People had not firft commanded to reigner Election.
People in
over them, to whofe Election therfore SERVIUS, tho in poffeffion
of the Throne, thought it his best way to refer himſelf. Far be it
from me to compare Prodigys among Heathens, to Miracles in the
Church: But each People had of each a like opinion. Both Ifrael
and the Heathens began their popular Affemblys with Sacrifice. In
order to the election of SOLOMON, the Reprefentative of Ifrael fa- 1 Chron. 29.
crific'd Sacrifices to the Lord- even a thousand Bullocks, a thousand
Rams, and a thouſand Lambs, with their Drink-offerings, and Sacrifices
in abundance, for all Ifrael. And when they had thus don, what Ma-
giftrats foever the Ifraelits, or the Heathens elected, they always un-
derſtood to be elected by God. The Lot is caft into the lap, but the Prov. 10. 33.
whole difpofing therof is of the Lord. And indeed, wheras in this man-
ner they made SOLOMON King, and ZADOC to be Prieft, if we
will hold otherwife, we muſt think that neither the King nor the
Prieſt was elected by God. A man that is elected to fom great Office,
by a King rightly qualify'd, muft have little Religion, or hold himſelf
to be rais'd up by God. Why then fhould it be otherwife, when a
Magiftrat is elected by a People rightly qualify'd? Or what confe-
quence is there in faying, that SAUL was anointed by SAMUEL
before he was elected by the People, or that God rais'd them up
Judges; therfore neither SAUL nor the Judges were elected by the
People? That God elected the Kings in Ifrael, is certain; and that
the People no leſs for that did alfo elect the Kings, is as certain. One
from among thy Brethren ſhalt thou (that is, thou the People of Ifrael) Deut. 17. 15.
fet King over thee. That God rais'd up Judges in Ifrael, is certain;
and that the People no lefs for that, did alfo elect the Judges, is as
certain. When the Children of Ammon made War againſt Ifrael,
Ifrael affembl'd themſelves together, and incamp'd in Mizpeh, whence the Judg. 10. 17.
Elders of Gilead went to fetch JEPHTA out of the Land of Tob.-
Judg. 11. 5.
Then JEPHTA went with the Elders of Gilead, and the People made
him Head and Captain over them: and JEPHTA utter'd all his words
before the Lord in Mizpeh. But that SOLOMON was elected by the
Lot, I do not affirm; it being moſt probable, that it was by Suffrage
only, DAVID propofing, and the People refolving. Nor whether
JEPHTA was elected by Suffrage, or by the Ballot, is it material;
however, that the ordinary Magiftrats were elected by the Ballot, I
little doubt.
II.
THE ordinary Magiftrats of this Commonwealth (as fhall here- Sect. 9.
after be more fully open'd) were the Sanhedrim, or the feventy El- Election of Se-
ders; and the inferior Courts or Judges, in the Gates of the Citys. Judges of in-
nators, and
For ferior Courts,
406
The Art of Lawgiving.
་
氨
​Book II. For the Inftitution and Election of thefe, MOSES propos'd to the
People, or the Congregation of the Lord, in this manner. Take you
Deut. 1. 13. wife men, and underſtanding, and known among your Tribes (xxτas now)
(κ) καταςήσω
and I will make (or conftitute) them Rulers over you. Where, by the
way, left Moses in theſe words be thought to affume power, So-
LON, fays ARISTOTLE (nμonpatíav natashca) made, or confti-
δημοκρατίαν καταςήσαι
tuted the Popular Government of Athens. In which he implys, not
that SOLON was a King, or had Soverain Power, but that he was.
a Lawgiver, and had authority to propofe to the People. Nor
is there more in the words of MOSES; upon whofe Propofition,
fay Jewish Writers, each of the twelve Tribes, by free Suffrages,
elected fix Competitors, and wrote their Names in fcrols, which they
deliver'd to MOSES. MOSES having thus prefented to him by the
twelve Tribes ſeventy and two Competitors for feventy Magiftracys,
had by confequence two more Competitors, than were capable of
the Preferment to which they were elected by the People: Wherfore
Moses took two Urns, into the one he caft the feventy two Names
preſented by the People; into the other, feventy two Lots, wherof
two were blanks, the reſt inſcrib'd with the word Elder. This don,
he call'd the Competitors to the Urn, where the feventy, to whoſe
Names came forth the Prizes, went up to the Tabernacle, the Seffion-.
houſe being there provided: and the two that drew the Blanks,
namely ELDAD and MEDAD, tho of them that were elected and
written by the Tribes, went not up to the Tabernacle, but remain'd in
the Camp, as not having attain'd to Magiftracy. Thus, if this
place in Scripture can admit of no other Interpretation, fo much as I
have cited out of the Talmud (tho otherwife, for the most part, but
a fabulous and indigefted heap) muft needs be good and valid. In
this manner, one or more Senators happening to dy, it was eafy for
each Tribe, chufing one or more Competitors accordingly out of
themſelves, to decide at the Urn which Competitors fo chofen, fhould.
be the Magiftrat, without partiality, or caufe of feud; which, if a
man confiders this Conftitution, was not perhaps fo readily to be don
otherwife. The like, no doubt, was done for the inferior Courts,
except that fuch Elections (the Commonwealth being once fettl'd)
were more particular, and perform'd by that Tribe only in whofe
Gates that Court was fitting.
See Num.
11.26.
Sect. 10.
theSanhedrim,
as to their
tion.
25.
THE firft inftitution of thefe Courts came to pafs in the manner
The Story of following. Before the People were under Orders, the whole Judica-
and of the in-ture lay upon the fhoulders of Moses, who being overburden'd,
ferior Courts, was adviſed by JETHRO. And MOSES hearken'd to the voice of his.
first inftitu- Father-in-law-and chofe (after the manner fhewn) able men out of..
all Iſrael, and made them Heads over the People, Rulers of thouſands,
Exod. 18. 24, Rulers of hundreds, Rulers of fiftys, and Rulers of tens. The number
of which Rulers, compar'd with the number of the People, as in the
mufter roll at Sinai, muft in all have amounted to about fix thou-
fand. Theſe thus inftituted, while Ifrael was an Army, came to be
the fame when the Army was a Commonwealth: wherof it is faid,
Deut. 16. 18. Judges and Officers fhalt thou make thee in all thy Gates which the Lord
thy God gives thee, throout thy Tribes; and they fhall judg the People
with juſt Judgment. Each of thefe Courts, by the practice of the
Jewish Commonwealth, confifted of twenty three Elders. But JE-
THRO, in his advice to Moses, adds concerning thefe Judicatorys,
this
The Art of Lawgiving.
407
}
1
14, 15
this Caution: Let them judg the People at all feafons; and it fhall be, that Chap. 2.
every great matter they shall bring to thee, but every small matter they ſhall
judg: So fhall it be easier for thy felf, and they shall bear the burden with Exod, 18.221
thee. Which nevertheleſs follow'd not according to JETHRO's promiſe,
the Appeals being fuch to Moses that he gos with this complaint to
God: Tamnot able to bear all this People alone, because it is too heavy for me. Num. 13.
Wherupon the Lord faid to MOSES, Gather to me feventy men, of the
Elders of Ifrael, whom thou knoweft to be Elders of the People, and Officers
over them; and bring them to the Tabernacle of the Congregation, that they
may ftand with thee (but Crowns will have no rivals) and they fhall
bear the burden of the People with thee, that thou bear it not alone. But a
Monarch is one that muſt be alone. And MOSES went out, and told the Ver. 24.
People the words of the Lord (which a Monarch needed not to have
don) and gather'd the feventy men of the Elders of the People; the man-
ner wherof is already fhewn. JETHRO, being a Heathen, informs
MOSES of the Orders of his own Commonwealth, which alfo was
Heathenifh. Yet in Scripture is both JETHRO join'd with MOSES,
and the Commonwealth of Midian with the Commonwealth of
Ifrael. How then coms it to be irreverend, or atheiftical, as fom fay,
in Politicians (and while political Difcourfes cannot otherwife be
manag'd) to compare, tho but by way of illuſtration, other Legifla-
tors, or Politicians, as LYCURGUS, SOLON, with MOSES; or other
Commonwealths, as Rome, and Venice, with that of Ifrael? But
the Authors of fuch Objections had better have minded, that the
burden wherof MOSES here complain'd, could in no manner be that
of ordinary Judicature, of which he was eas'd before by the advice
of JETHRO; and therfore must have bin that of Appeals only fo
either the Sanhedrim bore no burden at all with Moses, or they
bore that of Appeals with him. And if fọ, how ſay they that there
lay an Appeal from the feventy Elders to MOSES?
by Lot.
BUT I ſaid the Lot was of ufe alfo toward the difcovery of con- Sect. 11.
ceal'd Malefactors. Of this we have an Example in the detection of Lot, Ordel,
ACHAN. The words of the Law, wherby the Fact of ACHAN or Inquifition
was criminal, are thefe: If thou shalt hear fay in one of thy Citys, which Deut. 13.
the Lord thy God has given thee to dwell therin, faying, Certain men, 12, &c.
the Children of Belial, are gone out from among you, and have withdrawn
the Inhabitants of their City, faying, Let us go and ferve other Gods,
which you have not known: then shalt thou inquire, and make ſearch,
and ask diligently; and behold, if it be truth, and the thing certain, that
fuch Abomination is wrought among you, thou fhalt furely fmite the In-
babitants of that City with the edg of the Sword, deftroying it utterly,
and all that is therin, and the Cattel therof with the edg of the Sword.
And thoufhalt gather all the ſpoil of it into the midst of the street therof,
and ſhalt burn with fire the City, and all the spoil therof, every whit, for
the Lord thy God: and it shall be a heap for ever, it fhall not be built again,
and there fhall cleave nought of the accurs'd thing to thy hand. Among
the Citys that were given by God to Ifrael, was Jericho. Now
tho againſt this City, before it was taken, JOSHUA had folemnly
and publicly denounc'd the Anathema, or Curfes contain'd in the
foregoing Law; and after the taking of it, had, in all appearance, ex-
ecuted upon it the whole of the Anathema fo pronounc'd: yet thro
fubfequent loffes before the City of Ai, being fore afflicted, he en-
ter'd into fufpicion, that there might have bin fom failure in the per-
formance
Josh. 6. 17.
始
​408
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book II.
Joſh. 7, 6.
formance of the Law. Wherupon he rent his Clothes, and fell to the
Earth upon his face before the Ark of the Lord, till the eventide, he and
the Elders (or Sanhedrim of Ifrael) and put duft on their heads. The
Sanhedrim, in difficult cafes of the Law, inquir'd of God by Urim;
and the Sanhedrim, or the People, in cafes of high Concernment to
the State, as in the War againft BENJAMIN, inquir'd of the Ark.
When God was inquir'd of by Urim, he gave his Oracle by the fhining
of certain Stones or Jewels in the Breaftplate of the High Prieſt.
When he was inquir'd of by the Ark, he gave his Oracle vocally from
the Mercy feat, which was plac'd upon the Ark of the Covenant.
Whence he who fat between the Cherubims thus anſwer'd JOSHUA:
Joſh. 7. 10. Get thee up; wherfore lieft thou thus upon thy face? Ifrael has finn'd
they have even taken of the accurs'd thing. JOSHUA thus inform'd of
the Crime, but not fo particularly of the Malefactor as to know where
Joſh. 7. 17. to charge it, calls the whole People to the Urns; in one of which it
may be thought that there were eleven white Stones, or Lots, with
one black one; and in the other the twelve Names of the Tribes.
So Ifrael coming firft by Tribes to the Urns, the Tribe of JUDAH was
taken; that is, this Tribe lighting upon the black Lot, was denoted
for the Guilty Tribe: Which confifting (as appear'd by the Catalog)
of five Familys, wherof the Zarbits were one, came next by Familys
to the Urn; wherin there might be four white Lots, and one black
one, by which the Zarbits were taken. In like manner came the
Family of the Zarhits by Houfholds, and the Houfhold of ZABDI
was taken: Laft of all came the Houſhold of ZABDI man by man,
and ACHAN was taken. This kind of Inquifition was perform'd
with fuch Religion and Solemnity, that a man thus taken, if he had
any guilt, could have no face to conceal it; or, if there were any
Witneffes of his Crime, they could not any longer diffemble it: and
whether he were convicted by teftimony, or by his own confeffion
(as now ACHAN) he was put to death. The like proceding, in part,
1 Sam. 14. is imply'd to have bin in the cafe of JONATHAN; tho in this, by a-
greement therupon between SAUL and the People, it ſhould ſeem as
if but two Lots were put into the Urn, wherof SAUL and JONA-
THAN, on the one part, drew the black: Or the Prince of the Tribe
of JUDAH drawing for the whole People, on the other part, drew the
white one; and that the fame being put into the Urn again, to decide
it between SAUL and JONATHAN, JONATHAN drew the black:
wherupon, he being queſtion'd, confefs'd the Fact; and, but that the
People reſcu'd him from SAUL, had bin put to death.
Sect. 12.
rael.
TO conclude with the uſe of the Lot, in the divifion of the Land
Dißribution of Canaan. This (as implying the Foundation or Balance of the Go-
of Lands, and
Agrarian
vernment) ought to have bin the first in order, but happens here to
Laws in If- com laft; becauſe theſe Orders were inſtituted in the Wilderneſs, and
fo before the People had any Lands to divide. Nevertheleſs, this alfo
was propos'd by MOSES, and refolv'd by the People: By lot was their
Josh. 14. 2. Inheritance, as the Lord commanded MOSES; and now coms (as it
was, or fhould have bin put in execution by JOSHUA) to be con-
fider'd.
IT may be true, that the Roman People were the wifeft that have
bin; and it is true, that they only of a People, did labor to introduce
Agrarian Laws, tho without effect: Otherwife, Levelling was never
introduc'd, but by the wiſdom and providence of fom great Man, as
3
а
J
The Art of Lawgiving.
409
a MOSES, a JOSHUA, or a LYCURGUS; or by fom accident, or acci- Chap. 2.
dents, bringing a Nobility to ruin, as the Laws of HENRY VII. and
the ways of HENRY VIII. in England
BETWEEN the Mufter Roll in Sinai, wherby the men of mi- Num. 1. 46.
litary age, as was fhewn, amounted to fix hundred and three thou- Num. 26.51.
fand five hundred and fifty, in the twelve Tribes, and the Law for the
divifion of the Land of Canaan, there happen'd a Plague, by which the
number of the People, upon a new Poll, came but to fix hundred and
one thouſand ſeven hundred and thirty. Upon this Poll was the Law
made which runs thus: To theſe the Land ſhall be divided for an In- V. 53, 54,
heritance, according to the number of names. To many thou shalt give 55, 56.
the more Inheritance, and to fewer thou shalt give the lefs inheritance:
To every one fhall his inheritance be given, according to thofe that were
number'd of him. Notwithstanding, the Land shall be divided by lot:
according to the names of the Tribes of their Fathers, they shall inherit;
according to the lot ſhall the poffeffion therof be divided to many and few.
This Law, in another place, is repeated thus: You shall divide the Num.33. 54.
Land by lot, for an inheritance among your Familys; and to many ye
fhall give the more Inheritance, and to the fewer ye shall give the less In-
heritance: Every man's inheritance ſhall be in the place where his Lot
falls, according to the Tribes of your Fathers ye shall inherit.
cont. Ap.
IN the making of theſe Lots confideration was as well had of the
goodness of the Land, as of the meaſure. Now fuppofing this Law
to have bin in the whole and methodically executed, the Canaanits
muſt firſt have bin totally rooted out of the Land of Canaan; which
Land, in that caſe (as fom affirm) would have afforded to this Com-
monwealth a Root or Balance, confifting of three millions of Acres. Hecateus a-
Thefe, reckoning the whole People in the twelve Tribes, at fix hun- pud Jofeph.
dred and two thoufand (which is more than upon the later Poll they
came to) would have afforded to every man four Acres; to every
one of the Patriarchs (upon the poll of the foregoing Catalog, where
they are fixty) four thoufand Acres; to every one of the Princes of
the Tribes fourteen thouſand Acres; to the Levitical Citys (being
forty eight, each with its Suburbs, of four thoufand Cubits diameter)
one hundred thouſand Acres; and yet for extraordinary Donations,
as to JOSHUA and CALEB (of which kind there were but few) fom
eighty thouſand Acres might remain. Now it is true, four Acres to
a man may ſeem but a fmall Lot; yet the Roman People, under Ro-
mulus, and long after, had but two. And it may very well be, that
one Acre in Canaan was worth two in Italy, efpecially about Rome;
and four in England, tho' of the beft fort and if fo it were that four
Acres in Palestin were worth fixteen of our beft, fuch a Lot, at our
account, might be worth about thirty or forty pounds a year;. which;
for a popular ſhare, holding that rate thro the whole body of a Peo-
ple, was a large proportion. By this eftimat, or what poffibly could
be allow'd to the Princes of the Tribes and of the Familys, their ſhare
came not to a fixth of the whole: fo the reft remaining to the People,
the Balance of this Government must have bin purely popular. It is
true, that in the whole this Law of Moses for the divifion of the
Land was never executed: but that in the parts fom fuch courfe was
taken, is plain; for example, in the divifion to ſeven Tribes, where
JOSHUA propofes to the People in this manner: Give out from among
you three men for each Tribe-and they shall go thro the Land and de- Joh 18.4-
G g g
fcribe
410
The Art of Lawgiving.
1
Book II. fcribe it. The People having refolv'd accordingly, theſe went, and
pass'd thro the Land, and defcrib'd it by Citys into feven parts in a Book,
and came again to JOSHUA to the Hoft at Shiloh. And JOSHUA caft
Lots for them in Shiloh, before the Lord: and there JOSHUA divided
the Land to the Children of Ifrael according to their divifions. It were
abfurd to think that this Lot determin'd of proportions; for fo a mean
man might have com to be richer than the Prince of his Tribe but
the proportions allotted to Tribes being ſtated, tho at firſt but by gueſs,
and entred into the Lot Book of the Surveyors (who, fays JOSEPHUS,
were moſt expert in Geometry) the Princes came firft to the Urns,
wherof the one contain'd the names of the Tribes that were to draw,
the other the names of thofe parcels of Land that were to be drawn,
firſt to a whole Tribe. Thus the name of a Tribe, for example BEN-
JAMIN, being drawn out of one Urn, to that name a parcel was
drawn out of the other Urn; for example, the Country lying between
Jericho and Bethaven. This being don, and the Prince of the Tribe
having choſen in what one place he would take his ſtated and agreed
proportion, whether of fourteen thouſand Acres, or the like, the reſt
of the Country was fubdivided in the Lot Book, according to the num-
ber of Familys in the Tribe of this Prince; and the Parcels fubdivided
being caſt into the one Urn, the names of the Patriarchs into the other,
the fame Tribe came again by Familys. Thus every Patriarch making
choice in what one part of this Lot he would take his agreed propor-
tion, whether of four thouſand Acres, or the like, the remainder
was again fubdivided in the Lot Book, according to the number of
names in his Family: if they were more than the parcel would fur-
niſh at four Acres a man, then was that defect amended by addition
out of the next parcel; and if they were fewer, then the overplus
was caft into the next parcel. By fuch means the People came, or
might have com in the whole, and in every part, to the Lot of their
Inheritance; while every Tribe that was thus planted, became local
Numb. 36. 3. Without removal. Neither fhall the Inheritance remove from one Tribe
to another Tribe; but every one of the Tribes of the Children of Ifracl
Shall keep himself to his own Inheritance.
1
Sect. 13.
The Portion.
of Levi.
5, 6.
Deut. 18. 1.
"
THE Tribes thus planted, or to have bin planted, were twelve.
The thirteenth, or that of LEVI, came in the like manner to the
Lot, for their forty eight Citys with their Suburbs, and receiv'd them
Joh. 21. 4, accordingly; as the Lot came forth for the Familys of the Koha-
Numb.18.20. thits, and the reft. Thefe Ifrael gave to the Levits out of their In-
Deut. 10. 9. beritance: That is, theſe were fuch as the twelve Tribes, before the
divifion, fet apart for the Levits, with the Tithes, and the Offerings;
which, tho this Tribe had no other Lands, made their portion by far
the beſt. The Tribes being henceforth reckon'd by their locality, and
theſe forty eight Citys being ſcatter'd throout the twelve Tribes, that
of LEVI was no more computed as a diftinct Tribe, but loft as it
were the name, yet with advantage: for to their promifcuous abode
they had the right of promifcuous Marriage; no more in this point
being injoin'd any of them, than to take Maidens of the Seed of Ifrael,
or at leaſt the Widows of Priests. And as in the Tribes where they
dwelt they had promifcuous Marriage, fo had they right of promif-
cuous Election; that is, of electing, and being elected, into all the
Magiſtracys and Offices of the Commonwealth: which they fo fre-
quently injoy'd, that the Sanhedrim is fomtimes underſtood by their
Ezek. 44. 22.
names.
The Art of Lawgiving.
411
names. If there arifes a matter too hard for thee in Judgment, thou shalt Chap. 2.
com to the Priests the Levits. Between the Law, and the Religion of
this Government, there was no difference; whence all Ecclefiaftical Deut. 17. 8.
perſons were alfo Political perfons, of which the Levits were an intire
Tribe, fet more peculiarly apart to God (the King of this Common-
wealth) from all other cares, except that only of his Government.
Thus MOSES did that with the fafety of Liberty in Ifrael, which
LYCURGUS could not do in Lacedemon, but by condemning the
Helots to perpetual Slavery: For wheras without theſe to be Tillers
of the Ground, the Citizens of Lacedemon could not be at leifure for
the Commonwealth; the Children of Ifrael might imploy themſelves
in their domeftic Affairs, as they requir'd, with fafety: while the
Levits bore the burden of the Government; or, in cafe either their
privat Affairs permitted, or their Ambition promted, were equally
capable of Magiftracy.
OF the Levitical Citys, three beyond, and three on this fide Jordan, Sect. 14.
were Citys of Refuge. If a man was flain, the next of Kindred, by
Citys of Re-
the Laws of Ifrael was the Avenger of Blood; and to the Avenger of fuge.
Blood it was lawful to flay him that flew his Kinſman, wherever he Numb. 35-
could find him, except only in a City of Refuge. For this caufe, if a
man had flain another, he fled immediately to one of theſe Sanctuarys;
whence nevertheleſs, the Judges in the Gates, within whofe proper
verge the Crime was committed, caus'd the Malefactor to be brought
before them by a Guard, and judg'd between the Slayer and the A-
venger of Blood. If that which we call Murder, or Manflaughter,
was prov'd against him by two Witneffes, he was put to death:
but if it was found, as we fay, Chancemedly, he was remanded
with a Guard to the City of Refuge; whence if, before the death of
the High Prieſt, he was found wandring, it was lawful, not only for
the Avenger of Blood, but for any man elfe to flay him. The High
Prieſt being dead, he return'd, not home only, but to his Inheritance
alfo, with liberty and fafety. If a Prieſt had flain a man, his Refuge
was the Sanctuary: whence nevertheleſs he was taken by the San-
hedrim; and, if upon trial he was found guilty of wilful Murder, put
to death. If a man coms prefumtuously upon his Neighbour to flay him Exod. 21.
with guile, thou shalt take him from my altar, that he may dy.
14.
INHERITANCES, being thus introduc'd by the Lot were im- Sect. 15.
movably intail'd on the Proprietors and their Heirs for ever, by the infti- The Jubile.
tution of the Jubile, or the return of Lands, however fold or ingag'd,
once in fifty years to the antient Proprietor, or his lawful Heir. Yet
remain'd there two ways wherby Lots might be accumulated; the one
by cafual Inheritance, the other by marriage with an Heireſs; as in Num. 36.
the caſe of ZELOPHEDAD, or of his Daughters.
NOW to bring the whole refult of theſe hiftorical parts, thus
prov'd, to the true Political Method or Form, the Commonwealth
inſtituted by Moses was according to this Model.
Sect. 16.
THE whole People of Ifrael (thro a popular diſtribution of the Land The Model
of Canaan among themſelves by Lot, and the fixation of fuch a popular of the Com-
Balance by their Agrarian Law, or Jubile, intailing the inheritance of of Ifract.
each Proprietor upon his Heirs, for ever) was locally divided into twelve
Tribes.
Ggg 2
EVERY
412
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book II.
Deut. 4. 5,
6.
EVERY Tribe had a double capacity, the one Military, the other
Civil.
A TRIBE, in its Military capacity, confifted of one Staff or Stan-
dard of the Camp, under the leading of its diftinct and hereditary Prince,
as Commander in chief; and of its Princes of Familys or chief Fathers,
as Captains of thouſands and Captains of hundreds.
ATRIBE, in its Political capacity, was next and immediatly under
the government of certain Judicatorys, fitting in the Gates of its Citys;
each of which confifted of twenty three Elders, elected for life, by free
Suffrage.
THE Soverain Power, and common Ligament of the twelve Tribes,
was the Sanhedrim of Ifrael, and the Ecclefia Dei, or Congregation of
the Lord.
THE Sanhedrim was a Senat, confifting of feventy Elders for life, fo
infiituted by the free Election of fix Competitors, in and by each Tribe;
every Elder, or Senator of the Sanhedrim being taken out of this number
of Competitors by the Lot.
THE Congregation of the Lord was a Reprefentative of the People
of Ifrael, conſiſting of twenty four thousand, for the term of one month ;
and perpetuated by the monthly Election of two thouſand Deputys of the
People in each Tribe.
THE Sanhedrim, upon a Law made, was a flanding Judicatory of
Appeal from the Courts in the Gates, throout the Tribes; and upon a Law
to be made, whatever was propos'd by the Sanhedrim, and refolv'd in the
affirmative by the Congregation of the Lord, was an Act of the Parlament
of Ifrael.
OF this Frame fays MOSES to the People (as well he might)
Behold, I have taught you Statutes and Judgments, even as the Lord my
God commanded me, that ye fhould do fo in the Land whither you go to
poffefs it. Keep therfore, and do them; for this is your Wiſdom, and
your Understanding in the fight of the Nations, which shall hear all thefe
Statutes, and fay, Surely this great Nation is a wife and understanding
People. In another place, upon the People's obferving this form, he
pronounces all the choiceſt Bleffings; and in cafe of violation of the
fame, a long enumeration of moft dreadful Curfes, among which he
Deut. 28. 36. has this: The Lord fhall bring thee, and thy King which thou shalt fet over
thee, to a Nation which neither thou nor thy Fathers have known; and
there fhalt thou ferve other Gods, Wood and Stone. In which words,
firſt he charges the King upon the People as a Creature of their own,
and next oppoſes his Form pointblank to Monarchy; as is farther
ap-
parent in the whole Antithefis running throout that Chapter. To the
neglect of theſe Orders may be apply'd thoſe words of DAVID: I have
Said that ye are Gods-but ye fhall dy like Men, and fall like one of the
1
Princes. But this Government can with no countenance of Reaſon,
or teſtimony of Story, give any man ground to argue from the Frame
thus inftituted by MOSES, that a Commonwealth rightly order'd and.
eſtabliſh'd, may by any internal cauſe arifing from fuch Orders, be
broken or diffolv'd; it being moft apparent, that this was never eſta-
bliſh'd in any fuch part as could poffibly be holding. Moses dy'd in
the Wilderneſs: and tho JosHUA, bringing the People into the pro-
mis'd Land, did what he could, during his Life, towards the eſta-
bliſhment of the Form defign'd by MOSES; yet the hands of the
People
The Art of Lawgiving.
413
•
People, eſpecially after the death of JOSHUA, grew flack, and they Chap. 3.
rooted not out the Canaanits, which they were ſo often commanded
to do; and without which it was impoffible their Commonwealth
ſhould take any root. Nevertheleſs, fettled as it could be, it was in
fom parts longer liv'd than any other Government has yet bin; as
having continu'd in fom fort from Moses, to the difperfion of the
Jews in the Reign of the Emperor ADRIAN; being about one thou-
fand ſeven hundred years. But that it was never eſtabliſh'd accord-
ing to the neceffity of the Form, or the true intent of MOSES, is that
which muſt be made farther apparent throout the ſequel of the pre-
ſent Book; and firſt, in the ſtate of the Ifraelits under their Judges.
CHA P. III.
Shewing the Anarchy, or State of the Ifraelits under their
T
Judges.
rael.
I
Car. 27.
HE Frame of that which I take to have bin the ordinary Con- Sect. I.
gregation or Repreſentative of the People of Ifrael, is not
per- A full De-
fectly fhewn in Scripture, till the time of DAVID; when, tho it has fcription of
the Reprefen
nothing in it of a Monarchical Inftitution, it is found intirely remain- tative of the
ing, and perfectly defcrib'd in theſe words: Now the children of Ifrael People of If-
after their number, to wit, the chief Fathers, and Captains of thouſands
and hundreds, and their Officers that ferv'd the King in any matter of
the Courfes, which came in, and went out month by month, throout all the
months in the year; of every Courſe were twenty and four thousand men.
The Polls of the People, as they have bin hitherto fhewn, were taken
before their plantation in Canaan, where before they had Kings, they
had grown (according to the account of PAUL) four hundred and A&s 13. 20.
fifty years; during which time, that they were excedingly increas'd,
appears by the Poll of Military age taken by DAVID, and amount- 2 Sam. 24. 9,
ing to one Million three hundred thouſand: yet could this Affembly
of the Children of Ifrael after their number, in one year, by monthly
rotation, take in the whole body of them. How thefe, being a Repre-
fentative of the People, and thus changeable, could be otherwife col-
lected than by the monthly election of two thouſand in each Tribe, is
not imaginable. And that both a Repreſentative of the People they
were, and thus changeable, is by the clear words of Scripture, and
the nature of the buſineſs upon which occafion they are deſcrib'd, un-
deniably evinc'd: for DAVID propofing, and the People refolving,
they make SOLOMON King, and ZADOC Prieft. This Affembly 1 Chr. 29-
(befides the Military Difciplin therof, in which it differ'd little from 2z.
the Cuſtoms of fuch other Commonwealths as have bin great and
martial) had not only a Civil, but a Military Office or Function, as
the ſtanding Guard or Army of this Country; which, tho fmall, and
lying in the very Teeth of its Enemys, could thus, by taking in every
man but for one month in a whole year, fo equally diſtribute a Burden,
to have bin otherwiſe intolerable to all, that it might be born by a few,
and ſcarce felt by any. This Epitome of that Body (already defcrib'd
under the leading of the feveral Princes of the Tribes, with their
Staves, and Standards of the Camp) feems to have bin commanded
by Lieutenants of the Princes, or Tribuns of the refpective Tribes:
For,
414
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book II.
Ver. 2, 3.
Sect. 2.
That this Re-
prefentative
the time of
vas us'd in
the Judges.
Judg. 2. 6.
Judg. 3. 3.
Sect. 3.
The diffolu-
tion of the
Mofaical
Common-
wealth.
Judg. 2. 7,
! 1.
Judg. 2. 1,
2.
Deat. 7. 2.
ch. 12. 2.
For, over the first course, for the first month, was JASHOBEAM the Scn
of ZABDIEL (of the Children of PEREZ, or of the Family of the
Pharzits, in the Catalog of JUDAH) and of his courfe were four and
twenty thousand.
IN this cafe the Princes did not lead in perfon, but refided in their
Tribes for the Government of the fame; whence, upon extraordinary
occafions, they fent extraordinary Recruits: or in cafe of folemn War,
or fom weighty affair, as the trial of a Tribe or the like, led
up i
in
perfon, with their Staves and Standards; an Ordinance, whether we
regard the military or civil uſe of it, never enough to be admir'd.
IT is true, while, the whole People being an Army, Moses could
propofe to them in body, or under their Staves and Standards of the
Camp; as he needed not, fo he us'd not any Repreſentative. But when
JOSHUA had let the People go, and the Children of Ifrael went every
man to his Inheritance, to poffefs the Land; how was it poffible they
fhould poffefs any thing (while the five Lords of the Philiftins, and all
the Canaanits and the Sidonians, and the Hivits, remain'd yet among
them unconquer'd) without the wing of fom fuch Guard or Army as
this, under which to ſhelter themſelves? How was it equal, or poffi-
ble, that a few of the People upon the guard of the whole, ſhould be
without relief, or fuftain all the burden? Or how could every man
be faid to go to his Inheritance to poffefs it, unless they perform'd this
or the like duty, by turns or courfes? Theſe things confider'd, there
is little doubt but this Congregation was, according to the Inftitution
of Moses, put in practice by JOSHUA.
THUS ftood both the Sanhedrim, and the Congregation, with
the inferior Courts, and all the Superſtructures of the Mofaical Com-
monwealth, during the life of JOSHUA, and the Elders of the San-
hedrim that outliv'd him; but without any fufficient root for the
poffible fupport of it (the Canaanits not being deftroy'd) or with
fuch roots only as were full of worms. Wherfore, tho' the People
ferv'd the Lord all the days of JOSHUA, and all the days of the Elders
that outliv'd JOSHUA; yet after the death of thefe, they did evil in
the fight of the Lord. And an Angel (a Meffenger or Prophet) of the
Lord came up from Gilgal to Bochim, and faid, I made you go up out of
the Land of Egypt, and have brought you into the Land which Ifwore to
your Fathers; and I faid, I will never break my Covenant with you: And
ye fhall make no League with the Inhabitants of this Land, ye fhall throw
down their Altars: but ye have not obey'd my
have not obey'd my Voice: Why have you don
this? Wherfore I also faid, I will not drive them out from before you: but
they shall be as Thorns in your fides, and their Gods fhall be a fnare to you.
Antiq. 1. 5. Upon the feveral Contents of which places, fays JOSEPHUS, The
Ifraelits (after the death of JOSHUA, and the Elders that outliv'd
him) neglecting their Arms, betook themſelves to Tillage; and effeminated
with Peace, gave their minds rather to what was eafy and pleafing, than
what was fecure or honourable: forgetful of the Laws of God, and of their
Difciplin. Wherupon God being mov'd to anger, admonish'd them by a
Prophet, that in fparing the Canaanits, they had disobey'd him; and that
in cafe they perfifted, for his Mercys neglected they ſhould taft of his Fuftice.
But they, tho terrify'd with the Oracle, were altogether averfe to the War;
both becauſe they were brib'd by the Canaanits, and thro luxury were be-
com unapt for labor: the form of their Commonwealth being now deprav'd,
and the Ariftocratical part therof invalid; while neither the Senat was
Josh. 23.31
Exod. 23.
33.
ch. 34 12.
C. 2.
elected,
The Art of Lawgiving.
415
1
}
elected, nor the folemn Magiftrats created as formerly. In which words, Chap. 3.
the not electing of the Senat as formerly, being laid as a Crime by
JOSEPHUS to the People; he is firft clear enough, for his part, that
the Senat was formerly elected by the People, and ought to have bin fo
ſtill: And ſecondly, that henceforth the Election of the Senat, or San-
hedrim, was neglected by the People. So this Commonwealth, which,
thro the not rooting out of the Canaanits, had never any Foundation,
came now to fail alfo in her Superftructures for proof wherof, the
Teſtimony of Scripture is no lefs pregnant in divers places. As where Judg. 1. 3,
JUDAH faid to SIMEON his Brother, Com up with me into my Lot, 27, 29, &c,
that we may fight against the Canaanits, and I likewife will go with thee
into thy Lot: So SIMEON went with him. In which words you
you have
a League made by two Tribes, and a War manag'd by them, while
other Tribes, that is, EPHRAIM, MANASSEH, with the reft, fat
ftill: wheras, if there had bin now any common ligament, as while the
Sanhedrim was in being, fuch leaguing, and fuch warring by particu-
lar Tribes at their own diſcretion, could not have bin. Again, wheras
to judg a Tribe pertain❜d to the Sanhedrim; in the Judgment given
againſt BENJAMIN, by the Congregation of four hundred thouſand, Judg. 20.
there is no mention of the Sanhedrim at all.
Liv.
; no
13.
NOW Government is of fuch a nature, that where there is no Sect. 4.
Senat, there muſt be fom King, or fomwhat like a King, and fuch was No King, jom
the Judg of Ifrael; yet is not their reckoning valid, who from hence at Se-
nut, fcm
compute the Monarchy of the Hebrews. First, becauſe PAUL di- King
ftinguiſhes between the Kings and the Judges. Secondly, becaufe Calv. ap.
GIDEON, when he was a Judg, in refufing to be a King, dos the like. As 13
Thirdly, becauſe the Judges in Ifrael (as Dictators in other Common- Judg 7.23.
wealths) were not of conftant Election, but upon Emergencys only.
Fourthly, becauſe complaint being made to the men of JUDAH of Judg. 15. 13.
their Judg SAMSON, they deliver'd him to the Philistins bound;
no leſs than did the Romans their Confuls to the Samnits. And laſtly,
becauſe SAMUEL, diſtinguiſhing to perfection between Dictatorian
and Royal Power, or between the Magiftracy of the Judg and of
the King, fhews plainly (in that he hearken'd to the Voice of the Peo-
ple) that the one being without any balance at all, was at the difcre-
tion of the People; and that the other (not to be founded but upon
Property in himſelf, to which end he muſt take the beſt of their Fields,
and give them to his Servants) could no otherwiſe fubfift than by hav-
ing the People at the diſcretion of the King. This difference (being
no fmall one) excepted, the office of the King and of the Judg was
much the fame; each confifting in judging the People, and going
forth with their Armys.
nere.
BUT whatever be the difference between theſe Magiftracys, the Sect. 5.
State of the Ifraelitish Commonwealth under the Judges was both void Beſognia
vezzaro fpeg-
of natural Superſtructures, and of the neceffary Foundation; ſo the
Ifraelits, when they were weak, ferv'd the Philiftins, as is imply'd in the
fpeech of the men of JUDAH to their Judg: Knowest thou not that the Judg 15. 11.
Philiſtins are Rulers over us?--And it came to pass when Ifrael was ftrong,
that they put the Canaanits to tribute, and did not utterly drive them out.
Which, as it was contrary to the Command of God, fo was it pointblank
againſt all Prudence; for thus neither made they to themſelves Friends,
nor did they ruin their Enemys: which proceding, as it far'd with
this Commonwealth, and was obferv'd by HERENNIUS in that Livy.
of
•
416
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book II. of the Samnits, is the certain perdition of a People.
of Ifrael.
19. I.
OF the diſorder of this People upon the diffolution of the Mofaical
Sect. 6. Commonwealth, it is often faid that there was no King in Iſrael :
The Anarchy every man did that which was right in his own eys. That is, at the times
Judg. 17. 6. related to by theſe expreffions, there was neither Sanhedrim, nor Judg,
18. 1. in Ifrael: fo every man, or at leaſt every Tribe govern'd it felf as it
21. 25. pleas'd. Which, nevertheless, is not fo generally to be underſtood,
but that the Tribes (without either Judg or Sanhedrim) marching
with their Standards and Staves of the Camp, not only affembl'd
the Congregation in the ufual place at Mizpeh, but there condemn'd
BENJAMIN for the rape of the Levit's Concubine; and marching
thence to put their Decree in execution, reduc'd that obftinat Tribe,
or rather deſtroy'd it by a Civil War.
Judg. 20.
1 Sam. 4. 3.
up
Sect. 7.
WHEN in this, and divers other ways, they had pamper'd their
The rife of the Enemys, and exhaufted themſelves, they grew (as well they might)
Hebrew Mo- out of love with their Policy; eſpecially when after impious expoftu-
narchy
lation (Wherfore has the Lord fmitten us this day before the Philiftins?)
they had, as it were, ftak'd their God (let us fetch the Ark---that it
1 Sam. 7. 3. may fave us) and the Ark being taken by the Enemy, they fell to
Idolatry. To this it happen'd, that tho upon Repentance fuccefs was
better, God having miraculouſly diſcomfited the Philiftins before them
yet SAMUEL their Judg was old, and had made his two Sons (be-
ing takers of Bribes, and perverters of Justice) Judges over Ifrael.
Wherupon, there was no gainfaying, but a King they muſt and would
have.
Sect. I.
The Method of
this part.
Sect. 2.
The Balance
of this Mo-
narchy.
Sam. 8.
11, 14.
2 Sam. 8. 1.
1 Chron.
11.
CHA P. IV.
Shewing the State of the Ifraelits under their Kings, to the
Captivity.
F
OR Method in this part, I fhall firft obferve the Balance or
Foundation, then the Superftructures of the Hebrew Monar-
chys; and laſt of all, the Story of the Hebrew Kings.
THE Balance neceffary to Kingly Government, even where it is
regulated or not abfolute, is thus defcrib'd by SAMUEL: This will be the
manner of the King that shall reign over you: He will take your Fields, your
Vineyards, and your Oliveyards, even the beſt of them, and give them to
his Servants. That is, there being no proviſion of this kind for a
King, and it being of natural neceffity that a King muſt have ſuch an
Ariftocracy or Nobility as may be able to fupport the Monarchy
(which otherwiſe, to a People having equal fhares in property, is
altogether incompatible) it follows that he must take your Fields,
and give them to his Servants, or Creatures.
THIS notwithſtanding could not SAUL do, in whoſe time the
Monarchy attain'd not to any balance, but was foon torn from him
like the lap of a Garment. The Prince who gave that balance to this
Monarchy, which it had, was DAVID: for befides his other Con-
quefts, by which he brought the Moabits, the Syrians of Damafcus,
the Ammonits, the Amalekits, the Edomits, to his Obedience, and ex-
tended his Border to the river Euphrates; he fmote the Philiftins, and
fubdu'd them, and took Gath and her Towns, out of the hand of the Phi-
liftins.
The Art of Lawgiving.
417
liftins. Now this Country which DAVID thus took, was part of the Chap. 4.
Land given to the People of God, and which was by the Law of
MOSES to have bin divided by Lot to them. Wherfore if this divi-
fion follow'd not, but DAVID having taken this Country, did hold
it in his particular Dominion or Property; then tho he took not from
the People any thing wherof they were in actual poffeffion, yet, as
to their legal Right, took he from them (as SAMUEL had forewarn'd)
their Fields, their Vineyards, and their Oliveyards, even the best of
them, and gave them to his Servants, or to a Nobility, which by this
means he introduc'd.
The firſt Order of the Nobility thus inftituted, were, as they 2 Sam. 23.
are term'd by our Tranflators, DAVID'S Worthys: to theſe may be 1 Chron. 11.
added, the great Officers of his Realm and Court, with fuch as fprang
out of both. But however, theſe things by advantage of foren Con-
queft might be order'd by DAVID, or continu'd for the time of his
next Succeffor; certain it is, that the balance of Monarchy in fo ſmall
a Country muſt be altogether infufficient to it felf, or deftructive to
the People.
chical Ba-
Plutarch in
THE Commonwealth of Lacedemon, being founded by LYCUR- Sect. 3.
GUS upon the like Lots with thefe defign'd by MOSES, came, after A Parallel of
the ſpoil of Athens, to be deftroy'd by Purchafers, and brought into the Monar-
one hundred hands, wherupon, the People being rooted out, there re- lances in Il-
inain'd no more to the two Kings, who were wont to go out with rael and in
great Armys, than one hundred Lords: nor any way, if they were in- Lacedemon.
vaded, to defend themſelves, but by Mercenarys, or making War up- Agis and
on the Penny; which, at the fartheft it would go (not computing the Cleomenes.
difference in Difciplin) reach'd not, in one third, thofe Forces which
the popular Balance could at any time have afforded without Mony.
This fom of thofe Kings perceiving, were of all others the moft earneſt
to return to the popular Balance. What diſorders, in a Country no
bigger than was theirs, or this of the Ifraelits, muft, in cafe the like
courſe be not taken, of neceflity follow, may be at large perus'd in the
ftory of Lacedemon; and ſhall be fully fhewn, when I com to the ſtory
of the preſent Kings.
the
FOR the Superftructures of DAVID'S Government, it has bin Sect. 4.
fhewn at large what the Congregation of Ifrael was; and that with- The Super-
out the Congregation of Ifrael, and their Refult, there was not any e Hebrew
ftructures of
Law made by DAVID. The like in the whole, or for the moft part, Monarchy.
was obferv'd till REHOBOAM, who, refuſing to redress the Grie-
vances of the People, was depos'd by one part of this Congregation or
Parlament, and fet up by another; and to the confufion both of Parla-
ment and People. And DAVID (as after him JEHOSH APHAT) did
reſtore the Sanhedrim; I will not affirm, by popular Election, after
the antient manner. He might do it perhaps, as he made JoAB
over the Hoft, JEHOSH APH AT Recorder, and SERAIAH Scribe. 1 Sam. S..
Certain it is, the Jewish Writers hold unanimouſly, that the Seventy 15-
Elders were in DAVID's time, and by a good token; for they fay,
to him only of all the Kings it was lawful, or permitted, to enter into
the Sanhedrim: which I the rather credit, for the words of DAVID,
where he ſays, I will praife the Lord with my whole Heart in the Council, Pfal. 111. 1,
and in the Congregation of the Upright; which words relate to the Se-
nat, and the Congregation of Ifrael. The final caufe of the popular
Congregation, in a Commonwealth, is to give fuch a balance by their
Hhh
Refult,
1
418
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book II. Reſult, as may, and muſt keep the Senat from that Faction and Cor-
ruption, wherof it is not otherwife curable, or to fet it upright. Yet
our Tranflation gives the words cited, in this manner: I will praiſe the
Lord with my whole Heart in the Aſſembly of the Upright, and in the
Congregation. There are other Allufions in the English Pfalms, of the
Pfal. 82. 1. like nature, fhaded in like manner: As, God is prefent in the Congre-
gation of God (that is, in the Repreſentative of the People of Ifrael)
he judges among the Gods, that is, among the Seventy Elders, or in the
Sanhedrim. What the Orders of the Ifraelitish Monarchy in the time
of DAVID were, tho our Tranflators throout the Bible have don what
they could againſt Popular Government, is clear enough in many ſuch
places.
Sect. 5.
The Story of
the Hebrew
Kings.
TO conclude this Chapter with the ftory of the Hebrew Kings:
Till REHOBOAM, and the divifion (thro the cauſe mention'd) of
the Congregation in his time, the Monarchy of the Hebrews was one,
but came thenceforth to be torn in two: that of Judah, confifting
of two Tribes, Judah and Benjamin; and that of Ifrael, con-
fifting of the other ten. From which time this People, thus di-
vided, had little or no reft from the flame of that Civil War, which,
once kindl'd between the two Realms or Factions, could never be ex-
tinguiſh'd but in the deftruction of both. Nor was Civil War of
ſo new a date among them; SAUL, whofe whole Reign was impo-
tent and perverſe, being conquer'd by DAVID; and DAVID in-
vaded by his Son ABSALOM fo ftrongly, that he fled before him.
SOLOMON, the next Succeffor, happen'd to have a quiet Reign, by
fettling himſelf upon his Throne in the death of ADONIJAH his elder
Brother, and in the depofing of the High Prieſt ABIATHAR; yet
made he the yoke of the People grievous. After him, we have the War
between JEROBOAM and REHOBOAM. Then, the Confpiracy
of BAASHA againſt NADAB King of Ifrael, which ends in the
deftruction of JEROBOAM'S Houfe, and the Ufurpation of his
Throne by BAASHA, which BAASHA happens to leave to his Son
ASA. Againſt ASA rifes ZIMRI, Captain of the Chariots; kills
him with all his kindred, reigns ſeven days; at the end wherof he
burns himſelf for fear of OMRI, who upon this occafion is made Cap-
tain by one part of the People, as is alfo TIBNI by another. The
next Prize is plaid betwen OMRI and TIBNI, and their Facti-
ons; in which TIBNI is flain. Upon this fuccefs, OMRI out-
doing all his Predeceffors in Tyranny, leaves his Throne and Virtues
to his Son AHAB. Againſt AHAB drives JEHU furiouſly, de-
ftroys him and his Family, gives the flesh of his Queen JEZEBEL to
the Dogs, and receives a Preſent from thofe of Samaria, even feventy
Heads of his Maſter's Sons in Baſkets. To ASA and JEHOSHA-
PHAT, Kings of Judah, belongs much Reverence. But upon this
Throne fat ATHALIAH; who, to reign, murder'd all her Grand-
children except one, which was JOASH. JOASH being hid by
the High Prieft, at whofe Command ATHALIAH was fom time
after flain, ends his Reign in being murder'd by his Servants. To
him fuccedes his Son AMAZIA, flain alfo by his Servants. About
the fame time ZACHARIAH King of Ifrael was fmitten by SH AL-
LUM, who reign'd in his ftead: SHALLUM by MANAHIM,
who reign'd in his ftead: PEKAHA the Son of MANTHIM
by PEKAH one of his Captains, who reign'd in his ftead: PEKAH
3
by
The Art of Lawgiving.
419
..
by HOSHEA. HOSHEA having reign'd nine years, is carry'd by Chap. 4.
SALMANAZZER King of Affyria with the ten Tribes into Captivi-
ty. Now might it be expected that the Kingdom of Judah fhould
injoy Peace: a good King they had, which was HEZEKIAH; but
to him fucceded his Son MANASSEH, a fhedder of innocent Blood.
To MANASSEH fucceded his Son AMMON, flain by his Servants.
JOSIAH the next, being a good Prince, is fucceded by JEHOAH AZ,
who being carry'd into Egypt, there dys a Priſoner, while JEHOIA-
KIM his Brother becoms PHARAOH's Tributary. The laft of thefe
Princes was ZEDEKIAH, in whofe Reign was Judah led away Cap-
tive by NEBUCHADNEZZAR. Thus came the whole Enumeration
of thofe dreadful Curfes denounc'd by Moses in this cafe, to be ful- Deut. 28.
fil'd in this People; of whom it is alſo faid, I gave them a King in Hof. 13. 11.
my anger, and took him away in my wrath.
TO conclude this Story with the Refemblances or Differences that
are between Monarchical and Popular Government: What Parallel can
there be beyond the Storys wherby each of them are fo largely de-
ſcrib'd in Scripture? True it is, that AHIMELEC ufurp'd the Ma-
giftracy of Judg in Ifrael, or made himſelf King by the men of Si-
chem; that the men of Ephraim fought against JEPTHA, and that
there was a Civil War caus'd by Benjamin: yet, in a Popular Go-
vernment, the very womb (as they will have it) of tumult, tho never
fo well founded that it could be fteddy, or take any fufficient root,
can I find no more of this kind.
tian Storms
BUT the Tribuns of the People in Rome, or the Romans under
the Magistracy of their Tribuns, throout the whole Adminiſtration 4 Parallel of
Sect. 6.
of that Government, were never quiet; but at perpetual ftrife and the Tribuni-
enmity with the Senat. It is very true; but first, this happen'd not with those in
from a Cauſe natural to a Popular Government, but from a Caufe un- the Hebrew
natural to Popular Government; yea, fo unnatural to Popular Govern- Monarchys.
ment, that the like has not bin found in any other Commonwealth.
Secondly, the Caufe is undeniably difcover'd to have confifted in a
Faction introduc'd by the Kings, and fofter'd by the Nobility, ex-
cluding the Suffrage of the main body of the People thro an Optimacy,
or certain rank or number admitted not by the People or their Election,
but by the value of their Eftates, to the Legislative Power, as the Com-
mons of that Nation. So the State of this People was as if they had
two Houſes of Lords, and no Houfe of Commons. Thirdly, this
danger muſt have bin in any other Nation, at leaſt in ours, much
harder to be incur'd, than Authors hitherto have made it to be ſeen in
this. And last of all, this Enmity, or theſe Factions, were without
Blood, which in Monarchys they are not, as you ſaw well in thoſe
mention'd; and this Nation in the Barons Wars, and in thoſe of York
and Lancaster, befides others, has felt. Or, if at length they came in-
deed to Blood, this was not till the Foundations were deftroy'd, that
is, till the Balance of Popular Government in Rome was totally ruin'd;
which is equally in cafes of the like nature inavoidable, be the Govern-
ment of what kind foever, as of late years we have bin fufficiently in-
form'd by our own fad Experience.
Hhh 2
CHAP.
420
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book II.
Sect. I.
The State of
2 Chr. 36.
22.
Ezra 1.
Sect. 2.
CHAP.
V.
Shewing the State of the Jews in the Captivity, and after
their return out of it; with the Frame of the Jewish
Commonwealth.
W
1
per-
E left the Children of Ifrael upon a fad march, even into Cap-
tivity. What Orders had bin antiently obferv'd by them
the Ifraelits during the time they were in Egypt (one of which, as has bin already
in Captivity.
fhewn, was their Seventy Elders) the fame, fo far as would be
mitted by the Princes whofe Servants they were, continu'd in
prac-
tice with them during the time of their Captivity, out of which the
Jer. 25. 12. ten Tribes never more return'd. The two Tribes, when feventy years
were accomplish'd from the time that they were carry'd away by NE-
BUCHADNEZZAR, and in the first year of CYRUS King of Perfia, re-
turn'd the beſt part of them, not only with the King's leave and liking,
but with reftitution of the Plate and Veffels belonging to the Temple.
THE firſt Colony (as I may fay) of the two Tribes, or thoſe that
The Balance return'd under the Conduct of ZOROBABEL Prince of Judah, a-
of the Com- mounted to forty two thouſand three hundred and threefcore, among
which there were about one hundred Patriarchs or Princes of Familys.
To thefe, in the reign of ARTAXERXES, came fixteen or twenty
Princes more with their Familys; among whom the Prophets HAG-
GAI, ZACHARIAS, and MALACHI were eminent. Som of
Ezra 2.59. them could not fhew their Fathers House and their Seed, whether they were
of Ifrael. But thefe were few; for it is faid of them in general, That
they went every one to his own City, or to the Inheritance of his Fathers:
In which you may note the reftitution of the Balance of the Mofaical
Commonwealth; tho to what this might com without fixation, the
Jubile being not after the Captivity in ufe, I cannot fay. However,
for the prefent, plain it is that the antient Superftructures did alfo in-
fue: as in order to the putting away of the ſtrange Wives, which the
People in Captivity had taken, is apparent.
monwealth
restor❜d by
Zorobabel.
Ezra 2.
Ezra 8.
this Common-
¡niah.
Ezra 10. 8,
Sect. 3.
THEIR whole Progreſs hitherto is according to the Law of Mo-
The Super-
SES; they return every man to his Inheritance by direction of his Pe-
Aructures of degree, or according to the Houſe of his Fathers; they are led by
wealth in the Princes of their Familys, and are about to put away ftrange Wives:
ime of Ezra for what reafon then ſhould a man believe that what follows fhould
and Nche-
not be according to the Orders of the fame Lawgiver? Now that
which follows, in order to the putting away of theſe foren Wives, is,
Proclamation was made throout Judah and Jerufalem to all the Children of
the Captivity, that they should gather themselves to Jerufalem; and that
whosoever will not com within three days, according to the counfil of the
Princes and Elders, all his Subftance should be forfeited, and himſelf ſe-
parated from the Congregation of thofe that had bin carry'd away. This
plainly, by the Penalty annex'd, is a Law for Banishment; of which
kind there was none made by MOSES; and a Law made by the
Princes and the Elders. What doubt then can remain, but theſe El-
ders were the Sanhedrim, or feventy Elders? But wheras neither the
Sanhedrim, nor any other Senat of it felf has bin found to make Laws,
what others can thefe Princes be that are join'd with the Elders, than
thofe
1
The Art of Lawgiving.
421
1 Chr. 27. I.
thoſe ſpoken of before; that is, the Princes of Familys, or the chief Chap. 5.
Fathers in the Congregation of them that had bin carry'd away? So
the Princes and the Elders in this place may be underſtood of the San-
hedrim and the People: for thus DAVID propofes to the Congrega-
tion of the People of Ifrael, or the chief Fathers, and muſt be under-
ftood of them; becauſe there is no fuch thing throout the Scripture to
be found, as a Law made by the Sanhedrim without the People: and
if fo, then that the Sanhedrim with the People had power to make a
Law, is by this place of Scripture undeniably evinc'd. But befides
the chief Fathers, which here are call'd Rulers of the Congregation, Ezra 10. 14.
and in the time of DAVID were call'd Captains of thousands and Cap-
tains of hundreds, mention is alſo made of the Elders of every City,
and the fudges therof; in which words you have the Judges in the Gates
throout the Tribes of Ifrael, as they were inſtituted by MOSES. All
which particulars being rightly fum'd up, com to this total; That the
Commonwealth reftor'd by EZRA, was the very fame that originally
was inftituted by MOSES.
liftical or
SUCH was the Government reftor'd by ZOROBABEL, EZRA, Sect. 4.
and NEHEMIAH. Now whether the Jewish or Cabaliſtical Common- A Transition
wealth, father'd by the Prefbyterian Jews of latter ages upon MOSES to the Caba-
or EZRA, be the fame, fhall be fhewn by reducing the invention of Jewish Com-
theſe Men to three heads: as firſt, their Cabala; ſecondly, their Or- monwealth.
dination; and laſt of all, their great Synagog.
The Cabala.
THE Cabala, call'd alfo by the Jews the Oral Law, confifts of Sect. 5.
certain Traditions by them pretended at the inftitution of the Sanhedrim
to have bin verbally deliver'd to the feventy Elders by MOSES for the
Government of the Commonwealth. Theſe were never written till
after the diſperſion of the Jews by the Emperor ADRIAN; when, to
fave them from being loft, they were digeſted into thoſe Volums cail'd
the Talmud: which they hold to be, and indeed are, as to matter of
Fact, the authentic Records of their Government. Of the Traditions
thus recorded fays one of the Rabbins or Jewiſh Doctors: Think not Rabbi Cor-
that the written Law (or the Law of Moses) is fundamental, but that bulenſis.
the Oral or Traditional Law is fundamental, it being upon this that God
“enter'd'into a League with the Ifraelits, as it is written: After the tenor of Exod. 34.
theſe words, I have made a Covenant with thee, and with Ifrael. A man in codice ju.
(fays another) who returns from the study of the Talmud to the study of the ris Chagiga.
Bible, can have no quiet confcience, neither was there any peace to him that Zach. 8. 10.
went out or came in. The like wherof is the Talmudical way of ap-
plying Scripture throout. And it was the common Bleffing the Pha-
rifes gave their Children: My Son, hearken to the words of a Scribe
or Doctor, rather than to the Law of Moses. To whom fays
CHRIST hereupon, You have made the Commandment of God of no ef- Mat. 15. 6.
fect by your tradition.
27.
NOW as true as the Talmud, or as this word of a Scribe, or that Sect. 6.
MOSES deliver'd the Oral Law to the feventy Elders and to JOSHUA, Ordination by
Impoſition of
fo true it is that MOSES ordain'd both the feventy Elders and
Hands,
JOSHUA by the impofition of Hands; and that this Ordination by
the impofition of Hands, together with the Oral Law, came fuc-
ceffively, and hand in hand from the feventy Elders, and from Jo-
SHUA downright to thefe Doctors. This indeed is fo generally af
firm'd by their Talmudifts, that there is no denying of it; but, that as
to the ſeventy Elders it is quite contrary to Scripture, has already bin
made
422
The Art of Lawgiving.
}
Book II, made fufficiently apparent; for JOSHUA is acknowleg'd to have
bin ordain'd by Moses with impofition of hands. But this Argu-
ment (befides that the Act of Moses was accompany'd with a mi-
racle, and that it is abfurd to think that a thing plainly miraculous
fhould or can be receiv'd as an Order in a Commonwealth) will go no
farther than that JOSHUA, upon this authority, might have elected
his Succeffor by impofition of Hands. Let them fhew us then that he
did fo, or indeed that he left any Succeffor at all: for certainly if
JOSHUA left no fucceffor fo ordain'd, or no Succeffor at all (which is
the truth of the cafe) then defcended there upon them no fuch Ordina-
tion from JOSHUA; and ſo by confequence none from Moses.
Whence it follows, that the Authority and Vogue of Ordination by
the impofition of hands among the Jews procedes not from the Law of
MOSES, but from the Oral Law; which how bad an Authority fo-
ever it be to us of right, is of fact, or of what the exerciſe of Ordi-
nation was among the Jews, a good and fufficient teftimony. Now
therby the condition of this Ordination (tho in fom times of the
Commonwealth it was lefs reftrain'd) was fuch, that no man not
having receiv'd the fame from the great Sanhedrim, or fom one of
the inferior Courts by laying on of hands, by word of mouth, or
by writing, could be a Prefbyter, or capable of any Judicature or
Magiftracy in the Commonwealth, or to give Council in the Law,
or any part of the Law, or to be of the Affembly of the great Sy-
nagog.
The great Sy-
nagog.
Grot, ad
WHAT the Affembly of the Princes and Fathers was in the time
Sect. 7. of EZRA, has bin fhewn, and is left to the judgment of others.
But this is that which the Talmudifts and their Anceſtors the Caba-
liftical Jews (among which the Pharifes were of the higheſt rank)
unanimoufly affirm to have confifted of the ſeventy Elders, and of a
Juncta of fifty Prefbyters not elected by the People; but by the laying
on of hands by the Sanhedrim, or by fom other Judicatory. This,
they fay, was the inftitution of their great Synagog, where I leave
them: but that, according to the fenfe wherin they cite their Autho-
ritys, the like with them was a conftant practice, appears not only by
their own Teſtimony and Records, but is plain in Scripture; as where
CHRIST fpeaks of the Jews to his Apoftles in this Manner, They
Mat. 10. 17. will scourge you in their Synagogs: that is, the Jews having as yet no
Law made wherby they can invade the liberty of Confcience, or
bring you for the practice therof to puniſhment, will call their great
Synagog, wherin the Priefts and the Pharifes, or the Sanhedrim, have
at leaſt ſeven to five the overbalancing Vote over the reft. Which al-
fo are their Creatures, and by thefe will eafily carry, or make fuch
Laws wherby they may inflict upon you corporal Puniſhment: which
Interpretation of Chrift's words, was fulfil'd even to a tittle, or rather
with over meaſure. For upon this occafion the High Prieſt, and as
many as were of the kindred of the High Priest, were gather'd together at
Jerufalem. That this fame Juncta, to be in this cafe added to the San-
hedrim, was to confiſt but of fifty, thoſe fifty not elected by the Peo-
ple, but choſen by the Elders of the Sanhedrim; and not out of the
body of the People, but out of fuch only as had receiv'd Ordination by
the Sanhedrim, or by fom other Court, or indeed were actually Judges
in fom other Court, was not enough, unleſs they might confift alſo of
A&ts 5. 21. as many as were of the kindred of the High Priest. Which Rights and
Acts
4.
6.
Privi-
The Art of Lawgiving.
423
Acts 5. 40.
Privileges being all obferv'd, The High Priest came, and they that were Chap. 5.
with him, and call'd the Sanhedrim, and all the Prefbytery of the Children
of Ifrael: that is, fo many of them, as being affembl'd in the great Sy-
nagog, reprefented all the Prefbytery of the Children of Ifrael, or all the
Children of Ifrael themſelves. In this Affembly you have the full de-
ſcription of the great Synagog: and when (in this Synagog) they had
beaten the Apoftles PETER and JOHN, they commanded them that
they ſhould not ſpeak in the Name of JESUS, and let them go. Upon theſe
procedings there are Confiderations of great importance; as firft, That
the Cabaliftical Doctors themſelves did never fo much as imagin that
MOSES had indu'd the Sanhedrim alone, or feparatly confider'd from
the People, with any Legiſlative Power; nevertheleſs, that the San-
hedrim came into the place, and fucceded to the whole power of
MOSES, they unanimoufly held: whence, even upon their Principles,
it muſt follow that in Moses, diſtinctly and ſeparatly taken from the
People, there could be no Power of making any Law. The fecond
thing remarkable in this proceding, is, That the moſt corrupt Com-
monwealth, and in her moſt corrupt Age, had not yet the face, with-
out fom blind, of pretending to Legiſlative Power in a fingle Counfil.
The laſt I fhall obferve, is, That no poffible fecurity is to be given to
liberty of Conſcience, but in the fecurity of Civil Liberty, and in that
only not by Laws which are otherwiſe as periſhing as flowers or fruits,
but in the roots or fundamental orders of the Government. What
even in theſe times muſt have follow'd, as to the liberty of Confcience,
had there bin an equal Reprefentative of the People, is apparent, in that
the Captain and the Officers, imploy'd by this Synagog to apprehend
the Apoſtles, brought them without violence; for they fear'd the People, A&ts 5. 26.
left they should have bin fton'd. It is true, there is nothing with us more
cuſtomary, even in the folemneſt places, and upon the folemneſt occa-
fions, than to upbraid the People with giddinefs from the Hofanna and
the Crucifige of the Jews. What may be charg'd upon a multitude not
under orders, the fouler Crime it be, is the fairer Argument for fuch
Orders, as where they have bin once eſtabliſh'd, the People have
not bin guilty of fuch Crimes; at leaſt, it ſhould ſeem, that in this
cafe there is great ſcarcity of Witneffes againſt them, ſeeing the Death
of SOCRATES is more laid to one People, than that of all the
Martyrs to Kings: yet were the falfe Witneffes by whom SoCRA-
TES fuffer'd (and by the like wherto a man in the beſt Government
may chance to fuffer) no fooner diſcover'd, than they were deftroy'd
by the People, who alfo erected a Statue to SOCRATES. And the
People who, at the Arraignment of CHRIST, cry'd, Crucify him, Mark 15.11.
crucify him, were fuch as the chief Prieſts mov'd or promted, and fuch
alfo as fear'd the multitude. Now that the People which could be Mat. 21.
promted by the chief Priefts, or the People which could fear the Peo-
ple, could be no other than this pretended Repreſentative of the Peo-
ple, but indeed a Juncta of Coufins and Retainers, is that which, for
ought I know, may be poffible; and the rather, for what happen'd be-
fore upon the Law call'd among the Jews, The Law of the Zealot,
which was inſtituted by Moses in theſe words: If thy Brother, the
Son of thy Mother---intice thee, faying, Let us go and ferve other Gods---
thy hand ſhall be first upon him to put him to death---and afterwards the
hand of all the People. By this Law it is plain that, as to the true in-
tent thereof, it relates to no other cafe than that only of Idolatry. The
execution
Deut. 13 E.
424
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book II. execution of the fame, according to the Talmud, might be perform'd
by any number of the People, being not under ten, either apprehend-
ing the Party in the Fact, or upon the Teftimony of fuch Witneffes
as had fo apprehended him: yet will it not be found to have bin exe-
cuted by the People, but upon inftigation of the Prieft, as where
(they interpreting the Law as they lift) STEPHEN is fton'd. Now
if the Priefts could have made the People do as much againſt CHRIST,
what needed they have gon to PILAT for help? and if they could not,
why fhould we think that the Multitude which cry'd out Crucify
bim, crucify him, fhould be any other than the great Synagog?
Sect. 8.
HOWEVER, that it was an Oligarchy, confifting of a Senat
and a Preſbytery, which not only fcourg'd the Apoſtles, but caus'd
CHRIST to be crucify'd, is certain. And fo much for the great
Synagog.
THESE parts being hiftorically laid down and prov'd, it fol-
The Model of lows that the Cabaliftical or Jewish Commonwealth was much after
this Model.
the Jewith
Common-
wealth.
BE the capacity of bearing Magiftracy, or giving Council upon the
Law, or any part of the Law of this Commonwealth, in no other than
fuch only as are Prefbyters.
BE Prefbyters of two forts: the one general, the other particular.
BE Prefbyters general ordain'd by the laying on of hands of the Prince of
the Sanhedrim with the rest of the Elders, or Prefbytery of the fame, and
by no other Court without a Licence from the Prince of the Sanhedrim;
and be thoſe ordain'd in this manner eligible by the major vote of the feven-
ty Elders into the Sanhedrim, or into any other Court by the major vote
of the Elders or Prefbytery of that Court.
BE Prefbyters particular ordain'd by any Court of Justice; and be
thefe capable of giving Council in the Law, or in fom particular part of
the Law, according to the gift that is in them by the laying on of the
hands of the Prefbytery.
BE all Prefbyters capable of nomination to the great Synagog.
BE the Sanhedrim in Law made the fupreme Magiftracy or Judica-
tory; and with a Juncta of fifty Prefbyters of their Nomination, the
great Synagog.
BE the great Synagog the Legislative Power in this Commonwealth.
SUCH was the Government, where the word of a Scribe or
Doctor was avowedly held to be of more validity than the Scripture ;
and where the uſual appellation of the People, by the Doctors and
Pharifees, was (populus terra) the Rafcally Rabble.
Regis ad exemplum totus componitur orbis.
Sect. 9.
THERE were other Synagogs for other uſes, as thoſe wherin
Ordination in the Law was read every Sabbath-day; each of which alſo had her
the leffer Sy- Ruler and her Prefbytery, with power to ordain others to this Ca-
nagog. pacity.
CHA P.
The Art of Lawgiving.
425
CH A P. VI
Shewing how Ordination was brought into the Chriftian
Church, and the divers ways of the fame that were at
divers times in ufe with the Apostles.
Chap. 6.
E do not find that CHRIST (who gave little countenance to Sect. 1.
WE the Jewish Traditions) ordain'd his Apoftles or Difciples by the The form in-
compares to
troduc'd by
Chrift into his
impofition of hands: his Apoſtles were twelve, whom he
the twelve Princes of the Tribes of Ifrael; and his Difciples were feven- Church.
ty, in which number it is receiv'd by Divines, that he alluded to the fe- Matth. 19.
venty Elders or Sanhedrim of Ifrael. So thus far the Government of 28.
the Church, inftituted by CHRIST, was according to the form
inſtituted by MOSES. But CHRIST in this form was King and
Prieſt, not after the Inftitution of Moses, who feparated the Levits
tium, & vi-
to the Priesthood; but as before MOSES, when the Royal and Prieft- Vid. Gro-
ly Function were not feparated, and after the order and manner of deat Grotius,
MELCHISEDEC, who came not to the Priesthood by proving his in Epift. ad
Pedegree, as the High Prieft in Ifrael by Father, or as the King Prieſt Hebræos.
in Athens by Mother, but without Father and Mother. Or be what
has bin faid of MELCHISEDEC approv'd or rejected, fuch for the
reft, as has bin fhewn, was the form introduc'd by CHRIST into his
Church.
s;
Sect. 2.
The first way
of Ordina-
tion.
CHRIST being taken up into Heaven, his Difciples or Follow-
érs in Jeruſalem increas'd to about one hundred and twenty names
and the Apoſtles decreas'd by one, or by JUDAS, who was gon to his
place. PETER, whether upon the Counfil or Determination of the Acts 1.
eleven Apoftles (as is moſt probable) beforehand or otherwiſe, ſtood
up and ſpoke both to the Apoſtles and Difciples affembl'd upon this
occafion, That one out of the prefent Affembly might be ordain'd an
Apoſtle: and they (that is, the Congregation, or why was this pro-
pos'd to them?) appointed two by Suffrage; for how otherwife can
an Affembly appoint? Theſe were BARSABAS and MATTHIAS,
which Names, being written in fcrols, were caft into one Urn; two
Lots, wherof one was a blank, and the other infcrib'd with the word
Apoſtle, being at the ſame time caft into another Urn. Which don, they
pray'd that God would fhew which of the Competitors by them fo
made, he had choſen : when they had thus pray'd, they gave forth
their Lots, that is, a fcrol out of the one Urn, and then a name to
that fcrol out of the other Urn; and the Lot fell upon MATTHIAS,
or MATTHIAS was taken; wherupon MATTHIAS was number'd,
or rather decreed with the eleven Apoftles. For Pfephifma, being * ʊyxaτe-
a word which properly derives from fuch Stones or Pebbles as po- Inpion.
pular Affemblys of old were wont to ballot with or give fuffrage by,
not only fignifys a Decree, but efpecially fuch a Decree as is made by
a popular Affembly. Now if this was Ordination in the Chriftian
Church, and of Apoftolical Right, then may there be a way of Ordi-
nation in the Chriftian Church, and of Apoftolical Right, exactly
conformable to the Ballot, or way us'd by MOSES in the inftitution
of the feventy Elders or Sanhedrim of Ifrael.
Iii
AFTER
Συγκατε
426
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book II.
Sect. 3.
The ſecond
quay of Ordi-
nation.
Acts 4. 4.
Acts 6.
Sect. 4.
The third
way of Ordi-
nation.
1 Tim. 4. 14.
2 Tim. 1.6.
AFTER the converfion of fom thouſands more, moft, if not all,
of which were Jews, a People tho converted, yet fo tenacious of their
Laws and Customs, that even Circumcifion (hitherto not forbidden
by the Apoſtles) was continu'd among them; the twelve Apostles call'd
the multitude of Difciples to them. So MOSES, when he had any thing
to propoſe, affembl'd the People of Ifrael. And when the twelve had
thus call'd the Difciples, they faid, Look ye out among you feven men of
honcft report, full of the Holy Ghoft and Wisdom, whom we may appoint
over this business. So MOSES faid to the Congregation of Ifrael, Take
ye wife men, and underſtanding, and known among your Tribes, and I will
make them Rulers over you. And the faying of the Apoftles pleas'd the
whole multitude. So the People of Ifrael were wont to anſwer to
MOSES, The thing which thou fayft is good for us to do. This faying of
the Apoſtles being thought good by the whole multitude, the whole
multitude elected feven men whom they fet before the Apostles: and when
they had pray'd, they laid their hands on them. To fay in this place (as
they do) that the Act of the People was but a Preſentation, and that
the Apoftles had power to admit or refuſe the Perſons ſo preſented, is
as if one fhould fay, That the Act of electing Parlament men by the
People of England, was but a Preſentation, and that the King had
power to admit or refuſe the Perfons fo prefented. And feeing the
Deacons henceforth had charge of the Word, to fay, that by this choice
the Deacons receiv'd not the charge of the Word, but the care to
ſerve Tables, is as if one ſhould ſay, That Parlament men by their E-
lection receiv'd only the care to levy Mony or Provifion for the King's
Table; but if upon fuch Election they debated alfo concerning Laws,
that Power they receiv'd from the King only.
BUT if this was a way of Ordination in the Chriſtian Church,
and of Apoftolical Right, then there may be a way of Ordination in
the Chriftian Church, and of Apoftolical Right, confifting in part
of
the Orders of the Ifraelitish Commonwealth, and in part of the Orders
of the Jewish Commonwealth.
LASTLY, PAUL writing to TIMOTHY concerning his Ordina-
tion, has in one place this expreffion, Neglect not the Gift that is in thee,
which was given thee by prophefy, with the laying on of the hands of the
Presbytery. So the Prefbytery of a Jewish Synagog laid their hands on
the Party ordain'd. And in another place he has this expreffion: Stir up
the Gift of God which is in thee by the laying on of my hands. So the Ruler
of a Jewish Synagog did lay his hands alfo on the Party ordain'd.
Moreover, the Apoſtle in theſe words, The Gift that is in thee by lay-
ing on of hands, tho in relation to Gifts beyond compariſon more ex-
cellent, uſes the Phraſe known upon the like occafion to have bin comi-
mon with the Jews. Wherfore if this were a way of Ordination in the
Chriſtian Church, and of Apoftolical Right, then may there be a way
of Ordination in the Chriftian Church exactly conformable to the Jewiſh
Commonwealth, and be of Apoftolical Right. Nor is it fo ftrange
that the Apoſtles in matters of this nature fhould comply with the
Jews, of which fo many were converted, feeing it is certain that not
only the Apoſtles, but all fuch as in thefe times were converted, did
obferve the Jewish Sabbath; nay, and that PAUL himſelf took T1-
MOTHY and circumcis'd him, becauſe of the Jews; that is, to com-
ply with them, or to give them no offence. Nor do our Divines any
where pretend impofition of hands to be deriv'd from Chrift, but
unani-
The Art of Lawgiving.
427
unanimouſly confefs, that it was taken up by the Apoftles from the
Jewish Sanhedrim.
·
Ordination
NOW in theſe feveral ways of Ordination, there is a moft re- Sect. 5.
markable Providence of God. For wheras States and Princes in re- The Provi-
dence of God
ceiving of Religion are not at any point fo jealous as of an incroach- in the diffe-
ment upon their Power; the firft way of Apoftolical Ordination de- rent way of
ftroys Monarchical Power: the laſt wholly excludes the Power of the Apoftolical
People: and the ſecond has a mixture which may be receiv'd by a Com-
monwealth, or by a Monarchy. But where it is receiv'd by a Com-
monwealth, the Impofition of Hands coms to little; and where it is
receiv'd by a Monarchy, the Election of the People coms to nothing,
as may be farther confider'd in the original and progrefs of the
Conge d'Elire.
THE ways of Ordination or of Church Government lying thus in
Scripture, the not receiving of the Chriftian Religion is not that wherof
State or Prince thro the whole world can be any ways excufable.
any
The Conclufion :
Shewing that neither GOD, nor CHRIST, or the Aro-
STLES, ever inftituted any Government Ecclefiaftical
or Civil upon any other Principles than thofe only of
Human Prudence.
То
O fum up this fecond Book in the Uſes that may be made of it:
Certain it is of the Greec and Roman Storys, that he who has not
fome good Idea or Notion of the Government to which they relate,
cannot rightly underſtand them. If the like holds as to the Scripture
Story, fome light may be contributed to it by this Book. Again, if
fom gifted Men happening to read it, fhould chance to be of the ſame
judgment, it is an Argument for acquir'd Learning, in that for the
means of acquir'd Learning, and in the means of acquir'd Learning
for Univerſitys. For how little foever this performance be, had it not
bin the faſhion with the English Gentry, in the breeding of their Sons,
to give them a fmack of the Univerſity, I ſhould not have don fo
much.
BUT letting thefe pafs. If there were Commonwealths, or Go-
vernments exercifing Soverain Power by the Senat and the People, be-
fore that of Ifrael, as namely, Gibeon: If the inferior Orders and
Courts in Ifrael, as thofe inftituted by Moses after the advice of
JETHRO a Heathen, were tranfcrib'd out of another Government
tho Heathen, as namely, that of Midian: If the order of the Church
introduc'd by CHRIST in his twelve Apoftles and his feventy Difci-
ples, were after the pattern of Ifrael, namely, in the twelve Princes
of the Tribes, and the feventy Elders: If there were three diftinct
ways of Ordination introduc'd by the Apoſtles; one exactly accord-
ing to the Ballot of Ifrael, as namely, in the Ordination of MAT-
THIAS; another exactly according to the way of the Jewiſh Sanhedrim
or Synagog, as namely, that of TIMOTHY; and a third, compos'd
of theſe two, as namely, that of the Deacons: Then it is a clear
and undeniable refult of the whole, That neither GOD, nor CHRIST,
Iii 2
01'
Sect. I.
Uſes of this
Book.
Sect. 2.
Book.
The preſent
ule of this
428
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book II, or the APOSTLES, ever inftituted any Government Ecclefiaftical or Civil
upon any other Principles than thofe only of Human Prudence.
Sect. 3.
The Confe-
quence of this
Use.
Sect. 4.
A transition
to the next
Book.
AN Obfervation of fuch confequence, as, where it has bin rightly
confider'd, there the truth of Religion and of Government once
planted, have taken root and flouriſh'd; and where it has not bin
rightly heeded, there has Religion or the pretence of it bin the hook
and the line, and the State the prey of Impoftors and falfe Prophets,
as was fhewn in the hypocritical Pharifees, for ever ftigmatiz'd by the
word of Truth.
AND for Might, let her be never fo much exalted in her felf, let
her Sword be never fo dreadfully brandiſh'd; the Government not
founded upon Reaſon,, a Creature of God, and the Creature of God
whoſe undoubted right in this part is by himſelf undeniably avow'd
and afferted, is a Weapon fram'd againſt God; and no Weapon
fram'd againſt God ſhall profper.
THE Principles of Human Prudence, and in them the Art of
Lawgiving, being fhewn in the firſt Book, and vindicated throout
the whole courſe of Scripture by this ſecond, I com in the third to
ſhew a Model of Government, fram'd according to the Art thus
ſhewn, and the Principles thus vindicated.
THE
429
THE
THIRD BOOK,
}
CONTAINING
A MODEL
O F
POPULAR GOVERNMENT,
Practically propos'd according to Reaſon, con-
firm'd by the Scripture, and agreable to
the preſent Balance or State of Property in
England.
The PREFACE,
Containing a Model of Popular Government,
propos'd Notionally.
T
HERE is between the Difcourfes of fuch as are commonly call
Natural Philofophers, and thofe of Anatomifts, a large diffe-
rence; the former are facil, the latter difficult. Philofophers,
difcourfing of Elements for example, that the Body of Man
conffts of Fire, Air, Earth and Water, are easily both underſtood and cre-
dited, feeing by common Experience we find the Body of Man returns to
the Earth from whence it was taken. A like Entertainment may befal
Elements of Government, as in the first of thefe Books they are flated. But
the fearful and wonderful making, the admirable ftructure and great va-
riety of the parts of man's Body, in which the Difcourfes of Anatomifts
are altogether converfant, are understood by fo few, that I may fay they are
not understood by any. Certain it is, that the delivery of a Model of Go-
vernment (which either muß be of no effect, or imbrace all thofe Mufcles,
Nerves, Arterys and Bones, which are neceffary to any Function of a well-
order'd Commonwealth) is no less than political Anatomy. If you com
Short of this, your Difcourfe is altogether ineffectual; if you com home,
you are not understood: you may, perhaps, be call'd a learned Author; but
you are obfcure, and your Doctrin is impracticable. Had I only fuffer'd
in this, and not the People, I fhould long fince have left them to their bu-
mor, but ſeeing it is they that fuffer by it; and not my felf, I will be yet
more
430
The Preface.
Bock III. more a fool, or they shall be yet wifer. Now coms into my head what I ſaw
long fince upon an Italian Stage, while the Spectators wanted Hoops for
their fides. A Country fellow came with an Apple in his hand; to which,
in a frange variety of faces, his Teeth were undoubtedly threaten'd, when
enter'd a young Anatomift brimful of his laſt Leſſon, who, stopping in good
time the hand of this fame Country fellow, would by no means fuffer him to go
on with fo great an Enterprize, till he had firft nam'd and defcrib'd to him
all the Bones, Nerves, and Mufcles which are naturally necessary to that
motion: at which, the good man being with admiration plainly chopfallen,
coms me in a third, who, fnatching away the Apple, devour'd it in the pre-
fence of them both. If the People, in this cafe wherof I am speaking, were
naturally fo well furnish'd, I had here learn'd enough to have kept filence :
but their eating, in the political way, of abfolute neceffity requires the
aid of fom political Anatomift; without which, they may have Appetits,
but will be chopfallen. Examples wherof they have had but too many; one
I think may be infifted upon without envy.
The Anarchy
of the Loud-
jers.
THIS is that which was call'd The Agreement of the People, con-
fifting in fom of theſe Propofitions :
THAT there be a Repreſentative of the Nation confifting of four
hundred Perfons, or not above.
WHICH Propofition puts the Bar on the quite contrary fide; this be-
ing the first example of a Commonwealth, wherin it was conceiv'd, that
five hundred thousand men, or more, might be repreſented by four hundred.
The Reprefentation of the People in one man, caufes Monarchy; and in a
few, caufes Oligarchy: the Many cannot be otherwife reprefented in a State
of Liberty, than by fo many, and fo qualify'd, as may within the compafs
of that number and nature imbrace the intereft of the whole People. "Go-
vernment ſhould be eſtabliſh'd upon a Rock, not fet upon a Precipice: a
Repreſentative confifting but of four hundred, tho in the nature therof it
be popular, is not in it felf a Weapon that is fix'd, but has fomthing of
the broken Bow, as ftill apt to ſtart afide to Monarchy. But the paucity
of the number is temper'd with the ſhortness of the term, it being farther
provided,
THAT this Repreſentative be biennial, and fit not above eight
Months. But feeing a fupreme Council in a Commonwealth is neither,
affembl'd nor diffolv'd, but by ftated Orders directing upwards an irresistible
Strength from the root, and as one tooth or one nail is driven out by another
how is it provided that this Biennial Council fhall not be a perpetual Coun-
cil? Wheras nothing is more dangerous in a Commonwealth than intire
Removes of Council, how is it provided that theſe ſhall be men fufficiently
experienc'd for the management of Affairs? And last of all, wheras diffo-
lution to Soverain Power is death, to whom are thefe after their eight
months to bequeath the Commonwealth? In this cafe it is provided,
THAT there be a Council of State elected by each new Repre-
ſentative, within twenty days after their firſt meeting, to continue till
ten days after the meeting of the next Repreſentative. In which the
faults obferv'd in the former Order, are fo much worse, as this Council
confifts of fewer. Thus far this Commonwealth is Oligarchy: but it is
provided,
THAT thefe Reprefentatives have Soverain Power, fave that in
fom things the People may refift them by Arms. Which firſt is a flat
contradiction, and next is downright Anarchy. Where the Soverain Power
is not as entire and abfolute as in Monarchy it felf, there can be no Govern-
ment
1
The Preface.
431
ment at all. It is not the limitation of Soverain Power that is the caufe
of a Commonwealth, but fuch a libration or poize of Orders, that there
can be in the fame no number of men having the intereft, that can have the
power; nor any number of men having the power, that can have the intereft,
to invade or disturb the Government. As the Orders of Commonwealths
are more approaching to, or remote from this Maxim (of which this of the
Levellers has nothing) fo are they more quiet or turbulent. In the Reli-
gious part only, propofing a National Religion and Liberty of Con-
fcience, tho without troubling themselves much with the means, they are
right in the end.
AND for the Military part, they provide,
THAT no man (even in caſe of Invafion) be compellable to go
out of the Country where he lives, if he procures another to ſerve in
his room. Which plainly intails upon this Commonwealth a fit Guard for
fuch a Liberty, even a Mercenary Army; for what one dos of this kind, may
and will (where there is no bar) be don by all: fo every Citizen by mony
procuring his man, procures his Mafter. Now if this be work of that kind
which the People in like cafes (as thofe alfo of Rome, when they inflituted
their Tribuns) do ufually make, then have I good reafon not only to think,
but to ſpeak it audibly, That to footh up the People with an opinion of their
own fufficiency in theſe things, is not to befriend them, but to feed up all
hopes of Liberty to the flaughter. Yet the Leveller, a late * Pamphlet,
having gather'd out of Oceana the Principles by him otherwife well infinua-
ted, attributes it to the Agitators, or that Affembly which fram'd this
wooden Agreement of the People: That then fom of that Council af-
ferted theſe Principles, and the reaſon of them.
BUT Railery apart, we are not to think it has bin for nothing that
the wifeft Nations have in the formation of Government as much rely'd
upon the invention of fom one man, as upon themselves: for wheras it can-
not be too often inculcated, that Reafon confifts of two parts, the one In-
vention, the other Judgment; a People or an Aſſembly are not more emi-
nent in point of Judgment, than they are void of Invention. Nor is there
in this any thing at all against the fufficiency of a People in the Manage
ment of a proper Form, being once introduc'd, tho they should never com to
a perfect underſtanding of it. For were the natural Bodys of the People
Such as they might commonly understand, they would be (as I may fay)
wooden Bodys, or fuch as they could not ufe; wheras their Bodys being now
fuch as they underſtand not, are yet fuch as in the uſe and prefervation
wherof they are perfect.
THERE are in Models of Government things of fo eafy practice, and
yet of fuch difficult understanding, that we must not think them even in
Venice, who use their Commonwealth with the greatest prudence and fa-
cility, to be all, or any confiderable number of them, fuch as perfectly un-
derstand the true Reafon or Anatomy of that Government : nor is this a
prefumtuous Affertion, fince none of thofe Venetians, who have hitherto
written of their own form, have brought the truth of it to any perfect light.
The like perhaps (and yet with due acknowlegement to Livy) might be
faid of the Romans. The Lacedemonians had not the right underflanding
of their Model, till about the time of ARISTOTLE it was first written
A later Pamphlet call'd XXV Querys, ufing the Balance of Property, which is fair enough,
refers it to Sir Thomas Smith's 15th chap. (de Repub. populi ingenio accommodanda) where the
Author ſpeaks not one word of Property; which is very foul.
by
432
The Preface.
Book III. by DICE ARCHUS one of his Scholars. How egregiously our Ancestors (till
thoſe foundations were broken which at length have brought us round)
did adminifter the Engliſh Government, is fufficiently known. Yet by one
of the wifeft of our Writers (even my Lord VERULAM) is HENRY
the Seventh parallel'd with the Legiflators of antient and heroic times, for
the inſtitution of thoſe very Laws which have now brought the Monarchy
to utter ruin. The Commonwealths upon which MACHIAVEL in his-
Difcourfes is incomparable, are not by him, any one of them, fufficiently
explain'd or understood. Much less is it to be expected from a People, that
they ſhould overcom the like difficultys, by reafon wherof the wifeft Nations·
(finding themfelves under the neceffity of a change or of a new Government)
induc'd by fuch offers as promis'd fair, or against which they could find no ex-
ceptions, bave ufually acted as men do by new Clothes; that is, put them on,
that, if they be not exactly fit at first, they may either fit themselves to the
body in wearing,or therby more plainly fhew wherin they can be mended even
by fuch, as would otherwife prove but bad workmen. Nor has any fuch offer
bin thought to have more Prefumtion, much less Treafon in it, than if cne
confcious of his skill in Architecture, fhould offer himself to the Prince or
State to build a more convenient Parlament houſe. England is now in fuch
a condition, that he who may be truly faid to give her Law, ſhall never go-
vern her; and he who will govern her, ſhall never give her Law. Yet fom
will have it, that to affert Popular Power, is to fow the feed of Civil War,
and object against a Commonwealth, as not to be introduc'd but by Arms;
which by the undeniable teftimony of latter Experience, is of all other Ob-
jections the most extravagant: for if the good old Caufe, against the defire
even of the Army, and of all men well affected to their Country, could be trod
under foot without blood; what more certain demonftration can there be,
that (let the deliberations upon, or changes of Government, be of what
kind foever which ſhall pleafe a Parlament) there is no appearance that they
can occafion any Civil War? Streams that are ftop'd may urge their Banks ;
but the courſe of England, into a Commonwealth, is both certain and
natural. The ways of Nature require Peace: The ways of Peace require
Obedience to the Laws: Laws in England cannot be made but by Parla-
ments: Parlaments in England are com to be mere Popular Aſſemblys :
The Laws made by popular Aſſemblys (tho for a time they may be aw'd, or
deceiv'd, in the end) must be popular Laws; and the fum of popular Laws
muſt amount to a Commonwealth. The whole doubt or hazard of this Con-
Sequence remains upon one question, Whether a fingle Council confifting but
of four hundred, indu'd both with Debate and Refult; the Keys of whofe
Doors are in the hands of ambitious men; in the croud and confufion of
whofe Election the People are as careleſs as tumultuous, and eafy, thro the
want of good Orders, to be deluded; while the Clergy (declar'd and inve-
terat Enemys of popular Power) are laying about, and fweating in the
throng, as if it were in the Vineyard; upon whofe Benches Lawyers (being
feather'd and arm'd, like ſharp and fudden Arrows, with a privat intereſt
pointblank against the Public) may and frequently do fwarm, can indeed be
call'd a popular Council. This, I confess, may fet the whole ftate of Liberty
upon the cast of a Dy; yet queftionless it is more than odds on the behalf of
a Commonwealth, when a Government labors in frequent or long struggles,
not thro any certain biafs of Genius or Nature that can be in fuch a Council,
but thro the impotence of fuch Conclufions as may go awry, and the external
force or fate of Property now fully introduc'd: whence fuch a Council may
wander, but never find any reft or fettlement, except only in that natural and
proper
The Preface.
433
proper Form of Government which is to be erected upon a mere Popular
Foundation. All other ways of proceding must be void, as inevitably
guilty of contradiction in the Superftructures to the Foundation; which
have amounted, and may amount to the difcouragement of honeft men, but
with no other fuccefs than to imbroil or retard Bufinefs: England be-
ing not capable of any other permanent Form than that only of a Common-
wealth; tho her fupreme Council be fo conftituted, that it may be Monarchi-
cally inclin'd. This contradiction in the Frame is the frequent occafion of
contradictory Expoftulations and Queftions. How, fay they, should we
have a Commonwealth: Which way is it poffible that it should com in?
And how, fay I, can we fail of a Commonwealth? What poffibility is
there we should mifs of it?
;
IF a man replys, he anfwers thus: No Army ever ſet up a Common-
wealth. To the contrary, I inftance the Army of Ifrael under Moses
that of Athens about the time of ALCIBIADES; that of Rome upon
the expulfion of the TARQUINS; thofe of Switzerland and Holland.
But, fay they, other Armies have not fet up Commonwealths. True in-
deed, divers other Armys have not set up Commonwealths; yet is not
that any Argument why our Armys ſhould not. For in all Armys that
have not fet up Commonwealths; either the Officers have had no Fortunes
or Eftates at all, but immediatly dependent upon the mere Will of the
Prince, as the Turkish Armys, and all thofe of the Eastern Countrys; or
the Officers have bin a Nobility commanding their own Tenants. Certain
it is, that either of thefe Armys can ſet up nothing but Monarchy. But
our Officers hold not Eftates of Noblemen able upon their own Lands to
levy Regiments, in which cafe they would take home their People to plow,
or make Hay; nor are they yet fo put to it for their Livelihood, as to de-
pend wholly upon a Prince, in which cafe they would fall on robbing the
People: but have good honeft Popular Eftates to them and their Heirs for
ever. Now an Army, where the Eftates of the Officers were of this kind, in
no reafon can, in no experience ever did fet up Monarchy. Ay but, fay they,
for all that, their Pay to them is more confiderable than their Eftates. But
So much more must they be for a Commonwealth, becauſe the Parlament
must pay and they have found by experience, that the Pay of a Parla-
ment is far better than that of a Prince. But the four hundred being
Monarchically inclin'd, or running upon the intereft of thofe irreconcila-
ble Enemys of Popular Power, Divines and Lawyers, will rather pay an
Army for commanding, or for fupporting of a Prince, than for obeying.
Which may be true, as was acknowledg'd before, in the way; but in the
end, or at the long run, for the reaſons mention'd, must be of no effect.
THESE Arguments are from the Caufe; now for an Argument to
Senfe, and from the Effect: If our Armys would raife Mony of themselves,
or, which is all one, would make a King, why have they not made a King
in fo many years? Why did they not make one yesterday? Why do they not
to day? Nay, why have they ever bin, why do they fill continue to be of
all others in this point the most averfe and refractory?
BUT if the cafe be ſo with us, that Nature runs wholly to a Common-
wealth, and we have no fuch Force as can withstand Nature, why may we
not as well have golden Dreams of what this Commonwealth may be, as of
the Indys, of Flanders, or of the Sound? The Frame of a Commonwealth
may be dreamt on, or propos'd two ways; the one in Theory, or notionally,
in which it is of eafy understanding, but of difficult practice: The other
practically, in which it is of difficult understanding, but of facil uſe.
Kkk
One
434
The Preface.
Book III. One of thefe ways is a Shooinghorn, and the other the Shoo; for which
caufe I fball propofe both, as first notionally, thus:
The Model
propos'd no-
tionally.
1. THAT the native Territory of the Commonwealth be divid-
ed, fo equally as with any convenience it may, into fifty Tribes or
Precincts.
2. THAT the People in each Tribe be diſtinguiſh'd, firſt by their
Age, and next by the valuation of their Eftates: All fuch as are a-
bove eighteen, and under thirty, being accounted Youth; and all fuch
as are thirty or upwards, being accounted Elders. All fuch as have
under one hundred pounds a year in Lands, Goods, or Mony, being
accounted of the Foot; and all fuch as have fo much or upwards, be-
ing accounted of the Horſe.
3. THAT each Tribe elect annually out of the Horſe of their
number two Elders to be Knights; three Elders out of the fame, and
four Elders more out of the Foot of their number, to be Deputys
or Burgeffes. That the term of each Knight and Burgefs, or Deputy
fo elected, be triennial; and that whoever has ferv'd his triennial
Term in any one of thefe Capacitys, may not be reelected into any one
of the fame, till a triennial vacation be expir'd.
4. THAT in the first year of the Commonwealth there be a Se-
nat fo conftituted, of three hundred Knights, that the term of one
hundred may expire actually; and that the hundred Knights, annual-
ly elected by two in each Tribe, take in the Senat the places of them
whofe Term coms to be thus annually expir'd.
5. THAT in the first year of the Commonwealth there be a
Repreſentative of the People, confifting of one thouſand and fifty De-
putys; four hundred and fifty of them being Horſe, and the reft Foot.
That this Repreſentative be ſo conftituted, that the term of two hun-
dred of the Foot, and of one hundred and fifty of the Horfe, expire
annually; and that the two hundred Foot, and one hundred and fifty
Horſe elected annually, by four of the Foot, and three of the Horfe
in each Tribe, take the places in this Repreſentative of them whoſe
terms com thus annually to be expir'd.
6. THAT the Senat have the whole Authority of Debate; that
the Repreſentative have the whole Power of Refult, in fuch a manner,
that whatever (having bin debated by the Senat) fhall by their Au-
thority be promulgated, that is, printed and publiſh'd, for the ſpace
of fix weeks; and afterwards (being propos'd by them to the Repre-
fentative) ſhall be refolv'd by the People of the fame in the Affirma-
tive, by the Law of the Land.
THUS much may fuffice to give implicitly a notional account of the
whole frame. But a Model of Government is nothing as to use, unless it
be alfo deliver'd practicably; and the giving of a Model practicably, is fo
much the more difficult, that men, not vers'd in this way, fay of it (as they
would of the Anatomy of their own Bodys) that it is impracticable. Here
lys the whole difficulty: fuch things as, trying them never ſo often, they
cannot make hang together, they will yet have to be practicable; and if you
would bring them from this kind of ſhifts, or of tying and untying all forts
of knots, to the natural nerves and ligaments of Government, then with
them it is impracticable. But to render that which is practicable, facil;
or to do my last indeavor of this kind, of which if I miss this once more, I
must hereafter defpair: I shall do two things; first, omit the Ballot, and
then make fom alteration in my former method.
THEY
•
The Art of Lawgiving.
435
THEY who have interwoven the Ballot with the defcription of a Chap. 1.
Commonwealth, have therby render'd the fame by far the more complete
in it felf; but in the understanding of their Readers, as much defective:
wherfore prefuming the ufe of the Ballot throout the Orders of this Model,
I shall refer it to practice; in which it will be a matter of as much faci-
lity, as it would have bin of difficulty in writing. And for the method
I have chofen, it is the most natural and intelligible, being no more than to
propoſe the whole practicably: first, in the Civil, fecondly, in the Re-
ligious; then in the Military; and laft of all in the Provincial part of
the Model.
CHA P. I.
Containing the Civil part of the Model, propos'd
practicably.
SEE
EEING it has bin fufficiently prov'd, that Empire follows the
nature of Property; that the particular kind of Empire or Govern-
ment depends upon the fpecial diftribution (except in ſmall Countrys)
of Land; and that where the Balance in Property has not bin fix'd,
the nature of the Government (be it what you will) has bin floting:
it is very reaſonable that, in the propofition of a Commonwealth,
we begin with a fixation of the Balance in Property; and this being
not otherwiſe to be don than by fom fuch Laws as have bin common-
ly call'd Agrarian, it is propos'd,
Laws.
I.
THAT every one holding above two thousand pounds a year in Land,
lying within the proper Territory of the Commonwealth, leave the faid Agrarian
Land equally divided among his Sons; or elſe ſo near equally, that there
remain to the eldest of them not above two thousand pounds a year in Land
fo lying. That this Propofition be fo understood, as not to concern any Pa-
rent having no more than one Son, but the next Heir only that shall have
more Sons; in fuch fort, as nothing be hereby taken from any man, or
from his Pofterity, but that fatherly Affection be at all points extended as
formerly, except only that it be with more Piety, and lefs Partiality.
And that the fame Propofition, in fuch Familys where there are no Sons,
concern the Daughter or Daughters in the like manner.
THAT no Daughter, being neither Heir nor Cobeir, have above fif-
teen hundred pounds in Portion, or for her preferment in Marriage. That
any Daughter, being an Orphan, and having feven hundred pounds or
upwards in Portion, may charge the State with it. That the State being
charg'd, be bound to manage the Portion of fuch an Orphan for the
beft, either by due payment of the Intereft of the fame; or, if it be de-
fir'd, by way of Annuity for Life, at the rate of one hundred pounds a
year, for every feven hundred pounds fo receiv'd. The manner wherof
being elſewhere fhewn, is not needful to be repeated.
THAT theſe Propofitions prevent the growing of a Monarchi-
cal Nobility, is their peculiar end: Wherfore that this ſhould hold the
weight of an Objection in a popular Balance, already introduc'd thro
the failure of a Monarchical Nobility, or thro a level made not by the
People but by the Kings or themſelves, were prepofterous. Yet upon
this fcore (for I fee no other) is there fuch Animofity againſt the like
Laws, that wife men have judg'd it an Indiſcretion, in fuch as are
affected to Popular Government, not to temporize in this point; at
K kk 2
leaft,
436
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book III. leaſt, till a Commonwealth were first introduc'd. To which Judg-
ment I am by no means inclining: Firft, Becauſe the whole ftream of
this kind of Government is fo clear and pellucid, as to abhor having
any thing in the bottom which may not appear at the very top. Se-
condly, Becauſe an Agrarian, not brought in with the introduction of a
Commonwealth, was never yet known to be brought in after the intro-
duction of a Commonwealth. And thirdly, Becauſe the change of Ba-
lances in States, thro the want of fixation, has bin fo fudden, that be-
tween the Reign of HENRY the Seventh, and that of Queen ELIZA-
BETH, being under fifty years, the English Balance of Monarchical
became Popular; and that of Rome, between the Lives of SCIPIO and
of TIBERIUS GRACCHUS, being alfo under fifty years, of Popular
became Monarchical. Nevertheleſs, if there remains any cure of A-
nimofity that may be fafe, it must be prudent: And fuch a cure (if
we be not fo abandon'd to mere fancy, as to facrifice all Prudence to
it) there may be in the addition of this Claufe;
Additional
THAT no Agrarian Law hereby given to this Commonwealth, or to be
Claufe to the hereafter given to the fame, or to any Province of the fame, be under-
Agrarian. flood to be otherwife binding, than to the Generation to com, or to the
Children to be born feven years after the enacting of the Law.
+
The first Pa-
rallel.
UPON the addition of this Claufe, it may be ſafely faid of theſe
Agrarian Laws, that they concern not any man living: and for Pof-
terity, it is well known, that to enact a Law, is no more in their re-
gard, than to commend a thing to their choice; feeing they, if ſo
pleas'd, can no more be devefted of the Power to repeal any Law en-
acted by their Anceſtors, than we are of repealing fuch Laws as
have bin enacted by ours.
TO this it may be objected, That Agrarian Laws, being once en-
acted, muſt have brought Eftates to the ftandard of the fame, before
Pofterity can com into a Capacity to judg of them. But this is the
only means wherby Pofterity can com to a true capacity to judg of
them: First, becauſe they will have had experience of the Laws
wherof they are to judg: And fecondly, becauſe they will be void
of all ſuch imaginary Interefts as might corrupt their Judgment, and
do now certainly corrupt ours.
THE Balance of the Commonwealth of Ifrael, thro the diftribu-
tion of Lands at the introduction of the fame, became Popular; and
becoming Popular, was fix'd by the Law for the Jubile. That which
Deut 25. 28. was fold, fhall remain in the hands of them that bought it till the year of
Jubile; and in the Jubile it shall go out, and he shall return to his poffefi-
The ways in Ifrael, and in the Commonwealth propos'd, where
the Popular Balance is not made but found, are divers; but the Agra-
rian Laws in each, as to the end, which is the prefervation of the
Balance, are of a like effect.
Freemen and
Servants.
on.
TO rife thus from true Foundations to proper Superstructures, the
firſt ſtep from the Balance thus fix'd into the Orders of a Common-
wealth, is not otherwiſe to be taken than by certain Diſtributions or
Divifions of the People, wherof fom are to be perfonal, and fom local.
THE firſt perſonal divifion of a People, is into Freemen and Ser-
vants. Freemen are fuch as have wherwithal to live of themſelves;
and Servants, ſuch as have not. This divifion therfore is not conftitu-
tive, but naturally inherent in the Balance; nor, feeing all Govern-
ment is in the direction of the Balance, is it poffible for the Super-
ftructure
The Art of Lawgiving.
437
ftructures of any to make more Freemen than are fuch by the nature Chap. 1.
of the Balance, or by their being able to live of themſelves.
Parallel.
ALL that could in this matter be don, even by Moses himself, is The fecond
contain❜d in this Provifo: If thy Brother that dwells by thee be grown Levit. 25. 2.3.
poor, and be fold to thee, thou shalt not compel him to ferve as a bond-
fervant: but as a bir'd fervant, and a fojourner he shall be with thee, and
Shall ferve thee to the Year of Jubile. And then shall be depart from thee,
both he and his Children with him, and ſhall return to his own Family,
and to the Poffeffion of his Fathers ſhall he return.
THE nature of Riches confider'd, this divifion into Freemen and
Servants is not properly conftitutive, but as it were natural.
To com
to fuch Divifions as are both perfonal and conftitutive, it is pro-
pos'd,
3.
Horfe and
Foot.
4.
THAT all Citizens, that is, Freemen, or fuch as are not Servants,
be diſtributed into Horfe and Foot. That fuch of them as have one hun-
dred pounds a year in Lands, Goods or Mony, or above that proportion, be
of the Horfe; and all fuch as have under that proportion, be of the Foot.
THAT all Elders or Freemen, being thirty years of Age or upwards, Elders and
be capable of Civil Adminiftration: and that the Youth, or fuch Freemen, Youth.
as are between eighteen years of Age and thirty, be not capable of Civil
Adminiflration, but of Military only; in fuch a manner as ſhall follow in
the Military part of this Model.
NOW, befides perfonal divifions, it is neceffary in order to the
framing of a Commonwealth, that there be fom fuch as are local.
For theſe therfore it is propos'd,
5.
Precinct of
THAT the whole native, or proper Territory of the Commonwealth,
be caft, with as much exactness as can be convenient, into known and the Parish.
fix'd Precincts or Parishes.
Parochial
THAT the Elders, refident in each Parish, annually affemble in the 6.
fame; as for example, upon Monday next infuing the last of December. Congrega-
That they then and there elect out of their own number every fifth man, or tions and De-
one man out of every five, to be for the term of the year infuing, a Deputy Putys.
of that Pariſh; and that the first and fecond fo elected be Overfeers, or Pre-
fidents, for regulating of all Parochial Congregations, whether of the El-
ders or of the Youth, during the term for which they were elected.
7.
Precinct of
Hun-
THAT fo many Parishes lying nearest together, whofe Deputys fhall
amount to one hundred or therabout, be caft into one Precinct call'd the then-
Hundred. And that in each Precinct call'd the Hundred, there be a Town, dred.
Village, or place appointed to be the Capital of the fame.
S.
Affembly or
Mufter of the
THAT the Parochial Deputys elected throout the Hundred, affemble
annually; for example, upon Monday next infuing the last of January, at
the Capital of their Hundred. That they then and there elect out of the Hundred.
Horfe of their number one Justice of the Peace, one Juryman, one Cap-
tain, one Infign: and out of the Foot of their number, one other Jury-
man, one High Conftable, &c.
THO our Juftices of the Peace have not bin annual, yet that they
may fo be is apparent, becauſe the high Sherifs, whofe Office is of
greater difficulty, have always bin annual: feeing therfore they may
be annual, that fo they ought in this Adminiſtration to be, will ap-
pear, where they com to be conftitutive of fuch Courts as, fhould
they conſiſt of a ſtanding Magistracy, would be againſt the nature
of a Commonwealth. But the Precincts hitherto being thus ftated,
it is propos'd,
THAT
438
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book III,
9.
Precinct of
the Tribe.
10.
Muller of
THAT every twenty Hundreds, lying nearest and most conveniently
together, be caft into one Tribe. That the whole Territory being after this
manner caft into Tribes, Jom Town, Village, or place be appointed to every
Tribe for the Capital of the fame. And that these three Precincts, that is,
the Parish, the Hundred, and the Tribe (whether the Deputys, thenceforth
annually chofen in the Parishes or Hundreds, com to increafe or diminish)
remain firm and inalterable for ever, fave only by Act of Parlament.
THESE Divifions, or the like, both perfonal and local, are that
in a well-order'd Commonwealth, which Stairs are in a good houſe;
not that Stairs in themfelves are defirable, but that without them there
is no getting into the Chambers. The whole matter of Coft and Pains,
neceflary to the introduction of a like Model, lys only in the firſt
Architecture, or building of theſe Stairs; that is, in ftating of theſe
three Precincts: which don, they lead you naturally and neceffarily
into all the Rooms of this Fabric. For the juft number of Tribes into
which a Territory thus caft may fall, it is not very eaſy to be gueft:
yet, becaufe for the carrying on of difcourfe it is requifit to pitch upon
fome certainty, I fhall prefume that the number of the Tribes, thus
ftated, amounts to fifty and that the number of the Parochial De-
putys annually elected in each Tribe, amounts to two thouſand. Be
the Deputys more or fewer by the alterations which may happen in
progreſs of time, it diforders nothing. Now to afcend by theſe Stairs
into the upper Rooms of this Building, it is propos'd,
THAT the Deputys elected in the feveral Parishes, together with their
Affembly or Magiftrats and other Officers both Civil and Military, elected in their fe-
veral Hundreds, aſſemble or muſter annually; for example, upon Monday
next infuing the last of February at the Capital of their Tribe.
the Tribe.
HOW the Troops and Companys of the Deputys, with their
Military Officers or Commanders thus affembl'd, may, without ex-
pence of time, be straight diftributed into one uniform and orderly
* In Oceana. Body, has bin elfwhere * fhewn, and is not needful to be repeated.
For their work, which at this meeting will require two days, it is
propos'd,
II.
Magiflrats of
the Tribe.
12.
THAT the whole Body thus affembl'd, upon the first day of the Affem-
bly, elect out of the Horfe of their number one High Sherif, one Lieute-
nant of the Tribe, one Cuftos Rotulorum, one Conductor, and two Cen-
fors. That the High Sherif be Commander in chief, the Lieutenant
Commander in the fecond place, and the Conductor in the third, of this
Band or Squadron. That the Cuftos Rotulorum be Muftermafter, and
keep the Rolls. That the Cenfors be Governors of the Ballot. And that
the term of thefe Magiftracys be annual.
THESE being thus elected, it is propos'd,
THAT the Magiflrats of the Tribe, that is to fay, the High Sherif,
The Prero- Lieutenant, Cuftos Rotulorum, the Cenfors, and the Conductor, toge-
gative Troop.
ther with the Magiftrats and Officers of the Hundreds, that is to ſay, the
twenty Justices of the Peace, the forty. Jurymen, the twenty High Confta-
bles, be one Troop, or one Troop and one Company apart, call'd the Pre-
rogative Troop or Company. That this Troop bring in and affist the
Juftices of Affize, hold the Quarter Seffions in their feveral Capacitys,
and perform their other Functions as formerly.
BY this means the Commonwealth at its introduction may imbrace
the Law as it ftands, that is, unreform'd; which is the greateſt advan-
tage of fuch Reformations: for to reform Laws before the introduction
of
The Art of Lawgiving.
439
of the Government, which is to fhew to what the Laws in Refor- Chap. 1.
mation are to be brought or fitted, is impoffible. But theſe Magi-
ſtrats of the Hundreds and Tribes being fuch wherby the Parlament is
to govern the Nation, this is a regard in which they ought to be fur-
ther capable of fuch Orders and Inftructions as fhall therto be requi-
fit: For which caufe it is propos'd,
larch.
13.
THAT the Magiftrats of the Tribe, that is to ſay, the High Sherif,
Lieutenant, Cuſtos Rotulorum, the Cenfors, and the Conductor, toge- The Phy-
ther with the twenty Justices elected at the Hundreds, be a Court for the
Government of the Tribe call'd the Phylarch; and that this Court pro-
cede in all matters of Government, as fhall from time to time be directed
by Act of Parlament.
BY theſe Courts the Commonwealth will be furniſh'd with true
Channels, wherby at leifure to turn the Law into that which is fuf-
ficiently known to have bin its primitive Courſe, and to a perfect Re-
formation by degrees, without violence. For as the corruption of our
Law procedes from an Art inabled to improve its privat Intereft; or
from the Law upon the Bench, and the Jury at the Bar: So the Re-
formation of our Law muſt com from difabling it as an Art to im-
prove its privat Intereft; or to a Jury upon the Bench, and the Law
at the Bar, as in Venice.
JUDGES and Officers fhalt thou make thee in all thy Gates which the The third
Lord thy God gives thee throout thy Tribes, and they fhall judg the People Parallel.
with just Judgment. Thefe Courts, whofe Seffionhoufe was in the Deut. 16. 18.
Gates of every City, were fhewn each of them to have confifted of
twenty three Elders, which were as a Jury upon the Bench, giving
fentence by plurality of Votes, and under a kind of appeal to the
feventy Elders or Senat of Ifrael, as was alfo fhewn in the fecond
Book.
THIS, or the like, by all example and beyond any controverſy,
has bin, and is the natural way of Judicature in Commonwealths.
The Phylarchs, with a Court or two of Appeals eligible out of the
Senat and the People, are at any time with eaſe and very ſmall altera-
tion to be caft upon a triennial Rotation: which, in all things befides
proceding after the manner of the Venetian Quarancys, will be in this
cafe perfect Orders.
TO return: The firſt Day's Election at the Tribe being as has bin
fhewn, it is propos'd,
14.
THAT the Squadron of the Tribe, on the fecond day of their Affem-
bly, elect two Knights and three Burgefjes out of the Horfe of their num- Knights and
ber, and four other Burgesses out of the Foot of their number. That Burgeffes.
each Knight upon Election forthwith make Oath of Allegiance to the Com-
monwealth; or refuſing this Oath, that the next Competitor in Election to
the fame Magiftracy, making the faid Oath, be the Magiftrat; the like
for the Burgeffes. That the Knights, thus fworn, have Seffion in the Se-
nat for the term of three years; and that the Burgeffes thus fworn be of
the Prerogative Tribe, or Reprefentative of the People for the like term.
NOW wheras this Propofition is fufficient for the perpetuation of
the Senat and the Affembly of the People, being once inftituted, but
not fufficient for the full and perfect Inſtitution of them, it neceffi-
tats the addition in this place, not of a permanent Order, but of an
Expedient for the first year's Election only; which may be this:
3
"ТНАТ
440
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book III.
Expedient
for the firſt
year's Elec-
tion.
15.
Provifo.
The fourth
Parallel.
"THAT for the full and perfect Inftitution of the Affemblys men-
"tion'd, the Squadron of the Tribe in the first year of the Commonwealth
"elect two Knights for the term of one year, two other Knights for the
"term of two years, and lastly, two Knights more for the term of three
years: the like for the Burgefjes of the Horfe first, and then for thoje
of the Foot.
r
<c
BY this Expedient the Senat in fifty Tribes is conftituted of three
hundred Knights or Senators, wherof one hundred, by the expira-
tion of their terms, com annually to fall; and another hundred at the
fame time to enter. The like for the Prerogative Tribe or Affembly of
the People, which, confifting of the whole of one thouſand and fifty,
fuffers the like alteration in one third part, or in the yearly exchange of
one hundred and fifty Burgeffes: By which means the Motion or Ro-
tation of theſe Aſſemblys is Annual, Triennial, and Perpetual, For
the full diſpatch of the foregoing Elections there remains but one Pro-
pofition more, which is this:
THAT a Magiftrat or Officer elected at the Hundred be therby exclud-
ed from being elected a Magiftrat of the Tribe, or of the first day's Election:
that no former Election whatsoever exclude a man from the fecond day's
Election at the Tribe, or to be chofen a Knight or Burgeſs. That a man
being chofen a Knight or Burgeſs, who before was chofen a Magiftrat or
Officer of the Hundred or Tribe, delegat his former Office, or Magistracy
in the Hundred or the Tribe, to any other Deputy being no Magiftrat nor
Officer, and being of the fame Hundred and of the fame Order, that is, of
the Horfe or Foot refpectively. That the whole and every part of the fore-
going Orders for Election in the Parishes, the Hundreds, and the Tribes,
be holding and inviolable upon fuch Penaltys in cafe of failure, as ſhall
hereafter be provided by Act of Parlament against any Parish, Hundred,
Tribe, Deputy or Perfon fo offending.
WITHOUT fom fuch Provifion as is contain'd in the former
part of this Provifion, men would be inconveniently excluded from
preferment, or the Tribe oblig'd to return to the Ballot; and fo to
ſpend more time for trifles than is requir'd by their real bufinefs.
THE Repreſentative of Ifrael collected monthly by the two thou-
fand out of each Tribe (if we confider what Method muft have bin
2 Chron. 27. us'd in fuch Elections) intimats, firft, that there were Subdivifions to
that end in each Tribe, perhaps of the nature of our Hundreds and
Pariſhes Secondly, that there were qualifications in thofe Elections
as to the Patriarchs or chief Fathers, and as to the People with their
Captains of thouſands, and Captains of Hundreds; which is enough
thus far to approve and recommend the foregoing Propofitions.
THE Senat, and the Congregation or Reprefentative of the Peo-
ple, are in every Commonwealth the main Orders. The Stairs or De-
grees of afcent to theſe being now mounted, it remains that I lead you
into the Rooms of State, or the Affemblys themfelves which fhall
be perform'd, firſt, by fhewing their Frame, and next by fhewing their
Ufes or Functions. To bring you firſt into the Senat, it is propos'd,
THAT the Knights of the Annual Election in the Tribes take their
Frame of the places on Monday next infuing the last of March in the Senat. That the
like number of Knights, whofe Seffion determins at the fame time, recede.
That every Knight or Senator be paid out of the public Revenue quarter-
ly, one hundred twenty five Pounds during his term of Seffion, and be ob
lig'd to fit in purple Robes."
Senat.
16.
THAT
The Art of Lawgiving.
441
•
17.
THAT annually, upon the reception of the new Knights, the Senat Chap. 1.
procede to the election of new Magiftrats and Counfillors. That for Ma-
giftrats they elect one General, one Speaker, and two Cenfors, each for the Senatorian
term of one year; theſe promiscuouſly: and that they elect one Commiffioner Magiſtrats
of the Great Seal, and one Commiffioner of the Treafury, each for the
term of three years, and out of the new Knights only.
THIS Propofition fuppofes the Commiffioners of the Seal and
thoſe of the Treaſury to confiſt each of three, wheel'd by the annual
Election of one into each Order, upon a triennial Rotation. For far-
ther explanation of the Senatorian Magiftracys, it is propos'd,
18.
THAT the General and Speaker, as CONSULS of the Common- The General
wealth, and Prefidents of the Senat, be, during the term of their Magi- fitting, and
the Speaker.
ftracy, paid quarterly five hundred pounds: That the Infigns of these
Magiftracys be a Sword born before the General, and a Mace before the
Speaker: That they be oblig'd to wear Ducal Robes; and that what is faid
of the General in this Propofition, be understood only of the General fitting,
and not of the General marching.
19.
THAT the General fitting, in cafe he be commanded to march, receive The General
Field Pay; and that a new General be forthwith elected by the Senat to fuc- marching.
cede him in the House, with all the Rights, Infigns, and Emoluments of
the General fitting: And this ſo often as one or more Generals are marching.
THAT the three Commiffioners of the great Seal, and the three Com-
miſſioners of the Treasury, ufing their Infigns and Habit, and performing
their other Functions as formerly, be paid quarterly to each of them three Sealand of the
hundred feventy five Pounds.
THAT the Cenfors be each of them Chancellor of one Univerſity by
virtue of their Election: that they govern the Ballot; that they be Pre-
fidents of the Council for Religion; that each have a filver Wand for the
Infign of his Magiftracy; that each be paid quarterly three hundred ſeventy
five Pounds, and be oblig'd to wear ſcarlet Robes.
20,
Commiffio.
ners of the
Treaſury.
21.
The Cenfors.
22.
THAT the General fitting, the Speaker, and the fix Commiffioners The Signory.
abovefaid, be the Signory of this Commonwealth.
THIS for the Senatorian Magiftrats. For Senatorian Councils it
is propos'd,
23.
THAT there be a Council of State confifting of fifteen Knights, five Council of
· out of each Order or Election; and that the fame be perpetuated by the State.
annual Election of five out of the new Knights, or last eleted into the
Senat.
(
24.
Religion, of
THAT there be a Council for Religion confifting of twelve Knights,
four out of each Order, and perpetuated by the annual Election of four out Councils of
of the Knights, last elected into the Senat. That there be a Council for Trade.
Trade, confifting of a like number, elected and perpetuated in the fame
manner.
25.
Council of
THAT there be a Council of War, not elected by the Senat, but elect-
ed by the Council of State out of themselves. That this Council of War War.
confist of nine Knights, three out of each Order, and be perpetuated by the
annual Election of three out of the last Knights elected into the Council of
State.
26.
THAT in cafe the Senat adds nine Knights more out of their own num- The Dictator.
ber to the Council of War, the faid Council be understood by this addition
to be DICTATOR of the Commonwealth for the term of three months,
and no longer, except by farther Order of the Senat the faid Dictatorian
Power be prolong'd for a like term.
LII
THAT
442
The Art of Lawgiving.
27.
The Propo-
fers general.
28.
Provoſts, or
particular
Propofers.
29.
Academy.
30.
THAT the Signory have Seffion and Suffrage, with right alfo jointly
or ſeverally to propofe, both in the Senat and in all Senatorian Councils.
THAT each of the three Orders, or Divifions of Knights in each
Senatorian Council, elect one Provost for the term of one week; and that
any two Provoſts of the fame Council fo elected may propofe to their respective
Council, and not otherwife.
THAT fom fair Room or Rooms well furniſh'd and attended, be allow'd
at the States charge for a free and open Academy to all comers at fom conve-
nient hour or hours towards the Evening. That this Academy be govern'd
according to the Rules of good Breeding, or civil Converfation, by fom or
all of the Propofers; and that in the fame it be lawful for any man
word of mouth or by writing, in jest or in earnest, to propoſe to the Pro-
pofers.
FROM the frame or ſtructure of theſe Councils, I fhould pafs
to their Functions; but that befides annual Elections, there will be fom
biennial, and others emergent: in which regard it is propos'd, firft,
for biennial Elections,
THAT for Embaſſadors in ordinary, there be four Refidences; as
Embaffadors France, Spain, Venice, and Conftantinople: that every Refident, upon the
in ordinary. Election of a new Embaſſador in ordinary, remove to the next Refidence
in the Order nominated, till having ferv'd in them all, he returns home.
That upon Monday next infuing the last of November, there be every fecond
year elected by the Senat fom fit Perfon, being under thirty five years of
Age, and not of the Senat or popular Aſſembly: that the Party fo elected,
repair upon Monday next infuing the laft of March following, as Em-
baffador in ordinary to the Court of France, and there refide for the term
two years, to be computed from the first of April next infuing his Electi-
every Embajador in ordinary be allow'd three thousand pounds
a year during the term of his Refidences; and that if a Refident coms to
dy, there be an extraordinary Election into his Refidence for his term, and
for the remainder of his Removes and Progrefs.
31.
Emergent
Elections.
32.
the Senatorian
Councils.
012.
That every
THAT all emergent Elections be made by Scrutiny, that is, by a
Council, or by Commiffioners propofing, and by the Senat refolving in the
manner following: That all Field-Officers be propos'd by the Council of
War; that all Embajadors extraordinary be propos'd by the Council of
State; that all Judges and Serjeants at Law be propos'd by the Commiffio-
ners of the great Seal; that all Barons and Officers of Trust in the Ex-
chequer, be propos'd by the Commiffioners of the Treafury: and that fuch
as are thus propos'd, and approv'd by the Senat, be held lawfully elected.
THESÊ Élections being thus difpatch'd, I com to the Functions
of the Senat, and firft, to thofe of the Senatorian Councils: for which
it is propos'd,
THAT the cognizance of all matters of State to be confider'd, or
Function of Law to be enacted, whether it be Provincial or National, Domestic or Fo-
ren, pertain to the Council of State. That fuch Affairs of either kind, as
they fhall judg to require more Secrecy, be remitted by this Council, and
belong to the Council of War, being for that end a ſelect part of the fame.
That the cognizance and protection both of the National Religion, and of
the Liberty of Confcience equally eftablish'd in this Nation, after the man-
ner to be fhewn in the Religious part of this Model, pertain to the Council
for Religion. That all matters of Traffic, and the regulation of the fame,
belong to the Council of Trade. That in the exercise of thefe feveral Functi-
ons, which naturally are Senatorian or Authoritative only, no Council
affume
1
443
The Art of Lawgiving.
affume any other Power than fuch only as ſhall be fettl'd upon the fame by Chap. 1.
Act of Parlament.
33.
· THAT what ſhall be propos'd to the Senat by any one or more of the
Signory or Propofers general; or whatever was propos'd by any two of the Function of
Provofts or particular Propofers to their refpective Council, and upon de- the Senat.
bate at that Council fhall com to be propos'd by the fame to the Senat, be ne-
ceſſarily debatable and debated by the Senat. That in all cafes wherin Power
is committed to the Senat by a Law made, or by Act of Parlament, the
Refult of the Senat be ultimat: that in all cafes of Law to be made, or not
already provided for by an Act of Parlament, as War and Peace, levy of
Men or Money, or the like, the Refult of the Senat be not ultimat. That
whatſoever is refolv'd by the Senat, upon a cafe wherin their Reſult is not
ultimat, be propos'd by the Senat to the Prerogative Tribe or Reprefen-
tative of the People; except only in cafes of fuch speed or fecrefy, wherin
the Senat fhall judg the neceſſary flowness or openness in this way of pro-
ceding to be of detriment or danger to the Commonwealth.
34.
THAT if upon the motion or propofition of a Council or Propofer Function of
General, the Senat adds nine Knights promifcuously chofen out of their own the Dictator.
number, to the Council of War; the fame Council, as therby made Dicta-
tor, have power of Life and Death, as alfo to enact Laws in all fuch cafes
of Speed or fecrefy, for and during the term of three months and no
longer, except upon a new Order from the Senat. And that all Laws enacted
by the Dictator be good and valid for the term of one year, and no longer ;
except the fame be propos'd by the Senat, and refolv'd by the People.
THIS Dictatorian Council (as may already appear) confifts
fundamentally of the Signory, with nine Knights elected by the
Council of State, additionally of nine Knights more emergently cho-
fen by the Senat, and of the four Tribuns of courfe; as will appear
when I com to ſpeak of that Magiftracy. Now if Dictatorian Power
be indeed formidable, yet this in the firſt place is remarkable, that the
Council here offer'd for a Dictator is of a much fafer Conftitution,
than what among us hitherto has bin offer'd for a Commonwealth ;
namely, a Parlament and a Council in the interim. For here is no in-
terim, but all the Councils of the Commonwealth not only remaining,
but remaining in the exerciſe of all their Functions, without the abate-
ment of any; fpeed and fecrecy belonging not to any of them, but to
that only of the Dictator. And if this Dictatorian Council has more in
it of a Commonwealth than has hitherto among us bin either practis'd or
offer'd, by what Argument can it be pretended that a Commonwealth
is ſo imperfect thro the neceffity of fuch an Order, that it muſt needs
borrow of Monarchy; feeing every Monarchy that has any Senat,
Affembly, or Council in it, therby moft apparently borrows more of
a Commonwealth, than there is to be found of Monarchy in this
Council?
TO diſmiſs this whole Senat with one Parallel: The inſtitution of The fifth Pa-
the ſeventy Elders in Ifrael (as was fhewn in the fecond Book) for rallil.
their number related to an Accident, and a Cuſtom therupon antiently
introduc'd. The Accident was that the Sons of JACOB who went
into Egypt were fo many; thefe, firft governing their Familys by na-
tural right, came, as thofe Familys increas'd, to be for their number re-
tain'd and continu'd in the nature of a Senatorian Council, while the
People were yet in Egyptian Bondage. So we, having had no like
Cuſtom, have as to the number no like Inducement. Again, the
L112
Terri-
444
The Art of Lawgiving.
2 Chr. 19.11.
Book III. Territory of Canaan amounted not to a fourth of our Country; and
in Government we are to fit our felves to our own proportions. Nor
can a Senat, confifting of few Senators, be capable of fo many diftri-
butions as a Senat confifting of more. Yet we find in the reftitution
of the Sanhedrim by JEHOSHAPHAT, that there was AMARIAH
chief in all matters of the Lord, that is, in judgment upon the Laws,
which, having bin propos'd by God, were more peculiarly his mat-
ters; and ZEBADIAH chief in all the King's matters, that is, in po-
litical debates concerning Government, or War and Peace. Laftly,
Judg. 11. 5, When the Children of Ammon made War againſt Iſrael, the People of
Ifrael made JEPHTHA not only Captain, but Head over them. So
the Judg of Ifrael, being no ftanding Magiftrat, but elected upon
emergencys, ſupplys the Parallel as to Dictatorian Power in a Com-
monwealth.
11.
DEBATE is the natural Parent of Refult; whence the Senat
throout the Latin Authors is call'd Fathers, and in Greec Authors the
compellation of a popular Affembly is Men; as Men of Athens, Men
of Corinth, Men of Lacedemon: nor is this Cuftom Heathen only,
A&. 7. 2. & feeing theſe Compellations are us'd to the Senat and the People of the
Luke throout Jews, not only by STEPHEN, but alſo by PAUL, where they be-
is perfectly gin their fpeeches in this manner: Men, Brethren, and Fathers. To
well skill'd in com then from the Fathers to the People, the Popular Affembly, or
the Customs of
Common- Prerogative Tribe; it is propos'd,
22. I.
wealths.
35.
Prerogative
Tribe.
THAT the Burgefjes of the annual Election return'd by the Tribes,
enter into the Prerogative Tribe upon Monday next infuing the last of
Fabric of the March; and that the like number of Burgeffes, whofe term is expir'd, re-
cede at the fame time. That the Burgefjes thus enter'd elect to themselves
out of their own number, two of the Horfe; one to be Captain, and the
other to be Cornet of the fame: and two of the Foot; one to be Captain,
the other to be Infign of the fame, each for the term of three years. That
thefe Officers being thus elected, the whole Tribe or Affembly procede to the
Election of four annual Magiftrats; two out of the Foot, to be Tribuns
of the Foot: and two out of the Horse, to be Tribuns of the Horfe. That
the Tribuns be Commanders of this Tribe in chief, ſo far as it is a Military
Body; and Prefidents of the fame, as it is a civil Affembly. And lastly,
that this whole Tribe be paid weekly as follows. To each of the Tribuns
of Horſe, ſeven pounds. To each of the Tribuns of Foot, fix pounds.
To each of the Captains of Horfe, five pounds. To each of the Captains
of Foot, four pounds. To each of the Cornets, three pounds. To each of
the Infigns, two pounds feven fhillings. To every Horfeman two pounds,
and to every one of the Foot one pound ten fhillings.
36.
Officers.
FOR the Salarys of the Senat and the People together, they a-
mount not to three hundred thouſand pounds a year; which is cheaper
by near two parts in three, than the chief Magiftracy ever did or can
otherwiſe coft: for if you give nothing (omnia dat qui jufta negat)
men will be their own Carvers. But to procede, it is propos'd,
THAT inferior Officers, as Captains, Cornets, Infigns, be only for
Offices of the the Military Difciplin of the Tribe. That the Tribuns have Seffion in
the Senat without fuffrage; that they have Seffion of course in the
Dictatorian Council, fo often as it is created by the Senat, and with fuf-
frage. That they be Presidents of the Court in all cafes to be judg'd by
the People.
THAT
The Art of Lawgiving.
445
THAT Peculat or Defraudation of the Public, and all cafes tending Chap. 1.
to the fubverfion of the Government, be triable by this Repreſentative;
and that there be an Appeal to the fame in all Caufes, and from all Magi- Appeal to the
ftrats, Courts and Councils, whether National or Provincial.
37.
People.
THIS Judicatory may feem large but thus the Congregation of The fixth Pa-
Ifrael, confifting of four hundred thouſand, judg'd the Tribe of Ben- rallel.
jamin. Thus all the Roman Tribes judg'd CORIOLANUS. And thus Judg. 20.
Duke LOREDANO was try'd by the great Council of Venice, confiſt-
ing yet of about two thouſand.
THIS is as much as I have to fay feverally of the Senat and the
People; but their main Functions being joint, as they make one Par-
lament, it is farther propos'd,
Halicar.
Janotti.
38.
THAT the right of Debate, as alfo of propofing to the People, be The main
wholly and only in the Senat; without any power at all of Refult, not de- Function of
riv'd from the People.
THAT the power of Refult be wholly and only in the People, with-
out any right at all of Debate.
the Senat.
39.
The main
Function of
the Preroga-
tive Tribe.
THAT the Senat having debated and agreed upon a Law to be pro-
pos'd, caufe promulgation of the fame to be made for the space of fix weeks
before propofition; that is, caufe the Law to be printed and publiſh'd ſo long Promulga-
before it is to be propos'd.
tion.
40.
Propofition.
THAT promulgation being made, the Signory demand of the Tribuns, 4.1.
being preſent in the Senat, an Affembly of the People. That the Tribuns, Manner of
upon fuch a demand of the Signory or of the Senat, be oblig'd to aſſemble
the Prerogative Tribe in Arms by found of Trumpet, with Drums beating
and Colors flying, in any Town, Field, or Market-place being not above fix
miles diftant, upon the day and at the hour appointed; except the meeting,
thro any inconvenience of the weather or the like, be prorogu'd by the joint
confent of the Signory and the Tribuns. That the Prerogative Tribe being
affembl'd accordingly, the Senat propofe to them by two or more of the Sena-
torian Magiftrats, thereto appointed at the firſt promulgation of the Law.
That the Propofers for the Senat open to the People the Occafion, Motives,
and Reafons of the Law to be propos'd; and the fame being don, put it by
diftinct Claufes to the Ballot of the People. That if any material Claufe
or Claufes be rejected by the People, they be review'd by the Senat, alter'd,
and propos'd (if they think fit) to the third time, but no oftner.
Act
42.
THAT what is thus propos'd by the Senat, and refolv'd by the People, a of Parla-
be the Law of the Land, and no other, except as in the cafe referv'd to the ment.
Dictatorian Council.
THE Congreation of Ifrael being monthly, and the Reprefenta- The Seventh
tive propos'd being annual and triennial, they are each upon Courſes Parallel.
or Rotation: the Congregation of Ifrael confifting of twenty four
thouſand, in which the whole number of the Princes of the Tribes and
of the Princes of the Familys amounted not, I might fay, to one hun-
dred, but will fay to one thoufand; it follows, that the lower fort in
the Congregation of Ifrael held proportion to the better fort, above
twenty to one. Wheras in the Repreſentative propos'd, the lower fort
hold proportion to the better fort but fix to four; and that popular
Congregation where the lower fort hold but fix to four, is by far the
moſt Ariſtocratical that is or ever was in any well-order'd Common-
wealth, except Venice: but if you will have that Gentry to be all of
one fort, or if you allow them to be of a better and of a meaner
fort, Venice is not excepted. The Sanhedrim made no Law without
the
446
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book III. the People; nor may the Senat in this Model: but the Sanhedrim with
the Congregation, might make Laws; fo may the Senat, in our Mo-
Ezra 10. 8. del, with the Reprefentative of the People. Laftly, as the Congre-
gation in Ifrael was held either by the Princes in perfon, with their
Staves and Standards of the Camp, or by the four and twenty thou-
fand in Military Difciplin; fo the Repreſentative propos'd is in the na-
ture of a Regiment.
Thuryd. lib.
8.
!
Lib 3.
EXCEPTING Venice, where there is a fhadow, and but a
ſhadow of Law made by the Senat (for the Soverain Power is un-
deniably in the great Council) and Athens, where a Law made by
the Senat was current as a Probationer for one year before it was pro-
pos'd to the People; there neither is nor has bin any ſuch thing in a
Commonwealth as a Law made by the Senat. That the Senat fhould
have power to make Laws, reduces the Government to a fingle Coun-
cil; and Government by a fingle Council, if the Council be of the
Many, is Anarchy, as in the Affembly of the Roman People by
Tribes, which always fhook, and at length ruin'd that Commonwealth:
Or, if the Council be of the Few, it is Oligarchy, as that of Athens con-
fifting of the four hundred, who nevertheleſs pretended to propoſe to
five thoufand, tho they did not. Of which fays THUCYDIDES,
This was indeed the form pretended in words by the four hundred; but the
moſt of them, thro privat ambition, fell upon that by which an Oligarchy
made out of a Democracy is chiefly overthrown: for at once they claim'd
every one not to be equal, but to be far the chief. Anarchy, or a ſingle
Council confifting of the Many, is ever tumultuous, and dos ill even
while it means well. But Oligarchy, feldom meaning well, is a Facti-
on wherin every one ftriving to make himſelf, or fom other from whom
he hopes for advantages, fpoils all. There is in a Commonwealth no
other cure of theſe, than that the Anarchy may have a Council of
fom few, well chofen, and elected by themſelves, to adviſe them;
which Council fo inftituted, is the Senat: Or that the Oligarchy
have a popular Repreſentative to balance it; which both curing Tumult
in the raſh and heady People, and all thoſe Corruptions which cauſe
Factiouſneſs in the fly and fubtil Few, amount to the proper Super-
ſtructures of a well-order'd Commonwealth. As, to return to the ex-
ample of the Oligarchy in Athens, where the four hundred (whoſe
Reign, being very fhort, had bin as feditious) were depos'd; and
the Soverainty was decreed to a popular Council of five thousand,
with a Senat of four hundred annually elective upon Courfes, or by
Rotation. Of this fays THUCYDIDES, Now first (at least in my
time) the Athenians feem to have order'd their State aright, it confifting
of a moderat temper both of the Few and the Many. And this was the firſt
thing that, after fo many misfortunes, made the City again to raife her
Head. But we in England are not apt to believe, that to decree the
Soverainty to thoufands, were the way to make a City or a Nation
recover of its Wounds, or to raiſe its Head. We have an averfion
to ſuch thoughts, and are fick of them. An Affembly of the People
Soverain! Nay, and an Affembly of the People confifting in the major
vote of the lower fort! Why, fure it muſt be a dull, and unſkilful
thing. But fo is the Touchftone in a Goldſmith's Shop, a dull thing,
and altogether unfkill'd in the Trade; yet without this, would even the
Mafter be deceiv'd. And certain it is, that a well-order'd Affembly of
the People is as true an Index of what in Government is good or great,
as any Touchſtone is of Gold.
A
3
The Art of Lawgiving.
447
A COUNCIL (efpecially if of a looſe Election) having not Chap. 1.
only the Debate, but the Refult alfo, is capable of being influenc'd
from without, and of being fway'd by Intereſt within. There may
be a form'd, a prejudic'd Party, that will haften or outbaul you from
the Debate to the Queſtion, and then precipitat you upon the Reſult :
Wheras if it had no power of Refult, there could remain to the fame
no more than Debate only, without any Biafs, or cauſe of diverting
fuch Debate from Maturity; in which Maturity of unbiafs'd Debate
lys the final cauſe of the Senat, and the whole Light that can be given
to a People. But when this is don, if your refolving Affembly be not
fuch as can imbibe or contract no other Intereſt than that only of the
whole People, all again is loft: for the Reſult of all Affemblys gos
principally upon that which they conceive to be their own Intereſt.
But how an Affembly upon Rotation, confifting of one thoufand,
where the Vote is fix to four in the lower fort, ſhould be capable of
any other Intereſt than that only of the whole People by which they
are orderly elected, has never yet bin, nor, I believe, ever will be
fhewn. In a like diftribution therfore of Debate and Reſult, confiſts
the higheſt Myſtery of Popular Government; and indeed the fupreme
Law, wherin is contain'd not only the Liberty, but the Safety of the
People.
FOR the remainder of the Civil part of this Model, which is now
but fmall, it is farther própos'd,
43.
THAT every Magistracy, Office, or Election throout this whole Com- Rule for Va-
monwealth, whether annual or triennial, be understood of confequence to cations.
injoin an interval or vacation equal to the term of the fame. That the
Magistracy of a Knight and of a Burgefs, be, in this relation, understood
as one and the fame; and that this Order regard only fuch Elections as are
National or Domeftic, and not fuch as are Provincial or Foren.
Exception
THAT, for an exception from this Rule, where there is but one Elder 44.
of the Horfe in one and the fame Parish, that Elder be eligible in the fame from the
without interval; and where there be above four Elders of the Horfe in Rule.
one and the fame Parish, there be not above half, nor under two of them e-
ligible at the fame Election.
OTHERWISE the People, beyond all manner of doubt,
would elect fo many of the better fort at the very firft, that there
would not be of the Foot or of the meaner fort enough to fupply the
due number of the Popular Affembly or Prerogative Tribe: and the
better fort being excluded fubfequent Elections by their intervals,
there would not be wherwithal to furnish the Senat, the Horſe of
the Prerogative Tribe, and the reſt of the Magiftracys; each of which
Obſtructions is prevented by this Exception. Where, by the way, if
in all experience fuch has bin the conftant temper of the People, and
can indeed be reaſonably no other, it is apparent what cauſe there can
be of doubt who in a Commonwealth of this nature muſt have the
leading. Yet is no man excluded from any Preferment; only Indu-
ſtry, which ought naturally to be the firſt ſtep, is firſt injoin'd by this
Policy, but rewarded amply: feeing he who has made himſelf worth
one hundred Pounds a year, has made himſelf capable of all Prefer-
ments and Honors in this Government. Where a man from the low-
eſt ſtate may not rife to the due pitch of his unquestionable Merit, the
Commonwealth is not equal: yet neither can the People, under the
Limitations propos'd, make choice (as fom object) of any other than
the
3
448
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book III. the better fort; nor have they at any time bin fo inclining to do, where
they have not bin under fuch Limitations. Be it ſpoken, not to the
difparagement of any man, but on the contrary to their praiſe whofe
Merit has made them great, the People of England have not gon fo
low in the election of a Houſe of Commons, as fom Prince has don
in the election of a Houſe of Lords. To weigh Election by a Prince
with Election by a People, fet the Nobility of Athens and Rome by the
Nobility of the old Monarchy, and a Houſe of Commons freely cho-
fen by the Nobility of the new. There remains but the Quorum, for
which it is propos'd,
45.
THAT, throout all the Affemblys and Councils of this Commonwealth,
The Quorum. the Quorum confift of one half in the time of Health, and of one third
part in a time of Sickness, being fo declar'd by the Senat.
HOW the City Government, without any diminution of their
Privileges, and with an improvement of their Policy, may be made to
* In Oceana. fall in with thefe Orders, has * elfwhere bin fhewn in part, and may be
confider'd farther at leiſure. Otherwife the whole Commonwealth,
ſo far as it is merely Civil, is in this part accompliſh'd. Now as of
neceffity there muſt be a natural Man, of a Man indu'd with a natural
Body, before there can be a fpiritual Man, or a Man capable of Divine
Contemplation; fo a Government muſt have a Civil, before it can
have a Religious part: And if a man furnifht only with natural parts
can never be ſo ſtupid as not to make fom Reflections upon Religion,
much leſs a Commonwealth; which neceffitats the Religious part of
this Model.
CHA P. II.
Containing the Religious Part of this Model, propos'd
practicably.
Τι
HERE is nothing more certain or demonftrable to common
than greater part in matters of
Senſe, than that the far greater part of Mankind, in matters of
Religion, give themſelves up to the public Leading. Now a National
Religion rightly eſtabliſh'd, or not coercive, is not any public driving,
but only the public leading. If the Public in this cafe may not lead
fuch as defire to be led by the Public, and yet a Party may lead fuch as
defire to be led by a Party; where would be the Liberty of Confcience
as to the State? Which certainly in a well-order'd Commonwealth,
being the public Reafon, muſt be the public Confcience. Nay, where
would be the Liberty of Confcience in reſpect of any Party which
fhould fo procede as to fhew, that without taking their Liberty of
Confcience from others, they cannot have it themſelves? If the Public,
refufing Liberty of Confcience to a Party, would be the cauſe of Tu-
mult, how much more a Party refuſing it to the Public? And how,
in cafe of fuch a Tumult, fhould a Party defend their Liberty of Con-
ſcience, or indeed their Throats from the whole or a far greater Party,
without keeping down or tyrannizing over the whole or a far greater
Party by force of Arms? Theſe things being rightly confider'd, it is
no wonder that Men, living like men, have not bin yet found without
a Government, or that any Government has not bin yet found with-
out
The Art of Lawgiving.
449
out a National Religion; that is, fom orderly and known way of pub- Chap. 2.
lic leading in divine things, or in the Worſhip of God.
A NATIONAL Religion being thus prov'd neceffary, it re-
mains that I prove what is neceffary to the fame; that is, as it con-
cerns the State, or in relation to the Duty of the Magiſtrat.
CERTAIN it is, that Religion has not feen corruption but by
one of theſe three cauſes; fom Intereſt therwith incorporated, fom ig-
norance of the truth of it, or by fom complication of both. Nor was
ever Religion left wholly to the management of a Clergy that eſcap'd
theſe 'Cauſes, or their moſt pernicious Effects; as may be perceiv'd in
Rome, which has brought Ignorance to be the Mother of Devotion,
and indeed Intereft to be the Father of Religion. Now the Clergy
not failing in this cafe to be dangerous, what recourſe but to the Magi-
ftrat for fafety? fpecially feeing theſe Caufes, that is, Intereft and
Ignorance (the one proceeding from evil Laws, the other from the
want of good Education) are not in the right or power of a Clergy,
but only of the Civil Magiftracy. Or if fo it be that Magiftrats are ob-
lig'd in duty to be nurfing Fathers and nurfing Mothers to the Church; Ifa. 49 23.
how ſhall a State in the fight of God be excufable, that takes no heed
care left Religion fuffer by Caufes, the prevention or remedy
wherof is in them only? To theſe therfore it is propos'd,
THAT the Univerſitys being prudently reform'd, be preferv'd in their
Rights and Indowments, for and towards the education and proviſion of an
able Miniftry.
46.
Universitys.
WE are commanded by CHRIST to fearch the Scriptures: The Joh. 5. 39-
Scriptures are not now to be fearch'd but by fkill in Tongues: The
immediat gift of Tongues is ceas'd: How then ſhould ſkill in Tongues
be acquir'd but mediatly, or by the means of Education? How should
a State expect fuch an Education (particularly, for a matter of ten
thouſand men) that provides not for it? And what proviſion can a
State make for this Education, but by fuch Schools fo indow'd and re-
gulated, as with us are the Univerſitys? Theſe therfore are a neceffary
ſtep towards the prevention of fuch Ignorance or Intereft, as thro the
infirmitys or bias of Tranflators, Interpreters, and Preachers, both
have and may frequently com to be incorporated with Religion; as
alfo to the improvement or acquifition of fuch Light as is by the com-
mand of CHRIST to be attain'd or exercis'd in fearching the Scrip-
tures.
1 Chron 25.8.
THE excellent Learning of the Levits in all kinds, not ordinarily The cighth
infus'd, but acquir'd (there having bin among them as well the Teacher Parallel.
as the Scholar) leaves little doubt but their forty eight Citys were as Mal. 2. 12.
fo many Univerfitys. Theſe with their Suburbs or Indowments, con-
tain'd in the whole (each of their Circuits in Land reckon'd at four
thouſand Cubits deep) about a hundred thouſand Acres; that is, if
their meaſure was according to the comon Cubit: if according to
the holy Cubit (as with Levits was moſt likely) twice fo much;
which, at the loweſt account, I conceive to be far above the Revenues
of both our Univerſitys.
THESE being order'd as has bin faid, it is propos'd,
tion of Liv
THAT the legal and antient provision for the national Miniſtry be 47.
fo augmented, that the meanest fort of Livings or Benefices, without de- Augmenta
falcation from the greater, be each improv'd to the Revenue of one ings.
hundred pounds at least.
M m m
THIS,
450
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book III.
The ninth
Parallel
48.
Ordination.
THIS, in regard the way is by Tithes, coms up ſo cloſe to the
Orders of Ifrael, as, in our day, may fhew that a Commonwealth
may com too near that pattern to be lik'd. We find not indeed that
the Apoſtles either took or demanded Tithes; in which cafe the
Prieſts, who were legally poffeft of them, might have had fufpicion
that they, under color of Religion, had aim'd at the violation of Pro-
perty. But putting the cafe that generally the Priefts had bin con-
verted to the Chriftian Faith, whether the Apoftles would for that
reafon have injoin'd them to relinquish their Tithes? Or what is
there in the Chriftian Religion to favor any fuch furmife? To me there
ſeems abundantly enough to the contrary. For if the Apoſtles
ftuck not to comply with the Jews in a Ceremony which was of mere
human Invention, and to introduce this, as they did Ordination by im-
pofition of hands, into the Chriftian Church; that they would, upon
a like inducement, have refus'd a ftanding Law undoubtedly Mofaical,
is in my opinion moft improbable. So that, I conceive, the Law for
Tithes now in being, may or may not be continu'd, at the pleaſure of
the Lawgivers, for any thing in this cafe to the contrary. Confident
I am, that the introducing of this Model in the whole, which is
thought impracticable, were not to willing minds fo difficult a work
as the abolition of Tithes.
BUT Benefices, whether by way of Tithes or otherwiſe, being
thus order'd; it is propos'd,
THAT a Benefice becoming void in any Parish, the Elders of the
fame may affemble and give notice to the Vice-Chancellor of either Univer-
fity by a Certificat, specifying the true value of that Benefice: that the Vice-
Chancellor, upon the receit of this Certificat, be oblig'd to call a Congrega-
tion of his Univerſity: that the Congregation of the Univerfity to this end
affembl'd, having regard to the value of the Benefice, make choice of a
Perfon fit for the Ministerial Function, and return him to the Parish fo
requiring: that the Probationer thus return'd to a Parish by either of the
Univerſitys, exerciſe the Office, and receive the Benefits as Minifter of the
Parish for the term of one year: that the term of one year being expir'd,
the Elders of the Parif affemble and put the Election of the Probationer
to the Ballot that if the Probationer has three parts in four of the Balls or
Votes in the Affirmative, he be therby ordain' d'and elected Minifler of that
Parish; not afterwards to be degraded or remov'd, but by the Cenfor of the
Tribe, the Phylarch of the fame, or the Council of Religion in fuch cafes
as fhall be to them referv'd by Act of Parlament: That in cafe the Proba-
tioner coms to fail of three parts in four at the Ballot, he depart from that
Parish; and if he returns to the University, it be without diminution of
the former Offices or Preferments which he there injoy'd, or any prejudice to
his future Preferment: and that it be lawful in this cafe for any Parih
to fend fo often to either Univerfity, and it be the duty of either Vice-Chan-
cellor upon fuch Certificats to make return of different Probationers, till
fuch time as the Elders of that Parish have fitted themſelves with a Mini-
fter of their own choice and liking.
IN cafe it was thought fit that a Probationer thus elected
fhould, before he departs, receive impofition of hands from the
Doctors of the Univerſity, I cannot fee what the moft fcrupulous in
the matter of Ordination could find wanting. But let this be fo, or
otherwiſe, it is indifferent. The Univerfitys by propofing to the Con-
gregation in every Pariſh, do the Senatorian Office; and the People,
thus
The Art of Lawgiving.
451
thus fitting themſelves by their Suffrage or Ballot, referve that Office Chap. 2.
which is truly popular, that is the Refult, to themſelves.
MOSES (for fo far back the Divines reach at Ordination) in the The tenth
inftitution of the Senat of Ifrael, wherin he can never be prov'd to Parallel.
have us❜d impofition of hands, performing the Senatorian Office, caus'd
the People to take wife men, and underſtanding, and known among Deut. 1.
their Tribes, wherof the Lot fell upon all but ELDAD and MEDAD. Numb. 11.
And the Apoſtles doing the Senatorian Office, in like manner without
impofition of hands, caus'd the whole Congregation to take two, Acts 1. 26.
wherof the lot of Apoſtleſhip fell upon MATTHIAS. So that this
way of Ordination being that which was inftituted by MOSES, and
the chief or firſt of thoſe which were us'd by the Apoftles, is both
Mofaical and Apoftolical. Nor has a well-order'd Commonwealth See Book z.
any choice left of thofe other ways of Ordination, us'd by the Apo- chap. 8.
ftles in complaifance to worſe fort of Government; but is naturally
neceffitated to this, that is, to the very best.
ORDINATION being thus provided for, it is propos'd,
THAT the National Religion be exercis'd according to a Directory in 49.
that cafe to be made, and publiſh'd by Act of Parlament. That the Natio- National Re-
nal Miniſtry be permitted to have no other public Preferment or Office in provifion a-
ligion; and
this Commonwealth. That a National Minifter being convict of Ignorance gainft fcanda-
or Scandal, be movable out of his Benefice by the Cenfors of the Tribe, un-
der an appeal to the Phylarch, or to the Council of Religion.
lous Minifters.
50.
Conſcience.
THAT no Religion, being contrary to or deftructive of Christianity,
nor the public exercife of any Religion, being grounded upon or incorporated Liberty of
into a foren Intereft, be protected by or tolerated in this State. That all
other Religions, with the public exerciſe of the fame, be both tolerated and
protected by the Council of Religion: and that all Profeffors of any fuch Re-
ligion, be equally capable of all Elections, Magiftracys, Preferments, and
Offices in this Commonwealth, according to the Orders of the fame.
UPON the whole of thefe Propofitions, touching Church Difci-
plin, we may make theſe Obfervations. Thus neither would the
Party that is for gifted Men, and Enemys to Learning, thro ignorance.
(which elſe in all probability they muft) lofe Religion; nor the Cler-
gy be able to corrupt it by Intereft. But Decency and Order, with
liberty of Confcience, would ftill flouriſh together; while the Mini-
fter has a Preferment he fought, the Pariſh a Minifter they chofe, the
Nation a Religion according to the public Confcience, and every man
his Chriſtian Liberty. He therfore that indeavours to confute this
Chapter, muſt either fhew how theſe things may be omitted, or more
effectually provided for; or tithe Mint and Cumin, and neglect the
weightier things of Lawgiving.
A COMMONWEALTH having, in the eſtabliſhment of
Religion, made refignation of herſelf to God, ought in the next
place to have regard to the natural means of her defence; which in-
troduces the Military part of this Model,
Mmm 2
CHAP
452
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book III.
51.
the Youth.
CHA P. III.
Containing the Military part of this Model, propos'd
practicably.
T
HE Military Part, on which at preſent I fhall diſcourſe little,
confiſts in the Diſciplin of the Youth, that is, of ſuch as are
between eighteen and thirty years of Age: and for the Diſciplin of
the Youth it is propos'd,
THAT annually upon Wednesday next infuing the last of Decem-
Difciplin of ber, the Youth of each Parish (under the inspection of the two Overfeers
of the fame) affemble and elect the fifth man of their number, or one in
five of them, to be for the term of that year Deputys of the Youth of that
Parish.
52.
and Sports.
*In Oceana.
THAT annually on Wednesday next infuing the laft of January, the
Their Troops, faid Deputys of the refpeclive Parishes meet at the Capital of the Hundred
(where there are Games and Prizes allotted for them, as has bin fhew'd*elf-
where) and there elect to themselves out of their own number, one Captain,
and one Infign. And that of these Games, and of this Election, the Ma-
giftrats and Officers of the Hundreds be Prefidents, and Judges for the im-
partial diftribution of the Prizes.
53.
drons, and
Exerciſes.
THAT annually upon Wednesday next infuing the last of February,
Their Squa. the Youth thro the whole Tribe thus elected, be receiv'd at the Capital of the
fame, by the Lieutenant or Commander in chief, by the Conductor, and by
the Cenfors; that under the infpection of thefe Magiftrats, the faid Youth
be entertain'd with more fplendid Games, difciplin' d in a more military man-
ner, and be divided by lot into fundry parts, or Eſſays, according to the
Rules * elfwhere given.
* In Oceana.
54.
flanding Ar-
THAT the whole Youth of the Tribe, thus affembl'd, be the first
The fecond Efay. That out of the first Eſſay, there be caft by lot two hundred Horje,
Effay, or the and fix hundred Foot: that they whom their friends will, or themselves can
mount, be accounted Horfe, the reft Foot. That thefe Forces (amounting
in the fifty Tribes to ten thousand Horfe, and thirty thousand Foot) be always
ready to march at a week's warning: and that this be the fecond Effay, or
the ftanding Army of the Commonwealth.
my.
55.
Guards.
THAT for the holding of each Province, the Commonwealth in the
Provincial first year affign an Army of the Youth, confifting of feven thouſand fivé
hundred Foot, and one thousand five hundred Horfe. That for the per-
petuation of theſe Provincial Armys or Guards, there be annually, at the
time and places mention'd, caft out of the first Effay of the Youth in each
Tribe ten Horſe, and fifty Foot: that is, in all the Tribes five hundred
Horfe, and two thousand five hundred Foot for Scotland; the like for Ire-
land; and the like of both orders for the Sea Guards: being each oblig'd to
Jerve for the term of three years upon the States pay.
THE ſtanding Army of the Commonwealth confiſting thus of
forty thoufand, not Soldiers of fortune neither in body nor in pay,
but Citizens at their Vocations or Trades, and yet upon command in
continual readineſs; and the Provincial Armys each confifting of nine
thouſand in pay in body, and poffefs'd of the Avenues and places of
ftrength in the Province, it is not imaginable how a Province ſhould
be ſo ſoon able to ftir, as the Commonwealth muſt be to pour forty
thouſand men upon it, befides the Sea Guards. Nor coms this Militia
thus
The Art of Lawgiving.
453
thus conftituted, except upon Marches, to any charge at all; the Chap. 3.
ſtanding Army having no pay, and the Provinces, wherof the Sea
thus guarded will be none of the pooreft, maintaining their own The eleventh
Guards. Such is the military way of a Commonwealth, and the Parallel.
Conſtitution of its Armys, whether levy'd by Suffrage, as in Rome;
or by Lot, as in Ifrael.
WE will go up by Lot against Gibeah.
STANDING Forces being thus eſtabliſh'd; for fuch as are
upon emergent occafions to go forth, or march, it is propos'd,
Judg. 20. 9.
زاد
The third Ef-
THAT the Senat and the People, or the Dictator having decreed or
declar'd War, and the Field Officers being appointed by the Council of War; fay, or Army
the General by Warrant ifju'd to the Lieutenants of the Tribes, demand marching.
the fecond Ellay, or fuch part of it as is decreed; whether by way of levy
or recruit. That by the fame Warrant he appoint his time and Rendevouz:
that the feveral Conductors of the Tribes deliver him the Forces demanded
at the time and place appointed. That a General thus marching out with
the standing Army, a new Army be elected out of the first Efay as for-
merly, and a new General be elected by the Senat; that fo always there be a
General fitting, and a ſtanding Army, what Generals or Armys foever
be marching. And that in cafe of Invafion the Bands of the Elders be
oblig'd to like duty with thofe of the Youth.
57.
Pœna x-
Tεías, or the
THAT an only Son be discharg'd of thefe Dutys without prejudice.
That of two Brothers there be but one admitted to foren Service at one
time. That of more Brothers, not above a half. That whoever otherwife Guardian of
refufes his Lot, except upon cauſe ſhewn he be difpens'd with by the Phy- Education
larch, or upon penitence be by them pardon'd and reftor'd, by fuch refufal and Liberty.
be uncapable of electing, or being elected in this Commonwealth; as alfo
that he pay to the State a fifth of his Revenue for protection, befides
Taxes. That Divines, Phyficians, and Lawyers, as alfo Trade's not at lei-
fure for the Effays, be fo far exemted from this Rule, that they be ſtill
capable of all Preferments in their respective Profeffions, with Indemnity,
and without Military Education or Service.
A COMMONWEALTH whofe Militia confifts of Mer-
cenarys, to be ſafe, muſt be ſituated as Venice, but can in no wife be
great. The Induſtry of Holland is the main Revenue of that State;
whence not being able to ſpare hands to her Arms, fhe is caft upon
Strangers and mercenary Forces, thro which we in our time have feen
Amfterdam neceffitated to let in the Sea upon her, and to becom (as it
were) Venice. To a Popular Government that could not do the like,
Mercenary Arms have never fail'd to be fatal; whence the laft Pro-
pofition is that which in every well-order'd Commonwealth has bin
look'd to as the main guard of Liberty.
1 Sam. 11.7%
IN this Ifrael was formidable beyond all other Commonwealths, The tave'ftis
with a kind of Fulmination. SAUL when he heard the Cruelty of Parallel.
NAHASH the Ammonit, at the Leaguer of Jabesh-Gilead, took a
yoke of Oxen and hew'd them in pieces, and fent them throout the Coafts
of Ifrael, by the hands of Meffengers, faying, Whofoever coms not out
after SAUL, and after SAMUEL, fo fhall it be don to his Oxen.
Which amounted not only to a confiſcation of Goods (the Riches
of the Ifraelits lying moft in their Cattle) but to a kind of Ana-
thema, as more plainly appears, where it is faid, Curfe ye Meroz, Judg. 5. 23.
curfe ye bitterly the Inhabitants therof, because they came not forth to help
the Lord against the Mighty. Nay this (argaría) deſertion of the
Military
454
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book III. Military Orders and Services in Ifrael, was fomtimes punifh'd with
total extermination, as after the Victory againſt Benjamin, where
the Congregation or Political Affembly of that People, making inquifi
Judg. 21. tion what one of the Tribes of Ifrael came not up to the Lord in Mizpeh
(the place where before the taking of Jerufalem they held, as I may
fay, their Parlaments) and finding that there came none to the Camp
from Jabefh-Gilead, fent thither twelve thousand men of the valianteft,
faying, Go and finite the Inhabitants of Jabefh-Gilead with the edg of
the Sword, and the Women and the Children: which was don accord-
ingly.
Judg. 12.
BUT by this time men will ſhrink at this as a dreadful Order,
and begin to compute that a Commonwealth, let her Prerogatives for
the reſt be what they will, muft at this rate be but a dear purchaſe:
wheras indeed, if this way coſts fomthing, there is no other that dos
not hazard all; forafmuch as difcarding this Order, play your game as
you can, you are fome time or other a Prey to your Enemys, or to your
Mercenarys. This certainly is that root in (the Penetralia) the
bowels of a Commonwealth, whence never any Court Arts, or Polite-
neſs, could attain to the gallantry or fplendor of the Education in Po-
pular Governments. For let any man (remembring what it was to
be a GIDEON, a MILTIADES, a TIMOLEON, a SCIPIO, or a Ma-
giftrat in a Commonwealth) confider if there ſhould be no way
with us to Magiftracy, but by having ferv'd three years at Sea, and
three years at Land, how the whole face and genius of Education,
both in the better and in the lower fort, would of neceffity be chang'd
in this Nation, and what kind of Magiftrats fuch experience in thoſe
Services muſt create to the Commonwealth. Confider, whether
the threaten'd Puniſhments of this Order, tho thro unacquaintance
they may at first fight have fom brow, would not, as they have
don in other Commonwealths of like ftructure, even with low fpirits,
expire in fcorn and contempt, or thro the mere contemplation of the
reward of Honor, nay of the Honor it felf, in which point where
right has not bin don, men, under Governments of this nature, have
bin much more apt to heats; as where the men of Ephraim fought
against JEPTHA, for an affront in this kind which they conceiv'd him
to have put upon them. Wherfore paſſedst thou over to fight against the
Children of Ammon, and didst not call us to go with thee? We will burn
thy houſe upon thee with fire. Nor is this way fo expenſive of the
Purfe or of Blood. Not of the public Purfe, becauſe it detefts Mer-
cenarys; nor of the privat Purfe, becauſe the ways of Education thus
directed, are all affifted with the States pay: fo that a man in this road
might educat three Children cheaper, and to the moſt folid ends, than
he could any one to trifles in thoſe which among us hitherto have
bin uſual. And as to Blood, there is nothing more certain, than that
Idleneſs, and its infeparable companion Luxury, are excedingly more
waſtful as of the Purſe, ſo of Health, nay and of Life it felf, than
is War; which nevertheleſs this Order is fuch as dos rather prevent
than neceffitat, in regard that to be potent in Arms is the way of
Peace. But wheras in a Martial Commonwealth there may be men
having exceded the thirtieth year of their Age, who like thofe of
Ephraim would yet take it ill to be excluded the Lifts of Honor, and
it muſt alſo be to the detriment of the Commonwealth that they
ſhould; for theſe, whom we may call Volunteers, it is propos'd,
THAT
The Art of Lawgiving.
455
58.
THAT upon Warants iffu'd forth by the General for Recruits or Chap. 4°
Levys, there be an Affembly of the Phylarch in each Tribe; that ſuch Vo-
lunteers, or men being above thirty years of Age, as are defirous of farther Volunteers.
imployment in Arms, appear before the Phylarch fo affembl'd. That any
number of theſe, not exceeding one moiety of the Recruits or Levys of that
Tribe, may be taken on by the Phylarch, fo many of the Youth being an
the difcretion of this Council disbanded, as are taken on of the Volunteers.
That the Levys thus made, be conducted by the Conductor of the respective
Tribe to the Rendevouz appointed. And that the Service of thefe be
without other term or vacation, than at the diſcretion of the Senat and the
People, or fuch Inftructions to the Gereral, as fhall by them in that cafe
be provided.
THUS much for the Military or Defenfive part of this Model.
For Offences in general it is written, Wo unto the world becauſe of Of- Mat. 18. 7.
fences; for it muſt needs be that Offences com, but wo to that man by whom
the Offence coms. Among Offences are offenfive Wars: now it be-
ing out of question, that for the righteous Execution of this Wo upon
him or them by whom the Offence coms, a War may be just and
neceffary, as alſo that Victory in a juft and neceffary War may
one Prince or one People to the Dominion or Empire of another
Prince or People; it is alfo out of queftion, that a Commonwealth,
unleſs in this cafe fhe be provided both to acquire, and to hold what
The acquires, is not perfect: which Confideration brings me to the
Provincial part of this Model.
CHA P. IV.
intitle
Containing the Provincial Part of this Model, propos'd
practicably.
T
HE word Province is with Roman Authors of divers fignifi-
cations. By theſe it is taken fomtimes for Magiftracy; as that
of the Conful, which is call'd His Province: fomtime for any Reli-
gion or Country, in which a Roman Captain or General was com-
manded to make War; but fpecially for fuch a Country as was ac-
quir'd and held by Arms, or by Provincial Right. The word is of
the like different ufe in Scripture; as where it is faid, That AHA- Eſth. 1.1
SUERUS reign'd over a hundred and feven Provinces; by which are
underſtood as well the divifions of the native, as thofe of the ac-
quir'd Territorys. But where TANAIS the Governor writes to the Ezra 5. 8.
King of Agria concerning the Province of Judea, it is underſtood
a Country acquir'd and held by Arms; which coms to the ufual
fignification of the word with the Romans, it being in this ſenſe that
the Governor FELIX afk'd PAUL of what Province he was, and came Acts
to underſtand that he was of Cilicia, then a Province of the Roman
Empire: and this fignification is that in which I take the word thro-
out this Chapter.
THE mighty load of Empire which happen'd to the Common-
wealth of Rome thro the Acquifition of many and vaft Provinces,
is that wherto the Songs of Poets, and the opinions of more ferious
Writers attribute the weight which they fay overfway'd her. But
this Judgment, tho in itſelf right, is not in the manner they take it to
be ſwallow'd without chewing. For how probable it is that the
I
fuc-
456
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book III, fucceding Monarchy was able to ſupport a weight in this kind, which
the Commonwealth could not bear, may at this diſtance be difcern'd,
in that the Provinces were infinitely more turbulent in the Reign of the
Emperors, than in that of the Commonwealth, as having a far ftronger
Intereft, thro ambition of attaining to the whole, to tear the Em-
pire in pieces which they did, while divers Provinces made divers
Emperors, which before could not hope to make divers Common-
wealths, nor to acquire fafety by retreat to a petty Government.
But in this, the acquifition of Provinces devour'd the Commonwealth
of Rome, that, ſhe not being fufficiently fortify'd by Agrarian Laws,
the Nobility, thro' the fpoil of Provinces, came to eat the People out
of their popular Balance or Lands in Italy by Purchaſes; and the Lands
that had been in the hands of the Many, coming thus into the hands
of the Few, of natural and neceffary confequence there follows Mo-
narchy.
Plutarch in
Gracch.
59.
Additional
Propofitions
NOW that England, a Monarchy, has bin feiz'd of Provinces
(one of them, while France was fuch, being as great as any one of the
Roman) is a known thing; and that the Militia propos'd by the pre-
fent Model, contains all the cauſes of Greatneſs that were in that of
Rome, is to fuch as are not altogether ftrangers to the former no lefs
than obvious. Now of like Caufes not to prefume like Effects, were
unreaſonable. The fafety therfore of the foregoing Agrarian, as hi-
therto propos'd, or that Lands be divided in their defcent, muft in this
cafe be none at all, unleſs there be ſom ſtop alſo given in their Accu-
mulation by way of purchaſe; left otherwiſe the ſpoil of fom mighty
Province be ftill fufficient to eat out the People by purchaſe.
TO ſubmit therfore in this place (for ought I perceive) to in-
evitable neceffity, it is propos'd,
THAT (great Commonwealths having bin overthrown by the spoil of
Provinces) an
Provinces) an Estate of two thousand pounds a year in Land, be inca-
to the Agra- pable of any Accumulation by way of purchaſe.
rian.
DONATIONS and Inheritances will be fewer than to be
dangerous; and as fome fall, others will be dividing in their defçent.
But to reſume the Diſcourſe upon the Agrarian Laws, which, becauſe
they were not till in this Propofition complete, remains imperfect.
That to Agrarian Laws fom Standard is neceffary, appears plain-
ly enough. This Standard in a well-founded Monarchy, muft bar
recefs; and in a well-founded Commonwealth muft bar increaſe.
For certain it is, that otherwife each of the Policys dos naturally
breed that Viper which eats out the Bowels of the Mother: as Mo-
narchy, by Pomp and Luxury, reduces her Nobility thro debt to
poverty, and at length to a level with the People, upon which no
Throne ever ſtood or can ftand: fuch was the cafe of this Nation un-
der her latter Princes. And a Commonwealth by her natural ways
of frugality, of fattening and cockering up of the People, is apt to
bring Eftates to fuch excefs in fom hands, as eating out the reft,
bows the Neck of a free State or City to the yoke, and expoſes
her to the goad of a Lord and Mafter, which was the cafe of Rome
under her perpetual Dictators. But why yet muft this Standard of
Land in the preſent cafe, be neither more nor leſs than juſt two thou-
fand pounds a year? Truly, where fom Standard was neceffary to
be nam'd, I might as well afk why not this as well as any other? yet
am I not without fuch Reafons why I have pitch'd upon this rather
than
The Art of Lawgiving.
457
than any other, as I may fubmit to the judgment of the Reader in Chap. 4.
the following computation or compariſon of the divers Effects or
Confequences of fo many different Standards, as by the rules of
portion may give fufficient account of the reft.
pro-
LET the dry Rent of England (that is, at the rate a man may
have for his Land without fweating) be computed at ten Millions:
This prefum'd, if you fet the Standard at ten thousand pounds a
year, the whole Territory can com into no fewer than one thouſand
hands. If you fet it at five thouſand pounds a year, it can com into
no fewer than two thouſand hands; and if you ſet it at two thou-
fand pounds a year, it can com into no fewer than five thouſand
hands. It will be faid, In which way you pleafe, it will never com
into fo few hands as are capable of having it; which is certain: yet
becauſe the Effects in their approaches would be fuch as may be mea-
fur'd by their Extremes, I fhall pitch upon theſe as the readieſt
way to
guide my Computation. The Balance in a thouſand hands might
affect the Government with a hankering after Monarchy; in two
thouſand hands it might ufurp it, as did the Roman Nobility, and
therby occafion a feud between the Senat and the People. Theſe
not only in the extremes, but with much of a like nature in the ap-
proaches.
BUT letting theſe pafs, as alfo the numbers or compafs neceffary
to the Rotation of fuch a Commonwealth (none of which inconve-
niences are incident to the Standard of two thoufand pounds a year, as
that wherby Land can com into no fewer than five thouſand Pro-
prietors) we will fuppofe thefe Standards to be each of them, as to the
fafety of the Government, indifferently practicable.
YET it is recorded by Experience, and wife Authors, that the
true cauſe whence England has bin an overmatch in Arms for France,
lay in the communication or diftribution of Property to the lower
fort; and for the fame cauſe let it be confider'd, if the Commonwealth
upon the Standard of two thouſand pounds a year (cæteris paribus)
muſt not neceffarily be an overmatch in the potency of its Militia for
the other two. Such are the advantages, fuch is the glory of the like
moderation to the public. Mony (fays the Lord VERULAM) is
like muck, not good except it be spread. Much rather in Popular Go-
vernment is this holding as to Land, the latter having upon the State a
far ftronger influence, at leaft in larger Territorys, than Mony: for
in fuch, Mony, while fcarce, cannot overbalance Land; and were
Silver and Gold as plentiful as Braſs or Iron, they would be no more,
nor would Land be lefs worth. And for privat men, were it not that
it is easier to fill the belly of a Glutton than his eys, not only Virtue,
but the Beatitude of Riches, would be apparently confiftent in a mean.
But what need I play the Divine or the Philofopher upon a Doctrin,
which is not to diminiſh any man's Eſtate, not to bring any man from
the Cuſtoms to which he has bin inur'd, nor from any emergent ex-
pectation he may have; but regards only the Generation to com, or
the Children to be born feven years after the paffing fuch a Law?
Whence it muſt needs follow, that putting the cafe this Agrarian be
introduc'd, it is to our Age as if there were none; and if there be
no Agrarian, it is to our Age as if there was one. The difference is no
more, than that in the one way the Commonwealth is at all points
fecur'd, and in the other it is left to its fortune even in the main. Of
Nnn
fuch
458
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book III, fuch foverain effect are the like Laws, that I would go yet farther,
60.
Agrarian for
and propoſe,
THAT in Scotland the Standard be fet at five hundred pounds a
Scotland and year; in Ireland at two thousand pounds a year in Land; the rest for
cach as for England.
Ireland.
61:
Provincial
Councils.
'62.
Provincial
Governors or
Generals.
NARROWNESS of an Agrarian for Scotland, being a Mar-
tial Country, would make the larger provifion of a good Auxiliary
Militia; and largenefs of an Agrarian for Ireland, being lefs Martial,
would caft a Sop into the Jaws of the Avarice of thofe who fhould
think it too much confin'd in England. And left the Provincials in
this cafe fhould think themſelves worfe dealt with than the Citizens
themſelves, the fum of the Agrarian Laws being caft up together, any
man in the three Nations may hold four thouſand five hundred pounds
a year in Land; and any ſmall Parcel of Land, or mere Refidence in
England, makes a Provincial a Citizen. Should the Commonwealth
increafe in Provinces, the Eftates at this rate both of the Citizens and
Provincials would be more and greater than ever were thofe of the
antient Nobility of theſe Nations; and without any the leaft hazard
to Liberty. For he, who confidering the whole Roman ftory, or that
only of the GRACCHI in PLUTARCH, fhall rightly judg, muft con-
fefs, that had Rome preferv'd a good Agrarian but in Italy, the Rich-
es of its Provinces could not have torn up the Roots of its Liberty, but
on the contrary muſt have water'd them. It may be faid, What need
then of putting an Agrarian upon the Provinces? I anſwer: For two
Reaſons firſt is Indulgence to the Provincials: and the fecond, Ad-
vantage to the Commonwealth. For the first, it is with fmall fore-
fight apparent enough, that the Avarice of the Citizen being bounded
at home, and having no limits in the Provinces, would in a few years
eat up the Provincials, and bring their whole Countrys (as the Roman
Patricians did Italy) to found in their Fetters, or to be till'd by their
Slaves or Underlings. And fo, for the ſecond, the Commonwealth
would by fuch means lofe an Auxiliary Militia, to be otherwife in
Scotland only more worth than the Indys. The things therfore thus
order'd, it is propos'd,
THAT upon the expiration of Magiftracy in the Senat, or at the an-
nual Recefs of one third part of the fame, there be elected by the Senat out
of the part receding, into each Provincial Council four Knights for the
term of three years; therby to render each Provincial Council (prefuming
it in the beginning to have bin conftituted of twelve Knights, divided
after the manner of the Senat by three feveral Lifts or Elections) of an-
nual, triennial, and perpetual Revolution or Rotation.
THAT out of the jame third part of the Senat annually receding,
there be to each Province one Knight elected for the term of one year.
That the Knight fo clected be the Provincial General or Governor. That
a Provincial Governor or General receive annually in April at his Rende-
vou appointed, the Youth or Recruits elected in the precedent Month to that
end by the Tribes, and by their Conductors deliver'd accordingly. That he
repair with the faid Youth or Recruits to his Province, and there difmifs
that part of the Provincial Guard or Army whofe triennial term is expir'd.
That each Provincial Governor have the conduct of Affairs of War and
of State in his refpective Province, with advice of the Provincial Coun-
cil; and that he be Prefident of the ſame.
THAT
The Art of Lawgiving.
459
t
THAT each Provincial Council elect three weekly Propofers, or Pro- Chap. 4.
vofts, after the manner, and to the ends already fhewn in the conftitution
of Senatorian Councils; and that the Provost of the fenior Lift, during his Provincial
term, be Prefident of the Council in abfence of the General.
63.
Provoſts.
64.
vincial Coun-
THAT each Provincial Council procede according to Inftructions re-
ceiv'd from the Council of State, and keep intelligence with the fame by Subordina-
any two of their Provofts, for the Government of the Province, as to tionand Func-
matters of War or State. That upon Levys of native or proper Arms by tion of Pro-
the Senat, and the People, a Provincial Council (having to that end re- cils.
ceiv'd Orders) make Levys of Provincial Auxiliarys accordingly. That
Auxiliary Arms upon no occafion whatſoever excede the proper or native
Arms in number. That for the reft, the Provincial Council mantain the
Provincials, defraying their peculiar Guards and Council, by fuch a known
proportion of Tributs, as on them fhall be fet by the Senat and the People,
in their proper Rights, Laws, Libertys and Immunitys, fo far as upon the
Merits of the Caufe wherupon they were fubdu'd, it feem'd good to the
Senat and the People to confirm them. And that it be lawful for the
Provincials to appeal from their Provincial Magiftrats, Councils, or
Generals, to the People of England.
IN modelling a Commonwealth, the concernment of Provincial
Government coms in the laft place; for which cauſe I conceive any
long Diſcourſe upon theſe Orders to be at prefent unneceffary: But
certain things there are in the way' which I am unwilling to let flip
without pointing at them.
SOM will have Men, fom will have Mony to be the Nerve of War;
each of which Pofitions, in proper cafes, may be a Maxim: For if
France, where the main Body of the People is imbas'd; or Venice,
which ſtands upon a Mercenary Militia, want Mony, they can make
no War. But it has heretofore bin otherwife with Commonwealths.
Roman Hiftorians (as is obferv'd by MACHIAVEL) in their Mili-
tary Preparations or Expeditions, make no mention of Mony, unleſs
what was gain'd by the War, and brought home into the Treafury; as
the Spoil of Macedon by EMILIUS PAULUS, being fuch, as the Peo-
ple for fom years after were diſcharg'd of their Tribute. Not that their
Wars were made altogether without Mony: for if fo, why fhould
the People at any time before have paid Tribute? Or why upon this
occafion were they excus'd? but that the Mony in which their Wars
ftood them, was not confiderable in compariſon of that which is re-
quifit where Mony may be counted the Nerve of War; that is,
where Men are not to be had without it. But Rome, by virtue of
its Orders, could have rais'd vafter numbers of Citizens and Affo-
ciats than perhaps it ever did, tho during the Confulat of PAPPUS
and REGULUS, fhe levy'd in Italy only feventy thoufand Horſe,
and ſeven hundred thouſand Foot. Should we conceive the Nerve of
this Motion to have bin Mony, we muft reckon the Indys to have bin
exhauſted before they were found; or fo much Brafs to have bin in Ita-
ly, as would have made Stones to be as good as Mony. A well-order'd
Commonwealth dos theſe things not by Mony, but by fuch Orders as
make of its Citizens the Nerve of its Wars. The Youth of the Com-
monwealth propos'd are eſteem'd in all at five hundred thouſand. Of
theſe there is an annual Band, confifting of one hundred thoufand. Of
this one hundred thouſand there is a ſtanding Army confifting of thirty
thouſand Foot and ten thouſand Horfe, befides fuch as being above
Nnn 2
thirty
Whether Men
or Mony be the
NerveofWar.
460
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book III. thirty years of age, fhall offer themſelves as Voluntiers of which
the number is in no wife likely to be few. To the ftanding, Army
the Provinces, or that only of Scotland, being both Populous and Mar-
tial, can afford at any time an equal number of Auxiliarys.
THESE Orders, thus fum'd up together, render this Common-
wealth ordinarily able to wage War with fourfcore thouſand men;
a Force which, it is known, not any Prince in Chriftendom is able
to match in Virtue, Number, or Difciplin. For theſe the Common-
wealth in her Sea Guard has always at hand fufficient Waftage, or at
leaſt ſuch a fufficient Convoy as may make any Veffels at hand'a fuf-
ficient Tranſportation: all this, I fay, by virtue of Orders. Not
but that the March, the Equipage, the Waftage of fo great an Army
muſt coſt Mony; but that it will com to no account in compariſon of a
lingring War made by a matter of thirty thoufand Mercenarys, the
very confumtion of a State: wheras fourfcore thouſand men fo difci-
plin'd and fo furniſh'd, as has bin fhewn, being once tranfported, muft
fuddenly com to be no Charge, or make the War defray it ſelf.
the
BUT 'tis objected, that to reckon upon fuch a Militia were to fuppofe
a large Country capable of being a Commonwealth; wheras we hold
them learn'd, who fay that no Commonwealth has confifted of more
Whether a
than fom one City or Town. But in what Language or in what
Common- Geography, are the twelve Tribes of Ifrael; the (duo) Peopledoms
wealth has
or Prytanys of Athens, which THE SEUS gather'd into one body;
confifted of
more than one the Tribes and Linages in Lacedemon inftituted by LYCURGUS;
City or Town. the five and thirty Roman Tribes planted between the Rivers Vultur-
nus and Arno, or between the Citys now call'd Capua and Florence;
13 Cantons of the Switzers; the feven United Provinces of the Low
Countrys, underſtood to have bin or to be but one City or Town? Whe-
ther were not the People of Ifrael under their Commonwealth fix hundred
thouſand? What reafon can be given why the Government that could
take in fix hundred thoufand, might not as well take in twice that
number? How much fhort came the Country, planted by the Ro-
man Tribes, of 150 Miles fquare? Or how much over is England?
And what reafon can be given why a Government, taking in
150 Miles fquare, might not as well take in twice that Compafs?
Whether was our Houfe of Commons under Monarchy not collected
from the utmoſt Bounds of the English Territory? And whether had
the Laws by them enacted not their free courfe to the utmoſt limits of
the fame? And why fhould that be impoffible or impracticable to a
Repreſentative of the People in a Commonwealth, which was fo facil
and practicable to a Repreſentative of the People under Monarchy?
IT is a wonder how the Commonwealth of Rome, which held
as it were the whole World by Provinces, ſhould be imagin'd by any
man to have confifted but of one Town or City.
BUT to return: It is alleg'd by others, and as to Provincial Go-
vernment very truly, that a Commonwealth may be a Tyranny:
Nor do I think that Athens, in this point, came fhort of
any Prince:
Rome, on the other fide, was (according to the merits of the cauſe)
as frequent in giving Liberty as in taking it away. The Provinces of
Venice and of Switzerland, would not change their condition with the
Subjects of the beft Prince. However the poffibility in a Common-
wealth of tyrannizing over Provinces, is not to be cur'd; for be the
Commonwealth or the Prince a State or a Man after God's own heart,
there is no way of holding a Province but by Arms.
WHEN
The Art of Lawgiving.
461
1
teenth Paral-
WHEN the Syrians of Damafcus came to fuccor IIADADEZER The thir-
King of Zobah, DAVID flew of the Syrians two and twenty thousand lel
Men: then DAVID put Garifons in Syria of Damafcus, and the Sy- 2 Sam. 8.5,6.
rians became Servants to DAVID, and brought Gifts; and the Lord
preferv'd DAVID whither foever he went.
WITH this Parallel I draw the Curtain, and cloſe (be it Come-
dy to fuch as are for Tragedy) the Model; appealing to the preſent,
or the next Age, whether throout I have not had God himſelf for my See the Corol-
Vouchee. In the mean time, there is nothing hereby propos'd which lary of
may not ſtand with a ſupreme Magiſtrat.
The Conclufion :
Shewing how the Model propos'd may be prov'd or examin'd;
and giving a brief Anfwer to Mr. WREN's laft Book,
intitl'd, Monarchy afferted againſt Mr. HARRINGTON'S
Oceana.
F
Oceana.
less feditious
than i' beſt
of Monarchys.
OR a Nation to be ftill upon the caft of a Dy, to be ever in Sect. 1.
trepidation as to the main chance of Government, is a dreadful That a Com
ftate of things. Such indeed with us has bin the Conftitution of our monwealth
not rightly
late Governments, of which therfore not any can be call'd a Common- order d, is
wealth. Yet has the like ftate of things (in favor of Monarchs, and
thro the induſtry of the Clergy) bin for many Ages, that wherof
Commonwealths unheard are ſtill accus'd and condemn'd. For proof
in this cafe, the Tribunitian Storms of the Roman People are thought
abundantly ſufficient. But theſe having bin without Blood, if with
our Affairs they hold any parallel, are not to be compar'd with the
Barons Wars, thoſe of York and Lancaster, or the like; but with the
Conteſts or Strivings of our Parlaments with their Kings, while fuch
Diſputes came not to Arms. Or if the Roman Fields from the time of the
GRACCHI grew bloody, we have known a matter of a dozen years
in which ours might have compar'd with them. The Seditions un-
der the Commonwealth of Rome to thofe under the Empire, hold fuch
a proportion, as the Seditions under the Commonwealth of Ifrael to See Bookz.
thofe under their Kings. I am contented at this time, for difcourfe chap. 4.
fake, that the Seditions of Venice fhould pafs as they are computed by
Mr. WREN: Let thoſe alſo which have happen'd in the Common-
wealths of the Switzers, and of the United Piovinces, by the ſkill of
ſom Man who may be thought more impartial than my felf, be right-
ly enumerated and added. This being don, let the Seditions that
have happen'd in the Monarchys of England, France, and Spain, be
as impartially fum'd up; and I may venture to promife you, That
you ſhall not find the fum of the Seditions which have happen'd in
thoſe three Commonwealths, to balance the foot of the account with
thoſe Seditions which have happen'd in any one of thoſe Monar-
chys: nor are we without fufficient inducement to believe, that
the whole account in this particular of thoſe Commonwealths which
have bin in the World, can com any whit nearer to that of the
Monarchys. But this being fo, be it alfo fuppos'd, tho not granted,
that a Commonwealth is a feditious Government, yet muſt it be
}
the
462
The Art of Lawgiving.
the leaft feditious Government. The Republic of Corinth never fuf
Exλv. fer'd but that one Sedition which is defcrib'd by Xenophon; and this
too from an external cauſe.
Lib. 4.
XW V.
Sect. 2.
That Mr.
BUT I am the more confirm'd by the Affaults of Mr. WRen,
to have no less than demonftrated in the propos'd Model, that a Com-
Wien's Oppo- monwealth rightly order'd is altogether incapable of Sedition, and fo
fition of Popu-
lar Prudence confequently of Diffolution, that is, from any internal caufe. To
amounts to a render his Confutation intire, and the truth of this Affertion the more
Confirmation confpicuous, I fhall firſt inſert thoſe Rules or Maxims wherby a Mo-
of it.
How a Model
del of a Commonwealth may be exactly prov'd or examin'd, and then
ſhew how they totally enervat and overturn thofe Arguments elabo-
rated by Mr. WREN towards the examination and confutation of the
Model propos'd.
THE Maxims or Rules wherby a well-order'd Model of Popular
of Popular&o- Government may be moſt exactly prov'd or examin'd, are ſpecially two:
vernment may
be try'd or
examin'd.
W. p 78.
Ibid.
1. IT must be wholly void of any Contradiction or Inequality.
2. IT must be fuch in which no number of Men, having the Interest, can
have the Power or Strength; and no number of Men, having the
Power or Strength, can have the Interest to invade or disturb the
Government.
IT is not in the power of Nature that there fhould be an effect,
where there is not the cauſe of that effect; and in a Frame of Go-
vernment that is exactly according to the foregoing Maxims, there can
be no caufe of Sedition or Diffolution. A Model of Government
therfore that will hold examination by theſe Maxims, muft (without
oftentation, or with Mr. WREN's patience) be perfect.
NOW let us obferve how he beftirs himſelf to examin and con-
fute this Model. As to contradiction, he dos not fo much as pretend
that there is any Guile in it; yet will not allow it to have any
truth:
For, fays he, as in a Fiction the feveral Members may be fo contriv'd, as
not to give one another the ly, but be all contain'd within the limits of
Verifimilitude, and yet the whole remain without the least fyllable of Truth;
fo in a Model of Government. To which I anſwer, that there being a
truth of Nature, and a truth of Fact, this way of Mr. WREN'S
diſputing is mere equivocation. For the Model is not propos'd to
fhew the truth of Fact, or that there has bin any fuch exactly in
practice; but to fhew the truth of Nature, or that fuch a Model is
practicable: wherfore he needed not to have alleg'd that it has not the
truth of Fact, which we all know; but was to fhew where it fails of
fuch a truth in Nature as can any way render it impracticable. But in-
ſtead of this, he is gon to the Moon; and will read us a Lecture in
Politics by the Planets, or the various Hypothefes of Celeſtial Mo-
tions, which may be excogitated including no abfurdity in themselves, and
yet perhaps not any one of them prove to be the true method of Nature.
But may a Man therfore argue in this manner? It is very hard to know
certainly which are the Highways of the Planets, therfore there can
be no certain Knowlege which are the Highways to London. Let us
e'en fay, Becauſe the Rotation of the World may as well go upon the
Heavens as upon the Earth, therfore a man may as well go upon his
Head as upon his Heels, and a Commonwealth as well ſtand upon a
Milkwoman's Pattins, as upon the ſtrongeſt Intereſt, or the Intereſt
of the ſtrongeſt.
SO
The Art of Lawgiving.
463
But
So much for Contradiction. Now for inequality, fays Mr. WREN, W. p. 179
Tho it should be allow'd Mr. HARRINGTON, that his Commonwealth
has none in it, yet would it fail of attaining the perfection of Government,
feeing there is an equality in the Nature of man, which is not rectify'd by
the Model of bis Commonwealth. As if the equality of a Government
was pretended to be fuch, as fhould make a crooked man ftraight, a
wicked man good, or a paffionat man a Philofopher; and it were
not perfect, in being fufficient to prevent any influence that Wicked-
nefs or Paffion in a man or men, may have upon the Government.
for farther diſcovery of thefe Inequalitys in the Nature of man, that
are not rectify'd by the Model, Mr. WREN fends us to his eighth
and ninth Chapters, where he produces them in fuch order, as I fhall
obferve in repeating him. Whenfoever, fays he, under Popular Go- Pag. 84.
vernment the number of those whofe Offences have render'd them liable to
the ſeverity of Laws, is confiderable enough to qualify them for attemt,
Popular Government has no more fecurity than any other, of being free
from Sedition. It is very true: but Mr. WREN was oblig'd to fhew
how in an equal Commonwealth, or under the Model propos'd, it
was poffible that the number of fuch men fhould com to be confider-
able enough to qualify them for fuch an attemt. But in this kind he
is no otherwife provided than to tell us, That of this Original and Ex-
traction, as to the main, was CATILIN's attemt upon the Roman
Commonwealth. So undertaking againſt Oceana, or the moft equal
Commonwealth, he is com to arguing againſt Rome, or the moſt ine-
qual Commonwealth; and at fuch a time too, when being no longer
capable of Liberty, but ready for bonds, there were other Partys be-
fides CATILIN's, and others befides fuch as were obnoxious to the
Laws, that lay in wait for her: as POMPEY and his Party, or at
leaft CESAR and his, who at length carry'd it; fo that this feat was
not fo much perform'd by men otherwife liable to feverity of Laws, as
by men puff'd up by ambition. But let theſe have bin of which fort
he will, it remains with him to fhew, how there fhould be of either
kind enough in Oceana for a like attemt. It is known that long before
this happen'd in Rome, the whole of that Commonwealth was in the
hands of three men, CESAR, POMPEY, and CRASSUS: wherfore
he ſhould have firft fhewn, which way the whole of the Common-
wealth of Occana might com into the hands of three, or of a few men.
But leaving this untouch'd, he runs making a duft, and a doubt where
the foverain Power of Oceana can be; which even in Rome, as ine-
qual as it was, is acknowleg'd to have bin in the Affemblys of the Peo-
ple; and in Athens, THUCYDIDES exprefly fays, That the Sove- Lib. 5.
rainty was in the five thoufand. Who ever doubted but where the ulti-
mat Reſult is, there alfo muſt be the Soverainty? and the ultimat
Refult of Oceana is in the Prerogative Tribe, or Reprefentative of the
People. Then fays he, This Reprefentative thinking it their intereft, may Pag. 84.
diffolve the Government, and perpetuat themſelves, and may com to think
it their intereft. For the defire of Power being natural to man, a far greater
Share of Power remains with every particular man, when the Soverain
Power is divided among jo many, than when the fame Power is divided
among two hundred thousand. But I fhew'd that this Repreſentative
has the whole Soverain Power in themſelves, not divided with any
other, or with the five hundred thoufand; which I fuppofe he means
by the two hundred thouſand he mentions. Now this Repreſenta-
tive
464
The Art of Lawgiving.
W. p. 85.
tive cannot be underſtood to have the Soverain Power by overbalance
offtrength, becauſe they are but one thouſand to five hundred thou-
fand; fo it is plain that they have it by conſent, or by orders only:
wherfore thefe Orders they have not the power, or ftrength, nor the
intereſt to break; becauſe breaking their Orders (by which only, and
not by ſtrength, the Power is in themſelves) they com to divide the
Power that was in themfelves, with the five hundred thoufand, as
they, who, in defect of the Orders, have the far greater ftrength, and
no legal bar. Yet fays he, That a Reprefentative is not incapable of
making fuch an attemt as this, will (it is not improbable) eaſily find be-
lief with those who are acquainted with the Actions of thefe last eighteen
years, Which is as much as to fay, That becauſe a Repreſentative,
by and with the People, may have both the intereft, and the power
or ftrength to free themſelves of a broken Monarchy; therfore a Re-
prefentative may, without and againſt the People, have both the inte-
reft, and the power or ftrength to break the Orders of the moſt equal
Commonwealth. But if the Reprefentative of Oceana has not the
power or ſtrength to break their Orders, and perpetuat themſelves
much lefs the Senat. True it is, if we look upon fom other Common-
wealths, a Senat might have the Intereſt to do it; but not where the
Senat has bin upon Rotation. To add then to Mr. WREN'S faculty
of oppofition greater ftrength than is in it; if the Senat of Oceana
would do any thing of this kind, their readieſt way were by creating of
the Dictator. The Dictator being created, has foverain Power in car-
rying on the Orders of the Commonwealth: but thoſe do not perpe-
tuat their Power; this therfore cannot be don but by Force or Arms.
The Arms of the Commonwealth are both numerous, and in a poſture
or readineſs; but they confift of its Citizens: and for the Dictator
to bring the Citizen to break the Commonwealth, were for a Ge-
neral to command his Army to cut their own throats. It is true,
the Roman Decemvirs put in for prolongation; but, tho in the
moft inequal Commonwealth, they could not make it ftand one
year, becauſe of the Citizens in Arms: And for Mercenarys there are
none in Oceana; is this news? there were none in Ifrael, there were
none in Athens, there were none in Lacedemon, there were none in
Rome, while thofe Commonwealths flouriſh'd. But were there Mer-
cenarys, as he might perhaps reckon Servants, they are unarm'd, un-
difciplin'd; they cannot rife thro the vaſt bodys of Citizens in Arms
both Elders and Youth; or if they would rife, they could be nothing
in their hands. The Roman Slaves, and the Lacedemonian Helots,
being far of another and more dangerous nature, never roſe againſt
their Lords but to their own deſtruction. All this while I fay nothing
of the ſecurity which is in the frame of this Dictator, beyond any ex-
ample or intereft of prolongation to be found either in the Roman
Dictator or the Venetian Council of ten, each wherof having had the
like power, did never diſcover any fuch inclination. It is true, that
in the time of SYLLA, the Roman Dictator began to be perpetual;
but this is not to be attributed fo much to the imperfection of the
Order, as to the change of the Balance. But if the Dictator of Oceana'
cannot have the intereft, or, having the intereft, cannot have the power
or ftrength to perpetuat that Magiftracy; much lefs can the Senat.
THE fum of what has bin faid, may be thus caft up, as to the
whole Conſtitution. If Things or Perfons that have neither the
right
The Art of Lawgiving.
465
fition 44.
་
right nor the might, may prevail againſt Things and Perfons who have
both the right and the might; then may one Order of this Common-
wealth break the whole Syſtem: but the Might, thro the foundation
or popular balance of Property, being in the whole People, and the
whole Superftructures of this Commonwealth being nothing elſe but an
equal diftribution of common Right to the whole People, who are
poffeft of the Might; they who have the Might, have not the intereft to
break, but to preſerve the Orders; which therfore no other can have
the power or ſtrength to break, or fom other breaking, muſt but loſe
that which they pretend to gain, to wit, the Right, which in this caſe
muſt ſtill fall to the Might devolving upon the People. That Mr.
WREN will needs fancy the Tribes or Citys in Oceana, as thofe in w. p. 87.
the united Provinces, or the Cantons of Switzerland, to be diftinct Sove-
raintys, concerns not me, feeing the form of Oceana is far otherwife; nor
indeed him, ſeeing neither do the Citys in Holland, nor the Cantons in
Switzerland go about to diffolve their Commonwealths or Leagues.
The Champion having thus fail'd at the head, is contented to play low.
Tho there be care taken, fays he, that at the Affembly of the Hundred W. p. 181.
and the Tribe, fuch and fuch Magiftrats ſhould be elected out of the Horfe,
there is no neceſſary provifion there should be any Horfe there, out of which
to elect. And where can they be then, if not in fome Pariſh? He
might better have faid, that at the Pariſh there was no care taken,
that the People ſhould not elect too many of the Horfe, which being
indeed the defect of the former, is in this Edition rectify'd. His laft See Propo-
exception is against the place where I fay, that They who take upon w. p. 183.
them the profeffion of Theology, Phyfic or Law, are not at leifure for the
Eſſays, wherby the Youth commence for all Magiftracy and Honors, in the
Commonwealth. To which reafon he offers not fo much as any An-
fwer: nor pretends any other Argument againſt it, than that this ex-
cludes Divines, Lawyers, and Phyficians, from thofe Honors to which
their Pariſh Clerks, their Scriveners, and their Apothecarys, nay Far-
riers and Coblers may attain. And what can I help that, if it ought ne-
vertheleſs ſo to be, for a reafon which he cannot anfwer? Nay, if fo
it be in common practice where the reaſon is nothing near fo ſtrong,
ſeeing a Pariſh Clerk, a Scrivener, an Apothecary, nay a Cobler or a
Farrier, is not uncapable of being of the Common Council, nor yet
of being an Alderman or Lord Mayor of London; which nevertheleſs
that a Divine, a Lawyer, or a Phyſician fhould be, were abfurd to
think. Divines have a Plow from which they ought not to look back:
they have above a tenth of the Territory, with which they ought
to be contented; and more than all, Civil Intereft contracted by a
Clergy, corrupts Religion. For Lawyers, their Practice and Magi-
ftracys are not only the moſt gainful, but for life; and in a Common-
wealth, neither is accumulation of Magiftracy juft or equal, nor the
confounding of Executive and Legiſlative Magiftracy fafe. Will
Mr. WREN believe one of our own Lawyers, and one of the learnedſt
of them upon this point? It is the Lord VERULAM: They, fays he, Verulam de
who have written (de legibus) of Lawmaking, have handl'd this Argu- Aug. Scien.
ment as Philofophers, or as Lawyers. Philofophers ſpeak higher than will
fall into the capacity of practice (to which may be refer'd PLATO's
Commonwealth, Sir THOMAS MORE's Utopia, with his own At-
lantis) and Lawyers being obnoxious, and addicted each to the Laws of their
particular Country, have no freedom nor fincerity of Judgment, but plead
O oo
as
*
lib. 8. cap. 3.
466
The Art of Lawgiving.
Sect. 3.
That
Mr. Wren's
mounts to the
Subverfion of
it.
W. p. 97.
W. p. 99.
W. p. 103.
as it were in bonds. Certainly the cognizance of thefe things is moſt pro-
perly pertaining to political Perfons, who best know what stands with bu
man Society, what with the fafety of the People, what with natural Equity,
with antient Prudence, and with the different Conftitution of Common-
wealths. Theſe therfore, by the Principles and Precepts of natural Equity
and good Policy, may and ought to determin of Laws. For Phyficians,
who (as fuch) have in the management of State-Affairs no prejudice,
if you open them the door, they will not at all, or very rarely,
com in: wherby it appears, Firſt, that ſuch a bar may in fom cafes
be no violation of Liberty; and, fecondly, that the Divines, who
for better cauſes might be as well fatisfy'd, and for more unanſwera-
ble Reaſons ought to forbear, yet arc impatient, and give a full tefti-
mony that their meaning is not good.
THUS is the Commonwealth by Mr. WREN oppos'd, by him
afferted. There remains no more to the full confutation of his Book,
than to fhew how the Monarchy by him afferted is by him deſtroy'd.
This is to be don by the examination of his ninth Chapter, which is
the next of thoſe to which he refer'd us.
THE oppofition made by Mr. WREN to a Commonwealth,
and his pretended afferting of Monarchy, run altogether upon
Aertion of Mr. HOBBS's Principles, and in his very words; but for want of un-
Monarchy a- derſtanding, much enervated: fo that Mr. WREN's whole feat of
Arms coms but to have given me a weaker Adverfary for a ftronger.
In Soverainty, fays he, the diffus'd ftrength of the Multitude is united
in one perfon; which in a Monarchy is a natural perfon; in a State, an
artificial one procreated by the majority of Votes. This then is the grand
fecurity of all Soverains, whether fingle Perfons or Affembly's, that the uni-
ted Forces of their Subjects, with which they are invested, is fufficient to
Suppress the beginnings of Seditions. Who reads Mr. HOBBS, if this be
news? But what provifion is made by either of theſe Authors, that
the Forces of thefe Subjects muft needs be united? Is Union in Forces, or
in Government, an Effect wherof there is no Caufe? Or to what caufe
are we to attribute this certain Union and grand Security? Why let
there be fuch a Nobility as may be a Monarch's Guard against the People.
And left a Monarch ftand in need of another Guard against this Nobility,
let none of thefe excel the rest of his Order in power or dignity. Which
Effects or Ends, thus commanded, vouchfafe not to acquaint us with
their ways: Yes, let the Nobility have no right to aſſemble themselves for
electing a Succeſſor to the Monarchy, or for making a War or Peace, or for
nominating the great Minifters of State, or for performing any other Act
which by the nature of it is infeparable from the foverain Power. But why
then muſt ſuch a Nobility be a guard againſt the People, and not rather
a guard for the People, feeing both their Interefts and Sufferings at this
rate are the fame, and include thoſe very cauſes for which, in the Ba-
rons War, the Nobility became Incendiarys and Leaders of the People
of England againſt their Kings, and fo thoſe wherby their Captain
came to excel the reſt of his order in power or dignity? But for this
the Prince is to be provided, by having always in pay a fufficient Militia;
W. p. 105. and fom places of ftrength where a few may be fecure against a number.
For places of Strength, Citadels, or Caftles, there were in the time of
the Barons Wars, more than fom; yet were they, as to this purpoſe,
But a Militia is one thing, and a fufficient Militia is another;
where the Government confifts of a Nobility and of a People, what
fufficient
İbid.
none.
The Art of Lawgiving.
467
i
fufficient part of the Property or Revenue of the Territory can there
remain to the Prince, wherby to have always in pay fuch a Militia, as
may be fufficient to keep the Nobility and the People from joining, or
to ſuppreſs them being join'd? If theſe be ſmall Armys, the like may
befal them, which befel thoſe of the Kings in the Wars of the Barons.
And if they be great Armys, the Prince has not wherwithal to fup-
port or content them; nay if he had, Mr. WREN tells us plainly, w. p. 195.
That Princes who keep great Armys, as Guards to their Perfons or Empires,
teach us that this is to walk upon Precipices; there being no poſſibility of
preventing fuch an Army (pecially if they ly fill without imployment)
from acquiring an intereft diftinct from that of the Prince. Wherfore (to
follow Mr. WREN, and no other Leader, in his own words againſt
himſelf) this Militia being great, cannot be ſo inftituted, as to have no
intereſt beſides the pay it receives from the Monarch; nor ſo as to have
no hopes of being fafe in their own ftrength, if they ſhould withdraw
themſelves from the Service and Obedience due to him: and being not
great, againſt the whole Order or Orders of the Nobility and the Peo-
ple they cannot be fufficient. What then remains but to ſay, that
Mr. WREN having declar'd the perfection of Monarchical Government W. p. 107.
to confift in a mixture of Monarchy by a Nobility, and a Monarchy by
Arms, has as to his Model intirely fubverted Monarchy? In this way
of difputing, I have rather follow'd my Leader than Reafon; the true
Anſwer being that which was given in the Preface, namely, that an
Army to be effectual in England, muſt be ſuch where the Officers have
popular Eſtates, or where they have fuch Eſtates as had the antient
Nobility: in the latter cafe, they make a King; in the former, a
Commonwealth. But Mr. WREN will have his own way; and
therfore, to conclude, let me but defire him to lay his hand upon
his heart, and then tell me, whether the condition of the Nobility
(to whoſe favor in my exclufion he pretends a meritorious Title)
fharing eminently and according to their rank with the People
in the Commonwealth by me propos'd; or the condition of the
Nobility under the infolence and burden of a mercenary Army,
fharing equally with the People in Oppreffion and Slavery, or re-
viving the old Barons Wars for new Liberty, in the Monarchy by
him propos'd; be the more defirable. And to ſpeak a word for
Adverfary, we will ſubmit it wholly to the prefent Nobility, whether
Mr. WREN or I be fo extravagant in theſe things, that they have
or can have any other than the like choice. Yet enters not Mr. WREN
into defpair of living to injoy his ſhare (which ought to be a good one)
of the Felicitys which will belong to the Subjects of fuch a Government.
He looks upon Perfons, but Things are invincible.
my
THE reft of his Book (to which The Prerogative of Popular
Government is still a complete Anfwer) confifts altogether of grofs
evafion or invective, or of drawing out of ftory againſt Popular Pru-
dence fuch imaginary Swords as do but ſtand bent. To rectify or
ftreighten theſe, I may hereafter prefent him (if any man ſhall think
it worth the while) with a fuller Anſwer.
0002
A
Ibid.
468
A Word concerning
A WORD
Concerning a Houfe of PEER S.
N°
O man knowing what is neceffary to the Foundation or Being
of a Popular Government, can hope or expect the intro-
duction of any fuch Form, where Monarchy is not im-
practicable. They (where Monarchy is impracticable) who com
firft to diſcover it, and be convinc'd of it, if Reafon be not altogether
depos'd, are inevitable Leaders. Hence it is that our Common-
wealthfmen are already renown'd throout this Nation for their invin-
cible Reaſons, even by the confeffion of their Opponents, or fuch as
procede nevertheleís in other ways. But where Seed is fo well ſown
and rooted, intervening Poffeffion and Interefts are like fuch Weather
as holding back the Spring, yet improves the Harveſt: Common-
wealthfmen indeed may have a cold time on't, but upon the Common-
wealth it muſt beſtow Fermentation. Had our incomparable Affert-
ors of public Liberty appear'd before a univerfal eviction of the ne-
ceffity which inforces their Caufe, it muſt have bin thro fuch a re-
luctancy, as would have made them glad to do things by halves, which
is the only Rock to a rifing Commonwealth of Scandal, or of Danger;
the whole being fuch againſt which there is nothing to be alleg'd, and
the half what may be eafily confuted. Theſe things confider'd, what
appearance is there but that it muſt redound to the greater advantage
of our Commonwealthſmen, that we are under the force of a prefent
Humour which abhors the very name of a Commonwealth? Seeing by
this means one of two things muſt of neceffity happen, and com
ſhortly to public view or difcovery: either that Monarchy is practi-
cable, or that it is not practicable; I mean, in our ſtate of Affairs, or
in this prefent diftribution of the Balance. If Monarchy be found
practicable, Commonwealthfmen are fatisfy'd in their Confciences,
and fo ready in fair ways to return, and fubmit not only for Wrath,
but for Confcience fake. But (let Divines cry Atheiſm, and Law-
yers Treafon) if it be once difcover'd to common Underſtanding that
Monarchy is impracticable, then in coms the Commonwealth, not
by halves, but with all its Tackling, full fail, difplaying its Streamers,
and flouriſhing with Top and Topgallant.
THE ways wherby it is at hand to be diſcover'd whether Mỏ-
narchy be practicable or impracticable, are particularly two; the one
quicker, the other flower: The quicker way will be by the Work-
men, the flower by the Work.
IF the Workmen, being willing, be yet overcom by the mere
obftinacy of their Matter, it amounts to a plain confeffion, that Mo-
narchy is impracticable. And if they give away the Libertys of the
People, they are overcom by the obftinacy of the Matter; for that is
not their Work: nor any other Work than ſuch as muſt be uſeleſs,
not fo much in regard of it felf tho that may be true enough) as by
the want of any other Security than what the Prince had before, that
3
is,
a Houfe of Peers.
469
is, an Army. And fuch an Army, which for fecurity is as good as
none at all, nay the very contrary, as has bin fhewn already: nor to be Art of Law-
alter'd with better fuccefs than theirs, who became Princes in Gre-giving p 433.
cian and Sicilian States.
BUT if the Workmen give not away the Libertys of the People,
then muſt they fo limit their Prince, that he can in no manner invade
thoſe Libertys; and this by any other means than the full and perfect
introduction of a well-order'd Commonwealth, they will find to be
utterly impoffible: So either way they are overcom by the mere ob-
ftinacy of their Matter.
IF thro fom fecret Dictat (as when the Senat of Rome was Cɔn-
viva Cæfaris) or a haft to make riddance, this be not perceiv'd by the
Workmen, it will be but the more perceivable by the Work when it
coms to wearing or in practice; and the Flaws or Grievances being
found infupportable, the next Parlament, thro the mere want of any
other remedy, muft introduce a Commonwealth.
GOOD, and egregiously Prophetical! But what fay you for all this,
if we have a House of Peers, and that even for the Lord's fake, there being
no other way to fecure Liberty of Confcience? Why I fay, if we have a
Houſe of Peers, it muſt be a Houſe of old Peers, or a Houſe of new
Peers, or a Houſe of the one and the other. Moreover I fay, Let it
be which way you will, fuch a Houſe may at fom time, or for fom
reafon, be perfonally affected to Liberty of Confcience; but is a
Conſtitution in it ſelf naturally averfe, and contrary to Liberty of Con-
fcience, and therfore can be no fecurity to the fame, whether the Lords
be Spiritual, or Temporal, or partiperpale.
LORDS Spiritual are infpir'd with a third Eſtate, or ſhare of a
Realm, which gives no toleration to any Religion, but that only aſ-
ferting this point, which is Monarchy. Setting this Oracle, and fom
like Reaſons of State afide, we may think that every Soverainty (as
fuch) has Liberty of Confcience: This a King having, cannot give;
and a People having, will not lofe. For Liberty of Confcience is in
truth a kind of State, wherin a man is his own Prince: but a Houſe
of Peers fets up another Prince; it cannot ftand without a King. If
the Balance be in the Lords, as before HENRY the Seventh, yet muft
they have a King to unite them, and by whom to adminiſter their
Government; and if the Balance be not in the Lords, they ſtand or
fall with the King, as the Houſe of Peers in the Long Parlament
and the King falling, their Government devolves to the People. Again,
a Houſe of Peers having the overbalance, fignifys fomthing; in which
cafe it has not bin known to be for Liberty of Confcience: and not
having the overbalance, fignifys nothing; in which caſe it cannot ſecure
the Liberty of Confcience. Thus a Houfe of Peers, whether fom-
thing or nothing, is no way for the Liberty of Confcience; but every
way for a King: and a King is a defender of the Faith. The Faith
wherof a King is defender, muſt be that which is, or he ſhall call his
own Faith; and this Faith it concerns his Crown and Dignity, that he
defend againſt all other Faiths. True it is, that a King for a ſtep to a
Throne, may uſe what is readieft at hand: Otherwife where there is
Liberty of Conſcience, to affert Civil Liberty by Scripture can be no
Atheiſm; which lames a Prince of one Arm. But where Liberty of
Conſcience is not at all, or not perfect, Divines, who (for the greater
part) are no fair Huntfmen, but love dearly to be poaching or club-
bing
470
A Word concerning
bing with the fecular Arm (tho if we, who defire no ſuch Advan-
tages, might proſecute them for abufing Scripture, as they have don
this thouſand years, to all the ends, intents, and purpoſes of Monar-
chy, they would think it a hard cafe) Divines, I fay, not only brand
the Affertors of Civil Liberty with Atheiſm, but are ſome of them ftu-
dious in Contrivances, and quaint in Plots to give a check or remove
to this or that eminent Patriot, by the like pretences or charges;
which fucceding accordingly by the power of a Parlament, they may
at length com to have a Parlament in their power. Where there is no
Liberty of Confcience, there can be no Civil Liberty; and where
there is no Civil Liberty, there can be no fecurity to Liberty of Con-
fcience: but a Houſe of Peers is not only a neceffary, but a declar'd
check upon Civil Liberty: therfore it can be no fecurity to Liberty of
Confcience. And ſo much for this particular.
NOW to make upon the other parts propos'd, and in a mere civil
fenſe, fom farther conjecture.
WHEN a Houſe of Peers fets up a Houſe of Commons, as in
the Barons Wars, they will govern the Commons well enough for
their own purpoſe, and not ſeldom the King too.
BUT we are to ſpeak of a thing without any example, a Houſe of
Peers fet up by a Houfe of Commons; nor, in the want of example,
are we thought worthy by our Adverfarys to be furniſh'd with Rea-
fon: fo the guidance of our Diſcourſe upon this point is committed
to Mother Wit, a notable Goffip, but not fo good a Politician.
NEVERTHELESS, if this Houſe confifts of old Peerage on-
ly, we have direction enough to know how that will be; for either
the fingle Perfon, or the Commons will be predominant in the Go-
vernment: if the Commons be fo, then it will be with the Peers, as
it was before their laft Seclufion; that is, while they do as the Com-
mons would have them, they may fit; otherwiſe they are fent home.
And if the fingle Perfon be predominant, it can be no otherwiſe than
by an Army; in which cafe the old Peers being not in Arms, nor
having any help that way, are as much under the Yoke as the Com-
mons. By which it may be apparent, that it is the great intereſt of
the preſent Peerage, that there be a well-order'd Commonwealth: 0-
therwiſe the Commons being in bondage, the Lords, whom that leaft
becoms, are but equal with them: and being free, the Lords are not
the head, but at the foot of them; wheras in an equal Common-
wealth, that the Nobility be not at the head, or have not the leading,
is quite contrary to all Reaſon and Experience.
IF the Houſe conſiſts of new Peers only, it muſt conſiſt of the chief
Officers in the Army; which immediatly divides the Government into
two diſtinct Governments: the one in the Houſe of Commons, whoſe
Foundation is the Body of the People; the other in the Houſe of
Peers, whofe Foundation is the Army. This Army if it remains firm
to the Peers, they not only command the Commons, but make and
unmake Kings as they pleafe; or as ambitious Partys and Perfons a-
mong themſelves are diligent or fortunat: But if the Army (as is moſt
and more than moſt likely) coms off to the Commons, the Peers are
nothing, and the Commons introduce a Commonwealth.
IF the Houſe confifts of new Peers and old, the old Peers while they
like it, are Cyphers to new Figures; and when they like it not, may
go home again: nor whether they ftay or go, is this cafe fo different
from
a Houſe of Peers.
471
from the former, as to be any greater obftruction to a Common-
wealth.
TO hate the very name of a Commonwealth, or not to fee that
England can be no other, is as if men were not in earneſt. It is afk'd
of the Commons what the Protector fhall be, and he can be nothing
but what they will. It is afk'd of the Commons what the other
Houſe ſhall be, and it can be nothing but what the Commons will.
The Commons are afk'd whoſe the Army, whoſe the Militia, whoſe
the Negative Vote is; nor can theſe be otherwiſe determin'd than as
they pleaſe. The Commons are afk'd whether they will make ſuch a
War, whether they will pay fuch a Debt, whether they will advance
ſuch a Sum; all which are intirely at their diſcretion: therfore actual-
ly and pofitively England is a Commonwealth. Nay, and that there
remain not the leaſt doubt, whether it be ſafe for any man to ſay thus
much, the preſent Government has either no legal denomination at all,
or is legally denominated the Commonwealth: the queſtion of the
future ftate of it coms not one whit upon the matter, which is already
granted, but upon the form only. A Commonwealth for the matter
makes it ſelf; and where they will not bestow upon it the Form ne-
ceffary, fails not of coming to ruin, or, at leaſt, to diſgrace the Work-
men: Or, to ſpeak more properly and pioufly, a Commonwealth is
not made by Men, but by God; and they who refift his holy Will,
are Weapons that cannot profper.
Feb. 20.
1659.
1
SIX
:
Six Political
TRACTS
Written on
Several Occafions.
VI Z.
I. Valerius and Publicola. A Dialog.
II. A Syftem of Politics, delineated in ſhort
and eafy Aphorifms, now firſt publiſh'd from
the Author's own Manufcript.
III. Political Aphorifms.
IV. Seven Models of a Commonwealth, Ancient
and Modern, &c.
V. The Ways and Means of introducing a
Commonwealth by the Confent of the People.
VI. The humble Petition of divers well affected
Perfons: with the Parlament's Anſwer therto.
PPP
$
475
Valerius and Publicola:
Or, the True
FOR
OF A
M
POPULAR COMMONWEALTH
EXTRACTED
EX PURIS NATURALIBUS.
Quos perdere vult JUPITER, hos dementat prius.
T
To the READER.
HE way of Dialog being not faithfully manag'd, is of all other
the most fraudulent; but being faithfully manag'd, is the clearest
and moſt effectual for conveying a man's fenfe into the under-
ftanding of his Reader. There is nothing in this World, next
the favor of God, I ſo much defire as to be familiarly understood; which
becauſe great men have thought below them, has prov'd hitherto but the ruin
of themſelves, and the detriment of the Public: for which reaſon, having
try'd all other means, I now add this. My work, if I be not given over
to utter blindness, is the fame with, or nearest, that of the Nation; and
the Work of the Nation being not understood, is in extreme danger of ut-
ter ruin.
1
D
Valerius.
EAREST PUBLICOLA, how have I long'd to meet you, and
in the favorable filence of this long Walk!
Publicola.
What has my noble Friend VALERIUS to command his faithful
Servant?
Val. Why really, notwithſtanding the tumult of theſe extravagant
Changes, your laſt Diſcourſe had fo much of my attention then, and
has had fuch a digeftion with me fince, that I feel it running in my
Veins.
Pub. Do you find in that any temtation to the buckling on of High-
fhoon?
Val. My thoughts, PUBLICOLA, are quite of another ftrain; fom-
times I fancy I fee England graſping at Empire, like Rome it ſelf.
Ppp 2
Pub.
476
Valerius and Publicola.
Pub. Why then VALERIUS, my Difcourfes are not fuch as they
fay; there runs nothing of them in your Veins, that has imbas'd your
noble Blood.
Val. The Heraldry of them is of as high a pitch as the Policy; but
I would have them be a little lower in fom things.
Pub. What are thoſe ?
Val. The Vulgar complain of you, that you are too learn'd.
Pub. I thought it was not you, VALERIUS.
Val. For all that, I could be contented to fee
you raiſe
your Structure
by your own ſtrength, and without the help of other Authors.
Pub. That I dare fay you may, when you pleaſe.
Val. I muſt ſee it then, before I lofe the covert of thefe reverend
Elms.
Pub. You take care that the Building ſhould be well fituated; and
for the Foundation, I may prefume by what has already pafs'd between
you and me, that we are long fince agreed.
Val. That the threefold Balance, or Diftribution of Property is the
cauſe of the triple way of Government, I fully confent with you;
alfo, that the Balance now in England is in the People plainly, and ex-
cluſively both of a King and Lords.
W
Pub. You are not of them that grant this, and then aſk which way
a Commonwealth fhould be introduc'd in England.
Val. Why truly yes; feeing not only the People are fo wholly un-
acquainted with the means, but their Leaders fo averſe to it.
Pub. Think you that a Plant grows the worſe for not underſtand-
ing the manner of its Vegetation?
Val. A Plant is not a free Agent; but among Men who are free
Agents, the Introduction of Government feems to be Arbitrary.
Pub. What, where there is no more than Hobfon's choice, this or
none?
Val. It is true, that if they can have nothing elſe, they muſt at
length have a Commonwealth; but tho they can have nothing elſe to
be holding, yet they will be trying other things.
Pub. There is all the miſchief.
Val. And enough to ruin the Nation.
Pub. To hurt it very fore, but not to ruin it; nor yet to evade a
Commonwealth, except they expofe us to foren Invafion.
Val. I am glad of your Confidence.
Pub. You may let it pafs for Confidence, if you pleaſe; but if there
be no other way except that only of Invafion, wherby the preſent Ba-
lance can receive a change fudden enough to admit of any other Form,
the reaſon why we muſt have a Commonwealth is coercive.
Val. And putting the cafe it be the Will of God to defend us from
foren Invafion, how long will it be ere they fee at home the coercive-
neſs of this Reaſon, or, which is all one, that all Power is in and from
the People?
Pub. Good VALERIUS, how long is it fince this was both ſeen
and declar'd in Parlament?
Val. Perhaps as they meant, it might be admitted as a Principle even
in Monarchy.
Pub. This with your pardon you will revoke, feeing you well re-
member that this their Declaration of Power in the People, has bin
excluſive of King and Lords, and that in expreſs terms.
Val.
Valerius and Publicola.
477
Val. But in this they related not at all to the Diſtribution of Property.
Pub. Why then, there is not fuch a difference between the growing
of a Plant and of a Commonwealth, as you thought; feeing a Com-
monwealth knowing as little, dos no lefs.
Val. This of all others is to me a Confideration fulleft of comfort.
Pub, It will in time procede accordingly, thro a mere neceffity of
nature, or by feeling; but your defire, I fuppofe, is to know how it
ſhould be rationally introduc'd, or by feeing, and that with more eaſe
and greater ſpeed.
Val. If it might pleaſe God, I would live to have my fhare of it,
tho I fear I never ſhall.
Pub. You carve for yourſelf ill: for by hope a man injoys even that
which he never coms to attain; and by fear he is depriv'd even of
that which he coms not to lofe.
Val. I muſt confefs that our Army has it now in their power to in-
troduce a Commonwealth.
Pub. And there is no other action in their power that can excuſe
them.
Val. Putting the cafe they would hearken to you, what courſe
would
you advife?
Pub. The fame I have advis'd over and over.
Val. As how?
Pub. As how! is that yet a Queſtion? Let them divide the Terri-
tory into fifty equal parts.
Val. They will never make a new divifion.
Pub. Why then they ſhall never have an equal Commonwealth.
Val. What ill luck is this, that the firſt ſtep ſhould be fo difficult?
Pub. You ſpeak as if never any Territory had bin divided, wheras
there is none that has not; and Surveyors will tell you, it is a work to
be perfectly perform'd in two months, and with eaſe.
Val. Putting the cafe this were don, what is next?
Pub. The next is, that the Commonwealth were complete.
Val. Say you fo? this indeed makes amends: but how?
Pub. With no more addition, than that the People in
divifion elect annually two Knights and feven Deputys.
Val. I dare fay the People would never ſtick at this.
Pub. Not fticking at this, they of their own power have inſtituted
the two great Affemblys, of which every Commonwealth confifts.
Val. But in advifing theſe things, you muſt adviſe men ſo that they
may underſtand them.
every
diſtinct
Pub. VALERIUS, could I as eaſily have advis'd men how to un-
derſtand, as what to do, there had bin a Commonwealth ere this.
Val. Com, I will have you try fomthing of this kind, and begin
upon fome known Principle, as this, All Power is in the People.
Pub. Content. But the diffufive Body of the People (at leaſt in a
Territorry of this extent) can never exercife any Power at all.
Val. That is certain.
Pub. Hence is the neceffity of fom form of Government,
Val. That is, the People of themſelves being in a natural incapacity
of exercifing Power, muſt be brought into fom artificial or political
capacity of exercifing the fame.
Pub. Right. Now this may be don three ways; as firſt, by a fin-
gle Perfon-
Val.
1
1
478
Valerius and Publicola.
Val. How!
Pub. Nay, I am not likely to trouble you much upon this point:
but as you were intimating juft now, there are Royalifts who derive
the original Right of Monarchy from the conſent of the People.
Val. There are ſo.
Pub. And theſe hold the King to be nothing elſe, but the Reprefen-
ter of the People and their Power.
Val. As the Turc.
Pub. Yes, as the Turc.
Val. The People's Power at that rate coms to the People's Slavery.
Pub. You fay right; and fo it may at other rates too.
Val. As how?
Pub. Why, as I was about to fay, The Power of the People may
be politically brought into exerciſe three ways: by a fingle Perfon; by
an Aſſembly confifting of a few; or by an Aſſembly conſiſting of many.
Val. Or by a mixture.
Pub. Nay, I pray let that alone yet a while: for which way ſoever
you go, it muſt com at length to fom mixture, ſeeing the fingle Perfon
you nam❜d but now, without his Divan or Council to debate and pro-
pofe to him, would make but bad work even for himſelf. But as the
Government coms to be pitch'd fundamentally upon one of theſe three,
fo it differs not only in name, but in nature.
Val. I apprehend you, as Monarchy, Ariftocracy, and Democracy.
Pub. Nay, you are out with your Learning, when you have for-
bidden it me.
But in Countrys where there is not a Nobility fuffici-
ently balanc'd or inrich'd, there can be none of your Ariftocracy; and
yet there may (as long asit will laft) be a Government in a few.
Val. What call you that?
Pub. Nay, what ſay you?
Val, Com, it is Oligarchy: when all is don, fom words of Art we
muſt uſe.
Pub. I thought you would com to it; and yet feeing I have pro-
mis'd, I will be fparing. But with your pardon, you have diforder'd
my Diſcourſe, or by this time I had fhew'd, that if the Power of the
People be committed to a fingle Perfon, the common Intereft is fub-
mitted to that of a Family; and if it be committed to a few, it is fub-
mitted to the Intereſt of a few Familys.
Val. Which, fo many times as they are more than one, is ſo many
fo
times worſe than Monarchy.
Pub. I am not forry that you are of that mind. For there is no fuch
thing as a Commonwealth, or, as you, fay, Democracy in Nature, if it
be not pitch'd upon a numerous Affembly of the People.
Val. What call you numerous?
Pub. Why an Affembly fuch for number as can neither go upon the
intereſt of one fingle Perfon or Family, nor the intereft of a few Per-
fons or Familys.
Val. How will you conſtitute fuch an Aſſembly?
Pub. Commonwealths, for the Conſtitution of their Popular Affem-
blys, have had two ways. The first by inrolling all their Citizens,
and ſtating the Quorum in fuch fort, that all to and above the ſtated
number repairing at the time and place appointed, are impower'd to
give the Vote of the whole Commonwealth.
~
Val.
Valerius and Publicola.
Val. The Athenian Quorum was fix thouſand; which towards the
latter end of that Commonwealth came to five.
Pub. So, fo, you may quote Authors: But you may remember alſo,
that Athens was a ſmall Commonwealth.
Val. How many would you adviſe for England?
Pub. Put the caſe I ſhould ſay, ten thouſand?
Val. They will laugh at you.
Pub. What can I help that? or how many would
Val. I would not go above five thouſand?
you adviſe?
Pub. Mark you then they only that are neareſt would com; and
fo the City of London would give Law to the whole Nation.
Val. Why really that fame now is clear; but would there be lefs
danger of it, in cafe you ftated your Quorum at ten, at twenty, or
tho it were at a hundred or two hundred thouſand?
Pub. No: For which caufe, as to England, it is a plain cafe, that
this is no way for the inftitution of a popular Affemby.
Val. Which way then?
Pub. For England there is no way but by Repreſentative, to be
made to riſe equally and methodically by ftated Elections of the Peo-
ple throout the whole Nation.
Val. Needs this to be fo numerous as the other?
Pub. No.
Val. Why?
Pub. Becauſe it is not obnoxious to a Party, to any certain Rank,
or fuch as are fooneft upon the fpur, or that make leaſt account of
their Pains or of their Mony.
Val. Will you be fo curious?
Pub. Do you think this a Curiofity? How elfe will you avoid im-
provement in the Intereft of the better fort, to the detriment of thoſe
of meaner rank; or in the Intereſt of the Few, to the detriment of
that of the Many?
Val. But even this way there is danger of that foul Beaſt the Oli-
garchy.
Pub. Look about you. The Parlament declares all Power to be in
the People; is that in the better fort only?
Val Stay; the King was to obferve Leges & Conftitutiones quas
vulgus elegerit: That Vulgus is to be underſtood of the Parlament;
and the Parlament confifted wholly of the better fort.
Pub. It is true; but then that Commonwealth acted in all things
accordingly.
Val. It was, you will fay, no Democracy.
Pub. And will you fay it was?
Val. No truly yet this deriv'd in part from the free Election of the
People.
Pub. How free? feeing the People, then under Lords, dar'd not
to elect otherwiſe than as pleas'd thoſe Lords.
Val. Somthing of that is true; but I am perfuaded that the People,
not under Lords, will yet be moft addicted to the better fort.
Pub. That is certain.
Val. How then will you prevent the like in your Inſtitution?
Pub. You fhall fee preſently. The diffufive Body of the People,
in which the Power is, and is declar'd to be, confifts in the far greater
part of the lower fort: wherfore their Reprefentative, to rife natural-
ly,
479
480
Valerius and Publicola.
5
ly, and to be exactly comprehenfive of the Common Intereſt, muf
confiſt alſo in the far greater part of the lower fort.
Val. Of what number will you have this Repreſentative?
Pub. Suppoſe a thouſand, or therabout.
Val. What proportion will you have the meaner fort in it to hold to
the better?
Pub. Suppofe about fix to four.
Val. How will you order it, that it ſhall be ſo conſtituted?
Pub. Why thus: Let the People in every Precinct or Shire at E-
lection chufe four under one hundred pounds a year in Lands, Goods,
or Mony, together with three at or above that proportion.
Val. I fee not but this Repreſentative muſt be exact.
Pub. It is yet none at all; that is, unleſs you prefume Changes:
for one thouſand, without change governing the whole People, a-
mounts neither to a Repreſentative nor to a Commonwealth, but coms
ftill to your hard name.
Val. How do you order your Changes?
Pub. By annual election of one third part for three years.
Val. So that every year one third part of your Affembly falls out of
it, and a new third part at the fame time enters into the ſame.
Pub. Even fo.
Val. This caufes the Repreſentative to be perpetually extant.
Pub. It dos fo: But to refpit that a little, I fhould be glad, before
I ftir farther, to know which way the Vote of a Repreſentative thus
conftituted, can go one hair's breadth befide the common and public
Intereft of the whole diffufive Body of the People.
Val. No way in the Earth that I can imagin, except thro igno-
rance.
Pub. No Human Ordinance is infallible; and what is don thro mere
ignorance or miſtake at one time, will be found and amended at
another.
Val. A thouſand men, and fix to four of the lower fort perpetual-
ly extant! this muſt be a grievous Charge to the moſt of them; it
will be hard to bring them, and impoffible to hold them together.
Pub. Upon fuch as are elected and com not, confiderable Fines
muſt be levy'd; and fuch as com and ſtay together muſt have good
Salarys.
Val. Salarys to fo many! what will that com to?
Pub. Not, with the reft of the Commonwealth, to three hundred
thousand pounds a year.
Val. Why? the Kings have rarely had above fix.
Pub. And did England ever grudg them any part of that
tion?
propor-
Val. I muſt confeſs the Quarrel grew when they would not be con-
tented with fo little.
Pub. Now if England never did, nor needed grudg a King fix
Lundred thousand pounds a year, to be ſpent among Courtiers, why
ſhould we imagin the fhould grudg a Commonwealth three hundred
thouſand pounds a year, to be ſpent among Magiftrats ?
Val. But Parlamentmen have taken nothing.
Pub. Have the People given nothing?
Val. That was for the maintenance of Armys.
Pub. And whether had you rather maintain Armys or Magiftrats?
Val.
Valerius and Publicola.
481
Val. But putting the cafe that this Affembly needed not to be per-
petually extant, this Charge in the whole or in the far greater part
might be abated.
Pub. I cannot tell: for how often think you fit that this Affembly
fhould convene?
Val. Parlaments at moſt met not above once a year.
Pub. If they had bin perpetually extant, there would have bin no
King.
Val. No truly, except in name only.
Pub. Therfore the Popular Affembly in a Commonwealth ought
not to be perpetually extant.
Val. To the end, you will fay, that there may be fom King.
Pub. Mock not: or what other guard of Liberty is there in any
Commonwealth, but the Popular Affembly?
Val. Com, let them affemble twice a year upon their ordinary
Guard.
Pub. And what if there be an extraordinary occafion?
Val. Then, as often as there is any fuch occafion.
Pub. How much will this abate of their neceffary Charge, or of
the Salarys? And how much better were it for a Reprefentative to
lead the Life of Stateſmen than of Carriers?
Val. Commonwealths, whofe affemblys have bin of the former
kind, have call'd them no otherwiſe than at ſtated times, or upon ex-
traordinary occafions.
Pub. But then their Affemblys were not equal Repreſentatives, but
confifted of fuch as being next at hand were ſtill ready upon any oc-
cafion.
Val. That makes indeed a confiderable difference: But were this
Repreſentative always extant, I cannot fee but it would have nothing
to do.
Pub. And in caſe it be not always extant, you imagin that it may
have fomthing to do.
Val. Yes.
Pub. Then whether gos it better with the Commonwealth when
the Repreſentative has fomthing to do, or when it has nothing to do?
Val. This is very quaint.
Pub. No truly, VALERIUS, it is plain, that the Guard of Liberty
perpetually extant, in doing nothing muft do much; and not per-
petually extant, in doing much may do nothing.
Val. I am afraid that having nothing to do, they will make work.
Pub. Such I warrant you as the Parlament and the Army made the
other day.
Val. Nay, I am not fo wide. A civil Council and a ſtanding Ar-
my muft needs have Intereſts much more diftinct than two civil
Affemblys; and where there is not a like caufe, I know well enough
there cannot be the like effect.
Pub. I fhall defire no more, than that you will hold to this; and
then tell me what Difputes there us'd to be between the Senat of Venice
and the great Council, which is perpetually extant, and confifts of a-
bout two thouſand.
Val. Nay, certain it is, that between thoſe two there never was any
diſpute at all.
Q q q
Pub.
J
482
Valerius and Publicola.
1
Pub. Then tell me for what caufe fuch a thing fhould any more
happen between the Affemblys propos'd; or, according to your own
rule, from like caufes expect like effects.
Val. You put me to it.
Pub. Nay, it is you that put me to it; for you will be prefuming
that this Affembly can have nothing to do, before we com to con-
fider what are their proper Bufineffes and Functions.
Val. I beg your pardon, and what are thoſe?
Pub. Why furely no fmall matters; for in every Commonwealth
truly Popular, it is infeparable from the Affembly of the People that
firft they wholly and only have the right of Reſult in all matters of
Lawgiving, of making Peace and War, and in levying Men and
Mony: Secondly, That the ultimat Reſult in Judicature ly to them:
and thirdly, That they have right to call to account, and to puniſh
their Magiftrats for all matters of Maladminiſtration of Govern-
ment.
Val. I affure you this muſt amount to a great deal of buſineſs.
Pub. Certain it is, that in fom Commonwealths the Popular Affem-
bly by this means has bin perpetually imploy'd.
Val. And fo I think it might be in England.
Pub. It might; but I do not think it would. However, if it be
in the undoubted right of the Popular Affembly to procede againſt
their Magiftrats for Maladminiftration, would you leave it upon
the hand of thoſe Magiftrats, whether this Repreſentative fhouldˇaf-
femble or no?
Val. Com, you have faid enough, it were not prudent: but as to
the matter of Appeals, it is certain that in Ifrael the ultimat Reſort was
to the Sanhedrim or 70 Elders.
Pub. I know it very well: nevertheleſs you ſhall find that the Con-
gregation judg'd Benjamin; and if you mark the Appeal to the 70
Elders, you ſhall find that it was not an Appeal of the Party for
Relief, but of the Judges in inferior Courts for further light and di-
rection in difficult cafes of the Law.
Val. Let me but know in what manner this Affembly is to perform
theſe Functions, and I have don.
Pub. Why as to matter of Lawgiving, I told you that they whol-
ly and only have the right and power of Refult.
Val. But to Reſult, there muſt neceffarily go precedent Debate;
ſeeing a Man, much leſs an Affembly, refolves not upon any thing
without fom Confiderations, Motives or Reaſons therto conducing,
which ought to be firſt orderly and maturely debated: and how will
you bring a thouſand men, eſpecially being fix to four of the lower
fort, to debate any thing with order and maturity?
Pub. You fay that the Popular Affembly in Athens confifted at the
leaft of five thouſand.
Val. And I ſaid true.
Pub. Yet this Affembly debated: Why may not a thouſand men
debate as well as five thouſand ?
Val. As well! Nay PUBLICOLA, if they debate no better in your
Commonwealth than they did in that, you may know what will be-
com of it. And to tell you true, I do not think that a thousand men
can debate any whit more orderly and maturely than five thousand.
Pub. And fo think I too.
Val. How then?
Pub.
Valerius and Publicola.
483
Pub. How then? Why this is the reaſon of the Senat in every
Commonwealth.
Val. So there muſt be a Senat, which amounts to thus much; with-
out a Sénat there can be no Commonwealth, and with a Senat there
will always be Practices upon the Liberty of the People.
Pub. How prove you
that?
Val. Why by the Senat of Lacedemon in the beginning, and by the
Senat of Rome throout.
Pub. But find you the like by the Senat of Athens and Venice?
Val. No.
Pub. Confider then that theſe were by Election of the People, and
upon frequent Removes, and that the former were defective in one or
in both theſe circumſtances.
Val. You intend your Senat upon Removes then?
Pub. Right.
Val. And Elective by the People?
Pub. Yes.
Val. How? by the Popular Affembly, or by the body of the People
in their Precincts ?
Pub. By the body of the People in their Precincts, at the ſame time
when they elect their other Deputys, and with the fame circumftan-
ces, except that theſe be all elected out of fuch as have a hundred
pounds a year real or perfonal.
Val. What hurt, if they were elected by the Popular Affem-
bly?
Pub. They would not derive fo immediatly, nor rife fo equally from
the People, as when choſen in the Precincts; becauſe this way every
Shire coms neceffarily to have a ſhare in the Senat: befides, wife men
and underſtanding are better known in their Tribes than they can be in
an Affembly out of their Tribes, efpecially while they are new comers;
nor will the Popular Affembly afford fo good a choice as the whole
People. There are other Reafons.
Val. Enough, enough. Of what number do you conſtitute this
Senat ?
Pub. Of three hundred.
Val. Why ſhould not one hundred be full enough for a debating
Council, eſpecially feeing Debate is the more orderly where the
Counfillors are fewer?
Pub. You are to bear it in mind, that this Senat is upon annual
change in one third part.
Val. That is, every year one hundred having ſerv'd three years, go
out, and a new hundred coms in.
Pub. Right for which cauſe, to have one hundred well practis'd
in debate, your Senat muſt confift of three hundred.
Val. May not thoſe that go out com prefently in again by a new
Election ?
Pub. Not at all; for that were yet another way of continuing the
Government in a few.
Val. Do you mean that no man fhall ferve in this Capacity, or in
that of the Popular Affembly, but once in his life?
Pub. I mean that a man, having ferv'd his term in one of theſe,
may after a like vacation or interval be elected again to ferve in either
of them, and not before.
Q992
Val.
484
Valerius and Publicola.
Val. At what age do you make a man capable of thefe Elections?
Pub. Not till thirty.
Val. He ſtays a great while ere he coms to preferment, and is foon
out again at which rate a man fhould have much ado to attain to
fufficient knowlege for the leading of the Commonwealth.
Pub. This was never objected againſt Parlaments.
Val. It is true: but then the Election of Parlamentmen was not
oblig'd to any Interval, and divers have bin of every Parlament that
was fummon'd during their Lives.
Pub. Parlaments, when they were the most frequent, aſſembl❜d not
above once a year, very rarely fo often; and how long, pray, did they
uſually fit?
Val. Som two or three months.
Pub. I allow you the moſt you afk: at which rate a man that had
fat in twenty Parlaments, could not have fat above four years com-
plete.
Val. And in your Parlament, at one Election he fits three.
Pub. Mark you that?
Val. Yes, and more: Wheras a Parlamentman without interval
could in twenty years have fat but four complete, in your Affemblys a
man obferving his intervals, may in twenty years ferve ten years
complete.
Pub. You allow that, I hope, to be fom advantage towards acqui-
ring knowlege in conduct; and yet antiently your Parlamentmen were
in this point thought able enough.
Val. Now would I defire no more than to be as fully fatisfy'd, that
thefe Senators muſt be honeſt enough.
Pub. Which way can they be diſhoneſt?
Val. Indeed I am not yet acquainted with their ways: but if no-
thing can be propos'd to the popular Affembly, except by theſe only,
they ſhould, I think, propofe nothing but what is for their own ad-
vantage.
Pub. They are the Senat: and in that they have all the advantages
that a well-order'd Commonwealth can give to a Senat.
Val. But they will be ftill hankering after more.
Pub. As what?
Val. Why Riches or Power.
Pub. All Magiftrats are accountable to the Popular Aſſembly; and
fo, without acquifition of Power, I cannot imagin which way they
ſhould turn themſelves to the acquifition of Riches.
Val. They will drive then at Power; they will be coordinat.
Pub. In the World there has never yet bin any Senat that durſt ſo
much as pretend to Power.
Val. No? Had not the Senat of Ifrael, and that of Lacedemon Power?
Pub. Executive Power they had, in as much as they were Judica-
torys; but Legiſlative or Soverain Power (which is that wherof we
ſpeak) they had none at all.
Val. Other Senats have had other power, as in the managing of
foren Affairs, and the like.
Pub. Which ſtill coms not to the point in hand, becauſe in theſe
and the like matters, as the creation of divers Magiftrats, the Senat
uſes to be made Plenipotentiary by the Popular Affembly, that is, by
Law.
Val.
Valerius and Publicola.
485
1
Val. I hear them talk of making a coordinat Senat firſt, and with-
out the People, and then of affembling a Parlament in the old way to
govern with that Senat.
Pub. Things, VALERIUS, are foon faid; but if
but if any Parlament
whatever, fo it be elected by the People (and, perhaps, if otherwiſe)
do not make it one of their firſt works to pull down a coordinat Senat,
I aſk no credit to my Politics.
Val. This is to prophefy.
Pub. Then, to reafon the cafe: I fay, That the Senat affuming
Power, the popular Affembly falls immediatly to debate; and the
popular Affembly debating, the Senat is ipfo facto depos'd, there being
no other neceffary ufe or function of the Senat but Debate only.
Val. You faid but now, That the Popular Affembly could not de-
bate.
Pub. Not orderly and maturely: but upon fuch an occafion as this,
they will do as they can; nor is it avoidable.
Val. Nay, if there be fom occafion in which you allow that the
popular Affembly muft and ought to debate, there will hardly be any
in which they will be perfuaded that they may not. So this will com
to the pulling down of the Senat as often as the People pleaſe.
Pub. Which is fo much the rather to be fear'd, becauſe you fhall
never find that popular Affembly which did ever actually depofe their
Senat.
Val. Our Army has pull'd down a good many Parlaments.
Pub. What is that to the purpofe? Is our Army a popular Affem-
bly? Yet let them pull down a Parlament as often as they pleaſe, they
muſt ſet up another; and in this indeed there may be fom refem-
blance for let a popular Affembly pull down the Senat as often as they
pleaſe, they muſt fet up another.
Val. Or a fingle Perfon.
Pub. Right for that holds both ways too, and (as to our caſe)
will ftand neither.
Val. The People of Athens debated, yet for all that their Senat was
not depos'd.
Pub. Not formally; but it remain'd little better than a Warren,
wherin great Men did, as it were, ſtart hares, to be hunted in the
tumult of the popular Affembly.
Val. Verily, PUBLICOLA, this Model of yours is a moſt entire
thing.
Pub. This with the neceffary confequences, as the divifion of the
Senat into Senatorian Councils, the adorning and actuating of this and
the other Affembly with fit Magiftrats, wherof I have fufficiently
diſcours'd in other places, amounts to an entire thing.
Val. And you offer it freely.
Pub. I do.
Val. Would it not grieve you to fee them crop a little of it, and
fpoil it?
Pub. They had better take it to fom purpoſe:
Fal. Nay, what they take will be to fom purpoſe, I warrant you.
Com, there is a Party, a felect, a refin'd Party, a Nation in a Na-
tion, that muft and will govern.
Pub. That is it which I defire to fee.
Val. You are of a rare temper: happy in unhappineſs.
Pub.
486
Valerius and Publicola.
Pub. O I love frequent Changes.
Val. Is that any of your Virtues?
Pub. Yes, where we are certain never to go right, while there re-
mains a way to go wrong.
Val. They are confident men.
can govern the World.
(
Pub. Till they have try'd.
as can be govern'd by Reafon.
or what
People.
They cannot be perfuaded but they
Such as can govern the World, are fuch
Now there is no Party refin'd, felect,
you will in England, amounting to one twentieth part of the
Val. One twentieth part of the People, for aught I know, may
amount to a hundred thouſand; there is no Party any thing near this
account, I dare fay.
Pub. A twentieth part of the People can never govern the other
nineteen but by a perpetual Army.
Val. They do not like that the worſe.
Pub. The People having been govern'd by a King without an Army,
and being govern'd by a Commonwealth with an Army, will deteft
the Government of a Commonwealth, and defire that of a King.
Val. Yes, fuch is the ſpirit of the Nation.
Pub. Such is the ſpirit in this cafe of any Nation.
Val. And yet they make it a particular quarrel.
Pub. They make every thing particular: if you fpeak of Ifrael,
Athens, Rome, Venice, or the like, they hear you with volubility of
countenance; and will not have it that God ever minded the matter of
Government, till he brought them in play. Nay, tho they have com
heels over head for this very thing, I know not how often, yet they
are refolv'd to take no warning.
Val. PUBLICOLA, you will be fhent.
Pub. I am to perform my duty. To flatter is not my duty.
Val. But between you and me, Do you not think that the fpirit of
the Nation, or the main body of the People of this Land, defires the re-
ſtitution of their antient Government ?
Pub. I make little doubt of it.
Val. How then in caſe of a Commonwealth are they to be truſted?
Pub. In cafe of a Commonwealth, it is not the People that are
truſted, but the Orders of the Commonwealth.
Val. The Commonwealth muſt confift of the People.
1
Pub. The People under the Monarchy, when that invaded them,
invaded it.
Val. True, and in fuch a manner as has caus'd the ruin of it,
Pub. What was the ſpirit of the People then?
Val. But it is now another thing.
Pub. Nay, the very fame: for then it invaded a Government that
invaded their Liberty, and now it would invade a Government that
invades their Liberty.
Val. But how ſhould this be mended?
Pub. Do you not fee that this ſhould not be mended, but in-
courag'd?
Val. How fhould it be incourag'd then?
Pub. By` giving them a form that muſt preſerve their Liberty.
Val. I little doubt but there is in your Form a full fecurity to the
People of their Liberty: but do you think that there is in it any full
fecurity
Valerius and Publicola.
487
#
fecurity that the People fhall not caft off this Form?
Pub. If it fecures their Liberty, why ſhould they?
Val. My queſtion is not, why they ſhould, but whether they can.
Pub. They cannot, without going againſt their own intereſt.
Val. But they can go against their own intereft,
Pub. Nay, remember your felf, whether the Form fhewn be not
fuch, as you have already granted can in no wife go befide the intereſt
of the whole People.
Val. They that are now in power, have no truft at all in Forms.
Pub. Do they fail in Ships, not upon Planks? Do they ride Horſes,
not Hogs? Do they travel in Coaches, not upon Hurdles? Do they
live in Houſes, not in Ditches? Do they eat Bread, not Stones?
Val. Enough, enough.
Pub. But in fo doing, they acknowlege fuch a Form to be ſecurity
for fuch a ufe or action. And muſt the form of a Commonwealth be
the only form in which they can allow no fecurity for the proper ufe
and action?
Val. They obſerve none of this.
Pub. Do they obſerve that there is any fecurity in Men ?
Val. That, eſpecially in our times, were fomwhat a hard matter.
Pub. And how many Securitys are there?
Val. I know no more, than one perfonal, or in Men; another real,
or in Things.
Pub. Chufe you whether you would have.
Val. Well, be the neceſſary action or ufe of your Form what it will,
I would fee it more plainly and particularly demonftrated how the
ſpirit of the Nation, or the whole People, being freely eligible into
your affemblys, muſt preſently loſe that inclination which now plain-
ly they have to ſet up Monarchy, or to perfecute for Conſcience.
Pub. You will allow no weight in the Argument, that a People in
Liberty, unleſs the Orders of their Commonwealth were firft funda-
mentally ruin'd, that is, broken in the balance or foundation, did never
do either of theſe.
Val. What weight foever I allow to this Argument, it is no ways to
my preſent purpoſe.
Pub. You will put me then befide experience, and to fhew by what
reaſon it is that a Peartree muft bear Pears, or why men gather not
Grapes on Thorns, or Figs on Thiſtles.
Val. Poor PUBLICOLA, be the taſk as hard as it will, I am for
this time refolv'd to hold you to it.
Pub. What is it then that any Government can be fufficiently founded
or balanc'd upon, but fuch an Intereſt as is fufficiently able to bear it?
Val. Good Sir, a Government ought to be founded upon Juftice, I
take it.
Pub. Right and is not that Government which is founded upon an
Intereſt not ſufficiently able to bear it, founded upon Injuſtice?
Val. I fufpect whither this will go. A Government founded upon
the overbalance of Property, is legitimatly founded, and fo upon
Juſtice; but a Government founded upon the underbalance of Pro-
perty, muft of neceffity be founded upon Force, or a ftanding Army.
Is not this that which you mean by Intereft fufficient or not fufficient
to fuftain a Government?
Pub. You have it right.
Val.
!
488
Valerius and Publicola.
Val. O Atheiſt! this damns the Government of the Saints.
Pub. Look you now, how irreligious a thing it may be made, to
ſpeak but with common honefty. Do you think that fuch as are
plainly Oligarchiſts, or fhall exerciſe by a force, and without election
by the People, fuch a Power as is both naturally and declaredly in the
People, and in them only, can eſtabliſh their Throne upon Juftice?
Val. No.
Pub. Do you think that fuch as are truly Saints, can eſtabliſh their
Throne upon Injuftice?
Val. No.
Pub. Why then you have granted, that fuch as are plainly Oligar-
chifts cannot be truly Saints. Again, do you ftill think, as you once
intimated, that a Government now introduc'd in England, exactly ac-
cording to the Principles of Prudence and Juſtice, would rule the
Earth ?
Val. Yes.
Pub. Do you think, that fuch as are truly Saints, if they introduce
a Government, ought to introduce it exactly according to the Princi-
ples of Prudence and Juſtice?
Val. Yes.
Pub. Why then, let fuch as are truly Saints but fee what it is to rule
the. Earth, and take the Rule of the Earth.
Val. They will not approve of this way.
Pub. How! not the Saints approve of Prudence and Juftice! Who
is the Atheiſt now, VALERIUS?
Val. Good PUBLICOLA, let us keep to the point in hand. You
fay, That the fecurity of Liberty lys not in the People, but in the
form of their Government; fo I am yet to expect when you will
ſhew, what there is in your form, why it must be impoffible for the
People under it to reſtore Monarchy, or to perfecute for Confcience.
Pub. See you not, that to do either of thefe under fuch a form, muſt
be pointblank against their Intereft?
Val. But fo either of thefe is now, and yet in this pofture
confeſs that they would do both.
you will
Pub. Mark how I am us'd. I fpeak of a Form fupported by an In-
tereſt ſufficiently able to bear it, and of an Intereft contain'd under a
Form fufficiently able to fecure it, and you inftance in a Pofture which
is no form at all, but fuch a confufion among, and force upon the
People, as creates an Intereft in them to rid themſelves which way
they can of ſuch a miſery,
Val. I did acknowlege and muſt confefs, that your popular Affem-
bly is fuch as cannot err, except thro ignorance; but thro this, you
your ſelf have acknowleg'd and muſt confefs, that it may er.
Pub. I retract nothing.
Val. Now firſt, or never, they will reſtore M onarchy thro igro-
rance.
Pub. But they cannot do this first, therfore they can never do it.
Val. Why cannot the Popular Affembly do this firſt?
Pub. Becauſe it muſt firſt be propos'd by a Senat, that can neither do
any fuch thing thro ignorance nor thro knowlege.
Val. Nay, then have at you; I will fet this fame Senat and Re-
preſentative of yours to work in fuch a manner, that you ſhall confels
they may ſet up Monarchy.
1
Pub.
Valerius and Publicola.
489
C
.
.
<
Pub. Do
your worſt.
Val. Your Senat being affembl'd (I will not have them make long
Speeches;
Pub. Nor I.)
Val. Rifes me up one of the Senators, and fays, Mr. Speaker,
this Nation has bin long in labor, but now thro the mercy of God,
the Child is not only com to the Birth, but there is alfo ftrength to
bring forth In the number of Counfillors there is ftrength; the
number of this Houfe is good (far better than has uſually bin of late)
' and their Election has bin very free and fair. Here is alfo, I know
not how (but the Inventions of men are overrul'd by the Providence
of God) an extraordinary and exceding great confluence of honeft
men, who are not fo well here; and if
<
c
you determin
any thing that
' is good for your Country, will go home and pray for you.
you. Now,
Sir, (to be brief) fince our Government confifted of King, Lords,
and Commons, the antient, the only, the moſt happy Government
that this Nation, nay, that the world ever knew, it is but too well
known, that we have had no Government at all: wherfore my o-
pinion is, that we propoſe, as they call it, to theſe honeſt men (who
you need not doubt will receive it with glad hearts) the reftitution
of Right, and of the Government in this Nation by King, Lords,
• and Commons.'
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As fure as you live, PUBLICOLA, thus much being faid, your
whole Senat will immediatly agree to propofe it to the Repreſentative:
and thus much being propofed to the Reprefentative, thofe People will
throw up their Caps for joy, and immediatly return to their Houſes.
Pub. But VALERIUS, thus much has bin faid in Parlament when
the Houſe was fuller; when they who were for this Reftitution were
back'd by a fingle Perſon in actual poffeffion of the Throne; when
over and above the zeal of the Prefbyterians, there were Partys that
knew no other means of felf-prefervation; as without, Divines be-
laboring the Oak of every Pulpit; and within, Lawyers, Officers,
and Penfioners: yet was it fo far from being carry'd, that the fingle
Perfon has bin forc'd to diffolve Parlaments, and that thro apparent
danger of being overrun by the Principles of a Commonwealth not in
being. But if this were fo when a Commonwealth could fcarce be
hoped, what will it be when the Commonwealth ſhall be in ſuch a con-
dition as cannot be withſtood? for the Senat can never com to propoſe
any thing to the People without firft agreing upon debating what it is
they will propofe; nor is it poffible that fuch Debate ſhould be
brought to any end, but by reafons therto conducing: now it must not
only be impoffible to find reafons for the reſtitution of Monarchy, but
the reafons why Monarchy ought not to be reſtor❜d muſt be obvious;
not only in regard that it is quite contrary to the intereſt of the Na-
tion, and of thefe Affemblys, but to the intereft ten to one of every
particular man in either of thefe Affemblys: nor are or have the
reaſons bin lefs obvious, or lefs ventilated in Parlament, why Monar-
chy as to this Nation is impoffible in it ſelf.
Val. Will you fay the like for Liberty of Confcience?
Pub. Yes; becauſe without Liberty of Confcience, Civil Liberty
cannot be perfect; and without Civil Liberty, Liberty of Confcience
cannot be perfect.
Rrr
Val.
490
Valerius and Publicola.
Val. Theſe things are true, but they never will fee them, never,
PUBLICOLA: you your ſelf ſay, that the People cannot ſee, but they
can feel.
of
Pub. I meant that of the diffufive Body of the People, not of the
People under good Orders; in which cafe they are the fharpeft fighted
any kind of government whatſoever: and therfore it is not modeſt
that you, or I, or any particular Man or Party, blinded with ſelf-con-
ceit, fhould pretend to fee with fuch a Conftitution; or fhew me
that Ey under the Sun, that fees like that of Venice. But putting the
cafe it were otherwife as to feeing, theſe things are plainly palpable
or obvious to feeling.
Val. I have indeed obferv'd, that in Commonwealths there are very
few that fee or underſtand them, and yet their affection to that way
of Government is exceeding vigorous.
Pub. Whence can this otherwife be than from feeling? But one
thing, VALERIUS, I take at your hands extreme heavily.
Val. What is that, PUBLICOLA?
Pub. That you with one little Speech of a fingle Senator, fhould
run fo regardlefly over theſe two Affemblys, without taking any no-
tice at all of the neceffary Courſe of them.
Val. What Courfe, PUBLICOLA?
Pub. Why you might eafily have thought that among three hun-
dred Senators there might have bin at leaſt one hundred as good Speak-
ers as yours.
Val. Have I faid any thing to the contrary?
Pub. And do you or I what we can, ten to one of them will be
longer winded than you have allow'd.
Val. For that matter let them pleaſe themſelves.
Pub. Ay, but then you ſhould not have made an end of your Debate
in a minute.
Val. What is all this?
Pub. Why I fay, They would have bin debating on that point at
leaft a fortnight.
Val. Well, and when that had been don, would never have agreed.
Pub. No.
Val. Did not you ſay that before?
Pub. Well, but I am now upon that point; that was to the
matter in debate, this is to the manner of proceding: imagin the
matter had bin fuch upon which they could have agreed.
Val. What then?
Pub. That fuch an agreement had bin a Decree of the Senat.
Val. Is a Decree of the Senat binding?
Pub. If it be upon a Law made, it is binding; if upon a Law to
be made, it is to be propos'd to the People. Now every Propofition
to the People is to be promulgated, that is, printed and publiſh'd to
the whole nation fix weeks before the time that the Reprefentative is
to affemble and give the Vote of the Commonwealth, or that teſt
without which no fuch Propofition can be any Law.
Val. By this means it muſt follow, that the whole People both by
Difcourfe and Letters, debate fix weeks together upon the matter.
Pub. You are right.
Val. How is it then that you fay, The Repreſentative of the
People muſt not debate? You allow to theſe leſs privilege than to the
whole People.
3
Pub.
Valerius and Publicola.
491
Pub. No lefs, nor in this point any more.
Val. Yet dos this amount to Debate in thofe that are of the Repre-
fentative.
Pub. You fay well, but not to any Debate at all in the Repreſen-
tative.
Val. Why this Repreſentative is nothing elſe but an Inftrument or
Method, wherby to receive the Reſult of the whole Nation with
order and expedition, and without any manner of tumult or con-
fufion.
Pub. And is that any thing the worſe ?
Val. No; but I am glad you have told it me: for that thoſe of the
Repreſentative would one way or other have Debate, I knew cer-
tainly.
Pub. In fum, are you fatisfy'd, that the Spirit of the Nation, or
the People, however they may now under no Form at all, and in de-
teftation of fuch as having govern'd them by force, will let them fee
no way out of confufion, defire their old Government, as having ne-
ver yet known any other; yet under fuch a Form as is propos'd, can
never go about to introduce Monarchy, without obvious difcove-
ry, that as to their Intereft it is quite contrary, and as to it felf im-
poffible?
Val. The fatisfaction is pretty good.
Pub. Pretty good! give me but half ſo good, that the Spirit of the
Army, not formerly obedient to Parlaments, and now dreading or de-
fpifing them, muft apprehend the reftitution of Monarchy to be quite
contrary to their intereſt.
Val. You furprize me: for if the Army will have no Parlament,
and a King reſtor❜d can now in England without an Army have no
Government, they may imagin this their only way to Greatneſs and
Continuance.
Pub. Had not the Oligarchy then, if they meant well, better to have
us'd fober expreffions, and minded what thoſe true and real Intereſts are
which in the foundation and prefervation of every kind of Government
are paramount, than to have overcaft them with the miſt of new af-
fected Phrafes, and fallen on conjuring up Spirits?
Val. You have conjur'd up a Spirit that will keep me waking.
Pub. Set him on pulling down the Law and the Miniftry; when
that is don, let him blow up Windſor Caſtle, Hampton Court, and
throw Whiteball into the Thames.
Val. It is the only way, for then there can be no King.
Pub. You may be fure of that, ſeeing the Count of Holland's Do-
main, and his Houſes are yet not only ftanding, but diligently pre-
ferved by the Hollanders.
Val. PUBLICOLA, have you any more to tell me?
Pub. VALERIUS, have you any more to afk me?
Val. Not, except why you have not given the Parlament to under-
ftand thus much.
Pub. I have printed it over and over.
Val. They take no great notice of Books; you ſhould have laid it,
as they fay, in their diſh by fom direct Addreſs, as a Petition, or ſo.
Pub. I did petition the Committee for Government.
Val. What anfwer did they make you?
Pub. None at all.
Rrr2
Val.
492
Valerius and Publicola.
Val. I would have gone further, and have preſented it to the Houſe.
Pub. Towards this alfo I went as far as I could.
Val. How far was that?
Pub. Why, I think my Petition may have bin worn out in the
pockets of fom two or three Members.
Val. Have you a Copy of it about_you?
Pub. Let me fee-here are many Papers; this fame is it.
To the Parlament of the Commonwealth of
England, &c.
Sheweth,
The Humble Petition, &c.
HAT what neither is, nor ever was in Nature, can never be in
T Nature.
THAT without a King and Lords, no government either is, or ever
was in Nature (but in mere force) other than by a Senat indu'd with Au-
thority to debate and propofe; and by a numerous Aſſembly of the People
wholly and only invested with the right of Refult in all matters of Law-
giving, of making Peace and War, and of levying Men and Money.
WHERFORE your Petitioner (to difburden his Confcience in a
matter of fuch concern to his Country) most humbly and earnestly
prays and befeeches this Parlament to take into Speedy and feri-
ous confideration the irrefragable truth of the Premifes, and
what therupon muſt affuredly follow, that is, either the inflitution
of a Commonwealth in the whole People of England (without
exception, or with exception for a time, of fo few as may be)
by way of a Senat, and a numerous aſſembly of the People, to
the ends, and for the respective Functions aforefaid; or the
inevitable ruin of this Nation, which God of his mercy avert.
And your Petitioner ſhall
pray, &c.
Val. I would it had bin deliver'd.
Pub. Look you, if this had bin preſented to the Houſe, I intended
to have added this other Paper, and to have printed them together.
I
Reader,
The Petitioner to the Reader.
SAY not that the Form contain'd in the Petition (if we had it,
and no more) would be perfect; but that without thus much (which
rightly introduc'd, introduces the reft) there neither is, was, nor can be
any fuch thing as a Commonwealth, or Government without a King and
Lords, in Nature.
WHERE
Valerius and Publicola.
493
WHERE there is a coordinat Senat, there must be a King, or it falls
inftantly by the People; as the King failing, the House of Peers fell by
the Commons.
WHERE there is a Senat not elective by the People, there is a per-
petual Feud between the Senat and the People, as in Rome.
TO introduce either of thefe Caufes, is certainly and inevitably to intro-
duce one of theſe Effects; and if ſo, then who are Cavaliers, I leave you
to judg hereafter.
BUT to add farther reaſon to experience. All Civil Power among us
(not only by declaration of Parlament, but by the nature of Property) is in
and from the People.
WHERE the Power is in the People, there the Senat can legitimatly
be no more to the Popular Alembly, than my Counfil at Law is to me,
that is (auxilium, non imperium) a neceſſary Aid, not a Competitor or
Rival in Power.
WHERE the Aids of the People becom their Rivals or Competitors
in Power, there their Shepherds becom Wolves, their Peace Difcord, and
their Government Ruin. But to impofe a felect or coordinat Senat upon
the People, is to give them Rivals and Competitors in Power.
SOM perhaps (fuch is the temper of the times) will fay, That fo
much buman Confidence as is exprefs'd, especially in the Petition, is A-
theistical. But how were it Atheistical, if I fhould as confidently foretel,
that a Boy must expire in Nonage, or becom a Man? I prophefy no other-
wife; and this kind of Prophefy is alſo of God, by thofe Rules of his Pro-
vidence, which in the known Government of the World are infallible.
In the right obfervation and application of thefe confifts all human Wif
dom; and we read that a poor man deliver'd a City by his Wifdom, Ecclef. 9. 14.
yet was this poor man forgotten. But if the Premifes of this Petition
fail, or one part of the Conclufion coms not to pass accordingly, let me bit
the other mark of this ambitious Addrefs, and remain a Fool upon Record
in Parlament to all Pofterity.
Val. Thou Boy! and yet I hope well of thy Reputation.
Pub. Would it were but as good now, as it will be when I can
make no uſe of it.
Val. The Major of the Petition is in fom other of your Writings;
and I remember fom Objections which have been made againſt it: As,
that à non eſſe nec fuiffe, non datur argumentum ad non poffe.
Pub. Say that in Englifb.
Val. What if I cannot? are not you bound to answer a thing, tho
it cannot be faid in Engliſh?
Pub. No truly.
Val. Well, I will fay it in English then. Tho there neither be
any Houſe of Gold, nor ever were any Houfe of Gold, yet there
may be a Houfe of Gold.
Pub. Right: but then, à non effe nec fuiſſe in natura, datur argu-
mentum ad non poſſe in natura.
Val. I hope you can fay this in English too.
Pub. That I can, now you have taught me.
fuch thing as Gold in nature, there never could
Gold.
If there were no
be any Houſe of
Val.
Valerius and Publicola.
494
Val. Softly. The frame of a Government is as much in Art, and
as little in Nature, as the frame of a Houſe.
Pub. Both foftly and furely. The Materials of a Government are as
much in Nature, and as little in Art, as the Materials of a Houſe.
Now as far as Art is neceffarily difpos'd by the nature of its Founda-
tion or Materials, fo far it is in Art as in Nature.
Val. What call you the Foundation, or the Materials of Govern-
ment?
Pub. That which I have long fince prov'd, and you granted, The
Balance, the diftribution of Property, and the Power thence natural-
ly deriving; which as it is in one, in a few, or in all, dos neceffarily
diſpoſe of the form or frame of the Government accordingly.
Val. Be the Foundation or Materials of a Houſe what they will,
the Frame or Superftructures may be diverfly wrought up or ſhapen;
and fo may thofe of a Commonwealth.
Pub. True but let a Houſe be never fo diverfly wrought up or
fhapen, it must confift of a Roof and Walls.
Val. That's certain.
Pub. And ſo muſt a Commonwealth of a Senat and of a Popular
Affembly, which is the fum of the Minor in the Petition.
Val. The Mathematicians fay, They will not be quarrelfom; but
in their Sphere there are things altogether new in the World, as the
preſent poſture of the Heavens is, and as was the Star in Caffiopeia.
Pub. VALERIUS, if the Major of the Petition extends as far as is
warranted by SOLOMON, I mean, that there is nothing new under
the Sun, what new things there may be, or have bin above the Sun
will make little to the prefent purpoſe.
Val. It is true; but if you have no more to fay, they will take this
but for fhifting.
Pub. Where there is Sea, as between Sicily and Naples, there was
antiently Land; and where there is Land, as in Holland, there was
antiently Sea.
Val. What then?
Pub. Why then the prefent poſture of the Earth is other than it
has bin, yet is the Earth no new thing, but confifts of Land and Sea
as it did always; fo whatever the prefent pofture of the Heavens be,
they confift of Star and Firmament, as they did always.
Val. What will you fay then to the Star in Caffiopaia?
Pub. Why I ſay, if it confifted of the fame matter with other
Stars, it was no new thing in nature, but a new thing in Caffiopeia;
as were there a Commonwealth in England, it would be no new thing
in Nature, but a new thing in England.
Val. The Star you will fay in Caffiopeia, to have bin a new thing in na-
ture, muſt have bin no Star, becauſe a Star is not a new thing in nature.
Pub. Very good.
Val. You run upon the matter, but the newneſs in the Star was in
the manner of the generation.
Pub. At Putzuoli near Naples, I have feen a Mountain that rofe
up from under water in one night, and pour'd a good part of the
Lake antiently call'd Lucrin into the Sea.
Val. What will you infer from hence?
Pub. Why that the new and extraordinary generation of a Star,
or of a Mountain, no more caufes a Star, or a Mountain to be a new
thing
Valerius and Publicola.
495
}
thing in nature, than the new and extraordinary generation of a
Commonwealth cauſes a Commonwealth to be a new thing in nature.
ARISTOTLE reports, that the Nobility of Tarantum being cut off in
a Battle, that Commonwealth became popular. And if the Pouder
Plot in England had deſtroy'd the King and the Nobility, it is poffible
that Popular Government might have rifen up in England, as the
Mountain did at Putzuoli. Yet for all theſe, would there not have
bin any new thing in nature.
Val. Som new thing (thro the blending of unſeen cauſes) there
may ſeem to be in fhuffling; but Nature will have her courſe, there
is no other than the old game.
Pub. VALERIUS, let it rain or be fair weather, the Sun to the dif-
ſolution of Nature ſhall ever riſe; but it is now fet, and I apprehend
the miſt.
Val. Dear PUBLICOLA, your Health is my own; I bid
night.
Pub. Goodnight to you, VALERIUS.
you good-
Val. One word more, PUBLICOLA: Pray make me a preſent of
thoſe fame Papers, and with your leave and licence, I will make uſe
of my Memory to commit the reſt of this Diſcourſe to writing, and
print it.
Pub. They are at your difpofing.
Val. I will do it as has bin don, but with your name to it.
Pub. Whether way you like beſt, moſt noble VALERIUS.
Octob. 22.
1659.
}
A
496
Chap. I.
A
Syftem of Politics
Delineated in ſhort and eaſy.
APHORISM S
Publiſh'd from the Author's own Manuſcript.
I.
A
CHA P. I.
Of GOVERNMENT.
PEOPLE is either under a ftate of Civil Government,
or in a ſtate of Civil War; or neither under a ftate of
Civil Government, nor in a ſtate of Civil War.
2. CIVIL Government is an Art whereby a Peo-
ple rule themſelves, or are rul'd by others.
3. THE Art of Civil Government in general is twofold, Na-
tional, or Provincial.
4. NATIONAL Government is that by which a Nation is go-
vern'd independently, or within it ſelf.
5. PROVINCIAL Government is that by which a Province
is govern'd dependently, or by ſom foren Prince or State.
6. A PEOPLE is neither govern'd by themſelves, nor by others,
but by reaſon of fom external Principle therto forcing them.
7.
FORCE is of two kinds, Natural and Unnatural.
8. NATURAL Force confifts in the vigor of Principles, and
their natural neceffary Operations.
9.
UNNATURAL Force is an external or adventitious oppo-
fition to the vigor of Principles, and their neceffary working, which,
from a violation of Nature, is call'd Violence.
10. NATIONAL Government is an effect of natural Force, or
Vigor.
II. PROVINCIAL Government is an effect of unnatural
Force, or Violence.
12. THE natural Force which works or produces National Go-
vernment (of which only I ſhall ſpeak hereafter) confifts in Riches.
13. THE Man that cannot live upon his own, muſt be a Servant ;
but he that can live upon his own, may be a Freeman.
14. WHERE a People cannot live upon their own, the Govern-
ment is either Monarchy, or Ariftocracy: where a People can live
upon
!
A Syftem of Politics.
497
their own,
upon own, the Government may be Democracy.
15. A MAN that could live upon his own, may yet, to fpare his
own, and live upon another, be a Servant: but a People that can live
upon their own, cannot ſpare their own, and live upon another; but
(except they be no Servants, that is, except they com to a Democracy)
they muſt waſte their own by maintaining their Maſter's, or by having
others to live upon them.
16. WHERE a People that can live upon their own, imagin that
they can be govern'd by others, and not liv'd upon by fuch Governors,
it is not the Genius of the People, it is the Miſtake of the People.
17. WHERE a People that can live upon their own, will not be
govern'd by others left they be liv'd upon by others, it is not the
Miſtake of the People, it is the Genius of the People.
18. OF Government there are three Principles; Matter, Priva-
tion, and Form.
I.
T
CHA P. II.
Of the Matter of Government.
HAT which is the Matter of Government, is what we call
an Eſtate, be it in Lands, Goods or Mony.
2. IF the Eſtate be more in Mony than in Land, the port or garb
of the Owner gos more upon his Monys than his Lands; which with
privat Men is ordinary, but with Nations (except fuch only as live
more upon their Trade than upon their Territory) is not to be found:
for which caufe overbalance of Riches in Mony or Goods, as to the
fequel of theſe Aphorifms, is altogether omitted.
3. IF the Eſtate be more in Land than in Goods or Mony, the
garb and port of the Owner (whether a Man or a Nation) gos more
if not altogether upon his Land.
4. IF a Man has fom Eftate, he may have fom Servants or a Fa-
mily, and confequently fom Government, or fomthing to govern: if
he has no Eſtate, he can have no Government.
5. WHERE the eldeft of many Brothers has all, or fo much
that the reft for their livelihood ftand in need of him, that Brother is
as it were Prince in that Family.
6. WHERE of many Brothers the eldeſt has but an equal ſhare,
or not fo inequal as to make the reſt to ſtand in need of him for their
livelihood, that Family is as it were a Commonwealth.
7. DISTRIBUTION of ſhares in Land, as to the three grand
Interefts, the King, the Nobility, and the People, muſt be equal or
inequal.
8. EQUAL diftribution of Land, as if one man or a few men
have one half of the Territory, and the People have the other half,
cauſes privation of Government, and a ſtate of Civil War: for the
Lord of Lords on the one fide being able to affert their pretenfion or
right to rule, and the People on the other their pretenfion or right
to Liberty, that Nation can never com under any form of Govern-
ment till that Queſtion be decided; and, Property being not by any
Law to be violated or mov'd, any fuch Queftion cannot be decided
but by the Sword only.
Sff
9. IN-
Chap. II.
498
A System of Politics.
Chap.III. 9. INEQUAL diftribution of fhares in Land, as to the three
grand Interefts, or the whole Land in any one of thefe, is that which
cauſes one of theſe three to be the predominant Intereſt.
10. ALL Government is Intereft, and the predominant Intereſt
gives the Matter or Foundation of the Government.
11. IF one man has the whole, or two parts in three of the whole
Land or Territory, the Intereſt of one man is the predominant In-
tereſt, and cauſes abfolute Monarchy.
12. IF a few men have the whole, or two parts in three of the
whole Land or Territory, the Intereft of the few or of the Nobility
is the predominant Intereft; and, were there any fuch thing in na-
ture, would cauſe a pure Ariftocracy.
13. IT being fo that pure Ariftocracy, or the Nobility having the
whole, or two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, with-
out a Moderator or Prince to balance them, is a ſtate of War, in which
every one, as he grows eminent or potent, afpires to Monarchy; and
that not any Nobility can have Peace, or can reign without having
fuch a Moderator or Prince, as on the one fide they may balance or
hold in from being abfolute, and on the other fide may balance or
hold them and their Factions from flying out into Arms: it follows,
that if a few men have the whole, or two parts in three of the whole
Land or Territory, the Intereft of the Nobility being the predomi-
nant Intereſt, muft of neceffity produce regulated Monarchy.
14. IF the Many, or the People, have the whole, or two parts
in three of the whole Land or Territory, the Intereft of the Many or
of the People is the predominant Intereft, and cauſes Democracy.
15. A PEOPLE neither under abfolute or under regulated
Monarchy, nor yet under Democracy, are under a Privation of Go-
vernment.
I.
W
CHA P. III.
Of the Privation of Government.
HERE a People are not in a ſtate of Civil Government,
but in a ſtate of Civil War; or where a People are neither
under a ſtate of Civil Government, nor under a ſtate of Civil War,
there the People are under Privation of Government.
2. WHERE one Man, not having the whole, or two parts in
three of the whole Land or Territory, yet affumes to himfelf the
whole Power; there the People are under Privation of Government,
and this privation is call'd Tyranny.
3. WHERE a few Men, not having the whole, or about two
parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, yet affume to them-
felves the whole Power; there the People are under Privation of Go-
vernment, and this Privation is call'd Oligarchy.
4. WHERE the Many, or the People, not having the whole, or
two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, yet affume to
themſelves the whole Power; there the People are under Privation of
Government, and this Privation is call'd Anarchy.
5.
WHERE the Tyranny, the Oligarchy, or the Anarchy, not
having in the Land or Territory fuch a full fhare as may amount to
the
A Syftem of Politics.
499
1
the truth of Government, have nevertheleſs fuch a fhare in it as may Chap. IV.
maintain an Army; there the People are under Privation of Govern-
ment, and this Privation is a ſtate of Civil War.
6. WHERE the Tyranny, the Oligarchy, or the Anarchy, have
not any ſuch ſhare in the Land or Territory as may maintain an Ar-
my, there the People are in privation of Government; which Priva-
tion is neither a ſtate of Civil Government, nor a ſtate of Civil War.
7. WHERE the People are neither in a ſtate of Civil Govern-
ment, nor in a ſtate of Civil War, there the Tyranny, the Oligarchy, or
the Anarchy, cannot ftand by any force of Nature, becauſe it is void of
any natural Foundation; nor by any force of Arms, becauſe it is not
able to maintain an Army; and fo muft fall away of it felf thro the
want of a Foundation, or be blown up by fom tumult and in this
kind of Privation the Matter or Foundation of a good orderly Govern-
ment is ready and in being, and there wants nothing to the perfection
of the fame, but proper Superſtructures or Form.
I.
T
CHA P. iv.
Of the Form of Government.
HAT which gives the being, the action, and the denomi-
nation to a Creature or Thing, is the Form of that Crea-
ture or Thing,
2. THERE is in Form fomthing that is not Elementary but Di-
vine.
3. THE contemplation of Form is aſtoniſhing to Man, and has a
kind of trouble or impulfe accompanying it, that exalts his Soul to
God.
4. AS the Form of a Man is the Image of God, ſo the Form of
a Government is the Image of Man.
5. MAN is both a ſenſual and a philofophical Creature.
6. SENSUALITY in a Man is when he is led only as are the
Beaſts, that is, no otherwiſe than by Appetit.
7. PHILOSOPHY is the knowlege of Divine and Human
Things.
8. TO preferve and defend himſelf againſt Violence, is natural to
Man as he is a fenfual Creature.
9. TO have an impulfe, or to be rais'd upon contemplation of
natural things to the Adoration or Worſhip of God, is natural to
Man as he is a Philoſophical Creature.
10. FORMATION of Government is the creation of a Po-
litical Creature after the Image of a Philofophical Creature; or it is
an infufion of the Soul or Facultys of a Man into the body of a Mul-
titude.
II. THE more the Soul or Facultys of a Man (in the manner
of their being infus'd into the body of a Multitude) are refin'd or
made incapable of Paffion, the more perfect is the Form of Govern-
ment.
12. NOT the refin'd Spirit of a Man, or of fom Men, is a good
Form of Government; but a good Form of Government is the refin'd
Spirit of a Nation.
Sff 2
13. THE
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A Syftem of Politics..
Chap. IV.
13. THE Spirit of a Nation (whether refin'd or not refin'd) can-
neither be wholly Saint nor Atheiſt: Not Saint becauſe the far greater
part of the People is never able in matters of Religion to be their own
Leaders; nor Atheiſts, becauſe Religion is every whit as indelible a
Character in man's Nature as Reaſon.
14.
LANGUAGE is not a more natural intercourfe between
the Soul of one man and another, than Religion is between God and
the Soul of a man.
15. AS not this Language, nor that Language, but fom Language;
fo not this Religion, nor that Religion, yet fom Religion is natural
to every Nation.
16. THE Soul of Government, as the true and perfect Image of
the Soul of Man, is every whit as neceffarily religious as rational.
17. THE Body of a Government, as confifting of the fenfual part
of Man, is every whit as prefervative and defenſive of it ſelf as ſenſual
Creatures are of themſelves.
18. THE Body of a Man, not actuated or led by the Soul, is a
dead thing out of pain and mifery; but the Body of a People, not
actuated or led by the Soul of Government, is a living thing in pain
and mifery.
19. THE Body of a People, not led by the reafon of the Go-
vernment, is not a People, but a Herd: not led by the Religion of the
Government, is at an inquiet and an uncomfortable loſs in it felf; not
diſciplin❜d by the Conduct of the Government, is not an Army for de-
fence of it ſelf, but a Rout; not directed by the Laws of the Govern-
ment, has not any rule of right; and without recourſe to the Juſtice
or Judicatorys of the Government, has no remedy of wrongs.
20. IN contemplation of, and in conformity to the Soul of man, as
alfo for ſupply of thoſe his Neceffitys which are not otherwiſe ſupply'd,
or to be fupply'd by Nature, Form of Government confifts neceffarily
of theſe five parts: The Civil, which is the Reaſon of the People;
the Religious, which is the Comfort of the People; the Military,
which is the Captain of the People; the Laws, which are the Rights
of the People; and the Judicatorys, which are the Avengers of their
Wrongs.
21. THE parts of Form in Government are as the Offices in a
Houfe; and the Orders of a Form of Government are as the Orders
of a Houſe or Family.
22. GOOD Orders make evil men good, and bad Orders make
good men evil.
23. OLIGARCHISTS (to the end they may keep all others
out of the Government) pretending themſelves to be Saints, do alfo
pretend that they in whom Luft reigns, are not fit for Reign or for
Government. But Libido dominandi, the Luft of Government, is the
greateſt Luft, which alſo reigns moft in thoſe that have leaſt right, as
in Oligarchifts: for many a King and many a People have and had un-
queftionable Right, but an Oligarchift never; whence from their own
argument, the Luft of Government reigning moft in Oligarchifts, it
undeniably follows that Oligarchifts of all men are leaſt fit for Go-
vernment.
24. AS in Houfes not differing in the kinds of their Offices, the
Orders of the Familys differ much; fo the difference of Form in dif-
ferent Governments confifts not in the kinds or number of the Parts,
which
A Syftem of Politics.
501
which in every one is alike, but in the different ways of ordering Chap. V
thoſe parts. And as the different Orders of a Houſe arife for the moſt
part from the quantity and quality of the Eftate by which it is de-
fray'd or maintain'd, according as it is in one or more of the Family
as Proprietors, fo it is alfo in a Government.
25. THE Orders of the Form, which are the manners of the mind
of the Government, follow the temperament of the Body, or the di-
ſtribution of the Lands or Territorys, and the Intereſts thence ari-
fing.
26. THE Intereft of Arbitary Monarchy is the abfolutenefs of
the Monarch; the Intereft of Regulated Monarchy is the greatneſs
of the Nobility; the Intereſt of Democracy is the felicity of the Peo-
ple: for in Democracy the Government is for the uſe of the Poople,
and in Monarchy the People are for the uſe of the Government, that
is, of one Lord or more.
27. THE ufe of a Horfe without his Provender, or of the People
without fom regard had to the neceffitys of Human Nature, can be none
at all nor are thofe neceffitys of Nature in any Form whatfoever to
be otherwiſe provided for than by thofe five parts already mention'd;
for which cauſe every Government confifts of five parts: the Civil, the
Religious, the Military, the Laws, and the Judicatorys.
I.
T
CHAP. V.
Of Form in the Civil parts.
HOSE Naturalifts that have beſt written of Generation,
do obſerve that all things procede from an Eg, and that there
is in every Eg a Punctum Saliens, or a part first mov'd, as the purple
Speck obferv'd in thofe of Hens; from the working wherof the other
Organs or fit Members are delineated, diftinguiſh'd, and wrought into
one Organical Body.
2. A NATION without Government, or fallen into privation
of Form, is like an Eg unhatch'd; and the Punctum Saliens, or first
mover from the corruption of the Former to the generation of the
fucceding Form, is either a fole Legiflator or a Council.
:
3. A SOLE Legiflator, proceding according to Art, or Know-
lege, produces Government in the whole piece at once and in perfection.
But a Council (proceding not according to Art, or what in a new
cafe is neceffary or fit for them, but according to that which they call
the Genius of the People ſtill hankering after the things they have bin
us'd to, or their old Cuſtoms, how plain foever it be made in reaſon
that they can no longer fit them) make patching work, and are Ages
about that which is very feldom or never brought by them to any per-
fection; but commonly coms by the way to ruin, leaving the nobleſt
Attempts under Reproach, and the Authors of them expos'd to the
greatest miferys while they live, if not their Memorys when they are
dead and gone to the greateſt infamy.
4. IF the Punctum Saliens, or first mover in generation of the
Form be a fole Legiflator, his proceding is not only according to Na-
ture, but according to Art alfo, and begins with the Delineation of
diſtinct Orders or Members.
5. DE-
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A Syftem of Politics.
Chap. V.
DELINEATION of diftinct Organs or Members (as to
5.
the Form of Government) is a divifion of the Territory into fit Pre-
cincts once ſtated for all, and a formation of them to their proper
Offices and Functions, according to the nature or truth of the Form
to be introduc'd.
6. PRECINCTS in abfolute Monarchy are commonly call'd
Provinces; and as to the delineation or ftating of them, they may be
equal or inequal. Precincts in regulated Monarchy, where the
Lords or Nobility as to their Titles or Eſtates ought not to be equal,
but to differ as one Star differs from another in Glory, are commonly
call'd Countys, and ought to be inequal. Precincts in Democracy,
where without equality in the Electors there will hardly be any e-
quality in the Elected; or where without equality in the Precincts,
it is almoft, if not altogether impoflible there fhould be equality in
the Commonwealth, are properly call'd Tribes, and ought by all
means to be equal.
7. EQUALITY or Parity has bin repreſented an odious thing,
and made to imply the levelling of mens Eſtates; but if a Nobility,
how inequal foever in their Eftates or Titles, yet to com to the truth
of Ariftocracy, muft as to their Votes or participation in the Govern-
ment be pares regni, that is to fay Peers, or in parity among them-
felves: as well likewiſe the People, to attain to the truth of Demo-
cracy, may be Peers, or in parity among themſelves, and yet not as
to their Eſtates be oblig'd to levelling.
8. INDUSTRY of all things is the moft accumulative, and
Accumulation of all things hates levelling: The Revenue therfore of
the People being the Revenue of Induſtry, tho fom Nobility (as that
of Ifrael, or that of Lacedemon) may be found to have bin Levellers,
yet not any People in the World.
9. PRECINCTS being ftated, are in the next place to be form'd
to their proper Offices and Functions, according to the truth of the
Form to be introduc'd; which in general is to form them as it were into
diſtinct Governments, and to indow them with diftinct Governors.
10. GOVERNMENTS or Governors are either Supreme or
Subordinat. For abfolute Monarchy to admit in its Precincts any Go-
vernment or Governors that are not fubordinat but fupreme, were a
plain contradiction. But that regulated Monarchy, and that Demo-
cracy may do it, is feen in the Princes of Germany, and in the Cantons
of Switzerland: Nevertheleſs theſe being Governments that have de-
riv'd this not from the Wiſdom of any Legiſlator, but from accident,
and an ill diſpoſition of the matter, wherby they are not only incapable
of Greatneſs, but even of any perfect State of Health, they com not
under the confideration of Art, from which they derive not: but of
Chance, to which we leave them. And, to fpeak according to Art,
we pronounce that, as well in Democracy and in regulated as in abfolute
Monarchy, Governors and Governments in the feveral divifions ought
not to be Soveraintys, but fubordinat to one common Soverain.
II. SUBORDINAT Governors are at will, or for life, or upon
Rotation or Changes.
12. IN abfolute Monarchy the Governors of Provinces muſt ei-
ther be at will, or upon Rotation, or elfe the Monarch cannot be
abfolute. In regulated Monarchy the Governors of the Countys may
be for life or hereditary, as in Counts or Lords; or for fom certain
term
1
A Syftem of Politics.
503
term and upon rotation, as in Viſcounts or Sherifs. In Democracy Chap. V.
the People are Servants to their Governors for life, and fo cannot be
free; or the Governors of the Tribes muſt be upon rotation and for
fom certain term, excluding the Party that have born the Magiftracy
for that term from being elected into the like again, till an equal In-
terval or Vacation be expir'd
13. THE term in which a man may adminiſter Government to
the good of it, and not attemt upon it to the harm of it, is the fittest
term of bearing Magiftracy; and three years in a Magiftracy defcrib'd
by the Law under which a man has liv'd, and which he has known
by the carriage or practice of it in others, is a term in which he can-
not attemt upon his Government for the hurt of it, but may adminifter
it for the good of it, tho ſuch a Magiftracy or Government ſhould con-
fift of divers Functions.
14. GOVERNORS in fubordinat Precincts have commonly
three Functions; the one Civil, the other Judicial, and the third
Military.
15. IN abfolute Monarchy the Government of a Province confifts
of one Beglerbeg, or Governor for three years, with his Council or
Divan for Civil matters, and his Guard of Janizarys and Spabys, that
is, of Horfe and Foot, with power to levy and command the Tima-
riots or Military Farmers.
16. In regulated Monarchy the Government of a County con-
fifts of one Count or Lord for Life, or of one Viſcount or Sherif for
fom limited term, with power in certain Civil and Judicial matters,
and to levy and command the Poffe Comitatus.
17. IN Democracy the Government of a Tribe confifts of one
Council or Court, in one third part elected annually by the People of
that Tribe for the Civil, for the Judicial, and for the Military Govern-
ment of the fame; as alſo to prefide at the Election of Deputys in that
Tribe towards the annual fupply in one third part of the common and
foverain Affemblys of the whole Commonwealth, that is to ſay, of
the Senat and of the Popular Affembly; in which two theſe Tribes,
thus delineated and diſtinguiſh'd into proper Organs or fit Members to
be actuated by thoſe foverain Affemblys, are wrought up again by
connexion into one intire and organical Body.
18. A PARLAMENT of Phyficians would never have found
out the Circulation of the Blood, nor could a Parlament of Poets have
written VIRGIL's Æneis; of this kind therfore in the formation of
Government is the proceding of a fole Legiflator. But if the People
without a Legiſlator fet upon fuch work by a certain Inftinct that is in
them, they never go further than to chufe a Council; not confidering
that the formation of Government is as well a work of Invention as
of Judgment; and that a Council, tho in matters laid before them
they may excel in Judgment, yet Invention is as contrary to the nature
of a Council as it is to Muficians in confort, who can play and judg
of any Ayr that is laid before them, tho to invent a part of Mufic they
can never well agree.
19. IN Councils there are three ways of Refult, and every way
of Refult makes a different Form. A Council with the Refult in the
Prince makes abfolute Monarchy. A Council with the Reſult in the
Nobility, or where without the Nobility there can be no Reſult,
makes Aristocracy, or regulated Monarchy. A Council with the Re-
fult
1
504
A Syftem of Politics.
Chap. V. fult in the People makes Democracy. There is a fourth kind of Re-
fult or Council which amounts not to any Form, but to Privation of
Government; that is, a Council not confifting of a Nobility, and yet
with the Reſult in itſelf, which is rank Oligarchy: fo the People, fel-
dom or never going any further than to elect a Council without any
Reſult but itſelf, inftead of Democracy introduce Oligarchy.
20. THE ultimat Refult in every Form is the Soverain Power.
If the ultimat Refult be wholly and only in the Monarch, that Mo-
narchy is abfolute. If the ultimat Refult be not wholly and only in the
Monarch, that Monarchy is regulated. If the Refult be wholly and
only in the People, the People are in Liberty, or the Form of the Go-
vernment is Democracy.
21. IT may happen that a Monarchy founded upon Ariftocracy,
and fo as to the Foundation regulated, may yet com by certain Ex-
pedients or Intrufions (as at this day in France and in Spain) as to the
Adminiſtration of it to appear or be call'd abfolute; of which I fhall
treat more at large when I com to ſpeak of Reafon of State, or of Ad-
miniftration.
22. THE ultimat Refult in the whole body of the People, if the
Commonwealth be of any confiderable extent, is altogether impracti-
cable; and if the ultimat Reſult be but in a part of the People, the
reft are not in liberty, nor is the Government Democracy.
23. AS a whole Army cannot charge at one and the fame time, yet
is fo order'd that every one in his turn coms up to give the Charge of
the whole Army; fo tho the whole People cannot give the Refult at
one and the ſame time, yet may they be fo order'd that every one in
his turn may com up to give the Refult of the whole People.
24. A POPULAR Affembly, rightly order'd brings up every
one in his turn to give the Reſult of the whole People.
25. IF the popular Affembly confifts of one thouſand or more,
annually changeable in one third part by new Elections made in the
Tribes by the People, it is rightly order'd; that is to fay, ſo conſti-
tuted that fuch an Affembly can have no other Intereft wherupon to
give the Reſult, than that only which is the Intereft of the whole
People.
26. BUT in vain is Refult where there is no Matter to refolve
upon; and where maturity of Debate has not preceded, there is not
yet Matter to refolve upon.
27. DEBATE to be mature cannot be manag'd by a Multitude;
and Reſult to be popular cannot be given by a Few.
28. IF a Council capable of Debate has alfo the Refult, it is Oli-
garchy. If an Affembly capable of the Reſult has Debate alſo, it is
Anarchy. Debate in a Council not capable of Refult, and Refult in
an Affembly not capable of Debate, is Democracy.
29. IT is not more natural to a People in their own affairs to be
their own chufers, than upon that occafion to be provided of their
Learned Counfil; in fo much that the faying of PACUVIUS, That
either a People is govern'd by a King or counfil'd by a Senat, is univer-
fally approv❜d.
30. WHERE the Senat has no diftin&t Intereft, there the People
are counfillable, and venture not upon Debate: where the Senat has
any diſtinct Intereft, there the People are not counfillable, but fall
into Debate among themfelves, and fo into Confufion.
31. OF
A Syftem of Politics.
505
31. OF Senats there are three kinds: Firſt, A Senat eligible out of Chap. 6.
the Nobility only, as that of Rome, which will not be contented to be
merely the Council of the People, but will be contending that they
are Lords of the People, never quitting their pretenfions till they have
ruin'd the Commonwealth. Secondly, A Senat elected for life, as
that of Sparta, which will be a fpecies of Nobility, and will have a
kind of Spartan King, and a Senat upon rotation; which being rightly
conſtituted is quiet, and never pretends more than to be the learned
Council of the People.
32. THIRDLY, Three hundred Senators, for example, change-
able in one third part of them annually by new Elections in the
Tribes, and conſtituted a Senat to debate upon all Civil matters, to
promulgat to the whole Nation what they have debated, this Promul-
gation to be made fom fuch convenient time before the Matters by
them debated are to be propos'd, that they may be commonly known
and well underſtood, and then to propoſe the fame to the Reſult of the
Popular Affembly, which only is to be the Teſt of every public A&,
is a Senat rightly order'd.
FORM of Government (as to the Civil part) being thus completed,
is fum'd up in the three following Aphorifms.
33. ABSOLUTE Monarchy (for the Civil part of the Form)
confifts of diftinct Provinces under diftinct Governors, equally fub-
ordinat to a Grand Signor or fole Lord, with his Council or Divan de-
bating and propofing, and the Reſult wholly and only in himſelf.
34. REGULATED Monarchy (for the Civil part of the
Form) confifts of diftinct Principalitys or Countys under diftinct
Lords or Governors, which if rightly conftituted are equally fubordi-
nat to the King and his Peerage, or to the King and his Eftates af-
ſembl❜d in Parlament, without whoſe Conſent the King can do no-
thing.
35. DEMOCRACY (for the Civil part of the Form) if
rightly conſtituted, confifts of diftinct Tribes under the Government
of diſtinct Magiftrats, Courts, or Councils, regularly changeable in
one third part upon annual Elections, and fubordinat to a Senat con-
fifting of not above three hundred Senators, and to a popular Affembly
confifting of not under a thouſand Deputys; each of theſe alfo regularly
changeable in one third part upon annual Elections in the Tribes, the
Senat having the Debate, and the Popular Affembly the Reſult of the
whole Commonwealth.
I.
F
CHAP. VI.
Of Form in the Religious part.
ORM for the Religious part either admits of Liberty of Con-
ſcience in the whole or in part; or dos not admit of Liberty
of Confcience at all.
2. LIBERTY of Confcience intire, or in the whole, is where
a man according to the dictats of his own Confcience may have the
free
Ttt
:
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506
A Syftem of Politics.
Chap. 6. free exercife of his Religion, without impediment to his Preferment
or Imployment in the State.
3. LIBERTY of Confcience in part is, where a man according
to the dictats of his Conſcience may have the free exerciſe of his Re-
ligion; but if it be not the national Religion, he is therby incapable
of Preferment or Imployment in the State.
4. WHERE the Form admits not of the free exerciſe of any
other Religion except that only which is National, there is no Liberty
of Confcience.
5. MEN who have the means to affert Liberty of Confcience, have
the means to affert Civil Liberty; and will do it if they are oppreſt in
their Confciences.
6. MEN participating in Property, or in Imployment Civil or
Military, have the means to affert Liberty of Conſcience.
7. ABSOLUTE Monarchy, being fole Proprietor, may admit
of Liberty of Confcience to fuch as are not capable of Civil or Military
Imployment, and yet not admit of the means to affert Civil Liberty;
as the Greec Chriſtians under the Turk, who, tho they injoy Liberty
of Conſcience, cannot affert Civil Liberty, becauſe they have neither
Property nor any Civil or Military Imployments.
8. REGULATED Monarchy, being not fole Proprietor, may
not admit naturally of Liberty of Confcience, left it admits of the
means to affert Civil Liberty, as was lately feen in England by pulling
down the Biſhops, who, for the moſt part, are one half of the Foun-
dation of regulated Monarchy.
9. DEMOCRACY being nothing but intire Liberty; and Li-
berty of Confcience without Civil Liberty, or Civil Liberty without
Liberty of Conſcience being but Liberty by halves, muſt admit of Li-
berty of Conſcience both as to the perfection of its prefent being, and
as to its future ſecurity: As to the perfection of its preſent being,
for the Reaſons already fhewn, or that the do not injoy Liberty by
halves; and for future fecurity, becauſe this excludes abfolute Monar-
chy, which cannot ftand with Liberty of Conſcience in the whole and
regulated Monarchy, which cannot ftand fafely with it in any
part.
10. IF it be faid that in France there is Liberty of Confcience in
part, it is alſo plain that while the Hierarchy is ftanding this Liberty
is falling, and that if ever it coms to pull down the Hierarchy it pulls
down that Monarchy alfo: wherfore the Monarchy or Hierarchy will
be beforehand with it, if they fee their true Intereft.
II. THE ultimat Reſult in Monarchy being that of one Man, or
of a few Men, the National Religion in Monarchy may happen not
to be the Religion of the major part of the People; but the Refult
in Democracy being in the major part of the People, it cannot happen
but that the National Religion muſt be that of the major part of the
People.
12. THE major part of the People, being in matters of Religion
inabled to be their own Leaders, will in fuch cafes therfore have a pub-
lic leading; or, being debar'd of their Will in that particular, are
debar'd of their Liberty of Confcience.
13. WHERE the major part of the People is debar'd of their
Liberty by the minor, there is neither Liberty of Confcience nor De-
mocracy, but Spiritual or Civil Oligarchy,
14. WHERE
A Syftem of Politics.
50%
14.
WHERE the Major part is not debar'd of their Liberty of Chap. 6.
Confcience by the Minor, there is a National Religion.
15. NATIONAL Religion is either coercive, or not coercive.
16. RELIGION is not naturally fubfervient to any corrupt or
worldly Intereft, for which caufe to bring it into ſubjection to Intereſt
it must be coercive.
17. WHERE Religion is coercive, or in fubjection to Intereſt,
there it is not, or will not long continue to be the true Religion.
18. WHERE Religion is not coercive, nor under fubjection to
any Intereft, there it either is (or has no obſtruction why it may not
com to be) the true Religion.
19. ABSOLUTE Monarchy pretends to Infallibility in matters
of Religion, imploys not any that is not of its own Faith, and pu-
niſhes its Apoftats by death without mercy.
20. REGULATED Monarchy coms not much ſhort of the
fame pretence; but confifting of Proprietors, and fuch as if they
diffent have oftentimes the means to defend themſelves, it dos not
therfore always attain to the exerciſe of the like power.
21. DEMOCRACY pretends not to Infallibility, but is in mat-
ters of Religion no more than a Seeker, not taking away from its
People their Liberty of Confcience, but educating them, or fo many
of them as fhall like of it, in fuch a manner or knowledge in Divine
things as may render them beſt able to make uſe of their Liberty of
Confcience, which it performs by the National Religion.
22. NATIONAL Religion, to be fuch, muſt have a National
Miniſtry or Clergy.
23. THE Clergy is either landed or a ftipendiated Clergy.
24. A LANDED Clergy attaining to one third of the Territory,
is Ariftocracy; and therfore equally incompatible with abfolute Mo-
narchy, and with Democracy: but to regulated Monarchy for the
moft part is fuch a Supporter, as in that cafe it may be truly enough
faid, that NO BISHOP, NO KING.
25. THE Soverainty of the Prince in abfolute Monarchy, and
of the People in Democracy, admitting not of any Counterpoife, in
each of theſe the Clergy ought not to be landed; the Laborer never-
theleſs being worthy of his hire, they ought to be ftipendiated.
26. A CLERGY well landed is to regulated Monarchy a very
great Glory; and a Clergy not well ftipendiated is to abfolute Monar-
chy or to Democracy as great an Infamy.
27. A CLERGY, whether landed or ftipendiated, is either Hie-
rarchical or Popular.
28. A HIERARCHICAL Clergy is a Monarchical Ordination;
a Popular Clergy receives Ordination from Election by the People.
FORM of Government (as to the Religious part) being thus
completed, is fum'd up in the three following Aphorifms.
29. ABSOLUTE Monarchy (for the Religious part of the Form)
confiſts of a Hierarchical Clergy, and of an Alcoran (or fom Book
receiv'd in the nature of Scripture) interpretable by the Prince only
and his Clergy, willingly permitting to them that are not capable of
Imployments a Liberty of Confcience.
Ttt 2
30. REGU
508
A Syftem of Politics.
Chap. 7.
30. REGULATED Monarchy (for the Religious part of the
Form) confifts of an Ariftocratical Hierarchy, of the Liturgy, and of
the Holy Scriptures (or fom fuch Book receiv'd for a Rule of Faith)
interpretable only by the Clergy, not admitting Liberty of Confcience,
except thro mere neceffity.
31. DEMOCRACY (for the Religious part of the Form) con-
fifts of a Popular Clergy, of the Scriptures (or fom other Book
acknowleg'd divine) with a Directory for the National Religion, and
a Council for the equal maintenance both of the National Religion,
and of the Liberty of Confcience.
I.
A
CHAP. VII.
Of Form in the Military part.
MAN may perish by the Sword; yet no man draws the
Sword to perish, but to live by it.
2. SO many ways as there are of living by the Sword, fo many
ways there are of a Militia.
3. IF a Prince be Lord of the whole, or of two parts in three of
the whole Territory, and divides it into Military Farms at will and
without rent, upon condition of Service at their own charge in
Arms whenever he commands them, it is the Sword of an abſolute
Monarchy.
4. IF the Nobility, being Lords of the whole or of two parts in
three of the whole Territory, let their Lands by good pennyworths
to Tenants at will, or by their Leaſes bound at their Commands by
whom they live to ferve in Arms upon pay, it is the Sword of a re-
gulated Monarchy.
5. IN Countrys that have no Infantry, or Militia of free Common-
ers, as in France and Poland, the Nobility themſelves are a vaſt Body
of Horſe, and the Sword of that Monarchy.
6. IF a People, where there neither is Lord nor Lords of the
whole, nor of two parts in three of the whole Territory, for the com-
mon defence of their Liberty and of their Livelihood, take their turns
upon the Guard or in Arms, it is the Sword of Democracy.
7. THERE is a fourth kind of Militia, or of men living more
immediatly by the Sword, which are Soldiers of Fortune, or a mer-
cenary Army.
8. ABSOLUTE Monarchy must be very well provided with
Court Guards, or a mercenary Army; otherwiſe its Military Farmers
having no bar from becoming Proprietors, the Monarchy it felf has
no bar from changing into Democracy.
FORM of Government (as to the Military part) being thus com-
pleted, is fum'd up in the three following Aphorifms.
9. IN a regulated Monarchy where there is an Infantry, there
needs not any Mercenary Army; and there the People live tolerably
well.
10. IN a regulated Monarchy where there is no Infantry, but the
Nobility themselves are a vaft Body of Horfe, there muſt alſo be
a
A Syftem of Politics.
509
a mercenary Infantry, and there the People are Peaſants or Slaves. Chap. 8.
II. THERE is no fuch thing in nature as any Monarchy (whe-
ther abfolute or regulated) fubfifting merely by a mercenary Army,
and without an Infantry or Cavalry planted upon the Lands of the
Monarch, or of his whole Nobility.
I.
IF
CHAP. VIII.
Of Form in the Legal part.
Juftice be not the Intereft of a Government, the Intereſt of
2. LET Equity or Juftice be what it will, yet if a man be to
judg or refolve in his own cafe, he refolves upon his own Intereſt.
3. EVERY Government, being not obnoxious to any Superior,
refolves in her own cafe.
4. THE ultimat Refult in every Government is the Law in that
Government.
5. IN abfolute Monarchy, the ultimat Reſult is in the Monarch.
6. IN Aristocracy, or regulated Monarchy, the ultimat Reſult is
in the Lords or Peers, or not without them.
7. IN Democracy the ultimat Reſult is in the People.
8. LAW in abfolute Monarchy holds fuch a difproportion to na-
tural Equity, as the Intereſt of one Man to the Intereſt of all Man-
kind.
9. LAW in Ariftocracy holds fuch a difproportion to natural E-
quity, as the Intereſt of a few Men to the Intereſt of all Mankind.
10. LAW in Democracy holds fuch a diſproportion to natural E-
quity, as the Intereſt of a Nation to the Intereft of all Mankind.
II. ONE Government has much nearer approaches to natural
Equity than another; but in cafe natural Equity and Selfprefervation
com in competition, fo natural is Selfprefervation to every Creature,
that in that cafe no one Government has any more regard to natural
Equity than another.
12. A Man may devote himſelf to death or deftruction to ſave a
Nation, but no Nation will devote it felf to death or deftruction to
fave Mankind.
13. MACHIAVEL is decry'd for faying, that no confideration
is to be had of what is juft or injuft, of what is merciful or cruel, of what
is honorable or ignominious, in cafe it be to fave a State, or to preſerve
Liberty; which as to the manner of expreffion is crudely spoken. But
to imagin that a Nation will devote it felf to death or deftruction any
more upon Faith given or an Ingagement therto tending, than if
there had bin no fuch Ingagement made or Faith given, were not
piety but folly.
14. WHERSOEVER the power of making Law is, there only
is the power of interpreting the Law ſo made.
15. GOD who has given his Law to the Soul of that man who
fhall voluntarily receive it, is the only Interpreter of his Law to that
Soul; fuch at leaft is the Judgment of Democracy. With abfolute Mo-
narchy, and with Ariftocracy, it is an innat Maxim, That the People
are to be deceiv'd in two things, their RELIGION and their LAW;
3
or
•
510
A Syftem of Politics.
Chap. 9. or that the Church or themſelves are Interpreters of all Scripture, as
the Priefts were antiently of the Sibyls Books.
FORM of Government (as to the Legal part) being thus completed,
is fum'd up in the three following Aphorifms.
16. ABSOLUTE Monarchy (for the Legal part of the Form)
confifts of fuch Laws as it pretends God has deliver'd or given the
King and Prieſts power to interpret; or it confifts of fuch Laws as the
Monarch fhall or has choſen.
17. ARISTOCRACY (for the Legal part of the Form) con-
fifts of fuch Laws as the Nobility fhall chufe or have chofen; or of
fuch as the People fhall chufe or have chofen, provided they be agreed
to by their Lords, or by the King and their Lords.
18. DEMOCRACY (for the Legal part of the Form) confifts of
fuch Laws as the People, with the advice of their Council, or of
the Senat, fhall chufe or have chofen.
1.
¹M
CHA P. IX.
Of Form in the Judicial part.
ULTIPLICITY of Laws, being a multiplicity of Snares
for the People, caufes Corruption of Government.
2. PAUCITY of Laws requires arbitrary Power in Courts, or
Judicatorys.
3. ARBITRARY Power (in reference to Laws) is of three
kinds. (1) In making, altering, abrogating, or interpreting of Laws,
which belong to the Soverain Power. (2) In applying Laws to Cafes
which are never any one like another. (3) In reconciling the Laws
among themſelves.
4. THERE is no difficulty at all in judging of any cafe what-
foever according to natural Equity.
5. ARBITRARY Power makes any man a competent Judg
for his Knowledge; but leaving him to his own Intereft, which often-
times is contrary to Juſtice, makes him alfo an incompetent Judg, in
regard that he may be partial.
6. PARTIALITY is the cauſe why Laws pretend to abhor
Arbitrary Power; nevertheleſs, ſeeing that not one cafe is altogether
like another, there muſt in every Judicatory be fom arbitrary Power.
7. PAUCITY of Laws caufes arbitrary Power in applying
them; and Multiplicity of Laws cauſes arbitrary Power in reconci-
ling and applying them too.
8. ARBITRARY Power where it can do no wrong, dos the
greateft right; becauſe no Law can ever be fo fram'd, but that with-
out arbitrary Power it may do wrong.
9. ARBITRARY Power, going upon the Intereſt of One or of
a lew, makes not a juft Judicatory.
10. ARBITRARY Power, going upon the Intereſt of the
whole People, makes a juft Judicatory,
11. ALL Judicatorys and Laws, which have bin made by Arbi-
trary Power, allow of the Interpretation of Arbitrary Power, and
acknowlege an appeal from themſelves to it.
12. THAT
A Syftem of Politics.
511
}
12. THAT Law which leaves the leaſt arbitrary Power to the Chap. 9.
Judg or Judicatory, is the moſt perfect Law.
13. LAWS that are the feweft, plaineft, and briefeft, leave the
leaſt arbitrary Power to the Judg or Judicatory; and being a Light to
the People, make the moft incorrupt Government.
14. LAWS that are perplext, intricat, tedious, and voluminous,
leave the greateſt arbitrary Power to the Judg or Judicatory; and
raining fnares on the People, make the moſt corrupt Government.
15.
SEEING no Law can be fo perfect as not to leave arbitrary
Power to the Judicatory, that is the beft Conftitution of a Judicatory
where arbitrary Power can do the leaſt hurt, and the worſt Conftitution
of a Judicatory is where arbitrary Power can do the moſt ill.
16. ARBITRARY Power in one Judg dos the moft, in a few
Judges dos leſs, and in a multitude of Judges dos the leaſt hurt.
17. THE ultimat Appeal from all inferior Judicatorys is to fom
foverain Judg or Judicatory.
18. THE ultimat Refult in every Government (as in abfolute Mo-
narchy, the Monarch; in Ariftocracy, or Ariftocratical Monarchy,
the Peers; in Democracy, the Popular Affembly) is a foverain Judg
or Judicatory that is arbitrary.
19. ARBITRARY Power in Judicatorys is not fuch as makes
no uſe of the Law, but fuch by which there is a right uſe to be made
of the Laws.
20. THAT Judicatory where the Judg or Judges are not obnoxious
to Partiality or privat Intereft, cannot make a wrong uſe of Power.
21. THAT Judicatory that cannot make a wrong ufe of Power,
muſt make a right ufe of Law.
22. EVERY Judicatory confifts of a Judg or fome Judges without
a Jury, or of a Jury on the Bench without any other Judg or Judges,
or of a Judg or Judges on the Bench with a Jury at the Bar.
FORM of Government (as to the Judicial part) being thus com-
pleted, is fum'd up in the three following Aphorifms.
23. ABSOLUTE Monarchy (for the Judicial part of the Form)
admits not of any Jury, but is of fom fuch kind as a Cadee or Judg in
a City, or as we fay in a Hundred, with an Appeal to a Cadalifkar or a
Judg in a Province, from whom alſo there lys an Appeal to the Muphti,
who is at the devotion of the Grand Signior or of the Monarch.
24. ARISTOCRACY or Ariftocratical Monarchy (for the
Judicial part of the Form) may admit of a Jury, fo it be at the Bar on-
ly, and confiſts of fom fuch kind as Delegats or ordinary Judges,
with an Appeal to a Houſe of Peers; or fom fuch Court, as the Parla-
ment at Paris, which was at the inftitution in the Reign of HUGH
CAPET, a Parlament of foverain Princes.
25. DEMOCRACY (for the Judicial part of the Form) is of
fom fuch kind as a Jury on the Bench in every Tribe, confifting of
thirty Perfons or more annually eligible in one third part by the Peo-
ple of that Tribe, with an Appeal from thence to a Judicatory refi-
ding in the Capital City of the like Conftitution, annually eligible in
one third part out of the Senat or the popular Affembly, or out of both;
from which alſo there lys an Appeal to the People, that is to the Po-
pular Affembly.
CHAP.
512
A Syftem of Politics.
Chap. 10.
1.
"Α
CHA P. X.
Of the Adminiftration of Government, or
REASON OF STATE.
S the Matter of a Ship or of a Houfe is one thing, the Form
of a Ship or of a Houſe is another thing, and the Admini-
ſtration or Reaſon of a Ship or of the Houſe is a third thing; ſo the
fo
Matter of a Government or of a State is one thing, the Form of a Go-
vernment or of a State is another, and the Adminiſtration of a Govern-
ment (which is what's properly and truly call'd Reaſon of State) is a
third thing.
1
2. THERE are thoſe who can play, and yet cannot pack the
Cards, and there are who can pack the Cards, and yet cannot play.
3. ADMINISTRATION of Government, or Reafon of
State, to fuch as propoſe to themſelves to play upon the ſquare, is one
thing; and to fuch as propoſe to themſelves to pack the Cards, is ano-
ther.
4. REASON of State is that in a Kingdom or a Commonwealth,
which in a Family is call'd THE MAIN CHANCE.
5. THE Maſter of a Family that either keeps himſelf up to his
antient bounds, or increaſes his Stock, looks very well to the main
Chance, at leaſt if his play be upon the fquare, that is, upon
his own
Abilitys, or good Fortune, or the Laws; but if it were not upon the
fquare, yet an Eſtate however gotten, is not for that a leſs Eſtate in
it felf, nor leſs deſcending by the Law to his Succeffors.
6. IF a People thro their own Induſtry, or the prodigality of
their Lords, com to acquire Liberty; if a few by their Induſtry, or
thro the folly or flothfulneſs of the People, com to eat them out, and
make themſelves Lords; if one Lord by his Power or his Virtue, or
thro their Neceffity, their Wiſdom, or their Folly, can overtop the
reſt of theſe Lords, and make himſelf King, all this was fair play and
upon the fquare.
7. REASON of State, if we ſpeak of it as fair play, is foren or
domeftic.
8. REASON of State, which is foren, confiſts in balancing fo-
ren Princes and States in fuch a manner, as you may gain upon them,
or at leaſt that they may not gain upon you.
9. REASON of State, which is domeftic, is the Adminiſtration
of a Government (being not ufurp'd) according to the Foundation and
Superftructures of the fame if they be good, or fo as not being good
that they may be mended, or fo as being good or bad they may be
alter'd; or, the Government being ufurp'd, the Reafon of State then
is the way and means wherby fuch Ufurpation may be made good or
maintain'd.
10. REASON of State, in a Democracy which is rightly founded
and rightly order'd, is a thing of great facility, whether in a foren or in
a domeftic relation. In a foren, becauſe one good Democracy, weigh-
ing two or three of the greateſt Princes, will eafily give the Balance
abroad at its pleaſure; in a domeſtic, becauſe it confifts not of any
3
more
A Syftem of Politics.
513
more than giving ſuch a ſtop in accumulation that the State coms not Chap. 10.
to be Monarchical: which one Reaſon of State being made good,
all the reft gos well; and which one Reafon of State being neglected,
all the reft coms in time to infallible ruin.
II. REASON of State in a Democracy, which is not right in its
Foundations, may flouriſh abroad, and be one: but at home will lan-
guiſh or be two Reaſons of State, that is, the Reaſon of the State or
Orders of the Nobility, which is to lord it over the People; and the
Reaſon of the popular State or Order, which is to bring the Common-
wealth to equality which two Reaſons of State, being irreconcilable,
will exerciſe themſelves againſt one another, firft by Difputes, then
by Plots, till it coms at laft to open Violence, and fo to the utter ruin
of the Commonwealth, as it happen'd in Rome.
12. REASON of State in an abfolute Monarchy (whether Foren
or Domeftic) is but threefold; as firſt to keep its Military Farmers
or Timariots to the firſt Inſtitution; next to cut him that grows any
thing above his due Stature, or lifts up his head above the reſt, by
ſo much the ſhorter; and laſt of all, to keep its Arms in exerciſe.
13. IN Ariftocratical Monarchy Reaſon of State (as to the whole)
is but one thing, that is, to preſerve the Counterpoiſe of the King and
the two, or the three, or the four Eftates: For in fom Countrys, as
in Poland, there are but two Eſtates, the Clergy and the Nobility; in
others, as in Sweden, there are four, the Nobility, the Gentry, the
Clergy, and the Commons: in most others there are but three, the
Lords Spiritual, the Lords Temporal, and the Commons.
14. ÎN Ariftocratical Monarchy Reaſon of State (as to the parts)
is a multifarious thing, every State having its peculiar Reaſon of State,
and the King alſo his Reaſon of State: with the King it is to balance
the Nobility, that he may hold them under; Reafon of State with
the Nobility is to balance the King, left he fhould grow abfolute ;
Reaſon of State both with the King and the Nobility is to keep down
the People; and Reaſon of State with the People is to drive at their
Liberty.
15. IN Forms that are pure, or in Governments that have no more
than an abfolute Prince or one State, as abfolute Monarchy and equal
or pure Democracy, there is but one Reaſon of State, and that is to
preſerve the Form intire. In Forms that are mix'd (as in an inequal
Commonwealth where there are two Eftates, and in Ariftocratical
Monarchy where there is a King and two if not three Eſtates) there
are fo many Reaſons of State to break the Form, that there has not
bin any inequal Commonwealth which either the People have not
brought to Democracy, or the Nobility to Monarchy. And fcarce
was there any Ariftocratical Monarchy, where (to omit the Wars of
the Nobility with their King, or among themſelves) the People have
not driven out their King, or where the King has not brought the Peo-
ple into Slavery. Ariftocratical Monarchy is the true Theatre of Ex-
pedient-mongers and State-emperics, or the deep Waters wherin that
Leviathan the Minifter of State takes his paftime.
16. THE Complaint that the Wiſdom of all theſe latter times in
Princes Affairs confifts rather in fine deliverys and fhiftings of Dangers
or Miſchiefs when they are near, than in folid and grounded courfes
to keep them off, is a Complaint in the Streets of Ariftocratical Mo-
narchy: and not to be remedy'd, becauſe the Nobility being not bro-
Uuu
ken,
514
A Syftem of Politics.
Chap. 10. ken, the King is in danger, and the Nobility being broken, the Mo-
narchy is ruin'd.
17. AN Abſurdity in the form of the Government (as that in a
Monarchy there may be two Monarchs) ſhoots out into a miſchief
in the Adminiſtration, or fom wickedness in the Reaſon of State, as
in ROMULUS's killing of REMUS, and the monftrous Affaffinations of
the Roman Emperors.
18. USURPATION of Government is a Surfeit that converts
the beſt Arts into the worst: Nemo unquam imperium flagitio acquifi-
tum bonis artibus exercuit.
19. AS in the privation of Virtue, and in Beggery, men are Sharks
or Robbers, and the reafon of their way of living is quite contrary to
thoſe of Thrift; fo in the privation of Government, as in Anarchy,
Oligarchy, or Tyranny, that which is Reaſon of State with them is
directly oppofit to that which is truly fo: whence are all thoſe black
Maxims fet down by fom Politicians, particularly MACHIAVEL in
his Prince, and which are condemn'd to the fire even by them who,
if they liv'd otherwiſe, might blow their fingers.
20. WHERE the Government from a true Foundation rifes up
into proper Superſtructures or Form, the Reaſon of State is right and
ſtreight; but give our Politician peace when you pleaſe, if your Houſe
ſtands awry, your Props do not ſtand upright.
21. TAKE a Jugler, and commend his Tricks never ſo much,
yet if in fo doing you ſhew his Tricks you ſpoil him; which has bin
and is to be confefs'd of MACHIAVEL.
22. CORRUPTION in Government is to be read and con-
fider'd in MACHIAVEL, as Diſeaſes in a man's Body are to be read
and confider'd in HIPPOCRATES.
23.
NEITHER HIPPOCRATES nor MACHIAVEL introduc'd
Diſeaſes into man's Body, nor Corruption into Government, which
were before their times; and feeing they do but difcover them, it
muſt be confeſt that ſo much as they have don tends not to the in-
creaſe but the cure of them, which is the truth of theſe two Authors.
POLI-
515
POLITICAL
APHORISMS
Obfequium amicos, veritas odium parit. Terent.
"T
HE Errors and Sufferings of the People are from their
Governors.
2. WHEN the Foundation of a Government comes
to be chang'd, and the Governors change not the Super-
ftructures accordingly, the People becom miferable.
3.
THE Monarchy of England was not a Government by Arms,
but a Government by Laws, tho imperfect or ineffectual Laws.
4. THE later Governments in England fince the death of the King,
have bin Governments by Arms.
5. THE People cannot fee, but they can feel.
6. THE People having felt the difference between a Government
by Laws and a Government by Arms, will always defire the Govern-
ment by Laws, and abhor that of Arms.
7. WHERE the Spirit of the People is impatient of a Govern-
ment by Arms, and defirous of a Government by Laws, there the
Spirit of the People is not unfit to be trufted with their Liberty.
8. THE Spirit of the People of England, not truſted with their
Liberty, drives at the reftitution of Monarchy by Blood and Vio-
lence.
9: THE Spirit of the People of England, trufted with their Li-
berty, if the Form be fufficient, can never fet up a King; and if the
Form be infufficient (as a Parlament with a Council in the intervals,
or two Affemblys coordinat) will fet up a King without Blood or
Violence.
10. TO light upon a good Man, may be in Chance; but to be
fure of an Affembly of good Men, is not in Prudence.
11. WHERE the Security is no more than perfonal, there may
be a good Monarch, but can be no good Commonwealth.·
12. THE neceffary Action or Ufe of each thing is from the na-
ture of the Form.
· 13. WHERE the Security is in the Perfons, the Government
makes good men evil; where the Security is in the Form, the Go-
vernment makes evil men good.
14. ASSEMBLY S legitimatly elected by the People, are that
only Party which can govern without an Army.
15. NOT the Party which cannot govern without an Army, but
the Party which can govern without an Army, is the refin'd Party, as
to this intent and purpoſe truly refin'd; that is, by Popular Election,
according to the Precept of MOSES, and the Rule of Scripture:
Uuu 2
Take
516
Political Aphorifms.
Take ye wife men, and understanding, and known among your Tribes,
and I will make them Rulers over you.
16. THE People are deceiv'd by Names, but not by Things.
WHERE there is a well-order'd Commonwealth, the Peo-
ple are generally fatisfy'd.
17.
18. WHERE the People are generally diffatisfy'd, there is no
Commonwealth.
19. THE Partys in England declaring for a Commonwealth, hold
every one of them fomething that is inconfiftent with a Common-
wealth.
20. TO hold that the Government may be manag'd by a few, or
by a Party, is inconſiſtent with a Commonwealth; except in a Situa-
tion like that of Venice.
21. TO hold that there can be any National Religion or Miniſtry
without public Indowment and Inſpection of the Magiftracy, or any
Government without a national Religion or Miniftry, is inconfiftent
with a Commonwealth.
22. TO hold that there may be Liberty, and not Liberty of Con-
ſcience, is inconſiſtent with a Commonwealth that has the Liberty of
her own Conſcience, or that is not Popiſh.
23. WHERE Civil Liberty is intire, it includes Liberty of Con-
fcience.
24. WHERE Liberty of Confcience is intire, it includes Civil
Liberty.
25. EITHER Liberty of Confcience can have no fecurity at
all, or under Popular Government it muſt have the greateſt ſecurity.
26. TO hold that a Government may be introduc'd by a little at
once, is to wave Prudence, and commit things to Chance.
27. TO hold that the Wiſdom of God in the Formation of a
Houſe or of a Government, gos not univerfally upon natural Principles,
is inconfiftent with Scripture.
28. TO hold that the Wiſdom of Man in the formation of a
Houſe, or of a Government, may go upon fupernatural Principles, is
inconſiſtent with a Commonwealth, and as if one ſhould ſay, God
ordain'd the Temple, therfore it was not built by Mafons; he or-
dain'd the Snuffers, therfore they were not made by a Smith.
29. TO hold that Hirelings (as they are term'd by fom) or an in-
dow'd Miniſtry, ought to be remov'd out, of the Church, is incon-
fiftent with a Commonwealth.
30. NATURE is of GOD.
31. SOM part in every Religion is natural.
32. A UNIVERSAL Effect demonftrats a univerfal Caufe.
33. A UNIVERSAL Caufe is not fo much natural, as it is
Nature it felf.
34. EVERY man, either to his terror or confolation, has fom
fenfe of Religion.
35. ΜΑΝ may rather be defin'd a religious than a rational Crea-
ture; in regard that in other Creatures there may be fomthing of Rea-
fon, but there is nothing of Religion.
36. GOVERNMENT is of human Prudence, and human
Prudence is adequat to man's Nature.
37. THE Prudence or Government that is regardleſs of Religion,
is not adequat nor fatisfactory to man's Nature.
38. WHERE
Political Aphorifms.
517
38. WHERE the Government is not adequat or fatisfactory to
man's Nature, it can never be quiet or perfect.
39. THE major part of Mankind gives itſelf up in the matter of
Religion to the public leading.
40. THAT there may be a public leading, there muſt be a Na-
tional Religion.
41. WHERE the minor part takes away the National Religion,
there the major part is depriv'd of Liberty of Conſcience by the mi-
nor.
42. WHERE the major part is depriv'd of Liberty of Conſcience
by the minor, there they will deprive the minor of that Liberty of
Conſcience which they might otherwiſe injoy.
43. IN Ifrael there was an indow'd Clergy or Priesthood, and a
National Religion under inſpection of the Magiſtrat: whence the
Chriſtians in Apoftolic Times, defraying their own Miniſtry, could
have Liberty of Confcience; wheras if the Chriftians by going about
to take away Tithes, and aboliſh the National Religion, had indea-
vor'd to violat the Confciences of the unconverted Jews, thefe being
far greater in number, muſt needs have taken away the Liberty of
Confcience from the Chriftians.
44. PAUL in Athens could freely and undiſturbedly convert Dio-
NYSIUS and others; therfore in Athens there was Liberty of Con-
ſcience: but if PAUL and his Converts had gon about to drive Hire-
lings, or an indow'd Priesthood or Clergy out of that Church, who
fees not that the Athenians would have driven PAUL and his Converts
out of Athens?
45. THAT there may be Liberty of Confcience, there muſt be
a National Religion.
46. THAT there may be a National Religion, there muſt be an
indowed Clergy.
47. COMMONWEALTHS have had three ways of U-
nion. As the Athenians, by bringing their Confederats to ſubjection:
As the United Provinces by an equal League: or as the Romans by
an inequal League. The firft way is tyrannical. In the fecond, one
Commonwealth under the League is no more than another, and each
one as to herſelf has a Negative: which kind of Union is not only
obſtructive, but tends (as we have ſeen both in Holland and Switzer-
land) towards Divifion. In the third way, the Commonwealth u-
niting other Commonwealths, retains to her felf the leading of the
whole League, leaving to each of the reft her own Laws, and her
own Liberty.
48. TILL a Commonwealth be firſt fram'd, how ſuch a Com-
monwealth ſhould make an effectual Union with another Nation, is
not poffible to be ſeen.
49. THE new, unpractis'd, and heretofore unheard Union (as it
is vulgarly ſpoken) with Scotland, by uniting Deputys of divers Na-
tions, not in a Council apart, or by way of States General, as in the
United Provinces, but in the ſtanding Councils of fom one Common-
wealth in the League, is deftructive to Liberty both in England and
in Scotland.
50. IF the Commonwealth of England receives Deputys from
Scotland in a greater number than that of her own, fhe receives Law
from a foren Intereft, and fo lofes her own Liberty.
51. IF
518
Political Aphorifms.
51. IF Scotland be receiv'd in an equal number, it obſtructs the
freedom of both, or occafions War or Diffenfion.
52. IF Scotland be receiv'd in an inferior number, fhe receives
Law from England, and fo lofes her Liberty. The like is underſtood
of Ireland.
53. WHERA S a well-order'd Commonwealth ſhould give the
Balance to her Confederats, and not receive it from them; the Coun-
cils in which divers others are thus united, tho in a far inferior num-
ber of Deputys, yet if thefe ly in wait, or lay their heads together,
may be over-rul'd, obftructed, or overbalanc'd by foren Interefts.
54. WHERE Countrys are divers in their Laws, and yet are to
receive Laws one from the other, neither the Commonwealth giving
Law, knows what to give, nor the Commonwealth receiving Law,
underſtands what the receives: in which cafe the Union returns to
Force or Confufion.
55. THE beſt way of holding a Nation different or not different
in Laws, is the Roman, that is, by way of Province.
56. A PROVINCE, efpecially if ſhe has ſtrong holds, may
by defraying of a ſmall Guard, be kept to a juſt League, and for the
reft injoy her own Laws, her own Government, and her perfect Li-
berty. Other ways of Union will be found more chargeable, and
lefs effectual, on both fides: for if England has no Army in Scotland,
Scotland will receive no Law from England; and if England has an
Army there, her hold confiſts not in the Union, but in the Force. The
like is to be underſtood of Ireland.
57. IF a Country be very fmall, and not able to fubfift of it felf,
as Wales, it may be fafely united and held: but the advantage that
Wales has in a participation of all Magiftracys and Offices, is not that
which England is able to afford to fuch a Country as Scotland, with-
out ſubjecting her neck to the yoke.
58. THE order of a Commonwealth requires, that it confifts,
firſt of a Civil; fecondly, of a Religious; thirdly, of a Military;
and fourthly, of a Provincial part. The manner of uniting Provin-
ces or different Nations, pertains to the laft part; and in the forma-
tion of a Commonwealth, to begin with that first, which is naturally
laft, is to invert the Order, and by confequence the Commonwealth
it ſelf, which indeed is nothing but Order.
59. WHERE there can be any other Government, there can be
no Commonwealth.
60. WHERE there can be a Commonwealth, what tumults fo-
ever there happen, and which foever prevail, there can be no other
Government; that is to fay, without foren Invafion, which throout
I must be understood to except.
61. IF Sir GEORGE BOOTH had prevail'd, he muſt either have
introduc'd a Commonwealth, or have reftor'd the King.
62. IF the King were reftor'd, he muſt either govern by an Army,
or by Parlaments.
63. A KING governing now in England by an Army, would
for the fame Caufes find the fame Effects with the late Protector.
64. A KING governing now in England by Parlaments, would
find the Nobility of no effect at all.
65. A PARLAMENT, where the Nobility is of no effect at
all, is a mere Popular Council.
66. A
Political Aphorifms.
519
Į
66. A MERE Popular Council will never receive Law from a
King.
67. A MERE Popular Council giving Law to a King, becoms
therby a Democracy, or equal Commonwealth; or the difference is
no greater than in the imperfection of the Form.
68. A COMMONWEALTH or Democracy to be perfect in
the Form, muſt confift eſpecially of fuch an Aſſembly, the Reſult
wherof can go upon no Intereft whatſoever, but that only which is
the common intereft of the whole People.
69. AN Affembly confifting of a few, may go upon the Intereſt
of one man, as a King; or upon the Intereft of one Party, as that of
Divines, Lawyers, and the like; or the Intereft of themſelves, and
the perpetuation of their Government.
70. THE Popular Affembly in a Commonwealth may confiſt of
too few, but can never confift of too many.
71. IN every Commonwealth there has bin a Popular Affembly.
This in Ifrael at leaſt confifted of twenty four thoufand, upon a
monthly Rotation. In Athens, Lacedemon, Rome, it confifted of the
whole Citizens, that is, of all fuch as had a right in the Common-
wealth, whether they inhabited in City or Country. In Venice it con-
fifts of about two thouſand. In the Province of Holland only, which
contains eighteen or nineteen Soveraintys, the Popular or refolving
Affemblys confift at leaſt of five hundred Perfons: theſe in the whole
Union, may amount to five or fix thoufand; in Switzerland I believe
they com to a greater number. And the moſt of theſe Aſſemblys
have bin perpetually extant.
72. IF the Popular Affembly confifts of fo few, and fo eminent
Perfons as are capable of any orderly Debate, it is good for nothing
but to deſtroy the Commonwealth.
73. IF the Popular Affembly conſiſts of ſo many, and for the
greater part of fo mean Perfons as are not capable of Debate, there
muſt be a Senat to help this defect.
74. THE Reaſon of the Senat is, that a Popular Affembly rightly
conſtituted, is not capable of any prudent debate.
75. THE Reaſon of the Popular Affembly is, that a Senat right-
ly conftituted for Debate, muſt conſiſt of ſo few and eminent Perfons,
that if they have the Reſult too, they will not refolve according to
the Intereft of the People, but according to the Intereſt of themſelves.
76. A POPULAR Affembly without a Senat cannot be wife.
77. A SENAT without a Popular Affembly will not be honeſt.
78. THE Senat and the Popular Affembly being once rightly con-
ſtituted, the reft of the Commonwealth will conftitute itſelf.
79. THE Venetians having flain divers of their Dukes for their
Tyranny, and being affembl'd by fuch numbers in their great Council
as were naturally incapable of Debate, pitch'd upon thirty Gentlemen
who were call'd Pregati, in that they were pray'd to go apart, and,
debating upon the Exigence of the Commonwealth, to propofe as they
thought good to the great Council: and from thence firft arofe the
Senat of Venice (to this day call'd the Pregati) and the Great Council,
that is, the Senat and the Popular Affembly of Venice. And from theſe
two aroſe all thofe admirable Orders of that Commonwealth.
80. THAT
:
3
520
Political Aphorifms.
80. THAT a People of themſelves ſhould have ſuch an under-
ſtanding as when they of Venice did inftitute their Pregati or Senat,
is rare.
81. THAT a Senat or Council of Governors having fupreme
Power, fhou'd inftitute a popular Affembly, and propofe to it, tho
in all reaſon it be the far more facil and practicable, is that which is
rarer.
82. THE diffuſive body of the People is not in a natural capacity
of judging; for which caufe the whole judgment and power of the
diffufive Body of the People must be intirely and abfolutely in their
collective Bodys, Affemblys or Reprefentatives, or there can be no
Commonwealth.
83. TO declare that Affemblys or Reprefentatives of the Peo-
ple have power in fom things, and in others not, is to make the diffu-
five Body, which is in a natural incapacity of judging, to be in a poli-
tical capacity of judging.
84. TO bring a natural incapacity of judging to a political capacity
of judging, is to introduce Government. To bring a natural incapa-
city of judging to fuch a collective or political capacity of judging, as
yet neceffarily muſt retain the Intereft of the diffufive Body, is to
introduce the beſt kind of Government. But to lay any appeal what-
foever from a political capacity of judging, to a natural incapacity of
judging, is to fruftrat all Government, and to introduce Anarchy.
Nor is Anarchy, whether impos'd or obtruded by the Legiſlator firſt,
or by the People, or their Demagogs or Incendiarys afterwards, of
any other kind whatſoever than of this only.
85. TO make Principles or Fundamentals, belongs not to Men, to
Nations, nor to human Laws. To build upon fuch Principles or Fun-
damentals as are apparently laid by GoD in the inevitable neceffity or
Law of Nature, is that which truly appertains to Men, to Nations,
and to human Laws. To make any other Fundamentals, and then
build upon them, is to build Caftles in the Air.
86. WHATEVER is violent, is not fecure nor durable; what-
ever is ſecure and durable, is natural.
87. GOVERNMENT in the whole People, tho the major
part were difaffected, muſt be fecure and durable, becauſe it waves
Force, to found it felf
upon Nature.
88. GOVERNMENT in a Party, tho all of theſe were well
affected, muſt be infecure and tranſitory, becauſe it waves Nature, to
found itſelf upon Force.
89. COMMONWEALTHS, of all other Governments, are
more eſpecially for the preſervation, not for the deſtruction, of Man-
kind.
90. COMMONWEALTH S, that have bin given to cut off
their difeas'd Limbs (as Florence) have brought themſelves to impo-
tence and ruin. Commonwealths that have bin given to healing their
difeas'd Limbs (as Venice) have bìn healthful and flouriſhing.
91. ATHENS under the Oligarchy of four hundred, was infi-
nitly more afflicted and torn with Diſtraction, Blood and Animofity
of Partys, than is England; yet by introduction of a Senat of four
hundred, and a popular Affembly of five thouſand, did therupon, fo
fuddenly as if it had been a Charm, recover Might and Glory. See
the
Political Aphorifms.
521
}
the eighth Book of THUCYDIDES; A Story in thefe Times moſt neceſſa-
ry to be confider'd.
92. TO leave our felves and Pofterity to a farther purchaſe in
Blood or Sweat of that. which we may preſently poffefs, injoy, and
hereafter bequeath to Pofterity in Peace and Glory, is inhuman and
impious.
93. A S certainly and ſuddenly as a good ſtate of health diſpels the
peeviſhneſs and peril of Sickneſs, dos a good ſtate of Government the
animofity and danger of Partys.
94. THE Frame of a Commonwealth having firft bin propos'd
and confider'd, Expedients (in cafe fuch fhould be found neceffary
for the fafe, effectual, and perfect introduction of the fame) may
with fom aim be apply'd or fitted; as to a Houfe, when the Mo-
del is refolv'd upon, we fit Scaffolds in building. But firſt to re-
folve upon Expedients, and then to fit to them the Frame of a Com-
monwealth, is as if one ſhould fet up Props, and then build a Houſe
to lean upon them.
95. As the chief Expedients in the building of a Houſe are Axes
and Hammers; fo the chief Expedient in the building of a Govern-
ment, is a ſtanding Army.
96. AS the Houſe which, being built, will not ſtand without the
perpetual noiſe or uſe of Axes and Hammers, is imperfect; fo is the
Government which, being form'd, cannot fupport it felf without the
perpetual uſe of a ſtanding Army.
97. WHILE the Civil and Religious parts of a Commonwealth
are in forming, there is a neceffity that the ſhould be fupported by an
Army; but when the Military and Provincial parts are rightly forma'd,
fhe can have no farther ufe of any other Army. Wherfore at this
point, and not till then, her Armys are by the practice of Common-
wealths, upon flighter occafions, to have half pay for life, and to be
difbanded.
98. WHERE there is a ftanding Army, and not a form'd Go-
vernment, there the Army of neceffity will have Dictatorian Power.
99. WHERE an Army fubfifts upon the Pay or Riches of a fin-
gle Perfon, or of a Nobility, that Army is always monarchical.
Where an Army fubfifts not by the Riches of a fingle Perfon, nor of a
Nobility, that Army is always popular.
100. THE English Armys are popular Armys.
101. WHERE Armys are popular, and exercife Dictatorian
Power in depoſing ſingle Perfons, and monarchical Affemblys, there
can be no greater, nor needs any other Expedient for the introduction
of a Commonwealth. Nevertheleſs to this may be added fom fuch
moderat Qualifications as may prune the Commonwealth, not lop off
her Branches. Whom theſe will not fatisfy, it is not a Common-
wealth, but a Party, that can.
102. IF the late King had freely permitted to the People the ex-
erciſe of the Power inevitably devolv'd upon them by the change of
the Balance, he had not bin deſtroy'd. If either of the late fingle
Perfons had brought the People into an orderly exerciſe of the Power
devolv'd upon them, he had bin great. What Party foever shall
hinder the People from the exercife of the Power devolv'd upon
them, fhall be certainly ruin'd: who or what Party foever fhall in-
Xxx
troduce
-
522
Political Aphorifms.
1
troduce the People into the due and orderly exerciſe of the Power de-
volv'd upon them, fhall be forthwith ſecure and famous for ever.
103. A MAN ufes, nouriſhes, and cheriſhes his Body, without
underſtanding it, but he that made the Body underſtood it.
104. THE reaſon why the Nations that have Commonwealths,
ufe them fo well, and cherish them fo much, and yet that fo few Na-
tions have Commonwealths, is, That in ufing a Commonwealth, it is
not neceffary it fhould be underſtood; but in making a Common-
wealth, that it be understood, is of abfolute neceffity. Caput Rei-
publicæ eft noffe Rempub. CICERO.
105. AS the natural Body of a Chriftian or Saint can be no other
for the frame, than fuch as has bin the natural Body of an Ifraelit or
of a Heathen; fo the political Bodys, or Civil Governments of Chrifti-
ans or Saints can be no other, for the frame, than fuch as have bin
the political Bodys or Civil Governments of the Ifraelits, or of the
Heathens.
106. IT fhall be as foon found when and where the Soul of a Man
was in the Body of a Beaft, as when or where the Soul or Freedom
natural to Democracy, was in any other Form than that only of a
Senat, and an Affembly of the People.
107. IN thofe things wherin, and fo far as Art is directed or li-
mited by the nature of her Materials, it is in Art as in Nature.
108. THAT Democracy, or equal Government by the People,
confift of an Affembly of the People, and a Senat, is that wherby
Art is altogether directed, limited, and neceffitated by the nature of
her Materials.
109. AS the Soul of Man can never be in the Body of a Beaft, un-
lefs GOD make a new Creation; fo neither the Soul or Freedom na-
tural to Democracy in any other Form whatſoever, than that only
of a Senat, and a Popular Affembly.
110. THE right Conſtitution, Coherence, and proper Symme-
try of a Form of Government gos for the greater part upon Inven-
tion.
III. REASON is of two parts; Invention, and Judgment.
112. JUDGMENT is moft perfect in an Affembly.
113. INVENTION is moft perfect in one Man.
114.
IN one Man, Judgment wants the ftrength which is in a
multitude of Counfillors.
115. IN a multitude of Counfillors, Invention is none at all.
116. THRO the defect of Invention, the wifeft Affemblys in
the formation or reformation of Government, have pitch'd upon a
fole Legiſlator.
117. IT is not below the Dignity of the greateft Affembly, but
according to the practice of the beft Commonwealths, to admit
of any man that is able to propofe to them, for the good of his
Country.
118. TO the making of a well order'd Commonwealth, there
gos little more of pains or charge, or work without doors, than the
Eſtabliſhment of an equal or apt Divifion of the Territory, and the
propofing of fuch Election to the Divifions fo made, as from an equal
Foundation may raiſe
equal Superſtructures; the reft being but paper-
work, is as foon don, as faid or voted.
"
119. A
Political Aphorifms.
523
119. WHERE fuch Elections are propos'd, as being made by
the People, muft needs produce a well order'd Senat and Popular
Affembly, and the People (who, as we have already found by ex-
perience, ſtick not at the like work) elect accordingly; there not
the Propoſers of any power in themſelves, but the whole People by
their peculiar and natural right and power, do inftitute and ordain
their whole Commonwealth.
120. THE higheſt earthly Felicity that a People can aſk, ör
GOD can give, is an equal and well-order'd Commonwealth. Such
a one among the Ifraelits, was the reign of GOD; and ſuch a one
(for the fame reafon) may be among Chriftians the Reign of
CHRIST, tho not every one in the Chriftian Commonwealth
fhould be any more a Chriftian indeed, than every one in the
Ifraelitiſh Commonwealth was an Ifraelit indeed.
:
:
3
Xxx 2
Seven
524
Divers Models
Seven Models of a Commonwealth:
OR BRIEF
DIRECTIONS
བཀ་
Shewing how a fit and perfect MODEL
QF
Popular Government
May be made, found, or underftood.
T
HERE is nothing more apparent, than that this Nation is
greatly difquieted and perplex'd thro a complication of two Cau-
Jes: The one, that the prefent ftate therof is not capable of any
other Form than that only of a Popular Government; the o-
ther, that they are too few who understand what is the Form or Model na-
turally neceffary to a Popular Government, or what is requir'd in that Form
or Prudence for the fitting of it to the ufe of this Nation. For theſe
Infirmitys I fhall offer fom Remedy by a brief Difcourfe or Direction con-
fifting of two Parts.
ör
THE firft fhewing thofe Forms or Models of Popular Government,
of Commonwealths, which have bin hitherto extant, whether fit or unfit for
the prefent ftate of this Nation: The fecond, fhewing a Model or Form
of Popular Government fitted to the prefent state of this Nation. In the
firſt part I ſhall propofe feven Models roughly and generally: in the fecond,
one, but more particularly and exactly.
I
THE FIRST PART.
N every Frame of Government, either the Form must be fitted to the
Property as it ftands, and this is only practicable in this Nation; or
the Property must be alter'd and fitted to the Frame, which without
force bas bin fomtimes, but very feldom, practicable in any other Nation.
Nevertheless, for the better knowlege of the one way, it will be best to pro-
pofe in both ways.
THE
of Popular Government:
525
THE
FIRST MODEL
OF
POPULAR GOVERNMENT
T
PROPOS’D.
The Commonwealth of Ifrael.
HAT the Nobility, the Gentry, and the People, be per-
fuaded to give up their whole Lands to the Commonwealth.
THAT if the whole People fhall fo give up their Lands, they
be divided into twelve equal Precincts, call'd Tribes.
THAT the man of greateſt quality in every Tribe have about
ten thouſand pounds a year given to him and his Heirs, with the he-
reditary Dignity of Prince of his Tribe.
THAT fom ten other men of the next quality under the Prince
in every Tribe, have about two thouſand pounds a year in the fame
given to each of them and their Heirs, with the hereditary Dignity
of Patriarchs, or Chief of the Fathers.
THAT the remaining part of the Lands, except forty eight Ci-
tys and their Suburbs, be diſtributed to the whole People equally by
Lots.
THAT it be not Lawful for any Prince, Patriarch, or other, to
fell or alienat his Land, or any part therof, in fuch manner, but that
upon every fiftieth year, being for this caufe a year of Jubile, all
Lands within that compaſs fold or alienated return to the antient
Poffeffors or lawful Heirs.
THAT there be one other Tribe added to the twelve; that this
Tribe ſo added be not local, nor fuffer'd to have any Lands at all, ex-
cept the forty eight Citys above referv'd, with their Suburbs, that is
with a quantity of Land to each of them, being in depth two thou-
fand Cubits round. That theſe be fettl'd upon them and their Heirs
for ever, befides the annual Tithe of the whole Territory, and a piece
of Mony every year upon every Head under the notion of an Offering,
in regard that other Offerings are now unlawful; and that this Tribe
confift of Clergy, having one hereditary Archbishop, or High Prieſt,
for the Head and Prince of their Tribe.
THAT there be no other Law than that of the Word of God
only; and that the Clergy being beft ſkill'd in this Law, be eligible
into all Courts of Juftice, all Magiftracys and Offices whatſoever.
THAT the Prince of a Tribe, together with one or more Courts,
confifting of twenty three Judges elected by the People of that Tribe
for life, be the Government of the fame.
THAT the People of twelve local Divifions take by the Bal-
lot wife men and underſtanding among their Tribes, and of thefe
con-
526
Divers Models
conftitute a Senat for the whole Commonwealth confifting of ſeventy
Elders for life.
THAT every local Tribe monthly elect two thouſand of their
own number; and that theſe Elections amounting in all to four and
twenty thouſand, affemble at the Metropolis or Capital City, and be
the monthly Repreſentative of the People.
THAT the Senat be a ſtanding Judicatory of Appeal from all
other Courts, with power to fhew the Sentence of the Laws of God.
THAT befides the Law of God, whatever fhall be propos'd by
the feventy Elders, and refolv'd by the monthly Reprefentative of
the People, be the Law of the Land.
A SECOND MODEL
O F
A COMMONWEALTH
TH
PROPOS' D.
HAT there be a King without Guards.
THAT the Word or Command of this King be the Law.
THAT this King ftirring out of his Palace, it may be lawful for
any man to flay him.
In this Model there wants but Security, that while the People are dif
pers'd the King can gather no Army, to demonftrat, That either the Peo-
ple must be free, or the King a Prifoner.
A THIRD MODEL
O F
A COMMONWEALTH
T
PROPOS D.
The Commonwealth of Sparta.
HAT the Nobility, the Gentry, and the People, having upon
perfuafion given up their Lands to the Public, the whole Ter-
ritory be divided into one hundred thouſand equal Lots, and two
more, being each of ten thouſand Acres.
THAT the inferior Lots be diftributed to the People.
THAT every man poffeffing a Lot, be a Citizen.
THAT the reft, except only the Children of Citizens, be Ser-
vants to, and Tillers of the ground for the Citizens.
THAT there be no profeſs'd Students.
THAT
of Popular Government.
527
THAT no Citizen exerciſe any Trade but that of Arms only;
and that the uſe of Mony, except it be made of Iron, be wholly
baniſh'd.
THAT there be two Kings hereditary: That each of them pof-
ſeſs one of thoſe Lots of ten thousand Acres.
THAT they be Preſidents of the Senat, with fingle Votes ; and
that in War they have the leading of the Armys.
THAT there be a Senat confifting, befides the Kings, of twenty
eight Senators, elected for life by the People.
THAT whatever be propos'd by this Senat to the whole Peo-
ple, or any ten thouſand of them, and ſhall be refolv'd by the fame,
be the Law.
THAT there be a Court confifting of five annual Magiftrats
elected by the People; and that this Court have power to bring a
King, a Senator, or other, that ſhall openly or fecretly violat the
Laws, or invade the Government, to Juſtice.
A FOURTH MODEL
OF
A COMMONWEALTH
TH
PROPOS' D.
The Commonwealth of Athens.
HAT there be a Reprefentative of the People, confiſting of
five thoufand.
THAT theſe annually elect by lot a Senat confifting of four hun-
dred, and a Signory by fuffrage confifting of nine annual Princes.
THAT each fourth part of the Senat, for one fourth part of their
annual term, be a Council of State.
THAT the Council of State may affemble the People, and propofe
to the fame: That the Senat may affemble the People, and propoſe
to them. And that what is propos'd by the Senat, and reſolv'd by
the People, be the Law.
THAT the executive Power of the Laws made, be more efpe-
cially committed and diftributed in various Functions, and divers Âd-
miniſtrations, to the nine Princes.
528
Divers Models:
(
A FIFTH MODEL
OF
A COMMONWEALTH
TH
PROPOS' D.
The Commonwealth of Rome.
f
HAT the whole Nation be divided into three diftinct Orders:
the one Senatorian, or Nobility; the other Equestrian, or Gen-
try; and the third Plebeian, or Popular.
THAT the Equeftrian Order be the Cavalry of the Common-
wealth, and the Plebeian the Foot.
THAT there be a Senat confifting of the Senatorian Order, and
of three hundred Senators for life.
THAT there be two Magiftrats elected by the People, for five
years term, call'd Cenfors.
THAT the Cenfors have power upon cauſe fhewn to remove a
Senator out of the Senat; and to elect a Nobleman, or fomtimes a
Plebeian, therby made Noble, into the Senat.
THAT there be two annual Magiftrats elected by the People,
call'd Confuls.
THAT the Confuls be Prefidents of the Senat, and have the
leading of the Armys.
THAT the Senat (as they fhall fee occafion) may nominat one
perfon to be Dictator for fom fhort term.
THAT the Dictator for his term have Soverain Power.
THAT there be a Divifion of the whole People, of what Orders
foever, into fix Claffes, according to the valuation of their Eftates.
For example: That the firft Claflis confift of all fuch as have two
thouſand pounds a year, or upwards; the ſecond of all fuch as have
one thousand pounds a year, or upwards, under two; the third, of
all fuch as have fix hundred pounds a year, or upwards, under one
thouſand; the fourth, of all fuch as have three hundred pounds a
year, or upwards, under fix hundred; the fifth, of all ſuch as have
under the former proportion; the fixth, of all fuch as pay no Taxes,
or have no Land, and that theſe be not us'd in Arms.
THAT the Senat propofe all Laws to be enacted, to an Affembly
of the People.
THAT all Magiftrats be elected by the fame.
THAT this Affembly of the People confift of the five Claffes, in
fuch manner, that if the Votes of the firft and fecond Claffes be near
equal, the third Claffis be call'd; and if theſe agree not, the fourth be
call'd; and fo for the reft.
THAT what is thus propos'd by the Senat, and refolv'd by the
People, be the Law.
1
IN
of Popular Government:
529
IN this Frame the Senat, by the optimacy of the first and fecond Claffes
(which feldom or never difagree) carrys all, to the exclufion of the main
Body of the People: whence arifes continual feud or enmity between the Senat
and the People: who confulting apart, introduce Popular Debate, fet up fom
other way of Aſſembly, as by Tribes, or by Parishes, with more equality of
Votes; elect Magiftrats of their own, make Decrees binding the Senat of
Nobility, indeavor to curb their Power by weakning their Balance, or
diminishing their Eftates: All theſe tumultuously, and to the alteration
of the Government, with fo frequent Changes under fo divers fhapes, as
make a very Proteus of the Commonwealth, till having bin all her life-
time afflicted with Anarchy, she ends her days in Tyranny.
A SIXTH MODEL
O F
A COMMONWEALTH
PROPOS D.
The Commonwealth of Venice.
HAT the Soverain Power be eftated upon four thouſand ſelect
men, to them and their Heirs for ever.
TH
THAT there be a great Council confifting of theſe four thouſand;
and that their Sons at five and twenty years of age have right to the
fame.
THAT the great Council elect one Duke for life: That the
Duke have a Royal Palace affign'd, with a Guard, at the States charge,
and a Revenue of fifteen hundred pounds a year; and that he bear the
Soverain Dignity of the Commonwealth.
THAT this Duke have fix Counfillors annually chofen by the
great Council. That he have no power to fign any Writing, tho in
his own Name, nor to do any of his political Functions without his
Counfillors. That his Counfillors have power to fign any Writing
in the Duke's name, or to do any of his political Functions without
him; and that the Duke with thefe fix Counfillors be the Signory of
the Commonwealth.
THAT the Signory of this Commonwealth have feffion and fuf-
frage in all the Councils of the fame, with right alſo to propoſe to
cach or any of them, either jointly or ſeverally.
THAT one hundred and twenty elected annually by the great
Council, together with other Councils and Magiftrats, to whom of
courſe the like Honor is appertaining, be the Senat.
THAT fixteen other Magiftrats propos'd by the Senat, and con-
firm'd by the great Council for the term of fix months, be a Coun-
cil apart, with three weekly Provofts or Propofers, call'd the Col-
lege.
THAT the Signory may affemble the College, and propofe to
them; that the College may affemble the Senat, and propoſe to them;
Y y y
and
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Divers Models
and that the Senat may affemble the great Council, and propofe to
them. And that whatever is refolv'd by the Senat, and not contra-
dicted, nor queſtion'd by the great Council, be the Law.
THAT there be a Council of Ten elected annually by the great
Council; and that this Council of Ten, with the Signory, and fom of
the College, having right of Seffion and Suffrage in the fame, may
upon occafion exerciſe Dictatorian Power in this Commonwealth.
THAT the reft of the People under the Empire of this Com-
monwealth, be difarm'd, and govern'd by Lieutenants of Provinces.
That the Commonwealth have a ſtanding Army of Strangers or others,
in Diſciplin and Pay. And that the City wherin fhe fhall refide, be
founded in the Sea, after fuch a manner, that it can no more be approach'd
by a Fleet, than by an Army without a Fleet. Otherwife, this Common-
wealth is expos'd both to the Provinces, and to a mercenary Army.
A SEVENTH MODEL
O F
A COMMONWEALTH
T
>
PROPOS D.
The Commonwealth of Holland.
HAT the People in every City, and in every Province or
County within theſe three Nations, elect to every City, Pro-
vince, or County of the fame, a matter of twenty, thirty, or forty
Magiſtrats for life. That theſe Magiftrats being fo elected, be the
Senat of that refpective City, Province or County.
THAT the Senats, thus elected, thenceforth have and injoy the
Soverain Power within their refpective Jurifdiction, for ever. That
every Senat annually elect two or four Burgomafters or Confuls, to be
Prefidents of the fame. That they alfo elect feven Magiftrats, or
preſent fourteen perfons to the Governor of the Province; and that
he elect feven. That the feven fo elected be judges, or have the
Executive Power of the Laws for their term, and within their re-
fpective Jurifdiction.
THAT in cafe of Affairs of more public and general concern, as
War or Peace, levy of Men or Mony, and the like, the Governor of
the Province give information of the things to be confider'd, to the
Nobility, and to the Senats of that Province; therwith appointing a
timé and place for the Affembly of the States Provincial. That each
of the Senats, having debated the matter propos'd, delegat one Conful,
with fom other Senators well inform'd and inftructed with their Will
and Pleaſure, to the Affembly of the States Provincial. That the No-
bility of the fame Province delegat fom of their Order likewiſe to the
Provincial States. That the Delegats both of the Nobility and of the
Senats, give the Vote of their Principals according to inftruction
and
of Popular Government.
53T
and that neither the Nobility, nor any Senat or Soverainty be other-
wife bound, than by their own Vote.
THAT the Provincial Eftates elect one Magiftrat for life, or du-
ring pleaſure, to be Provincial Governor: That they elect one or more
other Magiftrats for life, or during pleaſure, to be States General.
THAT the States General being elected, and well inftructed by
their Provinces, have the direction of the whole League: That each
give not his own Vote, but the Vote of his Province; and that no
Province be otherwiſe bound, than by her own Vote.
F thefe Models (in which, I claim to be the first that has laid the whole,
and the highest Mysterys of the antient Commonwealths, to the loweſt
capacity of vulgar Debate) be not all in the mouths of great men, and in
Pamphlets, for Chimeras or Utopias, it is great chance: Yet contain
they no less than the whole Revolution of Popular Prudence. Nor is it
more certain, that no one of them would fit the prefent ftate of this Nation,
than that he or they, whofe Contemplation and Understanding is not well
vers'd in the moſt, or in the beſt of theſe, ſhall never fit a Model of Popu-
lar Government to the prefent state of this Nation, or of any other. In
which affurance, I com to fulfil my promife in the Second Part, or to pro-
pofe fuch a Model as is fitted to the preſent ſtate of this Nation.
THE
SECOND PART,
Propoſing a MODEL of
A COMMONWEALTH
B
Fitted to the
Prefent State of this Nation.
UT ſo it is ever, that the Humors or Interefts of predominant Par-
ty's hold themſelves to be National; and that which fits them, can
never fit a Nation; nor that which fits a Nation, ever fit them.
This in the Introduction of Government, is always the main difficulty.
But where Partys are no better founded, or fitted for Ufurpation, than
now in England, they are rather to be flighted than confider'd, as thoſe,
the ftouteft wherof have but given this Example to the reft, that they
who in this state of Affairs fhall obftruct an equal and well-order'd Go-
vernment, fhall but ruin themselves. For which caufe it is propos'd:
I. HAT all Citizens, that is, Freemen, or fuch as are not
1. TH Servants, be diftributed into Horfe and Foot. That fuch of
them as have one hundred pounds a year in Lands, Goods, or Mony,
Yyy 2
or
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J
Divers Models
•
or above this proportion, be of the Horfe; and all fuch as have
under this proportion, be of the Foot.
2. THAT all Elders, or Freemen, being thirty years of age or
upwards, be capable of civil Adminiftration; and that the Youth, or
fuch Freemen as are between eighteen years of age and thirty, be not
capable of civil Adminiſtration, but of military only, in fuch manner
as fhall follow in the military part of this Model.
3. THAT the whole native, or proper Territory of the Com-
monwealth be caft with as much exactnefs as can be convenient, into
known and fix'd Precincts or Parishes.
4. THAT the Elders refident in each Pariſh annually affemble in
the fame, for example upon Monday next infuing the laſt of Decem-
ber: That they then and there elect out of their own number every
fifth man, or one man of every five, to be for the term of the
year in-
fuing a Deputy of that Pariſh; and that the firſt and ſecond ſo elected
be Overſeers, or Prefidents for the regulating of all Parochial Congre-
gations, whether of the Elders, or of the Youth, during the Term for
which they were elected.
5. THAT fo mány Pariſhes lying neareſt together, whofe Depu-
tyś fhall amount to one hundred or therabouts, be caft into one Pre-
cinct call'd the Hundred; and that in each Precinct call'd the Hun-
dred, there be a Town, Village, or place appointed to be the Capital
of the fame.
6. THAT the Parochial Deputys elected throout the Hundred af-
femble annually, for example upon Monday next infuing the laſt of
January, at the Capital of their Hundred. That they then and there
elect out of the Horſe of their number one Juftice of the Peace, one
Juryman, one Captain, one Infign; and out of the Foot of their
number one other Juryman, one High Conftable, &c.
7. THAT every twenty Hundreds lying neareft, and moſt con-
veniently together, be caft into one Tribe; that the whole Territory
being after this manner caft into the Tribes, fome Town or place be ap-
pointed to every Tribe for the Capital of the fame; and that theſe
three Precincts (that is, the Parish, the Hundred, and the Tribe)
whether the Deputys thenceforth annually chofen in the Pariſhes or
Hundreds, com to increaſe or diminiſh, remain firm and inalterable
for ever, fave only by Act of Parlament. The Tribes are prefum'd
throout thefe Propofitions to amount to fifty.
8. THAT the Deputys elected in the feveral Pariſhes, together
with their Magiftrats and other Officers both Civil and Military elected
in the feveral Hundreds, affemble or mufter annually, for example
upon Monday next infuing the laſt of February, at the Capital of their
Tribe, for the ſpace of two days.
9. THAT this whole Body thus affembl'd, upon the first day of
their Affembly elect out of the Horfe of their number, one High
Sherif, one Lieutenant of the Tribe, one Cuftos Rotulorum, one Con-
ductor, and two Cenfors. That the High Sherif be Commander in
chief, the Lieutenant Commander in the fecond place, and the Con-
ductor in the third place, of this Band or Squadron: That the Cuftos
Rotulorum be muftermafter, and keep the Rolls; that the Cenfors be
Governors of the Ballot: and that the term of thefe Magiftracys be
annual.
10. THAT
1
of Popular Government.
533
10. THAT the Magiftrats of the Tribe (that is to fay, the High
Sherif, Lieutenant, Cuftos Rotulorum, the Cenfors, and the Conductor,
together with the Magiftrats and Officers of the Hundreds, that is to
fay, the twenty Juftices of the Peace, the forty Jurymen, the twenty
High Conſtables) be one Troop, or one Troop and one Company apart,
call'd the Prerogative Troop or Company. That this Troop bring in
and affift the Juſtice of Affize, hold the Quarter Seffion in their feveral
Capacities, and perform their other Functions as formerly.
1. THAT the Magiftrats of the Tribe (that is to fay, the High
Sherif, Lieutenant, Cuftos Rotulorum, the Cenfors, and the Conductor,
together with the twenty Juftices elected at the Hundreds) be a Court
for the Government of the Tribe call'd the Phylarch; and that this
Court procede in all matter of Government as fhall from time to time
be directed by Act of Parlament.
12. THAT the Squadron of the Tribe on the ſecond day of their
affembly, elect two Knights, and three Burgeffes out of the Horfe of
their number, and four other Burgeffes out of the Foot of their number :
that each Knight upon Election forthwith make Oath of Allegiance to
the Commonwealth, or refufing fuch Oath, the next Competitor in
Election to the fame Magiftracy, making the faid Oath, be the Magi-
ftrat. The like for the Burgeffes. That the Knights thus íworn, have
Seffion in the Senat for the term of three years; and that the Burgeffes
thus fworn, be of the Prerogative Tribe or Repreſentative of the People
for the like term.
13. THAT for the full and perfect inſtitution of the Affemblys.
mention'd, the Squadron of the Tribe in the firſt year of the Com-
monwealth, elect two Knights for the term of one year, two other
Knights for the term of two years, and laftly two Knights more for the
term of three years; the like for the Burgeffes of the Horſe firſt, and
thon for thoſe of the Foot. And that this Propofition be of no far-
ther uſe than for the first year's Election only.
14. THAT a Magiftrat or Officer elected at the Hundred be ther-
by bar'd from being elected a Magiftrat of the Tribe, or of the firſt
day's Election; but that no former Election whatſoever bar a man of
the fecond day's Election at the Tribe, or to be chofen a Knight or
Burgeſs. That a man being chofen a Knight or Burgefs, who be-
fore was choſen a Magiftrat or Officer of the Hundred, or Tribe,
may delegat his former Office or Magistracy in the Hundred, or in
the Tribe, to any other Deputy, being no Magiftrat nor Officer, and
being of the fame Hundred, and of the fame Order, that is, of the
Horle or Foot refpectively.
15. THAT the Knights of the annual Election take their places
on Monday next infuing the laft of March in the Senat; that the like
number of Knights whofe Seffion determins at the fame time, recede.
That every Knight or Senator be paid out of the public Revenue quar-
terly, one hundred twenty five pounds during his term of Seffion, and
be oblig'd to fit in purple Robes.
16. THAT annually on reception of the new Knights, the Senat
procede to election of new Magiftrats or Counfillors. That for Magi-
ftrats they elect one General, one Speaker, and two Cenfors, each for
the term of one year, theſe promifcuously; and that they elect one Com-
miffioner of the great Seal, and one Commiffioner of the Treaſury, each
for the term of three years, and out of the new Knights only.
17. THAT
534
Divers Models
17. THAT the General and the Speaker, as Confuls of the Com-
monwealth, and Prefidents of the Senat, be during the term of their
Magiftracy paid quarterly out of the public Revenue five hundred
pounds; that the Infigns of thefe Magiftracys be a Sword born before
the General, and a Mace before the Speaker; that they be oblig'd to
wear Ducal Robes. And that what is faid of the General in this Pro-
pofition, be only underſtood of the General fitting, and not of the
General marching.
18. THAT the General fitting, in cafe he be commanded to
march, receive Fieldpay; and that a new General be forthwith elected
by the Senat to fuccede him in the Houfe, with all the Rights, In-
figns and Emoluments of the General fitting; and this fo often as
one or more Generals are marching.
19. THAT the three Commiffioners of the Great Seal, and the
three Commiffioners of the Treafury, ufing their Infigns and Habit,
and performing their other functions as formerly, have paid quarterly
to each of them three hundred feventy five pounds.
20. THAT the Cenfors govern the Ballot; that they be Prefi-
dents of the Council for Religion; that each have a filver Wand for
the Infign of his Magiftracy; that each be paid quarterly three hun-
dred feventy five pounds, and be oblig'd to wear fcarlet Robes.
21. THAT the General fitting, the Speaker, and the fix Com-
miffioners abovefaid, be the Signory of this Commonwealth.
22. THAT there be a Council of State confifting of fifteen
Knights, five out of each Order, Lift, or Election; and that the fame
be perpetuated by the annual election of five out of the new Knights,
or thoſe laſt elected into the Senat.
23. THAT there be a Council for Religion confifting of twelve
Knights, four out of each Order, and perpetuated by the annual e-
lection of four out of the Knights laft elected into the Senat. That
there be a Council for Trade, confifting of a like number, elected and
perpetuated in the fame manner.
24. THAT there be a Council of War not elected by the Senat,
but elected by the Council of State out of themſelves. That this
Council of War confift of nine Knights, three out of each Order,
and be perpetuated by the annual election of three out of the laſt
Knights elected into the Council of State.
25. THAT in cafe the Senat add nine Knights more elected pro-
miſcuouſly, or not promifcuouſly, out of their own number, to the
Council of War, the faid Council of War be underſtood by ſuch ad-
dition to be Dictator of the Commonwealth for the term of three
months and no longer, except by farther Order of the Senat the ſaid
Dictatorian Power be prolong'd for a like term.
26. THAT the Signory have feffion and fuffrage, with right alſo
jointly or ſeverally to propofe both in the Senat, and in all Senatorian
Councils.
27. THAT each of the three Orders or Divifions of Knights, in
each Senatorian Council, elect one Provoſt for the term of one Week;
and that any two Provofts of the fame Council fo elected, may pro-
pofe to the fame Council for their term, and not otherwiſe.
28. THAT fom fair Room, or Rooms well furniſh'd and attend-
ed, be allow'd at the States charge, for a free and open Academy to
all comers, at fom convenient hour or hours towards the Evening:
That
of Popular Government.
535
That this Academy be govern'd according to the Rules of good Breed-
ing, or civil Converfation, by fom one or more of the Provoſts; and
that in this Academy it be lawful for any man, by word of mouth, or
by writing, in jeft or in earneft, to propofe to the Propofers.
29. THAT for Embaffadors in ordinary, there be four Refiden-
ces, as France, Spain, Venice, and Conftantinople; and that
every Re-
fident upon election of a new Embaffador in Ordinary, remove to the
next Refidence in order hereby mention'd, till having ferv'd orderly in
all the faid Refidences, he returns home. That upon Monday next
infuing the laſt of November, there be every fecond year elected by
the Senat fom fit perfon, being above twenty five and under thirty five
years of age, and not of the Senat, nor of the Popular Affembly.
That the Party fo elected repair on Monday next infuing the laft of
March following, as an Embaffador in Ordinary to the Court of
France, and there refide for the term of two years to be computed
from the firſt of April next infuing his election. That every Embaf-
fador in Ordinary be allow'd three thouſand pounds a year during the
term of his Refidence. And that if a Refident coms to dy, there be an
extraordinary Election into his Reſidence for his term, and for the re-
mainder of his removes and progrefs.
30. THAT all emergent Elections be made by fcrutiny, that is
by a Council, or by Commiffioners propofing, and by the Senat re-
folving in the manner following: That all Field Officers be propos'd
by the Council of War: That all Embaffadors Extraordinary be pro-
pos'd by the Council of State: That all Judges and Serjeants at Law be
propos'd by the Commiffioners of the Great Seal: That all Barons
and Officers of truft in the Exchequer be propos'd by the Commiffio-
ners of the Treaſury; and that fuch of theſe as are thus propos'd to,
and approv'd by the Senat, be held lawfully elected.
31. THAT the cognizance of all foren Negotiation, and of all
matter of State to be confider'd, or Law to be enacted, whether Pro-
vincial or National, Domeſtic or Foren, pertain to the Council of
State. That all fuch Affairs of like kind as the Council of State ſhall
judg fit to be carry'd with more than ordinary Secrecy, be committed
by them, and pertain to the cognizance and truſt of the Council of
War, to this end confifting of a felect Part, or Committee of the
Council of State. That the Cognizance and Protection both of the
National Religion, and of the Liberty of Confcience, equally efta-
blifh'd in this Nation, after the manner provided in the religious part
of this Model, pertain to the Council for Religion. That all matter
of Traffic, and regulation of the fame pertain to the Council for
Trade. That in the exerciſe of theſe feveral Functions, each being
naturally Senatorian or Authoritative only, no Council affume any other
Power than fuch only as ſhall be particularly or exprefly eſtated upon
the fame by Act of Parlament,
32. THAT what ſhall be propos'd to the Senat by any one or
more of the Signory, or of the Propofers General; or whatever was
propos'd by any two of the Provoſts, or particular Propofers to their
reſpective Council, and upon debate at that Council fhall com to be
propos'd by the fame to the Senat, be neceffarily debatable, and de-
bated by the Senat.
33. THAT in all cafes wherin Power is deriv'd to the Senat by
Law made, or by Act of Parlament, the refult of the Senat be ultimat:
That
}
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Divers Models
That in all cafes of Law to be made, or not already provided for by
Act of Parlament, as fom particular Peace or War, levy of Men or
Mony, or the like, the Refult of the Senat be not ultimat, but prepa-
ratory only, and be propos'd by the Senat to the Prerogative Tribe, or
Affembly of the People, except only in cafes of fuch ſpeed or fecrecy,
wherin the Senat fhall judg the neceffary flowneſs or openneſs of like
proceding to be of detriment or danger to the Commonwealth.
34. THAT if upon the motion or propofition of a Council, or
Propofer General, the Senat add nine Knights, promifcuously or not
promifcuouſly choſen out of their own number, to the Council of War,
the faid Council of War be therby made Dictator, and have power
of Life and Death, as alfo to enact Laws in all cafes of fpeed or fe-
crecy, for and during the term of three months and no longer, except
upon new Order from the Senat: And that all Laws enacted by the
Dictator, be good and valid for the term of one year, and no longer,
except the fame be propos'd by the Senat, and refolv'd by the People.
35. THAT the Burgeffes of the annual Election return'd by the
Tribes, enter into the Prerogative Tribe on Monday next infuing the
laft of March; and that the like number of Burgeffes whofe term is
expir'd, recede at the fame time. That the Burgeffes thus enter'd,
elect to themſelves out of their own number two of the Horfe, one to
be Captain, and the other to be Cornet of the fame; and two of the
Foot, one to be Captain, the other to be Infign of the ſame, each for
the term of three years. That theſe Officers being thus elected, the
whole Tribe or Affembly procede to the election of four annual Ma-
giftrats, two out of the Foot to be Tribuns of the Foot, and two out
of the Horſe to be Tribuns of the Horfe. That the Tribuns be Com-
manders in chief of this Tribe fo far as it is a Military Body, and Prefi-
dents of the fame as it is a Civil Affembly. And lastly, that this whole
Tribe be paid weekly as follows: to each of the Tribuns of the Horſe
feven pounds, to each of the Tribuns of the Foot fix pounds; to each of
the Captains of Horſe five Pounds, to each of the Captains of Foot
four pounds; to each of the Cornets three pounds, to each of the
Infigns two pounds feven fhillings; to every Horfeman one pound
ten Shillings, and to every one of the Foot one pound.
36. THAT inferior Officers, as Captains, Cornets, Infigns, be
only for the Military Difciplin of the Tribe. That the Tribuns have
Seffion in the Senat without Suffrage: That of courſe they have Sef-
fion and Suffrage in the Dictatorian Council, fo often as it is created
by the Senat. That in all cafes to be adjudg'd by the People they be
Prefidents of the Court or Judicatory.
37. THAT Peculat or Defraudation of the Public, and all Cafes
or Crimes tending to the fubverfion of the Government, be triable by
the Prerogative Tribe or the Affembly of the People; and that to the
fame there ly an Appeal in all Cauſes, and from all Courts, Magiſtrats,
or Councils, National and Provincial.
38. THAT the right of Debate, as alfo of propofing to the Peo-
ple, be wholly and only in the Senat, without any power at all of
Reſult not deriv'd from the People, and eſtated upon the Senat by act
of Parlament.
39. THAT the power of Refult be wholly and only in the Peo-
ple, without any right at all of Debate.
40. THAT
**
of Popnlar Government.
537
40. THAT the Senat having debated and agreed upon a Law to
be propos'd, caufe promulgation of the faid Law to be made for the
fpace of fix weeks before Propofition; that is, cauſe the Law to be
written fair, and hung up for the time aforefaid in fom of the moſt
eminent places of the City, and of the Suburbs.
41. THAT promulgation being made, the Signory demand of
the Tribuns fitting in the Senat, an Affembly of the People. That
the Tribuns upon fuch demand of the Signory, or of the Senat, be
oblig'd to affemble the Prerogative Tribe in Arms by found of Trum-
pet, with Drums beating, and Colors flying, in any Town, Field, or
Marketplace, being not above fix miles diftant, upon the day, and at
the hour appointed, except the meeting, thro inconvenience of the
Weather, or the like, be prorogu'd by confent of the Signory and of the
Tribuns. That the Prerogative Tribe being affembl'd accordingly,
the Senat propoſe to them by two or more of the Senatorian Magi-
ftrats therto appointed, at the firſt Promulgation of the Law. That
the Propofers for the Senat open to the People the occafion, motives,
and reafons of the Senat for the Law to be propos'd; and that the fame
being don, they put the Law or Propofition by diſtinct clauſes to the
Ballot of the People. That if any material Clauſe or Clauſes of the
Propofition, or Law fo propos'd, be rejected by the People, the Clauſe
or Clauſes ſo rejected may be review'd, alter'd, and propos'd again
to the third time, if the Senat think fit, but no oftner.
42. THAT what is thus propos'd by the Senat, and reſolv'd by
the People, be the Law of the Land, and no other, except what is
already receiv'd as fuch, or referv'd to the Dictatorian Council.
43. THAT every Magiftracy, Office, or Election throout this
whole Commonwealth, whether annual or triennial, be underſtood
of courſe or confequence to injoin an interval or vacation equal to the
term of the fame. That the Magiftracy or Office of a Knight, and of
a Burgeſs, be in this relation underſtood as one and the fame; and
that this Order regard only fuch Elections as are National or Dome-
ftic, and not fuch as are foren, or contain'd in the Provincial part of
this Model.
44. THAT for an Exception from this Rule, where there is but
one Elder of the Horſe in one and the fame Pariſh, that Elder be eli-
gible in the fame without interval; and where there be above four
Elders of the Horfe in one and the fame Parish, there be not above
half, nor under two of them eligible at the fame Election.
45. THAT throout all the Affemblys and Councils of this Com-
monwealth, the Quorum confift of one half in the time of health, and
of one third part in a time of fickneſs, being fo declar'd by the Senat.
THE ufe of the Ballot, being as full of prolixity and abftrufenefs in
writing, as of dispatch and facility in practice, is prefum'd throout all
Elections and Refults in this Model, and for the rest referv'd rather to
practice than writing. There remain the Religious, Military and Pro-
vincial parts of this Frame: But the Civil part being approv'd, they
follow, or being not approv'd, may be ſpar'd.
Zzz
CON
538
CONCLUSION; or, the uſe of theſe
PROPOSITIONS.
T
HESE Propofitions are fo laid out to debate or examination, that
a man having the mind to weigh, difcourfe upon, or object against
this Model, may do it in the parts with the greatest convenience.
ANY examination of, or objection against the whole, or any part in
print or in writing, the Author holds himself bound to acknowlege or an-
fwer: But as to mere difcourfe upon matters of this compass, it is ufually
narrow; befides that in writing a man must put himself upon better aim
than he can be oblig'd to take in difcourfe.
ANY one objection lying in writing against any one Order in this part
of the Model, after fuch manner as to fhew that the Part or Order ĵo in-
vaded ought to be expung'd, alter'd, or amended, unless it may be ex-
pung'd, alter'd, or amended accordingly, deftroys the whole.
AND any one or more Objections fo lying against any one or more of
thefe Orders or Propofitions, that therby they may be expung'd, alter'd or
amended, muft in the whole or in part make a better Model.
IN this cafe therfore, or in cafe no Objection lys, the uſe of theſe Pro-
pofitions will be fuch as therby any Man or any Affembly of men, confider-
ing or debating upon them in order, may find or make a true Model of a
well order'd Commonwealth.
Gb-
AND that an Aſſembly can never make or frame a Model of any
vernment otherwise than in fom fuch manner, is probable first by a de-
monftration from the effect; and fecondly by a demonftration from the
caufe.
THE demonftration from the Effect is, that an Affembly no otherwiſe
frames a Law or Order, than by having it first pen'd by fom one man, and
then judging upon it; and the Model of a Commonwealth must confift of
many Laws or Orders.
THE demonftration from the Caufe is, that wheras Reafon confifls of
two parts, the one Invention, and the other Judgment, a Man may be as
far beyond any Aſſembly for Invention, as any Affembly can be beyond a
Man for Judgment; or which is more, that the formation of a Model of
Government requires a strong faculty of Invention, and that an Aſſembly
is naturally void of all manner of Invention.
Nov. 13.
1658.
THE
539
་
THE
Ways and Means
Wherby an Equal and Laſting
COMMONWEALTH
May befuddenly introduc'd, and perfectly found-
ed, with the free Conſent and actual Confir-
mation of the Whole People of England.
Scire tuum nihil eft, nifi te fcire hoc fciat alter. Perf.
A
WORD fitly ſpoken is like Apples of Gold in Pictures of
Silver.
THE Defire of the People of England now runs ftrong-
ly to have a Free Parlament.
LET there be a free Parlament.
TO the end that the People may be moft equally repreſented, or
that the Parlament may be Freeft,
LET there be a new Divifion of England and Wales, with as
much equality as may ftand with convenience, into fifty Shires.
LET every Shire elect annually two Knights to be of one Houſe,
and ſeven Deputys to be of another Houſe of Parlament, for the term
of three years. For the firft year only, let the Deputys in each Di-
vifion be elected triple, that is, feven for the term of one year, feven for
the term of two years, and ſeven for the term of three years. The like
for the Knights, fave only that the prefent Parlament remain; that is,
let two Knights in each Divifion be elected the first year only for the
term of one year, two other Knights at the fame time for the term of
two years; and let the prefent Parlament be the triennial part of the
Knights Houſe for the first Election.
THE Houſe of Knights and the Houfe of Deputys being affembl'd,
let the Houſe of Knights debate and propofe.
LET what is propos'd by the Houfe of Knights, be promulgated
for the ſpace of fix weeks.
PROMULGATION being thus made, let the Houſe of De-
putys meet, and give their Reſult upon the Propofition.
LET what was thus propos'd by the Senat or Houſe of Knights,
and refolv'd by the People or Houſe of Deputys, be the Law.
IN this Conſtitution theſe Councils muft of neceffity contain the
Wiſdom, and the Intereft of the Nation.
IN this method, Debate muft of neceffity be mature.
Zzz 2
IF
540
The Ways and Means, &c.
IF it be according to the Wiſdom and the Intereſt of the Nation
upon mature debate that there be à King, let there be a King.
IF it be according to the Wiſdom and the Intereft of the Nation
upon mature debate, that there be a Commonwealth; two Affemblys
in this Order are actually a Commonwealth, and fo far a well Order'd
Commonwealth, that they are capacitated and inclin'd to reach to
themſelves whatever furniture fhall be further neceffary in more par-
ticular Orders, which alfo is at hand.
TILL this or the like be don, the Line of the late King and the
People muſt be fellowfufferers; in which cafe the impatience of the
People must be for the reftitution of that Line at all adventures.
BUT this or the like being once don, immediatly the Line of the
late King and the People becom Rivals, in which cafe they will never
reftore Monarchy.
WILL never, may fom fay? But if the Senat and the Popular
Affembly be both Royalifts, they both will and can reftore Monar-
chy.
THO both Royalifts, they neither will nor can: for let them,
that look no further than home or felf, fay what they will, to affirm
that a Senat, and a Popular Affembly thus conftituted can procreat
Monarchy, is to affirm that a Horfe and a Mare can generat à Cat:
that Wheat being rightly fown may com up Peafe; or that a River
in its natural channel may run upwards.
IN the prefent cafe of England, Commonwealthfmen may fail
thro want of Art, but Royalifts muſt fail thro want of Matter; the
former may miſs thro impotence, the latter muft thro impoffibility.
Or where the State is purely popular, that is, not overbalanc'd by a
Lord or Lords; let there be one Example, or one Reaſon given that
there is, was, or ever can be Monarchy. There will be this when all
fails, for the aftergame, tho the Work ſhould fall, as is like enough,
into the hands of Royalifts.
CERTAIN it is, that where any privat Citizen or Freeman
might not (fom way or other) propofe, there never was a well or-
der'd Commonwealth.
UPON this incouragement I offer'd this Paper to good hands, but
it was (according to cuſtom) thrown after me.
SO it went in the Protector's time, in every Revolution fince,
La fortuna accieca gli animi de gli huomini; but that is Atheiſm,
that's MACHIAVEL.
men;
WELL, but now fays the Protectorian Family, O that we had
fet up the equal Commonwealth! So fay broken Parlaments and Stateſ-
fo ſay the fadly miſtaken Sectarys; fo fay the cafhier'd Officers;
ſo ſays he that would have no nay, but Oligarchy was a good word;
and fo will more fay after thefe, except they learn to fay after ano-
ther, aut reges non exigendi fuerunt, aut plebi re, non verbo, danda
libertas; either the Kings ought not to have bin driven out, or the
People to have their Liberty not in word, but in deed: but that is
Heathenifm, that's CICERO; well this is Chriftian, if there will be
no fuch faying, I would there might be no fwearing.
Feb. 6. 1659.
THE
541
}
THE HUMBLE
PETITION
OF DIVERS
Well affected Perfons,
Deliver'd the 6th day of July, 1659,
With the PARLAMENT'S Anfwer therto.
TO THE
SUPREME AUTHORITY,
THE
Parlament of the Commonwealth of England;
The Humble Petition of divers well affected Perfons,
SHEWS,
T
HAT your Petitioners have for many years obferv'd the
breathings and longings of this Nation after Reft and Settle-
ment, and that upon miſtaken grounds they have bin ready
even to facrifice and yield up part of their own undoubted
right, to follow after an appearance of it.
AND your Petitioners do daily fee the bad effects of long conti-
nu'd Diftractions, in the ruins and decays of Trade foren and domeftic:
and in the advantages that are taken to make Confederacys to involve
the Nation in Blood and Confufion, under pretence of procuring a
Settlement.
THAT it has bin the practice of all Nations, on the Subverfion of
any form of Government, to provide immediatly a new Conſtitution
fuitable to their condition; with certain Succeffions and Defcents, that
fo both their Lawgivers and Magiftrats might ufe their feveral
Trufts, according to the eftablish'd Conftitution; and the People's
minds be fettl'd fecure, and free from attemts of introducing feveral
forms of Government, according to the variety of their Fancys, or
corrupt Interefts,
THAT God has preferv'd this Nation wonderfully without ex-
ample many years, fince the diffolution of the old form of Govern-
ment by King, Lords and Commons;, there having bin no fundamental
Conftitutions of any kind duly fettl'd, nor any certain Succeffion pro-
vided
542
The Humble Petition
vided for the Legiſlative Power; but even at this inftant, if by any
fudden fickneſs, defign, or force, any confiderable numbers of your
Perfons fhould be render'd incapable of meeting in Parlament, the
Commonwealth were without form of fucceffive Legiſlature or Ma-
giftracy, and left to the mercy of the ſtrongeſt Faction. Yet we have
reaſon to remember in thefe years of unfettlement, the inexpreffible
fufferings of this Nation in their Strength, Wealth, Honor, Liberty,
and all things conducing to their well-being; and we have like reafon
now fadly to apprehend the impending ruin. And we cannot diſcern a
poffibility of your Honors unanimous and expeditious proceedings to-
wards our Country's prefervation, and relief from its heavy preffures,
while your minds are not ſettl'd in any known Conftitution of Govern-
ment or fundamental Orders; according to which, all Laws fhould be
made but divers or contrary Interefts may be profecuted on different
apprehenfions of the Juftice and Prudence of different forms of Go-
vernment, tho all with good intentions.
YOUR Petitioners therfore conceiving no remedy fo effectual against the
prefent Dangers, as the fettlement of the Peoples minds, and putting
them into actual fecurity of their Propertys and Libertys, by a due efta-
blishment of the Conflitution under which they may evidently appre-
hend their certain enjoyment of them; and therupon, a return of
their Trade and free Commerce, without thofe continual fears that
make fuch frequent ftops in Trade, to the ruin of thouſands.
AND yaur Petitioners alfo cbfeving, that the Intereft of the late
King's Son is cry'd up, and promoted daily, upon pretence, that
there will be nothing but Confufion and Tyranny, till he com to
govern; and that fuch as declare for a Commonwealth, arè for
Anarchy and Confufion, and can never agree among themſelves,
what they would have.
UPON ferious thoughts of the Premises, your Petitioners do
prefume with all humility, and fubmiffion to your Wisdom, to
offer to your Honors their Principles and Propofals con-
cerning the Government of this Nation: Wherupon, they
humbly conceive, a just and prudent Government ought to
be establish'd, viz.
1
1. THAT the Conftitution of the Civil Government of England
by King, Lords, and Commons, being diffolv'd, whatever new
Conftitution of Government can be made or ſettl'd according to any
rule of Righteouſneſs, it can be no other than a wife Order or Me-
thod, into which the free People's Deputys fhall be form'd for the
making of their Laws, and taking care for their common Safety and
welfare in the execution of them: For, the exerciſe of all juft Au-
thority over a free People, ought (under God) to arife from their
own Confent.
2. THAT the Government of a free People ought to be ſo ſettl'd,
that the Governors and Govern'd may have the fame Intereſt in pre-
ferving the Government, and each other's Propertys and Libertys re-
ſpectively; that being the only fure foundation of a Common-
wealth's Unity, Peace, Strength, and Profperity.
3. THAT
1
of divers well affected Perfons.
543
3.
THAT there cannot be a Union of the Interefts of a whole
Nation in the Government, where thoſe who ſhall fomtimes govern,
be not alfo fomtimes in the condition of the Govern'd; otherwiſe the
Governors will not be in a capacity to feel the weight of the Govern-
ment, nor the Govern'd to injoy the advantages of it: And then it
will be the intereft of the major part to deſtroy the Government, as
much as it will be the intereft of the minor part to preſerve it.
4. THAT there is no fecurity that the Supreme Authority ſhall
not fall into Factions, and be led by their privat Intereft to keep them-
felves always in power, and direct the Government to their privat
advantages, if that Supreme Authority be fettl'd in any fingle Affem-
bly whatſoever, that ſhall have the intire power of propounding, de-
bating and refolving Laws.
5. THAT the Soverain Authority in every Government, of what
kind foever, ought to be certain in its perpetual Succeffions, Revolu-
tions, or Defcents; and without poffibility (by the judgment of hu-
man Prudence) of a death or failure of its being, becauſe the whole
form of the Government is diffolv'd if that ſhould happen, and the
People in the utmoſt imminent danger of an abfolute Tyranny, or a
War among themſelves, or Rapin and Confufion. And therfore
where the Government is Popular, the Affemblys in whom refide the
Supreme Authority, ought never to dy or diffolve, tho the Perfons be
annually changing: neither ought they to truſt the Soverain care of the
ſtrength and ſafety of the People out of their own hands, by allow-
ing a Vacation to themſelves, left thoſe that ſhould be trufted be in
love with fuch great Authority, and aſpire to be their Maſters, or
elfe fear an Account, and feek the diffolution of the Commonwealth
to avoid it.
6. THAT it ought to be declar'd as a Fundamental Order in the
Conſtitution of this Commonwealth, that the Parlament being the
Supreme Legiſlative Power, is intended only for the exercife of all
thoſe Acts of Authority that are proper and peculiar to the Legiſlative
Power; and to provide for a Magiftracy, to whom ſhould appertain
the whole Executive Power of the Laws: and no Cafe either Civil
or Criminal to be judg'd in Parlament, faving that the laſt Appeals in
all Cafes, where Appeals fhall be thought fit to be admitted, be only
to the Popular Affembly; and alſo that to them be refer'd the Judg-
ment of all Magiftrats in Cafes of Maladminiſtrations in their Offices.
AND in profecution of thefe Principles,
YOUR Petitioners humbly propofe for the fettlement of
this Commonwealth, that it be ordain'd,
1. THAT the Parlament or the fupreme Authority of England, be
chofen by the free People, to reprefent them with as much equality as may
be.
2. THAT a Parlament of England ſhall confift of two Aſſemblys,
the leffer of about three hundred, in whom shall refide the intire power of
confulting, debating, and propounding Laws: the other, to confift of a
far greater number, in whom shall reft the fole power of refolving all
Laws fo propounded.
3. THAT
544
The Humble Petition
3. THAT the free People of England, in their respective divifions at
certain days and places appointed, fhall for ever annually chufe one third part
to each Aſſembly, to enter into their Authority, at certain days appointed:
the fame days, the Authority of a third of each of the faid Affemblys to
ceafe, only in the laying the firft Foundation in this Commonwealth's
Conftitution: the whole number of both the Affemblys to be chofen by the
People respectively, viz. one third of each Affembly to be chofen for one
year, one third for two years, and one third for three
years.
4. THAT fuch as fhall be chofen, having ferv'd their appointed time
in either of the faid Affemblys of Parlament, ſhall not be capable to ferve
in the fame Affembly during fom convenient interval or vacation.
5. THAT the Legiſlative Power do wholly refer the execution of the
Laws to the Magiftracy, according to the fixth Principle herein men-
tion'd.
6. THAT in respect to Religion and Chriftian Liberty, it be ordain'd
that the Chriftian Religion by the appointment of all fucceding Parlaments,
be taught,and promulgated to the Nation, and public Preachers therof main-
tain'd: and that all that ſhall profefs the faid Religion, tho of different
Perfuafions in parts of the Doctrin, or Difciplin therof, be equally protected
in the peaceable profeffion, and public exercife of the fame; and be equally
capable of all Elections, Magifiracys, Preferments in the Commonwealth,
according to the order of the fame. Provided always, that the public ex-
ercife of no Religion contrary to Chriftianity be tolerated; nor the public
exercife of any Religion, tho profefedly Chriftian, grounded upon, or in-
corporated into the Intereft of any Foren State or Prince.
THESE your Petitioners humbly conceive to be the Effentials
of the form of a free Commonwealth, which if they were made fit
for practice by your Honors appointing the numbers, times, places,
and all other neceffary Circumftances, and fettl'd as the fundamental
Orders of the Commonwealth, would naturally diſpoſe thoſe that
ſhould hereafter be choſen into the Parlaments, from the love of their
own intereſt to ſeek the common good, being oblig'd by the Confti-
tutions here humbly offer'd to partake with the whole body of the
People, of the good or evil that ſhall happen to the Commonwealth,
having no probable temtations or means left to compafs any privat
or factious ends in matters Religious or Civil. And your Petitioners
cannot imagin a greater fecurity for the Caufe and Intereft contended
for with fuch effufion of Blood, than by difpofing the free People
into this kind of order, wherby the fame Caufe would becom their
common Intereſt. Yet if your Honors ſhould think it neceſſary or
convenient for fecuring the minds of fuch as are doubtful and jealous
that the People may betray their own Libertys, there may be inferted
into the fundamental Orders of the Commonwealth, thefe following
Expedients, viz.
1. THAT for ſecuring the Government of this Commonwealth,
and of the Religious and Civil freedom of the good People therof,
it
may be for ever eſteem'd and judg'd Treafon againſt the Common-
wealth, for any Member of either Affembly of Parlament, or any
other perſon whatſoever, to move or propofe in either of the faid
Affemblys, the reſtitution of Kingly Government, or the introducti-
on of
any fingle Perſon to be chief Magiftrat of England, or the alte-
ration of that part of the fundamental Order herein contain'd that
3
concerns
of divers well affected Perfons.
545
concerns the equal Freedom and Protection of religious Perfons of dif
ferent Perfuafions.
2. THAT about the number of twelve Perfons of the moſt un-
doubted Fidelity and Integrity may be authoriz'd and impower'd, for
ſome certain number of Years next enſuing, to ſeize, apprehend, and
in fafe Cuftody to detain any Perfon or Perfons whatſoever, till he or
they be in due Form of Law deliver'd, as is hereafter ſpecify'd, that
ſhall move or propoſe in either of the faid Affemblies of Parliament the
Reſtitution of Kingly Government, or the Introduction of any ſingle
Períon to be chief Magiftrate of this Commonwealth, or the Alteration
of that part of the fundamental Order herein contain'd, that con-
cerns the equal Freedom and Protection of religious Perfons of different
Perfuafions; but for no other Matter or Caufe whatſoever. And when
it ſhall happen, that any Perfon or Perfons ſhall be arreſted or feiz'd
for any of the Cauſes aforeſaid, in manner aforefaid, then a Commiffion
of Oyer and Terminer may iffue forth in due Form of Law to the ſaid
twelve, or any fix of them, to proceed in due Form of Law, within
one Month after the Apprehenfion of any fuch Perfon or Perfons, to
the Arraignment and publick Trial of every fuch Perfon or Perfons; and
upon the legal Conviction of him or them by the Teftimony of two fuf-
ficient Witneffes of any of the Treaſons, herein declar'd, to condemn to
the pains of Death, and to cauſe the fame Judgment to be duly exe-
cuted and the Keeper or Keepers of the Great Seal of England that
ſhall be for the time being, may be authoriz'd and requir'd from time
to time during the term of Years, to iffue out Commiffions to the
faid twelve, or any fix of them, authorizing them to proceed as aforeſaid.
AND if your Honours fhall further judge it convenient, the fun-
damental Orders of the Government may be conſented to or ſubſcrib'd
by the People themſelves, if their expreſs Pact ſhall be eſteem'd any
additional Security; other Nations, upon the like occafions of Expul-
fion of their Kings, having taken the Peoples Oaths againſt their return-
ing and the fame may be proclaim'd as often as our Anceſtors provi-
ded for the proclaiming of Magna Charta; and any further Security
alſo added, if any can be found among Men, that has a Foundation
in Juſtice.
NOW your Petitioners having, with humble Submiffion to your
grave Wiſdoms, thus declar'd their Apprehenfions of the preſent Con-
dition of this diſtracted Nation, and the only effectual means under
God to prevent the impending Miſchiefs; They do muſt humbly pray,
THAT fuch-ſpeedy Confiderations may be had of the Premiſes
as the Condition of this Nation requires; and that fuch a
Method may be fettled for the debating and confulting about
the Government, that your wife Refults may be ſeaſonable
for the healing all the Breaches of the Commonwealth, and
eſtabliſhing the ſure Foundations of Freedom, Juftice, Peace,
and Unity.
And your Petitioners fhall always pray, &c.
A aa a
Wednef-
546
The Parliament's Anfwer.
T
Wedneſday July the 6th, 1659.
HE Houſe being inform'd, that divers Gentlemen were at the Door
with a Petition, they were call'd in, and one of the Petitioners in
behalf of himself and the rest faid, We humbly prefent you a Petition, to
which we might have had many thouſand Hands, but the Matter rather
deferves your ferious Confideration than any public Atteftation; and there-
fore we do humbly prefent it to this Honourable Houfe. Which, after the Pe-
titioners were withdrawn, was read, and was intitl'd, The humble Pe-
tition of divers well affected Perfons.
Refolv'd,
THAT the Petitioners have the Thanks of the Houſe.
THE Petitioners were again call'd in, and Mr. Speaker gave them
this Anfwer.
Gentlemen,
THE Houfe has read over your Petition, and find it without any
private End, and only for the public Interest; and I am commanded to
let you know, that it lies much upon them to make fuch a Settlement as
may be most for the Good of Pofterity: and they are about that Work,
and intend to go forward with it with as much Expedition as may be.
And for your parts, they have commanded me to give you Thanks; and
in their Names I do give you the Thanks of this Houfe accordingly.
Tho. St. Nicholas, Clerc of the Parliament.
4
APPENDIX,
APPENDIX,
Containing all the
POLITICAL TRACTS
OF
JAMES HARRINGTON, Efq;
Omitted in
Mr. T O L AN D's EDITION
OF HIS
WORK S.
Aaaa 2
549
PIAN PIAN 0:
O R,
INTER COURSE
BETWEEN
H. FERNE, D. D. and J. HARRINGTON, Efq;
Upon occafion of the Doctor's Cenfure of the COMMONWEALTH Of
OCEAN A.
r
•
Sentit terra Deos, mutataq; fidera pondus
Quafivére fuum.
Petron. Sal.
EPISTLE to the READER.
READER,
→
1. Seldom talk with him that does not confute me, nor ever read that which
did not confirm me: Wherefore if I be glad to take a Man in black
and white, you will not blame me, or do not know that I have had an
Univerſity about my Ears, without any Poffibility left unto me whereby
to defend my felf, but this, in which you may imagine me ſpeaking unto
the Chair
Intercourſe between H. FERNE, D. D. and JAMES
HARRINGTON, Efq; upon Occafion of the Doctor's
Genfure of the Commonwealth of Oceana.
WHEN
JHEN I had publifhed my Oceana, one of my Sifters making
good Provifion of Copies, preſented of them unto her Friends,
as well to fhew her Refpect to them, as to know their Judgments of it.
Among the reft being acquainted with Doctor Ferne, the fent him
one, and foon after receiv'd this Anfwer
MA D A M;
550
Intercourfe between H. FERNE, D. D.
I
MADAM,
Received a Book directed to me from your Ladyship, with Intimation
I fhould express my Senfe of it. I acknowledge, Madam, the Fa-
vour you have done me in fending it; but the Return you expect bath its
Difficulties, the Book being now past the Prefs, and of fuch an Argu-
ment, had I feen it before it was publick, I ſhould have faid it was not
likely to pleaſe, &c. But that is nothing to me; your Defire, I fuppofe, is
to know how I like it. I conceive your Ladyship is not fo far a Stranger
either to the Book which you fent, or to me, whom you are pleaſed thus
to own, but that you take me to be of a different Judgment from the Au-
thor in this his Form, whether concerning State or Church. And it may
be your Ladyship did therefore call me to speak, as one that would be lefs
partial. Give me leave then, Madam, in plain English to fay, that albeit
the Author bath fhewn good Sufficiency of Parts, and taken much
Pains in order to his Defign; yet I conceive, First, that he is not a little
miſtaken in thinking the Ifrael-Commonwealth or Government under
Mofes fo appliable unto his Purpoſe, as he would make it. Next, that
when the Question 'twixt his Form and the Monarchical is difputed over
and over again, Reafon and Experience will fill plead for the latter.
Nor can the Balance he pretends ftand fo fteady in his Form, as in a well
tempered Monarchy, by Reafon the Temptation of advancing are more
like to fway with many in a Commonwealth, than with one, &c. in the
height of Dignity. Next, when I confider fuch a Change by this Model
from what was ever in, &c. and that the Agragrian, with fome other
levelling Orders, are the Laws of it, Ifhould think the Nature of Men
was first to be new model'd, before they would be capable of this. Lastly,
what is faid in relation to the Church or Religion in the point of Govern-
ment, Ördination, Excommunication, had better befeemed Leviathan,
and is below the Parts of this Gentleman, to retain and fit down with
thofe little things, and poor Miſtakes, which the Ignorance or Wilfulness
of many in thefe Days bath broached in way of Quarrel against the
Church of England. And lamentable it is to fee fo many (efpecially Gen-
tlemen of good Parts) fo opinionate, fo boldly meddling in Matters of Re-
ligion, as if they had forgot, or did not understand their Article of the
Catholick Church.
MADAM, You fee I have been plain in fpeaking my Senfe, and
hope you will think me therefore more fit to do you real Service, when you
fhall have Occafion to command,
T
Nov. 4th,
1656.
MADAM,
Your humble Servant.
HE Doctor's Letter, though it be fcandalous (for to charge a
Writer of little things, poor Miftakes, fitting down by Igno-
rance, or Wilfulneſs, without Proof, is no better) was yet but private;
and therefore I may be asked why I would make it publick? where-
unto I answer, That what a Divine will have to be true, is no leſs
publick than if it were printed; but more, for he will preach it; and
preaching communicates unto more than can read. Alſo his prefent
Doctrines are exceeding dangerous. For in Government, that is caſt
Parliaments or popular Elections, as ours hath ever been and
upon
is, to take wife Men, and underſtanding, and known among their Tribes
+
to
and JAMES HARRINGTON, Efq;
551
to be Rulers over them, hath ever (except where the People were not
free in their Elections) been, and muft ever be, the certain and infalli-
ble Confequence. Now wife Men, and underſtanding, and known
among their Tribes, muft needs be (at leaft for the greater Part) of that
Rank, which we now call the Ariftocracy or Gentlemen. Whence the
Senate in every well ordered Commonwealth hath confifted of the
Ariftocracy or Gentry. And that the Senate ever had the fupreme Au-
thority, as well in Matters of Religion as State, is not only clear in
all other popular Governments, but in the Old Teftament; which alſo
is confirmed by our Saviour in the New, Matt. xxiii. 2, 3. The Scribes and
Pharifees fit in Mofes's Seat; and therefore whatſoever they bid you obferve,
(both He and His Apoftles obferved the national Religion) obferve and do';
for the Liberty of Confcience or prophetick Right in the Commonwealth
of Ifrael, as in others, was fuch, as by which Chriftianity, notwithſtanding
the national Religion, might grow. But do not (faith he) after their Works,
for they fay and do not. In their Enquiry after John, Job. 1. they ſeem
to imply or fay, that if he were that Prophet, there was nothing in
the Law why he might not introduce his Baptifm; and therefore why
he might not gather Churches, or inftruct the People in his way.
Nevertheleſs when they come to doing, they kill the Prophets, and
ftone them. This indeed Chrift blameth, being the Abuſe of their
Power. But whereas the fupreme Authority of the Senate, whether
in Matters of Religion or State, is confirmed by all divine and human
Prudence; and the Senate is the more peculiar Province of the Gentry;
the Doctor faith that Lamentable it is to fee fo many, (not only Men
of fuch Parts or Quality as the People in their Elections are not likely
to look upon) but especially Men of good Parts (than which the People
upon like Occafions have no other Refuge) fo opinionate, fo boldly med-
ling in Matters of Religion, as if they had forgot or did not understand
their Article of the Catholick Church. Now where-ever the Clergy
have gained this Point, namely, that they are the Catholick Church,
or that it is unlawful for Gentlemen, either in their private Capacity to
diſcourſe, or in their publick to propoſe, as well in the Matter of
Church as State Government, neither Government nor Religion have
failed to degenerate into mere Prieft-craft. This efpecially was the
Reafon, why I wrote unto the Doctor as followeth.
t
SIR,
WF
HEREAS in a Letter of yours to one of my Sifters, I find your
Judgment given vehemently againſt me, but merely pofitive, I
conceive that both in the Matter and Manner of Delivery you have given
me Right to defire, and laid Obligation upon your felf to afford me
your Reaſons, which may be done (if you pleaſe) either by confuting
my Book, or anſwering the Queries hereunto annexed; in either of
which Ways, or any other, I am more than defirous to undertake you;
and that for many Confiderations, as your Abilities, the Safety (at
leaſt on your Part) in the Performance, the Importance of the Argu-
ment, the Seaſonablenefs, and (however it came in your Mind to dif-
truſt it) the Welcomeneſs of fuch Difcourfe unto all Men of Inge-
nuity, both in Power and out of it, or whofe Intereſt is not the
mere Study of Parties, from which the freeft fince the late Troubles,
that hath written in this Nature, is,
Nov. 17..
1656.
SIR,
Your bumble Servant.
The
552
Intercourfe between H. FERNE, D. D.
The Queries I fall interweave with the Doctor's An-
fwer unto each of them, returned unto me with this
Preamble.
SIR,
your
I Received
your Paper wherein you are pleased to propound Queries,
and fay an Obligation now lies upon me to render my Reafons of dif
fenting, or to answer the Interrogatories. But you must give me leave
to fay, the Obligation ftill arifeth from my Refpect to my Lady and
felf, not from the Matter or Manner (as you feem to imply) of the deliver-
ing my former Judgment. For I could not conceive that by the Favour
and Honour my Lady did me in fending the Book, I had loft my Freedom,
and ftood bound either to comply, or be challenged as an Adverfary to
try out the Difference. Therefore upon the fcore of Friendship and Civi-
lity, I have forced my felf in the midst of many preffing Occafions, to give
you this Account of my Thoughts in order to your Queries.
The Doctor hath written heretofore upon Politicks. Than this
among the Occafions or Subjects of writing, there is none of greater
Moment. I am a Beginner in this Art, and have no Defire to im-
poſe upon any Man; but if I cannot teach him, to learn of him.
But my Senior in it contradicts me, and gives me no Reaſon. Now
to contradict a Man, and give him no Reaſon, is to give him an Af-
front; and to demand Reafon in fuch a cafe, that is, for fuch an
Affront to fend fuch a Challenge, as provoketh unto no other Conten-
tion than that for Truth, being according unto Scripture, and not
againſt Laws, concerns a Man's Honour and Right. Therefore it is in
fuch a cafe not of Courtefy, but the Devoir of him that gave the Af-
front to anſwer; which the Doctor having now done, I come into
the Lifts or to the Queries, with his Anſwers and my Replies.
The first Query.
How much, or in what the Author of Oceana is miſtaken,
to think the Commonwealth of the Hebrews appliable
to his purpoſe.
The Doctor's Anſwer.
I Have reaſon ftill to think and fay, The Government or Common-
wealth (as you call it) of the Hebrews, was of all other less appli-
able to your Form, which fuppofes a Senate debating, propofing, and the
People refolving, choofing, as page 15. to which there was nothing like
in that Government. You find indeed Princes and Heads of the Tribes,
and may call them a Senate, and read of the Aſſemblies of the People,
but without any fuch Power or Authority; both of them receiving Laws
by the Hand of Mofes without any Debate or Contradiction. And 'tis in
a manner confeſſed, page 18. where you ſay, the Function of that Senate
was executive only, the Laws being made by God. And if we look to
the Inftitution of the Seventy, we find it was upon the Advice of Jethro,
and that not to be as a Council to Mofes, but as Under-Judges for his
Eafe in the Adminiftration of the Laws; which rather fuits with the
Condi-
and JAMES HARRINGTON, Eſq;
553
Condition of inferior Minifters of Justice under a Monarch, God's Vice-
gerent on Earth, as all Kings are in a more large Confideration, as Mofes
was more fpecially in that Theocracy. Therefore I did not a little won-
der at your Affertions and Inferences, Pag. 16, and 17; where you Speak
of their making God their King, their Power of rejecting and depofing
him as their civil Magiftrate. The Harfbnefs of the Phrafe may be molli-
fied, but the Thing afferted I fuppofe cannot be defended, viz.) any fuch
Power in the People to God-ward; your Inference alfo feems strange and
infirm, that they had Power to have rejected any of thofe Laws. What
you affert in the 17. Page of all the Laws given by Covenant, is true
in a fober Senfe, but the Inference ftrange, that only which was refolved
(or chofen) by the People of Ifrael was their Law. This is fo far from
good Logick, that it falls fhort of good Divinity; for it must fuppofe God
and the People on equal Terms at their entring that Covenant; whereas
God often (especially in Deut.) fhews bis Right of commanding, and en-
forces their Obedience to his Commands upon the antecedent Obligations;
his being the Lord their God, his chufing them out of all Nations to be
a peculiar People, his bringing them out of the Land of Egypt. Much
more might be faid to fhew thefe Inftances of the People receiving Laws
from God (in which they were only paffive) are far from proving any
Power in the People as to God-ward, or from concluding generally the
Power in the People of refolving and chufing Laws; and therefore this
Commonwealth of Ifrael not applicable to your Purpoſe.
IN
REPLY.
my Book I call the Government, whereupon we are difputing,
the Commonwealth of Ifrael; but though I think I did not much
amifs, I am the firſt that ever called it fo, and make no Difficulty in
your firft Letter to ſpeak after me. But when I come to call it, as
all they do that have written upon it, then you begin to doubt, and
it is the Commonwealth (as I call it) of the Hebrews, whence you will
be more than ſuſpected, not to have read any of thoſe Authors. And
yet how confidently it is laid to me in your firft Letter, that I am not a
little mistaken in thinking the Ifraelitif Commonwealth or Government
under Mofes to be fo applicable to my Purpose, as I would make it?
Nevertheleſs when you come in Anſwer to this Query to give your
Reaſons, you bring this for one, that Page 18, I ſay the Function of
the Senate was only executive, the Laws being made by God: Where
Firſt, the Word only is not mine, but of your impofing. Secondly,
when you ſhould ſhew that I am miſtaken in thinking the Common-
wealth of Ifrael fo applicable to my Purpoſe as I would make it, you
fhew that I make it no more applicable to my Purpoſe than it is:
which is not fair, eſpecially when I give you ſo clear a Reaſon, that
albeit the Authority of propofing laws appertain unto every Senate,
as fuch, yet the Laws of the Commonwealth of the Hebrews having
been all made by an infallible Legiſlator, even God himſelf, the Senate
had no Laws in the Beginning to propofe, but came afterwards to
propoſe, when thofe Laws given in the Beginning came to need Addi-
tion; for if you find the Kings upon fuch Occafions as David, 1 Sam.
vii. 2. and Hezekiah, 2 Chron. xxx. propofing, and the People re-
folving, was this likely to have been introduced by them? or if the
People had the Refult in the Monarchy, muſt they not much more
have had it in the Commonwealth? Wherefore the Authority of pro-
Bbbb
I
pofing
1
554
Intercourse between H. FERNE, D. D.
pofing unto the People, as will better appear hereafter, was derived
by the King from the Judge, by the Judge from the Sanhedrim, by
the Sanhedrim from Mofes, and by Mofes from God : As (Exod. xix.
5.) where God giveth him Inftructions for a Propofition unto the
People; Thus fhalt thou fay unto the Houfe of Jacob, and tell the Chil-
dren of Ifrael, ye have feen what I did unto the Egyptians, &c. Now
therefore if you will obey my Voice indeed, and keep my Covenant, then
you ſhall be unto me a Kingdom of Priefts: If you will (not whether
you will or no) you ſhall be (which relates unto the future) unto me
a Kingdom; that is, I will be your King. God having given thefe
Inftructions unto his fole Legiflator, Mofes came (accordingly) and
called for the Elders of the People, and laid before their Faces all thefe
Words that the Lord had commanded him. And all the People answered
together (gave their Suffrage, Nemine contradicente) and faid, All that
the Lord hath spoken we will do: And Mofes returned the Words (that
is, the Suffrage, or Refult) of the People unto the Lord. Wherefore
God was King in Ifrael by Covenant, propofed by Himfelf or his
Servant Mofes, and reſolved by the People. Now that he was after-
wards rejected by the People, when they choſe another King, that he
Mould not reign over them, 1 Sam. viii. 7. are his own Words. And if
in thefe Words he fhew plainly, that the People had Power to reject a
Law that was not only propofed unto them, but refolved by them,
then muſt it needs be included even in God's own Words, that the
People muſt have had Power to have rejected any Thing that was pro-
pofed, and not confirmed by them. And yet you tell me, that this
is ſo far from good Logick, that it falls short of good Divinity. And
why? becauſe it muſt ſuppoſe God and the People on equal Terms at
their entring that Covenant. Then that a King either cannot cove-
nant, for Example, with his Chandler to ferve him with Wax, or
that the Chandler was upon equal Terms, or Hail-fellow well met
with the King, at their entering that Covenant, comes up to good
Divinity, Such is the Logick which you chop with me, for you are
beyond my Underſtanding! But the honeft Part of Logick I under-
ſtand well enough, not to envy them that ſeem to have more.
·
For if by the Word Terms you underſtand the Conditions of the
Covenant, it is fair: as to theſe indeed, the Parties covenanting are
ſo far equal, that they may equally will or chooſe; elfe it were a Pre-
cept or Command, not a Covenant. But if by the Word Terms you
underſtand the Dignity or Power of the Parties, it is not fair, but an
Equivocation; for the Equality of the Parties in that Senfe is no-
thing at all unto the Equality of the Covenant: wherefore the Im-
piety you would fix upon me, is your own, and arifeth from your
Want of diſtinguiſhing between the Almighty Power of God, in which
he is above all Things, and his infinite Love whereby he boweth the
Heavens, and defcendeth unto his poor Creatures. In the former Re-
gard to talk of electing or depofing God, who is King, be the Heathen
never fo unquiet, were, indeed, impious; but in the latter it is moſt
certain, that He ruleth among no other than a confenting, a refolving,
a willing People. Or tell me whether the Rein of God on the Neck
of the Turks be the fame with that in the Hearts of his Elect, or
wherein confifts the Difference? Moreover to what I have ſaid, and
more than what I have faid for the Debate that was in the Senat, and
the Reſult that was in the People of Ifrael, Grotius hath ſummed up
the
and JAMES HARRINGTON, Eſq;
555
the Talmudiſts in this Note upon the Tenth Verſe of Deut. xviii.
Notandum præterea fcita Senatus nonnulla five legi interpretanda five
præmuniendæ facta evanuiffe, non modo fi Senatus ante receptum ubique
morem fententiam mutaffet, verum etiam fi vel ab initio Populus ea non
ferret, vel irent in diffuetudinem, where there is nothing plainlier to
be perceived than that Debate was in this Senate, and Refult in this
People and you confefs what I affert in the 17th Page of all their
Laws given by Covenant to be true in a fober Senfe; now the Senfe
which I have fhew'd you is that of all fober Men. But can you fhew
me the Judgment of any fober Man, that becauſe we find Princes
and Heads of the Tribes, we may call them a Senate? Pray, how do
you cut Twelve Princes into Seventy Elders, or where do you find
them in the Senate? but this is nothing. If we look to the Inftitution
of the Seventy, we find it, ſay you, to be upon the Advice of Jethro.
We: I pray you take it to yourſelf, or I appeal to him that ſhall
compare Exod. xviii. with Numb. xi. whether this have been the
Opinion of any fober Man. Mofes in that of Exodus hearkens unto the
Voice of his Father-in-law, Jethro the Prieft of Midian: making
able Men out of Ifrael, Heads over the People, Rulers of Thouſands,
Rulers of Hundreds, Rulers of Fifties, and Rulers of Tens. And they
judged the People at all Seafons: the hard Caufes they brought unto
Mofes, but every fmall Matter they judged themfelves. Theſe were the
Jethronian Prefectures, or the Courts afterwards confifting of Twenty
three Judges that fate in the Gates of every City. Never were they
miſtaken before for the Sanhedrim or Seventy Elders, which came
not to be inſtituted till afterwards in the 11th of Numbers, where
Mofes while he ſtood alone, being as weary of the Recourſe had unto
him from theſe Judicatories, as he was of that, before their Inftitu-
tion, cries unto God, I am not able to bear this People alone (his
Office of fole Legiſlator) in which relation Lycurgus and Solon are as
well and as properly called Kings, as he, who was King indeed in
Jefurun, Deut. xxxiii. 5. but no otherwife than they in their Com-
monwealths, that is to propofe the Laws in his Form, when the
Heads of the People, and the Tribes of Ifrael were gathered together,
which was now almoft accompliſhed. Wherefore the Lord faid unto
Mofes, Gather unto me feventy Elders of the Men of Ifrael, whom thou
knoweft to be Elders of the People, and Officers over them, and bring
them unto the Tabernacle of the Congregation (in which or in the Tem-
ple was ever after the Seffion-Houſe of the Senate) that they may ftand
there with thee. If this be not enough, you may have a farther fight
your great Miſtake, 2 Chron. xix. where at the Reftitution of this
Government in fome Part by Jehoshaphat, the Jethronian Counſels are
fet up City by City: But the Senate, or Seventy Elders with a More-
over in Jerufalem; and that the Jethronian Courts are intimated in the
New Teftament by the Name of the Judgment, as the Sanhedrim by
that of the Council, Godwyn the Schoolmafter could have told you.
But whereas nothing is more conſtantly delivered by all Authors, nor
expreſs in Scripture, than that Mofes having inftituted the Sanhedrim,
ftood from that Time forward no more alone, or was thenceforth
but Prince of the Senate, which God appointed to ftand with him;
you ſay that he was a Monarch or ftood alone. And whereas the
Jethronian Prefectures henceforth brought all their difficult Cafes unto
the Sanhedrim, in the Inftitution of which Sanhedrim Jethro had
B b b b 2
of
no
556
Intercourfe between H. FERNE, D. D.
no Hand; you fay, that the Sanhedrim or Seventy Elders were in-
ftituted by Jethro. How plain would your Engliſh have been upon
this Occafion, if they had given it? whereas I fhall fay no more than
that theſe are no little Things nor poor Miftakes.
The Second Query.
In Caſe the Author's Form, and the Monarchical be or be
not diſputed over and over again, what the Reaſon or
Experience may be that remaineth, or may be thought
to remain, for the Advantage of the latter?
I
The Doctor's Anſwer.
Have not Time to difpute the Two Forms, nor Will to make it my
Study; but his Reafon is cogent for Monarchical, that in it there is
one Chief; for Order is the main Concernment of Government, and Order
is more perfected by reducing to Unity, or having ftill one Chief in the
Order. And this I mention the rather, becaufe as anciently the Romans,
fo you in your Model, are forced to betake you in Neceffity to a Dictator,
which undeniably evinces Monarchical Government the fitteft for all
Exigencies. Alfo because God, to whom you feem to appeal (Pag. 15.)
led his People (Pfal. lxxvii. ult.) by the Hand of Mofes and Aaron;
Mofes Chief in the whole Government, and Aaron the Chief in the
Priesthood, and after Mofes Joſhua; and ſtill raiſed up fingle Perfons to
judge his People. Lastly, because the Duft of Nature led your Form of
Government, from Paternal (fo it was at the Beginning or peopling of
the World) unto Monarchical, as Families encreaſed into Nations.
REPLY.
OU in your Letter are pofitive that be the Two Forms never
fo often difputed, the Advantage in Reaſon will remain to the
Monarchical; but when you come to give your Reaſon, have not
Time to diſpute the Bufinefs, nor Will to make it your Study; you
will give a Man his Sentence, without Recourfe to the Law, and his
Objections. Again, without taking Notice of his Anfwers, as in the
Matter of Dictatorian Power, for which you fay, First, that one
Perfon is fitteft, and Secondly, that one Perfon being fitteft for this
one Thing, it undeniably evinces Monarchical Government the fitteſt
for all Exigencies. Now granting the former were true, as I have
fhewed it to be falfe, and therefore chofen the Venetian Dictator, which
confifteth not of one Man, rather than the Roman, which did; yet
if one Man be fitteft to be a Pilot, how doth it follow that that one
Man is fitteſt for all Exigencies? Or if Gideon were fitteſt to be
Judge or Dictator of Ifrael, that it was fitteft (as the People defired
of him, Judges viii. 22.) he should rule over them, both He and his
Son, and his Son's Son alfo? And whereas you fay that God (unto whom
I appeal) fill raifed up fingle Perfons to judge his People; doth it fol-
low that thefe Judges or Dictators were Monarchs, eſpecially when
Gideon anſwers the People, I will not rule over you, neither shall my
Son rule over you; the Lord fhall rule over you? Or rather that Mo-
narchical
A
and JAMES HARRINGTON, Efq;
557
4
narchical Government even in the Time of the Judges was in this
Commonwealth, to the Rejection of God? In which Place (to allude
unto that in your Anſwer to the firſt Query, to which I have not yet
reply'd,) it is plain alfo, that antecedent Obligations do not always im-
ply Command, or enforce Obedience: for fay the People unto Gi-
deon, rule thou over us, &c. for thou haft delivered us from the Hand
of Midian; yet neither did this oblige the People to chooſe, or Gideon
to be chofen King.
THAT God led his People, Pfal. lxxvii. by the Hand of Mofes and
Aaron, is right; but your Flouriſh upon it, where you fay Mofes Chief
in the whole Government, and Aaron Chief in the Priesthood, wi-
thers; for the Place relateth unto the Times, (Exod. vii.) in which
faith the Lord unto Mofes, See I have made thee a God to Pharaoh, and
Aaron thy Brother shall be thy Prophet (that is, thy Chaplain or Ora-
tor, for otherwiſe there arofe not a Prophet like Mofes in Ifrael,) and this
was before the time that Mofes made Aaron High-Prieſt. Nor after
the Inftitution of the Sanhedrim, was the High-Prieft other than
fubordinate unto it, whether in matter of Religion or State: nay,
if he had given them juft Caufe, he might be whipt by the Law, as
is affirmed by the Talmudifts. This Senate was to ſtand, as hath
been fhewed, with Mofes; therefore Mofes from the Inſtitution there-
of, was no more than Prince or Archon of it, and General of the
Commonwealth; in each of which Functions he was fucceeded by
Joshua. And the People ferved the Lord all the Days of Joſhua, and
all the Days of the Elders that out-lived Joſhua, (Judges ii. 7.) But
from this time forward you hear no more of the Jethronian Prefec-
tures, that fate in the Gates of the Cities, nor of the Senate, as I
take it, (being yet but ftudying this Commonwealth, in which it
were a better Deed to aid, than miſlead me) till the Reftitution of it
by Jehoshaphat, 2 Chron. xix. For after the Death of Joshua, and
of the Elders of theſe Courts, the People of Ifrael mindlefs of the
excellent Orders of their Commonwealth given by God, were ſo
ſtupid, as to let both the Senate and the inferior Courts to fall. But
a Commonwealth without the Senate muſt of natural Neceffity dege-
nerate into Anarchy. Wherefore the Nature of this Commonwealth
throughout the Book of Judges was downright Anarchy. You have
the Tribes without any Common Council or Deliberation leaguing one
with another, and making War at their Fancy, as Judges i. 3. Judah
faid unto Simeon his Brother, Come up with me into my Lot, that we
may fight against the Canaanites, &c. Whence (efpecially when there
was no Judge neither) is that frequent Complaint throughout this Book,
that in those Days there was no King (as Men of your Rank have ren-
dered the Word, though in this Place it rather fignifies Suffes Conful,
or Dictator, as fome of the Laity, that is of the Folks do affirm) in
Ifrael, but every one did that which was right in his own Eyes. In
this cafe of a Commonwealth there is no help but by Dictatorian
Power, which God in the raifing up of Judges did therefore indulge,
appointing them ordinarily but pro tempore, or upon fome, not upon
all Exigencies. For Judges xx. the Congregation fentenceth the
Tribe of Benjamin, decrees and manageth the War againſt them,
without a Judge or Dictator. This Anarchy with the Confufion of
it, by want of the Senate, eſpecially when the Sons of Samuel grew
corrupt and imperious through the long Rule of their Father, was the
•
true
2
3
558
Intercourſe between H. F E R N E, D. D.
true Cauſe why the People choſe to have a King, and ſo fell into Mo-
narchy, under which they fared worfe; for though there happened to
come with a great deal of Coſt, as in the War with Saul, a David to
be defended; yet by another War againſt his ambitious Son, and after
him a Solomon, in the next Generation the Tribes rent in funder, and
befides the execrable Wickedneſs of the moſt of their Kings (the like
whereunto was never known,) gave not over hewing one another, till
Ifrael firft, and then Judah fell into miferable Captivity. And yet this
is that Unity and Order which you celebrate, and the Argument for
Monarchy muſt be cogent; which happens, becauſe you are refolved not
to theſe that the Unity of Government confifts in fuch a Form,
which no Man can have the Will, or having the Will can have the
Power to diſturb, but caft all upon the Unity of a Perfon, that may
do what he lift, running ftill upon your Equivocations, as if Brethren
could not live together in Unity, unleſs reduced to the Will of one
Brother.
The Third Query.
Where there is or ever was a Monarchy upon a popular
Balance, or that propoſed by the Author, but thoſe
only of the Hebrews, and whether theſe were not the
moft infirm of all other?
The Doctor's Anſwer.
Perceive not how it concerns any thing I faid, or the Caufe in band,
as to any material Point. Only it feems to fuppofe the Monarchy of
the Hebrews to be in a popular Balance, which I cannot apprehend,
unleſs becauſe they had a kind of Agrarian, their Land divided by Lot,
which notwithstanding left Place for a fufficient Difference, and Excefs
in Dignity of Perfons, Bonds of Eftates, Measure of Wealth and
Riches.
N
your Letter
REPLY.
I ready in my Form, as in a well temper'd Monarchy, and yet to the
you fay, that the Balance I pretend cannot stand fo
Query, where there is or ever was a Monarchy upon fuch a Balance?
you anſwer, that you perceive not how it concerns any thing you faid,
or the Caufe in hand as to any material Point, as if the Balance were of
flight Concernment to a Government. And for the Monarchy of the
Hebrews you fay, that you cannot apprehend it to have been upon a
popular Balance. But the Land of Canaan as it is computed by Heca-
taus Abderites in Jofephus againſt Appion, contained three Millions of
Acres; and they among whom it was divided, as appears Numb. i. 46.
at the Cenſe of them taken by Mofes in Mount Sinai, amount unto
603550. Now if you
allow them but four Acres a Man, it comes
unto two Millions four hundred thoufand Acres, and upwards, by
which means there could remain for Joshua's Lot, Caleb's Portion,
with the Princes of the Tribes, and the Patriarchs or Princes of Fa-
milies, but a matter of five hundred thouſand Acres, which holdeth
not
and JAMES HARRINGTON, Efq;
559
not above a fixth Part in the Balance with the People, and yet you will
not apprehend, that this was a popular Balance. Why then it will be
in vain to fhew you the certain Confequence, namely that the Mo-
narchies of the Hebrews, being the only Governments of this Kind
that ever were erected upon a popular Balance, were the moſt infirm
and troubled of all others; that the cauſe why the Congregation that
elected the former Kings were able to reject Rehoboam, was from the
Power of the People, and the Power of the People from their popu
lar Agrarian: and that the Cauſe why the Kings of Ifrael and Judah,
while they had not foreign Wars, never gave over knocking out the
Brains of the People, one againſt another, was, that having no mo-
narchical Balance, or not fuch a one as was fufficient, whereupon
fafely to reſt themſelves in Peace, they were neceffitated, as fome Kings
at this day, the Balance of whofe Empire is broken, to make them-
felves uſeful unto the People through their Danger, that fo through the
want of Order, they may fubfift, according to the modern Maxim,
by Confufion and War; an Expedient fufficiently practifed to be well
known.
The fourth Query.
Whether the Temptations of advancing did fway more
with the Many in the Commonwealth, than with the
Few under the Monarchies of the Hebrews, that is,
under the Kings of Judah, Ifrael, or the High Prieſts,
when they came to be Princes? And whether other
Story be not, as to this Query, conformable unto that
of Scripture.
The Doctor's Answer.
Whether greater Temptations in the Hebrew Government before or af-
ter they had Kings, feems little material by comparing them to learn,
and as little to your Purpose, till what you fuppofe be granted, viz. that
the Government before they had Kings, was in your Senfe a Common-
wealth. But as for all Forms that have been popular, or ſhall be, ſtill
the Temptations are the more powerful or dangerous, as to the change of
Government. This put them upon an Inconvenience by often changing
their Generals of Armies, and upon often banishing them, or any great
Citizens, when their juft Deferts had made them honoured and beloved;
and this I fuppofe puts you upon a Neceffity in one Place of defending the
Oftracism as no Punishment, and the People of Rome as not ungrateful
in banishing Camillus.
I
REPLY.
to doubt whether Ifrael were a Commonwealth in my Senſe
be excufable in one that will take no notice of the Elders that ſtood
with Mofes, nor why Gideon being a Judge refufed nevertheleſs to be
King; yet the League that was made between Judah and Benjamin in
the firft, and the Sentence that was given by the whole Congregation,
with the War thereupon levied by the People only, without fo much
as
560
Intercourse between H. F L R NE, D. D.
as a Judge or Dictator, in the laft Chapter of the Book of Judges,
evinces my Senfe, and that of all reafonable Men. Wherefore the
Compariſon defired by me is plainly material; and your Evaſion a
poor fhift, below a Man of Parts, or Well-meaning.
FOR albeit Ifrael for the far greater time of the Commonwealth
before the Kings was Anarchy, the moſt fubject State of fuch a Go-
vernment unto Confufion; yet abating the Confpiracy of Abimelech,
made King of the Men of Sichem, there was, as I remember, no
Diſturbance from Ambition, nor ftriving to be uppermoft, of which,
after the Kings, there was no End. For to omit David's deftroying
of the Houfe of Saul, and reigning in his ſtead, as done with good
Warrant; you have Abfalom levying War againſt his Father; Jeroboam
an arrant Knave, breaking the Empire of Rehoboam, a hair-brain'd
Fool in two Pieces, whence the Children of Judah turning Sodc-
mites, (1 Kings xiv. 20.) and they of Ifrael Idolaters; you have Baajka
conſpiring againſt Nadab King of Ifrael, murdering him, deſtroying
all the Pofterity of Jeroboam, and reigning in his ftead: Zimri,
Captain of the Chariots, ferving Afa the Son with the fame Sauce,
when he was drunk, killing all his kindred, that piffed againſt the
Wall, as Baasha the Father had done Nadab, when, may chance, he
was fober; Omri hereupon made Captain by the People, and Zimri
after he had reigned feven Days, burning himſelf; the People of
Ifrael when Zimri was burnt, dividing into two Parts, one for Omri,
and the other for Tibni, who is flain in the Difpute; whereupon Omri
out-does all the Tyrants that went before him, and when he has done,
leaves Ahab his Son, the Heir of his Throne and Virtue, You have
Jebu deftroying the Family of Ahab, giving the Flesh of Jezebel
unto the Dogs, and receiving a pretty Prefent from thofe of Samaria,
ſeventy Heads of his Maſter's Sons in Baſkets. To Afa and Jehosha-
phat of the Kings of Judah belongeth much Reverence; but the
Wickednefs of Athaliah, who upon the Death of her Son Abazich, that
fhe might reign, murdered all her Grand-children, but one ftolen
away, which was Joaf, was repaid by that one in the like Coin, who
alſo was flain by his Servants. So was his Son Amafiah that reigned after
him; and about the fame time Zachariah King of Ifrael, by Shal-
lum, who reigned in his ftead, and Shallum was fmitten by Manaim,
who reigned in his ftead, (Battle Royal in Shoe-Lane) Pekahab the
Son of Manabim was fmitten by Pekah one of his Captains, who
reigned in his room; Pekah by Hofbea, who having reigned nine Years
in his ftead, was carried by Salmanezer King of Affyria with the
ten Tribes into Captivity. Will Judah take a warning? Yes, Heze-
kiah, the next, is a very good King, but Manafeh his Son, like the
reft, a Shedder of innocent Blood; to him fucceedeth Ammon, Fa-
ther's own Child, who is flain by his own Servants. Jofiah once again
is a very good King; but Jehoahaz, that died by the Heels in Egypt
deferv'd his End, nor was Jehoiakim the Brother of the former, who
became tributary unto Pharaoh, any better; in whofe Reign and his
Succeffor Zedechias was Judah led into Captivity by Nebuchadnezzar,
(the common End of Battle Royal) where I leave any Man to judge how
far the Unity of a Perfon tends to the Unity of Government, and
whether the Temptations of advancing (to ufe your Phrafe) were greater
in the Commonwealth than in the Monarchies of the Hebrews. It were
eaſy to ſhew, if you had not enough already, that the High-Priefts
when
and JAMES HARRINGTON, Esq.
561
+
when they came to be Princes, were never a Barrel better Herring;
whereas that there is no fuch Work in Venice, Switz, or Holland, you
both know, and might, if you did not wink, as eafily fee. All is one, it
for it is as you have faid, nay, and more, in all Forms that have been
popular or fhall be, ftill the Temptations are more powerful and dangerous
as to the change of Government; this put them upon great inconveniences
by often changing their Generals of Armies. Á Pound of Clergy, for M. Difc.
·
which take an Ounce of Wiſdom, in this Maxim evinced by Ma- B. 3. Ch. 24,
chiavel: Prolongation of Magiftracy is the Ruin of popular Government :
The not often changing their Generals or Dictators was the Bane of
the Commonwealths both of Rome and of Ifrael, as by the Corruption
of Samuel's Sons (Mofs that groweth not upon a rolling Stone) is ap-
parent. And for the Baniſhment of Great Men, name me one that
fince thoſe Governments were fettled, had been baniſh'd from Venice,
Switz, or Holland. The Examples in Rome are but two that can be
objected by a rational Man in feven hundred Years, and I have an-
fwered thofe in my Book; for the Ostracism, though I hold it a
fooliſh Law, yet where the People have not Prudence to found
their Government upon an Agrarian, I fhew'd you out of Reaſon,
Ariftotle, and Experience, that it is a fhift they will be put to, whether
a Puniſhment, or not; though no Man, that is verfed in the Greek
Story, can hold it to have been fſo eſteem'd.
The fifth Query.
Whether Men, as they become richer or poorer, free or
fervile, be not of a different Genius, or become new
model'd; and whether theſe things happen not as the
Balance changes ?
The Doctor's Anſwer.
S to the Pipe of Orpheus, or Ovid's
UCH fudden Changes of the Genius and Nature of Men, I leave
to the Pipe of Orpheus, or Ovid's Metamorphofis.
A
REPLY.
Pretty Jeer; but there is one in that Book metamorphofed into the
Bird'that cannot fee by Day. Now, a Change that happens in
the Revolution of one hundred and forty Years, is not fudden; but fo
long hath the Government in queftion been changing from Aristocra-
tical to Popular. And if the Acts of popular Councils from that Time,
have ſtill been and be to this Hour more and more popular, the Ge-
nius of the People is as clear as the Day with the Alteration of it, in
thofe Opinions you in your firft Letter are pleaſed to call the Ignorance
or Wilfulness of thefe Days, that fince the Ariftocratical Balance of
the Clergy is gone, fhake the Yoke of the Prieft. The Butcher fought
bis Knife, and had it in his Mouth.
Cccc
The
562 Intercourfe between H. FERN E, D. D.
The fixth Query.
Whether Gentlemen have been more beholden unto
Divines, or Men in Orders, or Divines more beholden
unto Gentlemen, or fuch as have not been in Orders,
for the Knowlege which we have of the Common-
wealth of the Hebrews? or who of each fort have
written beſt upon that Subject?
C
The Doctor's Anſwer.
Ompariſons being odious, I only fay, Divines have cauſe to give
learned Gentlemen their Due, and Thank for their Labours, but ·
alfo caufe to complain, when they are too bold with holy Things, not only
with the Commonwealth of the Hebrews, the Form that God then ap-
pointed, but alſo with the Government of the Chriftian Church, the Form
and Functions left by Chrift and his Apoftles, according to which the
Church acted three hundred Years before the Civil Power became Chri-
fian.
D
REPLY.
IVINES have Cauſe to complain, when Gentlemen are too
bold with holy Things, as with the Commonwealth of the
Hebrews; but if you afk, who of each Sort have written beſt upon this
Subject, Compariſons are odious. Here you can be modeft; for no body
hath written in this Kind, but Carolus Sigonius, Buxtorfius, Cornelius Ber-
tramus, Hugo Grotius, Selden, and Cunaus, all which were Gentlemen,
or fuch as were not in Orders. Nor can it be gathered from any Thing
now extant, that any Divine underſtood this Government. But if
Divines cannot deal with this Government, and Gentlemen may not,
how ſhould it be known? or if Divines underſtand not this, why
do they meddle with others?
The Seventh Query.
What and how many be thofe little Things, and poor
Miſtakes, which the Author below a Gentleman of his
Parts hath entertain'd?
The Doctor's Anſwer.
THOSE little Things and poor Miftakes I confined to the Matters
of the Church; for innovating wherin thefe latter Times make
Exceptions against our Tranflation, delight in fome Notions of Words
in Scripture, vent new Interpretations, make ſtrange Inferences, in which
to reft fatisfy'd is below, &c. Such Page 16. from Notion or Origina-
tion of Ecclefia to infer Democratical Government of the Church; and
that Inference for the Right of gathering Churches now, Page 28. So
after
and JAMES HARRINGTON, Eſq;
563
after in the Model, what is faid for the Notion of xεpolove to the Pre-
judice of due Ordination, and the like.
REPLY.
IN
N Judges xx. 2. the Civil Congregation of the Chief of all the
Tribes of Ifrael, is called Ecclefia Dei: and not only Greek Wri-
ters, as particularly fchines, ufe that Word for the Affemblies of the
People in the Grecian Commonwealths, but Luke alfo fpeaking of the
People of Ephefus, he faith, Erat autem Ecclefia confufa: wherfore
this Word having been of this Ufe before the Apostles, and being ap-
plied by them unto their Convocations or Affemblies, there muſt
needs have been fome Reaſon, why they made Choice of this, ra-
ther than of any other. Now if the Reaſon had not been that they
intended the Church to be Democratical, why would they borrow a
Word that is of that Senfe? or why ſhould you think that they would
give Names unto Things not according unto their Nature; ſeeing if
they had intended it ſhould have been Aristocratical, they might as
well have taken the Word yeparía or Senate? Wherefore, fays Calvin
the Lawyer, Sumpferint Apoftoli illud melius Nomen ad fignificandum
Ecclefiam, ut oftenderent politiam Populi Dei effe quidem Democraticam,
&c. I have ſhewed you my Reaſons, and given you my Teſtimony,
and yet you that have neither, call this a Notion. Then for the
Chirotonia, or holding up of Hands, it was the Way of giving Suf-
frage in fome of thofe popular Aſſemblies, more particularly, that of
Athens, and this Word the Apofiles alfo came to borrow for the Suf-
frage of their Congregations, as in the Greek, Acts xiv. 23. where they
ufe the Word Xpolovozules, the fame that was uſed by the Atheni-
ans, fignifying holding up of Hands, or their Manner of Suffrage:
but this the English Tranflators have left out, and where they fhould
have render'd the Place, and when they had ordained Elders, by the
holding up of Hands in every Congregation, they render it, when they
had ordain'd them Elders in every Church. Now you, though you
know this well enough, never lay any Blame upon the Tranflators, but
with them that find Fault with the Tranflation, as if it were lefs
Impiety in Divines to corrupt the Scriptures, than in others to vin-
dicate them from Corruption. And this is another of thoſe Things
which you have the Confidence to call Notions, albeit in fc doing
you muſt needs fin againſt your own Confcience: but what is that
to Intereft? If this Place be reſtored, Ordination is reſtored unto the
People; and fo Divines lofing it, there is an End of Prieſt-craft, as by
telling the Story of this Invention, though in brief, will bette rappear;
Ordination in the Commonwealth of Ifrael being primarily nothing elſe
but Election of Magiftrates, was performed by the Suffrage of the People
or (as is fhewn by the Talmudifts upon Numb. xi. in Eldad and Medad)
by the Ballot. Nor was it otherwiſe till the Sanhedrim got a Whim of
their own, without any Precept of God, to ordain their Succeffors by the
Chirothefia or Impofition of Hands, and the Parties being fo ordained
called Prefbyters, became capable of being elected into the Judicato-
ries, whereby cheating the People of the Right of electing their Ma-
giftrates, the Sanhedrim inftituted the first Prefbyterian Government;
nevertheleſs this Form as to the Impofition of Hands, was not always
held ſo neceffary among the Jews but if the Party were abfent it
Cccc 2
might
}
564
Intercourfe between H. FERNE, D. D.
might be done by Letter, and fomtimes, though he were prefent,
it was done by Verfe or Charm only. But whereas the Senate, if
not every Senator, by this Innovation had right to ordain; by Hilel
High Prieſt and Prince of the Sanhedrim, who liv'd fome three hun-
dred Years before Chrift, Means was found to get the whole Power
into his Hand, which being of fuch Confequence, that no Magiftrate
could thenceforth be made but by the High Prieft, it changed this
fame firſt Preſbytery, the High Prieſts becoming afterwards Monarchs,
as I may fay, into the firft Papacy; for this Track was exactly trodden
over again by the Chriftians: first, to the Prefbytery, from thence to the
Biſhop, and that by means of the fame Chirothefia or Impofition of Hands
taken up
from the Jews, and out of this Biſhop ſtept up the Pope, and his
Seventy Cardinals, anciently the Prefbytery, or Seventy Elders of Rome,
in Imitation of thoſe of Ifrael. Moreover it is the Judgment of good
Divines, as Bullinger, Mufculus, P. Martyr, Luther and Melancthon,
that this Chirothefia or Impofition of Hands is not neceffary, for that
the Apoſtles took up fom Things from the Jews, as Community of
Goods, which are not neceffary, you will not deny and if this were
not of that Kind, then wherfore in the Place alledged, where the
Chirotonia, Prayer and Fafting, as all Things neceffary unto Ordina-
tion, are mention'd, is the Chirothefia omitted even by the Apoftles
themſelves? Nor can you find that it was otherwife than ſparingly
uſed by them in compariſon of the Chirotonia or Suffrage of the Peo-
ple; and perhaps there only, where the People had not the civil Right
of any fuch Suffrage, by which where it was, they ordained Elders
in every Church. And in this Place comes that of your Anſwer unto the
7th Query, Namely, That the Church acted three hundred Years before
the Civil Power became Chriftian, to be very queftionable. For that
Tarfus a City of Cilicia was fo free, that Paul, being a Native there-
of, claimeth the Right of a Roman, is clear in Scripture; nor is it
more obfcure in Story, that the People in the Cities of Lycia, Pam-
phylia, Lycaonia, or Cappadocia, in which the Apoſtle ordain'd eccle-
fiaftical Elders by the Chirotonia of the Church or Congregation, had
not only the ancient Right but Cuſtom of electing their civil Elders
in the fame Manner. And where was the Neceffity or Senfe, that
the Apoſtles to convert them unto the Chriftian Religion, ſhould go
about to depoſe them, than which nothing could have caufed a greater
Jealoufy, Obftruction or Scandal upon their Doctrine? But if the Apo-
tles ufed the Words Ecclefia and Chirotonia in thefe Places, according
unto the Right of the People, and the known Senfe, in which they
had bin always taken, then acted not the Church three hundred Years
nor half a hundred Years before the Civil Power became Chriftian, And
if the Biſhops, when the Emperors became Chriſtian, made no Bones of
receiving their Mitres from the Civil Magiſtrate, they muſt have don ill,
had they known or conceived that the Church in the pureft Times had
waved the Civil Magiftracy. Paul arriving at Athens converts Dio-
nyfius one of the Senators, and fom others unto the Chriſtian Faith.
Suppoſe he had converted the whole Senate and the People, what fober
Man can imagine, that he would have difputed with the Congrega-
tion the Senſe of their former Name Ecclefia, or the Right of electing
their new Elders by their old Chirotonia or Suffrage by holding up
of Hands? But he converted but a few; wherfore as he had no Aid,
fo he had no Hindrance from the Magiftrate. This, then, was a
gather'd
and JAMES HARRINGTON, Efq;
565
gather'd Church, I think, or what was it? If the Prophets in Ifrael
went up and down preaching unto the People, by whom they were
followed; and if fom of theſe that were thus followed were true,
and more of them falfe, the People that followed them could not be
all of the fame Perfuafion, though it is like that no Man would
follow fuch an one as he was not perfuaded was true. But the Peo-
ple chooſing at their own Diſcretion whom they would follow, how
could thefe Congregations be lefs gather'd than thoſe, when the Peo-.
ple were divided into three Sects, Pharifees, Sadduces, and Effeans,
which could be no other? Nor doth the Sanhedrim, though they
had the Government of the national Religion, ſending unto John the
Baptiſt (John xi. 25.) to know who he was, and why he baptized,
refufe him the like Prophetic Right, ufed by him firft, and after-
wards by our Saviour and the Apoftles, without the Authority of the
Sanhedrim: nor doth Paul blame the Congregations of Apollos and
Cephas (1 Cor. i.) in that they were gather'd, but in that they put
too much upon them that gathered them. How then doth it appear
that my Inference for gathered Congregations now, is a little Thing
or poor Miſtake, below a Gentleman of Parts; when I fay no more,
than that gather'd Congregations were in ufe both before and after
Chriſt, notwithſtanding the National Religion that was then fettled ?
and therfore gathered Congregations for any Thing in the Old or
New Teſtament that I can find to the contrary, might be now,
though a National Religion were fettled. And if this be not true,
the Teſtimony, which you bear in your prefent Practice, is againſt
your felf; for what elfe are your Congregations now, that will uſe
none other than the Common-prayer, but gathered?
TO conclude, it ſhould feem by you, that if the National Religion
were fo fettled, that the meddling with holy Things by any other
than a Divine, might be refolv'd as boldly, and, to ufe a fine Word,
opinionately done, as if it were againſt an Article of our Creed; you
would be pleas'd. But the National Religion and the Liberty of Con-
ſcience ſo ordain'd in Oceana, that neither the Intereſt of the Learn-
ed, nor the Ignorance of the Unlearned can corrupt Religion (in
which Cafe though there might, yet there is no probability, that
there would be any gathered Congregations, this being the peculiar
Remedy for that which you hold a Difeafe) you are difpleas'd: for
thus you conclude.
SIR,
You
OU fee 1 have used Freedom again, it is like you will think too
much; but I defire you would allow me the Privilege of the old
Saying, fuo quifque fenfu abundet, and not trouble your ſelf with in-
terrogating me, from whom you can draw fo little Satisfaction. I never
made it my Study to model or shape out Forms of Government, but to
yield Obedience to every lawful Command proceding from Authority,
how perfect, or otherwife the Form was. In a word, Sir, I honour
your Parts, wish them imployed as may be most for the Service of God
and his Church, and do promife myself in all friendly and Chriftian
Offices,
Nov. 26, 1656.
SIR,
Your bumble Servant,
:
H. FERNE.
To
566
Intercourfe between H. FERNE, D. D.
ว
I
To which I ſay that
Have not heard a Divine quote Scripture (Quifque fuo fenfu abun-
det) as an old Saying; but you are not contented to do fo only,
but to uſe it accordingly; for wheras (Rom. xiv. 15.) it is indulged
by the Apoſtles as to indifferent Things, this was never intended to
be an Argument, that the Seventy Elders were erected upon the Ad-
vice of Jethro, that Mofes inftituted a Monarchy, that Gideon was
King of Ifrael, or indeed for any Thing that you have ſaid. And
therefore however you call it interrogatory, it is civil enough in fuch
a Cafe to defire better Reafon; but do not fear that I fhould give you
any more in this Kind, nor had I at all, if wheras you confefs in the
Cloſe that you have not ſtudied theſe Things, you had but faid fo
much in the beginning, for there had been an End.
THIS Study indeed, as I have fhewed elſewhere, is peculiar unto
Gentlemen; but if it be of your Goodneſs that you study not to
ſhape ſuch Work, muſt it ever be the Study of your Tribe to mif-
fhape it? Is it in fuch lefs impiety to have ruin'd a Kingdom, than
in any other to fhew the true Principles of a Commonwealth? Or
wheras the nature of the Politics, or fuch Civil Power (witneſs the
Sanhedrim of Ifrael) as cometh neareſt unto God's own Pattern, re-
gards as well Religion as Government, and is receptible of Gentlemen;
doth it follow that I have not laid out the beſt of my Parts in my
Vocation, to the Service of God and his Church, becauſe you, in
your pretended Zeal, have choſen to infinuate the contrary by a Prayer?
But he, unto whom you have addreffed yourſelf, knoweth the Se-
crets of all Hearts. To him therefore I appeal, whether I have not
fought him in a Work of univerfal Charity; and whether one End
of this prefent Writing be not, left you making Ufe of your great
Authority thus to prejudice fuch a Work, fhould hurt them moſt,
whom you love beft; it being apparent unto any Man, that can fee
and underſtand the Balance of Government with the irreſiſtible Con-
fequence of the fame, that by fuch Time as the Vanity of Men's
Ways
ſhall have tried them a little more, it will be found that God
in his infinite Goodneſs and Mercy, hath made that only poffible for
us, which is beft for us all, moſt for the Good of Mankind, and his
own Glory. And fo notwithſtanding the Heat of our Difpute,
which fo far as it hath not refifted nor exceeded Truth, cannot have
been very finful or uncharitable, I do oblige myſelf in all the De-
oirsof
SIR,
London, Jan. 3.
1056.
Your affectionate Friend,
and humble Servant,
JAMES HARRINGTON.
THE
567
1
THE
STUMBLING-BLOCK
OF
DISOBEDIENCE and REBELLION
Cunningly imputed by P. H. unto CALVIN, remov'd
in a Letter to the faid P. H. from J. H.
Let no Man put a Stumbling-Block in his Brother's Way,
Rom. xiv. 13.
SIR,
Gave my Judgment upon your late book (that I mean againſt Cal-
vin) in fuch Manner among fom Gentlemen, that they defired
me to write ſomething in Anſwer to it, which if there happen to be
Need, I may. In the mean time it will, perhaps, be enough, if I
acquaint you with as much as I have acquainted them. In this Book
of yours you ſpeak fome Things as a Politician only, others as a Po-
litician and a Divine too. Now to repeat a few, and yet as many I
think as are needful of each kind, I fhall begin with the former.
The Rife, Progrefs, and Period of the Commonwealth of Lace-
demon is obfervable in Authors by theſe Steps.
1. The Infufficiency of the Monarchy.
2. The Form of the Commonwealth.
3. An Infirmity in the Form, and a Cure of it.
4. The Corruption and Diffolution of the Whole.
All which happened within the Compaſs of Eight hundred Years.
To the first you fay, That the Spartan Kings were as abfolute Mo- P-39, 40, 41.
narchs as any in thofe Times, till Eurytion, or Eurypon, to procure
the Favour and Good-will of the Rafcal-rabble (fo you commonly call
the People) purchas'd nothing but the Lofs of Royalty, befides an empty
Name unto his Family, thence call'd the Euripontida.
It is true that Plutarch in the Life of Lycurgus fays, That Eury-
pon was the first, who to obtain Favour with the People, let loofe
the Reins of Government; and this he faith there without ſhewing
any Neceffity that lay upon the King fo to do: nevertheleſs that fuch
Neceffity there was, is apparent in Agis, where he affirmeth, That a
King of Lacedemon could never come to be equal unto any other King,
but only by introducing Equality among the People; forafmuch as a
Servant or Lieutenant of Seleucus, or Ptolemy, was worth more than
ever were all the Kings of Sparta put together. Which latter Speech,
if a Man confider the Narrowness of the Laconic Territory, being
but a Part of Peloponnefus, muft needs evince the former Action to
have been not fo voluntary in Eurypon, as in Prudence unavoidable.
But Eurypon having by this Means rather confeffed the Infirmity of
the Monarchy, than introduced any Cure of the Government, it re-
3
mained
568
The Stumbling-Block
p. 41.
P. 43.
mained that the People not yet brought under fit Orders muft
needs remain in Diſorders, as they did till the Inſtitution of the Com-
monwealth.
The Monarchy, that is or can be abfolute, muſt be founded upon
an Army planted by Military Colonies upon the Overbalance of Land
being in Dominion of the Prince; and in this Caſe there can neither
be a Nobility, nor a People to gratify, at leaſt without ſhaking the
Foundation, or diſobliging the Army. Wherefore the Spartan Kings
having a Nobility or People to gratify, were not abfolute. It is true,
you call the Kings of France abfolute; fo do others, but it is known
that in the whole World there is not a Nobility nor a People fo fre-
quently flying out or taking Arms against their Princes, as the Nobi-
lity and People of France.
The Monarch, that is founded upon a Nobility, or a Nobility and
the People (as by the Rife and Progrefs of the Norman Line in our
Story is apparently neceffary) muft gratify the Nobility, or the No-
bility and the People, with fuch Laws and Libertys as are fit for
them, or the Government (as we have known by Experience, is
found in France, and no doubt was feen by Eurypon) becometh ty-
rannical, be the Prince otherwiſe never fo good a Man.
Thus Carilaus, in whofe reign the Commonwealth was inftituted
by Lycurgus, is generally affirmed to have been a good Man, and yet
faid by Ariftotle to have been a Tyrant. It remaineth therefore with
you to fhew how a good Man can otherwife be a Tyrant than by
holding monarchical Government without a fufficient Balance, or if
you pleaſe, how he that fhall undertake the like, be he never fo good
or well deferving a Man, can be any other; or confefs that not the
Favour of Princes (by which if they be well balanced they lofe no-
thing) nor the Ufurpation of the People (by which without a popu-
lar Balance they get nothing) but the Infirmity of the Monarchy cauſed
the Commonwealth of Lacedemon. And what lefs is faid by Plutarch,
or thus rendered by yourſelf: Not the People only fent Meffages to Ly-
curgus for his Counsel, but the Kings were as defirous he bould return
from his Travels, in hopes that his Prefence would bridle and restrain
the People: but Lycurgus applied not himself unto either, being refolved
to frame both into one Commonwealth.
To the Form of this Commonwealth, you fay, That whatever the
Kings loft, the People got little by this Alteration, being left out of all
Imployment in Affairs of State, and forced to yield Obedience unto thir-
ty Maſters, wheras before they had but two.
A ftrange Affirmation, feeing the Oracle containing the Model of
Lacedemon is thus recorded by your Author, When thou hast divided the
People into Tribes and Linages, thou shalt eftablish the Senat, confifting
with the two Kings of thirty Senators, and affemble the People as there
fhall be Occafion, where the Senat fhall propofe and difmifs the People
without fuffering them to debate. Now who feeth not that the Peo-
ple having no Right to debate, muſt therefore have had the Right to
refolve, or elſe were to be affembled for nothing? but the ultimate Re-
fult is the fovereign Power in every Government. It is true, the Greek
of the Oracle is obfolete, and abftrufe; but then it is not only inter-
preted by Plutarch in the Senfe I have given, but by the Verfes of the
Poet Tyrteus, which the Kings themſelves, tho they would have
made other Uſe of, acknowledged unto the People to be authentick.
They
of Difabedience and Rebellion, &c. removed.
569
They having of Apollo fought,
This Oracle from Delphos brought;
Unto the Spartan Kings, among
The Senators, it doth belong
To moderate in royal Chairs,
And give their Votes in all Affairs;
And when they have propofed theſe,
The People choose whatere they pleaſe.
Of many other Teftimonies, I ſhall add no more than one out of
Ifocrates; I am not ignorant, faith he, to the Areopagites, that the
Lacedemonians flouriſh for this Cauſe eſpecially, that their Government
is popular.
To the Infirmity of this Form, and the Cure of it you ſay, That P. 45.
the Royalty and Power of the Kings being thus impaired, the People ab-
folutely discharged from having any Hand at all in publick Government,
and the Authority of the Senate growing every Day more infolent and
predominant, by reafon that (albeit the Senators were elected by the
People) they had their Places for Term of Life, the Kings refolved upon
a Courſe of putting the People into fuch a Condition as might enable them
to curb and controul the Senators, to which End they ordained the E-
phori, Magiftrates to be annually chofen out of the Body of the
People.
In which firſt you make that to be a Practice of the Kings againſt
the Senate, which by your Author is plain to have been a Combina-
tion of the Kings, and the Senate againſt the People; for the Peo-
ple upon the Infolency and Predominancy of the Kings and the Senate,
fell, as is in that Cafe the inevitable Nature of them, upon Counſel how
to defend themſelves, and ſo affumed the Power of Debate. Here-
upon the Kings Theopompus and Polidore would have added unto the
Tenor of the Oracle, that if the People went about by Debate to
change the Propofitions of the Senate, it fhould be lawful for the
Kings and the Senate to null the Refult of the People; which prac-
tice, if it had paſt, muſt have made the Kings and the Senate altoge-
ther uncontroulable; wherefore the People incenſed at it, put a Bit
into the Mouth of the Senate, by the Inftitution of the Ephori. This
is the clear Senſe of Plutarch, which he taketh out of Plato, who
affirmeth the Ephorate to have been fet up againſt the hereditary De Leg. 3.
Power of the Kings; with whom agree both Ariftotle and Cicero; pol. lib. 2.
the former affirming this Magiftracy to contain the whole Common-
wealth, inaſmuch as the People having obtained it, were quiet; and
the latter that the Ephori in Lacedemon were fo oppoſed to the Kings, De Leg. 3-
as the Tribunes in Rome to the Confuls. Now if other Authors at-
tribute the Inſtitution of the Ephori unto the Kings, and there be a
Story affirmed as well by Plutarch as others, that Theopompus having
thus created the Ephori, and being told by his Queen he had done
that which would leave narrower Power to his Children, anſwered
well, that it would leave that which would be narrower, but longer:
this is neither any Riddle nor kind of Contradiction to the former
Senſe, ſeeing, when we fay that Henry the Third inſtituted the Par-
liament to be affiftant to him in his Government, we no more doubt
of that, than how it is to be underſtood. Nor if his Queen had faid
Dddd
as
570
The Stumbling-block
P 55.
as the of Lacedemon, and our King had made the like Anſwer, would
that have altered any thing, or proved the Woman to have been,
as you will have it, the better Prophet, ſeeing either Government laſt-
ed longer for either Reformation, nor came to alter, but through the
Alteration of the Balance, which was nothing to the Woman's Pro-
phecy.
The Ruin of this Balance, and Corruption of the Commonwealth,
you wholly omit, to the End, that picking up your Objections againſt
the Government in Vigour, out of the Rubbish and Diffolution of
it you may caft Duft in Mens Eyes, or perfuade them that the E-
phori trufting to the Power and Intereft, they had in the Commonalty,
came to ufurp upon the Kings, and to be Tyrants, as they are called
Plato and Ariftotle; ſo you affirm.
But the Truth is thus recorded by Plutarch in the Life of Agis.
So foon as the Lacedemonians having ruined Athens, became full of
Gold and Silver, the Commonwealth began to break. Nevertheleſs,
the Lots or Divifion of Lands made by Lycurgus yet remaining, the
Equality of the Foundation held good, till Epictetus an ill-natured
Fellow became Ephore, and having a mind to dif-inherit his Son,
got a Law to paſs, whereby any Man might diſpoſe of his Lot as he
pleafed. This by him purfued of mere Malice to his Son, was hur-
ried on by the Avarice of others, whoſe Riches came thus to eat the
People fo clearly out of their Lands, that in a fhort time there re-
mained not above an hundred Freeholders in all Sparta. This he
ſhews to have been the Rife of the Oligarchy. The Oligarchy thus
balanced totally excluded the People, and murther'd Agis, the firſt
King that was ever put to death by the Ephori; and to theſe Times,
about which Plato and Ariftotle lived, relateth that Tyranny, which
they, who, as was fhewn, commended the Ephorate in the Common-
wealth, now laid unto it in Oligarchy. Thus have you fetcht Ar-
guments againſt a Commonwealth, that are nothing to it. Again,
whereas Agis and Cleomenes, by the Reftitution of the Lots of Ly-
curgus were Affertors of popular Power, you infinuate them to have
been Affertors of Monarchy; fuch is your Play with human Authors,
or as a Politician. Now let us fee, whether you have dealt
any thing
better with Scripture, or bin more careful as a Divine. In Order
to this Diſcovery, I fhall repeat that Piece of Calvin, which you call
the Stumbling-block of Difobedience. Calvin having preached Obedi-
ence to your good Approbation, comes at length to this Expreffion :
Calv. Inft.lib. But fill I must be understood of private Perfons; for if there be now any
c. 20. §. 31. popular Officers ordained to moderate the Licentioufness of Kings (fuch as
were the Ephori, fet up of old against the Kings of Sparta, the Tri-
buns of the People against the Roman Confuls, and the Demarchs a-
gainst the Athenian Senate, of which Power perhaps, as the World now
goes, the three Eftates are feized in each feveral Kingdom when folemnly
affembled) fo far am Ifrom hindring them to put Restraints upon the ex-
orbitant Power of Kings, as their Office binds them, that I conceive
them rather to be guilty of perfidious Diffimulation, if they connive at
Kings, when they play the Tyrants, or wantonly infult on the People; in
that fo doing they betray the Liberty of the Subject, of which they know
themſelves to be made Guardians by God's own Ordinance.
What Calvin fays of the Athenian Demarchs, they having been
Magiftrats of another Nature, is a Miftake, but fuch an one, as
deſtroys
3
14
of Difobedience and Rebellion, &c. removed.
571
deſtroys no other Part of his Affertion, the reft of the Parentheſis, or
that which he faith of the Ephori, and the Tribuns being confirmed,
as hath been already fhewn by Plato and Ariftotle, by Cicero and Plu-
tarch. Wherefore of the Ephori and the Tribuns enough; now why
the Eſtates in a Gothick Model fhould be of lefs Power, no Politician
in the World ſhall ever fhew a Reaſon; the Eſtates are fuch by virtue
of their Eftates, that is, of their Over-balance in Dominion. You are
then either ſpeculatively to ſhew how the Over-balance of Dominion
ſhould not amount unto Empire, or practically that the Over-balance
of Dominion hath not amounted unto Empire, and that in a quiet
Government, or it can be no otherwife in a quiet Government, than
that the Over-balance of Dominion muſt amount unto Empire. This
Principle being now fufficiently known, is the Cauſe it may be why
you chooſe in this Place to ſpeak rather like a Divine, as you fuppofe,
than a Politician. For you would fain learn, you fay, of Calvin, in P. 290.
what Part of the Word of God we ſhall find any fuch Authority given
to fuch popular Magiftrats, as he tells us of.
TO which by the way I answer, that God founded the Ifraelitiſh
Government upon a popular Balance; that we find the People of If-
rael judging the Tribe of Benjamin, and by the Oracle of God, levy-
ing War againſt them, which are Acts of Sovereign Power: therefore
a popular Balance, even by the Ordinance of God himſelf expreffed in Judg. xx.
Scripture, amounted unto Empire.
But you, when you have asked in achat Part of the Word of God P. 290.
we shall find any fuch Authority given to popular Magiftrats; anfwer,
not in the Old Testament you are fure. For when Mofes first ordained
the feventy Elders, it was not to diminish any Part of that Power which
was invested in him, but to ease himſelf of fome Part of the Burthen lying
upon him, as you will have to appear plainly by the 18th of Exodus,
where Moſes upon the Advice of Jethro chofe able Men out of all Iſrael, and
made them Rulers of Thousands, Rulers of Hundreds, Rulers of Fifties,
and Rulers of Tens. Now I am ſure that about this Time the Num-
ber of the Men of Ifrael was above fix hundred thoufand, and fo any Numb. i. 46.
Man may be fure that the Elders thus chofen (fhould we count but the
Rulers of the thouſands only) muſt have come at the leaft to fix Hun→
dred: wherefore, you cannot be fure that this makes any thing to the
Election of the feventy Elders.
WELL, but out of thefe, fay you, God afterwards in the eleventh of
Numbers, willed Mofes to choose the feventy Elders.
YOU may do me a greater Favour than you can fuddenly imagine,
to tell me really for what Caufe, or upon what Authority your Speech
is fo pofitive, that God willed Mofes to chooſe the feventy Elders out of
thofe that were chofen in the eighteenth of Exodus. For whereas
Mofès is willed to chooſe them out of fuch as he knew to be Elders,
fuch there were in Honour among the People, though not in Power,
before the Election of thoſe adviſed by Jethro, as appears, Ex. iii. 16.
and iv. 29. But had this been as you would have it, what is the Necef-
fity, that becauſe there lay an Appeal unto Mofes from thoſe in Exodus,
that is, from the Jethronian Elders, or Courts which fat afterwards in
the Gates of the Temple, and of every City; therefore there muſt
needs lie an Appeal from the ſeventy Elders, or the Sanhedrim unto
Mofes, especially while the whole Stream of Jewish Writers or Talmu-
difts, who fhould have had fome Knowledge in their own Common-
Dddd 2
wealth,
572
The Stumbling-block
Grotius adEx.
xviii. 21.
Numb. xi.
P. 292.
wealth, unanimouſly affirms that there was no fuch thing? Where
upon to the Election of the former Elders, faith Grotius, in the Place
of theſe came the Judges in the Gates, and in the Place of Mofes the
Sanhedrim. Nor need we go farther than the Scripture, for the Cer-
tainty of this Affertion, where the Seventy are choſen not to ſtand un-
der Mofes, but with him; not to diminiſh his Burthen, or bear it under
him, with an Appeal in difficult Caſes to him, as is expreffed in the
Election of the Jethronian Elders, but to bear the Burthen with him,
and without any mention of fuch Appeal. Mofes before the Election
of the Jethronian Judges had the whole Burthen of Judicature lying
upon him; after their Election, the Burthen of the Appeals only:
wherefore if the feventy Elders were indeed inſtituted to bear the Bur-
then with Moſes, there thenceforth lay no Appeal unto Mofes, which
Deut. xvii. 8. is yet clearer in this Precept: If there arife a Matter of Controverſy
within thy Gates, (which plainly is addreft to the Jethronian Courts)
too hard for thee in Judgment, then shalt thou come unto the Priest and
the Levite, (by which in the Senfe of all Authors Jewish and Chriftian
is underſtood the Sanhedrim) or to the Fudge that ſhall be in thofe Days,
(the Suffes or Dictator) and they shall fhew thee the Sentence of Judg-
ment: whence by the clear Senfe of Scripture, all Matter of Appeal
in Ifrael lay unto the Sanhedrim. Your next Argument, that there
muſt be nothing in all this but eafing the fupreme Magiftrate of fome
part of the Burthen, which was before too heavy for him, without any
Diminution, in the leaft Refpect of his Power; is, that when God had
taken of the Spirit which was upon Mofes, and put it upon the feventy
Elders, the Spirit yet refted upon Mofes in as full a Meaſure as it did
at first: I grant in a fuller, for I believe his Wiſdom was the
greater
for this Diminution of his Power, it being through the Nature of the
Balance, apparently impoffible that he could be any more than a Prince
in a Commonwealth. But your Argument can be of no Force at all,
unleſs you will have him to have been lefs wife, for not affuming So-
vereign Power, where, without Confufion, it was altogether impoffible
he ſhould have held it. A Prince in a Commonwealth fubfifteth by
making himſelf, or being made of uſe unto the free Courſe of popular
Orders; but a Sovereign Lord can have no other Subfiftence or Security,
than by cutting off or tearing up all Roots, that do naturally ſhoot.or
fpring up into fuch Branches. To conclude, if the Congregation of
the People, in Law to be made, had fuch Power as was fhewn, and
in Law, fo made, the ultimate Appeal lay unto the Sanhedrim ; why,
are not here two Eftates in this Commonwealth, each by God's own
Ordinance, and both plain in Scripture? Well, but when they came,
you will fay, to make unto themſelves Kings, whatever Power they
had formerly, was now loft. This at beſt were but to diſpute from the
Folly of a People againſt an Ordinance of God; for what lefs is tefti-
Sam viii. 7. fied by himſelf in thofe Words to Samuel, they have not rejected thee,
but they have rejected me that I ſhould not reign over them? The Go-
vernment of the Senate and the People is that only, which is or can be
the Government of Laws and not of Men, and the Government of
Laws and not of Men, is the Government of God and not of Men:
A pot. 3. He that is for the Government of Laws, is for the Government of
God; and he that is for the Government of a Man, is for the Govern-
ment of a Beast. Kings, no queftion, where the Balance is mónar-
chical, are of divine Right, and, if they be good, the greateſt Bleffings
&
7
that
t
of Difobedience and Rebellion, &c. removed.
573
that the Government fo ftanding can be capable of; but the Balance
being popular, as in Ifrael, in the Grecian, in the Sicilian Tyrannies,
they are the direft Curfe that can befal a Nation. Nor are Divines,
who will always have them to be of divine Right, to be hearkned to,
feeing they affirm that which is clean contrary to Scripture, for in this
Cafe, faith Hofea, they have fet up Kings, and not by me; they have made
Princes, and I knew it not. Pharaoh may impofe the making of Brick Hof. viii. 4.
without the Allowance of Straw, but God never required of any Man
or of any Government, that they 'fhould live otherwife, than according
to their Eftates, It is true if a Man's Want make him a Servant,
there are 'Rules in Scripture that enjoin him the Duty of a Servant :
but fhew me the Rule in Scripture that obligeth a Man who can live of
himſelf unto the Duty of a Servant. Hath God lefs Regard unto a
Nation than to a Man? Yet the People of Ifrael, continuing upon a
popular Agrarian, though God forewarned them, that by this means
they would make themſelves Servants, would needs have a King;
whence, faith the fame Prophet, O Ifrael, thou haft destroyed thy felf, Hoſ. xiii.
but in me is thine Help, I will be thy King (which foretels the Reftitu-
tion of the Commonwealth, for) where is any other that may fave thee
in all thy Cities? and thy Judges of whom thou faidft give me a King
and Princes. Igave thee a King in mine Anger, (that is in Saul,) and I
took him away in my Wrath, that is in the Captivity, fo at leaſt faith
Rabbi Bechai, with whom agree Nachmoni, Gyfchome, and others.
Kimchi, it is true, and Maimonides are of Opinion, that the People
making a King, difpleafed God not in the Matter, but in the Form
only, as if the Root of a Tree, the Balance of a Government, were
Form only and not Matter. Nor do our Divines yet, who are divided
into like Parties, fee more than the Rabbies. Both the Royalifts and
the Commonwealthfmen of each fort, that is, whether Divines or Tal-
mudifts, appeal unto the Letter of the Law, which the Royalifts (as the
Tranflators of our Bible) render thus: When thou shalt fay (the Com- Deut. xvii.14.
monwealthſmen, as Diodati thus, If thou com to fay) I will fet a King
over me, like all the Nations that are about me, thou shalt in any wife fet
him King over thee, whom the Lord thy God fhall choose. The one
Party will have the Law to be pofitive, the other contingent, and with
a Mark of Deteftation upon it; for fo where God fpeaketh of his
People's doing any thing like the Nations that were about them, it is
every where elſe understood, But let thefe, which are no Niceties, be
as you will; who ſeeth not that to argue from this Place for the Ne-
ceffity of the King, is as if one from that foregoing fhould argue for Verſe 9.
the Neceffity of the Judges? The Words are thefe, thou shalt come
into the Priest and to the Levite, which, as was faid, is to the Sanhedrim,
and (that is or) to the Judge that ſhall be in thofe Days. Yet that the
Judge, not by any Neceffity implied in theſe Words, but through the
mere Folly of the People came to be fet up in Ifrael, is plain by Jor
in Ifrael, is plain by for Book 5. c. 2.
fephus, where he fhews that the Ifraelites laying by their Arms, and
betaking themfelves unto their Pleaſures, while they did not as God
had commanded, root out the Canaanites from among them, but ſuf-
fered them to dwell with them, fuffered alſo the Form of their Com-
monwealth to be corrupted, and the Senate to be broken; the Senators
nor other folemn Magiftrates being elected as formerly, which both in
Word and Fact is confirmed alfo by the Scripture. In Words, as
Where it is thus written: When Joſhua had let the People go (that is
had
574
The Stumbling-block
to
Pacuvius apud
23.
Fudg. ii. 6. had difmiffed the Army, and planted them upon their popular balance)
the Children of Ifrael went every Man unto his own Inheritance to poffefs
the Land, and the People ferved the Lord all the Days of Joshua, and
all the Days of the Elders that out-lived Joſhua, that is, while the San-
bedrim continued after him; but when the Elders hereof came to die,
and the People elected them no Succeffors, they lived evil in the fight of
the Lord, and having broken their Civil Orders, forfook alfo their Re-
ligion, the Government whereof depended upon the Sanhedrim, and
ferved Baalim. And for the Matter of Fact included in thefe Words, it
Judg. i. 3. farther appears, where Judah faid unto Simeon his Brother, come up
with me into my Lot, that we may fight against the Canaanites, and I like-
wife will go with thee into thy Lot; fo Simeon went with him. By which
the Tribes leaguing at their Pleaſure one with another, it is plain, that
the Sanhedrim their common Ligament was broken. Now except a
Man fhall fay, that this Neglect of God's Ordinance was according unto
the Law of God, there is no difputing from that Law to the Neceffity
Livium. lib. of the Judge, which happened through no other than this Exigence
(quippe aut rex, quod abominandum, aut quod unum liberæ civitatis
confilium eft, fenatus habendus eft) wherefore the Judge of Ifrael was not
neceffitated by the Will of God, but forefeen only by his Providence,
not impofed by the Law, but provided by it as an Expedient in Caſe
of Neceffity; and if no more can be pleaded from the Law for the
Judge against whom God never declared, much leſs is there to be pleaded
from the fame for the King, againſt whom he declared ſo often. There
is nothing more clear nor certain in Scripture, than that the Common-
wealth of Ifrael was inftituted by God; the Judges and the Kings no
otherwife, than through the Imprudence and Importunity of the Peo-
ple. But you who have no better Name for the People in a Common-
wealth than the rafcally Rabble, will have Kings at a venture to be of
divine Right, and to be abfolute; whereas in truth, if divine Right
be derived unto Kings, from thefe of the Hebrews only, it is moft ap-
parent that no abfolute King can be of divine Right. For theſe Kings,
if they were fuch by the Law alledged, then by the fame Law they
could neither multiply Horfes nor Wives, nor Silver nor Gold, with-
out which no King can be abſolute; but were to keep all the Words of
this Law and thefe Statutes, and fo by Confequence were regulated
Monarchs; nay, could of Right enact no Law, but as thoſe by David
for the Reduction of the Ark, for the Regulation of the Priefts, for
the Election of Solomon, which were made by the Suffrage of the Peo-
ple, no otherwiſe than thoſe under the Kings of Rome, and ours under
the late Monarchy. What then is attributed by Calvin unto popular
Magiſtrates, that is not confirmed by Scripture and Reafon?. Yet no-
thing will ſerve your Turn, but to know what Power there was in the
Sanhedrim, to controul their Kings: To which I anſwer, that both Schick-
ardus and Grotius with the full Confent of the Talmudists have affured
you, that in caſe the King came to violate thofe Laws and Statutes, it
was in the Power of the Sanhedrim, to bring him unto corporal Puniſh-
ment. Moreover it is fhewn by the latter out of Jofephus, that Hyr-
De jure B. ac canus, when he could not deliver Herod from the Sanhedrim by Power,
did it by Art. Nor is your Evafion fo good as that of Hyrcanus, while
you having nothing to fay to the contrary, but that Herod when he
was queftioned was no King, ſhuffle over the Buſineſs without taking
any Notice as to the Point in Controverfy, that Hyrcanus, who could
not fave Herod from the Queſtion, was King.
Deut. xvii.
P. Lib. 1.
Cap. 1.
The
of Difobedience and Rebellion, &c. removed.
575
Ad Mat. v.
THE manner of the Reftitution of the Sanhedrim made by Jehofba- 2 Chr. xix.
phat plainly fhews, that even under the Monarchy the Power of the
Sanhedrim was co-ordinate with that of the Kings, at leaſt, ſuch is the
Judgment of the Jewish Writers; for faith Grotius, the King (as is
rightly noted by the Talmudifts,) was not to judge in fome Cafes; and
to this the Words of Zedekiah ſeem to relate, where to the Sanhedrim
demanding the Prophet Jeremiah, he faid, behold he is in your Hands, Jer. xxxviii.
for the King is not he that can do any thing with you. Nor, except s-
David, had ever any King Seffion or Vote in this Council. To which
foon after he adds, that this Court continued till Herod the Great,
whoſe Infolence, when exalting it felf more and more againſt the
Law, the Senators had not in time as they ought, fuppreffed by their
Power; God puniſhed them in ſuch manner for the Neglect of their
Duty, that they came all to be put to Death by Herod, except Sameas
only, whoſe Forefight and frequent Warning of this or the like Ca-
lamity they had as frequently contemned. In which Words Grotius
following the unanimous Confent of the Talmudifts, if they knew any
thing of their own Orders, exprefly attributes the fame Power unto the
Sanhedrim, and chargeth them with the fame Duty in Ifrael, that is
attributed unto the three Eftates in a Gothick Model, and charged
upon theſe by Calvin.
THUS that there never lay any Appeal from the Sanhedrim, unto
Moſes, nor, except when the Jews were in Captivity, or under provin-
cial Government, to any other Magiftrate, as alfo that they had Power
upon their Kings, being that your felf fay, Is the Objection paramount, P. 289.
and which not answered, you confefs that the three Eftates convened in
Parliament, or any other popular Magiftrate Calvin dreams of, notwith-
ftanding any Difcontinuance, or Non-Usage on their parts, or any Pre-
fcription alledged by Kings to the contrary, may refume and exercife that
Authority, which God hath given them, whenever they shall find a fit time
for it. And this Letter fhewing plainly that you have in no wife an-
fwered this Objection; it remains that your whole Book, even accord-
ing to your own Acknowledgment, is confuted by this Letter. Or if
you be of another Mind, I fhall hope to hear farther from you.
A Letter unto Mr. S T U B S in Anſwer to his
Oceana weighed, &c.
SIR, to begin with the beſt Piece of your Work; your Quota-
tions in the Title Page ſpoiled with ill Application, I fhall firſt
fet right. You fee that all Councils, all Things are upon the Rota,
upon the Wheel. From that Rota only which I ſuppoſe you mean;
what came forth, came forth unfoiled, and as it went in. We do
not by this Trial defpair, but with a little Senfe, the right Inftitution
of fuch a Society may come to compare with Piccadilly, Play-houſes,
or Horſe-matches; but if theſe be yet preferred, then indeed
-Amphora capit
Inftitui, currente Rota, cur urceus exit?
Thus
756
A Letter to Mr. STUB S
Thus applied there may be Senfe in this Quotation. So for your o-
ther, had it been affixed unto your former Book, and applied to
your felf, or thoſe, unto whom you wrote Journey-work for Oligarchy,
it might have been well faid as in Afinar.
Nunc enim hic eft
Negotiofus interdius, videlicet Polon eft
Leges ut confcribat, quibus fe populus non teneat Gerræ.
Qui fefe parere apparent hujus legibus, profecto
Nunquam bona frugi ftent.
Thus taken you know it is true. And fo your Title Page being in
Part rectified, I come
To your Preface.
Mr. Harrington fays, That without a national Religion there can be
no Liberty of Confcience. And you anſwer, That in Athens and
Rome there were national Religions; therefore in Athens and Rome
there was no Liberty of Confcience; which is fo much the more
abfurd in that you cite Petit for Confirmation of your Confequence,
who affirms the contrary, and that by undeniable Authorities,
as may be ſeen in the fecond, third, and fourth Pages of his Dif-
courfe upon the Attick Laws, the Sum whereof amounts unto thus
much, That albeit there were in Athens Laws for the National Reli-
gion, yet it by Law was in the Areopagites alfo to give Liberty unto
any other Way of Worſhip, which Liberty ſo given was Law, and
became a Man's Right, whether it were to a publick or private Way
of Worſhip; in which Manner it is affirmed and proved by the fame
Petit, that into Athens, befides the national Religion of that Coun-
try, were introduced the Religions of almoſt every other Country.
The fame he affirmeth of Rome, where notwithſtanding the national
Religion therein eſtabliſhed by Romulus, it is vulgarly known that
ſcarce any Country was fubdued by them, whofe Religion they did
not infert into their own.
And where is your Truth, who ſay, That Mr. Harrington enter-
tains us with Difcourfe of Paul's Trial at Athens? Where doth he
fay that Paul was tried there? Or what faith he of Paul's preaching
there, other than is affirmed by other Pens, as that particularly of
Grotius? But out of this you fall merrily, as thus: Once upon a
Time there was a Man called William Thomas, therefore William and
Thomas muſt for evermore be one and the fame Man.
This is your Way of difputing, which you carry on in like Man-
ner, for Example thus.
Every Man is to be taxed for that Eſtate, whereof he is not
Owner.
Now Oceana is an Eſtate, whereof Mr. Harrington is not Owner.
Therefore Oceana is an Eſtate, for which we are to tax Mr. Har-
rington.
If the Minor be denied, as that Oceana is an Eſtate whereof Mr.
Harrington is not Owner, your Difcourfe implies this or the like
Proof of it.
Where
Letter to Mr. S T U B S.
577
Where any one Man and no other is the conftant Defender of one
and the fame Eftate or Propriety, that one and the fame Eftate or
Propriety is not his, but fome others.
But Mr. Harrington and no other is the conftant Defender of O-
ceana.
Therefore Oceana is no Eftate or Propriety of Mr. Harrington's,
but of fome other. Now if it pleaſe you
To the Body of your Work.
Sir, to a Man who pretends not to underſtand a Language, it is no
Shame not to underſtand that Language; but it is a Shame to a Man,
and a Scholar who pretends to Senfe, not to underſtand Senfe. If I
ſhall make it plain that in this Point you come fhort, I fhall have
vindicated the Greek of your Authors from your ignorant Applica-
tion of the fame, without troubling the Reader with any more Lan-
guages than his Mother Tongue. You, in pretending to have found
Oceana light, weigh only Sparta, nor that truly.
Firſt, Becauſe the Senate of Sparta was inftituted by Lycurgus,
you argue, That it was not inſtituted eligible by the People; whereas
all Authors, particularly Ariftotle, lib. 4. cap. 9. affirm, That the Ma-
giftrates in Sparta were all choſen by the People, as that of Senator
or chofen, and alſo born by the People, as that of Ephori.
10
For the Miſtakes you lay unto Mr. Harrington in the Greek, as,
That the Tribes in Lacedemon were pre-exiftent to the Oracle, what
maketh that to the Purpoſe? And that the Word Oba doth not fig-
nify Lineages, you will hardly perfuade, feeing Amyot, thought to
be as good an Interpreter of the Greek as Mr. Stubs, in rendring the
Oracle, hath theſe Words, Aprez que tu auras divifé le peuple en lig-
niees. But I will not trouble the Reader with foreign Languages :
Things indifputable ſhall hereafter be brought for Interpretation of
the Words you diſpute at a dear Rate, giving fo much Greek for Two-
pence as you have made not worth an Half-penny. Mr. Harring-
tin ftates the Commonwealth of Sparta thus ;
Lycurgus inftituted a Senate eligible by the People for Life, with
Right to debate and propoſe, and a popular Affembly with Power to
refolve. To which he adds the Place in Plutarch. Lycurgus having
thus tempered the Form of this Commonwealth, it ſeemed nevertheless
to them who came after, that the fmall Number of thirty Perfons (and
for Life) whereof this Senate confifted, was the Caufe of greater Force
and Authority in the fame than was convenient; for which Caufe to
hold in this fame Senate, they (the People) gave them the Senate, (as
Plato faith) the Curb, which was the Power and Authority of the
Ephori, Magiftrates created about One hundred and thirty Years after
the Death of Lycurgus, in the Time of King Theopompus, who to
his Wife reproaching him in Difdain, that he must thus bafely leave his
Kingdom lefs unto his Succeffors, than he had received of his Predecef-
fors; made Anfwer, That he ſhould leave it greater, in Regard that it
would be more firm and durable.
Hereby it is apparent, when the Senate upon thefe Advantages of
Fewneſs and for Life, began to propofe perverfely unto the People,
then the People began to add, diminiſh, pervert, and evert what the
Senate propofed, that is, they began (as in like Cafes is unavoidable) to
Eeee
debate.
578
Letter to Mr. STUB B S.
debate. And the People thus taking upon them to debate, Polydorus
and Theopompus being Kings, endeavoured to add unto the fundamen-
tal Law, That if the People did not determine well, then the Senators
and the Kings fhould ftop the Procedure. Hereupon, for the Defence
of their fundamental Laws, the People erected the Court of the E-
phori, confifting of annual Magiſtrates choſen by and out of them-
felves, and with Power to queftion any of their Kings or Senators
upon their Lives, that ſhould go about to pervert thofe Laws. Thus
by this Patch of the Ephori, came that Flaw in Sparta (wherewith
Mr. Harrington for that Reaſon propofing otherwife, is not concern-
ed) to be amended. And this is the Account he gives of that Com-
monwealth, which you, perverting the whole Story, go about to
weigh otherwiſe.
1. Inferring that the People were guilty of thoſe Miſcarriages,
which it is plain proceeded from the Senate, and were rectified by
the People, in the Inſtitution of that Curb upon the Senate (as is plain-
ly fhewn by Plutarch) in the Inftitution of the Ephori.
2. You infer from you know not what, that the Senate had a ne-
gative Vote, and yet confefs that the People had no Right to debate.
Whereas to leave Words or Canting, (for your Greek, as you uſe it,
amounts to no more) and come as I faid to the undeniable Teftimo-
ny of Things or of Senfe; if the popular Affembly had no Right
to debate, how ſhould the Senate have a Negative? Or if the popular
Affembly had Right to the Reſult only, then who but themfelves
could have the Negative? Contra rationem nemo fobrius, contra ex-
perientiam nemo fanus. For that which you alledge out of Demof-
thenes, as that he calleth the Senate of Sparta Lords of the People, it
can (confidering the Nature of this Commonwealth, which Ifocrates
to the Areopagites affirms to be popular) be no otherwiſe underſtood,
than as they who have the like Function, I mean of debating and
propofing unto the Parliament in Scotland, are called Lords of the
Articles. Lord in this Senfe, as you (in great Letters ſetting a Mark
upon your Ignorance, and not interpreting your Text) would imply,
doth not fignify Sovereign, for neither are the Lords of the Articles
fovereign, nor doth Demofthenes affirm that of the Senate of Sparta.
But where the Propofers are few, and for Life, as in Lacedemon,
and as the greater Nobility or Officers in Scotland, they may in fome
Senſe be called Lords of the People, though not they, but the Peo-
ple have the Reſult.
To conclude, Mr. Harrington hath long fince fhewed, that among
the Greeks, the Words Oligarchy and Democracy, were underſtood in
fuch Manner, that where the popular Affembly had the Reſult only,
there the Commonwealth was fometimes called Oligarchy, eſpecially
if the propofing Council confifted of few, and for Life, as in Sparta,
and where the People had not only the Reſult but Debate alſo, that
was called Democracy, as in Athens. Hence that an Oligarchift in
your Senfe, or one that hath endeavoured to make Helots and Gibeo-
nites, or Servants of fuch as are now his Lords and Maſters, is no
Ideot, there is no Confequence, even for what hath happened in our
Days. Quid verba audio, cum facta videam? &c.
March 6. 1659.
POLL
579
POLITICAS TER:
OR,
:
A Comical DISCOURSE, in Anfwer to Mr. Wren's Book,
intituled, Monarchy afferted, against Mr. Harrington's
OCEAN A.
1
By J. H.
Ad Populum phaleras, ego te intus et in cute novi.
EPISTLE to the READER.
READER,
T
in
HEY fay well, that a Man who hath written ſhould not trouble
himself with fuch as write against him; but let the World hear on
both Ears, and then judge. That this in Time would do well enough
my Cafe, I make as little Doubt as another. Nevertheless, where
through Silence there may be Damage, at the tendereft Point or Seafon,
I hold my felf obliged forthwith to answer the prefent Book, though it be
but meer Raillery or Feft: and for this Caufe, if I alfo be merry, you
will have me excufed. Another Inftigation or Spur to this laudable Ad-
venture, is, that as Gloves which have lain in Spanish Skins give No-
tice of themſelves in fair Aſſemblies, fo bath fome Book by having lain.
in fome Man's Pocket. For Order, though where there are but two
Speakers, I ſhall ſcarce obferve the Laws of a Play, yet the beſt Method
I can upon this Occafion fit my felf withal, will be by diſtributing my
Difcourfe into Acts and Scenes. The Acts, as well becauſe I have not
taken my Degrees, as that Multitudes of University Scholars (they fay,
foberly and ſeriouſly) profefs themselves to be converted by Mr. Wren,
Shall not be dramatical, but University Acts: and to theſe, being the
Scholars flight me for a Law-giver, I will for once give fuch Laws, as,
let them do what they can, they shall never evade. The fame fhall be
done in fuch Manner, as, if they cannot answer nor get loose from my
firft Act, then will I thereupon declare my felf A Batchelor of Arts: if
they cannot answer or get loose from my fecond Act, then will I be un-
deniably A Maſter of Arts: The Third ſhall make me in like Manner
A Batchelor of Law; the Fourth, A Doctor of Law, and perhaps of
Divinity. For without Confutation by Divines or Lawyers, there will
be no Reaſon why my Exercifes are not fufficiently performed; and theſe
being fufficiently performed, why have not I legitimately, acquired my
Degrees? Then in the latter End, I will do fomething to go out Orator;
and in the last Place, fhall I ftand to be Poet Laureat. But you muſt
think that a Man may as lawfully be two Years, if he have nothing elſe
Eeee 2
to
580
Politicafter.
to do, about Bufinefs of fuch Importance, as Mr. Wren hath been about
lefs Matters. Be then attentive: for the prefent you ſball have the
first Act; and what you find Mr. Wren or me to be in this, I bere
engage my Reputation, that the respect Characters ſhall be made good
throughout.
But now upon Occafion of theſe Acts, I warrant you we shall have
my Antagoniſt go pitifully complaining unto Dr. Wilkins, of difingenu-
ous Contumely thrown upon the University. Goodness! What is an
Univerfity, at least one where they can call fuch a Writer as Mr. Wren
ingenious; and fuch Trumpery as his Writings, full Satisfaction
Conviction, that it should be unlawful for any Man, though but a Bal-
lad-finger, to laugh fuch a white Mother into red Cheeks!
March 20, 1656.
THE
PROLOGU
GE
In Anſwer to Mr. Wren's PREFACE.
E
ENTLE Mr. Wren, (fine ira & obfequio) without Paffion or
Partiality, give me your Hand, and let me as it were by fome
familiar and unftudied Difcourfe, treat with you upon the Contents
of that fame Book you call Monarchy afferted, and fo forth.
:
SIR, for Method, I fhall take thofe Places which are moft ma-
terial, in the Order you have borrowed for them, and fo bestowed
upon them; omitting none that is not implied in the Anſwer I ſhall
give unto theſe you ſhall not find me ſkipping, as you do, whole
Pages and Chapters. And whereas you (upon my taking that Li-
berty which is every Man's Right, of ufing a Libel without a Name,
as he thinks fit) have appealed in the Conclufion unto my Lords, the
Provoſts of Oceana, as if I had given you ill Language; and have alſo
in divers and fundry Places of your Work, as it were, dared my Muſe;
I fhall at leifure (it may be within two Years) add a Piece of Oratory,
addreffed unto the faid Lords, the Provoſts of the Academy in Oceana,
and fome Poems not abhorring from your Defires or Provocations,
not in the Thunder-thumping Way of Grandfire Virgil, but in the
fugar'd Speech of mine Uncle Chaucer. If you pleaſe by the Way
to take a Lick of it, I fhall at this Diſtance from the Opera, infert
the Prologue.
What Chaucer ho, pe han the English key,
Of the high Kock Parnas with the Tow’rs twep.
Pour footen Gab, lo ken 3 well thus far,
Of Courtesy the Bate till me unfpar.
But here be Bavins in the Wap I trow,
All to be prickle like Archin, hi ho.
Forth come wi brond, gin peno bren em green
Me mote thep keepen out that nere were in.
3
Pray,
Politicafter.
581
Pray, Sir, ha' me commended to them that fay, your Book. is un-
anfwerable, and let them know, it is to them that the Prologue is
fpoken. The Body of the Work is heroick; the Title thereof be-
queathed by famous Selden, runneth thus: The Wars of the Makers
of Moufe-traps against Inigo Jones; and it beginneth in this wiſe.
Leif Mistress Margery Melpomene,
Out how ye (norten! fooch it been brede Day
Ne Mother Midnight fit in Skp, ne duskin,
For Shame now buckle on pour bloodred Buskin:
Or if pe like pour Cafe, sweet Lady Meg,
Of Womanhood, lend me your Lethren Leg :
And gin, 3 lig it not about ſquare Caps
That meet in hugger for to make Mouſe-traps,
And wagen War anent Inigo Jones
That harpen, like Amphion, till huge Stones
And makên riſe in vew of Kerſon People
Into the Element, and fit on Steeple.
Mote I ne tack pe mere by the small Fute
When pe mount Pegaſus in Crimson bute.
Look you there now, is not this fair? You have the Length of my
Weapon. Moreover, I have manifefted unto you the whole Order of
my Work. Now to my Tackling.
Noble Mr. Wren, you have declared your ſelf to be of an Aſſembly
of Men who are known both at home and abroad to be of the most learned
Perfons of this Age: and fome fufpect it to have been under their Eye,
that you have been about two Years in anfwering my laft Book; an
Enterpriſe in which you have performed, feeing you now own the
former, your fecond Adventure in like Chivalry; yet where I vouch
Ariftotle, Machiavel, and like Authors for the undoubted Right, which
a private Man may claim in treating upon the Politicks, or upon the
Nature of Government, you tell me, that this Privilege is not to be
extended unto every little Writer. I, against whom one of the Af-
Sembly, known both at home and abroad to be of the moſt learned Perfons
of this Age, hath written twice, and been fo long about it, A little
Writer! Sir, you forgot your felf.
Again, the Teſtimony of Machiavel throughout his Works, is,
that he intendeth not carelefly to ſtart ſome Philofophical Opinion, but
applieth every Thing home and exprefly unto Italy, though not
without fome Deſpair, yet with the Ardour, or, if you will have it
fo, with the Heat and Paffion belonging unto fo noble a Defign.
Wherefore for you to adoperate this Teftimony quite contrary to the
Truth of it, as a Proof that my Way of Writing hath no Affinity with
this Author's, is Subornation of a Witnefs.
But, good Mr. Wren, is your Propofition of German-horſe, or,
which is all one, of a mercenary Army for a ſtanding Government,
fuch as profeffeth to have any Fiction or Romance, while you enter not w. p. 107.
into Defpair (as you fay) of living to enjoy your Share of the Felicities
which will belong unto the Subjects of fuch a Government, or adapted to
the Occafions or Neceffities of a particular Juncture? Is it fuch as in
many fair Compliments wherewith you interweave me nominally,
fo
is
582
Politicafter.
Hen. VIL
Page 188
is propofed with the Temper and Moderation becoming a philofophical
Opinion, and not with the Heat and Paffion belonging to a Defign?
Was my Book which named no Man, a Libel or a Pafquin; and are
both yours, each Page whereof is endued with my Name, moſt
ferious Tracts, and true Hiftory? Alas, that ever I fell into the Hands
of fuch an Hiftorian: what will become of my Name, preferved in
fuch fugar'd Eloquence to future Ages? But notwithſtanding you are
a great Hiftorian, Mr. Wren, yet as concerning Chriftopher Columbus,
and becauſe you will go to that, as concerning Sebastian Gabato like-
wife, I appeal unto my Lord Verulam, whether they firft framed
not Deſigns or Cards before they found out their Diſcoveries; or if
Diſcoveries cannot be made but by Defign or Chance, what need I
appeal to any Man for this, feeing it is known that they made their
previous Contracts with Princes, before they undertook their Adven-
tures? What mean you then to fay, that they who understand that
Chriſtopher Columbus must first have been at the Indies, before he
could make a Card to teach others the Way thither, will go near to fuf-
pect Mr. Harrington's Abilities in modelling a Commonwealth, till he
have spent fome Years in the Miniftry of State?
Good Sir, befides the Trick you put upon your Reader, in your
Antecedent, you are quite out in your Confequence. For how many
Years, I pray you, had Lycurgus, or Numa Pompilius ſpent in the
Miniſtry of State before they modelled their Governments? Or what
Modelling of Government hath been bequeathed unto the World, by
all the Miniſters of State in France, fince the Diffolution of the three
Eſtates, the ancient Model of that Government; or by all the Mini-
ſters of State fince Henry the feventh in England; or have not theſe
rather been the Ruin of the Engliſh Model? Mr. Wren, if you will
believe me, the main, nay the whole Ability of modelling a Com-
monwealth, lyeth in two Things; the one, in being well verfed in
ancient Prudence; the other, in being difengaged from all Parties:
neither of which Qualifications is common with Miniſters of State.
go-
Talk not to me of French Taylors; to model is not fo eafy a Thing
as you take it for, if we may but count our late Changes of Govern-
ment: when the King left the Parliament, and the two Houſes
verned without a King, there was one Change. When the Peers were
excluded, and the Commons governed without King and Peers, there
was two when the Commons were excluded, and the General governed
alone, there were three: when the General governed with a Convention
of his own making, there were four: when by the Major-Generals, there
were five: when the Protector governed by the Inftrument, there were
fix: when he governed by the Petition and Advice, there were ſeven;
the preſent ſhould be the eighth: Nor hitherto hath there been any
Model at all, or any fuch as the Makers themſelves have approved of.
I hope I give no offence; for I fay but as they fay: But you are fuch
a Man, you can fhew me no Body fo good at modelling as I, except
it be your felf; who I am fure have had as little Miniſtry; and yet the
next Dung-hill, which is your own fweet Book, you think fitteft to be
my Magazine. Why ſeeing you will have it fo, come your ways.
ACT
Politicafter.
583
1
ACT
I.
Scene I. In Anſwer to Chap. I.
Whether Prudence be well diftinguished into ancient and modern.
1
Ough! this fame mixen in the ftirring, is like Pepper in the
Noſe; but he faith, it is Hellebore for to purge Heads.
Now as concerning purging of Heads, Mr. Wren, there feemeth
already to peep out a Queſtion. Do your Univerfities (gentle Sir)
derive their Learning from Nimrod, from the Kings of China, from
the Monarchies? (to be equally with Macedon, I doubt, as to this
Point, paffed over in wife Silence.) Are they defcended (do you under-
ſtand me?) from the Times in Greece called by Thucydides, The Im-
becillity of ancient Times; from thoſe in Rome, called by Florus, The
Childhood of that Government? Or fpeak out, is their whole Stock of
Learning, without which they had not had any kind of Thing where-
upon to fet up, derived from the Hebrew, the Greek, and the Ro-
man Commonwealths? If ſo, Mr. Wren, whether I pray you call you
not now that Stock of Learning ancient Learning, albeit they could
not call it ſo then? and if Politicians have no other Pedigree of Pru-
dence, than the fame that you have of Learning, why is not that
Prudence, which they have received in the like Manner, ancient Pru-
dence, albeit thofe Commonwealths could not call it fo then?
To ſhift theſe Things which are thus plain, you are in this Chapter
a wonderful Artificer; yet cometh all but to this, That neither Thu-
cydides nor Florus divide Prudence into ancient and modern. Why,
Mr. Wren, neither did the Commonwealths mentioned divide Learn-
ing into ancient and modern. This Diftinction belongs unto latter
Times, in Regard of fome modern Learning that is of latter Inven-
tion. So, Mr. Wren, in Regard of fome modern Prudence, which
firſt I tell you what it is, namely, Government by King, Lords and
Commons and fecondly, how it came in, namely, by the Goths and
Vandals. I call the Prudence (do you mark ?) of thoſe ancient Com-
monwealths, ancient Prudence; and the Prudence remaining unto us
from theſe Goths and Vandals, modern Prudence. What could you defire
more? Nay, and this is according unto the plain Senfe of Janotti too:
For, faith he, as to his two Limits or Periods of Time, Of the former, or
that wherein Rome was oppofed by the Arms of Cæfar, came the fecond,
or that when Italy was overrun by the Huns, Goths, Vandals and Lom-
bards; and of the fecond came all that Alteration, which hath given
unto the World the Face in which we now fee it, and utterly loft it that
Face which it had in the Time of the Romans. Wherein Relation
unto the two Governments (the one popular, which was the more an-
cient; and the other by King, Lords and Commons, which is the
more modern) is fo plain, that you are put unto a Shift, who can ſay
no more than that I make Janotti Author of the Divifion of Pru-
dence into ancient and modern. How dare you for your Reputation
do thus, Mr. Wren? while first by your own Acknowledgment I
infer this Divifion from more ancient Authors, as Thucydides and
Florus: And fecondly, my Words relating unto Janotti do no where
from him derive the Divifion of Prudence into ancient and modern,
as to thofe Terms, upon which runneth your Equivocation; but for-
tify
584
Politicafler.
Gen. x. 8.
tify this Diviſion of my own, by the two Periods of Time by him
obferved, and that are of like Senfe with theſe Terms.
But, Mr. Wren, there was never the like of you! Whereas the
Queſtion by me propofed, was, whether Prudence be not rightly di-
vided into ancient and modern, you have conveyed it into a Queſtion,
whether Monarchy be not a more ancient Government than a Com-
monwealth? This have I hitherto not difputed, as that which con-
cerneth not the prefent Controverfy. But feeing it may be for your
Service, I do flatly deny that Monarchy is the more ancient Govern-
De cor. polit. ment; not that Mr. Hobbs holdeth Democracy to be of all Govern-
ments the firſt in Order of Time; but firft, becauſe upon the Place
where it is ſaid, That Nimrod was a mighty Hunter before the Lord,
it is refolved by Divines that Nimrod was the firft Monarch. Now,
Sir, Nimrod began his Reign about the One thouſand eight hundredth
Year of the World: Whence I conclude thus: Either the World
had no Government till Nimrod, or a Commonwealth may be above
a thouſand Years elder than Monarchy: nay, unless you can find
fome Government that was neither a Commonwealth nor a Monar-
chy, muſt have been no lefs. I know what you will fay, That the
Government till Nimrod was by Fathers of Families. Why fo, I
hope, you will yield it was afterwards, at leaſt in the Line of Shem.
Now let us compute from Noab, and confider in the Pofterity of
Shem, what Judgment may be made of the Government by Fathers
of Families; or whether this were indeed, as Divines affirm, mo-
narchical, or may not much rather be eſteemed popular.
Gen. xi.
Gen. x.
Noah had three Sons, Shem, Ham and Japhet; of Shem, by Ar-
phaxad and others, defcended Reu; of Reu, Serug; of Serug, Nahor;
of Nabor, Terah; of Terah, Abram; of Abram, Iſaac; of Iſaac, Jacob;
and of Jacob deſcended the Commonwealth of Ifrael. So much for
the elder Brother, which was Shem. Now, Sir, for the ſecond Son of
Noah, that is Ham: of Ham defcended Cush, and of Cush, Nimrod:
by which, plain it is at the firſt Sight, that the Commonwealth, as
to Precedence in Dignity, is of the elder Houſe; and as to Prece-
dence in Time, unleſs you can fhew the Defcendants of Shem to have
been under Monarchy, muſt alſo have been the more ancient Govern-
ment, that is, if Government by Fathers of Families were popular.
Gemara Ba- Now as to this, it is a Tradition with the Rabbins, that there were
bylonia ad tit.
Sanhedrim. Seven Precepts delivered to the Children of Noah: 1. Concerning Judica-
tories: 2. Concerning Blafphemy: 3. Concerning perverfe Worship: 4.
Concering uncovering of Nakeknefs: 5. Concerning the fbedding of Man's
Blood: 6. Concerning Rapine or Theft: 7. Concerning eating of Things
Strangled, or of a Member torn from a living Creature. This Tradition
throughout the Jewiſh Government is undoubted: for to fuch as held
theſe Precepts, and no more, they gave not only, as I may fay, Tolera-
tion, but allowed them to come fo near unto the Temple as the Gates,
and called them Profelytes of the Gates. Nor do I think the Proof
in Scripture of thefe Precepts, though not fet down together, to be
Levit. xviii. obfcure: as where it is faid, None of you shall approach to any that is
6. near Kin to him, to uncover their Nakedness:for in all thefe the
24. Nations (that is, the Canaanites) are defiled, which I caft out before
you. The Canaanites were defcended from Ham; and that in theſe
Words it muſt be implied that they had violated the foregoing Pre-
cepts, is in my Judgment evident, feeing there is nothing in the Law
of
Politicafter.
585
of Nature why a Man might not approach in this manner unto one
that is near of Kin to him.
AGAIN, that two other of theſe Precepts were given by God unto
Noah, the Scripture is plain, where he faith, Flesh with the Life Gen. ix.
thereof, which is the Blood thereof, fhall you not eat. And whofo
fheddeth Man's Blood, by Man fhall his Blood be ſhed. Whence it muſt
follow, that either Fathers of Families were not ſubject unto this
Law, which becauſe it is given generally and without any Excep-
tion, were abfurd to think; or elfe that during patriarchal Govern-
ment, they ſubjected themſelves unto fome common Judicatories, ac-
cording unto the firſt of the ſeven Precepts. Of which faith Mai-
monides, By this the Sons of Noah conftituted Judges in every City, to
judge of the other fix Precepts, and to govern the People; and the Ge-
mara Babylonia faith, That this was done after the Manner that Mofes
commanded Judges to be fet in the Gates throughout the Tribes. By
the Advice of Jethro to Mofes, the like ſhould have been the Cuftom
of the Midianites, who, (as alfo the Gibeonites, defcended of the fame
Line with the Monarchy of Nimrod, and for ought perhaps to the
contrary, of as ancient ſtanding) were a Commonwealth. But above
all, it fhould feem by fome of the Rabbins, that there was a Con-
fiftory or Senate inftituted by Shem, which was of Ufe with his
Pofterity. Now if patriarchal Government was exerciſed by or un-
der the common Ligament of a Senate or Confiftory, then was the
Government of the Patriarchs of a popular Nature, or a Common-
wealth; at leaſt theſe, Mr. Wren, muſt be difproved by them, who
will have Monarchy out of all Controverfy to be the more ancient
Government.
GOOD Sir, I do not know, nor do I think that this fame Way (do
you fee?) of Diſputation hath any Predeceffor. What do you tell me
then, that you have Caufe to think by the last or any Book of mine, that W. Preface.
my Stores of Reason and Arguments are brought very low? You fee
already that it is far otherwife. Tell not me in this Place, that Do-
derus is as good a Book as the Bible; nor let Divines (for a Thing
that I know) run here as they do from the Scripture unto Heathen
Authors. It is confeft that Diodorus Siculus, Aristotle, Cicero, Saluft
and Trogus fay, That in the Beginning of Things and of Nations, the
Power was in Monarchs. But then the Heathen Stories know nothing
beyond Nimrod, or his Succeffor Belus; which is no Excufe to you,
while the Scripture is ſo much a more ancient Record; much lefs to
Divines, at leaſt fuch of them as preach againſt the fquaring of Go-
vernment according to the Rule of Heathen Authors. Mr. Wren,
(to be plain) there are of theſe that have a ſtrange Kind of Froward-
nefs: If a Commonwealth be defcribed out of Heathen Authors,
they will undertake to prove that of Ifrael to have been a Govern-
ment of King, Lords and Commons. And if a Commonwealth be
out of this of Ifrael deſcribed unanſwerably otherwiſe, then they run
to Ariflotle, Trogus, and the reſt of the Heathens, for the Antiquity
of Monarchy. When none of this will do, they fall flatly upon
conjuring the People to take heed how they hearken unto Men of
Wit, Reafon, or Learning, and not in any wife to be led but by
Grace, and fuch Grace only as is without any Mixture of Wit, Rea-
fon, or Learning. Mr. Wren, I defire them but to tell us once, what
they mean by fuch Grace as is without any Mixture of Wit, Rea-
Ffff
fon,
586
Politicafter.
Pol. Lib. 3.
Cap. 10, 11
fon, or Learning; and you in the mean Time to confider, that Hea-
then Authors, though they give Monarchy the Precedence in Time,
are very far from giving it the Van in Prudence. Nay, for this
Matter you will find them ſo much of one Mind, that we need hear
no more of them than Ariftotle, who divides Monarchy into two Kinds;
the one whereof he calleth Barbarous, and in this he relates to your
Nimrod, or your Eaſtern Monarchs; the other Heroick, in which he
relates exprefly to Principality in a Commonwealth, and namely, that
of the Lacedemonian Kings. Say you then, To which giveth he the
Van in Dignity; to the heroick, or to the barbarous Prudence?
But it is no Matter, ftrike up and let us have the Rodomontado, which
it pleaſeth you ſhall be of or belong unto the prefent Scene: This
(fay you, for you may as well fay it of this as of any thing elfe) ap-
proaches very near unto raving, and gives me Caufe to fufpect I have
taken a wrong Courſe of curing Mr. Harrington's political Difempers.
For whereas I think to do it by giving him more Light, knowing Men
(and known to be of the learnedeft in this Age) are of Opinion, that I
ought to have fut up the Windows, and fo forth. Now very paffing
good indeed-law !
Scene II. In Anfwer to Chap. II.
1
Whether a Commonwealth be rightly defined to be a Government of Laws
and not of Men, and a Monarchy to be the Government of fome Man
or few Men, and not of Laws.
THE
HE readieft Way, Mr. Wren, of Diſpatch with the preſent Que-
ftion, will be to fhew how far you and I are at length agreed;
And we are agreed, that Law proceeds from the Will of Man, whether
a Monarch or a People; that this Will must have a Mover; and that
this Mover is Intereſt.
NOW, Sir, the Intereft of the People is one Thing; it is-the pub-
lick Intereft; and where the publick Intereſt governeth, it is a Go-
vernment of Laws, and not of Men. The Intereft of a King or of a
Party, is another Thing; it is a private Intereſt; and where private
Intereft governeth, it is a Government of Men, and not of Laws.
What ails ye! If in England there have ever been any fuch Thing as
a Government of Laws, was it not Magna Charta? Well, and have
not our Kings broken Magna Charta fome thirty Times? I beseech
you, Sir, did the Law govern when the Law was broken? Or was
that a Government of Men? On the other Side, hath not Magna
Charta been as often repaired by the People? and the Law being fo
reftored, was it not a Government of Laws, and not of Men? I
think you are wild! Why have our Kings in fo many Statutes or
Oaths engaged themſelves to govern by Law, if there were not in
Kings a Capacity of governing otherwife? And if fo, then by every
one of thofe Oaths or Statutes it is agreed both by King and People
that there is a Government by Laws, and a Government by Men.
Why Goodneſs, Mr. Wren! is there not a Government of Men, and
a Government of Laws? Where do you dwell! Such as have laid
People in Lavender for the late great Man and his Government, it is
•
now
Politicafter.
587
now thought will be left unto the Law and her Government. Come,
come; Divines and Lawyers are indeed good Men to help a Prince at
a dead Lift; but they are known well enough: for they will no
fooner have ſet him up, than if he do not govern by their Laws, they
will be throwing Sticks at him. But do you hear? if a Prince would
be intirely freed of fuch Danger, let him get a Parliament of Mathe-
maticians.
WHAT Miracles hath Mr. Hobbes done in this Kind! and how
many more are there will make you a King by Geometry? But I fhall
at this Time content myſelf, Sir, to let them pafs, and confider only
your grand mathematical Demonſtration, with the Nooks, Crooks,
Angles and Appertenances of the fame. You Gentlemen of lower
Forms, be attentive; it hath paſt the Trial and Teft of the Doctor's
Academy, confifting of Men known to be of the learnedeft of this
Age; and the Manner thereof is as followeth.
TO be plain (and rouzing) if the declared Will of the fupreme Power
be confidered as the immediate Caufe of Government, then a Monarchy
is as much as a Commonwealth, an Empire of Laws and not of Men.
If we look farther back, and confider the Perfon whofe Will is received
as Law, a Commonwealth is, as much as a Monarchy, an Empire of Men,
and not of Laws.
(HERE, Sir, is your Caft for the Game: Now, Sir, for your Shout.)
THIS is ſo manifeft, and yet Mr. Harrington fo firmly refolved not to
underſtand it, that confidering his Temper, I muſt needs applaud his
Refolution of having nothing to do with the Mathematicks; for half this
Obftinacy would be enough to keep him from apprehending, that the three
Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles.
MR. Wren, you ſpit crooked Pins; you ſhould be exorcifed. For
pray now hear me, did you ever fee 'em chooſe Knights of the Shire?
Thoſe fame People, the high Shoone, as you call them, expect not, I
conceive, that Angels fhould come down there to ride upon their
Shoulders nor, I doubt if the Truth were known, do they greatly
care for Saints; they are moſt for Men that drink well, or at leaſt
for fuch as cat good Meat in their Houſes. Nor have I found by my
reading, that thoſe fame high Shoone have at any time fet the worthy
Gentleman on foot, and taken his Horſe upon their Backs: by which
it is manifeft, that they do not conceive their Laws to be made by any
thing above the Nature of Man, as Angels; or below the Nature of
Man, as Horfes. Now, Sir, all you have proved by your wonderful
Mathematicks, is, that Laws are neither made by Angels nor by
Horfes, but by Men; therefore the high Shoone are as good Mathema-
ticians as your felf. The Voice of the People is as much the Voice of
Men, as the Voice of a Prince is the Voice of a Man; and yet the
Voice of the People is the Voice of God, which the Voice of a Prince
is not, no not as to Law-giving, the Voice of the Prince who was a
Man after God's own Heart: for thus David propofeth unto the Con-
gregation of Ifrael; if it ſeem good unto you, and that it be of the Lord 1 Chro. xiii.
our God-let us bring the Ark to us. David in Matter of Law-
giving, maketh not himſelf, but the People judge of what was of
God; and the Government of Laws, faith Ariftotle, is the Government
of God.
Ffff2
MR.
588
Politicafler.
Liv. li. 2.
Mr. Wren, were you contented to be no wiſer than Titus Livius,
(who in pafling from the Government of the Roman Kings unto that
of the Commonwealth, hath this Tranfition; I come now unto the
Empire of Laws more powerful than that of Men) fome who conceive
the faid Titus to have done paffing well, would think you the better
Politician, for not taking the upper Hand of him. You will not find
that Auguftus Cæfar, in whoſe time this Author wrote, did fet any
Mr. Wren upon him; which is a fhrewd Sufpicion that Princes in that
Age either wanted ſuch a Wit as you are, or would ſcarce have thanked
you for
your fubtil Argument, fomewhat too mercurial to ſtay even in
your own Head. For do not you yourſelf ſay in another Place, that
a Commonwealth having no Eyes of her own, (as if this of all other were
W. p. 171.
a Mark of Blindness) is forced to refign her felf to the Conduct of Laws?
What imply you in this, lefs than that a Monarch is not forced to re-
fign himſelf unto the Conduct of Laws? Or what lefs can follow from
this Confeffion of your own, than that a Commonwealth is a Govern-
ment of Laws and not of Men, and that a Monarchy is a Govern-
ment of a Man, or fome few Men, and not of Laws? Nay, Mr.
Wren, nor is it once that your Mind mifgives you; for foon after you
are at it again, in fhewing what you fancy befals a Commonwealth as
She is a Government of Laws.
W. p. 172.
But now, for foy, let me my Cap up throw;
For one thing I have faid, is Senfe, I trow.
SIR, for this Rhime I have ſome Reaſon; ſeeing in a Monarchy,
that the Laws being made according to the Intereft of one Man or a
few Men, muſt needs be more private and partial, than fuits with the
Nature of Juſtice; and in a Commonwealth, that Laws being made
by the whole People, muft come up to the publick Intereft, which is
common Right and Juftice; are Propofitions, which Mr. Wren can
confefs to have indeed fome Senfe in them. But this Milk, alas! is
kick'd down again, while you add, that they have not any more Truth
than thoſe other which wanted Senfe. Now this is a fad Cafe; yet fuch,
as you fay, will be apparent, if we examine the different Tempers of a
fingle Perfon, and a multitude acting Laws.
ARE we no farther yet? I verily believed that the different Temper
of a ſingle Perſon, and of a popular Affembly, had been long fince
confidered in the Propofitions already granted, in as much as the ſingle
Perſon is tempered by a private, the Multitude by the publick Intereſt:
which were heretofore by your felf acknowledged to be the firſt Mo-
vers of Will, and fo the efficient Caufes of Law. If your Mathema-
ticks, or what ſhall I call them? would but hold to any thing, we
might have ſome End. But for the Diſcovery of theſe different Tem-
pers, you forget all that is paſt, and begin a-new in this manner.
When a Monarch acts the Legiflator's Part, he ought to be fo far from
Partiality, or refpecting his own private Intereft, that he is then chiefly
to direct his Thoughts to the common Good, and take the largest Profpect
of publick Utility, in which his own is fo eminently included.
THIS Propofition then of yours is oppoſed to mine, or thoſe in
which you fay there is fome Senfe, but no Truth: fo in this, both the
Senfe and the Truth ſhould be apparent. But Mr. Wren, if I fhould
fay, that the Father of a Family, in giving Rules to the fame, ought
to be fo far from refpecting his private Intereft, or the regard of keep-
ing his whole Eftate and Command unto himſelf, and holding the Ser-
vants
Politicafter.
589
vants that live upon him, fhort, or in neceffity to obey him, and
work for him, that he were to take a larger, nay, the largeſt Profpect
of what is the publick Utility of the Men that ferve him, which is
to attain unto means whereby to live of themſelves: fhould I fay that
a Father of a Family would find the common and natural Intereſt of
his Servants, which is to be free, that wherein his own Intereft, which
is to have Servants, is eminently included; I am confident you would
neither allow this Affertion to be Truth or Senfe. The like I fay to
your Monarchy, whether it be by a fingle Perfon, or by a Nobility.
A Monarchy not keeping the People in Servitude, is no Monarchy;
therefore either Servitude muſt be the Intereſt of the People, or the
Intereſt of the People is not that, to which a Monarch ought chiefly
to direct his Thoughts. Yet can you not believe that there are many
Examples to be produced of Princes, who in enacting Laws have con-
fidered their own private perfonal Intereft: You are coftive of Belief,
Mr. Wren: Confider the Turkish and Eaſtern Monarchies, and fhew
me any one of their Laws from any other Principle. It is true, in
Monarchies by a Nobility, or by Parliaments, Princes have not in
enacting Laws, been able to make fo thorough Work: for which
Cauſe, left Laws fo enacted ſhould give check unto this private Intereſt
fo effential to Monarchy, they have ftill been breaking them. But
neither can you believe that Laws have been broken by any Prince,
Seeing that in buying and felling, and other private Contracts, Princes
are content to tie themselves up to the fame Rules which they preſcribe to
others. Rare! A King that plays fair at Piquet, can never break
Magna Charta. Cæfar paid no lefs for an Horfe than another Man ;
therefore Cafar's Monarchy was a lawful Purchaſe. O! but fuch Laws;
as upon that occafion were made by Cafar, were neceffary to attaining
the Ends of Government: Good! and fo that which is neceffary unto a
private Intereft, or a ſingle Perfon, towards the attaining unto the Ends
of Government, the fame cometh up to the publick Intereſt, which is
common Right and Juftice. Is this difputing, Mr. Wren, or is it fid-
ling? Yet again: A Prince breaketh not the Law, but for the publick
Tranquillity. Wonderful! not the Tinkers that fight, but the Con-
ſtable breaks the Peace. That the Poffe Comitatus is according unto the
Laws; or that there is a War in the Law for the Maintenance of the
publick Peace, I have heard; but that the publick Peace is in any Cafe by
the Breach of the publick Peace, whereof the Laws only are the Bond,
to be defended, in good earneſt I have not formerly heard. Yet take
heed, I pray. On this fide of yours, there must be no fond Imagination:
but on the other fide, fay you, there can be no fonder Imagination,
than to think that (in the Republick of Ifrael framed by God or Mofes, in
the four hundred thouſand that judged Benjamin, in all, in any of the
Commonwealths) or when any Multitude is aſſembled to enact Laws, it
is neceffary their Refolutions (though thofe of a fingle Perſon muſt)
Should be confonant to publick Justice. I have a weary Life with you,
Mr. Wren, and with ſuch of your Admirers, as if at their Pleaſure I
pick not Straws, can foberly and ſeriouſly refolve you to be Conqueror
of Mr. Harrington; what is that? nay, of Mofes, of Solon, and
Lycurgus. The Straw that is your firft Lance in this Encounter, is,
that a great Part of this Multitude (fo you will have it called, though
Politicians underſtand not a People under Orders by the Word Multi-
tude, but the contrary) will not, for want of Capacity, comprehend
what this fuftice and Intereſt is.
SIR,
590
Politicafler.
·
SIR, if a Man know not what is his own Intereft, who ſhould
know it? And that which is the Intereft of the moft particular Men,
the fame, being fummed up in the common Vote, is the publick In-
tereft, O! but the abler fort will preſently be divided into Factions and
Juncto's; and under Pretence of publick Intereft, will profecute their
own Deſigns.
BUT, good Sir, if theſe abler fort act as a Council under a fingle
Perfon, what ſhould hinder them from doing the like, except they
debate only, and propofe unto the Prince, who only may reſolve?
Wherefore if in popular Government the Senate or Council of the
People have no more than the Debate, and the Refult remain wholly
unto a popular Council having no Power to debate; how can the abler
Sort any more divide into Juncto's or Factions under popular Govern-
ment, than under Monarchical? Speak your Confcience; the Intereſt
of the People being as you fay, that Juftice be impartially adminiflred,
and every
Man preferved in the Enjoyment of his own; whether think
you the more probable Way unto this End, that a Council, or the
abier fort, propoſe, and a fingle Intereſt, that is, a fingle Perſon,
reſolve; or that the abler fort propoſe, and the common Intereft, that
is, the whole People, have the Refult? O! but take heed; for it is to
be remembred, that the greatest Part of Laws concerns fuch Matters as
are the continual Occafion of Controverfy between the People of a Nation,
fuch as regard Regulation of Trade, Privileges of Corporations, &c.
Sweet Mr. Wren! are there more Corporations in England, than dif-
tinct Sovereignties in the United Provinces? Have thofe People noTrade
in compariſon of ours? Or what Quarrels have they about it?
Perſuade them to have a King; and to this End be fure you tell them,
that if we had not had Kings in England, there had certainly inſtead
of the Barons Wars, been Wars between the Tanners and Clothiers;
and inftead of thoſe of York and Lancaster, others between the Shoe-
makers and the Hofiers. Say, if you have any Ingenuity, do you not
make me pick Straws? But the longeſt Straw comes here after all,
fay you.
IT being eſſential to popular Aſſemblies, that the Plurality of Votes
Should oblige the whole Body, thofe Laws which lay claim to the Confent of
all, are very often the Refolutions of but a little more than half, and muſt
confequently go lefs in their Pretenfions to publick Intereft.
GENTLEMEN, here are forty of you, whereof five and twenty
ſee in yonder Grove a Rook's-neft, which the other fifteen of you fee
not; now, Gentlemen, is that lefs a Rook's-neft for this? Or do theſe
five and twenty fee farther than thoſe fifteen? If fo it be with every
thing that is to be feen, felt, heard, or underſtood, how cometh the
World to be refolved otherwiſe upon any thing, than that, quod pluribus
vifum id valeat, which appeared unto the moſt, is moſt authentick?
And what can you defire more of Certainty in a Government, than all
that Certainty which can be had in the World?
IT was even now that we came from the Prince to the People; now
from the People to the Prince again. Good Mr. Wren, why do you
'fay, or whoever faid the like, that thofe Laws which are reputed the
People's greatest Security against Injustice and Oppreffion, have been eſta-
blished by the Authority of fome Prince? Do you find any
any ſuch thing
in Ifrael, Athens, Lacedemon, Rome, Venice, Holland, Switz? But
you equivocate; as to Authority in Princes, Magiftrates, or fole Legif
lators,
Politicafter.
591
lators, in Matter of Law-giving, you well know that I am for it; but
not as you impofe upon this Term for their Power. Thus be it
granted, that Alfred, Edward, Lewis, Alphonfo, have been excellent
Legiflators; what is this to Power, or to your Purpoſe, ſeeing the
Laws propoſed by Authority of theſe Princes, were enacted no other-
wife than as Poining's Laws, by the Power of the People, or Affem-
blies of their three Eftates? But above all, fay you, feveral of the
Roman Emperors, and chiefly Juftinian, have fabricated thofe Laws fo
much admired for their Reafon and Equity, which have ftretched them-
felves farther than ever the Roman Legions were able to march, and
which are ftill embraced by thofe People, who have long fince ceafed to ac-
knowledge the Roman Empire. Herein you have paid your felf to fome
Purpoſe: for moft eloquent Mr. Wren, who but your felf faith, that
Juftinian fabricated thofe Laws you fpeak of? I have heard indeed,
that he compiled them; and furely, Sir, in that Work of his, he did
but new vamp the old Boots of the People of Rome. Nay, good
Mr. Wren, your Roman Emperors at the gallanteft were no better; for
the full Proof whereof, I need go no foot farther than your own ſweet
felf; for do not you give out of Juftinian this very Definition of a
Law; Lex eft, quod Populus Romanus Senatorio Magiftratu interrogante w. p.59.
(veluti confule) conftituebat? How fay you then, that Juftinian fabri-
cated thefe Laws, which he plainly telleth you, were propofed by the
Senate, and refolved by the People of Rome? Do you fee what your
Emperors themſelves acknowledged to have been a Government of
Laws, and more excellent than a Government of Men, though they
themſelves were the Men that governed? And you yourſelf have ſaid
enough to confirm, that the Juftice of the dead People went farther
than the Arms of the living Emperors; nay, and that fuch Laws as are
yet of the greateſt Treaſures in the World, are ftill extant of the
Reman People, though of the Emperors there remain nothing that
is good.
BUT ſay you, on the other fide (you may pleaſe to ſay as you will,
but it is on the fame fide yet) thofe Commonwealths that have been moſt
celebrated for their Laws, have received them from the Hands of a fole
Legiſlator, which both Words and Things, though you lift not to
acknowledge it, every Body knows that I taught you. Now let us fee
how you can hit me with my own Weapon; therefore it may be doubted,
whether thefe People of Athens and Lacedemon thought fo well of them-
felves, as Mr. Harrington feems to do of popular Aſſemblies. Why, do
not I fay, that a popular Affembly, as to the Formation or fabricating
of Government, through the want of Invention, muft of Neceffity
have fome fole Legiflator? What Fault do you find with Mr. Harring-
ton? Why, that with fuch repeated Confidence he afferts, that the People
never fail to judge truly of the publick Intereſt, where (the Legiflator)
the Senate diſcharge their Duty. And what have you been faying all
this while in thefe Examples of Solon and Lycurgus, whofe Laws be-
ing by them prudently propofed unto the People, were as prudently
judged, and thereupon enacted by the People? So likewife for the
Roman Decemvirs: for if you think that theſe did any more than pro-
poſe to the People, or that any Law of theirs was otherwife good than
as voted and commanded by the People, you ſhould go to School. Yet
that if the Legiſlator or the Senate divide well, the People ſhall be fure to
make a good Choice, you must confefs is too hard for your Faith. Why if
it
592
Politicafter.
it be Matter of Faith, you might have let it alone. But do
you think
it right in civil Matters, that the Tenderneſs of Faith ſhould ſupply
the want of Senſe in you? or what is the Scruple can yet remain in
your Confcience? Goodness! the Obfervation which Anacharfis made,
who faid of the popular Affemblies in Greece, that wife Men propounded
Matters, and Fools decided them. Why, Mr. Wren, Anacharfis would
not loſe his Jeft, and you cannot find it. Do you think that the Com-
monwealths of Greece thought Anacharfis, for this fine thing, wifer
than Lycurgus, Solon, or themſelves? Why, Mr. Wren, in this Earneſt
you make yourſelf the Jefter. But let you alone, you will be the Gaf
con ftill; that which is thrown out of the Windows where-ever. you
come, is no less than the whole Houfe; or if you leave any thing, it
is but that you are weary to diſcover all the weak Arguments and falfe
Inferences of Mr. Harrington, as a Work to others of Small Profit, and
to your felf of little Glory. Poor Mr. Harrington! He will now leave
you a while to take breath, and confer a little with your Patron.
DOCTOR Wilkins having laughed ſo much as is ſuggeſted in the
Epiſtle, ſhould not methinks be altogether left out of our Game. He
B. 1. c. 14. in his Book called Mathematical Magic, pretends to a Balance too.
And his Balance is made for all the World like a Jack; the whole
Force of which Engine confifteth in two double Pullies, twelve Wheels
and a Sail; the Sail is inſtead of the Creſt of the Jack, at which a
Fellow ftands blowing; and by blowing in this manner, the faid Au-
thor pretendeth to demonftrate mathematically, that the faid Fellow,
with the faid Jack, fhall tear you up the ftrongeſt Oak by the Roots.
This, to Men who know that fome Ships in a Storm will break the
ſtrongeſt Anchor that is made of Iron, and the ſtrongeſt Cable that is
made of Hemp, muſt needs be wonderful: of what then muſt this
Jack and this String be made, that it break not before it fetch up this
Oak? Nay, how can any Man blow a Million of Years together?
Or if he could, where would the Oak or the Jack be? And in a lefs
time the Oak it is confeft could not by this Means be removed one
Inch. This nevertheleſs must be a Mathematical Demonftration.
Goodneſs! what Stuff is here for Mathematicians, upon which to
ufurp Demonftration in ſuch wiſe, that it muſt be forbidden unto all
the rest of Mankind?
Ch. 16.
MR. WREN, I have Du Moulin, and Sanderfon; will you deny
theſe Authors to be good Logicians? Upon the Credit of my two Eyes,
in all their Examples of Demonſtration, they have not one that is ma-
thematical. Are not they clearly on my Side then, that there
may be
Demonſtration, and yet not mathematical? Why fure there may,
Sir; nay, and ſuch a Demonſtration may be every whit as valid and
convincing, as if it were mathematical. For this I appeal to Mr.
Hobbes: All true Ratiocination, faith he, which taketh its Beginning
Elements, p. from true Principles, produceth Science, and is true Demonftration.
This afterwards he declares in all forts of Doctrines or Arts, and con-
ſequently in the Politicks, to be holding. Wherefore, fay I, if we
Commonwealthſmen have nothing that can be fo ftrong or holding as
this fame Jack and Jack-line of Doctor Wilkins's, let us e'en with Pa-
tience turn the Spit, while our Salary Men eat the roaſt Meat.
63.
BUT now, Sir, mark me well: What was always fo and no other-
wife, and fill is fo and no otherwiſe, the ſame ſhall ever be ſo and no other-
wife. What think you of this for a Principle? A Principle which is
Right
Politicafter.
593
go
right and ſtraight, fhould be fuch as admitteth of as little Proof or
Denial, as that the Fire burns. I can no more prove the one than the
other: wherefore if you can no more deny the one than the other,
by the leave of your Mathematicians, this Principle is no lefs
fure and certain than the beſt in their Art: and what Ratiocination I
ufe in my Politicks, that taketh not its beginning, or is not legitimately
and undeniably derived from this Principle, I am contented fhould
for nothing. What would you have more? Or, why must I be hit
in the Teeth with the want of Demonftration? Stand away, I will
demonftrate that's certain: but here is the Mifchief; not every Man
that pretends unto Underſtanding in the Politicks, hath converfed with
them; and fo in thefe, through mere want of Underſtanding, a Man
will confidently deny, what in other Converſation, where he is more
fkilled, he would be afhamed to queftion. For this Caufe I will not
fall full butt upon the Politicks at firſt daſh, but begin fairly and foftly,
Puris naturalibus.
THAT Converfation, which with Men is moſt general, I apprehend,
to be with Women: and ſo here I come with my firſt Demonſtration.
WHAT was always fo, and not otherwife, and ftill is fo, and not
otherwiſe, the ſame ſhall ever be fo, and not otherwiſe.
BUI, Sir, Women have been always fome handfome, and fome un-
handsome, and not otherwife, and Women ftill are fome handfome, and
fome unbandfome, and not otherwife.
THEREFORE, Women fhall ever be fome handſome and ſome un-
handfome, and not otherwife.
MR. WREN, the Reaſon why I begin to demonftrate in this manner,
or in fomething merely natural and known to every Body, is, that
otherwiſe I ſhould never ftave Men off from faying, that what was
always fo, and not otherwife, and fill is fo, and not otherwife, muft
ever be fo, and not otherwife, muft needs be true; that is, except a
Man can give a Reaſon why it may be otherwife. This is that when I
come unto the Politicks, things not lefs natural, but only more remote
from Men's Knowlege or Acquaintance, which they will be all fure
enough to return. Wherefore let them begin here to fhew me fuch
Reafon as hereafter they will afk, that is, why Women, notwith-
ſtanding what is paft or prefent, may for the future be all handfome.
Would not the undertaking of fuch an Adventure be a notable ridicu-
lous Piece of Knight Errantry? In footh, Mr. Wren, though Men
will not ſo eaſily ſee it, it is no otherwiſe in the Politicks, which are
not to be erected upon Fancy, but upon the known Courſe of Nature;
and therefore are not to be confuted by Fancy, but by the known
Courſe of Nature. Remember, Sir, Anatomy is an Art; but he that
demonftrates by this Art, demonftrates by Nature, and is not to be
contradicted by Fancy, but by Demonſtration out of Nature. It is
no otherwiſe in the Politicks. Theſe things therefore being duly con-
fidered, I proceed.
WHAT always was fo, and fill is fo, and not otherwife, the fame
fhall ever be fo, and not otherwife.
BUT where the Senate was upon Rotation, and had not the ultimate
Refult, there was not any Feud between the Senate and the People; and
where the Senate is upon Rotation, and hath not the ultimate Reſult,
there is no Feud between the Senate and the People.
Gg & s
THERE-
594
Politicafter.
THEREFORE, where the Senate ſhall be upon Rotation, and not
have the ultimat Refult, there shall be no Feud between the Senate and
the People.
I KNOW the humour of theſe Times: though any thing that will
patch be now called Prudence, it will be known that what is after this
manner undeniably deducible from the major of theſe Propofitions, is
Prudence or Policy, and no other.
BUT Mr. Wren, true it is that the Demonftration given is but
T. Hoti, that is, from the Effect; which tho a certain Effect imply
a certain Cauſe, and come after that manner to be as good and unde-
niable a Proof as the other Demonſtration; yet becauſe this is not fo
honourable an Argument as the other, I fhall now give you the fame,
diori Diboti, or from the Cauſe.
WHERE the Senate hath no Intereft diftinct or divided from the
Intereft of the People, there can be no Feud between the Senat and the
People.
BUT where the Senate is upon Rotation, and hath not the ultimate
Refult, there the Senate can have no Intereft diftinct or divided from the
Intereft of the People.
THEREFORE, where the Senate is upon Rotation, and hath not the
ultimate refult, there can be no Feud between the Senate and the People.
SIR, this I fay is Dihoti: and feeing it is a Cuſtom with you to give
my things a turn over the Tongue, I am refolved hereafter to hoti them
and diboti them in fuch manner, as fhall make you take your Teeth.
You will ſay, that I am a paffionate Gentleman. But what hath any
Man to do in this place to tell me of the Feuds between the Senate
and the People of Rome, or thofe of the States in regulated or Gothick
Monarchies? Did I ever undertake to hoti or dihoti any of theſe? If
they break looſe, let them look to that whom it concerneth. Never-
theleſs, I ſay, that Laws, whether in Commonwealths or regulated
Monarchies, are made by Conſent of the Senate and the People, or by
Confent of the States, or Lords and Commons. And I pray you Mr.
Wren, what is in your Allegation to confute this Saying? Your Words
are theſe.
IF any one of thefe States have, in cafe of Difference, a just Power
to force the Obedience of the other, it is all one as if they were private
Perfons; but if no one of them be acknowledged to have fuch Power,
then it comes in cafe of Difagreement to a State of War.
BUT doth this prove, that in cafe of a Senate upon Rotation, there
may be Feud between them and the People? or that Laws in regulated
Monarchy are not enacted by the Lords or Commons? You might
as well have argued thus, Mr. Wren: Theſe fame Lords and Com-
mons have Power enough to diſagree, or make Wars; therefore they
have no Power to agree or to make Laws: Or what doth this con-
cern me?
BUT now for the Jig at parting. Mr. Hobbes faith, that Arif
totle and Cicero wrote not the Rules of their Politicks from the Principles
of Nature, but tranfcribed them into their Book out of the Practice of
their own Commonwealths, as Grammarians deſcribe the Rules of Lan-
guage out of the Practice of the Times. Mr. Wren, if I had anfwered
Mr. Hobbes thus; That the whole Force of his Argument amounted
3
but
}
Politicafter.
595
16
but to this, that becauſe Grammarians deſcribe the Rules of Language
out of the Practice of the 'fimes, therfore Ariftotle and Cicero did fo
in their Diſcourſes of Government; what would you have faid? But
becauſe Mr. Hobbes doth not prove, but illuftrate what he faith by way
of Similitude; therefore I anſwer him by way of Similitude in this
manner : "That for Mr. Hobbes to ſay, Ariftotle and Cicero wrote
not the Rules of their Politicks from the Principles of Nature, but
"tranſcribed them into their Book out of the Practice of their own
"Commonwealths, is as if a Man ſhould ſay of the famous Harvey, that
"he tranfcribed his Circulation of the Blood, not out of the Principles
"of Nature, but out of the Anatomy of this or that Body." Yet
you anſwer me, that the whole Force of this Objection amounteth but to
this; That becauſe Harvey in his Circulation hath followed the Principles
of Nature, therefore Ariftotle and Cicero have don fo in their Dif-
courfes of Government. Mr. Wren, I have complained of you
for re-
peating me fraudulently, but not fo often as I might: for whereas upon
this Occafion I told you, "That a Similitude is brought for Illuftra-
"tion, or to fhew how a thing is, not to prove that it is fo:" You
repeat me thus: Mr. Harrington affured me in his last Book, that he
produced this only as a Similitude, and never intended that any Man
Should look for Reafon or Argument in it. Sir, though a Similitude
have not that Proof in it, which may draw a Man, yet it hath ſuch
Inducement in it as may lead a Man. But, why fhould I be troubled,
ſeeing in the clofe you heartily crave my Pardon? Good Mr. Wren,
abundantly enough: Nay, no more, no more, I beseech you. Look
you, do what I can, he will be making Reparation too.
then, if it muſt be fo, what is it? Why, fay you, by way of Repa-
ration to Mr. Harrington, I make here a folemn Declaration, that for
the future he ſhall have no Caufe to accufe me for expecting Reafon or Ar-
gument in any of his Difcourfes. O Ingenuity! he confeffeth that he
hath taken my Similitude for an Argument, my Goofe for my Pig;
and the Satisfaction promiſed comes to this, that he will take my
Arguments for Similitudes: when he ſhould be fhooing my Goofe,
he is foling my Pig? for which he will make, as ye fhall find here-
after, this Amends, that when he ſhould be foling my Pig, he will
be ſhooing my Goofe. Mr. Wren, good Night.
Well
THE next is the Balance. Gentlemen, to Morrow we play Hunks
that bears thirty Dogs.
Hunks of the Bear-Garden to be feared if he come nigh one.
I
Pour enclouer le Canon.
T is obvious and apparent unto Senfe, that Venice, Holland, Switz,
are not moleſted with Civil War, Strife or Sedition, like Germany,
France, Spain, and England; yet will Men have a Commonwealth to
be a Confufion. What Confufions, we have had in England, while the
Norman Line ftrove for abfolute Power; while the Barons ftrove for
ancient Liberty; while the Houſes of York and Lancaſter ftrove for
Gggg 2
Royal
596
Pour enclouer le Canon.
See M. B.
1. c. 9.
Royal Dignity; and laſt of all, during thefe eighteen Years, in the
Wars that have been between the King and the People, in the Dif
ference of Judgment both concerning Religion and Government, and
under the perfidious Yoke of the late Tyranny, is known. At the
Apparition, or but Name of a Commonwealth, and before any fuch
Orders are introduced, or perhaps truly understood, all Men, or the
moſt of them, are upon a fudden agreed that there be a good and
perfect Fixation of the Army unto the old Cauſe; and that the Rem-
nant of the Long Parliament be affembled: fo we have this for a Taſte
or Relish of a Commonwealth, that of the eighteen, the prefent
Year is already the moſt unanimous. Nor can this be attributed unto
Chance; feeing the Wit of Man, our Cafe confidered, could not, I
think, have invented a more natural and neceffary Way of launching
into the Orders of a Commonwealth, than firft by Fixation of the
Army fo, as no Council enfuing may have any ambitious Party on
which to fet up and then to affemble that Council, which hath given
Teſtimony of it ſelf, to have been the moſt popularly addicted. By
theſe it is no less than demonftrated, that the Army is faithful, and
the People, for the moſt active Part of them, which in like Cafes
cometh to more than all the reft, is wife. Be it granted, that the far
greater Part of them (Libertatis dulcedine nondum experta) would
force us unto the Continuation of Monarchy, if they could, this is
the old Temper of a People in like Cafes: thus the Romans, upon
the Death of Romulus, forced the Senate, who would have introduced
a Commonwealth, to elect Numa with the fucceeding Kings; and
could not be brought unto the Abolition of Monarchy, till it was im-
poſed upon them by Brutus to abjure it. Nevertheleſs, this People
having once tafted of Liberty, were of all others the moſt conſtant
Affertors of the fame. It cauſeth with the beſt Politicians Deſpair,
and, as it were, a kind of Tearing themſelves, that the People, even
where Monarchy is apparently unpracticable, and they have no Way
but a Commonwealth or Confufion, hold their ancient Laws and
Cuſtoms unalterable, and perfecute fuch as adviſe the neceffary Change
of them, how plainly foever demonftrated, as Authors of Innovation,
with Hatred, if not in Tumult and with Violence, as when Lycurgus
in a like Affault loft one of his Eyes. Here is the Difcouragement;
the many through Diverſity of Opinions, want of Reach into the
Principles of Government, and Unacquaintance with the Good that
may by this Means be acquired, are never to be agreed in the Intro-
duction of a new Form: but then there is alſo this Confolation, that
the many upon Introduction of a new Form, coming once to feel the
Good, and taſte the Sweet of it, will never agree to abandon it. This
is all the Comfort that Politicians, in like Cafes, have been able to
give themſelves, upon Confideration of the Nature of People in gene-
ral. But if we confider the Nature of the People of England, I am
much deceived, or the Confolation of knowing Men, and good Pa-
triots, may yet be far greater. For though the People of England
may be twenty to one for Monarchy, they are but deceived by the
Name, feeing they having of late Years been more arbitrarily governed
than formerly, defire no more under this Name, in the Truth of
their Meaning, than not to be at the Will of Men, but return unto
the Government of Laws; for the late Monarchy being rightly confi-
dered, was indeed no more than an unequal Commonwealth; only here
is
Pour enclouer le Canon.
597
is the Fault of all unequal Commonwealths; they pretend to be Go-
vernments of Laws, and at the fame time defer unto fome one, or
few Men, fuch Power, Prerogative and Preheminence, as may invade
and opprefs Laws; which Fault was the Caufe of perpetual Feud,
or at leaſt Jealouſy between our Kings and our Parlaments. But
there is in Relation unto the People of England, yet a greater Encou-
ragement unto Commonwealthfmen, for though if we look upon the
true Caufe of Popular Government, the Balance hath been many
Years in turning, yet fince it came to be fo perceivable as to caufe
any Mention of a Commonwealth, it is but a ſhort Time. Should
we go fo far as to compute it from the Beginning of the late War, it
exceedeth not eighteen Years, in which the Eyes and Affections of
the People are fo wonderfully opened and extended, that I do not
think there are fewer than fifty thouſand of the more active and know-
ing that drive vigorously at a Commonwealth; while the reſt are not
only calm and paffive, but mature for any good Impreffion without
Danger, or indeed Appearance of any War or Tumult that can enfue
upon the Introduction of a new Form: nor is there the leaſt Impro-
bability that an equal Commonwealth may be receiv'd with Embra-
ces, feeing a Tyranny came not only in, but was fupported without
Blood. But if People for the Extent of their Territory, and for their
Bulk or Number fo great as this of England, fhould fall (to take a lar-
ger Compaſs than I hope we fhall need) within the Space of thirty
Years out of Monarchy, to which they have ever been accuſtomed, into
a Commonwealth of which they have had no Experience nor Know-
ledge, and that (except in the Ruin of Monarchy, which, how infirm
foever, uſeth not to expire otherwife) without Rapine, War, or in-
deed without any great Coufufion, I doubt whether the World can
afford another Example of the like natural, eafy and fudden Tranfi-
tion of one Government into another. Yet ere two Parts in three of
this Time be expired, Men can be defpairing. In what, fay they,
have you ſhewn us, that we muſt neceffarily be a Commonwealth?
Why in this, fay I, that you cannot fhew me how we ſhould be any.
thing elſe. In what Pofture, fay they, do we fee the People to give
us this Hope? Why in the very beft, fay I, that in this State of Af-
fairs, a People, if you confider their Humour or Nature, could have
caft themſelves into. This Pofture or Return is thus, or at leaft thus
I take it to be. The Armies of this Nation by Reftitution of their
old Officers, are fixed, refolved upon, and encouraged by the moſt
active Part of the People towards the Profecution of the old Cauſe,
or introduction of a popular Form. The framing of this Form is
modeftly and dutifully defer'd by them unto the civil Power in the
Reftitution of the Long Parliament, in that Remnant of the fame,
which declared for, and obligeth themſelves unto this End.
NOW putting this to be the Cafe, I come to the Scope of this Paper,
which is to difcourfe upon this Pofture; in which to my Underſtand-
ing, there are but three Things that can interpofe between us and a
Commonwealth, and but two more that can interpofe between us and
an equal Commonwealth. The Things that may interpofe between
us and a Commonwealth, are fuch Monarchy, as can no otherwiſe
get up than by foreign Invafion; or Tyranny, which at the ſtrongeſt
among us was not of any Duration, and which changing Hands muſt
ftill be weaker. Of theſe two, they being only poffible, and not a whit
probable,
598
Pour enclouer le Canon.
probable, I ſhall ſay no more. But the third Thing which can inter-
poſe between us and the Commonwealth is Oligarchy, which in like
Cafes hath been more probable and incidental, than I conceive it to
be at the preſent. Such a Thing if it be introduced among us, is
moſt likely to be of this Form.
IT may confift of a Council not elected by the People, but obtru-
ded upon us, under the Notion of a Senate or a Balance, or of Reli-
gion; and it may be for Life, or for fome certain or pretended Term,
with a Duke or princely Prefident at the Head of it, or without
one.
THE Power at which ſuch a Council doth naturally drive, is to call
Parliaments, and to govern in the Intervals. But the Succefs of fuch
Council, will be, that if in calling Parliaments, it do not pack them,
it will be forthwith ruined; and if it do pack them, then the Caſe of
fuch a Council, and a Parliament, will be no otherwife different from
the Caſe of a ſingle Perfon and a Parliament, than that more Maſters,
lefs able to fupport, their Greatneſs, and whofe Greatnefs we ſhall be
lefs able to ſupport, will be a Burthen by fo much more heavy, than
one Maſter more able to fupport his Greatneſs, and whofe Greatneſs
we were more able to fupport. But this will either not be, or be of
no Continuance.
THE Things that can interpofe between us and an equal Common-
wealth, are either a Senate for Life, or an Optimacy.
THE feventy Elders in Ifrael were a Senate for Life: this though
conſtitutively elected by the People, became after the Captivity, or
in the Jewish Commonwealth (how anciently is uncertain) meer Oli-
garchy, by the Means of Ordination; no Man being capable of Ma-
giftracy, except he were a Prefbyter, no Man being made a Prefbyter
but by laying on of Hands, and the Prince with the Senate engroffing
the whole Power of laying on of Hands.
NOR were the People thus excluded, and trampled upon by the
Pharifees, under other Colour than that of Religion, or Tradition de-
rived in their Oral Law or Cabala from Mofes, in whofe Chair
they fat, and not only pretended their Government to be a Govern-
ment of Saints, but in fome Things bad fairer for that Title than
others, who affumed it afterwards. For that they did Miracles, is
plain in theſe Words of our Saviour unto them: If I by Beelzebub
caft out Devils, by whom do your Children caft them out? therefore they
Shall be your fudges, Mat. xii. 27. By which I may believe that-
Miracles themſelves do not in any wife oblige us to hope that ſuch a
State of Government can be religious or honeft; much lefs, where there
are no Miracles, nor any fuch certain Diſtinction to be outwardly
made between a Saint and an Hypocrite, as may fecure us that we
ſhall not have Hypocrites impofed upon us for Saints. The fureft Te-
ſtimony of Saintſhip in Rulers, is, when they are willing to admit of
fuch Orders in Government, as reſtrain the Power to do wickedly, or
of lording it over their Brethren.
UPON the Pattern of the High-prieft, and the ſeventy Elders,
aroſe the Government of the Pope and his feventy Cardinals, preten-
ding alſo unto Saintſhip; which nevertheleſs is as little yielded unto
them, as they affume that a Council of Seventy for Life is a good
Guard of the Liberty of Confcience.
THE
Pour enclouer le Canon.
THE next Senate for Life, was that of Lacedemon, confifting of two
Kings hereditary, and twenty eight Senators elective. Thefe not-
withſtanding they were not eligible but by the People, and at the
fixtieth Year of their Age, and by the Balance or equal Agrarian of
their Commonwealth, could not any one of them excel the meaneſt
Citizen in their Lot, or Shares in Land, fo vigorously attempted to
draw the whole refult of the Commonwealth unto themſelves, that
if the People had not ftriven as vigorously for the Preſervation of their
Right, they had been excluded from making their own Laws. The
Expedient found out by the People in this Exigent, was their Elec-
tion of five annual Magiftrates out of their own Number, called the
Ephori, with Power to try, condemn and execute any of their Kings
or Senators, which thenceforth fhould go about to fubvert the funda-
mental Laws of their Government, by which it belonged unto the
Senate to debate and propofe only, and unto the Affembly of the
People to refolve. Without this Expedient (which in another Com-
monwealth not planted upon a like Agrarian, would have availed
little, as the Roman People heard afterwards by their Tribuns) had
the People of Lacedemon through a Senate for Life been deprived of
their Liberties.
THE Roman Commonwealth was alfo founded upon a Senate for
Life; which, though firſt inſtituted by Election of the People, came
afterwards to be fuch into which their Children found other Admit-
tance, in ſuch Manner as from hence grew a Patrician Order, in-
groffing not only the Senate, and excluding the People from bearing
Magiftracy in the Commonwealth, but oppreffing them alſo by an
heavy. Yoke of Tyranny, which cauſeth perpetual Feud between this
Senate and the People, and in the End the Ruin of the Common-
wealth; yet entituled this Nobility themſelves unto thefe Preroga-
tives, no otherwiſe than by ſuch religious Rites, as among
them were
believed to confer Saintſhip, and thereby to intitle them unto a Do-
minion over the People, in which they were alſo aided by the Opti-
macy.
NOW Examples of a Senate for Life being of like Nature and ne-
ceffary Confequence, it is my Hope and Prayer, that never any fuch
be introduced in England.
BUT in Cafe of an Optimacy, a Commonwealth, though not ad-
mitting of a Senate for Life, may yet be unequal.
ATHENS confifted of a Senate upon annual Rotation; yet
through the Optimacy, which was inſtituted by Solon, came under ſuch
a Yoke of the Nobility, as upon Victory obtained in the Battle of
Plataa, they took the Opportunity to throw off, and reduce the
Commonwealth unto more Equality.
AN Optimacy is introduced, where a People is not only divided by
Tribes according to their Habitation; but every Tribe into Claffes,
according unto their Eftates or different Meaſures in Riches; as if
you ſhould caft all that have above two thouſand Pounds a Year, into
one Claffis; all that have above one thouſand Pounds a Year, into
another; all that have above five hundred, into a third; and fo forth,
for as many Claffes as you like to make.
NOW if in this Cafe the firſt and ſecond Claffes may give the Suf
frage of the whole People, as in Rome; or that theſe only may en-
joy the Senate, and all the Magiftracies, though but upon Rotation,
as
599
600
Pour enclouer le Canon.
1
as in Athens; yet the People, as to thefe Parts being excluded, the
Commonwealth muft needs remain unequal: wherefore this alſo
ought to be forewarned, to the end that it may be prevented.
TO conclude, if we in England can have any Monarchy, we ſhall
have no Commonwealth; but if we can have no Monarchy, then
bar but a Senate for Life, and an Optimacy, and we must have an
equal Commonwealth. Succeffive Parliaments, whether immediate-
ly, or with Councils in the intervals, and like Fancies, will be void
of Effect, as of Example, or Reaſon.
BUT an abundance of Things is tedious; we would have ſuch a
Commonwealth as may be dictated in a Breath. Thus then: Let
a Senate be conſtituted of three hundred, and a popular Affembly of
one thouſand and fifty, each for the term of three years, and to be
annually changed in one third Part. But in Cafe a Commonwealth
were thus briefly dictated, what would this abate of thoſe many
Things, which must of Neceffity go unto a like Structure, that it may
be equally and methodically brought up from a firm and
firm and proper
Foundation? There is no way of dictating a Commonwealth unto
facile Practice, but by the feeming Difficulty of the whole Circum-
ftances requifite, even to a Tittle. Nevertheleſs to try again: Let the
Lands throughout England be all caft into fome Pariſh. Let every
Pariſh elect annually a fifth Man; let every hundred of theſe fifth
Men, with the Places of their Habitation, conftitute one hundred ;
then caſt twenty of theſe hundreds into one Tribe or Shire. Put-
ting the Caſe the Tribes or Shires thus ftated amount unto fifty,
let the fifty Men or Deputies in every Tribe or Shire, elect annual-
ly two out of their own Number, to be Senators for three Years,
and ſeven to be of the Affembly of the People for a like Term,
each Term obliging unto an equal Interval: which Senate being for
the firſt Year conftituted of three hundred, and the Affembly of the
People of one thouſand and fifty, gives you thofe Bodies upon a tri-
ennial Rotation, and in them the main Orders of an equal Common-
wealth. If you muſt have a Commonwealth, and you will have an
equal Commonwealth, then (pardon my Boldneſs) after this or fome
like Manner muft you do, becauſe like Work never was, nor can be
done any otherwiſe.
May 2. 1659.
James Harrington.
1
|
601
A
DISCOURSE
UPON
This SAYING:
The Spirit of the Nation is not yet to be trufted with
Liberty; left it introduce Monarchy, or invade the
Liberty of Confcience.
Daple
AVID was a Man after God's own Heart, yet made the Peo-
ple Judges of what was of God, and that even in Matters of
Religion; as where he propofeth unto the Repreſentative, confifting
of Twenty four thouſand, in this Manner: If it feem good unto you,
and that it be of the Lord our God, let us-bring again the Ark of
our God to us: for we enquired not at it in the Days of Saul, 1 Chro.
xiii. But Men in this Nation blow hot and cold: one main Excep-
tion which the Prelatical and Prefbyterian Sects have againſt popular
Government, is, that as to Religion it will truſt every Man unto his
own Liberty; and that only, for which the reft of the Religious Sects
apprehend popular Government, is, that the Spirit of the Nation (as
they fay) is not to be trufted with the Liberty of Confcience, in that
it is inclining to perfecute for Religion. What Remedy? Afk the
former Sects, or Parties different in Judgment as to Matter of Reli-
gion, (for the Word fignifies no more) they tell you a King; afk
the latter, they tell you fome certain or convenient Number of Prin-
ces, or an Oligarchy. But faith the Scripture, Put not your Truſt in
Princes. It doth not any where fay the like of the Congregation of
the Lord, or of the People; but rather the contrary, as is implied in
the Example already alledged of David's Propofition unto the Repre-
fentative of Ifrael, and is yet plainer in the Propofition of Mofes unto
the whole People, even before they were under Orders of popular Go-
vernment; and when they were to introduce fuch Orders, as where he
faith, Take unto you wife Men, and known among your Tribes, and I
will make them Rulers over you. Now thefe Rulers thus elected by
the People, were fupreme, both in Matter of Religion and Govern-
ment: in which Words therefore, both by the Command of God,
and the Example of Mofes, you have the Spirit of the People trufted
with all Matters either Civil or Religious. Throughout the Tefta-
ments, Old and New, (as I have over and over demonftrated unto
you) the Proceedings of God, as to the Matter of Government, go
not befide the Principles of human Prudence the Breadth of one
Hair. Let Saints therefore, or others, be they who or what they
will, work otherwiſe in like Cafes, or (to ſpeak more particularly un-
to the preſent State of Things) obtrude upon us Oligarchy, when they
can or dare, they fhall be, and foon confefs themſelves to be below
Men, even of natural Parts. In the mean While, having thus the
free Leave and Encouragement both of Scripture and Religion, I
Hhhh
come
802
A Diſcourſe upon this Saying,
come unto a farther Difquifition of this Point by the Card of Rea-
fon, and the Courſe of Prudence.
IN all the Circle of Government, there are but three Spirits; the
Spirit of a Prince, the Spirit of the Oligarchy, and the Spirit of a
free People: wherefore if the Spirit of a free People be not to be truft-
ed with their Liberty, or, which is all one, with the Government,
then muſt it follow of Neceffity, that either the Spirit of a Prince, or
of the Oligarchy, is to be trufted with the Liberty of the People, or
with their Government.
WHAT the Spirit of a Prince intruſted with the Government or Li-
berty of the People hath been, we have had large Experience; and
full enough of the Spirit of the Oligarchy: for a fingle Council ha-
ving both the Right of Debate and Reſult, never was nor can be
eſteemed a Commonwealth, but ever was and will be known for
mere Oligarchy. It is true, that the Spirit of the People, in different
Cafes, is as different as that of a Man. A Man is not of that Spirit
when he is fick, as when he is well: if you touch a fick Man, you
hurt him; if you fpeak to him, he is froward; he defpairs of his
Health; he throws down his Medicines: but give him Eaſe, he is debon-
naire and thankful; give him a Cure, and he bleffeth you. It is no
otherwiſe with the People. A People under a Yoke which they have
loft all Hopes of breaking, are of a broken, a flaviſh, a pufillani-
mous Spirit, as the Paifant in France. A People under a Yoke which
they are not out of Hopes to break, are of an impatient, of an active,
and of a turbulent Spirit, as the Romans under their Senate for Life,
the Hollanders under the King of Spain, and the English, after the
Ruin of the Nobility, under the late Monarchy. A People broken
looſe from their ancient and accuſtomed Form, and yet unreduced
unto any other, is of a wild, a giddy Spirit; and, as the Politician
faith, like fome Bird or Beaſt, which having been bred in a Leaſe or
Chain, and gotten looſe, can neither prey for itſelf, nor hath any
Body to feed it, till, as commonly comes to paſs, it be taken up by the
Remainder of the broken Chain or Leafe, and tyed fo much the
ſhorter; as befel thofe in Spain after the War of the Commonalties,
and the Neapolitans after that of Maxinello. But a People under
Orders of popular Government, are of the moſt prudent and ferene
Spirit, and the voideſt of inteſtine Diſcord or Sedition; as the Vene-
tians, the Switz and the Hollanders.
WHEREFORE thus we may in no wife argue: A Ship without
Tackling and Steerage is not to be trufted with any Freight, nor can
make any Voyage; therefore a Ship with Tackling and Steerage is not
to be trufted with any Freight, nor can make any Voyage. But to fay
that the People not under fit Orders of popular Government, are not
capable of Liberty; therefore the People under fit Orders of popular
Government, are not capable of Liberty, is no better. As the for-
mer Argument breaketh up all Hope of Trade, fo the latter breaketh
up all Hopes of popular Government.
HERE lyeth the Point. The Mariner truſteth not unto the Sea, but
to his Ship. The Spirit of the People is in no wife to be trufted with
their Liberty, but by ftated Laws or Orders; fo the Truft is not in
the Spirit of the People, but in the Frame of thoſe Orders, which,
as they are tight or leaky, are the Ship out of which the People being
once imbarqued, cannot ftir, and without which they can have no
Motion.
IF
That the Spirit of the Nation, &c.
603
If the Trumpet give an uncertain Sound, who shall prepare himſelf
unto the Battle? It is not a Multitude that makes an Army, but
their Diſcipline, their Arms, the Diſtribution of them into Troops,
Companies, Regiments, and Brigades, this for the Van, that for the
Rear-ward; and thefe Bodies muft either rout themfelves, which is
not their Intereſt, or have no Motion at all, but fuch only as is ac-
cording unto Orders. If they march, if they halt, if they lodge, if
they charge, all is according unto Orders. Whereof he that giveth
the Orders, trufteth not to the Army, but the Army trufteth him.
It is no otherwiſe in the ordering of a Commonwealth. Why fay we
then, that the People are not to be trufted, while certain it is, that in
a Commonwealth rightly ordered, they can have no other Motion
than according unto the Orders of their Commonwealth? Have we
not ſeen what Difference there may be in an Houſe elected by the
Counties only, and an Houſe elected both by the Boroughs and the
Counties? Is this ſo much from the People, as from their Orders?
The Lacedemonian Senate for Life, before the Inftitution of the E-
phori, was dangerous; after the Inftitution of the Ephori, was not
dangerous. The Venetians, before the Introduction of their preſent
Policy, were very tumultuous; fince the Introduction of the fame,
are the moſt ferene Commonwealth. Was this from the People who
are the fame, or from the Difference of their Orders? If you will truft
Orders, and not Men, you truft not unto the People, but unto your
Orders: fee then that your Orders be fecure, and the People fail not.
YOU the preſent Rulers of England, now the Object of Angels and
Men, in the Fear of God look to it. I dare boldly fay, and the
World will fay to all Pofterity, if England through the Want of Or-
ders be ruined, it was not that you needed to truſt the People, but
that the People trufted you.
AND of what Orders have fome of you that lay the People fo low,
and think yourſelves only to be trufted, made Offer? Do you not
propoſe,
THAT they who are or fhall be intrufted, (with Power or Authority)
be fuch as ſhall be found to be most eminent for Godliness, Faithfulness, and
Conftancy to the good old Caufe and Intereft of thefe Nations?
NOW I beseech you confider, if you mean to make your felves
Judges, without the People or Parliament, in fuch Manner as you
have owned your Commander in Chief, who are godly, and what the
Intereft of the Nation is, what kind of Commonwealth this muſt
make. Or if you mean to make the People Judges, without which
it is impoffible there ſhould be any well-ordered Commonwealth, whe-
ther you can give them any other Rule than according unto Mofes,
Take ye wife Men, and understanding, and known among your Tribes.
CONSIDER whether thoſe you would indemnify for ftrengthning
the late unnatural and difhonourable Yoke, be eminent for Godliness,
Faithfulneſs to the good old Caufe, or for afferting the Intereſt of theſe
Nations; and whether to impofe fuch Qualifications as may bring
thefe or the like again into Power, be the more probable Way unto
a free State; or to leave the People according to the Rule of Mofes,
unto their Judgment in theſe Cafes.
YOU propofe, That to the End the Legiſlative Authority of this
Commonwealth may not by their long fitting become burthenfom or incon-
venient, there may be effectual Provifion made for a due Succeffion thereof.
Hhhh 2
I BE-
604
A Difcourfe upon this Saying,
I BESEECH you to confider what Example can be produced of any
one Commonwealth wherein the ligiflative Authority was not con-
tinually extant or fitting; and what Reaſon there can be that it ſhould
poffibly be otherwife, the Government remaining a Commonwealth.
Confider whether in cafe the two Houfes of Parliament had been
heretofore perpetually fitting, the Government had not been a Com-
monwealth; whether the Intervals of the fame, were not that in a
good Part, which caufed it to be Monarchical; and ſo, whether the
legiſlative Authority in a Commonwealth being intermitted, muſt not
convert the Commonwealth into Monarchy, in cafe the Intervals be
guided by a fingle Perfon; or into Oligarchy, in cafe they be guided
by a Council. Laftly, confider whether fuch a Council in the Intervals
of Parliaments, be not, of all others, that Mole-hill by which a Tyrant
can be moſt conveniently raiſed for a jump into a Throne; or what
there is in this Cafe to withſtand him, though Whitehall fhould be
fold or pulled down.
AGAIN, you propofe, That the Legislative Power be in a Repre-
fentative confifting of an Houfe fucceffively chofen by the People, and of
a felect Senate, co-ordinate in Power.
be any
UPON which I beseech you to confider whether there can
fafe Repreſentative of the People, not conftituted of fuch a Number,
and by fuch Rules as muſt take in the Intereft of the whole People.
Whether there be not Difference between the Intereft which a Peo-
ple can have under Monarchy, and the Intereft which a People ought
to have under a Commonwealth: and whether it be a good Argument,
that an Affembly of four hundred upon Intervals, was a fufficient
Repreſentative of the People under Monarchy, or under Lords on
whom they depended; therefore the like may be fufficient under a
Commonwealth, where they are their own Lords, and have no de-
pendence. I beseech you to conſider whether it be natural unto any
Affembly to refolve otherwiſe than according unto the Intereſt of that
Affembly. Whether it be not natural unto the Senate, eſpecially
being not elected by the People, but obtruded, and, as I fufpect, for
Life, to debate according as they intend to refolve, and to refolve
according to the Intereſt of the Few, or of a Party. Whether it be
not unnatural, confufed and dangerous unto a Reprefentative of the
People, rightly conſtituted, to debate, whether it be not natural to
fuch a Repreſentative to refolve according unto the Intereſt of the
whole People. Whether the Senate refolving according unto the In-
tereft of the few, and the Repreſentative refolving according to the In-
tereft of the many, be not the certain Way of creating Feud between
the Senate and the People, or of introducing Blood and civil War.
And laſt of all, whether to declare the Senate and the Repreſentative
co-ordinate, be not to give unto either Council both the Debate, and the
Reſult indifferently, and in that the unavoidable Occafion of fuch Feud.
LASTLY, you propoſe, That the executive Power be in a Coun-
cil of State.
i
UPON which I beseech you to confider whether ever the Pry-
tans in Athens, the College in Venice, or a Council of State in any
Commonwealth, had any executive Power, except in the Manage-
ment perhaps of a War or Treaty with foreign States.
UPON the whole, 1 beteech you to confider whether theſe Propo-
fitions, and fuch like, be not contrary unto the whole Courfe of po-
pur Frudence in all or any one Commonwealth, and tending unto
the
3
That the Spirit of the Nation, &c.
605
the certain Deſtruction, or at leaſt intolerable Confufion of the Peo-
ple. Yet are theſe, I ſuppoſe, intended by you as a Bar unto Monar-
chy, and a Guard unto the Liberty of Confcience.
The whole Ter-
TO the ORDERS of a COMMONWEALTH.
ritory is equally divided into fifty Tribes or Shires; in every one
of theſe Tribes, the People of each Pariſh elect out of them-
felves one Man in five to be for that Year a Deputy of that
Pariſh. I but, they will chooſe Cavaliers or Preſbyterians. Well,
if that be the worst, for Difcourfe Sake be it fo. Theſe Deputies
thus chofen in each Parish, are upon fome certain Day in their
Year to affemble at the Capital of their Tribe or Shire, and there
to elect a few to be Knights or Senators, and a fuller Number to be
Burgeffes or Deputies in the Repreſentative of the People. Good:
and theſe alfo muſt therefore be fuch as were their Electors. So
the Sovereign Affemblies of the Nation will confift of Preſbyterians
and Cavaliers; and being thus conſtituted, will either introduce Mo-
narchy, or invade the Liberty of Confcience, or both.
BUT thefe at their Election take an Oath of Allegiance unto
the Commonwealth. An Oath is nothing.
An Oath is nothing. How! not among Chrif-
tians? Let us ſee what it hath been among Heathens. Brutus
having driven out the Tarquins, or Roman Kings, thought the Spirit
of that People not yet fit to be trufted with their Liberty; and for this
Caufe gave them an Oath, whereby they abjured Kings; which was
then thought and found in that Cafe to be enough. But if this would
not have ferved the Turn, what could? For Brutus to have expelled
the Kings, and yet not to have given the People their Liberty, he well
knew was not to have driven forth Monarchy, but to have laid Obli-
gation upon the People to bring it back again in hatred of the Oli-
garchy; as we in our way of proceeding have felt, and continue ftill
to feel, yet blame the People upon as good Grounds as if we ſhould
fay, the People are impatient of truſting Oligarchy with their Liberty;
therefore the People are not to be trufted with their Liberty.
But fupofing an Oath were as flight a Matter as indeed in theſe Days
it is made; theſe Sovereign Affemblies, tho' they ſhould be thus con-
ſtituted of Preſbyterians and Cavaliers only, yet could in no wife ei-
ther introduce Monarchy, or invade the Liberty of Confcience, for
thefe Reaſons. The natural Tendency of every thing, is unto the Pre-
fervation of itſelf; but Cavaliers and Prefbyterians under theſe Orders
are a Commonwealth; therefore their natural Tendency muſt be to
the Preſervation of the Commonwealth. It is not fo long fince a
Roundhead was made a Prince; did he make a Commonwealth?
Or what more Reafon can there be, why if you make Cavaliers and
Independents a Commonwealth, they ſhould make a King? What
Experience is there in the World, that the greateſt Cavaliers being once
brought under the Orders of popular Government rightly balanced,
did not thenceforth deteft Monarchy? The People of Rome, Liber-
tatis dulcedine nondum experta, where the greateſt Cavaliers in the
World; for above one hundred Years together they obftructed their
Senate, which would have introduced a Commonwealth, and cauſed them
to continue under Monarchy; but from the first Introduction of popu-
lar Government, continued under perfect Deteftation of the very Name.
PUTTING the Cafe that the Senate could have a Will to deftroy it
felf, and introduce Monarchy, you muſt alſo put the Cafe that they
may
606
A Difcourfe upon this Saying,
may have fome Intereft to do it; for the Will of every Affembly
arifeth from the Intereft of the fame. Now what Intereft can there be
in a Senate thus inftituted, to deftroy it felf and fet up Monarchy ?
THE Senate can do nothing but by propofing unto the People: it
is not poffible for them to agree unto any thing that can be propofed,
without debating it; nor can any Debate tend unto any fuch Agreement,
but in the force of Reafons thereunto conducing. Now what Reafon
had ever any Senate, or can any Senate ever have, to incline them unto
fuch an End?
NO Man nor Affembly can will that which is impoffible: but
where a Commonwealth is rightly balanced, that a Monarchy can
there have any Balance, except the Senate can perfuade People to quit
three Parts in four of the whole Territory unto a Prince, or to a
Nobility, is impoffible. But if the Introduction of Monarchy can nei-
ther be in the Will of the Senate, though that ſhould confift altogether
of Cavaliers and Prefbyterians, then much lefs can it be in the Will
of the Affembly of the People, though this alſo ſhould confift alto-
gether of Cavaliers and Prefbyterians.
BUT while we talk, that the People will be fo rafh in Elections, we
obſerve not that this is but the Raſhneſs of the few, exalting their Wif-
dom above the Wiſdom of the People. If it be not feen that a Com-
monwealth fo ordered as hath been ſhewn, muft of Neceffity conſiſt
in the Senate of the Wiſdom, and in the popular Affembly of the In-
tereft of the whole Nation, after fuch manner that there can be no
Law not invented by the wifeft, and enacted by the honefteft, what
the People under fuch a Form ſhall do, cannot be judged: and if this
be ſeen, we muft either believe that the Exclufion of Monarchy, and
the Protection of Liberty of Confcience, concern not the Wiſdom or
Intereft of the Nation, in which cafe they are Points upon which the
prefent Power ought in no wife to infift; or that being according unto
the Wiſdom and Intereft of the Nation, that Wiſdom and Intereft fo
collected as hath been fhewn, muſt be much more able to judge of,
obliged to adhere unto, and effectual to profecute thofe Ends, than any
hundred or two hundred Men in the World, were they never ſo ſelect
and unbiaffed. Which nevertheleſs is not faid against the Ways we
have to go, but for the End in which we are to acquiefce.
THE Diſtinction of Liberty into Civil and Spiritual, is not anci-
ent, but of a later Date; there being indeed no fuch Diftinction,
for the Liberty of Confcience once granted feparable from Civil Li-
berty, Civil Liberty can have no Security. It was the only Excufe
that the late Tyrant pretended for his Ufurpation, that he could fee
no other Means to fecure the Liberty of Conſcience. Suppofe an Oli-
garchy were like minded, would it follow that the Tyrant did not, or
that the Oligarchy could not ufurp civil Liberty? Or is not this the
only plaufible way by which they might? What Encouragement,
except for prefent Ends, or fome fhort time, hath Liberty of Confci-
ence had to truft more unto Men, than civil Liberty? Or what be-
came of that civil Liberty which was at any time trufted unto a
Prince, or to the Oligarchy? On the other fide, where hath that free
State or Commonwealth been ever known, that gave not Liberty of
Confcience?
IN Ifrael at the worst, or when it was fcarce a Commonwealth,
Paul carneftly beholding the Council, that is, the Sanhedrim, or Senate
of
That the Spirit of the Nation, &c.
607
of the Jews, cryed out-Men and Brethren-of the Hope and Re-
furrection of the dead I am called in Question: and when he had fo faid,
there arofe Diffention between the Pharifees and the Sadduces-For
the Sadduces fay, that there is no Refurrection, neither Angel nor Spi-
rit; but the Pharifees confefs both. Acts xxiii. Howbeit the Sadduces,
for the reſt adhered unto the Scriptures of the Old Teftament, of
which the Pharifees made little or no Account in Reſpect of their
Oral Law, or Traditions. Whence it followeth, that in this Senate
there were two Religions, and by Confequence that in this Common-
wealth there was Liberty of Confcience; and fo much the rather, in
that befides thefe Sects, and that alfo of the Effenes, this Common-
wealth confifted in a good Part of Profelytes of the Gates, who did not
at all receive the Law of Mofes, but only the Precepts given by God
to Noah.
PAUL, Acts xvii, in like manner, feeming to be a Setter-forth of
Strange Gods, in the Commonwealth of Athens, because he preached
unto them Jefus, and the Refurrection; and the Athenians, being given
to ſpend their time in telling or hearing fome new Thing, they took
him and brought him, not by Application of any Violence, but out of
Curiofity and Delight in Novelties, unto Areopagus, or unto the famous
Senate in Athens, called The Areopagites, honoured by Cicero to fur-
niſh an Argument againſt Atheiſts, where he argued, that to fay, the
World is governed without God, is as if one fhould fay, that the Com-
monwealth of Athens is governed without the Areopagites. Paul being
thus brought unto Areopagus, or unto the Place, that you may fee it
was not under Cuftody, where the Senators uſed to walk, ftood in the
midst of Mars-bill, and preached: now the Areopagites or Senators,
were fome Epicureans, who held as the Sadduces, and others Stoicks,
who held as the Pharifees: and when they heard of the Refurrection of
the Dead, fome, that is, the Epicureans, mocked, and others, that is,
the Stoicks, faid, we will hear thee again of this Matter. And Paul,
for another Argument that he was all this while at his own diſpoſing,
and full Freedom, departed from among them. Howbeit, certain Men
clave unto him, and believed, among which was Dionyfius the Areopa-
gite. So in the Senate of Athens there were now three Religions; the
Epicurean, Stoick, and Chriftian; whence it muſt needs follow, that
in the Commonwealth of Athens, there was Liberty of Confcience.
Men that are vers'd in Roman Authors will have little reaſon to doubt,
that the learnedft of this People gave not much credit unto the fabulous
Religion that among them was national. Among theſe, as is yet ap-
parent by his Writings, was Cicero, who nevertheleſs lamenteth, that
he found it eaſier to pull down a Religion, than to fet up any, yet
was neither Cicero, nor any Man of his Judgment, for this, lefs ca-
pable of being Conful, or of any other Magiftracy. All things are
not equally clear in every Story, yet fhall no Man give one Reafon or
Example that it hath been otherwiſe in any Commonwealth.
IT is true, that the Popish Commonwealths do not give the Liberty
of Confcience. No Man can give that which he hath not: they de-
pend in Part, or in the Whole, as to Religion, upon the Church of
Rome; and fo have not the Liberty of Confcience to give: but even
thefe do not take it away; for there is no Popish Commonwealth that
endureth any Inquifition. Now I fay, if there be no Reaſon nor Ex-
ample that a Commonwealth ever did invade the Liberty of Confcience,
either
-
608
A Difcourfe upon this Saying,
either there must be fome Caufe in Nature, which hath hitherto
had no Effect, or there is no Reaſon why a Commonwealth can
invade the Liberty of Confcience. But the Reaſon why it can-
not, is apparent: for the Power that can invade the Liberty of
Conſcience, can ufurp civil Liberty; and where there is a Power
that can ufurp civil Liberty, there is no Commonwealth. To
think otherwiſe, is to meaſure a Commonwealth by the overflowing
and boundleſs Paffions of a Multitude, not by thofe Laws or Orders,
without which a free People can no otherwife have a Courſe, than a
free River without the proper Channel. Yet as far as we in this Na-
tion do yet ſtand from this Object, we can perceive a Difference be-
tween Men, and Orders or Laws. A Man will truft the Law for a
thouſand Pound, nay muſt truft it with his whole Eſtate. But he
will not truſt a Man for an hundred Pounds; or if he do, he may
repent it. They who dare truft Men, do not underſtand Men; and
they that dare not truft Laws or Orders, do not underſtand a Com-
monwealth. I told a Story of my Travels to fome Gentlemen that
were pleaſed with it. The Italians are a grave and prudent Nation,
yet in fome Things no lefs extravagant than the wildeft; particularly
in their Carnival or Sports about Shrovetide: in theſe they are all
Mummers, not with our Modefty, in the Night, but for divers Days
together, and before the Sun; during which Time, one would think
by the Strangenefs of their Habit, that Italy were once more overrun
by Goths and Vandals, or new peopled with Turks, Moors and In-
dians, there being at this Time fuch Variety of Shapes and Pageants.
Among theſe, at Rome I faw one, which reprefented a Kitchen, with
all the proper Utenfils in Ufe and Action. The Cooks were all Cats
and Kitlings, fet in fuch Frames, fo ty'd and fo ordered that the
poor Creatures could make no Motion to get loofe, but the fame cau-
ſed one to turn the Spit, another to bafte the Meat, a third to ſcim
the Pot, and a fourth to make Green-fauce. If the Frame of your
Commonwealth be not fuch, as caufeth every one to perform his
certain Function as neceffarily as this did the Cat to make Green-
fauce, it is not right.
BUT what talk we of Frames or Orders? Though we have no
certain Frame, no fitting Orders, yet in this Balance there are Bounds,
fet even by his Hand who filleth the Raging of the Sea, and the Mad-
nefs of His People. Let the more wary Cavalier, or the fiery Pref-
byterian march up when he may into the Van, he ſhall lead this Na-
tion into a Commonwealth, or into certain Perdition. But if the
old Officers, Men for the greater Part of fmall Fortunes, but all of
large Souls, ancient Heroes, that dared to expofe themſelves unto
Ruin for their Country, be reftored unto their moſt deſerved Com-
mands, this will be done, and done without a bloody Nofe, or a cut
Finger.
WE hope ye are Saints; but if you be Men, look with all your
Might, with all your Prudence, above all, with fervent Imploration
of GOD's gracious Affiftance, who is vifibly crowning you, unto the
well-ordering of your Commonwealth. In the Manner confifts the
main Matter. Deteft the baſe Itch of the narrow Oligarchy. If
your Commonwealth be rightly inftituted, ſeven Years will not pafs,
ere
Pour enclouer le Canon.
609
ere your Cluſters of Parties, Civil and Religious, vaniſh, not through
any Force, as when cold Weather kills flies; but by the rifing of
greater Light, as when the Sun puts out Candles. Theſe in the Rea-
fon of the Thing are demonftrable, but fuit better with the Spirit
of the prefent Times, by way of Prophecy. England fhall raife her
Head to ancient Glory, the Heavens fhall be of the old Metal, the
Earth no longer Lead, nor fhall the founding Air eternally renounce
the Trumpet of Fame.
May 16. 1659.
JAMES HARRINGTON.
1
A
DISCOURSE
SHE WING,
That the Spirit of PARLIAMENTS, with a COUNCIL
in the Intervals, is not to be trufted for a Settlement;
left it introduce Monarchy, and Perfecution for Con-
fcience.
TH
;
HE prefent Cafe confidered, I need fay no more, than, if there
be no Bar, a Parliament may confift wholly, or in the greater
Part, of Prefbyterians or Royalifts; and if there be a Bar, it is no
Government by Parliaments, but by the Bar that is upon them
which must be of greater Danger. But the Houſe of Commons, as
hath been hitherto ufual in England, confifted of about four hundred
Deputies of the People, for the moſt Part Gentlemen, and old Sta-
gers, elected again and again unto the fame Employment, without
Vacation: this is that which being fweet in the Stomach of divers,
is the old Love for which they deteft new Forms. Such an Affem-
bly, for the Number or Nature of their Elections, is fomewhat too
low and too large to come up unto the true Intereft of a King, and
too high and too narrow to defcend wholly unto the true Intereſt of
the People; they have antiently provided diligently, that they might
hawk and hunt without Impediment of the King, and of the lower
fort, to whom it was almoft capital to fpoil their Game: and though
this may feem but a jefting Inftance, yet have the reft of their Laws,
for their Pitch, been much of the middle Way, or of the like Genius,
while they were under a Nobility; but fince, through the na-
tural Decay of that Order, they came to a greater Height,
hath been to endure no Check. Wherefore as it hath been
found under a King, that fuch an Affembly will endure no King,
through the Check they apprehend from him; fo it will be found
that under a Commonwealth they will be addicted unto the Intro-
ᏞᎥᎥᎥ
duction
it
610
A Difcourfe fhewing,
duction of Monarchy, through the Check they apprehend from the
People.
CERTAIN it is, that an Alteration of Government going no far-
ther than the Inftitution of Parliaments, and a Council in the Inter-
vals, can come to no more than that, fo often as the Council fhall be
changed for a King, or the King for a Council, fo often the Com-
monwealth (if this deferve any fuch Name) muſt be changed into
Monarchy, and the Monarchy into a Commonwealth; which Chan-
ges may be made with fuch Eafe and Suddenneſs, that every Night
it may be a Caft of a Dye, what the Government fhall be the next
Morning. Where the Alteration (I fay) of the Government is no
greater than from a King's Chair, to a narrow Bench of Counſellors;
there goeth no more to make a fingle Perſon, than throwing down
the Bench, and fetting up the Chair; nor to make a Commonwealth
(fuch an one as it is) than throwing down the Chair, and ſetting up
the Bench. But for the farther Diſcovery of fuch Caufes, as in fo
ftrange and unheard-of Innovation may give frequent or continual
Mutation, if this Pofture of Things be upheld (as I cannot fee how
otherwiſe it ſhould ſtand) by an Army. Let us confider three Things:
FIRST, What is incident unto fuch an Army.
SECONDLY, What is incident unto fuch a Council.
AND thirdly, What is incident unto ſuch a Parliament.
•
IT is incident unto fuch an Army, let the Body thereof be never
fo popularly affected, to be under a monarchical Adminiſtration, or
to be top-heavy in their great Officers, which will have Power, whe-
ther they will or no, to overfway both the Army and the Govern-
ment; as in the fetting up of the late fingle Perfon. Again, if the
Body of the Army mutiny againſt the Government, neither their
great Officers, nor any Thing elſe in the Parliament or Council, can
withſtand them; as in the pulling down of the latter fingle Perfon:
whence it is evident that ſuch an Army can be no Foundation of any
Settlement.
A Council in the Intervals, though it fhould rule well, will yet
have a Tendency toward Prefervation or Prolongation of itſelf; and
if it rule ill, will be obnoxious unto Parliaments. For which Cauſe,
what Help for themſelves ſhall be in their Power, is to be prefumed,
will be in their Will; and they have the fame Power which the
King had, or which is all one, are in as effectual a Pofture to ob-
ſtruct or elude the Meeting of Parliaments; therefore it will be in
their Will to do it. And if they will this, they reduce the Govern-
ment into Oligarchy, then into Faction, and laft of all, into Confufion.
•
THE People this while muft unavoidably perceive this Council
to confift of too few to be Fellows, and of too many to be Maſters.
For which Cauſe, being all broken into Faction, fome for a Com-
monwealth, and fome for Monarchy, Parliaments coming by Gufts,
whether with or againſt the Will of the Council, will either be torn
with like Faction among themſelves, or pull down the Council as no
Government, and endeavour fome Settlement. Now if a Monarchy
(as most likely, becauſe moſt obvious) be fet up, it can be no Settle-
ment, becauſe it is quite contrary unto the Balance of the Nation ;
and fo they mend nothing, but make greater Confufion. And a
Commonwealth or Democracy confifteth of fuch Orders and fuch
Novelties in this Land, as will never be light upon by an Affembly,
nor
That of the Spirit of Parliament.
611
nor credited by fuch as are unexperienced in the Art. So that this
Nation going thus far about, will come but unto that very Point,
where it now ſtands at gaze, or to far greater Confufion; for which
there is no Remedy, fave only that they who are in Power would
lay afide all Prejudice unto pretended Novelties and Innovations, or
rather not give themſelves unto fuch Novelties as tend unto Con-
fufion, (for fuch have been the late Changes) but confider fuch An-
tiquities as have been, and muſt be the Rule and Reafon of a wife
Proceeding in that, which by the Providence of God never was be-
fore, and yet is now come to be the Truth of their Cafe.
BUT if what hath been hitherto fhewn, be the certain Confe-
quence of Parliaments with a Council in the Intervals, as that it
will be no Settlement, but a State now ſetting up, then pulling down
Kings or fingle Perfons; it is apparent that what introduceth Mo-
narchy, introduceth Suppreffion of civil Liberty, and in that, of Li-
berty of Conſcience. Wherefore certain it is, that the Spirit of a
Parliament with a Council in the Intervals, is not to be truſted, left
it introduce Monarchy and Suppreffion of Liberty, and in that, of
the Liberty of Confcience; nor the Spirit of any Form whatſoever,
but that only of a Democracy or free State, which is the fame that
through Novelties introduced by God himſelf, is only practicable as a
Settlement in the preſent Cafe of this diſtracted Nation.
THE true Form of a Democracy or free State confifteth eſpecially
in this, That as to Lawgiving, the Wiſdom of the Nation propofe,
and the Intereft of the Nation refolve. If this be poffible in England,
then it is impoffible, that there ſhould be in England greater Security
unto Liberty, whether civil or of Confcience, which but for a new
Diſtinction is the fame. Now that it is poffible and eafily practica-
ble to frame ſuch ſtanding Affemblies in England, whereof the one
ſhall contain the Wiſdom, the other the Intereſt of the whole Nation,
hath been long fince evinced.
BUT Men that go upon picking up Arguments againſt an Houſe
out of the Rubbiſh, and diſtinguiſh not between the People under
the Ruins of the old Government, and what they must needs be
when raiſed into a proper Structure of a new Frame, will fay, that
the People have a general Averfion from being built up into any new
Form at all. So hath the Rubbiſh, and yet it may have good Stones
and Beams in it. They will fay, that there is a general Dif-affection,
nay Hatred, throughout the Countries, unto the Government; and
that more now, than in the Time of the late Ufurper. Which I
eaſily believe, becauſe the Change of a Perfon, with what Lofs for
ever, is yet a lefs Change than the Change of a Government. The
former is a Change from a Thing that was known, to another that
is known; but the latter muſt be a Change from a Thing that hath
been known in this Nation, to a Thing that was never known
in this Nation. A Man that walketh, treadeth, with almoſt
equal Boldness his next Step, if he fee it, though it be in the
Dirt; but let it be never fo fair, if he fee it not, he ſtands ſtock-
ftill. This is the prefent State of the People, and this Effect in the
People is eſpecially occafioned by their natural Diftruft of fuch No-
velties as they cannot penetrate or diſcover what they are. Nor is
it an ill Pulfe, the Cafe confidered, in which it fignifies no other
than their Conftancy and dear Affection unto their old Laws and
Ways,
Iiii 2
612
A Difcourfe fhewing,
Ways, how unfit foever they be now become. Wherefore, fo foon
as you have fitted them better, none of this will be against you, but
all for you. It is certain, that a People under proper Orders, is the
leaſt effeminate, and moſt manly Government in the World. But fuch
an one as hath no Experience or Knowledge in theſe, hath a Fro-
wardneſs, that is altogether childiſh. What they find uneafy, they
tear off and throw away; as in the late War; but no fooner find the
Nakedneſs unto which by like means they are brought, than being
unable to clothe themſelves, they fall into an unmanly Penitence,
and betake themſelves unto picking up of their old Trappings. If
there be not Men at the Head of them, who by Introduction of a
proper Form, can clothe their Nakedness, and reduce their Paffion
unto Temper, there is nothing to be expected, but Darkneſs, Defo-
lation and Horror.
NOW if you be Saints, do good unto them that hate you, and would
perfecute you. Now caft your Bread upon the Waters, and after many
Days, nay after a few Days, you shall find it.
THAT the People of this Land have an Averfion from Novelties
or Innovations, that they are incapable of Difcourfe or Reaſoning upon
Government, that they do not understand the true Form of a free
and equal Commonwealth, is no Impediment unto them, nor Excufe
unto wife and honeft Men, why they fhould not be imbarked.
AS the Soul of Man being by the Wiſdom of God imbarked in
Fleſh, doth all the Functions of the Body, not that ſhe underſtand-
eth it, but that the can work no otherwife; fo the Body of a Peo-
ple, by the Wiſdom of one Man, (if there be any ſuch Man, as
having fuch Power, can be fo honeft) or of a few Men (if there be
any fo few, as having fuch Power, can agree in fuch a Matter) im-
barked in the true Form of a Government, do all the Functions of
the fame, not that they underſtand it; for how much underſtood they
the late Monarchy, when it was in the greatest Vigour; but that
through the Neceffity of the Form, except it came to be infufficient
(as through the late Decay of the Church and the Nobility) they can
work no otherwiſe than according unto the Nature of it.
IF the Form thus introduced be that of a free and equal Com-
monwealth, the People not being able to work otherwife than ac-
cording unto the Nature of it, can never introduce Monarchy, nor
Perfecution for Confcience, becauſe either of theſe is contrary and de-
ftructive unto the Nature of the Form.
THAT the former is fo, I need not prove; and that the latter is
fo, is obvious. For without invading civil Liberty, there is no inva-
fion of the Liberty of Conſcience; and by invading civil Liberty, this
Form is diffolved. But fome will fay, Thruft the People into Inno-
vations unto which they have fo great Averſion? before they can be
brought to underſtand them, and againſt their Confent? What a
Violation of Freedom! what a Difficulty! what an Injuſtice!
BUT taking all this together; what lefs can be faid to whatever
the Parliament fhall next introduce? Or if you take them apart.
As to Averfion, I have already fpoken; it is not any Malice in the
People, but their Nature in this Cafe, which being through mere
want of Acquaintance with fuch Things as they can no wife under-
ftand but by Trial, is not to be rectified but by the Introduction of
fuch a Form as they finding far more worthy of their holding, will
r
by
That the Spirit of Parliaments, &c.
613
by changing of the Hand, but improve their more deferved Con-
ftancy.
AS to the Difficulty of introducing a new Form, of obtaining the
People's Confent, and the Violation that in Failure of the fame may
be made upon Liberty, I fay, that Elections, at divers Times, have
already been divers; that in this there hath been no Violation of Li-
berty, nor Difficulty in obtaining the People's Confent: and ſuch E-
lections as will neceffarily introduce the whole Form of a new Com-
monwealth, have no fuch Difference in them from the former, that
they ſhould not be as eafily confented unto, and performed by the
People; and this done by ordaining the Caufe, they have ordained
the Effect, and fo introduced the new Form by common and uni-
verfal Confent,
LASTLY, If it be juſt that the People ſhould have their Liberty,
they will foon find by this Change, that they both have it, and know
how to hold it which a People once finding, were never willing to
part with; and in this confifteth the ftrongeſt Security againſt Mo-
narchy, and for Liberty of Conſcience.
TO conclude: This to our prefent Commonwealths-men is dicta-
ted by univerſal Experience, and written by the beſt Politicians, as their
certain Doom.
IF they introduce a well-ordered Commonwealth, they ſhall be
fafe while they live, and famous when they are dead; and if they
introduce not a well-ordered Commonwealth, they fhall be unfafe
while they live, and infamous when they are dead.
July 21. 1659.
Certain Maxims calculated unto the prefent State of
England.
WHERE nothing is to be obtained by Reasoning, there every Thing
is referred to Event; and ſo are thefe Maxims.
1. WHERE there is no publick Endowment of a Ministry, there can
be na National Religion.
2. WHERE there is no National Religion, there can neither be
any Government, nor any Liberty of Confcience.
3. WITHOUT Invafion there may be a Tumult, but can be no Civil
War in England.
4. WITHOUT a Civil War, there can be no Monarchy in Eng-
land.
5. WHERE there is no Situation like that of Venice, there can be
no lafting Oligarchy.
6. A Commonwealth upon Intervals is againſt Nature.
7. Parliaments upon Intervals fet up Kings or Fyrants.
8. Parliaments when they are falariated, will fit in Harveſt.
9. Caput Reipublicæ eft noffe Rempublicam. When the Orders
of any one Commonwealth that is or hath been, are rightly underſtood by
fuch as have the Power, England will be a Commonwealth.
10. IF the narrowest Commonwealth require at least twice the Root
of the largest Monarchy, and the English Monarchy were founded upon
two Aſſemblies containing fix or feven hundred; then a Commonwealth in
England,
614
A Parallel of the Spirit of the People.
England, must be founded upon Aſſemblies confifting of about thirteen
hundred at the leaft.
11. IF Juſtice be the common Intereft, and the common Intereft be
Juſtice; then private or partial Intereft, oppofed unto the common, muft
be Injustice.
12. IF the Laws of the People muſt needs go upon the common In-
tereft, and the Laws of the Oligarchy must needs go upon partial or
private Intereft, oppofed to the common; then the Laws of the People
must be juft, and the Laws of the Oligarchy must be unjuſt.
13. EVIL Men, that can do no other than make juft Laws, are
Safer than good Men, that must either make unjuſt Laws, or ruin
themfelves.
"
A
PARALLEL
OF
The SPIRIT of the PEOPLE
WITH
The SPIRIT of Mr. Rogers.
AND
An Appeal thereupon unto the READER, whether the
Spirit of the People, or the Spirit of Men like Mr.
Rogers, be the fitter to be trufted with the Govern-
ment.
R. ROGERS's firft Character of himſelf is, that he is one through
MR Grace kept under many Sufferings a faithful Servant to Jefus
Chrift, his Caufe, and the Commonwealth.
THE Character that by Men of his Judgment is but too often
given of the People, is, that they are profane Wretches, haters of the
Godly, or of a perfecuting Spirit. Whereas if the Jayls be looked in-
to under any Commonwealth that is popular, the moſt of the Prifo-
ners will be found to be in for Matter of Crime, few for Debt, and
none at all for Conſcience; the contrary whereof is known in other
Governments. And this is Matter of Fact, whereof every Man, that
doth not like Mr. Rogers give his Spirit wholly unto Paffion, and
never think himſelf bound either to give or take any one Reafon or
Example, is a competent Judge.
3
BUT
with the Spirit of Mr. ROGER S.
615
BUT Men ſkill'd in common Converfation know, that if the Peo-
ple be offended by a Man upon whom they live, they are very pati-
ent; but if they be offended by a Man upon whom they do not
live, they are very apt to fly out; and their common Expreffion up-
on this Occafion is, What care I for him? I can live without him.
From the common and vulgar Expreffion of this Reafon or Truth,
the whole Spirit of the People, even as to Matter of Government,
may be defined; which in the Definition (becauſe there are but too
many who in like Compariſons boaft their Spirit for Righteoufneſs,
Godliness and Juftice above that of the People) I fhall make bold to
parallel with that of Mr. Rogers.
THE Spirit of the People, where they live by a King, will obey
a King very faithfully. Mr. Rogers is not for a King upon any Terms
whatſoever.
THE People, where they fubfift by Lords, are always faithful
unto their Lords; and where they are under the Power of a few by
whom they fubfift not, never defift from ſhaking that Yoke.
THE Spirit of Mr. Rogers is not for the Government of Lords,
or fuch as might pretend any fuch Reaſon of their Government;
but for the Government of a few, that cannot pretend any fuch
Reaſon of their Government; which therefore can have no Juftice
nor Bottom.
A People that can live of themſelves, neither care for King nor
Lords, except through the mere want of inventing a more proper way
of Government; which till they have found, they can never be
quiet; wherefore to help a People at this Streight, is both the greateſt
Charity to our Neighbour, and the greateſt Service that a Man can
do unto his Country.
THE Spirit of Mr. Rogers is not only to have a People that can
live of themſelves, to be governed by none other but fuch as him-
ſelf; but throwing away all Modefty, is a profeffed Enemy to any
Man that at fuch a Streight fhall fairly offer a Charity to the Peo-
ple, or a Service unto his Country.
WHETHER he be wronged thus far, I leave unto the Reader in
what follows; where what the Senfe is, we muſt gueſs; but the
Words are certainly Mr. Rogers's. He takes me up, after having
handled Mr. Baxter like himſelf in this Manner :
inSlandering:
BUT in the winding up our Difcourfe, I am furprised or way-laid
with Mr. Harrington's Correfpondence with Mr. Baxter against an Oli-
garchy, (I wish he had been as much against Anarchy or Atheifm) if Mark his Art
he means by it the Parliament, or fuch a Parliament, or the Body of He dareth not
Adherents to the Caufe, as one of them I believe he must, and fome fay to call me A-
all; (wherein Mr. Baxter and he agree.) But when he tells us his theift, because
by myWritings
Meaning without mumping and fcoffing, (which we must understand be- all Men may
fore we reply) he may bear further.
5%
I ever underſtood and explained Oligarchy, without mumping or
fcoffing, to be the Reign of the few, or of a Party, excluding the
main Body of the People; yet faith he, From their old Mumpfibus,
and his new Sumpfibus, good Lord deliver me. He fhould be fined 5/
By the new Sumpfibus, he intimates that he means the Government
by a Senate and by the People: and the Reaſon why he deprecates
this by his Litany, is, that moſt undoubtedly it muſt bring in a ſingle
Perfon. This Confequence he purſueth with much Greek, in which
you
know that I
am none.
616
A Parallel of the Spirit of the People.
you fhall fee how well he underſtandeth that Language, or indeed
any
ancient Commonwealth or Author. His firft Greek Quotation,
as you may find at length in his 72 Page, importeth that in Lacede-
mon no Man ftood up by the Way of Honour, but to a King, or to
an Ephore. This, without mumping or fcoffing, he Engliſheth thus,
None ſtood or were raiſed up (meaning in the Commonwealth of La-
cedemon) but a King and the Ephore; whence he infers, That a fingle
Perfon had an executive Power there. Then out of Heraclides he fets
down a Text which fhews, that the Thefmotheta in Athens were fworn
not to take Bribes; or if they did, were to pay a Statue of Gold to
Apollo; and this he Engliſheth thus: The Thefmothets were not to take
Bribes, nor to fet up the Golden Image, which he underſtands of a
King and finding a King-Prieſt in that Commonwealth, (as in ours
there is a King-Herald) he concludes that they did fet up a King; and
fo, that the Senate and the People is a Government inclining to ſet
up a fingle Perfon. Nor is there much of his Quotations out of an-
cient Authors, that is lefs miſtaken, and it may be out of Scripture.
You fhall have but one Piece more of him, which is concerning Ro-
tation of this faith he,
WHETHER this Way be not, of any, the moſt liable to an
Oftraciſm, let any judge, by difcouraging, laying afide, or driving
Well bowl'd out of the Land, the moft publickly fpirited Worthies that are in it;
Mr. Rogers. Men of the greateſt Ability, Gallantry, and Fidelity, by which Means
TE
a many brave Governments have been utterly deftroyed: as the A-
thenians, Argives, Thebans, Rhodians, and others. It is faid in Athens,
Ιππίας ἐξυράννει, καὶ τὸν περὶ Οστρακισμό νόμον εἰσηγήσαλος δὲ Ἄλλοι
ὠς ρακίθησαν καὶ Ξάνθιππῷ καὶ ᾿Αριστείδης That Hippias plaid the
Tyrant, and he brought forth the Law of Oftracifm; but others were
caft into Exile by it, fuch as Xantippus, Ariftides, &c. Nor can we
but foreſee, how faft the Wheel of their Rotation would boult or
fling out the beſt and ableſt in the Commonwealth, for Bran, leaving
Steal a little the worſt behind in, of all others. And yet of this muſt his Cake
more, and say, be made, which, after it is baked, he would have divided by filly
His Cake is
Dough.
Girls! A pretty Sport for the Mummers indeed, or thoſe nimble-
witted Houſe-wives (that with Vice can out-vie the Virtues of the
beſt) to learn fo lightly the whole Mystery of a Commonwealth, and
moft abftruſe Intrigues or Cabals of State (Page 13. Oceana) that
when theſe Joans are weary with their Bobbins, they may bob our
Ears bravely, with a garrulous Rule; and when they lag in their
Bone-lace, they may lace our Bones, (for Loggerheads,) to let them lay
down the Diſtaff, and take up the Scepter; leave the Spindle, and
divide the Spoil; yea, then fit like Magpies at their Doors, dumb
Saints in their Idol's Churches! Goats in their Gardens! Devils in
their Houſes! Angels in the Streets! and Syrens at their Windows!
as they fay of the Italians; for when they can live no longer by their
Work, they ſhall live by their Wits, in Mr. Har.'s Commonwealth,
that fifts out the beſt, and keeps in the worst to make his Cake with.
But in Lacedemon, Λυκέργος ὁ Εὐνόμε παῖς δικαίως βεληθεὶς ἀποφήναι
Λακεδαιμονίες, ὑπὲρ τότε γὲ ὁ καλὸς της μισθός ἠρύσατο. Lycurgus the
Son of Eunomus, willing to endow the Lacedemonians with their Dues
in Righteouſneſs and Juſtice, took not away any worthy or good
Reward from any one. And the Thebans, to encourage Dignity, and
•
keep
with the Spirit of Mr. ROGERS.
617
keep up the Honour of Magiftracy from Contempt, made a Law,
Ut nemo habilis effet, ad Honores Reipublica, fufcipiendos, nifi Decem
Annis à Mercatura deftitiffet, &c. That no Man fhould be accounted
qualified for the Honours of the Commonwealth, i. e. in Magistracy,
unleſs he had firſt left his merchandizing ten Years: Such a care had
they to keep out the Joans and Toms, which Mr. H. admits, by Turns
and Times, as the Rotation boults them into the Government, and
their Betters out. And what was faid of Clifthenes an Athenian,
Κλεισθένης δὲ τὸ δεῖν ἐξοστρακίζεται εἰσηγησάμενος, αυτὸς ἔτοχε τῆς καταδίκης
#pτ, might poffibly be applied to Mr. H. were their Rogation ef-
fected; that he was one of the firft that introduced this Government
by Oftraciſm, and one of the firſt that felt it, and would have retro-
duced it; the firſt that brought it in, and the firſt that wrought it out.
Therefore let him fecure his own Bull, before he baits another's, and
take his Play ! εκἄν βᾶς ἀπόλοιτο, εἰ μὴ γείτων κακὸς εἴη.
Márk the in-
genuity of thefe
Men: That t
the Common-
take no Notice;
is derived.
LASTLY, I would willingly be informed how his new Platforms have written
or Principles Paganiſh or Popish, fetch'd from Athens, or from Venice, wealth of If-
can, without cruciating Extremities and Applications, be adequated to rael, they will
our Commonwealth under Chriſtian Profeffion? fo that Qua femel nor that from
poffidebant Papifta, femper poffideant Rapifta; what the Papifts once thence efpeci
had, Rapifts and ravenous ones would ever have, viz. our Rights and ally Rotation
Liberties from us; nor could it be acquired, I think, without greater
Advantages to Papifts and Atheists than to us, feeing the very Intereft
of the Son of God, and Saints in the Nation, the beſt and nobleſt
Cauſe on Earth, in all the integrating Parts thereto, is not taken no- No! find them
tice of in his Platform; neither in the Balance nor the Wheel; in the another Way
for Liberty of
Ballot nor Rotation (or Rogation) of it; fo that Differs curandi tempus Confciente.
in Annum? Quicquid delirant Reges, plectuntur Achivi. I may con-
clude with Mr. B. p. 240. That God having already given us the beft
Fundamental Laws; let us have but good Magiftrates, and we ſhall have
good derivative Laws, or human. It was a Law among the Cre-
rians, that της παἶδας μανθάνειν τις Νόμος ἐκέλευον μετά τίνα μελωδίας
ἵνα ἐκ τῆς μεσικῆς ψυχαγωγῶν ται καὶ ἐυκολώτερον αὐτὸς τῇ μνήμῃ πάρα
raμßávwol, &c. That their Children fhould learn their Laws with
Melody; that from the MUSICK they might take great Pleaſure in
them, and more eaſily commit them to Memory. We need no fuch
Law, to endear or dulcify our Caufe or the Laws of it in the Common-
wealth. If the Foundation of it be that, which the Hand of the Al-
mighty hath laid amongſt us both for Church and State, from Chriftian
Principles, rather than from Paganish or meer Morals, it will make
moſt excellent Harmony in the Ears and Hearts of all Men and
Chriſtians; And the Governours of Judah fhall fay in their Hearts, the
Inhabitants of Jerufalem fhall be my Strength, in the Lord of Hofts
their God, Zach. xii. 5. Thus our Governors thought of them in
the Days of Straits, and will again fee it, one of their beſt Intereſts,
to have their Prayers and their God, as well as their Purſes and Blood,
engaged for them; and not difoblige them upon Jealoufies fuggeſted
by the Enemy, who for their Virgin Fidelity, and untainted Adhe-
rence to the Cauſe, may be called Tagleviss, as the Lacedemonians did
their Wives after their Innocency did break out, and get above the
Clouds of Sufpicion and Reproach. But if, after all, they will be
planting and founding us again in the Spirit of the Nation, as if
God had owned no Caufe, or made no fignal Difcrimination; of
K kk k
fhaken
618
A fufficient Anfwer to Mr. STU B B.
fhaken no fuch Foundations of the Earth, &c. which their Lord
General pretended as one Ground of their Interruption, which Mr.
H. and others would hurry them into, to the endangering of the
Cauſe, and the difobliging the Adherents; then will the Jehovah,
that keepeth Covenant with his People, and not alter the thing that is
gone out of his Lips, Pfal. lxxxix. 34. Acts ii. 30. and iii. 20. 21.
raiſe up others in their ſtead, to carry on this his Cauſe, both in the
Civils and the Spirituals; and to form another People for himſelf to
ſhew forth his Praiſe, Iſa. xliii. 21. Then they that rule over Men, ſhall
be just, ruling in the Fear of God; and they shall be as the Light of
the Morning when the Sun arifeth; a Morning without Clouds, and as
the tender Grass that ſpringeth out of the Earth, by a clear ſhining after
Rain, 2 Sam. xxiii. 3, 4. which that theſe may be, agrees better with
my Prayer, than with his Propoſals I am fure. But thus I leave him
whom Mr. B. has quoted as a Stumbling-block before me; whom I am
not only gotten over, but I prefume have given a good lift to the re-
moving of him out of others Way, as to the right Foundation of
the Commonwealth, and ftating the Caufe.
YOU might have more; but becauſe it is no better, here is enough.
I could never yet find among Men like Mr. Rogers, that my Spirit is
likely to paſs with them for any more than a moral Spirit; and there
is nothing more uſual among Divines that make mention of me, than
to call me Mad-man or Atheiſt. On the other fide, Mr. Rogers, and
moſt of them that thus uſe me, hold themſelves to be Men of fancti-
fied Spirits. Yet without boafting, and upon Provocation, I fubmit
it unto the Reader, whether Mr. Rogers or my felf be of the better
Spirit: nor do I blame him fo much for emptying himſelf luftily of
that which burthened him; Paffion in a Man is far more pardonable
than Malice. He accuſeth me in his Title Page, of Venom and Vili-
fication towards the honourable Members now in Parliament; which,
for any thing he hath faid, or can fay to prove it, is not only to bear
falfe Witneſs againſt his Neighbour, but in ſeeking the Deſtruction of
his Neighbour by falfe Witneſs, to blaft a Cauſe which he is no other-
ways able to invade. Let this be confidered; for if it prove to be the
truth of his Meaning, it muſt be from an evil Spirit. However, the
Reader may now eafily judge, whether the Spirit of the People, ex-
cluding no Man, or the Spirit of Mr. Rogers, and fuch like, which
is that which he would have, excluding the People, be the fitter to be
trufted with the Government.
Sept. 2. 1659.
READER, Iintreat your Pardon; I know well enough that this is
below me;
but fomething is to be yielded to the Times: and it hath been
the Employment of two or three Hours in a rainy Day.
T
A fufficient Anfwer to Mr. Stubb.
HERE is a Book newly put forth by Mr. Stubb, intituled, A
Letter to an Officer, &c. which in brief comes to this, that he
would have a felect Senate for Life, confifting of Independents, Ana-
baptiſts, Fifth-Monarchy-Men, and Quakers; for which he is pleafed
to quote Deut. xxiii. that he would have all fuch as adhered unto the
Parliament againſt Sir G. Booth, to be inrolled as the People of Eng-
land: that he would have all the reft of the People of England to be
Helots, Gibeonites, or Payfants. This Book I have read; and I have
heard
3
A fufficient Anſwer to Mr. Stubb.
619
heard a Tale of one, who, to get fomething, pretended the fhewing
of a ſtrange Beaft, and Horſe and no Horfe, with the Tail ſtanding
where the Head ſhould ſtand; which when all came to all, was a Mare,
with her Tail ty'd to the Manger; the lively Emblem of an Oligar-
chy. Mr. Stubb pretending to fhew his Learning, takes thoſe things,
as it were changing the Sex of them, which I have written, and in
his Writings turns their Tails unto the Manger. Now this, as to the
unlearned Reader, is that upon which it is to no Purpoſe to move any
Controverfy; and as to the Learned, I need no more than appeal,
whether in their proper Stables, or in the beſt Authors, the Heads of
them ſtand, as I have fet them, or the Tails as Mr. Stubb hath ſet
them. Only let me fay, that as to a felect Senate, underſtanding
thereby a Senate not elected by the People, there is no more of this in
all Story, than the Senate of Rome only. Whence it is undeniable by
any Man of common Underſtanding, that a felect Senate bringeth in a
felect Intereft, that a felect Intereft caufeth Feud between that ſelect
Intereft, and the common Intereft, and fo between the Senate and the
popular Affembly; which Coal in England it is fitter for fuch as Mr.
Stubb and his Patrons to blow, than for fuch as underſtand Story,
Government, and common Honeſty. But their Reaſons who decry
the Poffibility or Plauſibility of ſuch Acts or Orders as theſe, it pleaſeth
him to call high Rodomontado's. Now which are the higher Rodomon-
tado's, thefe, or thoſe which he uſeth in flouriſhing the Juftitia of
Aragon, a Patch in a Monarchy, which his Deſign is to tranflate by a
Select Senate, into a Commonwealth, I leave any Man to judge, even
by the Teftimony of his own Author Blanca, and in a Place cited by
himſelf, though not fo well rendered. Our Anceſtors, faith Blanca,
have three ways fecured our Liberties; by the Juftitia, by the great
POWER of the Ricos hombres, (now he fpeaks,) and by the Privilege
of the Union. The first was a civil and forenfick Curb, a Gown, the
Second was a domeftick and more restraining one, (I think fo, the Purfe and
the Power,) the third popular and warlike, an excellent Militia. Now
let any Man fay, even after Blanca, if without the Nobility, in whom
was the Balance of this Monarchy, and their Retainers and Depen-
dents, of which conſiſted the Militia, this Court of the poor Gown-
man called Juftitia, muſt not have been a very likely thing to reſtrain
a Prince; or confider whether without this fame Mummery of the
Arragonians, Houſe of Peers and of Commons in other Monarchies,
have not every whit as much reſtrained their Kings, and more, feeing
this Toy, at every Election of the Magiftrate called Juftitia, it re-
ceived not Breath but from a King, was blown away by a King. His
other Inſtances, as the thirty fix Curators of the Publick appointed unto
Lewis the Eleventh of France, by the three Eſtates, and the twenty
five felect Peers, given unto King John of England, were like Shifts,
and had leſs Effect. Security in Government muſt be from Entireneſs
of Form; and Entireneſs of Form must be from Soundneſs or
Rightneſs of Foundation. But Mr. Stubb founding himſelf upon the
Authority of Ariftotle, that the Western Parts are not capable of a
right Commonwealth, is declaredly for a wrong Commonwealth in
England. He minds not that Venice, for the Capacity, is a righter
Commonwealth than was ever any in Greece; nor that the preſent
State of England is of a far different, if not a quite contrary Nature
to that of the Weſtern Parts, in the time of Ariftotle.
Kkkk 2
A PRO-
620
A
PROPOSITION
15
In order to the Propofing of
A Commonwealth or Democracy.
F the Parliament fhall be pleaſed to appoint a Committee to receive Mr.
Harrington's Propoſals for fettling the Government of this Commonwealth,
it is humbly propofed that unto the Committee of the Houſe may be added,
The Earl of Northumber- Mr. Jofas Bernards.
land
The Earl of Denbigh.
The rl of Clare.
The Earl of Kingſton.
The Duke of Buckingham.
Loid Grey of Wark.
Lord Faulkeland.
Lord Lam ert.
Lord Bronker.
Richard Nevil, Efq;
Mr. Nathaniel Fiennes.
Lord Mayor of London.
Alderman Titchborne.
Mr. Thurlo.
Mr. William Pierepoint.
Sir John Eveling.
Mr. Crew.
Mr. Anflo of Ireland.
Mr. Prynne.
Sir Paul Neal.
Sergeant Maynard:
Colonel Taylor.
Lord Broughal.
Mr. Hubard.
Mr. John Trevor.
Captain Adam Baynes.
Mr. Samuel Moyer.
Mr. Anthony Samuel.
Major Wildam.
Mr. Maximilian Petty.
Mr. William Harrington.
Mr. Wren.
Mr. Baxter of Kiddermin-
fter.
Mrs. Walwin.
Dr. Brooks.
Mr. Arthur Eveling.
Mr. Cook.
Dr. Ferne.
Dr. Haymond.
Dr. Oren.
Dr. Seaman.
Mr. Calamy.
Mr. Manton.
Captain Andrew Ellis.
Mr. Challinor Chute.
Mr. Slingsby ethel.
Sir Cheany Culpepper.
Sir Henry Blount
Sir Horatio Townshend.
Sir Anthony Afbly Cooper.
Mr. Job Charleton.
Mr. Edward Waller.
Colonel Harloe.
Major Harloe.
Colonel John Clark.
Mr John Denham.
Mr. Morrice.
Mr. Hugh Bifscowen.
Sir George Footh.
Mr. Robert Roles.
Dr. Mills.
Sir Orlando Bridgeman.
Mr. Robert Stevens.
Mr. William James.
Sir Juftinian ham.
Lieutenant Colonel
Jey.
Sir Robert Honnywood,
Mr. Sedgwick
Mr. Philip Nye.
Dr. Thomas Goodwin.
Colonel Lilburn.
Charles Howard, Efq;
Colonel Affield.
Sir Thomas Gower.
Lord Com Bradshaw.
General Deshorow.
Colonel James Berry:
Kel-
Major William Packer. ·
Praifegod Barebones.
Sir William Waller.
Colonel Sanders.
Colonel Hatcher.
Colonel Edmond Salmon.
Colonel Francis Hacker.
Mr. Richard Knightley.
Colonel John Burch.
Mr. John Swynfen.
Mr. Thomas Dampfield.
Colonel John O'ey.
Mr. William Kiffen.
Anthony ierfon.
Colonel Mofs.
Mr. Erecheville of Stavely.
Mr. James Morley.
Dr. Philip Carteret.
Captain Richard Dean.
Adjutant General William
Allen.
Mr. William Forester of
Aldermarton.
Mr. Edward Harifon.
Mr. Arthur Samwell,
Mr Samuel Tull.
Mr. Edward Salloway.
THAT this Committee fit Tueſdays and Fridays, by three of the Clock
in the Afternoon, in the Banquetting-Houfe, Court of Requefts, or painted
Chamber, the Doors being open, and the Room well fitted for all Comers; and
that Mr. Harrington having propofed by Appointment of the Parliament, fuch
others may propofe as fhall have the leave of the Parliament.
THIS by Friends of the Commonwealth is propofed with Mr. HAR-
RINGTON's confent.
The REASONS for this PROPOSITION are thefe:
IT is the faireft way of proposing a Government, that it be
first propofed to Conviction, before it be impofed by Power.
THE Perfons herein nominated being convinced, it muſt ne-
ceffarily have an healing Effect.
THE
621
THE
ROTA:
Or a Model of a Free State, or equal Commonwealth.
Once propoſed and debated in brief, and to be again
more at large propoſed to, and debated by a free
and open Society of ingenious Gentlemen.
R
Ite fortes, ita fælices.
At the ROTA. Decem. 20. 1659.
ESOLVED, that the Propofer be defired, and is hereby defired
to bring in a Model of a Free State, or equal Commonwealth, at
large, to be farther debated by this Society, and that in Order thereunto
it be firft Printed.
RESOLVED, that the Model being propofed in Print, ſhall be
first read, and then debated by Claufes.
RESOLVED, that a Claufe being read over Night, the Debate
thereupon begin not at the fooner till the next Evening.
RESOLVED, that fuch as will Debate, be defired to bring in their
Queries upon, or Objections against the Claufe in Debate, if they think
fit, in Writing.
RESOLVED, that Debate being fufficiently had upon a Clauſe, the
Question be put by the Ballotting-Box, not any way to determine of, or
meddle with the Government of thefe Nations, but to discover the Judg-
ment of this Society, upon the Form of popular Government, in Abſtract,
or fecundum Artem.
A
The Principles of Government.
LL Government is founded upon Over-Balance, in Propriety.
IF one Man hold the Over-Balance unto the whole People in
Propriety, his Propriety cauſeth abfolute Monarchy.
IF the Few hold the Over-Balance unto the whole People in Pro-
priety, their Propriety caufeth Ariftocracy, or mixed Monarchy.
IF the whole People be neither over-balanced by the Propriety of
one, nor of a few, the Propriety of the People, or of the many,
cauſeth the Democracy, or popular Government.
THE Government of one againſt the Balance, is Tyranny.
THE Government of a few againſt the Balance, is Oligarchy.
THE Government of the many, (or Attempt of the People to
govern) againſt the Balance, is Rebellion, or Anarchy.
WHERE the Balance of Propriety is equal, it cauſeth a State of
War.
TO hold, That Government may be founded upon Community,
is to hold, that there may be a black Swan, or a Caſtle in the Air;
or,
622
The Principles of Government.
or, that what Thing foever is as imaginable, as what hath been in
Practice, muſt be as practicable, as what hath been in Practice.
IF the over-Balance of Propriety be in one Man, it neceffitateth
the Form of Government to be like that of Turky.
IF the over-Balance of Propriety be in the Few, it neceffitateth
the Form of the Government to be like that of King, Lords, and
Commons.
1
IF the People be not over-balanced by one, or a few, they are
not capable of any other Form of Government, than that of a Senate,
and a popular Affembly. For Example, as followeth.
For the FORM or MODEL in Brief of a FREE-
STATE, or equal COMMONWEALTH. It
hath been propoſed in this Manner.
2.
LET the whole Territory of Oceana be divided as equally as may
be, into fifty Parts or Shires.
2. LET the whole Inhabitants (except Women, Children, and
Servants) be divided according unto their Age into Elders and Youth;
and according unto their Eftates into Horfe and Foot.
3. LET all fuch as are eighteen Years of Age or upwards to
thirty, be accounted Youth; and all fuch as are thirty or upwards,
be accounted Elders.
4. LET all fuch as have one hundred Pounds a Year, or upwards,
in Lands, Goods, or Money, be accounted of the Horſe; and all fuch
as have under, be accounted of the Foot of the Commonwealth.
5. LET every Pariſh in a Shire elect annually the fifth Elder of
the fame, to be for that Year a Deputy of that Pariſh; if a Pariſh be
too ſmall, let it be laid as to this Purpoſe, unto the next; and in
this Reſpect, let every Part of the Territory appertain to ſome
Pariſh.
6. WHERE there is but one Elder of the Horſe in a Pariſh, let
him be annually eligible, without Interval : where there are more El-
ders of the Horſe, let no Deputy of the Pariſh be re-eligible, but
after the Interval of one Year.
WHERE there be four Elders of the Horſe, or more, in one
7.
and the fame Pariſh, let not under two, nor above half of them be
elected, at one and the fame Election, or Time.
8. LET the Deputies thus elected at the Pariſhes, affemble annu-
ally at the Capital of their Shire, and let them then, and there elect
out of their own Number, two Elders of the Horfe to be Knights
or Senators, three Elders of the Horſe, and four Elders of the Foot,
to be of the Affembly of the People, for the Term of three Years, in-
joining an equal Vacation, or Interval, before they can be re-elected
in either of theſe Capacities.
9. LET there be elected at the fame Time in each Shire, the firſt
Year only, two other Knights, and feven other Deputies for the
Term of one Year, and two other Knights, with ſeven other Depu-
ties for the Term of two Years, which in all conftituteth the Senate
of three hundred Knights, and the popular Affembly of one thoufand
and
The Rota:
623
and fifty Deputies, each being upon a triennial Rotation, or annual
Change in one third Part.
10. LET the Senate have the whole Authority or Right of deba-
ting and propofing unto the People; let the popular Affembly have
the whole Power of Refult; and let what fhall be propoſed by the
Senate, and refolved by the popular Affembly, be the Law of Oceana.
T
The Conclufion.
WO Affemblies thus conftituted, muft neceffarily amount unto
the Underſtanding and the Will, unto the Wiſdom and the In-
tereft of the whole Nation; and a Commonwealth, where the Wif-
dom of the Nation propofeth, and the Intereſt of the People reſol-
veth, can never fail in whatever fhall be farther neceffary for the
right conftituting of itſelf.
The MODEL at large of a FREE-STATE, or e-
qual COMMONWEALTH. Propofed in four
Parts:
I.
Firſt, the Civil,
Military,
Fecondly, the Religious, }Part. {Thirdly, the rotarcial.
TH
Fourthly,
PART I.
For the Civil Part, it is propofed,
HAT the whole native or proper Territory of Oceana (reſpect
had unto the Tax-role, unto the Number of People, and to
the Extent of Territory,) be caft with as much Exactness as can be
convenient, into fifty Precincts, Shires, or Tribes.
2. THAT all Citizens, that is, Free-men, or fuch as are not Ser-
vants, be diſtributed into Horfe and Foot, that ſuch of them as have
One hundred Pounds a Year in Lands, Goods, or Money, or above
that Proportion be accounted of the Horfe; and all ſuch as have un-
der that Proportion, be accounted of the Foot.
*
3. THAT all Elders or Free-men, being thirty Years of Age,
or upwards, be capable of civil Adminiſtration; and that the Youth,
or fuch Freemen as are betweeen eighteen Years of Age and Thirty,
be not capable of civil Adminiſtration, but of Military only, in fuch
Manner as fhall follow in the military Part of this Model.
4. THAT the Elder's Refident in each Pariſh, annually affemble
in the fame; as for Example, upon Monday next enſuing the laſt of
December. That they then, and there elect out of their own Num-
ber every fifth Man, or one Man out of every five, to be for the
Term of the Year enfuing a Deputy of that Pariſh; and that the
firſt and ſecond fo elected, be Overfeers, or Preſidents for the regula-
ting of all parochial Congregations, whether of the Elders, or of the
Youth, during the Term for which they were elected.
5. THAT ſo many Pariſhes lying nearest together, whoſe Depu-
ties fhall amount to one hundred, or thereabouts, be caft into one
Precinct, called the Hundred: and that in each Precinct called the
Hundred,
624
The Rota.
Hundred, there be a Town, Village, or Place appointed, to be the
Capital of the fame.
6. THAT the parochial Deputies elected throughout the Hun-
dred affemble annually; for Example, upon Monday next enfuing
the laſt of January, at the Capital of their Hundred.
That they
then and there; elect out of the Horfe of their Number one Juftice
of the Peace, one Jury-man, one Captain, one Enfign; and out of
the Foot of their Number, one other Jury-man, one High-confta-
ble, &c.
7. THAT every twenty Hundreds, lying neareſt, and moſt con-
veniently together, be caft into one Tribe, or Shire. That the whole
Territory being after this Manner caft into Tribes, or Shires, fome
Town, Village, or Place, be appointed unto every Tribe, or Shire,
for the Capital of the fame: And that theſe three Precincts, that is,
the Parish, the Hundred, and the Tribe, or Shire, whether the De-
puties thenceforth annually chofen in the Pariſhes, or Hundreds,
come to increaſe, or diminiſh, remain firm, and unalterable for ever,
fave only by Act of Parliament.
8. THAT the Deputies elected in the feveral Pariſhes, together
with their Magiſtrates, and other Officers, both civil and military,
elected in their feveral Hundreds, affemble, or mufter annually; for
Example, upon Monday next enfuing the laſt of February, at the
Capital of their Tribe, or Shire.
9. THAT the whole Body thus affembled upon the firſt Day of
the Affembly, elect out of the Horſe of their Number one High-
Sheriff, one Lieutenant of the Tribe, or Shire, one Cuftos Rotulorum,
one Conductor, and two Cenfors. That the High-Sheriff be Com-
mander in Chief, the Lieutenant Commander in the fecond Place, and
the Conductor in the third, of this Band, or Squadron. That the
Cuftos Rotulorum be Mufter-maſter, and keep the Rolls. That the
Cenfors be Governors of the Ballot. And that the Term of theſe
Magiſtracies be annual.
10. THAT the Magiftrates of the Tribe, that is to fay, the High-
Sheriff, Lieutenant, Cuftos Rotulorum, the Cenfors, and the Conduc-
tor, together with the Magiftrates and Officers of the Hundred, that
is to fay, the twenty Juftices of the Peace, the forty Jury-men, the
twenty High-conftables be one Troop, and one Company apart, call-
ed the Prerogative Troop, or Company. That this Troop bring in,
and affift the Juftices of Affize, hold the Quarter-Seffions in their
ſeveral Capacities, and perform their other Functions as formerly.
II. THAT the Magiftrates of the Tribe, or Shire, that is to fay,
the High-Sheriff, Lieutenant, Cuftos Rotulorum, the Cenfors, and the
Conductor, together with the twenty Juftices elected at the Hundreds,
be a Court for the Government of the Tribe called the Phylarch;
and that this Court proceed in all Matters of Government, as ſhall
from Time to Time be directed by Act of Parliament.
12. THAT the Squadron of the Tribe, upon the ſecond Day of
their Affembly, elect two Knights, and three Burgeffes out of the
Horſe of their Number, and four other Burgeffes out of the Foot of
their Number. That the Knights have Seffion in the Senate, for the
Term of three Years, and that the Burgeffes be of the Prerogative
Tribe, or Repreſentative of the People for the like Term. That if in
cafe of Death, or Expulfion, a Place become void in the Senate, or
popu-
The Rota.
625
1
popular Affembly, the refpective Shire or Tribe have timely Notice
from the Seignory, and proceed in the Manner aforefaid unto extraor-
dinary Election of a Deputy or Senator, for the remaining Part of
the Term of the Senator or Deputy, deceaſed or expelled.
13. THAT for the full and perfect Inſtitution, at once, of the
Affemblies mentioned, the Squadron of each Tribe or Shire, in the
firſt Year of the Commonwealth, elect two Knights for the Term
of one Year, two other Knights for the Term of two Years, and
laftly, two Knights more for the Term of three Years; the like for
the Burgeffes, of the Horſe firſt, and then for thoſe of the Foot.
14. THAT a Magiftrate, or Officer elected at the Hundred, be
thereby barred from being elected a Magiftrate of the Tribe, or of the
firſt Day's Election. That no former Election whatſoever bar a Man of
the fecond Day's Election at the Tribe, or to be chofen a Knight or
Burgefs. That a Man being chofen a Knight or Burgefs, who be-
fore was chofen a Magiftrate or Officer of the Hundred or Tribe,
delegate his former Office or Magiſtracy in the Hundred or the
Tribe, to any other Deputy, being no Magiftrate nor Officer, and
being of the fame Hundred, and of the fame Order, that is, of the
Horſe, or of the Foot refpectively. That the whole and every
Part of the foregoing Orders for Election in the Parishes, the Hun-
dreds, and the Tribes, be holding and inviolate upon fuch Penalties,
in caſe of Failure, as ſhall hereafter be provided by Act of Parlia-
ment againſt any Pariſh, Hundred, Tribe or Shire, Deputy or Perfon
fo offending.
15. THAT the Knights of the annual Election in the Tribes
take their Places on Monday next enfuing the laft of March, in the
Senate. That the like Number of Knights, whofe Seffion deter-
mineth at the fame Time, recede. That every Knight or Senator
be paid out of the publick Revenue quarterly feventy five Pounds,
during his Term of Seffion, and be obliged to fit in purple Robes.
•
16. THAT annually upon Reception of the new Knights, the
Senate proceed unto Election of new Magiftrates and Counſellors.
That for Magiſtrates they elect one Archon or General, one Orator
or Speaker, and two Cenfors, each for the Term of one Year, thefe
promifcuoufly; and that they elect one Commiffioner of the Great
Seal, and one Commiffioner of the Treaſury, each for the Term of
three Years, out of the new Knights only.
17. THAT the Archon or General, and the Orator or Speaker, as
Confuls of the Commonwealth, and Prefidents of the Senate, be du-
ring the Term of their Magiftracy paid quarterly five hundred Pounds:
that the Enfigns of theſe Magiftracies be, a Sword born before the
General, and a Mace before the Speaker: that they be obliged to
wear Ducal Robes: and that what is faid of the Archon or General in
this Propofition, be underſtood only of the General fitting, and not
of the General marching.
18. THAT the General fitting, in cafe he be commanded to
march, receive Field-pay; and that a new General be forthwith elected
by the Senate to fucceed him in the Houſe, with all the Rights, Enfigns
and Emoluments of the General fitting, and this fo often as one or more
Generals are marching.
19.
THAT the three Commiffioners of the Great Scal, and the
three Commiffioners of the Treafury, ufing their Enfigns and Habit,
L111
and
826
The Rota.
1
and performing their other Functions as formerly, be paid quarterly
unto each of them three hundred feventy five Pounds.
20. THAT the Cenfors be each of them Chancellor of one Uni-
verfity by Vertue of their Election: That they govern the Ballot:
That they be Preſidents of the Council for Religion: That they have
under Appeal unto the Senate right to note and remove a Senator
that is fcandalous: That each have a Silver Wand for the Enfign of
his Magiftracy: That each be paid quarterly three hundred feventy
five Pounds, and be obliged to wear fcarlet Robes.
21. THAT the General fitting, the Speaker, and the fix Com-
miffioners aboveſaid, be the Seigniory of this Commonwealth.
22. THAT there be a Council of State confifting of fifteen Knights,
five out of each Order or Election; and that the fame be perpetuated
by the annual Election of five out of the new Knights, or laft elected
into the Senate.
23. THAT there be a Council for Religion confifting of twelve
Knights, four out of each Order, and perpetuated by the annual Elec-
tion of four out of the Knights laft elected into the Senate. That
there be a Council for Trade confifting of a like Number, elected and
perpetuated in the fame Manner.
24. THAT there be a Council of War, not elected by the Senate,
but elected by the Council of State out of themfelves. That this
Council of War confift of nine Knights, three out of each Order,
and be perpetuated by the annual Election of three out of the laft
Knights elected into the Council of State.
25. THAT in cafe the Senate add nine Knights more out of their
own Number into the Council of War, the faid Council be under-
ftood by fuch Addition, to be Dictator of the Commonwealth, for
the Term of three Months, and no longer, except by further Order
of the Senate the faid Dictatorian Power be prolonged for a like
Term.
26. THAT the Seigniory have Seffion and Suffrage, with Right
alfo jointly or ſeverally, to propoſe both in the Senate and in all
Senatorian Councils.
27. THAT each of the three Orders or Divifions of Knights in
each Senatorian Council elect one Provoft for the Term of one
Week; and that any two Provofts of the fame Council fo elected
may propofe unto the refpective Council, and not otherwiſe,
28. THAT fome fair Room or Rooms well furniſhed and at-
tended, be allowed at the State's Charge for a free and open Aca-
demy unto all Comers, at fome convenient Hour or Hours, to-
wards the Evening. That this Academy be governed according to
the Rules of good Breeding or civil Converfation, by fome or all of
the Propofers: and that in the fame it be lawful for any Man by
Word of Mouth, or by Writing, in jeft or in earneſt, to propoſe unto
the Propofers.
29. THAT for Embaffadors in ordinary there be four Reſidences,
as France, Spain, Venice, and Conftantinople: That every Refident
upon Election of a new Embaffador in ordinary, remove to the
next Refidence in the Order nominated, till having ſerved in them
all, he return home. That upon Monday next enſuing the laſt of
November, there be every fecond Year elected by the Senate fome
fit Perſon, being under thirty five Years of Age, and not of the Se-
nate,
The Rota.
627
nate, nor of the popular Affembly: That the Party fo elected repair
upon Monday next enfuing the laft of March following, as Embaf-
fador in Ordinary unto the Court of France, and there refide for the
Term of two Years, to be computed from the firſt of April next
enſuing his Election. That every Embaſſador in Ordinary be allow-
ed three thouſand Pounds a Year, during the Term of his Refiden-
cies; and that if a Reſident come to die, there be an extraordinary
Election into his Refidence for his Term, and for the Remainder of
his Removes, and Progrefs.
30. THAT all emergent Elections be made by Scrutiny, that is, by
a Council, or by Commiffioners propofing, and by the Senate refolving
in the manner following: That all Field Officers be propoſed by the
Council of War: that all Embaffadors extraordinary be propofed by
the Council of State: that all Judges and Serjeants at Law be propo-
fed by the Commiffioners of the Great Seal. That all Barons and
Officers of Truſt in the Exchequer be propoſed by the Commiffio-
ners of the Treafury, and that fuch as are thus propofed and ap-
proved by the Senate, be held lawfully elected.
31. THAT the Cognizance of all Matter of State to be confider-
ed, or Law to be enacted, whether it be provincial or national, do-
meſtick or foreign, appertain unto the Council of State That fuch
Affairs of either Kind as they fhall judge to require more Secrecy,
be remitted by this Council, and appertain unto the Council of War,
being for that End a felect Part of the fame. That the Cognizance
and Protection both of the national Religion, and of the Liberty of
Conſcience equally eſtabliſhed, after the Manner to be fhewn in the
religious Part of this Model, appertain unto the Council for Reli-
gion. That all Matter of Traffick and Regulation of the fame apper-
tain unto the Council for Trade. That in the Exerciſe of theſe feve-
ral Functions, which naturally are fenatorian or authoritative only,
no Council affume any other Power, than fuch only as fhall be efta-
ted
upon the fame by Act of Parliament.
32. THAT what fhall be propofed unto the Senate by one or
more of the Seigniory or Propofers general, or whatever was propofed
by any two of the Provoſts, or particular Propofers, unto their re-
ſpective Council; and upon Debate at that Council fhall come to be
propoſed by the fame unto the Senate, be neceffarily debatable and
debated by the Senate. That in all Cafes wherein Power is derived
unto the Senate by Law made or by Act of Parliament, the Reſult of
the Senate be ultimate; that in all Cafes of Law to be made, or not
already provided for by Act of Parliament, as War and Peace, Levy
of Men, or Money or the like, the Refult of the Senate be not ul-
timate. That whatſoever is decreed by the Senate upon a Cafe
wherein their Reſult is not ultimate, be propoſed by the Senate unto
the Prerogative Tribe, or Repreſentative of the People, except only
in Cafes of fuch Speed or Secrecy, wherein the Senate fhall judge the
neceffary Slowneſs, or Opennefs, in this way of proceeding, to be of
Detriment, or Danger unto the Commonwealth.
33. THAT if upon the Motion or Propofition of a Council or Propo-
fer General, the Senate add nine Knights, promifcuouſly chofen out of
their own Number unto the Council of War; the fame Council, as
thereby made Dictator, have Power of Life and Death, as alfo to
enact Laws in all fuch Cafes of Speed or Secrecy for and during the
Lill 2
Term
628
The Rota.
Term of three Months and no longer, except upon new Order from
the Senate. And that all Laws enacted by the Dictator be good and
valid for the Term of one Year and no longer, except the fame be
propofed by the Senate, and refolved by the People.
34 THAT the Burgeffes of the annual Election returned by the
Tribes, enter into the Prerogative Tribe, popular Affembly, or Repre-
ſentative of the People, upon Monday next enfuing the laft of March;
and that the like number of Burgeffes, whofe Term is expired, re-
cede at the fame time. That the Burgeffes thus entered, elect unto
themſelves out of their own Number, two of the Horfe, one to be
Captain, and the other to be Cornet of the fame; and two of the
Foot, one to be Captain, and the other to be Enfign of the fame
each for the Term of three Years. That thefe Officers being thus
elected, the whole Tribe or Affembly proceed to the Election of four
annual Magiſtrates, two out of the Foot to be Tribunes of the Foot,
and two out of the Horfe to be Tribunes of the Horſe. That the
Tribunes be Commanders of this Tribe in Chief, fo far as it is a mili-
tary Body, and Preſidents of the fame, as it is a civil Affembly.
And lastly, that this whole Tribe be paid weekly, as followeth:
Unto each of the Tribunes of Horſe feven Pounds. Unto each of
the Tribunes of Foot fix Pounds. Unto each of the Captains of
Horfe five Pounds. Unto each of the Captains of Foot four Pounds.
Unto each of the Cornets three Pounds. Unto each of the Enfigns
two Pounds, ſeven Shillings. Unto every Horfeman two Pound; and
to every one of the Foot one Pound, ten Shillings.
35. THAT inferior Officers, as Captains, Cornets, Enfigns, be
only for the Military Difcipline of this Squadron or Tribe. That
the Tribunes have Seffion in the Senate without Suffrage; that
they have Seffion of Courſe and with Suffrage in the Dictatorian Coun-
cil, fo often as it is created by the Senate. That they be Preſidents of
the Court in all Cafes, to be judged by the People: And that they
have Right under an Appeal unto popular Affembly, to note or re-
move any Deputy or Burgeſs that is fcandalous.
36. THAT Peculate or Defraudation of the Publick, all Cafes
tending to the Subverfion of the Government, be triable by this Re-
prefentative; and that there be an Appeal unto the fame in all Cauſes,
and from all Magiſtrates, Courts, and Councils, whether National
or Provincial.
37. THAT the Right of Debate, as alfo of propofing to the Peo-
ple, be wholly and only in the Senate, without any Power at all of Re-
fult, not derived from the People.
38. THAT the Power of Reſult be wholly and only the popular
Affembly, without any Right at all of Debate.
39. THAT the Senate having debated and agreed upon a Law to
be propoſed, cauſe Promulgation of the fame to be made for the Space
of fix Weeks before Propofition, that is, cauſe the Law to be
printed and publiſhed, ſo long before it is to be propoſed.
40. THAT Promulgation being made, the Seigniory demand of
the Tribunes being preſent in the Senate, an Affembly of the People.
That the Tribunes upon fuch Demand by the Seigniory or by the Senate,
be obliged to affemble the Prerogative Tribe or Reprefentative of the
People in Arms by found of Trumpet with Drums beating, and Co-
lours flying, in any Town, Field, or Market-place, being not above
fix
The Rota.
629
fix Miles diftant, upon the Day and at the Hour appointed, except
the meeting through Inconvenience of the Weather, or the like, be
prorogued by confent of the Seigniory and the Tribunes: That the Pre-
rogative Tribe being affembled accordingly, the Senate propoſe to
them by two or more of the Senatorian Magiſtrates thereunto ap-
pointed, at the firft Premulgation of the Law: That the Propofers
for the Senate open unto the People the Occafion, Motives and Rea-
fons of the Law to be propofed; and the fame being done, put it by
diſtinct Clauſes unto the Ballot of the People. That if any material
Clauſe or Clauſes be rejected by the People, they be reviewed by the
Senate, altered, and propoſed, if they think fit, to the third time,
but no oftner.
41. THAT what is thus propofed by the Senate, and reſolved
by the People, be the Law of the Land, and no other, except as in
the Cafe referved unto the Dictatorian Council.
42. THAT every Magiftracy, Office, or Election, throughout
this whole Commonwealth, whether annual or triennial, be under-
ftood of Confequence, to injoin an Interval or Vacation equal unto the
Term of the fame. That the Magiſtracy of a Knight and of a
Burgeſs, be in this Relation underſtood as one and the fame; and that
this Order regard only fuch Elections as are national and domeſtick,
and not fuch as are provincial or foreign.
43. THAT for an Exception to this Rule, where there is but
one Elder of the Horſe in one and the fame Pariſh, that Elder be eli-
gible in the fame without Interval; and where there be four Elders of
the Horſe or above in one and the fame Pariſh, there be not under
nor above Half of them eligible at the fame Election.
44. THAT throughout all the Affemblies and Councils of this
Commonwealth, the Quorum confift of one Half in the time of
Health, and of one third Part in a time of Sickneſs, being fo declared
by the Senate.
45.
·T
PART II.
For the religious Part, it is propofed:
HAT the Univerfities, being prudently reformed, be pre-
ſerved in their Rights and Indowments for and towards the
Education and Provifion of an able Miniſtry.
46. THAT the legal and ancient Provifion for the national Mi-
niftry be fo augmented, that the meanest fort of Livings or Benefices,
without Defalcation from the greater, be each improved to the Re-
venue of one hundred Pounds a Year, at the leaſt.
47. THAT a Benefice becoming void in any Pariſh, the Elders of
the fame may affemble, and give Notice unto the Vice-Chancellor of
either Univerſity, by Certificate, fpecifying the true Value of that
Benefice; that the Vice-Chancellor upon a Receipt of fuch Certificate,
be obliged to call a Congregation of the Univerfity; that the Congre-
gation of the Univerfity to this End affembled, having regard unto the
Value of the Benefice, make choice of a Perfon fitted for the minif-
terial Function, and return him unto the Pariſh fo requiring; that the
Pro-
630
The Rota.
Probationer, thus returned unto a Pariſh, by either of the Univerſities,
exerciſe the Office and receive the Benefits, as Miniſter of the Pariſh
for the Term of one Year. That the Term of one Year expired, the
Elders of the Pariſh aſſemble, and put the Election of the Probationer
unto the Ballot. That if the Probationer have three Parts in four of
the Balls or Votes in the Affirmative, he be thereby ordained and
elected Miniſter of that Pariſh; not afterwards to be degraded or re-
moved but by the Cenfors of the Tribe, the Phylarch of the fame,
or the Council of Religion, in fuch Cafes as fhall be unto them re-
ferved by Act of Parliament. That in cafe the Probationer come to
fail of three Parts in four at the Ballot, he depart from that Pariſh;
and if he return unto the Univerſity, it be without Diminution of the
former Offices or Preferments which he there enjoyed, or any Preju-
dice unto his future Preferment; and that it be lawful in this cafe for
any Pariſh to ſend fo often to either Univerfity, and be the Duty of
either Vice-Chancellor, upon fuch Certificates, to make return of diffe-
rent Probationers, till fuch time as the Elders of that Pariſh have fitted
themſelves with a Minifter of their own Choice and Liking.
48. THAT the national Religion be exerciſed according to a Di-
rectory in that Cafe, to be made and publiſhed by Act of Parliament.
That the national Miniſtry be permitted to have no other publick Pre-
ferment or Office in this Commonwealth. That a national Minifter
being convict of Ignorance or Scandal, be moveable out of his Bene-
fice by the Cenfors of the Tribe, under an Appeal unto the Phylarch,
or to the Council for Religion.
49. THAT no Religion being contrary unto, or deftructive of
Chriſtianity, nor the publick Exerciſe of any Religion, being grounded
upon, or incorporated into a foreign Intereft, be protected by, or to-
lerated in this State. That all other Religions, with the publick Exer-
cife of the fame, be both tolerated and protected by the Council of
Religion; and that all Profeffors of any fuch Religion, be equally ca-
pable of all Elections, Magiftracies, Preferments and Offices, in this
Commonwealth, according unto the Orders of the fame.
50.T
PART III.
For the military Part it is propofed:
HAT annually upon Wednesday next enſuing the laſt of De-
cember, the Youth of each Pariſh, under the Inſpection of
the two Overſeers of the ſame, affemble, and elect the fifth Man of
their Number, or one in five of them, to be for the Term of that
Year, Deputies of the Youth of that Pariſh.
•
51. THAT annually, on Wednesday next enfuing the laſt of Janu-
ary, the faid Deputies of the refpective Pariſhes meet at the Ca-
pital of the Hundred, where there are Games and Prizes allotted for
them, as hath been fhewed elſewhere, that there they elect to them-
ſelves out of their own Number, one Captain, and one Enfign. And
that of theſe Games, and this Election, the Magiftrates, and Officers
of the Hundred, be Preſidents and Judges for the impartial Diftribution
of the Prizes.
52. THAT annually, upon Wedneſday next enfuing the laſt of
February, the Youth through the whole Tribe thus elected, be re-
ceived at the Capital of the fame, by the Lieutenant, as Commander
in
ปี 1
The Rota.
631
in chief, by the Conductor, and by the Cenfors; that under Inſpection
of theſe Magiſtrates, the faïd Youth be entertained with more fplendid
Games, difciplined in a more military Manner, and divided by Lot
into fundry Parts or Effays, according to Rules elfewhere given.
THAT the whole Youth of the Tribe thus affèmbled be the
53.
firft Effay. That out of the firft Effay there be caft by Lot two hun-
dred Horfe, and fix hundred Foot; that they whom their Friends will,
or themſelves can mount, be accounted Horſe, the reft Foot. That
theſe Forces amounting in the fifty Tribes to ten thouſand Horſe, and
thirty thoufand Foot, be always ready to march at a Week's warning;
and that this be the fecond Effay, or the ſtanding Army of the Com-
monwealth.
54. THAT for the holding of each Province, the Commonwealth
in the first Year affign an Army of the Youth, confifting of feven
thousand five hundred Foot, and one thouſand five hundred Horfe.
That for the Perpetuation of thefe provincial Armies, or Guards,
there be annually at the Time and Place mentioned, caft out of the
firſt Effay of the Youth, in each Tribe or Shire ten Horfe, and fifty
Foot; that is, in all the Tribes five hundred Horfe, and two thou
fand five hundred Foot for Marpefia, the like for Pampea, and the like
of both Orders for the Sea-Guards, being each obliged to ferve for the
Term of three Years upon the State's Pay.
55. THAT the Senate and the People, or the Dictator, having
decreed or declared War, and the Field-Officers being appointed by the
Council of War; the General, by Warrant iffued unto the Lieutenants
of the Tribes, demand the fecond Effay, or fuch Part of it, as is de-
creed, whether by way of levy or recruit. That by the fame War-
rant he appoint his Time and Rendezvous; that the feveral Conductors
of the Tribes or Shires deliver him the Forces demanded at the Time
and Place appointed. That a General thus marching out with the
Standing Army, a new Army be elected out of the firſt Effay as for-
merly, and a new General be elected by the Senate; that ſo always
there be a General fitting, and a Standing Army, what Generals fo-
ever be marching. And that in Cafe of Invafion, the Bands of the
Elders be obliged unto like Duty with thoſe of the Youth.
56. THAT an only Son be diſcharged of theſe Duties without
Prejudice. That of two Brothers, there be but one admitted to foreign
Service at one time. That of more Brothers not above Half. That
whoever otherwiſe refuſeth his Lot, except upon Cauſe ſhewn he be
diſpenſed withal by the Phylarch, or upon Penitence, he be by them
pardoned and reſtored by fuch refufal, be uncapable of electing, or
being elected in this Commonwealth; as alfo, that he pay unto the
State a fifth of his Revenue for Protection, beſides Taxes. That Di-
vines, Phyſicians and Lawyers, as alfo Trades not at leiſure for the
Effays, be fo far forth exempted from this Rule, that they be ſtill capable
of all Preferments in their reſpective Profeffions with Indemnity.
57. THAT upon Warrants iſſued forth by the General for Recruits
or Levies, there be an Affembly of the Phylarch in each Tribe: That
fuch Voluntiers or Men being above thirty Years of Age, as are defi-
rous of farther Imployment in Arms, appear before the Phylarch fo
affembled. That any Number of theſe not exceeding one Moiety of
the Recruits or Levies of that Tribe or Shire, may be taken on by the
Phylarch, fo many of the Youth being at the Difcretion of this
Council diſbanded, as are taken on of the Voluntiers. That the Le-
vies
632
The Rota.
vies thus made, be conducted by the Conductor of the refpective
Tribe or Shire, unto the Rendezvous appointed : And that the Service of
theſe be without other Term or Vacation, than at the Diſcretion of
the Senate and the People, or fuch Inftructions unto the General, as
fhall by them in that cafe be provided.
PART IV.
For the provincial Part it is propoſed:
58. THAT upon Expiration of Magiftracy in the Senate, or at the
annual Recefs of one third Part of the fame, there be elected
by the Senate out of the Part receding into each provincial Council
four Knights for the Term of three Years, thereby to render each pro-
vincial Council, prefuming it in the beginning to have been confti-
tuted of twelve Knights, divided after the manner of the Senate, by
three ſeveral Lifts or Elections, of annual, triennial and perpetual
Revolution or Rotation.
59. THAT out of the fame third Part of the Senate annually re-
ceding, there be unto each Province one Knight elected for the Term
of one Year. That the Knight fo elected be the provincial Archon,
General or Governor. That a provincial Archon, Governor or Gene-
ral, receive annually in April, at his Rendezvous appointed, the Youth or
Recruits elected in the precedent Month to that end by the Tribes, and
by their Conductors delivered accordingly. That he repair with the
faid Youth and Recruits, unto his refpective Province, and there diímiſs
that Part of the provincial Guard or Army, whofe triennial Term is ex-
pired. That each provincial Governor have the Conduct of Affairs of
War and of State, in his refpective Province, with Advice of the pro-
vincial Council; and that he be Prefident of the fame.
60. THAT each provincial Council elect three weekly Propofers or
Provoſts, after the manner, and to the Ends already fhewn in the Con-
ftitution of Senatorian Councils; and that the Provoſt of the fenior Lift
during his Term, be Prefident of the Council in Abſence of the pro-
vincial Archon, or General.
61. THAT each provincial Council proceed according unto Inftruc-
tions received from the Council of State, and keep Intelligence with
the fame by any two of their Provofts, for the Government of the
Province as to matter of War, or of State. That upon Levies of na-
tive, or proper Arms, by the Senate and the People, a provincial
Council, having unto that End received Orders, make Levies of pro-
vincial Auxiliaries accordingly. That Auxiliary Arms upon no Occa-
fion whatſoever exceed the proper or native Arms in Number. That
for the reft, the provincial Council maintain the Provincials, defraying
their peculiar Guards and Council, by ſuch known Proportion of Tri-
butes, as on them ſhall be ſet by the Senate and the People, in their
proper Rights, Laws, Liberties and Immunities, fo far forth as upon
the Merits of the Caufe, whereupon they were fubdued, it feemed
good unto the Senate and the People to confirm them. And that it
be lawful for the Provincials to appeal from their provincial Magiftrates,
Councils, or Generals, to the People of Oceana.
FINI S.
1
INDE X
OF THE
PRINCIPAL MATTERS
Treated of in
HARRINGTON's WORKS*.
* N. B. This INDEX does not particularly refer to the ſmall Tracts at the End
of the Volume; they being only the fame Principles defended, abridged
or reduc'd to Aphorifms. Yet in the perufal of theſe the Index will be
found no leſs uſeful; as it will direct the Reader to a fuller Explana-
tion or Proof of any Phraſe or Pofition that may ſeem to want it.
A.
Academy of Provoſts, to receive
Intelligence
BSENCE, leave of, its conditions
142.
pag.
178.
A and of 168:
Aldermen of Emporium (London) their Election— 169.
170.
pag.
Agriculture, its Praiſes
Propoſals and
128,442.
Achaeans, their Commonwealth
79, 123.
their Council called the Synarchy.
their Policy
130.
311.
Achan, his Crime and Puniſhment
407, 408.
Adam, his Dominion
8.
Court of
Alexander the Great
Alienations Statute of, its Effects
Alma, the Palace of St. James.
Ambaſſadors in ordinary of Oceana
Anarchy
215, 289.
40, 69, 389.
125, 442.
40, 308, 388, 446.
Adoxus, K. John
68.
Adrian (the Emperor) publiſhes an Edict againſt the Jews
of Ifrael under the Judges
of the Engliſh Levellers
413-416.
430.
358.
S. Andrew, Order of
20.
Aetolians, Commonwealth of
79.
Annuity of Orphan Maids on what terms fettled in
Agathocles Tyrant of Syracufe
70.
Oceana
222.
Agrarian (Law) neceffary to a ſtable Government-40,
391, 392.
invented by Phaleas
103.
Aphorifms political (a Treatife)
Apoſtles, the Ariftocracy of the Church
Appeal, how to be made in Oceana
Equal, what it is
54.
feveral kinds of it
of Rome, Athens and Lacedemon
ultimate belongs to the People-158,
none from the DICTATOR
496-523-
366.
none from the Seventy Elders to Mofes
155.
159, 445.
159, 443.
291.
57, 61.
399,
of OCEANA, Marpefia and Panopea 102, 290,
407.
435, 458.
Appius Claudius, a fierce Enemy of the Roman People
additional Clauſes to it
is a reaſonable Standard
456.
144.
457,
458.
ARCHON,(or fole Legiſlator) Olphaus Megaletor (Crom-
well) created by the Army
78.
alters not Property
290.
not impoffible
110.
his Speech for the Agrarian Law
in Defence of the Ballot-
104.
120.
Arguments againſt it
103, 104.
-anfwered
wars not againſt Cuſtom
in Ifrael
Agreement of the People (a Scheme of the Engliſh Le-
vellers fo called) confuted
104-111.
put upon the Commonwealth of Oceana itſelf
or its Equivalent is in every Commonwealth
221.
290 & feqq. vid. 105.
defended againſt (the Confiderer) Mr. Wren
292.
298.
not unjuſt
not affected by the Rife and Fall of Money
302.
- on the Perfection of the Common-
wealth of Oceana, that it is capable of the Patronage
of the World
192.
302, 303.
57, 408.
defends the Conftitution of his Commonwealth
againſt an Opinion of Machiavel
149, 152.
the MODEL
430, 431,
·
abdicates his Magiſtracy and retires
*A
his Proclamation upon the Promulgation of
209.
212.
ARCHON
TATOR
concerning the Councils and Dic-
on the zoth Order
129.
133.
on the 22d Order
143.
or Comment cn Order 23d- 157.
on the 25th, 26th, 27th Orders
165, 177.
INDEX of the
307, 394.
pag.
217.
ARCHON, is made PROTECTOR during Life
his Death and Monumental Inſcription-227,
228.
(Prince of the Sanhedrim of Ifrael) 50.
of Athens
Areopagites, Council of, an Athenian Judicatory-138.
Ariftocracy natural, diffuſed by God through Mankind
Ballance of the Norman Monarchy
pag.
67.
whence it came to be in the popular Party 69,
its Effects
National and Provincial
388.
73.
250.
whether from diftinét Balances under one head,
a new one reſults?
ibid.
47.
of France
271.
of Oceana
of Lacedemon
fuch by Jofephus and Philo
of the Jews
is never Pure
See Government.
133.
of the Hebrew-Monarchy
416.
308.
compared with that of Lacedemon
- the Commonwealth of Ifrael miſtaken for
417.
355.
of the Commonwealth of Ifrael reftored after
356.
the Captivity
420.
393.
See Government, Commonwealth.
Standing
Affemblys popular
Ariftides, his Cafe
Ariftotle quoted
Arms (and Contracts)
Monarchy by
of feveral kinds
35, 37, 41, 45, 292, 295, &c.
proper of three kinds.
improper of two kinds
of Subjects and of Servants
a neceffary Diſtinction of their Uſe
See Mercenarys, Auxiliarys, War.
Army, how it may be planted.
Parliamentary, of Oceana, State of it
may fet up a Commonwealth
Afia, a threefold Acceptation of the Name
of Ifrael, how held
Athens, the Conftitution of her Commonwealth
212.
Ballot of Ifrael compared with that of Venice
fuffrages by, moſt free
50.
5+.
of a Parish in Oceana, explained.
86.
41.
of a Hundred
89, 90.
267.
for Captains and Enfigns
92.
275.
of a Tribe in Oceana
93.
277.
of Venice, defcribed at large
111-fee
-fee 394.
ibid.
83, 84, 100, 278.
and Refult
279.
70.
Trials
217, 219.
224, 225.
433.
is of two Parts, Lot and Suffrage, or Propofition
in the Senate of Oceana
of the Prerogative Tribe of Oceana in judiciary
of the Youth for Provincial Service
of the Provincial Militia
for conferring the Protectorship of Oceana 217,
114.
132.
156, 157.
175.
191.
333.
218.
143, 153.
49, 404.
in the Commonwealth of Ifrael 343, 403, 407.
Ballotins, Regulation concerning them
162.
51,
Barons, Gothic
63.
306, 527.
inequal
57, 446.
after the Conqueft, of three kinds-
Wars, their Riſe
67.
67, 68, 388.
Oligarchy of
76.
by Writ
68.
her Senate
50, 138.
by Letters Patent
ibid.
her popular Affembly
143, 153.
her Care in educating the Youth
her Commonwealth why called a
172.
of the Exchequer in Oceana, how elected 125.
Beacons to be fired in cafe of an Invafion
170.
Democracy
Bean, Senate of the (fee Athens)
306.
308.
Beglerbeg in the Turkish Empire
392.
332.
128.
8.
39.
an Abſtract of her Hiſtory from Strabo
Attendance of the Councils of Oceana
Auguftus, an Ufurper
Authority diftinguiſhed from Power --
ought to be united with it 44, 45.
derives from Virtue, and that from Reaſon
45.
―of the Fathers (Au&toritas Patrum) founded
in Nature
47.
Autovopía, (peculiar or domeftic Government remaining
in a Province)
371, 377.
Auxiliary Troops
277, 278.
B.
BALIOL, his Title and Succeffion to the Crown of Scot-
land
25.
Ballance (of Dominion) in Lands- 39, 243, 244, 387.
whether it be the natural Caufe of
Empire
in Money
the Territory
243.
40.
when better than in Land 245.
in what Cafes it cannot overbalance
246, 247.
41, 292.
its Neceffity ſeen by Ariftotle
narrowly miss'd by Machiavel, but confirined
by his Judgment in many Places
42.
how partially ſeen by the greateft Authors 389,
Boroughs, the Antiquity of their Rights -
Boxhornius, a new coined Diſtinction of his
Brothers younger, their Intereft provided for in the A-
grarian Law
107, 108.
25.
172.
Bruce his Title to the Crown of Scotland
Brutus his Sons, their unhappy Prejudices
Buchanan copies Hector Boyes and the Book of Paiſley
16.
208.
Burgeffes (or Deputys) in Oceana, their Election—98,
439.
C.
Cabala and Cabaliſtic Commonwealth of the Jews 421.
Caefar the Dictator, miſerable by his Ambition, ſo
painted by Boccalini
how we may know what the Romans thought
of him
215.
Cake, the manner of dividing it by two Girls explains
the whole Myſtery of a Commonwealth-- 47, 253.
Camillus his Cafe
212.
Benefices (ecclefiaftical) in Oceana, their Value
Beneficiarii Milites
127.
62.
Benjamin, Tribe of, War levyed againft it
Boccalini his Compariſon of 7. Cæfar and
159, 399.
Andrea Do-
ria
208.
his Fable of Harpocrates
Body Political reſembles the Natural
Books, how they lead into Errors concerning Govern-
231.
313.
ment
5.
66.
14.
390.
of foreign Empire
42, 43, 44.
its feveral Kinds
44, 290.
Cappadocians renounce their Liberty
Captain of the Hundred in Oceana
334-
90,93.
variouſly introduced and altered
290, 291.
of the Roman Empire
62.
Capuans how diverted from their Deſign of murdering
their Senate
255.
Gothic
63.
Carthage, its Commonwealth
.51.
of the Saxon Monarchy
65.
Caruca (Plowland)
65.
Cenfors
PRINCIPAL MATTERS.
'Cenfors of a Tribe in Oceana (1ft and 2d)
pag.
95, 96.
of the Tropic (1ft and 2d) 114, 123, 131, 441.
Cenfus, or Valuation of Eftate, in Rome and Oceana
82, 84.
162, 163, 224.
Charges publick, of Oceana
CHARLES I. his Character and Fall
— VII. of France, alters the
how
31, 32, 391.
Conftitution and
274.
Children (in Oceana) what Number exempts from
Taxes
Chirothefia (Impofition of Hands)
Government
Princes
pag!
Committees, the Abuſe of them
129, 130.
Commons, Houfe of, how become formidable to their
69.
COMMONWEALTH, an Empire of Laws and not of
Men, according to Ariftotle and Livy 45, 386, 393-
whether rightly fo defined ?— 240.
48.
called by Ariftotle the Kingdom of GoD
its conftituent Parts
97.
57, 327, 349.
deduced from Monarchical or Aristocratical
350.
the ſeveral Uſes of it, from Dr. Hammond
351, 352.
52.
of Ifrael, Athens, Lacedemon, Rome, &c.
49, 51, 79, 524.
of ISRAEL
81,397.
and why?
its Diffolution
412.
414.
neceffary in Ifrael, when the Chirotonia
failed
357.
the Confequences of it
358.
not neceſſary to Ordination
304.
the fame as Election
See Ordination, Chirotonia, Election.
Chirotonia (Suffrage by holding up the Hands) 88, 138,
369.
ancient Uſe of the Word
182, 309, 310.
250, 327, 340.
deduced from popular Government 340-
of GOD, what is meant by it
among the Jews changed to the Chirothefia
350.
347.
Rome
354.
once
359.
whether different from the Chirothefia?
the moſt ancient way of Ordination. 364.
excludes not the Election of the Holy Ghost
more than the Chirothefia (Acts xiii.)
369.
Ufe of the Word according to Dr. Ham-
373.
ibid. & feq.
how rendered in feveral Tranflations of the
mond
refuted
never thoroughly eftablifhed,
of the Jews after the Captivity 350-421.
of LACEDEMON, and of ROME 82, 526,
528.
of feveral kinds-as fingle or leagued 54,
394.
for Prefervation or Increase
ibid. & 147.
equal or inequal ibid. & 149.
equal, its Definition
55, 259, 394.
Objections againſt it anſwered
55, 56, 259.
inequal, in Ifrael, Lacedemon, Athens and
57, 273.
ought to be conſtituted by one Man, and at
77, 78, 395.
two natural Cauſes of its Diffolution 193.
to be propagated three Ways
195.
whether ever conquered by any Monarch,
if not broken by itſelf ?
its Antiquity
of CRETE, Epitome of it
284-290.
396.
371.
of Salem, Philifia, Midian and Gibean
396, 397.
concerning its Eftablishment in England
xxix, xxx, 539.
as apply'd to GoD or Men
City of Emporium (London) its Government, according
Bible
376.
See Election, Government, &c.
CHRIST his Kingdom not earthly-8, 425, 427.
Church-See Government, Clergy, Ordination.
Church-wardens (in Oceana) their Election
Chufing (laſt Reſult) the Right and Office of the Peo-
ple
48,253, 446.
359, 360.
of OCEANA, its Generation
72.
copied from the beſt Models
86.
79.
its MODEL
81.
169.
Conveniences of the Alterations to be
170.
169.
ibid.
170.
its Inftitution
its Conſtitution
its Primum Mobile
immortal
Epitome of it
192, 193, 266.
copies after that of Ifrael 294,
Queries concerning it 323,
83-101.
101.
86.
204.
295.
299.
- 411.
324.
may be extenſive
460.
may poffibly tyrannize in the Government
of Provinces
ibid.
to the new Model
made
Tribes and Wards, with their Names
Liverys, Companys and Elections
its Increaſe not dangerous
Citys of Refuge their Inſtitution and Uſe
Civil and Military Affairs and Counfels neceffarily to be
diftinguiſhed
7.
Claffes (three) of the Prerogative Tribe of Oceana 142.
the 3d fees executed the Sentences of Criminals
Clergy-See Minifters.
trate
157.
their Function naturally pertains to the Magif-
•
Landed, their Original
ibid.
Confequences of their being a third Eftate 272,
358.
generally against a Commonwealth, and why?
297, 380, 432, 470.
College of Venice
Colonys, the Roman Policy in planting
Military
130, 311.
43.
62.
Comitia Curiata-Centuriata-Tributa- 82, 83, 147.
Command joint, pernicious in War
188, 189.
Commandments the Ten, whether propoſed by GOD
(or Mofes) and voted by Ifrael?
257.
Commiffioners of the Great Seal of Oceana-114, 441.
-of the Treafury ..
123, 441.
74.
169.
altho' not rightly ordered, is yet leſs ſe-
ditious than the best of Monarchys
461.
See Government, Model, Monarchy, Ifrael, Athens, &c.
Commonwealth's-man (Engliſh)
Companys of the City of London.
Conductor (Quarter-Mafter-General of a Tribe) 95-
Confifcations, unnatural, and infufficient for planting a
Monarchy
of three kinds
Conqueft, when eafy, when difficult
Confcience, how mifled in favour of Monarchy
Liberty of, See Liberty.
Confiderations upon Oceana (a Pamphlet) by Mr. Wren
235-
Conſtable of a Pariſh in Oceana, his Election
High, of a Hundred
Conful of a Roman Province
of Rome
70-72.
344.
275, 276.
7.
86.
90.
236, 237.
394-
Contradiction, a neceffary Cauſe of the Diffolution of
Government
193, 234, 463.
Gonvallium
INDEX of the
Convallium-See Hampton-Court.
Coraunus-See Henry VIII.
Corollary to Oceana
pag.
211.
Corruption in Government and Manners, how con-
nected
Cofmi, Magiftrates in Crete
73.
371.
Council (in Oceana) of State-of War-of Religion-
of Trade-of the Provosts
124, 441.
the proper Buſineſs of each ——126, 127, 442
pag.
346, 353.
336.
Dictatorian Power of Mofes and Joſhua
Dictatorſhip perpetual, how introduced by Sylla 62.
Dioceſes of a Roman Province
Directory for the publick Exercife of Religion-451.
Difpatch of Buſineſs a pretended Advantage of Monar-
chy
Difciples, amongst the Jews
14.
354, 355-
their Attendance
128.
the 120 (Act. i. 15.) fhuffled into a Paren-
thefis by the Divines
Divan in the Turkish Empire
365, 366.
(great) of Venice
392.
-of Ten, (de' Dieci) —
Councils of Princes
158, 311.
130, 131, 312.
130, 131, 312.
282, 283.
312.
458.
of Venice, their Rights and Functions-
provincial
Counsellors of Princes in theſe later Times are but Ex-
pedient-mongers (Bacon)
Counts Palatin
County
how related to Empire
134. DORIA (Andrea) a happy Deliverer of his Country 209.
66.
Dividing and Chufing (debating and refolving)-47, 48.
Divination deftroyed not the Liberty of the People's Suf-
frage
350, 370, 405.
Dominion what?
perfonal
39.
40.
101, 243.
Courfes-See Rotation.
Court of Aldermen
-of Westminster
64,65.
E.
Earl, of the Gothic Creation
170.
171.
in the Saxon Monarchy
under the Normans
60.
Courts of Judicatory beſt conſtituted in Venice-
Crete, its Conftitution by Minos and Rhadamanthus
371.
Crimes, their Trial and Puniſhment in Oceana 156,
157.
Croefus, more potent in Gold than Iron, buys Com-
monwealths
284.
Cromwell (Olphaus Megaletor) how ſuppoſed to be af-
fected by a Paffage of Machiavel
77.
his Diffimulation and miſtaken Ambition xx,
See Archon.
Crowner of a Hundred in Oceana
Culdys, an Order of religious Men
Curia, in the Commonwealth of Rome
D.
xxi.
90.
18,21.
82, 83.
ibid.
95, 96.
praerogativa and jure vocata
Cuftos Rotulorum, Muſter-Maſter-General of a Tribe
Daughters (in Oceana) the greateſt Portion that is al-
lowed them
102,435.
the Advantages of this Settle-
63.
64, 65.
66.
Ecclefia, what is meant by it 49, 138, 259, 307, 338,
Education the plastic Art of Government
of the Youth of Oceana
its feveral Kinds-
339.
172.
173.
177.
183, 184.
25.
its Effects
EDWARD I. his Affairs in Scotland
Elosyyɛhía (a Crime not provided againſt by the Law)
307, 310.
Eldad and Medad, the Paffage concerning them, ( Num.
xi) explained
50, 345, 352, 406.
Elders, at what Age fo accounted in Oceana-83, 437-
Election-of Kings, its Conditions and Confequences 9.
of the Sanhedrim in Ifrael
345, 415.
404.
of Saal K. of Ifrael
in the Senate of Oceana, threefold-122,442.
of Ambaffadors in ordinary- 125.
extraordinary, or by Scrutiny ibid.
of the Officers and Magiftrates of
the PREROGATIVE
in Emporium (London)
ment
!
109, 110.
David (King) makes no Law but by Propofition to the
People
popular
Ecclefiaftical, various
398.
and Hammond
4.16.
142.
394.
362.
acquires a Monarchical Balance
Deacons, their Ordination (A&t. vi.) conformable to an
Athenian Pattern
367, 368.
Death of a Commonwealth, violent or natural- 193.
natural of two kinds
ibid.
Debate belongs to the Senate of a Commonwealth 47,
253,446.
in the popular Councils of Oceana, punished
allowed to the People by Grotius
362.
of the People, the Election of GOD- 365.
excludes not that of the Holy Ghoft
See Ballot.
Electors of a Hundred in Oceana, how chofen-
ſeveral Orders of, in the Ballot
of the German Empire
ELIZABETH (Q) plays Love-tricks with her People,
and neglects the Nobility
369, 370.
90.
115.
362.
97, 141, 143.
Decemvirs of Rome
Demiurgs of the Achaeans
76.
130.
Democracy
never can be pure
Denmark, King of, his advantageous Situation-
Deputys parochial (in Oceana) how chofen
(Reprefentative of the People) three chofen out
of the Horſe, and four out of the Foot, in each Tribe
Dicaearchus defcribes the Commonwealth of Lacedemon
Dicotome, fee Richard II.
DICTATOR of Oceana (on extraordinary Emergencys)
a Junta fo called
38, 308.
393.
69, 390.
yet unhappily omits to eſtabliſh a
perfect popular Government
390.
Emperors Roman, their Policy and wretched Condition
289.
44.
86.
Empire and Authority, to what they are related and
how diftinguiſhed
39.
domestic and foreign
ibid.
follows the Balance of Dominion
101, 387.
98.
from Increaſe of Strength
249.
univerfal, whence to be look'd for
288.
81.
See Government, Monarchy.
Emporium (London)-See City.
England-See Oceana.
of Ten
128-132, 441.
its Power neceffary and fafe 130,
443, 446.
reſembles the Venetian Council
131.
Enfign of a Hundred, in Oceana
90.
Ephefus, Tumult there, raiſed by the Silversmiths 338,
339-
Ephori of Lacedemon, their Inſtitution and Power 150,
of Ifrael-See Judge.
Epiftata in Athens, who?
159.
307.
Erafmus,
PRINCIPAL MATTERS.
Erafmus, and his Paraphrafe
pag.
328.
76.
Errors of the People from their Governors
Effays (military Divifions) of the Youth of Oceana 174,
175, 186, 187, 452.
Effenes, Cuſtoms of theirs which were of Civil Úſe, af-
terwards introduced into the Chriftian Church- 57.
Excife of Oceana to be applied to the public Uſe for
161.
eleven Years
when to be for ever aboliſhed 163, 221.
Excommunication, a kind of it eſtabliſhed by a Law
under Efdras
50.
-not clearly proveable by Scripture 88.
F.
Factions often productive of Good ------- 7; 14, 15.
Family, Monarchical and Popular
in Ifrael (its Import)
Catalogue of them
385.
402.
ibid.
Fathers of the Church their Writings, how uſeleſs in
Civil Controverfys
9.
of the People, a metaphorical Expreffion abufed
in favour of Kingly Government
I 2.
FERNE (Dr. H.) his Difpute with Mr. Harrington xxiv,
p'g.
68.
235.
236.
Government, when a Wrestling-Match?
private Men may write on it
12 Queſtions concerning it
which eafieft to be conquered and held 275,
276.
the Art of, not fo deep as is pretended 322,
which most natural--
386.
46, 381, 388.
of Heaven, an Argument from it 382.
its Foundation and Superftructures- 385.
its Divine Right
388.
none, either Ecclefiaftical or Civil infti-
tuted by God but upon the Principles of Human Pru-
of Greece
of OCEANA, not ſubject to Diffolution
dence
MONARCHICAL
427.
237.
161, 193.
for Extent and Number of Do-
3.
minions exceeds the Popular
Reaſons of this which fway (1.)
the lefs knowing Part of Mankind, and (2.) Men of
Speculation
3, 4, 5, 6, 7.
not founded in the Law of Na-
11, 12, 13.
I
changed by CHARLES VII. 274.
Freemen or Citizens, who?
549.
FERRE ad Populum
47.
Feudatory Principalitys their Inſtitution
63.
Feudum, its divers Significations.
ibid.
of three Kinds
ibid. 64.
Feuda Militum (Knights Fees)
67.
Firſt-born are GOD's, what it implys
401.
ſtory
Florence-See Medicis.
PROVINCIAL.
Florus diftinguishes the feveral Ages of the Roman Peo-
ple
238.
lute Monarchy
Force, what fort of Kings it makes
II.
FRANCE its Balance
271, 388.
ture, of Nations, or Municipal
its Expediency confidered 14.
pretended to be the beſt from its
Unity, Secrefy and Diſpatch of Buſineſs
ibid.
exemplified in the Scottish Hi-
15-29.
the fame as National in an abſo-
43.
of the Venetians and of the Spa-
niards in the Weft-Indies
ibid.
See 445
83, 436.
G.
Reafon
99, 140, 441.
bliſhed as ſhall even
174, 452.
a common Intereſt
5 Prerogatives of it-
53.
has the beft Authoritys for it 230.
its Superſtructures
393-
beſt in Experience
419.
divers Models of it-
·524.
POPULAR, when it takes place 40, 387.
its Reafon comes neareſt to right
its Orders founded in Nature
ibid. 47.
fuch Orders of it may be eſta-
neceffarily give the Preference to
ibid.
may reach Perfection-52, 259.
46.
Galaxy, a Liſt of Knights and Deputys of Oceana fo
98.
named
a fecond and third neceffary at the firſt Ín-
ftitution of the Commonwealth
Games (martial Exerciſes of the Youth)
General ought to have the fole Conduct of a War 188.
in the new Model
provincial
Genoa (an Oligarchy) fubdued by itſelf
Gentlemen, peculiar to their Genius to
as to adminifter Commonwealths
114, 123, 441.
458.
285.
found as well
56, 235.
288.
German Princes, their Method of raiſing Armys— 167.
Germany, the Defect of her Policy
GOD, his acting, chufing, or raifing up, how to be under-
ftood
his Government
Political King of the Jews
" Good Men good Laws, a fallible Maxim
Orders good Men," infallible
Goods twofold, of the Mind and of Fortune
Goths (and Vandals) their Kings were no
Captains
how they got footing in the Empire
their Balance
Gothic Politicians, Inventors of Gun-powder
Government (de jure and de facto) defined-
ECCLESIASTICAL.
in the Age of the Apoftles 359.
a continued external Act-363.
primitively Popular-88, 363.
fubject to Viciffitude, and various
367, 370, 378.
according to Dr. Hammond, was
copied from the Metropolitan Church at Jeruſalem
378.
365, 388-495.
382.
259.
75.
76.
39:
more than
See Commonwealth, Monarchy, Ifrael, Athens, Rome,
52, 72.
63.
Oceana, Orders, &c.
Gracchi, their unſeaſonable Efforts
57, 61, 458.
ibid.
244.
Grand Signor
392.
139.
37.
Grandees English, their Ignorance
Greece fet free by Flaminius
231.
197.
its two Periods of ancient and modern Pru-
dence
ibid. 240.
its threefold Divifion into Monarchy, Ari-
ftocracy and Democracy
its Corruptions
its Principles twofold
lance itfelf
38.
38.
39.
its Governments from Thucydides
Greeks (and Romans) defended againſt Mr. Wren―239.
Grotius quoted-paffim- See 46, 251, 343, 361.
Guards foreign, uſe of them in France-275, 279, 281.
Provincial
237.
452.
certain Confufions of it rooted in the Ba-
compared to the Soul of Man
wherein its Perfection confifts
40.
45. Halcyonia (the Thames)
52, 259. Halo- (Whitehall.)
B
H.
Halymoot,
+
INDEX of
of the
nation
pag.
65.
alymoot, in the Saxon Times
Hammond (Dr.). a Difpute with him concerning Ordi-
325.
his Objections concerning the Ordination of
Deacons (Act. vi.)
368.
his Interpretation of the Chirothefia cenfured
373.
Anſwer to his Objection againſt popular Or-
dination, from the fmall Number of Converts 377,
378.
Hampton-Court (Convallium) laid out for a Summer-
houſe for the Prerogative of OCEANA 168.
HARRINGTON (the Author) his honourable Defcent
xiii, xli.
his Education, Studies and Travels xiv,
made Groom of the Bedchamber to K.
CHARLES I. and in favour with him
fuffers for his Loyalty
had been feized
pag.
Hooker, a Paffage from him concerning the Good of
the Whole
explained
46.
252.
Horfe and Foot, the People of Oceana divided into, and
upon what Valuation of Eſtate
Hundred in Oceana, its Inftitution
its Officers
Definition of it
Huſbandry
I.
.84, 437-
89, 437-
90, 437-
gil a
178.
JAMES VI. of Scotland and I. of Great-Britain, hie
Title to the Crown of England
29.
xv.
his Character and Policy-
Janizaries-See Turkish Monarchy.
Jannotti, his two Periods of Government
Idlenefs, the Miſchief of
30, 31, 391.
37.
171.
xvi.
JETHRO (a Heathen) gives advice to Mofes 51,81,407.
Jethronian Prefects, their Office
354.
Jews, their Animofity against the Chriftians
338.
their Difperfion, and the Cauſes of it-
their Commonwealth (Cabala)
356.
396.
Ireland
35, 36.
343-
238.
192.
II, 20.
ibid. xvii.
his Motives to write the OCE A NA- xvii.
is the Inventor of the Balance of Empire
xviii.
his Adreffe in recovering his Papers that
xix, xx.
Account of his Works and Controverfys
xxi,-xxviii.
his Club called the ROTA-xxviii, xxix.
committed to the Tower
xxx.
his Examination
xxxi-xxxiv.
carried off by Night and landed in S. Ni-
cholas Ifland by Plymouth
xxxvi.
diftempered in Body and Mind- ibid.
difputes with his Phyficians xxxviii, xlii.
his unfeafonable Marriage, and Death
xxxviii.
(Sir James) his Monumental Infcription
xli.
22.
Hay, remarkable Origin of that Family
Hebrews their Commonwealths, viz. the Common-
wealth of Ifrael (ELOHIM) and that of the Jers
(CABALA)
Heliaea of Athens
Helots (See Lacedemon)
Hemifua (the River Trent.)
396.
157, 308.
136.
HENRY VII. his Policy and its Confequences 69, 270,
387.
his Riches did not change the Balance-247.
VIII. the Confequence of his diffolving the
69, 389.
ought to have farmed the Kingdom of
for ever
Jewifh Authors.
Imbecillity of ancient Times, what?
IMMORTALITY of a Commonwealth
Impoſtures political
Indies, Babes that may come to wean themſelves-44-
Induftry, how affected by an Agrarian Law 108, 166.
the Price of Property
387.
Inequality, a natural Caufe of Diffolution in a Com◄
monwealth
193, 234, 295, 296, 394.
See Commonwealth.
Inns of Court and Chancery in Oceana
Inftructions for the Councils of Oceana
Intereft (publick or more private) the firſt Principle of
Government
the Mover of the Will
thing?
182.
126.
241.
ibid.
common of Mankind, whether there is ſuch a
251.
how, by the Orders of a Common-
wealth, beft diftinguiſhed from private Intereft ibid.
of the People
260, 264.
Invafion of Oceana, provifions against it 176, 189.
Invention of Political Orders, to whom it belongs 230,
231.
JoHN (K.) his Policy
68.
Joſhua his Defignation to fucceed Mofes, extraordinary,
346, 35, 353-
ISRAEL its Commonwealth, confifting of the Senate (or
Sanhedrim) People, and Magiftracy 49-51; 81,106,
Abbeys
Lord Darnley, his tragical End
Hereditary Right, Fallacys concerning it-
Hiera-(Westminster.)
28.
10, IF.
90.
64.
95.
171.
its Nobility
its Senate
384
7, 183.
thers, and why?
High-Conſtable in Oceana
Sheriff (High Reeve) under the Saxons
of a Tribe of Oceana
Steward of Weſtminſter
Priest of Ifrael
Hiftory, its Ufe in rectifying the Judgment
Hobbes fpeaks doubtingly of the Expediency of Regal
Government
14.
goes about to deſtroy ancient Prudence 38, 52,
58.
mifrepreſents Aristotle, Cicero and Livy 38, 45.
holds that Covenants have their Force from the
publick Sword
41.
Rome
his Miſtakes concerning the Conſtitution of
ibid.
on Ordination, cenfured by Dr. Hammond 364.
the Author's regard for him
257.
quoted-pain.-See
211, 238.
Holland its Commonwealth-
11
245,343-525. 396, &c.
Inequality in its Conftitution 57.
135.
49, 137.
different in its Function from all o-
50.
153.
its popular Affemblys
votes Obedience to GoD and his Laws 257,
Divifion of their Lands
258.
293, 408.
Rotation in their Commonwealth 304-306,
People of, make war without the Sanhedrim
divided Genealogically
Locally
413.
399:
400.
410:
413, 414.
its Reprefentative defcribed
its State under the Kings till the Captivity 416.
under David
of Captivity
417.
420.
Conftitution of, reftored by Zorobabel, Ezra
51, 257, 530.
its Senate
139.
its Antiquity
285.
allows not her Clergy to meddle with Affairs of
State
181.
and Nehemiah
See Commonwealth, Jews, Government, Parallel.
ibid. 421.
Jubilee,
PRINCIPAL MATTERS.
pag.
294,411.
97.
125.
Jubilee, the Defign of its Inftitution
Judges itinerant in Oceana
their Election
of Ifrael their Office and Election 304, 347,
-of Oceana to be promulgated fix Weeks before it
Law of Oceana, what?
pag.
133, 156, 445.
is propofed
in the Commonwealth of Athens
415.
in Ifrael
their Election irregular
in the Gates, and in the Villages, their
57.
Roman, de Repetundis
155, 445-
308.
347,412.
337-
Rupilian, concerning the Trial of Caufes in a Pro-
Function
354, 405.
230, 305.
Judgment (laft Refult) belongs to a popular Affembly
See Chufing.
Judicature fupreme in Oceana where lodged and how
exerciſed
155, 156, 158.
90.
ibid.
58.
59, 395.
60.
101.
how the Roman Senatûs-confulta came to have
their Force
Juryman (first and fecond) of a Hundred
Jus Civitatis (of the Roman Allys) of two Kinds- 197. Lawgiving (Art of) a Treatiſe
Juſtice of the Peace in Oceana, his Election
K.
90.
Kadıgávaι (to conftitute) its proper Meaning 341, 406.
is not a Word of Power
Kings vainly inveſted with the divine Attributes
their Title left undetermined and doubtful by the
Fure-divino-Writers
when neceffary
of two kinds
256.
381.
386.
ibid.
Lawyers (and Divines) incompetent Judges of Politics
134-
ought not to be Members of a Legiſlative
vince
Laws Ecclefiaftical
Civil
ought to be few
fundamental, which?
by Election, how limited
by Force
by Succeffion
of Scotland, an abridged Hiftory of them 16-29.
their Right fubject to natural Diffolution- 74.
their Guards regulated by Mr. Wren 267.
the Manner of, fhewn by Samuel 293, 416.
Ambiguity of the Word
398.
of Ifrael, of popular Election -347, 374, 403.
how diftinguished from the
their Hiſtory
in the Athenian Commonwealth
in Lacedemon and Rome
344, 363.
6.
Council
Leagues Social and Provincial
182,432—465.
ibid.
Legions Roman, how enrolled
196.
185, 186.
9, 10.
11, 256.
11.
Legiſlator ought to be One
Legiſlators, Council of, in Oceana
Levellers, impoffible the Oceaners fhould become 166,
265, 291, 299.
Levelling never introduced but either by the Wisdom of
foine great Man, or by Accident
Leviathan-See Hobbes.
Levites, their original Ordination
77.
79.
408.
Judges
415.
418.
349, 401.
their Portion in the Diviſion of the Land 410;
449.
Levy of Men or Money, muft be by the Confent of the
People
155.
307.
82, 394.
Lexiarcha (Roll of Athenian Freemen)
Liberty natural
307-
10, 11.
of a
45-
45.
their Stile of the plural Number, its Antiquity
of a Man, the Empire of his Reason;
Commonwealth, the Empire of Laws
373.
See Monarchy, Government.
King's-Thane his Qualifications
65:
is a Baron, after the Conqueft
66.
People
King-Craft, Arts of
4, 31.
Knights Roman
87.
quefts
of S. Andrew
20.
(Senators of Oceana) two choſen in each Tribe
98, 439.
Knights Fees (Feuda Militum) their Value unknown 67.
Korah, his Rebellion
L.
Hobbes's Diſtinction of it expoſed.
whether more fafely trufted to the Nobility or
157, 158.
for moſt part left untouch'd in the Roman Con-
333, 371.
renounced by the Cappadocians
·334-
of CONSCIENCE 58, 87, 127, 338, 448,
4.51,469.
in Ifrael, appertained to the Pro-
59.
depends on Civil Liberty 423.
Liverys of Attendants; aRegulation concerning them 162.
— of the City of London
169.
Living Country-and City-, their different Effects with
regard to the Publick
397.
phets
Lacedemon, the Form of its Commonwealth 40, 51,
147, 149, 526.
its Commonwealth reſembles that of Ifrael
57, 353.
(Commonwealth of)
inequal in its Conftitution57.
its Model pretended to be given
35.
Livings (Church) their Value in the new Model
Livy quoted-paffim. See
London (Emporium) fee City.
·449.
37, 39, 45, &c.
389.
95, 96.
170.
114, 441.
ibid.
its Growth to what owing?
Lord Lieutenant of a Tribe in Oceana
Mayor of London
Strategus, or General in Chief
Orator (Speaker)
Lot, the Ufe of it in the Commonwealth of Iſrael 344,
by the Oracle
82.
its Senate
its popular Affembly -
138.
154.
careful in the Education of Youth-
its Seditions accounted for
172.
262.
times an Oligarchy
its Kings
Law is what is enacted by the Authority
thers and the Power of the People
the Cauſe of its Fall
143, 287, 417.
why called fometimes an Aristocracy, fome-
308.
82, 394.
of the Fa-
48.
Mr. Wren's Notion of it expoſed
—of Nature not favourable to Regal Government
of Nations, various and doubtful
Municipal makes not for Monarchy
241, 242.
347, 403, 407.
Lots of Land in Iſrael, their Value
4c9.
might be accumulated two ways 411.
Lucca, a Quibble of Hobbes' upon its Motto (Liber-
tas)
45.
Lycians, Commonwealth of
79.
Lycurgus the Lacedemonian Lawgiver-paffim- See
147, 296.
II, 12.
12, 13.
ever
binds his Laws upon that Commonwealth for
211.
ibid. Lyfander, his Avariçe fatal to his Country- 143.
M.
INDEX of the
M.
Maccabees, their diftinguiſh'd Merit
whence become neceffary to their Country
Macchiavel retrieves ancient Prudence
pag.
pag.
356.
See Arms.
ibid.
Minilters (of the Gospel) on what account to be turned
out of their Livings
96, 451.
38.
incapable of Civil Places
127, 451.
42.
unfit for Government
181, 182.
See Clergy, Ordination.
106.
136.
Miracles, the Argument from, concerning Ordination,
confidered
363, 422.
380.
81.
209.
411.
424.
a dangerous Miſtake of his
corrected concerning the Agrarian of Rome
concerning Nobility, explained
his Opinion in a noble Queſtion of Politics
147, 148.
cenfured
1-49.
his Queſtion, whether the Nobility or People
are the beſt Guardians of Liberty
157.
a Caution of his concerning the Glory of
7. Cafar
215:
hisApology for writing on the Art Military
236.
fhews in what Governments Conquefts are
eaſieſt made and held, or the contrary.
275, 276.
277.
his excellent Diſcourſe on Arms
accounts for the Diffolution of the Roman
Republick
318.
quoted—paſſim.
Macedonia thrice conquered by the Romans- 197.
Magiftracy (proper) the executive Order of a Common-
wealth
48, 160, 393.
a neceffary Condition of it
48, 49.
Prolongation of, pernicious-54,318, 320.
its Rotation
304.
of Venice, wheels round in a few hands 314.
(Supreme) how diftinguiſhed from Sous-
Mitre and Crown, their Sympathy accounted for
MODEL of the Commonwealth of Oceana
promulgated.
of the Commonwealth of Ifrael
of the Jewish Commonwealth
of Popular Government, agreeable to the
(then) Balance of England
propofed
429, (531, 539.)
1. notionally, in fix Heads- 434-
2. practicably, (1.) the Civil Part
(3.) the Military-452.
435**
(2.) the Religious— 448.
(4.) the Provincial 455.
how it may be proved or examin-
ed: with an Anſwer to Mr. Wren's MONARCHY
ASSERTED
461.
Models (diverfe) of a Commonwealth
524-538.
MONARCHY fallaciouſly maintained in the Abſtract 5.
is in reality only an Optimacy
6.
its Kind left undetermined by Writers ib.
confidered in itſelf, viz. in its Legality
and Policy
9.
reignty
386.
its Origin and Fortunes
13.
(improper or) Legislative
393.
its Advantages extolled and its Difadvan-
Magiftrates (in Oceana) annual and triennial·
(Supreme) of various kinds-
123.
tages fuppreffed by Authors
15.
394.
exemplified in the Scottish Hiftory ibid
of Ifrael, their Election
405.
29.
Senatorian, in the new Model
441.
Abfolute
39, 294, 387, 392.
Maimonides, quoted by Dr. Hammond
Mixed
351.
39, 72, 387, 392.
Malvezzi prefers Optimacys to Monarchys
corrects himſelf
Mamalues, who they were
Mancinus the Roman General defended against Mr.
357.
14.
43.72.
by Arms
tho' perfect in the kind, yet reaches not
the Perfection of Government; and why? 52, 53,
by a Nobility, its Imperfection 53, 269,
267.
53-
Wren
Manners, Corruption of, whence?
Manufactures (and Merchandize)
Marius firſt arms the capite cenfi of Rome —
his Confulfhip impertinently quoted by Mr.Wren
MARPESIA (Scotland) the Nature of its Inhabitants 35.
its Agrarian Law
102,458.
the Confequences of it- III.
repreſented in the Senate and Prerogative
Tribe of Oceana
how uſeful to Oceana
its Adminiſtration Civil and Military 190,
191, 458.
96.
361.
28, 29.
Marriage legitimately pronounced in Oceana
Imperfection in the Laws concerning
ARY Q. of Scots
Maxims calculated to the preſent State of England 613.
Mechanic Employments in Oceana
177.
MEDICI, Family of, its Hiftory and Rife- 285, 286.
Melchizedek a Monarch
317.
73.
293.
178.
its Origin and Antiquity
237.
84,3·19.
whether rightly defined " A Government
of Men and not of Lars?"
240.
318.
its Perfection according to Mr. Wren 281,
282.
160.
187.
tion
pretended to be more natural — 7, 381.
Turkish, is pure, and why
Saxon in England
Norman
62, 267.
64
66.
of Oceana, its Conftitution and Diffolu-
Difficultys in re-eſtabliſhing it
64, 68, 70, 390.
70. See 540.
in Ifrael
356, 357.
its date miſtaken
415.
its Balance of Foundation — 416.
its Superftructures
417.
382, 396.
Monarchical Family
Money-See Balance, Ufury.
385.
Mercenary Arms
pernicious to a State
277.
188, 279, 453.
when neceffary
280.
why forbid in Lacedemon
cannot overbalance a large Territory
when the Nerve of War?-
2450
246.
225,459.
Merchandize makes a Bank
Metropolitan Church of Jerufalem
Military Orders in Ifrael
Education, its Advantages
Milites beneficiarii
emeriti
Militia, its Right ſtated
378. Morpheus, K. JAMES I.
propoſes to the People
not to be touched injuſſu Populi
of Oceana
247, 299. Mora in Lacedemon, what?
401. Mofes-See Commonwealth, Ifracl, Lacedemon.
454.
62.
186.
42, 388.
➖➖➖ was no King; but in a Senſe, may be fo called 398.
no Appeal to him from the LXX Elders 399, 407.
Mount Celia, Windfor.
125, 126. Mufter-Maſter-General in Oceana (Cufies Rotulorum)
82.
397, 398.
173.
95.
N.
PRINCIPAL MATTER S.
N.
pag.
Names (fanciful) given to Perfons and Things in the ORDERS of the Commonwealth of OCEANA.
xxi.
Oceana-paffim-See
Nature, the Arguments for Monarchy feen in her
Works
7.
hath made all Men equal in point of Freedom
pag.
3. dividing the People into Horfe and
Foot
8.4-
4.
into Parishes, Hundreds and
Tribes
ibid.
5. Inſtitution of the Parishes, Ballet
and Deputys
85.
6. of Ordination, a natural Religion
and Liberty of Confcience-87.
7. Election of the Civil and Military
Officers of the Hundreds- -89.
8. For marfhalling a Tribe
92.
II.
popular Government founded in
47.
Mechanics of, an imperfect Treatiſe
xlii.
Natural (and Artificial,) as applied to Government 381.
Nebulofa, Offices in a Hundred, fo named
90.
Negative Voice cannot be againſt the Ballance of Power
388.
Nexftria-Normandy.
No Bishop no King
380.
93.
No King fome Senate; no Senate fome King·
415.
10. For the Election of the Prime
Magnitude
94.
56.
96.
9. How the Cenfors are to order the
Ballot of a Tribe
Nobility, their intereft the fame with that of the People
of England, how weakened and difarmed by
HENRY VIII.
of three Kinds
of Ifrael, Athens, Lacedemon,
Holland, Switzerland, Oceana
69.
134, 135.
Rome, Venice,
136, 137.
of Oceana, not hurt by the new Model of its
302.
Conftitution
checked
Monarchy by a - 267, 293, 388, 393.
of France
274,275.
engaged to the KING, and how
279.
Nomothetæ of Athens
308-310; 341.
Nonfincere (neither Affirmative nor Negative) a Term
119, 156.
66.´
its Adminiſtration during the Reign of the firſt
in Balloting
Norman Monarchy
Kings
0.
67.
82.
Oba in Lacedemon, what?
Objections (three) againſt popular Government; with
381, 382.
the Anſwers
OCEANA (England) Pliny's Defcription of it 34.
the Nature of the People
ibid.
its Genius (like that of ancient Italy) addicted
to Commonwealths
35,433.
Situation of its Commonwealth
its Monarchy
36.
64.
102, 290, 435·
Model of its Commonwealth 81-(531,539)
its Agrarian Law
its Commonwealth may become an Afylum to
194-199.
the diftrefs'd World
Objections to the Model of it anfwered by
Wholeſale
not ſubject to Seditions
compared to Ifrael
See Commonwealth, Orders, &c.
234.
2645 265.
436.
70.
408.
10, 221.
OLPHAUS Megaletor-See Archon, Cromwell.
Oliveretto di Fermo
Oracles in Ifrael
Orange, Prince of
Orations (ftated) to the Prerogative of Oceana- 157.
their Uſefulneſs
Orator of a Tribe, his temporary Office
Lord (the Speaker)
160.
92.
114, 123.
Orbs, in the Civil. Military or Provincial divifions of
the Citizens of Oceana, fo called from their perpetual
11. The Functions of the Magiftrates
of the Prime Mag.
12. Inſtitution of the Galaxy-98.
13. Conſtituting the Agrarian Laws
102.
14. appointing the Ballot of VENICE
to be uſed in all the Affemblys
of Oceana
-15.
III.
15. Tropic of the Magiftrates 122.
16. Conftitution of the Councils 124.
17. Conftitution of the Election of
Ambafadors in ordinary-125.
18. Conſtitution of Elections extra-
ordinary, or by theScrutiny ibid.
-19. diftributing to every Council its
proper Buſineſs
126.
-20. Inftructions to the Councils as to
the Manner of proceeding 131.
21. The Change or Election of the
triennial Officers of the Prėro-
gative Tribe
142.
22. The Election of its annual Magi-
ftrates
ibid.
-23. the Power, Function and Manner
of proceeding of the Prerogative
Tribe
155-
-24. Conſtitution of the Provincial
Part of the Senate and People 160.
25. concerning the Reparation of the
publick Revenue
161.
26. concerning the Education and Dif
cipline of the Youth.
173-
27. provides for the Cafe of an Inva-
fion
176.
28. civil Part of the Provincial Orb
189.
29. military Part of the fame 191.
-30. concerning the Divifion of Spoils
taken in War
Ordination (of Parfons in Oceana)
ibid.
87,88, 410.
88.
originally belongs to the People
Chriftian, copied from the Sanhedrim 137,
-a political Difcourfe concerning it 325-382.
Occafional
427.
331-
from the CHIROTONIA
340.
-of the Priests in ancient Rome:
342.
-original Right of
343-
Rotation
paffim.
-in Ifrael·
ibid.
Orders, Equeſtrian and Patrician in old Rome
87.
-with fupernatural Gifts
346.
ORDERS, of popular Government in Nature
·47.
-of Levites
349.
ofa Commonwealth in Experience
49.
-good make good Men
76.
ought not to be too few
208.
diftinguiſhed from Laws
395.
how conferred
-of the Commonwealth of OCEANA 83.
1. dividing the People into Freemen
Chriftians
and Servants
83.
2.
into Youth and Elders ib.
lies not in the Ceremony of Confecration 350.
whence derived by the Divines— 349, 352.
from the CHIROTHESIA
oecafional among the Jews imitated by the
355-
-Right of it among the Jervs engroffed by
the Prince of the Sanhedrim
356.
Ordination
C
350, 421.
354-
INDEX
of the
368, 370.
of the Deacons, A&.vi.
367; 368,426.
the third way of,
exemplified in Timothy
369, 370, 426.
Ordination in the leſſer Synagogue
pag.
diftinguifhed from Election by the Divines
360, 362.
pag.
88.
424. The PEOPLE have the Power of Ordination
Affemblys of, when dangerous ? 143.
reduced to Defpair, become their own
151.
Affemblys of, of feveral Conftitutions 153,
393, 394.
the first way of, (by the Chirotonia) in the
Election of S. Matthias to the Apoſtleſhip 364, 373,
425.
the fame thing with Election 364,
the Second way, exemplified in the Election
accommodated to political Inftitutions 370-
Politicians
-in Oceana, befſt conſtituted ibid.
apart and in Affemblys, how differing? 154.
an Obfervation of Cicero concerning 158.
impoffible they fhould all turn Levellers
166, 266, 291.
- never die
1.92.
their Fault too much Love rather than In-
372, 427.
the Form of it which was introduced by
425.
gratitude
Ariftides
2.12.
excuſed in their Treatment of Camillus and
ibid.
their Confent and Power the fame Thing
222.
377.
42, 105, 292
212.
their Giddineſs excuſed
Perambulation of Paul and Barnabas
the Citys named in it,
423.
Government
Perfection of Government
of Monarchy
328-331.
under popular
ibid.
52, 259, 260.
267.
96.
127.
CHRIST
Orphan-Maids in Oceana, their Annuity and its Con-
ditions
Ollraciſm (of Athens) why introduced
not a Puniſhment
Overſeers of a Parish in Oceana, how chofen-
P.
PANTHEON-Westminster-hall.
86.
PANOPEA (Ireland) the Nature of its Inhabitants 35.
proper to have been farmed out to the Jews
ibid. 36.
for ever
its Agrarian Law
102.
III.
the Confequences of it
its Repreſentative in the Senate and Preroga-
tive of Oceana
161.
its Adminiſtration civil and military in the
new Model
Panurgus-HENRY VII.
Petition of a Tribe in OCEANA
to the Senate
of divers well-affected Perfons, Jul, 6th, 1659,
with the Parliament's Anfwer
Philo de Inft. Princ.
541.
343, 350.
Phylarch or Prerogative Troop, its Functions 96, 439.
Pian Piano, or an Epiftolary Intercourfe between Dr.
FERNE and the Author
549..
190, 191.
417.
Pillar of Nilus, a Roll fo called
Plato, a remarkable Saying of his
Pleading in Trials, the Time allowed for it
Plebiscita
97, 223.
44.
155.
82, 147.
419.
Pliny to Trajan (Letters of with the Anſwers)-
Plutarch-quoted paffim-See
Poets (in Oceana) to be whip'd for Scurrility—
Laureat and Dramatic
Polemarch, Lacedemonian
235.
296.
223.
ibid.
82.
Athénian
307.
Parallel between the monarchical Balance of Ifrael and
Lacedemon
between the Tribunitian Storms in Rome and
thofe of the Hebrew Monarchy
of the Spirit of the People with the Spirit of
Mr. Rogers
614.
Parallels between feveral Parts of the Model propofed for
England and the Commonwealth of Ifrael436.
Parembole of Ifrael
303, 306.
See Rotation.
Pariſh (in Oceaną)
Officers chofen
its Definition
84, 85, 437.
86, 437.
89.
78.
Parliament of England, an Argument concerning the
Nature and Antiquity of its Conftitution 66. vid 393.
LONG,a thing new, and without Example 76.
diffolved by the Army
of OCBANA, its Conſtitution
161.
Parliaments, if their Spirit is to be trufted for a Settle-
609.
73, 260.
-fundry into which England was divided 74.
none to be excluded in the new Commonwealth
74. vid. 216.
ment
PARTHENIA-Q. ELIZABETH.
Partys, their Rife
Paternal Power
Patriarch-Seé Prince.
Patrician Order in Rome
(Field-Officer in Oceana) his Election 125.
Policy the Foundation of Empire
288, 289.
Politics a Syftem of, delineated in Aphorifmis 496–514.
Political Aphorifms
515-523.
Difcourfes, two
601, 609.
Politicafter, a comical Diſcourſe againſt Mr. Wren 579
·595.
Pomp at the Propofition of a Decree in Oceana 213,
Officers of it in Venice
of the Roman provincial Magiftrates-336, 337-
The Pope, Author of Religious Wars
59, 272.
Foundation of his Empire and Policy 357,
358.
214.
292.
87.
87.
182.
91.
328-331.
his Election anciently, and now- 379, 380.
Damafus makes himſelf by Force ibid.
Popular-See People, Government, Commonwealth.
Family
Population, Statute of, and its Effects-
Populoufnefs of a capital City, its Effects- 300.
Pour enclouer le Canon (the nailing up of the Cannon)
595:
Power of Life and Death, an Objection from it anfwered
362.
See Balance, Dominion.
POWERS (Rom. xiii.) the Meaning of theWord
Præfectus Urbi (Rome)
385.
69, 389.
8.
342.
Prætor, Governor of a Roman Province
Prætorian Bands
336.
62, 63.
lity
56.
Pregati of Venice
51.
73
their Errors are from their Governors 76.
of OCEANA, their Divifione-
Prejudices of the lefs knowing Part of Mankind in fa-
vour of Monarchy
83
·
3, 4.
Prelates (Managers of the two Theatres of Oceana) 223.
Preliminarys
Patrons (and Clients) in ancient Rome
Pavilions (for the Rendezvous of a Tribe) their Infti-
tution and Uſe
PAUL and Barnabas, their. Perambulation of the
Churches of Lycaonia, Pifidia, &c. A. xi. 19-xv.
Peers, Houſe of, a Word concerning it
468.
The PEOPLE have the Power of refolving or chufing
and of fupreme Judicature- 48, 158, 159, 230.
their Intereſt one with that of the Nobi.
corrupted, whence ?
PRINCIPAL MATTERS.
Preliminarys (Principles of Government.)
Part I. of ancient Prudence
cated
pag.
37.
enlarged, interpreted and vindi-
233.
Part II, of the Rife, Progrefs and Decli-
nation of modern Prudence
6i.
Prerogative Curia in Rome
83.
Tribe, or equal Reprefentative of the Peo-
ple of Oceana
98, 141, 155, 158, 439:
Names of its Troops and Companys 1415
142.
Election of its Officers and Magiftrates
ibid. 444.
why ſo named
155.
its Power two-fold
ibid. 445.
of popular Government (a Treatiſe)— 229.
354, 422, 424.
of Ifrael
See Ordination.
pag
Puniſhment (in OCEANA) fix Degrees of it to be balloted
in criminal Cafes
157,
of the Youth that refuſe to ſerve 176, 453:
of looſe Women
Q
222.
Quarter-Mafter-General (CONDUCTOR) in Oceana 95.
Quarter-Seffions
97.
Queries concerning the Commonwealth of Oceana 323,
Queſtions (Arguments) in Politics
Queftor of a Roman Province
Quorum of a provincial Council
- in all Aſſemblys, according to the
Quoting of Authors, what it is and is not
R.
Rabbi, his Ordination and Office
324.
236.
336-338.
191.
new Model
448.
237
355-
356.
30.
Jehuda ben Baba, called Ordinator
Rawleigh (Sir Walter) his Crime
Reaſon and Paffion, their contrary Nature and Effects
Prefbyter (Jewish)
Prefbyterian Party among the Jews, its
fequences
Date and Con-
355, 421.
357:
342, 349.
348.
94, 95.
reft
8.
86.
the Image of GoD
its two Parts
Regalia, Feuda fo called
threefold,-private-of State-of general Inte
44, 45-
46, 251.
230
ibid.
63.
Prefbytery (Papal) its Rife and Strength
Priefts of ancient Rome, their Ordination-
Prime Magnitude (Officers in a Tribe)
Primitive Times of Chriftianity, little to be argued from
them for Monarchical Government
Primum Mobile (firſt Mover) of OCEANA
Prince of a Tribe or Family in Ifrael 81, 135, 397, 400.
Private Men may, and ought to write upon Politics viii,
Privernates their undaunted Zeal for Liberty
Prizes for the Youth of Oceana
Funds for them
Probationer in OCEANA
Probouleuma of Athens
Proclamation by the Lord ARCHON
Proconful his Office
Prodigality how puniſhed in OCEANÀ
Proëdri in Athens
Πρόγραφοιν, Meaning of the Word
Property, its Definition and Original
Alteration of
Prophets in Ifrael, their Prerogative
Propofers from the Senate to the People
Propofition (of Laws)-See Debate.
235, 3.91.
331.
162, 174, 186,
162, 187.
88,450.
Region Úfe of the Word in the Commonwealth of Ŏ-
ceana
REGULI
Religion National, the Neceffity of it
122, 140.
65.
448.
in Ifrael, of the Jurifdiction of the
58-87.
87.
in OCEANA
in other Commonwealths 59, 178--
Chriftian, grew up according to the
the Commonwealth of Iſrael
Sanhedrim
307.
209.
336, 337.
84.
307; 341.
307:
Council of, in OCEAN A
290, 387.
290.
59.
corrupted three ways
133,442.
Religious Partys
307:
Wars
182..
Orders of
59.
124, 127,
Queſtion in it, how to be decided
127.
449.
75,448,
in Athens
in Ifrael
272.
to the Parliament concerning the new Model
347. Rents not to be rack'd, nor too eafy
Repreſentative-See Prerogative, Tribe, Parliament.
of Ifrael deſcribed
178.
413.
620.
Republicans (in England)
74-
Proprætor in a Roman Province
336.
Refult (ultimate)-See Chufing.
Protector of OCEANA created
217.
Retainers, Statute of, and its Effects
69, 8891
Provinces-See Government.
Revenue of OCEANA
161, 166, 221,
of OCEANA their Adminiſtration-i90,
Roman, their Adminiſtration
191.
Revolution natural or violent
244.
331.
in Afia
333 334.
RICHARD II. (Dicotome) creates Barons by Patent 68.
Riches are Power
39-
different Significations of the Word-
Councils and Officers of
455.
Rogers Mr. a Diſpute with him
614-
458, 459.
Provoſts (in Oceana) their Election
124.
ROME, the Conftitution of her Commonwealth 51, 79,
82, 528.
Council of
ibid.
cleared of the Mifreprefentations of
is the Affability of the Common-
Hobbes
416
wealth
128.
inequal
57-
- are to propofe to the Senate
provincial
132, 442.
her Agrarian Law
61.
45.9. --
her Empire compared to the Turkiſh
62.
PRUDENCE, ancient and modern
37.
civilizes England
64.
whether rightly fo diftinguished
-her Decemvirs
76.
237.
Cauſe of her Ruin
106, 318, 323, 456-
ancient retained by Venice
ibid.
her Senate
139.
the Tranſition of ancient into modern—61.
what it is
73.
all Policy whatever founded in it 366, 427.
its Principles proveable from Scripture 395.
Prytans Council of, (a Committee in OCEANA fo named)
of Athens
Pfephifma, what?
79, 129, 210.
129, 306–341.
807; 341-343:
Struggles between her Nobility and Commons
how the acquired the Empire of the World 196.
Government of her Provinces 197, 199, 333.
diftrefs'd by the Samnites
her Treatment of conquered Nations-
See Agrarian, Balance, Commonwealth.
316.
333.
ROTA
her military Difcipline
143-147, 151.
184, 185.
1
INDEX of
of the
pag.
ROTA or Model of a Free State, &c. a Treatife- 621.
the Author's Club, with the Names of the prin-
cipal Members
Rotation equal, deſcribed and defended
its ſeveral Kinds
of Offices in Oceana, how eſtabliſhed
Advantages of it
xxviii.
54, 303.
304, 394.
pag.
Senatus-confulta of Rome, if they had the Force of
Laws?
99.
256.
Servants bearing Arms, dangerous to a Commonwealth
83, 84, 100, 436.
Severus the Emperor makes military Benefices hereditary
620
124.
Sheriffs of London
Shire-See County.
170.
125.
Shiremoot
65.
140.
of Ambaſſadors in ordinary, with its Advan-
tages
in the Senate
Royalifts
whether neceffary in a Commonwealth- 303.
-approved of by Ariftotle
in Athens (and Rome)
306.
57, 304.
in OCEANA, annual and triennial
315.
-of Generals, maintained againſt Mr. Wren 316,
317.
allows time fufficient for gaining Experience
321.
their Intereſts and Sentiments-
Ruſtic Tribes of Rome their fuperior Reputation-
S.
Signorie of the Commonwealth of Oceana 123, 131,
of Venice
441.
312.
Situation its Advantages exemplified in Denmark and
Venice
44.
Soldiers, why anciently honoured and eſteemed (from
Macchiavel)
Solon his Diſtribution of the Athenian People-
propofes to the People
278.
136.
74.
342, 406.
Son (an only) left at the Difpofition of his Parents 173,
220.
453.-
35.
Spahis-(See Turkish Monarchy)
392.
75.
SPAIN its Policy in the Government of the Indies-43.
its Riches have not increaſed its Balance 247.
Speaker of the Senate in the new Model
441.
See Lord Orator.
Saints, as fuch, pretending to civil Power-
Salarys of the Senatorial Officers of OCEAN A 162.
of the Officers of the Prerogative- 162, 163.
an Apology for them
167.
Sanhedrim, its Inftitution
50, 340,-352, 405.
irregularly ſubſtitute their Succeffors by Or-
57.
dination
could only propoſe to the People— 399, 423.
lefer
347,353, 405.
after the Captivity over-reaches the People
349, 356.
Speculative Men, their Errors and falſe Reafonings con-
cerning Monarchy
5, 6, 7.
Speech. (congratulatory) of Hermes de Caduceo to his
Tribe
99.
of Philautus di Garbo againſt the Agrarian Law
103.
104.
of the Lord Archon for it
fooliſh of Lord Epimonus di Garrula againſt bal-
118.
anfwered by the Lord Archon 120.
loting
Savi of Venice
not a Senate only but a Judicatory ·353.
at first compoſed of Priefts and Levites; and
why?
354.
311, 312.
of the Archon, concerning the Councils and Dic-
tator
129.
upon Order 20th
133.
Saxon (Teuton) Monarchy in England
64.
upon Order 22d
143.
Scandians (Danes.)
upon Order 23d
157.
of Lord Epimonus
163.
177.
172.
165.
of the Archon upon Order 27th
177.
Schools of Oceana, how regulated and infpected 173,
Scipio an Example of good Education-
SCOTLAND-See Marpefia.
a Prediction of K. Charles II. his Treat-
15, 32.
ment of it
Hiſtory of its Kings
16.
from what Date unconteſted-18.
Scripture mifinterpreted concerning Civil Government
7,8.
be underſtood 88, 179, 180, 449.
how it may
See Tranflators.
Seaman Dr. Diſputes with him
309, 325.
Seceffion of the Roman People, an Account of it- 143.
Secreſy in Buſineſs a pretended Advantage of Monarchy
in Lacedemon, accounted for
cannot happen in Oceana
Seditions, with their Cauſes
Selden quoted
Senate, what is its Office
anſwered by the Archon
on the Adminiftration of Provinces ;
and "that, by the Orders of his Commonwealth, O-
ceana may obtain and keep the Patronage of the
World"
192.
in Praiſe of the Archon; and for conferring on
him the PROTECTORSHIP
214.
-of Argus de Crookborn
218,219.
Spirit of the Nation, if to be truſted with Liberty, &c.
-a Difcourfe
14.
of the People ard of Mr. Rogers, compared-614.
Spiritual Lords (See Clergy)
601.
of Parliaments with a Council in the Intervals,
&c.
609.
260-394.
262.
264, 265.
64, 343, &c.
67.
Statutes fundry of HENRY VII. and their Effects- 69.
Strabo his Account of the Revolutions in Athens- 332.
a remarkable Paſſage from him
Strategus (General in Chief)
334.
114, 123.
47,48.
50, 340.
Stratiot (Deputy of the Youth)
STUART Royal Family of
174.
26.
50.
Stubbs Mr. a Letter to him
575-
82, 353.
a fufficient Anſwer to him
618.
129, 138, 306.
51,311.
82, 340.
135, 141, 393-
broken or tainted
95, 96.
II.
13.
of Ifrael its Inftitution
how different from all others?
of Lacedemon
of the Bean in Athens
Rotation of that of Athens, Achaia,&¤.- 304.
of Venice
of Rome
of divers Conſtitutions
of OCEANA, the Face or Afpect of it
its Conftitution
121.
122, 440.
its manner of proceeding 132,443.
Stumbling-Block of Difobedience, &c. a Treatiſe- 567.
Subcenfors their Office in Oceana
Succeffion of Kings, ill-founded
puts into the hands of Fortune Things
that ought to be managed by Prudence
ibid.
Boxhornius's Diftinction of it, im-
141.
pertinent
See Kings, Monarchy.
14.
Suffetes (in Ifracland Carthage) Shophetim, Judges 57,
47
304-
Suffrage
Debate proper to it
See Government, Commonwealth.
Senatus-confulta of Rome.
PRINCIPAL MAT T.ER S.
91.
51, 79, 257.
39, 139.
Synagogue (the great) its Conftitutin
perfecuted CHEST and his Apoftlès
41.3.424.
Suffrages in Rome, Manner of giving hem
Superftition uſeful to Legiflators
Surveyors of Oceana, their Ufe andMethod
their Accomptof Charges
Switzerland, its Commonwealths-
its Senates
pag.
83.
pag.
V.
II, 211.
85.
Vacations(See Rotation)
447
the LegiſlativePower in the Jewish
Commonwealth
the Lefer
Synarchy of the Achaans
424.
ibid.
130.
her Councils
her Senate
T.
Talmud preferred by the Jews to Mofes's Law
421.
422.
475.
Vavafors in the Gothic, Suxon and Norman Monarchys
64, 65, 66.
VENICE, her Conftitution 43, 51, 79, 148, 150, 158,
202,529.
fome Inequalitys in it which would
be of worſe Confequence in a greater State 55-
her Ballot deſcribed at large
her Caution againſt Papal Influence- 181.
has in her Commonwealth no Cauſe of Diffo-
Valerius and Publicola, or the true Form of a popular
Government; a Dialogue
113.
130-143.
139.
Taxes make People hate the Impofers
72.
lution
how raiſed in Oceana
97, 155, 221.
-her Seditions accounted for
TEUTON (Saxons.)
Thane (King's)
middle
22, 65.
ibid. 66.
copies Athens and Lacedemon
Theatres of Oceana, their Eftalliſhment and Regulation
giſtracy
223.
Thefmotheta of Athens
Thucydides
307, 341, 367.
237, 446.
Epitome of her Commonwealth
——a Riddle concerning the Rotation of
her provincial Government
-DUKE of, has the fupreme Dignity without
the Power
193.
263, 264.
311, 529.
313.
her Ma-
311.
43.
390.
62, 244, 266, 392.
226.
396.
450.
23.
371.
372.
Timar and Timariot, what?
Timoleon, how honoured by tle Syracufans
Tithes originally belonged to Kings
in the Chriftian Church
Titles of Honour introduced in Scotland
Titus left at Grete
his (ſuppoſed) Speech for Ordination by Impofition
of Hands
Toland (the Editor) his Apology for himſelf-vii, xl.
Trade, Council of, in Oceana
124, 125.
Trajan to Pliny, Letters of
335, 336.
Tranflators of the English Bible, cenfured 49, 88, 338,
373, 398, 418.
Travelling, Regulation of, in Oceana
neceffary to a Stateſman
Treaſon, Cognizance of it belongs to the Prerogative
Tribe
Treaſury, State of it in Oceana, the 41st Year of the
Commonwealth
Commiffioners of the
under the Normans
Unity, its Perfection made uſe of in favour of Monarchy
Univerſitys, Places in them to be given to the moſt
worthy
his Function Civil only
Verecundia Plebis founded in Nature
47, 253.
VERULAMIUS (Lord Bacon) animadverted upon—34.
394.
quoted― 134, 139, 140, 179, 184, 302.
Veturius the Roman Conful defended
Vice-Admiral in Oceana, his Election
Viſcounts under the Saxons
316.
125.
65.
66.
14.
173.
183.
127.
abſolutely neceſſary to the Commonwealth
178, 179, 449-
owe their Being to popular Government
239.
155.
See Ordination, Religion.
225.
Tribe, in Ifrael, Lacedemon and Athens
Urban and Ruftic in Rome
123, 441.
81, 82, 153.
Voice of the People the Voice of GOD
Volunteers, Order concerning them
Urns for Balloting
230.
175, 455-
83, 91, 403.
Ufury, in itſelf lawful, why prohibited in Ifrael 245,
35.
246.
prærogativa and jure vocata
83, 154, 306.
neceffary where Merchandize is exerciſed-ibid.
in the Commonwealth of Oceana, its Inftitution
91, 438.
Orator of a
its Officers of the prime
92.
W.
of the Galaxy
Magnitude
95, 438.
98.
Wallace, the Heroic Protector of Scotland-
War, Council of, in Oceana
its Definition
101.
Tribuns of Rome
PREROGATIVE of Oceana -98, 141.
of Occana, their Election
their Office in Trials-
142.
Tribunitian Storms, compared with thofe in the Hebrew
Monarchy
419.
Troops of the Prerogative Tribe, and their Names 141.
Tropic of Magiftrates, what?
114, 122.
TURBO (WILLIAM the Conqueror }
Turkiſh Monarchy, of the most perfect Kind, and why?
53, 62, 267,388, 392.
how to be broken
71.
Policy fums up and excels that of other abfolute
Governments
239, 279, 288.
Windfor (Mount Celia) to be the Summer Refidence of
the Senate of Oceana
168.
222.
Women of ill Fame, their Puniſhment
Words often uſed improperly
375-
381.
Wren Mr. his Reaſonings confuted 237,323, 461,467,
579, 595.
his Affertion of Monarchy fubverts it
466
71.
40, 388.
76, 332.
neareſt to that of Hell
Tufculans, on what Occafion made free of Rome-
Tyranny
Tyrants (the Thirty)
147, 159.
See Arms.
156.
Ward and Wardmote in Emporium
Weidenagemote (Parliament)
Weſtminſter (HIERA) its Government
White and Red Rofe
WILLIAM the Conqueror-(TURBO)
ought to be conducted by one General
State and Charges of it in Oceana
whether Men or Money is its Nerve -
25.
124, 125.
188, 189.
224.
225, 459.
169.
65.
171.
68.
66.
*D
X.
{
X.
INDEX.
pag.
Xenophon, his Account of the XXX Tyrants 76.
Youth, their Difcipline
See Education, Prizes.
Y.
Youth of Oceana
pag.
173.452.
Z.
Zadok made Prieſt in place of Abiathar, by whom?
304.
83. Zorobabel reftores the Hebrew Commonwealth-
FINI S.
}
{
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VERITAS
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