ºfº º º: ºisºº; º: 㺠ºś º §: * § º º º: º tºº º ºr º º : -: §§ §-- w º- : #. § Si § § ; - sº § § º-y t ſº - * #ºſº '- i; 3. . § M [] WEMBER 1944 ARMY SERVICE FORCES MANUAL M103-3 GEOGRAPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONAL POWER . SECTION 1 (CONCLUDED): Chapters 9, 10 - SECTION ll: Chapters 11-13 • SECTION Ill: Chapter 14 Š {} Will sº, % %ls ( • November 1944 Headquarters, Army Service Forces United States Government Printing Office: Washington 1944 A4 * - • A 3 4. S. 4. ‘T NUMBERING SYSTEM OF ARMY SERVICE FORCES MANUALS The main subject matter of each Army Service Forces Manual is indicated by consecutive num- bering within the following categories: - M1– M99 Basic and Advanced Training M100-M199 Army Specialized Training Program and Pre-Induction Training M200–M299 Personnel and Morale - M300–M399 Military Law and Enforcement, Organizations, Civil Affairs M400–M499 Supply and Transportation - M500–M599 Fiscal M600–M699 Procurement and Production M700–M799 Administration M800–M899 Miscellaneous M900 up Equipment, Matériel, Housing and Construction sº >< >k HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES, º-º- WASHINGTON 25, D.C., 3 November 1944. Army Service Forces Manual M103–3, Geographical Foundations of National Power, Section I (Concluded); Sections II and III, has been prepared under the supervision of the Director, Army Specialized Training Program, Headquarters, Army Services Forces, and is published for the infor- mation and guidance of all concerned. [SPX 300.7 (9 Sep 44).] BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SOMERVELL : - - W. D. STYER, :: - Major General, General Staff Corps, "OFFICIAL: Chief of Staff. J. A. ULIO, Major General, The Adjutant General. DISTRIBUTION: X ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The Army Specialized Training Division has called on a considerable number of America's lead- ing geographers to assist or participate actively in the production of this text. In the planning stage, Dr. Isaiah Bowman, president of Johns Hopkins University, Dr. Richard Hartshorne of the Office of Strategic Services, Dr. Derwent Whittlesey, Harvard University, Dr. Charles C. Colby, Univer- sity of Chicago, and Lieutenant Colonel W. H. Kinard, Jr. of the United States Military Academy, participated in the draft of the basic outline. Lieutenant Colonel Kinard prepared the initial draft of the introductory chapter, edited several other chapters, and organized the task of production. Dr. Whittlesey, Dr. J. K. Wright, director of the American Geographical Society, and Dr. Dorothy Good of the American Geographical Society, are chiefly responsible for the chapters of Section I. The chapter on Japan was prepared by Mr. Philip Dunaway and Mrs. Mary Jane Keeny of the Foreign Economic Administration. Section II is the work of Dr. Harold Sprout, Princeton Uni- versity. The maps in this section were prepared by Mr. Liam Dunne. Section III was prepared by Dr. Charles C. Colby, University of Chicago. Personnel of the Office of Strategic Services, the Office of Economic Warfare, and of several other Government agencies have assisted materially with critical analysis, drafts of certain special Sections, preparation of maps, and other phases of the work. Army Specialized Training Division, Army Service Forces. Washington 25, D.C., 15 November 1943. CONTENTS -- CHAPTER 9. CHINA Page INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND - - - - - - - - I. WORLD POSITION AND CONNECTIONS____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1. Location------------------------------- * — — — — — — — — — — — 2. Size, Shape, and Depth------------------------------ 3. Climate and Basic Natural Resources------- - - - - - - - - - - - 4. Sea, Land, and Air Connections----------------------- a. Sea Connections-------------------------------- b. Land Connections------------------------------- c. Air Connections--------------------------------- II. AREAL STRUCTURE.------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1. Major Areal Divisions------------------------------- . Humid and Arid China-------------------------- . Mountain Systems------------------------------ Seacoasts and Ports----------------------------- . North China----------------------------------- (1) The Uplands------------------------------ (2) The North China Plain-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - South China------------------------------------ (1) The Yangtze Basins------------------------ (2) The Canton Delta-------------------------- (3) The Hill Lands---------------------------- The Outlying Territories - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (1) The Tibetan Plateau - - - - - - - — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — (2) Chinese Turkestan - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (3) Dzungaria and Outer Mongolia- - - - - - - - - - - - - - (4) Inner Mongolia---------------------------- (5) Manchuria.-------------------------------- 2. Frontiers and Critical Areas-------------------------- a. Frontiers from the Military Point of View_____ _ _ _ _ _ b. Critical Areas from the Political Point of View______ III. PEOPLE--------------------------------------------- -- 1. Size and Trends of Population and Age Groups--- - - - - - - 2. Density and Productivity---------------------------- 3. National Traits and Cohesion - - - - -------------------- €.: f. l . : Page 13 16 16 16 17 18 18 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 21 21 21 22 22 22 23 23 23 24 24 24 IV. USE OF NATURAL RESOURCES_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1. Production----------------------------------------- a. Agriculture, Fishing, and Forestry - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - b. Mineral Resources------------------------------ c. Manufacturing---------------------------------- 2. Internal Transportation - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - a. Railroads-------------------------------------- b. Highways and Inland Waterways- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - c. Airways---------------------------------------- 13 CHAPTER 9. CHINA-Continued. W. POST-WAR PROBLEMS AND NATIONAL ASPIRA- CHAPTER 10. LATIN AMERICA INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND I. WORLD POSITION AND CONNECTIONS____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1. Location------------------------------------------- 2. Size, Shape, and Depth ------------------------------ 3. Climate and Natural Resources----------------------- 4. Sea and Air Connections--------- — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — II. AREAL STRUCTURE----------------------------------- 1. Major Areal Divisions------------------------------- a. The Andean Highlands-------------------------- b. The Eastern Border Valleys----------- - - - - - - - - - - - c. The Brazilian Highlands------------------------- d. The South American Lowlands--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (1) The Pacific and Caribbean Coastal Lowlands- (2) The Interior Lowlands of South America, and * * * * * * * * * * (3) The Atlantic Coastal Plain of Brazil--------- e. Central America and Mexico.--------------------- 2. Frontiers and Critical Areas-------------------------- a. Frontiers from the Military Point of View_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ b. Critical Areas from the Political Point of View - - - - - III. PEOPLE----------------------------------------------- 1. Size of Population----------------------------------- 2. Population Trends---------------------------------- 3. Density and Productivity---------------------------- 4. National Traits and Cohesion - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - IV. USE OF NATURAL RESOURCES_____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1. Production----------------------------------------- a. Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing --------- - - - - - - - b. Mineral and Power Resources_-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ c. Manufacturing--------------------------------- 2. Self-Sufficiency------------------------------------- 3. Internal Transportation----------------- - - - - - - - - - - - -- a. Waterways------------------------------------ d. Airways-------------- — — — — — — — — — — — — — — ... — — — — — — — — — — W. NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS _ _ _ !'----------------------- 24 24 25 25 25 26 26 26 26 26 26 CONTENTS-Continued CHAPTER 11. A GEOGRAPHICAL VIEW OF THE WAR AS A GLOBAL WHOLE I. SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY 1. Military Importance of Geographic Facts - - - - - - - - - - - - - - `-- a. Position, Distance, Space------------------------ b. Topography and Ground Cover------------------- c. Climate and Weather---------------------------- d. Material Resources------------------------------ 2. Dynamics of Strategic Geography - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - a. Strategical Consequences of Man-made Changes in the Earth’s Physical Structure-----. - - - - - - - * me •es - - b. Changes in the Strategical Value and Meaning of Fixed Geographic Facts Resulting from Technolog- ical Advances--------------------------------- 3. Geography and Logistics in the Machine Age--- - - - - - - - - 4. Industrial Basis of Modern War--------------- - - - - - - - II. GEOGRAPHICAL PATTERN OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1. One World—One War----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2. The Berlin-Tokio Axis. -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - a. Geographical Structure of the Axis--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - b. Strategical Situation of the Axis: Central Positions— Interior Lines----------------------- -- - - - - m - - - c. Strategical Isolation of the Axis---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (1) The Desert-Mountain Barrier- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (2) The Ocean Barriers--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * * * * - 3. The United Nations---------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - . Geographical Structure of the Anti-Axis Coalition--- Peripheral Position—Exterior Lines ------ - - - - - - - - - Global Strategical Unity of the United Nations_ _ _ _ _ . Atlantic Ocean Supply Lines-------------- - - - - - - - Pacific Ocean Supply Lines----------------------- The Indian Ocean and Its Borderlands- - - - - - - - - - - - . Aerial Life Lines of the United Nations------ - - - - - - . CHAPTER 12. GEOGRAPHY AND GRAND STRATEGY IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF WAR INTRODUCTION__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I. HITLER’S MARCH TO THE ATLANTIC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Page 30 30 30 31 31 31 31 31 32 33 33 33 33 36 36 36 38 39 39 39 39 42 44 45 48 48 1. Germany, 1919–33- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2. Hitler's Objective- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 48 5] I. HITLER’S MARCH ON THE ATLANTIC-Continued. 3. Return of the Saar--------------------------------- 4. Remilitarization of the Rhineland-------------------- . Formation of the Berlin-Rome Axis - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . Axis Intervention in the Spanish Civil War------ - - - - - - . Occupation of Austria------------------------------ . Dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . Nazi-Soviet Nonagression Pact - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10. Conquest of Poland-------------------------------- 11. Occupation of Denmark and Norway.-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12. Conquest of the Low Countries and France - - - - - - - - - - - II. HITLER’S ASSAULT ON THE BRITISH ISLES_____ _ _ _ _ _ 1. England. After the Fall of France---------- - - - - - - - - - - - 2. The Battle of Britain-------------------------------- 3. Consequences of the Battle of Britain- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - III. HITLER'S ASSAULT ON THE DESERT BARRIER_____ _ _ 1. Mare Nostrum–Italian Aims in the Mediterranean----- 2. Nazi Aims in the Mediterranean and Middle East------- 3. Mediterranean Battleground - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4. The Struggle for the Desert Barrier – _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 5. Results of Hitler's Failure to Breach the Desert Barrier-L- IV. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HEARTLAND _ _ 1. Living Space for the Third Reich- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2. Russian Battleground- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3. Blitzkrieg in the East-------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4. Russian “Blitz-grinder” and Counteroffensives--...---- - - - V. THE EUROPEAN AXIS AT HIGH TIDE_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ VI. THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC---------------------- 1. Battle of the Atlantic: First Phase-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2. Battle of the Atlantic: Second Phase_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 3. Battle of the Atlantic: Third Phase - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - WII. AXIS EUROPE ON THE DEFENSIVE__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1. Fortress Europe------------------------------------ 2. Europe's Southern Face----------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3. Europe’s Western and Northwestern Face--- - - - - - - - - - - - 4. The Eastern Face of Fortress Europe-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - VIII. STRATEGY FOR WICTORY: ENDS AND MEANS 1. Denying the Enemy Foodstuffs and Raw Materials - – - - - 2. Destruction of the Enemy’s War Industry and Communi- cations------------------------------------------ i IX. XI. XII. XIII. XIV. CONTENTS-Continued GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS IN THE BLOCKADE OF Page AXIS EUROPE.------------------------------------- 1. Blockade of Axis Europe: First Phase- - - - ------------- 2. Blockade of Axis Europe: Second Phase- - - - ----------- 3. Blockade of Axis Europe: Third Phase----------------- 4. Blockade of Axis Europe: Final Phase----------------- . THE BOMBING OF AXIS EUROPE__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1. The Strategic Bombing of Axis Europe - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2. Geographical Factors in the Bombing of Axis Europe---- HITLER'S RETREAT FROM RUSSIA -------------- 1. Withdrawal “According to Plan” - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2. Strategical Consequences of the German Retreat-------- ON THE ROAD TO WICTORY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1. Turning Points: Stalingrad and Egypt.----------- - - - - - - 2. Strategical Consequences of Mediterranean Victories - - - - THE NEW WESTERN FRONT_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ PINCERS ON BERLIN_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ CHAPTER 13. GEOGRAPHY AND GRAND STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC AND ASIATIC THEATER OF WAR I. II. III. INTRODUCTION__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - PRE-WAR JAPAN: MILITARY POTENTIAL AND STRA- TEGICAL POSITION_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1. The Rise of Japanese Power--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2. Japan's Strategical Position------------------- '- - - - - - - 3. Japan's Strategic Outposts--------------------------- - 4. Japan’s Vulnerability to Long Range Blockade - - - - - - - - - 5. The Menace from the Mainland - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 JAPAN’S UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST CHINA_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . Japanese Strategy in North China, 1937- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - War in Central China------------------------------- Amphibious Warfare on the Yangtze - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . Strategy of Communications in Central Çhina - - - - * * * * - - Chinese Defense in Practice- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Strategy of Attrition---------------------------- . The Strategy of Blockade---------------------------- . China’s Answer to the Blockade - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . Japan's Strategic Dilemma--------------------------- PACIFIC BATTLEGROUND - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1. Trans-Pacific Distances------------------------------ 1 The Chinese Plan of Defense------------------------- - 73 73 73 73 74 74 74 74 76 76 77 77 77 77 78 79 CHAPTER 14. POSTWAR WORLD I. WORLD RECOVERY_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ II. WORLD PATTERNS AND REGIONAL DIVERSITY_ _ _ _ _ _ III. PACIFIC BATTLEGROUND–Continued. 2. The North Pacific----------------------------------- Iv. JAPAN's oppoRTUNITY to STRIKE------------------ 1. Oceanic Blitzkreig----- — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 2. Japan's Blitzkreig Formula--------------------------- 3. Role of Sea Power---------------------------------- 4. Pattern of Conquest--------------------------------- v. Holding THE LINE IN THE PACIFIC---------------- 1. Rising Threats Facing the Allies - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2. Pacific Defense Line--------------------------------- 2. Geography and Blockade in the Pacific---------------- 3. Target Tokio.--------------------------------------- 4. The March on Japan-------------------------------- GEOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS OF THE 1. Natural Patterns------------------------------------ 2. Facility Patterns------------------------------------ 3. Occupational Patterns------------- ------------------ 4. Institutional and Idea Patterns----------------------- IV. GLOBAL CONSIDERATIONS_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1. Global Use of Resources----------------------------- 2. Western Europe in the World Order____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ v. THE UNITED STATES IN Post-war world ORDER. . The United States as a World Power------------------ . Agriculture Production and Resources-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . Significance of American Forest Resources - – - - - - - - - - - - - . Grazing and the Livestock Industries--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- . Mineral Industries and Resources- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . National and International Aspects of the Manufacturing Industries of the United States--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - : WI. SOME FUNDAMENTALS OF PEACE_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 109 114 114 114 114 115 117 117 117 117 117 118 118 118 119 119 119 121 o 100 200 400 soo __ l o 100 200 -400 500 Boo. K-LOMETERs 55 - KIRGHIZºSTEPPES tºº, --- 3. º º O ºf a n si- - - M. º. | 135° * ...” PREDOMINANTLY mountains or uplands & Desert No. 3218 - 19 June 1944 FIGURE 1 & HIGH PLATEAU. LARGELY DESERT PREDOMINANTLY DRY stEPPEs (HUMID. GRASSLANDS IN MANCHURA) -- *OUNDARY OF CHINA --- boundary of wanchuria and outer MONGOLIA --- other international soundaries --- cERTAIN INTERNAL BOUNDAREs of CHINA --- GREAT wall of China - Railroad MOTOR ROAD --- Motor Road (Projected) -------------- CARAVAN. Route Note only selected data are shown on this map, the purpose of which is to present-uch information-a-i-m-ded for an understanding of the accompanying text. DRAwN IN THE BRANCH of RESEARCHANDANALYSIS, OSS uTHQGRAPHED IN THE REPRODUCTION BRANCH, QSS Chopter 9 CHINA INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The foundations of Chinese history go back many centuries before the Christian era. The unification of the people into an empire came in the third century B. C. Since that time there have been many dynasties, some of them dynasties of conquering rulers leading nomadic peoples from the north, some of them native rulers. There were periods of weak central govern- ment characterized by wars between feudal states. The area known as China has shrunk and grown with the changing fortunes of these dynasties. Under the Mon- gol rulers of the Yuan dynasty (1280–1367) the bound- aries of China were extended to the borders of Europe and encompassed Manchuria, Korea, Indochina, Burma and Tibet. The Ming dynasty (1368–1644) that fol- lowed the Mongol rule was under native sovereigns and in this period some of the conquests of the Mongols were lost. Manchu rule replaced the Mings in 1644 in another period of aggressive expansion. Under this rule the boundaries again extended into Tibet, Central Asia, and other areas lost during the Ming dynasty. Much of this territory was very loosely held and alle- giance amounted to sending tribute to the Imperial Court at stated times. The Republic of China dates from 1911. In the revolution that brought about this change of dynasty native control was re-established. However, China was subjected to almost continuous civil war from the revolution to the time when local differ- ences were forgotten in common cause against the Japa- nese aggressor. Under the Republic the boundaries have again shrunk and present day Free China contains only a small part of a once very widespread empire. At the time of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, China included, in addition to the 18 provinces of China proper, the three northeastern provinces of Manchuria and the more loosely held provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, Ninghsia, Sinkiang, Tsinghai, Sikang, and (nominally) Tibet, all areas surrounding the 18 prov- inces." - Within these barriers, a self-sufficient civilization arose based upon an agricultural economy and a com- mon written language. This common language has tied together areas of very wide diversity and peoples of different customs and spoken dialects. North China is sub-humid, average annual precipi- tation ranging from 17 inches in the Loess Upland to 21 inches in the North China Plains. But owing to the very high variability from year to year the area is sub- ject to famine from droughts and floods. The winters are cold, the summers hot; most places produce only one crop. The people depend on millet, kaoliang (a sorghum), and wheat as their primary food. The great plain of the unruly Yellow River (Hwang Ho) domi- nates the region and is densely populated. Chinese civilization originated and developed in this area. The people are tall and speak a uniform dialect. South China divides into two areas with distinctly different geographical features. In the northern por- tion the valley of the Yangtze (Ch'ang Chiang), some- times termed “Central China” by Chinese geogra- phers, is densely populated. Here are found fertile easily irrigated lands with abundant rainfall, making possible the growing of rice as the principal crop. The south portion is mountainous and rugged, much of it ill suited to agriculture. The lands of the Canton delta section surrounding the estuary of the Hsi (West) river are, however, quite fertile and support a dense popula- tion. The people of south China are shorter in stature than those of north China and speak a multitude of dialects. In west and northwest China there are other varia- tions. Much of the area is grasslands and the people are nomadic and live by their herds. In the desert areas, sedentary groups live on oases. Numerous races and religious groups make up the population. Early con- Quests of China came from the north and west and brought with them influences that are still active in these 3.Te2S. The civilization that grew within the areas known as China was of a very high order. Learning was held in great regard, and officials were scholars, appointed to their posts under a democratic examination system that was fairly well developed as early as the sixth cen- tury. Literature, philosophy, poetry, and the arts flourished and rose to high levels of excellence. An ingenious handicraft system produced objects of great beauty and delicacy as well as sturdy objects for daily UlSe. Transportation and communications were well organ- ized and amazingly swift. Post offices were set up at short intervals along the main roads and letters were carried by relays of riders on horseback so that the Emperor in Peking was informed within a very few days of events occurring on the outer edges of his empire. This stage post system began in the Han period before the Christian era. Public inns also served the main highways and were open freely to all who had occasion to travel, and there were stores of fodder for the horses. Some of the more important roads were paved with stones. In the Sui dynasty in the 6th century the Grand Canal was built to connect the north and the south. It was rebuilt in the 13th century by the great Khublai Khan to improve communications be- tween the capital and the Yangtze Valley and to facili- tate the administration of the empire. Great use was made of the rivers as means of internal communication. The Yangtze and its tributaries were then, as they are now, important factors in the life of the nation. The Chinese felt no need of the outside world. Their civilization was superior to that of neighboring lands and was drawn upon and borrowed from by those lands. It reached also into the outside world and influenced distant cultures. Japan took from China her written language and much of her art and literature and in- dustry. Korea also drew heavily on Chinese culture. China gave the world silk and paper and many medi- cines, the art of printing, the magnetic needle, gun- TT For the purposes of this chapter we shall designate the smaller area or coreland, now consisting of eighteen provinces, as “China proper,” and the larger area as “Greater China.” Both areas have fluctuated in size and shape through the ages. PHOVISIONAL EDITION_ AREAL COMPARISON OF GREATER CHINA WITH THE UNITED STATES **, r***-* U Y U A N ſ \ | K \ —."--, Gº •-, Kuei-sui'9 \ \ : \. ſhellow Ri 2- © 2 J’ \ © low River) - S. 2.--~~~~~~. 4 & / Sº 9.’ ^... "Y-...- - “N. % ...~ \\ - { Y- ... *** / >.. ~, S.- :* \\ }. ſ ſ Co g f"S. -. S. ~" J O /* \ N. P. S-T">< ...— .. 2">. \ 'N. 21, | Ning-hsia §s 2’ \ 3. * f’-> ~..--~...~" `-s * \\ \- § i>~ſ *~ : * tº i’s....S. & Ż ºx ~~~. s * Fº • *** - Y ~~~ \ f *...*.* ! 3 ° || > *N./ / T S | N G H A | Hsiºing 3 ... ).2 ſº * * 7->9Lan-chou * j) Go "Nº A : <--" | • * sº CL1 *-2 C. ſ chang'an º, 2- cº- Sº 2. w Sººry):... •.” •, J C/) 'S. *s *_ _{AſO &R; \-...--~~~~...~.. - ..) * - tº: "...º. >\,-\ ( \-, —º Nanking) tºv :*. º **\,...; & : * º S Z E C H W A N.Y H U P E H Si sº. C޺. Riveſ.” "anc : Huai. ' Hang-chou & Ch'eng-tu ?/ ? Wu-ch'angº, N Jºi. , :::: sement §/ > * > /CHBKANG; Ž CH'UNG-CHING § -2 r.....Sººº-º-º: °N ... We f º $º \ ( r º y sº } \ º - F-, ..., , - * , ... *_ſ\ſ” ºn, b Ch'ang-sha(s) }KIANGSy U./"-": -". ‘J ( * * ( (KWEIcHowſº .../ ...’ W H E L L UN G K A N G A. - Lung-chiangº V) / *H U N A N', Fu-chou .../ f * © \2\ Kuei-vang i-º-TT. \) jFUKIENg GREATER CH |NA - 2 º’ "...º. ) tº lºſº º wº J Y U º* *A N. 2–~/ Rºut & Asſ * - A oy)g: "formosa tº sº tº º q &mºs º º INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY c. &- is KW A N G & ºw.sense * TAIWAN, \ .* /Kuanº. «s * * * as as as a s = • * * * **** - PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY * } ~f~~ /...º.º. *e. 2-ºxº~ ~3 & (Canton, §ºHong Kong © PROVINCIAL CAPITAL %. ".… } ( - (Br). y P-3 FRENCH § º 200 400 600 4– _* Miles - /~~~) INDO.CHINA & . SOUTH CHINA SEA § u 2.0 t so g so W so KILOMETERS K. ſ' - i ! º: ::::: . NO. mºrrº Tºp NTE errºcºs 3 AUGUST 1944 3. FIGURE 2 powder, and many other things. Chinese philosophy reached far beyond the widest borders of the empire. Influences from the outside world did come in and affect Chinese culture. Some of these influences came in by way of the conquering barbarians from the North; some came through peaceful trade; some were brought back by Chinese forces that had moved into the outer regions in the waves of empire expansion. Buddhism came from India and Christianity from the West, and they have had a wide and deep influence upon Chinese thinking and upon Chinese art. China also received many gifts from the outside, including cotton, which has become the primary fiber of her economy. By the 11th or 12th century, the use of the compass brought more sailing ships to China's shores, and by the 16th century contact with Europe by sea had become frequent. China's self-sufficient economy had little interest in these first visitors from the West and the trade that they wanted. Even later, when the British East India Company tried to develop a trade, because they wanted China's tea and silk, pottery, lacquer, and cotton cloth, there was little besides silver that they could use in exchange—silver and a few luxuries and trinkets like watches and clocks. Their woolen cloth could find no market. The Chinese were not interested in the staple products of the West. America traded ginseng and silver for China's silk and teas in the early trade. The Chinese were not eager for trade with the West. They erected a barrier to commerce comparable to the Great Wall they had built against the northern invaders in the first years of the Empire. This wall against commerce was a strict control of all trade by Sea through the Co-hong, a Guild system operated under strict su- pervision of a commissioner, or emperor's merchant, appointed by the throne. Under Guild regulations foreign commerce was permitted only through the port of Canton. For many years this strict monopoly held the foreign traders under control. The advance of in- dustrialization in the West, however, was a much stronger force than the Emperor's trade monopoly. Early in the 19th century the invention of the steam- ship broke down the barrier of the Pacific Ocean. The Western Nations had advanced in their industrial de- velopment and were looking for markets, not for a luxury trade, but for the disposal of a large surplus pro- duction in exchange for China’s tea and silk. For many decades their factory-made goods could find no market in China. They were inferior in quality to China’s handmade products, and they were also sometimes more costly. The lighter weight cotton cloth for work clothes was not as elegant as the finer cloths still being spun by skilled native craftsmen. Gradually the fac- tory goods improved in quality and cheapened in price, and the disintegration of China’s great handicraft econ- omy began. As the factory goods came into the coastal cities and displaced the hand-made goods of the coun- try, the economy was thrown out of adjustment. Fol- lowing on the heels of the goods themselves, new indus- trial methods were imported into the coastal cities under foreign influence. The new methods established on the shores of China offered more serious competition to the old industries than the foreign factory goods, and disin- tegration of the old order was hastened. The superior ships and weapons of war of the Western nations forced political and economic concessions from isolationist China. Hongkong was lost to the British and Macao to the Portuguese. The French secured a lease on Kwangchow wan; the Germans, a lease on Chiao-hsien (Kiaochow); the Russians, Liao-tung in Manchuria. Japan obtained the Nansei (Ryukyu) Is- lands, Taiman (Formosa) and the Pescadores by arbi- trary annexation or military conquest. Concessions were granted to foreign powers in Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow and many other so-called “treaty ports.” Rail- way concessions were yielded to the Russians and Japa- nese in Manchuria, the British, French, Belgians, and Americans in China proper. Mining rights went to British, German, and French nationals. Legation Quar- ters were set up in Peking” with special privileges for the foreign powers and their “unequal treaties.” The Revolution that brought in the establishment of the Republic of China came about in 1911. The years that have followed the Revolution have been marked by both civil wars and foreign invasion. The old economy has continued to disintegrate, while a new economic structure has been slow to build under the competition offered by the more industrialized nations. A few modern industrial centers, controlled largely by foreign interests, developed in the coastal area, with industries mainly for the production of consumer goods. A few unsuccessful attempts were made to establish heavy industry. Railway development was prejudiced by the frequent civil wars. Only a skeleton 2 Known as Pei-p'ing since 1928. The Japanese since 1937 have endeavored to restore the old name of “Peking” (north capital). system linked the major cities in the coastal region, with almost no development of feeder lines. The far interior and the areas away from the navi- gable rivers and railways continued to operate on the old economic structure, with imports from the coast. When the Japanese invasion came and it was necessary to move the government to the southwest, there was no modern industrial structure in the area to support a war government. It was necessary, therefore, to build overnight a modern industry salvaged from the coastal cities. Factories and equipment had to be moved, liter- ally under fire, from the coast back into the remote in- terior and reestablished there with great difficulty. The labor to operate these plants had to be imported with the equipment in order to have a nucleus of experi- enced workers who could be used to train the people of the area in the new type of industry. These things were moved thousands of miles, by rail and steamship, and then by junk and animal pack and porter. The Chinese formed “Industrial Cooperatives” to stimulate production in the handicraft industries for the supply of necessities such as blankets and clothing to the Chi- nese Army. Free China has been maintained in this way. After the loss of the Indochina-Yünnan Railway in 1940 and the Burma Road in 1942, Free China has been blockaded from outside supply except for small amounts of goods from Russia through the Northwest Highway and the air transport that has been developed between India and China. The Chinese Republic that arose from the Revolution has some of the aspects of a western democracy, but it is built on customs and traditions that go deep into the past and on patterns of thought that have been shaped by the experiences of the people over many cen- turies. The government, as a consequence, is not yet a fully representative government, and central authority is not strong. The long traditions of local autonomy that goes with a widespread agricultural economy not tied together by modern transportation and communi- cations systems are still strong. The family unit is important; the local government is important; the pro- vincial government is less important; and the remote central government is least important. These things are changing under impact with modern communica- tions and with the outside world. The Central Govern- ment of China today commands more allegiance throughout both the free and occupied areas than any other such government in the past half century. I. WORLD POSITION AND CONNECTIONS 1. LOCATION. Until about 1890 nearly half the circumference of the earth separated China proper from the main centers of military force in other states of equal or greater strength. Possessing the only large and productive lowlands on the shores of the Pacific and protected by distance against large-scale invasion, China for nearly four thousand years had been not only self-sufficient, but secure against all but the nomads and semi-nomads of its northern frontiers. Being self-sufficient, China was not impelled to expand overseas, although it had exacted tribute from Korea, Japan, Formosa, Indo- china, and Burma at intervals for many centuries; and, feeling secure, its Manchu rulers had neglected military defenses and so were unable to prevent the entering wedge of encroachment by the Western Powers and Japan—encroachment that ultimately threatened the virtual dismemberment of the country. 2. SIZE, SHAPE, AND DEPTH. In area Greater China today (4,314,000 square miles)* is larger than Europe (3,750,000 square miles). China proper has an area of (1,398,000 square miles)”, or slightly less than half that of the continental United States. Both Greater China and China proper possesses the military advantage of great territorial depth. Like the Red Army, the Chinese armies in the present war have been able to withdraw far into the interior, and the Chinese government, like that of the Soviet Union, has moved manufactures for military needs into the heart of the country beyond the reach of the invader. When superficially examined on a map, Greater China appears to have a compact triangular shape. This is misleading. Wastelands intervene between China proper and the inhabited marginal regions of Tibet, Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria, and have always made it difficult for the central government to hold and protect these regions, especially during times of internal disorganization. 3. CLIMATE AND BASIC NATURAL RE- SOURCES. Greater China may be divided into two climatic re- gions: the arid, sparsely settled, and relatively unpro- ductive western and northwestern parts of the country; and the more humid coastal provinces of China proper and Manchuria. - Since the humid region of eastern China and the eastern United States each lies on the eastern side of a continental land mass in the middle latitudes, there are broad climatic resemblances between them. Both have sufficient precipitation to support agricultural popula- tions; both have the marked contrasts between winter and summer characteristic of continental climates; in both the summers are everywhere hot and the winters cold and snowy in the north and milder in the south. There are, however, two notable differences. In the first place, a large part of China proper extends farther south than does any part of the United States and hence has a considerably warmer and more tropical climate than that of our southeastern States. In the second place, northeastern China as a whole is much drier than the northeastern United States. In northeastern China, grasslands like those of our Great Plains extend eastward to the shores of the Gulf of Po Hai and into Manchuria. Sandy deserts are found no farther inland from Pei-p'ing than Syracuse lies inland from New York City. Despite the inherent fertility of much of the soil of northeastern China, farming there is handi- capped by recurrent devastating droughts, from which northeastern United States is free. China is predominantly an agricultural country. Its mineral wealth has not been fully explored but is be- lieved to be modest for a country so large, although there is considerable variety, some of which, such as tungsten and antimony, are important in modern indus- trial production. The greatest mineral resource is coal. There is also some iron ore, but no deposits of outstand- ing magnitude like those of the United States, France, or Sweden. 4. SEA, LAND AND AIR CONNECTIONS. a. Sea Connections. Although China's land fron- tiers are more than three times as long as its Seacoast, the sea is the country’s primary link with the outside world. This is no less true today, when the Japanese are using the Seaways to bring in their armies and take out China's wealth for their own use, than it was in peace- time when China's ports were open to the shipping of all the world. Shipping routes converge on the China coast from the northeast and the south. The northeastern ap- proach is followed by vessels coming not only from Japan and Vladivostock but in normal times from across the Pacific along the Great Circle course, or short- est route, to China from the west-coast ports of the United States and Canada. This course swings far north of the Hawaiian Islands and close to the south- eastern shores of Japan. The southern approach is followed by shipping from the Philippines, Nether- lands Indies, French Indochina, and Singapore, and in peacetime from Australia and points west of Singa- pore. Prior to 1942, Hongkong was the eastern termi- nus of Britain's historic life line to the Far East. The war with Japan which began in 1937 disrupted China's oversea trade, and since early in 1942 all ocean connections have been cut between China and the world beyond the reach of the Japanese Navy. Hence the latest year in which China's sea connections functioned in anything like a “normal” fashion was in 1936. Dur- ing that year the total value of China's imports and ex- ports combined (excluding those of Manchuria)* was about one-fifteenth that of the United Kingdom, one- tenth that of the United States, and one-third that of Japan. These comparisons are illuminating when we consider the size of China. China's imports during the four years ending with 1936 tended to exceed its exports in value by a ratio of about two to one. As would be expected of a predom- inantly agricultural country the greater part of the im- ports consisted of manufactured and semi-manufac- tured goods and the greater part of the exports, of raw materials and food products. During the four years 1933–1936 approximately 22 percent of China's total foreign trade was with the United States; Japan ranked second with 14 percent, and the United King- dom and Germany followed with about 10 percent each. b. Land Connections. The outer boundary of Greater China nowhere lies far from the railroads in the adjoining countries, but so formidable are the moun- tain and desert barriers along most of this boundary that it is actually crossed by railroads only in the far northeast and far southeast. Two main lines link Man- * These represent the latest official figures published by the Chinese. * The foreign trade of Manchuria was mostly with Japan ; excluding trade between Manchuria and the rest of China, it was valued in 1936 at about three-quarters that of China proper. 4. churia with Korea and then by train ferry with South- ern Japan. From a point less than 100 miles east of Lake Baikal, a branch of the Soviet Union’s Trans- Siberian Railroad has been reported to extend south to Urga (Ulan Bator Khoto), capital of Outer Mongolia, and about 300 miles farther east another branch (the Chinese-Eastern Railroad) cuts directly across Man- churia to Vladivostok. Two other lines within Man- churia run north to, but not across, the border. In the far southeast, a railroad from French Indochina ex- tended " some 300 miles into the Chinese province of Yünnan, but made no connection with the rail network of China proper. Since Manchuria and Indochina are today in Japanese hands, unoccupied China is wholly without rail connection with the outer world. Most of the roads leading out of China are merely rough caravan trails. There is, however, the well- known Western Imperial Highway, a road used by mo- tor trucks from Lanchow, on the northwestern margin of China proper, across some 2,000 miles of desert and steppe country to points on the Turkestan-Siberian Railroad near Lake Balkhash in Soviet Central Asia. From this route another road passable for motor vehi- cles leads to Kashgar (Shufu), near the westernmost extremity of Greater China, and may now have been extended to the rail terminus of the Trans-Caspian 5 This railroad was French-owned. It was torn up inside the Chinese border by Chinese troops in 1940 as a defensive measure. 1. MAJOR AREAL DIVISIONS. a. Humid and Arid China. A line drawn from the northeasternmost corner of India to the northern tip of Manchuria marks the approximate division between arid China on the west and humid China on the east." Except in parts of Manchuria, most of the country east of this line is densely populated and the people are predominantly Chinese; west of the line the population is nearly everywhere sparse, large tracts are uninhabited and many of the people are non-Chinese, chiefly Mon- gols, Tibetans, or Turks. Nearly everywhere east of the line crops are raised without dry-land irrigation; west of it grazing largely takes the place of agriculture, which is confined to scattered oases where water for 7 No exact line can be drawn. Rivers and mountain ranges traverse the area, causing various climatic conditions and ground cover. Railroad at Osh in the Soviet Union beyond high moun- tains. Still another motor route runs from Urga across Mongolia to Kalgan and Pei-p'ing, but its southern end is in Japanese hands. The distances are so great along all of these routes that a large part of the load of the motor vehicles using them must of necessity be in the form of fuel and oil for the motors, and the traffic at best is relatively insignificant. When the Japanese cut off China’s access to the sea and the capital of China was moved to Chungking a new life-line to the Indian Ocean was opened up—the famous Burma Road. Constructed by the Chinese Government between 1937 and 1939 under the supervision of Amer- ican-trained Chinese engineers, it connects K'un-ming (Yünnanfu) in Yünnan with Lashio in Upper Burma, whence a railroad reaches the port of Rangoon. The road passes over a region of prodigious gorges two or three thousand feet deep and filled with dense jungle. Tropical heat and heavy rains added to the difficulties of road construction and maintenance. The Japanese conquest of Burma in 1942 cut this line, and the projects for two other roads, the Assam and Ledo Roads farther north, linking Assam in northeastern India with Chung- king, have not yet been completed although surveys have been made and construction begun. There is now no way by which motor vehicles may enter unoccupied China from the southwest except as air freight. c. Air Connections. Before the attack on Pearl II. AREAL STRUCTURE irrigation is available along belts between mountains and dry plains. The whole region west of the line forms an immense barrier area between China proper and the neighboring territories of the British Empire and Soviet Union. b. Mountain System. A large part of Western China is hilly and mountainous with a large expanse of tableland, sandy desert, and plateau. To the South lies the high, cold, and rugged plateau of Tibet, separated from India and Burma by the lofty Himalayas, the highest mountains in the world. To the north the ter- rain levels out into a dry plateau, low when compared to Tibet, but high when compared to the lowland plains lying between it and the Sea. Besides containing sev- eral sandy desert areas, this region is cut up by hills and mountains. From the mountainous mass which com- Harbor, Hongkong (as we have seen in the chapters on the British Empire and the United States) was the terminus both of an American trans-Pacific airway, via Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines, and of the British airway from Europe via India and Singapore. Air routes to Hongkong and to Rangoon linked Chungking with these world-encircling airways, but, as Rangoon, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila have all fallen into the enemy's hands, these routes are now severed. Chungking is today served by two airways in opera- tion, one from the Soviet Union, which follows approxi- mately the same course as the motor highway from the northwest, and the other from India. The latter, it is said, is bringing into China a larger volume of military supplies than was ever carried over the Burma Road. The lofty mountains on the southern and western frontier, however, are obstacles to air transportation as well as to land movement. Weather extremes accen- tuate the difficulties of air travel over these routes by forcing planes to heights of 20,000 or more feet, with a consequent reduction in payloads.” The vast deserts of Inner Asia create problems of servicing planes. The problem of supplying fuel for planes can be met only by carrying it in by air. Some attempts are being made to develop local oil resources in Szechwan and Kansu provinces, but here, too, lack of drilling and refining equipment is discouraging. ° In South America trans-Andean flying faces these same problems. pletely dominates westernmost China, branching chains extend toward the sea like the several trunks of a di- vided tree. To the far south a broad, rugged structure extends to the coastal region of South China. A center trunk supplies three main branches, one of which ends in the Ch’in Ling Shan (Nan Shan) range which is the Great Divide between the Hwang Ho and Yangtze riv- ers and separates North from South China; a branch which swings northeastward, and, though broken by the Yellow Sea, continues to skirt the shores of the Japan Sea; and still another branch which swings abruptly North to follow the western boundary of Manchuria. To the north another main trunk with lateral branches lies along the Soviet border. c. Seacoasts and Ports. Where the uplands of the Liao-tung and Shantung peninsulas and the hilly coun- 5 try of South China face the sea, the coasts are rugged and indented and there are deep natural harbors. The shore lines of the great alluvial plains are low, flat, and difficult of approach, except through the estuaries of the Yangtze and Hsi rivers and at a few other places where ship channels have been dredged. In winter, ice forms an obstacle to navigation in the Gulf of Po Hai and along the north shore of the Yellow Sea. The principal southern outlets of Manchuria are the ports of Dairen, near the tip of the Liao-tung Peninsula, and of An-tung and Newchwang developed at the mouths of the Yalu and Liao rivers, respectively. Far- ther south, on the North China coast we find the ports of Tientsin (the port of the long-time capital, Pei- p'ing), Tsingtao, on a fine natural harbor in the Kiao- chow district on the outer side of the Shantung Penin- sula, and Lien-yün (Lao-yao) north of the present mouth of the Hwang Ho. Shanghai, the port for the Yangtze region and the Hwang Ho basin south of the Shantung highlands, normally handles half of the over- sea trade of China. South of the Yangtze delta there are many good har- bors but access from them into the interior is poorly developed because of the rugged terrain. Hongkong on a mountainous island close to the mainland, and Canton, reached through the estuary of the Hsi and the Chu (Pearl) rivers, together serve the Canton delta and sur- rounding country, and rank as important ports. Little trade moves through the small ports south of the Hsi. It was to the seaports of China that the Westerners first came to trade, and by the close of the nineteenth century Occidental interests had become deeply en- trenched in all of the principal coastal cities, the river ports along the Yangtze, in Pei-p'ing, and in various inland commercial towns. Over two of the seaports (Macao and Hongkong) China had relinquished its sov- ereignty; certain others it had leased for long terms to foreign nations; and with regard to Some thirty-five more (the “Treaty Ports”) it had concluded treaties granting special privileges to the foreigners.” In the Treaty Ports, which were established from 1842 on, foreigners were granted the privilege of trading and residing in certain restricted areas. These quarters, or concessions, developed into self-governing municipali- ties, exempt from local taxation and with their own schools, hospitals, courts, public utilities, etc., and for- eign military establishments to guard them. Among other extraterritorial rights enjoyed by foreign residents was that of immunity from the jurisdiction of the Chi- nese courts. “They soon attracted to themselves the bulk of the trade, both foreign and domestic, in the districts in which they were situated. Chinese merchants flocked to them both for trade and protection; they became the centers of Chinese, foreign and coastal shipping, the starting points of her railways, and the cradle of her infant industries.” ” To bring about the abolition of these and other special privileges has been one of the first objectives of the republican government of China. It is highly signifi- cant, therefore, that on January 11, 1943, Great Britain and the United States concluded a treaty with China whereby they gave up their extraterritorial rights and established full equality in all their dealings with the Chinese nation. d. North China. North China proper comprises two very different subregions: (1) the uplands of the interior and (2) the great alluvial plain of the Hwang Ho, or North China Plain, with the included uplands of Shantung. (1) The Uplands. The Hwang Ho (Yellow River), which rises in Tibet, drains the western portion of the uplands; thence it makes a great swing far to the north into the steppes of Mongolia, where it turns back south through the uplands, only to make a right angle bend to the east, 200 miles before flowing out into the plain. The upland area as a whole was the historic frontier zone between China proper and the drylands of inner Asia. Much of the region is covered with deep deposits of loess, which the Chinese descriptively call “Yellow Earth,” an exceedingly fine-grained, but fertile soil, laid down by the wind. The scarce and unreliable rain- fall renders agriculture precarious, however. In pe- riods of drought famine occurs. Conversely, when a series of years brings more than average rain, much of the steppe borderland can be tilled, and farmers push out into it. For centuries this drought-racked land has been eco- nomically overshadowed by the more productive parts of China, but its strategic significance persists, as proved at every important political turning-point in Chinese history, including the current invasion by Japan. Chinese guerrillas have thus far prevented the Japanese army from seizing the hill land west and South of the Hwang Ho. The loess country lends itself to guerrilla warfare because of its many caves and bluffs. Ambush of movements through deep defiles is easy. Scouts carry light bamboo ladders to scale the steep valley walls. While the region is well suited to guerrilla warfare, modern large-scale military opera- tions can be carried on only with the greatest difficulty because the problems of supply and communication are extremely complicated. The existing sections of the Chinese Great Wall run almost without interruption along the entire north- western margin of China proper. At the eastern end of this ancient frontier, the Lin-yü (Shan-hai-kwan) corridor, a strip of lowland, five miles wide between the sea and the mountains, gives access from Manchuria to North China. Southwestward from Lin-yü, mountain ranges sepa- rate the North China Plain from the steppes of Inner Mongolia. The mountains vary in height and direc- tion, some reaching crestlines of 8,000 to 10,000 feet. Across them the Nankow Pass provides a much used trunk line from Pei-p'ing, near the northern end of the Plain, to Kalgan, important as a crossroads through which the only direct route between the steppes and North China passes and from which roads branch out to all parts of Mongolia. Farther south, Lanchow forms the principal western portal of China proper, and the terminus of the motor road from the Soviet Union to Unoccupied China. It is also linked by motor roads with T’ung-kwan and Chungking. (2) The North China Plain. The North China Plain is an immense complex delta. The Hwang Ho shifts its course from time to time, reaching the sea first to the north and then to the south of the Shantung hills.” 8 Macao, on a small island at the mouth of the Hsi estuary, has been Portuguese since 1557. Great Britain acquired Hongkong in 1842 after a war with China and in 1860 added to this colony Kowloon on the adjacent mainland. In 1898 China leased Chiaohsien (Kiaochow), with the port of Tsingtao, to Germany ; Kwantung, with Dairen and Port Arthur, to Russia ; Wei-hei-wei, on the north coast of Shantung, and some additional territory on the mainland near Hongkong, to Great Britain ; and Kwangchow wan, in the far south, to France. Kwantung was transferred to Japan in 1905 after the Russo-Japanese War. Japan seized Kiaochow from the Germans during the first World War, but restored it to China in 1922 and Britain returned Wei-hei-wei to China in 1930. 9 Sir Harry Fox : What the Surrender of Extraterritoriality Will Mean to Us, Journal Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 18, 1931, pp. 384–398; reference on p. 385. See also “The End of Extraterritoriality in China,” Bull. of International New8, Royal Inst. of International Affairs, Vol. 20, 1943, pp. 49–56. - 19 Between 1853 and 1938 the river followed the northward course shown by a broken line on the accompanying map ; before 1853 it fol- lowed approximately its present course. The diversion was apparently deliberately made on both occasions, in 1853 “to arrest the advance of the Taiping rebels northward toward Peking” and in 1938 to check the advance of the Japanese (H. Chatley : The Yellow River as a factor in the Development of China. The A8iatic Review, Vol. 35, 1939, pp. 1934–1941). 6 Numerous tributaries and ditches cross the Plain. These waterways are shallow and most of them are fordable and they have generally been diked in an effort to keep them within bounds during flood season. As the river deposited silt and debris the dikes were built higher and higher to keep above the rising water level until the bed of the stream in many sections is above the level of the surrounding country. This situation placed the residents of the area in a precarious position. Few rivers are subject to such violent floods as the Hwang. Hardly any of its waters, shallow and full of shifting sand bars, are navigable for large craft. The country is so dry that it is a yellow and dusty land except during spring and early summer. There is generally sufficient rain, however, to bring crops to bearing without irrigation. The plain has frequently been invaded. The large- scale warfare of the present day heightens its military importance as the most favorable region in China for deploying large armies. It has been easier for Japa- nese armies to seize its arteries of communication than those of other sections of the country, a conquest they effected during 1938. Steeply sloping mountains, interspersed with gentle hills, mark the interior edges of the Great Plain. An ancient north-south highway lies along the foothills ex- tending southward to the Middle Yangtze Basin. A railroad now parallels this ancient route and forms a western link between the Great Plain and South China. Another railroad to the east takes a southeasterly direc- tion, connecting Pei-p'ing with Nanking and Shanghai. The latter somewhat parallels and supplants the Grand Canal which, rebuilt in the thirteenth century, was until modern times the principal connecting traffic link be- tween North and South China. Nevertheless, the avail- ability of the canal to people of limited means continues its importance as a mode of local transport. Both roads join at Pei-p'ing, which is linked by rail with Man- churia through the Lin-yü (Shan-hai-kwan) Corridor and with Inner Mongolia through the Nankow Pass. Pei-p'ing is served by the port of Tientsin. The excel- lent harbor of Tsingtao in Shantung Province also serves the Great Plain by way of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway which connects with the Pei-p'ing-Shanghai line at Tsinan. The east-west Lung Hai Railroad, as we have seen, crosses the full width of the plain into the heart of the loess upland. The eastern terminus of the latter line is at the port of Lien-yün (Lao-yao) on the north Kiangsu coast. . e. South China. South China is a different world from that of the North. Its abundant rainfall and warmer climate make it lush and green at times of the year when North China is parched with drought or withered with cold. Much of South China is hilly or mountainous. The principal lowlands are the three large basins drained by the Yangtze River and the smaller Canton delta section. (1) The Yangtze Basins. The three Yangtze Basins are set off from each other by narrows in the river valley. The Lower Basin is a delta merging with that of the Hwang Ho. The Middle Basin is likewise largely built up of river sediments and is flat, low, and dotted with lakes. The soil of these two basins is not quite as fertile as that of the North China Plain, but the more abundant rainfall insures a good crop every year and provides water for the irrigation of rice, which cannot be extensively grown farther north because of the long, cold winters. The third or Red Basin lies farther upstream, separated from the Middle Basin by a mountain wall through which the river has cut a deep gorge. The Red Basin stands several hundred feet above the Middle and Lower Basins and is a land of hills, among which lies the highly productive Chengtu plain. -> 3. The Yangtze basins are set off from North China by a combination of barriers. On the east the many rivers and lakes of the delta flats form a considerable ob- stacle. Farther west, first a range of hills and then the Ch’in Ling (Tsin-ling) mountains, which rise to more than 10,000 feet, mark the border zone. These barriers are crossed by minor trails in many places, but the main highways for traders and warriors are few and have remained little changed since the beginning of China's history. Even the construction of canals and railroads has not altered the pattern of the principal connecting routes. The Middle and Lower Yangtze basins were inte- grated with the original nucleus of the Chinese state in North China before the year 100 B. C. The govern- ments of North China, depending upon marching armies were able to carry offensive operations overland into the Yangtze basins, and once there, the armies had an addi- tional advantage in the ease with which irrigation works could be destroyed or damaged. The consequent de- struction of the rice crop, the staple food for the dense population, added famine to the devastation of warfare itself. Throughout its course in China proper the Yangtze River is broad, deep, and, in places, swift. It is the backbone of the Chinese communication system. The lower part of its course is paralleled by railroads, but the river itself constitutes the sole through connection between the three basins. It has always carried naval vessels as well as trading ships. Large ocean craft can ascend to Nanking at all seasons. Ships drawing ten feet of water can continue, at all seasons, to Hankow, the metropolis of the Middle Yangtze Basin, and river craft drawing seven feet can ascend to Ichang at the foot of the gorge. Chungking, 1,300 miles from the river mouth, is the head of year-round navigation for small power vessels. The gorge between Chungking and Ichang is hazardous because of rocks, whirlpools, and the swift current, and specially constructed, powerful Steamers are required for its navigation. Toward the end of 1937, Japan seized the Lower Yangtze Basin by invasion from the sea. No part of this basin had ever before suffered military conquest from that side. The government was forced to move first from Nanking to Hankow, and at the end of 1938 to Chungking in the Red Basin. The Japanese advance westward was finally halted in the neighborhood of Ichang, at the east end of the gorge. Cut off by mountain masses, the Red Basin was not annexed to China until the fourth century B. C. It is more readily defensible than any other productive part of the mainland of East Asia. A barrier of lofty moun- tains and the gorge of the Yangtze itself aid its defense against ground forces attempting invasion from the east. In productivity, the Red Basin combines char- acteristics of South and North China, growing both rice and wheat. Today it is the core of Unoccupied China and the political and administrative center of the State. Most of its history, however, has been passed in isola- tion. (2) The Canton Delta. The principal river of China's far south is the Hsi, or West, River, a shorter stream than either the Hwang or the Yangtze. Its course is through uplands, except where its delta merges with those of lesser streams to form the Canton delta, a densely populated lowland, smaller in area than those farther north. This lowland, which is separated from the Yangtze by a wide belt of hills and low mountains, 7 was not finally incorporated into China until the time of the Tsin and Han dynasties, nearly 1,000 years after the basins of the Hwang Ho and Middle and Lower Yangtze had been consolidated. Two main routes lead to the Canton delta area from the Yangtze valley. The oldest runs almost due south from Hankow following the courses of tributaries of the Yangtze and Hsi affording a direct route from the Middle Yangtze Basin. When Chinese social and po- litical reforms first made their way southward they took this easy way. The other route begins at the lower end of the same basin and joins the older route after crossing into the watershed of the Hsi. All three of the valleys traversed by these two routes are broad, and their streams are navigable for Small craft. The people of the Canton delta are industrious and progressive and it was here that the revolutionary ideas underlying the present Chinese Republic took form. The political concepts of the Chinese revolution appear to have been engendered by contact with the Occidental world through the return of Chinese from studies abroad, bringing Western ideas and customs with them, and through missionary schools, which have exerted no small influence and which are most in- fluential in this part of China. - * (3) The Hill Lands. The coastal zone between the deltas of the Yangtze and the Hsi is so difficult to pene- trate that it was not annexed to China until the third century A. D. The range of relief is between 1,500 and 2,500 feet, although some peaks rise to 6,000 feet. The rivers are short, swift and unnavigable, and each basin constitutes a unit isolated except on the seaward side. The size of the towns at the river mouths is limited by the productivity of the basins they serve. Agriculture is restricted to small and scattered valley lands. The coast is dotted with fishing hamlets. This is the only section of China in which the people have taken much interest in seafaring. Most of Yünnan, the southwesternmost province of China proper, is a deeply dissected plateau some 6,000 feet high. In the long history of the southward ad- vance of the Chinese, it was the area most recently pene- trated. Many primitive groups still live there unas- similated to the Chinese way of life, and intermittent guerilla warfare persists in places between these native folk and Chinese settlers. The construction at the be- ginning of this century of a narrow gauge railroad from Hanoi in French Indochina to Kunming, the provincial capital, and, in the winter of 1938–1939, of the Burma Road brought part of the region into touch with the outside world. - f. The Outlying Territories. (1) The Tibetan Plateau. Tibet is the largest and loftiest plateau" on earth, standing more than 12,000 feet above sea level, and almost surrounded by still higher mountains. It is so cold and dry that it can support only a very sparse nomadic population. Parts of it are unexplored. The western two-thirds, a tableland above which rise lofty mountains, is politically autonomous. Tibet is so iso- lated that it is neither a threat requiring, nor an asset encouraging, close supervision by the Chinese govern- ment. - The mountain crossings into Tibet are extremely ar- duous. Only two trails reach China proper; one a direct trail to middle China over the dissected mountain bor- derland of the Upper Yangtze, the other an easier but roundabout trail via the Hwang Ho Valley to North China. The principal rivers of China and Indochina rise on the plateau of eastern Tibet. Their headwaters have trenched the plateau margin with numerous deep gorges, virtually impassable as routes of travel. Seg- ments of the valleys, however, are wide enough to Sup- port small agricultural groups. Five-sixths of the tilled area of Tibet lies in this borderland, control of which usually, but not always, implies domination of the main block of the Tibetan Plateau. The present Chinese Government has set up new border provinces to strengthen its control—Sikang, in the dissected coun- try, and Tsinghai, a mountain-girt basin much lower than the rest of Tibet, which opens northeastward upon the trunk line of the caravan trails on the West. (2) Chinese Turkestan. The historic silk routes, the ancient tracks by which oriental goods reached Europe and European travelers and missionaries reached China before the ocean connection was opened, still carry considerable traffic. They leave China proper by a trunk line through the Kansu Corridor, an oasis- studded trough trending northwestward from Lanchow along the desert margin. Beyond the Corridor, the roads diverge: two of them lead westward across Chi- nese Turkestan, to converge at Kashgar; a third leads northwestward through the Dzungarian basin. The basin of Chinese Turkestan is the lowest part of Inner Asia, standing at 4,000 feet and in places less. For the most part, it is an extreme desert, incapable of sup- porting grazing tribes except along its northern rim. In spite of this climatic handicap, it, together with the region of Kansu to the east, was the first of the border- lands to be attached to the Chinese Empire (in the time of the Han dynasty). The dry heart of the basin is uninhabitable. The piedmonts” of the two great ranges that hem it on the south and on the north, the K'un-lun Shan and the T'ien Shan respectively, are dotted with Oases fed by streams from the bordering snowfields and glaciers. A chief function of these settlements is to pro- vision the caravans moving along the two main routes that run through them—one on each piedmont. Today the route that skirts the south base of the T'ien Shan is the main highway and the southern route is little used. The latter, however, was the principal silk road of earlier days, the road taken in the thirteenth century by Marco Polo, greatest of all Asiatic travelers. (3) Dzungaria and Outer Mongolia. North and northeast of Kansu and Chinese Turkestan spreads an immense tract of desert and steppe some 4,000 feet above sea level. Large parts of it are featureless unbroken plains where the rainfall is so scanty that vegetation hardly exists and there are belts of shifting sand dunes. These broad flats are locally called gobis, and the name “Gobi Desert” is applied to a vast area where they domi- nate the landscape. North of the open plains, the mountain ridges, which extend eastward and southeastward from the Soviet border, wholly or partly enclose a number of basins. The westernmost and largest of these, the Dzungarian Basin, politically forms part of the Chinese province of Sinkiang, which also includes Chinese Turkestan. Dzungaria and Outer Mongolia, which adjoins Dzun- garia on the east, are debatable ſands between China and the Soviet Union. China’s hold on them has always been more tenuous than on Chinese Turkestan. The more humid steppelands and basins, where most of the no- madic population lives, lie to the northeast and north, far from China proper but near the border. Ever since the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the peo- ple of these richer regions have been reorienting them- selves toward the new and improved line of access beyond the frontier. 11 The Tibetan plateau extends considerably farther to the north and east than the political area shown as Tibet on the accompanying map. 12 A piedmont is a belt of foothills or lowland country along the base of a mountain range. 8 Physically Dzungaria is much like the adjacent Kir- ghiz Steppe in the Soviet Union. Through it ran the third of the great silk routes by way of oases along the northern piedmont of the T'ien Shan. The motor high- way from Lanchow to Serigiopol on the Turkestan- Siberian Railroad follows much the same route today. Outer Mongolia is separated from Inner Mongolia by the Gobi Desert. Since 1924 it has been established as an independent republic governed on Soviet principles and under Soviet influence. Tannu Tuva on its north- ern border, a basin more enclosed by mountains than is Dzungaria but draining to and therefore facing the north, has been set up as a republic under Soviet protec- tion and for all practical purposes is a part of the Soviet Union. All along the frontier Soviet citizens are ex- ploiting Mongolian trade and minerals. China, how- ever, has never relinquished its claims to Outer Mon- golia and Tannu Tuva. These claims date back to the thirteenth century A. D., when the Mongol rulers brought all this northern country into the empire which they established not only over China but over the greater part of Asia. (4) Inner Mongolia. Between southern Outer Mongolia and China proper lies Inner Mongolia, a long and narrow strip of steppe, desert, and barren moun- tains. Three-fourths of the country is useless. The population is mainly nomadic, but there are sedentary settlements in alluvial valleys. In western Inner Mongolia, within the great north- ward swing of the Hwang Ho, lies the Ordos country, a desert of dunes and scanty grasslands. More than 2,000 years ago Chinese farmers admitted their failure to conquer and settle the Ordos by withdrawing from it to the line of the present Great Wall. Recent and nota- bly unsuccessful attempts to till the soil here have been made almost entirely by Mongols or local nomadic tribes. West of the Ordos, the Hwang Ho provides both flat land and irrigation water for a considerable Oasis, Ningsia. The value of this land is enhanced by its proximity to the Chinese (eastern) end of the Kansu Corridor. The eastern section of Inner Mongolia, between the Hwang Ho and the mountains on the Manchurian bor- der, is relatively productive steppe land. In the periods of minimum rainfall, the grass assures an ade- quate living to nomadic herdsmen. In the more rainy years the land can be tilled by farmers according to the standard Chinese practice of intensive agriculture on small plots. Physically the region consists of a series of basins connected with China proper by easy passes across low mountains. Hence it is set apart, rather than cut off, from China proper. These condi- tions have made it a region of conflict. All the great invasions of China proper from the north have fol- lowed one or another of the Inner Mongolian passes. Recurrently Chinese settlers have thrust the nomads northward, seizing their best lands for tillage and sub- ordinating the nomadic population to Chinese rule. In recent years farmers once more began to encroach upon the grazing land. This time they possessed advantages denied to earlier generations, for westward from Pei- p'ing a railroad has been built into the steppe, making possible the production of crops for export. (5) Manchuria. Manchuria is sometimes included in China proper and sometimes treated as a marginal appendage. This uncertainty is in keeping with the character of the region, a humid country where the in- terests of China, the Soviet Union, and Japan conflict. Manchuria literally faces both north and south, for its lowland core is made up of two river basins, those of the Sungari and the Liao Ho, separated by a broad, low saddle. To the north the Sungari River flows into the Amur, here the boundary with the Soviet Union. As late as the seventeenth century the landscape and culture of the Sungari Basin were indistinguishable from those of neighboring Siberia. Across the widest part of this basin runs the direct line of access between Lake Baikal and Vladivostok. The Chinese Eastern Railroad today follows this route, shortcircuiting the original trans- Siberian line, twice as long, which keeps outside the Manchurian border. Northern Manchuria is thus set squarely within the sphere of Russian interests. |Until 1878 Manchuria, despite its fertile soils and con- siderable mineral resources, was undeveloped and sparsely peopled. In that year the Manchu government removed restrictions that had long been in force against Chinese migration into the region. After 1900, migra- tion was encouraged by the government, and nearly two and one-half million Chinese are reported to have set- tled, mostly as farmers, in Manchuria between 1923 and 1929. Manchuria is the only part of China suitable for pioneer settlement on a large scale. It has been called a Chinese counterpart of the “Great American West,” of earlier days. 2. FRONTIERS AND CRITICAL AREAS. a. Frontiers from the Military Point of View. China may be considered as having three frontier zones: the outer land frontier of the Greater China, the interior frontier of China proper, and the Seacoast. The outer land frontier zone of the Chinese realm consists throughout almost its entire length of broad mountain barriers, through which the only large gaps lead from the north in Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Dzungaria. Since these gaps are separated from China proper by wide deserts that would present difficult ob- stacles to any invading army, China proper is fairly secure against invasion by land except across the south- ernmost boundary near the coast, where the barrier is hilly rather than mountainous, and through Manchuria and eastern Mongolia. The exact boundary line between the outer frontier zone and the neighboring countries has rarely been de- limited by treaty or precisely demarcated on the ground. Nomads or farmers practicing shifting cultivation oc- cupy much of the zone, and they have no interest in fixed boundaries. Except near the coast, the southern borderland is rugged country of wild mountains and plateaus cut by deep gorges. These highlands merge westward without a break into the most formidable of all mountain bar- riers, the Himalaya range, which separates Tibet from India. On the north the main block of the Tibetan Plateau is buttressed by the K'un-lun Shan, alpine and snow-clad mountains like the Himalayas, forming a barrier hardly less lofty and continuous. At their western end the K'un-lun converge with other Tibetan ranges in the high Pamir plateaus, from which another alpine range, the T'ien Shan, trends northeastward. To- gether these ranges and masses form a definite barrier boundary. Northeast of the T'ien Shan, the boundary claimed by China has shifted back and forth through the cen- turies. This conforms with the character of the coun- try. Instead of continuous lofty ranges, the mountains consist mainly of blocks and discontinuous ridges, be- tween which the passes are only a little above the level of drylands of Central Asia. The boundary between Manchuria and Siberia follows rivers throughout most of its length. The Amur valley, on the north, is an axis of settlement. The river is navigable, although icebound in winters, and a source of fish, one of the principal foods of the primitive peo- 9 612655°—44—2 ples of the region. On the northeast an extension of the Soviet Union includes the mountains between the border and the coast. Here the boundary is marked by the Ussuri River, a branch of the Amur, along the east (Siberian) bank of which the Trans-Siberian Rail- road runs to its terminal at Vladivostok. Between southeastern Manchuria and the sea lies the mountain- ous base of the Korean Peninsula. At no point, except in the extreme south, does Manchuria touch salt water. The interior frontier 20me of China proper comprised two segments. The southern segment, the wild border- land of the Tibetan Plateau extending from the north- eastern corner of India to the Hwang Ho near Lanchow, is of military significance as an almost impassable bar- rier. The segment from the Hwang Ho to the Gulf of Po Hai, on the other hand, is the borderland between agricultural China and the Steppes and deserts of inner Asia, the frontier across and along which most of China’s wars have been fought. In the present war these ancient routes across this zone have again been used as avenues of invasion—not this time by nomads of the steppes but by Japanese armies pushing south- ward from bases in Manchuria. As their many prede- cessors had done before them, the Japanese proceeded along the steppes of Inner Mongolia before attacking China proper in force. When the attack came in 1937 it was made upon both the North China Plain and the uplands of the northwest. º In the following years separate forays were made upon the sea frontier at the mouths of the Yangtze and Hsi Rivers. At the same time the push southward from the bases on the northern frontier was continued. Com- bined thrusts from the North China Plain and west- ward up the Yangtze led to the capitulation of most of the Middle Yangtze Basin that lies bekow the rivers and lakes that protect its upper segment. China's retaliation to Japanese tactics has been two- fold. Lacking any considerable manufacture of war matériel, China faced strangulation when its seaports were seized. To some extent its armies make up in sheer numbers what they lack in arms. Action over terrain so broad and difficult as that of China makes such de- fense possible at the cost of heavy casualties, but large- Scale offensive actions, to be successful, require the arms and equipment of modern warfare. Chinese strategy relies chiefly upon defense in depth and a war of attri- tion. Unoccupied China’s core is the Red Basin, seem- ingly impregnable to ground forces so long as a small, resolute army protects its approaches. Guerilla fighting is usually associated with a mobile defense. The prevalence of mountain and hill land in China has so facilitated this type of warfare that Japan has found it impossible to conquer completely the hill lands of either the north or the south. Japan does have a precarious hold on the Fen Valley in the northern uplands, but does not occupy any of the critical strategic sites in the vicinity of the great eastward bend of the Hwang Ho and is far from effecting a junction between the forces holding the lowlands of the Yangtze and the Hsi. b. Critical Areas from the Political Point of View. Four types of area within China and around its margins present problems actually or potentially critical from the political and economic points of view. (1) Within China proper there is a pronounced po- litical cleavage between the traditionally more conserv- ative North and more progressive South. Chinese civil wars—and there have been many—have tended to de- velop into conflicts between ambitious war lords of these two principal areas. Another critical area exists in the dry northwestern interior of China proper, long char- acterized as a region of chronic political uncertainty and instability. Not only are conditions of life there more precarious than elsewhere in China, but a large part of the people, though Chinese in speech, are Moslem in religion and none too tolerant of Chinese ways or sub- missive to Chinese rule. These remote provinces have been the scene of violent rebellions in the past. During the last 15 years they have come under Communist in- fluence. North Shensi is a main center of the Commu- nist movement, which threatened for a time to split China apart. Since 1937, however, the Communists have joined forces with Chiang Kai-shek’s government in the struggle against the common enemy, Japan. (2) From the point of view of industrial develop- ment one of the most critical areas within China proper is the upland of North China, particularly the province of Shansi. China's richest coal deposits lie here where the Japanese army now holds the principal lines of com- munication. Unless complete control is regained over this vital region, China cannot hope to develop into a powerful industrial nation. (3) Outside China proper, Manchuria is probably the only outlying territory with natural resources of sufficient magnitude to make any large potential contri- bution to the future economic and military strength of China. Manchuria occupies a foremost place in the post-war plans of the Chinese. Occupation by the Jap- anese interrupted a large-scale migration of Chinese to this area which can be compared with the middle west of the United States a century ago. It may be assumed that the Japanese will be driven out of Manchuria and that China will regain control of that region. It should not be forgotten, however, that the Russian Empire and, after it, the Soviet Union acquired interests in Man- churia, Some of which the Soviet Union may wish to recover. The primary value to China of the other out- lying territories is their function as protective buffers, and it is not likely that they will ever be much more than this unless hitherto unknown reserves of petroleum or other mineral deposits are discovered. When the Chi- nese government is too weak to maintain effective rule over these regions and they become centers of dissatis- faction or fall under foreign influence, they are in many ways liabilities rather than assets to China. (4) Finally, among the politically critical areas must be counted a number of marginal territories that were once under suzerainty but which China had relinquished either by cession or lease before the present war. A powerful and regenerated China of the future may be expected to seek the recovery of some of them. The return of Manchuria and Taiwan (Formosa) was prom- ised China at the Cairo Conference in 1943, and there are a number of European holdings over which thorny political problems have already arisen. The question of what is to happen after the war not only to British Hongkong, Portuguese Macao, and French Kwang- chow wan, and also to French Indochina is yet to be answered. 10 1. SIZE AND TRENDS OF POPULATION AND AGE GROUPS. Since there has never been an accu- rate census of the population of China, estimates based upon sample studies are the best information available. These suggest that the total number in 1936 was in the neighborhood of 450 million and also that the popula- tion was increasing rapidly. The birth rate (about 40) was higher than in any other country. except the U. S. S. R., and, although the death rate was also very high, there was an appreciable net increase of popula- tion at least until 1937, and the age distribution showed a preponderance of young people. It seems improb- able that the war losses, which have been estimated at 5,000,000, will permanently alter the trend of expanding numbers. 2. DENSITY AND PRODUCTIVITY. Although the density of population in the Greater China is only about 105 persons to the square mile, the population is unevenly distributed; six-Sevenths of the total popula- tion is concentrated in one-third of the area. The east is densely populated, especially in the lower valleys of It is true, however, that conservatism and political passivity have been national characteristics of China. These may be due partly to China’s long isolation in the past, but they are unquestionably also due in large meas- ure to qualities in the Chinese people associated with the economic conditions under which they live. Most of the Chinese are desperately poor. Peasant and city dweller alike pass their lives in endless, dogged toil. Their cheerful endurance under hardships and their amazing powers of recuperation after floods, famines, and wars are elements of strength, but the mere struggle for subsistence is so all-consuming of time and energy that there is little opportunity for the development of wider interests and broader outlook. The average peasant family has occupied the same farm for countless generations, and each generation strives to carry on as its predecessors have done. Because travel is difficult and costly and because there is no reason for him to travel, the peasant seldom leaves his home community unless called into military service. Each community keeps to itself, and ancient dialects and other cultural III. PEOPLE the Hwang Ho and the Yangtze, and the rice growing area South of the latter. The country is overpopulated in relation to its agricultural resources. Much of the sparsely populated outer area is unsuited to cultivation, and in China proper as a whole less than one-third of the people live in cities. The large peasant population live in small villages near their land. In spite of their lavish use of human labor and their inherited skill, Chinese farmers cannot wring an ade- quate living from the cultivated area at their disposal. The yield per acre is relatively high, but the output per worker is low, and the standard of living is at the margin of subsistence. Famine, disease, and war con- Sequently take a devastating toll. The low average productivity of Chinese labor is not due to lack of ability. In the traditional handicraft industries Chinese workers display great taste and skill, and they are capable of becoming skilled industrial workers when employed under favorable conditions. The obstacles to achieving such favorable conditions have been peculiarly difficult to overcome because of IV. USE OF NATURAL RESOURCES peculiarities persist. Deeply attached to his local “good earth” and to the graves of his ancestors, the Chinese peasant is unconcerned over what is going on in other parts of the country. He knows little of politics and cares less for them. China’s weak national cohesion, together with the backwardness of her systems of pro- duction and transportation, has left her a prey to the ambitions of other nations. The present leaders are undertaking a colossal task of national regeneration. Under the impact of Japanese aggression they are fostering a new Chinese nationalism, which is spreading and may achieve in the hardships of war what the ways of peace had failed to accomplish. There are signs that China’s passivity, like its isolation, may be a thing of the past. 1. PRODUCTION. a. Agriculture, Fishing, and Forestry. Approxi- mately 80 percent of the population of China proper is engaged in agriculture. It is essentially an industry of peasant cultivators who work in family units to provide their daily food. The average farm is about 21 mow the generally disordered economic conditions and the social habits of the Chinese, which discouraged indi- vidual initiative and responsibility. The high degree of illiteracy has been a further handicap. Sample studies have shown that in rural communities less than one in three of the males and one in one hundred of the females can read a common letter. In these commu- nities practically every able-bodied person works from the age of seven on. 3. NATIONAL TRAITS AND COHESION. Be- cause the Chinese have not kept pace with the West in the development of a machine-age civilization, the aver- age American is too likely to jump at the superficial conclusion that they are primitive and backward. They are backward with respect only to certain material pos- sessions and technical accomplishments by which the Western world sets great store. Their culture as re- flected in many of their arts, in the tone of their thought, and in their philosophical outlook on funda- mental problems of life, though different, is as rich and aS mature as Ours. or 3.5 acres varying in size from province to province— in the congested southeast from one-third to one-half an acre per person—and is scattered in minute plots over considerable area. The proportion of peasants owning small farms varies by province. In the North and Northeast the percentage of land-owning farmers is large, whereas in the South, the more fertile and well Watered soil will support both tenant and landlord and the number of peasants owning their own land drops as low as 20 percent. Even where the peasant does not pay rent he is usually heavily in debt. Families are large, local taxes and interest charges are high, and he finds it difficult to make both ends meet. Students of Chinese agriculture believe introduction of modern mechanical methods, at least in some sections, would help to alleviate distressed conditions. There are still outlying areas which would respond to the type of mixed dirt and dairy farming methods practiced in the United States and Europe to provide support for large numbers of people. China proper may be divided into two major agricul- 11 tral regions, each including several smaller ones. South of the Yangtze the climate is subtropical and humid and rice is the principal crop with silk, Sugar, and tea as supplements. There, double cropping and water- farming in valleys and on terraced hillsides is typical, and water buffalo are used as draft animals. So much of the region is mountainous that only about 18 percent of the land is under cultivation. The cultivable parts are so fertile, however, that they support an extremely dense population. North of the Yangtze-Hwang Ho divide, where the winters are severe and drought is fre- quent, dry farming is practiced, and wheat, millet, kaoliang, beans, and maize are the principal crops. Oxen are the draft animals. Nearly 45 percent of the land is under cultivation, but it is so much less intensively cultivated than in the south that the northern crop area supports a population only about half as dense. The small amount of grazing land in China proper—about 5 percent of the cultivated area—is in the northwest where wool is raised and exported. Between the two principal agricultural regions lies an intermediate Zone where both rice and wheat are grown. Throughout China proper the forest land has been largely denuded of trees in the desperate search for fuel and timber. It is only in recent years that active affor- estation has been promoted with government aid. Less than 10 percent of the land is now forested, and soil erosion is a most serious problem, made worse by the fact that the wild grass growing on much of the former forest land is harvested for fuel. The largest accessible forests of commercial value are found principally in Manchuria, where they are being exploited by Japanese interests. Although sea fishing is confined largely to the in- dented sections of the coast, especially off Fukien and Chekiang provinces, many fish are caught in the care- fully stocked streams, lakes, and small artificial ponds scattered over the farmland. Some dried fish and fish products are imported, however. The most common meats are chicken and pork. Among industrial raw materials, Chinese agriculture, before 1937, provided small exportable surpluses of raw cotton, raw silk, wool, vegetable oils, hides and skins, Among the food exports, egg products, tea, some vege- tables, and fruit were notable. In the future when improved internal transportation, economic stability, and the application of modern scientific knowledge have made specialization more widespread, these commercial crops may well become of far greater importance than hitherto. b. Mineral Resources. China is the only country of the far East of which the coalfields are of world im- portance, and, although not so rich as was once Sup- posed, the estimated reserves are much greater in extent than those of Great Britain. Much of the coal is of good quality. Coking coal is obtained from a number of the deposits. The important coal-bearing areas are in the interior, the principal one centering in Shansi within the right-angle bend of the Hwang Ho; another is found in Shensi province to the southwest. Most of the production, however, is in the northeastern provinces of China proper and in Manchuria. Before 1937 the annual output of coal in China proper averaged from 17 to 20 million tons or from 1 to 2 percent of world production. About one-twelfth was exported to Japan and Formosa. For many years it was thought that the petroleum resources of China were negligible. In 1934, however, the National Geological Survey of China announced an estimate of a total reserve of 4,337 million barrels in China proper and Manchuria, including oil recoverable from shale. These reserves are as yet undeveloped, ex- cept for the production of oil from shale in Manchuria. If they should prove as rich as estimated, China would be in the front rank of petroleum-bearing areas, sur- passed only by the United States, the Persian Gulf area, the U. S. S. R., and Venezuela. The deposits are, of China proper, in the western provinces of Shensi, Szechwan, Kansu, and Sinkiang. The potential resources of water power are probably not remarkable, although the mountainous southern provinces are fairly well endowed. At present, however, with the exception of a few local power stations, almost all the electric energy is produced and used in the eight principal cities (84.5 percent of the total electric energy in 1936). The Japanese have developed some transmis- sion lines in the occupied areas. The iron ore reserves of China are not outstanding. It has been estimated that total reserves of China proper are equal to about two tons per capita in comparison with 37.9 tons per capita in the United States. Accurate statistics are not available, however. More than half the reserves are in Manchuria where most of the ore is of low iron content; of the remaining reserves a little more than half are in the northeastern part of China proper and the rest in the lower Yangtze Valley. The chief producing mines are in Manchuria where an iron and steel industry has been built by the Japanese. The much smaller iron mines near Hankow and to the east along the Yangtze supply ore most of which, even in peace- time, was shipped to Japan. The iron industry in Chi- nese hands consisted, for the most part, of small iron foundries, although plans had been made for building national government steel mills at strategic points and for rehabilitating some earlier abandoned enterprises. After the invasion by the Japanese and the removal of the government to Chunking small scale steel plants were erected in the vicinity. Foreign experts seem to agree that an iron and steel industry of the first rank using Chinese resources alone is not practicable. Other metals of note produced in China include tin, antimony, tungsten, and manganese. Although these re- sources are a valuable contribution to the world supply of these by no means common minerals, they do not jus- tify hopes of a future great industry based upon them. The largest deposits are in South China. The principal deposits of tin lie in Yünnan, an extension of the better known tin fields of Indochina. Mining there has been stimulated by the railroad running from the coast in French Indochina to the Yünnan plateau. Copper is found in many places, but the chief producing unit today is in northeastern Yünnan, remote from adequate trans- portation. China supplies about 80 percent of the world’s antimony, all from south of the Yangtze. It also produces between one-half and three-quarters of the world’s tungsten, again from the rugged country be- tween the Yangtze and the plateau of Yünnan. Other minerals are present in China in great variety, but in none does China hold a prominent part in world pro- duction. c. Manufacturing. The industrial development of China in the modern sense began just before the turn of the century but was greatly accelerated in 1905 when foreign powers obtained the right to establish factories in the Treaty Ports. By 1937 three kinds of industrial regions had developed: (1) the treaty-port cities along the coast where both foreign and Chinese-owned mod- ern plants, producing chiefly textiles and tobacco, flour- ished side by side with smaller native establishments in the Chinese quarters; (2) the river valleys and rail- way zones where industrial development was growing and industrial plants were largely foreign-owned, espe- cially by Japanese; and (3) the interior, where the tra- ditional handicraft industries still prevailed. These 12 local trades were usually on a very small scale and often combined with agricultural occupations. Perhaps the most notable was the raising, spinning, and hand-weav- ing of cotton, a method by which a large part of the country's cotton cloth was produced. Large scale pro- duction existed in coal-mining, textiles, cement, paper, flour-milling, iron and steel-making, soap-making, and the generation of electric light and power. It may be expected that, with the exception of iron and steel-mak- ing, these will develop much more fully in the future and that light manufactures of various kinds, the mak- ing of railway and electrical equipment and of chem- ical fertilizers will also expand. The labor conditions in Chinese factories and mines have been extremely bad by almost every criterion, and the efficiency of the labor force has been correspondingly low. The modern Factory Act of 1934 established standards that would make an enormous improvement if enforced. Basically the problem is the improvement of agricultural production, for the impoverished coun- tryside is an inexhaustible source of cheap labor. 2. INTERNAL TRANSPORTATION. a. Railroads. The railroad system in China proper is grossly inadequate for the needs of a modern nation. In 1937 the main lines and branch lines totalled a little more than 6,000 miles in contrast to Great Britain which has over 20,000 miles of track. Moreover, in China the rolling stock was out of date and insufficient, and the service was erratic, and the charges were high. The railroad network consisted chiefly of a framework of through lines in the eastern coastal provinces. The southwestern provinces of China proper had no rail connections with the rest of the country nor had they more than a few miles of short lines for local use. With unimportant exceptions all the railway lines have been porters. owned and operated by the National Government since 1911. In contrast with the rest of China, Manchuria was better equipped with a network of railroads that in 1940 totalled 7,380 miles, the Chinese Eastern and South, Manchurian railways forming the bases of the system. b. Highways and Inland Waterways. Although through routes known to have persisted since prehis- toric times cross the Chinese realm, they have normally carried only luxury goods, aside from local trade. Most of them are mere tracks for camels, bullocks, or human Even the motor roads of recent construction are hardly to be described as through routes. Nowhere are they paved except in the vicinity of the cities in which foreign influence has been strong. The larger part are merely graded and become dusty in dry weather and rutted after heavy rains. Military movements to- day therefore depend more upon the railroads than on the highways. The highways of China proper in use in 1936 totalled somewhat more than 56,000 miles, of which less than 12,000 miles represented paved roads. At the same time there were nearly 7,000 miles of highway in Manchuria and about 5,500 in the outer territories of Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet. In the eight western provinces of China proper, with a total area of over one million square miles and a combined population of nearly 100 million people, there were but 13,000 miles of roads in 1936. The network covered the eastern half of the coun- try with reasonable density and routes reached the western provinces with only a few breaks. In 1937 the length of navigable inland waterways in China was estimated at 11,250 miles. Most of these are in the eastern half of China proper. The Chinese, with flat bottomed boats, make use of many additional streams not ordinarily considered navigable. Many small canals have been constructed, some of them centuries ago. True some of them are not much more than ditches, but they serve as connecting links between communities, and provide access to larger streams. Throughout the history of China, water transportation has"been of great importance. As we have seen, the principal north-south route consists of the ancient Grand Canal from Tientsin southward for 700 miles to Hangchow (south of Shanghai) and the principal east-west route of the Yangtze. The Yangtze's impor- tance as an artery connecting the coast with the interior cannot be overstated. Large ocean steamers proceed up the river as far as Hankow and smaller vessels still fur- ther to Ichang, a thousand miles from the sea. Above Ichang the river rapids are negotiated by specially con- structed powerful steamers. Native craft make use of the river for 1,630 miles, more than half of its length. Numerous tributaries are navigable by native craft, broadening the breadth of the area served to an enor- mous territory. The Hwang Ho is obstructed by rapids and by shallows and frequently shifts its course. The Hsi Chiang can be navigated for considerable distance by small steamers. Practically all streams are used to some degree by native craft. c. Airways. In 1937 the eastern provinces were served by three aviation companies with established airlines totalling about 8,750 miles. Many parts of the world such as the Soviet Arctic and northern Canada, have leaped from slow and primi- tive transportation to the air age. There is little evi- dence that China is doing so to anything approaching the same extent. The high mountains and deserts of the marginal areas constitute obstacles, and through- out China aviation is hampered by the lack of airports, emergency landing fields, facilities for servicing planes, and the necessary fuel itself. W. POST WAR PROBLEMS AND NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS Free China will come into the post-war period with two major problems. One will be the reestablishing of Chinese sovereignty over the territories lost and re- gained; the other will be to organize a government that can hold its own among the other nations in peace con- ferences and in world developments. The problems that will arise in this connection are of three kinds, and they cannot be taken one by one, but must be dealt with immediately and simultaneously. The first task of China now and after the war is polit- ical. It is the task of achieving governmental unity and stability, of consolidating the territories now held and of moving back into the lost areas with an effective central government that can control and develop the whole area. It is the task of uniting war lords and dissident groups, of harmonizing economic and social elements now at variance, of establishing order at home and confidence abroad. The second task is economic. It is the task of build- ing a new economy that will serve the needs of the Chi- nese people and that can withstand competition from 13 other national economies. This task will require the economic use of the nation's mineral resources, the refor- mation of agriculture, the widespread development of technical competence in modern industry, the develop- ment and organization of financial resources and tech- niques, and the tying together of the whole economy by expansion of transportation and communications. Social problems will arise from the economic and po- litical measures taken, which together with existing social problems will form the third task which the Chi- nese government must face at the same time as the other two. There will be problems of labor arising from the development of modern industry. There will be factory legislation to make and enforce regulations concerning wages and hours and industrial hygiene and safety. There will be problems of public health and living costs, of displaced populations and underprivileged groups. Land ownership and tenancy must be taken into consid- eration in any agricultural reforms undertaken. Prob- lems of literacy and technical training must be met in educational reforms. Changes in legal structure are necessary to supplant the foreign courts of the interna- tional concessions and to provide a structure in which other nations will have confidence in the conduct of business. China is well aware of these problems, and the first steps are being taken even now looking toward their solution. A constitutional government has been prom- ised to the people; the Central Government has moved toward closer control of outlying provinces; a compro- mise has been brought about in the Communist problem. There are plans for large scale technical training, plans for agricultural reform, for the court system, and many other paper plans, the fulfillment of which is hampered by the difficulties of maintaining even the status quo. With the loss of the coastal areas, the present govern- ment lost its most important sources of income. Pre- war government revenue was drawn almost entirely from three sources: 1. The Customs Tax which provided 50 to 60 percent of total national revenue, and which was levied on a trade that is now destroyed. 2. The Salt Tax which ranged between 20 and 30 per- cent of the total and was drawn very heavily from the salt production of the coastal areas now under Japanese occupation. 3. The so-called Consolidated Taxes on mining and industry, particularly on the factory industries like cot- ton mills, flour mills, and tobacco mills that were located in the currently occupied areas. These taxes consti- tuted 10 or 12 percent of the total. All of these sources have failed the present government and no taxes have been devised to take their place. The land tax is now the basic source of income, providing over 60 percent of the total; direct taxes have been increased and wartime consumption taxes have been added. There has there- fore been a complete revolution in the source of income in a time of increasing wartime expenditures and shrink- ing national production. Faced with this dilemma, the Chinese government has resorted to the issue of currency Out of all proportion to government reserves. There is a critical currency inflation with runaway prices which is resulting in discouraging production in a country al- ready blockaded and short of goods. The situation has seriously undermined both domestic and foreign rela- tions and is perhaps China's most critical immediate problem. A second critical problem arises from the existence of the Communist border region state in the Northwest with an army of its own which only nominally acknowl- edges allegiance to the Central Government. This Com- munist state has linked to it guerrillas in the occupied parts of China, which gives it strength in those areas to the possible detriment of the Chinese government. That government is, therefore, concerned as to the future course of Communism within its boundaries. The third critical problem that is worrying the Chi- nese government is the present lack of technical compe- tence necessary to the maintenance and development of industry in the lost territory and the full development of a strong industrial China. The Chinese government is afraid that this lack of competence may react against the claims of the Chinese government to those territories at the peace table. That China may be successful in solving their prob- lems and achieving the position of a Great Power and in securing many of these demands is suggested by the numbers of the Chinese people, their cultural unity, na- tional pride, and fighting qualities, and by the immense area of China proper and the richness of its material resources. The factors that have prevented the realiza- tion by China of its potential strength are probably less fundamental. The economic lag due to centuries of iso- lation from the main currents of world thought, the resulting “half century of humiliation” at the hand of imperialist powers, and the wholesale destruction of wealth and human life by war and other disasters need not be permanent conditions if the cooperative effort and resourcefulness revealed by the Chinese today are. applied with equal vigor to the problems of peace. REFERENCES (See also list of references, p. 125, M103–1; and p. 150, M103–2.) BARNETT, R. W. Economic Shanghai : Hostage to Politics, 1937–1941. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941. 210 pp. ; illustrations; maps. An account by an American observer of the economic effects of the Japanese occupation of the Chinese section of the greatest Treaty Port. BISHOP, C. W. Origin of the Far Eastern Civilization : A Brief Handbook. (Smithsonian Institution, published 3681; War Background Studies No. 1, Washington 1942. 53 pp.; maps; diagrams; illustrations; bibliography. A Synoptic introduction by a leading anthropologist. cussion of Chinese civilization is central. The dis- BUCK, J. L., and others. Land Utilization in China (Nanking, University of Nanking, 1937). In three volumes: Vol. 1, Text. 494 pp.; maps; illustrations; diagrams. Reports of an authoritative field study made in China under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations in cooperation With the Chinese Government. Deals with many aspects of land, food, and population, CHIEN, T. S. New China’s Demands. 690–698, Vol. 21, July 1943. The author is a distinguished Chinese Professor of political science. CHINA : MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS: DIRECTO- RATE GENERAL OF POSTS. List of Post Offices, II, Public Series No. 13. 14th issue. Shanghai, 1936. Useful both as a gazeteer and as a guide to the English spelling of place names. CHINA : MINISTRY OF INFORMATION. China Handbook 1937–1948: A Comprehensive Survey of Major Develop- ments in China in Six Years of War. New York, Macmillan, 1943. 876–lxxv-xv pp.; map. Foreign Affairs, pp. CRESSEY, G. B. China's Geographic Foundations: A Survey of the land. Its People. New York and London, McGraw- Hill; Shanghai, United Book and Stationery Co., 1934. 486 pp.; illustrated; maps; diagrams; bibliography. A standard work. 14 FONG, H. D. Industrial Organization in China. Nankai Social and Economic Quarterly, pp. 919–1006, Vol. 9, January 1937. Tientsin, Nankai Institute of Economics. A critical study of the difficulties in the way of Chinese industrial development on the eve of the war with Japan. The Post-War Industrialization of China. Washington, National Planning Association, 1942. Analysis by a Chinese authority for American readers. 92 pp. ; map ; bibliography. Deals with the potential resources for industrial development and the wartime achievements in transport, agriculture, and industry ; outlines post-war needs. FOX, Sir HARRY. What the Surrender of Extraterritoriality Will Mean To Us. Journal of Royal Central Asian Society, pp. 384–398, Vol. 18, London, 1931. A statement of the British trader's point of view. FREYN, JUBERT. Free China's New Deal. New York, Mac- millan, 1943. 277 pp. An account by an American observer, with access to official Chinese Government circles, of the economic and social changes in progress in wartime China. GARDNER, C. S. A Union List of Selected Western Books on China in American Libraries. 2nd ed. Washington, Com- mittee on Chinese Studies, American Council of Learned Societies, 1938. 111 pp. Lists 350 books and 21 periodicals. GOODRICH, L. C. A Short History of the Chinese People. New York and London, Harper, 1943. 260 pp. ; maps; bibli- Ography. A brief historical interpretation by an American student of the Chinese language. H. C. FENN. A. Syllabus of the History of Chinese Civilization and Culture. 3rd ed. New York, China Society of America, Inc., 1941. 56 pp.; maps. GULL, E. M. British Economic Interests in the Far East. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations and Oxford University Press, 1943. 272 pp. A comparative historićal analysis of British trade relations in the various countries of the Far East with especial emphasis upon China. 3. HERMANN, ALBERT. Historical and Commercial Atlas of China. Harvard-Yenching Institute Monograph Series Vol. I. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1935. 112 pp. ; maps; bibliography. HSIAO—T’UNG, FEI. Peasant Life in China: A Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtse Valley. With a preface by Professor Bronislaw Malinowski. New York, Dutton, 1939. 300 pp.; illustrations; diagrams; maps. A study of the changing social and economic life in a village of the lower Hangtze Valley in 1936, by a Chinese anthropologist. HUGHES, E. R. The Invasion of China by the Western World. London, Black, 1937. 323 pp. ; maps; bibliography. An outline of Western cultural influences in the last hundred years and especially since 1900, by a reader in Chinese religion and philosophy at the University of Oxford and a former resident of China. KEETON, G. W. China, The Far East, and the Future. don, Cape, 1943. 296 pp. ; maps. A conservative interpretation by a professor of English law at the University of London, formerly of Hong Kong University. LATTIMORE, OWEN. China's Turkestan-Siberian Supply Road. Pacific Affairs, pp. 393—412, Vol. 13, December 1940. Inner Asian Frontiers of China. American Geographical Society Research Series No. 21, New York, 1940. 585 pp.; maps; bibliography. A history of the relations of China Proper and the marginal ter- LOn- ritories, written from the geographical point of view by an Amer- ican Scholar. ELEANOR LATTIMORE. The Making of Modern China. New York, Norton, 1944, 212 pp. ; maps. - A simplification of the authors' earlier and more detailed studies, together with an interpretation of the present situation based upon the senior author's recent stay in China as a special envoy to the Chinese Government. LATOURETTE, K. S. The Chinese: Their History and Cul- ture. New York, Macmillan, 1934. In 2 vols. Vol. 1, 506 pp. ; bibliography; Vol. 2, 389 pp. ; map. A standard work by an American scholar. PELZER, K. J. An Economic Survey of the Pacific Area, Part I, Population and Land Utiltization. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941. 215 pp.; map; bibliography; foot- noteS. A statistical summary 6f studies of population, land utilization, and land tenure in the individual countries bordering the Pacific Ocean. QUIGLEY, H. S., and G. H. BLAKESLEE. The Far East: An International Survey. Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1938. 353 pp. ; maps; bibliographical footnotes. An outline of the political history of the modern period up to the invasion of North China in 1937, written by two American professors. RAJCHMAN, MARTHE. A New Atlas of China: Land, Air, and Sea Routes. Descriptive text by the staff of Asia Magazine. With an introduction by H. E. Yarnell. New York, John Day, 1941. 24 pp. ; maps. ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Chinese Routes of Supply from Abroad. Bulletin of Inter- national News, pp. 1348–1353, map. Vol. 17, London, Octo- ber 19, 1940. The End of Extraterritoriality in China. Bulletin of International News, pp. 49–56, Vol. 10, London, Janu- ary 23, 1943. SALTER, Sir J. A. China and Silver. Forum, 1934. 117 pp. An authoritative study made for the Chinese Government by an English economist. Deals with the changing financial struc- ture and with long-range economic prospects. TAWNEY, R. H. Land and Labour in China. court Brace, 1932. 207 pp. A fundamental study of Chinese agriculture and industry, made for the Institute of Pacific Relations by the noted English economic historian. New York, Economic New York, Har- TEICHMAN, Sir Eric. Affairs of China: A Survey of the Recent History and Present Circumstances of the Republic of China. London, Methuen (1938). 311 pp.; illustrated ; ImapS. An English diplomat's informal attempt to give “a true and objective account of China's recent circumstances, an outline drawn from his personal experiences during the past thirty years.” TSUI, CHI. A Short History of Chinese Civilization. With a preface by Laurence Binyon. New York, Putnam (1943). 388 pp. ; maps; bibliography; illustrated. A highly readable account by a Chinese scholar. What One Should Know about China : An Annotated List of Some Dependable Books Compiled at the Library of Con- gress. Wilson Library Bulletin, pp. 47–50, Vol. 17, New York, September, 1942. A useful bibliography of 28 titles, stressing cultural aspects. WOODHEAD, H. G. W., ed. The China Year Book 1938. Shanghai, North China Daily News and Herald, Ltd. (1938). 595 pp. WORLD POWER CONFERENCE. Electric Power Develop. ment in China. Transactions of the Third World Power Conference 1936. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1938. Vol. 2, pp. 105–130. 15 Chopter 10 LATIN AMERICA INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Latin America is a name applied to the twenty inde- pendent republics south of the United States in which the official languages are of Latin origin: Portuguese in Brazil, French in Haiti, and Spanish in the eighteen others. Because for convenience a general name is ap- plied to these countries as a whole, it is not to be as- sumed that they are a unit in development, attitude, or aspirations. Indeed, there is no great similarity among them beyond the circumstance that eighteen of them have a common origin as colonies of Spain, all are pre- dominantly Roman Catholic in religion, all except Cuba have been politically independent for more than a hun- dred years, and all are still economically colonial in aspect." For about 300 years what are now the Spanish-speak- ing republics of the mainland and the Dominican Re- public in the West Indies were colonies of Spain.” Except for Cuba these republics won their independ- ence in 1820 in a series of revolutions that began in what is now Colombia and Venezuela and spread rapidly to the other colonies. Spain retained the West Indian colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico until the Spanish- American War of 1898, when the former gained its inde- pendence and the latter became a possession of the United States. In Brazil, originally a Portuguese colony, independence and a republican form of govern- ment were achieved as a result of a rather slow evolu- tion. In 1808 the regent of Portugal transferred his court and the seat of government to Rio de Janeiro, and in 1822 the country was set up as an independent empire with descendants of the original regent ruling as em- perors, but with a representative government. After a brief and bloodless revolution, the Empire in 1883 was declared at an end and a republic was proclaimed. None of the Latin American countries can be classed among the Great Powers, and for none of them would there seem to be any early prospect of rising to Great Power rank. In dealing with them here, we are con- cerned less with an analysis of their relations to one another than with the factors in their geographical set-up that bear on their relations to the Great Powers. Those relations assume steadily increasing importance as the rich and relatively unexploited economic re- Sources of Latin America become available to meet a growing world demand for its commodities. I. WORLD POSITION AND CONNECTIONS 1. LOCATION. Distance from Europe, coupled with the waning power of Spain and Portugal, partly accounts for the fact that the Latin American colonies were able to carry out successful revolutions, set themselves up as inde- pendent republics, and maintain their independence. Not to be discounted, however, is the fact that in these countries the dominant classes, politically, economi- cally, and intellectually, have been European in mode of living, if not always in blood descent. This would have made attempts toward their reabsorption into any colo- nial empire a difficult matter. Accessibility to the United States and the fact that their exportable products (except to a certain extent those of Mexico and Argen- tina) complement rather than supplement those of the United States, have tended to bring the Caribbean coun- tries of Latin America into the economic sphere of the United States and sometimes individually into its politi- cal sphere. Because of their limited economic and mili- tary strength, these nations in themselves have consti- tuted no menace to the United States. Their weakness, however, is an indirect menace, since they afford pos- sible avenues of attack by the other powers. Not until the campaigns of the present war had dem- onstrated the possibility of transporting large forces great distances by sea and air did the east-coast and west-coast nations of South America begin to fear inva- sion from either Europe or Asia. The east-coast coun- * No part of Latin America now remains in the possession of the dis- coverers and original colonizers, Spain and Portugal. The only vestiges of European possession are the Central American colony of Great Brit- ain, British Honduras; the large West Indian islands of Jamaica and Trinidad, belonging to Great Britain ; the Smaller islands of the West Indies, divided among Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands ; the three Guianas on the north coast of South America, possessions, re- spectively, of Great Britain, the Netherlands, and France; and the Falkland Islands off the coast of the Argentine Republic, occupied and administered by Great Britain but claimed by Argentina under the name of Islas Malvinas. * The first colonies on the island now occupied by Haiti and the Domini- can Republic were Spanish, but France was ceded the western part of the island in 1697. This French colony, Saint-Domingue, was the first of the Latin American republics to gain its freedom when, in 1804, after a protracted revolution, its independence from France was proclaimed under the name of Haiti. The Dominican Republic was invaded by Haiti in 1822, only a few months after its independence from Spain had been won, and remained under Haitian rule until 1844 when inde- pendence was again established. tries, in spite of their accessibility from Europe and European possessions in Africa, experienced no such fear until the rise of Fascist aspirants to world domina- tion. The west-coast countries, though more isolated, are nevertheless weak from the point of view of defense, because of the difficulty of protecting their open coast lines, their inability to recruit large military forces from their sparse populations, and their lack of heavy indus- tries for the manufacture of war material. Latin America as a potential stepping stone or base on the road to the United States is one problem; Latin America as an objective of resources-hungry Old World powers is another. Actually the two combine to create a single focus of our national interest. No other continent 16 Pºwston-to-To- ºlº gauapagos S. --- º º - ARIBBEAN SEA PREDOMINANTLY MOUNTAINS OR UPLANDS **** * ... Mainly NHasmed tº mainly uninhasſed LOWLANDS Ǻ forested or cleared -- * Savannas --- FREE LAT | N 1200 A M E R CA ----- -------- º - - º º º sº º º -- - Rºº. & ºn * Fºr ATLANTI C º * f N 6, --- **u. - - - - - - tº steppes and Prairies *** Q--> DESERTS AND SEM-DESERTS O NATIONAL CAPITAL - INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY Moº-only --d-do-or-shown on thº-ºp, the purpo- --------------for-tºo------ on und-rºunding of the accompanying- No. 3259-R-A, QSS --June 19- FIGURE 3 compares with South America in wealth of unexploited natural resources. In spite of the interruption to the play of normal economic forces occasioned by the world wars of 1914 and 1939, as also by the general economic depression of 1930–38, the total demand for raw mate- rials has been rising at an accelerating pace. Techno- logical advances at the same time are reducing the out- lay in human energy necessary to proper exploitation of resources once considered inaccessible. Germany's swift economic penetration of Latin America in the years pre- ceding the present war aptly illustrates the manner in which the latent demand of an energetic and ambitious nation can be translated into positive accomplishments. By 1939 the extent of Germany's penetration had as- sumed the aspect of an invasion, even though no line or word of the Monroe Doctrine had been violated. Nazi supported puppets and groups in every state were being groomed to seize control of their governments. So effec- tively was the work done that pro-Axis minorities, work- ing behind the mask of neutrality, have been able to create a dangerous situation in a number of Latin Amer- ican countries. Whatever the immediate and the ultimate objectives of Germany’s penetration, all the evidence disclosed indicates that a major threat to the safety of the United States was swiftly taking shape. An important ele- ment in the situation was the military weakness of most of the Latin American states. Without exception the organization, equipment, and training of their armed forces has been determined chiefly by the needs of in- ternal security, sporadically by emergencies arising out of wars and threats of war with neighboring powers, and not from overseas. With the crumbling of the barriers of space behind which Latin America has hitherto lived its own life, the revision of defense poli- cies and of mutual cooperation against threats from abroad is indicated. 2. SIZE, SHAPE, AND DEPTH. Latin America as a whole is slightly larger than the North American continent excluding Mexico and Cen- tral America. The several countries vary in size, from Brazil, which is somewhat larger than the United States, or about the size of Europe without the Scandinavian Peninsula, to Haiti, which is about the size of Albania or Maryland. Argentina, second in size, is slightly more than a third as large as Brazil. It has an area about equal to that of Mexico and Central America com- 17 bined. Paraguay is comparable to the combined areas of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the New England States. Uruguay compares with the New England States in area. The Latin American countries most favored by depth are probably Mexico and Colombia. In both, the chief centers of population are in the interior highlands. It is a question, however, whether the difficulties of com- munication among these highland centers of popula- tion might not present as serious a problem to the de- fenders as distance and difficulty of approach from the coasts would present to an invader. The West Indian and Central American republics are small and open to the sea, and the long, narrow neck of land that is Panama is particularly vulnerable. Of the east-coast republics of South America, Brazil is an enormous, com- pact unit, but its settled areas lie close to the coasts. The rain forests of the Amazon Basin constitute a suffi- cient barrier against invasions of the coastal settlements from the north or west, but an equal barrier to with- drawal. The coastal settlements of Brazil appear more or less continuous on a small-scale map, but a detailed population and communications map shows that, in gen- eral, effective overland connection between them is lack- ing. Uruguay is not only small but open to the sea. The principal populated centers of Argentina are scarcely less exposed, but withdrawal from the coastal cities could be effected westward to a considerable depth by virtue of the railroad net in the Pampas region and the general ease of travel and transport across it. Of the west-coast countries, neither Ecuador nor Peru pos- sesses effective depth, while Chile is little more than a strip of seacoast 2,600 miles long and nowhere one- tenth as wide. As for the two countries without sea- coast, Paraguay lacks depth, and Bolivia lacks effective depth. From the coast, however, Paraguay can be ap- proached only by a river navigable for ships of rela- tively shallow draft, and Bolivia, by difficult terrain across a neighboring country. 3. CLIMATE AND NATURAL RESOURCES. Latin America extends north and south for a distance of 6,000 miles. Rather more than half of this distance, but a much greater proportion of the total area, lies within the tropical and subtropical climate zones. A small part of northern Mexico, practically all of Chile, Argentina south of and including the pampas, and a large part of Uruguay have climates characteristic of the temperate middle latitudes. The climate in the vicinity of Cape Horn is somewhat like that of British Columbia. Equatorial South America is much wider than is equatorial Africa and hence has a far greater extent of truly tropical climate. The lofty plateau of the Andes, however, gives it a broad belt in which the climates are determined by zones of altitude, from steaming jungles to crests with perpetual snow. The west coast of South America as far north as Southern Ecuador is swept by a cold ocean current which makes the climates of the coastal strip considerably cooler and drier than those of the east coast in corresponding latitudes. Freezing temperatures nowhere occur along the shores of Latin America. The range of zones of natural vegetation is corre- spondingly wide, from great stretches of desert in the coastal regions of southern Ecuador, Peru, and northern Chile, semi-desert in northeastern Brazil, and tropical jungle in the great river basins of the interior to sub- Arctic conditions on the high uplands of the Andes. The result is that every variety of crop may be grown, not only in Latin America as a whole but in many of the individual countries. The forest resources are enor- mous, but in general, the forested areas, such as the Amazon lowlands and temperate southern Chile, are far from the principal settlements. Latin America has considerable resources of the in- dustrial minerals, but they are widely scattered and only a few of the countries have coal and one or more of the metallic ores in sufficient quantities for heavy industries. Still fewer have these resources so located as to be within easy access of each other. Nor does it happen that the metallic ores of one country are complemented by coal resources in another in such relation as to make recipro- cal use practicable in their steel industries, as happens between France and Germany. Petroleum deposits exist in larger or smaller quantities from Mexico to southern Argentina. - 4. SEA AND AIR CONNECTIONS. For access to world markets, all of the Latin American countries, with the exception of Mexico, are dependent on sea transport. Mexico's railroad network has good connections with the railroad systems of the United States, and the Pan-American Highway provides a motor transport route to Mexico City and Some distance beyond.” Cuba also has rail connection with the United States over a ferry with terminal points at Havana and Tampa, but actually, transportation between the United States and Cuba by this route is of little importance as com- pared with other sea-borne transportation. In South America there are only two transcontinental railroad routes: the Trans-Andean Railway between Chile and the Argentine Republic and the route be- tween La Paz and Buenos Aires. Theoretically the latter links Buenos Aires not only with the principal settled areas of Bolivia, but with northern Chile by means of connecting lines to the ports of Arica and Antofagasta, and with southern Peru by connecting lines (involving transhipment across Lake Titicaca) from La Paz to Cuzco and the port of Mollendo. Neither route, however, figures importantly in trans- portation between the west-coast countries and their foreign markets. Before the opening of the Panama Canal, shipments from the west-coast countries to mar- kets in Europe and the eastern United States involved the long and stormy journey around Cape Horn or through the Strait of Magellan, or rail transhipment across the Isthmus of Panama. The Panama Canal has not only greatly shortened the routes to Europe but has played an even more important role in bringing the west-coast countries more closely into the commercial orbit of the United States. Only a negligible amount of Latin American ship- ping is carried in locally owned ships. Until the present war there were no Latin American-owned lines operating between any of the Latin American countries and Europe. British, French, Dutch, German, and Italian steamship companies operated regularly sched- uled trips to and from both east- and west-coast ports. All of these companies participated in transportation between the United States and Latin America, although the bulk of the transportation in recent years has been in the hands of United States lines, with Chilean and Brazilian ships participating, and the Peruvian govern- ment operating a line of Small ships between Peruvian ports and Panama. Air connection between Latin America and the out- side world may be said to have begun in 1928 with the establishment of a mail line from Toulouse (France) 3 Freight and passengers may be carried by rail between the United States and La Union, the port of the republic of El Salvador on the Gulf of Fonseca and also to Guatemala’s Caribbean port of Puerto Barrios. However, the poor condition of both roadbed and rolling Stock on the Mexican railroad eastward from the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, makes through transportation by this route Wholly uneconomic as respects both cost and time. 18 to Buenos Aires by way of Dakar (Africa) and Natal (Brazil), but it was not a through air route, since the Dakar-Natal open-water section of 1,900 miles was operated by obsolete destroyers of the French Navy. The first complete air service was a seasonal service by Zeppelins between Friedrichshafen (Germany) and Recife (Brazil) opened in 1931, and extended to Rio de Janeiro in 1936, but suspended the following year owing to the United States’ refusal to furnish helium gas. 1. MAJOR AREAL DIVISIONS. The highlands of Latin America have exceptional significance. On them the European conquerors found civilized aboriginal inhabitants, and on them live most of the people of the tropical republics today. In South America three principal highland regions, the Andes, the highlands of Brazil, and the largely uninhabited Guiana highland are separated from each other by a vast interior lowland.” Only in the Argentine Repub- lic, Uruguay, Chile, and southern Paraguay are tem- perate climates found outside the highlands. a. The Andean Highlands. The cordillera of the Andes extends unbroken from the southern tip of the continent almost to the Caribbean coast of Colombia, and continues in an eastward branch across Venezuela. Between Chile and the Argentine Republic the main cordillera forms a single barrier range. In the ex- treme north on the Chilean side, is one of the world’s greatest deposits of copper. On the Argentine side there is some mining of copper and other minerals as well as agriculture and cattle raising. In Bolivia the Andean highland forms a plateau more than 400 miles long and averaging 80 miles in width between bordering western and eastern ranges. Stand- ing at an elevation of 12,000 to 13,000 feet, this is one of the highest inhabited regions of the earth. Although its economy is chiefly pastoral, it forms the principal populated section of Bolivia. Silver was the attraction here in colonial times, but today tin is the leading mineral product. In Peru the Andean plateau is narrower than in Bolivia, but, in spite of the fact that the capital and a 4 The Guiana highlands will not be discussed in detail here, since they are of little present economic importance and are only partly explored. After a number of experiments in combined air and steamer service between Germany and Rio de Janeiro and efforts to develop a flying boat that could carry a paying load across the water gap, the German Lufthansa in 1933 evolved a method of using small planes launched by catapult from mother ships to bridge the 2,000-mile gap from Bathhurst in British Gambia to Recife. The first passenger service between Europe and Latin Amer- ica by airplane was begun in 1939 when an Italian line II. AREAL STRUCTURE number of other cities and towns lie in the coastal val- leys, about 70 percent of the nation’s population lives on the highlands. There the chief mining enterprise is of copper, although the mining of silver and manganese is also important. The agricultural economy, except in numerous deep, protected valleys, is mainly pastoral, as it is in Bolivia. Connection between the plateau and the Pacific ports is better developed than in any of the other west-coast countries. The railroads and roads are adequate for transporting the mineral products of the plateau down to the sea and for supplying the mining centers. The transportation network, however, is in- sufficient to knit the country closely together from a political or strategic point of view. Ecuador has its capital and most of its population in the Andes, where the population is concentrated in a number of basins. Lying under the equator, the high- land of Ecuador has a more temperate climate than that of the plateaus of Peru and Bolivia and a corre- spondingly wider range of temperate-Zone crops. Al- though there is considerable production of gold, the Andes in Ecuador are not so rich in minerals as are the highlands farther north or south. Farming and sheep raising are, in consequence, the principal pursuits. Since Ecuador depends largely for exports on the agri- cultural products of its tropical coastal lowland, the principal productive area of the country is separated from its principal populated area—the center of its national life—by the steep ascent of the western front of the Andes. Although there is fairly good road con- nection between the larger towns of the plateau, and rail connection in the northern half, there is only one link, othér than a poor road and pack trails, between the plateau and the coast—the Guayaquil and Quito Railroad. began a weekly Schedule carrying a few passengers by way of Spain, Spanish Morocco, the Cape Verde Islands, and Natal. By 1941 this line had been ex- tended to Buenos Aires. The United States entered the Latin American field in 1929 with a line from Miami to Puerto Rico, and by 1931 passenger and mail service between the United States and all the principal Latin American countries was in operation. In Colombia an even greater proportion of the popula- tion lives on the highlands than in the three republics to the south. All of the important cities and towns are in the Andes, except for a few that serve as coastal gate- ways. The Colombian Andes fork out into three branches, separated by the deep valleys of the Magda- lena and Cauca rivers. Hence Colombia has a wide dis- tribution of areasin which the whole range of crops from tropical to temperate can be produced. These include not only crops for domestic consumption but coffee, the country's main export product. Gold, second in value among the exports of the highlands, is scarcely less widely distributed. Nowhere else in the west-coast and Caribbean countries are the populated areas so widely scattered and so much cut off from each other by dif- ficulties of travel and transportation. Until recently the only means of transporting heavy freight to and from the Caribbean coast was by shallow-draft steamers on the Magdalena River with rail connections to the two principal commercial centers—Bogotá (the capital) and Medellín. In recent years transportation facilities have been improved by the construction of roads and railroads, but even the highland region itself is still far from an integrated unit. Of all the countries traversed by the Andes, Vene- zuela has the greatest concentration of population in the highlands, which there consist of a narrow exten- sion of the Eastern Cordillera of the Colombian Andes closely paralleling the Caribbean coast. Venezuela's railroads are limited to a few short lines connecting the principal populated areas of the Andes with the nearest Caribbean ports. The road system is better developed. A main trunk highway traverses the Andes to the western border of the country, where it joins a motor road from Bogotá on the Colombian side; and from the 19 trunk road in Venezuela lateral roads reach ports on the Caribbean, towns on the border of the inner low- land, and Ciudad Bolívar, an old and important port across the lowland on the lower Orinoco. b. The Eastern Border Valleys. Although the Andean plateau is the chief habitat of man in the west- coast countries, it effectively divides each of them into two sections between which there is little land communi- cation. Everywhere it forms a barrier to penetration into the eastern border valleys and adjacent lowlands. These valleys, with their rich soils and temperate or subtropical climates, might well support a large white agricultural population if they could be reached easily from the plateaus. The approaches, however, are so difficult as to have prevented settlement except at a few scattered points, and even there the settlements are of little economic importance. Only in Bolivia, where the border valleys are more accessible from the plateau than elsewhere, has anything approaching effective use been made of them. There a considerable population and many towns have developed, railroads have been built, and so comparatively easy is the descent that troops in large numbers with their equipment were brought down from the plateau during the recent Chaco War. Such an operation would have been possible nowhere else along the eastern Andean front. In fact, during the Colombia-Peru boundary dispute in 1933, the Peruvian Government found it more expeditious to send troops to the upper Amazon by Sea through the Panama Canal and up the Amazon than to attempt to bring them overland. * Two roads in Peru and one in Ecuador lead from the plateau into the eastern valleys. Both of the Peruvian roads are passable for motor transport, but they repre- sent hopes rather than actuality for the economic devel- opment of the regions into which they go, and neither one has much more than a psychological value politi- cally or strategically. Ecuador's single road is poor at best and impassable for wheeled vehicles in the wet season. In Colombia during colonial times extensive cattle raising in the adjacent grasslands drew some settlement into the border valleys, but, with the dis- appearance of the cattle industry in the face of compe- tition from areas more favored by climate and nearer to the highland markets, these settlements have all but died out. c. The Brazilian Highlands. A roughly triangular tableland occupies more than half of Brazil. Its longest and highest side, a broad belt with elevations reaching upwards of 4,000 feet, parallels the east coast, from which it is separated by a narrow coastal plain. For over a thousand miles along its most densely popu- lated South and central part, the plateau as seen from the sea presents the appearance of a continuous moun- tain range. Although nowhere comparable to the Andes, the Brazilian highlands afford an enormous area of subtropical and temperate climate in a region that would be otherwise truly tropical. In all but the northeastern end rainfall is plentiful, though seasonal, for a considerable distance inland. More than nine- tenths of the population of the country lives in the more temperate coastal belt of the highlands and on the ad- jacent coastal plain. From colonial times to the present the states of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais and neighbor- ing parts of Mato Grosso have been the country's chief Source of mineral wealth: gold, diamonds, iron ore, and manganese. Lack of coal suitable for metallurgical coke has prevented any large-scale local smelting of the ores, but the tremendous potential hydroelectric power of the region offers the possibility of electric-oven Smelting. Agriculture, however, in this section as well as throughout Brazil, is the principal occupation and Source of wealth, with coffee the chief export crop, and with the production of cotton rapidly increasing. The extreme northeastern part of the highlands is a sparsely populated, semiarid region. Its aridity is due partly to prolonged periodic droughts and partly to the fact that the annual rainfall is concentrated each year in a few months or even weeks. It is generally be- lieved that the rich alluvial soils of the valleys here could be made to support a large population by the con- struction of reservoirs to store irrigation water, but the cost of reservoirs sufficient to care for any substantial fraction of even the existing population would be pro- hibitive in the present state of Brazil’s economy. The South-central part of the highlands is well served by a close network of railroads and roads, but the steep Seaward face presents obstacles to the construction of railroads and roads up from the coastal ports. Of the existing railroads only two are of standard gauge. The line from the port of Santos to Sao Paulo makes the ascent by cables. d. The South American Lowlands. The lowlands of South America may be grouped under three head- ings: (1) The Pacific and Caribbean coastal lowlands; (2) the great interior lowlands; and (3) the Atlantic coastal lowlands bordering the Brazilian highlands. (1) The Pacific and Caribbean Coastal Lowlands. No lowland fronts the southernmost coast of Chile—a maze of rocky islands and deep fiords to which almost continuous cold rains from the west give a cover of dense forest. From the Gulf of Ancud north, how- ever, narrow coastal lowlands are almost continuous. These vary in width, topography, and climate, the cli- matic differences being due as much to ocean currents as to differences in latitude. Between the Gulf of Ancud and about latitude 30° South, the coastal belt is well-watered by rainfall that decreases progressively northward, and also by many streams from the Andes. There, in a trough between the main Cordillera and low coast ranges, is the core of Chile, the most densely popu- lated and highly developed part of that country. The coastal belt of northern Chile and of Peru is under the influence of the cold, northward-flowing Peru or Humboldt Current. Although heavy mists hang over the land much of the time, rain in any appreciable quantity falls only at intervals of many years. Hence the whole coast is desert. In Chile the desert is un- broken, with no streams reaching the sea. It contains Chile's famous nitrate fields. In Peru ribbons of cul- tivated land lie along the widely separated courses of streams fed by melting snow in the Andes. A few broader patches are found on the intensively irrigated areas. In contrast with the desert that separates them, they contain about one-sixth of the land estimated to be under cultivation in Peru and about one-third of the country’s population. At the northern end of the Peruvian coastal plain are important oil reserves that have been exploited for a number of years. In spite of the wide stretches of desert, the coastal region of Peru is the most closely integrated section of the coun. try, since a motor road traverses its full length. The relatively wide coastal plain of Ecuador, with precipitation increasing northward, lies in the equator- ial rainfall belt. This circumstance makes possible the existence of Ecuador's leading industry, cacao cultiva- tion, and also the cultivation of tropical fruits, rice, and sugar cane. In the Santa Elena Peninsula there is an important petroleum development. A warm, south- Ward-flowing current partly accounts for such exces- sive rainfall and dense forest on the Pacific coast of Colombia as to have precluded settlement except at a few river-mouth ports. 20 The broad Caribbean coastal plain gives to Colombia a number of its chief resources—cattle ranches, banana plantations, and petroleum. The only connection with the heart of the country except by air, however, is by way of the Magdalena River. Farther east, a small portion of the Maracaibo oil field lies within Colombia. Formerly oil was shipped thence by way of Lake Mara- caibo, but the construction of a pipe-line over the Andes would seem to have given the needed tie-up with the rest of the country. In Venezuela the coastal plain includes by far the greater part of the Lake Maracaibo basin, where oil deposits, which rank third in produc- tion among those of the world, constitute that nation's chief present source of wealth. (2) The Interior Lowlands of South America, and Patagonia. South of the Argentine pampas and merg- ing imperceptibly into them, is the low tableland known as Patagonia, dry and windswept. Its considerable economic potentialities have been little developed, ex- cept for the petroleum in the vicinity of Comodoro Rivadavia in Chubut. The chief occupation of the sparse population is sheep raising. Although it is fre- quently said that automobiles and trucks can be driven anywhere in Patagonia and a fairly good road follows its entire coast and connects with the roads and rail- ways of the pampas, the main connection with northern Argentina is by coastwise steamers. The basins of the Parana, Amazon, and Orinoco rivers form a great lowland, broken only by the rela- tively small Guiana highlands in the north. All of the South American countries except Chile share in this lowland and all of the west-coast countries except Chile have more than half their territory in it. The lowland in northern and central Argentina, Uruguay, and the southern tip of Brazil forms one of the greatest food-raising regions in the world. It has the triple advantage of lying within the temperate zone, of being further tempered near its coasts by a warm, southward-flowing ocean current, and of opening di- rectly to the sea. Much of Paraguay east of the Para- guay River shares the first of these advantages. A large part of the area, particularly the Argentine pam- pas, is treeless. In southern Brazil and in Uruguay the basis of the economy is mainly cattle and sheep raising. In the Argentine these are supplemented by wheat, corn, flaxseed, and other temperate zone crops. The whole region, except for Paraguay, is served by a network of roads and railroads. North of the Argentine Republic the lowland, up to the present, has proved to be of negligible value for settlement. It has formed a barrier to communica- tions, especially formidable in the rain forest of the Amazon Basin. The basins of the Parana and the Ori- noco are mainly grasslands, but in general these have proved unprofitable for the large-scale cattle raising for which they might seem best adapted; they are handi- capped by their distance from markets and by the fact that large parts of them are waterless in the dry season and flooded in the wet season. - In Bolivia, where access from the Andean plateau is less difficult than elsewhere, cattle raising on the low- land has prospered. Between 1928 and 1935 Bolivia fought a long and losing war with Paraguay for posses- sion of the Chaco, as the southern part of this section of the lowland is called. The grasslands of Venezuela. and northern Colombia supported herds of cattle in colonial times, and there is still a cattle industry north of the lower eastward-flowing section of the Orinoco, where the Andean settlements furnish a market of rela- tively easy access. Within the Amazon Basin there would appear to be much habitable country in the interstream areas. Ex- tensive open grasslands (savannas) are known to exist within the forested area north of the main river and may well exist south of it, although their location and extent are not yet established with sufficient accuracy for plotting on a map. The problem of getting to such areas and of getting their products out, combined with acute problems of labor and of food supply, has pre- vented penetration by white men in any large numbers except during the short period of the rubber boom. Ex- ploitation of the region is practicable only when the demand of the world market for its forest resources— rubber, valuable cabinet woods, vegetable oils, nuts, and medicinal plants—is such as to outweigh transporta- tion difficulties. Petroleum has been reported in many sections of the lowlands bordering the Andes, and it is believed by some that the deposits form an almost continuous belt extending the full length of the lowlands. Since most of this oil-bearing belt is within the territories of the west-coast and Caribbean countries, nationalistic senti- ment and practical strategy may well demand, except in Venezuela, that pipe-lines be constructed to bring the oil to the highlands and the west coast. (3) The Atlantic Coastal Plain of Brazil. The At- lantic coastal plain between the Brazilian highlands and the sea may be divided into three sections. The south- ern section, where the coastal plain borders the densely settled central and southern parts of the plateau, has a large population and a number of ports. The cen- tral section, which extends south of Salvador for a distance of nearly 500 miles, is in general low and Swampy and has only a small population. The north- ern section (north of Salvador) was the scene of the first European settlement in what is now Brazil and of the first sugar plantations in South America. Here sugar is still an important product as well as cotton, although production of the latter is now exceeded in the state of Sao Paulo. Cacao production in the state of Baía is second to that of the West African plantations. The only link between the cities of this section and the rest of the country is by coastwise steamer. e. Central America and Mexico. The highlands of Central America and Mexico are even better suited to human habitation than are those of South America. Here, as elsewhere in Latin America, the principal cen- ters of population are on the highlands. In general the coastal lowlands serve only as gateways to the high- lands, except for the extensive petroleum development on the Gulf Coast of Mexico and the banana plantations on the Caribbean coasts of Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica, and more recently of Nicaragua. Only the marshy and forested lowlands of the east coast of Hon- duras and Nicaragua present serious obstacles to the penetration of the more habitable regions. The separation of Central America, into many in- dependent republics is largely a result of the rugged highlands and the difficulty of communication among them. The highland people and their governments have paid little or no attention to the development of their low- lands fronting on the Caribbean. Rather they have feared the hot, humid climate of these lowlands as breed- ing grounds of tropical diseases. The cultivation of bananas on the coastal lowlands was originally intro- duced by, and still remains in the hands of, foreigners, and even the labor has been imported in large part from the West Indies. Most of Mexico consists of a plateau open to the north and bordered east and west by mountain ranges. Al- though this plateau is by no means as high as the plateau of the central Andes, the fact that it lies much farther from the equator gives the ascent from either coast a 21 similar range of climate zones. However, even in the highest zone, the tierra fria (cold country), no really cold winter is experienced. The Mexican plateau has none of the broad stretches of unbroken country that characterize the Andean plateau in Bolivia and Peru, and the few wide valleys and depressions, such as the one in which the city of Mexico lies, are exceptional. Nevertheless, northward from the Isthmus of Tehuan- tepec the bulk of the highland, with its rich and diverse mineral deposits and its agricultural lands, is probably the best integrated national area in all of Latin America. The fertile lowlands of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and the Caribbean coastal zone are like a world apart. The uplands of Chiapas, physiographically a part of the highland belt that parallels the Pacific coast in the Central American republics, constitute the least de- veloped part of Mexico. 2. FRONTIERS AND CRITICAL AREAS. a. Frontiers from the Military Point of View. All of the countries of Latin America, except Bolivia and Paraguay, have long seacoasts. Bolivia is completely land-locked; Paraguay has access to the sea through the Parana River. Mexico, Colombia, and all of the Cen- tral American countries except El Salvador border on both the Atlantic and the Pacific. The Pacific coast is lacking in good harbors. Most of the ports are open roadsteads where a low promontory may afford sufficient shelter for a short pier for docking lighters by which ships, anchored well out beyond the surf but otherwise at the mercy of wind and wave, are loaded and unloaded. The only natural harbors are the gulfs of Fonseca (divided among El Salvador, Hon- duras, and Nicaragua), Guayaquil (in Ecuador), and Talcahuano (in south central Chile), but even at Guaya- quil the alongshore water is so shallow that ocean-going steamers cannot dock. Extensive dredging and port works have made Buenaventura in Colombia accessible to large ocean-going vessels, and docking facilities have been provided at the Peruvian port of Callao by the contruction of a large mooring basin. Northwards from Buenaventura the Colombia coast lacks harbors; high mountains rising abruptly from the sea and heavily covered with rain forest make this one of the world's most inaccessible shorelines. South of latitude 42° south, the Chilean coast is broken by numerous fiords and islands. The value of the fiords as hiding places for warships fleeing pursuit was well demonstrated in the First World War, but these waters are bordered by steep mountains covered by almost impenetrable forest and are too far from areas of settlement to be of use to an invader, at least until after he has done extensive development work. In a sense, the Caribbean Sea with its protective Óuter barrier of islands supplies the depth that the Central American republics, and even Mexico, may lack against invasion from the Atlantic. Except for Barranquilla in Colombia, the mainland facing the Caribbean pro- vides only indifferent harbors for shelter from the steady blowing of the trade winds. The large islands of the West Indies all have good harbors, so good, in fact, that the United States, Great Britain, and France have long maintained naval bases at Guantanamo (Cuba), Port Royal (Jamaica), and Fort-de-France (Martinique). Minor British bases were established at several other points in the West Indies and Caribbean areas. On the smaller islands in this region the port towns and a number of harbors lie on the west sides where the water is quiet except during hurricanes. The generally smooth Atlantic coast of South Amer- ica is broken by a number of harbors of varying accessi- bility to deep-draft ships. Northward from Cape Sao Roque they consist of river deltas or estuaries. Rio de Janeiro Bay is the finest harbor of the east coast. The mouth of the Rio de La Plata affords deep-water dock- age at Montevideo, but the channel by which ships reach the wharves at Buenos Aires is kept navigable only by constant dredging. The coast of Argentine Patagonia has a number of harbors, but, since they give access only to scantly populated and meagerly productive territory far from the country’s principal area of settlement, they would be of doubtful value to an invader. Of the great rivers that drain the interior of South America, the Parana, Paraguay, Uruguay, Orinoco, and Magdalena are all navigable in high-water season by ships of medium draft for hundreds of miles from the sea. The Amazon is navigable for ocean-going steamers of deep draft at least as far as Manaos and of 14-foot draft as far as Iquitos, 2,300 miles from its mouth. It also has a number of tributaries navigable by shallow-draft steamers for long distances before the first rapids are reached. Only the Magdalena would be of any sub- stantial value to an invader. The others lead into the almost uninhabited interior lowland, which is cut off from the settled areas of the continent by the wall of the Andes and by vast stretches of tropical forest. The part of Latin America nearest Europe and hence most easily and immediately vulnerable to attack from that continent, is the great eastward bulge of Brazil, which brings South America to within about 1,800 miles of the African coast. Except for a narrow strip along the coast with sufficient rainfall for permanent agricul- ture, this region, as we have seen, suffers from periodic droughts. At such times a large part of the population must be removed or fed by government aid. It would be an all but impossible region to defend, because of the sparse population, the narrow margin of food supply even in the best years, and the distance from, and inade- quate connections with, the country’s principal areas of Settlement. On the other hand, for these same reasons, it would be of doubtful value as a point of invasion, in spite of the fact that physiographically it offers little obstacle to the movement of troops or to the construction of air fields. Although the Panama Canal has greatly shortened the route from Europe to the west-coast countries, it constitutes no menace to them but rather a protection as long as the United States controls it. Its obstruc- tion by an enemy-planned invasion from the Pacific would seriously, and possible fatally, curtail the speed and proportions with which assistance could be sent to the west coast from the United States. In the event of such obstruction, as the result of bombing or sabo- tage, the sea route around the southern tip of the conti- nent would become vital. An enemy in possession of the Straits of Magellan at such a time would be in a position to sever our sea communications between the Atlantic and Pacific. b. Critical Areas from the Political Point of View. In the recent past a discussion of critical areas in Latin America would have dealt largely with boundary dis- putes. From the moment of independence for upwards of a hundred years such controversies persisted, as a ' result of the vague terms in which the limits of the colonial territories had been defined and of inaccurate information on which the definitions were based. Sel- dom, however, did the controversies result in armed conflict. Although not all of the boundaries have as yet been fixed, only a few sections are still in dispute, and these involve areas of minor significance. These controversies might have been a serious menace to Latin American unity, and consequently to Pan-American unity, if they had continued into the present. This is evidenced by the concern of the Conference of Ameri- 22 can Foreign Ministers at Rio de Janeiro in 1942 over border incidents that occurred in the last major dispute, that between Ecuador and Peru, immediately before and during the Conference. Reassuring, however, was the speed with which the Conference acted in the matter, the manner in which the contending parties recognized the seriousness of any inter-American dispute in the face of the Fascist menace, and the spirit of compromise in which they reached a settlement. Among the possible remaining sore spots are: The feeling of a number of Ecuadorians that their country made all the concessions in the recent settlement of their boundary dispute with Peru; Bolivia's constant demand for the return of at least part of the Seacoast territory lost in the Chilean-Peruvian War of the Pacific of 1878– 1883 together with her disappointment over the loss to Paraguay of the greater part of her claims in the Chaco region; and Argentine claims to British-held Falkland Islands. It cannot be assumed that there is no possi- 1. SIZE OF POPULATION.1 *- In 1938 the total population of Latin America was estimated at about 128 million, or somewhat less than that of the United States. However, the Latin Amer- ican population was increasing at a more rapid rate than was that of the United States, and it may well in- crease even more rapidly in the future as public health services improve and industrialization progresses. The country with by far the largest population is Brazil (41 million), followed by Mexico (20 million), and Argen- tina (14 million). The Caribbean region contains 52 million; the west-coast countries of South America, 18 million; and the east-coast countries of South America other than Brazil, 17 million. In some countries the aboriginal Indians have dis- appeared, and the descendants of Spanish immigrants predominate (Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica). In others the Indians survive in substantial numbers. In several countries Indian stock predominates (Guate- mala, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Mexico). In others mestizos, of mixed Indian and Spanish blood, are the Tº Because of the varying practices of Latin American censuses, there are no exact data on the racial composition of the population. For many countries detailed population statistics do not exist. Moreover, the differences in classification among the statistics that do exist make Comparisons difficult. bility of the reopening of other boundary disputes or even of attempts by one nation to invade and occupy territory assigned by existing treaties to another, al- though this seems unlikely. However, the future de- velopment of petroleum, mineral, forest, and other re- sources in South America will take place in general in the very areas in the interior which figured most in the original boundary disputes. There is also some danger that, as industrialization develops in one country or another and effective occupation of the land suitable for agriculture reaches a Saturation point, national ambi- tions may upset the present peace and nonaggression. Dictatorships have governed all of the Latin Amer- ican republics at different times, and still govern the majority. This, however, does not mean that totali- tarian ideas are necessarily acceptable in these coun- tries. Actually the Latin American dictator has little in common with a Hitler or a Mussolini. Often he has been a product of the lack of effective physical integra- III. PEOPLE prevailing racial type (Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador, Colombia, Venezuela, Chile, and Paraguay). The Indians are of two kinds. One group consists of the sedentary peoples of the Andean highlands, whose ancestors had attained high cultural develop- ment before the coming of the white man. Among their most famous “nations” are those of the Aztec and Maya Indians of Mexico, the Chibcha of Colombia, and the Quechua and Aymara (Incas) of Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The second group comprises tribes—some still in the most primitive state—that inhabit the forests of the tropical lowlands of Colombia, Venezuela, the Guianas, the Amazon basin, and the deserts of southern Chile and Patagonia. Among these the Tupi-Guarani in Brazil and the Carib and Arawak to the north are the best known. Many remain in the unexplored inte- rior at a Stone-Age cultural level. In the countries where the cultivation of sugar cane gave rise to the importation of slaves, the Negro element in the population is now large. In most of the West Indies and in Panama, it is dominant, and in Brazil it has contributed a vital part to the emergent “Brazilian” type—a blend of Portuguese, Negro, Indian, and other strains. tion that prevails throughout most of Latin America. He has usually been a local leader who has capitalized grievances against the central government and has been able to assemble a military force strong enough to seize control, but he has usually professed to be a “constitu- tional president.” In Argentina a powerful minority with represen- tation in the army and navy has leaned toward close relations with the Axis powers. Before and during the early years of the present war, the colonies of Germans in southern Chile and especially in southern Brazil, the scattered Japanese colonies in Brazil and Peru, and the Italian colonies both in Argentina and in Brazil were pointed to with much alarm as possible centers of sedi- tion. Although there is undoubtedly a strong senti- ment for the Fatherland in each of these colonies, the chief concern of the settlers seems to be one of bettering themselves in a country that offers opportunities denied by the land from which they came. 2. POPULATION TRENDS. Available data indicate that the average birth rate is nearly twice as high as that of the United States and that the death rate is also much higher. The rate of natural increase varies widely both within and among the Latin American countries, but, on the whole, it is more than adequate to maintain the present numbers. Among the great racial groups only the Indians seem in danger of decreasing, partly because of a high infant mortality. The number of deaths from tropical dis- eases is being reduced, in large part through inter- American cooperation. Immigration from Europe and Asia has contributed to the steady increase of population during the present century. Immigrants from Latin homelands—Spain, Portugal, and Italy—have settled in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Cuba, and Mexico. Germans have Settled in Southern Brazil, in Argentina, and in Chile. Descendants of Chinese immigrants are fairly numerous in Peru, Central America, Mexico, and Cuba. Japa- nese settlers, chiefly in Southern Brazil, have attracted attention in spite of their relatively small number (180,000 Japanese immigrants since 1900). Syrian im- migrants of the second generation are now to be found widely Scattered over South America. S}. § ** * 23 The expansion of population is following a course quite different from that of settlement in the United States in the nineteenth century, when the growing numbers pushed the frontier steadily westward, occupy- ing the free land as they went. In Latin America there is little freeland for settlers to occupy, for most of the arable land was long ago assigned in great estates to private landlords or to the Church. Consequently the increasing numbers are drawn inward to the cities rather than outward to an expanding frontier. In only a few regions, notably the highlands of Costa Rica, the highland of Antioquia in Colombia, the Central Valley of Chile, and the three states of southern Brazil, is there a positive outward expansion. 3. DENSITY AND PRODUCTIVITY. In spite of its expanding population, Latin America still lacks the manpower for an industrial economy on a scale commensurate with its resources of raw mate- rials. The average density for the twenty Latin Ameri- can republics is about 15 inhabitants per Square mile, which may be compared with 703 in England and Wales, 640 in the Netherlands, and 34 in the United States. The population is very unevenly distributed among countries and among regions within them. Among countries, it is most sparse in Bolivia and Paraguay (each with 5.9 per square mile) and most dense in Haiti (254.8). Mexico and Central America are more than twice, and the West Indies more than nine times, as densely populated as South America. Throughout Latin America the principal concentrations of popu- lation are found in the well-watered parts of the highlands and in the fertile valleys and plains of the temperate south. Within these concentrations, the settlements consist of numerous small or large groups, each with its urban center and with very little commu- nication with the other groups. The general lack of easy transportation facilities has fostered the isolation of the many local units. 1. PRODUCTION. a. Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing. In every country of Latin America the national economy is based upon agriculture. It has been estimated that about two-thirds of the population is engaged in farming and t; The leading cities are surprisingly large. Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City, and Sao Paulo have each more than a million inhabitants, and four others— Santiago de Chile, Montevideo, Havana, and Rosario— have more than 500,000 each. There are about fifty cities with a population of over 100,000, most of them in South America. In the Central American countries and in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay, the urban population is very small. The productivity of the people in agriculture, min- ning, and industry varies from place to place. In ag- riculture, the methods of cultivation are extensive rather than intensive and frequently prove wasteful. In Several countries, especially Chile, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela, agricultural missions and rural schools set up in even the most remote places are improving the Quality of the farming. In forestry and mining the prevailing emphasis has been upon immediate returns with little regard to conservation. Often this attitude has been due to the lack of adequate manpower to ex- ploit the resources properly; in other instances the ab- Sentee owner has failed to provide adequate supervision or capital. In manufacturing, a body of skilled workers and technicians is in process of development. Both agricultural workers and town laborers have a low standard of living, and their efficiency is impaired by chronic disease, such as hookworm and malaria, by malnutrition, insanitary housing, etc. A number of Latin American governments have enacted modern so- cial legislation to protect the workers. Illiteracy has been a serious obstacle to the improve- ment of social conditions. The rate is still high among the rural population nearly everywhere, with the ex- ception of Uruguay, Chile, the province of Buenos Aires in Argentina, and the State of Sao Paulo in Brazil. Impressive achievements in primary education have been made in Mexico. - IV. USE OF NATURAL RESOURCES stock raising. The agricultural workers’ families usu- ally provide themselves with food and other subsistence. Many of the Indian and Negro communities attempt no more than this, but where European or North American influence is dominant, commercial crops are also raised. 4. NATIONAL TRAITS AND COHESION. Perhaps the greatest need is for the reconciliation of the Indian and the European cultures in those regions where the Indians have resisted assimilation. In the predominantly Indian countries the Indian has tried to defend himself against exploitation either by withdraw- ing into isolated communities where he can pursue his traditional ways or, if forced to work for the white man, by adopting a taciturn passivity. He often in- creases the passive tendency by an addiction to chewing coca, the narcotic plant used in making cocaine. In many places, notably Brazil and Mexico, steps have been taken to improve the conditions of the Indians and to bring them as full citizens into the circle of the national life. Horizontal cleavage along class lines is clearly marked between the landed aristocrats and the landless peons on whose labor the great estates and commercial plantations depend. Except in the industrialized cities, the middle class is almost non-existent. There, how- ever, new lines of cleavage between capitalists and land- owners and between industrial employers and employ- ees are appearing. The situation is aggravated when, as often happens, the commercial plantation or the in- dustrial establishment is foreign-owned. A long standing source of disturbance in Latin Amer- ican countries has been the practice of permitting the army and other militaristic groups to partcipate in national politics. When the conflicts of interest be- tween racial groups or economic classes become acute, the temptation to substitute force for democratic methods is often too great; then coups détat, revolu- tions, and prolonged dictatorship occur. Some Latin American countries such as Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico, have well established liberal governments, but in several the attainment of democratic stability is still in the future. There the typical institution is the great estate— whether producing coffee or sugar in Brazil, bananas in the Caribbean countries, sheep, or cattle in Argen- tina. Most of the agricultural workers are tenants or employees of the large planters. The number of small 4 *$3. " *: independent farmers is growing, however, especially in Mexico and the temperate South, and they have long been typical in Costa Rica and Haiti. A number of the commercial crops are raised both for domestic use and for export; these include cereals (barley, corn, oats, and wheat), meats, cotton, and to- bacco. Others are produced almost exclusively for ex- port, chiefly to the United States and Northern Eurºpe; these include bananas, coffee, sugar, hides and skins, and wool. A striking feature of the production of the export crops is the extent to which the various countries have specialized in the development of a very few com- modities and have thus made the national economy highly sensitive to changes in the price of a single article in the world market. A depression in the world price causes an acute crisis in the producing country. A boom in the world market, on the other hand, is not always a benefit to the majority of the people, for it may raise local prices much more rapidly than Wages. Stock raising is an important activity in many differ- ent parts of South America but especially in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. These three countries together produce an annual output of beef and veal approxi- mately equal in quantity to that of the United States and far exceeding that of any other comparable area. Sheep are raised, chiefly in the temperate south, pri- marily for wool but also for meat. Chilled, frozen, and canned beef, veal, and mutton together with hides, skins, and wool are among the leading exports of the east-coast countries of southern South America. The pigsgrown in most parts of the continent are insufficient for the domestic demand. Although forests cover nearly half of the land area of Latin America, there is very little softwood in them suitable for modern building material, and most of this is in Mexico and southern Brazil. The greater part of the stand is in hardwoods suitable for cabinet making and other special uses. The tropical forests contain a variety of medicinal plants; and other forest industries yield rubber, coconuts, cacao, Brazil nuts, tonka beans, balata, palm leaves and agave fibers, oil-seeds and nuts, chicle, waxes, dyeing and tanning materials, and yerba mate. Most of these products are exported. Fishing is of local importance to a varying extent from place to place, but in none of the Latin American countries does fish constitute a principal element in the diet as it does in many maritime countries. b. Mineral and Power Resources. The develop- ment of the large mineral reserves of Latin America has been held back by such difficulties as their inaccessi- ble location and wide separation and by the lack of trans- portation facilities and of capital. The development that has occurred has often been undertaken by foreign capital and foreign engineers; the minerals have been largely exported, and most of the profits have been spent outside the country. The attempts of several Latin- American governments to regain control of the mining enterprises in their territories have led to strained in- ternational relations. Of the chief minerals produced, only iron ore is used to any great extent domestically. Almost all the copper, lead, manganese, nitrate, petro- leum, tin, and zinc is exported. Of the basic fuel resources—coal, petroleum, and water power—the first is represented by deposits, only slightly developed and most of them apparently of mediocre or poor quality, in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru. The petroleum reserves are of outstanding richness, the chief producing countries being Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, Argen- tina, Peru, and Ecuador. The potential water power is variously estimated, but as yet it is little developed and the great falls are a long way from the industrial cen- ters. The fuel resources as a whole do not appear to be remarkable. Opinions differ as to the possibilities of utilizing them to form the base of a large-scale heavy industry. The iron ore necessary to such an industry is found in Brazil, Cuba, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. The Brazilian deposits are especially rich and extensive, although far inland and remote from coal. Although Brazil has perhaps the world’s largest de- posits of iron ore and also considerable coal, the coal is unsuitable for metallurgical coke and is at an appar- ently impracticable distance from the ore deposits. In Argentina deposits of iron and coal are of little im- portance and are awkwardly situated in relationship to each other. Chile accounts for about two-thirds of the present South American coal production, but Chilean coal is in general not suitable for metallurgical coke. There are some deposits of iron ore of large dimen- sions and of high quality; the ore production, however, is largely for export, although efforts are now being made to develop a domestic smelting industry through the use of electric furnaces fueled by the country’s abun- dant water power. Mexico has considerable resources of good coking coal but is deficient in iron deposits. Although there is iron in all of the West Indian Repub- lics, it is of commercial value only in Cuba where iron is the most important mineral. In the West Indies, coal has been found only in Cuba and there only in small quantities. In Peru and Colombia there are known to be large deposits of coal, some of which may be suitable for metallurgical coke. In Colombia difficulties of transportation between the ore and coal deposits would seem to make the development of a large-scale steel in- dustry impracticable in anything like the near future. Peru, with what are estimated to be the largest coal de- posits in South America and with a number of large iron deposits, some of exceptionally high quality, in close relationship to coal fields, may prove to be the Latin American country best fitted for heavy industries. Latin American copper is of world importance, the most productive mines being in Chile, Mexico, Peru, Cuba, and Bolivia. Other metals produced in Latin America include lead, zinc, mercury, chromium, man- ganese, bismuth, antimony, wolfram, gold, and silver. Many of the less important nonmetallic minerals are also produced there. Chilean nitrate was for many years the chief supply for world markets, but the development of synthetic nitrates has now largely supplanted it. Valuable guano deposits are found along the Peruvian coast. c. Manufacturing. Until the First World War manufacturing in Latin America consisted principally of handicrafts and the simple processing of raw ma- terials. Since that time, however, industrialization has proceeded rapidly, until on the eve of the present war Several of the republics, especially Argentine, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico were entirely, or very nearly, self- Sufficient in consumers goods, such as boots and shoes, cotton piece goods, glass, flour and other processed food, cement, and low-grade paper. This change had been facilitated by protective tariffs and other forms of gov- ernment aid for the new home industries. The only manufactures so far being exported, however, were the simpler processed forms of the raw materials produced locally—preserved meat, flour, refined sugar, cigars, vegetable oils, and a little refined copper and petroleum. Most of the industries are to be found near the seaports important in foreign trade. 2. SELF-SUFFICIENCY. Although most of the individual countries are self- sufficient in basic foodstuffs, and a few are nearly self- sufficient in the basic consumer goods, none are able 25 612655°–44—3 to maintain their prosperity without access to export markets. Moreover, as we have seen, the concentration upon a very few export commodities makes each country extremely vulnerable to the ups and downs of foreign trade. When in time of war foreign markets are cut off and the supply of merchant ships sharply reduced, an acute emergency quickly develops. In the present war the resources of the United States Export-Import Bank have been used to support the market for many Latin American exports and to insure the United Nations of a steady supply of essential ma- terials from Latin America. An unfortunate, if in- evitable, result has been a reduction in Latin American imports and a sharp rise in the cost of living. In peacetime it was only by exporting more goods than it imported that Latin America could reimburse the foreign investors, executives, and technicians who had undertaken the exploitation of many of the agricul- tural and mineral resources. In 1937 the value of ex- ports from Latin America represented more than 10 percent of the value of total world exports, while im- ports into Latin America represented only 7 percent. Thus the lack of self-sufficiency in business enterprise and financial resources has proved costly. The prospects for attaining economic independence in the foreseeable future seem most favorable in Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. 3. INTERNAL TRANSPORTATION. a. Waterways. The Parana, Paraguay, and Uru- guay river system is the most important for traffic. The Parana-Paraguay is navigable for small boats (6 to 7 foot draft) for 1800 miles above Buenos Aires. Ocean steamers ascend its lower courses to various wheat ports. Each of twenty republics of Latin America has its in- dividual aspirations. These vary in content and em- phasis just as the individual national histories have varied. However, each contains in some form certain typical needs and hopes. Each nation wishes, first of all, to attain a fundamental unity through a reconcilia- tion of the isolated or conflicting social groups within it, whether these be racial, economic, or religious. Only when a measure of harmony has been achieved can a Self-confident national consciousness emerge. In Colombia, the Magdalena-Cauca system provides the principal access, other than by air, from the port of Barranquilla to the highland capital, Bogotá. The passage is slow and arduous, however. The navigable limits of the Amazon have already been described. Although it forms an invaluable artery through the jungle, the difficulties of utilizing the rain forests along its margins has kept the traffic low. For similar reasons, the llanos-bordered Orinoco carries even less traffic. Because of the steep descent of the west-coast rivers, few are of use for transpor- tation. b. Roads. Within the last twenty years a program of road building has been undertaken by nearly all the Latin American governments, and by 1937 a total mile- age of about 500,000 miles of all-weather roads of vary- ing quality was reported by the twenty republics. The highway systems are most developed in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru, although no country has less than 500 miles. Apart from these, dirt roads and pack trails still pro- vide the principal routes for horse and mule traffic, Oxcarts, human porters, and foot passengers. The Pan-American Highway is planned as an all- weather motor road to extend from Laredo, Tex., to Buenos Aires, crossing from the West Coast by way of Valparaiso, Chile, and alternatively over the Bolivian plateau. Several of the most difficult sections are still to be built, i.e., those through the lowlands of Mexico, Central America, and northwestern Colombia and the link between Bolivia and Argentina. In other parts, such as those through southern Ecuador and northern Peru, further work is required to make the highway passable at all times in the year. c. Railroads. The trunk and branch lines in the W. NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS Each republic wishes further for an adequate devel- opment of its economic resources in a manner consistent with the welfare of its citizens. Among the thorny problems that have to be solved are how to attract a sufficient immigrant population to provide the man- power for a sound industrial growth; how to engage the services of foreign investors and technical advisers needed in the earlier stages of such an industrial de- velopment without bargaining away the ultimate con- trol of the nation's resources; how to diversify produc- Latin American republics total about 80,000 miles, but only five countries have a well-balanced national serv- ice. These are Cuba, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Apart from the transcontinental railroad lines already described, most of the other railroad sys- tems consist of a short line, or lines, connecting agri- cultural or mining areas or capital cities with the nearest ports. d. Airways. The rapid expansion of commercial aviation in Latin America since its beginning in 1927 has produced a network of efficient services tying to- gether Mexico, Central America, the West Indies, and most of South America in an essentially new relation- ship. The hitherto formidable barriers to communi- cation between the capitals of the leading countries have been overcome, a fact of no small political sig- nificance. In many parts of the interior the establish- ment of air services has changed the economic orienta- tion of whole regions. In South America the main routes from the north follow the coasts as far as Santiago de Chile and Buenos Aires. In addition to inland spurs at a number of points, there are four principal trans-continental cross- ings: (1) across the Isthmus of Panama, (2) from Rio de Janeiro to Lima, Peru, (3) from Buenos Aires to Lima via La Paz, Bolivia, and (4) from Buenos Aires to Santiago de Chile. The west coast is served chiefly by the Panagra lines and the east coast, Mexico, Central America, and the West Indies, by Pan-American Airways.” * In the years preceding the outbreak of World War II, Germany suc- ceeded in Securing direct or indirect control of a considerable percentage of South American airways. The situation became critical when it was discovered that actual or potential flying fields within easy bombing range of the Panama Canal were in German hands. Representations by the United States to the Latin American governments concerned resulted in the elimination of this hazard before any harm was done. tion more than in the past; and finally how to find and keep foreign markets for the surplus products. Such problems call for statesmanship and perspicacity. Beyond these individual national aspirations, the Latin American republics recognize other aspirations in the Securing of which they must cooperate. They are agreed that the Sovereignty of their respective terri- tories must be maintained and that military defense against aggression must be provided. They have com- mon interests in the development of international com- 26 munications, in the improvement of public health, and in other economic and social services of benefit to them all. In such problems as these the United States also has a stake and consequently has become a partner in cooperative action. How well equipped are the Latin American countries to accomplish their individual and collective aspira- tions? Each shares in important sources of strength: valuable economic resources, a national tradition maintained in most cases through at least a century of independence, a rich culture inherited from the diverse racial elements in the population, a multiplying and gifted people. For the attainment of their collective aspirations, there already exists a considerable mecha- nism of inter-American consultation and a disposition by the Latin Americans to accept the Good Neighbor policy, at least pragmatically. The remoteness of the Americas from the areas of conflict in Europe and the Far East has simplified the problems of hemisphere defense. On the other hand, obstacles to the realization of these aspirations are not to be overlooked. It seems unlikely that any individual country or Latin America as a whole can attain economic self-sufficiency except at a low subsistence level. Moreover, even with the most favorable development of human and natural resources, none of the countries seems to have the physical quali- fications for Great Power rank. Consequently, Latin America will probably always be dependent upon for- eign trade and, therefore, upon stability in world mar- kets. The distance of Latin America from the United States, Europe, and the Far East is a disadvantage in the economic sense, for transportation costs and incon- venience in trade negotiations handicap Latin Ameri- can exports to the most rewarding markets. Because of this apparently unavoidable dependence, Latin American economics will probably always have an ele- ment of insecurity, although this may well be less than in the past. Whether some of these aspirations may ultimately be realized, rests not with Latin America but with its neighbors. Will they be willing in the future, as they have often been unwilling in the past, to receive Latin American export goods whether or not these compete with the products of some protected industries in the importing country? Will they be willing to practice a thoroughgoing reciprocity in the exchange of eco- nomic services as well as of goods? Only favorable answers to such questions as these can give reasonable grounds of hope for the future. 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New York, Double- day-Doran, 1942. 324 pp.; illustrations; bibliography. RICH, J. L. The Face of South America: An Aerial Traverse. (American Geographical Society Special Publication No. 26). New York, 1942. 319 pp.; illustrations; maps. More than three hundred photographs. STUART, G. H. Latin America and the United States. 3rd ed. London and New York, Appleton-Century (1938). 510 pp. ; InapS. TANNENBAUM, FRANK. Whither Latin America? An In- troduction to its Economic and SOcial Problems. New York, Crowell (1934). 185 pp. WHITEECK, R. H., F. E. WILLIAMS, and W. F. CHRIS- TIEANS. Economic Geography of South America. New York and London, McGraw Hill, 1940. 469 pp. ; maps; illus- trations; diagrams; bibliography. WILSON, C. M. Ambassadors in White: The Story of Ameri- can Tropical Medicine. New York, Holt, 1942. 372 pp.; illustrations; maps; bibliography. U. S. TARIFF COMMISSION. The Foreign Trade of Latin America. (Report 146, Second Series). In four volumes. Washington, 1942. Part I. Trade of Latin America with the World and with the United States. (Revised). 100 pp.; map. Part II. Commercial Policies and Trade Relations of Indi- vidual Latin American Countries. Vol. 1. The South American Republics. 304 pp.; map. Vol. 2. Mexico and the Republics of Central America and the West Indies. (Revised). 326 pp. ; map. Part III. Selected Latin American Export Commodities. (Revised). (Revised). 253 pp.; map. STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES Argentina. DENIS, PIERRE. The Argentine Republic : Its Development and Progress. Translated by Joseph McCabe. London, TJnwin, and New York, Scribner, 1922. 296 pp.; illustra- tion ; maps; bibliography. HARING, CLARENCE. Argentine and the United States (America Looks Ahead Pamphlet Series No. 5). Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1941. 75 pp.; bibliography. JEFFERSON, MARK. Peopling the Argentine Pampa. (Amer- ican Geographical Society Research Series No. 16). New York, 1926. 211 pp.; illustrations; maps; diagrams. LEVENE, RICARDO. A History - of Argentina. Translated and edited by W. S. Robertson Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1937. 565 pp.; illustrations; maps; diagrams; bibliography notes. WHITE, J. W. Argentina: The Life Story of a Nation. New York, Viking, 1942. 366 pp. ; illustrations; bibliography. Bolivia. CLEVEN, N. A. N. The Political Organization of Bolivia. Washington, Carnegie Institution, 1940. 253 pp.; map; bibliography. A constitutional history. MCBRIDE, G. M. The Agrarian Indian Communities or High- land Bolivia. (American Geographical Society Research Series No. 5). New York, 1921. 27 pp.; maps; American illustrations. OGILVIE, A. G. Geography of the Central Anes . . . (American Geographical Society Map of Hispanic America Publication No. 1.) New York, 1922. 240 pp.; maps; illustrated ; dia- grams; bibliography. Brazil. CALOGERES, J. P. A History of Brazil. Translated and edited by P. A. Martin. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, and London, Oxford University Press, 1939. 374 pp. ; bibliography. JOBIM, JOSE. Brazil in the Making. New York, Macmillan, 1943. 318 pp. -- An account of current economic developments by a Brazilian Official. NASH, ROY. The Conquest of Brazil. New York, Harcourt Brace, 1926. 488 pp.; illustrated; maps; bibliography. NORMANO, J. F. Brazil: A Study of Economic Types. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1935. 254 pp.; maps; bibliography. Chile. BOWMAN, ISAIAH. Desert Trails of Atacama. (American Geographical Society Special Publication No. 5.) New York, 1924. 362 pp.; illustrated ; map. GALDAMES, LUIS. A History of Chile. Translated and edited by I. J. Cox. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1941, and London, Oxford University Press, 1942. 565 pp.; illustrated ; maps; bibliography. HANSON, E. P. Chile, Land of Progress. New York, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941. 201 pp.; illustrated; bibliography. MCBRIDE, G. M. Chile : Land and Society. (American Geo- graphical Society Research Series No. 19.) New York, 1936. 408 pp. ; illustrated ; maps; bibliography. SUBERCASEAUX, BENJAMIN. Chile : A Geographic Extrava- ganza. Translated by Angel Flores. New York, Macmillan, 1943. 255 pp.; illustrated ; map. Colombia. HENAO, J. M., and G. ARRUBLA. A History of Colombia. Translated and edited by J. F. Rippy. Chapel Hill, Univer- sity of North Carolina Press, 1938. 578 pp.; maps; bibli- Ography. ROMOLI, KATHLEEN. Colombia : Gateway to South America. New York, Doubleday Doran, 1941. 364 pp.; illustrated; Imap ; bibliography. Costa Rica. JONES, C. L. Costa Rica and Civilization in the Caribbean, (University of Wisconsin Studies in Social Science and His- tory NO. 23.) Madison, 1935. 172 pp. ; map ; bibliography. Cuba. JENKS, L. H. Our Cuban Colony: A Study in Sugar. New York, Vanguard, 1928. 341 pp.; illustrated; map; bibliography; In OteS. Guatemala. JONES, C. L. Guatemala, Past and Present. Minneapolis, Uni- Versity of Minnesota Press (1940). 420 pp.; illustrated ; diagrams; maps; bibliography. Mexico. GRUENING, ERNEST. Mexico and Its Heritage: Historical. New York and London, Century (1928). trated ; map; bibliography. HERRING, HUBERT, and HERBERT WEINSTOCK, Eds. Renascent Mexico. New York, Covici Friede (1935). 322 pp. 728 pp.; illus- A Symposium. McBRIDE, G. M. The Land System of Mexico. (American Geographical Society Research Series No. 12). New York, 1923. 204 pp.; illustrations; maps; bibliography. The Mayas and their Neighbors. Limited edition. New York, Appleton Century, 1940. 606 pp.; maps; illustra- tions; diagrams; bibliography. A Symposium. 28 PARKES, H. B. A History of Mexico. Boston, Houghton Mif- flin, 1938. 432 pp.; illustrations; maps; bibliography. An introduction to its social and political history Carried through the presidency of Cardenas. REDFIELD, ROBERT. The Folk Culture of Yucatan. Chicago, University of Chicago Press (1941). 416 pp.; map; illus- trations; diagrams; bibliography. Tepoztlan: A Mexican Village: A Study of Folk Life. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930. 239 pp.; illus- trations; diagram ; bibliography. SANCHEZ, G. I. Mexico: A Revolution by Education. York, Viking, 1936. 271 pp. ; maps; bibliography. New & SPINDEN, H. J. Ancient Civilizations of Mexico and Central America. (American Museum of Natural History Handbook Series No. 3). New York, 1917. 238 pp.; illustrations; maps; bibliography. TANNENBAUM, FRANK. The Mexican Agrarian Revolution. New York, Macmillan, 1929. 543 pp.; illustrations; maps; diagrams; bibliography. * Peace by Revolution: An Interpretation of Mexico. . New York, Columbia University Press, 1933. 317 pp.; illustra- tions; map ; bibliography. WAILLANT, G. C. Aztecs of Mexico : Origin, Rise, and Fall of the Aztec Nation. New York, Doubleday Doran, 1941. (American Museum of Natural History Science Series). 340 pp.; illustrations; map; bibliography. WEYL, N., and S. WEYL. The Reconquest of Mexico: The Years of Lazaro Cardenas. New York, Oxford University Press, 1939. 394 pp.; map; bibliography. Paraguay. ELLIOTT, A. E. Paraguay: Its Cultural Heritage, Social Con- ditions, and Education Problems. (Teachers College, Colum- SAUR, C. O., and DONALD BRAND. Atatlan: Prehistoric Mex- ican Frontier. On the Pacific Coast. (Ibero-Americana No. 1). Berkeley, University of California Press, 1932, 92 pp.; illustrations; maps. SIMPSON, E. N. The Ejido: Mexico's Way Out. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1937. 849 pp.; illus- trations; maps; diagrams; bibliography. bia University, Contribution to Education, No. 473). New York, 1931. 210 pp. bibliography. “This study has for its primary purpose a survey . . . to deter- mine what the objectives of a mission school in Paraguay should be.” Peru. BOWMAN, ISAIAH. The Andes of Southern Peru: Geographi- cal Reconnaissance Along the Seventy-Third Meridian. (American, Geographical Society Special Publication No. 2). New York, 1916. 336 pp.; illustrations; maps; diagrams. Uruguay. HANSON, S. G. Utopia in Uruguay: Chapters in the Economic History of Uruguay. New York, Oxford University Press, 1938. 262 pp. Venezuela. ALLEN, H. J. Venezuela : A Democracy. New York, Doubleday Doran, 1940. 289 pp.; illustrations; map. FERGUSSON, ERNA. Venezuela. 346 pp.; illustrations. New York, Knopf, 1939. 29 Chopter ll A GEOGRAPHICAL VIEW OF THE WAR AS A GLOBAL WHOLE I SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY 1. MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF GEOGRAPHIC FACTS. Geography enters into every phase of military plan- ning and the conduct of war. The size and configura- tion of the oceans and adjoining narrow seas; the shape, area, and relative location of the continents and inter- vening islands; the width, depth, navigability, and flow of rivers; topography, ground cover, climate, and weather; the distribution of arable land and of mineral deposits; and still other earth features, all have a bear- ing on the balance of military power and on the strategy and tactics of war. - Geography is thus an element of every military equa- tion. The military commander who ignores geograph- ical factors, or fails to evaluate them correctly, invites disaster upon the battlefield. Without some knowledge of these factors and of the part they play in modern war, the citizen—be he soldier or civilian—will find it diffi- cult, if not utterly impossible, to grasp the meaning and inter-relations of the complicated moves upon the mili- tary chessboard of this global conflict. Geography affects military strategy and operations in a great many different ways. Some of these geo- graphical-military (or simply geomilitary) relation- ships are extremely involved and complex. For these reasons a few guideposts and markers will help us to keep our bearings and to find our way without delay and confusion. We shall begin, therefore, by considering some of the basic ideas and principles of strategic geography, and then proceed to the application of these principles to the global struggle between the Axis and the United Nations. a. Position, Distance, Space. A country’s geo- graphical location vis-à-vis other military power centers has a vital bearing on its problem of defense and on its ability to wage war offensively. Oceanic space is a military factor equivalent to a definite number of ships, planes, or other units of sea power. Continental space has analogous military qualities. The role of the United States in the present war illus- trates graphically the military qualities of position, dis- tance, and space. Our country is the greatest producer of war equipment in the world today. We are supply- ing our own forces with the best equipment, and are sending large quantities to our allies overseas. Our monthly plane production is climbing towards 10,000 units. In 1943 alone, American shipyards built two- thirds as much tonnage as the United Nations possessed altogether in 1942. The iron and steel production of American mills approximates all Europe's, and far ex- ceeds that of any single country. From almost every point of view, the United States leads in the produc- tion of war equipment. To a considerable, if not a calculable, degree the pro- ductive strength of the United States is the direct re- sult of its relative security from enemy attack. No other belligerent enjoys a comparable immunity. Dur- ing 1940–41, England carried on under a destructive rain of bombs. German armies have devastated thou- sands of square miles within the Soviet Union, includ- ing some of Russia's most productive pre-war industrial centers. Italy has become a battlefield. Japanese armies have occupied China’s pre-war industrial regions. British and American bombers are methodically oblit- erating the war industries of Axis Europe. The day is inexorably approaching when Japan will stagger under the shattering impact of aerial bombardments. The United States, on the contrary, carries on with- out fear of enemy attack. Token air raids are possible, and defensive preparations have been made for them. But, for the present at least, our farms, mines, factories, shipyards, transportation lines, cities, and military training centers, all lie beyond range of large-scale enemy attack. However, the same factor of distance, which gives security to the continental United States, conversely limits our strategical opportunities for offensive action beyond the oceans. This handicap is somewhat modified in the Pacific where we possess a number of outlying military bases. But the United States, with all its man power, raw materials, factory equipment, and human skills, could hardly deliver a single decisive blow in Europe without allies relatively close to the main cita- dels of enemy strength. Without allies overseas, we would find ourselves in a position somewhat like that of the two men who tried to fight a duel with axes at fifty feet. b. Topography and Ground Cover. We shall have much to say in the following chapters about topography and ground cover. No geographical factors exercise a more persistent or far-reaching influence upon the planning and conduct of warfare upon land. Level plain with wide open spaces and scant ground cover favors a war of movement such as the German army carried out in their lightning drives through the Ukraine and the Caucasus in 1941 and 1942. Such a ter- rain provides ample room for the deployment of large forces and for the use of motorized equipment. A hard pressed army has room to retreat. But driven from one natural defense line, it may have to retreat fifty to one hundred miles or more before reaching another tenable defensive position. Rough terrain conversely tends to slow down ground operations. This has been repeatedly illustrated in the Tunisian, Sicilian, and Italian campaigns. Mountains facilitate stubborn guerilla defense such as Yugoslav patriot forces have carried on ever since the German con- Quest of their country in 1941. Broken terrain and lack of roads have prevented effective occupation of large areas behind the Japanese armies in China. Forests and marshes have played a key role in the successful guerilla warfare which partisan bands have waged incessantly against German occupation forces in western Russia. 30 Topography also limits the choice of invasion routes. The physiography of Europe determines where invad- ing armies can go. It is no accident that the historic invasion routes into the Balkans follow the Vardar val- ley from Salonika and the Maritsa valley from Istanbul. No expert knowledge is required to appreciate the dif- ficulty and cost of fighting across the Alps in the face of determined enemy resistance. c. Climate and Weather. These factors influence the timing of campaigns, the choice of invasion routes, and the method of fighting. The almost impenetrable jungles of New Guinea and the Solomon Islands have repeatedly compelled the ground forces to take to the air. Large-scale land fighting virtually comes to a stand-still during the rainy monsoon in southeastern Asia. To cope with the pervasive sand and burning heat of the African desert, it was necessary to devise special types of military equipment. Winter frost creates difficult problems of many kinds. Without proper clothing and shelter men will freeze to death. Snow-blocked roads can temporarily impair, even destroy, an army's mobility. Motorized equipment requires special lubricants in order to operate under con- ditions of extreme cold. Weather enters constantly into the planning and exe- cution of air operations. Clouds may obscure the target. But clouds can also protect the attacking planes from enemy fighters and from his ground defenses. Extreme frost at high altitude can immobilize delicate control instruments, cause dangerous icing upon the wings, and otherwise interfere with normal plane operation. Low- hanging fog over landing fields may prove a greater hazard to returning bombers than enemy gun-fire over the target. d. Material Resources. The location of arable land and of mineral raw materials profoundly affects war strategy and the relative strength of opposing forces. Germany's dependence upon sources of coal, iron, aluminum, molybdenum, manganese, and other es- sential raw materials, which lie dangerously close to the fighting fronts on the perimeter of Axis Europe, is a geomilitary fact of vital significance. It has a direct bearing on Allied military plans, on German defense strategy, and even on the duration of the war. The advance and retreat of armies, with consequent gain or loss of food and mineral producing lands, con- stantly alters the relative war-making capacity of the opposing coalitions. Germany's loss of the coal-produc- ing Donets Basin and the mineral-rich Ukraine was a military blow no less severe than the debacle at Stalin- grad. Japan's conquest of Melanesia deprived the United Nations of natural rubber, tin, quinine, and other strategic necessities. Reconquest of these territories or disruption of Japanese shipping in the China Sea will radically redress the balance of advantage in the Pacific. 2. DYNAMICS OF STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY. In extreme cases geography can put military strategy and tactics into a strait jacket. More often distance, space, terrain, climate, soil, minerals, and other earth features allow considerable latitude in the choice of mili- tary objectives, and in the selection of ways and means to reach objectives chosen. In every instance broad and accurate knowledge of the earth's physical structure is the starting point in the analysis of military situations and in the planning and execution of successful cam- paigns. Strategic geography, however, is not static, but highly dynamºo. Bare knowledge of earth facts is not enough. These facts constitute only the substructure of strategic geography. The reason for this is plain. Within limits man can change the earth's physical structure, and there- by alter military power relationships among nations. Moreover, the military meaning of static geographical facts never remains fixed and immutable for long. Hu- man ingenuity is constantly inventing new tools, new weapons, and other devices. These may change the stra- tegical value and properties of even the most durable and unalterable of the earth's physical features. a. Strategical Consequences of Man-made Changes in the Earth’s Physical Structure. Man has modi- fied his physical surroundings in various ways. He has dug canals, used up irreplaceable minerals, exhausted the soil, occasionally improved it, and otherwise changed the earth's physical structure. In some instances such man-made changes have profoundly altered pre-existing power relationships among nations. Construction of the Suez Canal, for example, radically changed the geomilitary structure of the British Empire. This in turn altered England's power relations with every country around the globe. The Kiel Canal and the Panama Canal produced similar if less drastic modi- fications in the political and military relationships of the Great Powers. The excessive depletion of certain countries’ mineral reserves in today's war is shaping the future pattern of international relations. Some nations will emerge from this war much more impoverished than others in this respect. Carried beyond a certain point such impover- ishment can seriously curtail a nation's influence in world affairs. What is even more important, it may even imperil a country's capacity for successful military de- fense in the future. b. Changes in Strategical Value and Meaning of Fixed Geographic Facts Resulting from Technologi- cal Advances. No realistic student of military situa- tions or of future power relationships can ignore the far-reaching strategical effects of these and other man- made changes in the earth's physical structure. But even more vital to an understanding of today’s war is an appreciation of the changes which have taken place, and are still taking place, in the military meaning of fixed or static geographical facts. Such changes in strategical values arise mainly though not exclusively from progress in technology. Man has advanced with prodigious strides in the conquest of time and space. The same holds for developments in the mechanics of waging war. Each advance in the tech- nology of weapons, transport, and communication, as well as parallel advances in sanitary engineering, medi- cine, dietetics, climatology, weather forecasting, and other technical fields, has widened or narrowed the range of choice open to the military strategist. The military meaning and properties of geographic facts must be con- tinuously reexamined, therefore, in the light of an ever advancing technology. Innumerable illustrations of this principle could be cited. Take, for example, the strategical properties of oceanic space. These have fluctuated with every ad- Vance in the technique of navigation and in the mechanics of naval warfare. Sailing ships could re- main at sea for weeks or months at a time. But they were dependent for movement upon the direction and strength of the wind. Prevailing winds in the Red Sea, for instance, would have severely limited the military value of the Suez Canal had it existed in the era of sail. Steam power has given fleets greater tactical mobility. But fuel requirements have set rigid limits on their strategic radius of operation. Invention of steel hulls, rifled ordnance, armor plate, mines, automotive torpedoes, submarines, and other naval equipment have altered repeatedly the technique of naval combat, the practice of blockade, the radius of naval power, the 31 protective value of the oceans, the use of narrow seas, and the potentialities of sea power in general. Other illustrations of technical developments affect- ing the military properties of geographic facts readily come to mind. Strong natural boundaries afford no protection whatever against high-flying planes. Fac- tories, railroads, and other vital installations hundreds of miles behind a country’s defended land or sea fron- tiers, have become easy targets for long-range bombers. Vast space for maneuver, even for retreat, has become a priceless military asset, indeed almost a condition of survival, in this era of mechanized mobile warfare. A single invention may start a long chain of technical development which eventually transforms the military pattern of the entire world. One such invention was certainly the internal combustion engine. This inven- tion, together with thousands of other inventions Sup- plementary and subsidiary to it, has given us tanks, sub- marines, planes, motor vehicles of all kinds, and other paraphernalia of modern war. Directly and indirectly the internal combusion engine has undermined the posi- tion of certain countries. To others it has opened up strategical opportunities formerly beyond reach. The ramifications of this invention have penetrated to the ends of the earth. One effect in particular has been to enlarge and to complicate almost unbelievably the prob- lem of logistics faced by every military commander today. 3. GEOGRAPHY AND LOGISTICS IN THE MACHINE AGE. Soldiers in barracks, guns in the arsenal, tanks and planes in the parking lot, ammunition in Warehouses, do not win battles or decide campaigns. Production is one measure of a country's war-making capacity. But production is not the true measure of its effective mili- tary strength upon a particular battlefield in a given theater of war. Men and material must reach the battlefield to affect the outcome. Logistics—the business of transporting men, equipment, and supplies to the fighting fronts, and of maintaining them there—is one of the key functions of a modern military organization. For everything de- pends upon keeping open the supply lines which connect production centers with operating bases, and these in turn with the front lines. Military transport has grown steadily in importance. Armies, in ancient times, could advance only a few miles each day. But they could remain in the field for months, even years, more or less cut off from a perma- nent base of supply. Alexander the Great, Caesar, Hannibal, Genghis Khan, and many another ancient chieftain ranged thousands of miles afield. Their armies carried little baggage and lived largely off the country through which they passed. The invention of gunpowder and the resultant intro- duction of firearms first tied armies to a more or less permanent supply base. Guns and explosives could not be manufactured on the march. The development of artillery enormously increased the weight of an army's field equipment. Military machines have grown ever more complicated, creating service and repair problems undreamed of even within the memory of men still liv- ing. Ammunition alone for modern rapid-firing weapons outweighs an army's total equipment in the period of the Napoleonic Wars. Long trains of wagons were required to supply the armies of that period. But the total weight of miltary baggage has increased at least one hundred times since Waterloo. It has more than doubled since the first World War. It takes roughly seventy-five trains of thirty cars each to move an army division of 15,000 men by rail; 180,000 tons of shipping to move it by sea. Every division in the field consumes 1,000 to 1,500 tons of material each day. Mechanical power has given military forces great tactical mobility. An armored division can travel farther in an hour than a comparable number of men could formerly advance in a day of forced marches. A fleet can move several hundred miles a day in any direction without much regard to wind and weather. Heavy bombers can fly several hundred miles an hour to strike paralyzing blows a thousand miles behind the enemy's front lines. To achieve this tactical mobility, indeed to maintain mechanized forces in the field at all, an army must pos- sess huge quantities of fuel, chiefly liquid fuel for in- ternal combustion engines, but also heavier fuel oils for ship's steam boilers and Diesel engines. Warships, tanks, troop carriers, motorized artillery, planes, and other motorized equipment burn incredible quantities of fuel in the aggregate. A motor torpedo boat may consume more gasoline on a single day's run than would be required to drive an average passenger automobile twice around the world. A single bombing mission may use up a million gallons of gasoline or more. Fuel for military vehicles, like other military supply, must be hauled from production centers to operating bases. This transportation in turn involves the con- Sumption of additional quantities of fuel for the ships, locomotives, motor trucks, cargo planes, or other car- riers employed. Fuel for combat vehicles, plus fuel for the carriers which transport fuel and other matériel, outweighs in the aggregate all other military freight combined. In some campaigns the ratio has been as high as three or four to one. This brings us to one of the paradoxes of machine-age warfare. While tactical mobility has grown by leaps and bounds since the introduction of automotive weap- ons and other motorized equipment, strategical mobility has proportionately diminished. The steam turbine and the internal combustion engine have made the short haul shorter. But the insatiable fuel requirements of modern engines and motors, together with staggering increases in the total weight of military baggage and supply, have made the long haul longer. An armored division has great mobility within the radius it can travel on full gas tanks. But nothing is more helpless than an armored division out of gas. Long and arduous preparation, often running into months, even years, must precede large-scale offensives. Reserves of fuel, weapons, ammunition, and other ma- tériel must be built up near the combat zone before it is safe to launch a campaign. And the difficulties of sup- ply multiply by leaps and bounds the farther an armed force advances from these forward ammunition dumps and supply depots. Long hauls cut down the efficiency of available trans- portation. Distances from mine to factory, and from these to the operating bases and to the fighting fronts, are far greater in the aggregate today than in any pre- vious war. As a result, each ship, each freight car, each motor truck, cargo plane, or other carrier, represents less net transportation than it would if the hauls were shorter. When German air power all but blocked the Sicilian narrows of the Mediterranean (1941–43), compelling Allied shipping to make the long detour around the Cape of Good Hope, the military effect was comparable to the sinking of several million tons of Allied cargo shipping. Had it not been for the location of Allied oilfields and refineries in the Middle East, it might have proved utterly impossible to supply the army defending 32 Egypt against the onslaught of General Rommel's desert army. It is a fateful coincidence that the techniques for dis- rupting communications and supply lines have grown progressively more destructive during a period in which military transport has grown proportionately in value and importance. Now when more and heavier matériel has to be hauled greater distances than ever before, weapons for destroying transport have attained a potency unique in the annals of war. 4. INDUSTRIAL BASIS OF MODERN WAR. Modern weapons are products of huge industrial or- ganization and infinitely complex manufacturing proc- esses. Coal and iron ore must be brought together in immense quantities to make the incredible amounts of steel consumed by war today. Iron must be supple- mented by a long list of ferro-alloy metals—manganese, molybdenum, chromium, tungsten, and many others. The light metals—aluminum and magnesium—are gaining rapidly in value, largely because of the continu- ing growth of air power. Plastics, too, play a vital role in war technology. A long list of additional synthetics bolster the weak points in a country's war economy. These include rubber, liquid fuel, drugs, and many other items. Battles can be won or lost in the laboratories where scientists labor to produce better fuels, stronger alloys, substitutes for missing materials, precision in- struments, and other components of military power. Only a few great states, or super-powers, can hope to possess either the resources or the industrial structure and techniques to make war today. The strong are com- sequently growing stronger, while the weak become rela- tively weaker. So-called buffer states, wedged in be- tween Great Powers, have become little more than open highways for invading armies. All this constitutes nothing short of a strategical rev- olution. This war has unsettled strategical doctrine and geomilitary hypotheses which only yesterday seemed as solid and enduring as the Rock of Gibraltar itself. Space, location, distance, climate, minerals, and other earth features are taking on new strategical meaning and values. It is against this strategical revolution that we must study the geographical pattern of the war and the war strategy of the Axis and of the United Nations. II. GEOGRAPHICAL PATTERN OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1. ONE WORLD-ONE WAR. It is doubtless a truism to begin a discussion of today's war by observing that it is a global conflict. That has been said many times. Yet it may profitably be said again. For the human mind is almost incapable of grasping the concept of a truly global War. The war now reaches into every continent and ocean. All of the Great Powers are deeply and inextricably in- volved. Ranged alongside the giants are well over 40 states and fragments of states and empires. The few countries which have succeeded thus far in remaining technically neutral, have been able to cling to their precarious nonbelligerency only by appeasing whichever coalition was in position to bring the greatest pressure to bear upon them. No community anywhere in the world has escaped the effects of this global struggle. There are many combat zones and several major theaters of war. But these are all connected and inter- related. Victory or defeat in one region sways the tide of battle in every other. Men and matériel expended in Europe cannot be used in the Pacific or in Asia. Ship- ping sunk in the Atlantic will carry no cargoes to the southwest Pacific. Victories in one war theater release forces for service in another. Thus the fighting in Europe, in the Atlantic, in the Pacific, and in eastern Asia, all constitute parts of a single titanic struggle, It is one war. This global conflict has a distinctive geographical pattern or grand design. That pattern is determined in part by the make-up of the opposing coalitions, in part by the location and physical structure of the different battle grounds. The geographical pattern of the war is determined also by the mechanics of waging war in the machine age, and by the potentialities and limitations of modern weapons employed within the geographical framework of the war as a whole. 2. THE BERLIN-TOKIO AXIS. a. Geographical Structure of the Axis. The Ber- lin-Tokio Axis (formerly the Rome-Berlin-Tokio Axis) is a war-making coalition built around two Great Powers, Germany and Japan. Each of these constitutes the nucleus of a more or less compact cluster of unwilling satellite states and conquered territories. The geo- graphical area thus dominated by these two partners in aggression and plunder at the time of their greatest ad- vance is shown upon the accompanying map (fig. 4). The enemy-dominated area is considerably smaller today than the shaded area upon the map. The shrinkage in the area controlled from Berlin and from Tokio is one measure of the declining political and military fortunes of the Axis. - Germany, the stronger of the two Axis partners, is preeminently a continental power. The region under Nazi control, known both as Axis Europe and as For- tress Europe, lies almost entirely upon the European mainland. At the pinnacle of his infamous career, Hit- ler either ruled or exacted tribute from an area which embraced all of continental Europe west of a line run- ning from the Russo-Finnish border to a point just west of Moscow and thence southeast in a great salient reach- ing clear to the lower Volga and to the foothills of the Caucasus Mountains. In addition, he controlled, either directly or through the Fascist government in Italy and the Vichy regime in France, the large islands of Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily and Crete, the Dodecanese islands of the Aegean Sea, the north coast of Africa almost to the Suez Canal, and the Italian colonies reaching deep into the Dark Continent. By the end of 1943 the area of German domination had shrunk to radically smaller size. Axis forces had been driven from Africa altogether, and from southern Italy and the large islands of the central Mediterranean. The invaders clung to a precarious foothold in the Baltic states and eastern Poland, but had been driven from all lands east of the Dnieper River and from a steadily growing area west of that river as well. At that time Hitler's much-vaunted European fortress resembled a great trianguar wedge of territory. The western (or, strictly speaking, northwestern) side of this triangle was a sea frontier reaching from Norway to the Bay of Biscay. The south side followed in the main the chain of mountains and broken uplands which stretches across Europe from the Pyrenees to the Black Sea. The east- ern side reached from the Black Sea to the Baltic and thence through Finland to the Barents Sea. Within this continental stronghold lay two islands of neutrality, 33 Sweden and Switzerland. The remaining area was dominated more or less completely by Germany, al- though there were accumulating signs that the Nazi grip upon France, Yugoslavia, Norway, and other oc- cupied countries was weakening under the impact of German defeats on every front. Axis Europe is covered with an elaborate mosaic of communication lines. The backbone of this transpor- § ATZANTI O) CAAAY % GREAT Båſtain E TURKEY tºf SAUD! ARABIA FRENCH rmansk 3. tation system is a network of railroads. These are sup- plemented by motor highways, canals, navigable rivers, airways, and to a degree by coastal shipping routes as well. These latter, especially the iron-ore routes from Sweden which pass through the Baltic and along the coast of Norway, are extremely important. But in the final analysis, Germany’s ability to feed her people, to transport raw materials to her factories, and to supply Of" MONGOLIA ºre ZAVZ) /A AV \} & & © oc 3A & Berlin—Tokyo Axis Greatest extent Axis advance armed forces on the outer ramparts of Fortress Europe, all depend upon the functioning of inland communica- tions and transport. Japan, the other Axis partner, is both an insular and a continental power. Japan proper occupies a group of islands lying off the coast of eastern Asia, and in this respect somewhat resembles Great Britain. But the area under Nipponese domination (which the Japanese E United Nations - Wombeſigerents |LIPPINE SLANDS #. CAROLIN FIGURE 4 ICELAND COMMUNICATIONS :º-º-º-º-º: WITHIN THE FORTRESS EUROPE & Finlanp’; 3% Aake S O V | ET U N | O N Portress Europe" * June /, /944 ——— Main railways = High Speed highways ~ Aſſed lines of siege At G E R1A 2– (wns Ağ ——— Allied % % supply ---T !. #: º: est | SCALA, OA AM/Z ES \ f^ ºi º Tºtº. [T] /Vombe/gerents O 50 ſoo 200 300 4oo 500 e J º-ºº: ‘A N } Ll BYA 'ri FIGURE 5 have styled “the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere”) includes a large continental area as well as far-flung island possessions and conquests. In the spring of 1942, this “Co-prosperity Sphere” in- cluded upon the Asiatic mainland the whole of Man- churia (converted into the puppet state of Manchukuo), northeastern China, a deep salient reaching up the Yangtze Valley, the coastline of south China, French Indochina, nominally independent Thailand, British Burma, and the Malay peninsula. The oceanic com- ponents of this empire reached from the westernmost Aleutian islands to the Gilberts in the west central Pacific, and included everything to the coast of Asia north of a line drawn through southern New Guinea. In the spring of 1944 this empire was still substantially intact, though deeply dented at several points along its southeastern rim by Allied successes in New Guinea, the Solomon islands, the Gilbert group, New Britain, and the Aleutians. These widely scattered territories, continental as well as insular, are held together and defended chiefly by means of sea communications. Except in one or two areas upon the Asiatic mainland, railroad, highway, and other overland communications play a distinctly sub- sidiary role. Even in China the main artery is the Yangtze River which, in a military sense, is but an ex- tension of the deep-water shipping route across the East China Sea. b. Strategical Situation of the Axis: Central Posi- tions—Interior Lines. Within their respective geo- graphical regions both Germany and Japan occupy a central position. This central location in each case can be likened figuratively to the hub of a wheel. The outer defenses along the periphery of conquered terri- tory constitute the rim of the wheel. Arterial supply lines run along imaginary spokes of the wheel to the rim of outer defenses. Such supply lines, radiating from a central position, together with interconnection lateral branches, are known in military parlance as interior lines. It is an accepted military principle that central posi- tion and interior lines give certain advantages to the belligerent possessing them. Interior lines are gener- ally shorter. Given an efficient transportation system, this means quicker hauls from arsenal or training center to the fighting fronts. It is usually assumed that men and matériel can be concentrated for offensive action at any point on the outer rim more rapidly than opposing on his outer ramparts. forces can be shifted outside the rim to parry them. Conversely, possession of interior lines should enable the centrally located belligerent to shift his forces from one point to another in plenty of time to meet an attack For these reasons, each military unit is supposed to represent more effective power when operating along interior lines from a central position. Such a position, however, has certain ineScapable drawbacks. For one thing, it is inherently easier to blockade. This has been repeatedly demonstrated— witness the blockade of France in the Napoleonic Wars, the blockade of the Central Powers in the first World War, and of the Axis powers today. Unless the central belligerent can keep open a supply corridor to the out- side world or possesses sufficient arable land and mineral reserve within his area of control, he will eventually feel the strangling pressure of blockade. º The central position is also vulnerable to simulta- neous attacks on two or more fronts. The necessity of fighting a two-front war against a superior coalition, while being strangled by blockade, spelled defeat for Germany in the first World War. As the result of almost incredible political and strategical blunders, Germany is confronted with this situation again today, aggravated in this instance by the development of stra- tegic bombing which is relentlessly smashing in the roof of Hitler's European fortress. This last development may indeed revolutionize the previous balance of advantage as between the central and peripheral positions. Today a belligerent occupy- ing the central position can be blasted from widely spaced air bases around the rim of his outer defenses. Given command of the air and strongly held operating bases close enough to the enemy's vital centers, the peripheral belligerent or coalition can deliver a with- ering “cross fire” of aerial bombardment against mines, factories, railroads, and other targets inside the outer defenses of the central position. In this respect Germany's situation has reached a crisis before Japan's. The latter country is believed to be inherently more vulnerable to injury by bombing, because of the flimsy structure of Nipponese cities. But Japan is not yet so closely ringed by Allied air bases. As a result Japan has thus far enjoyed comparative immunity from the destructive aerial bombardment which is obliterating one by one the main industrial cities of Germany and the satellite countries of Axis Europe. Since air power is still in process of rapid growth, it is too early to evaluate all the strategical effects of this development. Evidence at hand suggests strongly that heavy and sustained aerial attack can severely shake enemy morale, disrupt production of war goods, slow down or even paralyze troop and supply movements, “soften up” the enemy's outer defenses, and render the central position incapable of successful resistance to in- vasion. Air power has thus gone far, and will doubtless go farther, towards nullifying the strategical advan- tages formerly enjoyed by a belligerent operating from a central position along interior lines of communication and supply. c. Strategical Isolation of the Axis. (1) The Desert-mountain Barrier. Hitler's Germany and Hiro- hito's Japan suffer a still more formidable handicap resulting from their respective geographical positions. The two halves of the Axis are located at opposite ends of Eurasia and on opposite sides of the world's longest and most forbidding geographical barrier. This barrier is the desert-mountain belt which cuts diagonally across the World Island (to use the expressive term first used by the British geographer, Sir Halford Mackinder, to designate the huge land mass of Europe-Asia-Africa). The Afro-Asian desert-mountain belt reaches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific. It embraces the des- erts of Sahara, Lybia, Egypt, Sinai, Syria, Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Turkestan, Gobi, Mongolia, and the arid region of northeastern Siberia. These deserts are linked with for- bidding mountain ranges and broken uplands. The whole formation varies greatly in depth, but averages well over a thousand miles, and constitutes one of the earth's most formidable natural barriers to the passage of large modern armies. Indeed it is virtually impass- able except along well-defined strategic corridors deter- mined by oases, waterways, mountain passes, and other geographic features. Several natural transit routes cross the Sahara and Lybian deserts from north to south. In the main these desert trails are fixed less by terrain than by the location of water along the way. Specially equipped motor ve- hicles can cross the desert upon several of these trails. But none of them presents a feasible line of march for large armies encumbered with heavy equipment and de- pendent upon a continuous flow of supply. These north-south desert trails, moreover terminate either in the tropical rain forest of west equatorial Africa or in the mountainous uplands of east Africa. 36 [TJAPANSINNERLINES OF DEFENSEJune I.Tº /* 2 sº Aarbor Pºsy – 4'ſ y %iskº /- c £2. W. gº ~, - *=e º 22 * V.Y.:*::::::::::::::PARAMUSHIRO S--_ "N, D. 22 {X. º *:: g . . 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Q S, ... • <2 ... : Ful O 2^ AUSTRAL | A NEWCALEDONIAN FIGURE 6 At no point do they afford easy access from the Mediter- ranean coastline to the Indian Ocean. As will appear later in these pages, the trans-African desert routes have played a part in this war. But they have figured scarcely at all in repeated attempts of the Axis partners to join forces in the Indian Ocean. Just the opposite is the case with the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. This man-made short-cut from Europe to the Indian Ocean has been the strategic jugular vein of the British Empire since the opening of the Canal in 1869. It is today an important link in the global com- munications of the United Nations. During 1941–42 the Allies temporarily lost the use of this supply line. Following Italy's entry into the war (June 1940), Axis sea and air forces gradually gained the upper hand in the central Mediterranean. For a time it became prohibitively costly for Allied convoys to run the gantlet of the Sicilian narrows. During that period Axis men and matériel poured across from Italy into north Africa, and Marshal Rommel's army struck repeatedly at the western desert gateway into Egypt. Had Rommel broken through to Suez and seized this only all-water passageway through the desert barrier, the Allies would have suffered a catastrophic defeat. They could temporarily lose the use of the Mediterra- mean, and still carry on by way of the long detour around the Cape of Good Hope. But a junction of German and Japanese forces in the Indian Ocean would have split the United Nations asunder, ended the strategical isolation of the Axis, and thereby reversed the global situation of the opposing coalitions. It is difficult to grasp the magnitude of such a disas- ter. The Middle East and India would have been cut off. China would have been completely blockaded. The Soviet Union would have been all but isolated. The Axis would have gained a shipping route for the ex- change of mutually needed raw materials and military equipment. The Axis, in short, would have achieved strategical unity and a virtually unassailable global position. Continuing eastward from Suez, the next natural cor- ridor through the desert-mountain barrier is formed by the Persian Gulf and the Tigris-Euphrates River val- leys. From these valleys run branch corridors across the Syrian desert to the Mediterranean coast, across Turkey to the Balkan peninsula, and over the mountains of western Iran to the Caspian Sea. From termini far- ther east on the shores of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, several additional overland routes wind their tor- tuous way across the deserts and mountains of central and eastern Iran, Baluchistan, Afghanistan to the arid steppes of Southwestern Siberia. The main western approaches to these Middle Eastern corridors converge on the lower Volga in southern Rus- sia. Broadly speaking, Stalingrad is the principal bas- tion guarding these gateways to the Indian Ocean. Had Stalingrad fallen in the autumn of 1942, the German armies would have had an open road not only to the Baku oil fields but also to the Middle East. It would have taken desperate fighting in the face of heavy odds to have prevented a German break-through in force to the shore of the Indian Ocean. Precipitous mountain roads and trails cross the lower passes of the western and eastern ends of the Himalayan cordillera. Neither those from northwestern India into Russian Turkestan nor those from Assam and Burma into southwestern China offer feasible routes for the passage of large quantities of heavy equipment. The same limitation applies to the desert roads and trails which connect western China with Mongolia, Singkiang, and central Siberia. Farther north the trans-Siberian railway system pierces the broken uplands of eastern Siberia to reach the maritime province of the Soviet Union, which lies east of the desert-mountain barrier. As already indicated, the Allies have clung tenaciously to every one of these passageways through the Afro- Asian desert-mountain belt. For a time in 1942 their margin of safety in the Mediterranean and in southern Russia was perilously small. The Japanese actually broke through into the Indian Ocean. But the German drives on Stalingrad and on Suez were stopped and hurled back, the tide of battle gradually turned, and by the spring of 1943 the last chance to join forces across the desert-mountain barrier had slipped irrevocably from the hands of Germany and Japan. (2) The Ocean Barriers. The Axis partners have been no more successful in their attempts to join forces around the periphery of the World Island or across the opposite face of the globe. Numerous and well-placed Allied sea and air bases guard all the ocean portals of Europe. Anglo-American naval and air forces com- mand the southern route via the Cape of Good Hope from bases flanking the shipways of the south Atlantic and Indian Oceans. An Arctic sea route skirts the northern coastline of the World Island. This route is navigable during a few months each year by ice-breakers and other spe- cially equipped vessels. But there has never existed the slightest possibility of a junction of Axis forces by way of this northern route. The Axis navies and merchant marines possess neither the equipment nor the technical knowledge and experience necessary to navigate these treacherous waters, even if they were prepared to chal- lenge the overwhelming power of the Soviet Union in this region. Equally formidable obstacles stand in the way of communication between the principal Axis countries across the opposite face of the globe. The two Ameri- cas, reaching from the Arctic to the Antarctic, con- stitute the backbone of a hemispheric military barrier. To the north and to the south of this continental- oceanic barrier there are seaways roughly comparable to the routes which skirt the World Island. The Pan- ama Canal, like the Suez Canal, provides a shipway through the continental barrier. East and west the Americas are flanked by Oceans several thousand miles wide. But every one of these waterways through or around the continental backbone of the Western Hemi- sphere is held in overwhelming strength by the armed forces of the United Nations. (See fig. 7.) Thus by Sea as well as by land, Axis Europe and the Japanese Empire are cut off and isolated from each other. As previously stated, they lie at opposite ex- tremes of the huge land mass of Eurasia and on oppo- site sides of the world’s longest, most continuous, most forbidding, and most heavily defended land barrier. The Axis capitals are nearly 6,000 miles apart by air line. Even at the time of their greatest advance, the armies of Hitler and of Hirohito never approached to within 3,500 miles of each other. They have never con- Quered the bases from which a determined attack could be launched against the seaways skirting the World Island. Axis sea and air power has never even at- tempted to blast a passage through the continental- oceanic barrier of the Western Hemisphere. The Axis countries are prisoners within their respec- tive regions. They can be likened to huge besieged fortresses, completely surrounded by enemies or poten- tial enemies. Such, in fact, has become the publicly admitted German conception of the war, and such will become the Japanese view as well, if indeed it has not already become so. The United Nations derive incalculable advantage from this strategical separation of their enemies. To 38 appreciate the full measure of that advantage, consider what it would mean for us if Japan were able to Send rubber, tin, and other military raw materials to supply the starving war industries of the Third Reich. Or conversely, if Germany could deliver machine tools and superior military equipment to supplement the limited war production of Japan. From time to time a lone ship has managed to slip through the Allied blockade. But those infrequent blockade runners only serve to emphasize the desperate plight of our enemies, and to remind them of their ines- ./ AR/7/5/ capable isolation and steadily deteriorating strategical situation. 3. THE UNITED NATIONs. a. Geographical Structure of the Anti-Axis Co- alition. The geographical structure of the United Na- tions differs in every respect from that of the Axis. The anti-Axis coalition is made up of many and various political elements, held together in the common cause of defending or of regaining their independence. This coalition embraces over thirty states and fragments of A A& C 7 / C Northwestern Passage barred by Canada and the U.S. occupation of Greenland ATA A/V7 / C Mediterranean passage blocke ‘by the Allies ſºlo | | OCA- route held U.S.A. :^T Cape Horn route Af blocked by the Alliés PA C / / / C aaº O CA A/V e * 2. A 7/4/V7/C SEA AND LAND BARRIERS TO AXIS. TRANSPORT O CAEA M ń. * SAVAWWAA/S AWD S7 EAEPE'S 77°Op/CAL RA//V AORAEST |TIII AEROAD/AAA' PESERT, PR4/R/FS, #| || 7vavora (refezass £% §§ 7A/GA (Foré's 7) DAFSAFRT S//RUB AMO WAS7 FZA/VO AAAshes Awo ALAINs) states. The constituent parts are not grouped closely around one or two dominant military centers, as is the case with the Axis. On the contrary the United Na- tions are widely distributed over the face of the globe. The key states in this global coalition are the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and China. For numerous reasons—partly geographical, partly military, but also political—these are known as the Big Four. However, since China is exclusively an Asiatic country, the Big Four becomes a Big Three in the strug- gle against Axis Europe. Similarly the Big Four be- O C. E. A M Arctic ship route, blocked the U.S.S.R. and the lack ice-breaking equipment Blocked ɺ | |...} ^. Panama Canal route held by U.S.A. : ://w pſA'N O CAE A/V Z Cape Horn route blocked by the Allies FORES 7" AA/AO COAV/FPROUS VEG£747/O/V AAEp/75RRAA/EAay Scrosſ POPA's 7" PR/AVC/PAZ A&A/L AND R/VER I. Sº ROUTES.5///7AB/A AOR //AAVY 7 RAFP/ C - AoyºA/7/44 ocAAA/TROUTES - - - -, BETWFAAV GERMAWY A. JAAAW FIGURE 7 comes a slightly different Big Three in the Pacific and Far East, since the Soviet Union is not at war with Japan. Besides the United States, China, and Great Britain, the coalition against Japan consists mainly of the Brit- ish Commonwealth countries—especially Canada, Aus- tralia, New Zealand, and India—and refugee elements from the Dutch East Indies and the Philippine Islands. The parallel coalition against Germany—built around the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States—also includes the British Commonwealth coun- tries—especially Canada and the Union of South Africa—fragments of the French Empire, and refugee forces from all of the countries overrun and occupied by the Third Reich. Mexico, the Caribbean , and Central American re- publics, and Brazil have likewise entered the anti-Axis coalition. Iran and the restored kingdom of Ethiopia are nominally at war with Germany. And Italy, since its break with Germany and surrender to the Allies, has been given a probationary status of co-belligerent. b. Peripheral Position—Exterior Lines. In rela- tion either to Axis Europe or to the Japanese Empire alone, the United Nations occupy a peripheral position. Their operating bases, their production centers, and their communication lines all lie outside the rims of the Axis wheels, to revert to the figure of speech used in describing the central position and interior lines of Germany and of Japan respectively. In the European theater, Allied bases are located in the British Isles, in North Africa, in Italy, in the Med- iterranean islands, in the Middle East, and in the Soviet Union. These operating bases lie on all sides of the strategic triangle which encloses Axis Europe. Lines of communication linking these bases together skirt the perimeter of Hitler's continental fortress. Supply lines reach back from these advanced bases to Allied production centers in the rear. Some of these are several thousand miles from the fighting fronts— in North America, in the Caribbean, in the Middle East, in the Ural Mountains, in central Siberia, and else- where. Great Britain is unique in that it is both a main operating base and a great manufacturing center. England is the only important Allied production cen- ter within reach of large-scale German attack. In the Asiatic and Pacific theater of war, the same general pattern exists. Allied operating bases on the Asiatic Front are located in China, in India, and po- tentially in the Soviet Far East. On the Pacific Front our operating bases extend along a great arc from the Aleutian Islands to Australia. As in the European theater, lines of communication between these ad- vanced bases skirt the area held by Japan. And supply lines reach back from these advanced positions to Al- lied production centers in the rear, some of them far in the rear, thousands of miles from the nearest enemy base. This peripheral position of the United Nations both in the European and in the Far Eastern war theaters involves strategical problems and opportunities the op- posite of those presented to the Axis. With certain minor exceptions, the Allies have to operate over longer supply lines. Those requiring military protection alone aggregate over 50,000 miles. The grand total is very much larger. It is thus obvious that a very substantial part of the manpower and other military resources of the United Nations have to go towards providing and protecting transportation along these long and extended supply lines. This handicap is partly, but only partly, offset by their greater opportunities to employ water transport which today is still far more economical than land or air transport. Because of their peripheral position and exterior lines vis-à-vis either Europe or the Far East alone, the Allies generally experience greater difficulty in shifting their armed forces from one combat zone to another. During 1941–42, for example, the Allied countries bordering on the Atlantic Ocean could send men and ma- tériel to Egypt only by way of the Cape of Good Hope, or by the shorter but nevertheless roundabout airline across equatorial Africa. The Axis, by contrast, had only to ship their reenforcements across the Mediter- ranean. Today the situation is vastly improved, and is steadily improving in every region. But even today Germany and Japan both possess shorter communica- tion lines between different combat zones within their respective spheres than do the Allies between the same points. At the same time, as previously noted and now reemphasized, the Allies derive certain definite com- pensating advantages from their peripheral positions enclosing the two widely separated blocs of Axis-held territory. - For one thing, with the exception of the British Isles, their main production centers are located safely beyond enemy reach. Since the evacuation of Soviet industry from White Russia and the Ukraine, the active indus- trial regions of the Soviet Union reach eastward from Moscow to central Siberia and beyond. The industrial Southeast coast of Australia lies well beyond the range of Japanese attack. The nearest enemy base lies sev- eral thousand miles from Canada and the United States. The same immunity from destructive attack holds in greater or less degree for other production centers of the United Nations. The peripheral position of the anti-Axis coalition also facilitates the blockade of Europe and of the Japa- nese Empire. The Atlantic Allies control every oceanic approach to, and marine gateway into, continental Europe. The Red Army bars the eastern portals of Europe. Allied forces by sea and by land similarly encircle the besieged fortress of Japan. Finally, as previously shown, the peripheral position of the United Nations opens up large opportunities for the strategical use of air power against the industrial structure and internal communications of Hitler's Eu- rope and of Hirohito’s “co-prosperity sphere” in greater east Asia. c. Global Strategical Unity of the United Nations. The situation of the United Nations, while peripheral and exterior with respect to either Europe or the Far East, is strategically central as regards the war viewed as a global whole. Two of the principal Allied pow- ers—the Soviet Union and the United States—face both main theaters of war. No member of the anti-Axis coalition—not even China, the most isolated of all– is cut off from its allies to a degree in any way com- parable to the isolation of Germany and Japan from each other. The Soviet Union occupies a unique position in the anti-Axis coalition. It alone among the Allies has land frontiers adjoining both German-held and Japanese- held territory. This country, which extends clear across northern Europe and Asia, constitutes the only land “bridge” between the geographically separated but functionally related struggles going on in Europe and in eastern Asia. Distance plus difficulties of communication, however, limit somewhat the strategical value and potentialties of this continental linkage between the European and Far-Eastern conflicts. The trans-Siberian railway sys- tem and the Russian trans-continental airways repre- Sent monumental engineering achievements. But the distance thus spanned is immense—considerably more than twice the mileage from New York to San Fran- 40 cisco. Vladivostok, the eastern terminus of the trans- Siberian railroad, is far distant from the main industrial regions of the Soviet Union. Intensive industrialization of the Russian Far East compensates in some degree. But war on two frontiers five to six thousand miles apart would place a terrific strain upon the slender threads connecting the extremities of the Soviet Union. Space and distance, in short, partly cancel the military ad- Only direct route ,” JAtlantic / 62CZ/1 º:.. Cairo & * * • • { • j” * * * * • • * - - * * vantage derived from the country’s central position and interior lines with respect to Eurasia as a whole. With certain important differences the position of North America resembles that of the Soviet Union. We have no land frontiers adjoining enemy-held territory. We are much farther removed from the European and the Far Eastern theaters of war. But the United States like the Soviet Union faces both regions under the THE FRONTIERS OF THE ; SOVIET UNION, June 1944 J/ndia.T. Ocea 7 FIGURE 8 enemy's domination. Hence, we too occupy a central military position between Germany and Japan. In the case of the United States, or rather of North America as a whole, this central position differs from the Soviet Union's in the form of a geographical linkage connecting the widely separated theaters of war. Nine trunk-line railroads span North America. Trans-con- tinental highways and airways supplement the railroad Northern sea route frozen over för a lar, part of the year § DESERT BARRIERS MOUM7A/W BARR/ERS - A&A/LWAYS = ROADS — A/R//WAS |LIPPINES //V7AA'/V47/OWA/ BORDER t 3 AXIS & AXIS-HEAD 7/AR/TORY ||||||||||||||||||WOWBF///GARFWy 612655°–44–4 system. Navigable lakes, rivers, and canals afford addi- tional channels for the movement of inland traffic. Coastal sea routes further supplement the inland net- work. The Panama Canal provides an especially im- portant linkage between our widely separated oceanic frontiers. (See fig. 9.) “Bridges” of ships and planes, but especially of ships, span the oceans from North America. These reach overseas to widely distributed sources of food and raw materials, to Allied production centers in every conti- nent, and to Allied military bases behind the fighting fronts in Europe and in the Far East. Trans-oceanic lines from North America join other communication links which encircle and penetrate into the huge mass of the World Island. The whole constitutes a network of military communications and supply lines which girdles the globe. d. Atlantic Ocean Supply Lines. This ocean is an arena of the greatest importance to the Allies. Mili- . tary operations based in the British Isles are totally dependent upon Atlantic supply lines; campaigns in southern Europe and in the Mediterranean, only slightly less so. Much of the lend-lease matériel sent to the Soviet Union has first to cross the Atlantic on its way either to Murmansk-Archangel or to trans-shipping points on the Persian Gulf. Guns for the armies of China travel halfway around the world from the At- lantic ports of Great Britain and of North America. Even the amphibious Pacific Ocean front depends in a measure upon supply lines which reach through the Panama Canal from the Atlantic ports of North and South America. This supreme importance of the Atlantic Ocean arises both from the part which the Western Hemisphere is playing in this global war, and from the physical geog- raphy of North and South America. The great hinter- land of both continents drains largely toward the At- lantic, with lofty mountains rising more or less ab- ruptly from the Pacific shoreline. With certain im- portant exceptions, the principal manufacturing cen- ters lie 2,000 miles or more from the Pacific seaboard of North America. And in consequence of these facts, most of the great seaports face the Atlantic rather than the Pacific Ocean. - The Western Hemisphere, as previously emphasized, is a vast reservoir of manpower and war material. The developed mineral wealth of this hemisphere alone ex- ceeds that of the Axis. The production of North Amer- ican industries approximates all of Europe's. Within the Americas lie some of the world's most bountiful granaries. From the borderlands of the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico comes a very substantial pro- portion of the fuel oil which drives the ships, planes, and overland vehicles of the United Nations. But American production centers lie thousands of miles from the nearest fighting front. The planes, tanks, guns, and other products of American factories; food stuffs from American farms and ranches; the out- put of American oil wells and refineries; and troops from the American members of the anti-Axis coalition— all must cross the Atlantic Ocean, traveling from 3,000 to 15,000 miles to reach the fighting fronts in Europe and in eastern Asia. Though the exact routes which the convoys follow in crossing this ocean are of necessity closely guarded Se- crets, the main links of the Atlantic communications network are well known. Great Britain is inescapably one main focus of trans- Atlantic supply lines. Britain is the springboard for every offensive against western Europe—sea blockade, aerial bombardment, or actual landings upon the con- tinent. England is also one of the principal manufac- turing centers of the United Nations. A small country with a dense population, Great Britain is more depend- ent upon Seaborne imports of food and raw materials than is any other member of the anti-Axis coalition. War has tended on the whole to increase Britain's dependence upon oversea supplies. Imports of food and luxuries for the civilian population have been rig- orously curtailed or suspended altogether. But the decline in these categories has been more than offset by the inflow of raw materials for the war industries and by fuel for the Allied military machine. Great Britain is also a way station on the northern supply route to the Soviet Union. Because of its geo- graphical location, the U. S. S. R. is difficult to reach from any direction. All the routes into that country are long and circuitous. The shortest way from North America and from England—principal sources of Rus- sia-bound lend-lease matériel—is the northern sea route which skirts the Scandinavian coastline to the Arctic ports of Murmansk and Archangel. . Another group of Atlantic supply lines connects the British Isles and North America on the one hand with the Mediterranean basin and with the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean borderlands. Down to the fall of France, the main trunk line to the Indian Ocean ran through the Mediterranean. After Italy's entry into the war, this route became increasingly dangerous. It was virtually closed for nearly 2 years (1941–43). During that period Allied shipping was forced to use the long detour around the Cape of Good Hope. This added weeks to the voyage from British and Amer- ican ports to the Middle and Far East. But it remained the only usable route until the Mediterranean victories of 1943 restored that vital short cut to the Persian Gulf and to the more remote shores of the Indian Ocean. Reopening of the Mediterranean lessened the pressure of traffic in the South Atlantic. But that marine sector still retains much of its strategic importance to the United Nations. Large quantities of food and raw materials, including critical items formerly obtained from lands temporarily held by Japan, flow continu- ously northward from African and South American ports to various North Atlantic destinations. e. Pacific Ocean Supply Lines. Three main trunk lines reach out into the Pacific. The northernmost follows the great circle to Alaska where it divides, with One branch continuing westward towards the Pacific ports of the Soviet Union, while the other swings north and then west through Bering Sea and Arctic Ocean to the northern ports of Russia. The second trunk line extends southwest to Hawaii where it divides into many branches leading to the operating bases in the western and Southwestern Pacific. The third runs direct from the Panama Canal to New Zealand, Australia, and the Same combat zones in the southwestern Pacific. Distance dominates every aspect of our supply prob- lem in the Pacific. This ocean covers fully one-third of the globe. Its area approximates that of the Atlantic, Indian, and Arctic Oceans combined. In consequence, Pacific supply lines are long and will grow ever longer with every mile of advance toward Tokio. The Western Hemisphere is the largest supplier of men and material for the Pacific Front. Australia and New Zealand have contributed heavily in proportion to their limited resources and population. A little is de- rived from the smaller islands of the Pacific. Some- thing reaches the Pacific theater from India, Africa, and the Middle East, although Japanese occupation of Mel- anesia has largely blocked for the time being the east- ward flow of traffic from the Indian Ocean. But the total from all these sources is but a small fraction of the 42 - - - - - - - - • * * * * * - - - - * * * * * * - - CN W. .*.*.*.*. :::: Guaymas/ *>4e. * Mºtº & |RON º Monterre | RON - * * * * * * * * * -——- MAIN RAILMWAYS |NTERNATIONAL HIGHWAYS -ms amº- *- (2.ÉÉ% ____ – INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES IND, … I N DUSTRY - * * * - - - - tº *, * TºrspoRTATIONTINKSTANDF OF NORTH AMERICA *Tºon //e *%a, softon *%x. ſun "% § IND. º: .*.*.*.*.*.*:- .*.*.*.*.*.*.*.*.*.*.* * * * * - - - - tº * - - - - *.*.*.*.*.*.*. - - - - - - - -_-_* < a. --_*, * * •º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º.º. º. º.”.”.º.º.º. men and matériel transported across the Pacific from the Western Hemisphere. Take, for example, the item of oil. As previously noted, fuel oil, Diesel oil, ordinary motor fuel, aviation gas, and other petroleum products represent more weight in the aggregate than do all other items of mili- tary freight combined. The exact proportion varies with the character and intensity of the fighting. Tanker tonnage required also varies depending on the length of haul. War in the Pacific, with its emphasis upon long- range sea and air operations, uses up enormous quanti- ties of oil fuel, and that fuel has to be transported thou- sands of miles by sea, chiefly from the Western Hemi- sphere. Loss of the oil-producing region which formerly sup- plied the southwestern Pacific area was one of the most disastrous consequences of Japan's conquest of Mela- nesia. This disaster has thrown upon the oil fields of California and the Caribbean borderlands, and upon the overworked tanker fleet of the United Nations the tre- mendous task of hauling fuel thousands of miles across the Pacific to the combat zones in the western and South- western reaches of that Ocean. - Another supply bottleneck in the Pacific arises from the concentration of heavy industry in the middle-West- ern and eastern parts of Canada and the United States. Before reaching the Pacific, much of the equipment and other supplies destined for the fighting forces in that ocean must first be hauled across the Rocky Mountains by rail, or around through the Panama Canal by ship, adding hundreds of thousands of miles to the long and extended supply lines which reach out across the Pacific. The shape of the Pacific Ocean affords very much shorter supply lines to Alaska than to Australia. The sea route to Alaska and to the Aleutian Islands hugs the continental coastline. But crooked channels, fog, and other navigational hazards make rapid passages danger- ous if not altogether impossible. Military convoys to Alaska probably do not average over five knots. At that rate the voyage from Puget Sound to Seward (terminus of the railroad to Fairbanks, military center of interior Alaska) would take about 10 days; to Dutch Harbor, 17 days; to Attu Island, 20 days. Before the war the only overland linkage between the States and Alaska was an airline. This provided fast transportation for a limited number of passengers and for small quantities of urgent freight. But planes could never have carried the whole load of military FIGURE 9 43 traffic required for the defense of that vital strategic area. The situation would have been perilous indeed had the Japanese made good their early threats to Alaska and to our sea communications in the North Pacific. To meet that eventuality, which happily did not ma- terialize, the Army built the now famous Alcan highway (See fig. 10). This road, built in record time in the face of tremendous physical obstacles, was opened for mili- tary traffic late in 1942. It follows the line of flying fields previously in existence. This made it possible to fly in construction gangs and road-building machinery The road in turn provides the means of hauling in larger quantities of aviation gas, and thereby increases the :*śs. GREENLAND & s librfrn ſº St. TED ºtif:{{{SY NSS $º Çiğ Sºº º :::::::::: º U capacity of the airline. The combined capacity of high- way, airline, and sea route insures the uninterrupted flow of men and matériel to one of the key strategic posi- tions in the possession of the United Nations. es The sea route to Hawaii, key military position in the central Pacific, runs west and south from the California ports. The distance is about 2,000 nautical miles. From Hawaii and from the Panama Canal to the southwestern Pacific the distances are considerably greater. From Pearl Harbor to Sydney it is nearly 4,500 nautical miles; from the Canal to Sydney, over 7,500 miles. Assuming a somewhat faster average speed on these runs—say 7.5 knots—our hypothetical convoy could make the passage from San Francisco to Pearl Harbor in 12 days; from * : * ~. ſº º ºSºº n ºrº ºr ºr a 2: A there to Sydney in 25 days; and from the Canal to Sydney in not less than 40 days. f. The Indian Ocean and Its Borderlands. This Ocean and the lands bordering on it contain additional important links of the global network of production centers and transportation lines which supply the land, sea, and air forces of the United Nations. The lands facing the Indian Ocean extend in a vast semicircle from the Cape of Good Hope to the south- western promontory of Australia. For considerably more than a century British sea power reigned supreme in this ocean. At the beginning of today’s war the British Empire peoples and their allies still held every land and water passageway leading to its shores. Wazſ and Japaneſe- i. Áed territory 6/1944; w———— Main ra////nes : — Highways and over- (and sage& routes — Akan highway —e=^ Mavigab/e cºvers —sº- Øcean supply ſines (oisſances twºwfical Miles) FIGURE 10 These lands all play a part in the war economy of the United Nations. Through the seaports of east Africa flow foodstuffs and raw materials—coffee, sugar, cotton, rubber, copper, and many other items—to sustain the Allied war effort. Australia is both a primary producer of food and raw materials, and also an important manu- facturing country. From the northern coastline rise India, Iran, and other lands of great and varied stra- tegical importance. India is a huge triangular promontory reaching southward from the Himalayan cordillera, the world's most forbidding mountain barrier. This country is about half the size of the United States, but has a popu- lation exceeding 350,000,000. India maintains a large army—over 1,500,000 men, one-third of whom are Serving overseas. The country is a foremost producer of strategic raw materials—cotton, coal, iron, bauxite, ferro-alloys, and others. Indian steel mills represent an extremely important component of Allied military power. Indian factories are turning out ships, air- plane parts, small arms, ammunition, uniforms, tents, and many other items of military equipment. These industries played a vital role in the defense of Egypt during the dark days of 1942. Their steadily increas- ing output will hasten the march of victory in eastern and southeastern Asia. To the west of India lie Iraq and the huge Arabian peninsula. These are thinly populated and generally arid countries. They have little developed industry. But they do contain some of the world's richest oil fields, which have contributed immeasurably to the Allied war effort throughout the Middle East. During the Lybian desert campaigns, for example, Allied forces enjoyed the advantage of abundant fuel piped to the eastern shore of the Mediterranean. Middle Eastern oil, no less than India-made equip- ment, helped to hold the desert-mountain barrier against the Axis onslaught. It will play a part no less important in the expulsion of the Japanese invaders from Burma and from China. These northern borderlands also contain numerous strategic gateways into the interior of Asia. Iran, for example, is one of the main links between the Soviet Union and the other United Nations. Russia-bound equipment and supplies are unloaded at Seaports all the way from Karachi (in northeastern India) to the head of the Persian Gulf. From these trans-shipping points they are hauled across the deserts and mountains of Iran, by rail, by motor truck, even by animal caravan, to the shores of the Caspian Sea and to Russian rail- heads in Southern Turkestan. Indian seaports are also gateways into China. Since Japan's blockade of China's coastline and occupation of Burma and Indochina, the only supply routes into free China are desert roads across Sinkiang, mountain trails which climb over the outlying ranges of the Himalayan cordillera, and an airline from northeastern India. China is consequently the most isolated of the United Nations. No other fighting front in this global war presents such formidable logistical problems as those which dominate every move in eastern Asia. g. Aerial life lines of the United Nations. Air transport plays a role of exceptional importance in the war effort of the United Nations. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the conduct of coalition warfare on a global scale would be virtually impossible without the airways which connect not only the fighting fronts but also the political nerve centers of the anti- Axis coalition. Without air transport there could be almost no move- ment of diplomatic, administrative, and military officials between the Atlantic and Eurasian capitals of the United Nations. Integrated military operations would be all but impossible. The psychological barriers to mutual understanding, which beset every coalition, might prove insuperable. With air transport there is a constant movement of people among the United Nations. Difficulties and dif- ferences of opinion are ironed out by conferences among the highest ranking officials, instead of through the devious channels of long-range diplomacy. In no other phase of modern war has the conquest of time and space produced such decisive results. The exceptional value of air transport to the Allies arises in part from the immense distances which separate them from each other and from the major fighting fronts. Washington and Chungking lie almost exactly 180° apart, or halfway around the world. The shortest airline distance from Washington to London is 3,650 miles; from London to Moscow, 1,600 miles; from Mos- cow to Chungking, 3,750; from Washington to Sydney, 9,725. These shortest airline distances, however, do not rep- resent the distances which actually must be covered in most instances. Axis Europe stands between London and Moscow. Japan blocks the trans-Pacific routes to China. For 2 years (1941–43) Axis sea and air power barred the Mediterranean short cut to Egypt and to the Indian Ocean. Under conditions thus created by early Axis victories, Sea and land communications among the United Nations were forced out around the periphery of the World Island. The northern, or Arctic, routes were the short- est. But as previously shown, enemy action, ice, or other hazards limited the use of these northern routes. Moreover, these routes gave no direct access to China and to the lands bordering on the Indian Ocean. To reach these lands, and also southern Russia, the Middle East, and Egypt during the period of Axis Mediter- ranean domination, the Allies had to get across or go around the Continent of Africa. Africa resembles a gigantic promontory jutting south- ward from Eurasia. This great promontory is nearly three times the size of Europe, four times the United States, and over 100 times Great Britain. From the eastern tip of Africa across the huge western bulge to French Dakar, the distance is roughly equivalent to that from New York to Moscow by air. North and south, Africa extends from the latitude of Norfolk to that of Buenos Aires, approximately 5,000 miles, twice the air- line distance from New York to San Francisco. For centuries this huge promontory blocked direct sea communication between Europe and the Indian Ocean. Ships had to round the Cape of Good Hope, a voyage of 12,000 to 15,000 miles. The Suez Canal, opened in 1869, clipped several thousand miles from this voyage. The short cut through the Mediterranean quickly became the backbone of the British Empire. It was a vital artery of Allied military traffic in the first World War, and in the initial phase of the present struggle. And following the victories in North Africa and the surrender of Italy, it has become once more the main trunkline of inter- Allied communication to the Indian Ocean and its bor- derlands. But, as previously noted, there was a considerable period during which this military trunkline was all but closed to Allied traffic. Allied convoys—even those carrying men and matériel to Egypt—were forced back into the long detour around the Cape. The stra- tegical result was equivalent to destruction of several million tons of Allied shipping, a result which inexor- ably affected the flow of supply to every fighting front. Temporary loss of the Mediterranean shipping route coincided, moreover, with rapidly increasing pressure 45 on the supply line to Egypt and to the Indian Ocean. During this period Germany invaded Russia, and the latter came to depend heavily upon matériel delivered through Middle Eastern ports. Japan's attack in the Pacific and in Southeastern Asia put a heavier burden on the Indian Ocean supply line which afforded the only means of strengthening the defenses of Singapore, Burma, and of India itself. A continuous flow of reen- forcements was needed to stem the Axis drives on Egypt and to prepare for possible attack in the Middle East. All this traffic, if shipped by sea, had to make the long and circuitous voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. But pressure on shipping space was not the only factor. Time is also a crucial factor. Campaigns could be irretrievably lost for lack of critical repairs and replacements. A shorter and more rapid supply route to Egypt, the Middle East, India, and China, simply had to be found. In 1941 the only alternative was a route across Africa. Vast distances, damp fever-infested jungles, scorch- ing deserts, rivers, broken by falls and rapids, have all held back overland transport to Africa. In 1941 no railway crossed the great northern desert, though the Vichy regime under Nazi tutelage was slowly building a line Southward from Algeria to connect with a dead- end line running east from Dakar. Several motor trails across the Sahara were capable of carrying limited traffic, but all these terminated at points on the north coast then in Axis hands. Neither railway nor highway connected the British or free-French territories in central Africa with the upper reaches of the Nile whence there was a choice of routes to the Red Sea and Mediterranean coasts. Motor vehicles had made the transit of equatorial Africa, but only in the face of almost incredible difficulties. There was loose talk of building a “Burma Road” across equa- torial Africa. But in 1941 the need for transportation was immediate. In this crisis the United Nations turned to air transport. (See fig. 11.) The groundwork was already completed. European commercial air lines had built scores of flying fields in \ AMERICA § Angeles sº |-- 756, KHoNolulu --------------. Airways temporarily unusable by the Aſſes 977/777% Areas of bad climatic £//%% flying conditions DiSTANCES SHOWN ARE IN statuTE AA, LES : Punta Arenaë. AA C//7/ C 3% O C. Aſ A /V * {} 35s /3 SOUTH atal O ASCENSION @ - AMERICA. O \\\ A23# Airways 7 le * io Grande //VA)/A A/ O CAA A/ O C A A A/ JAPAN Tokyo AA C / / / C }% § -: Vladivostok Sr* * 4 = ./, /, /. . . " N 2. NEW ZEALAND FIGURE 11 Africa before the war. Established lines included two routes down the west coast to Dakar and Bathurst, one across the Sahara, and connecting lines in equatorial Africa. A British network extended from Cairo to the Cape, with a branch running from Khartoum to Nigeria and other west African colonies of Great Britain. Two lines crossed the Atlantic to Brazil. There they con- nected with a Pan American Airways line to Miami. These commercial airways provided the main links for a trans-African military line. In 1941 such a line was pioneered by Pan American, and rapidly developed by the United States Army's Air Transport Command, in cooperation with the British Overseas Airways Corpo- ration. - Two main stems joined to form the western terminus of the trans-African air ferry. One of these came from the British Isles via Gibraltar. The other originated in the United States, and followed the Pan American route down the shoulder of Brazil and thence across the south Atlantic narrows to the coast of Africa. There the two stems joined, and continued across the Dark Con- tinent, following in the main the established British route from Nigeria to Khartoum and thence down the Nile valley to Cairo. This air line helped to meet a desperate military crisis in the spring and summer of 1942. It made possible the swift delivery of combat planes to the Egyptian desert front. Repairs and spare parts flown across Africa put grounded planes back into the air within a matter of days. All sorts of high-priority matériel were flown in, including ammunition for the antitank artillery which stopped the German panzers at El Ala- mein. The air ferry did not, and was not designed to, supplant the longer and slower sea route. But it helped mightily to solve the problems in waging war at the end of a 15,000-mile sea line. That, however, was by no means the only function per- formed by the trans-African air-line. At Cairo it con- nected with a British line already in operation to Tehe- ran, Karachi, and Calcutta. At Teheran the British air line connected with a Soviet line running to Moscow. And from Calcutta Chinese National planes flew over the mountains to Chungking. The trans-African link thus completed a system of airways extending from Chungking, Calcutta, and Mos- cow, to London and Washington. This system, con- necting the major Allied capitals, has become the lifeline of the United Nations, in much the same way that the Mediterranean short cut through Suez and the Red Sea formerly constituted the military backbone of the British Empire. Scarcely less important are the air links which connect the United Nations around the opposite side of the globe. One network extends outward across the Pacific. The Japanese attack disrupted the pioneer line to the Philip- pines and China via Hawaii, Midway, Wake and Guam. But the southern route to New Zealand and Australia has been developed and extended, and today plays an important role in the war in the Pacific. The air route to Alaska has already been mentioned. This line connects with a Soviet line which extends the whole length of the U. S. S. R. to Moscow. This route which spans parts of three continents—North America, Asia, and Europe—connects with central Asian lines running to Chungking, and provides some of the most important links in the globe-girdling communications of the United States. The whole system—widely distributed production cen- ters, operating bases, and fighting fronts, all connected by land, sea, and air communications—gives to the United Nations a strategical unity denied to the two halves of the Berlin-Tokio Axis. No member of the Allied coalition is cut off from the rest, not even China which is the most isolated of all. From month to month new links are forged and old links restored among the United Nations, while successive victories draw ever tighter the blockade which isolates the ill-gotten em- pires of Hitler and Hirohito. 47 Chopter 12 GEOGRAPHY AND GRAND STRATEGY IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF WAR In 1933, when Hitler seized the reins of power in Berlin, the German Reich was gripped in a seemingly unbreakable wise. It had been forged with great care after the defeat of Germany in the first World War. Germany had been compelled to disarm and to dis- mantle her border fortifications. The victorious Allies had forbidden Germany to rearm, and they had given the prostrate Reich new boundaries made purposely weak. The Treaty terms were enforced from a ring of care- fully chosen geographical positions. Strong armed forces confronted Germany on all sides. These were linked into a closely knit system of mutual security, by means of alliances, interlocking munitions industries, financial ties, and other devices. France was the guid- ing spirit and master architect. But the system also included Belgium in western Europe, and Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, extending across eastern Europe in a solid tier from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic. Nevertheless, within ten years after seizing power, Hitler had broken the bonds which held Germany, and had made himself master of Europe from the Atlantic to a line deep within the Soviet Union. He had marched into Austria and Czechoslovakia without firing a shot. Poland had resisted and had The necessary prelude to these global conquests was the subjugation of Europe—a formidable task for a dis- armed nation surrounded by heavily armed potential enemies. So formidable indeed were the difficulties con- fronting Germany, and so overwhelming the initial ad- vantages held by the encircling allies, that Hitler's in- tended victims simply could not be brought to appreciate their danger until it was too late. ^. INTRODUCTION gone crashing down in ruins. The same fate had be- fallen Norway, the Low Countries, and France. Hun- gary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland had been torn from their neutral moorings and hitched to the Nazi war chariot. German panzers had roared through the Balkans, cutting down Yugoslavia and Greece. Mus- solini had been demoted from a partnership in plunder to the status of a mere satellite. British forces had been driven from the Continent. By the autumn of 1942 Axis armies were fighting in the outskirts of Len- ingrad, in the streets of Stalingrad, and in the oil-bear- ing foothills of the Caucasus Mountains. Other Axis armies had swarmed across the Mediterranean and driven to the gates of Suez. Those victories stand as a monument—though an unfinished one—to that group of German geographers, generals, and Nazi zealots who had planned and executed the most astounding succes- sion of conquests in modern times. We do not yet know all the details of the grandiose imperial project upon which Hitler had thus embarked. But its main features are clear. From public utter- ances, from “Mein Kampf,” and from the events them- selves, we know that Hitler viewed the conquest of Europe as merely a necessary preliminary to a much larger program of aggression overseas. In general, the Nazi plan was to win Europe, and, . HITLER'S MARCH TO THE ATLANTIC Yet seven and a half years, from the Nazi Revolution to the fall of France (1933–40), Hitler advanced from one triumph to the next. This was no haphazard prog- ress. Every German move during those fateful years followed a carefully planned geographical pattern and sequence; unless one grasps the geographical logic which guided Nazi statecraft, he will never understand how Hitler was able to break the chains and to destroy the put the conquered peoples to work, growing food, pro- ducing raw materials, and making arms for the “master race.” With these weapons Hitler would next break England's hold on the ocean portals of Europe, and gain control of the immense military resources of the Soviet |Union.* Each new conquest would add something to the mush- rooming growth of Greater Germany. With a terri- torial base reaching from the Atlantic Ocean to central Asia, with a European monopoly of armament, with an unbreakable grasp on the sea approaches to Europe, and with his main arsenals all beyond reach of any possible counterattack, Hitler would occupy the strongest mili- tary position upon the globe. From this impregnable base, German armies could leap deserts, mountain ranges, and ocean barriers, to conquer Africa, India, eastern Asia, the islands of the Pacific, and finally exe- cute a gigantic pincers attack on the last remaining centers of resistance in North America. {} *Hitler’s public pronouncements and likewise his secret diplomatic exchanges were of two kinds. Antedating each act of aggression was a Series of Solemn assurances that Germany's intentions were wholly pacific and that treaty Commitments would be honored. Once the attack was rolling on to apparent success his real intentions as to the victim would be revealed. With such revelations came repeated assurances of good behavior to the nations which as yet were merely earmarked for Slaughter. guardians of the peace of Versailles. One can fully ap- preciate the geographical logic of German aggression only by following upon the map in the footsteps of the conqueror. 1. GERMANY, 1919–33. The peacemakers after the last war redrew the map of Europe with the intention of keeping Germany within 48 |THE FRANCO-GERMAN | ||North - <>NS \ \ O : . . MX \\//// Rhineland and NETHERLANDS # *%|º]}} e & © 'º. •ºe \\ demili tar'Ized ZO/16 Rotte dam ~~ > &a A/º 34 •" SS Wilſº º G 6S •8russeſ; 1, *...* : Nº : A * * * assº * e g St” ºn-sºº Dieppe 1–3 º!!!" (üxià &. " Main *... sº, W 4) ! º ſ/ZZX *... • *Uſ. º Ll N E w §§ 3.2% - 2-1 \\ 㺠\\\ ſ/ / ſº 0) eſ’ "... ww {\% §i) NS * \ §§ * ‘eſſy,\,\,\ ſ W } 1) ‘sº & º ;S. GERMAN | O *** sº - SS S. S aſſ, º BELGIUM Žſe § # gººgº ë. gº" 3. º * . Z/7 & .2 J3 Abbeville “: š jº | ſiſtſ, 11") * A. *\/\S ſº, "4__ 2% YKZZX:.. J&K. Peims • -ºš. 2. €//m3 ºln/: 2 tº t . . \l 9% 2 2-S-s Qº. sºmmº-mº- ~ * : * \\\\". Q 7- -2\º ww. \\ § s:Sº re ŽKG ERMAN 2/) § * I / / / ºnkº”.a...ºlwºrwallº Caláis; 3 .* • * 0. ^e //jº" | §ºš º/Z4%//?ASX4% iinz * / 14/ e ..". - - 'Cºx; &% 4 UR f/\º f kº. MAGINOT Säään 2# (alsº 4. º ZZX :.. Paris º, N Rºx.I.T. S. 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O C EN /swººp Sºv i- .* *. .*** O *.../ ū-So * •Za Qi' *** * , X 2 gre lyon * •Milan - YUGOSLAVIA. ^ * \| T A LY &TLZTL2, A \ - / | N ) T.Y.FIRAH ENIANZ S.E.A. / 22 S ; NS SARDINIA <2 BALEAR c "N -- *E= A. iSLANDS SS N. & - © EA =/ / N Z N. A / - / / _----------s *ē- sº- º –3. ===T. N E A M —A. 2’--ºff E 3/6 A ~~4.8% TM £ P_-'gºs- º 7tunis A L G E R J A - t *...* ** A F R J C A } NN FR. WOROCCO Casablanca THE MENACE OF THE —%2. ROME-BERLIN AXIS `TS_Teeſ -T , **** -\ FIGURE 13 bounds. In the west, the provinces of Alsace and Lor- raine were restored to France. Within Lorraine lay the iron mines which had been the main support of the great German munitions industry. The Versailles Treaty also detached from Germany the adjoining Saar Valley, a coal producing region. The mines were given outright to France, the region organized as an autonomous dis- trict under the League of Nations, and the whole ar- rangement made subject to a plebiscite after fifteen years. French military strategists strongly desired the an- nexation of all territory up to the Rhine, but were dis- suaded from this course, which would have put several million Germans under French rule. Germany was, however, forbidden to erect fortifications or other mili- tary installations anywhere west of the Rhine or within a broad zone east of that river as well. The peacemakers of 1919 dealt similarly with Ger- many's eastern frontiers. The resurrected Polish state acquired some of the coal and iron producing region inside German's pre-1914 eastern border. A corridor was cut across Prussia to the Baltic. It split East Prus- sia from the Reich, and left Berlin within a hundred * miles of the Polish border. To the south, Czechoslovakia achieved its independ- ence with the long mountain-rimmed salient of Bohemia and Moravia reaching deep into southern Germany. The German-speaking part of the Hapsburg empire be- came the independent republic of Austria and was for- bidden to unite with the German Reich. As in the Rhineland, Germany was prohibited from fortifying a broad zone along its northern, eastern and southern frontiers. The Reich was also denied military airplanes, heavy artillery, tanks, or other offensive weapons. The General Staff was outlawed. Universal military service was abolished, and the Reich was lim- ited to an army of 100,000, enlisted for long terms so as to prevent the building up of a large trained reserve. The aim of these and other restrictions was to keep Germany weak. As a result of boundary changes the Reich lost 65 percent of its iron ore, 45 percent of its coal, and comparable proportions of certain other basic minerals. Every frontier was deliberately made as in- defensible as possible—so that French troops could march swiftly into the industrial Rhineland; so that French and Czech forces could cut off southern Ger- many; so that Polish armies could descend on Berlin, which had become almost a frontier town. 2. HITLER'S OBJECTIVE. This was nothing less than the total destruction of this mutual security system designed to keep Germany permanently in chains. His first step was to rearm Ger- many. In open and successful defiance of the powers, he restored the General Staff, reinstated compulsory military service, and began accumulating raw materials and military equipment prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles. - Step by step Hitler proceeded, at first cautiously, then with increasing boldness. Each act of aggression was so planned as to prepare a geographical route for the next. Each success weakened the geographical as well as the political foundation supporting the iron vise which had held the Reich. Each step destroyed some vital part of the structure until the whole European state system came crashing down in ruins. 3. RETURN OF THE SAAR. In 1935 the plebiscite was held to decide the owner- ship of the Saar District. The preponderantly Ger- man-speaking population, whipped up by Nazi propa- ganda, voted almost unanimously for reunion with the Reich. German manpower was increased by nearly a million, and Hitler acquired the densely built-up manu- facturing centers and coal mines of the Saar valley. But the Saar lay in a vulnerable spot, close to the French border and within the demilitarized zone. This undefended western frontier put Nazi statecraft in a strait-jacket. Without the heavy industry of the Rhine and tributary valleys, Germany could not fight a major war. Without fortification and other military installa- tions in the Rhineland, the Reich could not defend this vital region against invading French armies. The in- exorable logic of military geography, compelled Hitler to look to the remilitarization of the Rhineland before he could take any step involving serious risk of armed conflict with France. 4. REMILITARIZATION OF THE RHINELAND. The opportunity for such a move, at a minimum risk came early in 1936. It was created by the confusion into which Europe had been thrown by Mussolini's con- quest of Ethiopia. In March of that year Hitler sent troops into the demilitarized zone and began work on a system of fortifications. (A diplomatic crisis re- sulted but no effective counter-action.) The democratic powers hesitated, then acquiesced. In doing so they relinquished, without firing a gun, a military advan- tage upon which hinged in no small degree their future ability to restrain Germany without fighting a major W3.I’. The result is shown in figure 12. Remilitarization of the Rhineland meant that French armies could no longer march virtually unopposed into western Ger- many. They could no longer cut off the German armies from their industrial base in the Ruhr. They could no longer advance swiftly across southern Germany to join forces with their Czech Allies. Germany could hence- forth fight a stubborn defensive campaign in the west if necessary to hold off the French army while cutting down the Allies of France in the east. 5. FORMATION OF THE BERLIN-ROME AXIS. The next step in the progressive immobilization of France—and of England as well—was the formation of the Berlin-Rome Axis. It created a diversionary men- ace in the Mediterranean, a region of vital concern both to France and to Great Britain. As indicated in figure 13, Axis pressure in that region might, almost certainly would, prove a deterrent to French and British coun- ter-action against Germany elsewhere in Europe. 6. AXIS INTERVENTION IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR. The dangerous potentialities of this fascist combine were immediately apparent when Hitler and Mussolini began sending “volunteers” to help Franco install a fascist regime in Spain where civil strife had broken out in the summer of 1936. This intervention provided a means of testing Axis military equipment, tactics, and training. As figure 13 makes clear, it also confronted France with the spectre of a land war on two fronts, and Great Britain with the menace of devastating air and land attack on Gibraltar from Spanish territory on either side of the strait. 7. OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA. The deterrent effect of the foregoing aggressions be- gan to be apparent early in 1938 when Hitler made his first major move in central Europe, the occupation of Austria. Such action had been prohibited by the Ver- sailles Treaty for precisely the reasons that the Nazi dictator desired to do it. German troops marched into Vienna unopposed, and Austria was absorbed into the expanding Reich. A diplomatic crisis was precipitated but that was all. Once again the democratic powers hesitated, and then faced an accomplished fact which 51 |*" | cz Echoslov A K1A –(9– BOUNDARY, /9/8 TO MARCH /938, LARGELY FOLLOW/MG 7//E MOUM7A/M R/DGES H — "AMSCHLUSS” OPENS WAY FOR P/WC ER t /MOVA-MA; M7" SMALL ARROWS SHOW POL/SH A/VD // U/VGA Az/A/V /DA’ſ VAS /M// PS Š de sº — O SO ſoo /50 2OO ^, ſº P. O L A N D — *—ºr, 27 TWTWV * TV. T. Z l/All//.4 ("/, %2 ºz. . * ...' 4%. 2. t—a a- * & 22 º * / 2 • * _- ſ ſº tiny 2-2 •, & * Sºſſºw "45 $WſcA32×42.2. // º '''''', 2% 2/N \! ///ZZ º 2 4 // 2. T- 2 – sº S} *N *A . A s M. // ;SS SY % 7%) ſ]\\\ \\ % %3Dº * * I ~ *, * . * ºf .." • e o 'º' * *_2: g * : S Ǻllº S-2, ſ/...I ſ/11]] W///|\\S. º.º. 2, . …........."…º. * , ‘. . . . . . se 1 *\ 7 y º V\ . Sº 2 ! l l Z2, . wº º $22ſ.{ / 2 */ a . w); sº tº Lºn/iºs &nº.3 ºffiºſº ºff. *~ --> * ji". 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Even more important from a military stand- point, occupation of Austria opened for Hitler a door- way into Czechoslovakia, key to the whole security sys- tem of eastern Europe. We have already noted how Czechoslovakia reaches westward into southern Germany. This huge salient comprises the ancient province of Bohemia. It has been likened to a vast saucer surrounded by ranges of wooded hills and mountains. On the north, west, and southwest, Bohemia presents a strong military front. The Western boundary of Czechoslovakia is one of Europe's strongest natural frontiers. The only relatively easy invasion route into Czechoslovakia is by way of the south (fig. 14). Through this gap in the highlands invasion by motorized forces was feasible. With Germany in pos- session of Austria, Hitler had marshalled the forces inherent in geography to bring heavy pressure to bear on Czechoslovakia. backed by armed forces if necessary. 8. DISMEMBERMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Pressure on the Czechoslovak republic began immedi- ately. It took the form of stirring up unrest among the German-speaking inhabitants of the Sudetenland, and of Supporting their inspired demands for autonomy and union with the Reich. The Sudeten people had never lived under the German flag. Their trumped up clamor was a clever pretext to disguise the underlying geomili- tary aim. Hitler's real objective was the acquisition of Czechoslovakia’s northern frontier, a region in which Hamburg O Brem er) - westwall. -* Aſ Dresden • l, Wºl -- }= \lostRY tº ſº ſº & &as: Sandomierz š. - ZINC \\ É' Baou, N --- es Zhitomi ; :"...º. §: . . .'; Žaguée O(\ Paºko NN O ©A.//t0/7/re ºx. \Mannheim fy N Zwow tº e §3. º O àrnberg Przemysl 'N }: "Metº...? •. --- N YN3. FRANCE. North ºë "K. - § - S § AMAG/AVoy | jºš 3 & 4/AVE jº - d •Cernăuţi G.E.R/W A/VY ſ Baltic Stettin • eBerli /7 osen Sºo \ L | T H U A N | A Königsberg PRUSSIA & Q - -- /.g. /S, N A ºf º W º: N.J. * &N Nº N § N W &Mansa NA NS tº NSS Nº. %. sº NRoN NNN | GERMANY ... IN POLAND Wha •Siva/k/ Minsk O //?S Y SOV| ET | UNION FIGURE 15 the Czechs had made the most of strong natural de- fenses to guard the republic's mountain-rimmed west- ern boundary. Once that line of fortresses was gone, Czechoslovakia's resistance would be futile. Despite previous concessions to appease the dictators, and despite the resulting loss of strategical advantages, the situation of the antifascist group was not yet hope- less. Though German forces stood poised at the south- ern border, the Czechoslovak army was well trained, well equipped, mobilized, and ready to fight. In spite of east-European rivalries, almost every country on Germany’s eastern and southern frontiers would have rallied to the defense of Czechoslovakia, for that state occupied the geographical position which blocked Ger- man aggression both east and southeast. Once more, however, the democratic powers gave in without a struggle. At Munich in late September 1938, Britain and French statesmen made another pact with Hitler, and the Nazis made another bloodless conquest. The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia began imme- diately. By successive steps that country was broken up and absorbed into the Reich. The long western salient was thus eliminated. In its place Hitler ac- quired in the province of Slovakia his own deep salient reaching eastward almost to the boundary of the Soviet Union. With it went coal and iron mines, factories, munitions centers, in fact the most highly industrialized region of south central Europe. German occupation of Czechoslovakia radically altered the military map of eastern Europe. It placed Nazi troops all along the northern border of Hungary and southern boundary of Poland. The Polish state, sprawled over the east European plain, had notoriously weak frontiers. In the summer of 1939, after Hitler's occupation of Czechoslovakia, Poland faced Germany along a vast and indefensible arc reaching from East Prussia to the apex of the long Slovakian salient. The destruction of Czechoslovakia thus prepared the way for German assault on Poland, next on the Nazi agenda of aggression, and shattered beyond repair the geograph- ical framework of the east-European front which France had forged at such great pains and expense after the first World War. - 9. NAZI-SovieT NONAGGRESSION PACT. Destruction of Czech military power and loss of the Bohemian salient threw Poland and the west-European powers back upon the Soviet Union. Russia alone FIGURE 16 54 Airection of Mazſ drives westān Porspººr. f y < F. Drives after > **= ENG LAND sº \ Cº-F--- \ Londôn | ºSN g .0 2S3 O 20 40 60 80 /OO ºf 4% O Antwerk N ALBE Frá *A Southampton Dovereſtſ ". $.” sº Colo - **ſºzººi...º GAE A*/MA M º * & £asis º: EMABLS’ §achen N. WESTWALL 2°lf ge wº T- S -- ne N O 4. -o Al © 3rſ.” —A Q. c. sº A/ - N SAbbeville A. anº Diepp ~ $8 WS P Q gºt /*Y*Seº *geRMANY (2) w u- sº y ºſſº"- Mažºſs Verdun K&A/w As - X. A ū º Sº 45 Cº * \Ly F º 1a Rochelle Ayon FIGURE 17 could give effective aid when Hitler struck at Poland. But neither that state nor the Atlantic powers were able to come to terms with Stalin during the fateful summer of 1939. In August, while they procrasti- nated, Hitler stole another march with his surprise announcement that he and Stalin had concluded a non- aggression pact. Polish independence was doomed. For Hitler that pact was another bloodless triumph, assuring Soviet inaction while Germany overran Po- land and then turned west to strike down the Military power of France, before the final reckoning with the Soviet Union. 10. CONQUEST OF POLAND. The Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact galvanized the democratic powers into action. Britain and France, awake at last to the rapidly growing menace in central and eastern Europe, encouraged Poland to make a stand, and met the German assault on that country with declaration of war on the Reich. Unhappily, there was little that the Anglo-French combine could do at the moment. Hitler now reaped the fruits of his earlier aggressions. Germany's strongly fortified West Wall blocked Allied occupation of the Industrial Ruhr. The Czechoslovak army had ceased to exist. The Soviet Union was at least temporarily immobilized. The lightning conquest of Poland, carried out in Sep- tember 1939, together with the German truce with the U. S. S. R., momentarily gave Hitler a secure eastern frontier. He could now turn westward against the Ilow Countries and France. But first he took the pre- II. 1. ENGLAND AFTER THE FALL OF FRANCE. Conquest of France placed the Wehrmacht in position to attack and invade the British Isles. German arms commanded the European coastline from Spain to the North Cape. German submarines now possessed bases fronting directly upon the Atlantic, so situated as to dominate the main sea approaches to Great Britain. The Luftwaffe's planes stood poised for attack along a thousand-mile arc reaching from southern Norway to the Britanny peninsula. Only the English Channel, scarcely more than twenty miles wide at Dover, sep- arated Britain from the invasion army massing in northern France. To meet the threat, England had only the exhausted remnants of the army evacuated from Dunkirk, an caution of safeguarding Germany's exposed northern flank and the supply line which brought high-grade iron ore from Sweden to feed the war industries of the Reich. 11. OCCUPATION OF DENMARK AND NOR- WAY. The occupation of Denmark and the Swift conquest of Norway, carried out in the early spring of 1940, fur- ther strengthened the military position of Germany. It gave Hitler enough leverage on Sweden to insure the safe delivery of Swedish iron ore via the Norwegian port of Narvik and thence south through Norwegian coastal waters. Occupation of Norway also gave Ger- many additional gateways to the Atlantic. These were immediately useful for stepping up blockade running and the campaign against British shipping in the At- lantic. Later, Hitler was to use Norwegian ports and flying fields with still more deadly effect in making Savage attacks on British and American convoys bound for the Arctic ports of the Soviet Union. 12. CONQUEST OF THE LOW COUNTRIES AND FRANCE. By May 1940 the stage was set for Hitler's grand assault on western Europe. Much of what had gone before was preparatory for this great offensive. Hitler had broken up the French block in eastern Europe. He had taken the necessary steps to protect his southern and northern flanks. His truce with Stalin temporarily assured an inactive Russia. The German armies could now be massed in the west to deliver a smashing blow army which had left all its tanks and heavy equipment in France. The British Navy had suffered heavy losses in carrying out the evacuation and in the simultaneous withdrawal of the last British troops from northern Norway. The Royal Air Force had likewise suffered, and possessed all too few planes for the supreme test that now lay ahead. - Twentieth-century developments in military technol- ogy heightened England's peril at this critical juncture. Sea power alone could no longer defend the British Isles as in the past. Without mastery of the air, Brit- ish battleships and other surface craft could not even operate in the narrow waters separating England from the mainland. With submarines and bombing planes, an enemy in possession of the nearby Continent could at France and the Low Countries. Figure 17 indicates the main features of the German drive for Holland, Belgium, and France. Within five days The Nether- lands were driven from the struggle, and resistance collapsed in 19 days. Meanwhile, the drive appeared to be following the 1914 invasion route into northern France, but this was only a diversion to conceal a smash- ing Surprise attack in great force through Luxembourg and the broken Ardennes district. It struck with shat- tering impact at the northern hinge of the Maginot Line near Sedan. Breaking through the French defenses, the German vanguard raced across northern France to Abbeville on the Channel coast. The Allied armies were split apart, their communica- tions disrupted. Most of the forces to the north of the German salient escaped to England through the port of Dunkirk. Those to the south were swiftly encircled, cut off, and captured, as Paris fell and France went down to defeat and total disaster. A bare 6 weeks of blitzkrieg sufficed to destroy French resistance. The fall of France ended the first phase of the second World War. Hitler had wrecked the European state system. Each step in the amazing sequence of aggressions, beginning with the remilitarization of the Rhineland back in 1936, was the logical consequence of steps previously taken. Each opened a path for the next in the sequence. The geographical logic of this process was inexorable. Down to the summer of 1940 it unfolded without a blunder in conception and with scarcely a hitch in execution. * HITLERS ASSAULT ON THE BRITISH ISLES do serious, possibly fatal, injury to England before ever landing a soldier upon British soil. .. The defense of Great Britain in 1940 thus turned on air power as well as sea power. If the numerically stronger Luftwaffe could knock out the Royal Air Force, England's plight would become desperate. Without aerial cover the British Navy would be sunk or driven from the Channel and North Sea. German armies under their own aerial umbrella could stream across these narrow waters, force a landing upon the British coast, and strike inland to encircle and cut off the defending armies, just as they had done repeatedly in the Battle of France. But the Luftwaffe had first to win mastery of the air. As long as the RAF ruled the sky over England and 56 | THE INVASION COAST 2% 2^ a º º (3) sº"/rondheim o |- m m lº Fººt } SHETLA 4. W <- Axis sea lane through the A/ed b/ockade - <= Axis attempts to cut the Murmansk supply line TI (9) /Wazi nava/ basés before the fall of Prance Túpe of the ford coast (3) #e found % Worway H Dune coast, along most of (5) the Dutch & Belgian shores — aſso along most of the west coast of Denmark & the – Biscay coast of France Typical German northern Dutch, drid southern tianish coastlines (C) (5) Steep cliffs, topped by plateaus (E) Steep, indented cliffs, rolling country. ETLANDSZ2 - * -\ Lewis 9. -- * º & " O RK N EYs (A) §eºgen sº North ($ \º -> Stavanger 2-Jºliverpoo/ > Y&Bristo/ W -E. Y Q ENGLAN&D Q AA/LES Š O 9 × < 2OO Hambur AA/4. Es Bremen gé cº- O 50 WOO 2OO - § & O Æ ngſ7sh Channe/ 4 Magdeburg |-> & *Frankfºrt RS C. —st —N — RS st |- NF.X “X” feet A.A.A/GTA/ —/000 Im 25 o The Cherbourg area O f Mile AVorth — Jºe a nnel Aſternating C/ff/3. sandy FIGURE 18 the Surrounding coastal waters, no army could force a landing upon the shores of Great Britain. 2. THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN. From early August to the end of October 1940 the Luftwaffe battered at the aerial defenses of England— and failed. During that period 2,375 German planes were shot down over England at a cost of less than 800 British fighters, and the RAF still ruled the sky over the British Isles. Failing to knock out the RAF and thus open the road for invasion of England, the German High Command switched to strategic bombing, in an attempt to break British resistance by air power alone. A terrific aerial blitz was directed against London, de- signed apparently to shatter the morale of the nation. When continued daylight raiding proved too costly, the Luftwaffe shifted to night operations which culminated in the terrible fire raids of the winter and spring of 1941. The air blitz caused enormous damage. Ports were Smashed; factories were burned; production disrupted; communications repeatedly paralyzed. The rain of bombs continued throughout the spring. But time was running short. Hitler's timetable called for a smashing surprise blow at the Soviet Union as soon as the ground was dry in eastern Europe. Accordingly the Luftwaffe was shifted to the east in May in preparation for the coming offensive. But England still stood, damaged but defiant and undefeated. Hitler had suffered his first major defeat, a defeat so serious as to affect the outcome of every ensuing campaign. 3. CONSEQUENCES OF THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN. Conquest and occupation of the British Isles would have clinched Hitler's hold on western Europe. No re- invasion of Europe was conceivable without an oper- ating base adequate for this purpose. The fall of Eng- land would have ended also the blockade of Axis Europe. Even if the British government had moved to Canada and tried to continue the struggle from North America, the key geographical position covering the Sea ap- proaches to northern Europe would have been lost. With Germany in possession of the British Isles, nothing could have kept German shipping off the high seas. Conquest of Britain would have had shattering reper- cussions in the Mediterranean theater. With a Secure Atlantic frontier, Hitler could have shifted large forces to the Mediterranean and Middle East. The thin line of 57 612655°–44–5 British defenses in that region could in all probability have been overwhelmed, opening a road to the oilfields of Iraq and Iran, and to the borderlands of the Indian Ocean. Lastly Britain's collapse would have placed in German hands the industrial and labor resources of the British Isles. That increment might conceivably have been sufficient to carry the Wehrmacht to victory over the Soviet Union. In any case, German occupation of the British Isles would have isolated the U. S. S. R. It would have placed German air and sea power in position to cut the north Atlantic supply line to Murmansk and Archangel. An accompanying collapse in the Middle East would have blocked the alternative route via the Persian Gulf. Whether the Soviet Union alone could have withstood the German onslaught no one can say. But no one can deny that the flow of food, raw materials, and equip- ment made possible by Allied control of the eastern Atlantic, has been a vital factor in hastening the Ger- man debacle in Russia. Hitler's failure to conquer Britain produced other results just as decisive. England undefeated presented a terrific threat to Germany's rear. The British Isles constitute a formidable military base as near to the heart of Axis Europe as is Long Island to that of North America. London was the capital of a world empire with immense if scattered military resources. British sea and air power blocked Nazi expansion overseas. From England was to come much of the inspiration which kept alive the spark of revolt in occupied Europe. From England was to come the great bombing offensive, compared with which the Luftwaffe's efforts pale into insignificance. From England sped the nerve impulses which drew ever tighter the sea and air blockade of Axis Europe. Into England were to pour the reinforce- ments which one day would batter down the western bastions of Hitler's European Fortress. These were the stakes for which Hitler played in the Battle of Britain. These are some of the reasons why the Luftwaffe's defeat in the skies over England will go down to posterity as a major Axis disaster and one which affected the future course of the second World War. III. HITLERS ASSAULT ON THE DESERT BARRIER The Mediterranean-desert zone did not become an active theater of war until the summer of 1940. Prior to the fall of France, Hitler held no military position on or near the Mediterranean coastline. Mussolini watched prudently from the sidelines. Franco desired nothing so much as a breathing space for war-torn Spain. The east Mediterranean countries clung to a precarious neutrality. The Anglo-French coalition oc- cupied most of the key positions and held the initiative at all points. Allied shipping moved back and forth through the Mediterranean unmolested. - The collapse of France changed all this. Assuming that England would go the way of France, Mussolini hastily entered the war to be in at the kill. Except for the followers of General DeGaulle, French armed forces either ceased to exist or passed under the Axis-spon- sored Vichy régime. The south shore of the Mediter- ranean became actually or potentially hostile soil from Morocco to the Egyptian border. Having seized the initiative in the Mediterranean Theater, Germany held it almost continuously for over two years, while Hitler and Mussolini blasted a road through the Balkans and hurled their legions at the British and Allied desert defenses which barred the way to the Middle East and points beyond. 1. MARE NosTRUM-ITALIAN AIMS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. Mussolini and his fellow Fascists dreamed of building a new Roman empire around the shoreline of the Medi- terranean. It was to be Mussolini's crowning achieve- ment. By 1939 Italy had already made an ambitious beginning. Her flag waved over Albania, Libya, the Dodecanese Islands, Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, and Ethiopia, a land area ten times the size of the Italian peninsula, Sardinia, and Sicily combined. One fatal defect of Mussolini's position was Italy's inherent military weakness (see chapter IV). If his grandiose dreams, looking to the acquisition of French North Africa, Corsica, and Savoy as items in the vast plan for dominance of the Mediterranean area were to be realized, Italy would have to have a helping hand. On that basis the partnership with Hitler seemed wholly logical, provided always that it remained a partner- ship of equals. As events were to prove, Italy was doomed shortly to become a mere German satellite. 2. NAZIAIMS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST. German imperialists have long nursed large ambi- tions in and beyond the Mediterranean area. Before the first World War, Kaiser Wilhelm II intrigued and maneuvered without much success to obtain a foothold in Morocco in order to pry France loose from North Africa, and Great Britain from Gibraltar. pushed the building of a German-owned railroad from Berlin to Bagdad, and thence to the Persian Gulf. War in 1914 interrupted this project which, if completed, would have given Germany a corridor to the Indian He also Ocean, and a strategical position flanking the Mediter- ranean-Suez lifeline of the British empire. Hitler has followed in the Kaiser's footsteps. By helping to put Franco in power in Spain, he won a po- tential foothold menacing Gibraltar. His partnership with Mussolini promised access to strategical points commanding the central narrows of the Mediterranean. The Balkans, Egypt, Turkey, and the farther Middle Eastern countries were all subjected to propaganda and other pressures designed to promote German influence throughout this region. The fall of France and Mus- solini's entry into the war opened North Africa to the Nazis and cleared the way for direct assault on the British-held corridors to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. 3. MEDITERRANEAN BATTLEGROUND. Geography set the pattern of Axis attack on the desert barrier. The Mediterranean is virtually an inland sea. The Strait of Gibraltar narrows to eight miles; the Dardanelles to less than one mile; the Suez Canal to some two hundred feet. The inland sea reaches more than 2,000 miles into the heart of the so-called World Island. It connects with the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to form the only shipway through the desert barrier which separates the European world from the Indian Ocean borderlands and the Far East. The Mediterranean is extremely irregular in shape, especially on the European side. The Italian peninsula and its geographical appendage, the island of Sicily, 58 divides the sea into two great basins connected by the islands of Corsica and Sardina. In the eastern basin the Greek peninsula and its extension, the island of Crete, reach to within 175 miles of Africa. These peninsulas, islands, and narrow waterways pro- vide natural invasion routes around and across the Mediterranean. Armies have marched around the east- ern and western ends of this inland sea from time im- memorial. The Aegean Sea is filled with historic island “stepping stones” between Greece and Asia Minor. Armies have crossed and recrossed the central narrows between Sicily and Cape Bon since before the days of the Punic Wars. And in prehistoric days the Minoans of Crete sailed north to seize the Peloponnesus. All these routes have entered into the strategy of today's war. At one time or another Axis armies have threat- ened a crossing at every one of these points. 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Yº Yºkºirouan 7 S==º: • * & Y STATEs. 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ontº **(*# Mºgº. E. R | Yºjºſ” 42 zº Poorººts: 3. º, \!' . . . . 2, . . . . . . . . . ſº ſ -” - s WN º * w $ ! ! . . * e efru ... • 2%. , º ... " \\\!! jº . ." *S ... ſ !) }, \ º Pºp ga - 4 º'erra, € a /? Jea - /", " ... • * Z, . . l/2 - 4. M...ſºfº.º. n3. v Haifa j. 2. Nº.: 37 eyodor § •4%rråkéch 3. sy 6% Nº. ſoggouré's...}|^* º: Q per ** arº, a & & * Sº;: Äg. §º ºGolºmb Bechar... . .” [...} : \ſ. . . . . fi,' ... } N sº §§ Y. .." . . Q- jº. º . . . . . . . ; “ſ jº.1%alensk. Fºl'. Exfººl.' Nºs º Sº º s * * I • e - * ... ." - e * - - * ~ : º 2%| |† featiº - |É . . . . . . . . . . ; & -ºšE 3:. . . — * . Tº...!, | . . . . . . . . | -- | • | | | | .. FROM ZAKE CAAD :A:l ..]” 'J'. . ; *Giró: §. T-I : * * 4 ‘ſ - - CE ||| • U QATTARA. YUGOSLAVIA #Depressio E.N . . . ; KEY Rome & B ... . . . . . . . . . . 4- Allied drives | . . . | B G Y PT . . . . . . º . . i --- – Projected ... º O . . . . . ' ' , " . . . . . 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In Libya and Egypt the desert thrusts northward to the water's edge, except for the narrow irrigated valley of the Nile. - This waterless expanse of barren rocks, shifting dunes, burning Sunshine, chill nights, and pervading sand is the battleground over which the armies marched and counter-marched during two years of struggle for the Suez corridor to the Indian Ocean. Its predominant feature consists of wide open spaces in which motorized *gºriº . . . . . . .\sonaALILAND . s tº St. . . * . . . . . . $ g equipment can maneuver freely, often without regard for roads. In such sectors operations assumed many of the characteristics of war at sea. The dessert battle- field was frequently described as a tactician's paradise. On the other hand, war in the Western Desert (the name commonly used to designate the area west of the Nile) involved stupendous problems of maintenance and supply. There were almost no natural defense lines. The combat area was immense, the distance from the main Axis base at Tripoli to the Allied headquarters in Cairo being approximately 1,000 miles. The battle- field contained nothing, not even water. Everything had to be transported hundreds of miles, chiefly by motor truck. The pervasive sand ruined motors and other machinery, creating maintenance and repair prob- lems never previously encountered. Despite these and many other difficulties the Western Desert became the principal battlefield in the struggle for Egypt and the Middle East. Yet it was not the only line of Axis approach to this critically important region. led down through the mountain valleys of the Balkan peninsula. One branch of this route turns south through Greece and leaps the water gap to the island of Crete. Another branch, the line of the historic Ber- lin-to-Bagdad railway project, runs through Bulgaria to the gates of Istanbul on the shore of the Bosporus. From these menacing springboards Axis armies re- peatedly threatened a thrust through or around Turkey into Syria, and thence south to Suez or east to the Per- sian Gulf. A third route to the Middle East, which is more fully described below in connection with the Ger- man attack on Russia, runs across the Ukraine to the lower Volga, with a branch turning Southeast around the head of the Black Sea through the Caucasus to the shore of the Caspian Sea. 4. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE DESERT BAR- RIER. *. The Axis struck first at the back door of Suez. In July 1940 Italian forces from Ethiopia crossed into Kenya and the Sudan, threatening the upper Nile, and hence the water-supply of all Egypt. Italian units also forced their way into British Somaliland on the Gulf of Aden, increasing the pressure on the back door of Suez. Both threats were met in time, and within a few months all Italian forces in east Africa had been cap- tured or dispersed. A second route from the heart of Axis Europe More serious was Marshal Graziani's advance across the desert from Tripoli, in September 1940. His offen- sive got as far as Sidi Barrani, well inside the Egyp- tion border. There, while awaiting reinforcements, the Italians were routed by a surprise attack early in December. The British pursued the fleeing remnants of Graziani's army as far as El Agheila, halfway to Tripoli. But the victory was inconclusive. The Axis still held Tripoli, their main African base at the end of a heavily guarded supply line reaching across the central Mediterranean from Italy. The desert, and not Italian arms, denied Britain the full fruits of victory. In the meantime a new danger was looming up in the eastern Mediterranean. Rumania, Hungary, and Bul- garia were forced into the Axis orbit. In October 1940, Mussolini attacked Greece through Albania. The Greeks fought back with great bravery and initial suc- cess. But in the spring of 1941, the German Wehr- macht roared down through the Balkans. Yugoslavia and Greece were cut down within a fortnight. British forces sent to the rescue were beaten back to the coast, then to the island of Crete, and driven from there be- fore the end of May. - - These Axis victories put the Luftwaffe within bomb- ing range both of the Suez Canal and of the east-Medi- terranean oil ports through which flowed the fuel for British forces defending Egypt. Likewise they put Hitler in position to apply pressure to Turkey, which for the time being entered into agreements with Ger- many, which temporarily nullified its existing alliance with Great Britain. A German fifth column in the neighboring Arab state of Iraq started a revolt which the British had to put down by force. In May, during the battle for Crete, German planes actually landed in Syria, compelling British and Free-French forces to occupy that strategically located Vichy-ruled depend- ency to keep it from falling completely into German hands. In August, Britain and the Soviet Union, brought together by Hitler's attack on the U. S. S. R., had to intervene in Iran to counteract the influence of a well-organized Nazi movement in that country, impor- tant both as a source of oil and as an ocean doorway for the U. S. S. R. Meanwhile the Axis was preparing another blow at Suez from the west. Strong formations of the Luft- waffe were transferred to the Mediterranean early in 1941. Operating from southern Italy and the island of Graziani's Italians. Sicily, German dive bombers barred the central narrows to Allied shipping and opened a passageway for Axis convoys to Tripoli and to Libyan ports farther east. Thus was built up Marshal Rommel's famous Afrika Korps which struck eastward toward Egypt in March 1941. British desert forces, depleted in order to send help to Greece, were driven back again. This time they held on to the desert port of Tobruk, which remained an island of resistance in Rommel’s rear, while the main body of British troops retreated into Egypt. But once more the enemy had outrun his supply, necessitating an- other period of inaction while Rommel awaited reen- forcements and material. Rommel's presence at Halfaya Pass, Axis occupa- tion of the Balkans and Crete, the German drive into Russia, and the constant danger of a thrust through Turkey, all added up to a major threat to the Allied position in Egypt and in the Middle East. The Suez Canal, the one shipway through the great desert barrier, Was menaced from two directions. To lessen this menace the British High Command undertook another counterstroke in the Western Desert. Fighting against Rommel's veterans, the British reached El Agheila only after weeks of costly fighting. But their victory was even less conclusive than the earlier victory over Rommel's troops were never routed, and his counter-attacks presently forced the British back to the vicinity of Tobruk late in January 1942, at the moment when Japan's amphibious armies were carrying everything before them in the south- western Pacific. The following May, Rommel launched a third major offensive against the defenders of the Suez Canal. Out- maneuvered and badly defeated, the British were driven back to El Alamein. There the Qattara Depression, a virtually impassable no-man's land of eroded rocks and gulleys, thrusts northward to within forty miles of the coast. Along this forty-mile front, less than 200 miles from the Canal, the British dug in, and the Axis troops, weary and again short of supplies, paused to await reenforcements. Only a fraction of what Rommel pleaded for was actually sent. Only part of what was sent ever arrived. British submarines and bombers accounted for a large proportion. By the summer of 1942, when the danger of a break-through to the Suez seemed most grave, the balance of forces was gradually but inexorably shifting 60 on all the fighting fronts. The aerial bombardment of Germany, the unceasing drain of men and munitions to the Russian front, the steady growth of Allied air power in the eastern Mediterranean, and the mounting volume of American munitions and supplies were felt in the Western Desert. When Rommel finally attacked, and failed to crack the Alamein line in August, the crisis was safely past. The strategical initiative in North Africa had finally passed to the Allies. 5. RESULTS OF HITLER'S FAILURE TO BREACH THE DESERT BARRIER. The Axis played for high stakes in the eastern Medi- terranean. The United Nations could suffer temporary loss of the use of their Mediterranean life line, and still IV. The timing of Hitler's massive assault on the Soviet Union is one of the war's unsolved riddles. To muster the air strength necessary for this colossal effort, the bombing campaign against the British Isles had to be suspended, with fateful consequences already noted in a previous section. We have also seen how the insati- able demands of the Russian campaign were to prevent sending into the Mediterranean sufficient forces to blast open a road to the Middle East and Indian Ocean. In June 1941, Hitler had still to win the geographical posi- tions necessary to protect his rear and his Southern flank from devastating counterattacks; the position necessary to insure sufficient oil supplies for a long- drawn-out struggle in the U. S. S. R.; and the positions necessary to block the flow of military equipment and other war material from Britain and America into the Soviet Union. 1. LIVING SPACE FOR THE THIRD REICH. If mystery shrouds the timing of Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, the event itself translated into action the supreme declared objective of Nazi aggression. German imperialists have long yearned for the limitless spaces and vast resources lying to the east. Following Germany's defeat in the first World War, they derived no little inspiration from the writings of Sir Halford Mackinder, dean of British geographers. In 1919, Mackinder emphatically warned his countrymen that they had won the war but could still lose the peace. If carry on—albeit with difficulty—by air transport across central Africa and the long sea route around the Cape of Good Hope. But an Axis break-through to the Indian Ocean would have split the anti-Axis coalition asunder. It would have opened to Germany the oilfields of the Middle East and the raw materials of the Indian Ocean borderlands. The southern supply route to Russia would have been sealed. India would have fallen. China would have been totally isolated. Japan would have gained access to the desperately needed products of Europe's industries and to wanted raw materials. The strategical unity of the United Nations would have been shattered; the two isolated halves of the Axis would have been joined together. Despite the high stakes involved, the Axis effort in THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HEARTLAND the scientific talent, discipline, and organizing genius that were outstanding German characteristics should be harnessed with the manpower and material resources of Russia, German leadership might yet forge a mili- tary machine with which to conquer and rule the world. Mackinder's warning, set forth in his book, Demo- cratic Ideals and Reality, passed virtually unnoticed within the victorious countries. In defeated Germany, however, his ideas were avidly studied and discussed and became the guiding principles of the Institut für Geopolitik which set out in the early 1920's to fashion a new imperial strategy for the German Reich. One promoter of this movement was General Karl Haushofer whose name has become synonymous with Geopolitik. Haushofer ignored no part of the globe, but he devoted most attention to the Heartland, the name which Mackinder had given to the vast interior of Eurasia. There, according to Haushofer and his disciples, lay the Lebensraum (living space) for the greater Germany of the future. Haushofer doubted Germany's ability to wrest the Heartland from the Soviet Union by force. But he had great confidence in German ability to achieve the same end by subtler means. He looked forward to a partnership in which Germany, the senior partner, would increasingly direct the economic growth and political destiny of the Soviet Union. Haushofer is said to have exercised considerable in- fluence over Hitler's thinking. Many of his geopoliti- the Western Desert never attained the proportions of other major campaigns. It never approached the di- mensions of the attack on France or the full scale action on the Russian front. The difficulty of supplying large forces in the desert unquestionably limited the scale of operations. The Allied forces further had the very real advantage of abundant fuel brought by pipe-line to the east shore of the Mediterranean. But in most other respects, the Axis had the stronger position. When all is said and done, the fact remains that Hitler sent inadequate forces and matériel for the job—and failed. The result was disaster for the Axis, a disaster as costly in the end perhaps as Hitler's failure to con- quer Britain in the autumn of 1940, or to bomb Britain out of the war in the winter of 1940–41. cal ideas, especially the doctrine of living space to the east, were early woven into the creed of the Nazi Party. But Hitler's own utterances took on a violence largely absent from the less passionate writings of the geo- political theorist. It was generally believed in Europe and America that Nazi aggressions in central Europe were preparing the way for an early showdown with the Soviet Union. - Hitler's nonaggression pact with Russia on the eve of war in 1939 seemed for a brief time to constitute an about-face. A stunned world interpreted the pact as an alliance among the dictators to divide eastern Eu- rope. Haushofer is said to have hailed the pact as a victory for his own program of bloodless penetration of the Heartland. But that fateful pact was neither of these things. The Nazis had discovered, if the rest of the world had not, that the time had passed when any outsider could dictate the destiny of the Soviet Union, yet they had to defeat the Red Army and have access to the resources of the Heartland as well as a secure eastern frontier, before they dared embark upon larger ventures overseas. Thus Hitler had either to destroy the Red Army or abandon his whole strategy of world conquest. But he dared not attack Russia, with the combined military strength of France and Great Britain poised ready to strike at his rear. The pact with the Soviet Union gave Germany time to conquer western Europe before undertaking the greater task in the east. 61 A/OA-7A/ | THE RUSSIAN BATTLEGROUND A ſºſ ſº /M//es º º O /OO 200 500 | sº - ‘PLATINUMA ~s £º COAL ALUMINUMA #S. Trondheim * %. SHROMEcole (ºf * . ‘w / $% ZINC $ºrsy º -\ | S$ || - Ol L PLAIN!!Mºšwº = \º- º .* %º \ & |RON S-TNICKEL tº: ... " •" NICKEL / ào, , § ſº • - gºtº S ºf . Yºğº O_V | E cold - S º MAGNESIUM gºſs º % 73/in |Waleø PHOSPHATES - 32 gº, ºn g INDUSTRY ZINC # / ſ INDUSTRY Gorkſ § ſ | WHEAT-21ſºpusTRY OIL COPPER /% & | Ş. PHOSPHATES ZINC-T-2. *A* C Nºbuºrrº!º . T tºgre Mosco - ºrs_ſ ºSººſ ſº - #2,” Sºº } º fº § 77 §§§ ºº NDusrky INDIſ fºr tº Nº. NOV.5, 1943 \ INDUSTRY TIMBER - BATTLE LINE - es# IRONºjjīy 2. 343 QIl-49 º: &=SR::gººd ~%$ºl. #!ºrk.º.) Tºñº, ~~s Tºger coat Sº...”iwoº, Lſ N E OF PARTHEST — Raſ/ways CO - A NAZI ADVANCE — Main Aghways - W ROSPN ckostov (94/1942 º — 0///pe/neſ. º - Jºe? Y A º <= Mázſ driver /24/ |...... *. 2. ($3.9NXS -cs (m. Wazi drives /940 'ix.a. § * * * Nſ, Tºº Makhachkº { Szinc-te: Nºe 3/s ( Mºz/ drier ſfSta/in- Poest NDUSTRY § -ā- grad had fa/en OeSC/ Ol §§s ---— Battle-line June/9% º-ºr- 2’ſ 27Bakā N //ne J/ /2, /943 ZINC . . . . . COTTON N] -----. Aſne /6/5, /943 \l — /ºrthest Mázi adv- amce, /942 feºjºa. £- \ Sº ZX-T S. as sº K - T-r- ===ſ*V ~ * } Moxºp=NUM2 ‘ºsºft %. º Y, 143-A N - T U R K E Y' & * FIGURE 20 2. RUSSIAN BATTLEGROUND. Western Russia was a battlefield to test the strength and endurance of even the German Wehrmacht. At the 1941 frontier the main battle front was over 500 miles long. Because of the wedgelike shape of European Russia, this front increased with every mile of advance eastward. By the end of the summer, Axis armies were deployed across the Continent from the Arctic shore of Finland to the Black Sea. The combat zone was fully 2,000 miles long, a factor increasingly in Russia's favor as the vastly greater reserves of the Red Army gradually became available for front line service. The battlefield was also one of immense depth. Moscow is over 500 miles from the 1941 frontier. The industrial heart of the Soviet Union lies still farther to the east. When the invaders stood before the gates of the Soviet capital, they had conquered an area comparable in size to that part of the United States which lies east of the Mississippi River. Except along the southern margin of the Crimea, this gigantic battlefield is a continuous plain. In the south it is a virtually treeless steppe, well watered in the west, progressively arid towards the east. That part lying north of the Black Sea is known as the Ukraine, a region agriculturally, and to some extent physically, comparable to the North American prairie. Farther north the west Russian country is more roll- ing and grows progressively more wooded. The area between Warsaw and Moscow bears considerable re- semblance to parts of Ohio and Indiana. Still farther north lies a heavily forested belt, broken by thousands of lakes and clearings, a country not unlike northern Michigan and Wisconsin 50 years ago. Several large rivers flow across the west Russian plain—northwest to the Baltic; southeast to the Black and Caspian Seas. These rivers, especially the great Dnieper, have more than ordinary military value in a country possessing few other natural defense lines. In the main, owing to the land's geological structure, the west banks of these west-Russian rivers are higher than the east banks. Hence they afford more protection, and constitute less of a military obstacle to an army facing east than to one facing west, a factor in Germany’s favor at every stage of the struggle inside Russia. Almost nowhere in western Russia is there sufficient slope to afford rapid surface drainage. Immense areas have scarcely any drainage at all. As a result there are many swamps and marshes, some of them covering hundreds of square miles. The most famous of these, the Pripet Marshes, east of Brest-Litovsk, is a geo- graphical feature of great military importance. It sharply restricts the choice of invasion routes into west- ern Russia, and throughout its great depth makes vir- tually impossible the maintenance of a continuous fight- ing front along the line of the old Polish frontier. The Pripet Marshes and the wooded and marshy plains farther to the northeast provide abundant ground cover. The Red Army and Soviet guerrilla bands have made skillful use of this terrain. German commanders have repeatedly complained of the diffi- culty of mopping up in this wooded country, and of the incessant forays of guerrillas from the woods and Swamps on the flanks and in the rear of the invading armies. Y. * Western Russia has few improved highways. In wet weather, especially after the spring break-up and dur- ing the autumn rains, dirt roads become all but impass- able. Mud is king for weeks at a stretch. Large areas in the Ukraine may become completely flooded. Dur- ing such periods the railways provide the only means of moving large bodies of troops and the huge quan- tities of matériel consumed by modern armies. In dry weather, however, most of western Russia, especially the treeless southern Ukraine, constitutes an ideal battlefield for deploying huge armies in a war of rapid movement. The terrain is such that an army dislodged from one defensive position may have to re- treat as much as a hundred miles before reaching an- other. But in this country of vast space there is room to retreat, to retreat again, and still again. This factor of space accounts in no small degree for the Red Army's astounding ability to absorb the shock of the German blitzkrieg and escape the fate of the encircled Allied armies in the low Countries and France. 3. BLITZKRIEG IN THE EAST. The physiography of the battlefield as well as the training and doctrine of the Wehrmacht dictated the German plan of campaign. The Red Army must be given no chance to escape into the limitless space of the Russian plain. The initial blow must be decisive. The campaign once begun must proceed continuously and at a terrific speed. One battle must flow into the next. The enemy must be allowed no pause in which to re- group or withdraw his shattered armies. The battle of the frontier, in short, was to decide the whole cam- paign. of great mobility and tremendous striking power. All things considered, this plan offered more promise than any other. Hitler, it will be remembered, was turning his back on an undefeated England. Beyond England stood the United States ominously converting its huge industrial system into a gigantic arsenal. The contributions of the British Dominions were likewise mounting rapidly. For Germany to attack Russia at all in 1941 was a colossal gamble. To be sure of success, Hitler had to win a swift and conclusive victory. He , had to annihilate the Red Army in one lightning cam- paign—or risk a long war of attrition and ultimate disaster. For this fateful gamble, his generals massed armies In- cluding Finnish, Hungarian, and Rumanian units, fully 3,000,000 troops were assembled for the initial blow. At least twenty panzer divisions spearheaded the great offensive. Virtually the whole first-line strength of the Luftwaffe was thrown into the superblitz. But so long was the fighting front, and so vast the battlefield, that the concentration of troops and fire-power fell con- siderably below that achieved in previous campaigns. Six army groups began the great offensive. A mixed force of Finns and Germans launched a series of attacks in a vain attempt to cut off the Arctic ports of Mur- mansk and Archangel. Another Finnish army ad- vanced on Leningrad across the Karelian isthmus. One group of German armies struck northwest from East Prussia toward Leningrad following the Baltic rail- ways through Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The central and main spearhead drove eastward just north of the Pripet Marshes in the direction of Moscow. An- other group advanced southeast toward Kiev. Still farther south, Hungarian and Rumanian forces attacked through Galicia and Besserabia. (See fig. 20.) All Summer long and on into the autumn these Axis armies battered their way forward. A tremendous but inconclusive battle was fought in eastern Poland; another near Smolensk, still another in the suburbs of Leningrad. Armored forces raced across the flat Ukraine and on into the Donets Basin, penetrating as far as Rostov, gateway to the oil-bearing Caucasus. But time was running out. The battle of the frontier had failed to annihilate the Red Army. Large Russian detachments had been cut off; many thousands of prisoners had been taken; but the main body had re- peatedly eluded the encircling army of the German pioneers. Late in November the German central 63 armies made a last supreme effort to take Moscow before winter. They drove deep into the Soviet defenses north and south of the partly surrounded capital. At one point the German vanguard almost reached the suburbs. But there the blitzkrieg ground to a halt. During the first week of December the onset of a savage winter, coupled with German exhaustion and a totally unex- pected Russian counterstroke, sent the invaders reeling back all along the front from Leningrad to Rostov. Once again Hitler had played for high stakes—and failed. The Wehrmacht, it is true, had overrun an im- mense area. This included the grain-growing Ukraine, the iron mines of Krivoi Rog, the priceless manganese of Nikopol, the coal of the Donets Basin, and a long list of manufacturing centers. But German armies were stranded deep inside the U. S. S. R. They faced a still unbeaten enemy and a bitter winter for which they were wholly unprepared. No further advance could be undertaken until the return of summer. Until then there was nothing to do but dig in and hang on if possible. Hitler's 1942 campaign uncovered a basic shift in strategy. No further attempt was made to stage a grand assault on all fronts. This time the Axis armies concentrated on the southern end of the long front. The Crimean naval base of Sevastopol was taken after a furious siege lasting several weeks. Another German army drove east to Voronezh on the Don River. This thrust cut the main rail connection between Moscow and the Caucasus. Rostov was again taken by storm, and with frightening momentum the blitzkrieg roared through the breach into the Caucasus. One column struck southeast through the Maikop and Grozny oil producing center on the Caspian Sea. Another and stronger spearhead battered its way across the great bend of the Don and into the industrial city of Stalin- grad on the lower Volga. The underlying strategy gradually became clear. Conquest of the Caucasus and capture of Stalingrad would open a road to an unlimited oil supply and to the borderlands of the Indian Ocean. Conversely it would block Russia's Middle Eastern supply line from overseas, and stop the flow of oil to the farms, factories, and armies of the Soviet Union. Finally, with the col- lapse of Russian resistance in the south, the invaders could wheel north through Voronezh, sweep to the rear of Moscow, and trap the Russian armies on the central and northern fronts. Hitler's plan came dangerously close to succeeding. But the Red Army hung on grimly at Woronezh, at Stalingrad, and in the Southern Caucasus. Once more time ran out with the Wehrmacht stalled on the thresh- old of a decisive victory, and with the onset of an- other winter came a second Russian counteroffensive which wiped out the Axis army in Stalingrad and drove the supporting armies back across the battlefields of the preceding Summer. 4. RUSSIAN “BLITZ-GRINDER” TEROFFENSIVES. The Red Army met the German onslaught in 1941 with a defense which skillfully utilized the strategical quali- ties of the battlefield. Russian strategy and tactics combined the principles of active defense in great depth, strategic retreat, attrition of the enemy, and counter- offensive. Relatively weak forces manned the frontier. Their function was to absorb the first shock of the attack. Behind the frontier came the main defenses distributed to a depth of 30 to 50 miles or more. These comprised an elaborate system of land mines, barbed wire, felled trees, tank traps, and other obstacles, covered by a withering cross-fire from machine guns, antitank guns, and heavier artillery, backed up by tank brigades, in- fantry, air forces, other arms. Time and again German Vanguards broke through forward positions, only to find the corridor closing behind them. Trapped Russian units repeatedly fought to the last man, and often hacked their way out to rejoin the main body or to merge with organized guerrilla bands. - Such warfare presented no front in the usual sense. German observers complained bitterly that the front was everywhere, with the enemy counterattacking sav- agely on two, three, or all sides at once. Such tactics proved especially effective in cities. They were equally effective in wooded and marshy country which pro- vided maximum cover from which to pounce upon Nazi columns. Only in the treeless Ukraine was the Wehr- macht able to attain the pace and momentum achieved in previous campaigns. Guerilla warfare played an extremely important role. Each village and collective farm formed a guerilla band. Arms and supplies were cached in thousands of hidden arsenals. Each night the partisans Sallied forth to blow up supply trains and attack enemy service units far in the rear of the main combat zone. The farther the Germans advanced, the longer grew their supply AND COUN- lines, and the more vulnerable they became to attacks in their rear. The Russian scorched earth policy prevented the in- Vaders from reaping immediately the economic benefits expected from their advance into the Heartland. The retreating armies left little of value intact. Mines were wrecked and flooded. Industrial machinery and work- ers were evacuated. Farm tools were removed; live- stock was sent to the rear, hidden, or killed. What could not be taken away was destroyed as far as possible. Even the great Dnieprostroy Dam, hydroelectric marvel of the Ukraine, was blown up. Twice the Red Army rebounded after months of de- fensive fighting. In December 1941, just as the Wehr- macht stalled in front of Moscow, the Red Army struck back with totally unexpected strength, and continued offensive operations on a limited scale throughout the winter. Again in November 1942, just as Hitler was proclaiming the doom of Stalingrad, the Red Army opened a second winter counter offensive of great power and major consequences. Frost played no small part in these winter operations. Only the western and southern margins of European Russia have a January mean temperature as high as 20° F. North and east the winter mean drops off rapidly to zero or below. Temperatures of 20°–40° below zero are the rule; mid-winter thaws the exception. Snow covers the landscape. Swamps freeze to iron hardness. The Red Army was prepared for winter campaign- ing; the Germans were not. Russian winter uniforms and equipment camouflage blended into the snowy landscape. Russian clothing kept out the cold. Rus- sian motorized equipment was designed for subzero temperatures. Russian fuels and lubricants stood the test of biting frost. The Germans suffered cruelly from inadequate shelter and unsuitable clothing. Their lu- bricants “froze” in the motors. While the cold lasted, their previous advantage in equipment was largely can- celled out. Their tanks and trucks were stalled on the ground; their planes disappeared from the sky for days and weeks at a stretch. Winter also provided the long hours of darkness which covered surprise Soviet troop movements. Mur- mansk lies about as far north as Point Barrow, Alaska. Kharkov is farther north than Quebec or Vancouver. Baku, Southernmost city in European Russia, has about the same latitude as New York City. This far northern location means long nights during the winter months. 64 Long hours of darkness greatly facilitate Secret troop dispositions, surprise attacks, and guerilla warfare. Darkness restricts the tactical use of air power. The Red Army made the most of this advantage, especially during the first winter when they faced an enemy still decidedly stronger in most types of military equipment. The Red Army counteroffensives also represent an adaptation of the pincers technique to the conditions of W. Early autumn 1942 was the high-water mark of Ger- man success. Rommel's Afrika Korps stood deep inside Egypt, awaiting reenforcements with which to crack the last line of defenses guarding Suez and the roads to the Middle East and to the Indian Ocean. Far to the north, Leningrad was beseiged and cut off. German armies crowded the Western approaches to Moscow. All the Ukraine, the Donets Basin, and most of the Caucasus were in German hands. Hitler was confi- dently predicting the early fall of Stalingrad, key to Russia's Volga lifelines, and gateway to the Middle East. In terms of increased military potential, Hitler's achievement was no less impressive. Axis Europe— Germany, the satellite states, and the Occupied coun- tries—covered an area exceeding 2,000,000 Square miles, two-thirds the size of the United States. The popula- tion of Axis Europe was approximately 300,000,000 at that time. The Wehrmacht numbered eight to ten mil- lion veteran troops, supported by a labor force of fifty to sixty million workers. In the Ukraine, Hitler possessed Europe's richest granary. He had a grip on the iron of Lorraine and Erivoi Rog, and seemingly indisputable access to the high grade iron ores of Sweden. He had access to the coal of the Donets Basin and of the Ruhr, the manganese of Nikopol, the oil of the Maikop fields, the bauxite 1. BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC: FIRST PHASE. The Battle of the Atlantic opened the day England and France went to the aid of Poland. From the out- set the west-European Allies depended heavily upon foodstuffs, raw materials, and military equipment brought across the Atlantic Ocean from the Americas winter warfare. The final drive on Moscow in 1941 started as a vast encircling movement. The Russian counteroffensive was a Super-pincers which drove in behind the German flanking columns north and South of the city. The Soviet winter offensive of 1942–43 began as an- other pincers superimposed upon the German jaws en- circling Stalingrad. The Red Army drive rapidly de- veloped into a whole series of bold interrelated flanking movements all the way from Voronezh to the southern Caucasus. Not only the Axis siege army in Stalingrad but also many other detachments were cut off and wiped out in the best blitzkrieg manner by the tireless white- clad Russian troopers. THE EUROPEAN AXIS AT HIGH TIDE mines of France, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, and other strategic minerals in sufficient quantity and variety to render Axis Europe all but self-sufficient for a war of in- definite duration. In addition he had captured more or less intact the industrial machinery of western and southern Europe, and with a little time he hoped to restore the wrecked mines and ruined factories of Western Russia. But there was another side of the picture. Hitler had won a vast territory and huge quantities of booty. But he had failed to conquer Britain. He had yet to breach the desert barrier which cut Axis Europe off from the Indian Ocean borderlands and from the Far East. He had yet to make contact with his Japanese allies. Ger- man armies had driven hundreds of miles into the So- viet Union, but had failed to break Russian resistance, Great Britain and the Soviet Union were both com- mitted to the destruction of Nazi power. And to the immense resources of these two giants was now added the still greater military potential of the United States. When, in the winter of 1942–43, the Wehrmacht was forced back from the Volga and from the foothills of the Caucasus Mountains, it was no tactical retreat in prepa- ration for another great offensive. It marked the pass- ing of the strategical initiative on One more front from the Axis to the United Nations. Hitler still possessed capacity for mischief and WI. THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC and from other lands beyond the seas. If German naval and air power could disrupt this traffic suffi- ciently, the Allied war effort would be seriously if not fatally impaired. - In the beginning, however, geography was definitely on the side of the western Allies. Germany in 1939 wanton destruction. The military potential of Axis Europé"was still very great. But the resources of the anti-Axis coalition were greater. Only by preventing the United Nations from deploying their greater strength on the fighting fronts could Hitler avert ulti- mate defeat and irretrievable disaster. By the end of 1942 his opportunities in this direction were severely limited. The Luftwaffe could still raid but it could not wreck the Russian railway system which fed men and material to the eastern front. Germany held no geographical springboard from which to launch attacks against the Indian Ocean and Middle Eastern supply lines which played so important a role in Allied defense of the desert barrier. Nor could Hitler break up the network of airways which connected the Allied countries with each other and with the fighting fronts. In one important combat zone, however, the situation was different. In the Atlantic Ocean, Hitler possessed both the necessary strategical positions and the weapons for a destructive war of attrition against Allied supply lines. If he could stop the flow of food and raw ma- terials to Great Britain and the U. S. S. R., and of American armies and military equipment to the Euro- pean fronts, something might yet be saved from the wreckage of Nazi dreams of world conquest and empire. possesed no doorways opening directly onto the At- lantic. Germany's seaboard was limited to the south- east corner of the North Sea and to the South shore of the Baltic. Between Germany and the Atlantic lay the British Isles. Britain can be likened to a huge breakwater screen- 65 ing northwestern Europe from the ocean. To reach the Atlantic from the Baltic and North Seas, it is necessary to go around the ends of this barrier. One has either to pass through the narrow English Channel or through the somewhat wider but more roundabout passageway between Norway and Scotland. During the early months of the present war, Germany surface raiders and submarines got into the Atlantic in considerable force. But they all had to run the gantlet through the heavily guarded Channel or make the long and also dangerous detour north of the British Isles. German air power operated under still more serious handicap. German flying fields were far dis- tant from the Atlantic ship lanes. The Luftwaffe could attack shipping in the North Sea and lay mines in British coastal waters. But German planes could do little to hinder the flow of military traffic across the Atlantic. At no time during those early months did German sea and air power present a really dangerous threat to Anglo-French supply lines in that ocean. 2. BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC: SECOND PHASE. The Allied situation began to deteriorate rapidly fol- lowing German occupation of Norway in April 1940. It moved swiftly to a crisis for Great Britain after the fall of France two months later. German forces now occupied both the east and south shores of the North Sea. They faced England across the Channel, and held the Atlantic coastline of France. Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire, and other French ports provided ideal U- boat havens within easy reach of the Atlantic shipping routes that converge on the south and west coast ports of England and Wales. From flying fields in France, the Luftwaffe could now join in the campaign, deliver- ing heavy blows on shipping far out over the Atlantic. This dual threat forced British convoys into more northerly routes. But these too were brought under heavier attack. Norwegian fjords harbored enemy sur- face raiders as well as U-boats. From these havens Ger- Iſla, Il battleships and other raiders could and did break out into the Atlantic. And the Luftwaffe's long-range patrol bombers could reach these northern approaches to the British Isles from bases in southern Norway and in northern France (see fig. 18). The danger mounted rapidly as the enemy brought out larger and more heavily armed submarines, and per- fected new methods of attack. The U-boats began oper- ating in groups, popularly known as “wolf packs.” These sometimes trailed convoys all the way across the ocean, picking off any ship they could get, but concen- trating whenever possible on tankers, the Achilles heel of any cargo marine in today's war. Enemy planes aided the U-boats by scouting to the limit of their flying radius, and joined in attacks on convoys far out upon the ocean. Naval escort alone proved insufficient. Shipping losses continued danger- ously high month after month during 1942. Worse was feared for 1943 as every indication pointed to a des- perate German attempt to block completely the flow of men and supplies to the European theater of war. 3. BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC : THIRD PHASE. - Allied defensive efforts developed along many lines, too many even to enumerate completely here. But two developments in particular helped to put geography back on the side of the United Nations. One of these was the spreading of a protective aerial umbrella over the Atlantic from shore to shore. The other was the relentless bombing of German shipyards and industries participating in the construction and maintenance of the submarine flotillas. The first was partly a problem of bases. The coastal command of the RAF was expanded, and its field of operations extended outward from the British Isles, to the extreme flying radius of the largest patrol bombers. But the range of these Britain-based planes was severely restricted because of Eire's refusal to grant the use of flying fields in western Ireland. Bases in Labrador, Newfoundland, Bermuda, and the West Indies were developed for the common use of Brit- ish and American planes. Developments were pushed in Greenland and in Iceland, occupied since the middle of 1941. The South Atlantic was covered with a net- work of air patrols based at many points in Africa and also in Brazil. Finally in 1943 the Allies secured the use of the Portuguese Azores, a group of islands which oc- cupy a commanding position in mid-Atlantic, slightly over 1,000 miles from Gibraltar, 1,500 miles from New- foundland, and 2,000 miles from Bermuda. With all these shore developments the Allies still lacked a complete land-based air coverage over the Atlantic ship lanes. There was an unprotected area in mid-ocean where the U-boats wrought great havoc. There was a still more exposed stretch opposite the Norwegian coastline on the sea route to Murmansk and Archangel. Russia-bound convoys using that route passed beyond the range of Allied planes based in north- ern Scotland and Iceland. They simultaneously passed within range of German bombers, surface raiders, and submarines operating out of Norwegian bases. Not until they were well beyond the North Cape did Allied convoys come under the protective umbrella of Soviet air power. And because of the long hours of daylight in the far north during the summer months, ships making this dangerous passage in that season were subjected to almost continuous attack for several days. - The only solution was to bridge these unprotected zones with ship-based aircraft. Regular naval aircraft carriers were too few in number for the task. Also they were too imperatively needed for combat operations with the various fighting fleets. But smaller auxiliary carriers were built upon hulls similar to those of large cargo vessels. By the end of 1943 several dozen of these were in convoy service. They strengthened the Atlantic defenses immensely, and played no small role in winning that third round of the Battle of the Atlantic. - The bombing of German U-boat bases and building yards represented another triumph of air power over geography. In the last war, Germany's principal naval bases all lay beyond range of large-scale Allied attack. Even the U-boat operating bases along the Belgian coast were not raided until late in that war, and then with indifferent success. Today, however, the situa- tion is just the reverse. German naval bases, building yards, engine plants, as well as the basic steel, chemical, and electrical equipment industries, all lie within reach of Allied air power operating from the British Isles or from the Mediterranean borderlands. The roar of the heavy bomber formations which almost daily wing their thunderous way over the Continent is a recurrent re- minder to Hitler and his generals of the fateful conse- quences which have flowed from their failure to conquer and occupy the British Isles and to smash Allied de- fenses in the Mediterranean and Middle East. 66 WII. AXIS EUROPE ON THE DEFENSIVE It is impossible to set a single date when the stra- tegical initiative passed irrevocably to the United Nations in the European theater of war. The tran- sition took place at different times on different fronts. Upon the sea it was never entirely in Axis hands. Even during the darkest days of 1940 and 1941 British sea and air forces never once relaxed the blockade of Axis Europe. The RAF opened its great bombing offensive against Germany while Englishmen were still fighting the fires lit by the Luftwaffe in London and in other English cities. Throughout 1942 the balance of forces was gradually but inexorably shifting in favor of the United Nations. By the end of that fateful year, Axis armies were definitely on the defensive in the European and North African theater of war. 1. FORTRESS EUROPE. During this transition period, a new concept began to creep into German propaganda. As bombs rained down upon the Ruhr, as Rommel retreated westward across the Western Desert, as the Wehrmacht reeled under the sledge-hammer blows of the Red Army, as large-scale Allied preparations got under way for the coming liberation of Europe, German spokesmen dwelt less on future Axis conquests, more on the defensive strength of their European Fortress. The idea of Europe as a fortress has a definite geo- graphical basis. Europe is really not a continent at all, but rather a huge promontory attached to Asia. Though extremely irregular in outline, Europe's shape is generally triangular. Two of Europe's three sides face water. The southern boundary extends from the head of the Black Sea to Cape St. Vincent in Portugal. On the west and northwest, Europe faces the Atlantic and adjoining narrow seas all the way from Southern Portugal to Norway's North Cape and beyond. 2. EUROPE'S SOUTHERN FACE. Sometimes erroneously described as the “soft under- side,” this area actually presents one of the world's most forbidding coastlines. Three great mountainous pro- montories reach southward into the Mediterranean. The countries occupying these promontories are Spain, Italy, and Greece. With the exception of Italy, none has a modern transportation system. All have meager communications into the heart of Europe. (See fig. 21.) North of these great Mediterranean promontories lies a belt of broken highlands and rugged mountains, reaching all the way across Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Black Sea. Starting with the Pyrenees, this barrier passes through southern France, through Switzerland and Austria, across northern Italy, Yugo- slavia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, and reappears along the mountainous southern margin of the Crimea. With few exceptions existing roads and railroads into France and central Europe from the south, follow the infre- quent well-defined trenches which the rivers have carved through the mountains during the ages past. Geography thus determines possible invasion routes into central Europe from the Mediterranean. Geogra- phy is also the key to an understanding of the relative difficulties to be encountered along one route as com- pared with another. Southern France offers two well-defined routes. The Rhone and the Garonne valleys both contain trunk-line highways and railroads. Subsidiary lines follow smaller valleys which pierce the broken highland massif of southern France. The Garonne valley has the definite disadvantage of leading away from the centers of Ger- man power, towards the Atlantic port of Bordeaux. The nearest passageway into Germany from the north- south Rhône valley runs via the Belfort gap, 300 miles north of Marseilles, through country which favors the defense nearly all the way. - To force a passage across the Alps from Italy into southern Germany would be an operation of the greatest difficulty. These towering mountains rise abruptly from the north Italian plain. Four trunk-line railroads cross the main ranges of the Alps. But three of these run through Switzerland, only one directly into Austria and southern Germany—the famous Brenner Pass line to Innsbruck and Munich. For over 100 miles this route passes through deep canyons and along precipitous mountain barriers. Alternative routes cross the Alps farther east. Railroads from Venice and Trieste con- verge on Klagenfurt, with lines running from there to Vienna and Budapest. As invasion routes into central Europe, these are not much easier than the Brenner Pass route. Passage could probably be forced. But moun- tain roads and railroads, with frequent bridges, tunnels, cuts and fills, are terribly vulnerable to mining and aerial bombardment. The Dalmation coast presents difficulties no less for- midable. Mountains rise steeply from a wild and rugged coast line. There are few large ports, none with facilities for handling heavy traffic. Only one trunk- line railroad crosses the mountains which rim the east shore of the Adriatic Sea—the line from Fiume to Zagreb and Belgrade. Besides this there is only a low- capacity mountain railway running via Sarajevo, and a few wagon roads connecting with the interior. Albania and Greece present terrain just as difficult. But the transportation system of these countries is even more primitive. Albania has no through railroads at all, and few good highways. The same condition prevails on the west coast of Greece as far south as the Gulf of Corinth. A single line runs north from Athens through the broken east-coast low-lands. There remains the historic invasion route through the Balkans from the head of the Aegean Sea. From Istan- bul on the Bosporus, and from Salonika on the Aegean, two deep trenches lead north and northwest into the Balkan mountains. These river-cut trenches join at Nish (north and west of the Bulgarian Capital of Sofia), whence a single valley continues in a northwesterly direction to Belgrade where it connects with all the communication lines fanning out across the Hungarian plains. The Belgrade-Nish-Sofia Adrianople-Istanbul route follows the valleys of the Morava, Nishava, and Maritsa rivers. The Nish Salonika cut-off runs through the Morava and Wardar valleys. The whole system resem- bles an inverted “Y”. Much of the way the valleys are broad. In a few places they narrow to gorges. Passes crossing the watersheds are low in comparison to the altitude of the surrounding heights. The Belgrade-Istanbul trench is the historic highway of south-eastern Europe. It was used long before the dawn of recorded history. Through this trench the Romans built a famous military road to Byzantium. Through these valleys marched the Crusaders to and from the Holy Land. Through these valleys poured the conquering Turks clear to the gates of Vienna. Here lies the only route for a railroad from central Europe to the Middle East. It is followed by the line of the famous Orient Express, whose rails were a link in Germany's notorious Berlin-to-Bagdad railway proj- ect before the first World War. That railroad was the strategic backbone of the coalition of Central Powers 67 º Ż...... ) El NLAND Tºš ZAkë © s'êör LAS D NORTH §9 {R WAY. OS/3 fe /sinkigº lan *Vº wº 440CGA O • Tº frin Zéningrad **śAberdeen º' " Aarvik. &alſ såſå Voſ. © Sg ...As ) S ºf Rf Eston, gº •/6%rod Belfast Götebºrg #AARE E|{R E S-N |éſikē/ok. .%sco Weve/ Véebsk ~ Y L ATVTA |\LITHUAN | XP. // sº 40 Ore/ SO V.I.E.T. U-N-1) O'N ** A \* u, * wººt-lºº.:) Alg. N ..Y...”. 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In today's war should Turkish bases become available to Allied sea and air power to force their way through German defenses to the head of the Aegean, Axis Europe will again face the same peril of toppling satel- lites and of invasion from the rear. For-this reason German leaders have labored tirelessly to win Turkish support, or at least to keep that country out of the Allied orbit. Partly for this reason, Hitler's generals have clung stubbornly to Greece, Crete, Scarpanto, Rhodes, and the smaller islands from which the Luftwaffe can sweep all waterways leading to the head of the Aegean Sea. & 3. EUROPE'S WESTERN AND NORTHWEST- ERN FACE. This area presents no such major topographical ob- stacles to invasion, except in the Iberian peninsula and in Norway. From the mouth of the Seine River to the northern tip of Denmark, the flat or gently sloping north European plain reaches clear to the shores of the English Channel and the North Sea. Within this area lie northern France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the lower Rhine valley, most of the industrial Ruhr, most of Prussia, and the peninsular state of Denmark. This north European plain (more fully described in the chapters on France and Germany) is covered with a network of roads and railroads matched in few other places upon the globe. Rivers and canals form almost VIII. The victory strategy of the United Nations has grad- ually taken shape around three interrelated military objectives. The first is to deprive the enemy of food- stuffs and industrial raw materials essential to his war effort. The second is to wreck the instrumentalities of production and transport which keep the enemy popu- lation working and his armies fighting. The third and ultimate objective, to which the others are subsidiary, is to destroy or capture those armies themselves, and thereby bring the war to a victorious close. 1. DENYING THE ENEMY FOODSTUFFS AND RAW MATERIALS. There are two principal methods of denying the enemy foodstuffs and raw materials. The first of these the only barriers across this generally level country, though considerable areas of reclaimed land, mainly in the Netherands, can be reflooded by opening the dikes to let in the Sea. The invasion problem in the west is largely one of getting ashore and holding the beachheads. A coast- line, like a mountain range or a desert, is a strong mili- tary frontier. By the end of 1942 German troops pa- trolled the beaches from the Finnish port of Petsamo to the Spanish border in the Bay of Biscay. The Low Countries, the English Channel coast, and other likely invasion points had been strongly fortified, or were in process of becoming so. But once the armored outer shell has been pierced, there are no protecting moun- tains and few other natural barriers to impede the ad- vance of the Allied armies. The industrial heart of Germany would then lie exposed to invasion from the west. (See fig. 18.) 4. THE EASTERN FACE OF FORTRESS EUROPE. This area is topographically the weakest side of the triangle. From the Baltic Sea southward to the Su- deten and Carpathian Mountains, Germany has neither a sea frontier nor a highland barrier against invasion from the east. Nowhere in Poland or in eastern Ger- many is there a strong natural defense line. Two riv- ers—the Vistula and the Oder—have some military value. The Pripet Marshes farther to the east afford some protection. But space and distance are the chief natural defenses of the East European plain. is blockade; the second, conquest of territories from which he derives essential supplies. Blockade was a major factor in bringing Germany down in the first World War. In this war, however, it has been more difficult to enforce and less effective in its results. This is so for three chief reasons. Early vic- tories gave Germany outlets on the Atlantic, extremely difficult to blockade completely under operating condi- tions prevailing in this war. Those early victories also gave Germany possession of, or access to, production areas much larger and with more varied resources than the areas held by the Central Powers in the first World War. Even more important, Science and technology have Lengthening communication lines became an ever greater handicap to the German armies invading the Soviet Union. The same problem confronts the Rus- sian armies driving westward. Across this strategic no-man's land, the retreating army enjoys steadily shortening supply lines, and hence a growing relative advantage as the advancing enemy moves ever farther from his own sources of Supply. Man-made communications, rather than topography, fix the routes of invasion into eastern Germany. Since there are relatively few all-weather roads in western Russia and across Poland, and since dirt roads become virtually impassable during the rainy seasons, armies tend to follow the lines of the principal east-west rail- ways. This was the strategy of the German invasion of Russia. It is likewise the strategy of the Soviet coun- terinvasion of Germany. Four main rail routes enter Germany from the east. One reaches northwest from the Black Sea port of Odessa with a branch line from Kiev. This trunkline railroad runs through Lwow, Przemysl, and Krakow, thence via Breslau to Berlin. The second, also from Kiev skirts south of the Pripet Marshes, thence across the Polish plain to Warsaw. There it joins the third main route, the great trunkline road and railway system from Moscow to Berlin, via Smolensk, Minsk, Brest- Litovsk, and Warsaw. The fourth route starts from Leningrad and comes down through the Baltic states and East Prussia to Danzig, thence across the old Polish Corridor to Berlin. STRATEGY FOR VICTORY: ENDS AND MEANS wholly or partially freed Germany from some of the most critical shortages that developed under the grind- ing pressure of blockade in the last war. Great progress. has been made in synthesizing edible fats, vitamins, motor fuel, rubber, and many other essential products. Every step in this direction cuts down the military value and potentialities of blockade. But blockade is by no means a negligible factor. While science has created many substitutes for scarce materials, the raw-material requirements of war in- dustry have tended to increase steadily in variety and complexity. The list of essential ferro-alloys, for ex- ample, is considerably longer today than it was a genera- tion ago. Likewise the quantities of all raw materials 69 Cl .. A Az C 7T / C O C A A /V2 AºA /3. A /W7 ſ \ A 4 ºeykjavik E- *g |C+ LANº KEY (D IRow ore tº W @ coA, - Q) oil. F/ELos Awo ReArayerſes SCA/ Aſ W. // O Aº’ W A C / A A/ (3) Potas/y = /OO 200 300 © coapaz J. A. A % @ AV/C/ræſ. Wº © MA/woa/wesz NORTH O Faeroes º ..º-º- (D / AAA, wº _ºŽáñ. © 540x/re (4///w/ww) O (D (D 7UAwas 7Eaw }*==== Shetlands tº {NORWAY G chaowazowa § (2) & MozYeosawaa § -ºssmºs fºr 2 *oº: Bergen (5) (3) Awr/Mowy zºº g25% (3) suzAvR O © Mercury @ WoZAAAAM © coaa/ 7- (ii) 7/A/ Ø (2) z/A/C MWDUSTR/AL (ii) 7//WAER AREAS (£) AA75 O V •e ge es e o e o e º see 89 §—ty- Qº Sgº.º4 @ GRA/W boundaries 5A ^º. •%haf Smolensk & o zvestock- msterdam’s” (B abº sº § º fºa S O ſ". T • Orel N | { O N Br *Sºrºra (I) (D (D (2) ER º & ..º. "essessee Ž N ...lish Channel § Ø * 6%ºp’o %hsaw Pask "; •Gome/ Kºsº Ş £ng fºrg/6% 94%. , Q insk (G) LINE of FARTHE5T NAzi Bºg-º @ % º 9/ 2% º Ó L' A N D. ADVANCE 1941/1942 @ @ 6. º §§ e RS (G) ã% * † § 9 @ (pº § 㺠6 @ ºf Kiev & © & //5 (G) . G 7 CD G) º sº N: &Mºº- (6) % ©'g {} © *i; }~7. * … (P) "º /e7/739) #/º %’t • * (2) (N) tº (2) (2) (3) º Q % \º % gº @ (C © (S) º Yo gº, i. aswº ºf ºn. Grozny sº @ op º Sevastopo/ * (M) Constanta 454. A C K – S 4 A 53tum © & S PA I NJ aw Sºrsº °.Cordova º & cº) *::::: \º - * Erzeru, ©o (D L- -ºr- eAnkara (C) O #sº. 9° M A Z) @ e Algiers / T U R }< E Y &O dy-wº J- (2\@ A L G E P I A ) - *Matty SY R | A © F- Q- ^2 CYPRUS ^ I R A Q. EUROPEAN PRODUCTION AREAS VITAL TO & ©Dºmasco's NAZI WAR ECONOMY as of June 1942 *—w. 3–5–4 W. I WI. TS - ſrººpas, FIGURE 22 required to wage total war are greater than ever before. Thus blockade still remains an important means of Sapping the enemy's military strength. Territoral conquest supplements blockade as a means of denying essential raw materials and other supplies to the Nazi war economy. The hard facts of Geography and Geology compel Germany to rely heavily upon food and raw materials produced dangerously close to the outer rim of Fortress Europe. In 1942, at the peak of Nazi territorial conquest, Germany was drawing high- grade iron ore from Sweden, iron and manganese from the Ukraine, coal from the Donets Basin, bauxite from France and Yugoslavia, sulphur and mercury from Italy and Spain, phosphates from North Africa, and many other strategic materials from regions far from the heart of Axis Europe. Even the coal and iron fields that straddle the Franco-German border were too close to the military frontier to be safe. Germany’s inescapable dependence upon peripheral areas for essential war materials is a geographical fact of great military significance and of incalculable ad- vantage to the United Nations. The bombing of western Germany, Allied victories in North Africa and in south- ern Europe, Soviet recovery of the Donets Basin and Ukraine, and other breaches in the walls of Fortress Europe have all produced strategic results out of pro- portion to the numbers of enemy troops killed or cap- tured. For these victories and others yet to come, like the blockade, are inexorably cutting down the military potential of Axis Europe, slowly destroying the ca- pacity of German war industry to produce the arms and ammunition without which the Axis armies cannot con- tinue indefinitely to defend the walls of their much vaunted European fortress. 2. DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY'S WAR IN- DUSTRIES AND COMMUNICATIONS. Closely related to the denial of foodstuffs and raw ma- terials by blockade and territorial conquest, is the de- struction of the enemy's industry and communications. Modern industry is not like separate eggs in a basket. It is more like an exceptionally complex machine with tens of thousands of intermeshing gears. Raw materials of many kinds must be grown or mined in widely sepa- rated places, smelted or otherwise refined, and routed to fabricating plants of all sorts and kinds. The prod- ucts of sub-assemblies must be brought together at the final assembly plant. + Everything depends upon timing and schedule. To produce the parts of an airplane engine, for example, may involve bringing together at the right places and at the right time literally scores of different raw mate- rials and thousands of fabricated parts. Break even One vital link in the process, and the final assembly be- gins to slow down. Break several links, and the entire production process may grind to a more or less pro- longed stop. All Military operations depend upon the production and uninterrupted flow of huge quantities of material to the armed forces in the field. Any breakdown either in production or in transport will impede and slow down the enemy's military operations. If the breakdown of supply is sufficiently serious and prolonged, it must eventually paralyze the enemy's war effort and sap the strength of his armed forces at the front. Military commanders have long recognized the im- portance of attacking the enemy's supply services. The problem has been how to do it effectively. Many a cavalry raid in earlier wars was undertaken for the purpose of destroying supplies and communications in the enemy's rear. Sabotage has sometimes caused dam- age to a few important installations, but as a rule enemy war industries and communications, even those within a few miles of the front lines, have been relatively safe from attack in the past. The advent of air power has changed all this radi- cally. It is now possible to deliver smashing blows far in the rear of the enemy's front-line ground defenses. If sufficiently heavy and sustained, strategic bombing can seriously disrupt the production of military equip- ment and its transportation to the fighting fronts. To the extent that strategic bombing is successful, the enemy's ground troops are cut off from supplies and compelled to defend with dwindling stocks of arms and ammunition a crumbling arsenal in their rear. The blockade which cuts off Hitler's Europe from external supplies, the reconquest of territories whence the Axis has previously drawn strategic materials, and the strategic bombing of Axis war industry and inter- nal communications, are all contributing to the ultimate annihilation of the Wehrmacht. Every factory burned, every locomotive wrecked, every water dam broken, every military storage depot blasted, cuts down by so much the fighting power of the Axis armies defending the portals of Fortress Europe. 3. RESISTANCE WITHIN EUROPE. Hitler's European fortress not only “lacks a roof.” making it vulnerable to Allied air power, it also has been subject to increasingly severe pressures from within. Every occupied country in Axis Europe has brought forth forces ready and eager to fight the Nazi invaders with any weapons they can find. The cou- rageous resistance of the French patriotic forces, the Solid opposition of the Norwegian people, the gallant exploits of the Greek and Albanian guerillas, the steady Sabotage by the Czech and Polish underground are but examples of the way in which widespread hatred of Hitler's conquest has created active forces against him. Throughout Europe, Hitler has had to put German gar- risons everywhere, in order to smother resistance and revolt, and the Wehrmacht has spent part of its man- power keeping down the subject peoples. Their active hostility toward the occupation has been of real prac- tical assistance to the Allies. - The anti-Nazi movement within Europe has achieved its greatest military strength in Yugoslavia. Organ- ized resistance to the German invaders began almost as Soon as the country had been, so Hitler thought, finally conquered. It has grown steadily since those black days in the spring of 1941. The mountains of Yugoslavia provide an excellent terrain for guerilla operations, and these have been developed with skill and courage. A large force has rallied to the support of guerilla leaders and so effective have been their operations that German forces consisting of a number of divisions have been constantly engaged in the area. 71 NORTH TT of re/7t-s | #|iſ 9 ~" & sº FeykjaVik&# |Woº' W. A. G.W.A.A. 0. §: es"/"Whº JCE LAND ; ºr / ſº 4 - &n, ºr a £º º O /OO //AFS 6OO i º [[III] Žíº...ſº ſhe O *... 14. 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Zack CŞ. f “S. 3-4-usage kºenic º Constanta % AS- Tº Joukon e Nº N.3%r Jºe a Lisbonº & ) "Madº, /73 2^v-/~ $2..S S-PAl N era” oRSº-AºS P. /stanbul | FM- *—Maples Durazzo =S.Z. •Ankara Gibre/tar, e safety hantò «» • * { E SY & ZSs W = 2 / 7.5 º' a 4 w is SICſ LY SFG#Ec T U R }< • * &: Casablanca Tº Algiers. Athen - } Whis ~5° ACŞy, SP A 24 L G E R J A A * 2. g". .3 °. * CRETE ſ \\ & E A EL ALANAEI N 0 E G Y P T FIGURE 24 However, the longer the mission, the greater the quantity of fuel required to take the planes out and back. Increase in the fuel load inexorably cuts down the bomb load. For each type of plane there is a point where the fuel required to fly the mission would displace arma- ment altogether. One approach to this problem is to build larger or more efficient planes capable of carrying heavier armament on larger missions. Another ap- proach is to acquire operating bases closer to distant objectives. The engineering Sciences are making significant prog- ress in the development of planes with greater combat In March 1943, when the spring break-up ended the Red Army's second winter offensive, the Nazis still held the richest food-growing and mineral-producing region of European Russia. This region—comprising the Ukraine and part of the Donets Basin—was vitally im- portant to the Third Reich. The day was approaching when Hitler's armies would have to face not only the Red Army but also massive Allied blows in southern and western Europe. The bombing offensive was crip- pling the industrial Ruhr. Without the coal of the Donbas, the iron of Krivoi Rog, and the manganese of Nikopol, Axis Europe could not match the tremendous power building up in the west. Nazi occupation forces had worked feverishly, and with considerable success, to restore the agriculture of the Ukraine and the mining, metallurgical, chemical, and other industries of the TJkraine and the Donbas. But Germany’s hold on Southern Russia was insecure, and would remain so as long as the Red Army was intact and determined to expel the invader from Russian soil. This was so abundantly clear that virtually every observer expected Hitler to make one more supreme effort to smash the Red Army and knock Russia out of the war before the rapidly growing power of the United States could be fully employed in the west. During the spring lull all signs pointed to another German offensive. The German armies in Russia were regrouped and re-equipped. Aerial reconnaissance showed endless trains bringing up reenforcements, with the heaviest concentration in the Orel-Belgorod sector where the Russians held a shallow salient or bulge to the west. radius. The quality of aviation fuel is being steadily raised. Engines are designed to burn the higher octane fuels. Larger planes can be designed to carry dispro- portionately greater loads. In these and other ways the radius of air power from its operating bases is being steadily lengthened. - In addition bases have been acquired closer to impor- tant bombing objectives. This has been one of the main strategical results of Allied victories in the Mediter- ranean. The Liberator bombers that attacked the Ploesti oilfields in Rumania, in the summer of 1943, flew altogether more than 2,500 miles a round trip from XI. HITLER'S RETREAT FROM RUSSIA The Wehrmacht struck on July 5, but within a fort- night, after expending thousands of planes and tanks, and several hundred thousand men, the Germans were everywhere on the defensive. By August 5, a month after the battle opened, the Red Army was in Orel and Belgorod. The Russians followed up these victories with a rapidly expanding offensive northwest towards Bryansk and Smolensk, west along the Belgorod-Kiev railway, southwest towards Kharkov and the Donbas, with coordinated advances still farther to the north and in the extreme south. O Employing large-scale encircling tactics reminiscent of the German blitzkrieg of former years, the Red Army recaptured one after another the fortress cities which anchored the German front in Russia. The enemy at- tempted a stand on the Desna and Dnieper rivers. But the Russians breached the Desna-Dnieper line from end to end, retook Kiev, repulsed a short but violent Ger- man counteroffensive, and then plunged on into Poland and the southwestern Ukraine. ern Russian armies raised the two-year siege of Lenin- grad, isolated Finland, and drove the Germans back through the Baltic states. From northern Finland to the shores of the Black Sea the whole German position in Russia was toppling under the sledge-hammer blows of the Red Army. The Soviet drive cut all direct communications be- tween the Southern and northern German armies. Odessa and Nikolaev on the Black Sea coast were lib- erated. In a rapid spring advance the entire Crimea was cleared of Nazi troops. Meanwhile, the northern Russian armies advanced in the Leningrad area, iso- through the Baltic states. Meanwhile, the north- bases in the Middle East. The same mission would require a round trip flight of less than 1,200 miles from bases in southern or central Italy. (See fig. 24.) From flying fields in Italy and on the island of Cor- sica, a 600-mile arc includes all of Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria, most of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, and large areas in southern and southeastern Germany. Finally, establishment of American bases in the Soviet Union, and the initiation of large-scale shuttle-bombing has put all of Axis Europe within range of aerial bombers. lated Finland, and began to drive the Germans back From northern Finland to the shores of the Black Sea the whole German position in Russia toppled under the sledge-hammer blows of the Red Army. By May 1944, at the end of the Soviet Offensive the Red Army had freed almost all the Ukraine and much of White Russia. They had ad- vanced to the frontier of Czechoslovakia and, for the first time in the war, had crossed the Soviet border, into Rumania. 1. WITHDRAWAL. “ACCORDING TO PLAN.” The German High Command and Nazi propaganda described this epic retreat as a voluntary withdrawal carried out “according to plan.” It was true only in a qualified sense. The German retreat seems to have been orderly in the main. The German generals extricated the bulk of their surviving troops from one trap after another, keeping their armies fairly intact and the way open for further withdrawal. On the other hand, the Wehrmacht fought desper- ately to hold Orel, Belgorod, Kharkov, Bryansk, and other key positions. Only after the Russians had driven them from these fortress anchors did their “planned withdrawal” begin. The ensuing retreat was voluntary only in the sense that the German High Com- mand chose to withdraw rather than to stand and fight on to almost certain annihilation. The German re- treat from Russia in 1943 was voluntary in precisely the same sense that the German retreat from France in the autumn of 1918 was a withdrawal “according to plan.” 76 2. STRATEGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE GERMAN RETREAT. The German retreat from Russia cost heavily in men and matériel, especially the latter. Rapidly retreating armies can take with them only limited quantities of baggage. During their long occupation of Western Russia, the invaders had gradually built up large stocks of matériel at scores of depots behind their lines. It would have taken months to evacuate all these stores. There was neither time nor transport available to Save very much. The Germans took what they could, de- stroyed much of what remained, and the Russians cap- tred the rest. Far more serious than the losses of men and matériel, º however, was the threat to German dominance over southeastern and northern Europe. Every mile of ad- vance brought the Russians closer to the borders of Hitler's satellites—Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. The German retreat from the Baltic states left Finland at the mercy of the Soviet armies, threatened Nazi in- fluence in Sweden, and menaced the German position in Norway. Equally serious was the blow to Axis war potential. Germany had expended several million men, the flower of the Wehrmacht, and incredible quantities of matériel, to win the Ukraine, the Donbas, and the Caucasus. With the cropland, coal, oil, and minerals of south Russia, Germany had hoped to possess the resources necessary to complete the conquest of Britain, to break through to the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, and to defy the United States. The retreat from Russia was, therefore, something more than the recoil before another spring. The “planned withdrawal” from the “Heart- land” was nothing less than tacit admission of the bank- ruptcy of the entire strategy of conquest and empire upon which the rulers of the Third Reich had embarked with such confidence and with such astounding initial success. The disastrous retreat from the “Heartland” constituted abandonment of the prize without which all previous victories would turn to ashes under the shatter- ing blows of the United Nations. XII. ON THE ROAD TO WICTORY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1. TURNING POINTS: STALINGRAD AND EGYPT. The German debacle in Russia has paid dividends on every fighting front; nowhere more so than in the Medi- terranean. But for the demands of the Russian cam- paign, Rommel might well have mustered the force necessary to crack the Alamein Line, and plunge on to Suez, the Middle East, and the shores of the Indian Ocean. But for the drain of men and munitions into the hopeless battles for Stalingrad and the Caucasus, the price of Allied victories in the Mediterranean would have been incalculably higher, if indeed those victories could have been won at all. On October 22, 1942, while the Germans were fighting in the streets of Stalingrad and on the road to Baku, the Allied army in Egypt struck the initial blow of a cam- paign which culminated six months later in the invasion of Italy. The campaign opened with the shattering defeat of Rommel's army facing the Alamein Line. This was followed by pursuit of his fleeing troops across the Libyan sands, capture of the Axis base of Tripoli, Anglo-American landings in French North Africa, the pincers movement on Tunisia (see fig. 19), the capture of a great Axis army in North Africa, the invasion of Sicily and then of southern Italy, the occupation of Sar- dinia and Corsica, the collapse of the Fascist regime, the surrender of Italy, and the slow advance up the Italian peninsula against stubborn German resistance. 2. STRATEGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF MEDI- TERRANEAN VICTORIES. This series of victories produced far reaching strategic results. Not the least of these were heavy Axis losses of men and matériel. 267,000 prisoners were taken in the battle of Tunis alone. Of these well over one-half were Germans from some of the best fighting units in the Wehrmacht. Matériel losses were in proportion. Thousands of planes, tanks, guns, trucks, and other equipment littered the battlefields from Alamein to Rome. To appreciate the significance of these losses One must view them against the vastly smaller losses of the Allies and against the larger reserves and greater military resources of the United Nations. Another strategical result was further dispersion of Axis forces already spread thin over Europe. Our land- ings in North Africa forced Hitler to occupy the rest of France in self defense, thus tying down additional thou- sands of German troops and diverting labor and scarce materials for the fortification of the south coast of France. The surrender of Italy compelled the dispatch of still more German divisions, to take the place of Ital- ian occupation forces in the Balkans, and to resist the advance of the Allied armies up the Italian peninsula. Allied victories and the collapse of Italy fanned the spirit of resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece, tying down still larger German forces who presently found themselves fighting a major campaign in the Balkans. The Allied advance in Italy, meanwhile, opened up a supply route to the Dalmatian coast and the interior of Yugoslavia. Along this route passed arms and technical aid for the patriot guerrilla forces in Yugoslavia, pre- paring the way for operations on a steadily increasing Scale. Another strategical result, previously discussed, was the acquisition of air bases in Corsica and in central Italy. This advance brought Allied heavy bombers within effective striking range of the industrial centers of Southern and southeastern Europe, industrial centers upon which Germany was coming more and more to de- pend, as England-based air-fleets caused increasing damage to the production centers of northern and west- ern Europe. Still another result was the virtual extinction of Axis naval power in the Mediterranean. When the Germans occupied Toulon, the crews of the interned French fleet scuttled most of their ships to prevent the Nazis from seizing them. A few months later the Italian Navy sur- rendered, the bulk of the fleet escaping to Allied ports. These two events not only strengthened Allied command of the Mediterranean but also released strong naval units for service in the Far East, thereby accelerating the war against Japan. One very important result of Allied victories in the Mediterranean was the reopening of that sea from end to end. It strengthened the Allies in every theater of 77 war. Thousands of miles were clipped from the supply routes to the Middle East, to southern Russia, to India, and to China (fig. 19). With shortened communications the Allies achieved greater mobility of strategic reserves of men and matériel. Each soldier and each piece of equipment represented more effective strength than pre- The Mediterranean offensive served still another mili- tary purpose in the Allied victory strategy. The land- ings in North Africa, in Sicily, at the heel and toe of the Italian boot, at Salerno, and before Rome, all con- stituted dress rehearsals for the vastly greater and more difficult enterprise of invading western Europe from the Sea. No military operation presents greater difficulties and hazards than does that of establishing a secure foothold upon a strongly defended hostile shore. No operation requires a more exact appraisal and correlation of geo- graphical and military factors. The difficulties of amphibious warfare arise mainly from the traffic bottle- neck between ship and shore. A large operation may entail landing hundreds of thousands of men and millions of tons of equipment and supplies within the space of a few days. These must be transferred from ships to lighters or barges, ferried ashore, and unloaded upon open beaches. Such movements must be carried out under fire, and, in the early stages at least, without the aid of docks, cranes, and other cargo-handling ma- chinery found only in established ports. Without secure command of the sea approaches to the selected debarkation points, the operation is totally impossible. Command off shore involves not only ships but also planes. Large naval craft cannot even ap- proach a hostile shore, defended by air power, without strong air protection of their own. To give artillery support to the landing parties, the ships must remain indefinitely within a few miles from the shore. To do so the invasion force must be able to establish and hold air supremacy over the whole off-shore Zone. Strong air support is also necessary to cover the landing operations and to protect the accumulating forces upon the beaches. The planes of the invasion force must be able to drive away the enemy's bombers attacking landing craft and the beachhead. They must be able also to blast open a pathway for the advancing viously. The enemy's advantage of central positions and interior lines was partly overcome. Finally, the Allied march on Rome ended once and for all any real danger of Axis flanking attacks through Spain or Turkey. Hitler lost his last chance of achiev- ing a break-through to the Middle East and to the shores XIII. THE NEW WESTERN FRONT ground forces, and to strike at the enemy's airfields, troop concentrations, supply dumps, and transportation system farther inland. Air cover for the invasion force can best be provided by land-based planes. In general, planes operating from long runways can carry aloft greater armament and fighting power than planes flown from the com- paratively short decks of aircraft carriers. To bring aircraft carriers within reach of shore-based bombers is itself an operation usually involving considerable risk. It is a justifiable risk only when the carrier-based aviation of the invasion force is qualitatively as well as quantitatively superior to the land-based planes that can be sent against it. Unless the invasion force enjoys this qualitative superiority, it must have land-based air cover, and the latter is a decided asset under any circumstances. This principle has been repeatedly illustrated in the European theater of operations. Carrier-based planes, operating from North African bases, provided incom- parably better air cover for the landings in Sicily. The crossing of the Strait of Messina was made under a canopy of shore-based air power. But the landing at Salerno was touch-and-go because of the distance of that beachhead from Allied bases in Sicily, and the consequent necessity of pitting carrier-based air power against the Luftwaffe's veteran pilots and first-class equipment. The advantage, if not the necessity, of supporting a large-scale invasion of western Europe with shore-based air power greatly restricts the choice of landing points. England is the only base of operations. The English Channel narrows to slightly over twenty miles at the Strait of Dover. Both east and west of Dover, how- ever, the Channel widens rapidly. At the western en- trance, opposite Lands End and the Brittany peninsula, the water gap is well over 200 miles. From Great Yar- mouth in Southeastern England to the Dutch coast, the of the Indian Ocean. Coinciding with the failure of Japanese efforts to penetrate deeply into that ocean, the Allied successes in the Mediterranean established both the strategical isolation of the Axis and the strategical unity of the United Nations. distance is almost as great. The Atlantic coast of France is even more remote: about 250 miles from southern England to St. Nazaire; over 400 miles to Bor- deaux. From eastern England to the North Sea coast of Germany, Denmark, and southern Norway, the dis- stance varies from 250 to 400 miles. Thus, if provision of land-based air cover were the only consideration, the Channel coast has decided advantage over either the west coast of France or the North Sea coast of the Low Countries, Germany, or southern Norway. But air cover is only one of many considerations. A tenable beachhead must have some depth. The position is in mortal danger as long as the enemy's artillery can shell the exposed landing beaches where men and equip- ment are coming ashore. There must also be sufficient depth in which to absorb the shock of repeated enemy counter-attacks. High land overlooking the beaches gives the defending army a decided initial advantage, and may confine the invasion force within a zone too narrow to hold in the face of carefully plotted artillery fire and repeated infantry attacks. It must be assumed, moreover, that the defending army will be able, for a time at least, to concentrate greater strength at the landing point to attack the forces coming ashore. Men and equipment can be moved up to the coast from inland far more rapidly than these can be ferried ashore during the first days of the invasion. Thus it becomes highly advantageous to select a landing point or points where a short front can be quickly estab- lished, with one or both flanks protected by the sea, a river, an escarpment, or Some other strong natural barrier. Still other factors influence the choice of invasion points. Topography, ground cover, rivers, canals, and other landscape features will indicate where advances inland can probably be made with the least delay and the smallest casualties. The transportation grid in the enemy's rear determines the points where he will be able 78 to bring up reenforcements with greatest dispatch. Prevailing winds, fog and cloud conditions, tidal varia- tions, offshore islands, shoals, tidal flats, and tortuous coastal channels make some landing points inherently more dangerous than others. And there is the certainty that the enemy's fortifications and other prepared de- fenses will be strongest at precisely those points where geographical advantage lies on the side of the invasion force. All these considerations further narrow the choice of landing points. From the standpoint of beach topog- The invasion of western Europe completes the geo- graphical pattern of Allied strategy in the European theater of war. The blockade has long since closed the channels of supply into Axis Europe. The bombing campaign has progressively laid waste the war indus- tries and internal communications of Hitler's much trumpeted continental fortress. It remains to Smash raphy, the shoreline is generally more favorable for landings east of the Seine River. From the standpoint of flank protection, the strongest points are the Brit- anny, Normandy, and Denmark peninsulas. Rough water is a problem at many points, especially in the Bay of Biscay. Shoals, tidal flats, and winding chan- nels from deep water to the beaches characterize long stretches of the North-Sea shoreline. The enemy's transportation network is strongest and his fortifica- tion system deepest along the French and Belgian coast, where the narrowing Channel brings English flying XIV. PINCERS ON BERLIN the Wehrmacht weakened by the blockade and by the shattering blows from the air. The Red Army has already made a gigantic contribu- tion to the task of destroying the German army. On a smaller scale, the Mediterranean campaign has con- tributed to the war of attrition against the Wehrmacht. The reopening of a major land front in western Europe fields closest to the continental shoreline. (See fig. 18.) Thus it is clear that no landing point gives all the geo. graphical advantages to the invasion force. The final decisions necessarily involve compromises reached after most careful evaluation of all geographical and military factors. Whatever the decisions, the invasion of western Eu- rope is an operation fraught with risks. But if the risks are great, great also is the opportunity to breach the walls of Fortress Europe and penetrate to the inner- most citadels of the enemy's power. adds immeasurably to the strain upon the enemy's de- pleted and rapidly shrinking reserves of men and ma- tériel. The concerted offensive on all three fronts is the final play that leads inexorably to the annihilation of the Wehrmacht and Germany's unconditional sur- render. 79 Chapter 13 GEOGRAPHY AND GRAND STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC AND ASIATIC THEATER OF WAR Long before the present war, the military caste which rules Japan was building a vast continental-oceanic empire in the Far East. Some Nipponese extremists talked recklessly of extending their sway over all Asia, and into Europe, Africa, and the Americas. But Japan's more realistic empire builders devoted their energies mainly to eastern and southeastern Asia and the Pacific Ocean. They have never blue-printed precisely the bound- aries of their projected realm. Japanese ambition has tended to grow with each success. But it is now reason- INTRODUCTION ably clear that the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” as the Japanese have called their growing empire, was eventually to reach deep into Asia and far out into the Pacific Ocean. ** Throughout an immense region, bounded roughly by India, Lake Baikal, Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand, Aus- tralia, and the East Indies, Japan was to have a mo- nopoly of arms, and a near monopoly of heavy industry. The subjugated peoples were to be hewers of wood and drawers of water, producing food and raw materials for their Japanese lords and masters. I PREWAR IAPAN. * The steps taken to carry out this grandiose project reflect a geographical and military logic as plain as that underlying Hitler's march to the Atlantic. Each Japanese move has represented an attempt to counter- act some geographical handicap, to overcome some stra- tegical weakness, or to exploit some natural advantage. Each territorial accession has prepared the way for the next. And down to the summer of 1942, each Japanese aggression strengthened either the industrial potential or the Strategical position of the mushrooming empire. MILITARY POTENTIAL AND STRATEGICAL POSITION Japan embarked upon her quest for empire with few natural assets and many liabilities. The geographical foundations of Japanese power—and weakness—have been described at length in a previous chapter. It will suffice here to recall that Japan proper comprises four large and numerous small islands strung along the coast of eastern Asia between the latitude of Lake Superior and that of New Orleans. Altogether these main islands cover a land area smaller than California. Like California the island kingdom is a mountainous country. Less than 20 per- cent of the land can be cultivated. This gives Japan's 70 million people less arable land in their home islands than is contained in the single state of Iowa. Japan proper has an even poorer endowment of fuel and mineral wealth. There is considerable mediocre coal, some copper, less iron, a little petroleum, and not very much else. The country's metallurgical base, without the empire, is scarcely greater than Italy's, and grossly inadequate to support a military power rivalling that of Great Britain, Germany, Soviet Russia, or the United States. - 1. THE RISE OF JAPANESE POWER. Japanese military development constitutes an ex- traordinary achievement in the face of terrific natural obstacles. By drawing heavily upon the resources of Europe and America, and by cultivating a spartan way of life for all but a trifling minority of aristocrats, the “Children of the Rising Sun” succeeded in accumulating the arms necessary to take the first steps in empire- building. By diverting their meager resources more and more into military channels, and by exploiting the chronic strife among the Western powers, they were able to achieve one success after another at compara- tively small cost. These successive cheap victories gave them new Sources of raw materials. By this means, they progressively enlarged the industrial base of their military power and proportionately freed their country from its economic bondage to the West. But all this achievement has not given Japan the status and strength of the Super-powers. Japan still has feet of clay. 2. JAPAN'S STRATEGICAL POSITION. Geographical remoteness from strong potential ene- mies contributed not a little to Japan's rapid rise to power. The military development of China and of the Russian Far East is of recent date, and still lags far behind that of Europe and the United States. The principal European powers and the United States all have colonial possessions or other interests in the Pa- cific and Far East. But their main seats of power are located far away upon the opposite face of the globe. 80 IN THE PACIFIC, 1937 & & S O V | ET UN | ON . Aake S \ A Irkutsk &aika/ * e. JAPAN's STRATEGICOUTFOSIST * = *sº goa” & .* Farawshiko Alaº KARAFUTO. Ko: & WAONG OL | A § 24% A . ." \S ,” £r A ZOA (CZW/ C. () CACAN' +ALASKA Q. c{\ º § Go/f of Alaska 5urch ...”HARBOR SKure `... WARCUS 1. tº sºs - e Fr Frigate Sº-T PEARL ºfflomolºſ) #&#. * Saipan *s, GUAM Rota [JAPANESEI w (U.S.) \, • * * AWARSHALL JEniwetok, [S. * @ HAWAIAN wake 1 a.º. (ſhiteå States) • * * * * AMAJOR AWD AOTE/W77AA A/AV/GABAR TøADA Advre Ex/TS PROM 7//E AZAC/AT/C. tº sº s = * tº ſº Ya ºv • 's ti "Pengh; é? €9 "... * . ($ "guape 3.69Wotje § Kingman Reef }(s) Tº Palau caroline islan ºut. T---> Washingºing gia; sº Sº * ol. * 3. `----, Gër) & Christmas(Ge.8:303) SUMA J º • J GILBERT. Is C Yss * [BRITISH Sººn, EEGEEE i. ...woºttº i. s e & º WARQUESAs .S. s. 19. Euge | ... [U.S.-NZ) ... Is. christwas .* *santag r: Fă U * •. gº " & º §ºtuſ. TUAMOTO ARCH (ºt. Gr) (Gr. 8r) Darw/ ga|EFEk, New Fly tº SAMA Tutuila S. 2 • *.... ! i :HEBRIDEs º”. |S. INEW ZEALAND * ... . *:::::: ZAV ZD/AAV ! * © 3. * -. • SJ . . . . . . | <> (/Vä - * '• -. `--> * : • . Ø (C ZEALANſ A U S T R A L I A jº. tºry Tºga Cook is. [ERENCH] NAVAL BASES &isine # Usº /Main Secondary risbane 5- © *::::: [. ! SC. : KERMADEC 15 “....., || @ & U.S. syney," i "º" (AZz) - `i º E3 BRITISH & ; - | / * Sº - i HE BE DUTCH sºlº, Nºw, ºf PACIFTC OcEAN | €39 é9 JAPANESE $) A *"º Weſſington | @ U.S.S.R. F-----, WJºania *CHATHAM 15. «» (wz) Geographical isolation has definite military value. Ja- pan, like the United States, has derived great advan- tage from the vast distances separating it from other centers of military power. 3. JAPAN'S STRATEGIC OUTPOSTS. The Japanese have progressively strengthened their strategical position by acquiring and fortifying out- posts screening virtually all the sea approaches to their island home. By 1937 these had come to include the following: (1) Karafuto and the Kurile chain which guard the northern approaches and flank the great circle route from North America to the Orient; (2) the Bonin and Mariannas islands protecting the direct line of approach from the south; (3) the Caroline and Mar- shall groups extending far out into the central Pacific; (4) the Ryukyu (Nansei) chain and the great island of Taiwan (Formosa) which screen the passages into the East China Sea; and (5) Korea and Manchuria on the Asiatic mainland facing Japan. 4. JAPAN’S WULNERABILITY TO LONG-RANGE BLOCKADE. Japan's island screen afforded no protection whatever against long-range blockade. To this form of pressure the island kingdom was and is peculiarly sensitive. Be- . fore 1941 Japan depended heavily upon imports of in- dustrial equipment and raw materials. Despite efforts to develop their own sources of supply, the Japanese still drew large quantities of machine tools, oil, rubber, scrap metal, and other strategic essentials from North Amer- ica, the East Indies, southeastern Asia, India, the Middle East, and Europe. Two main arteries connected Japan with these sources of supply overseas. One ran parallel to the Asiatic coastline, through the South China Sea, and thence into the Indian Ocean and beyond. The other crossed the Pacific to the Americas. Well over one-half of Japan's vital imports flowed along these extended sea routes. Both of them reached beyond the pre-1941 range of Japanese naval power, and far beyond the island out- posts of Japan's pre-1941 empire. The British Empire held commanding positions along the southwestern rim of the Pacific. American sea power held sway over the eastern reaches of that Ocean. Between them Great Britain and the United States controlled all passage-ways between the Pacific and the Indian, Arctic, and Atlantic Oceans, as well as the sea FIGURE 25 81 -: U 'S S R SAKHALIN ſ] Ö 0. O O s B E R A. / sº gº” 3. * KARAFUTO § § Khabarºvsk J- ſ (7 ULPHUR - y Z §s OK KAI DO º C & oſ' * - º 2/3part- Ron - // *O | Vis ONSU KANSU (a. Y -" <=º 'sees @TOKYO Nº. * || * e º, - - - - - ſºjº, gº" º' Key: U. !lſº 'º" ºf tº SH | KOKU -TTT 7% fyVº 2 COA -- & 2 § *ś, MANGANEse Lll *WW/MCF'ſ A///#/) T &\,\ k\(USHU Ø ("AEAAW _LLLL 707% PUPP. 7 Vº &B D |North $7A7A. Shanghai —O- JAPAWFSF DK/VF5 lºng Ža. .# %. g ///70 WGO//A & © 7/# JV/£7 (//V/0// %achow Chºna & /M/Z &s N. : B00MWDAR/FJ Foochow Jºe #. O * : - . . . - * ". . . . . . . . . . /000 Powca. * T MANCHURA's YUN N AN TAIWAN, cT - - | KWANGS ] ſº) | STRATEGICAL POSITION CH IN A 2--> FIGURE 26 approaches to the Americas, to the East Indies, and to southeastern Asia. Prior to 1941 it was generally accepted that Japan dominated a huge land and water area behind its far- flung screen of island ramparts. But as long as the United States and the British Empire held the more re- mote borderlands and the exits from the Pacific Ocean, Japan was and would remain a prisoner within a sharply circumscribed region bounded roughly by the Interna- tional Date Line (180th Meridian) and the Equator. 5. THE MENACE FROM THE MAINLAND. Japan's position vis-à-vis the Asiatic mainland also embodied elements both of strength and of weakness. The Japanese islands screen the coastline of Asia as do the British Isles the coastline of northwestern Europe. Ships bound for the ports of central and northern China and Siberia must pass within a few miles of Japanese territory. On the other hand, the rapid development of military technology in recent years—in particular, the submarine and the bombing plane—has progressively undermined the security of Japan's island citadel, just as in the case of Great Britain. Both countries are heavily dependent upon seaborne supplies. Both lie dangerously close to existing or potential air and submarine bases on the nearby continental mainland. The situation of Japan, however, has differed from England's in at least two important respects. On the one hand, Japan is even more sensitive to blockade than England, and incomparably more vulnerable to bombing because of the flimsy construction of Japanese cities. On the other hand, as previously noted, eastern Asia has lagged behind Europe in political and military develop- ment, thus giving Japan additional time in which to meet the rising menace from the mainland. 6. JAPANESE STRATEGY IN EASTERN ASIA. Since there was no staying the advance of military technology, Japanese leaders chose the other alterna- tive. They have tried persistently to block the develop- ment of strong rival states in eastern Asia, and have undertaken themselves to establish and build up a sub- sidiary industrial-military seat of power upon the mainland. - These aims harmonized perfectly with other ambi- tions. Long before the present war, Japanese im- perialists were laboring tirelessly to enlarge their economic sphere in the Far East. Their insatiable ap- petite for power and profits went hand in hand with their more legitimate quest for national security. The first World War gave Japan its first great oppor- tunity. That titanic conflict created an inflated market for war matériel. This fostered rapid industrial expan- sion in Japan, with a consequent rise in that country's military potential and capacity for future mischief. The war also removed temporarily the danger of serious Western interference. European forces were withdrawn from the Far East under the pressure of necessity. The United States was left virtually sole guardian of West- ern interests in eastern Asia. But even the United States was forced momentarily into a relatively passive role as the American people became more and more deeply involved in the European struggle. Japan made the most of this unprecedented oppor- tunity. In 1914, the Nipponese government took ad- vantage of its alliance with Great Britain to enter the war and seize both the German concession in Shantung on the mainland and the German islands north of the equator. In 1915 China was presented with the in- famous “Twenty-One Demands.” That ultimatum, if fully carried out, would have reduced China to the status of a helpless Japanese satellite. In 1918, follow- ing the Russian revolution, Japanese armed forces swarmed into eastern Siberia with the obvious purpose of subjugating that region for the emperor. Though local resistance and Western pressures eventually com- pelled the Japanese to suspend both of these aggressive enterprises, there was no mistaking the trend of Jap- anese policy in eastern Asia. This trend became still more pronounced in the grow- ing struggle for control of Manchuria. The area bear- ing that name comprises the three northern provinces of Greater China. These lie northwest of Korea in a pocket formed by that Japanese dependency, eastern Siberia, Mongolia, and North China proper. Japanese strategists and empire-builders have long regarded Manchuria as the key position in their struggle for eastern Asia. - : They have coveted Manchuria for three principal reasons. First, that region contains valuable raw ma- terials—iron and coal in particular—which supple- ments the weak industrial base of Japan proper. Sec- ond, Japanese strategists have desired Manchuria to forestall its ever becoming a springboard for an attack on Korea, or even on Japan itself. Third, they have viewed this region as a geostrategic lever with which to pry open the doorways into eastern Siberia, into central Asia, and into North China. - One glance at the accompanying map (fig. 26) is suffi- cient to grasp the military importance of Manchuria's geographical position. With the Japanese in Man- churia, Vladivostok stands at the apex of a long narrow salient, exposed to attack on three sides. Northern Manchuria in turn thrusts a broad and deep salient into Soviet Asia. From southern Manchuria opens an his- toric gateway into Mongolia, through which an army could strike deep in the area of Soviet defenses in the Far East. Finally, Manchuria provides an easy land route into North China, a region of immense value to the Jap- anese Empire. Within the five Chinese provinces of Shantung, Shansi, Hopei, Suiyuan, and Chahar, are lo- cated the richest known coal fields in the Far East. Shansi alone has thirty times as much coal fields as all the Japanese islands. In addition there are substantial mineral deposits, especially iron ore. The ores of Cha- har alone are said to exceed the total iron reserves of Rorea and Japan combined. Without the fuels and minerals of this region, China would have little chance of ever becoming a strong mili- tary power. With the resources of North China and Manchuria together, the Japanese could build upon the Asiatic mainland a supplementary industrial base to bolster the shaky foundations of their top-heavy empire. In 1931, at a time when the peoples of Europe and the United States were mired in the Great Depression, Japanese armed forces took over Manchuria. Shortly thereafter they extended their hold to the neighboring province of Jehol. These territories they grouped to- gether to form the puppet state of Manchukuo. From that strategic fulcrum they commenced prying their way into North China, and in July 1937 struck the open- ing blow of the still continuing war in eastern Asia. 83 "Auſ * * e 2. (2. *Zaº 5 § 3. . . . . . '', ** {4////lultſ; I..." . : ...?ºſit/ ſe * * * ..? * * * * tº • I «» • * * * 17/7, , ; ; il | | | */ : , - s'. t sº • * * * !!!}. %, & Z, J 1 ºv"...º.º. * f. , ..."? º SN Z # * * * * * * , ... ſº, iſ ºs ...llinºiſillſ; * : *t iſ nº. f g & !?!, M1,'" . #3; * wº 14 a e * * * K{EY Aaj/wey's Aoeo's Grena/Cºng? 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S.S.S t L * * * * J/J * , t , S. S • W \!! t * , e g | | * ~ * S' '' S 3. > º • • *. 2 ~ : T. • S S S > . ~. * * * *... .Y. E: E - - * * * → & • " º * ... a = 5 SSS 5 × . . .” *... • Nº- ºr-- . ę gº - * gº ** * § SF S: , . . . . . . .\;E/:: * º . SAS3 s - . . . . . . . . . . . Nº A-. " s * - * - *E= * gº S s sº * '. * & * = - YV- - I. S. s -" * * g • . - - - .* SSSF. o • * iſ 7. $ > S > . . . * * , * t * * gºe := & . . . ~~ . . . = • 2: / ?' " :22 i#* =à : sº • : 3. g tº º : <<ā; : e : : & .. .. .- : §§º: }"Viadii §§ ºff Vladivostock *:::: º::::::\,\º Sº... *: • ** , - º & • * * * * * * * . . * * * & ** , , , , . " ' ' ' ' ' ' , , , , , * **. * * **\ * * * ' ' ' ' ' " i , ºf * 9 :/º tº , ; N e **** \lº ‘. * i; g g goveshchensk * , ºr OSEN 3. s(korea) : ** l º * YA: / / Ol// A/orkh AAS7 CA///ya º ºg §§ {Weſºłow SEA * * § { fe * s' •A. * JAPANESE STRATEGY IN NORTH CHINA IN 1937 II JAPANS UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST CHINA Geography has influenced every move in this Asiatic struggle. The structure of China's frontiers, the country's land and sea connections, its shape and size, its mountains, rivers, deserts, and other natural barriers, the location of passes and plains, of waterways, roads, and railroads, all these and other geographic factors have influenced the strategy both of Japanese invasion and of Chinese defense. 1. JAPANESE STRATEGY IN NORTH CHINA, 1937. The Sino-Japanese conflict opened with an obscure shooting affray near Peiping. This incident afforded a pretext for aggression. Japanese troops poured in from nearby Manchuria, and fighting spread through- out North China. The immediate Japanese objective seems to have been limited to occupying the five provinces of North China. Mention has already been made of some of the reasons why Japan’s military masters coveted that re- gion. But there seems to have been a further and more pressing strategic consideration. From various clues it appears that the Japanese Army in the summer of 1937 was preparing for an early attack on the Russian Far East. For this venture it was imperative to Secure a tight grip on the eastern terminus of the caravan- motor road across Outer Mongolia, and on the railroad connecting that road with the North China plain. Without control of this desert artery, Manchuria would be exposed to Soviet attack in the rear. With the road in Japanese hands, the Russians themselves would have to hold back strong forces to defend their own communications system which runs close to the Mongolian frontier. Japanese operations developed rapidly in the north- west. One strong force advanced along the railway from Peiping through Nankow Pass into Chahar prov- ince. The invaders occupied Kalgan, terminus of the desert road, and pushed on through Chahar and Suiyuan provinces. Part of the force continued to the rail- head at Paotow. Another column turned south into Shansi. Still another force, meanwhile, was advancing into Shansi by a railroad farther south. These two coi. umns converged on Taiyuan, the provincial capital, and an important way station on the route from Peiping and the North China plain to Siam, Lanchow, and the cara- van-motor road across Sinkiang to central Siberia. By the end of 1937 the Japanese were in control of most of the railroads and other communications of North China. In addition, they had fastened an iron grip on the principal mining and manufacturing cen- ters. They had barred the back door to Manchuria. Given a little more time in which to stamp out continu- ing guerrilla resistance in the back country, they would be in position, should opportunity offer, to strike north- westward across Outer Mongolia to break Russia's only railway link with the Far East. (See fig. 28.) 2. WAR IN CENTRAL CHINA. Events, however, did not permit the conquerors to di- gest north China at their leisure. Whether by accident or by Chinese design, the fighting spread in mid-August 1937 to the region around Shanghai, the great inter- national city near the mouth of the Yangtze River in Central China. Hostilities in that vicinity developed rapidly into a major battle which raged for weeks, with both sides pouring in reenforcements. In the end heavier fire- power and better generalship won victory for the Jap- anese. The Chinese, badly disorganized, retreated up the river. located about 175 miles above Shanghai. By this time the Japanese were deeply involved, more deeply perhaps than they had originally intended. Their limited campaign to subjugate North China had grown into a full-scale war on the Yangtze. They had defeated large bodies of Chinese troops. But they had yet to destroy the government and armed forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Japan's prestige was at stake, and with it the future of the Japanese Empire. Or so it seemed to the war lords of Tokio, who now made the fateful decision to press the larger struggle, wipe out Chiang's government, smash the emerging Chi- nese nationalism, and subjugate the whole country at one fell swoop. 3. AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE ON THE YANGTZE. After the early battles in North China and around Shanghai and Nanking, the next Japanese offensive was a ship-borne advance on Hankow, industrial city and communications focus several hundred miles farther up the Yangtze, whence the Chinese government had re- tired after the fall of Nanking. The enemy pursued and, before the end of the year, marched into Nanking, Chinese capital This campaign was a revelation of the potentialities of amphibious warfare. At intervals above Nanking the Chinese had blocked the river by sinking junks in the channel. These obstructions were covered by ar- tillery and machine guns so placed as to deliver an en- filading fire from both shores. Lack of roads back from the river protected these shore batteries from attacks in the rear. The enemy had to come ashore and take them by storm. To do so they had to, and did, perfect methods of landing under cover of planes and naval guns. It took several months of this kind of fighting to reach Hankow. But on the way the Japanese learned a great deal about combining land, sea, and air forces in amphibious attacks on defended beaches. Thus the advance on Hankow was both a rehearsal and also a preview (for those who had eyes to see) of the am- phibious blitzkrieg which Japan was to unleash later against British, Dutch, and American defenses in the Pacific and Far East. 4. STRATEGY OF COMMUNICATIONS IN CEN- TRAL CHINA. Hankow is the strategic focus of Central China. That city is the hub of the densely populated middle basin of the Yangtze, one of China’s richest food-growing regions. It is also a foremost manufacturing center. But above all it is a communications crossroads. Han- kow is to China what Chicago is to the United States. Hankow stands at the point where the main north- south railway crosses the Yangtze. This railway, the last link of which was completed only a few months before the outbreak of war, reaches from Peiping in the far north to the South China port of Canton. It is the only through overland route connecting North and South China. & The Yangtze River is the comparable east-west artery. This great waterway, navigable by large vessels for several hundred miles upstream, and by special river craft for 1,500 miles, is to China today what the Missis- sippi was to the United States a century ago. Hankow is the transshipping point for traffic through the deep gorges which the Yangtze has cut through the mountain wall guarding Szechwan province, the rugged interior citadel whose principal city, Chungking, is to- day China's temporary capital. - 85 In 1938 the rail and river arteries which intersected at Hankow formed the skeletal frame of the country's communication system. From one or other of these main lines branched off most of the railroads, water- ways, and roads capable of carrying heavy military traffic. - Hankow, the hub of this communications grid, was thus a prize of great value to Japan; its loss a major disaster for China. The capture of Hankow tightened the conqueror's grip on the North China plain and on the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze. At Han- kow they stood astride the strategic crossroads of Cen- tral China. This gave them the greatest possible mobility, while isolating the Chinese forces still fight- ing at widely separated points in North, Central, and South China. The Chinese retreat across the mountains into Szechwan was the inexorable consequence of the fall of Hankow. 5. THE CHINESE PLAN OF DEFENSE. This retreat into western China was no headlong flight. It was an orderly withdrawal carried out in accordance with a defense plan prepared in advance, a plan which envisaged a long war of attrition fought in three phases. The first phase was to be a fighting retreat from the coast to strong positions in the mountainous provinces of Shansi, Shensi, and Szechwan. The Japanese, it was foreseen, would not risk an all-out drive into western China. The second phase of the war was to consist mainly of guerrilla fighting. Armed bands were to raid enemy garrisons, supply trains, and other military objectives throughout the occupied zone. By such tactics the conquerors were to be kept from reaping the fruits of early victories. Eventually, it was assumed, the Jap- anese would be compelled to withdraw towards the Coast. - At that point the war would enter the third phase contemplated in the Chinese plan. This was to be a major offensive to turn the enemy's retreat into a rout. 6. CHINESE DEFENSE IN PRACTICE. The war did not develop entirely as the Chinese ex- pected. In North China the struggle passed almost im- mediately into the guerilla phase. In Central China the fighting retreat up the Yangtze valley cost the Chi- nese most of their foreign-trained first-line troops and imported heavy weapons. Japanese strength and per- sistence certainly exceeded Chinese expectations. At the same time, as Chinese military leaders had foreseen, geography set limits to the Japanese invasion. Broken terrain and lack of modern transportation have been the critical factors in this military equation. Many parts of China can be reached only by foot-trails. These conditions rigidly limit the use of automotive equipment and modern heavy weapons. Only along navigable rivers and canals, the few railroads, and in- frequent highways, is it possible to move and deploy tanks, artillery, and other heavy equipment. In most regions troops can advance across country away from the main arteries with only such matériel as they or their coolie porters can carry upon their backs. Without roads the Japanese could not bring their su- perior ground-fighting weapons to bear on the remain- ing centers of Chinese resistance. Without their heavy Weapons they could not defeat the vastly greater num- bers of Chinese troops awaiting them in the back country. 7. THE STRATEGY OF ATTRITION. For the geographical reasons just mentioned, the Japanese armies made no attempt to pursue the Chinese westward into the mountains. Instead, after the fall of Hankow, they settled down to a war of attrition, in which they concentrated mainly upon tightening their grip on eastern China and upon starving western China into submission. One phase of this attrition strategy was unremitting effort to stamp out guerilla resistance within the occu- pied zone. In this, however, they were none too success- ful. Japanese punitive expeditions could temporarily break up partisan bands in particular localities. But they could not police every town and village. By the end of 1941 Japanese troops still had little or no hold, even in eastern China, beyond artillery range of the main roads, railroads, and navigable waterways. Another phase of the attrition strategy was the sys- tematic pillaging of the countryside. On these raids, often timed to coincide with harvests, the Japanese troops seized or destroyed crops, sacked and burned villages, killed large numbers of peasants, drove others from their farms, and then retired leaving utter devasta- tion in their wake. - A futile attempt was also made to break Chinese re- sistance by means of bombing. In June 1940 Japanese troops advanced up the Yangtze from Hankow to Ichang at the entrance to the Yangtze gorges. From there it was only about 250 airline miles to Chungking. Establishing airfields in this area, the Japanese bombed the Chinese capital and other objectives repeatedly, causing heavy damage but achieving no strategic results whatever. Three years of these and other limited operations in- side China left the military map pretty much as it was after the fall of Hankow. The Chinese could not expel the invaders from their eastern provinces. The latter could not reach the centers of resistance in western China. Confronted with this deadlock inside China, the Japanese concentrated more and more effort on tightening a blockade around China. s. THE STRATEGY of BLOCKADE. Japanese naval power completely dominated Chinese coastal waters. During 1937–38 the invaders occupied every important seaport from the Manchurian border to the mouth of the Yangtze. Late in 1938 a Japanese army landed near Canton, outflanked that city’s de- fenses, and marched into the gateway seaport of South China. During 1939 enemy forces occupied or block- aded every remaining Chinese port having rail or water connections with the interior. One roundabout route, however, remained open. This ran from the port of Haiphong in French Indochina. From Haiphong a narrow-gage railway connected with Kunming, capital of Yünnan, China’s southernmost province which adjoins both Indochina and Burma. From Kunming supplies were trucked several hundred miles over rough mountain roads to Chungking and other points in free China. After a few months this link with the coast was blocked also. Following the German conquest of France in June 1940, Japanese forces occupied the principal ports of Indochina, blocking further shipments to free China by that route. Meanwhile, events were causing a simultaneous if less drastic curtailment of traffic along the desert roads into western China (fig. 27). As previously noted, early Japanese operations in North China blocked the eastern terminus both of the desert road across Outer Mon- golia and of the northern branch of the longer route from central Asia across the deserts of Sinkiang. The southern branch of the Sinkiang route, through Lan- chow and Chengtu, remained open. The airline, which 86 VTV N.' - * * * * * C Akyº. 8 UP MA Aſ *HONG KONG \ A--~ \-- G.ulf ſ f of w § J 70mkin +4AI NAN .-' “Jºv a & ſº MANGANESE - \ Riº \ T] Nſ | THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MALACCASTRATT IN THE DRIVE TO CUT THE BURNMA ROAD ) - ToBAcco . º \. 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But the flow of war materials along this route dwindled to almost nothing as the Soviet Union labored to bolster its own defenses, and finally to stem the German invasion. - 9. CHINA’S ANSWER TO THE BLOCKADE. China countered the blockade in three ways. These were: (1) new local sources of production; (2) block- ade-running; and (3) the Burma Road. The loss of pre-war industrial centers as the Jap- anese took possession of the Seaports and advanced in- land along the railroads, roads, and waterways, dealt a body blow to Chinese military potential. But China had a second line of defense on the production front. This second line consisted of a great many widely dis- tributed small-scale metal-working industries. Every town in the interior has its little workshops and skilled artesans. These have survived in the ma- chine-age largely because of the extreme difficulty and prohibitive cost of distributing factory-made goods in China’s mountainous and almost roadless back country. Under the pressure of the blockade these workshops were converted into makeshift arsenals. They learned to make rifles, grenades, trench mortars, and other sim- ple weapons, using mainly local raw materials produced in the most primitive smelters. They could not make tanks, artillery, and other heavy equipment. In con- Sequence, the fire-power of the Chinese armies declined from year to year. But poor weapons are better than no weapons at all, and China’s workshop industries played a significant role in Chinese defense during the struggle of attrition which followed the fall of Hankow. In addition to metal craft, thousands of blankets and large quantities of cloth for clothing for the army have been produced in homes and 'small local workshops. This is not the result of unorganized activity but rep- resents a carefully planned cooperative movement. Blockade-running also played a role of some im- portance. Small craft smuggled goods into coastal China from the nearby Philippines and from the British and Dutch colonies farther south. Manila and Hong- kong, moreover, provided vital links in the airline which continued to fly high priority passengers and supplies across Japanese-held territory into free China. The Burma Road was China's third answer to the blockade. A route was surveyed connecting Kun- ming in mountainous Yünnan province, with Lashio in equally mountainous northern Burma. From Lashio a railroad ran to Rangoon on the Bay of Bengal. The airline distance separating Kunming and Lashio is only about 250 miles. But the Burma Road traversed some of the roughest country in the world. The finished road measured over 700 miles of steep grades and hairpin curves. Part of it was only a one-way track. While sections were repeatedly washed away by the torrential rains which fall during certain seasons of the year. Traffic began to move along the Burma Road in 1939. At first the tonnage was very small. It never grew to be very large. In no month during its brief period of operation was more freight hauled into China over this route than could be loaded into two Liberty ships. But even that little helped to keep China fighting and to hold the military stalemate in eastern Asia. 10. JAPAN'S STRATEGIC DILEMMA. By the Summer of 1941 Japanese strategy in eastern . Asia was rapidly approaching bankruptcy. Direct at- tack had won victories and carried the Japenese armies deep into China, but had failed to force a decision. The ensuing strategy of attrition had caused untold misery to China's suffering millions, but had failed utterly to break that people's will to resist. The blockade, prin- cipal instrument of the attrition strategy, showed an incurable tendency to develop leaks. Traffic on the Burma Road was increasing, and Japan was powerless to stop it without precipitating armed conflict with Great Britain and the United States. Fresh clouds, moreover, darkened Japan’s eastern and Southern horizons. China's struggle was gradually becoming the common cause of other nations. The flow of supplies along the Burma Road symbolized the grow- ing alarm with which the English-speaking peoples watched the struggle in China. An emerging will to resist the growing and spreading menace was reflected in active if belated preparations for the concerted de- fense of British, Dutch, and American territories in the Far East. The Dutch were defiantly resisting Japanese demands on the oil and other natural resources of the East Indies. The British Empire and the United States were cutting down exports of critical war materials to Japan. These trade restrictions were rapidly develop- ing into a virtual counter-blockade which undermined the shaky foundations of Japanese military power and threatened disaster to Japan's deadlocked armies in Asia. To conquer China, Japan had to stop the leaks in the blockade and, above all, close the Burma Road. To break the counter-blockade rising against Japan itself, Tokio's military masters had no alternative but to seize the sources of critical raw materials, in the Philippines, in Southeastern Asia, and in the East Indies. To do any of these things, they had first to smash the Anglo- Dutch-American coalition taking form in the Pacific. The key position, in Japanese eyes, was the island of Singapore. This island, located just off the tip of Malaya, commands the main passage-way from the South China Sea into the Indian Ocean (fig. 28). Upon this island the British government had constructed a formidable naval base. Around this stronghold were grouped the defenses of an immense area. This area reached from India, Burma, and Malaya, to Hongkong and the Philippines, and to the East Indies, Australia, and New Zealand. The fall of Singapore would shatter the defenses of this whole area, and open to Japan a military highway into the Indian Ocean. But Japan’s rulers hesitated to risk an all-out drive on Singapore without first crippling the naval-air power of the United States. Our Pacific Fleet, consisting in December 1941 of eight battleships, four aircraft car- riers, and a large number of cruisers, destroyers, and subsidiary craft, was the strongest military force in the Pacific available for immediate counter-action. The mere presence of the American fleet at Pearl Harbor during the autumn of 1941 was a strategical fact which Japanese commanders dared not ignore. They had to reckon with the possibility of its being dis- patched in whole or in part to Singapore and the South China Sea, the possibility of its covering the movement of land and air reinforcements to that area, or the pos- sibility of its undertaking diversionary action in some other quarter once Japanese forces were fully engaged in the southwestern Pacific. Japan was thus confronted with a strategical prob- lem of staggering dimensions. To conquer China and complete their Asiatic empire, Japan’s military masters had literally to conquer and hold the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In undertaking this in 1941, Tojo turned his back on unvanquished China. He committed Japan's armed forces to fighting simultaneously on widely sepa- rated fronts upon a battlefield covering fully one-third of the globe. He pitted Japan's severely limited mili- 88 O 2° ſº? S ; K.A.T. BORN:9 wº/Z ſº. f e/? | Sea * N Cóe 93 Philº TAIWAN *A*2 3. <2 We Seaſ MONGOLIA ºf-5 •GUAM l º: MANCHURIA (ſ U |* S e R. Kºź ... JAPA & iſºpon sy *SS º * Jeºsy PARAMUSHIRU 1. " - //V/D/A /N Zºº; tºº º 4" AKE |. W-S normº A/CC//C OCAA/V º POLE * ALEUTIAN , º/79. I/ º ocea'. - & ſ - E U ROPE Q Q \ , MIDWAY, I. *.N u/A' of V 7/exico Aº’ ” º *†Carréean = Nº * SOUT * XA M\ E R | CA SINGAPORE TO LIMA SOUTHERN ROUTE FIGURE 29 tary resources against a coalition of enemies who pos- sessed vastly greater war-making capacity, and hence incalculably greater staying power in a long war of at- trition. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, like Ger- many's invasion of Russia, was a colossal military gamble, involving the risk of irretrievable disaster. At the same time, Japan’s fateful gamble reflected shrewd appraisal of certain compensating conditions and circumstances. These were derived in part from the geography of the Pacific Ocean, in part from the strategic situation within that ocean, and in part from the trend of the war in Europe and the Atlantic. III. PACIFIC BATTLEGROUND The Pacific Ocean is the world’s largest battleground. In size this huge body of water approximates the At- lantic, Indian, and Arctic Oceans combined. It reaches nearly half-way around the globe at the equator; three- quarters of the way from pole to pole. In shape the Pacific Ocean is almost a hemisphere. This fact is not readily apparent from the Mercator and other maps in common use. It can be easily verified, however, by examining a globe, or by describing an imaginary plane flight around the rim of this vast ocean. One could lay a straight-line flying course from Sing- apore that would follow quite closely the Pacific coast- line of Asia and the Americas, and eventually reach Lima, Peru. Such a course would pass between For- mosa and the China coast; between Korea and Japan. The plane would pass almost within sight of the Jap- anese naval base upon Paramushiru in the Kurile Islands. It would skirt the long Aleutian chain. Its course would cut the Oregon coast near the mouth of the Columbia River; cross Nevada, Arizona, and eastern Mexico. It would pass over the Pacific again near the Panama Canal, and roughly parallel the coastline of Peru. * At the start of this imaginary flight the plar e's course would lie roughly northeast. Though following a straight-line course, it would arrive over Lima pointed Southeast. By changing course to due South at this point, the plane would skirt the coast of Chile and fly over the South Pole. Continuing in this new straight line, but now pointed due north, the plane would even- tually arrive back at Singapore, having made a com- plete circuit of the Pacific with only one rather slight deviation from its original straight-line course. 612655°—44—7 89 SINGAPORE TO LIMA NORTHERN ROUTE FIGURE 30 1. TRANS-PACIFIC IDISTANCES. The Asiatic and North American coast-lines, as indi- cated above, lie almost but not quite in a continuous straight line. At Bering Strait the two continents al- most touch. A few hundred miles to the south, Petro- pavlovsk (in Russian Kamchatka) and Prince Rupert (British Columbia) lie in nearly the same latitude but are 2,500 miles apart. Still farther south on another common parallel, Yokohama and Los Angeles are nearly 5,000 miles apart. In the latitude of Saigon (Indo- china) and Panama, the Pacific has widened to 10,000 miles. As already indicated, the shortest routes between the United States and eastern Asia lie well to the north. Even along these routes the distances are great. The shortest sailing course from San Francisco to Tokio measures over 5,000 miles. But it is well over 6,000 miles from San Francisco to Tokio by way of Hawaii, and more than 12,000 miles by way of Sidney, Australia. To go from the United States to Japan by this southern route is like going from New York to London by way of Brazil. 2. THE NORTH PACIFIC. / Along the northern route to Japan we possess strate- gic outposts in Alaska and in the Aleutian islands which reach out like a long arm towards Asia. Kiska and Attu lie well within 2,500 miles of all the important industrial centers of Japan. But military operations in this northern area encounter climatic and other difficul- ties which partially cancel out the advantage of geo- graphical position. Coastal Alaska, the Aleutian islands, and adjacent waters are notorious for every kind of weather except fair weather. Weather in the eastern part of the islands is continually bad. Fogs are almost continu- ous. Violent winds and heavy seas make any kind of operations in this area difficult. The land itself is almost everywhere mountainous and rocky. 3. THE NORTH-CENTRAL PACIFIC. Reaching southward from the Aleutian islands is a vast region of empty ocean. Oahu island (where Pearl Harbor is located) is 2,400 miles from the California coast; 2,300 miles from the Aleutian islands; and 5,000 miles from the Panama Canal—with no island “step- ping stones” in between. Turning west, the distance from Pearl Harbor to Tokio is almost 4,000 miles. This stretch of ocean, too, is completely empty save for the Hawaiian chain which terminates at Midway island, 1,300 miles from Oahu, and 2,600 miles from Japan. 4. THE WESTERN AND SOUTHWESTERN PACIFIC. This area presents a very different aspect. Islands Screen the coast of Asia all the way from Kamchatka to the Southern tip of Malaya. A belt of islands roughly 2,000 miles in width, extends through the tropic Pacific, along both sides of the equator, from the coast of Asia. to a point fully two-thirds of the distance to the Panama Canal and the west coast of South America. The accompanying map shows the island structure of these areas. In the main, the islands lie in tiers or chains, a geographic fact of the utmost military significance. From Hokaido, northernmost of Japan’s home islands, the Kurile chain reaches out towards Kamchatka and the Aleutian islands. From Kyushu, Japan's most Southerly home island, the Ryukyu (Nansei) chain ex- tends almost to the great island of Taiwan (Formosa), occupied by Japan since 1895. From there it is only a short jump to Luzon where the chain divides. One branch continues in a southwesterly direction through Palawan island and the great island of Borneo. An- other runs south through the Philippine archipelago and continues across the sprawling island of Celebes. These two tiers approach a third which jumps from the Malay peninsula to Sumatra, and continues on across Java, Timor, and Australia. This latter tier is roughly paralleled by still another which runs from Mindanao, in the Southern Philippines, through Halmahera, New Guinea, New Britain, the Solomons, New Hebrides, and New Caledonia, whence it is but a few hundred miles to Australia's populous southeast coast, and only a little farther to New Zealand. (See fig. 32.) Starting back in Japan proper, yet another tier of islands reaches down into the south Pacific. This tier extends due south from Tokio, through the Bonin and Mariannas chains to the American island of Guam seized by Japan in December 1941. Guam forms the connect- ing link with an east-west tier. These are the Caroline islands which are scattered through 2,000 miles of tropi- cal Ocean just north of the equator. Palau, western- most sub-group in this chain, lies only about 600 miles east of the southern Philippines. Kusaie, at the eastern extremity, is less than 500 miles from the Marshall islands. The Marshalls, together with the Gilbert and Ellice groups, form an almost continuous chain reaching Southeast to Samoa. Once within that area island con- nections reach out in every direction, those to the east terminating in the Marquesas which lie almost due south of San Francisco, and over 1,000 miles east of Hawaii. Thus there is a choice of island-to-island routes across the South and southwest Pacific. Starting from Japan one can advance to the eastern rim of the Indian Ocean, or two-thirds of the way across the tropical Pacific, without ever having to jump a water gap over 500 miles wide. Similarly, one can cross the north Pacific from Japan to Alaska, via the Kurile and Aleutian chains. Or conversely, one can advance on Japan by these same inter-island routes, starting from Alaska, Hawaii, or Australia. One vitally important fact should be emphasized. All the main island chains lead straight to Japan. But except in the far north, none of them approaches within 3,500 miles of the United States. Thus our strategic position is inherently stronger than Japan's, whether viewed from the standpoint of defense or of offense. 5. PACIFIC ISLANDS. The islands of the Pacific differ greatly in size and structure. At one extreme stands the sub-continent of Australia, almost as large as the United States. At the other are thousands of tiny islets covering an acre or less. Many Pacific islands are the rugged peaks of sunken mountain ranges. Some are volcanoes pushed up from the ocean floor. Thousands, lying in the warm waters of the tropics, are constructed wholly or partly of coral. 6. CORAL REEFS AND ATOLLS. Coral structures of the tropical Pacific fall into three principal classes. In some instances the formation slopes seaward from the island's beachline. This type, known as a fringing reef, is found in the Hawaiian islands, at Kusaie and Ponape in the Carolines, at Guam and other Mariannas islands, and elsewhere. If the reef lies at some distance from the beach with an intervening salt-water lagoon, it is known as a bar- rier reef. The barrier may be short or long. It may partially or completely enclose an island or a group of 91 - sº > * rx- | SOV | ET UN | ON , Beºwo sea 2% &e 2-3 /~) pººl...ºbºtshºrter $3% A-'- ~~~ Š 4’ *P *Sorials lºsso” sºo S. Q: A N_A D A *S. \s 2--Tº – 27 “... 3, & Tº e "VO-e * Z _^- 2^ .*_ºvº V Wy “S —'ſ . Sº, \ _- A J.' ;4 ye ^sº Sºx § ( , “-. — 2 .-C ON - - ...sº ~. ſ $o SAN FRAMcſSS 2 622 / S F U N | T E D A7/ A/V7/C A.TOKYO PAN MANPA- Yoko Hawa - "SAN FRAMC/sco 46.36 3. an Francisco * CH | N A ſºas ſºft *#555 © *— \es awºkes asso Los Angeles OCAA/V N. - * JC//wA wº *Use S T A T E S SAEA “6. * * Hawº IAN - \-"N. f e 2219 29 BAHAMA ; BONIN is. Ss is * 2 Lºs º 43. tº "WEST INDI Es & º cº, 22. 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Towg/, /S., COOK /9. (**) “. . . .". N \ . . . . . . 2- * * (Ge-ge) N 3. W. ... Milºšº * . » * \s | calfoova ×Noumea © --~ / - gº g sº * e” //VD/A/Vºss, A U S T R A a Yi; 2 So aſ 7-// PA C/ F / C o CAE A/V -> N Brisbane || 2^ _-- T N // _2^ . — OCAA/V Perth !” \\ º, "Aºss Nº. THE STRATEGY OF ATTACK `--------Mºse, Jaw sº." / AND DEFENSE 2 ( º 2^ IN THE PACIFIC, 1942 FIGURE 34 dependence upon established ports and conventional unloading machinery. 3. ROLE OF SEA POWER. Strategic mobility in the Pacific theater depended from the outset upon command of the sea. Planes could fly from island to island. They could bomb chosen tar- gets, carry limited numbers of men, and transport small Quantities of military cargo. But only ships could bring up the troops, equipment, and supplies necessary to overpower local defenses, to consolidate beachheads, and to stage the next landing operations. Command of the sea was just as vital to the defense in this theater. Almost nowhere, even upon the larger islands, were there adequate inland communications. As a rule, the only transportation between Allied posi- tions, even upon a single island, was by sea. No position could be successfully held without sea-borne reinforce- ments. And sea-borne reinforcements could not be brought in without naval-air protection in sufficient strength to parry any enemy attack. Allied strategists fully appreciated the key role of sea power. They planned to blockade Japan at long range from Pearl Harbor and Singapore. By this means they expected to make the enemy fleet come out and fight. They counted on sinking it or driving it to cover, and on breaking up in transit any amphibious invasion force which the Japanese might send out to attack British, Dutch, or American territories in the western Pacific. These expectations rested upon miscalculation both of Japanese plans and of the relative strength of forces immediately available. Allied sea power in the Pacific was geographically scattered and poorly coordinated. The main American fleet, strongest single Allied strik- ing unit, was stationed far to the east, and had been progressively depleted to bolster our Atlantic defenses. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor temporarily im- mobilized it by putting most of its battleships out of action. Three days later the enemy's air force succeeded in sinking the two British capital ships which comprised the backbone of Allied sea power in the western Pacific. These blows did not wipe out Allied sea power in that ocean. But they temporarily crippled it, giving Japan's amphibious armies the necessary freedom of movement and margin of Security needed to carry out their light- ning conquests in Southeastern Asia and the south- western Pacific. 4. PATTERN OF CONQUEST. Among the first moves in this campaign were virtually simultaneous amphibious attacks on Wake, Guam, Luzon, and Hongkong. LOSs of Wake and Guam broke completely the direct air link between Hawaii and the Philippines. Invasion of the Philippines removed the most serious threat to Japanese troop and supply move- ments through the South China Sea. The siege and capture of Hongkong erased the lesser threat to the western flank of this vital Japanese supply line. All these operations had a strategic bearing on the crucial drive on Singapore. That offensive involved a series of operations designed first to isolate and then to storm that key bastion of Allied defense. The main springboard for this offensive was the south coast of Indochina which, it will be recalled, the Japanese had occupied after the fall of France in 1940. From Saigon and other staging points in that derelict colony. Japa- nese forces moved west into Thailand, leaped the South China Sea to seize British and Dutch airdromes along the west coast of Borneo, and descended in great strength on the northeast coast of Malaya. After a brief struggle this main invasion force gained possession of the Khota Baru airdrome, anchor of all British defenses in northern Malaya. Simultaneously another Japanese column drove across the narrow Kra isthmus to seize Penang island, from which planes could command the northern entrance into Malacca strait. These moves put the Japanese in position to attack all Seaborne reinforcements approaching Singapore. Meanwhile a larger Japanese army was fighting its way southward through the Malay peninsula. Contrary to expectation the jungle did not seriously impede this advance. Japanese troops filtered through the British lines. They outflanked rivers and other natural or prepared defenses by new landings from the sea farther down the coast. In this manner, the defending troops were pushed back farther and farther south. On Janu- ary 30 they quit the mainland altogether, and prepared for a last stand on Singapore island itself. The military engineers who designed the Signapore base never seriously contemplated this contingency. They had counted on the presence of friendly French forces in Indochina and on the natural obstacles to an overland invasion through Malaya. Singapore's prin- cipal defenses all faced southward toward the sea. On the landward side a strip of water less than a mile wide, and crossed by a causeway, separated the island from the mainland. Following their usual pattern of am- phibious attack the Japanese swarmed across this nar- row water gap and quickly overwhelmed the isolated forces defending the island. . (See fig. 35.) Without waiting for the fall of Singapore, the Jap- anese launched a major offensive against Burma. That British dependency is a mountainous country wedged in between India and China and Thailand. Jungle- covered mountains extend north and South in great ranges which open on to the Bay of Bengal. In 1942 only two vehicular roads crossed the Burmese fron- tiers. One was the famous Burma Road from JLashio to Kunming. The other was a mountain trail across the eastern border into Thailand. No roads at all crossed the higher western ranges into India. The principal way in and out of Burma was by sea, chiefly through the port of Rangoon on the delta of the Sittang River. (See fig. 36.) At the outset the Japanese had not yet won control of the Malacca strait, and hence had no sea route to the Burma coast. Instead of delaying, however, they struck overland across the mountains from Thailand. The attack opened with the usual devastating air raids. The fall of Singapore opened up the sea route, along which came enemy convoys with reenforcements. These fought their way ashore and drove the defending forces from Rangoon and other Burmese ports. Loss of the ports closed the only supply line to Allied forces in the interior. Thus the fall of Rangoon decided the fate of all Burma. As the advancing Japanese fanned out through the river valleys of upper Burma, remnants of the defeated armies straggled across the mountains, northeast into China, west into India. While these disasters were taking place, the Japanese Were unfolding a still more complicated offensive against the Dutch East Indies. The islands bearing this name lie in two great tiers between southeastern Asia and Australia. The northern tier consists of Bor- neo, Celebes, New Guinea, and countless smaller islands in between. The southern tier is formed by Sumatra, Java, and a chain of lesser islands reaching almost to Australia. As shown in the accompanying map (fig. 37), the East Indies spread over a land and water area larger than the continental United States. From the western tip of Sumatra to the eastern end of New Guinea the distance is close to 4,000 miles. (See fig 32.) With the exception of New Guinea, the larger islands of this huge archipelago are grouped around the Java 97 3. \ A. KEY º-ſtEconouest of Z SINGAPORE — Kailways Sºul & | = AEoads wº !!! e 4- Jap /XYves Alor Star — ſnéernational * Baru boundar/es Sovth J’ Georgeto sº i S *{uablengganu . º i Kaaſa Oingºn China o—Kääk, Kābū? *N. Hºyoman Yéºgau *}Mersing \\ – ill" Sºhorº Bahru - ( ſº ſº. SINGAPORÉ-Q} ºf ºººººoks º STA&A' º ºS & BATAMJ BINTAN * f Ş, º, * Q Nº.4: ... ." *_2^* N. • * FIGURE 35 %jeeloſ -2& %. . s/ 3) % NS | Tajarange - g © II**ś: | *º-ºpuſmén Andaman Islands () Ö O © fört Borº s: º SE Victoria #s [THE CONSUESTE-G | OF BURNMA FIGURE 36 º Sea. The southern littoral of this semi-enclosed sheet of water is formed by the island of Java. This island consists of a mountainous ridge 600 miles long, 50 to 120 wide. The north coast of Java, one of the earth's most densely peopled regions, was in 1942 the strategic key to the whole archipelago. Batavia, the political capital and chief port, is located in the northeast near Sunda strait, main gateway from the central Indies to the In- dian Ocean. Soerabaja, 400 miles east of Batavia, was in 1942 the only important military base between Singa- pore and Australia. After the fall of Singapore, the fate of the East Indies hinged upon successful defense of Java's north coast. This depended upon keeping the enemy out of the Java Sea and keeping open at least one strait for the transit of Allied reinforcements. In the final analysis the problem became one of defending the airdromes which commanded the inter-island passageways leading into the Java Sea, and maintaining at those strategic points Sufficient air forces to protect Allied naval and cargo shipping and to bomb enemy forces attempting to use those narrow waters. - Dutch military strategists clearly recognized the Supreme importance of these narrow straits. They had built airdromes covering every line of approach into the Java Sea. They had poured their limited resources into air and naval forces designed to repel exactly the kind of attack which the Japanese were preparing. But Dutch resources were unequal to the task. They simply did not have either the planes or the ships necessary to hold all the key positions. And in 1942 their British and American allies, for reasons previously discussed, were unable to send enough help in time to stave off disaster. * The Japanese invasion plan rested upon the same geographic facts as did the Dutch defense strategy. The plan, in essence, was first to block the avenues of entrance to and escape from the Java Sea, and then to storm the main citadels upon Java itself. It was Singa- pore all over again, with variations. Some of the outly- ing positions would be occupied in the course of this undertaking. The rest, chiefly isolated outposts along the coasts of the various islands, would become easy prey once the root and main branches of Dutch power were destroyed. The accompanying map (fig. 38) shows how all this was accomplished. The principal staging base for the East Indian offen- sive was the south Philippine port of Davao. This port 99 upon Mindinao island was supplemented by Jolo in the Sulu archipelago, and by airdromes in west Borneo, previously captured in the drive on Singapore. Later in the campaign, the Japanese also used lower Malaya and Singapore itself as staging points for their invasion of the great island of Sumatra. The encirclement of Java involved a complicated MALAY - states */S, N y • * : X * S \|^ & Series of island-to-island advances. One spearhead drove south through Macassar strait in several stages to establish advanced air bases within striking range of Soerabaja. Another struck east of Celebes against Kendari, Amboina, Timor, and other points along the eastern rim of the Java. Sea. A third line of advance was down the west coast of Borneo; a fourth by way ill- A Nº Dºs ss 2* O BA/VDA JAA Flores sea . . .” - 4 sacºss-crºſſ. • 12 of Malaya and the northeast coast of Sumatra. These drives closed off the western rim of the Java Sea. Capture of Bali, the island just east of Java, cut still another escape route into the Indian Ocean. With Java isolated, a large invasion force started South through Macassar strait. Desperate efforts were made to break up this expedition. But these failed North –éP– | '2 y Halá H ERA • *F, * ..?uſ |comparative sizes – NETHERLANDS INDIES AND THE UNITED STATES /M// A S. 5OO /OOO FIGURE 37 completely with disastrous naval losses. Surviving Allied craft limped back to Java. But north Javanese ports, including Soerabaja, were now under constant aerial attack. Several more ships were sunk, Some in port, others attempting to escape. The invading armies February 9, 1942, ending organized resistance in the East Indies. The loss of Singapore, followed by conquest of Burma and the East Indies, put India and the Middle East in peril. These disasters turned Japanese naval-air power nese task force raided the two British naval bases on the island of Ceylon, at the strategic focus of the Indian Ocean. Allied convoys were attacked, and several British warships, including an aircraft carrier, were sunk. The fall of Java opened to Japan several additional passages into the Indian Ocean. For a time Allied loose in the Indian Ocean. The Andaman islands north of Sumatra were occupied. Planes from a Japa- swarmed ashore at many points. Local defenses crumbled and were overwhelmed. Soerabaja fell on ... INDO- CHINA SO//7// CA///VA SATA PHILIPPIN E goſ, Pala |S Mindanao - {QAVAQ BSABANG (see) AAc/F/c OETARADJA *— May LAB! N tº Ço • G Mºs ‘. TE :*: * & cºc © . : 2, NGAPORE BARQEe Q PAMANGKAT :sº •y (Jan. 29) AbAN& 2 & 8) 2%) 73- 2. cáz&BA's sea Jan. 10-13) W}K B O R N E BALI KPAPA N (Jan. 25) * •yz NDJER |N BANG €e IS) © º PAL XY Dae SXº NA s/N º, (Jan. 30–31) BA/VDA SAA | N. D 1 E. 5 == A / O AEA S S A.A Jan.25) AAC/// C - S. Aſ O C A A/V N E T H E V R L § 㺠$SEMARA A ENG SOE RABAJA SSA b. 10-12) D & wº O d THE JAPANESE ADVANCE IN THE EAST INDIES, 1942 BALI WOR Feb.2O (Feb.19) cº Skogea ) ALLI ED BASES 6B JAPANES E BASES m), DIRECTION OF DRIVEs FIGURE 38 ||||||||||||||| Sea of \s → ſº S|O V | |E T N | ON ATTU ſºutch Harbor — | Ohkotsk *"...ska -- ** soº –éP– TN * • * º \9 v * ! L^r).” \ .* garrie or \{ | E 07" | ~) s” o 7A/AF ALEUT/AA/S" -N . .3 tº ONGOL MAY//-JUMA; 7 ñºſ) 2& /943 JAPAN'S SOUTH SEAS OFFENSIVE Z J. F. gº AND THE ALLIED HOLDING FRONT { Spring 1942 K JW 0 & 7 H P A C / F / C O C E 4 A/C & * as - \ºe” CH] NA * as * & O 20 ** = = => **, HA wa / &" MIDWAY " .. '4 w | THE OUTER | 3. | ! g MARS HALLS Nicº e º a Ponapé |. > : FORTRESS ; | SL-A N D!S | | | | - & :Tarawal A Q//A 7 OAQ \ Zººl º ſº Hølºndia. || GILBERTs T. \ Q O 8-| ". NEW “. . . ; r gº * ; > O spºkew £Lice :: * l + S$SERIAN *$gºons 15. l j/ 1 tº tº º º GUADALCANAT"- —l- l- – - ** * 7//MOR SAEA AXarwin © JAPAN ON THE DEFENSIVE 7- ºre : Fºles. |942-1943 '. New SS — — — — — — — — — — - __w cALEDONIA _ _ 7°95/9. Of C4/28/998/Y_ _ A U S T R A L / A ſº Y” FIGURE 40 That would put the enemy two-thirds of the way across the Pacific to a point over 1,000 miles east of Hawaii, less than 3,500 miles from California, and but little farther from the west coast of South America. Conversely, as will be shown more fully later on, Australia and New Zealand in Allied hands presented a continuing threat to Japan's hold on its newly con- quered South Seas empire. Australia might be a long way from Tokio, but it was next door to New Guinea and the East Indies. These considerations undoubtedly weighed heavily in the Japanese decision to attack and conquer Australia and New Zealand. The Japanese plan in this as in preceding offensives was first to isolate and then to overwhelm the selected objective. Conquest of the East Indies, it will be re- called, had previously cut the Indian Ocean sea route to Australia. An attempt to block the sea routes from Hawaii, by driving a wedge southeastward from the captured Gilbert Islands, was frustrated by swift and effective counter-measures which American forces car- ried out during the winter of 1942. The next attempt to break this supply line was a major drive southeastward from Rabaul toward the New Hebrides and New Cale- donia archipelagos. This enterprise, which got under way in late April, was to be no hit-and-run raid, but a full-fledged inva- With the opening of 1943, Japan held in subjugation an empire reaching deep into Asia and extending far out into the Pacific Ocean. This subjugated area was roughly triangular in shape. Its northwestern face reached across Asia from the India-Burma frontier to the captured American island of Kiska. The eastern side of this vast triangle extended from Kiska to the Gilbert islands in mid-Pacific. The southern side was a long curving line which passed through the upper Solomons and New Guinea, bent to the south of Java and Sumatra, and then turned northwest across the Bay of Bengal to the India-Burma border. This triangle enclosed a land and water area several times greater than the continental United States. Its land surface alone exceeded three million square miles, one and one-half times the size of Axis Europe. Its population, 400–500 millions, embraced fully 20 percent of the human race. Its natural resources provided the sion. Occupation of Espiritu Santu (New Hebrides) and Noumea (New Caledonia) would place Japanese forces not only astride Australia's only remaining sup- ply line, but also in a favorable position to strike at the densely populated southeast coast of Australia. Because of the distances involved, the Japanese Com- mand had to bring up aircraft carriers to support the troop convoys and contemplated landings. The planes of a strong American task force intercepted these enemy forces and repulsed them with heavy losses in the fa- mous Battle of the Coral Sea (May 1942). Frustrated in this second attempt, the Japanese turned next on Hawaii, keystone of the whole Allied defense structure. This resulted in a still larger naval- air action, the Battle of Midway, in which American land-based and carrier-based planes teamed up to de- liver a smashing defeat to the formidable invasion force which the Japanese sent against the Hawaiian Islands (June 1942). Simultaneously, another Japanese invasion force struck at the Aleutian islands. The main attack on Dutch Harbor was repulsed. But under cover of foul weather the enemy succeeded in gaining a foothold upon Kiska and Attu in the westernmost Aleutians, from which he was not completely expelled until mid-summer 1943. VI. JAPAN ON THE DEFENSIVE foundation for a truly formidable military power. (See fig. 40.) Before the war the area conquered by Japan produced 95 percent of the world’s natural rubber, 90 percent of the quinine, 80 percent of the copra, 70 percent of the tin. In southeast Asia and the East Indies Japan took over one of the world’s richest oil-producing regions. Somewhere within their ill-gotten empire the Japanese could obtain all the coal they could use, large if not over-abundant supplies of iron ore, plenty of manganese, chromium, and other ferro-alloys. There was bauxite in abundance, raw materials for a great chemical industry, indeed virtually everything needed for the building of a self-sufficient military state of great strength. What Japan gained, moreover, her enemies were at least temporarily deprived of. This magnified the stra- tegic effect. Cut off from their previous sources of rub- Having failed disastrously in these carrier-supported amphibious attacks, the Japanese reverted to their ear- lier method of island-hopping. They started building a flying field upon Guadalcanal island in the southern Solomons. From this unsinkable platform they could launch another amphibious attack on New Hebrides without risking their depleted supply of vulnerable air- craft carriers. This move in the Solomons was accom- panied by a push across the Owen Stanley Mountains to capture the airdrome at Port Moresby, Australia out- post on the southeast coast of New Guinea facing Torres Strait. . The Allies broke up these undertakings by two bit- terly contested counterstrokes. One was seizure of the partly completed flying field upon Guadalcanal. The other was a counteroffensive from Port Moresby which drove the Japanese back across the mountains to their bases in northeastern New Guinea. These victories, won and consolidated after a struggle lasting to the end of 1942, established an impregnable defensive front. Heavy Japanese losses, coupled with the slow but steady growth of Allied strength, ended the threat of further large-scale attacks on Allied bases and inter-connecting supply lines. * ber, tin, and other military essentials, the Allies suf- fered a serious if temporary loss of war-making poten- tial. They had to divert man power and raw materials from fighting the enemy in order to build up new Sources of natural or synthetic supplies. This, as well as the necessity of fighting simultaneously on widely sepa- rated fronts in Europe and the Atlantic and also in the Pacific and Far East, delayed for many months the opening of large-scale counter-offensives against Japan. In certain respects the geostrategic situation of Japan resembled that of Axis Europe at the pinnacle of Nazi success. Tojo's armies, like Hitler's had conquered a rich and populous domain. But both were surrounded by undefeated enemies bent on regaining what they had lost. The enemies of Japan, moreover, like those of Germany, still clung tenaciously to the strategical posi- tions which would enable them eventually to open strong counter-offensives. 105 612655°–44—8 Japan was more isolated from its most dangerous enemies than was Germany. In that respect Japan's position was defensively stronger. But the distance which partially protected Japan from the retributive fury of the Allies, conversely rendered the Emperor's supposedly invincible armies incapable of striking de- cisive blows against the main citadels of Allied strength. At no point in their advance did the Japanese get a secure foothold within 4,000 miles of the main produc- tion centers of the United States. Japan, furthermore, held a larger and more scattered group of territories than those comprising Axis Europe. These territories were knit together by long and ex- posed sea communications. The voyage from Yoko- hama to Batavia is longer than from New York to Liverpool. Rangoon is farther from Tokio than Naples is from Washington, D. C. Japan's scattered empire contrasted sharply with Hitler's compact continental bloc. The communications of Axis Europe were being effectively attacked by bombers ranging deep inside the walls of Hitler's continental fortress. But European communications were far less vulnerable than the long sea lines reaching out from Japan to southeast Asia, to the East Indies, and to the scattered islands of the South Seas. Japan's situation also differed from Germany’s in the nature of the booty captured. Hitler won not only forests, crop lands, mines, and oil wells, but also blast furnaces, steel mills, automobile plants, aircraft fac- tories, and all the other paraphernalia of modern indus- trialism. Germany had only to repair what the armies had damaged in order to increase the military output of the expanding Reich. The colonial lands of south- eastern Asia and the southwestern Pacific, on the con- trary, were mainly producers of food and raw materials. These products had to be transported over long sea routes to Japan. But Japan lacked the ships to trans- port all this tonnage and simultaneously to carry on large-scale military operations along the rim of its sprawling empire. Japan also lacked the smelters and factories necessary to utilize fully the glut of raw ma- terials which began piling up in the conquered areas. The island empire, in short, faced a gigantic problem of capital development. Japan's empire builders desper- ately needed a breathing space in which to enlarge their industrial plant and digest the fruits of aggression. Conquest of Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, and Alaska would have given Japan the needed respite. Occupation of those key positions would have deprived the Allies of the advanced bases from which to launch early counteroffensives. Had Japan won the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, or even the long-drawn-out struggle for Guadalcanal, she would have gained time— certainly months, perhaps years—in which to exploit the newly conquered riches of her inflated empire and build a formidable military power in the Far East. But Japan did not win those critical battles of 1942. The labor and raw materials that might otherwise have gone into building new plants and enlarging old Ones, had largely to be used to replace ships, planes, and other matériel lost in the Coral Sea, at Midway, in the western Aleutians, in New Guinea, in the Solomons, and along the extended sea routes relentlessly patrolled by Ameri- can submarines. By the end of 1942 Japan's over-all situation was seriously deteriorating. Rice rotted in the warehouses of Burma while Japan’s millions lived on bare subsist- ence rations. Japan possessed limitless oil in the East Indies, but not enough tankers to haul it to the fighting fronts. The shortage of ships was particularly acute, though Japan possessed in Manchuria, North China, and elsewhere all the coal and iron ore needed to build a cargo marine of any desired size. The plain truth was that Japan had more raw materials than she could utilize with her existing industrial plant. And increas- ing pressure on the military fronts prevented any large- scale diversion of effort from munitions production to industrial expansion. This military pressure reflected the rapid growth of Allied strength in the Pacific. This was partly a result of the astonishing pace of American industrial mobili- zation. But it was a result also of global improvement in the strategic situation of the United Nations. The German defeat at Stalingrad, the Russian counteroffen- sive, Rommel’s expulsion from Egypt, the Anglo-Amer- ican invasion of French North Africa, the reopening of the Mediterranean, the increasing fury of the air war over Germany, and other developments all reflected the changing tide of war; all affected the disposition of Allied forces and the military balance in the Pacific. Equally ominous for Japan was the growing margin of Allied technical supremacy. The Japanese won their amphibious blitzkrieg against outnumbered defenders fighting largely with obsolete or obsolescent weapons. In the summer of 1942, the Japanese met the “first team” and were routed. Allied Sea, air, and land equipment was proving technically superior in almost every cate- gory. By the end of 1942, Japan's early advantage in numbers of men and quantity of equipment was also disappearing. Early 1943 brought accumulating evi- dence that Japan, like Germany, was digging in for a bitter defensive struggle on the outer rim of its in- flated empire. This trend was especially apparent in the South Seas where geography provides a natural invasion route into the heart of Japan’s “Outer For- tress.” This broad expanse of blue water lies between the mandated islands on the north and Melanesia on the South. Once past the Gilbert atolls and the Bis- marck archipelago, the invasion corridor runs straight to the Philippines. Its width, 500 miles or more, gives space in which to maneuver large naval formations, either for raiding enemy bases to the north, or for sup- porting invasion forces advancing along the southern side of this strategic corridor. There were indications also that Tokio's master strate- gists were beginning to study seriously the possibility of losing the Outer Fortress altogether. Capital de- velopment in the Philippines, East Indies, and south- east Asia was being held to a bare minimum. The con- quered areas were being looted of everything movable. The Japanese were striving desperately to bring home large quantities of tin, rubber, bauxite, manganese, and other essential raw materials produced in the outer regions. Confronted with impending disaster in their Outer Fortress, Nipponese spokesmen dwelt more and more upon the defensive strength of their Inner Fortress. This so-called Inner Fortress consists of Japan proper, Korea, Manchuria, North China, Formosa, and minor intervening islands. (See figs. 6 and 40.) That re- gion contains most of the industrial centers. Within it are located the principal beds of high-grade coal, and sufficient iron ore to feed Japan’s blast furnaces for a time at least. The Inner Fortress could also produce the food and textile fibers necessary to keep soldiers and Workers alive and clothed on a bare subsistence basis. Local production, with the aid of built-up stockpiles, could be made to provide enough ferro-alloys, chemicals, copper, and certain other essentials. But the Inner Fortress could provide little or no petroleum, rubber, tin, light metals, and many other ingredients of modern military power. Cut off from the outer empire, Japan could carry on only to the limit of its precious stock- piles. How long that would be would depend largely 106 upon the scale and pace of the war and the consequent rate of military consumption. Loss of the Outer Fortress would not only deprive Japan of vital raw materials; it would also expose Japan's industrial centers to shattering blows from the 1. ENDS AND MEANS. The Allied war effort is directed toward the same ends in the Pacific and Far East as in Europe and the Atlantic. These objectives have been stated and dis- cussed in the preceding chapter. From that discussion it will be recalled that one objective is to deprive the enemy of essential foodstuffs and raw materials. Another objective is to destroy the enemy's instrumen- talities of production. A third, to which the other two are subsidiary, is to destroy or capture his armed forces and thereby to bring the struggle to a victorious close. While the ends are much the same in both theaters of war, the means differ according to local conditions and circumstances. In the Pacific and Far East, as in Europe, the fundamental determinants of military strategy are the hard facts of geography. 2. GEOGRAPHY AND BLOCKADE IN THE PACIFIC. Allied offensive strategy employs blockade against Japan in two ways: (1) to disrupt the flow of food- stuffs and especially of raw materials from the outer empire to the production centers of Japan's so-called Inner Fortress; and (2) to isolate the island garrisons which guard the ramparts of the Outer Fortress. As noted previously, Japan depends heavily upon ships for the movement of military traffic. Sea lines, supplemented only in minor degree by air and land transport, connect the home islands with their outlying defenses and with the sources of numerous strategic materials vital to the Japanese war effort. The accom- panying map (fig. 41) shows the main structure of these communications. Ships moving toward Japan carry mainly raw materials for Nipponese war industries. Those traveling in the opposite direction are loaded with troops, equipment, fuel, and other military supplies for the fighting zones. Despite all efforts to build up stockpiles and otherwise to strengthen the Inner Fortress, Japan remains criti- air. During the early years of the struggle, Nippon's wood and paper cities had escaped largely because of the great distances from Allied advanced bases to the indus- trial core of the island empiré. Collapse of that em- pire's outer defenses would bring Japan's crowded and VII. ALLIED STRATEGY cally dependent upon raw materials brought up from southeast Asia, the East Indies, and the South Seas. Japan's Outer Fortress in turn must be defended mainly by men, weapons, and supplies brought down from the north. Except at a few points upon the Asiatic mainland, there is no military “front” in the sense that this term is commonly used in Europe. The advance across the Pacific consists mainly of air, sea, and land fighting for possession of small islands, or for more or less isolated coastal positions upon larger islands which have little or no inland communications. As long as Japan had a tight grip on the air and Sea links, especially the latter, which connect these island positions with each other and with supply depots and production centers in the rear, these positions consti- tuted interlocking bastions of a virtually impassable military frontier. Without command of the sea, how- ever, these enemy bastions become merely isolated outposts, cut off from each other and from Japan, each too weak to repel the attacks which can be hurled against it. The Allies have employed various combinations of ships and planes to disrupt Japanese communications. Far ranging task forces periodically blast enemy supply depots and staging bases. Their bombs and shells smash shore installations, blow up ammunition and fuel dumps, sink ships in port, and destroy planes upon the ground and in the air. Such have been the devastating naval-air attacks on Truk, Palau, Guam, Wake, and other Japanese bases. Air and naval forces have repeatedly broken up con- voys attempting attacks on the famous “Tokio Express” convoys running arms and men into Guadalcanal during the struggle to hold Henderson Field. Such was the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in which American air forces wiped out a large convoy attempting to reinforce the enemy on New Guinea. Many a Japanese garrison has run short of supplies, Some have literally starved to inflammable production centers within range of massive air attacks, comparable in scale to those which had razed the industrial cities of Axis Europe. death, so vigilant have been the sea and air forces of the United States, Development of the Fourteenth Air Force in China opened a new phase of the war on Japanese communi- cations. General Chennault’s bombers have taken a heavy toll of Japanese shipping upon the Yangtse River. They have struck lightning blows at the sea- ports of Indochina, and seriously disrupted enemy ship- ping along the main artery which runs through the South China Sea. Particularly destructive has been the campaign waged by Allied, chiefly American, submarines. Fall of the Philippines, Singapore, and the East Indies deprived Our Submarines of operating bases near the main Japanese sea arteries. But the undersea craft carried on at long range. They have penetrated to the coastal Waters of Japan itself. Today enemy shipping is no- where Safe from their avenging torpedoes. • The war on communications is inexorably sapping Japan's strength. The rate of sinkings has long since exceeded that country's shipbuilding capacity. Gradu- ally a critical shipping shortage has developed. Lack of tonnage has curtailed the movement of foodstuffs, industrial raw materials, oil, and other products from the outer empire. This has reacted upon the output of Japanese factories. It has also cut down the enemy's ability to reinforce and supply his crumbling Outer ramparts. This has enabled the Allies to speed up their advance across the Pacific. Each step forward gives our planes, submarines, and surface craft new operating bases closer to the main Japanese supply lines. Closer bases bring new weapons within range and enable long- range commerce raiders to spend more time on station, with a steadily rising toll of enemy shipping. Thus Japan is confronted with a vicious and unbreakable circle leading inexorably to irretrievable disaster. We are moving steadily closer to the main supply lines connecting Japan's outer and inner empire. When our forces reach the Philippines, they will once more stand 107 astride all the sea routes from Japan to southeast Asia and the Indies. From there they can draw tight the noose of blockade. The emperor's soldiers may fight on with fanatical zeal, but they will do so with a steadily shrinking supply of fuel, equipment, ammunition, food, and other essentials. In preparation for this catastrophe the Japanese High Command has made repeated attempts to open an over- land route from North China to southeast Asia. In 1944 Japanese armies temporarily cleared the Peiping- Hankow railroad. They followed this up with a drive to open the Hankow-Canton line. There were reports m S O V | ET Lupiſº - Mancho OUTER MONG OL LA (AAANGHU ºf a {AMACHATKA …º. * * : *{ARAMUSHIRo Kuo) * º 4 : alſº fitch Harbor ** gåTTU - AAW; fºrw/4 • ‘’. =– M///JARY COMMUM/- Giger sº, In MAVAL BASES ///7AR/VA7/O/V4/ AO/W/04/º/AST , ELLIcé †MoR. ...:* ******- --> FIGURE 41 of Japanese plans to connect this line with the railway system of Indochina, Thailand, and Malaya. But these were pipe dreams far beyond the ability of Nippon's engineers and soldiers to carry out in the face of relent- less pressure on their tottering empire. 3. TARGET TOKIO. During the early years of the Pacific war, geography protected Japanese industrial centers from the devas- tating air attacks which played so large a role in Smash- ing the power of Nazi Germany. Japanese industry was concentrated within a smaller area than that of Axis Europe. Japanese cities were more inflammable. But these destructible targets lay far beyond the range of available planes operating from airdromes still in Allied hands after the Japanese oceanic blitzkrieg. (See fig. 42.) ! One approach to this problem was to attack Japanese industrial centers with carrier-based aircraft. Such operations were formerly considered impracticable. Ship-based planes, it was argued, were no match for land-based planes; in consequence the carrier's planes could not get through, and the carriers themselves would be sunk before they could escape. Events have largely invalidated this reasoning so far as Pacific operations are concerned. American ship- based air power is more than a match for Japanese land- based air power. American task forces have repeatedly dealt heavy blows to strongly defended Japanese land positions, and have done so with negligible losses. The Doolittle raid on Tokio, in April 1942, showed the possibility of developing a ship-based air offensive against Japanese industrial targets. In that operation a small force of twin-engine bombers were successfully flown off from a carrier deck to attack Tokio and other industrial cities. For various reasons this feat was not repeated immediately. But it nevertheless indicated one line of possible future development in the bomb- ing offensive against the production centers of the island empire. At the same time, it should be remembered that car- rier-based operations have ineScapable limitations. One is the relatively small bomb-carrying capacity of ship-based planes. Another is the difficulty of achiev- ing continuity of attack from carriers. Ship-based air power will doubtless play a role in the bombing of indus- trial Japan. But it will be difficult to achieve decisive strategic results without permanent bases within strik- ing range, from which to send out formations of the heaviest bombers. Acquisition and development of such bases has been one of the aims of Allied strategy. The accompanying map (fig. 42) shows the location of all possible bases. The choices are: (1) the island chains northeast of Japan; (2) those south and Southwest of Japan; (3) eastern Siberia; and (4) unoccupied China. There has been much loose talk about bombing Japan from bases in the Aleutian Islands. It is not generally appreciated that most of industrial Japan is as far from the westernmost Aleutians as the California coast is from Pearl Harbor. The distance to the nearest indus- trial center in southern Hokaido is nearly 1,900 miles; to the main concentrations of heavy industry upon Kyushu Island, about 2,700 miles. The closer objectives do not lie beyond the reach of our newest superbombers. But distance is not the only factor. Weather and terrain also determine the qualities of an air base, and, as pre- viously noted, both impose limitations upon military undertakings in the Aleutian Islands, and the same would hold true for the Kurile chain as well. South and southwest of Japan there is considerable choice of strategic positions from which to carry on large-scale bombing operations. The Mariannas IS- lands, Luzon, and Taiwan (Formosa) all lie within a radius of 1,500 miles. The last named is less than a thousand miles from Kyushu. These islands may well become the focus of intensive aerial activity against Japan's Inner Fortress. - Eastern Siberia stands considerably closer still, with airdromes less than 600 miles from the heart of indus- trial Japan. But Soviet neutrality has prevented the use of these bases. In any case, mere right of access to them would not automatically solve the logistical prob- lems involved in their use. Air power requires large personnel, elaborate ground installations, huge quanti- ties of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. Air forces operating from the region around Vladivostok could be supplied only by sea across the Pacific or by railroad across Siberia. Either route would present political as well as military problems which might prove insoluble until a later stage of the war. Development of heavy bombardment aviation in China presents even greater logistical problems. Though there are large unoccupied areas within striking range of Japanese industrial concentrations in Man- churia, North China, and Japan proper, there is no modern transportation to supply the airdromes. In 1944 it was still necessary to transport virtually every- thing into China by air. Even the reopening of a land route from India would help but little. Despite these logistical difficulties, American air forces in China have made an impressive beginning. Important coal mines and other installations in North China have been blasted and at least temporarily knocked out. Various installations in eastern China and Indochina have been attacked. In the summer of 1944 American super-bombers staged their first devas- tating attacks from Chinese bases against the great Yawata steel works and other industrial objectives in southwestern Japan. These operations have been carried out in spite of terrific handicaps. Every bomb, every gallon of gaso- line, as well as ground crews, service equipment, and stores, have had to come in by air over the mountainous hump from India. Still, the over-all bombing picture is one of an offensive steadily gathering deadly mo- mentum, both from China and from other bases in the Pacific and Far East. In no phase of the struggle has man faced and surmounted more formidable geographi- cal obstacles than in the rising air offensive against the industrial core of Japan's Inner Fortress. 4. THE MARCH ON JAPAN. Land fighting in Asia and amphibious warfare in the Pacific play a dual role in the Allied victory strategy. One objective is to occupy advanced bases deeper and deeper inside Japan's Outer Fortress, bases from which to push relentlessly the blockade and strategic bombing of the enemy's Inner Fortress. But another equally important objective is to compel the enemy to stand and fight, at any points and under adverse conditions, and thereby expend men and matériel at a rate faster than his blockaded and bomb-damaged industries can provide replacements. It is important to emphasize the close relationships between the blockade and bombing offensives and the land, sea, and air fighting in the Pacific and in Asia. The tighter the blockade and the heavier the bombing of Japanese industry, the smaller is the output of ships, planes, tanks, guns, and other matériel. The larger the scale of military operations and the more continuous the pressure on the fighting fronts, the faster the attrition of Japanese power. The long-drawn-out struggles in the western Aleu- 612655°–44—9 109 | & _e}+º, --AJu °KISKA - — K. Q__ - e Potential bombing bases cº | TA | [T]] Japan and occupied China - RGET TO KYO -- - - Y Mues ſ \\ O JOO /OOO . *ARAMUSHiro • ? aſ: SAKHALIN KURI LE SOVIET UNIO =ls. 4. karatino' . f 2000 Miles #!/am/de . “y 15OOMiles iſ lºº. N º URI | / IOoo" Miles ſ Vádivostok © & -Hár Wiigata, ...A PAN \ iſ l & §ºyº, 500 Miles WAKE & &# Kyoto CHOSEN \ Koś Šaka • # *ś * > O NAARCUS Māśāk. ". lºº * Bonin is cº *NANSE is •'Foochow - was ANAs ‘eskiPAN 22 TINIAN 26) & - Amoy's o ROTA Kweiyang O e.g. Swatow %. G) GUAM ...” - Á kWéilín / :* * •/(Unmſn . A : g *Hong kóng CAROL N E * . 2 #Fuk - | \, VAP wana's LUZON PHILIPPINES ~~ - 44 .1) NS H| - S; n so & : «» . Urºš, E - * - BJSMARCK — º º, MANUs. 2 ARCH FIGURE 42 tians, in the Solomons, and in New Guinea seemed for a long time to be making little headway. But those campaigns served a most important strategical purpose. They put a heavy strain on the enemy's limited military resources. They used up precious reserves of planes, ships, and other matériel, preparing the way for the spectacular Allied victories of 1944. These victories are being won in the face of terrific logistical difficulties as well as stubborn enemy resist- ance. In the words of General Marshall: “For both Great Britain and the United States, military opera- tions in the Pacific Area and the Far East created un- precedented logistical problems with respect to ship- ping. . . . To land and maintain American forces in Australia required more than twice the ship tonnage necessary for similar American forces in Europe or North Africa. The bulk of supplies for China have had first to be hauled across the Atlantic and Indian Oceans by Sea, a voyage of 40 to 70 days, depending upon the route 22 * A-24 CI//-/C 22 42 2. ”, Z OCAA/V Z 43 º 38. g/ 63% ºap * } º - • g º & **º-sº gº Jº. • *9 © *ss 9 Ø Rºese º’” Q sº 692 Ž & © GUADALCANAL 2× / º 6 hours X % ** 2 . . .” * –” ^ $ . . .” &e ſe - ºnew CALEDONIA - - - • * * wº --~~ - - & sº BRISBAN E Y--- T $2 21 h .--> Tº * '898s e’ SS exº & 2 *N #4&ICH HARBOR & N - &y's Şsearrie 2 ºr Žiš3% . _/8 hours. * 3% days SAN FRANCISCO *A followed and the sailing conditions encountered. After delivery in India, the most difficult leg of the journey still remains—the flight over the hump into China. So acute is this bottleneck that considerable numbers of Chinese troops have been brought to India for training in the use of modern weapons. The transportation bottleneck presents apparently insuperable obstacles to the early opening of any major counteroffensive to drive the Japanese armies out of China. There is no industry in free China capable of producing heavy weapons. Only a trickle of supplies can be brought in over the long desert roads from Rus- sian railheads in central Asia. Cargo planes can handle but a fraction of the matériel required for large- Scale ground operations. Even reopening of the trans- mountain highway across Burma would go but a little way toward meeting the situation. The old Burma Road never carried more than approximately 17,000 tons of freight in any single month—not enough to supply an infantry division one month in the field. High ranking military spokesmen for the Allies have publicly declared that there is no solution to the logis- tics problem in Asia, except the reopening of one or more ports on the coast of China. The course of the war in Asia thus depends in no small degree upon Allied suc- cesses in the amphibious advance across the Pacific. Our Pacific offensive differs in important respects from the Japanese blitzkrieg of 1942. The island struc- ture of the Pacific Ocean has been described in a pre- vious section, and should be restudied at this point. The position of island chains in the western Pacific enabled the Japanese to advance in relatively short stages from their home islands and from their bases in Asia. In most instances the staging base was near enough to the elected landing point so that short-range land-based fighter planes could cover the ship move- ments and landing operations. Longer jumps were made in the initial landings upon New Guinea and the Bismarck archipelago. These were supported by carrier planes, but without serious risk *~ Ø | Loeistics PROBLEMS IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 6 bº ~s sº fºr ºys _BASRA e “” SS-- $3%urs - - * &s TT-----KUNMING \ S Sºs, ^ hou?. LCUTT N S. 1%h 2^ BOMBAY Sº-º: Y - *Jays //N D/A W O C A A/V Ç <> *2. º • Key. am Sea routes ––– Air routes — Railways FIGURE 43 because of the early weakness of Allied defenses in that area. Later Japanese attempts to use carrier task forces to support long-range amphibious operations ended in a decisive repulse in the Battle of Midway. Thereafter Japanese command of the sea was never Secure enough, and Japanese carrier-based air power was never strong enough, to attempt another long-range amphibious operation. From the outset, Allied amphibious strategy has relied heavily upon naval-air power. The landings upon Guadalcanal were carried out with the support of naval guns and carrier-based planes. This amphibious tech- nique was progressively developed over increasing dis- tances. Ability to employ naval-air power on a massive scale has enabled the Allies to advance with giant strides across the Pacific. The landings in the Mariannas con- stituted a jump of at least 1,100 miles from the nearest staging base, and was carried out in the face of the strongest resistance the enemy could offer. The geostrategical pattern of the Allied advance across the Pacific is gradually unfolding. By the sum- mer of 1944 the over-all design was clear. One arm of the offensive was thrusting towards the Philippines through a breach in the southeastern ramparts of Japan's Outer Fortress. This spearhead was advancing in great strides along the northern rim of Melanesia and the East Indies. Every step forward pushed deeper the wedge which the Allies were driving between the enemy’s Outer and Inner Fortress. The line of advance lay straight towards the Philippines with the south China coast just beyond. Meanwhile a second spearhead was driving westward from the captured Marshall islands. In one long leap these forces reached the Mariannas islands. 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The ideas of a people as expressed in religion, cus- toms, form of government, and other institutions have a great bearing on what happens in the world. Of these, government, as shown on the accompanying polit- ical map of the world, has a very direct and measurable influence (fig. 46). In fact, as stated previously, the policies and actions of the seven Great Powers, individ- ually and collectively, “have determined the course of international events for more than 50 years.” In many cases these policies and actions have helped the welfare of many people by developing new industries and by In the world of today seven regions stand out con- spicuously, namely, (1) Western Europe, (2) Eastern Europe and contiguous areas of Asia, (3) East Asia, (4) Malayasia, that is, Malaya and the East Indies, (5) India, (6) Southeastern South America, and (7) Middle Latitude North America. These seven regions taken together contain most of the people of the world, most of the natural resources, most of the transport and other facilities, most of the productive activies, and most of the advanced social institutions. In addition, they have produced most of the ideas which are promoting—or retarding—the welfare of mankind. These regions, therefore, are the areas of international concern and the regions of supreme interest in world recovery. The distribution of the seven major regions throws light on the geographic foundations of world power. At no time in the long evolution of civilization have all parts of the world been utilized in the support of the world's population. As yet, man has not really “in- herited the Earth” since he has not drawn on the re- sources of all the productive parts of it. Full use of the world’s resources lies ahead, and thus it is to be expected that the great opportunities for civilization are in the future rather than in the past. 1. GLOBAL USE OF RESOURCES. The nearest approach to global use of resources was in the period immediately preceding World War I. III. utilizing new resources. In other cases, the policies of nations have hindered rather than helped people in gaining a living. Examples of unwise use of land and other resources are just as numerous as examples of Wise use. In this connection it should be understood that men and land, that is, the use of land by man, are inseparable and that, in the long run, men as well as land pay the penalty if national policies lead to unwise use of the basic resources. In the chapters of this manual devoted to the Great Powers, the intimate relations of the State to the area it occupies has been emphasized. It becomes clear that Five of the seven are in Eurasia and thus only two lie in the Americas. Only one is wholly in the Southern Hemisphere, although another, Malayasia, extends south of the Equator. Two face the Atlantic, two the Pacific, and two the Indian Ocean. One, Eastern Europe, is almost landlocked and one, Middle Latitude North America, has the unique and significant distinction of facing both the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. The relation of the seven major regions to the seven Great Powers poses problems for the future. Western Europe alone contains four of the Great Powers, namely, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy. This fact further emphasizes the significance of Western Europe among the regions of the world. Eastern Eu- rope is almost exclusively under the control of the Soviet Union and is the dominant part of that vast country. IV. GLOBAL CONSIDERATIONS Then, most productive parts of the world had been Settled, each area adding its quota to the commodities available for human use. Moreover, railways on land and steamships by sea furnished cheap and regular transport for commodities to the world’s markets. The cost of the essentials of food, clothing, and shelter lowered until they came within the reach of most people in most areas. There were, of course, poverty belts but the standard of living was rising in most parts of the world. Thus through the introduction of modern transportation and the development of trade, life at the turn of the century was being lived more nearly in world MAJOR REGIONS OF THE WORLD the productive performance of the people of any area is influenced profoundly by the way in which the area is governed. In such study, however, there is a tendency to think of the nation as the all-important regional con- cept. In order to gain perspective in our study of poli- tical geography, it will be wise to view the world again and again in terms of the interrelated series of patterns with which we are dealing, namely the natural patterns, the facility patterns, the occupational patterns and the institutional or idea patterns. By so doing, we gain perspective in regard to individual regions and to the world as a whole. Japan has been for some decades the great power of East Asia, although China occupies most of the region, has most of the people, and certainly has most of the resources. Malayasia has no great power seated in the area, but both Britain and France were represented there before Japanese occupation, and The Netherlands, not a great power, had a huge stake. India is a key part of the British Empire and, in its coal and iron, has power potentialities not yet fully utilized. Southeastern South America contains none of the territory controlled by the Great Powers but does have the leading two nations of South America. Finally the seventh region, Middle Latitude North America, is almost entirely un- der the control of the United States and furnishes the best example of the coincidence of a great power and a major region which the world offers. terms than at any other time in history. Then, in 1914, and again in 1939, global war interrupted the progress of civilization. Global peace, implemented by what- ever Safeguards may be needed to make it effective, is the announced objective of the United Nations. 2. WESTERN EUROPE IN THE WORLD ORDER. In modern times Western Europe has been the heart of the commercial world. Most of the people of other regions have depended on Western Europe as a market for their raw materials and as a source of manufactured articles. The individual importance of the countries of 117 Western Europe especially of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany is widely recognized but their collective or regional significance commonly is over- looked. Normally in the past the trade among these countries was enormous. This intraregional trade not only was vital to the smooth functioning of the business and industry of those countries, but it was essential to their trade with other parts of the world. From the standpoint of the welfare of people in other regions, therefore, it is highly desirable that trade be carried on between the several parts of Western Europe. In fact, this trade is desirable to the point of being essential if people in other parts of the world are to have full op- portunities of employments. Thus one of the impor- tant considerations of the post-war years is the recovery of trade among the nations of Western Europe.* The high importance of Western Europe to the rest of the world can be demonstrated in many spheres of activity. The international trade of its fourteen coun- tries amounts to nearly as much as the combined total of all other countries. All but two of the leading twelve flags on the ocean lanes are flags of Western European countries. Eight of its nations hold colonies in other 1. As used here, western Europe includes fourteen countries, namely: the United Kingdom, Eire, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxem- bourg, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. parts of the world. Their combined empires cover more than 40 percent of the earth's surface, and contain more than 40 percent of the world's people. This means that the ideas and forms of government of Western Europe spread far beyond the confines of that relatively small 3.I'ê8. The tragedy of our times is the inability of the nations of Western Europe to compose their intraregional dif- ficulties. Twice within the first half of this century these countries have drawn the rest of the world into their conflicts. These wars have disrupted the world's economy, consumed the world’s resources, and lowered the world’s plane of living. They have destroyed rather than furthered civilization. The nations of Western Europe individually and collectively did not recover fully from World War I. Aside from the destruction of property, the waste of resources, and the trail of poverty, crippled bodies, and bitterness left by the War, the countries of Western Europe lost heavily in world trade and influence. Ger- many, for example, lost its leadership in chemicals and drugs when the United States and other countries, no longer able to buy from Germany, were forced to de- velop their own chemical industries. Britain never recovered its former dominant position in the textile trades and did not regain its former amazing leadership in shipping. During World War I, people in South America, Asia, and other parts of the world were unable to secure neces- sary manufactured goods from Western Europe and turned to the United States and Japan for supplies. At the end of the War, some of this trade reverted to West- ern Europe, but both the United States and Japan retained considerable parts of it. The effect on the economy of the United States and Japan has been stated, in part at least, in chapters 7 and 8 of Section I. The economic dislocations produced by the present war will be even more pronounced. For example, synthetics have released the United States, in part at least, from her former complete dependence on the Far East for such vital commodities as rubber, quinine, and silk. Britain, having reduced by half her imports of food- stuffs, will not spon relapse into her former vulnerability to blockade, at least not to the same degree as in her last two wars. The extensive development of heavy industry in such formerly agricultural regions as Australia, Canada, and leading South American countries is bound to affect the export trade of the leading pre-war indus- trial countries. It may help, however, to look more specifically at the post-war world order in terms of the United States and its probable role in that order. V. THE UNITED STATES IN POST WAR WORLD ORDER 1. THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER. In 1790, the United States was a new nation occupy- ing a small strip of relatively poor land along the Atlan- tic. World interest in the new country focused on its political philosophy rather than on its resources or its economic production. No one thought of it as a potential world power. In Europe it was regarded as a frontier area both in distance and in importance.” 2 In 1904, Sir Halford J. Mackinder, the first of Britain's geopoliti- cians, developed his thesis of a world doomed to ultimate domination by whatsoever nation might rule the “Heartland”—a region roughly coterminous with the boundaries of Soviet Russia of today. In his exposition, republished without change in 1942 (“Democratic Ideals and Reality,” Henry Holt & Co., N. Y.) North America appears as one of six “satellites” of the “World Island.” The raw totals of area and population are accepted by Mackinder as the basis of his conclusions. No more than cursory attention is given to the power potential for peace or war realizable from the areas considered. In the light of the history which has been made since 1939, Mackinder's views are due for thorough review. In particular, his rating of North America's potential in relation to global problems is seriously out of line with the facts. 2. AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION AND RE- SOURCES. - - - - - Size is only one of the natural qualities which make for power. Great sections of the territory acquired during the growth of the United States were among the richest lands of the world. More than any other con- tinent, North America has its best lands and richest mineral resources in the interior. Thus the area now included in the Corn Belt extending from middle Ohio to middle Nebraska in its combination of surface, drain- age, soil and climate ranks at the top among the world's natural productive areas. Other agricultural areas of the first order in size and importance are the Cotton Belt, the tobacco country, the wheat regions, and the Dairy Belt. With the exception of the last named each of these major segments of American land and economy have written themselves into the international scene by producing a huge surplus for export. As each of them probably will continue to create a surplus for export, the disposal of surplus agricultural products in foreign markets is bound to influence American international policy for a long time in the future. The value Öf farm property represents a large part of the national income of the United States. Nearly 40 percent of the population lives on farms or in farm vil- lages and thus shares directly in this agricultural in- come. Agriculture, however, is widely but not evenly distributed in the country. In spite of the wide distri- bution of agricultural population, only half of the land of the United States is held in farms, and crops are har- vested from only about 20 percent of the total area. Of the people gainfully employed in this country about 22 percent are engaged in agriculture. The greater part of our cropland is in the humid and more nearly level 118 eastern half of the country. In a recent year the agri- cultural production of the Soviet Union, China, and India was individually less than three-fourths that of the United States. These facts suggest both the im- portance of agriculture in the United States and of its agricultural products in the markets of the world, even though the high costs of United States production inter- feres seriously with the competitive position of such products. 3. SIGNIFICANCE OF AMERICAN FOREST RESOURCES. Access to forest products is a question of much im- portance to most nations. Trees grow in all humid sections of the world, but only in a relatively few areas are forests of such size and character as to furnish big quantities of commercially desirable products. Tropi- cal forests, except for a few specialized products like rubber and mahogany, count for very little commer- cially. This is due in part to the fact that tropical for- ests do not contain solid stands of commercial species as do many forests in middle latitudes. Such a wide dis- persal of trees of the same species makes commercial production difficult and only special products like ma- hogany can stand the cost of harvest and export. The flow of lumber, mine props, pulpwood, and other forest products from the Scandinavian countries and Finland to Britain, Germany, and France is a well known part of European economy. Forest products make up 36 percent of the value of Swedish exports and 80 percent of all exports from Finland. Russia and Siberia, moreover, contain large areas of com- mercial timber and are almost certain to export these products in the post-war years. Before the war, forest products made up about 20 percent of Soviet exports. This flow of forest products from these lands is an example of human activity wisely adjusted to natural conditions on the one hand and to market demands on the other. In recent times the United States has consumed about two-fifths of the forest products of the world and has been the leading producing and exporting country. The war has called for enormous quantities of lumber and plywood, and of pulpwood for the extraction of chemicals. Cutting in our forests has been accelerated greatly and thus our future lumber supply is one of the grave questions facing the American people in the post-war years. Not much of our virgin timber is left and although timber can and will be grown as a crop, such timber is certain to cost more than the product of nature. Thus the end of cheap lumber is in sight and in the post-war years the United States may find it difficult to supply the nation's demand for forest products. In this connection, it should be understood that the other big exporting countries are in Europe, and thus, except from Canada, the United States cannot expect to import large quantities from other countries. As a result, every reasonable effort needs to be exerted to conserve and develop the remnants of the forests (fig. 6). 4. GRAZING AND THE LIVESTOCK INDUS- TRIES. Pasture lands constitute an important resource in the United States and in some sections of the country are the major resource underlying the economy. The same holds true in many countries; in fact the total area of the grazing lands of the world is considerably larger than that of the farming areas. The grazing indus- tries, however, support a much smaller fraction of the world’s people because only a few men are required to look after even large herds or flocks. Nevertheless poli- cies looking toward enduring peace must provide for the welfare of pastoral people in many parts of the world. In the United States ownership and management of our pasture lands are of two types, namely, (1) pasture land unsuitable for crops but included in farms and thus privately owned and managed; and (2) pasture lands which are a part of the Public Domain or are under the jurisdiction of other Federal or State agencies. Of the pasture land included in farms the big display is in the semiarid Great Plains where uncertain rainfall limits agriculture but in most years gives good stands of grass. In the eastern humid parts of the country, the farm pasture lots in many cases are on land too steep, too stony, too poorly drained, or with a soil too poor for crops. The pasture lands, with associated crop lands, support the livestock industries. Hides and skins, wool and meat are among the numerous products. The war has demonstrated anew the importance of meat in the diet of most countries. If supply of meat is vital in time of war, it is even more important in times of peace. Na- tional and international policies should recognize this vital necessity of the human race. The United States can and does produce its own sup- tions of world power.” ply of pork and mutton and in the past produced an adequate supply of beef. In the future, however, it may need to import beef. Thus the supply and price of beef may become a matter of controversy between beef-producing areas, loath to have foreign beef enter American markets, and consumers of beef, wishing to buy beef cheaply. Similar questions of demand and supply affect the foreign policy of other nations, although the commodities involved may be different. All this indicates that matters of production and con- sumption are of the essence of policy making whether national or international. 5. MINERAL INDUSTRIES AND RESOURCES. Of all commodities, minerals occasion the most acute controversies among nations. This grows out of their value in the production of energy and their use as raw materials in industry. Inadequate supplies of gasoline and lubricants, for example, helped defeat the Germans in World War I and may break them in the present conflict. The Stone Age and the Iron Age, as divisions of history, show the importance of minerals in the evolu- tion of civilization. It was not until the modern devel- opment of the manufacturing industries, with their ever-increasing demand for power and raw materials, that the distribution of mineral resources took rank with climate, soil, and surface as one of geographic founda- Leith points out “that more mineral resources have been mined and consumed since the opening of the century than in all preceding his- tory,” and that “minerals now constitute about two- thirds of the railway tonnage of the United States and about a quarter of all ocean-borne traffic.” (See fig. 47.) The present century has witnessed not only a great increase in the use of the major minerals, such as coal, iron, petroleum, and copper, but a rapid increase in the number of other industrial minerals. The consumption of such large quantities of the major minerals has resulted in the elimination from world consideration of any but the few large well-located producing areas. Small deposits simply will not support the huge de- mands of modern industry. The increased market for formerly little used materials has led to the opening of new mining areas and has stimulated the search for min- erals in many Sections. In spite of the need, but few really important discoveries have been made in recent 8 C. K. Leith, World Minerals and World Politics, New York, 1931, p. 3. 119 decades. Leith states that “except for oil, a major source of minerals has not been discovered in Europe since 1850, in the United States since 1910.” “ The ma- jor mineral discoveries of recent times have been in Canada, Central Africa, South America, and Australia (with probabilities of important discoveries in Africa, Asia, and Australia in the future). . The distribution of minerals among the nations is uneven in variety and quantity. “Of the twelve large * Ibid., p. 26. mineralized areas of the world, two are in the United States and six are wholly or in part in the British Em- pire.”" Except for potentialities in the Soviet Union (and perhaps China) most of the future discoveries are likely to be in territory controlled by the United States and United Kingdom by their mining, smelting, and refining activities control at least 75 percent of the World’s mineral output and mineral reserves." Here * The extent of such control has been definitely curtailed in recent or Britain. In addition to the reserves within their own terri- tory the commercial organizations of the United States * Charles C. Colby and Alice Foster, Economic Geography, Boston, 1940, p. 43. years by the nationalization policies adopted by an increasing number of countries. Taking its cue from Soviet Russia, Mexico took over all mineral lands which had been developed by foreign capital, chiefly American and British. A similar trend in South America was tem- porarily stayed by the outbreak of the war. The rates of compensation to the investors in these cases have not been such as to encourage the inflow of new capital. On the whole the trend is away from Great Power exploitation of foreign mineral sources. gº dº º ºsmº sº. dº º sºme sº dº sº sº ºne * gº tº gº tº sº º sº º sº. 2/ M 6 %\,AT& SS=ss Sºss 60° • f | 2 Q º d º _AY < * > yº rºſ | \ * • \ \ _rºſ if r P v_ſ^ wº Qºrº S- z-SS & | ޺ * * * * * * *ms"sºme ºms –24-rº---->> H----><--4-------A-\!-----tºº-y--->g: gº N. * iss. IEEEZ \ \ } *::2_ \ NS= 80. Z SNC Çe 40° ~~1 * ) © 3 Ø —º: --------------------/ sº, sº me use º 'º º sº, sº ºn dº dº º ºſ w tº ºf wºo sº º ºs º ºs º ºs º ºs = | * * * * * * * * * * \ sº sº sº gº dº tº -|- * -----|---------/ \-------\----- *— 1. Eastern North American 4. Caribbean i}; 6. European (A &A Asbestos Mica Asphalt / "º. Coal 9. Ural-Siberian ibauxite Petroleum Bauxite Copper Asbestos 0. East Asi Coal Phosphate Manganese ! r * 8. South African Bauxite 10. e 12 tº Copper Silver Petroleum t i.º Asbestos Chrome Antimony 11. Indian and East Indian w §: Sulphur 5. And | M 3. Chrome Coal Chrome Chrome Petroleum º • AllOlCall angaſhCSC i. Zinc & Mº #. Coal Copper 3. f Iron Silver Antimony Gold ppe g & Copper Potash Copper Iron Graphite Lead Tin 2. Western North American .." (A Silver Diamonds Magnesite Gypsum Manganese Tungsten 3. #. Nitrates Zinc $. Manganese Iron Mica & opper Petroleum Petroleum 7. Western Mediterranean anganese Mica Lead 12, Australian : º Platinum Antimony Manganese #in Phosphate Manganese Coal Lead Zinc Silver Bauxite Mercury Silver Platinum Pyrite Gold Tin Copper Phosphate Tin Potash Sulphur Lead 3. Alaskan Graphite Potash Pyrite Talc Platinum e phite Potas e ſº tº Scale of miles Copper Gypsum Pyrites Zinc Tin Silver 2000 §. Fº §º Tungsten Tin º 1% | " * C FIGURE 47 then is evidence of power potential in world terms. The policies of these two great powers, together with those of the Soviet Union, therefore are likely to dominate world poliey. Of the three, the United States has the largest share of control and thus should have a big voice in determining world policy. If the policies of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the U. S. S. R. are fair both to themselves and to other nations, we can assume that the necessary and wise adjustment of human activities to these vital resources will be forth- coming. In this connection it should be realized that a third of the world’s mineral tonnage crosses inter- national boundaries and thus policies must be truly international in character. 6. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL AS- PECTS OF THE MANUFACTURING INDUS- TRIES OF THE UNITED STATES. The growth of the United States to the stature of a great power has been associated with striking changes in the national economy, that is, in changes in the ways in which people gain their living. Since 1870 the big increases in employment have been in manufacturing, trade, and transportation. In 1930 manufacturing, trade, and transportation em- ployed more than 50 percent of the nation’s gainfully employed as compared with only 30 percent in 1870. Of the total gainfully employed, manufacture alone ac- counted for more than a fourth. During this same pe- riod although the number of persons gainfully employed in agriculture increased gradually to 1910, the relation of agricultural employment to total employment dropped from 53 percent in 1870 to about 22 percent in 1930. Thus, since 1870, the national economy has shifted from one in which agriculture predominated to one dominated by manufacturing. The growing importance of manufacturing in the United States raises international as well as national issues. It means, for example, that the United States has become an actual and potential competitor of Europe in the world markets, both for needed raw mate- rials and for the sale of many types of manufactured goods. The rise of manufacture, moreover, now con- tributes more than any other pursuit to the national income. This means that our national and inter- national policies will need to be visualized increasingly in terms of their influence on American manufactur- ing industries. Nothing more clearly demonstrates the power poten- tial of the United States than the command of the energy needed in a growing industrial civilization. Its consumption of energy is more than that of any other nation. In fact, American consumption of power per capita is 50 percent higher than that of Great Britain, more than twice that of Germany, and more than ten times that of Japan." In terms of energy Leith states that the United States produces and consumes about 40 percent of the energy produced in the world and that it has about 40 percent of the reserves. In terms of energy, the United States does nearly half of the world’s work. Production of energy in the United States depends in descending order of importance on coal, petroleum, nat- ural gas, and water power. With the exception of water power, these sources of energy are exhaustible. Fortunately American reserves of coal are enormous. Its reserves of petroleum and natural gas are quite a different matter. They must be thought of as dis- tinctly limited in quantity. This means that shortly the American people shall need to look abroad for supplies and look at home for substitutes. To some extent the United States can rely on water power but “all our water power, including both that developed and that feasible of development, could produce energy annually equivalent to only about a fourth of the energy contained in all mineral fuels consumed in the country in 1937 for all purposes.” " The location of coal fields and thus the distribution of a vital element in the national power potential of the country is shown in the accompanying figure 48. Some, but not all, of the coal lies within the major manufac- turing areas. Of American reserves almost 70 percent lies in the Great Plains and Rocky Mountain areas, whereas about 85 percent of present production is from the 30 percent of the reserves east of the Mississippi. In the long run this distribution is likely to lead to Some striking shifts in the industrial pattern of the United States. At present manufacturing is distributed largely in the eastern half of the country, more especially in a belt extending from Chicago and St. Louis on the west, to Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore on the east. This area is known as the “American Manu- facturing Belt” and it is the one part of the world which * Energy Resources and National Policy, Report of the Energy Re- sources Committee to the National Resources Committee, Jan. 1939, p. 9. * Energy Resources, op. cit. p. 2. in size and production challenges the European Manu- facturing Belt, extending from England to Western Poland. These two areas constitute power in terms of our modern industrial Society. They are the major two areas of international concern. They possess the coal, the iron ore, the skilled manpower, the transport and manufacturing facilities, the momentum of an early start, and the sea frontage which contribute to national power. Their strength rests on firm geographic and economic foundations. In recent years, and hastened by the war, manufac- turing has developed rapidly in the Soviet Union. This development is in harmony with the agricultural, min- eral, and forest resources, the great size, and the large population of this giant among nations. Four large districts are outstanding, namely (1) the Moscow Dis- trict which includes Moscow and Gorki and is notable for its diversity of products, (2) the South Ukraine District based on the Donetz Coal Field, the Krivoi Rog iron ores, and large deposits of manganese, (3) the Ural District which includes the great iron and steel produc- tion based on the famous Magnitogorsk iron ore de- posits, and (4) the new centers in the Kuznetsk Basin of western Siberia. Together these districts give the Soviet Union a large and diversified output of manu- factured goods. The districts are widely separated, however, and the Soviet Union has a long way to go before it can match the huge output of the manufactur- ing belts of Europe and the United States. In comparing the world influence of the major manu- facturing areas it should be remembered that the European belt is divided among several countries and that it is well-nigh impossible for these countries to ... present a unified front in competing for world trade. In fact their unwillingness to cooperate is one of the causes of world wars. These European areas have the advantage of long experience, world-wide shipping Services, and trade and financial connections. Manufac- turers in the United States, however, have the advantage of a much larger domestic market than any of the nations of western Europe. A population of 135,000,000 with a high per capita buying power, makes for quantity production and low cost per unit output. In some cases the domestic market pays the cost of manufacture while the foreign sales provide the profit. In this respect the Soviet Union is like the United States, for it too has a large population, although as yet not as high a per capita buying power. tº 121 LOCATION OF COAL FIELDS º CŞ. UE GEND Ø Bituminous, commercial value �u ~> 3 > ~^ < Q ∞ uJ 2-5 ± O © uf |- 2-2 92 •ð FIGURE 48 WL SOME FUNDAMENTALS OF PEACE The part played by geography in creating the pres- sures which lead to war and in the prosecution of war itself has been stressed in this text. The weight of geography is felt no less in shaping the character and durability of the peace—or truce—which terminates war. In particular it influences vitally the scope, speed, and thoroughness of the rehabilitation of areas ravaged by war. In the areas devastated by the fighting forces of the belligerents and in those which have been stripped of their resources by Axis occupation troops an enor- mous latent demand for every kind of goods, ranging from the means of bare subsistence to machinery of all kinds, awaits satisfaction. Less acute, but equal or greater in volume, is the cumulative demand which is piling up among belligerents like the United States, and among the neutrals as well. The aggregate of such un- satisfied wants when the fighting has ended will greatly exceed anything in the history of the human race. The efficiency with which this problem is met will go far toward determining the stability of the peace to come. It places the treatymakers, and those to follow who will seek to maintain the treaties, in a role vastly different from that of the diplomats and statesmen of a few generations ago. The day of peace settlements limited to such matters as territorial expansion and defensible boundaries, along with the political provi- sions to implement their execution, is past. It went out when modern technology expanded warfare to global limits and stepped up the destructive processes to the point of wholesale ruin of vast areas. The men who made the peace of 1919 got a preview of the prob- lems created by global war. They at least made the effort to establish global peace on a secure basis. Habit and precedent, however, had bound these leaders and their political followings too closely to local, national, and regional considerations to permit them to draft a blueprint for peace on the same scale as that of the war which they were liquidating. The lines of the coming peace settlement have been in the forefront of public debate since the moment the de- feat of the Axis became an assured fact. Once again it is clear that the insistence on satisfying the mutually irreconcilable demands of local, national, and regional groups may prevent the arrival at a solution as broad in its scope and application as the war itself. We are here concerned only with the geographical aspects of the problem, but these too are global in their extent and in- fluence. The geographical experts on the treaty commissions will deal with an array of facts which fall into two gen- eral classifications, those subject to little, if any, change and those which may be readily modified under human direction. The position, size, shape, and physiography of the world’s land bodies, the climatic conditions which prevail, and the distribution of natural resources are examples of the first category—the immutables. Taken together they have provided the geographical founda- tion for the history of past and present civilizations. They pose an immediate problem for the statesmen in that four-fifths of the world's land area is to be found in the single unit comprising Eurasia and Africa— Mackinder’s “World Island.” There too is found seven- eighths of the world’s total population, if we add the peoples of the offset islands, including Britain and Japan. Population distribution, far from uniform, shows heavy concentrations generating serious pressures in China, India, Korea, and Japan; and likewise in a broad belt extending from north to south in Europe, including Germany, the Low Countries, Britain, and Italy. By contrast vast areas in Africa, Asia, and Australia, and in South Sea Islands like Sumatra, Bor- neo, Celebes, and New Guinea, support mere handfuls of people. In terms of world distribution, the Ameri- cas are underpopulated. If the land and its natural resources belong to the category of immutable conditions, the unbalance in population distribution is at least partly subject to hu- man control. Left to itself, such unbalance has in the past created and will again create the pressures which can lead to major war. On the other hand, declining birth rates in Europe point to an eventual easing of the pressure on the continent. No such phenomenon is oc- curing in the congested area of Asia, except for the spo- radic effects of the present war. Indeed, the advent of western sanitation and medicine in those regions, by reducing sharply the normally heavy death rates, has served to aggravate the congestion. It is but natural that those who struggle with the problem of world stability should look to the possibility of wholesale migration of population surpluses to the sparsely settled regions. Such redistribution, how- ever, is certain to encounter obstacles, some of which appear to be insurmountable. The wholesale absorp- tion of the pigmented peoples by nations whose populace now includes little or none of the non-white elements will hardly be given serious consideration at any time that can be foreseen. In areas where these conditions do not exist, such as the East Indies and Central Africa, the jungles and the various kinds of tropical diseases must first be overcome before any large scale migration becomes possible. The successes in this direction achieved by the United States in the Panama region and more recently by the Dutch in Sumatra and Borneo and Japanese settlers in Brazil indicate that the problem is not insurmountable. In another direction, both the United States and the Soviet Union have pointed the way toward the development of desert areas where rain- fall is adequate to build up irrigation reserves. In sum, the reclamation of extensive areas of the earth's surface which now possess little or no utility may create the means for relieving the most seriously congested regions. The problem is not merely one of reclaiming the world’s waste spaces to the end of reducing popula- tion pressure. The remedy looks first to assuring a sound agricultural basis of economy but in a modern technological world something more than arable land and the production of agricultural raw materials is needed. In part, industry will follow the trail opened by the pioneer. In part, a healthy balance must be sought through positive action by the nations chiefly concerned. Such action in turn calls for the stimula- tion of the natural flow of raw materials to the end that a more nearly balanced economy will become uni- formly feasible. Collectively such measures should make it easier to remove one of the greatest dangers to stability in peace, namely, the extreme discrepancies in living standards in various parts of the world. Full equality in that respect must remain a dream of the visionaries. To begin with, no means exist for the correction of Nature's highly uneven distribution of its gifts, in particular such basic resources as arable land, mineral raw materials and favorable climate. Taken together these factors make it certain that the cost in time and energy which enters into the production of any item of finished goods will run higher in one area than in another. Added to that are the factors of distance and the means of transport for the delivery of such goods to the ultimate 123 consumer. Whatever economic or financial means may be devised to correct these latter inequalities, as re- flected in consumer payment, they cannot affect the basic measuring rod of the human sweat and hours which pro- duce the goods in question. A final bar to the creation of uniform living stand- ards is the fact that Nature has not endowed men equally with leadership, initiative, and productive ca- pacity. Even if the Utopian ideal of uniform produc- tive conditions for all could be created, the variations in individual and group capacities to utilize the ap- portunity would defeat the general purpose. The most that can be practicably sought at the present varying levels of human development is the amelioration of the most dangerous inequalities in living standards. The foregoing discussion is postulated on the as- sumption that the former geographical barriers to easy communication between all parts of the earth will con- tinue to come down before the march of technological progress. Such advances go hand in hand with an ever-rising demand for the world's goods, which in turn leads the way to increasing economic interdependence 124 among the nations. Neither imperialism nor the more recent efforts of certain leading powers to attain eco- nomic self-sufficiency has done more than check that trend. The joint effort of the United Nations in the present war, as evidence in the pooling and sharing of resources, has given new impetus to this principle of international economic solidarity. What will remain of it after peace has brought back the old emphases on national self-interest remains to be seen. What has been shown is that a major emergency can create neces- sities surmounting those of the national group, and that the latter can and will be sacrificed temporarily for the common good. It cannot be anticipated, however, that considerations of national self-interest will vanish with the return of peace. The Soviet Union's desire for access to ice-free ports, the United Kingdom's need of life lines to main- tain some degree of solidarity and strategic unity in the British Commonwealth of Nations, the concern of the United States over adequate protection for her own life line through Panama and her determination to have a secure footing for her growing interests in the Western Pacific—these are instances of the types of problems awaiting solution. They fall on a world where technol- ogy, in particular the development of air transport, is shrinking each day the distances which separate the Continents. The “humps” of Africa and South America are becoming close neighbors, the once formidable bar- rier of the North Polar ice cap has vanished before air transportation, leaving only the polar storms as a handicap to easy air communication “over the top.” Less spectacular but definitely notable are the corre- sponding advances in sea and land transport. Full ex- ploitation of the opportunity thus created is open chiefly to the highly industrialized nations, more specif- ically the Great Powers. Their strength in turn rests in each instance on a geographical foundation, subject to modification in its basic aspects only through the loss or acquisition of territory. The utility aspect, the measure of sound exploitation of the territory which they can achieve remains within their control. In the measure of their individual and collective success in converting Nature's gifts to human use lies the funda- mental basis of a stable peace and a better world. U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINT ING OFFICE: 1944 TY OF MICHIGAN Illii 3 9015 O 8025 2532