A tº º
Second Edition.
PROPERTY IN LAND, .
A DEFENCE OF INDIVIDUAL OWNERSHIP.
By
J. C. spence.
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PUBLISHED AT THE CENTRAL OFFICES OF THE
LIBERTY AND PROPERTY DEFENCE LEAGUE,
I, VICTORIA STREET, LONDON, SW,
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The Lillºry and PrºpBFly Dºſºnſ; LBāg|8.
(To uphold the principle of Liberty, and guard the rights of Labour and
Property of all kinds against undue interference by the State;
and to encourage Self-help zersus State-help.)
COUNCIL–1896–97.
THE RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF WEMYSS, Chairman.
Sir FREDERICK BRAMWELL, Bart., F.R.S. -
Sir W. J. R. COTTON.
The Hon. BARON DIMSDALE.
Alderman Sir JoSEPH DIMSDALE.
Sir MYLES FENTON.
The Right Hon. EARL FoRTEscue.
ALFRED HEWLETT, Esq.
Sir WILLIAM LEwis, Bart.
W. H. MALLOCK, Esq.
GEORGE PALMER, Esq.
The Right Hon. LoRD PENZANCE.
The Right Hon. LoRD Rookwood.
H. C. STEPHENS, Esq., M.P.
H. H. RILEY SMITH, Esq., J.P.
W. J. CARRUTHERS WAIN, Esq.
Sir EDWARD W. WATRIN, Bart.
WALTER FARQUHAR, Esq., Aſon. 7% easurer.
An & Zºe/resentatives of 198 Federated Corporate Aodies and ZJeſence
Societies, representing the chief industries and interests ºn ºfte Aïng-
dom.
Secretary and Zarliamentary Agenz FREDERICK MILLAR.

PROPERTY IN LAND.
IN England, and in most civilized countries, land is bought and
sold, and in other ways treated as private property; but, from
the time of John Locke down to Mr. Herbert Spencer's recent
work, “Justice,” philosophers have taught us that the land is
originally the common property of all mankind, and ought not
to belong exclusively to individuals. All those who are capable
of looking at two sides of a question agree that the rights of
the present owners cannot be ignored without gross injustice ;
but a great and rapidly-increasing number of one-sided advo-
cates argue that the injustice of keeping “the people’ out of
“ their rightful property” greatly exceeds the injustice of dis-
possessing those who “usurp” that property. In this pamphlet
it is proposed to contest the generally-accepted theory on the
subject, and to show, firstly, that the owning of land is justifiable
on exactly the same grounds as the owning of any other material
object; and, secondly, that land, or any other thing, may be
owned by some, without transgressing the equal rights of
others.
Starting with Locke's assumption, “that the earth and all
inferior creatures are common to all men,” innumerable writers
have come to the curious conclusion that the land ought to
remain common property, but that inferior creatures, such as
horses and cattle, the vegetable products of the earth, and the
mineral contents thereof, may honestly become private property.
If the earth and all that it contains belong equally to all men,
it is not easy to see how some parts of it can rightly belong
exclusively to any individual. And all the arguments brought
forward to prove that there is an essential difference between
land and other forms of property can be used with far greater
force to prove that property in land rests on identically the
same basis as property of any other kind.
4. AA’OAAEA 7" V /AV /AAV/).
According to Professor Cairnes,” “The main grounds on
which the distinction between land and other forms of property
depends are summed up in the following weighty sentences of
Mr. J. S. Mill – Moveable property can be produced in
indefinite quantity, and he who disposes as he likes of any-
thing which, it can be fairly argued, would not have existed
but for him does no wrong to anyone. It is otherwise with
regard to land, a thing which no one made, which exists in
limited quantity, which was the original inheritance of all man-
kind, and which whoever appropriates keeps other men out of
its possession. Such appropriation, when there is not enough
left for all, is, at the first aspect, an usurpation of the rights of
other people.’” This argument looks very convincing until we
ask the questions, What kind of moveable property can be pro-
duced in indefinite quantities, and what kind of material objects
has man brought into existence It is perfectly true that land
was not made by any man, and that it exists in limited quantities;
but it is not true that it is otherwise with regard to other things;
on the contrary, it is exactly the same with regard to every
other kind of property; for instance, all that was said of land
could be said with equal force of gold, which is “a thing which
no one made, which exists in limited quantity, which formed
part of the original inheritance of all mankind, and which who-
ever appropriates keeps other men out of its possession. Such
appropriation, when there is not enough for all, is, at the first
aspect, an usurpation of the rights of other people.”
A novice in the study of political economy might carelessly
assume that moveable property can be produced by man in
indefinite quantity ; but it is not easy to understand how such a
proposition can be “fairly argued" by Mr. J. S. Mill, seeing
that the first part of his “Principles of Political Economy” is
devoted to proving that man's labour can produce nothing, and
that only things of which the supply is limited can be classed as
property. He says : “Nature, however, does more than supply
materials ; she also supplies powers...... If we examine any
other case of what is called the action of man upon nature, we
shall find, in like manner, that the powers of nature–or, in
other words, the properties of matter—do all the work...... The
one operation, of putting things into fit places for being acted
upon by their own internal forces, and by those residing in
other natural objects, is all that man does or can do...... The
part which nature has in any work of man is indefinite and in-
commensurable. It is impossible to decide that in any one
thing nature does more than in any other. One cannot even
* “Essays on Political Economy.”


AA’OAAA’ 7"Y /AV /AAV/O. 5
say that labour does less.” After this elaborate proof that
labour cannot produce anything, while nature produces every-
thing, it is rather startling to come across the following passage
in another part of the same work –“The essential principle of
property being to assure to all persons what they have fro-
duced by their labour, this principle cannot apply to what is
not the produce of labour—the raw material of the earth.” How
it was possible for a man like Mr. J. S. Mill to consider the
land as the produce of nature, while he treats as the produce of
labour gold and silver, horses and cattle, grain, and all other
material objects, must be explained by those who still hold that
land ownership is intrinsically wrong.
The fact that land is not the produce of labour affords no
grounds for placing property in land on a different footing from
property in other things. In the same way, it is evident that
land does not differ from, but agrees with, all other kinds of
property in being limited.
That an unlimited supply of coal can be drawn from a limited
mine, or that a limited field will produce an unlimited crop of
grain, or support an unlimited herd of cattle, is, of course, im-
possible. There is no form of wealth, natural or artificial, that
is not strictly limited. The number of gold coins and the
quantity of bullion in England, or in the world, is limited. The
number of tons of pig-iron, lead, copper, etc., the stocks of
grain, timber, and all other commodities, are all limited, the
quantities of each being known with great exactness by dealers
in these commodities; and, instead of these things being pro-
ducible in indefinite quantities, the quantities are so definite
that a very small change in the supply or demand for any of
them is sufficient to cause great fluctuation in the price. Not
only is it a fact that every kind of wealth is limited in quantity,
it is also the fact that it would not be wealth unless it were so
limited. As Mr. Mill himself says in another place :* “So long
as the quantity of a natural agent is practically unlimited it
Cannot...... bear any value in the market.” In this argument,
therefore, the reason assigned for treating property in land as
differing from property in other things is a characteristic of all
possible forms of wealth ; and, still more strange, land is the
one form of wealth in which this characteristic has the least
influence. There are millions of acres of unoccupied land
which can be taken by anyone, at a nominal fee, for nothing at
all—even for less than nothing, as we frequently see advertise-
ments of free grants of land with assisted passages. The
following paragraph is from this morning's paper :—“Bonuses
* “Principles of Political Economy,” book i., chapter i.

6 AA’O/2/2/07"V /AV /AAV/O.
to Emigrants to Canada.-Ottawa, December 23rd. At a
meeting of the Cabinet to-day it was decided to continue next
year the system of giving bonuses to immigrants who become
actual settlers in Manitoba, the North-west Territories, or
British Columbia. Every head of a family will receive ten
dollars, and each member of his family over twelve years of age
will receive five dollars. Proof of settlement will be required
before the bonus is paid. Booking agents in Great Britain will
receive five dollars commission on all emigrants booked, on
proof of their settlement on the land being produced.”—Red//e7.
If the supply of land were not greater than the demand, no
one would pay people to take possession thereof.
Let us next examine the assumption that the land is the
common inheritance of all mankind. As a generality, this looks
quite axiomatic ; but when we reduce it to a particular case, we
reduce it to an absurdity. The assumption is that each of my
readers and all the inhabitants of Timbuctoo are part proprietors
of the land in Ottawa, and that no one can take possession of
an acre there without usurping our rights. For my part, I fail
to see how I have any right to claim any share of this land.
It was made, not by me, or by any man, or by all men, but by
no man. The unoccupied part of it is really the property of no
man, and he who takes possession of it now does no injury to
any man. After a particular plot of ground had been cleared
and enclosed and cultivated by one settler, it would clearly be
an usurpation of his rights if a fresh emigrant came along and
demanded a half share of the cleared ground, because the land
is the equal inheritance of all. Such claims would inevitably
lead to perpetual fighting, to mutual destruction, instead of
mutual help. The basis of property is not the securing to each
the produce of his labour, for labour produces nothing, but the
acknowledgment of priority of claim, which is the only way to
avoid continual strife. There cannot be a question that, if the
second emigrant wanted the land already taken by the first,
the only honest course for him would be to buy or rent it from
the first claimant, on such terms as could be mutually agreed
upon. It seems unquestionable that the first one to take pos-
session of unoccupied land in Ottawa does not usurp the rights
of any other man, nor of all mankind ; and that he could sell it
or rent it or dispose of his rights to anyone. And the second
proprietor would not, any more than the first, be usurping the
rights of all mankind. In course of time, longer or shorter as
the case may be, the land which people have to be bribed to
accept might become as valuable as land in the City of London;
but the lapse of time and the growth of population would not
convert private into common property. Those who may happen

PKOPERTY ZAV ZANZ). 7
to live on the land a century hence have no more inherent right
to own the land than have the present inhabitants of Timbuctoo.
The future owners of the land will be no more usurping the
rights of others than are the present owners. And what will be
true for Ottawa in the future is true in England at present. The
man who owns an acre of ground in the City of London is no
more usurping the rights of other men than the man who owns
a valuable diamond, provided always that he has honestly come
by it.
Professor Cairnes has said that the arguments given above
sum up the main grounds on which property in land differs from
other forms of property ; and, after diligent search, I can find
no others except in Mr. Spencer's work on “Justice.” In this
Mr. Spencer recognizes, and states definitely, that property in
any material object rests ultimately on the right to the use of the
earth. But he also assumes that the earth is common to all
mankind, and not only the earth, but all it contains, and all the
natural forces at the disposal of man—the natural media, as
he calls them. The two theories—first, that all the natural
media are common to all men, and, second, that some parts
of the natural media may rightly be appropriated by some to
the exclusion of others—are both assumed to be true. And the
conclusion drawn from them is that the justification of the right
of property in any natural object is not ethically perfect, but is
good enough for practical purposes; that any attempt on the
part of mankind to resume common ownership of that which
has hitherto been treated as private property would cause a far
greater breach of equity than it would cure ; and that the
common rights of mankind are satisfied if absolute ownership
of one part of the natural media—the land—is qualified by State
Suzerainty.
Although this may be the best possible compromise between
two irreconcileable theories, it is by no means a satisfactory one :
and as we have seen some reasons for questioning the truth of
the generally accepted theory, that we are all equal inheritors of
the earth, it will be well, instead of assuming both theories to be
true, to weigh the evidence for them, the one against the other—
to accept one and reject the other, for they are contradictory, and
cannot both be true. In “Justice” the distinction between
metam and fuum is traced in its growth, from a vague sentiment
barely perceptible among the most intelligent of the lower
animals, to one of the strongest passions among civilized men—
namely, the love of justice. A survey of the evolution of law
and custom in uncivilized, semi-civilized, and civilized societies
shows that the rights of private property have become more
definite and more strictly regarded as society has progressed

8 AA’OAAA’7” V /AV /AAVZ).
towards civilization. The right to own private property is also
shown to be a corollary of the “Law of Equal Freedom.” It
might also be shown that this right is involved in one of the
most fundamental laws of ethics, Thou shalt not steal; for,
unless one man can own property, another cannot steal it from
him. The theory that men may rightly own some parts of the
natural media must be accepted as true.
The theory that all the natural media belong equally to all
men is not supported by a particle of evidence, that I can find.
At first sight it seems plausible, but it will not stand the least
examination. Mr. Spencer classes” the natural media as “res
communes, the property of which belongs to no person, but the
use to all.” According to Roman law, this class includes “the
light, the air, running water, etc., things which are by nature
itself incapable of appropriation, so that they cannot be brought
under the power of anyone.” He says that “under the same
heading must be included something which admits of appropria-
tion—the surface of the earth.” (Including, I presume, all
mineral, vegetable, and animal matter derived from it.) As, by
the definition, res communes applies to things incapable of appro-
priation, it cannot be argued that the inclusion of all objects,
which have in fact been appropriated, in the same class with
those “that are by nature incapable of appropriation,” has the
sanction of Roman law. On the contrary, “all those things
which are capable of appropriation, but are not yet appropriated,
but which are, at the moment, the property of no man, but which
may become the property of any one, by his advisedly taking
possession thereof,” are defined as res yºu//ius, the property of no
one. Of course, the rules of Roman law are not conclusive in
the court of ethics; but, as they are the results arrived at by
generations of keen and powerful intellects avowedly seeking to
determine what was just, their value as evidence of what corre-
sponds with the sentiment of justice cannot be over-rated.
And, it is evident, they do not support the theory that the
natural media belongs equally to all men; on the contrary, they
prove that, according to ancient law, all such parts of the natural
media as were capable of appropriation were considered to be
originally the property of no man, and could be honestly taken
and kept by anyone without usurpation of the rights of other
Inern.
Mr. Spencer admits that the classification of land as common
property is not strictly in accordance with the definition, and
the reason he gives for doing so is “that the earth's surface
* “Justice,” chap. xi.
† Sir Henry Maine’s “Ancient Law.”

A/('O/P/EA’ſ'Y /AV /AAV/D. 9
cannot be denied to anyone absolutely, without rendering life-
sustaining activities impossible.” But, in the same way, food
and clothing and shelter, and even money, “cannot be absolutely
denied to anyone without rendering life-sustaining activities
impossible.” Mr. Spencer would certainly disapprove of treating
all the necessaries of life as res communes ; yet his argument
applies as much to these things as to land. To exclude a man
from any particular plot of ground, or to sell or to rent that
ground to him, on terms determined by the open market, is not
to deny him absolutely the use of the earth.
After classing land as common property on these unsatisfactory
grounds, Mr. Spencer gives a few modern instances to show that
the air, the light, running water, etc., are still considered to be
public property, from whose use no one should be excluded ; and
then he continues: “If, while possessing these ethical sentiments,
which social discipline has now produced, men stood in posses:
sion of a territory not yet individually portioned out, they would
no more hesitate to assert equality of their claims to the land
than they would hesitate to assert equality of their claims to the
light and the air.”
It might be questioned whether men do claim equal quantities
of air and light ; but let it be granted that, if a number of men
found themselves in possession of an unoccupied country, they
would divide it equally among themselves. Let us assume the
division is made, and each man has taken possession of his
allotment. After a time an equal number of landless men
arrive on the scene, and, because they consider the land belongs
equally to all mankind, demand that the country shall be
re-divided so as to give them their share. Would equity demand
that each of the original settlers should divide his property into
two equal halves, and present one of these to each of the new
comers without money and without price P If the equal inheri-
tance of all mankind in the earth is the law of ethics, then
undoubtedly they should do so. But if the true basis of property
is priority of claim, then the first occupants would be justified
in excluding the new comers from their land, or in dictating the
terms on which they should share it with them.
What men might do under given circumstances is open to
endless argument. What they actually do is capable of veri-
fication. In America, Australia, and other parts of the world,
civilized man stands in possession of vast tracts of unoccupied
land. In all of these districts, whether subject to organized law
or the occasional exercise of lynch law, priority of claim is
recognized as the basis of property. Equality is never thought
of. The unsuccessful miner does not expect to share equally
with the successful; and it is reckoned a breach of miner's law

IO ZAOPAEA'7"Y/AW ZANZ).
to disregard the rights of the first claimant, unless he, of his
own accord, abandons possessions. As with mines, so with land.
The Homestead Laws of the United States” are unimpeachable
evidence that civilized men recognize that unappropriated land
may honestly become the property of anyone. Millions of acres
in territories belonging to the States are not yet surveyed ; of
this anyone may take up as much as he chooses, and when it
comes to be surveyed his claims will be admitted. Millions of
acres are surveyed, but not occupied ; and anyone who is a
citizen of the States, or declares his intention of becoming one,
can take possession of a free grant of 160 acres of this land on
payment of a registration fee. He can choose the land where
he likes, provided it is unoccupied, and if he occupies it for five
years he can claim a patent of absolute ownership. According
to this arrangement, unappropriated land is not treated as
belonging equally to all citizens of the State, still less as
belonging to all mankind. But the principle that no man's
land may become any man's land, and also that the first
comer's claim excludes all subsequent claims, are the guiding
principles of these laws.
It is therefore evident that ancient law, modern customs, and
ordinary ethical conceptions, all agree that unoccupied land may
be taken possession of by anyone. They also agree that after
it has been taken possession of it is no longer common, but
private, property. He who takes away the private property of
another man is, according to ancient law, modern customs, and
ordinary ethical conceptions, classed as a thief.
If a Government commits a robbery (not an unusual event),
it is called an act of confiscation—theft writ large. And if
this view of the subject is correct, Governments are no more
justified in confiscating the property of landowners than that of
bankers or co-operative stores, or of any other class of owners.
Like all previous writers, Mr. Spencer has, I venture to think,
failed to give any ethical reason why land should be treated
differently from other forms of property. At the same time, he
has given abundant evidence that such difference as does exist
is due, not to ethical, but to historical causes. The suzerainty
of the State over land is a survival of the servile condition in
which the property, and also the life, of a vassal or subject were
at the service of his lord or king.
Mr. Spencer proves that the right to property in general has
developed slowly, that the right to property in land was one of
the last to be developed, and that its perfect recognition has been
obscured, from first to last, by the state of warfare. Peaceful
* “Encyclopedia Brit.,” art. “Homestead Laws.”

AA’OAAA’ TV /AV /AAV/O. II
competition tended to evolve the idea of equal freedom ; the
discipline of war to produce complete subjection to the chief or
king. The idea of freedom involved the right to personal
property; that of subjection tended to vest supreme ownership
in the king. -
Among wholly uncivilized people, the right of property in
anything is hardly recognised. Property in land cannot exist.
Nomadic tribes could not even realise what is meant by the
term as we use it. Even agriculture did not at first involve any
absolute ownership where land was plentiful and men were few.
Thus “each Cossack, who wished to raise a crop, ploughed and
sowed wherever he thought fit, and retained, as ſong as he chose,
the land thus appropriated ; and when the soil began to show
signs of exhaustion, he abandoned his plot and ploughed else-
where.” As population increased and markets were built,
land would begin to get valuable, and would at the same time
begin to get more definitely divided by buildings and enclosures.
If these primitive people had possessed the ethical sentiments
which social discipline has now produced, the vague communistic
ownership of the territory might have been transformed, peace-
fully and equitably, into private ownership ; as has been done,
and is still being done, in America. But, although it is clear to
us that the settler who, by improved agricultural processes, is
able to continue raising crops from the same plot of ground, takes
less from the common property of the tribe than those who ex-
haust the soil and then take up fresh ground, yet it is very
probable that primitive people, with whom the only standard of
right and wrong is custom, would regard the enclosure and
permanent occupation of ground as a trespass on their nomadic
rights. The nomadic habits of the people were not the only,
probably not even the chief, cause that tended to prevent
temporary occupation being converted into permanent owner-
ship.
According to Caesar's commentaries,f the same system
of land tenure as existed with the Cossacks existed also in
Germany before his time, and was continued because, as he says,
their chiefs would not allow it to be altered, for fear the people
should be led, by permanence of residence, to renounce the
pursuits of war for those of agriculture, or construct houses with
such luxury as to keep out heat and cold Knowing the
immense vitality of long-established customs and institutions, it
is not surprising to find that communistic ownership of the land
survived in Germany until comparatively recent times ; down,
indeed, to the time when the land reforms of Stein and
* “Justice,” chap. xi. + De Bell. Gall., book iv.

I2 AA’O/2ZA'7'y /AV /AAV/).
- - - - -
Hardenburg enabled common land to be converted into private
property.
Throughout Europe and elsewhere constant warfare evolved
the feudal system, which gave the supreme ownership of all
things, men included, to the king, with sub-ownership and sub-
sub-ownership to nobles and vassals. As all modern titles to
land are derived, directly or indirectly, from this system, which
recognised the king as supreme owner, and as the State has
taken the place of the king, it is easy to see how the idea of the
supreme ownership of the land by the State originated, and how
it has survived to our times.
By Mr. Spencer's own showing, therefore, the history of the
development of land ownership is a perfectly sufficient cause for
the difference existing between property in land and property
in other things. The whole history of agriculture might be
claimed as evidence that land held in common by a tribe or a
people can never be put to its best uses, that fixity of tenure
is essential to improvement, and that no tenure is so perfect as
absolute ownership. The fact that manufactures and commerce
prosper best where least hampered by State interference
indicates that the proper treatment of the land question is the
abolition of all artificial restrictions on its absolute ownership.
Absolutely free trade in land, as in all other commodities, ought
to be our aim.
The arguments given above may be summed up as follows:
The theory that land ought not to be private property rests
solely on the assumption that the natural media are common
property, in the sense that they belong equally to all men—an
assumption which looks so rational that it has been accepted
and endorsed by most of the great writers for centuries past ;
yet it will not stand criticism. The first corollary from the so-
called axiom, that all natural objects are the common heritage
of mankind, is that, as no one ought to use the property of
others so as to destroy it, therefore no one ought to use any
natural object as fuel or as food, or in any other way that
destroys it. If this reductio ada/surdum can be explained away,
the next corollary is that, as all material objects form part of
the common heritage, the title to private property must be in all
cases not merely imperfect, but absolutely bad. Again, if we
accept the dictum that no one ought to appropriate any natural
object unless there is enough, and as good, left for everybody
else, then nothing would ever be appropriated. Now, our real
intuitions are not those we read in books and repeat with
approval, but those we feel and act on. And it is not going too
far to say that no human being ever acted on these axioms or
their corollaries. No one ever refused to appropriate a sovereign,

AA’OAAA’.7"Y /AV /AAV/D. I3
which he had fairly earned, because gold forms part of the
original inheritance of mankind, or because it is a thing which
no man made. And no sane man ever hesitated to claim
exclusive ownership of a coin until he had first ascertained that
there were enough coins of equal value for everybody else. The
nominal acceptance of these maxims, joined to a genuine accept-
ance of the right to own private property, has produced some-
what of confusion and contradiction into all theories of property
and of political economy. They form the intellectual basis of
all communistic systems which do not dispense altogether with
reason, and rely solely on sentiment. They are only consistently
held by the communistic anarchists who deny altogether the
rights of property; and even by them they are held, not prac-
tically, but only theoretically.
If the common experience and inherited instincts of mankind
are not to be entirely ignored, the right of common and that of
private ownership must be co-ordinated. This may be done by
assuming that the natural media were originally common
property, in the sense that they belonged to zºo one, but could
be honestly appropriated by anyone ; that all unappropriated
matter is still common property in the same sense ; and, con-
versely, that the part which is already appropriated is no longer
common, but private property, and cannot be treated as though
it belonged equally to all men without violating the rights of
the present owners. These latter assumptions completely
harmonize the current antagonistic theories ; they are in
accordance with laws, customs, and ordinary ethical sentiments,
ancient and modern. And they are also corollaries from Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Law of Equal Freedom.

Price Is., by post Is. 3d.,
Rádiſalism and its SilpiditiºS.
BY
H. STRICKLAND CONSTABLE.
Contents:–Radicalism as Distinguished from Liberalism—Stupidi-
ties of Radicalism—Effective Radicalism—Stupidities of Radicals about
the Privileged Classes—Stupidities of Radicals about “the People” –
Stupidity of Radicalism about Human Nature—Stupidity of Radicalism
about Majorities—Stupidity of Radicals about the Vox AEopuli and
Right and Wrong—Stupidity about the “ Irresistible * March of
Democracy—Stupidity of Radicals about Degree in Democracy—
Stupidity of Radicals about what they call the Increasing Misery of
the Poor—-Stupidity of Radicals about Muscle Labour—Stupidity of
Radicals about Capital–More Stupidity about Capital and Capitalists
—Stupidity of Radicals about Land—Stupidity of Radicalism about
Primogeniture—Stupidity of Radicals about Migration of Labour to
Towns—Stupidity of Radicals about Agricultural Landlords and Capi-
talists—Stupidity of Radicals about Peasant Proprietary—Stupidity
about the Land for the People—Stupidity about Unearned Increment
—Stupidity about the “Sons of Toil”—Stupidity about Rates and
Rents—Stupidity of Radicals about the Effect of Strikes —Stupidity of
Radicals about Aristocracies—Stupidity of Radicalism about Tories—
The Stupid Radical thinks a Nation means a Manufactured Article that
he can Alter as he Likes—Stupidity of Socialist-Radicals about the Un-
employed–Stupidity of Radicals about the “Caucus.” System—
Stupidity about Competition—Stupidity of Radicalism about Patriot-
ism—The Stupid Radical Doctrine of Ransom –Stupidity about Edu-
cation—Stupidity of Radicals about Titles—Stupidity of Radicals about
Equality—Stupidity of Socialist-Radicalism about Overturning the
System of Society in Great Britain—Stupidities of Radicals about
Progress and Retrogression—The Socialist-Radical Stupid Craze about
Luxuries that Rob the Poor—Stupidities of Radicals about War—
Stupidity about Slavery—Stupidity of Radicalism about the Virtuous-
ness of Rebellion—Stupidity of Radicals about Free Trade—Stupidity
about Taxation—Final Remarks.
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