） |× |-|- |：|| ） |× PRESENTED BY THE AUTHOR TS vº s - * * - | D tº . . t-r- - - §§ * -. **- - º º - - A - - -- - º: * * * -º-º-º-º- is nº Yºst * Sº sº, tº sº ºf. \, * º -- - - º- º- 'º --~ * -- - - - **, - - *. * ** * * * * º, -º- . º, Sºx \ y \, - sº º º * º - * sº º tºº. 3-º, ***** º º \ º -* \º, º º, - - - - * - § º- - - º º ** º º *…* º * - - - - --- - º º --- º - º -***** º * ºssº ºr sº * º ~sºsº º - º - "- º, - º - * º º, - - º º, -, º, - *- - º º - -- * - *~ - - - º º º º, º * … º N * º, * - º * *. a º º a • * * * * - - * * ****, ºf * º --- º - * º º - * * K. *" - º º * \ * ** . *...} - \º º * * º Ş. jº, \ \ - - -- º -- - --~~~~ º, tºº...º.º. A BRIEF SKETCH of THE HtSTORY OF PHILOSOPHY * -- -- º --- -- - With Special Reference to its Leading Logical Divisions or Periods. º º º - - by /ºr . - BENJAMIN C". BURT, M.A., Author of a "Brief History of Greek Philosophy," "A History of Modern Philosophy," tº , ºf c. – %. 4. zoº acce/Zoº &o a - * #ea. a/ º ża- Žeevee, acº, /422,-7%. cº-º-º-º-º-º- (/44.2/4/, / ºr ~~~~ -- ------- - º- * º ºiſ º - º º º - ---------------- -- --- º lºº º - - | ". º - - * ºn º ... }, º Tºº ... O Hºnºlº - - - - - - - - ----------> * º ".. ºoſiº Mesº ºne tº lºº" a to nº * , , ºº * , ººgeºlº tººl tº ºth ſº - º TABLE OF CONTENTS. Introduction. Grounds for Attempting a New Division of the History of Philosophy. Idea of the History of Philosophy. Thesis. Proper. Division of the History of Philosophy into "Ancient', Modern, "Medieval." A - Ancient Philosophy. - General Character and Divisions of Ancient Philosophy. First, Cosmological, Period of Ancient Philosophy; (a) Hylicists, (b) Ontologists (c) ontologic-hylicists. second, Anthropological, Period of Ancient Philosophy. General Character and Divisions. (l) Main stem of Thought, Sophistico-Socratic Philosophy; (2) Universalis- tic Branch; (3) Individualistic Branch. Particular Characterization of the Philosophy of the Period. (l) Sophistico-Socratic Foundation; (a) sophistics, (b) Socrates, (c) Lesser So eratics º º The two Stems or Branches of the Philosophy of the Period: (2) The Universalistic Stem: (a) Plato, º Academy, (c) Aristotle. (3) Individualistic Stem: (a) Dogmatists: Stoics, (2) Epicureans, (b) Scep- tics (including "Academics"), (c) Eclectics. Third, Theological, Period of Ancient Philosophy: Pythagorizing Platonists, Orien- talizing Platonists, Neo-Platonists proper. - Conclusion on Ancient Philosophy. B - Medieval Philosophy. General Character and Main Divisions of Medieval Philosophy. First, Trinitarian, Division of Medieval Philosophy: Patristic Philosophy: Q?” (a) Gnostics, (b) Monarchia ms A Sabellians, (c) Trinitarians proper. ſº 27|216 Second, Unitarian, Division of Medieval Philosophy: (a) Syrians, (b) Arabians, (c) Jews. Third, Unitario-Trinitarian, Division of Medieval Philosophy: Scholasticism. - I - The Beginning of Scholasticism - II- Bloom of Scholasticism, Early Scholasticism enriched by Arabian Aris- totelianism. III-Decay of Scholasticism; Victory of Nominalism. General Result of Medieval Philosophy. C - Modern Philosophy. General Character and Main Divisions of Modern Philosophy. First, Thetic, Period of Modern Philosophy: (a) Revival of Ancient Systems; (b) Religious Philosophy, (c) Systems of Natural and of Moral Philosophy. Second, Analytic, Period of Modern Philosophy; General Character and Divisions. Empiricism; (a)Materialistic, (b) Quasi-Metaphy eical, (English, French), (c) Sceptical. - Intuitionalism: (a) Religious, (b) Aesthetico-Ethical, (v) Intellectualistico- Ethical. --- Rationalism: (a) Substantialistic, (b) Monadistic or Deterministic, (c) Teleo- logistic or Individualistic. Third, synthetic, Period of Modern Philosophy. Character and Divisions. Empiricism: (a) Sensational, Utilitarian, Materialistic, (b) Positivistic, (c) Evolutionistic. Intuitionalism: (a) Scotch, (b) French, (c) Italian, (d) German. Rationalism: (1) Pure Rationalism: (a) Critical, (b) Intuitionalistic, (c) Absolute, (2) Empiricistic Rationalism or Ideal Realism. = Conclusion. BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, With Special Reference to its Logical Periods or Divisions. I. Introduction. It may easily seem superfluous, or even worse, to add another to the already numerous attempts at a scientific division of the History of Philosophy. But Note: Ueberweg divides the entire field as follows: Ancient Philosophy, Thales to the Neo-Platonists inclusive, Medieval Philosophy, from Founding of Christianity to Renaissance, Modern Philosophy, Renaissance to the Present; Stoeckl, Ancient Philo- sophy, Oriental Philosophy to Neo-Platonism inclusive, Post Christian Philosophy, in- cluding Patristic, Medieval, Modern Philosophy; Michelet, Grecian Philosophy, Thales to Plato inclusive, Philosophy in the Roman World, Aristotle to Bacon & Boehme, Modern Philosophy, Descartes to the Fresent; Erdmann, Ancient Philosophy, Thales to Philo Judaens, Medieval Philosophy, Gnostics and Neo-Platonists to Bacon, Grotius and Hobbes inclusive, Modern Philosophy, Descartes to the Present; Hegel, Ancient Philo- sophy, Thales to Neo-Platonists inclusive, Medieval Philosophy, period between Neo- Platonists, and Boehme and Bacon, Modern Philosophy, Bacon, Boehne and Descartes to the Present; Schwegiae, Ancient Philosophy, Thales to Neo-Platonists, Transition to Modern Philosophy, Modern Philosophy, Descartes to the Present; Bax, Ancient Philosophy Oriental & Greek Philosophy to Neo-Platonism, Medieval Philosophy, Erigena to Occam, Modern Philosophy, Descarves to the Present; Weber, Ancient Philosophy, Thales to Neo-Platonists, Medieval Philosophy, Christian Platonism to Boehme, Modern Philosophy Bruno to the Present; indelband, Greek Philosophy, Thales to Aristotle, Hellenistic - Roman Philosophy, Stoics to Augustine, Medieval Philosophy, Augustine to Nicolaus - Cuaanus inclusive, Philosophy of Renaissance, Renaissance to Hobbes and Cambridge Pla- tonists, Philosophy of the Enlightenment, Locke to Herder, German Philosophy Kant to Benecke, Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century; Lewes, Ancient Philosophy (in nine distinct epochs), Modern Philosophy (eleven epochs); Noack, , Greek Philosophy, Ionic - 2 - amid such differencess of opinion as exist , it is the more encumbent upon the real Philosophy to Roman Electicism, Philosophy in the Roman Empire and christian Middle Ages, Alexandrian Syncretism and Neo-Platonism to assius Cusanus, Philosophy of Modern Times, Renaissance to the Present; Diaring, Greek Philosophy, with Roman, Jewish-Alexandrian and Medieval Philosophy as Appendix, Modern Philosophy under in- fluence of modern Scientific spirit, Bruno to Encyclopidistes, Philosophy since its creative development by garians, Kant to Darwin and Buckle; Poetter, Ancient Philoso- phy, Ionics to Neo-Platonists, Transition to Modern Period, Modern Philosophy, Des- cartes to Hegel; Brücker, Antediluvian Philosophy and Post-diluvian Philosophy, in- cluding Barbarian and Greek Philosophies, Philosophy from beginning of Roman Monarchy to Restoration of Letters in Occident, including Roman, Jewish, Saracenic, Christian Philosophies, Restoration to the Present. Following are a few of the modes of division that may be found of Greek and of Modern Philosophy taken separately : Zeller (Brandis, Schwegler) divides Greek Philosophy thus: Pre-Socratic Philosophy, Socrates to Aris- totle, Post-Aristotelian Philosophy, including Neo-Platonism; Hegel, Thales to Aris- totle inclusive, Greek Philosophy in the Roman World, including Dogmatism and Scepti- cism, neo-Platonia and Jewish Alexandrian Philosophy; Erdmann, Greek Philosophy in its Immaturity, Thales to Atomists, Attic Philosophy, Anaxagoras to Aristotle inclu- sive, Decay of Greek Philosophy, Dogmatists, Sceptics and Syncretists exclusive of Neo-Platonists; Ueberweg, Cosmological Period, Thales to Anaxagoras inclusive, Anth- ropological Period, Sophists to Roman Philosophy inclusive and Neo-Platonism; Michelet, Nature-Philosophy, Thales to Anaxagoras inclusive, Ethical Philosophy, Sophists to Socratics, Platonic Philosophy, Plato and the Old Academy; Ueberweg divides Modern Philosophy as follows: 1 - Transitional Epoch, Renaissance. 2 - Empiricism, Dogmatism, septician as rival systems Bacon and Descartes to Hume. 3 - Criticism and speculation from time of Kant; Hegel, Transition to Modern Philosophy, Bacon and Boehme, Period of Reflective Understanding, Descartes to German Enlightenment, Most recent German Philosophy, from Kant onward; Michelet, Metaphysics of the Understanding, Descartes - 3 - student to use all effort to possess himself of a view that shall to him seem sub- stantial and safe, i.e., fairly scientific. There appears * Aprior, Pea Son for treat- ing the History of Philosophy as a branch of knowledge that must of necessity be ruled by caprice, or merely subjective opinion; on the contrary, the fair presumption would seem to be that, as philosophy is in its ideal an exact science, its history must exhibit a distinct number and an organic connection of parts, i.e., must possess the form and character of a science. But there is a positive ground for treating the His- tory of Philosophy as a scientific branch of knowledge. This ground is given in the notion of thought as a living, organic activity, as a thing making itself what it is, and having a growth and a history, and in the very notion of the History of Philosophy as the record or registration of the development of thought. In the individual mind there is a recognized natural and necessary development, having distinct stages, of - thought, namely, from a sensuous to a non-sensuous or spiritual condition; and because to Wolff, Empiricism, English, Scotch, French, Philosophies, German Philosophy, Kant to Present; Erdmann, Pantheism, Descartes to pinoza, Individualism embracing Real- istic systems, Idealistic Systems, Popular Philosophies of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Period of Mediation, Kant to Present; Weber, Age of Independent Meta- physics, Bruno to Locke and Kant, Age of Criticism, Locke and Kant to Present; pºh- ring, Philosophy under influence of Modern Scientific Spirit. - A - New spirit as affected by Medieval Limitations and Forms, (a) Bruno, Telesius, Boehme, etc. (b) Bacon, Hobbes, (c) Descartes, Malebranche. B - Spinoza's System building, Locke's critical Method, Leiºt." Electic Reflec- tion. - G - Hume and Philosophies in France. Philosophy since its creative transformation by Germans. Critical Element in Kant and Reaction against it, (a) Kant, (b) Fichte Schelling, Hegel, (c) Schopen-hauer, Comte, Present Philosophy. - 4 - of this fact we have very good apriori reason to assume in a succession of ages an analogous development. At all events, such an assumption we shall provisionally make and we shall trust to the facts involved in the subject to justify it. Idea of the History of Philosophy - In order to prepare the way for the main portion of our task it is necessary here to state more specifically the conception of the History of Philosophy that governs the thought of the present thesis. The de- velopment of the world's thought from a sensuous to or towards a spiritual condition is a ºvement in which there is a gradually increasing manifestation of spirit, a movement having reason or spirit for its goal and its process. By reason or spirit we do not understand a condition of thought the value or meaning of which is purely subjective, but a condition that contains, sublated or transformed, the outer world - as well as the inner. But this condition is *** * * One , one CoA trolled by certain fundamental facts or forms; it is, we may even say, a logical con- dition. And this is the more true the more the condition is viewed as one of re- flective thought. The History of Philosophy as the history of reflective thought - and such we prefer to regard it - must have essentially a logical character - merely external conditions, conditions ordinarily called historical or biographical, come into its purview only as secondary matters, as merely stimulating or, it may be , perturbing elements. Though conditioned by its environment, thought , i.e. , philo- sophical thought, is and must be essentially self-determining, or, if we must still speak of environment, must be and is ultimately its on environment, has subjectivity within itself. Holding this conception of the History of Philosophy, we cannot attach so much importance even to what is called the "spirit of the age" as do Some historians. On the other hand, we shall not undertake to read closely into the "data" of the history of Philosophy any highly-wrought water of categories, m ir- respective entirely of the external conditions of thought-development. II. Thesis Proper. Division of the History of Philosophy into Ancient," "Medieval" and "Modern' Philosophy - We may begin the treatment of our theme proper by a discussion of the - 5 - very commonly (though not universally) received division of the entire history of philosophy into the three sections or periods 'Ancient," Medieval' and "Modern." The division seems a correct one. The complete justification for it can, of course, become apparent only after the having traversed the entire course of the history of philosophy. But something at least may be laid down at the very beginning if we will but apply the general law of the development of thought, from a sensuous to a spiritual condition. The history of philosophy as conscious, reflective thought has, of course, little or nothing to do with thought in its sensuous condition; but first takes it up just as it has left or is leaving that condition. It deals with thought not in its purely natural state, or at least if it does, it is with reflective thought in its natural or undeveloped state. In its natural state, reflective thought is not governed by nature but governs itself, so to say, in the element or medium of nature in general. Such, broadly speaking, is the condition of thought in the first or "Ancient' period of its development. But this natural cast or hue of reflective thought has a natural limit. This limit arises when, and because, thought becomes conscious of its distinction from nature, and feels free in and by itself as apposed to and above nature. Thought in this stage realizes itself and has its complete de- velopment in the wedieval period of philosophy. But thought cannot suffer this dis- tinction from its opposite (which, owing to the natural origin of thought, is not its Here opposite) as an absolute distinction; to be entirely separated from nature at large is, for thought, to be deprived of the conditions for its own proper activity and growth, to fail to realize fully its nature or end, which is, to be the universal form and expression of what exists. Hence a movement out of and away from the purely subjective condition of the 'Medieval" period to one that unites and harmonizes the subjective and the objective aspects of thought. This occurs in º &S the 'Modern' period of the history of philosophy. The significance, logical and historical, of either of these periods is fully understood only by reference to its relations to the other two. Ancient lack of subjectivity had as its natural and logical consequence "Medieval" emphasis of that, while Modern philosophy is the natural and logical re- conciliation of the two. Illogical, therefore, is any treatment of the history of Im-- - - 6 - philosophy (as that of Schwegler, of Lewes, or of Dühring) which leaves out of account or passes very lightly over either of these periods. A - Ancient Philosophy. general Character and Division of Ancient Philosophy - Ancient philosophy as thought just issuing from Nature, has, as has been stated, a natural hue - it is from the beginning to the end more or less completely governed by the concept of Nature viewed as real being underlying and determining phenomena. In its method it is char- acterized by a certain freedom, by the general absence from it of fixed preconceived ideas and of dependence upon authority; it is thought unhampered by any other because it is the earliest reflective thought. The course of its development is quite natural. At first occupied with the immediate natural world, it turns, when full of that, to man as a thinking being and to the world of thought or of ideas. Having formed a satisfying general concept of this, it remembers the outward world, turns to it and attempts the theoretical union of the two in the notion of the reason, or of reason, and with and by this notion ascends to the realm transcendent. Representing these three levels or stages of ancient thought there are three (successive) divisions or sub-periods of Ancient Philosophy, which may be designated respectively as the Cos- mological, the **asu, and the Theological period of Ancient Philosophy. First, Cosmological, Period of Ancient Philosophy • - The history of really philo- Sophical reflection begins, as is familiarly known, with the attempt of certain Ionian thinkers of * * * B.C. to fix upon a universal ground of physical phenomena. Of the existence prior to them of any philosophical systems from wie, the Ionians might have borrowed, or indeed of any at all, there appears to be no real evidence. (a) The *onians, not unnaturally, as a rule conceived the ground of phenomena in a crassly material form, namely, as air, water, and are appropriately styled Hylicists or Hyloº zoists. Chief among these materialistic thinkers were Thales, Anaximander and Anax- imenes, all of Miletus in Asia Minor. (b) The simple materialism of these men became a stimulus to further reflection. Rising above and rejecting the purely sensible world, thought passed, in the quasi-mathematical doctrines of the early Pythagoreans, through - 7 - the quasi-sensible world of number to the more purely intelligible sphere where it be- came defined and stated, on the one hand, as the Eleatic aestrine of Pure Being, and, on the other, as the Heraclitic theory of Becoming. The Eleatics, Xenophanes, Parmen- ides, Zeno of Elea, Melissus, conceived Being as pure, fixed, completely self- deter- mined, self-contained entity, known only by thought, as distinguished from and even- opposed to , mere sense, and alone the * real cognition. For them the world of changing things, known, only by the senses or in opinion, or conjecture, was, 3.5 COrtles pared with Being, the non-existent. This strict concept of Being and bold denial of its opposite called forth, quite naturally, the asserttion, from Heraclitus of Ephesus, of the absolute reality and universality of Becoming or change. All things, said Heraclitus, exist in and by virtue of "strife," opposition; fixedness is mere illusion of the senses, not the truth of reason - the real universe is an eternal process, as of fire alternately kindled and extinguished forever. That the Eleatics and Hera- clitics in denying the sensible world, conceived the real as strictly immaterial can not be affirmed; they were all in a sense materialists. But - and this is a point important to note, in view of the present tendency of writers to convert the pre- spºuſ thinkers as a body into mere materialists - they were as much idealists as materialists. We shall style them Ontologists. The attitude and historical position of Heraclitus demand here a special word. Heraclitus has been classed with the early Ionics, the simple materialists, the Hylozo/ists, and, on the other hand, with the later Ionics, the Ontologico-Hylicists presently to be considered. But to class him with the Hylicists seemed simply impºssible; and, since he is engaged with the essence, rather than with the external form and appearance of things in general, he is hardly to be placed with the later Ionics. His doctrine is the polar opposite of the Eleatic and his true place is in juxta-position with them. (c) But how are the opposing stand- points to be reconciled; what is the synthesis corresponding to the antithesis of Being or Becoming? If Becoming must be affirmed as well as Being, how is the real universe to be conceived as a whole? The answer in general was, "By identifying Being with ab- solute reality and Becoming with appearance." In particular, ºupedocles answered - 8 - that the real universe is a process (not Being) of a limited number of qualitatively distinct and fixed elements (Being) combined and separated by º powers Love and Hate; the Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus (the latter of won, notwithstanding the attempt sometimes made to place him in the next following period, has his true place here because of his pure materialism, systematically reasoned though it may *), say that the universe is a mere assemblage of an unlimited number of quantitatively fixed and qualitatively similar elements (Being) combining and separating, according to a blind necessity, in a void (not Being); and Anaxagoras affirmed that the universe is an aggregate of an unlimited number of diverse but organically constituted parts (not Being), parts in each of which all others are represented, combined and disjoined by a pure, unmixed entity, mind (ºne). In these three ontologico-hylical doctrines there are contained three attempts to bring together into consistent union concepts hitherto grasped only in their abstractness and isolation; thought now, and for the first time, seeks and arrives at a (relatively) concrete wis. Especially is it true as regards the doctrine of Anaxagoras, in which the concept of organicity for the first time distinctly appears, that thought attains to the concrete, to self-determined wholeness; therefore it may be said that in this doctrine there is the culmination and the completion of a period (a sub-period) in the history of philosophical thought. This view as to the proper close of the first period of ancient philosophy requires explanation and confirmation and since, on the one hand, Anaxagoras has sometimes been regarded (by Erdmann) as standing at the beginning of the second period, and on the other, the Sophists have been made (by Zeller, Ritter, Brandis, Schleiermacher and \ others) to close the first period, Anaxagoras introduces, in Mind, a principle that mſhº is in a manner foreign to the general aim of the materialistic or, rather, natur- alistic, reflection of the first period; but, with Anaxagoras, Mind is virtually sub- ordinate to the external world, a means rather than an end-in-itself, SO that, while he may well enough be viewed as a fore-runner of the intellectualistic thinkers of the next period, his real position is rather at the close and culmination of the present one. There is a certain historical propriety, no doubt, in placing him among the "Attic" - 9 - philosophers, for, unlike any of the other philosophers of our first period, he lived in Athens, and was a companion of the great intellects that made Athens in its most brilliant period what it was. Logically, however, he is to be classed among the pre- Attic philosophers. The Sophists, on the contrary, though in a sense followers of certain of the naturalistic thinkers (the Eleatics and Heraclitics), employed the theories of those thinkers only to negate them and to found a subjectivism quite foreign to the character of the first period in general. They do not, therefore, be- long to first period but to the second, and, as we shall see, to its very beginning. The period which we have just passed over has certain distinctive characters, as fol- lows: Its chief object of reflection is Nature, objective reality in general - only incidentally and secondarily has the subjective, the world of mind, been thought of; its attitude has in general been positive rather than accºuve, confident rather than sceptical; the period is the naive product of reflection that is primitive and, in the double sense, natural. Like Nature, it is pregnant with the future; it con- tains the germs of the periods to follow. As to the historical and biographical conditions of the period, it may be noted, first, that something was due to the em- pirical - but purely empirical - science of the Fgyptians, the Chaldaeans and the Babylonians, to a certain extent known to the Greeks, and much to the fact that no brilliant social order such as later existed at Athens was yet in being to stimulate active and penetrating reflection upon man and the subjective world; and second, that there were certain great personalities to whom, as such, the period in part owed its character, – in particular, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Empedocles and Anaxa- gores. Second, Anthropological, Period of Ancient Philosophy: General Character and Divisions - The second period in the history of Ancient Philosophy, at which we have now arrived, is in origin and initiatory impulse the natural antithesis of the first, a statement almost tautologically true since the condition, and only condition, upon which there could be conceived a second period of philosophy would be that it be op- posed to the first. Glancing at historical and personal conditions, it may be observed - - - ~ * * ~ * - - 10 - here that the second period opened at Athens, where there was a highly developed in- tellectual and social life, and that thought now, quite as naturally as before it was fixed on nature, turned to man and the inner life. This direction of thought inward was, as compared with its earlier attitude, a negative, and, in considerable degree, sceptical one. The fundamental motion of this period is embodied in the famous aphor- ism, "Man is the measure of all things." This aphorism is open to two interpreta- tions, according to one of which "man" is taken as the human being in his individual nature, according to the other as that being in his universal character - and, quite in agreement with this fact, the general thought of this period has a two-fold char- acter, it is in one of its branches individualistic, in another universalistie, in character. The general root and substrate of the developed thought of the period is contained in the doctrines of the Sophists, of Socrates, and of the so-called Lesser Socratics, who combine Sophistic with Socratic concepts. The universalistic branch springing from this root is constituted by the line of thought followed in the theories of Plato, the Old Academy, and Aristotle; the individualistic by that followed in theo- ries of the well known "post-Aristotelian' schools, - swies, ºrieureus, Sceptics and Electics. The external conditions of this period of philosophical thought are doubt- less very striking in their importance, and the philosophy of the period very accur- ately reflects them, but the absolute originality of its great thinkers is not thereby brought into doubt; the spirit of the age was quite as much in those thinkers as in any other class of persons, and the philosophy of the age is one of its most important 'conditions.' What were the great culture of Athens, considered apart from the phil- osoppy of the age The greatest personality of the age, Socrates, was a philosopher, his personality and his philosophy were not two distinct, mechanically related things, the former "causing" the latter, but one and the same organic thing. The like is true as regards nate, Aristotle and others. Particular Characterization of the Philosophy of the Period: 1 - Sophistico-Socratic Foundation: (a) By the Sophists, Gorgias (Eleatic) Protagoras (Heraclitean) Hippo, Pradicus, the maxim home mensura was taken in its - 11 - individualistic bearing; and the (sceptical) affirmation was advanced that the truth really is that which seems true to each individual pure and ºne and that human laws owe their binding force not to a 'nature of things' but to mere human convention. (b) The opposed standpoint appears as that of Socrates, for whom subjectivity, instead of being merely individual, is universal in its meaning, is asterºined by thought as such. Knowledge, according to Socrates, is not found in mere sense-perception but in the concept common to , and ºracing, many possible objects of perception; the end of human choice and action is not the gratification of a limited interest or desire but the (universal) good, embracing and mºnians all interests. The Socratic standpoint is, in short, the standpoint of real, universal, knowledge and virtue or goodness. And, more specifically, it is the assertion of the identity of knowledge and virtue. Whether or not this identification was complete and absolute, whether or not Socrates maintained the entire equivalence of the propositions, Virtue is Knowledge and Knowledge is Virtue may be questioned, particularly in view of the variance in the doctrines of his immediate followers. The philosophizing of Socrates, fundamen- tally correct as tar as it went, did not get beyond the most general principles, viz., as above given, and was, in so far, incomplete and abstract. (c) As a first more special determination of the Socratic teaching (and of the soºnisus also ) we have the doctrines of so-called Lesser Socratics, represented by Euclid of Megara, Antisthenes of Athens, Aristippus of Cyrene. The three several schools - the Megaric, the Cynic, the Cyrenaic - represented by these men seem to have had their origin in varying in- terpretations - springing partly, no doubt, from differences of personal disposition or temperament -of the Socratic standpoint, which ambiguously identified knowledge and virtue. If virtue be conceived as subsumed under knowledge, we get the standpoint of the Megarics; if the reverse occurs, we have that of the Cynics and the Cyrenaics, who, both, mate knowledge merely a means to virtue, though they differed in that the former conceived virtue as an abstraction from worldly goods, while the latter re- garded it as a skillful enjoyment of them or as regulated pleasure. These three - 12 - schools, or at least two of them, have logically and historically certain affinities with the Sophists and thereby with the Eleatic and the Heraclitian Schools, Antis- thenes, in fact, having at one time been a pupil of Gorgias (Eleaticizing Sophist), and Aristippus of Protagoras (Heraclitean Sophist). Euclid is evidently allied to the Eleatics. These circumstances, it may be noticed, afford us a point of view for de- termining the order of treatment of these senosis, viz., as follows: (1) Megaric, (2) cynic, (3) Cyrenaic. (This order agrees with that followed by Zeller, though it differs from that which Hegel, Frdmann, Michelet follow). From the immediately fore- | | - going, it appears that the Lesser Socratics modified somewhat the teaching of their Master by blending with it doctrines of earlier thinkers. The result of the union, is, indeed, something different from the absolute * of the sophists but is, since there are three distinct partial doctrines instead of one complete thing, not a concrete universalistic, but rather a particularistic, individualism. Such is the general character of the 'root' of the philosophy of the Anthropological period of Ancient Philosophy. It remains to add that this 'root' is almost solely ethical and logical in scope, excluding for the most part physical considerations. II - The two 'stems' of the **** of this Period: We have ºr to consider the two 'stems' 'Universalistic' and "individualistic," which sprang from the above char- acterized 'root." Before viewing these #tems separately and in detail we have to state their general relation one to the other. They are both expansions or specifi- cations of the one Sophistico-Socratic substrate, and, therefore, are not abstract Or simple opposites (as their names might suggest) but, rather, are, technically des- cribed, "moments of one another," e.g. , imply and contain (in different degrees, of course) one another. Further, both comprise comprehensive attempts to frame bodies of doctrine not merely ethical and logical but physical as well, attempts to con- struct well-rounded philosophical systems. They differ in the degree of comprehen- Siveness of fundamental point of view and as to emphasis of the moments or parts of the complete system, - with results which we have attempted to indicate by the terms 'universalistic" and "individualistic." Logically, what we have termed the univer- - 13 - salistic stem seems, on the whole, the higher moment and should follow the other. But, , owing to external conditions, such as the fact that the individualistic subjectivism of Ancient life did not fully display itself until the more universalistic had flour- ished, the fact that the powerful influence of Socrates was in favor of universalism, and the fact, not less important, that one of the personal disciples of Socrates, viz. Plato, happened to be a person of transcendently comprehensive and penetrating intel- lectual energy, - the universalistic stem is historically prior in it. development to the individualistic. To avoid the appearance of being willing to 'murder' in order to "dissect" - to avoid dividing the thought of the most brilliant age of Greek life, an age whose essence was almost identical with thought itself, from that age, - we offering º ºº: as 8. compensa- yield here to historical reasons of order - but not without tory reflection, the remark that the universalistic stem plays a larger part in the history of philosophy in general thah the individualistic, that, of the two, the for- mer is rather a philosophy for all time, the latter a philosophy of a particular age, or particular ages. Concrete Universalism: (a) Plato... (b) old Academy (c) Aristotle - (*) While, in the earlier periods of his philosophizing, Plato may be said to have set up a uni- versal that allowed too little value relatively to the particulars as such which it was intended to comprehend, in his later, more advanced thought, he fairly recognized at least in a purely ontological regard, the organic unity of all opposites, as, for example, when he argues that the one is meaningless apart from the Many, and vice versa, that Being contains within it, or rather implies not-Being as the principle of dif- ference, and that all categories by virtue of participation in Being, directly or in- directly, "participate' in all other categories. In the Platonic physics also the universal, i.e., the Idea, is mediated with its opposite, matter, and the atomic and mechanical origin and constitution of the material world is represented as obeying a System of ends governed by the idea of the good as the supreme end. And finally in the Platonic Ethics there is, in the subordination of the other virtues, in both in- dividual and state, to justice as their harmony; and in the subordination of the Classes of "husbandmen' and 'warriors' to the philosophic 'guardians", the manifest - 1.4 = conscious aim to bring into organic union the elements of a total concept. But cri- ticism, it must be admitted, easily discovers a certain abstractness, a certain dual- ism even, in the Platonic philosophy as a whole. Heroically as that philosophy grapples with and overcomes the merely abstract in the realm of ontology, it displays a certain want of sympathy with outward nature, and a certain lack of appreciation of the individual self-consciousness as such. (b) The Old Academy, though having com- paratively little importance in the history of thought, deserves attention here as manifesting the tendency of the Platonic idealism to round itself out by a scientific understanding of nature. Speusippus, Xenocrates, and other members of this school, attaching less value to the Theory of Ideas, bestowed relatively more consideration upon the due explanation of natural phenomena than their master had bestowed. (c) Aristotle represents the concrete union of purely idealistic and realistic tendencies and is the true perfector of the thought put forth by Plato. In the system of Aris- totle pure, abstract thought goes distinctly forth from its Centre to take possession of, and reduce to its own terms, the external world, or the sphere of the particular, the "opposite' the "other." Concreteness and universality of aim and principle ap- pear in the Aristotelian Logic as the theory of the syllogism, in which the middle term so-called is treated as representing the moment of the real and vital union of that which is embodied in the major and the minor terms. In the Metaphysics they are present as the doctrine of matter and form, and the doctrine of the highest substance as a universal containing within it self and producing from itself all individuality, was that which, itself movea, is yet in pure activity, and moves and governs all things, that which, as Thought, is identical with itself as Thinker, and that which, finally, is the absolute ever-blessed end of all that is or can be. In Aristotle's Physics, or theory of Nature as such, concrete universality appears as the theory of efficient causes governed by immanent final causes, of the plenum and the inherently dynamical constitution of the material world, and, in general, the comparative self- relatedness and the sempiternity of the nature as a realm of self-developing ends. In the Aristotelian Psychology we find, in the present reference, the theory of the soul as the entālechy of the body ( a theory assuredly intended as the harmonization - 15 - of the opposing abstract theories of sense and reason as being, both theoretically and practically, the possibility of the forms of external objects and in so far idea tified with them. In Aristotle's Ethics, again, the concrete universal is found in the general view that the theory of the Good is not an abstract science (as Socrates seemed to treat it); in the view that the Good is not a single absolute principle but something more or less relative; in the view that the determination of what is virtuous or not is impossible merely w the application of some single rule, and de- pends upon a ºn-a-rºwn of human acts with regard to the various categories, in the view that the so-called irrational part of the soul is capable of a certain re- lative virtue; in the view (versus Socrates) that one may do wrong contrary to and in spite of knowledge (possessed but not used by him); and in the view that happiness or the end of living, includes not merely virtue but pleasure, not merely knowledge but a harmonious sensibility together with the conditions to it. In Aristotle's Politics, finally, the concrete universal is manifested in the doctrine of the state as having for its end not merely its own formal permanence and welfare but also the highest good of the * citizens as such; as being, in its true form consti- tutional and democratic; as maintaining private property and the family as opposed to community of property and wives. That Aristotle overcame entirely, the relative abstractness and dualism of the purely Platonic system can, perhaps, not be positively asserted. The Deity of Aristotle, that pure form void of all matter, might seem, by reason of its purity and transcendence, a finite entity beside the material world, so tertium-quid that there seems still required a ######"mººd to bring the two into organic union. On the other hand, the material world is not conceived by Aristotle in terms purely materialistic but as instinct with the divine life and spirit and aiming immanently at the divine, the good, so that the charge of dualism cannot be fully sustained against Aristotle. The lack is Aristotle' just here appears explicable as an instance of a lack common to nearly all ancient thought as such, namely a lack in emotional subject- ivity. But, it may be suggested, the mere emotionalist must fail to grasp the real and substantial truth of the Aristotelian philosophy. The concreteness of Aristotle's - 16 - philosophy, it should be said finally, is not merely in the system as a whole but in every essential part of it, and in the moving and informing spirit of it. Precisely by reason of its pre-eminent concreteness and universality the philosophy of Aris- totle forms the centre of ancient philosophy in general, and, considering the mighty influence it has exercised and still exercises increasingly, one is almost tempted to say the centre of the entire history of thought. (Hence the fulness of the space which we have allowed to it.) The peculiar merit of the Platonico-Aristotelian philosophy, that which makes it a concrete universal, is its full consciousness of the substan- tial unity of all opposites, of mind and nature of inner and outer worlds, subject and object, in reason. This it is which distinguishes this philosophy from those of the individualistic schools, which only one-sidedly, or partially, recognized the truth. Eclecticism. Individualism: (a) Dogmatism, (b). Scepticism, (v) ºr We take up now the individualistic counterpart of the rich vein of universalistic and concrete thought of which we have just given an imperfect survey; we consider the schools known as the Dogmatic, comprising the Stoic and the Epicurean, the Sceptic, comprising the earlier and later 'Sceptics' proper and the thinkers of the middle and new academies, and the Eclectic *****kº schools. Our view of these schools as together forming a stem springing from the same root as the Platonico-Aristotelian philosophy sprang from , viz., the Sophis- tico-Socratic philosophizing, necessarily takes us away from the path followed by those historians - among them Hegel, Ritter, Zeller, Brandis, Schwegler, Erdmann, Windelband - who appear to feel the first and new impulse in the restless movements of the 'world spirit" and who begin here a new period. in their accounts of Ancient Philosophy, 3. period of 'decay" of mere 'individualism,' or of distinctively "Ethical' philosophy, etc. But the intellectual, moral and social individualism which the schools about to be considered represent was at work even in the age when Socrates and Plato philoso- phized and thought, indeed was largely the stimulative cause of their philosophizing and teaching, so that we are not here entering upon a new stream of life and thought, but rather following out to the end an old one. We may admit the fact of a 'decay" set- *ing in immediately after Aristotle; but 'bloom' and 'decay" and other such terms seem - 17 - superfieial distinctions just here. And it is true that the individualistic schools Were markedly 'Ethical'; but so were those of the Lesser Socratics, of Plato and Aris- totle; in fact these individualistic schools were ethically but the continuation of the Lesser Socratic and Academic. And, physically viewed, their doctrines were in large measure of *: origin than even the Socratic, they were largely Heracli- team and Democritean in source. Finally, the doctrines of these individualistic schools is pretty plain rationalism, and, instead of belonging to the last - mystical transcendental, theological - period of Ancient Philosophy (in which they are placed by Zeller) fall in the Anthropological Period. The general relations of the three individualistic schools are somewhat as follows: The Dogmatists and the Sceptics con- stitute the extremes to which the Eclectics form the reconciling mean. The Dogmatists represent, relatively, universalistic individualism, the notion of the individual who by virtue of his embracing all particularities in himself, is sufficient to himself. The sceptics represent pure, so to say individualistic, individualism; inasmuch as they theoretically sever the individual from all connection whatsoever with objectivity. The Eclectics finally, stand for a form of particularistic individualism. These three schools exercised an influence upon one another and developed together. It is most logical and convenient to treat the three forms of doctrine in the order in which they have just been named. (a) of the Dogmatists the Stoics advocate an individualism founded primarily upon subjective thought; the Epicureans an individualſº founded - 8 primarily on sense. (l) The Stoics are, historically, the direct dºcendants of the Socratic school of Cynics. Stoicism in Cynicism "writ large", broadened, it is true, intº a world system, but ethical, in the narrower sense, in its main aim. Individual- istic features in the Stoic philosophy are, for example, such doctrines as the follow- ing. The individual is, body and soul, a corporeal being and his communication with all other individuals is assentially physical, (so that there is no common ground be- tween individuals); thus, true sense-perception occurs through merely physical COrl- tact (accompanied by an irresistible feeling of assent) and sense impressions are Presented by, (i.e., memory is reduced to) a physical mechanism, the material sensorium. Again, the individual, though a part of the universal (material) reason, that rules as – 18 - a Fate, is yet to be regarded in and by itself as free. Finally, the true end of all human endeavor is to perfect the individual man (corporea individual?), to make him sufficient in himself, to place him beyond and above any limited association with his fellows, as in a city, state or nation, and render him a citizen of the world , – which of course, is practically, to remove from him all possible limitations except his ar- bitrary pleagure - Leading Stoics were Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes and Chrysippus. (2) Epicureanism bears much the same relation to Cyrenaicism as Stoicism bears to Cyni- cism. It is a mechanical system of thought, and, as such, naturally emphasizes the value of the distinct individual; it explains knowledge materialistically, the outer world by the notion of the atom, the moral life as a life of individual pleasurable sensation, of enjoyment in seclusion from the common life of man. Leading Epicureans were, besides Epicuºus himself, Hermarchus of Mytelene, Zeno of Sidon, and the cele- - * - brated Latin poet Lucretius. Such were the standpoints of the two schools termed 'Dogmatic" by way of opposition to the Scepticism which they failed to comprehend and denied. (b) Scepticism, as the doctrine of certain particular schools in Ancient Philosophy, descended from the doctrines of the Megarian s,the Academics, and even of Democritus. It represents a very important part of the influence of the Sophistico- Socratic reflection proper upon the times following Socrates. The individualism of the Sceptic is obvious; denying utterly the possibility of objective knowledge, he shuts himself off from the rest of the World, reducing human conduct to mere passivity. Lead- ing Sceptics, in the broad application in which we here employ the term, were Pyrrhus, Timon of Phlius, Aenesidemus, Agrippa, Sextus Empiricus ('Sceptics' in the limited sense) Eclecticism Arcesilaus, Carneades (Academics). (c) Ancient *ssssssss came into being as an at- tempt to mediate between Dogmatism and Scepticism as just portrayed. While recognizing the truth in the Sceptical view of knowledge considered as a fixed, dogmatic function, Relecticism held to knowledge as probable cognition sufficient for the practical require- ments of human existence, a cognition answering sufficiently well man's moral and re- ligious needs. As practical requirements and moral and religious needs , superficially regarded, may be viewed as varying with individuals, Eclecticism was almost necessarily a form of indivi --- - --- * - mdividualistic doctrine, less positive than Dogmatism, less negative than = 19 = Scepticism. Eclectics, of varying hues, were Philo of Larssa, Antiochus of Ascaloº, - - - - - - - - I+. Panaetius and Posidonius of Rhodes, Cicero, Seneca, Epicteus, Marcus Aurelius should be observed that we are here speaking of rationalistic Eelecticism, * of ration." alistic, Eclectics, not of mystical and transgendental Eclectiº" and Eclectics. Ancient mystical and transcendental Eclecticism and Eclectics belong, according to our point of view, to the third period of Ancient Philosophy. - - - - Eclecticism Conclusion of the Second ſeriod of Ancient. Philosophy: With **** we arrive at the close of the second period of Ancient Philosophy historically considered. This period opened with a certain breach between subject and object. This breach was , for those who preserved the proper degree of insight, healed by the doctrines of concrete universalism, for the essence of that doctrine was contained in the principle of the substantial identity of mind and nature, subject and object; but for those who lacked insight - and they formed the majority of thinkers - the breach widened and further- more became what was not merely a breach between man and the external world, but , owing to the growth of subjective consciousness, a breach within man himself, as it were; so that the period at its close left a great problem to be solved, if possible on a higher level or standpoint of thought. The solution of the problem became the main task of the next period of Ancient Philosophy. Third. Theological...Period of Ancient. Philosºphy. The merely natural reason, Q r" reason in its natural phase, having, for ordinary reflection, failed to bring into full harmony the separate moments of truth, refuge was naturally rought in something seem- ingly beyond or higher than, that , something that could reach behind and above the ap- parent division between subject and object. This mediating somewhat was found in a supposed power of direct intuition of , and communication with, the first principle of knowledge and existence. God, it was held, is known in - but only in - certain ecsta- tic (preternatural) states of the soul and man becomes like Him only by complete puri- fication of his merely corporeal or natural life. Philosophic truth is not adequately *Pressed in scientifico-ethical universalism (the Platonico-Aristotelian philosophy) no r - - - - - - - - - - - in dogmatico-ethical individualism (Stoicism, etc.) but only in a transcendentalism - 20 - which is both universalistic and individualistic or subjectivistic, for in ecstatic union with God there is a (mystic)identity of the universal and the individual. The general standpoint of the period is that of spiritualistic, dualism (e.g. Platonism) as opposed to maturalistic monism (e.g. Stoicism). The form of the philosophy of the period is, owing to the fact of the syncretism of nationalities and ideas under the wide sway of the Roman Empire, somewhat Eczectic . Three prominent phases of the thought of the period may be taken to represent an. namely, Pythagorizing Platonism, Oriental- izing Platonism, and Neo-Platonism. The term Platonism in these designations must be understood merely to point out the predominating form of thought in each phase; since the phases are all Eclectic or syncretistic, though not necessarily loosely so. Re- presentatives of Pythagorizing Platonism are Nigidius Figulus, Plutarch of Chaeronea, Apollonius of Tyana; of Crientalizing Platonism, Philo Judaeus, and Numenius of Apemee; of Neo-Plationism (which might almost equally well be termed Neo-Aristotelianism) Am- monius Saccas, Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus. The Platonism of this period is a certain advance upon the original Platonism, in that now the realm of Ideas occu- pies a secondary position, the Idea of the cood, or of the One, having been brought dis- tinctly forward into the first unapproachable place. Plato had , indeed, spoken of the Idea of the good as the parent of the realms of knowledge and of essence or being 8.8 such, but had, otherwise, left its relation to the principles logically succeeding it partially undetermined. The more particular determination and emphasis of this rela- tion, together with the showing the return of all lower ideas into the one highest, i.e. of all emanations from God back to Hiia, constitutes the peculiar work of the revived Platonism. The accomplishment of this work does not take place without the mixture, with genuine philosophical reflection, of much that belongs to the sphere of phantasy; and hence the philosophy of the period presents from the exterior a mystical aspect, it is of necessity religious as well. But it is in its essence a continuation of the best philosophical reflection that has preceded it. And though it is religious, it belongs unequivocally to the third period of Ancient Philosophy (the period of the re- ligious philosophy of paganism) and not the first period (chiefly christian) of Medieval Philosophy. -- – 21 = Conclusion on Ancient Philosophy. - Our detailed survey of Ancient Philosophy in its periods has (we trust) sufficiently verified the general characterization of it. given at the beginning. Ancient Philosophical thought is, and must always remain, a type - and what a magnificent type ! - of natural free or unºrameled reflection, of thought developing and expressing itself by, from and for itself. It has been the foundation, inspiration, and guide of most of the world's pure thought; to it the minds of the world's thinkers have perennially returned for light. Of the truth of these observations we shall have abundant illustration as We proceed. canº to its importance as a foundation for the periods that follow, we have given Ancient Philo- sophy a relatively more detailed notice than that which we shall give to those periods. - B. - MEDIENAL PHILOSOPHY. General-Character. and Jain Divisions of Medieval. Philosophy: Ancient Philosophy as we have just seen, closed with a sub-period of religious philosophizing. The new, Medieval, period is introduced, not by a change from the religious to a non-religious attitude but , by a change from one religious standpoint to another. The difference of the new from the old standpoint lies in the fact that the latter is, less than the former, a standpoint of the inner life, withdrawal from the world; the God of the lat- ter is relatively impersonal - partaking of the character of mere Destiny - an object primarily of the merely intellectual or aesthetic apprehension, while the God of the former is a thoroughly personal God, a Conscious Providence, a God of the heart and Will. Or, speaking in the technical language of metaphysical logic, the God of 'An- cient' and religious philosophy is reason or spirit conceived as 'substantivity"; that of Medieval religious philosophy is reason or spirit conceived as 'subjectivity". Ow- ing to His full personality and providential relation to man and nature, God is, in the new period, nearer to man and nature than in the old - more immanent, less transcen- dent. And yet, by a natural dialectic, in so far as man is like God, who is self- subsistent, and thus possesses self-sufficiency, freedom, he is ar becomes, in a certain Sense, separated or estranged from God; and in so far as spirit, and not matte‘, is the – 22 - essence of God, the material world seems a thing fallen away, with man, from God; so that in a certain point of view God is more transcendent and less immanent, as re- gards man and nature than before. In short, in the new religious philosophy both the identity of God with the world and man and his distinction from these are more inten- sive than in the old, and , we must observe, the necessity of mediation between them is more keenly felt. Because of the added subjective element in the new religious philosophy, it has a dual character; it is a philosophy of inner feeling or faith as well as of thought or knowledge. That these two moments - faith and knowledge - of the new religious philosophy should always be in equilibrium with one another, so that the one would be and seem merely the other in a different form, was, in all human contingency, not possible. There occurred, necessarily, disturbances of balance be- tween them that gave character to the philosophy of the new period. In the earlier portion of the Medieval period they were in relative ºrium, knowledge or gno- sis, slightly preponderating, perhaps, but, later, disturbance of balance increased, and at last the two moments became completely unequal and were incommensurate. On the whole, "faith" rules, and the philosophy of the period is, not s philosophy having 3. content of its own and freely developing itself, but precisely a philosophy under a foreign yoke, that st mere arbitrary faith, mere authority. But the general enaracter of the philosophy of medieval times must be determined also from a point of view other than that just noticed, - namely, from the point of view of the difference of content characterizing it according as its view of God, in himself and in his relation to man: and nature, differs. God may be viewed as one, and as governing the universe and mani- festing himself without the cº-operation in any manner of a mediator (as, e.g., in the purely monistic or panthistic Stoic *ilosophy), or, if we * the notion of his transcendence, we may think of him sending forth from himself assisting agency (as in Platonic dualism). From the point of view here in question Medieval philosophy shows three main divisions: a prevailingly trinitarian, a unitarian, and (if we may be allowed the word) a unitario-vrinitarian (the precise meaning. of these designations will appear later). Chronologically, the second of these divisions follows the - 23 - first and is contemporary with the earlier and middle portions of the third. It may be noted that in two points of view just described, we have represented the cardinal problems respectively, of Modern Philosophy and of Ancient Philosophy, the problem of the relation of knowledge to its object, and that of the relation the One to the Many . In our exposition the second is taken as the leading one, as affording the clearer view of the material content of the philosophy of the Medieval age. First. Trinitarian, Division of Medieval Philosophy. Patristic Philosophy. - The first division of Medieval Philosophy, commonly styled Patristic Philosophy, i.e., the philosophy of the (Church) Fathers' had its origin in the attempt to fix for thought (as distinguished from mere sentiment) to render a permanent intellectual possession, the supposed precious content of the life and teachings of Jesus and of the so-called Apostles, a content that is conveniently summed up in the idea of the universal cre- atorship and fatherhood of God and of the universal brotherhood of man. Such an at- tempt could have only one source, viz., a knowledge of the only instrument yet pro- vided for the scientific formulation of truth, namely, Greek Philosophy, pure or more dified. This fact, together with the fact that there was at the period of the for- ‘mulation, a considerable element in common between the Greek and the Christian reli- gions, made it inevitable that the new philosophy should largely borrow from and de- pend upon the old. But, though Greek philosophy was at hand to be used, as a finished product, Christian philosophy did not arrive at a fixed expression by a single leap, as it were, but only through a course of development, through a conflict of trinitar- ian or quasi-trinitarian and unitarian views as to the nature of coa, tº the univer- sm, and his relation to man and the world, or the realm of particular things. (a) in the crºss-orienta speculations of the Gnostics (who may be viewed as the earliest ***) we find existing between the supreme God and the material world a me- *ating sphere of personal beings who are manations from God or are amanations of such emanations. In the Basilidean system of Gnosticism there occurs among these : emanations a Christ (nows) who appeared on earth as a mediator in the form of Jesus, though another, human, being suffered crucifixion in his stead. In the more elaborate Gnostic system, of Valentinus, there appear, amid a multitude of other emanations, three" Christs" as redeemers of three several spheres, Jesus the terrestrial Saviour being a child of Mary fructified by the influence of a certain (lower) Wisdom and of the Holy Ghost. (b) In contrast to the comple, intermediation put forth in the Gnostic system, between the universal and the particular, is the direct relation be-, tween the two, implied in the purely unitarian doctrines known 3.8 Monarchianism and Sabellianism, taught by Theodotus of Byzantium and sabellius of Libya, the latter of whom, it should be noted, was strongly influenced by Stoic teaching. The monarchists in particular *ara, that there was a Lagos distinct from God and that the Son and the Spirit were real personalities, affirming them to be rather powers or faculties of the God-head. (c) The interaction of the two main forus of doctrine thus far described had as a result a certain modified form of trimitarianism, which itself underwent a development, that brought it near -dangerously near - to pure unitarian- ism. Trinitarianism varied in type according as the ways raised of viewing the S6 C = ond and third members of the triune Godhead in relation to the first. By the Arians the doctrine was upheld of the subordination of the second and third persons, by the Athanasians that of their equality with the first; by one individual at least, namely, Lactantius, a third view, which may be regarded as a sort of compromise between the two foregoing, was advanced, the view, namely, that there are in the Godhead but two distinct persons, Father and Son, ahe Spirit being merely their mutual knowledge and love. Of the three views just described the Athanasian became at last the generally accepted one, but not without undergoing a certain development after its general adopt- ion (325 A.D.). For, Gregory of Nyssa conceived the three persons of the Godhead relatiºd as three individuals of a logical species, while John Philopºus viewed them as three distinct Gods, and Augustine, finally, drawing as near to pure unitarianism * . º analogous as possible, spoke of them as being in a relation to one another * to that of the faculties or functions (e.g., memory, thought and will,) of a single spirit to one another. The view of Augustine became the orthodox view and ruled throughout the purely Christian portion of the medieval period. Beside trinitarianism - and in close logical connection with it - the other essentials in doctrine of early medieval philo- sophy were: (1) the doctrine of the quasi-temporal origin of the world, its creation - 25 - out of nothing by God and its non-etermity; (2) the doctrine of the personal indi- vidual freedom and immortality of may either by nature (as some held) or (as others held) alone by divine grace ar favor; (3) the doctrine that in addition, and superior, to the four cardinal moral virtues taught by the Greeks there must be reckoned three spiritual virtues, viz., faith, hppe and love; *...*. the (Augustinian) doc- trine of history as a process of education upon earth of a select portion of the human race to fitness to inhabit an ever-blessed City of God. The conceived relation of faith and gnosis is in general (though the hostility of Tertullian, Lactantius, and Arnobius to heathen philosophy is to be noted a.ºsception) perhaps that of a certain superiority of gnosis together with its dependence upon faith. Such was in its es- sential features, Patristic Philosophy. This philosophy reached its complete de- velopment in Augustine (A.D. 430) and continued essentially unchanged until the be- ginning of the ninth century; though it is necessary to note a certain tendency of the purely Neo-Platonic element of it - for the body of Patristic, or Early Christian Philosophy is Neo-Platonic in form - to free itself from its Christian religious sub- strate. Leading Patristic philosophers, besides those already mentioned, were Justin Martyr, Irenaeus and Hippolytus, Clement and Origen of Alexandria, Athenagoras of Athens, Theophilus of Antioch, Synesius, Nemesius, and "Dionysius the *a*. *nd in this first period of usaeval Philosophy might logically be reckaned an im- portant thinker usually placed at the beginning of the Scholastic Division of Medie- val. Philosophy, namely, John Scotus Erigena (815 circa 889), whose doctrine is closely akin to that of the Areopagite. * With the Fathers, he in no sense teaches (as did the Scholastics) the discordance of 'faith" and "knowledge." He had comparatively little importance in the Scholastic period, since, owing to the condemnation of early works of his by the Church, his writings in general were not commonly read - are not even named by such men as Anselm, Abelard, Albert, Thomas, and Duns Scotus. A special remark - before leaving the present period - is necessary concerning Augustine, prob- ably the most influential, throughout the medieval period, of the Patristic philosophers / By his appeal to inner experience, especially to the fact of the soul's certainty of - 26 - itself even in the midst of all sceptical regards, and by his doctrine of the will as the essence of the soul, he is the chief encourager and sustainer of the subjectivism, - contrasting so strangely with its Aristotelian substantialism - of the Medieval Period of the history of philosophy. Second, Unitarian, Division of Medieval philosophy: Philosophy of Syrians, Arabs and Jews. - Though the pure monotheistic, or the unitarian, tendency in medieval philosophy received among the Western Christians little encouragement, it was (all the this - more on his account perhaps) cherished among Eastern Christians and among thinkers not exactly Christian, i.e., among Arabian (Mohammedan) and Jewish thinkers. And the form of philosophy chiefly cultivated by these thinkers, because of its peculiar fitness to embody this tendency, was, not the Neo-Platonism adopted by the (trinitarian) Fathers but, for the most part, Aristotelianism. (a) In the Ninth and Tenth Centuries, we are told, there flourished among the Syrians, Schools for pºisºnism away and inter- polation; and translations of the works of ** and his **** were made into the Syriac and Arabic languages. (b) The Arabians, going beyond their teachers, the Syrians, produced a number of great copies of ancient systems, beyond the limits of whose authority Medieval philosophizing in general scarce dated to venture, or trust itself. In the systems of the Oriental Arabian philosophers a certain predi- lection is shown for Neo-Platonic doctrines; in those of Occidental Arabian philoso- phers Aristotle is followed. The problem of 'faith and knowledge" is quite secondary in importance in this Division of medieval philosophy, and is, since the philosophers of the Division are mostly trained men of science, to whom philosophy becomes an end in itself, in general solved favorably to "knowledge" rather than to mere "faith." It is however, brought into some prominence by the system of Algazel, a sceptical thinker of the Oriental group of Arabians, who assumes an attitude of pronounced hostility to - wards philosophy and puts faith in its stead; while his apponent in this regard, Avery- oes, asserts that faith or religion is rather a form of knowledge adapted to the un- / cultivated intelligence, that complete truth is found only in philosophy and that the - - -- - º --- - - º religion of the philosopher consists in the deeping of his knowledge proper. Among , r - 27 - the most interesting particular results of Arabian philosophizing are; the doctrine of Alfarabi that the individual of sense exists formally in the intellect while also the universal is found in sense in the union with the individual; the distinction made - - generic by Avicenna of the three modes of the existence of the gºnska concept, i.e., as ante- rem, in rel, and post rem: Averroes' doctrine of the passive and the active reason and his doctrine of form as implicit in matter. The names of the leading Arabian philo- sophers are perhaps the following: Alkendi, Alfarabi, Avicenna - oriental thinkers, and weapas, ºr Averroes, - Occidental. A word is necessary here on the inter- tance of Arabian philosophy as an integral part of the history of philosophy in gen- eral. It seems a mistake to ignore or to pass lightly over this philosophy on the - ground (as does Windelband, in part) that it is not a portion of European philosophy. In its ultimate origin, certainly it is decidedly European, for it is mostly a copy of the systems of Plato and Aristotle; and in its influence also it was almost wholly European, since, it never became an organic part of Arabian life and histºry as such. A slurring treatment of this philosophy in any account of philosophy as a whole con- tradicts a healthy sense of the organic relation of the theories of the world's past. (c) 0f the Jewish Medieval philosophers we may mention as chief the Neo-Platonist Avicebron and the three Aristotelians, Abraham David, Moses a smas, and Levi ben Gerson. Avicebron supplements in an interesting manner the Neo-Platonic theory, by the interpolation, between God, the one hana, and intellect or nous, on the other, of the will or creative word, - a point in which he seems tº have exercised an influence upon important later thinkers, in particular Duns Scotus. Maimonides teaches an Aris- totelianism especially harmonized in certain features e.g., as regards the creative and *rnity or wice versa, of the world) with Biblical teaching; he is closely followedgerson. Among the Jews, as among the Arabs, there were teachers who put faith above knowledge and made it their philosophy to antagonize all philosophy, so- called. Such 'philosophers' were Samuel ha Levi and Chasdi Greskas. The Jews exer- cised an important influence upon the development of medieval philosophy by transla- tions into Latin of Arabic versions of Aristotle and his leading commentators, these - 28 - translations becoming for the Christian philosophers of the latter portion of the me- dieval period, the source of their first knowledge of the metaphysical and physical doctrines of the "master of those who know" and greatly stimulating the further study of his philosophy. Chronologically, the second period of medieval philosophy extends from the Ninth to the Fourteenth centuries. As a rule, authorities have incorporated the Arabian and Jewish systems with the Scholastic systems. As we have seen, however, they are separated from the rest of Medieval philosophy by their prevailingly mono- theistic or unitarian character. But they are also separated from that by the more purely scientific character of their motive. The philosophers of this "period" were not teachers of dogmas derived from the Fathers or from the Bible; they were not all even interested in the support of any special religious dogmas. The chief among them were, primarily at least, merely scientific expositors and advocates of the philosophy of Plato, Plotinus, or Aristotle. In our grouping of these philosophers - Arabian and Jewish - by themselves We find ourselves in agreement with at least Hegel, Noack, Michelet and Seth. Third, Unitario-Trinitarian, Division of Medieval Philosophy: Scholasticism. - In this period of medieval philosophy we have, in general, a return to or towards the trinitarianism and the dogmas in general of the first period; with, however, a dis- tinct separation, gradually developing into complete opposition, of 'faith" and ' 'knowledge', 'authority" and 'reason', and in general a sundering of the moments of concrete truth, which in the first period, though not organically united, harmon- igusly stood, as it were, side by side. But the division shows, in its middle and later portions, a marked influence upon it of the strictly monotheistic Aristotel- ianism of the Arabian thinkers. More distinctly characteristic of this Division of medieval philosophy are the following organically related features. (1) Owing partly to the fact that, during a portion of the earlier portion of the period, the chief philosophical literature consisted mostly of certain minor logical works of Aris- totle, and partly to the felt need of a dogmatic demonstration of the doctrines adopted from the Fathers, a need that was, essentially, pedagogical or scholastic - - 29 - the name Scholasticism as applied to the philosophy here under consideration - the thought of the Division bears a markedly aialectical or logical stamp, in a meta- physical as well as a formal sense. This was particularly manifested in a dispute running through the entire division, as to the nature and meaning of the logical universal in its relation to reality. (2) But the pºsion also exhibits mystical tendencies, having their immediate origin in a dialectical opposition to the merely logical. (3) And, finally, certain, sporadic *** were made - particularly in the latter portions of the period - in the independent study of nature, external and internal, and the consequent extension of existing knowledge in physical science and in the psychology. These three special moments gradually separate and become an- tagonistic as the period advances. The Division falls naturally into three Sections answering to what may well enough be termed the "Beginning, " the "Bloom" and the "Decay" of Scholasticism. Chronologically it comprises the period extending from the Ninth to the Fifteenth Centuries. The Berinning of Scholasticism. - The distinctive characteristics of seholasa- cism as above set forth appear at first in mere germ. We meet them in this form in thought of Hrabanus of wense (d. 856), Heiricus and Remigius of Auxerre, Gerbert (af- terward Pope Sylvester) a scientific investigator, Berengarius, 3. sceptical diles-- ticean, Lanfranc, an upholder of dogma in opposition to Berengarius. with the battle of the early so-called Nominalists and Realists, they became somewhat pronounced. The Nominalists held that the logical universal had in no sense a substantial or indepen- dent substance, was merely a subjective concept or else the name, even the mere sound of the voice, denoting such concept, while the only reality was the individual thing. And, it should be incidentally observed, an important consequence was drawn by the chief of the Nominalists, Roscellinus, as to the nature of the Trinity, namely, that the three persons of the Godhead did not have one substance but were three distinct individuals. The Realists declared the universal to be not merely ºn. subjective - concept but a substantive reality existing 'prior' to the individual (e.g. in the Di- vine Mind), in the individual itself, and after the individual (namely in our under- – 30 - standing) 'ante rem' 'in re' and post rem. The victor in the conflict of these two parties proved to the Realists. Leading names of men are, in this particular con- nection, Roscellinus of Compiègne, (Nominalist), Aasai- of Canterbury, William of Champeaux, Gilbert of Poitiers (Realists), Abelard, whose views have been variously understood but probably were somewhat Nominalistic. Anselm and Abelard are also deserving of special notice on other accounts; the torner particularly because of his rationalistic proof - known as the "ontological proof" - of the existence of God, the latter because of a rationalistic view of conscience and the ethical in general. A tendency to dialectical aevelopment of doctrine independently of received dogma and authority showed itself - in the theorizing of Abelard, as just seen, and in that of Gilbert of Poitiers, in particular - and had as a consequence a distinct assertion of the superiority of faith to reason, and the assertion of the doctrine of a direct .. apprehension of the divine. The increasing s - * -. ****** of the principle of authority in religion is particularly evidence by the compilation in regular form, by a class of writers afterwards styled "sum- Summaries - -, * mists," of Samway'ss of the Patristic dogmas. Of the sumnists the most noted is per- haps Peter of Lombardy. Of mystical philosophers we may name Hugo, Ralph, Walter St. Victor, the so-called 'Victorines" and Bernard of Clairvaux. Chief representatives of the scientific tendency (which, in part at least, may, like the mystical tendency, have arisen as a reaction against the tendency to extravagant dialectical rational- ism) were Gerbert, already mentioned, Bernard of Chartres, William of conenes, who were occupied with the external world;and Abelard, the Mystics, and John of Salisbury, who may be classed 3.3 psychologists. on the whole, the first section of the schol- astic period, though it displays some originality in reflection, is characterized by a certain poverty of philosophical knowledge, a poverty that was a spºiled by the ais- covery to the Scholastics;through the instrumentality of the Arabs, Jews ana others, of the body of Aristotle's "physical" and metaphysical' works, a S well as his rasum logical works. - - The 'Bloom' of Scholasticism. Early scholasticism Enriched and Modified by (Arabian) Aristotelianism. - The principal logical works and the metaphysical and - 31 - physical works of Aristotle having become known to Scholastic thinkers, Scholasti- cism quickly flowered into a much fuller and more systematic form of philosophy than it had been. A much larger body of material than before was now at hand for the rationalistic support of dogma; and much more were logical proofs of acetra lar- ated. Naturally, the distinction *** **** and 'faith" came to be empha- sized; with the consequence that now as not before leading dogmas - such as those of the trinity, creation from nothing, the incarnation - were, as regards their ultimate solution, in general taken from the province of strict knowledge and relegated to that of faith. This relegation, it should be noted, was, as regards the trinity, no doubt in part due to the teaching of Averroes, who emphasized the necessary unity of God, rationalistically, or philosophically viewed, and then practically compelled his trin- ty to be regarded as a matter of mere faith. But the breach between reason and author- ity did not at this time widen to the extent of the assertion of an open contradic- tion between men. On the contrary, within the limits above implied, the application of philosophical formulae to the support of dogma was, theoritically and practically, carried to the highest degree, "reason" being held to be the best "introduction" to the 'mysteries' of faith. The appearance of contradiction between reason and faith, philosophy and religion, was avoided by the conceiving of their relation as that of being the theoretical and the practical sides of the same truth. The problem of the nature of 'universals' now, owing to the influence- exercised by the doctrine ºf wº- cenna, uniformly receives the Realistic solution. A special and peculiar contri- bution to the discussion of the problem was made in the theory (of Duns scotus) that w the individuality of finite things, the principium individuationis, was constituted by a certain haecceitãs. over and above their generic and specific atti:ibutes; the more common solution of this question being that the principium individuationis was con- tained in the 'matter" as distinguished from the 'form"of things. Mysticism reappears in this section in the systems of a number of thinkers. The study of external nature goes on likewise. We have, finally, as a special mark of this period of Scholasti- cism a division of view, psychologically, metaphysically and ethically, as to the pri- Macy of intellect as opposed to will, and yiee versa, and of thinkers, consequently, * - 32 - into two groups, known as Thomists and Scotists, the former taking the side of the in- tellect, the latter that of the will. The chief philosophers Of this ºut-period are , perhaps, (l) Alexander of Hales and Boventura, who (the latter in particular) may be classed as mystical; (2) Albert of Bolstädt and Thomas Aquinas, Aristotelians; (3) Dunn scotus, Neo-Platonic. Albert may be especially mentioned as a scientific stu- dent, of external nature, e.g., as a botanist, and Thomas as applying with great ef- fect the Aristotelian concept of development whereby the natural is shown to become the spiritual. A word of explanation is perhaps required at this point * to the in- clusion of Duns Scotus in the present sub-period. Scotus may undoubtedly be said to prepare the way for the revival of Nominalism and for the 'decay' of Scholasticism as such. But he does not * or separate faith and knowledge, but, in one regard at least, goes further than even Thomas and the rest in the attempt to main- tain their agreement, in that he argues that the doctrine of the trinity is ration- ally co-prºnºvie he emphasizes, instead of abandoning as do the later Shholastics, logical process as a part of the logical method; he is as much as Albert or Thomas, a Realist, for he maintains that not only things themselves but the relations of things also are real; he upholds with Thomas the doctrine of intelligible species (which Occam did not do); he unites body and soul, nature and spirit in general (in- stead of opposing them), by his forma corporeitatis; and, while he says that a thing may be true in philosophy and yet false in theology and vice versa, he apparently does so only in a moderate sense. There is a ground for his inclusion in the pres- ent period also in the fact of the rivalry of his doctrine with that of Thomas and in their sºon battle against the nominalists for Realism. In the position which we assign to Scotus we find ourselves in agreement with Stöckl, Weber, Ueberweg, Scott, Noack, Herº,” Hara. Even Werner, wn, places Scotus among the Later Scholastics, ' does not class him with the Occamists. - The "Decay" of scholasticism, The General Victory of Nominalism. - In this, the last stage of sensiastian, the great dogmas of religion have, as a rule, ceased to have validity except as subjects of mere faith; faith and knowledge, authority and - 33 - reason are regarded as discordant or at least indifferent in relation to one another; reality is held to be the individual, the concept being merely subjective; the the only, Princiº individuationis is considered meaningless; ideas, of external things are not copies or representations but mere signs of them - knowledge is a purely subjective function; the soul is not a substance besides its faculties but is constituted by them. And yet, notwith standing the general triumph of Nominalism, with its sceptical theory of knowledge, we have to note that, the purely rationalistic as- sertion is made of a power in the unassisted reason of ºn, reason apart from re- velation, to demonstrate cardinal theological truth; secondly, there is a. pronounced mystical tendency, in decided reaction from previous and tº rºad- in this last stage of Scholasticism. (3) Again, appeal is made to the experimental in- vestigation of nature as a source of the knowledge of truth in harmony with, and leading up to, the truth of revelation. The dialistical relation of these three sides of decaying Scholasticism is, perhaps, ºutriesently obvious, they are the correlative moments of original scholasticism distinctly separated and isolated, re- lated still, however, by their antagonism. the most important thinkers ot this sub- period are perhaps the following named : (1) Petrus Aureolus, William Durand, William of Occam', chief of his class (1347), John Burian, Pierre d'AillyGabriel Biel (a. 1495) Nominalists, Raymond Lully, pure rationalist (2) Roger Bacon, Raymund of Sabunde, - experimental natural philosophers; (3) Meister Eckhart (d. 1327) Thomas a. Kempis, etc. Mystics. - - - General Result of Medieval Philosophy.” - In the foregoing results o: Scholastic A reflection we have, as the general outcome of medieval philosophy, the differentiation of categories which in Greek thought add at the beginning of medieval thought were as yet relatively undifferentiated, viz., the categories of transcendence and imman- ence, of feeling or faith and thought, the ideal and the real, etc. This differen- tiation is quite abstract the opposed concepts are viewed simply in their opposi- tion. In this abstractness we have precisely a character of medieval thought as sub- jective and formal. Receiving its content from a foreign source, viz., from religious feeling and authority, medieval thought was chiefly occupied in analyzing and forming - 34 - that content as something independent and above itself; and it could not do other- wise than reach a result contradictory in itself, though not completely negative. In this result of medieval philosophy - a result which may be summed up in the most general terms as the opposition, for thought, of subject and object - we have a fun- damental presupposition for succeeding philosophy, we have, indeed, virtually a statement of the principal problem of modern philosophy, viz., What is the true re- lation of subječt and object? And, we may add, in the three opposed sides of the last stage of Scholasticism we have an anticipation of the paths to be pursued by modern thought in arriving at its peculiar or distinctive goal. Cº.— MODERN PHILOSOPHY- General Character and Main Divisions of Modern Philosophy.'” Modern Philosophy is, in its origin and growth, an organic part of a great human movement extending in time from the Fourteenth and Fifteenth centuries to the very present, and having as its aim or goal the freeing man of the shackles of mere custom, tradition, authority, and the rendering him self-determinative, self-conscious. The external conditions of the rise of modern philosophy, as of modern activity in general - the re-discovery, and so to say, of ancient literature and art, the discovery of the art of printing, of the trans-Atlantic world, of the true relations of the solar system, etc. - are too familiar to need rehearsing at length in this connection. By these things modern philosophy, we shall see, has been deeply influenced. But philosophy, is not entirely moulded by things external to itself, and we must look for a prime condition of the rise and character of modern philºsºphy in the character of the philosophy preceding it. º, - Modern philosophy, in other words, may be regarded as largely a result of a natural reaction of the whole. intellectual nature of man from that state of deep abstraction or of absorption in a partial truth which was characteristic of medieval philosophy; it is, in large measure, purely the result of a spontaneous return to nature and to (*) See the author's History of Modern Philosophy (published by A.C. McClurg & Co., 1892). – 35 - º first principles, to the concrete, the real, the immanent, on the part of the human intellect after prolonged occupation with the non-natural, with the abstract, the un - real, the transcendent; it is a new and original effort of free reflective thought to determine for itself the underlying fundamental truth of things in general. As the work of free reflective thought, it bears a nearer relation to the philosophy of the ancient world than to medieval philosophy with which it is, in tespect to ori- ginality and freedom, in contrast. It differs from ancient philosophy in being, more than that, the product of reflection that has turned inward, upon itself, i.e., , of reflection in the proper sense of the term. In this regard, in fact, modern philo- sophy combines the atti:ibutes of ancient and of medieval philosophy; it is the free objective thought of ancient philosophy qualified by the subjectivity of the medie- val period. That is to say, while the subject of ancient reflection had been pri- marily the objectively real, or being as such, and that of medieval reflection the subjective world (though hypo statized or in a certain sense objectified) the peculiar subject of modern reflection is the relation of object and subject, or knowledge and consciousness as such relation. The precise character of modern thought is not clearly and fully manifesta at its beginning; its opening period is one of transition, of tentative effort, of, in part a return, pure and simple, to older - ancient - forms of doctrine, in part an adaptation of such forms, in part a more or less hypothetical and gemi-poetic enunciation of new ideas. With the dawning of a clear consciousness of its peculiar task, modern philosophy passes into a stage more truly and positively modern. A third period arrives when, after analytic observation and reflection, the modern consciousness, having discovered its moments, seeks to combine them into an organic whole. The precise characters of these periods will, naturally, be more ful- ly discussed hereafter. - First, Thetic, Period of Modern Philosophy. - The first, or opening, Division of modern philosophy is necessarily characterized to a high degree by a negative relation to the philosophy immediately preceding it, i.e. , it is anti-Scholastic, hostile to- wards medieval supersubtlety, otherworldliness, submission to tradition and authority. - 36 - But besides this negative phase of it, there is the positive one that Earl attempt is made to supplant Scholasticism by other forms of thought more accordant with the hu- manistic, scientific, practical spirit of the age. This positive phase assumes three special aspects, in that there are (l) a rehabilitation of ancient systems of thought, (2) an adaptation of older systems to the needs of the new religion, (3) new creative efforts in the spheres of physical and moral philosophy. (1) Among the an- cient systems revived the most conspicuous were the Platonic, or Neo-Platonic, the Aristotelian, and Ciceronian. Leading Platonists were Gemisthus Pletho, Bessarion, Marsilius Ficino, Pico of Mirandola; leading Aristotelians were Gennadius of Con- stantinople, George of trebizona,zavarsii, (an Averroist"paesalpinus and Pomponatius ("Alexandrists"); Ciceronians were Laurentius Walla, Rudolph Agrissie and Ludovicus Wives, Marius Nizolius, Petrus Ramus. Epicureanism had an important representative in Pierre Gassendi. (2) of religious philosophers we may mention in º, connection Melanchthon, and Nicolaus Taurellus, who may be designated as semi-rationalists, and the mystics Sebastian Franck, valentin weigel, Jacob Boehme. Boehme is especially im- portant, because of the strong stimulus his teachings have exercises upon some of the very greatest of modern thinkers. (3) 0f the natural philosophers, forerunners, in part, of the great empiricistic school of modern philosophers, there were Nicolas of Cusa, Paracelsus, Cardanus, Telesius, Patritius, Campanella, vania, Bruns. Of these Bruno is easily chief. Of the moral and political philosophers may be named Mach- iavelli, More, Oldendorp, Hemming, Bodin, Gentilis, Winckler, Grotius, Hooker. Of these Grotius is perhaps best known, while Hooker is in fundamental principles the most philosophical. The present period is, as has been stated, transitional in its char- acter; but it is to be regarded as modern rather than medieval. Philosophy is now no - longer merely auxilliary to theology (the chief philosopher of the period, Bruno, is not even a Christian, but rather an avowed pagan, in sentiment); it lives and flour- ishes as a thing having its own end; it shows a disposition and ability to enter new fields, to assimilate new materials and establish an independent character for itself. - 37 = Further, it is clearly connected with what, on all hands, is allowed to be modern philosophy as such. In the doctrines of these early thinkers, that is to say, we find many anticipations of the philosophy that is to follow, not merely as to in- dividual points but also as to general spirit and method; we find the substance of modern philosophy in a germinal form. In the three aspects of the philosophy in gen- eral of this period we have, in a certain degree, anaapaasn't the three stand- points - rationalistic, intuitionalistic, empiricistic - of the following periods. The elements of the cardinal problem of modern thought as such, as to the sources and limitations of knowledge, are by a number of the thinkers of this opening period broached. Thus, Ludoricus Wives advocates the experimental investigation of nature, i. and Gassendi denies innate ideas and stºrestion to be the original source of all ideas; earanº and Télesius assert that science is a knowledge of causual relations, of fixed laws in nature, Bruno that the method of knowledge is both deductive (with him quasi-mathematical) and inductive (empirical), Campanella that the beginning of all knowledge is the certainty of self (compare Descartes), the po- litical philosophers that political philosophy is governed by rational premises and method, while in the doctrines of the Mystics, and even of the natural philosophers, e.g., Cardanus and Bruno, intuition is especially treated as a valid source of knowl- edge. An exhaustive critical consideration of the problem of knowledge is of course not to be found in this period; but, in one instance at least, that of Bruno, one of the profoundest results of modern reflection is foreshadowed, in that by him the two aposteriori, sides, apriori, and agº, of knowledge are organically identified, by the asser- tion, distinctly made, that thought is nothing if it cannot be "put into the mould of phantasy, and imagination is nothing if not a vehicle of thought" (Compare Kant's "Concepts without percepts are empty, percepts without concepts are blind'). And in this opening period is advanced by more than one of it. leading minds a logico-meta- physical principle, of the first rank, that has been of the utmost consequence in the later periods of modern thought, namely, the principle of the organic unity of oppos- ites. Finally, there is in the present period a common quest - a quest which par- ticularly characterizes universally acknowledged Modern thought as opposed to Scholastic. - 38 - for a method of investigation that shall not merely arrange and verify old or given truth but shall guarantee the discovery of new truth. Of course these anticipations of later thought have not in this period full distinctness and emphasis; they exist in a state of chaotic mºm mixture with other elements. It remains for the changes of succeeding thought to usher them into distinct existence with and make them starting- points of new philosophic evolutions. Second. Analyſis. Period of Modern Philosophy.' General Character and Divisions- In the second period of modern thought - and this, indeed, is what constitutes the character of theperiod as second - the moments or factors of the peculiar problem of modern philosophy become distinguished and each is considered by itself. The most general and conspicuous manifestation of the distinction made lies in the circum- stance that there are three great lines of thought, viz., an empirical, which, in analogy with mere physical science, assumes as the source of knowledge experience, (2) an intuitionalistic, which, in analogy with (natural) relian as a theory, finds the highest , the fundamental, source of knowledge in a power of direct intuition - of ultimate reality, (3) a rationalistic, which, in *** * * *- ence, sees the norm of truth in apriori demonstration. These three lives, it may be noted, correspond to, and were doubtless conditioned in their origin by, the very striking growth of early modern discovery in the provinces of physical science, re- ligious experience, and mathematics. But there is a certain logical, as well as his- torical, meaning in this three-fola division of thought; for if knowledge be divided, on the one hand, into immediate and mediate, and, on the other, into knowledge of sea sible things and of rational things, we have empiricism, as the doctrine of the ori- gin and basis of all knowledge of reality in the immediate ( and mediate) knowledge of sensible things, intuitionalism as the doctrine of the immediate knowledge of the fundamentally real in a direct supersensible perception, and rationalism as the doctrine of the origin and basis of all knowledge in a mediate or demonstrative, cognition of the non-sensible or rational . It was doubtless largely owing to the logical truth of this division that the division became historical. Each of these - 39 - three lines has its peculiar development and result, which, it will be our task to exhibit, in outline. But before entering upon this task one or two preliminary ob- servations will be pertinent. And first, so far as we are aware, no one has as yet given to the intuitive line of thought a distinct place in the history of philoso- phy. But nevertheless, it not only has a sistine loacal existence, but is dis- tinctly marked historically, and requires a separate consideration. Secondly, though it is true in general to say that these lines have distinct, and separate de- velopments, it happens that there are especially near the close of the period here in review, certain blendings of threads from the separate lines, certain tendencies to synthesis, certain impºrtest anticipations of the next following truly synthetic period of modern philosophy. Empiricism. - We take up, first, as, so to say, lying nearest at hand, Empiri- cism, both as a formal method and as - for it is one as well as the other - a meta- physical theory. As a formal method, Empiricism was in its inception pure aposteriº orism, the observation, analysis, comparison of given phenomena. It , for the most - 2e2,…exº~ part, rejected as aids mathematical 4+stinctiºn, hypothesis, and everything else of the sort. But Empiricism as a method underwent 8. certain development in that in time it came to accept the aid of mathematical reasoning and of cautiously framed hypo- thesis. As a metaphysical doctrine Empiricism underwent a development, somewhat as follows: (1) It limited the field of knowledge to phenomena as such, and eschewed entirely that which lies beyond phenomena ( or possible phenomena ) as belonging sole- ly to the province of 'revelation' so-called; a stage of Empiricism which may be as- signated as the premataphysical or quasi-materialistic stage of it. (2) But Empiri- cism came to aspire to the attainment of a knowledge - not absolute perhaps - of that which lies behind phenomena, a knowledge that is of course not direct or "intuitive" (as in the knowledge of phenomena) but indirect or "anonstrative". or, if not "de- monstrative", yet probasis or according to "reasonable judgment" or "hypotheses" the quasi-metaphysical or semi-idealistic, stage of Empiricism. (3) Finally, since Em- piricism supposes a merely mechanical relation between subject and object, knows a - 40 - and so leaves a certain impassable gulf between them, it was forced to deny the pos- sibility of all knowledge of anything besides mere phenomena, the sceptical agnostic or positivistic stage of Empiricism. (1) The high priests, so to say, of ºrian in its first stage are Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes. It is manifestly incorrect to relegate these men (as Erdmann does) to the middle ages. They are both stout antagonists of sensiºn and champions of the new, the distinctively modern spirit. Medieval they may be in their excessive reverence for "Revelation" but in this they do not differ essentially tº any acknowledged modern philosophers. On the other hand, they are indubitably the very corner stones of the Empirical method and spirit so conspicuous and so influential in modern thought generally. As to their doctrines, Bacon and Hobbes agree in the view that the proper sphere of philosophy is the sphere of phenomena. But it may be noted as a formal difference between them that while Ba- con is in his method relatively naive, rejecting for the most part mathematical de- duction and hypothesis, and practically ignores ºveryºne but the external world. Hobbes is somewhat advanced in that (l) he denies to mere experience the name of philosophy, postulating, on the other hand, mathematical or logical influence from certain fixed and defined abstract"first principles" ºtten, however, from exper- ience) to consequences, or in the reverse araction. as the necessary form or method of philosophical thought, and (2) extends the field of application of philosophical method to inner phenomena. The Baconico-Hobbesean Empiricism practically lands in a materialistic view of the universe, - a consequence, so far as Hobbes at least was concerned, distinctly avowed. (2) In the second, quasi-metaphysical, semi-idealistic stage of Empiricism historically viewed, we have as the foremost names those of Locke and Berkeley. In immediate connection with Locke must be taken the leading Lockians in - - - England and in France. English Lockians were: (a) Vincent Perronet, Samuel Bold, Mrs. Cockburn, - defenders of Locke against criticism; (b) John Toland, Matthew Tindal, An- thony Collins, et al – so-called "English Deists"; (c) David Hartley, Joseph Priestly, * ... . associational psychologists. French Lockians were: (a) Montesqueiu, voltaire, Rousseau (Diderot), - Deistic, (b) Condillac, Bonnet, - sensationalists; (c) (Diderot) - 41 - Lamettºrie, Helvetius, Cabanis - Materialists. Though denying "innate ideas" and asserting that knowledge originates in sensation (primarily) and reflection (sec- ondarily) and that it is the wereº of the connection and agreement or dis- agreement and repugnance of any of our ideas" and "grows not from supposed apriori 'maxims" or axioms, nor by hasty hypotheses but from clear, distinct, complete ideas given in experience" - Locke yet undertakes to speak with some aegree of dog- matism of that which is not merely phenomenal, in that he asserts that we have an "intuitive" knowledge of our real selves, a "demonstrative' or "inferential" knowl- edge of God, and a probable knowledge of objects of sense. But Locke says that the relation between the 'primary" or real qualities of bodies, or matter, and the 'secondary" or merely phenomena qualities is inscrutable, and Berkeley, by logical consequence, denies that the so-called primary qualities are any more real (ex- ternal) than the secondary, and affirms, that all that is known or knowable is what is or may be perceived, and that any such thing as a matter independent ºf and is a mere abstraction, the only reality being spirit and its ideas. Thus the (Lockio) Berkeleyan Empiricism resulted in a sort of idealism - which may be denominated ºrism or sensational idealism. In France, Lockeism had consequences more ma- terialistic, became, , indeed, the parent of the purest materialism, in the doctrine of Holbach. In its in general aspect Lockeism in France is very well described as the "Enlightenment." (3) Berkeleyan idealism directly paved the way to the third, sceptical, stage of empiricism, whose chief exponent is David Hume, Hume, applying the method of "experience' strictly, derived from Berkeley's denial of matter a - suggestion for the denial of mind as anything but a mere 'bundle' of subjective impressions or perceptions, and thereby brought empiricism to its logical issue as a theory of knowledge, - which Wąś scepticism. With progress of time Empiricism lost somewhat its purity and associated with itself, or became in certain instances associated with, certain forms of intuitionalism and of rationalism. In this Way as well as in its negative unsatisfactory results, material sm and scepticism, it was preparing to pass into a higher form of truth hereafter to be pointed out. Iºasau- - Intuitionalism has the logical affiliation with Empiricism that, like it, it is on the whole a doctrine of the immediate or direct knowledge of the real; it differs from Empiricism in that for it the real is not (sensible) * or some law of phenomena but rather what lies behind (sensible) phenomena, it is the first negation of Empiricism. It is the affirmation of the possibility (and reality) of immediate consciousness of the hyperphenomenal. It is the direct assertion of the immanent possession by the mind of the substantial and vital truth of the universe. Whether it be the proof of this assertion is perhaps a question - and on this account it may also be a question whether Intuitionalism has real sci- º cannot be denied. This development entific validity. However, this may be, that it has historical **** In- tuitionalism in the second period of modern philosophy is somewhat as follows: (1) It began as a revolt of spontaneous religious feeling and insight against the purely discursive reflection of a decaying Scholasticism, and against mechanico-material- istic philosophy (of Hobbes); and bears a somewhat religious character, becomes a theory of natural, as opposed to revealed, religion. (2) Relaxing in the severity of its tone, it assumes an aesthetic, or, rather, an aesthetico-ethical, phase, becomes the doctrine of a "moral sense' which artinºames the 'right" and the "wrong" as the (aesthetic) taste does the beautiful or the ugly. (3) Assuming a more purely intellectual character it **** rationalistic ethical intui- tionalism. (a) Representatives of Intuitionalism in its first stage are Lord Her- bert of enerary and most, if not quite all perhaps, of the so-called Cambridge Pla- tonists. Lord Herbert maintained distinctly the doctrine that the mind possesses innately a body of apriori universal, necessary, self-evident principles which, be- sides constituting a knowledge of the highest reality, are the foundation of another human knowledge, and particularly the basis of a natural religion that renders the traditional, i.e. the "revealed" religion superfluous. The Cambridge Platonists ad- vocated the doctrine of the mind's participation in the consciousness of the divine no emata, or pure concepts, and its possession thereby of a knowledge independently of that of sense or of discussive feflection - and upon the possession of this conscious- - 43 – ness they founded the doctrine of immortality, God, and immutable morality. (b) As chief representatives of the second historical stage of Intuitionalism we may take Shaftesbury and his close follower Hutcheson. With these men, who, like the Cam- bridge Platonists, are open opponents of the mechani co-materialistic theories of Hobbes, the knowledge of ethical principles is immediate, instinctive, as if given by a special sense - for - the good. With Shaftesbury the 'moral sense' even amounted to an intuitive faculty of discerning the order in general, the harmony, of the uni- verse, the moral or good being but a phase, tº ºn phase, of that harmony. By Hutcheson the conception of the immediate apprehension of truth is carried so far that a possible 'sense' (not, it would seem, dependent in every case upon physical organs) is supposed for every possible class of ideas that we receive independently of the operation of our wills. This is , perhaps, Intuitionalism carried to its extreme. With Shaftesbury and Hutcheson must, to a certain extent at least, be classed Hume and Adam Smith considered as ºrmat. (c) Chief of those representing the third stage of Intuitionalism are Samuel Clarke, Joseph Butler and Richard Price. of these Butler perhaps stands nearest logically to the foregoing. His intuitionalism is es- pecially contained in his doctrine of conscienee as a reflective (as distinguished from a purely sensitive) apprehension of moral truth and tasºa. Butler, it will be seen, attiributes less importance to the emotional and more to the intellective side of 'conscience" than did Shaftesbury and Hutcheson a fact, it should be noted, which had as a consequence a reaction from the purely altruistic doctrine of Shaf- tesbury toward - though not to - the Egoistic doctrine of Hobbes. Clarke's Intui- tionalism, more rationalistic than Butler's, appears in the theory of the immediate ap- zº prehension, by reason of the fitness or adaptations among things according to which * all objects exist and right action must be governed. Price (an admirer of both Butler and Clarke) holds that the mind in reason or understanding (as distinguished from mere moral 'sense') directly apprehends power, space, time, cause as well as right and wrong; and in the more intellectual apprehension of right and Wrong has a sufficient stimulus to the pursuance of the one as well as the avoidance of the - 44 - other. Price did not entirely deny the emotional apprehension of right Hºld wrong. - In the catalogue of Intuitionalists might also be reckoned, to a certain extent, the º so-called English Deists, though it seems on the whole more apprepriate to clas them as quasi-metaphysical empiricists. Empiricism and Intuitionalism as doctrines of "immediate knowledge" have a certain tendency, not indeed to coalesce, but to com- bine with, and to supplement, one another (since to immediate knowledge of the sen- sible merely may well be added a like knowledge of the non-sensible); and where this occurs it is not easy to group individuals in any one class exclusively. Such is the case as regards others besides the Deists. This union of &mpiricism and intuitionalia. seems to point to a higher form of truth than either. In its historical result In- tuitionalism is - as opposed to Empiricism - dogmatic and spiritualistic. Rationalism - Rationalism may technically be described as the negation of Intui- tionalism, and the negation of the negation of Empiricism. It is in a manner the synthesis of the two, the totality of which they are the moments. It aims to arrive at the knowledge of what is not immediately given - the non-sensible - by a process 3-f-knowledge, analogous, as has been stated, to mathematical processes. For ration- º alism, truth lies in concepts rather than in percepts, whether purely sensible or quasi- intellective. By 'demonstrative' apriori processes it will, from certain rational or nonsensible data, evolve the truth contained therein. It will show how from the pos- sible or conceivable world the actual comes to be. It in general assumes, as a start- ing point, the existence of the self as well as the validity of the Mathematicº-logical method. The development of rationalism has three general stages as follows: (l) A stage of what may be termed substantialism, its ruling category being that of sub- stance or fixed static reality; (2) The stage of dynamic causalism and recipro cal- - º - ism, the relative category being that of activity as opposed to merely static being; (3) The stage of (subjective) teleologism. The first of these stages may be described as on the whole pantheistic, the second as monadistic, the third as individualistic. The precise nature and connection of these stages will appear more clearly i. their special treatment. Finally, rationalism developed by the gradual admission into it of Empirical and Intuitional elements; so that at the close of the development it bears a somewhat eclectic character. (a) The representative names for substantialistic rationalism are those of Descartes, Geulincx, Malebranche and Spinoza. (1) starting with the certainty of the individual self, Descartes, through the concept of God as the necessary "primary substance" underlying self and the external world - as the postulate from which by definition and deduction, all else is to be demonstrated - arrives at the existence of God and the external world. He does not completely i- dentify self and the world with the underlying substance, but allows them a certain independence as "secondary substances". In the rationalism of Descartes there en- ters - it may be observed - an element of intuitionalism, in so far as the doctrine of innate ideas is taught, and the existence of the self is viewed as self-evident; also one of scepticism, since with Descartes absolute doubt is the beginning of true philosophy. (2) By Geulincx the way is prepared for the more complete identificatiºn of the external world and self, of extension and thought. According to Descartes, there is no direct interaction between independent substances. dealine, therefore explains the apparent intercourse between mind and matter, thought and the external world, by the intervention of God between the two, His concourse with them in every act of per- ception or of volition, the celebrated doctrine of Occasionalism. (3) But this lo- gically leads to the complete subsumption of mind and matter under the one real ºut- stance God, in the doctrines of Malebranche and of Spinoza, respectively assicaea, º and logico-rationalistic in cast. (b) Representative names for the second, causal- istic , monadic, stage of rationalism are those of Leºnit. and Wolff. Leibnitz sees in the doctrine of substantialism pantheistic materialism, in which there is no place for a principle of activity, and of synthetic individuality. He undertakes to rectify the doctrine; and, while retaining in name the category of substance, he so defines substance (viz., as 'action') as to introduce a new and higher category, that of dynam- is causality. He does not, any more than Descartes, admit real interaction of sub- stances but he introduces a certain ideal interaction in that he conceives all finite individual substances (for activity implies individuality), all monads, as harmonized - | - 46 - together in the representational activity of a single monad of monads. (Hence the ºwº is not one of pure individualism as sometimes represented). Something approaching real system ºleibnitzian theory in the development of it by Wolff. But though the (reciproc- (ity enter: monads of the Leibnitzo-Wolffian theory are not determined from without, they are(the nevertheless in a certain sense necessarily determined inasmuch as each state of a given monad follows a given other and precedes a third according to a predestined or necessary connection; so that the theory is one of Determinism. This theory, like that of Descartes, only in greater degree, has intuitional and even empirical elements. In connection with *. Wolff and their followers (G.B. Bilfinger, Alex. Baum- garten, G. F. Meier, J. H. Lambert and others) it is convenient to consider fore- runners (of Wolff) as Tschirnhausen, Thomasius, and critics, as Buddeus, Crusius, Daries, et al. (c) In the third stage of rationalism we find, displacing the determin- ism of Leibnitz, a teleologism in the subjective humanistic sense - the categories o: cause and reciprocity pass into that of self-eonsciousness or self-conscious end. More truly than the foregoing stage is this last stage of rationalism individualistic non-pantheistic. Representative thinkers of this stage are Samuel Reimarus, Nicolas Tetens, and especially, Moses Mendelsohn and the great Lessing. For these thinkers the "proper study of mankind is Man's human freedom, human immortality, human happines. 3.1°3 the objects of highest consideration, and are , properly speaking, the end of creation, the supreme end in the great universe of providentially determined ends. Formally viewed, rationalism in this it 3 last stage has a decidedly Eclectic character; it is in part intuitionalistic and empiricistic (the latter owing to Lockean influence on the Continent); it is emotionalistic as well as intellectualistic or mathematico- logical, and, finally, instead of being merely a philo spphy for thinkers as such, tends to become a popular philosophy. (It may be compared not so much perhaps with the an- cient Sophistic philosophy as with that individualistic philosophy following the uni- versalistic philosophy of Plato and Aristotle which in its turn is paralleled by the encyclopedic philosophy of Leibnitz). In its general tenor and results, as in its starting-point, rationalism holds a place between Empiricism and Intuitionalism, it is neither wholly sceptical nor wholly dogmatic, but inclines to be critical. - 47 - Third, Synthetic, Period of Modern Philosophy; its General Character and laim Divisions. - while, as we have seen, the Second Period of Modern Philosophy was char- acterized by certain attempts at synthetic forms of doctrine, it was, upon the whole, without the proper standpoint for a really synthetic combination of the opposing mo- ments of the highest philosophic truth. It is the possession of such a standpoint that of necessity constitutes the fundamental attribute of the newſ, third, period of modern philosophy historically viewed. This period supplies the required standpoint in that, instead of regarding knowledge as merely a reception of something 'given", it views it as an active process the essence of which is the relating of the parts of the - sine qua non "given" to one another (even as a condition of their being 'given") and bringing them into a concrete whole. The proof of the essentially active synthetic nature of all knowledge, consciousness, or experience was furnished in particular by the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, though other thinkers, as Reid in Scotland and DeBiran in France, early understood the spontanéous synthetic nature of intellection. As regards the forms of doctrine that prevailed in the period preceding him, Kant showed that Em- piricism and Rationalism were, in the very nature of experience as being constituted by the combined activity of sense and understanding, organically related, and not really true in themselves or abstractly taken. That Kant did for Intuitionalism what he did for the other two of the forms of philosophical doctrine of the Second Period can hardly be said (as is evidenced by the fact that Intuitionalism in the doctrine of Jacobi, became one of the first and strongest opponents of his theory of knowledge as such.) He simply denied the existence in us of a faculty of direct intuitive per- ception of a real existence not given in sensation, a denial that was to a certain extent arbitrary and was sufficiently met by the opposite assertion which was repeat- edly made by contemporaries and successors of his. In consequence of the general cogency of the Kantian demonstration as to the nature of experience as such it rol- fowed that the old forms of doctrine could not survive entirely unmodified but must, even when striving to be independent, be tinged, in a greater or less degree, with the hue of the new doctrine, i.e. Kartian criticism, and must conséquently draw nearer to – 48 - one another in character and, to a certain extent, appear as but differently accenta ated forms of the one synthetic doctrine. With this understanding, ve retain the names of the three chief forms of doctrine of the Second Period. Since Kant's *- diation of the old standpoints was a mediation from the standpoint of the subject rather than of the object the new standpoint has an apriori character, the new me- diating doctrine is a form of rationalism in the broad sense of the term. We have, then, in the new as in the old period, the true cardinal forms of doctrine: Empiri- cism, Intuitionalism, and Rationalism. As the distinctive character of this period is supplied chiefly by (critical) rationalism it wºuld seem to be in logical order to begin the account of the period with the treatment of that form of philosophic doctrine. Practically, however, it appears best - more in accordance with the logic of the history of Modern philosophy as a whole - to take tºp the two older forms of doctrine first, inasmuch as they are in their actual representatives largely mere survivals of or from a past period. We shall, then, take up, first, ºries, sº- ona, Intuitionalism, and lastly Rationalism. - - Empiricism: The Empiricism of this peridd may be said to have the following stages of development: (1) a stage in which, sufficiently certain of itself as sen- sationalism, utilitarianism, materialism, it pursues its way wninfluenced by other forms of doctrine; (2) a stage in which it examines into the grounds of the knowl- edge and shows a tendency to pass beyond narrowly sensational, utilitarian and ma- terialistic limits; (3) a stage in which it constructively expands and seeks to em- brace and to found on its own basis forms of theory opposed to it. Empiricism as a moment of a wider doctrine has had in the present period a large acceptance. As an exclusive doctrine, or by itself it has also has numerous adherents, chief of whom are perhaps the following, grouped with reference to three stages above given: (l) James Mill, Jeremy Bentham, Melchior asſa, Ludwig reserbach, Carl Vogt, Louis Büchner, Heinrich Czolbe; (2) Comte, John stuart Mill, Ferrari, Franchi, Dühring; (3) Lewes, Spencer, Strauss. (l) of James Mill and Bentham it is perhaps sufficient here to say that they attempted to found, the one a psychology (associational), the other an Ethics (utilitarian) which belong in spirit to the second period of modern philosophy, though their influence in the present period makes it impossible to re- legate them to the preceding; and Vogt, Büchner and, in part, Feuerbach simply re- habilitate the Fighteenth Century materialism of France. cºlve represents the more advanced mechanical materialism of the present century. (2) comte laid down the principles and limits of Empiricism as positive knowledge, or knowledge of phen- omena solely . He was followed in his teachings by J. S. Mill, who, however, shows a certain tendency to abandon the Empirical standpoint in that he recognizes the inexplicability of the Ego in merely sensationalist principles. Indeed both an and Comte offer a certain curious contrast to the other mechanical thinkers, Ben- tham, James Hill, et al., since they show a leaning to 'Mysticism," not to say trans- cendentalism (Dºhring is a assario of Comte and lili). The Italians Ferrari and Franchi reached the positivistic standpoint by the path of the ‘antian Critique of Pure Reason, and may be taken as a sort of evidence of the strength of the Empirical moment in Kantian criticism as well as representatives of Positivism. (3) In the theories of Spencer and Lewes Fºmpiricism attempts to explain genetically by the principles of physical "evolution' those fundamental concepts and impulses of man which both rationalism and intuitionalism are wont to assume as the preconditions of all or any experience whatever, and thereby seeks to render rationalism and in- tuitionalism superfluous theories. Strauss is an Evolutionalist who does not dis- card entirely teleological considerations. In the third period, as in the second, Empiricism has often tended to Scepticism or Agnosticism. In the theory of Spencer, there is to be found, beside the agnostic element referred to, a tendency to (Scotch) Intuitionalism. In the doctrine of Lewes there are reminiscences of German idealism. Intuitionalism - The Intuitionalism of the third modern period, though histor- ically and logically continuous with that of the second, differs from it in being more distinctly conscious of the forms of doctrine opposed to it, and therefore in asserting itself more positively with relation to such forms; it also differs from that of the second in being on the whole less purely realistic and more idealistic. - 50 - It had its stimulating cause in the startling results of the Humian' Scepticism. In opposition to these the Scotch Metaphysicians - the chief originators and represen- tatives of Intuitionalistic doctrine in this period - asserted as intuitively or im- mediately known fact all that Hume had denied as to our knowledge of wººl. Intuitionalism appears not only in Scotland, its birthplace, one may say, but in France in Italy, and in Germany. It suffered various modifications by being blended or com- bined in these countries with other forms of philosophical doctrine, in particular with German transcendentalian, spread throughout Europe. (a) In scotland its prin- cipal exponents were the well-known philosophers Reid, Stewart, Brown, Hamilton. The two first named of this group were Intuitionalists of the ºr co-realistic type Brown was sceptically inclined, though attributing to "criticism" all that Hume had attributed to mere custom or experience. Hamilton turned in some respects toward the position of Reid but blended transcendental (Kantian) with intuitionalist concepts. Curiously enough, while Intuitionalism took its rise in an antagoniº to scepticism, it shows, especially in the Hamiltonian form of it, a large moment of agnosticism. (b) In France, Intuitionalism, chiefly of the Scotch pattern, had a very notable following. Leading French Intuitionalists were, Maine de Biran, Pierre Laromiguiere, Royer Col- lara, jourtrºy, Victor Cousin and his numerous disciples. (l) bearan (who was more independent of the Scotch Intuitionalists than were the othere of this group), antag- onizing the sensationalism of Condillac, as Reid and Kant had antagonized that of Hume, held that we have a direct intuitive knowledge of our substantive selves as - will or positive activity and not mere receptivity. He was in this followed by Lar- omiguiere. (2) Royer Collard and Jouffrey were content * * mere reproduction of the theories of ºne ºries-realistie seaten Intuitionalists. (3) Cousin develops Intuitionalism by the addition of elements borrowed from German transcendentalism, with the substantial gain of the advantage of knowing act only that we, the external world, God are, but also what all these things are, and their necessary interrelations. (c) In Italy (Scotch) Intuitionalism appears in combination with other forms of philosophical teaching, particularly German transcendentalism. The chief names in - 51 - this connection are those of Galuppi (who stands in much the same relation to sen- sationalism in Italy as Reid and DeBiry: do to it in Scotland and France respectively) Rosmini, Mamiani. (d) Intuitionalism forms a conspicuous element in the thought Of - a considerable number of German philosophers, e.g., Herder, Jacobi, Fries, Beneke; but it seems more fitting to treat these men rather in connection with the German transcendentalistic movement than in this place. Rationalism - The great rationalistic movement of this period had its outward conditions - to speak first o: these - in such momentous occurrences as the first of the French Revolutions (1791-1815), the so-called Romantic movement in literature and art, and the wonderful advance of natural science during the past century. It was during the period of the Revolution that the great leaders of the movement, Kant in part excepted, were constructing or evolving their systems; and it is not difficult to point out definite correspondences between different stages of the Revolution and different systems, or even different parts of the same systems of thought contempor- aneous with the Revolution. One may very well affirm, for example, that the system of Kant and Fichte correspond with the Republican, that of Schelling with the Im- perial, that of Hegel with the Restorational period of the Revolution; or that the earlier thought of Hegel corresponded to the Republican, the later to the Restora- tional sentiment of the Revolution, while that between the two reflects more or less the Imperial. correspondences between philosophical systems and the developments in science in this century might as easily be named, e.g. , that between Schelling's sys- tem of Iaentity and discovery in Electio-Magnetism. But no real student of this period of philosophy would, because of such correspondences, feel inclined to deny that the rationalism of this period is one of the most original thought products of the period or which the world has ever seen or is ever likely to see. The philosophic system of no one of the leaders in the rationalistic movement can be regarded as a mere trans- cript of external conditions corresponding to the movement. Each of these systems in - is, a true, a vital sense, a self-determined fact, an original contribution to the his- A. - tory of mankind. Originality, self-determinedness is precisely a very conspicuous attribute of the movement of thought now under notice. The materials or the stimulus - 52 - derived by the Master-thinkers of this movement from external sources, and even from the history of philosophy reappears in their work transformed, synthetically wrought into new, ideal, creations. In accordance with distinctions which we have already made, we may make three varieties of rationalism, viz., pure (so to say rationalistic) rationalism, intuitional rationalism, and empiricistic rationalism. In the specimens's that we have of intuitionalistic rationalism, it seems best to treat this form of rationalism as a moment in the development of pure rationalism. The treatment of Empiricistic rationalism will, for obvious historical reasons, follow that of pure rationalism. Pure Rationalism - Pure rationalism has to be treated under the three heads of (l) Critical rationalism, or Criticism, (2) Intuitional rationalism, the so-called Faith-Philosophy, and (3) Absolute rationalism, or absolute idealism. A - critical Rationalism or criticism - criticism undertakes to exhibit in a true light the constituent elements of experience in general in their synthetic relations. In the theoretical sphere, it will unite, or synthesize sense with url- derstanding (in the notion of the 'synthetic unity of apperception'); in the prac- tical sphere, the conceptions of duty, freedom and virtue with their opposites pleasure, necessity, and happiness; in the sphere of judgment, individual feeling, as to the beautiful and the sublime with objectivity, mechanical law with the no- tion of ana. But it leaves the question of the nature of the sense element in ex- perience problematic, makes the reconsulation of duty and pleasure, etc., possible only in a never-ending process, treats the concept of end as having validity only as filling a subjective need, a need of merely ‘reflective judgment'. Thereby it acquires a subjective character, becomes critical subjective idealism. Of critical subjective idealists there are, besides the founder of Criticism as above just s sketches, namely, Kant and the direct followers of Kant (of whom Schiller is, per- haps, the most important) also certain Critics and Emendators of Kantism, who oc- cupy in a sense the critical standpoint. Of these we distinguish two general classes, comprising (l) those who develop the Kantian doctrine with transcendental aspect and bearing, and (2) those who undertake, rather, an empirical or a quasi- - 53 - empirical interpretation and extension of that doctrine. The former, as seeming to stand the nearer to Kant, we take up first. (1) In this class fall Reinhold, with his critics, and Richte and his followers - Reinhold sought to * (* Kant had assumed merely), the 'one-stemmedness of the faculty of knowledge, and the fact of the thing-in-itself, (as cause of sensation) being outside conscious- ness. His critics Schulze, Maimon and Beck got rid entirely of the thingi-in-itself and directly prepared the way thereby for the doctrine of Fichte. Fichte, criti- cizing and logically trounding the theoretical philosophy of Kant by transcenden- tally deducing and organizing into a system the categories, finds the kernel of all truth in the pactical reason, so that the real is for him the ideal and not in any sense the merely biven". Fichte's follºwers, particularly Schlegel, carried his subjectivism to the highest possible extreme, introducing as a result a ten- dency of the doctrine tº pass into its opposite. Indeed even in Fichte's own hands his doctrine underwent a change in the direction indicated for he issued it in an- other form, in which we find recognized a suppressed objective ºnent that saw was at first for Fichte merely a name for the moral order of the world, has an ack- nowledged substantial being as that of which the moral order is but a manifestation. By Schlegel, and Schleiemacher also, the earlier form of Fichtian doctrine was dis- carded for doctrines less purely subjective. With Fichte, in the later form of his doctrine, may be classed seasºnauer with his theory of the will as the essence of all that appears. (2) of those critics and emendators of pure Kantism who incline to an empiricistic criticism or interpretation of experience as such we may mention (a) Bouterwek, Krug, Hermes, Bolzano, (b) Fries and Beneke, (c) Herbart. Of these three groups the first may perhaps be described as the more realistic, the second º the more idealistic (since they discarded the thing-in-itself), was Herbart ex- hibits a peculiar combination of realistic and idealistic elements. All these menº belong to a class of thinkers who, adversely affected towards the development of Kantism in its transcendental aspect by the Fichtbans and 4 as and aa ia aaa-a-aallasi-toº-ººs-idealism—later Tº 7 ºf 7 - T- º --- ----- - 54 - later idealists "returned" to Kant and sought, so to say, a ballast for pure ideal- ism in a consideration of the "facts of consciousness" ºn their own account . Upon these facts as a basis and alone upon them, they hoped for the construction of a substantial edifice of philosophic truth. The philosophy of these men, as opposed to the transcendental reduction of the Fichtian philosophy may be styled a philo- sophy of mere 'reflection'. Bonterwekº - to go a little into specification - found evidence of external reality in the feeling of resistance. Fries, ignoring the "thing-in-itself' asserted that philosophy must be psychical anthropology or enºir- ical psychology, and, eschewing the search for super sensible reality, found the - highest attitude of thought in that of faith and presentiment; Herbert viewed phil- osophy as the elaboration of concepts derived from the matter given in sensation, and admitted metaphysics s (as a doctrine of super sensible reality) for the behoof, of the explanation of phenomena as such, though he conceived God merely as object of aes- thetico-teleological judgment, as did “ant in his Critique of Judgment. B - Intuitionalistic Rationalism - As the natural counterpart of the critical rationalism (or subjective idealism) just reviewed, we find what may be termed the "intuitional rationalism" of the so-called Faith-Philosophy. This philosophy, in answer to the Kantian aerial of a theoretical knowledge of anything beyond mere phenomena, asserted a knowledge by direct, intuitional perception - by "faith" of the reality or existence (though not of the nature) of objects corresponding to our con- cepts of the self, the world and God. This doctrine may be viewed as a sort of realism, though one quite distinct in kind from that naïve realism which takes the world, just as sensibly perceived, to be actual, without inquiring as to the grounds of this belief. This realism is a sort of idealism as well; it was to a certain ex- tent based upon the idealistic presuppositions and results of the Kantian criticism. The leading names in this connection are those of Hamann (mystic) Herder (empiricistic) Jacobi (critico-sceptical). Jacobi (to speak in particular of him only, as the Chief of the "Faith Philosophers') accepted Kant's demonstration of the limited application of the categories of the understanding, and taught the impossibility of demonstrating a - 55 - the existence of a God above the world from data supplied by the sensibly limited un- derstanding, and, in fact, of demonstrating (i.e. mediating) the existence of God in any sense. But Jacobi refused to follow Kant in his ascription to the ideas of God the World, and the Soul a merely regulative application; on the contrary, he asserted, as has been said, a direct, intuitive perception by reason (as contradistinguished to understanding) of the reality (not merely the ideality) of God, the world and the Soul. It may be observed that the intuitionalistic teachings of Jacobi considerably in- fluenced the course of rationalistic thought-development. c. Absolute Rationalism, or Absolute Idealism - Absolute Rationalism had its basis and beginning in the Schellingian doctrine of the identity of Opposites (of subject and object, mind and nature.) This position was arrived at as a result of a natural reaction against the Fichtian unceremonious absorption of object in subject; combined with a certain impulse received by sensuing from special studies in the metaphysics of natural science and in the naturalistic substantialism of Spinoza. But the doctrine of the *dentity or Inarrºrenes of Opposites is as such only the beginning, the (re- latively neutral basis of absolute rationalism. It was, logically, followed by certain (one-assa) specifications or specializations of it - a naturalistic specification, and 3. mystical or theosophic; and which in turn were followed by more purely rationalistic ones in which was sought a reconciliation of the naturalistic and the theosophistie, the mere objective and the more subjective elements of the total problem. (l). In the system of Identity as originally propounded, sensuing, starting with the Fichtian ideal- ian, sought to restify the error or incompleteness of that idealism by admitting the objective side of thought to its full rights as co-ordinate with the subjective; the unity of the tº in their polar relation he took as the category of indifference or as reason regarded as the indifferent ground and source of an oppositions whatever. of this theory there were many adherents, chief among them Mklein, G. F. Ast, B. K. Blasche, A. C. A. Eschenmayer, G. H. Schubert, C. H. Windischmann, F. 3. Molitor, J. J. Wagner, I. P. W. Troxler. (2) (a) A naturalistic specification of the System of Identity occurs in the Natur-philosophic of Lorenz Oken, in which, of course, - 56 - objective element of thought is emphasized, somewhat at the expense of the subjective. (b) In the later doctrines of Schelling himself (his "Roctrine of Freedom" and his "Positive Philosophy') in that of Heinrich Steffens, and especially in that of Franz Baader, the subjective element is brought to the front and the principle of Identity appears in a character air. antithetical to that which it has in the philosophy of Oken, viz., in that of a highly mystical, theosophical statement of truth, a statement which, so far at least as Schelling and Baader are concerned, virtually had its real source in the philosophy of the prince of modern mystics, Jacob Boehme. (3) The purely rationalistic reconciliation of the subjective and objective elements of the problem implied in the postulate of the Identity of Opposites was, in different man- ners and degrees, given in the great systems of K. C.F. Krause and G.W.F. Hegel, as a sort of prelude to which may be taken the philosophy of C. W. Solger. (a) In the philosophy of Solger the content of the system of Identity begins to take on a dia- lectical or technically speculative form, a form the principle of which is that truth is the unity of opposites. While maintaining that philosophy begins with tº ºr inner experience, Solger lays chief stress upon method, which in his view is 'dia- logue" regarded as dialectic appearing in a "living form'. (b) In the philosophy of Krause subject and object in their various stages are joined and distinguished ac- cording to strict rules of method but of a method that is perhaps rather too objec- tive as that of Solger is rather too subjective. The formally objective character of the method of Krause lies in the fact that his categories, instead of being perfect- ly fluent, and interactive one with another, seem to require, to a certain extent, mechanically to be brought together and separated. But in spite of this, there pre- wails in Krause" thought the impulse to bring into union the moments of every con- crete unity, to establish true really synthetic propositions. (c) It is probably in the system of Hegel, among those belonging to the general class of "Systems of Iden- tity", that is to be found the most perfect embodiment of a true philosophical content in a strictly methodical form. The method of Hegel has this distinguishing attribute, that it consciously is, or aims to be, a method growing out of, and yet, in turn, de- - 57 - termining, its content, and so being that content in another form. Its essence lies in the recognition of the different or negative as springing out of and returning into identity, and vice versa. (A conception, it may be observed, of which the Spencerian 'instability of the homogeneous" is a certain, ºpertº, sºrºrº The fluency, as we may term it, of the Hegelian action and the vital relation of this method to its content, confer upon the System of Identity as it left the hands of Schelling (where it had a relatively static character) a new nature, that is, it in- fuses into it the life of thought, spiritualizes it, distinctly subordinating the substantialistic side of it, so that the System is no longer one of mere indifferent identity but of concrete identity of opposites, an identity comprising in itself me- gativity. In connection with Hegel may (briefly) be considered the Hegelian 'school" or "schools". According to a natural, well-known dialectic, the disciples of Hegel divided into opposed parties or schools - a division probably to be attributed rather to differences in one-sided personalities than to radical inconsistencies in the doc- trine of the Master - known respectively as radical, "left-wing" Hegelians, who gave a one-sidedly rationalistic and even in some instances, a purely naturalistic - even individualistic interpretation of Hegel's teaching, conservative, "right-wing". Hegel- ians, whose interpretation of Hegel's teaching conformed to the traditional orthodox spiritualistic view of thought in general, moderate Hegelism forming the "centre," who held or attempted to maintain an intermediate position. To the neº-ºng” belong Strauss, renerbach, stirner, Schmidt and others; to the "right" Goeschel, cabler, - Erdmann, et al; to the "centre" Rosenkranz, achelot, Watke and others. wºrleºtie Rationman, or Ideal-Realism - Owing to the break-down (real or supposed) of pure rationalism, evidenced by , for example, the split in the 'Hegelian School", and to the brilliant success of the labors of natural scientists in the great fields of possible discovery, and perhaps to other important events, there has o C- curred, and been in progress ever since pure ratiânalism flourished, a certain reaction against the great idealistic movement culminating, say, in the System of Hegel, and attempts have been made to bring the results of philosophic speculation or reflection - º into nearer relation to the realistic branches of knowledge generally. The philoso- phers of this reaction assumed the titles of Ideal-Realists and Ideal-Realism for themselves and their philosophy. This reaction did not entirely repudiate meta- physics but sought to strengthen its foundations by realistic elements. But by the side of the law of mechanical cause and effect, which it admitted absolutely to rule as such, it asserted, not, perhaps, in a dogmatic, but in an ethical, spirit the law of final end. The reaction does not represent a new advance in the region of pure con- cepts, a new logico-metaphysical advance, so much as the felt need in the ideal system of philosophy of reducing as nearly as possible to the transparency and simplicity of pure principles, or to * * of pure self-consciousness, the entire realm of given fact or of phenomena. Leading philosophers participating in this movement are the Germans I. H. Fients, Portlage, carriere, Georg, chalytaea. Trendèlenburg, Ulrici, Lange, Fechner, Van Hartmann, Lotze; to whom should perhaps be added the Britains Whewell, Ferrier and T. H. Green. Of the men here named, Von Hartmann, Techner and Lotze show most distinctly in their doctrines the influence of the study of empiri- cal science. Fechner and Van Hartmann *** of the theory of Evolution, though not in the merely mechanical sense, for they , as are the isemi-semiº generally, are teleologists in doctrine. Lotze (who, all things considered, is the most note- worthy of the ideal-Realists) conceives the universe as the expression of the energy of free personality rather than as the realization of the idea of law as such. Whe- well, Ferrier and Green may be said to form a connecting link between ºnglish ºpir- cism and German Rationalism. Conclusion:. It is proper to say, in conclusion, that our task was not undertaken in ignorance or unmindfulness of the delicacy and difficulty in general of the matter of making proper division of any given subject. Division is, of necessity, always relative; it implies a certain continuity of what is supposed divided. Particularly is this true in case the subject divided be an organic whole, or be so viewed. Or- ganic connection is a connection such that, while parts are distinguishable, they must not be treated as entirely separable, they have a continuity one with another that must = 59 - be observed or the whole is lost. In the present work the endeavor has been to dis- tinguish clearly the natural divisions of the history of thought regarded as an or- ganic whole, and, at the same time, to avoid arbitrary separation of such divisions, to make clear the points of transition and the grounds of transition from one period to another. The triplicity in division which prevails in our treatment of our sub- ject and which, because of its regular recurrence might seem to give the treatment an arbitrary character, grows out of the fact that we have regularly sought, in accord- ance with the nature of thought-development as explained above (p. 5) to distinguish the two most general phases of thought - that of particularity and that of universality, or the naturalistic and the spiritualistic - and their harmony or synthesis. Tri- partite division is a familiar phenomena in the natural or physical organic realm; it is not less common but even more common (though not generally observed) in the sphere of thought. We have sought to avoid seeing this form of division when it is not really implied in the subject matter to be derived. But though satisfied of the substantial correctness of the principle of division which we have followed, we cannot assume to have been so fortunate as to overcome completely the difficulty of bringing in every instance the given matter under the principle; individuals are as such of a more or less arbitrary character. ve Cºan only trust that our groupings or classifications are on the whole correct, and that none of them are absolutely confusing or misleading. *G -0-0- - ） - - º º |× №.